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Gurnell University Library
Ithaca, New York

THE JAMES VERNER SCAIFE
COLLECTION
CIVIL WAR LITERATURE

THE GIFT OF
JAMES VERNER SCAIFE
CLASS OF 1889
CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
 
 

Masor-Generay J. E. B. Sruarr
STUART’S CAVALRY
IN THE

GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN
STUART’S CAVALRY

IN THE

GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

BY

JOHN S. MOSBY

“I give thy harp heroic theme,
And warm thee with a noble name.”
— Scorrt.

NEW YORK
MOFFAT, YARD & COMPANY
1908
Copyright, 1908, by
MOFFAT, YARD & COMPANY
NEW YORK

 

All rights reserved

Published, February, 1908

 

The Plimpton Press Norwood Mass. U.S.A,
a

This volume is inscribed as a tribute of devotion to the memory of
GENERAL J. E. B. STUART

“the champion of a cause more interesting than prosperous — one
of those causes which please noble spirits but do not please
destiny — which have Cato’s adherence but not
Heaven’s.”
CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE . . 1. ww
INTRODUCTION

I
BRANDY

Hooker and the Army of Northern Virginia — Culpeper — Pleasan-
ton crosses the Rappahannock — Beverly Ford — Stuart repul-
ses Buford — Kelley’s Ford —- Winchester — Brandy Station .

I
GETTYSBURG

General Lee moves to the Potomac — General Stuart — Union
officers captured — Aldie — Col. Duffie defeated — Hooker at
Fairfax — Rodes crosses the Potomac — Defeat of Reynolds
— General Ewell — Meade issues orders — July 1st — Bristoe
Station — General Robertson — General Lee’s Report — .

58
ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE
Masor-Generay J. E. B. Sruarr. > . . . . Frontispiece

Cotonen Joun §. Mospy. . . . . 2. 1 ee ee ew ee)

Map or THE Gerryspura CAMPAIGN. . . 2. 1 « ss 6 © 222
PREFACE

THESE pages have been written as a duty I owe to a soldier
to whom great injustice has been done. The statements in the
two reports of the commanding general in regard to his orders
and the management of the cavalry in the Gettysburg cam-
paign have been generally accepted without question; and the
criticisms of his staff officers and biographers on the conduct of
the Chief of Cavalry have assumed them to be true. It seems
never to have occurred to these critics to analyze and compare
the two reports with each other, and with the contemporaneous
correspondence, to ascertain if they agree, or in what respect they
differ. This I have done and have found it impossible to recon-
cile their differences. It was my fortune to serve under the direct
orders of General Robert E. Lee and General Stuart, and for
both I have always felt a deep affection. General Lee men-
tioned my name when I was a private in a general order to the
army, and the last communication I received from him put me
in command of all Northern Virginia. I have tried to explain
how his name is signed to papers that do so much injustice as
well to himself as to General Stuart. The following letter to me
from General Beauregard shows that my theory of the Gettys-
burg campaign is far more flattering to General Lee as a com-
mander than his own report.

New Orteans, Jan. 6, —92.
My Drar CoLoneL: —
I read with much pleasure your two articles in Beljord’s Magazine
on the Gettysburg Campaign, which J had always condemned as danger-
v
vi PREFACE

ous and ill advised, but as explained by you, I withdraw my condemna-
tion of it. It is on the contrary to be regretted that General Lee’s plan
was not carried out as he intended.
I am yours very truly,
(Signed) G. T. BEAUREGARD.

General Stuart’s report of the campaign shows what were my
relations with him at that time; and as I brought the information
that induced him to ask permission to cross the Potomac in
rear of the enemy when he was ordered to the Susquehanna,
and was chosen to command the advance of his column, I think
I have a right on my own account as an actor in the great tragedy
as well as on his, to be heard. The fatal shears cut the thread
of his life before the end of the conflict came, and he was denied
the opportunity to speak for himself. The time has come to
apply the test of reason to the Gettysburg legend to discover
who is responsible for bringing upon us the Dies irae !— dies
ila!

The equestrian statue of the great leader of the Southern
cavalry which was lately unveiled at Richmond is a testimony
of the love and admiration of the men who followed him in battle
and wept over his bier:

“So sinks the day-star in the Ocean bed,
And yet anon repairs his drooping head,
And tricks his beams and with new spangled ore
Flames in the forehead of the morning sky.”

Jno. S. Mossy.
Wasuineton Crry,
August 21, 1907.
INTRODUCTION

For the true laurel-wreath which glory weaves,
Is of the tree no bolt of thunder cleaves.
Brron, Childe Harold.

Tue battle of Chancellorsville was fought on May 3,-
1863; it was a prelude to Gettysburg. Considering the
numerical inferiority of the Southern army and the fact
that it took the offensive and drove its antagonist out of
his entrenchments over the river it had just triumphantly
crossed,’ I consider it the boldest deed of arms and the
most wonderful achievement in the history of war.

1GpneraL Orpers, No 47.

Heapquartrers ARMY oF THE PoroMac,
Camp NEAR Fatmours, Va.

April 30th, 1863.
It is with heartfelt satisfaction the commanding General announces
to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined
that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind
his defences and give us battle on our own ground where certain destruc-

tion awaits him... .
By command of Major-General Hooker,
S. Wiss,
A. A. G.

In contrast with the above is the following despairing despatch
from Hooker to President Lincoln.
“May 3, 1863, 3.30 p.m.

“We have had a desperate fight yesterday and to-day, which has
resulted in no success to us, having lost two lines which had been selected

vu
viii INTRODUCTION

I once expressed this opinion to General Sherman; he
agreed with me. General Warren, an engineer officer,
referring in his report to Jackson’s flank march and sur-
prise of Hooker’s right wing on the evening of the 2d, says:
“JT was near this part of the field about 5 p.m., when
heavy firing of musketry began on our right and I hastened
to the spot. The Eleventh Corps on their left had made
no stand at all behind its breastworks, but ran away while
yet the enemy’s bullets scarcely reached them, and while
their own artillery heroically served, still held the enemy
in check. I tried in vain to assist some of the officers
in rallying their men, but soon saw it was a waste of pre-
cious time. This flank move in our very presence, which
General Lee had decided upon, and the execution of which
he had entrusted to General Jackson, was one of great
risk under any circumstances.”

At Austerlitz the Allies attempted to do the same thing
that Jackson did and met a great disaster. But General
Lee knew that he did not have Napoleon in his front.
At 4.10 p.m., on May 2, when Jackson was almost in
touch with his flank and was forming his lines for attack,
Hooker, unconscious of Jackson’s presence and of
the impending blow, said in a despatch to Sedgwick:

for our defence. It is now 1.30 o’clock and there is still some firing of
artillery. We may have another tur at it this p.m. I do not despair
of success. If Sedgwick could have gotten up there could have been
but one result. It is impossible for me to know the exact position of
Sedgwick as regards his ability to advance and take part in the engage-
ment. I cannot tell when it will end. We will endeavor to do our best.
My troops are in good spirits. We have fought desperately to-day.
No general ever commanded a more devoted army.”
INTRODUCTION ix

“Capture Fredericksburg with everything in it and vigor-
ously pursue the enemy. We know that the enemy is
fleeing to save his trains. Two of Sickle’s divisions are
amongst them.”

But at 9 p.m., after Jackson had struck the blow that
created a panic and rout, Hooker ordered Sedgwick to
“at once take up his line of march on the Chancellors-
ville road until you connect with us. You will probably
fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by General
Lee and between us we will use him up. Send word to
General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg.”
Gibbon was on the opposite side of the river at Falmouth.

On April 29, Sedgwick with 22,000 men had crossed
the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg. This was only
a feint by Hooker to deceive Lee while the main body of
his army was marching out of sight to the upper fords.
Lee soon penetrated his design and, with Jackson’s corps,
went to meet Hooker, but left Early behind with 10,000
men as a rear-guard and containing force to hold Sedgwick
in check and protect his flank.1_ Hooker had not antici-

1“A containing force is a body of troops charged with the duty of
holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the enemy,
while the main efforts of the army are directed against another portion
of the hostile force.” — Wagner.

Colonel Hamley, in his work on the operations of war, says:

“To bring an army from the order of march to the order of battle
is a work of time. Therefore it may, in most cases, be checked by a
force deployed in order of battle, only a little superior to the heads of
the advancing columns. And the uses to be made of this circumstance
are manifold; it is not too much to say that, rightly employed, it is the
most effective weapon in the military armory. . . . If a body of troops
were to remain drawn up to oppose the advance of a superior force on
x INTRODUCTION

pated this bold move of his adversary. He had expected
him to retreat toward Richmond to fight a defensive
battle; his orders to Sedgwick were to pursue him in that
direction. Hooker’s plans were upset by Jackson’s unex-
pected turning of his flank; his army was divided and he
was now on the defensive. Such a sudden transforma-
tion of scene was never seen before. Jackson’s untimely
fall in the first act of the great tragedy has put him amongst
the deified heroes of antiquity, and his name is so blended
with the great victory that the world has taken little

a plain where the whole conformation were visible, the attempt would
be futile and disastrous. The enemy would at once attack with superior
forces and compel a costly retreat under penalty of rout or destruction.
But skilfully disposed in a good position across the path of an adversary
advancing in an ordinarily broken country, the risk is greatly reduced.
If the armies have been manceuvering near each other, with numbers
and positions constantly changing, and plans and combinations only
to be guessed at, the leader who comes on such an obstacle in his path
cannot at first know the amount of force which bars his way sufficiently
well to begin an immediate battle. He will generally pause, recon-
noiter and feel his way; and will defer a general attack till he shall be
ready to deploy a force sufficient to render him confident of success.
In the meanwhile the commander of the smaller force must watch care-
fully the disposition of his adversary, and combine in an unusual degree
resolution with prudence. For if he were to engage the whole of his
troops throughout the extent of their front, it would be out of his power
to withdraw when the adversary had deployed a superior force, and he
would be out-flanked and heavily defeated. On the other hand, if he
were to give way before the enemy had made a considerable deployment,
the advance, which it was his business to check, would not be retarded.
He must occupy his ground to the last moment possible without com-
mitting himself to a general action, and must then effect an orderly
retreat. At the first opportunity offered by the ground, he must repeat
the manceuver. . . . The sole use of a containing force is to prevent a
reunion of the enemy’s parts.”
INTRODUCTION xi

account of the fact that Stuart took Jackson’s place on the
field and finished the work which Jackson had begun.
If Homer had painted this battle scene of the Wilderness
he would have represented Jackson and Stuart as the
Twin-Gods riding on the lightning and directing the storm.

I do not mean that Stuart accomplished all that Jack-
son would have done if he and his next in command, A. P.
Hill, had not been wounded. Jackson fell about 8 P.m.;
Hill about the same time. He was pressing to cut the
enemy off from the United States Ford, their line of re-
treat. Stuart, on whom the command of Jackson’s
corps now devolved, was several miles away on the flank
near Ely’s Ford on the Rapidan. The advance of Jack-
son’s troops had been arrested by his fall for they had no
commander. Stuart did not arrive on the field to take
command until midnight! The panic had then subsided;

1 GENERAL LEE TO PRESIDENT DAVIS, RICHMOND, VA.
HEADQUARTERS NEAR CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA.

May 2nd, 1863.
Mr. PresipEent: —

I find the enemy in a strong position at Chancellorsville and in
large force; his communications extend to the Rapidan at Germanna
and Ely’s Fords, and to the Rappahannock at United States Ford. He
seems determined to make the fight here and, from what I learn from
General Early, has sent up troops from his position opposite Fredericks-
burg. Anticipating such a movement on his part, I directed General
Early last evening, if it occurred, to leave a guard at his position and
join me with the rest of his forces. I have repeated the orders this
morning. It is plain that if the enemy is too strong for me here I shall
have to fall back, and Fredericksburg must be abandoned. . . . I have
no expectations that any reinforcements from Longstreet or North
Carolina will join me in time to aid in the contest at this point... .
xil INTRODUCTION

Hooker’s army had recovered from the shock of the attack
and his lines had been re-formed to protect his rear. The
opportunity to destroy him was gone.

It is impossible even for the greatest master of a pro-
fession to execute another’s conceptions without specific
directions. It was said of Apelles that no artist could be
found to complete a picture which he left unfinished. Of
all the great commanders of history, Jackson was prob-
ably the most reticent about his plans. Even if Stuart
had been present on the field when he fell, the transfer of
command would have involved a delay that might have
been fatal to victory.

Colonel Henderson, an English soldier, in his “Stone-
wall Jackson and the American War,” says:

“These arrangements made, Jackson proceeded to
join his advanced line. At the point where the track to
the White House and United States Ford strikes the
plank road, he met General Lane seeking his instructions
for the attack. They were sufficiently brief: ‘Push right

GENERAL LEE TO GENERAL STUART

May 8rd, 1863, 3 a.m.
GeneraL J. E. B. Sruarr: —

GENERAL; it is necessary that the glorious victory thus far achieved
be prosecuted with the utmost vigor and the enemy given no time to
rally. As soon, therefore, as it is possible they must be pressed, so that
we can unite the two wings of the army. Endeavour, therefore, to dis-
possess them of Chancellorsville, which will permit the union of the
whole army. I shall myself proceed to join you as soon as I can make
arrangements on this side, but let nothing delay the completion of the
plan of driving the enemy from his rear and from his positions. I shall
give orders that every effort be made on this side at daylight to aid in the
junction.
INTRODUCTION xiii

ahead Lane, right ahead.’ As Lane galloped off to his
command, General Hill and some of his staff came up
and Jackson gave Hill his orders: ‘Press them, cut them
off from the United States Ford, Hill; press them.’ . . .

“The skirmishers on both sides were now engaged and
the lines of battle in the rear became keenly on the alert.
Some mounted officers galloped hastily back to their
commands. The sound startled the Confederate sol-
diers, and an officer of the 18th North Carolina, seeing
a group of strange horsemen riding towards him through
the darkness — for Jackson, hearing firing, had turned
back to his own lines — gave the order to fire. The volley
was fearfully effective. Men and horses fell dead and
dying on the narrow track. Jackson himself received
three bullets, one in the right hand and two in the left
arm, cutting the main artery and crushing the bone below
the shoulder, and as the reins dropped upon his neck,
‘Little Sorrel,’ frantic with terror, plunged into the woods
and rushed towards the Federal lines. An overhanging
bough struck his rider violently in the face, tore off his
cap and nearly unhorsed him; but, recovering his seat,
he managed to seize the bridle with his bleeding hand
and turned into the road. . . . When Stuart reached the
front he found the troops still halted, Rodes and Colston
re-forming on the open fields near Dowdall’s Tavern, and
the Light Division deployed within the forest, and the
generals anxious for their own security.

“So far the attack had been completely successful, ©
but Lee’s lack of strength prevented the full accomplish-
ment of his design. Had Longstreet been present, with
xiv INTRODUCTION

Pickett and Hood to lead his splendid infantry,’ the Third
Corps and the Twelfth would have been so hardly pressed
that Chancellorsville, Hazel Grove and the White House
would have fallen an easy prize to Jackson’s bayonets. . . .

“Tn Stuart, however, Hooker had to deal with a soldier
who was no unworthy successor of Stonewall Jackson.

1GENERAL LEE TO PRESIDENT DAVIS
Frepericsssure, April 30th, 1863.

. - - General Stuart is supposed to have crossed Rapidan last night
to interrupt enemy’s column at Germanna. He cut it in the afternoon
near Madden’s, north of Rapidan. Enemy was still crossing the Rappa-
hannock at 5 P.M. yesterday. . . . Object evidently to turn our left. If
I had Longstreet’s divisions — Hood’s and Pickett’s — would feel safe.

Ricumonp, Va., April 30th, 1863.

GeneERAL LoncsTrEET, SUFFOLK, VA.: —
Move without delay to this place to effect a junction with General
Lee.
S. CoorEr,
A. and I. G.

GENERAL LEE TO GENERAL JACKSON
Heapquarters, May Srd, 1863.
Gunerat: I have just received your note informing me that you were
wounded. I cannot express my regret at the occurrence. Could I have
directed events I should have chosen for the good of the country to be

disabled in your stead. I congratulate you on the victory which is due
to your skill.

GENERAL LEE TO GENERAL LONGSTREET
May 7th.
My letter of the Ist instant to which you refer, was intended to
apprise you of my intended movement and to express the wish rather than
the expectation that one of your divisions could cooperate in it. I did

not intend to express the opinion that you could reach me in time, as
I did not think it practicable.
INTRODUCTION xv

Reluciantly abandoning the idea of a night attack, the
cavalry general, fully alive to the exigencies of the situa-
tion, had determined to reduce the interval between him-
self and Lee, and, during the night, the artillery was
brought to the front and the batteries deployed wherever
they could find room. Just before the darkness began
to lift, orders were received from Lee that the assault
would be made as early as possible. The right wing,
swinging around in order to come abreast of the center,
became hotly engaged. Away to the southeast, across
the hills held by the Federals, came the responding thunder
of Lee’s guns; and 40,000 infantry, advancing through
the woods against front and flank, enveloped in a circle
of fire a stronghold which was held by over 60,000 muskets.
. . . It must always be an interesting matter of specula-
tion what the result would have been if Jackson had
accomplished his design on the night he fell, of moving
a large part of his command up the White House road
and barring the only line of retreat left open to the Fed-
erals.

“Undoubtedly to those who think more of numbers
than of human nature, of the momentum of the mass rather
than the mental equilibrium of the general, the fact that
a superior force of comparatively fresh troops was at
Hooker’s disposal will be sufficient to ‘put the success of
the Confederates -out.of court. Yet the question will
always suggest itself, would not the report that a victori-
ous enemy of unknown strength was pressing forward
in the darkness of the night towards the only line of
retreat, have so demoralized the Federal soldiers, already
xvi INTRODUCTION

shaken by the overthrow of the Eleventh Corps; that they
would have thought only of securing their safety ?
Would Hooker, whose tactics the next day, after he had
had the night given him in which to recover his senses,
were so inadequate, have done better if he/ had received
no respite? . . . He must be a great leader indeed, who,
when his flank is suddenly rolled up and his line of retreat
threatened, preserves sufficient coolness to devise a
general counterstroke.”

The Count of Paris says: “From eaniese dawn, Stuart,
anxious to show his comrades that he was not only a brill-
iant cavalry officer, but that he is likewise able to lead an
army corps, is occupied in rectifying his lines and in mak-
ing the Second Corps take the most favorable positions
for renewing the attack. . . . It is five o’clock in the
morning; provisions were about to be distributed to the
soldiers of these three brigades, who had fully earned
them by twenty-four hours of marching and fighting,
but at the cry ‘Let us remember Jackson,” they are all
in motion without waiting for anything, for they are no
longer ignorant of his wound, and are burning with desire
to avenge upon the enemy the fatal accident that has
robbed them of their chief. This cry is repeated by the
rest of the division, which is advancing on the left of the
road under Stuart’s lead, and the two other lines that
have passed beyond the clearing of Dowdall’s Tavern in
order to get back in the woods. . . .

“The plateau is soon covered with soldiers flying in
disorder, and the abatis, filled with the dead and wounded,
catch fire. The conflagration is soon communicated to
INTRODUCTION xvii

the Chancellor dwelling, which has been converted into
a hospital; with it perished all the victims of this fright-
ful conflict who had sought a protecting shelter under
its roof. Hooker mounts his horse again with difficulty
and proceeds in sadness and in silence in the direction of
the new line which he had caused to be formed in the
Bullock crossing. During this time Lee is in the vicinity
of the Chancellor dwelling; his soldiers are in possession
of the whole plateau. It is ten o’clock in the morning.
... The [third] Federal line was well defined; each
organization fell readily into its place in the same order as
around Chancellorsville. The position, which was very
bad for an army desiring to get out of the forest, was easy
to defend. Yet Lee, giving his troops only the time
strictly necessary to breathe and form again, was already
preparing to attack it. ... But at this moment came
alarming news to put a stop to his movement, obliging
him to form a resolution even more daring, perhaps, than
that which the day previous had brought Jackson upon
the flank of the enemy.”

This news was that Sedgwick after a short combat had
captured Fredericksburg and the surrounding heights —
that Early had retreated on the Telegraph road towards
Bowling Green (Richmond), and had left the plank road to
Chancellorsville open to Sedgwick, who was advancing on
Lee’s rear which was now uncovered. No doubt General
Lee intended |to leave the road to Richmond open. If
Sedgwick accepted the invitation, then Early, having the
interior line and central position could easily have united
with Lee at Chancellorsville to crush Hooker while Sedg-
xviii INTRODUCTION

wick was far away. In that event Sedgwick would never
have re-crossed the Rappahannock. If, on the contrary,
Sedgwick took the plank road he would have been checked.
by Wilcox while Lee with the reinforce: ent of Early
was driving Hooker into the river. Early had thus
become separated from Lee’s army. Lee had intended
that Early should guard his rear and keep between him
and Sedgwick. Fortunately Wilcox, who was at Bank’s
Ford, a few miles above Fredericksburg, without orders,
moved back to Salem Church on the plank road and
formed his brigade in the dense thicket across it. This
compelled Sedgwick to halt and deploy, and, temporarily,
barred his advance until the arrival of McLaws. Lee
had suspended the attack he was about making on Hooker’s
new position when he heard that Sedgwick was in his
rear, and sent Mclaws to check the movement. He fol-
lowed with Anderson’s division — attacked and drove
Sedgwick back over the river. The Count of Paris says:
“While McLaws’ [division] and Mahone’s brigade were
marching in the direction of Fredericksburg, Wilcox was
establishing himself at Salem Church, and Early, believ-
ing the enemy to be moving on the Bowling Green [Rich-
mond] road, was making useless preparations to dispute
it to him far away from the real battle-field.”

When Lee turned against Sedgwick he left Stuart to
hold Hooker; after finishing Sedgwick, he moved back
to strike Hooker another blow with his united army.
Early had then joined him. But Hooker had gone.
Lee had successfully repeated Napoleon Bonaparte’s
tactics in his first campaign in Italy. An English officer,
INTRODUCTION xix

Captain Cecil Battine of the 15th King’s Hussars, has
given in his book, “'The Crisis of the Confederacy,” a
graphic sketch of Stuart, and of his brilliant leadership
in this battle. He says:

“James Stuart, or Jeb, as he was called in the army,
from his first initials, proved himself, in his short career,
the greatest warrior amongst the great men who have
been so called. Whether or not he was really descended
from Robert the Bruce, he certainly inherited the kingly
talent for leading men and making war. He won the
great battle of May 3, which was decisive in this campaign,
by skilful and gallant leading. He was but twenty-eight
years old when he took Jackson’s place at the head of the
Second Corps; and it would have, perhaps been well for
the Southern cause if Lee had retained him at his side
to share in the supreme command as he had used Jackson,
instead of at once again transferring him to the command
of the cavalry which Fitz-Lee, W. Lee, or Hampton was
qualified to hold.1’ Stuart had, like Sedgwick, served under

1Wasuineton, D. C.
December 10, 1907.
CotoneL Mossy :—

Complying with your request for a brief account of how Wilcox and
his command stood between Sedgwick and the rear of Lee’s army on
the 3d of May, 1863. ‘

Coming from Bank’s Ford in the forenoon, Wilcox with his
Alabama Brigade, four pieces of Lewis’ Battery and forty or fifty of
the 15th Va. Cavalry under Major Collins, in three successive skir-
mishes, first near Taylor’s house, then near Downman’s, and then at
the toll-gate, so delayed Sedgwick’s advance that his final attack was
not made upon us at Salem Church, three and a half miles from
Fredericksburg, until five o’clock, Pm.
xx INTRODUCTION

Lee in the cavalry of the United States army, and the
knowledge possessed by their former colonel of the two
men’s characters and capacity stood the Southern general
in good stead on this critical field; he could take liberties
with the over-cautious Sedgwick, and give rein to the
offensive skill of Stuart. Soon after the outbreak of the

Wilcox’s Brigade was formed across the road. After shelling us
heavily, two divisions, Brooks’ and Newton’s, comprising six brigades,
were massed and assaulted us. The attack was mainly on our
brigade, but as General Lee reports it, ‘partially involved the two
brigades” on our left, Semmes’ and Mahone’s, which had come to our
help. After a hot and bloody battle we drove the enemy back to the
shelter of their artillery, three quarters of a mile three of Semmes’
regiments advancing with us. Losses on our side about 1000; on the
enemy’s side over 2500. %

A notable and singularly happy sequel was this: May 3, 1907, the
survivors of the gallant 283d New Jersey, one of the foremost regi-
ments in that bloody fight, erected a monument at Salem Church on
which were two plates, one inscribed

“To the Memory of our Heroic Dead Comrades Who Gave
Their Lives for their Country’s Honor on this Battle-field, This Tablet
is Dedicated.”

On the other plate was this:

“To the Brave Alabama Boys, Our Opponents on this Field of
Battle, Whose Memory we Honor, This Tablet is Dedicated.”

As the oldest surviving officer of the Alabamians in that fight, I
acknowledged gratefully this magnanimous compliment and received
from Colonel E. Burd Grubb a noble letter, which I much regret you
have not space to publish.

Very truly yours,
Hizary A. Hersert,!

Coroner Joun §. Mossy, Last Colonel, 8th Ala. Regt.

Washington, D. C.
Secretary of the Navy 1893-1897.
INTRODUCTION xxi

war Stuart distinguished himself as a cavalry leader, and
his strategical work in blindfolding the enemy and in
enlightening his own army has never been surpassed. As
a cavalry tactician he is not only the first, but hitherto the
only leader of the army who understood how to combine
the effects of fire and shock, how to render effective ser-
vice in fighting on foot without losing the power to strike
on horseback when opportunity offered, though his Fed-
eral opponents imitated his strategy and tactics with some
success in the next campaign.”

“On Sunday, May 3, the dawn was obscured by the
river mist so frequent on the banks of the Rappahannock.
By five o’clock in the morning the Confederate regiments
had got under arms and, scarcely waiting to eat the food
which Stuart had caused to be distributed, the soldiers
of Hill’s division, now forming the first line, were clamor-
ing to be led into action. While it was yet dark Stuart
had brought up the artillery of the Second Corps to the
Lewis creek in order to enfilade the hostile position, but
before it came into action his infantry threw themselves
upon the Federal soldiers still remaining in the wood
which had been the scene of last night’s engagement, with
vengeful cries of ‘Remember Jackson.’

“Sickles in the meanwhile had begun to execute Hooker's
orders for the evacuation of the ground west of Lewis
creek when the furious charge of the gray riflemen com-
pelled him to turn and defend himself. ‘The fierce and
costly fight which followed left the contested wood and the
heights of Hazel Grove in the possession of the assailants.
Stuart lost no time in dragging his artillery forward on to
xxii INTRODUCTION

the heights; he established a battery of thirty guns oppo-
site Fairview Hill and cemetery which could fire across
the high road at a range of only eleven hundred yards. . . .

“The troops at Lee’s disposal were too few to enable
him to strike home when Stuart began his advance on
both sides of the main road, but he closed his brigades
towards their left, leaving skirmishers to keep the enemy’s
left wing amused, and pushing forward artillery wherever
an opening in the trees gave it range. Thus skilfully
disposing his forces, he began gradually to press upon the
Federal breastworks, threatening them right along their
line and so keeping them in doubt as to his real point of
attack. The Confederate artillery, under the orders of
both Stuart and Lee, greatly assisted the attack; the fire
of the batteries of the First and Second corps crossed and
inflicted death and wounds in the space around the Federal
headquarters, crowded as it was with troops, trains, and
field-hospitals. Of the seven Federal divisions seriously
attacked, three defended the Fairview plateau, two faced
westward along the Lewis creek ravine, and two held Lee
at bay, facing east on the plank and old pike roads which
once again diverged at Chancellorsville.

“When he judged the fire of his guns to have produced
some effect, Stuart hurled his line across the ravine and
a hard fight followed on its eastern bank; at the same
time, two brigades attacked from the south and repeatedly
charged the defenders of the cemetery with the bayonet.
In the lull of the fighting Stuart rode through his troops
and helped to re-form them for another attack, while he
caused the artillery to increase its fire against the enemy’s
INTRODUCTION xxiii

position and to sweep the high road. Lee was doing the
same thing and the effect of this bombardment was to
inflict still greater loss and confusion in the enemy’s
ranks. Hooker himself was wounded and stunned by the
falling masonry at Chancellor’s house, which was set on
fire; many wounded soldiers were burnt alive and the dry
branches in the barricades and entanglements also caught
fire. All order had ceased in the clearing north of Fair-
view; no succor came to the decimated defenders. At this
critical moment Lee himself brought Perry’s Florida bri-
gade from the woods south of the plank road down the
ravine until he joined hands with Archer’s brigade which
formed Stuart’s extreme right. The five Confederate
divisions were thus united in a continuous line of battle.
The sight of Lee roused the utmost enthusiasm among
Jackson’s soldiers, who shouted, ‘God bless your noble
head!’ as he passed. The signal was then given for an
assault right along the line. While the guns swept the
road and the clearing on either side of it, Stuart led his
infantry once more across the ravine, singing at the top
of his voice and waving his sword. His blonde beard,
blue eyes, and noble figure on horseback recalled the
Norman heroes who led the van at Hastings, singing the
songs of Roland. With a fury the Federals were no longer
able to resist, the converging troops from the west, south,
and east thronged across the ravine cheering and waving
their tattered colors. The brigades and regiments were
mixed up and many hundreds of the men were dabbled
with blood from wounds given or received, but, undeterred
by previous failure, the whole line lowered their bayonets
xxiv INTRODUCTION

and fell upon Sickles’ corps, which bravely contested
every yard of the ground, repeatedly charging with cold
steel, but were finally swept away.

“By ten o’clock the whole mass of the three Federal
corps was recoiling before the victorious assailants. Sickles’
corps, which had sustained the brunt of the conflict, had
also suffered most and was in the greatest disorder; the
Twelfth Corps fell back fighting, and on the Federal left
Hancock withdrew his division in masterly style, checking
McLaws’ advance as he did so. In this manceuver Colonel
Miles, afterwards commander-in-chief of the UnitedStates
army, first became distinguished. The scene around
Chancellorsville, when Lee on horseback, amid his vic-
torious soldiers, reached the cross-roads, showed how
severe had been the struggle and how destructive had
been the fire of the Southern artillery. The ground was
littered with injured men and horses and with the smoking
debris of carts and equipments; an immense mass of mili-
tary stores became the prize of the victors, who crowded
around their well-beloved chief with enthusiastic cheers,
while the retreating mass and the sound of firing slowly
rolled northward. But little time was wasted in self-
congratulation. Lee was determined to finish off Hooker
without giving him time to recover from the stunning
blow under which his army was reeling, and orders were
issued to re-form the decimated gray divisions with the
intention of resuming the attack.

“The victory was indeed a brilliant achievement. . . .
News, however, reached the Confederate commander
soon after one o’clock which compelled him to counter-
INTRODUCTION XXV

mand the fresh attack for which troops had already been
drawn up, and to leave Hooker in his intrenchments, over
which a mass of black smoke rolled from the burning
woods. A message from General Early informed Lee
that the Federal Sixth Corps had stormed Marye Heights
and was in possession of the Orange plank road; Lee’s
countenance showed no change at these evil tidings; he
promptly suspended the preparations for the attack, and
commanded that four divisions instead should invest
Hooker while McLaws marched to meet the Federals
menacing the rear of his army. These orders were forth-
with executed. . . . Engrossed by the tremendous events
at Chancellorsville, Lee had omitted to inform Early of the
new situation which had arisen, and which made the road
to Chancellorsville, and not the road to Richmond, the
important one to bar.

“[Lee’s orders to Early were to protect his rear; his
report says; ‘General Early had been instructed, in the
event of the enemy withdrawing from his front and moving
up the river, to join the main body of the army with so much
of his command as could be spared from the defence of his
lines. . . . The enemy then began to advance up the
plank road, his progress being gallantly disputed by the
brigade of General Wilcox, who had moved from Bank’s
Ford as rapidly as possible to the assistance of General
Barksdale, but arrived too late to take part in the action.
General Wilcox fell back slowly until he reached Salem
Church on the plank road, five miles from Fredericksburg.
Information of the state of affairs in our rear having
reached Chancellorsville, as already stated, General
XxVi INTRODUCTION

McLaws, with his three brigades and one of General
Anderson’s, was ordered to reinforce General Wilcox.
The next morning General Early advanced along the
Telegraph road and recaptured Marye’s and the adjacent
hills without difficulty, thus gaining the rear of the enemy’s
left.’] .

“A single brigade could have sufficiently delayed Sedg-
wick’s advance to the South if he had rashly taken that
direction; but he had no such intention, and a close observa-
tion of the Federal dispositions and the swifter manceuver
of the slender forces at his disposal would have enabled
Early, if not to deny the Chancellorsville road entirely to
the enemy, yet to hold him in check long enough topre-
vent interference with Lee’s army. Moreover, Lee’s
headquarters were but ten miles distant by road, and the
sound of heavy firing all the morning attested the violence
of the struggle in which the main army was engaged, and
gave a clue to the situation. . . . Early rallied his division
on the Telegraph road leading to Richmond; Wilcox,
who had made a rapid march from Bank’s Ford, which
he was guarding to assist in the defence, fell back along
the plank road with the intention of guarding Lee’s rear
as long as possible by checking any Federal troops that
might try to march along it. . . The two divisions which
had been engaged piled their arms until Brook’s, the third
division, which had formed Sedgwick’s left wing, was
brought on the plank road and deployed across it in front
of them. ‘The manceuver was not unmolested by Wilcox,
who managed to delay the Federals another hour before
they advanced in two lines covered by skirmishers and
INTRODUCTION XXVii

followed by the Sixth Corps in column. . . . A running
fight to Salem Church, then a determined stand followed;
before the Federals could bring their strength to bear,
however, McLaws men, tramping from the batile-field of
Chancellorsville, had heard the firing and had hastened
their march. A solid line of battle was soon formed by
McLaws’ two leading brigades and a determined advance
threw the Federals on the defensive in their turn and
recovered a quarter of a mile of the road. . . . By his
presence of mind and a correct tactical insight, Wilcox
had gained a very important advantage for the Confederate
army in checking the Sixth Corps seven miles from the
principal scene of action. Early would have done better
if he had perceived the real objective of Sedgwick’s ad-
vance and if he had massed some of his troops so as to fall
on the flank of the Federals advancing on the plank road.
. . . The staunchness of the Confederate soldiers of the
First Corps who fearlessly fought overwhelming numbers,
and who swiftly strode from one sanguinary battle-field to
another, cannot be too highly praised nor too faithfully
imitated, for no infantry ever fought better; while the
constancy of their Federal opponents in returning again and
again to the struggle in spite of reverses of fortune caused
by feeble leadership established their claim to the highest
consideration and enhances the fame of both combatants.
. . . But there was yet a third group of Confederates,
the five brigades under Early, 8,000 men, lying in the
fields beside the Richmond road only five miles from the
bivouac of the Sixth Corps. During the night Early had.
established touch with McLaws and realized how matters
Xxvili INTRODUCTION

stood. Somewhat ashamed of the blunder he had made
in leaving open the road to Sedgwick, he now determined
to retrieve it by attacking the Federals in the rear without
waiting for orders, and as soon as it was light, his brigades '
were marching to sweep from the heights of Fredericksburg
the feeble hosts which occupied them. . . . Whilethese
movements were in process of execution, Lee betook him-
self to Salem Church to take command in the battle
while Stuart remained to sit on guard over the mass of the
enemy’s army. Profiting by the inaction of the Unionists
and making good use of the curtain of forest which nar-
rowly bounded its horizon, Stuart ably and successfully
carried out Lee’s instructions. A reconnaissance in force
against his left was driven in with a loss of 500 men to
the Federals, leaving Hooker more than ever convinced
that he was surrounded by superior forces. . . . Soon
there came word that Sedgwick’s army corps had dis-
appeared in the night; and the report was followed by a
message from Marye Heights announcing that the enemy
had retreated from them, evacuating the right bank of the
Rappahannock and the town of Fredericksburg. The
Confederate general had now greatly simplified the task
of his army; there only remained the forces of Hooker,
cooped up in their entrenchments, on the river bank, and
at them he resolved to strike at once. . . . The Federal
commander had already resolved to retreat, and in the
morning when it began to rain he summoned a council
of war to share the responsibility of the decision. . . .
The passage of the stream was successfully accomplished,
though it seemed at one time as though the current might
INTRODUCTION xxix

carry away the bridges and leave the army cut in’ twain.
The whole day was spent by the Federals in gloomily
retracing their steps to the winter cantonments; wet, weary
and discouraged, the troops could see no end to their task,
while the loss of comrades and kinsfolk in what seemed
to be an impossible attempt weighed heavily on every one.
Little as they seemed to have gained in the sanguinary
campaign, however, an accident had given them an advan-
tage which, perhaps, alone made possible the ultimate
triumph of the North, when, in the confusion of the forest
fighting, a chance bullet laid low their most dangerous
foe. In a very different frame of mind the Southern sol-
diers marched back from the scene of their glorious vic-
tory to their old quarters around Fredericksburg, for Lee
had found it impossible to follow his enemy over the river,
much as he would have liked to strike another blow at
him.” ?

1 GENERAL LEB TO PRESIDENT DAVIS
May 5th, 1863.

At the close of the battle of Chancellorsville on Sunday, the enemy
was reported advancing from Fredericksburg in our rear. General
Mcl.aws was sent back to arrest his progress and repulsed him hand-
somely at Tabernacle Church. Learning that this force consisted of
two corps under General Sedgwick, I determined to attack it. Leaving
a sufficient force to hold General Hooker in check, who had not re-crossed
the Rappahannock, as was reported, but occupied a strong position in
front of the United States ford, I marched yesterday with General Ander-
son, and uniting with McLaws and Early in the afternoon, succeeded
by the blessing of heaven in driving General Sedgwick over the river.
We have re-occupied Fredericksburg and no enemy remains south of
the Rappahannock in its vicinity.

General Lee’s report says: “At 5.30 a.m. on April 28, the enemy
crossed the Rappahannock in boats near Fredericksburg and driving
XXX INTRODUCTION

off the pickets on the river, proceeded to lay a pontoon bridge a short
distance below Deep Run. Later in the afternoon another bridge was
constructed about a mile below the first. A considerable force crossed
on these bridges during the day and was massed out of view under the
high banks of the river. The bridges as well as the troops were effec-
tually protected from our artillery by the depth of the river bed and the
narrowness of the stream, while the batteries on the opposite heights
completely commanded the wide plain between our lines and the river.
. . - No demonstration was made opposite any other part of our lines
at Fredericksburg, and the strength of the force that had crossed, and its
apparent indisposition to attack, indicated that the principal effort of
the enemy would be made in some other quarter. This impression was
confirmed by the intelligence received from General Stuart that a large
body of infantry and artillery were passing up the river. During the
forenoon of the 29th, that officer reported that the enemy had crossed in
force near Kelly’s ford on the preceding evening. Later in the day he
announced that a heavy column was moving from Kelly’s towards
Germanna Ford on the Rapidan and another towards Ely’s ford on the
same river. The routes they were pursuing after crossing the Rapidan
converge near Chancellorsville, whence several roads lead to the rear
of our position at Fredericksburg. . . . The enemy in our front near
Fredericksburg continued inactive and it was now apparent that the
main attack would be made upon our rear and flank. It was, therefore,
determined to leave sufficient troops to hold our lines and with the main
body of the army to give battle to the approaching column. . . .
“Jackson’s troops followed Anderson on the plank road. Colonel
Alexander’s battalion of artillery accompanied the advance. The
enemy was soon encountered on both roads and heavy skirmishing with
infantry and artillery ensued, our troops pressing forward steadily.
A strong attack on General McLaws was repulsed with spirit by Semmes’
brigade, and General Wright by direction of General Anderson, converg-
ing to the left of the Plank road, marched by way of the unfinished rail-
road from Fredericksburg to Gordonsville and turned the enemy’s
right. His whole line thereupon retreated rapidly, vigorously pursued
by our troops until they arrived in about 2 mile of Chancellorsville. Here
the enemy assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on
all sides by a dense forest filled with tangled undergrowth, in the midst
of which breastworks of logs had been constructed with trees felled in
front so as to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept
INTRODUCTION XXxi

the few narrow roads by which his position could be approached from
the front, and commanded the adjacent woods. The left of his line
extended from Chancellorsville toward the Rappahannock, covering
the Bark Mill Ford where he communicated with the north bank of
the river by a pontoon bridge. His right stretched westward along the
Germanna Ford road more than two miles. Darkness was approaching
before the strength and extent of his line could be ascertained, and, as
the nature of the country rendered it hazardous to attack by night, our
troops werd halted and formed in line of battle in front of Chancellors-
ville, at right angles to the plank road, extending on the right to the
Mine road and to the left in the direction of the Catherine Furnace.
Colonel Wickham, with the Fourth Virginia cavalry and Colonel Owen’s
regiment, was stationed between the Mine road and the Rappahannock.

“The rest of the cavalry was upon our left fank. It was evident that
a direct attack upon the enemy would be attended with great difficulty
and loss, in view of the strength of his position and his superiority in
numbers. It was therefore resolved to endeavor to turn his right flank
and gain his Tear, leaving a force in front to hold him in check and con-
ceal the movement. The execution of this plan was entrusted to Lieu-
tenant-General Jackson with his three divisions. The commands of
Generals McLaws and Anderson, with the exception of Wilcox’s brigade
which, during the night, had been ordered back to Bank’s Ford, remained
in front of the enemy. Early on the morning of the 2nd, General Jackson
marched by the Furnace and Brock roads, his movement being effectually
covered by Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry, under General Stuart in person. . . .
After a long and fatiguing march, General Jackson’s leading division,
under General Rodes, reached the old turnpike, about three miles
in rear of Chancellorsville, at 4 p.m. As the different divisions arrived
they were formed at right angles to the road — Rodes in front, Trimble’s
division under Brigadier-General Colston in the second, and A. P. Hill’s
in the third line.

“At 6 p.m. the advance was ordered. The enemy was taken by sur-
prise and fled after a brief resistance. General Rodes’ men pushed
forward with great vigor and enthusiasm, followed closely by the second
and third lines. Position after position was carried, the guns captured
and every effort of the enemy to rally defeated by the impetuous rush
of our troops. In the ardor of pursuit through the thick and tangled
woods, the first and second lines at last became mingled and moved on
together as one. The enemy made a stand at a line of breastworks across
xxxil INTRODUCTION

the road at the house of Melzie Chancellor, but the troops of Rodes and
Colston dashed over the entrenchments together, and the flight and pur-
suit were resumed and continued until our advance was arrested by the
abatis in front of the line of works near the central position at Chancellors-
ville. It was now dark and General Jackson ordered the third line,
under General Hill, to advance to the front and relieve the troops of
Rodes and Colston, who were completely blended and in such disorder,
from the rapid advance through the intricate woods and over broken
ground, that it was necessary to reform them. As Hill’s men moved
forward, General Jackson, with his staff and escort, returning from the
extreme front, met his skirmishers advancing and, in the obscurity of the
night, were mistaken for the enemy and fired upon. Captain Boswell,
chief engineer of the corps, and several others, were killed and a number
wounded. General Jackson himself received a severe injury and was
borne from the field. The command devolved on Major-general Hill,
whose division, under General Heth, was advanced to the line of intrench-
ments which had been reached by Rodes and Colston. A furious fire
of artillery was opened upon them by the enemy, under cover of which.
his infantry advanced to the attack. They were handsomely repulsed
by the Fifty-fifth Virginia regiment under Colonel Mallory, who was
killed while bravely leading his men. General Hill was soon after dis-
abled and Major-general Stuart, who had been directed by General
Jackson to seize the road to Ely’s Ford in the rear of the enemy, was sent
to take command... .

“Upon General Stuart’s arrival soon afterwards (midnight), the
command was turned over to him by General Hill. He immediately
proceeded to reconnoitre the ground and make himself acquainted with
the disposition of the troops. The darkness of the night and the diffi-
culty of moving through the woods and undergrowth rendered it advisable
to defer further operations until morning, and the troops rested on their
arms in line of battle. . . . As soon as the sound of cannon gave notice
of Jackson’s attack on the enemy’s right, our troops in front of Chancellors-
ville were ordered to press him strongly on the left to prevent reinforce-
ments being sent to the point assailed. . . .

“arly on the morning of the 3rd, General Stuart renewed the attack
upon the enemy, who had strengthened his right during the night with
additional breastworks, while a large number of guns, protected by
entrenchments, were posted so as to sweep the woods through which
our troops had to advance. ... As the troops advancing upon the
INTRODUCTION xxxili

enemy’s left and right converged upon his central position, Andezson
effected a junction with Jackson’s corps and the whole line pressed irre-
sistibly pn. The enemy was driven from all his fortified positions with
heavy losses in killed, wounded and prisoners, and retreated towards
the Rappahannock. By ten in the morning we were in full possession of
the field.”

GENERAL CARL SCHURZ TO GENERAL O. 0. HOWARD
May 2lst, 1863.

The arrangement spoken of between yourself and the Secretary of
War with regard to my transfer to another army is not acceptable under
present circumstances. . . . My reasons are these: I have been most
outrageously slandered by the press. Ridiculous as it may seem, my
division has been made responsible for the defeat of the corps; my officers
and men have been called cowards. If we go now will it not have the
appearance that we were shaken off by the army of the Potomac? Would
it not to a certainty confirm the slanders circulated about me? Would it
not seem as if I voluntarily accepted the responsibility of the disaster
of the 2nd of May?
J
BRANDY

Arter the battle of Chancellorsville and the death of
Jackson, General Lee reorganized the Army of Northern
Virginia, that had been divided into two corps under
Longstreet and Jackson; three corps were formed; Long-
street, Ewell, and A. P. Hill were assigned to the com-
mand of them.

On June 23 the first step in the campaign that cul-
minated at Gettysburg was taken, although General Lee.
at that time had no intention of going there. \McLaws’
division broke up its camp near Fredericksburg and led
the advance; the two other divisions of Longstreet’s corps,
Hood’s and Pickett’s, that had been at Suffolk, went
direct from Richmond to the Rapidan and united in Cul-
peper. Ewell’s corps from its camp at Hamilton’s
Crossing followed McLaws the next day by way of
Spotisylvania Court-house and Verdiersville in Orange,
and crossed the Rapidan at Somerville Ford some
fifteen or twenty miles above its junction with the
Rappahannock. General Lee’s object in sending his
troops by this route was to conceal the movement from
the observation of the enemy on the Rappahannock.

A. P. Hill’s corps was left in observation at Fredericks-
burg as a mask to screen the operation and create the

1
2 STUART’S CAVALRY

impression on Hooker that Lee’s whole army was still in
front of him. It seems that Hooker’s man in the balloon
had detected the disappearance of some Confederate
camps, which caused uneasiness. In his testimony before
the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker said
that on June 6 he directed two bridges to be thrown across
the Rappahannock, and ordered Sedgwick to make a
reconnaissance for the purpose of developing the enemy’s
forces; but the “enemy was found in full force and appar-
ently no movement was under way at that time.” On
the 5th Hooker had telegraphed to the President:
“Yesterday morning appearances indicated that during
the night the enemy had broken up a few of his camps
and abandoned them. These changes were observed on
the right of the line in the vicinity of Hamilton’s crossing.
So far as I am enabled to judge with all my means of
information, it was impossible for me to determine satis-
factorily whether this movement had been only a change
of camp, or the enemy had moved in the direction of Rich-

1Scott’s Military Dictionary says: “To gain information it is there-
fore necessary to push a reconnaissance through the curtain of light
troops by which an enemy has enveloped himself and drive back and cut
off outposts so as to enable the officer charged with the reconnaissance
clearly to see the army of the enemy, and note the advantages and dis-
advantages of his position, count his battalions, and judge of his means
of resistance. .. . By this means the general is assured of the true state
of the enemy before giving his last orders. ..- The commander of a
reconnaissance ordinarily receives written instructions. He should well
understand the object before him and demand such explanations as he
mnay require. ... The line of the enemy is soon pierced and his corps
will soon be deployed to repulse the attack. When once this object has

been gained, a retreat must be sounded, even in the midst of a combat.
+ « - The object of a reconnaissance is to gain information.”
BRANDY 3

mond, or up the river; but taken in connection with the
fact that some deserters came in from the divisions of
Hood and Pickett, 1 concluded that those divisions had
been brought up to the front from their late positions at
Gordonsville and Taylorsville [Hanover Junction], and
that this could be for no other purpose but to enable the
enemy to move up the river with a view to the execution
of a movement similar to that of Lee’s last year.”

