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ELEMENTS
O F
MORAL PHILOSOPHY
ELEMENTS
O F
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
BY THE
REV. R. H. RIVERS, D.D.
EDITED BY THOMAS 0. SUMMERS, D. D,
NasfjbtlU, Cenn.:
PUBLISHED BY A. H. BEDFORD, AGENT,
FOR THE M. E. CHURCH, SOUTH.
1872.
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1871, by
A. H. BEDFORD, AGENT,
in the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED AT T1IE SOUTHERN METHODIST PUJif.lSIHNU HOUSE,
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE.
CONTENTS.
PART I.
THEORETICAL ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
STATEMENT OE THE SUBJECT.
PA33
Definition, of Moral Philosophy—Difference between Moral and
Mental Philosophy—Subjects embraced in the philosophy of
duty—Divisions of Moral Philosophy 25
CHAPTER II.
MORAL LAW.
SECTION I.—Wayland's definition: its defects—The difference
betwec-n moral and physical law—Correct definition of moral
law—God the establisher—Attributes of moral law......... 28
(v)
vi CONSENTS.
PAGE
SECTION II.—Retribution — Definition—Universality of the
idea—Coleridge—Cousin—Theory of natural consequences :
objections to it—Theory that it is always administered for the
sake of reformation: objections to it—True theory 33
CHAPTER III.
MOBAE AGENCY.
SECTION I.—'Requisites of moral agency—Intellect: why re-
quisite—Sensibilities: argument to show they are needed—
Classification of sensibilities—Appetites : true doctrine of the
appetites - 37
SECTION II.—Propensities, or desires: classification—Desire
of life: its nature, universality, design, moral character, con-
nection with Christianity—Desire of knowledge : its nature
and design—Desire of property—Desire of power—Desire of
esteem: its universality: the effect of recklessness—Desire of
society: its design—Desire of imitation: its universality:
caution to parents—Desire of happiness: importance of this
principle 43
SECTION III.—The affections: difference between affections
and propensities—Classification—Their general design 48
SECTION IV.—Conscience: arguments to prove the existence
of a natural conscience—Objections stated and answered—
Finney's analysis of conscience—Etymology of the word—
Functions of conscience—Supremacy of conscience—Error to
be avoided 49
SECTION V.—Erroneous views of conscience—President Ma-
han's view—Objections to this view—Theory of the Rev. Hub-
CONTENTS. VII
PAGB
bard Winslow—Objections to this theory—Concluding reflec-
tions on the conscience 68
SECTION VI.—The will: definition of the will—Freedom of the
will—Arguments to establish its freedom—Opinions of cele-
brated writers—Importance of the doctrine—Fatalism runs
into atheism—Quotation from Fichte—Strength of the will—
Its capacity for good or evil—Cultivation of the will—The
doctrine of motives... 74
SECTION VII.—Light: its sources—The light of nature—The
light of revelation 86
CHAPTER IV.
MORAL OBLIGATION.
Definition of moral obligation—Foundation of moral obliga-
tion—True theory given and established—Conditions of ob-
ligation—Extent of obligation—Belief—Principles—Habits—
Intentions 97
CHAPTER V
MORAL CONDUCT.
SECTION I,—Definition of moral conduct—Theory of morals—
Mandeville's theory : objections—Wollaston's theory: objec-
tions to Wollaston's theory—Hume's theory: objections to
Hume—Selfish theory: arguments against the selfish system—
Theory of disinterested benevolence: objections—Theory
of sympathy: objections 117
Vlii CONTENTS.
PAGE
SECTION II.—True theory of morals—Virtue defined—Insepar-
able from the agent—When it shines most brightly—Hope of
reward and fear of punishment, characteristics of virtue—
Arguments to prove the theory true 137
SECTION III.—Criteria of moral conduct 115
CHAPTER VI.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
SECTION I.—Moral government—Physical government—Evid-
ences of physical government—Evidences of moral govern-
ment—Analysis of moral government—Necessity of moral
government 148
SECTION II.—God the moral governor—Arguments to estab-
lish this 151
SECTION III.—God's right to rule—By what established—What
is implied in this right 153
CONTENTS.
IX
PART II.
PEACTIOAL ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
DUTIES TO GOD.
PAGE
SECTION I.—Internal duties : To know God—Confidence—IIu-
mility— Reverence — Godly fear—Dependence—Love—Self-
consecration 157
SECTION II.—Outward duties: Prayer—Prayer defined—What
it presupposes—Natural views—Scriptural views—Different
kinds of prayer — Private prayer — Family prayer—Public
prayer—Posture in prayer—Arguments for and against forms
of prayer—Efficacy of prayer—Objections answered—Rcflcc-
tions 164
SECTION III.— Sabbath—Original Sabbath—Paley's theory:
objections to Paley's theory—True theory—Mosaic Sabbath—
Christian Sabbath—Day changed—Proof that it is obligatory—
How to be kept 172
CHAPTER II.
PERSONAL ETHICS.
SECTION I.—Self-protection—The principle of self-defence—
Arguments in favor of self-defence—Objection answered—
Self-injury to be avoided—Maiming—Torture—Suicide 188
1*
X CONTENTS.
PAGE
SECTION II.—Self-government: Control of the appetites—Sin
of becoming slaves to the appetites—Control of the passions—
Anger—Pride and vanity—Envy—Covetousness 187
SECTION III. — Self-culture—Physical culture: Diet—Exer-
cise—Dress—Cleanliness—Culture of the mind : Energy—
Perseverance — System—Moral culture: Pursuit of know-
ledge—Cherishing the sense of obligation—Obedience to con-
science — Self-examination—Repentance—Putting principles
into practice 195
CHAPTER III.
HUMAN ETHICS.
SECTION I.—Justice: definition—Justice to person forbids
mutilation—Destruction of life: horrors of the crime of mur-
der—Duelling: arguments against it 206
SECTION II.—Justice as it respects character—Definition of
character—Perfection the standard—What justice requires—
The guilt of injuring character 210
SECTION III.—Justice as it respects reputation—Reputation
defined—Circumstances in which it maybe lowered—Slander: .
its turpitude 214
SECTION IY.—Justice as it respects property—Definition of
the right of property—IIow the right of property is acquired—
The various ways in which it is violated—Fraud—Theft—Rob-
bery—Rules that should govern buyer and seller 220
SECTION V.—Justice as it regards belief—What is meant by
CONTENTS. xi
PAGE
justice in reference to belief—Veracity—Logical truth—Moral
truth—Paley's theory : objection to Paley's theory 227
SECTION VI.—Sincerity and fidelity—How sincerity is vio-
lated — Self-aggrandizement — Self-abasement — Flattery—
Hypocrisy—Mental reservation—Equivocation—Exaggeration
and extenuation—False impressions—Ignorant assertions—
Lying—Promises: when not binding—Contracts 234
SECTION VII.—-Oaths: The judicial oath—Official oath—Legal-
ity of oaths—The philosophy of oaths—Perjury: its turpi-
tude 241
SECTION VIII.—Benevolence: positive duties which we owe
to man—Proofs that we should perform those duties 246
SECTION IX.—The proper objects of benevolence—The poor—
Sick—Unfortunate—Afflicted—Ignorant—Depraved 249
SECTION X.—Benevolence to the injurious—The doctrine of
forgiveness—What the law requires—Benevolence to those
who are slandered—Manner of bestowing benevolence 253
CHAPTER IV.
POLITICAL ETHICS
SECTION I.—Necessity of human government—Ownership of
property—Title of property to be adjudicated—Bible view of
civil government—Objections to human government—Objec-
tions answered 2-57
SECTION II.—The different forms of government—Advan-
tages of a republican government—When preferable—The
rights and obligations of government—Revolution 262
PAGE
SECTION III. — The different departments of government:
legislative, judicial, executive—The constitution that governs
all—The British and American constitutions compared—The
duties of the legislator—Of the judge and jury—Of the ex-
ecutive 272
SECTION IV.—Crimes and punishments—Difference in crimes—
Legal crimes—Moral crimes—Capital punishment—Arguments
in its favor—When it may be inflicted—How to secure the
administration of justice 279
SECTION V.—Duties of citizens—Obedience—Voting—Union—
Intelligence and virtue—Developing resources — Defence—
Correction of evils 285
CHAPTER Y.
FAMILY ETHICS.
SECTION I.—Marriage—To what opposed—Arguments against
polygamy 288
SECTION II.—The design of marriage—Domestic happiness—
A numerous and happy posterity—Patriotism—Chastity 291
SECTION III.—The principles that should govern both parties
in forming the conjugal relation 293
SECTION IV.—Beciprocal duties of the conjugal relation:
Love —Sympathy—Help—Chastity—Confidence—Mutual in-
terest—Affection for common offspring—Mutual responsi-
bility 295
SECTION V.—Duties of husbands: Maintenance—Protection—
Politeness—Tenderness—Care in sickness...... 298
CONTENTS. Xlii
PAGE
SECTION VI.—Duties of wives: Obedience—Fidelity—Kind-
ness — Diligence —Providence — Contentment — Patience—
Keeping at home 300
SECTION VII.—Divorce—May be granted by the state—On
what grounds 301
SECTION VIII.—Parental duties: Maintenance—Physical edu-
cation—Intellectual education—Moral education 304
SECTION IX.—Parental authority and government—Unity—Im-
partiality—Uniformity—Efficiency—Reasonableness 312
SECTION X.—Parental obligations: how violated—By idle-
ness—Neglect—Flattery—Cruelty—Bad examples 315
SECTION XI.—Filial duties: Obedience—Affection—Rever-
ence—Care in sickness—Beauty of filial piety 317
SECTION XII.—Fraternal duties: Mutual affection—Reference
of disputes to parents—Submission to the will of parents—
Mutual respect—Mutual forbearance 322
SECTION XIII.—Duties of teachers and pupils — Teachers
should have thorough qualification—Punctuality—Energy—
Discipline—Care of the morals of pupils—Pupils should ex-
liibit obedience—Attention—Docility—Courteousness 324
CHAPTER VI.
DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS.
SECTION I.—Abolition of slavery— Results—Different races—
Negro race, inferiority of—Caucasian race, superiority of 329
XIV CONTENTS.
PAGE
SECTION II.—First duty: To prevent relapse into barbarism—
Danger of this—Difficulty of preventing — Antagonism
aroused—The duty does not include social equality—Danger
of social equality—Indications of Divine Providence—Should
not fight against God—Peaces must be kept distinct—Amal-
gamation 331
SECTION III.—Second duty: Education—Results of ignorant
legislation—Education the only remedy—No mixed schools 335
SECTION IV.—Third duty: The Christian religion to be in-
culcated — Present difficulties to be overcome — Sunday-
schools % 338
SECTION V.—Fourth duty: Justice—No invasion of rights—
No unlawful combinations—Horrors of a war of races—Dan-
ger of collisions—Power of public opinion 339
SECTION VI.—Fifth duty: Forbearance—Great need of it—
A lofty virtue 343
SECTION VII.—Sixth duty: Liberality—Give employment—
Master and servant: 1. No unjust exactions; 2. Good wages;
3. Spiritual welfare—No injury to morals 345
SECTION VIII.'—Duties of servants: Fidelity—No eye-ser-
vice—Cheerfulness—-Politeness—Obedience 349
CONCLUSION 351
PREFACE.
For many years, the institutions of learning in
the South have been without a suitable text-book
on Moral Philosophy. Indeed, it may be said they
have never had a suitable one. The errors of Dr.
Paley, though in many respects he is a fine author,
are so numerous, and of so grave a character, that
they are very apt to mislead the young mind, in
spite of the corrections that may be attempted by
the teacher. Most of the philosophical writings of
American authors are exhibitions of fanaticism,
rather than of sound logic or scriptural truth,
when they discuss the subject of slavery.
In view of these facts, the present writer has
been in the habit of teaching his classes entirely by
lectures.. This course was commenced at the urgent
(XV)
xvi preface.
solicitation of his classes. It has been kept np
from year to year, because it was believed to be the
most efficient plan of communicating instruction.
These lectures were uniformly delivered without
notes, and altogether without any manuscript pre-
paration. The students were required to take co-
pious notes, and, after retiring to their rooms, to
write, and preserve abstracts for future reference
and study. Indeed, the book was prepared by the
aid of some of these abstracts, furnished by two of
his old pupils, Mr. J. M. Hubbard and Mr. Thomas
J. Williams. The manner in which the work ori-
ginated will account for some apparent redundancy
in the style; which, it is hoped, will be overlooked,
as the author feels quite sure that his ideas are not
thereby obscured, but rather presented with fulness
and force.
Though not a word of the lectures was written
before delivery, they were prepared with great labor
and much study. Frequently hundreds of pages
would be read, on one subject, before the discus-
sion would be attempted in the lecture-room. Id
PREFACE. XY11
this way—especially as different authors were ex-
amined before the class—the author may have been
brought under some obligations which are not ac-
knowledged in the body of this work. He has,
however, scrupulously endeavored to accredit
each author with what was known to belong to
him.
The authors that were consulted during the pre-
paration of the lectures, were Hamilton, Cousin,
Jouffroy, Butler, Brown, Wayland, Alexander, Pa-
ley, Finney, Dwight, Mahan, Winslow, Hickok,
the author of the Lowell Lectures, Upham, Thorn-
well, Bledsoe, Fletcher, Hopkins, and Smith. To
all these the writer gratefully acknowledges his
obligation.
To pretend to any great originality of thought,
in a work of this kind, would probably be prepos-
terous: the author makes no such claims. What
he claims for the book is,
1st. A plan original, simple, compact, and easily
comprehended.
Xviii PREFACE.
2d. He claims an exhibition of a theory of moral
obligation freer from objections and more intelli-
gible than is found in any other work which he has
been able to examine. The theory is glanced at
by Dr. Alexander, and partially presented in the
Lowell Lectures; but, so far as is known to the
writer, its full exhibition is found in this work
alone.
Should this work be adopted in our seminaries
of learning, one or two suggestions may not be out
of place.
1st. Let the teacher fully master each exercise
required of a class, so that neither may have need
of the book.
2d. Let the class be required to give the ideas in
their own language.
3d. "When any proposition is sustained by argu-
ment, let the class be required to give each argu-
ment, without help from the teacher. This is a
most important suggestion. And it is well, at the
close of the exercise, to have some one give a sum-
PREFACE.
xix
mation of all tlie arguments which have boon pre-
scnted separately by individual members.
4tli. Let nothing be passed over superficially.
The teacher must not only hear, but he must in-
struct. lie must see that even the dullest member
of the class has a clear understanding of the subject.
The writing of the book was undertaken at the
request of beloved pupils. The writer has felt all
along a painful sense of incapacity, and yet a high
sense of responsibility. He would not sow the
seeds of error in the young mind and heart for all
the emoluments of earth. He has accompanied
almost every page of the work with prayer to
Almighty God for help and direction; and he now
sends it forth with an earnest prayer that it may
be a blessing to his race.
Wesleyan University, Florence, Ala.,
May 1G, 1859.
ADVERTISEMENT TO THE SECOND EDITION.
During the years that have passed since the issu-
ing of the first edition of these Elements, the au-
thor has seen no reason to change his views in
regard either to the theory or practice of morals.
In view of great changes in the relations not only
of individuals, but of races, the chapter on slavery
has been removed, and one on the duties of the
superior race to the inferior has been made to take
its place. "With the belief that the principles here
inculcated afford- the only Christian and peaceable
solution of a question involving the interests of the
whole country, they are earnestly set forth, and
modestly, yet boldly, presented for the considera-
tion of teachers and pupils.
The publication of this edition has been delayed by
the loss of the plates. The author was too greatly
reduced in means to pay for the reproduction of
stereotype plates, and it has not been possible for
the Publishing House to bring out the work at an
earlier day. It is hoped that it will be universally
adopted in the schools of the South, and by all just
and conservative teachers throughout the country.
Louisville, Ivy., Dec. 1, 1871.
TO THE
REV. JOHN C. KEENER, D.D.,
iitfjfjop of tfje IHGijofctst iSpt'sccpal tSljurct), iBoutf),
AND TO THE
hon. j. S. lititgow,
THE FORMER THE HIGHEST TYPE OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTER,
AND
THE HATTER OF THE CHRISTIAN LAYMAN,
BOTH EQUALLY REMARKABLE FOR THEIR EXALTED VIRTUES,
AND TO
BOTH OF WHOM THE AUTHOR IS INDEBTED FOR MUCH KINDNESS,
Uts focik is most ncptttfitllg btbicaieb,
BY THEIR OBLIGED AND TRUE FRIEND,
r. h. my ers,
PART I,
X H E 0 K E TI C A L ]<] T H I C S
ELEMENTS
0 F
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
PART I.
THEORETICAL ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
statement of the subject.
DEFINITION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY—DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AI
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY—SUBJECTS EMBRACED IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
DUTY—DIVISIONS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
The term moral in its common acceptation is the
opposite of immoral, and means virtuous or just.
Its scientific meaning is different. As a scientific
term, the word moral is applicable to actions that
are either good or evil, virtuous or vicious; or still
more generally it denotes something which has
reference to man in his relations. Moral philo-
sophy in its wider acceptation embraces the entire
science of immaterial objects—mental philosophy,
2 (25)
26 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
logic, etc.: in its narrower, it embraces only the
science of duty.
Dr. Paley defines it as "the science which teaches
our duty, and the reasons of it." Dr. Wayland
defines it as "the science of moral law."
Moral philosophy is the systematic arrangement
and elucidation of the principles in the light of
which we may learn our duty. The distinctions
between moral and mental philosophy are as fol-
lows:
; 1. Mental philosophy teaches what man is; it
enters into a thorough examination of his intellect,
sensibilities, and will: mojal philosophy teaches
what man ought to be and what he ought to do.
The latter begins where the former leaves off. A.Por
example, mental philosophy defines and illustrates
a desire or affection, and moral philosophy shows
how far such desire or affection may be gratified.
"When we look upon a beautiful object, pleasing
emotions are excited, and if any thing valuable is
connected with the object, a desire of owning it is
aroused, It is the business of mental philosophy to
illustrate the perception of the object, the emotion
of beauty, and the desire of owning; and here it
stops: moral philosophy, then, teaches to what
extent, within what liipits, and according to what
law, the desire may be gratified.
STATEMENT OP THE SUBJECT. 27
2. Mental philosophy exhibits to us man in the
abstract, without reference to his relations: moral
philosophy exhibits man in his relations: 1. In rela-
tion to God; 2. In relation to his fellow-creatures;
3. In relation to law; 4. In relation to a future
state of retribution.
3. Mental philosophy is subjective; it reveals to
us the ego—the self: moral philosophy is both sub-
jective and objective; it reveals to us not only self,
but law, duty, etc.
4. In mental philosophy the subject investigating
and the object investigated are one; it is mind
investigating mind, classifying and illustrating its
own powers : in moral philosophy, for the most
part, the subject and object are different; it is
mind investigating, classifying, and illustrating duty.
Hence we conclude that mental philosophy embraces
mind alone, while moral philosophy embraces mind
and its relations.
Moral philosophy is divided into two parts, theo-
retical and practical. In the theoretical part are
embraced moral law, moral agency, moral obliga-
tion, moral conduct, and moral government. In
the practical part are embraced our duties to God,
to ourselves, and to our fellow-creatures.
28
ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER II.
MORAL LAW.
SECTION I.
wayland's definition : its defects—the difference between
moral and physical law—correct definition of moral law—
god the establisher—attributes of moral law.
Dr. Wayland says that "The term law is a
form of expression denoting either a mode of
existence, or an order of sequence;" and that
"moral law is an order of sequence established
between the moral quality of an action and its
result."
This definition* is obscure, and to my mind
defective..
1st. It makes no analysis of law—it makes no
distinction between the rule and its sanctions.
2d. According to Wayland, the existence of the
action must be prior to the existence of law, as
without the action there could be no "order of
MORAL LAW.
29
sequence established between the action and its
results." ISTow the reverse of this is believed to
be true. Moral law exists before moral action,
and is the rule by which it should be governed.
As there could be "no transgression without law,"
so there could be no obedience. The law must
also exist before the object^ whose manner of ex-
istence is determined by law, just as necessarily
as it must exist before the action it is designed
to control. So, then, whether we regard law as
moral or physical, Dr. "Wayland's definition is to
be rejected.
Law is a rule of action, or for action, accom-
panied by sanctions. It may be physical or moral.
And it may be well to present such distinctions
as may enable the student to distinguish between
moral and physical law.
1. Moral law always involves the idea of ought-
ness: physical law involves no such idea. We do
not say that the sun ought to shine, or the earth
to revolve, or the seasons to change; yet all these
facts exist in accordance with the action of phy-
sical law. But we do say, God ought to be wor-
shipped, our neighbor ought to be loved, justice
ought to be done. These are the requirements of
moral law. But no such idea of oughtness is
connected with physical law, whether its action is
80 ELEMENTS 01 MOEAL PHILOSOPHY.
seen in the falling apple or the revolving world,
in the mite or mastodon, in man or insect.
2. Moral law always involves the idea of free-
dom: physical law involves the idea of necessity.
No one supposes that the actions of a moral being
are constrained, as are the actions which of neces-
sity result from physical causes. The subjects of
moral law are conscious that they are under a
"law of liberty:" they may or may not obey its
requirements; while the subjects of physical law
are known to be under the law of necessity.
3. Moral law involves the idea of right and
wrong: physical law involves no such idea. If a
stone falls in obedience to physical law, and death
is the consequence, no one attaches the idea either
of right or wrong to such operation. The stone
was not master of its actions; it was under the
"law of gravity;" physical law controlled it, and
no one attaches a. moral quality to its necessitated
actions. But all say that obedience to moral law
is right, and the transgression of moral law is
sin.
4. Moral law involves the idea of intelligence in
the subject: physical law involves no such idea in
its subjects.
5. Moral law involves the ideas of merit and
*
demerit; but no such ideas are connected with
MORAL LAW.
31
physical law. No one thinks of praising or blam-
ing either the animate or inanimate being for
rendering a forced obedience to physical law; but
all connect merit with obedience to moral law,
and demerit or blame to transgression of moral
law.
In the light of these distinctions, we may
say, with President Mahan: " Physical law is a
rule of action, and moral law is a rule for action."
The existence of law presupposes ai| establisher;
hence moral philosophy recognizes the existence of
an all-wise God, as the establisher of moral law.
The moral law is the offspring of the Eternal
Reason ; it is the revealing of the unnecessitated
and infallible will of God. We may know then
that it possesses the following attributes:
1. It is perfectly adapted to the nature of the
beings for whose control it is designed. He that
adapted light to the eye, food to the stomach,
and air to the lungs, would not fail to adapt his
moral law to the beings for whom He designed
it as a rule of action.
2. It is impartial. The same conditions and
relations being given, the same requirements will
always be made. This law, like its great Estab-
lisher, is "no respecter of persons."
3. It is just. We have said that moral law
32 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
consists of two parts—a rule and its sanctions.
The sanctions are the rewards and punishments.
In both these respects the law is just. It re-
quires no more, no less, than ought to be done;
and it always offers the very reward, and threatens
the very penalty, which justice requires.
4. Moral law can be obeyed. It is practicable.
Make it impracticable, and it is no longer a rule
for action—its character as law is destroyed. Make
it impracticable, and all ideas of oughtness, of
right and wrong, merit and demerit, are at once
destroyed.
5. Moral law is immutable. It is the law of
right, and its sacred principles are as immutable
as their great Author. The circumstances being
precisely the same, the rule for action must be the
same. The actions being the same, the retribu-
tion is always the same. To suppose otherwise
would be to reflect upon Him who is the "same
yesterday, to-day, and for ever."
ISTo analysis of moral law is complete which fails
to present the correct theory of retribution, and to
this we propose devoting the next section.
MORAL LAW.
33
SECTION II.
RETRIBUTION—DEFINITION — UNIVERSALITY OF THE IDEA—COLERIDGE
COUSIN THEORY OF NATURAL CONSEQUENCES : OBJECTIONS TO IT
—THEORY THAT IT IS ALWAYS ADMINISTERED FOR THE SAKE OF
REFORMATION: OBJECTIONS TO IT—TRUE THEORY.
By retribution, is meant that certain actions are
rewarded, and certain others punished; and that
the rewards and punishments are determined by
the moral law.
No idea of the human reason approaches nearer
to universality than that of retribution. It is ex-
hibited in the Elysian Fields and Tartarean regions
of the ancient Greeks and Romans; is found in the
"Spirit-Land" of the American Indians; and even
Atheists, in peculiar circumstances, have shown
that they are not strangers to the fearful idea of
future punishment.
Coleridge, speaking of the effect which sudden
calamities produce on guilty men, says, " The
wretched criminal already interprets the calamities
into judgments, executions of a sentence passed by
an invisible Judge; as if the vast pyre of the last
judgment were already kindled, in an unknown
distance, and some flashes of it darting forth at
intervals, beyond the rest, were flying and lighting
upon the face of his soul. The calamity may con-
2*
34 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
si at in loss of fortune, or character, or reputation ;
but you hear no regrets from him. Bemorse extin-
guishes all regret; and remorse is the implicit
creed of the guilty."
Cousin says: " If we raise our thoughts beyond
this world—if we conceive of God as we ought, not
only as the author of the physical world, but as the
father of the moral world, as the very substance of
good and the moral law—we cannot but conceive
that God ought to hold ready rewards and punish-
ments for those who have fulfilled or broken the
law."
"While the idea of retribution is so nearly uni-
versal, there are various and conflicting theories
concerning it.
I. The theory of natural consequences is, that all
the punishment deserved for the commission of any
crime, however flagrant, is simply the unhappiness
experienced by the culprit at the time of the com-
mission. Present unhappiness necessarily follow-
ing present crimes, constitutes the whole of retri-
butiop.
We object to this theory on the following
grounds:
1. Because, according to it, God and man are
bound to treat all alike, both virtuous and vicious.
Por dissimilar treatment, in view of moral cha-
MORAL LAW.
35
racier, would be the infliction of punishments upon
the vicious, other than what follows in natural con-
sequences. According to this doctrine, any such
treatment as would add to the punishment of
natural consequences would be wrong.
2. It is directly opposed to the universal convic-
tions of the human race, so far as those convic-
tions are known.
3. It is equally opposed to the teachings of the
Sacred Scriptures. They teach us that a man
should be judged, and that God will judge him,
" according to the deeds done in the body."
4. According to this theory, it would bo wrong
to put man to any inconvenience in order to make
reparation for any injury inflicted. Such incon-
venience would be punishment additional to natu-
ral consequences, and would of course be improper
if this theory were true.
II. The second theory of retribution is, that
punishment 4s never inflicted except for the sake
of reformation.
The objections to this theory are,
1. According to it, the incorrigible must ever
escape punishment. A man has only to steep him-
self in crime, in order to escape punishment: the
greater the criminal, the more certain the freedom
from punishment.
36 ELEMENTS OE MOKAL PHILOSOPHY.
2. It destroys the idea of justice in the punish-
ment. Remember, that according to this, punish-
ment is not inflicted because the person deserves it,
but to effect his reformation.
3. But the greatest objection to the doctrine, is,
that punishment, even when justly inflicted," often
leaves the criminal morally worse than it found him.
III. The last and true theory is, that punishment
is inflicted as the just desert of crime, and rewards
are given as the just desert of virtue—that the pun-
ishm'ent must be commensurate with the obligation
violated, and the reward must be coihmensurate
with the obligation fulfilled. Or, in other words,
the punishment is determined by the degree of
crime, and the reward is determined by the degree
of virtue.
Retribution commences in this life, and is con-
tinued for ever. It is experienced in remorse of
conscience, which sooner or later is proportionate
to the claim violated; it is experienced in the
moral indignation aroused against crime in the
community; and it is to be experienced in
the fearful penalties of a violated law, inflicted
by God himself upon the incorrigibly guilty.
The rewards come from the approbation of con-
science, the approbation of community, the appro-
bation of God.
moral agency.
87
CHAPTER III.
moral agency.
SECTION I.
requisites op moral, agency—intellect : why requisite—sensi-
bilities : argument to show they are needed—classification
of sensibilities appetites : true doctrine of the appetites.
Among the many studies that excite the interest
and improve the mind of man, not the least im-
portant is man himself. The marvellous structure
of his body, the wonderful powers of his intellect,
the great activity of his sensibilities, and more espe-
cially his peculiar moral organization, show, when
properly understood, what God intended man to do
in this world, and the destiny awaiting him in the
world to come.
The requisites to moral agency are conceded to
be, 1. Intellect; 2. Sensibilities; 3. Conscience;
4. Free Will; 5. Light. All these we find in
man.
1. Intellect. By the intellectual faculties we
38 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
mean those by which we know. It would be a
very imperfect philosophy that would confound
the power of knowing with that of feeling. Ho
one destitute of the power of attention, of observa-
tion, of understanding, of perception, of memory,
and of reasoning, can he capable of exercising
moral agency. A man must have capacity to per-
ceive relations, to understand law, to observe dis-
tinctions, to remember facts, to connect ideas, and
to draw conclusions, before he can he classed as a
moral agent. This is a first truth of reason. Ho
one looks upon a maniac or an idiot as capable of
exercising moral agency, for the simple reason that
the intellect is incapable of healthy action. Then
the intellect, in a sound state, is the first requisite
to moral agency.
2. Sensibilities. The feeling df pleasure or pain
is said to be the chronological condition of our
idea of worthiness—the idea/'of worthiness being
the logical condition of the/idea of pleasure or pain .
That is, the idea of pleasure or pain sustains the
same relation to the idea of worthiness that the
idea of body does to space. We arrive at the idea
of body through the senses; then, as an intuition
of the pure reason, we have the idea of space
as being necessary to the existence of body,
ftody could not have existed without space; vso
MORAL AGENCY.
89
when pleasure or pain is experienced, the idea of
worthiness is given as an intuition of the pure
reason. But for the sensibility, says a great moral-
ist, there would be no idea of right or wrong, of
praise or blameworthiness.
The sensibilities have been classed in the fol-
lowing order: 1. Appetites; 2. Propensities; 3.
Affections.
It belongs rather to mental than to moral philo-
sophy to give an analysis of the sensibilities; but,
in view of their intimate connection with morality,
we propose a brief investigation of them.
The appetites take their rise in the body;
they are only occasional in their action, and are
common to man with the lower animals. They
appear to have been given to man for three
purposes. 1. To continue the race, as without
them it would not extend beyond one generation;
2. They were implanted as a means of enjoyment;
3. As a means of moral discipline. As given to us
for these three wise and benevolent purposes, let us
examine them.
"Suppose," says Stewart, "that the appetite of
hunger had been no part of our constitution:
reason and experience might have satisfied us of
the necessity of food to our preservation; but how
should we have been able, without an implanted
40 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
principle, to ascertain, according to the varying
states of our animal economy, the proper seasons
for eating, or the quantity of food necessary to
the body?" "We dare say that we should not know
when to begin to eat, nor when to cease. Besides,
eating would be the merest drudgery; and that
which is now attended with real pleasure, and was
so designed by our Heavenly Father, would be
unattended by any gratification whatever. It is
true that we scorn the man wholly surrendered to
appetite, and hence we believe that the appetites
were given as a means of moral discipline.
The appetites may be gratified intemperately,
and man may give himself up entirely to their
claims. He then degrades himself. And never
does he present a more humiliating spectacle than
when he becomes the slave of his appetites. His
physical form, so "fearfully and wonderfully made,"
loses its proportions: bloated by dissipation and
fetid with corruption, it becomes a mass of
putridity. His intellect becomes almost stultified,
his conscience polluted, his will itself enthralled,
and his disordered and ungoverned passions usurp
control over soul and body. "Who has ever seen
the debased drunkard, the miserable victim of
opium, or the degraded libertine, and has not
MORAL AGENCY.
41
been impressed with the depth of the degradation
to which man can descend ?
On the other hand, a healthful and vigorous
body, an elastic and progressive intellect, calm and
tranquil passions, a pure and serene enjoyment,
are the heritage of the man whose appetites,
like so many obedient and well-trained servants,
minister to his necessities, contribute to his com-
fort, and obey his behests.
The appetites are not to be annihilated, as was
taught by the Ascetics; nor are they to be inordi-
nately gratified, according to the doctrine of the
Epicureans. To annihilate them is a violation of
nature which brings with it the most fearful con-
sequences. To give them supremacy is to place
them in a position that God never intended them
to occupy. In view of the theory of the appetites
here presented, we draw a few practical reflections:
1. That God has graciously designed us for
happiness. He has shown this in the rich pro-
fusion of nature's gifts, in the beauties that sparkle
in the dew-drop, and tnat flash on the brow of
night as the stars light up the firmament; in the
gorgeous splendors of the setting sun; in the
fascinating graces that adorn the bow arching the
eloud; in the variegated attractions of the land-
42 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
scape; in tlie sweetness exhaled from the flower,
and in the music carolled by the bird. All these,
and ten thousand times more than these, are given
by a benevolent Father to promote the happiness
of his children. And as we are not to close our
eyes nor stop our ears to these beauties, nor destroy
the taste that appreciates them, so we are not to
repress those grateful emotions which should arise
to our Heavenly Father for giving us appetites as
ministers to our pleasure.
2. We are to shun all those scenes which tend
to vitiate the appetites, and most carefully to avoid
all those indulgences which may give them undue
supremacy.
3. As they were given to develop the strength
of character, we must, like St. Paul, exercise
ourselves to "keep the body (appetites) under."
Remember that self-conquest is the most glorious
conquest man can make.
4. If by the force of habit our appetites have
already gained undue ascendency, let us at once,
with humble reliance upon Almighty God, seek to
bring them into a position of subordination to
reason and religion.
MORAL AGENCY.
43
SECTION II.
PROPENSITIES, OR DESIRES: CLASSIFICATION—DESIRE OF LIFE : ITS
NATURE, UNIVERSALITY, DESIGN, MORAL CHARACTER, CONNECTION
WITH CHRISTIANITY DESIRE OF KNOWLEDGE: ITS NATURE AND
DESIGN DESIRE OF PROPERTY DESIRE OF POWER DESIRE OF
ESTEEM : ITS UNIVERSALITY : THE EFFECT OF RECKLESSNESS—DESIRE
OF SOCIETY: ITS DESIGN — DESIRE OF IMITATION: ITS UNIVER-
SALITY: CAUTION TO PARENTS — DESIRE OF HAPPINESS : IMPORTANCE
OF THIS PRINCIPLE.
The propensities are more numerous than the
appetites, and are of a higher order. They have
been classified as follows: 1. Desire of life; 2.
Desire of knowledge; 3. Desire of property; 4.
Desire of power; 5. Desire of esteem; 6. Desire
of society; 7. Desire of imitation; 8. Desire of
happiness. It belongs rather to mental than to
moral philosophy to go into an elaborate investi-
gation of these eight primitive desires. Uni-
versal consciousness will testify to their existence.
1. The desire of life is designed to protect us
from such influences as may lead to its reckless
exposure; and to prevent misfortune from leading
the unhappy sufferer to commit suicide. It affords,
too, a facility for the implanting of that truth
which " springs to everlasting life." "Without it
one of the strongest motives brought to bear in
the Christian system would be powerless. From
44 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
which we see its intimate connection with the
purest morality. It is found universally in the
race, in childhood and in old age, and severe in-
deed must be the sufferings that can extinguish
it in the human bosom.
2. Curiosity, or the desire of learning, is designed
to excite to that effort which is essential to the
acquisition of knowledge. Without it, there would
be no investigation, and of course no progress.
Destitute of it, man would ever be a stranger to
that glow of feeling and really high enjoyment
arising from the solution of a difficult problem, or
the discovery of a long-searched-for truth. It is
a high-born power; and angels themselves are
said to desire to look into the wonders of the
Almighty. Under its influence, difficulties of the
most appalling nature have been surmounted,
mysteries revealed, obscurities cleared away, alpine
heights have been scaled, and abysmal depths have
been explored.
3. The desire of property is designed to excite to
industry, economy, and thrift. It was never designed
to degenerate into avarice, or to be perverted into
covetousness. Under its influence civilization has
advanced, laws protecting the right of property have
been enacted, public enterprises have been accom-
plished, the resources of a country have been de-
MORAL AGENCY.
45
veloped, and agriculture, commerce, and manu-
factures have been carried to a perfection which
they never could have attained without its influ-
ence.
4. The desire of power, or of the "ability to
produce results," is designed to be a stimulus to
every noble endeavor. Combined with the desire
of knowledge, it may excite to the greatest efforts
of which the mind is capable. It may fire the
imagination of the poet, direct the pencil of the
artist, point the argument, move the heart, and
open the lips of the orator, with thoughts and
words of almost irresistible force.
5. Desire of esteem is designed to so influence
our conduct that we may deserve the good opinion
of others. Ho sane man is indifferent to this. An
utter recklessness of the good opinion of mankind
is a sure indication of a badly organized mind, or
of deep moral degeneracy. In youth it foreshadows
a life as dreary and hopeless as the recklessness is
unnatural and sinful. This desire of the esteem of
others frequently projects itself into the future, and
is manifested by a desire to leave a good name as
the richest heritage to our children. It is readily
perceived that such a principle is peculiarly adapted
to the promotion of virtue.
6. Desire of society. God intended man for
46 ELEMENTS OF MOKAL PHILOSOPHY.
society, not for solitude. Children exhibit their
love of society in their sports and games, and the
boy that dislikes society is sure to be selfish and
disagreeable. Most affecting instances are given of
the action of this principle. " The Count de Lauzun
was confined for nine years in the castle of Pignerol,
in a small room where no light penetrated, except
from a small chink in the roof. In this solitude he
attached himself to a spider, and continued for some
time to amuse himself with attempting to tame it,
with catching flies for its support, and with superin-
tending the progress of the webs. The jailer dis-
covered his amusement, and killed the spider. The
Count used afterward to relate that the pang he felt
on that occasion could only be compared to that of
a mother for the loss of her child." The design of
the principle is to develop a noble philanthropy,
and to unite mankind in one common brother-
hood. It collects assemblies, founds states, builds
cities, establishes churches, unites members of the
same household, links man to God, man to man,
and man to the lower animals.
7. Desire of imitation. This is manifested in
many of the lower animals, especially in the ape,
as well as in man. It is seen in the plays of
children, when they assume the characters of their
parents, or seek to imitate the guests of the family.
MORAL AGENCY.
47
It gave rise to theatrical exhibitions; and is found
in our courts of justice, especially in the love of
precedent. Its design is to bring man under the
power of good example, and to warn him against
setting a had example before others. How power-
fully does it appeal to parents not to exhibit those
examples to their children which through this
propensity may lead them to ruin!
8. Desire of happiness. Possibly no principle
of our complex nature has been more fruitful of
controversy than this. "While philosophers of the
selfish school have made it the only principle of
our nature that should be consulted, others, who
believe that all virtue consists in disinterested
benevolence, have altogether ignored it. Doth of
these are wrong. Our Saviour himself, "for the
joy that was set before him, endured the cross."
To this very principle some of the strongest appeals
in the Bible are made; from which we learn that
it was implanted for the promotion of virtue. It
is not inconsistent with self-denial. On the con-
trary, present self-denial may be voluntarily sub-
mitted to as a means to greater future enjoy-
ment.
48 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION III.
the affections: difference between affections and propensi-
ties—classification—their general design.
Affections differ from desires in this: affections
have reference to persons, desires to things. We
love the man, we desire his prosperity.
The affections have been classified in the fol-
lowing order: 1. Parental affection; 2. Filial
affection; 3. Conjugal affection; 4. Fraternal
affection; 5. Social affection, or the love of the
human race; 6. Theistical affection, or the love
of God.
That these affections are natural to man will
hardly be denied. The particular design of
each one of them will be clearly seen when we
enter upon Practical Ethics. It may be merely
necessary now to state, that their general design
is to secure obedience to the laws of the family,
of society, and of God. Without them there
would be no domestic peace, no social benevo-
lence, no obedience to laws either human or
Divine, except such as may be exacted by fear.
MORAL AGENCY.
49
SECTION IV.
CONSCIENCE : ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A NATURAL
CONSCIENCE—OBJECTIONS STATED AND ANSWERED FINNEY'S ANALT-
SIS OF CONSCIENCE ETYMOLOGY OF THE WORD FUNCTIONS OP
CONSCIENCE SUPREMACY OF CONSCIENCE ERROR TO BE AVOIDED.
Thus far in our analysis of the requisites of
moral agency—of man as a moral being—we have
presented truths universally admitted. Now we
enter upon the examination of a faculty the very
existence of which as a natural faculty has been
denied. That conscience is an original faculty of
the mind is as clear to us as the existence of any
other faculty. This position may be established
by the following considerations :
1. The universality of moral distinctions. Ac-
cording to our apprehension, man would be as
destitute of the idea of duty, of right or wrong,
without a conscience, as he would be of beauty
without taste, of color without sight, or of sound
without ears. A man born blind was asked what
idea he had of the color red; he answered it
seemed to him very much like the sound of a
trumpet. He had no idea of color, because he was
destitute of the organ through which the mind
perceived color. So, without a faculty for discrimi-
nating right and wrong, no discrimination could be
50 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
made. If, then, moral distinctions are universal—
and no man will deny their universality—the
faculty of conscience must be universal, and of
course it must be original.
, 2. Its existence as a separate and original fa-
culty is clearly proved by the peculiar action of. the
mind in reference to moral subjects. The feelings
experienced in regard to moral subjects differ not
merely in degree, but in kind, from any other feel-
ings of which we are capable. hTo other feelings
are at all similar to those of remorse. The intel-
'f
lect cannot feel; hence the conscience cannot be
a mere function of the intelligence. But the sen-
sibilities cannot discriminate; hence the conscience
cannot be a mere function of the sensibility." And
as it can neither be a function of the intelligence
nor of the sensibility, it must be an original and
distinct faculty of the mind.
3. All languages have words to convey the idea
which we have of conscience. Why should there
be such words, unless there were such a reality,
the idea of which is conveyed by the words ?
The words, then, prove—as far as words can do so
—the universality of the idea that conscience is a
faculty original to our common nature. And as
words prove the existence of the idea, the idea
proves the existence of the thing. The existence
MORAL AGENCY.
51
of tlie faculty is therefore established by universal
testimony.
4. The existence of a natural conscience is infal-
libly attested by universal consciousness. In this
enlightened period of mental science, no sane mind
attempts to deny or thinks of calling in question
the veracity of consciousness. In the light of con-
sciousness every man will testify that he has some-
thing within him which convinces of duty, which
imparts the feeling of obligation and gives an im-
pulse to its discharge, which approves of his course
when he has done right, and which punishes him
when he has done wrong. This inward and uni-
versal monitor is the conscience.
5. It is clearly established by the Scriptures.
Whenever we have the authority of God's word
for the statement of a psychological fact, we feel an
assurance that we are right, which can hardly be
surpassed by demonstration. When He who made
man, and gave him a conscience, testifies to its
existence, he who doubts the testimony must be
indeed incredulous. "Paul earnestly beholding
the council, said, Men and brethren, I have lived in
all good conscience before God until this- day."
Acts xxiii. 1. "And herein do I exercise myself,
to have always a conscience void of offence toward
God, and toward men." Acts xxiv. 16. "For
52 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by
nature the things contained in the law, these, hav-
ing not the law, are a law unto themselves: which
show the work of the law written in their hearts,
their conscience also bearing witness, and their
thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing,
one another." Romans ii. 14, 15.
