aati
In compliance with current
copyright law, Cornell University
Library produced this
replacement volume on paper
that meets the ANSI Standard
Z39.48-1992 to replace the
irreparably deteriorated original.

2004
 

 

 

 

CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

 

BEQUEST

OF

STEWART HENRY BURNHAM
1943

 

 

 

 
LANISVD YWM AHL

 
 

 

 

 

 

HISTORY

OF THE

 

EMBRACING A COMPLETE REVIEW OF

OUR RELATIONS WITH SPAIN

BY

HENRY WATTERSON
C340 — | 921)

lustrated

WITH NUMEROUS ORIGINAL ENGRAVINGS AND COLORED PLATES,
ACCURATELY PORTRAYING THE SCENES DESCRIBED

esks

H. J. SMITH PUBLISHING Co.
CHICAGO, ILL.

 

Bee Lae IN at eek pase MBBS TITHE Sa on wT IEE bey
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COPYRIGHT 1898
BY

C. B. DENAPLE
IN PIOUS HOMAGE

TO THE

Memory of the Heroic Dead
WHO FELL IN THE WAR WITH SPAIN, THIS
VOLUME IS INSCRIBED
TO
THEIR LIVING KINDRED
AS SOME RECOGNITION OF THE SACRIFICES MADE BY THEM
UPON THE

ALTARS OF FREEDOM AND HUMANITY.
ae

 
PREFACE

   

HE war between the United States and Spain was
like no other war of ancient or modern times.
Begun at once as a protest of civilization and as
_ a plea for humanity, it ended as an act of unpre-
- meditated national expansion; and, from first to
last, it abounded in surprises. In its inception,
the public men of America were generally opposed
to it, as they are apt to be opposed to everything
either very original or very decisive; and, if the
controlling members of the cabinet at Madrid favored it—as there
are some reasons for believing that they did—theirs was rather a
choice between two dangers, foreign and domestic, which menaced
them, than any deliberate preference for war. In Spain all popular
impulse seems to have been wanting. In the United States the
declaration of war was forced upon the President and the Congress
by the people.

Thus, the war with Spain was essentially a people’s war. The
destruction of the Maine in the harbor of Havana undoubtedly quick-
ened the pulse of the nation and hurried the action of its official
representatives. But, long before, the patience of public opinion in
the United States had been exhausted by Spanish misrule in Cuba.
The time was come to make an end of an intolerable situation. When
we consider not merely tbe oppression and corruption which had
marked a cruel despotism existing in sight of us, and exploiting itself
in spite of us, but its actual cost to us in the treaty obligation of
policing our coasts against the filibusters and in its consequent and
constant injury to our commerce, it seems a matter of wonder that
the day of reckoning should have been delayed so long.

(v)
vi PREFACE

From the coming of Cortes and Pizarro to the going of Weyler,
the flag of the Spaniard in the Western Hemisphere was the emblem
solely of rapine and pillage. The discovery of Columbus seemed to
act upon the Spanish imagination as a magic philter, distorting all
its evil propensities and filling it with desires impossible of fulfill-
ment. Under its spell the phantoms of the soothsayer and the fancies
of the poet took definite shape. With some it was the dream of
eternal life; with others a vision of untold riches; but, with all, the
perversion of nature. Cut loose from the moorings of common sense,
the standards of morality were lost. Incalculable rapacity begot incon-
ceivable brutality, and, as a result, Spain, from the first, became the
last of the great European powers. The demon of gold had taken
hold of the greatest and noblest of the nations by its very vitals. The .
craze for lucre, which so often makes of good men bad men, under
the most civilizing influences, had, under the most barbaric, diverted
the courageous and enlightened Spaniard from the love of poetry
and art to the love of money; and, after Columbus and his wondrous
New World, Cortes and Pizarro, and the other minor tyrants and
robbers, down to Weyler, came in a kind of geometric progression,
as simple matters of course.

The flag, as the saying is, had finally dropped upon the dominion
of the Spaniard in America. One after another, Spain had been de-
spoiled of her American possessions.. It was the moderation of the
Great Republic which saved her Cuba and Porto Rico so long. If
any other power except the United States had been concerned, she
would have lost them fifty years earlier.

In the nature of the case, there could be no spirit of territorial
aggrandizement disturbing the serenity of the people of the United
States. With the vast area of unoccupied land in the west of their
continent, the Americans took little, if any, account of Cuba, whilst
Porto Rico was undreamed of. They had no quarrel with Spain. On
the contrary, there was a sentimental regard for the Spaniard, an
honorable gratitude, as it were, manifested during our great Fair by
the honors paid the Duke of Veragua, and the cordial reception given
PREFACE vil

to the Infanta Eulalia; and the idea of going to war with a nation so
weak as we knew Spain to be, was repugnant to every brave and
honorable man. There were two circumstances that, among intelli-
gent Americans, weighed far more than the world will ever give us
credit even for conceiving. As no orator since Patrick Henry, not
excepting Gambetta, Sefior Castelar had delivered those principles of
civil liberty which are dear to all our hearts. That meant a great
deal. It alternately appealed to our republicanism and stirred our
enthusiastic admiration. Then there was set before our eyes the figure
of a noble woman, with her boy king, in spite of our republicanism,
appealing to our manhood. All in all, it cost us a great sacrifice of
sensibilities to go to war with Spain.

But what could we do? The situation was inexorable. It was
either ruthlessly to beat down, or be ignominiously humiliated. When
nations can do nothing they can fight, and fight we did. And so did
the Spaniard. But centuries of moral poison, percolating through the
veins of the body politic of Spain, had done their work. The obso-
lete Spaniard was no match for the alert and enterprising American.
The war was quickly over. It might not have been so quickly over
in the case of Germany and France; but its end would have been the
same. Spain has no reason to be ashamed of her part in it. Through-
out the United States, at least, the Spanish character stands higher
to-day than it did before the war, though the Spaniards have Admirals
Montejo and Cervera and General Toral to thank for the maintenance
of the national credit.

On our own side, the war has surely paid us back far more than
it cost us,at the same time that it has brought us many things not
contemplated in the beginning.

It annihilated sectional lines and solidified the Union. It pro-
claimed us a nation among the nations of the earth; no longer a
huddle of petty sovereignties held together by a rope of sand. It
dissipated at once and forever the notion that we are a race of mer-
cenary shopkeepers, worshipping rather the brand upon the dollar
than the eagle on the shield. It announced the arrival upon the
Vili PREFACE

scene of the world’s action of a power which would have to be reckoned
with by the older powers in determining the future of civilization.
It rescued us from the turbulent discussion of many misleading ques-
tions of domestic economy, uplifting and enlarging all our national
perspectives. Above all, it elevated, broadened, and vitalized the man-
hood of the rising generation of Americans. In the heroes who fell in
battle, as in those who survived to tell the tale of surpassing endurance
and valor, examples of priceless value were set before it; and in such
illustrations as Dewey and Hobson, Shafter and Wheeler, coming from
extremes of North and South, notice was served upon Christendom of
the existence of a homogeneous race of soldiers and sailors destined
to carry the flag of the Great Republic to lands perhaps as yet un-
known, and certainly able to hold it against all who might dispute
its right of way.

The United States engaged in the war with Spain under many
disadvantages. It was supposed that the Spanish navy outclassed our
navy. It was known that we had no organized army. Europe was
rife with evil prognostications. Although the continental nations offi-
cially declared their neutrality, the ruling elements, social and political,
were all against us. In spite of the millions of Germans among us,
the trend of German opinion as delivered by the newspapers of Berlin
and Frankfurt and K6éln was surprisingly hostile. Though France is
a Republic, and our ancient ally besides, the Parisian journals, reflect-
ing on the one hand the interests of the Spanish bondholders and on
the other hand the prejudices of polite society, —perhaps also goaded
by the avowed friendship of the English,— made haste to open upon
us a cross-fire of the most fantastic billingsgate. It was on all sides
freely predicted that the raw militia of America could not stand against
the trained veterans of Europe, and that the American navy, over-
matched in ships by the navy of Spain, and manned by a riff-raff of
foreign adventurers, would become the easy prey of such Admirals
as Cervera, Montejo, and Camara. There were admissions in some
quarters that the superior resources and power of the United States
would in the end prevail; but nothing was allowed the Yankees except
PREFACE 1x

grudgingly, and even then rendered in a tone of apology. In Spain
it was given out that the South, still mourning the loss of the Southern
Confederacy, was ripe for revolt, and that the landing of a Spanish
army somewhere on the Gulf coast was only necessary to draw to it
a host of rebels waiting for a chance to rise and eager for revenge.

The war dispelled all these illusions. The United States went into
it even in its own eyes something of a riddle as to the matter of martial
equipment, resources, and capacity. It came out of it a conceded, self-
confident world power. The victories of Dewey and Sampson settled
forever all question as to the navy. The rapid mobilization of the
army proved the wonder of mankind; and, although the army had
less opportunity than the navy to show the stuff it was made of, the
operations in front of Santiago were sufficient to establish its claim
to the respect of the military establishments of Europe and to earn
for it and its leaders the admiration of their own countrymen. From
Miles, the able and gallant commanding General, to the humblest sub-
altern, the exhibitions of intrepidity.and fortitude and skill were never
exceeded by any band of officers or any body of troops of which the
history of warfare gives us an account.

The purpose of the pages which follow is to tell the story of these
soldiers and these sailors as they themselves revealed it from time
to time during the war with Spain. No notice is here taken of any
controversy incident to or growing out of the events attempted to be
impartially set forth. This history has nought to do with disputing
or disputed claims among ambitious rivals. As Admiral Schley ob-
served, there was “glory enough to go round.” Having no other aim
than to render to Cesar the things which are Cesar’s, its author has
sought to make a simple, lucid narrative of an episode, short indeed,
but not too short to glorify Amerigan arts and arms. Although written
concurrently with the progress of the events it describes, sufficient time
was allowed in every instance to ascertain from official and other.
sources the actual facts of every transaction; and it is believed that
it has omitted no essential feature of the operations on land and sea,
or failed to give to each of them its fair proportion. An abundance
= PREFACE

rather than a scarcity of material for its composition, ready-made by
the newspaper correspondents, to whom the authovr’s first and chief
acknowledgments are due, has attended its progress toward comple-
tion; and his would be but an imperfect account if it failed to mark
the daring, energy, and skill, along with entire fidelity to justice and
truth, which characterized the part played by these important and
inseparable companions of the soldiers in the field. Assuredly nothing
has been set down either in wanton praise or blame, so that the whole
is submitted to the public with the confident belief that it embraces
what, indeed, it purports to be, a complete and authentic account of
the war between the United States and Spain.

Henry WaArtTERSON.
CouRIER-JOURNAL, LOUISVILLE.

October 1, 1898.

 
CONTENTS

CHAPTER I.

THE CAUSES AND THE DECLARATION OF WAR.

Strained Relations between the United States and Spain—The Visit of Courtesy

by the American Battleship to Havana—Destruction of the Maine in
Havana Harbor—Indignation and Excitement among the People—The
Naval Board of Investigation—Its Report—Senator Proctor’s Speech and
Its Effect upon the Country— Messages of the President and Action of
Congress— The American Ultimatum— Minister Barnabe Demands His
Passports— Spain Refuses to Receive the Ultimatum and Sends His Pass-
ports to Minister Woodford —The Queen-Regent before the Cortes—A
Simultaneous Appeal to Arms—The Final Declaration of War .

CHAPTER II.

THE MAKING OF ARMIES AND NAVIES.

First ‘ets of the War and a Comparison of the Combatants —The Organization of

Extent

the United States Army and the Strengthening of the Navy—The Presi-
dent Calls for 125,000 Volunteers, and the Country Answers with 750,000
Applications for Enlistment— Appointment of the General Staff, Including
ex-Federals and ex-Confederates—Outburst of Patriotic Rivalry and Fra-
ternization between North and South— Unification of National Sentiment

CHAPTER III.
DEWEY AND MANILA.

and Condition of the Spanish Colonies of the Philippines—The Naval
Problems of Offense and Defense in the Pacific—The Movements Preced-
ing the Battle of Manila—Extraordinary Appeal of the Governor-General
to Resist the Americans—Commodore Dewey Sails to “Find the Spaniard
and Smash Him»—The Extraordinary Battle in Manila Bay in which the
Spaniards Were Annihilated by Commodore Dewey’s Squadron—The Effect
of the Victory upon the United States, Spain, and All Europe .

(xi)

PAGES

23-66

81-123
xii CONTENTS

CHAPTER IV.

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.

PAGES
First Work of Admiral Sampson’s Squadron — How the Blockade of Havana Was
Received by the Two Warring Nations and in Havana—The Problems of
War in the Atlantic—Spanish Spies Discovered and Captured—The Bom-
bardment of Matanzas—“The Matanzas Mule” Enters into History —The
American Baptism of Blood at Cardenas—Death of Ensign Bagley and

the Repulse of the Winslow—Unimportant Events of the War .. . . 124-151

CHAPTER V.
“BOTTLING UP” CERVERA’S SQUADRON.
f

The Chase of the Spanish Squadron of Admiral Cervera—Its Mysterious Dis-
appearance and Final Appearance in the West Indies—The Battleship
Oregon’s Wonderful Race of 15,000 Miles against Time—A War Ship’s Un-
paralleled Record of Endurance and Condition—Cervera’s Fleet “Bottled
Up” in Santiago Harbor—The Heroic Deed of Lieutenant Hobson and
His Volunteer Crew—The Merrimac Sunk in the Harbor Entrance —“The
Cork in the Bottle» 2. 2. 2. 1 1 6 wwe ee ee ee ee ee. 152-180

CHAPTER VI.
THE INVASION OF CUBA.

Landing of the Marines at Caimanera—Five Days of Almost Sleepless Fighting
with Spanish Fighters— First of the Cubans—The Mauser Rifle in Action
—Landing of Shafter’s Division at Baiquiri, and of Wheeler’s at Siboney
—United States Soldiers and Their Torments while Marching—The
Enemy Vanishes in Retreat—First Use of the Dynamite Cruiser Vesuvius
in Warfare—Result of the Experiments . ........ . . . . 181-204

CHAPTER VII.
HEROES AT LAS GUASIMAS.

First Military Battle of the War—Story of the “Rough Riders” Volunteers, the
Officers and Men— With Battalions of the First and Tenth Cavalry They
Carry an Impregnable Position at Las Guasimas against Four Times Their
Force—The Gallantry of Volunteers and Regulars — First wea Deaths
in the Field —Humors and Tragedies under Fire . .. . ow @ BOBS vce
CONTENTS

CHAPTER VIII.
CLOSING IN ON SANTIAGO.

The Terrible Hardships of the Troops Moving from Baiquiri to Attack— Spaniards
Terrorize Citizens and Soldiers with Tales of “Yankee” Cruelty — Prepar-
ing the Line of Assault and Cutting Off the Enemy’s Supplies—The Feint
on Aguadores and Santiago by the American Fleet and Duffield’s re
—Two Days of Murderous Gun-Firing eth tee, Weel I

CHAPTER IX.
SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY.

The Terrible Struggles Outside of Santiago— Wheeler and Kent’s Advance from
El Pozo Up the Valley to San Juan—“The Bloody Corner” and the
Heroism of Our Troops—Hawkins’s and Roosevelt’s Charges on the Hill
—Chaffee’s Great Fight at El Caney and the Dearly Bought ee
Scenes and Incidents of the Battles—A Foreign Opinion ‘

CHAPTER xX.
DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA’S SQUADRON.

The Dash of the Spanish Ships Out of the Harbor of Santiago—The Greatest Naval
Duel in the World’s History —All the Enemy’s Ships and Destroyers but
One Annihilated by Our War Ships in Fifty-five Minutes— The Long Chase
after the Cristobal Colon, and Her Capture after a Race of Fifty Miles—
The Glory of the Brooklyn, Oregon, Texas, and Giloucester Be ae

CHAPTER XI.
DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA’S SQUADRON (Continued).

Dreadful Scenes Attending the Rescue of Survivors and the Capture of Prisoners
—Incidents of the Surrender of Admiral Cervera and Captain Eulate —
Spanish Ships Reduced to Worthless Hulks by the Fury of Our Attack
—Treacherous Destruction of the Colon— Anecdotes of the Engagement —
Contrast of American and Spanish Men and Methods—The Effect of the
Vietory and the Credit of It BABS amie eS Vay Ree ee

CHAPTER XII.
DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA’S SQUADRON (Concluded ).

Spanish Story of the Battle as Told by Surviving Officers—It Does Not Differ in
Substance from the American Account—Incidents and Anecdotes of the
Engagement— How the Battle Looked to Observers—To Whom Does the
Credit of Victory Belong? 6k Se,

xlil

PAGES

+ 218-227

« 228-251

. 252-276

. 277-292

. 293-308
xiv

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XIII.

PROGRESS OF OUR ARMY AND NAVY.

General Shafter Surrounds Santiago and Demands Its Surrender—Singular Prog-

ress of the Negotiations— Exchange of Hobson and His Men, an Exciting
Incident—The St. Paul Sinks the Torpedo Boat Terror at San Juan—
The Texas Sinks the Reina Mercedes in Santiago Harbor— Alfonso XII.
Sunk at Mariel—The Ludicrous Voyage of Admiral Camara’s Fleet
through the Suez Canal and Back Again St oe Se By hcle, Grate

CHAPTER XIV.

THE DEATH GRIP AT SANTIAGO.

An Ominous Pause on Both Sides—The Spanish Reénforcements of Pestilence and

Famine—The Sinister Meaning and History of “the Honor of Spain»—
Twenty Thousand Starving Refugees to Support, and Yellow Fever to
Combat—Spanish Troops Loot Their Own City with Atrocity —Shafter
Sends a Sharp Demand to Toral— Personal Conference between the Gen-
erals —“It’s a D—d Poor Sort of Honor that Makes Soldiers Die for Noth-
ing”—Toral Agrees to Surrender the City — Wild nee in the Ameri-
can Army £F. Von, Sasser te as tee JS ek Use, mea dense IB

CHAPTER XV.

SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.

Toral Makes a Despairing Effort to Fight off Surrender by Delay—The Terms

Enforced with Courteous Firmness—Occupation of tHe City on Sunday,
July 17, with Impressive Ceremonial and amidst Wild Enthusiasm by Our
Troops and the Population—Fraternization of Spanish and American
Troops— Dreadful Conditions Prevailing in Santiago—Sickness, Infection,
Hunger, Anarchy— Work of the Authorities and the Red Cross— Sketches
of Generals Shafter and Wheeler, Leaders of Our Army

CHAPTER XVI.

GARCIA’S DISAFFECTION AND MANZANILLO.

Disappointment of the Cuban Allies when Santiago Was Not Given into Their Con-

trol— The Story of the Correspondence between Generals Garcia and Shafter,
and the Withdrawal of Cuban Forces into the Interior—Character of the
Services Rendered by the Cubans in the Santiago Campaign—Our War
Ships under Todd Sink and Destroy Five Spanish Gunboats and Three
Transports, Killing a Hundred of the ono —Not a Man or oar of the
Americans Hurt - a % ‘

PAGES

. 309-322

. 823-338

- 339-368

- 369-376
CONTENTS XV

CHAPTER XVII."

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FALL OF SANTIAGO.
PAGES
Extraordinary Test of the Fighting Qualities of Americans before the Surrender —
The Endurance, Courage, and Individual Skill of Our Troops Amazed All
Foreign Military Observers— Opinions Expressed by Some of the Experts—
The Storming of San Juan Considered an Impossibility in Advance — What
the Naval Engagements Demonstrated to the World—Effect of the Com-
bined Operations— Greater in Significance than Any Battle of the Century. 377-387

CHAPTER XVIII.
DEFEAT OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

Effect of England’s Attitude on Continental Europe—New Cuban Policy and Its
Complete Reversal in Our Favor—The Concert of Europe Accepted It as
Proof of an Alliance—Character of the Governmental Diplomacies and the
Methods of Their Procedure— Action and Attitude of All the Nations when
War Began—Effect of Dewey’s Victory at Manila . ..... . . . 888-400

CHAPTER XIX.
THE PHILIPPINES QUESTION.

Dewey’s Victory and Its Effect upon the Eastern Question in International Poli-
tics— Lord Salisbury’s Speech on Living and Dead Nations—Explanation
of the Eastern Question Developed since the Chinese-Japanese War—Mr.
Chamberlain’s Startling Speech Suggesting an Anglo-American Alliance on
the Lines of Common Purposes—The Sensation Caused in the World by
His Unexpected Freedom of Speech, against All Cabinet Precedents . 401-412

CHAPTER XX.
“ IMPERIALISM » — “EXPANSION ” — ANNEXATION.

The Uneasiness in the United States Caused by the Movement towards “Imperial-
ism” and “Expansion”—The Course of the Discussion and a Comparison
with European Dread of Our Appearance in Asiatic Waters—The Imme-
diate Extent of New Measures Proposed—The Nicaragua Canal, Hawaii,
Naval and Army Enlargement—The Annexation of Hawaii, and the His-
tory of the Measure in Congress—The Capture of Guam in the Ladrone
Islands—A Comedy of War ..........., ‘ . + 4138-429
Xvi

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXI.

ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE.

Remarkable Reversal of the Old Attitude of Aversion between Americans and

Britons—Continuation of the Response to Mr. Chamberlain’s Speech—
Utterances at the Anglo-American Dinner in London—Party Leaders on
Both Sides in Parliament Commit Themselves to Friendship and Union
with United States Interests in a Memorable Debate —Remarkable Fourth
of July Celebration in London

CHAPTER XXII.

ATTITUDE OF FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

The Curious Relations between France and the United States—The Desperate

Causes of Her Unfriendly Attitude towards Us at the Outbreak of War—
Mistakes and Follies of the Parisian Press and Parisian Populace— Absurd
Comparisons of Spain and America—Reprisals Proposed in the United
States that Caused a Swift Change of Attitude—Russia and Her Connec-~-
tion with the Anti-American Concert— A Negative Act Atoned for by Long,
Unbroken Friendship and Fresh Manifestations of Good Feeling

CHAPTER XXIII.

DEWEY AND THE GERMANS.

Very Unfriendly and Hostile Opposition to America by the Emperor and the

Agrarian Party —The Commercial Antagonisms that Produced It— Admiral
Dewey Receives an Apology from Prince Henry, the Emperor’s Brother—
The Irritating Interference of the German War Ships at Manila— Dewey
Demands that Admiral von Diederichs Shall Answer Whether He Wants
Peace or War—The Germans “Called Down” at Last—Diplomatic Expla-
nations and Assurances— Change of Tone of the German Press

CHAPTER XXIV.

DEWEY, AGUINALDO, AND AUGUSTI.

The Remarkable Story of Young Aguinaldo, Leader of the Revolution in the

Philippines— Rising from a Servant to Be the Popular Idol, and Ambitious
of Imperial Power and Honors—Account of His Crafty Proceedings with
the Americans and Spaniards—Proclaims Himself President-General of the
Provisional Government of the Philippine Republic—Augusti and His In-
trigues and Deposition from Office—Dewey and His Careful Diplomacy
and Reserve—The Decline of Aguinaldo’s Power— General Merritt’s Arrival
and Preparations for Assault . . . 2... 1 ee ee ee

PAGES

. 480-438

. 439-452

- 453-465

466-489
CONTENTS XVii

CHAPTER XXvV.

THE INVASION OF PORTO RICO.

PAGES

Yellow and Malarial Fevers Invade the Camps of the United States Troops near

Santiago—A “Round Robin” and the Protest that Caused the Highters to

Be Brought Home—General Miles, with the Fifth Army Corps, Invades

Porto Rico, Landing at Guanica— Yauco and Ponce Welcome Our Soldiers

and Are Glad to Be in the United States—The Two Movements that Were

to Unite and Capture San Juan, the Capital—Interrupted by the Peace

Protocol, but Very Successfully under Way—General Miles Regards the
People Favorably —Significance of Porto Rico’s Ready Surrender . . . . 490-510

CHAPTER XXVI.
PEACE.

Spain at Last Begs for Terms upon which Peace May Be Reached—The United
States Demands the Freedom of Cuba, Cession of Porto Rico and All
Spanish Islands in the Western Hemisphere, One of the Ladrones, and
Reserves the Right to Decide what Shall Be Done with the Philippines—
Spain Requires Delay, of Course, but Accepts the Terms— Peace Protocol
Signed August 12— Manzanillo, ae Bombarded the Same ees and a
Skirmish in Porto Rico... . Se OLR ah Ue is . 511-521

CHAPTER XXVII.
ASSAULT AND CAPTURE OF MANILA.

Electricity Not Quick Enough to Stop Admiral Dewey from Taking Manila—
Military Advances upon the City Walls—Three Nights’ Battle before
Malate, in which Spaniards Are Repulsed with Heavy Losses, by Our
Volunteers— Dewey and Merritt Demand Its Surrender and Make a The-
atrical Assault on August 13, in Order to Appease the “Honor of Spain”

—The Authorities Anxious to Surrender— Escape of General Augusti on a
German Ship— Americans Occupy the City—The Articles of Capitulation
—The Glorious Record of Admiral Pee Reviewed — Death of Captain
Gridley of the Olympia . . ; i te tw Seow eG) Glee gy 0 BBEHBS

CHAPTER XXVIII.
FIGHTING LEADERS OF THE WAR.

Anecdotes of Dewey from Boyhood to Immortality at Manilla—The School-teacher
that Rawhided Him into Good Behavior— What the Sailors Thought of
Him on All Occasions— Sampson, the Most Unassuming Officer in the Serv-
ice—Schley and His Fighting Record —The Meeting He Had with a Ger-
man at Valparaiso—A Story of “Fighting Bob” Evans— American Gunners
and Sailors—Target Practice Makes Them Perfect ...... . . . 586-553
Xvilii

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXIX.

FIGHTING LEADERS OF THE ARMY.

The Almost Romantic Career of General Nelson A. Miles, Commanding the Army —

From a Lieutenant at Twenty-two to a Major-General at Twenty-five —
General Merritt’s Rapid Rise in the Cavalry Arm at the Same Time—The
Soldiers of the Army as Described by Foreigners—A Vivid Description of
the Charge at San Juan—The London Times’s Description of Our Men .

CHAPTER XXX.

INTERESTING FACTS ABOUT WAR.

The Naval Lessons of the War with Spain, as Summed Up by a Naval Expert — Value

of Armor and Guns, and the Danger of Wood—Torpedo Boats Proved to Be
of Much Less Efficiency than Expected— Above All, Only the Best of Men
Must Form Fighting Crews—Cost of Many Modern Wars in Treasure and
Blood —Indemnities Paid by the Conquered Nation ay

CHAPTER XXXI.

ASPECTS AND INCIDENTS.

The Work of War Correspondents and Reporters— Enormous Cost of the Service —

No War in History Ever so Promptly and Fully Described — Material for
Historians—Incidents and Anecdotes of Soldiers in the Camp, in Battle,
and in Hospitals—How Some Heroes Died and Others Suffered — Naval
Anecdotes — Acts of Great Bravery — Bowery Music at Guam — Aguinaldo’s
Fine Band — Spanish and American Sailors Contrasted

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

Appointment of Members by the United States and Spain for all Purposes— Prog-

ress of the Negotiations at Paris—Spanish Delay and Diplomatic Pretense
Result in Slow Progress— Vain Efforts and Hopes for Intervention by Ger-
many —The German Emperor Intrudes, but Withdraws Quickly —Terms of
the Treaty of Peace as Verbally Agreed Upon November 28, 1898—The
United States Receives Vast Colonial Territory Under the Terms—The
Policy of Expansion and the Future of the Republic . ‘ *

APPENDIX.

Report oF THE NavaL COMMANDERS: —

CoRRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ADMIRAL Sampson | AND Cine Tarn

Admiral Sampson’s Report .
Commodore Schley’s Report
Report of Captain Clark .
Report of Captain Evans

Letter or Captain Manan (Retired)
Letter OF THE SECRETARY OF THE Navy .

Ture Lona Cruise or THE “OrEGoN”

Tue Treaty oF PEAOE

Account Written by Her Chief Engineer

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ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

THe Wark CABINET . F ; : 5 Frontispiece
U.S. Barrtesnie “Marne,” Destroyep in Havana Harsor, Fresruary 15th, 1898 . 23
Cuartes D. Siespez, 1n Commanp or tHE “Maine” Waen Desrroyep In Havana
HARBOR : : r ‘ ‘ 5 ‘ : 27
CrentRAL Park, Eneuanp Horet, anp Tacon THEATRE, HAVANA 31
La Fuerza, Havana, Ergotep 1573 ‘ ‘ j 35
THe Tacon Market, Havana 89
Fruit Sranp in Havana 43
Native Fruit-SeL.uer, Havana . : : : 47
AVENUE OF Patms, Havana P 51
Buanoo, GovERNOR-GENERAL OF CUBA : ‘ 55
INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL’S PaLace, Havana . 59
VILLAGE SoENE IN Havana PROVINCE . 63
U.S. Armorrep Cruiser “New York” . 69
Native Houses In THE PHILIPPINES : . 83
GENERAL View or ManiLa 4 : ‘ 87
View or Maniia, SHowine CaTHEDRAL 91
U.S. Crutser “Otymptra ” : ‘ . ’ ‘ : 97
ApmIRAL Montgso, ComManpine SPANISH SQUADRON DesTROYED IN Manita Bay 101
Pasia River at Manina . . 105
Navat Battie or Maniza, May Ist, 1898 (in colors) 109
DEPARTURE OF UNITED States Troops ror MANILA 121
Havana, PANORAMA FROM AOROSS THE Bay 2 125
Morro Caste, COMMANDING THE Entrance to Havana Harzor & 129
Toms or CoLuMBUS IN THE CATHEDRAL, Havana 5 ‘ 2 : 133
Ex Tempiete, Havana 187
Tue Inpian Status IN THE PRADo, Havana é é 141
CoRRIDOR IN THE CasINo, Havana. 145
THE Prapo, From CentRat Park, Havana 149
ADMIRAL CERVERA, COMMANDING THE SpanisH SquapRonN DEstROYED NEAR SANTIAGO 153
Morro Castie, COMMANDING THE ENTRANCE To SANTIAGO HARBOR . 157
U.S. Barruesnip “Oregon” : 161
Navat Constructor RicHMonp P. Hopson, U.S. N. 169

2 (xix)
XxX ILLUSTRATIONS

SINKING oF THE “MERRIMAO” IN Fron? of THE EsTRELLA Batrery, SANTIAGO Harpor, CuBa

SHarrer’s Army EmMBarKING AT Port Tampa, FoR SANTIAGO

First Hoisting oF THE STARS AND STRIPES ON CuBAN Sort, June 10th, 1898 (in seletis

THe Niaut ATTack oN THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO :

Tue Cruiser “MarBLEHEAD” SHELLING SPANISH GUERRILLAS OUT OF UNDERGROWTH NEAR
GUANTANAMO . :

U.S. Dynamite Gungoat! “Vesuvius” :

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL THEODORE RoosEVELT, oF THE RoveH Ruipers, U.S. A.

AMERICAN TRENOHES SURROUNDING SANTIAGO '

THE SpanisH War VESSEL “Maria Teresa”

Nava Barrie or Santiago, Jury 38rd, 1898 (in colors)

Tue “Marra Teresa” as SHE APPEARED AFTER THE BATTLE NEAR SANTIAGO

Tue “ALMIRANTE OQuENDO” as SHE APPEARED AFTER THE BaTTLE NEAR SANTIAGO

U.S. Barruesure “Texas”

ALPHONSE XIII., Kine or Spain <

Tue Fuaasuip “New York” unDER Futi SPEED

U.S. Barriesnip “Towa” n

U. S. Armorep Cruiser “Brookiyn”

Market In SANTIAGO

Masor-GENERAL WILLIAM R, SHAFTER

GeneRAL TorAL’s SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO TO GENERAL SHAFTER ON JuLyY 17th, 1898
(in colors)

Srreet ScenE— SANTIAGO

Curistina STREET, Santiago

GENERAL JosEPH C. WHEELER

Rear-ADMIRAL GEorGE Dewey, U.S. N.

AuGust1, GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES

WEAVING IN THE PHILIPPINES

Suear Cane GRINDING IN THE PHILIPPINES

FortiFrication, San Juan, Porto Rico

Tue Puaza, San Juan, Porto Rico

Srreet Sogzne, San Juan, Porto Rico

Srreet Scene in Mayacuez, Porto Rico

CaLLe DE Suan, Mayacuez, Porto Rico

M. Jutes Campon, tHE Frencw MintsteER WuHo ConpucteD THE PEAor NEGOTIATIONS
FOR SPAIN

Rear-ApmiraL W. T. Sampson, U.S. N.

Rear-ApmiraL W.S. Scutey, U.S. N.

Masor-GEneRAL Netson A. MIvEs .

Masor-GeneRAL WesLey Merritt, ComMANpDING THE U. 8S. Forces at Manna

Masor-GEenErRAL FirzHvesn Ler

PEACE COMMISSION é 5 - ‘

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609
CHAPTER THE FIRST.

Tur CAusES AND THE DEcLARATION oF War.

STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SpaAIN— THE VISIT oF COURTESY BY
THE AMERICAN BaTrLe-SHip TO HavaNna—DestrucTION OF THE ‘‘MaAINE” IN HAVANA
HarsporR—INDIGNATION AND EXCITEMENT AMONG THE PropLE— THE Navat Boarp
oF INVESTIGATION—Irs REPoRT— SENATOR PRocTor’s SPEECH AND ITS EFFECT
UPON THE CouNnTRY — MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENT AND ACTION OF CON-
GRess— THE AMERICAN ULTIMATUM — MINISTER BARNABE DEMANDS
HIs PassPORTS—SPAIN REFUSES TO RECEIVE THE ULTIMATUM
AND SENDS HIS Passports TO MINISTER WooODFORD—

THE QUEEN-REGENT BEFORE THE CorTES —A
SIMULTANEOUS APPEAL TO ARMS — THE
Finatu DECLARATION OF WAR.

HE morning of Wednesday, the 16th of February, 1898, the
world was startled by the report that an American battle-
ship had been destroyed in the harbor of Ha- 1. pesrruc-
vana, This proved to be the Maine, an armored TION oF THE

cruiser of the second-class, but one of the staunchest Serer
afloat, and often described as “the pride of the navy of the United
States.” Under orders from Washington, the Maine had proceeded to
Havana upon “a visit of courtesy.” Of this visit it was officially
stated that it meant “simply the resumption of friendly naval rela-
tions with Spain,’ and was known and approved by the Spanish.
authorities. The Maine steamed out of Key West the evening of the
24th of January, and entered Havana harbor the morning of the 25th,
being saluted by all the forts and war vessels, and conducted to her
place of mooring by the regular pilot of the port. She was com-
manded by Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, an officer of experience, upon
whose discretion the President and the Secretary of the Navy placed
entire confidence. This confidence was fully vindicated by succeed-
ing events.

The relations between Spain and the United States had been much

disturbed by the state of affairs in Cuba. For the most part during
(21)
22, HISTORY OF THE

quite thirty years an insurrection, sporadic in character, and more or
less active, had been going on in the island. As a general thing,
and in a general way, the people of the United States sympathized
with those uprisings of the Cubans, and not infrequently filibustering
expeditions eluded the vigilance of our coast guards. Naturally the
Spaniards were kept in constant irritation, although it does not ap-
pear that there was any lack of energy or of good faith on the part
of the American Government in repressing overt manifestations of
friendship for the insurrectionists. Finally, however, public opinion
in the United States, grown more concentrated and intense, had forced
the McKinley administration to take official cognizance of Cuban affairs
and to open diplomatic negotiations with Madrid, looking to the ces-
sation of what had become a war of extermination, ruinous to Cuba
and injurious to American interests. As an incident to these negoti-
ations a private letter of the Spanish minister, De Lome, at Wash-
ington, had been intercepted by a secret agent of the Cuban Junta
and had not only found its way into the newspapers, but was placed
in possession of the State Department. This letter grossly reflected
upon the President of the United States. Sefior De Lome, having
acknowledged its genuineness, was promptly given his passports, and,
as promptly, a disavowal was demanded from the Spanish Govern-
ment, which, in spite of the strained relations then existing, the Cabi-
net at Madrid was not slow to make, first personally and then
officially, in very emphatic terms.

Thus far all seemed well. It was known that the administration
at Washington sincerely desired peace with Spain, and, as there could
not be two opinions touching the character of the De Lome letter and
the warrant of the Department of State in requiring a public apology,
there was no reason to apprehend that the affair, being amicably
closed, would, however disagreeable in itself, have any further conse-
quences. Hence it was that the destruction of the Maine, following
quickly upon the enforced exit of the Spanish minister, and the con-
troversy which had led up to that exit, not merely came to the
people of the United States like a flash of lightning out of a clear
868! ‘SI “G34 SYOSAVH YNVYAWH N! G3A081S30

SNIVW dIHSSILLVd “SN

 

 

 

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 25

sky, but fell upon a public opinion already sensitive to ill impres-
sions from that particular quarter, and prepared to believe almost
any evil of Spain and the Spaniards.

There was nothing in the circumstances attending the destruction
of the Maine calculated to diminish the prejudice thus preconceived.
On the contrary everything tended to increase it. In spite of Captain
Sigsbee’s plea for a suspension of judgment, the people, with few ex-
ceptions, leaped at the conclusion of treachery. This did not fix any
direct responsibility upon the Spanish Government, but it did arraign
the Havana authorities, accusing them at the very least of gross neg-
lect of duty. As will be seen from the sequel there is reason to
suspect a yet greater crime and to trace this to agencies which could
not have existed outside the military establishment at Havana.

At exactly forty minutes after nine o’clock the evening of Tues-
day, the 15th day of February, 1898, without any warning, the
battleship Maine was blown out of the water and totally wrecked by
appliances the exact nature of which yet remains a mystery. All ac-
counts agree that there were two distinct explosions, followed as some
declare, by several additional detonations. ‘On that dreadful night,”
says Captain Sigsbee, “I had not retired. I was writing letters. I
find it impossible to describe the sound or shock, but the impression
remains of something awe-inspiring, terrifying, of noise—rending, vibra-
ting, all-pervading. There is nothing in the former experience of any
one on board to measure the explosion by. . . . After the first
great shock—TI cannot myself recall how many sharper detonations
I heard, not more than two or three—I knew my ship was gone.
In a structure like the Maine, the effects of such an explosion are
not for a moment in doubt. . . . I made my way through the
long passage in the dark, groping from side to side, to the hatchway
and thence to the poop, being among the earliest to reach that spot.
As soon as I recognized the officers, I ordered the high explosives
to be flooded, and then directed that the boats available be low-
ered to the rescue of the wounded or drowning. . . . Discipline
in a perfect measure prevailed. There was no more confusion than
26 HISTORY OF THE

a call to general quarters would produce—not as much. . . . I
soon saw, by the light of the flames, that all my officers and crew
left alive and on board surrounded me. I cannot form any idea of
the time, but it seemed five minutes from the moment I reached
the poop until I left, the last man it was possible to reach having
been saved. It must have been three-quarters of an hour or more,
however, from the amount of work done. . . . I remember the
officers and men worked together lowering the boats, and that the
gig took some time to lower. I did not notice the rain of débris
described by ,Lieutenant Blandin or others who were on deck at the
time of the first explosion, but I did observe the explosion of the
fixed ammunition, and wonder that more were not hurt thereby.

Without going beyond the limits of what was proper in the
harbor of a friendly Power, J always maintain precautions against
attack, and the quarter-watch was ordered to have ammunition for
the smaller guns ready so that in the improbable event of an attack
on the ship it would have been found ready. It was this ammuni-
tion which exploded as the heat reached it.”

Captain Sigsbee’s story is supplemented by many others, varying
in personal experience, but agreeing in all the essential features of
the catastrophe. The narrative of Lieutenant Blandin is especially
graphic. “I was on the watch,” the Lieutenant tells us, “and when
the men had been piped below I looked down the main hatches and
over the side of the ship. Everything was absolutely normal. I
walked aft to the quarter-deck behind the rear turret, as is allowed
after 8 o’clock in the evening, and sat down on the port side, where
IT remained for a few minutes. Then, for some reason I cannot ex-
plain to myself, I moved to the starboard side and sat down there.
I was feeling a bit glum, and, in fact, was so quiet that Lieutenant
Hood came up and asked laughingly if I was asleep. I said: ‘No;
{ am on watch.’ . . . Scarcely had I spoken when there came a
dull, sullen roar. Then succeeded a sharp explosion, some say numer-
ous explosions. I remember only one. It seemed to me that the
sound issued from the port side forward. Then followed a perfect
 

CHARLES D. SIGSBEE

IN COMMANO OF THE MAINE WHEN DESTROYED IN HAVANA HARBOR
SPAN ISH-AMERICAN WAR 29

rain of missiles of all kinds, from huge pieces of cement to blocks of
wood, steel railings, fragments of gratings and all the débris that
would be detachable in an explosion. . . . I was struck on the
head by a piece of cement and knocked down, but not hurt, and got
to my feet in a moment. Lieutenant Hood had run to the poop and
I supposed, as I followed, he was dazed by the shock and about to
jump overboard. I hailed him and he answered that he had run to
help lower the boats. When I got there, though scarce a minute had
elapsed, I had to wade in water to my knees, and almost instantly
the quarter deck was awash. On the poop I found Captain Sigsbee,
as cool as if at a ball, and soon all the officers except Jenkins and
Merritt joined us. The poop was above water after the Maine set-
tled to the bottom. Captain Sigsbee, ordered the launch and barge
lowered and the officers and men, who by this time had assembled,
got the boats out and rescued a number in the water. Captain Sigs-
bee ordered Lieutenant Commander Wainwright forward to see the
extent of the damage and if anything could be done to rescue those
forward or to extinguish the flames which followed close upon the
explosion and burned fiercely as long as there was any combustible
above water to feed them. . . . Lieutenant Commander Wain-
wright on his return reported the total and awful character of the
calamity, and Captain Sigsbee gave the last sad order, ‘Abandon ship,’
to men overwhelmed with grief indeed, but calm and apparently un-
excited. . . . Meantime, four boats from the Spanish cruiser AJ-
jonso XII. arrived, to be followed soon by the two from the Ward
Line steamer City of Washington. The two boats lowered from the
City of Washington were found to be riddled with flying débris from
the Maine and unfit for use. Captain Sigsbee was the last man to
leave his vessel and left in his own gig.”

Whilst these dreadful scenes were passing upon the ill-fated battle-
ship, the city of Havana, not yet gone to bed, was roused as it had
never been roused before. The shock and flash, coming almost in-
stantaneously the one upon the other, admonished every one of some
dire calamity. Quickly the streets were filled with excited people.
30 HISTORY OF THE

Naturally, the first impression of these was that the rebels had
effected a successful descent and were entering through some break
they had made in the fortifications. The next was that Morro Castle
had been blown up. All doubt, however, was soon dispelled by the
direction from which the reverberation came, as well as the flames
that began to rise above the sinking and burning ship, lighting the
heavens far and near, and the eager multitude rushed en masse to the
water’s edge, where the character and extent of the tragedy was at
once apparent. “On Tuesday evening,” says an eye witness of the
explosion, “I strolled down to the river front for a breath of fresh air.
I was about two or three hundred yards from the Maine. The first inti-
mation I had of an explosion was a crunching sound. Then there came
a terrible roar, and immense pieces of débris flew skyward from the
Maine. Some of them must have been thrown at least three hundred
feet. It looked as though the whole inside of the ship had been blown
out. Many persons on the pier were nearly thrown from their feet by
the force of the explosion. The air became stifling with smoke.”

Another account contributed to the history of this tragic night
by a guest of the Grand Hotel, related how, sitting in front of that
hostelry, he was startled by a peculiar noise, as of the fall of some
gigantic edifice, followed by another and a much louder and more
distinct report. “We thought the whole city had been blown to
pieces,” says this authority. “Some said the insurgents were enter-
ing Havana. Others cried out that Morro Castle was blown up.”
Continuing his description of the panic which followed the explosion,
he said: “On the Prado is a large cab-stand. The minute after the
explosion was heard the cabmen cracked their whips and went rat-
tling over the cobblestones like crazy men. The fire department
turned out and bodies of cavalry and infantry rushed through the
streets. There was no sleep in Havana that night. The Spanish of-
ficials were quick to express their sympathy and acted very well as
a whole, but I think their expressions of regret lacked the warmth
which would have been characteristic of an American city, had such
a disaster occurred under similar circumstances.”
YNVAVH “JYLVSHL NOOVL ONV ‘TALOH GNVTONA ‘WYVd WWHLNIO

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 33

As has been stated the Ward Line steamer City of Washington was
moored near the battle-ship Maine the night of the disaster. One of
the passengers on board the City of Washington tells this story: “A
party of us,” says he, “were sitting in the cabin engaged in idle con-
versation. It was, as nearly as I can recall, between nine and ten
o'clock. Suddenly we were startled by a loud report. As by a single
impulse our little group rushed to the portholes and saw an im-
mense flash shoot up in the air with a horrible, grinding, hissing noise
that might have been an earthquake or a cyclone. Débris of all kinds
and a large number of bodies were thrown upward. It was at first
believed that the Maine was being fired upon, but afterward, as the
City of Washington was struck by what turned out to be falling débris
and she careened, it was thought she was being fired upon. A second
explosion took place, and following it we heard groans and cries of
‘Help,’ ‘Help us. The boats of the City of Washington and those
of the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII. were hurriedly launched and
went to the rescue. I went into one of the boats of the City of
Washington, and the scenes I witnesséd were heartrending beyond
description. . . . Two of the small boats on board the City of
Washington were stove in by the débris from the Maine. The
battle-ship sank even with the water in about thirty minutes after
the explosion. The City of Washington was converted into a hos-
pital. Many of the rescued men were brought on board almost nude,
and the passengers gave them clothing. The officers of the City of
Washington did all in their power to make the rescued men comfort-
able. . . . About half an hour after the explosion Consul-General
Lee, the Civil Governor of Havana, and Captain-General Blanco’s
chief of staff came on board. General Lee remained with us all
night.

When all was over, and the casualties were estimated, it was
found that 266 seamen, including two commissioned officers, had lost
their lives.

In the beginning there was some effort on the part of the Spanish
authorities at an ostentatious display of sympathy; but soon this gave
34 HISTORY OF THE

way to a kind of official indifference. Sad, indeed, was the funeral of
those of our brave men whose bodies were recovered from the wreck.
With every mark of honor they were laid to rest in the beautiful ceme-
tery of the Cuban capital. But there was a striking contrast between
the conduct of the native Cubans and the Spaniards on this mourn-
ful occasion. The Cuban women in the streets were almost all dressed
in mourning, while the Spanish women wore colors. “The only flags
I saw in the procession,” says one who witnessed the pageant, “were
two small ones about three by six inches.” This writer continues:
“T went aboard the Alfonso XII., and was received politely. The single
expression of regret I heard there was from an officer who complained
that the force of the Maine explosion had broken his toilet bottles.
There can be no mistaking the indifference of the Spaniards in Havana
over the loss of the war-ship and those aboard. On Thursday, while
driving to the cemetery with two American friends, I was assailed with
jeers and some one threw a large stone at our carriage. In fact, one
or two children yelled after us that they had blown up the ‘Ameri-
cano,’ and that they were glad of it. I did not hear one expression
of regret for the terrible loss of life from any Spaniard during the
time I was in Havana.”

There is ample testimony to the truth of this lack of general or
spontaneous feeling among the Spaniards, and some evidence that
the under-currents of popular sentiment were those of rejoicing.
Meanwhile, in spite of the complete annihilation of the battle-ship,
there remained in the harbor a ghastly and constant reminder of the
tragedy, in the heap of flame-charred wreckage that still showed above
the surface of the water. “The huge mast,” writes one who reached
the scene next day, “looks as if it had been thrown up from a subter-
ranean storehouse of fused cement, steel, wood, and iron. Further
aft, one military mast protrudes at a slight angle from the perpen-
dicular, while the poop, on which gathered the band, offers a resting
place for the workmen or divers. Of the predominant white which
marks our vessels not a vestige remains. In its place is the black-
ness of desolation and death.”
 

ces
Gamat

is
cg

 

LA FUERZA, HAVANA, ERECTED 1573
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 37

Such is, in brief, a résumé of the events of the night of Tuesday
the 15th of February, 1898, destined to play so momentous a part in
the record of the world’s progress. They constitute a fitting prelude
to the imperial theme of war which they foreshadowed, for nothing in
marine history during peaceful times, not even the famous catastrophe
to the Royal George in Spithead roadstead toward the close of the last
century, nor the Samoan disaster, nor the running down of the Vic-
toria by the Camperdown in the latter part of this,—though resulting in
greater loss of life,—can be brought into comparison, in point of
horror and of far-reaching consequences, with the destruction of the
Maine. a
The first intelligence received in the United States seemed to daze
the public mind. But the civil and naval authorities acted with rare
prudence. Immediately upon reaching shore, and with all the dread
reality of an untoward calamity cruelly palpable on every hand, Cap-
tain Sigsbee cabled the following message to the Secretary of the
Navy:—

“Maine blown up in Havana harbor at 9:40 and destroyed. Many wounded
and doubtless more killed and drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish
man-of-war and Ward Line steamer. Send lighthouse tenders from Key West for
crew and few pieces of equipment still above water. No one had other clothes than
those upon him. . . . Public opinion should be suspended till further report.
All officers are beliéved to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for.

Many Spanish officers, including representatives of General Blanco, are now with me
and express sympathy.”

Il,

THE appeal of Captain Sigsbee for a suspension of judgment did
not fall upon deaf ears. Whilst the trend of public opinion was not.
long shaping itself, and falling into the theory of treach-
ery, the more thoughtful among the people of the United ee ee
States could not bring themselves to believe this pos- TA¥A» Gom-
sible. That murder upon such a scale, and at once so
cold-blooded and wanton, could be deliberately planned and executed
at the very high-noon of modern civilization and during a period of
38 HISTORY OF THE

profound peace seemed inconceivable. The Government at Washing-
ton took its cue from the self-respecting and at the same time the
wise and heroic moderation of Captain Sigsbee. It refused to enter-
tain the idea of conspiracy, the Secretary of the Navy going the
length of publicly rejecting it. But it was at once resolved by the
President and Cabinet that there should be investigation prompt and
thorough, and that this investigation should be conducted exclusively
by United States officials. To the proposal of the Spanish authorities
to unite in the work of fathoming the mystery, a polite negative
was returned, and, within forty-eight hours after the tragedy in
Havana harbor, a commission, under the presidency of Captain W. T.
Sampson, with Lieutenant Commander Adolphe Marix as judge advocate,
both naval officers of distinction, were named to proceed to the scene
of the disaster and to investigate all the facts, with the purpose of reach-
ing an impartial conclusion and reporting this to the Government.
No limit was set upon the powers of this commission, and its
investigation was exhaustive. It began its sittings at Havana and
continued them at Key West, but it did not complete its report until
the 21st of March, embracing twenty-three days of continuous labor
from the date of its organization. Through every means at its com-
mand, by the aid of expert divers and wreckers, and innumerable wit-
nesses among the survivors of the tragedy, as well as eye-witnesses of the
disaster, and all persons who could throw any light upon the affair,
Captain Sampson and his associates sought to penetrate and to bring
to light the truth concerning it. But one conclusion stared them in
the face from the very outset of their inquiry. The Maine was
destroyed by means of some explosive outwardly applied by parties
unknown. The report declares that the state of discipline on board
and the condition of the magazines, boilers, coal bunkers, and storage
compartments were excellent, and that no indication of any cause for
an internal explosion existed in any quarter. At 8 o’clock in the
evening of February 15 everything had been reported secure and all
was quiet. At forty minutes past 9 o’clock the vessel was suddenly
destroyed. The report goes on to say: “There were two distinct
 

 

 

THE TACON MARKET, HAVANA

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 4]

explosions, with a brief interval between them. The first lifted the
forward part of the ship very perceptibly ; the second, which was more
open, prolonged, and of greater volume, is attributed by the court to
the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines. The
evidence of the divers establishes that the after-part of the ship was
practically intact and sank in that condition a very few minutes after
the explosion. The forward part was completely demolished.” Then
the report continues: “At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a
point eleven and one-half feet from the middle line of the ship and
six feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up
so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water; there-
fore, about thirty-four feet above where it would be had the ship
~ sunk, uninjured.

“The outside bottom plating is bent into a reverse V-shape, the
after wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty-two feet in
length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against
the continuation of the same plating extending forward.

“At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two and the flat keel is
bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom
plates. The break is now about six feet below the surface of the water
and about thirty feet above its normal position.

“Tn the opinion of the court, this effect could have been produced
only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship
at about frame 18 and somewhat on the port side of the ship.”

These are the conclusions of the court :—

“That the loss of the Maine was not due in any respect to negli-
gence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew.

“That she was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine,
which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward mag-
azines, and that no evidence has been obtainable fixing the responsi-
bility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons.”

Without any comment, or the expression of any sentiment calcu-
lated to arouse public feeling, President McKinley submitted this report
to Congress as late as the 29th of March, a week after it was completed
42 . HISTORY OF THE

at Key West and returned to Rear-Admiral Sicard, in command of the

Gulf squadron. Every means was employed to procure delay and to
prevent rash judgment in the public mind and precipitate action by
Congress. The President had been employing the intervening time
with a most persistent and earnest attempt to arrive at some ami-
cable adjustment of all the questions at issue with Spain through the
medium of diplomatic negotiation. The Spanish Cabinet at Madrid

seemed to be playing a waiting game, a game for time, holding our

minister, General Stuart L. Woodford, in a state of helpless abeyance

with all sorts of subterfuges, whilst casting about amongst European

Powers for help in the event of war, which it anticipated, and otherwise

seeking to embarrass the United States and to compromise us in the

estimation of other nations. These things, however secretly done, had~
not escaped the rapt attention of the American people. They had

awaited patiently the report of their commission. No more than the

President did they wish to perpetrate any injustice against Spain.

But the public mind was made up that, if it should be clearly shown

that the Maine was destroyed by external agencies, nothing short of

war should be the forfeit. Within an hour after the finding of the

report was known to our country, no one doubted that war was inevi-

table. All well-meaning sophistries were brushed aside by the rude

hand of a popular demand for reprisal, and Congress was admonished

that it disobeyed the summons at its peril.

Ill.

Wuitst the country waited upon the investigation of the Naval
Commission, the course of events was slowly but, as we now know,
surely drifting toward war. The unanimous adoption

SENATOR .s
PROCTOR’S by the two houses of Congress of a joint resolution
Sa creating an emergency fund of fifty millions of dollars,
and placing this enormous sum at the absolute discretion
of the President, was significant as an exhibition both of national unity
and of warlike purpose. The rapid completion of unfinished battle-
 

 

 

 

FRUIT STAND IN HAVANA
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 45

ships in our own ship-yards, and the purchase of others from foreign
governments, pointed in the same direction. So, too, did the passage
by Congress of an act increasing the artillery arm of the regular serv-
ice. On the other hand, the demand by Spain for the recall of Gen-
eral Fitzhugh Lee, our Consul-General at Havana, greatly incensed
the American idea of fair play, and, although this demand was with-
drawn, it left a sting in the popular mind. But a circumstance. at
first rather private than public in its character, and little noted at
the time, was destined to cut a very great figure, indeed, in the ulti-
mate disposition of the event of peace or war. This was the visit of
Senator Redfield Proctor, of Vermont, to the island of Cuba.

It was said by the newspapers that the Senator went at the request
of the President. Be this as it may, Senator Proctor disclaimed official
character, and gave out that he was merely seeking, as a Senator and a
private gentleman, the satisfaction of his own judgment as to the real
state of affairs in Cuba. He went about freely, and, as was thought,
incautiously, over the island, and on his return he made a statement
in open Senate which created the widest and profoundest impression
both upon those who heard it and upon the people at large.

_ Senator Proctor was known to be one of the least imaginative and
most just-minded of men, a hard-headed Yankee, who all his life had
shown himself incapable of being lured or bullied out of any purpose to
which he had once enlisted his interest and energies. He rose from
his place in the Senate Chamber the 16th of March, and, reading from
manuscript, with no attempt at display, delivered a speech, which,
for its effect upon results, has never been surpassed in that or in any
other deliberative body. From every point of view the statements
embraced by this speech were remarkable. It had been most care-
fully prepared. Every element of sensationalism had been eliminated
from it, and, except as far as the facts recited were sensational, it bore
not the slightest evidence of an effort to arouse the public mind,
already keenly alive to the condition of affairs on the island of Cuba.
Every statement was made with the clearness and precision which
characterize the accurate demonstration of a problem in mathematics.
46 HISTORY OF THE

Calm and dispassionate, the utterances of the Senator aroused breath-
less interest. Every person who heard him was convinced that he was
putting his observations into exact terms, lest he might subject him-
self to the charge of being emotional. One of the best characteriza-
tions of the speech was made by Senator Frye, of Maine, a few minutes
after its delivery. ‘It is,” said he, “just as if Proctor had held up his
right hand and sworn to it.” That, indeed, was the impression it
made upon the Senate. But it made a still greater impression upon
the country. It constituted America’s highest and best justification for
going to war and had more influence in determining public opinion
than any other single agency.

The limits of a narrative such as this do not admit of the incor-
poration of the speech of Senator Proctor entire. But a few salient
extracts will serve to show its character and to account for its
effect. Having described the city of Havana as showing little evi-
dence of a state of war the Senator said :—

“Outside Havana all is changed. It is not peace, nor is it war. It is desolation
and distress, misery and starvation. Every town and village is surrounded by a trocha
(trench), a sort of rifle-pit, but constructed on a plan new to me, the dirt being thrown
upon the inside and a barb wire fence on the outer side of the trench. These trochas
have at every corner and at frequent intervals along the sides what are there called
forts, but which are really small block-houses, many of them more like a large sentry-
box, loop-holed for musketry, and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in each.
The purpose of these trochas is to keep the reconcentrados in as well as to keep
the insurgents out. From all the surrounding country the people have been driven
into these fortified towns, and held there to subsist as they can. They are virtu-
ally prison-yards and not unlike one in general appearance, except the walls are
not so high and strong, but they suffice, where every point is in range of a sol-
dier’s rifle, to keep in the poor reconcentrado women and children. Every rail-
road station is within one of these trochas and has an armed guard. Every train
has an armored freight car, loop-holed for musketry, and filled with soldiers and
with, as I observed usually and was informed is always the case, a pilot engine a
mile or so in advance. There are frequent block-houses inclosed-by a trocha, and
with a guard along the railroad track. . . . With this exception there is no
human life or habitation between these fortified towns and villages, and throughout
the whole of the four western provinces, except to a very limited extent among
the hills, where the Spaniards have not been able to go and drive the people tc
the towns and burn their dwellings, I saw no house or hut in the 400 miles of
VNVAWH 'H3773S LINYS SALLVN

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 49.

railroad rides from Pinar del Rio province in the west across the full width of
Havana and Matanza provinces, and to Sagua La Grande, on the north shore, and
to Cienfuegos, on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish trochas.
There are no domestic animals or crops on the righ fields and pastures except such
as are under guard in the immediate vicinity of the towns. In other words, the
Spaniards hold in these four western provinces just what their army sits on.
Every man, woman, and child, and every domestic animal, wherever their columns
have reached, is under guard and within their so-called fortifications. To describe
one place is to describe all. To repeat, it is neither peace nor war. It is con-
centration and desolation.”

These dreadful conditions were brought about by the famous and
brutal order of Captain-General Weyler, the first clause of which Sen-
ator Proctor quoted and which is here repeated. It reads: —

“T order and command first, all the inhabitants of the country or outside of the
line of fortification of the towns, shall, within the period of eight days, concentrate
themselves in the town so occupied by the troops. Any individual who, after the

expiration of this period, is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered a
rebel, and tried as such.”

The other three sections forbid the transportation of provisions
from one town to another without permission of the military author-
ity, direct the owners of cattle to bring them into the towns, pre-
scribe that the eight days shall be counted from the publication of
the proclamation in the principal town of the municipal districts, and
state that if news is furnished of the enemy which can be made use
of it will serve as a “recommendation.”

This was nothing less than an artfully planned scheme to exter-
minate by starvation and disease the native population. As a conse-
quence, within a single year over four hundred thousand innocent
human beings, mostly old men, women, and children, actually per-
ished. Of its operations Senator Proctor gives us this picture. Again
we quote:—

“Many, doubtless, did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible
meaning. Its execution was left largely to the guerillas to drive in all that had not
obeyed, and I was informed that in many cases a torch was applied to their homes with
no notice and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock

and other belongings being appropriated by the guerillas. When they reached the
3
50 HISTORY OF THE

towns they were allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant
places within the trochas and left to live if they could. Their huts are about ten
by fifteen feet in size, and for want of space are usually crowded together very
closely. They have no floor but the ground, and no furniture, and after a year’s
wear but little clothing except such stray substitutes as they can extemporize.
With large families or with more than one in this little space the commonest sanitary
provisions are impossible. . . . Conditions are unmentionable in this respect.
Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none,
what wonder that one-half have died, and that one-quarter of the living are so dis-
eased that they cannot be saved. A form of dropsy is a common disorder result-
ing from these conditions. Little children are still walking about with arms and
chest terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the nat-
ural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless. . . . Deaths in the
streets have not been uncommon. I was told by one of our consuls that they have
been found dead about the markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping
to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters and that there had been cases
where they had dropped dead inside the market surrounded by food. These people
were independent and self-supporting before Weyler’s- order. They are not beggars
even now.”

Later on, that is the 24th of March, another notable speech was
made in the Senate by Senator Thurston, of Nebraska, who, like
Senator Proctor, had gone to Cuba for the purpose of seeing and judg-
ing for himself. Senator Thurston’s speech differed from that of Sena-
tor Proctor in being considerably more rhetorical and emotional. The
Senator from Nebraska is a finished orator and a man of culture and
fancy, and on this occasion his appearance was attended by the in-
cident of a most grievous personal bereavement, which had touched
all hearts and was still fresh in the memory of those who listened to
him. Mrs. Thurston had accompanied her husband on his voyage, and,
although apparently in the best of health, she had suddenly died on
ship-board. She was deeply enlisted in the cause of Cuba, and it was in
answer to her last wishes that the Senator delivered this speech.
Despite its eloquent and glowing words, however, it could add nothing
to the stubborn facts given out with mathematical precision by Sena-
tor Proctor, and served rather as oil to keep the lamp which the
Vermonter had lighted burning bright in the minds and hearts of
the people. Indeed, although Senator Gallinger, of New Hampshire,
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AVENUE OF PALMS, HAVANA
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 53

another senatorial excursionist to Cuba, had preceded Senator Proctor
with a narrative hardly less vivid, it was the statement of the ex-Secre-
tary of War, which, coming at the opportune moment, riveted the
public attention and gave it definite direction and purpose. It awak-
ened the conscience of the nation and formulated in the popular mind
a proclamation of war.

Iv.

As A means of obtaining some stay of warlike proceedings, the
Spanish Cortes had adopted an alleged measure of autonomy for the
Cubans and a pretended election had been held in those

3 a ‘ THE MESSAGE
parts of the island of Cuba still controlled by Spain. or rue presi-
The farce deceived no one. It failed wholly to arrest elicoh sores
the course of events. Seeing its futility, the Cabinet a AS
at Madrid proposed to the insurgents an armistice,
which it had refused when proposed by us. The insurgents would
not listen to this. With them it was independence or nothing. All
that came of Spain’s attempt to enlist the Powers of Europe in her
scheme to hold the United States, while Spanish rule in Cuba continued
intact and unabated, was an offer of mediation simultaneously made at
Washington and Madrid by the embassadors of England, Germany,
France, Russia, Austria, and Italy, and in both capitals dismissed with
polite common-places, neither Government feeling itself in a position
to assume publicly any positive attitude. Recourse was had by the
Queen-Regent to the Pope of Rome. But his Holiness, having no
temporal power, could only throw the influence of his prayers upon
the side of humanity and peace.

Throughout this prolonged tension, the Minister of the United
States at Madrid, General Woodford, was making concessions to Spain
which the public temper in America would hardly have confirmed,
whilst Sefior Sagasta, the head of the Spanish Cabinet, was temporiz-
ing, if not double-dealing, with our representative. Congress, feeling
the spur of the popular impulse, was restive and at times turbulent,
54 HISTORY OF THE

held in check only by the hands of the President and the Speaker of
the House. The two weeks intervening between the 29th of March,
when the report of the Maine investigation was submitted to Congress,
and the 12th of April, when the President sent in a message relegat-
ing to the two Houses the final responsibility of the issue of peace or
war, the country was kept in a state of excitement, not merely by the
uncertainties of the situation, but by the harassing character of
passing events.

Under the order of his Government, General Fitzhugh Lee, Consul-
General of the United States at Havana, had, the 9th of April, closed his
office, turned over to the English consul the care of American interests
and, with a number of other Americans, had embarked for Key West,
reaching there the next day: The withdrawal of the Consul-General
was the signal for some explosions of popular feeling among the Span-
ish citizens of Havana, but barring these expressions of ill-will, and the
refusal of Captain-General Blanco personally to receive the farewell
visit of General Lee, the exodus of the Americans was uneventful.
By this time, however, Congress would brook no further delay and on
the Tuesday following the safe arrival of General Lee on American
soil, that is the 12th of April, Mr. McKinley sent in his message. It
reviewed the situation with minute particularity, but with exceed-
ing forbearance. The President repeated the thrice-told tale of Span-
ish barbarism in Cuba; recounted the friendly efforts of the United
States to attain a better state of affairs in the island: related the tor-
tuous course of Spanish diplomacy; cited precedents of international
law, with liberal quotations from Presidents Jackson, Grant, and Cleve-
land in support of his present position; and ended a very able and
admirable document, which yet failed to meet the exactions of public
opinion, by asking Congress “to authorize and empower the President
to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities
between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure
in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of
maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring
peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens, as well as our
 

GOVERNOR-GENERAL BLANCO
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 57

own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as
may be necessary for these purposes.”

As justification for this demand, the President, with clearness and
precision, rested the case of the United States upon the following four
propositions: —

First—In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the _barbarities,
bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the par-
ties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no
answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is
therefore none of our business. It is especially our duty—for it is right at our
door.

Second— We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection —
and indefinitely—for life and property which no government there can or will
afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal pro-
tection.

Third— The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious, injury to
the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of
property and devastation of the island.

Fourth — And which is of the utmost importance, the present condition of affairs
in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Government
enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us
and with which our people have such trade and business relations— when the lives
and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed
and themselves ruined—when our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are
seized at our very door by warships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibuster-
ing that we are powerless to repress altogether and the irritating questions and
entanglements thus arising —al]l these and others that I need not mention, with the
resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace and compel us to
keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

The war party in Congress was in an overwhelming majority, and
to this majority the message of the President proved a disappoint-
ment. The efforts of Mr. McKinley at delay had been received with
undisguised impatience, and, joined to his pacific intentions, which
were well known, had created a question in the public mind whether
in case the decision should be left with him, he could be relied on
to carry out the now set purpose of the people to allow no further
equivocation, but to proceed at once by force of arms to compel
Spain to withdraw from Cuba. Without debate the message was
58 HISTORY OF THE

referred to the appropriate committees; but, when Congress adjourned
that afternoon, no doubt was anywhere entertained that—a state of
war already existing—a formal declaration of war was but the matter
of a few days or hours.

The very next day, the 13th of April, Congress began to act. Each
of the two committees, to which the President’s message had been
referred made its returns, each consisting of two reports, one of the
majority and the other of the minority. Objections from a senator
carried the two reports of the Senate Committee over for a day; but
in the House immediate consideration was had. The minority report,
offered by the Democrats and recognizing the insurrectionary Cuban
government, was voted down, 147 to 190. Then the House by a vote
of 322 to 19 adopted the resolutions reported by the majority of its
Committee on Foreign Affairs, denouncing Spain’s methods in Cuba as
inhuman and uncivilized, holding Spain responsible for the destruc-
tion of the Maine, and directing the President “to intervene at once”
for the restoration of order in Cuba, and for the establishment of “a
stable and independent government” in the island, for which inter-
vention “he is empowered to use the land and naval forces of the
United States.” In the Senate, where objection delayed immediate
consideration, a majority of the Committee on Foreign Relations re-
ported resolutions declaring that the people of Cuba are and of right
ought to be free and independent, denouncing Spanish misrule in the
island as “cruel, barbarous, and inhuman,” demanding that Spain at
once withdraw her forces from the island and empowering and direct-
ing the President to intervene with the army and navy of the United
States to drive Spain from Cuba. The minority of the Senate Com-
mittee, consisting of the Democratic members and Senator Foraker,
brought in resolutions definitely recognizing the independence of
the insurgent Cuban government. On the 16th, after a debate of
three days, the Senate adopted resolutions similar to those adopted
by the House, but embracing a recognition of the insurgent gov-
ernment. Thus matters rested over Sunday the 17th, when, after
many and prolonged consultations beginning the morning of the
LET

A
HI
AY AN

 

INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL’S PALACE, HAVANA
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 61

18th and extending far into the night of the 19th, the Conference
Committee agreed upon a final report. This declared that the people
of Cuba “are, and of right ought to be, free and independent,” de-
manded that Spain at once withdraw from Cuba, directed the Presi-
dent of the United States to use the army and navy if necessary to
enforce this demand, and pledged the United States to leave the peo-
ple of Cuba free, after the expulsion of Spain, to establish their own
form of government. Concessions were made by both House and
Senate to this agreement, though as the resolutions were at last
adopted they proved to be those reported to the Senate by the ma-
jority of its Foreign Relations Committee, with the addition of the
amendment pledging liberty to Cuba to establish its own government.
The conference reported was promptly adopted by the Senate by a
vote of 42 to 35. The House, however, did not get through its roll
call for more than an hour later, finally adopting the report by a vote
of 310 to 6.

Thus was the Congress a unit; and behind it an overwhelming
majority of the people.

Vv.

Tue Joint Resolution, as it was finally adopted by the two Houses
of Congress and was signed by the President, read as follows: —

WueEreas, the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more FINAL
than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, oe
have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States,
have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the
destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its
officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot
longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in
his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was
invited; therefore,

Resolved, By the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,

1. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of a right ought to be, free
and independent.
62 HISTORY OF THE

2. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of
the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once
relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land
and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

3. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and
empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to
call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States
to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

4. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to
exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for the pacifi-
cation thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave
the government and control of the island to its people.

The discretion asked by the President was withheld partly because,
as was claimed, Congress should not surrender to the Executive its
war-making prerogative, and partly because the war party thought
the President was not sufficiently aggressive in temper and purpose.
There appeared, however, no reason to find fault with the conduct of
the President in the emergency created by the action of Congress.
Minister Woodford, at Madrid, was promptly instructed to lay the
ultimatum of the United States before the Government of Spain and
to demand an answer by the following Saturday, the 23rd of April, it
then being Wednesday the 20th. Spain, however, did not wait to be
officially advised. Sefior Barnabe, who had succeeded Signor De Lome
as Spanish minister at Washington, demanded and received his pass-
ports at once, taking the train that same evening and, without event
of any kind, going through to Toronto, Canada. The instructions
from the State Department, sent in cypher, did not reach Minister
Woodford at Madrid in time to be translated and delivered to the
Spanish premier, Sefior Sagasta, that same Wednesday evening, and
the action of Congress, being already known, was deemed by the
Premier all-sufficient. so that before Minister Woodford had time to
present the ultimatum of his Government next day, he was given his
passports and told that Spain considered the congressional proceeding
of the previous day a declaration of war. Minister Woodford, al-
though furnished an escort to the Spanish frontier, was not so fortu-
nate in the circumstances of his departure from Madrid as Signor
JONIAOYd YNVAVH NI SN3OS SDVTIIA

 

 

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 65

Barnabe had been in his departure from Washington. There was much
excitement among the populace, who assembled in noisy crowds about
the railway stations, and at Valladolid a mob collected, demanding the
surrender of a member of the Minister’s official staff and otherwise
menacing General Woodford and his party. Without serious accident,
however, the frontier was reached, and on Friday evening the Ameri-
cans arrived in Paris. Thus, although there had been no formal
declaration of war on either side, actual war was at hand, a tension
little short of a state of war having existed from the day when the
Maine report had been submitted to Congress.

In the United States the tone of public sentiment was resolute
rather than turbulent or embittered. Conscious of their power, and
sustained by a sense of intolerable outrage, the people had taken
matters into their own hands and had freed the hands both of the
Congress and the President. Except upon the immediate seaboard,
and in the leading centres of commerce, there had been little thought
of a peaceful solution or desire for it. The manhood, as well as the
humanity, of the country was thoroughly aroused, and for the mo-
ment even party rancor was silenced.

In Spain the response of the ruling classes was, if possible, still
more animated. It was vehement and defiant. The Cortes had been
assembled in extraordinary session. Even whilst the Congress at
Washington was framing the ultimatum to Spain, a scene, both im-
pressive and pathetic, was passing at Madrid. The Queen-Regent
with her son, the youthful King of Spain, appeared in the Spanish
Senate Chamber, where were assembled not only the Legislative Bod-
ies, the Cabinet, and the great officials, civil and military, but all the
wealth and beauty of the capital, gorgeously attired and arrayed.
The spectacle was truly magnificent. When Queen Christina and the
little King Alfonso appeared, the enthusiasm knew no bounds;
though there must have been many among that brilliant throng,
who, seeing this stately and noble lady, and reflecting upon the true
character and meaning of hurrying events, could not but feel more
of sadness than of exaltation. The Queen-Regent read her speech
66 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

from the throne, the boy King standing on her right, Sefior Sagasta
on her left. It described the menaces and insults of America as in-
tolerable provocations which would compel her Government to sever
relations with the Government of the United States. She expressed
her gratitude to the Pope and Powers, and hoped the “supreme deci-
sion of parliament” would sanction the unalterable resolution of her
Government to defend the rights of Spain. She appealed to the
Spanish people to maintain the integrity both of the dynasty and
the nation. “I have summoned the Cortes,” she said, “to defend our
rights, whatever sacrifice they may entail. Thus identifying myself
with the nation, I not only fulfill the oath I swore in accepting the
regency, but I follow the dictates of a mother’s heart, trusting to the
Spanish people to gather behind my son’s throne, and to defend it
until he is old enough to defend it himself, as well as trusting to the
Spanish people to defend the honor and the territory of the nation.”
Her brave words found their answer in all hearts, and were echoed
and re-echoed throughout the Senate Chamber and the nation. :

It was not until the 25th of April that Congress passed a bill for-
mally declaring war to exist, and dating this from the preceding
21st of April, though the President had already called out 125,000
volunteer soldiers. Meanwhile, the entire north coast of Cuba, includ-
ing Havana, had been blockaded, and several Spanish prizes had been
captured and brought into Key West by the naval vessels operating
in that quarter.
® At last after fifty years of unsuccessful but continuous revolution,
of heroic sacrifices on the one hand, and oppression incalculable on
the other hand, were the Cubans about to feel the friendly hand of
the great Republic mailed and stretched out across the Gulf of Mexico
to save them from the barbarism and corruption of Spanish domi-
nation; and at last after thirty-three years of peace were the patrio-
tism and the manhood of America to be again tested on land and
sea, not now, as formerly, in civil strife or in resistance to foreign
aggression, but as an aggressive and progressive force, and in direct
answer to the call of liberty and humanity. \_
CHAPTER THE SECOND.

Tur Maxine or ARMIES AND NAVIES.

First AcTs OF THE WAR AND A COMPARISON OF THE COMBATANTS— THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
UniTED STATES ARMY AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE Navy— THE PRESIDENT CALLS
FOR 125,000 VOLUNTEERS AND THE CouNTRY ANSWERS WITH 750,000 APPLICATIONS
FOR ENLISTMENT — APPOINTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF, INCLUDING
EX-FEDERALS AND EX-CONFEDERATES— OUTBURSTS OF PATRIOTIC
' RivaLry AND FRATERNIZATION BETWEEN NoRTH AND

SouTH — UNIFICATION OF NATIONAL SENTIMENT.

*

I,

wn Tuesday, April 19, the American Congress had declared its
ultimatum to the Spanish Government, and the same day,
as if intended to be an answering act of de-
fiance, a strong squadron composed of the
flower of the swift armored cruisers of the Spanish
navy sailed out of the port of Cadiz, westward, with Havana as its
ostensible port of destination. The squadron consisted of the first-class
armored cruisers Vizcaya, Almirante Oquendo, Maria Theresa, Cristobal
Colon, and a complement of three torpedo boats and three destroyers.
It was under the command of Admiral Cervera, a Spanish officer of
high character, who had been naval attaché of his government with
the United States, and who was well informed of the spirit and strength
of American determination.

The news of this reached Washington immediately by cable, and
the President issued orders to Acting Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson,
commanding the North Atlantic squadron of the United States navy,
directing a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, particularly the city
of Havana, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast. A squad-
ron consisting of the two first-class battleships, Jowa and Indiana,
the armored cruiser New York (flagship), the Wilmington and Cincin-

nati, and a number of gunboats and converted auxiliaries, sailed
(67)

FIRST ACTS OF
WAR
68 HISTORY OF THE

from Key West before daylight and at 4 o’clock on the afternoon of
April 22 an effective and close blockade had been established over
the harbor of Havana, and the northern coast was under patrol.
These events and movements so quickly passing turned all ex-
pectation upon a decisive naval engagement in Cuban waters or an
attack by the Spaniards upon one or more of the American coast
cities. Feeling leaped to a high pitch of excitement. ‘“Remem-
ber the Maine” became the war-cry, despite the protests of church
societies and ethical bodies against public expression of a desire for
vengeance. The belief that the Spanish navy was stronger than our
own in fast ocean-going offensive cruisers and in the torpedo-boat
arm, at once made the capacity and skill of the American seamen
qualities to be counted upon in advance and to be extolled by pop-
ular admiration. The fact that 266 such seamen had been done to
death by treachery in Havana harbor kindled resentment in the pop-
ular heart, and the ominous legend “Remember the Maine” expressed
what statesmen, diplomats, and religionarie$ might try to cover up
in vain. The long and vexatious controversies over Cuban wrongs
were concentrated and merged into an irresistible desire to punish
a distinct and atrocious crime against civilization and American
sailors. It was this feeling that justified to the public the appro-
priation of $50,000,000 to be used by the President in his discretion
for the purpose of strengthening our coast defenses and of adding
to the effectiveness of the naval establishment. A large portion of
the appropriation had been used in the purchase of steel steamships
and their conversion into auxiliary war vessels. From Brazil the
newly completed protected cruiser, Amazonas, of 3,600 tons, had been
purchased and rechristened the New Orleans. From the same friendly
government the dynamite cruiser Nichteroy was afterward obtained
and named after the city of Buffalo. This was the result of six
weeks of urgent operations by the Navy Department anticipating the
course of events. It had, indeed, accomplished much more than this.
When the destruction of the Maine occurred the Government,
hitherto confident of avoiding war. was without a war supply of
MYOA MAN YASINYO G3SYOWHY 'S "ND

 

 

 

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 71

powder, new explosives, and projectiles. These it was necessary to
provide suddenly and with secrecy, and upon their purchase and man-
ufacture the President was forced to wait, deferring action in the
face of popular impatience which he was estopped from placating by
openly avowing the unpreparedness of the Government. It was not
until the blockade of Cuba was well established and prolonged that
the sources of continuous supply were perfected.

Under these circumstances the people of the United States wit-
nessed the sailing of Admiral Sampson’s squadron and waited for
collision with the Spanish ships. Four days later the American squad-
ron on the Asiatic station, under command of Commodore George W.
Dewey, sailed from Hong Kong under orders to “capture or destroy”
the Spanish squadron under Admiral Montejo at Manila, in the Phil-
ippine Islands. Then came ten days of wearying uncertainty and
doubt. The Spanish ships of Cervera put in at Port St. Vincent,
Cape de Verde Islands, and became enveloped in mystery. They were
reported as intending to descend upon the North Atlantic coast, and
a flying squadron under Commodore Winfield Scott Schley was kept
on waiting orders at Hampton Roads to repel such an attempt if
made. Atlantic harbors were placed in a state of defense and the
old single-turreted monitors used in the Civil War were overhauled,
manned, and put in active commission. Ten days were thus passed in
tiresome suspense, relieved only by the occasional capture of Spanish
merchant vessels as prizes of war, some twenty of which were taken
into the harbor of Key West.

Il.

Durine a week of waiting, interrupted only by trivial incidents
that seemed to be momentous because of the tension, the adminis-
tration at Washington began a work of hurried organ- seg teen ss
ization of the army and navy, the ultimate completion ARMY AND
of which demonstrated before the other powers of the Pe
world the unequalled resources and celerity of the Americans. There
was no question of the disparity between the two nations in wealth,
72 HISTORY OF THE

population, and the means of conducting an aggressive war. But the
effective condition of each at the moment of beginning the struggle
was involved in doubt. Europe looked on with interest and com-
pared the possibilities.

The regular army of Spain consisted of an apparent force of
150,000 men in Cuba, under the command of General Blanco; of
about 60,000 in garrison in the fortresses and principal cities of the
mother country, and some 30,000 more scattered through the Phil-
ippines, Porto Rico, the Canaries, and other colonies. In round num-
bers the whole ‘was estimated at about 250,000 troops. These could
be increased by calling out the first reserves, numbering about 160,000,
consisting of Spanish subjects undergoing instruction by performing
compulsory military service—a better organized and more advanced
militia than that maintained by the States of the United States.
The general reserves, that is the capable fighting material left in
Spain, numbered about 1,000,000. The total Spanish military strength
in men was therefore about 1,410,000. These numbers could be en-
larged by the volunteers of the colonies, but the ineradicable spirit
of revolution rendered the loyalty of these colonial volunteers unre-
liable. They were intractable and the constant source of uneasiness
to Spanish governors and commanders.

As against the Spanish military fighting strength, the United States
had a regular army that was limited by law to 25,000 men, but which
had been depleted by lack of recruitment to about 18,000 men, of
which one-third or more were colored regiments. The regular army
of the United States, notwithstanding thirty-three years of general
peace, had been kept in a state of high efficiency in discipline: by
the Indian outbreaks in the West, in which courage, skill, endurance,
and ingenuity had been developed.

The next military resource was in the militia organizations of the
various States, numbering between 150,000 and 200,000 men. The
instant mobilization of the State militia was hampered by sentiments
growing out of our political institutions. That they could be ordered
into the service of the National government at home was not ques-
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 73

tioned, but assent to the authority of the President to order them on
service out of the United States was not conceded by tradition. To
that extent the militia was not so ready an arm as the reserves of
European countries constituted. There was no question of the readi-
ness of the militia of the various States to go out of the country and
fight. On the contrary, the patriotic spirit of these organizations
flamed up at the prospect of war and they were ready as a single
man to march against Spain. The question was one merely of pro-
cedure, and in order that no controversy might interrupt thorough
unity of purpose, the President concluded to call for enlistments in
the volunteer army of the United States, announcing a preference
for the militia regiments of the States as completed organizations.

The third resource, the body of men of fighting age in the United
States, could yield at least 10,000,000 men. As against Spain’s limit
of 1,410,000, the preponderance of the United States was, of course,
overwhelming.

In the naval establishment of each country the number of ships
constructed for war was nearly equal, but of greatly differing character,
both in purpose and condition. The Spaniard possessed but one battle-
ship of the first-class, the Pelayo, of 9,900 tons and moderate speed power.
Of armored cruisers of the first-class he possessed six, each about 7,000
tons and having a speed estimated at 20 knots per hour. Of torpedo
boats and swift torpedo-boat destroyers there were 28, and of smaller
torpedo and gunboat craft for harbor service, about 100. The Spanish
navy footed up 153 boats of all sorts, but it was in the modern armored
cruisers of high speed, carrying great battery power, strongly protected
by steel armor, and in the yet untested and mysterious torpedo ma-
chines, that its strength was concentrated.

The navy of the United States, before war approached, presented
every Opposing feature of purpose. The four sea-going battleships of
the first-class, the Oregon, Massachusetts, Iowa, and Indiana, with the
second-class battleship, Texas, were regarded more as coast-defenders
than as open-sea fighters and sailers. In an organized battle, how-
ever, their enormous gun power and low freeboard exposures to the
74 HISTORY OF THE
PO

enemy’s fire would have found them more than a match for all the
large ships Spain possessed. We had but two armored cruisers,
the Brooklyn and New York, each with lighter armor than their ad-
versaries of the corresponding class. There were fourteen protected
cruisers of high speed, four double-turreted monitors, and twelve tor-
pedo boats, besides a number of gunboats and antiquated craft for
harbor protection. Untried experiments were the dynamite cruiser
Vesuvius and the ram Katahdin, the product of American inventive
ideas.

The Vesuvius was expected to be more effective in battle than
any of the torpedo craft, but her practical efficiency had been so
stubbornly questioned that the government had not duplicated her.
She was small, swift, and easily handled, and carried three pneumatic
guns, each of which could discharge 500 pounds of nitroglycerin every
five minutes. Nitroglycerin has five times the explosive power of gun
cotton and twenty-five times the explosive power of ordinary powder.
The Katahdin was designed to destroy the enemy by ramming under
the water-line.

Such is a brief summary of the appraised and recorded forces of
the adversaries at the moment when the destruction of the Maine
made war imminent. Beneath this open page of the governmental
ledger on each side, however, were concealéd congenital differences
of national and racial character that were to render the instruments
of war a mere item of record. It was not the armor, the fortifica-
tion, or the gun that was to decide the contest; but the man behind
the gun and the institutions behind the man.

Every boy in America is born a machinist, and the instinct of
mechanical genius has found enlargement in the competition for in-
ventions and in the acceptance and use of all mechanical contriv-
ances. The esteem in which labor is held, the scorn that is felt for
ignorance and indolence, the entire freedom of education, of religion,
of political contention—all these have made the average American a
responsible individual, self-reliant, skillful with his hands, with his
head, and cool of heart and mind in moments of trial. This natural
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 75

and acquired skill and familiarity with mechanical appliances was
required to make the old Springfield rifle and grain powder superior
to the Mauser rifle and smokeless powder on battlefields. It was to
be relied upon to turn slow battleships into racers that could pursue
fleet cruisers, and to take an enormous vessel such as the Oregon a
flying voyage of 15,000 miles in sixty-six days without hurt to her
machinery or equipment, so that she could go into actual battle with-
out needing repairs. When to such type of man is given an imple-
ment he adds to its effectiveness and preserves its capacity. Self-
poised, openly confident of his resources to the point of boasting, the
American has been regarded by Europeans as a vain braggart, and
his direct manner of thrusting aside the conventionalities of diplo-
matic and governmental etiquette—the Circumlocution Office rules
of international relations—drew upon him the Spanish epithet of
“the Yankee Pig.”

England alone, of all the European nations, understood the reso-
lute intelligence, practical skill, and patriotism of the Americans.*
The Continent would not believe that we could make out of raw

* Mr. Henry Norman, a distinguished English journalist of great experience, who visited
Washington during the opening weeks of the war, wrote to the London Chronicle concerning
certain features of the American character under the stress of the crisis. After some amusing
comments upon “‘spread-eagle enthusiasm,” he said of the army: ‘‘After admitting every
reasonable criticism, it is a triumph of organization. I doubt if so much, from so little, has
ever been accomplished so expeditiously and so uneventfully before. And look at the display
of American patriotism. When the volunteers were summoned by the President they
walked on the scene as if they had been waiting in the wings. They were subjected to a
physical examination as searching as that of a life insurance company. A man was re-
jected for two or three filled teeth. They came from all ranks of life. Young lawyers,
doctors, bankers, well-paid clerks are marching by thousands in the ranks. The first surgeon
to be killed at Guantanamo left a New York practice of $10,000 a year to volunteer. As
I was standing on the steps of the Arlingtori Hotel one evening, a tall, thin man, carrying
a large suit-case, walked out and got on the street car for the railway station, on his way
to Tampa. It was John Jacob Astor, the possessor of a hundred millions of dollars.
Theodore Roosevelt’s rough riders contain a number of the smartest young men in New
York society. A Harvard classmate of mine, a rising young lawyer, is working like a
laborer at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, not knowing when he may be ordered to Cuba or
Manila. He is a naval reserve man and sent in his application for any post ‘from the
stoke-hole upward.’ The same is true of women. When I called to say good-by to Mrs.
John Addison Porter, the wife of the Secretary to the President, whose charming hospi-
tality I had enjoyed, she had gone to Tampa to ship as a nurse on the Red Cross steamer
for the coast of Cuba. And all this. be it remembered, is for a war in which the country

4
76 HISTORY OF THE

recruits efficient soldiers that could face the Spanish regulars. They
sneered at the conglomerate American population as composed of
sordid mercenaries, the scum and refuse of the world, or emigrants
intent alone upon making fortunes with which to return home—hav-
ing no loyalty or patriotism, and no courage against a trained army
of the European standard.

The American people understood their strength and at the same
time the weakness of their adversary. They did not make the mis-
take of estimating the Spaniards as cowards. But they rated Spanish
courage as that of desperation rather than of cool tenacity and hope.
While the Spaniard believed that Republican institutions rendered
the volunteer soldier of America insubordinate under discipline, the
American knew that his adversary was a servile dependent upon
caste leadership;* that his final courage must depend upon his
officers, since they, alone, were informed and intelligent, though cor-
rupted by national degeneration. Caste placed an impassable barrier
between the Spanish officer and the line. Under rigid censorship of
the printing press, and through religious intolerance, the masses were

is not in the remotest danger, and when the ultimate summons of patriotism is unspoken.
Finally, consider the reference to the war loan. A New York syndicate offered to take
half of it at a premium which would have given the Government a clear profit of $1,000,000.
But the loan was wisely offered to the people,and the small investor gets all he can buy
before the capitalist is even permitted to invest. And from Canada to the Gulf, from
Long Island to Seattle, the money of the people is pouring in. As I write, it is said
the loan will be all taken up in small amounts.

“Here, then, is the new Amcrica in one aspect— armed for a wider influence and a
harder fight than any she has envisaged before. And what a fight she will make! Dewey,
with his dash upon Manila; Hobson and his companions going quietly to apparently cer-
tain death, and ships offering the whole muster-roll as volunteers to accompany him;
Rowan, with his life in his hand at every minute of his journey to Gomez and back,
worse than death awaiting him if caught; Blue, making his 70-mile reconnoissance about
Santiago; Whitney, with compass and note-book in pocket, dishwashing his perilous way
round Porto Rico—this is the old daring of our common race. If the old lion and the
young lion should ever go hunting side by side ——!”

*Major De Grandprey, military attaché to the French embassy in Washington, who
was present at the battles fought about Santiago early in July, observing the army opera-
tions for his government, made this statement to the Associated Press on July 12, after
returning: ‘I have the most complete admiration for your men. They are a superb body,
individually and as an army, and I suppose not throughout the world is there such a
splendid lot of fighting men. It is the fighting characteristic of the men which is most
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 77

in dense ignorance of their adversaries, without practical resources,
skillful only in the cunning of cruelty and deception, such as has
marked the race since the time of Philip IL.

The administration at Washington, representing the type of the
practical American, who only needed tools with which to fight, had
begun to make the army and navy even before war was declared.
While Spain, with a bankrupt treasury, was ostentatiously searching
in all European countries to purchase ships of war, the United States
obtained three abroad and constructed out of our own merchant
marine a squadron of eleven steel cruisers. The American line fur-
nished four steamers, the St. Louis, St. Paul, New York, and Paris
(the latter two rechristened Yale and Harvard);and the Morgan line
provided four, whose Spanish names were altered to Dixie, Yankee,
Prairie, and Yosemite. Many other yachts were converted into scout
fighters,and within two weeks after war began there were eighty-eight
effective fighting ships in commission, mostly assembled in Atlantic
waters. Six weeks later Congress made appropriations for building
fifty-one new ships, the largest authorization in the history of the
country.

The making of the army was pushed with equal activity. Promptly
on April 22 a bill was adopted for calling out the volunteers, and on
the 23d the President issued his proclamation calling for 125,000
men, distributed pro-rata among the several States. Within ten
days there were 750,000 applications for enlistment. A few days later
a bill was adopted authorizing the President to recruit the regular

apparent. They are aggressive, eager for action, never needing the voice of an officer to
push them forward. Another marked characteristic is the self-reliance of each man; what
we call the character of ‘initiative.’ It is almost unknown in European armies, where
every movement and the move to meet each action of the enemy awaits the initiative of
“an officer. But with your men they fight to the front, meeting each emergency as it
arises, overcoming obstacles by their own initiative. Such self-reliant fighting men make
an exceptionally impetuous army, for every unit contributes to the irresistible onward
movement. The Spanish troops do not have this same characteristic. They are more
passive, more cautious. Besides the impetuosity of such fighting material, it has the
effect of inspiring a morale among the troops, making them feel that success is assured,
and at the same time carrying disorder and depression to the ranks of the enemy.’’
78 HISTORY OF THE

army to an effective strength of 60,000 officers and men, whenever
in his judgment it should be needed to place the regular army on a
war footing; and the work of recruiting immediately began. Camps
of instruction and recruitment for the volunteers were opened in
every State, from which regiments, after mustering, were mobilized
at Chickamauga National Park, Tennessee, at Camp Alger, Virginia,
and Tampa, Florida. The regular troops were collected at New Or-
leans; Mobile, and Tampa.

On May 4 the President appointed the army staff, including the
following as Major-Generals: Promoted from the regular army — Briga-
dier-Generals Joseph C. Breckinridge, Elwell 8S. Otis, John J. Cop-
pinger, William R. Shafter, William M. Graham, James F. Wade, Henry
C. Merriam. Appointed from civil life—James H. Wilson, of Delaware;
Fitzhugh Lee, of Virginia; William J. Sewell, of New Jersey, and Joseph
Wheeler, of Alabama.

Of the civilians, General Wilson and General Sewell had been distin-
guished Federal commanders during the Civil War, and General Fitz-
hugh Lee and General Joseph Wheeler had served with corresponding
distinction upon the Confederate side. General Sewell did not accept the
appointment, however. He was serving as United States Senator from
New Jersey, and it was held that his acceptance of a commission in
the army would vacate his seat in the Senate. General Wheeler, who
was representing his Alabama district in the lower house, entered the
service immediately without regard to the point.

As soon as practicable a second call for 75,000 volunteers was is-
sued, and before Spain could land a regiment of reénforcements in
Cuba or place a portion of her fleet in Cuban waters, the United States
had provided a sufficient and powerful navy and had in service camps
on the southern watershed about 150,000 troops, of which 30,000 were
efficient enough to force a landing in Cuba within six weeks of en-
listment, and 16,000 had been mobilized at San Francisco and trans-
ported to Manila under Major-General Merritt to destroy Spanish
authority in the Philippines. It was, indeed, a triumph of practical
Americanism. ;
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 79

II.

Tue declaration of war by the Congress, followed by the procla-

mation of the President calling for volunteers, proved signals for an
extraordinary outpouring of national sentiment. Asin,
1812 and in 1846, the response of the people was en- UPRISING OF
thusiastic and spontaneous. In each of the forty-five ices
States of the Union there was a generous rivalry for the opportunity
to rally around the flag and to serve the country. In Georgia, Ala-
bama, and Texas, no less than in Vermont, Michigan, and Illinois, in
Massachusetts and in South Carolina, in Kentucky, Missouri, Indiana,
and Wisconsin, in the crowded centers of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New
York, as in the more isolated regions of New Hampshire, Arkansas,
and Oregon, the drum-beats and the heart-beats kept time to the
music of the nation’s anthem and made a cause common to all men.
If there had been question anywhere about the wisdom or the justice
of the war with Spain, it ended with the call to arms.

During thirty-three years, except upon the Indian frontier, not a
hostile shot had been heard in the United States. An entire gener-
ation had grown to manhood since the close of the Civil War in 1865.
The wounds of prolonged and embittered sectional controversy were
healed indeed, and there had been many evidences that the resto-
ration of the Union was complete, both in spirit and in fact; but
there was wanting some great occasion to proclaim to the world the
thorough reconstruction of the States, the thorough rehabilitation of
the people in the restored, and, in a sense, in the regenerated Union.
There was something exhilarating and at the same time pathetic in
the promptitude with which party distinctions were dropped by the
men who rushed to the national standard, and in the mingling of
regiments, without regard to States or sections, into army divisions
and brigades. In camp, Tennessee touched elbows with Connecticut,
and Mississippi and Maine fraternized as one family, whilst such
terms as Republican, Democrat, and Populist were unknown and
unheard.
80 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The fathers of the men now enlisted to fight side by side had fought
bravely against one another during four years of deadly battle. In
many cases veterans of the Union army and survivors of the Con-
federate army, divided in the former war, were brought together in
this as comrades and colleagues. The appointment of the gallant
Confederate Generals, Joseph Wheeler and Fitzhugh Lee, followed by
that of other distinguished Southern soldiers, was everywhere hailed
with the liveliest acclaim ; and very soon upon the assembling of the
forces, North and South were given an object lesson of rare impres-
siveness and value in the exploits of Dewey, the Vermonter, at Ma-
nila, and of Hobson, the Alabamian, at Santiago, illustrating the union
of skill and daring which was now assured to American arms. In
1861 the country had been divided. Now it was united. Then the
sections stood in opposing battle. Now they stood shoulder to shoul-
der and heart to heart. The world was to witness at last what this
union truly means. It was to see arise from the ashes of old and
dead and buried controversies, a power undreamed of by itself before ;
a vast world-power, with which henceforward the nations of the earth
must reckon. The swaddling clothes of National babyhood were gone.
The giant stood forth in all the pride of his manhood, armed cap-a-
pie and, arrayed on the side of humanity and liberty, ready, willing,
and able to give battle to all comers who might challenge his suprem-
acy, wherever he might plant the star-spangled banner or set up the
standards of free government.

 
CHAPTER THE THIRD.

Dewey anp Maniua.

EXTENT AND CONDITION OF THE SPANISH COLONIES OF THE PHILIPPINES—- THE Naval PRos-
LEMS OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE IN THE PaciFIC— THE MOVEMENTS PRECEDING THE BATTLE
oF MANILA — EXTRAORDINARY APPEAL OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO RESIST THE
AMERICANS — COMMODORE Dewey SAILs To ‘‘ FIND THE SPANIARD AND SMASH Him”
—THE EXTRAORDINARY BATTLE IN MANILA BAy IN WHICH THE SPANIARDS
WERE ANNIHILATED BY COMMODORE DEWEY’s SQUADRON — THE EFFECT
OF THE VICTORY UPON THE UNITED STATES, SPAIN, AND ALL EUROPE.

I.

urine the first ten days of the war attention was centered upon
the naval field of operations in Cuban waters or upon the
Atlantic seaboard of the United States, the ean eee
great cities along which, it was expected, PHILIPPINE

would invite swift attack from the Spanish ships. ce
Meanwhile in Asiatic waters an event was preparing that was to fill
the world with wonder and admiration, and to render American arms
glorious in the very first collision with the enemy. This was the
enterprise of the American squadron on the Asiatic station against
the city of Manila, the capital of the Philippine Islands, colonies of
Spain in the Pacific not less valuable and productive than Cuba and
Porto Rico in the Atlantic. The Philippines had been first discovered
by Spanish adventurers and had been in the possession of the Span-
ish crown for more than four hundred years, during all of which time
the cruelty and rapacity of the sovereigns and of the Governors sent
out to administer colonial affairs, had provoked many revolutions and
uprisings. The archipelago, which consists of from 1,200 to 1,800
separate islands, only a few of which are of considerable size, con-
tains mixtures of the most savage and intractable populations in the

world. These occupy the principal islands of Luzon, Mindanao, Samar,
(81)
82 HISTORY OF THE

and Panay. Luzon has an area of about 43,000 square miles, nearly
equal to the State of Illinois; Mindanao covers about 36,000 square
miles, nearly the area of the State of Kentucky. The land area of
the archipelago is estimated at 114,000 square miles, equal to the
whole of New England and New York.

In order to comprehend the problems that confronted the American
forces in the Philippines, the peculiar contradictions of tribal prejudice
and the oppression of the Spanish Government must be considered.
The colonial government was administered by a Governor-General,
invariably selected in Spain. The place was used to réward crown
favorites who could return home after a few years of service with
enormous fortunes wrung from natives and foreign immigrants alike
by a system of taxation that savored of blackmail and confiscation.
The Governor-General had a junta or cabinet composed of the Arch-
bishop of Manila, the Captain-General of the army,and the Admiral
of the navy stationed in the colonies. The administrative power lay
with the Governor-General and the Archbishop, and the religious
orders of the Spanish Catholic Church were the practical controllers,
under their superiors, of the fortunes and the fate of every locality
and village that Spanish power had been able to subjugate to its
iron rule. The first permanent settlement of the islands had been
made by the missionaries, and upon the succession of these Philip
II. had conferred peculiar and most rigorous powers of civil and reli-
gious government, which have been little changed. The result
through four centuries was the acquisition of vast wealth by the
religious orders, the possession of well-defined incomes from monopo-
lies and collections, and the perfection of a system of espionage that
deprived the inhabitants of refuge from the rapacity of the conquer-
ors. The persistence and intolerance of the system had been secured
by excluding all native-born persons from appointment under either
the civil or church branches. All civil servants and priests were
native-born Spaniards sent out for the purpose, to take their instruc-
tions from those already adept in oppression, and ambitious to sur-
pass their predecessors in the fortunes to be accumulated for the
 

 

NATIVE HOUSES IN THE PHILIPPINES
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 85

home churches or by the court favorites who returned to Spain to
dazzle the supporters of the crown with the glories of a short term
abroad in the service of their country. The trying climate of the
Philippines, which is tropical, subjected to violent monsoons, seasons
of drenching rains, and an almost intolerable heat lasting from March
to July, has made it necessary to change continually the Spanish ad-
ministrators. From the Governor-General down to the private sol-
dier, five years was the average length of service possible, so that the
native population, estimated at from 8,000,000 to 15,000,000 in num-
bers, was always under the rule of transient strangers, having no
continuing interest in their welfare. There have been, of course,
individual instances of honorable and just governors. Among these
recognized in recent times was General Blanco, who was afterwards
selected to establish the weak experiment of autonomistic govern-
ment in Cuba. It was, however, the rule, under the very nature of
the colonial system, that temptation to oppress, rob, and enslave the
natives was held out to every administration in succession, and such
temptations are not long resisted by those appointed over uncivilized
and ignorant people.

The population of the Philippines was especially difficult to hold
in orderly government. Naturally a heterogeneous mass, the problem
of assimilating the different tribes and races would have been one
difficult to accomplish by the most patient and industrious govern-
ment, with years of application. The fiercest and most primitive
savages inhabit the scattered islands, sometimes two or more anti-
pathetic races occupying the same island and ceaselessly waging
war against each other and the government alike. The Aborigines
are called “Negritos,” or little Negroes, dwarfs, rarely exceeding five
feet in stature, intractable and wary mountaineers, indulging in the
cruelest pagan rites of sacrifice, including cannibalism, and who have
resisted conquest by retiring to mountain fastnesses, where they
have been slowly diminishing in numbers by self-extinction.

The Manthras, an equally wretched but more contemptible tribe,
are nearly as great in numbers as the Negritos. They are a cross
86 HISTORY OF THE

between the Negritos and Malays, and are more degenerate, after
being at one time warlike and aggressive. The great body of the
population is Malayan, with some Chinese and a few Japanese.

A historical writer in the French Revue des Deux Mondes has de-
scribed the most recent condition of the endless conflict in the archi-
pelago in a manner to exhibit the spirit of Spanish colonial government
as it is displayed in the capital, Manila, and in the restless and un-
conquered provinces. There, as in Europe and America, Spain set
upon every locality she occupied the indelible mark of her sinister
and unchanging intolerance and pride. In Manila, as well as in
Mexico, Panama, and Lima, was the severe and solemn aspect, the
feudal and religious stamp, which the Spaniard impresses upon his
monuments, his palaces, his dwellings in every latitude. Manila ap-
peared like a fragment of Spain transplanted to the archipelago of
Asia. On its churches and convents, even on its ruined walls, time
has laid the sombre, dull-gold coloring of the mother country. The
ancient city, silent and melancholy, stretches interminably along
gloomy streets, bordered with convents whose flat facades are only
broken here and there by a few narrow windows. It still preserved
all the austere appearance of a city of the reign of Philip II. But
there was a new city within the ramparts of Manila, sometimes called
the Escolta, from the name of its central quarter, and this city is
alive with its dashing teams, its noisy crowd of Tagal women, shod
in high-heeled shoes, and every nerve in their bodies quivering with
excitement. They are almost all employed in the innumerable cigar
factories whose output inundates all Asia. The city contained 260,000
inhabitants of every known race and color.

From Manila throughout the archipelago the religious fanaticism
of the Spaniards radiated and came into collision with manners, tra-
ditions, and a fanaticism fully as fierce as those of Spain—the im-
movable fanaticism of the Mussulman. At a distance of 6,000 leagues
from Toledo and Granada, the same ancient hatreds have brought
European Spaniard and Asiatic Saracen into the same relentless an-
‘tagonism that swayed them in the days of the Cid and Ferdinand the
MIA WYAN39

WIINVIN 40

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 89

Catholic. The island of Sulu, on account of its position between Min-
danao and Borneo, was the commercial, political, and religious center
of the followers of the Prophet, the Mecca of the extreme Orient.
From this center they spread over the neighboring archipelagoes.
Merciless pirates and unflinching fanatics, they scattered everywhere
terror, ruin, and death, sailing in their light proas up the narrow
channels and animated with implacable hatred for those conquering
invaders, to whom they never gave quarter and from whom they
never expected it. Constantly beaten in pitched battle, they as con-
stantly took again to the sea, eluding the pursuit of the heavy Span-
ish vessels, taking refuge in bays and creeks where no one could follow
them, pillaging isolated ships, surprising the villages, massacring the
old men, leading away the women and the adults into slavery, push-
ing the audacious prows of their skiffs even up to within 300 miles of
Manila, and seizing every year nearly 4,000 captives.

Between the Malay creese and the Castilian carronade the struggle
was unequal, but it did not last the less long on that account, nor,
obscure though it was, was it the less bloody. On both sides there
was the same bravery, the same cruelty. It required all the tenacity
of Spain to purge these seas of the pirates who infested them, and
it was not until after a conflict of several years, in 1876, that the
Spanish squadron was able to bring its broadsides to bear on Tianggi,
a nest of Suluan pirates, land a division of troops, invest all the out-
lets, and burn the town and its inhabitants, as well as the harbor and
all the craft within it. The soldiers planted their flag and the engi-
neers built a new city on the smoking ruins. This city was then pro-
tected by a strong garrison.

For a time, at least, piracy was at an end, but not the Moslem
spirit, which was exasperated rather than crushed by defeat. To the
rovers of the seas succeeded the organization known as juramentados.
One of the characteristic qualities of the Malays is their contempt of
death. They have transmitted it, with their blood, to the Poly-
nesians, who see in it only one of the multiple phenomena and not
the supreme act of existence, and witness it or submit to it with'
90 HISTORY OF THE

profound indifference. Travelers have often seen a Kanaka stretch his
body on a mat, while in perfect health, without any symptom of dis-
ease whatever, and there wait patiently for the end, convinced that
it is near, and refuse all nourishment and die without any apparent
suffering. His relatives say of him: “He feels he is going to die,”
and the imaginary patient dies, his mind possessed by some illusion,
some superstitious idea, some invisible wound through which life
escapes. When to this absolute indifference to death is united Mus-
sulman fanaticism, which gives to the believer a glimpse of the gates
of a paradise where the excited senses revel in endless and numberless
enjoyments, a longing for extinction takes hold of him and throws
him like a wild beast upon his enemies. The juramentado kills for
the sake of killing and being killed, and so winning, in exchange for
a life of suffering and privation, the voluptuous existence promised
by Mohammed. .

The laws of Sulu make the bankrupt debtor the slave of his cred-
itor, and not only the debtor, but the debtor’s wife and children are
enslaved also. To free them there is but one means left to the hus-
band—the sacrifice of his life. Reduced to this extremity, he does
not hesitate—he takes the formidable oath. From that time forward
he is enrolled in the ranks of the jwramentados, and has nothing to do
but await the hour when the will of a superior shall let him loose
upon the Christians. Meanwhile the panditas, or Mohammedan priests,
subject him to a system of excitement that will turn him into a wild
beast: They madden his already disordered brain, they make still
more supple his oily limbs, until they have the strength of steel and
the nervous force of the tiger or panther. They sing to him their
impassioned chants, which show to his entranced vision the radiant
smiles of intoxicating houris. In the shadow of the forests, broken
by the gleam of the moonlight, they evoke the burning and sensual
images of the eternally young and beautiful companions who are call-
ing him, opening their arms to receive him. Thus prepared, the jura-
mentado is ready for everything. Nothing can stop him, nothing can
make him recoil. He will accomplish prodigies of valor, borne along
WYCAHLVO ONIMOHS VIINVW 4O M&IlA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 93

by a buoyancy that is irresistible, until the moment when death seizes
him. He will creep with his companions into the city that has been
assigned to him; he knows that he will never leave it, but he knows,
also, that he will not die alone, and he has but one aim-—to butcher
as many Christians as he can.

When to such natural antipathies of race and religion are added
the iron oppression which Spain has always laid upon peaceful com-
merce and production, it will be secn that the colonies were in per-
petual unrest and that the colonia] authorities had little sympathy
from even the most peaceful classes. The native Spaniards resident
in the country never exceeded 10,000 in number, except on a few rare
occasions when large bodies of troops were sent out for specific serv-
ice. There are about one hundred thousand mixed descendants of
Spaniards, who were held in contempt by the natives of Spain as Span-
iards of Cuban birth were regarded in Cuba. These 10,000 Spaniards
were the civil servants and religious orders, and the favored owners
of concessions in manufacturing and planting that conferred monop-
olies; about 4,000 were soldiers garrisoning Manila and the arsenal
forts at Cavité, situated upon a point eight miles south of Manila in
the bay and intcnded to render the defense of the city unquestion-
able. In addition to the soldiers there were 2,000 sailors and marines,
manning a squadron of fourteen warships and gunboats. When war
with America was begun these forces were just recovered from the
hardships of a fierce revolution, headed by General Emilio Aguinaldo,
a native half-breed of great popularity and activity. After bloody up-
risings for independence, without money, arms, or supplies, the Span-
ish had resorted to their usual tactics of bribing the leaders and
massacring the disordered followers, duped into surrender by promises
of amnesty. The hatred of the natives was still fierce and only
awaited opportunity.and leadership to blaze with renewed fury.
94 HISTORY OF THE

Il.

Wuen Congress issued its ultimatum to Spain on April 19, the
condition of our Pacific defenses and naval force was such as to cause
nee uneasiness. San Francisco, San Diego, and other sea-

SPANIARD AND ports were nominally in a state of defense, but no more.

SMASH E™’ ‘The United States naval squadron in Asiatic waters,
commanded by Commodore George Washington Dewey, was assembled
at Hong Kong. In preparation for events it had been well supplied
with ammunition, stores, and coal. It consisted of six ships, as follows:
The Commodore’s flagship Olympia, protected cruiser of 5,900 tons, of
high speed and with heavy armament, regarded as one of the best
fighting cruisers among the navies of the world; the protected cruis-
ers Baltimore, 4,400 tons, Raleigh, 3,200 tons, Boston, 3,000 tons; the
gunboats Concord, 1,700 tons, Petrel, 890 tons. The dispatch boat Mc-
Culloch and the steamers Zafiro and Nanshan, used for supply and col-
lier, were attached to the squadron. The six fighting ships were 7,000
miles from the nearest American port base, since the United States
possessed no coaling station in the Pacific nearer than California
available for purposes of war. On the California coast were the first-
class battleship Oregon, the gunboat Marietta, and the monitors Mon-
terey and Monadnock, all purely coast defenders and all unable to
cross the Pacific upon their own coal supply. The lack of American
merchant steamers in the Pacific rendered it difficult to obtain trans-
ports and auxiliary vessels if they should be needed.

The Spanish naval force available at Manila bay, under command
of Admiral Montejo, consisted of fourteen ships and gunboats. Four
were protected cruisers, one, the flagship Reina Christina, well armed
and equipped, though of only 3,500 tons displacement. The Castilla,
Don Juan de Austria, and Velasco were smaller cruisers, and the re-
maining eight were gunboats. While the Spaniards had more vessels,
they were not as powerful in size or armament combined as the six
ships of the American squadron. They were, however, assembled in
Manila harbor, under the guns of the forts at Manila and Cavité,
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 95

with batteries on Corregidor Island, at the entrance to Manila Bay,
a position apparently impregnable if properly maintained, especially
as the approaches could be covered with mines to render entrance
dangerous.

If the Spanish fleet remained at Manila the safety of our Pacific
coast against attack was assured, but if declaration of war should be
made the American fleet would be forced to leave the neutral harbor
of Hong Kong, and, with its supply of coal, stores, and ammunition
limited, its effectiveness would also be limited to the period of con-
sumption of these articles without any available source of fresh sup-
ply. It was plain that the American squadron must sail for American
waters and act upon the defensive, or seek out the Spaniard in the
bay of Manila under the guns of his own fortresses and abide the
issue of battle. To Americans, eager to test the enemy, to authorities
fully confident of the intelligence, courage, skill, patriotism, and readi-
ness of our sailors, there was but one thing to do.