As Hood and Pickett were nowhere near the Rappa-
hannock that day, no doubt these pretended deserters
were sent over to mislead Hooker and make him believe
that their divisions had joined General Lee on the river.
He further said: “Under instructions from the Major-
General, commanding the army, dated January 31, I am
instructed to keep in view always the importance of cover-
ing Washington and Harper’s Ferry, either directly, or so
operating as to be able to punish any force sent against
them. In the event the enemy should move as I antici-
pate he will, the head of his column will probably be headed
towards the Potomac, via Gordonsville or Culpeper, while
the rear will rest on Fredericksburg.

“After giving this subject my best reflection, I am of
the opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear,
although, by so doing, the head of his column may reach
Warrenton before I return.”

On the 5th of June Hooker telegraphed the President
about a reconnaissance he had just made. “. . . As soon
as we got to work they began to assemble in great num-
‘bers from all quarters, and the more remote are still
arriving. I took about 50 prisoners and they report that
4 STUART’S CAVALRY

the changes remarked in their camp proceed from the re-
organization of their army and the assignment of them to
new camps. All of Longstreet’s command are now with
Lee, but no part of the Charleston forces. They have
no infantry force higher up the Rappahannock than its
junction with the Rapidan. Their cavalry is assembled
around Culpeper [Court-house], but the threat to make a
crossing [here] may bring them back.” General Lee did
not leave Fredericksburg until the 6th.

What the prisoners reported to Hooker about the forces
on the river confronting him was just the opposite of the
truth, and was intended to deceive him, as it evidently
did; Hooker, by reporting this information to Mr. Lincoln,
showed that he believed it. General Lee was still there
with only Hill’s corps; Hooker thought his whole army
was before him.

General Lee left the next day for Culpeper. But
President Lincoln did not approve of Hooker's plan to
cross the river and pitch into Lee’s rear. He replied —
“In one word, I would not take any risk of being tangled
up on the river like an ox jumped half over a fence, and
liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair
chance to gore one way, or kick the other.”

On June 5, Halleck from Washington sent a telegram
to Hooker, saying: “Prisoners and deserters brought
in here state that Stuart is preparing a column of from
15,000 to 20,000 men, cavalry and artillery, for a raid.
They say it will be ready in two or three days.” Later
on the same day, Hooker telegraphed to Halleck that
Buford, whose division of cavalry was at Warrenton
BRANDY 5

Junction, had just informed him that a refugee reported
Stuart to be in Culpeper with 20,000 cavalry, and that it
was understood that he intended to make a raid. The
truth is, Stuart’s cavalry had been sent to Culpeper, not
to make a raid, but to prevent a repetition of the Stoneman
raid of a few weeks before. There was also another
reason. Culpeper was good grazing ground for the cavalry
and forage was scarce at that season. Jones’ cavalry
brigade had just been brought from the Shenandoah
Valley and Robertson’s from North Carolina. Stoneman
had been relieved after Chancellorsville, and Pleasanton
had succeeded him as Chief of Cavalry. Pleasanton was,
in my opinion, the ablest Chief of Cavalry the Army of the
Potomac ever had.

In a letter to Stuart on May 9, General Lee said:
“Hampton has probably joined you. Get your cavalry
together and give them breathing time, so that, when you
strike, Stoneman may feel you.” Pleasanton with the
cavalry corps was now in Fauquier on the Orange and
Alexandria railroad, which was his line of supply; his
outposts were on the Rappahannock River. In a letier
dated May 11, instructing Stuart to rendezvous with his
cavalry in Culpeper, General Lee said: “I regret to
inform you that the great and good Jackson is no more.
He died yesterday at 3.15 P.M., of pneumonia, calm, serene,
and happy. May his spe pervade our whole army; our
country will then be secure.”

When Buford’s cavalry division was ordered to the rail-
road he was directed; “On arriving at Bealeton, should
you find yourself with sufficient force, you will drive the
6 STUART’S CAVALRY

enemy out of his camps near Culpeper and across the
Rapidan, destroying the bridge at that point.” [Ttalics
mine.] On May 28, Hooker told Secretary Stanton that
“The enemy has all of his cavalry force [five brigades]
collected at Culpeper [Court-house] and Jefferson [ton].”

[Culpeper in the Northern dispatches means the town;
in the Southern it means the county.]

“This would indicate a movement in the direction of the
Orange and Alexandria railroad. If Stoneman had not
almost destroyed one-half of my serviceable cavalry force,
I would pitch into him in his camps, and would now if
General Stahel’s cavalry were with me for a few days.”

To this Stanton replied: “There is no other cavalry
force about Washington but that of General Stahel, which
is now engaged in scouting duty towards Bull Run and
Occoquan River. If it be removed, there will be no force
in front to give notice of enemy’s raids on Alexandria and
Washington.” In his testimony before the Committee
on the Conduct of the War, Hooker said: “I may here.
state that while at Fairfax Court-house [moving to the
Potomac] my cavalry was reinforced by that of Major-
General Stahel. The latter numbered 6100 sabres and
had been engaged in picketing a line from Occoquan
River to Goose creek. The line was concentric and a
portion of it within the line held by my army. The force
opposed to them was Mosby’s Guerrillas, numbering about
200 [50] and, if the reports of the newspapers are to be
believed, this whole party was killed two or three times over
during the winter. From the time I took command of
the Army of the Potomac there was no evidence that any
BRANDY 7

force of the enemy, other than the above named, was
within a hundred miles of Washington City, and yet the
planks on the Chain bridge were taken up at night during
the greater part of the winter and spring. It was this
cavalry force, it will be remembered, I had occasion to
ask for [Brandy Station], that my cavalry might be strength-
ened when it was numerically too weak to cope with the
superior numbers of the enemy.”

Hooker’s headquarters were at Fairfax in June when
his army was moving North; Stahel’s division of cavalry
was then assigned to his command. The following dis-
patches are evidence of the trouble he had in keeping
open his line of communication:

Hawieck To HEINTZELMAN

Wasuineton, May 29th, 1863.

It is reported that the enemy’s cavalry is collecting in force on the
upper Rappahannock. I think General Stahel should be cautioned to
be exceedingly vigilant against raids to cut the Orage and Alexandria
Railroad into Alexandria. If made, they will be quick and rapid.
The utmost vigilance must be kept up at all the posts. Staff and
other officers must be detailed to see that the troops are continually
on the alert.

Burorp To PLEASANTON:
Warrenton Juncrion, May 3lst, 1863.

. .. On assuming command yesterday I saw a note from Colonel
Mann stating that a railroad bridge had been burned about four miles
from here. I moved the whole command up the railroad to near the
place. No bridge was burned, but a train of cars with supplies was de-
stroyed by some 100 [40] of Mosby’s cavalry. The party was pursued
and routed by some of General Stahel’s troops, who captured and killed
some 16 men [1 killed; 2 captured] and took a piece of artillery. Iam
removing the wreck of the train from the tracks and suppose a con-
8 STUART’S CAVALRY

struction train will be sent to repair the road. The wires were cut yester-
day at 7.30 a.m. and no communication was had until 8 a.m. to-day.
The train was destroyed four or five miles beyond my department and
in General Stahel’s. The guard on the train [Vermont men] ran to the
woods and returned to see the train burn. . . .

Colonel Mann of the 7th Michigan Cavalry, reported:
. “Mosby, with 200 [40] men and one howitzer attacked our
train near Catlett’s; guard fled; Mosby burned train.
Heard firing in camp and went in search with First Ver-
mont, Fifth New York, and a detachment of the Seventh
Michigan. Came up with Mosby in strong position two
miles southwest of Greenwich and charged him. He
gave us grape; boys never faltered; took his gun [after my
last round of ammunition had been fired]; Captain Hos-
kins mortally wounded, and Lieutenant [Sam] Chapman,
severely, and several privates.” .

Stahel reported four killed and fifteen wounded, also
eleven horses killed. No one on our side was killed except
Captain Hoskins, an English officer; he had the Crimean
medal. That no independent raid by the cavalry corps
was contemplated, as Hooker and Halleck imagined, is
shown by a letter from General Lee to Stuart, of June 2,
in which he discourages such an enterprise. He says:
“I have read with much attention General Hampton’s
letter of Ist instant, giving results of his reconnaissance of
the enemy’s line on the Rappahannock. I should like
very much to capture the division of the enemy he speaks
of and am much pleased at the gallantry of the proposition.
It is what I would expect of an officer of his boldness and
daring. But at this distance I do not feel so confident as
BRANDY 9

he does that it can be so easily done, and I fear the loss
that would fall on our brave men.”

To forestall Stuart in making his expected raid, Hooker
determined to take the initiative and attack his camps,
which he thought were at Culpeper Court-house, disperse
the cavalry force collected there and drive them over the
Rapidan. He thought all of Lee’s army except the
cavalry was still on the lower Rappahannock. On June 5
Buford telegraphed to Hooker from Warrenton Junction
that — “I have just received information which I con-
sider reliable, that all the available cavalry force of the
enemy is in Culpeper County. Stuart, the two Lees,
Roberston, Jenkins, and Jones are all there. [All except
Jenkins, who was in the Shenandoah Valley.] Robertson
came from North Carolina, Jenkins from Kanawha, and
Jones from the Valley. Jones arrived at Culpeper after
the others on the third. Since the Chancellorsville fight
the cavalry has been much increased from the infantry;
800 Texans from Hood’s command have been recently
mounted on horses from Richmond. [Not true: Hood’s
division with his infantry brigade of Texans was then
camped on the Rapidan.] My informant, a refugee from
Madison County, says Stuart has 20,000; can’t tell his
intentions but thinks he is going to make a raid.”

A dispatch from Hooker to Halleck shows his object
in crossing the Rappahannock to attack Stuart:

June 6th, 1863, 3 p.m.
Masor General Hatneck: —

As the accumulation of the heavy rebel force of cavalry about
Culpeper may mean mischief, I am determined, if practicable, to break
10 STUART’S CAVALRY

it up in its incipiency. I shall send all my cavalry against them, stiffened
by about 3000 infantry. It will require until the morning of the 9th for
my forces to gain their positions, and at daylight on that day it is my
intention to attack them in their camps. As many of my cavalry are
unserviceable from the effects of Stoneman’s raid, I am too weak to cope
with the numbers of the enemy if as large as represented. It would add
much to my efficiency if some of Stahel’s forces could advance and hold
the fords at Beverly and Sulphur Springs sometime during the forenoon
of the 9th. If this should be done, I desire that the officer in command
should not be informed of the object of bis march, but merely to hold
these fords. It is next to impossible to confine information to its proper
limits. I have 2500 sabres on a reconnaissance to-day in the vicinity
of Jefferson [ton]. Jones’ brigade, which has been hovering about
Milroy all winter, numbering 1600, is among them; also an additional
brigade from North Carolina.
JoserH Hooxer, Major-General.

Hooker to HALLECK
June 6th, 1863, 8 p.m.

I request that I may be informed whether or not I am to receive
assistance in my attack on the rebel forces at Culpeper from any portion
of Major-General Heintzelman’s forces [Stahel’s cavalry] and if so,
what ?

The aid was not furnished. The capture of the train
on the railroad near Catlett’s a few days before had created
great uneasiness at Washington. It required all of Stahel’s
cavalry to guard the road. In his dispatch to Halleck
informing him of his intention to attack the cavalry in
Culpeper, nothing is said about making a reconnaissance
and getting information. As Pleasanton was defeated,
he tried afterward to make it appear that the affair was
only a reconnaissance; and that he got the information
he wanted and voluntarily withdrew from the combat.
It is strange that Southern writers should have been mis-
BRANDY 11

led into putting the same construction upon Pleasanton’s
expedition. The object of a reconnaissance is not to
fight, but to get information; whatever fighting is neces-
sary is only an incident. An officer conducting a recon-
naissance avoids fighting as much as possible. A sufficient
force is applied to compel an enemy to develop his strength
and position, but no more. When this has been accom-
plished the reconnoitering force retires even in the midst
of a combat; which gives a reconnaissance in force even
when successful the appearance of a defeat.!

Hooker thought he knew the location of every corps in
Lee’s army. He was not seeking information, he relied
on spies for that; his instructions to Pleasanton did not
order him to make reconnaissance, or ask for informa-
tion. His telegram to Lincoln about his intended attack
on Stuart’s camps, and his orders to Pleasanton, do not
mention any object except to break up what he thought
was a contemplated raid, by dispersing the cavalry as-
sembled in Culpeper. He told Pleasanton expressly that
there was no infantry there; he knew that the cavalry was

1Voyle’s Military dictionary says: — “Reconnaissances are made for
the purpose of procuring information of the position and strength of
the enemy. The commander of a reconnaissance ordinarily receives
written instructions. [Pleasanton had written instructions to attack
and drive Stuart back over the Rapidan.] He should well understand
the object before him and demand such explanations as he may
require. When the reconnaissance is finished, the commanding officer
makes a written report to the general when his verbal account is not
sufficient. . . . This kind of a reconnaissance is conducted by a
general officer, who, at the head of a considerable force, marches
towards the enemy, driving in his outposts, and forces him to discover
his position.”
12 STUART’S CAVALRY

there. Of course, he would not have sent Pleasanton to
find out what he already knew. Pleasanton did, or rather
tried to do, what he was ordered to do — he crossed the
Rappahannock at Beverly Ford — drove in the pickets —
moved forward until he ran unexpectedly into a strong
force of cavalry and several batteries — halted — and
then re-crossed the river on the same day. McDowell
might as well have called his Bull Run campaign a recon-
naissance. The Court-house, ten miles away, where he
supposed Stuart’s cavalry were camped, was his objective
point; he had anticipated no serious resistance before he
got there; and had arranged to unite at Brandy with
Gregg’s division that had crossed six miles below at Kelly’s.
The plan was for the united columns then to move on
to the Court-house, attack the cavalry in their camps,
and pursue them to the Rapidan. Gregg had detached
Duffie’s division after crossing the river to go to Stevens-
burg on his left and join him at Culpeper. Although
Pleasanton crossed the river at daylight with Buford’s
division he never got within sight even of Brandy; Duffie
only got as far as Stevensburg, where he met two cavalry
regiments under Colonel Butler and Colonel Wickham.
Gregg retreated when he got in seven miles of Culpeper
Court-house. After a skirmish in which Colonel Butler
(afterward a Senator from South Carolina) lost a leg,
and Colonel Frank Hampton was killed, Duffie went
home satisfied to be let alone. To cover up Pleasanton’s
defeat it was given out that he was only making a recon-
naissance; that his expedition was a success, and that he
voluntarily returned after accomplishing his purpose.—
BRANDY 13

Southern writers adopted this account as true. His
instructions and report to Hooker had not then been
published. They now appear in the War Records and
contradict any such theory. He went after a fight. Its
principal effect was to mislead the authorities at Washing-
ton, and was really the cause of Milroy’s rout and disaster
at Winchester. It was assumed at Washington that, if
Longstreet and Ewell had been in Culpeper, Pleasanton
would have found it out. He made no reference to it
in his report to Hooker on the night he returned. He
spoke of cars coming to Brandy with infantry to account
for his retreat, but gave no estimate of the number, or
where they came from. The story about a train load of
infantry was a fiction. On the day after the combat,
June 10, Ewell, who had been several days in Culpeper
with his corps, started to the Valley. General Lee re-
mained there with Longstreet several days longer. The
cavalry was also kept in Culpeper to mask Ewell’s move-
ment and to conceal Longstreet. It had received no
orders to cross the Rappahannock. If they had gone
with Ewell it would have been notice to Milroy that
a forward movement had begun. Jenkins’ cavalry
brigade was watching and waiting for Ewell on the
Shenandoah. Milroy did not suspect any other force
in his front.

No warning had been received from Washington. On
the 13th he was surprised to find Ewell’s corps surround-
ing him. No doubt Hooker was as much surprised as
Milroy when on the 14th he got this dispatch from Mr.
Lincoln: “Do you consider it possible that 15,000 of
14 STUART’S CAVALRY |

!

Ewell’s men can now be at Winchester?” Later in the
day Stanton told him: “No doubt is entertained here
that Milroy is surrounded at Winchester and so closely
invested that no scout or other information has been
had from him later than 11 o’clock Saturday night [13th].”

At 11P.m., on June 9, when Stuart ine Gregg were
charging and counter-charging around Brandy, Hooker
sent the following telegram to General Dix at Fortress
Monroe, telling him the news that a spy had just brought
him: “We have reliable information that Pickett’s
division, which was lately at Taylorsville, near Hanover
Junction, has come up this way and gone towards the
Rapidan. Hood’s preceded it in the same direction. . . .
Our scouts penetrated to Hanover Junction and we be-
lieve the above reliable from previously reported infor-
mation concerning it and the character of the scouts.”
So it was a spy on June 9, and not Pleasanton, who in-
formed Hooker that Pickett and Hood had gone toward
the Rapidan.

This is Hooker’s letter of instructions to Pleasanton;
it was sent by a staff officer, Captain Eric Dahlgren:

Camp NEAR Fatmovurs, Va.
June 7th, ’63.

Commanpine Orricer CavaLry Corps : —

I am directed by the Major-General commanding to inform you as
follows: Brigadier General Ames left here yesterday and Brigadier
General Russell left to-day, and it is expected that their brigades, con-
sisting [each] of 1500 men and a horse battery, will be in position to-
morrow night. The latter marches with rations for three days and will
require to be replenished before they cross the river from Bealeton. As
they march without wagons, it will be advisable to have them sent to
Kelley’s ford in season to be distributed to-morrow night. Two boats
BRANDY 15

have also been forwarded to facilitate the passage of the last named ford.
As it is held by the enemy’s pickets it may be advisable to throw over a
small party above and below the ford to knock them away without
resorting to artillery, as the first gun would be heard by the enemy at
Culpeper [Court-house] and vicinity. From the most reliable informa-
tion at these headquarters, it is recommended that you cross the Rappa-
hannock at Beverly's and Kelley’s fords and march directly to Culpeper
[Court-house]. For this you will divide your cavalry to carry into exe-
cution the object in view, which is to disperse and destroy the rebel force
assembled in the vicinity of Culpeper and destroy tts trains and supplies
of all descriptions to the best of your ability.

Shortly after crossing the two fords the routes you will be likely to
take intersect, and the Major General commanding suggests that you
keep your infantry force together, as in that condition it will afford you
a moving point d Apput to rally on at all times, which no cavalry force
can be able to shake. Ii is believed the enemy has no infantry. Should
you find this to be the case, by keeping your troops well in hand, you will
be able to make head in any direction. The General recommends also
that you make use of the forest and the cavalry to mask the movements
of the infantry from the enemy’s forces, and keep the enemy in ignorance
of their presence as long as possible, in order that, at the proper time,
you may be able to cut off and destroy great numbers of them. The
General also suggests that you throw out strong pickets at Ely and Ger-
manna fords, and that you hold Stevensburg with not less than a regi-
ment and section of artillery, with special instructions to look after
Raccoon ford [on the Rapidan]. All the fords on the Rappahannock
below Kelley’s ford and including it are held by our forces. If you
should succeed in routing the enemy, the General desires that you follow
him vigorously as far as tt may be to our advantage to do so.

The officer in command [Barnes] holding Kelley’s ford will be in-
structed to lend you such aid as may be in his power, and it is hoped
will be able to throw out on the Culpeper road a sufficient force, in con-
junction with your cavalry at Stevensburg, to secure your flank from
any force in that direction. Captain Dahlgren, aide-de-camp, will
deliver this to you, and it is desired that he will remain with you
until you cross the river and that you communicate with headquarters
as often as is practicable. He will hand you some maps of the
direction in which you are operating. Have received no word from
Washington as to the force [Stahel’s] to be sent to your assistance
16 STUART'S CAVALRY

from General Heintzelman’s command; you will not be able to count
on any assistance from there.
Very Respectfully, /
DantEL BorreryTeL.
Major-General Chief of Staff.

These instructions contain no hint or suggestion of
making a reconnaissance. If Hooker had wanted Pleas-
anton to find out if Lee had taken one or two army corps
to Culpeper, he would have told him so. On the con-
trary, Pleasanton was told that there was no infantry there.
He speaks of the road to Culpeper on which Pleasanton
would go after crossing the Rappahannock. As he would
be in Culpeper County as soon as he got over the river,
this clearly refers to the road to the Court-house.

Pleasanton’s instructions show that Hooker did not
suspect that Ewell and Longstreet were in Culpeper
County, or that Stuart’s camps and headquarters were
so near the river. At 2 p.m. on the 7th, Pleasanton sent
a dispatch to Hooker, saying: “The enemy have an
idea that our army is to advance by the railroad, and the
Rapidan is to be their line of defense. This comes from
the country people. Culpeper County is the best grazing
in Virginia and they use it for their animals. Its loss will
be a great one to the rebels.”

This letter is the key to the operations on the 9th; the
intention was to drive the Confederate cavalry from their
grazing ground in Culpeper and break up a raid. Barnes’
division of the Fifth Corps was at Kelly’s. Two infantry
brigades were to accompany Pleasanton. They were told
that they would be absent from camp four or five days —
“rations in haversacks, empty knapsacks, one blanket
BRANDY 17

and 150 rounds of ammunition to be carried on pack
mules and on the person. The pack mules, to transport
the ammunition and the shelter tents of the officers, should
come from reserve mules supplied by the Chief-Quarter-
Master for contingent uses, to avoid, if possible, taking
any from the wagon-trains. Pack-masters, ambulance
attendants, etc., should accompany the detachment so
that its effective fighting force may not be less than that
indicated above.” Such preparations do not look like
it was expected that these troops would cross the Rappa-
hannock in the morning and return in the evening —
march up a hill and then march down again. As before
stated, Pleasanton, in person, at daylight on the morning
of the 9th, with Buford’s cavalry division, supported by
Ames’ infantry brigade, crossed the Rappahannock at
Beverly Ford, while Gregg, with his own and Duffie’s
cavalry divisions, and Russell’s infantry brigade, crossed
six miles below at Kelly’s. They had marched during
the night from their camps at Bealeton and Warrenton
Junction. General Lee and Stuart knew that Hooker’s
cavalry had moved their camps to Fauquier two weeks
before and that their outposts were on the Rappahannock.
There was a heavy fog on the river that morning that
favored the operation. All the fords were picketed on
the Southern bank; Captain Gibson’s company of the
Sixth Virginia Cavalry was at Beverly’s Ford and gal-
lantly contested the crossing. The column was led by
the Eighth New York Cavalry; it was commanded by
Colonel “Grimes” Davis, a Mississippian, and a West
Point graduate. He fell soon after he reached the oppo-
18 STUART’S CAVALRY

site bank of the river. Jones’ cavalry brigade, with Beck-
ham’s four batteries of horse artillery, was camped a mile
and a half from the ford. For some reason, the artillery
camp was between the cavalry and the river. Stuart’s
headquarters were four miles away — near Brandy.

Jones was a graduate of West Point and was regarded
as the best outpost officer in the army.’ He had resigned
from the United States army and was captain of the com-
pany in which I was a private the first year of the war.
The camps were aroused by the firing at the ford; there
was saddling and mounting in hot haste. It is said that
many of Jones’ men rode bareback in the charge, and
that Jones led them without coat or boots on. Jones’
and Beckham’s accounts give a vivid description of the
engagement. While Jones with two regiments was hold-
ing the enemy in check, Beckham was hitching the horses
to his guns, and removing them back a few hundred yards
to a hill near St. James’ Church. One of the guns was
drawn by hand into the road; it opened fire and stopped
the advance of the enemy’s column. This was a great
surprise to Pleasanton; he had expected to find only a
few pickets on the river, and to go on and meet Gregg at
Brandy; and to be at the Court-house before noon. In
what appeared to be a desperate situation both Jones and
Beckham displayed the self-command and courage of
Cesar, when his camp was surprised by the Nervii. Jones
says:

“At daylight the report of small arms in the direction of
Beverly Ford indicated a serious attack. Knowing the

1 Jones was killed in 1864.
BRANDY 19

park of division artillery was without other protection
than the pickets in front, its safety was doubtful. The
Sixth Virginia Cavalry was on picket at the time and the
Seventh Virginia was grand guard. Going to the scene
of action at top speed, the Sixth and Seventh regiments
were found rapidly approaching the position of the enemy,
only a few hundred yards beyond the artillery.

“The batteries being neither ready for action nor move-
ment, it was a matter of the utmost importance to gain
time. Major Flournoy, in command of the Sixth, was
ordered down the Beverly road and to its right, and Colonel
Marshall on his left. Both were directed to attack with
vigor whatever force they encountered. At the same time
directions were sent to the artillery to withdraw as quickly
as practical from the edge of the woods. The cavalry did
its work well, but with considerable sacrifice. The artillery
took position near the brick church. Captain W. K.
Martin, Assistant-Adjutant-General, having ordered up
the Eleventh and Twelfth regiments, and the Thirty-
Third Virginia cavalry, they were posted in support of
the artillery. When the Sixth and Seventh regiments
could no longer withstand greatly superior numbers of
footmen in the woods, they retired right and left of the
position held by the remainder of the brigade. By this
time the enemy had penetrated through the woods, show-
ing himself in some force in the open ground. A little
shelling having caused a withdrawal, an attack was deemed
expedient. Colonel Harman leading with his regiment
[Twelfth Virginia], moved along the road, supported on
the left by the Thirty-Fifth Battalion [Colonel E. V.
20 STUART’S CAVALRY

White] and the Eleventh Regiment [Colonel Lomax]. As
the head of Colonel Harman’s regiment reached the
woods, it received a severe fire and was immediately
charged by cavalry. The prompt arrival of supports
soon turned the tide of battle in our favor. The enemy
lost here very considerably in killed and wounded, and
heavily in prisoners.

“ About this time General Hampton [arrived] and took
position on my right [from his camp near Brandy], and
General W. H. F. Lee [who had camped near Wellford’s
Ford on Hazel River] notified me he was on my left. He
was requested to keep up connection with me, which for
some time was done, our line making a right angle at the
Junction. The enemy now made his appearance in our
rear at, Brandy Station and Miller’s house. This was the
force [Gregg’s] which early in the day was reported by
Captain Grimsley through me to General Stuart as advan-
cing from Kellysville.t . .. My brigade bore the brunt

1Cunprpmr, Va.
February 16, 1907.
Colonel Joun S. Mossy,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Srr:—On the 9th of June, 1863, when the Battle at Brandy
Station was fought, I was Captain of Company B, Sixth Virginia
Cavalry, Jones’ Brigade.

This command had recently come from the Shenandoah Valley to
Culpeper, reaching the latter place on or about the 7th of June. After
the Cavalry Review on the 8th, Jones’ Command, with Beckham’s
Battalion of Artillery, went into camp near St. James’ Church, picket-
ing the Rappahannock River for a few miles in its front. On the night
of the eighth, Company ‘A’ (Captain Gibson), of the Sixth Regiment,
was on picket at Beverly’s Ford, Company ‘B’ at the Rappahannock
BRANDY 21

Bridge (not then destroyed), and the ford immediately below. Some
time during the night, the picket at the bridge notified me that he could
hear the movement of troops on the north side of the river. I went
down to the bridge and lying down on the track with my ear to the rail
could hear distinctly horses passing over the railroad on the north side,
and the ‘cluck’ of the artillery wheels as they came in contact with the
rails. I immediately sent a courier to General Jones informing him of
this fact. I do not recall exactly the time of night this occurred, but
I apprehend it was but a short while before daybreak. The enemy
crossed at Beverly’s Ford about day light, and the battle was on. I
threw out a line of videttes communicating with the field of battle and
sent out scouts towards Kelley’s Ford, who shortly reported the enemy
crossing in large force at that point, and I so informed General Jones.

General Robertson, with his North Carolina Brigade was sent in the
early morning towards Kelley’s Ford, by way of Elkwood, and after he
had passed me, I ceased to look to the condition of affairs in that direction.

From Culpeper to Brandy is about six miles, from Brandy to Fleet-
wood Heighis is about one mile, and to Beverly’s Ford and Rappahan-
nock Bridge about four miles. From Brandy to Stevensburg is about
three and a half miles southeast. Rappahannock Bridge is about
two miles below Beverly’s Ford, and about five miles above Kelley’s
Ford. From Jones’ Camp at St. James’ Church to Beverly’s Ford is
about one and a half miles, a large body of woods intervening. The
picket firmg at Beverly’s was distinctly heard in Jones’ Camp, as well as
by me at Rappahannock Bridge. I could also hear the firing at Kelley’s
Ford.

Company ‘A’ (Captain Gibson), resisted the advance of the enemy
from Beverly’s with great persistency and gallantry, and the 6th and 7th
Regiments (the latter, the Grand Guard), of Jones’ Brigade, were soon
mounted and hurled against the advancing columns of the enemy in
the woods, and checked their advance. Beckham’s Artillery Camp
was near that of Jones’, and his guns were brought immediately into
action, one of them being put in position by hand and brought into
action before the horses were harnessed and hitched up. They were
finally put in position on the ridgein front of and tothe right of the church.
Hampton’s Brigade coming up on the right of Jones’ and William F. H.
Lee’s on the left, the battle was joined with great fury, and Buford was
held in the woods as if in a vice, although he made repeated efforts to
advance therefrom, apparently bringing into action his entire force,
22 STUART’S CAVALRY

infantry as well as cavalry. The day thus far was with the Confeder-
ates. Buford had been foiled and defeated, and would have been driven
pell mell across the river but for the appearance of Gregg at Fleetwood
Hills, near Brandy Station, who had eluded Robertson, and passing
by his right flank, reached the latter point.

You will observe from the map accompanying Stuart’s report, that two
roads led from Brandy to Kelley’s Ford, one by way of Elkwood, nearer
the river, and the other, the more direct, from Brandy to Kelley’s Ford.
These roads at the farthest points are distant one from the other
about one and a half or two miles. You will also observe from the same
map, and from Robertson’s reports, that he met the enemy at or near
Brown, laid down on the map, about two miles south of Kelley’s Ford,
and from the same map and reports it will be observed that Gregg,
taking the more direct route, passed to the right of Robertson, and
reached Brandy Station in his rear.

Gregg was, however, soon driven from Fleetwood and Brandy, where
a fierce conflict took place between his command and that of Jones and
Hampton, and swinging around to the east and north joined on to
Buford, near St. James’ Church, where the entire Federal force was
united. After the union of the enemy’s forces, and the re-arrangement
of our lines, an ineffectual effort was made by General Merritt, with his
brigade of regulars, to turn our left on the road from Brandy to Well-
fords, but this movement was met by the 9th and 10th regiments of
William H. F. Lee’s and the 6th regiment of Jones’ brigade, and effect-
ually checked, and Merritt’s command was driven in confusion from
this part of the field. The enemy began then their retrograde move-
ment, and re-crossed the river. Fitz Lee’s brigade encamped the night
before near Oak Shade, some seven miles north of Brandy, and did not
reach the field in time to take part to any extent in the action.

General R. E. Lee reached the battle-field some time during the day,
and in the evening occupied the Barbour House, situated on an eleva-
tion, about one mile west of Brandy, from which point he had a plain
view of the battle-field. His Headquarters at this time were at Eastern
View, three quarters of a mile east of the town of Culpeper. Evwell’s
Corps was in Culpeper County. His advance division (Rhodes’) was
encamped at Chestnut Fork, about two and a half miles north of Cul-
peper, and his other two divisions, nearer the town, on the Sperryville
turnpike.

Two divisions of Longstreet’s corps (Hood’s and McLaw’s), were
BRANDY 23

encamped on the road between Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan River,
about sixteen miles above its confluence with the Rappahannock River,
and the Town of Culpeper, on the west side of Mt. Pony. Mt. Pony is
about two and a half miles from Culpeper, and extends south some two
or three miles towards the Rapidan River. I have been unable to iden-
tify the particular locality of the encampments of these two divisions.
I am satisfied no train came from Culpeper towards Brandy on this
occasion with infantry aboard. Rhodes’ division of Ewell’s corps left
its encampment at Chestnut Fork and, marching across the country, in
the direction of Brandy Station, reached the Botts farm, about two
miles southwest of Brandy, but following the line of depression along
Jonas’ Run were concealed from view at Brandy. On our side this
was a battle of the cavalry alone; on the Federal side both infantry and
cavalry.
Yours very truly,
Dan’ S. GRIMSLEY.

P. S.— Excuse delay in answering your letter, but I have been
so much engaged lately I have not really had time. I hope this covers
all points of your inquiry.

D. S. G.
of the action both in the morning and evening and lost
severely in killed and wounded, but had the satisfaction
of seeing the enemy worsted in every particular more than
ourselves. We ended the fight with more horses and more
and better firearms than we had in the morning. We
took two regimental colors, many guidons, and a battery
of three pieces.”

Major Beckham reports:

“TI have the honor to report that on the morning of
June 9 four companies of the horse artillery were en-
camped on the Beverly Ford road about one and a half
miles from the river. The Fifth Company [Breathed’s]
had been detached and was at this time higher up the
river with General W. H. F. Lee’s command. [Lee’s
24 STUART’S CAVALRY

brigade was near Wellford’s ford on the Hazel River
not far from its junction with the Rappahannock River.]
Just before sunrise I received information to the effect
that our pickets had been driven in and that the enemy
was advancing in large force. I immediately directed
Captain Hart to place one piece by hand in the road,
and ordered others to be hitched up as promptly as
possible and take position on the high ground about 600
or 700 yards south of the camp. ‘The enemy ap-
proached rapidly and boldly, and had it not been for the
delay of a few minutes caused him by the arrival of a
regiment under General Jones, it is more than probable
that we would have been compelled to abandon the pieces.
As it was, several of the horses were wounded before we
could move camp.

“The position first taken was just opposite St. James
Church on the east of the road. This was held with ease
against the enemy’s columns for two hours or more; and
could, I think, have been held all day had not the appear-
ance of the enemy in our rear rendered it necessary to
abandon this point in order to regain Pettis Hill [Fleet-
wood], which the enemy had occupied with his cavalry.
In this first position taken up three of the pieces had be-
come disabled from the shock of the recoil; one had been
detached with Colonel Butler on the Stevensburg road;
two were on the Kellysville road, and two had been placed
by order of the major-general commanding on Pettis
Hill. This left only five pieces, now nearly exhausted, of
ammunition within reach to be brought into action. Three
of these by General Stuart’s order were left with General
BRANDY 25

Jones, and the remaining two [McGregor’s] were moved
to the rear to assist in driving the enemy from the position
north of Brandy. Captain Hart also succeeded in getting
into position one of the guns whose carriage had already
been greatly damaged, and fortunately succeeded in firing
two or three effective shots before the carriage was com-
pletely disabled. The pieces first placed on Pettis Hill
were under command of Lieutenant [Tuck] Carter, of
Chew’s battery, and had been repeatedly charged by the
enemy and re-taken by our cavalry, and at the time that
the two guns were brought towards the crest of the hill,
it was very doubtful which party had possession of it.
The guns, however, moved off rapidly, and scarcely had
they reached the top, and before they could be put into
position, a small party of the enemy charged them. The
charge was met by the cannoneers of the pieces. Lieu-
tenant Ford killed one of the enemy with his pistol; Lieu-
tenant Hoxton killed another, and private Sully [Sudley] of
McGregor’s battery, knocked one off his horse with a
sponge staff. Several of the party were taken prisoners
by the men at the guns. Fire was then opened from these
guns upon the enemy towards Brandy Station, and soon
afterwards I was enabled to get together the guns which
had been sent on the Kellysville road, or left with General
Jones, and to place them in position for clearing the plain
about the hill, firing slowly until the enemy had re-
crossed the river and I received an order to withdraw.
During all the morning the firing had been quite regular,
but not very rapid, and in the first position directed nearly
all the time at the skirmishers of the enemy and the masses
26 STUART’S CAVALRY

concealed in the woods. I was not able to judge positively
of the effect of the firing owing to the covered ground the
enemy occupied, he rarely showing more than his line
of sharpshooters. However, I learn since that a large
number of horses were left dead in the woods, and no
doubt he suffered severely in men also. The firing done
in regaining Pettis Hill was very accurate and powerful in
its results, scattering the columns of the enemy advancing
to the charge. Captain Breathed, whose battery was
with General W. H. F. Lee, in the vicinity of Freeman’s
Ford, reports that about 8 p.m., of the 7th instant, one
section, under Lieutenant Johnston, crossed the Hazel
River and took position guarding the road leading from
Beverly towards Wellford Ford; the other section was near
Starke’s Ford.” There is no explanation of the artillery
being placed between the cavalry camps and the ford.

Beckham was a West Pointer and a fine officer. When
Pelham was killed a few months before and on the same
field as the fight of June 9, he succeeded him in command
of the horse artillery.’

Stuart’s headquarters were at Fleetwood, half a mile
from Brandy Station and between the latter place and the
Rappahannock. He was apprised early in the morning
by the picket firing that the enemy were crossing the river
at two fords. He promptly disposed his forces to meet
them. Hampton’s and W. H. F. Lee’s brigades were
ordered toward Beverly to support Jones; Robertson’s
brigade and a battery were sent on the road to Kelly’s
to hold in check the column advancing from that direction.

1 Beckham was killed in 1864.
BRANDY 27

Robertson had sufficient force to do it. Everything at
headquarters was packed up and sent off with the wagons
of the division to the Court-house. Stuart then went at
full speed to take command of the troops on the field near
St. James’ Church, that were holding back Buford’s
division in the woods. He found Pleasanton already on
the defensive. Pleasanton’s dispatches from the field
betray his surprise at the strong force he had met at the
crossing, and his despair of overcoming it. He was evi-
dently alarmed about the possibility of Stuart’s getting
in his rear and cutting him off by crossing at a ford

above him.
PLEASANTON TO STAHEL, KETTLE RUN

Bevery Forp, June 9th, 1863.

The enemy has his whole cavalry force here, and I have had a severe
fight. He may try to cross above me before Gregg joins from below.

Gregg joined Buford on the Rappahannock on the
retreat that evening. Pleasanton and Gregg were
moving from different bases in two widely separated
columns that were not in communication with each
other. Such a movement is called a double line of
operations. It is always hazardous when the point of
concentration is in the presence of an enemy. It gives
him an opportunity to attack and destroy the separate
forces before the combination can be effected. It
proved to be so in this case. Buford’s and Gregg’s
divisions were marching on roads so far apart that there
could be no co-operation between them. Stuart’s
cavalry had the interior line and had this advantage.
The lines of the two columns converged on Brandy Station.
28 STUART’S CAVALRY

The plan was for them to unite at that point and then
go on to Culpeper Court-house. They would have had to
pass through Stuart’s camps to get there. At that place
they expected to join Duffie’s division, which Gregg had
detached after crossing at Kelly’s to go by Stevensburg.
Stuart with the inspiration of genius did exactly what
Bonaparte did when he discovered the Austrians surround-
ing him at Rivoli.*

1 Napoleon always regarded Rivoli as one of his masterpieces in both
strategy and tactics. In his dying hour at St. Helena he handed his
watch to Count Bertrand, saying, “It struck two in the morning when I
ordered Joubert to attack at Rivoli.” Colonel Sargent in his “Napoleon
Bonaparte’s First Campaigns” in Italy says: “By these dispositions
Alvinzie expected to surround the French and by making simultaneous
atiacks upon their front and both flanks, to overwhelm and crush them.
On January 13, these fractions of Alvinzie’s army were marching to-
wards Rivoli. They camped that night in sight of the battle-field. . . .

“During the night while the Austrians were sleeping, Joubert was
returning to occupy the plateau, Massena and Rey were hurrying for-
ward, and Bonaparte himself, having pushed ahead of Massena’s column,
was riding rapidly toward Rivoli. He arrived there after midnight; he
saw the lights from the Sixth Austrian corps; he saw that Alvinzie had
separated his columns by impassable obstacles; and he saw that if he
could collect his own forces and hold the plateau, he could probably
prevent the Austrian columns from arriving simultaneously upon the
battle-field, and by so doing he could defeat them in detail. In his front
were twenty-eight thousand Austrians; he had only Joubert’s division
of ten thousand; but Massena would soon bring eight thousand more
upon the battle-field, and perhaps Rey might arrive with his four thousand
in time to take a part in the struggle. At once Bonaparte began to
arrange the troops and artillery for battle. Early in the morning Joubert ,
advanced; the Austrians in his front having no artillery, he succeeded
in driving them back, and by directing part of his artillery upon Quas-
danovich’s column, he held it in check. But the Austrians soon rallied;
the fighting became desperate. An Austrian column attacked furiously
the French left and succeeded in turning it. Bonaparte himself re-
BRANDY 29

He struck Buford in the morning.a stunning blow that
S him reeling back toward the river and stopped him;
then turned and concentrated his force against Gregg at
Brandy and drove him back to the Rappahannock.
Pleasanton’s separated columns were thus beaten in detail.
After a skirmish at Stevensburg with the Fourth Virginia
and the First South Carolina Cavalry, Duffie was called
off by Gregg to support him at Brandy. He started but
found Gregg on the road retreating. Pleasanton’s tele-
gram to Hooker from the field shows that he had lost heart,
was beaten early in the morning, and that his enterprise

was a failure.
PLEASANTON TO HOOKER
Brverty Forp, June 9th, 1863.
The enemy is in strong cavalry force here. We had a severe fight.
They were aware of our movement and prepared. [Italics mine.]

arranged his shattered left, then hurried to the town of Rivoli to bring
up Massena’s division which had just arrived there. These troops were
hurried forward and Massena hurled them against the Austrian right,
drove it back and succeeded in re-establishing the French left. But
the French right was hotly engaged. Quasdanovich, after hard fighting,
had overcome the resistance in his front and was urging his column up
the winding road to the battle-field. Already his advance troops were
deploying on the plateau. Lusignon, too, could be seen in the distance
deploying in Bonaparte’s rear. In fact Bonaparte was surrounded;
twenty-eight thousand Austrians were advancing upon him. He had
but eighteen thousand soldiers. For a moment success seemed impos-
sible, defeat inevitable; but his clear eye took in the whole field; he saw
that none of the Austrians columns had yet united; he saw at a glance
where the blow must be struck in order to turn disaster into victory, and
with remarkable coolness he gathered his troops and prepared to throw
them in succession against the several Austrian columns. . . . On all
sides the Austrians were defeated. Alvinzie’s army was almost de
stroyed.”
30 STUART’S CAVALRY

It is clear that Pleasanton was more surprised than the
Confederates were. He had not then gone a mile from
the river; he stayed where he was nearly all day. It was
the commanding ability of Stuart that “from the nettle
danger plucked the flower safety,” and won the battle
of Brandy. There were many able officers under him,
but as a distinguished writer, Colonel Dodge, says of
Napoleon, “Every captain owes much to his lieutenants.
But the creative force which fashions an army, or an
engine, as well as the motive power which drives either,
have their origin in the heart and head of the chief:
both depend on him. The engine has a driver, every
division must have a lieutenant, but the role of each is
subordinate.”

BUTTERFIELD, CHIEF OF STAFF TO PLEASANTON

Bevery Forp,
June 9th, 1863, 12.10 p.m.

Dispatch 7.40 received. If you cannot make head against the
force in front of you, return and take your position on the north bank
of the river and defend it. At this distance it is impossible for the
General [Hooker] to understand your circumstances. Exercise your
best judgment and the General will be satisfied.

Which shows that Hooker, too, was in despair; he sent
this telegram to Halleck:
June 9th, 1863, 12 m.

Brigadier-General Pleasanton reports that after an encounter with
the rebel cavalry over the Beverly Ford, he has not been able to make
head against it. He reports that his movement was anticipated.
[Italics mine.]

At 12 . Pleasanton, still near Beverly Ford, asks Hooker
to reinforce him with infantry. He says, “For fear the
BRANDY 31

enemy should receive reinforcements during the night,
had\you better not order 1000 of the Fifth Corps to Brandy
Station?” If he had then supposed that Longstreet and
Ewell were in Culpeper he would not have asked Hooker
to send 1000 infantry to meet them. He thought that
reinforcements might be brought to Stuart by rail from
a distance. On June 11 he told Hooker, “I am in-
formed the enemy can bring troops by railroad from
Gordonsville to Brandy Station in two hours. They can
also send infantry by rail from Fredericksburg in from
six to eight hours.” At 2.40 p.m., on the 9th, when Gregg
was fighting at Brandy, and when he did not pretend that
he had heard of any Confederate infantry in Culpeper,
Pleasanton tells Stahel, who was at Kettle Run, “I will
re-cross this p.m., I send my trains to Bealeton. Please
give them protection.” Bealeton is five or six miles from
Beverly. Who ever heard of taking a wagon train on a
scout? Earlier in the day he said to Stahel, “Please send
some cars down this side of Bealeton for our wounded.
Have crossed. Enemy in some force of cavalry.”

If he had expected to have a fight so near camp he would
have provided transportation for his wounded before he
started, unless he expected to hold Culpeper County.
But Meade did not, as requested, send the 1000
infantry to Brandy, because Pleasanton returned. He
said to Barnes, “The order to hold 1000 men in readi-
ness to move and supply their places from the reserve
was based on the supposition that General Pleasanton
was at Brandy Station and might require them. His
return has done away with this exigency.” Stuart arrived
32 STUART’S CAVALRY

on the field at St. James’ Church after Buford had been
repulsed, and was about taking the offensive to drive him
over the river when the surprising news came that Gregg
had passed Robertson and was approaching his rear at
Brandy Station without opposition. Leaving W. H. F.
Lee’s brigade, which was on Buford’s flank, to hold him
in check, Stuart, with Jones, Hampton, and the artillery,
went a gallop to Brandy. Munford’s brigade, which was
on the other side of Hazel River, was expected on the
field every minute. His delay in not arriving earlier had
been caused, it is said, by ambiguous orders.

Stuart arrived in time to meet Gregg, drive him off, and
capture his guns; but in the open plain around Brandy
there was probably the fiercest mounted combat of the
war — in fact of any war. Gregg’s battery was captured
and re-captured several times. First by Colonel Elijah
White, who was overpowered and driven away, and finally
Lomax, with the Eleventh Virginia Cavalry, swept the
field, took the guns and held them.’