From these passages we draw the following con-
elusions: 1. That man is recognized as possessing
a distinct faculty which is called conscience. 2.
That it is regarded as the most important of all the
faculties of the human soul. "We argue that it
must be original, or God has left the soul destitute
of its most important faculty. He has left to the
educator to supply a faculty which is to exercise
more influence upon man as a moral being than all
the other faculties! Is not this a reflection on the
character of God ?
6. The existence of conscience as an original
faculty is argued from the uniformity of moral dis-
tinctions. On this subject we quote from Dr.
Alexander's work on Moral Science. " Let an act
of manifest injustice be performed before their
eyes, and among a thousand spectators, there will'
be but one opinion and but one feeling. If a
strong man, for example, violently takes away the
property of one weaker than himself, and for no
MOKAL AGENCY.
53
other reason than because he covets it, all men will
condemn the act. So if any one who has received
from another great benefits, not only refuses to
make grateful returns, hut, on the contrary, returns
evil for good, all men will agree in judging his
conduct to he wrong. All intuitively discern, that
for a ruler to punish the innocent and reward the
guilty, is morally wrong. / lit is not true in fact that
there is no agreement among men as to the funda-
mental principles of morals. Their judgments on
those points are as uniform as on the axioms of
mathematics; as in their agreement that the starry
firmament is grand and beautiful; yea, as uniform
as concerning the greenness of grass or the varied
colors of the rainbow, "ff Whether or not the uni-
formity is as great as our author supposes, in regard
to the ou.tward act, is not important to our argu-
ment. We believe the uniformity to be perfect, so
far as the intention is concerned. If a Hindoo
mother voluntarily throws her child into the
Ganges, or a widow immolates herself on the
funeral-pile of her husband, or a heathen son
deprives his suffering and aged father of life, one
and all of these acts are justified by the intention.
The intention is to please God, or avert his-wrath,
or relieve the infirm old man of his sufferings. So
the ancient Spartans justified theft, for the reason
54 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
that the intention was to obey the laws. The con-
elusion, then, is inevitable, that there must be an
original principle or faculty, before which all moral
questions are presented, and by which they are
decided with so much uniformity.
As objections have been urged to the theory
which we have presented and attempted to estab-
lish, it may be fair to notice them at this point.
We quote from Paley:
" The father of Caius Toranius had been pro-
scribed by the triumvirate. Caius Toranius, com-
ing over to the interests of that party, discovered
to the officers, who were in pursuit of his father's
life, the place where he concealed himself, and gave
them withal a description by which they might dis-
tinguish his person when they found him. The
old man, more anxious for the safety and fortunes
of his son, than about the little that remained of
his own life, began immediately to inquire of the
officers who seized him, whether his son was well;
whether he had done his duty to the satisfaction of
his generals. ' That son,' replied one of the officers,
'so dear to thy affections, betrayed thee to us;
by his information thou art apprehended and diest.'
With this he struck a poniard to his heart, and the
unhappy parent fell; not so much affected by hie
fate as by the means to which he owed it.
MORAL AGENCY.
55
"Now," says Paley, "the question is, whether if
this story were related to the wild hoy caught in
the woods of Hanover, or to a savage without ex-
perience and without instruction, cut off in his
infancy from all intercourse with his species, and
consequently under no possible influence of exam-
pie, authority, education, habit, sympathy—whether,
1 say, such a one would feel upon the narration any
of that sentiment of disapprobation of Toranius's
conduct which we feel, or not."
In reply to this very plausible objection to the
existence of a natural conscience, we have to pre-
sent the following considerations:
1. The case presented as the basis of the argu-
ment, shows that the whole theory of conscience
as an original principle of our constitution was
altogether misapprehended by Dr. Paley. Ho one
ever contended that the undeveloped, uneducated
conscience could pronounce at all, much less infal
libly pronounce, concerning any question of morals
Ho one ever contended that the conscience of an
infant could decide in regard to right and wrong.
All that we mean by the original and universal
faculty of conscience is, that, when the mind is
developed, it has the capacity of making moral dis-
tinctions, and that it has this capacity universally.
2. If this case prove any thing, it proves too
56 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
much; for if the incapacity of an entirely ignorant
savage, a wild man of the woods, to determine
right and wrong, can prove thatv no such faculty as
conscience exists, or belongs originally to the
human constitution, then a like^ incapacity to
understand some axiom of mathematics would
settle the fact that the understanding is not
original.
3. But we ask, in the third place, Are great
truths in moral science to he settled by appeals to
isolated and anomalous cases, only to be found
once in a century ? or are these truths to be deter-
mined by an appeal to humanity in its normal state
of development? We should like to see a system
of mental philosophy based upon the irregular and
anomalous exhibitions of intellect as found in "the
wild boy of Hanoveij," or any such erratic presenta-
tion of human nature. No objection can be valid,
until it can be shown that the mass of mankind are
utterly incapable of making moral distinctions.
All attempts to ignore the existence of this faculty,
because of mistaken views of right and wrong,
which are admitted to exist, are as futile as argu-
ments to prove that man has no taste, because men
differ in regard to the beautiful. Nay, more, it
would be equally as sensible to attempt to prove
that eyes were not natural and original faculties of
MORAL AGENCY.
57
vision, because men are found to differ about colors.
For as the existence of erroneous views of beauty
demonstrate that there is a faculty for perceiving
the beautiful; or as ideas concerning color, even
though erroneous, constitute incontestable evidence
of a faculty of vision; so imperfect or mistaken
views of morals demonstrate the existence of the
faculty of conscience.
Having established the fact that the Creator has
not left man destitute of the most important
requisite to moral agency, we proceed to give the
functions of conscience.
"Conscience," says Finney, "is the faculty that
recognizes the conformity, or the want of con-
formity, of the heart and life to the moral law, as
it is revealed in the reason; and it also awards
praise to conformity, and blame to disconformity
to that law. It also affirms that conformity to the
moral law deserves reward, and that disconformity
deserves punishment. It also possesses a propelling
power, by which it urges the conformity of will to
moral law. It does, in a certain sense, seem to
possess the power of retribution."
Conscience is not a simple, but a complex faculty.
The etymology and composition of the word show
the complex nature of the faculty. It is both
intellective and sensitive, combines the rational
3*
58 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
and emotional, embraces judgment and sentiment.
In this respect it is analogous to the taste, which
is both discriminating and emotional. Its functions
are four. 1. The discriminating; 2. The obli-
gatory; 3. The impulsive; 4. The retributive.
1. As a discriminating faculty, it distinguishes
between right and wrong, innocence and guilt,
merit and demerit. It has, therefore, capacity for
perceiving moral relations and obligations, and for
apprehending moral law. This power of judging,
in the conscience, is essentially different from the
ordinary function of the intelligence called judg-
ment. The conscience judges alone in reference
to duty. It does not judge as to what is, but as to
what ought to be. The one word ought embraces
its entire range for discrimination and investigation.
How it is known that the judgment may be very
acute in distinguishing the expedient, in deter-
mining the utility of a financial plan or speculation,
and exceedingly obtuse on all subjects of duty.
When natural phenomena are to be learned, facts
and principles discriminated, arranged and classi-
fied, the judgment is ever ready, and may be
safely consulted; but when principles are to be
ascertained for the regulation of the conduct, we
must consult a higher principle. The conception
of duty is unlike all other conceptions, and, as a
MORAL AGENCY.
59
good writer remarks, "it corresponds to nothing
physical, and has no archetype, in the universe."
We refer to this principle to determine character
as moral or immoral, guilty or innocent.
2. The second office of the conscience is to
impart to man the feeling of moral obligation.
Immediately after duty is perceived, the feeling of
obligation arises. And this is not felt in reference
to ourselves only, but also in reference to others.
We can and do feel that obligations are binding
upon others, just as certainly as we can feel them
binding upon ourselves. It is conscience that
imparts this twofold feeling, for destitute of it we
would ever be strangers to the feelings of obligation
to discharge even the plainest duty. To define this
feeling may be difficult, but every one by reference
to his own experience will be able to form the
clearest conception of the feeling which we have
been attempting to discuss.
3. After duty has been perceived, and the
obligation to discharge it felt, then there is an
impulse to its performance. The conscience gives
this impulse. It impels us to resist temptation, to
overcome all obstacles, and to dare to do right.
For illustration, suppose a man has accidentally
come into possession of what does not belong to
him. Say that a merchant, through mistake in
60 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
changing money, finds that he has received fifty
dollars more than his due: he at once perceives it
to he his duty to restore the money to the owner;
he also feels under obligation to restore it; then
comes the impulse of conscience urging him
forward with an "authority which should excite to
the immediate performance of the honest act. No
murderer would ever have been stained with his
brother's blood had he listened to the voice of
conscience addressing him with commanding elo-
querice, as though it were the voice of a divinity
saving to him, "Man, do thy brother no harm!"
No seducer would ever have polluted the guileless
and the innocent, had the monitions of conscience,
the promptings of his better nature, been heeded.
We dare say that no crime, of whatever grade and
by whomsoever committed, has ever been com-
mitted but after a struggle and a conquest as
fearful as it was disastrous to the soul.
4. Lastly, we notice the retributive function.
Conscience rewards us when we have done right,
and punishes us when we have done wrong. The
thrill of pleasure which is experienced by the man
that has conquered temptation, brought his body
into subjection, resisted a powerful influence to
evil, can only be compared to that which wells up
in the bosoms of the pure and incorruptible inhabit-
MORAL AGENCY.
61
ants of heaven. No sudden experience of good
fortune, no acquisition of fame, or place, or power,
can atford a tithe of the happiness which arises
from the testimony of a " conscience void of offence
toward God and toward men."
Let conscience give this testimony and secure
this reward to the humble votary of virtue: you may
throw him into the dungeon, clothe him in rags,
deprive him of food, separate him from friends,
load him with fetters, and torture him to the utmost
capacity of physical endurance; still there will be
an inward peace as indestructible as his own
immortal nature, and as pure as perpetual—a peace
whose price is far above rubies.
But this retributive function is not confined to
rewarding virtue; it puts forth an equal energy in
punishing vice. The fable of the guilty wretch
haunted by furies, but poorly expresses the agony
of remorse. It is a' Promethean vulture that lays
hold upon every sensitive fibre of man's moral
nature, and produces an agony different in kind
from the agony of a mother bewailing lier first-
born, and far surpassing it in degree. No sorrow
is like that sorrow. It deprives of peace, produces
suspicion, destroys appetite, drives away sleep,
injures health, wrinkles the brow, places its fearful
and indelible mark upon the countenance, silvers
62 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
the hair with the frosts of premature old age, and
gradually hut certainly brings down its victim to a
dishonored grave. The poison of the rattlesnake,
the racks of the inquisition, are harmless when
compared to the fearful enfoldings of that serpent
which never dies. So terrible are its inflictions, that
often the guilty and wretched culprit can only
avoid confession by suicide, and "suicide is con-
fession."
This punishment may not always follow imme-
diately after the crime has been committed. Long
years may intervene before conscience wakes up to
perform its fearful office. But then, as though
months or years of inactivity had served to
increase its force, with one terrific stroke it sinks
the agonized sufferer to the depths of despair. Let
not then the hardened culprit hope to escape the
agonies of remorse. Those agonies may be delayed
by dissipation and crime, but, like the long-pent-up
fires of a volcano, they will break forth in such
throes as must terrify, convulse, and overwhelm
„ thejsoul.
Such is an analysis of the functions of conscience,
as it is presented to the mind of the author.
Whether or not it be considered true, either in
whole or in part, few can deny that the mind has
such functions as are here ascribed to conscience.
MORAL AGENCY.
63
This being admitted, we ask no more. We
cannot contend about words. That we make
moral distinctions, that we feel moral obligation,
that we have impulses to duty, and that we enjoy
pleasure in doing good, and suffer pain for doing
wrong, are facts attested by universal conscious-
uess. These are absolutely essential to moral
agency, and whether they are functions of con-
science, or of some other power, is immaterial.
Hence, we proceed to examine the supremacy of
conscience.
By the supremacy of conscience, we mean its
authority among the other motive-powers. We
do not intend to place conscience above law; on
the contrary, it must be amenable to law.
Bishop Butler is said to have been the first to
recognize the supremacy of conscience among the
affections and other principles of man's nature. In
reference to this, he uses the following language:
" That principle by which we survey, and either
approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and
actions, is not only to be considered as what in its
turn is to have some influence—which may be said
of every passion, of the basest appetites—but like-
wise as being superior; as from its very nature
manifestly claiming superiority over all others,
insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this
64 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
faculty of conscience, without taking in judgment,
direction, and superintendence7. This is a con-
stituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty
itself; and to preside and govern, from the very
economy and constitution of man, belongs to it.
Had it strength as it has right, had it power as it
has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern
the world."
Again he says: " This faculty was placed within
us to be our proper governor, to direct and regulate
all under, principles, passions, and motives of
action. This is its right and office; thus sacred
is its authority. And hoAV often soever men violate
and rebelliously refuse to submit to it, for supposed
interest which they cannot otherwise obtain, or for
the sake of passion which they cannot otherwise
gratify, this makes no alteration as to the natural
right and office of conscience."
Gn the same subject Dr. Chalmers uses the fob
lowing language: "In every human heart there is
a faculty, not, it may be, having the actual power,
but having the just and rightful pretension, to sit
as judge and master of the whole human conduct.
Conscience is the rightful sovereign in man, and if
any other, in the character of a ruling passion, be
the actual sovereign, it is a usurper. In the former
case the mind is felt to be in its proper and well-
MORAL AGENCY.
65
conditioned state; in the latter case it is felt to be
in a state of anarchy. To it belongs the mastery—
although the mastery is often wrongfully taken
from it. It is the sovereign de jure, although it
may not he de facto."
What we mean, then, by the supremacy of con-
science, as stated above, is that when appetite,
desire, or affection comes in conflict with con-
science — when interest or gratification opposes
duty—the latter should rule. The following con-
siderations may serve to establish this point, if,
indeed, it be not a first truth of reason, as I am
inclined to think it is.
1. If God intended man for virtue, he designed
that faculty to he authoritative which would be the
most certain to lead to virtue. That he did form
man for virtue, no one who has any just idea of
his character can doubt. That conscience, more
than any other principle of our nature, promotes
virtue, is a truth equally clear. Hence the conclu-
sion is absolutely infallible, that conscience should
be supreme, that it should have might as it has
right, and rule the world.
2. Its true design is that of a regulator. Deprive
it of that characteristic, and it is useless. It is to
the moral mechanism what the regulator is to the
watch; and if it be not allowed to act in that capa-
66 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
city, the very design for which it was given will he
subverted. Or, to change the figure, its position is
that of a civil governor among his subjects: if per-
chance the lawful ruler be dethroned, and his place
occupied by another, he still retains the insignia of
royalty, and with a sublime dignity asserts his
claims to the throne. If such be the position of
conscience among the other faculties of the soul,
we must admit its supremacy, or charge God with
folly — with having given us a faculty for no
purpose.
3. The supremacy of conscience is manifest,
when the nature of its rule is compared with that
of any other faculty. Place man under the domi-
nion of appetite, and he is little, if any, better than
the brute. Let passion have the sway—ambition
with power for its object, avarice with wealth for
its object, the love of esteem with fame for its
object—and man would hardly retain a vestige of
his pristine dignity. The passions contend with
tiger-like ferocity, and appetite blindly urges to
gratification. Unhallowed lust, fierce rage, malig-
nant envy, scornful pride, heated jealousy, and
"unruled" ambition produce confusion in the hu-
man bosom, wild and fearful as that which reigns
in Pandemonium. If, then, God intended order
and not confusion, rule and not anarchy, he de-
MORAL AGENCY.
67
signed the supremacy of conscience. Another fact
in this connection strengthens the position taken.
Any one even of the benevolent afl'ections may
become of monstrous growth. Man may love wife
or child or friend to idolatry. But who ever heard
or believed that man could become too conscien-
tious ?
4. The retributions of conscience show that it
should be supreme. When the passions are obeyed
or the appetites gratified to satiety, then they inflict
their punishment. For obedience rather than for
disobedience are their penalties inflicted. hTot so
with conscience: its rewards come from obedience,
and its punishments from disobedience. These re-
wards afford the highest enjoyment, these punish-
ments the deepest suffering. The very arming of
conscience with this fearful power of retribution,
is the clearest possible proof that the Creator de-
signed its supremacy. Why give this power of
rewarding or punishing, unless to exact obedience ?
These retributions, like lictors' rods, are the insignia
of authority, the infallible evidence of supremacy.
5. But lastly, we appeal to every man's con-
sciousness. Every one feels and knows intuitively
that conscience ought to rule; and by no amount
of argument could you convince any man to the
contrary. Every man is conscious that the voice
68 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
of conscience is heard only in command. The
appetites may persuade, the passions may las-
cinate, like so many seductive sirens, hut conscience
commands.
Having stated, as we think, the true theory in
regard to the supremacy of conscience, we desire to
guard the student against error. Let no one plade
conscience above God, or above his law. Let no
one fall into the error that there is a " higher law"
in his moral nature which is above God's revealed
law. Conscience is supreme in its sphere. In any
conflict with any other principle of our nature, con-
science should he admitted as the higher principle,
and should he obeyed. In this, and in this alone,
is the rightful supremacy of conscience.
SECTION V.
ERRONEOUS VIEWS OF CONSCIENCE — PRESIDENT MAHAN'S VIEW—OB-
JECTIONS TO THIS VIEW—THEORY OF THE REV. HUBBARD WINSLOW
—OBJECTIONS TO THIS THEORY—CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON THE
CONSCIENCE.
" Conscience," says Mahan, "is the voice of God
within us." (Intellectual Philosophy, page 260.)
It is with great diffidence that we oppose the view
of so profound and accurate a thinker on metaphy-
sical subjects as we acknowledge President Mahan
to be—especially as we ard indebted to him for
MORAL AGENCY.
69
many valuable thoughts — yet the cause of truth
demands it in this case.
1. If conscience were the voice of God, it could
not be polluted, nor perverted, nor hardened. How
would it do to speak of the voice of God as "seared
with a hot iron," as "purged from dead works," as
"defiled," and as "guilty?" Yet in this very way
is conscience spoken of in the Scriptures.
2. This declaration comes in contact with what
he had just stated—namely, that "conscience is a
function of the reason." Can the voice of God
be a function of the human reason ? To propose
the question is to show the absurdity of that doc-
trine which we are opposing.
3. If conscience were the voice of God within us,
it would be a perfect guide in all circumstances and
at all times. The light of revelation would not
have been needed, nor would any necessity for the
culture of conscience have existed.
The Rev. Hubbard Winslow, in his very excel-
lent work on Moral Philosophy, has expressed some
views of conscience which we judge to be erro-
neous; although he is supported in them by no less
aulhority than Dr. Alexander. He says that "con-
science is man's susceptibility to moral distinction;"
and he opposes the idea that conscience possesses
any discriminating function. According to Mr.
TO ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
Winslow, conscience is the faculty by which we
feel right and wrong. "We regard this view as erro-
neous, for'the following reasons:
1. Because it is not the province of the mere
intellect to investigate the subject of morals. The
pure intellect can form no conception of duty.
Men may have the most accurate judgment in
reference to natural subjects, to mathematics, to
finances, etc., and be utterly destitute of the ideas
of right and wrong. In cases of congenital moral
derangement, this is admitted to be the case.
There are constitutional thieves, to whom you can-
not show the criminality of theft, "f "We presume
this fact will not be denied. To such persons you
cannot impart the idea of duty, though they receive
ideas upon other subjects with readiness and accu-
racy. Now, the argument is that, if the derange-
ment or deprivation of the moral faculty effaces not
only the feeling but the idea of right and wrong,
the faculty must have a function for 'perceiving as
well as feeling moral distinctions.
2. But we are still more thoroughly convinced
of the erroneousness of this view by the fact that,
in proportion as man loses the power of feeling
moral distinctions, he at the same time loses the
power of judging or discriminating. As is the one,
so is the other, which shows that they are functions
MORAL AGENCY.
71
of the same faculty. One of the greatest writers
and most astute logicians that England ever pro-
duced, had so abused his conscience that he could
neither perceive nor feel that adultery is wrong,
and so taught in his writings.
3. But this view, which Mr. Winslow elaborates
through twenty pages of his "Elements," is in
direct opposition to another view expressed by him.
He says : " Conscience includes the rational power
to discern, with the susceptibility to feel our moral
obligations." Again, he speaks of "its enlightened
decisions." And again, " Conscience includes both
the power of perception and a susceptibility to a
peculiar feeling." In one place he says it does nol
include the power of perception, and in another
place of the same work he makes it include the
power of perception. As two contradictory propo-
sitions cannot both be true, we must judge between
them, and accept that which accords with our no-
tions of truth.
Conscience has been supposed by many to be a
perfect guide; and consequently, when they act in
accordance with the dictates of conscience, they can-
not do wrong.
The truth is, whether conscience guides aright or
not depends upon the light and culture it has re-
72 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
ceived. If light has been offered and refused, or
if the conscience has been blinded or rendered
insensible by a course of sin, man is responsible
for its defect, and is just as guilty as though he
had sinned against it.
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.
1. The existence of conscience affords the highest
proof of the existence and character of God that
can possibly be presented. It not only shows de-
sign, but virtuous design, and hence it not only
manifests the existence of the Divine Being, but
his virtuous character. "It is the strongest argu-
ment which nature furnishes for the moral per-
fections of the Deity; and even with all minds,
or certainly with most minds, it is the most effective
argument for his existence. The inference is
neither a distant nor an obscure one, from the
existence and character of the design, to the exist-
ence and character of the designer."
2. As the existence of intellect shows that man
was designed for knowledge, so the existence of
conscience proves that he was designed for virtue.
And as he instinctively feels that conscience is the
highest faculty of his nature, so he ought to feel
that he was designed more for virtue than for any
MORAL AGENCY.
73
thing else. The softest whispers of conscience are
more imperative, and come armed with higher
authority, than the loudest calls of passion.
3. Virtue for its own sake should he chosen as
the highest end of* man's existence. Just in pro-
portion as man departs from virtue is the design
of his creation perverted, and, instead of accom-
plishing his destiny, his life is a failure.
4. Our theory of conscience being admitted to be
true, man is seen to be invested with a power in-
volving elements of the most fearful character—
elements by which not only the turpitude of sin is
exhibited, but by which its penalties are most ter-
ribly visited. Hence man's highest interests are
indissolubly connected with his highest duty.
5. As conscience teaches more of the Divine
character than any external object, it likewise
teaches more of man as related to God's law.
It behooves us, then, to look deep into our own
natures, and seek a clear and accurate apprehen-
sion of every function of conscience. It behooves
us also to pursue that course which will the most
perfectly develop this important faculty.
4
74 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION VI.
THE WILL: DEFINITION OF THE WILL—FREEDOM OF THE WILL—ARGU-
MENTS TO ESTABLISH ITS FREEDOM OPINIONS OF CELEBRATED
WRITERS IMPORTANCE OF THE DOCTRINE FATALISM RUNS INTO
ATHEISM—QUOTATION FROM FICHTE—STRENGTH OF THE WILL—ITS
CAPACITY FOR GOOD OR EVIL—CULTIVATION OF THE WILL THE
DOCTRINE OF MOTIVES.
In the presentation of the requisites of moral
agency, the will comes next in order.
By the will is meant the power of choice, which
always involves an alternative. Moral agency could
not exist in the absence of power of choice. Man
must he free, or he is incapable of moral agency.
His freedom is found in the will, and can he found
in no other faculty. All his acts of both mind
and body which are involuntary are admitted to
be necessitated, while all that are voluntary are of
course produced, controlled, or necessitated by the
will. Hence the great importance of establishing
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
1. All the promises of the Bible are made upon
the supposition that man is free to accept or to
reject them. It would be absurd to offer promises
to rewhrd a necessitated action. As promises are
offered as incentives to action, they necessarily
MORAL AGENCY.
75
presuppose that the action for the performance of
which the reward is promised is a perfectly volun-
tary one.
2. All the threatenings of the Bible prove with
still more force the freedom of the will. The ab-
surdity of a holy and just God threatening to
punish an agent for an act of which he was not
the master, is too obvious to admit of denial or
to require proof.
3. All our feelings of remorse incontestably
prove that the act for which the remorse is felt
was a free act — that the course exactly opposite
might have been chosen.
4. All our feelings of self-approbation prove that
man is free. No man could stultify his conscience
so far as to commend himself for an unavoidable
act.
5. All human laws go upon the supposition that
man's power of choice is not necessitated. If laws
are rules of action accompanied by sanctions, they
can only be prescribed for those who are free to
obey or to disobey them.
6. The moral law prescribed by God for the gov-
ernment of man proves that the acts of the will
are not necessitated.
7. All distinctions in moral actions—such as
virtue and vice, merit and demerit-—would be ab-
76 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
sard, except upon the principle of the freedom of
the will. A forced action, whether performed by
man or a machine, is intuitively perceived to be
destitute of a moral character.
8. Every man is conscious of his freedom. This
-argument alone is sufficient to answer all the so-
phistry of the fatalist. No argument against the
testimony of consciousness can be of any avail.
Its decisions are imperative, and universally ac-
knowledged.
As this subject is one of vital importance to the
philosopher, and has created much controversy,
we offer the following opinions of distinguished
writers.
Sir William Hamilton says : " Practically, the fact
that we are free is given in the consciousness of an
uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness
of our moral accountability. Practically, our con-
sciousness of the moral law, which without a moral
liberty in man would be a mendacious imperative,
gives a decided preponderance to the doctrine of
freedom over the doctrine of fate. We are free in
act, if we are accountable for our actions." (Hamil-
ton's Philosophy of the Conditioned, pp. 510-512.)
Speaking of the will, Cousin says: "Analysis
discovers in this single element two terms still, a
special act of willing, and the power of willing,
MORAL AGENCY.
77
which is its cause; and this cause, in order to pro-
duce its effect, has no need of another theatre, of
another instrument than itself. It produces it
directly, without intermediation and without con-
dition, continues it, consummates it, or suspends
it, and modifies it, creates it entirely or destroys it
entirely; and at the moment even when it exercises
itself by such a special act, we have the conscious-
ness that it could exercise itself by a special act
entirely contrary, without being thereby exhausted;
so that after having changed its act ten times, a
hundred times, the faculty would remain integrally
the same, inexhaustible and identical with itself, in
the perpetual variety of its applications, being
always able to do what it does not do, and not to do
what it does. Here (that is, in the will) in all its
plenitude is the character of liberty," (History of
Modern Philosophy, pp. 407, 408.)
"By free will," says Prof. Finney, "is intended
the power of choosing, or refusing to choose, in
compliance with moral obligation in every instance.
Free will implies the power of originating and
deciding our own choices, and of exercising our
own sovereignty in every instance of choice upon
moral questions; of deciding or choosing in con-
formity with duty or otherwise in all cases of moral
obligation. That man cannot be under moral obli-
78 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
gation to perform an impossibility, is a first truth
of reason. But man's causality, his whole power
of causality to perform or do any thing, lies in his
will. If he cannot will, he can do nothing. His
whole liberty or freedom must consist in his power
to will. His outward acts and mental states are
connected with his will, by a law of necessity. If
I will to move my muscles, they must move, unless
there be a paralysis of the nerves of voluntary mo-
tion, or unless some resistance be opposed that
overcomes the power of my volitions. The se-
quences of choice or volition are always under the
law of necessity, and unless the will is free, man
has no freedom; and if he has no freedom," he is
not a moral agent." (Systematic Theology, pp. 27,
28.) Again he says: " Liberty is an attribute of
the phenomena of the will. I am as conscious of
being free in willing, as of not being free in my
feelings." Page 32.
Dr. Alexander, the great Princeton divine, and
one of the greatest lights of the Presbyterian
Church, says: "In answer to all arguments brought
to prove that man is not a free moral agent, we
appeal to the consciousness of every rational being.
Ho arguments, however plausible, are of any force
against intuitive principles. "Whether we can or
cannot' answer arguments against liberty, we know
MORAL AGENCY.
79
that we are free." Again he says: "We lay it
down as a first principle, from which we can no
/
more depart than from the consciousness of exist-
ence, that man is free, and therefore stand ready to
embrace whatever is fairly included in the idea of
freedom." (Moral Science, p. 97.)
Hickok utters the following sentiment: " I feel
that my act of will was not bound, in its given
conditions, without an alternative. I know that I
could have done differently if I had pleased; and I
know, moreover, that if I was pleased to do wrong,
that pleasing to do so was not inevitable." (Science
of Mind, p. 272.)
I have been thus careful in collecting these testi-
monies concerning man's free agency, because of
the vast importance of the doctrine in the science
of morals. Fatalism runs into Atheism, and is
utterly destructive of moral accountability.
We will listen to one of the most accomplished
of this school—Fichte. He says: "I myself, with
all that I call mine, am but a link in this chain of
rigid natural necessity. . . . The time at which
my existence commenced, and the attributes he-
longing to me, were determined by this universal
power of Nature, of which I form a part; and all
the forms under which these, my inborn attributes,
have since manifested themselves, have been deter-
80 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
mined by the self-same power. It was impossible
that instead of me another should have arisen, it is
impossible that at any moment of my existence I
should be other than what I am. ... I am,
and I think, both absolutely and necessarily. . . .
Give to hfature a single definition of a person, let
it be ever so apparently trivial, the course of a
muscle, the turn of a hair, and she would be able,
had she a universal consciousness, to declare what
would be his whole course of thought during his
whole course of being. Most certainly I cannot,
by all my repentance, by all my resolutions, pro-
duce the smallest alteration in the appointed course
of things. I stand under the inexorable power of
rigid necessity: should she have destined me to
become a fool and a profligate, a fool and a profli-
gate without doubt I shall become. Should she
have destined me to be wise and good, wise and
good I shall doubtless be. There is neither merit
nor blame to be attached to her or to me. She
stands under her own laws, I under hers."
Here is no ambiguity, no concealment. The doc-
trine, in all its horrid deformity, is clearly, fully
stated. Man is like a piece of inert matter carried
along by a strong current, and he must quietly sub-
mit to be borne along at its mercy. This system
dethrones Deity, degrades humanity, destroys
MORAL A 0 K j\ 0 Y.
81
moral law, annihilates human responsibility, and
swallows up, in one dread vortex, all our hopes and
fears, our wills and consciences, in fact all that is
noble in action or virtuous in resolve. On the
other hand, the theory of free-will being true, God
is recognized, his moral government is a great
truth, human responsibility a fearful reality, and
man has it in his power to work out a noble
destiny,
STRENGTH OF THE WILL.
The will has no power to control our perceptions
or to determine our cognitions. They must be as
the objects perceived or known. No act of the will
can make us perceive a horse to be a tree, or the
opposite. Nor can the will, by any force it is capa-
ble of exerting, make the body warm when it is
cold, or, by the mere act of willing, satisfy the
cravings of hunger, etc., yet the will possesses
great strength, which may be illustrated as fol-
lows;
1. The will of God is the greatest causative
power in the universe; probably the will of man is
next. Its effects are seen in the formation of gov-
ernments, and the revolutions of empires.
2. A strong will enables man to endure the
greatest sufferings without complaint^ ^ As in the
4*
82 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
case of Mucius Scsevola, who stood with unmoved
countenance while his right hand was consumed in
the flames. The racks of the Inquisition have not
been able to move the man of strong will from his
governing purpose.
8. It enables its possessor to triumph over pas-
sion, and subdue appetite, and, upon occasions, rise
superior to the force of inveterate habit.
4. Strength of will is essential to the accomplish-
ment of great enterprises. It enabled Hannibal to
pass the Alps, Columbus to discover America,
"Washington to triumph in the Revolution, Bona-
parte to bring Europe to his throne, and imparted
to Andrew Jackson the force which characterized
him as a hero and a statesman.
A strong will, when directed to the performance
of right, is capable of effecting the most-beneficial
results; but, when directed to evil, it may become
the most fearful instrument of ruin. It may nerve
the arm of the assassin, as well as invigorate the
heart of the benefactor; it may give success to the
traitor, as well as victory to the patriot. Hence the
necessity of the
CULTIVATION OF THE WILL.
The will is to be cultivated: 1. By shunning all
those influences which may enthrall it or give it a
MORAL AGENCY.
83
morally wrong direction; such as, 1. Party or sec-
tarian prejudices; 2. Sudden but violent gusts of
passion; 3. Long-continued self-indulgence, or any
vicious habit whatever. Persons have become so
depraved by habit, that when they " would do good,
evil was present with them."
2. The will is to be cultivated by always giving
the assistance of reason and enlightened conscience.
The will should he rational, not arbitrary. God's
will is never arbitrary—it is always a rational will:
so should man's be. There should be no act of the
will merely for the sake of willing, but always for a
sufficient reason. So, also, the will should be cul-
tivated in connection with conscience. We should
will nothing which conscience disapproves.
3. But lastly, the will is to he cultivated by sub-
mitting it to the will of God. Let the will of man
concur with the will of God, and its acts will cer-
tainly be right.
THE DOCTRINE OF MOTIVES.
Sir William Hamilton says, "A determination by
motives cannot to our understanding escape from
necessitation." And yet he maintained the free-
dom of the will, and a determination by motives.
On this subject Dr. Alexander is chargeable with
a strange contradiction. On page 92 of his Moral
84 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
Science, lie makes the broad declaration, " No in-
voluntary action can be of a moral nature," This
theory be attempts to prove, and we think with
success. On page 140 of the same work, he says,
" It is clear, then, that men are more accountable
for their motives than for any thing else." If both
these statements are true, and we do not doubt
their truth, man must he master of his motives,
or, in other words, they must be voluntary, or they
ean have no moral character. On page 120, he
says: "If there is one point above all others on
which responsibility rests, it is on the motives
from which proceeds volition, and by which it is
governed." According to our understanding, he
first declares man irresponsible, except for volun-
tary actions; second, he is responsible for his
motives; third, his motives are not voluntary;
hence he is responsible for what he cannot avoid—
for what is involuntary.
Men almost instinctively and universally refuse
to hold a man responsible for any thing unavoid-
able, and, with equal instinctiveness and univers-
ality, agree to hold him responsible for his motives.
This very fact establishes the universal belief of
the voluntariness of motives. Impugn a man's
motives, and he at once becomes highly offended.
No offence could arise if there were not a universal
MORAL AGENCY.
85
consciousness that will governs the motive, and
not motive the will. Man, by his intelligence, his
reason, and his conscience, examines the various
motives that may present themselves for his choice,
and by his will he chooses them.
The truth is, that instead of motives governing
the will, the will always determines the motives,
and is itself free.
1. If the motives were involuntary, man would
no more he responsible for his motives than for
any act committed while the body was convulsed
with spasms.
2. If the motives were the governors of the will,
and man of course could not choose his motives,
the law should not ask the " quo animo"—the mo-
tive that prompted the act.
3. If the motives were not voluntary, man could
feel no condemnation for acting from them—they
being entirely beyond his control.
4. If the motives were not voluntary, the will
would be necessitated, controlled, and we should
look for freedom in some other attribute, or man
would lose his character as a free agent. It has
been shown that all the acts of both mind and
body are necessitated except the acts of the will;
if, then, this be necessitated, man has no freedom.
The acts that are not voluntary are admitted to be
86 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
controlled by physical or other laws ; and all the
acts of mind or body that are voluntary are of
course necessitated, by the will. If the will then be
necessitated, man becomes a machine, human re-
sponsibility a fiction, and the whole system of
morals a fable.
"We come then to the conclusion that the will
chooses the motives, the motives determine the
character of the action, and hence the propriety
of holding man responsible for his motives.
SECTION VII.
LIGHT : ITS SOURCES THE LIGHT OF NATURE—THE LIGHT OF REVE-
LATION.
It has been stated that in order to render man
accountable, he must not only have intellect, sen-
sibilities, conscience, and free-will, but that, in addi-
tion to all these, there must be light. In this section
we propose to give the sources of this light, and
the manner of teaching morality to man.
THE LIGHT OF NATURE.
The light of nature teaches that ignorance is
universally the penalty of idleness: hence is readily
inferred a most important duty in reference to the
intellect. It also teaches us that loss of health,
MORAL AGENCY.
87
and either a lingering or sudden death, are the
penalties of inordinate indulgence of the appetites.
Hence from the light of nature we infer the duties
of temperance and chastity, and the vices of intern-
perance and debauchery. Or take the affections.
The indulgence of resentment in any of its forms,
and especially of revenge, is attended with the
most painful consequences: aggression joiust follow
aggression, until, if not arrested, the annihilation
of society would he the fearful consequence. On
the other hand, the gratification of the benevolent
affections, such as parental love, or the love of the
human race, is attended with the highest gratifica-
tion, and with the very best results. Hence is
inferred the duty of benevolence, and the sin of
revenge.
So, by the light of nature we may judge of the
propriety of an action from the results of such an
action. It is our only means of judging. As re-
velation is absent, and no duty declared or sin
forbidden, it must only be by the " light of expe-
Hence" that our feet can be guided. Upon the
same principle, by looking at the consequences of
falsehood, we may learn the duty of veracity. By
seeing the consequences of fraud, we may learn the
duty of honesty. Hence the old adage, " Honesty
is the best policy."
88 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
Now let it be distinctly understood what relation
the intellect and moral sense bear to this light.
"Without light the powers of both would be dor-
mant and undeveloped. Neither intellect nor con-
science is a light—they are the receptacles of light.
As no natural truth could be perceived without
light, so no moral truth could be perceived with-
out light. . The clearness of the light determines
the accuracy with which truth or duty may be
apprehended. As a man in a starless night, with-
out one ray of light, would be unable to see his
path, so without either the light of nature or of
revelation he could have no idea of the path of
duty. As in the dim twilight the path may be
obscurely discerned, so in the dim light of nature
he may faintly discover the path of duty.
Again, as the medium through which light passes
greatly changes its character, and gives either the
red, blue, or yellow ray the ascendency, imparting
to objects the red, blue, or yellow tinge, so the
moral medium, whether it be prejudice, supersti-
tion, tradition, or any form of error, gives its par-
ticular hue to the moral objects discerned. And
as in the former instance the fault would not be
in the light, nor in the eye, but in _the medium,
so, in the latter, the fault may not be in the
light, nor in the conscience, but in the medium by
MORAL AGENCY,
Si)
which it has been perverted. We believe the
light of nature is a great source of knowledge,
and that it is rather imperfect in degree than in
kind.
1. It teaches us duties, a knowledge of which
could not be obtained without it.
2. It presents motives to virtue. 1st. Motives
derived from the natural consequences of crime
or virtue, such as loss of health, destruction of life,
etc.; or the peace of society, the happiness of the
race, etc. 2d. Motives derived from the moral
consequences, such as shame, guilt, remorse, or the
opposites of them, self-approbation, peace of con-
science, and the like.
That this system is defective is proved, 1st. By
reference to the fact that under its influence the
course of man has been one of moral deterioration.
The heathen always regarded their first age as the
golden, their second as the silver, their third as
brazen, and their fourth as iron. 2d. The religious
and moral systems of the heathen were based upon
natural religion. Those systems were essentially
defective, and necessarily so from the very defect-
ive light with which they were favored. Those
defective systems, moreover, existed at a time when
the mind had arrived at a very high state of im-
provement; when the arts and sciences had made
90 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
astonishing progress, and when civilization had
been cultivated by a people learned in all the wis-
dom of this world's philosophy. Still these very
people were bound down to those systems of false
philosophy and false religion. The causes of these
defects are inherent in the system of natural reli-
gion, and are obvious to any who may give to the
subject a little reflection.
1. The light of nature teaches only by experi-
ence. Experience is a slow teacher: the know-
ledge gained by experience is not only dearly
bought, but slowly bought. As we must learn the
nature of an action by the consequences of the
action, of course we must not only await the per-
formance, but must actually await the results of
the action before we can determine its moral char-
acter. Sometimes these results may follow imme-
diately, at other times they do not follow until
long years after the performance of the action.
2. However clear may be the inferences, yet in-
ferences only they are. They are not the indubit-
able utterances of truth in words. They are not
the unmistakable language of a great lawgiver.
Hence much of the nature of fact remains in ob-
scurity, and must for ever remain uncertain, until
the uncertainty is removed by the light of revela-
tion.
MORAL AGENCY.
91
LIGHT OF REVELATION.
The revealed facts of Christianity are not very
numerous, but they are very important, and in
their light our duties may be distinctly seen. They
are, 1. The existence and perfections of God. 2.
The creation of man. From these clearly revealed
facts we may learn the- duties we owe to God.
3. The original purity of our race. 4. The fall of
man, involving human depravity, in all its fearful
extent and depth. 5. The great remedial dispen-
sation. From these last, three great facts may be
learned the cf&ty, and from" them also may be
derived incentives to the attainment of moral
purity. 6. The great fact of retribution in a future
state. 7. The fact of the resurrection of the body.
From these last may be deduced those awful
motives which arouse man under a sense of his
immortality, and excite his hopes and fears in
reference to present duties as connected with the
eternal future. ^Christianity not only reveals these
great facts, but lays down many precepts, and
hence it may be necessary to state certain leading
principles which should guide us in learning our
duty from the light of revelation. There are three
eupposable methods of revealing duty:
9% ELEMENT? OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
1. A specific revelation in reference to every
relation into which man could enter, and of every
duty connected with that relation. According to
this, every change of circumstance would he noted,
and every possible phase of relation during the
entire course of man's existence distinctly marked.
The objection to this method would be that the
revelation would be so voluminous as to render it
impossible for any one to subject it to a thorough
examination,
2. The statement of mere general principles, in
the light of which duties may be learned; but
these general principles to be illustrated by no
specific duties or special examples. According to
this, all is to be generals-nothing special. And
even the most general principle is to be left without
illustration. The objection to this is its vague-
ness, and the consequent difficulty of arriving,
with any degree of certainty, at a knowledge of our
duties,
3. The third method embraces the good and
discards the objectionable features of both the
others, According to this, general principles are
clearly stated, and they are illustrated by specific
examples, so that in no supposable case in which
man can be placed can he fail to learn his duty,
MORAL AGENCY.
93
if he make the proper effort. This seems to be the
method adopted by God in the revelation which he
has given to us.
In learning our duty from the Bible, certain •
things are to be excluded as not obligatory
upon us.
1. Every thing that is merely historical; for the
mere fact that any thing has been done, and has
been recorded in God's book, by no means places
us under obligation to perform it.
2. All those duties which were required of
particular men in particular circumstances are
excluded. Such commands as were only intended
for individuals, or even nations in particular
circumstances, would not be binding upon us.
3. All those laws which are merely ceremonial,
and which were simply intended to separate one
nation from all others, or which had reference to
types of a new dispensation, are to be ex-
eluded.
4. All that is not enjoined upon man as man,
is excluded upon this principle.
6. Any command which, taken literally, is found
to be directly antagonistic to the great principles
of Christianity, and to other positive specific duties
of the Christian system, is to be regarded as not
binding; for duties can never clash, nor can a
94 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
specific duty come in contact witli a correct general
principle.
In learning our duty from the Bible, certain
things are to he included.
