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A PARTICULAR ACCOUNT OF THE EUROPEAN
MILITARY ADVENTURERS OF HINDUSTAN
ROM 1784 to 1803.
 

 

EDITED BY HERBERT COMPTON.

A MASTER MARINER:

BEING THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF

CAPTAIN ROBERT WILLIAM EASTWICK.

(Forming the Ninth Volume of ‘‘ The Adventure Serics.”)
Six Illustrations, Cloth, 5s.

THE Times :—‘‘In some respects the best of the series, and
certainly possesses a unique interest in the glimpse it affords
into the way in which fortunes were made and lost by adven-
turous ship-captains in the palmy days of the old East India’
Company and the French wars... . His straightforwardness,
shrewdness, and indomitable enterprise, entitle Eastwick to a
niche in the temple of Iénglish worthies.”

SatTurDAY Review :—‘‘ Mr. Compton has done well to print
it... . There are, as might be expected, several little touches
which have a general historical interest.”

Buack AND Waite :—‘ When the old sailor comes to tell of
roe moving tule of luck or daring, he tells his story as simply
and naturally as if he were recling off a fo’castle yarn.”

GLoze :-— The narrative is written with a simplicity and a
directness which assures the reader—if he required assurance—
of its good faith and accuracy, aud it will be found full of interest,
varied and sustained.”

Loxpon: T. FISHER UNWIN.

 

 
A PARTICULAR ACCOUNT

OF THE

EUROPEAN MILITARY
ADVENTURERS OF HINDUSTAN

From 1784 to 1803

COMPILED BY

HERBERT COMPTON

EDITOR OF ‘‘A MASTER MARINER,” &c.

Zondon

T. FISHER UNWIN
PATERNOSTER SQUARE

MDCCCXCII

@
Go

LESTOCK REID, ESQUIRE
(Of the Bombay Civil Service)

THIS ATTEMPT TO PERPETUATE
THE MEMORY OF
MANY BRAVE MEN
IS INSCRIBED
WITH

REGARD AND GRATITUDE
INTRODUCTION.

HE European Military Adventurers of Hindustan
belong to an heroic age which seems further removed
485) fron: our’s than the mere lapse of a century suggests.
VZ] It is probable that, saving to the student of Indian
2) 30,0} history, their names are but as indistinct items on a

forgotten scroll, whose record is nearly obliterated by
the dust of oblivion. They and their deeds are blended into a bar-
baric past, when history was written in blood not in books, and of
which scarce a vestige remains in the civilised Indian Empire of the
Victorian Zenith. And yet only a hundred years ago these dead and
gone Adventurers created armies, conquered kingdoms, overturned
princes and ruled provinces, winning such distinctions and wielding
such personal power as are not within the reach of modern endeavour.
Forming a link between the eras of Oriental despotism and European
government, they bedizened the introduction of Western enlighten-
ment with the gaudy paraphernalia of the Hast. But Fate planted
them in one of those periods of transition which by their very nature
are temporary, and they share with it a short-lived fame. Their
individual places in History are limited to a paragraph or, at most, a
page. They are but units in the sum of India’s story—stray drafts on
its capital of achievement which have been retired, filed away and
forgotten. None heed these faded personalities now. The whisper of
-De Boigne’s name is as powerless to compel attention as the thunder
of his cannon to create terror ; the mention of George Thomas awakens
no responsive recognition even in hearts alert to the influence of
Romance and Adventure ; the political opinions of Perron have long
ceased to affect the price of India stock, or set heads wagging in
Leadenhall Street. As for the lesser Soldiers of Fortune—the cen-
turions and the lieutenants of the Mercenary Armies of Native India
—they are dust of the common dust, whose memory the greedy march
of English enterprise in the East has shuffled out of sight, reducing
their achievements to the common level which displays not a head-
stone to view. Yet each in his different way, designedly or uncon-
sciously, directly or indirectly, worked towards one common end by

  
8 INTRODUCTION.

assisting in bringing about the conditions that paved the way for the
establishment of English supremacy in India; and each, when his
personal share in the drama was finished, and the last great act
opened, passed off the stage unnoticed and unknown, and left the
completion of the task, and the applause it evoked, to other actors.

A word of explanation is necessary concerning the title chosen for
this book. The “Hindustan”? therein referred to is the circumscribed
territory defined by that fine old geographer, Major James Rennell, in
his ‘‘ Memoir of a Map of Hindostan,” published in 1785. It was a
territory bounded by the Indus on the west, by the “ Burrampootra
or thereabouts” on the east, by the Himalayan mountains on the
north, and ‘by the countries of the Deccan on the south, so that the
whole peninsula to the south of a line drawn nearly from Balasore to
Broach is not reckoned Hindostan.” It is necessary to thus localise
the Adventurers whose lives are sketched in the following pages in
order that they may not be confounded with the innumerable European
Free Lances, who served the courts of Haidarabad and Mysore and
other Native Princes in Southern India.

The period in which the European Military Adventurers of Hindu-
stan flourished began in 1784, during the Government of Warren
Hastings, and ended in 1803 during that of the Marquis Wellesley.
Those twenty years saw the rise, the reign, and the ruin of Independent
Military Adventure in India. To De Boigne belongs the honour of
having initiated the wonderful system that took root and grew with
the fatal rapidity of an exotic. He created for Madhoji Siundhia—‘ A
Ruler of India”—the first complete army of regular troops employed
by the Native Princes of the country. The example was soon followed
by the Nizam of Haidarabad, and, in a different degree, by Tipu Sultan.
In 1798 there were three great disciplined military establishments in
the service of the leading Indian Courts, commanded by Frenchmen in
the French interest, and employing European arts and tactics of war.
Their destruction and extermination was forced upon the Marquis
Wellesley by the political exigences of the times, and was the most
important work of his administration. De Boigne’s army, which had
passed under the command of Perron, was the first of these three
organisations to be called into existence and the last of them to be
broken up.

The political and, indeed, international importance of the European
Military Adventurers of India can be guaged from the following
extract from a despatch written by the Marquis Wellesley in 1798 :—

“Tn the present weak state of the Nizam of Haidarabad’s Govern-
ment, the French corps in his service would (in the event of a war
INTRODUCTION. 9

between the English and Mysore, which was anticipated) openly join
Tipt Sultan, and by a sudden blow endeavour to seize the Nizam’s
territories, and to secure them to the Dominion of France under an
alliance offensive and defensive with Tipu Sultan. . . . The interest
and the inclination of Sindhia, who entertains a large army in his
service under the command of a French officer (Perron), would lead
him to engage with Tipu Sultan and the French. . . . The junction
which might thus be effected between the French officers, with their
several corps in the respective services of the Nizam, of Sindhia, and
of Tipu, might establish the power of France upon the ruins of the
states of Poonah and of the Deccan.”

Although this book does not deal with the French Factions ot
Haidarabad and Mysore, their existence and importance must be
noted, because they are intimately connected with the subject treated.
In Haidarabad, in addition to the Nizam’s irregular soldiery, there
was a trained army of 14,000 men and 30 guns under the command of
Piron, who had succeeded the famous Raymond. The native army of
Mysore numbered 75,000 troops of all arms, and included Tipt’s
“European or French Force” of 550 officers, non-commissioned
officers and men. Finally Sindhia could muster 40,000 disciplined
infantry with 380 guns, the whole commanded by Perron, who was
assisted by an efficient staff of 300 Europeans. Sindhia’s Brigades
were one factor, and, as events proved, the most formidable factor in
that possible combination which a hundred years ago threatened the
existence of the English power in India. The story of those Brigades
is the story of the European Military Adventurers of Hindustan.

I am desirous of taking this opportunity of recording my obligations
to two gentlemen for help received. Mr. Edmund Neel, C.I.E., the
assistant secretary in the political department of the India office,
facilitated a search through many volumes of Government records,
and kindly assisted in regard to those of a secret nature which were
not open to my inspection ; and Count de Boigne placed at my disposal
a memoir of his illustrious grandsire’s life, and cleared up one doubtful
point of great interest.

In compiling the following pages a great many authorities have
been consulted, but it would be tedious to give in detail the names of
all the works from which fragments of information have been gleaned.
The principal ones are indicated in the list printed below, to the first
four books in which I am particularly indebted. The sketch of De
Boigne’s life was written before the two French biographies indicated
came under my observation, and they have only been used to correct
a few minor statements of fact, chiefly of a personal nature. In the
10 INTRODUCTION.

life of George Thomas, his memoirs have been very closely followed,
but a great quantity of extraneous and uninteresting matter has been
eliminated, and a good deal of additional information incorporated.
With regard to Perron, so far as I am aware, there is no detailed
biography of this adventurer in existence, and the one here presented
is compiled from original sources. The lives of the lesser adventurers
have been culled from a great variety of works, by far the most
important of which is the one written by Lewis Ferdinand Smith.

An earnest endeavour has been made to secure correctness of narra-
tive, but in some cases it has been rendered very difficult, and success
rendered doubtful, by divergent statements and contradictory dates

bearing on the same incident.
H.C.

LIST OF AUTHORITIES CONSULTED.

A Sketch of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the Regular Corps formed
and commanded by Europeans in the service of the Native Princes of India.
By Lewis Ferprnanp Smiru. Calcutta, 1805.

Military Memoirs of Lieutenant-Colonel James Skinner, C.B. By J. BatLiie
Fraser. London, 1851.

The Military Memoirs of George Thomas. By CotonEL WiLuIam FRANCELIN.
Calcutta, 1803.

A History of the Mahrattas. By James Grant Durr. London, 1826.

The Despatches, Minutes, and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley, K.G.,
during his administration in India. London, 1837.

Memoire sur la carritre de M. Le Général Comte de Boigne. Chambéry, 1830.

Une page inédité de histoire des Indes. Le General de Boigne (1751-1830).
Par Victor DE Sainr-GeEnis. Poitiers, 1873.

Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune. . Ameer Khan. Compiled in
Persian by Busawan Lau. Translated by H. T. Prinser. Calcutta, 1832.

Illustrations of some Institutions of the Mahratta People. By W. H. Tone.
Calcutta, 1818.

The History of the Reign of Shah Aulum. By CoLtonEL WILLIAM FRANCELIN.
London, 1798.

The Calcutta Monthly Register, 1790; The Calcutta Monthly Journal, 1798-
1800; The Hindostanee Intelligencer and Oriental Anthology, 1801-1802 ;
The Asiatic Annual Register, 1801-1811; The Asiatic Journal, 1831, etc.
Selections from the Calcutta Gazette. By W.S.Szron Kare. Calcutta,
1864.

Government Records at the India Office.

Etc., Etc., Etc.
CONTENTS.

PAGE
INTRODUCTION igs ee he eae Ja soa 7
De BoIcne jae ee die eee sa ve 1d
GEORGE THOMAS ... aie i ake a .. 109

PERRON Po iN re ae de oan ww. 291

APPENDIX... re a iy saz os .. «3837
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

Map oF Inpia_ sn... ae ne wa ... Frontispiece
Der Boicne ae se 206 ae To face p. 18
Mapuogi SINDHIA... sae aa wee wae sy 79
GrorcEe THOMAS ... te ike igs aint dy 109
Ruree Struck spy GEorGE THOMAS ... 28 p. 148
CEMETERY AT BERHAMPUR, IN WHICH GEORGE

THomAS 1s BURIED ... a8 a To face p. 213
Tur Emperor SHAH ’ALAM wae sate tae “ 271
Lizut.-CoLoNEL JAMES SKINNER, C.B. es 69 337
THE Breaum SoMBRE eae dag aia sat 3 403
 

DE BOIGNE.
DE BOIGNE.

 

CHAPTER I.
HIS EARLY LIFE AND SERVICES. ARRIVAL IN INDIA.

1751-1784.

 

\F the daring and errant military adventurers who,
during the last two decades of the eighteenth
century, helped to wreck dynasties and establish
kingdoms in Hindustan, there is one who towers
high and great above the rest. The pride and pomp
of Perron, and the delirious ambition of George
Thomas, must yield place to the genius and achievement of General
Count de Boigne, who, if he never quite touched the political im-
portance attained by the former, or aspired to the actual independence
usurped by the latter, must yet take precedence of both as the creator
of the military system they inherited or adopted. For De Boigne was
the first to raise up disciplined armies from the fierce races of Upper
India, and teach them how to fight and how to conquer; he was the first
to carry the science of European warfare into the heart of Hindustan ;
and his famous battalions formed the connecting link between the
eras of Mughal Empire and British Dominion in the East. If the
extraordinary power De Boigne’s brigades exercised, and the brilliant
record they left behind them, during a momentous quarter of a century,
fill but a single chapter in the turbulent history of India, it is at
least one glowing with enterprise and achievement, and worthy of the
place it fills between the pages that record the conquests of Clive and
Coote and the victories of Lake and Wellesley.

Benoit La Borgne—better known to history as Benoit de Boigne—
was born at Chambéry, in Savoy, on the 8th of March, 1751. He

 

 

 

 
16 DE BOIGNE.

was the second son of a large family, and his father followed the calling
of a hide merchant. Despite his narrow means, Pére La Borgne
contrived to afford Benoit a sufficient education at the college of his
native town, where, under the tutelage of pious and learned monks,
the youth acquired a general knowledge of books and a tolerable pro-
ficiency in Latin ; whilst, from the circumstances of his birthplace
being situated near the French frontier, he spoke French and Italian
with equal fluency.

As a lad, Benoit found his chief pleasure in music and fencing, and
his brain was filled with the fanciful ideas of glory in which boys
indulge. It was his father’s intention to make him a lawyer, but he
himself determined at an early age to follow the profession of arms,
for which his fine physique and bold spirit eminently fitted him. His
desire was to enter the army of his native country, then under the
rule of King Charles Emanuel, but in this he was disappointed owing
to all its commissioned appointments being monopolised by the
nobility of Savoy and Sardinia, and admitting no cadets of less dis-
tinguished birth. Perhaps De Boigne lost nothing by this, for the
life of an officer in the Sardinian service was often one of inflated
poverty wherein a glittering coat covered a hungry stomach during a
long and depressing period of uniformed impecuniosity.

But he had not far to look for 4 more hopeful sphere of action.
France was contiguous, and its capital the head-quarters of a body of
adventurers famous in history—the Irish Brigade. This corps
enjoyed the highest reputation throughout Europe for gallantry in
the field and discipline in the camp. Its ranks were open to the
merit and talent of all nations, and to belong to it was at once an
establishment and a distinction in life. It was, in short, just such a
service as appealed to the inherent instincts of young De Boigne, and
he determined to enter its ranks if possible.

Tradition says that he left his native country under circumstances
which did more credit to his spirit than to his respect for those laws
which his father had intended he should expound. A duel with a
Sardinian officer, which threatened retribution at the hands of a local
magistrate, led De Boigne to accelerate his departure from the
paternal roof. Nurturing high aspirations, and without any definite
ambition in view, he crossed the frontier and entered France in 1768,
and presented himself for employment in the Irish Brigade.

There was a recommendation in his tall martial figure and frank
soldierly bearing. His large-boned limbs and massive frame gave
evidence of unusual physical powers, and he confronted the world
with an air of conscious superiority. His features were stern and
HIS EARLY LIFE AND SERVICES. 17

resolute, lit up with piercing eyes, and surmounted by a lofty brow,
not common in the Latin race, and indicating the possession of those
qualities from which soldiers are shaped and heroes hewn. His
application was successful, and he obtained an ensign’s commission
in the Clare Regiment, temporarily commanded by Major Leigh, an
officer noted for his discipline. Joining his corps at Landrecies,
De Boigne passed the next three years chiefly in Flanders, until his
regiment embarked for the Isle of France, where it remained for
eighteen months before being ordered back to Europe.

During his stay in the Irish Brigade De Boigne was noted for his
professional zeal and general good conduct, and in this famous corps
acquired the intimate knowledge of military affairs which proved of
such essential use to him in later life. But after some years’ service
his active and ambitious temperament grew disheartened from want
of encouragement ; promotion stagnated, and he found advancement
to the higher grades too slow for his restless spirit. He never spared
himself, but he expected a snitable reward for his exertions. Despite
his zeal and love for his profession, De Boigne was so far a mer-
cenary at heart that he recognised his sword was his sole capital, and
desired to invest it to the best advantage. Love of money was
strongly engrained in his character, and a subaltern’s pay in a
foreign legion satisfied him as little as a subaltern’s position. "When,
therefore, he chanced to hear of an opening for volunteer officers in
the service of Russia (then at war with the Turks), De Boigne
determined to quit the Irish Brigade, and endeavour to advance his
fortunes under a new flag where the chances of active service
were assured, and the flow of promotion promised to be more
rapid.

Resigning his commission in the French service in 1774, De Boigne
proceeded to Turin, and obtained from the Marquis D’Aigueblanche,
the Sardinian minister, a letter of recommendation to Admiral
Orloff, who commanded the Russian forces in the Grecian Archi-
pelago. Equipped with this, he started for the seat of war, and made
his way to Paros, where he presented himself before the Admiral, who,
with the quick perception of a commander accustomed to read character,
was favourably impressed with De Boigne’s appearance, and appointed
him to a captaincy in a Greek regiment in the service of the Empress
Catherine.

But Fate ordained that De Boigne’s career of active service should
be of short duration. After a few weeks his regiment was employed
in an attack on the island of Tenedos, at the mouth of the Darda-
nelles. The expedition was ill-conceived and ill-executed, and met

2
18 DE BOIGNE.

with a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Turkish garrison, by
whom De Boigne, one of the few survivors of the fight, was made
prisoner.