1 Captain Martin, who commanded the Sixth New York battery, in
his report says: “Immediately on arriving at the position where Lieu-
tenant Clark was engaged with his remaining pieces, I formed the section
on his right and immediately commenced firing at the house which I
before mentioned as having been occupied by General Stuart as his
headquarters, and which was completely surrounded by a dense mass of

‘the enemy’s cavalry. Almost simultaneously the enemy commenced
their attack by repeated charges on the guns, but it was not until they
had been twice repulsed that their efforts were successful, and I am con-
fident that even then they would have been discomfited had their final
charge not been made almost simultaneously front and rear. It took
but one of canister shot from each piece to repulse their charges, and could
I have reversed my pieces in sufficient time on their last effort to have
BRANDY 33

Stuart ought to have been surprised to hear that Gregg
was in his rear, and at first he would not believe it. When
firing was heard at Kelly’s early in the morning, he had
ordered Robertson to go with his brigade and some guns
on that road and hold in check any force of the enemy he
might meet. His plan was first to concentrate against
Buford; drive him over the river, and then turn on Gregg.
In some way Robertson seems to have gotten lost; he
allowed Gregg’s column to pass unmolested in Stuart’s
rear to Brandy. Robertson reports: “Although in sight
of the enemy for several hours and exposed to the fire of
his artillery, my command was not at any time actively
engaged. With the exception of four horses mortally
wounded or totally disabled, I have no casualties to
report.” Robertson and Gregg seem to have taken dif-
ferent roads both in the morning and evening and so they
missed each other. As parallel lines meet in infinity there
might have been a collision between them if the fight had
lasted long enough. Stuart at Beverly’s Ford was now in
the same position that Lee was in at Chancellorsville when

given them a round before they were in the battery, they should never
have taken the guns. Once in the battery it became a hand-to-hand
fight with pistol and sabre between the enemy and my cannoneers and
drivers, and never did men act with more coolness and bravery and show
more of a stern purpose to do their duty unflinchingly and, above all,
save their guns; and while the loss of them is a matter of great regret
to me, it is a consolation, and great satisfaction, to know I can point
with pride to the fact that of that little band who defended the battery,
not one of them flinched for a moment from his duty. Of the 36 men
I took into the engagement but 6 came out safely, and of these 30, 21
were either killed, wounded or missing, and scarcely one of them but will
carry the honorable mark of the sabre or the bullet to his grave.”
34 STUART’S CAVALRY

the surprising news came that Sedgwick was moving up the
plank road in his rear, and that Early had retreated on
the Bowling Green road toward Richmond. Lee sus-
pended the attack he was making on Hooker who was
cooped up on the river, and moved back against Sedgwick.
Stuart left a small force in front of Pleasanton to hold him
in check and then concentrated on Gregg. General Gregg
says in his report: “that after hearing from Pleasanton of
the severity of his engagement with a superior force at
Beverly’s, he determined to recall Duffie from Stevens-
burg and direct him to join him at Brandy.” When the
head of the Third division arrived near Brandy Station,
Gregg says, “It was discovered that the enemy were in
great force.” He was disappointed that Buford’s com-
mand did not join him at Brandy; no doubt that was
his reason for recalling Duffie. Evidently he had not cal-
culated on meeting anything but a picket there. Of the
fight around Brandy, Gregg says: “Thus for an hour and
a half was the contest continued, not in skirmishing, but
in continued charges. ‘The contest was too unequal to be
long continued. The second division [Duffie’s] had not
come up; there was no support, and the enemy’s numbers
were three times my own. I ordered the withdrawal
of my brigades. In good order they left the field, the
enemy not choosing to follow.” Duffie says that while
he was engaged at Stevensburg he received an order from
Gregg to move to his support. He started, but met
Gregg’s division going back and covered its retreat.
After stating that he ordered a retreat because he was
greatly outnumbered by Stuart’s cavalry, General Gregg
BRANDY 35

says, “When engaged with the enemy at Brandy Station,
cars loaded with infantry were brought from Culpeper.”

No other report on either side speaks of cars with
infantry coming to Brandy that day; and none came.
Neither Wyndham or Kilpatrick, who commanded Gregg’s
two brigades and fought around the station, speaks of
seeing any infantry. Wyndham says: “Observing the
enemy breaking away on the left, I ordered a portion of
the First Maryland Cavalry, led by Major Russell, to
charge the Station, which they did in fine style, capturing
a number of the enemy and bringing away an ambulance
and four horses captured by our advance guard. . . . My
command being now much scattered by the charges it had
made, Colonel Duffie not coming to my support as I
expected, and seeing that the enemy was strongly re-
inforced, I was compelled to withdraw.”

If Wyndham and Kilpatrick had seen a train-load of
infantry coming up they would have been glad to have
given it as a reason for their retreating. As General Gregg
had Russell’s brigade of infantry in supporting distance,
why did he not order it to attack this infantry, instead of
leaving the field? If he was making a reconnaissance he
ought to have compelled the force to at least deploy and
display its strength. It might be only an isolated train-
guard. The last charge that drove the enemy from Brandy
Station was made by Colonel Lomax with his regiment,
the Eleventh Virginia Cavalry. His report says: “Ob-
serving a force of the enemy at Brandy Station, I moved
towards that point and found three regiments of cavalry
under Sir Percy Wyndham plundering and destroying the
36 STUART’S CAVALRY

property there. I charged and drove them from the
station, taking a stand of colors, and many privates
(amongst them a colonel), and pursued them some dis-
tance on the Stevensburg road. This ended the fight
at Brandy.” Lomax says nothing about any infantry
being there.

Colonel Newhall, who was an aide to Pleasanton and
on the field that day, in an article in the Philadelphia
Times of November 10, 1877, says: “Culpeper Court-
house is some ten miles south of the river, and there was
no expectation on General Pleasanton’s part of encounter-
ing Stuart’s troopers when crossing the fords of the Rappa-
hannock. General Pleasanton having no reason to
suspect the presence of the enemy in force this side of
Culpeper Court-house, his plan contemplated a movement
of at least two columns on Brandy Station, an intermediate
point on the Orange and Alexandria railroad between
Culpeper and the Rappahannock. The Orange and Alex-
andria railroad crosses the river at Rappahannock Station.
Beverly Ford is, perhaps a mile above, and for the purpose
of his reconnaissance General Pleasanton determined to
pass his troops over both these fords. The consequences
of this plan proved to be to some extent unfortunate, be-
cause when the river was crossed on the morning of the
9th, and the troops became engaged, the operations of the
widely severed connections were independent of each
other and could not at that distance, and in a wooded and
irregular country, be brought promptly into harmony.
. .. Be it as it may, General Pleasanton was destined
to reap some of the occasional disadvantages of a broken
BRANDY 37

military chain. The force dispatched to Kelley’s Ford was
composed of Gregg’s and Duffie’s cavalry and a small
brigade of infantry, perhaps 1500 men, commanded by
the gallant General David Russell, who was subsequently
killed in the battle of the Opequon in the Shenandoah
Valley. The force to cross at Beverly Ford was accom-
panied by General Pleasanton in person, and was com-
posed of Buford’s cavalry and a smali brigade of infantry
commanded by General Adelbert Ames [afterwards dis-
tinguished in leading the assault on Fort Fisher, and
notorious later as the carpet-bag Governor of Mississippi].
To effect the contemplated junction near Brandy Station,
the Beverly Ford column would bear to the left, the Kel-
ley’s Ford column to the right—the Orange and Alexandria
railroad lying between them as they marched. As an
aide-de-camp to General Pleasanton it was my fortune
to be thrown with the Beverly Ford column, and all that
I saw of what occurred after the crossing of the river on
the morning of the 9th was connected with the operations
of the right. . . . There was no word yet of the Kelley’s
Ford column and our progress towards Brandy Station had
been greatly delayed; but nothing could be done to get on
faster until our right was relieved of the pressure of the
enemy towards Beverly Ford. ... Leaving General
Buford to push on as rapidly as possible, General Pleasan-
ton now rode to St. James’ Church where all was quiet
with no enemy in sight. Towards Brandy Station
[which was two or three miles away] a high hill confronted
us, shutting off all view in that direction; but Buford’s
success now made it possible to resume the march, which
38 STUART’S CAVALRY

was about to be done when General Gregg rode into our
lines from the left, reporting the results of the Kelley’s
Ford column as far as he was aware of them... .

Before reaching Brandy Station, General Duffie had
turned to the left, hoping to accomplish something in
the enemy’s rear. . . .

“General Gregg had advanced directly upon Brandy
Station without opposition, and thence to Fleetwood Hill,
where Stuart made hasty preparations to receive him.
Fleetwood is a ridge of ground half a mile from Brandy
Station towards the Rappahannock and west of the rail-
road. St. James’ Church is on the river side of the hill
and General Buford was working his way up to it from
that side also; hence, while the Beverly Ford column was
approaching it from one side, Gregg had been moving on
it from the other, neither column having knowledge of the
other’s movements, whereby Stuart escaped the conse-
quences supposed to arise from being between two fires
. . . Gregg gained this hill and the house that surmounted
it, and a fierce fight was brought on with charges and
counter-charges, at the end of which Gregg found him-
self over-matched and withdrew to the lower ground,
losing, as he fell back, three pieces of artillery after a
desperate effort to save them, as Major McClellan [Stuart’s
staff officer] says. . . . It was after his own repulse that he
was rejoined by Colonel Duffie, and meantime the enemy
were pouring infantry into Brandy Station by railroad
from Culpeper Court-house [a pure invention], introducing
a new and not unexpected element to General Pleasanton’s
consideration. When Gregg reported all this to General
BRANDY 39

Pleasanton at St. James’ Church, all that was necessary
to the purpose of General Hooker had been accomplished ;
the information required had been secured with unmis-
takable accuracy from personal observation and from
the official documents captured on the field as related by
Major McClellan.” Pleasanton had told Stahel some
hours before he met Gregg that he would re-cross that
evening.

Buford and Gregg had both been successively repulsed;
they had found out they could go no further; therefore they
went back — that was all. Major McClellan in his Life
and Campaigns of Stuart says: “There are two points
in connection with this battle which, although proven
incorrect, have been persistently repeated. It is asserted
that General Stuart’s headquarters, his baggage and his
papers, were captured; that Confederate infantry was seen
debarking from the cars in the vicinity of Brandy Station
while the fight with Grege’s division was in progress.
As regards the asserted capture of Stuart’s baggage and
papers, it is to be noticed that no official report on the
Federal side makes any such claim; and it cannot be
supposed that so important a fact would have passed with-
out notice had it occurred. . . . If necessary, the testi-
mony of every surviving officer of Stuart’s staff can be
produced showing that long hours before Gregg’s attack
on the Fleetwood Hill all of the headquarters wagons
had been sent to Culpeper Court-house. The assertion
that Confederate infantry was seen debarking from the
cars in the vicinity of Brandy Station has no better foun-
dation. If any such papers had been captured, Pleasanton
40 STUART’S CAVALRY

would have sent them to Hooker and they would have
been published.” Colonel Newhall speaks of Pleasanton’s
advance to St. James’ Church late in the day as if it were
owing to the Confederates being defeated. This was the
position held by Jones’ brigade and Beckham’s artillery
in the morning. When Pleasanton reached it no enemy
was there; Colonel Newhall omits to give the reason why;
he leaves it to be inferred that Buford had driven the
Confederate cavalry away. It is true that Stuart had
left; he had withdrawn his guns and all his cavalry,
except W. H. F. Lee’s brigade, to meet Gregg at Brandy
Station. He had thought the containing force he had
sent under Robertson toward Kelley’s Ford would hold
Gregg in check — Napoleon thought the same of Grouchy
at Waterloo. W. H. F. Lee’s brigade was pressing on
Buford’s flank and threatening his rear; Munford with
a brigade was just coming up. Pleasanton became
alarmed; he was afraid that Lee and Munford would
get between him and the ford. It was for this reason
that he sent Stahel the dispatch I have quoted about the
enemy crossing the river above and intercepting him.
Stahel construed it as a cry for help, and replied: “Your
telegram, 2.40 p.m., has just been received and I will com-
ply with your request at once. Colonel Mann is already
moving up.” This dispatch shows that Pleasanton was
looking with more anxiety to his rear than to his front.
Colonel Newhall claims that this was a reconnaissance
in force to ascertain if Lee was moving across the Blue
Ridge to the Shenandoah Valley; and that it was then
known that a part of his army was in motion in a “dan-
BRANDY 41

o

gerous direction,” and that Stuart’s cavalry was in Cul-
peper. If that was Pleasanton’s object his expedition
was worse than a failure, it was a great blunder. When
Colonel Newhall was writing he had an ex post facto
knowledge of the position of each corps of Lee’s army
that day; but neither Hooker, Halleck, Milroy, or Pleasan-
ton had even a suspicion on June 9 that Lee was then at
Culpeper with the corps of Longstreet and Ewell; or that
a blow was meditated in the Shenandoah Valley. Pleasan-
ton was not even instructed to inquire about them. All
that Pleasanton claimed in his dispatch that he had done
was that he had so crippled Stuart that he could not go
on his raid. Stuart had no intention of going on a raid.
Pleasanton was simply ordered to attack and break up
Stuart’s camps in Culpeper to prevent a cavalry raid.
If Pleasanton learned anything of importance on. his
so-called reconnaissance, why was it not communicated
to Milroy so that he could pack up and leave?

If what Colonel Newhall says about the information
Pleasanton got is true, then Milroy was the victim of
Stanton and Hooker, and was placed under arrest for
other people’s sins. Milroy’s report says that on June 12
he sent out from Winchester a reconnoitering force on
the Front Royal pike. It met the advance of Evwell’s
corps at Cedarville, and had a skirmish. Milroy was
only looking out for a cavalry raid against which he had
been warned; he had no reason to be looking for any-
thing more. He discredited the report of the command-
ing officer that he had encountered a large force; he thought
it was only some of the forces that had been a long time
42 STUART’S CAVALRY

in the Valley. He says: “The reconnaissance on the
Front Royal road was abortive. The expedition con-
sisted of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry, about 400
strong, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Moss.
It returned to Winchester about three o’clock in the after-
noon on Friday. Its commanding officer reported that
at Cedarville, a place about twelve miles from Winchester,
he encountered a large force of the enemy composed of
cavalry, infantry, and artillery. It did not appear, how-
ever, that he had placed himself in a position to ascer-
tain the number and character of the force which he had
encountered, or exercised the usual necessary efforts to
obtain that essential information. Officers of his com-
mand and reliable scouts who were present gave contra-
dictory reports. This report was discredited by myself
and by General Elliott, my second in command.’

1QOn June 12th, 7 p.m., Pleasanton telegraphed to Hooker from
Warrenton Junction: “A colored boy captured on (Tuesday) 9th states
that Ewell’s corps passed through Culpeper on Monday last on the way
to the Valley and that pagt of Longstreet’s was gone also. A second
negro across the river confirms the statement. I send a reconnaissance to
find out the truth.” The reconnaissance does not seem to have found
out anything. On the same day Hooker told Halleck: “Brigadier-
General Pleasanton, without additional cavalry, I fear will not be able to
prevent the rebel cavalry from turning his right.”

Hooker at that time did not seem to apprehend a movement against
Milroy, although a negro had reported it and Ewell was then in the
Shenandoah Valley. There was, however, still great uneasiness about a
cavalry raid toward Washington. For this reason Reynolds on June 12th,
with three corps, was sent to Bealeton to guard the railroad. His letter
of instructions speaks of “the absence of any specific information as to
the objects, movements and purposes of the enemy,” which shows that
Pleasanton had discovered nothing and that Hooker was still in the
dark.
BRi ANDY 43

PLEASAN}ON TO HOOKER
June 13th, 9 p.m.
“The negroes sa, Ewell. took the road to Sperryville. They were all
travelling the same way. I am pushing reconndissances in that direc-
tion. Ask Ingalls if he got my dispatch about Mosby.”
When Pleasanton was writing this dispatch Ewell was closing around
Winchester.

There was nothing in the report that indicated the pres-
ence of General Lee’s army [in Culpeper]. It was sup-
posed that the force on the Front Royal road could be no
other than the enemy we had faced during the occupancy of
Winchester, or that the anticipated cavalry raid of General
Stuart was in progress; against either or both of which I
could have held my position." I deemed it impossible

1HOOKER TO HALLECK
June 12th, 1.15 p.m.

Learning that the enemy had massed this cavalry near Culpeper for
the purpose of a raid, I dispatched General Pleasanton to attack him
on his own ground. General Pleasanton crossed the Rappahannock
on the 9th at Beverly and Kelley’s Fords, attacked the enemy and drove
him three miles, capturing over 200 prisoners and one battle flag. This
in the face of greatly superior numbers was only accomplished by hard
and desperate fighting by our cavalry, for which they deserve much
credit. Their morale is splendid. They made many hand-to-hand
combats, always driving the enemy before them.

HOOKER TO DIX
June 12, 1863, 1.30 p.m.

All of Lee’s army, so far as I know, is extended along the immediate
banks of the Rappahannock from Hamilton’s crossing to Culpeper.
A. P. Hill’s corps is on his right, below Fredericksburg. Ewell’s corps
joins his left [Ewell was then in the Shenandoah Valley] reaching to the
Rapidan, and beyond that river is Longstreet’s corps with not less than
10,000 cavalry under Stuart. For several days past Lee has been at
Culpeper.
Ad STUART'S “AVALRY |

that Lee’s army with its immense artille;y and baggage
trains could have escaped from tie Army £ the Potomac,
and crossed the Blue Ridge through Ashby’s, Chester’s,
and Thornton’s Gap, in concentric columns. ‘The move-
ment must have occupied four or five days; notice of its
being in progress could have been conveyed to me by
General Hooker’s headquarters in five minutes, for tele-
graphic communication still existed between Baltimore
and Winchester. . . . Telegraphic communication with
my headquarters continued till 12 noon Saturday (13).
The Blue Ridge screened the operations of Lee’s army
from me. I had always relied with implicit confidence
upon receiving timely notice by telegraph of its advance in
my direction.” [Italics mine.]

In his. review of the records of the Court of Inquiry
in Milroy’s case, Judge-Advocate-General Holt says:
“It is singular to observe up to how late a period the
movement of Lee in advancing upon Winchester and
down the Valley remained undiscovered by those in
authority. It appears that soon after June 1 intelli-
gence had been received and it was generally understood
that the rebel general, Stuart, had collected a large force
(about 12,000) of cavalry in Culpeper for the purpose of
making an extensive raid. In a telegram of May 29
General Halleck had warned General Schenck that his
forces must be on the alert in anticipation of an attack;
and that on June 8, he telegraphed to the latter general
the particulars in reference to Stuart’s force, etc. It
was observed by Milroy that after June Ist the enemy in
his front was becoming bolder, and this was attributed
BRANDY 45

to the fact that Stuart was assembling his cavalry in force
and that a raid was impending. In his telegrams to
General Schenck up to the evening of the 13th, especially
those of the 12th and 13th, he reports the troops as hav-
ing severe skirmishes with the enemy, whom he repre-
sents to be in force, but he conveys no intimation, nor had
he been able to obtain any information, that Lee’s army was
advancing. [Italics mine.] On the contrary, he ex-
presses the opinion that the attack on Winchester (which
he supposed to be made by the usual Valley force some-
what increased) is but a feint to cover the raid of Stuart.
Nor does General Schenck’s information from Kelly up
to the evening of the 13th suggest the advance of Lee
through the mountains, but on the contrary tends to
allay any apprehension of such advance. On the 9th
the latter General telegraphs that his scouts have returned
from Snicker’s Gap and saw no enemy. On the 12th
he telegraphs that his scouts are in and have neither seen
nor heard of an enemy. . . . Meantime (on the 10th),
the Secretary of War telegraphs to General Schenck that
Pleasanton had sharply engaged Stuart at Beverly and
thinks the latter too much crippled to make his raid into
Maryland very soon. [Not a word about Lee, Longstreet,
or Ewell]... . It was on the 14th also, about noon,
Schenck received a telegram from the General-in-Chief
in final answer to his of the 12th. This telegram, which
was dated from the War Department at 10.30 a.M.,
is as follows: ‘It is reported that Longstreet’s and
Ewell’s corps have passed through Culpeper to Sperry-
ville towards the Valley.’ This, General Schenck testi-
46 STUART’S CAVALRY

fies, was the first and only information received by him
from General Halleck that any of Lee’s force had gone
to the Valley.”

On this opinion Abraham Lincoln endorsed: “The
disaster, when it came, was a surprise to all.” So it
appears that if Pleasanton found out that Lee, Longstreet,
and Ewell were in Culpeper, he kept it a secret. By
his report from Culpeper he had given Milroy a cup of
kind Nepenthe. He put him to sleep.

General Lee’s headquarters were near Culpeper Court-
house. He rode to a hill on the field and witnessed the
combat from the Barbour house. Although it was known
that the attacking force was both cavalry and infantry,
he supposed it was only a reconnaissance to discover if
his army was there. Of course he would, as far as prac-
ticable, conceal from the enemy what they wanted to
find out. But there was a probability that it was a real
attack by Hooker’s army and he wanted to provide for
that contingency. If it were a reconnaissance, he would
not allow it to proceed beyond Brandy, for it might dis-
close the presence of Longstreet and Ewell. Rodes’
division of Ewell’s corps was in camp four miles from
the field on the Rixeyville road. It was therefore ordered
to march to a point to be in convenient supporting dis-
tance of the cavalry in case of necessity. It halted on
the Botts’ farm two miles off, but was kept out of sight.
The emergency for using it never arose, nor did Gregg,
or any of his officers, discover its presence or report
seeing it. Gregg said a train-load of infantry came
up to Brandy, but it was imaginary. Why would Gen-
BRANDY 47

eral Lee display a train-load of infantry at a point near
where he had a division of infantry concealed behind a
hill? Rodes says: “On the 9th, anticipating an order
to do so, I moved the division towards Brandy Station to
the support of General Stuart’s cavalry. Halting, under
General Ewell’s orders, at Botts’ place, I subsequently
under orders advanced to Barbour’s house in advance
of the station, but did not get in reach of the enemy, he
having apparently been repulsed by the cavalry.”
General Junius Daniel, whose brigade of Rodes’
division approached nearest to Brandy, reports: “On
the morning of the 9th firing was heard in the direction
of Brandy Station and I received orders to proceed in
that direction. About twelve o’clock I arrived near Brandy
Station and received orders from General Ewell and
General Lee to proceed in person to the station and re-
port to Brigadier-General Hampton. Upon arriving at
the station I reported to General Hampton and was
by him placed in line of battle about one mile in
advance of the station, to support some cavalry that
had fallen back before the enemy; their skirmishers
being at that time a little in advance of their position,
and their artillery firing upon the enemy at long range.
A short time after this I received orders from the
Major-General commanding the division to throw out
skirmishers to the front and move my line some half
mile to the rear. After remaining in this position
a short time, the enemy began to retire and I re-
ceived orders to advance my skirmishers and _ retire
my line still further to the rear; keeping my troops con-
48 STUART’S CAVALRY

cealed behind the hills during the movement. 'The enemy
retired before my line of skirmishers. About 5 p.m. I
received orders to call in my skirmishers and move to a
wood near Botts’ house and there go into camp.” It
is clear that the infantry was concealed from view by
the hill on which the Barbour house is situated. Gregg
never saw them. The infantry was kept in reserve; the
Confederate cavalry was between them and the enemy,
and won a great victory. The following dispatch from
General Lee to Stuart on the field shows what was his
opinion of the operation, and his anxiety to conceal the

presence of infantry:
June 9th 1863.
Masor-Generat Stuart, COMMANDING: —

Generau: General Lee desires me to say that he has your dis-
patches by the couriers and from the signal station. General Long-
street has a division looking to Stevensburg, and General Ewell on the
other side (of the railroad) looking to Brandy Station. He desires you
not to expose your men too much but to do the enemy damage when
possible. As the whole thing seems to be a reconnaissance in force
to determine our force and position, he wishes these concealed as much
as possible and the infantry not to be seen, if it is possible to avoid it.

I am, etc.,
C. S. VENABLE,
Major, ete.

Duffie went to Stevensburg but never saw or heard of
Longstreet. Hood and McLaws were a few miles ahead
of him; Pickett’s division had not yet arrived.

LEE TO SEDDON
Cutprper, June 9th, 1863.

The enemy crossed the Rappahannock this morning at 5 aM.
at the various fords from Beverly’s to Kelly’s, with large force of cavalry,
BRANDY 49

accompanied by infantry and artillery. After a severe contest till 5 p.m.,
General Stuart drove them over the river.

It is true that no effective pursuit of the enemy to the
Rappahannock was made, but it is was not because
Stuart’s cavalry was too much crippled. Robertson’s
brigade had not been engaged and was intact; Munford’s
had crossed Hazel River and arrived on the field after
Buford’s repulse at St. James’ Church; only three of his
squadrons were engaged late in the afternoon as sharp-
shooters. Hampton, however, did pursue. His report
says in reference to Gregg’s retreat from Brandy Sta-
tion: “In conjunction with this charge of the enemy
in front I moved the First Carolina and the Jeff Davis
Legion so as to turn his right. The leading regiments
‘(Cobb’s Legion and the First South Carolina) charged
gallantly up the steep hill upon which the enemy was
strongly posted, and swept them off in a perfect rout
without pause: or check. Their guns were abandoned
and many of their men killed and captured. In the
meantime, as the enemy attempted to escape down the
railroad, the two regiments which were with me met the
head of their fleeing column and dispersed it in every
direction. The First North Carolina, which was in front,
took many prisoners and the colors of the Tenth New
York regiment. The capture of the force which had
been driven from the hill would have been almost certain
but that our own artillery, which had been again posted
on the hill we had recovered, opened a heavy and well
directed fire at the head of my column. The delay
rendered necessary to make this fire cease enabled the
50 STUART’S CAVALRY

enemy to gain the woods in his rear.” The principal
reason why there was not a more vigorous pursuit was
that the infantry with Pleasanton covered the cavalry.
This reversed the usual order of these two arms on a
retreat. Since the invention of long range and repeating
fire-arms the use of cavalry in attacking infantry is obso-
lete tactics. Stuart had of course resisted, and had re-
pelled the combined attacks of infantry and cavalry in
the morning near Beverly’s. Colonel Newhall speaks of
his having deployed infantry to cover Buford’s crossing
at Beverly’s Ford. Buford made no report of Brandy;
if he had had any success that day I suppose he would have
reported it. He made several reports during the cam-
paign. That night Pleasanton sent the following dis-
patch to Hooker, and Hooker repeated it to Washington.
If it had given any definite information about Lee’s army,
it would have been communicated to Schenck at Balti-
more, and Milroy at Winchester.’

1 Pleasanton’s report, which is dated June 15, states that he conducted
what he calls “the expedition” in accordance with Hooker’s instruc-
tions of the 7th, but says nothing about a reconnaissance. At the date
of his report he had heard that Ewell had stolen a march on Milroy and
of course he then knew a great deal about Lee’s army that he did not
know on June 9. He says he halted at Beverly Ford but that he was
holding it to hear from Gregg. The plan was for him and Buford to
unite with Gregg at Brandy and move on to Culpeper Court-house.
But this operation was reversed; Gregg fell back and joined Buford
and retreated with him over the Rappahannock. Gregg’s report says:
“T moved my command [from Brandy] in the direction of Rappahannock
bridge and soon united with General Buford’s left.” Pleasanton re-
ported a total loss of 907; of this 75 of the killed and wounded were in

the infantry; and that his total effective force was 10,981. Stuart’s
loss was 575. Of his five brigades Robertson’s took no part in the action,
BRANDY 51

and only three squadrons of Munford’s were engaged. Stuart captured
6 flags and 3 pieces of artillery. How little information Pleasanton
carried back is shown by Hooker’s dispatch to President Lincoln the
next day.

June 10th, 1863, 2.30 p.m.

“General Pleasanton, by telegram forwarded to the Major-General
[Halleck] commanding the army this morning, reports that he had an
affair with the rebel cavalry yesterday near Brandy Station which resulted
in crippling him so much that he will have to abandon his contemplated
raid into Maryland [No raid had been contemplated] which was to have
started this morning. I am not so certain that the raid will be aban-
doned from this cause. It may delay the departure for a few days.
[Elwell started to Winchester that morning.] I shall leave the cavalry,
which is all that I have mounted, where they are near Bealeton, with
instructions to resist the passage of the river by the enemy’s forces. If
to effect this he should bring up a considerable force of infantry [the
infantry had already been brought up to Culpeper, but Hooker did not
know it] that will so much weaken him in my front that I have good
reason to believe that I can throw a sufficient force over the river [at
Fredericksburg] to compel the enemy to abandon his present position.
If it should be the intention to send a heavy column of infantry to accom-
pany the cavalry on the proposed raid [when the movement began the
cavalry accompanied the infantry] he can leave nothing behind to inter-
pose any serious obstacle to my rapid advance on Richmond. .. . At
present the enemy has one corps of infantry at Gordonsville with the
advance at Culpeper, with the manifest tendency of other corps to drift
in that direction. I now have two bridges across the Rappahannock,
ready to spring over the river below Fredericksburg, and it is this, I
believe, that causes the enemy to hesitate in moving forward.”

All of which shows how little Hooker knew about the situation of
Lee’s army. Ewell was then drifting to the Shenandoah Valley.

June 9th, 1863, 8 p.m.
Masor-GeneraL Hooker: —

A short time after my last dispatch to you, General Gregg with
his infantry and artillery joined me about two miles from the river, to
which point I had driven the enemy. He reported that he had en-
countered a much superior number of the enemy’s cavalry and had a
52 STUART’S CAVALRY

severe fight. Also, that a train of cars had been run up to Brandy
Station filled with infantry who opened on his men. I also received
information from letters and official reports captured in the enemy’s
camp, as well as from his prisoners, that the enemy had upwards of
12,000 cavalry (which was double our own force of cavalry) and twenty-
five pieces of artillery. I also learned from contrabands and prisoners
that a large force of infantry had been sent for from Culpeper, as
well as Longstreet’s command at Ellis’ Ford. Having crippled the
enemy by desperate fighting so that he could not follow me, I
returned with my command to the north side of the Rappahannock.
Gregg’s command crossed at Rappahannock Bridge. To-morrow Stuart
was to start on a raid into Maryland, so captured papers state. Rest
satisfied he will not attempt it. Buford had a long and desperate hand-
to-hand encounter with the enemy, in which he drove before him hand-
somely very superior forces. Over two hundred prisoners of war were
captured and one baittle-flag. The troops are in splendid spirits, and
are entitled to the highest praise for their distinguished conduct. Lee
reviewed the whole of Stuart’s cavalry yesterday.
A. PLEasanton,
Brigadier-General.

If Gregg saw infantry on the train at Brandy, he should,
as a reconnoitering officer, instead of retreating, at least
have made a demonstration against it with both his
cavalry and infantry. This would have compelled the
force, if there, to show its strength. Nothing of the sort
was done, which looks as if General Gregg was not seek-
ing information. He says nothing about the number
of the infantry, whether it was a brigade or a company.
The failure of a reconnoitering force to discover the
presence of an enemy and making a false report often
results in great damage to his own side. It is said that
such a failure was the cause of the surprise at Shiloh.
Hooker’s reply showed that he did not attach much im-
portance to Pleasanton’s dispatch. He said: “I am
BRANDY 53

not so certain as you appear to be that the enemy will
abandon his contemplated raid. With this impression
T have felt a little hesitancy about withdrawing the in-
fantry. Will you be able to keep him from crossing the
river with his cavalry and batteries with you?” Not a
word about Confederate infantry.

At that time Longstreet’s corps was camped about
Mount Pony in Culpeper; Pleasanton thought it was at
Ellis’ Ford on the Rappahannock; Ewell was then march-
ing to the Shenandoah Valley; Hooker thought he was
about Fredericksburg. Pleasanton was almost close
enough to see the dust from Ewell’s columns. Stuart’s
cavalry was stretched out as a screen along the
Rappahannock; Pleasanton had never penetrated the
screen.

At 2.30 p.m., on the 10th, Hooker telegraphed Mr.
Lincoln that he had so crippled Stuart that he would
abandon his contemplated raid into Maryland. “I am
not satisfied,” he said, “of his intention in this respect,
but, from certain movements in their corps, I cannot
regard it as altogether improbable. . . . At present the
enemy have one corps of infantry at Gordonsville, with
the advance at Culpeper, with the manifest tendency of
the other corps to drift in that direction.” He again
«proposed that, as a part of Lee’s army had left his front,
he should move towards Richmond. Mr. Lincoln dis-
approved it. On the 11th and 12th he telegraphed that
Hill and Ewell were still in his front on the lower Rappa-
hannock, and that Longstreet, with Stuart’s cavalry, was
in Culpeper. Ewell was then in the Shenandoah Valley
54 STUART’S CAVALRY

within twelve miles of Winchester. Pleasanton had sent
him some reports about contrabands (negroes) and deserters
having reported that Ewell had gone towards the Blue
Ridge, but evidently he placed no reliance in them. He
must, therefore, have been thunderstruck when, on the
13th, Mr. Lincoln asked him if it was possible that Ewell
could be at Winchester. Hooker immediately issued
orders that set his army in motion for Manassas Junction.
The next day his headquarters were at Dumfries on the
Potomac. He there received a characteristic dispatch
from Mr. Lincoln. It said: “So far as we can make out
here, the enemy have surrounded Milroy at Winchester
and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a few
days longer could you help them? If the head of Lee’s
army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank road
between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal
must be very slim somewhere. Could you break him?”
Hooker did not seem to think he could.

Critics may object that the horse artillery were too
much exposed by being so near the picket line at Beverly
Ford. Such criticism is mere pedantry; the operations
of war cannot be reduced to maxims and formulas. The
result shows that it was fortunate for the Confederates
that their guns were in the place where Pleasanton found
them. They were therefore in the right place. As a gen-
eral rule, a battery in action has the support of infantry
or cavalry. When Pleasanton’s column was only chasing
a picket, as they supposed, and almost in the artillery
camp, a gun in the road suddenly opened fire on it. The
column halted for fear of an ambuscade. It was natural
BRANDY 55

to conclude, as Pleasanton did, that the gun had been
masked and was there in anticipation of his crossing the
river and had a strong support behind it. There was a
similar ruse by the German cavalry at Sedan. Colonel
Bonie, in his account of the operations of the French
cavalry in the war of 1870, says: “The Colonel of the
Prussian Hussars, who came to take over Sedan, stated
that for several hours the 200 guns which caused such
damage were supported by his regiment alone. His
anxiety for a long time was intense, as, had anything hap-
pened, he could have afforded but little help. Accord-
ingly, in order to convey the impression that he had a
large body of troops at his disposal, he showed himself
along the crests of the various heights, and thus displayed
a continuous line that seemed to extend for some dis-
tance. What a splendid success might have been achieved
had our cavalry been launched against the regiment that
supported those guns?”

The misinformation which Pleasanton brought from
Culpeper tended to quiet the fears of an aggressive move-
ment. A similar false report by an officer sent to make
a reconnaissance came near being the ruin of Bonaparte
in Italy. On the 13th of June he went to Marengo, a
village situated on the east bank of the Bormida, a tribu-
tary of the Po; he was looking for Melas, whose communi-
cations he had severed; the Austrians had been at
Alessandria, a few miles below on the other bank of the
river. A force was sent to reconnoiter; it reported that no
Austrians were there and that there was no bridge on the
river. Bonaparte concluded that Melas had escaped and
56 STUART’S CAVALRY

was retreating to Genoa; he accordingly directed Desaix
with his division to move to Novi to intercept him.
Bonaparte’s forces were scattered; he was not prepared
to receive and he was not expecting an aitack. Victor
was left in observation at Marengo; Bonaparte slept that
night several miles away; he was in no condition for
battle the next morning.

According to Bourrienne, Bonaparte was as badly
deceived by the staff officer who made the reconnaissance
for him, as Hooker and Milroy were by Pleasanton. He
says: “On the 13th, the First Consul slept at di Galifolo.
During the evening he ordered a staff officer to ascertain
whether the Austrians had a bridge across the Bormida.
A report arrived very late that there was none; this infor-
mation set Bonaparte’s mind at rest and he went to bed
well satisfied; but early the next morning, when firing
was heard, he heard that the Austrians had debouched on
the plain where the troops were engaged; he flew into a
furious passion, called the staff officer a coward, and said
he had not advanced far enough.”

Both Lee and Stuart had known for several days that
Pleasanton’s cavalry corps was massed on the river. It
is hard for a cavalryman who served under Stuart to
realize that an army of 30,000 Austrians was at Alessandria
on the opposite bank of the river, only five or six miles
away, and that Bonaparte’s Chief of Cavalry had not
found it out. As is well known, Victor was surprised by
an attack at daybreak in the morning; the French were
defeated and driven several miles until they met Desaix’s
division; he had turned back and marched without orders
BRANDY 57

to the sound of the cannon, and arrived just in time to
snatch a victory from defeat. Although he was sur-
prised, no other battle is more associated with the glory
of Napoleon; on his coffin was spread the cloak he wore
at Marengo.
II
GETTYSBURG

On June 14, Longstreet’s corps was in camp in Culpeper,
near Pony Mountain. General Lee’s headquarters were
near the Court-house. At midnight orders were issued
to the division commanders, Hood, Pickett, and McLaws,
to be ready to move the next day on the road to Win-
chester. News had been received that Ewell had cleaned
the Valley of Milroy’s forces. The route was afterward
changed and Longstreet’s corps marched along the eastern
base of the Blue Ridge to Ashby’s and Snicker’s Gaps.
They remained in the vicinity of the Gaps from the 17th
to the 24th. General Lee’s object was to perplex Hooker
as to the destination of his army. He wanted Hooker
to think that he intended a blow east of the Ridge on the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

In anticipation of such a movement, Hooker kept the
bulk of his army massed along the railroad, while Ewell,
who had crossed the Potomac on June 15, with his corps
and a strong force of cavalry under Jenkins, was roaming
around unmolested over Maryland and Pennsylvania.
The militia always scattered when he got close to them.
Hooker detached no troops to follow Ewell. Lee had
the initiative; Hooker conformed to Lee’s movements and
turned around on the inner circle so as always to cover

58
GETTYSBURG 59

Washington. Of course it was expected that he would
pursue Lee if he crossed the Potomac; otherwise Wash-
ington would be uncovered. When Ewell left Culpeper
on the day following the combat at Brandy Station,
Stuart’s cavalry remained where it had been for some
weeks. If it had gone with Ewell its absence would
have disclosed the movement to the enemy and at-
tracted their attention to the Shenandoah Valley. As
the cavalry stayed in the same place, it was natural to
conclude that the infantry was somewhere behind it
on the Rapidan or Rappahannock. Jones’ brigade
of cavalry had been brought the week before from
the Valley. The withdrawal of Jones’ brigade had
deceived Milroy and the authorities at Washington. It
relieved them of all fear of an offensive movement in that
direction. Milroy woke up one morning and found him-
self surrounded by Ewell’s corps. Stuart, with a part of
his cavalry corps as a veil, moved on Longstreet’s right
flank to screen it from observation. As the chief of cavalry
of an army — as a commander of outpost service in mask-
ing his own side and unmasking the other — Stuart never
had an equal.

Pleasanton’s cavalry withdrew from the Rappahannock
along the line of the railroad on the day that Stuart crossed
it. Hampton’s and Jones’ brigades were left on the
river; they followed the next day.

Hooker was moving north. On the night of June 16,
in company with Fitz-Lee’s brigade, which was under
the temporary command of General Munford, Stuart
went into bivouac near Piedmont Station in Fauquier.
60 STUART’S CAVALRY

General Lee’s headquarters remained in Culpeper until
the 16th; I suppose he was waiting for A. P. Hill’s corps
to come up from Fredericksburg. Hill was kept there
until it was certain that Hooker was moving to the Poto-
mac. At 3.30 p.m, on the 17th, General Lee was at’
Markham, near Manassas Gap, where he spent the night.
From there he went on to the Valley and had his head-
quarters for a week at Berryville.

Notice of the northern movement of the Confederate
army had not been formally given to me, but there were
many signs of it. I had heard of Milroy’s rout and ex-
pected it would be followed by our whole army. On the
16th I went on a scout and discovered Hooker’s camps;
he was then moving toward Washington. When I tre-
turned I heard where Stuart was and early the next
morning went to see him. His tent was in Miss Kitty
Shacklett’s front yard near the roadside. He greeted me
cordially; our last meeting had been at Culpeper, when
I carried General Stoughton to him as a prisoner. He
was in his usual gay humor —TI never saw him at any
time in any other. Always buoyant in spirits, he in-
spired with his own high hopes all who came in contact
with him. I felt the deepest affection for him — my
chief ambition was to serve him. He was the rare com-
bination of the Puritan and the knight-errant; in his
character were mingled the graces of chivalry with the
strong religious sense of duty of a Round-head. He felt
intensely the joy of battle, and he loved the praise of fair
women and brave men. I served under him from the
beginning of the war until he closed his life, like Sidney,
GETTYSBURG 61

leading a squadron on the field of honor; yet I do not re-
member that he ever gave me an order.

There was always so much sympathy between us, and
I felt so much affection for him, that he only had to express
a wish and that was an order to me. To Stuart I owe
my first commission to raise a Partisan corps, and the
promotion I afterwards received as Captain and Lieu-
tenant-Colonel. All came unsolicited. There is no
allusion to me in the published records of the war so
gratifying as the endorsement he made on a report I
made to him in February, 1864, in which he said: “Since
I first knew him in 1861 he has never once alluded to his
own rank or promotion; thus far, it has come by the force
of his own merit.” Perhaps some may say that the pro-
motion came through Stuart’s partiality. Maybe it did.
I certainly owe to him whatever I was in the war. The
work in which I had been engaged for several months in
Northern Virginia made me capable of rendering a ser-
vice at that time which he acknowledged in his report
of the campaign.

After we had talked over the situation it was arranged
for me to meet him at Middleburg in the afternoon. See-
ing he was badly mounted, I gave him a fine sorrel we
had captured from a Michigan lieutenant. A few days
afterward the horse was killed under him. My men were
waiting for me at the rendezvous a few miles away and I
rode off to join them. We then went on to Middleburg
and found Stuart there ahead of us. Colonel Munford,
with his brigade, had just passed on to Aldie, a village
on the pike a few miles below in a gap of the Bull Run
62 STUART’S CAVALRY

Mountains. Stuart was dismounted, standing in the
street.

“Grim visaged war had smoothed his wrinkled front”;
the young ladies of the town had surrounded and cap-
tured him; the scene looked like a dance around a May-
pole. It lasted an hour or so until they were startled by
the roar of guns at Aldie. In our conference I told him
I was going again over the Potomac at Seneca. It had
only been a week since I was there, but I thought they
would not expect me back so soon.’ Neither of us knew
that the heads of Hooker’s columns were so near.

Washington City, and the North generally, were in
such a panicky state that I knew that my presence north
of the Potomac would create an alarm as it had done the
week before, altogether out of proportion to the size of
my force, or the damage we could do. It would at least
create a diversion in favor of General Lee. This was the
first time, in fact the only time, that Stuart ever saw

1 Colonel Jewett, commanding at Poolesville, reported: “The enemy
dashed rapidly up the canal, driving in the patrols, and attacked Captain
Dean’s Company I, Sixth Michigan Cavalry, on duty at Seneca locks.
Captain fell back towards Poolesville, forming line three times and only
retreating when nearly surrounded. The enemy followed to within
three miles of Poolesville, when he rapidly retreated, destroying the
camp of Captain Deane and re-crossing the river where he had
crossed. Our loss is four men killed, man wounded and sixteen men
missing [and over twenty horses].”

HEINTZELMAN TO LOWELL, WASHINGTON, JUNE 12

“Consult your own discretion in your direction. Go where yeu
please in pursuit of Mosby. A squadron from Winchester will probably
pass Middleburg or Aldie to-day. It has been notified to be on the
lookout for Mosby.”
GETTYSBURG 63

my men in a body. As they passed him in the street he
made a jocular remark that the Yankees, when they saw
them, were like the coon up a tree when he saw Captain
Scott —the coon called out, “Don’t shoot, Pll come
down.” ‘The men moved on and I remained for some
time with him. When we parted I told him that he
would hear from me soon. After going a mile down the
pike, I overtook my men and we turned off toward the
Potomac. It was a hot day; the command had halted
in a valley at the foot of the mountain to rest in the shade
and drink some buttermilk a farmer named Gulick had
brought us. We were not dreaming the enemy were so
near us until we heard the artillery firing over the hills
in the direction of Aldie. The enemy had unexpectedly
come in collision with Munford. This showed that
they must be in strong force ahead of us. In an instant
every man was in the saddle. Ascending the hill we could
see clouds of dust that indicated the roads on which
Hooker’s army was marching. Going on for two or three
miles, we learned from prisoners we captured that Hooker’s
people were all around us.

But we were in the woods and they were not looking
for small game. The prisoners were sent back to Stuart,
with a dispatch giving him full information about the
force in front. He got it before dark. I now determined
not to go to the Potomac; I thought I could be more
useful by operating against the enemy on the turnpike
leading from Fairfax to Aldie, which I knew must be
their line of communication. In this way I could annoy
them and communicate with Stuart. That night I placed
64 STUART’S CAVALRY

my command in the woods, and with three men — Joe
Nelson, Charlie Hall, and Norman Smith — rode to the
pike which was a few hundred yards off. The Union
troops were passing in a continuous stream, but we did
not attract their attention; in the dark they could not
distinguish the gray uniforms from the blue.

The house of a Northern man named Birch, with
whom I was well acquainted, was near. His front yard
gate opened on the pike. We saw three horses standing
there; a soldier was holding them. I concluded that
these were officers’ horses and an orderly. When we rode
up the orderly no doubt thought I was a big officer with
his staff. In a tone of authority I asked whose horses
these were. The soldier respectfully replied that they be-
longed to Major Sterling and Captain Fisher, and that
they were just from General Hooker’s headquarters. He
told me that the headquarters were in Fairfax and that
the officers had gone into the house to get something to
eat. After pumping him dry, I told him to come close
to me; he did not hesitate and had no suspicion as to
who I was. I leaned over, took him by the collar and told
him my name. He was an Irishman; he misunderstood
me and thought I called him “Mosby,” and answered
indignantly: “ You are a d—d liar, I am as good a Union
man as you are.” It was clear that an exhibition of force
was necessary to subdue him; so I drew my pistol; he
saw it in the starlight. I now felt sure of a prize, and
as happy as a Florida wrecker when he sees a ship drift-
ing ashore in a storm. The Irishman stood perfectly
quiet — all doubt of my personality had vanished.
GETTYSBURG 65

I then told my companions to dismount and be ready
to receive the officers whom we saw walking to the gate.
Joe Nelson approached Major Sterling and, extending
his hand, asked for his arms. Major Sterling mistook the
movement for a salutation and shook hands, as he thought,
with a friend. Charlie Hall was equally polite to Captain
Fisher. It was hard to convince them who we were.
At first they thought it was a practical joke. I then
ordered them to deliver their dispatches. Major Sterling
handed me a large envelope.’ It contained a letter of
instructions to Pleasanton and with it a statement of the
strength of Hooker’s army.? He informed Pleasanton

1COLONEL RICE TO LIEUTENANT CLARK, A. A. G.
June 18th, 1863, 12 m.

In accordance with directions from the commanding officer of the
brigade I report the facts in regard to the capture of Major Sterling and
Captain Fisher, as related to me by the people of the house where they
were taken. Major Sterling and Captain Fisher were on their way to
communicate with {General Pleasanton, when they halted at the resi-
dence of Mr. Almond Birch for supper and to inquire how far it was
to Aldie. Having finished their supper, they started for their horses
which were left with their orderly at the yard gate. The horses and
orderly had been removed and, before Major Sterling and Captain
Fisher had reached the gate, 10 or 12 cavalrymen seized them and hur-
tiedly mounted them and bore them off. This took place last evening
at ten o’clock, about 400 yards from the picket outpost at the house of
Mr. Birch on the Little River turnpike. Mr. Birch and his family
are from Clifton Park, Saratoga County, N. Y. They are Union people
known to some of the officers of our regiment.

2PLEASANTON TO BUTTERFIELD, CHIEF OF STAFF
June 19th, 1863.