On April 25, when the declaration of war was formally made, Com-
modore Dewey received orders by cable from the President to “seek
the Spanish fleet and capture or destroy it.” The same day the British
authorities at Hong Kong, after receiving notice of the declaration of
war, notified Commodore Dewey that as Great Britain was neutral in
the conflict, his squadron would be expected to leave Hong Kong within
twenty-four hours under the rules of international agreement. The
Commodore immediately set sail without consuming the time remain-
ing to him under the rule, and rendezvoused at Mirs Bay on the Chi-
nese coast, to strip his ships for action and communicate his plans to
the officers of his ships. The plan was simplicity itself. It was to
obey orders by seeking the Spaniard, finding him as quickly as possible
and, without hesitating a moment, to “smash him” with all the might
of projectiles that the American ships could deliver. The details of
the line of battle and order of ships were also arranged and the prep-
arations aroused the sailors to great enthusiasm. George Washington
Dewey was born in Vermont of good old Puritan stock. When he
was ordered against Manila he was in his sixty-first year. A
96 HISTORY OF THE

graduate of the Naval’ Academy at Annapolis in 1858, he had served
with courage and distinction in the Civil War. He was a junior
officer on the Hartford under Admiral Farragut when that com-
mander, entering Mobile Bay and finding the bay mined with ex-
plosives that had already destroyed a ship ahead of him, had cried
out to the ship’s captain who seemed to hesitate: “Go right ahead,
Captain, damn the torpedoes!” The same laconic spirit of action
was in Commodore Dewey’s language thirty-three years later when
in Mirs Bay he told his men, “we are to seek the Spaniard and
smash him as soon as we find him.” To sailors imbued with patri-
otic pride, far from home, and who cherished a determination to
“Remember the Maine,” the promise of quick battle was full of ex-
citing recompense.

But Commodore Dewey’s plan went further than one of mere battle.
The Philippine revolutionary leader, Aguinaldo, who had found refuge
at Hong Kong, had been invited to codperate. Supplied with money.
arms, and ammunition, he and his influential followers were to be
transported to Luzon and landed. In the event of a protracted siege
or the miscarriage of plans, the Americans would thus have allies in
the rear of the Spanish army and navy, and the revolutionists under
the encouragement of new and powerful allies in front, would be able
to reduce the Spanish power to impotence for offensive action. These
arrangements were perfected in one day, and on Friday, April 29,
the American squadron sailed for Manila, distant about 700 miles, re-
quiring three days’ steaming.

The Spaniards awaited the approach of the Americans with a dis-
play of exultation. Governor-General Augusti announced that after
the expected battle Spanish cruisers would be dispatched against San
Francisco. The capture of an American trading bark by a Spanish
gunboat was made an occasion of popular rejoicing. The means
adopted to excite native hatred against the Americans by inspiring
dread of them seems incredible and would only be possible in a coun-
try where press censorship and general ignorance combine to leave
the people at the mercy of unscrupulous rulers. The Governor-
S. CRUISER OLYMPIA

 

 

 

ca — Sarl

= Te
Serre

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 99

(Jeneral issued a bombastic address in which, after declaring that
“the hour of glory had arrived,” he reveled in abuse of the Ameri-
cans :—

“The North American people, constituted of all social excrescences, have ex-
hausted our patience and provoked war by their perfidious machinations, their
acts of treachery, their outrages against the laws of nations and international con-
ventions. ‘

“Spain, which counts upon the sympathies of all nations, will emerge trium-
phant from this new test, humiliating and blasting the adventurers from those
United States that, without cohesion, offer humanity only infamous traditions and
ungrateful spectacles in her chambers, in which appear insolence, defamation, cow-
ardice, and cynicism.

“Her squadron, manned by foreigners, possessing neither instruction nor dis-
cipline, is preparing to come to this archipelago with ruffianly intention, robbing
us of all that means life, honor, and liberty, and pretending to be inspired by a
courage of which they are incapable.

“American seamen undertake as an enterprise capable of realization the sub-
stitution of Protestantism for the Catholic religion, to treat you as tribes refractory
to civilization, to take possession of your riches as if they were unacquainted with
the rights of property, to kidnap those persons they consider useful to man their
ships or to be exploited in agricultural and industrial labor.

“Vain designs, ridiculous boastings! Your indomitable bravery will suffice
to frustrate the realization of their designs. You will not allow the faith you pro-
fess to be made a mockery or impious hands to be placed on the temple of the true
God. The images you adore thrown down by the unbelief of the aggressors shall
not prove the tombs of your fathers. They shall not gratify lustful passions at the
cost of your wives’ and daughters’ honor, or appropriate property accumulated in
provision for your old age. 7

“They shall not perpetrate these crimes, inspired by their wickedness and covet-
ousness, because your valor and patriotism will suffice to punish a base people
that is claiming to be civilized and cultivated. They have exterminated the natives
of North America instead of giving them civilization and progress.”

As if the defense of Manila were a theatrical spectacle the au-
thorities sent daily to Madrid rhetorical assurances of their security
and the preparations to destroy the Americans; of the impregnabil-
ity of their fleet and forts and the patriotism of the Spaniards and
volunteers. Yet it was well known at Manila that the forts alone

mounted good modern guns, that the fleet was poorly equipped, that
5
100 HISTORY OF THE

the insurgents beleaguered the city ready to fall on when the Ameri-
can ships arrived, that the harbor contained few if any effective mines
to prevent entrance. During these days thousands of refugees left for
Hong Kong on passing ships and the price of food increased alarm-
ingly. Terror was felt by the whole population. The Spanish Admi-
ral, Montejo, whose reputation for courage was unchallenged, took his
vessels to Subic Bay, a harbor at the northern entrance to Manila
Bay, with the intention of assailing the American fleet unexpectedly
as it passed. He found only worthless defenses at Subic and brought
his ships back under the guns of Cavité, to give battle inside the bay
and support the capital defenses. This Admiral, who was called “The
Fighting Montejo” by the Spanish sailors, was at one and the same
time to prove his dauntless courage and to demonstrate his utter in-
competence to provide against surprise or to make adequate prepa-
ration for combat.

Ii.

Tue morning of Saturday, April 30, the American squadron was
sighted off Cape Bolinao and at 4 o’clock in the afternoon it rounded
eee to off Subic Bay on the sea side of the peninsula that

OF encloses the great bay of Manila on the west. The dis-
noe tance to the city of Manila was. about fifty miles. The
cruisers Boston and Concord were detailed to search Subic Bay for
the enemy, the crews of all ships standing by their guns ready to en-
gage. There was no trace of the Spaniard in Subic. It was then that -
Commodore Dewey for the first time made known to the commanders
of his ships his intention to force the entrance of Manila Bay under
cover of night, and to engage the enemy under the fire of the forts.
Slow headway was made down the coast and at 11 o’clock at night
the squadron entered the Boca Grande, the larger mouth of the two

entrances to the bay.

The bay of Manila is one of the largest and deepest harbors of the
world. It has an area of 125 square miles, with a depth approximating
 

 

 

 

ADMIRAL MONTEJO

COMMANDING SPANISH SQUADRON OESTROYED IN MANILA BAY
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 103

the ocean itself. The entrance is twelve miles wide on the south and
almost midway rise the rocky islands of Corregidor and Caballos.
Corregidor was strongly fortified, armed with heavy modern guns
and equipped with searchlights that would have enabled competent
defenders to render entering it a hazardous feat. The channel to the
north of Corregidor is called the Boca Chica, or small mouth, and
the Boca Grande is on the south.

More than twelve hours earlier the appearance of the Americans
at Cape Bolinao had been reported to the Spaniards, yet when the
squadron in order, with all lights out, and every man at his station,
turned Corregidor and headed up the Boca Grande toward the city
of Manila, there was not a Spanish patrol to give warning of its ap-
proach, and apparently no watch on Corregidor fortress or tower. On
board the American ships every man was at his post, and had been
for eighteen hours, as he was to be for eighteen hours longer, except
for brief moments of rest. Down in the engine and furnace rooms
the heat was from 125 to 160 degrees; but no engineer or stoker left
his place, save the engineer of the dispatch boat McCulloch, who
dropped dead from heart disease superinduced by the heat. This
happened as the ships were passing in.

Realizing the preparation that could be made by a warned foe,
expecting floating mines, torpedo attacks, and a plunging fire from the
lofty fortress on Corregidor, the Americans, hidden only by darkness,
slowly and silently as possible filed into the channel, led by the
flagship, and began to run the terrible gauntlet of unknown dangers
without hesitation.

Half the squadron had passed when sparks escaping from one of
the funnels were observed by the watch on Corregidor. Instantly the
guns on the fort opened fire upon the squadron, to which the Boston
and McCulloch replied with a few shots, and then silence again reigned.
Past the fort the ships slowed down to bare steerway and, all hands
resting by their guns, the squadron waited for day to dawn to begin
the terrible work that lay before it in the splendid amphitheatre of
the mountain-locked bay.
104 HISTORY OF THE

At 5 o’clock in the morning the Olympia was five miles from Ma-
nila, the spires of whose churches and the towers of whose fortresses
could be dimly seen through the glasses of the lookouts. The city
lies on the east side of the bay, about twenty-five miles from the en-
trance, situated upon a low plateau, divided by Pasig River. Volcanic
mountains enclose the coasts at varying distances. Eight miles south
of Manila, on the same side of the bay, is a low point of land pro-
jecting into the water, eked out by the construction of a breakwater,
upon which stand the arsenal and fortress of Cavité, commanding the
Spanish navy yard. Thus Manila and Cavité were within sea view
and gun range of each other, and the theatre of battle was so de-
signed that the combat might be witnessed by the 300,000 people
dwelling within range.

The American ships and the Spanish guard at Manila discovered
each other at 5 o’clock. As the lght increased the Spanish ships
were revealed lying under the guns of Cavité, in line of battle
almost east and west. At 15 minutes past 5 the light permitted ac-
tion, and three batteries of heavy guns at Manila and two at Cavité,
together with the long range guns of the Spanish ships, opened fire’
on the Americans. The shots were harmless. Two guns were fired
at Manila from our ships, but Commodore Dewey signaled orders not
to reply to Manila. It was not his intention to subject the helpless’
non-combatants of that crowded city to a bombardment, but to
“smash the Spanish fleet.” So that, while the Manila batteries kept
up a continuous fire upon our ships for two hours, without effect, no
shells were thrown into the city, which must have been a thing
greatly marveled at by those who had described the Americans as
pitiless destroyers and cruel cowards.

Under the cross-fire of the enemy Commodore Dewey formed his:
squadron for attack as coolly as if for target practice. His flagship
Olympia led, followed at regular distance in line by the Baltimore, the
Raleigh, the Petrel, the Concord, and the Boston, in the order named,
which formation was preserved without change. N otwithstanding the’
furious fire of the enemy, our ships moved steadily without replying’
po

 

 

 

 

 

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SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 107

for twenty-six minutes, steaming directly for Cavité, which was some
miles distant. Commodore Dewey, with his officers, was on the bridge
of the Olympia, and Captain Gridley, who was fighting the ship, was
in the conning tower. The day was clear and the heat intense.
On every ship the fighters were stripped to the waist, waiting with
natural impatience for firing orders, and eager for close collision in
fighting. As the Olympia steamed to the attack in the lead two
torpedo mines were exploded in her path by the Spaniards, but too
far ahead to affect her. The explosions threw enormous columns
of water to a great height. The power was sufficient to have de-
stroyed the vessel if it had been successfully managed. In spite
of these dangers, and of more to be apprehended, the Olympia
kept steadily on. No other mines were exploded, however, if any
existed.

At 41 minutes past 5 o’clock Commodore Dewey, the Olympia
then being bow on, 5,500 yards or about three miles, from the fortress
at Cavité, called out to Captain Gridley: ‘““You may fire when ready.”
A moment later one of the 8-inch guns in the forward turret belched
forth flame and steel at the flagship of Admiral Montejo. At this
signal to engage the enemy an eyewitness with the squadron reports
that from the throats of the Americans on all the ships rose a tri-
umphant cheer and the ery, “Remember the Maine.” And then,
from every ship that could train guns on the enemy, poured a rain
of shot and shell directed by men who were as deliberate and cool
as if they were at play. The deadly accuracy of American marks-
manship was exhibited under circumstances so extraordinary that it
was destined to stand without precedent or comparison in all naval
history.

Sheltered under the guns of Cavité the Spanish cruiser Castilla
lay anchored by head and stern, broadside to our fire. On either
side Admiral Montejo’s flagship, the Reina Christina, the Don Juan
de Austria, and the Velasco moved in action, while the gunboats behind
the breakwater were sheltered to some extent. The Americans at
5,500 yards filing in line past the enemy and, countermarching in a
108 HISTORY OF THE

circle that extended closer to the Spaniard at every turn, sent in
a crushing rain of fire from each broadside as it was presented.

Lieutenant L. J. Stickney, a former naval officer who was on the.
bridge of the Olympia as a volunteer aide to Commodore Dewey and
who wrote an account of the battle as a press correspondent, thus
describes the combat after the first fire of the Americans :—

“The Spaniards seemed encouraged to fire faster, knowing exactly
our distance, while we had to guess theirs. Their ships and shore
guns were making things hot for us. The piercing scream of shot
was varied often by the bursting of time fuse ‘shells, fragments of
which would lash the water like shrapnel or cut our hull and rigging.
One large shell that was coming straight at the Olympia’s forward
bridge fortunately fell within less than one hundred feet. One frag-
ment cut the rigging; another struck the bridge gratings in line with
it; a third passed under Commodore Dewey and gouged a hole in the
deck. Incidents like these were plentiful.

“Our men naturally chafed at being exposed without returning
fire from all our guns, but laughed at danger and chatted good-
humoredly. A few nervous fellows could not help dodging, mechanic-
ally, when shells would burst right over them, or close aboard, or
would strike the water, or pass overhead with the peculiar spluttering
roar,made by a tumbling rifled projectile.

“Still the flagship steered for the center of the Spanish line, and,
as our other ships were astern, the Olympia received most of the
Spaniards’ attention.

“Owing to our deep draught, Commodore Dewey felt constrained
to change his course at a distance of 4,000 yards and run parallel to
the Spanish column.

“Open with all guns,’ he ordered, and the ship brought her port
broadside bearing. The roar of all the flagship’s 5-inch rapid-firers
was followed by the deep diapason of her turret 8-inchers. Soon our
other vessels were equally hard at work, and we could see that our
shells were making Cavité harbor hotter for the Spaniards than they
had made the approach for us.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 113

“Protected by their shore batteries and made safe from close at-
tack by shallow water, the Spaniards were in a strong position. They
put up a gallant fight.

“One shot struck the Baltimore and passed clean through her,
fortunately hitting no one. Another ripped the upper main deck,
disabled a 6-inch gun, and exploded a box of 3-pounder ammunition,
wounding eight men. The Olympia was struck abreast the gun in
the wardroom by a shell, which burst outside, doing little damage.
The signal halyards were cut from the offiéer’s hand on the after
bridge. A sailor climbed up in the rain of shot and mended the
line.

“A shell entered the Boston’s port quarter and burst in Ensign
Dodridge’s stateroom, starting a hot fire, and fire was also caused
by a shell which burst in the port hammock netting. Both these
fires were quickly put out. Another shell passed through the Boston’s
foremast just in front of Captain Wildes, on the bridge.

“After having made four runs along the Spanish line, finding the
chart incorrect, Lieutenant Calkins, the Olympia’s navigator, told the
Commodore he believed he could take the ship nearer the enemy,
with lead going to watch the depth of water. The flagship started
over the course for the fifth time, running within 2,000 yards of the
enemy, followed by all the American vessels, and, as even the 6-pounder
guns were effective at such short range, the storm of shot and shell
launched against. the Spaniard was destructive beyond description.”

Two small launches were sent out from the Castilla and boldly
advanced toward the Olympia. They were supposed to be provided
with torpedoes to be discharged against the flagship. No sooner was
their purpose suspected than the small guns of the Olympia were
turned upon the two boats with deadly effect. One was riddled and
sunk at the first fire and the other, badly damaged, turned back and
sought safety.

The enemy fought with desperation. Admiral Montejo with the
Reina Christina, sallied forth from his line against the Olympia, but
was met with a concentrated fire from our ships so frightful that
114 HISTORY OF THE

he could not advance. The Reina Christina turned and made for the
breakwater when an 8-inch shell from the Olympia was sent whizzing
through her stern, penetrating the whole extent of the ship to her
engine-room where it exploded with awful destruction, setting fire to
the vessel and rendering her unmanageable.

The fire made such headway that Admiral Montejo ahandonad his
vessel and taking his flag in an open boat, was transferred to the Isla
de Cuba gunboat, whence he continued to issue his orders. It was an
act of personal bravery:so marked that it elicited admiration from all
the Americans and was especially commented upon by Commodore
Dewey in his report of the battle. Captain Cadarso, of the Reina
Christina, a Spaniard of noble family at Madrid, was mortally wounded
with many others on his ship, but refused to be carried off. He re-
mained with his men and went down with his ship. A shell entered
the magazine of the Don Juan de Austria and that vessel was blown
up. The Castella at her moorings was also on fire by this time, but
the firing from the other vessels and the forts was maintained with
wild desperation.

The heavy guns from Manila were also keeping up their attack.
Commodore Dewey sent a flag messenger to the Governor-General
bearing notice that if the firing from that quarter did not instantly
cease he would attack and shell the city. The message at once silenced
the batteries.

It was now 7:35 o’clock and the men had been in suspense or in —
exhaustive action for nearly thirty hours. During the two hours of
fighting they had been served with only a cup of coffee each. Observ-
ing the destruction in the enemy’s ranks and desiring to give him
time for reflection, but mainly to give his own men refreshment and
new strength, Commodore Dewey ordered action to cease and the ships
to retire beyond range. This they did, the squadron filing past the
Olympia with triumphant cheers and steaming across the bay followed
by the sullen fire of the enemy. The Olympia brought up the rear
and orders were issued to serve breakfast bountifully on all the

ships.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 115

While the men were refreshing themselves, the commanders of the
ships were summoned aboard the Olympia to make reports of their
condition and for conference. It was then the discovery was made—
almost incredible—that no material casualty had occurred to the
Americans during an engagement filled with such disaster to the
enemy. It seemed miraculous to have gone through a hail of fire
without one man being killed or a ship disabled. Meanwhile the
Spanish had viewed the withdrawal of our ships with exultation.
With the fatuity of over-confidence in their own courage they had
construed the American pause for rest as a retreat. To that effect
they cabled the Spanish Government, where the news caused excited
rejoicings. The Minister of Marine cabled a message of bombastic
compliments to Admiral Montejo upon the glory of Spanish sailors.
While these messages were yet passing under the ocean the second
attack was in progress that was to turn exultation to despair and set
the Spanish populace at Madrid on fire with angry protests of TECER
tion and betrayal.

After three and a half hours of recuperation, the American squad-
ron got under way at a quarter past eleven o’clock and advanced
again to attack the enemy. Buoyed up by the early morning results,
the gunners aimed with perfect deliberation and, under orders for
“close action,” the line steamed up as near as the water-depth per-
mitted, and poured a remorseless fire into the enemy’s ships that were
now replying slowly. But the guns of Cavité were hard at work and
the Baltimore was ordered to silence the arsenal. The bay was filled
with smoke, and into this the Baltimore steered straight for the point
of attack. When close up she opened all her batteries, and in a mo-
ment the powder magazine of the arsenal blew up with a deafening
roar, and the battery of Cavité was destroyed.

The Boston, Concord, and Petrel were ordered to enter the bay and,
destroy the ships there. The Petrel being of very light draught was
able to penetrate behind the breakwater up to the gunboats. The
Spaniards on board made haste to surrender, and their ships were
then scuttled and fired. The only ship left was a transport belonging
116 HISTORY OF THE

to the coast survey, and she was taken possession of by our forces.
At 40 minutes past 12 o’clock, the Spanish flag had been hauled down
from Cavité and the white flag of surrender was flying. The Olympia
stood off towards Manila, leaving the other vessels to take care of the
wounded on shore.

In this battle the Spanish lost the following vessels: Reina Chris-
tina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, sunk; Don Juan de Austria, Isla de
Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lezo, Marquis del Duero, El Correo, Velasco
and Isla de Mindanao, burned; the Manila and several tugs and launches
captured. There were about 1,000 Spaniards killed in the engagement
and more than 600 wounded, among the latter Admiral Montejo and
his son, a lieutenant, both slightly. The wounded were removed to
the arsenal in Cavité, where they were attended by the American
surgeons, who gave their skill, science, and labor to succor the unfor-
tunate. Yet while this work of humanity was in progress the Arch-
bishop of Manila was issuing a pastoral letter to his flock in which
he called upon all Christians in the island to defend the faith against
heretics who designed to erect an insuperable barrier to salvation,
intending to enslave the people and forbid the sacraments of bap-
tism, matrimony, and burial, and the consolation of absolution. He
declared that if the Americans were allowed to possess the islands,
altars would be desecrated and the churches changed into Protes-
tant chapels. Instead of there being pure morality, as then existed,
examples of vice only would be inculcated. He closed by appointing
May 17 as a day of rejoicing over the renewed consecration of the
islands to the sacred heart of Jesus.*

Commodore Dewey sent a message to Governor-General Augusti
in Manila proposing to be permitted to use the submarine cable to .
Hong Kong for the purpose of communicating his reports to the Gov-
ernment at Washington. Augusti refused the permission and Com-
modore Dewey cut the cable, thus rendering impossible all communi-
cation with the world except by mail, by way of Hong Kong, three

* Translation cabled from Hong Kong, May 17, 1898.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 117

days’ sail distant. He then sat down before Manila to await reén-
forcements and orders, the revolutionists under General Aguinaldo
cutting off all supplies from the landside, and investing the city in
effective siege.

Iv.

Tuer impression made upon the United States and upon Europe
by the battle of Manila was in an unexpected degree momentous.
The extraordinary nature of the victory won by Com- aie eae
modore Dewey’s squadron,—in which the enemy had THE MANILA
1,400 men killed and wounded, lost fourteen ships, Wpeenene
valued at millions of dollars, vast stores of coal, supplies, guns, and
equipments, together with a great colonial possession of enormous
wealth and resources, without the loss of one man or one ship by
the victors,—filled the world with amazement and admiration, and
caused the United States to ring with enthusiasm for the cool and
intrepid commander and his brave sailors. The first news received
was through distorted sources at Madrid, where reports came from
Manila speaking of glorious action by the Spaniards and confessing
Spanish losses by piecemeal. Accustomed to the mendacity of Spanish
reports and the duplicity of the officials discharging the function of
supervising all information concerning the war, the Englsh-written
press of the world eked out from the involved mass of incoherent
exultation and evasion the central fact of a sweeping American vic-
tory. The moment this was recognized all possibility of obtaining
details was destroyed by the cutting of the cable. For a week there
was suspense, during which the fact of American victory was con-
firmed by desperate rioting in Madrid caused by the Spanish people
discovering that their losses were greater than Sefior Sagasta and his
advisers had admitted.

On May 8 the dispatch boat McCulloch arrived at Hong Kong
from Manila with the first official reports from Commodore Dewey.
They consisted of two brief messages, but no commander ever con-
veyed to his country so much information in detail of such wonderful
118 HISTORY OF THE

achievement in fewer words. The first message, dated Manila, May 1,
but sent only when the second was forwarded, was as follows :—
“Squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged
the enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels: Reina Christina, Castilla,
Don Antonio de Ulloa, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lezo, Marques
del Duero, Correo, Velasco, Isla de Mindanao, a transport and a water battery at
Cavité. The squadron is uninjured, and only a few men are slightly wounded. Only

means of telegraphing is to the American consul at Hong Kong. I shal] communicate
with him.”

The second, dated at Cavité, May 4, completed his record of the
action :—

‘“‘T have taken possession of the naval station at Cavité and destroyed its fortifi-
cations. Have destroyed fortifications at the bay entrance, paroling the garrison.
I control the bay completely, and can take the city at any time. The squadron is in
excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not fully known, but very heavy ; 150
killed, including the Captain of the Reina Christina. J am assisting in protecting the
Spanish sick and wounded ; 250 sick and wounded in hospital within our lines. Much
excitement at Manila. Will protect foreign residents.”

With these came columns of press reports of the victory. The
suspense of a week to Americans accustomed to the procurement and
immediate publication of all news at every hazard and at any cost,
found relief in a national outburst of praise of the victorious com-
mander and the officers and men of his squadron. In every city and
hamlet the news fired the popular imagination. ‘Dewey day” was
set apart in many cities and towns, and school children rehearsed pa-
triotic speeches and songs. Naval authorities of the world testified to
the completeness of the demonstration of American fighting ability and
to the unprecedented annihilation of an adversary in his own fastness
without the slightest loss in return. It was conceded that the name
of Dewey was enrolled among the names of immortal naval command-
ers. The Secretary of the Navy, upon the receipt of Commodore
Dewey’s reports, cabled to him and his men, in the President’s name,
the thanks of the American people for the “splendid achievement
and overwhelming victory,” in recognition of which he appointed
Commodore Dewey an Acting-Admiral. On the following Monday
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 119

the President sent a message to Congress recommending the adoption
of a vote of thanks. “The magnitude of this victory,” said the Presi-
dent in his message, “can hardly be measured by the ordinary stand-
ards of naval warfare. Outweighing any material advantage is the
moral effect of this initial success. With this unsurpassed achieve-
ment, the great heart of our nation throbs, not with boasting or with
greed of conquest, but with deep gratitude that this triumph has come
in a just cause, and that by the grace of God an effective step has thus
been taken toward the attainment of the wished-for peace. To those
whose skill, courage, and devotion have won the fight, the gallant com-
mander and the brave officers and men who aided him, our country
owes an incalculable debt.”

To the American people the victory at Manila was indisputable
proof of the superiority of American training, discipline, intelligence,
mechanical skill, and courage over the ignorant and undisciplined
bravery of the Spaniard. The capacity of the free volunteer in the
regular branches of armed science as against the forced conscription
of the continental systems was again established, and the people looked
now confidently to see the same spirit exhibited in the army organiz-
ing to occupy Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. To those coun-
tries that believed the American navy to be manned by foreigners
and mercenaries disinclined to stand up at the critical moment, the
lesson was startling.

The practical results of the combat at Manila were thus stated by
Mr. Beach, an engineer officer on the Baltimore during the battle.
In writing home after the event he said :—

1

* We feel that we have had a great victory here, which we ascribe to several
causes. First, the Spaniard is always behind the times. He knew that an Ameri-
can fleet was expected and was so sure of his tremendous superiority that he took
absolutely no precaution. The night we ran by the forts (in the early morning of
the engagement) the Spanish officers were all at a grand ball. The entrance to the
harbor was planted with torpedoes; he thought that was enough, and had no patrol,
picket boats, or torpedo boats on watch. The result is that we ran by their mag-
nificent guns guarding the entrance to Manila Bay, and were out of range inside
before the Spaniards knew it.
120 HISTORY OF THE

“ Another reason for our success was due to Commodore Dewey’s orders. Not
one of the ships had any intimation that we would run by the forts as we did
until thirty miles away. We were by the Spanish forts and at the fleet by 5:30
A.M. on Sunday, May 1. They were ten fighting ships strong, carrying 116 modern
guns, to which we opposed a superior fleet of six ships carrying 135 guns. Two
of their ships were over 3,200 tons displacement, and the rest were modern gun-
boats. This fleet was assisted by batteries on shore armed with modern guns,
which made their guns superior in number to ours. In number of men engaged,
they were undoubtedly far superior to us. The Spaniards were absolutely confi-
dent of victory. No other outcome was anticipated by them; no preparation was
made fora different result. I think that their ships, combined with their forts, made
them equal to us, so far as powers of offense and defense were concerned. They
had as many modern guns approximating to the same size as we had, and more
men to fire them. They should have been able to have fired as much weight of
shot in a specified time as we did.

“The whole result, in other words, lay in the fact that it was the American
against the Spaniard. Every shot fired from our fleet was most deliberately, coolly,
and pitilessly aimed. The Spaniards fired an enormous number of times, but with
apparently the most impracticable aim. Shells dropped all around our ship; we
were in action for over four hours; hundreds of shot and shell fell close to us.
Only five or six pierced us, and they did no damage.

“The damage done by our ships was frightful. JI have visited all of the sunken
Spanish ships, and, had I not seen the effects of American marksmanship, I would
hardly give credit to reports of it. One smokestack of the Castil/a, a 3,300-ton
Spanish ship, was struck eight times, and the shells through the hull were so many
and so close that it is impossible that a Spaniard could have lived on her deck.
The other large ship, the Reina Christina, was perforated in the same way. We
did not employ much tactics because there wasn’t much need for them. There
were the enemy, and we went for them bullheadedly and made them exceedingly
sick.

“The lesson I draw from the fight is the great utility of target practice. The
Spaniard has none; we have it every three months. Strengths of navies are com-
pared generally ship for ship; the personnel is just as important. I am confident
that had we manned the Spanish ships and had the Spaniards manned our fleet,
the American side would have been as victorious as it was. The Spaniard cer-
tainly was brave, for he stuck to his guns to the last.”

The effect of such a crushing defeat upon Spain was correspond-
ingly disheartening. The riots that ensued in her principal cities
compelled the government to proclaim martial law in several prov-
inces. In the Cortes the opposition taunted the Government with
 

 

 

 

 

DEPARTURE OF UNITED STATES TROOPS FOR MANILA
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 123

incapacity and supineness, and recrimination became both bitter and
loud. The government had not counted upon nor made plans in the
event of defeat any more than had its officials in the Philippines.
Yet, with the usual methods of influencing the Spanish people through
its power of suppressing or manipulating information in the press,
the Cabinet turned to Admiral Cervera’s squadron, yet lingering at
the Cape Verde Islands, and made ostensible preparations for reprisal.

The threat of sending to the Philippines a new Spanish fleet, much
stronger in fighting power than Commodore Dewey’s, awoke the Amer-
icans to immediate action. The President assigned General Wesley
A. Merritt to the command of an army corps of occupation to proceed
at once to the support of our fleet at Manila. The forces were to con-
sist of 4,000 regulars and 16,000 volunteer troops, to be accompanied
by the cruiser Charleston, and the monitors Monterey and Monadnock.
Upon General Merritt was conferred also the supreme power of
Military Governor of the Philippines, and an establishment of aides
was created to seize and administer the government of those islands
under the military laws of the United States as applied to conquered
territory. The preparations were carried forward with utmost speed
and in a few weeks the first division of the new army was upon the
Pacific, preceded by the Charleston with supplies of ammunition and
stores in convoy.

The step toward holding the Philippines as a conquered territory
was not less momentous than the actual destruction of the enemy’s
forces at Manila. It intimated the acquirement by America of col-
onies in Asiatic waters, so rich, so potential of power and development,
that it injected into the Oriental questions occupying European
diplomacy a shock of vital change so startling that the purposes of the
United States at once became the absorbing problem of the world’s
great chancelleries. For that moment the fate of Spain was dwarfed
in interest beside the question: What will the United States do with
the Philippines? The progress of this question, the most novel and
far-reaching that had come upon the country, must, however, be
treated in its proper place.
CHAPTER THE FOURTH.

Tue BiLookapE oF CuBA.

Firsr Work or ApmiraL SAmpson’s SQUADRON — How THE BLOCKADE OF Havana WAS RE-
CEIVED BY THE Two Warrinc NATIONS AND IN HAVANA— THE PROBLEMS OF WAR IN
THE ATLANTIC — SPANISH Spits DISCOVERED AND CAPTURED — THE BOMBARDMENT OF
MatTanzas—'‘'THE Maranzas Mute” ENTERS INTO History — THE AMERICAN
BaptisM OF BLoop aT CARDENAS—D£EATH OF ENSIGN BAGLEY AND THE
REPpULSE OF THE WINSLOW — UNIMPORTANT EVENTS OF THE WAR.

I.

HE magnificent victory of Dewey’s squadron at Manila was won
at exactly the opportune moment. The intrepidity, no less
than the unexampled skill, of American gunners and sailors
so gloriously demonstrated, gave patience for the hard labor

of war that was to be undertaken in the work of driving the Span-
iards out of Cuba. The first step was taken when, on April 22, part
THE Btockapr Of the squadron under Acting Rear-Admiral Sampson
een began the blockade of Havana and other Cuban ports.

The destruction of Spain’s power in Cuba was the chief
object of the war, and in the Atlantic Ocean and on Cuban soil the
naval and military spirit of both countries could be exhibited upon
a larger scale than elsewhere. The blockade of Havana and its trib-
utary ports was therefore an act to challenge at once the vitality of
Spanish power. Havana was the keystone of this power in the West
Indies. Its large population and vast commerce made it the seat of
opulence, and the strongest fortifications and largest garrisons were
to be found there. If Spain intended to hold Cuba, she must hold
Havana. She could only hold Havana by sending constant reénforce-
ments of troops, with fresh supplies of food and ammunition to main-
tain them. The first object of the United States, therefore, was to

prevent at all hazards the landing of troops and supplies by Spain.
(124)
AVG AHL SSOYOV WOYS VNVYONVd VNVAVH

 

 

 

 

 
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 127

For this reason Sampson’s squadron was ordered to blockade Havana
as the initial act of war, on April 22.

The following day the President issued a proclamation declaring
the blockade to be enforced against all ports on the north coast be-
tween Cardenas and Bahia Honda, including Havana, and of the port
of Cienfuegos on the south coast. From these ports there were rail-
ways to Havana that would enable Spain, by landing supplies at any
one of them, to succor the capital. If supplies were landed else-
where it would be difficult, if not impossible, to transport them to
Havana on account of a lack of railway facilities and because the
Cuban insurgents could be depended upon to intercept them. The
closing of Havana harbor and the harbors of its tributary towns at
once put the Spanish army in Cuba upon its own resources for
maintenance. or rendered it necessary for Spain to force her way

~ into Havana by the aid of her navy, then in home waters.

The problems of the Atlantic were easily apparent. If Spain sent
her navy with troops and supplies to the assistance of Cuba, a great
decisive naval battle must be fought in Cuban waters. If she divided
her naval force and sent one squadron to Havana and the other to
attack the American coast cities on the north, she would divide the
American naval force by the necessity of repelling each movement.
The Flying Squadron of Spain was that under Admiral Cervera at
the Cape Verde Islands; her heavily armored squadron was in Spanish
harbors under the command of Admiral Camara. The latter squadron
was not in readiness for action, but, by strict censorship of all tele-
graph and mail channels of communication. the Spanish Government
at first succeeded in concealing this fact.

To meet the problem, therefore, Admiral Sampson was sent to
blockade Havana, while Commodore Schley, with a small number of
battleships and cruisers, waited in Hampton Roads, ready to sail north
or south, to aid Sampson, or to repel any descent that might be at-
tempted upon the northern coasts by the Spanish ships.

The uneasiness of the American authorities was great, and it was
skillfully promoted by Spanish artifice. The Spanish minister, Sefior

&
128 HISTORY OF THE

Polo y Bernabe, on leaving Washington had gone to Canada, accom-
panied by his secretary, Sefior Dubosc, and his naval attaché, Lieutenant
Carranza. There the two latter succeeded in arranging an ingenious
system of spies and manufacturers of false intelligence, aided by Span-
ish representatives abroad, by which the press was kept excited with
reports of Spanish cruisers and other war vessels on the North At-
lantic steamer chart line and off the Canadian and eastern coasts.

One of Carranza’s spies, George Downing, who had been employed
as a steward on the United States cruiser Brooklyn, and who had been
discharged for causing trouble, was arrested in Washington and his
papers seized. The next day he committed suicide by hanging him-
self in prison, but his papers enabled the secret service officers to en-
trap Carranza and obtain a private letter which he had written to a
friend in Spain, criticising the acts and personal characters of Spanish
leaders, admitting that he was engaged in Canada perfecting a spy
system, and confessing that Downing had been in his pay. This, al-
though it occurred several weeks after war began and is in this place
an anticipation of events, caused the Canadian Government to send
Dubose and Carranza out of the Dominion. But their activity for
three or four weeks served to keep the newspapers filled with false
rumors and kept the cities of the eastern coast excited with fears that
had no real cause. It also deterred the Navy Department from con-
centrating its vessels for a descent upon Cuba in overwhelming force.

The vital problem remained unaltered by all the incidental possi-
bilities: Spain must relieve and rescue Havana if she meant to retain
possession of Cuba.

The sailing of Sampson’s squadron on the morning of April 22
was, therefore, of profound significance to America, to Spain, and to
Cuba. In Washington the excitement and satisfaction were uncon-
cealed and all over the country the stars and stripes were unfurled,
municipal bodies, associations and crowds of people assembling in
the streets to give expression to their patriotism and to emphasize
their approval of the first act of the war. Business corporations and
firms allowed leave of absence to employees, upon full salary, to go
HYOSaYVH YNVAVH OL SONVALNS SHL DNIGNYWWOO

SILSVO OYYON

 

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 181

with their militia organizations to fight for the freedom of Cuba.
Similiar outbursts of national feeling occurred in the cities of Spain.

That evening in Havana all factions of the Spanish loyalists
united in a great demonstration of fealty to the crown. The news-
paper El Correo issued the call in a flaming article full of denuncia-
tion of “the treacherous perfidy of a country that does not deserve
to be called civilized, because its base and cowardly crimes are the
shame of mankind.” It called on all faithful Spaniards to unite in
the war-cry “down with the foreigner!” The theatres were crowded,
patriotic plays were performed and patriotic songs were sung until
the singers were hoarse. But Cuban families were leaving by every
ship that could clear, and thousands of refugees hurried out of the
citadel of Spanish power in Cuba. A number of Spanish officials also
deserted their posts and sought safety in flight. This caused great
indignation and in all the patriotic shops articles of women’s apparel
were displayed in the windows placarded “for sale to men who wish
to run away like women.”

Captain-General Blanco issued an address urging all Cubans, with-
out regard to past differences, to rally against the invader. “If the
United States,” he said, “wish the island of Cuba, let them come and
take it. Perhaps the hour is not far distant when these Carthagin-
ians of America will meet their Zama in this land of Cuba, which
Spain discovered, settled, and civilized, and which can never be any-
thing but Spanish. To arms, then! Fellow-citizens, to arms! There
will be room for all in the fight. Let all contribute and codperate
with like firmness and enthusiasm to resist the eternal enemies of
the Spanish name.”

At night he addressed the crowds asking them to resist to the
death. The populace answered with cheers and shouts. He con-
tinued, holding the national flag in his hand: “I swear to die before
I will abandon Cuba, leaving this flag dishonored. The hour has
come for us to avenge the wrongs and insults of sixty years. If they
want Cuba, let them come and take it. We will kick them into
the sea!”
132 HISTORY OF THE

This was the,.spirit in which Havana received the announcement
of the sailing of the American fleet.

Acting Rear-Admiral Sampson had been chosen by the President
to command the squadron operating in Cuba, over the heads of several
officers his superior in rank and in length of service. The selection
was made because of Sampson’s reputation as a careful and safe
strategist and his qualities as an executive commander. Bred to the
navy he had been in the Civil War and had served at Annapolis
Academy as head of the department of chemistry and physics. He
was recognized as a master of ordnance, as well as a serious, accurate,
and just man, having a sterling sense of responsibility and unflinch-
ing readiness to bear it. His task was to isolate Havana from re-
énforcement by Spain and from supplies from any source outside its
own provinces.

About sunset on Friday, April 22, part of the American squadron
arrived before Havana. It consisted of the flagship New York, the
battleships Jowa and Indiana, and four smaller vessels. From all the
forts of Havana three warning shots were fired to notify the citizens
of the arrival of the enemy. The streets were instantly crowded with
people, and with soldiers going to quarters, and the excitement of ex-
pected attack was at the highest pitch. General Blanco and his staff
made the rounds of the defenses, animating the soldiers, reassuring
the citizens.

In this beautiful and ancient city of America, filled with all the
luxury and squalor characteristic of Spanish civilization, there was
much that was sacred to the memories and traditions of the people
of the United States—much that had stirred their resentment and
indignation. There was the Cathedral in which the bones of Colum-
bus had lain so long, the very cradle of our infancy; there were
magnificent public and private buildings, the institutions of those
arts that spring naturally from the hearts of the Latins. There
were 50,000 regular troops to defend it, besides the splendid for-
tresses at Morro Castle, at Cabanas, and at Santa Clara. These had
been deemed impregnable for nearly a century. In the beautiful
 

 

 

TOMB OF COLUMBUS, IN THE CATHEDRAL, HAVANA
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 135

harbor was concealed a forest of dynamite mines, such as that one
which had wrought international and unpardonable murder on the
Maine. Havana, the beautiful, the luxurious, the romantic, the squalid,
and the tyrannous, was defended by the concentrated courage and in-
genuity of the flower of Spanish strength.

The possible bombardment of such a capital was indeed momen-
tous to its inhabitants.

An eyewitness of the scenes that night has reported what the
Havanese saw and felt when the American ships stood off the entrance
to the harbor :—

“The sky and the shore line were pierced with great light beams of the search-
lights that swept to and fro and up and down, Now they rested on the stone walls
of Morro, now on ships in the harbor, and then on the buildings ashore. The sur-
face of the water was always alight with them, and there was not an object afloat
that was not covered by them. There were five of these light beams, and at the
end of each could be made out the dim outlines of a ship. What ships they were
no one could tell, but their purpose could not be mistaken. They stood well out
to sea, and they passed constantly up and down before the entrance to the harbor.
Never for an instant did the light beams disappear, and never was the surface of
the water unlighted by them.

“Again and again during the night the guns of Morro and Cabanas blazed
out the warning, and each signal was greeted in the city with renewed excitement.
From the moment of the firing of the first guns the streets were alive. Squads
and companies of soldiers marched and countermarched in the squares. The roll
of the drum was almost continuous, and was accompanied by the bugle call to
arms. The people were wild, some of them with fear, but most of them with
patriotism. The frightened ones hid in cellars and in attics. Some of them fled
the city, preferring to trust themselves to the insurgent bands that swarm about
the province rather than to chance it in a bombardment by the American fleet that
they were sure would follow the dawn of day.

“As the night wore on the excitement increased. At the forts every soldier
was working at the big guns, getting them in shape to withstand the attack of the
morning. The volunteers were there in such crowds that the regular soldiers fell
over them in their work, and they cursed and swore at each other as they damned
the ‘pigs’ of Yankees and told each other what they would do when day broke.

“All night long the people swarmed the streets and the river fronts. They
crowded the roofs of buildings as well. They demanded impatiently that the forts
should open fire and sink the ships, though they knew that the squadron was be-
yond the reach of the guns.
136 HISTORY OF THE

“Dawn came at last, and at the first sign of it the big light beams went out
and the ships that could now be plainly seen steamed off to the east. Why they
left or where they were going no one knew, but the Spaniards said the command-
ers were cowards, and that they were fleeing because they knew that with the light
the big guns of the forts would sink them.

“The excitement and apprehension of the night changed to joy and men
hugged each other and laughed and shouted at what they thought an evidence of
fear. Some of them went home satisfied that there would be no more seen of them.

“The morning wore away and noon came. There was still no sign of the boats.
But at three o’clock this afternoon the lookouts at the forts saw the black smoke of
five ships on the horizon to the east. They reported to the Captain-General. A
few minutes later it was plainly seen that the smoke came from the visitors of the
gain crowded -into the

s
streets, women and children as well as men. Workingmen and business men left

night before, and again the warning guns sounded. People a,

their work and seized their guns and rushed again for the forts. The water front
was lined and jammed in less time than it takes to tell it. The rolling of the
drums and the bugle calls began again, and the marching and countermarching of
the soldiers went on.

“The ships loomed up on the horizon bigger and bigger. They seemed headed
straight for the big guns of Morro, and the soldiers manned the guns and pre-
pared for an assault. But the chance never came. By 5 o'clock all five of the
ships were directly off the entrance to the harbor, but they were still out of gun-
shot and they resumed their pacing up and down of the previous night.

“As darkness came the big beams of light shone again. But one ship came
into the harbor after the warships were sighted. She was the Italian warship
Giovanni Bausan. When she was still some distance out the roaring of guns
could be heard and puffs of smoke could be seen coming from near the bow of
the ship. There were answering puffs from one of the five ships. This all added
to the excitement, and the report started and went through the city like wildfire
that the boat, which had not then been identified, was a Spanish warship and was
giving battle to the fleet. But the sound of the guns and the puffs of smoke died
out quickly, and as the strange boat approached the Italian flag was run up and
the people learned what she was and that she had merely been saluting, but they
wouldn’t believe it. They were sure she had fired on the fleet. They prepared
to give her a welcome. As she passed the fortifications her sailors yelled, ‘ Long
live Spain,’ and cheered the Spanish flag. This set everybody wild with entbu-
siasm. It led to a demonstration on the French cruiser F'/ton, which was in port,
and the Frenchmen cheered for Spain, too.

“The crowds continued in the streets all night and the excitement kept up.
By the moving of the beams of light it could be seen that the warships were con-
stantly shifting their position. Up in the top of the foremast of each signal lights
could be seen changing constantly from red to white or blue, and it was evident
YNVAVH ‘SLAId WSL 13

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 139

that the commanders of the ships were continually communicating with each other,
but of course the signals could not be read, though the officers at the forts tried
to decipher them.”

It was not the purpose of the United States, however. to wage a
war of destruction against either the lives or the property of non-
combatants in Cuba. Havana was not to be bombarded, unless all
other means of bringing Spain to reason proved fruitless. But the
blockade established was rigidly maintained, and no troops, supplies,
or food could reach Havana.

This blockade soon became monotonous and the crews grew rest-
less. The only incidents were prize captures of Spanish vessels. The
New York had taken one, the Pedro, just as the squadron reached
Havana. The fine Spanish merchantman took the desperate chance
of attempting to escape to Spain at the very moment of investment,
but was run down and sent to Key West as a prize.

An incident that served to excite popular expectation of trouble
with France grew out of the capture of the French steamer La Fayette,
which was bound from Spanish ports with passengers and food for
Havana. She left the Spanish port of Corunna two days after war
began, and while she was crossing the French Government requested
the American Government to permit her to discharge her passengers
at Havana, promising that none of the cargo should be taken off.
Our authorities consented to the arrangement and sent notice to that
effect to Admiral Sampson. By miscarriage the notice did not come
to Admiral Sampson until after the La Fayette appeared and steamed
towards the harbor. The Frenchman was warned by several blank
shots, but he paid no attention until a solid shot crossed his bows and
a shell whistled dangerously near his bridge. Then he hove to and
made vigorous protest. He had not heard of the blockade. His ship
was sent under a prize crew to Key West where its arrival caused a
sensation. As soon as the news reached Washington the ship was
released by order of the Secretary of the Navy and permission was
granted to her to proceed to Havana under the original agreement.
The Frenchman landed his passengers at Havana and was so greatly
140 HISTORY OF THE

impressed with the quiet release given to him that he ascribed it to
American fear of France. He was proceeding to discharge his cargo,
also, in which event he would have been seized as he came out, but
the French consul interfered and compelled him to restore all cargo
and leave port according to agreement. There was no ill feeling
between the two governments over this comedy of errors, but for two
or three days there was excited gossip over the possibilities.

Ii.

A werk of suspense and inaction was passed by the blockading
squadron. Not a hostile gun had been fired, not even target practice

THE FIRST was achieved. Admiral Sampson had heen directed to
nant ae keep his ships at a sufficient distance from the Havana
DEATH fortifications and others of a formidable character, in

order that the efficiency of his squadron might not be impaired while
the Spanish naval force under Cervera remained intact at St. Vincent
and Cadiz. But it was not intended that Admiral Sampson should
remain silent against the barking of Spanish coast defense guns. Such
a policy would make the enemy confident that the American vessels
could be shot at without fear of receiving a shot in return, and, besides,
it would probably cause the excellent state of discipline now main-
tained on the blockading squadron to deteriorate. The men were
already restless, when, on April 27, the flagship New York, the monitor
Puritan, and the Cincinnati steamed off Matanzas Bay to reconnoitre
the fortifications and works that were being strengthened and con-
structed.

Matanzas is fifty-two miles east of Havana, on the San Juan River,
and is the most important commercial point in Cuba after the cap-
ital. It has a population of about 35,000, and the city, situated up
the bay and protected by forts on the small bluffs on the coast, is
built of stone and ornamented with handsome structures.

The point furthest out from Matanzas, where the Spaniards had
been building fortifications, was Point Rubalcava. It is to the west
YNVAVH ‘OGVYd SHL NI ANLVLS NVIGNI SHI

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 143

of the harbor. and out from the entrance about three miles. The
next nearest point was Point Maya, which is four miles from Point
Rubalcava, on the east side of the harbor and directly at the entrance,
four miles from Matanzas, which is at the head of the bay. The New
York ran provokingly near to the first of these fortifications, and in
a few minutes there was a puff of smoke from Point Rubalcava, fol-
lowed by the roar of a heavy gun and the whistle of a shell. At the
same time there was another puff of smoke to the east, near Point
Maya, and the roar of another gun. It was the expected Spanish
marksmanship and the shells went ludicrously wide of the mark.

Instantly the three American ships answered with Yankee accu-
racy. Going in as close as the water depth permitted, they poured
in broadsides that demolished the fortifications, while not one shot of
the enemy touched a ship. After fifteen minutes of this kind of target
practice, during which a number of Spanish soldiers were killed, the
signal to cease firing was given, since the work of days on the forts
had been knocked down in a few minutes.

As the signal flew up the halyards on the New York the perfection
of American marksmanship was displayed by a gunner on board the
Puritan. At the very moment Rubalcava fired her last shot. The
Puritan was a long distance away, but her marksman saw the smoke
puff out and aimed for that spot with one of the big 12-inch guns.
The aim was magnificent. The huge 1,000-pound shell of the Puritan
struck exactly in the centre of the ring of smoke, hit the cannon from
which it had come, smashed it, and drove on into the earthworks,
carrying destruction even before it exploded. When it exploded it
seemed to those who were watching the shot as if about all the forti-
fications that remained had vanished into dust. A British artillery
officer who was present declared, in an account to the press, that it
was the most marvelous exhibition of accurate gunnery in the history
of gun firing.

The first humor of the war appeared in this action. “The Ma-
tanzas Mule”? became famous in verse and in simile. The Spanish
Government, pursuing its usual policy of concealing all facts, gave
144 HISTORY OF THE

out what purported to be General Blanco’s official report of the bom-
bardment of Matanzas, in which it was gravely declared that the
American shells did no damage to the city, but that a mule on the
beach had been killed. The American sense of humor seized on
this and “the Matanzas Mule” became a figure in history.

From this time forward there was “target practice” for all the
ships patrolling the coast against fortifications and against Spanish
soldiers that were kept on guard to resist any effort at landing parties
to carry supplies to insurgents in the interior. Meanwhile the news
of the Manila victory had come and the seamen were restive for an
opportunity to repeat in Cuban waters the intrepid work that de-
stroyed Montejo at Cavité.

The first American sailors to find in death the baptism of hero-
ism were killed in a battle between small ships in Cardenas harbor,
on the north coast, the 11th of May. The gunboat Machias, the torpedo
boats Winslow and Foote, and the revenue tug Hudson were blockading
Cardenas in the harbor of which were three Spanish gunboats. On
the 11th the cruiser Wi/mington arrived off the harbor and Commander
Merry of the Machias and Captain Todd of the Wilmington decided
to send the torpedo boats into the harbor and cut out or destroy the
Spanish craft which were coming out and menacing our boats. The
Wilmington could not enter on account of her draught and the pres-
ence of mines in the main channel. The Winslow entered the harbor
at; full speed after a Spanish gunboat, and immediately the vessels
of the enemy and a shore battery opened a raking fire upon her, to
which the Wins/ow and the Wilmington both replied. The Spaniards
concentrated their whole attention upon the Winslow.

There followed forty minutes in which American heroism and cour-
age rose to splendid heights as described by the reports of the fight.
The first shot from the enemy fell among the buoys in the harbor.
The next tore through the flimsy hull of the torpedo boat, wreck-
ing the steam steering gear forward and rendering the boat unman-
ageable. The Spanish trap had caught its victim. The decoy gunboat
had lured the fierce little fighter to within range of the shore guns.
YNVAVH ‘ONISVO SHL NI YOCIHHOO

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 147

The red buoys marked the range. The Winslow could not escape,
and it was a fight then to the death. Her three little 1-pound guns
began to hurl back missiles at the gunboat, which was now’ adding
its share to the firing.

Again and again the shells crashed into the Winslow. A splinter
flying from the. deck struck Lieutenant John J. Bernadou, the brave
commander of the little craft, just below the groin in the right leg.
He wrapped a towel about it, using an empty l-pound shell for a
tourniquet, and went on with his duty as commander. When he
found that his steam steering gear was gone he rushed aft to arrange
the hand gear. A shot wrecked that, too. Steam was already pouring
out of a perforated boiler below and the men were coming up. An-
other shot and the port engine was wrecked. Then went the fore-
castle gun. But still the brave men kept firing with their two
remaining 1-pounders.

Help was coming, for the little Hudson was steaming in at full
speed, and the Wilmington’s 4-inch guns were dropping shells all about
the murderous battery ashore.

Amidships, near the ammunition stand, was Ensign Worth Bagley
calling down to the engineer to back and go ahead with his one re-
maining engine in his effort to spoil the Spaniards’ aim. All the
electrical contrivances were wrecked, so the orders went by word of
mouth. By the Ensign were working a half dozen of his men. No
one had yet been killed, although the craft had been riddled through
and through. Then came a shell that struck squarely on the deck and
exploded as it fell. The Hudson was by this time so close that her
crew could hear the words of the men as they went to their death.

“Save me! Save me!” shouted one poor fellow, with his face all
torn, as he staggered back and all but fell into the sea. Some one
reached an arm to him, caught him by a leg, pulled him back, and
laid him on the deck, dead. Ensign Bagley had thrown his hands
into the air, tottered forward, and fell against the signal mast, around
which he clasped his arms and sank slowly down in a heap. They
did not know he was dead until they went to carry him below.
148 HISTORY OF THE

Besides Bagley those killed outright by the shell were two serv-
ice sailors, and two others, who, mortally wounded, died within an
hour.

Now began a spectacle of unrivaled heroism by the Hudson. She
had come near enough to extend aid to the Winslow. A long line was
thrown the latter and made fast, but as the revenue cutter backed
away this line parted. Another line was made fast after twenty min-
utes’ work. The shells of the enemy were still dropping on every
side. The second line held, but the Winslow would not tow because
she could not be steered, and at last the Hudson made fast alongside.

Though crippled, the little torpedo boat was still able to fight,
and, with her flag flying and her two remaining guns puffing away
at the gunboat, she stuck to the fight. The Hudson was fighting,
and had been all the time. Her commander, Lieutenant F. H. Newcomb,
had kept his two guns firing so rapidly that in the thirty-five minutes
she was engaged she fired 120 shots. She escaped with only one shot
in her hull, and some insignificant wounds. The bravery of her cap-
tain and crew in rescuing the Winslow from her perilous position
was unsurpassed even by that of the men under Bernadou.

The Wilmington meanwhile had played havoc with Cardenas. By
the time the smaller vessels were in safety the town along the shore
was on fire and the Spanish gunboats had also caught fire, and soon
the shore batteries ceased to answer the Wilmington’s guns. The Wins-
low was badly injured and had to be towed to Key West for repairs.
One Spanish gunboat was destroyed, another Spanish steamer was
burned, and many of the enemy were killed.

The death of Ensign Bagley and the four sailors brought to the
United States the first realization of war. Nota man had been killed
at Manila. Bagley was the first to give his life to the cause. He
was appointed to the Naval Academy from Raleigh, North Carolina,
in 1891, and had been in the service but three years. The five men
who were first to lose their lives in the war, fighting against the
Spaniards, were buried with martial honors. At the funeral of En-
sign Bagley at Raleigh, a great concourse assembled to do honor to
WNVAVH ‘MYVd TWHLNSO WOYS 'OOVed SHI

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 151

his memory. The city was draped in mourning and the first dis-
play of patriotic sorrow and homage was equally complete and sig-
nificant.

During the two weeks that had elapsed since war began, American
sailors had achieved glory at Manila and had been baptized with blood
at Cardenas. There were several efforts made to land supplies for the
insurgents in Cuba, but the first expedition on the steamer (Guss7e
was successfully repulsed by the Spaniards without loss to the Ameri-
cans, but with a loss of ten of their own men killed.

Lieutenant Andrew 8. Rowan of the Nineteenth Infantry, regulars,
made a most hazardous journey into Cuban forests to find General
Maximo Gomez, General-in-Chief of the Cuban forces, to communicate
to him the plans of the United States Government with regard to co-
éperation with the Cuban forces. He made the journey successfully
and then worked his way to Nassau, N. P..in an open boat with full
responses and reports for the War Department.

At this moment a sequence of extraordinary events was preparing
for the world that must be described in detail. Skirmishes and col-
lisions were no longer regarded; marvelous feats of war and of strategy
were at hand.

 
CHAPTER THE FIFTH.

“Borrting Up” CErveras’s SQUADRON.

THe CHASE OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON OF ADMIRAL CERVERA—Itrs MystTER1ous DISAPPEAR-
ANCE AND FINAL APPEARANCE IN THE West INDIES—THE BATTLESHIP ‘‘OREGON’S”
WonvDERFUL Race oF 15,000 Mites Acarnst TimeE—A War SuIp’s UNPARALLELED
RECORD OF ENDURANCE AND CONDITION—CERVERA's FLEET ‘‘BoTTLED UP” |
IN SANTIAGO Harspor—THE Herotc DEED oF LIEUTENANT Hopson
AND His VOLUNTEER CREW—THE ‘‘MERRIMAC” SUNK IN THE
Harspor ENTRANCE—‘‘THE CorK IN THE BOTTLE.”

Ie

N THE very day that the Winslow was crippled and the first
Americans were killed at Cardenas, began a series of puz-
zling manceuvres in the game of war that were adroitly
conducted on both sides, and were destined to end in

astonishing successes to both branches of our arms. On April 20, it
must be recalled, a Spanish squadron sailed from Cadiz with the

ostensible purpose of proceeding to Havana. The move-
. beige mala ment was promptly met by the blockade of Havana, so

that when Cervera’s ships reached Port St. Vincent in
the Portuguese Cape Verde Islands, they were met with news of the
counter-movement. They remained at. St. Vincent, and the expla-
nation was made that they were making repairs and arranging their
coal supply. Day after day slipped by and then early in May it was
announced that Cervera’s ships had sailed west, leaving three of the
torpedo boats behind. These returned to Cadiz, but whither Cervera’s
squadron was bound could not be known. The disappearance of this
squadron into the mysteries of the Atlantic waste immediately ckal-
lenged the ingenuity and the speculations of strategists. It was not
considered probable that it was sailing to engage Sampson’s forces.

The result at Manila had instantly demonstrated the great superiority
(152)
 

 

 

 

 

 

ADMIRAL CERVERA

COMMANDOING THE SPANISH SQUADRON DESTROYED NEAR SANTIAGO
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 155

of American naval skill and American gun fighters, and Admiral
Sampson’s seamen were eager to prove that superiority by another
test.

It was intimated from Spanish sources that Cervera, instead of
sailing to succor Havana, was on his way to Manila to fall upon Dew-
ey’s light ships and transfer the war to the Pacific again. The drop-
ping of the three torpedo craft was cited as proof of his intention to
make a long and swift voyage. His four cruisers were faster than
any the Americans were supposed to possess, and, with a good start,
he could easily reach Manila days in advance of our ships.

Another suggestion that carried with it much uneasiness was that
on his way to Manila, around Cape Horn, Cervera could meet and
overpower the United States battleship Oregon, which had sailed from
San Francisco for Florida some weeks before, and was now making
her way northward along the South American east coast. In the
estuarial Paraguay River in the Argentine a Spanish torpedo boat, the
Temerario, lying there on the outbreak of war, was waiting. The Tem-
erario was invited to leave by the Argentine government, but she
claimed that repairs were necessary and consumed much time. If she
were waiting to fall on the Oregon in the night, and if Cervera should
be able to come to her aid, serious loss might ensue.

Promoted by the Spanish system of setting afloat false information,
the most surprising and startling rumors appeared. Cervera’s ships
had been sighted off the coast of Canada, supposed to be making for
a descent upon New England and eastern coasts; it had gone back
to Cadiz; it was going to sink the Oregon and then ravage the Cali-
fornia coast, left without ships to defend it.

In the midst of this uncertainty our Government was not alarmed,
but wary. It determined to seek Spain in a vital part. On the sup-
position that Cervera had more reasonable orders than those sug-
gested by the Spanish Government, it secretly sent Sampson with
four ships to seek Cervera in the ports of Porto Rico where he
might be expected to enter for coal and supplies, and to establish
a base.
156 HISTORY OF THE

Suddenly on the morning of May 12, Sampson appeared off the city
of San Juan, Porto Rico. His squadron was a magnificent fighting
force, consisting of the New York (flagship), the battleships Jowa and
Indiana, the monitors Terror and Amphitrite, and the gunboats Mont-
gomery and Detroit. It was not yet dawn when the ships, with lights
out, arrived off the harbor. It was not intended to attack the fortifi-
cations unless Cervera’s ships were behind them, but as the long
black line of ocean monsters crept up close to the entrance, every
man was at quarters, the decks were sanded, and destruction was in
suspense. The scout Detroit was in advance, going as far in as pos-
sible in an attempt to reconnoitre the inner harbor. When within a
mile of the old fort on the east side of the harbor, the first faint
light of dawn sprang up, and in another moment the Spanish gun-
ners in the old fort made out the ships and opened fire at the Jova.

Instantly the battleship’s forward guns let fly at the fort, and
then swinging around her after guns, she gave the fort a whole broad-
side. The Detroit and Montgomery were ordered out of range, and the
tive armored fighters, steaming in a long ellipse before the forts on
either side of the entrance, poured a torrent of shot and shell against
the fortifications. The old Morro fort standing on the hill behind
which stood the city of San Juan, required a high elevation from our
guns, and some of the shells went too high and fell into the city. It
was not intended to throw a shot into the town among non-combat-
ants, but the assault having come from the shore, the forts must be
chastised.

For three hours the five ships made their death-dealing rounds of
the ellipse. The fortifications were irreparably injured. Repeatedly
masses of masonry were blown skywards by the shells from the Amer-
icans’ guns. Fragments from one shell struck the commandant’s
residence, which was situated near the fortifications, damaging it
greatly. The center of the Morro was almost blown away. The shells
that passed into the city did not do much damage, and but few per-
sons were killed in the forts, though many were injured. A number
of Spanish guns were knocked over and the gunners ran from their
SOS8SVH OVVILNYS O01 SONVGINS BHL SONIONYDWWOS

SILSVO OYYON

 

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 159

posts and had to be forced back. One of the Spanish shells exploded
on the New York, killing one American seaman, and wounding five,
but not seriously.

The bombardment was carried on in a hazy fog in which the smoke
hung, so that the contestants could not see each other well, but again
the American gunners proved their accuracy, while the Spanish shells
were wholly wide of the mark, except by accident. The fact was as-
certained that Cervera was not at San Juan, and Sampson’s fleet sailed
out of sight again.

Meanwhile Cervera’s squadron had been reported at the French
island of Martinique, where it had arrived safe and in search of coal.
This island was in the path that the Oregon might take on her north-
ward way. Then the squadron disappeared again and, on the day
after the San Juan bombardment, conclusive information reached
Washington that Cervera’s ships were off the Dutch island of Cura-
cao on the Venezuelan coast, where they had met colliers sent ahead
with coal. Instantly Commodore Schley’s squadron, the Brooklyn,
Massachusetts, Texas, Minneapolis, New Orleans, and the gunboat Scorpion,
sailed out of Hampton Roads to seek the enemy.

Where was the Oregon, meanwhile?

II.

Tue United States battleship Oregon was making an ocean race
against time that proved to be a performance unparalleled in naval
history, demonstrating at once the perfection of Amer-
ican shipbuilding, the unsurpassed competency of Amer- “oesay nacn
ican engineers in the care of machinery, and the
sustained courage and watchfulness of the American crew that
manned her. More than a month before war began, on the 14th of
March, the Oregon had been ordered to Key West to strengthen the
squadron there. The ship was at Puget Sound, but on March 19

sailed from the Golden Horn with a journey of nearly 15,000 miles
7
160 HISTORY OF THE

to make with all the haste possible. There was at that time no appar-
ent danger in the path to be traversed, which lay down the west
coast of South America and up the east coast. But there was reason
for haste. And besides there was the case of the Maine, known to all
the crew.

The Oregon is a sea-going coast-line battleship of the first class,
348 feet in length, 694 feet broad, with a displacement of 10,288
tons, 10,400 horse power in the driving engines, and a speed of nearly
17 knots an hour. The regular complement consisted of 32 officers
and 441 men.

A battleship of the first class is intended to be a floating fort of
steel armor, carrying the largest guns and the greatest number of
batteries of all sizes possible. The interior of this steel fort is, how-
ever, the most complex and delicate mechanism that human inge-
nuity has combined. The guns, weighing many tons, are moved,
loaded, aimed, and fired by electrical machinery ; the projectiles, rang-
ing from 125 to 1,200 pounds in weight, are brought into turrets and
gun rooms by electrical machinery. From “fighting mast” and “con-
ning tower” the range or distance of the target and the speed and
direction of the ship are determined by delicate instruments, from
which, through electrical connection with the various parts of the ship,
the pressing of a button carries orders to fire the gun, steer the ship,
or conveys engineer’s orders. Such a ship carries from 65 to 160 dif-
ferent engines, every one of which in the hour of battle must move
with perfect precision and ease. Such a ship manufactures ice with
one machine, distills fresh water from ocean brine with another, and
all move and breathe as with life.

Seamen, sailors, such as the old navies had and needed—they have
no place upon such a ship. In their stead are scientific machinists
and engineers, students of navigation, executives trained to perfectly
discipline the various departments, gunners patiently trained to an
accuracy of aim practical to attain only within the fifth part of a
second,— during which the indicated dot of the range passes the
crossed lines upon the lens of the “sight,”— athletic and skilled
NOOS3HO dIHSSILLV “SN

 

Reis
aE

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 163

assistants to the gunners, engineers, and executives, who are respon-
sible for the quick and accurate execution of every detail of the or-
ganized operations of the machinery.

A modern battleship is more than a ship and a fort and an army
combined: it is the mechanical incarnation of death-dealing power
and massed force; it is almost living mechanism of destruction, with
the commanding brain in the fighting top, whence, by lines of elec-
tricity, all the nerve centers of action from turret to furnace room are
controlled and inspired and transformed into parts of one brain.
Such a ship probably should not be called “She.” Femininity has
given way here to the very essence of the masculine, though the old
custom of personalizing them may probably continue to prevail.

One does not think of such an engine of force, power, and potential]
destruction except as typical of man’s highest warlike virility. It was
so that a poet of the hour saw and pictured the Oregon, when she was
out on the ocean, making the great and dangerous race of life and
death from the Pacific to the Atlantic, fearing no enemy, but rush-
ing to the aid of the fleet—‘“a mailed knight of the sea.”

Thus sang H. J. D. Browne in a poem called “The Voice of the
Oregon.”

“You have called to me, my brothers, from your far-off eastern sea,
To join with you, my brothers, to set a prostrate people free.
You have called to me, my brothers, to join to yours my might,
The slaughterers of our brethren with our armored hands to smite.

““We have never met, my brothers, we mailed knights of the sea;
But there are no strangers, brothers, ‘neath the Banner of the Free;
And though half a world’s between us and ten thousand leagues divide,
Our souls are intermingled end our hearts are side by side.”

The Oregon, after leaving San Francisco, saiied to Callao, Peru,
without stop, arriving there on April 4, and three days were spent
coaling. Ten days later the Straits of Magellan were entered. From
spring weather at San Francisco, the ship had crossed the torrid
equator, where the furnace room heat of 160 degrees was stifling,
164 HISTORY OF THE

and now the cold of December in the southern zone was encountered,
with ice on the decks and wintry blasts in the air.

Here began sleepless watch against the proved treachery of the
Spaniard. War had not been declared; nor had it been when the
Maine was destroyed. Through the narrow straits, marked with many
inlets and dangerous places, in which an enemy might waylay, the
Oregon ran only during daylight, and at highest speed, and then
turned the United States shield on the prow northward. At every
stopping place, for whatsoever purpose, however brief the stay, two
launches were lowered and kept ceaseless round of the ship to make
sure no enemy approached. The South American republics were one
with us in practical interests in the war, but there were many Spanish-
born persons in every port and the perfidy of Havana was not to be
repeated with the Oregon. The great ship, costing more than three
millions, was to be brought home safely.

The Paraguay was passed and no sign of the Temerario was seen.
The gunboat Marietta and the dynamite cruiser Nichteroy were picked
up on the way, and on April 30 they sailed into Rio Janeiro to coal.
There Captain Clark received news of war and of the Cervera squad-
ron’s disappearance, and the possibilities of encountering it. Coal was
taken on and the Oregon put to sea; but not to sail. The great fighter
was getting ready to fight, if necessary. Outside the harbor, in the
open sea, Captain Clark stopped for target practice with all guns
and at varying distances. More than two hundred and fifty rounds
were fired with forty-seven misses. The men were up to the mark
and ready for work. Then the ship was taken back into the harbor
under pretense of “making repairs” and remained there until further
orders were received.

On May 3 the ocean was sought and there the battleship left the
Marietta and Nichteroy and hurried on. On May 24 the great ship
steamed into Jupiter Inlet, Florida, and Captain Clark reported to
Washington that he had arrived safely and was ready to put to sea
and fight. The distance had been covered in fifty-five days of actual
sailing and sixty-six days actual time, and every part of the delicate
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 165

mechanism was in perfect condition and the health and spirit of the
crew excellent.

That is what the Oregon was doing during the uncertain days when
Cervera’s squadron was sailing in mystery, and that is where the
Oregon was, ready for action, a week after Schley had sailed to hunt
the enemy.

III.

Crervera’s squadron was all this time playing hide and seek in
the West Indian islands where Spanish sympathizers were many and
information doubtful of accuracy. From Madrid came selene
news that Cervera had reported his safe arrival at THE SPANISH
Santiago de Cuba on the southeastern coast of Cuba, a
and then came news from the same doubtful source that Cervera
had left Santiago. The first statement was true, the latter was fic-
tion; but what was its object? Sampson was covering the Wind-
ward Passage and could prevent Cervera from going to Havana by
the eastern route. Schley was in the west to close that path.

On May 20 Cervera’s squadron entered the harbor of Santiago, and
six days later Schley’s squadron appeared off the harbor. Commo-
dore Schley had been intent upon preventing the enemy from get-
ting to Havana, and on his way eastward along the southern coast
stopped to see if Cervera had, or would attempt to, put into the
harbor of Cienfuegos, where two days were lost in doubts. At San-
tiago Schley got word that Cervera was in the harbor with all his
ships, but the high hills at the entrance and the narrow passage
prevented him from seeing the Spanish fleet. It was not until
May 30 that Schley sent his famous dispatch to the Navy Depart-
ment saying, “I have seen the enemy’s ships in the harbor with my
own eyes.” By adroitly sailing in small boats at dawn he had got
near enough to the passage to be enabled to see the Spanish war
ships.

Cervera was “bottled up.”
166 HISTORY OF THE

But the Spaniard had chosen the safest and most impregnable
harbor in Cuba. If he was “bottled up,” our own ships were “bottled
out”; for, owing to the narrowness of the entrance, it would be diffi-
cult for us to get inside to attack. On the other hand, however, a
blockade of that port would be very easy, and we could starve the
Spaniards into submission. They could get little or no supplies in
Santiago province, for Calixto Garcia had some well-armed men in
that province, and he held most of the interior towns. He was then,
indeed, holding Santiago city from the rear, and if we blockaded the
port the Spanish fleet would be in a bad way.

On the day that Cervera was seen in the harbor, orders were issued
to Major-General W. R. Shafter, commanding the Fifth Army Corps at
Tampa, to prepare 15,000 or 20,000 troops for embarkation on trans-
ports for Santiago. With the Spanish fleet in the trap guarded by
Schley, it was determined to attack Santiago at once by land and sea
and make it the base of operations in Cuba. It was a decisive propo-
sition.

On May 381 Commodore Schley bombarded the forts at Santiago
for the alternate purpose of inviting Cervera out to give battle or to
test the effectiveness of the shore batteries. Firing was exchanged
for nearly an hour, in which the guns on the Spanish ships inside
participated. The forts were damaged and a shell struck the Admi-
ral’s flagship in the harbor and set fire to Admiral Cervera’s room.
There was no injury to the Americans. .

The following day Admiral Sampson arrived with his squadron,
and all hope of escape was cut off from Cervera. Still no American
ships could venture to enter the harbor, the passage to which was
not more than two hundred yards in width. The harbor channels were
planted with torpedo mines, four land batteries guarded the narrow
door, and, inside, a battery moored upon an old war ship faced the
entrance, while Cervera’s full squadron lay in wait. For days the
American ships lay off the harbor, like cats before a rat-hole, varying
the suspense with bombardments of the batteries and with feints
intended to draw Cervera out.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 167

The situation was ripe for heroism, and the hero appeared. He
was Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson, an assistant Naval Con-
structor, upon whom Admiral Sampson called to decide whether it
would be possible to sink a ship in the harbor entrance and effectually
block it. A stopper was to be put into the mouth of the bottle
which held Cervera’s ships. Lieutenant Hobson, after several days’
consideration, came forward with a plan that he pronounced practic-
able and begged to be permitted to command the enterprise, which
seemed to involve nothing less than sending seven men into the jaws
of almost certain death, in order that the navy of Spain might be
trapped beyond escape, and the sentinel American ships relieved of
the strain of watching.

Lieutenant Hobson’s daring plan was to take the big ship Merri-
mac straight into the entrance under the fire of forts and ships and
sink her suddenly by the aid of torpedoes. It involved the assistance
of six men to sail her in, and these, with the commander, had to
expect to escape death only by miracle. Admiral Sampson accepted
the plan, rewarded Hobson by granting his request to command the
perilous enterprise, and then called for six volunteers, one from each
of his fighting ships.

Then a spectacle was witnessed that was to make the world ring
with surprise and admiration for American seamen. Our sailors had
been described by Europeans of the continent as “mercenaries,” “the
scum and refuse of the world’s navies,” as mere hirelings, without
patriotism, and without courage.

When these “mercenaries” heard the call for volunteers to face the
prospect of almost certain death, practically every man on every ship
came forward. They not only offered to go, but many wept and begged
for the privilege of going. As only six were needed for special duties
the choice was narrowed down, but lots were drawn in some instances
and record-ratings resorted to in others, to determine thus fairly who
should be taken, and so pacify the eagerness of the intrepid crews.

And when the volunteers were put aboard the Merrimac, there
were eight men instead of seven to go, because a coxswain of the
168 HISTORY OF THE

New York, who had been at work on the Merrimac, concealed himself
and when discovered at the last moment became insubordinate and
refused to leave her. The officers, rigorous as they were in discipline,
saw that there was sublimity' in the mutineer, and, in silence, left
him at the post he had resolved to occupy.

The Merrimac was a big ship, 380 feet in length, and the plan was
to run her into the entrance, swing her across the channel, and, by
exploding torpedoes attached to the hull below the water line and
opening all the water valves, sink her instantly and leave her an
immovable obstacle to the passage of ships in or out.

In two days the Merrimac was made ready, under Hobson’s per-
sonal supervision, and then the volunteers were called. The list of
these would adorn any page of the world’s history. They were :—

Lieutenant Ricumonp Prarson Hopson, an Assistant Naval Constructor.
Ossorn DEIGNAN, a coxswain of the Merrimac.

GrorGE F. Pariuies, a machinist of the Merrimac.

Joun KELty, a water tender of the Merrimac.

GORGE CHARETTE, a gunner’s mate of the flagship Vew York.

Danie, Montaeus, a seaman of the cruiser Brooklyn.

J.C. Murpuy, a coxswain of the Jowa.

Ranpotpa OLauseEn, a coxswain of the New York—(the heroic mutineer).

Wednesday night, June 1, was selected for the enterprise; but the
night was unfavorable. It was about three o’clock on Friday morn-
ing that the start was made. The night was beautiful, with the sea
bathed in the splendid luster of tropical moonlight. In the city, far
inshore, the lights blinked, and the searchlight ou Morro tower burned
brightly. On all of the big ships of the American fleet every man
of the crews was lying on the decks with his rubber blanket under
him, waiting to witness the desperate act.

The Merrimac headed straight for the western shore of the harbor
entrance, followed by the launch of the New York, commanded by
Naval Cadet Joseph Wright Powell, of Oswego, New York, with five
men. Theirs was a duty scarcely less hazardous than that of the
men on the Merrimac. There was no apprehension that the men on
 

 

 

 

.S.N.

U

HOBSON,

CONSTRUCTOR RICHMOND P.

NAVAL-
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 171

the Merrimac would be killed by the explosion of the torpedoes against
her hull. The charges were to be controlled by an electric wire
that would ignite a fuse so timed as to allow the heroes to leap into
a whaleboat and catamaran towed astern. But in case of miscar-
riage of concerted action and failure to reach the floats, Cadet Pow-
ell’s launch was to rescue the survivors if she could.

On board the Merrimac Lieutenant Hobson stood on the “bridge”
of the ship in full uniform, in command. The other men, stripped to
the waist and wearing light under-trousers alone, were at their posts.
As noiselessly as possible, with three lights showing rearwards, the
ship crept towards the Estrella point, with the intention to drop the
bow anchor on that side and thus swing with the flood tide across
the channel. She had fairly reached the entrance under the cover
of a cloud over the moon, when the sentinels on Morro sighted her
and a shot was fired into her. In another moment all the Spanish
batteries were busy pouring a torrent of shot and shell into the ship,
while from inside the harbor the ships cleared for action and cen-
tered their metal upon her sides. In the midst of this torrent the
heroes of the Merrimac calmly stood at their posts and carried out
their plan as they could. Then was added to the roar of cannon the
crash of the torpedoes that had been set against the Merrimac’s hull,
and, almost immediately, she sank. Still the batteries poured in their
deadly hail of missiles for ten minutes, until the absence of all life
on the sunken ship indicated that further attack was useless.

Under this fire Cadet Powell and his crew drove the launch of the
New York close in and hovered on the spot to await the heroes. None
came. All night the launch kept watch and even at daylight ran
across the entrance under the fire of the batteries to look for sur-
vivors. The Merrimac lay across the channel.

When broad day was in the sky and no raft or boat could be ob-
served, Cadet Powell steamed off shore for his ship, pursued by Spanish
shots.

“No man came out of that harbor alive,” he reported to Admiral
Sampson, sorrowfully. It was true, and on all the American war
172 HISTORY OF THE

ships the sailors looked at the sunken vessel in the channel, whose
masts and funnels could be seen, and thought of the men who had
apparently given up their lives for their country’s service—and again
“Remembered the Maine.”

So the long, hot day wore into afternoon, until a small tug, bear-
ing a flag of truce at the peak, came out of the harbor and the yacht
Vixen went to meet her. A Spanish officer was taken aboard and con-
veyed to the New York. From the New York’s mast the signal soon
went up to the fleet that the Merrimac’s whole crew were prisoners
of war on Cervera’s ships, two slightly wounded only, and “all well.”

The sea off Santiago harbor seemed to roll up cheers with every
wave. The same charm that had protected the American fleet in
collision with the Spaniards at Manila seemed to be holding good.

Lieutenant Hobson and his crew were safe. They had executed
their plan, escaped to the raft, and were carried into the harbor by
the tide, where they were picked up and taken before Admiral Cervera.
When he learned from Lieutenant Hobson the truth of the heroic
deed, he kissed him on the forehead and declared that men capable
of such gallant deeds should not be mourned by their comrades. He
at once gave orders to prepare a vessel to convey to Admiral Samp-
son the news that the eight heroes were honored prisoners of war,
and soon afterwards took steps to secure their exchange, although the
act was much delayed by the Spanish authorities in Cuba and at
Madrid. It was a month before the heroes of the Merrimac were ex-
changed. But during their imprisonment they were treated by Admi-
ral Cervera with great kindness and respect, and they were permitted
to receive money and food from the American ships. .

The Spanish officer who reported the safety of the men, reported
also that the Merrimac did not close the channel. “You have made
it more difficult,” he said, “but we can yet get out.” A fact that was
afterwards demonstrated. The rush of the tide into the Merrimac’s
shattered hull sank her before she swung squarely across the channel.

But “the cork had been put into the bottle” that held Cervera and
his ships. And the American people ceased from worry on that score
WENS SHOR avH ODVIANVWS ‘AdSLiVeE VINSYLSS BHL AO ALNOadS NI

OVWIYYSIN SHL SO ONIMNIS

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 1%

and showered honors on Hobson and his men. The seamen were all
promoted to warrant officers, and the President sent a message to
Congress eulogizing Lieutenant Hobson and his men, suggesting a
vote of thanks and the passage of a special act to enable him to
transfer Lieutenant Hobson to the line of the Navy for such promo-
tion as might be determined upon.

Lieutenant Hobson, the hero of the daring enterprise, was not
twenty-eight years old when he carried out the action that made his
fame world-wide. He was born August 17, 1870, at Greensboro, Hale
County, Alabama, and graduated from the university there at the head
of his class when he was fourteen. At fifteen he entered the Annap-
olis Naval Academy. He graduated there at nineteen, the youngest
member of his class. His aptitude in mathematics and mechanics
was so great that he was sent abroad to take technical courses in con-
struction at French academies, from which he received several medals
of distinction. On returning he was placed at the head of the acad-
emy course of construction at the Annapolis School, a course he had
suggested. He wrote a number of papers upon naval topics, which
attracted considerable attention abroad. He, like Admiral Dewey, was
so careful of the conventions of dress, manner, and the little amen-
ities of society, that be was esteemed a “dude” among those with
whom he enjoyed the relaxations of social life. But, like Dewey,
also, the garb of the “dude” covered the clear brain, the cool cour-
age, the quiet heart, and the steel nerves of the dauntless American
fighter.

IV.

ArrEeRwaRps, on the stage of the Metropolitan Opera House in
New York, at a great meeting held to assist the Soldiers’ and Sailors’
Fund, Lieutenant Hobson, who had come home for the Bea eae
purpose of devising means to raise some of the Span- oF
ish ships, told the story of his feat, and described the oo ae
heroism of the American sailor and soldier in these glowing terms : —

“Tt is known to everybody that when the call was made for vol-
unteers to go in on the Merrimac, men fell over one another in their
176 HISTORY OF THE

haste to be accepted. On the New York alone, 140 men volunteered
before the order could be passed that no more volunteers were needed.
When a few out of this number had been assigned to stations on the
Merrimac, all, in obedience to orders, lay flat on their faces. Two were
stationed by the anchor gear, others by the torpedoes arranged along
the side, two in the engine room. It was agreed by each one that he
should not even look over his shoulder, no matter what happened to the
ship, to any of his companions, or to himself. If wounded he would
place himself in a sitting or a kneeling posture, or whatever posture
was necessary, so that when the time for his duty came he could do it to
the best advantage. And so they lay, each man at his post, and under
what difficulties you may understand when I tell you that, out of the
seven torpedoes placed along the side, five had been shot away by the
enemy’s fire before the order was given for the Merrimac’s crew to.
gather at the rendezvous on the quarter deck. Projectiles were coming
more as a continuous stream than as separate shots. But, through the
whole storm, Jacky lay there ready to do his duty as he had been
instructed to do it. There was not only the plunging fire from the
forts on both sides, but a terrific horizontal fire from the fleet in the
harbor, and it seemed as if the next projectile would wipe all the sailors
out of life at once. If ever a feeling of ‘each man for himself,’ a feeling
of ‘get away from this,’ ‘get out of this any way, anyhow,’ was to be
justified it was justified then. Nota man so much as turned his head.

“Then, later, when we were on the catamaran and the enemy’s
picket boats came crawling up out of the darkness with their lanterns,
the impulse was just as strong to slip off the raft and swim for the
shore, or for the entrance of the harbor. The simple order was given:
‘No man moves until further orders.’ And not a man moved or stirred
for nearly an hour.

“On that same afternoon, by the kindness of the gallant Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Spanish forces, Admiral Cervera, the party was
in prison, and the men’s clothing was permitted to be brought to
them from the fleet. One of the men, as spokesman for the rest,
was allowed to come over to my cell with a package for me. He
said: ‘We would do it over again to-night, sir.’
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 177

“The next day, when it seemed uncertain whether or not a remnant
of the Inquisition was to be revived, when the enemy did not know
whether it was his fault or ours that a ship had been sunk, and rather
inclined to the belief that he had sunk an American battleship and that
we were the only survivors out of several hundred, the men were taken
before the Spanish authorities and serious and impertinent questions
put to them. Remember, they did not know what it might cost them
to refuse to answer. Spanish soldiers of the guard stood before
them, making significant gestures with their hands, thus: [Mr. Hobson
passed his hand edgewise across his throat]; our seamen laughed in their
faces. Then a Spanish Major questioned Charette, because he spoke
French, and asked him this question: —

“« What was your object in coming in here?’ and so long as I live I
shall never forget the way Charette threw back his shoulders, proudly
lifted his head and looked him in the eye, as he said: —

“*Tn the United States navy, sir, it is not the custom for the seamen
to know, or to desire to know, the object of an action of his superior
officer.’

“Take this simple incident,— and, after all, in comparison with the
whole war, a very simple incident,— the sinking of the Merrimac, and
make your own deductions as to the quality of manhood in the United
States navy. You will have then a more or less complete but certainly
not an overestimated idea of Jacky.

“Experience with the soldier has naturally been restricted for me
under existing conditions, but recently from my prison window, which
was but little in the rear of the Spanish line of intrenchments, I saw
the Spaniards fortifying the city for twenty days. I watched them
with critical interest. I saw them bring up guns from the ships and
place them. Then I saw our men come up and drive the Spaniards into
those intrenchments, and when they had driven them into the intrench-
ments I saw them go on and try to take the intrenchments themselves.
It looked to be an impossible thing, but as yet the artillery was silent.
The men came on up the hill and the artillery opened, and my heart
sank when IJ saw that it was flanking artillery. For a moment the
178 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

American fire ceased, as though the enemy’s guns had been a signal.
‘Now, then,’ said I to myself, ‘this is the place where the individuality
of the soldier will appear, for each man there knows that he is just
as likely as any other man to be struck with that shrapnel.’ None
of them had ever been under fire before; they could not be put to a
harder test; but how did they respond to it? Instantly after the lull a
more rapid fire set in, and a more rapid rush of men up to the trenches.
In spite of flanking artillery we had taken those fortified trenches with
unsupported infantry, a thing that army experts the world over said
could not be done. I have nothing further to say. A sailor cannot go
out of his experience.”

With a few words of appreciation for the spirit of the volunteer
soldiers in the camps who had not had a chance to fight, for the men
who wanted to volunteer, but did not have the opportunity, Mr. Hobson
closed with these words: —

“T can only say that after seeing our soldiers and our sailors as I
have seen them, I thank Heaven that it is vouchsafed to me to devote
my life, my whole lifework, I trust, to the country.”

 
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KANE DS AR DADAM RAE ER RRL RK IE RM ARRIOLA SO BOERS

 

 

 

 
CHAPTER THE SIXTH.

Tuer Invasion or Cua.

LANDING OF THE MARINES AT CAIMANERA— FIVE Days oF ALMOST SLEEPLESS FIGHTING WITH
SPANISH FIGHTERS—FIRST OF THE CUBANS— THE Mauser RIFLE IN ACTION— LANDING
oF SHAFTER’S DiviIsION AT BaIQUIRI, AND OF WHEELER’S AT SIBONEY— UNITED
StTaTEs SOLDIERS AND THEIR TORMENTS WHILE MarcHinc— THE ENEMY
VANISHES IN RETREAT—FirsT USE OF THE DYNAMITE CRUISER
‘‘VeEsuvius” IN WARFARE— RESULT OF THE EXPERIMENTS.

I.

HE hull of the Merrimac had scarcely settled at the bottom of
the entrance to Santiago harbor when the President instructed
Major-General Shafter to proceed with the Fifth . ooo saypine
Army Corps and effect a landing at or near 8Y MARINES AT

Santiago. There were 15,000 troops ready for service i cas
at Tampa, regulars and volunteers, and it required thirty-five trans-
ports, with supply, hospital, and other service ships, and a convoy of
men-of-war, to convey them safely to whatsoever point should be
deemed best to seize for a base. The ordering and embarkation
of the expedition was, of course, therefore, attended with delay and
some impatience. Meanwhile the war ships released from continual
watch at Santiago reconnoitered the coast to. the east and west, con-
ferring with the Cuban allies and seeking to discover the best landing
point. To cover the place selected, feints were made at several points,
which were bombarded by our ships in turn.

The first descent in force was upon the town of Caimanera, in
Guantanamo Bay, about forty miles east of Santiago. Caimanera, or
Alligator Pool, is a small town situated six miles from the bay en-
trance, and was the only place of any importance in the shallow
harbor. It is the sea terminus of a railroad fifteen miles in length

to the towns of Guantanamo, Santa Catalina, and Jamaica northward.
(181)
182 HISTORY OF THE

Tuesday, June 7, five ships bombarded the shore batteries, which the
Spaniards had constructed for defense, and for eight hours threw
shells toward the town in which there was a garrison of about 1,000
Spanish. Here, under the fire of the shore batteries, the St. Louzs
was sent in to cut the cable line, which, under the international
agreement, could only be done within three miles of the shore. Pro-
tected by her consorts the St. Louis lay steady under terrific fire and
succeeded in the task without injury. At the end of two days of
bombardment the ships had destroyed the shore batteries and forced
their way within the entrance of the bay to Fisherman’s Point, on
the east side.

Here it was that, on Friday, June 10, the first forces of the United
States landed upon Cuban soil. They were 650 men of the First Ma-
rine Battalion Volunteers of New York, under command of Lieutenant-
Colonel Robert W. Huntington. They had been aboard the transport
Panther since May 22, without setting foot on land. They had en-
countered a fearful storm off Cape Hatteras, had lain for weeks under
a broiling sun, and now, with the prospect of stretching themselves
on shore, were full of enthusiasm. The afternoon of the 10th they
landed and marched up the steep hillside east of Fisherman’s Point
to the plateau at the summit, where a grateful breeze was blowing.
Then, under the influence of unrestrained enthusiasm, a pole was
erected and at ten minutes before two o’clock in the afternoon, Color-
Sergeant Richard Silvey, of Company C, raised the Stars and Stripes
over Cuban soil, while the men, drawn up with uncovered heads, sa-
luted the flag with cheers. Then, on the hilltop a camp was laid
out, tents set up, supplies fetched with enormous difficulty up the
side of the hill overgrown with dense brush and the sharp cactus
plant that covers the whole country. But this was a labor of en-
joyment to the marines sick of being cooped up on shipboard in
inaction. No Spaniards appeared to oppose the landing or to resist
the establishment of the camp. The sun went down that afternoon
upon Camp McCalla, so christened after the commander of the gun-
boat Marblehead, leaving the marines weary with labor but grateful
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 187

for rest assured, and proud of the honor of first landing. Next day
the camp was finished and the men gave themselves up to security.

This was to be rudely destroyed, however. About four in the after-
noon, while some of the men were bathing, and others lounging, with
scouts out among the foothills to the north and east, a Cuban scout
rushed into camp and reported that 200 Spaniards were in the tropi- —
cal forest preparing to attack. Immediately shots were heard in the
tangled fastnesses and our men were called to defense. A hundred
and fifty who were bathing scrambled ashore, ran up the hill entirely
nude, grasped their carbines, and fell into line with their comrades.
Then followed a few minutes of fighting. ,

For the first time the Mauser rifle and smokeless powder of the
Spanish regulars were matched against the Lee rifle of the American
navy, with its grain powder. The result of the test was to prove
the superiority of smokeless powder, at least. The rain of Spanish
bullets— more like steel wire nails than conical bullets—came from
ambush without betraying the hiding place of the marksman, so that
our marines were fighting an unseen foe who could be flushed only
by hunting for him. This exposed the hunter more than the hunted.

The little skirmish was soon over, but at nine o’clock that night
when the moon had come up, burying the thickets in dense gloom and
flooding the open spaces with silvery radiance, the Spanish again at-
tacked from the thickets, shooting into the white tents and at the
moving figures of pickets or those to be seen in camp. Four of our
men were killed and a number wounded. The first to fall was Dr.
John Blair Gibbs, of New York, a distinguished young surgeon who
had given up a large practice to volunteer. He was the first man to
be accepted as a New York volunteer in the navy and the first to be
killed in a battle on Cuban ground. He was shot as he came out of
the hospital tent into the moonlight. He was surgeon of the bat-
talion.

All night long, without a moment’s sleep, the marines sustained
the defense, sending out scouting squads into the thickets and amongst

the prickly cactus plants, almost impenetrable. They could discover the
8
188 HISTORY OF THE

enemy only by the flash of his gun. The ships in the bay threw their
searchlights into the thickets to assist, but all night the unseen foe
beleaguered the marines. When morning dawned there were four
marines dead and a number wounded, while there were indications
that the Spaniards had carried off their dead and wounded, the num-
ber, of which could not be ascertained.

When day dawned the marines had been twenty-four hours with-
out sleep. They were not yet to get any. For twenty-four hours
afterwards no man in that camp had an hour of sleep or even of
rest. The hilltop, which had seemed impregnable to-attack, proved
to be a target for the hiding foe. So at daylight down came all the
clean, white tents, and all the camp luggage and supplies had to be
wearily carried down the hill again. Then trenches must be dug
around the crown of the hill. In these for a week the men were to
crouch by day and sleep by night. They intended to hold Camp Mc-
Calla. Huddled on the hilltop they could see nothing, save here and
there a flash in the night or a moving bush in the day, but they fired
away as best they could. When they were not in camp, they were
out in the woods scouting and skirmishing. These expeditions were
trying to those untrained to the work. Most of the marines came
from the cities. They were absolutely ignorant of woodcraft. None of
the men had been taught to fight in this manner. Even the bravest
do not like to keep looking for death and have it continually about
to seize them.

With the arrival of sixty Cuban scouts and soldiers under the in-
surgent Colonel Alfredo Laborde, of General Garcia’s command, however,
on the second day, there was improvement in the situation. They
understood the guerilla method of fighting. Their intuition in the
thickets astonished the marine volunteers. They would go carelessly
through the jungle, apparently keeping no watch and devoid of fear.
Then, without there seeming to be any reason for it, they would an-
nounce that there were Spaniards in the vicinity and prepare to meet
them. They were of immense service as scouts and guides, and en-
abled the marines in three or four days to hunt down the secreted
cm

OWVYNVLNVND LY SSNIYVA SHL NO MYOVLLV LHSIN SHL

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 191

Spaniards, who were killed all through the ae as if they were
lurking animals.

At the end of five days and nights of es fighting, with
almost no sleep, the Spaniards were driven back to Caimanera, and
then Camp McCalla was again occupied with the tents of the brave
volunteers who encountered the first horrors of the campaign to cap-
ture Santiago.

The sailors of the navy on board the war ships in the harbor, who
had not expected great things of the volunteers at first, saw the heroic
capture of the base with wonder and pride. They volunteered again
and again to land and assist the volunteers in keeping the flag aloft.
When the last Spaniard was driven back to the trenches of the town,
the sailors on the Marblehead sent to the volunteers a testimonial of
their admiration. It took the form of 340 pounds of “plug” tobacco,
sent over and delivered in camp by the impulsive seamen. When it
was received the marines were drawn up in line on top the hill, the
megaphone was pointed at the Marblehead, and then ensued a passage
of complimentary greetings between ships and marines, accompanied
by cheers and shouts of joy.

In this heroic encounter, which cannot be called a battle, although
no battle ever demanded more fortitude or involved more endurance
or suffering, the United States forces obtained their first impressions of
Spanish and Cuban soldiers. It was, that, while both were brave, they
were of no value as disciplined fighters. The Cuban scouts were a
total surprise. They could not shoot. The rifles with which they were
supplied after their arrival in camp were as so many useless clubs. In
the excitement of battle their instinct was to throw them away and
take to their machetes. If they did fire, it was from the hip and they
were as likely to kill their own men or the Americans as the Span-
iards. Their enthusiasm was unbounded. When fighting was on they
gave one wild cheer after another: “Viva Cuba Libre,’ “Viva los
Americanos,” ‘Viva Cubanos.” They refused the concealment of
breastworks, preferring to rise at full length after each volley and,
waving their machetes, to shout wild oaths of defiance at their foes,
192 HISTORY OF THE

for whom they appeared to have the utmost hatred and contempt.
Their endurance was superb. They clambered over the cactus-covered
hills in their bare feet all day, easily outlasting the much larger and
more powerful Americans, who are not accustomed to such movements.

Most of the Cuban soldiers were negroes, although their officers were
white. Some of them were full-blooded blacks, who seemed to inherit
the savage blood of their African ancestors. Had it not been for the
Americans the Spaniards who were captured would have fared badly.
The night the first were captured the Cubans were in tremendous ex-
citement. They ‘hopped about smoking, laughing, and shouting, in
utter defiance of camp regulations. While arrangements were being
made to have the prisoners taken on board the Marblehead, one of the
Cubans —a little black fellow with a string of white beads about his
neck—approached an American officer. Not being able to speak Eng-
lish, he rolled his eyes suggestively in the direction of the prisoners,
tilted back his head, and drew his finger across his throat three times.

“S8i2” he asked with a nod of his head toward the Spaniards, and
again he cut at his throat with his finger.

“No,” said the officer, shaking his head positively. The Cuban
scowled, grunted, shrugged his shoulders, and walked away in deep
disgust.

Deserters began to come in from the Spanish lines in a starving
condition and much disheartened. These, with the prisoners captured
and their statements and condition, surprised the Americans. Like
the Cubans, the Spanish regulars were totally ignorant of the mech-
anism of the modern rifle. The “sights” on many of the Mausers
found on the ground were so badly rusted that they could not be
moved, and in such position as to indicate that the only elevation the
Spanish soldier knew was “point blank.” The Spaniard, like the Cuban
again, fired from the hip, disregarding accuracy of aim. The fatalities
among the marines were therefore accidental hits. These hits, even
if accidental, caused dreadful wounds, and in the second day’s fighting
gave rise to the charge that the Spaniards mutilated the dead. Care-
ful investigation by our own surgeons entirely disproved the charge.
OWYNYINYND SVEN HAMOYDABGNA SO LNO SYTNNAAaSNSD HSINVIS VNITTIBHS

QVSHAISYVW YSSINYO SHL

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 195

The long, slender Mauser bullet, at close range, after entering the
body appeared to turn around and go tearing and cutting its way
through. The aperture at entry was small, but where the bullet
came out great holes were torn in the killed and wounded.

Il.

Tue first division of the United States army of THE LANDING
: : : . OF THE TROOPS
invasion arrived off Santiago June 20. It was com-
manded in person by Major-General Shafter and consisted of the
following troops : —

Infantry regiments: Sixth, Sixteenth, Seventy-firss New York Volunteers, Tenth,
Twenty-second, Second, Thirteenth, Ninth, Twenty-fourth, Eighth, Second Massachu-
setts Volunteers, First, Twenty-fifth, Twelfth, Seventh, Seventeenth, Third, Twentieth..
Total infantry, 561 officers and 10,709 enlisted men.

Cavalry: Two dismounted squadrons of four troops each from the Third, Sixth,
Ninth, First, and Tenth Cavalry, and two dismounted squadrons of four troops each
from the first United States Volunteer Cavalry. Total dismounted cavalry, 159
officers, 2,875 enlisted men; mounted cavalry, one squadron of the Second, 9 officers
and 280 enlisted men.

Artillery: Light batteries E and K, First Artillery; A and F, Second Artillery;
14 officers and 323 enlisted men. Batteries G and H, Fourth Artillery, siege, 4
officers and 132 enlisted men.

Engineers: Companies C and EH, 9 officers, 200 enlisted men.

Signal Corps: One detachment, 2 officers, and 45 enlisted men.

Hospital detachments are included in these official figures. The
staff corps numbered 15 officers. The grand total of the expedition
was 773 officers and 14,564 enlisted men.

General Shafter, who was on board the transport Seguranca, went
on the New York to confer with Admiral Sampson, after which both
proceeded to Aserradero, eighteen miles west of the harbor, for a con-
ference with the Cuban General, Calixto Garcia, who held that place
with 4,000 of the insurgent troops, under agreement established with
General Maximo Gomez, Commander-in-Chief of the insurgent forces.
This had been arranged by Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew 8. Rowan, and
was a part of the occasion of his dangerous journey through Cuba in
196 HISTORY OF THE

search of General Gomez. The three commanders held a long con-
versation at Aserradero and the plan of invasion was fully agreed
upon,

On Wednesday, the 22d, the preconcerted measures for landing
were put into effect. The fleet under Sampson separated into small
groups of ships and proceeded to attack all the batteries along the
coast for many miles. Against the batteries on the west of Santiago, at
Aguadores, two and one-half miles east, at Las Altares, eight miles
east, and at Baiquiri (or Daiquiri), twelve miles east, the ships at-
tacked with such weight that the batteries were silenced, and the small
garrisons were driven in confusion to the hills in the rear. When
this was achieved the transports were run in at Baiquiri and at Las
Altares where the troops were disembarked without meeting the
slightest resistance. These two places were selected in order that
the Spanish outposts defending Santiago might be attacked in front
by the United States forces landed at Baiquiri, while those disem-
barking at Altares or Siboney, would be able to fall on the right
flank or the rear of the enemy.

Here, again, as at Camp McCalla, the landing was so easily made
and the first advance was so little resisted that the campaign began
with no intimation of the stout resistance and desperate obstacles that
were to be met. The division that went ashore at Baiquiri advanced
to the northwest upon a foe that vanished into the jungle and among
the hills without making a stand. At Demajayabo, two miles north-
west of Baiquiri, the head of the invading column rested on Wednesday
night. Thursday morning the vanguard advanced to Juragua, four
and a half miles further, without check. General Lawton’s brigade,
which formed the vanguard of the army, consisted of the Second
Massachusetts Volunteers, the Eighth, Twelfth, Twenty-second, First,
Fourth, Seventh, and Seventeenth Regular Infantry, and the Eighth,
Fourth, and Ninth Cavalry, and a battalion of engineers. The skir-
mish line was commanded by Colonel Wagner. In it were fifty picked
men from the brigade and about two hundred Cubans whose famil-
iarity with the country and the tactics of the Spaniards rendered
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 197

them most desirable for this service. Colonel Aguirra was in charge
of the Cubans.

Within a mile of Juragua a messenger came in from Colonel Wag-
ner announcing that the Spanish under General Linares had aban-
doned the place. Brigadier-General Lawton took possession of the
town without firing a shot. He found that the Spaniards had retreated
so precipitately that they were unable to carry out their purpose of
destroying the town by fire. An unsuccessful attempt to burn the
railroad shops had been made and a few huts on the outskirts were
set on fire. Otherwise property there was unharmed, and the Stars
and Stripes were raised over the Government buildings.

General Lawton established temporary headquarters at Juragua
and set about taking the precautions necessary to hold it against pos-
sible attack. Colonel Wagner’s scouting party in advance pushed on
in a westerly direction. They had not gone far when the Cubans under
Colonel Aguirra stumbled upon the rear of the retreating Spaniards
and shots were exchanged. Two Cubans were killed and the others
wounded.

General Linares with his 1,200 Spanish forces fell back upon Sevilla,
near which is a plantation called: Las Guasimas, which was the field
of a bloody battle between Cubans and Spaniards in the Ten Years’
War, in which the Spaniards lost a thousand killed and were badly
defeated.

On Wednesday, also, at Siboney, eight miles east of Santiago Bay
and about six miles southeast of Sevilla, the second division of the
United States forces under Major-General Wheeler had disembarked.
It consisted of the First, Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Twenty-
fifth Regiments of regulars; the First and Tenth Regiments of cav-
alry; Roosevelt’s Rough Riders; four troops of the Second Regular
Cavalry, mounted; the Second Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers,
a battalion of engineers, and a number of horses intended to be used
by mounted infantry.

The landing was effected under cover of a fierce fire from the
battleships. When the bombardment had ceased, a large number
198 HISTORY OF THE

of famished, ill-clothed Cubans, flocked down the mountain sides to
welcome the Americans. Many of them wept when they saw the
soldiers who had come to rescue them. The Spaniards who had been
driven out of the village and the forts defending the place, applied
the torch before they left and when the Americans reached the shore
the houses in the village and the forest also were burning.

While the loaded small boats were being pulled ashore the bands
on the transports enlivened the proceedings by playing “There’ll be a
Hot Time in the Old Town To-night.” The popular air was greeted
with wild cheers from the soldiers and from the bluejackets and ma-
rines on the war ships.

Thursday the division set out to effect a junction with the main
body under General Shafter. The march ahead was to prove almost
intolerable, even to regulars inured to the hardships of marching. The
men were equipped with all the impedimenta described by the War
Department for campaigning. Each man had his rifle and cartridges,
bayonet, pistol, canteen, blanket, poncho, half of a shelter tent, rations,
and the other things considered necessary. All had worn the packs in
Florida, and it was thought that they had become accustomed to them
and would be able to bear them throughout the march.

The progress, as described by those present, under the blazing sun,
fighting along half-made trails through cactus and jungle, was in itself
heroism. There was no shade to protect the men, and their feet
crushed the red earth into a fine dust which rose in clouds, enveloping
them from head to foot. It settled in the perspiration on their faces
and arms, covering them with a red paste. It worked into the folds
of their packs, and was blown out into their faces and down their necks
as the packs shifted on their shoulders. Dust and perspiration entered
their eyes and nostrils, blinding and choking them; but the men toiled
on, unmurmuring and clinging to their packs, heedful of the warnings
which they had heard about deserting their shelters and rations,

But now this intolerable condition was to grow worse. As they
penetrated further, not only was the burning sun overhead, but the
hills shut out the breeze. The packs on the backs of the men
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 199

caught in the overhanging brush, causing them to lose their footing.
At last one man threw his blanket away. His example was followed by
others, and extra clothing, blankets, cans of meat and vegetables, shel-
ter tents, and cooking outfits littered the path along which the army
passed. The first guideposts on the way to Santiago were the articles
cast aside by that weary, toiling line of soldiers who forced their way
over the hills through the hot sun. The practice once begun, it was
easy to discard things. Coats, underclothes, and haversacks followed
the bulkier articles, and the ground might have been the scene of a
retreat instead of a scarcely opposed advance, judging from the litter
along the line of march. Many a soldier who started out bravely with
all the outfit that his superiors considered necessary finished his first
day’s march with little besides the clothing he wore, his arms, and his
canteen. What was thrown away was not wholly lost, however, for a
busy band of Cubans spent their time in picking up the articles cast
aside and packing them back to Baiquiri and Siboney where they
disappeared in the huts in which the Cubans live.

It was not until night came that regret began to weigh heavily upon
our troops. With the setting of the sun the terrific heat passed and
the damp night air seemed doubly chill after the exhausting march
they had made. The question of food was an important one, too.
Many of the men had abandoned their rations, which were not liberal
at the outset, and as there was no hope of a supply train reaching the
camps before two or three days the situation threatened to become
serious. The plight of the men was no worse than that of their officers,
and the first regiments that pitched camp did so with a gloomy enough
outlook.

Under these circumstances, as on the march, the wonderful good
nature of the soldiers came to their aid and made it possible for them
to overlook some of the discomforts, dismiss others, and belittle the
rest. Despite their weariness and hunger, they went to work without
complaint, and by combining and contriving, lending and begging, were
able to give something to eat’ to every one and to provide shelter for
most. Bacon and hardtack, in very limited quantity, made up the bill
200 HISTORY OF THE

of fare. The coffee supply was also very limited, and almost without
exception the men had abandoned the tinned meats and vegetables
with which they had been supplied at starting. The fare of officers
and men in most of the regiments was identical. The officers had what
each had packed for himself and many of them had thrown their sup-
plies away on the march. No hardship borne by the men was not
in equal measure borne by their officers,and all alike took the situation
philosophically. Fortunately, there was abundance of water in moun-
tain brooks and streams, complete water supply systems at Baiquiri and
Siboney, so that the torments of thirst were not added to the exhaus-
tion of heat and hunger on the first days of the march.

Il.

Tue landing of the troops had been fully covered by the fleet.
The Spanish ships in Santiago Bay and the garrison of General
HURLING Dyna. Linares in the city had been kept under constant ten-

MITE WITH THE sion by bombardments from the heavy ships of the line.

Ee” s Gavia 23, Santiago was closed to the sea and our army
was starting to invest it by land. General Pando, with a force said
to be 12,000 strong of Spanish regulars, was reported to be advancing
across Cuba from Havana to the relief of the city. At Manzanillo,
a hundred miles west of Santiago, was a garrison of 7,000 Spaniards,’
but Garcia and his Cubans lay at Aserradero and were to move north-
ward around the bay, so that he would have to be reckoned with by
any reénforcements from that direction.

During the bombardments of Santiago Bay the first experiment
in warfare with pneumatic guns throwing dynamite shells was made.
On June 14 the American dynamite cruiser Vesuvius hurled into the bay
three of these dynamite shells. The Brazilian government had pur-
chased a similar ship, the Michteroy (now the United States ship Buffalo),
for the purpose of using her against the ships controlled by the naval
commanders who had joined the revolutionists. But the Nichteroy’s
SNIANSSA LVOSNNS SLINVNAG ‘S “1

——

Se

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 203

guns had never been fired. It has been explained that dynamite has
twenty-five times the explosive power of gunpowder. For twelve
years the navy had been divided as to the usefulness of the Vesuvius
in war time, and, until some practical experiments could be made, it
was argued that it would be foolish to build more ships of her type.
She was one of the early ships completed for the navy and the fastest
in the service for many years, but she was always regarded as a fail-
ure except by a few officers who had tested her and had the amplest
confidence that she would do everything she was designed for. The
good results obtained with the pneumatic gun invented by Mefford
and greatly improved by Zalinski were, it is true, conceded long ago.
The slow, steady action of compressed air as the propulsive force
had allowed the use of enormous quantities of high explosives for
the bursting charge of the shell, whereas, with ordinary gunpowder
to expel the projectile, explosion in the bore had resulted even when
comparatively small quantities of dynamite were fired. But many
naval officers regarded these weapons as better suited to land forts
with stable platforms than to naval uses. Owing to her extreme
length and narrowness it was difficult for her to turn in a radius of
less than 400 yards, although provided with twin screws. Naval
officers have pointed out that another defect was the fact that her
three tubes are stationary and can be trained only by the rudder.
To train them, therefore, is sometimes a difficult matter in heavy
seaway.

Captain Folger, her commander, had said on sailing to join the
fleet in Cuban waters: “Whatever we can hit with a shell will be
destroyed. But if a shell strikes us first it will not be necessary to
erect a monument over us. There will be nothing left of us to
bury.”

This was the mysterious vessel that arrived at Santiago on June
14 and remained concealed all day behind the big war ships. A
Cuban pilot, acquainted with the moorings of Cervera’s ships in the
bay, went aboard her, and at nine o’clock at night she was sent in
towards the mouth of the harbor. She crept in to within six hundred
204 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

yards of the shore and took position and range with great care.
In three minutes as many shells were fired, one from each of the
tubes. The report of the pneumatic guns was peculiar, sounding like
a sudden, short cough. The discharge imparted no perceptible force
of recoil to the ship.

The first shot struck near the ridge of the hills and exploded
with a tremendous roar, not unlike the thunder of a shell. There
was, however, very little flame. The light emitted was rather in the
nature of a glow. An immense column of earth was blown straight
up into the air to a height of two hundred feet.

The effect of the second shot, which struck higher up on the cliff,
was similar to that of the first.

The third shot went. over the hill and probably reached the sup-
posed position of the torpedo boats in the harbor.

The Vesuvius backed out at a high rate of speed, although she
was moving with her engines reversed. She swept by a lighthouse
tender that was lying to seaward and which was getting away from
the fire of the forts, passing her as though the tender were lying at
anchor.

Several times the Vesuvius repeated her work, though it was after-
wards ascertained that no great damage had been done. But the
tremendous force of the explosions and the uncertainty of the attack,
combined with the lack of flame and report, filled the enemy with
terror, and reduced the Spanish sailors to a condition bordering upon
nervous exhaustion.

The tubes of the Vesuvius are of 15 inches calibre, but she did
not fire the full charge they are capable of throwing. Sub-calibre
charges of 5- 8- and 10-inch projectiles, containing from 200 to 500
pounds of gun cotton, were used in the attacks on Santiago. It was
regarded as practically settled that the Vesuvius would play as im-
portant a part in completing the destruction of Morro Castle at Ha-
vana, if that should be necessary. Her range of effectiveness is from
one mile to one mile and a half for smaller charges.

The pneumatic mortar was a match for the Mauser rifle, at least,
CHAPTER THE SEVENTH.

Heroges at Las Guasimas.

First Mri.irary BATTLE OF THE War—STORY OF THE ‘‘RouGH RIDERS” VOLUNTEERS,
THE OFFICERS AND MEN—WITH BaTTALIONS OF THE FIRST AND TENTH CAVALRY
THey Carry AN IMPREGNABLE PosiTIon aT Las GUASIMAS AGAINST Four TIMES
THEIR ForcE—THE GALLANTRY OF VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS — FIRST
Mititary DEATHS IN THE FIELD—Humors AND TRAGEDIES UNDER FIRE.