As an infidel and a captive of war in the hands of the Moslem he
received but scant consideration. One account says he was sent to
Scio, where he languished six months in prison till the war terminated.
But another authority gives the following somewhat apocryphal
but picturesque version of his adventures during the next three years.
After being taken prisoner he was sent to Constantinople, and there
sold as a slave for fifty dollars, and for a time employed in a menial
capacity, being actually set to hew wood and draw water for his
master’s household. During this period he managed to communicate
with his parents, who arranged for his ransom. On regaining his
freedom he made his way to St. Petersburg to press his claims for
consideration after the hardships he had suffered in the Russian
service. After some little waiting he succeeded in obtaining a pre-
sentation to the Empress Catherine, who listened graciously and with
interest to the story of his slavery at Constantinople, and is said to
have predicted a career for him. To compensate for his misfor-
tune she bestowed on him a commission as major in her army, and
the war with the Turks being at an end, he was posted to a
regiment doing duty on the south-western frontier of Russia, where
he was not long afterwards selected for the command of an escort
detached to attend Lord Percy, a son of the Duke of Northumber-
land, on a tour through the islands of the Grecian Archipelago.
De Boigne quickly ingratiated himself with this nobleman. In
the course of their travels they touched at Smyrna, where De
Boigne chanced to meet some European merchants lately returned
from the East, whose dazzling descriptions of India, and the prospects
it held out to military adventurers so fascinated him that he deter-
mined to visit the country. This intention he communicated to Lord
Percy, who furnished him with a letter of introduction to Warren
Hastings, the Governor of Bengal.

‘While considering the best way to carry his design into execution,
the idea occurred to De Boigne of making the journey to India over-
land, by way of the Caspian Sea, Tartary, and Kashmir. It was a
boldly conceived enterprise, and worthy of his adventurous spirit.
Returning to St. Petersburg he solicited an audience with the
Empress, and laid his proposition before her. The project was one
that appealed to a sovereign who was always ready to encourage
travel and exploration, more especially in those countries which
Peter the Great had indicated in his will as indispensable objects of
AIS EARLY LIFE AND SERVICES. 19

future acquisition by Russia. The Empress accorded her countenance
to the scheme, and it is interesting to note that, twelve years
later, when the relations between Russia and England threatened a
rupture, she ordered her ministers to obtain all available information
concerning the actual route suggested by De Boigne, with a view to
invading India by an advance in that direction.

Such is one version of De Boigne’s adventures during this period,
but another account merely states that after his capture by the Turks
he was confined for seven months at Scio, until the end of the war,
which event liberated him, but stopped his promotion ; that he then
resigned the service of Russia and embarked for Smyrna, where he
met certain English traders lately returned from the East, who
described India as a veritable political chaos, but withal so marvellous
a country that, listening to them, De Boigne felt all the fantastic
dreams of his youth revive, and was inspired to go there and search
for fortune.

There is nothing incompatible in the two versions, and they both
bring the narrative to the same point at Aleppo, where De Boigne
found himself about the year 1777, and joined u caravan starting for
Baghdad. Unfortunately Turkey was at war with Persia, and the
arms of the former having recently suffered some serious reverses,
the districts through which the caravan would have to travel were
rendered unsafe by the presence of marauding bodies of Persian
cavalry, and the leader of the expedition, fearing capture, decided
shortly after starting, to abandon the proposed journey and return to
Aleppo.

Undeterred by this inauspicious beginning, De Boigne determined
to reach India by some other route, and.set sail for Alexandria. But
misfortune still dogged his path, for the vessel that carried him was
wrecked at the mouth of the Nile, and he found himself a castaway
on the inhospitable shores of Egypt. He was rescued by a band of
Arabs, from whom he expected the inhumanity of treatment they
were generally credited with exercising; but it appeared that, how-
ever pitiless they might be in plundering the rich, they were pre-
cluded by their notions of honour from oppressing the needy, and, so
far from ill-tveating De Boigne, they succoured him most charitably,
and assisted him to reach Grand Cairo.

Here he met his old acquaintance Lord Percy, who introduced
him to Mr. George Baldwin, the British Consul, through whose
kindness De Boigne obtained a passage in a country ship to Madras,
by way of the Red Sea. He was also furnished with letters of intro-
duction to Major Sydenham, the Town-major of Fort St. George,
20 DE BOIGNE.

where he landed in January, 1778, just after Sir Thomas Rumbold
had assumed the government of the Presidency.

De Boigne was at this time a young man of twenty-seven years of
age, ten of which had been spent in military service and foreign
travel. And yet he was not so worldly wise but that he expected to
find the famous pagoda tree flourishing, whose branches required
only to be shaken to ensure the dropping of their golden fruit. He
had come to acquire wealth, but he soon learnt that poverty and want
existed in the East as well as riches and luxury. War had recently
been declared between England and France, and Sir Hector Munro
was engaged in laying siege to Pondicherry. It was an inauspicious
moment for an ex-oflicer of the French service to seek his fortune in
an English dependency. Month after month passed by, and De Boigne
waited for the preferment that did not come. His slender stock of
money gradually melted away, and at last, in order to procure the
necessaries of life, he was compelled to give lessons in fencing—an
art in which he was highly proficient.

That he was very poor, that he was very distressed, and that he was
greatly disheartened, is confirmed by his acceptance shortly afterwards
of an ensign’s commission in the 6th Regiment of Madras Native
Infantry. This he obtained through the good offices of Major Syden-
ham, who found means to overcome the scruples of the Governor. It
has been suggested that by entering the British service De Boigne
desired to disarm suspicion as to his political relations with the Russian
Government, and that this step offered the most efficacious method of
doing so. But this theory may be dismissed, for there is little doubt
but that it was poverty alone which compelled this ex-captain of the
Irish Brigade and ex-major of the Russian army to don the uniform
of a subaltern in a regiment of Madras Native Infantry, and swear
allegiance to a Company of merchant adventurers.

For nearly two years De Boigne continued in this station, and, but
for a fortunate accident, might have ended as well as begun his Indian
career as a Company’s ensign. His regiment was attached to Colonel
Baillie’s force at Gantur in September, 1780, when De Boigne
happened to be detached on escort duty to convoy up a supply of grain
from Madras. During his absence Colonel Baillie was surrounded by
the Mysore army, under Tipu Sahib, the son of Haidar Ali, and after a
brave, but hopeless, resistance, during which the greater portion of
his force was cut to pieces, obliged to surrender.

Just about this time Lord Macartney succeeded Sir Thomas Rumbold
as Governor of Madras, and, after the disaster of Gantur, offered
De Boigne an appointment in his body-guard It is not improbable
HIS EARLY LIFE AND SERVICES. 21

that during the next three years De Boigne learnt many particulars
concerning the French military adventurers in the service of Mysore,
for the deeds of these Free Lances of Carnatic must have been topics
of common conversation. Amongst them were many able officers
not unworthy successors to Dupleix, Bussy, La Bourdonnais, Lally,
and Law. Lally, it may be noted, had served in Dillon’s Regiment
in the Irish Brigade. Aided by the condition of the times, and the
circumstances of the country, these military adventurers attained sub-
stantial, and, in many cases, lucrative, commands in the service of
Haidar Ali, and were struggling to keep in existence the French
influence in Southern India.

Before many months had passed De Boigne came to the conclusion
that the Madras Native Army dangled no charms for a soldier of
fortune. On the contrary, it confirmed his repugnance for a progressive
service. Those were the daysof grey-headed ensigns and veteran lieu-
tenants, to whom promotion could never come. Money, not merit, com-
manded steps, and De Boigne’s prospects were the more hopeless because
he laboured under the disadvantage of alien birth, which was a bar to
his advancement. Yet all this time he was constantly reminded of
the possibilities the country offered to men of ability and enterprise,
for but a few leagues distant there were Frenchmen—who, in Europe,
must have saluted him respectfully—enjoying immense powers, dignity
and wealth in a service that was greedy to receive all European appli-
cants who would fight against the English.

The resignation De Boigne decided on was accelerated by two
incidents, the one arising out of the other. A charge was preferred
against him of taking undue liberties with the wife of a brother officer,
and aithough the accusation was unfounded, and he was honourably
acquitted by a court-martial, the circumstance led Lord Macartney to
refuse De Boigne’s application for an adjutancy, and confer the
appointment on an officer of junior standing. Whereupon De Boigne
threw up his commission. This induced the Governor to inquire
more clearly into the matter, and he was soon convinced that De
Boigne had been harshly treated. Anxious now to repair the un-
witting injustice, he professed himself ready to sanction the appoint-
ment, but De Boigne had made up his mind to leave the Company’s
service, and declined to withdraw his papers. Lord Macartney was
therefore obliged to accept his resignation, but to testify his kindly
feeling, he provided him with a letter of recommendation to Warren
Hastings at Calcutta.

Captain Edward Moor, in his “ Narrative of Little’s Expedition,”’
gives another version of the reason that led to De Boigne’s departure
22 DE BOIGNE.

from Madras. According to this writer he was dismissed from the
service for a trivial offence ‘‘ by the overgrown authority of the Civil
power;” but it matters little whether he resigned voluntarily or of
necessity. In 1782 he arrived at Calcutta, where a kind-hearted resi-
dent of Fort William—an intimate friend of Captain Moor—took him
by the hand, and furnished him with credit to a very considerable
amount, which enabled him early in the following year to set out on
his journey to Upper India.

Meanwhile De Boigne presented his letters of introduction from
Lord Percy and Lord Macartney to Warren Hastings. These secured
him a courteous reception, and he confided to the Governor-General
his intention of endeavouring to make his way to Europe overland.
The boldness of the design interested Hastings, who could appreciate
enterprise in all its forms, and he provided De Boigne with letters to
the British agents in India, and also to the Nawab Wazier of Oudh,
which assured the recipient great pecuniary advantages, since it was
the custom of the Native Courts of India to bestow valuable Khiluts,
or presents of honour, on all persons recommended by friendly powers.
This to a traveller of De Boigne’s narrow circumstances was a matter
of immense importance.

Early in 1783, after a short stay in Calcutta, De Boigne proceeded
to Lucknow, and waited upon Mr. Middleton, the English Resident
at the Court of Oudb, and in the course of time was received in
audience by the Naw4b Wazir, and honoured with a valuable Khilut
and letters of credit on Kabul and Kandahar for Rs.12,000. The
Khilut De Boigne immediately sold for Rs.4,000, and being thus
provided with the necessary means, settled down at Lucknow to study
the languages for five months, and to prepare a suitable equipment
for his journey through Central Asia. During this time he made the
acquaintance of General Claude Martine, a remarkable adventurer,
who held a post of the highest confidence in the Nawal’s Court, and
with whom he formed a friendship that lasted until Martine’s death,
sixteen years later.

In August Major James Brown, an officer deputed by Warren
Hastings on w mission to the Emperor Shah ’Alam, was starting for
Delhi, his object being to discover the designs that the Mahratta Prince
Madhoji Sindhia had formed in regard to the Mughal Empire. De
LBoigne decided to accompany Major Brown, but afew days after leaving
Lucknow, the march of the mission was arrested by the intrigues of
the turbulent nobles of the Court of Delhi, who, having long since
reduced their sovereign to a state of impotence, were very averse to

oreign interference, and especially dreaded the arrival of the British
HIS EARLY LIFE AND SERVICES. 23

Ambassador. In consequence of which they took measures to impede
Major Brown’s progress; but De Boigne pressed on, and made his
way to Delhi, where he arrived towards the end of the month.

The Emperor’s Wazir, or prime minister, Mirz4 Shafi, being absent
from the capital on an expedition against the Jats at Agra, De Boigne
found it impossible to obtain an audience with Shah’Alam, and
decided to proceed towards Agra, where Mirzdé Shafi was encamped.
But when the latter heard that the traveller had been in Major Brown’s
mission, his fears were aroused and he suspected De Boigne of sinister
designs. He therefore accorded him the coldest reception (for Mirz&
was at this time intriguing with Madhoji Sindhia), and refused to
comply with his application for assistance on his journey towards the
west.

Not far from the Wazir’s camp lay the army of Madhoji Sindhia,
who was engaged in an invasion of the territory of the Rana of Gohad,
and the siege of the fortress of Gwalior. Madhoji was one of the
most powerful chiefs of the great Mardth4 Confederation, and attached
to his Court, in the quality of British Resident, was Mr. James Ander-
son. As soon as this gentleman heard of De Boigne’s arrival in the
neighbourhood he asked him to visit his camp, and, hopeless of obtain-
ing any assistance from Mirz4 Shafi, De Boigne gladly accepted the
invitation, But now, in turn, Madhoji’s suspicions were aroused by the
advent of this stranger, who had been first in the entowrage of Major
Brown, next at Delhi, then in the camp of the Wazir, and was finally
coming to Mr. Anderson. It seemed impossible that such a sequence
of visits could be altogether innocent in their nature. The re-occupa-
tion of Delhi, which the Marathas had been forced to evacuate after the
battle of Panipat, was the object of Sindhia’s present ambition, whilst
the encroachment of the British power excited his keenest jealousy.
Under these circumstances Madhoji was particularly anxious to dis-
cover the real character of the suspicious wanderer, who was moving
from camp to camp in a way that suggested intrigue. To obtain
this information he had recourse to the usual Maratha expedient of
craft, and employed one of the gangs of robbers, with which the
country was infested, and whose dexterity in theft was beyond descrip-
tion, to steal De Boigne’s baggage during his march to Mr. Anderson’s
camp, hoping to discover in it letters or credentials that would explain
the recent movements or ultimate designs of their owner. His plot
was successful, and when De Boigne reached his destination he reported
that all his property had been plundered on the march.

Mr. Anderson’s resentment was aroused at this indignity offered to
his guest, and he demanded the restoration of the stolen baggage. A
24 DE BOIGNE.

few days afterwards it was all brought in, with the exception of the
letters of recommendation and credit. These were never given up,
although every pressure was brought to bear to secure their recovery.

The loss of his money and papers was a fatal blow to De Boigne’s
schemes of travel and exploration. Without means or credentials he
could not hope to pierce the unsettled and disturbed districts that lay
between Hindustan and Russia, and he had no other resources on
which to fall back. Without friends, without employment, a stranger
in a strange land, and penniless to boot, all that was left to him was
his sword, his talent, and his determination.

It was of course open to him to return to Calcutta, and Mr. Ander-
son would have considered it a duty to arrange for his journey thither.
But this was a poor and ignominious retreat out of his difficulties,
and one that could not commend itself to a man of De Boigne’s
character and ambition. The spirit of adventure was quick within
him, and he scorned surrender. He felt he was on the threshold of
an arena where great achievements were possible. Vivid in his
memory was the recollection of the French soldiers of fortune in
Southern India, whose successes afforded an example of the attain-
ment possible to men fitted for military command, if they once obtained
the confidence of the native princes. Instances of similar success were
around him: Sombre * and Médoc, Martine and Sangster, Pauly and
Baours were adventurers who had commanded, or were at the present
moment commanding, small disciplined corps in the service of
neighbouring rulers. Here he was, in the centre of Hindustan,
amidst contending interests and warlike peoples, eacl: eager to over-
come the other. To the north lay Delhi, with its Mughal population
nurtured in conquest for centuries past; to the west dwelt the Rajputs,
a warrior nation, the bravest and most chivalrous in all India; close
at hand were the Jats, staunch and sturdy soldiers, who had recently
won their independence ; whilst to the southward stretched the great
Maratha Dominion, with its Confederated princes, whose spears had
glistened at the gates of Lahore, until the Abdali, carrying the crescent
from the north, hurled them back to within their own boundaries from
the field of Panipat.

War was in the hearts of all these antagonistic races, whom rapine
ruled, and whose profession was plunder and pillage. Yet they were
utterly wanting in the science of war. They relied on the strength of
countless numbers, or, at best, on the advantage of surprise by swift
advance or safety by rapid retreat. They fought with the ponderous
club, whose very unwieldiness carried its blows astray, not with the

* For this, and all subsequent lesser adventurers mentioned, see Appendix.
HIS EARLY LIFE AND SERVICES. 25

trained rapier, which pierced the heart almost before its thrust was
seen. Their armies were vast multitudes, impossible to manceuvre,
subject to panic, ill-armed, and absolutely without discipline. The
brute power was there, but it was wasted by reason of the ignorance
that could not direct or control it. Its proper organisation opened
out to De Boigne a splendid field for his talents. In the strife and
scramble for the wreck of Taimux’s Empire, a soldier’s sword, supported
by European intelligence, was a sufficient capital.

De Boigne had already served three masters, and was no novice in
the art of swearing allegiance. His fortunes had never been at so low
an ebb as they were at this moment, when he found himself derelict
in the centre of Hindustan. He was, in truth, a castaway, whose
condition might have awakened commiseration in the coldest breast.
But herein lay his opportunity. From the lowliness of his beginning
must be measured the height of his attainment. He was to prove the
resultant of his own works, and before accompanying him on his career
to his ultimate success, it is well to note this point from which he
started. It was one hedged about with novel and singular difficulties
and dangers; but they could not veil from his eyes the possibilities
beyond. To a man of his splendid spirit and tireless perseverance
obstacles were but the stepping stones to an end. That voyager
succeeds in life whose eyes are fixed, not on the troubled waters that
intervene, but on the harbour he desires to reach. It was so with
De Boigne. He felt that, at last, his career was in his own hands,
and with squared shoulders and resolute mien he faced the future that
lay before him. Long ago, as a boy, he had dreamed of glory and
greatness; but now the reality of his life was dawning, and it was
destined to carry him far beyond “ the utmost further rim” of youth’s
imagination.
CHAPTER II.

DE BOIGNE ENTERS SINDHIA’S SERVICE. THE BATTLES OF LALSOT
AND CHAKSANA.

1784-1788.