Your dispatch of 10 a.m. received; I heard from an orderly, who
escaped, of the capture of Major Sterling and judged he had something
important so I have acted carefully. The pass taken from Longstreet’s
66 STUART’S CAVALRY

that Stahel’s cavalry would be sent on a reconnaissance
to Warrenton and Culpeper the next day. As the dis-
patch gave notice to Stuart, he sent Hampton to meet
Stahel; Hampton drove him back to Fairfax Court-house.’
We then went to a house a mile off and got a light. I
read the dispatch and then wrote Stuart all I had learned.
The prisoners, the dispatch, and my letter were sent
immediately to Stuart in charge of Norman Smith. He
delivered them before sunrise. Captain Fisher was Chief
Acting Signal Officer on his way to establish a signal
station on the Blue Ridge.

This shows Hooker’s ignorance of the whereabouts of
Lee’s army; Captain Fisher would have ridden into

infantry soldier is important, and, from the caution they are using to
cover Upperville, I think they may attempt to mass their force there
and throw it through Thoroughfare Gap by night. Thoroughfare Gap
and Leesburg are the two points it is necessary to make strong in con-
nection with this at Aldie; then the mountain range will do the rest.

1 HOOKER TO PLEASANTON
June 19th, 1863, 11 a.m.

Inclosed is a copy of a dispatch captured with Major Sterling,
probably on the 17th, which, we suppose, did not reach you. Since this
was written you have further information, and General Slocum has gone
to Leesburg. General Meade will with this be ordered to Aldie; Birney
to Gum Springs. You will note the information that may have been
received by the enemy, if they got the dispatch when they captured Ster-
ling. What do you know of his capture? As early as possible, establish
communication with General Slocum. Howard is at Trappe Rock cross-
ing of Goose Creek. [Near the Potomac.] Nolan’s Ford is held, or should
be, by McKee, and the mouth of the Monocacy. As soon as you know
that McKee can come on and reach you by Leesburg, order him to join
you. Of course you will only order him up when you are sure that he
can do so without danger to his command.
GETTYSBURG 67

Longstreet’s camps if he had gone on. In his report
Captain Norton of the Signal Corps says, “On the 17th,
Captain Fisher, Chief Acting Signal Officer, went out
on a reconnaissance and in the evening was captured
by the enemy near Aldie.”* Stuart forwarded the cap-
tured dispatch to General Lee at Berryville. I remember
saying in my note to Stuart, “The skies are bright
to-night with the reflection of Hooker’s camp-fires.”
Meade’s corps was that night at Gum Spring in Loudon;
we slept within half a mile of their camps;neither disturbed
the other’s slumbers. It was a midsummer night’s dream:

“At the dead of the night a sweet vision I saw,
And thrice ere the morning I dreamed it again.”

We were again on the pike early in the morning. After
some captures we hurried back to Stuart. It was more
important to carry him information than prisoners and
horses. As before stated, I had left Stuart at Middleburg
the day before; he too had had an adventure soon after we
parted which caused him to move his headquarters four
miles back to Rector’s Cross-roads.

On the morning of June 17, Pleasanton’s corps was
camped about Manassa Junction. His orders to his

1DeForest’s brigade was sent on the scout to Warrenton. This is
his report:

DEFOREST TO HOOKER, FAIRFAX STATION
CENTERVILLE, June 19th.

I found a large force of rebel cavalry at Warrenton. I drove in
their pickets to within one mile of the place. Two regiments attempted
to flank me on each side. The number is said to be 5,000 or 6,000.
A contraband said Stuart was to be there to-day.
68 STUART’S CAVALRY

two division commanders, Buford and Gregg, were to
move to Aldie, a pass of the Bull Run Mountain, and
camp there that night; the next day they were to go on to
Noland’s Ford on the Potomac, where an engineer was
laying a pontoon bridge. Every army corps was march-
ing that morning in that direction and expected to cross
the Potomac the next day. Hill, Longstreet, and Stuart
were still east of the Blue Ridge; Hooker and Pleasanton
thought they were in the Shenandoah Valley to follow
Ewell, who was then in Maryland. Their ignorance of
the whereabouts of Lee’s army shows how well Stuart,
with a curtain of cavalry, had screened its operations.
Hooker was evidently greatly surprised when he heard
of the collision at Aldie. Pleasanton had expected to
stay one night there; he stayed a week. Hooker came
to a halt. On the 17th, Butterfield wrote from Fairfax
Court-house to Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster at Wash-
ington: “Since we were not allowed to cross and whip
A. P. Hill, while Longstreet and Ewell were moving
through Culpeper and Sperryville, we have lost the oppor-
tunity of doing a thing which we know to a certainty we
could have accomplished. My impression is now that
there is not a rebel, excepting scouts, this side of the
Shenandoah Valley; that Lee is in as much uncertainty
as to our whereabouts and what we are doing as we are
to his; that his movement on the upper Potomac is a
cover for a cavalry raid on the north side of the river and
a movement of his troops further west, where he can
turn up at some weak spot.” He had not then heard
from Aldie, or that we were inside his lines, and was still
GETTYSBURG 69

under the delusion that only a cavalry raid was contem-
plated by the Confederates.’

1 BUTTERFIELD TO COMMANDING OFFICER, FORCES MOUTH OF THE
MONOCACY
June 18th (Rec’d 9.10 a.m.)
Seize and hold Noland’s and Hauling Fords. General Slocum’s
corps may be in that vicinity to-day, on that side of the Potomac.

BUTTERFIELD TO REYNOLDS
Farrrax Station, June 18th, 3.30 p.m.

. » + [Colonel E. V.] White last night at Point of Rocks marching
careless of our cavalry. Two regiments of infantry ought to have been
at the mouth of the Monocacy last night. We have not settled where
Lee with Longstreet and Ewell are yet. Headquarters at Fairfax
Court-house to-night.

REYNOLDS TO BUTTERFIELD
Brapy’s House NEAR HERNDON.
June 18th, 4 p.m.
My two signal officers were within one mile of Leesburg this morning
at 10.45 a.m. They report no force of any kind there, but Mosby’s
guerillas from there up to Point of Rocks.

BUTTERFIELD TO MEADE

They are getting sufficiently over their stampede to speak collectedly,
coolly in Pennsylvania. . . . White was at Point of Rocks with 400 men
last night, destroying cars. Six hundred of our cavalry from Dumfries
via Alexandria, should have reached the mouth of the Monocacy with a
bridge and two regiments of infantry last night. Slocum is by this time
in Leesburg (3 p.m.) We don’t exactly settle where Lee is yet. Catch
and kill any guerillas, then try them, will be a good method of treating
them.

BENHAM TO HOOKER
Wasuincton, June 18th, 8 a.m.

About 8 p.m. of the 16th I received an order to have a bridge of
1200 feet in the Georgetown canal by daylight of the 17th, which I at
70 STUART’S CAVALRY

But two hours later, at 10.30 p.m., he wrote to Pleasanton
“Your dispatch by orderly received announcing that
you had run against [Fitz] Lee’s brigade at Aldie. The
general desires that you push him up and find out what
is behind him — whether it is the advance of Lee’s army
covering his movements. . . .” Gregg had ordered Colonel

once directed the whole command to prepare, it requiring much time to
unload trucks and rearrange the boats for passing the locks. About
2 a. of the 17th I received a dispatch directing the bridge to be laid
at Noland’s Ford by noon of the 18th, and, it appearing necessary by
that dispatch, I ordered 250 more men of the Fiftieth to accompany the
bridge. .. . Captain Trumbull was fortunately up with all his boats
in the canal about 6 a.m., and he wrote me that he was pushing them
through the set of locks above there, which was what I expected and
desired.
SCHENCK TO TYLER
June 18th, 11.30 a.m.

What have you done for guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
against the enemy from Harper’s Ferry to Point of Rocks or the
Monocacy? Report, if you can, as to train captured and destroyed by
[Colonel E. V.] White’s cavalry near Point of Rocks last night, and as to
capture of Captain Means’ cavalry company. . . . Keep up your cavalry
patrol constantly to the mouth of the Monocacy. Heintzleman’s people
patrol below that point. ;

J. W. GARRETT, PRESIDENT B. AND O. R. R., TO SECRETARY STANTON

“A train sent to Harper’s Ferry yesterday a.m. with troops and sup-
plies, which left Sandy Hook for Baltimore at 5 last p.m., has been cap-
tured and burned at Point of Rocks. It consisted of a first-class engine
and 22 cars. Our operator reports that the enemy were 400 of White’s
cavalry, and that they also captured and carried off Captain Means
with his entire company of cavalry. [A mistake.] I fear this destroys
connections west of the Monocacy until re-opened by a strong force. . ..”

The pontoon bridges were afterward laid lower down the river at
Edwards’ Ferry, but the fords above were kept heavily guarded. At this
time Stuart and Pleasanton were fighting about Middleburg.
GETTYSBURG 71

“Duffie with his Rhode Island regiment to move through
Thoroughfare Gap to Middleburg, and to camp there
that night. The next day he was to join the division at
Noland’s Ford on the Potomac. Gregg evidently thought
that Stuart was in the Valley. Duffie drove off a picket
of Chambliss’ brigade at Thoroughfare and moved on to
Middleburg. The picket at Thoroughfare did not give
notice of the enemy’s approach. Stuart did not hear of
it until Duffie’s advance guard chased a vidette into the
village. He and his staff got away as fast as they could.
In accordance with his orders, Duffie went into camp
at Middleburg with 275 men, although he knew that
Stuart had just left the place. Of course, if Stuart
was there, his cavalry was near. Duffie’s folly is an
illustration of the truth of what I have often said — that
no man is fit to be an officer who has not the sense
and courage to know when to disobey an order. The
Confederate cavalry soon came up, attacked, scattered,
and captured most of Duffie’s regiment. His report,
dated the next day (18th), at Centreville, tells the tale
of the catastrophe: “I returned here exhausted at
1.30 p.m. to-day, with the gallant debris of my much-
loved regiment — 4 officers and 27 men. My colors did
not fall into the hands of the enemy, but were destroyed
when they could not be saved. The color-bearer was
mortally wounded.”

Duffie was ordered to Alexandria and laid up for repairs.
It was said that he had served as a French cuirassier in
Africa, and had had many encounters with the sons of
the desert. He escaped capture by Abd-el-Kadir to be
72 STUART’S CAVALRY

caught by my men in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864.
Exit Duffie.*

We returned from inside Hooker’s lines by an unguarded
path over the Bull Run Mountain and found Stuart at
his headquarters. I gave him all the information I had
gained; immediately a courier was sent with a dispatch
to General Lee. Stuart enjoyed greatly my account of
our adventures the night before. My men were dispersed
for rest, but I stayed at headquarters.

On the 21st Pleasanton, reinforced by Barnes’ division
of infantry, made a reconnaissance and pushed the cavalry
back to the Blue Ridge. But he could go no farther;
Ashby’s Gap was held by McLaws’ division of infantry,
and Snicker’s Gap by Hood’s. Early the next morning
Pleasanton retired to Aldie and there waited for General
Lee to develop his purpose. It is well understood that
Stuart rode that night to see General Lee at his head-
quarters. Ewell had crossed the Potomac some days
before and Jenkins’ cavalry brigade had gone into Penn-
sylvania. While Pleasanton was pressing Stuart back
to the Blue Ridge, I moved my command around his
flank and bivouacked that night on the path in the Bull
Run Mountain where we had crossed three days before.
We were then between Thoroughfare Gap, which was
held by Hancock, and Pleasanton who was at Aldie. At
daybreak we moved down the eastern slope. When cross-
ing a field we saw a body of cavalry drawn up by a church.

1 BUTTERFIELD TO PLEASANTON

June 19th, 1863, 4.15 p.m.
Colonel Duffie is here with 28 men and officers; 32 all told.
GETTYSBURG 13

Not suspecting that they were put there as a bait to draw
us into a trap, I ordered my men to charge. The cavalry
ran away when we got close to them, while a body of in-
fantry, lying down in the church a few yards off, dese-
crated the sanctuary by firing a volley into us. We fell
back to the woods at the foot of the mountain; no doubt
it was thought that we had gone away — at least for that
day. The force at the church returned to their camps
near Aldie. Not one of my men or horses was killed;
three were wounded. Ballard lost a leg, Mountjoy lost
a finger, and Charlie Hall got a bullet in his shoulder.
There was no pursuit of us; the party seemed satisfied
with what they had done and went home. I sent the
wounded back under charge of one of my most trusty
men, Fount Beattie, and with about twenty men flanked
around and kept on to the Little River pike. It was not:
long before we caught a wagon-train. Stuart’s quarter-
master was in need of mules; we furnished him with a fine
lot. We had our revenge for getting into the ambuscade.
The news of the capture of the wagons created a sensa-
tion in the camps and seems to have demoralized Hooker.
A few hours before it had been reported to him that we
had been routed and driven over the mountain. Another
visit was not expected so soon. General Meade, who
had put up the job on us at the church that morning,
was very much disgusted with the performance. The
following letter to Howard, written from Aldie, tells how
he felt about it:
7A STUART’S CAVALRY

“June 22, 1863.

“Pleasanton, as I wrote you yesterday, drove the enemy through
Ashby’s Gap. He returned this morning and informs me that the Con-
federate army are in the Valley of the Shenandoah and Martinsburg;
Lee and Longstreet at Winchester [both near Berryville]; A. P. Hill is
coming up the Valley to join them. This is the substance of news as
given by Pleasanton. He was yesterday opposed by only a brigade of
cavalry and one battery, but the character of the country was so favor-
able for defense that it took him all day with his large force to drive them
back some 12 [8] miles. I came near catching our friend, Mosby, this
moming. I had intelligence of his expected passing a place about four
miles from here at sunrise. I sent forty mounted men (all I had) and
100 infantry who succeeded in posting themselves in ambush at the desig-
nated spot. Sure enough, Mr. Mosby, together with 30 of his followers,
made their appearance about sunrise, but I regret to say their exit also,
from what I can learn, through the fault of both foot and horse. It
appears Mosby saw the cavalry and immediately charged them. They
ran (that is, my horses) towards the infantry posted behind a fence.
The infantry, instead of rising and deliberately delivering their fire, fired
lying on the ground but did not hit a rebel, who immediately scattered
and dispersed, and thus the prettiest chance in the world to dispose of
Mr. Mosby was lost.”

Captain Harvey Brown, who commanded, reports a
cavalry sergeant killed. He says they did not charge us
because the ground was rolling. It was the same ground
over which we had charged them. About the time that
we captured the train on the pike that morning, Hooker
told Heintzelman at Washington that Stahel had been
sent on another reconnaissance to the Rappahannock.
Hampton had driven him back on the one he had started
to make two days before.

At 7 p.m. on the same day he heard of the loss of his
mules, and telegraphed to Hancock at Thoroughfare to
“direct General Stahel to return without delay to dis-
GETTYSBURG 45

pose his forces so as to catch the party inside our lines,
if possible.” Stuart’s quartermaster then had his mules.
Hancock replied: “I have sent your dispatch [by
courier] to General Stahel by different routes.” The
dispatch overtook Stahel at the Rappahannock. He
started back (in disgust he says), and on June 23d (the
day after the capture) telegraphed Hooker from Gaines-
ville: “In accordance with your orders I shall now scout
the whole country from Bull Run Mountain towards
Fairfax Court-house, and have ordered the rest of my
command, and my train, to return to Fairfax, where I
shall report personally to you.”

Butterfield had also telegraphed to Hancock at
Thoroughfare: “The General thinks you had better
not send in any train until General Stahel’s command
comes in, and then move with them. A party of about
100 men of the enemy are inside our lines and have to-
day attacked a train en route for Aldie.”

In a report to the Secretary of War, Stahel said: “It
was with feelings of bitter regret and disappointment I
received this order, inasmuch as I was just crossing the
Rappahannock with three brigades of cavalry and a
battery of horse artillery, who were fresh from camp.
. . . All of Lee’s supplies had to pass between the Rappa-
hannock and the Blue Ridge Mountains across the Shenan-
doah Valley, and my force was sufficient to have destroyed
his entire trains and cut off General Lee completely from
his supplies. . . . I was compelled by this order to aban-
don my movement and restrained from dealing so fatal
a blow to the enemy, and return with my whole division
16 STUART’S CAVALRY

to disperse about 100 guerrillas, who had escaped back
of our lines before I ever received the order to return.”

For more than a week Hooker’s headquarters were
at Fairfax and his army remained stationary; the seven
corps were scattered over three counties — Fairfax,
Prince William, and Loudon. The right was on the
Potomac about Leesburg; the left twenty-five miles dis-
tant at Thoroughfare, and Pleasanton with his cavalry
and Meade’s corps in the center at Aldie. In the expedi-
tions I had made inside their lines I had located each
corps and reported it to Stuart. They were so widely
separated that it was easy for a column of cavalry to pass
between them. No corps was nearer than ten miles to
another corps. On all the roads were wagon-trains haul-
ing supplies. I pointed out to Stuart the opportunity
to strike a damaging blow, and suggested to him to cross
the Bull Run Mountains and pass through the middle
of Hooker’s army into Maryland. There was no force
to oppose him at Seneca Ford about twenty miles above
Washington — where I had recently crossed.

Hancock, with two divisions, was at Thoroughfare;
his other division was at Gainesville, seven miles away.
Hooker still had a suspicion tltat Lee meditated a blow
against him on the railroad.t| At Hopewell Gap there
was nothing but a cavalry picket.2 It would be easy to

14 division of the Sixth Corps was also kept at Bristoe on the railroad.
2 WILLIAMS, A. A. G., TO HANCOCK

“June 24, 11.35 p.m.

“The commanding General does not think it necessary to have an
infantry guard at Hopewell Pass. The cavalry guard there will answer.”
GETTYSBURG 77

flank Hancock on either side. No such movement was
anticipated; that would make it safe. He could pass the
Bull Run Mountains early in the morning and cross
the Potomac early in the evening; in passing through the
army he would sever communication between Hooker
and Pleasanton. On the way a large portion of Hobdker’s
transportation would be destroyed. His cavalry would
be sent in pursuit of Stuart; that was the very thing Lee
wanted him to do. It would relieve his army from the
cavalry pressure and Stuart would be so far ahead that
Pleasanton could never overtake him. The best way to
protect General Lee’s communications was to assail Hooker’ s.
Small detachments from Stuart’s main column could
break up the canal to Edwards’ Ferry on the Potomac, and
railroad communication with Washington. The canal
was the line of supply for the depot just established at
Edwards’ Ferry, where a pontoon bridge had been laid
for crossing. ‘This would create a panic in Washington;
in all probability Hooker’s army would fall back for
supplies and to protect the capital. Ewell was in Mary-
land and Jenkins was making a raid into Pennsylvania;
it was not then known that General Lee would follow
him with Longstreet and Hill. Stuart would not, of course,
expect to return by the same route by which he had gone
into Maryland; but he could have easily joined Ewell
somewhere. north of the Potomac, as Hooker was still
on the south bank. ‘The truth is that General Lee was
doubtful, as his correspondence shows, when he first
reached the Valley, about following Ewell. When I
got back from my trip inside Hooker’s lines with my
78 STUART’S CAVALRY

drove of mules, Stuart told me that General Lee was
anxious to know if Hooker’s army was moving to cross
the Potomac. He did not ask me to go, but I volunteered
to return and find out for him. With two men I re-crossed
the mountain on the path where I had been bushwhacked
the day before; and on the morning of June 23 was again
riding between the camps of the different corps in Fair-
fax and Loudon. All was quiet; there was no sign of a
movement. Hooker was waiting for Lee. During the
day I sent two dispatches with some prisoners to Stuart
by the men who were with me. I remember very well
that one squad consisted of four lieutenants of Sickles’
corps. I was now all alone. It must not be supposed
that I was in disguise; I wore a Confederate major’s uni-
form. The camps of the different corps were so far
apart that it was easy to ride between them. After
gathering the information which General Lee wanted, I
turned my face late in the afternoon to the Bull Run
Mountain. I knew that Stuart would be anxious to see
me. In some way I lost my bearings and rode up to the
house of a farmer named John J. Coleman and inquired
the direction to the Little River pike. I told him who I
was and showed him my gray coat and star. A light
shower of rain was falling; an India rubber cape was
thrown over my shoulders, not for disguise, but to keep
me dry. I had been riding all day between the camps
with the cape rolled up and tied to my saddle. ‘The farmer
had never before seen me; he could not conceive it pos-
sible that a Confederate officer would be there in uniform
amongst the enemy’s camps. Reynolds with the First
GETTYSBURG 79

Corps was at Guilford about two miles off; the Third
Corps (Sickles’) was at Gum Springs about the same
distance in another direction; while Meade’s corps and
the cavalry were six or eight miles away at Aldie. Hooker’s
headquarters were behind me in Fairfax. Coleman re-
fused to tell me anything; he was sure that I was a Yankee
disguised in a Confederate uniform. While I was trying
to persuade him who I was I heard the tramp of horses
behind me. Looking back, I saw two cavalrymen riding
up; they took no notice of me but stopped to pick cherries
from a tree. I rode back to them and asked who they
were. They replied that they belonged to the Fifth
New York Cavalry and were just from General Reynolds’
headquarters.

They had ridden out from camp without arms. I
demanded their surrender; there was nothing else for
them to do. This transpired within sight of the farmer,
who was now sure that I was not a Confederate soldier and
that I wanted to trap him. We rode to the gate where
he was still standing. I finally prevailed on him to point
towards the turnpike. As I could not surround them,
I then made the prisoners tie their horses together with a
halter strap, and we rode away. It was not long before
we were good friends; I told them who I was. My name
was quite a familiar one in their camps at that time, and
seemed to have put them under a spell. When we got in
sight of the pike a long train of wagons with a large escort
of cavalry was passing. To get to the mountain I would
have to cross the pike. I knew I could not find the
narrow path over it in the dark; it was near sundown; if
80 STUART’S CAVALRY

I waited for the train to pass out of my way it would be
night. It was important for me to see Stuart. So I
concluded to take the greatest risk that I took in the war —
to ride with my prisoners through the wagons and column
of cavalry. The rubber cape partly concealed my gray
coat; but I did not put much reliance in the cape. It
would attract no attention to see a man dressed in a gray
suit riding in a column of blue-coats. He could not be
a spy, as he was not in disguise; and it would be presumed
that no Confederate soldier would dare to be there in
uniform. But I chiefly relied on the prisoners to protect
me from discovery. They rode by my side; there was
nothing to indicate that they were prisoners; they ap-
peared to be my companions, or an officer’s escort. I
held my pistol under my cape and warned the men against
giving any sign to their friends. We rode on to the pike
through a gap in the fence; I had calculated on going
straight across, but there was a high fence with no gap
on the other side.

I knew a road a hundred yards ahead that led from the
pike. I determined to go on. It was my intention, if
discovered, to dash speedily away. I was on a fast horse
and I was afraid my prisoners would betray me if I dis-
mounted to pull down the fence. So, ordering them to
keep close to my side, we went on at a trot through the
column and turned off on the road leading toward the
mountain. In passing through the cavalry my right
elbow jostled against a cavalrymen. He took no excep-
tion to my rudeness. If he had I would have said, “Ex-
cuse me,” and ridden on. The prisoners seemed to be
GETTYSBURG 81

in a dazed condition. I remember that one of them asked
me after we had passed through the column if those were
our cavalry or theirs. It was now dark and I had not
reached the foot of the mountain; I was afraid to sleep
with my prisoners alone like the babes in the wood; so
we stopped at a house. They signed their paroles and
started to walk home. I got to Stuart early the next
morning. He listened to what I told him, wrote a dis-
patch, sent off a courier to General Lee, and then laughed
over my adventure. The information was that Hooker’s
army was still resting in the camps where it had been
for a week. General Lee arrived at Berryville on the
18th; he was waiting for Hill’s corps that had reached
the Valley on the 21st and moved on to Charlestown.
On the 15th Rodes’ division of Ewell’s corps, with
Jenkins’ cavalry, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport;
Jenkins went on to Chambersburg, but had returned to
Hagerstown; Johnson’s division followed, and on the 22d
Early crossed at Shepherdstown and moved to Boons-
boro at the foot of South Mountain — which is an exten-
sion of the Blue Ridge. Early’s division had been kept
back to threaten Harper’s Ferry. The army was now
closed up and Lee was ready to move. It has been repre-
sented by his biographer (Long) that Gettysburg was
his objective point when he left Fredericksburg, and that
he expected to fight a decisive battle there. The story
has no more foundation than the legend of Romulus.
General Lee’s cotemporaneous correspondence con-
tradicts it. He had just won a great tactical victory at
Chancellorsville, but he reaped no fruits from it. His
82 STUART’S CAVALRY

report says that he took the offensive in order to com-
pel the Northern army “to leave Virginia and possibly
to draw to its support troops designed to operate against
other parts of the country. In this way it was supposed
that the enemy’s plans of campaign for the summer would
be broken up, and a part of the season of active opera-
tions be consumed in the formation of new combinations
and the preparations that they would require.”

If Gettysburg had been his objective point he would have
marched directly there from Hagerstown on the road
through the Monterey pass by which he retreated. A
straight line is the shortest distance between two points.
On June 8 he wrote from Culpeper to Mr. Seddon,
Secretary of War: “As far as I can judge, there is nothing
to be gained by this army remaining quietly on the defen-
sive, which it must, unless it can be reinforced. I am
aware there is difficulty and hazard in taking the aggres-
sive with so large an army in its front intrenched behind
a river where it cannot be advantageously attacked.
Unless it can be drawn out in a position to be assailed, it
will take its own time to prepare and strengthen itself
to renew its advance upon Richmond and force this army
back within the intrenchments of that city. This may
be the result in any event; still I think it worth a trial to
prevent the catastrophe. Still, if the Department thinks
it better to remain on the defensive and guard, as far as
possible, all avenues of approach and wait the time of
the enemy, I am ready to adopt this course. You have,
therefore, only to inform me.” .

Mr. Seddon concurred in these views, but called atten-
GETTYSBURG 83

tion to the defenseless condition of Richmond at that
time. There is no intimation in this letter of invasion;
I do not think at that time General Lee had any more
definite plan than to capture Milroy’s force in the Shenan-
doah Valley, and manceuver the Northern army out of
Virginia. All that he meant by aggressive action was a
strategic, not a tactical offensive.

On the 19th, writing to Ewell, who was at Hagerstown,
General Lee said: “I very much regret that you have
not the benefit of your whole corps, for, with that north
of the Potomac, should we be able to detain General
Hooker’s army from following you, you would be able
to accomplish as much unmolested as the whole army
could perform with General Hooker in its front. If your
advance causes Hooker to cross the Potomac, or separate
his army in any way, Longstreet can follow you. The
last of Hill’s divisions had, on the evening of the 18th,
advanced a few miles this side of Culpeper Court-house
en route to the Valley.”

Ewell had not then been ordered to go into Pennsylvania,
and it seems that Longstreet’s following Ewell depended
entirely on Hooker. Hooker did not follow Ewell, but
kept between Lee and Washington. General Lee could
not have expected that if his whole army crossed the
Potomac, Hooker would stand still in Virginia. Some
of his biographers and eulogists seem to think so — three
of his staff officers say so.

From Berryville on June 23 he wrote to President
Davis: “If an army can be organized under command
of General Beauregard and pushed forward to Culpeper
84 STUART’S CAVALRY

Court-house, threatening Washington from that direction,
it would not only effect a diversion most favorable for
this army, but would, I think, relieve us from any appre-
hension of attack upon Richmond during our absence.”

If it had been practicable to raise such an army, as the
campaign closed the next week at Gettysburg, it could
not have been assembled in time to render any assistance
to General Lee in the Pennsylvania campaign. On the
day (19th) that General Lee wrote to Ewell in what event
Longstreet would follow him, he wrote again to Mr.
Davis saying that — “Ewell, with two divisions, has ad-
vanced from the Potomac towards Pennsylvania. His
Third (Early’s) is retained near Shepherdstown for the
present to guard his flank and rear. General Long-
street’s corps on the Ashby’s and Snicker’s Gap roads
threatens the enemy, who is massed between him and
Washington. General Stuart’s cavalry is operating in
his front. I hope the First division of A. P. Hill’s corps
will reach here to-day, so that Early may be relieved and
follow Ewell. All attempts of the enemy to penetrate
the mountains have been repulsed by Stuart’s cavalry,
who yesterday again drove him from Middleburg, and
by reports received last evening the enemy’s infantry
have evacuated Aldie. [Meade’s corps had not left
Aldie.] Indications seem to be that his main body 1s pro-
ceeding towards the Potomac, whether upon Harper's
Ferry or to cross the river east of it 1s not yet known. The
difficulty of procuring supplies retards and renders more
uncertain our future movements.” [Italics mine. ]

It appears, therefore, that General Lee was aware that
GETTYSBURG 85

Hooker was preparing to cross the Potomac; he could
not then have been surprised when he heard he had crossed.
Again, on the 20th, he wrote Mr. Davis: “Lieutenant-
Colonel [E. V.] White of the cavalry has cut the Baltimore
and Ohio east of Point of Rocks.t General Milroy has
abandoned the south side of the Potomac, occupying
Harper’s Ferry with a picket, and holds the Maryland
Heights with about 8000 (11,000) men. General Ewell’s
corps is north of the Potomac, occupying Sharpsburg,
Boonsboro, and Hagerstown. His advance cavalry is at
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. The first division of A. P.
Hill’s corps will reach this vicinity to-day; the rest follow.

1 Colonel White’s report to Stuart says: “I crossed the Potomac last
night (17th) about three miles above the Point of Rocks; broke the rail-
road and the telegraph wires at that point; then moved down to the
Point of Rocks, at which place I attacked the enemy, killed 4, wounded
20 and captured 53, including three commissioned officers. I cap-
tured a train of cars and a number of wagons together withalarge amount
of baggage and camp equipage, which were burned.”

Captain Semmes says: “‘On June 17 I was ordered by General Tyler,
in company with Captain Vernon’s company, to go to the Point of Rocks
and hold the position. Before we got there we were attacked by White’s
battalion; we were overpowered and whipped.”

This affair happened on the day that Stuart arrived at Middleburg.
Point of Rocks is where the B. and O. railroad is located on the bank
of the Potomac and is ten or twelve miles east of Harper’s Ferry. After
that affair, troops were sent there and to the mouth of the Monocacy.
Longstreet’s book says he wanted Stuart to cross at Point of Rocks.
Stuart could not have crossed there. Point of Rocks is not mentioned
in his correspondence with Stuart. He gave no such advice or order.
He told Stuart to go through Hopewell Gap in rear of the enemy. But
in going by Hopewell Stuart would have to go in an opposite direction
from Point of Rocks; besides Point of Rocks was between and in front
of both armies and in the rear of neither.
86 STUART’S CAVALRY

General Longstreet’s corps, with Stuart’s cavalry, still
occupy the Blue Ridge between the roads leading through
Ashby’s and Snicker’s Gaps, holding in check a large
force of the enemy consisting of cavalry, infantry, and
artillery. The movement of the main body of the enemy
ts still toward the Potomac, but its real destination is not
yet discovered.”

Again, on the 23d he wrote Mr. Davis: “ Reports of the
movements of the enemy east of the Blue Ridge cause me to
believe that he is preparing to cross the Potomac. A pontoon
bridge is said to be laid at Edwards’ Ferry, and his army
corps, that he had advanced to Leesburg and the foot of the
mountains, appears to be withdrawing. ‘Their attempts to
penetrate the mountains have been successfully repelled
by Genral Stuart with the cavalry. General Stuart last
night was within a few miles of Aldie, to which point the
enemy had retired. Evwell’s corps is in motion towards the
Susquehanna. General A. P. Hill’s corps is moving
[from Charlestown] towards the Potomac; his leading
division will reach Shepherdstown to-day. I have with-
drawn Longstreet west of the Shenandoah and, if nothing
prevents, he will follow to-morrow.” [Italics mine.]

These letters show that General Lee knew that it was
Hooker’s intention to follow him across the Potomac.
The truth is, General Lee’s fears of Hooker’s crossing
the river ahead of him, or that he was moving in that
direction, were not justified by the information that Stuart
had given him. The itinerary of the Army of the Potomac
shows only a few slight changes in the positions of the
seven corps between the 18th and the 25th of June.
GETTYSBURG 87

Hooker’s headquarters were at Fairfax. It is strange that
no part of that army had been sent in pursuit of Ewell. I
think it was because Hooker did not think that Lee would
cross the Potomac. On the 22d Ewell received orders
to move on to the Susquehanna. He was told that it
would depend upon the quantity of supplies he found in
the country, whether the Confederate army followed him
or not.'

“Tf Harrisburg comes within your way,” General Lee
said, “capture it.” This was not an order; it simply
gave Ewell full discretion to go there, or not to go, accord-
ing to circumstances. He further said: “General A. P.
Hill arrived yesterday in the vicinity of Berryville. I shall
move him on to-day, if possible. Saturday Longstreet
withdrew from the Blue Ridge. Yesterday the enemy
pressed our cavalry so hard with infantry and cavalry
on the Upperville road that McLaws’ division had to be
sent back to hold Ashby’s Gap. I have not yet heard
from there this morning.” ‘General Stuart could not
ascertain whether it was intended as a real advance
toward the Valley or to ascertain our position.”

1In his report dated August 20, 1863, Stuart estimated Jenkins’
cavalry brigade at 3800 men. General Rodes, in his report, speaks
incidentally of Jenkins being 1600 strong. Stuart took command of
Jenkins in Pennsylvania, and at the date of his report Jenkins’ brigade
was on duty with him at Culpeper. As Jenkins’ returns were in his
adjutant’s office, it is not probable that he would greatly have over-
estimated his strength. In addition to Jenkins, there were with Ewell,
Emack’s Maryland battalion, White’s and Gilmor’s cavalry battalions,
and Randolph’s company. It is a low estimate to place the total of this
force at 3000 cavalry. These operated on Ewell’s right; on his left was
Imboden’s brigade of mounted infantry and cavalry.
88 STUART’S CAVALRY

Tt was only a reconnaissance that Pleasanton made on
the 21st. Early the next morning he returned to Aldie.
After hearing from Stuart that Pleasanton had gone back,
General Lee at 3.30 p.m. on the same day wrote to Ewell:
“T have just received your letter of this morning from
opposite Shepherdstown. Mine of to-day, authorizing
you to move towards the Susquehanna, I hope has reached
you ere this. After dispatching my letter, learning that
the enemy had not renewed his attempts of yesterday to
break through the Blue Ridge, I directed General R. H.
Anderson’s division [of Hill’s corps] to commence its march
towards Shepherdstown. It will reach there to-morrow.
I also directed General Stuart, should the enemy have so
jar retired from his front as to permit of the departure of a
portion of his cavalry, to march with three brigades across
the Potomac and place himself on your right and in com-
munication with you, keep you advised of the movements
of the enemy and assist in collecting supplies for the army.
T have not heard from him since. [Italics mine.] I also
directed Imboden, if opportunity offered, to cross the
Potomac and perform the same offices on your left. I
shall endeavor to get Early’s regiments to him as soon as
possible. I do not know what has become of the infantry
of the Maryland line. I had intended that to guard
Winchester.”

This letter settles a question that has been raised whether
Stuart’s instructions required him to remain in Virginia
and march north on the right flank of the two corps that
were with Lee, or to move to Pennsylvania and join Ewell
on the Susquehanna. General Lee’s staff officers say
GETTYSBURG 89

that he was ordered to march into Pennsylvania on Long-
street’s right flank between him and the enemy; the record
says he was not. As they were widely separated he could
not be with Longstreet and Ewell at the same time. When
this letter was written, Ewell was marching north; Long-
street and Hill were still in Virginia and had received no
orders to go to Pennsylvania. Stuart did not possess
the power of the Genius of Aladdin’s Lamp; he could not
act as Ewell’s Chief of Cavalry on the Susquehanna and
watch Hooker with Longstreet on the Potomac. General
Lee’s staff officers say he ought to have done it. I do
not think he possessed any such magical power.
This is General Lee’s letter of instructions to Stuart:

June 22nd, 1863.
Masor-GEneRaL Stuart: —

GENERAL: I have just received your note of 7.45 this morning to
General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were
to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is
satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he
will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware.
[Italics mine.] If you find that he is moving northward and that two
brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can
move with the other three into Maryland and take position on General
Ewell’s right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank,
keep him informed of the enemy’s movements and collect all the supplies
you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell’s army
will probably move towards the Susquehanna by the Emmitisburg route,
another by Chambersburg. Accounts from last night state that there
was no enemy west of Frederick. A cavalry force (about 100) guarded
the Monocacy bridge, which was barricaded. You will of course take
charge of Jenkins’ brigade and give necessary instructions.

At that time Longstreet’s corps was at the Gaps of the
Blue Ridge; Stuart was guarding the approaches from
90 STUART’S CAVALRY

the east; he was brought into contact with Longstreet and,
to some extent, under his orders. His correspondence
with General Lee at that time passed through General
Longstreet. This was to produce concert of action.
The above letter of instructions to Stuart was sent to
Longstreet and subject to his approval.

June 22, 1863, 7.30 P.M.
Genera R. E. LEE: —

GeneRAL: Yours of 4 o’clock this afternoon is received. I have
forwarded your letter to General Stuart with the suggestion that he pass
by the enemy’s rear if he thinks that he may get through. We have
seen nothing of the enemy to-day. [Italics mine.]

Most Respectfully,
James LonGsTrEet,
Lieutenant-General, etc.

Mittwoop, June 22, 1863, 7 p.m.
Masor-GeneraL, J. E. B. Struart:—

Genera: General Lee has enclosed to me this letter for you, to be
forwarded to you provided you can be spared from my front, and pro-
vided I think you can cross the Potomac without disclosing our plans.
He speaks of your leaving via Hopewell Gap [Bull Run Mountain} and
passing by the rear of the enemy. [Italics are mine.] Ij you can get through
by that route I think you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are
than if you should cross by passing to our rear. [Shepherdstown.] I
forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions. Please advise
me of the conditions of affairs before you leave and order General Hamp-
ton — whom I suppose you will leave here in command — to report to
me at Millwood, either by letter or in person, as may be agreeable to
him. Most Respectfully,

James LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General.

N.B. I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear [Shepherds-
town] at the present moment will in a measure disclose our plans. You
had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route
in rear of the enemy. [Italics mine.]
GETTYSBURG 91

General Lee’s letter of the 22d to Stuart, which was
sent through Longstreet, simply directed him, in the event
that the enemy “is moving northward,” to leave two
brigades to guard the Gaps, and, with the other three,
to place himself on Ewell’s right on the Susquehanna.
It did not suggest by what route he should go. But
Longstreet’s letter, forwarding it to Stuart, says that
General Lee, in a letter to him, spoke of his going through
Hopewell Gap in the Bull Run Mountain; and he urges
Stuart to go that route and around the rear of the enemy.
In directing Stuart to join Ewell, if the enemy was moving
northward, General Lee clearly did not mean that he
was only to do so if Hooker’s army was actually i motion
to the north, but if he was satisfied that its general trend
and direction were that way. There was a bare possi-
bility that Hooker might turn his face toward Richmond;
General Lee wanted Stuart to be on his back if he turned.

On the morning of the 24th, when I reported to Stuart
the situation of Hooker’s army, he had received another
letter of instructions from General Lee. It differed' from
the first in suggesting to Stuart to cross the Potomac in
Hooker’s rear. I suppose he did so because he had heard
from General Longstreet that he wanted Stuart to go
that way; and General Lee seems to have suggested in a
letter to Longstreet that Stuart might go through the
Hopewell Gap in the Bull Run Mountain. I have quoted
Longstreet’s letter to Stuart advising him “to pass by the
enemy's rear,” if possible.

In conference with Stuart that day it was arranged that

1Dated June 3rd.
92 STUART’S CAVALRY

I should again cross the Bull Run Mountain with my small
command and meet him the next day at a designated point
on the Little River turnpike. There I was to take com-
mand of his advance as it moved on through Hooker’s army
to Seneca Ford. Ewell was then in the Cumberland Val-
ley with Rodes’ and Johnson’s divisions. Early was mov-
ing north on a parallel line near the western base of South
Mountain. Ewell had an abundance of cavalry with him.

Imboden with a considerable body of mounted troops
moved on his left to Mercersburg. With Ewell’s cavalry
were two battalions commanded by Colonel Lije White
and Major Harry Gilmor. ‘They had been detached and
sent with Ewell and Early because White and Gilmor
were regarded as two of the boldest cavalry leaders in
the Southern army; and many of their men were
from Maryland and their homes were on the border.
Gilmor was from Baltimore; Colonel White lived on the
Potomac. Their knowledge of the country would make
them valuable as guides and in procuring information.
French’s cavalry regiment and White’s battalion went
east with Early to York. Ewell arrived at Carlisle on the
27th. On the 24th Early halted on the pike leading from
Chambersburg to Gettysburg and went to see Ewell. He
received orders to move east through the Cashtown pass
to York, cut the railroad between Baltimore and Harris-
burg, to destroy the bridge over the Susquehanna, and
then to join Ewell at Carlisle. Before he got to Cashtown,
a village on the pike at the eastern base of the South
Mountain (Blue Ridge), he turned to his left on the Mum-
masburg road, but sent Gordon’s brigade to Gettysburg.
GETTYSBURG 93

Gordon camped at Gettysburg that night and Early
rode to the town to see him in the evening. If Gettys-
burg had been General Lee’s objective point, as historians
say, it is remarkable that he did not instruct Early to hold
it when he had it; and that he should have marched such a
roundabout way (via Chambersburg) to get there. His
military secretary and biographer, Long, says that at
Fredericksburg, just before the campaign began, General
Lee traced the lines of march of his army on a map, and
pointing to Gettysburg said there the great battle would
be fought. This is fiction. I doubt if General Lee at
that time had ever heard of such a place. It was of no
strategic value. A military writer of high authority
defines a strategic point as being “Any point or region
in the theater of warlike operations which affords ‘to its
possessors an advantage over his opponent — every point
in the theater of war, the possession of which is of great
importance to an army in its military operations, is a
strategical point. There are points which an army act-
ing on the offensive strives to gain; the army on the de-
fensive strives to retain.” Gettysburg offered no such
offensive or defensive advantages. On the day before
the battle the commander of neither army wanted to get
possession of it; and either was willing for the other to
have it and hold it. Meade, who had superseded Hooker,
held it simply as a cavalry outpost; General Lee had no
thought of going there. '

Some writers have said it was a place of military impor-
tance because it was the center from-which so many roads
radiated. That was the very thing that made it weak
94 STUART’S CAVALRY

and untenable. It was so easy to approach it from any
direction and to turn it. An army on the Ridge had a
tactical advantage in an attack on its front; but the at-
tacking force had the choice of turning its flanks. On
the second day of the battle Meade was still doubtful
about holding the position. He feared a movement
around him toward Washington; which, it is said, Long-

street advised.
MEADE TO HALLECK

July 2, 1863, 3 p.m.

If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the po-
sition of the enemy, which will justify me in so doing, I shall attack.
If I find it hazardous to do so, or am satisfied the enemy is endeavoring
to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall
fall back to my supplies at Westminster.

The great objection to Lee’s army occupying the place,
even if the enemy did not oppose it, was that its front did
not cover its line of communication, or of retreat to the
Potomac. It was compelled, in military language, to
form a front to a flank. Such a formation is always
avoided, if possible. This was McClellan’s weakness on
the Chickahominy; Lee took advantage of it and sent
Stuart and Jackson to cut him off from his base on the
Pamunkey, and force him to retreat by the flank to a
new base on the James. A retreat under such circum-
stances is always a difficult and hazardous operation.

General Lee discovered this on his retreat to the Po-
tomac with the enemy on his flanks. Historians have
represented — notably Lee’s staff officers, Colonel Taylor,
General Long, Colonel Marshall and also Fitz-Hugh Lee
— that it was owing to the absence of the cavalry that his
GETTYSBURG 95

adversary by celerity of movement got ahead of him; which
implies that Gettysburg was their objective point. Now,
on July 1,at 12 noon, when the battle was raging at Gettys-
burg (but Meade, who was fifteen miles away had not
heard of it; neither had Lee), he sent a dispatch to
Halleck, “I shall not advance any, but prepare to receive
an attack in case Lee makes one. A battle-field is being
selected in the rear, on which the army can be rapidly
concentrated on Pipe Creek between Middleburg and
Manchester, covering my: depot at Westminster.”

Meade had intended to move on July 1 away from
Gettysburg and nearer the Susquehanna. In a letter
to Pleasanton on June 30, Butterfield, his chief of staff,
said that his “projected movement is towards the line
of the Baltimore and Harrisburg railroad. His instruc-
tions require him to cover Baltimore and Washington,
while his objective point is the army under Lee.”

As Early was at York, Ewell at Carlisle with Jenkins’
cavalry skirmishing in the suburbs of Harrisburg, while
Stuart was moving to the east to join them with a long
wagon-train he had captured, Meade concluded that Lee
would concentrate somewhere on the Susquehanna. On
the night of June 30, Reynolds with three corps was about
Emmittsburg, ten miles from Gettysburg; the other corps
were off to the east and heading for the Susquehanna.
Early in the morning Reynolds, without hearing from
Meade, moved in the direction of Gettysburg; not to fight
a battle but simply in observation. Buford’s cavalry
division had occupied the place the day before. The
news that the Confederates were falling back from Carlisle
96 STUART’S CAVALRY

and York had not reached Meade on June 30. Stuart
had cut the telegraph wire. But after Reynolds had
received orders to move to Gettysburg, Meade got news
from Harrisburg that the Confederates had evacuated
Carlisle and York, and were apparently concentrating
at Chambersburg. So he immediately issued a circular
informing corps commanders that his object had been
accomplished in compelling the enemy to withdraw from
the line of the Susquehanna.

“Tf the enemy assume the offensive,” he said, “and
attack, it is my intention, after holding them in check
sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other impedi-
menta, to withdraw the army from its present position
and form a line of battle with the left resting in the neigh-
borhood of Middleburg and the right at Manchester, the
general direction being that of Pipe Creek.”

Tn a letter to Reynolds on July 1, the last he ever wrote
him, Meade said, “The movement of your troops at Gettys-
burg was ordered before the positive knowledge of the
enemy’s withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration
was received.”

Orders were immediately issued for the army to fall
back if the Confederates advanced. But Reynolds was
killed and never received Meade’s order to withdraw to
Pipe Creek. If he had received it that morning before
starting from camp, no battle would have been fought at
Gettysburg. Yet, according to historians, there was a
race between Lee and Meade to get to Gettysburg. So
say General Lee’s staff officers. Reynolds had camped
on the night of June 30, between Emmittsburg and Gettys-
GETTYSBURG 97

burg. When he reached Gettysburg he found Buford’s
cavalry engaged with Heth’s division that was advancing
on the pike from Cashtown. Buford knew that Hill was
at Cashtown, and that Ewell was ten miles north at
Heidlersburg the night before. He could not have ex-
pected to do more than to hold the Confederates in check.
Instead of forming his line of battle on Cemetery Ridge
with Buford’s cavalry on his flanks, Reynolds abandoned
that strong position and moved two miles out on the Cash-
town road with his infantry to join Buford. He then had
Hill in his front and Ewell on his flank. The result of his
tactical error was a defeat for which he paid the penalty
of his life. His monument on the field perpetuates the
memory of a heroic action and a great blunder. If
Reynolds’ object in leaving the Ridge and going to meet
Hill had been to lure the Southern army to a place where
it must fight at a disadvantage, then he would have re-
produced Hannibal’s stratagem of the battle on the Trebia.
Mommsen says: “From the earliest hour of the morn-
ing the Roman light troops had been skirmishing with the
light cavalry of the enemy; the latter slowly retreated
and the Romans eagerly pursued it through the deeply
swollen Trebia, so as to follow up the advantage which
they had gained. Suddenly it halted; the Roman van-
guard found itself face to face with the army of Hannibal
drawn up for battle on a field chosen by himself; it was
lost unless the main body should cross the stream with
speed to its support.” The main body crossed, but the
Romans lost. Reynolds did by accident what Hannibal
did by design.
98 STUART’S CAVALRY

On the morning of June 24, General, Lee left Berryville
with Longstreet’s corps to unite with Ewell, who was
then in Pennsylvania on the road to Carlisle; he crossed
the Potomac the next day at Williamsport and spent two
days in the neighborhood of Hagerstown. Maryland is
only about ten miles wide where he crossed.