I.

the war with Spain. Not so much for what was actually

gained in victory, but for what was exhibited of | oon amers

American courage, tenacity, and character in the AND
three factors that made up the fighting forces of United pe
States troops. That day was fought the battle of Las Guasimas, near
Sevilla, on the road to Santiago, the first battle of the war. The
brunt of it was borne by a battalion of 450 of the regiment of Rough
Riders, volunteers, 200 of the First Regular Cavalry, and 224 of the
Tenth Regular Cavalry (colored), all dismounted. Not more courage
galloped into the lane of death at Balaklava than marched into the
treacherous valley bordered by trees concealing hidden forces far in ex-
cess of the invaders at Las Guasimas.

It is the nature of Americans to welcome bold experiments and to
applaud success. There was no volunteer body of the war that received
as much attention and invited as much interest as the regiment of
cavalry known as Roosevelt’s Rough Riders. That was its popular
name, although Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt was but second in com-
mand. His was the resolute spirit that prompted its organization and
fixed public interest upon it.

The Honorable Theodore Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the

Navy at the opening of the war. He had long been one of those
(205)

Pee: June 24, 1898, is a date memorable in the history of
206 HISTORY OF THE

characteristic personalities in the public and private life of the United
States that represent the vigor of democracy without regard to dif-
ferences of opinion. Of the old Dutch stock of New York’s oldest
settlers, he was born to great wealth, and with determined character.
Carefully educated in universities, he made his entrance into poli-
tics early, with vigorous ideals and practical methods. Greeted with
the epithet of the “dude” politician, he received the epithet with the
good nature that an athletic, courageous, and good-humored man would
naturally exhibit. He was soon a representative in national conven-
tions, was the forlorn hope candidate of his party for the mayoralty of
New York, was appointed president of the Civil Service Commission,
was Police Commissioner of New York, and became Assistant Secretary
of the Navy in 1897. Recognizing then the probabilities of war with
Spain he began to encourage the system of State Naval Reserves and
made many addresses in which he upheld the manful necessity of war
to compel peace and secure justice. The good condition of the navy
at the outbreak of war was largely due to his labors and enthusiasm.

When war was inevitable, he resigned his position as Assistant.
Secretary and asked for a commission to organize a regiment of cavalry
of which Dr. Leonard Wood was to be commissioned Colonel. Great
was the public surprise. His friends remonstrated with him and urged
that he was jeopardizing his career. The authorities suggested that he
would be more valuable in the Navy Department. “The Navy Depart-
ment,” he answered, “is in good order. I have done all I can here.
There are other men who can carry it on as well as I, but I should
be false to my ideals, false to the views I have openly expressed, if
I were to remain here while fighting is going on, after urging other men
to risk their lives for their country.” He declined a Colonel’s commis-
sion and asked it for his friend, Dr. Wood. There was in his answer the
self-reliant courage of American manhood. Mr. Roosevelt had written
admirable historical works, exciting stories of adventure in hunting
“big game,” while he was leading the life of a ranchman in the Far
West. He was at once at the beginning and end of the American type,.
rich, intelligent, industrious, thoughtful, cultured, and had “sand.”
 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL THEODORE ROOSEVELT

OF THE ROUGH RIDERS, U.S.A.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 209

Colonel Leonard Wood, who was commissioned as Colonel of the
regiment of Rough Riders, was an assistant surgeon in the army. He
had been with the army on the plains, and General Miles had brought
him to Washington as his attendant physician. He was then detailed
as physician at the White House; but while surgery was his profession,
fighting was his bent. He had the instincts and bearing of a soldier; of
New England birth, a graduate of Harvard, he had a record of which any
soldier might be proud, and wore a medal of honor which testified
to his gallant conduct.

These two commanders, who had lived on the plains of the Far West,
turned their eyes in that direction for recruits and the appeal was
answered by a response from the most remarkable types of men that
the varied population of the United States could produce. With admir-
able felicity of terse description and picturesque suggestion the regi-
ment was afterwards described by John Fox, Jr., the well-known
author, who wrote from Cuba to Harper’s Weekly: “Never was there
a more representative body of men on American soil; never was there a
body of such varied elements; and yet it was so easily welded into
an effective fighting machine that a foreigner would not know that
they were not as near brothers in blood, character, occupation, mutual
faith, and long companionship as any volunteer regiment that ever
took the field. The dominant element was the big-game hunter and
the cowboy, and every field officer and captain had at one time or
another owned a ranch. The majority came from Arizona, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Indian Territory, though every State in the
Union was represented. There were graduates of Harvard, Yale,
Columbia, Princeton, Cornell, University of Virginia, of Pennsylvania,
of Colorado, of Iowa, and other Western and Southern colleges. There
were members of the Knickerbocker Club of New York and the Somer-
set of Boston, and of crack horse organizations of Philadelphia, New
York, and New Jersey. There were revenue officers from Georgia and
Tennessee, policemen from New York City, six or eight deputy mar-
shals from Colorado, half a dozen Texan Rangers, and one Pawnee,
several Cherokees and Chickasaws, Choctaws and Creeks. There were
210 HISTORY OF THE

men of all political faiths, all creeds— Catholics, Protestants, and Jews.
There was one strapping Australian and one of the Queen’s mounted
police, though 90 per cent. of all were native-born Americans. And
athletes a plenty —- Wrenn, who twice saved America the tennis cham-
pionship over England, and Larned, the second-best player in the land;
Goodrich, the captain of Harvard’s crew in 1897, and Bull, who rowed
on that crew; Dean, the best quarter-back in Harvard’s history, and
Greenway, the best end in the history of Yale; Channing and Church,
who played football at Princeton; Hollister the runner and Waller the
high-jumper of Yale; Stephens the polo player, and Ferguson and
Thorpe, the members of Roosevelt’s old polo team at Oyster Bay; and
besides these, who were all troopers, Lieutenant Devereux, who played
good football at Princeton, and Lieutenant Woodbury Kane, who did
the same at Harvard, and who helped win his commission washing
dishes on a cooking detail for a New Mexico outfit, and washing them,
as a superior said, “‘d——d well.”

“And more: Sergeant McElhinny, the Louisiana planter, who has
an island of his own; Captain Jenkins of South Carolina, son of the
Confederate general; Captain O’Neill, ex-mayor, ex-sheriff, and hunter of
Indian and white desperado, Populist and Free-Silver man; Captain
Llewelyn, who carries four bullets in his body; Captain Luna, who
demanded at Tampa that he should be permitted to go to the front and
show his loyalty because he was the only man of pure Spanish blood
holding a commission in the American army; Sergeant Darry, who was
Speaker of a Lower House and Gold Democrat candidate for Congress;
Heffner, who, though shot mortally, asked Colonel Roosevelt to give him
his gun, and, propped against a tree, kept firing until the line went for-
ward; and Lieutenant Thomas, whose father fought in the Civil War,
whose grandfather was killed in the Mexican War, who had two great-
grandfathers in the War of 1812, three great-grandfathers in the war of
the Revolution, while the fourth was Patrick Henry—all these were
citizens of New Mexico. Lastly, there was Captain Capron, who fell—
the fifth from father to son in the United States army, a captain of
Indian scouts, an expert in Indian sign language, and a great hunter.”
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 211

What finer or more thorough description could be given, that would
set forth the swinging characteristics of that regiment of conglomerate
Americans who were called “ Roosevelt’s Rough Riders” until they
were dismounted at Tampa to go to the front on foot. Then the
irresistible instinct of humor in Americans instantly dubbed them
“Wood’s Weary Walkers.” These were the volunteers who were to
be first under fire and to die on Cuban soil.

At the other extreme were the two troops of the Tenth Regular
Cavalry, men whose fathers had been slaves and whose capacity to fight
had long been doubted by unbelievers, but whose record of intrepidity
and exhaustive service on the frontier with its twin regiment, the
“Black Ninth,” was well known to the War Department and signalized
by many medals of honor for courage and gallantry. Nearly every
man black, nearly every man disciplined by years of service, these sons
of former slaves had a place in equity in the first line to fight for
the freedom of Cuba.

Between these extremes were the two hundred men of the First
Regular Cavalry, white troops, with ranks suddenly filled with recruits.
Yet all these cavalrymen were to fight on foot—dismounted cavalry.

Il.

Las Guasimas is so called from the tree /a guasima, which is the
characteristic growth of the locality, a low wide-spreading tree with
strong boughs extending almost horizontally out from gus parrz ar
the trunk. It bears nuts rich in nutrition for the swine “4S GUASsIMas
herded by the farmers. The spot is about six miles inland from
Baiquiri and near Sevilla.

General Young’s brigade of troops, the vanguard of the army, had
been marched from the coast to Siboney in the afternoon of June 23,
and went into camp. Its object was to effect a junction with the other
division of the army and threaten the flank of the retreating Spaniards.
That night Cuban scouts reported to General Young the presence of the

enemy in a strong position at Las Guasimas beyond Siboney. It was
9
212 HISTORY OF THE

the junction of a mountain trail and a valley roadway. It was deter-
mined to attack next morning and fight the first battle of the war.
Colonel Wood of the Rough Riders was ordered to take his battalion
over the mountain trail, supported by the two troops of the First Regu-
lar Cavalry, while the two troops of Tenth Cavalry followed the valley
road.

The march began at dawn and the Rough Riders climbed the hill.
After proceeding several miles, moving with difficulty along a narrow
trail that would not admit of more than four men abreast, while the
scouts and skirmishers were working their way through dense under-
brush, the advance entered upon the top of a ridge that pointed towards
high hills ahead and on either side— holding the ridge like a horseshoe.
The hills outlooking the ridge were covered with trees amid which the
Spanish were concealed, from 2,000 to 3,000 strong. The 900 United
States troops were in a cul de sac that was to have the force of an
ambuscade, because of the enemy’s enormously greater number and
stronger position. The country around was a chaos of high hills and
peaks. So numerous were these that a tenacious force, fertile in re-
source, ought to have been able to annihilate an invading force much
larger than the defenders. The Americans were marching with heavy
packs and suffered greatly with the heat. The First Cavalry behind and
the Tenth in the valley road at the foot of the ridge, were inured to
the heat and moved cheerily along.

The advance halted for relief from the heat to permit men in ranks
to fall out on the roadside and recover.

Captain Allyn Capron of Troop L, Rough Riders, was riding “at
point,” or ahead of the main body, when he became aware of the
presence of Spaniards on the hill to his right. He sent word back
to the main body and the men were deployed on both sides of the trail
with injunctions to keep silence. The news that Spaniards were within
striking distance had suddenly developed in this remarkable body of
hard riders and dead-shots a spirit of strange hilarity. Some of them
laughed aloud and exchanged jokes. Quiet was restored and the
advance proceeded cautiously.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 218

Suddenly from the hill on the right a Spaniard stood up from cover
and fired the first shot. Thomas Isbell of Troop L, a dead-shot, saw
him rise and almost as soon as the Spaniard had fired, he fell dead with
Isbell’s bullet through his head.

Then from the three sides that encircled the ridge the enemy began
to pour a furious plunging fire upon the volunteers, who were now ata
disadvantage because of the smokeless powder employed by the Span-
iards. These first volleys were mostly concentrated on Troop JL, in.
advance. Captain Capron was killed in the first few minutes. It was
difficult for our soldiers to see the enemy through the underbrush, but
every advance step of an American offered a plain target upon which
the Spanish riflemen could concentrate their fire.

After the first shock of encounter, the Rough Riders were ordered
ahead at double-quick, shooting as they ran. The Mauser bullets from
an overwhelming force were dropping our men dead and wounded
about, when the rage of the volunteers began to find vent in curses
at their inability to get sight of the enemy and take vengeance.

“Don’t swear, men!” cried out Colonel Wood, with cool good-humor,
“ Don’t swear or you'll catch no fish!”

Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, who, with Colonel Wood, was in front
encouraging the men, picked up a Krag-Jérgensen rifle that had been
dropped by a wounded trooper and leaping forward ahead of his men
began firing shot after shot into a blockhouse that stood at the head of
the slope.

Then the men steadied down and fought with the precision of regu-
lars. Five times during the advance the volunteers were ordered to
cease firing and they obeyed instantly, a proof of discipline remarked
by the regulars as most unusual.

Forty or fifty men had fallen, when the battalion cleared the under-
brush and could see the blockhouse at the top of the slope with a clear
open space between.

After a moment’s pause for formation, the volunteers,with Lieuten-
ant-Colonel Roosevelt marching in front of the line, made a dash for the
blockhouse, the men raising the terrible yell of the Western Indians as
214 HISTORY OF THE

they went. A murderous fire poured from the blockhouse. Lieutenant-
Colonel Roosevelt turned and, waving his sword, called on his command
to follow him up the hill.

The Spaniards poured a steady fire and for a second the volunteer
fighters hesitated under the shock of it. At that critical moment the
Tenth Cavalry on the valley road to our left and the First Cavalry in
the rear that had been ordered against the wings of the enemy had
made their attacks and charged up the slopes with the intrepidity of
disciplined veterans. The sound of their guns was echoed by cheers
from the Rough Riders who dashed against the blockhouse with cyclonic
force. At the sight of such impetuous daring the enemy burst from the
fort and ran to the cover of the woods behind, leaving seventeen dead
on the ground as they fled. Then they gave way on both wings and
3,000 Spaniards were in full flight before 950 Americans that had
fought againt enormous odds and disadvantages.

No pursuit was possible, and our victorious troops camped on the
ground and held it.

It was charged that the Rough Riders were led into ambush by
the unnecessary carelessness of the officers. This charge was immedi-
‘ately dispelled by the reports of General Wheeler and General Young,
stating that the movement was made under orders and for the pur-
pose of forcing a collision. It was probably true that the force of
the enemy was largely underestimated by the Cuban scouts that dis-
covered them.

But the result of the encounter was, beyond all its cost, of great
value to our troops. Our army was as irresistible as our navy against
great odds. The Spaniards were plainly disheartened and confused
by the result of the battle. So sure were they of victory that they had
brought some of their women with them to witness the defeat of the
Americans. The fact was, the unfaltering advance of our men, after
volleys had been poured into them from the front and flanks was a
killing surprise for the Spaniards. By Spanish rules of war the Ameri-—
cans were whipped early in the fight, and so badly whipped that their
‘invincible volleying and rushing were like the resurrection of men
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 215

who ought properly to remain dead. Indeed, they complained that
the Americans did not fight under the rules of civilized warfare, but,
like savages, charged on without fear of death, when they should
have retreated.

III.

Tue victory at Las Guasimas was not dearly bought—as casualties
in battles go—but the list of dead and wounded produced a great
impression upon the public at home. First to fall was ee
Captain Allyn K. Capron of Troop L, Rough Riders, one MILITARY
of a family of soldiers. His father was Captain Allyn aeeer
Capron of the First Regular Artillery. Allyn K. was one of three sons
and was ambitious to enter West Point Academy, but, with a younger
brother, failed of appointment. They were not turned from their pur-
pose, however, but enlisted in the regular army, and by conscientious
work and study both finally won commissions as Second-Lieutenants.
Allyn K. Capron got a transfer to the Rough Riders and was made
Captain of Troop L. He was a well-built, handsome man, about twenty-
seven years of age. He was very courageous and very popular in his
troop. His friends were not at all surprised to learn that he was in.
the thick of the fight, and he dieda hero. After being mortally struck
he turned to a Sergeant standing near. “Give me your gun a minute,”
he said to the Sergeant, and, kneeling down, deliberately aimed
and fired two shots in quick succession. At each a Spaniard was seen
to fall. The Sergeant, meantime, had seized a dead comrade’s gun and
knelt beside his Captain and fired steadily. When Captain Capron fell
he gave the Sergeant a parting message to his wife and father, bade
the Sergeant good-bye in a cheerful voice, and was then borne away
dying.

The second on the list was Hamilton Fish, Jr., prospective mil-
lionaire, athlete, adventurer, ranchman, laborer, Sergeant of Rough
Riders. He was one of a family that has rendered conspicuous service
216 HISTORY OF THE

to this country from the days of the Revolution. His great-grand-
father, Colonel Nicholas Fish, was a gallant soldier of the Revolution,
esteemed especially by Washington. His grandfather was Hamilton
Fish, fifty years ago Governor of New York, and afterwards a United
States Senator, and, finally, Secretary of State in the Cabinet of
President Grant. Young Fish’s father, the Honorable Nicholas Fish,
who was just graduated from college as the Civil War was drawing
to a close, has been United States Minister to Belgium and Switzer-
land, and was at the time of his son’s death an honored resident of
New York City. His uncle, the Honorable Hamilton Fish, was long
an able and conspicuous member of the New York Assembly, and
subsequently, as its Speaker, sustained the honorable record of his
family. Young Fish was about twenty-six years old. Like most mem-
bers of the family he was very tall, standing six feet three inches in
his bare feet. He was of powerful build. For two or three years he
was a student at Columbia University, and was a crack oarsman. He
was a fine boxer and was magnetized with animal spirits and the love
of danger. Wild, prankish, yet good-natured, this young man who was
called “incorrigible” met his death with the simplicity of a hero.
Standing behind a tree, firing, a comrade in the open fell wounded.
Young Fish stepped out, drew the wounded man behind the tree,
stepped out in the open to take his place and was shot the next mo-
ment. He lived twenty minutes and died without complaint.

Captain Maxim Luna of the Rough Riders was of pure Spanish blood
and enlisted in New Mexico for the purpose of fighting to obtain for
Cuba the freedom he had found in the United States.

Among the wounded were Major Alexander O. Brodie of the
Second Battalion, Major James L. Bell of the First Cavalry, and half
a dozen officers of the three commands. The wounded numbered
about fifty.

The stories of heroism were characteristic. One of the men of Troop
E, desperately wounded, was lying between the firing lines in an open
spot. Assistant Surgeon Church hurried to his side and, with bullets
falling all around him, calmly dressed the man’s wound, bandaged it
ic SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 217

and walked unconcernedly back, soon returning with two men and
a litter, bringing him into the lines. While engaged in his duties,
another Rough Rider who was standing behind a tree ahead, called
aloud, “ Doctor, you'll get shot if-you-don’t-watch-out.”

The Surgeon turned his face, langhed at the man behind the tree,
and retorted: “Well, what business have you here without BAuhing
killed?” And each resumed his work with a smile.

In the hardest of the fighting during the advance, the New York
“swells,” as the aristocratic privates were called, began to sing pop-
ular songs and apply the words to the occasion, amidst laughter and
applause.

Edward Marshall, a newspaper correspondent, who was in the thick
of it, was shot, the ball striking his spine and causing paralysis. He
was borne to the rear and, as his condition seemed desperate, he called
for his chief, asked for a cigarette, and lying on the stretcher smoking,
dictated the story of the battle as far as he had seen it, between mo-
ments of paroxysm. When he was asked where he had been struck, he
smiled and answered, “All over, I guess, because I don’t feel it any-
where.”

The courage of the black troops as they charged deliberately up
the slope was everywhere applauded. There was no hurry, no hesi-
tation, but cool deliberation. When a man was struck his comradé
turned and called “Hospital!” with as much presence of mind as if
it were a sham battle. The black troops displayed fine courage and
discipline.

There was not lacking courage among the enemy. They were badly
disciplined and poor marksmen, but there were individual instances
of daring that were repaid with death by the American dead-shots.

There were two hundred Spanish killed and many wounded. That
they had carefully planned the fight was plain, because their wounded
were carried off to Santiago in wagons, of which there was a long train.
CHAPTER THE EIGHTH.

CLOSING IN ON SANTIAGO.

4

THE TERRIBLE HARDSHIPS OF THE Troops MovING FROM BaIQuIRI TO ATTACK— SPANIARDS
TERRORIZE CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS WITH TALES OF ‘‘ YANKEE” CRUELTY — PREPARING
THE LINE oF ASSAULT AND CUTTING OFF THE ENEMY's SUPPLIES— THE FEINT
on AGUADORES AND SANTIAGO BY THE AMERICAN FLEET AND Dur-

FIELD’s TRoops—Two Days or MurRDEROUS GUN-FIRING.

is

HE fierce and irresistible onslaught of our cavalry on the enemy
at Las Guasimas sent the Spaniards flying back upon the
outposts of Santiago. They made no effort to hold Sevilla,
which General Wheeler occupied next day and whence, on

Sunday, he sent the advance guard with Cuban scouts two miles
ahead to take position near the hill of San Juan. Rest was needed
THE ADVANCE and delay was required to bring up field guns and re-

ON SANTIAGO = gnforcements from Baiquiri. Then, too, the dreaded
rainy season began on Saturday and the camps and roads were del-
uged with the downpour. The troops chafed, and the officers also,
but it was necessary to have the siege guns and to draw them over
the trail through the jungle.

A newspaper correspondent on the ground admirably described in
the New York Sun the condition, the prospects, and spirit of the army
during this wait of six days.

“No man,” he wrote, “who has not gone over this trail, no man
who was not in the terrible downpour of rain which drenched the
American army to the skin this afternoon, can understand the suf-
fering of our troops and the heroism with which they bore it.

“Cavalrymen, dismounted for the first time in years, and infantry-
men from cool Michigan and Massachusetts, toiled hour after hour
along these so-called roads and paths, through the jungles of cacti,

poison vines, and high grass that cuts like a razor, in a blistering
(218)
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 219

sunlight that makes the skylines of the distant hills shimmer and
waver before the eyes, while from the stagnant pools strange, gray
mists float upward, and vultures, with outstretched wings, look greedily
down from above.

“The vegetation torn down and trampled under foot by our troops
has fermented, and a horrible sour breath arises from the earth. Curi-
ous stenches steal from hidden places in the jungle.

“Thousands of gigantic land crabs, spotted with yellow and red,
wriggle and twist themselves along the sides of the roads, with leprous,
white claws clicking viciously, a ghastly, dreadful sight to young sol-
diers fresh from New York, Boston, and Detroit. Ragged Cubans
slip noiselessly through the undergrowth or sprawl under the shade
of huge gossamer trees watching with childish pleasure the steady
onpush of their American defenders.

“The heat is almost intolerable. The sun is like a great yellow
furnace, torturing everything living and turning everything dead into
a thousand mysterious forms of terror.

“The fierce light swims in waves before the eyes of the exhausted
soldiers. This morning a young infantryman reeled and fell in the
road almost under the feet of the mule ridden by your correspondent.
When I helped him to his feet he smiled and said: ‘It’s all right. I
never struck such a place as this, but I must get to the front before
the fight begins. I had to he to get into the army for I am only
seventeen years old.’ Five minutes after he was trudging along gal-
lantly.

“Two hours later the first great tropical rainstorm we have en-
countered fell from the sky, not slantwise, but straight down. It
was the first actual test of the army in a most dreadful experience
of the tropics. For three hours a great, cold torrent swept down
from the clouds, drenching the soldiers to the skin, soaking blankets,
and carrying misery into all our vast camp, reaching out on either
side of the trail, extinguishing camp fires, and sending rivers of mud
and red water swirling along the narrow road, dashing over rocks
where the trail inclined downward, and through this filthy flood the
220 HISTORY OF THE

army streamed along, splashing in the mud and water or huddling
vainly for shelter under the trees.

“An hour before the heat was so intense that men reeled and
swooned; but now came one of the mysterious transformations of
the tropics. The whole army shivered, and robust men could be seen
shaking from head to foot, turned gray and white. Millions of land
crabs came clattering and squirming from under the poisonous under-
growth, and the soldiers crushed them under their heels. Every man
who had quinine swallowed a dose. The officers. splashed with mud
to their hips, hurried here and there, urging the men to strip naked
when the rain was over and dry their clothes at the camp fires.

“Presently thousands of men were standing about naked while
the sun drew up thick vapors from the earth and vicious tropical
flies stung their white skins. The American army is a noble body of
men when it is stripped. Think of the tremendous strain of heat
like this and rain like this in one day on men from a northern cli-
mate, and yet there was not one word of complaint anywhere.

“The writer has seen several armies in the field, but he never saw
a more splendid exhibition of cheerful endurance. One thought which
seemed to run like an electric current through the army was anxiety
to get to the front. The soldiers everywhere begged to have their
regiments put in the first line of attack. The weather is nothing to
them, the possibility of disease is nothing to them, exposure and hunger
do not trouble them. They want to fight. You can see it in their
faces; you can hear it in their talk.”

During six days a cordon of these men was drawing around the
enemy. The situation and the plan of attack may be briefly described.
Six miles from the sea at the head of the bay of the same name, lies the
city of Santiago, surrounded on all sides by high mountains which rise
almost straight up from the water. These mountains stand in ridges
practically running parallel with the coast. Between the first and
second ridges is Santiago. Two and a half miles east of the entrance
of the harbor is Aguadores, directly south of Santiago itself. South-
east of Santiago, on the top of a hill, is San Juan. About three
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 221

miles northeast of the city is El Caney. Santiago is a walled city,
and the three small towns were its outposts. General Shafter first
intended to take it by siege, then concluded to carry it by assault,
and, in the end, both plans were adopted.

From Aguadores to El Caney the line of the invading army pre-
sented nearly six miles of front when arrayed for attack. It consisted of
about 12,000 soldiers of the United States, together with a force of
Cubans, under the command of General Calixto Garcia, estimated at
from 3,000 to 4,000 men, many of whom were occupied in scouting
service. Refugees and deserters from Santiago reported that there were
12,000 Spanish regulars in the city under General Linares, of which
number 4,000 were sick or disabled. A condition of terror prevailed
among the inhabitants, who had been told that 40,000 American troops
were marching on the city. It was declared also that the United States
troops were picking up Cubans as they advanced and were forcing them
to carry guns and to fight in the front. The women of the city were
terror-stricken at the tales that were told of the cruelties and outrages
perpetrated by the hated “ Yankees.”

The Spaniards warned Cubans that all who left the city would be
killed by the Americans. They added that the Cubans who left the
city to join the American army were all shot as soon as they got
in range of the “Yankee” guns; that the Americans were killing
pacificos, men, women, and children. The better class of Cubans knew
that all these stories were false and did their hest to counteract them.
They were not very successful, however, as the Spaniards declared
they had absolute proof.

The situation in Santiago was desperate. There was famine every-
where. The soldiers, of course, had most of the food, but it was
of the poorest quality and greatly restricted as to quantity. Civilians
had to shift for themselves. Practically all the food in the city con-
sisted of black bread, which, in most cases, was unfit to eat. Many
were starving because they could not get even this. Water was
scarce, owing to the cutting off of two of the sources of supply by
the Americans. There were many wells in the city, however.
222 HISTORY OF THE

Meanwhile the enemy was preparing to defend Santiago to the
bitter end. Trenches and earthworks were constructed and in front
of these were erected barbed-wire fences, many in number, to pre-
vent our troops from making any of the tremendous charges such
as had swept away the Spaniards at Las Guasimas. But the Ameri-
cans had prepared for this with details of soldiers supplied with steel
“clippers” to precede the main body and cut down the fences. Naval
guns from the batteries of the disabled war ship Reina Mercedes in
the harbor were landed and mounted at the various points of defense,
and the guns on Admiral Cervera’s ships were relied upon to throw
a great weight of shell and solid shot into our troops.

From Manzanillo on the west General Pando was expected to come
to Linares’ assistance with a force estimated at from 5,000 to 11,000
men. It was proposed to send General Garcia with his Cubans to pre-
vent this, but when General Shafter heard that food was scarce and
disease prevalent in Santiago, he decided that it was better to have
Pando’s force enter and increase the distress. ‘ Besides,” he added,
“we will know then where all the Spanish forces are.” General Pareja
at Caimanera, with a number of Spaniards, was kept busy with the
United States marines and war ships in the harbor and could not
reach Santiago.

On June 30 the investment was complete. The Cuban outposts
nearest to the city had reached a picturesque old stone house three
miles from Santiago. The portholes and turrets of the old building
were a few days before manned by a hundred Spanish soldiers. Now
the house was held by fifty Cubans. From this position the city of
Santiago could be distinctly seen below. Red Cross flags were flying
in many places, apparently to discourage gunners. All this time
the advanced skirmish and picket lines were exchanging desultory
shots, with little effect. The methods of the Cubans in picketing
the advance excited admiration among American officers and troops.
The work is of such a character that it would have been impossible
for the Americans themselves to do it as well, owing to their
ignorance of the country and their lack of exact knowledge of Spanish
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 223

methods. The ragged, half-starved insurgents in the harassing under-
growth and almost impassable defiles left not a single footpath or
knoll unguarded. At least three sentries were at every point. No
one could pass without their knowledge. They would sit on one knee,
crouched over, with guns at half-cock, for hours at a time, watching
patiently every wave of grass or movement of the trees that might
indicate the presence of the enemy.

II.

AT EARLY morning on July 1 the American army and navy began
a continuous assault on the enemy from Aguadores on the sea to El
Caney on the northeast of Santiago. Never before in
warfare had there been massed so many powerful and ea eae AND
ingenious engines of destruction to be wielded on both Famunc’
sides by men of acknowledged courage, and on the side
of the United States, at least, by men of the highest competence and
training. The assault was actually three separate battles, although
two of them, inland—San Juan and El Caney—involved each other
and the same troops.

The attack on Aguadores by General Duffield with the Michigan
Volunteers and some Cubans, aided by the war ships, was purely a
feint to prevent the Spanish forces there from going to the assist-
ance of those at points nearer Santiago. General Duffield’s four bat-
talions were loaded in cars on the railroad and transported westward
from Siboney until the fire of the enemy was met. Then they were
taken off the cars and marched forward to the assault.

Aguadores is on the sea side. Through the mountain in its rear
is a pass through which the railway line extends. Batteries were on-
the crags on the west side of the rocky pass and a masonry fort on
the east side, half a mile inland. Standing off the shore were the
United States cruiser New York, with Admiral Sampson on board,

and the Swwanee and Gloucester, converted yachts. Communication
224 HISTORY OF THE

between the ships and General Duffield was maintained by stgnals
made by means of a white flag ‘“wig-wagged” by code.

At seven o’clock eight companies marched inland to get in the rear
of Aguadores. An hour later the sound of firing was heard, indicating
that the pretense of assault had been commenced by the army. Ac-
cording to signal, the war ships then began their part of the work.
The Suwanee began shooting at the fort and got the range on the
second shot. The New York’s aim was remarkably accurate, the shore
batteries being struck every time by her shells. Clouds of smoke,
red with dust, obscured everything. This was kept up for an hour,
and it seemed that every inch of the vicinity had been ploughed up
by the missiles. In the meantime the Suwanee kept firing at the fort.
Every shell went through and exploded inside.

There was a huge red and yellow flag at the corner of the fort.
Commander Delahanty of the Suwanee fired and hit it just at the base
of the staff. The men on the New York and Gloucester cheered lustily.
No one was seen within the fort, but the tilted flagstaff was straight-
ened. The Commander fired four more shots and hit the fort every
time, but not the flag. The fifth time the flag and staff were tilted
again. The sixth shell struck the flag squarely in the middle, tear-
ing it to ribbons; the seventh severed the pole, at a range of 2,000
yards.

This splendid marksmanship was received with cheers and the
roar of siren whistles on the war ships. The men on the New York
and Gloucester were so interested that they had ceased firing; but
now they resumed, and it rained shell everywhere. The fort was hit
often; great holes were knocked in it, and blocks of granite were
thrown into the air to fall into crumbled dust.

The answering fire, if any, was too feeble to be noticed. Now and
then there was a puff of smoke at places where batteries were sup-
posed to be. The next moment a shell from one of the ships would
strike the spot. No shots from the forts were seen to land on the ships.

While the firing was in progress the Yale, Newark, and Vulcan
arrived, crowded with soldiers. They ran close alongside the New
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 225

York. The soldiers cheered every shot. They wanted to land, then,
but the sun was too high.

All the ships carried great American flags, the Newark the largest
of all. She sailed in under the guns of Morro so that from her decks
the Spaniards could be seen with the naked eye, but she did not draw
their fire, although she steamed up and down twice. She signaled
to the New York for permission to join in the fire against Aguadores,
but the flagship refused. The Newark continued parading in front of
Morro until eleven o’clock. Then firing ceased for half an hour and
the ships took up new positions, opening again. After the second re-
newal of the firing the bushes on shore parted and men in single file
came out. The first carried a Red Cross flag, the last had the same
banner in his hand; the party had half a dozen wounded men and two
dead.

There was another stop at noon; then the firing was resumed with
greater energy, the shots being aimed at the masked batteries. The
result was not seen from the ships, but the soldiers inland saw the
great shells burst passing over their heads. The firing lasted until
2:20 o’clock, and ceased for the day. The soldiers who came out said
the shells had ruined all the fortifications.

Next morning, responding to the advance made by the army on
San Juan and El Caney and for the purpose of distracting the Span-
iards in the city and on the ships in the bay, a magnificent bom-
bardment began of the forts and batteries at the entrance and of the
inner harbor and of the Spanish positions about Santiago itself. The
tremendous assault was to deceive the enemy’s navy into the belief
that the American ships intended to force their way past the sunken
Merrimac into the bay. It succeeded, as it was afterwards admitted
that the nervous strain of expectation had exhausted the Spanish
sailors.

At sunrise the line of the United States war ships was formed. It
comprised the Gloucester, New York, Newark, Indiana, Oregon, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Texas, Brooklyn, and Vixen in the order named. The
gunners received orders to fire slowly, but not to lose opportunities.
226 HISTORY OF THE .

The firing began at a signal raised upon the New York at ten minutes
to six o’clock. The first shot was fired from the forward turret of
the flagship. It was immediately answered by the batteries to the
east and west of the harbor entrance. The other ships quickly followed
the New York, and the bombardment became general. The Spanish
guns replied for ten minutes, then the gunners seemed to desert
them. Sampson’s fire was maintained steadily for half an hour, when
the Newark was ordered out of the line.

The manceuvring of the battleships during the action evidently
surprised the enemy. As the ships changed position, moving on to
give those behind them a place, the Spaniards began to shout, in the
belief that they were retiring disabled. But it was poor satisfaction,
for every Spanish shot was answered by one that struck almost the
spot whence the last puff of smoke came from the Spanish batteries.
The Oregon, which led the way, firing deliberately, sailed in almost
to the entrance of the harbor. The Jndiana swung in to the east of
the Oregon. When she opened up, every one of her guns was brought
to bear upon the east battery, and the result was observed by the
dust and the masses of earth and brick, with here and there a cannon,
hurled high into the air. The ship was concealed by smoke, but,
belching fire every second, she rained shells true to the mark until
the east battery ceased to answer.

The Oregon took Morro Castle for her mark, and knocked great holes
in it. The big flag on the castle, which had waved lazily above the
smoke of every engagement, was lost sight of when the Oregon opened
fire at just seven o’clock. As the flag was knocked over an exultant
yell from the battleship was taken up on the other ships and wild
cheering followed. One shell struck the face of the old castle, which
was now crumbling. At the next shot a large section of the ramparts
seemed to be carried away. After this there was no reply.

The Oregon and Indiana were then ordered inshore until their guns
were brought to bear upon the Punta Gorda battery, behind Morro.
They passed to the west directly under all the outer guns, firing quickly
as they went. A great explosion was seen on Tivoli Hill, where Punta
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 2979

Gordo is, and there were thirty distinct explosions, all within a small
area. A shell went through the cabin of Admiral Cervera on his flag-
ship in the bay, setting it on fire. Another exploded on the deck of
a Spanish ship, killing and wounding several sailors. One of the great
18-inch shells, not intended to cause such injury, struck the facade
of the Cathedral in Santiago and caused great damage to the old
church.

The firing lasted until eight o’clock, when the fleet was signaled
that the shells thrown toward the Spanish positions might endanger
our own troops. Then firing ceased, but no such magnificent naval
spectacle had been witnessed up to that time. Again the marksman-
ship of American gunners was demonstrated to be unsurpassed.

 

10
CHAPTER THE NINTH.

SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY.

Tue TERRIBLE STRUGGLES OUTSIDE OF SANTIAGO— WHEELER AND KeEntT’s ADVANCE FROM EL
Pozo Up THE VALLEY TO San JuaNn—‘'THE BLoopDy CoRNER” AND THE HEROISM OF
Our Troops —HaAwkIns’s AND ROOSEVELT’S CHARGES ON THE HILL—CHAFFEE’S
GREAT FicHT aT EL CANEY AND THE DEARLY BouGHT VICTORY —

SCENES AND INCIDENTS OF THE BATTLES—A FOREIGN OPINION.

I.

HILE the war ships and Duffield’s brigade were hammering
Aguadores and the bay of Santiago, General Shafter’s two
divisions under General Wheeler and General Lawton
were charging the outposts of San Juan and El Caney

with an impetuous vigor that was to overthrow the superior strength
of the enemy in his own chosen intrenchments. General Lawton’s
division composing the right wing of the American line
was sent against El Caney, a village three miles north-
east of Santiago, protected by fortifications, a block-
house, and trenches. On Lawton’s right General Garcia with 2,000
Cubans ‘covered the roads leading to Santiago to cut off any reén-
forcements.

The center of the army was at El Pozo, about four or five miles south
of El Caney, under Generals Wheeler and Kent. Its objective was the
high hill of San Juan, almost a part of the suburbs of Santiago and
the highest eminence in close reach of the city. It was defended by
trenches, two houses converted into defenses, and its approaches were
covered by mazes of barbed wire obstacles and innumerable hiding
places for sharpshooters along the available road. The flanks of the
roads were also defended by numerous hills, each occupied and defended
by Spaniards, rendering advance one continuous series of skirmishes,

amounting altogether to a day’s battle.
(228)

BATTLE OF
SAN JUAN
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 229

The fighting line of our army consisted of about 18,500 men; 1,500
under Duffield on the left, about 7,000 under Wheeler and Kent in
the center, and 5,000 under Lawton, engaged on the right. Of this
number there were three regiments of volunteer infantry and one of
volunteer cavalry. The remainder were the regulars with their re-
cruited force. The cavalry under Wheeler was dismounted.

Before daylight Friday morning (July 1), everything was in readiness.
Wheeler had planted Grimes’s battery of field guns in the San Juan
valley, menacing a hillside plantation called E] Pozo which had been
converted into a blockhouse. There were four guns in Grimes’s bat-
tery, and they were but three miles from the walls of Santiago with
San Juan hill between.

The first gun of the battle was fired by Captain Capron of the
First Battery, who was with Lawton on the right. His son had been
killed at Las Guasimas a week before.

But the battle itself was to begin in the center, at El Pozo, the
first intrenched hill on the road to San Juan. It is almost impossible
to describe the action at San Juan, which was a battle fought largely
without orders, with orders that could not be delivered, and in oppo-
sition to orders. What plan there was, at first, was thrown to the
winds through necessity. It was a battle without record, except the
actual experiences as remembered by officers and men. It is asserted
that it was no part of Shafter’s intention to take San Juan on that
day, unless El Caney could be reduced early; so that Lawton could
move along the ridge to the southwest and attack San Juan in the
flank or rear. It is also asserted that Shafter believed El Caney
could be taken in a short engagement, and that his army would be
before the walls of Santiago in one day and capture the city the next.

Whatever the intention, the obstinacy of the Spanish defense proved
much greater than was expected; yet, however much the fighting
qualities of the Spaniards were underestimated, the unflinching courage
of the Americans was to overcome all the failure of plan, estimate,
and actual resistance, and to surprise the world with unsurpassed
heroism.
230 HISTORY OF THE |

General Wheeler, with his two cavalry brigades, commanded by
General Samuel S. Sumner and Colonel Leonard Wood, had moved
to within two and a half miles of San Juan on the night before, and
was resting on the hillside on the left of the valley, through which
ran the shallow San Juan River, and the Santiago wagon road. Across
the valley was Hawkins’s brigade of Kent’s division of infantry, and in
the rear of these the two brigades of Colonel Wikoff and Colonel Pear-
son. They were out of sight of the enemy’s guns on San Juan.

At half-past six in the morning Grimes’s battery opened fire on El
Pozo, for the purpose of uncovering the enemy’s position. He pro-
voked no reply for twenty minutes, when the Spaniard, having ob-
tained our range by the smoke of Grimes’s guns, answered. It was
first detected by a muffled report, followed by the sinister singing and
hissing whizz of shrapnel that came over the brow of the hill where
Grimes was posted, and burst into death-dealing fragments. The shot
revealed our disadvantage. Grimes was employing 3.2-inch field guns
with black powder. The Spaniards were replying with 5-inch guns
and smokeless powder. Nothing could be seen of the enemy’s posi-
tion; our troops were fighting spectres in jungle and hills. For
ten minutes the Spanish artillery fired away and Grimes responded,
though his gunners were picked off and the enemy’s fire was being
concentrated upon our men in the bushes behind. Then the troops
were ordered off. At the same moment the Spanish battery ceased
firing and remained entirely silent against all attempts to draw their
fire.

It was a successful ruse to draw the Americans out. Hawkins’s
brigade moved down the hillside to the river and road, a narrow pas-
sage at that point, under orders from Kent to advance up the road
toward the objective point. When they reached the ford they were
met with orders to let the cavalry under Sumner and Wood have
right of way. This resulted in confusion, owing to the narrow roadway
and a new form of attack that now began. .

From every tree top, from every bush-crowned knoll and jungle
thicket in the vicinity, front, sides, and rear, sharpshooters of the
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 231

enemy, hitherto silent, began to pour in deadly and galling fire upon
our troops as they emerged upon open ground. Using smokeless
powder, the position of these sharpshooters was not revealed. They
were covered by the fan-like sprays of foliage. All that could be
known was what the ear discovered of the continuous crackle of the
rifles, and what the eye observed of our men falling dead and wounded
as they entered the open spot at the ford, where the water was thrashed
by the rifle balls as if hail were falling.

Under this haptism of fire, forty minutes were lost in permitting
the cavalry to pass, and then, without waiting longer, the infantry
were marched along parallel to the cavalry, a tedious and dangerous
movement, necessitating slow progress, and presenting masses to the
sharpshooting fire of the enemy.

After moving ahead the advance entered an open spread of the
valley, from which San Juan could be seen. The view was full of
deception. It was apparently a smooth, green hill, with clumps of
trees and bushes here and there, and houses among them. But each
clump proved to be the summit of an intervening hill, defended by
barbed wire and Spanish troops. From this point of view it was de-
termined that San Juan could be captured by assault upon the Spanish
right, to the left of the road.

At this moment a message was received from Lieutenant-Colonel
Derby, who was scouting from a balloon over our army, that there
was a narrow pathway along a creek branching off to the left of our
advance, but some distance in the rear. This path had been in-
geniously covered by the Spaniards from passing observation, but from
the balloon it was clearly visible.

The value of the path to deliver the brigades in the rear by a detour
against the enemy’s right at San Juan, was instantly perceived and
General Kent rode back to deflect his troops in that direction, while
two regiments of Hawkins’s brigade and the cavalry pushed ahead under
the galling fire.

Upon arriving at the point indicated, a ford at which a small creek
entered the San Juan, Kent and his staff met the first battalion of
232 HISTORY OF THE

the Seventy-first New York Volunteers coming foward to join their
brigade under Hawkins.

The ford and cross-path here combined to make a small, open, rock-
covered, swampy spot, overgrown at the edges by tall grass and bushes,
closed in by tall trees and jungle growth that also lined the creek
and path that entered from the left or west side. Halting the battalion,
General Kent gave instructions to the officer in command to proceed
west by the path.

This was the spot since called “The Bloody Bend of San Juan.” As
the battalion entered the open and moved to the left, entirely inexpe-
rienced in war, without any knowledge of the shock of sudden fire from
ambush, they were assailed by deadly volleys from every tree top
and ambuscade about the ford. Little wonder that these raw troops
were for the time being thrown into confusion and recoiled from the
shock. Kent ordered them to lie down in the grass and thickets. Soon
after the Second and Third battalions came up, and, being informed of
the dangers of the ford, were prepared against the shock. It was the
highest test of the pride and courage of these volunteers that, disdain-
ing the cover of bushes and trees, they marched erect through the
deadly angle, while the trained regulars behind, practiced in the sci-
ence of war, and knowing the value of avoiding danger until the
final blow is to be delivered, crawled and wriggled on their bellies
through the grass and bushes until they were in the shelter of the
narrow path.

Immediately behind this regiment came the Third brigade com-
manded by Colonel Wikoff. It consisted of the Ninth, Thirteenth, and
Twenty-fourth Regulars. Its passage of the “Bloody Bend” was the
beginning of a record of soldierly heroism never surpassed in American
history. Moving into the open it seemed to invite a concentration
of all the ambuscaded Spanish hatred. Colonel Wikoff was killed a
moment after he had reached the ford. Lieutenant-Colonel Worth of
the Thirteenth succeeded him and in five minutes fell wounded. He
was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum of the Twenty-fourth,
who also fell in five minutes badly shot. Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers of
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 233

the Ninth then became commander. The brigade had had four com-:
manders in eleven minutes.

A brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Pearson was hurried
up, and two of the regiments, the Second and Tenth, were sent to
the left, while the Twenty-first was ordered forward to take the place,
in Hawkins’s brigade, of the Seventy-first New York that was now
attached to Pearson’s.

The three divisions of our army toiled and fought with dogged
persistence for hours against continuous ambuscades, only less con-
centrated and dismaying than those at the “Bloody Bend.” The cavalry
in front, marching to get opposite the enemy’s left, advanced the en-
tire distance through this deadly fire, being torn by shrapnel from
San Juan whenever they came into view in the flat and broadening
valley, having continually to make detours to drive the enemy from
the hills that rose on the sides, and which were defended by trenches,
barbed wire, and trees concealing sharpshooters no eye could detect.
With the cavalry, occasionally parallel, sometimes in advance,
marched Hawkins’s infantry, under the same force of resistance,
while the brigades of Pearson and Ewers, detouring to the left, were
passing hillside ambuscades.

It is not wonderful, therefore, that—now advancing, now stopping
to make a diversion against a hill—commands, regiments, bat-
talions, and companies became confused, orders went astray, and the
rear guard became the advance without knowing it. But not one
body of these troops turned back. That determination of American
character, developed by years of struggle against the silent immensity
of plains and forests, which in deadliest temper develops into
patience and coolness, shone out all along the line of march through
that awful ambuscade, with a steady glow that was but accumulating
force for explosion.

No troops ever made better use of their advantages than the Span-
iards did about San Juan. Ingenuity had seized upon every bush and
every weapon that could be brought into play. No place of concealment
was neglected, no opening left unguarded. Knowing the range to every
234. HISTORY OF THE

open spot, through which our troops must pass, concealed by smoke-
less powder, they were spirits of air, terrible because unseen.

After two or three hours of advance the cavalry were on the east
front of San Juan, Hawkins’s brigade was on the southeast, and Pearson’s
and Ewers’s brigades were on the south and southwest. Between our
lines that had been moving along the valleys there were several inter-
vening hills almost like terraces leading to San Juan itself. The hill
of San Juan that had appeared so gentle in ascent from a distance, now
rose high up from the valley.

From this time, about two o’clock in the afternoon, all accounts
of the battle that have been available are confused with respect to
the general action and are based upon individual observations by
officers of their own commands, unable to correctly perceive the forces
supporting or operating at another part of the field.

A halt was called. Nothing had been heard from Lawton’s division
at El Caney, except the booming of Capron’s guns from time to time.
To take San Juan without Lawton’s assistance was not in orders, and
yet there was nothing left but to take the hill, go into camp under
the very muzzles of its artillery and rifles, or to retreat. Retreat was
ignored as impossible, and encampment under fire as absurd.

It was a moment pregnant with heroism. It was delivered of thou-
sands of heroes, one of whom by his conspicuous rank, his intrepid cool-
ness and imagnetic control of men, stood out among them all. This was
Brigadier-General Henry 8. Hawkins, whose conduct in another part
of the field was duplicated by Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, and on yet
another side by regiments and battalions, with no orders or settled
leadership, whose men acted upon the intelligence that perceived oppor-
tunity and seized it by common impulse.

After conference, the brigade under Hawkins was ordered to advance
up the terrace in the direction of San Juan. The movement took them
out of the cover of trees and bushes in the valley and across the open
and unprotected hillside upon which a growth of high grass offered
the only chance of safety in crawling. The two regiments that were
with him, the Sixth and Sixteenth, went doggedly up the hill, squirming
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 235

in the grass where they were deployed. The Twenty-first had not
arrived. Yard by yard the cool regulars drove the enemy back from
clumps of bushes and thickets until they found themselves over the
last terrace, with the center of San Juan hill rising in front of them,
crowned with trenches in which the enemy was lying in force.

At about the same moment, it appears beyond all question, the
brigade of Colonel Ewers on the left, consisting of the Ninth, Thir-
teenth, and Twenty-fourth, arrived from its jungle detour and appeared
before the right of the enemy at the foot of San Juan itself. Colonel
Ewers had not been able to get his regiments so connected as to
communicate his succession to the command; but these regulars had
advanced under battalion orders and by companies. They halted as
they saw the hill and realized the charge to be made. The men of the
Twenty-fourth began to sing the “Star Spangled Banner” and took
off their hats in the very teeth of the enemy that was harassing them
with deadly fire.

Then, on their right, General Hawkins, a magnificent soldierly figure,
tall, stalwart, with a white moustache, pointed gray beard, and the eye
of an eagle, rode out in front of his two regiments, the Sixth and Six-
teenth, and scornfully turning his back to the Spanish line, every
man in which marked him for death, cried: —

“Boys, the time has come. Every man who loves his country, for-
ward and follow me!”

He turned his horse and with set face rode forward up the hill.
Two thousand Americans leaped to their feet with a tremendous cheer
in which the “Rebel yell” and the Indian yell were mingled, and
dashed up the hill after their fearless leader. Through volley after
volley of withering fire, during which men reeled and fell out, while
their unhurt comrades sprang to fill the gap, the men, steadying down
from the first rush, climbed and pulled themselves up the slope until
they could see the strained and amazed eyes of Spaniards gazing at
a spectacle never before witnessed in war—the dogged advance of those
intrepid Americans who would not be denied by even the yawning hell
that modern instruments of war could belch in their faces.
236 HISTORY OF THE

Our men fired as they went and then, with a last rush, bayonets
on, they sprang for the trenches from which the astounded Spaniards
turned and ran like rabbits, while our troops, breathless as they were,
shot them as they fled, but could not pursue.

General Hawkins smiled grimly. He had not received a scratch
in the terrific mélée, but down the hill lay scores of his brave soldiers,
dead or wounded. In that day’s fighting the heroic Sixth had lost 119
killed and wounded, and not a man was “ missing.” The Sixteenth lost
101, with only six missing.

On the left of Hawkins, the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-fourth
had heard the cheer of their comrades on their right and they, too,
had charged up the hill on the enemy’s right, going through the same
deadly fire and resistance. It was a longer distance and they had none
but the line officers to lead them on. When they had nearly reached
the summit aGatling gun, that had been brought up by Hawkins, was
planted so as to enfilade the Spanish trenches before the Third brigade,
and with a yell the Americans made a savage rush, bayonetting the
Spaniards who had not been quick to run, and driving the enemy flying
into the trenches outside Santiago’s walls.

On the right, at about the same time, the cavalry was maintaining
American heroism by equally glorious work. Under the brow of the
first hill leading to San Juan, a council of war was held upon the
advisability of charging the main hill. There was some suggestion that
the loss of life necessary could not be justified. Colonel Roosevelt
argued that the only way to capture the hill was at once, when our
troops were at its foot. General Wheeler had listened without
comment.

“Tf you will let me, I will lead the way,” cried Colonel Roosevelt,
turning to General Wheeler.

Without a word Wheeler gave the daring volunteer that inscrutable
look which in the hour of extremest peril gives consent and confers
death or honor.

Roosevelt sprang to the front of his Rough Riders, flashed his sword,
and cried “ Forward, charge the hill!”
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 237

The Rough Riders, some of the Twenty-first Infantry now come up, and
some of the Ninth and Tenth (black) Cavalry followed him with cheers
and, with a determined rush that carried them to the very top of the ridge,
they fell upon the trenches from which the enemy had fled in confusion.
Now it was discovered that there was yet another hill, that had been
masked by the ridge of that captured, and which was a little higher.
Roosevelt, excited with the enthusiasm of battle, called for another
charge and dashed forward, followed by only five men. Observing this.
he rode back and cried: “I did not think you would refuse to follow
where I would lead.”

With one impulse the troopers followed him up the hill. His horse
was shot, but the rider fell upon his feet and, seizing a rifle, climbed up,
firing as he went. That hill, also, was captured.

And now for an hour the Americans hid under the cover of their
captured places, avoiding the artillery onslaught from the trenches
before them, and waiting for the cover of night.

What company.or what regiment was first at the top of San Juan
hill that day? What matters it? All were there at different points
when needed. What spot was the top of that deadly hill? They were
all American companies and regiments—any one of them was brave
enough and worthy to be first!

II.

Orr to the right of the army that took San Juan out of the “very
jaws of hell,’ General Lawton began the attack on Hl Caney at six
o’clock in the morning, when Capron’s battery fired the —rge caprure
first gun at the fort. The report echoed and reéchoed Eee
and died away. There was no reply. Another shot followed, and
then another. Still there was no reply. It seemed as if the Spaniards
would not fight. That view of it, however, was a great mistake.
The Spaniards had no artillery at El] Caney, and our own troops had
none but the four field guns under Capron, distant a mile and a half
from the village. El Caney, situated on the top of a hill, had at its
southeast corner a steep, bare, conical hill, upon the top of which
238 HISTORY OF THE

stood a round stone fort with a tiled roof sloping up to a sharp
point. To the east, south, and southwest the town was defended by
barbed wire entanglements, and the stone houses in the town—even
the old church—had been loopholed and converted into defensive
stands for resistance.

Capron’s battery continued firing until it had delivered twenty-
seven shots, to which no answer was made. But as the twenty-
eighth shot was being fired there was a whistling near our battery,
followed by the explosion of a shell from the Reina Mercedes’ battery.
Another and another followed, but the Spaniards on their harbor
water, battery did poor shooting. Their shells did not touch our bat-
tery, but fell on a house where some soldiers were hiding, some dis-
tance away. The three shells wounded thirteen Cubans and eighteen
Americans.

The number of our troops sent against El Caney was about 5,000,
though only about 3,500 were engaged. The plan of attack was made
by Brigadier-General Adna R. Chaffee, who had reconnoitered the
country and acquainted himself with all the paths and roads. Gen-
eral Chaffee’s brigade of the Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth In-
fantry was placed on the east of the town, Colonel Miles’s brigade of
the First, Fourth, and Twenty-fifth Infantry was on the south, and
General Ludlow’s brigade, comprising the Second Massachusetts Vol-
unteers and the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry, was at the left
on the southwest side.

The Spaniards were quite as willing as, and better prepared to
sustain a fight than, the Americans. After the long bombardment by
Capron’s battery Chaffee’s brigade was sent forward to lead the attack
under cover of the artillery. The Seventh and Tweifth were moved
ahead and the Seventeenth was held in reserve. An advance was
also ordered on the south and southwest, but all had to be made cau-
tiously. The powder smoke from the battery and the guns of the
volunteers gave the Spaniards our range, and enabled them to do
deadly execution. Besides, the ground was covered with barbed wire
resistances and every thicket concealed sharpshooters.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 239

At a distance of 600 yards from El Caney, hiding behind bushes
and lying in the grass, our troops maintained a rifle duel with the
enemy for three hours. The volunteers were ordered to the rear,
so as not to expose our line by the smoke from their guns.

A blockhouse on the slope, that harbored a small detachment of
the enemy’s sharpshooters, was turned over to a detachment of our
Cuban allies. They exhausted their ammunition, but did not disturb
the Spaniards. Yard by yard the Americans crept up the hill, but
hour after hour passed and the progress was painfully slow.

At 10:30 we were just holding our advance in good safety, although
losing more than the enemy, when an order arrived from Shafter to
cease the assault and move to the assistance of Wheeler and Kent at
San Juan. It was a serious interruption. As a military observer
present pointed out, to comply with the order would have entailed
a demoralizing defeat in the face of the enemy. General Lawton
did. not obey the order, but pressed the attack. The Fourth and
Twenty-fifth Infantry joined in the attack. The fire of Capron’s bat-
tery became terribly effective, and was directed to reduce the fort.
At one o’clock the flag was shot away. The incident evoked cheers
from the whole army of attack, and heartened them up.

Captain Lee of the British army, who was present for observations
under the orders of his Government, described the spirit and peril of
our troops at that moment. “Wishing to see how Chaffee’s men were
faring,” he wrote, “I crawled through a hedge into the field beyond,
and, accidentally, into such a hot corner, that I readily complied with
General Chaffee’s abrupt injunction: ‘Get down on your stomach,
sir.” Indeed, I was distinctly grateful for his advice, but could not
fail to notice that he was regardless of it himself. Wherever the
foe was thickest he strolled about unconcernedly, a half-smoked cigar
between his teeth, and an expression of exceeding grimness on his
countenance.

“The situation was a trying one for the nerves of the oldest sol-
dier, and some of the younger hands fell back from the firing. line
and crept into the road. In a moment the General pounced upon
240 HISTORY OF THE

them, inquiring their destination in low, unhoneyed accents, and then
taking them persuasively by the elbows, led them back to: the extreme
front and, having deposited them on the firing line, stood over them
while he distributed a few last words of pungent advice. Throughout
the day he set the most inspiring example to his men, and that he
escaped unhurt was a miracle. One bullet clipped a breast button off
his coat, another passed under his shoulder strap, but neither touched
him, and there must be some truth in the old adage that fortune
favors the brave.

“Close in front of me, a slight and boyish Lieutenant compelled
my attention by his persistent and reckless gallantry. Whenever a
man was hit he would dart to his assistance, regardless of the fire
that this exposure inevitably drew. Suddenly he sprang to his feet,
gazing intently into the village, but what he saw we never knew, for
be was instantly shot through the heart and fell over backward,
clutching at the air. 1 followed the men who carried him to the road
and asked them his name. ‘Second-Lieutenant Wansboro, sir, of the
Seventh Infantry, and you will never see his better. He fought like
a little tiger.’

‘““A few convulsive gasps and the poor boy was dead, and as we laid
him in a shady spot by the side of the road the Sergeant reverently
drew a handkerchief over his face and said: ‘Good-bye, Lieutenant,
you were a brave little officer, and you died like a true soldier.’”

A few minutes before three o’clock Capron’s battery had played so
effectively upon the stone fort as to materially reduce the resistance,
and then General Chaffee at the head of the Twenty-fifth Infantry
charged the hill and took the fort in the face of deadly volleying.
The inner walls of the fort were splashed with blood. The gate was
so wedged with dead and débris that it could not be entered. The
rifle trenches were full of Spanish dead, most of them shot through
the forehead, their brains oozing out.

But yet the town remained to be taken. Our troops were sheltered
in Spanish trenches and by the brow of the hill. Capron’s battery
now turned upon the town itself, but the effect-could not be observed.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 241

When our troops had moved up under the shelter of the foothill, they
were divided and sent right and left to enter the streets.

The fighting before they reached El Caney was as nothing com-
pared with the resistance met in the town. They were fired on from
all sides by the enemy, who were concealed everywhere. The trenches
in view were filled with men, whose hats were visible. The Amer-
icans shot the hats to pieces, but killed none of the Spaniards, who
had resorted to the old trick of placing their hats on sticks for our
men to shoot at. The breastworks in the northeast corner of the
town did the most damage. This battery of Gatlings was not discovered
for a long time. It showered an almost resistless fire upon our men.
The Americans lay down to avoid it. The Spaniards had the range,
however, and killed and wounded many of our men as they lay. The
officers suffered particularly.

But the masked battery was soon located and then began a charge
through the streets that sent the Spaniards flying, while our soldiers
picked them off as they ran. Every street leading out was filled with
the rout, and 125 Spaniards were captured. The enemy had lost half
their number in killed and wounded, 125 were prisoners, and 375
escaped.

Up went the flag over the fort and church and four miles to the
southwest came cheers from the heights of San Juan, where victory was
already perched.

The Spanish retreat from El Caney left that outpost safely in our
possession, being further from the city than San Juan. At night
General Lawton attempted to march with some troops to reénforce
Wheeler’s division at San Juan, but met with opposition from con-
cealed Spanish forces and was compelled to make a detour so long
that he reached the point only next day at noon.
242 HISTORY OF THE

II.

Wuewn the sun went down on that terrible first day of July, the
stars and stripes waved over San Juan and El Caney, and over our
troops, weakened by many killed and wounded, worn by
sens Deane twelve hours of constant marching and fighting under
eapelecs the broiling sun, with little to eat, and yet with the pros-
pect of still more desperate work ahead. There was to
be no rest. No wonder there was a moment of depression, when for
an hour the hearts of some of these heroes sank within them. On
‘San Juan there were not more than 5,000, while in front of them the
enemy, 8,000 strong, lay in their trenches, supported by heavy artillery
ready to assault or defend. We had 5,000 at El Caney.

In his report to General Shafter, written that night at 8 o’clock,
General Wheeler described the position with the simplicity of a soldier,
and the dauntless heart of a hero. This sick man had been at his post
all day. After describing the capture of the hill and the cessation of
the fighting towards sunset, he wrote :—

“T examined the line in front of Wood’s brigade, and gave the men shovels and
picks and insisted on their going right to work. I also sent word to General Kent to
come and get intrenching tools, and saw General Hawkins in person and told him the
same thing. They all promise to do their best, but say the earth is very difficult, as a
great part of it is rocky.

“The positions our men carried were very strong, and the intrenchments were very
strong.

« A number of officers have appealed to me to have the line withdrawn and take up
a strong position farther back, and I expect they will appeal to you. I have positively
discountenanced this, as it would cost us much prestige.

«The lines are very thin, as so many men have gone to the rear with wounds and
so many are exhausted, but I hope these men can be got up to-night, and with our line
intrenched and Lawton on our right we ought to hold to-morrow, but I fear it will be a
severe day. If we can get through to-morrow, all right; we can make our breastworks
very strong the next night. You can hardly realize the exhausted condition of the
troops. The Third and Sixth Cavalry and other troops were up marching and halting
on the road all last night, and have fought for twelve hours to-day, and those that are
not on the line will be digging trenches to-night.
OSVILNVS DNIGNNOYYNS SSHONSYL NVOINSINV

 

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 245

“T have been on the extreme front line. The men were lying down and reported
the Spaniards not more than three hundred yards in their front.”

There was in the condition much to appal any but the strongest
heart. Throughout the night the picket firing was continuous. Men
who could be spared were carrying the wounded back to Siboney and
burying the dead on the battlefield. The wounded were carried in
army wagons, that jolted over the stones during the passage of five
long miles.

What a passage of torture that was—not of physical pain alone;
but the Spaniards, with the instinct of cruelty, threw off the restraints
of civilized warfare. During the day’s fighting their sharpshooters
deliberately fired upon our wounded as they were carried from the
battlefield, and guerillas, armed with Mausers, infested the road to
Siboney, firing upon the wounded, nurses, helpers, newspaper corre-
spondents, and all non-combatants. The perpetration of such acts
enraged our troops to a point that threatened reprisals, but none was
permitted.

The Spaniards expected vengeance, conscious of their own brutality.
A body of 165 Spanish prisoners was sent to the rear in charge of a
detachment of our troops. Half the prisoners were servants and
camp followers taken at El Caney. The remainder were a company
of regulars of the Battalion Constitucional, with two lieutenants and
one sergeant. They saluted the American officers they met, in a most
cringing fashion, and one officer hailed a Cuban who was with our
troops, saying :—

“Please ask these gentlemen who are in charge of us to kill us
here by the roadside and not force us to undergo the torture of a
long walk before we are shot.”

“Fools,” answered the Cuban in Spanish and with evident disgust,
“they will not harm you; they will only keep you prisoners.”

But the Spaniard shook his head. He believed little in warfare in
which the lives of captives were spared, and he could not believe

that the Cuban was not taunting him.
uu
246 HISTORY OF THE

At Siboney doctors and nurses were ready. The nurses did won-
derful work. In the cases of a large percentage of the wounded
operations were necessary; the tables were filled, and hundreds were
waiting their turn. The work went on steadily all night by the light
of small lanterns and candles. It was a strange scene in the huge tents.
When their wounds had been dressed, the men were carried out and laid
upon the grass in blankets.

At the front fighting was resumed early Saturday morning. The
Spaniards made a desperate effort to recapture San Juan hill. They
assaulted again and again, and each time were driven back with
awful loss. Our Hotchkiss guns did great execution. Finally, the
enemy was driven back upon the third intrenchment, before Santiago
itself. Then the Spanish sharpshooting began and all day long the
exhausted soldiers on both sides carried on the sullen duel, with artil-
lery, with volley firing, with spasmodic advances and feints, while all
through the field and along the roads the guerillas harassed and shot
down our stragglers. The Spanish fire along the line was so hot that
no one could stand up at times. For two miles in our rear the road
was blocked with wounded. But when night came the Americans
held every inch of ground they had taken, and the Spanish prisoners
brought in were dejected and confessed the desperation of the enemy
within the city’s entrenchments.

Our losses in the two days’ fighting included twelve officers and
about two hundred and fifty men killed, with thirteen hundred
wounded. The wounds proved to be unusually easy to handle and
deaths from them were few. The Spanish loss was very much greater,
both in killed and wounded. Half the force in the city was disabled
in the two days’ fighting.

Among our dead were a number of gallant and distinguished offi-
cers. Colonel Charles A. Wikofft of the Twenty-second Infantry, killed,
enlisted as a private in Company H, First Pennsylvania Infantry, in
the War of the Rebellion. He was made a First-Lieutenant, and pro-
moted to Captain in 1864. He was made a Major in the Fourteenth
in 1886, and promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel of the Nineteenth in
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 247

1891. His commission as Colonel of the Twenty-second dated from
1897. For gallant and meritorious services at the battle of Shiloh
he was brevetted Captain, April 7, 1862, and for bravery at Chicka-
mauga and Missionary Ridge was made a Brevet Major. Colonel Wikoff
was born and reared at Easton, Pennsylvania. He was highly esteemed
as an excellent officer and amiable and agreeable man. Colonel Wikoff
lost an eye in the Civil War, and could have been retired for that dis-
ability, but he always expressed the wish that he might serve until
his sixty-fourth year and be regularly retired. Since the Civil War
he had been on constant duty in the West.

Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Patterson of the Twenty-second In-
fantry, killed, wore a medal of honor presented to him by Con-
gress “for most distinguished gallantry in action at the battle of
the Wilderness in Virginia, on May 5, 1864, under the heavy fire of
the advancing enemy, in picking up and carrying several hundred
yards, to a place of safety, a wounded officer of his regiment, who was
helpless and would otherwise have been burned in the forest; while
serving as First-Lieutenant, Eleventh United States Infantry.” He
was a New Yorker by birth, a soldier of fine character, and popular
in the service.

Colonel John M. Hamilton of the Ninth (black) Cavalry enlisted
in the Civil War as a private in 1861. He was born in Canada, and
after serving for two years with gallantry he was transferred to the
regular army and came out of the struggle a Captain. He was ad-
vanced to the command of the Ninth during the Indian wars on the
frontier.

On the Spanish side there was among the killed General Vara del
Rey, a distinguished officer in charge of the defense at El Caney.
General Linares, Commander-in-Chief at Santiago, was badly wounded
in the charge on San Juan and was compelled to hand over the com-
mand to General José Toral. Commander Romero, of the celebrated
Guarda Civile of Spain, was also desperately wounded.
248 HISTORY OF THE

Iv.

San Juan and El Caney comprised together one of those great
contests that history will discuss and controversy will struggle with
sree ue for a long time. Everything will be disputed except

A GREAT the valor and determination of American soldiers and

a the desperation of Spanish resistance. Well-informed
men who participated express the opinion that when the military
statistician completes his work and military experts analyze the totals
showing the number of men engaged and those killed and wounded,
it will be found that the battle of San Juan was one of the bloodiest
on record. It is estimated that the average of disabilities was above
ten per cent. General Kent’s division, it is said, suffered to the extent
of thirteen per cent.—an average higher than many of the famous
battles in history.

Although the battle of July 1 was properly one engagement, never-
theless there were two distinct and separate, though interdependent,
fights going on at the same time—that which gave us the stone fort
and the town of El Caney, taken by the men of Lawton’s division,
and that which advanced our center (Wheelevr’s division) three miles and
gave us San Juan hill and blockhouse, and commanding positions for
our batteries. The two engagements were interdependent, for, if the
center had been repulsed and driven back the Spaniards could, and
probably would, have swept down and flanked our right. Had Lawton’s
division been driven back, the Spaniards would have come between
Wheeler and our base of supplies—Siboney—and starved Wheeler
out. The artillery opened the engagement in each fight (treating El
Caney and San Juan as separate engagements), but it was the infantry
and dismounted cavalry, assisted to some extent by the Gatling sec-
tion, that secured definite results.

From the best obtainable information it may be set down to the glory
of the United States soldier that part of the charge on San Juan was
made, not after orders, but without orders from any officer command-
ing a division or brigade. It was the spontaneous forward movement
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 249

of one brigade that could not be stopped or checked until the troops
halted, breathless, but victorious, on top of San Juan hill, and that
carried commanding officers along with it, willing, leading, and brave,
but without the intention.

Of the incidents of the first day’s fighting, that illustrate the tem-
per of our troops and the uncomplaining patience and fortitude of
the wounded in the absence of surgeons and hospital helpers, those
described by Captain Arthur Lee of the British army, a competent
and disinterested observer, are best in point. His observations were
set out in his official report to his Government, and are not, therefore,
to be considered as tinged with any sentiment, except that which is
necessary to put his own military authorities in possession of the truth
concerning the character, courage, discipline, and disposition of the
troops of another nation.

He noted that at El Caney our total artillery force was but four
guns, and these were quite unequal to the task of demoralizing the
enemy. Consequently the infantry had to do all the fighting, and the
brunt of it fell upon the men of one brigade. He reported that little
attention was paid to the Spanish firing until our black powder smoke —
established the range, and then bloody execution commenced.

“The expenditure of ammunition on our side,” he writes, “was enor-
mous and improvident, for there was little target visible, but the
Spanish sharpshooters concealed in the trees, cottages, and blockhouses
were replying with deadly effect. At one point eight marksmen of
Captain Evans’s company crept forward to occupy a small advanced
knoll, and five were hit in less than as many minutes. At another point
- seven men of the Seventeenth regiment broke through a hedge into
the field beyond, and instantly a volley killed three and wounded the
remaining four. The Second Massachusetts was compelled to withdraw
from the fight, because their Springfield single-loaders drew so much
fire in their direction.

“Two men of the First Infantry crept forward under fire, and, within
200 yards of the enemy’s trenches, cut all the barbed-wire imped-
iments. Colonel Haskell, leading the Seventeenth Infantry, was hit
250 HISTORY OF THE

three times in a very few seconds; his quartermaster was killed by
his side. ¥

“The Seventh was exposed to a terrible fire. Hour after hour the
men stood it unflinchingly, the fierce sun scorching their backs, suffer-
ing heavy losses from an enemy practically invisible, and to whom they
could not reply effectively.”

Captain Lee at noon came to a sunken road and noticed it was
full of men lying down. He asked an officer if they were reserves.
The answer was : —

“No, sir; by ——, they are casualties.”

He found over a hundred killed and wounded laid out on as many
yards of road, and so close together that one could only pass by
stepping over them. There was a strange silence among these men,
not a whimper or a groan, but each lay quietly nursing his wound
with closed eyes and set teeth, only flinching when the erratic sleet
of bullets clipped the leaves off the hedge close above their heads.

“Many looked up curiously at my strange uniform as I passed,”
he added, “and asked quickly and quietly: ‘Are you a doctor, sir?’
I could but shake my head, and they would instantly relapse into
their strained, intent attitudes, while I felt sick at heart at the thought
of my incompetence. Some of the slightly wounded were tending
those who were badly hit, and nothing could have surpassed the
unskilled tenderness of those men. I was astonished, too, at their
thoughtful consideration.

“*Keep well down, sir,’ several said as I stopped to speak to them,
‘them Mausers is flying pretty low and there’s plenty of us here al-
ready.’

“The heat in the little road was intense; there was no shade, not
a breath of air, and the wounded lay sweltering in the sun until the
head reeled with the rank smell of sweat and saturated flannel. Right
among the wounded lay, curled up, a Cuban, apparently asleep. Upon
approaching him, however, it was only too apparent that he had been
dead for several days, and on the tree overhead two sleek and gorged
vultures looked down furtively at his ever-increasing companions.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 251

“The worst feature of it all was the scarcity of doctors. Hour after
hour these wounded men had lain in the scorching sun, unattended,
and often bleeding to death. Their comrades had, in many cases,
applied the first aid dressings in rough and unskilled fashion, but,
so far as one could see, there had been no medical assistance. The
nearest dressing station was three-quarters of a mile to the rear, and,
while the medical staff there was, undoubtedly, more than busy, it was
chiefly with such cases as were slightly enough wounded to walk down
for aid.

“One man I noticed lying very quiet in a great pool of blood. A
comrade with a shattered leg was fanning him with a hat, and keeping
the flies off his face. Isat down beside them, and, seeing the man was
shot right through the stomach, knew there was nothing I could do
beyond giving him a little water. I asked him how he felt, and he
replied with difficulty:— ‘

“*Oh, Tam doing pretty well, sir. His companion then said: ‘ Well,
sir, if you can, you might send a doctor to see this man. He was one of
the first hit, about eight this morning, and no one has seen him yet.’
The wounded man here broke in: ‘That’s all right, Mick, I guess the
doctors have more than they can do looking after them as are badly
hurt, and they will be along soon.’ [ looked at my watch and it was
nearly one o’clock.”

Saturday afternoon both sides, worn out with fatigue, rested. Then
came a lull as if before a storm—the night of Saturday, July 2, glori-
ous to our military arm, presaging ominously the event that was to
follow on Sunday on the sea, and fill the world with astonishment at
American prowess.
CHAPTER THE TENTH.

DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA’S SQUADRON.

Tne Dash oF THE SPANISH SHIPS OUT OF THE HarBoR OF SANTIAGO— THE GREATEST NAVAL
DvueEL In THE WorLp’s History—ALL THE ENEMy’s SHIPS AND DESTROYERS BUT ONE
ANNIHILATED BY OuR War SuHips IN Firry-FivE Minutes— THE Lone CHAsE
AFTER THE ‘‘CrISTOBAL COLON” AND HER CAPTURE AFTER A RACE
oF Firry Mires— THE GLory OF THE ‘‘ BROOKLYN,”

‘“‘OREGON,” ‘* TEXAS,” AND ‘‘ GLOUCESTER.”

I.

over the ocean and the bay of Santiago. The United States

ships of war that lay in a great semicircle before the entrance

were bathed in the brilliant sunshine that glittered on the

water just rippled by a breeze. Along shore the last misty haze of

cave cesar  2Wn hung under the cliffs, blue and dim. On the crags

moriTuRI TE of Old Morro and Socapa Point the guns were still point-

eeounnge ing outward from the battered forts, and above the walls
streamed the flag of Spain.

For a month and a day our ships of war had lain off the same
spot, keeping unwearied watch upon the gash in the cliffs that marked
the harbor entrance. By day they lay off from four to six miles,
with a lookout at every ship’s head; at night they steamed in, lying
from two-and-a-half to four miles off, with a blazing searchlight from
one of the ships, by two-hour turns, fixed upon the center of the gash.
As our troops closed about Santiago, the ships drew nearer in day-
light, and on this Sunday morning they steamed with bare steer-
way, or drifted, in a half-circle eight miles long, from two to four
miles from the shore.

Inside the bay, in front of the wharves of Santiago, were the ships
of Spain commanded by Admiral Cervera, the torpedo section com-

manded by Vice-Admiral Villamil, two officers of great repute and
(252)

CS" morning, the third of July, dawned clear and beautiful
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 953

noble lineage. The Admiral had determined to remain in the harbor
and assist in the defense of the city by driving back the American
troops with his heavy guns when our men should move on the lines.
But the cord had tightened about Santiago, and the Admiral’s plan
had proved impracticable. He could not elevate his guns sufficiently,
and the intrepid Americans had followed the Spanish so closely, beating
them back step by step, that his fire would have endangered his own
allies quite as much as the American forces. It was gloomy in the
city. With the invaders at its very doors, the Spanish soldiers, ex-
hausted by fighting, hunger, disease, and sleeplessness, were dejected;
the citizens terrorized with vague apprehension. The sailors on Cer-
vera’s ships were in want of food and worn with nervous anxiety.

The Admiral had, moreover, received positive orders from the Spanish
Government and Captain-General Blanco at Havana, to leave the har-
bor, put to sea and, if possible, sail to the rescue of Havana. With
his swift cruisers it was believed Cervera could at an opportune mo-
ment dash out of the harbor at full speed and escape danger from
pursuit, except by our New York and Brooklyn, equally swift vessels.
Under these orders, against which the Admiral had protested as being
impossible to execute with hope of success, he had, nevertheless, made
his preparations to act. The coal bunkers were filled, live cattle for
provision were taken aboard, the ships were stripped, guns loaded,
and all was in readiness.

Saturday night, in fact, had been selected for the desperate enter-
prise; but on that night the United States ships had refrained from
keeping their searchlights on the harbor entrance, and it had been
decided that the Spanish ships could not steam past the sunken Mer-
rimac in the dark. For that reason Cervera waited till Sunday morn-
ing. The news of his purpose was abroad in the city, and thousands
of persons were expected on the wharves to witness the dash to battle.
But the events of the previous day had rendered such a spectacle
uninteresting to the beleaguered and terrorized populace in Santiago.
None came to see the pride of Spain’s navy go to the field of the
swiftest and most awful destruction ever known in naval warfare.
954 HISTORY OF THE

On the ships, therefore, the men waited in dejection for orders.
The Captains issued brandy freely to dispel the nervous depression,
and encouraged their men with promises or urged them with threats
to do their duty. There was to be no surrender, but a fight to death.
At eight o’clock a lookout on the mountain top brought the informa-
tion that Admiral Sampson’s flagship, the New York, and the battle-
ship Massachusetts had left the blockading line and steamed eastward
out of sight. This was good news to the Admiral. The Brooklyn, he
thought, was the only American left capable of overhauling any of
his own cruisers. Quickly the plan of sortie was arranged. Admiral
Cervera, on his flagship, the Maria Teresa, was to lead the way, turn
to the west, where the Brooklyn lay at one end of the blockading
line, and attack Commodore Schley’s cruiser. Under cover of this the
Vizcaya was to follow and ram the Brooklyn if possible. If this was
successful, there was the open sea in which to run away from the
heavy battleships. :

The commanders were given orders, more brandy was served, and
the men were worked up to the point of desperation, at which it
seems the Spanish sailors were expected to fight best—the old
eighteenth-century plan of “Dutch courage through a blind drunk,”
as long ago described by an English sailor.

Meanwhile, out on the sea, in the dancing sunlight, the Americans
were at easy Sunday duties. No man on those ships dreamed that
Cervera would emerge in the broad light of early morning, when the
men he must engage were fresh from a profound night’s rest and
in perfect condition to meet attack. The Brooklyn lay at the west of
the line, three miles off shore, while the little converted yacht Vixen
was close in under the cliffs, two miles west of the Socapa battery.
Next in order, eastward from the Brooklyn, lay the Texas, Iowa, Oregon,
Indiana, and the steel yacht Gloucester, formerly the pleasure yacht
Corsair. The Gloucester was off the bay of Aguadores, so that it was
at the western end of the line only, between the Brooklyn and the
shore, that there was an open space through which the enemy could
turn, unless it intended to attack the line.
«VSSYAL VINVW,. TASSSA YVM HSINVdS SHL

 

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 957

The Massachusetts had sailed east to Guantanamo bay to coal, and,
seven miles off in the same direction, Admiral Sampson, on the New
York, was steaming to Siboney to meet General Shafter by agreement
for a conference.

At half-past nine o’clock Commodore Schley, seated in his chair
under the awning of the Brooklyn, had just dismissed the men after
“quarterly muster,” when the articles of war are read aloud to the
crew, according to regulations, four times a year. On the other ships
quarters inspection was in progress. The men were in their “Sunday
clothes.” It was a peaceful and lazy scene, despite the air of prompt
discipline during the performance of duty.

Overhead the bright sun. There was nothing ominous of the next
minute that was pregnant with the most frightful destruction and
terrible carnage that modern war has yet known.

II.

THERE came one moment when every ship in the line was alive
with premonition. Lookouts had observed smoke rising back in the
harbor, but that was not unusual. Suddenly, every look- pease
out saw the same thing, and at the same instant every TO
sailor on the fleet felt a mysterious thrill. Even those aise eae ys
on the New York, seven miles away, afterwards told of the mysterious
instinct that, like a telepathic whisper, made all suddenly look back
at the harbor entrance.

At the rear of the gash in the cliffs appeared the fighting masts
of a war ship, her funnels pouring out dense clouds of smoke, indi-
cating that she was coming out with speed.

“The ships are coming out!” was shouted on every Yankee war
vessel.

It was as if electricity had vitalized every man and every machine
on our ships of war. The same signal flew to every masthead, fol-
lowed by another from Commodore Schley, on the Brooklyn, “Close
in and engage the enemy!”
258 HISTORY OF THE

But signals were not necessary. The clear orders that had been
known for weeks, the perfect discipline on board every vessel, caused
every Captain to fight his ship without signals. Then it was, not
taken by surprise, but steadied by amazed excitement, that the three
thousand men aboard our war ships, drilled in perfect sobriety, trained
upon excellent food and with regular method, felt the nerves and
muscles in their healthy bodies tingle with the eagerness of long-
expected combat. They had enjoyed splendid gunning practice during
the bombardments, and now it was “to do or die.”

It was thirty-five minutes past nine when the nose of the Spanish
flagship, Maria Teresa, showed outside the entrance and, swinging to
the west, headed toward the Brooklyn, firing as she came. On all our
ships some of the furnaces and boilers were being cleaned’ out, and
the driving power was low; but signal bells and tubes were hurrying
orders everywhere, while messengers went scurrying about ship, gun-
ners stripped for action, and awnings were stowed away. The Lowa,
Indiana, Oregon, and Texas were at nearest range, with the Gloucester
off to. the right.

In a minute guns were trained from every turret, barbette, and
steel bastion, and into the cloud of white steam and black coal
smoke that enveloped the Maria Teresa, the four battleships hurled
their shells and solid shot. The first shell that struck the Spaniard
shattered her main water-supply pipe and the second, went into the
Admiral’s cabin, exploded and set the stern afire, while another from
the Indiana, as the flying Spaniard turned to westward, exploded as
it tore through a gun-room and killed sixty men. Still the Spaniard
held on his way and headed out somewhat toward the Brooklyn.

And now, eight hundred yards behind her, the second Spaniard,
the Vizcaya, steamed out of the entrance, belching smoke and flame
under forced draught, and turned to follow the Maria Teresa.

Commodore Schley, on the Brooklyn, had but two boilers in service,
though the others were being fired up, and he was not able to make
more than eight knots. With the instinct of a fighter he guessed the
intention to ram his ship, and with the splendid skill of a manceuverer
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 263

he executed a movement so bold as to confound the Spaniards. He
had not yet fired a shot, but was running westward and northward
to cut off the flight. Now, however, he wheeled in the face of the
enemy, to starboard, and with all the speed he could command, steamed
bow on to meet the Vizcaya prow to prow. The Spanish flagship,
however, was undone. Already her men were unable to stand to
their guns, swept by the killing metal of our battleships, and thick
with the smoke of fire burning everywhere. In vain did her officers .
threaten their gunners, and even shoot them down to prevent deser-
tion of the guns. The Texas and Oregon were running in and devas-
tating her, and the Jowa and Indiana were assisting.

Captain Victor Concas, of the Teresa, was standing on his bridge
with the second officer, Captain Maocochron, to whom he turned :—

“Shall we beach the ship for humanity’s sake or fight longer, dis-
abled as we are?” he asked.

“We should beach her,” replied Maocochron.

As he spoke, a shell struck Captain Concas, who fell dying. His
last orders were to beach the Teresa and haul down the colors. This
was done and the Spaniard ran ashore, on fire from stem to stern.
The men were compelled to leap into the water and swim ashore.
Admiral Cervera, an old man, was aided by his son, a Lieutenant,
and gained the beach wearing only his underclothing. All occurred
in twenty minutes.

Meanwhile the Vizcaya had come out twelve minutes after the
Teresa, and, seeing the plight of the flagship ahead, abandoned the idea
of ramming the Brooklyn. She therefore sheered off towards the
coast, seeing which the brooklyn changed her course, and with the
Oregon and Texas poured a terrible fire into the new enemy that had
just run the gauntlet of the Indiana and Iowa.

At this moment the Cristobal Colon, the fleetest ship of the Spanish
navy, its pride and glory, had steamed out, and the scene in front of
the harbor became magnificent and terrible. The clouds of smoke
that enveloped the ships from the rapid discharge of the great guns
began to expand and cover the water. The Oregon, Iowa, Indiana, and
264 HISTORY OF THE

Texas were cramming their furnaces with coal saturated with oil,
which produced such rapid and pure combustion that the flames from
the furnaces roared out of the smoke stacks, while the continuous
flashes from the guns belching out fire and smoke gave observers in
the rear an impression that American and Spanish ships alike were
on fire. And all around on the water the falling and exploding shells
made fountains of spray leap up.

Through the veil of smoke that impended, the Cristobal Colon had
rushed from the harbor fast upon the heels of the Vizcaya and plunged
through the rain of shot and shell almost unscathed. Immediately
behind her came the Almirante Oquendo, last of the cruisers. Into
her the Indiana, Iowa, Texas, Oregon, and Brooklyn hurled the full
weight of their guns. The first shell that landed exploded in her after-
torpedo compartment, setting the ship on fire. The decks were swept
as if by a hurricane of destruction, the Spanish gunners were killed at
their guns, and the guns overturned upon them. But she fought on
desperately, hoping to give the Vizcaya and Colon some advantage
in flight.

Just as she passed the Indiana and Iowa, the Oregon moved in
upon her with guns vomiting destruction, while the Teras and Brook-
lyn, heading for the quarry making west, turned their after-guns
upon her. On the Oquendo brandy had been served out to the crew
for desperate resistance, but no courage could withstand the tempest
of fire that swept her. Suddenly there was an explosion forward and
she turned to the beach, just a mile beyond the spot where the Maria
Teresa was already wrecked and burning. Her colors came down and
her commander, Captain Juan Lazaga, it was reported by some of the
crew, committed suicide in the conning tower of his vessel, as she
headed to the rocks. Afterwards, when the wreck was examined,
there were found at the entrance to the tower a jeweled sword, a re-
volver, and a heap of ashes, among which were human bones. The
cartridges of the revolver had been discharged, four by heat, one by
the hammer. The captain of the Oquendo was not found among the
prisoners.
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SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 267

Forty minutes had now elapsed since the first ship emerged. To
the west the Vizcaya and Colon were speeding, pursued by the Brook-
lyn, Texas, and Oregon.

A few minutes before, out of the harbor entrance came rushing,
like a railroad train, the torpedo destroyer Pluton, with Vice-Admiral
Villamil in command, and, immediately behind, her sister craft, the
Furor. They were spitting shots furiously from the small guns they
carried.

These were the type of war craft designed to make thirty knots
an hour. Armed with torpedo tubes and small batteries, much mys-
terious power had been attributed to them by the navies of the world
in the absence of practical tests. Was it part of Cervera’s plan to
have these boats come out last, and, while our great ships were occu-
pied with his cruisers, the torpedo machines should fall upon the rear
and destroy them? If it was, never did plan fail so wretchedly.

At the east of Morro the steel yacht Gloucester had been lying.
Her commander, Lieutenant Richard Wainwright, expectant of the
appearance of the destroyers in the rear, had moved up slowly
under cover of the shore, gaining steam power by the delay, but
firing the small batteries of his ship at the big cruisers as they
came out.

As soon as the low, black, racing hulls of the destroyers were seen
in the harbor channel, the big shells from the battleships began to fall
about them, enveloping them in the smoke of explosion and the spray
of columns of water that shot up like fountains from the spots where
shot and shell fell about them. The awful impact of that storm of
metal seems to have produced upon the little craft a shock like that
which a charging army feels when it receives the point-blank, deadly
volley of a cool adversary in waiting. They wavered for a minute,
seemed to slow up, and hesitated whether to turn to the east or west.
That moment was fatal. One more concentrated hail of missiles fell
upon them from the battleships that immediately left and steamed
westward. Captain Taylor, of the Indiana, signaled “Gunboats in,”
indicating that the Gloucester would not be endangered by our own
268 HISTORY OF THE
ships’ fire. The destroyers, with blind fatality, had also. turned west
and were following the path of death.
Then the thrill which always accompanies the sight of heroic
bravery leaped in the hearts of the American crews. They saw the
Gloucester with the speed of the wind dash in northwestwardly towards
the shore, directly across the course of the destroyers, firing her port
guns at the Oquendo and Vizcaya, her starboard broadside at the de-
stroyers. The Teras sent one last shot at the Pluton, which struck her
boiler. There was a rending, tearing sound, and a volcano of steam
and black smoke rose from the Vice-Admiral’s boat. Another shot
from the Gloucester destroyed the Pluton’s steering gear and she hung
helpless, close up to the beach, toward which she began drifting on
the tide. Then the Gloucester turned her bow and steamed directly to
meet her, and, the Furor coming up, she ran between the two, deliver-
ing both broadsides. The New York had come up speedily to the chase
of the Colon, and she sent two shots at the Furor. .The Gloucester held
on her course with dauntless courage, straight into the fire of the de-
stroyers and under the guns of the shore forts. Then the flag came
down on the Pluton as she went ashore, and the Furor, with fire and
smoke pouring from her deck, wavered, turned shoreward, struck her
colors, and went down, battered, riddled, and sinking, as was her
companion.

Il.

Hueerne the coast ahead, masked by smoke and flame, urged on
by desperation and hope, the Cristobal Colon and Vizeaya raced to the
isumeenee, SREY, with the Brooklyn, Oregon, and Texas off shore in

ON THE hot pursuit, firimg as they raced, with the Jowa and In-

or diana, foul of hulls, laboring behind at slower speed. On
the Oregon and Texas full speed had been hard to attain. Steadying to
the task, straining every human power on board to increase the steam
pressure, the two ships hung upon the quarry to capture or destroy. It
was a terrific race of steam against steam, of machinery and men against
machinery and men, of hunter against hunted, of hope against despair.
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SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 271

The great vessels groaned and the draughts roared as if the ships
were alive and laboring with human desire. On board these battle-
ships it was like that other race, when—

“The Prairie Belle burnt a hole in the night
* * x * *

With her furnace crammed with rosin and pine.”

Except the Brooklyn, it was heavy battleships against swift cruisers.
Down in the furnace rooms on the battleships, stripped to the skin,
dripping oily sweat from their shining bodies, the stokers—those ob-
scure heroes, without the inspiration of scene or objective to encourage
them—were true Americans. On the Brooklyn, when the chase began
after the Cristobal Colon, Commodore Schley realized the position of the
engine room and furnace men. He called his sailors, formed a line
down the stairs and sent cool beer, kept for the officers, down the line
to cheer the faithful workers. In addition, an ensign stood at the
hatchway and described the chase, the shots, and the results, to the first
man in the line. The message was thus carried down to the depths
of the hold by human telegraph. Every point of our success was
cheered by the gallant stokers, who worked on with renewed energy
to send the great ship with greater speed than even her builders had
expected.

That was the American way.

On board one of the Spanish vessels, it was told with horror that.
firemen and engineers who were unable to endure the heat, smoke,
and escaping steam, and who attempted to come up, were pushed
back by the officers, and the hatches fastened. That, finally, in an in-
sane fury, coal oil was poured over the hatches and ignited when the
ship was about to drift ashore—and no man came alive out of that
hell under the water line.

That was the Spanish way.

The Colon had outstripped the Vizcaya, and now the pursuers con-
centrated their fire upon the latter, with an occasional shell at the

Colon. It was long-range shooting and they were difficult targets, but
12
272 HISTORY OF THE

the United States gunners were good at all ranges and targets. Six
minutes after the onslaught began on the Vizcaya, that vessel was on
fire astern, her gun-decks swept, her sailors dead and dying strewing
the floors, her hull was riddled, and she turned and lurched headlong
to the shore. Her flag was still flying at the gaff, and it fluttered
there until it was almost burned away by the flames that were leaping
up from her hull and upper works. A boat was lowered from her and
men leaped overboard on every side. A detachment of Cuban insur-
gents on the shore were firing upon the unfortunates in the water and
in the boats. Captain Evans of the Jowa fired a small gun over the
Cubans to warn them off, and, in obedience to orders, stopped to pick
up the survivors, 38 officers and 240 men. The Vizcaya went ashore
at Aserraderos, fifteen miles west of Santiago.

During this time the Cristobal Colon had increased her lead and
was flying under forced draught along the coast. Flame and smoke
came from her funnels, and, under cover of the shore, her hull was
with difficulty observed. After her sped the Brooklyn in advance, well
out from shore, the Oregon next, a little closer in, the Vixen, still closer
in, and the Texas astern. It was the quarter of an ellipse hemming in
the flying Spaniard. Behind, at a great distance, came the New York,
flying like the wind. As she passed the spot where the Vizcaya had
been destroyed, she passed two naked men in the water. They were
Spanish sailors who had leaped overboard to escape from the burning
ship. The first was a magnificent fellow, physically, and an expert
swimmer. He was heading, apparently, for Santiago. As the New York
approached him he stood up in the water, waving both arms above
his head, shouted some unintelligible words, and smiled terribly. A
life-preserver was hurled toward him, for which he struck out in long,
powerful strokes. The second man was passed a few minutes later
heading for the beach. He was nearly exhausted, and wasted much
of his remaining strength im shouting for help and cursing at the ap-
parent delay in getting it. He was evidently frightened. Life-
preservers were also thrown to him, but it could not be seen whether
or not he reached them.
SVX31 dIHSSILLVS ‘Sn

 

 

 

 
 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 275

Minute after minute the chase sped on, the speed of the Americans
increasing, that of the Spaniard not improving, until the Colon began
to slip back to the inner focus of the terrible ellipse that was rush-
ing to embrace her in destruction.

Minute after minute went by. The Americans had ceased to fire
and were intent upon capture or to demonstrate the superiority of
our ships in chase. Mile after mile the great engines of war raced
on. On the Oregon the speed was seventeen knots an hour and
she was keeping up with the Brooklyn and overhauling the Spaniards,
while the Texas was also exceeding her speed record.

Twenty, thirty, forty miles, were run and now the doom of the last
of Spain’s famous squadron appeared. Far ahead the dim blue out-
lines of Cape Cruz were seen. The cape jutted out from the coast and
the Colon, following the shore line, must skirt it. The Brooklyn, sheer-
ing off the coast, steered straight for the Cape Cruz point, making the
diameter of a quarter circle, while the Colon would be forced to make
the circumference. The Brooklyn and Oregon drew abreast the enemy;
the Texas followed the quarry.

The men on our ships had been cheering, and were gathered on
decks, watching the chase with intense excitement and with that
outflow of humor, so cynical, yet practical, in the teeth of danger.
Captain Clark signaled from the Oregon to Commodore Schley on the
Brooklyn : —

“ A strange ship, looking like an Italian, in the distance.”

This was an allusion to the fact that the Colon had been purchased
from Italy.

Commodore Schley, sitting on the edge of the forward eight-inch
turret, in a careless attitude, his glasses on the Colon, smiled as the
message was brought, and answered: —

“Tell the Oregon she can try one of those thirteen-inch railroad
trains on her.”

There was a terrible roar as the shell went by the Brooklyn, a mo-
ment of suspense and watching, and then a hearty cheer as the great
‘projectile struck the water close astern the Colon, four miles away.
276 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Another was tried, which reached the mark, and there were more
cheers. It had struck the bow and weakened the ship.

Plainly outraced, the Colon slowed up. She fired one shot to the
rear at the Texas, hauled down her colors, which were left in a limp
huddle at the foot of the line, turned her nose to shore and ran aground
at Rio Tarquino, forty-eight miles west of Santiago at 1:15 P.M.

This was the spot where the crew of the Virginius had landed
and had been massacred by the Spanish, thirty years ago.

' The other five ships had been destroyed in fifty-five minutes, but
the chase of the Colon lasted three hours and sixteen minutes, during
which, under complete preparation and forced draught most of the
time, she had made less than sixteen knots an hour, while our ships
under disadvantages in respect to preparation, removing which as they
steamed, had outsailed and destroyed the pride of Spain—a cruiser
rated as the swiftest in the world’s navy.

Captain Cook of the Brooklyn went on board the Colon in a boat
to receive her surrender. The New York then came up and Commodore
Schley went on board to report to Admiral Sampson. While doing so
the’ Resolute came up and reported a strange war ship off Santiago.
Schley was ordered back with the Brooklyn to meet her. It proved
to be the Austrian cruiser, Maria Teresa, seeking permission to take
Austrian refugees from Santiago.

 
CHAPTER THE ELEVENTH.

Destruction oF CerRvERA’s Squapron (Continued).

DREADFUL SCENES ATTENDING THE RESCUE OF SURVIVORS AND THE CAPTURE OF PRISONERS—
INCIDENTS OF THE SURRENDER OF ADMIRAL CERVERA AND CAPTAIN EULATE — SPAN-
IsH SHIPS REDUCED TO WorTHLEsS HuLKs BY THE FuRY oF OuR ATTAacK—
TREACHEROUS DESTRUCTION OF THE ‘‘COLON”— ANECDOTES OF THE ENGAGE-
MENT — CONTRAST OF AMERICAN AND SPANISH MEN AND METHODS
— THE EFFECT OF THE VICTORY AND THE CREDIT oF It.

I,

APTAIN Cook, of the Brooklyn, chief-of-staff of Commodore Schley,
who had boarded the Colon to receive her surrender, bore
from his commanding officer considerate in- ae ea cere
structions to permit all the officers of the AND VAN-

enemy’s ship to retain their personal effects. This ooes cee
was chivalrous treatment of the vanquished. It proved to be entirely
undeserved. The rules of warfare provide that when an enemy has
hauled down his colors and run up the white flag of surrender, the
property of the government he carries and the arms of the crew are
by that act transferred to the conquerors. The Colon was run ashore
at high speed upon a rather steep beach, from which she slipped back
into the sea by the working of the waves. Then it was discovered.
that the sea-valves of the vessel had been treacherously opened, so
as to render it impossible for her to float. It must have been done
after she bad surrendered, or she could not have made the swift run
that carried her far up on the beach.

The Colon was not much injured by our firing; her hull was not
penetrated below the water line, and it would have been possible to
repair ber at small cost and convert her into a valuable addition
to the United States navy. It was doubtless to prevent this that her
commander resorted to the trick, dishonorable in civilized warfare, of

rendering her useless. The sea-valves were not only opened but
(277)
278 HISTORY OF THE

their caps were heaved overboard, the dead-lights of the portholes
were smashed, and even the breech-plugs of the guns were thrown
into the sea.

The 530 survivors were taken on board the United States ship
Resolute, and the captured ship was examined. Except for the vandal-
ism of her crew she could have been saved. But she swung off, and
drifted westward, turning her bow off shore. The New York went in,
and placing her prow against the nose of the Colon, pushed the latter
into shoal water, where she turned over on her side and sank, swallow-
ing the sand and refuse of the coast, an almost hopeless wreck.

The Colon had but two serious wounds from our fire, her sides
having been masked by the Oquendo and the Vizcaya during the hot-
test part of the engagement.

Meanwhile, the death-strewn coast of Cuba, from Santiago to Aser-
raderos, a distance of fifteen miles, the scene of gigantic work of de-
struction, had become a theatre of heroic rescue. It was as if the angel
of Mercy had followed upon swift wing the angel of Death.

No sooner had the riddled ships run ashore than the American
pursuers changed from merciless adversaries to unwearying life savers.
When Captain Cook ordered a boat out to board the Colon, his men,
half-naked and begrimed with powder, ran shouting and dancing to
their work. He cautioned them, however, to show no signs of triumph
or exultation to the vanquished, and the crew rowed to the Colon in
silence. As they approached the ship the Spaniards called out “ Bravo
Americanos!” and then our men returned “Bravo Espanoles!” The cabin
and gun-room tables of the Spaniard were littered with wine and brandy
bottles, and the men were half drunk and dazed.

Back at Aserraderos the Jowa had stopped when the Vizcaya was
beached. Five boats were sent out to rescue the Spaniards. It was
a frightful scene. Fire was raging furiously between decks, and portions
of the steel hull were red with heat. Men were hanging to chains
or other grappling points, many were scrambling ashore through the
surf. The fire was threatening magazines and projectiles, but the
American seamen plunged into the wreck, seeking the wounded that
‘

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 279

had been abandoned to a horrible fate by their own terror-stricken
comrades. Loaded guns were now and then being discharged by the
heat, but all this was braved. The Hricsson, torpedo boat, assisted
at this rescue. Ashore Cubans were in waiting to assail the wretched
Spaniards as they crawled upon the beach, but the arrival of the
Americans put a stop to the barbarity.

Captain Antonio Eulate commanded the Vizcaya. More than any
other Spanish officer he typified the racial pride and weakness of
his nation. He had been especially selected to bring his vessel to
New York harbor in a show of defiant courtesy when the Maine had
been sent to Havana. While he was yet on the ocean the Maine was
destroyed at Havana and Captain Eulate did not discover the fact until
he reached New York. Then he entered the harbor with his flag at half-
mast, without music, and declined all invitations to be entertained,
giving as his reason bis sympathy for the sailors lost on the Maine.
He displayed no fear, and his conduct in all ceremonious acts was above
reproach.

He remained ten days in New York, during which time the excite-
ment over the Mane tragedy was high, and then he sailed away to
Havana. After he had gone, one of the bowlévard papers of Paris printed
a ludicrous story which was attributed to an officer of the Vizcaya, who
was said to have written the account home. It was intended to illus-
trate the cowardice of the Americans and their trembling fear of the
Spanish. The story was, that when the Vizcaya raised anchor to steam
out of New York harbor, the piers. were crowded with thousands
of “Yankee pigs” who began hooting and jeering at the vessel. Captain
Eulate, who was on the bridge, heard the contemptuous sounds and
became white with passion. Ordering the ship to stop, he had his
launch lowered and manned, and then called for his second officer,
to whom he‘said, showing a revolver: —

“Tf you-hear a pistol shot from me on shore, you will at onze open
fire and bombard the city!”

Then he went in his launch to the pier, while the “ Yankees” con-
tinued to jeer or to show confusion. He mounted the stairs, walked
280 HISTORY OF THE

along the front of the pier, revolver in hand, while the “trembling pigs
of Yankees” cowered before him and crushed each other as they
huddled back. Captain Eulate, controlling his voice, which was almost
breaking with passionate and scornful rage, cried out: —

“Tf any man dares to jeer the ship and flag of Spain, I will kill
him!”

Dead silence ensued and lasted for twenty minutes, during which
time the Spaniard, with frowning brows, paced the pier, ready to
execute his threat. At last, seeing that the “rabble of Yankee pigs”
was completely cowed, he descended into his launch and, without a
glance backward, boarded his ship and steamed out, while the thousands
upon thousands of frightened “Yankees” stood in respectful silence.

It is not possible that Captain Eulate, or any of his officers, was
authority for this ludicrous romance. It was doubtless made of the
fancy of some Paris scribbler, for the amusement of the Latin preju-
dice against Americans. But it had been translated and republished
in the newspapers of the United States, so that an individual and
special interest was felt in the brave Spaniard who had borne himself
so well under trying circumstances at New York.

When he was discovered on the beach by the Jowa’s crew, he was
covered with blood from a number of wounds and, it afterward ap-
peared, was suffering some mental strain or aberration. Yet he retained
his pride of office and race as he was taken off to the Jowa. As he
was carried up the battleship’s side, unable himself to mount, Captain
Evans ordered the ship’s guard to parade as a token of respect. The
Spanish commander was deeply affected as he was carried aft, where
Captain Evans waited.

Here Captain Eulate stood up, drew his sword from its scabbard,
held it up and, with tears in his eyes, kissed the blade. Then he
stepped forward and offered the hilt to Captain Evans. But the
American Captain with a gesture pushed it back, and advancing seized
Captain Eulate’s hand.

“Keep your sword, sir,” he said; “you have fought like a brave
and gallant officer.”
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 281

The Spaniard fairly broke down in gratitude at this signal courtesy.
He would have fallen but for assistance, and was borne to his state-
room in tears, crying, “My poor Vizcaya—lost, lost!”

He was the only officer who refused parole when brought to Amer-
ican soil. To accept parole from the enemy is against the regulations
of the Spanish army and navy, justifiable only before court-martial.
It was also said that he was the only officer among the captured who
possessed no independent income and was solely dependent upon his
pay.

It was darkly hinted, also, that his mental condition of moroseness,
nervous excitability, and depression, was due to remorse—that he had,
with his own hands, pistolled forty of the Vizcaya’s gunners who at-
tempted to desert their posts during the terrible fight. This was not
established; it was most probably false in entirety, one of those grim
manufactures of a moment opportune to the hands of a picturesque
seeker after sensation. But Captain Don Antonio Eulate was the
most strikingly picturesque figure of that day. He tempted the
romancers of both continents.

From the Vizcaya 24 officers and 248 men were rescued, out of a
crew of about 550. Others were picked up later, on the beach, where
they were hiding from the Cubans. But more than 150 were killed by our
fire, drowned, or burned on the ship. Captain Eulate said one shell
had exploded in a wardroom, killing 90. Of the survivors, 32 were
wounded, a few of whom died afterward.

Eight and a half miles further in the direction of Santiago, the
Almirante Oquendo lay wrecked on Juan Gonzales Point, and a few
hundred yards further, the Maria Teresa; these two, the last and first
of the Spanish cruisers to emerge, and first to be destroyed.

The Indiana and Gloucester were here engaged at rescue. The sur-
roundings were appalling. Both ships were glowing like furnaces,
their upper works an array of twisted and distorted beams and shat-
tered walls. Admiral Cervera had leaped overboard, clad in his under-
clothing only, and his son had assisted him until a life raft was
reached. The Admiral entreated Lieutenant Huse of the Gloucester
282 HISTORY OF THE

not to go aboard his burning ship, lest explosions should kill those
attempting to rescue the wounded on board. But the Americans did
not hesitate. They scrambled upon the decks and bore the wounded
out of the intense heat and stifling smoke, and transferred them to our
boats, where American surgeons attended to their injuries with all
the skill they would have exerted for our own crews.

Admiral Cervera was conveyed on board the Gloucester, where
Captain Wainwright received him with the distinction due to his
rank. The Spanish Admiral, Don Pascual de Cervera y Topete Conde
de Jerez, Marquis de Santa Ana, was the nephew of Admiral Topete,
one of Spain’s naval heroes, and boasts of royal blood. He was about
sixty-five years old. His first campaign was the Spanish expedition
to Morocco in 1859, where he won promotion. He was once naval
attaché of his government at Washington, and speaks English fluently.
He was sent to Cochin China in 1862, and in 1868 to Peru, as captain
of a war ship. Two years later he was called to Cuba, to take charge
of the blockade, but later went to Spain and became Minister of
Marine. When he retired he was placed in command of the Pelayo,
Spain’s only first-class battleship. He was made Admiral in 1887.
When Spain prepared her fleet for Cuban waters Cervera was placed
in command. A man of distinction by birth, manners, education, and
experience, he does not appear to have possessed abilities equal to his
opportunities. On the Gloucester he was given a stateroom and pro-
vided with apparel.

“T have been defeated,” he said to Captain Wainwright, “and my
career is ended. I thought you would be having ‘church’ on your
ships, and as I had been ordered to run out and escape to Havana
it was the best opportunity to be expected. My ships are lost, and
all I have is lost. Permit me to give you my autograph—all I can—
in recognition of your courtesy and humanity.”

Two and a half miles nearer Santiago, the Destroyers, Pluton and
Furor, had sunk near the beach. Each carried 72 men. Only 39 of the
144 men were found alive. Among the dead of the Pluton was Vice-
Admiral Fernando Villamil, an expert in torpedo-boat construction,
 

 

 

 

ALPHONSE XIII., KING OF SPAIN
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 285

who was a naval officer of eminence, well known in Europe and Amer-
ica. He was a man of tenacity of purpose, a fine drillmaster and
executive aboard ship, and of very agreeable appearance, bearing, and
manner. He enjoyed the personal friendship of the Queen-Regent.
Some four years before his death, while a Commodore, he was ordered
to San Sebastian, the summer home of the Spanish royal family, to
act as guard for the youthful King and the Queen-Regent, at that sea-
side town. His appointment aroused the envy of other Spanish naval
officers who desired the opportunity of being near the royal family.
At that time Villamil commanded the torpedo boat Destructor, a boat
of his own designing, but the laughing stock of the Spanish navy, on
account of its small size and low freeboard. The Queen-Regent, however,
was greatly interested in this new fighting craft and paid frequent visits
to it, causing much heartburning among the other officers. In the
middle of summer she and the King decided to sail to Bilbao, and
chose the Destructor for the voyage. This caused a great outcry, and
the Minister of Marine begged the Queen-Regent to send the King
on another boat, so that in the event of an accident at least one of
them would be saved.

“Commodore Villamil,” asked the Queen-Regent, “is there the
slightest danger?”

“None, your Majesty,” was the reply.

“Then we will both sail with you,” replied the Queen-Regent,
much to the discomfiture of the Minister of Marine. The trip was
made in safety, and Villamil was shortly afterward raised to the rank
of Admiral.

The Spanish loss was about 300 killed, 150 wounded, and about
1,600 prisoners. The four cruisers had complements of about 550
each, but these were doubtless reduced by disease and accident; and
the Destroyers 144 together. There were at least 2,250 men on the
vessels, and it is believed that the Cubans killed and secreted the bodies
of a number, not reported, and that 150 managed to find their way
back to Santiago through the jungle, unless they were picked off by
Cubans on the way.
986 HISTORY OF THE

Il,

Tue glory of our ships was deservedly great. To the Oregon was
credited the first alarm of the enemy’s intention. She signaled “ Think
Beye the enemy are preparing to leave the harbor,” and fired a

OF small gun to attract the fleet’s attention to the signal.

oyeeere On the authority of one who investigated the action, who
observed it from the New York, who seems to have been a naval officer,
and whose report is here adopted for its lucid account of the part taken
by each ship, the Oregon was the first of our battleships cleared for
action, and she engaged every Spanish ship in order. Her 13-inch guns
did most execution among the enemy’s ships, and the handling of the
ship herself was a proof of her excellence in every particular. Her
station was south of the Morro, well to the eastward of the Vizen,
Brooklyn, Texas, and Iowa. In the long chase after the Cristobal Colon
she passed all these, one after another, except the Brooklyn, and did
it with less apparent effort at speed than was shown by any other ship.
The Cristobal Colon’s funnels, especially, belched out immense columns
of dark smoke. The power of her forced draught carried even flames
at times from the stacks. None of the American vessels made so much
smoke, and from none were the columns so continuous. The Oregon’s
smoke was not heavy at any time, and there were minutes at a time
when only the faintest haze floated from her funnels. The great ship
piled up a big foam-crested billow across her bows, and rushed on
as though dragged by a hidden force of incalculable power.

The Gloucester, formerly the pleasure yacht Corsair, achieved a name
for herself that will long be remembered. She had the slight advan-
tage of a harmless appearance, and may not have been attacked very
fiercely. Her own advances were straight, quick, and fearlessly under-
taken. She was not hit during the action, and this statement alone
is convincing proof of the incomparably poor marksmanship of the
Spaniards. The little vessel was a target for every gun mounted on
shore and for the broadsides of the Colon, Oquendo, Furor, and Pluton,
all at easy range. The shells flew around her, landing on all sides.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 287

After the two destroyers had shown the white flag, the Gloucester low-
ered her boats and gathered in as many prisoners as came her way.
Some she rescued as they swam, a few she took directly off the burning
Pluton with that vessel’s surrendered colors, and some she took from
the beach.

The Brooklyn was lying at the western and outer end of the Ameri-
can line when the ships came out. Her first sight of the escaping
enemy was when the Spanish flagship Teresa rounded the head of land
at the western side of the harbor and pointed for her, firing as she
came. There was a distance of at least three miles between the ships,
but from the direction taken by the Teresa the Brooklyn expected to
be rammed at any moment and turned her own strong bow to meet
the enemy. When the whole Spanish line had cleared the harbor
entrance and headed to the west, the Brooklyn turned off too, and
started to head off the escaping ships. She fired her starboard broad-
side as she gathered headway, and kept up an intermittent fire until
her guns grew hot and several of them were put out of commission.
Her turret guns, considering the range, were her most useful arms.
Only two of the Brooklyn’s boilers were in commission at the appear-
ance of the enemy and it was some time before fire could be placed
under the others. Like the New York, however, she hurried on, increas-
ing her speed by coupling on fresh boilers as fast as steam was up
in them. Before one o’clock she had six and her auxiliaries in circuit.
The Brooklyn was slightly in advance of the Oregon during the greater
part of the long chase of the Colon, but when the Colon finally ran
ashore the Brooklyn turned in astern of the battleship.

The Vixen, formerly the yacht Josephine, was on the extreme western
station. The course of the Spanish ships was outside her. For several
reasons the little vessel moved quickly out. She was in range of
the American ships for one thing, and her presence might interfere
with their fire at the enemy. So the Vixen raced out to the southward
as fast as she could, firing valiantly at the cruisers as she went. She
followed the chase to the westward and was sent back from Rio
Tarquino with dispatches.
288 HISTORY OF THE

The Texas, which had met with many accidents of navigation in
times of peace, and had thus earned the wardroom sobriquet of “The
Old Hoodoo,” proved herself worthy to rank in the first class, doing
work scarcely less effective than the Oregon. She was in the thick of
combat from beginning to end, and her guns engaged every one of
the enemy’s ships. The shot that tore open the boilers of the Pluton
is credited to Ensign Guise of the Texas. The Spanish commanders
had special orders to sink the Brooklyn and Texas if they could. As
the Texas drew up on the Oquendo Captain Phillip, her commander,
left the bridge and went to the conning tower to direct the fighting.
Scarcely had he done so when a shot passed where he had been
standing. She: was several times struck, one shell exploding in her
smokestack, but no shots caused serious injury. The guns of the Texas
were swung in so many directions in the fury of fighting, that the
concussion caused by cross-deck firing deafened most of her men
for days. One was hurled down a hatchway by the tremendous impact
of the rushing air, and suffered a broken arm.