HE value of European direction and discipline in native warfare

began to be acknowledged by the Princes of Upper India about
the middle of the eighteenth century. The Nawadbs of Bengal and
Oudh, the Rajahs of Rajputana, the Jat chiefs of Agra and Bhartpur,
and the Imperial Court of Delhi itself, all employed from time to time
the services of several French, and a few English, military adven-
turers, who found their way westward or northward from Calcutta or
the Carnatic, and sold their swords to the highest bidder. General
Claude Martine, of Lucknow, could have told De Boigne many stirring
and romantic histories, that can never be known now, of European
soldiers of fortune who drilled the troops and led to battle the armies
of alien races, inspiring them with confidence and courage, and teaching
them how to fight fields and win victories. Amongst these daring
men were persons of birth, education, and approved character, who,
from various causes, expatriated themselves, and entered the services
of the Native Courts. Some from dissatisfaction with their prospects,
others—-men of less respectability—from caprice or more unworthy
motives; a few were driven to this form of banishment by reason
of their necessities or pecuniary embarrassments, whilst many were
actuated by a spirit of pure adventure, without any aim except a
desire to win distinction in fresh fields, and rise to a pre-eminence
denied them in their own country.

Of this cosmopolitan company two or threc achieved high rank and
position at the Courts they served, either through their own abilities
or under favour of fortune. But the majority were men of inferior
moral calibre, who proved unable to resist the temptations around

them, and succuinbed to tlie notorious vices of the Hast. Having once
26
DE BOIGNE ENTERS SINDHIA’S SERVICE. 27

given way to debauchery and immorality, they soon fell into the lowest
state of degradation, despised by the very people they had purposed to
teach.

History has recorded the good and bad deeds of only a few of these
early European pioneers in Hindustan. From time to time their
names flit across its pages in desultory transit, to be too often dis-
missed with perfunctory comment or contemptuous unconcern. Liven
the current literature of their day ignores them, and one may search
page after page of contemporaneous history without gleaning more
than the baldest facts concerning men whose enterprises deserved a
fuller recognition, and who in this more civilized and calmer age would
have been acclaimed heroes of no common clay.

None of these early soldiers of fortune, who served in the armies of
Delhi, Lucknow, Agra, and Bengal, left any permanent mark upon the
history of their times. Some of them were locally successful, and won
battles for their several masters, but their victories were isolated in-
cidents leading to no substantial assertion of power. The doctrine of
the highest bidder governed their actions whenever they attained to
any temporary importance, and counteracted sustained effort in one
direction. It was left to De Boigne, not only to inaugurate more
perfect systems of discipline and superior methods of warfare, but to
show how loyalty to a single cause could raise it up to supremacy.
His genius and his constancy created a dominion such as those who
preceded him never dreamt of, and his career presents a contrast to,
rather than a comparison with, the careers of the Military Adventurers
who established themselves in Upper India previous to the period in
which he flourished.

When De Boigne joined Mr. Anderson’s camp, Madlhoji Sindhia was
engaged in the reduction of Gwalior. This stronghold had been in
the possession of the Marathis, but was captured from them by the
English during the late war, and made over to Chattra Sing, the Rana
of Gohad, «a Jat chieftain who had created an independent principality
for himself on the ruins of Mughal decadence. The Rina had been
assisted by a Frenchman named Médoc, from whom, by a species of
transaction peculiar to those days, he purchased a battalion of dis-
ciplined infantry. In 1784 the coniumand of this battalion was in the
hands of a Scotchman named Sangster. It consisted of one thousand
disciplined men, and a respectable train of artillery, and was partially
officered by Europeans, one of them being an Irishman named Thomas
Legge, the hero of a marvellously adventurous life. But this single
battalion was not strong enough to cope with Madhoji Sindhia’s
28 DE BOIGNE.

immense Maratha hordes investing Gwalior, the siege of which place
it had been unable to raise.

De Boigne, smarting under a sense of resentment at the robbery he
had sustained, determined to offer his sword to Sindhia’s enemy, the
Rana of Gohad. But instead of endeavouring to enter the service as
an officer under Sangster, he spurned such humble means to an end,
and boldly proposed to raise an independent and much larger force of
his own. A single battalion would not suit the ambition of this
vagrant adventurer, whose pride was not broken by his poverty. He
aspired to the immediate command of a brigade of five regiments. It
is impossible not to admire the cool audacity which from the depths
of recent disaster could deliberately ask for an advance of a lakh of
rupees (£12,500) to create an army. This was the actual proposition
De Boigne made to Chattra Sing, undertaking in return to recruit five
thousand men at Delhi, Jaipur, Gohad, and elsewhere, and withal
so secretly and expeditiously as not to arouse suspicion until he was
in a position to act in conjunction with Sangster, and relieve the
beleaguered fort of Gwalior.

The proposal was an imperial one. But De Boigne had unbounded
belief in himself, and did not hesitate to formulate it, even though it
should bring him into direct conflict with the might of the Maratha
Empire, which at this time was the dominant power in India. A
lakh of rupees was all he required. But, alas! for the littleness of
human nature and the economy of regal minds, it was over this
miserable bauble the scheme was wrecked. Chattra Sing was a
prudent and thrifty potentate. He mistrusted the enthusiastic but
unknown stranger, and declined to confide so large a sum to his care.
But this did not prevent the practical prince from turning the incident
to his advantage, by causing circumstantial details of it to be circu-
lated, so that they might reach Sindhia’s ears, and intimidate him.
The information was soon current in the Maratha camp, and not
unnaturally excited Madhoji’s enmity against De Boigne. But at the
same time it discovered the daring and enterprise of a man who could
conceive such an audacious scheme, and marked him as one of more
than average ability.

This repulse instead of discouraging De Boigne stirred him to fresh
endeavour, for his perseverance was as dogged as his ambition was
aspiring. There were other enemies of Sindhia to be appealed to,
and first and foremost Partab Sing, the Rajah of Jaipur, who was
jealously watching the movements of the Maratha armies, ready, in
his desire to restrain them within their own boundaries, to take the
field at any moment. To this prince De Boigne now addressed
DE BOIGNE ENTERS SINDHIA’S SERVICE. 29

himself, and his proposals were favourably reeeived. Negotiations
followed, and he was engaged at a salary Rs.2,000 a month to raise
and discipline a couple of battalions of regular infantry.

De Boigne at once wrote to Warren Hastings, acquainting him of
his good fortune. Whether he did so from mere exuberance of : satis-
faction, or from a sense of duty, it is difficult to say. Possibly he was
influenced by the circumstance of his having held a commission in
the Company’s army, or he may have considered that as he had
started from Bengal in pursuit of a fixed purpose, for the furtherance of
which he had received credentials from the Governor-General, it was
right, now that his original plan was abandoned, to communicate the
fact. Unfortunately his letter was official in form, and was read at
the meeting of the Bengal Council, whose factious members never
neglected an opportunity of opposing the Governor-General; and they
immediately expressed disapproval of a European, a protégé of Warren
Hastings, entering the service of native princes. This opinion was
quite in keeping with the petty prejudices of the period, when “ inter-
lopers’’ were regarded with only one degree less suspicion than
loafers create at the present day. It resulted in an order for De
Boigne to return to Calcutta immediately.

De Boigne received this just as he was entering on his new task,
and it is to his credit that he at once obeyed, and started for Bengal.
His prompt compliance so pleased Warren Hastings, that after expla-
nations had been tendered, he permitted De Boigne to accompany
him to Lucknow, whither he was going, and from thence to return
to Jaipur to resume his engagement. But meanwhile the treaty ot
Salbye had been ratified, and this changed Partab Sing’s policy, and
he dispensed with De Boigne’s services, salving the disappointment
with a solatium of Rs.10,000, with which the latter returned to Delhi,
where he found his friend, Major Brown.

Little did the Jaipur ruler suspect what a disastrous effect upon his
future fortunes was to follow this decision, or he would never have
permitted the departure from his service of a man who was to become
his scourge and dictator in the future. It is idle to speculate upon
the what-might-have-beens of history, yet it is indisputable that, but
for the failure of De Boigne’s negotiations with Chattra Sing and
Partab Sing, he would have been arrayed in the field of battle against
Madhoji Sindhia, instead of on his side, and this circumstance must,
in all human probability, have changed the course of Central and
Upper Indian history for the next twenty years.

During these transactions Madhoji Sindhia had been obser-
vant of the man whose papers he had stolen, and of whose
30 DE BOIGNE.

enterprise he received such constant proofs, and so high was the
opinion he conceived of his capacity that he came to the con-
clusion it would be better to secure his services for himself. In the
recent war with the Inglish Sindhia had learnt the value of dis-
ciplined infantry. Twice within a fortnight his army of 20,000
cavalry had been attacked and dispersed by Colonel Goddard at the
head of a force of 4,000 British troops, whilst Captain Popham, by his
brilliant capture of Gwalior, had proved how much could be achieved
by Sepoys well trained and heroically led. The Mardth4 armies of
this period mustered no infantry at all, and Sindhia determined to
raise a force of this arm. He therefore made advances to De
Boigne through Mr. Anderson, and invited the man, who had so
deliberately sought to beard him, to enter his service.

With such splendid prospects as were now opened out to him, De
Boigne could afford to forget all injuries and bury all animosities,
and he accepted the offer without any hesitation. And here a short
digression is necessary to explain the political situation in Upper
India at the time when De Boigne entered the service of Madhoji
Sindhia.

In this year, 1784, the Empire of the Mughal was tottering to its
fall. It had, indeed, virtually ceased to exist twenty-two years pre-
viously, when ’Alamgir IT. was murdered, for Shah ’Alam, who suc-
ceeded him, was never anything but a mere symbol of sovereignty,
now paraded by one minister in power, now by another, as his patent of
authority. Meanwhile the Mardtha power was fast recovering from
the shock its prestige had sustained at Panipat, and under the genius
of Madhoji Sindhia reasserting its influence at Delhi. Madhoji had
good cause to remember Panipat, for a wound received in that battle
left him a cripple for life. Since that memorable day he had been
associated with Takuji Holkar in consolidating the Maratha power
in the great province of Malwa, whose government they shared
equally, and preparing to recover the supremacy of Hindustan. Ten
years after Panipat the two chiefs placed Shah ’Alam on the throne
of Delhi, from which he had been driven by the Abdali. Eight years
later war broke out with the English, and they were obliged to
withdraw their forces southward to protect their own territories.
During this campaign, which lasted from 1779 to 1782, Madhoji’s
fortunes rose and fell, and rose again, until they were finally estab-
lished by the treaty of Salbye, which recognised his independence,
raised him to the head of the confederated Maratha princes, who
acknowledged the Peshwa of Poonah as their suzerain, and left him
a free hand to deal with the wreck of the Mughal Empire as he willed.
DE BOIGNE ENTERS SINDHIA’S SERVICE. 31

The road was now clear for the fulfilment of those ambitious
designs against Delhi, which had been interrupted by late events.
Since the withdrawal of the Maratha protection from Shah ’Alam,
the capital had become a prey to internal quarrels and jealousies,
which reduced it to a state of absolute anarchy. It was a period
when great political and territorial changes were on the tapis, and the
Emperor's dominions, torn by dissensions, seemed to court invasion.
Madhoji only waited a favourable opportunity to advance, whilst
behind him crouched the enormous power of the Maratha nation.
To be associated with such a prince at such a time was to woo fortune
by her most certain path.

De Boigne was so associated, and how well he used his oppor-
tunities these pages will attempt to show. The commission he
received from Madhoji was to raise two battalions of disciplined
infantry, with a suitable complement of artillery. He was to receive
eight rupees a month for each soldier in the force, and his own pay
was fixed at Rs.1,000 per mensem. The battalions were to consist
of 850 men each, and to be formed as nearly as possible upon the
lines of those in the Company’s service, with similar accoutrements,
arms, and discipline. In short, the corps was one calculated to
give fair scope to De Boigne’s powers of organisation and his military
ability.

In 1784 De Boigne began this task with characteristic energy.
Recruits soon flocked to his enlisting centres, for in such warlike
times, and amongst such warlike races, soldiers were an abundant
ready-money commodity. He fixed the pay of a Sepoy at five and a
half rupees per mensem, thus leaving a sufficient surplusage from
which to offer attractive inducements to European officers to join his
standard. Sangster was one of the first to do so, having recently left
the Rana of Gohad’s service on that chief submission to Sindhia.
The Scotchman was a man of considerable ingenuity, and skilful
in the art of casting cannon, and De Boigne appointed him super-
intendent of his arsenal, where he was soon busy turning out
excellent artillery and small arms. Another officer was John Hes-
sing, a Dutchman by nationality, and a gallant man by nature. He
commanded one of the battalions, and a Frenchman named Fremont
the other.

During the time he was engaged in raising his corps De Boigne’s
energy was inexhaustible, and in vivid contrast to the sensual indo-
lence which too frequently characterised the military adventurers of
the period. From morning to midnight he was continuously at work,
superintending every detail of the new force. He examined and
82 DE BOIGNE.

passed recruits, drilled the raw levies, organised the companies and
divisions, and selected and appointed the native officers. Amongst
others who offered their services about this time was a certain
Rohillé, named Amir Khan, whom De Boigne rejected because of
his youth. It was not often that he was at fault in selecting his
native subordinates, but in this instance he failed to detect the merits
of the applicant; for Amir Khan rose to an eminence which, in
comparison, was as great as that attained by the European who
declined his services. As soon as his muster roll was full De Boigne
turned his attention to succeeding details, choosing the uniforms,
deciding on the accoutrements and armament, and providing a
suitable equipment for field service. He never spared himself, but
grappled with the work he had undertaken strenuously and enthu-
siastically. The result was that in less than five months he had
brought into readiness for active service two excellent battalions of
regular infantry. Those only who have had experience of the interior
economy of a native state, which nowadays is but a reflection of the
chaos existing in India a hundred years ago, can form an idea of the
magnitude of the work accomplished by De Boigne within this short
space of time.

As soon as his new-fledged battalions were ready to take the field,
Madhoji Sindhia ordered them to join the army of Appa Khandi Rao,
one of his leading generals, who was engaged in the subjugation of
Bundelkhand. Appa’s force consisted solely of cavalry, that being
the only arm of service engaged in the predatory system of warfare
which the Mardthas affected. There was at first a prejudice, amount-
ing to a contempt, displayed towards De Boigne’s new battalions, but
this did not prevent him from making their value felt; and when the
siege of Kalinjar, a strong fortress a few miles south of Allahabad,
was undertaken, the whole brunt of the attack devolved upon his
infantry and artillery, who distinguished themselves so signally that
they evoked the highest tribute of praise from Appa Khandi Rao.

But the Bundelkhand campaign was brought to a premature close
by events at Delhi. Madhoji Sindhia had long been watching the
dissensions in progress at the Court of Shah ’Alam, which culminated
in the assassination of two successive Wazirs. Paralysed by the
difficulties around him, and after vainly seeking help from the
English, the luckless Emperor appealed in his extremity to the
Marathi prince to subdue his mutinous nobles and seat him in
security on the throne of his forefathers.

This was the opportunity Madhoji had so long desired. He at once
crossed the Chambal River, which formed the northern boundary of
DE BOIGNE ENTERS SINDHIA'S SERVICE. 33

the Marathi dominions, and joined the Emperor at Agra in October,
1784, and early in the following year escorted him back to Delhi,
from which he had been forced to fly. Some of the rebellious nobles
evacuated the city on his approach, and others submitted, and in
January, 1785, the unhappy monarch was once more elevated to the
regal state, if not the sovereign power, of Emperor of Hindustan.

The power remained in Sindhia’s hands, for he was the master of the
situation. In his gratitude Shah ’Alam desired to invest his deliverer
with the title and dignity of Amir-ul-Umrah, or Chief of the Nobles,
but this honour was declined. The titular distinction was not accom-
panied by corresponding practical advantages, and the empty leader-
ship of such a factious aristocracy was to be avoided rather than
accepted. The crafty Hindu prince—a great soldier, but a greater
statesman-—had other objects in view than the impossible post of
keeper of a Muhammadan emperor’s unruly kin. With a sycophantic
assumption of humility, which he always carried to excess throughout
life, Madhoji declined all honours for himself, but for his suzerain,
the Peshwa, who was nominally the vassal of Delhi, he requested the
dignity of Vakil-i-Mutluq, or supreme deputy of the Emperor, a post
which carried with it paramount authority. This was accorded by
Shah ’Alam, who thus signed away his regal power. As a natural
consequence Madhioji, the Peshwé’s local representative, assumed the
office, and with it the control, of the Imperial army, the sole
machine of government in Oriental politics. Soon afterwards the
chief command of it was conferred on him as a personal distinction.

Hindustan was now in Sindhia’s hands. His arms and his diplomacy
liad made him its master. The rich Mughal districts in the Dodb, a
fertile tract of country between the Ganges and Jumna, soon sur-
rendered with the fortresses of Aligarh and Agra. On the fall of
the latter, regarded as the key of Hindustan, the Deccan Hindu was
paramount lord of the Mughal Empire.

But Fortune had been too lavish with her favours. In his career of
conquest Madhoji Sindhia was aided by circumstances too fortuitous
to be permanently relied upon. The ancient aristocracy of Delhi,
awed into subinission at first by his masterly advance, and the weak-
ness of their own internal chaos, began to foregather and recover
spirit. Sindbia’s necessity, possibly his cupidity, could not resist the
temptation of sequestrating the estates of the leadivg nobles, and thus,
to the intolerable insult of a despised infidel being placed in command
over them, was added the positive injury of the loss of their property.
Misfortune made them kin, and they determined to sink for a time all
their private enmities, and concert measures to expel the invader. To

3
34 DE BOIGNE.

which end they entered into communications with the Rajahs of Jaipur
and Jodhpur, in Rajputana, to whom they proposed an alliance, and
these princes, mindful of the heavy exactions they continually suf-
fered as tributaries of the Mardthas, turned a favourable ear to their
overtures.

Directly Madhoji Sindhia heard of this combination he determined
to anticipate its action. The Rajputs had long been nominal vassals
of the Empire, and seizing on this as a pretext, he called upon them, in
his capacity of Vakil-i-Mutlugq, for payment of tribute. The demand
was only partially obeyed, and in order to enforce it, Madhoji prepared
to lead the Imperial army against the rebels.