On the night of the 26th his headquarters were near
the State line. His intention evidently was to keep in
close contact with Hooker who was crossing the river east
of the Blue Ridge at Edwards’ Ferry on the same day.
He did not want to get too far ahead of Hooker; he might
turn back and march on Richmond as Sherman marched,
after Hood left him, from Atlanta through Georgia. If
he did, Lee would be close on his heels and would have the
choice of pursuing him, or of taking Washington and Balti-
more.

A. P. Hill, with Heth’s and Pender’s divisions, also
crossed the Potomac on the 25th at Shepherdstown;
Anderson’s division had crossed on the 24th and had
gone on to Boonsboro near South Mountain. Early had
just left there and had marched north along the western
base of the mountain. Anderson was sent to the Pass as
a feint to create the impression that the Confederates
were moving east. The object was to draw Hooker over
the river in pursuit. General Lee here repeated the
strategy that drew Hooker away from the Rappahannock.

On June 25, writing from Williamsport to Mr. Davis,
General Lee said: “I have not sufficient troops to main-
tain my communications and have to abandon them. I
think I can throw General Hooker’s army across the
GETTYSBURG 99

Potomac and draw troops from the South; embarrassing
their plan of campaign in a measure, if I do nothing else
and have to return. I still hope that all things will end
well for us at Vicksburg.”

This letter is not an afterthought written in despair when
his plans had been defeated and his hopes were blasted,

‘but a part of the res geste of the campaign and a key to
his operations. It discloses the fact thathe was manceuver-
ing to draw Hooker out of Virginia and not invading hostile
territory with any expectation of conquest or occupation;
or of dictating a peace on Northern soil. His main object
seemed to be to throw Hooker over the Potomac; the
incidental advantage would be that it would create a
diversion and cause troops to be brought from the South
in defense of the North. By abandoning his communi-
cations he meant that as he had no base of supply he would
subsist on the country and no line of communication
would be necessary; as for ordnance stores and ammu-
nition, he took with him all he expected to need.

That he was not in the least sensitive about his rear is
shown by the fact that he had marched by Harper’s Ferry
and made no effort to compel the garrison of 11,000 men
to abandon it. Yet up to the day of the battle there was
continuous and uninterrupted intercourse between Lee’s
army and the Potomac. The reason was that Hooker
had sent nearly all his cavalry after Stuart to defend
his own communications with Washington. An English
officer, Colonel Freemantle, a guest at Longstreet’s head-
quarters, in his diary speaks of the spoils that Ewell was
sending back.
100 STUART’S CAVALRY

“June 25. We took leave of Mrs. —— and her hos-
pitable family, and started to overtake Generals Lee and
Longstreet, who were supposed to be crossing the Potomac
at Williamsport. Before we got more than a few miles
on our way we began to meet the first fruits of Ewell’s
advance into Pennsylvania.

“June 26th. The town of Williamsport is on a bank
of the river and we were now in Maryland. We had the
mortification to learn that Generals Lee and Longstreet
had quitted Williamsport this morning at 11 o’clock and
were obliged to toil on to Hagerstown, six miles further.

“June 27th. After riding eight miles I came up with
General Longstreet at 6.30 a.m., and was just in time as
he was on the point of moving. Both he and his staff
were most kind when I introduced myself and stated my
difficulties. . . . General Longstreet is an Alabamian, a
thick-set and determined looking man, forty-three years
old. . . . He is never far from General Lee, who relies
very much on his judgment. By the soldiers he is favor-
ably spoken of as the ‘best fighter in the army.’...
This part of Pennsylvania is very flourishing, highly
cultivated and, in comparison with the Southern States,
thickly peopled. But all the cattle and horses have been
seized by Ewell, farm labor had come to a complete stand-
still. . . . I entered Chambersburg at 6 p.m. ... The
women (many of whom are pretty and well dressed) were
particularly sour and disagreeable in their remarks. I
heard one of them say: ‘Look at Pharaoh and his army
going to the Red Sea.’ . . . Others were pointing and
laughing at Hood’s ragged Jacks, who were passing at the
GETTYSBURG 101

time. .. . They answered the numerous taunts of the
ladies with cheers and laughter. One female had seen
fit to adorn her ample bosom with a huge Yankee flag, and
she stood at the door of her house, her countenance ex-
pressing the greatest contempt for the bare-footed Rebs;
several companies passed her without taking any notice,
but at last a Texan gravely remarked; ‘Take care, madam,
for Hood’s boys is great for storming breastworks when
the Yankee colors is on them.’ After this speech the
patriotic lady beat a precipitate retreat... . I found
Generals Lee and Longstreet encamped on the latter
(Gettysburg) road, three quarters of a mile from the town
(Chambersburg). . . . Ewell, after the capture of Win-
chester, had advanced rapidly into Pennsylvania and has
already sent back great quantities of horses, mules, wagons,
beeves, and other necessities. He is now at or beyond
Carlisle, laying the country under contribution and making
Pennsylvania support the war instead of poor, used-up
and worn-out Virginia. The corps of A. P. Hill and
Longstreet are now near this place, full of confidence and
high spirits. . . . June 30. This morning, before march-
ing from Chambersburg, General Longstreet introduced
me to the Commander-in-Chief. General Lee is almost
without exception the handsomest man of his age I ever
saw. . . . It is impossible to please Longstreet more than
by praising Lee. I believe these two generals to be as
little ambitious and as thoroughly unselfish as any men in
the world.”

On the 25th and 26th, while General Lee, with the
corps of Hill and Longstreet, was resting in Maryland
102 STUART’S CAVALRY

near the South Mountain (Blue Ridge), Hooker’s army,
after crossing the river below Harper’s Ferry, was march-
ing to seize the Gaps. The itinerary of the army of the
Potomac shows that at that time two corps with cavalry
had already reached Middletown and Jefferson in the
Catoctin Valley near the eastern base of the mountain.
Another corps was near at Point of Rocks. It must be
presumed that the Confederate generals used every avail-
able means to discover the whereabouts and movements
of the énemy. It would be proof of their incapacity if
they neglected to do it. It is a conclusive presumption in
law that a party has notice and that he has used due dili-
gence to acquire knowledge of a fact when there are cir-
cumstances sufficient to put him on inquiry about it.
General Lee was making manceuvers to throw Hooker
over the river and he knew, as he says, that Hooker had
thrown a pontoon over it; it is incredible that he did not
have a vidette and a signal station on the mountain to
inform him when his object had been accomplished. That
he was guilty of such negligence I cannot believe — even
on the testimony of the staff officers. The pontoon bridge
was notice of Hooker’s intention to cross, and should have
put General Lee on inquiry to find out when he was cross-
ing. With each army corps was a signal corps; from a
mountain peak a scout, or a signal officer, could have seen
a host in the Valley below, — “like the leaves of the forest
when summer is green.”

A cavalry force was not required to find this out; one
man on the mountain could have done it as well as a
thousand. Hooker made more use of his signal officers
GETTYSBURG 103

than of his cavalry to get information. I have spoken
of the capture of one he had sent to establish a station
on the Blue Ridge to overlook the Shenandoah Valley.
On June 23, Tyler, at Harper’s Ferry, telegraphed
Hooker, who was then at Fairfax: “The signal officer
reports that the atmosphere is clear and that he can see
a line of troops ten or twelve miles long, moving from
the direction of Berryville towards Shepherdstown Ford.
It looks like Lee’s movement towards Hagerstown in
Pennsylvania.”

It was Anderson’s division, the advance of A. P. Hill’s
corps. On the 24th the signal officer discovered the
movements of Longstreet’s and Hill’s corps, and Tyler
again telegraphed to Hooker: “The following is just
received from the signal station —‘the wagon train that
was near Shepherdstown last night is now crossing the
river near Sharpsburg. A large train extending as far as
I can see on the Berryville road is passing Charlestown
towards Shepherdstown. I see artillery with it.’”

General Lee was then marching to the Potomac. This
premature movement of Longstreet’s and Hill’s troops in
sight of the signal station on Maryland Heights, as dis-
closed in the above dispatches, made the Gettysburg cam-
paign the Iliad of the South. It set Hooker's army in
motion jor the Potomac the next day. I shall refer to
it again.

The following dispatch shows that Hooker’s signal
officer thought that the Confederates would have signal
stations on the South Mountain as they had reached there
first:
104 STUART’S CAVALRY

SLOCUM TO HOOKER
June 23rd, 1863, 10 p.m.
The signal officer at Point of Rocks reports a large force of the enemy
at Shepherdstown, encamped on the south side of the river; they have
not crossed yet.
TYLER TO HOOKER
: Harperr’s Ferry, June 23, a.m.
Captain Daniels, the Signal officer, reports this morning as follows:
view this morning is very fine. The enemy’s camps are all gone in
the vicinity of Sharpsburg and only a few troops left. But I can not see
where they have gone. A long line of troops with wagon train can be
seen coming towards Charlestown on a road south of the place.

CAPTAIN DANIELS TO MYERS, SIGNAL OFFICER
June 23, 1863.
Enemy that were in Sharpsburg yesterday have gone. Rear of the
train is in sight, going north to Hagerstown. A wagon and artillery
train is now passing through Charlestown towards Shepherdstown, 10
miles in length, accompanied by infantry and cavalry.

WILLIAMS, A. A. G., TO FRENCH, HARPER’S FERRY
Famrax C. H., June 24th.

The General suggests that you keep the signal officers employed
and order them to secure commanding points for observation.

BABCOCK (signal officer) TO HOOKER
June 24th.

I learn beyond a doubt that the last of Lee’s entire army has passed
through Martinsburg towards the Potomac. . . . The main body are
crossing at Shepherdstown. . . . I can see them from the Mountain. . .
Large bodies of troops can be seen from South Mountain at Antietam
Furnace by aid of a glass.

WILLIAMS, A. A. G., TO HOWARD, EDWARD’S FERRY ’

June 24th, 11.35 p.m.

The Commanding-General directs that your corps take up the line
of march early to-morrow morning for Sandy Hook, in the vicinity of
Harper’s Ferry, reaching that place to-morrow afternoon.
GETTYSBURG 105

8AME TO FRENCH AT HARPER’S FERRY

The General [Hooker] suggests that you keep the signal officers
employed and order them to secure commanding points.

HOOKER TO REYNOLDS, EDWARD'S FERRY
June 25th, 1863, 12.40 p.m.
Your dispatch, 9.45 p.m., received. General Howard has received
orders directing him to report to you, and states that he has sent a staff
officer to report to you. His headquarters to-night are at Jefferson.
In Catoctin Valley near South Mountain.

Orfice or THE SicnaL Orricnr,
WasHineTon, June 25th, 1863
Stenau Orricer, Maryland Heights: —
What has become of the immense trains reported from your station
as moving through Charlestown to Shepherdstown ?
Ausert J. Myer.

HOOKER TO HANCOCK, THOROUGHFARE GAP
June 25th, 1863, 7 a.m.
On receipt of this order take up your line of march to Edwards’
Ferry. Your best line will be via Sudley Springs and Gum Springs.
The last named place you should reach to-night.

Orrice or THE SicnaL OFFicrr,
WasHineTon, June 25th, 1863.
Carrain L. B. Norton, Chief Signal Officer,
Headquarters Army of the Potomac: —

If any considerable portion of the Army of the Potomac is moving
north in Maryland, either in the Middletown Valley or east of the Catoctin
Ridge, suggest to General Butterfield to keep the crest of the South
Mountain and Catoctin Ridge clear of the enemy’s scouts and signal
officers by scouting parties of our cavalry. Send some of our [signal]
officers with the cavalry. 1

Apert J. Myer, Colonel and Signal-Officer.

1 WILLIAMS, A. A. G., TO PLEASANTON
June 25th, 1863, 7.10 p.m.
The commanding general directs that you hold your command in
readiness to march in the direction of Edwards’ Ferry. Hancock will
106 STUART’S CAVALRY

be at Gum Springs to-night. The First, Third and Eleventh corps will
cross the river to-day. No supplies will be sent up to you to-day, unless
you absolutely need them. You can draw at Edwards’ Ferry.

On the other hand, it would have been much easier
for the Confederates to keep the crest of the mountain
clear of Hooker’s scouts and signal officers. It was thought
that the Confederates would do what they could do. I
assume, until there is evidence to the contrary, that they
did. But, to discover the presence of the enemy, it was
not necessary to send out scouts and signal officers to the
top of the mountain; by the 26th, Hooker’s troops were
occupying the Passes and in plain view. At 8.10 a.M., on
the 25th — when Lee and Hill were crossing the river —
Butterfield, chief of staff, who was still with Hooker at
Fairfax Court-house, sent Reynolds a telegram saying:
“Orders were telegraphed you early this morning to
assume command of the Third and Eleventh Corps, in
addition to your own (First). At the same time directions
were given for a brigade of cavalry to report to you with
two sections of artillery. All of these troops are under
orders to cross the Potomac to-day at or near Edwards’
Ferry, all but the Third Corps being convenient to that
crossing at this moment. The cavalry and sections are
ordered to report to you, that you may take possession of
Crampton Pass and what is called South Mountain Gap
(Turner’s), as speedily as possible — if practicable, to-
night; and that each cavalry column be closely followed
by a brigade of infantry and a battery, and all instructed
to hold these passes until further orders. Late last night
the enemy had no force at either point. As their posses-
GETTYSBURG 107

sion may be of importance in determining the future
operations of this army, the General desires that you will
take and hold them. You will direct your column in
the direction of Middletown on two lines, — should you
find it practicable,—and there encamp, should you re-
ceive no orders to the contrary. Please keep the General
informed of all your movements and those of the enemy
as soon as you can learn them; and especially advise him
the moment we are in possession of the Gaps. Two of
his staff officers will be sent you; also maps.”

Hooker’s army crossed the Potomac about as far below
Harper’s Ferry as the Confederate army crossed above.
Reynolds, now commanding three corps, in pursuance of
orders, sent the following letter to Howard:

Near Poo.esvitie, June 25th, 1863, 9 a.m.
Masor-GeneraL Howarp,
Commanding Eleventh Corps: —

After detaching the brigade and battery to support General De-
Forest’s cavalry going to Crampton’s Pass, you will move your command
in the direction of Middletown, as indicated, unless the passage of the
Pass be disputed, in which case you will move to the support of Colonel
DeForest. General Hooker will be here by 10 or 11 to-morrow morn-
ing.

STEINWEHR TO HOWARD
Boonssoroues Gap, June 27th, 1863, 1 p.m.

There is a monument placed upon a hill about one-half mile from
here, from which point an extensive and clear view is had of the whole
Valley including the towns of Sharpsburg, Williamsport, Hagerstown,
Boonsborough, and also the approaches to the Gaps south of us. In
this important position I have placed an intelligent officer, furnished
with a field glass, who will report to me whatever he may see of move-
ments in the Valley, and which reports I shall forthwith transmit to you,
if of any importance.
108 STUART’S CAVALRY

Heapquarters ARMy OF THE PoTomac
June 25th, 1863.
Joun C. Bascock, Frederick, Md.: —

General Reynolds goes to-day with three corps to hold, if possible,
the South Mountain Gap (Boonsboro) and Crampton’s Gap. Re-
port.

REYNOLDS TO HOWARD
JEFFERSON, June 26th, 1863.

Let me know as soon as you get information about the passes —
Crampton’s and South Mountain. General Hooker is at Poolesville
and very anxious to know if they are occupied. . . . My headquarters
will be here to-night, and I will move up all the corps together, so as to
concentrate at Middletown or in that neighborhood.

HOOKER TO BIRNEY
Pornt or Rocks, June 26th, 2.30 p.m.
General Hooker directs that you report to General Reynolds at

Jefferson, who will command the First, Third and Eleventh corps until
the marches are completed as ordered.

REYNOLDS TO HOOKER
JEFFERSON, June 26th, 2.30 P.M.

The signal officers report that they can see nothing at Crampton’s
Gap. Howard has moved up to Middletown and my aide, Captain
Wadsworth, went with General Howard to Middletown. General Birney
(Third corps) is at Adamstown and I have sent him orders to move up
here to-morrow and shall move Doubleday forward to Howard. It is
called six miles to Middletown from here and also six or seven miles from
Adamstown here. . . . General Stahl was at Frederick to-day and will
be at Middletown to-night.

TYLER TO HOOKER

That portion of the rebel troops passing Boonsboro are evidently
taking the route by Emmitsburg into Pennsylvania. A. P. Hill’s division
passed Sharpsburg this morning for Hagerstown. Anderson’s division
had gone to Boonsboro the day before. The next day it marched to
Hagerstown.
GETTYSBURG 109

At that time Jones’ cavalry brigade was on picket duty
on the Potomac in Loudon County, Virginia, having been
placed there to observe the enemy. Hooker’s troops
crossed and ae up the river in sight of him. There
was not a more Yigilant officer in the army than Jones. I
knew him well, and had been his adjutant. No one who
knew Jones can believe that he failed to watch and report
what he saw. A dourier sent over the Blue Ridge could
have carried the news in a few hours to Lee or Longstreet.’

Then the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, one of the largest
and best regiments in the army, was detached from Jones
to picket the Potomae west of the Ridge from Shepherds-
town to Harper’s Ferry. The homes of many of the men
were in the Valley and they knew the country. Baylor’s
company was from the neighborhood of Charlestown.
He was an active partisan officer; with him were a number
of men distinguished as scouts. Couriers were sent fre-
quently from this regiment to General Lee. If Lee or
Longstreet didn’t know where the enemy were, he had
only to send one of these scouts over the mountain to find
out. Some historians — including some of Lee’s staff
officers — say that Lee, Longstreet, and A. P. Hill spent

1MEADE TO HALLECK
June 28, 1863, 7.25 p.m.

General Steinwehr, from the Mountain House, South Mountain,
reports that his scouts inform him that 5,000 of Stuart’s cavalry passed
through Williamsport yesterday afternoon. General Sedgwick, on the
march from Poolesville, reports that 3,000 of the enemy’s cavalry, with
some artillery, are in his rear. This is communicated to you for your
information. My impression is that Stuart has divided his force with a
view of harassing our right and left flanks.
110 STUART’S CAVALRY /

two days in Maryland, in the shadow of South Mountain,
and never suspected that Hooker’s army was on the other
side in the Gap; and that General Lee was seized with
a panic and spoke of returning immediately to Virginia
when he heard at Chambersburg that Hooker had crossed
the Potomac.*

They do not seem to realize that they bring a grave
charge of incompetency against their chief as a commander
as well as against his lieutenants. Such Arcadian sim-
plicity should not be imputed to these generals. Lee and
Longstreet remained during the 26th about Hagerstown;
that night they camped a few miles from there in Pennsy]-
vania. I believe they exercised due vigilance and used
the means they had to get information. Kershaw’s
brigade of Longstreet’s corps was the rear of the column.
He gives his itinerary as follows:

1 Longstreet’s chief signal officer was Captain J. H. Manning; he
was from Loudon County, Virginia, near the Potomac. This gave him
the advantage of having a local knowledge of the country. Longstreet’s
report says: “Captain Manning with his signal torches lighted us
across the bridge” at Falling Waters; and again speaks of his having dis-
charged the duties of his department “with zeal and ability.” If Long-
street had any curiosity to know where Hooker was, all he had to do was
to send Captain Manning on top the mountain. In the last fight of my
command, a week or so before General Lee surrendered, Captain Man-
ning happened to beat home on furlough; he volunteered to go in the charge
at Hamilton and was severely wounded. I am sorry that he is not living
now for I have no doubt he would be a witness to prove that Longstreet
made use of his signal corps, when he was on the road to Pennsylvania.
It would be a great reflection on Longstreet if he did not. Manning
could have told him, and, I believe, did tell him, that Hooker was cross-
ing on his pontoon at Edwards’ Ferry while he and Hill were crossing
the Potomac above.
\ GETTYSBURG 111

Twenty-sixth, crossed the Potomac River; encamped
near Williamsport.

“Twenty-seventh, marched by way of Hagerstown,
Middletown, Pa., and Greencastle, and encamped five
miles from Chambersburg.”

On that day Hooker’s army was occupying the South
Mountain Passes and looking down on the Confederate
columns.

HOWARD TO REYNOLDS
Mippietown, Mp., June 26th, 5.10 p.m.

Ihave learned from different sources that there is no enemy at Cramp-
ton’s Pass, though my brigade commander sent there has not reported.
Fifteen of my headquarter cavalry dashed into Boonsboro and went half
a mile beyond, chasing out a squad of rebel cavalry. [I suppose they
were some of the Twelfth Virginia on a scout.] The inhabitants there
report that Longstreet encamped between Berryville and sage
last night and moved this morning towards Hagerstown. . . . Lee in
person crossed the Potomac last night. His entire force came a yester-
day — reported to be between 60,000 and 70,000 men. 4

The Northern Generals seem to have had pretty accurate
information about Lee’s movements. They did not get

1STAHEL TO REYNOLDS
June 26th, 1863, 3.10 p.m.

“I have one brigade and one section of artillery at Crampton’s Pass,
patrolling thoroughly on the other side, but without meeting with any
enemy whatever; they are supported by one brigade and two sections of
artillery of the Eleventh Corps. I have one regiment in South Mountain
Pass patrolling in that vicinity but without meeting any of the enemy.
One brigade and two sections of artillery are at Middletown and two
regiments about two miles from this place on the road leading to Lewis-
ton. . . . There was a small force of rebel cavalry at Boonsborough
this morning but there are none of them there now.”

Of course the Confederate cavalry which was sent there to scout
reported what they saw.
112 STUART’S CAVALRY

it from their cavalry, but from observation on the moun-
tain. Pleasanton’s cavalry corps did not cross at Edwards’
Ferry until the night of the 27th, the day that Lee arrived
at Chambersburg. It was kept as a rear-guard of the
army because of the news that Stuart was behind it.
According to the general rules of war, they would have
been in advance, harassing Lee’s flank. In this way
Stuart protected Lee. During all that time Lee did not
lose a wagon or a straggler. Stahel’s division of cavalry
from Fairfax had been sent to join Reynolds, but did not
come up till the night of the 26th, after the Confederates
had passed through Maryland. On the 26th, Reynolds
at Middletown complained to Hooker that “'The cavalry
sent out by Stahel does nothing. They go into camp
behind the infantry and send out small squads from them.
General Stahel was at Frederick to-day and will be at
Middletown to-night.”

At Hooker’s request, Stahel was relieved of command;
Kilpatrick succeeded him. The conditions show that
General Lee must have known on the 26th that several
corps of Hooker’s army had arrived near South Mountain
when he was in Maryland; he would not in fact have
advanced into Pennsylvania if he had not known it. He
left the Gaps open to Hooker to pass. He must have
calculated that Hooker might cross the mountain and get
in his rear: I think he wanted Hooker to doit. He would
have turned and finished Hooker.

As before stated, the main body of the Confederate
army arrived in Chambersburg on the 27th; Longstreet
and General Lee had their headquarters near the town;
GETTYSBURG 113

A. P. Hill, with Pender’s and Anderson’s divisions, moved
several miles east on the Gettysburg pike and joined
Heth’s division which was in the advance at Fayetteville.
The next day a part of Heth’s division was sent to Cash-
town at the eastern base of South Mountain. It is eight
miles from Gettysburg. Heth followed with the remainder
the next day.'

1 An itinerary of the Confederate army in the Gettsyburg campaign
is published in “New York at Gettysburg,” Vol. I, page 159. Pender’s
division is marked as “June 25th. Crossed the Potomac at Shepherds-
town and marched to Fayetteville.” Heth’s is not mentioned on the
25th and 26th. Pender could not have marched all the way from Shep-
herdstown to Fayetteville on the 25th. Hill’s corps certainly camped
somewhere that night en route between Hagerstown and Chambersburg.
Heth’s division led the advance and no doubt arrived at Fayetteville on
the 26th. On the 28th the itinerary says — “Hill’s corps halted at Fay-
etteville.” On the 29th — “Heth’s division moved from Fayetteville
to Cashtown.” A part of Heth’s division had gone a day or so before to
Cashtown and had a picket at Fairfield several miles south. Buford ran
up against it on the morning of the 30th.

Professor Jacobs of Gettysburg seems to have kept a diary at this time.
Tt has these items:

June 28th, 1863.

“On this evening the camp-fires of an advance party of A. P. Hill’s
corps [Heth’s division] then halting at Fayetteville, were to be seen on
the eastern slope of the mountain about a mile above Cashtown.”

Tune 29th.

“The rebel encampments, by the aid of a spy-glass, were seen to have
been considerably enlarged. Hill had thrown a large portion of his corps,
probably the whole of Heth’s division, over the mountain.”

Tf it had been General Lee’s intention to go on North to Harrisburg
(as his staff officer, Colonel Marshall, said in his address on Lee’s birth-
day, January 19 (1896), he would not have halted at Chambersburg;
nor would he have sent Heth’s division east to hold the Cashtown Pass.
But another staff officer and biographer, Long, contradicts Marshall.
114 STUART’S CAVALRY

If he had been going to Gettysburg and wanted, as Long says, to
preserve his line of communication, he would have guarded the Monterey
Pass through which his army retreated. The distances from Hagerstown
to Chambersburg and to Gettysburg are nearly equal. Long, Lee’s staff
officer and biographer, says a spy came in on the night of the 28th that
brought the first news that Meade had superseded Hooker; and also that
the Union army had crossed the Potomac. He says that until then General
Lee “was under the impression that the Federal army had not crossed.”
Taylor’s biography makes no mention of the spy story; or of Lee’s plan
to go to Harrisburg. It did not occur to Long that as Meade assumed
command at Frederick on the afternoon of the 28th, it was a physical
impossibility for the spy to have reached Chambersburg that day. The
Flying Dutchman might have done it. If General Lee thought that
Hooker would stay on the south bank of the Potomac while he was
ravaging Pennsylvania, then he was not fit to command an army. There
was not a private under Lee who did not know better. Long’s state-
ment is the most derogatory thing ever said about Lee’s military capacity.
Lee’s staff officers do not agree with each other.

Jacob Hoke, a citizen of Chambersburg, published a book, “The
Great Invasion.” It says:

Thursday, 25th.

“‘On the morning of this day General Ewell removed his headquarters
from the Franklin Hotel in Chambersburg to a Mennonite Church,
which stood in the midst of a beautiful grove one mile north of the town
along the pike leading to Harrisburg. Hill’s corps marched from
Hagerstown and encamped one night between Greencastle and Chambers-
burg. General Early on this day rode from his encampment at Green-
wood to Ewell’s headquarters one mile north of Chambersburg, to consult
with him as to his future course. He was directed to proceed on the
following morning by way of Gettysburg to York, break up the Northern
Central railroad, seize the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrights-
ville and wait there for further orders. As soon as the Confederate force
began to pass through Chambersburg, we saw the propriety of sending
information of their number and movements to the authorities at Harris-
burg. . . . Some of the scouts who made the perilous journey to Harris-
burg had narrow escapes. In almost every case they were either chased,
fired upon or captured in passing through the Confederate lines. When
capture seemed inevitable they would chew up and swallow their dis-
patches... .”
GETTYSBURG 115

Friday, 26th.

“This day was fraught with great events and stands marked in the
history of Chambersburg. This will appear from the following facts:
at an early hour in the morning of this day — Hill’s corps being close at
hand — Rodes’ division left its encampment about Shirk’s Hill, where
it had been since the Wednesday preceding, and moved on down the
Harrisburg road. . . . Johnson’s division following Rodes moved but
a short distance below Greenvillage. About eight o’clock in the morning
Heth’s division of Hill’s corps entered the town, but instead of following
Rodes and Johnson down the Harrisburg pike, turned east in the dia-
mond or public square and proceeded out on the Gettysburg road and
encamped near Fayetteville. Dismounting in the diamond and hitching
his horse in front of a grocery store, the General entered into conversa-
tion with one of the citizens. . . . The citizen gave him whatever infor-
mation he could and then inquired of him when he expected General
Lee to arrive. Hill replied, ‘I am expecting him every moment.’ Cast-
ing his eyes up Main street he said, ‘There he comes now... .’ The
two Generals — Lee and Hill — then rode a short distance away from
the group and held a short, whispered conversation. As a large part of
Heth’s division of Hill’s corps had already passed through Chambers-
burg, not following the divisions of Ewell’s corps down the valley to
Harrisburg but turning eastward and going out on the pike leading to
Gettysburg, I concluded that if Lee followed in the same direction,
Baltimore and Washington were his destination.”

This conclusion was right. The other two divisions — Pender’s and
Anderson’s — followed Heth’s on the Cashtown pike. If General Lee
had intended to take his army to Harrisburg, as Marshall says, he would
not have turned to the east at Chambersburg, and would not have sent
Heth on to Cashtown. Longstreet’s report says a spy came in on the
night of the 28th — he was evidently mistaken as to the date of the spy’s
appearance — but he does not intimate that the spy caused any change in
Lee’s programme, or that he ever had any purpose of going to Harrisburg.
Lee’s report follows Longstreet’s as to the spy. Hill says he was ordered
east to menace the communications between Harrisburg and Philadelphia.
Long also says General Lee arrived at Chambersburg on the 26th. But
admitting the spy story to be just as Longstreet tells it, if Gettysburg had
been Lee’s point of destination, as his staff officers say, he could easily
have occupied it on the 29th. It is only 25 miles to Gettysburg from
Chambersburg. On that day Hill with two divisions was camped 18
116 STUART’S CAVALRY

miles away from there; Heth’s division was only 8 miles away. Long-
street was 25 miles distant, but by an easy march he could have arrived
in supporting distance of Hill. Then if Lee had intended to go to Harris-
burg he would not on the 27th have ordered Ewell back from Carlisle.
to Chambersburg. If on the night of the 28th the spy told Lee that
Meade was then at Frederick, Lee knew that Meade could not be at
Gettysburg the next day. Lee was much nearer to Gettysburg than
Meade. Meade’s itinerary shows that he did not leave Frederick until
the 29th, and that he did not then move north towards Gettysburg, but
in an easterly direction to intercept Lee on the Susquehanna. His report
says: “June 28th was spent in ascertaining the position and strength
of the different corps of the army, but principally in bringing up the cavalry
which had been covering the rear of the army in its passage over the
Potomac and to which a large increase had just been made from the
forces previously attached to the defenses of Washington. Orders were
given on that day to Major-General French, commanding at Harper’s
Ferry, to move with 7000 men of his command to occupy Frederick and
the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and with the balance of his
force, estimated at 4000, to move and escort the public property to Wash-
ington.” At that time there was no enemy in the Cumberland Valley
to annoy General Lee in front or in the rear. Not a courier, a wagon, or
a strageler had been captured between his army and the Potomac. The
truth is that at that time Stuart was attracting more attention than Lee.

“Opening the door the officer entered alone — the soldiers crossing
bayonets to prevent any one else from going in — and passing to the
rear and out again, he ordered me to lock it up, saying, ‘All right, now
you will not be disturbed.’ He did not go into the cellar where our
groceries were stored. After these squads had reported at headquarters,
our grocery, drug, book, stationery, clothing, boot and shoe stores were
relieved of their remaining contents. In this work of plunder Major
Todd, a brother of the wife of President Lincoln, took a prominent part
and came near losing his life, for while attempting to enter the cellar
of Dr. Richards, the doctor’s daughter flourished an axe over his head
and threatened to split it open if he persevered; when the miscreant

ingloriously fled.”
Hoxx’s “Great Invasion.”

Tf Lee had intended to go on North to Harrisburg, he
would not have recalled Ewell from Carlisle; nor would
GETTYSBURG 117

A. P. Hill have been sent so far to the East on the Gettys-
burg pike; if he was going to Gettysburg Heth would not
have stopped at Cashtown.' The following letier, dated
June 28, 7.30 a.m., shows that as soon as Lee arrived at
Chambersburg (27th), he wrote Ewell where Hooker’s
army was, and ordered him to countermarch to Chambers-
burg. I have read this letter in General Lee’s letter-book
which is now in possession of Colonel Gordon McCabe,
of Richmond; it was copied by him for me directly from
it. It appears in the letter-book in the handwriting of a
staff officer, Colonel Charles Venable, and is attested by
him. He was Professor of Mathematics at the Univer-
sity of Virginia. The hour and the minute of the day on
which it is written are noted; General Lee understood the
importance of dates in military dispatches. It must have
been copied soon after the original was written as its place
in the letter-book is in due succession of dates and pages.
No doubt the dispatch was sent off in haste as it partly
countermanded orders of the night before, and was soon
afterward dictated to Venable by General Lee.

From memory—sketch of letter.
Heapquarters Army oF NorTHERN VIRGINIA,
CuamMBERSBURG, June 28th, 1863, 7.30 a.m.
Lirvrenant-Genera R. S. Ewen,
Commanding Corps: —
Genera: “I wrote you last night, stating that General Hooker was
reported to have crossed the Potomac and is advancing by way of Middle-

1In his address on January 19, 1896, Lee’s birthday, Marshall said
that Lee had issued orders at Chambersburg to go on to Harrisburg,
but after the spy appeared on the night of the 28th, Lee changed his plan
and recalled Ewell. He had ordered Ewell back to Chambersburg
twenty-four hours before it is alleged that the spy came in.
118 STUART’S CAVALRY

town, the head of his column being at that point in Frederick county.
I directed you in that letter to move your forces to this point. If you have
not already progressed on the road, or if you have no good reason against
it, I desire you to move in the direction of Gettysburg, via Heidlesburg,
where you will have turnpike most of the way and you can thus join your
other divisions (Johnson’s and Rodes’) to Early’s which is east of the
mountain (at York).

I think it preferable to keep the east side of the mountains. When
you come to Heidlesburg you can either move directly on Gettysburg or
turn down to Cashtown. Your trains and heavy artillery you can send,
if you think proper, on the road to Chambersburg. But if the roads
which your troops take are good, they had better follow you.”

Official, C. S. VENABLE, R. E. Luz.
Maj. and A. D. C. General. *

[Italics are mine.]

1 Captain McCabe appends a note to the copy he furnished me of
this letter, which says: “The above is a verbatim copy of the letter
written down ‘from memory’ by Major (afterwards Lt. Colonel)
Chas. S. Venable. The letter is in Colonel Venable’s own hand-writing,
which I know well as he was a correspondent of mine for many years.
It cocurs on page 27 of the original ‘Private Letter Book’ of General
R. E. Lee, now in my keeping. It is written immediately after a letter
from General Lee to President Davis, dated Williamsport 25th June,
1865 (p. 25), and immediately before a letter from General Lee to General
Imboden, pp. 27 and 28 of Letter Book.”

(Signed) W. Gorpon McCazz,
Former Capt. Artillery,
8rd corps, A. N. V.

As will be seen from the following letter from Captain McCabe, the
two letters immediately preceding and the one immediately succeeding
Lee’s letter from Chambersburg to Ewell are in the handwriting of
Colonel Charles Marshall. He had this letter in his possession when
he delivered his philippic on Lee’s birthday in 1896 against Stuart;
but he did not refer to it. In 1877 Colonel Walter Taylor, A. A.G., at the
headquarters of the army of Northern Virginia (who is now living in
Norfolk, Va.), published “Four Years with Lee.” Of course he had access
to Lee’s letter-book if he wanted to see it. Marshall was then living in
GETTYSBURG ‘119

Baltimore. Taylor and Marshall make the same complaint against
Stuart. They make no mention of Lee’s Chambersburg letter. An-
other staff officer, General Long, wrote the “Memoirs of Lee.” He
appears as ignorant as Marshall and Taylor about Lee’s correspondence.
Captain McCabe says that Lee’s letter of 5 p.m., June 23, 1863, which
directed Stuart to join Ewell on the Susquehanna and authorized him to
go around Hooker, is in Colonel Taylor’s handwriting; judging from
Taylor’s book he had forgotten all about it. It is strange that he did not
examine the letter-book to see the orders he had written. Lee’s letter to
Ewell of June 22, ordering him to move on from Hagerstown into Penn-
sylvania, and informing him that Stuart would report to him with three
brigades of cavalry, is in Long’s handwriting. He and Taylor both
censure Stuart for obeying the instructions which they wrote him at Lee’s
dictation. Captain McCabe further says that the letter immediately
following Lee’s Chambersburg letter, dated “Greenwood, July 1, 1863,”
and addressed to Imboden, is in Marshall’s handwriting. It instructs
Imboden about picketing the roads west of the mountain and concludes
by saying: “My headquarters for the present will be at Cashiown,
east of the mountain.” [Italics mine.] It is clear that when General
Lee was writing this letter he had no idea of going to Gettysburg. Hill
and Heth were fighting there then, but Lee didn’t know it. Marshall
copied the letter; but he was nota mere automaton; he understood its
meaning —that the army would be concentrated at Cashtown that
day.

Th his address he stated that after the spy appeared at Chambersburg,
Lee ordered the army to Gettysburg; which is contradicted by the letter
to Imboden. The Homeric legend of the Lotus-eaters who lost their
memories seems to be no longer a romance but a reality. Again, Colonel
Taylor speaks of an interview between General Lee and A. P. Hill at
Cashtown on the morning of July 1, before Hill started to Gettysburg.
If this were true it would make General Lee responsible for the blunder
of Hill and Heth. Now, as the letter to Imboden shows, General Lee
was at Greenwood, west of the mountain and ten miles from Cashtown
that morning. A. P. Hill’s report says that Heth’s division started to
Gettysburg at 5 A.M., and was followed by Pender’s. Hill went in com-
mand. General Lee certainly did not reach Cashtown before noon, long
after General Hill had gone.

These are the letters from Captain McCabe of which I have spoken:
120 STUART’S CAVALRY

Ricumonp, Va., December 24th, 1905.

My Dear Coronet Mossy: —

I received your kind letter this evening and have at once copied the
letter from Lee to Ewell verbatim, as it appears in p. 27 of the original
“Letter-book” now in my keeping. The “sketch of letter,” “from
memory” is throughout in Colonel Venable’s handwriting, which I
know well as we corresponded for years and I still have many letters
from him... .

Yours very truly,
W. Gorvon McCaze.

I wrote Captain McCabe another letter asking him to state if Lee’s
Chambersburg letter appeared in the letter-book in due succession of
dates and pages and received the following reply:

Ricumonp, Vireiia,
Jany 11th, 1906.
Dear Cot. Mossy: —

Your letter of the 9th instant reached me on yesterday, and I have
given close scrutiny to the letters in the “Letter Book” immediately
preceding and immediately succeeding the letter written [by General Lee]
at Chambersburg, 7.30 a.m., June 28th [1863.] I have taken six pre-
ceding and six succeeding, which will, I fancy, be quite sufficient for

your purpose.
I. Immediately preceding

1. First letter immediately preceding letter of June 28, dated “ Wil-
liamsport, 25th June, 1863,” is in handwriting of Charles Marshall,
Major A. D. C.

2. Next preceding, dated “opposite Williamsport, 25th June, 1863,”
is in same handwriting.

3. Next preceding, dated “Hd. Qrs. Army No. Va., 5 p.m., June 23rd,
1863,” is in handwriting of W. H. Taylor, A. A. G.

4. Next preceding, dated “Headquarters A. N. Va. June 23rd, 1863,”
is in handwriting of C. S. Venable, Major A. D. C.

5. Next preceding, dated “A. N. V. Hd. Qrs. 23rd, 1863,” is in hand-
writing of Charles Marshall, Major and A. D. C.

6. Next preceding, dated “Hd.Qrs. 22nd June 1863,” is in handwriting
of A. L. Long, Col. and Mil. Sec.
GETTYSBURG 121

II. Immediately succeeding

1. First letter (immediately succeeding letter of June 28), dated
“Greenwood, Ist July, 1863,” is in handwriting of Charles Marshall
Major and A. D. C.

2. Next succeeding, dated “Headquarters A. N. V., 4th July, 1863,”
is in handwriting of C.S. Venable, Major A.D.C. ...

Captain McCabe gives the dates and handwriting of four more suc-
ceeding letters.

My object is to show that Lee’s letter to Ewell, dated 7.30 a.m., June
28, was written in the letter-book by Colonel Venable on the day of its
date, and appears in its proper place in the book. The reports of Gen-
erals Ewell, Early, and Edward Johnson show that their movements
conformed to these instructions; and that there can be no mistake about
the date of the letter.

Lee’s letter of June 28th to Ewell speaks of a letter he had written
him “last night.” That letter, which was not copied, could not have
been written later than the 27th, as Johnson’s division, in compliance
with that order, left Carlisle, which is thirty miles from Chambersburg,
on the morning of the 29th; and Early on the evening of the 29th at York
(thirty-six miles distant) received a copy of it from Ewell. Ewell’s trains
must have left Carlisle on the evening of the 28th, before Ewell received
the second letter; else all would have gone by the Eastern route.

Ewell’s and Early’s reports verify the correctness of the
copy of the order in every respect. Ewell says; “From
(Carlisle) I sent forward my engineer, Captain Richardson,
with General Jenkins’ cavalry, to reconnoiter the defenses
of Harrisburg, and was starting on the 29th for that place
when ordered by the general commanding to join the main
body of the army at Cashtown, near Gettysburg. . . .
On the night of June 30, Rodes’ division, which I accom-
panied, was at Heidlersburg [nine miles north of Gettys-
burg,] Early three miles off on the road to Berlin, and
Johnson, with Colonel Brown’s reserve artillery between
Green Village and Scotland [near the Chambersburg pike
122 STUART’S CAVALRY

west of South Mountain]. At Heidlersburg I received
orders from the general commanding to proceed to Cash-
town, or Gettysburg, as circumstances might dictate,
and a note from General A. P. Hill, saying he was in
Cashtown. Next morning I moved with Rodes’ division
towards Cashtown, ordering Early to follow by Hunters-
town. Before reaching Middletown I received notice
from General Hill that he was advancing upon Gettysburg,
and turned the head of Rodes’ column towards that place,
by the Middletown road, sending word to Early to advance
directly on the Heidlersburg road. I notified the general
commanding of my movements, and was informed by him
that, in case we found the enemy’s force very large, he
did not want a general engagement brought on until the
rest of the army came up. By the time this message
reached me General Hill had already been warmly en-
gaged with a large body of the enemy in his front, and
Carter’s artillery battalion of Rodes’ division had opened
with fine effect on the flank of the same body which
was preparing to attack me, while fresh masses were
moving into position in my front.” [Italics are mine.]
Ewell must have received Lee’s order of the 27th on the
next day, as he says he was preparing to start to Harris-
burg on the 29th, as he had been authorized by Lee’s
letter from Berryville on the 22d, when the order came
arresting the movement. It is thirty miles from Cham-
bersburg to Carlisle. General Edward Johnson’s division
with the reserve artillery and the trains must have been
sent off by Ewell in accordance with his first order on the
western route before he got the second order to march
GETTYSBURG 123

east of the mountains. The trains must have started
on the evening of the 28th as they were passing Chambers-
burg at midnight of the 29th. Johnson’s report says he
left Carlisle on the 29th. He never would have started
from Carlisle by such a circuitous route to Cashtown or
Gettysburg. Chambersburg must have been Johnson’s
destination when he left Carlisle; no doubt an order
overtook him to turn east by Scotland.1 Ewell had then

1“Tn the evening of this day — Monday, June 29th — sometime
after dark in company with two of our citizens I went up into the steeple
of the Reform Church to take observations. From that elevated position
we had an uninterrupted view for miles around us. . . . Some time in
the after part of this night, probably about one or two in the morning, I
was awakened by my wife who told me to come to the window for some
important movement was going on amongst the Confederates. Peering
cautiously through the half-closed shutters we saw a continuous stream
of wagons driven hurriedly through our streets. They were coming
back from the direction of Harrisburg and, turning east at the Public
Square, drove out on the Gettysburg pike. Although these wagons
were heavily loaded, as the grinding noise they made indicated, they
were sometimes driven in a trot. A low, rumbling noise could be heard
which sounded stronger in the stillness of the night, as if the whole valley
was filled with moving trains. These wagons proved to be a part of
Ewell’s train and their rapid passage eastward was a part in the great
drama of concentration about Gettysburg, which will be described fully
hereafter.”

“Tuesday, 30th.

“The hasty passage of the wagon-trains through Chambersburg on
the night of the 29th convinced us that Lee was about concentrating his
army and that no time should be lost in sending this important infor-
mation to the authorities at Harrisburg. . . . The remaining division
of Ewell’s corps — Johnson’s — retraced its steps from the neighbor-
hood of Shippensburg to Green Village, six miles northeast of Chambers-
burg, and from thence went by the country road directly across through
Scotland to Greenwood, where it remained over night. [Fayetteville
124 STUART’S CAVALRY

is six and Greenwood seven miles east of Chambersburg.] General
Johnson’s wagon-train, instead of following him across the country,
came up to Chambersburg and turning east in the public square, pro-
ceeded to Gettysburg. Part of Rodes’ wagon-train also retraced its
way to Chambersburg and, joining Johnson’s, passed towards the same
destination. . . . This was the train which passed through Chambers-
burg during the night, as previously stated, and these two when united
were, according to the statement of General McLaws in ‘Annals of the
War,’ page 440, fourteen miles long. Its importance may be inferred
from the fact that it was given precedence over Longstreet’s two divisions
and it was the detention caused by it that prevented these two divisions
from reaching the field of battle as soon as expected. The divisions of
Generals McLaws and Hood, which were unable to proceed until Ewell’s
wagon-train had passed, were detained in their encampment about
Fayetteville until the following afternoon, when by a forced march the
former reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, a little after
dark, and the latter got about the same distance at twelve o’clock at
night [July 1st]. The artillery belonging to these two divisions did not
get the road until the following morning [Thursday, July 2].”
“The Great Invasion.”
By Hokxs, a Citizen of Chambersburg.”

received the second dispatch from Lee. The trains were
passing at midnight of the 29th through Chambersburg
and took the Gettysburg pike. If the letter dated 7.30 a.m.,
June 28, had been written on the 29th, Johnson with the
trains would not have started from Carlisle before the 30th.
As Ewell acted under both orders, he blends them in his
report. If, as Ewell says, he notified General Lee from
Heidlersburg of his movements, and received a reply that
he did not want a general engagement brought on, he
could not have received it before the afternoon, as they
were twenty miles apart on the morning of July 1, and on
opposite sides of the mountain.