The Indiana, being slow and unwieldy, did little more than fire
as a stationary fort as the ships came out of the entrance. After
the sinking of the destroyers, by which time the outcome of the
action was already pretty evident, she was ordered back to the harbor
entrance to keep watch there. On the way she lowered boats and
joined in the rescue work.

The Jowa was in all the fighting equally with the Tezas, until the
sinking of the Vizcaya, when she was ordered back to take part in
the rescue of the Spaniards,

The New York and her Admiral took no part in the fighting, but
the ship was racing to the assistance of the Brooklyn, Oregon, and
Texas, after the Colon. She made the 55 miles under the handicap
of small boiler power, but arrived only half an hour after the Colon
was beached.

For the Spaniards there was no glory. All their ships had met
the same fate but the Colon, and she escaped it only through treachery.
She was surrendered in order that her own men might destroy her.
 

 

 

; 3 THE FLAGSHIP NEW YORK UNDER FULL SPEED
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 291

Her officers shrank from combat only to take refuge in the vandalism of
cowardice. For these acts they were liable to punishment by death;
but no notice was taken of it.

A correspondent of Harper’s Weekly, describing the Spanish wrecks
a day after their destruction, wrote thus of the Teresa and Oquendo,
which might also describe the Vizcaya: —

“They lie in a little cove a few hundred yards apart, both bows on to a hard
sand beach, at the foot of high hills that come down to the sea less steeply than
usual, and are separated from the water by a stretch of flat, low, grass-grown land
adorned with tall cocoanut palms. The two beaches, neither more than 300 yards
in length, are separated by a bluff of precipitous rock. High and gloomy hills to
the north shut in the view, while the heavy ground-swell rolls in its heavy voice
against the shore. This cove, five and one-half miles from the entrance to Santiago,
was most opportune for the two hard-pressed ships, as the usual coast line is steep,
rocky, and it would be impossible for ships or men to have survived for a minute
the thundering breakers.

“Smoke still poured from the two ships, and blew away in a thin veil against
the dark hills; the surf beat along their sides and swept in and out through the
sternports and through shot-holes and torpedo-tubes. It was quite a climb up the
tall sides of the Maria Teresa, and once in the gangway the scene that met our
eyes was one of utter ruin. Bad as the ships looked from the outside, the paint
all burned off, or hanging in folds where the water had cooled its farther progress,
guns slewed every which way, and wire rope and tackle hanging over the side in
wild disorder, the scene on deck was so much worse as to leave one speechless
with dismay.

“The spar-deck was nothing but an array of twisted sagging iron beams, set
with copper bolts that had held the deck-planking, and now stuck up in ragged
rows or bent over as the fire had left them. Around some of the broadside 5-inch
guns bits of deck still remained and smoldered, sending up wreaths of pale blue
smoke. Argund the guns and scattered about between the smokestacks and ven-
tilators were charred bodies that gave out an unpleasant odor. The forward military
mast had fallen, mixed up with guns, davits, and iron plates, on the starboard side.
The bridge was a mass of twisted iron and brass. Smokestacks and ventilators
sagged, and some of the latter had fallen down entirely. There was a great hole
where the magazines had been, forward and aft; they had exploded from the bot-
tom up, in the line of least resistance, ripping the deck and beams away entirely,
so you could look down to the bottom of the ship, where the water swashed around.
The iron deck aft was bent and twisted and buckled under the weight of the big
turret and 11-inch gun. The main deck, made of iron plates, still remained, and
was covered with ashes and débris fallen from above. The forward part of the
292 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

ship was full of dead, and was too hot to admit of much investigation, Sailors
from the Z’exas swarmed over the vessel while we were there, and brought up from
below rifles, cutlasses, and souvenirs of all sorts. One man had a hat full of silver
money that had melted and stuck together. The hammock nettings were full of
burned tin boxes that had held canned food; wine bottles and such litter were
scattered about, and from forward and aft were brought many books of a doubtful
character.”

There was no honor for the Spanish ships. They were all magnifi-
cent vessels of their type. The armament, protection, and motive
power of the Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and Vizcaya ranked them as almost
second-class battleships rather than cruisers. The Colon’s 11-inch guns
had never been mounted, and they were missed. Her crew, however,
was the best one of the four, and had had charge of the guns of the
western battery at Santiago, that had done the most effective work
against the blockading fleet. The Furor and Pluton were of the latest
type of the torpedo-boat destroyer class, and had been much feared,
though not by the Americans. The engagement at Santiago in many
respects was without precedent.

 
CHAPTER THE TWELFTH.

DEsTRUCTION OF CERVERA’S SquapRon (Concluded).

SpaNIsH STORY OF THE BaTTLE As TOLD BY SURVIVING OrFicers—Ir Dogs NoT DIFFER
IN SUBSTANCE FROM THE AMERICAN AccOUNT— INCIDENTS AND ANECDOTES OF
THE ENGAGEMENT — How THE BATTLE LOOKED TO OBSERVERS —
To Wuom Dorks THE CREDIT OF VicTORY BELONG?

I,

its history no less necessary than our own. Admiral Cervera

was permitted by our Government to make up and forward

his official report to Spain, but it was a confidential com-
munication, and its character was not indicated. A copy is in the
archives of the United States Government. The Admiral declined to
speak publicly of the battle, andthe officers also declined =. Coarse
to make any authorized statement; but during their pas- STORY OF
sage to Annapolis on board the St. Louis, as prisoners, Bee dees
they spoke freely to our officers of the experiences of their ships.
A report of these statements was carefully made up and published in
the New York Sun, from which this summary is taken.

Lieutenant Gomez Imas of Cervera’s staff on the Maria Teresa said:
“After clearing the harbor we headed to the westward along the shore.
We fired the first shot of the battle, aiming at the Brooklyn, then about
three miles away. The Texas, Oregon, and Brooklyn returned our fire,
but their first shots all fell short. As the distance between the ships
decreased the shells commenced to strike us and did great damage.
First, a shell exploded in the Admiral’s cabin, setting fire to the wood-
work there. A signal was sent to the engine room to start the pumps,
but the fire mains had been ruptured by an exploding shell, so that

no water could be got on the fire. Another shell struck the main steam
18 (298)

Tt Spanish side of the story of the great battle is a part of
294 HISTORY OF THE

pipe, disabling the port engine, and the escaping steam killed every
man in that compartment. One exploding shell killed or wounded
eighty of our men. Our fire was directed principally against the
Brooklyn. The fire in the after part of the ship had driven the crews
away from the after guns, and the rapid-fire guns of the American
ships were playing havoc with our men and riddling the upper
works of the ship. Having one engine disabled and the whole after
part of the ship on fire, the vessel was headed toward the shore
in search of a suitable place for beaching. The Captain said to the
Admiral: —

“My ship is in flames, my engines are disabled, my men have been
driven from the guns and are being killed; ought I not for humanity’s
sake to surrender?’

“The Admiral answered, ‘It will be useless to fight longer.’

“The flag was hauled down and the ship run on the beach.
The Captain was struck and severely wounded just as the flag was
being lowered. The fire was now raging aft so that there was great
danger of the magazine being blown up at any minute. The Admiral
and those of the officers and crew still alive took to the water, the
risk of drowning being preferable to the certainty of being burned or
blown up. Many reached the shore, but some were drowned. Admiral
Cervera stripped to his underclothing and plunged into the water.
Two of the sailors secured ropes to a grating, and taking the other
end of the ropes in their mouths swam to the shore towing the grat-
ing, the Admiral bearing part of his weight on it. The Admiral’s
son, one of his staff, swam along behind his father and assisted him
as best he could. Had it not been for this assistance Admiral Cervera
would undoubtedly have been drowned, as he is a very poor swimmer.
While the men were in the water the Cubans on shore commenced
firing at them until the Jowa put a stop to that atrocity by firing a
shell among them and scattering them.”

Captain Eulate of the Vizcaya said: “When the Maria Teresa
headed for shore I passed her, and I had the Brooklyn, Texas, Iowa,
and Oregon all firing at me. The firing from these ships was terrific;
YVMO! dIHSSILLVS *S “N

 

 

 

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 297

shells were bursting all around us. My ship was set on fire by a
shell exploding in my cabin. My engines and pumps were disabled,
and I could not fight the fire. My men were being killed and wounded
in large numbers. A shell finally exploded in one of my forward
magazines and I was forced to head for the shore. When I went into
action I had flying at the masthead a large embroidered silk flag, which
had been made and presented to the ship by ladies of the province
of Vizcaya. When I saw that my ship would be lost, I had this flag
hauled down and burned, and hoisted another ensign in its place.
My flag was shot away twice during the engagement, the last time
just as the ship grounded. The boats of the Jowa picked up those
of my officers and men still left alive, carrying them to that ship.
When I went on board the Jowa,I took off my sword and tendered
it to Captain Evans, but he refused it, saying that I had fought four
ships and that I should keep my sword. That was the proudest moment
of my life.”

The Captain of the Oquendo committed suicide, and the second
and third officers were killed during the engagement. The following
description was obtained from the paymaster of the Oquendo:—

“When we came out of the harbor we were fired on by the Jowa,
Texas, and Oregon. Our fire was mostly directed against the Texas,
for we had seen the splendid shooting done by her in the attacks on
the batteries. From the first the firing was terrific, and great damage
was done. The after part of the ship was set on fire by bursting
shell and could not be put out. Finally, fearing that the magazines
would explode and everyone be lost, the ship was beached and the
flag lowered. The mortality on the ship was great, over half of the
crew having been killed and wounded.”

Captain Moreu of the Cristobal Colon, said to have been by far
the ablest officer in the fleet, gave an account of his ship. He did
not open fire at first, but passed inside of the other vessels. When
the Vizcaya headed for the shore, he passed her and then opened fire
on the Oregon, Brooklyn, and Texas, which ships had taken up the
chase. He ran to the westward, close to the shore. The heavy guns
998 HISTORY OF THE

intended for this ship had never been mounted, and when asked
where they were, the Captain shrugged his shoulders and said: “Per-
haps in the pocket of the Minister of Marine.” Finally, when nearly
fifty miles from Santiago, he was headed off and hauled down his
flag at 1:20 p.m. There was no serious battle damage done to this
ship, and but one man killed and sixteen wounded.

Lieutenant Diego Carlier, in command of the destroyer Furor, and
Lieutenant Pedro Vasquez, in command of the Pluton, told each the
same story. They were literally riddled by the rapid-fire guns of the
Oregon, Iowa, and Texas. Their boilers were struck and exploded, one
after the other, in rapid succession. A large shell struck the Pluton
almost amidships and exploded, nearly tearing her in two. She sank
almost immediately. The steering gear on the Furor was shot away,
and she ran into shoal water and sank. These vessels each carried
seventy-two men. But twenty-two were saved from the Pluton and
but seventeen from the Furor. The officers all expressed themselves:
amazed at the rapidity and accuracy of fire of the American ships.
They all expressed the hope that Spain would see the uselessness of
continuing the war.

Another officer said: “For twenty days I have had no rest. Every
night we expected some kind of an attack. One day, when you bom-
barded El Morro, a shell came over the heights and wrecked my room.
Ever since the war began I have known that this day must come.
Particularly since May 29, when you blockaded us in Santiago harbor,
we have been under a nerve strain such as the knowledge of certain
defeat, deferred from day to day, must always induce. Imagine ‘to
what a tension our nerves have been wrought up. We knew per-
fectly well that in coming out of the harbor we were coming to destruc-
tion, but it was a sacrifice that we had to make for our honor and
our country. There was no way out of it, and, since it had to come,
I cannot but feel relieved that it is over, andI am grateful to God
that we have fallen into such kind hands.”

An American officer who was present when the Spaniards were
taken aboard one of our rescuing ships, bore testimony to the bravery
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 299

displayed. “About thirty of the prisoners,” he said, “were wounded,
all of whom bore their suffering with most admirable spirit. One
poor fellow had his right foot knocked off above the ankle and another
severe wound in the calf of his leg; but our surgeon was busy trying
to stop the flow of blood from a man who was bleeding to death, so
the heroic sailor said: — :

“*Oh, ’'m all right; all l want is a cigarette.’ Then, having smoked
one, instead of fainting, he actually went to sleep! No man could
witness, as I did, the patience and fortitude displayed by these poor,
suffering prisoners, without experiencing increased respect for them.
Understanding the condition of affairs at Santiago, notwithstanding
that our forces were sure to administer a crushing defeat in case the
enemy came out, | must bear witness to the courage of Admiral Cervera,
his officers and his men. It was a cruel fate. They knew that they
were offering themselves up in making a desperate effort, and they
chose to do it because there was only one alternative—that of giving
up without a struggle. They played their last card and lost. I must
mention how the Spanish prisoners behaved when we fired our
national salute at noon. As the first gun was fired and our officers
all stood up and uncovered, the Spanish officers did likewise and
their men followed the example, all standing in respectful silence until
the last gun was fired.”

Il.

In Trais great naval battle off Santiago, Spaniard and “ American
mercenary” had measured themselves again, as they had on the other
side of the world when Dewey erased the squadron of meee
Montejo. The movement was reversed, but the result AND
was not changed. Dewey had sailed into unknown Cae aes
and masked dangers and had annihilated the Spaniard under the guns
of his shore forts, without the loss of a man. At Santiago Cervera
steamed out against a force he knew perfectly well, with four cruisers
300 HISTORY OF THE

as strong as battleships in armament, and much higher in contem-
plated speed. Spanish incompetency with machinery and Spanish in-
competency at the guns had in both instances gone down before the
unrivaled skill and accuracy of American engineers and gunners.
Dewey surprised Montejo in his own fastness, and beat him by celerity
and intrepidity of action. Cervera surprised Schley, but yet was
beaten by the celerity and intrepidity that could recover against
all odds. Montejo had been at a ball. Schley’s squadron was ex-
pected to be “at church.” It was the living against the dying race.

Nothing could illustrate more strikingly their racial differences
than the condition and conduct of the men. The American seamen
were all sober; the Spaniards were all stimulated to the point of des-
peration by liquors—the fashion of the eighteenth century. When
rescued, the Spaniards at first trembled at the expectation of death;
the Americans risked death again to save their wounded enemies.
So astonished were the Spaniards at their treatment that Admiral
Cervera cabled to General Blanco: “The crews are very grateful for
the noble generosity with which they were treated.’ The prisoners
were taken to healthful quarters in the United States, supplied with
good quarters, clothing, and food, the officers conveyed to Annapolis
and released on parole; yet they expected court-martial, disgrace, per-
haps death, because they accepted this ordinary kindness. The Span-
iards abandoned their own wounded to the fires on their vessels;
and were amazed when the Americans entered these burning hells to
rescue men they had just been engaged in destroying.

When the padré of the Vizcaya was taken aboard the Ericsson
he sat down upon a chest. The wounded of his own charge wera
brought in and he was asked to remove from the chest in order that
a wounded Spaniard might be placed upon it for treatment. He
coldly refused to yield, and it is to the honor of Ensign Edie of the
rescuing crew that he promptly seized the heartless chaplain and
contemptuously threw bim upon the floor.

These are not natural exhibitions of human cruelty; they are the
outcome of caste, that institution of social slavery that exists in Spain.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 301

Some of the Spaniards exhibited the highest courage, fortitude, and
nobility of conduct under their misfortunes. The junior surgeon of
the Vizcaya declined to have his wounds dressed until his men had
been attended to. One young officer, with his left arm broken and
helpless, mounted the side of his prison ship without assistance, and
with his right arm saluted the deck as he reached it. Captain Eulate,
Admiral Cervera, Captain Maocochron, and others, bore themselves
with the naturalness, simplicity, and courage of brave men. When
Captain Eulate’s sword was refused, and he burst into tears, the crew
of the Jowa burst into cheers for him as a brave man.

When the Texas had riddled the Oquendo and the Spanish colors
came down, to be followed by a great explosion that marked her ruin,
the crew of the American started to cheer.

“Don’t cheer, boys,” cried Captain Philip; ‘the poor devils are
dying.” And the cheers were silenced on the very lips of the con-
querors.

When the Colon surrendered, the same crew gave three cheers and
a “tiger” for their veteran commander. Instantly Captain Philip
called all hands to the quarter-deck, and, with bared head, thanked
God for the almost bloodless victory.

“T want to make public acknowledgment here,” he said, “that I
believe in God the Father Almighty. I want all you officers and men
to lift your hats and from your hearts offer silent thanks to the
Almighty.”

All hats were off. There was a moment or two of absolute silence,
and then again the overwrought feelings of the ship’s company relieved
themselves in three hearty cheers for their commander.

The engagement was almost the counterpart under reversed plan
of that at Manila. But one man was killed on the American ships
at Santiago. He was George H. Ellis, yeoman, of the Brooklyn. Ellis
was standing with Commodore Schley, when the Vizcaya came out of
the harbor.

“Ellis,” said the Commodore to the yeoman, “find the range of that
ship.”
302 HISTORY OF THE

Ellis stepped toward his place to comply, when a shell took his
head off so quickly that the body remained swaying for a moment,
until companions rushed forward and caught it.

“Too bad!” cried the Commodore, who replaced the glasses to his
eyes and resumed his watch of the enemy.

The Brooklyn was struck twenty-six times by the enemy’s shots,
but sustained little injury. It was proof that the Spaniards concen-
trated their fire upon her. The Jowa was struck five times, two shells
piercing her, one starting a fire that was quickly extinguished. The
Texas was struck three times.

The Oquendo received greatest punishment from our gunners. When
examined, part of her hull was under water, but in that portion above
it, it was found that she had been struck sixty-six times. The Teresa
was struck thirty-three times, the Vizcaya twenty-four, and the Colon
eight. All had distinct wounds in their hulls. The shots were from
the 4-, 5-, 6-, 8-, and 12-inch guns. One big shell, a 12-incher from the
Texas, tore a hole through the Oquendo. There were other shell holes
made by the Brooklyn, Oregon, and Iowa. The Vizcaya’s forward tor-
pedoes, which had their war heads on, exploded, tearing a great hole
in her bow. She was the worst wreck of all. The Oguendo’s back
was broken on the beach. The Teresa’s fire mains were destroyed at
the beginning of the action. She was set on fire by a 6-inch shell
immediately and could not put it out.

Il.

To WHOM Tur Fourth of July, 1898, in the United States was

aeonceprr? nt less glorious to our national pride and the strength

of our arms than the first Fourth had been to the

struggling hopes of the Republic. On the afternoon of the 8rd Ad-

miral Sampson sent the following cable dispatch to Washington: —
Sisoney, July 3, via Haytt, July 4.

The fleet under my command offers the nation, as a Fourth of July present, the
destruction of the whole of Cervera’s fleet— not one escaped. It attempted to escape
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 303 |

at 9:30 this morning. At two the last ship, the Cristobal Colon, had run ashore
sixty miles west of Santiago and had let down her colors. The Infanta Maria
Teresa, Oquendo, and Vizcaya were forced ashore, burned and blown up within
twenty miles of Santiago. The Furor and Pluton were destroyed within four miles
of the port.

Our loss, one killed and two wounded. Enemy’s loss, probably several hundred
from gun fire, explosions and drowning. About 1,300 prisoners, including Admiral
Cervera. The man killed was George H. Ellis, chief yeoman of the Brooklyn.

[Signed] Sampson.

This message reached the President at noon on Monday the 4th
following quickly the information briefly printed in the newspapers.
It filled the country with joy and exultation. From the depression
caused by the heavy losses at San Juan and El Caney, national spirit
leaped to patriotic heights.

Immediately on the receipt of Admiral Sampson’s message the Presi-

dent sent the following: —
Exxcutive Mansion,
Wasuineton, D. C., July 4. {
Admiral Sampson, Playa del Este: —

You have the gratitude and congratulations of the whole American people.
Convey to your noble officers and crews, through whose valor new honors have been
added to the American navy, the grateful thanks and appreciation of the nation.

Witiram McKINtey,

Secretary Long sent the following: —

Wasuincton, D. C., July 4.
To Admiral Sampson, Playa del Este: —

The Secretary of the Navy sends you and every officer and man of your fleet,
remembering affectionately your dead comrade, grateful acknowledgment of your
heroism and skill. All honor to the brave! You have maintained the glory of the
American navy. Joun D. Lone.

As has been pointed out, the battle of Santiago was almost a
reversal of the movement at Manila, but the result had not been re-
versed, and was the same in both combats. The men behind the guns,
behind the ship, behind the engines, had triumphed over Spanish
incompetency, in each instance, with scarcely a scar to show for it.
At Manila we had eight men slightly wounded; at Santiago one man
killed and one slightly wounded.
804 HISTORY OF THE

In the two engagements the enemy had lost four of the finest
first-class cruisers of the world’s navies, eight unprotected light cruisers,
six gunboats, and two of the most valued destroyers of her great
torpedo fleet—twenty ships in all, valued at about $25,000,000. The
Colon had been purchased from Italy at a cost of $3,500,000 and the
three original Spanish cruisers cost each as much to construct. The
Spanish loss in men in both engagements was about 1,100 killed, 2,400
captured, several hundred wounded and missing.

The United States had not lost a ship or a ship’s boat, and the
injuries sustained to armor and machinery were trivial. The superiority
of our men could have received no more signal demonstration.

Whose was the victory at Santiago?

That was the question to spring up even before the cheers of
national exultation had ceased. It was as though the people of the
United States were unable to realize the vast extent and the glorious
completeness of the battle in detail. The report of Admiral Sampson
did not mention the name of an officer or ship of our navy, but gave
the glory to “the fleet under my command.” The magnificent per-
formances of the Brooklyn, Commodore Schley’s flagship, and the tem-
porary absence of the Admiral, during which time the command
devolved upon Schley, gave to public opinion, heated by excitement
and passion, seeking for heroes and resentful of any appearance of *
favoritism, the impression that Sampson had ignored the claims of
“the fighting Commodore.”

The sudden elevation of Sampson had caused comment, and his
position was, professionally, embarrassing and delicate.

Whose was the victory at Santiago?

It was, as Sampson said, that of the fleet under his command. It
was, as Schley said in his report, when with the directness of. an
officer of courage, loyalty, and thorough discipline, he wrote to the
Admiral, “I congratulate you upon the great victory to the squadron
under your command, . . . a victory that seems big enough for
all of us.”

Who would care to alter this verdict of two heroes?
NAIMOOYS YASINYO GSYOWYY 'S ‘nN

 

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 307

It was a victory “big enough for all”—from the Admiral, on his
great cruiser, to the humblest powder-monkey on the Gloucester; from
the gallant Commodore to the lowliest stoker. There can be no
effective action without plan, just as there can be no good plan estab-
lished without action. It is not the true nature of Americans, except
under excitement, to underrate the value of that patient, silent, loyal,
brave, and far-seeing Admiral, who made no mistakes in preparation
or disposition, who demonstrated, in the difficult and burdensome task
to which he was called, the glory of the genius of Republican insti-
tutions; the genius of thoroughness of education in his profession,
of untiring industry and energy, of deliberate preparation for the
purpose in hand, of unflinching responsibility for what result soever
might ensue, and the calm courage and willingness to set his life upon
the outcome.

Nor could they fail to view without admiration the valiant acts
of the Commodore, ready in his place, quick and dauntless to meet the
enemy, with his life in his hand, and who was the conspicuous figure to
lead in the actual fighting—the figure of deathless courage that all the
world hails as a hero. His work could not have been better done.

The victory at Santiago belongs to Americans, to Sampson, Schley,
Clark, Philip, Cook, Evans, Taylor, Wainwright, and the patriotic
men on all the ships. What if Sampson was away at the beginning,
upon an errand of highest duty—was he not there at the finish? If
Schley had been struck down by the first shot, can Americans be-
lieve we should have lost? Were there not Clark, Philip, Evans, Cook,
and Taylor? Did any one of the men or the ships act in such manner
as to indicate that the stout fabric of the American navy was woven
about a single thread, to unravel and fall in pieces if that thread
were cut? ;

To credit the victory to any but ‘‘the fleet under Admiral Samp-
son” is to discredit all.*

*Lieutenant Akijama, naval attaché of the Japanese Empire at Washington, who ac-
companied our fleet for observation, was questioned by the New York Sun on his return
308 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

In recognition of the victory the President soon after promoted
Acting Rear-Admiral Sampson to be Rear-Admiral, and Commodore
Schley received the same advancement. In both cases the reason
recorded was “for eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle.” Captain
Philip, of the Texas, was made a Commodore, and all the other com-
manders were advanced in the order of their rank for their participation
in this engagement, and that at Guantanamo.

from Santiago, July 21. He had witnessed the battle, and was asked if he had formed
any opinion upon it.

“Many,” he replied. ‘‘First, the arrangement of the American fleet by Admiral
Sampson. It was complete. It was without fault.’ ‘

“You think, then, that Admiral Sampson deserves the credit for the battle?”

‘Sincerely, I do. The officers of other Governments all agree with me that the great-
est credit is for the Admiral. He made the plans. He gave the orders. He said where
each ship should wait for the Spanish. The Spanish came. The result was the most com-
plete victory that ever was known. He was not there. He was unfortunate. But the fight
showed, by its complete victory, that his plans were right. If the flagship had been in the
fight, she would have fought as well as the other ships. The seamanship, the crews of the
American ships, the directness of their aim, it is all alike. It could not be better.

‘Admiral Sampson was fortunate to have brave, quick officers to obey the commands
he had given to them. They were quiet, waiting. The Spanish came and made a sur-
prise. The Admiral was away. It was a good test. The American fleet went quickly to
meet them, It was as if they knew long before that the Spaniards were coming. Com-
modore Schley fights well. He led the fleet with great dash. They fired so fast, so
fiercely, so accurately, that the people who looked thought ‘the American ships are on
fire.’ The firing, I say, was so great that the Spaniards were [Here the Lieutenant made
a downward motion of his hands with the palms outward, more expressive than words
could have been.] stopped from helping themselves. The Spaniards would be brave in
fight, very likely, but there was no chance; your fleet was too good. If any one had said
before such a victory was possible, he would have been laughed at.

“The smoke around your fleet was very great. Shooting straight seemed to be im-
possible. But the shooting was very straight. All the foreign officers said to one another
often on the Seneca: ‘It is wonderful; it could not be better.’ ”’

Asked to compare the naval battle of Santiago with the battle of the Yalu, Lieutenant
Akijama said :—

**They would be hard to compare, because the character of the fights differed. At the
Yalu there was much maneuvring. All through the fight the position of the ships
changed. At Santiago it was shoot, advancing on the Spanish. When the Spanish found
themselves overpowered and desired to escape, it was follow and destroy. It was simple,
but it was well done. If it had not been well done it would not have been simple, but
most confused; the American victory would not have been with only one man killed.”

New York Sun, July 22, 1898.
CHAPTER THE THIRTEENTH.

Proeress or Our Army anp Navy.

GENERAL SHAFTER SURROUNDS SANTIAGO AND DEMANDS ITs SURRENDER— SINGULAR PROGRESS
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS— EXCHANGE OF Hosson AND His MEN, AN ExciITING INCIDENT
—TuHE “Sr. Paut” Sinks THE TorPepDo Boat ‘‘ TERROR” AT SAN JUAN— THE
“Texas” SINKS THE ‘‘ REINA MERCEDES” IN SANTIAGO HARBOR—‘ ALFONSO
XII.” Sunk at MarieEL—TuHE Lupicrous VoYAGE OF ADMIRAL CAMA-

RA’Ss FLEET THROUGH THE Sugz CANAL AND Back AGAIN.

I,

HILE our navy was destroying the Spanish sea forces that

Sunday morning, our soldiers, haggard and exhausted with

battle and hunger, yet undismayed, lay be- Pree oian

fore the walls of Santiago, tenaciously hold- corp azout
ing every foot of ground that had been won by their Renee
blood and valor. Saturday four batteries were moved up into posi-
tion to bombard the city and a portion of the entrenchments, to
aid General Ludlow with a force to move to the north and shut in
the city on that side. The same day Colonel Escariel arrived in San-
tiago with about 1,000 Spanish reénforcements.

The condition of the roads to the rear prevented supplies from being
brought up,and our troops were living upon scant rations. General
Shafter and General Wheeler were ill with fever, General 8. B. M.
Young was seriously ill and had to be sent back to the hospital ship,
although he protested in the delirium of fever his desire to go to
the front. On Saturday night a council of war was held and misgivings
were expressed, only to be swept away by the tenacity of General
Wheeler, who declared that not an inch should be conceded. General
Shafter cabled to Washington for reénforcements to support the ex-
hausted army and was promised aid as quickly as troops could be

dispatched. The council decided to put on a bold front to the enemy
(309)
310 HISTORY OF THE

On Sunday morning, while Cervera’s fleet was leaving the harbor
to meet destruction, a flag of truce from Shafter entered Santiago
bearing this letter to the commanding General: —

To the Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba: —
S1r:— I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please
inform the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children that they should
leave the city before ten o’clock to-morrow morning.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. R. Suarter, Major-General U.S. A.

It was given into the hands of General José Toral, who had suc-
ceeded to command through the wounding of General Linares and the
death of General Vara del Rey, second in command. Toral was aware
of Cervera’s movement and hoped that its success would weaken our
naval forces by the necessity of pursuit of the Spanish vessels. With-
out delay he sent back a response full of cool defiance. It read: —

“J advise the foreign women and children that they must leave the city before ten
o’clock to-morrow morning. It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surren-
der, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your
message.”

The reply was brought to Shafter at 6:30 in the evening, and
with the truce-messenger came a deputation of foreign consuls who
appealed for more time in which to get the non-combatants out of.
the city. They asked leave to send these to El] Caney and represented
that there were from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand persons
anxious to leave, many of them old, feeble, sick, and helpless. They
were also without food, which Shafter could not promise to supply
while his own troops were hungry and supplies were coming forward
with dangerous slowness. He granted to the refugees permission to
go to El Caney, but firmly refused to allow any at Siboney, where
it was determined to keep our hospitals free from the danger of in-
fection. By the consuls he forwarded the following to General Toral:
The Commanding General Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba: —

Str:—In consideration of the request of the consuls and officers in your city
for delay in carrying out my intention to fire on the city, and in the interest of the
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 311

poor women and children, who will suffer very greatly by their hasty and enforced
departure from the city, I have the honor to announce that I will delay such action
solely in their interest until noon of the fifth, provided during the interval your
forces make no demonstration whatever upon those of my own. I am, with great
respect, your obedient servant, W. R. SHaFrer,
Major-General U. S. A., Commanding.

General Toral consented to this truce and the evacuation of San-
tiago by the miserable refugees of war began next morning. Among
them were the Civil Governor, the Mayor, and the highest officer of
justice. They had been forbidden to depart by Toral, but escaped
in the rout, a most significant indication to our authorities of the
desperate straits in the city. When questioned they reported the
effects of the siege as dreadful, and Spanish losses as very great. The
poorer classes were at the point of starvation. Food was very scarce.
Only rice and black bread were to be obtained. The food was all
held by the army, and was given out in smallest quantities by officers.
The people were almost ready to surrender before the fight, and after
that they were anxious to capitulate. These civil officers had favored
surrender, for which they had been denounced by General Toral,
but they continued to urge him. The Archbishop of Santiago, the
highest ecclesiastical authority in the island, was in favor of sur-
render, and he, too, had pleaded with General Toral, who continued,
however, to maintain his stubborn attitude. They did not believe
Toral could hold out much longer. Pressure upon him was great
from citizens and soldiers. The foreign consuls had confirmed these
reports and opinions.

Not fewer than 18,000 men, women, and children marched out of
Santiago that Monday morning, over the roads deep in mire that led
to El Caney. The village, that had only a thousand inhabitants, was
much damaged by the battle on the preceding Friday, so that
the massing of 18,000 helpless persons there meant pitiful hardships
and much suffering. The sick were carried on litters, many of
the weak women succumbed to the heat and fell almost dead by
the roadside. Many women were widows, wives, or mothers, of Spanish
312 HISTORY OF THE

soldiers. Thousands were well dressed, some of the women of the
highest class handsomely attired in silk gowns. These volunteered
as nurses, and when the families of the killed or wounded discovered
how well the wounded Spanish were being cared for, they became
devoted adherents of the American cause.

At noon, on Tuesday, the truce would expire. That morning, how-
ever, a flag of truce came out from Toral. The bearer of it, instead
of being blindfolded, as usual, to prevent observation of the
strength and disposition of our forces, was escorted open-eyed past
our batteries, trenches, and lines, so that he might be impressed with
the hopelessness of resistance. Toral had heard that Cervera’s ships
were destroyed, but could not believe it. His communication to Shafter
was lengthy. He asked that the truce be further extended, as he
wished time to communicate with the Madrid Government concerning
the surrender of the city. He also asked that cable operators be sent
to operate the line between Santiago and Kingston. He pledged his
honor as a soldier that the operators should not be asked to transmit
any matter that did not solely bear on the surrender, and that he
would return them safe to El] Caney when a final reply should be re-
ceived front Madrid. This request for operators was necessary for the
reason that the operators of the Santiago cable were British subjects
and had all left the city under the protection of the British Consul
when the non-combatants left. The commissioner said General Toral
desired to consult the authorities in Madrid because he had been
unable to communicate with Captain-General Blanco at Havana.

It was finally arranged that the truce should be extended until
Saturday, and the cable operators were sent into the city.

Toral’s commissioner also bore to his commander the following
letter from Shafter:—

Sir:—l. In view of the events of the 8d inst., I have the honor to lay before
your Excellency certain propositions, to which, I trust, you will give the consider-
ation which, in my opinion, they deserve.

2. I inclose a bulletin of the engagement on Sunday morning, which resulted
in the complete destruction of Admiral Cervera’s fleet, the loss of 600 officers and
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 313

men, and the capture of the remainder. The Admiral and General Paredes and other
officers escaped alive and are now prisoners on the Harvard and St. Louis. The
latter ship, in which are the Admiral, General Paredes, and the surviving Captains
of all the vessels, except the Captain of the Almirante Oquendo, who was slain,
has sailed for the United States. If desired, this may be confirmed by your Ex-
cellency sending an officer under a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson and he can
arrange to visit the Harvard, which will not sail until to-morrow.

8. Our fleet is now perfectly free to act. I have the honor to state that
unless a surrender is arranged by noon of the 9th inst. the bombardment of the
city will be begun and continued by the heavy guns of our ships. The city is
within easy range of these guns, the 8-inch being capable of firing 9,500 yards
and the 13-inch much further. The ships can so lie that with a range of 8,000
yards they can reach the center of the city.

4. I make this suggestion in a purely humanitarian spirit. I do not wish to
cause the slaughter of more men of either your Excellency’s forces or my own, the
final result, under circumstances so disadvantageous to your Excellency, being a
foregone conclusion.

5. As your Excellency may wish to make reference of so momentous a ques-
tion to your home Government, it is for this purpose that I have placed the time
for the resumption of hostilities sufficiently far in the future to allow of a reply
being received.

6. I beg an early answer.

Then began an extraordinary series of negotiations, never before
heard of in the business of warfare. Both sides were not averse to
gaining time. Toral dared not surrender without authoyity from Blanco
or his Government at Madrid. Shafter, whose forces were suffering
from disease following hunger, exposure, and exhaustion, was willing
to wait for 6,000 fresh troops that were speeding to his assistance
with General Nelson A. Miles, the Commander-in-Chief, at their head.
These arrived at Baiquiri on the day the truce expired.

Meantime, Toral, after consulting with his superiors at Madrid
and Havana, suggested terms offering to evacuate Santiago if Gen-
eral Shafter would permit him to depart unmolested with all his
troops, arms, and flags. He added that any attempt to conquer
the city must cost the Americans enormously in the matter of lives,
for he had been reénforced, and now had plenty of ammunition. Re-.

sistance, he said, would be long as well as strong, because, by sending
14
314 HISTORY OF THE

out the poor of Santiago to be fed by the Americans, he had enabled
himself to provision his garrison for an indefinite time.

The truce was again extended one day. Six batteries of Ran-
dolph’s light artillery arrived and occupied positions overlooking the
Spanish lines and the city. The disposition of troops composing our
line was about as follows: On the right, Lawton’s division (Ludlow’s,
Chaffee’s, and Miles’s brigades) and Wheeler’s cavalry division (First,
Ninth, Tenth, and Rough Riders); center, Bates’s brigade; left, Kent’s
brigade. It was reported that the Spaniards were digging trenches
in the streets of Santiago, and otherwise preparing for a house-to-house
fight.

Sunday the 10th General Shafter notified Toral that by the Presi-
dent’s directions the Spanish proposition to surrender was rejected,
and that the United States would accept no terms but unconditional
surrender. General Toral replied in effect that he would discuss no
other terms than those suggested by himself.

The attack on the city by the artillery did not begin until after
five o’clock in the afternoon, when the Brooklyn, Texas, and Indiana,
lying off Aguadores, threw shells over the cliffs in an effort to reach
the city, six miles distant and hidden from view. Signals from shore
announced that the shells fell short of the Spanish position. From
Shafter’s lines, the Spanish defenses outside the city were fired upon
by our field guns, mortars, Gatling guns, and the dynamite gun of
the Rough Riders. The enemy’s reply proved to be less vigorous than
was anticipated. On our side Captain Charles W. Rowell and one
private were killed and four wounded.

On July 11 Shafter’s available forces, counting all reénforcements,
and deducting the dead, sick, and wounded, was about 22,500 fighting
men. This is based on an estimate of 15,337 men in General Shafter’s
original expedition, and a little more than 10,000 in various expeditions
which had since gone, making in all 25,500 men. Bombardment
was resumed that day until a flag of truce was raised in the city and
negotiations were resumed.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 315

Il,

Tue undeniably brave, if desperate, resistance of the Spanish troops
had earned the respect and admiration of the United States forces.
Whatever the incompetency of the Spanish navy, none neues be
was displayed by the military forces. Spain’s troops HOBSON AND
have always been celebrated for courage and cruelty. eres
They cost Napoleon more trouble than any other adversaries. During
the truces before Santiago there was some fraternization between
officers on both sides and our men recognized the courtesy and cour-
age of their enemies.

This good opinion was increased when, on July 6, Toral agreed to
exchange Lieutenant Hobson, the hero of the Merrimac incident, and
his seven sailors, for an equal number of Spanish prisoners.

The incident was picturesque and exhilarating to the soldiers,
wearied by long service in the trenches.

At two o’clock in the afternoon, the agreement having been con-
cluded, the Spanish prisoners to be exchanged started from the Amer-
ican lines in charge of Lieutenant John D. Miley of Shafter’s staff.
Lieutenant Miley was followed by three Spanish Lieutenants, from
whom one was to be selected to be exchanged for Lieutenant Hobson.
They were blindfolded and carried in a covered wagon. The officers
were followed by the soldiers for whom our sailors were to be exchanged.
The road led up a hill on the crest of which our firing line was lying
in the trenches. Passing through the line, the procession moved four
hundred yards down the hill toward Santiago and turned into a field.
Here the bandages were removed from the prisoners’ eyes, and all
the party sat down under a tree to await the arrival of Hobson and
his men, who could already be seen moving out of the city with a white
flag floating above them, accompanied by a guard.

When the two groups met beneath the tree the eyes of both armies
were upon them. The Spanish officer in charge of the Americans
talked for an hour with Lieutenant Miley before final terms of
316 HISTORY OF THE

exchange were agreed upon. Lieutenant Miley told the Spanish officer
that he might select any one of the three Spanish Lieutenants in -
exchange for Hobson. Finally Lieutenant Arias was selected for the
reason that he was wounded.

Then the two groups saluted and each turned back to its own lines.
As the Americans came up the hill road, Lieutenant Hobson was
riding in advance with Lieutenant Miley, on horseback. The soldiers
recognized him by his uniform, and instantly broke into deafening
cheers. The party moved rapidly forward, and when they were well
within the American lines the sailors cheered, while the soldiers waved
their hats and shouted themselves hoarse. One of the regimental
bands played “The Star-Spangled Banner,” whereupon all cheered
again and again.

Hobson looked somewhat pale, due, perhaps, to his confinement in
prison, buf he smiled and bowed in response to the welcome given
to him.

The ovation to the sailors equaled that given to Hobson. The
men rode in the wagon that had conveyed the Spanish prisoners.
The vehicle was constantly surrounded by cheering soldiers, who seized
and heartily shook the outstretched hands of the released heroes, while
the band, in honor of the seamen, played “When Johnnie Comes
Marching Home.”

Lieutenant Hobson’s account of his imprisonment of a month gave
to our soldiers and sailors, and to the people of the United States, a
high impression of the courage and sincerity of Admiral Cervera.
The Spanish Admiral had made their comfort and care his personal
responsibility as far as the demands of his position permitted. “If
he had been my personal friend,” said Lieutenant Hobson, “he could
not have been more solicitous for my welfare.” The prisoners were
in the Morro fort for a few days, after which they were removed to
Santiago. They had been sick with fever, but received careful med-
ical attention, and Cervera had brought to bear all his official in-
fluence to secure the exchange of these brave men, and their restoration
to the fleet they had so greatly honored by their heroic deed.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 317

Hobson’s testimony to Cervera’s fine conduct was sufficient to win
from the United States a. display of popular admiration and much
kindness to the unfortunate Admiral when he was brought to An-
napolis a prisoner of war.

On the second night before Hobson’s exchange the Spaniards made
a futile attempt to imitate his exploit. At midnight they tried to
tow the dismantled cruiser, Reina Mercedes, into the entrance and
sink her across the channel not closed by the Merrimac. It was
moonlight, and the watch on the battleship Texas observed the glint
of reflected light from the steel sides of the Mercedes. Signal was
made to the other ships of our fleet and then the Texas opened fire
with perfect deliberation, between the cliffs. The aim was so true
that the shots drove the Mercedes out of her course to the north side
of the channel, where a 13-inch shell struck her in the hull, exploded,
and sank ner in shoal water, leaving her masts and upper works out
of water, and the ship far out of the channel.

July 6 the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII. left Havana harbor and
proceeded eight miles to the westward before she was discovered by
the American blockading squadron. The latter then gave chase. The
cruiser attempted to enter Mariel, but stranded at the entrance of
the port. We fired at her until she was set on fire. Detachments of
Spanish infantry and artillery hastened to the shore and saved her
crew and part of her cargo. Two of her crew were wounded. The
cruiser was a total loss.

Ill.

Ware the army was waiting before Santiago, the prestige of our
navy was to be advanced even more. Captain Sigsbee, who had been
commander of the Maine, was ‘placed in command of capratn stcsBEE
the auxiliary cruiser S#. Paul, and on June 22 arrived SNES ABE
off San Juan, Porto Rico, to assist in the blockade of ‘TERROR”
that port. The afternoon of the same day, while lying six miles off

shore, jookouts discovered a ship coming out of the harbor. It proved
318 HISTORY OF THE

to be the Spanish unprotected cruiser Isabella IJ., and she opened
fire on the St. Paul without effect. Captain Sigsbee waited for a
nearer approach, but the Spaniard stopped as if trying to draw our
ship under the guns of the forts.

At this moment the lookout reported that the destroyer Terror, the
finest of the Spanish torpedo boats, was coming out of the harbor,
keeping out of sight behind the Isabella. The trick was now appar-
ent. The cruiser was to act as a decoy to lure the St. Paul within
striking distance of the destroyer. The Jsabella maintained quick
firing, perhaps to cover the Terror with smoke. The latter turned
off along the coast, as if manceuvring to come out. Captain Sigsbee
followed, endeavoring to get between the two Spaniards with the pur-
pose of keeping the Terror in the trough of the sea if she headed
for an attack.

When the Terror realized that she was being outmanceuvred, her
commander sent the destroyer around in a circle to get up speed,
and then headed straight for the St. Paul. It was a perilous moment
now, for everything depended on gunnery. Unless a shot stopped
the Terror, there was nothing to prevent her coming near enough to
Jaunch a torpedo and destroy the St. Paul. The American gunners
let the enemy get within 6,000 yards, and then welcomed her with
the whole starboard battery—three 5-inch guns, two 6-pounders, two
Hotchkiss rifles, and two 8-pounders. All guns carried the range, and
several shots struck the Terror, damaging her slightly. She stopped
suddenly in her onward rush—she was coming at full speed—and
wheeling around fired at the St. Paul without effect.

Both Spaniards now seemed anxious to retreat, and the St. Paul
pursued, shooting away the rear smckestack of the Terror and landing
several shots on the cruiser that now ran away, another gunboat
coming from the harbor to assist-her. The Terror was also re-
treating, firing as she ran, when the S¢. Paul sent in a shell from
a 5-inch gun that struck the enemy on the port side astern. It
tore through the engine room, killing the engineer’s assistant and
mortally wounding a sailor, completely wrecked the engine and
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 319

steering gear, and, going out through the hull, left her in a sink-
ing condition.

The Terror began drifting and signaling for help. A ship ran out
to her assistance as she was now well under the guns of the fort.
It was too late to tow her in. She was pushed towards the beach
and sank fifty yards from shore. The Jsabella and her consort then
retreated into the harbor.

Merchant ships coming out of San Juan reported the ludicrous side
of the engagement. The Spaniards mistook the St. Paul for her sister
ship, the St. Louis, which was not so heavily armed, and concluded
to sink her at a safe distance. The Spanish naval officers publicly
announced their intention to engage the American in a duel for her
destruction. The populace cheered the officers wherever they appeared,
until finally the captain of the Terror made an address in the public
square. He was going out to sink the American or be sunk by her,
he declared, and then cordially invited the people of the city to mount
the hills surrounding the harbor and watch the battle. They accepted
the invitation. From the St. Paul hundreds could be seen watching the
battle from the heights above the city. The other Spaniards were not
much injured.

Iv,

Axsout the same time a new Spanish squadron, the third and last
of the navy possessed by the enemy, sailed from Cadiz, ostensibly to
succor the beleaguered capital of the Philippines, but apmrat cama-
really for the desperate hope of attempting to draw PA'S EXRET AND
our ships away from Santiago to follow and thus give OPERA voYaGE
Cervera rather more chance to escape. It was under the command
of Admiral Camara, and consisted of the battleship Pelayo (second
class), the armored cruiser Emperador Carlos V., the Rapida and
Patriota (auxiliary cruisers like our St. Louis), the Giralda, a steel
pleasure yacht converted into a destroyer corresponding to our Glouces-
ter, and three torpedo boats, the Audaz, Osado, and Proserpina, with half
320 HISTORY OF THE

a dozen troop ships having about 7,000 soldiers on board, accompanied
by colliers and supply ships.

Never in modern warfare was the dispatching of a force against
the enemy, for the purpose of falling upon him with a swiftness amount-
ing to surprise, attended by ostentatious ceremonies so fully displaying
the weaknesses of race. The politicians who were governing Spain
knew perfectly well that the war was hopeless, that neither their army
nor their navy could cope with ours, but the internal dissensions of
factions, the perils that threatened the Alfonsine dynasty, the uncon-
trollable selfishness and vanity of party leaders, made it impossible
at that time to publicly acknowledge the truth. Cervera’s squadron
had not been destroyed, Santiago had not been attacked by land, and
therefore, it was vitally necessary for political reasons to maintain at
home a warlike front.

The departure of Don Quixote de la Mancha to assail windmills
was not more solemnly ludicrous than the sailing of Camara’s fleet,
but the latter was enveloped in magnificent ceremonial. The ships
were splendid offensive machines on paper; practically they were
distrusted by their own officers. Their seaworthiness was suspected,
their engines were out of order. They had been renovated at Ferrol.
near the French border, by French engineers, and it was understood
that French and Austrian gunners and machinists were secretly en-
listed to secure the proper management of the engines and to work
the guns.

The ceremonies were solemn and aroused intense enthusiasm in
Spain. The ladies of Cadiz embroidered a flag, which the Bishop
blessed aboard the Hmperador Carlos V., for which vessel the flag was
made. The prelate arrived and departed accompanied by a procession
of choristers, and vestmented youths bearing censers. The ceremony
was marked with all religious pomp. The choristers led the crew
of the war ship in singing hymns of hope and prayer.

The Minister of Marine delivered a lyrical, patriotic oration. He
announced that the reserve squadron would no longer be reserved,
but would seek danger for the country’s sake. It was a privilege to
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 321

be placed in a situation that must ennoble the humblest sailor, trans-
forming him into a hero. The officers and men of the ships visited
the cathedral, and amid much emotion, all kneeling, made the custom-
ary vow never to surrender to the enemies of Spain, but to die in
her service.

Before leaving Cadiz Sefior Aunon, Minister of Marine, telegraphed
to the Queen-Regent that “the reserve squadron and the expeditionary
troops, who are quitting Spanish waters, send a warm and enthusiastic
salutation to your Majesty, avowing their determination to fight to
the death for the honor of the nation.” A great pretense of secrecy
was maintained concerning the fleet’s destination. The Spanish were
not permitted to know whether it would attack Boston, go to Cervera’s
relief, or to Manila. But the United States knew perfectly well that
it was to sail eastward through the Suez Canal.

The progress of Camara’s fleet was comparable only to a comic-
opera promenade. Moving slowly, with many impressive feints, accom-
panied by vague rumors and contradictions, it passed Gibraltar and
entered the Mediterranean. Then it put in at Cartagena, where it
was met with the announcement that the United States were assem-
bling a squadron of war ships under Commodore John Crittenden Wat-
son, to attack the seaports of Spain and ravage them. Camara’s project,
as a reality, was thus instantly exploded. Dewey’s fleet, reénforced by
the Charleston and the monitor Monterey, was strong enough to destroy
him; yet even if he went to Manila, the Spanish coasts would be left
undefended.

But Camara dared not return to Cadiz. At a farewell public ban-
quet he had declared—for the purpose of impressing the populace —
that he would never return until his flag had been dyed in American
blood; and Spanish colors were waved, the band played national
airs, while Spanish emotion and French champagne mingled themselves
in a glorious “fizz” of patriotism and excitement.

For political purposes, therefore, our threat was counteracted with
the announcement that a fourth squadron was assembling at Cadiz,
and Sefior Sagasta admitted that Camara had sailed for Manila.
322 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

And so he had, and he arrived at Port Said, the northern entrance of
the Suez canal, on June 26. Then ensued a series of amusing difficul-
ties. The Egyptian Government refused to permit him to coal in the
harbor, and then granted to him the permission, only to withdraw
it. Then he was permitted to coal from his own colliers, and again
that privilege was withdrawn. Spain accused England of conniving
at and fomenting these causes of delay and sent a note to the Powers.
Meantime, the United States had purchased all the private coal sup-
plies at Port Said.

When at last Admiral Camara took on coal of his own and made
ready to enter the canal, he offered a draft on his Government for the
$260,000 necessary to pay canal tolls. The draft was politely declined,
and gold was demanded. After vexatious delay, the draft was guaran-
teed by French financial creditors of Spain, and the fleet passed
through. It lay off Ismaila until July 9. Cervera’s squadron, mean-
while, had been destroyed, and Toral was about to surrender Santiago.
Then the Spanish Government ordered the fleet to return to Cadiz, paid
another $260,000 of toll, and Camara, turning the prows of his terrible
armada to the north, once more braved the dangerous waters of the
canal, and navigated his fleet through the frowning tempestuosities
of the Mediterranean safely home without sustaining the loss of any-
thing more than time and money.

American preparations to send Commodore Watson’s squadron
against the Spanish coast were meanwhile continued, and knowledge
of it filled all Spanish seaports with terror. The towns were deserted,
and all Spain fled inland except from great fortified ports such as
Cadiz, Barcelona, and Cartagena. It was our purpose to carry the
war to Spain’s very doors.
CHAPTER THE FOURTEENTH.

Toe Death Grip at SANTIAGO.

An Ominous Pause on BotH Sipes—THE SPANISH REENFORCEMENTS OF PESTILENCE AND
FaMINE— THE SINISTER MEANING AND History oF ‘THE Honor oF SpAIN”— TWENTY
THOUSAND STARVING REFUGEES TO SUPPORT, AND YELLOW FEVER TO CoMBAaT— SPANISH
Troops Loot THEIR Own Ci1TY WITH ATROCITY — SHAFTER SENDS A SHARP DEMAND
To ToRAL— PERSONAL CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE GENERALS—‘‘ ITs A D—p Poor
Sort oF Honor THAT MAKES SOLDIERS DIE FoR NOTHING”—TorRAL AGREES
TO SURRENDER THE CiTy—WILD ReEjoIcING IN THE AMERICAN ARMY.

I.

HE gaunt and haggard soldiers of the United States still kept
sleepless guard over every rood of the walls and trenches that
contained Santiago. Day after day passed with ee
no change, except that the patient men added _PESTILENCE

to their earthworks, or moved into a better position, Pay azts
or changed a battery. Day after day small bodies of reénforcements
arrived from Siboney or Baiquiri, covered with the mire from the
red roads, worn with the labor of wading through the sticky trail,
climbing up hillsides, and along the rock-covered beds of mountain
torrents. As they trudged wearily on they could see the mute signals
of heroism, testifying how the advance army had fought its way.
Through jungles, on hillsides, in rank grass, and strung from rock
to rock in gorges and streams, the terrible coils and strands of barbed
wire, with which the Spaniards had abatised the approach, were
discovered. It had been believed, at first, that these obstacles were
merely wire fences along post lines, from four to eight feet high, but
it was discovered when the advance was made on Santiago that there
were not only fences to be encountered, but all the forms of the
barbed torture that ingenious Spanish cruelty could invent. The
wire was stretched from tree to tree at irregular heights. Some-

times a strand would be fastened to a stump, and from there to a
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324 HISTORY OF THE

height of eight or ten feet to a tree, then down again to the next
tree to a height of three or four feet from the ground. In this way
hedges, with six or eight strands of barbed wire, were strung along
for miles, the construction being so irregular that the soldiers could
not learn where to look for the individual strands.

The whole formed a formidable barrier superior to the abatis
made from the limbs or trunks of trees. Wood can be torn away by
artillery fire, and, once down, the troops can pass over. Or it can be
set on fire and destroyed. But the barbed-wire barriers had to be
cut with shears, or beaten down carefully with clubs. While the men
were halting, the wires did not prevent the enemy’s bullets from mow-
ing down our soldiers. In some instances the strands were woven so
closely together that the clippers could not be inserted between them;
yet the terrible Mauser bullets came through with deadly ease.

July 12 General Miles and about 8,000 reénforcements had arrived
at the front and General Ludlow, with a force of Americans and Cubans,
had occupied the town of Caimanes, west of Santiago, across the bay.

But the army of Spain meanwhile had also developed reénforce-
ments, and these had invested our lines as effectually as our troops
had invested Santiago.

This new Spanish force, though it flew no colors of Spain, though
it marched with no pomp or display, was yet more to be dreaded than
the Spanish army in Santiago—it was more terrible than a thousand
armies with banners. It was massed and ordered and placed by malefi-
cent veteran purposes that had served as-allies and servants of Spain
for five hundred years of abandonment of power to cruelty and
treachery. These veteran allies had marched in the bloody train of
Alva in Germany, with the Duke of Parma in the Netherlands, with
Cortez in Mexico, with Pizarro in Peru, with Philip V., and Charles
III., when Spaniard fought Spaniard with ferocity, treachery, and evil
- cunning that equaled themselves on both sides and demonstrated that
good faith and mercy were congenitally absent from Spanish character.
The cruelties practiced upon prisoners and harmless non-combatants
are forbidden of record in open history.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 325

They are still practiced where Spanish domination is safe from
the inquisitive eye of other races. Hideous ingenuity in cruelty drove
the native Indians of Cuba, by thousands, to find suicide preferable
to life in the power of Spaniards. To this year Spanish soldiers in the
Philippines have nailed captive revolutionists to walls in an attitude
of crucifixion, and lashed them to death. Within two years General
Weyler, a worthy successor of Alva and of Philip, undertook to crush
revolution by starvation. He had placed 225,000 murders to his account,
when the United States forced his recall to Spain, where the public
received him as a hero.

Wherever the army of Spain has passed, it has left behind scars
upon the fair name of mankind as cruel as those of the branding
iron upon the flesh of its victim. When the Spanish soldiery has
relaxed itself it has been in the pleasures of torturing the conquered,
in the unspeakable agonies of inquisition, in the exercise of intrigue
in a bottomless sea of treachery, or in public corruption that has made
practical government impossible among them.

In any monarchical government, buttressed by a rich and powerful
caste of nobles, the soldiers of its standing army determine the character
of the people. The soldier, representing everywhere the living type
of courage, is the hero of the masses. What must be the hereditary
practices of Spanish soldiers is reflected ominously to-day in the pop-
ulace of Spain, whose vast crowds on holidays abandon themselves
to blood-scent, and, as the fume of revolting cruelty rises from the
sand of the bull-ring, it envelops every tier—royalty, nobility, com-
monalty —in a vaporous madness, such as the barbarous Greeks and
degenerate Romans entered upon during their “ mysteries,” but which
in Spain evokes a frenzied lust for murder that delights in the sight
of physical suffering.

No wonder such a nature seeks concealment beneath the garb of
a chivalrous etiquette, and masks its intentions behind the accom-
modating ambiguities of noble language. But, behind the costume and
the ailuring phrase, have always existed the pitiless heart, filled with
the love of cruelty, with the intricacies of fraud and treachery, with the
326 HISTORY OF THE

pride of a limitless selfishness that would sacrifice the world for
its own vanity. For five hundred years “the honor of Spain” has been
a phrase with which Spaniards have juggled to conceal the selfishness
of caste pride. The “honor of Spain” has been maintained by the
sacrifice of every virtue and noble ideal that mankind has cherished
as a factor entering into honor.

It was the army of Famine and Pestilence that Toral had marched
out of the gates of Santiago, led by the spectral veterans of old. In
the garb of helplessness and innocence it passed through the American
lines to El Caney. Twenty thousand refugees were there, or scattered
along the roads, or roaming the jungles in an effort to reach Siboney.
It was the beginning of the season of the fiore amarilla, the yellow
fever, that pestilence of filth and fetor, which Spanish institutions have
allowed to persist —a silent witness of their indifference to death as the
alternative of cleanliness and industry. Fora hundred years Santiago
de Cuba, Havana, and San Juan de Puerto Rico have been centers of
this deadly disease, which has ravaged all the warm and tropical coun-
tries having free communication with them.

It was even showing its jaundiced face in the city of Santiago when
General Shafter, pursuing the tactics of civilized warfare, answering
the demands of humanity, had given Toral notice of assault in order
that the non-combatants might retire. “Good!” was the reply of the
Spaniard, “we shall have 20,000 fewer mouths to feed.” And the non-
combatants did retire — retired to the ranks of the besiegers. “Good!”
Toral might have said, if he did not actually say it, “we send you
famine and the fiore amarilla along with our poor and helpless. Feed
them and nurse them, or starve and die with them!” For Toral knew
that the hunger and disease and filth and despair of 20,000 women and
children in Santiago was a greater and more terrible army threatening
his troops than the 22,000 Americans standing intrepid and unconquer-
able sentries at every door by which escape might be possible.

The Anglo-Saxon—to whose nature cruelty is to be justified only
as the last extremity of necessity, to whom maleficent treachery is a
brand of the unpardonable infamy — must turn with loathing from the
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 327

thought that Toral sent the poison of disease to the adversaries his’
soldiers had not been able to beat back from impregnable defenses.
But he knew the disease, the season, the dangers, and the effects. He
sent his helpless dependants to the magnanimous invaders—in return
for magnanimity he offered the horrors of pestilence and famine.

And now, he could well afford to temporize, to squirm and delay
behind the old sinister pretense of “the honor of Spain.” With an
army 20,000 strong in disease and starvation in our rear, and an army
of 11,000 in the trenches of his fortress, every day’s delay for Toral
meant hope. Every day’s delay, while the cold rains fell in torrents,
or the burning sun scorched and tortured the unacclimated, hungry,
and exhausted Americans. gave opportunity for infection and spread of
the fever.

Our army was supporting the Spanish army of pestilence. Our
own troops were living upon half rations of “hard-tack” and water,
while such ‘supplies as could be brought up were divided with the
starving thousands at El Caney. Men, women, and children, 20,000 of
them, with two hundred houses in the village. They huddled in the
streets, squares, roads, and fields, which they converted into a vast
lazaretto of despair.

“Mucha hambre!” wailed the women and children, “I am so hungry,”
and the food for the army went to the helpless. But no soldier
of the United States complained or would have stopped the relief.
The Red Cross Society sent nurses, medicines, and supplies to the
refugees. Flour was distributed—the refugees did not know how to
make use of it. The army cooks set up bakeries and made bread for
the starving, while the soldiers in the trenches ate “hardtack” and
took courage of determination against the Spaniard hiding in the city.
Our surgeons and physicians and nurses attended the sick of the refu-
gees and the wounded of the enemy, while the wounded troops of
the United States tramped back on foot, or were jolted in ammunition
wagons, over the torturing roads to Siboney.

Even to Siboney a thousand helpless refugees had managed to pen-
etrate, bringing with them fever and deadly hunger. July 11 yellow
328 HISTORY OF THE

fever had appeared at the hospital base there, and General Miles or-
dered every house in the town to be burned, in the hope of staying
the infection. The torch was applied. A great, drowning torrent
of rain extinguished the incipient flames and drenched the houses
to a degree that made it necessary to lose another day. But Siboney
was burned on the 12th.

Out in the trenches before Santiago the soldiers of the United States
were chafing. There was no complaint at the hardships that humanity
imposed upon them, although the seasoned regular troops were weak-
ened for lack of good food, tents, and by the tension of hiding in
trenches. Even those who had fought over the hot and arid plains of
the West were appalled by the deadly humidity of this Cuban climate, .
a steaming suffocation all day, that gave place to a clammy chill all
night. :

They chafed at delay and inactivity. They wanted to fight, and
cursed every hour that did not bring the order to storm the enemy’s
works.

General Shafter reflected upon the cost of carrying the town by
assault. Our ships could not enter the harbor until the mines there
had been removed or destroyed. The long-range bombardment was
a slow, difficult, and almost impossible task. There were only his
soldiers, then, to take the city. To order these brave men, who had
weakened themselves by fighting their way through every peril and dif-
ficulty of the jungle, and by hunger and toil in the trenches, to assault
the artillery, barbed-wire abatis, and the treachery of street-fighting
in Santiago, was a serious step to take. Even though they pleaded
for the order, the cost of it was his responsibility, and he determined not
to give the order except as a last necessity. And General Miles agreed
with him.
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SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 331

II.

Waar our soldiers could see of Santiago from their lines on the hill
of San Juan was its beauty in the panoply of war. They could look
down upon its ancient red and yellow houses, gleaming  . spansarps
in the sunlight against the vivid background of green LOOT THEIR
on the mountains behind. The red and yellow flags of pene
Spain were flying from walls, roofs, and pinnacles. The white flag
of the Red Cross Society, with its blood-red Maltese cross in the center
of the field, flew over the hospital from which the wounded Span-
jards could see our troops by looking out the windows.

In the military headquarters on the Plaza de Armas General Toral
devised the many ingenious ways of saying “To-morrow,” by which
he had evaded Shafter’s demands, and he patiently waited for the
work of his allies, pestilence, and famine.

The Spaniard was doing his work characteristically in the old
city. Dreadful stories were brought out by refugees and deserters.
Before surrendering the city they were sacking it. The Spanish soldier
does not discriminate when he begins to loot. All valuable property
of civilians, friends and enemies alike, is his by right of taking or
destroying. The dwellings and storehouses of all who had fled were
broken into and despoiled.

One peculiarly atrocious crime was reported, against the Sefiora
Rosa Chacon de Odis, a wealthy resident who had refused to leave
because her fortune, which consisted of gold, silver, and securities of
various kinds, and her valuable jewels, were kept in her house. She
thought the property would be safer under the protection of Spanish
soldiers than within the American lines. It was known among the
Spanish soldiers that she had much property in her house, and one
night some of them went to her residence and assassinated her. Then
they looted the house of everything valuable.

Churches and handsome residences were invaded and everything
of convertible value carried off, fine pictures were cut out of the frames
or defaced and slashed with swords, windows broken, furniture hacked

15
332 HISTORY OF THE

and destroyed. Banks were despoiled of money and nameless barbar-
ities of violence perpetrated upon the few defenseless women remain-
ing. For those two weeks Santiago de Cuba was in the merciless
clutches of the fourteenth century. Only those things were left un-
touched that were necessary to the comfort of the Spanish soldiery
who were upholding “the honor of Spain,” or to destroy which would
necessitate the abandonment of indolence and a resort to labor.

In the San Carlos Club on the Plaza de Armas, the resort of aris-
tocratic society, the officers off duty congregated at night to regale
themselves. Resplendent in gold braid and decorations, they listened
to a mechanical musical instrument that had been imported from the
United States for the entertainment of the club membership. Among
the airs rendered was one that none of the Spaniards recognized, but
which became a favorite. It was “The Star Spangled Banner,” and
its rendition always called out applause and a demand for repetition.

And so, between the excitements of riot and luxury, Toral com-
municated the mysterious evasions contained in the Spanish word
manana (“to-morrow’’) in reply to Shafter’s demands. The fever was
very slow in beginning its work.

But General Toral received on July 13 an abrupt notification that
if Santiago was not surrendered unconditionally without further delay
the ships would begin a continuous bombardment at noon next day
and destroy the city for which his obstinacy must bear the respon-
sibility. He read between the lines of that message that if he sought
to escape the shells of the ships the soldiers he had so long irritated
and menaced with treachery might meet him with terrible retribution.

Til.

COUNCIL OF WAR THERE was a council of war before Santiago on
rorcretatton July 13. It was between General Miles, General Shatter,
General Garcia, and Lieutenant Hobson of the navy, rep-

resenting Admiral Sampson. General Garcia counseled a heavy and
continuous bombardment if the next answer from General Toral should
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 333

be a request for further delay or a refusal to surrender. He declared
that the Spaniards could not hold out long, and that the best action
to take was to reduce them at once by bombardment. He added that
if General Toral’s proposed terms of surrender, which specified that
his troops be permitted to retire with their arms, were complied with,
the Spanish forces would immediately join General Luque at Holguin,
where there were 10,000 men and 2,000,000 rations, or would fall back
on Puerto Principe, where the Cubans had many head of cattle.

It was declared at the council that Captain-General Blanco was
personally opposed to the surrender on any terms, and wanted the
forces there to hold out to the bitter end.

The possibility of the fleet forcing the entrance of the harbor, steam-
ing up to the inner bay and bombarding the city, was brought. up at
the council. Many army men had insisted that it was Admiral Samp-
son’s duty to go to the city with his battleships, and accusations had
been made that the navy was not willing to accept its share of the
dangers. These rumors had caused ill-feeling, but they were untrue.
Admiral Sampson had told the military authorities that it would be
madness in him to try to pass the harbor entrance as long as the
forts commanding it had not been reduced. Lieutenant Hobson ex-
plained to the council the reasons rendering it impossible for the fleet
to get into the harbor. The approach from the sea was several miles
long, and was mined for the entire distance.

It was agreed at the council that the city could be taken by the
army in three hours, with the loss of 1,000 men, and by the navy with
the loss of one ship. It was also agreed that such losses were not
necessary.

When the council adjourned the notice to Toral that caused him
to act was at once dispatched. An answer was not expected until next.
day; but Toral replied at once and suggested a personal conference with
Shafter. Up to that date the negotiations had been carried on through
aides.

The conference was held under the shade of a great cottonwood

tree, midway between the lines of the two armies. General Miles
14
334 HISTORY OF THE

was present, in his character as commanding general of the armies,
and as an adviser. General Shafter was attended by Colonel Maus
and Captain McKittrick. General Toral came attended by Colonel
Velasquez and Mr. Mason, British Vice-Consul at Santiago. Sefior Men-
doza acted as Shafter’s interpreter. The two groups were charac-
teristic of the two nations. General Miles wore a plain blue field
uniform, while Shafter and his aides were attired in the dirty brown
linen blouse coats adopted for the men in Cuba. Toral and Velasquez
were magnificent with gold lace, braid, and medals.

General Toral began by pointing out that his government would
not permit him to do more than surrender possession of the city,
marching his troops with their arms to join the main Spanish army.
General Shafter replied that the United States Government had de-
clined to accept anything but unconditional surrender, and he must
insist upon it.

To this General Toral politely responded that each General must
obey the orders of his Government, as loyal soldiers. He, himself,
personally regretted that his government left him no discretion.

General Shafter reminded him that no soldier was expected to de
stroy his army when nothing could be gained. He pointed out the
investment, the presence of the ships, the unlimited reénforcements
that could be brought, the starvation of the refugees, and the danger
of disease that threatened all alike. That, moreover, it had been de-
termined to immediately assault Santiago by land and sea, at all cost,
and General Toral must realize that it could be taken.

Personal anecdotes are not always reliable, but when they are
redolent of peculiar character they gain credence. Such an anec-
dote came from the front, growing out of this conference. General
Shafter, known to the army as “Bull” Shafter, for his obstinate
fighting and brusque qualities, was also celebrated for a vocabulary
rich in powerful, if profane,emphasis. A self-made man, a self-made
soldier, and full of vigor, he had learned to attend strictly to busi-
ness and to waste no time upon the accomplishments of ceremonial
etiquette.
 

SHAFTER.

R.

GENERAL WM

MAJO R-
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 337

When General Shafter began his reminder of the hopelessness of
the Spanish position and the fact that the place could be taken by
assault, Toral answered with lofty chivalry: —

“Even if that can be done, yet it is to be remembered that every
soldier in my army is ready to die to maintain the honor of my
country.”

“Tell him,” General Shafter is reported to have said, in an em-
phatic outburst, when the interpreter had translated Toral’s remark:
“tell him, I say, that while it is honorable in his soldiers to be will-
ing to die, it is a d——d poor sort of honor in their country which
requires them to die for no purpose. We call it murder. It is no
honor for my soldiers to kill his for nothing. I do not want to
kill his men because they are brave, and I don’t want my men killed
for nothing. He must take the responsibility before the world for
every life lost. Humanity and the common sense of war demands
his surrender in order that these soldiers and helpless refugees may
be saved!”

Sefior Mendoza, himself a Spaniard, accustomed to graceful amen-
ities, was perhaps struck with this impetuous and blunt presentation.
It is not known whether he interpreted the Anglo-Saxon directness of
the speech to the fiery but courteous Toral. Whatever he rendered in
its place, however, proved sufficient.

Toral hesitated, the conference became general, and the Spaniard
confessed the hopelessness of his defense. He appealed to Shafter
and Miles, however, to spare his army humiliating treatment. Upon
this it was agreed that the troops should deliver up their arms and
ammunition to their own officers in the city, that the Spanish officers
might retain their side arms, and that the soldiers would be marched
with military honors into encampment outside the city and transported
to Spain as quickly as possible by the United States Government. This
was done to avoid epidemic and the expense of supporting and guarding
such a large body of prisoners.

After agreement the conferees separated to appoint commissioners
to meet and draw up the agreement in terms.
338 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The truce was continued until these commissioners could meet
and conclude the work.

When the American conferees returned to our troops and announced
the agreement of capitulation, the army broke into wild cheers of
delight. They began in the center and spread right and left in waves
of enthusiasm. The news flew to the rear over the miry roads and
telegraph wires and the “Old Doxology” was sung along miles of
bristling entrenchments. “Santiago has fallen!” was the pass-word
from mouth to mouth between laughing, cheering, singing, and ex-
cited veterans, who hugged each other at the prospect of relief. But
no sound of applause came from the ominous trenches in front of them
or from the picturesque city that lay glowing in the bright sunlight
in the valley below.

 
CHAPTER THE FIFTEENTH.

SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.

ToraL Makes A DEsvAIRING EFrrort TO FicHT Orr SURRENDER BY DELAY— THE TERMS
ENFORCED WITH CourRTEOUS FIRMNESS—OCCUPATION OF THE CiTy oN SuNDAY JULY 17,
WITH IMPRESSIVE CEREMONIAL AND AMIDST WILD ENTHUSIASM BY OUR TROOPS AND
THE PopuLATION— FRATERNIZATION OF SPANISH AND AMERICAN TROOPS —DREAD-

FUL CONDITIONS PREVAILING IN SANTIAGO —SICKNESS, INFECTION, HuNGER,
ANARCHY — WORK OF THE AUTHORITIES AND THE RED Cross— SKETCHES
oF GENERALS SHAFTER AND WHEELER, LEADERS OF OuR ARMY.

I.

N THE morning of July 15, the commissioners from each army
appointed to draw up and sign the terms of surrender met
under a spreading ceba tree between the lines. an ae
For the Americans came General Joseph THE

Wheeler, General H. W. Lawton, and Lieutenant Miley ea aero
of Shafter’s staff. For the Spaniards came Colonel Fontaine, chief
of Toral’s staff, General Escariel, and Mr. Robert Mason, British Vice-
Consul. They met shortly before noon and our commissioners were
courteously invited to enter the city and complete the business com-
fortably. The invitation was as courteously declined.

At the very outset of proceedings a misunderstanding arose, through
the presentation of a letter from Toral, which General Shafter had
referred to our commissioners, with instructions to reject its proposition
as to the disposition of arms. The copy here given is a literal trans-
lation and is a curiosity: —

SanT1aGo DE Cupa, July 15.
To Excellency, Commanider-in-Chief of the American Forces: —

ExceLLentT Sir:—I am now authorized by my Government to capitulate. I
have the honor to so advise you, requesting you designate hour and place where
my representatives should appear to confer with those of your Excellency to effect the
articles of capitulation on the basis of what has been agreed upon to this date. In due

time I wish to manifest to your Excellency my desire to know the resolution of the
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340 HISTORY OF THE

United States Government respecting the return of arms, so as to.note on the capitula-
tion; also the great courtesy and gentlemanly deportment of your Great Grace’s Repre-
sentatives, and return for their generous and noble impulse, for the Spanish soldiers will
allow them to return to the Peninsular with the arms that the American army do them
the honor to acknowledge as dutifully descended. Josk Torat,
Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Army Corps.

The misunderstanding, it was thought, was due to a failure of
exact interpretation on the previous day. At that time the inter-
preter, translating the language of General Toral, had given Generals
Shafter and Miles distinctly to understand that Captain-General Blanco
nad consented that the commissioners should have plenary powers to
negotiate the terms of surrender, such terms as agreed upon to be
binding upon both parties. Something had been said about a notifi-
cation to the Madrid Government, but General Shafter insisted that
the capitulation had actually been agreed upon, and that no further
consent of the Madrid Government was required.

The Spanish commissioners combatted vigorously the assumption
that Toral had already capitulated. The consent of Madrid, they in-
sisted, was still necessary; but at the same time they declared decisively
that it would be forthcoming, as Captain-General Blanco had authorized
it and the home government would also approve. General Toral, who
was personally present and who directed the negotiations on his own
behalf, said he had never been overruled by the Captain-General. Still,
he added, until Madrid had sanctioned it Santiago had not capitulated.

All this was extremely unsatisfactory to our commissioners, who
clung tenaciously to the understanding General Shafter had received.
Leaving the question still open, the commissioners proceeded to consider
the preliminaries. Lieutenant Miley had drawn up thirteen articles of
a general nature and these were submitted to General Toral personally,
who made a strong appeal that the word “ capitulation” be used instead
of the term “surrender,” and that his army be allowed to march out,
the officers with their side arms and the men with their small arms. He
said the arms could afterward be sent to Spain, either in the same ships
with the troops or on some other ships. General Toral further remarked
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 341

that he expected that our commissioners, as representatives of a brave
and a chivalrous people, would not seek to humiliate his army or make
it appear that he was vanquished. As brave men, his soldiers desired to
go home with honor. They had simply yielded to superior force, and
they would prefer dying to going home without their honor.

The Americans expressed sympathy at this appeal but declared
it was beyond their power to change the terms as understood and
approved by the President. They could only agree to recommend
such changes in detail to the President, at Washington, who alone
had the power to approve.

At two o’clock General Toral retired to Santiago to confer with
General Linares and returned shortly with suggestions of further change
in details. He proposed an adjournment until next morning to con-
tinue the negotiations. General Wheeler, who had taken the lead
in the discussion for the United States, emphatically declined to wait,
and insisted that terms must be settled before the day closed. There-
upon a recess was taken until four o’clock, when a few alterations of
verbiage were agreed to, for the purpose of softening expression witb-
out changing the meaning.

After each commissioner had been asked in turn if the agreement
was complete and satisfactorily understood, General Wheeler suddenly
requested them all to sign. It was a test of Spanish nature. The
enemy’s commissioners had agreed to the articles, but they were plainly
surprised at the request to complete it by their signatures. There was
no excuse, however, and, with much reluctance, they signed the two
copies, and the boards separated to meet the next morning at 9:30
o’clock. In the meantime each side was to report the terms to its
own government.

Saturday morning Toral received approval of the terms from his
superior officer. The Washington Government, however, would not
approve the recommendation of its commissioners to consent to return
the arms of the Spanish troops. Shafter had been particularly in-
structed not to so agree, and the commissioners had been directed by
Shafter to the same purport. But the commissioners, after avowing
342 HISTORY OF THE

their inability to concede the demand, had consented to recommend
it as a matter of form, to hasten the conclusion. The President was
determined to retain the Spanish rifles and ammunition and declined
the recommendation.

The articles of surrender that were signed may be thus summar-
ized: —

The first declares that all hostilities shall cease pending the agreement of final
capitulation.

Second—That the capitulation includes all the Spanish forces and the surrender of
all war material within the prescribed limits.

Third—The transportation of the troops to Spain at the earliest possible moment,
each force to be embarked at the nearest port.

Fourth—That the Spanish officers shal] retain their side arms and the enlisted men
their personal property.

Fifth—That after the final capitulation the Spanish forces shall assist in the removal
of all obstructions to navigation in Santiago harbor.

Sixth—That after the final capitulation the commanding officers shall furnish a com-
plete inventory of all arms and munitions of war and a roster of all the soldiers in the
district.

Seventh—That the Spanish General shall be permitted to take the military archives
and records with him.

Eighth—That all guerillas and Spanish irregulars shall be permitted to remain in
Cuba if they so elect, giving a parole that they will not again take up arms against the
United States unless properly exchanged.

Ninth—That the Spanish forces shall be permitted to march out with all the honors
of war, depositing their arms to be disposed of by the United States in the future, the
American commissioners to recommend to their Government that the arms of the sol-
diers be returned to those “who so bravely defended them.”

The territory surrendered was in extent somewhat more than a
third of the province of Santiago, including the military jurisdiction
of the Fourth Corps of the Spanish army. It did not embrace the
important towns of Manzanillo and Holguin, where there were many
Spanish troops, nor the 6,000 men of General Pando’s corps, that had
left Manzanillo to succor Santiago, but failed to reach their desti-
nation. The western boundary of the territory surrendered begins
at Aserradero, a town near the coast, west of Santiago, thence to
the town of Palma, a little east of north of Aserradero, and about
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 343
twenty-two miles distant, thence northeast to Sagua de ‘Tanamo, on
the north coast, a town at the head of the swryidero, or anchorage
of that name, and almost directly north of Guantanamo. It includes
an area of 8,000 square miles.

The number of soldiers surrendered as prisoners of war was esti-
mated to be about 20,000, but when the muster rolls were made up
there were 22,789 in and about Santiago, and between 1,000 and

 

    
 

ISLE OF PINES

 

 

 

MAP OF CUBA.

That portion of Cuba surrendered with Santiago is colored black.

2,000 additional troops were reported to be scattered through the
zone of surrender—a total of about 25,000 men, mostly in well-forti-
fied places, protected by all the resources of the country, wholly
surrendered to an attacking army of 22,250 men, only 16,000 of whom
were effective when the surrender occurred. Within three days the
Spaniards had turned over 7,000 Mauser rifles and 10,000,000 rounds
of ammunition.
344 HISTORY OF THE

It,

Sunpay morning, July 17, the eleventh Sunday after Manila, the
second Sunday after Cervera’s annihilation, and the second Sunday
peri es after the first demand for the surrender of the city, the

FLAG OVER United States troops marched into Santiago to take pos-

tacos session. AlJ Saturday swarms of refugees had tramped
wearily over the roads returning to the city, many to find their homes
despoiled, all to find hunger awaiting them.

It was shortly before nine o’clock Sunday morning, when, pursuant
to the program arranged, General Shafter. accompanied by Generals
Wheeler, Lawton, Kent, Ludlow, and Ames, with eighty other officers,
marched out of the American lines down the hill to the tree under
which the negotiations for surrender had been conducted. The mo-
ment they halted under the tree every cannon on the hillsides, within
the city, at Siboney, and at Aguadores, boomed the national salute of
twenty-one guns that filled the echoing valleys with the magnificent
thunder of victory and called 60,000 people to attention.

From one end to the other of the eight miles of American in-
trenchments, our troops, standing on the sand bags, waved their hats
aloft and raised cheer upon cheer of rejoicing.

A troop of colored cavalry and the Twenty-fifth Colored Infantry
immediately started forward to join General Shafter and his officers.

A few moments later General Toral, in resplendent uniform, at the
head of two hundred of his officers in full-dress uniform, left the gate
of the city and marched to the tree, preceded by trumpeters. There
was a salute of bugles on both sides, after which General Shafter and
General Toral saluted each other formally and the officers on both
sides exchanged courtesies and introductions.

When these ceremonies were concluded, the two commanding
Generals met in front of the lines. General Toral spoke in Spanish,
his voice trembling with feeling as he concluded : —

“General,” said he. “1 am forced by my fate to surrender to the
possession of the American army and to you the city and the strong-
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 349

holds of Santiago. I am now ready to do so formally and honorably as
agreed.”

As he finished the Spanish officers brought their swords to “ present
arms.”

“T receive the city,” replied General Shafter, briefly but courteously,
“in the name of the Government of the United States of America!”

The two Generals saluted, after which General Toral turned and,
addressing an order to his officers, they wheeled about and, with swords
still presented, marched toward the city followed by the American
officers and the troop of cavalry. As the procession entered the city,
tremendous cheers broke out again from along the American lines.

Inside the walls Spanish troops met the official body and escorted
it to the Plaza de Armas, in front of the Governor’s palace, opposite
which stands the Cathedral. The square was filled with people. The
soldiers drew up in line and General Toral was courteously authorized
to salute his flag. This was done amid silence by firing twenty-one |
guns, after which the Spanish flag was hauled down from the staff over
the portico, upon the front of which stood in black letters, formed
of gas-pipe for illumination at night, the words: —

“VIVA DON ALFONSO XIII.”

General Shafter then formally presented to General Toral the sword
and spurs of General Vara del Rey, who had been killed at El Caney.
His body had been identified and given respectful burial by the United
States troops. General Shafter had ordered his sword and spurs
preserved to be returned to General del Rey’s family. He placed them
in General Toral’s hands for that purpose. This considerate act made
a deep impression upon the emotional Spaniards.

The Spanish troops were marched to the arsenal and surrendered
their arms, after which, accompanied by the Americans, they were
marched out, 7,600 strong, a weary, haggard, disheartened body, to a
camp provided for them near the city.

The Americans returned to Santiago at once, accompanied by the
Ninth Infantry Regulars, who were drawn up in the Plaza.
350 HISTORY OF THE

The American officers were then invited to the palace, where they
were introduced to all the civil officials, the Governor, the Mayor, the
Intendant of Police, and others. The Archbishop of Santiago, Fray
José de Sturrs de Isainz y Crespo, the highest ecclesiastical dignitary
of Cuba, accompanied by his chief prelates, came in a body and paid
their respects to the conquerors. Luncheon was served and a short rest
taken.

A few minutes before twelve o’clock, the Americans and their
entertainers left the palace and walked into the Plaza. Lieutenant
Miley had ascended to the roof of the palace with a great new silken
flag of the United States. Just as the clock was striking twelve,
Lieutenant Miley, Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., and Captain McKit-
trick bent the flag to the halyards, ran it to the top of the staff and
broke its glorious folds wide open upon a strong southwestern breeze.

Every building facing the Plaza was crowded with persons and the
little park itself was filled to suffocation with eager and curious hu-
manity. As the flag unrolled its stars and stripes upon the breeze all
heads were uncovered, and the soldiers presented arms. As the last
stroke of the hour tolled out, the Ninth Regimental Band played
“The Star Spangled Banner,” which was followed by cheers from the
soldiers. They were joined by more than half of the people, who cried
“Viva los Americanos.” The crowd was composed of miserable and
half-starved creatures whose appearance told plainly the sufferings
they had undergone since the siege began. They all seemed grateful
that the Americans were in possession of the city, evidently believing
the days of hunger and misery were over.

The Spanish officers and members of the San Carlos Club, who had
been applauding “The Star Spangled Banner,” and demanding its
repetition by the orchestra at the clubhouse, were much astonished
to hear our band playing it as the National Hymn of the United
States. They looked at each other guiltily, then smiled, and finally
told the story with laughter.

As the American flag floated over the city, Captain Capron’s bat-
tery, at the right center of the American line, fired a national salute.
 

 

 

STREET SCENE— SANTIAGO
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 353

And as the guns thundered, all the 20,000 men, from the Third Regi-
ment on the left of the line, to the Eighth Regiment far off on E] Cobre
road on the right, shouted, cheered, and threw their hats into the air.
Following the salvos of cheering, one got an idea of how completely
Santiago and the Spanish army were hemmed in. Our soldiers stood
on the crest of the trenches, which they had won at the cost of so
many lives, as far as the eye could reach.

To these ceremonies succeeded fraternization over the trenches
between men of the opposing lines. Our soldiers had been forbidden
to cross trenches or to enter the city, for fear of infection, but the
Spaniards went forward from their near camp to the edge of the
American trenches, shook hands with their captors, expressing admira-
tion and respect for those with whom they had so desperately fought.*
It was a curious spéctacle. Each Spaniard had a bottle of rum or
wine in his haversack, and these were offered to the Americans to
drink “good health.” In return our soldiers gave their recent antag-
onists “hardtack,” which was received with gladness.

*An incident that stands alone in the history of wars, occurred upon the sailing of the
Spanish prisoners for their homes in Spain. A Spanish private soldier, Pedro Lopez de
Castillo, authorized by a plebiscite taken of his 11,000 fellow-prisoners, sent through his
officers the following address to the American army from the vanquished side:—
Major-General Shafter, Commanding the American Army in Cuba: —

Str: The Spanish soldiers who capitulated in this place on the 16th of July last,
recognizing your high and just position, pray that through you all the courageous
and noble soldiers under your command may receive our good wishes and fare-
well, which we send them on embarking for our beloved Spain. For this favor, which we
have no doubt you will grant, you will gain the everlasting gratitude and consideration
of 11,000 Spanish soldiers, who are your most humble servants.

(Signed.] Prpro Loprz pg CasTIL1o,
Private of Infantry.

The letter addressed to the soldiers of the American army was as follows :—

SoLtpIeRS oF THE AMERICAN ARMy:—We would not be fulfilling our duty as well-born
men, in whose breasts there live gratitude and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved
Spain without sending to you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell.
We fought you with ardor, and with all our strength, endeavoring to gain the victory,
but without the slightest rancor or hate toward the American nation. We have been
vanquished by you (so our Generals and chiefs judged in signing the capitulation), but
our surrendér and the bloody battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for re-
sentment against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in
compliance with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent the power of our
354 HISTORY OF THE

That afternoon 90,000 pounds of rations were served to the Span-
ish prisoners from our commissariat. These soldiers cared nothing
for the loss of Cuba, and were overjoyed at the thought of returning
home. They had received no pay for nearly a year, had been poorly
fed, and were discouraged.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Marble of the navy, in command of steam
‘launches, had entered the harbor in the morning, by permission of
Admiral Sampson. The Spanish gunboat Alvarado, was surrendered to
him, and he took possession of other vessels in the harbor that had
been used for troop ships. Spanish officers accompanied him to ex-
plode or remove the submarine mines in the bay, a task accom-
plished in time to permit the Red Cross relief boat, State of Texas,
to enter at 5 P.M.

From the Spanish officers was heard again almost incredible state-
ments of the dense ignorance in which the home government had
kept its most trusted officers of the events of the war. Admiral Cer-
vera and his captains had not learned of the annihilation of Montejo’s

respective States. You fought us as men, face to face, and with great courage, as before
stated, a quality which we had not met during the three years we have carried on this war
against a people without morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could
not confront the enemy, but hidden, shot their noble victims from ambush, and then im-
mediately fled. This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this unfortunate land.
You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the armies of
the most civilized nations of the world, have given honorable burial] to the dead of the van-
quished, have cured their wounded with great humanity, have respected and cared for
your prisoners and their comfort, and, lastly, to us, whose condition was terrible, you
have given freely of food, of your stock of medicines, and you have honored us with dis-
tinguished courtesy, for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony.
With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all, there remains but to express our fare-
well, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in this land which
will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours, who have conquered it by force
and watered it with your blood, as your conscience called for, under the demand of civiliza-
tion and humanity, but the descendants of the Congo and of Guinea, mingled with the blood
of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers, these people are not able to exer-
cise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern
civilized communities.
From 11,000 Spanish soldiers.
[Signed.]  Pepro Lorgz ng Castiixo,
Soldier of Infantry.
Santiago de Cuba, August 21, 1898.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 355

fleet at Manila and the capture of Cavité until they became prisoners
on our ships. In Santiago the Spanish officers and troops were offi-
cially informed from Madrid that Admiral Montejo had won a glo-
rious victory over Dewey. No other information had been permitted
to reach their army and navy. They admitted that if they had known
the facts they would not have fought. At Santiago they had been
informed that Camara’s fleet was coming to Cervera’s aid, as at Ma-
nila Augusti had been informed that Cervera had destroyed Samp-
son’s fleet, was ravaging the American coasts, and that Camara was
hastening to the relief of Manila. For three months the edifice of
colonial resistance had been supported by a scaffolding of ingenious ~
and absolute falsehood.*

Upon examining the harbor forts, Morro, Socapa, and Estrella, they
were found to be knocked to pieces and of no strength. Modern guns
from the Reina Mercedes, some old eighteenth-century cannon, rapid-fire,
and Gatlings were half in place, half knocked over. The harbor en-
trance could have been passed by our ships, but the mines were the
defenses that made the task dangerous.

In the city our Generals were astonished at the ingenuity of the
military fortifications and barricades erected to resist assault. General
Wheeler after examining them admitted that the army could have
forced its way through, but that it would have cost great loss of life
to the Americans.

*General Shatter, writing under date of August 17, of the expedition of Major Miley
to Baracor and Sagua de Tonamo to receive the surrender of 7,756 officers and men, says :—

“These troops knew nothing whatever of the destruction of Cervera’s fleet, the fall of
Santiago, or any later events. They accepted the situation, however, and appeared to be
glad at the opportunity of getting home. Major Miley says that on the door of the com-
manding officer was posted a bulletin purporting to be a telegram from the naval commander
at Manila, informing Sagasta of his great victory over Dewey at Manila, and Sagasta’s thanks
to him for the same.”

16
356 HISTORY OF THE

IIl.

Tue city was in a horrible condition of uncleanliness and disorder.
Santiago is three centuries old; it lies upon a hillside, sloping to the
ee i: bay. Its topography invites perfect sewerage and sani-

TION oF TROoPs tation at slight cost. But the Spanish have never

eee paid attention to sanitation. The narrow streets, with
broken curbings and unmasked gutterage, are cleaned only by the co-
pious rains. At night all sorts of garbage and refuse are thrown into
them from dwellings, to decay or to be carried off by rains — it matters
not which. Even dead animals lie for days, poisoning the air with
stenches. The soil of the yards and gardens is saturated with the
refuse of centuries, breeding fevers. It had been determined in ad-
vance not to allow the American army to enter, except in sufficient
force to support the civil authorities pending final arrangements. The
main army was ordered back to the hilltops and mountains at a
distance, and only necessary communication with the city was
permitted. :

Upon taking possession General Shafter committed the civil gov-
ernment to the hands of the autonomist officials already in office,
who were to perform their duties under the supervision of the United
States military governor designated by him. The first military gover-
nor appointed was General Chambers McKibbin, who was succeeded
in a few days by Brigadier-General Leonard Wood of the Rough Riders,
who had been promoted from Colonel after Las Guasimas, his place
as Colonel having been filled by the promotion of Lieutenant-Colonel
Roosevelt. General Wood’s selection was due to his fine practical
knowledge of medical and sanitary subjects, very important for the
time, and also for his executive ability.

There were 1,800 patients in the public hospitals and every house
contained its sick. On top of this, hunger and destitution. There
were 40,000 persons for the Red Cross Society to supply with food.
The surrender destroyed at once the value of Cuban and Spanish
money. Gold was demanded until the value of American silver and
 

 

 

CHRISTINA STREET, SANTIAGO
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 359

paper money was demonstrated. For two weeks citizens of the high-
est standing and means had been forced to live upon rice, tough meat,
and occasionally poor vegetables. Horses killed in battle were turned
over to the butchers for the soldiers.

It was a dreadful condition to face both inside and outside the
city. The camps of the prisoners were sure to become a threatening
source of disease and infection. The most strenuous efforts of the
military executive and the noble labors of the Red Cross Society
were necessary to mitigate the sufferings, which could not be fully re-
lieved. The helpless populace, the prisoners, our own army in the
mountains, the thousands of sick and wounded at Santiago, El Caney,
Siboney, and Baiquiri, must be handled under circumstances difficult
enough to dismay the stoutest heart and will.

This was not all. Business destroyed by the siege must be reés-
tablished, commerce must be reopened with all its tedious regulations
under the new attitude of the province toward our government. Order
must be maintained, jealousies soothed, appeals heard, and over all
must be held an iron hand to establish the unquestioned authority of
the United States in all questions of public and private rights.

The President at once transmitted by cable to General Shafter a
proclamation to be published, declaring the intentions of the United
States towards the territory under temporary control of the United
States. It guaranteed to the people security of their persons and
property in all their private rights and relations, without regard to
party, faction, birth or religion. The municipal laws already in force
were to be continued until suspended or superseded by others. The
courts were to continue their functions under the judges occupying
their seats if they accepted the supremacy of the United States.
Such judges would administer justice under the law of land as be-
tween man and man, under the supervision of the United States Mili-
tary Governor, who was empowered to establish new courts of com-
mon justice if the sitting judges failed to recognize the new authority.
All public property, railways, telegraphs, schools, churches, homes of
art and science, monuments and archives were to be guarded and
360 HISTORY OF THE

protected ; none must be destroyed except as an urgent military ne-
cessity. Private property was to be carefully protected in every case
and, if its seizure should prove necessary for military purposes, must be
paid for in cash at a fair valuation. The revenues payable formerly
to Spain were to be collected for the United States. All ports in the
surrendered territory were to be opened free to the commerce of ~°
neutral nations upon the payment of duties in force at the time of
importation.*

*The President’s proclamation is a historical paper of great interest. It is the first
State paper ever issued from this government containing authorization and instruction
for the government of captured foreign territory, and also a proclamation to the people
of the territory of the intentions of the government regarding them and their interests.
The full text of the document is as follows :—

. ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE,
Wasuineton, July 18, 1898.
General Shafter, Santiago, Cuba: —

The following is sent to you for your information and guidance. It will be published
in such manner in both English and Spanish as will give it the widest circulation in the
territory under your control :—

Executive Mansion,
Wasuineton, July 18, 1898. i
To the Secretary of War:—

Sir: The capitulation of the Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern
part of the province of Santiago, and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the
United States, render it necessary to instruct the military commander of the United States
as to the conduct which he is to observe during the military occupation.

The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy’s territory is the severance of
the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political
power. Under this changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as they perform
their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property, and in all their private
rights and relations. It is my desire that the inhabitants of Cuba should be acquainted
with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in
this regard. It will, therefore, be the duty of the commander of the army of occupation
to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not to make war
upon the inhabitants of Cuba, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect
them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights.
All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, codperate with the United
States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its
support and protection. Our occupation should be as free from severity as possible.

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and imme-
diately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for
the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compat-
ible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying
belligerents, and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in
force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 361

The conditions prevailing in and around Santiago were crushing
in their immediate demands. The prevalence of rains, the precipitate
advance of the army from the coast, the length of the lines, and their
thinness, had disorganized and demoralized the supply trains, and in

the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion.

The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they
accept the supremacy of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the
land, as between man and man, under the supervision of the American Commander-in-Chief.

The native constabulary will, so far as may be practicable,be preserved. ‘I'he freedom
of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when it is
necessary to do so.

While the rule of conduct of the American Commander-in-Chief will be such as has
just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a different kind, if, unfortunately,
the course of the people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of
law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or expel the native officials in
part or altogether, to substitute new courts of his own constitution for those that now
exist, or to create such new or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the ex-
ercise of these high powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and his
experience, and a high sense of justice.

One of the most important and most practical problems with which it will be neces-
sary to deal is that of the treatment of property and the collection and administration of
the revenues. It is conceded that all public funds and securities belonging to the gov-
ernment of the country in its own right, and all arms and supplies and other movable
property of such government may be seized by the military occupant and converted to
his own use. The real property of the State he may hold and administer, at the same
time enjoying the revenues thereof, but he is not to destroy it save in the case of military
necessity.

All public means of transportation, such as telegraph lines, cables, railways, and boats
belonging to the State may be appropriated to his use, but, unless in case of military
necessity, they are not to be destroyed. All churches and buildings devoted to religious
worship and to the arts and sciences, all schoolhouses, are, so far as possible, to be pro-
tected, and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places, of historical monuments
or archives, or of works of science or art is prohibited, save when required by urgent
military necessity.

Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected,
and can be confiscated only as hereafter indicated. Means of transportation, such as tel-
egraph lines and cables, railways and boats may, although they belong to private individ-
uals or corporations, be seized by the military occupant, but unless destroyed under
military necessity are not to be retained.

While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy contributions upon the
enemy in their seaports, towns or provinces which may be in his military possession by
conquest, and to apply the proceeds to defray the expenses of the war, this right is to be
exercised within such limitations that it may not savor of confiscation.

As the result of military occupation the taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants
to the former government become payable to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to
362 HISTORY OF THE

the immensity of casualties, sickness, and suffering the medical and
surgical corps, though it labored with unsparing devotion, was wholly
inadequate to the task confronting it.

The army was cheered up by immediate acknowledgment of its
great triumph. After the flag had been raised in Santiago at noon,
General Shafter received and had read to the troops present the follow-
ing telegram from President McKinley: —

“The President of the United States sends to you and your brave army the pro-
found thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at Santiago, result-
ing in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops and territory under
General Toral.

“Your splendid command has endured not only the hardships and sacrifices inci-
dent to campaign and battle, but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over
obstacles which would have overcome men less brave and determined. One and all
have displayed the most conspicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation.

“The hearts of the people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and wounded.
May the Father of Mercies protect and comfort them.”

The message was transmitted by the Secretary of War, who sent
with it a telegram of congratulation.
To the President General Shafter replied: —

“J thank you and my army thanks you for your congratulatory telegram of to-day.
I am proud to say every one in it performed his duty gallantly. Your message will be
read to every regiment in the army at noon to-morrow.”

Major-General William R. Shafter of the Fifth Army Corps, who
was in command of the forces at Santiago, was born in 1835 on a farm

substitute for them other rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the govern-
ment. The moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of
government under the military occupation, such as the salaries of judges and the police,
and for the payment of the expenses of the army.

Private property taken for the use of the army is to be paid for when possible in cash
at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not possible receipts are to be given.

All ports and places in Cuba which may be in the actual possession of our Jand and
naval forces will be open to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in
articles not contraband of war, upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may
be in force at the time of the importation.

Witnram McKintey.
By order of the Secretary of War.

H.C. Corsry, Adjutant-General.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 363

near Galesburg, Michigan. He was, therefore, sixty-three years old
when, at the head of the army of invincibles, he invaded Cuba. He
weighed three hundred pounds when he set out and lost fifty pounds
during the campaign of thirty days. General Shafter’s history is
characteristic of American life and opportunity. He was reared as
a plain farmer’s boy, doing hard work in the field and getting such
schooling as he could obtain between crops and through the hard
winters. His youth was one of plain living, hard work, modest ambi-
tion. When he was grown he became teacher of the county school,
and there Lincoln’s first call for volunteers found him in 1860, being
then twenty-five years old.

He quitted his occupations and ambitions, went into town, raised
a company of volunteers for the Seventh Michigan Regiment, and was
commissioned First-Lieutenant. His record in the Civil War was a fine
one: He was brevetted Brigadier-General, for ‘‘ most distinguished gal-
lantry in action at Malvern Hill, Virginia, August 6, 1862, while serving
as First-Lieutenant, Company I, Seventh Michigan Infantry, in com-
mand of prisoners, voluntarily taking an active part in that battle and
remaining on the field, although wounded, until the close of the engage-
ment.” At Fair Oaks, before, he had been brevetted Colonel for gallant
‘conduct. In 1864, he organized the Sixteenth Regiment of colored
troops and in the battle of Nashville led them with marked success.
At Fair Oaks, General Shafter was badly wounded, but he could not
be persuaded to leave the field until the battle was over. He then
went back to the hospital tent for treatment. Shortly after the battle
he was promoted to be Major of the Nineteenth Michigan Regiment,
and in a few months he was made Lieutenant-Colonel. In 1866, he was
mustered out of the volunteer service, and then began a struggle to
determine what he should do. He had become a thorough, well-
disciplined soldier, and dreaded farm life. After long consideration
he entered the regular army. He was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel
of the Forty-first United States Infantry. After the consolidation of .
regiments in 1879, he was promoted to be Colonel of the First United
States Infantry. He obtained his star as Brigadier-General in 1897.
364 HISTORY OF THE

With the development of plans for the invasion of Cuba the President
and Secretary of War began to seek for suitable leaders. Prominent
among them was General Shafter. President McKinley made him
a Major-General, and he was assigned to command the troops in the
Santiago campaign.

General Shafter’s thirty years of service on the frontier distin-
guished him as a splendid soldier, an aggressive and daring fighter
of Indians, and a popular officer and gentleman. He was a firm but
practical disciplinarian, caring little for the niceties of form but de-
manding faithful performance of the spirit of discipline. He was
full of geniality and humor and subject to quick changes of temper.
But he was just to his men, who stood in awe of him and who loved
to follow him in danger, where he was at his best. Personally a
man of conspicuous bravery, he was very active and liked hard work.
His great bulk was never in his way until the terrible climate about
Santiago struck him down. But illness did not make him cease his
purpose with the army. There is no successful general who can escape
criticism, but it must be admitted that the obstacles to be overcome
at Santiago were so enormous that, while they will increase the criti-
cism, they will increase in a corresponding degree his distinguished
success in the campaign. It was characteristic of the man, blunt,
unaffected, violent in language, brusque in manner at times, that he
wrote this in a letter home from the front at Santiago: “It is to the
gallant soldiers who uncomplainingly bore every ‘privation that the
country is indebted for its victory.”

Major-General Joseph Wheeler, of the Cavalry Corps, codpera-
ting with General Shafter, second in command, was a distinguished
leader of cavalry in the Confederate army during the Civil War.
He was born in Alabama in 1836 and was, therefore, a year younger
than Shafter. He weighed nearly two hundred pounds less. He
was admitted to West Point Academy in 1854, when eighteen years
- old, and graduated to enter the regular army as Second-Lieutenant
in a regiment of mounted riflemen at Fort Fillmore, on the Rio
Grande.
 

GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 367

He resigned his commission April 22, 1861, to enter the service of
the Confederacy. He was attached to General L. P. Walker’s staff
with the rank of Colonel; but after a short service on the staff, he
went back to Alabama and raised a regiment. When it was pro-
posed to make him a Brigadier-General in the Confederate army, ob-
jection was offered on account of his youth, but the objection was
overcome, and the wisdom of the appointment was justified by his
results.

He became a daring and skillful commander of cavalry, dividing
with General Forrest the honors of that arm of the service on his side.

Since his disabilities were removed after the close of the Civil War,
General Wheeler has been continuously in Congress from the Eighth
Alabama district. He left his seat to accept a commission as Major-
General of Cavalry in the war with Spain. In his absence the Gov-
ernor of Alabama, acting upon the rule prohibiting any member of
Congress from holding employment under the government, declared
his seat vacant, and ordered an election to be held to fill the vacancy.
General Wheeler’s constituents met in convention and promptly
nominated him to fill the vacancy by unanimous action.

He has been an interesting, active, and respected Congressman.
He is but five feet two inches tall and weighs one hundred and ten
pounds. His nervous vitality and physical restlessness made him a
marked personage. One of the characteristic stories of this peculiarity
is told of the Honorable Thomas B. Reed, then Speaker of the House,
who cherished high respect for General Wheeler’s unswerving integ-
rity of character and firmness of purpose. After the death of an old
member of the House, a group was discussing those left alive. General
Wheeler was present, an old member, and one of the group observing
him, remarked, “Well, we have General Wheeler left.” ‘“ Yes,” re-
marked the Speaker quickly, “the Almighty has never been able to
find the General long enough in one place to lay His finger upon
him.” Nobody enjoyed the epigrammatic comment more than the
subject of it. He was one of the strongest men of the Ways and
Means Committee. When asked by Mr. Dingley if he would like to
368 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

go to Manila as Military Governor, he replied that he wanted to go
to Cuba, where he could more readily help to bring things to a close.
He had been a student of the operations of the Cuban insurgents.
At sixty-two General Wheeler displayed at Santiago the same indom-
itable spirit that distinguished him thirty-three years ago. He left
his sick bed and went on horseback to the front of the line all day
at San Juan, and, though burning with fever after twelve hours of
fierce battle and exposure, interposed before discouraged officers who
were suggesting retirement from the positions already won and that
could only be held by unflinching bravery,and indignantly refused to
hear of retreating one foot. He warned General Shafter against the
proposal and by his splendid and fearless courage of heart and deter-
mination turned the disheartened ones the other way about, by in-
fusing his own tenacity of purpose into them.

At San Juan, during the hottest fighting, it is told that General
Wheeler forgot his whereabouts on the calendar of time for a mo-
ment and, as the enemy showed signs of weakening. cried out impul-
sively to his troops :—

“Give those Yankees h-ll now, boys!”

His aides and those standing near, burst into laughter and told
him what he had said.

“Oh, well.” he explained with a smile of deprecation, “I just for-
got a moment — but you all know I meant the Spanish. I’m a Yankee
myself, now, wearing the uniform and following the old flag of the
country where Yankee and Dixie are the same words to the whole
land.”

No soldier earned more distinction than General Wheeler.
CHAPTER THE SIXTEENTH.

Garcia’s DISAFFECTION AND MANZANILLO.

DIsarvPOINTMENT OF THE CUBAN ALLIES WHEN SantTlaco Was Nor Given into THEIR Con-
TROL — THE STORY OF THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERALS GARCIA AND SHAFTER,
AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN Forces INTO THE INTERIOR— CHARACTER OF
THE SERVICES RENDERED BY THE CUBANS IN THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN —

Our War SHIpPs UNDER Topp SINK AND Destroy FIve SpaNnisH Gun-

BOATS AND THREE TRANSPORTS, KILLING a HUNDRED OF THE
Enemy —Not a Man or SHIP OF THE AMERICANS Hurt.

I.

OLITICAL misunderstandings with the armed Cuban forces began
with the surrender of Santiago, and added for the moment to
the difficulties of the situation. It was par- |. jane
ticularly noticed on the day of occupation that OF GARCIA'S

no Cuban flags were raised in the city. A party of Grenvere rps
Cubans mounted the hill of the Morro at the harbor entrance on Sun-
day morning and displayed a Cuban flag on the staff over the walls,
but Admiral Sampson ordered it down at once by signal to his shore
forces. The only Cubans accompanying General Shafter into the city
to take possession were General Joaquin Castillo and an aide on his
staff. They went as personal guests of the American General, and
did not take official part in the ceremonies.

General Calixto Garcia, commanding the Cuban allies in the de-
partment of Eastern Cuba, had been engaged in all the operations
around Santiago from the landing of the United States troops to the
surrender. He had arrived at Aserradero on June 14 in response to
a communication from General Miles to place himself under the
orders of the American commander for full codperation, having about
4,000 troops under his authority. They were poorly clothed, and
when some of them reached the American fleet and camps, were so

nearly starved that a number died in a few hours, after voracious
(369)
370 HISTORY OF THE

eating. -As rapidly as possible they were supplied with clothing,
equipments, food, and then assigned to positions in the United States
line under command of their own officers. They were principally
used for scouting and advance skirmishers, because they were familiar
with the country and the Spanish methods of fighting.

General Garcia took part in important conferences and movements
before and during the investment of the city. His troops fraternized
with the Americans in good spirit at first, but complaints arose. There
can be no doubt that the ragged and unfortunate insurgents were
wholly undisciplined according to our ideas. They had been fight-
ing for three years after guerilla tactics, and had no training in the
business of proceeding by regular formation and with cool determi-
nation to assault. The overwhelming numbers of the United States
troops and the display of power and preparation in ships, munitions,
and supplies, doubtless served also to make these half-starved bush-
rangers feel some discouragement between foes and allies each so
much greater in strength. They could not speak English, which gave
room for much misunderstanding. They were not gluttonous for the
hard and exhausting labor of building roads and fortifications. They
had never needed either, flying light in their campaigns through
jungles, having no supply trains to provide for, each man carrying his
all on his horse or in his haversack.

That the Cubans rendered valuable services during the Santiago
campaign, there is little doubt. General Wheeler said that while they
were wholly undisciplined according to our standard, they had in no
instance, to his knowledge, refused to obey any order or respond to
any request made upon them. On the contrary, they seemed anx-
ious to do everything in their power, and where there were miscar-
riages, they were probably due to lack of understanding of our language
and inability to comprehend just what was wanted. At El Pozo, one
of the points in the Santiago battle, where three hundred of the Cubans
fought, forty-seven of their number were killed and wounded, or more
than fifteen per cent., as high a percentage of casualties as any other
organization could show. ;
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 87]

When Santiago was evacuated by the 20,000 non-combatants, and
capture or surrender was inevitable, the Cuban patriots were expectant
of the immediate triumph of their cause under the guarantee of the
United States that this Government intended only to extinguish Spanisn
sovereignty on the island and establish the independence of the people
of Cuba. A plebiscite was taken quietly among the non-combatants
and Cuban troops, which resulted in the selection of General Deme-
trius Castillo for Military Governor of Santiago when the city should
be taken. Accordingly, the name of General Castillo was recom-
mended to General Garcia by the leaders, and in a conference the
recommendation was laid before General Shafter. The Cuban leaders
maintained that at the first conference between Garcia, Sampson, and
Shafter at Aserradero, Shafter had promised to turn Santiago over
to Garcia’s occupation as soon as it was surrendered.*

If such a promise was actually made it was singularly unwise and,
under the light of conditions that prevailed at the time of the sur-
render, General Shafter could not, under the President’s instructions,
or in good common reason, place the city under control of insurgent
authorities. At,that time it was an imperative necessity that the
40,000 occupants of the city should feel the strong arm of United
States authority for the prevention of panic and disorder. The rec-
ommendation of General Demetrius Castillo for Governor was therefore
rejected by General Shafter, who explained that the capitulation was
to the United States forces and that it was his intention to continue
the autonomist officials in place until further orders from the President.

Upon this General Garcia declined to enter Santiago on the day
of surrender or while it was administered by officials that had re-
ceived their commissions from the Spanish Government.

When, therefore, orders were issued that no Cuban or American
troops should enter Santiago for occupation, except those needed to
maintain order, and that no Cuban flag should be raised in the city,
General Garcia and his staff held aloof from all participation and

*Statement of General Joaquin Castillo, Associated Press report, August 24, 1898.
372 HISTORY OF THE

withdrew to a distance for consultation. A few days afterward Gar-
cia sent to Shafter a letter containing a statement of his intention
to withdraw from the campaign and his reasons therefor. He said :—

“T have done my best, sir, to fulfill the wishes of my Government, and I have been
until now one of your most faithful subordinates, honoring myself in carrying out your
orders and instructions as far as my powers have allowed me to do it.

“The city of Santiago surrendered to the American army, and news of that impor-
tant event was given to me by persons entirely foreign to your staff. Ihave not been
honored with a single word from yourself informing me about the negotiations for peace
or the terms of the capitulation by the Spaniards. The important ceremony of the sur-
render of the Spanish army and the taking possession of the city by yourself took place
later on, and I only knew of both events by public reports.

“J was neither honored, sir, with a kind word from you inviting myself or any
officer of my staff to represent the Cuban army on that memorable occasion.

«Finally, I know that you have left in power at Santiago the same Spanish author-
ities that for three years I have fought as enemies of the independence of Cuba. I beg
to say that these authorities have never been elected at Santiago by the residents of
the city, but were appointed by royal decrees of the Queen of Spain.

“T would agree, sir, that the army under your command should have taken posses-
sion of the city, the garrison, and the forts. I would give my warm codperation io any
measure you may have deemed best under American military law to hold the city for
your army and to preserve public order until the time comes to fulfill the solemn pledge
of the people of the United States to establish in Cuba a free and independent govern-
ment. But when the question arises of appointing authorities in Santiago de Cuba»
under the peculiar circumstances of our thirty years’ strife against the Spanish rule, I
cannot see but with the deepest regret that such authorities are not elected by the
Cuban people, but are the same ones selected by the Queen of Spain, and, hence. are
ministers to defend against the Cubans the Spanish sovereignty.