1. All that is required of man as man, in
distinction from what has been required either of
individuals or of nations.
2. All those specific duties which do not come
in conflict with other commands, or with the great
principles contained in revelation.
If, then, we are reading the Old Testament, we
should inquire, To whom were these commands
given ? In what circumstances ? For what object ?
Is the command renewed in the Hew Testament?
If we are endeavoring to find out our duty from
the Hew Testament, the way is plain. Most of its
requirements are made of man as man, and not
of man in any peculiar circumstances, such as
surrounded the Jewish nation, so that here the
inquiry should he: Is a duty required? Am I
included among those of whom the duty is
required ? Would the practice (though not precisely
forbidden) come in conflict with the duties that
are known to be binding?
How bright is the light thrown on our path by
this candle of the Lord! Men may differ in regard
to abstruse points of theology, but in regard to
MORAL AGENCY.
95
duty there should be no controversy. Before this
light the clouds of bigotry and error should disap-
pear like mists before the rising sun. Before this
all lesser lights grow dim, as stars fade at early
morn. In this presence heathen oracles are dumb,
and heathen philosophy gives up its crown. It
breaks in "upon slumbering and benighted man in
characters of flame, startling him from his slumbers,
enlightening his darkness, and even dazzling his
vision by its divine radiance. Man needed the
light shining in truthful narrative, flashing in
earnest precepts, glittering in song and promise,
ascending in auroral splendors amid grand and
eternal truths, spanning with beautiful etful-
gence the valley of death, and opening before his
vision the portals of immortality. For this light
man labored, looked, and prayed. At length it
came. It reaffirmed the moral law which was
given to us in natural religion, in its whole extent,
and sanctioned the severity of its demands. Its
precepts have regard not so much to outward acts
as to the disposition of mind from which such acts
proceed, and to the secret purposes of the heart.
By it we perceive that the great design of creation
is a moral one; that all physical arrangements and
events, as we are accustomed to call them, are
chiefly intended to promote the growth of the
90 ELEMENTS OE MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
religious element in man, and to introduce the
reign of justice, purity, and love, of truth and
righteousness, upon the earth. By this light God
is displayed in nature before the mind of man,
creating the universe, fixing its laws, harmonizing
its movements. He becomes the God of providence,
marshalling the clouds, sending the showers, cloth-
ing the earth with verdure, painting the lily, and
noticing the falling sparrow. By it the Redeemer's
footprints are seen, and under its potent influence
life and immortality become a divine reality. It is
a power—a sublime moral power—for no other
power has ever dismantled the grave, lighted up its
gloom, and made its dreary slumbers hopeful.
Again and again has man presumptuously turned
away from the light of Christianity; but the earnest
prayer of the author is that all who read this
volume may ever be guided by the light of religion,
and may ever be influenced by the words of the
"Great Teacher."
moral obligation.
97
CHAPTER IV.
moral obligation.
DEFINITION OF MORAL OBLIGATION — FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLI-
OATION TRUE THEORY GIVEN AND ESTABLISHED CONDITIONS
OF OBLIGATION — EXTENT OF OBLIGATION — BELIEF—PRINCIPLES —
HABITS INTENTIONS.
Moral obligation is that which binds moral
beings to the observance of moral law. When pros-
pectively considered, it bears the same relation to
law that virtue does when retrospectively considered.
Obligation has the same relation to law, in refer-
ence to future action, that virtue has in reference
to past action. Obligation requires the observance
of moral law: virtue has met the requirement.
Every being endowed with a moral nature feels the
force of moral obligation with a power and vivid-
ness which give a clearer idea of the meaning of
the term than can be conveyed by any definition.
98 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
In the definition given above, we believe, however,
all authors concur.
In reference to the ground of moral obligation,
authors have presented theories at once unsatis-
factory, numerous, contradictory, and false. One
has made utility; another, right; another, self-
interest; a fourth, sympathy; a fifth, fitness; a
sixth, moral order; a seventh, the will of God.
liemember that all these answers have been given
to the celebrated question propounded by Dr. Paley,
"Why am I obliged to keep my word?" and hence
have each been assumed as the only foundation
of moral obligation.
To our mind, all these theories have a tendency
to mystify one of the; plainest subjects in morals.
This question is supposed to be asked by one who
is satisfied that an obligation is upon him to keep
his word; but, not satisfied with a knowledge of
the existence of the ^obligation, he carries his
inquiries still farther, even to the foundation on
which the acknowledged obligation rests. How,
we venture the assertion thfit no mere seeker after
truth, no earnest inquirer after the path of duty,
ever did ask or ever will ask such a question as the
one propounded by Dr. Paley, and discussed with
so much zeal and learning by others. Heither
reason nor conscience, unbiased by a pseudo-philo-
MORAL OBLIGATION.
99
sophy, ever made such an inquiry as, "Why is it a
duty to do my duty ? or, Why am I obliged to meet
an acknowledged obligation? The question is
based upon the supposition that a man, with the
acknowledged obligation to tell the truth, with the
deep feeling that he ought to tell the truth, is still
seeking for a higher, a stronger reason for telling
the truth. A man's disposition to lie must be
extreme, when the felt obligation to tell the truth
is not a sufficient reason for telling it. Suppose
you convince a man that it is his duty to perform
a certain act, to make reparation for some injury
done: he acknowledges that he ought to do what
is required, he feels it, he knows it; but now he
says, Just show why I ought to do what you have
convinced me I ought to do, and without hesitation
I will do it. You would at once doubt either his
sanity or his sincerity. You would say, Does the
man wish me to show him that it is his duty to do
his duty? Is he really in earnest in asking me to
give him a reason for doing what he admits to be
his duty ?
That we have not misrepresented the question is
evident from the following authorities:
President Mahan says: " The question as to the
foundation of obligation resolves itself simply and
exclusively into this one—namely, What are the
100 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
reasons in view of which snch affirmations are
made ? What are the reasons for which the intelli-
gence affirms that the will ought to put forth
certain intentions or choices, and ought not to put
forth others? This one question being correctly
answered, we have discovered the real and only
foundation of moral obligation. hTo one, we pre-
sume, will deny that this is a distinct and correct
statement of the question."
" The foundation of moral obligation," says Pre-
sident Finney, "is the reason or consideration that
imposes obligation on a moral agent to obey moral
law."
Dr. Paley thus presents the subject: " Why am I
obliged to keep my word? Because it is right,
says one; because it is agreeable to the fitness of
things, says another; because it is conformable to
reason, says a third," etc.
ISTow we hold that all theories in regard to the
foundation of moral obligation are based upon the
false assumption that a higher reason for the per-
formance of obligation can be given, or is required
to be given, than the existence of obligation; while
the truth is, obligation is original, self-sustaining,
and ultimate, and is not only the highest, but the
most authoritative reason that can be given for the
performance of any act. Satisfy any sane mind
MO liAL OBLIGATION.
101
that obligation exists to pursue a certain course of
conduct, and no other reason is wanted, for none of
equal authority can be given.
Dr. Paley himself has shown that no answer can
be given to the question, " What is the foundation
of moral obligation?" which will prevent it from
being instantly repeated. For instance, Dr. Paley
makes all obligation rest on the ground that virtue
promotes our eternal happiness. The inquiry im-
mediately arises, Why am I obliged to promote my
eternal happiness ? Or take Finney's theory, which
is, that the highest well-being of God and the uni-
verse is the only foundation of moral obligation.
Again the question immediately recurs, Why am I
bound to promote the well-being of God and the
universe? And so with every other theory that
has been presented. This is not the line pursued
by the intellect. It does not move in a circle. It
must have an ultimate on which to repose; and
what can afford to the mind such support as the
idea of obligation ? Resting on this foundation, it
asks no firmer stay. Instead of for ever moving in
a circle, seeking satisfaction and finding none, it
rests with an unwavering confidence on moral obli-
gation, as one of those grand first truths vouch-
safed to us by the Almighty.
The following considerations will probably con-
102 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
vince most impartial minds that the position here
taken is true.
1. If obligation be not ultimate, then conscience
is not the highest faculty of man's nature. The
admitted supremacy of conscience is not true, if
obligation itself be not supreme. If there can be
any higher reason for the performance of a work
than the claims of moral obligation, which lays
hold of the conscience, then is the oft-quoted saying
of Bishop Butler false: " If conscience had might
as it has right, it would absolutely rule the world."
2. If obligation be not ultimate, and there is
something behind it of a more binding character,
then is our whole moral nature a lie, its authori-
tative imperatives are mendacious, the remorse
which it inflicts is a fiction, and the feelings of self-
approbation for the performance of virtue are unreal.
For we dare assert, that all its commands are only
in view of obligation; that remorse follows the vio-
lation, and peace of conscience the observance of
obligation; and that no consideration is ever
extended beyond obligation, either in its com-
mands, its impulses, its rewards, or its penalties.
3. If obligation be not ultimate, then can the
human mind find nothing ultimate. For it can be
demonstrated that no answer can be given to the
question. What is the foundation of moral obliga-
MORAL OBLIGATION. 10^
tiou ? which will prevent the recurrence of the
question. Take the answers that have been given
to the question as proposed by Paley, "Why am I
obliged to keep my word?" "Because it is right,"
says one. The question immediately recurs, "Why
am I obliged to do what is right?" "Because it
promotes the public good," says another. Again
the question comes up, " Why am I obliged to pro-
mote the public good ?" And thus may the ques-
tion be repeated for ever, and the mind never find
a resting-place—an ultimate, blow we hold that
the mind does not thus move in a circle, and that
this very unnatural movement is proof positive of
the absurdity of the question, and of the folly of
seeking an answer.
4. If obligation be not ultimate, then obligation
is not binding per se. For the very question pre-
supposes a reason of greater moment than the sense
of duty—a reason which, lying behind obligation
and supporting it, may impart to it a force which
does not inherently belong to it. If obligation is
binding per se, why require one to give a reason for
performing a duty other than is found in duty
itself?
5. Universal consciousness proclaims the supreme
and ultimate nature of moral obligation. Here,
and here alone, the mind rests satisfied, and feels
104 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
that no more commanding reason can be given for
the performance of an act, than that we are under
obligation to perform it. It acknowledges that the
great culminating idea of our humanity is moral
obligation.
"We hold, then, that in regard to any specific act,
it is reasonable to inquire whether an obligation
exists to perform it; hut this being ascertained, to
attempt to inquire into the foundation of the obli-
gation, is to enter upon a series of questions at
once interminable, absurd, and unnecessary, pro-
ducing confusion of thought, and involving the
mind in a mist of metaphysical nonsense. We hold
it to be just as absurd to ask why we ought to do
what we ought to do, as to ask why things equal to
the same thing are equal to each other, or to ask
why two and two make four. And we believe that
the many writers who have mystified themselves
and their readers, by seeking for a ground of obli-
gation, have inadvertently admitted the supreme
and ultimate nature of this principle.
For example, take the answers that have been
given to the question. One says utility; another,
self-interest, etc. Now what do these answers
mean, except that an obligation exists to be useful,
to promote self-interest, or "to do the will of God ?
If they do not mean this, they are utterly destitute
MORAL OBLIGATION.
105
of meaning; and if they do mean this, they estab-
lish the truth of our theory.
Every science has its first truths, upon which the
whole fabric is reared. The axioms of mathematics
are intuitively perceived, and from them the student
goes forward to the solution of the most difficult
problems. It is so in natural philosophy; it is
equally so in morals. Among these, moral obliga-
tion, intuitively perceived by all moral beings, and
rested upon as eternal and immutable, lies at the
foundation of the sublime science of morals.
With a little care, we may be able to account for
the manner in which philosophers have been led
into this fundamental error. They misapprehended
the evidences by which the existence of obligation
is established, for the foundation of obligation;
whereas, they are two entirely different subjects;
as may be seen by the following illustration: " I
believe in the existence of God." How the founda-
tion of that belief is one thing, and the proof that
I do believe it is another. So in regard to every
thing else: the foundation of its existence, and the
proofs of its existence, are two things essentially
different. But in reference to moral obligation, we
find that whatever can be taken as proof of its
existence has been assumed as its foundation. It
may be the foundation upon which rests the belief
5*
106 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
in the existence of obligation, and not that upon
which is based the obligation itself.
The question really answered by all these theo-
rists is not, Why am I obliged ? but, What am I
obliged to do ? And this is the inquiry proposed
by every honest seeker after truth and duty. One
says, You are obliged to do whatever the will of
God requires; and another, whatever will promote
the public good, etc. Yow who does not see that
these answers are legitimate, and that they may
both be correct? The will of God is, to the mind
of the writer, always sufficient evidence of what
man, in all his relations, is under obligation to do.
When duty is revealed in the Bible, the evidence is
complete, and the mind is satisfied. But when no
explicit declaration of the will of God teaches the
existence of the obligation, it may be learned by
the tendency of the act, or by the relations of the
actors. By whatever evidence the existence of obli-
gation may be made manifest to the mind, when
the fact is known, all inquiries in reference to it
cease, and the mind reposes upon it, with the assur-
ance which God's own eternal and immutable truths
always impart.
The conditions of moral obligation are intelli-
gence, free-will, sensibilities, conscience, and a suf-
ficiency of light to develop these powers. So soon
MORAL OBLIGATION.
107
as these conditions exist, obligation exists; had
they existed from eternity, moral obligation would
also have existed. Let such conditions meet in
any being, and obligation becomes supreme, and
be feels that God himself cannot change it; for
this is only feeling and saying that it is impossible
for God to act contrary to his own nature, or that
it " is impossible for God to lie." As these are
universally admitted to be the conditions of moral
obligation, and as we do not hope to add any
thing new, we pass to the investigation of its ex-
tent.
As a general principle, we assume that obliga-
tion extends to all intelligent acts of the will.
According to this principle, it does not extend to
any instinct, nor to any involuntary affection or
desire, nor to any involuntary act of intellect, nor
to any involuntary muscular act. In the light of
the same principle, we maintain the following
points:
I. Moral obligation extends to the belief.
1. Our first argument to establish this position
is derived from analogy. Man is held responsible
to physical law, and why not to moral ? Let a man
determine' to • take corrosive sublimate under the
sincere belief that it is innocent, and death will be
the consequence in spite of his belief; he may sin-
108 ELEMENTS OF MOliAL PHILOSOPHY.
cerely believe that indulgence in alcoholic liquors
will do him no harm, but the signals of distress
which violated nature will hang out will convince
others, if not himself, that he is responsible to phy-
sical law.
2. The influence of belief upon the heart is con-
elusive evidence that obligation extends to the
belief. The tendency of error, however sincerely
believed, is to corrupt the heart and degrade the
conscience. The tendency of truth is to purify and
exalt the moral sensibilities. This shows that man
is fearfully accountable for his belief.
3. The intimate connection between belief and
conduct proves the same truth. A man who be-
lieved polygamy right, would not be very apt to
regard with proper rigor the law of marriage. If,
then, he be not responsible for his belief, in all law
and right he should not be held responsible for his
conduct, the result of that belief.
4. The trial by jury, in which the juror is sworn
to decide according to evidence, would be a mock-
ery on any other supposition than that man is
under obligation to believe according to the evi-
dence.
5. If sincerity can give to error the character of
truth, it must of course give to vice the character
of virtue. Hence, to deny that obligation extends
MOKAL OBLIGATION.
109
to the belief, is to deny that truth and error, virtue
and vice, possess distinctive qualities.
Other arguments might be added, but these are
deemed sufficient. It may, however, be proper to
explain how it is that obligation extends to the belief.
In belief there are three things: a thing believed, a
believing mind, and evidences on which the belief
is founded. Evidence, to have its proper influence,
must be examined, weighed, and understood. This
requires attention, perseverance, and the earnest
direction of the mind to its investigation. We
may or we may not examine the evidence. We
are perfectly free to examine, or refuse to examine,
or to examine under the influence of partiality or
prejudice. The will is uncontrolled; hence the
responsibility.
H. Man is responsible for his principles ; that
is, he is under obligation to have right principles.
Principles sustain the same relation to the moral
nature that belief sustains to the intellectual. They
are the tempers or dispositions which issue in
actions. It is the avarice that causes the miser to
hoard his coin, unjuindful of the calls of pity or the
duties of benevolence, that we regard as base. It
is the malice that nerves the arm of the assassin
that we condemn. And no man can regard the
sleeping robber or murderer in the same light in
110 ELEMENTS OE MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
which, he views the unconscious infant. If the
actions proceeding from corrupt principles are
worthy of condemnation, much more worthy are
the principles from which the actions spring. "Why
condemn the stream for its pollutions, if you do
not condemn the source? Corrupt a man's prin-
ciples, and his conduct will become corrupt.
1. Man is more detested for had principles than
for instances of bad conduct.
2. Men will overlook slight departures from rec-
titude if the principles are believed to be sound.
3. If we are satisfied of the correctness of a man's
principles, we are always sure that his conduct will
be just and proper.
" 4. All teachers of morals urge the importance of
cultivating correct principles as the basis of good
character. hTow, if obligation does not extend to
the principles, you are deprived of one of the
strongest incentives to their cultivation.
5. All the vicious that seek the ruin of the in-
nocent, try first to vitiate their principles. When
they have poisoned their principles, they make
them an easy prey. IsTo seducer seeks to gain his
unholy ends but by corrupting the principles of
his weak and unfortunate victim.
6. The Great Teacher makes the principles the
sources of all evil, or of all good. The very
MORAL OBLIGATION.
Ill
essence of his religion consists in purifying the
heart and correcting the moral principles. His
blessings are poured upon the meek, charitable,
forgiving, patient, and pure. He was the embodi-
ment of all holy principles; and he exalts before
our gaze, and offers to our imitation, such prin-
ciples as adorned his godlike, character.
HI. Moral obligation extends in the next place
to the habits.
By habit is meant the increased inclination and
facility acquired in the performance of an act by
frequent repetition. Hence it is the product of
custom, and of course always involves custom. It
is thus portrayed by Dr. Chalmers:
"If ever for once we have described the process
of thought and feeling which leads through the
imagination or the senses from the first presenta-
tion of a tempting object to a guilty indulgence,
this of itself establishes a probability that, on the
recurrence of that object, we shall pass onwards
by the same steps to the same consummation.
And it is a probability ever strengthening with
every repetition of the process, till, at length, it
advances towards the moral certainty of a helpless
surrender to the tyranny of those evil passions
which we cannot resist, just because the will itself
is in thraldom, and we choose not to resist. It is
112 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
thus that we might trace the progress of intemper-
ance and licentiousness, and even of dishonesty, to
whose respective solicitations we have yielded at
the first—till by continuing to yield we become
the passive, the prostrate subjects of a force that is
uncontrollable only because we have seldom or
never in good earnest tried to control it. It is
not that we are struck of a sudden with moral
impotency; but we are gradually benumbed into
it. The power of temptation has not made instant
seizure upon the faculties or taken them by storm.
It proceeds by an influence that is gently and im-
perceptibly progressive."
The insidious nature of habit is often observed
in the downward course of the inebriate. At first
a network of gossamer entangles him; he could
break every thread, and scarcely realize that he had
made an effort. You tell him of his danger, and
he laughs at your foolish fears. But pursue him
for a few years, or even months—the gossamer
threads become adamantine chains, and the strength
of a giant would be required to break them. He
yields himself a willing victim to the inveteracy of
habit, and can only utter useless wails over his pros-
trate condition. As the cords that bind him have
grown stronger, the power to break them has be-
come less, until with the helplessness of infancy
MORAL OBLIGATION.
113
he vainly seeks to accomplish what Titanic force
would hardly effect. Thus have we traced the
operation of habits; from which we infer that obli-
gation extends to them.
1. Because they are voluntarily contracted.
Habits do not force themselves upon men; on
the contrary, man chooses any habit of which he
may become the victim.
2. In their early history they could be easily
overcome, and one victory would give the victor
such power as by the force of the same law would
make every successive victory more easy.
3. Even the most inveterate habits have been
conquered by a strong will, assisted by reason and
conscience.
4. Because good habits may be as readily con-
tracted as vicious ones; and if we do not hold man
responsible for the bad, we cannot praise him for
the good.
5. Because if we allow habits to change the moral
character of actions, we at once break down the
distinction between virtue and vice. Suppose we
allow habit to be pleaded in extenuation of a crime,
merely to lessen the guilt: if habit can be pleaded
to justify swearing, lying, or drinking, it should fol-
low, of course, that the habitual murderer or the
common highwayman is less guilty in propor-
114 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
tion to the number of robberies or murders com-
mitted.
What a fearful element of our nature is here pre-
sented! The more frequently we perform a virtuous
action, the more capable of virtue we become; and
the more frequently we engage in vice, the more
capable we become of progress in vice. Progress
in vice—of what fearful import are these words!
Down, down, and yet ever descending in all the
depths of vice, and still lower depths opening to
receive the victim.
The first oath the boy swore trembled on his lips;
the first lie almost palsied his tongue; the first de-
parture from virtue stung his heart with a scorpion
lash; but, alas ! his lips fear not now to utter horrid
oaths, his oily tongue falters not at the utterance of
falsehood, and his base passions find remorseless
gratification in dens of infamy.
Youthful reader, remember a dear lover of youth
warns you against the formation of vicious habits.
Remember the fearful doctrine, we are responsible
for our habits.
IV. Moral obligation extends to the intentions.
Originally, it is probable, obligation extends di-
rectly to the intention only, when reference is made
to any special act. That this is true may be in-
ferred from the following facts and arguments:
MORAL OBLIGATION.
115
1. When any specific wrong act is charged upon
children, they universally excuse themselves by say-
ing they did not intend it; and the excuse so uni-
versally given is received, provided the injured
party is certain that no evil intention existed.
2. All jurisprudence, by inquiring into the inten-
tion, and by settling the act and its penalty by the
intention, shows that originally and directly moral
obligation extends only to the intention.
3. The same fact is established by reference to
the different class of feelings which arise towards
the person who has intentionally done us an injury
or a favor, and towards one who, without intention,
may have injured us, or conferred upon us a favor.
4. The Great Teacher removes all doubt, in re-
gard to specific acts, when he teaches us that he
who intends a crime is guilty whether he commit
the overt act or not.
5. As the intention decides the moral quality of
the act, it must follow that moral obligation extends
directly to that and that alone.
6. God has agreed to take a willing mind as
obedience to the whole law. If the intention is
right, it is accepted by him as obedience. And if
right intention is absent, no outward act of devotion,
of self-denial, or of any service whatever is accepted
by him as obedience. Hence all obedience exists
116 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
in the intention; so that if one has intended to do
right, his intention is set down to his credit, and he
is rewarded accordingly.
The muscles of the body by which the outward,
act is performed, the attention and pursuits of the.
intellect, and the states of the sensibility, are under
the control directly or indirectly of the will, and
hence moral obligation extends to the belief, to the
principles, and to the outward conduct or habits, as
was shown in the preceding part of the chapter. It
is through the intention that moral obligation may
be said to extend to any outward act, or to an}'- state
of the intelligence or sensibility.
moral conduct.
117
CHAPTER V.
moral conduct.
SECTION I.
definition of moral conduct—theory of morals—mandeville's
theory: objections wollaston's theory: objections to wol-
laston's theory—hume's theory: objections to hume—sel-
fish theory: arguments against the selfish system—theory
of disinterested benevolence : objections—theory of sym-
pathy: objections.
By moral conduct is meant the conduct of moral
beings, having reference to moral law and to moral
obligation. It is conduct which has a moral qual-
ity, and may be regarded as right or wrong, as vir-
tuous or vicious. Dr. Abercrombie has with great
care given the different theories of morals; Dr.
Alexander has done the same; and Dr. Thomas
Brown still more extensively than either. "We shall
avail ourselves of the labors of these excellent
writers, and give to the student the different theo-
ries of morals.
118 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
I. Mandeville's theory is, that virtue consists in
a conformity of the conduct to the laws of the state.
The motive governing the conduct is the love of
praise. Man, he says, naturally seeks his own
gratification, without any regard to the happiness
of other men. But legislators found that it would
be necessary to induce him, in some way, to surren-
der a portion of his gratification for the good of
others, and so to promote the peace and harmony
of society. To accomplish this, with such a selfish
being, it was necessary to give him some equivalent
for the sacrifice made, and the principle of his
nature which they fixed upon for this purpose is
the love of praise. They made certain laws by
which the general good was to be promoted, and
then flattered man into the belief that it is praise-
worthy to observe them, and noble to sacrifice sel-.
fish gratifications for the general good. Thus the
whole of virtue is resolved into a love of praise.
Man pretends to be virtuous simply that he may
receive praise.
There are two objections to this theory:
1. It makes virtue to depend not upon eternal
and immutable principles, but upon the enactments
of human legislatures. Hence virtue changes with
every change of law. How, we intuitively perceive
the difference between an act whose moral charae-
MOB, All CONDUCT.
119
ter is dependent on human legislation, and one
whose moral character is inherent in the act. No
law could make it right to murder, or steal, or rob;
nor, on the other hand, could make it wrong to be
chaste, and honest, and to abstain from murder.
Everyone sees a great difference between the crime
of smuggling and that of murder. Smuggling be-
comes a crime, because of human legislation: mur-
der is a crime in its very nature, and if there were
no enactment against it, it would still be a crime;
whereas there would be no such crime as smug-
gling, but for the laws enacted for the supposed
good of the country. A system that would make
all virtue thus mutable, is at once rejected as false.
2, But, secondly, it really makes all virtue to
consist in hypocrisy. Man pretends to be virtuous
for the love of praise. Now, the very idea of hy-
pocrisy supposes an excellence which is counter-
feited. Hence the theory is self-destructive. There
must be real virtue somewhere, or pretended virtue
would have no existence. Just as counterfeit coin
supposes real coin, so does counterfeit virtue sup-
pose real virtue.
H. The theory of Wollaston and Clarke makes
virtue consist in the conformity of the conduct to
the fitness of things.
We object to this theory, 1. Because it gives
120 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
us no definite idea of virtue. A definition of
virtue ought to be clear, and such as may not well
he misapprehended; but no one from this definition
gets any notion of the thing attempted to he
defined.
2. We object to it, because it may apply almost
if not quite as forcibly to vice as virtue. Vice is
suited to accomplish its ends, as virtue is to
accomplish its ends. Let a man, utterly destitute
of the idea of virtue, learn that it is conduct
characterized by fitness or suitableness, and then
let him see vice suited to accomplish the woe, the
destruction of peace, etc., and he must conclude
that vice is virtue.
3. We object to it, in the third place, because it
is as applicable to the action of the lower animals,
or even of a machine, as it is to the conduct of man.
The action of the lower animals is in conformity
with the fitness of things; so is the action of the
steam-engine. If pulleys, and wheels, and ropes
act in conformity with the fitness of things, they
become capable of virtue, according to this theory.
4. We object, lastly, to this theory, because,
while it ignores a moral principle, it goes upon the
supposition that there is a moral principle which
has already decided in reference to the end to be
sought. On this subject, Dr. Brown remarks very
MORAL CONDUCT. 121
justly : " The moral sentiments are necessary before
we can feel the moral fitness, or moral truth, accord-
ing to which we are said to estimate actions as
right or wrong. All actions, virtuous and vicious,
have a tendency or fitness of one sort or other, and
every action which the benevolent and malevolent
perform, with a view to a certain end, may alike
have a fitness for producing that end. There is
not an action, then, which may not be in conformity
with the fitnesses of things; and if the feelings of
exclusive approbation and disapprobation, that
constitute our moral emotions, be not presupposed,
in spite of the thousand fitnesses which reason may
have shown us, all actions must be morally inditfer-
ent. The fitness of virtue for producing serene
delight, is not greater than that of vice for pro-
ducing disquietude, and we act therefore as much
according to the mere fitness of things in being
vicious as being virtuous. If the world had been
adapted for the production of misery, with fitnesses
opposite indeed, in kind, but exactly equal in
number and nicety of adjustment, to those which
are at present so beautifully employed in the pro-
duction of happiness, we should still have framed
our views and our actions according to these
fitnesses, but our moral view of the universe and
6
122 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
of its Author would have been absolutely reversed.
Since every human action, then, in producing any
effect whatever, must be in conformity with the
fitnesses of things, the limitation of virtue to actions
which are in conformity with these fitnesses has no
meaning unless we have previously distinguished
the ends which are morally good from the ends
which are morally evil, and limited the conformity
of which we speak to the one of theee classes." Here,
then, we see the man first knowing the end to be
sought, and then what is fitted to secure that end
is to be regarded as virtue. But without the moral
sentiment, he could have no idea of the good. He
would as soon make the evil the end to be sought
as the good.
III. According to the theory of utility, as warmly
supported by Hume, we estimate the virtue of an
action only by its usefulness. He seems to refer all
our mental impressions to two principles, reason
and taste. Reason gives us a knowledge of truth
and falsehood, and is no motive of action. Taste
gives an impression of pleasure or pain : it thus con-
stitutes happiness or misery, and becomes a motive
of action. To this he refers our impressions of
beauty and deformity, of vice or virtue. He has
therefore distinctly asserted that the words right
MORAL CONDUCT.
123
and wrong signify nothing more than sweet and
sour, pleasant and painful. And hence he resolves
all virtue into usefulness.
To this theory we offer the following objections:
1. It transfers the moral quality of the action
from the motive, or intention, to the consequences.
According to this theory, our whole system of juris-
prudence is at fault. The law should not inquire
into the motive, or animus, that prompted the action,
but into the usefulness that follows it. Such a
view of virtue is abhorrent to the moral sense of
the world.
2. "We object to it, in the second place, because
it leaves the action without any moral qualification
until all its consequences are developed. Moral
consequences are slow in following actions; hence,
according to this theory, it might be months or
years before an action can be determined to be
either right or wrong.
3. A third objection to the theory of utility is,
that, in confounding utility with virtue, it makes
men's notions of utility determine their views of
virtue. It gives no standard of virtue to which we
can infallibly refer. As men differ in their notions
of utility, so must they differ in regard to right and
wrong. And in the midst of such confusion we
have no means of determining with any degree of
124 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
certainty in reference to a subject of the deepest
importance to all.
4. Another, and probably a still stronger, objec-
tion to this theory is, that it degrades man to a level
with the mule or ox, or even to a level with the
tools with which he labors. If utility be the mea-
sure of virtue, then may a steam-engine or any_
other instrument of usefulness be as virtuous as
man. Mr. Hume saw the force of this objection,
and added to his theory, that the actions must be
performed by intelligent beings. How this, to our
mind, is a surrender of the theory. For if other
principles than mere utility are to be considered in
deciding upon the moral quality of actions, then the
moral quality does not depend entirely upon the
utility.
5. The theory is proved to be false by the differ-
ent feelings with which we view the inventor of
some useful machine and a public benefactor in
morals. The inventor of the printing-press may
have done more good to the world than St. Paul
himself, but we do not feel that he is therefore more
virtuous.
6. The theory is proved to be false by the absence
of the thought of utility in thousands of cases
of really virtuous action. "Of all the virtuous
actions," says Dr. Brown, "which are performed at
MORAL CONDUCT.
125
any one moment on the earth, from the slightest
reciprocation of domestic courtesies to the most
generous sacrifices of heroic friendship, there is
perhaps scarcely one in which this thought of the
supposed scale of utility according to which his
action is to be measured is present to the mind of
the agent, and is the influencing circumstance in
his choice—the immediate motive which confers on
his conduct the character of virtue." Who is there
that in the contemplation of Thermopylae, and of
the virtues that have made that desolate spot for
ever sacred to us, can think of Leonidas and his
little band without any emotion of reverence, till
the thought occur how useful it must be for a
nation to have defenders so intrepid ?
7. The theory is proved to be false by an appeal
to consciousness. The admiration of the useful,
and the reverence for the virtuous, are feelings
essentially different. The moral approbation of the
virtuous action is one thing, and the admiration of
the useful is another thing totally distinct in kind.
In proof of this we have only to appeal to universal
consciousness.
Before closing our remarks upon this theory, it
may be proper to remark, 1. Virtue is generally
if not universally useful, but it does not follow that
what is useful is virtuous. Virtue is always expe-
126 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
dient; but the converse is not true, that what is
expedient is always virtuous. Many an action has
been characterized by expediency which is utterly
destitute of every element of virtue. 2. In a few
actions we may be compelled to measure their
virtue by their utility. For example, two measures
present themselves to the statesman: these measures
have in them no moral quality: one course will be
attended with good, the other with bad conse-
quences to the country. It then becomes the duty
of the statesman to bring his whole influence to
secure such enactments as will advance the public
good. In such cases always the utility is to be
estimated before the policy is to be settled. In
neglecting to pursue the line of policy which will
advance the interests of the whole community, he
becomes guilty of a breach of trust, as much so as
if he were to appropriate to his own benefit money
that had been deposited with him for the good
of another. Here the crime is felt to be in the
breach of confidence, in the violation of the trust
reposed in him, and not in the departure from the
principles of utility.
In conclusion, I remark, in reference to this
theory, the errors of which I have been endeavor-
ing to expose, that although erroneous, it is not so
positively degrading as the system of Mandeville.
MORAL CONDUCT.
127
A man may make usefulness to others the great
object of his life, and be capable of the most
generous and virtuous actions. Nor have we failed
to concede to this theory the fact that utility is
sometimes the proof of the existence of the obliga-
tion ; and that, all other evidences being absent, the
utility alone of the act may establish the existence
of the obligation. Still, even in that case, we make
the virtue of the act one thing, and its utility alto-
gether different.
IV. "We next notice the Selfish System. The
most unobjectionable presentation of this system is
given by Paley. According to this theory, the fun-
damental principle of the conduct of mankind is a
desire to promote their own interest. Hence Dr.
Paley defines virtue as the doing of good to man-
kind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake
of everlasting happiness. The good of mankind is
the object, the will of God the rule, and everlasting
happiness the motive of human virtue. If the
question, then, be asked, why we should seek the
good of mankind, according to this theory, the
only answer is that it would promote our own hap-
pin ess. Again, if the reason for making the will
of God the rule of our conduct be required, Paley
would answer, It would promote our everlasting
happiness.
128 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
The objections to this theory are,
1. The only difference, according to it, between a
good man and a bad one is, that the good man is
more prudent than the bad. For it is a conceded
fact that all men desire happiness: hence the motives
that actuate the man of exalted virtue are the same
as those influencing the exactly opposite character,
and the only difference between them is that one is
w's'•r than the other.
According to this theory, there is no intrinsic
difference between virtue and vice, the only con-
ceivable good being happiness, and virtue is only to
be practiced as a means to its attainment. Hence
all virtue is absorbed in self-interest.
3. Like the system of utility, it transfers the
moral quality from the intention to the conse-
quences. A man must have sufficient foresight to
determine whether an action will promote happi-
ness or the opposite, before he can determine
whether it will be virtuous or vicious.
4. This theory makes no distinction between
expediency and right. Paley says, " To constitute
an action right, it must be expedient upon the whole
—at the long run, in all its effects, collateral and
remote, as well as those which are immediate and
direct."' Here we have the unequivocal statement
of the ablest and least objectionable advocate of the
MOHAL CONDUCT.
129
system, that what is expedient in the long run is
right. Then if I could believe that murder is
expedient, I should do right to commit it.
5. It leaves the standard of virtue to every man's
notions of expediency; consequently, right and
wrong would be changing their characters with
every change of expediency.
6. As happiness alone is the motive of action, if
we could imagine the devil more capable of reward-
ing us than the Divine Being, we should serve him;
that is, we must serve the master that can give
the highest wages, irrespective of any claims what-
ever.
7. It is opposed to the precepts of the Great
Teacher. He says, " Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and
with all thy mind, and with all thy strength; and
thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." But,
according to this theory, we should love our-
selves with all our strength, and love God only
because it would advance our own interests. Again
He says, "If any man will come after me, let him
deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow
me." But, according to the selfish system, the
terms of discipleship should have been, Promote
self: be selfish.
8. It not only opposes the precepts of the Great
6*
130 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
Teacher, but it comes in direct conflict with his
example. He sought not his own good, but ours.
He sought not his own glory, but the Father's.
He was the most unselfish of beings, and we are
to be like him.
9. It is opposed to universal consciousness.
Every man is conscious of performing virtuous
actions without once thinking of self - interest.
The greatest self-approbation of which we are
capable arises when we have performed a virtuous
action without reference to self-interest.
10. It degrades piety, and makes the Christian
a mere hireling, working for reward. He does
not love God because of the excellences of his
character, because of the moral attributes which
adorn and beautify the Divine nature, because of
the infinite mercies bestowed and the countless
favors shown, nor yet even because God so loved
him as to give his Son to die for him; but he loves
him because he hopes to receive everlasting happi-
ness for loving him. If the mother's heart warms
to her child, and causes her to be patient, faithful,
affectionate, kind; if she spends sleepless nights in
waiting by the suffering babe, or rejoices in the
innocent prattle, the unfolding intellect, and the
hopeful development of the morals of her offspring,
it is all done and suffered and enjoyed because of
MORAL CONDUCT.
131
one all-absorbing feeling, self-interest. If tbe sick
are visited, the poor relieved, the naked clothed,
the ignorant instructed, the erring reclaimed, all
this is accomplished from one sole motive—ever-
lasting happiness. Now I put the question to
every one, Does not this view of piety degrade it?
I put it to every one, if two individuals were to
expose themselves to the same peril for the same
common friend—the one has no other motive for
this exposure than the wish of securing to himself
a certain amount of happiness, at some time either
near or remote, on earth or after he has quitted
earth, [the other 110 motive but that of saving the
life of a friend, a life which was dearer to him than
his own—in which case and in reference to which
of these individuals would the feeling of approba-
tion be the more intense? Would we, nay, could
we feel that the man who was thinking of his own
happiness alone was the moral hero f On the
contrary, would not the universal sentiment ascribe
moral heroism alone to the man who, forgetful of
selfj with a noble fearlessness of danger, and think-
ing only of him whose life was exposed, sought
his rescue from certain death? "We should not
hesitate long," says Dr. Brown, "in rejecting a
theory of fluidity which should ascribe congelation
to an increase of heat, and liquefaction to a dimi-
132 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
nution of it; and as little ought we to hesitate in
rejecting a theory of virtue that supposes the moral
approbation, which gives birth to our very notions
of virtue, to arise only when the immediate motive
of the agent has been the view of his own happi-
ness in this or any other world."
V. A theory the opposite of the one we have
just been considering, is that first propounded
by Bishop Cumberland, and afterwards advocated
by President Edwards and his pupil, Dr. Samuel
Hopkins. According to this theory, all virtue
consists in disinterested benevolence.
This theory is not so objectionable, probably, as
the selfish system, for very much of virtue does
consist in good-will to others; but still we regard
the system as false, for the following reasons:
1. If it were true, then brutes themselves may
be capable of the highest virtue. How disinter-
ested often is the dog in his devotion to his master!
Benevolence, at once earnest, constant, and disin-
terested, often marks the conduct of this faithful
animal. So with other animals, especially to their
offspring. How our argument is that, benevolence
being predicable of the lower animals, which are
universally admitted to be incapable of virtue, the
whole of virtue cannot consist in benevolence.
2. It makes man care more for the good of
MORAL CONDUCT.
133
others than for his own. He is to love all others,
but not himself. Now a whole is made up of
parts. If he is to care for the whole, he must care
for all its parts. But he himself is one of those
parts : hence it is a virtue to have a prudent regard
for self. The pursuit of happiness, where the
rights of others are not violated, is not only allow-
able, but commendable.
3. It makes virtue indiscriminating, and therefore
impracticable. "W"e are to care no more for a friend
than for a stranger; we are to love our enemies as
well as we do our benefactors. Now both reason
and revelation teach us that virtue is discriminat-
ing. We owe duties to ourselves, to our neighbors
equally with ourselves, and then to strangers and
enemies.
4. It would even deprive of virtue the character
of Christ, the most disinterested being that ever,
lived, because he, "for the joy that was set before
him, endured the cross, despising the shame."
5. Bishop Butler presents his objections to this
theory in the following language: "It deserves to
be considered whether men are more at liberty, in
point of morals, to make themselves miserable
without reason, than to make others so; or disso-
lutely to neglect their own greater good for the
sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are
184 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
to neglect the good of others whom nature has
committed to their care. It should seem that a
due concern about our own interest or happiness,
and a reasonable endeavor to secure and promote
it, is, I think, very much the meaning of the word
prudence in our language; it should seem that
this is virtue, and the contrary behavior faulty
and blamable, since, in the calmest way of reflec-
tion, we approve of the first, and condemn the
other conduct, both in ourselves and others. This
approbation and disapprobation are altogether dif-
ferent from mere desires of our own and their
happiness, and from sorrow in missing it. Again,
suppose one man should by fraud or violence
take from another the fruit of his labor, with
intent to give it to a third, who, he thought,
would have as much pleasure from it as would
balance the pleasure which the first possessor would
have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the
loss; suppose that no bad consequences would
follow; yet such an action would surely be vicious.
Nay, further: were treachery, violence, and injus-
tice no otherwise faulty than as they are foreseen
to produce an overbalance of misery to society,
then if in any case a man should procure to him-
self as great advantage by an act of injustice as
MORAL CONDUCT.
135
the whole foreseen inconvenience, such a piece
of injustice would not be faulty or vicious at all."
YI. We now notice the theory of Sympathy.
Dr. Adam Smith, one of the most ingenious writers
011 metaphysics, is the author of this system. He
maintained, that before we can decide upon the
nature of an action, it is necessary to enter into
the feelings both of the agent and of the person
in reference to whom the action is performed. If
we sympathize with the actions of the agent, we
approve of his conduct as right; if not, we consider
his conduct as wrong. We thus observe our feel-
ings in reference to the conduct of others; then
apply these rules to ourselves, and determine our
own conduct.
The objections to the theory are, briefly,
1. It leaves us without any great fundamental
rule of right and wrong. Our sympathy can in no
sense be said to constitute an action either right
or wrong; nor can it be said to be the criterion of
good; for then, every thing with which we sym-
pathize would be good. But this is known not to
be the case; for we often sympathize with joy or
grief which has no connection with moral con-
duct. We even sympathize with physical suffering;
and Dr. Smith himself would not contend that
136 ELEMENTS OE MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
physical suffering is a virtue, however deeply it
might arouse our sympathies.
2. Sympathy is too changing to he set up as the
arbiter of right. "Sympathy for talent," says
Cousin, "weakens the indignation for outraged
virtue. We overlook many things in Voltaire, in
Rousseau, in Mirabeau, and we excuse them on
account of the corruption of that century. The
sympathy caused by the pain of a condemned
person, renders less lively the antipathy excited by
his crime. Thus sympathy turns, and wavers,
and changes like ripples upon the surface of the
ocean."
3. Let virtue consist altogether in sympathy, and
nothing is in itself good. The theory annihilates
the distinction between vice and virtue. Good and
evil become relative, and are precisely as each one
feels them to be. Change the sympathy, and the
action which a while ago was good becomes bad,
and that which was evil becomes a virtue.
4. Even if it were true that we always sym-
pathize with the right, still the system would be
incomplete; for it presupposes, though it may not
acknowledge, the action of an anterior principle
which determines the right, and then the sym-
patbies cluster about the man or action already
recognized as virtuous.
moral conduct.
137
section ii.