Early’s report is the most accurate of any made in the
GETTYSBURG 125

campaign. He says that on the evening of the 29th, at
York, he received from Ewell a copy of the order from
General Lee to rejoin his corps west of the mountain,
and that he started in obedience to the order the next
morning and sent White’s battalion on the pike towards
Gettysburg; if he had understood that place to be his
destination he would have marched directly there. As
it is thirty-six miles from Carlisle to York, the copy of
Lee’s letter to Ewell, which Early received on the evening
of the 29th, must have been the first letter (27th) to Ewell.
He had not expected to meet Ewell east of the mountain;
but Ewell had received Lee’s second order to go that
route. The report says: “On the evening of the 29th, I
received through Captain Elliott Johnson, aide to General
Ewell, a copy of a note from General Lee and also verbal
instructions which required me to move back so as to
rejoin the rest of the corps on the western side of South
Mountain; and accordingly, at daylight, on the morn-
ing of the 30th, I put my whole command in motion,
moving by Weiglestown and East Berlin in the direction
of Heidlersburg, from which I could either move to
Shippensburg or to Greenwood, by way of Arendttsville,
as circumstances might require. At the same time I
sent Colonel White’s cavalry on the pike from York
towards Gettysburg, to ascertain if any force of the
enemy was on that road. . . . A courier from General
Ewell met me here (East Berlin), with a dispatch in-
forming me of the fact that he was moving with Rodes’
division by way of Petersburg to Heidlersburg, and direct-
ing me to march in that direction. I encamped about
126 STUART’S CAVALRY

three miles from Heidlersburg and rode to see General
Ewell at that point, and was injormed that the object was
to concentrate the corps at or near Cashtown, and received
directions to move the next day to that point. I was in-
formed that Rodes would move by the way of Middle-
town and Arendttsville, but it was arranged that I should
go by the way of Hunterstown and Mumasburg. Having
ascertained that the road from my camp to Hunterstown
was a very rough and circuitous one, I determined next
morning (July 1), to march by the way of Heidlersburg,
and thence to the Mumasburg road. After passing
Heidlersburg a short distance, I received a note from
you, written by order of General Ewell, informing me
that General Hill was moving from Cashtown towards
Gettysburg, and that General Rodes had turned off at
Middletown and was moving towards the same place,
and directing me to move also to that point. I therefore
continued to move on the road I was then on towards
Gettysburg, and on arriving in sight of that place, on the
direct road from Heidlersburg, I discovered that General
Rodes’ division was engaged with the enemy to the right
of me, the enemy occupying a position in front of Gettys-
burg, and the troops constituting his right being engaged
in an effort to drive back the left of General Rodes’ line.”

On the 30th, General Lee, with Longstreet and Hood’s
and McLaws’ divisions of his corps, marched eight miles
east to Greenwood and went into camp about noon. The
detention was caused by Johnson’s long wagon train
from Carlisle that was passing. A. P. Hill had advanced
to Cashtown with Heth’s and Pender’s divisions. He
GETTYSBURG 127

had no orders to go farther. Longstreet’s report says:
“On the night of the 28th one of my scouts [spy] came
in with the information that the enemy had passed the
Potomac and was probably in pursuit of us. The scout
was sent to general headquarters with the suggestion that
the army concentrate east of the mountains and bear
down to meet the enemy.”

It has been represented that General Lee was greatly
agitated by the news the spy brought that Hooker had
crossed the river and was near South Mountain; and that
it produced a complete change in his plan of campaign.
I shall show that the story is as pure a fable as the Wander-
ing Jew. It has been generally accepted as true. And
I, too, once believed in the real presence of Santa Claus
and had no doubts about the deeds of Jack the Giant-
Killer. Nobody has tried to explain how General Lee
could have expected Hooker to stand still on the south
bank of the Potomac while he was foraging in Pennsyl-
vania; or how he could have been surprised to hear that
Hooker was following him. He ought to have been sur-
prised to hear that Hooker was not following him.

Longstreet attaches so much importance to the spy that
he dignifies him with his picture in his book and under it
is the inscription, “The Confederate scout who brought
to General Lee the first news of Meade’s assignment to
command and the positions of the corps of the Army of
the Potomac.” All this in and about Chambersburg on
the night of June the 28th. The order relieving Hooker
of command was brought from Washington to Frederick
City by Colonel Hardie on the moming of June 28th.
128 STUART’S CAVALRY

His mission was kept such a secret that his traveling
companion, General Sickles, a corps commander, did not
suspect it. ‘The general order announcing the change of
commanders was not published until the afternoon. It
is improbable, if not impossible, that the Texas spy could
have heard it before it was announced to the corps com-
manders.

It is fifty-five or sixty miles from Frederick to Chambers-
burg; the road is over the South Mountain; every path
and gap was closely picketed and patroled. The steed
Mazeppa rode could not have carried the spy to Lee’s
headquarters in that time. It would have required a
supernatural agency to doit. I admit that a spy did come
to Longstreet, and that he brought the news that Meade
had been placed in command. The news about Meade
being in command is unimportant. But it was ajter
General Lee had left Chambersburg, and on the 30th, at
Greenwood, when the army was on the march to Cash-
town. So the news brought by the spy could not have
been the reason for the halt at Chambersburg, or the recall
of Ewell from Carlisle. But Lee’s letter to Ewell, dated
7.30 a.M., June 28, shows that at the time of writing he
thought Hooker was still in command. It was therefore
written before the spy came in.

He said to Ewell: “I wrote you last night stating that
General Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac
and is advancing by way of Middletown” [Italics mine],
and he ordered him back to Chambersburg. He did
not mention Meade. It is, therefore, an anachronism to
claim, as Longstreet and Lee’s staff officers do, that the
GETTYSBURG 129

spy’s appearance was the cause of a change in Lee’s plan
of campaign and his going to Gettysburg instead of Harris-
burg.

In Troilus and Cressida Shakespeare commits a similar
error and makes Nestor quote Aristotle. There was a
change of plan, but not till July 1. The spy was not respon-
sible for it. Colonel Freemantle has this item in his
diary: “June 30, Tuesday. ... We marched from
Chambersburg six miles on the road towards Gettysburg
and encamped at a village called (I think) Greenwood.
In the evening General Longstreet told me that he had
just received intelligence that Hooker had been disrated and
Meade was appointed in his place. Of course he knew
both of them in the old army and he says that Meade is
an honorable and respectable man, though perhaps not
so bold as Hooker.”

So it was on the 30th and not on the night of the 28th —
and at Greenwood, not at Chambersburg — when Long-
street first heard that Meade was in command. No doubt
he heard it from a spy. Again Freemantle says: “ July Ist.
At 2 p.M., firing became distinctly audible in our front,
but although it increased as we progressed, it did not seem
to be very heavy. A SPY WHO WAS WITH Us insisted upon
there being a pretty bunch of blue bellies in or near Gettys-
burg, and he declared he was in their society three days
before.”

A spy, no doubt, did appear, as the diary, says at Green-
wood and told Longstreet that Meade had superseded
Hooker; but the news did not affect General Lee. The
appearance of the spy in the drama has been antedated by
130 STUART’S CAVALRY

historians and he has been transposed back to Chambers-
burg, and used as a deus ex machina to create the impres-
sion that he had performed for Lee the duty of his chief
of cavalry. If General Lee did not know when he first
arrived at Chambersburg — and if Longstreet did not
know — that Hooker had crossed the Potomac, then
neither was fit to command an army, or an army corps.
Longstreet further says that when he sent the spy to Lee
he suggested that the army concentrate east of the moun-
tain and “bear down to meet the enemy.” Since the war
Longstreet has claimed that he advised General Lee only
to fight a defensive battle. But that does not accord with
the advice which the report says he gave General Lee, —
“To bear down to meet the enemy.”

That is the language of Nelson’s order to Collingwood
at Trafalgar — it is the essence of offensive tactics. As
they were a short distance from the mountain it would
have been more consistent with the military policy which
he says he advocated, to have advised his chief to imitate
Hannibal when he decoyed the Roman army into the
Thrasymene Pass. It has been claimed that Lee was going
onto Harrisburg, but that the spymade him souneasy about
his communications that he ordered his army to Gettys-
burg to deter Hooker from crossing the mountain. But I
have shown that, as soon as he arrived at Chambersburg,
and twenty-four hours before it is alleged that the spy came
in, he informed Ewell that Hooker was in pursuit and
ordered him to countermarch to Chambersburg. He after-
ward modified the order and directed Ewell to move east
of the mountain in the direction of Cashtown. .
GETTYSBURG 131

General Lee put no obstruction in the Gaps south of
Cashtown. They were left open to Hooker and hewas
invited to come over. There was apparently a fine oppor-
tunity for him to seize Lee’s communications and strike
him in his rear. That was Lee’s own favorite manceuver;
and no doubt he calculated that Hooker would follow
his example; if so, he would flank Hooker and go on to
Washington. He set a trap for Hooker with a bait — he
did not practise the thing for which he prayed — “Lead
us not into temptation.” It was Hooker’s intention to
do what Lee hoped he would do, but Halleck interfered
and Hooker indignantly asked to be relieved. On June
28th, at Frederick City,'in the afternoon, Hooker was
relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac.

Before the Committee on the Conductof the War Hooker
said: “As soon as I ascertained that another corps of
his (Lee’s) was crossing the Potomac, I commenced
crossing my own army, and by the time that I was over
the whole of the rebel army was on the north side of the
Potomac. From Edwards’ Ferry, where I crossed, I
directed General Reynolds to send detachments to seize
the passes of South Mouniain, Turner’s and Crampton’s,
in order to anticipate the enemy passing through them
and confine him to one line of invasion, and directed him
to follow those detachments with the First, Third, and
Eleventh Corps, and take position at Middletown. On
the 27th of June the following instructions were communi-
cated to the Twelfth Corps: ‘Hold your command ready
to march to-morrow at 4 a.m.” It was to march in the
direction of Harper’s Ferry, where I was going myself.
132 STUART’S CAVALRY

It had been placed under my command by the orders of
the general-in-chief, and I directed the Twelfth Corps to
march in that direction for the purpose of being joined
by the garrison there and moving upon Lee’s rear upon
the Potomac. My object was to destroy his bridges, if
he had them; to drive away the guard that was left upon
the river and also to intercept the commerce that Ewell
had established in flour, grain, horses and horned catile,
which he was constantly sending to the rear.” . . . “In
connection with this I may state that I was unwilling to
send one corps upon Lee’s rear, apprehending he might
turn upon it and crush it. I had taken the further pre-
caution to send three corps to Middletown, to be in po-
sition to attack in flank if it was attempted.”

Hooker does not seem to have taken into account what
Lee would have been doing east of the Mountain, while he,
like Ajax, after he had gone mad, had turned to killing
sheep, was capturing stragglers and horned cattle on the
turnpike that Lee had traveled. If this turning movement
had not been disapproved by Halleck, General Lee would
have been in the position of Frederick the Great at Roos-
bach, and Napoleon at Austerlitz. The concentration at
Cashtown shows that he was preparing to do what these
great masters of the art of war did in similar circum-
stances — to flank the enemy that was flanking him. At
Austerlitz, when the Allies were seen extending around
his flank to gain the road to Vienna, which was his line
of communication, Napoleon had to restrain the impa-
tience of his marshals — they wanted to attack and stop
the movement against their rear. Jomini reports him as
GETTYSBURG 133

saying: “TI asked Soult how long it would take him to
gain the heights of Pratzen; he promised to do it in less
than twenty minutes. ‘We will wait, then,’ I replied;
“When the enemy is making a false movement we must
be careful not to interrupt him.’”

General Lee had no desire to interrupt Hooker if he
wanted to go over the mountain; he anticipated he would
do so and simply put himself in a position at Cashtown to
take advantage of such a movement if Hooker made it.
It would have been a grand anti-climax to his campaign
if Lee had lost heart and been stampeded, as some of his
staff officers have said, because Hooker had done what
he had dared him to do. He was perfectly willing to
trade Hooker the Cumberland Valley for Washington
City. If Hooker had crossed the mountain and got be-
hind him, then Lee would have been between Hooker and
Washington.

In his work on “The Operations of War,” Colonel
Hamley says: “As it is impossible that hostile armies can
be operated from the same base, it follows that an army
which throws itself across the communications of an
adversary cannot directly cover its own. In general,
however, an army, thus cut from its base, will have two
or three alternatives: first, it may march directly on the
opposing force and try to drive it off the line, or rout it;
second, it may march to one flank across the communi-
cations of the enemy [to Washington]; third, it may at-
tempt, by a march to the other flank, to avoid a collision.”

If Hooker had thrown his whole army west of the
mountain between Lee and the Potomac, which, no doubt,
134 STUART’S CAVALRY

Lee wanted him to do, and which Hooker says he intended
to do, then Lee would have done what Napoleon did at
Austerlitz; he would have marched directly on Washington.
Jf Hooker had divided his army, then Lee, having the
interior line, would have debouched through the Cash-
town Pass, struck and destroyed him in detail — as Bona-
parte did the Austrians at Rivoli. I do not believe that
General Lee could have been demoralized, as Colonel
Marshall says he was, by hearing that Hooker was
behind him. He held the card that could have won
the game.

As I have before stated, Meade issued orders on the
morning of July 1 for the army to retire to Pipe Creek,
about fifteen miles south, if pressed by the enemy. The
following letters show that Meade, like Lee, had no ex-
pectation of a collision that day.’

BUTTERFIELD TO HANCOCK
July ist, 1863, 12.30 p.m.

The major-general commanding directs that in view of the advance
of Generals A. P. Hill and Ewell on Gettysburg and the possible failure
of General Reynolds to receive the orders to withdraw his command by
the route through Taneytown, thus leaving the center of our position
open, that you proceed with your troops out on the direct road to Gettys-
burg from Taneytown. When you find that General Reynolds is cover-
ing that road (instead of withdrawing by Emmittsburg, which it is feared
he may do), you will withdraw to Frizellburg, as directed by the circular

of directions for the positions issued this morning.

1 Taneytown, Mp., July 1, 1863.
GENERAL Burorp: —
General: The major-general commanding directs me to order you
to fall back to Taneytown, and then to Middleburg, in case the enemy
should advance in force upon you and press you hard. The cavalry
GETTYSBURG 185

will dispute every inch of the ground, and fall back very slowly to the point
designated, and send in all information they can gather. By order of
Major-General Pleasanton.
C. Ross Suara,
Lieut.-Colonel, etc.

P.S. This move is only to be made in case of great necessity. The
same order was repeated to Gregg, Kilpatrick and Merritt.

At the same time Meade wrote Sedgwick, communneling
the Sixth Corps:—

“Should such be the case and General Reynolds find himself in the
presence of a superior force, he is instructed to hold the enemy in check

and fall slowly back. If he is able to do this, the line indicated in the
circular of to-day will be occupied to-night.”

Hill’s report says: “On July 1, at 5 a.m., Heth took up
the line of march with Pegram’s battalion of artillery, fol-
lowed by Pender with McIntosh’s battalion of artillery.
Colonel Walker, with the remainder (three battalions) of
artillery, being with General Anderson,” who was then
behind on the march from Fayetteville to Cashtown.
About three miles from Gettysburg, Heth’s leading brigade
(Archer’s) encountered the advance of the enemy, Buford’s
two brigades of cavalry, on Willoughby Run.

Meade had no idea of holding the place because it
would be so easy for Lee to turn it and get between
him and Washington. For that reason French was kept
all the time in his rear at Frederick with ten or fifteen
thousand men to guard his communications. In Meade’s
opinion of the necessity for it Hancock concurred. Heth’s

division, after leaving camp at Cashtown, soon came upon
Buford’s pickets. Buford fought his cavalry dismounted
136 STUART’S CAVALRY

and notified Reynolds. He kept. Heth in check until
Reynolds arrived and deployed for action. Heth’s report
says:

“On July 1, my division, accompanied by Pegram’s
battalion of artillery, was ordered to move at 5 a.M. in
the direction of Gettysburg. On nearing Gettysburg it
was evident that the enemy was in the vicinity of the
town in some force. It may not be improper to remark at
this time — nine o’clock on the morming of July 1—I
was ignorant what force was at or near Gettysburg, and
supposed it consisted of cavalry, most probably supported
by a brigade or two of infantry. On reaching the summit
of the second range of hills, west of Gettysburg, it became
evident that there were infantry, cavalry, and artillery
in and around the town. . .. Archer and Davis were
now directed to advance, the object being to feel the
enemy, to make a forced reconnaissance and determine in
what force the enemy were — whether or not he was mass-
ing his forces on Gettysburg. [Italics mine.] Heavy
columns of the enemy were soon encountered. Davis, on
the left, advanced, driving the enemy before him and
capturing his batteries. General Davis was unable to
hold the position he had gained. The enemy concen-
trated on his front and flanks in overwhelming force.

“The brigade maintained its position until every field
officer except two were shot down and its ranks terribly
thinned. On the right of the road, Archer encountered
heavy masses in his front, and his gallant little brigade,
after being almost surrounded by overwhelming forces
in front and on both flanks, were forced back. The ser-
GETTYSBURG 187

vice lost at this time that most gallant and meritorious
officer, Brigadier-general Archer, who fell into the enemy’s
hands together with some 60 or 70 of his men. The enemy
had now been felt and found to be in heavy force in and
around Gettysburg. ... The division was now formed
in line of battle on the right of the road. . . . Davis’
brigade was kept on the left of the road, that it might
collect stragglers, and, from its shattered condition, it
was not deemed advisable to bring it again into action
on that day. It, however, did participate in the action
later in the day. After resting in line of battle for one
hour or more, orders were received to attack the enemy
in my front, with the notification that General Pender’s
division would support me.”

As Heth states that he went only to make a reconnais-
sance to find out if the enemy was in force in his front,
the above account shows that he ought to bave been very
soon satisfied that the enemy was in force and ought to
have retired. But the report, on its face, shows that he
was not making a reconnaissance. Two of his brigades
had been shattered and a brigadier-general captured.
But Hill, instead of winning unexpected trophies, had
been worsted; he did not want to go back to camp and
meet General Lee with his plume torn and a black eye.
So he ordered Pender in.

“The division (Pender’s)” says Heth, “had not ad-
vanced more than a hundred yards before it became hotly
engaged.” Hill says he went there “to find out what was
in my front.” If that was his object, what Heth’s division
had suffered ought to have given him sufficient informa-
138 STUART’S CAVALRY

tion to have satisfied his curiosity.'_ He had lost a brigadier-
general and a large part of a brigade. Pender was faring
no better than Heth, and Hill’s force would no doubt
have been driven back to Cashtown, if Ewell, with Rodes’
division, marching like Desaix at Meringo, to the sound
of the cannon, had not come in on the flank and saved
him. But even with Rodes’ reinforcement the issue was
doubtful until Early came in on the enemy’s rear and
gave the finishing stroke. Evwell’s act in coming to Hill’s
support was purely voluntary; Hill had no right to expect
help from Ewell. Hill says that his two divisions were so
exhausted by six hours’ fighting that he did not pursue
when the enemy was routed. Anderson did not arrive
with his division on the field until the battle was nearly over.
He was not engaged. Hill had ordered him to Cash-
town before he left that morning with Heth and Pender
to perform what he no doubt thought would be a brilliant
exploit; and Anderson, with his division and three bat-
talions of artillery, halted there for further orders. It
seems that General Lee rode from Cashtown at full speed
to the field, and arrived in the afternoon about the close
of the combat. He knew in the morning that the enemy
were at Gettysburg, and he would have been in front with
Heth’s division, if he had ordered it to go there. But he
never would have sent one or two divisions to encounter
an unknown force with his army stretched out on the
pike from Chambersburg to Gettysburg. If he had
intended to go to Gettysburg he would not have stayed
so long at Chambersburg. Lee, Longstreet, and Stuart
were all absent for the same reason on the first day because
GETTYSBURG 139

the army had not been ordered to Gettysburg and it was not
their duty to be there. ‘They were in their proper places —
Hill and Heth were not.

Nor would General Lee have committed such an error
as to order his widely separated divisions to concentrate
on a point so close to the enemy. A military writer of
high authority says: “It is always a dangerous opera-
tion to attempt a concentration upon some designated
place within or near the enemy’s lines; for, as a rule, the
enemy can mass his forces there more rapidly than can
the commander of an invading army. In fact, many a
campaign has failed because the commanding general
has attempted to unite his scattered forces at some point
within the territory held by the enemy. By so doing he
gives the enemy a chance to assemble his forces between
the separated columns of the attacking army and to bring
superior numbers against each column in succession.”
This was Pleasanton’s error at Brandy.

Hill and Heth, to excuse themselves for precipitating
a battle without orders, said they were only making a
reconnaissance. If this were true they would not be
justified. A reconnaissance in force should only be made
by the orders of the commanding general. It is a hazard-
ous operation as it frequently brings on a battle prema-
turely. Its only object is to get information as to the
position and strength of an enemy. For this reason,
sufficient force, and no more, is applied to make an enemy
display himself. The attacking force then retires. Cap-
tain Wagner says (‘Security and Information”): “Recon-
naissances in force are made only by the orders of the
140 STUART’S CAVALRY

Commander-in-Chief and the force generally consists of
all three arms. They are often made before action for
the purpose of discovering the enemy’s strength and
disposition and frequently lead to a battle. ‘The recon-
naissance is conducted in the same general way as a regular
attack. ... It is evident, therefore, that a reconnais-
sance in force is a difficult operation. It is open to three
serious objections. (1) It often results in committing the
troops so completely to action as to bring on a battle
through the necessity of bringing up other troops to their
assistance. At Worth, a reconnaissance by the Twentieth
Prussian Brigade developed the enemy, and the other
German troops, moving to the sound of the cannon,
precipitated a battle a day earlier than the Crown Prince
had intended. (2) The withdrawal of the troops, in
pursuance to the general plan of the reconnaissance,
may often present the appearance of defeat. In 1859,
Ginlay caused a reconnaissance in force to be made
by Stadion’s corps. It developed Forey’s division near
Montebello and, although the Austrians withdrew in
accordance with the plan of reconnaissance, the moral
effect on both sides was that of a victory of a French
division over an Austrian army corps. (3) It is always
a costly means of gaining information.”

If the combat which lasted nearly all the day of July 1
had been really a reconnaissance it would present all of
this writer’s objections to reconnaissances in force. It
was without orders, and it did commit the Southern army
prematurely to battle; its withdrawal leaving its killed
and wounded on the field would have had the appear-
GETTYSBURG 141

ance of a defeat, and the adversary would have had the
prestige and all the moral effect of a victory.

It compelled Lee to stay at Gettysburg and fight a
battle under duress —or retreat—or at least appear
to retreat. Hill and Heth in their reports, to save them-
selves from censure, call the first day’s action a recon-
naissance; this is all an afterthought. They wanted to
conceal their responsibility for the final defeat. Hill
said he felt the need of cavalry — then he ought to have
stayed in camp and waited for the cavalry. But he felt
the need of infantry a great deal more than of cavalry.
No one ordered him, and there was no necessity for his
going to Gettysburg. Ewell was near there; he had as
much cavalry as Buford had. There were about 25,000
engaged on a side; the battle lasted nearly all day; Hill
says his two divisions were exhausted; but he says they
were only fighting to find out if the enemy was in strong
force in front of him. He found it. On July 1, Stuart
was on the Susquehanna; where he was ordered to go.
But Ewell had left; Stuart was not to blame for that.
General Lee was responsible for Stuart; he was not re-
sponsible for Hill and Heth.

On the morning of July 1, General Lee’s headquarters
were at Greenwood. Anderson’s division from Fayette-
ville, and Johnson’s from Scotland, where it had camped
the night before, occupied the road — Anderson’s in
advance — so Longstreet’s two divisions could not get off
before the afternoon. General Lee, before leaving, wrote
the following letter of instructions to Imboden. It appears
in his letter-book in the handwriting of his staff officer,
142 STUART'S CAVALRY

Col. Charles Marshall. The letter conclusively con-
futes the statement made by Marshall in his address on
General Lee’s birthday on January 19, 1896, that at
Chambersburg, after the spy reported Hooker’s advan¢e,
Lee ordered his army to concentrate at Gettysburg. He
would not concentrate his army at one place and have
his headquarters eight miles off at another. |

GREENwoop, July Ist, 1863.

Brigapier-Generat I. D. Impopen: —

Genera.: I have received your letter of 7 a.m. yesterday from Mer-
cersburg. . . . Upon arriving at Chambersburg to-day I desire you to
relieve General Pickett, who will then move forward to this place. You
will of course establish guards on the road leading to your position and
take every precaution for the safety of your command. Obtain all the
flour that you can load in your wagons from the mills in your vicinity,
and if you cannot get sufficient, I believe there are 700 or 800 barrels at
Shippensburg, about 10 miles north of Chambersburg, on the Carlisle
road. . . . Send word to General Pickett at this place to-morrow, which
is eight miles from Chambersburg, the hour when you will arrive here
in order that he may be prepared to move on your arrival. My head-
quarters for the present will be at Cashtown, east of the mountains.
[The italics are mine.]

General Lee was then less than ten miles from Cash-
town; he expected to stop there that evening. All the
divisions of his army — infantry, cavalry, and artillery —
were marching on that point and would be there, or in
supporting distance, by sundown. If his army had been
ordered to Gettysburg he would have told Imboden that
his headquarters would be with the army. There is a
tone of confidence in his letter and no anxiety is expressed
about his rear.

If he had felt any uneasiness about it he would prob-
GETTYSBURG 143

ably have sent Imboden’s cavalry to make a reconnaissance
toward the Potomac. As there was uninterrupted com-
munication with Williamsport by couriers west of the
mountain, he knew that the Northern army must be to
the East. He certainly knew that Meade was at Fred-
erick several days before and he knew that Meade wouldn’t
stop there. He certainly had no expectation of fighting a
battle that day; yet, at the time when he was writing,
A. P. Hill and Heth were fighting at Gettysburg. They
had gone off early that morning without orders, or notice
to Lee, for an adventure, and expected to return to camp
with their spoil that evening. Hill had five battalions
of artillery at Cashtown; he took only two with him. The
others were left behind with his impedimenta. In this
way a battle was precipitated where Lee never expected
to fight one. During the day (about noon, Freemantle
says), in company with General Longstreet, General Lee
left Greenwood for Cashtown. The Chief of Artillery,
General Pendleton, rode with him. In his report, Pendle-
ton says, that when they were crossing the South Mountain
“cannon shots were heard, but its significance, however,
was not fully understood. It might only be a passing
skirmish; it might be more serious. After a brief pause
near Cashtown, to see how it would prove, the command-
ing general, finding the cannonading to continue and
increase, moved rapidly forward. I did the same and, at
his request, rode near him for instructions.”

Although General Lee had written Imboden in the
morning that Cashtown would for the present be his head-
quarters, he paused there for only a few minutes, and then
144 STUART’S CAVALRY

galloped on to the field of battle. He never saw Cash-
town again. If he had given Hill and Heth authority to
go to Gettysburg, he would have known the significance
of the firing when he heard it. He knew the enemy held
the place; Hill says he had informed him the night before;
and he was in communication with Ewell, whose cavalry
was in contact with Buford. It was therefore at Cash-
town, and not at Chambersburg, where Lee was surprised
and found his plan broken up.

I have said that Heth’s division had gone in advance to
Cashtown. A. P. Hill came on afterward with Pender’s.
He had left Anderson’s division at Fayetteville on the
30th with orders to follow the next day. Anderson’s
report says: “Soon after daylight, on July 1, in accordance
with the commands of the Lieutenant-general, the division
moved from Fayetteville in the direction of Cashtown.
Arrived at the latter place early in the afternoon, and
halted for further orders. Shortly before our arrival at
Cashtown, the sound of brisk cannonading near Gettys-
burg announced anengagement in our front. Ajter waiting
an hour at Cashtown, orders were received from Gen-
eral Hill to move jorward to Gettysburg.” [Italics mine.]
If Hill had started to Gettysburg to occupy the place,
Anderson would not have had to wait for orders to go
on; and, as General Lee must have passed Anderson’s
division on the march to Cashtown that day, he would
have ordered him to move to Gettysburg if he had known
that there was to be a battle there. The instructions he
had sent to Imboden that morning for picketing the roads
in every direction west of the mountain and parking the
GETTYSBURG 145

trains in the Pass, and the statement that his headquarters
for the present would be at Cashtown, show that he then
had no idea of going to Gettysburg. Yet he was there
overlooking the battle-field that evening. As General
Lee says he knew that General Meade was at Frederick
City on the 28th, he must have expected his army to be
not far behind Buford’s cavalry. He could not expect
it to be stationary; Gettysburg is little more than a day’s
march north of Frederick. No doubt he was surprised
when he heard the sound of battle at Gettysburg; for he
had given no orders to any one to go there. Before Hill
arrived at Cashtown with Pender it seems Heth had sent
a force on picket to Fairfield, about seven miles south. It
was probably two Mississippi regiments. Buford’s cavalry
crossed the Potomac in rear of the army and then moved
on west on the night of the 27th from Edwards’ Ferry,
to Middletown. On the 29th he passed through Boons-
boro Gap and thence along the western base of the moun-
tain — re-crossed at Monterey Gap, and bivouacked that
night near Fairfield. He did not approach Lee’s line of
march, or capture a wagon or a soldier. Buford kept
so close to the mountain that he never saw a Confederate
during the day, and did not know that he had slept so
close to their camps that night until he started early to
go on to Gettysburg and unexpectedly ran against the
picket. He felt the picket, but withdrew, and took the
route by Emmittsburg.

He arrived near Gettysburg on June 30, about the time
that Pettigrew’s brigade, that Heth had sent out to get
some shoes he had heard were there, came in sight. Petti-
146 STUART’S CAVALRY

grew saw Buford and returned; he reported to Hill that
the enemy were at Gettysburg. Hill says he immediately
sent a courier with the information to General Lee. Yet
Heth, in a published letter after the war, said that on
account of the absence of the cavalry he ran like a blind
man against Buford and stumbled into a battle. If Hill
and Heth had stood still, they would not have stumbled.
Pettigrew had worn out a good deal of shoe-leather but
he got no shoes. It is not probable that Gordon’s and
White’s men, who were camped there the night of the
26th, left any but children’s shoes for the barefooted Con-
federates. No doubt Buford thought that Stuart’s
cavalry corps was on Lee’s right flank. In no other way
can his feeble operations on the 29th be accounted for.
On the day before, General Steinwehr had reported from
the mountain that 5000 Confederate cavalry had crossed
the Potomac and had passed through Hagerstown. It
was not true — but it did us almost as much good as if it
had been true. The imagination is a powerful factor in
war.

Buford expected to meet Kilpatrick, who had been put
in command of Stahel’s cavalry. But he and Gregg had
been sent off after Stuart, who was riding around Meade,
cutting his lines of communication and destroying his
trains. Buford did not know that Stuart had crossed at
Seneca. Meade was like a ship without a compass drifting
in a fog. He had to have as strong detachments to
guard his communications as if he had been in the enemy’s
country. On the contrary, General Lee had no trouble
about his. He lived on the country where he camped.
GETTYSBURG 147

He knew that Meade had cavalry at Gettysburg as an
outpost and that his army could not be far behind. Ewell
and Early had a strong force of cavalry and some of our
best cavalry officers to do their scouting.

Early sent Colonel Lije White on the morning of the
30th from York on the Gettysburg road to gather infor-
mation for him. No doubt he reported to Early that
evening. In a letter from Gettysburg to Pleasanton on
the 29th, Buford says: “I entered this place to-day at
11 a.m. Found everybody in a terrible state of excite-
ment on account of the enemy’s advance upon this place.
He had approached to within half a mile of the town
when the head of my column entered.” In a letter to
Reynolds on the night of the 30th, Buford said: “I am
satisfied that A. P. Hill’s corps is massed just back of
Cashtown about nine miles from this place. Pender’s
division of Hill’s corps came up to-day. . . . The road,
however, is terribly infested with prowling cavalry parties.
. .. Near Heidlersburg to-day one of my parties cap-
‘tured a courier of Lee’s. Nothing was found on him.
He says Ewell’s corps is crossing the mountain from Car-
lisle, Rodes’ division being at Petersburg in advance.”
[Italics mine.]

In another letter to Pleasanton on the night of June 30th,
Buford said: “There is a road to Cashtown running
through Mumasburg and Hunterstown on to the York
pike at Oxford which is terribly infested with roving de-
tachments of cavalry.” Buford did not seem to think
that the Confederates were deficient in cavalry. Hill’s
report of the campaign cannot be reconciled with the
148 STUART’S CAVALRY

movements of his own corps, or with the reports of Lee,
Early, and Ewell. It is dated in November and says that
on the morning of June 29, he was in camp at Fayetteville
and was directed to move in the direction of York and
cross the Susquehanna, menacing the communications of
Harrisburg with Philadelphia, and co-operate with Ewell.
But the staff officers say that he was ordered on the 29th,
after the spy came in, to Gettysburg. It is hard to believe
that such an order was ever given. If it was, why did
Hill stop at Cashtown? Why did he not move on to
York? There was no enemy then in his way at Gettys-
burg.

But if he had gone to York he would have crossed
Ewell marching away from the Susquehanna to Cashtown,
and he would have met Early on the road coming back
from York. Whywould General Lee call Early away from
the Susquehanna and send Hill there; or how could Hill
co-operate with Ewell if they were marching in opposite
directions? General Lee had not then ordered any corps
of his army to Gettysburg. He never did till after the
close of the first day’s fight. On July 1, General Lee’s
and Longsireet’s headquarters were ten miles from Cash-
town. Hill was there with two divisions; his third was
marching to join him; Ewell’s three divisions started that
morning for Cashtown. Longstreet’s orders to his
division commanders, Hood and McLaws, were to follow
General Edward Johnson’s division and trains that were
then passing on the pike and “camp on the other side
of the mountain.” Pickett was left at Chambersburg.
He was ordered to follow Hood as soon as relieved by
GETTYSBURG 149

Imboden, and, when he arrived at Greenwood, to relieve
Laws’ brigade, which was on picket at New Guilford;
Pickett was told that his own division would be relieved
by Imboden. The instructions to Longstreet’s three
division commanders and to his chief of artillery are to
“camp on the other side of the mountain.” Gettysburg
is not mentioned. Yet that evening the following dis-
patch was sent by Longstreet’s order:

SORRELL, A. A. G., TO WALTON, CHIEF OF ARTILLERY
Near Gerryspure, Pa., July Ist, 5.80 p.m.

The commanding General desires you to come on to-night as far
as you can without distressing your men and animals. Ewell and Hill
have sharply engaged the enemy to-day and you will be wanted for
to morrow’s battle.

The same order was sent to Hood, Pickett, and McLaws.
Laws did not wait for Pickett to relieve him; Longstreet
ordered him to come on; he arrived in time to be in the
next day’s battle. Pickett left in a hurry; he marched
through Greenwood and never halted. He left no picket
behind in place of Laws’ brigade. General Lee was, of
course, surprised when he reached Cashtown and heard
that Hill and Heth had gone off on an excursion and were
fighting a battle eight miles away at Gettysburg. Lee was
dragged to his doom and resolved to make the best of the
situation. But no one can show that the absence of a part of
the cavalry with Stuart had anything to do either with
bringing on or losing the battle. If Lee had needed
cavalry he had an abundance with Ewell at his call.
No doubt he felt the need of Stuart in whom he placed
great reliance; and that he expressed anxiety to hear from
150 STUART'S CAVALRY

him. He didn’t then know what had detained Stuart.
Stuart was absent on duty obeying Lee’s orders; he
heard from him that day.

There have been complaints, but no one has proved
that Lee did anything, or left anything undone, for want
of information that cavalry could have brought him. In
fact he did know all that cavalry could tell him. Long-
street says the spy told him more. The two generals who
precipitated the battle are responsible for the disaster;
they attempted to shift the blame on Stuart because his
absence on the first day gave color to the charge, and had
the assistance of certain staff officers at headquarters.

Stine’s History of the Army of the Potomac (1893)
and the Southern Historical Papers (1877), have letters
from Heth in which he imputes to Stuart the whole blame
for the loss of the battle; his description of the combat
of July 1 conflicts with his own and Hill’s official reports.

Of course, Heth’s motive was to divert attention from
himself; he admits that he proposed the trip to Gettys-
burg to Hill. His report says nothing about their going
to Gettysburg on July 1 for shoes; but that they went on a
reconnaissance and fought all day to find out if there was
an enemy in front of them. They fought hard and
found him.*

1 General Lee’s second report contradicts Heth; it says: ‘General
Hill arrived [at Cashtown] with Pender’s division in the evening, and
the following morning [July Ist] advanced with these two divisions
accompanied by Pegram’s and MclIntosh’s battalions of artillery, to
ascertain the strength of the enemy, whose force was supposed to con-
sist chiefly of cavalry. The leading division, under General Heth,
found the enemy’s videttes about three miles west of Gettysburg and
GETTYSBURG 151

There is nothing in their reports about General Lee
being present and giving orders on the field, or of Heth’s
getting permission from him to take his division into the
fight to help Rodes who was hard pressed. ~If Heth had
said so, General Lee would have sent his report back to
him for correction; he was not responsible for what Heth
did that day. The record evidence proves the reverse —
that Rodes came into the fight several hours after it began
and after Heth’s division had been knocked to pieces.
Heth’s letters since the war say he was hunting for shoes;
his report says he was hunting a fight. A. P. Hill’s report
does not mention shoes. Heth’s letters say nothing about
making a reconnaissance. “Rodes,”’ says Heth, “hear-
ing the firing at Gettysburg, faced by the left flank and

continued to advance until within a mile of the town, when two brigades
were sent forward to reconnoiter. They drove in the advance of the
enemy very gallantly, but subsequently encountered largely superior
numbers and were compelled to retire with loss, Brigadier-General
Archer commanding one of the brigades being taken prisoner. Gen-
eral Heth then prepared for action, and as soon as Pender arrived to
support him was ordered by General Hill to advance. The artillery
was placed in position and the engagement opened with vigor. General
Heth pressed the enemy steadily back, breaking his first and second
lines and attacking his third with great resolution. About 2.30 P.m.,
the advance of Ewell’s corps, consisting of Rodes’ division, with Carter’s
battalion of artillery, arrived by the Middletown road and forming on
Heth’s left, nearly at right angles with his line, became warmly engaged
with fresh numbers of the enemy. Heth’s troops having suffered heavily
in their protracted contest with a superior force, were relieved by Pender’s,
and Early coming up by the Heidlersburg road soon afterwards, took
position of the left of Rodes when a general advance was made. The
enemy gave way on all sides and was driven through Gettysburg with
great loss.”
And to cover up this blunder it is called a reconnaissance.
152 STUART’S CAVALRY

approached the town; he became heavily engaged and,
seeing this, I sought for and found General Lee, saying
to the General: ‘Rodes is heavily engaged; had I not
better attack?’ General Lee replied: ‘No, I am not
prepared to bring on a general engagement to-day;
Longstreet is not up’ [which implies that Longstreet had
then been ordered up]. Returning to my division I
soon discovered that the enemy were moving troops from
my front and pushing them against Rodes. I reported
this fact to General Lee and again requested permission-
to attack. Permission was given. My division num-
bered 7000 muskets. . . . Nor do I see how there could
have been any systematic plan of battle formed, as I
have, I think, clearly shown that we accidentally
stumbled into the fight.”

Now Heth’s story is contradicted by A. P. Hill, the
commander of the corps, whose report says that he put
Pender’s division in to support Heth’s that was in distress;
and that about 2.30 in the afternoon, Ewell, with Early’s
and Rodes’ divisions, came in and formed a right angle
to his line and the field was won. Just as true an account
of the battle as Heth’s letters can be found in the Pick-
wick papers. Rodes’ report shows that Heth’s story is
a fable. Now the truth is, when Heth early in the morn-
ing went into the action, General Lee was ten miles away,
west of the mountains. Pendleton’s report says they
heard the firing when they were on the western slope and
that General Lee did not understand it. When Rodes
arrived on the field, Heth’s division was in fragments.

In the same volume of the papers with Heth’s letter is
GETTYSBURG 153

one from General Long, who was a staff officer of General
Lee and his biographer. Long says: “An engagement
ensued which continued with great spirit until about
four o’clock in the afternoon, when the Federal forces
were signally defeated and almost annihilated. General
Lee arrived on the scene near the close of the action.”

Heth says he stumbled into the fight; he ought to have
said he blundered into it. He says that, had the cavalry
been in position, General Lee would have known of Rey-
‘nolds’ approach to Gettysburg and would have occupied
the place and made it impregnable. But the absence of
cavalry (if they had no cavalry) was no reason for Heth’s
going there on a raid; it might have been a good reason
for his staying in camp. This statement assumes that
Gettysburg was Lee’s objective; it was not. Lee was as
willing for Meade to be at Gettysburg as anywhere else;
he had no idea of going there before he heard the firing;
he went to the rescue of A. P. Hill and Heth. Lee had
known for a week that Meade was moving north from
Frederick and that he must be in the vicinity of Gettys-
burg. As a cavalry division was already there, he knew,
without being told, that Meade’s army must be near. He
selected and held the Cashtown Pass as his point of con-
centration because nature had made it impregnable. He
would have a mountain wall to cover his flanks, and the
rich Cumberland Valley behind him. If he had ordered
the army to Gettysburg he would have been with the lead-
ing division, and would have occupied the place several
days before, instead of halting Hill’s corps at Cashtown.
There was just as much reason for censuring Lee for
154 STUART’S CAVALRY

being absent on the first day as Stuart. It is impossible
to believe that General Lee ever professed the ignorance
of the movements of Stuart which Heth and Long and his
staff officers have attributed to him. If he had done so it
would have been affectation. He knew that his and
Longstreet’s orders would carry Stuart for a while into a
state of eclipse around the enemy, out of sight, and out
of communication with him.

Heth delivered the judgment in his letter that — “The
failure to crush the Federal army in Pennsylvania .
can be expressed in five words — the absence of the cavalry.”

I would rather say it was due to the presence of Heth. In
another letter in the Philadelphia Times of December 27,
1877, Heth professes to have read in General Lee’s letter-
book his instructions to Stuart to keep in close contact
and communication with him and Longstreet. Now the
contents of the letter-book have since been published and
I have read the original copies in the book. Heth’s ac-
count of what he read in the letter-book is pure fiction.
Instead of ordering Stuart to keep on Longstreet’s flank,
he ordered him to leave Longstreet in Virginia, cross the
Potomac, and join Ewell on the Susquehanna, — a hun-
dred miles away. It was all the same to Lee at what
ford Stuart crossed the Potomac. Heth’s letter was
written to give information about the battle to the Count
of Paris. It is the origin of his criticism of Stuart in his
History of the War.

As for cavalry, there were as many with Ewell as there
were with Reynolds that day. Buford fought his two
brigades dismounted in the morning when Heth attacked
GETTYSBURG 155

him. There were no cavalry charges on either side. The
Confederate cavalry simply guarded the flanks. If there
had existed any necessity to make a reconnaissance, Lee’s
headquarters were near, and so were Ewell’s cavalry.

The order should have come from the Commander-in-
Chief. Hill and Heth never informed him of the exploit
they meditated. He never would have sanctioned it.
The object of a reconnaissance is not to gratify curiosity
but to get information that shall be a basis of action — to
be ready for an attack or a retreat. But the army could
take no effective action before it was concentrated and
Lee proposed to stand on the defensive. The concen-
tration would have been completed that evening had it
not been defeated by an act of subordinates. As General
Lee was supposed to be responsible for the movement on
Gettysburg that day, it has been a mystery why a man
of his aggressive temper did not order a pursuit after the
rout, but allowed the enemy to re-form in a strong position
on Cemetery Ridge. Johnson’s and Anderson’s divisions
that had just arrived on the field might easily have taken
it. But we must not judge General Lee by what we know
now, but in the light that was then before him.

It is very plain why he did not pursue. The battle had
been brought on without his knowledge and against his
orders. It was improbable that two of Meade’s corps
and a division of cavalry would not be in supporting dis-
tance of his army. The battle had lasted six hours and
there was every reason to believe that fresh troops had
arrived, or were near at hand. The only way to find out
was to attack the enemy in force in his strong position.
156 STUART’S CAVALRY

The position of the enemy was almost inaccessible, even
to infantry. No use could have been made of cavalry
for a reconnaissance to find out the strength of the force

holding the Ridge.*

1Lezspure, Va., April 17, 1906.
Hon. Joun H. ALEXANDER,

My pear Comrape: According to promise I will give you for the
benefit of Colonel J. S. Mosby a condensed statement of the operations
of my Command at Gettysburg.

Gen. R. 5. Ewell applied to Gen. Lee for my Command to go with
him before he left the main army. I had scouted for General Ewell
much. The application was referred to General Stuart who refused to
comply with it, and Colonel French was sent. Before crossing the
Potomac River General Ewell again asked for my Command, and his
request was granted. I joined him at Chambersburg. The next morn-
ing I was ordered by Ewell to report to General Early, who was on the
direct road to Gettysburg. In his dispatch to Early, General Ewell
ordered to put me in front of Gordon’s brigade. Colonel French, with
a small portion of his Command was put on detached service; and the
greater portion of his Command was placed under me and I was put in
front of Gordon. But Colonel French’s own regiment was not put
under me, nor did I want them.

After we passed through Cashtown and arrived in about a mile of
Gettysburg, I saw on my left from 700 to 900 of the enemy drawn up
in line of battle. I reported this to General Gordon, and told him if he
wished to see the fight to come up, which he did. My Command num-
bered 250. The fight was short and decisive. I captured 170 of them
and would have captured more but for the fences which were numerous.
I camped near Gettysburg that night. I was then ordered by General
Early to go to Hanover Junction and break the railroad communica-
tions, &c. I started early the next morning. Nothing occurred on
the way of any consequence, except that I captured « wagon load of
jewelry. After supplying ourselves we buried the balance. We found
Hanover Junction guarded by infantry. After a sharp fight we drove
them away and burned the depot, bridges, &c. We camped that night
not far from Hanover Junction, and joined General-Early at York the
next day. I was sent by Early in front of his Command, the next day,
GETTYSBURG 157

in the direction of Gettysburg. I gave Early valuable information
which I gathered on the way, and joined Ewell at Cashtown. I was
ordered by Ewell to make reconnoissance and report their number,
position, &c. I did this and General Early made his attack on my
report. Early ordered me to watch his left flank and I took my position
on the left of Cemetery Hill.

After the first day’s fight was over, and about dark, I saw the enemy
leaving Cemetery Hill. I found General Ewell sitting on the ground
near Gettysburg and reported to him what I had seen. At that time
an officer from General Lee rode up and delivered General Lee’s com-
pliments to General Ewell for his great fight during the day, and said
that General Lee said, ‘if Ewell did not think his position strong enough
he was to swing around to the right on Longstreet.’ Early replied,
‘Tell General Lee I'll bet him fifty dollars in green backs we can whip
them any way they come.’ General Ewell, without replying, rose up
and walked away and ordered me to follow. He asked me if I could
find out for certain if my impression was correct that the enemy were
retreating. Said that he would detach any number of men to go with
me. I replied that if possible I would find out; but did not want any
of his men, and wanted but few of my own. I promised him to be back
by 3 a.m. IT selected five men to go with me. We found the Yankees
too thick around for us to ride through them; so I left our horses with
three men in an orchard of very large trees, and took men on with me
afoot. We had then gotten near enough to the pike to hear the noise
of the troops moving over it; but could not distinguish whether they were
reinforcements coming up or the army retreating. I finally reached
the pike and listened attentively to all that was said, and learned that
the whole army was up or coming up. The night had passed too swiftly
for me. One of my men said, ‘Colonel, the day is breaking.” We
reached our horses, I know not how; but on the way we passed houses
in which the Yankee soldiers were eating their breakfast, perhaps.
When we reported to General Ewell that the whole army was up, or
nearly so, he said, ‘Hear that gun, it is too late; that means the opening
of the battle. It is Longstreet’s gun.’

I continued scouting for Ewell until General Stuart arrived on
July 2nd, and was with General Stuart in his fight with the enemy on
that day. On our retreat General Ewell ordered me to report to General
Gordon and bring up his retreat. Gordon was in the rear on leaving
Gettysburg. We had hard fighting all that day; and at one time Gordon
158 STUART’S CAVALRY

had to come to our assistance. When night arrived I had scarcely a
man or horse fit for duty.

I would be glad to answer any questions that Colonel Mosby may
want to ask, and of which I am capable. I have gone but little into
details. We inflicted considerable loss on the enemy in several small
engagements, but also lost several men ourselves — especially while
with General Stuart.