«A rumor, too absurd to be believed, General, ascribes the reason of your measures
and of the orders forbidding’ my army to enter Santiago to fear of massacres and
revenge against the Spaniards. Allow me, sir, to protest against even the shadow of
such an idea. We are not savages ignoring the rules of civilized warfare. We are a
poor, ragged army, as ragged and as poor as was the army of your forefathers in their
noble war for independence, but, as did the heroes of Saratoga and Yorktown, we
respect too deeply our cause to disgrace it with barbarism and cowardice.

“In view of all these reasons I sincerely regret to be unable to fulfill any longer
the orders of my Government, and therefore I have tendered to-day to the Commander-
in-Chief of the Cuban army, Major-General Maximo Gomez, my resignation as com-
mander of this section of our army.

“ Awaiting his resolution, I withdraw my forces to the interior.”
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 373

The letter was transmitted to Washington, by General Shafter
and it was accompanied, according to reports from the War Depart-
ment, with comments disparaging to the Cuban troops. He held
Garcia’s troops responsible for the safe arrival in Santiago before the
surrender of General Nario’s regiment of Spanish regulars. He sent
the following reply to General Garcia :-—

“T must say that I was very much surprised at the receipt of your letter this
morning, and regret exceedingly that you should regard yourself as in any way
slighted or aggrieved.

“You will remember the fact that I invited you to accompany me into the
town ot Santiago to witness the surrender, which you declined.

“This war, as you know, is between the United States and Spain, and it is out
of the question for me to take any action in regard to your forces in connection
with the surrender, which was made solely to the American army.

“The policy of my Government in continuing in power temporarily the persons
occupying the offices is one which I am, of course, unable to discuss. To show
you the views held by my Government, I inclose a copy of the instructions re-
ceived by me yesterday from the President, which appear to cover everything that
can possibly arise in the government of this territory while it is held by the United
States.

“Full credit has been given to you and your valiant men in my report to my
Government, and I wish to acknowledge to you the great and valuable assistance
you rendered during the campaign.

“T regret very much to know of your determination to withdraw yourself from
this vicinity.”

As has been said before, Shafter’s: action in refusing to permit
authority to the Cubans to any extent was entirely proper and neces-
sary, but it is evident after reading the two letters that he had
lacked in tact and in proper consideration of the delicate position of
those despairing and long-hoping patriots, whose impulsive nature
would have responded to kindly candor.

This is not pointed out to criticize General Shafter’s conduct of
the war. It is always easy to point out mistakes after the fact, but
in haste, difficulties, and confusion, action must be taken without delay
and in the temper of the moment. General Shafter was in bad physical
condition, he was harassed with manifold duties, and was, moreover,
a man of brusque and quick temper.
374 HISTORY OF THE

The errors of detail in all great emergencies are many and are of
no importance if they do not affect the result of the central purpose.
In this instance the disaffection of the Cuban leader caused the Wash-
ington administration some uneasiness.

There had been many disparaging criticisms of the Cubans made
by some of our officers. It had been suggested that no more supplies
or arms be furnished to them. Washington authorities, however, were
favorably impressed by General Garcia’s protest, and the Cabinet de-
cided not to cease its efforts to retain the codperation of the allies.

Immediately after sending his protest, Garcia sent a courier to Gen-
eral Maximo Gomez of the Cuban forces with his resignation, and with-
drew with his troops toward Jiguani, fifty miles northwest of Santiago.

The influence and extent of the feeling aroused by this incident
could not be estimated at the time it occurred, but it was unfortunate.*

II.

Tue fall of Santiago was followed in two days by another naval
victory at Manzanillo, not less complete than those at Manila and
ee Santiago, but involving fewer and smaller ships and

VICTORY AT lacking, therefore, that factor of peril upon a vast scale
Pores which invests battle with magnificence and dramatic dis-
play. The United States war ships on blockade duty before Manza-
nillo on the east side of the Gulf of Guacanayaho, about one hundred

*In one paragraph of his report on the Santiago campaign Inspector-General Breckin-
ridge speaks of the Cuban allies in these words: ‘In the beginning the Cuban soldiers
were used largely as outposts on our front and flanks. There has been a great deal of discus-
sion among the officers of this expedition concerning the Cuban soldiers and the aid they
have rendered. They seem to have very little organization or discipline, and they do not, of
course, fight in the battle line with our troops. Yet in every skirmish or fight where they
were present they seemed to have a fair proportion of killed and wounded. They were of
undoubted assistance in our first landing and in scouting our front and flanks. It is not safe,
however, to rely upon their fully performing any specific duty, according to our expectation
and understanding, unless they are under the constant supervision and direction of one of
our own officers, as our movements and views are so different and a misunderstanding or
failure so easy.”
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 3875

miles west of Santiago, were the Wilmington, Helena, Scorpion, Hist,
Hornet, Wampatuck, and Osceola. All were auxiliary vessels except
the Wilmington, under command of Captain Todd (who had been at
Cienfuegos when the Winslow was badly damaged and Ensign Bagley
was killed), and the Helena, her twin gunboat. Captain Todd was the
ranking officer in command of the Manzanillo flotilla, and by direction
of Admiral Sampson he approached the harbor at seven o'clock on
Tuesday morning, July 18, for the purpose of destroying the Spanish
gunboats and transports contained in the harbor.

At 7:30 o’clock the Wilmington and Helena entered the northern
channel toward the city, the Scorpion and Osceola the mid channel,
and the Hist, Hornet, and Wampatuck the south channel, the move-
ments of the vessels being so timed as to bring them within effective
range of the shipping at about the same moment.

At 7:50 fire was reopened on the shipping, and, after a deliberate
fire lasting about two and a half hours, three Spanish transports, La
Gloria, José Garcia, and La Puricama Concepcion, were burned and de-
stroyed. The pontoon, which was the harbor guard and store ship,
probably for ammunition, was burned and blown up. Three gun-
boats were destroyed. One other was driven ashore and sunk, and a
fifth was driven ashore and was believed to be disabled.

The firing was maintained at a range beyond that of the shore
artillery. It was continued until, after a gradual closing in, the shore
batteries opened fire at a comparatively short range, when one of our
ships was recalled, the object of the expedition having been accom-
plished. No casualties occurred on board any of our vessels. Great
care was taken in directing the fire that as little damage as possible
should be done to the city itself. The Spanish loss was reported to
be nearly a hundred killed. The gunboats destroyed or driven ashore
helpless, were the Dalgado, Guantanamo, Ostralia, Continola, and Guar-
dian.

If the Manzanillo engagement had occurred at the outset of war,
it would have taken a great place in history. It is only smaller in

size than the other great engagements and the result was exactly
17
376 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

the same—the enemy’s ships annihilated, not one of our vessels in-
jured, and not an American sailor injured.

The achievements of the navy up to July 19 were extraordinary.
The two squadrons under Dewey and Sampson had destroyed, of Spanish
war vessels, four armored cruisers, three torpedo boats, seventeen
unprotected cruisers and gunboats, and four transports, and had captured
nearly thirty merchant prizes of considerable value. Our only loss
was the damaged Winslow, six men killed, and seven men wounded.
The Spaniards had lost about twelve hundred killed, six hundred
wounded, and two thousand prisoners.

Commander Todd’s triumph at Manzanillo was in keeping with the
glory of this unparalleled naval record.

 
CHAPTER THE SEVENTEENTH.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FALL or SANTIAGO.

EXTRAORDINARY TEST OF THE FIGHTING QUALITIES OF AMERICANS BEFORE THE SURRENDER— -

THE ENDURANCE, COURAGE, AND INDIVIDUAL SKILL OF OuR TRoops AMAZED ALL FoREIGN
MILITARY OBSERVERS — OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY SOME OF THE EXPERTS— THE
STORMING OF SAN JUAN CONSIDERED AN IMPOSSIBILITY IN ADVANCE—

Wuat THE NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS DEMONSTRATED TO THE
WorLD— EFFECT OF THE COMBINED OPERATIONS —

GREATER IN SIGNIFICANCE THAN ANY
BATTLE OF THE CENTURY.

I,

HE land fighting before Santiago was dwarfed by the spectacular
glory of the naval engagement that followed swiftly upon
its heels. The ocean is the perfect battlefield, eo
offering no natural advantage to either combat- ARMY BEFORE

ant. On land, the limitless opportunities for defense, aoa
concealment, and surprise require most patient investigation both
of the original plan of a battle and its variations in execution, in
order that the action may be comprehended and explained. All that
is known at first are the general results and the confused mass of
individual experiences and incidents that indicate the fighting temper
of the forces engaged. The fighting before Santiago on July 1 and
2 was without precedent,and was involved in more confusion than
any other modern battle of respectable scale. The destruction of
Cervera’s squadron was achieved amid all the surroundings of a magnifi-
cent theatrical display. Its opening, swift progress, and final tragedy,
possessed a dramatic completeness of effect that could not have been
surpassed if the details had been designed and rehearsed in advance.
Yet, splendid as the achievement was, the heroism displayed by the
soldiers in the obscurity of the inland jungles was of a quality that

equaled the courage and skill by which our ships were brought out
(377)
378 HISTORY OF THE

victorious. And, at the moment when the observers of the land bat-
tles were preparing to analyze the incidents and construct the great
story, the naval engagement intervened and relegated the army’s
achievements to second place. It was not until two weeks had
elapsed and Santiago had surrendered, that the world understood
the significance of the American fighting at San Juan and El Caney.

The discovery was momentous. Upon a larger field 16,000 men,
against the same odds and with the same determination of unprec-
edented courage, devoid of any quality of desperation, had repeated
the achievement of the 950 at Las Guasimas. As Sampson’s fleet
demonstrated that Dewey’s victory was the fruit of national char-
acter and system, and not chance, the forces at San Juan and El
Caney enforced with equal thoroughness the lesson of Las Guasimas.

It established the quality of manhood developed by free govern-
ment, which the monarchical systems had persistently denied. The
very blunders of forecast called out triumphantly the individual re-
source of each soldier, apart from the combination in bodies. It is
doubtful if the desperate courage of the Spaniards had been under-
estimated; but certainly the deadly Cuban climate, with its alternation
of burning heat and nightly chill, its drowning tropical rains, the
rankness of vegetation, the tangled jungles, and the absence of founda-
tions for road building—certainly, these were all underestimated or
not prepared for. Yet, if it had been determined to overcome these
obstacles before attacking, the purpose of the government to push
the war to a quick conclusion could not have been achieved. Cuba
could not have been scientifically invaded and the war ended short
of twelve months.

It was thoroughly characteristic of the American idea of “business”
that when Shafter perceived the heat and the impending of the
rainy season he determined without hesitation to “beat the rains to
Santiago,’ and do the necessary fighting while the health and spirits
of the men were good. It cannot be said that the losses in battle
were greater because of the impetuous advance. The losses by dis-
ease later demonstrated the wisdom of haste.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 379

The three battles on the journey were characteristic of what Europe
has sarcastically called “American enterprise.” Disregarding tradi-
tion and precedent, the army of the United States, provided with no.
field artillery of sufficient power, plunged into a jungle and marched
against a fortified city—leaving all supplies behind, and throwing
away, on the march, every pound of clothing and equipment that
was not necessary for actual fighting.

The extreme advance guard of 950 cavalrymen, marching and fight-
ing for the first time dismounted, half of them volunteers of two
months’ training, charged an enemy two or three times greater in
numbers, intrenched, provided with artillery, protected by barbed-wire
entanglements, in a familiar jungle, and drove him back after an hour’s
fighting. It was called an “ambush,” and at home amateur critics
of war attributed to desperation the valor of our troops. It was to
be discovered later that from Las Guasimas to Santiago the same am-
buscade confronted all our troops.

Halting only to fight, rest, and permit the main body to come
up, cut off from provisions and hospital relief, with quarter rations
for empty stomachs, the half nude and weary, but determined, army
reached the outposts of Santiago and assaulted them with a spirit that
would not be denied. The outposts that were to be taken in two days
were stormed and captured against overwhelming odds of defense in
one day, after ten hours of ceaseless fighting. The night was spent
in making intrenchments and resisting attempts at recapture, and the
next day in the blazing sunlight, without tents, without food, without
relief, they fought the enemy back to his last ditch and held the city.

Of the 15,000 troops engaged, three regiments were volunteers practi-
cally useless, not for lack of fighting qualities—the stubborn march
disproved that—but because their rifle ammunition carried black
powder and the smoke menaced our troops by revealing our position
at every discharge. Of the remainder one regiment was of volunteers
with smokeless powder ammunition and the remainder regulars, one-
third of whose ranks had been recruited within sixty-five days. One-
third of that army was practically composed of volunteer recruits.
380 HISTORY OF THE

The military observers present, representing foreign nations, were
unanimously of the opinion before the attack on Friday the Ist,
that the storming of San Juan and El Caney, without the aid of heavy
artillery, was a military feat impossible of accomplishment. The in-
trenchments of the enemy, his position, his advance defenses, his
artillery and numbers, rendered him impregnable against enormous
odds. Yet all this was swept away by infantry alone, by troops thrown
into regimental confusion in the jungle, some without brigade or reg-
imental commanders, yet all welded into substantial cohesive forma-
tion by the instinct of self-reliance, springing from intelligent knowledge
of the value of combination and organization.

Captain Lee and Captain Paget of the British army declared that
the United States troops had performed the impossible in warfare.
Count von Goetzen, the German attaché, whose opinion will scarcely
be suspected of too much leaning to the side of the United States,
said the fighting of the Americans was wonderfully well done, and
that the storming of the outposts was a wonderful feat of war.
The fighting was creditable, he declared, to both sides, but he did
not dream how formidable San Juan was until after it had been
taken. The American marksmanship was surprising. The vigorous
way in which our troops sprang to the deadly work was a tremendous
lesson to other nations. The volunteers, he heard from other expert
observers who had watched them, were fully up to the regulars, and
the dash and spirit exhibited were marvelous. Major Grandprey, of
the French service, who has been quoted elsewhere, declared that
some of the best-grounded theories adopted in Europe were over-
turned by the achievements of the American soldiers. The Frankfurter
Zeitung, @ leading newspaper authority of Germany, in a well-consid-
ered article from a military contributor, declared that the United
States troops before Santiago had surpassed all precedent, and that
the susceptibility of the American citizen to quick training had dem-
onstrated that our volunteer militia was a much more reliable force
than the compulsory reserves of Europe, an utterance astonishing in
the light of past beliefs.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 381

It may be said that our military operations against Santiago were
marred by blunders or misfortunes, without raising the question of
cause or responsibility for them. But through all, the intelligence,
tenacity, and strong character of the American citizen found an un-
erring way to victory against the odds of the enemy in front and
the failure or impossibility of support behind.

The courage of our soldiers was matched by the skill of our seamen.
The naval battle of Santiago was most extraordinary in its contrasts
of methods and men. For eighty-six years American seamen had
engaged no foreign adversaries. Our ships were regarded as too light
in armor, or too heavy in armament, and too delicate in interior
mechanism. It had been predicted by foreign experts that our battle-
ships would be capsized by the recoil from the delivery of full broad-
sides from the great and small guns. These theoretical doubts were
dissipated. The battleships, in bombarding, were “listed,” or ca-
reened to one side by running the heavy guns out of the ports and
turrets, in order to gain elevation sufficient for the guns on the other
side to throw shells over the hills. Not a gun exploded, not a piece of
delicate machinery failed, not one gloomy prediction was realized.

Our methods of fighting, like our methods of diplomacy, were start-
ling to the enemy. Europe has clung to the conventions. In diplo-
macy, Europeans proceed by the tortuous paths of tradition and the
etiquette of precedent. They pronounced the American directness of
procedure by going to the heart of the subject in a businesslike
manner as “brutal” and “irritating.” At San Juan the Spanish com-
plained that our troops charged, when, under all the conventions of
warfare by accepted tactics they should have run away!

In the naval battle our commanders wasted no time in vain tech-
nical parade and manceuvre. They fell upon the adversary with all
the weight of metal that could be discharged, pounding the amazed
and breathless Spaniards to destruction before they could recover
from the shock. The European gunner is trained to shoot on the
upward roll of his side of the ship, with the result that most of the
Spanish shots were hurled harmlessly over our ships. United States
382 HISTORY OF THE

gunners are trained to fire on the downward roll, so that the missile
may go straight to the enemy’s hull, or reach it on ricochet. The
hulls of the Spanish cruisers testified to the deadly efficacy of the
method.

II.

Tuer three battles of this century, preceding Santiago, that were
enormously greater in political significance than important as mere
sites military operations, were Waterloo, Gettysburg, and Se-

sanTiacoon dan. The effect of Waterloo was the destruction of the

Dre Gore personal power and threatened political supremacy in
Europe of Napoleon. The effect of Gettysburg was to presage the
downfall of the institution of slavery in the United States, and the
denial, by force of arms, of the political theory of the right of a State
to peacefully withdraw from the Federal Union. The effect of Sedan
was the ushering into immediate power of the German Empire, that
Bismarck had patiently constructed from the petty German States, the
solidarity of which was committed with its crown to the keeping of
William I., of the new imperial dynasty. In no military sense are
these battles comparable, but in significance they are. They were of
momentous effect upon the nations and continents whose interests
were directly concerned. But, to the round world, they were, after
all, more or less, incidents of locality. Waterloo was, perhaps, great-
est of all; but the world of 1814 was much smaller than the world
of 1898.

In respect of the importance of the forces engaged on land and the
display of recognized scientific military operations, the land battles
before Santiago were mere skirmishes beside Waterloo, Gettysburg,
and Sedan. But in respect of the revelation resulting from measur-
ing the fighting and enduring qualities of the American soldier by
the standard obtaining in the standing army of Spain, the result
was of the highest significance. Among the people of the United
States it confirmed and established the confidence they had long
cherished in the efficiency of their race. It was more important to
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 383

us than Gettysburg, in that, while it erased every jarring memory of
Gettysburg itself, it sanctified and heightened the one glorious herit-
age—of the valor of all Americans who met in that heroic struggle;
and that the reunited devotion to one country and one flag was sealed
in sacrifice of blood and life by North and South together fighting
side by side. It revealed to us, as by inspiration, the strength and
character of our population, and the resourceful intelligence springing
from liberty restricted only by the rights of man. That this revela-
tion was understood by all foreign observers was confessed. They
were sent to observe both sides; not merely the tools of war, but the
nature and power of the men who wielded them. It is for the pur-
pose of studying forces as possible adversaries that such observations
are made.

When the combined operations of the army and navy at Santiago
are considered, it is not improbable that the Spanish defeat will prove,
by future results, to have been more significant than any other battle
of the century.

The overwhelming and quick defeat of Spain was confidently pre-
pared for and expected by the United States. The progress of the
war did not appreciably interrupt the regular course of our everyday
life or business.

It was also conceded by all other nations that Spain must be de-
feated if the prosecution of the war were not averted by the inter-
vention of European Powers. But some grave authorities abroad did
not dream that it was possible for Spain in a hundred days to be
stripped of all her colonies, her splendid fleet annihilated, her ocean
commerce paralyzed, her finances demoralized, her population maddened
to the point of revolution, an important body of her army captured
within its own fortified places by a smaller army, and the prisoners
transported back to Spain, at the expense of the conquerors, as an
act of compassionate charity, founded upon good “ Yankee ” economy.

And all this without the enemy being able to strike a single
blow in return, or to disarrange in any particular the ordinary course
of life in this country.
384 HISTORY OF THE

The significance of Santiago lay in this: that those who had con-
sidered Dewey’s action at Manila to be a miracle of good fortune,
saw it repeated at Santiago, at Manzanillo, at San Juan de Porto Rico,
and at Nipe. Those who thought the 950 at Las Guasimas were reck-
less dare-devils, who won out of sheer audacity, saw the same quality
of indomitable courage repeated by increased forces, with equal suc-
cess, at San Juan and El Caney.

When Santiago surrendered, the republic of the United States,
so long scorned by Europe as a nation of money-getters and sordid
adventurers, with no traditions of dignity or glory; so long treated
with contempt by Europe in its accredited representatives as being a
government of ignorant and corrupt politicians and mercenaries —
that republic, after Santiago, stood before the world suddenly revealed
in its real strength, taking undisputed place in the first rank of
nations, unsurpassed in its practical ability to provide for offense or
defense, and with a capacity for future influence in the whole world, .
and for the increase of its strength restricted only within the national
purpose, whatever that might be.

The surrender of Santiago was the deathblow to Spain, and a sud-
den warning to Europe.

Even after the destruction of the Maine the Spanish Government
did not expect war with the United States. That act of cruel perfidy
was so well shrouded in mystery, as Spain viewed it, that it might
be made the subject of endless diplomacy; or, if put to it, the “mercen-
aries” of America could be pacified with a money indemnity. No
allowance was made for the existence of a profound public sentiment
in the United States aroused by the murder of our seamen. Once be-
fore Spanish authorities had shot to death the crew of the Virginius,
filibusterers from this country going to aid Cuban revolutionists, and
nothing had come of the outrage. The idea that the United States
possessed any actual sympathy for Cubans perishing under Spanish
cruelty, neither Canovas nor Sagasta could comprehend as anything
more than rhetorical declamation covering a pretense to forward some
scheme of sharp practice that our government was preparing to
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 385

present. They frankly admitted that Spain could not be victorious in
a war with the United States, but they did not expect war— diplomacy,
and money indemnity, at the proper time, would dispose of American
protestations of honorable purpose and humane motives.

Curiously enough, England, the European nation best able to know
and understand the spirit and power of the United States, underrated
the situation at first. Her naval and military authorities did not
hesitate to prophesy that the Americans were sure to be victorious
in the end, because, although the national spirit rose slowly, it rose
surely under adversity, and was then irresistible. They were ready,
however, to expect the first successes for Spain, whose standing army
and excellent navy, equipped according to European standards, would
be superior to the overloaded and lumbering ships of our fleet and
the handful of soldiers composing our standing army, which would
have to be laboriously recruited from raw volunteers, these, naturally,
of the lowest classes of our population.

Even after Manila, the London Times, that recognized channel of
sound conservative opinion in England, took a gloomy view of our
outlook. ‘In time, of course,” it said, “the United States will be able
to bring out their immense, almost inexhaustible resources of military
and naval strength, but for the moment nothing decisive can be looked
for so long as Admiral Cervera’s fleet is in being, and while the
American army is in process of manufacture.” All that had then
been gained, it believed, was the knowledge that European interven-
tion was no longer practicable.

“Intervention by the Powers” was, in fact, the trump card that
Spanish statesmen believed they held for use when all other resources
should prove futile. It was not possible to admit that a republic of
“ pig-stickers,” “railroad builders” and “tradesmen” would dare
resist the dignified wishes of the ‘Concert of Europe,” whose mission
was the maintenance of the balance of power, the custodianship of
the secrets of diplomacy by circumlocution, and the division of the
estates of deceased governments among heirs to be selected for the
decedent.
386 HISTORY OF THE

It was to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and
the Franco-Russian League that Spain looked for assistance. Great
Britain was, as usual, independent of alliances, a solitary among
nations, more powerful and much more feared than the United States,
but yet a solitary, as we have always been.

When Congress had taken steps that left no doubt of immediate
war, Spain recognized that her own diplomacy was ended. She turned
immediately to Austria, whose Emperor was the uncle of the Queen-
Regent and granduncle of Alfonso XIII, to the Pope and to France.
The mighty mystery of the “intervention of the Powers” was thus
solemnly invoked. The venerable Leo XIII, representing in his pon-
tifical character and personal virtues the loftiest mission of religion,
made overtures to the President that were acknowledged with interest
and respect and replied to with open frankness of explanation. Then
the aged pontiff suddenly learned that even in this effort to preserve
that curious national pretense called her “honor,” Spain had not
hesitated to ascribe his action to the wrong initiative and to repre-
sent his motives in such a manner as to cover his high office with
indignity and to reflect insult upon the United States. Overcome
with grief and feeling deep humiliation, Leo XIII. withdrew, not the
less respected by our Government and the world that recognized his
greatness of mind and nobility of purpose.

During this time, also, the Powers of the continent had agreed to
make united “representations” to the government of the United
States through their ambassadors and ministers in a body. The note
was intended to have the appearance of disinterested anxiety for peace
and the effect of a menace from combined Europe, if we persisted
in the determination to make war on Spain, and to destroy her
sovereignty in Cuba. Italy did not join in the action.

The continent having agreed upon the plan, application was made
to Great Britain to join in the remonstrance. The continent relied
upon the ancient feeling of jealous dislike between England and the
United States, and the recent embroilment over the Anglo- Venezuelan
boundary, as causes sufficient to move the Queen’s ministers.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 887

Much to Europe’s surprise, Great Britain declared a purpose to
take no step unfriendly to Spain or the United States, which countries
were presumed to be capable of managing their own affairs. But
Mr. Balfour, in the Premier’s absence, went further and consented to
an action, the significance of which the Powers did not then prob-
ably fully perceive. He desired peace, but he could not interfere.
He would, however, unite with the Powers in presenting to the Presi-
dent of the United States an address expressing the hope that war
might be averted, and offering friendly offices. But the nature of the
address must first be communicated to the President and his consent
obtained for its public presentation.

The text of the original note as determined upon by the Powers
is not known, but when the British ambassador at Washington en-
tered the White House, at the head of the delegation of foreign rep-
resentatives, it was notice to the world that the President had dic-
tated the terms of the joint address and that the British ambassador
presented it as the friendly and courteous suggestion of the greatest
European Power, and that his presence estopped the representation
from being construed as a menace, upon peril of its repudiation by
the British Government, and the danger of provocation that might
attach.

 
CHAPTER THE EIGHTEENTH.

Dereat or Foreign INTERVENTION.

EFrect oF ENGLAND’s ATTITUDE ON CONTINENTAL Europe — New Cuan Po icy anv Its
CompLeTe ReversaL IN Our Favorn—THE ConcEeRT OF Europe AccEePTeD IT As PROOF
OF AN ALLIANCE — CHARACTER OF ‘THE GOVERNMENTAL D1PLOMACIES AND THE METH-

ODS OF THEIR PRocEDURE— ACTION AND ATTITUDE OF ALL THE NaTIONns
Wuen War BecaNn—Errect oF Dewey's VICTORY AT MANILA.

I.

HE action of Great Britain, which converted the intended
menace into assurances of apologetic anxiety, and thus en-
abled the President to express, under terms of courteous
acknowledgment, the unalterable determination of the United

States not to permit interference by the European concert in any of
our differences with Spain, was as annoying to the concert as it was

gratifying to the American people. Our old fraternal
REPULSE OF

PROPOSED enemy had atoned to the great republic for the wrongs
EUROPEAN : ‘ .
iInteRvention  iwflicted upon the colonies before 1776. At the oppor-

tune moment Great Britain had chosen between aliens
in language and political ideals and a people possessing substantially
those she possessed. And she chose her own.

Whatever reasons may be ascribed to England, of selfish interest
or shrewd foresight, her decision cannot be impeached as lacking in
that unerring common sense and high intelligence of practical pur-
pose which characterizes what are known as the Anglo-Saxon people.
There is nothing permanent in the effusions of impulsive sentiment
alone. The United States not less than England has founded her
greatness upon practical and material interests. The independence
of the American colonies, achieved against gross oppression by the
mother country, has been of vast benefit, not alone to the enfran-
chised colonies, but to the people of England. In contrast with the

Continental and South American republics,— mere personal or organized
(388)
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 389

autocracies wearing republican costume,—the British people have
studied the United States, and have themselves erected a great repub-
lic attired in the robes only of monarchy and imperialism.

The first result of England’s action was to inflame Europe against
her and intensify the feeling against the United States, though it could
not be expressed in overt acts. It must be admitted that Europe had
abundant reason for disappointment. For a hundred years it had been
England’s expressed policy to maintain the sovereignty of Spain in
Cuba against any strong maritime rival, particularly the United States.
Mr. Canning said during his primacy that “the possession by the United
States of both shores of the channel, through which our Jamaica trade
must pass, would, in time of war with the United States, or, indeed,
of a war in which the United States might be neutral, but in which
we continued to claim the right of search and the Americans to resist
it, amount to a suspension of that trade and to a consequent total ruin
of a great portion of our West Indian interests.”

The utterance was made in support of his proposal to send a squad-
ron to Havana to check any advances the United States might be
tempted to make in 1822. As late as 1852, England, foreseeing the
probable construction-of a canal through the Central American isthmus,
served notice upon the United States of its expectations. In that note
was this paragraph: —

“ Now, if the maritime Powers are, on the one hand, out of respect to the rights of
Spain, and from a sense of international duty, bound to dismiss all intention of obtain-
ing possession of Cuba, so, on the other hand, are they obliged, out of consideration for
the interests of their own subjects or citizens, and the protection of the commerce of
other nations, who are all entitled to the use of the great highways of commerce on
equal terms, to proclaim and assure, as far as in them lies, the present and future neu-
trality of the island of Cuba.” ,

So tenacious had been England’s purpose to guard the interests of her
vast maritime commerce in the West Indies, and even its future oppor-
tunities, that she succeeded in obtaining from the United States an
agreement in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty that a canal through the
isthmus, if built, should be open to ships of all nations upon equal
390 HISTORY OF THE

terms, in times of war as well as peace, and that the United States
would not establish any fortifications or exert any control in violation
of that pledge.

In view of these facts of history, the continental nations naturally
sought reasons for the sudden volte-face upon a question of the
greatest magnitude to the supremacy of British maritime interests.
France, it was asserted, had taken the initiative in forming the con-
cert and in seeking England’s agreement to it. If this is true, there
was very good reason, because France and England had been closely
united in Cuban understandings. Just after the Mexican War these
two Governments had proposed to us a tripartite agreement of self-
denial between each other and joint denial against other nations, against
taking possession of Cuba and to discountenace attempts toward that
purpose on the part of Cubans themselves, though it was not to prej-
udice the right of Cubans to assert and obtain independence. The
treaty was rejected by the Fillmore administration and England re-
tired with a direct notice of her determination to exercise her free
right to enforce her views, if occasion arose, by combination with
other interested nations.

The expressed intention of the United States not to annex Cuba
or to do more than establish the freedom of the people, and their
right to self-government in 1898, did not afford any explanation of
England’s attitude. It was not possible for continental diplomats
to believe that the declaration of such magnanimous purpose was
more than a hypocritical cloak for the acquisition of rich territory.
Even if that were possible it did not explain England’s purpose.
During the Ten Years’ War in Cuba when the Virginius affair was
, agitating the United States, President Grant had proposed the inde-
pendence of Cuba to Europe through diplomatic overtures. France
remembered that England had then urged the Powers to refuse, and
the proposition fell lifeless..

It was not to be believed that England relied upon the self-deny-
ing purpose of the United States in 1898 more than in 1874—besides
international philanthropy was the dream of utopian people only.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 391

The only reason practicable under continental ideas was that Great
Britain and the United States had established an agreement to resist
European intervention or coercion in Cuban affairs, in order that they
might take and hold the invaluable island for themselves. They were
confirmed in this by the publication in an English newspaper of recog-
nized authority of the statement that the Queen’s ministers had deter-
mined to remain neutral; that if any combination were formed to in-
terfere with the United States, Great Britain would not only hold
aloof from it, but would, in fact, assist the United States. The publi-
cation was not upon official authority, but it was not denied.

The view continental governments took of these movements, in-
dicating a perfect accord between the two nations, was of profound
significance. An alliance of English-speaking nations was gigantic in
its potentialities. It offered elements of cohesive strength in a common
language, correlated ideals and purposes, and in material wealth and
power, that were incalculably threatening. The continental nations,
speaking diverse languages, accustomed to diverse ideals and purposes,
honeycombed with petty jealousies, the masses of people weakened
in faith by growing temptation to emigrate to the United States or
the British Colonies, whence came from relatives and friends estab-
lished there glowing accounts of peace, prosperity, and freedom—all
these constituted elements of disintegration, in spite of the perfection
of their enormous war establishments.

Besides, if there actually existed an Anglo-American agreement,
resistance to it meant the precipitation of that dreaded evil of the
century’s governmental development — universal war.

The failure of the concerted representation, and the specters evoked
by the situation, left Europe without immediate plan of action; but

the pressure to force intervention grew stronger during inaction.
18
399 HISTORY OF THE

II.

Wuen, therefore, we declared war with Spain, England was our
acknowledged friend; Russia was practically the unchanged friend
cHaracters of Of all previous political existence; France, the first of

beeen our friends and allies, torn by distracting interests
CONTESTANTS and political jealousies, was leading the opposition to
our purpose; Germany, bound to us by the natural strong ties created
by millions of faithful and excellent citizens come to us from all
parts of the sturdy Fatherland of genius, courage, and energetic in-
dustry, was unfriendly in its ruling classes, but yet to be relied upon
in the body of its people; Austria, of course, was devoted to Spain
with feeble power; Italy expressed popular approval of our intentions;
the Spanish-American republics were officially loyal in the fullest degree
to their continental protector, but the blood and language of Spain
decided the sympathies of their populations against us.

The narrative of the adventures of these governmental interests
during the war is not less interesting than the story of actual war itself.
For, after all, one nation, among all the nations, is as one person,
made up of the types of its population composed into a generalization
of their traditions, intelligence, character, wealth, and local customs.
The capacity of a nation for courage, purpose, and ambition is ex-
pressed as it is in one man. Pride or simplicity, impulsiveness or
deliberation, jealousy or trustfulness, strength or weakness, candor
or duplicity, appear in nations, and are as distinctly recognizable as
in men.

The establishment of a free democracy in the United States was
upon the foundation of the equal political rights of all men, and the
social equality of all men to the extent of their equipment. To the
leadership of a vast, nervous, energetic, and ambitious population, we
have called men of natural genius and capacity, without regard to prec-
edent or origin. It is not form so much as substance that free de-
mocracy demands. The great Liberator and profound statesman among
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 393

our leaders began life as a rail-splitter; the great General, twice pres-
ident, began as a farm boy and tanner. We have honored a canal-
boat boy, a tailor, farmers, lawyers—there is no presidential caste
excluding any male child born in the United States. Those of our
leaders who have shown greatest genius have usually been those
who had the humblest beginnings in life. In the war with Spain
every leader that was to develop sprang from the common average
of industrious and sturdy citizenship.

The American uational character as expressed by its Government
is an aggregation of directness of purpose, disregard of details that
are not vital, and a sort of energy in action that may be best de-
scribed, perhaps, in the American phrase of “ getting down to business,”
with the intention of going directly to the point without evasion.

In monarchical government the theory of the power of royalty
“by the grace of God” demanded through many centuries, and does
yet demand in a modified form, that the idea shall always be
materially presented through the glamour of splendid ceremonial,
privileged castes, the exclusion of subjects from the affairs of the
sovereign, who is the state; consequently, the envelopment of state
functions, diplomatic exchanges, and political procedure in a cloud of
ceremonious formalities, precedents, mysterious phrases, and time-
consuming leisureliness, has made European diplomatic service a pro-
fession open to those who have mastered the cult and closed usually
to those who have only the capacity.

It is because representatives of our government at these centers
of etiquette have ignored nice distinctions (that could only delay
progress) in order to conclude a simple matter, that they have been
regarded with terror, Americans generally described as “pigs,” and
our whole governmental procedure in diplomacy as “brutal.” Prince
Bismarck, the greatest man of the century in intellectual power and
clearness of foresight, was celebrated as one European diplomat who
brutally told the truth, while others, who knew thoroughly well the
esoteric verbiage in which to encase a fact and involve it in tortu-
ous uncertainties, dreaded to meet him in conference or negotiation.
894 HISTORY OF THE

He mastered them with ease, and they described him as intolerably
brutal in stating his demands. But Bismarck, himself, when, at the
Berlin Peace Congress, he met Disraelii—who was master of the
etiquette of diplomacy, as well as of the power of direct and energetic
pressure, stripped of all reservation and pretense,—said, “I do not
care much for their Lord Salisbury, who is merely a wooden lath,
painted to look like iron; but look out for that terrible Jew—he
means business.”

Of all European governments — excepting, of course, that of the
Sultan —the diplomacy of Spain has been the most artful and un-
scrupulous in method. Having small significance among nations,
because of her poverty and degeneration, her diplomacy has been exer-
cised by dynasties and cabinets upon the political factions of the Span-
ish people, upon the revolutionists of the outraged colonies, and guarded
as a weapon to be used by leaders temporarily in power, but not to be
betrayed to the common people. The chief diplomatic weapon she has
used in times of revolution was magnanimous promise, canceled by
cruelest treachery. The Ten Years’ Revolution was brought to an end
by the promise of Marshal Campos that Maceo and all his officers
and soldiers should be permitted to leave Cuba, and that the in-
surgent slaves should be emancipated to full citizenship without pun-
ishment. The terms were accepted, Maceo left the island; but his
officers were sent prisoners to Ceuta, and the slaves were not emanci-
pated until most of them had died under punishment from masters
against whom they had revolted. In the Philippines revolutionists
have been soothed by decrees of chivalrous amnesty. When they
reported to surrender arms, they were massacred in cold blood.

Hundreds of instances might be cited of Spain’s Machiavellian
procedure. The revolutions in Cuba that devastated the island, de-
stroyed prosperity and trade, and involved the United States in con-
tinuous cost and hurt by the necessity of suppressing filibustering
expeditions, were due to Spain’s utter incompetency to govern. Yet
for years, by the exercise of the most adroit diplomatic duplicity, by
explanations and promises limitless in ingenious cunning, she was
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 395

able to prevent action until the atrocities of Captain-General Weyler
revolted our common instinct of humanity. In the presence of the
horror she had aroused, her politicians shifted places and the relentless
cruelties of Canovas were succeeded by the generous promises of
Sagasta. Autonomy had been promised often before with the knowl-
edge that it could be suspended. Hesitating upon that memory
the doubt of the United States was answered by the sacrifice of the
Maine.

Such was governmental Spain among international associates—
the persuasive and enticing strumpet of diplomatic morals, whose
idea of national virtue was that the more sincere it was the more
it would cost to purchase. What more could be expected of a
country whose social code is crowded with maxims such as these: —

“Renounce the devil and thou shalt wear a shabby cloak. The good man’s son
inherits poverty. Alas, for the son whose father went to heaven! Blessed is the
son whose father went to the devil. The official who cannot lie may as well be

out of the world. He who does not lie does not come of good blood. Gold is
omnipotent, and the ducat is his lord-lieutenant.”

The usages of diplomacy in Europe rendered the continental nations
much more susceptible to influence by the Spanish procedure than
Great Britain or the United States. France, especially, with vast
financial stakes in Spanish securities, and Austria, moved by ties
of family, could give great assistance in an attempt to entice Europe
into a threatening attitude against us.

III.

Pusplic maneuvring and feinting in diplomacy are carried on along
lines of phrases calculated to hasten or delay expected action by others
or to invite expression of opinion. Thus, a dispatch | was pone
beginning, “It is reported here in political circles,” etc., | WHEN WAR
means that the press of the other interested country ca
will reveal how popular opinion receives the action rumored as prob-
able. Then, there is the phrase, “An attaché of a foreign embassy,
396 HISTORY OF THE

of high standing, declared to-day,” etc. The phrases progress in defi-
niteness thus: “It is rumored that the Government is preparing a
decree”; “Unofficial announcement is made”; Semi-official statements
appeared to-day”; “ Official announcements were issued by the Govern-
ment to-day.” Usually the latter is final, but, if a loophole is vitally
necessary, it is possible to follow the official decree with this: “The
minister of war has advised the authorities that the official decree
published yesterday is subject, of course, to all the modifications con-
sistent with the decree of the year before last, defining the status of
the governmental bugbear,” etc. It must be remembered that these
are mere primary phrases in the diplomatic Olendorf. When one
government is in position to secure the dissemination of these feints
by origination in the news center of another country, the finesse in-
creases in complication. While the antagonist is occupied in delib-
erating upon the intention or significance of the feint, much may be
done.

On the day that Sampson’s fleet sailed from Havana, “it was
reported” from London that Great Britain was preparing a neutral-
ity proclamation for immediate issuance,and that the cruiser Albany,
which we had purchased and were outfitting at Newcastle to bring
home, and the torpedo boat Somers, at Falmouth, would not be able to
leave those ports within the regulation time, and therefore must remain
until after the war. It would also force Dewey’s squadron from
Hong-Kong.

Spain had war vessels in French docks and ports; in Italian ports;
her finest squadron in the Portuguese harbor of St. Vincent, Cape de
Verde Islands; in Argentina. If England chose to rush into neutrality
before official declaration of war, there was no reason why France
and Portugal need hurry to disoblige a neighboring government.

The United States, thus reminded, hurried the last details of prepa-
ration. Cargoes of ammunition, of sulphur, of various war supplies,
were cleared from all ports where they originated. From Washing-
ton went a semi-official statement, that if England took such hasty
action this government would demand of Portugal immediate action
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 397

to compel Cervera’s fleet to leave St. Vincent. Cervera’s fleet was in
distress for coal and supplies.

Four days later Washington furnished a paragraph that “the War
and Navy Department officials are looking forward with interest,”
to the official publication of Great Britain’s proclamation of neutrality;
that Dewey’s fleet at Hong Kong and a Spanish torpedo boat at Queens-
town had been ordered to leave those British ports in advance of official
publication, that, however, the United States would probably not
make demands on Portugal until Great Britain’s action was formally
announced. From London “a Berlin correspondent learned” that Great
Britain and Germany would not interfere, but that France and Austria,
and probably Italy, would do so after the first collision, “even if it
prove quite indecisive.”

The next day in the British Commons Mr. Balfour announced that
the proclamation of neutrality would soon be ready, and the press
dispatches gave information that “the report that American war ships
had been notified to depart within forty-eight hours is incorrect.”
That day Congress declared that a state of war existed, and the next
day the President cabled his proclamation of that declaration to all
the nations. England at once issued neutrality commands, put Dewey’s
fleet upon notice to sail, and the Albany and Somers, unprepared, were
locked up pending the end of the war.

The President’s proclamation granted to all Spanish merchant ships
in our harbors, when the war began, a period of thirty days for safe
clearance. The act perplexed Spain. “What,” asked the official press
“is the meaning of this moderation after so many provocations? Does
America want to gain time?” Spanish military and financial circles
were anxious. They translated our fairness as foreboding an intention
to prolong preparations until autumn, and thus wear Spain out in
expense and anxiety. They could not believe we were eager to fight
the “invincible forces of Spain.” This questicn was answered the same
day by the bombardment of Matanzas and the death on the field of
glory of Captain-General Blanco’s historic mule of Matanzas. All eyes
were thus fixed upon Cuba.
8398 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The publication by Washington that Dewey’s fleet had withdrawn
to Mirs Bay and would sail thence to Manila, was answered by dis-
patches from Madrid that the American squadron that was going
to Manila was composed of vessels of no importance and that Manila
was enthusiastically eager to receive them, and all preparations were
complete to destroy them. Two days later Madrid announced “it is
rumored here” that Germany had officially warned the United States
that she would not permit bombardment of any of the principal towns
in the Philippines for the reason that German interests would suffer
greatly from such an act.

Throughout the first ten days the British Government had made
no sign, but popular feeling in England and Canada had expressed
itself in open and universal enthusiasm for the United States.
Messages of sympathy and hope had been cabled to the President
from societies and public meetings, and the newspapers were filled
with cheer. To a London correspondent, admitted to an interview,
the President had said, for publication in London, in answer to the
question whether he had any message for the English people:
“Tell them that the people of our whole nation respond to their
expressions. And,” he added, “tell them we will not forget.”

To this Madrid replied through Paris in an interview with the
Conservative leader, Silvela, in which he declared Spain’s intention
to convene the Powers of Europe for intervention as necessary to
continental interests. “England,” he said, “has sided with the United
States, but it will not be long until she perceives the immensity of
her mistake.”

The very next day the explosion of Dewey’s shells annihilating
the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, glorious as the sound was to this
nation, frightful as it was to Spanish hopes, was yet merely the hiss-
ing of a fuse that was to explode the greatest international political
bomb-shell of the century.
 

 

 

 

 

REAR-ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY, U. S.N.
CHAPTER THE NINETEENTH.

Tuer PHILIPPINES QUESTION.

Dewey’s Victory aND Its EFFECT UPON THE EASTERN QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL PoLiTics—
Lorp SA.ispury’s SPEECH ON Livinc AND DeaD NaTIoNS— EXPLANATION OF THE EAST-
ERN QUESTION DEVELOPED SINCE THE CHINESE-JAPANESE War— Mr. CHAMBER-

LAIN’S STARTLING SPEECH SUGGESTING AN ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE
ON THE LINES OF ComMMON PuRPOsES— THE SENSATION CAUSED
IN THE WorLD By His UNEXPECTED FREEDOM OF
SPEECH, AGAINST ALL CABINET PRECEDENTS.

I.

1rHin forty-eight hours after Dewey had hoisted the Star

Spangled Banner over the arsenal at Cavité international

governmental diplomacy was astounded at

the interjection of the Philippines question eae eae :
into the complications and threatening aspects of the ae
Eastern Question. The first news of our victory called
into existence in the United States a new spirit that from various
quarters demanded the capture of the entire Philippine Archipelago and
the holding of the islands as American colonies. This was echoed by
similar suggestions from England and was opposed by strong elements
in this country as well as by intimations from continental capitals
that such action was impossible in view of the political policy of the
United States,even if the attempt should not be prevented by Europe.
Before the final reports of the utter destruction of Montejo’s squadron
were received, the situation at Manila could only be guessed at, but
the question was debated fiercely.

The first news made public by Spain that the American ships had
been repulsed, followed by reluctant admissions of partial Spanish
defeat and intimations of injuries to the Americans, left upon Euro-
pean minds a doubt whether Dewey’s victory had been as sweeping

as claimed at Washington. The cutting of the cable deepened the
(401)
402 HISTORY OF THE

perplexity until official dispatches could arrive. The United States
nourished no doubts of the superiority of our men and ships, and
England expressed no hesitation to believe the full extent of our
success. But England expressed fears that Dewey could not hold
his advantage for lack of supplies and assistance, to obtain which
would involve delay, during which continental jealousy of America
would be accentuated. France threatened us immediately with vague
hints of interference, and all Europe was cheered by the fact that our
Pacific squadron lacked a secure base of operations.

After the battle at Cavité the British consul at Manila offered to
take the Chinese population under British protection. Spain refused
the offer with an outburst of resentment toward Great Britain, accus-
ing her of attempting to inject Chinese politics into the situation.
From Russia came reproachful intimations that an Anglo-American
alliance would be distasteful, reminding us of old friendship, and the
fact that she had long looked forward to an eventual Russo-Ameri-
can alliance. Germany maintained. silence during the opening dis-
cussion.

It was on May 5 that, Lord Salisbury having returned, petulant
exchanges of feeling became serious apprehensions. On that day he
delivered an address to the Primrose League in London, in which
he referred to the all-engrossing subject in the manner of the old-
fashioned English statesman, avoiding direct mention but giving to
his allusions mysterious suggestion of weight.

He began his address gravely by declaring that he could not pass
by the terrible conflict now being waged between two highly civi-
lized nations. He could only hope that the recollection of the bless-
ings of peace would before Jong restore the tranquillity of the world.
“T cannot dwell upon the subject,” he said, “without danger of de-
parting from that attitude of strict neutrality which it is my duty,
as well as that of many others, to maintain.” After discussing point-
edly the dangerous relations between Great Britain, Russia, Germany,
and France, as developed in the Eastern Question, he closed with a
foreboding criticism that was to enrage Europe. The nations of the
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 403

earth, he declared, might be roughly divided as the living and the dying.
On one side were the great countries of enormous power, with rail-
roads giving them the means of concentrating at one point the whole
military force of their population, and assembling armies of a mag-
nitude never dreamed of in generations gone by, with weapons grow-
ing in their efficiency for destruction.

By the side of these splendid organizations, which presented rival
claims that the future might only be able by bloody arbitrament to
adjust, there were a number of communities which he could only de-
scribe as dying. They were mainly the communities that were not
Christian, but he regretted to say that this was not exclusively a
fact. In these States disorganization and decay were advancing al-
most as fast as the power of the others was increasing. There were
other countries which were not well provided with leading men or
ministers in whom they could trust, that were apparently draw-
ing nearer and nearer to that fate, and yet clinging with strange
tenacity to the life they had.

Misgovernment, he said, was constantly on the increase there, and
their administration was a mass of corruption, so that there was no
firm ground on which any hope of reform or restoration could be
based, and in other degrees they were presenting a terrible picture
to the more enlightened portion of the world. How long that state
of things was likely to go on, he would not attempt to prophesy. All
he could indicate was that the process was proceeding and that the
weak States were becoming weaker and the strong States becoming
stronger.

He did not think it was necessary to go into any detail, but only to
point out what the inevitable result of that process must be. It was
that the living nations would gradually encroach upon the territory
of the dying States and the seeds of conflict would speedily appear.
Undoubtedly, England would not be allowed to be at a disadvan-
tage in any rearrangement that might take place. On the other
hand, England would not be jealous if desolation and sterility were
removed by the aggrandizement of a rival Power.
404 HISTORY OF THE

The studied care with which Lord Salisbury refrained from desig-
nating the governments decaying in public corruption, was the old-
school manner of lending profound significance to the countries.
obviously in point. China, threatened with dismemberment; France
in the throes of fear through the intimations of unspeakable corrup-
tion in her legislative and military oligarchy, exposed by glimpses of
the Dreyfus case; Spain, honeycombed with dishonest administrators.
and helpless to govern at home or abroad—these were some of the
interesting names with which to fill the blanks.

As if to add emphasis to Salisbury’s warning, the Chinese Minister
to the Court of St. James on the evening of the same day spoke at
a public dinner with cordial welcome to Great Britain. He said the
only way China could survive in competition with the world was by
combining with Great Britain, to whom she offered a free field for
her commerce. China, hitherto, had been the most exclusive country
in the world, acting on the principle of excluding outsiders. This was
now the principle of only her common people. The educated classes
were prepared to welcome British trade and desired that the friendship
of the two countries be consolidated on the widest basis, socially, politi-
cally, commercially, and economically. He referred to the opening
of the Chinese waterways and the impending construction of railroads,
and said he hoped that every obstacle to the expansion of British trade
in China would soon be removed.

Four days after the glorious first day of May, therefore, Great
Britain’s first minister and the Chinese voice had thrust upon Europe
the Philippines question wrapped in the Eastern Question.

Further significance was given by the preparations already hurry-
ing in the United States to send Major-General Merritt with troops
to the aid of Admiral Dewey.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 405

IT.

Tue Eastern Question, that is, the aspect of it that interposed itself
between the United States and any practical interference by Europe
with our seizure of the Philippines, maybe brieflysum- —  pporenn
marized. It was the outgrowth of the Chinese-Japanese QUESTION IN
War. The Chinese Empire had been opened to the com- asian
merce of the world many years ago by the persistence of British com-
mercial interests. What are called “open ports” were established by
England through which all commercial exchanges must pass. No for-
eigner was permitted to enter the Empire through any closed port.
The Anglo-Chinese treaty pledged England against attempting to ac-
quire any territorial rights beyond the coaling station and commercial
base of Hong-Kong, and it pledged China not to alienate to any other
Power any portion of the rich and productive basin of the Yang-tse-
Kiang River, which contains half of the 400,000,000 inhabitants of the
Empire.

The terms of the treaty were kept in good faith and other nations
made treaties with China by which they were permitted to extend
their commerce through the open ports on equal terms with “the most
favored nation.” Great Britain’s maritime preponderance and the
lose relations established with the Chinese administrators gave her
great advantages of good will, and when the war with Japan began
the value of her trade with China was about $200,000,000 annually,
with the United States next in importance.

Russia, which had been steadily increasing her Asiatic territory,
seeking an open harbor on the Pacific below the winter ice line, had
gradually penetrated down the coast until Korea was reached. More
advance was contemplated, but the strength of Great Britain was
feared.

That Great Britain did not exert her good offices to avert the war
between China and Japan was surprising to European governments.
She was friendly with both, might have composed the grievances, or,
as a last resort, was strong enough to have compelled arbitration.
406 HISTORY OF THE

Her failure to act awoke European suspicion of her wisdom and deter-
mination. When, therefore, in 1893, the treaty of peace between China
and Japan had been concluded at Shimoniseki, to the dissatisfaction
of the defeated nation, by yielding Korea to Japan, and England looked
on without making a sign, Russia invited Germany and France to in-
tervene with her. The result was that the Shimoniseki treaty was
revised by them, Japan was permitted to hold Korea as a guarantee
only until China should pay over the money indemnity for the cost
of war as agreed. Great Britain made no protest and Japan was
compelled to renounce the advantages gained by war and to give up
all hope of enlarging her industries and relieving her population by
having a foothold on the mainland.

The weakness displayed by Great Britain in that incident set in
play the resources of impenetrable Muscovite diplomacy. She did
not make the first move—she never does—but there is always pro-
duced a capable instrument to precede and open the way. Two or
three years had elapsed when two German missionaries were mur-
dered by a Chinese mob. The German Emperor sent some war ships
to Kiao-Chou Bay on the west coast of the Yellow Sea, between Korea
and Shantung Province, and seized the port and bay as an indem-
nity. He followed that by demanding a cession of the bay and a
small territorial district on the terms upon which Great Britain held
Hong-Kong.

This was German initiation, but the Muscovite justification was
established. The Czar promptly seized Port Arthur and Talienwan,
commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, within reach of
Pekin itself. France followed, taking the island of Hainan off the
south coast, protecting the French colonies of Tongking on the main-
land.

These successive blows to the prestige of Great Britain were suffi-
‘ cient to destroy Chinese confidence in her strength. Russia at once
took energetic measures to complete a Manchurian branch of the
Trans-Siberian railway to Port Arthur, and began to acquire actual
ownership of land by purchasing the ground in Port Arthur. Alarmed
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 407

by these proceedings Great Britain obtained from the Chinese Emperor
the port of Wei-Hai-Wei, commanding the approach through Korea
Bay to Port Arthur.

The situation was full of serious menace to English industries
and British commerce. The Northern Chinese provinces, now within
the influence and under the fear of Russia, could be crossed with
railways, while the German sphere of influence south of Wei-Hai-Wei
could be opened through similar concessions. The promise of China
that the valley of the Yang-tse-Kiang and the treasures of the Middle
Kingdom should never be alienated to any other Power was of no
importance, if the territory could be drained of and supplied with
vast commerce through flanking encroachments.

When the Spanish-American war opened, therefore, Great Britain
was placed between the alternatives of making war against the Russo-
Franco-Germanic Power, or of surrendering her old power and being
undermined of her great commercial trade in the East. She could
not fully rely upon Japan as an ally, although the two nations were
well able to defeat the three in opposition on the sea. English manu-
facturers and shipowners were in despair at the prospect, and British
politics were taking on threatening aspects.

This was why Dewey’s victory at Manila, and the instant demand
on the part of a strong body in the United States to hold the Philip-
pines, were so enthusiastically received by all England. Since this
country had at stake the next greatest value in commerce with China,
the acquirement by us of vast colonial interests in the Philippines
would increase our commerce and effectually check the encroachments
of Russia, Germany, and France. Great Britain and the United States
could be depended upon to maintain open doors to every port in
China.
408 HISTORY OF THE

IIl.

Tux resentful protest excited in continental Europe by the scarcely
veiled allusions in Lord Salisbury’s speech was as nothing compared
ancto-anmercax With the uproar created by the unexpected and remark-

ALLIANCE IS able utterances of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial

meen Secretary in the English cabinet, on May 138. Mr. Cham-
berlain’s speech was delivered at Birmingham and was received with
great outbursts of enthusiasm by the vast assemblage that listened
to it.

Mr. Chamberlain’s speech was as remarkable for its method in de-
parting from all recognized conventions of restraint by cabinet ministers
as it was for the boldness of the views he expressed, views that amazed
Europe—not because they were held, but because the etiquette of
cabinets was thus rudely destroyed. Lord Salisbury had uttered dis-
agreeable reflections, but he had uttered them in correct form, so that
no “gentlemanly” government could find fault with the manner.
Mr. Chamberlain, on the other hand, was telling the truth so directly
and plainly as to be offensive to all the governments in opposition.

Mr. Chamberlain began by declaring that the time had come for
English leaders to leave off the old ideas of fifty years ago and speak
plainly to the great public, instead of keeping mysteriously silent.
Then, after explaining and commenting upon Great Britain’s long-
continued policy of isolation, he continued: —

“A new situation has arisen, and it is right that the people of this country should
have it under their consideration. All the powerful States of Europe have made alli-
ances, and as long as we keep outside these alliances, as long as we are envied by all,
and suspected by all, and as long as we have interests which at one time or another
conflict with the interests of all, we are liable to be confronted at any moment with a
combination of Great Powers so powerful that not even the most extreme, the most hot-
headed politician would be able to contemplate it without a certain sense of uneasiness.
That is the situation which I want you to have in view, which you must always have in
view, when you are considering the results of the foreign policy of any Government in
this country. We stand alone, and we may be confronted with such a combination as

that I have indicated to you. What is the first duty of a Government under these cir-
cumstances? I say, without hesitation, that it is to draw all parts of the empire closer
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 409

together, to infuse into them a spirit of united and of imperial patriotism. We have
not neglected that primary duty. We have pursued it steadfastly and with results that
are patent to all the world. Never before in the history of the British Empire have the
ties which connected us with our great colonies and dependencies been stronger; never
before has the sense of common interests in trade and in defense and in war— never
before has the sense of these interests been more strongly felt or more cordially
expressed.

“What is our next duty? It is to establish and to maintain bonds of permanent
amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic. They are a powerful and a generous
nation. They speak our language, they are bred of our race. Their laws, their litera-
ture, their standpoint upon every question are the same as ours; their feeling, their
interest in the cause of humanity and the peaceful development of the world are iden-
tical with ours. I do not know what the future has in store for us. I do not know
what arrangements may be possible with us, but this I know and feel — that the closer,
the more cordial, the fuller, and the more definite these arrangements are with the con-
sent of both peoples, the better it will be for both and for the world. And I even go
so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased
if in a great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave
together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance. Now, it is one of the most satisfactory results
of Lord Salisbury’s policy that at the present time these two great nations understand
each other better than they have ever done since more than a century ago. They were
separated by the blunder of the British Government.

“Tt is not in this connection that our foreign policy has failed; it is in regard to the
East, and especially to the Far East.”

After discussing the comparative situation of Great Britain in China
and the perils that threatened British interests there, Mr. Chamberlain
closed with this declaration :—

“No, there was only one alternative to the policy of the Government — the policy of
war. Let us consider the alternative. We might have declared war on Russia. We
might for a year or two have held Port Arthur against Russia, but we have no military
force there to back us and no frontier in China. I am one of those who think that for
any country there are worse things than war; there is loss of honor; there is loss of
those interests which are so vital to the security of the existence of the nation. But, in
any case, I hope I am sensible enough never to give my voice for war unless I can see
at the commencement of the war a fair probability that at the end of the war the objects
of the war will have been obtained. Now, what does history show us? It shows us that
unless we are allied to some great military power, as we were in the Crimean War, when
we had France and Turkey as our allies, we cannot seriously injure Russia, although it
may also be true that she cannot seriously injure us. If that is the case, it is a case
which deserves the serious consideration of the people of this country. It is impossible

19
410 HISTORY OF THE

to overrate the gravity of the issue. It is not a question of a single port in China —
that is a very small matter. It is not a question of a single province; it isa question of
the whole fate of the Chinese Empire, and our interests in China are so great, our pro-
portion of the trade is so enormous, and the potentialities of that trade are so gigantic
that I feel that no more vital question has ever been presented for the decision of a Gov-
ernment and the decision of a nation, and for my part I have tried to-night to state
clearly and without exaggeration the conditions of the problem that we have before us.
I think you will see that it is complicated enough to preclude all hasty judgment. One
thing appears to me to be certain. I1f the policy of isolation, which has hitherto been
the policy of this country, is to be maintained in the future, then the fate of the Chinese
Empire may be, probably will be, hereafter decided without reference to our wishes and
in defiance of our interests. If, on the other hand, we are determined to enforce the
policy of the open door, to preserve an equal opportunity for trade with all our rivals,
then we must not allow Jingoes to drive us into a quarrel with all the world at the same
time, and we must not reject the idea of an alliance with those Powers whose interests
most nearly approximate to our own. I have thought it right to warn you of the dangers
ahead. But I have a great confidence in the future of this country,and I do not doubt
that an issue will be found out of all the difficulties which will be worthy of our tradi-
tion and our race.”

The day before this startling declaration was made by Mr. Cham-
berlain, the official papers in Germany had printed an official com-
munication from the Emperor’s Government, called out by rumors in
the French, English, and Austrian press that German sailors and
naval officers were openly fraternizing with the Spanish and that
Germany would oppose American seizure of the Philippines. The com-
munication declared that, after the Emperor’s declaration in the speech
from the throne, upon closing the session of the Reichstag, nobody
could doubt that Germany’s neutrality would be loyal, complete, and
strict. Let this be said also of the French, English, and Austrian
newspapers, it continued, which were endeavoring to represent the
German Government and public opinion as taking a part against
policy. Unless there should be imperative reasons for force, Germany
would do nothing to disturb the friendship existing for a hundred
years with a country where millions of Germans have found a second
fatherland.

Mr. Chamkerlain’s advocacy of Anglo-American alliance in terms
of eloquence amounting to sentimental enthusiasm, had come as if in
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 41]

quick response to the German Emperor’s calm diplomatic reserve.
Spain resented it bitterly, and Sefior Sagasta observed that if he had
given utterance to sentiments so full of feeling Europe would have
regarded him as a reckless statesman. The Spanish press said, “it
was believed” Spain would appeal to Europe to oppose an Anglo-
American alliance, and that the day such a document was signed
would be the date of the conflagration of universal war.

The organ of the Social Democracy in Germany published this
comment, which was significant of popular German opinion, because
no prosecution followed it:—

“Into the putrid swamp of European politics has been cast a stone, and the
turbid, slimy waters spout up. The great Republic on yonder side of the ocean,
without castles, nobles, or a standing army, has suddenly sprung out of her posi-
tion of neutrality to Europe, and one European State which has slaughtered
myriads of men wrestling for freedom is undone. Old Europe, in consequence, is
shaken to her foundations. It is a new power—no militarism, no huge fleet, yet
a mighty, an overwhelmingly mighty, elemental power.

“Tn Asia the same phenomenon has appeared. The new power has become the
balance of the scales. Even if an alliance with England comes to nothing, the new
American position in the Far East crosses every combination hitherto effected.”

The German Government made no sign, but expressed surprise that
a cabinet minister should speak with such unreserve. The French
journals considered it as foreboding designs against the French fleet
and then against Russia, seeking thus to alarm her Muscovite ally into
action.

The semi-official press of Moscow assumed for Russia a strong pro-
Spanish attitude. It denounced the Americans as pirates, whom only
Great Britain’s attitude saved from having to face the coalition of
Europe. It was jubilant over a report that two Spanish vessels had
beaten five American war ships. It heartily hoped that Spain would
be the victor in the war.

Other papers were much more guarded in their expressions, though
they generally displayed a pro-Spanish tendency.

Even the English press was astonished at the unexpected candor
of Mr. Chamberlain’s revelations, and hastened to explain that his
412 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

declarations would be construed by other governments so as to find
in them what they desired to find. Lord Salisbury in the House of
Lords said the importance of Mr. Chamberlain’s remarks depended
upon their interpretation, and in the Commons Mr. Balfour said the
Government would not discuss them.

In the United States the speech was received with popular enthu-
siasm. The possibility of such a governmental alliance was scarcely
considered, but the evident intention of Mr. Chamberlain’s speech, to
call out an expression of race feeling, was successful. In numerous
public meetings in the United States and Canada, the American and
British colors were displayed, entwined together, evoking tremendous
enthusiasm. The Queen’s birthday was celebrated by American and
British orators, speaking at the same boards, each extolling the com-
mon race virtues as displayed by the other’s Government and national -
history. :

 
CHAPTER THE TWENTIETH.

“IMPERIALISM ”—“ HxpANSION ’— ANNEXATION,

Tue UNEASINESS IN THE UNITED STATES CAUSED BY THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS “ IMPERIALISM”
AND ‘“EXPANSION”— THE CoURSE OF THE DiscussION AND A COMPARISON WITH EvRO-
PEAN DREAD OF OuR APPEARANCE IN ASIATIC WATERS — THE IMMEDIATE EXTENT
or New Measures Proposep—TuHE Nicaracua CaANaL, Hawau, Nava
AND ARMY ENLARGEMENT— THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII, AND THE
History oF THE Measure IN ConGress—THE CAPTURE OF
GuaM IN THE LapDRonE IsLANDs—A Comepy oF War.

I.

HE Philippines question, as discussed in the United States from
the moment the extent of Dewey’s victory was comprehended,
was called “Imperialism,” or “The Policy of Ex- peices
pansion.” But the uneasiness it caused in the AND

United States was not comparable to the consternation Se

into which it plunged all European politics. It was well understood
when war began that our Government would not stop at securing the
independence of Cuba. It was the full purpose to seize Porto Rico and
all the islands of Spain in the West Indies. This was a necessity.
The presence of Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies was not a cause
of political fear, but the destructive wars, the cruelties practiced, and
the apparent incompetence of Spanish administrators, rendered her
presence, in Cuba at least, unendurable for humanitarian and eco-
nomic reasons. Her presence in Porto Rico, if Cuba were taken from
her, would not be so annoying and not at all to be feared in itself.
But if, after the war, she should sell Porto Rico to England or to some
other powerful nation, our southern seaboard would be menaced, and
we should have a very vulnerable front in maintaining our South
American and Central American interests. The sound alternative was
to expel Spain altogether from the continent, and seize her possessions

for security and as our indemnity for the cost of war.
(418)
414 HISTORY OF THE

This situation as it applied to our interests was reversed in the
Philippines. If we should hold them permanently, it meant to three
of the greatest European Powers the intrusion of a new and dangerous
rival in a position of great strategical importance, at the very doors
of their Eastern interests. It meant to them politically what it would
mean to the United States if Germany or Russia acquired Porto Rico,
and could inject the jealousies and perils of European affairs into our
home waters. But it also meant to them, in an economic sense, far
more than the alternative would mean to the United States.

The long-inherited feuds of European monarchies at home, and
their acquired feuds in colonial experiments, have necessitated stand-
ing armies and naval establishments upon such a great scale that
taxation has become among them not only oppressive in amount but
irritating in the trivial and numberless methods of its application.
If the United States intended to permanently occupy the Philippines
and annex them as national territory, the defensive power of Eng-
land, Russia, Germany, France, and Japan, would of necessity have
to be largely augmented by each of the nations, not upon terms of
cordial alliance with us. If all were on equal terms, then the power
of all would have to be increased.

To the United States, comparing her population, vast wealth, and
unlimited natural resources (already in process of rapid development
under her free industrial system) with those of the other countries,
the increased burden would be inconsiderable. It would crush the
others, except Great Britain. The national debt of the United States is
very small when compared with the nations she might meet in East-
ern rivalry. However small the debt or however light the tax rate,
no increase of either is ever desirable by those who have dealings with
the tax collector. But at the point where Americans would merely
grumble and pay, the continental taxpayers would be driven to revolu-
tion or ruin. This was the secret of European consternation and the
secret of Great Britain’s prompt offices in our behalf. Next to the
United States she possesses the greatest reserve power of wealth; but
her taxation is great. In proportion to national wealth, the taxation
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 415

and debt of the United States is trivial as compared with European
States. The common language and common business purposes of the
two English-speaking nations would render their alliance, in the
sense of sympathy, a natural and perfect solution of the situation for
Great Britain. The only other possible allies she could then count
upon in the last extremity were Germany and Japan—neither made
to the purpose by nature.

It must be acknowledged, also, in fairness, that when Great Britain
offered her friendship to induce the United States to take territory in
the East and be a supporter in keeping open to commerce the ports
of China, she was well aware that this country would have a hostage
to hold. Canada, with its great railway system, giving England com-
munication with Hong-Kong and Australia, of great importance in
conceivable times of difficulty, lies beside the United States, full col-
lateral to secure the performance of honest obligations. In that re-
spect alone, if for no other reason, Great Britain was the best of possible
allies for the purposes urged upon the United States, as this Govern-
ment was responsively her best ally.

The preparations of the President to send reénforcements of war
ships, and an army corps under General Merritt, to the assistance of
Admiral Dewey, were approved with enthusiasm. The popular move-
ment in favor of seizing the Philippines, which immediately followed
the fall of Cavité, was the natural impulse of a people full of exulta-
tion and pride over the completeness, without precedent in naval wars,
of the victory that Dewey had achieved with a skill and intrepidity
that conferred splendor upon American arms. It was the spontaneous
outburst of simplest patriotism to ask that the flag, so valiantly
planted, might float there forever in memory of the heroes who raised
it. But popular outbursts are not always the safest gales for ships of
state to sail before.

Political leaders and students of national policy grew uneasy. There
was no party alignment upon the question. Each spoke for himself, or
for the expressed views of his constituency, as he could ascertain and
interpret them.
416 HISTORY OF THE

It was admitted that if the United States annexed the Philippines
for colonial territory the act would involve very serious responsi-
bilities and a radical departure from the traditions and customs of
national policy. But it was contended that traditions and customs of
national policy were good only when they promoted good ends; that
when they interposed between the country and the manifest high
destiny of its influence to confer freedom and civilization upon the
oppressed, they ought to be given up for better policies and ideas.

The warning contained in Washington’s “Farewell Address” against
entangling foreign alliances, was met with the completion of the sen-
tence advising that such alliances should be contracted only as needed
to serve our purposes.

The difficulties of governing and properly controlling “conquered
peoples,” elicited the rejoinder that there had been very little trouble
in governing Louisiana and Texas, both conquered from aliens. But,
was the interruption, the Filipinos were mostly in primal savagery,
to which retort was made that they could not be expected to emerge
from that condition under the sinister rule of Spain, and the United
States had a similarly savage population when the country was first
settled, and results had justified the methods of civilization.

It was urged as prudent national economy to reserve merely coal-
ing stations in the islands and return the sovereignty to Spain. To
this Imperialists interposed the declaration that as we were encour-
aging the native revolutionists for our own advantage, justice and
humanity would be revolted at the consequences of turning these
natives back to face the pitiless vengeance of Spain.

It was suggested that the islands might be turned over to one of
the Powers of Europe. Against this it was pointed out that to do so
would provoke war among European Powers; that as the United
States was, by the fortune of war, in practical possession of the
islands, all considerations of national duty to republican governmental
ideas forbade her to throw the responsibility upon others; she must
inculcate the principles of liberty and education in the Philip-
pines.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 417

The opponents of “Imperialism” argued that the possession of the
Philippines would require a vast addition to our naval strength to
defend the islands; the maintenance of a large standing army to pre-
serve order during the years necessary to convert the population to
American ideas of law and order; that the United States would be-
come embroiled in the quarrels of other nations; that there was
enough territory at home to fully occupy the government and the
energies of the population.

The advocates of “expansion” answered that the enlarged revenues
from the islands (although taxation would be greatly reduced from
the Spanish exactions) would pay for the increase in cost of the
army and navy; that the encouragement of industrial activity under
decreased taxation would soon make the islands valuable; that the
United States ought to take her place as an international power with-
out fear of embroilment; that she had successfully defended herself
from colonial infancy to magnificent national maturity; that she
had become responsible for the islands through an accident, not
. through intention, and the American people were entirely capable of
developing and governing them without lessening the progress of the
United States; that the islands were necessary to protect our com-
merce in the East, threatened by Russia, Germany, and France; that
the decline of England’s trade with China in the past two years omi-
nously foretold the fate of American trade if it were not defended
with determination, backed by a display of power ready for use; that
the first cost of colonial establishment was not to be considered as a
loss, for the reason that the loss of trade certain to follow a failure
to occupy the Philippines would be enormously greater than the cost
of occupation, and, moreover, would be a permanent loss.

Anti-expansionists quoted the Monroe Doctrine and its long and
determined enforcement by the United States as being in itself an im-
plied pledge that our country would not seek to plant a republican
form of government on other continents. Imperialists answered that
the expressed pledge was not to interfere with the “internal affairs”
of foreign countries, and pointed ont that the Monroe Doctrine was
418 HISTORY OF THE

only the declaration of our purposes and had never been approved
by Europe, and could be upheld by the United States by force only,
as was intimated in the Venezuelan boundary dispute, and that Great
Britain agreed to arbitration without assenting to the doctrine.

Il.

Wuitz the arguments thus briefly outlined were the simple prin
ciples of the differences of political opinion, the unknown lengths to
which a policy of expansion by colonial acquisition
oe aeane would commit the United States were, after all, the real
Apna EX- cause of uneasiness. The immediate horizon of the
necessities of such a policy was plainly visible. If the
Philippines were to be held, the annexation of Hawaii was logic-
ally necessary for strategic and economic reasons. Manila was 7,500
miles from San Francisco. Honolulu was 2,000 miles out on the path
to Manila. Our ships would need the Hawaiian Islands for all pur-
poses. It would be equally necessary to have stopping places between
Honolulu and Manila, a distance of 5,500 miles. More than this,
fortified coaling stations on the Asiatic mainland would be a require-
ment.

From another point of view arose the necessity of completing the
Nicaraguan Canal or of securing coaling stations along the route from
the Atlantic seaboard by way of the Suez Canal to the Philippines.
The ownership of the Spanish West Indies, if independent Cuba
should ultimately be annexed on her own request, would give perfect
security to the canal and increase the volume of traffic.

Commodore A.8. Crowninshield, U.S.N., chief of the Bureau of Nav-
igation, an officer of experience, keen observation, and capacity, out-
lined the possibilities and advantages of the Nicaraguan project in a
congressional publication,* early in May.

“We Americans,” he said, “pride ourselves upon the rapid develop-
ment of our country, upon its great trade and commerce, which have

*Senate Document No. 268, issued May 16, 1898.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 419

arisen from its wonderful resources through the activity and business
qualities of our people. But there is a country whose development
has been much more rapid than ours, a country which remained for
untold centuries isolated from the rest of the world, but which, within
the past few years—mainly through our aid and example, it is true—
has burst the web of ignorance and inactivity which bound it, and
emerges to-day before the eyes of the world as a civilized nation
making quick progress in all that proves a people strong. Suddenly,
therefore, we are brought to face the fact that a new power has
arisen in the Pacific, that Japan is already claiming imaginary rights
within the Hawaiian Islands—islands civilized and peopled by those
of our own blood, whose intelligent citizens speak our mother tongue
—and we realize on the instant that here is a power with which we
must reckon in the settlement of serious questions.

“Hawaii is 3,400 miles from Japan, but there are now 20,000 of
the Mikado’s subjects settled in Hawaii, and the interest of Japan in
the status of these people is so great that it has caused her to pro-
test vigorously against the suggestion of the annexation of these
islands to the United States. In thus recognizing the necessity of
possessing a powerful fleet of war vessels as a factor in defense or
aggression, her statesmen, themselves apt students of history, have
read to us a lesson which we might well commit to memory and to
practice.

“Beyond Japan, a few hundred miles to the west, lies the Chinese
Empire, with its four hundred millions of people. While Japan has
advanced, China has remained dormant. But will this continue? Given
new rulers, a new form of government, and the adoption of Western
ideas, China will throw off its yoke of conservatism, and then our
Pacific States will be confronted with a second Asiatic power many
times greater than Japan. With these possibilities to be considered,
it behooves this country to make itself strong where it is now weak.
In other words, it should be our first effort to develop our Pacific
coast States. Let us glance for a moment at the effect of an isthmian
canal upon this development.
420 HISTORY OF THE

“As a political factor in increasing the influence and power of
this country in the Pacific, the canal will be far-reaching. To-day, if
the United States were forced into a war with Japan over possession
of the Hawaiian Islands, which to her are stepping-stones to our con-
tinent, we should be placed at a great disadvantage; for it is a fact
that at this moment Japan’s naval force is greater than our own
Pacific and Asiatic squadrons combined. To reénforce our Pacific
fleet we should be obliged to send ships from our Atlantic squadron,
forcing them to make a voyage of 12,000 miles, thus consuming many
weeks, whereas, with the canal in existence, our powerful North Atlantic
squadron could be put into the Pacific within a week. Thus would
the canal enable us. to more than double our naval strength in the
Pacific.

“From every point of view, whether political or commercial, it is
plain that the Nicaragua Canal is a necessity to the United States.
It will build up our Pacific coast States as they must be built up if
we are to properly face the Orient. It will add immeasurably to our
naval power, and it will increase our influence not only far out into
the Pacific Ocean, over the islands and waters of that vast region, but
also over the Caribbean Sea and adjacent waters.

“Tt is undoubtedly a fact not only that the American people be-
lieve that any canal that shall connect the Atlantic and Pacific shall
be controlled by the United States, but that our government has
given, upon more than one occasion, expression to this sentiment.

“We should be wise in our generation, and, by legislation and such
other steps as may be necessary, inaugurate, without further delay,
the work of completing the Nicaragua Canal. Let us pierce the
isthmus at the one spot which nature has already pointed out, and
thus fulfill what has been for centuries the hope of commerce and the |
dream of navigators.”

The Nicaragua Canal had not been merely the dream of navigators.
It had been one of the dreams of international avarice and the subject of
governmental activity and fear. In the failure of the United States to
encourage it, France had undertaken the Panama Canal project. For
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 42)

years the Nicaraguan project had been a cause of bitter dispute in
Congress. It was antagonized by corporations of great wealth whose
interests were involved by the competitive strength of a short water way
of carriage. Its cost was estimated at from $115,000,000, by its advo-
cates, to $200,000,000, by its opponents.

The annexation of Hawaii had also been resisted by industrial inter-
ests and the traditional influences of governmental policy strong in
parties. The writings of Captain Mahan, U. 8. N. (retired), on the
influence of sea power upon the history of nations, had made a profound
impression upon Europe, but were estimated at their key value by
the men of our navy only. They had pointed out the modern changes
and necessities of naval armament and support. Great Britain, espe-
cially, had applied his theories and occupied many small Pacific islands
for future emergencies of her sea power.

The discussion of these projects in the United States during times of
peace had been accompanied by much rancor and exaggeration and had
the effect of giving to them an ominous importance in respect to cost
and the evils to be feared. The influence of this effect still remained,
but to popular sentiment the changed position of the country dwarfed
reasons that had once been gigantic in argument. There was no
question that the great preponderance of popular sentiment, excited by
splendid achievements and buoyed up by pride, was favorable to ex-
pansion as it appeared at the time.

II.

ImMEDIATELY after the announcement that ships and troops were
to be hurried to Manila to enable Dewey to occupy the city, the sen:

“~*~ timent in favor of expansion was cheered by two sig-

ANNEXATION OF

nificant intimations from the President. One was that SMA

the first expedition to Dewey’s relief at Manila would
pause on the way and seize the chief island of the Ladrones group,
belonging to Spain. The other was, that Congress, upon the expressed
499 HISTORY OF THE

desire of the President, would take determined action to annex the
Hawaiian Islands.

Since the native monarchy had been overturned by the revolution
which resulted in the establishment of a republic under President
Dole, the annexation of Hawaii had caused bitter contention in Con-
gress. President Harrison sent to the Senate just before he retired
from office a treaty of annexation, and one of the first acts of Presi-
dent Cleveland was to withdraw the proposed treaty and advise the
reinstatement of the monarchy, on the ground that the revolution
was aided and abetted by forces from the United States war ship in
the harbor at the time and that without that aid the revolution
would not have been successful. He contended that reparation should
be made to the native government. His efforts failed, and upon his
retirement President McKinley sent to the Senate the treaty of
annexation for confirmation. A two-thirds’ vote of the Senate was
required to approve the treaty. There was no possibility of obtaining
the necessary majority and the treaty remained in committee without
action.

The lower house was known to be largely in favor of annexation,
but the minority was very strong in influential leadership and the
measure threatened to produce party dissensions and disturb align-
ment. The House could not, of course, take action on the treaty, but
it could promote and effect annexation by a joint resolution accepting
the application of the Republic of Hawaii to become territory of the
United States. The resolution required a majority vote only in
the House and Senate and would thus evade the necessity for a two-
thirds Senate vote to approve the treaty.

Preparations for dispatching the first reénforcements to Manila
revealed the inconvenience of possessing no coaling station in the Pa-
cific and the sore need of colliers to accompany and supply our men-
of-war and the troop ships in convoy. This was the opportunity of
the annexationists and on May 17 the government of Hawaii decided
to render assistance unconditionally to the United States against
Spain and offered the use of her harbors as a base of supplies. The
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 423

acceptance of the offer would commit the little mid-Pacific republic
to a breach of neutrality and bind the United States to defend her
against all consequences arising.

The offer was accepted by the President as an executive act rendered
necessary by war. On May 17 a joint resolution introduced in the
House by Mr. Newlands, of Nevada, was reported favorably by the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs. Among the reasons advanced by the com-
mittee for its adoption were these :—

“We must face the future in dealing with this proposed annexation. It is im-
possible for the republic of Hawaii to maintain a permanent existence, preserving
in force the influences which are now in the ascendant there and which are cordial
and friendly to the United States. Of its mixed population of 109,000 a powerfal
element is Japanese — 24,407,— of whom 19,212 are males, almost all of them grown
men, for they are not divided, as ordinary populations are, in the usual proportions
of men, women, and children.

“They are a far stronger element of physical force than the native race, which
has diminished until there are now only thirty odd thousand, of whom, by the usual
proportions of population, there are not over 8,000 grown men. The native Hawaiian
race cannot in any contingency control the island. It must fall to some foreign
people.

“The Japanese are intensely Japanese, retaining their allegiance to their empire
and responding to suggestions from the Japanese officers. Very many of them served
in the recent war with China. The Japanese Government not long ago demanded
of the Hawaiian Government, under their construction of a treaty made in 1871,
that the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands should have equal privileges with all
other persons, which would include voting and holding office. This claim was made
when a flood of Japanese subjects, under the supervision of the government of that
country, of from 1,000 to 2,000 per month, were being poured into the Hawaiian
Islands, threatening a speedy change of the government into Japanese hands, and
ultimately to a Japanese possession. The demand was resisted by the little Repub-
lic, and a treaty of annexation with the United States arrived at for a time.”

After reciting the history of Japan’s protest against the treaty,
the advantages of its reciprocal clauses to our commerce, and the
fact that the rights of the United States to the privileges of Pearl
Harbor would cease with the termination of the treaty, the commit-
tee’s report continued :—

“With the Japanese element in the ascendant and the government under Jap-
anese control, the treaty would be promptly terminated, and with it our special
424 HISTORY OF THE

rights. This would be the first step taken by that active and powerful government
toward the complete incorporation of the islands into the Japanese Empire and their
possession as a strategic point in the northern Pacific, from which her strong and
increasing fleet would operate. The Japanese Government is now friendly, but that
would be the manifest dictate of enlightened self-interest to a wise Japanese states-
man.

« Annexation, and that alone, will securely maintain American control in Hawaii,
Resolutions of Congress declaring our policy, or even a protectorate, will not secure
it. The question of protectorate has been successively considered by Presidents
Pierce, Harrison, and McKinley, in 1854, 1893, and 1897, and each time rejected
because a protectorate imposes responsibility without control. Annexation imposes
responsibility, but will give full power of ownership and absolute control.

“In the struggling interests that have recently come into play in the Pacific,
the separate existence of the Hawaiian Government is liable at any time to raise
complications with foreign governments, as in the case mentioned above of the
recent interposition of Japan. An independent feeble government is a constant
temptation to powerful nations, in the stress of contending interests, to intermeddle
and disturb the peace. Once incorporated into the territory of the United States,
all this is done away with.

* * * * * * * * *

“Tt has been objected that the constitution does’ not confer upon Congress the
power to admit territory, but only States. The same objection was raised to the
acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, because there was nothing in the consti-
tution expressly authorizing such admission and treaty, and Jefferson himself, who
made the purchase, shared the doubt. But we have made eleven such acquisitions
of territory, and the courts have sustained such action in all cases. Texas was annexed
by joint resolution of Congress, similar to the one proposed now. The island of
Navassa, in the Caribbean Sea, and many others, have been made territory of the
United States under the act of August 18, 1856, authorizing American citizens to
take possession of unoccupied guano islands. They are United States territory, sub-
ject to our laws. So Midway Island in the Pacific, 1,000 miles beyond Hawaii,
was occupied, and Congress appropriated $50,000, which was expended trying to
create a naval station there. The manifest principle is that the power to acquire
territory is an incident of national sovereignty.

“The acquisition of these islands does not contravene our national policy or
traditions. It carries out the Monroe Doctrine, which excludes European powers
from interfering on the American continent and outlying islands, but does not limit
the United States, and this doctrine has long been applied to these very islands by
our government. As Secretary Blaine said in 1881, the situation of the Hawaiian
Islands, giving them strategic control of the North Pacific, brings their possession
within the range of questions of purely American policy.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 425

“The annexation of these islands does not launch us upon a new policy or depart
from our time-honored traditions of caring first and foremost for the safety and pros-
perity of the United States.”

The opposition to annexation was deep-seated, and involved so much
delay, that in the Senate ten days later Senator Lodge of Massachu-
setts and Senator Morgan of Alabama, resorted to the extremity of
offering amendments to the war revenue bill, thus making resources
for war depend upon annexation. Mr. Lodge’s amendment was the
Newlands joint resolution. This proceeding quickly forced the lower
house to an agreement to permit early and free discussion and action
upon Hawaii.

Debate did not begin in the House until June 11. Ten days
before, the first military expedition to the Philippines had arrived
at Honolulu, outward bound. The soldiers were welcomed with lavish
kindness. Two Hawaiian native princes boarded the Charleston and
presented to the ship two American flags on behalf of the ex-Queen
Dowager, widow of King Kalakaua. The United States troops paraded
through the city and were reviewed by President Dole. A great public
dinner was prepared at which the 3,500 soldiers were entertained.
Natives and aliens all joined in the demonstration.

During the day the Spanish consul sent a protest to the government
against the violation of neutrality. Foreign Minister Cooper replied
as follows: —

“In reply to your note of the Ist inst., I have the honor to say that, owing to the
intimate relations now existing between this country and the United States, this coun-
try has not contemplated a proclamation of neutrality, having reference to the present
conflict between the United States and Spain, but, on the contrary, has extended to the
United States privileges and assistance, for which reason your protest can derive no
further consideration than to acknowledge its receipt.”

The Gordian knot of opposition was disposed of by the force of
events. The joint resolution quickly passed the House by an over-
whelming majority, and, in spite of determined delay in the Senate,
was adopted by that body on July 6 by a vote of 42 to 21, exactly

the two-thirds needed for treaty confirmation.
20
426 HISTORY OF THE

The joint resolution as adopted is as follows: —

Joint resolution to provide for annexing the Hawatian Islands to the United
States.

Wuerzas, The government of the republic of Hawaii, having in due form sig-
nified its consent, in the manner provided by its constitution, to cede absolutely
and without reserve to the United States of America all rights of sovereignty of
whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies, and also
to cede and transfer to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all
public, government, or crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, mil-
itary equipment and all other public property of every kind and description belonging
to the government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every mght and appurte-
nance thereunto appertaining ; therefore,

Resolved, etc., That said cession is accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and that the
said Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies be and they are hereby annexed as a
part of the territory of the United States and are subject to the sovereign dominion
thereof, and that all and singular the property and rights hereinbefore mentioned
are vested in the United States of America.

The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply
to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands, but the Congress of the United States shall
enact special laws for their management and disposition, provided that all revenue
from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such part thereof as may be used
or occupied for the civil, military, or naval purposes of the United States, or may
be assigned for the use of the local government, shall be used solely for the ben-
efit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public
purposes.

Until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands, all the civil,
judicial, and military powers exercised by the officers of the existing government
in said islands shall be vested in such person or persons, and shall be exercised in
such manner as the President of the United States shall direct; and the President
shall have power to remove said officers and fill vacancies so occasioned.

The existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign nations shall forth-
with cease and determine, being replaced by such treaties as may exist, or as may
be hereafter concluded, between the United States and such foreign nations.

‘The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands not enacted for the fulfillment
of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with this joint resolution, nor con-
trary to the constitution of the United States nor to any existing treaty of the United
States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise
determine.

Until legislation shall be enacted extending the United States customs laws and
regulations to the Hawaiian Islauds, the existing customs relations of the Hawaiian
Islands with the United States and other countries shall remain unchanged.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 427

The public debt of the republic of Hawaii, lawfully existing at the date of the pas-
sage of this joint resolution, including the amounts due to depositors of the Hawaiian
Postal Savings Bank, is hereby assumed by the Government of the United States, but
the liability of the United States in this regard shall in no case exceed $4,000,000. So
long, however, as the existing government and the present commercial relations of the
Hawaiian Islands are continued as hereinbefore provided, said government shall con-
tinue to pay the interest on said debt.

There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Islands, except
upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United
States; and no Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed to
enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands.

The President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of whom shall be resi-
dents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as soon as reasonably practicable, recommend
to Congress such legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they shall deem neces-
sary or proper.

Src. 2.— That the commissioners hereinbefore provided for shall be appointed by
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Szc. 3.—That the sum of $100,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is
hereby appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, and
to be immediately available, to be expended at the discretion of the President of the
United States of America for the purpose of carrying this joint resolution into effect.

Possession of Hawaii was not taken until August 12, by which time
the Hawaiian legislature had ratified the action of the United States.
The flag was raised over the executive building with brief ceremonies
in the presence of a great concourse. United States Minister Sewall
and President Dole had exchanged the ratification documents, and Ad-
miral Miller with a force of marines took formal occupation.

IV.

Meranwaite, the first Philippines expedition, convoyed by the cruiser
Charleston, commanded by Captain Glass, had taken possession of Guam,
the principal island of the Ladrones group, about 1,200 a Gaprure oF
miles east from the Philippines. The original name of GUAM OF THE

. ~ . A LADRONES
this group of numerous, but mostly uninhabited islands,
was “Islas de las Velas Latinas,” or, Islands of the Lateen Sails, chosen
by Magellan, their discoverer; but his sailors preferred to call them
498 HISTORY OF THE

“Tslands of Thieves,” and the nickname has survived the memory of
the more poetical designation.

The Charleston, with three transports under convoy, arrived off
Umata Harbor on the morning of June 20. Protecting the entrance
to the harbor frowned the ancient stone forts of St. Iago and Santa
Cruz. The latter is on an island in the middle of the harbor. The
weather was misty and rainy, but it was soon made out that St.
Iago was not manned, but that Santa Cruz presented a dark air that
seemed to mean business, probably because of the thickness of its
walls and the depth of embrasures and ports in which the guns
might be masked.

After a reconnoissance that failed to discover the presence of the
enemy, Captain Glass fired a 5-inch shell at the fort. It fell short,
but a dozen more chipped holes in the walls and scarred the tower.
No response was made, and no human being was to be seen.

After waiting some time a rowboat was seen coming around the
island. It contained the Spanish naval captain of the Port of San
Luis d’Apra, the town at the head of the little harbor; the surgeon
of the Spanish garrison, and a merchant who had once lived in the
United States, and could speak English.

These Spanish officials and the merchant came aboard the Charles-
ton and apologized with great courtesy for being unable to return the
salute. They explained that there were no cannon and no powder at
San Luis and they were unaccustomed to receiving salutes.

To say the least, the situation was one not fitted to the grim-visaged
surroundings of war. When Captain Glass informed them that he had
been bombarding their fortress and not saluting the flag—that their
country and his were at war, the Spaniards were astounded. The
last mail had been received early in April and contained no intimation
of war. The mail was received every two months and the June steamer
was two weeks overdue. When they heard of Montejo’s destruction,
their wonder increased. Their ignorance was complete, as was Cer-
vera’s, Augusti’s, and Toral’s concerning Spanish defeats. Only victo-
ries are published by Spain.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 499

The officers were set at liberty to communicate with Governor Ma-
rina, at Agafia, the capital of the island, four miles from the port, and
arrange for surrender. Next day the Governor, his officers, fifty-four
Spanish soldiers, and fifty-four native soldiers, were disarmed and the
Spaniards taken aboard ship, prisoners, to be carried to Cavité. The
natives were released. The downfall of the Spaniards was very popular.
The Stars and Stripes were hoisted over the fort.

The merchant, Francisco Portusac, was a naturalized American citi-
zen. He said it was useless to leave a garrison; that the Chamorros
or natives were honest, mild, and orderly. He had the largest pecuniary
interest at stake and he could trust them. Upon learning this, the
Charleston and her consorts sailed away to Manila. The island of
Guam has from 8,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, and in the remainder of the
group there is a population estimated at 16,000.

Thus, the annexation of Hawaii and the seizure of Guam were links
in the chain across the ocean. Guam is 1,200 miles from Manila, 4,300
miles from Honolulu.

 
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-FIRST.

Aneto- AMERICAN ALLIANCE.

REMARKABLE REVERSAL OF THE OLD ATTITUDE OF AVERSION BETWEEN AMERICANS AND BRITONS —
CONTINUATION OF THE RESPONSE TO Mr. CHAMBERLAIN’S SPEECH — UTTERANCES AT THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN DINNER IN LONDON— Party LEADERS ON BoTH SIDES IN
PARLIAMENT COMMIT THEMSELVES TO FRIENDSHIP AND UNION WITH
Unirep States INTERESTS IN A MEMORABLE DEBATE — RE-

MARKABLE FourTH OF JULY CELEBRATION IN LONDON.

I.

0 ASPECT of the war was more surprising than this sudden re-
versal of the official and popular attitude of British and
American relations. For a hundred and twenty-two years
feelings of cordial and open aversion had beev expressed and

maintained between the two peoples. The vigorous dislike of the
people of the United States for England had compelled official expression
pritis Response OL it by representative leaders. That feeling was ac-

TO THEPROP- tively reciprocated by the English Government and the

Gone English people. The growth of American sentiment in
favor of the Irish agitation for Home Rule and the ample financial
support contributed to the Irish organizations, had intensified that
feeling of aversion which cannot be called hatred, but may, perhaps,
be described as a condition of jealous pride, that found expression
in an attitude of scornful aloofness and in continual“ nagging.” To
“twist the tail of the British lion” was political capital to an American
politician.

At the bottom of the feeling, however, was an instinct of profound
respect that each held for the national strength, intelligence, and
practical, homely wisdom of the other. The United States consti-
tution is founded upon the essential common-law principles of Eng-
land, with no caste exceptions. Our national democracy is, in its

nature, much like the charter of the corporation of the city of London.
(480)
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 431

Although we have received a very great proportion of immigrants
from Germany, Scandinavia, France, and Ireland, these have assimi-
lated the Anglo-Saxon ideas of individual freedom and have not
changed in appreciable degree the original political character of the
population. It might almost be said that, in proportion as the immi-
grant has understood, accepted, and exercised the Anglo-Saxon aspi-
ration for liberty under the common laws of order, he has become
prominent and successful. This curious influence of American citizen-
ship upon the foreigner may be observed everywhere in localities
where natives of the same foreign country are not gathered in sufficient
numbers to form a separate quarter, where they are often tempted to
continue alien customs and ideas. The Germans and Irish have adapted
themselves marvelously to a free democracy. Their ties of sentimental
affection for and family relations with the Fatherland are strong and
unwavering, but their loyalty to their new home has been demonstrated
to be as firm as if they were native Americans.

So it is that the United States and the British peoples are one at
bottom, despite the infusion here of other races and the differences that
climate has produced. All possess the patriotism that finds expression
in an arrogant national pride. But it is the pride of conscious intelli-
gence of strength. The English-speaking people study their rivals
carefully, in order to discover and possess themselves of the strength
of their rivals, and to ascertain their weakness also. And they study
their own strength and weakness, and their pride is, therefore, the
confident expression of knowledge. The “dying nations,” on the con-
trary, have the fatal habit of ignoring the rival as one incapable of
furnishing valuable suggestion, and their pride is born of ignorance and
blind self-confidence.

When the details of Dewey’s victory came from Manila, Great
Britain recognized the significant difference between American and
Spanish men and methods. She had long taunted us with ruinous cor-
ruption in politics, pretending to deduce the result that we had be-
come degenerate through wealth and self-pride. Twice had England
fought us. Twice had England found us to be good fighting men and
432, HISTORY OF THE

most dangerous marksmen. She saw again exhibited at Manila the
same qualities, developed and augmented, exercised with modern
implements of war. She required no further test to be convinced
that the only change was improvement.

A few days later Mr. Chamberlain spoke. He spoke for an hour and
a half in order to make a declaration for the United States in ten lines.
This declaration with apparent carelessness was placed near the middle
of his address. The remainder was devoted to home politics and Euro-
pean neighbors. Let us see, was the inquiry contained in Mr. Chamber-
lain’s brief reference to the United States, whether these Americans.
who can fight so well, are strong enough in common sense and political
wisdom to turn their backs on past animosities. Both nations are
big enough to look into each other’s affairs and its own at the same
time.

The popular response to Mr. Chamberlain’s declaration was prompt
and astonishingly unanimous, in England and her distant colonies,
in Canada, and in the United States. Australian sailors applied to be
received into our navy, public meetings in Canada indorsed alliance,
and within ten days the popular attitude of brotherly aversion had
been reversed.

In London on June 3 a public “Anglo-American” dinner was given,
attended by six hundred persons, prominent in public attention, but
not connected with the government. A large majority were English-
men, the remainder American residents and visitors. It was arranged
for the definite purpose of “promoting closer relationship between
the two countries.”

Lord Coleridge presided and in proposing the first toast, “Our
Kinsmen beyond the Sea,” he said that he had seen the motives of
America in the Spanish War question. There were always people who
disbelieve in the possibility of national probity and honor; but he was
foolish and ignorant enough not to share in this disbelief, but even
if he did, none the less he would desire victory to wait upon the Ameri-
can banner. He would wish it in the interest of America and of Spain,
and, higher than all, in the interest of common humanity. He did not
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 433

applaud without reserve all the contests in which America had engaged.
Twice only had she fought with all her soul and strength; first with
England, and she fought for freedom. That contest was forced upon
her by the folly of a king and the imbecile subserviency of his min-
isters, and America was right. ‘This sentiment was received with great
applause. Her second great contest was also for freedom, and the spirit
which prompted her to those great struggles is with her yet. Why,
then, should the countries not draw together? They were the only two
nations on the earth which knew how to combine public order and pri-
vate freedom. He did not ask a public alliance, offensive or defensive.
What Englishmen sought was personal and international friendship.

The Bishop of Ripon made an eloquent address, in the course of
which he said: “Some nations use the word liberty, but hardly know
the thing. But England and America have lived too long in freedom
to misunderstand its meaning. There are some causes worth paying
any price for, and freedom is one of them.”

On the day preceding, at Washington, a conference had been held
between commissioners from Canada and our State Department, for
the purpose of reopening negotiations for the composition of many old
differences concerning the Fisheries question and customs annoyances
between the two countries. It had resulted in the signing of an amic-
able protocol for full settlement by commission. This announcement
was received with cheers, and the dinner resulted in the organization
of an Anglo-American Society for the promotion of international friend-
ship.

In the British Parliament a remarkable debate occurred, precipitated
by Sir Charles Dilke of the Liberal party. In attacking the Salisbury
goverment he insisted that the only success Lord Salisbury could be
said to have attained during his ministry was that he had secured
better relations with the United States. That success, however, could
not be ascribed, he maintained, to the ministerial policy. Especially
rash and feeble had it been in the case of the United States, seeing
that only three years ago Lord Salisbury had rejected the principle
of arbitration laid down by the United States in the case of Venezuela.
434 HISTORY OF THE

and afterward had accepted it. That better relations now obtained
between Great Britain and the United States, the speaker attributed
exclusively to the conduct of Sir Julian Pauncefote, Ambassador at
Washington, and to the action of the opposition, the leader of which
had discouraged debate on the Venezuelan question at a most critical
period.

Another eminent Liberal, Mr. Asquith, who was Home Secretary in
the last Gladstone cabinet, and in the Rosebery cabinet, declared that
he entirely agreed with what Mr. Chamberlain had said in Birming-
ham when he declared that the closer union of Great Britain and
America, not only in sympathy of thought, but in political codpera-
tion, is no longer merely the ideal of those who see visions and
dream dreams. Mr. Asquith believed that such codperation was des-
tined to be one of the great civilizing forces of the twentieth century.

Sir William Vernon Harcourt, the leader of the opposition, heartily
concurred in the strong language in which Mr. Chamberlain had
expressed the desire for closer and more permanent relations with
the United States. Ever since he had had anything to do with pub-
lic life, his great and foremost object had been the cultivation of
good relations with the United States. He had seen attempts to rep-
resent that there was a difference between the two parties in the parlia-
ment upon that subject. There was no such difference. There was no
member of the Liberal party, any more than there was of the Unionist
party, who did not place friendship or alliance, in the sense of cordial
friendship,— of an entente cordiale,— with the United States, in the very
forefront of English foreign politics.

Mr. Curzon, the political Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, said
that he was glad to hear Sir Charles Dilke express the feeling of satis-
faction shared, as he believed, by both sides of the House, “at the
friendly relations now existing between the American Government and
people and ourselves.”

The only members who opposed the idea of an alliance or even a
cordial understanding between the two countries were the Irish nation-
alists,
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 435

Mr. Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, in a speech practically closing
the debate, referred to an assertion by Mr. Morley that no positive
alliance was desirable. Mr.Chamberlain said: “ Nothing in the nature
of a cut-and-dried alliance is proposed. The Americans do not want
our alliance at this moment; they do not ask for our assistance, and
we do not want theirs. But will any one say that the occasion may
not arise when Anglo-Saxon liberty and Anglo-Saxon interests will be
menaced by a great combination of other Powers? I think that such
a thing is possible, and in that case, whether it be America or Eng-
land that is menaced, I hope that blood will be found to be thicker
than water.”

Mr. Chamberlain’s concluding sentence was received with loud cheers
from both of the British parties, but with expressions of dissent from
the Irish Nationalists. It ran as follows: “Meanwhile, I say, with-
out forcing this opinion upon either party, or desiring that either
nation should enter into an alliance with which the majority of both
nations would not thoroughly sympathize,—I repeat what I said at
Birmingham,— the closer, more definite, and more clear the alliance
between the United States and ourselves, the better it will be for
both nations and for the civilized world.”

It was apparent to statesmen and leaders in both nations that no
alliance was possible in the sense of formal compact of offense and
defense as understood in Europe. The temper of both nations and the
nature of the Government of the United States were opposed to any
political alliance beyond that growing out of immediate sympathy,
interest, and common purposes. The popular response to the so-called
proposition of “alliance” was the manifestation of the ready purpose
of Great Britain to help us if any European combination threatened
interference. Successful interference would injure England’s interests
quite as much as those of the United States. The common sense and
common interests of the two governments were thus brought into
much closer relations by the general expression of opinion.

Throughout the period of the war there was no change in the at-
titude of the two countries. When our war revenue bill was discovered
436 HISTORY OF THE

to press heavily upon the maritime tonnage of British commerce, a
reminder of that fact, by the Salisbury government was met by a
prompt revision of the clause by Congress, entirely to the satisfaction
of England.

The Fourth of July was celebrated this year in England, Canada, and
the United States, with equal enthusiasm. The flags of both nations
were displayed at public meetings. The American Society in London
gave a public dinner at which many Englishmen of eminence and great
influence were present. Admiral Sampson’s telegram, announcing the
victory over Cervera, arrived just before the guests were seated, and
its reading was greeted with indescribable excitement and enthusiasm.

The addresses were all tinged with cordial congratulations to both
nations. ‘The Marquis of Ripon impressively pointed out that the
United States was now at the parting of the ways. The responsibility
of President McKinley, he said, was greater than that of any President
save Lincoln. He must face a greater problem than that of war, a
problem which would determine the history of America. Continuing,
he said: “The interests not only of your country but of this are in-
volved, and the decision to a large extent will shape the destinies of
the world.” He and all the other English speakers affirmed that Great
Britain awaited without jealousy or envy the decision of the United
States to become a great international Power, carrying the blessings
of liberty, knowledge, and peace to other quarters of the earth.

The Earl of Dufferin recalled the ties binding Great Britain and
the United States. There were, he said, dominant responsible forces
which must in the long run unite the two countries in honorable
and generous friendship. He rejoiced at the fresh symptoms necessary
to amity. Whether these feelings, in the face of the unstable condition
of the world, would eventually take a concrete form might be regarded
as a matter for pleasant speculation.

United States Ambassador Hay’s reply in response to the friendly
utterances was received with great cheering and enthusiasm. His
very first sentence evoked a deafening burst of cheers. “To-day,” he
said, “a new splendor fills the span of the earth from Santiago to
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 437

Manila.” The passing year, he continued, would be memorable for
nothing of greater significance than the lucid recognition by both the
American and British peoples that the way of pleasantness between
them was the way of wisdom, and that anything like variance would
be folly and madness. This recognition was no mere passing emotion
born of a troubled hour, but had been growing for many quiet years. It
only needed rough weather to show it to the world. Now that a cordial
and clear understanding had come, there was no reason why it should not
last forever. It injured none and threatened none. All its ends were
peaceful and beneficent. Recalling the day, he contended that it ever
had been a day of good augury to mankind. He predicted that the
nation would show the same efficiency and promptness in war and
the same clemency and generosity in its hour of triumph as in days
of old. The nation that ended a vast rebellion without a single exe-
cution or bill of attainder might safely be trusted to be considerate
and magnanimous in victory; and when the bitterness of the present
troubles had passed, both sides would be found to have profited from
the issue.

Mr. James Bryce, a Scots member of Parliament, distinguished for
his critical writings on the constitution of the United States, said: “In
1776 there was on one side a monarch and a small ruling caste, on the
other side a people. Now, our Government can no longer misrepresent
the nation, and across the ocean people speak to a people. The At-
lantic is ten times narrower now than it was then, and the passage of
men to and fro has increased a thousandfold; and through the per-
sonal knowledge of Americans by Englishmen and of Englishmen by
Americans there has been laid the best foundation for good will and
mutual understanding between the nations. We have both come, and
that most notably within the last few months, to perceive that all
over the world the interests of America and of England are substan-
tially the same, and in recognition of this fact we see a solid basis
for a permanent codperation.”

The public celebration of the day in London called out demonstra-
tions of popular fervor unprecedented in the celebration of the day
438 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

outside of the United States. London streets were filled with Ameri-
can and British colors intertwined.

The usual reception at the American embassy was attended by
15,000 persons. Lord Salisbury called personally, an unprecedented
Fourth of July compliment, and the function was also attended by
almost the entire diplomatic corps.

 
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-SECOND.

ATTITUDE OF FRANCE AND Russia.

Tue Currous RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES— THE DESPERATE CAUSES
OF HER UNFRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARDS Us AT THE OUTBREAK OF WaAR— MISTAKES
AND FOLLIES OF THE PARISIAN PRESS AND PaRISIAN PopuLacE— ABSURD COMPAR-

ISONS OF SPAIN AND AMERICA— REPRISALS PROPOSED IN THE UNITED STATES
THAT CAUSED A SwiFT CHANGE oF ATTITUDE— RussIA AND HER
CONNECTION WITH THE ANTI-AMERICAN CONCERT —A NEGA-
rive AcT ATONED FOR BY LONG, UNBROKEN FRIENDSHIP,

AND FRESH MANIFESTATIONS OF Goop FEELING.

I.

T Is not exaggeration, perhaps, to say that the United States as a
nation has entertained for France a feeling of warmer friend-
ship than for any other country on the globe.

There was a strong element of almost sentimental ieee
affection in our regard for France as an abstraction, [RAR
and equally for the French people. La Fayette was
not nearly so clothed with national devotion at home as he was in
the United States. The feeling for the French people can scarcely
be described. Absolutely alien in temper, taste, ideals, and race, yet
that they were our friends in the first death-struggle for independ-
ence was enough. The fact had given us courage. It awoke in
the heart of America that fervid gratitude which a competitor in
any struggle feels springing up at the sight of one face in a strange
multitude that cheers him with a look of encouragement and sym-
pathy.

But, truth to tell, no man ever received more monument in pro-
portion to actual deserving than did La Fayette from America. His
abilities as a soldier and statesman were not above mediocrity. He
was a good man and a brave man, and, as an aristocrat, sympathizing
with humanity, his position was striking. To the American colonies

his sympathy was inspiring. What if he did not show himself a
(489)
440) HISTORY OF THE

Hannibal in battle, or a great statesman in the closet, was he not
the loyal and loved friend of Washington? He was to Americans,
and is yet to many, the Washington of France. No good American
would take back one word of all the affection and reverence that
this nation has uttered about him.

In La Fayette we saw the French people—that look of sympathy
at the critical moment. After independence, the affectionate feeling
for France grew, despite quarrels and petty disagreements.

For, we reasoned, was not the ever-increasing intensity of her in-
herited hatred of “perfidious Albion” most satisfying to our national
susceptibilities? Americans have been able to enjoy English jibes and
sneers at the French ; but, laughing, we none the less loved. Was nota
friend privileged to have all the faults and foibles convenient to and
necessary for happiness ?

But there was much more than the La Fayette heroic myth at the
bottom of American friendship for France. He was merely the sym-
bol of an idea. The genius of French philosophical letters at the
period of our independence was of much more value to us than her
arms. The desperate excesses that attended her reaction against the
long tyranny of the Capets, not less than her declared views of human
rights, were of service. The one warned this new republic against li-
cense; her theories of natural rights applied by the fathers of America,
with cooler blood and calmer vision, inspired the infant republic of
the United States with wisdom and forethought.

Our friendship for France constantly grew. American people were
amused but not offended at the French idea of us: that we were a
race of monster millionaires, great giants of fellows, more amiable and
tractable than Englishmen, but, also, even more vulgar and ignorant.
They had no doubt that La Fayette had enabled us to conquer the
English. Without La Fayette all would have been lost. Yet at home
La Fayette was known to be esteemed as not among the first of
France’s sons of genius. But, as he had enabled the amiable and noy-
elty-mad Americans to beat “perfidious Albion,” they were proud of and
amused with their protégé.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 44]

The French have never quite understood the American feeling of
gratitude that ignored passing differences. Even though she sought
to interfere in our Civil War, the act was overlooked.

The United States did, however, deliver one serious and overwhelm-
ing blow at French pride. It was made necessary by the invasion of
Mexico, concerted by Napoleon III. and Austria during the Civil War.
It was at the zenith of the third empire’s glory, when Paris was
glowing with the splendors of imperial extravagance and display pro-
moted by Eugenie. The Emperor attempted to inflame the patriotism
and pride of his people after the manner of his illustrious uncle, by
kindling military glory abroad.

Acting with Austria he determined to erect a Franco-Austrian
empire in Mexico, with Maximilian on the throne. Our State De-
partment protested, but European Powers had never quite considered
United States diplomacy as having serious weight, and Napoleon III.
ignored the protest.

When the Civil War was ended and the United States free to turn
its attention to neighboring relations, the expulsion of France and
Austria from Mexico was determined upon. An ultimatum was drawn
up, setting forth fully and conclusively the reasons for the demand that
French troops be at once withdrawn from the American continent.
It was the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, clearly and firmly repeated.
The Atlantic Cable was then newly laid and tolls were costly, but the
document in entirety was transmitted over the cable, by Secretary
Seward, to the French Foreign Minister in Paris, at a cost of $15,-
000. The imperative nature of the demand was emphasized by the
cost of its transmission—enormous and unprecedented at the pe-
riod —and Napoleon III. awoke with a shock to the realization that
“L’Oncle Sam,” good, aimable, but yet awkwardly strong, “ meant
business.”

He was embarrassed, since it was no part of his expectation or
intention to fight the United States. Prussia, growing under Bismarck,
was a threatening and immediate danger. He must yield. The army

of France was immediately withdrawn from Mexico and the fate of
21
442 HISTORY OF THE

Maximilian and Carlotta added to the humiliation of France an
element of terrible tragedy.

Howsoever seriously statesmen viewed that action of France, it
is undeniable that the mass of our people—perhaps because the inci-
dent was entirely diplomatic and not active—did not change in their
feelings toward France. The French were French, excitable, erratic,
impulsive; but the French had been our friends and what quarrels
we might have with her must be, of course, friendly quarrels.

But to France and the French people the blow struck at their
military and national pride was too severe to be forgotten. French
leaders, who succeeded to the control of the nominal republic that was
to-day exerting imperial authority, to-morrow relapsing into the effu-
sive simplicities of free democracy, inherited the imperial resentment.

But it would be grossly unfair to France—and no American will-
ingly would do injustice to France—to declare that while our war
with Spain impended and after it had opened, her action was dictated
by nothing more than vain resentment. Her situation was very dis-
tressful, her needs distracting. With pitiless accuracy, Lord Salis-
bury’s description of dying nations and the symptoms of their decay
applied to France. The bursting of the vast bubble of Napoleonic
pretense and extravagance in 1870 had staggered the faith of the French
people in all leaders. Under Thiers and MacMahon there seemed to be
recovery, but it was to be rudely interrupted by an explosion of cor-
ruption in the parliament; in the shady but fashionable financial
enterprises, in which needy nobles found great profits from lending
their names; and in the representative press. The shameful revela-
tions of the Panama Canal inquiry, smothered down in order that
other nations might not learn the full disgrace, destroyed again the faith
of the industrious millions in the integrity of representative leaders.