TRUE THEORY OF MORALS VIRTUE DEFINED — INSEPARABLE FROM
THE AGENT WHEN IT SHINES MOST BRIGHTLY HOPE OF REWARD
AND FEAR OF PUNISHMENT, CHARACTERISTICS OF VIRTUE AllGU-
MENTS TO PROVE THE THEORY TRUE.
Virtue is not an abstract principle; it can only
be conceived of in connection with a moral agent.
It is the right willing of an intelligent being, who
is the master of his own actions, and who has
capacity to make moral distinctions. "We never
separate the action from the agent, and are bound
always to determine whether the action be virtuous
or vicious, by our knowledge of the capacities,
circumstances, and relations of the agent. Hence,
virtue and vice are but other names for the virtuous
and vicious. Two men may perform the same act,
and with the same intention, and the one would be
blamed, while the other would be pitied. A
lunatic may intend to kill, and may effect his
object, but no man would condemn him, as he
does the malignant but sound-minded murderer,
although both the intention and acts are apparently
the same.
We have said that virtue is right willing. The
question at once arises, What is right willing ? I
answer, It is willing as we ought to will; it is will-
188 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
ing in conformity with moral obligation; it is
willing in conformity to moral law. It is willing
the things that ought to be done, and refusing to
will those that ought not to he done. The virtuous
man asks hut one question—What is duty? He
then seeks to discharge it. Moral obligation with
him is supreme and ultimate. When once it is
felt, though it may he opposed hy self-interest, it is
felt to he immutable, and its claims must be met.
Virtue shines out brightly, and its outlines are
most distinctly visible, when resisting temptation.
Here is a man alone in the chamber of death. He
has just received from his departed friend a valuable
and sacred deposit. The last words that fell from
those pallid lips directed him to transmit that
deposit to another. It is known to no one besides
himself. His own wants are clamorous. Self-
interest utters loud her appeals to him. Bene-
volence, weeping over needy wife and children,
unites her solicitations to those of self-interest.
He can lock the secret for ever in his own heart.
The person to whom it was left is rich; does not
need it; his condition would not be improved by
it: no one will suspect him. Were ever circum-
stances more favorable to crime ? But he resists.
Duty demands the sacrifice. Moral obligation, as
the voice of God, commands him to surrender the
MORAL CONDUCT.
139
treasure. Conscience rises upon her throne, claims
supremacy, impels to duty, and restrains from the
commission of the crime. He submits : the will of
his friend is carried out; conscience is obeyed, and
God is honored. He knows that he has done right;
that he has not bowed to some fearful chimera;
that he has not obeyed some mendacious law, but
that he has obeyed a law universal, immutable, and
true—a law obligatory upon all moral agents. It
is the law made binding by the conscience, and to
that court it always refers the decision of the ques-
tion, whether or not the conduct has been in con-
formity with it. Had the opposite course been
pursued, remorse, in the midst of his ill-gotten
gains, would have blighted his happiness and
destroyed his peace. The one course is virtuous,
the other vicious; the one claims our approbation,
the other our disapprobation; the one is admired,
the other loathed. Virtue consists not in the
practicing of only one principle of right, but of all
principles. Every thing that is embraced in the
idea of oughtness, whether benevolent or just,
whether negative or positive, is virtue. It may be
virtue in the parent to iriflict pain upon his erring
child, in the judge to condemn the criminal, and
in the magistrate to refuse pardon. Virtue, whether
exhibited in justice, truth, or benevolence, is always
140 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
that quality in the actions of a moral being per-
ceived to he good. It is an act of which the moral
faculty approves. Without that faculty There could
be no more idea of virtue than there could he of
color without eyes, or of beauty without taste.
A question arises here, Can an act which springs
from the hope of reward, or the fear of punishment,
be a virtuous act? In answer to this, I remark
that rewards and punishments are schoolmasters to
bring us to virtue. The terrors of the law may be
the first means of arousing the transgressor to a
sense of his responsibilities. He is driven by a
slavish fear to change his conduct. But, in the
language of another, that beautiful law of our
mental constitution which accounts for the for-
mation of what are called secondary desires, affords
a means for the purification of the motive. At
first, a man seeks money merely as a means of
gratifying his desires; but afterwards, the desire
of money becomes a passion, and avarice is formed.
Thus, in the progress of virtue, the duty which was
first discharged because it was the best policy, the
service of God which was first rendered to escape
punishment or to secure reward, becomes at last
the joy of the heart, the earnest, unbought homage
devoutly rendered to Almighty Goodness. We go
still farther, and assert, that a prudent regard to
MORAL CONDUCT.
141
one's eternal happiness is compatible with the
highest virtue; nay, more, is itself a virtue.
Virtue, then, may he known by the following
characteristics: 1st. That it can never he considered
in the abstract, hut always in connection with a
free, intelligent moral agent. 2d. That it always
has reference to moral law. 3d. That it always
implies moral obligation. 4th. That it implies that
strange and indescribable feeling of moral approba-
tion, which moral beings alone can experience or
understand. 5th. That it involves that quality
which God himself in his holy law, and conscience
enlightened by that law, pronounce good.
That this theory is correct, we infer from the
following considerations:
1. It makes the distinction between right and
wrong so clear and broad, that one can never be
mistaken for the other. Right is conformity to
moral law and moral obligation, and wrong is a
violation of moral obligation. They are immu-
table—no power can change them. "We speak it
with reverence, as we look to that throne of
omnipotence, justice, and truth, and say, it is not
in the power of Omnipotence to reverse the moral
quality of actions.; for this is only saying that God
cannot act contrary to himself, or that "it is
impossible for God to lie." Try to imagine that
142 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
it is right to practice deception, to be cruel and
unjust! You cannot do it. We can as easily
imagine the annihilation of space as the annihila-
tion of moral distinctions.
2. This theory admits the universality and the
supremacy of moral obligation. According to it,
self-love, utility, and sympathy, as well as every
appetite and passion must be silent when moral
obligation lays its claim upon man.
3. A prudent care for one's self, whether in
reference to this world or the next, is justified
according to this theory, but is not made supreme.
Selfishness is rejected, and self-love, as an innocent
part of our constitution, is made to hold its subor-
dinate place. It is a happy medium between the
selfish theory on the one hand, and that of disin-
terested benevolence on the other.
4. It makes God's law the moral law, and the
highest virtue obedience to that law.
5. It accords with universal consciousness: 1st.
In that it makes the claims of moral obligation
superior to all other claims, and puts the obligatory
feeling above all other feelings. 2d. In that it
determines the quality of the action by the inten-
tion—always taking into consideration the circum-
stances of the agent. 3d. In that it refers all moral
questions to the conscience, and takes its judgment
MOUAL CONDUCT.
143
as final. 4th. In that it makes a wide difference
between the nature of the feelings of oughtness and
all other feelings; between the feelings of remorse
and other regrets; "and between the feelings of
moral approval and all other feelings of pleasure.
6. It does not determine the quality of an action
by its consequences, but by its conformity, or want
of conformity, to the principle of right. It distin-
guishes clearly between duty and expediency, right
and self-interest, moral obligation and sympathy,
harm and injury; and no other theory makes these
distinctions, which are as universal as the race.
Tfie writer has thus patiently, carefully, and
prayerfully sought to give fthe true theory of
1 i V * ./ f I
subj set it. And he most devoutly prqys that the
yom h in whose hands this /booky mai be placed
ma_) be Iqci by its teaching^ to theN^ultivation of
virtjie, not only as a means? to an end^ but a& the
highest end of their moral being.
144 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
DEDUCTIONS.
1. An action conforming externally to moral
obligation, but which does not conform to obliga-
tion in the intention, is not a viftuous action,
because it lacks the main element of virtue, viz.,
conformity to moral obligation in the intention.
2. An act may be outwardly good, and there
may be a partial design to do good, but the
main motive being self-interest, the act is not
virtuous. For instance, if a man gives money to
the poor, not from a sense of duty, but principally
for the sake of adding to his popularity, the act is
not virtuous. Even if the person is actuated by
some desire to do good, that is by benevolence,
unless he is governed by a sense of duty., by
conscience as a motive, the act cannot be regarded
as virtuous.
3. Now, if the outward act fails to comply with
moral obligation, and yet the intention is to comply
with moral obligation, and the person acts from
conscience as a motive, the question arises, Taken all
together, is the act right? We answer, 1st. If the
failure results from no fault of the actor, if he has
sought, by all proper means, to enlighten his con-
science, and to cultivate it, the act must be regarded
as virtuous. 2d. If the failure to know his duty
MORAL CONDUCT.
145
results from some neglect or from some vice in the
agent, which is almost sure to he the case, the act
is vicious, and he deserves punishment, although
the one particular act has been a conscientious one.
In order then to give a correct answer to the above
question, we have simply to find out the cause of
the defect. If man has voluntarily closed his eyes
to the light, or if he has neglected his conscience
until it has become seared and blunted, the fault is
his, and he is responsible.
SECTION III.
CRITERIA OF MORAL CONDUCT.
Before closing the chapter on moral conduct, it
may be proper to present the student with certain
criteria by which we may determine the right or
wrong of external actions. These criteria may not
be infallible, but in the absence of a knowledge of
the intention, which always imparts character to
the action, they may be of service in enabling us to
determine the moral quality of actions.
1. If an external action violate a law of the
Divine Being, as that law is revealed to us by the
law of nature, or in the Scriptures, the action is
vicious, and the actor is of course guilty.
2. If an external action violate the law of civil
7
146 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
society, provided the law of civil society does not
contravene the law of God, the act is vicious.
3. An act which violates a law of our physical
being is wrong; hence any fashion which invites
disease is regarded as sinful. Compressing the
waists of young females, thereby injuring the
health, bringing on disease of the lungs and spine,
etc., is vicious, because it violates a physical law.
4. A doubt concerning the rectitude of an.action
determines the action to be vicious, unless there be
an equal doubt about the propriety of its omission.
Then the only course is to remove the doubt, if
possible, by comparing the action with the great
standard of rectitude, as it is found in God's word.
5. In the absence of any other means of deter-
mining the character of the action, it may be deter-
mined by its probable consequences. An action,
then, whose necessary or probable consequences
are supposed to be injurious to the human race, is
to be judged as vicious, and shunned accordingly.
6. An action recklessly performed, with no par-
ticular regard to moral obligation, with no concern
as to whether it is right or wrong, with no care for
the consequences, is always a vicious act. As, for
example, a man who fires a gun where it may do
mischief, with no concern as to whether mischief is
done or not, is guilty of a vicious act.
MORAL CONDUCT.
147
7. An act becomes vicious which, wounding the
feelings of another, is allowed to go unexplained.
When the actor takes no pains to remove a false
impression from the mind of another, though
known to be laboring under a misapprehension, he
is just as guilty as if he had originally intended
injury.
Reverse these rules, and we are able to determine
the action to be right.
1. It is right when it conforms to the law of God.
2. To the law of civil society, with the limitation
as above. 3. When it conforms to the laws of our
physical being. 4. When after the most careful
examination there is no doubt as to its rectitude,
as to the duty of performing it. 5. When, without
infracting obligation, it promotes the good of the
race. 6. When it is performed with a due regard
to obligation and to consequences. 7. When every
effort is properly made to remove misapprehension.
These principles are few and simple, and yet they
are believed to meet almost every possible case of
human action.
148 elements op moral philosophy.
CHAPTER YI.
moral government.
SECTION I.
MORAL GOVERNMENT PHYSICAL GOVERNMENT — EVIDENCES OF PHY-
SICAL GOVERNMENT EVIDENCES OF MORAL GOVERNMENT—ANALYSIS
OF MORAL GOVERNMENT—NECESSITY OF MORAL GOVERNMENT.
Government implies control. "When government
is properly constituted, it implies control in accord-
ance with some rule or law.
Physical government implies guidance, or con-
trol, according to physical law. Thus it is that
God governs the physical universe. The changes
of the seasons, the regular succession of day and
night, the growth of plants, the propagation of
animals, rain and sunshine and harvest, are all
evidences of the existence of a physical govern-
ment. It is his atmosphere that envelops me, his
wind that refreshes me, his sun that warms and
eidightens me; his voice speaks in the thunder, and
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
149
his eye flashes in the lightning; his seasons come
round in their grateful vicissitudes, and wherever
I turn I see evidences of power, wisdom, and
goodness.
" The rolling year is full of Thee;
But, wandering oft, with brute unconsciousness,
Man marks not thee, marks not the mighty hand
That ever busy wheels the silent spheres."
Truth and poetry are beautifully blended in these
lines. God is in nature. He is the great efficient
cause. " The phenomena of nature," says one, " so
far as they show action or change, from the breaking
of a bubble on the stream, up to the swift flight of
the celestial orbs in their appointed paths, do not
merely prove, but manifest directly his existence
and glory."
Moral government is the government of the
free-will in opposition to the government of
physical force. It is a- government in accordance
with moral law. It is the government of moral
beings, of beings capable of embracing, in its
broadest sense, the idea of oughtness. The indi-
cations of the existence of moral government are
as clear as can be demanded, and it requires no
small amount of skepticism to deny its existence.
The impulses to virtue, the feeling of obligation,
the peace of a pure conscience, the agonies of
150 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
remorse, the happiness of innocence, and the
miseries of crime, all indicate that we are under
moral government. No harmonious action of the
physical universe gives clearer evidence of physical
government, than do the above-mentioned facts
testify of moral government.
A moral government implies, 1. A moral gov-
ernor. 2. Moral law. 3. Moral agents, who are the
subjects of moral law. 4. Moral obligation. 5.
Moral character. 6. Retribution, or rewards and
punishments, according as character is virtuous or
vicious.
1. Moral government is necessary, because
without it there could be no such thing as moral
happiness. Every agency, substance, and being
in the universe must be under a government
suited to its nature. But for this, the wildest
anarchy and most frightful confusion must ensue.
Hence man, as a moral being, must be under law
suited to his nature, or he cannot attain the
happiness of which he is capable.
2. Moral government is necessary in order to
present to man a moral standard. There could be
no standard by which to distinguish virtue from
vice, innocence from guilt, merit from demerit, it
there were no moral government, and, conse-
quently, no moral law.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
151
3. Moral government is necessary to the exist-
once of moral order. Destroy physical govern-
ment, and no longer is physical order the admi-
ration of the intelligent; no longer is the beautiful
fable of the music of the spheres the truthful
representation of the harmony that pervades the
physical universe. So let moral government cease,
and moral order disappears.
4. Moral government is necessary, in order that
virtue he rewarded and vice punished. "Without
moral government, such a thing as retributive
justice, which rewards the virtuous and punishes"
the guilty, must for ever be unknown.
SECTION II.
GOD THE MORAL GOVERNOR ARGUMENTS TO ESTABLISH THIS.
Moral philosophy recognizes God as the moral
governor. We argue this,
1. From universal consciousness. Every man
feels that God is, and by right ought to be, the
moral governor.
2. It is implied in the very idea we have of the
Divine Being. He is ever contemplated not only
as the governor of brute matter, but as the gov-
ernor of free moral agents.
3. He, and he alone, is qualified, by virtue of his
152 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
natural attributes, to be the great moral governor
of tbe universe. He alone has the ubiquity, the
wisdom, and the power fitting for that position.
4. His moral attributes of inflexible justice,
infallible truth, and perfect holiness, are such as
fit him for the exercise of moral government.
It is really a reflection upon his justice to say
that he is not the moral governor. Equally does it
reflect upon his holiness and goodness to say that
he would create moral beings, and leave them, with
all their hopes and fears, their powers and respon-
sibilities, to themselves. But more than this, it is
a direct reflection upon the veracity of God to say
that he is not the moral governor. God has written
a lie upon the conscience, which ever testifies to his
moral government—he has practiced deception in
the natural consequences of actions, as well as in
the Sacred Scriptures, or he is certainly the moral
governor.
5. It is absolutely essential to the honor of God
that he who created the universe should govern it.
6. Our last argument is drawn from the Bible.
In that book God, " whose ways are higher than
our ways, and whose thoughts are higher than
our thoughts," is always recognized as the moral
governor.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
153
SECTION III.
GOD'S RIGHT TO RULE BY WHAT ESTABLISHED—WHAT IS IMPLIED IN
THIS RIGHT.
1. God's right to rule is established by his rela-
tions to man as Creator and Preserver, aside from
the still more weighty fact that he is the Redeemer.
2. His right to rule is established by the intrinsic
excellence of his character. If infinite perfection
of character, in all its moral bearings, does not
show his right to rule, we know of no argument
that could be brought to convince of that fact.
3. His right to rule is proved by the fact that
his moral law is essential to the well-being of man.
How we hold that man as a moral being is the
proper subject of moral government, and that that
government which can best secure his virtue and
happiness, is the one by which he ought to be ruled.
This fact being admitted, establishes his right to
rule.
1. This right implies the right to give laws for
the control or guidance of his subjects.
2. The right to exercise moral government im-
plies the right to judge moral conduct, and to de-
termine its conformity or want of conformity to
moral law.
3. It implies the right to inflict such penalties as
7*
154 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
justice may demand, and such as may he necessary
for the maintenance of authority, for the promotion
of virtue, and the prevention of vice.
4. It implies the right to allow such vicarious
suffering in the person of a substitute for the
criminal as may subserve the ends of good gov-
3rnment, and at the same time justify the pardon
of the criminal.
5. It involves the right to require such sacri-
fices and to use such means as may he essential
to good order, and hence of calling into action
any amount of force that may be necessary for that
purpose.
From these principles we draw the following de-
ductions:
1. That God is a moral governor; and looking at
him in that light, we can account for many of the
dispensations of his providence otherwise unac-
countable.
2. Viewing him as a moral governor, we can
appreciate the means which he uses to reform the
vices, purify the morals, and in every possible way
elevate the moral character of man.
3. In viewing him as a moral governor, the reme-
dial dispensation becomes plain, and the great work
of the atonement is as philosophical as it is theolo-
gical and true.
PART II.
PRACTICAL ETHICS.
PART II.
PRACTICAL ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
duties to god.
section i.
INTERNAL DUTIES! TO KNOW GOD — CONFIDENCE—HUMILITY—REVER-
ENCE—GODLY FEAB—DEPENDENCE— LOVE—SELF-CONSECRATION.
The duties we owe to the Divine Being are em-
braced under the term piety. A pious man is gov-
erned by one law—the law of duty—and always has
reference to God in the discharge of duty. The
difference between a moral man and a pious man is
this: the moral man performs an act of justice or
charity without reference to the Divine Being; the
pious man would perform the same act in view of
his obligations to his Heavenly Father.
(157)
158 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
The duties we owe to God may he embraced in
two classes: the duties of the mind and heart,
and the duties of the outer conduct.
1. It is our duty to know all we can know of God.
The "heavens declare the glory of God;" and
" the invisible things of him from the creation of
the world are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made." From these and many other
similar passages of the Sacred Scriptures, we judge
that God is made known in the works of nature.
His power is made known in the thousands of
worlds that are sown in the immensity of space,
and his infinite wisdom in the harmonious laws
that govern them.
" Those mighty orbs proclaim his power,
Their motions speak his skill."
God, it is true, can only be partially compre-
bended by our finite minds, for he is infinite and
incomprehensible.
" God," says Cousin, " in manifesting himself, re-
tains something in himself which nothing finite
can absolutely manifest; consequently, it is not per-
mitted us to comprehend him absolutely. In order
absolutely to comprehend the infinite, it is necessary
to have an infinite power of comprehension, and
that is not granted to us."
DUTIES TO GOD.
159
Still, by attending to tbe Divine manifestations,
we may know not only his power and wisdom, but
we may acquaint ourselves with his ineffable good-
ness, his unwavering justice, his holiness and truth.
We may learn to say: "Of old hast thou laid the
foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the
work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou
shalt endure; yea, all of them shall wax old like a
garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and
they shall be changed; but thou art the same, and
thy years shall have no end."
This knowledge commenced here will be per-
fected in eternity. It is at once the most sublime
and the most purifying of all knowledge. Then,
by looking at nature's works, by investigating pro-
vidence, and by examining God's written word, we
must seek to know all that can be known of God.
2. The second duty we owe to God is implicit
confidence in him.
The duty of trusting in God is deeply impressed
upon us by a knowledge of his perfections. " Like
as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth
them that fear him." As children, then, should we
confide in God, in his infinite goodness, wisdom,
and power. This is a first truth of reason, that we
should exercise toward God a faith absolute, un-
wavering, and without limit.
160 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
3. The third duty that we owe to God is humility.
All beings, even angels and archangels, should be
humble in the presence of God. All the hosts of
heaven are satisfied each with the place assigned by
the Almighty. This is humility, and this spirit
should be universally cultivated.
" "Whatever grades of spiritual life," says Hickok,
" there may be from human to archangel, through all
the ranks of 'thrones, dominions, principalities, and
powers,' that is humility in each, which, in reverent
adoration of the Most High, cordially assents to its
own place among the worshippers; and the highest in
this classified rank, while he casts his crown before
the throne, and veils his face with his wings, will
be as truly virtuous in his humility as the lowest."
4. We owe to the Divine Being reverence.
When a man hoary with age, venerable for good-
ness, and profound in wisdom, enters our presence,
we almost involuntarily pay to him the homage of
reverence. It is this feeling infinitely exalted that
we owe to the awful Majesty "that inhabiteth
eternity." His infinite duration, past and future,
his omnipresence, which is everywhere and always
visible, his unsearchable knowledge, and his omni-
potent power, all should elicit a reverence profound,
sincere, constant, and universal.
5. Godly fear is due to God. He does not require
DUTIES TO GOD.
161
a fear that excites such a dread of his character and
presence as would make that presence uncomfort-
able, and of course undesirable. This would not
be a godly fear. The fear that is sought for, and
that should be rendered to God, is such as Moses
felt in the solitudes of the mountain, when the
"bush burned with fire and was not consumed:"
he reverently put his shoes from off his feet, be-
cause the place on which he stood was holy, and
yet he was attracted to the sacred spot.
6. A feeling of dependence should be cherished
and cultivated by all who would meet the claims
which God has upon them. This feeling of depend-
ence upon God as an infinite benefactor is a char-
acteristic of the pious mind, and is a chief dis-
tinction between the servant of God and the
servant of sin.
7. God claims our love. This is the sum of reli-
gion and the essence of piety. It is the most
reasonable claim that could be made. If you
wished to gain the affection of a fellow-creature,
you would seek to do so, not by telling him to love
you, but by exhibiting such dispositions and per-
forming for him such works as would excite his
love. This has been the course pursued by our
Heavenly Father toward us. He exhibits such
excellences of character, such moral beauty, such
162 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
goodness, that the heart should as naturally turn to
God, as the heliotrope to the sun.
"The real Creator," says Dr. Dwight, "has so
formed his works, and so constituted his provi-
deuce, that the minds of men irresistibly esteem a
benevolent being more than one of opposite char-
acter. This is the dictate of the intelligence, the
conscience, and the understanding. Any person
who will make the attempt, will find it beyond his
power to approve of malevolence at all."
So attractive is benevolence, that God seeks to
draw all men to him by his goodness. " God is
love." How these words vibrate upon the heart,
and meet a response in the human bosom! " God
is love" is uttered forth by a thousand voices, and
each utterance makes an impression upon the great
heart of our humanity, such as no other words
could make. Omnipotent power, omniscient wis-
dom, and even immutable justice, are the modifica-
tions of his love. But love is not only claimed in
view of the moral excellences which like a hril-
liant constellation shine in the moral heaven, and
illustrate the character of God; it is also claimed in
view of his frequent acts of kindness. In the
works of creation he has manifested his concern for
man. Equally for man he displays his regard in
that special superintending providence which sup-
DUTIES TO GOD.
163
plies his wants, wards off dangers, guards his foot-
steps, and watches his slumbers. But still more in
the great remedial dispensation, in the gift of his
Son, in the agonies and death of that Son, and in
all the instrumentalities connected with the dis-
pensation of grace, he has done enough to excite
love in the coldest heart.
8. We owe to God the entire consecration of our
persons. "Ye are not your own." God claims us,
soul and body, and to him we should surrender the
cultivated intellect, the subdued appetites, the well-
disciplined desires, and the heart's warmest and
purest affections. The act of self - consecration
should be entire, including the will and the con-
science. In this act we are to recognize the Author
of our being as possessing the right of absolute and
unlimited control, and our duty of positive, im-
plicit, and entire obedience. Reason teaches that
the finite should surrender to the infinite, and the
dependent to the independent.
"The will of God," says Mahan, "standing
before us, as it does, in revealed and absolute har-
mony with the dictates of infinite wisdom, know-
ledge, rectitude, and benevolence, the first duty
which conscience devolves on us is a distinct and
unlimited surrender of his own to the control of
the will of the Creator."
164 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION II.
OUTWARD DUTIES : PRAYER — PRAYER DEFINED — WHAT IT PRESUP-
POSES—NATURAL VIEWS—SCRIPTURAL VIEWS—DIFFERENT KINDS OF
PRAYER PRIVATE PRAYER FAMILY PRAYER PUBLIC PRAYER
POSTURE IN PRAYER ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FORMS OF
PRAYER—EFFICACY OF PRAYER—OBJECTIONS ANSWERED — REFLEC-
TIONS.
Prayer is the expression of desires to the Divine
Being, for things that are needful and lawful.
Hence prayer is said to be the communion of the
spirit of man with the Spirit of God. It consists of
thanksgiving, adoration, confession, and petition.
It presupposes, 1. A deep sense of want; 2. A
feeling of entire dependence; 3. Implicit confi-
dence; 4. A spirit of humility; 5. Submission to
the Divine will; 6. A desire to cultivate peace with
all mankind.
In reference to this duty we hold, that it is
natural and almost universal. In proof of this
position it may he stated:
1. That all persons when in great want naturally
invoke aid of those who are able to assist. This is
prayer, and it is thus proved to he natural and
reasonable.
2. All classes of persons in times of extremity
have been known to call upon God in prayer.
Even Atheists themselves have been known to pray.
DUTIES TO GOD.
165
Wherever the belief in God exists, prayer has been
invariably offered to him. Especially is this mani-
fest on occasions of sudden calamity: then there
arises a spontaneous petition to the God of heaven
for light and counsel, for pardon and salvation.
But in order to present this duty in a clearer
light, we offer the following as the scriptural views
on this subject.
1. The Scriptures command us to pray. The
commands are given with a frequency and an
emphasis which at once manifest the importance
attached to prayer by God. "Pray without ceas-
ing." "Pray everywhere, lifting up holy hands."
" Men ought always to pray." " Is any among you
afflicted? let him pray." These, and many other
similar passages, show howr this duty is enjoined by
Him to whom prayer should be offered.
2. The Scriptures abound with striking promises,
offered only to those who perform this duty. "Ask,
and it shall be given you ; seek, and ye shall find;
knock, and it shall be opened unto you." " Call
upon me in the day of trouble: I will deliver
thee."
3. Instances are given of special answers to
prayer. Abraham prayed to God, and he healed
Abimelech. Elijah prayed, and in answer to his
prayer God sent fruitful showers. He prayed, and
166 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
fire consumed the sacrifice. Hezekiah prayed, and
life and health were restored. The centurion
prayed, and Jesus answered. Cornelius prayed,
and God testified, " Cornelius, thy prayer is
heard."
4. Prayer marks the distinction between good
and bad men. David, Elijah, Daniel, Paul, and
hundreds of others, are represented as " continuing
instant in prayer;" while the wicked are repre-
sented as saying, " "What is the Almighty, that we
should serve him ; and what profit should we have,
if we pray unto him?"
5. Jesus Christ is given as an eminent example
of prayer. "Jesus fell on his face and prayed."
"He went into a solitary place and prayed." He
went to the mountain and prayed; he stood by the
grave of Lazarus and prayed; he continued a whole
night in prayer; he prayed for his disciples, for the
Church, for those that crucified him: his was a life
of prayer. How important that we imitate that
illustrious example!
We notice, in the next place, the different kinds
of prayer.
1. Private prayer. The Great Teacher is very
explicit in his instructions in reference to private
prayer. " When thou prayest, enter into thy closet,
and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy
DUTIES TO GOD.
167
Father which is in secret, and thy Father which
seeth in secret shall reward thee openly." Private
prayer commends itself to us, from the fact that we
have many private wants, that cannot be the proper
themes of public prayers. It also commends itself
to us because it brings us into the closest possible
communion with God. There is also less to divert
the mind when engaged in private devotion ; hence
the prayer can generally be more devout than when
offered in public. When a man finds himself alone
with his Maker, and feels as though the whole
attention of the great Jehovah were directed to
him, he is necessarily filled with most awful ideas
of Him before whose gaze he hows, and for whose
mercy he calls.
2. Family Prayer. The sacredness of the family
relation, the fearful responsibility of parents and
masters, and the immense influence exerted by
them for good or evil, make it clear that family
prayer should not be neglected. The reading of
the Sacred Scriptures in the presence of the family,
accompanied by solemn, earnest, and affectionate
appeals to the throne of grace, for light, support,
and guidance, cannot but have an influence upon
the entire domestic circle, as permanent as it will
be salutary. In this connection we may mention
prayers in the school. Every pious teacher feels
168 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
himself in the place of a parent, and, as he gathers
his interesting charge about him, a deep and pure
vein of devotion characterizes the prayer which he
otfers for the lambs of his fold.
3. Public prayer. If the worship of God is a
duty incumbent upon each individual man, and
upon man in the family circle, it is equally incuhi-
bent upon man in society. God should be ac-
knowledged in the great congregation, not only in
songs of praise, in reading, explaining, and en-
forcing his holy word, but in public confession
of sin, and in public supplication for Divine
mercy.
Whether prayer should be offered standing or
kneeling, is not a question of vital importance.
Hor do we think that there need be any con-
troversy as to whether prayer should be read or
offered extempore. Man may pray acceptably in
either position, and either with or without a
form.
It is argued, on the one hand, that the whole
congregation can more readily unite in the petition
when they are supplied with a written form. It
is also argued that we should never approach God
but after the most serious preparation, and that
this preparation can best be made by having a
written form of prayer. And, finally, that our
DUTIES TO GOD.
169
Saviour gave to his disciples a form of prayer,
which he intended should be used and followed as
a model.
On the other hand, it is argued that the prayer
when written becomes old and stale, and that we
are apt to repeat it without that fervor and devo-
tional spirit which should ever accompany prayer.
It is also argued in favor of extemporaneous
prayer, that no written form can be adapted to
every peculiar circumstance and relation of the
individual, the family, and the congregation.
We notice briefly the efBcacy of prayer.
1. The efficacy of prayer is seen in the influence
of prayer upon the subject. Its subjective influ-
ence is such as few will have the hardihood to
deny. It brings man into companionship with the
pure Spirit of God. This very intimate commu-
nion, by a law of his being, tends to make him
better: his mind receives the illuminations of
Divine grace; his tempers are chastened and re-
fined; his depravity removed, and his spirit
purified.
2. God makes prayer the condition on which
blessings are to be received. It is to save the sick,
to secure temporal blessings, and to procure the
high rewards of religious consolation in this life, and
it imparts the hope of life everlasting. Salvation
8
170 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
is the great blessing which God has promised, on
condition that it be sought with prayer.
3. Prayer is made one of the great instrumen-
talities for the world's conversion. It is to be
efficacious in giving success and power to truth.
" The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man
availeth much," is a mysterious truth, but still a
truth. Moral philosophy does not seek to deter-
mine how it is that prayer affects others besides
those that offer it; nor can it reveal the mystery of
its availing with God.
The objections to prayer demand a slight notice.
1. It is objected that God is all-wise and benevo-
lent, and will therefore do what is best without
prayer.
In reply to this, we have to say that the objection
can be made with as much force against any other
duty as against prayer. If he can and will do
what is for man's good, without his praying for it,
he can and will do what is best without any con-
dition, and man has merely to become a passive
recipient, and need obey none of God's behests.
We also reply to this objection, that it is compatible
with the wisdom and goodness of God to require
prayer, inasmuch as special answers to special
prayers beget thankfulness and induce holiness.
2. It is objected to prayer, that it is not
DUTIES TO GOD.
171
consistent with the uniformity of nature, and, as we
know that nature is uniform, we reject prayer.
We answer, that this argument cannot apply to
our moral wants, hut only to our physical wants;
and, consequently, it has no force in reference to
that for which our prayers are usually offered. We
argue, also, that this assumption of the perfect
uniformity of nature is made in ignorance. The
man that asserts that nature is not influenced in its
operations by God, through the prayers of the
pious, asserts more than he knows. It is utterly
impossible for him to know it, for he has no way
of finding it out. This objection presupposes God
to he inexorable, and that for no purpose will he
vary the laws of nature. We have not so learned
God.
Finally, in answer to all these objections, it may
II
be stated, that God usually works by second causes.
Tie desires the earth to produce, and, in order to
production, he gives us clouds, rain, and sunshine.
How, I would not say that God could not make the
earth produce without rain or sunshine; nor would
I say that he could not bring rain without the
clouds. But he has not chosen to do so. Rain and
sunshine are the antecedents, and crops are the
sequence. So, in the moral world, prayer is the
antecedent, and the gift of the Holy Ghost is the
172 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
consequent. And we can see as good reasons for
this course of things in the moral world, as we
can for rain and sunshine in the natural world.
From this entire discussion, we draw a few prac-
tical reflections.
1. God, in requiring of us prayer, only meets
a spontaneous demand of man's moral nature.
2. The efficacy of prayer is not limited to time,
but continues for ever.
3. If to be prayerful constitutes an evidence of
piety, to be prayerless constitutes an evidence
of want of piety.
4. If prayer is not specifically answered, it
affords no evidence that prayer is wanting in
efficacy. It is possible, nay, even probable, that
the prayer may be efficacious, and the evidences of
its efficacy be for a time withheld.
SECTION III.
BABBATH ORIGINAL SABBATH PALEY's THEORY: OBJECTIONS TO
PALEY'S THEORY TRUE THEORY — MOSAIC SABBATH CHRISTIAN
SABBATH—DAY CHANGED—PROOF THAT IT IS OBLIGATORY—HOW
TO BE KEPT.
I. The original institution of the Sabbath.
In regard to this there are two theories.
1. Paley maintains that the Sabbath was not
DUTIES TO GOD.
173
instituted at the creation, nor until a long time
subsequent. After reciting a portion of the six-
teenth chapter of Exodus, in which the account is
given of the miraculous fall of manna in the
wilderness, and of the large amount that fell on
the sixth day, with the reason for the amount being
doubled on that day, which was, " To-morrow is
the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord," Dr.
Paley makes the following remark: " ISTow, in my
opinion, the transaction in the wilderness above
recited was the first actual institution of the
Sabbath."
"We object to this view of the Sabbath:
1. Because it is evidently a forced construction
of the narrative. In Exodus, the Sabbath is not
spoken of as a new institution, but as a day well
known to the Israelites.
2. Because this hebdomadal division of time was
not only recognized among the Jews, but was also
recognized by the heathen. Hesiod speaks of the
seventh day as being sacred; Homer also men-
tions the seventh day as a sacred day. Other
similar testimonies might be adduced.
3. We object to Paley's theory, because, accord-
ing to it, God postponed for twenty-five hundred
years an institution which had been needed during
that entire period, both for man and beast.
174 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
4. We object to Paley's theory, because he
makes Moses recount two events as concurrent,
which were actually separated by the space of
twenty-five hundred years, if his theory be correct.
"And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified
it, because that in it he had rested from all his
work which God created and made." This pas-
sage is found in the second chapter of Genesis, and
immediately follows the account of the creation.
Now, says Paley, "the blessing and sanctification,
i. e., the religious distinction and appropriation of
that day, were not actually made till many ages
afterwards." Surely a theory must be poorly sus-
tained which requires such wresting of the Scrip-
tures to establish it.
2. The second and true theory is, that the
Sabbath was instituted at the creation. No other
just interpretation can be given of the account
recorded by Moses in the second chapter of
Genesis. Upon this enactment of the law of the
Sabbath, we remark:
1. The institution was intended for Adam—that
is, for the whole human family—and hence is of
changeless obligation.
2. The time was at the beginning of the world,
which also shows that it was instituted for the
entire race.
DUTIES TO GOD.
175
3. Tlie reasons assigned for the institution are
general: "And God blessed the seventh day, and
sanctified it, because that in it he had rested from
all his work which God created and made." blow,
as long as the creation should stand as his greatest
work, the seventh day was to be hallowed as the
monument of that grand work. If, however, a
greater work should he wrought, God might change
the day to commemorate that greater work. Still,
the reason assigned is a general one, applying to
the whole race, and shows the institution to be
perpetual.
II. The Mosaic Sabbath.
The reenaetment of the law of the Sabbath, as it
is found in the decalogue, is in these words: "Re-
member the Sabbath day to keep it holy : six days
shalt thou labor and do all thy work; but the
seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God :
in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son,
nor thy daughter, thy man-servant nor thy maid-
servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is
within thy gates; for in six days the Lord made
heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is,
and rested the seventh day: wherefore the Lord
blessed the Sabbath day and hallowed it." Upon
this we remark,
1. That the manner of the ordination is the
176 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
same as that employed in the original institution.
God blessed the Sabbath day; that is, God or-
dained the Sabbath to be a blessing to all nations,
and through all time. He hallowed or sanctified
it; that is, he set it apart from a secular to a holy
use. It was to be a blessing to all people, and for
ever : it was to be kept holy by all nations, and for
ever.
2. We remark that this command to keep holy
the Sabbath day is found in the moral law, which
must, of course, in all its requirements, be of per-
petual obligation. It is found side by side with
such commands as are admitted to be of universal
and changeless obligation. And the only reason-
able inference that can be drawn from this juxta-
position with permanent laws, is that the law to
keep the Sabbath is of universal and perpetual
obligation.
3. It may be proper to add that the violation of
this command met with the severest punishment.
And in after years God by the mouth of one of
his prophets speaks of the violators of this law in
the following language: " Thou hast despised mine
holy things, and hast profaned my Sabbaths. There-
fore have I poured out mine indignation upon them;
I have consumed them with the fire of my wrath;
their own way have I recompensed upon their heads,
DUTIES TO GOD.
177
saith the Lord God." This curse was inflicted upon
those who hid the Sabbath from their eyes.
4. Finally, we add that the Mosaic Sabbath was
not only a day of rest, but a day set apart for reli-
gious worship, and to its religious observers glow-
ing promises were given ; as, for example, in the
following beautiful passage found in the prophecy
of Isaiah: "If thou turn away thy foot from the
Sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy day;
and call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord,
honorable; and shalt honor him, not doing thine
own Ways, nor finding thine own pleasure, nor
speaking thine own words; then shalt thou delight
thyself in the Lord; and I will cause thee to ride
upon the high places of the earth, and feed thee
with the heritage of Jacob thy father; for the
mouth of the Lord hath spoken it."
III. The Christian Sabbath.
As the original Sabbath commemorated the
creation, and continued to be kept on the seventh
day as long as the creation was God's greatest
work, so the Christian Sabbath was changed to the
first day to commemorate the greater work of
man's redemption, which was completed by the
resurrection of Christ from the grave. That the
Sabbath was changed from the seventh to the first
8*
178 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
day of the week may he proved by the following
arguments:
1. On this day, just one week from his resur-
rection, Christ appeared to his apostles, thereby
indicating that this was to be the great day of his
Church.
2. This day was signalized as the day of Pente-
cost, on which the Holy Ghost descended upon the
disciples who were assembled " with one accord in
one place."
3. We prove by analogy that the first day was
ordained and sanctified as the Sabbath of the Lord.
The Lord's Supper is so designated to intimate the
holy nature of the supper: it is no common feast,
hut a feast consecrated to God. So the Lord's day
must he a day ordained and consecrated to the
Lord.
4. The writings of Pliny and Tacitus prove that
the special mark of a Christian was the observance
of the Lord's day.
5. The standing question put to the persecuted
Christians by the Romans was, "Have you kept the
Lord's day?" The usual answer is said to have
been, "I am a Christian: I cannot omit it."
6. All the early Fathers speak of this day as being
universally observed by the primitive Christian
DUTIES TO COD.
179
Church. The following extract from one of the
early Fathers—Justin Martyr, who wrote A.D. 140—
is a clear testimony on this point: "On the day
called Sunday, there is a meeting in one place of all
the Christians who live either in the town or in the
country, and the memoirs of the apostles are read
to them as long as suitable. When the reader stops,
the president announces the admonition, and ex-
horts to the imitation of those noble examples; after
which we all arise and begin to pray. We all meet
together on Sunday because it is the first day on
which God turned the darkness into light, gave shape
to chaos, and made the world; and on the same
day Jesus Christ our Saviour rose from the dead."
7. The conclusion then is inevitable that the first
day was substituted by Divine appointment for the
seventh day. The apostles observed it; they re-
quired its observance by the early Christians—it was
the mark of discipleship; its observance was at-
tended by the Divine blessing; it was a monument
of the great event in the completion of redemption;
and all the earliest Church historians speak of the
Lord's day as holy time.
If any, however, still doubt the propriety of the
change, we add that the universal observance of this
day by the Christian Church renders the observance
of a different day impracticable.
180 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY,
We argue that it is still obligatory upon man to
keep the Sabbath:
1. Because it is just as needful to mind and body,
to man and beast now as it ever was. If a day of
rest was ever needful, it is just as needful at this
time. If a holy day, designed for moral culture,
was ever necessary, such a day is as necessary now as
ever it was. Man needs as much repose, as many
means of grace, as numerous incentives to piety, in
this period of his history as at any former period.
If, then, in the language of our Saviour, the " Sab-
bath was made for man," we hold it to be ever
obligatory upon man.
2. We argue that it is still obligatory upon man,
because it has never been abolished. Other institu-
tions designed alone for the Jews have been abol-
ished, but no authority can be found in the word of
God intimating that the Sabbath has been abol-
ished.
3. But the Sabbath has been absolutely reenacted,
as has been seen, under the Mosaic and Christian
dispensations, and we do not see how any Christian
man can come to any other conclusion than that it
is still obligatory.
4. God has ever honored the observance of the
Sabbath. The morality and virtue of a community
are in proportion to the observance of the Sab-
DUTIES TO GOD.
181
bath. The neglect of the Sabbath is universally
accompanied by the moral degradation of the peo-
pie. When the Sabbath was desecrated and abol-
ished by France, God visited her people with the
most fearful punishment. The same is true of
individuals. The downward career of crime fre-
quently begins with a disregard of the Sabbath,
and ends with the miserable and frequently the
dishonored death of the unhappy criminal.
IY. The manner of observing the Christian Sab-
bath.
1. We are to abstain from all except necessary
labor, or labor for the sake of charity. ^Necessary
labor is illustrated by our Lord's parable of the ox
falling into the ditch, and our being allowed to take
it out on the Sabbath day. And as to works of
charity, he says, "It is lawful to do good on the
Sabbath day."
2. We are to abstain from the pursuit of pleasure
on the Sabbath. Assemblings of young people for
the sake of amusement are to be avoided. Hunting,
fishing, pleasure-rides, and kindred amusements,
in themselves innocent on other days, are to be re-
garded as a desecration of the "Lord's day."
3. We are to require our children and servants to
abstain from labor on the Sabbath day. In the
language of the sacred ordinance found in the
182 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
moral law, we are not to allow our "man-servant,
nor our maid - servant, nor our cattle, nor the
stranger within our gates," to work on the Sab-
bath.