But Sindhia’s power now showed the unstable basis on which it
was builded. His weakness lay, not in his will, but in his weapon.
The Imperial army was necessarily the instrument of his purpose, but
it was officered by those very nobles who had entered into intrigues
with the enemy, and its ranks filled with their own personal follow-
ing. It was obviously unsafe for Madhoji to place himself in the
power of such a force. In order, therefore, to strengthen his hands,
he recalled the army of Bundelkhand, and, on being joined by Appa
Khandi Réo and De Boigne, set out for Rajputana early in the year
1787.

Near the village of Lalsét, some miles to the south-east of Jaipur,
the allied forces of the Rajput princes were found drawn up for battle.
The untrustworthiness of the Imperial army soon discovered itself,
for two of the leading generals at once went over to Partab Sing,
taking with them all their troops. Their names were Muhammad
Beg Hamadini, and his nephew, Ismail Beg, who was destined to
become one of Madhoji’s most redoubtable foes for the next seven
years.

This early example of treachery created a spirit of mutiny amongst
the Mughal soldiery, whose sympathies were naturally with the de-
serters, and the aspect of affairs soon became threatening. In this
dilemma Madhoji was compelled to avail himself of that desperate
panacea for internal trouble—action. He determined to give battle
before there was time for any further desertions to take place, trusting
to fortune for victory, and knowing that halting indecision always
sides with the stronger party.

Accordingly he disposed his army for attack, and gave the order to
advance. On the left De Boigne’s battalions were stationed, and the
right was entrusted to the Maratha Cavalry, both supporting, or more
probably coercing, the Imperial army in the centre. The Rajput
princes at once accepted battle, and the action began. At the very
DE BOIGNE ENTERS SINDHIA’S SERVICE. 35

outset Muhammed Beg Hamadani was killed by a cannon-shot, which
so disheartened his troops that they began to retreat, and it seemed
as though the day was lost. But at this juncture Ismail Beg came to
the rescue. Rallying his uncle’s wavering soldiery he placed himself
at their head and charged the Mahratta Cavalry with such impetuous
gallantry that he drove them back in disorder.

Observing this, the Chief of Riah, one of the Raja of Jodhpur’s
generals, was encouraged to advance, and collecting his 10,000 Rathor
Cavalry, led them against Sindhia’s left wing, where only De Boigne,
with his little body of infantry, stood to oppose him.

The R&thors of Jodhpur were the very flower of Rajput bravery,
and celebrated throughout Hindustan for their splendid courage and
their handsome mien. They were a warrior clan whose past achieve-
ment had marked them out as the first and finest of all the fighting
races of the East, and won for them the proud distinction of being
without fear.

As they came within sight of De Boigne’s two battalions, drawn up
ready to receive them, they converged upon the little band, rending
the air with fierce and exulting shouts of anticipated victory. Their
flags flaunted in the breeze, the sunshine glistened on their plumed
helmets and chain armour, and their swords and spears flashed aloft
as they thundered over the sun-baked plain. Never yet in the history
of battle had footmen dared to oppose the might of Marwér mounted
for the fray, and when the Chief of Riah saw the compact formation,
steady as the stones around, awaiting his onslaught, he determined
to punish this insolence of courage.

It was a terrible baptism of battle for De Boigne’s young battalions.
Armies had melted and dispersed before these on charging warriors,
who seemed as if they had but to ride over to annihilate the little
square that held its place and awaited the shock with splendid courage.
In the midst of his men rode De Boigne, calm and fearless. He had
formed them into a hollow square (a formation Wellington and Quatre
Bas were to make famous in after years), with his guns hidden from
view in the centre. Not for a moment was his presence of mind dis-
turbed, and as he issued his orders and completed his dispositions, his
confident bearing gave his men that sense of security which Asiatics
have ever derived from the presence and co-operation of European
leaders.

Nearer and nearer came the advancing squadrons, until the supreme
moment arrived and only a few paces intervened. Then the word of
command rang out, and with the precision of the parade ground, De
Boigne’s front line fell back behind the guns, which, before the
36 DE BOIGNE.

amazed Rathors could realize what the movement signified, belched
out a murderous discharge of grape into their ranks.

The huge moving mass staggered at the shock, but, carried forward
by its own impetus, completed its charge. Reckless of everything
except the honour of the day, the sons of Marwar rode to the cannons’
muzzles, cutting down the gunners as they served their pieces, and
attempting to break into the centre of the stubborn square. For
a few seconds all was inextricable confusion; then, as the sinoke
cleared away, high above the roar of battle, the word of command
rang out again, aud from nearly two thousand muskets, at closest
quarters, a death-dealing volley was directed against the Rithor ranks.

Their horses refused to face the awful sheet of flame that flashed
out and strewed the field with corpses of men and beasts; and rider-
less steeds, stampeding back in terror through the main body, added
to its confusion. De Boigne’s military instinct seized the decisive
moment, and the advance was sounded. It was the turning-point of
the fight. The enemy were rallying for a second charge, infuriated at
the insult of a repulse from infantry. But before they could reform
De Boigne and his battalions were on them. Again the flames flashed
forth in the very faces of the horses, and like lightning from the
heavens above dealt death and dismay. The despised infantry could
not only resist, it could attack! A revelation burst upon these
warriors of the West, and before that small disciplined force the
chivalry of Réjputana wavered and broke, till finally, like driven
cattle, they streained out in flight, conquered by the genius, the reso-
lution, and intrepidity of a single man.

It needed but a general advance of the Imperial army to complete
the victory assured by the valour of De Boigne’s corps. The Mughal
centre was ordered to follow in pursuit, but intrigue and treachery
had been at work, and they refused to stir. And so the enemy made
good their retreat, and De Boigne found that the heroism of his men
had been expended in vain, and that the blood so freely shed on
Lalsét’s plain lad been sacrificed to the accomplishinent of an empty
victory.

Two days later Sindhia prepared to renew the battle, but even
as he was forming his line, the whole of the Inperial army, by a
volte face indigenous to Asiatic soil, passed over to the enemy, taking
with them eighty pieces of cannon. De Boigne’s indignation was
aroused beyond endurance as he saw the Mughal deserters marching
away with druns beating and flags flying. Galloping up to Sindhia
he asked permission to charge them with the Maratha Cavalry, but
Madhoji with a inore prudent appreciation of the danger their defec-
DE BOIGNE ENTERS SINDHIA’S SERVICE. 37

tion involved, preferred the doctrine of discretion and decided to leave
them alone.

There was nothing left but to retire, for the Maradth4 troops could
not hope to resist the overswollen ranks of the enemy. The danger
was critical, but it served to bring into operation all Madhoji’s finest
qualities of fortitude and resource. A line of retreat to Ulwar was
quickly decided upon and the march commenced, the defence of the
rear being entrusted to De Boigne. Ismail Beg at once prepared to
follow, but his Rajput allies, having satisfactorily asserted their exemp-
tion from tribute, and recovered their lost province of Ajmir (which
the Mardth4s were obliged to abandon), declined to take up another’s
quarrel and withdrew into their own territories. The Mughal noble,
collecting all the cavalry he could muster, followed in pursuit of the
retreating enemy with the intention of destroying them, but in this he
was foiled by De Boigne, who proved himself as skilful a general in
retreat as he had been in action, and with his two battalions success-
fully defended the rear of Sindhia’s army for eight days, meeting and
repulsing every attack nade by Ismail Beg, until Ulwar was reached
and refuge found within its walls.

The Mughal noble now relinquished the pursuit, and made his way
to Agra, and shortly afterwards Madhoji Sindhia, convinced that he
could no longer hold Hindustan, collected his vanquished forces, and
crossing the Chambal, fell back upon the fortress of Gwalior, whence
he wrote urgent letters to the Peshwa at Poonah to send reinforce-
ments to aid in retrieving this tremendous disaster to Marathd,
prestige.

Meanwhile Ismail Beg, in his design to recover Delhi, found
himself forestalled by a Rohillé chief named Ghulam Kadir, who had
seized the opportunity afforded by the distracted state of affairs in
Upper India, and the defenceless condition of the capital, to drive
out the Maratha garrison and take possession of it. The only in-
dividual who attempted to oppose him was the Begum Somru, who
had succeeded to the command of the regular troops her late husband
raised; but although she displayed great courage and spirit she was
obliged to retire. Ghulam Kadir next captured Aligarh, whereupon
Ismail Beg, finding the Afghan master of the situation, and not
feeling strong enough to oppose him, made overtures for an alliance,
offering to share with him all the conquests their joint forces might
effect; and these terms being accepted, a plan was formed for the
immediate recovery of the Mughal Doab provinces from the Marathas.

The capture of Aligarh was soon followed by that of the surrounding
districts. This accomplished, the two chiefs were able to concentrate
38 DE BOIGNE.

their forces on the siege of Agra, Sindhia’s sole remaining stronghold
in Hindustan, but here a stubborn resistance was opposed to them
by a Brahmin named Lakwa Dada, one of the bravest and best of the
Maratha generals, and a prominent figure in the history of the country
for the next fifteen years.

With the Imperial city wrested from him, the Doab Provinces lost,
Aligarh captured, and Agra closely invested, the fortunes of Madhoji
Sindhia were indeed dark. After his brief blaze of triumph, he had
in one short campaign lost nearly everything his arms had previously
won, and now found himself apparently further off than ever from the
attainment of hisambition. His army was beaten and dispirited, and
he had proved as weak in holding Hindustan as he had been bold in
seizing it. For some months he remained at Gwalior, anxiously
awaiting help from the Deccan; but it was a far ery from the
Chambal to Poonah. Not only many leagues, but many jealousies
intervened. Poonah politics were directed by a crafty Brahmin
named Nana Farnavis, who has been denominated the Machiavelli
of the Maratha Empire. He had long been hostile to Sindhia, whose
enormous and growing power aroused mistrust, and had no difficulty
in persuading the Peshwa that his vassal of Ujjain was aiming at the
establishment of an independent kingdom for himself. Beneath the
cloak of servility, under which Sindhia always disguised his intentions,
there existed designs of the most imperial nature. In his excess of
humility he called himself a Patél, or village mayor, and vowed that
to carry his master, the Peshwa’s, slippers was his hereditary duty ;
but under this artificial assumption of modesty there lurked far-
reaching aims and ambitions. Nana Farnavis was aware of this, and
in the hour of Sindhia’s need, deemed it the wisest policy to withhold
assistance. To the urgent appeals for reinforcements replies of
a temporising nature were sent, and it soon became apparent to
Sindhia that no help could be expected from Poonah at present, and
that he must depend upon his own exertions to re-establish his shaken
fortunes.

The relief of Agra was of the first importance, in order to secure
a base of operations for the reconquest of the lost territory. In
proximity to this fortress lay the country of the Jats, a low caste
Hindu tribe, originally from the banks of the Indus, who possessed
a tolerable army, which included a battalion of regular infantry,
commanded by a Frenchman named Lestineau. After his defeat at
Lalsot, Madhoji, with diplomatic generosity, had made a virtue of
necessity, and restored to the Jats a considerable tract of territory
and the fortress of Dig, which had originally been conquered from
DE BOIGNE ENTERS SINDHIA’S SERVICE. 39

them. This paved the way for an alliance which he now entered into
with their ruler, Ranjit Sing. Calling in all his scattered detach-
ments, Sindhia concentrated his army at Bhartpur, where a junction
was formed with his new allies, and in the spring of 1788 he prepared
to take the field again.

Whereupon Ismail Beg and Ghulim Kadir raised the sieye of
Agra, and marched to oppose him, and on the 24th of April the two
armies met at Chaksina, or Chaksu, about eight miles from Bhartpur.
Sindhia’s troops were commanded by Appa Khandi Rao and Rana
Khan. The latter was a favourite officer, who had saved Madhoji’s life
at Panipat more than a quarter of a century before, in gratitude for
which he had been raised to high military command. Although of
humble birth Rana Kkan proved himself worthy of the confidence
reposed in him, and was moreover a very capable general. Appa
Khandi Rao, as a reward for gallantry and enterprise, had recently
obtained the estates sequestrated from Ismdil Beg, but only to lose
them by his master’s present reverse of fortune. He had every
reason to desire the re-establishment of the Mardtha rule, and was
entrusted with the chief command in this battle. In the disposition
of his forecs he placed the Maratha troops in the centre, supported on
the right by De Boigne’s battalions, and on the left by the Jat army
and Lestineau’s regular infantry.

The action began with a heavy cannonade opened by Ismail Beg,
and chiefly directed against De Boigne’s corps, in the hopes of shaking
the solidity of the phalanx which had so successfully resisted all attacks
in the battle of Laélsét, and during the retreat to Ulwar. On the
other wing Ghulam Kadir, spurning such incidental aid, charged the
Jats, and soon put all to flight, except Lestineau’s infantry, who main-
tained their ground. Seeing the enemy’s left wing in retreat, and
anticipating that their example might be contagious, Ismail Beg now
suspended his artillery fire, and collecting his cavalry bore down upon
De Boigne.

But the same discipline and resolution which had saved the two
battalions when they stemmed the torrent of the Rathor charge
animated them now. Ismail Beg’s onslaught was met with firmness
and fortitude, and all his efforts failed to shake the square of trained
men, who, standing shoulder to shoulder, proved themselves im-
pervious to panic, and withheld their fire until their leader gave the
word of command. Then was repeated the lesson of Lalsdét: a hail
of bullets tore into the ranks of the enemy, and strewed the ground
with dead and wounded. Calm discipline again proved its superiority
over mad valour, and the science of war triumphed over the advantage
40 DE BOIGNE.

of numbers. Before De Boigne’s musketry fire the Mughal squadrons
fell back dazed and decimated, and it needed but the assistance of the
Maratha Cavalry to sccure the day. But again Fate snatched the
laurels from the adventurer’s grasp, for when the critical moment
arrived the Deccan warriors were not at hand to charge. De Boigne’s
and Lestineau’s infantry alone kept the field, until unsupported in the
unequal fight, they were obliged, after sustaining heavy losses, to fall
back and seek shelter within the walls of Bhartpur, whither their
cowardly allies had preceded them.

The defeat of Chaksina completes a chapter in De Boigne’s career,
for with it closes the record of his military misfortunes. The signal
personal distinction with which he emerged from the two disastrous
battles recorded served to establish his reputation in a more sensible
degree than if he had merely shared ina general victory. His gallantry
in action, his presence of mind in crisis, and his resource in retreat,
marked him as a great and gallant leader, and impressed his high
merits on the mind of Madhoji Sindhia, whilst the ordeal through
which his young battalions had triumphantly passed, completed the
confidence of his men in their commander, and in themselves.
CHAPTER III.
THE BATTLE OF AGRA, FORMATION OF THE FIRST BRIGADE.

1788-1790.

MMEDIATELY after their victory at Chaksina, dissensions broke
out between Ismail Beg and Ghulam Kadir. There was little in
common between them except their creed. The former represented
Mughal respectability, whilst the latter was an Afghan adventurer,
emasculated in his youth, and vindictive and truculent by nature, who
represented a purely foreign element in Hindustan. News of the
quarrel was conveyed to Sindhia, who learnt at the same time that
the Sikhs had made an incursion into Ghulam Kadir’s own territory
of Saharanpur. So he sent a force to assist them, and this obliged
the Rohill4 to proceed at once to the protection of his property, whilst
Ismail Beg returned to the siege of Agra, which still held out under
Lakw& Dada. Taking advantage of this division of the enemy’s
forces, Rana Khan and Appa Khandi Rao were encouraged to resume
the offensive, and marched to the relief of Agra, which place they
reached on the 18th of June, 1788.

It was the height of the hot season, just before the breaking of the
monsoon rains, when the heated air was like a furnace breath, and
the sun scorched with the fierceness of wu flame. The opposing
armies were drawn up on a large plain outside the city. Behind
Ismail Beg’s camp flowed the river Jumna, its waters swollen by the
melting of the Himalayan snows. To the far right the dazzling dome
and slender minarets of the Taj rose in exquisite symmetry over the
grave of Mumtéz-i-Mahal, a monument to the past glory of that
empire which could raise such a monument to one of its queens.
Behind the red stone battlements of the beleaguered fortress the
gallant Lakw4 Dada still held his own, and watched with anxious
eyes the result of the coming contest that was to decide the fate of
Hindustan, It was an historical day, on which, for the last time in

41
42 DE BOIGNE.

the annals of the house of Taimur, its army was to stand in battle
array, fighting for the faith against the great encroaching power from
the south, begotten of its own overgrown empire.

A long and desperate battle ensued. Around De Boigne’s battalions
the strife raged fiercest. But his men were veterans in warfare now,
trained in the hard school of defeat, and met and repulsed each
succeeding charge, till the Mughal Cavalry reeled backwards beaten.
Then De Boigne advanced, with serried ranks and compact forma-
tion, and before the sun had set Ismail Beg’s army was dispersed in
full flight, its guns abandoned, and its camp given over to flame and
pillage. When he saw the day was lost, the Mughal noble, who had
been twice wounded, mounted a swift horse, and spurred to the Jumna.
Plunging into its swollen waters, he swam to the other side, and so
made good his escape, whilst the remnants of his routed army flocked
in straggling bodies to Delhi.

The battle of Agra was the most important and decisive that had
taken place between the two parties engaged for many years. It
extinguished for ever the last flickering hope of independence that
remained to the Mughal, and completely established the ascendency
of the Marathas. It assured the easy reconquest of the Doab
Provinces, and made Madhoji Sindhia the undisputed master of
Hindustan. That the success of the day was due in the first degree
to De Boigne, every historian has admitted, and from this time forward
the force which his genius had created, became a recognised power in
the political history of the country, and the chief factor in framing its
course during the next fifteen years.