The French citizen is always vulnerable in his patriotic pride.
When, therefore, scapegoats of the Panama affair had been solemnly
offered up upon the altar of “national honor,” the victims of the
swindle were persuaded to wait. The canal, they were told, would be
completed as soon as confidence could be restored. They were urged
‘

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 443

to hold to their stock certificates, the value of which their children
would realize, even if the present holders should not. The habit of
thrift in France, which in the provinces has attained almost the
eminence of a national parsimony, was soothed. The stock was put
by for the inevitable dot in marriage settlements.

But the Dreyfus incident, which in 1894 had made the army glo-
rious, was to return in 1897, threatening to expose in the general
military staff corruption so revolting and cruel as to make the world
stand aghast. At the moment when the United States was electri-
fied by the destruction of the Maine, all civilization outside of France
looked with amazement at the spectacle of the French Government,
the French army staff, the French ministry of justice, and the French
press, engaged in a duel with the author, Zola, and Colonel Picquart,
head of the secret service of the army, resorting to the most desper-
ate quibbles of law to destroy these two champions of honest jus-
tice, who were ready to prove the innocence of Dreyfus. But, if this
should be permitted, the military corruption of France would be naked
before the nation and the whole world.

Once more patriotic pride was appealed to. The army, at least,
must be trusted. Was it possible that Frenchmen would permit sen-
sational writers and egotists, acting perhaps with foul motives, to
traduce the army? Could not a court-martial, conducted by the
general staff upon the “honor of a soldier,” be definitive until its
findings should be revised and ratified by foreign opinion and mere
writers for the newspapers? And patriotic pride stood firm once more.
Zola was overthrown in form; but he had succeeded in convincing the
world that Dreyfvs, the most pathetic figure in the history of political
exile, was probably innocent, and that the general staff was guilty.

Under the blistering criticism and denunciation of the press of
civilized countries, France was shrinking before war began. The press
of Great Britain and the United States was keenest and most searcli-
ing in its indictment of the injustice, cowardice, and impotence, of the
French Government, as displayed in sacrificing Dreyfus through fear
of learning too much truth, and doing too much justice.
444 HISTORY OF THE

A much stronger nation than France would have been distracted
by the dangers confronting her. Her people held 4,000,000,000 francs
($800,000,000) of Spanish bonds, many of them secured by pledges of
the revenues of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. Her financial
institutions and capitalists were heavily interested in Spanish railway
and industrial stocks, and much capital was employed in commercial
operations between the two countries. In addition to this the enor-
mous capital involved in the Panama Canal scheme, which had been
contributed by popular subscriptions, and which holders of the cer-
tificates clung to upon promises of future redemption, would be lost
forever, if Great Britain and the United States could reach an under-
standing.

Involved in a fog of despair over the integrity of their entire offi-
cial system, with the loss of immense capital threatened, what could
be expected of a people but bitter resentment and hostility to the
foreign country whose actions might cause such losses? The thrifty
population was certainly excusable in wishing that Spain might triumph;
while a ministry that had been unable to deal with the Dreyfus out-
rage could not be expected calmly to examine the future.

II.

Unper the circumstances, it was inevitable that the French pop-
ular press and her people generally would sympathize with Spain.
ieee It was inevitable, also, that the Government would do

FOLLIES OF so, but with circumspect concealment. For weeks be-
nue fore and after the first act of war, the popular press
was filled with editorials denouncing the United States, misrepre-
senting our motives; it printed all sorts of false news derogatory to
the dignity and integrity of Americans, and contained interviews, real
and imaginary, calculated to arouse against us the rage and anger of
their readers. The cause of Spain, on the other hand, was defended
for its righteousness, and sympathy for her was manufactured to a
vast extent and fanned to ardent heat.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 445

.

The immediate popularity of this abuse and scorn proved that such
utterances reflected popular sentiment accurately. Many persons of
prominence and influence, some officials, or occupying semi-official
posts, expressed through the newspapers bitter resentment against the
United States. A Rear-Admiral declared that, in his opinion, the
officers composing the Maine Board of Inquiry “were not, under the
circumstances, to be believed on oath.” The value of his opinion,
as it defined his prejudice only, without accurate knowledge of the
subject, may be estimated from an additional declaration he made
that, “there is not an officer in the United States navy capable of
commanding a vessel, and the navy included few vessels worthy of
command !”

It is to be remembered that these opinions were expressed prior
to Manila and Santiago. But they were entertained not alone by the
Rear-Admiral. Many other naval officers in Paris declared in inter-
views that our naval officers were incompetent, inexperienced, ig-
norant! That discipline was lax, that instruction was ignored, and
that the crews were mostly mercenaries kicked out of all other na-
vies for drunkenness, or were deserters. One officer’s opinion was that
Spain’s navy was three times as powerful as ours in ships, but when
the efficiencies of command, crew, and discipline were considered, the
Spaniards were ten times stronger.

A Spanish Admiral, who at Madrid consented to be interviewed
for the purpose of suggesting a plan for their naval campaign,
said: “With immediate vigor. I should advise the sending of a
fleet against Washington first; then, after reducing the city, the fleet
should proceed to Chicago and bring it to terms.” This was equaled
by sentences in a French naval Captain’s published article, accom-
panied by diagrams suggesting also a plan of campaign. ‘As Cuba,” he
wrote, “is not far from Havana, it would be easy for the United States
to transfer its fleet in the secondary movement from the one to the
other.” He placed the Philippines in the Indian Ocean, the Canary
Islands in the Chinese Sea, and the Carolines in the spot occupied on
the Atlantic chart by the Canaries.
446 HISTORY OF THE

These were not burlesque or humorous articles, but were intended
as serious contributions to the discussion.

In La Patrie, a very popular Paris paper, appeared an interview
evidently concocted by some scribbler, and pretended to give the views
of a Canadian army officer. Nothing could better expose the igno-
rance of the reporter or of the editor who could write or accept such
absurdities. Some of the views are reproduced for amusement :—

*, % * * % * * *% %

“The United States are in no condition to sustain a war with Spain. A war,
even if they were victors, would bring such disaster to American commerce that it
would be equivalent to their ruin.

“ With the exception of two or three armored ships the United States navy is
absolutely valueless. The officers who command it may be decent enough engi-
neers in theory, but they are entirely ignorant of the method of fighting guns. As
to the sailors, they have never been drilled to fight; they are worthless as artiller-
ists.

“The United States army does not exist. There are, to be sure, some 22,000
men under arms, but they are not soldiers. Doubtless, one could get recruits, but
in order to raise an army of 100,000 of them an enormous amount of money would
be required, and it would take several months. Still they would be only mercen-
aries, who would draw bounties at the recruiting station and then desert. During
the war of secession every recruit got a bounty of $3,000; and I have known per-
sonally of one man who drew this bounty three times within a week, and then im-
mediately fled to Quebec, where he went into business on the money.

“The American soldier, the typical American soldier, is not what one would
call a soldier in Europe, where one expects a man to be amenable to discipline,
intelligent and docile in the hands of his chiefs. Individually, he is a good marks-
man and capable of withstanding fatigue, but he is of no use as a component of a
body of troops, where he would have to learn tactics. However, the American officers
are not tacticians, and are absolutely ignorant of the art of war. Remember, too,
that I am now speaking of the standing army of 22,000 men. You may judge
from this what the recruits would be.

* * * * * * * * *

“There is Jingoism in the United States, but no patriotism whatever, as that
word is understood by other peoples. Americans will work, and sometimes fight,
but only for money. That is the one consideration, no matter what circumstance
arises. Perhaps if the United States were to undertake a war of pillage in Cuba
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 447

they would be able to raise armed bands, who would fight in exchange for the
proceeds of the robberies they could perpetrate. Otherwise not.

“All the ports of the United States, from New Orleans to New York, from
Florida to Newfoundland, are entirely open and unprotected. Not one has a single
gun or a soldier for defense. A small fleet of Spanish gunboats could bombard all
the principal cities, one after the other, and soon bring the Yankees to terms. It
would be the work of a few days only.

“In conclusion, the resources of America might prolong the conflict and make
the outcome doubtful. But there are many unforeseen things to take into account.
We must remember that it would be a war between a valiant, courageous people
on the one side, and a horde of mercenary cowards on the other.”

The volume of execration poured out upon everything American
at last produced a condition of excitement that exposed Americans, vis-
iting Paris for pleasure or business, to insults and annoyance.

The few serious and dignified journals did not, of course, descend
to the level of the popular press, but they dared not take the initiative
to restrain the popular feeling. They did not excite malignant igno-
rance, but they displayed more discretion than information. It was
hopeless to stem the tide when the Government was secretly leading
in an attempt to checkmate the United States.

The vanity of French leaders renders them prone to be induced
to take initiative when others hesitate. It has been declared upon
good authority that France acted as the organizer of the attempt to
form a concert for intervention. The belief that her interest with
England in opposing the Nicaragua Canal and the significance of her
willingness to throw over her old friend in America, in order to draw
Great Britain into an alliance that would “teach America a lesson,”
could not be resisted. The fact that Germany had declined to act
unless Great Britain joined, was ominous to all the Powers except
France. The consequence of her failure inflamed her afresh against
Great Britain and the United States.

All France believed in the incompetence of our army and navy,
because all France was wishing for incompetence. When Dewey had
won his unprecedented victory, France believed it was an accident,
because France wished it to be an accident. She transferred her faith
448 HISTORY OF THE

to Cervera, to the Offenbachian Camara, and her sneers and jibes to
Sampson, Schley, and Shafter.

At this time, however, France began to feel a new agony. The
preparations for the Paris World’s Fair of 1900 were greatly advanced.
Our State Department had prepared plans and an appropriation bill
for $1,000,000, through which the representation of the United States at
her fair would be an impressive feature. Opposition to the appropria-
tion appeared in Congress, and the bill languished. In many cities and
towns of the United States clubs had been formed for the purpose of
saving funds in advance for the expense of visiting the fair. These
clubs began to disband.

In a number of cities organizations were projected and some were
formed by women, for the purpose of systematically refusing to pur-
chase any articles imported from or made in France, and for notifying
merchants that if they carried French articles of stock it would be
considered cause sufficient for a withdrawal of patronage. Agitation
in such direction was, of course, mere ebullition of resentment, and
no more to be justified than the action of the French. It was quickly
_abandoned, discouraged and ridiculed by newspapers generally. But
it was reported, and it had its effect upon French conduct.

The large reduction in the number of American tourists in Paris
and other European centers began to cause consternation. Americans
are credited with spending upon pleasure $150,000,000 a year in Europe.
France and particularly Paris receive the greatest proportion of these
750,000,000 francs annually. It seemed to the Paris tradesman as if the
economic cataclysm were at hand.

Then France came to her senses. Commissioners, representing
boards of trade, bringing with them letters of commendation from
the Government, came to Washington and gravely issued explanations
prepared for the purpose of convincing the United States that the
French people had been grossly maligned by a mercenary and frivolous
press, representing no actual sentiment. The French people loved the
American people and were natural enemies of Spain. The appeal was
full of pathos, and faultless in diction.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 449

While this was making its effect, the “incompetent” Captains of
our fleet and their “undisciplined and uninstructed crews of merce-
naries” repeated before Santiago the miracle that Dewey had per-
formed at Manila—and against Spanish ships, commanders, and crews
that, according to French estimates, ought to have equaled sixty of
our ships.

And our soldiers, who, by French account, were “absolutely igno-
rant of the art of war,” had fought at Las Guasimas, San Juan, and El
Caney against enormous preponderance of the enemy in position and
force. When the Spanish surrendered 27,000 troops and a fortified
city to about 16,000 available Americans, France was not yet con-
vinced, perhaps, but her courtesy of speech was much improved, and
the tone of her newspapers greatly changed.

There was much in the acute distresses of France to excuse her
attitude, the knowledge of which caused the United States Govern-
ment to exert every effort to mitigate the strain of the situation,
and to refrain from any act calculated to increase the probability
of widening the breach.

Ill.

Tuat Russia consented to act in the anti-American concert proposed
by France, is true, unless the concert itself is wholly a myth. It
was the first unfriendly act of that Government towards
the United States, and its unfriendliness was plainly
negative. Since Catherine II. had quickly recognized
our independence of England, Russia had been not only friendly to
America, but had. given active and prompt proofs of it. Under
all circumstances she remained steadfast, recognizing that in the re-
mote republic, with its well-defined insular policy, there existed no
patent ‘rivalry with her own purposes.

She had acted as the determined friend of the United States dur-
ing the Civil War when France and Great Britain concerted interference
in our home affairs. Even then France was the active proposer of
interference. When Andrew G. Curtin was United States minister to

THE ATTITUDE
OF RUSSIA
450 HISTORY OF THE

Russia, he was shown by Prince Gortschakoff the original autograph
letter of Napoleon III. to Alexander II., proposing the action. Alex-
ander, in an autographic reply, declared that “the people of the
United States have a Government of their own choice, which they
are defending with their best blood and treasure, and I will never
do anything to weaken them.”* He followed this up by sending a
Russian fleet to American waters ready to resist with force any attempt
by Great Britain and France to interfere.

In 1898 Russia was involved in serious national distresses. Her
gigantic strides towards the Pacific, involving vast works of in-
ternal construction and an expansion of military and naval forces,
had strained her resources at a time when she was preparing to
adopt a gold basis for her currency system. Her rapid progress east
had intensified the distrust and hatred of Great Britain, and the
possibility of a resort to war had been imminent several years before.
In that crisis she looked about for a friend. Germany was not avail-
able because of the blood ties between William II. and Victoria. An
Anglo-German alliance was more probable than a Russo-German
agreement. France, friendly to Russia, committed to enmity against
England and Germany, presented an opportunity. She was dis-
tressed by isolation. The Franco-Russian alliance was formed, offensive
and defensive. When Germany had been induced to seize Kiao-Chau,
and Russia had followed it up by taking Port Arthur, France sup-
ported the movement by sitting down at Hainan.

Now, when France proposed the anti-American concert the obliga-
tions of an ally committed Russia to acquiesce. It was the fortune
of international politics and European diplomacy, and it must be
confessed that Russia’s part in the negotiations was mere acquiescence.
As soon as the concert failed and the formal diplomatic represen-
tation of peaceful wishes had been made at Washington, the Rus-
sian Government resumed and maintained its old position of friendly
neutrality.

*Jeremiah Curtin, communication published July 22, 1898.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 451

The enthusiastic response of the people of England and the United
States to the suggestion of an Anglo-American alliance, was a shock
to Russian feeling. A staff correspondent of the St. Petersburg Novoe
Vremya, the leading Russian newspaper, who was sent to study the
feeling of this country towards Russia and England, said in a pub-
lished interview: “It cannot be denied that a most painful impres-
sion has been produced on Russian public opinion by the language of.
a part of the American press advocating an Anglo-American alliance
against Russia in the Far East. Should the American nation follow
such advice there is no doubt that it would be deeply resented by
Russia, which is determined not to yield one inch of her legitimate
position on the shores of the Pacific.

“Fortunately, the admirable good sense and the clear-headedness
of the Americans do not admit a possibility of adopting such a policy.
In the Far East, England and the United States, as the two greatest
industrial nations, are natural competitors, struggling for a predomi-
nance in the Chinese markets. The part of Russia in Manchuria and
KXorea, as well as in China, is that of a protector of less civilized peo-
ples, which, by their origin and history, are nearer to us than to West-
ern nations. It is generally recognized that Russia has occupied Port
Arthur merely in order to counteract the pernicious consequences of
Germany’s violent seizure of Kiao-Chau. Russian policy in the Far
East ought to be particularly applauded by the Americans, for it cre-
ates a boundless field for American enterprise. Undoubtedly, the
development of Russian influence in Manchuria will open a consider-
able, area to American trade and industry. The only necessary con-
dition of fully profiting by these most favorable prospects is the ces-
sation of playing at a policy which might alienate an old and trusty
friend without being able to transform a natural and traditional
opponent into a disinterested ally.”

It is admitted everywhere that in the exercise of her impenetrable
diplomacy Russia has been more successful than she has ever been
with arms, and that her diplomacy has been more profitable than
the armed successes of some other nations. The declaration of her
452 HISTORY OF THB SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

‘

journalistic envoy was obviously authoritative. Open political opinions
are not proclaimed by Russians except at their peril. This appeal to
the old American hostility against Great Britain had been expressed
in the St. Petersburg Viedomostt more than a month before, with in-
genious and strong arguments to support it, and with bitter warn-.
ings to Great Britain.* The general tone of the Russian press was
most cordially expressive of friendliness to the United States.

In June the first Russian Ambassador to the United States was
presented to the President at Washington. Previous representatives
had borne the title of Minister. The Ambassador was Count Cas-
sini, one of the ablest and most accomplished diplomats of the Rus-
sian Government. He had long been her representative in China,
but had served at important European capitals. His transfer from
Pekin to Washington was considered at the time to be significant.
In his address to the President he referred to the unbroken friend-
ship between the two countries. The neutrality of Russia, after the
first negative act, was full and satisfactory. Indeed, the friendliness
of her people remained unchanged.

*“ But there is still another point showing the usefulness and expediency of the Rus-
sian-American friendship. Let us be candid. Sincere as the assertions of a few Russo-
philes on the banks of the Thames and Anglophiles on the banks of the Neva may be,
our relations with England must inevitably come to a bloody outcome. The war will not)
break out to-morrow, not after a month, undoubtedly not even after one year, but it is
bound to come. The historical march of events tends toward it. The eternal antagonism
of Russian and English interests shows it. Show us the nook in which Russia could
tender England the hand of friendship without hiding in the other hand, behind its back,
the murderous dagger! There is no such nook in existence. Russia advances toward
the Pamirs, England does the same; Russia endeavors to extend its influence in neigh-
boring Afghanistan, England sets to work the springs of its immense political mechanism
in order to paralyze such influence. Russia occupies Port Arthur; England installs itself
at Wei-Hai-Wei. Of Europe, the history of which is full of innumerable Anglo-Russian
conflicts, it is needless to speak. In a word, there is no place in the whole world in
which, as in a common sea, the course and the tendencies of both empires are merged,
and thus, sooner or later, war is inevitable. Once such war starts, what immense help
the United States ports would be to Russia! The sympathetic neutrality of the United
States would be for Russia more than a welcome find, and the possibility of even indirect
assistance by the American fleet, which is even now pretty strong, and will become more
so during the impending war with Spain. We have not yet forgotten the great help
given us by the United States in 1878, at the time of the Berlin Congress, when in view
of the very probable military conflict, cruisers were manned by Russian sailors in the
very ports of the United States.’’—St. Petersburg Viedomosti, April, 1898.
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-THIRD.

DEWEY AND THE GERMANS.

VERY UNFRIENDLY AND HostILze OpposiTION TO AMERICA BY THE EMPEROR AND THE AGRARIAN
Party — THE CoMMERCIAL ANTAGONISMS THAT PRopuceD Ir—ApmiraL Dewey RECEIVES
AN APOLOGY FROM PRINCE Henry, THE Emperor’s BrorHer— THE IRRITATING IN-
TERFERENCE OF THE GERMAN War SuHips aT Manita—Derwrey DEMANDS THAT
ADMIRAL VON DiepERICHs SHALL ANSWER WHETHER HE Wants PEACE OR
War— Tue Germans ‘*CaLtteD Down” at Last—DuipLomatic ExpLana-

TIONS AND ASSURANCES— CHANGE OF TONE OF THE GERMAN PREss.

Ti,

HE attitude of the German Empire and the German people

towards the United States was expressed in four languages.

The diplomatic records will show that it was pe eee

one of “friendly neutrality to both nations.” RIAN HosTILITY
The semi-official German press spoke the language of Sones
open hostility and enmity. The masses of German people, who have
millions of kinsmen in the United States, attracted here by the limi-
tations of life at home, were cordially friendly, and their popular
press bore witness to the fact. The court and the Agrarian party, the
latter composed of the hereditary landowners, the stiffest-necked
aristocracy of continental Europe, were bitterly hostile to us, and
through many channels gave vent to their feelings.

There has been a deadly commercial war between the United
States and Germany for some years. The tariff theories of the two
countries clashed, and Germany was greatly incensed by the adop-
tion of the McKinley tariff in this country. England succeeded to
the trade lost to Germany. American farm products, manufactures,
provisions, and other articles, could be set down in Germany so cheaply
that the landowners complained that America would destroy land
values in Germany. The Agrarian party was formed to conduct a

tariff policy that would close the German markets to the United States.
(453)
454 HISTORY OF THE

The land barons, ever the buttresses of the throne, contrived that court
influence should be hostile to the Washington government, while the
official record would remain correct throughout.

The United States did not expect or desire sympathy from the
German Emperor, bit we were fully prepared to stop any effort at
intervention. The first intimation of hostility was a curt remark
reported to have been made by the Emperor at a mess dinner with a
party of officers. “It will not be too bad,” he was quoted as having
said in substance, “if America shall very soon require Europe to teach
her the proper place for her.” After some delay the utterance was
officially denied with the additional declaration that the Emperor’s
feeling for the United States was not hostile.

When Dewey sailed from Hong Kong to attack Manila, it was an-
nounced by the Spanish Government, unofficially, that Germany had
determined to prevent the bombardment of the city because of the
large German interests. The annoyances of the German war ships at
Manila after the great battle, brought to light a personal incident
highly interesting at a time when excitement was high, and also
indicative of the German court and semi-official attitude.

A private citizen of good repute and prominence, residing in Chi-
cago, was at Hong Kong in March, when preparations were making
for possible war. He had completed a tour of the Orient and was
then homeward bound. All the sentiment he had heard expressed
was favorable and friendly to the United States, except that coming
from German officials and naval officers. These, he said, spoke sar-
castically of the United States.

Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the German Emperor, had ar-
rived at Hong Kong shortly before on his mission to represent the
German government as Admiral of the navy in affairs growing out
of the Kiao-Chau seizure. Immediately after his arrival, so the story
ran, Prince Henry gave a banquet to the representative officers of all
the fleets in port. Among those present was Commodore Dewey.
After dining Prince Henry proposed the usual national toasts. These
are regulated as to order of precedence by etiquette well understood
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 455

in the navies. When the Prince reached the place of the United
States in the list he passed it for another nation. But when he pro-
ceeded to the second omission, it meant wilful intention, ignorance,
or gross carelessness. Commodore Dewey left the banquet without
ceremony. Finally, just before the entertainment closed, the Prince
toasted the United States.

Next morning Prince Henry sent an aide to Commodore Dewey
with the explanation that the omission had been wholly inadvertent,
and was not meant as a discourtesy to the United States or her rep-
resentative commander. Dewey thanked the aide for the courteous
manner in which he conveyed the message from his Admiral, but in
reply requested him to inform Prince Henry that the incident was one
that called for a written or a personal apology from the Prince. Ger-
man sarcasm was thus put to thetest. Very soon Prince Henry called
in person and apologized, saying that the omission was caused by
neglect in writing the American toast in its proper order, and that
he had intended to put no slight upon the United States. The Prince
later gave a great entertainment, to which Dewey received invitation,
but which he did not attend.

Incidents of the character described in the anecdote are consid-
ered in official etiquette as having occurred in camera, and the
traveler who made it public acknowledged that he understood it was
an incident in camera when the facts were related to him by an
officer of the American fleet. He made it public in order that, at the
critical moment, when the Germans were annoying Admiral Dewey
after the battle, and before assistance could reach him, the American
people might feel reassured of the quiet and unobtrusive, but very
firm and decided, character of the fleet commander representing our
forces at Manila. The story was not denied.
456 HISTORY OF THE

II.

Tue hand of a strong man was undoubtedly needed at Manila after
the capture of Cavité. Admiral Dewey was in a position of very great

responsibility, requiring the utmost patience, courage,
sre hc Nee and abilities of the highest order. He had to estab-
oe lish and maintain an effective blockade against a city
of 300,000 people, walled, fortified, and well-garrisoned
by Spanish troops. He was expected to lend encouragement to and
exert restraint upon the insurgent forces just sufficient to keep them
up to the attitude of harassing the garrison without storming the city.
He was almost cut off from knowledge of Spanish movements else-
where, and must keep vigilant guard against possible Spanish reén-
forcements for Manila. It was hopeless to expect troops or ships for
his own support short of six weeks’ time.

The situation called for tension of nerve and constant watchfulness.
And this was aggravated by petty proceedings on the part of German
naval commanders calculated to irritate him beyond the point of
patience.

There were war ships of Great Britain, Russia, France, Japan, and
Austria, in Manila Bay, observing the blockade; but these nations were
content to send but one vessel, or, at most, two were sometimes present.
But there were five of the Germans constantly in attendance, and occa-
sionally seven, comprising the whole of the German fleet in Asiatic
waters. The Deutschltind, commanded by Prince Henry, and her sister
ship, the Kaiser, the flagship of Admiral von Diederichs, were heavily
armored cruisers of 7,700 tons‘ each, carrying eight 10-inch guns, with
secondary batteries of 8- and 6-inchers. The other ships were the
Kaiserin Augusta, Irene, Princess Wilhelm, Giffon, and Cormoran. In
numbers, in armor, and in guns, the Germans were stronger than the
Americans whose six vessels were unprotected cruisers and small
gunboats.

Upon establishing his blockade, Admiral Dewey drew up a code
of regulations which he considered necessary for shutting up Manila
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 457

without causing more inconvenience than the conditions required to
the foreign vessels. The imaginary line of the blockade cordon was
drawn from Cavité across the bay to Malibon harbor, leaving abundant
room for foreign ships to enter the bay and observe the blockade.

Among the regulations was one common to all blockade codes.
It was that there should be no movement of any foreign vessels or
boats about the bay after sunset, without the knowledge and expressed
permission of the blockade commander,

The Germans, as soon as their ships arrived, began to ignore and
violate the rule. They sent launches out at night as it suited their
inclination or whim. Admiral Dewey instructed his patrol launches
to turn back the intruders. Admiral von Diederichs protested vigor-
ously. Dewey sent back word with firmness that his regulations must
be observed.

But the Germans had no intention of making their presence agree-
able. The launches were started off later at night to convey German
officers to the clubs in Manila. Dewey turned the searchlights of his
ships on that part of the bay and swept it, with the result that the
launches were detected and ordered back. Persisting, the Germans
began to send one or two decoy launches in one direction, while others
moved out under cover of darkness in another. Then Dewey turned
his searchlights on the German war vessels and covered them, to prevent
any boat leaving at night without his knowledge.

In naval etiquette it is particularly offensive to the pride of a com-
mander to have his ships made the target of a searchlight from another.
Admiral von Diederichs sent word to Admiral Dewey that he objected
to having the ships of his fleet subjected to indignity. Admiral Dewey
returned a courteous message regretting that the conduct of von
Diederichs’ ships made it necessary to keep their movements at night
under observation. He added, with some sarcasm, that perhaps the
Germans had not fully understood whether the blockade was main-
tained by their own or American ships.

This caused a change of tactics. One or two of the German vessels

were kept at Mariveles harbor, opposite Corregidor Island, at the
22
458 HISTORY OF THE

entrance of the bay. The Germans now began to have their ships
change position frequently, sending one from the blockade line to
Mariveles while another would steam down the bay to replace it. With-
out knowledge of what Spain could send against him, it was one of
the responsibilities of Dewey’s situation to guard closely against sur-
prise. The movements of the Germans, therefore, were well calculated
to increase the nervous tension of the American commanders.

As soon as it became apparent that the manceuvres were intended to
cause irritation, Dewey directed that a launch or large vessel be sent
to meet every incoming ship of the Germans, to speak it and demand
to know its nationality, its last port and its destination. Every ship
was thus required to heave to and reply to all questions before pro-
ceeding further. This is an international rule of warfare.

Von Diederichs protested with much vehemence and asked if Dewey
proposed to enforce the right of search. The American Admiral
replied that under the rules he had the right to demand the name,
nationality, and purpose of every ship that came into the bay while
the blockade was in force.

Von Diederichs replied that the Americans knew quite well the
character of each of his ships and that the formal enforcement of the
right to question was intended to annoy him.

Dewey replied with firmness that the flying of the German flag
was not proof that a ship was a German ship, since it was recog-
nized in international law that a warship had the right to fly any
colors she desired in war for the purpose of surprising the enemy.
To the German flag lieutenant who brovght the protest, Admiral
Dewey said :—

“Tell Admiral von Diederichs that there are some acts that mean
war, and his fleet is dangerously near those acts. If he wants war,
assure him that he may have it here, now, or at the time that best
suits him.”

Von Diederichs regretted that his actions had been misunderstood,
and disavowed any intention to violate proper usages or to interfere
with Dewey’s blockade regulations.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 459

He added that he must refer Dewey’s letter, which he construed
as maintaining the right of search to the commanders-in-chief then
in the harbor. Accordingly, he called on Captain Chichester of the
British war ship Jmmortalité, senior commander, and asked what were
his intentions with respect to obeying the rigorous regulations laid
down by Dewey.

Captain Chichester, suspecting an entanglement, concluded to rebuff
the German by pretended concealment.

“Admiral Dewey and I,” he answered, “have a perfect understand-
ing on that point.” Then waiting for a few moments for his caller
to enjoy fully the disturbance his reply created, he added: “Iwill show
you, however, as I did Admiral Dewey, the instructions in which I have
been ordered to do precisely what Admiral Dewey has been contend-
ing you are required to do.”

Von Diederichs’ last contention was thus destroyed, but be had no
intention of ceasing his annoyances. He did not report to Dewey
the result of his conference.

When our troop ships arrived at- Corregidor channel, the Germans
in Mariveles harbor saluted them. The Kaiserin Augusta instantly got
under way, steamed up the bay, passing closely alongside each trans-
port in turn, and then saluted before the Olympia again, running up
American colors as she did so. It was ostentatious impertinence, since
a single salute would have been sufficient. The irritation was increased
by formal applications to permit launches to go ashore after night.
Reports came to Admiral Dewey that the Germans were lending
material assistance to the Spaniards. They were reported to have landed
flour and other supplies, and even to have landed guns. Their officers,
it was said, had visited the Spanish front, and inspected Spanish fortifi-
cations. The Admiral heard from indisputable authority that the Ger-
man consul had been told in the club at Manila that the Germans
were landing supplies, and that Spaniards of reputation and position
were ready to confirm the fact, and the German consul was unable to
deny it. Upon this, permission to go ashore at night was refused, to
the humiliation of the Germans.
460 HISTORY OF THE

The situation, already very strained, was much inflamed on July 8.
The native insurgents had captured a Spanish ship, on which they
embarked a number of their troops, and dispatched them to attack the
Spanish garrison on Isla de Grande in Subig Bay. The ship returned
July 7, and the commander of the troops reported to Aguinaldo that
upon arriving at Isla de Grande he found the German war ship Jrene
close off the island; that the German had not only refused to permit
the insurgents’ attack, but had compelled the transport to haul down
the insurgent colors and run up a white flag. Aguinaldo reported the
incident to Dewey.

The moment seemed at hand when the strained cord must break,
or one end of it be released. Admiral Dewey instructed the Raleigh
and Concord to proceed at once to Isla de Grande, demand its immediate
surrender, or to take it by force, at all hazard, if necessary. The gar-
rison consisted of 600 Spanish soldiers.

The Raleigh and Concord sailed at night, and arrived in Subig Bay
next morning. With decks cleared for action, the two ships steered
for Isla de Grande at 8:15 a.m. As they steamed into the channel
on one side of the island, the Jiene steamed out on the other side
at full speed. The garrison surrendered without resistance, and 623
prisoners, 600 rifles, and a large supply of ammunition, fell into our
hands.

As the Irene was returning to Manila, the United States ship Mc-
Cullough was waiting to speak her. She sent a blank shot across the
Trenes bow, and discharged the formal duty of inquiring her name,
nationality, and purpose.

The rage of von Diederichs flamed up. He sent a strong protest
to Admiral Dewey against the hauling up of his ships as if they were
the ships of an enemy.

The response of Dewey was sharp and not to be misunderstood.

“T desire to ask,” he said, “whether it is peace or war between
your country and mine. If there is war I wish to be informed. If
there is peace, the conduct of your fleet must be changed. It is not
the part of friendly neutrality to obstruct and distress the duty of a
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 461

friendly nation. But the proper way to make war is to clear ship
and go at it.”

There could be no mistaking the purport of such a message. In
laconic phrase, the German was “called down” and must meet the issue.
His response was an explanation and an apology. He denied that
the Irene had interfered against the insurgents, but admitted that
she had refused to answer signals until the insurgent ship had sub-
stituted a white flag for the native colors, because to do otherwise
would have had the effect of recognizing the insurgents’ flag, which
would have constituted an act unfriendly to Spain.

The German Admiral was now facing the dead-line of conduct.
If he advanced he must take the consequences; if he retired his pride
would be mortified. He resorted to correspondence. Meanwhile, the
news of Cervera’s destruction reached Manila a few days later, the
Charleston arrived, the Monterey was approaching, and the Monadnock
was contained in the prospect. Von Diederichs relapsed into sulky
obedience to regulations, and bided his time.

Ill.

In tHe United States and Germany, reports of the irritating conduct
of von Diederichs were complicated with frequent declarations through
anti-American or anti-German channels abroad that SRE ise
Germany was determined to resist acquisition by the  avowats, anp
United States of the Philippine Archipelago. The Em- a aes
peror, it was said, had instructed von Diederichs to land a force of
marines at Manila under the pretense of protecting German subjects
and German interests. The deduction to be made was obvious. It
would mean that Germany, having gained a foothold in Manila, would
be in position to involve in confusion the claims of the United States
to possession through war. The landing of marines, therefore, with-
out permission from Admiral Dewey under perfectly defined terms,
would be equivalent to an act of war, upon which Dewey would un-
doubtedly act.
462 HISTORY OF THE

Suggestions were thrown out that Germany and France had made
arrangements with Spain by which she conceded to them coaling
stations in the Philippines at points beyond the American blockade.
But subterfuges of that sort did not deceive the government at
Washington.

Reports that Germany’s war ships were lending aid and comfort to
the Spaniards at Manila, called for interrogatories and replies. The
German Ambassador at Washington called on the President and
assured him that a firm attitude of friendly neutrality was observed,
notwithstanding the flying reports, for which the German Emperor
was in no wise responsible. The Foreign Minister at Berlin assured
the American Ambassador that such rumors were mere absurdities;
that the presence of so many war ships at Manila was necessary to
the interests of German subjects, of whom there were more in the
city than of any other nation except Spain; that the Subig Bay in-
cident was a mere act of humanity to prevent non-combatants on
the island from massacre by insurgents. This did not agree entirely
with von Diederichs’ explanation, which was that the Jiene did not
interfere at all. It was affirmed that the German Government had
no knowledge that von Diederichs’ launches had violated regulations
of the port blockade or that any of the petty acts of interference
as reported had occurred. If such complaints were true, the govern-
ment would prevent a recurrence of them.

The tone of the German press changed decisively after the events
at Santiago. The semi-official Berlin Post, in answer to an article in
a Paris paper urging that it was time the Powers took extreme meas-
ures to prevent the proposed dispatch of Commodore Watson’s squad-
ron to Europe, and to end the war, uttered the warning that, before
summoning Europe to resist the United States, and predicting a quad-
ruple alliance in the Mediterranean, it would be well to ask Great
Britain’s consent to yoke the European Powers to one car. The
Agrarian papers denounced the change of tone in the radical press, and
insisted that the Spaniards were thorough artillerists, but had lacked
material at Santiago. They considered the surrender of Santiago
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 465

unimportant, and spoke of the danger of yellow fever in a tone of
dread that seemed to express great hopes of the ultimate safe burial of
the whole American army.

There was no mistaking the strong and open friendliness of the
great journals of the German people. The Frankfurter-Zeitung, in an
elaborate review of the operations on land and sea at Santiago, de-
clared that they had brought many disillusions to the despisers of
militia armies. The German newspaper strategists, especially, who
jeered at “the militia generals going into the field in elegant dress,”
had become more cautious in their criticism since the fights before
Santiago. When it was considered under what unfavorable circum-
stances the American soldiers had been obliged to fight, the reviewer
declared that they had exhibited an endurance and bravery that
could not be surpassed by any troops, no matter how well trained.
Dismounted cavalrymen had been employed to storm a strong posi-
tion; a preparation for the infantry attack by artillery fire had been
impossible, as there had been no artillery; the men suffered from
lack of food, because the commissariat had to struggle with great
difficulties of transportation; the preliminary preparations for the care
of the wounded had proved very defective. Al] this was known to the
soldiers, who, nevertheless, advanced with undiminished courage. The
positions the Americans gained on both days of battle they not only
retained, but later won still more ground.

Continuing, the reviewer spoke thus of the American demonstration:

“The Spanish troops, whose military qualities are valued very highly by the op-
ponents of the militia, were stationed in excellent strong positions, had with them
sufficient artillery, made use of smokeless powder, were superior in number to the
Americans, and were commanded by officers experienced in war. Why did not
these European-trained troops sally out of Santiago and simply drive the Americans
into the sea? Why does not Marshal Blanco, who is said to have at his command
a well-armed army of at least 100,000 men, accustomed to the climate and to fight-
ing, make his superiority felt?

“The value of troops does not depend merely on the military drill, such as is usual
in Europe. There is militia and militia. A popular army like the Swiss, with its
full equipment ever ready for war, represents a stronger power at the beginning of
464 HISTORY OF THE

a war than the American State militia, which is not intended for foreign service,
and out of which, when war breaks out, an army must first be formed. In spite of
all these disadvantages and difficulties, the Americans have set an army on foot in
a few weeks which was obliged to take the field under unfavorable circumstances,
and, nevertheless, has shown itself therein not merely equal, but superior to its well-
trained adversary.
“Almost as instructive as the combats on land have been the sea-fights.

As in the battle of the Yalu, between the Chinese and Japanese, superiority in
marksmanship decided the fight off Santiago. The Spanish vessels were in part su-
perior in speed to the American; the valor of the Spanish sailors is much praised
by the Americans; experienced officers commanded the ships, but, nevertheless, they
were defeated without doing much damage worth mentioning to the enemy. It is
well known that for years the Americans have kept up industriously target practice,
and that they expected good results from this themselves. Good guns without good
gunners are useless in a fight. The Spaniards shot poorly and the Americans shot
well. The result was that the Spanish vessels caught fire and were therefore com-
pelled to run ashore. How far better armor influenced the outcome of the fight
cannot be determined with certainty. One thing, however, is settled. Her speed
could not save even the Cristobal Colon from the sure aim of the Americans. Be-
sides this, the American material, missiles as well as armor plate, seems to have
shown itself to be much better than the Spanish. American experts, indeed, believe
that in this respect they are superior even to the English.”

There can be no question of the patriotism and loyalty of the
German people, but love of the Fatherland does not blind their intelli-
gence. The German-born citizens of the United States, and their
descendants, are strong upholders of American pride. In all their
duties as citizens, defenders, soldiers, the German-Americans have
proved their devotion whenever the call has been made upon them.

It must be remembered, also, that Germany occupied a peculiar
position. She had no alliance with England in the East, while Russia
and France (the hereditary enemy), were leagued. The Triple Alliance
was serviceable to Germany only in case of continental war, when
armies and the possession of the country separating Russia from France
would be an advantage. If her diplomacy was intended to remind
England that Germany could exert the balance of power in the East-
ern Question, and draw from Russia and France satisfactory assur-
ances on their side, it was justifiable in international politics as an
act of self-defense.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 465

True, there was Japan still to be reckoned with, the only nation
whose army was as convenient for Eastern operations as her navy. The
new Oriental power was in the best position for effective decision.
She expressed herself openly as the friend of the United States, at
the moment her ministers perceived the popular enthusiasm with
which the proposition of “Anglo-American alliance” was received.
England, at least, had been guilty only of negative unfriendliness. But
from Russia, Germany, and France wounds had come. The position of
Japan, therefore, operated to hold Germany stiff-necked to the last.

 
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-FOURTH.
Dewey, AGuINALDO, AnD AvGusTI.

THe REMARKABLE STORY OF YOUNG AGUINALDO, LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIP-
PINES— RISING FROM A SERVANT TO BE THE POPULAR IDOL, AND AMBITIOUS OF IMPERIAL
PowER AND Honors— Account oF His Crarry PROCEEDINGS WITH THE AMERICANS
AND SPANIARDS—ProcLaims HIMSELF PRESIDENT-GENERAL OF THE PROVI-

SIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC— AUGUSTI AND HIs
INTRIGUES AND DEPOSITION FROM OFFICE—DEWEY AND His
CAREFUL DirLoMacy AND RESERVE—THE DECLINE OF
AGUINALDO’S POWER — GENERAL MERRITT’s AR-

RIVAL AND PREPARATIONS FOR ASSAULT.

I.

HE victory of Dewey over Montejo, brilliant as it was, fruitful of
such great possibilities, arousing such world-wide interest, and
causing vast changes in international relations, was enforced
by the victory of Sampson’s fleet and Shafter’s army at San-

tiago. The splendid valor and endurance of the United States army
and the-unsurpassed skill of Sampson’s squadron swept away, as by a
breath, the scornful idea of Europe that Dewey’s great

THE STORY :
ee performance was accidental. . .
AGUINALDO, In his turn he was to display at Manila the quali-
INSURGENT 2 5 .
LEADER ties of tenacious courage, endurance, silence, and

power, in himself and his officers and sailors, in no less
degree than Shafter concentrated and exhibited with his American
soldiers before Santiago.

The Germans were only irritating and annoying. Dewey’s great task
of dealing with the Spaniards and the Malayan native insurgents was
one.in which he was to exhibit the highest abilities of statesmanship,
diplomacy, generalship, and executive judgment. In destroying the
Spanish fleet and capturing Cavité stronghold, he had executed the
lightest of his tasks, even though that alone astonished the world.

Without sufficient force to maintain order or secure life and prop-

erty in Manila, he could neither conquer it nor demand its surrender.
(466)
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 467

He was 7,500 miles from his nearest home port, and no preparation
had been made to reénforce or support him with ships or troops. There
was nothing to do but await these aids.

Foreseeing this possibility he had conferred at Hong Kong with
the insurgent leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, whom he encouraged by the
offer of arms, ammunition, and support, to return to the island of
Luzon and organize native troops to seal up Manila in the rear, and
hold the city in siege until American troops could arrive.

Aguinaldo was at this time the central figure of the revolutionary
movement, brave, intelligent, ambitious. The agreement with him
must be made without making promises that the United States could
not redeem. It was not a part of the character of a man of Admiral
Dewey’s mold to deceive. He could only assure Aguinaldo that the
United States Government would give protection to the islands and to
the people, and that the faith and purposes of the American people
were known of all men.

The details of the understanding have not been made known, but
Aguinaldo took the field immediately after the naval battle, and organ-
ized his army.

Thus, Admiral Dewey, with 2,000 men and his ships, was to hold
under control the open enemy and the impenetrable but ostensible
friend. The Spaniard and the Malay, are opposing extremes of the
same type. The Spaniard is the highest development of trained, cul-
tivated, and cold unscrupulousness; the metaphysician of duplicity.
The Malay is the most dangerous natural type of superstitious
craft and cruelty; without education, he is a fatalist whose purpose
never extends beyond the immediate object. The Mestizos, cross-breeds
of these extremes, may be imagined. With inherited adaptability to
the trained guile of one and with the unerring instinct of opportunity
and swift action of the other, they possess subtle duplicity and absence
of fear peculiar to them.

From this half-breed race sprang Aguinaldo, the child of a thrifty
peasant, ambitious for hisson. The stories related of Aguinaldo’s origin,
youth, ambitions, and adventures, are numerous; all have the flavor
468 HISTORY OF THE

of superstitious, half-barbarous tradition—stories that, with slight
changes, are related of all the heroes of wild and uncontrollable peo-
ples.. It seems quite sure, at least, that his father confided him to a
benevolent and kindly old Jesuit priest when Emilio was a child, with
the hope that the boy might find a place in the religious establishment.
He was the servant of this priest, who, observing the unusual intelligence
and quickness of the boy, stepped aside from the rule of the govern-
ment and performed the mission of his sacred office—he gave to
the young Aguinaldo the best education he could. The pupil learned
rapidly and was eager for knowledge. The old priest thought he saw in
his character an instrument of good influence over the wild natives,
and continued to teach him, hoping to induct his pupil into orders.

But the church had no place in the dreams of Aguinaldo. He
mastered all he could learn in the priest’s house and familiarized him-
self with the clerical offices and manners. When he could learn no
more, he concluded to go to Hong Kong and study medicine. There
he saw another world, of Europeans and subtle Orientals, of broad
and changing ideas and objects. Of pleasing address, agreeable, and open
in manner, with ready adaptability to circumstances, he was soon well
known and enjoyed excellent opportunities for acquiring the polish
as well as the Oriental pretenses of that society.

As there has always been a state of revolution in the Philippines,
a Junta was in perpetual existence, with headquarters at Hong Kong.
There embittered exiles and hunted leaders met, and from them
Aguinaldo became infected with that mysterious brain taint, peculiar
to genius and ambition—the restless and boundless desire to do great
things and be a leader of men.

He was intellectually superior to the members of the Junta, and
was popular with his people because of his attainments. He tcok the
threads of the raveled revolution in hand, knitted them together into
a new plan, and was sent to Luzon to set on fire the hearts of the
oppressed. His youth, his dauntless courage, his ready wit, his superior
knowledge of the world, soon made him the popular idol. The rey-
olution sprang up in every province where Spaniards could be looted
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 469

and massacred. Captain-General Augusti offered $20,000 for the head
of Aguinaldo. It was usual. The bribe had been offered many times
during four hundred years of Spanish rule. It was in the direction
of economy. If a native or Mestizo traitor yielded to the temptation
and brought in the desired head, it always happened that the claimant
was proved guilty of some previous act of treason to Spain. It was
more practical to punish treason than to reward treachery. The
claimant was usually executed after a rapid trial, and the reward was
saved. The families of attainted subjects could not inherit, and the
money could not be paid to the dead man. Thus, bookkeeping was
simplified, and the treasury profited.

A story is recorded of Aguinaldo’s first revolution that illustrates
the character of the government and the natives. It may not be true;
it reads very like that fiction of which it is said truth is stranger.
Yet, it must be remembered that in China and the Philippines much
obviously false in other countries may be peculiarly true.

The story runs that when Aguinaldo and 4,000 or 5,000 of his sup-
porters were hidden in a swampy retreat, the Governor-General, Sefior
Don Basilio Augusti y Davila, offered his reward for Aguinaldo. Within
a week he received a note from the insurgent chief, saying: “I need
the sum you offer very much, and will deliver the head myself.”

Ten days later the southeast typhoon was raging. It was raining
as it can rain only in the Orient, a sheet of black water flooding the
earth. The two sentinels at the Governor-General’s gate made the
usual reverent sign as a priest entered, who asked if his Excellency
was within and unengaged. They answered “Yes,” to both questions.
Don Basilio did not turn his head as some one entered. It was his
secretary, he supposed, come to help prepare an eloquent statement
upon the condition of the colonies. It was not the secretary, but a
priest, who said: “Peace be with you, my son.”

The cleric locked the door, and dropping his cloak, cried: “Do you
know me?”

Don Basilio did not know him. It was Aguinaldo, also a twenty-
inch bolo, a native knife —answering to the Cuban machete,—sharp as
470 HISTORY OF THE

a razor, carried by every Malayan in time of trouble. With it he
can lop off an arm with a single stroke.

“JT have brought the head of Aguinaldo,” the chief said, touching
the edge of his jewel-hilted bolo to ascertain its condition, “and I
claim the reward! Hasten, else I shall have to expedite the matter
myself.”

Don Basilio was entrapped. He had to open his desk and count out
the sum in Spanish gold. Aguinaldo punctiliously wrote a receipt,
coolly counted the money, and walked backward toward the door.
He suddenly opened it and dashed out, just ahead of a pistol bullet
that cut his locks on the temple. Captain-General Polavieja offered
Aguinaldo and Atachio, his lieutenant, a pardon and $200,000 each, to
quit the colony. They accepted and got the money, only to learn that
they were both to be assassinated the next night at a fiesta. The two
men who had undertaken the deed were found dead, stabbed to the
heart, in their own beds. On the kris handle was a bit of paper with
a line saying: “Beware of the Malay’s vengeance.”

Aguinaldo was then twenty-five years old. He and his lieutenant
soon discovered that the revolution was doomed. Such revolutions
are always doomed when the oppressor charges up against and draws
the sinews of war in taxes from the insurgents. In accordance,
therefore, with Oriental custom, the two leaders agreed to accept the
bribe and deprive the insurrection of its leadership. True, they
were leaving their followers by hundreds to cruel execution and the
grind of the taxgatherer; but that was the custom. Four hundred
years of Spanish colonial rule teaches much.

The amount of the bribe offered was variously reported at from
$100,000 to $500,000. In the Orient the nudity of virgin Truth is looked
upon as an impropriety, dangerous to public morality. She is repre-
sented, therefore, as bearing butterfly wings, brilliant with many colors,
draped in a scarf woven from the delicate threads of vivid imagina-
tion, and the great temple of her resort and worship is described as
extending far beyond the municipal limits and even penetrating the
suburban additions of the city of Utica.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 471

The acceptance of the bribe was justified to the faithful by the
promise that the sum was to be applied to purchasing arms and
munitions to be used when the flame of faith should rise again, when
the natives should have saved up fresh means for the struggle.

This, then, was the young revolutionary leader with whom Admiral
Dewey was now to deal. Twenty-eight years old, alert, confident, with
boundless ambition and the determination to find his way to leader-
ship and power past every obstacle that duplicity could evade or piti-
less treachery and cruelty could remove.

He had a personal feud with General Augusti, and could be trusted
to seal up Manila inland. He had a great respect for the American
Admiral, who had so swiftly destroyed from the face of the ocean the
naval power of Spain. But the genuine devotion of his heart was
expended upon Don Emilio Aguinaldo, and the honors and fortune
he could see awaiting himself. The description of the man—myth
or truth, half fact or half fancy, whatever the reports may be—deserves
the setting of Italy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when
guile and poison went hand in hand with brute mastership and the
bloody sword.

Il.

Tue story of the siege of Manila will not be told until some of
those who can shall have escaped the consequences of telling it, by
death in a natural manner. The mysteries involved in Ben aa
the ostensible jealousies and feuds between Governor-Gen- CRACKED IN
eral Augusti, the Archbishop of Manila, and the Vice- rege igare
-Governor Jaudenes, the negotiations between Spaniards and Aguinaldo’s
emissaries, the secret arrangements with the German Admiral, the
miraculous restoration of Augusti’s family by the insurgent leader,—
apparently through motives of humanity,— these are incidents that can,
in narration, produce only the effect which one who is stone deaf must
experience as he views the passing scenes of an acted drama.

It was about two weeks after the naval battle when Aguinaldo
landed on Luzon and issued a proclamation to the natives, admitting
472 HISTORY OF THE

that he had surrendered two years previously because all resources were
exhausted; but he had returned now to punish Spain for failing to keep
her promises to him; that he brought aid and arms for the struggle.

All the provinces around Manila at once rose in insurrection and
joined Aguinaldo. Governor-General Augusti issued a proclamation
offering $25,000 reward for the head of Aguinaldo.

Within two weeks the insurgent army had flocked into the country
around the capital, and, acting under Aguinaldo’s shrewd plans, began,
on May 28, a simultaneous assault upon Imus, Cavité province, and
Bakoor. The steady advance of the insurgents along the coast was
supported by the American gunboat Petrel, and the Spaniards in the
outlying districts took refuge in Manila. The insurgents soon held five
important positions within ten miles of Manila, and in capturing them
killed five hundred Spaniards. The Spanish outposts were reénforced
by the addition of 4,000 troops, but on. May 31 they were forced back
along the whole line by hand-to-hand fighting of the most desperate
character, in which the aggregate loss of the enemy was upward of a
thousand men. The fighting lasted seventy hours. A typhoon raged
fiercely during the whole time and the torrential rain rendered the
rifles of the contestants almost useless. The insurgents almost invari-
ably fought at close quarters and used their knives with terrible effect.

Malibon, Tarlac, and Bakoor were in possession of the insurgents,
who also made an attack upon Santa Mesa and Malate, on June 1.
Aguinaldo, who had been rendered more desperate and daring by the
price put upon his head, was most anxious to make a rush upon
Manila at once, but Admiral Dewey refused, from a huthanitarian
point of view, to permit this, fearing that the passions of the semi-
civilized natives might lead them to excesses. The Admiral, therefore,
insisted that Aguinaldo wait until the arrival of the United States
troops. In pursuance of that policy he forbade the insurgents to cross
the Malate River, seven miles south of Manila, and Aguinaldo established
his headquarters at Cavité, where his prisoners were brought in.

It was expected that troops would arrive from San Francisco not
later than June 15, and Aguinaldo was patient in expectation of their
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 473

arrival. He adopted the humanitarian policy that Dewey had not
only proclaimed but practiced, and issued orders to his army, forbidding
them, under pain of severe penalties, to destroy or injure the lives
or property of any foreigners, or of Spanish non-combatants. He
also indicated his desire to establish a native administration under
an American protectorate, holding a dictatorship, with an advisory
council, until the islands were conquered. Then a Republican Assem-
bly would be called.

A singular incident of war occurred in the early actions. The
swift descent of the insurgents upon the Spanish towns resulted in
placing in the hands of Aguinaldo as prisoners the wife and children
of General Augusti, who had offered a price for Aguinaldo’s head.
They were treated with great respect, and held as hostages to secure
proper treatment of native prisoners in Spanish hands for a time.
Admiral Dewey conveyed to Aguinaldo a suggestion of the moral effect
to be produced by returning the helpless captives to Augusti and re-
lieving the distress of all. Accordingly, the Augusti family was conveyed
to Manila harbor and placed in the hands of the German Admiral,
who took them secretly into the city to the Governor-General. What-
ever explanation of their return was made by the Germans or believed
by Augusti, the Spanish dispatches declared that the members of the
family had succeeded in effecting their escape from the insurgents
and, after encountering distressful hardships, were able to board a Ger-
man war ship and were smuggled into Manila. The Spanish account
of any fact affecting their pride is usually surprising to others.

The successes of the insurgents were so complete and rapid that
the first week in June saw Manila entirely invested, with constant
skirmishing in the suburbs. The water supply fell into insurgent hands,
but Dewey gave instructions that it must not be cut off because
of the great distress it might cause the helpless non-combatants and
foreign residents. Their successes inflamed the insurgents. They leaped
to the conclusion that they were masters of the situation. It was
boldly declared that the independence of the Philippines was achieved

and a republic would be established. At Singapore a delegation of
23
474 HISTORY OF THE

the Junta called on the American Consul-General and presented an
address, thanking him for sending Aguinaldo to the Philippines, con-
gratulating Admiral Dewey, expressing a desire for the establishment
of a native government in the Philippines under American protec-
tion, deprecating the restoration of the. islands to Spain or their
transference to any other power, and declaring that the natives were
able to govern themselves.

Meanwhile, Augusti had forwarded dispatches to Madrid, declaring
that defense was almost hopeless in the absence of supplies and
munitions. He asked for plenary powers in dealing with the situa-
tion. These were granted to him. The authority meant that he was
free to negotiate with the insurgents with boundless promises of
autonomy and liberty. Shortly afterwards Augusti reported that his
native troops were deserting and even his Spaniards were disheart-
ened and were surrendering themselves under promises made of the
security of their lives and safety.

General Prima de Rivera, formerly Governor-General of the Philip-
pines, made a fierce speech in the Cortes, in which he exposed the
fact that the Spanish Government had dealt foully with the colonial
government. He declared that when be took charge there was a sur-
plus of $5,000,000 in the treasury. He reported it and asked permis-
sion to fortify and strengthen his defenses, because the Americans
were preparing at Hong Kong. The government replied to him that
there was no prospect of war with the United States and the surplus
was dissipated in Spain. He charged the government with abandon-
ing Augusti.

At this time the plenary powers held by Augusti began to affect
the situation at Manila seriously.
 

 

 

 

 

AUGUST]

GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 477

Il,

ApmiraL Dewsy found himself in a network of Spanish guile, na-
tive craft, and foreign hostility. German, French, and Russian vessels
were to be distrusted. British and Japanese sympathy ueng ae
existed, but could not be displayed. The backbone of TRIGUES BY
resistance in the city was in the Archbishop of Manila. are
It was known that on May 1, after Montejo’s fleet was destroyed,
Augusti had hoisted the white flag of surrender in Manila. His
soldiers were ordered to be in readiness to march out and lay down
their arms. If the white flag was observed by Dewey, he did not dare
accept the surrender under the circumstances. His force was too
small.

When the Archbishop learned that the white flag was raised, he
held a council with the Vice-Governor, Sefior Don Ferruni Jaudenes,
and deposed Augusti. The yellow flag of Spain was unfurled again,
and the Archbishop issued his pastoral appeal against the accursed
and savage Americans. But Augusti was restored—though by what
process was not understood.

With plenary power bestowed upon him, negotiations now began
between Spaniards and insurgents. Advised by the Germans, it was
said, encouraged by government promises of assistance from Cer-
vera’s fleet, from Camara’s fleet, from troops, Augusti sought to win
Aguinaldo over by warning him that the Americans were only using
him to hold the Spaniards in check until their troops could arrive,
when he would be worse off than under Spanish autonomy. Or, that,
if the Spanish reénforcements arrived first, the Americans would Be
destroyed and the insurgents abandoned.

Aguinaldo replied that he had guarantees from the Americans.
The Archbishop urged him to test the guarantees and see if he were
not being deceived. The Americans were conscienceless mercena-
“ries, whose hand would be more remorseless than that of Spain.
Augusti warned him that the foreign war ships would not permit the
478 HISTORY OF THE

Americans to land their forces, that Europe had determined not to
permit the United States to gain a colony in the East.

Aguinaldo’s personal secretary, Legardo, was busily employed in
these negotiations, as the go-between. Atachio, the lieutenant of
Aguinaldo, who was to share the former bribe, and had charged that it
had not been employed for revolutionary purposes, but that Aguinaldo
had misused it for personal purposes, was now on the island. He was
not a pleasant person to have about if Aguinaldo should conclude to
make terms with Spain. Atachio was arrested, charged with a trea-
sonable act, and imprisoned. Sandigo, another insurgent leader, con-
ceded by general consent to be actuated by disinterested patriotism
alone, who possessed fine executive ability and true political foresight,
was in Atachio’s confidence, and distrusted Aguinaldo. He did not
hesitate to say that the leader was only looking out for personal
wealth, power, and honors. Sandigo, also, was arrested upon a pre-
tense, and sent to prison.

Atachio “disappeared.” It was said that he had been shot for treason;
that he had escaped and deserted to the enemy; that he had been
deported because of his jealousies, and as a benevolent act of his old
comrade who did not wish to take his life.

The news came to the Americans. They could not ascertain what
had become of Atachio or of his brother, his cousin and two nephews.
They discovered Sandigo, imprisoned in a house, awaiting death. They
talked with him and visited him daily. Aguinaldo could not risk
executing his vengeance under the circumstances. With the hard,
impassive, unscrupulous craft of his race, he had removed all the
enemies possible on the first days of his occupation. Twenty-three
priests in a monastery at Cavité fell into his hands the first day he
took possession. They, too, “disappeared.”

But Aguinaldo had ostentatiously practiced magnanimity to some
foes. Their lives were spared, and he had 4,000 or more Spanish
and native volunteer prisoners at Cavité. His army was large and
could be greatly augmented. He was credited with having 100,000
guns and some field pieces captured from the Spanish.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 479

He was rendered uneasy by the warnings of future hostility on the
part of Americans, and he concluded to test the good faith of Dewey.
He declared publicly the independence of the Philippine Islands,
announced the intention to organize a republic, and organized a Pro-
visional Government, of which he was President. He was to be dis-
tinguished by the privilege of wearing a collar of braided gold, as
the Spanish governors were. His proclamation was issued in these
words :—

Don Emitio AcuinaLpo ¥ Faury,
President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines and General-in-Chief of
Its Army: —

In conformity with the precepts in the decree of this government, dated June
23 ult., and the instructions which accompanied it, I proclaim as follows: —

ArticLe 1. Sefior Don Baldomero Aguinaldo is appointed Secretary of War
and Public Works; Sefior Don Leandro Ibarra, Secretary of the Interior and branches
comprehended therein; Sefior Don Mariani Trias, Secretary of the Treasury and the
annexed branches.

The conduct of the Bureau of Foreign Relations, Marine and Commerce, will be
in charge provisionally, for the present, of the Presidency, until there is appointed a
Secretary who is considered more apt.

Arr. 2, The gentlemen named will assume charge of their respective offices, pre-
viously having solemnly taken, on the day designated for that purpose by the Pres-
ident, the following oath: “I swear by God and my honor to carry out the laws
and decisions and to fulfill faithfully the duty I voluntarily accept, under the penal-
ties established for the same. So may it be.”

This oath will be taken before the President and the dignitaries who are invited
for this solemn act, the interested person placing his right hand on the New Testa-
ment.

Art. 3. The directors and chiefs of provinces and villages on receiving their
respective titles will take a similar oath before the President and the Secretaries of
the government.

The prominent counselors, as well as the delegates and sub-chiefs, will take thé
oath before the chief of the province and the chiefs of the villages previously in-
vited to the solemn act.

Art. 4, In the reports and similar documents presented to the authorities and
in official correspondence, there will be employed before the name of the official the
title “Sefior” or “ Maguifior” (Tagalo), according to the character and importance of
the same. When the official is not so addressed the personal title “Usted” will be
used when directed to an inferior or to an equal, but when addressed to a superior
the title ‘‘ Xorot ros” will be employed.
480 HISTORY OF THE

Art. 5. The Secretaries are empowered to sign “by order of the President” such
resolutions or decisions as are of small importance and those which expediency re-
quires should be put into effect; but final decrees and resolutions will be confirmed
by the President and the Secretary.

Art. 6. The chiefs of provinces are permitted to use as distinctive of their office
a cane with gold head and silver tassels. On the upper part of the cane there will
be engraved a sun and three stars.

The chiefs of villages may carry a similar cane, but with black tassels. The
sub-chiefs, also, may carry a cane with silver head and red tassels.

The provincial counselors are authorized to wear a triangular badge of gold,
pendent from a collar and a chain of the same metal; on the badge there shall ap-
pear an engraved sun and three stars. The delegates will wear a similar badge, but
of silver; also the chain.

Art. 7. The President will wear as a distinctive mark a collar of gold from
which depends a badge similar to those heretofore described, and also a whistle of
gold. The Secretaries will wear a similar collar with the badge, and the directors,
also, but of silver.

The President will carry, also, a cane with head and tassels of gold.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT,
EMILIO AGUINALDO.

Dated at Baxoor, July 5, 1898.

Aguinaldo had been told that the first American reénforcements
would arrive not later than June 15. They did not reach Cavité
until June 30, and there was but one brigade of troops under Gen-
eral Anderson. Aguinaldo was suspicious of the strength of the
Americans, and was not unwilling to set himself up between the
United States, Spain, and Europe as a factor to be reckoned with.

He respected Admiral Dewey, who had not been open to negotia-
tion or discussion and who had made no sign. He had seen what
Dewey’s squadron could do on the water; and when the Admiral
had warned him that if his troops undertook to enter Manila they
would be decimated by the guns of the war ships, he had acknowl-
edged the force of the argument. But now that American soldiers
were encamped between his lines and the ships he felt easier.

He was invited to attend the Fourth of July celebration by the
troops, but replied that he was “indisposed.” He sent his military
band.
NL ONIAVEM

SaNidditHd SAL

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 483

The “indisposition” was, perhaps, the preoccupation of preparing
the announcement dated July 5, of the provisional republic of the
Philippines.

The Americans were still reticent. He was puzzled by such unrespon-
siveness to his clearly expressed intention to forestall their purposes.

But Aguinaldo exhibited no lack of confidence, if he felt any. He
became haughty, reserved, cautious, as becoming his high office. When
the American commissaries and quartermasters asked the natives for
supplies, they answered that they could not comply with the request
without permission from “the President-General.” It was difficult to
secure horses, bullock-carts, and wagons, for transporting supplies.
Aguinaldo did not inconvenience himself to obtain them.

The patience of Chief-Quartermaster Jones was exhausted. He
must prepare quarters for an army division, soon to arrive,and delay
was perilous. He visited Aguinaldo’s headquarters at Bakoor, whither
they had been removed. The orderly announced that the General was
“indisposed.” Major Jones waited two hours and called again. The
orderly politely said the General was asleep and nobody dared awaken
him when he was asleep.

Major Jones left abruptly and wrote a terse and very plain letter
which he sent to Aguinaldo by an orderly who was instructed to see
that it reached the young Dictator. It notified him that if all the
transportation and assistance needed was not promptly furnished by
the natives, the American soldiers would at once seize everything
needed without permission. “We should regret very much,” the let-
ter concluded, “to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos.
Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel
the Spaniards and to give a good government to the whole people,
and the return we are asking is comparatively slight. General Ander-
son wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their
good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the
current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred
horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses
with each individual owner.
484 HISTORY OF THE

“JT will await your reply.”

The convenience of the American army was not as important to
“the President-General” as was the ultimate American purpose. He
sent an aide at once to Genera] Anderson to inquire if the letter of
Major Jones was authorized.

General Anderson replied that it was authorized, and, in fact,
ordered. He added the remark that when an American commander
was indisposed or asleep it was the rule to have some one in authority
ready to transact matters of importance.

Then the craft of Aguinaldo was exercised. He formally replied to
the letter next day. He expressed surprise that there should have
been any suggestion of unwillingness on the part of the Filipinos to
aid the Americans, for the Filipinos knew that the Americans “ did
not desire a colony,” and were there only to drive out the Spaniards
and turn the islands over to the Filipinos for government. The
Filipinos would be only too glad to help the Americans, but they could
not furnish so much transportation, because they did not have it. In
conclusion, he asked for a definite statement of the American inten-
tions.

The receipt of his letter was acknowledged, with the statement that
it would be referred to General Merritt upon his arrival.

Then transportation was furnished, but in many crafty ways Agui-
naldo sought to get a definite expression of purpose, and to obtain
letters addressed to him as “President.” General Anderson informed
him that the Americans could give no recognition to his government
or his office without authority from the President of the United States,

During these proceedings the insurgents were continually assault-
ing the fortifications around Manila, and the Spanish garrison was
worn out with sleepless guard, poor food, and exposure to the drench-
ing rains. Persons coming out of the city reported famine as fast
approaching. Horses were being butchered for food, and the distress
was great. There were dissensions in the army over the question of
surrendering. The Captain-General, Augusti, was determined to sur-
render as soon as the Americans advanced. Some of the subordinate
S3NIddIMHd SHL NI ONIGNIYD ANVO YVONS

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 487

officers who wanted to fight to the last, were reported as having secretly
drawn lots to determine which should kill Augusti if he surrendered,
and the plan for his assassination was reported complete. The vol-
unteers had refused to leave the walls of the city, and nearly all the
regulars had been sent into the trenches and outworks.

Iy.

On Juty 23, Major-General Merritt, Military-Governor and Com-
mander-in-Chief of the United States army for the Philippines, arrived
with 4,000 troops. Informing himself at once of the . oo. ivrer.
military and political conditions existing, he decided MENT or THE
to have no communication with Aguinaldo or his Perens
provisional government, but to deal with the Spanish holders of the
island and the obstacles in the way of the capture of Manila. He
made an inspection of the camps and of the prisons at Cavité, where
some of Aguinaldo’s prisoners were confined. They were emaciated,
wan, and starving. They had sold every button, medal, ornament,
and nearly all their clothing, to purchase food. They were served
with rations from the United States commissariat and cared for.

The brigades were moved up nearer to Manila, and the heavy bat-
tery, which had been presented to the United“States by Mr. John
Jacob Astor, of New York, was placed in effective position. The
road from Bakoor to Manila was occupied up to the village of Malate
on the river of the same name where the Spaniards had thrown up
intrenchments.

This movement thrust Aguinaldo’s troops aside. They had been
occupying the position and carrying on an intermittent artillery and
rifle duel with the Spaniards within the walls. The poor marksman-
ship of the Spaniards sent their shells and bullets over the insur-
gents and into the American ranks. General Merritt sent instructions
to Aguinaldo to remove his men, or to make them cease the exchange
of firing, because it accomplished no object and endangered our
488 HISTORY OF THE

troops. The insurgents were ordered away and the Astor battery was
placed within a thousand yards of the walls of Manila.

The country all around Manila was reconnoitered and mapped for
use in the event of assault. Preparations advanced rapidly, and with
the precision of well-ordered purpose. Aguinaldo grew uneasy. If
Manila passed under American control there would be no foothold for
an insurgent army. What was to become of Aguinaldo’s troops and
their arms? He relaxed his pride and practiced the cunning of hu-
mility. He wrote to General Merritt and begged the privilege, as a
reward for his troops, that on the day of capture or surrender, they be
permitted to march through Manila. The triumph of passing through
the streets they had assisted in conquering, would repay them for the
sacrifices they had made to assist the Americans against the power
of Spain.

General Merritt meditated over the political effect of this request,
the prestige and glory it would confer upon Aguinaldo, and the pos-
sibilities it offered for future troubles, and took it under advisement
only.

Aguinaldo was averse to having his men disarmed after Manila
should be taken. He made the suggestion that there might be formed
several regiments of Filipinos, officered by Americans, and kept as part
of the regular force of Americans as long as the United States main-
tained a military force in the islands. The suggestion brought up
vividly the action of the Filipinos in going over by whole regiments
to the Spaniards in rebellions. It would be difficult to find American
officers who would voluntarily take such a command. They remem-
bered the great Indian Mutiny, and discouraged a repetition of the
betrayals and massacres that were practiced by native regiments
against their British officers around Calcutta,

In the city Governor Augusti was disheartened. He was constantly
urging his government to authorize him to capitulate. The govern-
ment refused, and replied that Camara’s fleet was on its way with suc-
cor. But Augusti was a Spaniard, and did not believe the government.
He persisted in his demands, and expressed the fear that if he did not
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 489

capitulate to the Americans the insurgents would storm the city and
loot it with awful massacre.

Spain cared little for’such an argument. She was hoping by some
trick to save the Philippines in the negotiations for peace, then plainly
within politica] view.

Augusti resigned; or was deposed—which? Jaudenes was appointed
Governor, with the implacable Archbishop at his back to lend him
advice and strength.

At this time great events were occurring on the other side of the
world.

 
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-FIFTH.

Tue Invasion oF Porto Rico.

YELLOW AND MALARIAL FEvERS INVADE THE CAMPS OF THE UNITED STATES TROOPS NEAR SANTIAGO
—A “Rounp RoBIN” AND THE PROTEST THAT CAUSED THE FIGHTERS TO BE BrouGHT
Home— GENERAL MILES, WITH THE FIFTH ARMY Corps, INvaDEs PorTo Rico, Lanp-

ING AT GUANICA—YAUCO AND PoncE WELCOME OuR SOLDIERS AND ARE GLAD
To BE IN THE UNITED StTaTes—THE Two MovEMENTS THAT WERE TO
UNITE AND CapTuRE SAN JUAN, THE CaPITAL— INTERRUPTED BY
THE PEACE PROTOCOL, BUT VERY SUCCESSFULLY UNDER Way
— GENERAL MiILes REGARDS THE PEOPLE FAVORABLY —

SIGNIFICANCE OF Porto Rico’s READY SURRENDER.

I.

HE fall of Santiago was to be followed by the fall of Spain.
Dewey’s victory at Manila had opened vast possibilities of
internationalism to the United States and set in motion all
the political influences of the world. The victory of Samp-

son and Shafter at Santiago had confirmed the permanence of

American power and put an end to all possible machinations by con-

santiago arren ‘imental Europe. Just as it had unnerved Augusti at
THE Manila, it had unnerved Captain-General Macias of
ere Porto Rico, and filled Spain with mortal despair.

The surrender of Santiago was obtained none too soon. It was a
piece of good fortune. Immediately after the Spaniards turned over
their arms, the American troops were sent into camp on the hilltops
north of the city where the cool atmosphere, it was hoped, would enable
them to recuperate and resist disease. It was too late. Three weeks
of fighting and constant exposure in trenches, without tentage and on
short rations, followed by the sudden relaxation of nervous tension in
inaction, rendered them particularly susceptible to the diseases pecu-
liar to the country and the season. Yellow fever, malarial fever, and
other camp maladies began to appear. Nearly 75 per cent. of the army

was soon unfit for duty. August 1, fifteen days after the surrender,
(490)
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 49]

General Shafter reported 4,239 cases of sickness and fifteen deaths,
while many others of his men were weak and ready to succumb.

A conference was held by the officers at Santiago which resulted
in the preparation of a petition or protest called a “Round Robin,”
addressed to General Shafter, which was as follows:—

We, the undersigned officers commanding the various brigades, divisions, etc., of
the army of occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army should
be at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point on the northern
seacoast of the United States; that it can be done without danger to the people of
the United States; that yellow fever in the army at present is not epidemic; that
there are a few sporadic cases; but that the army is disabled by malarial fever to
the extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition to be prac-
tically destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever, which is sure to come in the near
future.

We know from. the reports of competent officers and from personal observations
that the army is unable to move into the interior and that there are not facilities
for such a move, if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until too late.
Moreover, the best medical authorities of the island say that with our present equip-
ment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season without losses from
malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever.

This army must be moved at once or perish. As the army can be safely moved
aow, the persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the
unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are the result of careful
personal observation, and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our
medical officers with the army, who understand the situation absolutely.

J. Forp Kent,

Major-General, volunteers, commanding First Division, Fifth Corps.
J. C. Bates,

Major-General, volunteers, commanding Provisional Division.
Apna R. CHAFFEE,

Major-General, commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.
SamMuEL 8S. SuMMER,

Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding First Brigade, cavalry.
Wirtiam Luprow,

Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Second Division.
ADELBERT AMES,

Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, First Division.
Lronarp Woop,

Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding the city of Santiago.
THEODORE RoosEVELT,

Colonel, commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.
492 HISTORY OF THE

General Shafter had called the conference, and the “Round Robin”
was transmitted to him by Colonel Roosevelt, with the following letter
of explanation :—

In a meeting of the general and medical officers, called by you at the palace
this morning, we were all, as you know, unanimous in view of what should be done
with the army. To keep us here, in the opinion of every officer commanding a
division or a brigade, will simply involve the destruction of thousands. There is
no possible reason for not shipping practically the entire ‘command north at once.
Yellow fever cases are very few in the cavalry division, where I command one of
the two brigades, and not one true case of yellow fever has occurred in this
division, except among the men sent to the hospital at Siboney, where they have, I
believe, contracted it. But in this division there have been 1,500 cases of malarial
fever. Not a man has died from it, but the whole command is so weakened and
so shattered as to be ripe for dying like sheep when a real yellow fever epidemic,
instead of a fake epidemic like the present, strikes us, as it is bound to if we stay
here at the height of the sickness season, August and the beginning of September.

Quarantine against malarial fever is much like quarantining against the toothache.
All of us are certain, as soon as the authorities at Washington fully appreciate the
conditions of the army, to be sent home. If we are kept here it will in all human
probability mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons here estimate that over half
the army, if kept here during the sickly season, will die.

This is not only the trouble from the standpoint of the individual lives lost, but
it means ruin from the standpoint of the military efficiency of the flower of the
American army, for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you. The sick
list, large though it is, exceeding 4,000, affords but a faint index of the debilita-
tion of the army. Not ten per cent. are fit for active work. Six weeks on the
north Maine coast, for instance, or elsewhere, where the yellow fever germ cannot
possibly propagate, would make us all as fit as fighting cocks, able as we are and
eager to take a leading part in the great campaign against Havana in the Fall,
even if we are not allowed to try Porto Rico.

We can be moved north, if moved at once, with absolute safety to the country,
although, of course, it would have been infinitely better if we had been moved
north or to Porto Rico two weeks ago. If there were any object in keeping us
here, we would face yellow fever with as much indifference as we face bullets.
But there is no object in it. The four immune regiments ordered here are suffi-
cient to garrison the city and surrounding towns, and there is absolutely nothing
for us to do here, and there has not been since the city surrendered. It is impos-
sible to move into the interior. Every shifting of camp doubles the sick rate in
our present weakened condition; and, anyhow, the interior is rather worse than the
coast, as I have found by actual reconnoissance. Our present camps are as health-
ful as any camps at this end of the island can be.
 

 

 

FORTIFICATION, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 495

I write only because I cannot see our men, who have fought so bravely, and
who have endured extreme hardship and danger so uncomplainingly, go to destruc-
tion without striving, so far as lies in me, to avert a doom as fearful as it is un-
necessary and undeserved.

The “Round Robin” caused a great deal of excited comment in
the United States, owing to the fact that such proceedings are rare
in armies, and to the additional fact that the public had not sus-
pected the existence of the conditions exposed. The government gave
orders that the official letters must not be permitted to pass outside the
United States by cable or telegraph, lest the information give encour-
agement to Spain.

The cavalry of Wheeler’s division at Santiago was immediately
ordered to Montauk Point, Long Island, U. 8. A., and preparations were
at once made to bring the infantry home. Five regiments of “im-
munes,” Southern soldiers that had once suffered from yellow fever,
and were considered safe from a second infection, were ordered to
Santiago for garrison duty, under command of Brigadier-General Hood,
son of the famous Confederate Commander.

The return of the troops from Cuba was attended by many diffi-
culties, and involved much suffering to the sick and wounded.

Il.

Swirtty following up the Spanish collapse at Santiago, General
Nelson A. Miles, General-in-Chief of the army, sailed with part of the
Fifth Army Corps from Santiago to Porto Rico nine Bl aid en oe
days after the surrender. He was accompanied by _ IsLanp oF
Major-General James H. Wilson, of volunteers, and was eee
reénforced later with fresh troops from Newport News under Major-
General John R. Brooke, U.S. A. No opportunity was to be permitted
for Spain to recover the shock of her losses.

The squadron under Commodore Watson, intended to pursue Ca-
mara’s ships, was now enlarged to a fleet, which Admiral Sampson
496 HISTORY OF THE

was to command, with orders to prepare for immediate attack upon
the Canary Islands and a descent upon the Spanish fortified seaports
to find Camara’s hiding ships and destroy them. The announcement
caused great fear throughout Spain, and once again her cabinet sought
to arouse Europe to combine against the entrance by American ships
upon European waters for war purposes—urging the step as a retalia-
tory act against the Monroe Doctrine. But the European Powers did
not display any intention to act after an exchange of notes. The
appearance of a British squadron at Gibraltar was considered ominous
to the proposed interference.

The island of Porto Rico, which was discovered in 1498, and has ever
since been under Spanish rule, is one hundred and eight miles in length
and about forty miles wide. It is a most healthful and delightful coun-
try, with mountain ranges and many streams. Forty of these are navi-
gable for a short distance from the coast. The climate in the interior
is particularly mild and salubrious. It contains an area of about 3,600
square miles and 800,000 inhabitants. It is fourth in rank, according
to size, of the Greater Antilles group, but in prosperity and density
of population it is first. It is one of the few tropical islands and
countries where the white population outnumbers the black. The
commercial capital and largest city is Ponce, situated three miles
inland from the port of the same name on the southern coast. The
city rests on a rich plain, surrounded by gardens and plantations.
There are hot springs in the vicinity, which are much frequented by
invalids. Along the beach in front of the port are extensive depots,
in which the products of the interior, forwarded through Ponce, are
stored for shipment. The last enumeration gave to Ponce a popula-
tion of 37,545, while San Juan, the capital on the north coast, had
only 23,414 inhabitants. Ponce has a number of fine buildings, among
which are the town hall, the theatre, two churches, the Charity and
the Women’s asylums, the barracks, the Cuban House, and the market.
The road between the city and the seaside is a beautiful prom-
enade. Cuba is thirteen times larger than Porto Rico, but its popula-
tion was not more than double the latter before Weyler exterminated
OOM OLYOd 'NVAP NVS ‘VZV1d SHI

 

 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 499

a third of the native Cubans. Besides Ponce and San Juan, the largest
towns on the island, are Arecibo (80,000 inhabitants), Utuado (81,000),
Mayaguez (28,000), San German (20,000), Yauco (25,000), Juana Diaz
(21,000), and there are some ten other towns with a population of
15,000 or over. In the past fifty years about half the population has
gravitated into and about the towns, particularly those of the seaboard.
The inhabitants live in comfortable houses, and many have sufficient
means to purchase all the comforts of the world.

Porto Rico has always been lightly touched by the blighting hand
of Spain. It has been regarded as a part of Spain, rather than a
colony, and for the past twenty years it has been politically a prov-
ince of the Spanish Kingdom. The Spanish Government has had little
to do directly with internal improvements in the island, and kept her
heavy hand off the people, so that there was opportunity for the spirit
of enterprise to develop. As a consequence Porto Rico has about one
hundred and fifty miles of railroad, and as much more under con-
struction; and a system of wagon roads leading to all the important
trading centers that surpasses anything of the sort seen in most parts
of Spain itself. The portions of railroad parallel to the coasts are
long sections of a line that will ultimately make the entire circuit of
the island, with short branches to all the seaports and the inland
market towns.

This beautiful island abounds in sugar, coffee, tobacco, honey, and
wax, which have enriched the people. A very large part of the
trade has been with the United States, whose corn, flour, salt meat,
fish, and lumber were imported in return for sugar, molasses, and
coffee. The natives have little taste for the sea and most of the
foreign trade has been carried in foreign bottoms. Porto Rico is
rich in natural blessings, and, for a tropical region, very healthful.

The capital, San Juan, was the best fortified city of Porto Rico,
occupying there the relative position that Havana occupied in Cuba.
When General Miles started his expedition the expectation was that
it would effect a landing at Fajardo, on the northeastern coast.

After this ostensible purpose had been well published, his convoys
24
500 HISTORY OF THE

and transports suddenly arrived off the harbor of Guanica on the
southwestern coast at daylight on the morning of July 25.

The small Spanish garrison in a blockhouse on the beach was
utterly surprised when Commander Wainwright of the Gloucester ran
into the harbor and with his small guns opened fire. The Spaniards
attempted to reply but were soon driven off and a party of marines
landed and hoisted the American flag over the blockhouse. None of
the Americans was injured, but the Spanish lost several killed and
wounded.

The troops of the expedition, numbering some 3,500, were disem-
barked in the afternoon without difficulty or opposition. The harbor
is the best in the island, although the country about is low and swampy.
Guanica is the port outlet for several towns near the coast. That part
of Porto Rico has never been entirely loyal to Spain, perhaps because
it was in sympathy with the eastern province of Cuba. East of Guanica
are the towns of Yauco and Ponce, the former not more than five
miles distant, and thence a railroad leads to Ponce.

Marching towards Yauco on the 26th there was a skirmish with
the enemy, in which the Americans had four men wounded, and the
Spaniards lost sixteen killed and wounded. When our troops entered
Yauco they were received with enthusiasm and joy, not wholly un-
mixed, however, with some anxiety. Francisco Megia, alcalde, or
mayor, of the town, had issued in advance a proclamation to the
public, to prepare the population for the crisis. It was in these terms,
which accepted annexation as an accomplished fact :—

Citizens :— To-day the citizens of Porto Rico assist in one of her most beanti-
ful festivals. The sun of America shines upon our mountains and valleys this day
of July, 1898. It is a day of glorious remembrance for each son of this beloved
isle, because for the first time there waves over it the flag of the Stars, planted in
the name of the government of the United States of America by the Major-Gen-
eral of the American army, General Miles.

Porto Ricans, we are, by the miraculous intervention of the God of the just,
given back to the bosom of our mother America, in whose waters nature placed us
as people of America. To her we are given back, in the name of her government,
by General Miles, and we must send her our most expressive salutation of generous
 

 

 

STREET SCENE, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 503

affection through our conduct toward the valiant troops represented by distinguished
officers and commanded by the illustrious General Miles.

Citizens: Long live the government of the United States of America! Hail to
their valiant troops! Hail Porto Rico, always American!

Yauco, Porto Rico, UnirEp SraTes or AMERICA.

On the same day the Massachusetts, Dixie, Annapolis, Wasp, and
Gloucester had appeared before Ponce to blockade the port and prepare
to bombard it when the troops arrived from Guanica, ten miles west.
Instead of, meeting with resistance, the city authorities sent a delega-
tion to call on Commander Higginson of the Massachusetts, and welcome
the American forces to peaceful occupation. The population was en-
thusiastic over the Americans, and when General Miles and his soldiers
arrived by rail from Guanica, he entered an American city from which
the Spanish garrison had fled without stopping to look back. In the
streets the whole population had assembled as for a patriotic cele-
bration. The buildings were decorated with the flags of all nations
except Spain. The ceremony of welcoming the conquerors was in-
teresting and unusual.

General Miles, who had come with the army from Guanica, and
General Wilson, who had come with the war ships, were met at Ponce
port by arrangement, and a delegated escort drove them in carriages
into the city proper, to the Casa del Rey, where the civil governor,
Toro, and the mayor, Ulpiano Colon, awaited them. A guard in front
of the building forced a way for the American Generals, and through
the cheering crowd they walked into the building, where they were
presented to the local officials.

Governor Toro said the citizens of Ponce were anxious to know
if the municipal officers and system that had been in vogué would
be continued temporarily, He was assured that municipal affairs
would not be disturbed for the time being, and that the same local
officers would serve. But it was explained that. the local authori-
ties would be responsible to General Wilson as Military Governor,
who would keep the city under a form of martial law oppressive to
none,
504 HISTORY OF THE

After the conference Mayor Colon said he was glad the Americans
had come, because the island would now enjoy prosperity and peace,
and the best. citizens wanted the Americans to take possession.

The political prisoners were released at once. Redolf Figeroa was
saved in the nick of time from being shot by the Spaniards. He
was charged with having cut the telegraph wire between Ponce and San
Juan the previous night. His purpose was to prevent the authorities
in Ponce from sending to San Juan for reénforcements. He had been
led from his cell to be executed, but when our ships entered the harbor,
the Spaniards, in their excitement, let him go, and Figeroa escaped.
Some men who had been political prisoners for years were released.

The popular demonstrations continued all day. The natives were
all in gala dress, and “open house” was kept for all Americans. Kind-
ness and hospitality were unbounded. This outburst was not entirely
the artifice of fear.

Three days before, Captain-General Macias, the Spanish Commander-
in-Chief, had cabled to the Madrid cabinet that Porto Rico could not
be defended. He said the populace was inclined to the Americans
‘and could not be depended upon, and that his handful of 12,000 or
15,000 troops could not make an effective resistance.

This information caused the Sagasta government’s pretenses of war

to collapse. Its most favored possession, Porto Rico, favorable to the
enemy, Cuba inevitably lost, its fleet destroyed, its treasury bankrupt,
and its expected friends in Europe unable to take a step, there was
but one thing to do, if the Philippines were to be saved by hook or
crook. That one thing necessary was to sue for peace.
» On the 26th of July, therefore, the Spanish Government made over-
tures for peace. While General Miles was waiting in Ponce peace
negotiations were pending, but there was to be no halt in the prose-
cution of his campaign.

The great central trans-Porto Rico highway runs from Ponce north-
easterly to San Juan, through the towns of Juan Diaz, Coamo, and Aybo-
nito, where it goes almost eastward to Cayey, there to take a winding
course to the north as far as Caguas, where it turns west to Aguas
 

 

 

STREET SCENE IN MAYAGUEZ, PORTO RICO
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 507

Buenas, and then goes decidedly north to San Juan through Guayanabo
and Rio Piedras, making in all a: distance of about eighty-five miles.
The distance from Ponce to San Juan in a straight line is only forty-
five miles. The highway is a fine military road. Major-General Wil-
son was appointed Governor of Ponce, and the troops started next
day for Juana Diaz. In two days, under American tariffs, the custom-
house at Ponce yielded a revenue of $14,000. The natives were asking
for American flags to hoist over the large buildings, a clear indica-
tion of the state of settled feeling about the new relations.

The campaign in Cuba lasted nineteen days, and was Sandiabaat
upon military lines which were impossible at Santiago. When the:
Spaniards withdrew along the line of the great military road between
Ponce and San Juan they destroyed the bridges, obstructed the roads,
and fortified strong positions in the mountain passage, and then were
surprised to find that one column of our army was sweeping around
the west end of the island, capturing the principalities and towns,
while another had passed over the mountains by a trail which the
Spaniards had supposed impassable, and, therefore, had not fortified
or guarded. The first the Spanish knew of the march of the Ameri-
can army was the appearance of a strong brigade within twenty miles
of the northern coast, at the terminus of the railroad connecting San
Juan with Arecibo. The actual objective of both movements was to
capture San Juan, where the greatest force of the enemy gathered
by retreat. There were not more than half a dozen encounters with
the enemy, all mere skirmishes. The troops on the west coast, under
General Brooke, were all regulars, while the main column that moved
along the military road was composed of volunteers. These acted with
courage and spirit throughout the whole march, and displayed the
temper that would qnickly convert them into veteran soldiers.

The campaign was ended without either movement being com-
pleted. But both were well in hand, and there is no doubt that they
would have been thoroughly carried out to success. A few days more
and General Schwan and General Henry, with their divisions, would
have effected junction at Arecibo, ready for a flank movement on the
508 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

capital in rear of the Spanish forces operating around Aybonito.
These would have been driven from the latter position by General
Wilson; and while there might have been found many points for a
stand by the enemy, the only possible outcome would have been pre-
cipitate retreat by the Spanish to San Juan, or their capture.

“The island of Porto Rico,” said General Miles, on his return,
“was fairly won by the right of conquest, and became a part of the
United States. The sentiment of the people was in no sense outraged
by the invaders, but, on the contrary, was successfully propitiated. A
people who have endured the severity of Spanish rule for four centuries
hail with joy the protection of the Great Republic. One of the rich-
est sections of country over which our flag now floats has been added
and will be of lasting value to our nation, politically, commercially, and
from a military or strategic point of view. The possession of that
island also rendered any further resistance of the Spanish forces in
Cuba hopeless.”

General Miles remained in Porto Rico as long as he deemed his
presence necessary for carrying out his instructions, and returned bring-
ing with him nearly 5,000 troops no longer required. There were
about 12,000 troops left on the island for garrison purpose, a number.
considered ample for the duty.

The remarkable welcome given to Americans in this island might
well be considered the deathblow to Spanish colonial rule. The least
harassed of all Spain’s possessions, the people were glad to escape
her clutches. It was not surprising that Spanish soldiers in Cuba were
eager to surrender and autonomist officials in some towns begged to
have their municipalities included in Toral’s surrender. At Manila
it was not so much surrender to Americans that was dreaded, as the
expectation of terrible retaliations from the insurgent natives who had
been so cruelly oppressed. There had been no Porto Rican revolutions
in recent times. But Cuba and the Philippines had written their
histories in their own blood.
 

 

 

 

CALLE DE SUAN, MAYAGUEZ, PORTO RICO
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-SIXTH.

PEACE.

Spain at Last Becs For TERMS UPON WHICH Peace May Be ReacHeD—THE UNITED STATES
DEMANDS THE FREEDOM OF CuBa, CEssION OF Porto Rico AND ALL SPANISH ISLANDS
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, ONE OF THE LADRONES, AND RESERVES THE
Ricut To DEecIDE WHAT SHALL BE DonE WITH THE PHILIPPINES —
Spain Requires DeLay, oF Coursz, BUT ACCEPTS THE
TerMs — PEACE ProTocoL SIGNED AUGUST 12 —
MANZANILLO, CuBA, BOMBARDED THE
Same Day AND A SKIRMISH
IN Porto Rico.

I,

or several weeks Spain had been seeking peace by every means
but the proper one. She had appealed to Europe for a
mediator, but the continental countries had no gate aaas
stomach for the business and coldly advised her FOR PEACE,
to turn to the United States. The American Ambassa- evar
dors at Paris and London were unofficially sounded, and they re-
turned the answer that the President would not permit any inter-
vention or mediation for peace through any third nation, and that
the only channel of communication was between Madrid and Wash-
ington. Spain’s guile was exhausted. The United States had kept
to a straight line of conduct that permitted no complication.

When war opened Spain requested the French Ambassador and the
Austrian Minister to take charge of the interests of Spanish subjects
resident in the United States. When these diplomats reported the
arrangement for approval, the President replied that it would give him
great pleasure to receive either of those gentlemen, but he could not
consent that both might act. It was an opening wedge through which
misunderstanding might arise and thus permit protest and appeal.
He begged them to arrange for a single representative. It was finally

arranged that M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, should act,
(511)
512 HISTORY OF THE

and that Austrian consuls should represent the interests of Spanish
subjects at points only where no French consuls were stationed, but
that their representations should come through the hands of the
French Ambassador.

The American Ambassador at London, Colonel John Hay, was in-
structed to inform the Spanish authorities that it was the intention
‘of this government not to recognize in any manner the right of
Europe to mediate or interfere in the affairs of the United States,
and that the only proposal for peace which could be received must
come from Spain direct through any agent the Spanish Government
would designate and furnish with the necessary authority.

The “honor of Spain” could find no means of escape from the
path of honesty. Porto Rico was slipping away; a great fleet of battle-
ships, cruisers, torpedo destroyers, scouts, and a dynamite engine was
ready to set sail under Sampson, to invade her home ports. The game
was up.

On July 26 the French Ambassador called on the Secretary of State
at Washington and presented a note from the Spanish Foreign Minister
embodying overtures for peace. He was conducted to the Executive
Office and had a conference with the President. The proposition was a
surprise, not because it was unexpected, but because it came so soon.
Spanish dilatoriness is so well known that speedy action in this instance
was an indication of acute distress.

The overture did not embrace any distinct proposition but asked
the United States for a statement of the terms upon which it would
be willing to cease hostilities. Instead of suggesting terms the Span-
iard was attempting to place the United States in the embarrassing
position of taking the first steps to obtain peace. Moreover, it would
force our government to show its purpose concerning the territory
already conquered or under process of seizure, and permit Europe to
ponder the terms and estimate the consequences upon its various
interests. Under the circumstances the President informed M. Cam-
bon that he would not reply to the note until he could consult with
his cabinet.
 

M. JULES CAMBON

THE FRENCH MINISTER WHO CONDUCTED THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SPAIN
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR , 516

Only the day before our troops had landed in Porto Rico, and the de-
lay would not affect United States action. The Spanish note said the
first thing hoped for was a cessation of hostilities. But the army opera-
tions and naval preparations went on vigorously.

The cabinet conferred upon the terms to be offered. There was
no variance of opinion upon demanding the evacuation of Cuba, the
cession to the United States of the island of Porto Rico and all other
Spanish islands in the Western Hemisphere, and the holding of one of
the Ladrone Islands. It was quickly determined to ask no indemnity in
money for the cost of war, since it was obvious that Spain could not
pay, and it was useless to waste time over an empty clause.

The whole interest centered upon what disposition was to be made
of the Philippines. The sentiment of the United States was not defi-
nitely known, and the President frankly announced that he was desirous
of having popular opinion. He was determined to reserve a coaling
station, at least, and perhaps the bay and city of Manila and its prov-
ince. His purpose was to make a statement of demands to Spain that
would be unequivocal and which would not be modified. The cab-
inet, it was understood, was divided upon the desirability of holding
all the Philippines.

The answer to Spain’s inquiry was handed to the French Ambas-
sador on Saturday, July 80. Its terms were not made known in form
to the public, but were fairly outlined. The most important feature
in the communication was the demand that Spain must signify ac-
ceptance or rejection of the terms offered without delay. It was the
firm determination of our government that the propositions should
not be used for the purpose of inciting European suggestion o» inter-
national political activity. It was intimated that failure to answer
affirmatively within a reasonable length of time, or an attempt to
temporize in the hope of securing a modification of the demands,
would be accepted by the government as sufficient cause for declining
to continue the negotiations.

The demands were substantially as follows: The withdrawal of all
Spanish military and naval forces from Cuba, and the relinquishment
516 . HISTORY OF THE

of Spanish sovereignty in that island; similar action with regard to
Porto Rico, with the additional provision that Spain should cede that
island to the United States; no responsibility to be imposed on the
United States for financial obligations contracted by Spain on behalf
of Cuba and Porto Rico, which are to be held to include all outlying
possessions of Spain in the Western Hemisphere; the United States
to maintain control over all other territory where the American flag
has been raised; the city and harbor of Manila to be occupied by the
United States until a peace commission should decide upon the future
control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. The imme-
diate acceptance of these terms would be construed by the United
States as sufficient guarantee of Spain’s good faith in proposing an
arrangement of peace terms, and would authorize the President to
appoint commissioners to treat with commissioners designated by
Spain to consider and arrange a treaty of peace, reserving all rights
to make demands of any character. In substance the United States
demanded that before any terms of peace should be considered, Spanish
authority in the Western Hemisphere should be relinquished, leaving
Cuba in the hands of this government as a trustee, and absolutely
ceding Porto Rico, Manila, and one of the Ladrone Islands. The
United States did not agree to let Spain have any part of the Philip-
pines, nor make any promises whatsoever.

These demands were received by the Sagasta government with
expressions of disappointment. They claimed that too much was de-
manded, in spite of the fact that everything had been lost. They
wanted: the Cuban and Porto Rican bonds saddled upon the islands,
or, at least,a part of them. Spain had also guaranteed $40,000,000 of
Philippine bonds in 1897. There were more than $500,000,000 of secu-
rities guaranteed by Spain involved in the alienation of her colonies
under the terms. Still, as these bonds had been issued for the benefit
of Spain and not for the advantage of the colonies, it was but the
return of her own selfishness to punish her.

The Sagasta cabinet had, also, to take notice of Spanish opinion
of the demands. Spain was lifeless, and the public was apparently
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 517

prepared to have peace accepted at any price. But the political leaders
must be appeased and committed, since Spain was in throes that
might, provoke a revolution of terrible proportions. All the leaders,
except General Weyler, conferred with Sefior Sagasta. Weyler wrote
a curt note in reply to the invitation, saying he was surprised that
Serior Sagasta desired to consult with him concerning peace when he
had not been consulted regarding war. He added that the nation
had been disappointed in what it was entitled to expect in its leaders,
namely, success in war.

There was some reason to believe that the American demands
were communicated to the Pope as the basis for requesting his offices
and power in restraining the Spanish clergy from assisting Don Carlos,
if the pretender should attempt to lead a revolution upon the pre-
tence that the Alfonsine dynasty would dishonor Spain by the con-
cessions.

After much delay and distress the Spanish cabinet agreed on Au-
gust 7, to accept the demands of the United States, the agreement
containing an expression of protest against the cession of Porto Rico, as
being largely in excess in value of any money indemnity that could
be reasonably expected, and against any final demand that Spain must
yield the Philippines. These two colonies now suddenly appeared to be
of vast importance.* The expression was not, however, contentious
in tone.

*If the French people are gratified at the arrangement they are helping to promote,
by which the United States will secure Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, the nation
is very easy to please. Cuba might have belonged to France. It did not become an ac-
complished fact mainly owing to the greed and the irresistible desire on all occasions of
Louis Philippe to drive a hard bargain. The proceedings were throughout kept a secret.
The affair happened as long as sixty-one years ago; in January, 18387. At the beginning of
that month, Aguado, the well-known Spanish banker, requested a strictly private and
absolutely secret interview of Talleyrand, which was granted. Aguado, it turned out, pro-
posed to introduce a secret envoy from Queen Cristina, the great-grandmother of the present
King, Alfonso XIII. Oristina was in greater money difficulties than usual, and offered to
sign away Cuba for the sum of thirty millions of reals [About $3,000,000, a sum that seems
absurd. —AvtHor.], with Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands thrown in for andther ten
millions. After comparatively short negotiations, the King, Talleyrand, and Sefior Camp-
uzano, Cristina’s unwilling envoy, it should be said, met in private conference in a small
apartment at the Tuileries. Only Talleyrand’s secretary and Aguado were admitted to
518 HISTORY OF THE

On the 9th of August, the Spanish Government had cabled its ac-
ceptance of the terms to the French Ambassador at Washington, but
the text of the document was not given to the public. M. Cambon
presented it to the President, who ordered the preparation of a peace
protocol to be signed by both governments. When this was drawn
up, the French Ambassador transmitted it to Madrid, where it was
accepted as satisfactory.

It was twenty-three minutes past four o’clock on the afternoon of
Friday, August 12, 1898, one hundred and twelve days since the first
act of war, on April 21, when the Honorable William R. Day, Secre-
tary of State, and M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, author-
ized by his own government to act for the government of Spain upon
official request, signed the protocol, under which hostilities were to
cease, pending the final results of peace negotiations.

witness the signing of the deeds, for it had already come to that, in the hurry imposed
by the dread of the whole affair leaking out and coming to the knowledge of Lord Pal-
merston, at that time the only European statesman of whom both Talleyrand and his
royal master stood in awe.

The provisions of the contract were read over by Sefior Campuzano, who looked abso-
lutely grief-stricken, and at the end of each article or clause there was a short interval,
during which the club-footed diplomatist and the citizen-king conferred in whispers. The
cession of Cuba led, however, to few observations; it was practically smooth sailing; the
price had been debated and settled beforehand; and, finally, the signatures were all duly
appended. Not so smooth was the discussion of the articles relating to the cession of
Porto Rico and the Philippines. Louis Philippe, on the pretext that the transfer of the
latter islands would be so obnoxious to England as possibly to lead to a war, demanded
a reduction of three millions of reals on the purchase money. ‘‘Seven millions of reals is
my final offer; if it be not accepted the contract had better be flung into the fire,’’ he
said somewhat peremptorily, pushing the document across the table.

Talleyrand was about to interfere, for he liked neither haste nor violence, but, before
he could open his lips, the Spanish envoy sprang to his feet so suddenly as to overturn
the chair on which he was seated, which rolled across the floor. Oblivious or indiffer-
ent at that moment to the presence of majesty, he leant forward, seized both the doc-
uments, twisted them together, and, looking Louis Philippe straight in the face, said
deliberately: ‘‘ Your Majesty is right, the contract is of no use; it is only fit to be thrown
into the fire.’’? And, suiting the action to the words, he strode across the apartment,
kicked the burning logs on the hearth with his boot, forced the papers between the incan-
descent embers, and stood stock-still until the charred wisps told him that all the docu-
mentary evidence of the proposed nefarious transaction had forever vanished.— Mr. A. D.
Vanpam (author of ‘‘An Englishman in Paris’), in Illustrated London News, September 10,
1898.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 519

The text of the agreement, for diplomatic reasons, was reserved.
The substance made public by the State Department, was as follows:

SUBSTANCE OF THE PROTOCOL.

Article 1. That Spain will relinquish all claim of sov-
ereignty over and title to Cuba.

Article 2. That Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands
in the West Indies, and an island in the Ladrones, to
be selected by the United States, shall be ceded to the
latter.

Article 3. That the United States will occupy and hold
the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the con-
clusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the
control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

Article 4. That Cuba, Porto Rico, and other Spanish
islands in the West Indies shall be immediately evacu-
ated, and that commissioners, to be appointed within
ten days, shall, within thirty days from the signing of
the protocol, meet at Havana and San Juan, respect-
ively, to arrange and execute the detatls of the evacu-
ation.

Article 5. That the United States and Spain will each
appoint not more than five commissioners to negotiate
and conclude a treaty of peace. The commissioners
are to meet at Paris not later than October 1.

Article 6. On the signing of the protocol, hostilities will
be suspended and notice to that effect will be given as
soon as possible by each government to the command-
ers of its military and naval forces.

There was ready, awaiting the President’s signature, a proclamation
directing immediate cessation of hostilities by the army and navy
of the United States against Spain. Cable messages were at once
dispatched to every commanding officer of the army and navy, in the
field and on the sea, conveying the necessary orders, with instructions,
also, to make it known to Spanish forces not in position to learn the
fact otherwise.
520 HISTORY OF THE

Il.

PrEace was proclaimed, but the war was not over. While the sig-
natures were attaching to the protocol, Captain Goodrich of the United
iGesraian States cruiser Newark, supported by the Suwanee, Osceola,

re Hist, and the converted Spanish gunboat Alvarado, was

opening a bombardment of Manzanillo,which Commander

Todd of the Wilmington had attacked a short time before. He had

demanded the unconditional surrender of the town, which was re-
fused.

At 3:45 p.m. Aug. 12 the bombardment began, and was maintained for
half an hour, when the Americans saw a white flag on a Spanish gun-
boat lying at the wharf. The Suwanee was sent in under a truce flag,
and firing ceased. The Suwanee grounded on her way into the harbor,
when ,within five hundred yards of shore. Suddenly the whole water
front was ablaze with the fire from the Spaniards, and a number of
shots were fired from the blockhouses. The Americans answered
fiercely, and after about fifteen minutes slowly drew off. The Span-
ish fire then slackened, but followed the gunboats out. No one was
hurt on our gunboats, but. much indignation was expressed because
of the firing upon a truce flag. One shot went through the Suwanee’s
flag.

Meantime, the Cubans in the rear of the town began to fire on the
Spaniards from the north. They had no artillery, but their rifle fire
finally grew so annoying to the enemy that they answered it with
field pieces, which soon caused the Cubans to cease firing. At six
o’clock the American war ships anchored for the night, but the Newark
continued to harass the Spaniards through the darkness. It was the
intention to renew the bombardment the next morning; but before
the firing was begun the Spaniards sent off two officers in a small boat, .
under a flag of truce, to announce to Captain Goodrich that the peace
protocol had been signed. They bore a dispatch for Captain Goodrich
from General Greely, Chief of the Signal Service. The Spaniards made
an effort to send it off to the Newark during the previous night, using a
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 521

white light instead of a white flag in the darkness. Not understanding
the meaning of the light, the boat was fired upon and returned to the
shore as quickly as possible. As soon as it was light enough in the
morning to see the flag of truce, the message was again sent off.

An artillery engagement occurred on the same day at Aybonito,
Porto Rico, in which one American officer was killed and four privates
were wounded.

 
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-SEVENTH.

ASSAULT AND Capture or Mani.a.

Evectricity Not Quick ENoucH To Stop ADMIRAL DrEwey FROM TakING ManiLa—MILI-
TARY ADVANCES UPON THE City WALLS— THREE NIGHTs’ BATTLE BEFORE MALATE, IN
WHICH SpanlaARDS ARE REPULSED, WITH Heavy Lossegs, By Our VoLUNTEERS—
DEWEY AND MERRITT DEMAND ITS SURRENDER AND MAKE A THEATRICAL
AssAULT ON AuGUST 13, INORDER TO APPEASE THE ‘‘ HONOR OF SPAIN”

— THE AUTHORITIES ANXIOUS TO SURRENDER — ESCAPE OF GEN-

ERAL AUGUSTI ON A GERMAN SHIP— AMERICANS OCCUPY
THE City — THE ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION —

Tue GLorious Record oF ADMIRAL DEWEY
REVIEWED — DEATH OF CAPTAIN
GRIDLEY OF THE ‘ OLYMPIA.”

I.

HEN the peace protocol was signed at Washington on
Friday, August 12, at 4:23 o’clock, p. m., the time at
Manila was a few minutes past midnight Friday morning.
The cable messages instantly hurried to Admiral Dewey
and Major-General Merritt might reach Hong Kong cable office within
a few hours, before noon, Friday, at Hong Kong. But Manila was
rHREE wants more than 700 miles distant, three days, by steamer.
oF FicHTING The Spanish Government had arranged for a fast steamer
a to be in waiting at Hong Kong, for the purpose of re-
ceiving the proclamation of peace and hurrying with it to Manila at
utmost speed. If this programme was perfectly executed, the Spanish
steamer might reach Manila about noon on Monday, August 15. But
even in that event it would discover that Manila had surrendered
unconditionally to the American army and navy on the previous Satur-
day, at half-past two o’clock in the afternoon. The electric telegraph,
united with Spanish steam power, was not equal to the task of fore-
stalling Dewey.
The arrival of General Merritt, the increasing uncertamty of Agui-

naldo’s final purpose, the good condition of our troops, and the desire
(522)
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 523

to conquer the city as soon as good order could be preserved and
the growing distresses of non-combatants alleviated, had resulted in
moving our soldiers nearer to the city. They had intrenched themselves
along the beach on the highway from Bakoor to Manila. There was
an old Capuchin chapel in the center of the line, situated upon a knoll.
Two field guns were planted on each side of the chapel. Our soldiers
were only seven hundred and fifty yards from the Spanish trenches.

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Malate is three miles south of Manila. The dotted line shows the outer investment
of the city by the insurgents. The black line from Malate to Manila is the highroad
to the city, along which our line was extending when attacked.

At ten o’clock in the night of July 31, a heavy fire from the
Spanish line opened upon the Americans, who were taken by sur-
prise, since the enemy had not actively resisted any of our operations
theretofore.

Our trenches were occupied that night by the Tenth Pennsylvania
Volunteers and Utah Artillery Company Volunteers. The Spanish
firing was surprisingly accurate, and a hail of bullets fell among the

Americans. Our pickets on the right were driven in and reported
25
524 HISTORY OF THE

that the enemy was advancing to flank us along the road, at which
point the trenches ended. There were trees, bushes, and high grass
about the right extreme of the line, however. The Spaniards ad-
vanced down the road swiftly, pouring in a continuous fire, and
finally getting in position to flank and enfilade the American line.
The Pennsylvanians, as all volunteers are prone to do before the
baptism of experience, had gone into trench duty with light ammnu-—
nition. Their cartridge belts were emptying rapidly, and a courier
was hurried to General Greene asking for reénforcements and ammu-
nition.

The Utah battery was at work with veteran coolness and precision.
The Pennsylvania reserves were ordered up and went to the right of
the line to repel the attack. They had to cross an open field, swept
by Spanish fire. It was the only way of going to the objective point,
and the brave volunteers crossed the death trap with unflinching
courage.

At this time, also, two platoons of Battery K, Third Artillery, regu-
lars, under Lieutenant Krayenbuhl and Lieutenant Kessler, all acting
as infantry, came up to the rescue. The Pennsylvanians, with ammu-
nition almost exhausted, were firing at will, irregularly. Lieutenant
Krayenbuhl drew his revolver and gave warning that he would kill
the first man who fired without orders.

That was the stern action needed to steady the volunteers. The
regulars began their volley firing with perfect discipline, and the
Pennsylvanians quieted into steady fighting.

Reénforcements came rushing up. Battery H, of the Third Regnu-
lars came flying up to the trenches along the road which the Spanish
occupied. The Americans ran in double column and sprang into the
trenches.

Private Mcllrath of Battery H, hoping to encourage steadiness
among the volunteers, leaped on the parapet of sand bags and walked
up and down, encouraging them. He was shot in the head, fatally.
Captain Hobbs took his place, and the Americans were soon steadied
down to deliberate, hard fighting.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 525

The Spanish guns at Malate were doing much damage, and in the
confusion of the night it was thought at headquarters, in the rear,
that our advance would be driven in. General Greene sent two
battalions of the First California Volunteers to the front at double-
quick. As they had not before been to the new trenches, they dropped
into the old Spanish trench and began to pour volleys into our own
troops ahead. There was no casualty, but a great disaster was barely
averted.

As soon as the mistake was discovered, the Californians dashed
ahead into the fight with all the more purpose to drive back the real
enemy. Private J. F. Finly, of Company C, of the Californians, espe-
cially distinguished himself. He took eight cart loads of ammunition
through a terrific fire in the open fields to the Pennsylvanians.
One native driver was shot in the leg, and a pony was killed. The
cart tops were riddled. When the pony was killed, Finly pulled the
cart himself and delivered the ammunition. As he returned across
the field, he found two wounded men and took them in the cart to
the hospital. Then he returned to the front with ten carts for the
wounded.

The Spaniards were beaten back to Malate with considerable loss.
The Americans lost about eighteen killed and forty-five wounded.

Fighting was resumed the next night and the third, but the
Americans were now prepared and reserved their fire. Several were
lost in the second and third skirmishes. A correspondent of -the
London Times, who was present in these engagements, cabled to his
paper: “I was impressed by the nonchalant demeanor of the Ameri-
cans on the fighting lines. They were like high-spirited youths pic-
nicking, while groups were lying on the second line playing cards.
Had the Spaniards, who were unaccountably non-aggressive during
the American landing and advance, dropped shrapnel from the Ma-
late fort they would have wrought terrible havoc, one house, forming
a conspicuous mark, being within easy gun range.”

The insurgents were now forced inland on the right of the Ameri-
can lines. They opened fire on the Spaniards, and the latter replied
526 HISTORY OF THE

briskly. Aguinaldo’s men caused the Americans considerable trouble.
Information was received that a party of California volunteers en-
gaged in felling timber had been arrested by insurgents. Under
General Greene’s instructions Colonel Smith ordered out an armed
detachment, which releasedy;the prisoners and brought the offending
insurgents to Camp Dewey. General Greene sent a message to
Aguinaldo saying that if the Americans were further molested he
would disarm all the Filipinos.

There was some belief that in the night firing the insurgents had
turned their weapons against our troops, but the fact was not estab-
lished.

On July 81 five transports arrived with more troops from San
Francisco, and on August 4 the monitor Monterey arrived in the bay
as a benediction to the American war ships.

Th,

THERE were now troops sufficient, together with the guns of our

fleet and the marines, to justify Admiral Dewey and General Merritt

in preparing to attack Manila itself. A week after the

ae new troops had disembarked, Dewey and Merritt united

meron in a demand upon the authorities to surrender. Gen-

eral Augusti, singularly enough, answered the demand,

and declined. It was on that day, according to Spanish authorities,
he was deposed or had resigned.