Respectfully,

E. V. Wurre (Signed).

But if immediate advantage was not taken of the panic
the opportunity was lost — the tide must be taken at its
flood that leads on to fortune. Steinwehr’s fresh division
with the reserve artillery occupied the commanding po-
sition of Cemetery Hill; and the troops that had been
engaged were forming there on the reserve.’ To judge

1 Colonel Freemantle says: “July 2nd, Colonel Sorrell, the Austrian
and I arrived at 5 a.m. at the same commanding position we were on
yesterday, and I climbed up a tree in company with Captain Schreibert
of the Prussian army. Just below us were seated Generals Lee, Hill,
Longstreet and Hood in consultation — the two latter assisting their
deliberations by the truly American custom of whitiling sticks. . . . At
7 a. I rode over one part of the ground with General Longstreet, and
saw him disposing of McLaws’ division for to-day’s fight. The enemy
occupied a series of high ridges, the tops of which were covered with
trees, but the intervening valleys between their ridges and ours were
open and partly under cultivation. The cemetery was on their right
and their left appeared to rest upon a high, rocky hill. The enemy’s
forces, which were now supposed to comprise nearly the whole Potomac
army, were concentrated in a space apparently not more than a couple
of miles in length. The Confederates enclosed them in a sort of semi-
circle, and the extreme extent of our position must have been from five to
six miles at least. . . . Only two divisions of Longstreet’s were present
today, viz; McLaws’ and Hood’s; Pickett’s being still in the rear... . At
2 pm. General Longstreet advised me, if I wished to have a good
view of the battle, to return to my tree of yesterday. . . . Every now
and then a caisson would blow up — if a Federal one a Confederate yell
GETTYSBURG 159

General Lee, we must put ourselves in his place; every
general must be condemned if judged by any other rule.
General Lee could not know by intuition that Meade’s
army was scattered, and a large part of it, including nearly
all of his cavelry, had gone after Stuart.

Johnson’s report says: “On June 29, in obedience
to orders, I counter-marched my division [from Carlisle]
to Greenvillage and hence easterly via Scotland to Gettys-
burg, not arriving in time, however, to participate in the
action of the first instant.” Johnson did not arrive at
Cashtown before noon of July 1. Ewell, with Rodes’

would immediately follow. The Southern troops when charging to
express their delight always yell in a manner peculiar to themselves.
Their cheer is much like ours; but the Confederate officers declare that
the rebel yell has a particular merit and always produces a salutary and
useful effect upon their adversaries.

“Every one deplores that Longstreet will expose himself in such a
reckless manner. To-day he led a Georgia regiment in a charge against
a battery, hat in hand and in front of everybody. As soon as the firing
began, General Lee joined Hill below our tree and he remained there
nearly all the time, looking through his field glasses — sometimes talk-
ing to Hill and sometimes to Colonel Long of his staff. But generally
he sat quite alone on the stump of a tree. . . . Soon after seven General
Lee got a report by signal from General Longstreet to say “we are
doing well. . . . A long train of horses and mules got in to-day sent in by
General Stuart and captured, it is understood, by his cavalry which had
penetrated to within six miles of Washington.’ [This was a supply train
of one hundred and fifty wagons which Stuart had captured on its way
from Washington to the army at Frederick.]

“At supper this evening General Longstreet spoke of the enemy’s
position as being ‘very formidable.’ He also said they would doubtless
entrench themselves strongly during the night. . . . I have the best
reason for supposing that the fight came off prematurely, and that neither
Longstreet nor Lee intended that it should have begun that day. I also
think their plans were deranged by the events of the first.”
160 STUART’S CAVALRY

division, did not leave Carlisle until the 30th. I suppose
he was waiting for Jenkins’ cavalry, which was skirmishing
in the suburbs of Harrisburg, to join him. In the mean-
time Ewell must have received Lee’s second letter of the
28th to come the eastern route. Although Ewell started the
day after Johnson left, yet he would have arrived at Cash-
town ahead of Johnson if the note from Hill had not
diverted him from his line of march, on the morning of July
1,to Gettysburg. This shows that Johnson marched about
twice the distance that Rodes did. Johnson must have
received orders at Cashtown to move on. Anderson says
he received orders there to join Hill at Gettysburg. Colonel
Freemantle passed both divisions on the road that morning
— Anderson was leading. In his “Four Years with Lee,”
Colonel Taylor, Lee’s A. A. G., says: “Major Edward
Johnson, whose division reached the field after the engage-
ment and formed on the left of Early, in a conversation
had with me since the war about this circumstance [at-
tacking Cemetery Hill on July 1st], in which I sought an
explanation of our inaction at that time, assured me that
there was no hindrance to his moving forward, but that
after getting his own command into line of battle and
before it became seriously engaged, or had advanced any
great distance, for some unexplained reason he had orders
to halt.”

Of course the Commander-in-Chief, after he arrived
on the field, became responsible for the conduct of the
operations. Discretion to attack or not to attack could
not be transferred to corps commanders. As Lee was
present on the field his orders must have been abso-
GETTYSBURG 161

lute, if any were given. With the light before him I
think General Lee had reason to think that Meade’s whole
army was on the Ridge in front of him. If he had or-
dered Hill and Heth to attack in the morning he would
have kept up the pursuit in the evening. ‘There were a
thousand reasons forcontinuing the fight: there was nogood
reason for beginning it. This shows that he did not look
with unalloyed pleasure on the trophies that had been won.
Yet on the field of victory he condoned his lieutenant’s
offense; afterwards he was estopped from complaining of
it. Colonel Freemantle’s diary says: “At 4.30 p.M., we
came in sight of Gettysburg and joined General Lee and
General Hill [in the moming when General Lee heard
the firing he rode rapidly forward and left Longstreet]
who were on top of one of the ridges which formed the
peculiar feature of the country around Gettysburg. We
could see the enemy retreating up one of the opposite
ridges, pursued by the Confederates with loud yells.
The position into which the enemy had been driven was
evidently a strong one. His right appeared to rest ona
cemetery on a high ridge to the right of Gettysburg as
we looked at it... . General Ewell had come up at
3.30 on the enemy’s right (with part of his corps) and com-
pleted his discomfiture. General Reynolds, one of the
best Yankee Generals, was reported killed. While we
were talking, a message arrived from General Ewell,
requesting Hill to press the enemy in front while he per-
formed the same operation on his right. The pressure
was accordingly applied in a mild degree, but the enemy
was too strongly posted and it was too late in the evening
162 STUART’S CAVALRY

for a regular attack. . . . The firing closed about dark,
at which time I rode back with General Longstreet and
his staff to his headquarters at Cashtown, a little village
about eight miles from Gettysburg. . . . In the fight to-
day nearly 6,000 prisoners had been taken and 10 guns.
About 20,000 men must have been on the field on the
Confederate side. The enemy had two corps d’armée
engaged. All prisoners belong, I think, to the First and
Eleventh Corps. . . .”

Lee had every reason to believe that the bulk of Meade’s
army was on the Ridge. His staff officer and biographer,
Long, after the manner of Herodotus, gives a dramatic
form to his narrative in an imaginary dialogue between
himself and Lee that night. I say imaginary, because an
analysis shows that he told Lee things that he and Lee
could not have known then. This is another instance
of an anachronism; Long antedated what he afterward
learned. Long says: “The General, as if he had been
thinking over his plans and orders, turned to me with the
remark: ‘Colonel Long, do you think we had better
attack without cavalry? If we do so, we will not, if suc-
cessful, be able to reap the fruits of victory.” In my
opinion, I replied, it would be best not to wait for
Stuart. It is uncertain where he is or when he will arrive.
At present only two or three corps of the enemy’s army
are up and it seems best to attack them before they are
greatly strengthened by reinforcements. The cavalry
had better be left to take care of itself.”

In the immortal dialogue of the Phzdo, Plato puts
imaginary speeches into the mouth of Socrates; while, as a
GETTYSBURG 163

fact, they were never spoken, still we know that they might
have been spoken by the great martyr. General Lee
would never have said what his staff officer here makes
him say—he would have stultified himself. If Plato had
introduced Lee in a dialogue, he would not have made
him ask such a silly question; or give such an absurd
answer if the question had been asked of him.

In modern war little use is made of cavalry except for
strategic purposes — to screen its own side and unmask
the other. The army had no Chief of Cavalry after
Stuart was gone. Stuart, in fact, created a revolution
in the use of cavalry. The improvements in fire-arms
have made Murat’s tactics in charging infantry squares
as obsolete as the lance and the flint-lock. If not having
cavalry to pursue and gather the fruits of victory was a
good reason for not attacking Meade, it would have been
an equally good reason for not attacking Hooker at Chan-
cellorsville. ‘There was no cavalry pursuit there; nor in
any of the battles of Virginia. In fact in all of Lee’s
battles the work done by the cavalry was valuable but
mostly preliminary — the cavalry cleared the way and
guarded the flanks.

Then Long makes himself tell General Lee not to wait
for Stuart — that they did not know where he was — and
that only two or three of Meade’s corps were up, and it was
better to make an early attack. Now Major Venable,
Stuart’s staff officer, had reported to General Lee in
person in the afternoon that Stuart was approaching and
would soon arrive. Lee’s report says so. He was on
the ground the next day before Longstreet deployed a
164 STUART’S CAVALRY

single brigade. Long also makes himself tell General
Lee that only two or three corps of the enemy were on
the ground. If Long knew it, General Lee knew it. But
if Lee knew it, then he made a great mistake, and there
is no excuse for his not having seized Cemetery Ridge on
the evening of July 1. The only defense that can be
made for General Lee’s inaction is that he did not know
then what we know now.

But if Stuart was not present, nearly all of Meade’s
cavalry was absent in pursuit of him. That was com-
pensation to Lee — Meade would have had no cavalry
to cover his retreat if defeated. Then, if General Lee
knew that only a small part of Meade’s army was in his
front, he knew that they would be gone before daybreak
or that Meade’s army would be on the Ridge by sunrise.
‘There are many things a man of sense knows without
being told.

Before any blame can be attached to Stuart for the loss
of the campaign it must appear, — (1) that he was guilty
of disobedience of orders and improperly absent; (2) that
in consequehce of it there was an imperative necessity
for Hill and Heth to move to Gettysburg on July 1.
It is immaterial whether they went to get information,
or to get shoes. It is a coincidence that in the October
following, General Lee on the Rapidan again took the
offensive and moved to strike Meade on the flank;
and that Hill and Heth should have been again in
advance at Bristoe, and have repeated the blunder of
Gettysburg.

But no one would suspect it from reading General Lee’s
GETTYSBURG 165

report. It says: “General Hill arrived first at Bristoe
where his advance [Heth’s division] consisting of two
brigades became engaged with a force largely superior
in numbers posted behind the railroad embankment.
The particulars of the action have not been officially
reported, but the brigades were repulsed with loss and
five pieces of artillery with a number of prisoners cap-
tured.” This is a very mild statement of the case. Hill
says he “ran up against the enemy’s line of battle behind
the railroad embankment (Second Corps) and of whose
presence I was unaware. . . . In conclusion I am con-
vinced that I made the attack too hastily [as he had done
on July 1] and at the same time that [if there had been]
a delay of half-an-hour there would have been no enemy
to attack. In that event I believe I should equally have
blamed myself for not attacking at once.” Hill and
Heth, in their haste to attack with two brigades the Third
Corps that had crossed Broad Run, were ambuscaded by
the Second Corps, under Warren, that had not crossed
the stream, and was lying near in a railroad cut behind
an embankment on their flank.

A few skirmishers would have developed Warren and
saved Hill from the surprise. I do not think Hill would
have had any reason to blame himself if he had taken
time to reconnoiter,as Warren could not move off by day-
light with Hill close on his flank without great loss; Warren
says he did not leave until nine o’clock that night. An-
derson’s division was brought up and a part of it engaged.
On Hill’s report are the following endorsements:
166 STUART’S CAVALRY

General Hill explains how, in his haste to attack the Third Army
corps of the enemy [in his front] he overlooked the presence of the
Second fon his flank] which was the cause of the disaster which

ensued.
R. E. Lez, General.

NovempBrr 24th, 1863.
Respectfully submitted to the President: —
The disaster at Bristoe Station seems to be due to gallant but over

hasty pressing on of the enemy.
J. A. Seppon.

Returned to the Secretary of War: —

There was a want of vigilance by reason of which it appears the
Third [Second] army corps of the enemy got a position giving great ad-
vantage to them.

J. D. [Davis].

Hill’s loss was 1378 killed, wounded, and captured, and
five pieces of artillery, in an affair that probably did not
last fifteen minutes. General Posey was mortally wounded.
General Lee had passed through Greenwich in pursuit
of Meade with Hill and Ewell’s corps. When they
arrived near Bristoe the Third Corps had just crossed
Broad Run on the retreat to Centerville; Hill ordered
Heth to cross and attack it; the Third Corps went on;
the Second, under Warren, was intercepted; it had not
reached the stream and was marching in column on the
railroad. Warren immediately formed a front to his
flank behind a railroad embankment and a deep cut.
Heth overlooked it; this was the cause of the failure of
the Bristoe campaign. With ordinary skill the Second
Corps should have been destroyed.

I have heard persons who were present speak of the

‘
GETTYSBURG 167

emotion that General Lee exhibited when he rode up and
saw the ground strewn with the dead and wounded of
Heth’s brigades — “Like the leaves of the forest when
Autumn hath blown.” Long, the staff officer and biog-
rapher of General Lee, says: “Meade had made the
best use of the several unavoidable delays of the Con-
federate army, and though Hill, who was seeking to inter-
cept the Federal retreat at Bristoe Station, made all haste
in his march, he arrived there only in time to meet the
rear-guard of Meade’s army. He made a prompt attack
on the Federal column, which was hastening to pass
Broad Run, which the remainder of the army had already
crossed. The assault proved unfortunate. . . . When
General Lee reached the position of Hill’s repulse, that
officer, deeply mortified by his mishap, endeavored to
explain the causes of his failure. The General listened
in silence and as they rode together over the field strewn
with dead bodies, replied with sad gravity: ‘Well, well,
General, bury these poor men and let us say no more
about it.’ The movement had evidently proved a failure.”
Tt ought to have been and came near being a master-
stroke. Colonel Taylor of Lee’s staff, in a note made at
the time says: “On Wednesday we left Warrenton and
reached this place [Bristoe] on the same day. Here Hill’s
advance met a corps of the enemy and at once engaged
it. Our other corps [Ewell’s] came up in good time and
we should have punished the enemy severely, but matters
were not properly managed and they all escaped and,
what is worse, they got the better of us in what little fight-
ing there was. ... By unpardonable mismanagement
168 STUART’S CAVALRY

the enemy was allowed to capture five pieces of artillery.
There was no excuse for it as all our troops were well in
hand and much stronger than the enemy.”

In October, General Lee, writing to Longstreet, who
had been sent west, said in reference to the Bristoe affair —
“We struck his [Meade’s] rear-guard three times. The
last at Bristoe, where Hill with his advance of two brigades
fell too precipitately on one of his corps and suffered a
repulse and loss.”

In his “Story of the Civil War,” John C. Ropes, a
Northern man, but certainly impartial in his judgment
as between Confederates, in reference to the opening of
the battles around Richmond in which the duty assigned
to A. P. Hill was to co-operate with Jackson, who was to
attack the enemy in flank and rear, says: “The Con-
federates under the lead of A. P. Hill, a daring and ener-
getic but inconsiderate officer, pushed the Federals hard
and their outposts retired to their intrenched lines behind
Beaver Dam Creek, a little east of Mechanicsville, where
they felt secure from any direct attack. In spite of the
fact that nothing had been heard of Jackson,.and not-
withstanding the evident strength of the Federal position,
Hill attacked fiercely and recklessly. He was repulsed
with great slaughter, mainly by McCall’s division of
Porter’s corps, without having made the smallest impres-
sion on the Federal lines.”

And in his life of Stonewall Jackson, Colonel Hender-
son says: “It was the impatience of Hill, not the tardi-
ness of Jackson, which was the cause of the Confederate
repulse.” And with equal justice it may be added that
GETTYSBURG 169

it was the impatience of General Hill at Bristoe and
Gettysburg, and not the absence of Stuart, that caused
the Confederate disasters. A. P. Hill fell on the lines
at Petersburg on April 2, 1865, and gave his life in de-
fense of a cause he had served not wisely but too well.
Of him it may with truth be said, as it was of the Roman
Consul who led his army into the fatal defile, that “ Fla-
minius died bravely, sword in hand, having committed no
greater military error than many an impetuous soldier,
whose death in his country’s cause has been felt to throw a
veil over his rashness and whose memory is pitied and
honored.”

And now to return to Stuart. I have said that on the
morning of June 24 I reported to him when I came back
alone from a scout inside Hooker’s lines. I was leading
the horses of the two prisoners I had captured and paroled.
Stuart’s headquarters were in Loudon at Rector’s cross-
toads—a few miles in front of the Gaps of the Blue Ridge.
General Lee was about fifteen miles away at Berryville in
the Shenandoah Valley. Stuart was anxiously waiting
to hear what Hooker was doing. He must then have
received General Lee’s order of 5 P.M., of the 23d, to
start the next day and put himself on Ewell’s right on the
Susquehanna. It gave him the choice of routes — through
the Valley by Shepherdstown, or by Hooker’s rear. The
news I brought of the situation in Hooker’s army deter-
mined him to take the latter route. I told him that Hooker
was quiet, waiting on Lee; there was no sign of movement,
no change in the location of the camps — the different
corps were still all far apart. General Lee controlled
170 STUART’S CAVALRY

the situation. Hancock was on the extreme left at
Thoroughfare; Slocum’s corps was at Leesburg, near
Edwards’ Ferry. Stuart chose to go the shortest and
most direct way to Ewell. If he passed through the
Shenandoah Valley by Shepherdstown it would be a
zigzag march over the Blue Ridge and then back again
east over the South Mountain. He could not watch
Hooker with the mountain between them. Longstreet
urged him to go the route he took. But to a soldier of
Stuart’s energy and enterprising spirit the most powerful
motive would be to go where he could do the most damage
to the enemy on the march. The eastern route would
offer the opportunity. Its safety —like Jackson’s flank
march at Chancellorsville—lay in its boldness. It
would not be anticipated. On all the roads were wagon-
trains, and on the canal which he would cross were boats
carrying supplies to the army depot above. He would
cripple Hooker by destroying his transportation. After
hearing my report Stuart wrote a letter to General Lee —
the most of it at my dictation — giving him the informa-
tion which I had brought. He, of course, would acknowl-
edge receipt of Lee’s letter of instructions of 5 p.m., of the
evening before, and inform General Lee when he would
start and the route he would take. The courier with
the dispatch must have overtaken General Lee during
the day; he left his headquarters with Longstreet that
morning and spent the night between Berryville and
Williamsport. For a week he had been receiving dis-
patches regularly from Stuart; these suddenly stopped
coming. This was notice to General Lee that Hooker’s
GETTYSBURG 171

army was between them. He knew that while the opera-
tion was going on it was a physical impossibility for Stuart
to communicate with him without a balloon or a carrier-
pigeon. Lee had studied astronomy; he knew the cause
of an eclipse. Lee’s order on the 23d to Stuart was to
come over to the Valley the following day and cross the
Potomac at Shepherdstown, if he did not go the other
way. As he did not cross with Hill’s corps at Shepherds-
town on the 25th, this also was notice that he would cross
east of the Blue Ridge. The possibility of crossing at
Point of Rocks or any point east of the Ridge, except
Seneca, was never considered because it was impracticable.
All the other fords east of the Ridge, except Seneca in
Hooker’s rear, were strongly guarded. Colonel White
had made a cavalry raid at Point of Rocks on the 17th;
but it could not be repeated. It created an alarm about
the communication between Harper’s Ferry and Wash-
ington. Stuart’s report says that early on the morning
of the 25th, when he discovered Hancock’s corps moving
northward, he sent a dispatch to General Lee with intelli-
gence of it. As Hancock was on Hooker’s extreme left
it indicated that his whole army was marching to the
Potomac. The courier traveled inside our lines and
could not have been intercepted. General Lee must have
received the letter about Williamsport the next day, as
there was a line of relay couriers to his headquarters.
It is therefore a reflection on General Lee to suppose that
he was surprised when he heard that Hooker had crossed
the Potomac. He had written Mr. Davis that a pontoon
bridge had been laid at Edwards’ Ferry; could he have
172 STUART’S CAVALRY

imagined that it was not laid there for Hooker to cross
on? The great military advantage of Stuart’s taking the
eastern route was that it would divert attention to the
defense of the capital; if successful, all communication
would be cut off and Washington would be isolated. He
was not conducting a raid, or an independent expedition
of cavalry, but was assigned to perform a part of a com-
bined movement of the whole army. Stuart performed
his part in the grand drama. It is understood that Stuart,
on the night of the 21st, when he was in Ashby’s Gap, rode
to General Lee’s headquarters a few miles off. No doubt
it was then agreed that Ewell, who was at Hagerstown,
should move into Pennsylvania, and that Stuart should
follow him with three brigades of cavalry and leave his
other two brigades with General Longstreet.

General Lee, of course, knew the character of the
commanders, and probably selected the two cavalry brig-
ades that were kept with him. At that time neither
Longstreet or A. P. Hill had been ordered to Pennsyl-
vania. The advantages of the different routes must
have been discussed by them, as Longstreet in a letter
to Stuart the next day speaks of Hopewell Gap in the Bull
Run as one suggested by General Lee in a letter to
him, and he expresses his preference for it. In fact, he
told Stuart not to go the other way. It is clear that General
Lee at that time had no objective point. His object was
to compel Hooker to withdraw his army over the Potomac.
He also sent Longstreet at that time a letter of instruc-
tions to be forwarded to Stuart, if Longstreet approved
them. The letter expressed a fear that the enemy would
GETTYSBURG 173

steal a march and get over the river first. Longstreet for-
warded the letter to Stuart with the qualification that he
must goaround the enemy through the Bull Run Mountain.
In his book Longstreet criticises Stuart for obeying his own
orders, and says he ordered him to march on his right
flank into Pennsylvania. If Stuart had passed through
the Valley he would have left General Longstreet and
General Lee behind him, and marched on to the Susque-
hanna. He could not, therefore, have stayed with Long-
street to watch Hooker unless he disobeyed General Lee’s
orders. Three of Lee’s staff officers — Colonel Taylor,
Colonel Marshall, and General Long — with the record
before them in their own handwriting, make the same
statement that Longstreet does. The ridiculous position
in which they put their Chief does not seem to have
occurred to them; his reputation survives because nobody
believes them. They take no account of the fact that
Ewell was far away from the other two corps and from
General Lee. The selection of the route through Hooker’s
army was based on the theory that the conditions would
be maintained as they were until Stuart got through.
The preservation of the status in Hooker’s army depended
on Lee. At that time the design was perfectly practicable;
his army corps were separated by many miles and the
only obstruction on the roads were wagon-trains hauling
supplies. Hooker would have been astonished to hear
that Stuart had cut his army in two, but before he could
have recovered from the shock the blazing meteor would
have passed out of sight.

He would then have sent his cavalry in pursuit —
4, STUART’S CAVALRY

that ought to have been what General Lee wanted —
they would have been too far off to hurt Stuart. My pref-
erence was to go by the Hopewell Gap in the Bull Run
Mountains and thus pass between Hancock at Thorough-
fare and Pleasanton at Aldie. ‘There was only a cavalry
picket at Hopewell. This shows how little Hooker sus-
pected the blow that was meditated; Hancock felt secure
on that flank. Stuart, for some reason, was induced to
cross at Glasscock’s on the other side of Hancock. The
contemplated enterprise, if it had not been defeated by
a cause that Stuart could not control, was far less diffi-
cult and involved far less hazard than the ride around
McClellan on the Chickahominy. Hooker was now on
the defensive — waiting for Lee to move. When Lee
halted, Hooker stood still; McClellan, on the contrary,
was engaged in an offensive operation to capture Rich-
mond; Hooker was defending Washington. After send-
ing the dispatch to General: Lee with the information I
had brought, Stuart made preparations to start that
evening. I was delighted at.the part that was given to
me. It was agreed that with my small command of
twenty or thirty men, I should meet the head of Stuart’s
column on the Little River Turnpike the next day, ten
or twelve miles befow Aldie, and then lead the advance
to Seneca Ford. Some of my men lived in that neighbor-
hood and would act as guides. Circumstances which I
had not anticipated prevented Stuart from meeting me at
the appointed rendezvous. I was there. On the night
of the 24th we bivouacked on the western side of the Bull
Run; at daybreak two men were sent ahead to look out
GETTYSBURG 175

for an ambuscade. I did not want to run into another
on that road. We had stopped at a spring and were
eating some canned goods captured from a sutler when we
heard a volley on the top of the mountain. The men did
not come back so we knew that they were either killed or
captured.' The party in ambush had done us the favor to
fire and give us warning. In a letter to Hookerthe evening
before Pleasanton said: “I shall try Mosby to-morrow.”
TI suppose this was his mode of trial. But the ambuscade
did not stop us; we made a detour, were soon over the
mountain and passed by Hancock’s corps to the turn-
pike. We met Hooker’s whole army in motion toward
the Potomac; the marching columns were on all the
roads. We heard artillery firing a few miles off; Stuart
had run against Hancock’s column about Haymarket,
and was having a duel with him. Hancock’s corps had
the road and was marching between us; so Stuart could
not get through. He turned towards Buckland; we spent
nearly all day in the woods near the pike and retraced our
steps about sunset. I supposed that Stuart had returned.
Stuart’s report dated August 20, 1863, gives a correct
account of events at that time. It says: “I resumed
[22d] my own position at Rector’s Cross-roads and, be-
ing in constant communication with the commanding gen-
eral, had scouts busily engaged watching and reporting
the enemy’s movements and reporting the same to the
commanding general. In this difficult search the fear-
less and indefatigable Major Mosby was particularly
active and efficient. His information was always accurate
and reliable. The enemy retained one army corps (Fifth)
176 STUART’S CAVALRY

at Aldie and kept his cavalry near enough to make attack
upon the latter productive of no solid benefits, and I
began to look for some other point at which to direct an
effective blow. I submitted to the commanding general
the plan of leaving a brigade or so in my present front and
passing through Hopewell or some other Gap in the Bull
Run Mountains, attain the enemy’s rear, passing between
his main body and Washington, and cross into Maryland,
joining our army north of the Potomac. The commanding
general wrote me authorizing this move if I deemed it prac-
ticable [June 22 and 5 p.m., June 23], and also what in-
structions should be given the officers in command of the
two brigades left in front of the enemy. He also notified
me that one column would move via Gettysburg and the
other via Carlisle towards the Susquehanna, and directed
me, after crossing, to proceed with all dispatch to join the
right [Early] of the army in Pennsylvania. Accordingly
three days’ rations were prepared and on the night of the
24th the following brigades — Hampton’s, Fitz-Lee’s and
W. H. F. Lee’s — rendezvoused secretly near Salem
Depot. We had no wagons or vehicles except six pieces
of artillery and caissons and ambulances. Robertson’s
and Jones’ brigades, under command of the former, were
left in observation of the enemy on the usual front with
full instructions as to following up the enemy in case of
withdrawal and rejoining our army. . . . At one o’clock
at night the brigades, with noiseless march, moved out.
This precaution was necessary on account of the enemy
having possession of Bull Run Mountains, which in the
daytime commanded a view of every move of conse-
GETTYSBURG 177

quence in that region. Hancock’s corps occupied
Thoroughfare Gap. Moving to the right we passed
through Glasscock’s Gap without difficulty and marched
for Haymarket. I had previously sent Major Mosby
with some picked men through to gain the vicinity of
Dranesville, find where a crossing was practicable, and
bring intelligence to me near Gum Springs to-day [25th.]
[Stuart is here slightly mistaken; I had already informed
him that he could cross at Seneca where I had lately
crossed.] As we neared Haymarket, we found Han-
cock’s corps en route through Haymarket for Gum Springs,
his infantry well distributed through his trains. I chose
a good position and opened with artillery on his passing
columns with effect, scattering men, wagons, and horses in
wild confusion; disabled one of the. enemy’s caissons,
which he abandoned, and compelled him to advance in
order of battle to compel us to desist. ... J sent a
dispatch to General Lee concerning Hooker’s movements
and moved back to Buckland to deceive the enemy. . .

I had not yet heard from Major Mosby, but the indica-
tions favored my successful passage in rear of the enemy’s
army.” Stuart did not hear from me because Hooker’s
troops were marching on all roads between us. As the
artillery firing had ceased in the morning, I concluded
that he had gone back and I did the same. He made a
wide detour through Fairfax and crossed the Potomac
the night of the 27th at Seneca, and went into bivouac on
the Maryland shore. On the same night Pleasanton’s
cavalry corps, the rear-guard of the army, crossed ten or
twelve miles above on the pontoon at Edwards’ Ferry
178 STUART’S CAVALRY

and marched on to Frederick. According to all pre-
cedents, it should have been in the advance harassing
Lee. It had been kept back by the news that a heavy
cavalry force was in the rear. So Stuart’s movement at
least neutralized Hooker’s cavalry corps. Pleasanton did
not know that Stuart was crossing the river below him.
The report further says: “The canal, which was now
the supplying medium of Hooker’s army, soon received
our attention. A lock gate was broken and steps taken
to intercept boats. At least a dozen were intercepted
and the next morning several loaded with troops, negroes,
and stores were captured by Colonel Wickham, Fourth
Virginia Cavalry, commanding our rear-guard. .. . I
realized the importance of joining our army in Pennsy]-
vania and resumed the march northward early on the
28th.”

One benefit of Stuart’s crossing at Seneca was that it
practically eliminated French’s corps in the campaign,
and put it on the defensive, to guard the line of the Po-
tomac and the rear of Meade’s army. It had been the
garrison — 11,000 — at Harper’s Ferry, but, when the
place was abandoned, it was added to Meade’s command.
But Stuart’s appearance created such a sensation that
Meade sent 4000 to guard the canal, and 7000 were
kept at Frederick. They were no more help to Meade in
the battle than if they had stayed above the clouds on
Maryland Heights. As before stated, it was perfectly
practicable on the evening of the 24th, when Stuart left
Rector’s Cross-roads, for him to pass through the Bull
Run and ride through Hooker’s army to the Potomac.
GETTYSBURG 179

The wagons on the roads would, of course, have been
burned; the mules he would have taken with him. If
Longstreet and Hill had rested one day longer in the
Shenandoah Valley, Hooker would have done the same,
and Stuart would not have found the roads blockaded
by his columns marching to the Potomac. Early on
the evening of the 25th Stuart would have crossed and
bivouacked for the night at Seneca. Men and horses
would have had a night’s rest. No doubt Hooker’s
cavalry would have been sent in pursuit, but they would
have been too far behind to give any trouble. A detach-
ment might have been sent that night (25th) to break the
communications between Washington and Baltimore.
On that day General Lee was at Williamsport; he could
not have expected Stuart to communicate with him while
he was executing the movement, simply because Stuart
was too far away and the Blue Ridge and Hooker's
army were between them. Besides, Stuart knew that
General Lee had retained two brigades of cavalry with
Longstreet in front of the Gaps to observe the enemy;
and his signal stations on the Ridge would command a
view of the Potomac and the Loudon Valley. Stuart’s
orders did not permit him to turn west and join Lee
after he got over the river, but to march north to join
Ewell. Lee’s staff officers seem to think that Stuart should
have marched in both directions at the same time.

“In either case,” said General Lee, “after crossing the
river [at Shepherdstown, or Seneca] you must move on
and feel the right of Ewell’s troops, collecting informa-
tion, provisions, etc.”
180 STUART'S CAVALRY

Lee had informed Stuart that he would find Ewell on
the Susquehanna. Stuart obeyed orders, and on the
morning of the 28th moved in that direction. It would
have been far better if the orders had been less rigid,
and Stuart had been given discretion to operate independ-
ently of the main army. There was an abundant force of
cavalry with Lee and Longstreet, as well as with Ewell;
there was onlya small force with Meade. Stuart’s columns
should have been allowed to turn east toward Baltimore.
Hooker’s cavalry would have been drawn after it and
would have been engaged in repairing the damage Stuart
had done. In other words, the body of cavalry under
Stuart should have been made an independent, or con-
taining force, to hold in check or put on the defensive
greatly superior numbers in Maryland and around the
Capital; while the Confederates were having as good a
time in Pennsylvania as Hannibal with the Carthaginians
had in the Valley of the Po. It is strange that Stuart
should have camped the night of the 27th on the river
between Edwards’ Ferry and Washington and that it was
not discovered. ‘The next moming, with no suspicion of
danger, the boats were sent up the canal; and a long
supply train left Washington for the army at Frederick.

The boats were burned. Stuart found the wagons
on the road on which he was marching and took them
along. He expected to turn them over to Early at York.
Some of the teamsters tried to get away and were chased
into the suburbs of Washington. He met and routed
several bodies of cavalry during the day. They carried
the astonishing news to Meade at Frederick, who had
GETTYSBURG 181

taken command of the Army of the Potomac at 2.30 p.m.
that day. He sent Gregg’s and Kilpatrick’s cavalry
divisions in pursuit. Buford was kept close on his left
flank to watch Lee, but one of his brigades (Merritt’s)
was detached to guard the trains in the rear. At West-
minster a body of Delaware cavalry showed more valor
than discretion and had to pay the penalty for it. The
fugitives got up a great panic in Baltimore which soon
spread over the country. Gunboats were ordered from
different places to protect Washington, Annapolis, Havre-
de-Grace, and the powder works. Stuart marched all
night of the 28th, and early the next morning burned the
railroad bridge and cut the telegraph at Sykesville, and
broke communication between Meade and Washington.
He spent the night of the 29th in the vicinity of West-
minster, and moved on in the morning, expecting to meet
Early at York. Gregg’s cavalry division and the Sixth
Corps were on his track and got to Westminster after he
left; they went on east to Manchester and Hanover Junc-
tion. On the night of the 30th the Fifth Corps camped
on the ground where Stuart had camped the night be-
fore. Meade had borne off to the east toward Baltimore
because he was sure from Early’s being at York, and
Stuart’s marching in that direction with a wagon train,.
that the Confederate army would concentrate on the
Susquehanna. At Hanover Stuart ran into, or rather
over, Kilpatrick’s rear-guard. There was a short skir-
mish — it was his policy as far as possible, to avoid
one — and he hastened on to find Early. The enemy’s
cavalry did not molest him on the march. Hancock
182 STUART’S CAVALRY

with the Second Corps was moving on in rear of the
Fifth. Meade was not then looking toward Gettysburg
but to the Susquehanna. In a letter that day he said to
Pleasanton that his “projected movement is toward the
line of the Baltimore and Harrisburg. road.” Stuart’s
night march from Hanover was a severe trial to men
and horses, but the enemy’s cavalry in pursuit of him suf-
fered just as much.'' Early in the morning of July 1 he

1In the Century Captain W. E. Miller describes the hardship endured
by Gregg’s cavalry that followed Stuart:

“Our march to Westminster was one of unusual severity for the night
was very dark and both men and horses were worn out. The men fell
asleep in their saddles and whenever the column halted the horses would
fall asleep too. As the officers were responsible for keeping the column
closed up, they had to resort to all sorts of expedients to keep awake,
such as pinching themselves, pounding their heads and pricking them-
selves with pins. When within about five miles of Westminster it was
discovered that the left of the line was not up. A halt was ordered and,
on sending back, the fact was discovered that the artillery men and battery
horses were sound asleep, and that whilst a portion of the column in front
of them had been moving on, that in the rear was standing still. At
Manchester a halt of a few hours was made, during which the men con-
sumed what was left of the rations procured at Mount Airy, gave their
horses the last grain of feed they had with them and obtained a little
sleep. Mounting again we moved north along the Carlisle pike for half
a mile and then by the Grove Mill road to Hanover Junction (Pa.), on
the Northern Central Railroad, where we arrived during the forenoon of
July 1st. Our movements at this place illustrate to some extent the
uncertainties of the campaign. After a short delay Gregg received an
order to proceed south towards Baltimore. Scarcely was the division
drawn out on the road when a second order came directing him to turn
about and move north as rapidly as possible towards York. Just as
we were starting in the latter direction the final order came to send Huey’s
brigade back to Manchester (Md.), and to march with McIntosh’s and
Irvin Gregg’s brigade westward to Gettysburg.”
GETTYSBURG 183

reached Dover and learned that Early had marched west
the day before. After a short rest Stuart moved on to
Carlisle and arrived there in the evening. He knew that
Ewell had been there; he did not know he had gone. At
Dover Stuart had sent a staff officer, Major Venable, on
Early’s track with a dispatch for General Lee.!| That

ISYKES TO WILLIAMS, A. A. G.
Union Mitts, June 30th, 6 p.m.

Stuart, Fitz-Lee and Hampton staid last night at the house of a Mr.
Shriver who owns the mills at this place.

WILLIAMS, A. A. G., TO HANCOCK
June 30th, 1 p.m.
General Sykes [5th corps] has been informed that you would support
him at Union Mills in case of the presence of a superior force of the
enemy.

PLEASANTON TO GREGG
June 30th, 11.30 p.m.

After arriving at Hanover Junction and finding no enemy, push a
force to York, and in case that place has been evacuated, let it proceed
towards Columbia on the Susquehanna River and communicate with
General Crouch. Take the brigade from Westminster with you but
have a regiment at Manchester with General Sedgwick to picket in that
vicinity.

The following is from Major Venable, who was an officer on Stuart’s
Staff:

FarMVvILLE, Va., March 8th, 1907.
Coronet Joun S. Mossy,

Dear Sir: On the Gettysburg campaign General Stuart’s com-
mand arrived at Dover, Penn., during the night of June 30th, 1863,
where, learning that General Early’s command was marching towards
Geitysburg, I was directed by General Stuart to take a detachment of
thirty mounted men and go in the direction pursued by General Early,
to learn the purpose of General Lee. I left Dover before daylight of
184 STUART’S CAVALRY

night at Carlisle he received an answer and immediately
started off to Gettysburg. He arrived there in time on
July 2 to cover Lee’s flank from Meade’s cavalry that
had just returned from pursuit of him. He had scarcely
reached the field when a severe but indecisive conflict
occurred in which General Hampton had a personal en-
counter with a cavalryman and was severely wounded. -

When that combat ended, the cavalry of the two armies
stood off, rested, and watched the flanks. The field of
Gettysburg would have been impracticable for cavalry
operations even if the improvements in fire-arms had not
made obsolete the use of cavalry against infantry. As I
have said, Gettysburg was a place of no strategic value
and neither side wanted to hold it. For this reason one
of Early’s brigades spent a night there and went away, and
Meade, whose cavalry was there on July 1, as an outpost
for observation, sent Buford orders to withdraw and let
the Confederates have it. A great objection to the position,
as I have said, was that Lee’s front did not cover his line
of communication; hence in the retrograde movement both
flanks were exposed to attack. There never was a more
difficult operation performed in war than then devolved on
Stuart. Not since the shouts of the Ten Thousand were

July Ist with the detachment of thirty men and after skirmishing all
day with a regiment which was pursuing us from Dover, we overtook
General Early about 4 p.m., just approaching Gettysburg, where upon
my arrival I reported to General Lee, and found him on the hill west
of Gettysburg. On making my report, he ordered a squadron of
cavalry to go in search of General Stuart at once.
Very respecfully,
A. R. Vewasie, Late Major, etc.
GETTYSBURG 185

heard when they caught a glimpse of the Euxine —
“Thalatta! — Thalatta! — the Sea/—the Sea,” has an
army escaped from such peril, or a retreat been
covered with such masterful ability. Nor does the par-
allel end here. The hero who led the Greeks to the sea
had to answer an impeachment after they crossed the
Bosphorus — so had Stuart! It turned jout to be fortu-
nate that Stuart missed Early and went on to Carlisle.
More cavalry was not needed at Gettysburg. General
Couch, who had commanded a corps in the army of the
Potomac, had about 15,000 troops at Harrisburg, and,
as the following dispatch shows, was directed to co-operate
with Meade:
HALLECK TO COUCH, HARRISBURG, PA.
WASHINGTON, June 28th.

You will co-operate as far as possible with General G. G. Meade,
who now commands the Army of the Potomac, and who is authorized
to assume command of all troops within his sphere of operations. This
authority embraces your command. Any information of the enemy’s
movements in your vicinity will be immediately telegraphed to General

Meade.
: COUCH TO HALLECK
Hanrispure, June 30th.

‘As telegraphed previously, part of the rebel forces, if not all, have
fallen back towards Chambersburg [Johnson’s division] passing Shippens-
burg last night in great haste. I expect every moment to hear that my
cavalry, under General Smith, has occupied Carlisle. My latest infor-
mation is that Early with his 8000 men went towards Gettysburg or
Hanover, saying they expected to fight a great battle there.

Harrispure, Pa., June 30th, 9 p.m.

AsraHaM Lincoun, President: —
The rebel infantry force left Carlisle early this morning on the Balti-
more pike. Cavalry still on this side of that town. Early with 8,000
186 STUART’S CAVALRY

left York this morning, went westerly or northwesterly. Rebels at
Carlisle and York yesterday a good deal agitated about some news they
had received. I telegraphed news to General Meade, care of Secretary
of War.

D. N. Covcu, Major-General.

COUCH TO MEADE
Harrissure, July Ist.
At 10 am., June 30th, Lee’s headquarters were at Greenwood,
8 miles east of Chambersburg, on the Baltimore pike. Hill’s corps lies
east of Greenwood. Greenwood is 24 miles from the mountain. Long-
street’s corps lies south of Greenwood, towards Hagerstown. Evwell’s
corps probably concentrated yesterday near Gettysburg.

MEADE TO COUCH
Harrissure, July Ist., 12 m.

The enemy are advancing on Gettysburg — Hill from Cashtown,
Ewell from Heidlersburg. Can you throw a force in Ewell’s rear to
threaten him, and at the same time keep your line of retreat open? If
you can, do so.

HALLECK TO COUCH
July Ist, 1863.

There seems to be a strong probability of a battle not far from
Emmittsburg. It is hoped that you will assist Meade by operating on
the enemy’s left flank or left rear towards Gettysburg.

COUCH TO HALLECK
July 1st.

Dispatch received. I have sent out a force in the direction of
Carlisle. It has been attacked by a body of cavalry at least. and just
now things do not look well.

When Couch heard that Ewell had evacuated Carlisle
he set his troops in motion to the south, in order, as he
said, “to make a diversion in favor of Meade by attack-
ing Lee’s flank and rear.” General W. F. Smith, with
3000 men, was in the advance and reached Carlisle in
GETTYSBURG 187

the evening of July 1. The other troops were following
him. Soon after the arrival of Smith’s troops, greatly
to his surprise, the Confederates appeared and he reccived
a demand for the surrender of the United States barracks
which he was then occupying. The demand for sur-
render was refused and Stuart’s artillery opened fire on
them. The shells set fire to the buildings and they were
burned. The troops that were marching in the rear,
thinking that Ewell had returned, started back to Harris-
burg. The troops that were at Carlisle came without
rations, expecting to get them there. The trains bringing
provisions had not arrived; they were stampeded by the
artillery firing and the troops could not leave hungry and
without rations. So they did not get away until July 4,
‘after the battle was over, and never got a sight of the Con-
federates, although they followed them down the Cumber-
land Valley to the Potomac. General Smith’s report says:
“General Ewell had passed through the town on the
Baltimore Pike about one and one-half miles, and while
going on to examine his position word came from scouts
that a large cavalry force of the enemy was in the immedi-
ate vicinity on the York road, and turning back, before
I entered the village, their guns had opened on us. . . .
Under these circumstances I determined to content my-
self till morning with simply holding the town, but before
I could get a line of skirmishers out a summons was sent
by General Fitz-Hugh Lee to surrender the town or send
out the women and children.”

A memorandum attached to his report says: “Friday,
July 3. The troops remained at barracks all day waiting
188 STUART’S CAVALRY

for provisions, the supply trains having been prevented
from arriving by the occupation of the road by the enemy
on the Ist and 2d of July. The attempt to procure
provisions from citizens was only partially successful.
Supplies arrived by railroad Saturday, July 4. The
whole command left Carlisle at 6 a.m., and moved by
the Papertown road, six and one-half miles to Mount
Holly... .

“July 6, all troops moved by different roads to New-
man’s Cut, on the turnpike between Gettysburg and
Chambersburg, four miles east of Cashtown, where they
were concentrated during the evening.”

All of Lee’s trains had been collected at Cashtown;
Imboden’s command was the only guard. On July 4,
they started to the Potomac, and on July 6 were at Williams-
port.

The loss of his supply trains near Washington on June
28 had a depressing effect upon Meade; during the whole
campaign he was nervous about his rear. On the 29th
he detached Merritt’s brigade from Buford’s division to
guard the trains on the road from Frederick to Emmitts-
burg. Hence it took no part in Buford’s combat on July 1.
On July 2, when Buford’s cavalry was covering Sickles’
flank, a signal officer sent the following stampede report:

Cemetery Siena Sration,

July 2nd, 1868, 12.35 p.m.
GeneERaL Burrerriecp: —

Numerous fires, apparently from the burning of wagons south
southeast from here. A wagon-train can be seen in the same direction.
I think our trains are being destroyed.

(Signed) Bascocx, Signal Officer.
GETTYSBURG 189

There was no truth in the report; Westminster, thirty
miles from Gettysburg, was now Meade’s base of supplies.
Stuart had camped there on the night of June 29. On
July 1 one of Gregg’s cavalry brigades had been detached
and sent to guard the depot. And now just in the opening
of the battle Buford’s whole division was sent off to West-
minster. It is not probable that a Confederate soldier
was in thirty miles of the place. The withdrawal of
Buford left Sickles’ flank in the peach orchard uncovered
—“in the air.’ Longstreet took advantage of it and
struck him a stunning blow. Buford was ordered in
pursuit when the retreat began, but he was so far off that
he did not overtake the Confederates till they got to
Williamsport. But he found them in line of battle ready
for him with their trains parked; so Buford went back.
His report says: “July 6. The whole division (the
Reserve brigade [Merritt’s] having joined the night be-
fore), marched at 4 a.m. towards Williamsport to destroy
the enemy’s trains which were reported to be crossing
the Potomac into Virginia. ... The expedition had for its
object the destruction of the enemy’s trains which were
supposed to be crossing at Williamsport. This, I regret
to say, was not accomplished. ‘The enemy was too strong
for me but he was severely punished for his obstinacy.”

Writing to Mr. Davis from Hagerstown on July 7,
General Lee said: “The enemy’s cavalry force which
attempted to reach our cavalry trains yesterday after-
noon was a large one. ‘They came as far as Hagerstown,
where they were attacked by General Stuart and driven
back rapidly towards Sharpsburg.”
190 STUART’S CAVALRY

General Lee’s report says: “Part of our train moved
by the road through Fairfield [Monterey Gap] and the
rest by Cashtown, guarded by General Imboden. In
passing through the mountains in advance of the column,
the great length of the trains exposed them to attacks by
the enemy’s cavalry, which captured a number of wagons
and ambulances, but they succeeded in reaching Williams-
port without serious loss. ‘They were attacked at that
place on the 6th by the enemy’s cavalry which was gal-
lantly repulsed by General Imboden. The attacking
force was subsequently encountered and driven off by
General Stuart and pursued for several miles in the direc-
tion of Boonsborough. The army, after an arduous
march, rendered more difficult by the rains, reached
Hagerstown on the afternoon of July 6, and the morning
of the 7th. ... Part of the pontoon bridge was re-
covered and new boats built so that by the 13th a good
bridge was thrown over the river at Falling Waters. The
enemy in force reached our front on the 12th. A position
had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from
Williamsport to Falling Waters and an attack was awaited
during that and the succeeding day. This did not take
place, though the armies were in close proximity, the
enemy being occupied in fortifying his lines. Our prepara-
tions being completed, and the river, though still deep,
being pronounced fordable, the army commenced to with-
draw to the south side on the night of the 13th.”