IsmAil Beg fled at once to Ghulam Kadir’s camp, where an apparent
reconciliation was effected between them. As soon as Shab ‘Alam
heard of the Maratha victory he wrote to Madhoji Sindhia, throwing
himself on his protection ; but this letter fell into the hands of
Ghulam Kadir, who immediately proceeded to the capital, where he
found the gates closed against him. Corruption and treachery soon
opened them, and seizing the person of the Emperor, the Rohilldé
chief deposed him from power, and placed a youth named Bédar
Shah on the throne. He then sacked the palace, not even sparing the
Zenina, or women’s apartments; but being disappointed by finding
less than was expected, he sent for Shah ’Alam and commanded him
to disclose the place where the concealed treasure was deposited. The
monarch pleaded in vain that he knew of none. Inflamed by a con-
tinued debauch, which had thrown him into a paroxysm of rage, the
brutal Rohill4 seized Shah "Alam, who was an old man of nearly
seventy years of age, and throwing him to the ground, gouged out
FORMATION OF THE FIRST BRIGADE. 43

his eyes with a dagger, heedless of the holy but impotent protest that
appealed against the sacrilege of destroying ‘‘ eyes which for a period
of sixty years have been assiduously employed in perusing the sacred
Koran.” For two months this bloodthirsty ruffian continued to hold
sway in the capital, during which it became the scene of the most
barbarous atrocities and foulest excesses consequent on his inhuman
efforts to extort money from the inmates of the palace.

During this time Madhoji Sindhia, with a supineness that has been
reprobated, halted at Gwalior awaiting the reinforcements from the
Deccan, which were at length being sent to him. It was not until
three months had elapsed that he ordered Rana Khan to march to
Delhi. On the approach of this chief, Ghulim Kadir at once eva-
cuated the capital, whilst Ismail Beg, who had quarrelled with him over
the spoils of the palace, and was further disgusted by his brutal
conduct, tendered his submission, and came over to the Maradthas, who
took possession of the fort and city without firing a shot. De Boigue’s
battalions were entrusted with the charge of the citadel, and the blind
emperor was released from confinement, and soon afterwards, on
Sindhia’s arrival, elevated for the third time to his unstable throne.
The office of Vakil-i-Mutluq was now confirmed on the Peshwa, and
the deputyship to Madhoji, whilst Ismail Beg was rewarded with the
territory of Haridva and Rewari, which he was sent to administer.

Ghulam Kadir fled to Meerut, whither he was pursued by Rana Khan
and Lestineau. The city being surrounded and all supplies cut off,
the chief’s followers became mutinous, and as a last resource, he
placed himself at the head of 500 faithful cavalry, and one night made
a sortie from the fort and cut his way through the investing lines. He
would doubtless have made good his escape, but for his horse falling
into a well, by which the chief was disabled, and his followers, un-
aware of the accident, left him behind. This led to his capture,
and he was shortly afterwards shockingly mutilated, his body being
dismembered, and his trunk, whilst he was yet alive, placed in a cage
for the purpose of being conveyed to Delhi. But death mercifully
released from his sufferings one who had never shown mercy to
others. His saddle-bags, stuffed with valuable jewels looted from the
emperor’s palace and harem, fell into the hands of Lestineau, who
conceived the opportunity of retirement from active service too
auspicious to be neglected,and on his return to the capital, drew
a large sum of money for the pay of his troops, and then decamped
to British territory, whilst his bilked battalion relieved its feelings by
breaking into mutiny.

The victorious termination of a long campaign that had opened so
44 DE BOIGNE.

disastrously, proved beyond doubt the value of De Boigne’s disciplined
infantry, which had done so much towards retrieving the earlier re-
verses of the war. Their commander now began to press his claims
for suitable recognition. In an army like Sindhia’s, a corps of 2,000
men counted as nothing, numerically speaking. They were lost in
the enormous multitudes of Maratha soldiery, and their leader preju-
diced by the insignificance of their numbers. Moreover, De Boigne
was subject to the control and authority of the native generals, and
although he saved them in defeat, and won their victories for them,
he still remained subordinate to men for whom he could not but feel
a professional contempt and a racial superiority. His amour propre
rebelled against a continuance of these conditions, and the false posi-
tion they placed him in. It was customary to measure the merits of
a military adventurer by his success, and to reward him in like ratio.
It has been observed that De Boigne was impatient of the slow pro-
motion of a progressive service ; but his present service was not even
progressive, for his command remained precisely the same now as
when he was first appointed to it, although in the interval his battalions
had been instrumental in saving Sindhia from annihilation, and had
mainly helped to restore to him a lost kingdom. One cannot wonder
that De Boigne began to expect a reward commensurate with the
results he had achieved, and proposed to Madhoji to augment the two
battalions into a full brigade of 10,000 men-at-arms. In urging this
he could point to the justification of past achievement, for Lalsdt,
Chaksfna, and Agra were credentials upon which almost any claim
might have been based by one whose share in them was as glorious as
De Boigne’s.

It is difficult to understand why Sindhia declined to accede to this
proposal. He was fully aware of the value of De Boigne and his two
battalions, and that the honours of the victory of Agra belonged to
them; for not even the jealousy that surrounded the European com-
mander could hide his merits or depreciate his success. Possibly it
was the circumstance of this jealousy that influenced Madhoji, who
could not afford to quarrel with his countryman at this crisis. An
acquiescence in De Boigne’s proposals would certainly have raised up
a host of dangerous malcontents. The time was not appropriate for
the introduction of euch radical measures, for it was imperative for
Sindhia to conciliate all hostile influences and consolidate his power.
Another substantial argument against the suggested increase of thie
force was its expense, for the chief was gravely embarrassed by pecu-
niary difficulties, and the disturbed and devastated condition of the
districts he had just reconquered made it impossible to collect any
FORMATION OF THE FIRST BRIGADE. 45

revenue from them. Lastly, it is not unlikely that there lingered in
his heart some deeply rooted Maratha prejudice in favour of cavalry ;
for although his experience and observation had taught him the value
of infantry, he was at this time a man convinced against his will. All
these causes operated against an immediate consent to De Boigne’s
suggestion, and Madhoji declared himself in favour of the existing
establishment and opposed to any augmentation.

Whereupon De Boigne, with the independence of character he had
often displayed before, tendered his resignation, and Sindhia, not
altogether displeased at the opportunity of gratifying his own couutry-
men, accepted it. But there was no personal ill-fecling displayed or
aroused. Madhoji was conscious that he owed much to De Boigne,
who on his part had innumerable pecuniary favours to remember.
And so the prince and his general parted with friendly compliments
and regrets, that augured an early rapprochement; and whilst the
former settled himself down to the consolidation of his power in Hin-
dustan, the latter determined to forsake the hazardous paths of war, and
devote himself to the cultivation of the quiet fields of commerce.

Leaving Delhi in 1789 De Boigne proceeded to Lucknow, where he
was welcomed by his old friend Claude Martine, by whose advice he
entered into trade as a cloth and indigo merchant, embarking in these
ventures the very considerable sum of money he had saved in
Sindhia’s service. He soon laid the foundation of a successful and
lucrative business, which he continued to conduct after he resumed
lis military career, utilising it as a means of transmitting to Europe
the large fortune le made in the Kast.

But he was not long permitted to pursue a peaceful life at Lucknow.
Madhoji Sindhia, having established himself at Delhi, and completed
the subjugation of the Dotb, turned his attention to army reform, and
early in the year 1790, began to introduce several innovations with the
view of making his forces better adapted for the requirements of the
service on which they were now employed. Amongst the first of
these was the enlistinent of Rajput and Muhammadan soldiers for
garrison work, his own countrymen being too independent by nature
and too lawless by habit to perform the duties of a standing army.
Before long Sindhia’s judgment convinced him that, however suitable
his hordes of cavalry inight be for predatory warfare, for the invasion
of countries and the sack of cities, those objects once attained an
infantry force was indispensable for the maintenance of a permanent
occupation, where fortresses lad to be garrisoned, and large centres of
population controlled. Vor such duties his wild Deccan horsemen,
with their impatience of restraint, and their irresistible craving for
46 DE BOIGNE.

plunder, were altogether unsuited, and to detach them for service of
this description was almost tantamount to billetting a pack of wolves
on a fold of sheep.

Moreover, there was another davger which began to make itself
apparent. Madhoji was illegitimate by birth, and this tended to
diminish his influence with his countrymen, and afforded a handle for
his enemies, of whom he had many, to intrigue against him. Mughals
Rohillas, Rajputs, and Jats, all resented his dominion at Delhi, and
were prepared to oppose him at every opportunity. But there were
more dangerous foes than these, for amongst his own countrymen
were many whose hostility was scarcely veiled, and chief amongst
them his great rival Takiji Holkar, who was consumed with jealousy
at Sindhia’s success. In order therefore to strengthen himself
Madhoji determined to create a special force, bound to him by the
strongest ties possible, and more completely under his control than
his unruly Marathas.

Early in 1790 he sent an agent to Lucknow, to invite De Boigne to
return to his service, and promising that the proposals originally made
should be accepted in every detail. De Boigne was discovered deeply
immersed in his new business; but he was a soldier before everything
else, and the call to arms fell upon willing ears. A few days sufliced
to regulate his affairs at the Oudh capital, after which he accompanied
the Vakil back to Madhoji’s camp at Mattra. In a single interview
an understanding was arrived at, for the prince was liberal, the soldier
not exacting, and both imbued with feelings of mutual confidence and
esteem that had not been disturbed by anything in the past.

The commission with which De Boigne was entrusted was the
creation of a Campoo or Brigade of ten battalions of infantry, with a
suitable train of cavalry and artillery, the whole to be disciplined in
the English style, and officered by Europeans. In the execution of
this task he was left a perfectly free hand.

Thus, after ten years of endeavour and perseverance, De Boigne
found himself with the means of accomplishing the object he had long
desired, and empowered to create a force worthy of his ambition.
The future was now his own to make: the materials required but the
moulding. With characteristic energy he set to work carrying into
execution the scheme whose details he had so long considered and
matured in hismind. His two battalions were still in Sindhia’s service,
and formed the nucleus of the new brigade. Lestineau’s regiment
had been disbanded as a punishment for its mutiny, but, at De Boigne’s
request, the men were permitted to re-enlist. Thus there were at his
disposal trained soldiers sufficient for three battalions. The remain-
FORMATION OF THE FIRST BRIGADE. 47

ing seven were raised in Rohilkhand, Oudh, and the Dodb with but
little difficulty. It was a time of war and battle, when the arts of
peace had fallen into desuetude. Every peasant was perforce a soldier,
and every artisan could wield a sword. The inducements of regular
pay and the anticipations of plunder were irresistible attractions to
men whose lives had been spent in defending their property or
fighting for existence against the exactions of tyrants and the incur-
sions of invaders.

The engagement of a staff of European officers presented greater
difficulties than the enlistment of the men. Sangster was still in the
service, and able to continue his work of casting cannon and manufac-
turing small arms, in both of which branches he was an expert.
During the next few years he supplied most of the best artillery in
Sindhia’s army, whilst his muskets, turned out at a cost of ten rupees
each, were far superior to anything then in the hands of the native
powers, and almost equal in finish and durabilty to weapons made in
Europe. His arsenal was established at Agra, which fortress Sindhia
assigned to De Boigne as a depot for his arms and munitions of war.

Frémont the Frenchman and Hessing the Hollander still remained
in their original posts, and the former was now promoted to second in
command of the Brigade. Of the other European officers engaged at
this time the names of at least six survive—Perron, Baours, Pedron,
and Rohan, all Frenchmen; and Sutherland and Roberts, who were
British subjects. They were posted to the command of the different
battalions which were named after forts and cities, such as the Ujjain,
Burhanpur, Delhi, and Agra regiments.

With the assistance of these officers, De Boigne rapidly organised
his Brigade. It consisted of ten battalions of infantry of 750 men
each. Of these, seven, known as Telingas, were uniformed and
accoutred in the same way as the Company’s Sepoy regiments and
armed with muskets and bayonets. The other three, designated
Najibs, were recruited from Pathdns, and at first armed with match-
locks, shields, and swords, but later on their efficiency was much
increased by the substitution of bayonets for the latter. These Najibs
wore Persian uniforms, and their matchlocks were of a new invention.
All the infantry were exercised in the drill and manual according to
the old English system of 1780, and although one ultra-patriotic his-
torian avers that the word of command was given in Irish, it is agreed
by the majority of commentators that English was the language in
use.

To increase the mobility of the Brigade 500 Mewitis, or irregular
soldiers, were incorporated, who performed the ordinary routine duties
48 DE BOIGNE.

of camp, thus leaving the regular troops available for combatant
work. The cavalry consisted of 500 regular horsemen, called
Trokesuwars, and the artillery of sixty pieces of cannon, three, six,
and twelve-pounders, with a proportion of howitzers, all excellentiy
appointed and drawn by capital cattle. When brought to its full
strength the entire brigade numbered very nearly 10,000 men-at-arms,
and formed a compact, well-organised fighting machine, immeasurably
superior to any hitherto existing in the native states of India.

De Boigne was promoted to the rank of General, and his pay, at
first fixed at Rs.4,000 per mensem, was subsequently raised to Rs.10,000,
and he enjoyed in addition many other services of emolument. In
his agreement with Madhoji Sindhia he made but two stipulations ;
one that he should never be called on to carry arms against the
English, the other that his troops should be regularly paid. Herein
he showed his wisdom. The history of all previous military adven-
turers employed by native princes pointed one moral, and that was
the failure that invariably attended unpunctuality in paying the men.
Eastern potentates were as poor in their pecuniary performances, as
they were prodigal in their preliminary promises, and Madhoji Sindhia
was no exception to the rule. He had a reluctance to, amounting to
a positive horror of, parting with hard cash from his treasury. De
Boigne was a prudent man, especially in money matters, and recog-
nised that silver was the sole power that could control a mercenary
army, and that without a fixed and certain revenue it was idle to
attempt the establishment of a serviceable force. He therefore insisted
upon a sound financial arrangement for the upkeep of his Brigade,
and Sindhia whose prejudices did not include indirect disbursements,
made over to De Boigne a Jaidad or military assignment of territory,
the revenues of which were to be devoted to the expenses of the corps.
This system of assigning land for the payment of troops was almost
universal in India, where districts were always apportioned to the
native chiefs and generals for the upkeep of their troops.

The Jaidad which De Boigne received comprised a large and rich
tract of country in the Dodb, and within its boundaries, he was para-
mount, exercising and enjoying sovereign rights and privileges. When
he first assumed the administration of this province its revenues
amounted to sixteen lakhs of rupees a year (£200,000) ; but by subse-
quent additions and good management the area was increased to fifty-
two pergannahs or districts, and the income to thirtylakhs. De Boigne’s
civil administration was as successful, and, in its way, as remarkable
as his military one. He introduced a system of order and regularity,
adopted a fixed and equitable scale of taxation, and created special
FORMATION OF THE FIRST BRIGADE. 49

departments for collecting and checking the same, by the simple but
efficacious expedient of two revenue offices, the accounts in one being
kept in French, and in the other in Persian. By a firm, but just
government he created confidence amongst the peasantry, and without
harassing or squeezing them, drew from the land larger and more
punctually paid revenues than had ever been obtained before. He
was allowed a commission of 2 per cent. on all collections, and so
xcellent was his administration that not only were his troops regu-
larly and liberally paid, but his own private fortune was materially
increased.

Early in the summer of 1790 the Brigade was brought to its full
strength and reported ready for service. This prompt accomplish-
ment of a really great undertaking was due to De Boigne’s indefatig-
able exertions. His enthusiasm and energy were marvellous, and he
neither stopped nor rested until he had completed his work. When
at length everything was ready, and he paraded his new-formed army
in review for the first time, prompted by a sentiment, that must touch
all patriotic hearts, he unfurled above it, in that wild and heathen
spot, so far removed from his native land, the flag of his own country
—the White Cross of Savoy.

When Madhoji Sindhia inspected his new Brigade for the first time,
he must have been struck with the contrast between it and his own
undisciplined Maratha army. The Deccan soldiery of the last century
were perhaps the most irregular rutfians in all India. Every indi-
vidual trooper asserted his independence and freedom from control ;
he was the proprietor of his horse and arms, and whilst agreeing to
give his services in return for a certain payment, he did not consider
it any part of the contract to imperil his property. Warfare, he
regarded, as a legitimate means of plundering, but as his steed and
spear represented his entire capital, and constituted his sole claim to
employment, he sedulously avoided all conflict (which somewhat
detracted from his merits as a combatant), and preferred flight to
fight on every occasion of danger.

The camps of these immense armies of discreet, and yet, at times,
dashing warriors, were vast halting p!aces, formed without any idea
of order or regularity, and covering extended tracts of ground. Every
trooper slept with his horse picketed beside him, and there were
generally three camp followers to each fighting man. A teeming
bazaar accompanied the armies in their line of march, wherein all
trades and professions of city life were represented, and which in-
cluded every accessory of Asiatic civilisation from bevies of dancing
girls to bands of professional thieves, who plied their licensed callings

4
50 DE BOIGNE.

under privilege of a trade tax. The multitudes which a Maratha
prince led to war consisted of a vast medley of conglomerate elements,
as far removed in appearance from a military expedition as it is
possible to conceive, and powerful only in their overwhelming
numbers, their wonderful cndurance, and the almost incredible
rapidity, with which they could move from place to place, either for
attack or in retreat.

De Boigne’s Brigade was the very antithesis of a Maratha army.
It was a small, solid, compact, slow-moving body, in which obedience
and discipline were the guiding principles. Every military operation
was carried out with precision and routine ; the men marched and
manceuvred in the methods that obtained in European armies, and in
camp afforded a spectacle of order and system that would have done
credit to a Company’s Sepoy regiment.