Manila was invested in the rear by insurgents, south by United
States troops and heavy field guns, and the fleet formed in the harbor.
Although the Spanish authorities asked and expected the Americans
to protect them from the insurgent rabble, the “honor of Spain”
demanded a sacrifice of lives. Destitution and distress prevailed, and
resistance was hopeless; but the “honor of Spain” must again be
sealed in blood. The American troops were scarcely in condition to
attack, and not much resistance was looked for. Neither Dewey nor
Merritt expected the Spanish to fight. Their information was to
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 527

the effect that there was a division in Manila, one faction ready to
surrender, the other in favor of holding out. The American com-
manders believed that a perfunctory resistance only would be made,
but both were prepared to make a strong assault, if necessary. The
ultimatum expired at noon on Tuesday, August 9.

Monday afternoon the Spanish requested, through the Belgian
consul, another day to remove the non-combatants and the sick and
wounded. This was granted. The Belgian consul had been active in
endeavoring to effect an arrangement between the Americans and
Spanish, to prevent further fighting and bloodshed. As soon as he
delivered the ultimatum he removed his family to a supply ship, and
remained on board with them. He reported on Tuesday afternoon
that the Spaniards were determined to make, at least, a show of
resistance. Accordingly, the fleet prepared to begin a bombardment
at noon on Wednesday.

Tuesday morning the war ships of the neutral countries began to
take positions to observe the assault. The arrangement exhibited the
national sympathies clearly. Four British ships, then on the station,
the Immortalité, flagship, Iphigenia, Linnet, and Swift, and the Japanese
cruiser Naniwa, came across the bay and anchored beside the American
ships. The German cruisers, Jrene and Cormoran, went to Mariveles
with the ships on board which the foreign residents had taken refuge.
The other German war ships, the flagship Kazser, the Kaiserin Augusta,
and the Prinz Wilhelm, with the French flagship Bayard and cruiser Pas-
cal, moved a little north of their former positions and anchored together.
These manceuvres caused general comment throughout the fleets.

Our ships were stripped and cleared for action on Tuesday after-
noon and Wednesday morning, and the crews were called to general
quarters.* Suddenly the Admiral signaled “Action postponed.”

* And then occurred a wonderful sight, which the world had not seen and may not see
again. The smaller British vessels steamed away, but the big, white Immortalité, said to
be the largest armored cruiser in the world, headed down the bay and came within two or
three blocks of the flagship, the Olympia, and stopped. Then her flag was dipped and from
her deck, loud and clear, her band played ‘‘The Star Spangled Banner.” — Letter from
LTieutenant-Colonel Charles L. Jewett, Judge Advocate General.
528 HISTORY OF THE

It was explained that General Merritt had declared the army not
ready, for lack of preparation. This was mere pretense, however.
M. André, the Belgian consul, anxious to prevent useless loss of life, had
been permitted to negotiate with the Spanish authorities, and succeeded
in arranging a plan under which the resistance would be so slight
that hard fighting would be unnecessary.

Flag-Lieutenant Brumby carried an order to the Concord and Pe-
trel, lying before the Pasig batteries, that they were not to fire unless
attacked. The Spanish wished to have a theatrical exhibition, sur-
render to the Americans, and be saved from the insurgents. Dewey
and Merritt were not averse to saving life, and, it was ordered that
no damage should be done to the city, but that the shots should be
confined to outer military positions alone.

Such was the position on Saturday morning, August 13. The day
was hazy and misty, with frequent downpours of squally rain.

At 9:30 the American ships, with battle flags flying, received the
signal for attack from the Olympia, from which two puffs of smoke shot
out, sending two shells at Malate. They fell short on the beach. These
were followed by two great roars from the Monterey, and cheers sprang
up from all the ships. All the ships then joined in and all the shots
were directed against Malate, and all fell short. There were no signs of
surrender. The “honor of Spain” was not to be appeased with smoke.
Yet no Spanish guns made reply.

The Monterey, a mere plank on the water, with no freeboard,
steamed in under the very guns of the shore batteries, tempting a
shot, but none came. Rain was falling so mistily as to cloud the bay.

The ships now tried for the Malate fort in good faith, and the clouds
of dust and dirt that arose were proof that our gunners were as skillful
as ever. Then they ceased for awhile, but the Spanish flags still
flew over the city, especially from the lofty spire of the Archbishop’s
cathedral.

In the meantime, the American army on shore advanced two bri-
gades against the Malate fort. It was captured with the loss of eleven
Americans killed and thirty-nine wounded. Capturing the fort, they
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 529

drove the Spaniards back along the beach into the city, and finally
occupied the deserted places of the enemy on the Lunetta parade.

At about 11 o’clock the Olympia signaled ‘‘cease firing,’ and then
set the international signal for the enemy demanding surrender. The
Spaniards made no reply from Manila, and Admiral Dewey grew sus-
picious of Spanish treachery. He signaled his ships to “close in,” and
there was prospect of serious work ahead. M. André, the Belgian
consul, had -been trusted by both sides, and his communications had
all been verbal. The question arose whether there was misunderstand-
ing or Spanish treachery. M. André was called on board the Olympia,
and declared that there might be misunderstanding, but he did not
believe there was treachery.

Again the signal was made, “Do you surrender ?” but no reply came.
Then a launch, bearing a flag of truce and the Belgian flag, went toward
Manila with M. André, Lieutenant Brumby, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Whittier on board to consult the Spanish authorities. They were
gone a long time, during which the Admiral signaled the fleet: to eat
dinner. As he had breakfasted in Cavité he was now dining at Manila.

The launch returned from the city at 2 o’clock, and half an hour
later the Olympia signaled, “The enemy surrenders.” The harbor was
filled with the cheers of the sailors.

Two battalions of the Second Oregon Regiment, who were on a
steamer, now started ashore. The steamer went in beside the break-
water, on which the troops landed, and marched on Jand. General
Merritt had already gone on shore in a small boat. Flag-Lieutenant
Brumby, with a great flag, went in a small boat to haul down the
Spanish colors. He took with him two apprentice boys.

When they reached the staff in front of the cathedral, a great
crowd of Spaniards gathered around them. As the Spanish flag came
down, many men and women in the great crowd assembled shed
tears. Just as the Stars and Stripes were hoisted in place of the red
and yellow flag of Spain,a regimental band at the head of our troops,
marching from Camp Dewey, started “The Star Spangled Banner.”
It was a coincidence, for the band was around a corner and could not
530 HISTORY OF THE

see the flag-raising. There was tremendous cheering by the Ameri-
cans when the flag rose over the building, and a burst of delight could
be heard aboard the ships in the bay from which they were echoed.
Then the guns on the Olympia boomed out a national salute to the new
sovereignty in the Philippines. The Charleston followed, and then all
the American fleet followed in order, even the Callao, that three months
before boasted allegiance to the flag now replaced by a better. The
clouds cleared away, and the sun set in a burst of brilliant beauty.

Major-General Merritt had landed with an Oregon company for
escort. They saluted the flag when it was hoisted, and the Oregon
volunteers guarded the streets all night and received the surrender
of the Spanish arms. The enemy was permitted to surrender with
the honors of war, the officers retaining their side arms. When the
Oregon troops reached the Captain-General’s palace, where General
Merritt made his headquarters, they found the plaza filled with Span-
iards. Between 6,000 and 7,000 soldiers gave up their arms, which
consisted mostly of Mauser rifles. Twelve thousand stands of arms
were taken and millions of rounds of ammunition. Enough new
Mauser rifles were captured to arm nearly all the American regi-
ments. Three magazines were found stored with powder.

Despite the promises made, Spanish treachery could not entirely
renounce its opportunity. After retreating from their lines they made
a cowardly guerilla fight, hiding in the brush and in gardens, and
shot at Americans as they advanced. The two American brigades
advanced together, General Greene’s moving along the beach and
main road against Malate, while General McArthur advanced along
the Cingalon road from Pasai. General McArthur had a hot fight at
Cingalon. The Astor battery distinguished itself by its bravery. It
lost two men killed and several wounded. The batteries shelled the
Spanish out of a blockhouse on the outer line. The Spaniards then
retreated to Cingalon, where they hid in houses and behind a barri-
cade, making a stubborn resistance. The Astor battery advanced
two guns, to within seventy-five yards of the barricade, and then
charged the Spaniards with pistols.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 531

iit.

Tuar night Manila was under martial law. The California Red
Cross Society was permitted to care for the sick and wounded of both
sides. The troops marched in with perfect order in ... ooouparion
the afternoon, and guards were placed before the house OF MANILA BY
of every foreign resident to prevent looting by disor- eres
derly mobs. General Merritt had refused to permit Aguinaldo’s army
to take part in the assault, in order that no lives might be sacrificed
to rage. No insurgent was permitted to enter after the surrender,
without first delivering up all his weapons.

These were the acts of protection accorded by Americans, whom
the Archbishop had described as heartless, immoral, cruel, and treach-
erous people.

General Merritt issued next day a proclamation, announcing the
establishment of a military government in Manila. It was printed
in Spanish and English. After setting forth the progress of the war,
it announced that the United States Government had directed him, as
Governor, to declare that Americans had not come to wage war on
the people, but to protect all in their personal and religious rights.
There would be a military occupation of the island of Luzon, but,
until further notice, all laws would continue in effect, as relating to
personal rights, local societies, and crime, unless they conflicted with
the necessary military laws as might be determined by the General
commanding.

The laws would be administered by the ordinary tribunals and
officers who would accept the authority of the United States. Churches
and places of religious worship would be protected, and all public prop-
erties, works of art, and libraries. The people would not be inter-
fered with as long as they preserved the peace. All ports would be
held by the land or naval forces until the United States declared them
open for the trade of neutral nations on payment of the prescribed
rates of duty.
532 HISTORY OF THE

The same day the commissioners selected to draw up the articles
of capitulation met. They were, on the part of the United States,
Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, Captain B. L. Lamberton, U. S. N.,
Lieutenant-Colonels Charles A. Whittier and V. E. H. Crowden. For
Spain, Nicolas de la Pena, Auditor-General, Colonel Carlos Reyes, and
Major José Maria Olaguen. The articles follow :—

1. The Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate, with the city and de-
fenses, with all honors of war, depositing their arms in the places designated by
the authorities of the United States and remaining in the quarters designated and
under the orders of their officers and subject to control of the aforesaid United
States authorities until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two bel-
ligerent nations. All persons included in the capitulation remain at liberty, the
officers remaining in their respective homes, which shall be respected as long as
they observe the regulations prescribed for their government and the laws in force.

2. Officers shall retain their side arms, horses, and private property. All pub-
lic horses and public property of all kinds shall be turned over to staff officers
designated by the United States.

3. Complete returns in duplicate of men by organization, and full lists of pub-
lic property and stores, shall be rendered to the United States within ten days from
this date.

4. All questions relating to the repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish
forces, and of their families, and of the expenses which said repatriation may occa-
sion, shall be referred to the government of the United States at Washington.
Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them. The return of
the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the
city, or when the American army evacuates.

5. Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied by the
United States, according to their rank, with rations and necessary aid, as though
they were prisoners of war, until the conclusion of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain. All the funds of the Spanish treasury and all other pub-
lic funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States.

6. This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational
establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the
special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.

The articles were authorized on behalf of Spain by General Jau-
denes, “acting General-in-Chief of the Spanish army in the Philippines.”
Augusti had disappeared. He had been reported as deposed and as
having resigned. The Spanish Government declared that he had been
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 533

removed on August 8, for being averse to holding out until the protocol
was signed. The government had made desperate efforts to prevent
American possession, its dispatches reaching Augusti through German
channels, it was said. Augusti did not know the protocol had been
signed when the city surrendered, and, perhaps, not daring to assume
the authority of the capitulation, he fled.

Then Spain claimed that Augusti had sent in his resignation, but
denied that it had been accepted; Jaudenes, therefore, had no right to
surrender any territory except that of Manila, of which, alone, he
was Military Governor.

The “honor of Spain” was displaying itself brilliantly in the final
episode of war.

The United States did not contend that the surrender included more
than the city and its suburbs. The whole Philippines ‘question was
open. Besides, the capture had been accomplished after the signing
of the peace agreement, which ceded the occupation and holding of
Manila and the harbor until otherwise determined upon.

The American losses in the fighting amounted to about forty killed
and one hundred and fifty wounded, the wounds being slight. The
Spanish losses were very heavy, and the prisoners were found to be
emaciated with hunger and worn out with sleepless nights in the
trenches deluged with rain.

Iv.

Ir was one hundred and four days after Admiral Dewey destroyed
the fleet off Cavité that Flag-Lieutenant Brumby broke out the Stars
and Stripes over Manila. Although the capture of Ma- |. eee
nila was merely an exhibition, Dewey’s ships had spent Done THat
only twelve hours in conquering the key of the East. ricteeee eeee
It was a record of glory and of duty well done, besides an exhibition
of pluck, sound capacity, and judgment that no naval officer has ever
surpassed. He had fought the Germans and the insurgents with firm
534 HISTORY OF THE

diplomacy and courage, and the Spaniards with metal. He had defeated
all of them equally.

There was one incident, however, which could not be foreseen.
Before the white flag of surrender was hoisted, General Augusti went
to a launch of the German war ship Kaiserin Augusta and was taken
aboard, the vessel sailing for Hong Kong before the bombardment con-
cluded. Augusti escaped under cover of the mist. The United States
paid no attention to him nor to the Germans. One Spaniard more
or less was not significant, and one incivility more or less from the Ger-
man fleet was not a matter for surprise or comment.*

Our fleet had not lost a man killed during the whole period of
blockade and battle.

But there was one deeply regretted loss. Captain Charles Vernon
Gridley, of the Olympia, who fought his ship so splendidly at Cavité,
did his duty at the cost of his life. He was dangerously ill at the
time, but determined to take his part against the advice of his
physician. He went through the long preliminary voyage to Manila
and fought the good fight, when he ought to have been in bed.

*During the blockade, the American ships were furnished with fresh meat from a
refrigerating steamer chartered by the government in Australia. The American sailors,
therefore, fared much better than their brothers of the foreign fleets lying off Manila.
These had to get their supplies from the city, and as provisions were rather low toward
the end of the blockade, they did not fare very well, having to live on buffalo meat, at a
dollar a pound. As soon as our flag was raised, the English gave it a national salute,
while the Germans, French, and Russians have not yet done so, as they are waiting for
instructions from their governments. Immediately after the English fired the. salute, our
Admiral hoisted an international signal with an English flag, meaning, ‘‘Send for fresh
meat.’’ The signal was immediately answered by the foreign fleets, and it was some mo-
ments before the Germans, French, and Russians found that the signal was to the English
only. They were very angry when they found their mistake, and are sorry they did not
salute the flag, as they are still living on buffalo meat, while the English are enjoying
mutton and fresh beef.— Letter from an officer at Manila.

The Germans have never given the ordinary courtesies of salutation, while the English
recognize Manila Bay as an American port, and put up the Stars and Stripes on the fore-
mast as they come in. One of the latest incidents that struck me at Manila was the salute
fired by Admiral Dewey in acknowledgment of the courtesy of an Englishman just coming
in. The flagship then was the Baltimore, and she raised a great white thunder cloud,
through which the red flashes of the guns played like the lightning.— Remark credited to
Mr. Murat Halstead, in an interview.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 039

After the destruction of the Spanish fleet he collapsed and was
invalided home, by way of Hong Kong. He died at sea, returning to
San Francisco, less than a week after he had started. Captain Gridley
was buried at Erie, Pennsylvania, his home, on July 13, with the
honors of war. He was a native of Indiana and had been thirty-
eight years in the navy at the time of his death. He had nearly
reached the rank of Commodore. He was the first and only naval
officer of high rank whose death was the actual result of war. He
was fifty-three years old, and a very handsome, agreeable, and cour-
ageous officer.

To a friend in Hong Kong he said, “I think I am in for it; but I
could not leave my ship on the eve of battle, after waiting all these
years to serve my country as well as it deserved. And, knowing
what will soon happen, I would do it again to-morrow without hesi-
tation.” These are heroic words. It was the presence of such men
in his fleet that made Admiral Dewey, in his report, speak so highly
of the patriotism and courage of his officers and crew.

It is no wonder that George Dewey came out of the war the pop-
ular hero of the United States, his name lustrous with glory; that glory
fixed by his modesty and quiet reserve. No naval officer has ever
written his name higher on the roll of honor in the history of any
country or impressed himself so deeply in the hearts and upon the
memories of his own people.

 
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-EIGHTH.

Fieutine Leaprers or tHE Navy.

ANECDOTES OF DEWEY FROM BoyHoop To IMMmoRTALITY aT MantLAa— THE SCHOOL-TEACHER
WHO RAWHIDED Him into Goop BEHAvVIOR— WHAT THE SAILORS THOUGHT OF
Him on ALL Occasions—Sampson, THE Most UNASSUMING OFFICER IN
THE SERVICE—ScCHLEY AND His FicHTiInc REcoRD— THE MEET-
ING He Hap witH a GERMAN AT VALPARAISO— A STORY
oF ‘‘ FicHTING Bos” Evans— AMERICAN GUN-
NERS AND SAILORS — TARGET PRACTICE
Makes THEM PERFECT.

I.

ur fighting leaders in the Spanish-American War were past

the prime of middle age. Fighting Generals and fighting

Admirals have usually been young men in all the wars of
history — Alexander and Cesar; Napoleon, triumphant at
twenty-five, established at thirty-one, and master of Europe at thirty-
seven; Washington, commanding the American armies at forty-four;
a Rott carn or Ellington defeating Napoleon when both were forty-
SEASONED VET- six; Nelson winning Trafalgar and death at forty-seven;
FRAN LEADERS Grant Commander-in-Chief of the Federal millions at
forty-one. Opposite the list is the single name, in modern times, of
von Moltke, who was seventy when he led the German hosts against
France, yet who was considered too old for the task which he so splen-
didly accomplished. Of the leaders of the Spanish-American War not one
was under fifty-eight, and none more than sixty-three. At the latter
age those in the regular service are usually retired as ‘“superannuated.”’
Among the seven in active command of fighting forces there was little
of the spirit of superannuation, but more the dash and intrepidity of
vigorous youth. Dewey, Sampson, and Schley; Miles, Shafter, Wheeler,
and Merritt; these were seasoned veterans of a previous war who proved

to be young enough to carry a world-covering war impetuously to a
(536)
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 537

triumphant close in a little more than a hundred days. There were
young heroes, but they were not commanders. There were Hobson and
Blue and Gridley, and in the ranks hundreds of young men of the
stuff of which great leaders are made.

II.

ApmiraL Grorce DEewey’s conduct in battle and blockade, his un-
flinching courage and coolness amidst the encompassing perils of diplo-
matic treachery and the ceaseless provocations of the , a4,
German fleet at Manila, made him the undisputed hero GEORGE DEWEY
of the war, and will give him brilliant and lasting fame wearers
in history. As has been recorded elsewhere, he is of good Puritan
stock, of the strong and persistent old Dewey family of Vermont, the
members of which have been successful in professions, scholarship,
business, and finance, for generations. The Admiral’s brothers are
excellent representatives of the family traits, as were their father and
their grandfather. It is a typical American family of moderate com-
petence, plain habits, and strong nature. It is a stock worthy to have
produced Admiral Dewey. .

Nobody has ever written better history than Plutarch and Herod-
otus, and they wrote theirs in anecdote. The earliest anecdote we
have of Admiral Dewey is related by Major Pangborn, for many years
a well-known journalist in New Jersey, but who was in early life a
school-teacher. Upon graduating from college he undertook the man-
agement of a district school, at Montpelier, that had been in rebel-
lion against all teachers for some time. Young Dewey was the ring-
leader of the “‘irreconcilables.” At the head of his boyish insurgents
he had driven away several teachers, and had stood one on his head
in a snowbank. The school seemed unmanageable.

When Major Pangborn appeared on the first day of the new session,
the first scene that met his eyes was young Dewey, perched up in a
tree, throwing stones at small boys. The teacher ordered him to come
down. Dewey’s reply was that the teacher could himself go down
538 HISTORY OF THE

to a certain tropical climate unmentionable, and he remained in the
tree. School went on smoothly that day, but there were indications
that trouble was coming. The teacher provided himself with a nice
rawhide whip, which he tucked away over the door, and then placed
several sticks of good hickory on the top of the pile in the old wood-
box.

Next day another boy who was disorderly was told to take his
seat. He did so, and seven of the big boys joined him on his bench.
Then Dewey stepped up and coolly informed the teacher that they
were “going to give him the best licking he ever had.”

“Go to your seat!” commanded the teacher, who was not so big
physically as either of the two boys mentioned.

Dewey struck out, and the next instant the rawhide was playing
catch-and-go all over him. The other “biggest boy” entered the fight,
and was promptly laid low by a blow from one of the hickories.

Dewey by this time was lying on the floor, howling with pain, but
sensibly ready to make peace. The other boy was unconscious. Major
Pangborn had quelled the mutiny and conquered the school. He
took Dewey home to his father, and reported that he had brought
him his son, “somewhat the worse for wear, but ready for school
work.”

“Thank you,” replied Dr. Dewey; “I think George will not give
you any more trouble. He will be at school to-morrow.”

The father of the other boy tried to get a warrant for the arrest
of the schoolmaster, but there was not a magistrate in the county
who would issue one. They agreed that if anybody had been found
who could govern that school, he was the man for the place.

Young Dewey remained at school. He soon became a good scholar,
and, under his friend’s tuition, fitted for the Annapolis Academy.
Years after these events he often visited Major Pangborn at his home
in Boston. On one of these visits, Dewey, then a naval lieutenant,
said to him: “I shall never cease to be grateful to you. You made
a man of me. But for that thrashing you gave me I should proba-
bly now be of very little account.” The swiftness and _ irresistible
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 539

force of Major Pangborn’s attack may have had its influence upon
the famous pupil at Manila.

Dewey was a Lieutenant in the Federal navy during the Civil War,
and during that period received the actual training for hostile opera-
tions that he could not exhibit until thirty-three years later. He was
on the Mississippi when New Orleans was captured. The vessel sank
the Confederate ram J/anassas, and met the same fate shortly after.
In attempting to run past the batteries at Port Hudson, March 15,
1863, she was thrown aground by an accident to the leading ship.
The batteries had her under direct range and riddled her with shot.
Seeing that the ship could not be saved, her commander ordered the
crew to abandon her. Captain Smith and his chief subordinate, Lieu-
tenant Dewey, displayed true courage throughout, and were the last
to leave the ship. “It is in such trying moments,” said Admiral
Porter, in his official report, “‘that men show of what mettle they are
made, and in this instance the mettle was of the best.” But there
was more than “mettle” in Dewey. One of the crew of the Missis-
sippi called attention to one incident that he believed was an inno-
vation in fighting a man-of-war at night. “Dewey gave orders,” he
said, “before we went into action, that the decks of the Mississippi
should be whitewashed (see the smartness); that gave the guns’ crews
a chance to see the running gear of the guns—S-inch. It was all
lights out that night.”

He was with Farragut at Mobile, and bore himself always with per-
fect courage and quiet modesty.

After the war, there came thirty-three years of humdrum duty,
which tires the temper and nature of men more than dangerous action.
In the navy he was greatly admired by his men; and his common
sense, natural sense of justice and fairness “between man and man,”
won their affection. He was always kindly to the sailors “forward,”
and it was said of him that he could get along with any man except
a liar. He could see or hear what he thought he ought to see
and hear, but was generally unobservant of petty, natural irregulari-

ties.
26
540 HISTORY OF THE

Here are some newspaper anecdotes of him taken from the gos-
sip that followed his victory at Manila, which convey a sense of
personal portraiture of a man such as Dewey of Manila might
naturally be :—

‘‘Dewey is a man with big, piercing eyes,” said a messenger in the
Navy Department, at Washington, who made a cruise with him. ‘“He’s
what I'd call a little fellow as to height, but he surely looked bigger’n a
Dutch frigate when he stood on his side of the mast and you were up in
front of him. But he was a tender-hearted man on the cruise when he
and I were shipmates. He’d try not to see or hear things that he didn’t
want to see or hear. None of us knew him, ‘up forward,’ I mean as a
commander. Some of us had been shipmates with him when he was a
deck officer, and had never got the worst of it at his hands. But we
weren’t sure how he’d stack up as a skipper. We weren’t long in
finding out. We had to sailorize all right, but there wasn’t much
brigging with Dewey. He didn’t like to see a man in double irons
on his tours of inspection. We hadn’t been to sea with him very long
before we got next to how he despised a liar. One of the petty officers
went ashore at Gibraltar, got mixed up with the soldiers in the canteens
up on the hill and came off to the ship paralyzed with drink. He went
before Dewey at the mast next morning, and gave him the ‘two-beers-
and-sunstruck’ yarn.

“*You’re lying, my man,’ said Dewey. ‘You were very drunk. I,
myself, heard you aft in my cabin. Iwill not have my men lie to me.
I don’t expect to find total abstinence in a man-of-war crew. But I do
expect them to tell me the truth, and I am going to have them tell
me the truth. Had you told me candidly that you took the drop too
much on your liberty, you’d have been forward by this time, for you
at least returned to the ship. For lying, you get ten days in irons.
Let me have the truth hereafter. I am told you are a good seaman.
A good seaman has no business lying.’

“After that there were few men aboard who didn’t throw them-
selves on the mercy of the court, and none of us ever lost anything
by it. He’d have to punish us in accordance with regulations, but he
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 54]

had a great way of ordering the release of men he had to sentence
before their sentences were half worked out.

“Dewey was the best liberty-granting skipper I was ever ship-
mates with. He hated to keep quarantined men aboard when the
good-conduct men were flocking off to the beach. One fine Christmas
day in Genoa harbor all the men entitled to shore liberty lined up at ten
o’clock in the morning to answer muster before taking the running
boats for the shore. There were about forty of us, myself among the
number, who were quarantined aboard for having raised Cain ashore,

How Dewry Won at Manita.— A veracious newspaper of Ross County, Ohio, published
an explanation of the battle of Manila that may prove of interest to those who are not
experts in naval tactics and construction. ‘‘On Saturday night,’’ said this veracious his-
torian, ‘‘John Bridges’s store was crowded with men who wanted to hear a description of
the battle, by Daniel Doble, and an explanation of some things that were not under-
stood.

““Whut I can’t git through my noodle,” said Pontius Anderson, ‘‘is how none o’ th’
Spanish cannon balls didn’t go right through our boats jest th’ same as our balls went
through theirn.

‘Simple enough,” said Daniel Doble, ‘‘’cause our boats is made o’ soft metal an’
theirn’s made o’ brittle. Ewv’ry time old Dewey hit a Spanish boat her sides cracked jest
like they wuz glass, but when a ball hit Dewey’s it was diffrunt. Th’ metal bein’ soft,
it closed over th’ balls when they struck, not leavin’ a hole, jest th’ same uz ef you threw
a marble int’ a pan o’ dough.

‘“‘Them Spaniards is sharp, though, an’ they ketched ont’ th’ thing, an’ ef they’d
ketched on sooner mebby Dewey’d had wa hard time. They seen th’t soft metal was th’
best, so they het up their boat, th’ last one they had. Th’ hotter it got th’ better it wuz,
an’ they het ’er way up. Old Dewey seen th’ balls frum his boats wuzn’t doin’ no hurt,
an’ he seen th’ trick, so he yelled out t’his Captains, ‘‘ Don’t shoot nothin’ but heavy balls!”’
They kept pepperin’ away with big balls till th’ Spanish boat wuz so full o’ lead she sunk
uv’er own weight.

“Them Vermont fellers is great fer tricks, I tell you. Dewey’s sailors waded t’ shore
an’ got in single rank, Indian file. Th’ Spanish Gen’ral seen whut Dewey wuz doin’ an’
he sez: ‘Whut’s good fer Yanks is good fer Spanish,’ an’ he drawed his men up in In-
dian file th’ same way. Thet was jest whut old Dewey was waitin’ fer; there was twixt
twelve an’ fifteen thousan’ Spaniards, an’ they made a line more’n six miles long. ‘ Fire!’
sez Dewey, when he seen ’em, an’ bang went ’is gun, th’ biggest one he had with ’im, one
th’t carried twelve miles. Thet ball went chasin’ down the line, knockin’ them Spaniards
over like they was tenpins. Th’ first three seconds a mile o’ Spaniards fell. Th’ heads
was knocked clean off’n ev’ry one o’ them. Course th’ ball was gittin’ weaker ev’ry min-
ute, an’ when it struck th’ second mile it had drapped till it ketched ’em in necks. Th’ third
mile o’ Spaniards got hit in th’ breast, an’ th’ fourth mile right in th’ stummicks. Then
th’ Spanish seen whut was goin’ on, an’ they begun t’ drap t’ th’ ground, but it didn’t do
no good, fer th’ ball wuz gittin’ spent an’ drapped too. It mowed down close an’ killed
ev’ry Spaniard deader’n a last year’s bird’s nest, whereas, ef they hadn’t drapped they’d
only lost their legs an’ feet.”
542 HISTORY OF THE

in Nice, a few weeks before. Our quarantine was for three months,
and it wasn’t half run ont on this Christmas day. Dewey stood at the
break of the poop, with his hands on his hips, watching the liberty party
line up. We fellows that couldn’t go were standing around the gang-
way, smoking our pipes, and looking pretty down in the mouth, I guess.
The big liberty party—there were a couple of hundred men in the
batch— finally got away, and the ship was practically deserted, except
for us quarantined fellows. Dewey watched us for a while out of the
tail of his eye. Wewere leaning over the side, watching the receding.
running boats with the big liberty party. Dewey went up on the poop
and walked up and down, chewing his mustache, and every once in a
while shooting a look at us men up forward. Finally, he walked down
the poop ladder and straight forward to where we were grouped.

“You, boys, hop into your mustering clothes and go on off to the
beach. Ill let you have a couple of the running boats when they
return. Come back with the other men when you get ready. Don’t
raise any more trouble ashore than you can help.’

“There wasn’t a man in the gang of us that didn’t want to hug
little Dewey for that, and you can gamble that we gave him a ‘cheer
ship’ that rang around the harbor of Genoa. We all got marked in the
log as ‘clean and sober,’ too, when we got back to the ship, for we
weren’t going to do any cutting up on Dewey after the way he’d
treated us.”

From a bandmaster on board the Pensacola, in 1887, when she was
lying at Manila, with Dewey in command, comes anotber anecdote
illustrating the same quiet trait of kindliness for his men and the
dauntless patriotic courage displayed in his attitude toward Prince
Henry of Prussia, for discourtesy to the United States. While the
Pensacola gunboat was at Manila, a number of sailors went on shore
and engaged in a street brawl. An alarm was turned in, but the
sailors succeeded in escaping to their ships. The next morning the
Spanish Captain of the port came out to the Pensacola to complain to
Captain Dewey of the action of his sailors.

“What can I do?” asked Dewey.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 543

“Why, your men raised a riot on shore, and you can assist me in
arresting and punishing them,” was the reply.

The American Captain was very courteous in the expression of
regret that sailors of the Pensacola should be lawless while on shore
leave, but could see no way in which he might assist his visitor in
searching out the guilty ones.

The reply of Dewey angered the port Captain, who said, somewhat
peremptorily: “You certainly can parade your crew before mnie, in order
that the rioters may be identified.”

Looking aloft, and pointing to the Stars and Stripes waving at
the masthead, Dewey made reply: “The deck of this vessel is United
States territory, and I’ll parade my men for no foreigner that ever
drew breath.”

The man described in these anecdotes, from boyhood to maturity,
can be easily understood in the incident attending the fate of Cap-
tain C. V. Gridley of the Olympia, who went into action at Manila a
sick man, and died a month later. Before the squadron sailed, every
officer and man was examined as usual for his physical fitness. The
surgeons “condemned” Captain Gridley, who was in very poor health.
Commander Lamberton was assigned to his place, but Captain Grid-
ley pleaded with Dewey against being relieved on the eve of battle.
He succeeded, and Lamberton was made Chief-of-Staff to the Admiral.
When the battle opened Captain Gridley wanted to stay on the bridge
with Dewey, but the Admiral ordered him to the safer position in the
conning tower, on the ground that it would be inexcusable if both
commanders of the ship should be killed. And Dewey remained on
the bridge, while, from the conning tower, Gridley fought ship for the
last time, and came home a corpse, but leaving a splendid memory
to his family and his country.

The part that good fortune plays in the lives of the best of men
is well illustrated in Admiral Dewey’s service record. When the irrec-
oncilable differences with Spain were growing rapidly, the command
of the Asiatic squadron lay between Commodore Howell and (then)
Commodore Dewey. Both made efforts to avoid selection for the good
544 HISTORY OF THE

professional reason that the Atlantic Ocean and Cuban waters seemed
to offer the best opportunities for service in war. Commodore How-
ell, by seniority, received the command of the European station, and
Dewey went unwillingly to Hong Kong. It was difficult to secure a
staff to accompany him, uot because officers were not glad to serve
under him, but because the service was believed to be out of the
way of glory. But, once there, Dewey saw the importance of seizing
and holding Manila, and, with one blow won immortality, and with a
second closed the war so gloriously begun.

It is also interesting to know that a man of such kindly, firm, and
sensible character, who endears himself to rough sailors and the great
world alike, does not look the portrait drawn. Never did so daunt-
less a fighter look less one; never did such a sailor’s “shipmate”
look so unlike one. Naval officers, spending much time abroad, where
the details of uniform dress, of scrupulous observance of etiquette,
and niceties of manner and address are official formulas, have been
looked upon as smartly-dressed idlers, mainly of that much-abused
yet harmless type of man described as a “dude.” But Dewey, in re-
spect to his apparel, his precise manners and scrupulous perfection
of address and “good form,” was the dude of dudes. One who writes
of him as from personal knowledge,* says: “In person Dewey is not
the naval hero of popular imagination. He is slight, of medium
height, with finely chiseled face, and hair sprinkled with gray, while
his firmly set lips and clear eye would mark him as a gentleman and
a man of the world. While in service at Washington he was a club
man and fond of society, one of those who rarely appeared after din-
ner except in evening dress; just the kind of a fellow, in short, that
the agitator has in mind when he inveighs against the ‘dudes’ of
the navy who are pensioned on the government and haunt the draw-
ing-rooms of the capital. He is quiet in manner, sparing and incisive
in speech, courteous in bearing, and decisive in action. In all these
qualities he does not differ greatly from other naval officers who have

*L, A. Coolidge, McClure’s Magazine, June, 1898.
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

REAR-ADMIRAL W. T. SAMPSON, U.S.N.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 547

been trained in the same school.” It is said of him that in the Civil
War he always went, into action in full dress, wearing kid gloves.

Finally, it must be said, that he was sixty when he became so
famous; that he deserved his fame by his work; that he bore it with
modesty; and to such men Americans yield unstinted honor and
admiration. .

III.

Rear-ApmiraL Wituiam T. Sampson, who stepped from a Captaincy
to his Rear-Admiralship at Santiago, is the son of a small farmer
of New York, and was entered at Annapolis Academy ,. vipa: samp-
and maintained by the sacrifices of his father—sacri- SON OF SANTI-
fices most nobly justified and rewarded in the character “°°
and achievements of the son. He was graduated at the beginning of
the Civil War, and was a Lieutenant when the war ended. He was
second officer on the monitor Patapsco, when that vessel was blown up
by a torpedo in January, 1865, in Charleston harbor. He was com-
mended by his superior officer as deserving “highest praise” for his
“cool intrepidity.” He has been known in the navy as a thorough
master of ordnance, possessing the highest executive capacity, great
courage, and patience. He is described as being a serious and stern
man, lacking in suavity and therefore in popularity; but, as all naval
officers usually are, a gentleman, unassuming, and possessing sagacity
and excellent judgment. He was always scrupulous to avoid mere
courtesy honors, and while a bureau chief in the Navy Department
(in the temporary occupancy of which every officer is usually ad-
dressed as “Commodore” ) he was careful to remind callers that he
was a captain only and preferred to be so addressed. It was such
-accurate distinction between fact and figment that gave to his insist-
ence that it was the fleet under his command which won the battle
off Santiago the immediate support of all high authorities. His lack
of popularity was apparent in the lack of responsive applause, but
that it was Sampson’s victory will be the undoubted verdict of his-
tory.
548 HISTORY OF THE

Iv.

CommoporE (now Rear-Admiral) Winrtetp Scorr ScHLEY, command-
ing the Flying Squadron, whose admirable gallantry in the battle off
aiAe Rone Santiago was conspicuous, was born in Maryland, and

une graduated from Annapolis about the same time that

Dewey and Sampson did, and saw service in the Civil

War. His intrepidity and dash were tested in many engagements and
skirmishes, aad he became known as an officer who loved fighting. He
is one of the few who have seen actual service between 1865 and 1895.
He was Lieutenant-Commander of the United States ship Benicia when,
in 1871, she attacked a fort on Salee River in Korea, for the purpose
of chastising the Koreans for the mistreatment of Americans. In 1884
he was commander of the expedition sent to the Arctic regions to
attempt a rescue of the Greely exploring party. The selection was
determined by his fearlessness and resourcefulness. He set out on
one day’s notice, and arrived at Sabine Point in time to rescue the
seven survivors, who would have been dead twenty-four hours later.
He was also in Valparaiso harbor, Chili, in 1891, when some of his
sailors ashore were set upon by a mob, and one was killed and five
injured. The American bluejackets were arrested, and Schley de-
manded their release. Upon this being refused, he sent word to the
authorities that if the men were not released at the dock within a
specified time, he would open fire on the city. He immediately cleared
decks for action, and notified the foreign ships of his purpose, and
requested their withdrawal out of range. It is a coincidence that all
but the Captain of a German war vessel promptly complied. The Ger-
man sent the surly reply that he would not move. Schley instantly
returned the warning that if his demand on the Valparaiso authori-
ties was not complied with, he intended to bombard; that there re-
mained less than an hour of time, and if the German chose to maintain
his position he was at liberty to do so, but if he chanced to find him-
self between the American and the shore batteries during hostilities,
he must be prepared to accept all the shots that the position might
 

 

 

 

REAR-ADMIRAL W. S. SCHLEY, U. S. N.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 551:

render it necessary to stop.* Then the German moved out; and
Schley’s bluejackets were returned to him in safety. It was a year
later that some Chilian revolutionists sought refuge on the Baltimore,
Captain Robley D. Evans’s ship, at Valparaiso. There were three Chil-
ian men-of-war in the harbor. The Admiral came on board the Balti-
more, and notified Captain Evans that if the refugees were not sur-
rendered, his three ships would follow the Baltimore out of the harbor
and sink her. Captain Evans conveyed the warning to his guests,
and told them to decide for themselves—he was ready to protect them
at all hazards. They concluded to remain with him, and Captain
Evans so informed the Chilian Admiral, adding that as long as they
chose to stay he would protect them.

“Very well,” replied the Admiral; “your ship will be sunk half an
hour after you leave the harbor.”

“That may be true,” Captain Evans is reported to have calmly
answered, “but the Baltimore will make you a h-ll of a lot of trouble
for half an hour.”

And he, too, had his- way, and kept his refugees.

¥,

To MEASURE out the merit of individuals in the war is an im-

possible task, but among the men who went in unknown to the public
and came out resplendent in heroism for duty well done,

OFFICERS, MEN,

Captain Clark of the Oregon stands boldly out. She AND GUNNERS

was the greatest ship of the seas, the best sailer, the conan

hardest fighter. And Captain Clark was worthy to command the great

* Dewey sent a similar message to Von Diederichs at Manila, requesting the Germans
to arrange their anchorage in such manner that they would not interfere with firing, if
necessary. He received a similarly surly answer, to which Dewey made reply that it was
of little consequence to himself if the Germans got in the way, but if they persisted they
must expect to receive all shots, accidental or otherwise, that the Americans might find
necessary to direct assault, if one were made. The Germans moved away. The German
people are most courteous and kindly, but the autocracy created by militarism has made
German army and naval officers the most insolent in the world. They usually yield to
force and determination, however.
552 HISTORY OF THE

vessel whose journey of 15,000 miles to enter battle startled the world.
Captain Gridley of the Olympia is another, Captain Evans of the Lowa,
Commodore Phillip of the Texas, Lieutenant Wainwright of the Glouces-
ter, Commander Todd of the Wilmington, and Lieutenant Gleaves of the
Cushing, proved to be men of independent resources and undoubted
bravery. The American naval officer in the war proved to be a man
of uniform high ability. Not one turned back from his duty or evaded
any post of danger. The personnel of our navy is to-day not surpassed
in any navy of the world. And the men behind the guns were the best
yet shown in modern naval warfare.

A month after Manila the world was amused by an article in an
English review, from the pen of a member of Parliament more cele-
brated for sensational eccentricities of opinion than for good sense,
in which the assertion was made that Dewey’s ships were manned with
English gunners who were promised five hundred dollars per month
each to enlist, because American gunners were notoriously incompe-
tent. The Navy Department gave out an analysis of the muster rolls
showing that there were but eight English-born men on Dewey’s ships,
and not one a gunner. Further, that the muster roll of the sailors of
the American navy proved that ninety-five per cent. were native-born
Americans. The writer of the article seemed to be entirely ignorant
of the fact that in every sea fight between America and England, the
Yankee had proved to be superior to his British cousin in marksman-
ship.

Writers on the subject attribute our superiority to target practice,
of which the American gunner gets more than in any other navy. Two
kinds of target practice are required, sea practice and record practice.
Sea practice is carried on six times each year and record practice once.
Every vessel is required to carry out these instructions. This refers to
normal times, for in the past year there has been three times the
amount of target practice called for. This was because the government
anticipated trouble with Spain. For purposes of sea practice a regu-
lation target, anchored or not, or any suitable mark not smaller than
a regulation target, may be used. Target practice may range between
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 503

eight hundred yards and three thousand yards or even higher, but is
seldom beyond three thousand yards, and it is required that the speed of
the ship shall not be less than eight knots when her batteries are open-
ing fire. Sea practice is intended to simulate as nearly as practicable
the conditions of actual battle, and the work of observing the fall of
shots is not allowed to interfere unduly with a spirited and continuous
fire. The ships are stripped, battle hatches are down, and sometimes
forced draught is put on in order to simulate a chase, during which
the batteries of some vessel are opened at the little target. At night
there is frequently target practice with the aid of searchlights, but this
is required only once a year.

At two sea practices annually the ship is cleared for action, and the
men are stationed as in actual battle, with necessary officers, aids, and
quartermasters in the conning tower, and all other officers at their sta-
tions. Ammunition is supplied in the manner that would actually be
necessary in battle, and, except in case of emergency, orders are given
by the means that would be employed in battle. Inducements, in the
shape of prizes, are offered by the department to enlisted men to become
expert gunners. In proportion to the extent of the navy the United
States spends more money annually on target practice than any other
service. Great Britain devotes a great deal of attention to it, but
France and Germany give comparatively little. The Spanish have
never spent much time at target practice because, their officers said,
“it was simply throwing money in the sea.” But their real shooting
threw a great deal more “into the sea,”

 
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-NINTH.

Ficgutine LeapERS OF THE ARMY.

Tue AvmMost Romantic CAREER OF GENERAL NE tson A. MILEs, COMMANDING THE ARMY —
From a LIEUTENANT AT TWENTY-TWO TO A Major-GENERAL AT TWENTY-FIVE —
GENERAL MERRITT's RapiD RIsE IN THE CAVALRY ARM AT THE SAME TIME—

THE SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY AS DESCRIBED BY FOREIGNERS—A
Vivip DescrIPTION OF THE CHARGE AT SAN JUAN— THE
Lonpon ‘‘TimEs’s” DESCRIPTION OF OuR MEN.

I.

HE biography of Major-General Nelson A. Miles, commanding
the army of the United States, when it shall be written, will
be one as striking as a page of romance. Especially so will
it be to Americans, who honor their free institutions, because

they provide no royal road to success, but maintain a free highway
along which natural capacity may find its way to all the honor it
can achieve. General Miles’s life is the romance of free

Me ca democracy. When the Civil War began Nelson A. Miles
ae was a clerk in a Boston business house, and twenty-
two years old. At his own expense he recruited a com-

pany of volunteers, and offered their services to the government.
The offer was accepted, but he was thought too young to be com-
missioned as their Captain, and was, instead, appointed a Lieutenant.
Without protest he went to the front in that capacity. In three
months the Lieutenant of twenty-two was Colonel of a regiment, a
post he had won by gallantry and capacity; in three years the young
man, then twenty-five, was Major-General, commanding a corps of
25,000 men, forming part of the line besieging Richmond, and it was
to him that General Lee communicated his purpose to arrange for a

surrender of the Confederate forces.
(554)
 

MAJOR-GENERAL NELSON A. MILES
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR ab57

General Miles was not a West Point graduate, but he was a graduate
of the university of experience—studied in the tents and trenches and
demonstrated his problems on the field of battle. In the Civil War
he was three times wounded, four times brevetted for personal bravery
in action. He had fought Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson, and was in
every battle fought by the Army of the Potomac, but one, and a wound
restrained him on that occasion. In every action he distinguished
himself as a commander. There are few careers more suggestive of
the glamour of romance than that of this young man who between his
twenty-second and twenty-fifth year was rejected as a Captain because
of his youth, and became a Major-General of the largest and most active
army corps in the Richmond campaign, and to whom the fortune of
war brought the offer of surrender of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Confederate armies.

After the war was over General Miles was transferred to the regular
army, and was sent to what was then the Far West, to subdue the
hostile Indians. There he earned great renown as “the Indian Fighter”’
against the Comanches, Sioux, Nez Perces, Apaches, and other tribes,
led by such Chiefs as Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Spotted Tail, Chief
Joseph, and Geronimo, all daring fighters and skillful in tactics.

No man in the army of the United States has won and deserved
more commissions than General Miles. They represent every grade
from Lieutenant of Volunteers to Major-General in the regular estab-
lishment commanding all the armies of the United States. He has
received votes of thanks of four legislatures, State and Territorial.
In addition to a congressional medal of honor, the people of Arizona
gave him a jeweled sword; for General Miles finally subdued the Indian
tribes and retired them to their reservations, where they now live in
peace and quiet, whereas they had been a continual menace to our
frontier ever since the settlement of the West began.

General Miles has been called “The Winner of Bloodless Victories.”
It is used to his honor by those who know him, and his record of
preserving the life and health of his troops, and in derision by his
enemies. In the Cuban invasion, as one of the war board, he insisted
558 HISTORY OF THE

upon disregarding the mere theatrical idea of assaulting Havana, where
great loss of life must inevitably follow, and proposed the Santiago
campaign; that is, he suggested the southern coast as the most healthful
point for the first foothold and to let Havana wait for a cooler and more
propitious season. These tactics he pursued in Porto Rico, and his
orders have always been to preserve the health of troops, and to make
war by the tactics that will result in least sacrifice of life.

He is a member of the International Peace Society and, like all good
soldiers, regards war as the last resort when nothing can be used but
force. He is about sixty years old, a gentleman in education, manner,
taste, and habit, as well as by birth. He represented the United States
army at the Jubilee of Victoria, and in the Greco-Turkish War.

Personally, General Miles is a very agreeable and unassuming gen-
tleman; as an officer of the army he is celebrated for his careful observ-
ance of appearances, and in all aspects of his official position he looks
as ke is the General commanding the American army.

Il.

A grapuaTeE of West Point Military Academy, Major-General Wesley
Merritt was distinguished during the Civil War as a most successful
mason-cenera, cavalry leader. He, like General Miles, became a

MERRITT, MILI- corps-commander before he was twenty-seven. He was

a graduated a year later than General Joseph Wheeler,
and the two men were on opposing sides and of opposing tempera-
ments. General Wheeler, ardent, fiery, yet tenacious, quick to pursue
advantage or to retreat from error; General Merritt cool, contem-
plative, and working out the problem carefully before achieving his
task. General Merritt served with Generals Sheridan and Custer. He
has won all his honors by courage and ability, and possesses the tem-
perament that inspires confidence in his troops.
, It was the possession of the faculties of order, fine regulation,
and coolness that singled him out to command the Philippines’ army
of invasion, and to be Military Governor of the conquered territory.
 

MAJOR-GENERAL WESLEY MERRITT

COMMANDING THE U.S. FORCES AT MANILA
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 561

For the same reason he had hardly secured a foothold before he was
instructed to proceed to Paris to advise the United States peace com-
missioners respecting the Filipinos and the problems of government
affecting the Philippine Islands. General Merritt was about sixty
years old when he was sent on these important missions.

Tit

Amone the leaders who were expected to fight in Cuba, none was
more conspicuous than Major-General Fitzhugh Lee, of Virginia, who
was commissioned to command the seventh army torps jrmen Peas
at the beginning of the war. General Lee had attracted AND THE MEN
national attention to himself by the courageous manner ae
in which he bore himself toward Captain-General Weyler and after-
wards toward Captain-General Blanco, while serving as Consul General
of the United States at Havana. A graduate of West Point Academy,
a cavalry leader of distinction in the Confederate army during the
Civil War, a member of Congress, Governor of Virginia,—he had borne
distinguished honors with credit to himself and his State. He was
appointed Consul General by President Cleveland and had so empha-
sized the quality of his ability that he was continued at the post by
President McKinley. It may be said, in fact, that General Lee’s posi-
tion at Havana transcended in importance that of a minister, and it
was his open, brave and determined stand that put an end to the op-
pression laid upon American citizens in Cuba. It was intended that
General Lee should lead the assault against the city of Havana in
the autumn; but the sudden collapse of the war, following upon the
splendid actions of the navy, rendered assault upon Havana unneces-
sary. There could be no doubt, however, that if opportunity had come
to him, General Lee would have distinguished himself as he had in all
other. positions of responsibility.

Accounts of General Shafter and General Wheeler have been given
in a previous chapter on the surrender of Santiago, as well as of other
562 HISTORY OF THE

‘brave and courageous leaders, such as Kent, Hawkins, Lawton, Chaffee,
Wood, and Roosevelt. The men they led were worthy of the leaders.
Descriptions of them by English correspondents will be interesting.

A correspondent of the London Daily Mail, who witnessed the
charge at El Caney, thus described it: “When the afternoon came,—I
lost exact count of time,—there was still a jumble of volleying over
by Caney. But in front our men were away out of sight behind a
ridge far ahead. Beyond there arose a long, steepish ascent, crowned
by the blockhouse upon which the artillery had opened fire in the
morning.

“Suddenly, as we looked through our glasses, we saw a little black
ant go scrambling quickly up this hill, and an inch or two behind
him a ragged line of other little ants, and then another line of ants
at another part of the hill, and then another, until it seemed as if
somebody had dug a stick into a great ants’ nest down in the valley,
and all the ants were scrambling away up hill. Then the volley
firing began ten times more furiously than before; from the right
beyond the top of the ridge burst upon the ants a terrific fire of
shells; from the blockhouse in front of them machine guns sounded
their continuous rattle. But the ants swept up the hill. They seemed
to us to thin out as they went forward; but they still went forward.
It was incredible, but it was grand. The boys were storming the
hill. The military authorities were most surprised. They were not
surprised at these splendid athletic daredevils of ours doing it. But
that a military commander should have allowed a fortified and in-
trenched position to be assailed by an infantry charge up the side of
a long exposed hill, swept by a terrible artillery fire, frightened them.
not so much by its audacity as by its terrible cost in human life.

“As they neared the top the different lines came nearer together.
One moment they went a little more slowly; then they nearly stopped ;
then they went on again faster than ever, and then all of us sitting
there on the top of the battery cried with excitement. For the ants
were scrambling all round the blockhouse on the ridge, and in a
moment or two we saw them inside it. But then our hearts swelled

.
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MAJOR-GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 565

up into our throats, for a fearful fire came from somewhere beyond
the blockhouse and from somewhere to the right of it and somewhere
to the left of it. Then we saw the ants come scrambling down the
hill again. They had taken a position which they had not the force
to hold. But a moment or two and up they scrambled again, more of
them, and more quickly than before, and up the other face of the
hill to the left went other lines, and the ridge was taken, and the
blockhouse was ours, and the trenches were full of dead Spaniards.

“Tt was a grand achievement—for the soldiers who shared it—
this storming of the hill leading up from St. Juan River to the ridge
before the main fort. We could tell so much at 2,560 yards. But we
also knew that it had cost them dearly.”

A correspondent of the London Times thus described the American
soldier’s outfit as compared with others :—

“In the way of clothing the American private carries a complete
change of underdrawers, undershirts, socks, laced boots, and uniform
trousers. My particular private was carrying a double allowance
of socks, handkerchiefs, and underwear. He had a toothbrush and
comb. That is the heavy marching order knapsack. For light
marching, which is the usual manner, the man begins by spreading
on the ground his half tent, which is about half the size of a travel-
ing rug. On this he spreads his blanket, rolls it up tightly into a
long, narrow sausage, having first distributed along its length a pair
of socks, a change of underwear, and the two sticks of his one tent
pole. Then he brings the ends of this canvas roll together, not
closely, as in the German army, but more lke the ends of a horse-
shoe held by a rope, which at the same time stops the ends of the
roll tightly. When this horseshoe is slung over the man’s shoulder
it does not press uncomfortably upon his chest. The total weight is
distributed in the most convenient manner for marching.

“The packing of the man’s things is strictly according to regula-
tion, excepting only the single pocket in his knapsack, where he
may carry what he chooses, as he chooses. His light canvas haver-

sack is much like the English one, and his round, rather flat water
27
566 HISTORY OF THE

flask is covered with canvas. It is made of tin, and the one I in-
spected was rusty inside. It would be better if of aluminum. In the
haversack is a pannikin with a hinged handle that may be used as a
saucepan. Over this fits a tin plate, and when the two are covering
each other the handle of the pannikin fits over both by way of
handle. It is an excellent arrangement, but should be of aluminum
instead of a metal liable to rust. The most valuable part of this
haversack is a big tin cup that can be used for a great variety of
purposes, including cooking coffee. It is hung loose at the strap of
the haversack. Of course, each man has knife, fork, and spoon, each
in a leather case.

“The cartridge belt contains one hundred rounds, which are dis-
tributed all the way around the waist, there being a double row of
them. The belt is remarkably light, being woven all in one opera-
tion. It is of cotton and another material, which prevents shrinking
or loosening. The belts have stood admirably the test put upon
them for the last six days, when it has rained every day, on top of
the ordinary heavy moisture usual at sea in the tropics. The test is
the more interesting from their having been previously in a very
dry country. Officers and men alike unite in praise of this cartridge
belt. The particular private whom I was inspecting said he now car-
ried one hundred as easily as he formerly carried fifty. This belt
rests loosely on the hips, without any straps over the shoulders. It
is eminently business-like in appearance. The hat is the gray felt of
South Africa, Australia, and every other part of the world where
comfort and cost are consulted. No boots are blacked on expedi-
tions of this kind. The men who form in line for guard duty have
their tunics well brushed, but that may be due to extraneous assist-
ance.

“For fighting purposes, then, the United States private has noth-
ing to keep clean excepting his rifle and bayonet. He carries no
contrivances for polishing buttons, boots, or the dozens of bits of
accoutrement deemed essential to a good soldier in Europe. In
Spain, for instance, the private, though he may have nothing in his
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 567

haversack, will, nevertheless, carry a clumsy outfit of tools for mak-
ing his uniform look imposing.

“Now, as to discipline in the American army, I cannot speak at
present, for the war is yet too young. It may, however, be worth
noting that in this particular regiment, while most complete liberty
was allowed the men all the twelve days of the rail journey from
San Francisco to Tampa, not a single case of drunkenness or any
other breach of discipline was reported. Among the one hundred
and five men on this boat there has not in the past seven days been
a single case of sickness of any kind, or any occasion for punish-
ing. The firing discipline during the three times we have been
under fire has been excellent, the obedience of soldiers to their of-
ficers has been as prompt and intelligent as anything I have seen in
Europe; and as to coolness under fire and accuracy of aim, what I
have seen is most satisfactory. The men evidently regard their offi-
cers as soldiers of equal courage and superior technical knowledge.
To the Yankee private ‘West Pointer’ means what to the soldier
of Prussia is conveyed by noble rank. In my intimate intercourse
with officers and men aboard this ship I cannot recall an instance
of an officer addressing a private otherwise than is usual when a
gentleman issues an order. I have never heard an officer or non-
commissioned officer curse a man. During the engagement of Cabafias
the orders were issued as quietly as at any other time, and the men
went about their work as steadily as bluejackets on a man-of-war.”

 
CHAPTER THE THIRTIETH.

Interestine Facts apout War.

THE Nava Lessons oF THE WAR WITH SPAIN, AS SUMMED Up By a NavaL ExpeRT— VALUE
oF ARMOR AND GuNs, AND THE DaNnGER OF WooD—TorPEDO Boats PROVED TO BE OF
Mucu Less EFrriclIency THAN ExpecTED— ABOVE ALL, ONLY THE BesT OF MEN
Must Form Ficutinc Crews—Cost or Many MopDERN Wars IN TREAS-

URE AND BLoop —INDEMNITIES PAID BY THE CONQUERED NATION.

L*

HIs battle [of Santiago] will be accepted by some naval experts
as the only modern one that can be counted on for theoretical
conclusions of value to the builders of war ships. In the
Yalu River the inequality of the two sides in character caused

students to hesitate about drawing many inferences from it. It is

true we have only emphasized the Yalu lessons in many respects, but
aivar peeaons: / think we can. go ahead with the two together, one
oF THE WAR checking the other, to say positively that we have
wee learned something.

To go back a bit, the ineffectiveness of a fleet against land batter-
ies is demonstrated, I think, by our bombardment of San Juan and
Santiago. We failed to reduce their works. We silenced them all
right enough. As we gained in skill we were able to drive the gun-
ners away very quickly. But their silence was only temporary, even
when the batteries were weak and the conditions all favorable to our
ships; when our guns numbered twenty to one.

Everybody knows by this time that the batteries guarding Santi-
ago harbor are on the bluffs, some of them two hundred feet above
the water line. This unquestionably makes them harder to hit, but
it likewise increases the difficulty of their aim. We found out the

*The entire article from the New York Commercial Advertiser, July 16, 1898, by an officer
of the battleship Iowa.
(568)
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 069

difference in the latter respect when the same gunners (probably)
came out in the ships. The first broadside from Cervera’s squadron
was much more effective than the fire of the shore batteries, and this,
despite the fact that the range during the bombardment was often
less than at the opening of the sea fight, when the Spaniards fired
so well.

The ability of a watchful and efficient fleet to ward off hostile
torpedo boats has been fully brought out. Here we have remained
for months blockading a port in which there were always two tor-
pedo boats. Our ships lay sometimes as close in as a mile off the
entrance. And several attempts were made by the destroyers to attack
us. None of them got out without being seen, and always they were
driven back. Our readiness was the thing. In South American wars
torpedo attacks have been successful several times, and the torpedo
boats were nowhere near as swift and powerful as the Spanish de-
stroyers Furor and Pluton. It is safe to say that we have shown that
if a man-of-war is ready at all times to open up instantly an efficient
rapid fire, that ship has little or nothing to fear from torpedo boats.

With the rapid-fire guns a modern vessel can throw a storm of
shell into an enemy. A torpedo boat with her “paper” sides might
as well sink herself before starting, so certain is she of destruction.
There must be swarms of these boats to have any prospect of suc-
cess against a modern ship of any size, even when the circumstances
are most favorable for the attack. Searchlight tactics and the great
service that they can do were well brought out off the blockade.
Without the searchlights our fleet could not have kept the Spaniards
penned up. Illuminating as we did, night after night, the entrance of
the harbor, by swinging the lights slowly from side to side over all the
water, nothing could have escaped unseen by the picket boats. Then,
too, the light was of great service in indicating to the crews manning
the guns just where to direct the fire. Since it was an invariable
rule never to throw the beam of a searchlight on one of our own
vessels, there could be no doubt left in the mind of the gun pointer
as to the hostile character of the approaching vessel. It eliminated
570 HISTORY OF THE

all the delay and liability of error to which any verbal orders are so
liable.

The necessity of a secondary fleet, as it might be called, was also
shown. The number of important and hazardous missions was so
great for these smaller vessels that they were more constantly on the
go than the proverbial fashion butterfly in the height of the season.
The work of these dispatch boats was most exhausting, and care should
be taken that they be given great credit for their efficient and valu-
able services. Indeed, these smaller craft are noted for the lack of
space aboard for “idlers.”

It is obvious, of course, that a large supply fleet is indispensable.
A ship cannot run without fuel, and in war times the boilers seem
to eat up coal. Nor can a crew, no matter how brave, fight as well
hungry as they can on a full stomach. “It is hard work fighting on
cracker hash,” so let there be plenty of supply ships. Our repair ship
Vulcan was an indispensable adjunct, and so, of course, was the ammu-
nition supply ship. After each engagement every ship brought her
ammunition supply up to the limit, no matter how little she had used.
The hospital ship possesses to a fleet not only the obvious use that
makes it a necessity; it gets out of sight the wounded men, and it
is a comforting thing to know it is near at hand.

Perhaps one of the most important lessons is the advantage of
smokeless powder. With the incessant firing of our ships there was
always smoke hanging round some part of the ship’s batteries, though
we had a gentle breeze, and the enemy was to windward of us. Fire
from the guns had to be slackened again and again, and I doubt if
the Colon could have escaped with so little punishment if the smoke
from the few minutes of firing at the leading ships had not left a
cloud which, combined with the firing of the smaller quick-fire guns,
prevented the pointing of the heavier guns. Of course, with a quick-
fire gun, any temporary lifting of the smoke will give plenty of time
to deliver a fire, but with the slower firing turret guns the view must
be unimpeded for some time. The smoke from our guns did the
enemy no harm either, as some part of the ship was almost bound
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 571

to protrude, and with this assistance his guns could be laid. Both
sides were even in this, however, since, with the exception of the
Colon, none of the Spanish ships had smokeless powder. The Colon
did not have any heavy guns in her turrets, as they had not been
completed. Wash deck gear, it is said, filled up their turrets, but the
turrets could not have been so small as that would imply.

The teachings of Mahan about men were fully borne out. The great

lesson of the war is the importance of the personnel. Poor men make
poor ships. No matter how brave and efficient the officers may be,
they cannot fight well with a poor crew. Thirty men, however alive,
cannot infuse their knowledge and enthusiasm into five hundred others.
The officers may make the men stand up at the guns and prevent them
from jumping overboard, by closing the half-ports, and by other means,
but they cannot cause other than real men-of-war’s men to put up a
.good fight. No wonder that the crews of some of the Spanish ships
wanted to jump overboard on coming out of the harbor. All the men
were conscripts, and six hundred had been impressed just before the
departure of the fleet from the Canaries. It is said that all the jails
there were opened and the male factors taken aboard the Spanish
ships. You can force a man aboard a ship, but you can’t force him
to fight.

Our men had another advantage. They had had gun practice. Most
of the gunners were on personally affectionate terms with their guns,
had made bull’s-eyes with them, and not only ached to train them on the
enemy, but had such confidence in their marksmanship that fear was
out of the question. The crews simply knew they could lick the other
fellows, and their whole interest was in their own ships, not in those
of the enemy. The Spaniards are not cowards, yet their impulse from
the first was to dive out of their ships. They felt sure of defeat.

I value, too, the moral effect on the men of large ships. That
also gives confidence. The resistance of thick armor was illustrated
in some instances. Battle is a better test than the conditions of the
proving ground. On the Colon’s 6-inch armor the nose of quite a
good-sized projectile was found sticking, and a large 12-inch common
572 HISTORY OF THE

shell had exploded on it without doing any damage. However, on
the Vizcaya a large shell had entered well aft in the cabin and had
passed right through, tearing off a plate on the other side; she was
not armored. On the Jowa two large shells struck well forward at
the water line, but on the unarmored part of the ship. The first, a
6-inch, did not even perforate the cofferdam, but, though it pulverized
the cellulose, it is still in the cofferdam, the inner side of which it did
not penetrate. Moreover, as it did not explode, the rotating band
being recovered entire, though separated from the shell, it presumably
was an armor-piercing shell. Surely it must have had little velocity.
This is the more surprising, as the Spanish ships all had the long,
high-power English guns. Still the blow probably was an oblique
one. The other big shell also struck the water line, just a few feet
aft of the first one, and made a clean hole in the cofferdam. Strik-
ing a hatch well amidships, it exploded, but the pieces seem to have
been carried along, most of them going through the chain locker,
which is right abreast the hatch. There are seven good-sized holes
through it, besides any number of dents. The chain locker happened
to be empty, so the pieces passed through into the midship chain
locker, where they were caught by the chain. One of them passed
through the after side of the chain locker and struck the base of the
turret. Most of the pieces were picked up around the deck in the
immediate vicinity and in the chain locker, showing that the force
of the bursting charge must have been slight. One of the pieces gave
the arc of the base of the shell, which proved to be a 12-inch. The
ship was struck by a number of other smaller shells, once on a stan-
chion aft, probably any number of times on the armor, and scars made
by two small-arm bullets were discovered on the muzzle face of one of
the after 12-inch guns. Everything would tend to emphasize the supe-
riority of armored ships over unarmored ones. Such a riddling as sonie
of the Spanish ships received could not have been inflicted on any of
our ships that were engaged.

Everything goes to prove the value of the battleship. The power
it has to keep off torpedo boats and rapid-fire fusilade, and the

2
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 573

confidence a battleship inspires in the crew, all go to show the value
of the type.

The importance of having no woodwork aboard, and making the
most perfect provisions against fire, cannot be overestimated. Fire was
what destroyed the Spanish fleet, and not only the fire from our ships
but that aboard their own. Now, they had little wood aboard any of
the vessels, yet no one of them was under fire more than a few minutes
(about fifteen) before smoke could be seen rising from the decks. It
seems even the cork paint burned. One fire on the Vizcaya was ex-
tinguished, but others started quickly, both forward and aft. The
water mains were shot away, and the fight had to be given up. Some-
thing must be done to protect these mains hereafter in every fight-
ing ship. Fire and smoke always have the worst possible effect on
the crew, and, owing to the great number of hatches and compartments
on the ship, flames are the harder to discover and fight. It was found
simply impossible to keep fighting both the fire and the ship, the gun-
fire slackening up immediately the alarm was given. So clear did this
become that whenever the flame and smoke could be seen from our
fleet it was felt that all was up with that ship, and the tendency was
to direct our gun fire on some other ship. Without an exception every
ship that was on fire was soon headed in for the beach. It is a
fallacy to think that fire drill is all a matter of form on a steel ship.
So quickly and rapidly does the fire spread that it seems that even
the steel itself must be burning. The importance, also, of keeping
watch in every compartment for fire was shown.

There was the greatest difficulty during all the action in getting
messages to and from the different parts of the ship. The noise and
concussions were too great to allow of the use of any kind of voice
tubes, and messengers are slow and unreliable, and in danger of being
killed. A serious error was made by the messengers on one ship. An
order which was intended for the secondary battery only was taken
to the turret. The messenger told the officer in one of the 12-inch
turrets to point on the torpedo boats, and a chance at the Colon
was missed. Unless some better means of communication is invented,
574 HISTORY OF THE

officers shut off as they are from any direct orders must be left to
act largely at their own discretion. This, at times, would be most un-
fortunate, as in the sighting hoods of the turrets, especially, the view
is so limited that it is often difficult to keep even the target in sight,
much less to have the complete range over the horizon that is so
necessary for proper gun control. Then, too, in case of accident, some
method of reporting promptly to the Captain is needed.

This fight probably gave a severe blow to the use of conning tow-
ers. So far, I can learn of no case where they were used during the
engagement, the Captain preferring not to cramp himself and be con-
fined in such narrow quarters, where he could see so little of what is
occurring. Every one has to rely chiefly on his eyes for a knowledge
of how the fight is going, and in the conning tower the range of view
is about as limited as in the sighting hood.

It was also shown that a practical battle range finder has yet to
be introduced. Those in use are so delicate that they cannot with-
stand the discharge of the guns. They get out of order in action, so
that the old method of angling on the masthead height of the enemy
has to be relied on. Even the range indicators, simple as they seem
to be, were completely thrown out by the gun blasts, and every one,
to a greater or lesser extent, had to use his own judgment in giving
the range, and without smokeless powder the opportunities for a
prompt correction of range were rare. I do not think the old fork
system of establishing the range has gone out for good.

A full knowledge of the nature of the blasts from the different
guns is valuable to the crew, and to the designers of the ships it will
be all-important. Some of the rapid-fire guns suffered so from the
blasts of the turret guns that the gun crews were actually blown
away from their stations. In other cases the smoke of the firing was
so great that the gun pointers were blinded by it. The taste and
the smell of the gunpowder were so objectionable that many of the
gun crews found it necessary to wrap towels about their mouths.
If this is the case with ordinary old brown cocoa powder, it must be
much worse with the smokeless. Indeed, it would be a necessity to
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 575

have the fumes from the smokeless powder made harmless in some
way, otherwise it will be impossible to keep any of the guns manned
during a rapid fire. This suggests the use in the shells of some ex-
plosive giving forth poisonous fumes.

Another interesting thing brought out by the action was the ex-
tremely short time the Spanish ships were under our fire before some-
thing happened that demoralized the crews. It would show that every
man on the ship must be so trained in his duties that he knows ex-
actly what to do in case of accident, for there will be no time to wait
and summon assistance.

The value of cofferdams was conclusively shown by the swelling
up of the cellulose so that it closed, the 6-inch hole. To be sure the
hole was only occasionally submerged, and the cofferdam itself was
not penetrated.

One of the great dangers to be avoided was shown to be splinters.
A great number of the wounded was laid out by splinters rather
than by the fragments of shot or shell. Steel splinters are very bad.
If one could get a ship that was absolutely splinter-proof and fire-
proof, it would be a long stride in the direction of the ideal—some-
thing “unsinkable and unlickable.”

u.*

In THE earlier wars of the century some notable precedents have
been made from which an idea may be formed of the size of the bill
shortly to be made out by the United States against 40.5 or wars
Spain. The principle followed has been that, both in AND INDEMNI-
territory and in cash, the defeated nation is liable to pay eee
for its experience. A far-off but famous illustration of this principle
is found in the terms of peace dictated by the allied powers of Europe
to France, after the fall of Napoleon at Waterloo. Not only were

*Entire article from the New York Sun, July 24, 1898.
576 HISTORY OF THE

various pieces of French territory appropriated, but her important
trontier fortresses were held for five years by an “army of occupa-
tion,” which the French treasury was made to pay and support.

As a result of the three wars between Great Britain and China,
(1840, 1857, and 1860), the Chinese government, besides ceding Hong
Kong to the victorious British, and opening several of her ports to
trade, was made to pay an indemnity amounting in all to about $35,-
000,000. In the case of the war between the United States and Mex-
ico, when the terms of peace were dictated by our government, com-
pensation was taken wholly in territory. Mexico was too poor at that
time to have paid a cash indemnity equivalent to the cost of the
war, which was about $100,000,000. So we took California and New
Mexico instead of money, and considered the bargain so good that
we paid $15,000,000 to the Mexican Government, as an additional
consideration for the transfer.

Although not strictly a war indemnity, that paid by Great Britain
on account of the depredations of the Alabama during our Civil War,
is of timely interest as exemplifying the extent to which claims for
compensation may be built up and cut down. As originally put for-
ward, the American claims practically comprised every item in the
expense of the war from the day on which the Alabama put to sea.
The prolongation of the war was attributed entirely to her, and she
was, therefore, made responsible for this, as well as for the loss suffered
by American commerce through its transference to foreign’ vessels
and the increased rates of maritime insurance. The Geneva tribunal,
however, decided that such indirect results of the Alabama’s depre-
dations could not be included in the bill, and awarded an indemnity
of $15,875,000 as an equivalent for the injury actually done to the
United States through the fault or negligence of England.

The recent war between China and Japan was terminated by the
peace of Shimonoseki three years ago. By the treaty China agreed
to pay Japan a sum equivalent to $175,000,000. In addition, she
ceded the island of Formosa to her conquerors, recognized the inde-
pendence of Korea, and consented to open four new treaty ports.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 577

The war between Prussia and Austria, in 1866, was rounded off by
the payment of a notable indemnity by the vanquished Austrians.
In addition to the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia and the ex-
clusion of Austria from the German Bund, the treaty of Prague, which
terminated the war, provided for the payment by Austria of an in-
demnity of 40,000,000 Prussian thalers, or about $30,000,000. From
this amount, however, deduction was made of 15,000,000 thalers, rep-
resenting Austrian claims on Schleswig-Holstein, and 5,000,000 thalers
as an equivalent for the free maintenance of the Prussian army in
Austria, pending the conclusion of peace.

“The heaviest war indemnity of modern times was, of course, that
paid by France at the close of the war with Germany. The hostili-
ties lasted over eight months, and the total cost of the war was
estimated at $1,580,000,000. Besides the cession of Alsace and Lor-
raine, France had to pay Germany five milliards of francs ($1,000,-
000,000), in installments, which were allowed to extend over three
years. The original demand of Germany was six milliards, or $200,-
000,000 more. M. Thiers strove in vain. to save Metz, but it was
to his exertions that the reduction in the amount of the indemnity
was due.

The cost of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 has been estimated at
$945,000,000. Between the declaration of war by Russia and the treaty
of San Stefano nearly eleven months elapsed. By this treaty the
Porte admitted itself indebted to Russia in the sum of 1,410,000,000
rubles (about $725,000,000) as indemnity for the losses and expenses
of the war. The items in the account were as follows :—

Four hundred and sixty million dollars for war expenses; $205,-
000,000 for damage done to the south coast of Russia, her export
commerce, industries, and railways ; $55,000,000 for injuries caused by
the invasion of the Caucasus, and $5,000,000 for injuries suffered by
Russian subjects and establishments in Turkey. In consideration of
the financial emharrassments of the Ottoman Empire, the Czar con-
sented to accept in substitution for about three-fifths of the total
sum the various territorial cessions sanctioned by the treaty of
578 HISTORY OF THE

Berlin. This left a balance of $225,000,000 due to Russia by Turkey,
and a part of it is still unpaid.

The latest and most lenient war indemnity was that levied by vic-
torious Turkey on Greece last year. The Sultan was obliged by the
Great Powers of Europe to cut it down to $20,000,000, which was not
a fourth part of what it actually cost him.

A few comparative figures, taken from official records, will serve
to put the great increase in the cost of war as now conducted, with
all the modern improvements, in a clear light. Our war for independ-
ence lasted eight years, and its cost is officially recorded as $135,000,-
000, using round figures. There were about 310,000 troops engaged in
that war— one-third more than have been called out in the present
conflict with Spain. It follows that, accepting Mr. Dingley’s estimate
of $500,000,000 a year as the cost of the present war, it is going to cost
three times as much to fight Spain for one year in 1898 as it cost to
fight Great Britain for the eight years from 1775 to 1783. The War
of 1812, which lasted two years and eight months, cost the United
States a little over $107,000,000, and to carry it on we put in the field
576,000 troops, nearly three times as many as we have now under
arms,

The Mexican War, which lasted two years and three months, cost
the American people $100,000,000, and 112,000 troops were engaged in it.
If the number of the troops who carried our flag victoriously to the
capital of Mexico had been doubled they would have about equaled
the number of the army now in the field against Spain, and the cost
of their two years and three months of operations would have been
about $200,000,000. From this it is.a plain deduction that, with the
same number of men under arms, a year of war in 1898 is about five
times as expensive as was a year of war in 1846.

The cost of our great civil conflict has been put down at $6,189,-
929,909, but that estimate includes all expenses growing out of the
war, as Well as the actual cost of the military and naval operations.
The direct outlay of the United States Government in carrying on the
war for four years was $3,400,000,000, and in the course of the struggle
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 579

2,859,132 Union troops were engaged. It is estimated that the num-
ber of troops actually engaged on the Union side averaged 2,326,168
for three years. Hence, it appears that the direct cost of the war,
counting it on this three years’ basis, was about $1,466,000,000 a year,
But Mr. Dingley has told us that it will cost $500,000,000 to keep
200,000 men fighting Spain for one year, which is more than one-third
as much as it cost the government to keep 2,326,000 men fighting
the Confederate States for the same length of time.

It is easy to understand why modern warfare is so much more
costly than the old-fashioned kind, if we turn to a few of the lead-
ing items in the military and naval expenditure of our time. The
average cost of a first-class battleship is $8,000,000. The cost of
the Maine, which was a battleship of the second class, was $2,500,000.
An armored cruiser of the Brooklyn type costs $3,000,000. An armored
ram like the Katahdin costs $1,000,000. A double-turreted monitor
costs about $1,500,000. A single-turreted monitor costs about $500,000.
A protected cruiser costs all the way from $1,000,000 to $2,700,000;
the Charleston cost the former, and the Columbia the latter sum. An
unprotected cruiser of the Detroit type costs $600,000. An unarmored
gunboat like the Concord is worth $500,000. A composite gunboat of
the Newport class costs $230,000. A dynamite gunboat like the famous
Vesuvius is worth $350,000. A torpedo boat of the Farragut pattern
costs $225,000. .

We have not lost any of our vessels in the war with Spain. The
Maine, destroyed in Havana harbor before the war began, is the only
item of this kind that will figure in the coming bill of costs. The
Maine cost about $2,500,000 to build. A more serious item will be
compensation for the lives of the two hundred and sixty-six American
sailors that were destroyed with her. This may well justify a claim
of $5,000,000 more, to be distributed among the surviving families of
the men who were thus treacherously killed. Other items in the bill
will cover our general war expenses of all kinds; for coal used at sea,
for transportation of our soldiers by land and by sea, for war supplies
of all kinds, for the pay of our soldiers and sailors, and for the losses
580 HISTORY OF THE

sustained by the interruption and disturbance of our trade and com-
merce, not only with Cuba, but with other parts of the world.

The Quartermaster’s department has estimated that $44,000,000
will be needed to pay the transportation charges alone of our armies
now engaged in fighting Spain for six months. The Navy Depart-
ment’s latest estimate of the cost of furnishing our fleets in time of
peace with all their necessary equipment—of which coal is the lead-
ing article—was nearly $1,500,000 a year. The exigencies of war
have certainly doubled it. This has nothing to do with the cost of
guns or the ammunition or the torpedoes. It covers only such things
as coal, hemp, wire, anchors, cables, chains, nautical instruments,
lamps, bunting, and other things that come strictly under the head
of “ships’ equipments.”

The high cost of modern ordnance and ammunition will also help -
swell Spain’s indemnity bill. A complete supply of ammunition to
fill once all the vessels sent to sea against Spain costs about $4,750,-
000. One battleship’s full supply of shot and shell costs about $400,000.
Every time one of our monster 18-inch guns is fired the charge
costs $1,500; a great many of these charges are already included in
our little account against Spain. The smaller guns are fired at a
cost running all the way from $200 up to $1,000 for each charge. The
guns themselves are costly, too. The bill for one hundred high-power
steel guns for seacoast defenses, built at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, is
$3,500,000— averaging $35,000 apiece.

Mr. Dingley’s estimate of $500,000,000 as the cost of our war oper-
ations against Spain for a year covers all these things, and is prob-
ably a calculation well within the actual expenditure. Even though
Spain sues for peace quickly, it is not possible for our government
to avoid a large portion of this estimated outlay, as the troops have
been called out and contracts of all kinds have been made for months
ahead.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 581

III.

Tue cost to the United States of the war with Spain cannot yet
be known. The actual expenditures during hostilities and the expen-
ditures in prospect may be estimated with something ee
like accuracy. But there always follows a train of — SPANISH-
consequential expenditures for the payment of claims, becca sd
pensions, etc., which cannot be foreseen. The first money appropri-
ated for the war was the $50,000,000 put into the hands of the Presi-
dent for national defense, without debate or a single opposing vote,
on March 9. Of this the President gave to the navy nearly $30,000,-
000, to the War Department nearly $20,000,000. Small sums went to
the Treasury and State Departments. New vessels were purchased for
the navy, at a total cost of $17,750,000, before war began. The auxil-
iary cruisers Harvard and Yale were chartered at a rental of $2,000
per day, the St. Louis and St. Paul at $2,500 per day. To fire one
13-inch armor-piercing shell costs $560; to fire an 8-inch shell costs
$134. Many thousands of the latter and hundreds of the former were
discharged during the war. Secretary Long estimated that the cost of
supplying the vessels of our navy with complete ammunition, sufficient
for one prolonged battle, would be $6,521,985. All might be fired in
one day. Admiral Dewey carried one million dollars’ worth of ammu-
nition to Manila when he passed Corregidor Island. Every time his
fleet passed before Montejo’s squadron, delivering broadsides, it cost
the government at least $100,000. In three hours he burned up
$500,000 of ammunition, and sunk $10,000,000 of Spanish property.
The same amount was expended by Sampson’s fleet in sinking Cer-
vera’s ships, valued at $16,500,000.

Assistant Secretary of War Vanderlip, in an article in McClure’s
Magazine,* from which these facts are taken, says :—

As a matter of fact, only $98,000,000 was paid out by the Treasury Department,

on account of the army and navy, during the actual continuance of the war, from

* October, 1898.
28
582 HISTORY OF THE

March until August 12, when the Protocol was signed. The following statement
will show these expenditures in detail, and will give a graphic idea of the im-
mensely greater expenditure for the army than for the navy, although in the pres-
ent war the navy accomplished the greater results : —

1898. War. Navy. TorTa..
Marche sia cedsecntaaaca jeet ects $ 600,000 $ 2,400,000 $ 3,000,000
April... .e...0000 cesses ee cee ee sees 1,200,000 9,800,000 11,000,000
MSY sh adans die -cetieaned arenes 12,000,000 7,000,000 19,000,000
June...... 0... eee eee eee ese 16,500,000 6,500,000 23,000,000
il yneicna ts conte ie 2 ie RAR ale 29,500,000 5,500,000 35,000,000
ANG USE LD. -inaigiitsntd'g gach Wieroatar wma meesteies 5,500,000 1,500,000 7,000,000

 

$65,300,000 $32,700,000 $98,000,000

The actual Treasury outlay for the war he estimates at about
$361,000,000. “The government,” he adds, “actually paid out an aver-
age of $860,000 for each day of the Spanish-American War. To this
must be added, however, an estimate of fifty per.cent. of accounts
not yet presented for settlement, which will bring the total up to
approximately a million and a quarter a day. And this maximum of
expense continued for several weeks after the close of the war, the
subsistence of troops and their transportation remaining very much
the same as if an actual state of hostility still existed. . . . Ac-
cepting the statistics of Mulhall as to the National Treasury cost of
our own Civil War, each day of that war cost the Federal Govern-
ment an average of $2,476,760. It will thus be seen that, unless
when all accounts are rendered a much different result from that
anticipated appears, the daily cost of the Spanish-American War was
only about fifty per cent. of that of the Civil War. It must be remem-
bered, however, that there were millions of men in the field during
the latter struggle, where only a quarter of a million were engaged
in the Spanish-American War, and if actual figures could be given of
the cost of the late war based upon the number of men engaged, it
would probably be found that the cost of fighting has not been re-
duced with the introduction of improved arms and ships.”

Mr. Charles A. Conant* gives the following interesting table of
appropriations on the war account, voted by Congress: —

* Article in the American Review of Reviews, September, 1898.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 583

APPROPRIATIONS MADE DURING THE SECOND SESSION OF THE Firry-FirTH Con-
GRess To Meer Expenses IncIpENT TO THE WAR WITH SPAIN.

For the national defense, act March 9, 1898...............--- $50,117,000.00
Army and navy deficiencies, act May 4, 1898................. 84,625 ,725.71
Naval appropriation act, May 4, 1898 — amount of increase over
preceding naval appropriation act .......... .....-...0e eee 23,095 549.49
Fortification appropriation act, May 7, 1898—amount of in-
crease over act as passed by House................. 00000 eee 5, 232,582.00
Naval auxiliary act, May 26, 1898...,.......... 0.6.0... c ce eae 3,000,000.00
Additional clerical force, War Department, auditors’ offices,
etc., act May 31, 1898...... (ect rb taeve tine sera cto ls msc ih de taste 227,976.45
Life-saving Service act, June 7, 1898............. 0.0... cee eee 70,000.00
Army and navy deficiencies act, June 8, 1898.................. 18,015 ,000.00
Appropriations in act to provide ways and means to meet war
expenditures, June 13, 1898............. 0... ccc cee cee eee 600,000.00
Army, navy, and other war expenses for six months, beginning
July 1, 1898, in general deficiency act..............-..-.... 226 ,604,261.46
Expenses of bringing home remains of soldiers................ 200,000.00
Totals scngc ete caaesd Gey er eee eGR Mee hveeeee ceed $361,788,095.11

He also prepared a very interesting table showing the difference
between army and navy warrants drawn during corresponding months
of peace and war, in 1897, and 1898:—

FOR THE ARMY.*

 

FOR THE ARMY.*

 

 

 

Sonia WARRANTS WARRANTS EXCESS IN
: DEAWN IN 1898. | DRAWN IN 1897. 1898.
$ 5,159,571 $ 3,046,103 $ 2,113,468
6,223,814 4,287,020 1,936,794
17,093,595 4.214.955 12,878,640
19 1723 ,804 2,886,016 16,837,788
34,774,153 10,736,758 24,037,395
14,315,000 2,782,000 11,533,000
$97,289,937 $27,952,852 $69,337,085 :

 

 

FOR THE NAVY.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

$ 5,241,443 $ 2,694,835 # 2,546,608

12,556,932 2,744,079 9,812,853

9,093,577 2,537,576 6,556,001

9,506,021 3,563,922 5,942,099

8,514,279 2,998.809 5,515,470

4,490,000 1,788,000 2,752,000

PO tal Sia ccansenemrcmnrnaminnay 20 $49 402,252 $16,277,221 $33,125,031
AGETE LACS be cnc5 2: oe erie seees $146 692,189 $44 230,073 $102 462,116

 

 

*The warrants drawn for the War Department in July, 1897. were abnormally large because the sum
of $6,047,320 was drawn for river and harbor improvements. The amount thus drawn in July, 1898, was less
than $2,000,000, so that the real excess of expenditures on account of the military service is $4,000,000 greater
than appears in the table. The drafts for river and harbor improvements are always large in J uly, because
disbursing officers then inaugurate their accounts for the new fiscal year with ample balances.
584 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Mr. Conant estimates the actual cost of the war at between $250,-
000,000 and $281,000,000 over and above the peace footing.

The United States demanded no money indemnity from Spain.
It will receive Porto Rico instead — without counting the Philippines
possibility or the eventual contingency of the annexation of Cuba.
These would prove sources of large revenue, but would, for a long time,
necessitate heavy garrison expenditures.

So that, counting not lives, or pensions, or anything future, the
cost of our war with Spain will prove to be about $300,000,000.

 
CHAPTER THE THIRTY- FIRST.

AsprEctTs AND INCIDENTS.

Tue Work oF WAR CORRESPONDENTS AND REPORTERS— ENORMOUS COST OF THE SERVICE —
No War 1n History Ever So PRoMPTLY AND FuLLy DeEscrinED — MATERIAL FOR His-
TORIANS—INCIDENTS AND ANECDOTES OF SOLDIERS IN THE Camp, IN BATTLE,

AND IN Hospitals — How SomE Heroes DIED AND OTHERS SUFFERED —

Nava AnEecpores— Acts oF GREAT BRAVERY—Bowery Music
aT GuaM—AGUINALDO’s FinE BAND— SPANISH AND
AMERICAN SAILORS CONTRASTED.

I.

wo or three days after Sampson’s fleet had moved out of Key
West to blockade Havana, the cable brought from Berlin a re-
port that the German Emperor was “greatly
amused at the idea of a fleet of war ships ae
going to battle accompanied by a fleet of newspaper ee ee
dispatch boats.” It is fortunate that amusement, like
happiness, is purely a relative joy. The German Emperor was to
see the fleet of dispatch boats forward reports of the progress of the
war (subsequently confirmed by acknowledgments of his own military
and naval observers), that proved beyond doubt the superiority, in
mettle and capacity, of men reared under the influence of a free
press, over those stunted by the existence of a truckling press, held
in terror by fear of prosecutions for free speech. He was to read in
the leading papers of his own empire—edited by men who were not
afraid to speak the truth, that his own fine standing armies, formed
by conscription and under compulsion, were not better than the
armies of the United States formed by volunteer enlistments, making
up in quick intelligence and initiative what his own soldiers learned
through despotic drill, and long service rendered with indifference.
Also, that his reserves were not better than our volunteers.
The “fleet of dispatch boats,” which so amused the Emperor, was

the navy of modern journalism, not less wonderful in its perform-
(585)
586 HISTORY OF THE

ances than the fighting navy. Its land forces, the war correspond-
ents with the army, composed a worthy arm of the great establishment
of trained journalism.

It remained for the newspapers of the United States to demon-
strate to international journalism, through their employes, the same
superior vigor, courage, endurance, and success in the labors on sea
and land that our army and navy demonstrated against the anti-
quated and incompetent mechanisms and ideas of war put forth by
a country restrained of free speech and manacled with ignorance.

Never before in the world’s history was the progress of a great
war so completely and so promptly described. It seemed as if Amer-
ican journalism, responding to the desire of the enormous clientage
it had established, mobilized its forces concurrently with army and
navy to make war on all the precedents of journalistic achievement.
On land and sea the American newspaper reporter was everywhere.
He was an army in himself. He stood on the bridge of the Olympia
at Manila with Dewey, and was complimented for his accuracy of
statement and his courage; he stood by Schley on the Brooklyn, raced
with Sampson on the New York, and watched the battle on the Oregon.
He went into the fight at Las Guasimas with the cavalry heroes, and
stormed El] Caney with Lawton, being, in fact, the first man in the fort.

Who can doubt the heroism of Hobson? But was it more, in
truth—apart from its setting—than that of Marshall, the correspond-
ent, who, shot through the spine at Las Guasimas, dictated his report
of the battle to a colleague, while death seemed to wait on his sen-
tences? Was it more than that of Creelman, who forced the fort at
El Caney and met a bullet for his pains, and who, suffering agonies
of pain, asked to be kept conscious until he could dictate his
notes to his employer? These actions have been equaled by jour-
nalists everywhere, but they have never been surpassed.

More than these incidents, which illustrate the courage, audacity,
and determination of the reporter, was the extraordinary spectacle of
an unfettered press giving news, opinions, and speculations from the
front as openly as if it were discussing local news at home. Except
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 587

for a short time, and with respect to specific information, there was
no censorship. It was the test of a free press. Plans of battle, faults
of execution, complaints of every sort were made public. If there
remain any secrets of the campaign in Cuba it must be because no
experienced correspondent or raw novice thought the affair worth the
telling.

Perhaps there was much inaccuracy of detail, error of judgment
in trusting rumor as fact, some mistaken “enterprise,” if not, indeed,
actual dishonesty in the haste and difficulty of the news service.
Even the press harbors its due proportion of incompetents and rascals
whose faults intrude everywhere; but the substantial foundations of
accurate reports of battles, marches, truces, and casualties, occurring
from day to day, were confirmed to the shame of fraud. But were there
not also similar errors in official military and naval reporting—more
than are known, perhaps, mercifully covered up in the archives at
Washington. Generals and Admirals are not more infallible than
reporters. But the reporter’s mistake is open to the whole world to
be tested and revised. His accuracy is measured against all the infor-
mation the world may possess. Are not General Wheeler and General
Kent brave, efficient, and honest leaders? But if the world depended
upon their reports of San Juan for knowledge of the battle, the result
would be a blank. Five hundred separate persons, perhaps, have
described the battles of San Juan and El Caney. There are five hundred
very different descriptions in details, but in the essentials the story is
the same in all. No American naval officer off Santiago knew in what
order the Spanish ships came out of the harbor until five days after
the battle, when the Spanish survivors cleared up the confusion. Yet the
morning after the great fight the American papers contained all
the material facts correctly, the errors being those of mere detaii.
Nine hours before the President received Admiral Sampson’s official
dispatch, announcing the victory, the news of the fight was in the
hands of every daily newspaper in America.

No war ever left such a wonderful mass of material for historians.
It is not only the great newspapers and the news-gathering associations
588 HISTORY OF THE

that are to be considered. These sent experienced correspondents and
observers capable of describing and understanding great events, but
there was also a real “army” of correspondents of the “home papers.”
Every regiment and company had its enlisted reporter or correspond-
ent, whose letters to the town or village paper will lend a new inter-
est to the history of war. And all these reported the opinion of the
general movement or the great events. Then, all the newspapers
were deluged with private letters from soldiers to their families at
home. The intelligence of the United States was writing the history
of the war which it was prosecuting. Only the archives of the Navy,
War, and State Departments are to be opened to complete the ma-
terial.

Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, himself a correspondent at the front, in
an article describing how war news was reported,* gives these inter-
esting ideas of the difficulty and cost: “When actual war [with Spain]
was approaching,” he writes, “a more extended service became nec-
essary, and each of several newspapers acquired a veritable fleet of
vessels, three, or four, or five, to patrol the waters of the West
Indies. These newspaper dispatch boats were swift-going steamers,
capable of making from twelve to fourteen knots an hour, and carry-
ing crews of a dozen men or more, with several correspondents on
each. Two dispatch boats, representing New York newspapers, were
private yachts, fitted with dynamos, powerful searchlights, and a hun-
dred and one other conveniences. Until war had been declared the
whole cargo of these vessels in their trips between Havana and Key
West, was a little package of copy that a man might carry in his
vest, pocket, and yet they were exceedingly expensive, as shipowners
exacted from $5,000 to $9,000 a month for the use of each boat, and
the newspapers were required to bear the additional expense of fire,
marine, accident, and war insurance, which the alarmed underwriters
of New York had fixed at the enormous rate of eight per cent. a
month. One New York newspaper paid $2,200 a month insurance on

*McClure’s Magazine, September, 1898.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 589

a single vessel, and it had five boats in service. But besides these
expenses the newspapers had to buy their own coal and supplies at
war-time prices, and pay the salaries of the correspondents who di-
rected the boats. One managing editor showed a salary list for a single
week, including only war correspondents. It amounted to $1,463.51,
and the best-paid correspondent hailing from New York is said to have
received $10,000 a year.

“Every time a dispatch boat made port in Havana harbor a rapa-
cious Spanish officer swooped down upon it and collected all manner
of fees—health-office fees, customhouse fees, and fees for clear water
to use in the boilers, to say nothing of pilotage charges—a total of
from $70 to $125 a day for this purpose alone. At the Key West end
of the voyage there were still further charges, rendered necessary by
the inevitable medical certificate and the pilot hire. Expenses were
paid in cash, and the correspondents found it necessary to go loaded
down with all they could carry.”

Sometimes a single paper received 5,000 words a day by cable
from Key West, and as the rate from Key West to New York is five
cents a word, this made an additional expense of $250 a day for this
single item. This in the face of the fact that after a dispatch was
received it was often crowded out by more important news. Every
message received by cable from Hong Kong cost $1.60 per word.

The result of all this vast expenditure, of the labors of reporters,
whose perils, exposures, hardships, and’ endurance were not less than
those of the fighting forces, was that the American people knew the
progress of the war by the hour. The newspapers kept the govern-
ment itself informed far in advance of its own sources of informa-
tion, In many instances.

The newspaper press came out of the war not less broadened than
the nation itself.
590 HISTORY OF THE

Il.

THE newspapers were filled with anecdotes and personal incidents,
pathetic and humorous, both of the army and navy. They impart
the true color of life to the game of war and illus-
seniors trate the heroism of the obscure as well as of the lead-
or nun army ers: A Red Cross nurse in the hospital at Siboney
during the battle of Santiago, wrote: “A striking fea-
ture of the first day’s engagement was the number of men wounded
in the head, arms, and upper part of the body—the unerring aim of
Spanish sharpshooters concealed in trees. Some of these cases—the
most severely wounded—were taken into the Red Cross hospital, where
they would receive the most skillful and gentle nursing. Two days
of steady strain began to show on the Sisters. But nobody thought
of meals; the one thing was to feed and nurse the four hundred and
seventy-five wounded and sick men. Human endurance, however, had
its limit, and unless the Sisters could get a little rest they would give
out. I went on duty for twenty-four hours, and at night, with the
assistance of one man, taking care of twenty-three patients—fever,
measles, and dysentery cases, and three badly wounded men.
“Among the latter were Captain Mills, of the First Cavalry, and
William Clark, a private in the Twenty-fifth Infantry regulars. They
were brought over from the hospital tents and placed on cots on the
little porch, where there was just space enough to pass between the
cots. Their wounds were very similar, in the head, and of such a
character as to require cool applications to the eyes constantly. Ice
was worth its weight in gold, for the lives of these men, as well as
of others, depended chiefly on cool applications to the eyes, with as
uniform temperature as possible. We had one small piece of ice,
carefully wrapped in a blanket. There never was a small piece of
ice that ‘went so far.’ If I were to tell the truth about it nobody
would believe it. Never in my life, I think, have I wished for any-
thing so much as I wished for ice that night. It was applied by chip-
ping it in small pieces, or bits, put in thin dry cotton cloth, folded over
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 591

in just the right size, and flat, to place across the eyes and forehead
—enough of it to be cold but not heavy on the wounds. The ears
of the sick are strangely acute. Whenever the sick men heard the
sound of chipping ice they begged for ice water—even the smallest
bit of ice in a cup of water was begged for with an eagerness that
was pitiful. I felt conscience-smitten. But it was a question of saving
the eyes of the wounded men, and there was no other way. To
make the ice last till morning, I stealthily chipped it off so the sick
men would not hear the sound.

“At midnight a surgeon came over from his tent ward with a
little piece of ice, not larger than his hand. I do not know his name,
but it does not matter—it was inscribed above. ‘This is all we can
spare,’ he said. ‘Take it. You must keep these wounds cool, at all
hazards. I have another case, very like these, wounded in the head.
I want to bring him over here, where he will be sure of exactly the
same nursing. His life depends on the care he will get in the next
twenty-four hours. Have you a vacant cot?’

“There was not a vacant cot, though we could make room for one
on the porch if he could find the cot. He thought he could, and
went back, taking the precious bit of ice that he really needed more
than we did. In the course of half an hour the surgeon returned
to say it was impossible to get a cot anywhere, and the wounded
man must be left where he was in the tent—at least until morning.

“And so it went on through the long night—the patient suffering
of the sick men, the heroism of the wounded —all fearing to give any
trouble, desiring not to do so, and grateful for the smallest attention.
The courage that faces death on the battlefield or calmly waits for
it in the hospital is not a courage of race or color. Two of the bravest
men I ever saw were here, almost side by side, on the little porch,
Captain Mills and Private Clark, one white, the other black. They were
wounded almost at the same time and in the same way. The patient
suffering and heroism of the black soldier was fully equal to the Anglo-
Saxon. It was quite the same—the gentleness and appreciation. They
were a study —these men, so widely apart in life, but here so strangely
592 HISTORY OF THE

close and alike, on the common ground of duty and sacrifice. They
received precisely the same care. Each was fed like a child, for with
their bandaged eyes they were as helpless as blind men. When the
ice pads were renewed on Captain Mills’s eyes the same change was
made on Private Clark’s eyes. There was no difference in their food
or beds. Neither ever uttered a word of complaint. The nearest
to a regret expressed by Captain Mills was a heavy sigh, followed by
the words:—

““Oh, we were not ready—our army was not prepared.’

“Of himself he talked cheerfully —strong and hopeful. ‘I think
I shall get back with the sight of one eye,’ he said. That was all.
In the early part of the night he was restless—his brain was active
—strong and brave as he was. The moonlight was very bright—a
flood of silver light, seen only in the tropics. Hoping to divert him.
I said: ‘The moonlight is too bright, Captain. I will try to put up
a little screen, so you can get to sleep.’ He realized at once the
absurdity and the ludicrous side, and with an amused smile replied:
‘But you know—I can’t see the moon.’

“T said it was time to get more ice for his head, and half stumbled
across the porch, blinded by tears. When told who his nearest neighbor
was, Captain Mills expressed great sympathy for Private Clark and paid
a high tribute to the bravery of the colored troops and their faithful
performance of duty. Private Clark talked but little. He would lie,
apparently asleep, until the pain in his head became unbearable, then
he would try to sit up, always careful to keep the ice pad on his eyes
over the bandage. ‘What can I do for you, Clark?’ I would ask.
‘Nothing, thank you,’ he would answer, ‘it’s very nice and com-
fortable here. But it’s only the misery in my head—the misery is
awful.’”

Sergeant McInerney of Company E, Ninth Infantry, is credited with
having fired the shot that disabled the Spanish General Linares. The
Sergeant was peeping over the edge of the trench Saturday morning,
the second day before Santiago; near him stood his Lieutenant. The
Ninth had received orders from its Colonel not to fire unless so ordered.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 593

“Lieutenant,” said the Sergeant, “there’s a Spaniard on a white
horse with staff officers around him. I think he’s a general officer.
The distance is 1,000 yards. Can I pick him off?” The word was
passed along, and permission came back. McInerney rolled his car-
tridge over his tongue (a soldier’s superstition), and loaded his rifle.
Then, resting his rifle on the edge of the pit, he aimed and fired.

“IT undershot just 100 yards,” said he, drawing another cartridge
from his mouth, “but it didn’t scare him.”

When McInerney’s rifle cracked again he cried, “I got him,” and
the officer on the white horse fell over with a shot in his shoulder.
It was General Linares, the Spanish commandant.

Before McInerney could get under cover a Mauser clipped the dirt
an inch from his ear. “A little too far to the right,” he cried,
waving his right arm as though he were a target marker on a rifle
range.

One of the volunteers before Santiago had an excessive fondness
for liquor, that at times rendered him unmanageable. One day while
in camp in Florida the Colonel of his regiment called him into his.
tent for the purpose of talking to him like a father, as he had known
him for years.

“Now, look here, John,” said the Colonel kindly, “what do you
mean by this sort of thing?”

“T mean to quit, Colonel,” he responded.

“You've said that a million times. You ought to be ashamed of
yourself. You are a man of more than ordinary intelligence, you
have nice people at home, you are of a good family, you are quick to
learn the duties of a soldier, you are clean, you look well, you keep
your accoutrements in fine condition, you are obedient, you are always
willing to take your share of the hardships, you never complain, and,
in fact, you are a model soldier with one exception.”

‘“What’s that, Colonel?” asked John, just a shade leerily, it must
be confessed.

“You will get drunk.”

“Ts that all, Colonel? ”
594 HISTORY OF THE

“That’s enough, isn’t it?”

John steadied himself by the Colonel’s table.

“Now, Colonel,” he said—all volunteers have a way of talking to
their superiors—‘if I’m all these good things that you say I am, why
not let the drinking go with the balance? You don’t expect to get
all the cardinal virtues for $13 a month, do you?”

It was in the canteen at Camp Wikoff that a reporter heard this
anecdote from a regular: —

“Talk about your Generals, Chaffee’s the old boy for my money.
I found out what he was at El Caney. My company was at work
digging trenches and while we were finishing up one the Spaniards
began to fire and the bullets sang their little tunes pretty nigh to-
our heads. Well, there was a kid in the company that couldn’t have
been over eighteen. Never ought to have let him enlist at all. He
was always complaining and kicking, and at the first fire down he
went flat on his face and lay there. One of the men kicked him,
but he didn’t stir. Then along came Chaffee, cool and easy, and
sees the kid.

“* Hello, there!’ says Chaffee. ‘What’s the matter, you fellow down
there? Get up and fight with your company.’

“No, I can’t,’ whines the kid.

“*Can’t?’? says Chaffee, jumping down into the trench and hauling
the boy up. ‘What’s the matter with you that you can’t? Are you
hurt?’

““No, sir, says he. ‘I’m scairt. I’m afraid of getting hit.’

“* Well, you’re a fine soldier,’ says the General. Then he looked
at the boyish face of the kid and his face kind of softened. ‘I sup-
pose you can’t help it, he said. ‘It ain’t so much your fault. I'd
like to get hold of the fellow that took you into the army.’

“T suppose any other General would have sent the kid to the rear
in disgrace and that would have been the end of it; but Chaffee stood
there with the bullets ki-yiying around him beside the boy, who had
crouched down again, and thought, with his chin in his hand. By
and by he put his hand on the boy’s shoulder.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 595

“<«There isn’t as much danger as you think for,’ he said. ‘Now,
you get up and take your gun and fight and I’ll stand here by
you.’

“The boy got up shaking like a leaf, and fired his first shot pretty
near straight in the air.

“<That’s pretty high,’ says the General. ‘Keep cool and try again.’

“Well, sir, in three minutes that ‘scairt’ kid was fighting like a
veteran and cool as a cucumber, and when he saw it the General
started on.

““You’re all right now, my boy,’ he said. ‘You'll make a good
soldier.’

“God bless you, sir,’ said the youngster. ‘You saved me from
worse than death,’ and he was pretty close to crying when he said it.
_ “After a while the order came to retire from the trench, and we
just had to collar that kid and haul him away by the neck to get
him to retreat with his company. And, at that, he’d got a bullet
through the fleshy part of his shoulder an hour before. In the rest
of the fights there wasn’t a better soldier in the company, and not
only that, but we never heard a grumble or a kick from him from
that day.”

Here is the story of “Old Hoss” at Camp Wikoff: In the middle
of the main roadway from the railroad station across the point is
a little grassy rise where the wagon trails divide to reunite a few
rods further on. A rough wooden cross stands upright there. It
marks the last resting place of a veteran of the Sixth Cavalry, who
fell there and was buried where he fell. On the cross is the inscrip-

tion :—
“RATTLESNAKE BILL,

A HORSE.”

The Sixth are mourning Rattlesnake Bill almost as they would a
man of the regiment, for he was a part of it before half of them en-
listed. Years of service had weakened his frame, but not his spirit,
and as one of the equine veterans he was treated with special con-
sideration. Yesterday a trooper rode him down to the station, where he
596 HISTORY OF THE

found a message requiring his immediate return. He urged the old
horse to extra speed with voice and rein,—spurs never were needed
for Rattlesnake Bill—and the animal answered with the best there
was in him. But Montauk roadways turn and twist over a hundred
little rises and descents, that break the wind and torture the spirits.
The sandy dust was fetlock deep. Clouds of it blew into the strain-
ing nostrils of the horse, and his breath came harder and _ harder.
Once or twice he looked around appealingly, but this was a case of
haste, and his disciplined spirit set the wearied muscles firmly to the
task at the word of command. On a roadway where nearly half the
cavalry horses go at a gallop not an animal passed him, until he
reached the hill where the roadway curves just before it splits at the
grassy mound. Then three colored cavalrymen went tearing by.

“Get on, Bill,” urged his rider. “What’s got you, lettin’ a lot of
skates like that go by you?”

Up went the old horse’s ears, and with a short whinny he leaped
forward, stumbled, staggered, plunged blindly up the little slope and
fell. In an instant the trooper was. at his head.

“What’s the matter, Bill, old boy? Come, boy, get up.”

Bill lay with half-closed eyes, panting. A little group of infantry-
men came up, and looked on while the trooper patted the animal’s
neck and talked to him.

“Come up now, boy!” cried the rider. “Come on, Bill!”

For the last time the brave old horse answered the word of com-
mand, got his forelegs under him, struggled half way up, then, with
a moan like that of a suffering human being, fell back. The trooper
sat down and took the great head on his knees. Bill whinnied brok-
enly, nestled his soft nose into his master’s hand, stretched out, and
was dead. The man’s head drooped over, and the face was buried in
the heavy mane. The infantrymen silently turned and walked away,
the owner of the flask forgetting, or not caring to reclaim it. Pres-
ently there came along a detachment of Sixth Cavalrymen. They
dismounted and joined their grief-stricken comrade. All their efforts
could bring no sign of life from the horse.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 597

They left a guard of honor beside the body of Rattlesnake Bill
until sunset. That night ten men of the Sixth ran the guard, and
with pick and spades, which they had borrowed from the engineers,
dug the veteran’s grave and buried the horse. His rider set firmly
in the ground the wooden cross with its penciled inscription, the
men, uncovering, and walking away in silence.

Sergeant Ousler of the regulars told some stories of the action at
Las Guasimas. “That story about Assistant Surgeon Church, the young
Washington medico of the Rough Riders, who dressed a fallen man’s
wound away out ahead of the line, amid a hail of Mauser bullets, has
been published,” said he, “but the coolness of that young fellow wasn’t
even half described. While he was making an examination of his
wounded comrade, paying no attention to the whistle of the bullets,
a young private of the Rough Riders, who had been a college mate
of Church at Princeton, yelled over to him from a distance of about
twenty feet—he was in with a half a dozen fellows doing sharp-
shooter’s work from behind a cluster of bushes—to ask how badly
the patient was hurt. The young surgeon looked over his shoulder
in the direction whence the private’s voice proceeded, and he saw
his former chum grinning in the bushes.

“<« Why, you whelp!’ said Church, with a comical grin on his face,
‘how dare you be around here and not be killed!’

“Then he went on fixing the wounded man, and he remained right
there with him until the arrival of the litter, that he had sent to
the rear for.

“Tn my cavalry outfit there was a fellow with whom I soldiered
out West four or five years ago. He was a crack baseball pitcher,
and he would rather play ball than eat, any time. He got a Mauser
ball plumb through the biceps of his right arm early in the engage-
ment. I never saw a man so darned mad over a thing in my life.
The wound pained him a good deal, but it wasn’t the pain that hurt
him so much. I met him at the rear after the scrap was over. He
had tried to go on shooting with his carbine, but he couldn’t make

it go with his left hand and arm alone, and so he had to drop back.
29
598 HISTORY OF THE

He was alternately rubbing his arm and scratching his head when I
came across him.

“Hurt much?’ I asked him.

“*Ffurt, nothing!’ said he, scowling like a savage; ‘but did you ever
hear of such luck as this, to get plugged right in my pitching arm?
Why the devil didn’t they get me in the neck, or somewhere else,
anyhow? Jl never be able to pitch another game, I'll bet $2, for
these muscles are going to contract when the hole heals up,’ and
he went on swearing ‘to beat the band’ because the Spaniards hadn’t
let him have it ‘in the neck, or somewhere else.’

“One of the fellows in the Rough Riders, an Oklahoma boy, got
a ball clean through his campaign hat, which was whirled off his
head, and fell about five feet away from him. He picked up the
hat, examined it carefully, and said: —

“<T’]] have to patch that up with sticking plaster, or Pll get my
hair sunburnt.’ The fun of it was that his hair was about the reddest
I ever saw.”

Another regular of the First Cavalry related an incident of the
advance on San Juan. “There was a young fellow near me,” he
said, “behind a tree trunk, one of those stunted little trees. It was
big enough to cover his body, because he was about as thick as a
lath. His name was Charlie Jacob, and his father was United States
Minister to Colombia at one time, and is now a rich and prominent
man at Louisville, in Kentucky.* Young Jacob was just a boy in
heart, though he was twenty-one. When the war came he enlisted
among the very first in the old First Cavalry. Uis hands were made
for kid gloves, and his feet for patent leathers, and he was as tall
and thin as they can make ’em without breaking. Well, we tried
putting work onto him, but he seemed to like it, and was so full of
singing, joking, and skylarking that it was’nt three weeks before we all
got to taking work off him. He never bragged, and he never kicked;
soldier-work was fun for him. When he was standing behind the

*The Honorable Charles D. Jacob, a distinguished citizen of Kentucky.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 599

tree there, his Sergeant started on a rush ahead for a clump of brush
in sight. He hadn’t got twenty feet past young Jacob’s tree wher
a bullet or two socked him in the legs and he fell. Shrapnel and Mau-
sers were coming hot, when young Jacob put down his gun and made
about two jumps to the Sergeant, and stooped over to lift him up and
bring him back to cover. He was asking where the Sergeant was
hit and gathering him up, when two bullets struck him, one in the
head. He didn’t live but a few hours.

“The Sergeant said, ‘You oughtn’t to have done it, Charlie.’

“*T couldn’t help it,’ said Charlie.

“His hands were soft, but he had a strong heart in him, and went
into fighting like he went into playing. When we buried him next
day we laid a brave soldier away, and thought of his happy disposi-
tion that had cheered us so much. There was some crying, I tell
you, used as we were to such things.”

Edward Marshall, the correspondent, badly shot at Las Guasimas,
describes the Mauser bullet and its effect.* He could not find a bet-
ter way to describe the sound of the Mauser bullets that were singing
around the Rough Riders in that fight than by the letters “z-z-2-z-z-eu,”
adding that the cracks of the rifles sounded for all the world like the
explosion of a lamp in a drawing-room. “The noise of the Mauser
bullet traveling through the air is not impressive enough to be
really terrifying until you have seen what it does when it strikes.
It is a nasty, malicious little noise, like the soul of a very petty and
mean person turned into sound. Its beginning and its ending are
pitched a little lower than its middle. Its beginning is gradual, but
its ending is instantaneous. I saw many men shot. Every one went
down in a lump without cries, without jumping up in the air, with-
out throwing up hands. They just went down like clods in the grass.
It seemed to me that the terrible thud with which they struck the
earth was more penetrating than the sound of guns. Some were only
wounded; some were dead.

* Scribner’s Magazine, September, 1898.
600 HISTORY OF THE

“Once I thought I had found a coward. A man was running
wildly toward the rear. I stopped him and asked him what he was
running away from. He restrained himself with difficulty from brain-
ing me with his carbine. He had torn off the sole of one shoe, and
the accident hampered his movements. He was running wildly about
in a temperature not less than one hundred and three degrees, searching
for a dead man to take a shoe from. He was running so that he could
get quickly back to where the firing was. I showed him the dead
man and helped him to take the shoe off. He was very grateful,
and after he had once more gained protection for his foot he started
on the double-quick for the firing line.”

iI.