Meade remained at Gettysburg until July 7; the follow-
ing dispatch shows that he was expected not only to fol-
low but to attack and destroy Lee:
GETTYSBURG 191

Wasuineton, D. C., July 8th, 1863.
Masor GeneraL Meane, Frederick, Md.: —

There is reliable information that the enemy is crossing at Williams-
port. The opportunity to attack his divided forces should not be lost.
The President is urgent and anxious that your army should move against
him by forced marches.

H. W. Hauiecx, General-in-Chief.

It is remarkable that the Army of the Potomac twice
afterwards during the year retreated — in October from
the Rapidan back to Fairfax, and in November from
Mine Run—before the Army of Northern Virginia.
Possibly if Stuart had burned the trains he captured on
the march he might have arrived earlier and joined Early
on the 30th. But none of Stuart’s critics can show any
bad results from his carrying the trains along with him.
If he had arrived on the 30th, at York, he could not have
communicated with General Lee. Lee was fifty-five miles
away west of the South Mountain at Chambersburg.
Then General Lee knew perfectly well at that time the
direction in which Meade was heading his army, and that
his cavalry occupied Gettysburg. Stuart could have told
him no more. The instructions did not require him to
report to General Lee, but to Ewell. All the critics over-
look that fact. But I have shown that while Early and
Ewell had no need of more cavalry, Stuart’s presence at
Carlisle on the night of July 1 defeated a combination
by which a heavy force would have been thrown on Lee’s
flank and rear when he was in the agony of combat.

The route through Hooker’s army was suggested on
the theory that the initiative being with General Lee,
Hooker would await his movements, and the conditions
192 STUART’S CAVALRY

in his army would not be changed before Stuart got over
the Potomac. But unfortunately General Lee, with
Longstreet and Hill, moved toward the Potomac on the
24th —the day before Stuart started to pass through
Hooker’s army — in view of the signal stations on Mary-
land Heights; Hooker immediately got notice of it by
telegraph and put his whole army in motion the next
morning (25th). This defeated the operation which Stuart
had so auspiciously begun. Stuart’s cavalry and Hooker’s
army could not travel together on the same roads.

If Longstreet and Hill had stayed quiet a day longer,
Stuart would have crossed the Potomac in advance of
Hooker’s army early in the evening of the 25th, and the
fate of the Confederate cause might have been different.
General Lee was with Longstreet. There was no pressing
necessity for the movement. Hooker was inactive —
Ewell was foraging in Pennsylvania with nothing but
militia before him that always scattered at his approach.
While this premature movement caused the failure of a
brilliant operation it was not necessarily fatal to the cam-
paign, and might have been retrieved but for Hill’s and
Heth’s blunder in precipitating a battle at the village of
Gettysburg. Hooker, Meade, and the authorities at
Washington all misunderstood the significance of Stuart’s
movement. They thought it was only a force detached
to harass their rear and that the greater part of the
Confederate cavalry was on their left flank with General
Lee. At 12.45 a.m., at Leesburg on the 26th, Pleasanton
told Hooker that: “The telegraph operator of Hancock’s
corps reported last night a body of several thousand
GETTYSBURG 193

cavalry at Gainesville, from direction of New Baltimore.
My dispositions cover that. I shall remain here till the
crossing is accomplished.” On the 27th, Howard at
Middletown telegraphed Hooker: “TI have reports from
different sources that Stuart’s cavalry, or a part, crossed
the river at Shepherdstown last night.” Stuart was then
in Fairfax. Hooker was all in the dark about Stuart.
Williams, his A. A. G., said on the 25th to Pleasanton:
“General Hancock reports that the enemy have appeared
in the direction of New Baltimore, with a force estimated
from four regiments to 6,000 men with one battery. The
commanding General directs that you at once send a
brigade of cavalry to report to General Hancock. He is
marching to-day from Thoroughfare to Gum Spring.”
Colonel Asmussen at Middletown told Hooker: “The
main body of General Stuart’s cavalry was encamped
last night between Williamsport and Hagerstown; the
head of the column of General Stuart’s cavalry com-
menced passing through Hagerstown at break of day.”
Meade at Frederick on the 28th told Halleck: “General
Steinwehr from the Mountain House, South Mountain,
reports that his scouts inform him that 5,000 of Stuart’s
cavalry passed through Williamsport yesterday afternoon.
General Sedgwick on the march up from Poolesville
reports that 3000 of the enemy’s cavalry with some artil-
lery are in his rear. This is communicated to you for
your information. My impression is that Stuart has
divided his force with a view of harassing our right and
left flanks.”

Meade then had no idea that Stuart was between him
194 STUART’S CAVALRY

and Washington and would soon break his communica-
tions. The first he heard of it was a telegram from Halleck
dated June 28, 12.30 p.m. It said: “A brigade of
Fitz-Hugh Lee’s cavalry has crossed the Potomac near
Seneca Creek, and is making for the railroad to cut off
your supplies. There is another brigade of rebel cavalry
south of the Potomac which may follow. [There was
no such brigade south of the river then, but the specter
had just the same effect as if there had been.] We have
no cavalry here to operate against them. General Hooker
carried away all of Heintzelman’s cavalry.”

Meade to Halleck: “Dispatch received in relation
to crossing of enemy’s cavalry at Seneca Creek. Have
ordered two brigades to proceed at once in search and
pursuit.” Meade sent two divisions after Stuart and
kept one, Buford’s, with him.

In the Philadelphia Weekly Times, of December 15,
1877, I published a reply to a letter of General Heth in
which he severely criticised General Stuart for being absent
on the first day at Gettysburg and charged him with
disobedience of orders. The War Records had not then
been published and I only had Stuart’s report as a guide,
which I knew was correct, to quote as evidence against
him. I contended that Stuart was absent under orders.
I had then seen General Lee’s first report, which states
that at Chambersburg he had ordered the army to Gettys-
burg, and on account of the absence of the cavalry had
run unexpectedly against the enemy. My article was
written on the hypothesis that this statement of the report
was true. As from my intimate relations with Stuart in
GETTYSBURG 195

the campaign I knew that his orders had required him to
leave General Lee in Virginia and join Ewell in Penn-
sylvania, and that he had full authority to pass through
Hooker’s army and cross the Potomac at Seneca, I main-
tained that if General Lee was embarrassed by want of
cavalry the blame must attach to General Robertson who
had been left with Longstreet with instructions to do the
very work which it was alleged was not done. I had not
then seen Lee’s instructions to Stuart; and Stuart’s to
Robertson. They are in the published records and sus-
tain me in every particular and contradict Heth. With
the evidence now before me that the army was never
ordered from Chambersburg to Gettysburg; that General
Lee never intended to go there, and that his plan was
defeated by Hill and Heth, I modify the terms of that
letter to the extent of saying that in my opinion no blame
can be imputed to Robertson and Jones, and that the
whole should fall on A. P. Hill and Heth. I said this
rouch in Belford’s Magazine, October, November, 1891,
and in the Richmond Times in March, 1896. Heth was
then living in Washington; he made no reply. Heth’s
rejoinder (Philadelphia Times of March, 1878), in behalf
of Robertson to my letter of December, 1877, reiterates
the charge against Stuart, but in defending Robertson he
unconsciously condemns General Lee when he says:
“General Lee was in daily communication with Robert-
son and knew exactly where he was. If he had not been
in position, if he was not doing the work he was ordered
to perform, why was he not ordered into position? No
message or orders by couriers to Robertson that he was
196 STUART’S CAVALRY

out of position. Some days as many as three couriers
were sent by General Lee to General Robertson.” Now
if as many as three couriers a day passed between Robert-
son’s and Lee’s headquarters they must have carried
dispatches about the movements of the enemy. It is not
conceivable that these dispatches did not inform General
Lee that Hooker had crossed the Potomac. On the
morning of the 26th, Hooker’s army moved across the
front of Jones’ and Robertson’s brigades to the pontoon
bridges — and they retired to the Gaps. It is literally
true that General Lee heard nothing from Stuart about it,
and he had no right to expect to hear from him; but his
report does not say that couriers from Jones and Robertson
did not bring him the news.

Heth insists that Jones and Robertson were ordered to
remain at the Gaps for further orders after Hooker had
crossed into Maryland. Stuart’s instructions to them
now published say just the reverse and sustain Stuart’s
report. If Jones and Robertson received such orders
they must have come from Longstreet, or General Lee.
My opinion is that Jones and Robertson informed General
Lee as soon as they discovered that Hooker was moving
towards the Potomac. If they had not there would have
been an official complaint against them for gross neglect
of duty, and they could not have held commissions in the
Confederate army after such delinquency. Heth’s quali-
fications to be a military critic can be judged by the fol-
lowing: “Colonel Mosby has been led by some one
into a very grave error. When referring to the opening
of the fight at Gettysburg (July 1), he says, ‘Here Buford
GETTYSBURG 197

fought two hours before any infantry support came to
him’; I can assure my friend, Colonel Mosby, that the
author of this assertion has not a shadow of truth to sus-
tain him; and of all the preposterous assertions in con-
nection with the war, this is the most so that has ever come
to my knowledge. As I opened the battle of Gettysburg —
going to Gettysburg to get shoes, not to fight — I claim
I should know as much about the opening operations and
whom I fought as any man living. I did not have so
much as a skirmish with General Buford’s cavalry.” If
Heth ever knew anything about Gettysburg he never told
it; his own report contradicts his letter. So do Buford’s
and A. P. Hill’s. Heth’s report does not say that he went
after shoes; it says he went on a reconnaissance—to find out
what force was in his front. He found i#. When I wrote
the letter in reply to Heth I did not know he had an interest
in concealing the truth, and was trying to shift from him-
self on Stuart the responsibility for the loss of the battle.
Heth and Hill, as their reports show, knew that the enemy
were holding Gettysburg; how then could they have
expected to get the shoes without a fight even if the shoes
had been there? A. P. Hill does not mention shoes.
Buford’s report says: “ By daylight on July 1 I had gained
positive information of the enemy’s position and move-
ments and my arrangements were made for entertaining
him until General Reynolds could reach the scene. Colonel
Gamble [Eighth Illinois Cavalry] made an admirable line
of battle and moved off proudly to meet him. The two
lines soon became hotly engaged, we having the advan-
tage of position, he of numbers. The First Brigade held
198 STUART’S CAVALRY

its own for more than two hours and had to be literally
dragged back a few hundred yards to a position more
secure and better sheltered. The First Brigade main-
tained this unequal contest until the leading division of
General Reynolds came up to its assistance and then
most reluctantly did it give up the front.” General Lee’s
second report also shows that Robertson and Jones were
not left in Virginia by Stuart to guard the Gaps south of
the Potomac after the enemy had disappeared. It says:
“General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes
with part of his command as long as the enemy remained
south of the Potomac, and with the remainder to cross the
Potomac and place himself on the right of Ewell.” At
that time Ewell was marching away from Lee to the Sus-
quehanna. J think it highly probable that Jones and
Robertson did afterwards get instructions from Lee or
Longstreet to wait at the Gaps for further orders. This
is the only way I can account for no complaint being made
for their remaining in their position after the enemy had
left their front, from the morning of the 26th to the after-
noon of the 29th, when the courier arrived from General
Lee. Robertson made no report of the campaign; Jones
made a brief one but it throws no light on the mystery
of these cavalry brigades being kept so long in Virginia.
At the same time I can see no damage that resulted from
it, as the myth of General Lee having been surprised by
meeting the enemy at Gettysburg has been exploded.
Besides, Longstreet in his book says that the spy brought
all the information that a body of cavalry could have
brought. What more then was wanted? Why should
GETTYSBURG 199

two brigades of cavalry have been wasted to guard the
Gaps and Lee’s communications in Virginia against an
imaginary enemy, when a hostile garrison of 11,000, a
few miles farther north in the Harper’s Ferry Gap, was left
behind; and Crampton’s, Boonsborough, and other passes
north of the Potomac were unguarded while Hooker’s
army was in front of them? If Heth is right, General Lee
should have kept one half his army guarding the Gaps.
As Robertson is entitled to be heard I give his correspond-
ence with Heth in reference to my article.

Ricumonp, Va., December 27th. 1877.
Genera B. H. Rosertson, Richmond, Va.: —

Dear Genera.: I send you to-day an article I prepared in answer to
an article which appeared in the Philadelphia Weekly Times of December
15, 1877, by Colonel John S. Mosby, headed “Stuart at Gettysburg.”
Will you do me the kindness to say whether the statements I made as
to orders received by you after being detached from General Stuart’s com-
mand with Jones’ brigade and your own in June, 1863, are correct or not.
I have submitted what I have written to Major Walter K. Martin,
Adjutant General of General William E. Jones’ Brigade [Jones was
killed], also to Captain Philip Haxall, Adjutant General of your brigade,
and both inform me that the orders received by you and under which
you acted are correctly stated by me.

Respectfully,
H. Hers.

Attention is called to the lines I have italicized. They
raise a new issue. Heth had charged Stuart with carry-
ing off all the cavalry which deprived Lee of his eyesight.
My reply denied the charge and stated that two brigades
of cavalry stayed with General Lee in front of the Gaps
in Loudon with orders from Stuart to observe the enemy
and report his movements to General Lee, or Longstreet,
200 STUART’S CAVALRY

through a line of relay couriers; and I quoted Stuart’s
report in support of my statement. In his letter to
Robertson, Heth refers, not to the instructions which
Stuart had given him, but to “orders received by you after
being detached from General Stuart’s command.” I had
said nothing about such orders as I had never heard of
them and they were entirely irrelevant to the issue; which
was, what orders Stuart gave Jones and Robertson before
they were detached. Any subsequent orders they re-
ceived must have come from General Lee or Longstreet.
If orders came to them to remain at the Gaps for further
orders they were in conflict with Stuart’s orders, and, of
course, revoked them. So if Heth is right he has shifted
the blame for the four days’ inaction of these two brigades
of cavalry on General Lee or on Longstreet. This is
Robertson’s reply:
Ricumonp, Va., Dec. 27, 1877.

GeneraL Hern, Richmond, Va.: —

Dear Genera: Your letter of the 26th is before me and the alluded
to article has been most carefully read. In spite of the repeated efforts
I have not yet succeeded in finding the written orders under which I
acted on the occasion referred to; but your statement corroborated by
others in high position corresponds precisely with my recollection of
said orders. My brigade, re-inforced by W. E. Jones’, was left to guard
the passes in the Blue Ridge Mountains — so as to protect the rear of
Lee’s army — with instructions to await further orders — then to sweep
through the Shenandoah Valley, picking up deserters and stragglers,
and join General Lee without delay. On the 29th of June I received
orders from General Lee to leave one regiment of my command to picket
south of the Potomac and report to him forthwith. I felt Ashby’s Gap
the same day in the evening (as soon as I could collect my command),
and reached Gettysburg [Cashtown] on the morning of July 3rd, a

distance which could not have been travelled except by rapid marching.
During the separation of my command from General Lee’s army there was
GETTYSBURG 201

constant communication between us. [Italics mine.] He was fully aware
of my position and the specific duty I was then performing. That it met
his entire approbation is proven by the fact that no complaint on his
part or from any other source, was ever made against me or my com-
mand. Much more can be said but I deem it entirely unnecessary. I
Temain, etc.

B. H. Rosertson.

It will be observed that Robertson says he was in con-
stant communication with General Lee. Of course then
he communicated to General Lee the movements of the
enemy — or nothing; that was the very thing he was there

for. But it was not Stuart’s orders for him and Jones to
stay at the Gaps, but to follow Lee and watch Hooker.
It is significant that General Lee expresses no disapproval
of Jones and Robertson having waited so long in Vir-
ginia for orders. The following are Stuart’s instructions
to Robertson. They are dated the day he started around
Hooker.

Hopagrs. Cav. Drv. Army or NorTHERN Va.

June 24th, 1863.
Bric. Gen. B. H. Rosertson,
Commanding Cavalry: —

Genera: Your own and General Jones’ brigades will cover the jront
of Ashby’s and Snicker’s Gaps, yourself, as senior officer, being in com-
mand. Your object will be to watch the enemy, deceive him as to your
designs and harass his rear if you find he is retiring. Be always on the
alert; let nothing escape your observation, and miss no opportunity which
offers to damage the enemy. After the enemy has moved beyond your
reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains, withdraw to the west
side of the Shenandoah, place a strong and reliable picket to watch the
enemy at Harper’s Ferry, cross the Potomac and follow the army, keep-
ing on its right and rear. As long as the enemy remains on your front
in force, unless otherwise ordered by General Lee, Lieutenant General
Longstreet or myself, hold the Gaps with a line of pickets reaching across
202 STUART’S CAVALRY

the Shenandoah by Charlestown to the Potomac. If, in the contingency
mentioned, you withdraw, sweep the Valley clear of what pertains to
the army and cross the Potomac at the different points crossed by it. You
will instruct General Jones from time to time as the movements progress,
or events may require, and report anything of importance to Lieutenant-
General Longstreet with whose position you will communicate by relays
through Charlestown. I send instructions to General Jones which please
read. Avail yourself of every means in your power to increase the
efficiency of your command, and keep it up to the highest number pos-
sible. Particular attention will be paid to shoeing horses and to
marching off of the turnpike. In case of the advance of the enemy you
will offer such resistance as will be justifiable to check him and discover
his intentions, and if possible you will prevent him from gaining pos-
session of the Gaps. In case of a move of the enemy upon Warren-
ton, you will counteract it as much as you fcan, compatible with
previous instructions. You will have, with the two brigades, two bat-
teries of horse artillery.
Yours &c., &c.,

[The italics are mine.] J. E. B. Sroarr, Major-General, &c.

P.S. Do not change your present line of pickets until daylight
to-morrow morning unless compelled to do so.

These are a model of instructions in outpost service.
When they were written Robertson was about Middleburg
in Loudon; Jones was some miles north, nearer the Po-
tomac. The report of Colonel Massie of the Twelfth Vir-
ginia cavalry shows that Jones promptly obeyed Stuart’s
orders and sent his regiment to the Valley to picket on the
Potomac. It is to bepresumed that Jones, who was a strict
disciplinarian, obeyed all his instructions about communi-
cating with Longstreet. He certainly obeyed a part. In
his report to Jones, Colonel Massie says: “On June 25
I received your order to establish a picket line fronting
Harper’sFerry. It was executed that evening ”; which was
the day Stuart crossed the Bull Run Mountains to enter
GETTYSBURG 203

Hooker’s lines. Colonel Massie is now living and is a
citizen of Rappahannock County, Va. In a letter to me
dated March 27, 1907, he says: “Yours received. I am
glad to give you any information I can. I was left with
my regiment on the Virginia side of the Potomac in charge
of a line of pickets to guard the river from Harper’s Ferry
to Williamsport, and sent couriers daily to General Lee as
I was ordered by General Stuart.”

W. D. Briscoe (now dead), of the Twelfth Virginia
cavalry, writes me: “On the 28th or 29th of June, 1863,
Captain: Twelfth Cavalry, told me he wanted me to
carry a dispatch to General Lee’s headquarters. What the
dispatch contained I do not know. I started immediately
and crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, thence to
Hagerstown and then to Greencastle and Chambersburg.
. . . Stopped for the night and delivered my dispatch at
General Lee’s headquarters the next morning, a mile or
two from the town.” ! See Lee’s letter of 5 p.m., June 23d,
instructing Stuart what orders to leave for the commanders
of the two cavalry brigades.

 

1qHE REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE

My criticism of General Lee’s Report, which I believe he signed
without reading, does not imply any criticism of him as a general. In
fact it is a defence of the commander at the expense of his report, which
does him great injustice. All criticisms of the campaign are based on
the assumption of the correctness of Lee’s report. It is to be regretted
that General Lee ever signed the report, but it must be remembered
that the first is dated a few days after the campaign closed, when he
was suffering great pain from the disaster to his army. It is doubtful
if he ever read it, or if it was ever read to him.

Tn defence of William of Orange for signing the order for the massacre
of Glencoe, Macaulay says:
204 STUART’S CAVALRY

‘An order was laid before him for his signature. He signed it but,
if Burnet may be trusted, did not read it. Whoever has seen anything
of public business knows that princes and ministers daily sign, and in-
deed must sign, documents which they have not read.”

John C. Ropes, of Boston, author of the “Campaign of Waterloo,”
on December 14th, 1897, wrote me: ‘Thank you very much for your
two letters of the 8th and 13th instants. Your views of the task which
General Lee imposed on his cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign seem
to me, as at present advised, correct, and I also share entirely in your
view of the inaccuracy of Lee’s Reports. I shall try to get it all into my
8rd volume. [The Story of the Civil War.] My second volume is about
three-fourths done, and I think and hope to put it into the hands of the
publisher this Spring.” Unfortunately Mr. Ropes died before his
third volume was completed. Two volumes had been published before
his death.

General Lee’s Report of July 31, 1863, says:

“, . . In the meantime, a part of General Ewell’s corps had entered
Maryland and the rest was about to follow. General Jenkins with his
cavalry, who accompanied General Ewell, penetrated Pennsylvania as
far as Chambersburg. As these demonstrations did not have the effect
of causing the Federal army to leave Virginia, and as it did not seem dis-
posed to advance upon the position held by Longstreet, the latter was
withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, General Hill having
already reached the Valley. General Stuart was left to guard the passes
of the mountains and observe the movements of the enemy, whom he
was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible should he
attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event General Stuart was directed
to move into Maryland, crossing the Potomac east or west of the Blue
Ridge as in his judgment should be best, and take position on the right
of our column as it advanced. By the 24th the progress of Ewell ren-
dered it necessary that the rest of the army should be in supporting dis-
tance, and Longstreet and Hill marched to the Potomac. The former
crossed at Williamsport and the latter at Shepherdstown. The columns
reunited at Hagerstown and advanced thence into Pennsylvania, en-
camping near Chambersburg on the 27th. No report had been received
that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the
cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information. In order,
however, to retain it on the east side of the mountains, after it should
enter Maryland, and thus leave open our communications with the
\ GETTYSBURG 205
Potomac through Hagerstown and Williamsport, General Ewell had been
instructed to send a division eastward from Chambersburg to cross the
South Mountain. Early’s division was detached for this purpose and
proceeded as far as York, while the remainder of the corps proceeded
to Carlisle. General Imboden, in pursuance of the instructions pre-
viously referred to, had been actively engaged on the left of General
Ewell during the progress of the latter into Maryland. . . . Prepara-
tions now made to advance upon Harrisburg, but on the night of
the 28th information was received from a scout that the Federal army
was advancing northward and that the head of the column had reached
the South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were
thus menaced it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that
direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains.
Accordingly, Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambers-
burg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed
to march from Carlisle. General Stuart continued to follow the move-
ments of the Federal army south of the Potomac after our own had
entered Maryland, and in his efforts to impede its progress advanced
as far eastward as Fairfax Court-house. Finding himself unable to
delay the enemy materially, he crossed the river at Seneca and marched
through Westminster to Carlisle, where he arrived after General Ewell
had left for Gettysburg. By the route he pursued the Federal army
was interposed between his command and our main body, preventing
any communication with him until he arrived at Carlisle. The march
towards Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been
if the movements of the Federal army had been known. The leading
division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning
of July Ist. . . . It had not been intended to fight a general battle at
such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy, but finding
ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a
matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large
trains. . . . During the afternoon intelligence was received of the arrival
of General Stuart at Carlisle, and he was ordered to march to Gettysburg
and take position on our left.”

The Report of January, 1864, says:

“General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part
of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac,
and with the remainder to cross into Maryland and place himself on the
right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the former officer that
206 STUART’S CAVALRY

he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting
in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion
whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was
instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our
column as soon as he perceived the enemy moving northward. ... It
was expected that as soon as the Federal army should cross the Potomac,
General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and nothing having
been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred
that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. Orders were therefore issued
to move upon Harrisburg. . . . The advance against Harrisburg was
arrested by intelligence received from a scout on the night of the 28th, to
the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac and
was approaching the South Mountain. In the absence of the cavalry
it was impossible to ascertain his intentions; but to deter him from ad-
vancing further west and intercepting our communications with Vir-
ginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains.
. . . Hill’s corps was, accordingly, ordered to move towards Cashtown
on the 29th, and Longstreet to follow the next day, leaving Pickett’s
division at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden.
General Ewell was recalled from Carlisle and directed to join the army
at Cashtown or Gettysburg as circumstances might require. The
advance of the enemy to the latter place was unknown and the weather
being inclement the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of
the troops. General Hill arrived [30th] with Pender’s division in the
evening, and the following morning (July 1st), advanced with these two
divisions, accompanied by Pegram’s and McIntosh’s battalions of artil-
lery, to ascertain the strength of the enemy, which was supposed to con-
sist chiefly of cavalry. As soon as it was known that the enemy had
crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of Robertson
and Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to
join the army without delay, and it was expected that General Stuart
with the remainder of his command would soon arrive.”

The discrepancies between the two reports, as well as with the cor-
respondence, are many and manifest. There is no explanation why at
Chambersburg, as stated, preparations were made to move on to Harris-
burg after Ewell had been ordered to return from Carlisle; or why Hill
was sent some distance on the Cashtown road and one of Heth’s brigades
was sent to the Cashtown Pass before it was alleged that the spy came
in. Cashtown is east of Chambersburg; Harrisburg is north. Nor is
GETTYSBURG 207

it shown how it could be possible for Stuart to put himself on the right
of = on the Susquehanna, and at the same time march “on the
right of our column” — 7.e., the main body with General Lee — as it
advanced into Pennsylvania. The report says that the movement against
Harrisburg was arrested by the intelligence brought by a spy on the night
of the 28th, while Ewell’s and Early’s reports and Lee’s order to Ewell
show that it was arrested on June 27th, and that the army was ordered
to concentrate at Chambersburg.

The fitst report says that after the appearance of the spy orders were
issued for the concentration of the army at Gettysburg as the objective
point. The second report says that A. P. Hill only went to Gettysburg
to ascertain the force of the enemy. If so, Hill ought to have returned
to his camp at Cashtown after he got the information he was seeking.

General Lee made two reports of Gettysburg. The
first is dated July 31, 1863, about a week after he reached
Culpeper. It is a general outline of the operations of his
army; the second report, dated January, 1864, gives a
more detailed account of the campaign. When the first
was written it is not probable that he had received reports
from either of his corps commanders except Longstreet;
his is dated July 27; A. P. Hill’s is dated in November;
Ewell’s has no date; Stuart’s report is dated August 20,
and is an answer to the complaints made against him in
General Lee’s report. Stuart evidently did not know
at the time of writing his report of the manner in which
a battle at Gettysburg had been precipitated against
orders by A. P. Hill, and he evidently had not seen General
Lee’s letter of June 28 to Ewell to return to Chambersburg
from Carlisle. He assumed that the report had cor-
rectly stated that at Chambersburg the army had been
ordered to concentrate at Gettysburg. He seemed to
have no suspicion that the apparition of the spy at Cham-
208 STUART’S CAVALRY

bersburg was a ghost. If Stuart had known what we
now know he could have made a much more effective
answer to the charge against him. But its mildness shows
the appalling majesty of General Lee. The Confederate
War Department immediately published Lee’s report in
the newspapers but suppressed Stuart’s. The haste of the
publication shows that the object was to forestall public
opinion. Its partial and inaccurate statements that do
so much injustice to the commander of the cavalry have
been accepted as a judgment that estops all inquiry into
the justice of the complaint. But in the Forum of His-
tory no judgment is final in the sense that it cannot be
reviewed. After reading the report the public did not
wait to hear the other side — it never does — but jumped
to the conclusion that Stuart had gone off without authority
with all the cavalry on a raid around Hooker’s army; and
that General Lee, having no cavalry, was left like a giant
with his eyes put out. This is the illustration of his
A. A. G., Colonel Walter Taylor. Stuart was thus made
responsible for the loss of the battle and the charge has
been re-echoed down the corridors of time. The report
was thought to be conclusive and public feeling did not
permit its statements to be questioned. In the South a
superstition prevailed that it was as sacred as an oracle
that had been uttered fromthe Pythian Cave. A scapegoat
was needed, and a scapegoat was found. It is said that
in the days of the Exodus the goat was sent to the wilder-
ness loaded with sins; but in this case that precedent was
not followed. Stuart held his high command until he
fell on the field and left a void that was never filled.
GETTYSBURG 209

He made no public defense against unjust criticism
and was content to prove that his sword was still as
potent as Arthur’s

“To lift his country’s fame above the polar star.”

The report is understood to have been written by a staff
officer, Colonel Charles Marshall, a great sophist, — an
able and astute lawyer.! It is a fine example of special
pleading, and the composition shows that the author pos-
sessed far more of the qualities of an advocate than of a
judge. It is unfair to Stuart as it says nothing about
Ewell having gone several days in advance into Penn-
sylvania; and that Stuart was ordered to join him with three

1In February, 1864, I was in Richmond and met Colonel Aleck
Boteler, 2 member of the Confederate Congress, who had been a volun-
teer aide on General Stuart’s staff. He told me that he had a resolution
prepared thanking Stuart and the cavalry for their services, but
was hesitating to offer it for fear of opposition from the prejudice
against Stuart on account of Gettysburg. On January 8th the Con-
gress had passed a resolution thanking General Lee and his army
for their achievements and specially naming Gettysburg. It seems that
to get the resolution passed Colonel Boteler had to make a compromise
and omit all reference to Gettysburg, which was, of course, an implied
censure. It recites the ride around McClellan on the Chickahominy,
and around Pope, and many other exploits of the cavalry, including “the
expedition into Pennsylvania.” This last referred to Stuart’s raid to
Chambersburg, Pa. in October, 1862. It was a great mistake
in Stuart’s friends to accept it. They ought to have demanded
praise for all he had done, or nothing. But as Stuart was then under a
cloud from the effects of General Lee’s report, it was thought that a
vindication of Stuart would be a condemnation of Lee. None then
suspected the part that A. P. Hill and Heth had taken in causing the
disaster and that the report concealed it. If the Confederate Congress
could thank General Lee for Gettsyburg, they might have thanked
Stuart for saving his army on its retreat to the Potomac.
210 STUART’S CAVALRY

brigades of cavalry; — or that Stuart had authority to
cross the Potomac in Hooker’s rear — or that he left two
brigades of cavalry with Longstreet and General Lee to
watch the enemy and guard the flanks of the main army
as it moved north. Yet Lee’s letters to Ewell and Stuart,
and Stuart’s report, all prove these omissions of the report.
In an elaborate address on General Lee’s birthday on
January 19, 1896, the writer of the report threw off all
disguise and openly charged what had been only inferred
from it, that the disaster was due to Stuart’s disobedience.
The address was simply an expansion of the report. That
Lee’s campaign was broken up by somebody’s disobedi-
ence nobody can doubt who will study the records; but the
name of the responsible person is not hinted at in the report,
or in Marshall’s address. Why it should have been kept
a secret no one has explained. It may be that by remain-
ing on the field and continuing a combat which a rash
subordinate had begun, General Lee thought that he had
condoned the deed, and given it a sanction which he could
not recall. If Hill had been censured after the battle by
General Lee, no doubt he would have pleaded an estoppel
against him. It does not seem to have occurred to his-
torians to compare Lee’s two reports with each other, or
with the contemporaneous correspondence, and to note
the discrepancies on material points between them. The
truth has been revealed by the publication of reports and
dispatches which show that the story of Gettysburg that
has come down to this generation is a fable. The state-
ment of the report that a spy came on the night of June 28,
at Chambersburg, and brought the first news that Hooker
GETTYSBURG 211

had crossed the Potomac was never questioned until
Longstreet and Marshall added their testimony that the
spy also brought the information that Hooker had been
superseded by Meade. As it was a physical impossi-
bility for the spy to have brought the news so soon from
Frederick about Meade, I became skeptical, and then
doubted the whole story about the spy; and finally I dis-
covered by Colonel Freemantle’s diary that it was a fiction.
Then the correspondence shows that on the day (27th)
that General Lee arrived at Chambersburg, and twenty-
four hours before it is alleged the spy came in with the
surprising news, he wrote to Ewell, who was at Carlisle,
telling him where Hooker was and directing him to return
to Chambersburg. Nobody can reconcile this letter with
the report. And now, since the methods of rationalism
have superseded authority, no one believes that General
Lee thought Hooker would stay on the bank of the Potomac
while the Army of Northern Virginia was ravaging Penn-
sylvania.

In reference to Stuart, the first report says that he was
left in Virginia to guard the Gaps of the Blue Ridge and
to harass and impede the enemy in crossing the Potomac;
in that event, it says, he was directed to cross into Mary-
land east or west of the Blue Ridge “and to take a position
on the right of our column as it advanced.” It also says
that a part of Ewell’s corps had entered Maryland and that
Jenkins’ cavalry had gone as far as Chambersburg;
that Longstreet and Hill followed on the 24th, crossing
the Potomac at Williamsport and Shepherdstown. “'The
columns reunited at Hagerstown,” the report says, “and
212 STUART’S CAVALRY

advanced thence into Pennsylvania, encamping near
Chambersburg on the 27th.” The inference from this is
that the corps of Hill, Longstreet, and Ewell united at
Hagerstown and marched in one column into Pennsyl-
vania. They did not in fact unite until they reached
Gettysburg. The truth is that on June 22, while General
Lee with Longstreet and Hill was still in the Shenandoah
Valley, Ewell, who was then at Hagerstown, got orders
to move to the Susquehanna and was told that Stuart had
been ordered to join him. Instructions to Stuart were
sent the same day through Longstreet, and also at 5 P.M
on the next day, to leave two brigades of cavalry with
Longstreet and go to Ewell. Yet the report does not
mention either the orders to Ewell, or the orders to Stuart.
The orders contemplated Stuart’s crossing the Potomac in
advance of both armies — in fact, General Lee expressed
to Stuart a fear that Hooker would get over the river ahead
of him. Nor do the instructions to Stuart say a word about
guarding the Blue Ridge Gaps, or harassing or impeding
Hooker in crossing the Potomac. The fact is, the only
effective impediment Stuart could have made to Hooker’s
crossing would have been by destroying his trains on the
roads as he passed through his army. But this would
have been only an incident of his march; the object was
to go the most direct route to Ewell. Nor is there a
word in Stuart’s instructions about placing himself “on
the right of our column as it advanced,” —z.e., the
main body —for the plain reason that Stuart could
not be with General Lee and at the same time far away
with Ewell. Romance might impute such a miracle
GETTYSBURG 213

to Merlin. Neither is it true, as the report says, that
Stuart followed the movements of the Northern Army
after ours entered Maryland; or that he went as far east
as Fairfax Court-house trying to impede its progress, for
it would have been an act of folly to attempt it, and he
had no such orders and no such motive. He went by
Fairfax Court-house because he had found Hooker’s army
on the road by which he had planned to march to the
Potomac on the 25th; and he was compelled to make this
detour to get around it. In other words, Hooker’s army
detained Stuart. By concealing the fact that Ewell’s
corps had been detached and sent as an expeditionary
force to the Susquehanna, and that Stuart was ordered
to leave the army in Virginia and join him, a false impres-
sion of Stuart’s conduct is created. It is natural to inquire
how could General Lee expect Stuart to be at the same
time on the Potomac and on the Susquehanna; or why he
should rely on Stuart to report to him that Hooker had
crossed the. Potomac when there were two brigades of
cavalry with him and Longstreet that had nothing else
todo. The report makes no mention of these two brigades
of cavalry, and gives no reason for not making them useful
if needed. The complaint is against Stuart personally for
not keeping the commanding general informed of the
movements of the enemy; not against the cavalry as a
body. But the complaint can have no reference to Robert-
son and Jones, as their brigades had been detached, and
were directly under the orders of Lee and Longstreet.
Now if they neglected to perform their duty and did not
inform the commanding general when Hooker moved
214 STUART’S CAVALRY

across their front to the Potomac, then they should not
only have been censured in the commander’s report, but
they should have been shot. Yet there is nothing in the
records to create a suspicion that they did not do their duty.

As General Lee had authorized Stuart to pass around
Hooker, he does not explain how he could have expected
Stuart to keep up communications with him while Hooker’s
army was between them. The report says that he ex-
pected it. In the accounts they have written of the cam-
paign the staff officers have carefully followed the report
and have been careful to conceal the orders to Ewell and
to Stuart. It is the characteristic of staff officers to be-
come merged in their Chief, and Lee’s have shown
themselves to be as subservient as Polonius was to his
royal master:

Hamlet. “Do you see yonder cloud that’s almost in the
shape of a camel?”

Polonius. “By the mass, and ’tis like a camel, indeed!”

Hamlet. “Methinks it is like a weasel.”

Polonius. “It’s backed like a weasel.”

Hamlet. “Or a whale.”

Polonius. “Very like a whale.”

The best evidence that the report is misleading is that
all who read it were misled. Nobody can reconcile the
orders with the report; their publication was a revelation;
the staff officers seem to have at least forgotten them
although they appear in their handwriting in Lee’s
letter-book. The gravamen of the complaint the report
makes against Stuart is that the cavalry was absent, and
that it was needed, not in the battle, but to make prelim-
GETTYSBURG 215

inary reconnaissances before the battle. If such was the
case, General Lee was responsible for the absence of the
cavalry with Stuart; but no one has shown that any harm
resulted from it. He and Longstreet were responsible for
the use of the cavalry left with them. Nor does the report
explain why, if the cavalry was needed in Pennsylvania,
the two brigades of Robertson and Jones were kept in
Virginia after the enemy had gone; General Lee’s second
report says they were guarding the Gaps; and that after
the spy came in he ordered them to join the army. This
shows that he knew he had this cavalry at his call to use
when he needed it. If Robertson and Jones remained
to guard the Gaps it must have been by Lee’s or Long-
street’s orders. Stuart’s orders to them were to cross the
river when the enemy crossed; and to move on Longstreet’s
flank, and to watch and report to him.

As before stated, not the slightest complaint was made of
Jones and Robertson. I suppose theystayed in front of the
Gaps under the orders of General Longstreet, or General
Lee. Robertson says that couriers were passing con-
tinually between his and General Lee’s headquarters —
Colonel Massie of the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry says the
same thing. But what ought to be conclusive in favor
of Robertson and Jones is that no charge of delinquency
was made against them. The cavalry was about equally
divided. Jones had the largest brigade; Robertson’s was
the smallest. While Robertson, the senior commander,
who was a West Point officer, lacked the initiative and
enterprise which are necessary to make an efficient cav-
alry officer, yet he was a good disciplinarian and could
216 STUART'S CAVALRY

obey orders and perform routine work as well as anybody.

ones was regarded as a very efficient outpost officer.
Stuart knew that Jones, although the junior in rank,
would be the real commander of both brigades. As proof
of this Stuart did not content himself with giving instruc-
tions to the senior officer and trusting him to instruct his
junior; but he also sent written instructions to Jones,
through Robertson, which he requested Robertson to
read. I do not think there can be found in the war
records another instance where instructions have been
addressed directly to a subordinate who is under the
immediate command of another. The rule is to direct
the intermediate officer to instruct the subordinate. When
General Lee told Stuart he must leave himand go to Ewell,
he also told him what instructions he must give to the
commanders — not alone the senior commander — of the
two brigades left in Virginia. The principal reason was
that the chief reliance was on Jones; another reason was
that Jones’ brigade was in Loudon, much nearer the
Potomac than Robertson’s, and Stuart wanted Jones to
save time by communicating directly with Lee and Long-
street instead of sending dispatches by a circuitous route
through Robertson according to official etiquette. On
the morning of the 26th, Pleasanton’s cavalry corps
marched directly across their front, and in full view of
Jones and Robertson, from Aldie to Edwards’ Ferry.
The movement was before their eyes and seen by them.
Robertson’s brigade then retired to Ashby’s Gap, and Jones’
brigade, which was twelve miles further north, to Snicker’s
Gap, in Loudon, where they remained until the afternoon
GETTYSBURG 217

of the 29th, when orders came from General Lee, and they
started to Pennsylvania. The second report says:

“As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed
into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of Robert-
son and Jones to rejoin the army without delay, and it
was expected that General Stuart, with the remainder of
his command, would soon arrive.” But Stuart could
not have been expected to arrive at Chambersburg; he
had never been ordered there. It will be observed that
General Lee here speaks of Robertson and Jones’ brigades
not as a single, but as separate commands, and says he
sent orders to each.

Ordinarily the orders would have been sent to the
senior officer alone. No doubt both Jones and Robertson
had each been sending dispatches directly to the army
headquarters, and orders had in turn been sent separately
to them. As General Lee says that Jones’ and Robert-
son’s brigades had been left to guard the passes of the
Blue Ridge, it must mean that they were kept there by
his orders. The orders to guard the Gaps until further
orders must have come from Longstreet or General Lee;
they certainly were not Stuart’s. He left these two
brigades some ten or twelve miles in front of the Gaps to
observe the enemy and “report anything of importance
to Lieutenant General Longstreet, with whose position
you will communicate by relays through Charlestown.”
I have before stated that the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry
in obedience to this order was sent to the vicinity of
Charlestown. In the event of the enemy’s moving to the
Potomac, Jones and Robertson were instructed by Stuart
218 STUART’S CAVALRY

to harass the enemy and follow the army. In reply to
the objection that Stuart should have left a more enter-
prising officer in command of the cavalry, the answer is,
it was done with the full knowledge and approval of Gen-
eral Lee — probably Robertson was his selection as he
knew that Jones would be with him. But, as Stuart
calculated that Hooker would send the most of his cavalry
in pursuit of him, he did not think that the routine work
that would devolve on the cavalry he left behind would
require any extraordinary boldness or skill. Robertson,
without the aid of Jones, had sufficient capacity to perform
the ministerial duty of writing a dispatch and sending a
courier with it. Most any private could have done that.
If he had not sent the information he would have been
guilty of a criminal negligence that would have demanded
his dismissal from the army. Yet General Lee made no
complaint of Robertson, and at his own request, when
the campaign was over, sent him to take a larger command
in South Carolina. Robertson had reported to him with
two regiments from a camp of instruction a few days
before the battle at Brandy. On that day he certainly
showed he lacked the energy required in a cavalry officer.
But no such high qualities were required to execute the
plain duties which Stuart imposed on him. There was
not a wagon-master or a teamster in the army that could
not have done that work. Robertson says he did it. The
report does not contradict him. The work was impor-
tant but it does not necessarily follow that it was difficult.
The second report differs materially from the first, although
it renews the complaint against Stuart. The first does
GETTYSBURG 219

not state, as the second does, that Stuart had authority to
cross the Potomac in rear of the enemy. It simply said
west or east of the Ridge.

This was construed as meaning that he was authorized
to cross east of Harper’s Ferry but between Hooker and
Lee. The first said nothing about Ewell’s entering Penn-
sylvania some days in advance of Lee and Longstreet.
The second admits that he did. The second also admits
that two brigades of cavalry were left in Virginia, but
erroneously says they were placed there to guard the
Gaps. On the contrary, Stuart ordered them to leave when
the enemy left and not a word was said about guarding
Gaps. The second admits that Stuart was ordered to
place himself on the right of Ewell, but then involves
itself in the contradiction of saying that he was directed
“to lose no time in placing his command on the right of
our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy
moving northward.” By “our column” was evidently
meant the main body with General Lee, as the report
says: “It was expected that as soon as the Federal
army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would
give notice of its movements, and nothing having been
heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was
inferred that the enemy had not left Virginia.” The
second report differs materially from the first in not stating
with precision the objective point on which the army
moved when it marched east from Chambersburg. The
first stated that the three corps of Longstreet, Hill, and
Ewell were immediately ordered to Gettysburg after the
spy brought in the surprising news that Hooker had
220 STUART’S CAVALRY

crossed the Potomac. But the second report only in-
dicated the direction in which the army moved and says
that Hill was ordered to move towards Cashtown, and
that Longstreet followed him, while Ewell was recalled
from Carlisle, and directed to go either to Cashtown or
Gettysburg. Cashtown is only mentioned once in the first
report, where it says a part of the trains on the retreat
passed through that Gap. The first report, after stating
that Hill was ordered to Gettysburg, says: “The leading
division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg
on the morning of July 1,” and further on it speaks of
“finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal
army,” but it does not intimate that Hill went there with-
out orders, or to make a reconnaissance. But the second
report, which conflicts with the first, was made to con-
form to Hill’s that had come in after the first was
written, and says that Hill went from Cashtown to Gettys-
burg to find out what was in his front. The first says
he was ordered there from Chambersburg. Stuart was
absent on the first day under orders; in my opinion the
orders were right. I now repeat what I said in the Rich-
mond Times in April, 1898, in reply to the strictures of
Colonel Marshall in his address: “How could Stuart join
Ewell on the Susquehanna, guard the Gaps of the Blue
Ridge Mountains in Virginia, watch and impede Hooker’s
crossing the Potomac, and then place himself on the right
of the column as it advanced with Lee into Pennsylvania
unless he was inspired with ubiquity. Even Hercules
could not perform all of his twelve labors at the same time.
This is the Age of Reason; the Age of Faith has passed.
GETTYSBURG 221

We wonder how a people as intellectual as the Athenians
could believe that’ Theseus appeared at Marathon and led
the last onset against the Persians; and yet we are now
asked to believe that General Lee expected Stuart to sur-
pass all the heroes of the Greek mythology.” And I might
have added, how could Stuart pass around Hooker and
at the same time keep between Hooker and Lee? ?

1Qn the day after the Confederate army recrossed the Potomac,
General Robertson addressed the following letter to General Lee. It
does not seem that General Lee had any fault to find with him.

HeapquartTers Cavatry Bricaps,
July 15th, 1863.
Bric. Gen. R. H. Currron,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Army, Northern Virginia: —
GerneErat: IJ have the honor to represent to the commanding general
the fact that in consequence of casualties, detached service, sickness, &c.,
my command is reduced to less than 300 men. I consider it injustice
to myself and the service to remain longer in my present position. Three
regiments of my brigade were left in North Carolina and are now actively
engaged there and upon the Peninsula. I voluntered to accompany the
two regiments ordered to Virginia, but since their reduction J think my
services would be of more avail elsewhere. I therefore respectfully re-
quest authority to rejoin my brigade, or else that I be assigned to a com-
mand commensurate with my rank.
B. H. Rogertson,
Brigadier-General, &c.
(ndorsement)
July 15th, 1863.
Respectfully forwarded and recommended that he be relieved from
duty with this command accordingly.
J. E. B. Sruart,
Major-General.

August 5th, 1863.
Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant and Inspector-General’s
Office. In accordance with this request of Brigadier-General Robertson
222 STUART’S CAVALRY

in and consequence of his being unfit for active duty at this time, he has
been relieved from the command of these two regiments and directed
to report to the Adjutant-General for orders. He was not ordered to
take command of that part of his former brigade in North Carolina
because it was thought possible some other disposition had been made
of it smce his removal from that department. I think it very important
to establish a camp at some point in the rear where our cavalry can be
recruited and I know of no one so well qualified for the post as Brigadier-

General Robertson.
R. E. Lex, General.

Carl Schurz, who commanded the Eleventh Corps in the battle, in
his autobiography says: ‘‘We did not know that we were marching to-
ward the most famous battlefield of the war. Neither General Meade
nor General Lee wished to fight a battle at Gettysburg. Lee wished to
have it at Cashtown, Meade on Pipe Creek. Both were drawn into
it by the unexpected encounter of the Confederate General, Heth,
who hoped to find some shoes for his men at Gettysburg, and a Federal
Cavalry general on « reconnaissance, both instructed not to bring on
a general engagement, but rather cautioned against it.” Heth sent
Pettigrew’s brigade on the 30th in search of shoes; probably the old
ones which Gordon’s and White’s men had thrown away when they
were at Gettysburg. : Heth’s report says: “On July Ist my division,
accompanied by Pegram’s battalion of artillery. was ordered [by A. P.
Hill] to move at 5 a.m. in the direction of Gettysburg.” Hill and Heth
were not searching for shoes on July 1st.

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