This result had not been accomplished without labour. De
Boigne’s life was far from one of Oriental ease and luxury. He rose
each morning with the sun, and until midnight devoted himself to
the multifarious duties of his position. Every day he inspected his
Kharkhdna, or arsenal, drilled his troops on parade, and issued the
orders of the day. To the enlistment of recruits he paid especial
attention. The equipment and armament of his force were designed
and provided by him, and he was his own quartermaster and
adjutant general. The medical department and ambulance service
had his care, and both were arranged for. He never delegated
administrative duties to subordinates, for he was a somewhat morbidly,
independently man, who insisted on doing everything himself, and
distrusted the deputation of authority. Active and laborious to an
astonishing degree, he seemed capable of performing the work of half
a dozen men, and his example infected those under him, with much
of his own energy and diligence. Before his zeal and determination
to succeed, difficulties faded away, and apparent impossibilities
became accomplished facts. The highly organised and disciplined
army, of which this first Brigade was the earnest, was a monument no
less to his military genius as a great soldier, than to his personal
industry as an able administrator.
CHAPTER IV.
THE BATTLES OF PATAN AND MERTA.

1790.

HERE was soon work for the new Brigade. Madhoji’s old and

redoubtable enemy, Ismail Beg, renounced his allegiance, and
having induced the Rajahs of Jaipur and Jodhpur to assist lim,
appeared in arms in the Ajmir district. Sindhia, with his accustomed
preference for intrigue, tried at first to corrupt the following of the
Mughal noble, but failing in the attempt, detached an army from his
camp at Mattra, under the command of Lakwa Dada and De Boigne,
to punish the rebel and crush the Rajput princes.

They came upon the enemy near Patan Tanwar, in the ShaikhawAti
country, on the 20th of June, 1790. It has been stated that a
secret understanding existed between Lakwa and Partéb Sing, by
which the latter agreed to stand aloof during the fight on the condi-
tion that his territory of Jaipur, adjoining the Mardthdé boundaries,
should not be devastated. To this cause is attributed the defeat of the
famous Raéthor Cavalry in a bloody and obstinate conflict, in which
Ismail Beg and his Pithan horse behaved with signal gallantry,
thrice charging through De Boigne’s line and cutting down his
artillery men at their guns. It was only the personal courage of the
general, and the staunchness of his troops, that secured victory. There
exists an authentic description of the battle, written by De Boigne
himself four days after it was fought, and which appeared in the Cal-
cutta Gazette of the 22nd of July, 1790. It reads as follows :—

“ Hatract of a Letter from Major De Boigne.
“Camp Paran, June 24, 1790.
“Our various little skirmishes since the severe cannonade of 8th
and 9th Ramzan,* are not, I hope, unknown to you. I have often

* Ramzan: the ninth Mohammedan lunar month. The mouth of the Fast,
51
52 DH BOIGNE.

tried to harass and surprise the enemy, but their naturally strong and
almost impregnable situation, added to their very great superiority in
numbers, both in troops and artillery, rendered all my exertions
fruitless. At last, tired out with vexation, I determined to march
from our ground in three columns, so as to form the line from the
centre of each with ease and celerity. In that way I advanced to a
little more than cannon-shot distance from the enemy, where I
formed my little army, consisting of two lines and a reserve, the
Maratha horse in the rear and on our flanks. After waiting the best
part of the day with impatient hopes to see them marching against
us, as they had threatened; at last, about three o’clock, a few
Maratha horses began to skirmish with the enemy’s right wing,
consisting of horse, which shortly increased from five to six thousand,
but they were soon beaten off. I was now encouraged to try if some-
thing better could not be done by our side, and in order to induce
them to come out from their stronghold, I ordered the line to advance
after a warm cannonade of about an hour from both sides. The enemy
not appearing to come out, I still advanced till we came within reach
of grape-shot; then, halting, we gave and received from each gun
nearly forty rounds of grape, which made it a warm business, we
being in the plain and they in the trenches. The evening was now
far advanced, and seeing at the same time such numerous bodies of
the enemy’s cavalry in motion, and ready to fall on us if they could
find an opening, I thought it prudent to move on rather quicker,
which we did till the firing of platoons began. But we had already
lost such numbers of people, principally clashies,* that those remaining
were unable to drag the guns any further. I, therefore, gave imme-
diate orders to storm the lines, sword in hand, which was as soon
executed. Upon which the enemy, not relishing at all the close
fighting, gave way on all sides, infantry as well as cavalry, leaving
us in possession of all their guns, baggage, bazaar, elephants, and
everything else. The day being now closed put an end to the
slaughter of the enemy, which must have been very considerable if
we had had an hour’s more daylight. However, it was a complete
victory. Their cavalry, after losing about 2,000 men and horses,
saved themselves by flight; the infantry, who could not run so fast,
took refuge in the town of Patun, strongly fortified. But in the
morning they thought proper to give themselves up, and surrendered
to me all their arms, colours, ete. Nine battalions and irregular troops,
making above 12,000 men, are now prisoners of war; I have promised

* Clashies : native artillerymen.
THE BATTLES OF PATAN AND MERTA. 53

to allow them a safeguard to conduct them to the other side of the
Jumna.

“Phe enemy’s force consisted of 12,000 Rhattore Cavalry, 6,000
from Jeypore, 5,000 Moguls under Ismail Beg, and 2,000 under
Allyhar Beg Khan; of foot they had 12,000 men, and 100 pieces of
artillery, and with Ismail Beg 5,000 Tellengas,* and matchlock men,
with twenty-one pieces of artillery, 4,000 Rohillas, 5,000 Fakirs,t
called Attyles and Brakys, and Rajpoot Sybundees,{ with eight
pieces of cannon, and 4,000 Minahs, § who were of great service to the
enemy, as the battle was given at the foot of the hills.

“‘ My Brigade was 10,000 strong. The Mahratta Cavalry stood on
our flanks as spectators; they began the skirmish, in which they had
only six men killed and forty wounded. Had it not been for two
battalions of mine, who changed frent when the enemy’s cavalry were
charging ours, the Mahrattas would have seen fine play.

“Our victory is astonishing! A complete victory gained by a
handful of men, over such « number in such a position! It may
surprise you when I say that in less than three hours’ time 12,000
round and 1,500 grape shot were fired by us, aud by the enemy much
more, as they had two guns to our one.

“During all the engagement I was on horseback encouraging my
men. Thank God I have realised all the sanguine expectations of
Sindhia. My officers, in general, have behaved well; to them I am
a great deal indebted for the fortunes of the day.

“We have had 129 men killed and 472 wounded. The enemy not
more, perhaps not so much, as they were entrenched; but they have
lost a vast number of cavalry.

“T have taken 107 pieces of artillery, 6,000 stand of arms, 252
colours, fifteen elephants (amongst them are Ismael DBeg’s five
elephants) 200 camels, 513 horses, and above 3,000 oxen. I intend
to send the whole to Sindlua as soon asit may be practicable. All
their camp was burnt or destroyed; they have absolutely saved
nothing but their lives.

“The terror of our arms alone put us in possession of the town of
Patun, in which the troops found u great deal of plunder, and near
2,000 horses. It would have required at any other time a month to
take it, its fortifications being very strong, and defended by three hills
close to each other. The place was never taken before.”

* Tellengas: regular soldiery.

+ Fakirs: religious fighting mendicants.

{ Sybundees: irregular infantry,

) Minahs: hill meu from the districts near Ajmir.
54 DE BOIGNE.

It is difficult which to admire moat in this letter,* the lucidity of
the narrative, or the modesty of the gallant soldier in his description
of an achievement in which he played the principal part. Another
account of the battle, also published in the Calcutta Gazette, enables
one or two interesting details to be added. It appears that the attack
on Ismail Beg and the Rajputs was commenced on the 28rd of May ;
but owing to their strong position and numerous artillery, no impres-
sion could be made on their lines, ‘‘it being full nine kos round the
mountains to come even at their foraging parties.” At last De Boigne
received information that the enemy’s council of war had fixed on the
20th of June as an auspicious day, and, taking them in the humour,
he sent word to Ismail Beg that he would meet him half way. For
this purpose the general marched out of camp an hour before day-
break, but the baitle was delayed until three o’clock in the afternoon,
owing to the reluctance of the enemy to join issue. The fight then
followed, as described by De Boigne, until “about six o’clock iu the
evening, our intrepid General, placing himself at the head of one of
the battalions, and giving orders to the rest to follow, rushed forward,
sword in hand, to the mouth of the enemy’s cannon. This vigorous
proceeding animating all our troops, had the desired effect, as we
almost instantaneously got possession of their first line. Their second
was forced about eight o’clock, and by nine the enemy were entirely
routed. The General’s courage and judgment on this occasion were
equally conspicuous. . .. In the course of three days we took the
strong town of Patun by storm, which was afterwards razed to the
ground, and so intimidated the Rajah, who commanded Patun Fort (a
place resembling Gibraltar from its almost impregnable position), that
he submitted to become a vassal of Sindhia, and is now (1st July) with
us on the march to Jaipur. Our signal victory was gained with only
the loss of 700 men killed and wounded; but the number of the enemy
who have fallen must be immense, for it is said that, beside those left
on the field, the road from here to Jaipur, about thirty-two kos, is
covered with tlie dead carcases of men, horses, camels, and bullocks.
Their camp, which was three miles in length and one in breadth, we
burned and left not uw stick standing. Our success affords a strong
proof of the amazing power of discipline under a brave and skilful
commander.”

Directly the result of the battle was placed beyond doubt, Ismail
Beg accepted the inevitable, and attended by a small retinue, galloped
from the field. When news of this great success reached Sindhia at

* It is probable the original was written in French and translated into
English for the Caleutta Gazette.
THE BATTLES OF PATAN AND MERTA. 55

Mattra, he determined to press home the advantage, and complete the
subjugation of the Rajput states, which had asserted, and main-
tained, their independence since the battle of Lalsét, and he now
ordered De Boigne to invade Jodhpur, aud reduce the Rajah to sub-
wission. On receiving these commands, De Boigne decided to first
attempt the capture of Ajmir, which, lying as it did, half way between
Jaipur and Jodhpur, was the key of the country. On the 15th of
August he reached it, and at once completed the investment, but, owing
to the impregnable nature of the fort, was unable to take it by a coup
de main. So he left 2,000 cavalry, and a sufficient force of infantry
to cover it, and marched with the rest of his army towards Jodhpur.

The following extract of a ietter from an officer in De Boigne’s
Brigade, published in 1790, refers to this incident :—

‘“ AGIMERE CAMP,
** September 1, 1790.

‘Although we have invested this fort for fifteen days very closely,
yet we can make no impression upon it; our guns, from the very great
elevation they are placed at, and the distance, make no visible im-
pression, and the narrow paths which lead to the fort are so defended
by nature, that a few large stones thrown down must carry everything
before them. The noise they make in rolling I can compare to nothing
but thunder. Indeed, I am afraid we must turn the blockade into a
siege, as they have six months’ water and a year’s provisions in the
fort. I fancy we shall divide our forces, leaving some here, and the
rest proceeding to Mairtha, where the enemy have taken the field.
Bijai Sing offered the fort of Agimere and country for fifty Kos*
round to General de Boigne, if he would desert Sindhia; but De
Boigne’s reply was that Sindhia had already given him Jodhpur and
Jaipur, and that the Rajah would not be so unreasonable as to
expect he would exchange them for Agimere.”

The latter paragraph is interesting as confirming the assertion often
made that De Boigne was on several occasions solicited to enter the
service of Sindhia’s enemies.

To turn for a moment tv the course of events in the Rajput states,
it must be noted that Bijai Sing, the Rajah of Jodhpur, had sustained
a terrible disgrace by the defeat of his Rathor Cavalry at Pitan. The
flight of those redoubtable warriors, even though it was due to the
treachery of their Jaipur allies, had given rise to a ribald rhyme,
which accused them of abandoning on the field of battle the five

* Kos: an elastic measure; probably a mile and a half in this instance.
56 DE BOIGNE.

attributes of manhood, namely, horse, shoes, turban, moustachios,
and the “Sword of Marwar.’’ This was tantamount to taunting
them with having degenerated into women. None but those who
can enter into the exaggerated sense of pride which is the ruling
passion of a high caste Rajput, and understand his precise views
concerning womankind, can appreciate the keenness of this taunt.
To wipe out the shame of Patan, Bijai Sing summoned to his
standard every Rathor between fourteen and sixty years of age capable
of wielding a sword. From hamlets and villages they came, from
towns and cities, eager to blot out with their blood this evil stain on
their national honour. In response to this call to arms, 30,000 warriors,
burning to repel the invader and efface the memory of the past, col-
lected at Merta, a large walled city, standing on high ground in the
centre of a vast grassy plain, thirty miles to the east of Ajmir. It
was an historical place, and had been the scene of many desperate
battles, in the annals of Marwayr, in which the crown of Jodhpur had
oftentimes been lost and won. The plain around was fat with blood,
poured out, sometimes in internecine strife, but more often in opposing
foreign invasion, and was covered with altars and memorials, erected
to the manes of the doughty dead who lay there. Here,in September,
1790, the Rathor army assembled to meet their Maréthaé enemies, who,
forty years before, had defeated them on the very spot, with a loss of
40,000 men.

Owing to the failure of the annual rains, all the ordinary sources of
water supply, never plentiful in the best of seasons, were exhausted,
and De Boigne was obliged to make a considerable detour to approach
Merta. On September 8th he reached a village called Riah, on the
banks of the Luni, and began the passage of the river. But soon his
cannon became embarrassed in its muddy bed, and this occasioned
considerable delay. Whereupon he sent the Maratha Cavalry forward
to reconnoitre, who, after proceeding a few miles, suddenly came upon
Bijai Sing’s army.

The Rathors were drawn up on the plain of Merta, their right flank
resting upon the village of Dangiwas. Dijai Sing was not present,
for he had remained at his capital, and entrusted the direction of the
war to his commander-in-chief, Gangaram Bhandari. But, unfortu-
nately, he had associated with this general one of his ministers, and
the introduction of a civil element into an essentially military matter
proved fatal. Directly Gangaram Bhandari saw the Mardthé Cavalry,
unsupported by those terrible battalions that had done all the fighting
at Patan, he desired to engage them. But the Rajah’s minister in-
sisted upon waiting until they were reinforced by Ismail Beg, who was
THE BATTLES OF PATAN AND MERTA. 57

hurrying to form a junction with them. Owing to this unhappy
divergence of opinion, the golden opportunity was lost. For it cannot
be doubted but that the Rathors dying to redeem their honour, would
have made short work of the Mardth4 Cavalry, whose cowardice was
notorious, and after defeating them, might have fallen upon De
Boigne’s Brigade during its passage of the Luni river, with every
prospect of destroying the force, or, at least, obliging it to retreat.

As it was, the Maratha Cavalry were permitted to retire unmolested,
and so to remain for the next thirty-six hours. It was not until mid-
night of the 10th that De Boigne completed the crossing of his guns.
The next morning he advanced slowly in the direction of Merta, his
march across the sandy plain being much impeded by the heaviness of
the ground. Towards midday he came in sight of the enemy, drawn up
in line of battle, and a heavy cannonade was at once opened upon him.
Lakwa Dada, the Maratha General, was anxious to engage forthwith,
but De Boigne, profiting by the experience of Pitan, where nightfall
robbed him of the full meed of victory, determined to defer the battle
till the next morning, in order that he might have a long day for the
work in hand. He accordingly decided to fall back, and the Rathors,
who still awaited Ismail Beg’s arrival, made no effort to force on an
action.

During the afternoon, De Boigne carefully reconnoitred the ground,
and after deciding on his plan of battle, gave orders for the Brigade
to be under arms before dawn, hoping to take the enemy by surprise.
Whilst it was yet dark the troops began to assemble, and in the silence
of the sweltering autumn night fell into their places and prepared for
action. As day broke, the sleeping hosts encamped in front of them
were awakened from their slumbers by showers of grape, followed by
the advance of the regular infantry, who rapidly stormed and occupied
their outer lines. All in confusion and haste, the Rathors formed
and opened a cannonade. But the advantage was already with the
attacking army, and the Jodbpur infantry was beginning to waver and
break, when a misadventure overtook De Boigne, which nearly proved
fatal in its results.

Captain Rehan, a French officer in command of the left wing of the
Brigade, took upon himself, without orders from the General, to ad-
vance, and the battalions on either side of him following his example,
the line was broken, and a weak point afforded for attack.

In order to show how the Rithors took advantage of this error, it is
necessary to revert for a moment to the events occurring in their
camp. When its occupants had been surprised in the early morning
by De Boigne’s attack, their principal chiefs were wrapped in the
58 DE BOIGNE.

lethargic slumber of opium—a narcotic universally consumed by the
governing classes of Rajputana. Slowly they were awakened from
their drowsy sleep, one of them—the Chief of Ahwa—being aroused
with the utmost difficulty. When they regained possession of their
senses, they found, to their shaine and humiliation, the camp in con-
fusion, and the infantry a disorganized rabble on the point of being
routed.

Then did these chiefs, twenty-two in number, decide on a great
atonement. Guirding on their swords, they called four thousand *
chosen followers to arms, and, as the clan was collecting, prepared
and drank opium together for the last time. It was not the final
carouse of weak debauchees, but a stern and solemn sacrament. Tor
they drank it as the draught of death. They wrapped themselves
around with shawls of yellow silk, the certain token that they rode to
victory or death, and so gave the order to mount.

It was at this moment that Captain Rohan advanced out of De
Boigne’s line. The Chief of Ahwa saw the opportunity presented for
attack, and in the act of imprudence recognised a propitious omen.
Standing up in his stirrups, he encouraged his clansmen with a few
spirited words, calling on them to follow him, and concluding with the
preguant exhortation : ‘‘ Remember Patan!”

Then he led the way, the squadrons following after, at full gallop.
The scene of conflict was soon reached, and charging straight against
De Boigne’s three detached battalions, he took them at disadvantage,
and drove them back in disorder. The moral effect of this temporary
triumph inspired the Rathors with hope and excitement. Their Chief
now turned his attack upon the main body of the Brigade, and when
he neared it his body of horse divided and trailed out, and, as if acting
ona preconcerted plan, wheeled round until De Boigne was completely
surrounded ; awhile they rent the air with the war cry they had ac-
cepted, and which was at once a confession and an inspiration.