4. We are to make it a day of religious contem-
plation. It is the emblem of eternal rest, that
"rest which remaineth to the people of God." The
cultivation of a spirit of devotion, reflection upon
the goodness and mercy of our Heavenly Father,
and the exercise of Christian graces, may well
employ the hours of the day designed for the reli-
gious improvement of the race.
5. We are to observe it as a holy day, and hence
we are to attend God's house; to listen to the
gospel, to offer praise, to observe the ordinances of
the sanctuary, and, by every possible public mani-
testation, exhibit our appreciation of the day whose
observance is productive of so much good to com-
munities and to individuals.
personal
ethics.
183
CHAPTER II.
personal ethics.
SECTION I.
SELF-PROTECTION—THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DEFENCE—ARGUMENTS IN
FAVOR OF SELF-DEFENCE—OBJECTION ANSWERED — SELF-INJURY TO
BE AVOIDED—MAIMING—TORTURE—SUICIDE.
The duties which a man owes to himself may he
embraced under three general heads. 1. Self-pro-
tection; 2. Self-government; 3. Self-culture.
1. Self-protection. The great principle of self-
protection is that you have the right, and that it is
your duty to protect yourself, by putting the inter-
ests of an aggressor in just such jeopardy as that in
which he may have placed yours. The aggressor
has forfeited his rights by his assault upon yours;
and if his attack is such as to endanger your life,
you have the right to disable him, and even to kill
him, in self-defence. Every one allows that it would
be wrong to passively submit to be maimed or
184 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
killed by a wild beast, when it was possible to avert
the injury by sacrificing the life of the beast. An
enraged man seeking your life is no more to you
than an enraged wild beast, and you have the same
right to kill the one as the other. I know that
some fanatical moralists of the present day have
pushed the doctrine of forbearance to an extreme,
and have proclaimed themselves non-resistants, and
denied the right of self-defence. In proof, how-
ever, that the position taken above is consistent
with the purest morality, I offer the following argu-
ments.
1. Self - defence is instinctively resorted to by
every one who is attacked, even before he has time
for reflection. It is, then, in accordance with a
universal instinct of human nature. It is a part of
our constitution, and, as our constitutional impulses
have a tendency to accomplish some wise purpose,
they should not be thwarted.
2. Every person is the natural protector of his
own life; and if an assassin should attack him, he
would be recreant to his duty, and unfaithful to
the sacred trust committed to him, were he not to
defend his life, even at the expense of the life
of the assassin. He that would not at once kill
the assassin, would be controlled by cowardice, and
would deserve the coward's death.
PERSONAL ETHICS.
185
3. Justice requires the course here indicated.
In the case supposed, one or the other must die.
Then, let the one that deserves death meet his
doom, and let the innocent he spared.
But we are met with the following passages of
Scripture: "Resist not evil." "If thine enemy
hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink."
"Love your enemies."
All I have to say in reference to these, and other
similar scriptures, is, that they are intended as a
prohibition of vengeance. We are not allowed to
indulge a spirit of revenge. Ror do we believe
the least spirit of revenge to be compatible with
pure morality. The disabling of the aggressor, or
the taking of his life, must be done as an act of
pure self-defence, and not as an act of vengeance.
The same principles hold in reference to the
protection of your reputation. If you are slan-
dered, you owe it to yourself to defend yourself
against the slander, even though it should utterly
destroy the reputation of the assailant. If one or
the other must go down, let the guilty one be the
sufferer.
While it is the duty of man to protect himself
from the aggressions of others, it is equally his duty
to avoid self-inflictions.
1. Maiming. An enlightened morality forbids
186 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
the practice of disfiguring and scarring the body,
which is so often practiced among barbarous people.
The emasculation of one's self, even for the sake
of a more rigid religious life, is at once ignoble,
unmanly, and degrading, and is as offensive to God
as it is disgraceful to man.
2. Self-torture. All penances which superstition
requires of her votaries, such as long fastings, lash-
ing one's body with whips, confining one's self in
solitude, and all rigid austerities which inflict per-
manent injury on the constitution, are at once
opposed to the principles of a pure morality, and
contrary to the spirit of the mild and merciful dis-
pensation of Christianity.
8. Suicide. It has been contended by some, that
a man has a right to commit suicide when he feels
that his life is a nuisance to society. The following
considerations will show the falsity of this view:
1. It goes upon the principle that man is per-
fectly capable of determining whether his life will
be useful or not, which is false.
2. Even if he could know this, and be certain
that he could never do any good, the spirit which
would influence him to the commission of suicide
is a rebellious spirit, coming in direct conflict with
the providence of God.
3. It is admitted that a man has not the right to
PERSONAL ETHICS.
187
take the life of another, except in self-defence; and
upon the same principle, he would not be allowed
to take his own life, except in defence of that life,
which is both absurd and impossible.
SECTION II.
SELF-GOVERNMENT: CONTROL OF THE APPETITES—SIN OF BECOMING
SLAVES TO THE APPETITES CONTROL OF THE PASSIONS ANGER
PRIDE AND VANITY ENVY COVETOUSNESS.
Self-government implies the control of the appe-
tites and passions.
I. Man must control his appetites. This prin-
ciple forbids intemperance. Intemperance applies
to immoderate indulgence of the appetites in eat-
ing and drinking. For a man to pamper his
appetites, to live for the sake of gratifying them,
to eat simply for the sake of pleasure, is to lose
sight of his own worthiness, and to forget the high
destiny for which he was created. And then, that
unnatural thirst for intoxicating liquors, which,
when gratified, fires the blood, and constantly seeks
gratification, and yet continues to cry, Give, give,
finally sinks the spirit in irrecoverable ruin. That
it is our duty to control the appetites may appear
still clearer by the following reflections:
1. Servitude to appetite is the worst form of
188 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
bondage. No bondage is so low, so degrading as
this. No servility is so hopeless as the servility to
a depraved appetite. When man once yields him-
self a bondman to this exacting tyrant, he becomes
heedless of the calls of duty: the claims of wife
and children are forgotten; the high behests of
Deity are disregarded; and all interests, temporal
and eternal, are forfeited. He worships no god but
appetite, and to that he yields a servile devotion, as
degrading as it is unnatural and unmanly.
2. Servitude to appetite destroys man's self-re-
spect, and causes him to forfeit the respect of others.
How debasing must be the slavery to appe-
tite when it lowers man to the brute, makes him'
forget that he is a man, effaces from him the last
vestiges of God's image, and makes him a fit com-
panion for swine! Men may pity the miserable
wretch who has thus sold his birthright, but thgy
cannot respect him.
8. When man yields himself a slave to appetite*,5
he becomes a hopeless slave. To relieve himself from
this slavery requires a moral power that he has
lost, a strength of character that he has forfeited,
a moral courage of which he is incapable, and an
heroic energy which he is unable to put forth/
His pledges, and high resolves, and noble purposes,-
yield like gossamer threads in the hands of this
PERSONAL ETHICS.
189
monstrous giant that lords it over God's heritage
>with an exacting tyranny that knows neither pity
nor remorse.
II. The second duty involved in self-government
is the control of the passions and affections.
1. Anger. "He that is slow to anger is better
than the mighty; and he that ruleth his spirit than
he that taketh a city." " Be ye angry and sin not."
""Whosoever is angry with his brother without
a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment."
From these, and many similar passages of Scrip-
ture, we judge that anger uncontrolled is sinful;
though anger properly controlled, and for a proper
cause, may be innocent. Many a man has con-
qugred others, and has been unable to rule his own
spirit. Violent anger is rash, cruel, vindictive, and
lawless. It is swift to shed blood, relentless in the
infliction of vengeance, and shows no mercy to a
foe. It dethrones reason and conscience, and
usurps their place. It storms and raves with
ungovernable fury, utters words hard to be borne
and difficult to be recalled; and, while it drives
peace from the bosom of its miserable victim, it
makes all around unhappy. The angry man is his
own worst enemy. He is blindly driven by a
passion which frequently places him in the power
of his antagonist, and thus is made to sully his
190 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
own fair name, to lose his influence, and sometimes
his life. Again, like a raging maniac he commits
an act for which a life of unavailing tears fails to
make atonement. Rule your own spirit, repress
your feelings of indignation, subdue your anger,
conquer yourself.
2. Pride and vanity. "Pride do I hate." "Pride
goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit
before a fall." "A man's pride shall bring him
low." "Lest, being lifted up with pride, he fall
into the condemnation of the devil." These
scriptures show that pride is hateful, that it is
destructive, that it is the precursor of a certain fall,
and that it brings its victim into certain condem-
nation. It involves a spirit of self-inflation and of
egotism which prevents all improvement, and which
degrades the subject in universal estimation. Pride
has protean shapes, and arises from divers causes.
"Wealth, family connections, superficial attain-
ments, fine dress, beauty of person, splendid equi-
page, may each and all of them excite pride. It
exhibits itself in "great swelling words," in loud
boastings, in scorn and contempt of others, in
sneers at the excellences which others possess,
in a morbid love of flattery and anxiety to receive
adulation, in repinings at neglect, and in un-
governable rage when slighted. Such is pride.
PERSONAL ETHICS.
191
All men reprobate this, spirit in all but themselves,
thereby showing how utterly despicable it is. To
repress it, we have but to reflect on its hateful
character, and how unbecoming it is in a little,
contracted soul to entertain such a feeling of
self-exaltation. Our numerous imperfections, our
close alliance with worms and dust, our very
contracted powers when compared with the Infi-
nite, should not only subdue but annihilate pride.
It is utterly opposed to a pure morality, is a barrier
to happiness, is the death of piety, and is the
fruitful source of countless evils. It is unworthy
of man, and he should bring all his strength of
will to overcome it, and should look for help to
Him who saith, "Whosoever humbleth himself
shall be exalted." I have but one more remark to
make concerning pride, and that is, it is never
"commendable;" it is always wrong. It is the
exact opposite of humility. It makes us think
of ourselves more highly than we ought to think,
and we might as well speak of commendable ven-
geance as of commendable pride. It is universally
condemned in the Sacred Scriptures, and should be
universally eradicated.
3. Envy. We give this name to that malevolent
affection which arises toward another, simply
because of his prosperity. lie is hated because
192 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
he has been successful. Envy is said to arise
between those who belong to the same class in
society. It springs up between two belles in the
same city, between rival candidates for the same
office, between members of the same profession.
It is said that fellow-students of the same class, and
whose standing is nearly equal, are prone to be
envious of each other, while no such feeling arises
in reference to members of other classes, whatever
may be their standing. That this is in the main
true, will not be denied. But we often find those
who dwell upon their own wants and disappoint-
ments, and who draw sad comparisons between
their own condition and the greater prosperity
of others, whether belonging to their own or to a
different class. And after comparison is made,
they dwell with the most morose feelings upon their
own sad fate, and indulge feelings of discontent,
fretfulness, and petulance. Its necessary attendant
is mental agony; it clothes itself with hypocrisy,
delights in slander, rejoices in iniquity, and
comforts itself with the sorrows of others. It is
sad when others rejoice, and indulges a malignant
joy when others suffer misfortunes. He that would
be either good or happy, must keep envy as far
as possible from his heart. The character of an
envious man is universally despised. His crime
PERSONAL ETHICS.
193
has 110 palliation, and there is no one so poor as
to do him reverence. Let the evil be shunned by
reflecting upon its opposition to all worthiness,
its hideous deformity, its unmitigated viciousness,
and its ruinous consequences. Let constant and
earnest prayer be offered to the Almighty that
he would free our hearts from the direst curse
which passion can bring.
4. Covetousness. " Thou shalt not covet." "Be-
ware of covetousness." "A heart they have exer-
cised with covetous practices: cursed children, which
have forsaken the right way." "But covetousness,
let it not once be named among you." "Woe to
him that coveteth." The desire which we term
covetousness would appropriate that which belongs
to another without giving an equivalent. Hence it
is excessive desire of owning. Its rapacity is without
bounds. It is the embodiment of selfishness. Its
object is wealth, and to its attainment the covetous
man bends every energy, sacrifices every comfort,
forfeits peace of mind, disregards the principles
of justice, and sets at naught the fearful mandates
of the Almighty. It is more ravenous than death,
and more cruel than the grave. The scruples of
honesty, the monitions of conscience, the claims
of duty, the esteem of the virtuous, and the favor
of God, are alike disregarded. Sometimes this
9
194 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
passion assumes a peculiar form, when it seeks
money for its own sake. We may have some
respect for the man who covets money as a means
to obtain what may satisfy his wants; but for a
man who seeks money as an end we can only feel
the contempt which the miser deserves. Other
sinful passions may appear to afford some gratifica-
tion, and in this delusive appearance may find some
little palliation, but the miser makes himself a
wretch by living and feeling only in his money.
He worships gold; he lives only to accumulate
gold; he hoards up gold; and becomes as destitute
of nobleness of purpose, of moral purity, and of
manly dignity, as the gold to which he bows. Let
all feel it to be their duty to govern themselves in
reference to this passion; and, by reflecting on the
severe judgments which God visits on the covetous,
on the misery with which it is always accompanied,
on the barriers which it raises between man and
God, and, above all, by appeals to the throne
of grace, let its entire eradication be sought.
PERSONAL ETHICS.
195
SECTION III.
SELF - CULTURE — PHYSICAL CULTURE : DIET — EXERCISE DRESS —
CLEANLINESS CULTURE OF THE MIND : ENERGY PERSEVERANCE
SYSTEM—MORAL CULTURE : PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE CHERISHING
THE SENSE OF OBLIGATION OBEDIENCE TO CONSCIENCE SELF-
EXAMINATION—REPENTANCE—PUTTING PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE.
The next duty which man owes to himself, is to
perfect his own nature.
I. To develop and perfect the physical system, is
a duty which we owe to an organization at once
the most complicated and the most delicate.
1. This must be done, in the first place, by a
proper regard to diet. Wholesome food, carefully
selected, well cooked, properly masticated, and
taken always in moderation, is essential to the
growth of the body, to its health, and its full devel-
opment. In the early years of life the selection
and preparation of the food depend upon the
parents, and fearful is the guilt of many parents in
this respect. In another department of practical
morality the duties of parents will he fully dis-
cussed: for the present we have to do only with
personal duties.V All rich and unwholesome viands,
all "surfeiting and drunkenness," all gormandizing,
are to he avoided, as injuring the tabernacle of the
soul; as rendering it unfit to perform its functions,
196 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
and as degrading the soul itself. It is believed, and
upon good authority, that over-eating and improper
drinking are fraught with more ruin to man than
"war, pestilence, and famine."
2. Proper attention should he paid to exercise.
Exercise imparts strength to the body, activity to
the limbs, hardness to the muscles, and vigor to the
constitution. It is the delight of childhood, and
the necessity of age. It is compliance with a great
law of our being, the neglect of which brings imbe-
cility of body, weakness of nerve, loss of health,
and premature old age and death. To violate this
law of our physical constitution, under the pretence
of excessive study, is to forfeit the very improve-
ment which we are seeking. Exercise of the body
is as necessary as exercise of the mind. An un-
sound body must exert its influence upon the spirit.
Exercise is better than medicine to promote health
and prolong life. Every student should have hie
set time for exercise, and should not allow any
ordinary circumstance to interfere with it. Ho
man can neglect this without a corresponding
failure of intellectual as well as physical energy.
3. Dress. The philosophy of dress requires that
such clothing should be worn as will most certainly
secure the comfort and health of the wearer. In
reference to dress we remark:
PERSONAL ETHICS.
197
1. It should always correspond in its texture to
the climate and season. It should he such as to
afford ample protection to the body against the
inclemencies of the weather.
2. It should be so adapted to the body, as not to
cramp it, hinder its growth, prevent its healthy
action, or enfeeble its energies. I am sorry to say
that in this respect the women of America have
rendered themselves especially liable to censure.
The miserable habit of tight-lacing has brought
unnumbered evils to them and their posterity.
bTor are they entirely free from a violation of the
first maxim we have presented. Their dress is
frequently of so frail a texture as to afford but
little protection from the severity of the weather.
8. The dress should never offend against modesty.
"When the dress is so arranged as to excite unchaste
feelings in the spectator, it deserves the strongest
reprehension by all lovers of virtue. It then
becomes an immorality, as offensive to God as it
must ever be disgusting to all pure-minded persons.
4. Dress may, and generally should, correspond
to the prevailing custom, unless that custom violate
one of the above principles. Then there should be
no hesitation between custom and right. If cus-
torn requires the sacrifice of modesty, or health, or
comfort, then custom must not be obeyed.
198 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
5. Other" things being equal, that dress which is
the most comely may he preferred. I can see no
reason for preferring an uncomely dress to one that
is comely. "We almost involuntarily form some
judgment of a person from his dress. And while
all extravagance in dress is to be avoided, and all
pride in dress is to he repressed as unworthy the
dignity of human nature, a proper regard to
comeliness of attire is by no means reprehen-
sible.
4. Cleanliness. " Cleanliness," says a great
divine, "is next to godliness." Frequent ablutions
are absolutely essential to the preservation of
health. One who lives in filth cannot have ex-
alted notions of purity. Cleanliness brings its own
reward, in the air of comfort which it imparts to
the dwelling, in the elasticity which it gives to the
spirits, in the health and vigor derived by the con-
stitution, and in those loftier aspirations which can
neither be excited nor encouraged in the midst of
foulness and stench. It guards the habitation
against the inroads of sickness, and preserves its
inmates in health.
II. Self-culture involves attention not only to the
body, but, in the second place, special care is to be
had in the culture of the intellect. We have
already shown that the desire of knowledge is con-
PERSONAL ETHICS.
199
stitutional, and this desire is to be gratified by a
faithful improvement of the mind. In order to the
cultivation of the intellect, there must be,
1. Energy. Ho indolent man ever became dis-
tinguished for knowledge. Indolence paralyzes the
intellectual powers, represses curiosity, shrinks from
investigation, is appalled by the difficulties attend-
ing a process of reasoning, and causes its victim to
pine in the poverty of ignorance, when he might
luxuriate in the wealth of knowledge. Under,its
baneful influence the young remain stupid, are dis-
couraged, leave school, enter upon business, make
failures, and live and die in obscurity. Ho origin-
ality of genius or brilliancy of intellect can begin
to make amends for deficiency of energy. Energy
masters difficulties, removes obstructions, over-
comes imbecility, sharpens dulness, stores the
memory, quickens the judgment, develops the
understanding, accumulates knowledge, and in
every way promotes intellectual advancement.
Energy develops powers which would ever have
remained dormant, and gives to those powers
beauty, elegance, and polish. Hothing can resist
it. In the cultivation of the intellect it is almost
omnipotent.
2. Intellectual culture requires perseverance.
The efforts must not be spasmodic; they must
200 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
be continuous, in order to be successful. If the
first effort does not solve the problem, or arrive at
the truth, the effort must be repeated, perseveringly
continued, until the truth is gained.y The cultiva-
tion of the intellect is not the business merely of
youth, it cannot be accomplished in a few short
years, it is rather the business of a lifetime. The
mind is progressive, and is capable of infinite
improvement. And it is to be lamented that intel-
lectual culture is sought principally to fit one for
the business of life, and when a partial qualifica-
tion for that business is attained, the effort at intel-
lectual progress generally ceases. This should not
be. It should be felt to be a high duty to perse-
vere in the culture of the intellect, as long as there
is truth undiscovered, or knowledge unacquired.
Without fear and without faltering, inspired by a
solemn sense of duty, man should be a student of
the great volume of nature, as it lies open before
him, revealing to his persevering gaze the wonders
of God Almighty. From every source, human and
Divine, in every department of science and litera-
ture, in the works of man and in the works of
God, at all times and in all places, by attention,
observation, and persevering study, he should seek
to be a learner. His field of thought should
embrace man, the universe, and God; and each new
PERSONAL ETHICS.
201
discovery should only fire his energy and increase
his perseverance.
3. System. The pursuit of knowledge is ren-
dered both more pleasant and more successful by
adherence to the most rigid system. A systematic
arrangement of time appears almost to double its
duration. Certainly, twice as much may be accom-
plished, when your work is systematically pursued,
as can possibly be done when you have no system.
We should seek by unfaltering energy, unwearying
perseverance, and faultless system, to accomplish
that intellectual culture which we owe to ourselves,
our country, and our God.
ITT. Moral culture. A personal duty of the
highest moment is the culture of the moral
feelings.
1. You are to do all you can to know your duty.
You must often inquire, Is this right? JSTo oppor-
tunity must be allowed to pass of studying your
relations and obligations, and the best methods of
fulfilling them. This investigation must be made
in a docile spirit, remembering your great liability
to self-presumption. It must be humbly made, it
must be perseveringly made, until an answer clear,
full, and satisfactory is obtained. In inquiring
what is right, it will be well to look into the con-
sequences of the action; to examine as far as
9*
202 ELEMENTS OE MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
possible all its bearings upon the individual actor,
and those in reference to whom it is performed.
It is absolutely essential to inquire what motives
are prompting to its performance, as the motives
always determine the quality of the action. Look
into God's word—"the perfect law of liberty"—
and continue therein, until from its infallible
pages you have learned " the way, the truth, and
the life." In it, as in a mine, seek for a knowledge
of duty, more earnestly than the lapidary seeks
for the priceless diamond. Read other good books;
they will refine the taste, exalt the intellect, and
improve the conscience. I Associate with the good,
and receive, in a willing mind and a grateful heart,
the words of purity and wisdom that they utter.
Take some faultless character as your model, and
dwell often and long upon its moral excellences.
Have ever before your mind the character of Him
who is the embodiment of goodness, justice, and
truth. By pursuing this course, you will hardly err
in reference to a knowledge of duty.
2. Cherish the feeling of obligation; let nothing
dissipate it. Remember that this feeling is essen-
tial to a well-developed moral character; and that
it places man in a high position, and dignifies his
actions. Remember that the godless sneer, the
ribald jest, and the infidel scoff, have often put to
PERSONAL ETHICS.
203
flight a feeling, the loss of which cannot be repaid
by all the philosophy infidelity ever invented.
Remember that he who regards the obligatory
feeling as a weakness, is himself unworthy of
confidence. Cultivate, exercise, strengthen, and
perpetuate this feeling of moral obligation, as
implanted by the Divine Being, and as leading to
issues of the greatest magnitude.
3. Cultivate the habit of obeying the impulses of
conscience, as the most authoritative faculty of your
nature. Dare to do right; be courageous in the
discharge of duty; let not the seductive smiles of
indolence, the imperious calls of ambition, the loud
trump of fame, the fierce clamors of appetite, the
tyrannical claims of selfishness, the insidious fasci-
nations of pleasure, or the wild cries of fanaticism,
prevent a noble, fearless, and consistent obedience
to the impulses of your moral principle, j Remem-
ber that the highest aspect of human nature is seen
when, struggling with misfortune, beset with
temptation, and assailed by countless adversaries,
it moves forward in the great tasks of life, un-
appalled by danger and unawed by opposition.
Be careful to distinguish between the impulses of
conscience, and those of a blind fanaticism. False
philanthropy sometimes usurps the place of con-
science, and leads its victims to the wildest and
204 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
most impracticable schemes. Religious frenzy is
sometimes mistaken for the impulse of enlightened
conscience, and in its name sheds blood, establishes
the inquisition, and produces the most alarming
results. Conscience is the highest function of the
reason, as well as of the sensibility, and is as
rational as it is sensitive. Then, be careful to
guard against any irrational impulse, and fanatical
ebullition of feeling, as the dictates of a rational
conscience.
4. Subject yourself to frequent and rigid self-
examination. Go into your own heart and search
its inmost recesses. Do this with single eye,
without prejudice, and without partiality. Do this
in the light of God's word, and with submission to
its dictates: let its radiance illuminate the secret
springs of action, and bring out under the broad
light of truth the most obscure motive. Do this
work earnestly, as though life and death, time and
eternity, were all involved in the issue. ] Be willing
to know the whole truth, to see the entire character,
however unpalatable the truth, and however de-
formed the character. Make no apologies for
yourself; seek not to conceal even the half-formed
thought, or the merely budding passion. Per-
form this work not once, but often; and always
with humble reliance upon that Almighty Being,
PEKS0NAL ETHICS.
205
from whose eye the intention cannot be concealed,
and in whose infallible judgment character is every
thing, and circumstances are nothing.
5. If you have done wrong, repent; be sorry for
it. Avoid, hereafter, the temptation by which you
fell. Notice the course of thinking that led you
into sin, and shun that course in the future. If
you have done an injury to another, show the depfh
of your repentance by making restitution, as far
as it may be in your power. Restitution is a means
of moral culture taught by the Great Teacher, and
it is probably the most effective that has been sug-
gested; it mortifies self, subdues pride, exalts
virtue, and enthrones the conscience.
6. Put these principles into practice. Let the
outward act correspond with the inward principles;
let the whole life be principles in action; let no
duty be neglected, however it may tax the patience,
or require the putting forth of energy in the per-
formance.
206
elements
oe moral philosophy.
CHAPTER III.
human ethics.
SECTION I.
justice: definition—justice to person forbids mutilation—
destruction of life : horrors of the crime of murder—
duelling : arguments against it.
By justice is meant that temper of mind which
prevents us from infracting the rights of others—
which causes us to leave them in the unmolested
enjoyment of those rights.
"We are required by the principles of justice to
refrain from injuring the person of another.
1. We are hound not to inflict any mutilation
upon the body of another. Let us apply this to
ourselves, and the horror which we feel at the
very idea of being mutilated in- body is an evid-
ence of the turpitude of the crime. Besides this,
the universal indignation which it excites in all
civilized communities is an evidence of its deep
criminality.
HUMAN ETIIICS.
207
2. Justice requires us to abstain from injury to
the life of another, except in the case of self-de-
fence. It is needless to present any arguments
exhibiting the horrors of the crime of murder.
The remorse of conscience felt by the murderer
is an evidence that God has placed in man's own
bosom a punisher which, by its fearful inflictions,
shows the detestation in which the Divine Being
holds the crime. But there is a question in con-
nection with homicide which it is important for
moral philosophy to decide. Has a man the right
to expose his own life, or to take the life of his
antagonist, in a duel ? "A law of honor having
affixed the suspicion of cowardice to patience under
an affront, challenges are given and accepted, with
no other design than to wipe out such suspicion."
This, then, being the design of the challenging
party, we are prepared to examine the criminality
of duelling.
We hold that for such object, and with such de-
sign, no man has the right to expose his own life.
1. Because the object is not of sufficient magni-
tude to justify such exposure. How, for a man to
expose that which is of great value, without a pros-
pect of gaining something of equal value, is, to say
the least, very unwise. In this case two valuable
lives are exposed for a point of honor.
208 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
2. Because, if he loses his own life, or takes the
life of another, nothing is gained. No one regards
suspicion removed, or the stain wiped out, because
he may have been successful in taking the life of
his antagonist.
8. But the objection to duelling becomes still
more forcible, when we take into consideration the
fact that the duellist risks the happiness of his
family. Why should a man imperil the happiness
of his own family, and that of his antagonist, when
really nothing is to be gained by such risk ?
4. No good is ever accomplished, nor is any de-
cision ever made by the issues of the duel, for the
innocent as often falls as the guilty. And whether
the innocent or the guilty may fall, nothing is
proved, except that one or the other is the more
expert in the use of the gun.
5. The testimony of duellists themselves is against
the practice. In the solemnities of death, when
man is apt to be honest with himself and with
his God, the fallen duellist has exhibited the deepest
remorse for the crime committed. This is said to
be almost universally the case. Some of the most
touching scenes are recorded in which both have
fallen, and both have lived sufficiently long to express
their horror of their crime, and to ask and obtain
forgiveness each of the other. The point of honor
HUMAN ETHICS.
209
for which they had perilled all was lost sight of
amid the fearful realities revealed by the light of
eternity. Such testimony, under such circum-
stances, is almost overwhelming against a practice
as revolting to humanity as it is opposed to the
principles of our holy religion.
6. The statutes of nearly all civilized states are
against the practice. This shows that the universal
mind of Christendom is opposed to it, and con-
demns it as not only foolish but criminal.
7. The tendency of duelling is bad: it creates a
morbid excitement in the public mind, degrades
the morals, and lowers the taste of the community.
Recklessness of human life becomes the order of
the day. Bullying takes the place of decency,
and the barbarism of the middle ages threatens to
destroy the civilization and refinement of the nine-
teenth century.
8. The whole duelling code is founded upon
false principles of honor. It is false honor, if such
a term is legitimate, which causes men to arm
themselves, and with vindictive coolness or savage
barbarity seek each other's lives. The whole idea
of honor is based upon public opinion, instead of
the interior principles. Hot to advance his own
worthiness, not to correct his own principles, not
to purify his own character, does the duellist seek
210 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
his brother's blood; but he fears the public may
esteem him a coward, or that in public opinion
some suspicion may rest upon his reputation, and
hence he kills his friend, or lets his friend kill
him. It is moral cowardice that makes the duel-
list: he has not the moral courage to face public
opinion for the sake of a great principle.
9. The practice is most unchristian. It is mur-
der, cold-blooded and deliberate murder, and is
condemned by the Divine law, and should be con-
demned by every human law. It amounts to no-
thing more nor less than assassination, and the
professional duellist is an assassin of the deepest
dye.
SECTION II.
JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER—DEFINITION OF CHARACTER—
PERFECTION THE STANDARD—WHAT JUSTICE REQUIRES—THE GUILT
OF INJURING CHARACTER.
By character is meant the present real condition
or state of the individual. It includes intellect
and morals, and in some circumstances may apply
to the physical man.
President Mahan makes perfection the standard
of character; and character is either high or low,
good or bad, according as it does or does not ap-
proximate perfection. Character may be degraded
HUMAN ETHICS.
211
or debased; and justice demands that we do no-
thing that can possibly lower the character. It is
especially in a moral point of view that the guilt
of injuring the character is seen. To injure a
man's morals is to affect him most injuriously:
1. Because, when properly estimated, a pure
morality is the highest possession of humanity.
Make a man guilty, rob him of his innocence,
corrupt his principles, and you have done him
more serious injury than you could have done in
any other way. To defraud him of his property,
or blast his reputation, or even to deprive him
of life, could not be so base as to degrade his
moral character.
2. The exceeding turpitude of this crime is
seen by examining the motives which influence
the act. If all actions are to be judged by their
motives—and we know of no other measure—then
does the crime of making a human being worse
appear to be of startling magnitude.
1. The person may be influenced by hate. Tie
may hate with a deep, malignant hatred, and this
may determine him to seduce his innocent victim
from the paths of virtue. How much like his
father the devil must be the man who from
very hate seeks the pollution of the pure, the
degradation of the virtuous!
212 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
2. Or, as is more generally the ease, selfishness
is the motive to injure the character of another.
It is that he may make another pander to his own
low and debased principles, that he may make
another the victim of his own unchaste passions,
that he "compasses sea and land" to effect the
work of corruption. He cares not how much suf-
fering and ruin he may bring, how much happi-
ness may he blasted, so he may accomplish his sel-
fish purposes. How intense must be that selfishness,
how blind to all virtuous principles, which to sub-
serve its own base ends will sacrifice all that is
lovely in youth, all that is dignified in manhood,
and all that is venerable in age!
We notice in the next place the manner in which
this principle of justice in regard to character is
violated.
1. It is violated when any efforts are made to cor-
rupt the imagination or to vitiate the taste of
another. This is done by exhibiting lascivious pic-
tures, the creations of salacious imaginations. Or
it may be accomplished by inducing the person to
read such works as are adapted to excite the lower
propensities of our nature. The wicked novels
which have been temptingly placed in the hands
of young persons by corrupt booksellers are fraught
with the worst of consequences, and have served
HUMAN ETHICS.
213
the ignoble and criminal purpose of bringing many
to ruin.
2. "We effect the ruin of the moral character
when we make another the minister to our corrupt
principles; as, when we bribe a man to commit
a crime. Many a man, and, alas! many a woman,
have prostituted themselves to crime for the sake
of gain.
3. The same object is effected by ministering to
the bad passions or corrupt appetites of others.
As you minister to a taste already vicious, it
becomes more vitiated. Minister to the appetite
for liquors, and you confirm the man in drunkenness.
4. The character may be injured by weakening
moral restraints. This is done principally by
ridicule. The holy associations of home, the
purifying influence of a pious mother and sweet
sisters, the teachings of the old family Bible, and
the sage precepts of an honored and beloved father,
are alike forgotten amid the ribald and scornful
jests of ridicule. The teachings of piety, and
their influence for years around the hearthstone,
are made to disappear before the jeers of in-
fidelity and the scoffs of licentiousness. It requires
a manly nerve, a settled purpose, an unwavering
attachment to principle, to withstand the " world's
dread laugh."
214 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
5. It is a violation of justice to present actual
temptations to crime, and the stronger the temp-
tation the greater the injustice. How often is this
done by men occupying the highest positions!
And how few there are who are able to resist!
There is as much wisdom as piety in the petition,
"Lead us not into temptation!"
SECTION III.
JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION — REPUTATION DEFINED CIB-
CUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT MAT BE LOWERED SLANDER ITS
TURPITUDE.
By reputation is meant the estimation in which
a person is held by the community. The difference
between reputation and character is this: Character
is the man's actual condition; reputation is the
estimation of that eonditichi by others. The cha-
racter may be good, and the reputation may be
bad; or the reputation may be good when the
character is bad. Justice requires that the repu-
tation always correspond with the character.
Hence circumstances may exist which may justify
us in lowering the reputation of another.
1. When, in order to meet the ends of public
justice, it is necessary to lower a man's reputation,
the reputation should be sacrificed rather than
HUMAN ETHICS.
215
that the ends of public justice should not be met.
Hence it is the duty of every good citizen to see
that the claims of justice be met, at whatever
sacrifice of private reputation.
2. "We have the right to lower the reputation
of another when it is necessary in order to the
preservation of our own. This is in accordance
with the law of self-defence, as already laid down.
We have the right, and it is our duty, to defend
ourselves by jeoparding the interests of another,
in so far as he may have jeoparded our interests.
If you are innocent and another guilty, you have
the right, and it is your duty, to sacrifice the guilty
in public estimation, and save yourself.
3. We have the right, and it is our duty, to bring
a man into disrepute, when it may be necessary in
ordej* to save the innocent. This may occur when
the innocent is about to suffer instead of the guilty,
whom we know; or it may occur when an in-
nocent man is about to be corrupted by a vicious
one. Then it behooves us to place the virtuous
man on his guard, by giving him the true character
of his associate. So far as known to the writer,
these are all the circumstances in which we are
justified in lowering the reputation of another.
Justice, in reference to the reputation, is
violated by the crime of slander.
216 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
1. Slander is committed by reckless conversation,
in which no regard is shown to the reputation
of another.
2. It is committed when we assert as fact what
is not known to be such, and, consequently, tho
assertion is based entirely upon suspicion.
3. It is slander when only a part of the truth
is asserted, and such material part is omitted as
will cause the assertion to make a false impres-
sion.
4. By stating what is really true, but from
malicious motives, and without any sufficient
reason of publicity, we incur the guilt of slander.
5. We are guilty of slander when we come to a
conclusion concerning a man's character from one
wrong act, and then give publicity to it. As, for
instance, a friend of mine became intoxicated.
It never occurred but once. For this one unfor-
tunate act, to have published him as a drunkard
would have been slander.
6. Slander is committed by attributing to a man
a bad motive when the outward act was really good.
Persons are often guilty of this crime against those
who give liberally. They admit the outward
generosity, but attribute it to a bad motive.
7. Sometimes slander is committed by gossiping,
talebearing, revealing secrets, etc.
II U M A N ETHICS.
217
8. It is committed by stating the fact, but with
such a version, or with such an emphasis, as to
make a false impression.
9. Slander is committed by giving publicity to
indefinite rumors, and asserting them as facts.
10. By coming to conclusions from doubtful
facts, or by denouncing a man as totally destitute
of good traits, because of some equivocal acts, the
guilt of slander is incurred.
That the crime of slander is one of no little
magnitude, may be proved by the following argu-
ments:
1. It is classed by Him who is too wise to err
among the crimes of adultery, murder, theft, etc.
Now the argument is infallible that a crime thus
classed by the Divine Being must, at least, assimi-
late in its turpitude to those with which it is thus
classed.
2. "We argue the baseness of the crime of slander
from the admitted value of that which is injured.
Just as we argue the magnitude of the crime of
murder from the value of human life, so we argue
the turpitude of slander from the value of repu-
tation.
3. Its turpitude is seen in that its tendency is
evil, and only evil, and that continually. Xeno-
phon says that at least three persons are injured
10
218 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
by slander. 1st. The slanderer is made worse by
the reflex influence of slander upon his own
character. 2d. The person to whom the slander
is told, by as much as he indulges a depraved
passion in delighting to listen to an exposure of
the foibles of others. 3d. The person slandered.
4. Human jurisprudence shows in what light
slander is held by our law-makers. Slander is
condemned as a base and ignoble crime, without
one redeeming trait, and the slanderer is considered
a vile wretch, deserving universal detestation.
5. Consider the motives which prompt the
slander, and it will appear in all its vileness.
Envy, jealousy, malice, these and other like
passions, are the motives which prompt to the
commission of The crime. These passions, so
unworthy of human nature, set on fire the tongue,
and cause it to utter words of defamation, which
in a day ma}7 destroy the work of years. The
slanderer appears to be aware of the vice, and
seeks to conceal it behind insinuations, innuendoes,
and spiteful suspicions, all of which have a covert
tendency to defame, without positively holding
him responsible to the law for his great crime.
It has been shown, and we believe the fact is
admitted, both in law and morals, that the truth
made public, when there is no necessity for the
HUMAN ETHICS.
219
publicity, may be regarded as slander. It becomes,
then, a moral, question whether there is any differ-
ence in the crime of slander when it is committed
by the utterance of truth, and wThen it is committed
by the utterance of falsehood. It has been argued
that the greater the truth, the greater the slander,
because truth can do more injury to the reputation
than falsehood. My own view of this subject is
different.
1. I argue that when the slander involves a fabri-
cation, the crime of falsehood is added to that of
slander. Hence the culprit is involved in two sins,
instead of one, as in the case where the slanderer
publishes the truth.
2. I argue that it exhibits deeper malice for a
man to originate a falsehood, and then propagate
it as true, than it does merely to propagate a truth
which justice demands should not be made public.
3. A malicious fabrication has no palliation what-
ever; but a malignant propagation of a truth may
have the palliation that it is true; and even in a
court of justice the truth might be pleaded in
extenuation of the slander.
4. Finally, in the case where truth is propagated,
the slandered party might deserve the injury
received; but we can imagine no case in which the
innocent man could suffer justly.
220 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION IV.
JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS PROPERTY — DEFINITION OF THE RIGHT OF
PROPERTY—HOW THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IS ACQUIRED—THE VARI-
OUS WAYS IN WHICH IT IS VIOLATED — FRAUD—THEFT —ROBBERY
—RULES THAT SHOULD GOVERN BUYER AND SELLER.
Property implies value which can be appro-
priated to individual use.
The fruits of the earth, and the flesh and skins
of wild animals slain in the chase, are recognized
as property in the purely savage state. In the
nomadic state, flocks and herds and tents are owned
by individuals, but the land is generally owned in
common. In the agricultural state, land is owned
by the cultivators of the soil.
Property is divided into real and personal: per-
sonal property is such as can be carried about with
the person: real property is not regarded as mov-
able; it consists of land and tenements, and is
called real estate.
The right of property implies the right to use
any thing as I may wish, so that I do not interfere
with the rights of another. It is controlled by the
laws of the State; and property must always be
held subject to taxation by the State.
The right of property is also modified by the
nature of the property owned. Man has no right to
use animate property in the same way that he uses
HUMAN ETHICS.
221
inanimate. Man can own animals, but they have
rights as well as he, and those rights must be
respected. This is more emphatically the case in
regard to property in man. Your fellow-man may
be your slave, and owned as property, but the right
of ownership is greatly modified by the fact that he
is your fellow-man.
That the right of property is sacred, and, with
the exceptions named, is exclusive, and that conse-
quently it should be respected, may be established
by the following considerations:
1. God has given to every man the desire of
owning. Hence he must have intended him to
own property, and of course designed that his
right should be respected.
2. The right to property in some form is univer-
sally acknowledged. This principle obtains even
in communities where most property is held in
common. Some things are still set apart as private
property. This is manifest from the fact that all
languages have the possessive pronouns mine,
thine, his, etc.
3. That this right should be held sacred, may be
argued, further, from the sad consequences which
would result to society from its violation. It is
unnecessary to dwell upon these consequences.
The destruction of the right of property would be
222 ELEMENTS OF MOEAL PHILOSOPHY.
followed by tbe destruction of our civilization, and
a return to tbe grossest barbarism.
4. The Scriptures teach that the right of pro-
perty is a sacred right. " Thou shalt not steal,"
"Thou shalt not covet," are commands which
clearly indicate in what light the right of property
is regarded by the infallible Lawgiver.
The right of property may be acquired,
1. By labor. " Thus, game and fish, though they
be common while at large in the forests or in the
water, become the property of the person that
catches them." President Mahan illustrates the
acquisition of property by labor, by supposing the
following case: "We meet a man with a bucket of
water. The water has just been drawn from a well,
or dipped from a fountain. To do this required
labor. Hence, while we consider the water in the
fountain as free, we regard that in the bucket as
private property.
2. The right of property may be acquired by
gift. When a person owns property, and volun-
tarily transfers it to another without an equivalent,
it becomes the property of the one to whom it is
transferred. . He is said to acquire the same right
as that possessed by the original owner, by virtue
of the transfer.
3. By inheritance. When a parent or other
HUMAN ETIIICS.
223
relative dies, without a will, the laws of the State
decide to whom the property shall descend.
4. By will. When a man of sound mind dies,
lie is granted the privilege of determining the direc-
Hon of his property. The laws generally secure to
the person to whom the property is left by the will
of the deceased, the same right which had been
possessed by the deceased.
5. By exchange. When two persons agree to
a mutual transfer, an exchange of property is
effected, and each acquires the right originally
possessed by the other.
6. By prescription. When an individual has
had long and undisputed possession of property,
and when no one comes forward to dispute the pos-
session, or to present a better claim, the property
becomes his by right of prescription. It will be
seen that these different modes of acquiring pro-
perty are regulated by the civil laws, and arc of
course modified by those laws. Consequently, a
man is bound to hold his property amenable to the
laws of the State.
We notice in what manner the right of property
is violated. Justice requires that we permit every
man to remain in the unmolested enjoyment of the
property to which he has the right. This principle
is violated,
224 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
1. Whenever a man desires to possess the pro-
perty of another, without being willing to give
a just equivalent for it.
2. The right of property is violated by taking
advantage of another's ignorance, and getting his
property at less than its real value.
3. It is violated by taking advantage of a man's
necessities, and thereby obtaining his property for
less than its value.
4. The right of property is violated by using
unjust means to induce a person to buy or sell his
property. By appealing to one's fears, to his pride,
his ambition, or his vanity, and thereby inducing
him to part with his property for less than its
worth, or to purchase property for more than its
worth, you do him an injustice, and violate his
right of property. In a word, you appeal to some
weak point in order to cheat him out of his money,
if you wish to sell, or out of his property, if you are
the purchaser.