In an account of the sea fight at Santiago by George E. Graham,

a press correspondent on board the Brooklyn,* he describes some acts
Peer of great courage and how they were performed. “Up
INCIDENTS FRoM forward on the gun decks,” he writes, “was a six-

Rorenerie cee pounder that in this close forty-minutes’ action had

been doing valiant work. As they were putting in a cartridge the
shell loosened from the casing and became wedged. This was on the
side near the enemy, but there was not a moment’s hesitation. Out
on the gun’s muzzle crawled Corporal Robert Gray, of the Marine
Corps, a rammer in his hand ready to drive the shell out. The gun
was hot, and he could not retain his hold; so he dropped down to
the sea ladder. Over his head was the frightful blast and draft of
the big gun, while around him pattered the shot of the enemy. He
failed in his attempt, and gunner Smith then tried it, but he too
failed. It looked as though the gun would have to be abandoned, but
Private MacNeal, of the squad, asked permission to make an attempt,
and was allowed to try it. Clinging to the hot gun, with death by
water assured if he dropped or was knocked off by the concussion,

*In McClure’s Magazine, September, 1898.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 601

and the enemy firing at him, he got the rammer in the muzzle and
rammed out the shell, amidst cheers from his comrades. I watched
these men closely. None of them showed the slightest sign of heroic
exhilaration. It was evidently to them a duty of the commonest
sort. A few minutes later a 6-inch projectile smashed into a com-
partment just below them. They laughed at the gunner’s aim when
they found nobody hurt. Five minutes later I photographed a man
at the after masthead fixing up one of the battle flags, the halyards
of which had been shot away. The fire was deadly about him. He
would not give his name.

Mr. C. 8. Clark, in the United Service Magazine, recounted an extraor-
dinary exploit by an officer named Gillis on the torpedo boat Porter:
“The torpedo had been fired from the destroyer Pluton, and, with force
almost expended, was coming slowly but surely toward the anchored
torpedo boat Porter. Gillis sprang overboard, swam to the torpedo,
turned the nose away from the Porter, and screwed up the firing-pin
tightly so that it would not operate. Then, treading water, he saluted
Lieutenant Fremont and reported: ‘Sir, I have to report I have cap-
tured a torpedo.’ ‘Bring it aboard, sir, replied Fremont; and Gillis
actually did so, swimming with it to the ship and fastening tackles
to it.”

From a very finely written and spirited description of the capture
of Guam Island, in the Ladrones group, in the New York Swn, is taken
this amusing incident of the visit of the American soldiers and sailors
to the house of the head of the police in Agafia: “Vincente Diaz pro-
duced cigarettes and cigars, of Manila make, and a bottle of hell-fire
aguardiente of his own distillation. Then from some mysterious inside
nook he brought out a new and shiny accordion. He gave it to a
vacant-faced and bashful young man and commanded him to play.
The Americans joined in the demand at once, and asked for a dance.
But Diaz replied that the Chamorros had no dances. The boy tried
the accordion a while and began to play. The first bar made every
American in the room cock his ears and stare at his neighbor. No weird,
fantastic music of any sort could have surprised them. They expected
602 HISTORY OF THE

that. They would have called it native and been well pleased with
it. But this was familiar. It wasn’t exactly as they remembered it,
‘but as the song grew louder’ it developed unmistakably into the ‘New
Bully,’ and when it struck the chorus the whole crowd joined with
a roar in yelling :—

When I walk that levee roun’
I’m lookin’ for dat bully, ’n’ he mus’ be foun’,

“The applause that followed this performance so astonished the
young artist that he stopped playing. When he was persuaded to
go on again he played ‘Ta-ra-ra-boom-de-ay,’ amid the wildest cheers.
The reception the Americans gave his music surprised him very
much,

“There were loud inquiries as to where he learned the tunes, but this
was the only question, almost, that the Diazes could not answer. They
‘ouessed’ that it was from a whaler, and probably they guessed right.
But the ‘New Bully’ is not so very old, and it was mighty queer to
hear it ground out on an accordion under a cocoanut-palm thatch
in Guam, when it was just the other day that May Irwin was singing
it in New York.”

The same correspondent gave an account of Aguinaldo’s military
band, at Cavité, which will surprise those who know so little of the
Far East. “A wonderful band,” he wrote, “marched up the muddy
Calle de San Francisco from Aguinaldo’s headquarters this morning,
and for an hour serenaded General Anderson with playing -that would
set the music-lovers of New York wild with excitement. The aver-
age Filipino does not present the appearance of a musician or a
music-lover. But for his bright, intelligent eyes he would look like a
stupid Patagonian sheep-herder. There are few musical instruments
in the native villages. Once in a while one runs across an old tin-
pan-toned cracked piano horribly out of tune, and two or three places
have harps. But this band, composed entirely of Filipinos, is worthy
to rank with the bands of the world. It was the famous military band
of Manila, where it used to furnish classic music on the Lunetta when
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 603

the aristocratic Spaniards went out for their evening drive or prom-
enade. And occasionally, or oftener, it was turned out to play while
a few dozens of the musicians’ people were shot for the edification of
the multitude, on the charge of sympathizing with insurrection or
some other trumped-up accusation.

“In Manila there were seventy-two members. Sixty of them man-
aged to get away with their instruments and music. This morning
forty-eight played on the little plaza in front of General Anderson’s
headquarters. And such playing! It was recompense for every dis-
comfort, every vexation, every disappointment, every hardship of seven
thousand miles in a troop ship, the last five thousand at half steam
in a tropic sea. You shut your eyes and heard the orchestra of the
Royal Opera at Vienna, the great Budapest Band, the famous military
band in Berlin, the Boston Symphony at its best, Seidl’s finest work,
anything in the world. With never a note in front of them, they
played what you liked, any part of any opera, the grandest music
ever written, or a simple Strauss waltz or a folksong. And the bass
drummer was the leader. You will never hear a bass drum really
played until you hear that Filipino do it. He makes a bass drum
talk, sing, cry, shout. It fits the mood and movement of the music.
It is subordinate or dominant, soft, subdued, or loud and roaring; it
laughs and chuckles like a thing alive; it raves and protests like an
angry soldier, and all in perfect harmony and sympathy with the rest.
The ambition of the average bass drummer is to develop the muscles
in his arms. He pounds the uncomplaining drum as if he were
swinging clubs for exercise. But with this Filipino it is a science
and an art, and he is master of both. It is a curiously organ-
ized band—one bass drum, two snares, a lyre, five tubas, eleven sax-
ophones, big and little; eleven clarinets, eight cornets, one ballad
horn, and four altos and tenors. They played songs from ‘Faust,’
and I sat again in the Metropolitan Opera House and heard and saw
the vast audience get to its feet with frantic cheers when Calvé and
the two de Reszkes finished the prayer song. They played, but no
telling describes what they played.”
604 HISTORY OF THE

From two articles on the subject* are extracted some compari-
sons of American and Spanish seamen on war vessels :—

“A man-of-war commander in the American naval service seldom knows what
one-half of the men of his crew are capable of doing until the man’s respective
capabilities are revealed by incidents that happen aboard ship. There are some
curious instances of how men forward, down on the rolls as ‘laborers’ or ‘clerks,’
have shown their hands, and made decided hits in emergencies. One night about
three years ago, when most of the officers, including the surgeon, of a gunboat
lying in San Francisco harbor were ashore attending a social function, a newly
shipped coal heaver, whose occupation on the roils was that of a laborer, fell down
the hatchway ladder from the main deck to the machine shop. There was no one
in the machine shop at the time. The coal heaver with his legs, the right one
badly broken, dangling in the air, walked on his hands from the machine shop up
forward to the sick bay, where some of the bluejackets picked him up and deposited
him on a couch. The coal heaver told the men that his leg was broken, and one
of them rushed to report the case to the officer of the deck.

“The officer of the deck sent for the apothecary. The apothecary told the officer
of the deck that he didn’t have the skill to set broken legs. A big, indolent
marine, a recruit, whose only capability thus far had seemed to consist in the getting
on the outside of three very heavy ‘squares’ a day, heard the excitement from his
hammock where he was dozing. The big marine tumbled out of his hammock, went
to the sick bay, and set the coal heaver’s broken leg in a style that aroused the
admiration of the surgeon when he returned to the ship after midnight. All hands
wondered how the coal heaver had managed to walk on his hands from the machine
shop forward to the sick bay, until he admitted that he had been a professional
acrobat ashore, and that he had shipped in the navy because the circus with which
he last traveled had gone to pieces in San Francisco, leaving him stranded in the
hardest town in which to go broke in the Western Hemisphere. The big, indolent
marine, who set the coal heaver’s broken leg, had to admit to the surgeon that he
had been graduated in surgery years before, and had done his tour in several
famous English hospitals before he drifted into sea-soldiering.

«“«How did you happen to enter the marine corps?’ inquired the surgeon.

««Rum,” laconically replied the marine.

“One afternoon, down in Honolulu harbor, Admiral Beardslee, in command of the
Pacific squadron from the flagship Philadelphia, was in a quandary because of the
unexpected arrival a day ahead of time of the Australian steamer that was to carry
the fleet’s mail to San Francisco. The Admiral had a voluminous report to make
on the situation in Honolulu—this was during the last Hawaiian revolution—and
he had only three hours in which to draw up the report, for the Australian steamer

*From the New York Sun, May 22, and June 5.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 605.

could not, of course, wait. The Admiral came out of his cabin and told the officer
of the deck at the gangway to send ashore with all haste for somebody who could
take rapid dictation on a typewriting machine. A young landsman, who had been
a good deal of a muff at ‘sailorizing,’ overheard the Admiral giving this order, and
he walked up to Beardslee, knuckled his forehead in the usual manner, and volun-
teered to do the work. The Admiral looked at the landsman without much confi-
dence in his gaze.

“¢What kind of a typewriter do you handle?’ he asked the recruit,

“¢Any kind,’ was the reply.

“The Admiral took the landsman recruit aft and began to dictate trial stuff to
the bluejacket. The bluejacket rattled the copy off in a style that opened the
Admiral’s eyes. Beardslee dictated his report to the lightning swift bluejacket
typewriter, the words hardly falling from his lips before the landsman had them
down pat. The Admiral took the pages one by one. There wasn’t a mistake in
spelling, punctuation, or paragraphing. The copy was absolutely clean, although the
Admiral had dictated at the rate of ninety words a minute. The Australian steamer
carried Beardslee’s report, and the landsman was immediately rated Admiral’s yeo-
man, or private secretary. A yeoman is a sixty-dollar-a-month chief petty officer.
The bluejacket had been a court stenographer in New York.

“A bluejacket who put in a three-year’s enlistment as a deck hand took his dis-
charge from the navy a couple of years ago while his ship was at Yokohama, Japan,
and got a job as a shipping clerk. A few weeks after he went to work ashore
one of his shipmates was arrested and locked up, charged with stabbing a jinriksha
Jap. The sailor was tried before the Consular Court, but before his trial came off
his ship left Yokohama for China. The ex-bluejacket conducted his shipmate’s de-
fense before the Consular Court, and he conducted it so ably and with such a fine
knowledge of law that his man-of-war’s man client was acquitted. The ex-bluejacket
lawyer had been in his day the junior partner in a well-known firm in St. Louis.
Rum, injudiciously mixed with politics and cards, had got him over the side of a
man-of-war with a hammock and ditty bag, but he went in as a ‘laborer.’

“When the officers of one of our cruisers on the Mediterranean station were giv-
ing a dance aboard one night about a year ago, the ship’s dynamo broke down and
all the lights on the ship went out at once. The swell congregation of American
tourists and foreigners was in the midst of a waltz on the main deck at the moment
of the extinguishment of the lights, and the women fell into a panic. The officer of
the deck galloped to the dynamo room, where he found the chief gunner’s mate, who
used to be the chief electrician aboard our war ships, in despair. The dynamo was
in such a condition that its custodian, whose course in electricity had been of a hur-
ried and superficial sort, reported that it would require a week anyhow to patch it
up. The machinists were called forward, but machinists are not supposed to have
much knowledge of electrical apparatus, unless they have been specialists ashore
with that kind of gear. They shook their heads.
606 HISTORY OF THE

“Then a bluejacket, who had shipped aboard in New York City a few months
before, when the cruiser started on her Mediterranean trip, turned up in the dynamo
room. He sized up the dynamo with the eye of a man who knew dynamos down to
the ground; and while the officers and chief gunner’s mate and machinists stood by
watching him wonderingly, he made a few little adjustments with a wrench, and the
dynamo started to whir, the ship immediately becoming a blaze of light again.
The landsman was down on the rolls as a laborer. But he had put in an appren-
ticeship of seven years at Mr. Hdison’s electrical works, and he is about the most
valuable electrician——a chief petty officer—in the navy to-day. He is serving with
one of the fleets in Cuban waters.”

The contrary of these pictures of skill and intelligence is presented
by the Spanish sailors :— :

“Naval officers of the United States service, in common with officers of the
British navy, have often marveled over the lack of expertness exhibited by Spanish
officers in handling modern ships, but they have always dwelt particularly upon
the apparent stupidity of the Spanish man-of-war’s men forward. There is nothing
ashore or afloat to equal the stolidity, indifference, slouchiness, and general incapacity
of the Spanish bluejacket. Nor is the wonder great that the Spanish bluejacket is
so poor a seaman, so inferior a gunner, so sluggish a performer of the thousand and
one chores aboard ship of which a good man-of-war’s man has the knack. Four-
fifths of the Spanish bluejackets are men who had never been at sea before being
impressed into the naval service. Impressed is the word, for the difficulty the
Spanish navy has experienced during the past decade or two in getting enough
men to man the ships is well known to those who make a study of naval matters.
‘Impressed’ is almost too well-sounding a phrase with which to express the fashion
the Spanish naval recruiters have of getting bluejackets. The term should rather
be ‘shanghaied.’? The Spanish law forbids the conscription of naval recruits in time
of peace. But if you ask any Spanish man-of-war’s man how he happened to take
on in an outfit wherein he received so little consideration, the reply is apt to be:
‘I was drunk.’ It is asserted that a majority of the Spanish sailors are men from
inland Spain. The Spanish merchant sailors, the men living in Spanish ports, who
are of age for service aboard war ships, know too well the cruelties and hardships
inflicted upon men forward in their country’s naval service to put themselves in the
way of being trapped into it.

“Spanish sailors forward are ill-treated habitually by their officers. This is not
a prejudiced or an exaggerated statement. It is literally true. The officers of the
Spanish navy are, for the most part, younger sons of good families, who have gained
their billets not by ability or through competition, but through the intercession of
their people at the court. The incapacity of many of them is laughable; their
cruelty is notorious. From the very day that a Spaniard is enlisted in the ship’s
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 607

company of one of his country’s war vessels,— enlisted voluntarily or involuntarily,—
he is made to feel that he is no better than a beast. For the slightest infraction
of regulations he is punished in a fashion that makes bluejackets in navies like our
own or that of Great Britain flush with anger. The central and consuming idea of
the Spanish naval officer is that all hands forward are his servants. There is abso-
lutely nothing of this in the American navy. Once in a while when an American
ship is at sea for a considerable period in tropical waters, and all hands, fore and
aft, are wearing white uniforms, an officer will pay a mess attendant for scrubbing
one of his uniforms and hanging it out on the scrub-and-wash line. The officer
who requests a man to do anything like this stands by to have the man refuse. It
is the man’s privilege to refuse outright to peform such a task for money or other-
wise, but if he accepts the job he is well paid for it. In the Spanish navy every
man forward, from the chief petty officer down to the unrated landsman, stands by
for a trick as valets for all the officers aft. They are not asked to wash the officers’
linen; they are not requested to blacken the officers’ shoes or pipeclay their belts —
they are commanded to do these things, and tasks more menial, more repugnant to
men of self-respect ; and the slightest indication of hesitancy on the part of a blue-
jacket is visited by heavy punishment. When a Spanish officer ‘gets it in’ for a
chief petty officer for any real or fancied cause, he does not immediately undertake
to secure the petty officer’s disrating. Instead, he begins systematically to humili-
ate him. He calls him vile names in the hearing of the unrated bluejackets, and
not infrequently kicks him. He calls him aft—especially when the petty officer
is showing a party of women visitors about the ship—and orders him to blacken
his shoes, right in sight of all hands and all the visitors on the main deck.

“The stanchion punishment is employed for the most trivial offenses in the
Spanish navy. The bluejacket who breaks his liberty by a few hours knows that
he is in for the stanchion lash when he returns aboard. The Spanish sailors .who
deserted their ships by the score in New York at the time of the centenary cele-
bration in 1889, were most of them liberty breakers who, after having got a whiff
of freedom, could not muster up the nerve to return to their ships to get the stanchion
lash. The man who is twenty minutes late in returning from his leave of absence
from a Spanish man-of-war gets as many cat-o’-nine-tail blows on his bare back, while
his wrists are securely lashed to a stanchion, as the officer of the deck cares to have
inflicted upon him. It all depends upon the state of the liver of the officer of the
deck. . . . To reduce the matter to its smallest term, a Spanish man-of-war is
simply a floating hell for the bluejackets, and the idea of the officers of the Sparn-
ish navy expecting men to put up a good fight for any sort of cause, after having
had a taste of the kind of treatment they get aboard ship, is a matter a bit beyond
the comprehension of the American mind.”

These descriptions account for the difference between the “men
behind the guns.”
CHAPTER THE THIRTY-SECOND.

THe Peace NEGOTIATIONS.

APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS BY THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN FoR ALL Purroses— Proc-
RESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PaRIs— SPANISH DELAY AND DIPLOMATIC PRETENSE
RESULT IN SLOow PRoGREsS— VAIN EFFORTS AND Hopes FoR INTERVENTION BY
Germany — THE GERMAN EMPEROR INTRUDES, BUT WITHDRAWS QUICKLY —

TERMS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE AS VERBALLY AGREED Upon No-

VEMBER 28, 1898—THE UNITED States REcEIVEs Vast COoLo-

NIAL TERRITORY UNDER THE TERMS —THE PoLicy OF
EXPANSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE REPUBLIC.

I.
PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PARIS

NDER the terms of the peace protocol, the President and the
Spanish ministry each selected five members to meet in
Paris on October 1, 1898, to negotiate final terms of peace
between the two countries. The members of the commis-
sion were as follows:—

For the United States. for the Kingdom of Spain.
Tue Hon. Wiwtiiam R. Day, SeNor Montero Rios,
Ex-Secretary of State, of Ohio. President of the Senate.
Taz Hon. Witiiam E. Frye, SeNor ABARZUZA,

U.S. Senator from Maine.

. SENoR
Tue Hon. Grorce K. Davis, Guarica,

U. S. Senator from Minnesota. GENERAL CERERO,
a EID
Tuz Hon. Warretaw Rem, SENoR VILLARUTIA.
Of New York.

Toe Hon. Grorce Gray,
U. S. Senator from Delaware.

The commissioners began their sessions in Paris, October 1, under

the friendly and hospitable auspices of the French Government.
(608)
 

R. Day,

Hox, Wat,

COMMISSION.

PEACE

ERICAN

AME

 

6
Se
a
&
HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 611

Commissioners for the evacuation of Cuba by Spanish officials were
appointed as follows:—

By the United States. By Spain.
Masor-GeneraL James F. Wane, GENERAL GONZALES PaRrRADO,
ApmiraL Wm. T. Sampson, CapraiIn Pastor LANDERA,
Masor-GENERAL MatrHew C. Burier. Tue Marquis or Montoro.

The corresponding commissioners for the island of Porto Rico
were the following :—

For the United States. For Spain.
Masor-GENnERAL Joun R. Brooke, ApMIRAL VALLARINO,
ADMIRAL WINFIELD S. SCHLEY, GENERAL ORTEGA,
Bric.-GENERAL WILLIAM W. Gorpon. SeNor Sancuez Drraaulta.

The local commissioners for the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico
met late in September and their duties were dispatched with com-
mendable promptitude. Porto Rico was in possession of the military
authorities of the United States within a few weeks. Major-General
Brooke was commander of the army of occupation, with Brigadier-
General Guy Henry as commander at Ponce. In November General
Henry succeeded General Brooke.

In Cuba the situation was more difficult to relieve. The num-
ber of Spanish soldiers to be transported to Spain, the diseased
conditions at Havana and other important points, and the natural
desire of the Spanish Government to maintain the status quo until
the Peace Commission could dispose of questions affecting ultimate
liability for the Cuban bonded debt, made it, in some sense, entirely
proper that more deliberate action should be permitted to the Span-
ish members of the commission. Every ship that sailed from Cuba
to the Peninsula, with its complement of Spanish troops for re-
patriation, was ravaged by disease and death. Spain’s army was
worn out by despair, lack of pay and food, and by exposure. On the
transports the deaths ranged from thirty to sixty per 1,000 on the
homeward voyage.
612 HISTORY OF THE

The flag of United States possession was raised over Ponce in
Porto Rico on November 18, but the Cuban commissioners agreed
upon January 1, 1899, as the date for Spanish sovereignty to cease
in that island, and the condition of the troops and the people caused
an agreement, through sympathy, to permit the transportation of
troops home to proceed at times and under conditions most favor-
able to the demands of humanity. Late in November, Captain-
General Blanco resigned, and returned with his staff to Spain, leav-
ing to his successor the duty of making the final surrender.

World-wide interest, however, centered upon the negotiations of
the Peace Commissioners at Paris. The members were received with
governmental honors and courtesies. France placed at their disposal
special apartments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with
formal ceremonies of a hospitable character the American and
Spanish bodies were entertained separately and then introduced to
each other. After these preliminaries began the difficult task of arrang-
ing the methods of procedure, which enabled Spain to interpose
with the inevitable and almost interminable delays peculiar to
Spanish diplomacy and the national character. For the United States
the Honorable William R. Day was president, for Spain Sefior
Montero Rios, a politician of great acuteness, experience and courage,
devoted to his country.

The United States demanded that all negotiations should be con-
ducted by interchanges in writing, without formal or official verbal
debate or comment. To this Spain assented with reluctance, since it
deprived her of some excuses for delay, and of opportunity to make
sympathy.

It would be useless to attempt to follow the course of the nego-
tiations in the absence of all direct and official reports of their actual
nature. But the general purpose of the Spanish commission soon
became apparent. It was to haggle over every point set out in the
protocol, with the object of getting the best terms possible, and to
avoid liability for the enormous debts Spain had laid upon Cuba and
the Philippines, which were represented by Spanish bonds, owned
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 613

mostly in Spain and France. The greater part of the debt, it was
understood, had been incurred to benefit Spain, or to suppress revolu-
tions, during which official corruption had diverted much of the funds
from the intended purposes.

The decided refusal of the United States to assume the Cuban
debt, or to guarantee its payment by any future government of Cuba,
and its decision to require a full renunciation of Spanish sovereignty
in the island unconditionally, was the first opportunity Spain sought
for an appeal through diplomatic channels to the sympathies of
Europe. It was intimated that holders of these bonds in other
countries must look to Cuba or the United States for their payment,
for the reason that Spain would be unable to meet enormous claims
secured alone by the pledged revenues of her colonies, if these col-
onies were now to be torn from her. The mingled plea and threat
brought no response. It was then intimated that the Spanish mem-
bers would be compelled to resign rather than sign a treaty con-
taining such a concession. They would not dare to face their
countrymen, it was said, after signing it. The Americans persisted
in the demand, and Spain yielded with protestations of helplessness.

Thus, through every step of the construction of a clear and defi-
nite agreement based upon the demands of the United States as set
forth in the protocol, the efforts of Spain’s representatives were con-
centrated upon obtaining by diplomatic priesse, some precedent, how-
ever slender or doubtful, with which she might, in the end, hope to
throw upon the conquering nation the burdens of debt and misman-
agement piled up by the conquered. Resistance was long drawn out,
and appeals for delay to the United States were made and granted.
The time gained by the delays was utilized by the Spanish Government
in representing to Europe that Spain was a helpless, crushed and
defenseless nation, pleading against despoilment by a cruel enemy
that threatened all Europe with the advantages to be gained by
achieving its designs in the East.

In France feeling began to run high against the United States;
but, the French Government, as the host of both negotiating bodies,
614 HISTORY OF THE

was bound. Moreover, the exciting change of popular feeling regard-
ing the Dreyfus conspiracy, the awakening of distrust of the army,
and the sudden clash with England over the Fashoda incident (dur-
ing which both governments made rapid and imposing naval prepa-
rations), put out of possibility any hope of assistance from that
quarter.

During the tension the Queen Regent of Spain conferred upon
President Faure, of France, M. Delcasse, Foreign Minister, and M.
Cambon, French Ambassador to the United States, royal decorations,
presented with great public ceremony. These honors could be re-
ceived, but the French Government could not repay her neighbor
with even hope.

There was yet a last chance. To the German Emperor, ardent for
colonial expansion, dreaming of absolutism, looking to an ocean force
commensurate with his military establishments, Minister Sagasta held
out a tempting apple. There had been some sort of understanding,
it was known, between Germany and Spain regarding the Caroline
Islands in the Pacific, upon which Germany based a claim in abeyance.
The German Emperor also longed for the Sulu group, southwest of the
Philippines.

When the third article of the protocol was reached, involving the
“oovernment” and “disposition” of the Philippines, the keen but ques-
tionable character of Spanish diplomacy was revealed in an unex-
pected manner. The Spanish commissioners maintained that the terms
of the protocol did not imply a demand from the United States for,
nor the possible acceptance by Spain of a cession of Spanish sover-
eignty in the islands. Spain, they admitted, was ready to discuss the
government and disposition of the Philippines, but “disposition” did
not mean “possession.” Possession of Manila by the United States,
it was argued, was gained after the peace protocol had been signed.
The United States was holding Manila by agreement only, not by
force. The surrender by the Spanish officials to Dewey and Merritt,
they urged, was voided by the prior effect of the protocol. Article
third of that agreement referred to what general “ disposition” might
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 615

be made of the islands by agreement, and did not imply “possession”
by the United States.

The diplomatists of Europe were refreshed in their occupation of
following maze lines in intricate convolutions by this delicate, yet
strong distinction between the American and Spanish construction of
the article. The United States Government was entirely prepared
for this.

President McKinley made the semi-official announcement that he
had made the final preparation and draft of the protocol with his
own hand, and after conference with M. Cambon, the French Ambas-
sador, that the word “possession” was written in the draft proposed,
and the word “disposition” was substituted for it at the request of
M. Cambon, who explained that he asked it only because the word
“possession”? when translated into the Spanish language, conveyed a
harsh idea that would wound the susceptibilities of the Spanish pub-
lic and render the task of Sagasta’s government more difficult. The
word “disposition” when translated into the Spanish tongue, he
explained, would be equivalent to “ possession,” and M. Cambon gave
his personal guarantee of honor that it should be so understood and
construed.

The President instructed the American commissioners to commu-
nicate his information to the Spanish commission, and-.to declare to
Spain that the United States Government could not permit any im-
peachment of or attack upon the honor and sincerity of the French
Ambassador.

This simple blow at the technical argument Spain had built with
elaborate care, destroyed instantly the possibility of evasion. The
French Ambassador stood between the President and the Spanish
Government, and France, which had instructed and permitted her
ambassador to act, must answer for his acts.

The Spaniards yielded, but ungraciously, declaring their helplessness.
They demanded that the question be submitted to arbitration. At
this time the German Emperor, about to return home from his visit

to Jerusalem, where his actions had attracted universal attention,
30
616 HISTORY OF THE

announced his purpose to proceed to Berlin by way of Gibraltar, and,
with the Empress, to touch at several Spanish ports. There were
unofficial intimations that instead of merely “touching” at Cadiz, he
would spend two days at Madrid, visiting the Queen Regent. Spanish
papers hinted that he was coming to “advise” the government and
that he would be proposed and accepted as the desired arbitrator.
His share in the spoils would be, of course, a great gain of strength
for German interests in the East. This suggestion of intervention ex-
cited Europe, but it had no effect upon the United States. The
American commissioners made demands upon the Spaniards for agree-
ment as to possession before proceeding to terms. The Spaniards
wavered, pleaded for delay, and waited upon the nod of the German
Emperor. That ruler then announced his intention: of returning to
Berlin by way of Austria, declaring that his proposed touching at
Spanish ports had been construed to have a political significance en-
tirely absent from his intention. In order that the United States and
Spain might not misunderstand him he abandoned the proposed route
by way of Spain. It was reported that his change of purpose was
caused by very earnest representations from the British foreign office
and from the Queen herself.

The conspicuous intrusion into Spanish-American affairs of the
vigorous and peculiar personality of William IL, through his diplo-
matic and naval establishments at Manila, and earlier at Havana,
made it seem possible that he might lend himself to a test of Amer-
ican determination. His attitude was irritating and his purposes were
not entirely apparent. But the young, self-confident, and spectacular
ruler gained from the struggle the first diplomatic advantages, by
securing an alliance with England covering Asiatic and African priv-
ileges of importance.

The withdrawal of William II. as a possible intervener left Spain
without apparent hope. The “possession” of the Philippines was
conceded.

The next demands of the United States probably caused surprise
to Germany quite as much as to Spain. They were that the Sulu
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 617

Archipelago must be considered as part of the Philippine group;
that a naval station must be ceded to the United States in the
Caroline Islands; that the sovereignty of the Island of Guam in
the Ladrones must be transferred to the United States; in return
for all of which the United States Government would agree to make
no claim against Spain for indemnity in money to repay the cost of
the war; in addition, recognizing and estimating the value of the
territory thus ceded by Spain, the United States would pay to the
Spanish Government the sum of $20,000,000 in cash, besides pro-
viding favorable terms for the continuance of Spanish commerce
in the colonies alienated by war.

The demand for the Sulu Islands had not been expected. These
had been a cause of dispute between Spain and Germany, but the
sovereignty had been finally settled upon Spain some years ago.
The Spanish Government by a decree of the Cortes had formerly
annexed the group to the Philippines. During the war with the
United States the Spanish Government had secretly revoked this de-
cree and attached the Sulu group directly to the home government.
The United States denied the validity of a retroactive decree and
held the islands to be attached to the Philippines. The Spaniards
yielded and thus one of the German Emperor’s coveted prizes was
lost.

With a persistence that pleaded poverty one day, and haughty
defiance the next, but which was yet always animated by the
spirit of shrewd haggling for monetary advantage over the American
“pigs” and “money-worshipping shop-keepers,” the Spanish recoiled
from the proposition of only $20,000,000 in return for the great
territory alienated. They declared it was a shameful sum to offer;
the commissioners would not put their names to a treaty involv-
ing such a petty stipulation, insulting to Spanish pride. Was Spain
a beggar, they asked, that mere alms should be thrown to her?
The Spanish Government and the Spanish politicians resented what
they described as a paltry offer, with characteristic outbursts of
patriotic pride. Well, yes, they declared, let us accept and sign;
618 HISTORY OF THE

America has the power of a brute and uses it to despoil us; we:
yield to her brutality with our pride and honor undimmed. Let
us sign her own disgraceful proposition to remain for all time a
testimony of her brutality to a helpless nation which has only
honor to defend itself. But never shall the price of our despoilment
pass into the hands of Spain. Let us sign the treaty but refuse
with scorn the money of the “Yankee pigs.”

This fine dramatic episode did not melt the Americans and it
naturally followed that at the next session the Spaniards pleaded for
$100,000,000 instead of the offered twenty millions. The American
commissioners refused to increase the bonus, and the Spaniards
discovered that they must accept, and quickly, or that an ulti-
matum would be issued, to be followed by the withdrawal of the
United States representatives and the descent of an American naval
force upon the Canaries and the coasts of Spain.

On November 28, therefore, the Spanish commissioners formally
agreed to the construction of the protocol in detail as described, ac-
cepting the twenty millions of bonus without resentment, and _ re-
linquishing Cuban sovereignty. The main points of the treaty ver-
bally agreed to were as follows :—

1.— Cession of Porto Rico to the United States.

2.— Relinquishment of the Sovereignty of Cuba, unconditionally.

3..Cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States (including the Sulu
Archipelago).

4.— Cession of the Island of Guam, in the Ladrone group, to the United
States.

5.— Payment to Spain by the United States of $20,000,000 as a balance fairly
due in settlement.

6.— Relinquishment by the United States of all claim for money indemnity for
the cost of war.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 619

I.

He wuo has followed the story of the war with Spain as here re-
lated, from the declaration of hostilities by the Congress at Wash-
ington to the agreement upon the terms of the treaty io. syrups
of peace by the Joint Commission at Paris, can have OF THE
perused it to little purpose if he has not been im- eee
pressed by the momentous changes effected through its result. Never
was conflict of arms so out of proportion to its consequences, both
with respect to its origin and its incidents. That war rarely ends
where it began, or leaves the respective combatants where it found
them, is an oft-repeated truism; but, as a rule, some basis for calcu-
lation, some estimate of chances, is given the more observant and
astute among statesmen and soldiers. Here there was none; for
what prescience, what discernment—even foreseeing Manila — could
believe it possible that within less than half a year a total revolu-
tion would be worked upon the sentiment of the people of the
United States and the policy of their government. ,

If Dewey had but sailed away, or if he had not sailed at all,
what a difference we should have witnessed in the conditions with
which the republic has had to deal! Far and away beyond the wis-
dom of the educated few, the rude instincts of the unlettered many,
unconsciously leapt at the truth; we could neither render back to
Spain the fruit of Dewey’s victory, nor abandon it as a temptation
to the rapacity of other nations, nor turn it over to domestic anarch-
ism. For evil, or for good, we had become the custodians of a rich
possession and a great responsibility. With Alaska upon the North
Pacific, with California upon the South, and Hawaii out to sea—to
say nothing about Cuba and Porto Rico in the South Atlantic — we
found ourselves face to face with the Colonial problem which Eng-
land had met and solved quite a hundred years before. There ap-
peared no honest way out of this; and, by a kind of impulse, the mass
of Americans—with many of their leaders against them — brushed
away precedents and theories and in tones which could not be
620 HISTORY OF THE

misunderstood erected a new gospel in place of the preachments of the
sages of other days. This declared that where the blood and treasure
of the nation have carried the flag, there the flag shall stay; that
what Great Britain has done with profit America may attempt with
safety; that that which was good for a struggling people, fringing
the Eastern Atlantic seaboard, no longer suffices a nation stretching
from ocean to ocean across the North American continent; and that,
conceiving and taking into the account the developments of the in-
tervening certury, the new departure adopted by the Great Republic
in 1900 will be no greater in its risks to liberty and law than was
the departure adopted by the Young Republic in 1800, when, disre-
garding the counsels of the statesmen who had made the Constitu-
tion, the people followed Jefferson upon a career of achievement, the
ruinous character of which was freely and loudly proclaimed.

It is indeed easy to find arguments against the proposed policy
of national expansion, and its opponents have been neither idle
nor uninventive. Beginning with the assumption that a colonial
establishment was not contemplated, or provided for, by the orig-
inal instrument and the structural fabric under which we have en-
joyed so many years of prosperous life as a nation and as a people
to end with the dread prophecy of imperialism, it has included all
the incidents of hazard and danger which an affectionate and prov-
ident father might submit to a son about to start upon a journey
to unknown lands, or to engage in an enterprise beyond the par-
ental experience and reach of vision. Pointing to the Chinese ex-
clusion bill it is asked why we should be seized so soon with the
desire to embrace the mongrel hordes of the Hawaiian Isles and
the Philippine Archipelago? Pointing to the unsolved problems of
State and municipal government at home, it is asked how we can
expect anything but disaster in undertaking the government of mil-
lions of half-civilized barbarians alien to our blood, institutions and
language? Taking lessons of ancient history, it is set up that these
things can only be done through the army and navy, that the ang-
mentation of the military power is ever a menace to liberty, and
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 621

that, once embarked upon a colonial policy beyond sea and a sys-
tem of satraps and proconsuls masquerading as governors, generals,
and the like, appointed by the central power at Washington, and
too far away to be held to a very strict accountability, it will be
only a question of time when the great republic of North America
will go to keep historic company with Greece and Rome.

It will hardly be denied by thoughtful men that these are
weighty considerations if we are to be influenced by the lessons of
human experience as they have come down to us from time im-
memorial. But, on the other hand, it is pleaded in rebuttal, that
nations, like individuals, cannot escape the dilemmas of which life
is made up; that the quandary of to-day becomes the opportunity
of to-morrow; and that back of nations, as of individuals, there is a
divinity that shapes their ends, rough-hew them how they may. It
is shown that suddenly, unexpectedly, this hand has interposed to
bring upon us conditions undreamed of indeed, but carrying with
them obligations and duties not wholly displeasing to our national
and personal aspirations. We must go forward, or backward, and,
with entire honor and self-respect we cannot go backward. Why
did Dewey win his immortal victory in Manila Bay? But, why was
the Maine blown up in Havana harbor? We cannot ignore Cuba
with all that it implies. We are already in undisputed possession
of Hawaii and Porto Rico. Why balk at the Philippines? The
philosophy that prefers to be killed for a sheep than a lamb joins
its forces to those of the philosophy that would not take two bites
at. a cherry; and herein we have the self-complacent optimism and
the self-confident thrift of the national character working out the
destiny of the nation through the principle of taking what it
pleases Heaven to send and of counting the costs afterward.

The argument advanced by the intrepid American optimist to meet
the ill omens advanced by his equally sincere and undoubting fellow-
countryman, the American pessimist, runs somewhat in this wise:
“The old order has passed away. A new order has come upon the
scene. The bucolic Republic of Franklin and Jefferson is gone. The
622 HISTORY OF THE

‘splendid government’ dreaded by Washington and Jackson is here.
But circumstances alter cases. Modern invention has not merely rev-
olutionized human conditions the world over, but it has centralized
power the world over. It has brought the nations into such close
propinquity and collision that the future becomes largely a matter of
the survival of the fittest. The President of the United States is in
the possession of powers not contemplated by the extremest theories
of Hamilton and Adams. He has but to touch a button in Washington
and the conspirators in Havana are arrested before they have had time
to disperse from their place of meeting to their several homes. He
may send troops in five hours where Frederic and Napoleon could not
have sent them in five weeks. Even the Philippine Archipelago is not
so distant from the Golden Gate as San Francisco was from Wash-
ington when California was admitted to the Union. As for alien races,
we have them in the Indian and in the African, and the very obligation
of providing for these remote peoples may, under God, help us to find
some better method for the adjustment of those problems that are
nearer home. Overproduction is the most serious danger that threatens
us. We must find wider markets. Idle, yet willing, labor has germi-
nated the seeds of discontent. We must make it outlets for its super-
fluous energies. The world moves, and it is moving toward the Orient.
Europe finds a vent in Africa. America cannot afford to be indifferent
to Asia. The sea-front of human activities may, within the coming
century, be transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific. We must
prepare to take our place in the procession—if need be, at the head
of the procession—of the nations. The lion has not yet lain down with
the lamb ; and, until he does so, mutton is good to eat. The millennium
has not yet made its advent; and, until it does so, that arbitration only
stands which is effected by the sword. The danger of militarism and
the martial spirit need not be gainsaid. It is a danger we must risk.
But let us hope that mankind has made progress in arts as well as
in arms; that America in the dawn of the twentieth of the centuries
is not as Rome in the zenith of the first ; and that— forewarned against
imperialism—we shall be able to attend to Caesar when we get to
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 623

him. In a word, eighty millions of people cannot be passive ; they
cannot escape the world’s movement; and, sufficiently admonished
by the isolation of China and its consequences, come what may, the
people of the United States prefer to follow the lead and example of
England. The die was cast when Dewey raised the Stars and Stripes
on the other side of the world, never too large and all too narrowing,
and, for weal or woe— rallying under the banners alike of Christianity
and Republicanism — America is embarked upon the shoreless ocean
of modern civilization, carrying in her, own ships her own ideas and
wares, marked, quoted, and signed to the furthermost ends of the
earth.”

Thus stands the debate between the friends and the foes of
National expansion. Which will vindicate the wisdom of its forecast
it~is for time to discover. The right and the wrong of the argu-
ment belong to the hereafter. But that the victory of circumstance
lies with the advocates of the new departure in National policy,
and that, as composite parts of the Great Republic, Cuba, Porto
Rico, and the Philippines are already assured, must be obvious to the
careful student of historic parallels and prevailing tendencies.

The simple American, who loves his country and is loyal to its
best traditions—the counsel of the fathers like words of Holy Writ
imbedded upon his understanding—the music of the Revolution, like
a pastorelle of Arcadia, ringing in his very soul—can only look upon
these changes with dismay. To him they seem but chaos come
again. It is like the ruthless razing of the home of his childhood—
the uprooting of the blessed roof-tree itself. Alas, such is the
common lot of man! It is the destiny of Nations. And yet, be they
of little faith of good hope still! Sursam Corda! Thus far the
Republic has survived every danger which has in times past assailed
the governments of the world; the struggle for existence; the foreign
invasion; the disputed succession; geographic friction; civil strife;
and it is at this moment stronger than ever it was, its faith
renewed, its credit intact and its primacy known of all men. Let
us believe that the untoward events of the war with Spain were
624 HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

brought about for some all-wise purpose by the Supreme Ruler of
men, and that that hand which has led American manhood through
every emergency to the one goal of the American Union, has in
store for that Union even greater uses and glory than irradiated
the dreams and blessed the prayers of the God-fearing men who
gave it life.

 
APPENDIX
OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

(625)
APPENDIX.
REPORTS OF THE NAVAL COMMANDERS ON SANTIAGO.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON’S REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Unirep States Fiacsuip “NEw York,”
First Rate, Orr SanTIAGO DE CUBA,
Juiy 15, 1898.

Sir: I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle with and
the destruction of the Spanish squadron, commanded by Admiral Cervera, off San-
tiago de Cuba, on Sunday, July 3, 1898 :—

Second —The enemy’s vessels came out of the harbor between 9:35 and 10 a. m.,
the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9:31, and emerging from
the channel five or six minutes later.

Third —The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that moment
were as follows: The flagship Mew York was four miles east of her blockading
station, and about seven miles from the harbor entrance. She had started for
Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go to
the front to consult with General Shafter. A discussion of the situation and a more
definite understanding between us of the operations proposed had been rendered
necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison of Santiago.
I had sent my Chief-of-Staff on shore the day before to arrange an interview with
General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made arrange-
ments to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in the position mentioned
above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels
were in or near their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle about
the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the westward in the following
order : —

The Jndiana about a mile and a half from shore; the Oregon, the New York's
place; between these two the Lowa, Texas, and Brooklyn, the latter two miles
from the shore, west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor en-
trance was from two and one-half to four miles—the latter being the limit of day
blockading distance. The length of the are formed by the ships was about eight
miles. The Massachusetts had left at 4 a. m. for Guantanamo for coal. Her station
was between the Lowa and Texas. The auxiliaries, Gloucester and Vixen, lay close
to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large vessels, the Gloucester to

(627)
628 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

the eastward, and the Vizen to the westward. The torpedo boat E’ricsson was in
company with the flagship, and remained with her during the chase until ordered
to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient service in rescuing prisoners from
the burning Vizcaya. I inclose a diagram, showing approximately the positions of
the vessels as described above.

Fourth—The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor at a speed esti-
mated at from eight to ten knots, and in the following order: Jnfanta Maria
Teresa (flagship), Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, and the Almirante Oquendo. The dis-
tance between these ships was about eight hundred yards, which means that from
the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the
last one was out of the harbor, an interval of only about twelve minutes elapsed.
Following the Oquendo at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came the torpedo-boat
destroyer, Pluton, and after her the Furor. The armored cruisers, as rapidly as
they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading
vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from their guns.

Fifth— The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday “quarters for
inspection.” The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels, “‘Enemy’s
ships escaping”; and general quarters was sounded. The men cheered as they
sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within eight minutes by the
vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The New York turned about and
steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal, ‘close in toward harbor entrance
and attack vessels,” and gradually increasing speed, until toward the end of the
chase she was making sixteen and one-half knots and was rapidly closing on the
Cristobal Colon. She was not at any time within the range of the heavy Spanish
ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the
forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers,
thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the Gloucester.

Siath— The Spanish vessels upon clearing the harbor turned to the westward in
column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy block-
ading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro at the instant of the enemy’s
appearance, and at their best speed delivered a rapid fire, well sustained and de-
structive, speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire. The initial speed of
the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the battle
developed into a chase in which the Brooklyn and Texas had, at the start, the ad-
vantage of position. The Brooklyn maintained this lead. The Oregon, steaming
with amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place. The
Iowa and the Indiana having done good work and not having the speed of the
other ships, were directed by me, in succession, at about the time the Vizcaya was
beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These vessels
rescued many prisoners. The Ven, finding that the rush of the Spanish ships would
put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column, and remained there dur-
ing the battle and chase.
ADMIRAL SAMPSON’S REPORT 629

Seventh — The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the Gloucester excitedthe
admiration of every one who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of the Navy
Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel—the yacht Cor-
sair —and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying two miles
from the harbor entrance, to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed
in, opening fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the Pluton
and Furor, the- Gloucester was slowed, gaining more rapidly a high pressure of
steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed and
was able to close to short range, where her fire was accurate, deadly, and of great
volume. During this fight the Gloucester was under the fire of the Socapa battery.
Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago harbor, the
careers of the Muror and the Pluton were ended and two-thirds of their people
killed. The Furor was beached and sunk in the surf; the Pluton sank in deep
water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the
fire of the secondary batteries of the battleships Jowa, Indiana, and the Texas, yet I
think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range,
of the Gloucester’s battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the GJouces-
ter did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the Infanta Maria Teresa.

Highth—The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards —all steering in the
same direction and in formation — removed all tactical doubts or difficulties, and made
plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately engage and
pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already stated, the first rush
of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading ships, which
could not immediately work up to their best speed; but they suffered heavily in
passing, and the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Oquendo were probably set on fire
by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement; it was afterward
learned that the Infanta Maria Teresa’s fire main had been cut by one of our first
shots, and that she was unable to extinguish fire. With large volumes of smoke
rising from their lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight and
ran in on the beach—the Infanta Maria Teresa at about 10:15, at Nima, six and
one-half miles from Santiago harbor entrance, and the Almirante Oquendo at about
10:30 a. M., at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.

Ninth—The Vizcaya was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the Cristobal
Colon had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range of
the guns of the leading American ships. The Vizcaya was soon set on fire and at
11:15 she turned in shore and was beached at Aserraderos, fifteen miles from San-
tiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already
beginning to explode. When about ten miles west of Santiago the Indiana had
been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Aserraderos the Jowa was
signaled to “resume blockading station.” The Zowa, assisted by the Hricsson and
the Hist, took off the crew of the Vizcaya, while the Harvard and the Gloucester
rescued those of the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Almirante Oquende
630 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded from the burning Spanish
vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the
day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were
exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main
magazines. In addition to this, a heavy surf was running just inside of the
Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of
humanity was complete. :

Tenth— There remained now of the Spanish ships only the Cristobal Colon —
but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the
Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed.
When the Vizcaya went ashore, the Colon was about six miles ahead of the
Brooklyn and the Oregon, but her spurt was finished, and the American ships were
now gaining upon her. Behind the Brooklyn and the Oregon came the Texas,
Vixen, and New York. It was evident from the bridge of the Mew York that
all the American ships were gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no
chance of escape. At 12:50 the Brooklyn and the Oregon opened fire and got her
range —the Oregon’s heavy shell striking beyond her—and at 1:20 she gave up
without firing another shot, hauled down her colors, and ran ashore at Rio Tarquino,
forty-eight miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the Brooklyn, went on board to
receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up on the New York,
received his report, and placed the Oregon in charge of the wreck to save her, if
possible; and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the Fesolute, which had
followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose Chief-of-Staff had gone on board
to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be
retained by the officers. This order I did not modify. The Cristobal Colon was
not injured by our firing and probably is not much injured by beaching, though
she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the
working of the sea. But her sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I
am sure, after her surrender, and, despite all efforts, she sank. When it became
evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the Mew York
bodily up on the beach—the New York’s stem being placed against her for that
purpose —the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment
—and sank in shoal water, and may be saved. Had this not been done she would
have gone down in deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total loss,

Eleventh —I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish
forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so
stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making
the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in
daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the
Cristobal Colon.

Twelfth—It seems proper to briefly describe here the manner in which this
was accomplished. The harbor of Santiago is uaturally easy to blockade — there
ADMIRAL SAMPSON’S REPORT 631

being but one entrance, and that a narrow one, and the deep water extending
close up to the shore line presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of the en-
trance. At the time of my arrival before the port, June 1, the moon was at its
full, and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any movement out-
side of the entrance to be detected; but with the waning of the moon and the
coming of dark nights, there was opportunity for the enemy to escape, or for his
torpedo boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It was ascertained,
with fair conclusiveness, that the Merrimac, so gallantly taken into the channel
on June 3, did not obstruct it. I therefore maintained the blockade as follows: To
the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving
up to the port at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro— dependent
upon the condition of the atmosphere, — they threw a searchlight beam directly up the
channel and held it steadily there. This lightened up the entire breadth of the
channel, for half a mile inside of the entrance, so brilliantly that the movement of
small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the
searchlight ship was always a matter of surprise to me, but they never did. Sta-
tioned close to the entrance of the port were three picket launches, and, at a little
distance further out, three small picket vessels, —usually converted yachts, —and,
when they were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrangement
there was, at least, a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbor undetected.
After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish Admiral
a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced to
two miles for all vessels, and a battleship was placed alongside the searchlight ship
with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Span-
ish ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the
perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The
Massachusetts, which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guan-
tanamo, like the others, had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a
better fate than to be absent that morning. I inclose, for the information of the de-
partment, copies of orders and memorandums issued from time to time, relating to
the manner of maintaining the blockade.

Thirteenth—When all the work was done so well, it is difficult to discriminate
in praise. The object of the blockade of Cervera’s squadron was fully accomplished,
and each individual bore well his part in it—the Commodore in command on the
second division, the captains of ships, their officers and men. The fire of the battle-
ships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was,
in great part, broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own
forts. The fine speed of the Oregon enabled her to take a front position in the
chase, and the Cristobal Colon did not give up until the Oregon had thrown
a 18-inch shell beyond her. This performance adds to the already brilliant record
of this fine battleship, and speaks highly of the skill and care with which her ad-
mirable efficiency has been maintained during a service unprecedented in the history

31
632 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

of vessels of her class. The Brooklyn’s westerly blockading position gave her an
advantage in the chase, which she maintained to the end, and she employed her
fine battery with telling effect. The Zexas and the New York were gaining on
the chase during the last hour, and, had any accident befallen the Brooklyn or the
Oregon, would have speedily overhauled the Cristobal Colon. From the moment
the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst of speed, the result was never in doubt.
She fell, in fact, far below what might reasonably have been expected of her. Care-
ful measurements of time and distance give her an average speed—from the time
she cleared the harbor mouth until the time she was run on shore at Rio Tarquino —
of 13.7 knots. Neither the New York nor the Brooklyn stopped to couple up their
forward engines, but ran out the chase with one pair, getting steam, of course, as
rapidly as possible on all boilers. To stop to couple up the forward engines would
have meant a delay of fifteen minutes—or four miles in the chase.

Fourteenth —Several of the ships were struck, the Brooklyn more often than
the others, but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard the
Iowa. Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the Brooklyn. It
is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat
with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor, at the best, and
the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their
guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and
by observation. The Spanish vessels, as they dashed out of the harbor, were covered
with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily diminished in volume and soon
almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid-fire batteries of the battleships appears
to have been remarkably destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels shows
that the Almirante Oquendo, especially, had suffered terribly from this fire. Her
sides are everywhere pierced, and her decks were strewn with the charred remains
of those who had fallen.

Fifteenth —The reports of Commodore W. 8. Schley and of the commanding
officers are inclosed.

Siateenth— A board appointed by me several days ago has made a critical ex-
amination of the stranded vessels, both with a view of reporting upon the result of
our fire and the military features involved, and of reporting upon the chance of
saving any of them and of wrecking the remainder. The report of the board will
be speedily forwarded. Very respectfully,

W. T. Sampson,

Rear-Admiral United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

To THE SECRETARY OF THE Navy, Navy DEPARTMENT,
Wasuineton, D. C.
COMMODORE SCHLEY’S REPORT 633

COMMODORE SCHLEY’S REPORT.

Norru Atiantic FLEET, Szeconp SQUADRON, l
Unitrep States Fiacsuip “ Brookiyn,”
Guanranamo Bay, Cusa, July 6, 1898.

Sir: Jirst—I have the honor to make the following report of that part of the
squadron under your command which came under my observation during the engage-
ment with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898:—

Second — At 9:35 a.m. Admiral Cervera, with the Infanta Maria Teresa, Viz-
caya, Oquendo, Cristobal Colon, and two torpedo-boat destroyers, came out of the
harbor at Santiago de Cuba in column, at distance, and attempted to escape to the
westward. Signal was made from the Iowa that the enemy was coming out, but
his movement had been discovered from this ship at the same moment. This vessel
was the farthest west, except the Vixen, in the blockading line; signal was made
to the western division as prescribed in your general orders, and there was imme-
diate and rapid movement inward by your squadron, and a general engagement at
ranges beginning at 1,100 yards and varying to 3,000 until the Vizcaya was de-
stroyed, about 10:50 a.m. The concentration of the fire of the squadron upon the
ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them.

Third — About twenty or twenty-five minutes after the engagement began, two
vessels, thought to be the Teresa and Oguendo, and since verified as such, took fire
from the effective shell fire of the squadron, and were forced to run on the beach
some six or seven miles west of the harbor entrance, where they burned and blew
up later. The torpedo-boat destroyers were destroyed early in the action, but the
smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say to which vessel or vessels
the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen from your flagship.

Fourth —The Vizcaya and Colon, perceiving the disaster to their consorts, con-
tinued at full speed to the westward to escape, and were followed and engaged in
a running fight with the Brooklyn, Texas, Iowa, and Oregon, until 10:50, when
the Vizcaya took fire from our shells. She put her helm to port, and, with a
heavy list to port, stood in shore and ran aground at Asseraderos, about twenty-
one miles west of Santiago, on fire, fore and aft, where she blew up during the
fight. Observing that she had struck colors, and that several vessels were nearing
her to capture and save her crew, signal was made to cease firing. The Oregon
having proved vastly faster than the other battleships, she and the Brooklyn, to-
gether with the Zexas and another vessel which proved to be your flagship, con-
tinued westward in pursuit of the Colon, which had run close in shore, evidently
seeking some good spot to beach if she should fail to elude her pursuers.

Fifth —This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the Brooklyn, Oregon,
and other ships, and soon the Brooklyn and Oregon were within long range of the
Colon, when the Oregon opened fire with her 18-inch guns, landing a shell close
634 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

to the Colon. A moment afterward the Brooklyn opened fire with her 8-inch guns,
landing a shell just ahead of her. Several other shells were fired at the Colon, now
in range of the Brooklyn’s and Oregon’s guns. Her commander, seeing all chances
of escape cut off and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun, and struck her flag
at 1:15 p. M., running ashore at a point some fifty miles west of Santiago harbor.
Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time, as was also the Texas and Vixen.
A little later, after your arrival, the Cristobal Colon, which had struck to the
Brooklyn and the Oregon, was turned over to you as one of the trophies of this
great victory of the squadron under your command.

Sixth — During my official visit a little later, Commander Eaton, of the Resolute
appeared, and reported to you the presence of a Spanish battleship near Altares.
Your orders to me were to take the Oregon and go eastward to meet her, and this
was done by the Brooklyn, with the result that the vessel reported as an enemy was
discovered to be the Austrian cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa, seeking the Com-
mander-in-Chief.

Seventh—I would mention for your consideration that the Brooklyn occupied
the most westward blockading position with the Vixen, and, being directly in the
route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some minutes, possibly ten,
to the gun fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west battery at a range of fifteen
hundred yards from the ships and about three thousand yards from the batteries,
but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon diverted this fire
and did magnificent work at close range. I have never before witnessed such deadly
and fatally accurate. shooting as was done by the ships of your command as they
closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem it a high privilege to commend to
you for such action as you may deem proper the gallantry and dashing courage,
the prompt decision and the skillful handling of their respective vessels, of Captain
Phillip, Captain Evans, Captain Clark, and especially of my Chief-of-Staff, Captain
Cook, who was directly under my personal observation, and whose coolness, prompt-
ness, and courage were of the highest order. The dense smoke of the combat shut
out from my view the Indiana and the Gloucester, but, as these vessels were closer
to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate obser-
vation.

Eighth — Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the Vixen, acted with conspicuous cour-
age; although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy with his light guns,
nevertheless he was close into the battle line under heavy fire, and many of the enemy’s
shots passed beyond his vessel.

Ninth —I1 beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my Flag-Lieutenant
James H. Sears, and Ensign Edward McCauley, Jr., aide, who were constantly at
my side during the engagement, and who exposed themselves fearlessly in discharg-
ing their duties; and also to the splendid behavior of my secretary, Lieutenant B.
W. Wells, Jr., who commanded and directed the fighting of the fourth division with
splendid effect.
COMMODORE SCHLEY’S REPORT 635

Tenth —I would commend the highly meritorious conduct and courage in the en-
gagement of Lieutenant-Commander N. E. Mason, the executive officer, whose presence
everywhere over the ship during its continuance did much to secure the good result
of this ship’s part in the victory.

Eleventh — The navigator, Lieutenant A. C. Hodgson, and the division officers,
Lieutenant T. D. Griffin, Lieutenant W. R. Rush, Lieutenant Edward Simpson, Lieu-
tenant J. G. Doyle, Ensign Charles Webster, and the junior divisional officers were
most steady and conspicuous in every detail of duty, contributing to the accurate
firing of this ship in her part of the great victory of your forces.

Twelfth —The officers of the medical, pay, and engineer and marine corps re-
sponded to every demand of the occasion and were fearless in exposing themselves.
The warrant officers, boatswain William L. Hill, carpenter G. H. Warford, and gun-
ner F. T. Applegate were everywhere exposed in watching for damage, reports of
which were promptly conveyed to me.

Thirteenth —I have never in my life served with a braver, better, or worthier
crew than that of the Brooklyn. During the combat lasting from 9:35 until 1:15
p. M., much of the time under fire, they never flagged for a moment, and were ap-
parently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles passing ahead, astern, and over the
ship. .

Fourteenth — The result of the engagement was the destruction of the Spanish
squadron and the capture of the Admiral and some thirteen to fifteen hundred
prisoners with the loss of several hundred killed, estimated by Admiral Cervera at
600 men.

Fificenth— The casualties on board this ship were: G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman,
killed; J. Burns, fireman, first class, severely wounded. The marks and scars show
that the ship was struck about twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one scars
as the result of her participation in the great victory of your force on July 3, 1898.
The speed-cone halliards were shot away and nearly all the signal halliard. The
ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling it down, at the close of the
action, it fell to pieces.

Sixteenth —I congratulate you most sincerely on this great victory to the squad-
ron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in
the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us.

Seventeenth—I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the command-
ing officer and a drawing in profile of the ship, showing the location of hits and
scars; also a memorandum of ammunition expended, and the amount to fill her
allowance.

Highteenth— Since reaching this place and holding conversation with several of
the Captains, viz.: Captain Eulate, of the Viscaya, and the second in command of
the Colon, Commander Contreras, I have learned that the Spanish Admiral’s scheme .
was to concentrate all fire for a while on the Brooklyn, and the Viscaya to ram
her, in hopes that if they could destroy her the chance of escape would be increased,
636 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of your squadron. This explains the
heavy fire mentioned and the Viscaya’s action in the earlier moments of the engage-
ment. The execution of this purpose was promptly defeated by the fact that all the
ships of the squadron advanced into close range and opened an irresistibly furious
and terrific fire upon the enemy’s squadron as it was coming out of the harbor.

Nineteenth—I am glad to say that the injury supposed to be below the water
line was due to a water valve being opened from some unknown cause and flooding
the compartment. ‘he injury to the belt is found to be only slight and the leak
small.

Twentieth —I beg to inclose a list of the officers and crew who participated in
the combat of July 3, 1898.

Twenty-first —I cannot close this report without mentioning in high terms of
praise the splendid conduct and support of Captain C. HK. Clark and the Oregon.
Her speed was wonderful, and her accurate fire splendidly destructive.

Very respectfully,
W. S. ScuLey,

Commodore United States Navy, Commanding Second Squadron,
North Atlantic Fleet.

To THE ComMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UniTep States Navat Force,
Norty AtTiantic STaTION.

CAPTAIN CLARK’S REPORT.

Unitep Srates Sip “Orecon,” First Rate,
Orr Santiaco pe Cusa, July 4, 1898. }

Sir: Férst—I1 have the honor to report that at 9:30 a. m., yesterday, the
Spanish fleet was discovered standing out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba.
They turned to the westward and opened fire, to which our ships replied vigorously.
For a short time there was an almost continuous flight of projectiles over this ship,
but when our line was fairly engaged and the Jowa had made a swift advance as
if to ram or close, the enemy’s fire became defective in train as well as range.
The ship was only struck three times, and at least two of them were but fragments
of shells. We had no casualties.

Second-— As soon as it was evident that the enemy’s ships were trying to break
through and escape to the westward, we went ahead at full speed, with the deter-
mination of carrying out to the utmost your order: “ If the enemy tries to escape
the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his ves-
sels, or force them to run ashore.” We soon passed all of our ships except the
Brooklyn, bearing the broad pendant of Commodore Schley. At first we only used
our main battery, but when it was discovered that the enemy’s torpedo boats were
CAPTAIN CLARK’S REPORT 637

following their ships we used our rapid-fire guns as well as the six upon them,
with telling effect. As we ranged up near the sternmost of their ships, she headed
for the beach, evidently on fire. We raked her as we passed, pushing on for the
next ahead, using our starboard guns as they were brought to bear, and before we
had her fairly abeam she, too, was making for the beach. The two remaining ves-
sels were now some distance ahead, but our speed had increased to sixteen knots,
and our fire, added to that of the Brooklyn, soon sent another, the Vizcaya, to
the shore in flames. Only the Cristobal Colon was left, and for a time it seemed
as if she might escape, but when we opened with our forward turret guns, and
the Brooklyn followed, she began to edge in toward the coast, and her capture
or destruction was assured. As she struck the beach her flag came down, and the
Brooklyn signaled, “Cease firing,” following it with “Congratulations for the grand
victory; thanks for your splendid assistance.”

Third—The Brooklyn sent a boat to her,and when the Admiral came up with
the New York, Texas, and Vixen she was taken possession of. A prize crew was
put on board from this ship under Lieutenant-Commander Comewell, the executive
officer, but before 11 p. m. the ship, which had been filling in spite of all efforts to
stop leaks, was abandoned, and just as the crew left she went over on her side.

Fourth—I cannot speak in too high terms of the bearing and conduct of all
on board this ship. When they found the Oregon had pushed to the front and
was hurrying to a succession of conflicts with the enemy’s vessels if they could be
overtaken and would engage, their enthusiasm was intense.

Fifth —As these vessels were so much more heavily armored than the Brooklyn,
they might have concentrated upon and overpowered her, and, consequently, I am
persuaded that but for the way the officers and men of the Oregon steamed and
steered the ship and fought and supplied her batteries, the Colon, and perhaps the
Vizcaya, would have escaped. Therefore, I feel that they rendered meritorious
service to the country, and, while I cannot mention the name of each officer and
man individually, I am going to append a list of the officers with their stations that
they occupied, hoping that they may be of service to them should the claims of
others for advancement above them ever be considered.

Very respectfully, ’
C. E. Crarxk,
Captain United States Navy, Commanding.
638 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

CAPTAIN EVANS’ REPORT.

Unirep States Sup “Jowa,” First Rare,
Orr Sanriaco bE Cusa, July 4, 1898.

Str: I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement with
Spanish squadron off Santiago de Cuba on the 3d of July: —

First — On the. morning of the 3d, while the crew were at quarters for Sunday
inspection, the leading vessel of the Spanish squadron was sighted at 9:31 coming
out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. Signal, ““Enemy’s ships are coming out,”
was immediately hoisted and a gun fired to attract attention. The call to general
quarters was sounded immediately, the battery made ready for firing, and the
engines rung full speed ahead.

Second— The position of this vessel at the time of sighting the squadron was
the usual blockading station off the entrance of the harbor; Morro Castle bearing
about north, and distant about three or four miles. The steam at this time in the
boilers was sufficient for a speed of five knots.

Third—Atter sighting the leading vessel, the Infanta Maria Teresa, Admiral
Cervera’s flagship, it was observed that she was followed in succession by the
remaining three vessels of the Spanish squadron, the Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, and
Almirante Oquendo. The Spanish ships moved at a speed of about eight to ten
knots, which was steadily increased as they cleared the harbor entrance and stood
to the westward. They maintained a distance of about 800 yards between vessels.
The squadron moved with precision, and stations were well kept.

Fourth—Immediately upon sighting the leading vessel, fires were spread and
the Zowa headed toward the leading Spanish ship. About 9:40 the first shot was
fired from this ship at a distance of about 6,000 yards.

The course of this vessel was so laid that the range speedily diminished. A num-
ber of shots were fired at ranges varying between 6,000 and 4,000 yards. The range
was rapidly reduced to 2,500 yards, and, subsequently, to 2,000 and to 1,200 yards.

Fifth —When it was certain that the Maria Teresa would pass ahead of us,
the helm was put to starboard and the starboard broadside delivered at a range of
2,500 yards. The helm was then put to port and the ship headed across the bow
of the second ship, and as she drew ahead the helm was again put to starboard and she
received in turn the full weight of our starboard broadside at a range of about 1,800
yards. The Jowa was again headed off with port helm for the third ship, and as she
approached the helm was put to starboard until our course was approximately that
of the Spanish ship. In this position, at a range of 1,400 yards, the fire of the entire
battery, including rapid-fire guns, was poured into the enemy’s ship.

Sixth — About 10 o’clock the enemy’s torpedo-boat destroyers, Furor and Pluton,
were observed to have left the harbor and to be following the Spanish squadron.
At the time that they were observed, and, in fact, most of the time that they were under
CAPTAIN EVANS’ REPORT 639

fire, they were at a distance varying from 4,500 to 4,000 yards. As soon as they
were discovered, the secondary battery of the Iowa was turned upon them, while the
main battery continued to engage the Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Maria Teresa.

The fire of the main battery of this ship, when the range was below 2,500 yards,
was most effective and destructive, and, after a continuance of this fire for perhaps
twenty minutes, it was noticed that the Maria Teresa and Oquendo were in flames,
and were being headed for the beach. Their colors were struck about 10:20, and
they were beached about eight miles west of Santiago.

Seventh — About the same time (about 10:20), the fire of this vessel, together with
that of the Gloucester and another smaller vessel, proved so destructive that one of
the torpedo-boat destroyers (Pluton) was sunk and the Furor was so much damaged
that she was run upon the rocks.

Eighth— After having passed, at 10:35, the Oquendo and Maria Teresa, on fire
and ashore, this vessel continued to chase and fire upon the Vizcaya until 10:36,
when signal to cease firing was sounded on board, it having been discovered that
the Vizcaya had struck her colors.

Ninth— At 11:00 the Zowa arrived in the vicinity of the Vizcaya, which had
been run ashore, and, as it was evident that she could not catch the Cristobal Colon,
and that the Oregon, Brooklyn, and New York would, two steam cutters and three
cutters were immediately hoisted out and sent to the Vizcaya to rescue her crew.
Our boats succeeded in bringing off a large number of officers and men of that ship’s
company and in placing many of them on board the torpedo boat Ericsson and the
auxiliary dispatch vessel Hist.

Tenth — About 11:30 the Mew York passed in chase of the Cristobal Colon,
which was endeavoring to escape from the Oregon, Brooklyn, and Texas.

Eleventh— We received on board this vessel from the Vizcaya, Captain Eulate,
the commanding officer, and twenty-three officers, together with about two hundred
and forty-eight petty officers and men, of whom thirty-two were wounded. There were
also received on board five dead bodies, which were immediately buried with the honors
due to their grade.

Twelfth — The battery behaved well in all respects.

The dashpot of the forward 12-inch gun, damaged in the engagement of the
2d, had been replaced the same day by one of the old dashpots, which gave no
trouble during this engagement. This ship was struck in the hull, on the star-
board side, during the early part of the engagement, by two projectiles of about six-
inch caliber, one striking the hull two or three feet above the actual water line
and almost directly on the line of the berth deck, piercing the ship between frames
nine and ten, and the other piercing the side and the cofferdam between frames
eighteen and nineteen.

The first projectile did not pass beyond the inner bulkhead of cofferdam A
41-48. The hole made by it was large and ragged, being about sixteen inches in
longitudinal direction. It struck with a slight inclination aft, and perforated the
640 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

cofferdam partition, bulkhead A 41-43-4547. It did not explode, and remained in
the cofferdam.

The second projectile pierced the side of the ship and the cofferdam A 105,
the upper edge of the hole being immediately below the top of the cofferdam on
the berth deck in compartment A 104. The projectile broke off the hatch plate
and coaming of the water tank compartment, exploded, and perforated the walls of
the chain locker. The explosion created a small fire, which was promptly extin-
guished. The hole in the side, made by this projectile, was about five feet above
the water line and about two or three feet above the berth deck. One fragment of
this shell struck a link of the sheet-chain, wound around the 6-pounder ammunition
hoist, cutting the link in two. Another perforated the cofferdam on the port side,
and slightly dished outside plating.

These two wounds, fortunately, were not of serious importance.

Two or three other projectiles of small caliber struck about the upper bridge
and smoke stacks, inflicting trifling damage, and four other small projectiles struck
the hammock nettings and the side aft.

There are no casualties among the ship’s company to report. No officer nor
man was injured during the engagement.

After having received on board the ship’s crew of the Vizcaya, my vessel pro-
ceeded to the eastward, and resumed the blockading station in obedience to the
signal made by the Commander-in-Chief about 11:30.

Upon returning upon the blockading station the Gloucester transferred to this
vessel Admiral Cervera, his Flag-Lieutenant, and the commanding officers of the tor-
pedo-boat destroyers Furor and Pluton, and also one man of the Oguendo’s crew,
rescued by the Gloucester.

Naval Cadets Frank Taylor Evans and John H. Lewis and five men belonging
to the Massachusetts were on board the Jowa when the enemy’s ships came out.
They were stationed at different points and rendered efficient service.

The officers and men of this ship behaved admirably. No set of men could
have done more gallant service.

I take pleasure in stating to you, sir, that the coolness and judgment of the ex-
ecutive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Raymond P. Rodgers, deserves and will, I hope,
receive a proper reward at the hands of the government. The test of the executive
officer’s work is the conduct of ship and crew in battle —in this case it was simply superb.

The coolness of the navigator, Lieutenant W. H. Schuetze, and of Lieutenant
F. K. Hill, in charge of the rapid-fire guns on the upper deck, are worthy of the
greatest commendation.

Other officers of the ship did not come under my personal observation, but the
result of the action shows how well they did their duty.

I cannot express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So long as the enemy
showed his flag they fought like American seamen, but when the flag came down
they were as gentle and tender as American women.
CORRESPONDENCE 641

In conclusion, sir, allow me to congratulate you on the complete victory
achieved by your fleet. Very respectfully,
R. D. Evans,
Captain United States Navy, Commanding.

To tHE ComMANDER-IN-CHlEF Unirep States Navat Forces,
Norra ATLaNtTic STATION.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ADMIRAL SAMPSON, CAPTAIN
TAYLOR, AND COMMANDER EATON.

ApmrraL Sampson filed in the Navy Department copies of letters
that had passed between himself and Captain Taylor, of the Indiana,
regarding the part taken by the latter in the action of July 3, off

Santiago.
Unitep Strares Sap ‘“Inprana,”
Guantanamo Bay, Cusa, August 6, 1898. {

ApmiRAL: The report of Commodore Schley on the battle of July 3, as pub-
lished, gives credit in the seventh paragraph to four ships, and mentions by name
their Captains, Philip, Evans, Clark, and Cook, and adds: ‘The dense smoke of the
combat shut out from my view the Zndiana and the Gloucester, but as these vessels
were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your im-
mediate observation.” -

Second —In your report, as published, you make but a slight mention of the
Indiana, stating that “the Jowa and Indiana, having done good work and not hav-
ing the speed of the other ships, were directed by me,” etc.

Third — The result of these reports is that the Captains of all the vessels of the line
of battle except the Jndiana have received personal mention in the official report
before the department, while the two smaller vessels have also had distinctive men-
tion, either from the Commander-in-Chief or the second in command.

Fourth —If the official record should be referred to in future, it will appear
from its general tone that the Jndiana was less deserving, than all of her consorts,
Leaving out my personal interest in the matter, it is right that I should consider
the officers and crew of the ship; and I speak for them as well as for myself when
I submit to you, Admiral, that the above combination of reports will place the ship,
in the opinion of the department and the country, markedly below all the other ves-
sels of your squadron. I respectfully submit, sir, that this is injustice to the Zndi-
ana and her officers and crew.

Fifth—I can say, without disparagement of any other vessel, that during the
first hour of the fight the ZJndiana’s gun fire. contributed to the destruction of the
642 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

Oquendo and the Teresa more than that of any single vessel of our squadron except
one, and equaled hers. I do not know why the second in command failed to ob-
serve the Indiana during this period of our hottest action. I saw the Brooklyn
quite plainly.

Siath— An examination of these reports with reference to the Indiana will, I
believe, convince you, sir, that they do produce the effect of putting the Indiana
below all the other vessels of the squadron. If it be your opinion, sir, that this is
the case, and that all the vessels, from the Brooklyn to the Vixen, rendered
services as much more valuable than the Jndiana’s as the published report of the
Commander-in-Chief and the second in command, taken together, would indicate,
then I must accept it for myself and the ship. If, on the contrary, that be not
your opinion, I urge respectfully that such steps be taken to remedy this injustice
as may seem wise to you. Very respectfully,

H. C. Taytor,
Captain United States Navy, Commanding.

To THE CoMMANDER-IN-CHlEF Unitep Sratres Navat Force,
Norru ATLantic STATION.

ApMIRAL Sampson replied as follows :—

Unitep States Suirp “New York,”
Guantanamo Bay, CuBa, August 8, 1898.

Sir: I am greatly obliged that you have called my attention to what appears
to have been an injustice to your ship, and of course, your crew, for the part which they
took in the action of July 3, and, also, for the very proper manner in which you
have presented it. I think, however, that you will agree with me that in submitting
such a report to the Secretary of the Navy, where so many officers are vitally
interested and justly proud of their ships, it is no easy task to do so without
apparently bestowing praise unjustly. It requires very careful consideration of the
report from every point of view to avoid misunderstanding.

Second—The position of the ships of the squadron must be carefully considered
to fully appreciate what it was possible for each vessel to accomplish under the
circumstances in which she was placed. Those that were to the westward of the
escaping enemy were certainly better placed for stopping the enemy, and also
better placed for delivering their fire, than the vessels to the eastward, which was
the blockading station of the Indiana.

Third—No distribution of the fleet could completely predict and provide
against every variation of such a sortie, nor do I consider that any commanding
officer deserved either credit or blame because the ship under his command was
faster or slower than another ship, or carried a heavier or lighter battery, but,
rather, that the commanding officer was blameworthy when he failed to put his ship
CORRESPONDENCE 643

in the proper place for destroying the enemy, just in proportion to the advantage
which he possessed in speed, battery, or position over his neighbors.

Fourth — Each commanding officer, in my opinion, was personally responsible
for the good use which he made of the tools with which he had to work. I cer-
tainly did not intend to criticize you, nor to bestow less praise upon the Indiana
than. was bestowed upon any other ship of the squadron.

Fifth —The fact that the commanding officer of the Indiana was signaled to
return to blockade duty at the mouth of the harbor, after she had so gallantly con-
tributed to the destruction of the Spanish ships, was only a necessary precaution
which the Commander-in-Chief felt obliged to take to prevent disaster to the large
number of transports which were left in that vicinity when the fleet started in pur-
suit of the enemy. There were still some armed vessels remaining in the harbor
of Santiago—at least two, and we did not know, then, how many more— which
could have come out, in the absence of the fleet,and produced great havoc among the
troop ships, which were defenseless in the absence of an armed vessel.

Sixth —This explanation, together with your letter, will be sent to the depart-
ment, with the request that it may be attached to and form a part of the original
report. Very respectfully,

W. T. Sampson,

Rea \dmiral United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

To THE COMMANDING )FFICER UNITED Srates Sup, “Inpi1ana,”
GUANTANAMO _1Y, CuBA.

CommaNnvDER Eaton, of the Resolute, also contributed his observations
of the Indiana’s part in the great battle, in the following frank letter
to Admiral Sampson:

U.S. S. “ Resoturs,” Navy Yarp, New Yor,
September 3, 1898. t

Sir: I consider it my duty to lay before you the following report of the events
witnessed by myself in the action of July 3, 1898, off Santiago:

The Resolute, which I commanded, lay just east of the Indiana, distant from
her one thousand feet, and about two and six-tenths miles from the Morro, when
the Maria Teresa was sighted.

The Indiana had been near the Morro, but about 9 o’clock circled to the
eastward with a port helm, leaving the Resolute within the arc of the circle de-
scribed by the fleet. The Aesolute was then turned under a slow bell and stopped
when the Zndiana was due west of us, and just outside the circle of fighting
ships. The Gloucester was to the northward and eastward, nearly off Aguadores.

As the Maria Teresa appeared the Iowa fired a 6- -pounder and hoisted signal.
Within a few seconds of this shot (not more than five or ten) all the Spanish bat-
teries opened, and at the same instant the port broadside of the Maria Teresa
644 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

was discharged. It seemed to me then that all or nearly all of these shots and
shells were fired at the Jndiana, and as the Resolute lay directly in line the
water around the Jndiana and the Fesolute was alive with the fall of projectiles.

Before the Vizcaya appeared the Indiana opened fire with her heavy guns,
and, with screws whitening the water astern, was heading for the Morro.

As the Vizcaya came out I distinctly saw one of the Indiana’s heavy shells
strike her abaft the funnels, and the explosion of this shell was followed by a
burst of flame, which for the moment obscured the afterpart of the Vizcaya.

The Vizcaya fired her port battery apparently at the Indiana, for many of
the shells struck about and beyond the Fesolute, which was then headed east.

The Cristobal Colon, as soon as she was clear off Morro point, fired her first
broadside at the Indiana.

The Oquendo, in coming out, also fired her first broadside at the Indiana, and
I could see some of the Jndiana’s shells strike the Oquendo as she steamed south.

Following close astern on the Colon and Oquendo came the destroyer Furor,
and I distinctly saw her struck by an 8-inch or 18-inch shell from the Indiana,
which was followed by an explosion and flames aboard the Furor.

During all this time the Zndiana had been steaming ahead, and I roughly es-
timated that she was then about 3,000 yards from the Oguendo and the Furor.

The Resolute was nearly in line with the Indiana, and I could clearly follow
the course of the Jndiana’s projectiles.

The other ships engaged, except the Oregon and occasionally the Brooklyn,
which showed at times to the southward, but were most of the time hidden by other
vessels (the Resolute being by this time well to the windward) were hidden in
smoke.

From the position of the ships engaged it appeared to me that the Indiana
was the first to close with the escaping enemy, and, though I could see the Teresa
and Vizcaya sweeping across her course, it was apparent that the Jndiana’s shells
were the first to reach them. This was due, first, to the Indiana’s proximity, and,
second, to the fact that the Jndiana had a fair beam target on each ship as it
came out.

The Oregon had this in a less degree, and the other vessels engaged seemed
to have all fired their first shells when the Spanish ships were four points on.

In addition to the heavier shells noted as striking the enemy, we could count
many lighter projectiles from the secondary battery exploding on board, and as the
Indiana’s fire was incessant I took these to be from her guns.

The Spanish officers who were prisoners from the Colon and the Vizcaya have
since told me that the fire from the Zndiana and the Oregon, as they (the Spaniards)
passed from the harbor, was deadly in its destructiveness, and that although the
Colon escaped with small injury,.due to her greater speed, and being in a measure
covered by other ships, the Vizcaya was hopelessly crippled before she had gone
a mile from the Morro.
LETTER FROM CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN 645

I have ventured to address you this letter, as I had exceptional opportunities
for observation during this part of the engagement, and it has seemed to me that
the very important part taken by the Zndiana in the first part of the action should
be laid before you.

Very respectfully,
J. G. Eaton,

Commander, Commanding. To the Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces,
North Atlantic Station.

LETTER FROM CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN.

To tHe Epiror or tur New Yorn “Sun”—Sir: In your issue of July 29, a
correspondent asks: “Why did Nelson, second in command, receive the credit for
Copenhagen, if Schley is not to have it for Santiago?”

A better knowledge of history would have shown the essential differences between
the two cases, and have saved the question. At Copenhagen, Nelson did not merely
do the fighting, the entire conception of the method of attack was his, and by him was
Jforced—the word is not too strong—upon a reluctant Commander-in-Chief. When
the latter had yielded his consent, the separate and decisive attack was made by Nel-
son, commanding a detachment from the main fleet, all the movements of which
detachment, including the positions in the order of battle, were prescribed by him.
With the preliminary dispositions and subsequent conduct of this detachment, his
Commander-in-Chief, Parker, had nothing to do, although within signal distance, beyond
making the since historic signal to “withdraw from action,” which Nelson refused to
obey. It is to be added that, although Parker was not formally censured, —as far, at
least, as I know, —he was recalled to England as soon as the accounts of the battle
were received there, Nelson being left in command in his place. A stronger implied
censure than the recall of a Commander-in-Chief after such a victory is difficult to
imagine.

At Santiago all the dispositions prior to action, and for over a month before,
were made by the Commander-in-Chief. A number of orders, issued from time to time
by him, for the enforcement of the close watch of the harbor’s mouth, were published in
the Washington Post of July 27, and, I presume, by other journals, as well. There is
very strong ground for believing that Cervera’s attempt to escape by day instead of by
night —the incident of his conduct which has been most widely censured and is most

inexplicable — was due to the fact that the United States ships kept so close to the
harbor mouth at night that a dash like his, desperate at best, had a better chance
when the ships were at day distance. This was so stated, substantially, to Admiral
Sampson by the Captain of the Colon. If so, the merit of this, forcing the enemy
646 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

to action under disadvantageous conditions, —and it is one of the highest achievements
of military art, — belongs to the Commander-in-Chief. Jt was the great decisive feature
of the campaign, from start to finish. Few naval authorities, I imagine, will dis-
pute this statement.

It will be noted, also, by comparing the report of Admiral Sampson, stating the
disposition of the ships, with the report of Captain Cook, commanding the Brooklyn,
Commodore Schley’s flagship, that the United States ships chased and fought in the
order, from left to right, established by Sampson. There is in this no particular
merit for the latter, beyond that in placing the two fastest ships, Brooklyn and New
York, on the two flanks, he had made the best provision for heading off the enemy:
which the Brooklyn so handsomely effected. But the fact that the ships chased as
they stood shows that it was unnecessary for Schley to make a signal; and in
truth, from first to last, the second in command needed to make no signal of a tac-
tical character, and made none, so far as is shown by his own report, or that of the
Captain of the ship. That is, the second in command exercised no special directive
functions of a flag or general officer while the fighting lasted. In this, there was
no fault, for there was no need for signals; but the fact utterly does away with any
claim to particular merit as second in command, without in the least impairing the
Commodore’s credit for conduct in all possible respects gallant and officer-like. So
far as plan is concerned, the battle was fought on Sampson’s lines; and, to quote
Collingwood before Trafalgar, “I wish Nelson would stop signaling, for we all know
what we have to do.” The second in command, and the Captains before Santiago
all knew what they had to do, and right nobly they all did it.

But the distinctive merit of the series of events which issued in the naval battle
of Santiago is that, so far as appears, Cervera was forced to fight as he did on ac-
count of the unrelenting watch, through more than a whole moon, including its dark
nights, maintained by Admiral Sampson. The writer has been told by a naval officer
whose name he has no authority to mention, but who would be recognized as one
of the most efficient of his mature years, and who had been off Santiago during
part of that eventful month, that he regarded Sampson’s watch of the harbor as the
decisive feature in the great result. This neither ignores the merits of the Captains
nor of the “man behind the gun.” Captains and the men behind the guns may be
of the best, the Colonels of the regiments and the privates of land warfare the same,
but vain are their valor and their skill if the Commander-in-Chief be wanting in
either. “ Better an army of stags led by a lion than an army of lions led by a stag.”

The phrase of the Washington Post, meant for a sneer, “Admiral Sampson wishes
the American people to believe that . . . things could not have happened otherwise,
even if Admiral Sampson had been seventy, instead of seven, miles away,” expresses
an exact truth. With the wise and stringent methods laid down and enforced by
the Admiral, it would not in the least have mattered, as things happened, with such
ships and such Captains, had the Commander-in-Chief and the second in command,
either or both, been seventy miles away. It is exactly with the fleet as with the
LETTER FROM CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN 647

single ships. The merit of each Captain was not only, nor chiefly, that he handled
and fought his ship admirably on the day of battle. His greatest merit was that,
when he took his ship into action, she was so organized and trained that, had he
himself been absent or struck dead by the first shot, the ship would none the less
have played her full part efficiently in the fight, under her second in command.
Few things in the observation of the writer have been more painful than the
attempt of a portion of the Press and of the public to rob Sampson of his just
and painfully won dues. During the night hours of July 2-3, when there is strong
reason to believe that Cervera, despite the full moon, wished to come out, the
Commander-in-Chief, with the whole of his force, lay close to the harbor’s mouth,
and the Spanish attempt was deferred till day, when it might be supposed from
their usual practice that the besieging vessels would be more distant, and, perhaps,
off their guard. At 4 a. u., when day began to break, the Massachusetts, com-
manded by one of the most spirited officers in the service, silently withdrew to
coal at Guantanamo, forty miles away. Half an hour before the enemy was dis-
covered coming out, the flagship New York also proceeded east. In doing this
the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sampson, was obeying a specific and direct order
of the Navy Department, to confer personally with the Commander-in-Chief of the
army. To this was owing that, to use the words of Sampson’s dispatch, the flag-
ship “was not at any time within range of the heavy Spanish ships.” Upon this
circumstance, mortifying as a mere disappointment, that the ship, though pushed to
her utmost speed, could not retrieve her original disadvantage of position,— incurred -
in obedience to the orders of the Navy Department,—has been raised the shameful
outcry, designed to deprive an eminent officer of the just rewards of his toils.
The injustice is, with many, doubtless unintentional and unwitting. The same
excuse can scarcely be made for the charge that the Admiral has grudged praise
to his subordinates. Some Washington papers have been particularly vicious in
this matter, and the Post of that city, in an editorial of July 31 to that effect, is
guilty, in quoting from one paragraph of Sampson’s dispatch, of suppressing these
following words in the succeeding paragraph: “The commanding officers merit the
greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan [of
blockade] and put it into execution. The Massachusetts, which, according to
routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others, had spent
weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that
morning.” Again, as regards the action: “ When all the work was done so well it
is difficult to discriminate. The object of the blockade of Cervera’s squadron was
fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it—the Commodore
in command of the second division, the Captains of ships, their officers and men.
The fire of the battleships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the
Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before they had got beyond
the range of their own forts.” If higher praise is expected, the only reply that
can be made is that it is, historically, rarely given. When individual men are
32
648 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

named, unless some conspicuous and unusual deed compels it, those passed over
feel slighted; while, if each who has done his duty is individually named, all dis-
tinctive effect is lost. Those who doubt may examine the dispatches of men like
Nelson and Farragut.

It would be improper to conclude without saying that there is not the slightest
proof that Commodore Schley is, in the least, responsible for the malicious attempts made
to depress Admiral Sampson with a view to exalt the second in command. On the
contrary, when they came to his ears he telegraphed to the Navy Department (on July
10) his “mortification” at the fact, handsomely attributing the victory to the force
under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic station; “to him
the honor is due.” More than this, there is no occasion for him to say, nor need he have
said anything but for the obligation forced upon him by the indiscreet and ungener-
ous clamor of those posing as his friends, from whom he might well pray to be saved.

So far as precedents may properly influence opinion in a matter of this kind, it
is interesting as well as instructive to notice two other instances in the career of Nelson,
for he was usually a second in command and was prone to come to the front, as at
Copenhagen, not by the absence of his superior, but by his own initiative. At Cape St.
Vincent, Nelson, — not being second, but third or fourth, —of his own motion, without
orders, took a step during the course of the battle which was a leading cause of its
success, and threw upon his own ship the largest single share in the whole fighting.
Nevertheless, although for this he received ample recognition, official as well as public,

the greater reward by far was rightly adjudged to his chief, whose ship was much less
exposed, but to whose previous dispositions and action it was owing that Nelson had
the opportunity he so well improved.

At the Nile, Nelson, in seniority of flag rank upon the station, was again only third
or fourth, but he was in sole command of a large detachment, 2,000 miles away from his
nearest superior. The battle, therefore, was fought solely “ off his own bat ;” the deci-
sion to fight, the methods, and the actual fighting, were all his own. Nevertheless,
although the Commander-in-Chief was absent, in a very full sense of the word, the
fact that Nelson was not a Commander-in-Chief was held, unjustly, I think, to diminish
his claim to reward. The reward, quite inadequate to the achievement, was “the
highest,” wrote the First Lord of the Admiralty, “that has ever been conferred upon
an officer of your standing who was not a Commander-in-Chief.” This decision,
therefore, was based on precedent, and throws light on British practice and opinion —
and in naval matters no nation has had a wider experience — as to the relative responsi-
bilities and claims of Commanders-in-Chief and flag officers junior to them.

A. T. Manan,
Captain (Retired) United States Navy.
Wasuineton, August 5.
LETTER OF SECRETARY LONG 649

LETTER OF SECRETARY LONG.

Tue Secretary of the Navy received several letters violently attack-
ing Admiral Sampson. The following is a copy of his reply to one of

them: —
Navy Department,
Wasuineron, August 5, 1898.

My Dear Sir: I am in receipt of your letter, and hasten to assure you that
what you say about Admiral Sampson is so unjust that it can only be pardoned on
the ground of your ignorance of the whole matter. You have no appreciation of
the responsibilities that have been upon Admiral Sampson, of his very superior
attainments as an officer, and the splendid work he has done in preparing for the
naval victory which was the crowning accomplishment of his efforts for weeks and
weeks before Santiago. Justice is always done in the long run., But wien you
indulge in such unfounded criticism I cannot forbear to protest, as I should feel
bound to do if you had referred in similar terms to any other of our deserving
officers.

Admiral Sampson was selected for the command of the North Atlantic squadron
because the department, in the exercise of its best judgment, with an eye single to
the public interest, believed that he was specially fitted for the place. Admiral
Sicard, who held the command, having become incapaciated for duty, by reason of
sickness, was necessarily withdrawn by order of the department, and Sampson was
next in command. These two are especially accomplished ordnance officers, having
been each at the head of the Ordnance Bureau and having devoted themselves to
that branch of naval science. Sampson is a man of the very highest professional
attainments, solely devoted to his duty. He never pushes himself forward, and
when you accuse him of anything on that score you do most cruel injustice to a
man who has never sought favor or applause in any other way than by the simple
discharge of his duty.

Second— The movement on Porto Rico was not a movement for its capture. The
department, which has very rarely interfered with the movements of Admirals com-
manding squadrons, did, however, make one express order, and that was that our bat-
tleships should not be exposed to the risk of serious injury from the fire of any fort.
At that time the Spanish fleet was strong; its whereabouts and destination were un-
known. The primal necessity was to meet and crush its ships, and to secure for us the
dcmination of the sea. The Oregon had not arrived, the Maine was destroyed, and no
naval authority would justify the unnecessary risk of the destruction of any of our
battleships, except in battle with the enemy’s ships. The movement to Porto Rico
was to meet, if possible, the fleet of Cervera, which was then expected. Cervera,
undoubtedly, learning that our fleet was at San Juan, changed his destination to
650 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

Santiago. Our movement to Porto Rico thus became a reconnoissance and fulfilled
its purpose. There was no intention at this time of taking Porto Rico, as the army
was not then ready to codperate.

Third — With regard to sending our ships into the harbor of Santiago, Admiral
Sampson was acting under the explicit orders of the department, not to expose his
armored ships to the risk of sinking by mines; and the wisdom of this course, I
believe, is universally acknowledged by naval authorities. He waited, as he should
have done, the codperation of the army. How effectually under this codperation the
result was accomplished is now matter of history. There are few more graphic
scenes than must have been presented at 4 o'clock, on the afternoon of the 14th of
July, when Shafter, with his troops, ready to assault Santiago, awaited the reply of
the Spanish commander to the demand for surrender. Sampson’s fleet was at the
mouth of the harbor, drawn up in line and ready to bombard, as it had been for
days previous, and the signal officer stood on the heights ready to wigwag the sig-
nal for firing. Happily, instead of this signal, came the good word that the Spanish
had sirendered to this combined readiness for attack.

Fourth— Please bear in mind the variety and weight of the responsibilities
which were upon Admiral Sampson for the month prior to the great battle which
destroyed Cervera’s fleet. He was commanding officer of the whole squadron, charged
with the blockade of the whole Cuban coast, charged with the detail of all the move-
ments of ships, charged with clerical correspondence with the department and other
officers, and specially charged with preventing the escape of Cervera. Remember
that this man, whom you so sweepingly accuse, was devoting his days and nights to
these duties. If you will read the orders issued by him, beginning with June 1,
you will find that the most thorough precautions had been taken to prevent the
escape of Cervera; that our fleet was kept constantly in line, so far from the entrance
at night and so far by day; that the most rigid care with searchlights and every
other appliance was taken every night; that the commanding officer of every vessel
knew his post and his duty in case of an attempt to escape, so that, when that at-
tempt came, the movement to prevent it, by the attack of our vessels upon the out-
coming Spaniards, went on like clockwork; as at Chattanooga, every movement of
that great battle was carried out, although General Grant was neither at Missionary
Ridge nor Lookout Mountain.

I can well understand why the friends of other officers should be so enthusi-
astic and earnest, as I am, in giving them the credit they so richly, every one of
them, deserve, for their glorious work. I cannot conceive of anybody so mean as to
detract, by a single hair, from their merit. But I cannot understand why such a bit-
ter feeling is manifested, in many quarters, toward Admiral Sampson, when all these
officers, subordinate to him, in their reports, clearly and cordially recognize the fact
that, although at the beginning he was, by orders from Washington, going to con-
fer with General Shafter, yet the battle was fought under his orders, and that the
victory was the consummation of his thorough preparation. For myself, I know no
LETTER OF SECRETARY LONG 651

predilection for any one of these gallant men. I would crown every one of them
with laurels. I want them all to have their just deserts. Every one of them de-
serves unstinted praise; not one of them deserves anything less than full measure
for that day’s work. And, therefore, I can think of nothing more cruel than a
depreciation of the merit of the faithful, devoted, patriotic Commander-in-Chief,
physically frail, worn with sleepless vigilance, weighed with measureless responsi-
bilities and details, letting no duty go undone; for weeks with ceaseless precautions
blockading the Spanish squadron; at last, by the unerring fulfillment of his plans,
crushing it under the fleet which executed his commands; yet now compelled in
dignified silence to be assailed as vindictively as if he were an enemy to his coun-
try. I am sure that no one more deprecates such an attack than the officers of the
fleet— Commodore, Captains, and all. Among them all is peace; whatever disquiet
there may be elsewhere, the navy is serene. I am reminded of Mrs. Beecher Stowe’s

beautiful verse :—
“Far, far beneath, the noise of tempests dieth,
And silver waves chime over peacefully;
And no rude storm, how fierce soe’er it flieth,
Disturbs the Sabbath of that deeper sea.”

Yours truly,
Joun D. Lone.

 
652 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS
CRUISE OF THE BATTLESHIP “OREGON.”

ACCOUNT WRITTEN BY HER CHIEF ENGINEER.

Unitep States Suir “OrEGon,”
BiockapiIne SANnTIaGO DE CuBA,
June 22, 1898.

Kwowine the great interest you take in all matters pertaining to our navy, and
the especial interest with which you have followed our remarkable race for the scene of
war, I am sure you will be pleased to have a more or less full account of our recent
voyage, together with some general data. I will, therefore, start this account, making it
from time to time as opportunity offers.

The Oregon, you know, is a first-class coast defense battleship of about 10,000 tons
displacement at the so-called normal draught. In this condition, however, she has only
a certain limited amount of stores on board and only four hundred tons of coal. When
she goes to sea, with her bunkers full of coal, all stores and all ammunition on board,
her actual displacement is something over 12,000 tons, and her draught of water is then
over twenty-seven feet, and she was, of course, in this latter condition when we
started out from San Francisco, having on board at that time about 1,500 tons of
coal, all bunkers being practically full.

The ship is driven by twin screws, worked by triple expansion engines, the engines
being placed in separate water-tight compartments, and the tops of the cylinders
come well below the protective deck. There are four large main boilers, double-
ended cylindrical, each boiler in a separate water-tight compartment, and, of course,
also well below the protective deck. These boilers are each fifteen feet in diame-
ter, eighteen feet long, and have eight furnaces, four in each end. The dimensions
of each furnace are three feet diameter, and length of grate five feet six inches,
giving a grate surface for each furnace of seventeen and a quarter square feet, or
552 for all main boilers.

We all knew, of course, that we had a remarkably fine ship, but before starting
out we felt some little anxiety as to our ability to keep the machinery fully up to
its work during such a long cruise. Nothing approaching it had ever before been
attempted by a heavy battleship. Fortunately, we had just come out of dry dock
in Bremerton (and our trip should really be considered as starting from that point
rather than from San Francisco) and were only nine or ten days in San Francisco
before starting for Callao—just long enough to fill our bunkers and magazines.
Our machinery, both engines and boilers, were then in excellent condition, every-
thing having been thoroughly overhauled by our own people while in dry dock,
so it was not necessary to do any great amount of work in San Francisco.

Having finally filled up with coal, ammunition, and stores we left on March 19,
and proceeded under three boilers direct for Callao, which port we reached on the
CRUISE OF THE BATTLESHIP “OREGON” 653

morning of April 4, having expended, during this run of sixteen days, nine hundred
tons of coal, leaving six hundred tons still in our bunkers. This we consider a
remarkably efficient performance, having averaged 4.24 knots per ton of coal. The
revolutions of the engines during this run were remarkably steady, averaging
seventy-five revolutions per minute for day after day without a variation of a tenth
of a revolution.

On two different occasions one of the boilers in use began to leak slightly
around the back ends of some of the tubes. On both occasions we immediately
started fires in the idle boiler, and allowed those in the leaking boiler to die out,
and as soon as possible the boilermaker was sent in to reéxpand the tubes. Dur-
ing all this time the water in the boilers was perfectly fresh, our evaporators and
distillers having a capacity of 5,000 gallons a day, which was sufficient for all pur-
poses, including the necessary make-up feed for the boilers.

On the afternoon of March 27 smoke and gas were discovered to be coming
out of one of the coal bunkers. This bunker was over half full at the time, hav-
ing probably between sixty-five and seventy tons in it. There was nothing to do
but dig for the fire, as it was evidently down somewhere in the body of the pile.
So we started in, working a couple of men in the bunker for about ten minutes at
a time, and then sending in a couple more to relieve the first. After about two
hours’ work the fire was reached, only about a shovelful of live coal being found,
but probably a couple of tons so hot that it was giving off smoke and gas. After
about four hours’ steady work all the dangerous coal had been removed, and no
further trouble was encountered. We had to call for assistance from the deck
force to help us out in carrying the coal away, as we kept up the speed of the
ship the whole time; but our own men did all the work in the bunker itself.
Naval Cadet Jenson, one of our engineer cadets, was temporarily relieved from watch
duty and put in charge of the fire gang, and the way he went at it, never paying
the least attention to the excessive heat and foul air and gas in which he was
working, was wonderful to see.

On arriving at Callao we found that our coal had been ordered for us by the
Marietta. The lighters had all been loaded, and were brought alongside as soon
‘as we let go the anchor.

Then began some roal work. I started in on the starboard engine and Reeves
on the port engine, and we overhauled connections, scraped in brasses where nec-
essary, examined, cleaned, and repaired air pumps, circulating pumps, wiped out and
oiled all the main cylinders and valve chests. Fortunately for me, my engine was
in pretty good shape, needing only a slight amount of keying up here and there.
Reeves, however, found one of his main cross-head slippers so badly cut and scored
that it was deemed best to remove it and put in place a spare one, which we car-
ried on board. This sounds easy, but it required twenty-four hours’ continuous
work, as it had to be fitted exactly, the face carefully scraped to a true surface;
and, finally, the guides nicely adjusted.
654 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

In the meantime the firemen and coal passers were engaged in trimming the
bunkers, under the supervision of our two cadet engineers, who took twenty-four
hours’ watch at a time.

When we arrived here it was evident that war with Spain was inevitable, but
war had not yet broken out. However, every precaution was taken to guard
against any treachery on the part of Spanish sympathizers. The ordinary number
of sentries was doubled and these men were armed with ball cartridges, ammunition
was gotten up for the rapid-fire guns, and the steam launches were manned with
armed crews and kept patrolling around the ship all night, to warn off and prevent
any strange boats from approaching. These precautions were observed whenever we
were at anchor in any port during the whole trip.

All our coal was finally on board by the afternoon of April 7, and out we
started again, using three boilers and averaging something over eleven knots per
hour until the evening of the 9th, when the fourth boiler was put on and the
average speed increased to about thirteen knots, and this was kept up until the
evening of the 16th, when we reached Port Tamar, just inside the entrance of the
Straits of Magellan. We had a few leaky tubes in one boiler a day or so after
leaving Callao, and, of course, stopped them as soon as possible. Soon after this, in
some way which we have never been able to determine, a small amount of salt
water got into our boilers, just enough to cause the density of the water to become
about what it would be if one-quarter of it were sea water. This, of course, meant
a certain amount of scale, but fortunately the amount was so small that it merely
served to make our tube ends tight, without being enough to cause any bad effects
on the boilers. At all events, from that time until long after our arrival off Santiago
we did not have another leaky tube.

We spent the night at anchor in Port Tamar, and the next morning started out
with the intention of making Sandy Point by dark. This, of course, required a
semi-forced draught run, what is known technically as “assisted draught”; that is to
say, the forced draught blowers are run, but the firerooms are not closed up
air-tight, as under full forced draught. We ran our blowers at such a speed as to
give an air pressure of one-quarter of an inch of water, and were thus able to run
the engines at a speed of 107.3 revolutions per minute, giving the ship a speed
through the water of 14.6 knots per hour. As a matter of fact our speed from
point to point along the shore was much greater, as there was a very strong
current running through the straits in our favor.

While at Callao we had heard that a Spanish torpedo boat was at Montevideo,
and we thought it just possible that she might attempt to intercept us in the
straits, lying behind one of the numerous high points and darting out on us. So
the rapid-fire gun crews were kept at their guns, ready for instant work. However,
we saw nothing of her.

Sandy Point was reached in the evening, and the next morning (April 18) be-
gan our usual work — coaling ship, cleaning, repairing, and overhauling machinery.
CRUISE OF THE BATTLESHIP “OREGON” 655

Of course, the only way to keep the ship going, was to turn to at every opportunity
and do everything possible in the time allowed; but it was beginning to tell on
all of us. We all had to stand watch at sea, and as soon as port was reached, all
hands of the engineer’s force had to go at the work and keep it up, going for every
little thing that showed the least sign of wear, and not waiting even for it to show,
but hunting for things of which there was the least probability of their becoming
out of order. But all hands stood the strain well.

We remained at Sandy Point until the morning of April 21, leaving with about
1,200 tons of coal in our bunkers. The Marietta accompanied us from Sandy Point to
Rio, or rather until the morning of the 30th, when we increased our speed to about four-
teen and a half knots an hour, in order to arrive in port during the afternoon, leaving
the Marietta to follow in later. The run from Sandy Point to Rio was without incident,
and was at a slower speed than our previous runs, on account of the Marietta.

It was at Rio that we received the news that war was on with Spain, and at the
same time a rumor of Dewey’s victory at Manila reached us. We also received a
long cablegram from Washington, informing us that Admiral Cervera’s squadron of
four heavy armored cruisers and four seagoing torpedo boats had left for Cuban waters,
and we were advised to avoid them if possible. We remained at Rio until May 4,
doing what repairing we could and filling up with coal, taking something over a
thousand tons. During our stay in this port we were not allowed to visit the shore.
Here, too, we found the MNichteroy, which had been bought by an American firm
and was flying our flag, and which was to be convoyed by us to the United States.
However, she was not allowed to leave port with us, so we stood up the coast a few
miles to wait for her. She joined us the following evening, but her boilers were in
such bad condition that it was decided not to waste time with her, so she was left
in charge of the Murtetta, and we went ahead, arriving at Bahia on the evening of
the 8th. Here we put on our war paint and made arrangements for refilling our
bunkers, but on the evening of the 9th a cablegram was received from Washington,
ordering us to leave, so out we went immediately, heading for Barbadoes, which was
reached at about 3 o’clock on the morning of May 18. Here we took 240 tons of
coal and left the same evening, standing well to the eastward, and finally reached
the Florida coast at Jupiter Light on the evening of the 24th, reporting our arrival
to Washington. Orders came back to proceed to Hampton Roads if in need of
repairs, otherwise to Key West. There was no hesitation as to which direction to
take under these orders, and, finally, Key West was reached on the morning of the
26th, thus completing the most remarkable and successful performance ever under-
taken by a battleship.

I have since heard that there was great anxiety among our own people at home
on account of this ship and that foreign nations were watching our run with great
interest, while many doubted our ability to successfully accomplish it.

In the first place the machinery of this ship was beautifully and strongly built,
and, above all, was erected in the ship with the greatest care and thoroughness. Great
656 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

credit is therefore due to her builders and to the inspectors who supervised the work.
From the day she went into commission the greatest care has been taken to keep
everything up as nearly to perfection as possible. On the discovery of the least
defect in any part, it has been remedied immediately. Whenever a run has been made,
no matter how short it may have been, on reaching port again the cylinders and
valve chests, air pump valves, etc., have been carefully examined, cleaned, and oiled.
The most careful attention has been paid to the condition of the boilers, and every
endeavor has been made to avoid the use of salt water in them; that, indeed, is the
point to which our success is largely due. Every leak, however small, in the
boilers themselves, in the steam pipes, in the engines or in the condensers has been
stopped just as soon as possible, and thus only has it been possible to keep down
the amount of water necessary for make-up feed to such a point that our evapora-
tors have been able to furnish it, in addition to the water required for all other
purposes.

The following is a summary, in tabular form, of our runs, showing at a glance
the number of knots run, the speed of the ship in knots per hour, the consumption
of coal, and the knots run per ton of coal. The data in this table are taken from
the time of getting fairly under way, the time while entering and leaving port be-
ing eliminated. The coal, of course, does not include that used while lying in port,
but includes coal consumed for all purposes while at sea.

 

 

 

. * Speed, Knots Run
PEnots,” | Hours, | Snotsper | ong, | per Ton
Bremerton to San Francisco...... 827.7 72 11.49 221.0 3.74
San Francisco to Callao....... ... 4,076.5 371 10.99 962.0 4.24
Callao to Port Tamar. ........... 2,529.9 212 11.93 785.0 8.22
Port Tamar to Sandy Point....... ; 132.0 9 14.55 66.0 2.00
Sandy Point to Rio de Janeiro.... 2,247.7 223 10.08 657.0 3.42
Rio to Bahia.................2... 700.0 | * * 288.0 ee
Bahia to Barbadoes............... 2,229.0 193 11.55 620.0 3.59
Barbadoes to Jupiter.............. 1,688.9 142 11.86 478.5 8.3
Jupiter to Key West.............. 280.0 27 10.37 77.9 3.6
Totalss: ccs pa Lmotaesey sey See 14,706.7 4,155.4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

*Speeds variable. Data unreliable.
C. N. Orriey.
THE TREATY OF PEACE.

NeEGotTiateD AT Paris By THE AMERICAN-SPANISH COMMISSIONERS,
DrEcEMBER 10, 1898.

Tux United States of America and Her Majesty, the Queen-Regent of Spain,
in the name of her August Son, Don Alfonso XIII., desiring to end the state of
war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose
appointed as plenipotentiaries: The President of the United States, i ie TERT
William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George TREATY
Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States; and Her
Majesty, Queen-Regent of Spain; Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the
Senate; Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, Senator of the kingdom and ex-Minister
of the Crown; Don Jose de Garnica, Deputy to the Cortes and Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary at Brussels; and Don Rafael Cerero, General of Di-
visions, who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers,
which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the mat-
ters before them, agreed upon the following articles :—

ArrTIcLeE I.

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over all title to Cuba.

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the
United States, the United States will,so long as such occupation shall last, assume
and discharge the obligations that may, under international law, result from the fact
of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.

ArtTIcLe II.

Spain cedes to the United States the island of Puerto Rico and other islands
now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the
Marianas or Ladrones.

Articie III.

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine
Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line :—

A line running from west to east along or near the 20th par-
allel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable pp a
channel of Bachi, from the 118th to the 127th degree meridian of PHILIPPINES
longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the 127th degree
meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of 4.45 north latitude,
thence along the parallel of 4.45 north latitude to its intersection with the meridian

(657)
658 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

of longitude 119.35 east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude 119.35
east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude 7.40 north, thence along the parallel
of latitude 7.40 north to its intersection with the 116th degree meridian of longi-
tude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the 10th
degree parallel of north latitude with the 118th degree meridian of longitude east
of Greenwich, and thence along the 118th degree meridian of longitude east of
Greenwich to the point of beginning.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of $20,000,000 within three months
after the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty.

ARTICLE IV.

The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange
of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to
the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of
the United States.

ARTICLE V.

The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to
Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture
of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in ques-

cue OF tion shall be restored to them.
PRISONERS Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present
treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of
Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the commissioners appointed to
arrange for evacuation of Puerto Rico and other islands in the West Indies under the
protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are com-

pletely executed.

The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall
be completed shall be fixed by the two governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured
war vessels, smal] arms, guns of all calibers, with their carriages and accessories,
powder, ammunition, live stock, and materials and supplies of all kinds belonging to
the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property
of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and
coast defenses, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be
reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may,
in the meantime, purcnase such material from Spain if a satisfactory agreement between
the two governments on the subject shall be reached.

ArticLe VI.

Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war
and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offenses in connection with the
insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States.
THE -TREATY OF PEACE 659

Reciprocally the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by
the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners
in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.

The government of the United States will, at its own cost, return to Spain, and the
government of Spain will, at its own cost, return to the United States, Cuba, Puerto
Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners
released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article.

ArTICLE VII.

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national
and individual, of every kind, of either government or of its citizens or subjects, against
the other government that may have arisen since the beginning of the
late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications ALL WAR-TIME

f th t treaty, including all claims for indemnity for th specie
0 e present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the WAIVED
cost of the war.

The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain
relinquished in this article.

ArticLE VIII.

In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and ITI of this treaty Spain re-
linquishes in Cuba and cedes in Puerto Rico and other islands in the West Indies,
in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine archipelago, all the buildings, wharves,
barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in
conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the crown
of Spain. ‘

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may
be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the
property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of
all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesias-
tical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and
possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded or of private indi-
viduals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.

The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all docu-
ments exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may
exist in the archives of the peninsula. Where any document in such archives only
in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever
it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain
in respect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to.

In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also in-
cluded such rights as the crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of
the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above
referred to, which relate to said islands or the right and property of their .inhabit-
660 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

ants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons
shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authen-
ticated copies of the contracts, wills, and other instruments forming part of notarial
protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives,
be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.

ARTICLE IX.

Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula, residing in the territory over which
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in
such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event
RIGHTS OF all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose
SPANISH :
SUBJECTS of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the
right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being
subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In
case they remain in the territory, they may preserve their allegiance to the crown
of Spain by making before a court of record within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty a declaration of their decision to preserve
such allegiance, in default of which declaration they shall be held to have re-
nounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may
reside.
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

ARTICLE X,.

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

ARTICLE XI.

The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes
or relinquishes her sovereignty, shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to
the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear
before such courts and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to
which the courts belong.

ArticLe XII.

Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications of

this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty,
shall be determined according to the following rules :—

PENDING First— Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private

seinen individuals or in criminal matters before the date mentioned, and

with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review under

the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final and shall be executed in due form
THE TREATY OF PEACE 661

by competent authority in the territory within which such judgments should be car-
ried out.

Second — Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date men-
tioned be undetermined, shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which
they may then be pending, or in the court that may be substituted therefor.

Third — Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme
Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be
Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judg-
ment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the
competent authority of the place in which the case arose.

ARTICLE XIII.

The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards
in the island of Cuba and in Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and othcr ceded terri-
tory, at the time of exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be
respected. Spanish scientific, literary, and artistic works not subversive of public
order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into
such territories for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the
exchange of the ratification of this treaty.

é ARTICLE XIV.

Spain will have the power to establish consular offices in the ports and places
of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded
by the present treaty.

ArticLe XV. _

The government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the
merchant vessels of the other nation the same treatment in respect PRIVILEGES
of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues OF SHIPPING
and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels not engaged in the
coastwise trade.

This article may at any time be terminated on six months’ notice given by either
government to the other.

ArTicLe XVI.

{t is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States
with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will, upon
the termination of such occupancy, advise any government established in the island to
assume the same obligations.

ArTIcLE XVII.

The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty, the Queen-
662 APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six
months from the date hereof, or earlier, if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and
have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord
One Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety-Hight.

[Seal] Wiuuiam R. Day,

[Seal] Cusuman K. Davis,
[Seal] Wiruiam P. Frre,

[Seal] GEoRGE GRay,

[Seal] WuitEetaw Rep,

[Seal] Evcenio Montero Rios,
[Seal] B. pE ABARZUZA,

[Seal] J. DE GaRNica,

[Seal] W. R. pe Vitia-URRUTIA,

[Seal] RaFraEL CERERO.

 
 

 

 

 

 

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