Peradventure the God of Battle, as he looked down upon that heathen
lost, smiled grimly in anticipation of the rich sacrifice about to be
offered up before his altars. The parched plain gaped for the coming
red flood that would drench it so darkly, and force forth richer pasture
growths than any springing from the rain which fell from above. The
steel-blue sky interposed no clouds between that awful arena and the
high heavens. The rugged Avavallis, towering on the horizon, caught
the first rays of the morning sun, and hung out crimson banners on

_their mountain-tops. Oft had they looked down on Merta’s fields, and
seen human strife and human carnage ; oft from their grey steeps and
* Some authorities quote this number as only four hundred.
THE BATTLES OF PATAN AND MERTA. 59

stony fastnesses the roar of battle had re-echoed back in angry thunder
tones; oft had their shadows fallen, as a pall, on ghastly heaps of
mangled men. And now the cycle of war had come round again, and
the wind that blew from Merta’s plain was soon to be hot with the
breath of battle.

“ Remember Patan !’—Onward swept the squadrons of Marwar;
out rang the battle cry, as with uplifted swords and lances poised to
thrust, they hurled themselves upon De Boigne’s battalions.

But the genius of the great general had anticipated the danger, and
prepared to meet it. With “incomparable presence of mind” De
Boigne rapidly formed his men into a hollow square, and as the
Rathors dashed on to them they found a magic change had ranged
serried rows of bristling bayonets and long lines of gaping guns ready
to receive them at every point. Up to the very muzzles of the cannon,
they charged and recharged, those valiant sons of Marowar, ‘‘The Land
of Death.” Dwellers in the Land of Death were they, and death they
despised. Theirs to retrieve a lost honour! Theirs to give the lie to
that stinging jest of false Jaipur! Theirs to “‘ Remember Patan!”

Again and again they charged, each time with ebbing effort and
weaker effect. Again and again they flung themselves against that
hedge of bayonets with merciless madness. There is a limit to
human endurance, but to-day that limit was Death. To the bravest
man there comes a time when conscience confesses, “ Enough,” and
justifies it; but to-day the command of conscience was Death. Great
gaps yawned in the ranks, where grape and shot ploughed their
furrows, only to be at once closed up by the valour of a frantic
fanaticism, as the Rathors reformed under the destroying fire, and
rode back to the charge with the abandon of despair. But the
disciplined Brigade confronted them, unmoved as the rocks against
which the succeeding storm waves are shattered, and they reeled
back broken, but unbeaten. And so the ghastly sacrifice was con-
summated until only fifteen remained alive, and these, steadfast to
the end, returned for the last time to the shambles of self-immolation,
and found the death they sought.

The God of Battle smiled grimly down, and the incense of war rose
to his nostrils. A holocaust of self-doomed devotees lay prone before
his feet. The plain reeked with blood, but it flowed not from alien
veins, but from hearts that claimed Merta as their mother earth. The
echoes of the cannon, booming sullenly back from the grey Aravallis,
thundered out no salute of national victory, but sounded the minute
guns that proclaimed the end of Marwar’s chivalry. Thus was the
atonement of the Chief of Ahwa accomplished.
60 DE BOIGNE.

Before midday the Jodhpur army was in full flight, and an hour
later De Boigne’s battalions in possession of their camp. After
allowing his troops a short rest upon their arms, he ordered the storm
of the town of Merta, and before sunset the colours of the Brigade
were flying over that formidable place.

There is an account of the battle of Merta, written by an officer in
De Boigne’s army, and printed in a Calcutta paper, which must be
quoted here, for the description already given is mainly based on
Colonel James Tod’s record in his “ Annals of Rajas’than.” This
letter is dated from Camp Merta on the 18th of September, 1790, and
reads as follows :—

‘We had laid close siege to Agimere for seventeen days, when the
General, finding that the spirits of the army were upheld by the
enemy taking the field at Mirtah, left 2,000 horse to blockade
Agimere, and marched against the enemy. Owing to a scarcity of
water, following on a famine and dry season, we had to make a
circuitous route, and did not reach Rie till the 8th. About midnight,
we recommenced our march, and having marched very near to the
enemy, a heavy cannonade commenced about nine o’clock in the
morning. The Mahratta chief was eager to advance upon the enemy,
but De Boigne objected, not only on account of the fatigue of the
troops, after a march of ten kos, but because of the intense heat and
lateness of the hour, which would have prevented him reaping the
fruits of success. The enemy’s force consisted of 30,000 cavalry,
100,000 infantry, and 25 pieces of cannon. On our side the same
number of horse, 6,000 to 7,000 rank and file, and 80 pieces of
artillery. On the 10th at break of dawn we were ordered to advance
on the enemy, the disposition of our troops being the same as at the
memorable battle of Patan. A heavy cannonade soon commenced,
supported on both sides with great vigour. Our first line of 50 pieces
of cannon shortly after began to fire with grape, and, by means of our
superiority of guns, drove the enemy from their lines. But a French
officer of Sindhia’s, elated with success, advanced without orders of
the line of battle at the head of three battalions. The enemy soon
took advantage of his imprudence, and charged him so vigorously
that it was not without great difficulty he effected his retreat. They
then charged our main body in front, flanks, and rear, but General
De Boigne’s foresight and incomparable presence of mind were the
means of saving us, for upon perceiving the error which his officer
had committed, and no doubt aware of the consequences, he formed
us into a hollow square, so that upon being surrounded shortly after-
wards, we on all sides presented a front to the enemy.
THE BATTLES OF PATAN AND MERTA. 61

“ About nine o’clock they were obliged to quit the field; about ten
we got possession of their camp; and about three p.m. took the great
and formidable town of Mirtah by storm. The pillage lasted three
days, and to mention all the particulars attending it would make your
teeth water. The ladies at first seemed displeased with our coming
abruptly into the town, but at length grew more kind, acknowledging
with good grace that none but the brave deserve the fair.

“The town of Mirtah is much larger than Benares, surrounded
by a thick mud rampart and parapet thirty feet high. It has two
minarets, and the houses are all pucca.* In this engagement the
attacking army lost six to seven hundred men, killed and wounded,
mostly by the sabre. Gangaram Bhandaree, the Commander-in-
Chief of the Rhattores, was taken on the 11th at night, endeavouring
to make his escape in the disguise of a servant. It is impossible for
me to describe the feats of bravery performed by the Jerd Kopperah
Waliahs,+ or Forlorn Hope, of the enemy. I have seen, after the
line was broken, fifteen or twenty men return to charge u thousand
infantry, and advance to within ten or fifteen paces before all were
shot. Captain Bahore (? Baours), who commanded the right wing,
was wounded in the thigh, and died; Lieutenant Roberts was also
severely wounded by a missile, or weapon called an Organ,{ which is
composed of about thirty-six gun barrels so joined as to fire at once.
The Rhattores lost five chicfs, including a nephew of the Rajah, and
the Busxee § of the army. These five, finding they could not escape,
quitted their horses, and fought with eleven other followers on foot
till they were all cut to pieces. This great victory is solely to be
attributed to the coolness and intrepidity of our general in making so
complete a disposition of his forces in time to repel the rapid charge
of the most courageous cavalry in the world. Ismdéil Beg arrived the
day after the engagement at Nagora, about two kos distant.”

Merta was a decisive victory, and was won by the bravery of De
Boigne. ‘‘ But for his skill and presence of mind,” writes Colonel
James Tod, who describes the battle from the Jodhpur point of view,
“his Brigade would infallibly have been annihilated.” His trained
intelligence recognised the impending danger before it was apparent

* Pucca: substantial, built of stone or burnt brick, in contrast to the usual
buildings, which are kutcha, e.g., built of mud.

+ Jerd Kopperah Wallahs : men in yellow raiment, the garb of doom.

t Organ = query, a mitrailleuse ?

§ Buzee =the paymaster of the army, a most important personage in
Oriental armies.
62 DE BOIGNE.

to any one else, and his military genius made the dispositions that
met and overcame it. The battle was recognised at the time as a
remarkable one. ‘De Boigne’s battalions,” writes the Calcutta
Chronicle of the 14th of October, 1790, “‘ have certainly all the merit of
the victory of Mairtha. De Boigne has shown such ability and courage,
that the corps seem to act asif they thought themselves invulnerable.”
Another writer, with a juster appreciation of the man he was describ-
ing, thus refers to him in another journal, “ M. de Boigne’s history
will make an important figure in future times in the annals of India
that will immortalise his name, and add celebrity to the European
character.” Six months later, in March, 1791, the deeds of this
adventurer were recognised in a debate in the British House of
Commons.

Merta won for De Boigne’s Brigade the name of the Cherri Foug,
or Flying Army, for it showed that infantry could not only protect
fortified places and act in pitched battle, but were able to undertake
extended campaigns, and invade distant territories. It converted
Madhoji Sindhia to a complete belief in his regular troops, and led
to the creation of the huge standing army which, before a decade had
passed, became a menace to the British power in India.

The day after the battle Ismail Beg joined Bijai Sing, bringing
with him a hurriedly-collected force. He endeavoured to persuade
the Jodhpur prince to renew the contest, and an attempt was made
to reassemble the scattered soldiery, and form a new army. But in
December discreeter counsels prevailed, and Bijai Sing sent a Vakil
to Ko4pur, where De Boigne was encamped, to sue for peace. The
terms imposed were severe, and included, in addition to an indemnity
of three quarters of a million sterling, the cession of the province of
Ajmir, which was granted as Jaidad to Lakwé Dada, the Maratha
Commander-in-Chief.

As soonas the treaty was concluded, De Boigne marched his brigade
back to Mattra, which he reached on the 1st of January 1791. Here
he was welcomed with an unique salute of the entire park of artillery,
and a few de jote of all the small arms in the Maratha camp, whilst
in the jubilation of his heart Madhoji loaded his victorious general
with honours and rewards commensurate with his great services.
CHAPTER V.

THE SECOND AND THIRD BRIGADES. MADHOJI SINDHIA PROCEEDS TO
POONAH.

1791-1793.

HE immediate result of the victories of Patan and Merta was the

formation of a second brigade in 1791 and a third in 1793, the
enlistment and organisation of which occupied much of De Boigne’s
time and attention till the summer of the latter year. Establishing
his headquarters at Koil, he threw himself with heart-whole energ
into the new work Madhoji Sindhia had entrusted to him, determined
to fulfil the expectations of his master and deserve the unlimited con-
fidence reposed in him. Koil was situated close to Aligarh, the forti-
fications of which were considerably strengthened, and beneath its
ramparts arose an extensive cantonment capable of holding a large
body of troops, whilst under De Boigne’s fostering administration the
town itself became an emporium of commerce. The spot was well
chosen for the headquarters of an army, for its position in the centre
of De Boigne’s districts secured to him supplies of all descriptions
necessary for his troops, whilst the equi-distance from Delhi and
Agra enabled him to dominate both cities by the rapidity with which
he could concentrate a force at either point.

When increasing his army, circumstances induced De Boigne to
somewhat remodel the constitution of the brigades, each now con-
sisting of 6,000 Telingas, or regular infantry, 1,000 Najibs, or irregu-
lars, and 1,000 Rohillas, called ‘‘ Allygools,’’ who were men of proved
bravery, and recruited for the special work of leading storming parties.
Attached to each brigade were 800 regular cavairy, 3 battering guns, 10
howitzers, 2 mortars, and 36 field-pieces. There was also a small
body of Persian Horse, mounted and armed at De Boigne’s expense,
and regarded as his personal bodyguard. The regular cavalry were

well mounted ; some were armed with matchlocks and swords, others
63
64 DE BOIGNE.

with carbines, pistols, and swords, and all were well disciplined to
perform the European evolutions.

To military readers the composition of a complete battalion in De
Boigne’s army may be interesting. It was as follows :—

Infantry.
1 Captain (European)
1 Lieutenant (European)
Rs.
1 Adjutant, or Subahdar_... es ... paid 35. per mensem.
8 Jemadars ak » 20. 33
1 Havildar Major es ae ihe yy 8 sf
32 Havildars (sergeants) esis ts ca » 10.8 i
32 Naiks (corporals) ... Ai Si abe » 88 $s
2 Colour Bearers as bas te ae | D2 3
2Cymballs ... da Bs 25 od ge 2: >
10 Drummers ... » 12. 55
10 Fifers gee fle
416 Sepoys, Grenadier ‘Cominnice 6. 5 s divers » 5.8. a9
Artillery.
1 Sergeant Major (European) sa ... paid 60. per mensem.
5 Gunners (European) Bei a sia » 40. 5
1 Jemadar ss af ty aes » 80. 6
1 Havildar ... dic 08 3h se » 15. 5
5 Naiks ag hse jo 4s
5 Sarangs (bullock sergeant) on oa De ‘3
5 Tindals (park sergeants) . sae » 68 5
4 Blacksmiths teh oes As oi ms 6. i
4 Carpenters ... 28 oes stil a 30: a
35 Golundars (native seemexs paid 6.,7., and 8. 53
35 Clashies (native artillerymen) paid 4.8 and 5 Ss
20 Béldars (sappers) . ws -. paid 4 5
24 Garewans (bullock dvivers) 4 das » 4 PA
Native Staff.
1 Pandit (accountant) a es ... paid 60. per mensem.
2, Matsaddis (writers) wii ies det 0 by: 0220: es
11 Beesties (water carriers) ... ah eae gg AS +9
7 Armourers ... iv ses Be sie a5 ths 46
2, Hirkarrus (messengers) ... aia fad. 9 de 5. 33
4 Gurreealas (time-keepers) avs awe 44 5. 45
1 Surgeon (native) ... wale see sae, 452, | ALO: 5

a

1 Masalchi (torch-bearer) ... ae ee
THE SECOND AND THIRD BRIGADES. 65

Each battalion was provided with—

408 stand of arms.
4 field-pieces (fowr- and six-pounders).
1 howitz.
5 tumbrils.
120 bullocks.
18 camels.
2 bullock carts.
300 round of shot for each gun.
100 round of grape for each gun.
50 stone shells for each howitz.
50 rounds of grape for each howitz.

Each tumbyril was drawn by twelve bullocks, under charge of three
drivers; and each gun by eight bullocks, with two drivers.

The irregular infantry were similarly equipped, but while the
Telingas were clothed in scarlet uniforms, obtained from Calcutta,
with black leather accoutrements and cockscombs in their blue tur-
bans, the Najibs wore garments of blue quilted country-cloth.

The companies fired by platoons independently, but as the fire of
the matchlock battalions was much heavier than that of the musket
battalions, De Boigne gave an extra ‘‘caronade” or ‘ howitz” to
each of the latter. The Rohillas, recruited for fighting in hill country
and attacks on fortified villages, were paid lhs.5.8 per mensen.
There were also 400 Méwattis attaclied to each brigade, whose duties
were to forage, furnish guards, escorts, wood-cutters, &c, and two
hundred and forty recruits, who drew two annas a day each until
incorporated in the rank and file.

The details concerning the Cavalry are not quite so explicit. The
number attached to a brigade appears to have been 800, and their
uniform was a green one, with red turbans and kammarbands or belts.
De Boigne’s bodyguard, the pick of the mounted troops, was made up
of four Risdlas or troops, each consisting of—

Rs.
1 Risdldar ae ... paid 40. per mensem.
1 Naib Risaldar... ies) ay OU: a
4 Jemadars sis we. g7 JS: “5 each.
4 Daffadars ws like Beye ADs » ae
64 Troopers wea Sais Jag. Bs 4 ‘i
1 Kettledium ... sien iy 7 5
85 Gunners ie oe yy «8 i 6

4 Galloper guns

a
66 DE BOIGNE.

It included also u special body of 75 skirmishing horse, mounted
on the fleetest and hardiest animals, and recruited from the bravest
and most active men, who were not disciplined like the troopers of the
other squadrons, but employed as irregulars.

Two Risdlas of similar cavalry, composed of the bravest and best
mounted men, were attached to each brigade for skirmishing purposes.
The ordinary cavalry, who had to provide and feed their own horses,
were paid as follows—

Rs.
Risdldars Hs ... paid 80. per mensem, each.
Jemadars aes fais 1 40. 5
Daffadars ans » 380. 3
Kettledrums ... gui 9 24. 3
Troopers ide ee » «24. 5

The number of men in each brigade was about 9,000, so that when
his army was brought to its full strength De Boigne had under his
command, including garrison troops, about 30,000 men. The monthly
cost of a brigade was Rs.56,000 in Hindustan, increased by a special
batta or allowance of 50 per centum to Rs.84,000, when serving south
of the Chambal river.

The difficulty of obtaining competent officers was in a measure over-
come by the pay and allowances offered. But it is probable that these
were not so liberal at first as the scale ultimately sanctioned, which
bore favourable comparison with that obtaining in the Company’s
army at the same period, and was certainly good enough to tempt
Europeans of recognised ability and character to enter the service.
This could hardly have been the case in 1792, as the following pay-list
of De Boigne’s officers, supplied to the Government of India, will
show—

OFFICERS IN COLONEL Dr Boicne’s Bricapr 1n 1792.

PAY

Commander of First Brigade. PER MENSEM.
Rs.
Major Fremont (Frenchman) 8 ... 1,400

Commander of Sccond Brigade.
Major Perron (Frenchman)... i ... 1,200

Brigade Major of First Brigade.
Captain James Gardner (Scotchman)... .. 450

Brigade Major of Sccond Brigade.
Captain Drugeon (Savoyard) ... Zee we 400
THE SECOND AND THIRD BRIGADES 67

Officers in the Iirst Brigade.