5. The right of property is violated when the
equivalent offered is not what you represent it to
be. A man may make a shrewd trade, and get
property for half its value, by making a false
impression in reference to the equivalent which he
offers, but he cannot have correct notions of justice
or of truth.
HUMAN ETHICS.
225
6. When donations are obtained under false pre-
tences, it is a violation of the right of property.
Here, it is true, no equivalent is ofi'ered, but by a
false representation the generosity of another is
aroused, and he is influenced to give, when, had all
the flicts been known, he would not have done so.
7. When an individual, or a number of individ-
uals, monopolize some necessary of life, and are
thus able to extort extravagant prices, the right of
property is violated.
In short, all cheating, double-dealing, all viola-
tion of contracts, all failing to pay debts, all eva-
sions of law in order to avoid payment, are
regarded as a violation of pure morality, as they all
ignore human rights.
We have thus far given examples of the violation
of the right of property by fraud. It is also violated
by theft.
By theft is meant the taking of the property of
another without his consent, in a clandestine man-
ner, and when it is supposed that his consent would
not be given, were he aware of the existence of the
desire to possess the property. Such is theft; and
whether practiced by the rude boy, who stealthily
enters his neighbor's orchard, and steals his fruit;
or by the youthful collegian, who enters, un-
der the cover of a dark night, some defenceless
10*
226 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
poultry-yard, and steals a turkey; or by the man
of mature years, who creeps into the stable, and
steals a horse; or into the store, and seizes mer-
chandise; or with false keys enters the "strong
box," and fills his pockets with money; it is
stealing, a violation of God's command, and a reck-
less disregard of another's rights.
„ Again, the right of property is violated by
robbery, or by the taking of the property of
another wTith his consent violently obtained.
"Your money or your life," is the cry of the
highwayman, and one or the other must be for-
feited. The crime has no advocates, and is
universally detested.
In closing this section, we notice the rules that
should govern the buyer and seller.
1. The buyer is bound to give a full equivalent
for the article bought.
2. The buyer is bound to use no improper influ-
ence to cause the seller to take less than the regular
market price. All such efforts to reduce the price
of goods as are sometimes resorted to by the
purchaser, are unworthy an honest man.
1. The seller is bound to offer the article at the
market value.
2. He is bound to give a correct and honest
statement of the quality of his goods.
HUMAN ETHICS.
227
3. He is bound to use no improper influence to
cause another to buy; he must not, by flattery or
any form of deception, induce another to purchase
his goods.
SECTION V.
justice as it regards belief—what is meant by justice in re-
ference to belief—veracity—logical truth—moral truth
paley's theory: objections to paley's theory.
Justice in regard to the belief of another requires
that we should not cause him to believe to be true
what is known to be false; justice here requires
conformity to truth, or, in other words, it involves
the law of veracity.
Veracity or truth is divided into two kinds—
logical, speculative, or physical truth, and moral
truth. Logical truth is, when the words conform
exactly to the reality of things as they exist. Moral
trtith consists in the conformity of our words to our
opinions; consequently, a statement may be logi-
cally true, and morally untrue; or it may be
morally true, and logically untrue. When the
statement conforms to the opinion of the person
making it, but not to the reality of the thing itself,
it is morally true, but logically untrue. The only
criminality that can attach to such statement,
228 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
arises from the want of proper caution in making
the statement. An investigation as thorough as
possible should be made, before risking a statement.
Sometimes sad consequences have resulted from
honest statements which, having been made with-
out sufficient examination, have proved to he false.
When the statement conforms to the reality, hut
not to our opinion of the reality, it is logically true,
hut morally untrue. Here the crime is that of
falsehood; as the person intended deception, and
actually spoke the truth without intending it.
When the statement conforms to our opinion and
to the reality, then it is both morally and physically
true.
The obligations to veracity are shown by the fol-
lowing facts:
1. The relations established by God between
man and man—relations of mutual dependence and
reciprocity—indicate most clearly that we are under
obligations to tell the truth.
2. The dignity of human nature indicates the
same thing. Ho greater indignity or dishonor can
be done to a man, than is done by an attempt to
deceive him. In the language of Hickok, "It is
an assumption that he is but a thing, to whom no
respect is due, but who may be made the sport of
delusions without indignity."
HUMAN ETHICS.
229
3. The countless evils resulting from deception
show the obligation to avoid falsehood, and always
to tell the truth.
4. The obligation to tell the truth is shown by
the character of the motives to deception. They are
always of a low order, such as cowardice, selfishness,
covetousness, etc.
5. The obligation to tell the truth is clearly and
forcibly expressed in the word of God. "Ye shall
not steal nor lie." "Lie not one to another."
"Speak every man truth with his neighbor."
The law of veracity binds us to speak according
to the exact relations of our intelligence to those
subjects in reference to which our communications
are made; that is, we should honestly intend, in all
our communications to others, to make our words
correspond with perfect exactness to the ideas or
opinions which we entertain of the subjects of con-
versation. And, on the other hand, the law binds
you not to intend to deceive others, in the commu-
nications which you make to them. This is the
law; and now the question arises, Is all intentional
deception criminal? Or, in other words, is all
intentional deception a lie ?
Paley answers this question in the negative. He
says: "A falsehood is not a lie when no one is
deceived." By this he means, that a falsehood is
230 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
not criminal unless deception is actually practiced.
To this we have several objections.
1. According to Paley, the criminality of lying
does not depend upon the intention of the person
uttering the falsehood, but upon the capacity of
another to detect the deception; that is, he trans-
fers the criminality from the intention of the person
telling the falsehood, to the intellect of the person
to whom it is told. The falsehood is a lie if told
to a weak or credulous person, but is not a lie if
told to one of sufficient sagacity not to allow him-
self to be deceived.
2. "W"e object to this view, because it involves the
absurdity that the same person, for the same act
and at the same time, may be regarded as a liar and
not a liar, as true and false, as innocent and guilty.
"With the same intention to deceive, he makes the
same statement to two different persons, at the
same time: one is deceived, and the other is not
deceived. In reference to one, he is innocent; in
reference to the other, he is guilty. He is con-
demned, because one is credulous; he is innocent,
because the other is sagacious.
3. The third objection to this view is, that when
a man has lied so often as to lose all character for
truth, he becomes incapable, by his very depravity,
of practicing deception, and is, consequently, no
HUMAN ETHICS.
231
longer guilty of crime. He never deceives, unless
it is when he tells the truth; and as, according to
Dr. Paley, there is no lie except where deception is
practiced, it would follow that an habitual liar is
only guilty of lying when he tells the truth; for it
is certain that such characters never deceive by
indulging the habit of falsehood ; they are too well
known to deceive any one. And is it not absurd
to acquit a man of guilt simply because his con-
tinued depravity prevents his accomplishing his
object?
Dr. Paley says that a falsehood is not a lie when
the person to whom the communication is made
has no right to know the truth. This theory is
liable to the same objection as the former. It does
not make the guilt depend upon the intention of
the person telling the falsehood, but upon the right
of the other to know the truth. Such methods of
determining guilt cannot be recognized in any -sys-
tern of pure morality. "We must look to the prin-
ciples, to the intention of the person, and not to
the rights of another. It is true that we are not
bound to tell a man the truth who has no right to
know it, for we need not open our mouths: we
can keep silence. This we have a perfect right to
do, and surely it is much more commendable than
falsehood.
232 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
Mahan says that a falsehood is not a lie where
no confidence is reposed. He illustrates the prin-
ciple by the deception which General "Washington
practiced on General Clinton during the war of the
Revolution. He says that here no confidence was
reposed, and hence no guilt incurred. That Wash-
ington was not guilty we admit, but that the
principle is a sound one we doubt. In some cases,
such as the one mentioned, it wfill hold good, but
in by far the majority of cases the principle is a
very bad one. According to Mahan's theory, a
man has only so to conduct himself as to lose the
confidence of the community, in order to enable
him to lie with impunity. A man, then, who has
forfeited your confidence by continuous lying, can
utter as many falsehoods as his wicked heart may
dictate, without incurring any guilt of lying.
I hold that there is no general principle that can
justify falsehood. The general principle is to tell
the truth, and there may be particular instances in
which a departure from this general principle
allowed.
1. It is not, in certain circumstances, a lie to
deceive a lunatic; though I hold it to be best in the
main to tell the truth even to a lunatic. A mili-
tary officer visited his brother, who was a lunatic,
and confined in an asylum: his room was in the
HUMAN ETHICS.
233
third story of the building. The officer happened
to be dressed in his uniform, and was armed with
sword and pistols. The lunatic was pleased to see
his brother, was delighted with his uniform, and
very earnestly solicited that the entire dress, pistols
and all, might be placed upon his person. The
officer had no sooner granted the request, than the
unfortunate lunatic, with frantic madness, ordered
him to leap from the window to the ground, or he
would shoot him. The officer quietly replied, that
he could perform a much more wonderful feat than
that: he could go down and leap up. The lunatic
was deceived, the life of the officer was saved, and
no guilt was incurred.
2. A man, in particular cases, where there is no
violation of some great principle, may practice
deception to save his life. In cases where principle
is violated, as in the cases of the Christian martyrs,
deception is never admissible.
3. "When no great moral principle is violated,
deception may be practiced to save one's country.
This covers the case of Washington. Had decep-
tion been practiced under the protection of a flag
of truce, his case would have been different, and
he would have incurred the odium of the civilized
world.
The great and safe principle of veracity is,
234 ELEMENTS OF MO HAL PHILOSOPHY.
never to practice deception, either in jest or
earnest, except in particular instances which rarely
occur.
SECTION VI.
SINCERITY AND FIDELITY—HOW SINCERITY IS VIOLATED—SELF-AGGRAN-
DIZEMENT SELF-ABASEMENT FLATTERY HYPOCRISY MENTAL
RESERVATION EQUIVOCATION EXAGGERATION AND EXTENUATION
FALSE IMPRESSIONS — IGNORANT ASSERTIONS—LYING — PROMISES:
WHEN NOT BINDING—CONTRACTS.
Moral truth is divided into two kinds: veracity
in respect to the past and present, and veracity in
respect to the future. The former is called sin-
cerity, and the latter fidelity. Consequently, sin-
cerity consists in stating a thing as we suppose it
to ejdst or to have existed, and fidelity consists
in the keeping of our word, or compliance with
our promises.
Sincerity is violated in several ways:
1. By self-aggrandizement or arrogance. In this
we are guilty of boasting and of representing
ourselves to be greater than we are. Such in-
sincerity is at once contemptible and wicked.
2. Sincerity is violated by self-abasement, or
pretended humility. It is often the case that
persons disparage themselves, not because they
HUMAN ETHICS.
235
feel unworthy, but with the hope of elevating
themselves in the estimation of others.
3. Sincerity is violated by flattery—by endeavor-
ing to puff up another with the idea that he pos-
sesses merits of which he is destitute. The words
of flattery fall upon the ear like the sweetest tones
of music ; they drop like new honey, they flow like
oil. They deceive, they charm, they destroy. The
flatterer is the embodiment of obsequiousness and
the impersonation of hypocrisy, a sinner against
the dignity of human nature, and an infamous en-
courager of pride and vanity. He speaks without
sincerity, panders to a morbid and vitiated taste,
deceives without remorse, and glories in his shame.
4. Sincerity is violated by hypocrisy. This is
acting rather than speaking a lie. It consists in a
man's assuming a character which does not belong
to him, in acting a part, in expressing by speech,
habit, and action, not his own character, but that of
him whom he undertakes to represent. He is a base
counterfeit, a walking cheat, a living, moving, act-
ing lie.
5. Sincerity is violated by mental reservation. In
this the person withholds something that materi-
ally affects a statement, and which, if disclosed,
would essentially change its import. " Mental re-
servations," says Thornwell, " when what is sup-
236 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
pressed is not obvious from the circumstances,
and it is necessary to prevent deception, are down-
right lies. It is only where what is suppressed is
essential to the truth, and is suppressed for the pur-
pose of deceit, that the reservation comes under the
censure of the moralist."
6. Sincerity is violated by equivocation. When a
word is used which is understood in one sense by the
person making the communication, and known to
be understood in a different sense by the person to
whom the communication is made, it is called equi-
vocal, and the person so using it is guilty of equivo-
cation. As an example, we may give the case of
the collegian, who, being asked his excuse for ab-
sence from recitation, answered, "Indisposed." He
was guilty of fraud which deserved rebuke.
7. Sincerity is violated by telling only a part of
the truth, when you profess to tell the whole truth,
and that with the intention of inducing a false
judgment. The same insincerity is manifest when
some facts are magnified and others extenuated
with the same object in view.
8. Sincerity is violated when real facts are so
arranged as to make false impressions upon the
hearer, and with the design of making false im-
pressions.
9. Sincerity is violated when a statement is made,
HUMAN ETHICS.
237
the truth of which is not known or sincerely he-
lieved.
10. It is violated, finally, when the statement
made is known to he false. This is lying, and
should be universally denounced.
Thus have we shown the principal forms in
which sincerity is violated, and we have done this
with a strong desire to guard against an evil
which is wide-spread, and whose turpitude is com-
pared to the basest crimes by which our humanity
can be polluted.
As sincerity respects the past and present, so
fidelity respects the future. We have seen that
human character is utterly destitute of virtue if it
lack a sacred regard for truth. We will now pro-
ceed to consider the law of veracity in reference
to fidelity, which involves the philosophy of duty
in reference to promises and contracts.
I. Promises.
By a promise is meant the making or the endea-
voring to make the impression upon the mind of
another that you will do or not do something
which is intimated by words or gestures.
The great rule in reference to the promise is
that it must be fulfilled as it is known to be un-
derstood by the person to whom the promise is
made. To promise, and not to fulfil the promise,
238 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
is deception, and hence Dr. Paley defines a lie to
be a "breach of promise."
To promise, and not to perform the promise,
as it was known to be understood by the pro-
misee, is deception, if possible, more reprehensible
than a bold breach of faith. For example, the
Romans promised an opposing army that they
would abstain from all injury for forty days;
and went by night and plundered the camp of
the enemy. Their excuse was, they had promised
to abstain from injury for so many days, but said
nothing about the nights. " Temures promised
the garrison of Sebastia that if they would sur-
render, no blood should be shed. Upon this pro-
mise they surrendered, and Temures buried them
all alive." Now both these were cruel violations
of promises, as they were known to be understood
by the promisees. Nor does it mitigate the crime
to say that the Romans and Temures carried out
their promises as they understood them, and as they
intended at the time of making them.
Still, there are circumstances in which the pro-
miser may be freed from the performance of his
promise.
1. The promiser is not bound to fulfil his pro-
mise when it would be unlawful or sinful for him
to perform it. No man can bring himself under
HUMAN ETHICS.
239
obligation to do a sinful act. It can never be a
man's duty to commit sin. The error is in making
the promise. But it is impossible to incur guilt by
refusing to do wrong. This, in the language of
Wayland, wTould be to suppose a man guilty for not
being guilty, which is absurd.
2. The promise is not binding when it is impos-
sible to fulfil it. If a man promises to meet another
at a certain time and place, and in the meantime is
prostrated by sickness, he is not culpable for failing
to fulfil his promise. If, however, the promiser
knew that he was making a promise which he could
not fulfil, he is culpable for making the promise,
but is not to be blamed for failing in the perform-
ance of that which is impossible. But suppose the
promiser create the impossibility. In that case, the
guilt attaches to him for putting difficulties in the
way of duty, and hence he is held responsible for a
violation of his promise.
3. A promise is not binding when the promiser
has been released from it by the promisee. This
release may be honorably sought, and properly
granted, and then no guilt is incurred. If, how-
ever, the release is sought and obtained by improper
means, the promise is still binding, and the pro-
miser incurs guilt in its violation.
4. When a promise has been violently extorted, it
240 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
is not binding, unless it would have been right to
make the promise without the violence.
5. A promise made to a maniac is not believed to
be binding.
6. "When the promise is made upon conditions
found afterward not to exist, it is not binding. As,
for example, if I promise money to one who pro-
fesses to be an agent for a benevolent institution,
and afterward learn that he is an impostor, I am
liberated from my promise.
II. Contracts.
By contract is meant a mutual promise. A pro-
mise binds one party: a contract binds two parties.
Hence it is an agreement to do or to neglect to do
something for a consideration. The general prin-
ciples that control promises control contracts also.
In view, however, of the slight difference between a
promise and a contract, there are a few special prin-
ciples which are applicable only to contracts.
1. When one party to a contract fails to perform
his part, as a general rule the other is released. In
the case of the marriage contract, however, except
for actual infidelity, the one party is not released by
the failure of the other. The husband may violate
his contract to be affectionate, attentive, devoted,
and yet, unless he is guilty of adultery, the wife is
bound still to fulfil her part of the contract.
HUMAN ETHICS.
241
2. When a person for a bribe already received
contracts to do some wickedness, he is not bound to
fulfil the contract; for he cannot bind himself to do
wrong. His duty in this case is to return the money
for which he had contracted to do the wrong. It is
said of Lord Bacon that when he was Chancellor
he received many bribes, but always decided the
cases, not according to contract, but according to
law and equity. Had he returned the money, it
would have been evidence of his conviction of guilt,
and of his determination to be just; but his retain-
ing the money made him universally odious, and
proved his ruin.
Vows are promises made with great solemnity to
Almighty God. The same principles apply to them
as to promises and contracts.
SECTION VII.
OATHS : THE JUDICIAL OATH—OFFICIAL OATH—LEGALITY OF OATHS—
THE PHILOSOPHY OF OATHS—PERJURY : ITS TURPITUDE.
Oaths are of two kinds, judicial and official.
By the judicial oath is meant the oath taken by
the individual " to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth," under the severe
penalty of the forfeiture of the Divine favor, if
the truth be not told, and it consequently closes
with the words, " So help me God."
11
242 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
The official oath is the solemn affirmation of the
man, that all the duties connected with his office
shall he fulfilled faithfully, to the best of his ability,
under the same penalty as that connected witli the
violation of the judicial oath.
Dymond, in his Essays on Morality, opposes the
morality, and hence the legality, of oaths. Wer
therefore offer the following arguments in support
of both their morality and legality.
1. The Divine Being binds himself by the solem-
nities of an oath: " I have sworn by myself, the
word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness,
and shall not return." Isaiah xlv. 23. "For I
have sworn by myself, saith the Lord, that Bozrah
shall become a desolation." Jeremiah xlix. 13.
" The Lord God hath sworn by himself, saith the
Lord the God of hosts, I abhor the excellency of
Jacob, and hate his palaces." Amos vi. 8.
2. Christ upon his trial answered upon oath
when interrogated by the high-priest, thus giving
his sanction to the oath. "And the high-priest
answered and said unto him, I adjure thee by the
living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the
Christ, the Son of God. Jesus saith unto him,
Thou hast said." Matt. xxvi. 63, 64.
3. The apostles frequently placed themselves
under the solemnities of an oath: "Moreover I call
HUMAN ETHICS.
243
God for a record upon my soul, that to spare
you I came not as yet unto Corinth." 2 Cor. i. 23.
" God is my record, how greatly I long after you."
Phil. i. 8. " For neither at any time used we
flattering words, as ye know, nor a cloak of covet-
ousness; God is witness." 1 Thess. ii. 5. In
reply to these arguments it has been quoted,
" Swear not at all." " Let your communication be
yea, yea; nay, nay; for whatever is more than these
cometh of evil." It is obvious to the mind of the
writer, as it is to the universal mind, with the
exception of certain small sects of Christians, that
these passages refer to profane oaths used in
ordinary conversation, and not to the judicial oath.
To have the conversation interlarded with profane
oaths, is as unworthy of man as it is dishonoring
to God. But the judicial oath is in no respect
similar, and is perfectly consistent with the purest
morality.
The philosophy of oaths appears to be this: the
state needs the solemn sanctions of the oath in
order to arrive at the truth, and thereby mete out
justice. It is a humiliating fact, that men will lie—
at least, they have been known to lie—when their
interest may be secured by falsehood. It then
becomes the interest of society, and the duty of
the state, to make it their highest interest to tell
244 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
the truth. This is believed to be done by the
administration of the oath. The phrase, " So help
me God," implies two things. 1st. It implies an
earnest prayer to God for help, to deliver us from
the power of temptation, and to enable us, in the
midst of our weakness and our proneness to err,
to "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth." 2d. It implies the imprecation of
Divine desertion, if we do not speak the truth:
that is, So help me God only as I speak the truth,
and if I speak not the truth, I agree to an eternal
forfeiture of the Divine favor. In what a fearful
position of responsibility the individual is placed
to whom the oath is administered, is at once seen.
He is brought into the very presence of God; he
makes him his witness, puts his soul in jeopardy
in such manner as to exclude all levity, as to fore-
stall all disposition to prevaricate, as to excite the
deepest solemnity, drive away all heedlessness and
carelessness, and impress the mind the most deeply
with the majesty of truth. It is here made the
highest interest to tell the truth. Time and
eternity blend all their interests, for the truth must
be told, or life, honor, fortune, reputation—in
short, all that is included in the Divine favor will
be forfeited.
When truth is violated under oath, the crime
HUMAN ETHICS.
245
is called perjury. The considerations that deter-
mine the turpitude of the crime of perjury are the
following:
1. The very strong and solemn obligations which
are violated by the perjured man exhibit, to some
extent, the fearfulness of his crime. These obli-
gations to tell the truth are voluntarily assumed
when he takes the oath.
2. Perjury is the grossest insult and the most
impious defiance that can possibly be offered to
Almighty God. It is the worst form of blasphemy,
the more heinous as it is attended with the greater
solemnity; and it is the highest irreverence of
which man can be guilty.
3. Perjury is universally ranked among the worst
of crimes, and this universal voice is strong proof
of its turpitude. It is a deliberate crime. It is also
a most reckless crime. The dignity of human
nature, the nobleness of truth, and the honor of
God, are alike disregarded by him who dares to
stain his soul with the crime of perjury.
We have but one more remark to make in
reference to oaths. They should never be adminis-
tered except on important occasions. The too
frequent administration of oaths causes them to
lose that solemn force which they are designed to
246 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
have. This remark is especially true in reference
to the oath of office. This oath is administered to
every village postmaster, and to other officers
whose entire duties are scarcely worth the adminis-
tration of oaths. And it is well known that
they are frequently administered to be broken.
SECTION VIII.
BENEVOLENCE: POSITIVE DUTIES WHICH WE OWE TO MAN — PROOFS
THAT WE SHOULD PERFORM THOSE DUTIES.
As the duties of justice require us to refrain
from injuring others, so the duties of benevolence
require us to do good to others. The former are
negative duties; the latter are positive. The duties
of benevolence involve not only the desire for the
good of others, but the actual putting forth of such
efforts and the performing of such actions as may
promote the good of others. It is benevolence in
action, energetic, zealous action, that is the duty
of man to his fellow-man. That such is man's
duty may be established by the following argu-
ments:
1. All men need the benevolence of others.
No man, in whatever position, is independent of
HUMAN ETHICS.
247
his fellow-man. All have kindred wants, and are
alike liable to disappointment, suffering, and death.
If then all are liable to stand in need of benevolent
acts from others, they should readily bestow them
upon others.
2. As all men are liable to need acts of benevo-
leuce, so no man lives who has not, at some time
or other, been the recipient of such acts. In the
years of helpless infancy, if at 110 other period, acts
of kindness have been received, and therefore all
should feel bound to bestow them.
3. It is a strong argument in favor of active
benev.olence, that the act of kindness has a reflex
influence. It blesses the man that performs it.
It is more blessed to give than to receive. Its
tendency is to the destruction of selfishness, and
to the promotion of a noble and enlarged philan-
thropy. The luxury of a good, of a benevolent
action, is the highest luxury.
4. The example of benevolence is found in the
character and the acts of God. Our lives give
constant exhibitions of his benevolence. The
warmth and light of the sun, the pleasantness and
variety of the seasons, the successions of day and
night, the blessings of health, food, and raiment,
the beauty of the heavens, the fertility of the earth,
the interchanges of thought and feeling by means
lM8 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
of language, the pleasures of social intercourse,
the capacity for grasping truth, and for improve-
ments in the arts and sciences, the light of Divine
revelation, and the peace and comfort afforded by
the remedial dispensation, are all evidences that
our Father in heaven is benevolent. If then we
wish to be godlike—and surely we can have no
higher aspiration—let us be benevolent.
5. We are taught still more forcibly the same
lesson by the example of Him who "went about
doing good." The most beautiful example of be-
nevolence is found in the character of Jesus Christ.
Men can see and feel the force of this example, for
Jesus was a man. As man, he indulges the holiest
sympathies, weeps over the sorrowing, and claims
brotherhood with the afflicted. We may admire,
adore, and worship him as God. But it is as man,
as a sharer of our nature and a partaker of our
sorrows, as shedding tears for our woes and sym-
pathizing with our infirmities, that he is brought
into closest communion with us, and by his
benevolent example claims the exercise of bene-
volence toward all that suffer.
6. It is the command of God that we exercise
benevolence. The second great commandment of
the law is this, " Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself:" a precept most beautifully illustrated in
HUMAN ETHICS.
249
the example of the good Samaritan. Luke x. 25-
37. We are, moreover, required to do good to them
that hate us, and of course, by the stronger reason,
to all others. The great test of discipleship in the
last day will be this: " I was an hungered, and ye
gave me meat; I was thirsty y and ye gave me
drink; I was a stranger, and ye took me in; naked,
and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me:
I was in prison, and ye came unto me." Matt,
xxv. 35, 36.
SECTION IX.
THE PROPER OBJECTS OF BENEVOLENCE—THE POOR—SICK—UNFORTU-
NATE AFFLICTED IGNORANT—DEPRAVED.
1. The poor. Our duty to the poor is to bestow
charity, in such a way as not to encourage indolence.
But to help the poor, to give them employment, to
encourage them by rewards to improve their con-
dition, and to afford them gratuitous supplies of
such necessaries of life as they are unable to obtain,
are duties which we must not neglect. To supply
them with fuel, with clothing, with food, and with
some of the comforts of a dwelling, to protect them
from the inclement weather, is a duty which the
benevolent readily perform, either with or without
requiring labor, as the poor may or may not be
able to perform it.
11*
250 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
2. The sick. When man is prostrated by sick-
ness, helpless as an infant, unable to help himself
to a cup of water, tortured with the indescribable
agonies of disease, he claims our sympathy, and
appeals loudly to our benevolence.
3. The unfortunate. When persons are suffering
from sudden and fearful calamities, it is required by
the law of benevolence that we seek to lighten the
force of the blow, to alleviate the sufferings oeca-
sioned by it, to stanch their wounds, and if possible
cause them, by our acts of kindness and our genial
charities, to forget the severe losses which have
befallen them.
4. The afflicted. Bereavements crush and over-
whelm the spirit, they sadden the heart, and fill
the bosom with irrepressible grief. IsTo sight is
more pitiable than that of a mother bewailing her
first-born, or of a father in stern and mature man-
hood bathing with his tears the lifeless body of the
loved and lost. "It is better to go to the house of
mourning than to the house of feasting." At
such time a kind look, a word of sympathy, some
delicate attention, a letter of condolence, may do
much to soften the affliction, to soothe the grief,
and to impart consolation and peace to hearts
almost broken.
5. The ignorant. To those who are suffering
II U M A N ETHICS.
251
from ignorance, it is the duty of benevolence to
offer knowledge. Common schools should be
established, teachers should be sent abroad in the
land, institutions of a high grade should be erected,
and every effort should be made to dissipate the
darkness of ignorance by the light of truth. A
powerful instrumentality, in this work of benevo-
lence, is the Sabbath - school. In this most of us
can become teachers, and can afford opportunities
of instruction to those who must otherwise remain
in the region and shadow of death.
6. The depraved. Depravity always brings suf-
fering, for a greater than man hath said, " The way
of transgressors is hard." Benevolence to the
wicked requires us to seek their reformation. Here
is a wide and inviting field for usefulness, and into
it all may enter and labor.
1. The reformation of the wicked is to be sought
by an example of blameless purity. In this all
may participate. To influence one to virttoe, by
setting an example of moral goodness, is a work
which well becomes our humanity, as indeed it is
not unworthy of an angel. The exhibition of a
meek and quiet spirit, of undissembled humility, of
faultless candor, of sincere honesty, and of deep
and earnest piety, will serve to draw men from sin
to virtue with more than magnetic force.
252 ELEMENTS OF M 0 R AL PIIIL 0 S 0 PIIY .
2. "We are to seek their reformation "by precept.
The mild reproof, the faithful warning, the fearless
exposure of the turpitude of sin, the earnest call to
duty, all emanating from a benevolent heart, may
arouse fears and hopes and resolves which may
restore the profligate to purity and virtue. In
seeking by this means to effect reformation, mild-
ness should blend with firmness, courage with
humility, and earnestness with affection.
3. We can effect this noble work, often, by direct-
ing the mind to good books. As bad books are
corrupting, good books are purifying in their
nature. The unpretending tract, the biography of
some good man, some such work as ISTelson on Infi-
delity, and above all the Bible, may do what both
example and precept may have failed to accom-
plish.
4. The reformation of the wicked may be accom-
plished by presenting to them examples of good
men. Such characters of moral excellence as Paul,
as Wesley, as Howard, as Jonathan Edwards, may
be the means of leading the erring from the error
of his way, and of causing him to enter upon a new
course of life. The influence of such models of
exalted virtue can never die. Let it ever be
brought to bear upon those who, though they may
give evidences of the deepest corruption, still are
HUMAN ETHICS. 253
not incorrigible, and may yet become bright and
shining lights.
SECTION X:
BENEVOLENCE TO THE INJURIOUS—THE DOCTRINE OF FOROIVENESS
WHAT THE LAW REQUIRES — BENEVOLENCE TO THOSE WHO ARE
SLANDERED—MANNER OF BESTOWING BENEVOLENCE.
We will now notice the duty of benevolence to
the injurious.
" Take heed to yourselves: if thy brother trespass
against thee, rebuke him; and if he repent, forgive
him. And if he trespass against thee seven times
in a day, and seven times in a day turn again to
thee, saying, I repent, thou shalt forgive him."
Luke xvii. 3, 4.
I do not think that unconditional forgiveness of
injuries is required by the law of God. On cbn-
dition, however, that the injurious person repents,
we are never to refuse forgiveness. " If thy
brother repent, forgive him." "We expect to obtain
forgiveness on condition of our repentance, and
we are required to forgive on the same condition.
The repentance should be as public as the act
of injury.
That this view of the subject is correct, will
appear from the nature of forgiveness. When we
254 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
forgive a man, we no longer liold liim guilty of the
injury. But we cannot regard the man innocent
who continues his course of injury, or who fails to
make the reparation involved in repentance. Sup-
pose a man slanders you, and will make no repara-
tion for the injury done: can you forgive him as
long as he continues his injurious course?
Our Heavenly Father has set us the example.
He requires us to repent before we can expect for-
giveness; and he presents that method as an
example for us. We are to forgive as we expect
forgiveness. We expect forgiveness only on com
ditionof repentance; consequently, we are to forgive
only on the same condition. To withhold forgive-
ness after repentance, would be cruelty to another;
to bestow it before it was asked, would be unjust to
one's self.
Having thus shown on what condition forgive-
nCss of injuries is to be bestowed, we proceed
to the consideration of the entire treatment toward
the injurious required by benevolence.
1. We are to show a spirit willing to forgive
at any time that the injurious person may ask for-,
giveness. The exhibition of this spirit is taught by
our Saviour, when he requires his disciples not only
to forgive seven times, but seventy times seven.
2. By as much as the man's conduct is vicious,
HUMAN ETHICS.
255
we are to exercise toward him compassion, and to
seek if possible his reformation.
3. You are to love your enemy. This love is to
be discriminating. It is not to equal the love you
have to your benefactor; but you are to love him
so well as to do him no harm, and so well as to do
him all the good you can.
4. You must ever return good for evil. This is
godlike.' It requires a lofty spirit, a manly unsel-
fishness, and a heavenly meekness, to be able to
repress all anger and wrath, to subdue revenge, or
to overcome even those natural feelings of resent-
ment which rise up against those who have injured
us. It is an exhibition of the moral sublime,
when man, injured in person, defrauded of pro-
perty, or deprived of his good name, is found with
a sweet spirit doing good to his enemy, praying for
the one that despitefully used him and persecuted
him, and blessing him from whom he received
nothing but injuries and curses.
The duty of benevolence to those who are slan-
dered demands a brief notice.
1. Benevolence teaches us to go forward and
seek to rescue the slandered person from the unjust
infamy under which he is suffering. "We are too
prone to pursue the opposite course. When a man
begins to lose the high position which he once held,
256 ELEMENTS OE MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
and his good name begins to suffer from the in-
famous tongue of slander, we are too apt to join
"the hungry pack" that are so eager in the chase.
2. We should show our appreciation of the
character of the innocent man, by ever treating
him with the greatest respect, manifesting for him
our sympathy, and exhibiting to him our con-
fidence.
Before closing the discussion of our positive
duties, we offer a few thoughts on the manner in
which they should all be discharged.
1. They should be performed with as little show
as possible.
2. Our acts of benevolence must be discrimina-
tive in their character: thus, if two persons claim
our benevolence, and we are under obligations to
one and not to the other, we should ever prefer the
former. So we should always select the most
worthy. The members of a man's household have
the first claims to his benevolence.
3. Our acts of benevolence should be as much
individual acts as possible. We should perform
them ourselves, not merely by means of societies
or associations for benevolent purposes:
political ethics.
257
CHAPTER IV.
political ethics.
SECTION I.
NECESSITY OF HUMAN GOVERNMENT—OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY—TITLE
OF PROPERTY TO BE ADJUDICATED BIBLE VIEW OF CIVIL GOVERN-
MENT OBJECTIONS TO HUMAN GOVERNMENT OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.
That human government is necessary will appear
from the following considerations:
1. It is necessary to the prosperity of a commu-
nity that there he ownership in property. This
cannot exist without law to regulate and govern
the right of property, and laws securing the right
of property cannot exist where there is no govern-
ment.
2. Human government is necessary, in order that
there be a registration of the titles to property.
3. It is necessary to protect us in the right to
property, and thus save us from fraud, theft, and
robbery.
258 ELEMENTS OF MOllAL PHILOSOPHY.
4. Where there are conflicting claims, human
government is necessary for their proper adjudi-
cation.
5. Without government there would be no
security to human life; hence, it is necessary for
the protection of life.
6. It is necessary for the protection of reputation
and character.
The necessity of human government being estab-
lished, the question arises, Has the government the
right to exercise the authority needful to carry out
the objects above set forth? The following facts
will show that this question should be answered in
the affirmative:
1. Man is a proper subject for human gov-
ernment.
2. The necessity of the existence of human
government, in order not only to the well-being of
man, but even to his continued existence, shows that
human government has the rights claimed for it.
3. The following passages from the Bible show
in what light human government is regarded by the
Divine Being:
"Let every soul be subject unto the higher
powers; for there is no power but of God: the
powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever,
therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordi-
POLITICAL ETHICS.
259
nance of God; and they that resist shall receive to
themselves damnation ; for rulers are not a terror
to good works, but to the evil. "Wilt thou then not
be afraid of the power ? Do that which is good,
and thou shalt have praise of the same; for he is
the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou
do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not
the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a
revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth
evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only
for wrath, but also for conscience sake." Romans
xiii. 1-5. "Put them in mind to be subject to
principalities and powers, to obey magistrates."
Titus iii. 1. " Submit yourselves to every ordi-
nance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be
to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto
them that are sent by him for the punishment of
evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well."
1 Peter ii. 13, 14.
From these passages we do not infer the Divine
right of kings; nor do we suppose that all govern-
ments are theocratic; but we do infer that human
governments are authorized by God. £Tay, more,
the state is an ordinance of God; and as govern-
ment is essential to the state, it may be regarded as
existing also by his ordinance. The true theory
appears to be this:
260 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
" The entire body of people living together in a
condition of mutual dependence, for protection and
liberty, are the state;" which is of course the
creation, the institution of God. Then the form
and administration of the government are left with
the state; but some form of civil government is
absolutely required for the existence of the state,
and hence is ordained by God.
"The true conception of a primitive state," says
Hickok, "is that of an organic existence, first
attained in the natural development of humanity
itself. It is no possible product of man's procuring,
but an ordinance of God in the very process of
nature's ongoing." "The powers that be are or-
dained of God," says Paul.
^Notwithstanding such authority as has here
been presented for the existence and authority of
human government, objections have been urged
against it which we deem it our duty to answer.
1. It has been objected to human governments
that they are all tarnished by crime, founded in
injustice, and consequently they are all wrong, and
there is a "higher law" by which we should be
governed.
In answer to this objection, we may admit that
human governments are imperfect; yet "much
greater wrong, far grosser injustice, and infinitely
POLITICAL ETHICS.
261
more evil, would result if they were all abolished.
Besides, the Divine Being teaches subjection to
human governments, and they cannot therefore be
altogether wrong.
2. It is objected to civil governments, that God
allows them to exist, merely as he allows Satan to
exist, and makes them accomplish his purposes, just
as he sometimes makes Satan do so.
In answer to this objection, we have to say, that
God never required us to obey Satan, but he does
require us to obey civil government.
3. It is objected that God says, "Vengeance is
mine;" but that the state claims the right of
avenging wrongs committed against itself or its
citizens.
In reply to this, it can be justly said that the
language of the Divine Being was used as a re-
buke to the exercise of private revenge, and not
against the infliction of a just penalty to violated
law. The government may be God's minister to
inflict vengeance.
4. It is urged by some fanatical Christians that
Christ's kingdom is intended to subvert all govern-
ments, and that in the day of the Millennium no
human government will be allowed to exist.
This objection, to my mind, proceeds upon a
mistaken view, both of the kingdom of Christ and
262 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
of human government. "My kingdom," say3
Christ, "is not of this world." It is the design
of the Christian system to purify all human gov-
ernments, but not to subvert them. Christ said,
"Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's."
And he governed his own conduct by this maxim.
The state, therefore, is an ordinance of God
directly, and civil government is his institution
indirectly, if not directly; but the particular form
of government is left to be determined by the
people. This is manifestly proper, because there
can be no permanent form established, inasmuch
as the form of government must be made to vary
according to circumstances. The particular form
of government must depend upon the present so-
cial, intellectual, and moral condition of the peo-
pie. Hence, as no permanent form can be estab-
lished, God has left the form to be decided by the
state.
SECTION II.
THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT—ADVANTAGES OF A REPUB-
LICAN GOVERNMENT—WHEN PREFERABLE—THE RIGHTS AND OBLI-
GATIONS OF GOVERNMENT—REVOLUTION.
1. Military despotism. By a military despotism
is meant the government of a military despot, whose
will is the law, and who, assuming the reins of
POLITICAL ETHICS.
263
authority, generally in a time of anarchy, oppresses
the people with an iron rule. In times of great
corruption of morals, such government may ho
allowable; it is certainly better than anarchy.
2. Absolute monarchy. In an absolute monarchy,
as in a military despotism, the whole power is vested
in one man—the monarch. He generally considers
himself as reigning by Divine right, and usually
exercises despotic sway over his subjects. His gov-
ernment is of a more permanent character than
a military despotism, and is usually hereditary in
its nature.
3. Limited monarchy. A limited monarchy is
that form of government in which the sovereign is
limited in his power. It may be elective or heredi-
tary. He has a parliament or congress, by which
his authority is restrained, and which usually con-
stitutes the law-making power.
4. Republic. In a republican form of govern-
ment, all power belongs to the people. They elect
their own officers, and through those officers make,
alter, repeal, adjudicate, and execute their own laws.
It may be simple, as where there is but one state ;
or it may be complex, as where there are several in-
dependent, sovereign states united in one federal
republic. In this form of government the federal
constitution may determine the rights and powers
264 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
of the several states. They may be allowed by that
instrument to nullify the laws of the republic, or to
secede, or these rights may be denied them. Or the
constitution may grant certain rights to the repub-
lie, while all others are secured to the states. This
federal constitution is of course formed by the
several states which meet together in convention for
that purpose. Ilence they will explicitly express
whatever is granted by them to the republic, and all
else is reserved to the states. The federal republic
would of course have the right to use all the power
granted in the constitution; but the general govern-
ment could use no other powers without oppressing
the states. Such a government is believed to con-
form to the principles of morality, and to have
advantages above every other form, when the people
are enlightened and virtuous.
1. Because it interests all the people in the gov-
ernment. Each man feels that the government rests
to some extent upon his shoulders.
2. It stimulates each citizen to become intelligent.
He desires to understand the many complicated and
perplexing questions that enter into the practical
workings of the government. He therefore reads
and hears addresses upon these subjects, looks into
the votes of the representatives, with the reasons
given for them, becomes familiar with the history of
POLITICAL ETHICS.
265
the country, and thus a mighty stimulus is given to
the acquisition of knowledge.
3. It of course must promote the cause of educa-
tion. In a country where the people elect their own
rulers, where the right of trial by jury is guaranteed,
and where every man may be elevated to some
office, universal education becomes an absolute
want. Common schools, high schools, and colleges
are therefore fostered by the government, and
patronized by the people.
4. It offers the highest incentives to patriotism to
all its citizens; it knows no nobility of birth or
blood; it gives the privilege of rising to distinction
to all, however humble their origin, and thus keeps
alive that love of country which is one of the surest
safeguards of its permanency.
The rights of government are now to be noticed.
1. A government has the right of self-protection.
It has therefore the right to prevent or to suppress
all fraud, all acts of injustice and violence among
the citizens. As vice, licentiousness, and acts of
injustice tend to destroy a nation, the government
has the right to repress lawlessness, cost what it
may.
There are rights which a nation has in reference
to its own citizens. It is a question among moral
philosophers whether a nation has the right to pro-
12
266 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
tect itself against outward violence, against the
attacks of another nation. To employ force to
defend our persons is a sad and melancholy duty
that sometimes devolves upon us. We admit it to
be the last expedient which should be resorted to.
The same duties that devolve upon the individual in
defending himself devolve upon the nation. We
hold that war is not only the right, but may be the
duty of a nation. But the right of making war
belongs to nations no further than maybe necessary
for their own defence, or for the maintenance of
their rights.
The law of nations makes three j ust grounds of
war. 1. To recover what belongs or is due to us.
2, To provide for our future safety by punishing the
aggressor or offender. 3, To defend ourselves from
injury by repelling unjust violence, So, then, the
foundation of every just war is injury done or
threatened.
When the existence of a nation is threatened, she
has the right to defend that existence to the last
extremity. Nothing save the immutable principles
of right should be regarded as too sacred to be sacri-
ficed in defending her own existence. She may
destroy the lives of thousands of her assailants, and
sacrifice the lives of thousands of her own citizens,
when her own existence is at stake.
POLITICAL ETHICS.
267
"War," says Hickok, "is righteous in defence
of tlie national freedom. Against a foreign enemy
a nation cannot maintain its rights by law; it can
only resist his violence to public freedom by arms.
There can be no question of-weaker and stronger,
of expediency and inexpediency; for the weaker
nation, like the weaker man, when driven to fight
for life, must resist and defend as it may."
There is nothing that appeals more to universal
sympathy than the sight of a weaker nation strug-
gling against a mighty and merciless tyrant, and
determining to sink, if sink it must, nobly battling
for the cause of freedom.
We know that these views do not accord with the
principles of non-resistance and pseudo-philan-
thropy, as they have been industriously propagated
of late years; but as they are believed to accord
with the purest morality, and are not opposed to
the teachings of the Bible, we do not hesitate to
present them.
War, indeed, is a terrible calamity, even when
it is resorted to in the cause of right, and when
the nation whose cause is righteous is the victor.
We would approve, then, of all honorable means
which a wise philanthropy could suggest to prevent
hostilities. A congress of nations may constitute a
high court, to which all questions pertaining to peace
268 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
and war could be appealed, and whose decision
should be final.
2. A government has the right to be supported
by the people. This support may be derived by
taxation, either direct, or indirect. "While the gov-
ernment has the right to lay taxes, it is bound to do
so in accordance with the principles of a pure mo-
rality. Hence, a nation is bound to equalize the
burdens, and must not tax the people upon any other
than just and equitable principles. It is also claimed
that the people taxed shall have the right of repre-
sentation.
3. A nation has the right to perfect itself. This
may be done by promoting the cause of education;
by establishing agricultural and other scientific
schools; by encouraging commerce; by securing to
the citizens the benefits accruing from their inven-
tions; by encouraging literature, in the granting of
copyrights; by works of internal improvement of
national importance; by liberal postal arrange-
ments ; by fostering religion, and recognizing it as
the only safeguard of the nation; in short, by every
means that can perfect the character of the people,
and develop the resources of the country.
4. A nation has the right to do every thing which
may be necessary for its defence or advancement,
with the single limitation that no act of wrong
POLITICAL ETHICS.
269
or injustice, or one invading private rights, is
allowed.
The compact existing between a government and
the citizens requires duties which may not he neg-
lected by either the one or the other. These duties
are reciprocal, and are equally binding upon both
parties to this compact.
1. Every man, so soon as he becomes a citizen,
binds himself to the duty of reciprocity, and the gov-
ernment is bound to observe the same duty; that
is, every citizen is bound to do to the government
as he would have the government do to him, and in
like manner the government is to act toward the
citizen.
2. The citizen is to look to the government for
protection of life, property, and reputation; and the
government is bound most faithfully to protect the
citizen from all injuries to person, property, or
reputation.
3. The citizen is to throw upon the government
the duty of avenging wrong. Private revenge is to
be entirely ignored by the citizen:
1st. Because the government can avenge wrong
much more effectually than it can be done by the
individual. With all the instrumentalities possessed
by the government, with officers both judicial and
executive, and with resources such as no private in-
270 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
dividual can have, the government can become the
minister of justice with much more propriety and
success than can any private individual.
2d. Because the government is armed with au-
thority from God, and " beareth the sword" as the
minister of his vengeance.
3d. Because by giving up this matter to the
government, the punishment is inflicted without
the indulgence of that private malice, and that
spirit of revenge, which are so reprehensible.
4th. Because in this manner crime will be pre-
vented, while if vengeance is inflicted by the indi-
vidual, crime will be increased.
4. The government is bound to redress all the
wrongs of the citizen.
5. It is the duty of the citizen to advance the
government toward perfection; and it is especially
the duty of government to advance the citizen in
every thing that pertains to the perfection of his
character. The citizen is under obligation to fur-
nish all the means necessary to the perfection of the
nation; the government is bound to exact from the
citizen no more than may be needful to effect this
object.
When this compact is carried out, no rights are
really surrendered by the citizen. Ho man has a
natural right to do wrong. And in this compact
POLITICAL ETHICS.
271
be voluntarily submits to tbose restraints that may,
on the one hand, prevent the commission of crime,
and, on the other, may develop and perfect his own
character. That this principle is correct may be
inferred from the fact, that the more "closely this
compact is observed, the happier are the people,
and the more prosperous is the government.
Suppose this compact has been violated by the1
government: have the people the right to revolu-
tionize it?
Dr. "Wayland points out three possible courses to
be pursued when the government violates this com-
pact: 1. Quiet submission to the wrong: of this he
disapproves. 2. Revolution, which he also opposes.
3. Suffering in the cause of right: this he regards
as the proper course. You may plead with the
government, but you may not engage in revolution.
On the contrary, we hold that revolution is the best
course. A government that is not adapted to the
people, that oppresses them, that prevents theii
progress, should be put down by force. The nation
should revolutionize the government.
The same right of revolution belongs to colonies
which may be oppressed by the mother country.
They are ready to become a nation: the mother
country represses their aspirations for freedom and
independence, imposes upon them heavy burdens
272 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
too grievous to be borne, taxes tbem without allow-
ing tbe privilege of representation: then such
colonies have the right, and it is their duty, to
engage in revolution. It requires moral heroism to
take the first step in such a work. He that first
opens his mouth and raises his voice for revolu-
tion is apt to fall a martyr to his principles,
but he should be willing to hazard every thing
for principle. If, like "Washington, he is success-
ful, he is hailed as the saviour of his coun-
try; if, like Kossuth, he is unsuccessful, he is a
rebel and an exile, or, worse, he fails to make his
escape, and is garroted like Lopez, or hung upon a
gibbet.
Revolutions are frequently attempted too soon,
when the people are not ready for them—before, by
their virtue and intelligence, they are capable of
self-government; then they are sure to fail.
SECTION III.
THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT: LEGISLATIVE, JUDI-
CIAL, EXECUTIVE THE CONSTITUTION THAT GOVERNS ALL THE
BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS COMPARED THE DUTIES
OF THE LEGISLATOR—OF THE JUDGE AND JURY—OF THE EXECUTIVE.
Every properly organized government fulfils its
duties by means of three departments, called the
POLITICAL ETHICS.
273
legislative, judicial, and executive. In a military
despotism, or an absolute monarchy, the autocrat
or despot may fill all these departments; but we
shall consider them as three separate departments,
in the hands of different officers, whose duties are
separate and distinct.
The instrument which controls these officers is
called the constitution. The two great progressive
constitutional governments, at this time, are the
English and North American. The constitutions
of both these grant freedom to the citizens; but
there are some distinctions which may be readily
pointed out.
1. The American is a written constitution; and
the British is unwrittefl: the authority of the latter
is derived from precedent.
2. The American constitution was framed by the
sovereign States of the American Union, assembled
in convention for that purpose. Each State sent
her own delegates to the convention, which repre-
sented her in that body, by which the constitution
was framed. The British constitution has grown
up with the state, and has the authority of custom,
to give it power over the officers of government.
3. The American constitution makes its govern-
ment elective. The President of the Republic is
himself elected by the people, holding his office for
12*
274 ELEMENTS OE MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
only four years, and is sworn to support the eonsti-
tution. The British constitution does not make its
government elective entirely. It acknowledges an
hereditary monarchy.
4. The American constitution was adopted by
independent, sovereign States granting certain
powers to the general government, and reserving
all others to themselves. It is an instrument,
therefore, designed for a federal republic, com-
posed of different States, each sovereign within
herself, and each having a separate written consti-
tution for her own government. The British con-
stitution has been established by precedent, is
designed for a limited and hereditary monarchy,
and has none of these peculiarities.
The legislative department is usually divided
into two branches—the Senate and the House of
Representatives, or the Lords and the Commons.
The duties of the legislator are,
1. To understand fully the constitution by which
he is to be governed in making laws.
2. It is his duty to make himself thoroughly
acquainted with the wants of the people, and to
learn the best means of meeting those wants, so
far as the laws of the country can meet them. He
ought therefore to understand political economy,
and to know the practical workings of the different
POLITICAL ETHICS.
275
and opposite systems which have been adopted at
various times by the legislature for the purpose of
advancing the interests of the people.
3. He should enact such laws, in accordance with
the constitution, as will best subserve the interests
of society. He must not claim to have any "higher
daw" than the constitution. And he that swears to
support the constitution, and then, under pretence
of rendering obedience to a "higher law," violates
that instrument, is to all intents and purposes
morally perjured.
It has been for a great while a question among
statesmen and moralists, whether the legislator is
bound to conform his action to the will of his con-
stituents.
Perhaps the best answer to that question is this:
When the will of his constituents is known, and he
can conscientiously conform his action to it, and of
course would not violate the constitution by so
doing, it would be consistent with a pure morality
for him to carry out their will. But if, upon einer-
gency, he has to decide some question upon which
he has had no opportunity of consulting his con-
stituents, he must in that case be governed by his
own judgment and conscience. Finally, if he
knows the will of his constituents, and cannot con-
scientiously or constitutionally conform his action
276 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
to it, let liim resign. Let him prefer a good con-
science to any office.
The judicial department is also divided: its duties
are fulfilled by the judge and the jury.
It is the business of the judge to expound the laws
enacted by the legislature, determine their constitu-
tionality, and require that they should he enforced..
It is therefore the duty of the judge,
1. To understand the law.
2. To understand the constitution, so that he
may compare the law with that instrument, and
determine its conformity or want of conformity
to it.
3. He must know all the facts in the case, so
that he may sum them up, and give a clear and
impartial presentation of them to the jury.
4. It is his duty to decide according to law, with-
out fear, favor, or affection.
It is the duty of the jury to decide according to
the law and evidence, without fear, favor, or affection.
"The trial by jury," says Blackstone, "has been,
and I trust ever will he, looked upon as the glory
of the English law. It is the most transcendent
privilege which any subject can enjoy or wish for,
that he cannot he affected either in his property,
his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous con-
sent of twelve of his equals."
POLITICAL ETHICS.
277
Fearful is the responsibility of those to whom is
committed the decision of cases which involve all
that is dear to man on earth. Let those upon
whom the responsibility is devolved, discharge it
with an honest and fearless spirit.
It is the business of the executive to execute
the law as enacted by the legislature and interpreted
by the judiciary.
In the case of simple executive officers, their
duties are exceedingly plain, as they have but
to execute the laws, without inquiring into their
justice or constitutionality. A sheriff, for example,
must imprison or even hang a man without inquiring
into the justice of his punishment. Though it is
his duty as an officer to execute the laws, he
must not forget that he is a man, and that the poor
condemned criminal is also a man. "While he
performs his unpleasant duties, he should do all
that delicacy or benevolence may suggest for the
comfort of the convict.
On executive officers whose duties are complex,
much greater responsibility devolves. The Presi-
dent of the United States, and the governors of
the different sovereign States, are executive officers
whose duties are complex. It is their duty to
recommend such measures as they may think
beneficial to the country, to affix their signatures
278 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
to the laws passed by the legislature, and in
certain circumstances to exercise the appointing,
the pardoning, and the veto power.
The duties of the executive may be summed up
as follows:
1. He must understand the constitution of his
country, that he may know when to approve and
when to veto an act of the legislature.
2. He should appoint such men to office as are
"honest and capable." This principle will not
prevent him from rewarding his friends, hut it will
prevent him from removing an honest, faithful
public §ervant, and appointing in his stead an
unprincipled and brawling politician.
8. He should exercise the veto power with great
caution. He should remember that a republic is
the government of majorities; and when a majority
have enacted a law, a law it should be, unless it
violate the constitution, or be deemed exceedingly
detrimental to the public welfare.
4. He should guard against any abuse of the
pardoning power. It may be proper for the execu-
tive to exercise this power after the sentence, when
there has come up new evidence which may justify
or require its arrest. But an abuse of this power,
whether brought about by bribery, by too great
sympathy for the criminal, or by any want of
POLITICAL ETHICS.
279
virtue in the magistrate, is sure to be attended
with the worst consequences. The probabilities
of punishment being lessened, the amount of crime
is greatly increased. Reprieves may give license
to crime, lessen the power of the judiciary, bring
our courts of justice into contempt, and throw wide
open the very flood-gates of iniquity.
SECTION IV.
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS—DIFFERENCE IN CRIMES — LEGAL CRIMES
MORAL CRIMES CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ARGUMENTS IN ITS FAVOR
— WHEN IT MAY BE INFLICTED — HOW TO SECURE THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE.
A legal crime is one that is not vicious per se:
it is an act that does not violate moral law; as, for
example, smuggling. This would not be a crime
hut for the tariff laws. It would not only be
innocent, hut it would he highly commendable for
individuals or companies to bring goods into the
country, and thus meet the wants of society, if
there were no law against it. Hence the crime
of smuggling is the result of legal enactment, and
is called a legal crime.
A moral crime is a crime per se: it is a violation
of moral law; and if there existed no legal enact-
ments against it, it would still be a crime. For
280 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
example, murder: this is a crime in the nature of
things; it is a crime, and would he a crime, even
if there were legal enactments requiring its com-
mission. So it is with theft. The enactment by
the Spartan Lycurgus encouraging theft did not
absolve those who committed it from crime. It
was a crime in spite of the law.
In regard to punishment, the great principle
established among moral philosophers and jurists
is, that the heaviest punishment must fall upon
him who commits a crime which affects most
deeply the peace, fortunes, or lives of men; and
the lightest punishment is to be inflicted for the
crime which does not greatly affect the peace,
fortunes, or lives of men.
It is still a question among moral philosophers
whether any circumstances will justify or demand
the infliction of capital punishment.
In the opinion of the present writer, capital
punishment is required by the law of God, both
as it is exhibited in the light of nature, and as it
is revealed in his word.
1. "W"e hold that the great objects of punishment
may be best accomplished by the infliction of the
death-penalty. These objects may be the reform-
ation of the criminal, the prevention of crime,
POLITICAL ETHICS.
281
or restitution to the injured party. That crime
is more effectually diminished by the death-penalty
will hardly he denied, inasmuch as it lessens the
number of criminals, and is the greatest terror to
evil-doers. But another and still higher object
is to administer justice to the criminal. This
design of punishment can be accomplished only,
in certain cases of aggravated crime, by the inflic-
tion of capital punishment.
2. The penalty of death is required by the
great law of self-preservation. It is the duty of
the state to use such efforts and enforce such
penalties as may be necessary to the preservation
of her citizens, and essential to the prevention
of anarchy. Let murder go unwhipped of justice;
let the blood-stained criminal lose all fear of the
death-penalty; let it be proclaimed that this
most fearful of all punishments is abolished, and
the darkest picture of iniquity appalls the imagi-
nation, and ruinous inroads are made upon the
morals, liberty, and life of the people. Judging,
then, by the light of nature alone, we must come
to the conclusion that capital punishment should
be inflicted.
"We now turn to the teachings of revelation.
The following scriptural argument is condensed
282 ELEMENTS Ot MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
from two masterly sermons on the subject of
capital punishment by the Rev. Dr. Mitchell.*
u < "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his
blood be shed.'
" The law was enacted by the Divine Legislator
after man's depravity had been fearfully manifested
and awfully punished. At the commencement of
a new era in man's history, ere another Cain
should raise his fratricidal hand, and cause a
brother's blood to cry for vengeance, this righteous
law is proclaimed for the benefit of the human
family. There it stands on the statute-book of
Heaven, unannulled, unrepealed, in as full force
and virtue, to all intents and purposes, against the
cruel and bloody man, as it was in the lifetime of
the son of Lamech. It is a generally received
maxim that a law stands as long as the reason for
its enactment stands; but the reason for the enact-
ment of this law still remains, and ever shall
remain, unaltered. 'In the image of God made
he man.' This law was reenacted and promulgated
in the law of the Ten Commandments. Again in
Leviticus: 'He that killeth any one shall surely
be put to death.' In the book of Numbers it is
* These sermons are in manuscript, but it is hoped the learned
author will consent to their publication.
POLITICAL ETHICS.
•283
recorded, 'Blood defileth the land; and the land
cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein,
but by the blood of him that shed it.'
" It is evident, then—unless it can be proved by
the word of God that murder is not so great a sin
in our enlightened age as it was in the days of
Moses—it is an inevitable deduction that blood
still defiles the land, and that the land cannot
be cleansed of the blood shed therein but by the
blood of him that shed it."
These are the arguments derived from the Old
Testament; the following are taken from the
Hew:
1. Jesus Christ, the boldest of teachers, never
uttered a word against the law, either as existing
among the Jews or Romans.
2. He in spirit reenacted the law in his Sermon
on the Mount.
3. He recognized the justice of the death-penalty
in reference to the malefactors that were crucified
with him. "We indeed justly," said one ^male-
factor to the other. Then, if ever, could Jesus
have uttered his anathemas against the barbarous
statute given to Hoah.
4. Paul admits that the death-penalty may be
just when he uses the following language: " If I
have committed any thing worthy of death, I
284 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
refuse not to die." Again, in the Epistle to the
Romans: " If thou do that which is evil, he afraid,
for he beareth not the sword in vain; for he is a
minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon
him that doeth evil."
"In conclusion," says Dr. Mitchell, "God has
not left it discretionary with civil government, he
has not left it optional with man, to say what degree
of punishment shall be inflicted upon the wretch
who perpetrates that horrible crime which occupies
an awful altitude on the mountain of human guilt.
He declares with a voice of thunder; he speaks the
announcement in tones of terrible majesty; he in-
terweaves its solemn sanction with the several reve-
lations which he makes to man—on Ararat, on Ho-
reb, on Calvary, in Patmos, by patriarchs, by pro-
phets, by apostles, by Jesus Christ himself—that not
only is government authorized and required to put
the malicious murderer to death, but that the omis-
sion to inflict the penalty entails a curse on any
nation."
For what crimes should this penalty be inflicted?
1. For murder. 2. For arson, as that crime most
recklessly puts to hazard human life. 3. The for-
cible violation of chastity.
The best means of securing the administration of
justice are,
POLITICAL ETHICS.
285
1. W^e should have an able and impartial judi-
ciary. Our judges must be men of exalted virtue, of
inflexible justice, and of commanding talents.
2. We should have our judiciary as nearly as pos-
sible independent.
3. Popular education should become universal, as
it is absolutely essential to the administration of
justice.
4. The citizens should be intelligent, moral, and
virtuous. ~No bribed jurors will give righteous
decisions.
5. The executive should be composed of such
men as will guard the constitution, recommend
the wisest measures, and see that the laws are
rigidly enforced.
SECTION V.
DUTIES OF CITIZENS—OBEDIENCE—VOTING—UNION—INTELLIGENCE AND
VIRTUE DEVELOPING RESOURCES DEFENCE CORRECTION OF EVILS.
The duties of citizens are embraced in the one
word patriotism—love of country. This principle
is the destruction of sectionalism, it weakens the
power of party, and embraces the entire country,
its government, its institutions, its citizens, and
all that is embraced within its limits.
1. The citizen is to render implicit obedience
to the laws of his country.
286 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
2. He is to exercise the right of suffrage. He
is hound to vote; it is a duty which he must not
omit, a right which he is not at liberty to prosti-
tute. By his vote he is ever to seek to place that
man in office who will impart to it dignity, dis-
charge faithfully its duties, and best promote the
interests of the country.
8. It is the duty of the good citizen to seek to
strengthen the bonds which unite together the
different portions of his country. He must not
make aggressions upon the rights of his brethren
occupying a different section, nor seek to wound
their feelings.
4. It is his duty to be intelligent and virtuous,
and to seek to increase the intelligence and virtue
of his countrymen.
5. The good citizen should neglect no means of
developing the resources of his country.
6. It is his duty to defend his country from the
assaults of her foes. "With a brave heart, when
occasion serves, he is to confront her foes, and do
battle for her cause. Ho danger must appall him,
no bribe must tempt him, no power must awe
him, no opposition deter him from a fearless and
patriotic discharge of duty.
7. It is his duty to seek by all means to reform all
abuses which may have crept into the government.
POLITICAL ETHICS.
287
Whether these abuses have arisen from extrava-
gance or corruption, the good citizen should endea-
vor to correct them. It may, therefore, he his duty
to fill high posts in the service of his country. It
is not only compatible with the Christian character,
but it may he the duty of the Christian man to sit
upon the bench, to enter the halls of legislation, to
lead armies, or to occupy the chair of state. Good
men, because of the temptations connected with
place and power, and of the wickedness that
exists in high places, have no right to withdraw
themselves from the councils of the nation. Let
them go amidst the corruptions of the court, or the
wickedness that sometimes stains the escutcheon of
the republic, and, retaining their purity un corrupt
and incorruptible, let them seek the purification of
the political atmosphere, and the advancement of
the country's welfare.
288
elements of moral philosophy.
CHAPTER V.
family ethics.
SECTION I.
MARRIAGE—TO WHAT OPPOSED—ARGUMENTS AGAINST POLYGAMY.
Marriage is the union of one man with one
woman "so long as they both shall live." It is
indicated by Christ in the following language:
" Have ye not read, that He which made them in
the beginning, made them male and female, and
said, For this cause shall a man leave father and
mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they
twain shall be one flesh."
The conjugal relation is believed to be opposed
to polygamy, and in this view there is great una-
nimity among enlightened nations. The following
arguments will substantiate this position:
1. "When God created man, he made one man
and one woman—"male and female created he
them;" thereby showing that there should only be
FAMILY ETHICS.
289
a pair united in this sacred relation. If ever a man
should have had more than one wife, it should have
been at that period, when the earth was destitute of
inhabitants.
2. Polygamy tends directly to the deep degrada-
tion of woman : it makes her a slave ; her power
and influence are gone, and her light is quenched.
3. Polygamy must produce constant strife and
discord in the domestic circle. Jealousies and con-
stant wranglings exist among the wives of the
harem, and vexation and distrust on the part of
the husband. Mutual confidence is destroyed, and
real conjugal affection is unknown.
4. Polygamy tends to the degradation of the chil-
dren. The masculine energy of the father, as well
as the womanly tenderness of the mother, is needed
in the rearing of children. If the mother's tender-
ness is wanting, the children become savage; if the
father's energy is withdrawn, they become effemi-
nate. It is impossible in the unnatural state of
polygamy for the father to give the proper attention
to the intellect, the morals, and the entire develop-
ment of his children.
5. Polygamy tends naturally to weaken the race.
The tendency of licentiousness is ever in that direc-
tion. It enervates the race both in mind and body.
6. Polygamy tends to produce unnatural crimes,
13
290 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
and the grossest and most loathsome forms of lieen-
tiousness. Some men, being deprived of wives,
resort to crimes which are too abominable to be
mentioned in a work of this kind.
7. The New Testament is very clear on this sub-
ject, though it has been said to utter nothing against
it. Christ says, "Whosoever putteth away a woman
save for fornication, and marrieth another, com-
mitteth adultery." Now, in what does the adultery
consist? Not, of course, in putting away one wife,
but in marrying another during the lifetime of the
first wife. If, then, the marrying of a second wife,
after the first is improperly put away, constitutes
adultery, then by the stronger reason is it adultery
to marry a second or a third wife while living with
the first. This, to all believers in the Bible, must
be a very strong argument, as it makes polygamy
nothing more nor less than adultery.
8. God has most clearly indicated his will on
this subject by causing the number of males and
females born to be about equal. This very fact
makes it a gross immorality in any nation to allow
polygamy. In legalizing this vice, adultery is
legalized, the sacred family relation broken up, the
express will of God violated, the freedom of society
Binned against, and countless evils are brought
upon the human race.
FAMILY ETHICS.
291
SECTION II.
THE DESIGN OP MARRIAGE—DOMESTIC HAPPINESS—A NUMEROUS AND
HAPPY POSTERITY—PATRIOTISM CHASTITY.
1. It is the design of marriage to promote indi-
vidual and domestic happiness, and especially the
happiness of woman. By the union of interests
and sympathies, joys are increased, and the sorrows
of life are greatly tempered and mitigated. Morose-
ness is nearly always the attendant of a life of celi-
bacy; and this is especially the case with woman.
This evil is fully prevented when the design of
marriage is accomplished. Marriage should ever
calm the turbulent propensities of human nature,
impart mutual confidence, add new charms to exist-
ence, brighten the hopes of the future, and strew
the path of life with flowers, almost as fragrant as
those which grew in paradise.
2. The design of marriage is the production of
the greatest number of healthy children, together
with their proper nurture and successful education.
The health and energy, the intellect and disposition,
the discipline and habits, the present and the future
welfare of children, all depend upon the sanctity of
the marriage relation.
3. Its design is to excite that deep and ardent
devotion to country which is necessary to the
292 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
country's welfare. It makes the parents feel that
the country is not only theirs, but that it is to be
the country of their children and their children's
children, and hence it begets an interest in the per-
manent welfare and glory of their country.
4. Its design is the promotion of chastity. God
has wisely implanted certain propensities in human
nature, which meet their appropriate and lawful
gratification alone in the marriage relation. To
prevent the promiscuous, unlawful, unnatural, and
vicious gratification of those propensities is one
great object of the conjugal relation. As the young
of both sexes grow up with the confident expecta-
tion of entering this relation, it tends to repress
licentiousness in its very incipiency.
It may not be improper to refer in the most
delicate manner to certain offences against chastity
which it is the design of marriage to prevent.
1. To prevent those solitary vices which, in both
sexes, have been found so detrimental to health, so
destructive of intellect, and so ruinous to morals—
crimes against which those who have the control
of the young should especially direct their efforts.
2. To prevent fornication, or the indulging of the
sexual passion between persons not married. God
has signified his reprobation of this crime, not only
in his written word, but by often visiting upon the
FAMILY ETHICS.
293
licentious the most loathsome disease that can affect
the body.
3. To prevent incest, a crime at once the vilest
and most revolting to every chaste and refined
mind. But, however revolting, it prevails wherever
polygamy prevails. God has set the seal of
his disapprobation upon this crime, by visiting
the iniquity of the guilty parents upon their
offspring.
SECTION III.
THE PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GOVERN BOTH PARTIES IN FORMING
THE CONJUGAL RELATION.
1. This union should be based upon love. hTo
two persons should ever think of uniting them-
selves in wedlock without love.
2. Those marrying should be very nearly of the
same age. A great difference in the ages of the
parties is almost sure to beget unhappiness, and
is too frequently the cause of crime. As age comes
on, the tastes change, and the habits become con-
firmed; and with dissimilar tastes and habits, it is
almost impossible that husband and wife can live
together in that harmony which is essential to hap-
piness, if not to virtue.
3. Both parties should belong to the same class
294 ELEMENTS 01 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
in society. I have but little sympathy with the
lady who marries her father's coachman. When
this principle is violated by an amalgamation of
the races, it becomes absolutely revolting.
4. Equality of fortune should be a governing
principle. It rarely happens that marriages of per-
sons with fortunes very unequal are happy.
5. The choice of both parties should be free.
Ho one — not even a parent — has the right to
constrain the choice in reference to so solemn an
engagement.
6. The selection must be mutual. Each must
choose the other in preference to any other person.
This is a very important principle; and no man,
however well he may love a woman, should desire
her to be his wife, unless her preference for him
be hearty and unbiased.
7. The principle of constancy should govern both
parties in making their betrothment. It should not
be suddenly made, and, after it is made, no ordinary
circumstance should prevent their marrying. A
breach of promise of marriage is an Immorality of
high grade. It is true that circumstances may
arise after betrothment which may forbid mar-
riage. In such circumstances it is right for the
party upon whom these influences bear to obtain a
release from the other party. If such release is
FAMILY ETHICS.
295
refused, then the only course appears to he to violate
the engagement. A man must not swear to love a
woman whom he does not love, and for whom he
does not even entertain respect; as would neces-
sarily be the case in the conditions supposed.
SECTION IV.
RECIPROCAL DUTIES OF THE CONJUGAL RELATION : LOVE — SYMPATHY
—HELP CHASTITY CONFIDENCE MUTUAL INTEREST AFFECTION
FOR COMMON OFFSPRING—MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY.
The duties which are presented in the following
section are mutual, and equally obligatory upon
both husband and wife. The sacred institution is
now supposed to he entered into, and for better or
for worse the twain have become one.
1. There must be mutual love. Without this as
an all-pervading principle, they can in no circum-
stances be either moral or happy. The solemn
marriage vow is upon them, in which they have
pledged to love each other with an undying devo-
tion. The palace becomes loathsome, wealth a
curse, social intercourse disgustful, magnificent
equipage and costly furniture give no delight,
and even the gardens and walks of literature are
planted with thorns, to the miserable pair who
are united but in form, and whose very union
296 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
is a lie. In spite of wealth, position, and the envy
of the multitude, they must pass through life with
constant, bitter, and unavailing regrets.
2. Mutual sympathy. "We are creatures of sym-
pathy, and one of the highest duties of the conjugal
relation is mutual sympathy. This world is cold v
and dark without it. The wife should sympathize
in her husband's plans, his aims, his toils in his
trade or profession, and in his disappointments and
trials. The husband should equally exercise sym-
pathy with her who has left all to he his wife, with
her who, by kindness, cheerfulness, and affection,
has sought to make his home happy.
3. Mutual help. The spheres and duties of hus-
band and wife may be to a great extent different;
but still it is the duty of each to help the other.
The wife may become accountant, clerk, corre-
spondent, to lighten the toils of her husband. The
husband may render assistance frequently in the
matters of the household. In attending to the
children—the pledges of mutual affection—he can
often assist his toilworn wife.
4. Mutual chastity. " Thou shalt not commit
adultery." The violation of chastity is the viola-
tion of this command. It is a fearful crime, upon
which God both in nature and in revelation has
placed the direst curse. It is as binding upon the
KAMI L Y H T III 0 8 .
297
husband as upon the wife, and a violation of the
command is as criminal in one as in the other.
5. Mutual interest. What belongs to the husband
belongs equally to the wife. The marriage relation
blends all their interests, their property is common,
their reputation common, and all that belongs to
one belongs equally to the other. This should be
felt. There should be no selfishness on the part
of husband or wife. No mine nor thine should be
uttered or felt in reference to what should be com-
mon.
6. Mutual parental affection. When children
bless the conjugal relation, they should be objects
of mutual affection, and thus should serve to bind
still more closely the marriage bond.
7. Mutual responsibility. "Neither," says Wins-
low, " can say, This is my duty, and this is yours.
The duty is common to both. They are mutually
and equally pledged to do all in their power to
secure the prudent management of their secular
interests, the order and peace of their households,
the right training of their offspring, and all those
temporal and everlasting benefits for which the
domestic constitution was established."
lo-
298 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION V.
DUTIES OF HUSBANDS: MAINTENANCE PROTECTION—POLITENESS—
TENDERNESS—CARE IN SICKNESS.
When persons enter the conjugal relation, they do
not lose their individuality. Duties arising from
difference in sphere and relation devolve upon both
husband and wife.
We first notice those of the husband.
1. Maintenance. The husband owes it to his
wife, to himself, to a manly independence, to sup-
port his wife. ISTo man with vigor of health or
strength of mind should consent to be maintained
by the toil of his wife. Men who are so indolent
as to depend upon their wives for maintenance are
a disgrace to their sex. Their indolence is a crime,
their imbecility a burning shame, and their mean-
spiritedness a degradation.
2. Protection. Every husband should feel it his
duty to protect his wife. In his presence and under
his protection she should ever feel safe. She has
left the home of her childhood for him, and with
all the confidence of woman she relies on him to
protect her from exposure, and guard her from
danger. Such confidence should not be misplaced.
8. Politeness. When he was wooing her who is
FAMILY ETHICS.
299
now his wife, how delicate were his attentions, how
gallant his hearing! His whole conduct was char-
acterized by politeness. This should continue
through life.
4. Tenderness. Woman in her entire organiza-
tion is far more delicate than man. Words of com-
plaint and harshness coming from him whom she
loves more dearly than life, pierce her bosom and
give her indescribable anguish. "Husbands," says
Paul, " love your wives, and be not bitter against
them." Col. iii. 19. " Love your wives, even as
Christ also loved the Church, and gave himself for
it." Eph. v. 25. As Christ loves and cherishes
the Church, so should the husband love his wife.
No tmkind word should ever escape his lips, but the
law of kindness should control both words and
actions.
5. Finally, it is the husband's duty to attend with
unabated love upon his wife in the time of sickness.
Then she needs his care. By her couch he should
be found performing acts of kindness, which, more
than the medicine he administers, will serve to
restore her to health. Never does a husband's love
appear so precious as when it manifests itself in
unremitting attention to a wife upon whom disease
is making its fearful ravages.
300 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION VI.
DUTIES ,OF WIVES : OBEDIENCE—FIDELITY—KINDNESS—DILIGENCE—
PROVIDENCE CONTENTMENT PATIENCE KEEPING AT HOME.
"We now notice the duties of wives.
1. Obedience. " Wives, submit yourselves unto
your own husbands." This is the command of God:
it must be obeyed. The husband is universally
acknowledged as the head of the family.
2. Fidelity. " The heart of her husband doth
safely trust in her." She is prudent in speech, and
frugal in her management.
3. Kindness. " She will do him good and not
evil all the days of her life."
4. Diligence. " She worketh willingly with 'her
hands : she riseth also while it is yet night."
5. Providence in household matters. " She look-
eth well to the ways of her household, and eateth
not the bread of idleness."
6. Contentment. She should ever be cheerful
and content with her lot. Her husband may be
poor, disappointments may come over him, and mis-
fortunes may crush him; then the smiles of his
wife, her courage to meet difficulties, and her forti-
tude in bearing adversity, will be a source of con-
stant and unceasing comfort.
7. Patience. Amid the trials of married life, no
FAMILY ETHICS.
301
virtue shines with a milder, purer radiance than
patience. A woman with a morose husband who
neglects her, who is unkind, has no sympathy,
and suffers her to pine in want, has much need of
patience. It is for her good and the good of her
sex that she be patient under all the ills of an
unfortunate marriage, rather than hastily seek a
divorce.
8. Keeping at home. Home is woman's sphere ;
it is her kingdom, and here let her reign without
a rival. Let her make home the most attractive
place on earth to her husband. Let her keep
it neat and tidy, ever giving a cordial welcome
to her husband. With a neat person, a pleasant
home, a smiling face, a cheerful and brave heart,
let her seek to make her husband happy. Her
reward will be domestic peace, the confidence of
her husband, the love of her children, and the
respect of all.
SECTION VII.
DIVORCE—MAY BE GRANTED BY THE STATE—ON "WHAT GROUNDS.
Circumstances may exist which may justify the
state in granting divorces. This fact does not lessen
but rather increases the solemnity and binding
nature of the marriage contract. Certainly the
•302 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
original intention of this contract was to bind the
parties for life.
Mr. Hickok says, " One cause only is admitted as
a justification of divorce, and that an already sun-
dering the nuptial tie by the adulterous infidelity
of one of the parties." He then quotes in proof
of this position from Matt. xix. 9: " I say unto you,
Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for
fornication, and shall marry another, committeth
adultery; and whoso marrieth her which is put
away, committeth adultery."
"It occurs to me," says Mahan, "that the ques-
tion propounded to Christ was in reference to what
might occur prior to jnarriage, and not to what
might occur after marriage, and be a sufiieient rea-
son for divorce. This was the question agitated
among the Jews. For what cause, existing prior to
marriage, and discovered after the consummation of
the relation, might a man put away his wife ? The
answer was, For licentiousness, or fornication. Paul
gives another reason for the dissolution of the bonds
of marriage. In the seventh chapter of 1st Cor-
inthians, he teaches that the departure of one of the
parties from the other absolves the forsaken one
from the marriage bonds. He tells us that iu
such circumstances the injured party is no longer
bound by law. In the light, then, of these scrip-
FAMILY ETHICS.
303
tures, we give two and only two causes for di-
vorce.
" 1. For infidelity either before or after the con-
jugal relation is entered into. If a man marries a
woman who he afterwards learns was impure at
the time of marriage, he is freed from the bonds,
and may morally seek a divorce. By the stronger
reason, if guilt in this respect attaches to either
party subsequent to marriage, the other may seek a
release from the contract.
"2. In cases where either party forsakes the
other, or refuses the nuptial rights, then there is
just ground for divorce. In this view we are sus-
tained by the ablest commentators, and certainly by
the wisest legislators."
These are the views of President Mahan, and
are seen to be opposed to those of Professor
Ilickok. According to the latter, there can he but
one cause of divorce : according to the former, there
can exist but two causes. So both views make the
marriage contract one of most binding obliga-
tion.
The greater facility with which this bond is legally
sundered, the greater the prevalence of licentious-
ness and the evil to' society. Let legislators re-
member this, and not disgrace their statute-books
with so many divorces.
304 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION VIII.
PARENTAL DUTIES: MAINTENANCE — PHYSICAL EDUCATION INTEL-
LECTUAL EDUCATION MORAL EDUCATION.
Among the original principles of our nature
is the love of offspring. "Without this it would he
almost impossible to fulfil the duties that are
connected with this important relation. Next to
the relation of husband and wife, the relation of
parent and child is the most important. Upon the
correct understanding and proper discharge of the
duties connected with this interesting relation
depends the prosperity of the country. If parental
responsibilities are felt, and if parental duties are
faithfully discharged, the influence is seen in a
virtuous, intelligent, and patriotic offspring, who
will ever be found battling courageously for truth,
piety, and freedom. If, on the contrary, these
responsibilities are not felt, and these duties are
not discharged, the influence is seen in a vicious
offspring, who are ever found on the side of vice,
fighting against truth and virtue. We may just
observe that guardians and step-parents are to treat
their wards and step-children as they do their own
offspring.
The duties of parents may be thus classified:
I. Maintenance. It is the duty of parents to
FAMILY ETHICS.
305
maintain their children. Their very helplessness
pleads for this. Unable to maintain themselves,
their only reliance is upon their parents.
1. This maintenance should be equal and im-
partial. Parents should carefully guard against
making a difference in this respect, for partiality
here is attended with the worst consequences.
2. The maintenance should be according to the
means possessed by the parents. Extravagance
should be avoided on the one hand, and parsimony
on the other. Parents should not be ambitious
of display, and thereby involve themselves in
debt.
II. Physical education. It devolves upon parents
to attend to the development of a healthy and
vigorous constitution in their children. Many
sickly constitutions have been the result of parental
negligence. "Whatever weakens the constitution,
unfits the future man for the duties of life, to the
full extent of the weakness. Both the State and
the Church can justly claim of parents to fulfil
this obligation; for a feeble man can hardly meet
the expectations of either the one or the other. In
order, then, that a vigorous constitution be de-
veloped in the child, the parent must see:
1. That children have the proper kind of food,
suitably prepared, at the proper times and in the
306 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
proper quantities. They should not he allowed
to indulge in eating to excess, nor should they be
stinted in their food in such manner as to prevent
physical development.
2. Parents should see that children are suitably
clothed. The clothes should vary with the sea-
son: they should not be of such a nature in their
cut and make as to hinder the growth of the
children.
3. Children should not only be allowed but
required to take proper exercise. They should be
required to work, to use the axe or hoe, and thus
be inured to labor.
4. They should be restrained from all things
that weaken the constitution, such as stimulating
drinks, indolence, eating at irregular times, and
especially late at night.
5. Parents should guard with great vigilance
the health of their children. They should not
expose them to an unhealthy atmosphere, to
unwholesome work, to pestilential diseases, or
impose upon them burdens which they are unable
to bear.
III. Intellectual education. An ignorant com-
munity is almost sure to be idle and vicious. If
children are allowed to grow up without instruc-
tion, they must form an ignorant community, and
family ethics.
307
must suffer all the evils entailed by idleness and
vice. A heavy responsibility rests upon parents
in reference to the education of their children.
They owe it to their country and their God to
meet this responsibility, as it becomes those to
whom so high a trust is committed. It is the duty
of parents to impart the first knowledge to their
children. This nearly all parents can do, and this
early training they ought to intrust to no other.
In addition to this, it is the duty of parents:
1. To procure teachers faithful and competent.
Let them not employ teachers because they are
cheap, but because they are earnest and faithful.
A teacher possessed of industry, patience, amia-
bility, and talent, is a priceless treasure to a family
of children, and no pains or expense should be
spared to obtain such a one. At the same time,
the parents should give encouragement to the
children, and urge them on in the career of
knowledge.
2. Parents should see that the teacher per-
forms his duty. No good teacher will object
to this. A visit from the parents is an evidence
of their interest in him and his interesting charge,
and an earnest of their cooperation if he is found
discharging his duty.
3. Parents should show by their words and
308 ELEMENTS OE MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
actions that they place education above wealth
or position. Let them be zealous in its promotion.
Let them he found in such associations and ex-
erting such influences as must cause their children
to feel that education is regarded by them as no
minor matter, as no affair of secondary consider-
ation. Children are very apt to imbibe the views
of their parents; and if they see that educa-
tion is a prominent object with them, regulating
their thoughts, and to a considerable extent govern-
ing their movements, it will be sought after with
more enthusiasm, perseverance, and success.
IV. Moral education. As the moral principle
is higher in its nature, and vastly more important
in its influence, than the physical or intellectual,
by so much the more important is moral educa-
tion. It is in reference to moral education that
Solomon says, " Train up a child in the way he
should go, and when he is old he will not depart
from it."
1. Parents should teach their children self-
control. The early subjugation of the appetites
and passions to reason and conscience, is abso-
lutely essential to the harmonious development of
character. Children that are allowed to control
others, and not required to control themselves, will
grow up with a tyrannical, overbearing, and un-
FAMILY ETHICS.
309
governable disposition, which will cause them to
be an annoyance both to themselves and their
associates.
2. Parents should teach their children obedience
to authority. The duty of obedience should be
exacted, cost what it may. To effect this may often
require sternness and inflexible resolve on the
part of parents. Punishment may be required; if
so, it must be administered, not in anger, not in
a gust of passion, but in a mild, Christian spirit,
and with firmness. Let them be taught obedience
to family government, that they may readily submit
to the government of the school. Children obed-
ient to parents become good citizens, obedient
to the authority of government, • and, above all,
obedient to the law of God.
3. Self-reliance. It is the duty of the parent
to teach the child self-reliance. No man who relies
solely upon others can fulfil his destiny. He must
ever be imbecile, without strength of character,
and destitute of that decision which is an attribute
of moral greatness. To be truly great or good,
man must feel that he is responsible for his own
words and actions, and that, to a great extent, his
destiny is placed in his own hands.
4. Love of truth. Let the first lessons of child-
hood be lessons of truth. Let a love of truth be
310 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
imbibed in the nursery. Let deception, in every
form, be shunned as a deadly moral poison. Let.
parents, with anxious solicitude, impress the young
mind and heart with an inviolable regard for the;
truth. Children should be made to feel that lying
is cowardly, ignoble, base. Exhibit before them
the purity of truth, its godlike, noble nature, its
lofty birth, and its glorious rewards. Let false-
hood be punished sooner than almost any other
vice, and be ready to forgive a wrong when it is
candidly confessed. Encourage, both by precept
and example, a rigid adherence to truth, in all
circumstances.
5. Guard against evil associations. The parent
is the guardian of the child, and this fearfully
increases parental responsibility. To allow children
to associate with the low, vulgar, and vicious, is
a breach of parental obligation, which is always
followed by bad consequences. "Evil communi-
cations corrupt good manners," is a proverb that
every parent should remember, and govern his
conduct accordingly. Vice imparts to the moral
atmosphere a deadly infection, which infuses itself
into the susceptible nature of a child, and produces
worse than cancerous sores upon it.
6. Example. The force of example is next to
omnipotent with childhood. Children almost
FAMILY ETHICS.
311
instinctively follow the example of their parents.
"Drunken fathers have drunken sons," has been
reduced to a maxim in illustrating the power of
example. The influence of parents is felt in every
word they utter, in every act they perform. And
when children see them prudent in speech, shun-
ning all slanderous and profane words, mild in
their tempers, free from petulance, envy, and jeal-
ousy, exercising no uncharitableness, exhibiting no
covetousness, practicing no deception, and guilty
of no fraud: when they see their parents thus
blameless in life, an influence in favor of virtue
almost irresistible comes over them. There is a
charm in a pure life more powerful than is found in
the blandishments of wealth, the fascinations of
eloquence, or the glory of warlike deeds. Let this
sacred influence be exerted upon the buddings of
childhood, and the flower will expand in beauty,
and the richest .fruits will reward the faith and
energy of the good.
7. Religion. Our duty to fear and love God
should be impressed most deeply upon the youthful
mind. Christianity is an ornament of grace and a
crown of glory to the young. " Jesus said, Suffer
little children to come unto me." "He took them
up in his arms, and blessed them." Children cannot
begin to love God too soon. Parents should teach
312 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
tlieir children that religion is not ascetic, that it
mars no innocent pleasure, that it offends no refined
taste, that it never behaves unseemly. The pre-
cious truths of the Bible, the inimitable parables
of the Great Teacher, the love of God to a lost
world, the passion and death of Jesus, will so
attract and impress the mind of the young, as to
cause them to make the Bible their book, and its
God their God. Children should be required to be
present at family prayer, to be constant in their
attendance upon church, to remember the Sabbath
day to keep it holy, and ever to treat with respect,
the ordinances of God.
SECTION IX.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND GOVERNMENT — UNITY IMPARTIALITY —
UNIFORMITY—EFFICIENCY—REASONABLENESS.
The authority of the parents varies with the ages
of the children. In infancy this authority is neces-
sarily absolute. From infancy to manhood it gra-
dually diminishes, until at the latter period it
entirely ceases. Usually the state determines at
what time the control of parents shall cease. It is
a duty of parents to exercise this authority for the
good of the children, with direct reference to the
good of the state and the glory of God.
FAMILY ETHICS.
313
1. Parental government should be a unit. The
want of unity in family government is the destruc-
tion of authority, and the ruin of domestic' tran-
quillity. When the parents are divided, when one
is indulgent and the other rigid, when one exacts
and the other indulges, when one punishes and the
other pities, then parental dignity succumbs, and
the bonds of family government are broken asunder.
Sometimes there may be an honest difference of
opinion between the husband and wife; then this
should be settled privately, and the child should
never know that such difference existed. The
children must feel that their parents are one. JSTo
complaint must he uttered to one concerning the
other. They must feel that father approves what
mother does, and that mother unites all her influ-
ence to that of father in sustaining parental an-
thority.
2. Parental government should be impartial.
When children feel that more is exacted of one
than of another, that one is made a servant, and
another is set up as a gentleman, it produces envy
and jealousy among them; their duties become irk-
some, they lose their love and respect for their
parents, and the parental authority becomes a yoke
too grievous to be borne.
3. It should be uniform. A want of uniformity
14
314 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
in the exercise of authority is always attended with
evil consequences. It offers temptations to violate
authority, so strong as to be almost irresistible.
Flattery, coaxing, and caresses, followed by out-
bursts of passion, by harsh words and harsher
blows, and these, again, succeeded by over-indul-
gence to every wayward disposition, must ever fail
to secure either obedience or respect.
4. It should be efficient. As we have before said,
children should be made to obey. Obedience must
be exacted, authority must be sustained. The rod
must be used when insubordination is manifested.
For this we have the authority of God. Children
who have been brought to submission by the use
of the rod, have acknowledged in after-years that
benefit resulted from its use ; while those who
have been allowed to go on in their own way, have
indulged unavailing regrets that obedience had not
been enforced by its use. Chastisement should
never be inflicted in anger, but always in sorrow,
with affection.
5. It should be reasonable. God's government
is preeminently a government of reason. He says
to his children, " Come now, and let us reason
together." Thus should parents reason with their
children. Their experience, their superior know-
ledge and accumulated wisdom, should be used for
FAMILY ETHICS.
315
the benefit of their children. Parents should be glad
to give to the young their advice. "When the child-
ren are about to leave the parental roof, and engage
in whatever vocation they may have selected,
then is wise counsel greatly needed. Who can
be expected to give this counsel so well as the
parents ?
SECTION X.
PARENTAL OBLIGATIONS: HOW VIOLATED — BY IDLENESS—NEGLECT—
FLATTERY—CRUELTY—BAD EXAMPLES.
From the principles we have laid down, some
useful deductions may be made in reference to the
violation of parental duty.
1. Idleness. Those parents who neglect 'to pro-
vide for their own households are worse than infi-
dels. In this country it must be sheer laziness
which will prevent a decent maintenance of a
family, however large. Idle parents who suffer
their children to go in rags, miserably fed, and with
no home comforts, deserve the execration of the
state, and the contempt of all good citizens.
2. Neglect. When parents fail to procure good
teachers, they are guilty concerning their children.
When, for the sake of acquiring wealth, or for the
sake of political preferment, they spend all their
316 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
time away from their children, they are sowing
to the wind, and may expect to reap the whirl-
wind. "When the mother is at the hall or theatre,
instead of in the nursery, she involves herself in
serious guilt, and brings frightful curses upon her
offspring. Fashionable, pleasure-loving parents are
planting thorns which will pierce them in old age
with the deepest anguish.
3. Flattery. When parents pamper pride and
ambition, when they make their children believe
that they are superior to others, and thus unfit
. ^ ^ . *
them for the positions which they are capable of
filling, great guilt is incurred, and great evil is
produced. While children are to be taught self-
reliance, they are equally to be taught humility.
4. Cruelty. So strong is the natural love of
parents for their offspring, that we seldom have to
complain of cruelty. It violates the very constitu-
tional principles of human and even of brute
nature; and a parent becomes a demon before he
can bring himself to inflict cruelty upou his unof-
fending, or even upon his erring child.
5. Bad examples. When parents teach morality
and fail to exemplify it, the consequences must be
pernicious. The guilt incurred by setting a bad
example before children is enormous. We cannot
condemn in too strong language the utterance of
FAMILY ETHICS.
317
profane or vulgar words, the expression of any
loose opinions on morality, the exhibition of any
infidel principles, of any licentious conduct, or the
indulgence in any inordinate appetite or passion on
the part of parents, and especially when such ex-
ample may contaminate their offspring.
SECTION XI.
FILIAL DUTIES : OBEDIENCE—AFFECTION—REVERENCE—CARE IN SICK-
NESS—BEAUTY OF FILIAL PIETY.
The duties of parents and children are to a great
extent reciprocal. If children have claims upon
their parents, their parents have corresponding
rights in reference to their children. These rights
and obligations vary, of course, with the conditions
and ages of their children.
In order that the numerous duties connected
with the filial relation may be discharged, God has
wisely endowed children with filial affection. It is
natural and universal. It may not he so strong
as parental affection, hut it is sufficiently strong for
all the duties that devolve upon the child. Its
implantation indicates the duties which the Divine
Being requires of children. Its strength and con-
tinuanee during life, unless perverted by bad prin-
ciples, indicate that filial duties do not cease until
death dissolves the sacred relation.
318 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
God has not left us without clear indications of
filial duty in his written word. Ajid even a failure
on the part of parents to do their duty does not
exonerate the child.
1. Obedience. " Children, obey your parents in
the Lord; for this is right." Eph. vi. 1. " Cursed
be he that setteth light by his father or his mother.
And all the people shall say, Amen." Deut. xxvii.
15. Such are the teachings of inspiration on the
subject of filial obedience ; and they are sanctioned
by the universal sentiment of mankind. These scrip-
tures involve, 1st. A positive command to filial obe-
dience. 2d. They contain a fearful curse in case of
disobedience.
This obedience to parents should be cheerful. A
bright face, an active limb, a cheerful smile should
accompany the act of obeying a parent's commands.
It should be cordial. An outward act of obedience
performed grudgingly loses all its moral beauty
and effect.
The question arises here, whether children are
bound to obey parents when it would be a violation
of the command of God for them to do so. "We
answer, it can never be right to do wrong. If a
parent require the child to lie or steal, the command
should not be obeyed. God's authority is far above
that of parents, and no parental command can
FAMILY ETHICS.
319
justify disobedience to God. This principle is clear.
But suppose the child is forbidden by the parents to
become a member of a certain Christian commu-
nion. The child is not prohibited from any of the
duties enjoined upon the Christian: he is allowed
to read his Bible, to engage in his religions devo-
tions, to remember the Sabbath, but is forbidden to
unite with a particular denomination. In such cir-
cumstances it is much more difficult to decide what
is duty. The child must examine the whole ques-
tion calmly and sincerely, must consider that his
minority will soon terminate, must carefully con-
sider the nature and extent of filial obligation; and,
above all, he must inquire whether his duties to God
cannot be fulfilled otherwise than by becoming a
member of the religious denomination to which his
parents are opposed. If, after all this, he feels it to
be his duty to God to attach himself to a particular
branch of the Church, I cannot see but that he
should do as his conscience dictates. /. In this case,
however, the child is supposed to have attained con-
siderable maturity of intellect, and to have acted
without bias from any improper source.
2. Affection. The child is bound to render to the
parents a deep and constant affection. He should
cherish filial love. The parents may have foibles,
may even be stained with crime, but still the child
320 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
should render to them the homage of an abiding
attachment, a deep and holy affection. This should
know no abatement during life. Obedience must
cease at a certain period, and even during the period
when it is required it may be wrong to render it,
but it can never be wrong to love our parents. We
instinctively look with horror upon those who have
forgotten to love their parents. They are without
natural affection," and have made themselves
monsters in the estimation of the wise and
good.
3. Reverence. "Honor thy father and mother;
which is the first commandment with promise;
that it may be well with thee, and thou mayest live
long on the earth." This command, given upon
Sinai, was thus solemnly reenacted by apostolic
sanction. Parents may not have had the advan-
tages which by honest industry they have given their
children. They may be inferior, consequently, to
their children in learning and polish ; still they de-
serve honor. To cherish this respect, to preserve
it incorrupt, is one of the highest duties of filial
piety. Reverence to parents should be manifested
by assiduous attention to the infirmities of age, by
a sacred regard for their honor in all intercourse
with men of the world, and by the application of
such titles as will show that reverence to parents is
FAMILY ETHICS.
321
the prevailing sentiment, and that their honor is
dearer than the apple of an eye.
4. Care in sickness and old age. It is a duty
dictated by filial affection to take care of parents
when the period arrives that they are unable to take
care of themselves. Time has brought its changes:
the parents can no longer command, can no longer
counsel, can no longer support the child. The
duties are now reversed. The child must watch
the steps trembling with age, must guard those
whose infirmities are bearing them to the tomb,
must administer with the most earnest piety to their
every want, must wait around their dying-bed, catch
their last breath, give them an honorable Christian
burial, and ever treat with sacred respect the
memory of the departed.
How beautiful is filial piety! God requires it;
nature claims it; and the universal sentiment of
humanity approves it. Its words of tenderness, its
patient watchfulness, its earnest seeking to relieve
the infirmities of old age, excite our admiration.
Filial piety adorns the sky of our humanity as a
star of mild and radiant beauty, and sheds abroad a
lustre almost divine. May its pure light guide the
youth for whose benefit this book is written; and
may they all feel it their highest honor to love,
obey, and reverence their parents.
14*
322 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION XII.
FRATERNAL DUTIES: MUTUAL AFFECTION—REFERENCE OF DISPUTES TO
PARENTS SUBMISSION TO THE WILL OF PARENTS—MUTUAL RE-
SPECT—MUTUAL FORBEARANCE.
God has wisely ordered that in the same family,
around the same hearthstone, brothers and sisters
should he reared. The duties of this relation are,
1. Mutual affection. Children should love each
other. They should be taught to love, and by offices
of kindness, and by words of tenderness, they should
seek to be loved. "When we see a family of parents
and children, brothers and sisters, all loving and
beloved, it suggests to us the day of millennial
peace. But a family where all is dissension, where
no love prevails, where suspicion, envy, and jealousy
reign, where brother quarrels with brother, and
sister indulges hatred to sister, reminds us of
the deep depravity of our nature, and fills us with
apprehensions of the future.;/, Children of the same
family, nurtured at the same maternal bosom, in-
structed by the same parental lips, with the same
blood flowing in their veins, should never forget to
love each other. The same pulsation should beat
in every bosom, the same light should irradiate
every countenance, and the same spirit should
breathe in every word and action. This affection
FAMILY ETHICS.
323
should continue after they are dispersed from the
home circle, where heart responded to heart for
so many years. They may be separated by almost
immeasurable distances and for long periods, but
still their love is to know no abatement. By oc-
casional reunions, and by those silent missives of
aflection, endearing letters, they should feed the
flame of love.
2. In cases of difficulties arising in the family
circle, let the question be referred to the parents.
The disinterestedness of the parents must not be
doubted, and all parties must be willing to abide
the decision.
3. In the case of division of property, the chil-
dren should be willing to submit to parental de-
cision. Better have no patrimony, than to have
it at the expense of family peace and brotherly
affection. It is sad to see brothers at daggers'-
points over the ashes of their parents.
4. Mutual respect for each other's reputation.
Be careful to say nothing that can wound the
reputation of a brother or sister. Their reputa-
tion is yours: in proportion as they suffer, so
must you suffer. Let no word of cruelty ever
escape your lips; let no suspicion ever be hinted
that must, while it blasts others, recoil with a
deadly influence upon you.
324 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
5. Mutual forbearance. In every relation of life
this virtue is needed. Man is inclined to selfish-
ness; and when difficulties assail him, or apparent
injustice is done him, he has to call into action all
the forbearance of which he is capable. This virtue
is especially needed when there is a turbulent mem-
ber in the family. An ill-tempered sister, a fretful
brother, may be subdued by forbearance. A selfish
boy may so have his selfishness put to the blush, as
actually to become noble and generous.
SECTION XIII.
DUTIES OF TEACHERS AND PUPILS — TEACHERS SHOULD HAVE THOR-
OUGH QUALIFICATION PUNCTUALITY—ENERGY—DISCIPLINE—CARE
OF THE MORALS OF PUPILS—PUPILS SHOULD EXHIBIT OBEDIENCE—
ATTENTION—DOCILITY COURTEOUSNESS.
The duties of teachers and pupils are embraced
principally under the heads of parental and filial
duties; for the teacher is universally admitted to
be in loco parentis, (in the place of a parent.) But
these duties are modified by the peculiarities of
their relative positions.
DUTIES OF TEACHERS.
1. The teacher should seek a thorough qualifiea-
tion for his work. An ignorant man (or woman) is
not fit to teach. Let him with laborious industry
FAMILY ETHICS.
325
Beek to obtain all the intellectual qualifications
which may be necessary to impart instruction with
success. He should never appear before his class
without a thorough preparation on the lesson to be
recited. He may have given instruction on the
same subject hundreds of times, and yet he
should not trust himself without a special pre-
paration.
2. Punctuality. The teacher should be at his
post always in time. By example he should teach
his scholars to be punctual. A want of punctuality
on the part of the instructor will beget carelessness
on the part of the pupils. They will begin to hope
that he will not be at the school in time, and will
take license to absent themselves, or to postpone
preparation for reciting. If the teacher be in the
habit of delaying, of causing his pupils to wait
beyond the appointed hour, he will soon lose his
influence, and his school will be scattered.
3. Energy. Ho man can be successful as a
teacher without energy. His business is not to sit
and hear lessons. He must impart instruction,
communicate knowledge, develop thought, educate
the mind. Without energy of thought and action
he cannot discharge his various duties and fulfil his
noble mission. A lazy teacher is a, disgrace to the
profession.
826 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
4. He should govern well. His discipline should
be mild but firm. It should be impartial and con-
sistent. If at any time he should be called upon
by a stern sense of duty to use the rod, he should
not hesitate, but he should ever use it as an afflicted
parent, and not as a revengeful tyrant. He should
feel it his first duty to govern himself, and then
he will be apt to be successful in governing
others.
5. He should guard the morals of the young.
He should feel his deep responsibility on this sub-
ject, and should exert all his powers, by word and
deed, to improve the heart, to correct the vices, to
refine the manners, and to cultivate the virtues of
the young. He should feel that he is educating for
the state, for God, for eternity; and no duty should
be neglected which can make virtue attractive and
vice hateful. It will be proper for him to present
the attractions of the Bible, and to urge upon the
young the solemn duty that rests upon them to
read God's word. And in order that his teaching
here be successful, he should exemplify the highest
morality in his own conduct. Let him practice no
deception upon his pupils, or attempt through them
to practice deception upon their parents or the
public. "When he attempts to do this, his influence
as a moral man is gone.
FAMILY ETHICS.
327
DUTIES OE PUPILS.
Pupils are too apt to look upon their teachers as
enemies. Let their first duty be to regard them as
friends. Pupils should treat their teachers with
respect, and should ever entertain a sacred regard
for their feelings. They will thus be prepared to
render,
1. Obedience to the commands of the teacher.
No school can exist without government; and
pupils should feel it a duty to sustain the teacher in
all his efforts to secure good order. They should
discountenance all acts of insubordination and
rebellion.
2. Pupils should endeavor to understand the
instructions of their teacher. They should seek
to be thorough scholars. They should go over
nothing in a superficial manner. They should ever
remember, that if any thing deserves to be learned,
it deserves to be thoroughly learned.
3. Pupils should be docile. Docility is abso-
lutely essential to thorough learning. An impu-
dent, egotistical, self-inflated scholar, is never a
good scholar. He is an annoyance to the teacher,
and a serious injury to the school. He thinks he
knows more than the teacher, and is therefore fre-
quently interrupting the recitation, calling in ques-
tion the plainest truths, advancing the most absurd
328 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
opinions, and maintaining them with a dogged
stubbornness.
4. Courteousness. Pupils should he courteous
to the teacher, and polite to each other. Nothing
is more out of place than boorishness among pupils.
The law of kindness should control them. The
school should be a family, in which the teacher
should he a father, and the pupils brothers and
sisters. No envyings and jealousies should exist in
the school. Here should he found the strongest
attachments, unalloyed by selfishness, and unworn
by time. Here are no conflicting interests, s£nd
here peace and harmony should prevail.
duties oe superiors and inferiors. 329
CHAPTER VI.
duties of superiors and inferiors.
SECTION I.
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY—RESULTS—DIFFERENT RACES—NEGRO RACE, INFE-
RIORITY OF—CAUCASIAN RACE, SUPERIORITY OF.
The abolition of slavery renders tbe discussion
of that subject unnecessary.
Time alone can unfold tbe full results of a revo-
lution which has not only set free four millions of
human beings, but which has made of them citi-
zens, and has placed in their hands the right of suf-
frage. Negroes, who, when this work was first is-
sued, were in slavery, are to-day invested with all
the rights of citizenship, can serve on juries, and
can hold any judicial, legislative, or executive office
to which they may be chosen. Without a knowl-
edge of letters, and utterly ignorant of the great
principles of constitutional government, they may
occupy any station of profit or of trust, from that
of the Chief Magistrate of the nation to the hum-
blest office within the gift of the people.
330 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
Our duties to these people are no longer the du-
ties of masters to slaves. They are, however, the
duties of superiors to inferiors.
It is shown in the "Elements of Mental Philoso-
phy" that the nigritian, or negro race, is inferior
to all the other races of human beings. That this
race should have been so suddenly invested with
such power as is implied in the right to vote
and hold any office, is one of the most astounding
events of the present century. It is, however, an
event with which the moralist has to grapple, and
it involves practical duties which we must calmly
discuss and faithfully discharge.
The young men and the young women into
whose hands this treatise will fall, and for whose
benefit it is designed, are supposed to belong to the
Caucasian race—a race the superior in mind, in
civilization, and in moral development, not only to
the negro race, but to all other races of human
beings. The discussion, then, of this really deli-
cate and momentous subject will bring us to a
knowledge of the duties of superiors to inferiors.
The inferiority of those in reference to whom these
duties arise, being an inferiority of race, increases
the difficulty of our task.
This inferiority is so marked, and has continued
so long, that there is no mor,e prospect of its being
DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 331
removed than of the Ethiopian's changing his skin.
It is seen in the smaller size of the brain, in the
diminution of the facial angle, and in the less deli-
cate nervous organization of the body, and in all
the manifestations of mind as well. The negro has
raised no monument to his own genius. He has
done literally nothing in discovery or invention.
His star has never shone in the sky of literature,
and in the world of mind he has been almost a
blank. The great men of ancient times did not
arise from, nor belong to, that race. The great
men of modern times do not assimilate to the negro
race. In the past, as a race, they have never shown
themselves capable of high intellectual effort. If
the races were equal when the work of progress
began, they are not now equal, nor is it probable
they ever will be equal again. The advantage
already secured by the Caucasian race will be kept
until the ages shall cease.
SECTION II.
FIRST DUTY : TO PREVENT RELAPSE INTO BARBARISM—DANGER OF THIS—
DIFFICULTY OF PREVENTING—ANTAGONISM AROUSED—THE DUTY DOES
NOT INCLUDE SOCIAL EQUALITY—DANGER OF SOCIAL EQUALITY—INDI-
CATIONS OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE—SHOULD NOT FIGHT AGAINST GOD—
RACES MUST BE KEPT DISTINCT—AMALGAMATION.
The first great duty, then, devolving on the supe-
rior race, is to prevent, as far as possible, the infe-
rior from going back to barbarism.
382 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
This is the universal tendency of the negro race.
By contact with the white race the negro haa
attained all of civilization, acquired all of learning,
and enjoyed all of religious privilege or culture,
which have served to elevate him in the scale of
being, and save him from the degradation in which
he is found in his native Africa. Let slavery be
denounced as it may be, and remain abolished as it
is now, it presented to the world the negro in the
Southern States of America in every way improved
and advanced from his condition in Africa. Sep-
arate him from the white man, and he at once sinks
into all the ignorance and superstition of his ances-
tors. Let this be prevented by all the means in
the power of the superior race.
At this time, the difficulty of accomplishing this
work is very great. The asperities of war have
scarcely passed away. An influence has been
brought to bear upon the ignorant negro which
has roused within him an antagonism to the native
population of the Southern States. This antagon-
ism has to be overcome. We must bring tact, for-
bearance, benevolence, and perseverance, in order
to overcome it. It must be shown that the inter-
ests of the two races existing in the same territory
must be identical. Friendship must exist between
the races, or the greatest calamities will inevitably
DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 333
result. When the negro turns away from all the
friends of his youth, when he refuses to take advice
from those who are his real friends, when he deter-
mines to follow his own counsels, or to unite his
destinies with the low and depraved, his condition
will be a thousand-fold worse than it has ever been
on this continent. The more superstitious he be-
comes, the less he will be fitted to discharge the
duties of citizenship. The more rapid his descent
into barbarism, the more certain his ruin, and the
greater will be the calamity to the whole country.
Self-interest, patriotism, and love of the human race,
and, above all, our obligations to God, should cause
the putting forth of every power by which to arrest
the ruin of one race, and prevent a terrible calamity
to the other. By dependence on the superior race,
and consequently by the conservative influence
which that race may exert upon him, the negro
may be restrained from voudooism, preserved from
idolatry and barbarism, and saved to the country as
a useful element of society.
The duty here presented does not include social
equality. This is not demanded by the word of
God, and seems to be directly opposed by the law
of Nature. According to the Scriptures, a man has
a right to choose his own associates, provided he
takes care to avoid evil communications which cor-
334 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
rupt good manners. Social equality implies inter-
marriage, and must bring with it all the horrible
consequences of miscegenation. A mixed race is
now struggling for existence in Mexico. One while
it is a republic, and then an empire, but most
of all in a state of anarchy. It has no stability.
It evinces no progress. It exhibits no power of
self-government. Ho patriot, no Christian, can
desire to see this fair land in possession of such a
race. The relation, then, of the two races has
been determined by God himself. He has marked
the two races by distinctions—physical, intellectual,
and moral—so broad and deep, that any attempt to
efface them would be fighting against God. I can
conceive no greater calamity to the races, except
their extinction. I can conceive no greater disre-
gard of the indications of Divine Providence than
would be manifested by an attempt to annihilate
distinctions which have not resulted from the action
of human governments, from the influence of edu-
cation, from the progress of civilization, nor from
any act of man at all, but from the direct power of
God. Let there be no interference with Divine
Providence. Let the races be distinct, as God made
them. And as social equality must result in amal-
gamation, let social equality be avoided. It is not
merely a matter of taste, which, when refined, turns*
DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 335
away with disgust from such alliances, nor is it a
matter of present expediency, to be settled without
reference to the future, but it is a matter of deepest
moment to the progress of civilization, the stability
of government, and the interests of the country, for
all coming time. Man never interferes with God's
work, without marring it, as he makes it in his own
way, and for the accomplishment of his own great
purposes. Man cannot violate a law of Nature
without suffering the penalty. It has ever been so,
and it ever will be so as long as God is immutable.
It is not for man to change the order of God's uni-
verse, nor to attempt to fight against God. On the
other hand, let us bow meekly to the will of God,
whether that will be manifested in his word or in
his works, and we shall accomplish for ourselves
and for others all that duty demands, and all that
philanthropy requires.
SECTION III.
SECOND DUTY: EDUCATION—RESULTS OF IGNORANT LEGISLATION—EDUCA-
TION THE ONLY REMEDY—NO MIXED SCHOOLS.
I hold, in the second place, that it is the duty of
the superior race to see, as far as possible, to the
education of the inferior race. The more intelli-
gent the negro becomes, the better for him and the
better for the white man.
336 ELEMENT3 OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
The tendency of ignorant legislation is to retard
education. This has been one of the legitimate
and mournful results of committing the great inter-
ests of legislation to persons entirely unlettered.
It is an evil with which we have to contend* It
requires a profound philosophy to devise a remedy*
My own opinion is, that the results of ignorant and
corrupt legislation are already so marked that unh
versal public opinion must demand a change. In*
tellect must at last control. Virtue will rise* even
though depressed for ages. The remedy for the5
evils to which we have alluded is, to'educate the
inferior race up to a sense of the responsibilities of
citizenship. They must have schools. Teachers
must be employed. The work of instruction irtUSt
be committed to competent hands. It has been a
terrible calamity, that so sacred a right as that of
suffrage has been placed in such incompetent hands.
For this, the people that have suffered most have
been the least responsible. Had this right been
denied to all that were incompetent to read and
write, it would have been a great stimulus to
learning. Had no one been allowed to sit on a
jury, and try and decide cases involving all that
is dear to man on earth, then the evil would not
have been so unmixed. Ho one can conceive all
the injury that has resulted to education alone,
DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 837
much less to all the interests of the country, from
throwing such responsibilities upon persons inca-
pable of comprehending their nature, or of per-
forming the duties connected with relations of the
importance of which they were totally ignorant.
In View of these facts, it becomes a matter of the
highest importance to the preservation of all that
remains of material substance, of intellectual cul-
ture, of social refinement, or of civil or religious
liberty, to see to the education of the inferior race.
It will i>e for the political economist to devise the
means of education, and to determine the plan,
hfothing is more certain than that, unless these peo-
pie are educated, ruin is inevitable, speedy, and per-
manent. It is not only our duty to throw no impedi-
ment in the way of their being educated, but to do
all in our power to encourage education among
them.
This does not imply that the two races are to be
educated in the same schools. As I believe God
made the races distinct, and that man should not
attempt to destroy the distinction which Infinite
Wisdom has seen fit to make, so I believe that
schools, for the two races should be distinct. In-
stead of elevating the inferior race, mixed schools
would serve to degrade the superior.
15
838
ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION IV.
THIRD DUTY': THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION TO BE INCULCATED — PRESENT
DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME—SUNDAY-SCHOOLS.
The blessings of Christianity must be given and
secured to the inferior in all the fullness in which
they are enjoyed by the superior race. Their spir-
itual and eternal interests must be cared for. They
must continue to have preached to them the gospel
of the grace of God.
Great difficulties have always stood in, the way
of the Church. Truth has always had its conflicts.
The gospel has always met with opposition. A
race eager to hear the gospel from the lips of intel-
ligent white men is now no longer willing to hear
it from such lips. A docile race has become in-
tractable. And now, what is to be done? With
increased difficulties there must be increased effort.
We must have patience, forbearance, persistency.'
Duty must be above every other consideration. A
relapse into idolatry is greatly to be feared. It
must be prevented. Christianity is the only-anti-
dote. It is the leaven which is to leaven our entire
humanity, of which this race is a part. No preju-
dice of caste or color, no violence of passion, no
amount of opposition, should deter from the dis-
charge of duty, or prefent the offer of salvation to
DUTIES OF SUPEiaOFS AND INFEEIOES. SS9
a people who once received it so thankfully, and
rejoiced in it so greatly. Vital piety is in peril,
and eternal interests are at stake.
The Sunday-school will be a great auxiliary to
the day-school, and an invaluable assistance to the
pulpit. It begins its work of evangelism at the
right time. It impresses the heart with relig-
ious truth, while it is tender and impressible. It
should be employed with energy to mold character,
and save from vice, ignorance, and ruin. The man
or the woman that establishes the Sunday-school
for the refinement of the negro race is doing a work
for all time. It may require self-denial, and may
tax all the powers of endurance as well as evoke
all the energies, and demand the exercise of all the
active and passive virtues; but, cost what it may,
the work must be done, faithfully done, for the
honor of God and the good of man. The man
that can do this work, at this time, is little less than
a hero. He as much deserves a crown as any mar-
tyr that ever died for the faith.
SECTION V.
FOURTH DUTY: JUSTICE—NO INVASION OF RIGHTS—NO UNLAWFUL COM-
BINATIONS—HORRORS OF A WAR OF RACES—DANGER OF COLLISIONS—
FOWER OF PUBLIC OPINION.
Let justice be done this race. It has suffered
340 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
often from the grossest injustice. No advantage
must he taken in making or carrying out a con-
tract.
The right of every individual must be carefully
respected. These people must not be oppressed.
We must remember the past, and must not ignore
the means that have been employed to provoke
them to think evil, and to plot evil, against those
who formerly occupied a different relation to them.
No combination must be formed against them.
No violence must be allowed. Justice demands
that no fraud, no deception, be practiced, and no
outrages committed against a people that are really
not accountable for the false position into which
they are sometimes thrown. They have rights, sa-
cred rights, which must not be invaded. Let them
enjoy their rights without intimidation and moles-
tation. Let the good and generous exert all their
influence to repress violence, however greatly such
violence may be sometimes provoked. While it is
the duty of every man to defend the right, it is the
disgrace of any man to defraud the ignorant, intim-
idate the cowardly, oppress the feeble, or injure the
unoffending.
A war of races would entail untold misery upon
a land still mourning from the calamities of war.
I know of to calamity that could befall this coun-
DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 341
try which could compare with that resulting from
a war of races. Acts of gross injustice, repeated
by either race toward the other, must end in a
strife, which would be the annihilation of one
race, and the source of incalculable misery to the
other.
When two races are compelled by circumstances
to live together, the danger of collision is always
imminent. This danger is increased when the
races are as far apart as the Caucasian and the
African. It may also be increased by a sudden
change in the condition of one race, as from
slavery to freedom. Such are the facts now exist-
ing among us. In such a state of things it is not
difficult to kindle a flame which cannot easily be
extinguished. Bad men may be found, whose
depravity may lead them to excite one race against
the other, to create disturbances at every public
gathering, and bring about collisions whenever pos-
sible. Such men are little less than fiends, and
deserve the execration of mankind. "The poison
of asps is under their lips; whose mouth is full of
cursing and bitterness; their feet are swift to shed
blood; destruction and misery are in their ways,
and the way of peace have they not known; there
is no fear of God before their eyes." From such
we must withdraw ourselves. A rigid adherence
342 ELEMENTS OE MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
to justice, which will allow the infraction of no,
rights, is absolutely essential to the preservation of
peace, to the cultivation of good morals, to- the,
growth and prosperity of the country, to the ele-
vation of the inferior race, and to the safety of
both. Wicked men must be restrained from,
kindling the worst passions of the human heart.
Lawless combinations, formed by either race, must,
be repressed..
Public opinion must be set against all violations
of law and order. Acts of injustice must meet,
with universal condemnation; justice must reign
and peace be preserved. I admit the difficulty of
the path which must be trodden, and am deeply
impressed with the purity and elevation of moral
character which must be cultivated, in order to the,
preservation of peaee, law, and order. Such prin-
ciples of truth and justice must be cultivated as
no temptation can allure, no bribe can corrupt,, and
no power can extirpate. In navigating a perilous
sea, we need a pilot of unusual skill, firmness, and
presence of mind. So in managing the affairs of
great communities, composed of every variety of
character and of different races of men, we need
every virtue that can command respect, win favor,
or impart power, to produce great results. Among
these virtues none shines with more luster, and
DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 343
none should be: cultivated with more assiduity, than
justice.
SECTION VI.
FIFTH DUTY: FORBEARANCE—GREAT NEED OF IT—A LOFTY VIRTUE.
To he patient in adversity is not so easy in
practice as it is beautiful in theory. It requires
more than courage; it demands fortitude to bear
injuries with equanimity, and insults with calm-
ness. In the state of things now existing, and des-
tined to continue for some time to come, there is
great need of forbearance. In the exercise of this
virtue, it will greatly assist us if we reflect that
many allowances are to be made for the conduct of
the inferior race. It must be remembered that the
negro has been a slave, or a barbarian, from time
immemorial; that he has but recently been invested
with all the rights of American citizenship; that
influences have been brought to bear upon him to;
make him believe that the superior race is inimical
to him, and desires nothing so much as to place
him again in slavery. In such circumstances, jt is
no marvel if he does many foolish and wicked
things. But is it not the part of a magnanimous
mind to exercise forbearance? For the sake of the
past, which brings up many pleasing recollections
of service rendered, and deep devotion exhibited,
344 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
and for the sake of the future, which must he dark
or bright, stormy or calm, as we direct, let there be
the greatest forbearance always exercised to the
inferior race.
It has been truly said: "Indeed, it is commonly
not difficult for men to be active, or even bravely
so; but when you come to the passive or reclin-
ing side of life, here they fail. To bear evil and
wrong; to forgive; to suffer no resentment for in-
jury; to be gentle when nature burns with a fierce
heat, and pride clamors for redress ; to restrain
envy; to bear defeat with a firm and peaceful
mind; not to be vexed or fretted by cares, hopes,
or petty injuries; to abide in contentment and
serenity of spirit when trouble and disappointment
come—these are conquests, alas, how difficult to
most of us!"
Just here, and just at this time, a rare combina-
tion of circumstances gives the opportunity, and
creates a very great demand, for the exercise of
endurance, for the cultivation of forbearance, and
for t^ie exhibition of all the passive virtues, whose
luster does not dazzle like the sun, but whose efful-
gence is like the mellow light of the evening star.
DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 345
SECTION VII.
SIXTH DUTY: LIBERALITY—GIVE EMPLOYMENT—MASTER AND SERVANT:
1. NO UNJUST EXACTIONS; 2. GOOD WAGES; 3. SPIRITUAL WELFARE—
NO INJURY TO MORALS.
The superior can well afford to be liberal to the
inferior.
From a sense of duty, employment should be
given to those in inferior position. All things
being equal, I should give the preference to the
negro as a farmer or as a domestic. I have always
doubted the correctness of that theory which pro-
poses to bring amongst us a third race. This will
only serve to increase our difficulties by increasing
our complications. The rich lands of the South
must not lie idle. Cotton is still in great demand.
Other products of the soil are constantly needed.
Let the landlord see that his fields do not lie idle.
The negro is probably the very best cultivator of
the soil. Let employment be given to him, and on
the most liberal terms.
The wisdom and patriotism of the owner of the
soil will enable him to adjust himself to the recent
change of relations, from that of master and slave
to that of master and servant.
As this latter relation will probably exist so long
as society shall continue, the duties connected with
i .1*
346 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
this relation may now be explained. I do not
know that it is desired by any person that slavery
should be reestablished. I know of no such desire,
unless it may exist in the bosoms of old family ser-
vants, who have most reluctantly been separated
from the guardianship of those who attended faith-
fully to all of their wants. Regrets have "been
sadly expressed by those who no longer could de-
pend upon the watchful care of others to supply all
their needs. There is certainly no general desire
to accomplish another revolution. We may then
regard it as permanent, that the relation of mas-
ter and slave will never more exist on this conti-
nent, and that the relation of master and servant
involves such duties as in the first edition of this
work were comprehended under the former rela-
tion,.
1. The master must not exact more from his ser-
vant than was embraced either in the letter or
spirit of the contract. This would create discon-
tent, and would render the relations between the
parties exceedingly unpleasant. Tasks that bear
too heavily upon the laborer have seldom resulted
in good to the capitalist, and have always done
harm to society. Such exactions beget suspicion,
arouse envy, extinguish sympathy, destroy mutual
confidence, give cause for complaint, tempt to dis-
DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 347
honesty, and should therefore he carefully avoided.
The imposition of merciless tasks even upon the
lower animals is wrong, and, of course, the sin is
increased in magnitude when the tasks are imposed
upon human beings.
2. The laborer is worthy of his hire. Let good
wages be paid, according to contract. The laborer
must live. He is entitled to enough to support
him while he lives, and his wages must not be
reduced below this standard. The conflict between
the capitalist and the laborer has been long-con-
tinued, and often violent. The capitalist desires
labor at the lowest price, while the laborer desires
the highest price. The law of supply and demand
will usually exercise a controlling influence upon
the wages of labor. "When the supply of labor is
abundant, wages will be low; but when there is a
lack of laborers, the competition among capitalists
will cause the wages to rise. These facts may not
be known to the laborer, or there may be a combi-
nation among capitalists to keep down the Avages
of labor, or some advantage may be sought by the
employer, by which to obtain labor at less than its
value. All this is wrong. Honesty requires us to
do unto others as we would have them do unto
us. Strict integrity forbids the employment of any
means in order to avoid obedience to this law. It
348 ELEMENTS OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
was regarded as a duty to the slave to give him for
his labor a comfortable habitation, an abundance
of good food, and suitable clothing, while he was in
health, to see that he was properly attended during
sickness, and to take care of him in old age. Sim-
pie labor ought at least to have this reward, if no
more.
3. The master should afford sufficient opportunity
to the servant to attend to his spiritual welfare.
The privilege of attending church should not be
denied. We have shown that the superior is al-
ways responsible to some extent for the moral cul-
ture of the inferior. Inferiors have precious souls,
whose interests must not be neglected by those
who must exert an influence over them for either
weal or woe. Let masters see to it that this influ-
ence is wielded for the good of the servant in this
life and in the life to come. In attending to the
spiritual welfare of the servant, the master must
set no bad example, must not corrupt the heart,
nor make vice appear less horrible than it really is.
The crime of seduction is at all times horrible, but
its turpitude is fearfully increased when it is com-
mitted against an inferior and a dependent. The
value of the soul is too great, and its eternal inter-
ests are too precious, to be disregarded by any who
may have it in their power to convert a sinner, from
DUTIES OP SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 349
the error of his way, and save a soul from death.
"He that winneth souls is wise, and they that turn
many to righteousness shall shine as the stars for-
ever and ever." Let not, then, the spiritual wel-
fare of the servant be neglected.
SECTION VIII.
DUTIES OP SERVANTS: FIDELITY — NO EYE-SERVICE — CHEERFULNESS—
POLITENESS—OBEDIENCE.
The duties of servants are easily understood, and
may therefore be explained in few words.
1. Servants should feel that their interests are
for the time identified with those of their employer.
"Whatever employed to do, they are bound to do as
for themselves. Hence the work should be done
with perfect fidelity, so as fully to promote the in-
terests of the employer.
2. Servants should be conscientious, and should
do the work assigned them as well without the su-
pervision of the master as with it. They must
serve, but not with eye-service as men-pleasers.
There should be no need of the eye of the master
to prompt them to zeal and fidelity.
3. The work should be done cheerfully. There
should be no murmuring. Having promised to do
the work, servants should perform it with an active
350 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
step and a cheerful heart. A murmuring, com-*
plaining servant is; an annoyance to every member
of the family. For such servants it will be diffi,
cult to secure a place, and still more difficult to
retain it.
4. The servant should be polite. Politeness is
always attractive; it is especially so in humble life.
Like charity, it never behaves itself unseemly. It
wins upon the feelings of the employer, and secures
a better position for the servant. It never comes
amiss, and is always appreciated by those whose
good opinion is worth deserving.
5. "Servants, obey in all things your masters ac-
cording to the flesh." "Be obedient to them that
are your masters according to the flesh, with fear
and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto
Christ ; with good will doing service, as to the
Lord, and not to man; knowing that whatsoever
good thing any man doeth, the same shall he re-
ceive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free."
"Exhort servants to be obedient unto their own
masters, and to please them well in all things; not
answering again, not purloining, but showing all
good fidelity, that they may adorn the doctrine of
God our Saviour in all things." Such is the teach-
ing of the Holy Scriptures on this subject. And aL
though these duties were enjoined upon those whose
DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 351
servitude was involuntary, they are not the less bind-
ing upon those who voluntarily contract to dot ser-
vice for another. The temporary character of the
service does, not lessen the obligation to fulfill the
duties with a conscience void of offense toward
God and man.
CONCLUSION.
Truly we have been led by a way we had not
known. During the years of study which has
conducted to conclusions that we believe to be
true, we have had constantly in view the good of
the young and rising generation. If obligation be
ultimate, and if duty be the great business of
moral beings, we cannot be far wrong in our view
of virtue, and we must be right in all that pertains
to practical morals. The satisfaction which we
have felt, as we have seen moral obligation cleared
of all obscurity, and shining like the path of the
just, has been of the highest order.
We have to urge all that may have traveled with
us along this path to cultivate every virtue, to be
strong in every noble principle, to neglect no op-
portunity of doing good, and to consecrate them-
selves to every good word and work. Never did
the country more need than at this time men of un-
352 ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
compromising integrity, of unfaltering courage, of
uncomplaining fortitude, and of sincere patriotism
and piety. It needs them, for the State and for the
Church. It needs them to arrest vice, to purify
politics, to give independence to the judiciary, to
exalt private worth, and to till places that have been
disgraced by ignorance and crime. It needsthem
to save the government from the ruin that threat-
ens, and to rescue liberty from its perils. It needs
men of wisdom to counsel, and of nerve to do or
die for truth and God. If the principles advocated
in this little volume shall tend to the development
of such men, then is our work not in vain.
Nor have we been less anxious as to the purity
and goodness of our women. "Women are needed
whose gentleness and truth, whose modesty and
intelligence, whose refinement and piety, shall
bring back to the land fraternity which has been
sacrificed, purity which has been corrupted, and
patriotism as unselfish as it shall be noble and true.
To bring out such characters is worthy the best
efforts of all that love their race. That such has
been my aim in all these pages I am sure. I may
therefore express the hope that many shall be
guided to truth by studying these principles, and
that by putting them in practice they may give the
highest evidence of their value. I close them with
o
DUTIES OF SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS. 353
a fervent prayer to God that the future of our
country may lack neither noble men nor pure
women, and that the present volume may con-
tribute something to increase the number of both.
THE END.
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