Captain Lyenite (France) wa see «700

3 Felose (Italy) ... 78 ea .. 800

1 Allamunde (England) diss .- 200

5 Baleman (Pohlman ?), (Hanover) .... 200

5 Butterfield (England) sas «200

Le Marchant (I’rance) iit . 800

Ciiphaiie Lieutenant Robert Bell (inglanil) .. 250

Lieutenant Sutherland (Scotland)... .. 200

‘3 Jumcon (Holland) se w. = 150

55 Rennick (Ireland) ... se 00)

3 Abbott (England) ... wea .. 200

6 Lewis (Bourguien ?), (france) ... 200
Ensign Harvey (Ireland), (deserter from

Company’s Artillery at Cawnpore)... «120

A footnote mentions that promotion and pay entirely depended on
Colonel De Boigne’s favour.

In this list the loaves and fishes are few and far between, but a con-
siderable improvement was made in the pay and allowances of the
officers when the third brigade was raised, as the following amended
scale of salaries then introduced indicates—

RANK PAY PERK MENSEM LAY PER MENSEM

OF OFFICER. IN HINDUSTAN. IN THE DECCAN.
Rs. Rs.
Colonel 0 ee . 8,000... -.. 4,500
Lieutenant- Colonel xx 2,000) aus ... 8,000
Major oe és «. 1,200... ... 1,800
Captain aot -- = 4000 2. w. GOO
Captain- Tieneensiat vs BUD aus w. 450
Lieutenant . wee wae “200! aes ws. 3800
Ensign a sad a 160... we 225

Besides their pay, all colonels, leutenant-colonels, and majors
commanding brigades drew Its.100 a month from the Bazaar as
table allowance. It is also easy to understand that there were many
other sources of emolument open to the officers besides their pay,
especially when they rose to positions of command and responsibility,
and as time passed certain privileges accrued which increased their
position and respectability. Jor instance, no ordinary person pre-
sumed to set up a palanquin in the Marithd dominions, and in the
Mughal provinces the right of riding in a yellow elephant howdah was
confined exclusively to the aristocracy; yet De Boigne’s Europeans
68 DE BOIGNE.

were permitted to use both unquestioned. In travelling through the
country their baggage was carried from place to place free of charge,
and all goods imported for their personal use were exempted from the
payment of customs dues. As for the duties of these officers, except
in the case of a commander of a battalion, they were far from onerous.
But, on the other hand, the service was admittedly a precarious one,
depending solely upon success in the field. So long as fortune smiled
upon their arms, pay and position were assured; but in the event of
a defeat, it was tacitly understood that there was no compensation
for, or appeal against, loss of employment. The expense of living was
considerable, requiring the upkeep of a large establishment of servants,
camp equipage, and transport animals.

That fortunes could be, and were, made by the officers in De
Boigne’s Brigades is a matter of fact, for they had opportunities of
acquiring large sums of money apart from that which the ordinary
exercise of their profession brought them. The Pagoda tree still
flourished in the native states of India. De Boigne himself, in his old
age, was wont to remark of many of his old subalterns, ‘“ Such a one,
if he had not drunk, or such a one, if he had not gambled, could have
done as I have done. It was his own fault that he did not save
£100,000. It depended on himself to make a fortune equal to mine.”

When the Second Brigade was completed Major Perron was
appointed to its command, whilst Major Fr¢mont received that of the
first. On the formation of the third Major Sutherland obtained the
command. As showing the value attaching to commissions in the
service, it is interesting to note that an officer named Pedron, who
joined as a captain-lieutenant, soon after purchascd his majority. Ly
the time the three brigades were brought to their full strength there
were about three hundred Europeans of different nationalities—
English, French, German, Swiss, Italian, Hanoverian, Portuguese,
and half-castes—in the force, of whom 10 per cent. held commissions.
The rest were drill-sergeants and artillery-men, chiefly recruited from
runaway soldiers and sailors of the Company’s service, or half-castes.
Their pay was very small, ranging from 30 to 60 rupees a month.
They were generally dissolute and degraded in their mode of life,
forming connections with native women, and in times of peace
reflecting but little credit on their European birth. But during active
service they constantly exhibited extraordinary courage, and sustained
their reputation for brave fighting.

De Boigne’s pay was raised, first froin Is.4,000 to Rs.6,000 a month,
and subsequently to Rs.10,000. Moreover, this was nearly doubled
by various perquisites, including a commission of 2 per cent. on the
THE SECOND AND THIRD BRIGADES. 69

revenue collections of his Jaidad, which could not have brought him
in less than Rs.60,C00 a year. He enjoyed the income of # modern
British Viceroy.

Soon after its establishment De Boigne’s force received the title of
The Imperial Army, for although it was absolutely of Madhoji
Sindhia’s own creation, and subservient to his orders alone, he pre-
ferred, perhaps from a sense of exaggerated humility, or more prob-
ably from motives of policy, to invest it with a titular designation
which accorded the shadow of authority to the blind emperor, and left
the substance in his own hands.

Of course these radical changes and innovations, creating as they
did for Sindhia a formidable standing army of 30,000 men, were not
introduced without causing enmity and dissatisfaction in many
quarters. In the first instance, the assignment to De Boigne of a
vast and fertile district in the heart of the Dodb as Jaidad, made him
an object of universal jealousy. Soon, in addition to this, a large
Jaghar, or personal estate, was conferred on him by his grateful
master, to the intense chagrin of the Maratha chiefs, who realised,
with impotent anger, that the European interloper had obtained their
prince’s ear and favour, and, having discredited their own military
pretensions, was completely superseding them. The power and
authority De Boigne enjoyed were equal to those of a sovereign ruler,
and his orders carried the same force as if they had been issued by
an independent Mughal Emperor.

Thus in nine short years, by perseverance and determination, by
ability and industry, by the valour of his sword and the wisdom of his
conduct, De Boigne raised himself from the inconsequence of an
ensign in a regiment of Madras native infantry to the position of
Commander-in-chief of the army of Hindustan. Assisted by none,
dependent solely on his own exertions and talents, he attained this
pre-eminence through sheer force of character and merit. In the
great city, which had for centuries been the capital of the most potent
and gorgeous empire in India, this wandering Savoyard was para-
mount. It was an elevation that exceeded his wildest aspirations—
one which in his old age he could never look back upon without ex-
claiming, ‘‘It all appears as if it were a dream!”

After the formation of the Second Brigade De Boigne was for some
time employed in consolidating Sindhia’s power in the Shaikbawati
district, but the service was of a comparatively unimportant character,
and chiefly confined to extirpating robber bands and reducing petty
chiefs to submission. No detailed chronicle of this period appears to
exist, but the following extract from a letter printed in The World
70 DE BOIGNE.

newspaper, published at Calcutta, in September, 1792, is so far in-
teresting that it localises his actions about this time, and conveys in-
formation regarding the state of his health. The letter was written by
an officer in the First Brigade, under Major Fremont, who was engaged
in punishing the Rajah Devi Sing, a tributary chief of Jaipur, and
compelling him to pay the amount of tribute due from him. The
first portion will be found in the appendix in the sketch of Frémont’s
life: the concluding part reads as follows :—

“This country is called the Sheikawutty District, and if properly,
or even moderately, cultivated, would yield seven lakhs’ revenue,
whereas it is not estimated at more than three. It is still populous,
and the ruins of vast cities and towns dispersed through all our route,
convey a strong impression of former and vast opulence. But want
stares through every village, and while the little that the wretched
inhabitant of a hut possesses is subject to be wrested from him by
numerous bands of banditti on the one side, or by the oppressions of
his chief or his servants, or both, on the other, heaven has afflicted
this unfortunate land with a drought of two years’ continuance. The
country is very mountainous, but the valleys, notwithstanding the
niggardness of the elements, give still a display of verdure not to be
expected, and almost incredible.

“We left the First Brigade with De Boigne at Rohtak on the 22nd
of June (1792). De Boigne was then just recovering from a dreadful
dysentery, which has deprived us of some of our officers. Colonel
Martine’s brother died at Jedger (Jhojjar ?), and Lieutenant Stewart
at Rohtak, the day prior to our march, and we came at the rate of
eight and nine cos each day. Grain was nine seers a rupee, and
coarse flour six picc the seer yesterday. It is now more moderate.

“Tiqua Adda (Lakwa Dada) commands the division of Mahratta
Cavalry attached to this Brigade. He is a man of great respectability,
and a favourite of Scindia’s. The second in command is Jaggo Cappoo
(? Bappoo) Dada, a man of ability and trust.

“De Boigne with his First Brigade is now at Ulwar, in the Mewatte
country, about fifty cos from Delhi. The position of our camp is in a
more westerly direction, but only fifty cos from Delhi. The country
is in such a state that subjection seems almost chronic; for plunder
is the universal system, and become so habitual as to be spoken of
with as much indifference as we talk of a purchase in w mercantile
way. As soon as a party has plundered a district, the plundered
directly make an incursion on their neighbours, and so it continues
with as great regularity as trade, only that it operates in the contrary
course, ruining instead of supporting nature.
THE SECOND AND THIRD BRIGADES. 71

“The superior politics, as you call it, has been some time out of
my way, or rather I have been out of its way, ou this active tour.
Scindia continues at Poonah, and a letter of yesterday from De
Boigne (August 9th) mentions that he is not to be expected speedily.
At Oojeen Major Palmer (the English Resident) has taken up a partial
abode, He will make it such so long as the subtle Mahratta continues
with the Peishwa. The situation is particularly favourable for keeping
the communication of correspondence complete between your presi-
dency and our friends in this quarter. It keeps the circle perfect. It
is certain that there had been some secret stroke in meditation be-
tween the British and the lately hostile Sultan.* Almost Dutchlike
slowness and Oriental indecision delayed the stroke till, to use an old
adage, the iron cooled. The opportunity is passed, and to prevent its
return will be the true British policy. Various ideas are entertained
by the delay of Scindia. It has been asserted in our camp that he
aimed at measures tending to fix a claim to the Mogul tribute of two
and a half lakhs of rupees, agreed to be paid by the Company to the
Dewanni. But I can scarcely credit it, although I know that
Scindia’s power at Delhi is all, and that of the Mogul is nothing.
Beside, by the king’s determination in 1771 to reside at Delhi instead
of Allahabad, that claim was forfeited.

“The Sikhs hold the northern balance of India. Intrigue cannot
act on them from the unsettled nature of their living. But if Scindia
had youth to reduce them, as he has spirit and resolution, their weight
would soon again restore the throne to the worshippers of the Hindoo
Theogony.”

During the period that De Boigne was raising the Second and Third
Brigades, and establishing his master’s authority, the enormous growth
of Sindhia’s power was being watched with rancorous jealousy by
Takuji Holkar, his partner in the province of Malwa, and his great
compeer in the Maratha Confederation. Holkar had been associated
with Madhoji in the extension of the Maratha power over Hindustan.
Politically the two were equal, and the former clung to his prescriptive
share in the conquest with great tenacity. But Patan and Merta, and
the completion of De Boigne’s army, disturbed the balance of power,
and the shrewd and enterprising policy of Sindhia outran the slower
and more conservative course that Holkar steered, and carried him to
the front. Taktji realised this, and, in order to combat it, raised a
disciplined corps of his own. Its organisation was begun in 1791, and
the Chevalier Dudrenee, a gallant French gentleman, but a singularly
unfortunate soldier, was chosen for its command.

* Tipt Sultan of Mysore.
72 DE BOIGNE.

Had Holkar merely confined himself to the establishment of an
infantry brigade, modelled on the lines of De Boigne’s, Sindhia might
have regarded his endeavours with tolerable indifference. But simul-
taneously cabals and intrigues were set on foot at the Peshwa’s Court
at Poonah, and every craft brought to bear to undermine Madhoji’s
influence. So successful were the conspirators that Sindhia soon
found it necessary to proceed to the capital to protect his own inte-
rests, and counteract the schemes of his enemies. The step was a
serious one, but the necessity was great; for Sindhia’s ambition com-
prehended an assertion of power, not merely in Hindustan, but over
the whole of the Marith& dominions, and Holkar’s hostility neutra-
lised in the south all that De Boigne’s successes had wrought in the
north.

Hindustan was secure while De Boigne’s brigades held it in an iron
grasp, and of this Madhoji felt satisfied. So he appointed Gopal Rao
Bhao his Viceroy, and prepared to start for Poonah. But in order to
allay suspicion he announced that the object of his journey was to
invest the Peshw4 with the insignia of the office of Vakil-t-Mutluq,
or supreme deputy of the empire, which had been confirmed on him
three years previously by the Emperor. Moreover, with diplomatic
moderation, he confined his escort to a single battalion (the one chosen
to accompany him being that commanded by Michael Filoze), and a
bodyguard raised for the occasion by Colonel John Hessing, who had
quarrelled with De Boigne after the battle of Patan, and resigned his
command. In the spring of 1793 Madhoji Sindhia commenced his
journey, and marching by slow stages arrived at Poonah on the 11th
of June following.
CHAPTER VI.
THE BATTLE OF LAKHAIRI. DEATH OF MADHOJI SINDHIA.
1793-1794.

HE departure of Madhoji Sindhia from Hindustan was the signal
for Takuiji Holkar to commence operations in that quarter. He
had long considered himself unjustly used by the small share awarded
him of the territory conquered from the Mughal, and his indignation
was greatly increased when he learnt that one of the principal objects
of Sindhia’s visit to Poonah was to procure the recall of his rival from
the conquered provinces. This was not an unnatural step for Madhoji
to take. In the battles that had led to the annexation of Hindustan,
and the subjugation of the Rajput States of Jaipur and Jodhpur,
Holkar had studiously, and on one notable occasion, treacherously,
kept aloof; but, as not unfrequently occurs, when the fighting was
over, he desired to share the plunder. In Hindustan he had been less
insistent, or less successful, but he had made up for this in Rajputana,
where he had carefully avoided conflict until Patan and Merta had
been fought and won, when he sent his troops across the Chambal,
pretended that in the division of the spoils the tribute of Jaipur had
passed to him, and Jodhpur to Sindhia, and asserted his equal right
to occupy, with Madhoji’s forces, the newly-annexed territory of Ajmir.
This, of course, led to disagreements and difficulties; but, before draw-
ing his own sword, Holkar sought for some other instrument to use
against Sindhia, and in the restless and rebellious spirit of Ismail Beg
found the very weapon he desired.

He at once determined to make a cat’s-paw of the Mughal noble,
and push him forward to disturb the tranquillity of the new conquests,
trusting in any disturbance that ensued to find an opportunity to
further his own interests. A plausible chance soon presented itself.
Before the Maratha occupation of Delhi, one of the Emperor's most

trusted ministers had been a nobleman named Najaf Kuli Khan,
3
74 DE BOIGNE.

This person had recently died, leaving a widow, who still maintained
her independence in the fortress of Kanaund. Being a woman of
brave and masculine spirit, she refused to surrender her stronghold to
Sindhia, and as such rebellious conduct could not be overlooked, it
was deemed necessary to take forcible measures to reduce her to
submission, and De Boigne ordered Major Perron to proceed against
Kanaund with a small force and capture it. Najaf Kuli Khan during
his lifetime had formed so high an estimate of the power of De Boigne’s
battalions, that previous to his death, although exhorting his Begum
to hold out resolutely against the Mardthas, he advised her to surrender
at once if De Boigne’s troops were sent against her. With this warn-
ing fresh in her memory the widow was prepared to sue for peace,
but before she actually did so, Ismail Beg, who had remained inactive
after his defeat at Patan, instigated by Takuji Holkar, collected a
force, and, marching to Kanaund, persuaded the Begum to oppose
resistance.

A description of the battle which ensued between Ismail Beg and
Perron’s forces will be found in the sketch of the latter’s life, to which
it rightly belongs. Here it is sufficient to record that the fort of
Kanaund was captured and the Begum killed, whilst Ismail Beg, in
order to save himself from a shameful treachery premeditated against
him by the garrison, surrendered to Perron, under promise of his life
being spared. Directly Madhoji Sindhia heard that his old enemy
was at last in his power, he sent orders for his immediate execution,
but De Boigne chivalrously resisted the mandate, and saved the life of
the gallant but unfortunate noble, whose energy in the field and
heroic resistance to the invaders of his country was the one bright
spot in the miserable history of incapacity and defeat that brought
about the downfall of the Mughal Empire. Ismail Beg was sent as a
state prisoner to Agra, where he was treated with the respect due to
his rank and courage, and awarded a subsistence of Rs.600 a month.
But his spirit was broken by his misfortunes, and he never lifted lis
head again. He died in 1799, and with him passed away the last
worthy warrior that sought to sustain the dynasty of Taimur in
independence on the throne.

The failure of Ismail Beg’s final effort left Holkar with only himself
to depend upon for the accomplishment of his hostile designs against
Madhoji, and it was not until the latter had proceeded to the Deccan,
in 1793, that he dared to bring matters to a crisis. In July of that
year a rupture took place between his troops and those of Sindhia,
when the two factions were engaged in levying tribute in Rajputana.
A quarrel over the spoils of a certain district led to an appeal to arms,
DEATH OF MADHOJI SINDHIA. 15

and this was at once followed by active preparations for war between
the two great rival chiefs.

Gopal Rao Bhio, Madhoji’s Viceroy in Hindustan, having summoned
Lakwa Dada and De Boigne to join him, advanced against Holkar’s
army, which was in the vicinity of Ajmir. The latter endeavoured to
avoid a pitched battle, and some time was lost in marclies and counter-
marches, but he was at length brought to bay in the pass of Lakhairi
in September, 1793.

Gopal Rao’s army consisted of 20,000 horse, and De Boigne’s First
Brigade of 9,000 infantry, with 80 guns, whilst Holkar brought into
the field 30,000 cavalry, and his four newly-raised regular battalions
under the command of the Chevalier Dudrenec. De Boigne, on whom
the command devolved, found the enemy strongly posted in a defile in
the hills, where the nature of the ground was such that only a very
small force could be utilised in attack. The battle that ensued has
been described by the General as the most obstinate and bloody one
he was ever engaged in. He began the action by sending forward
three battalions of infantry and 500 Rohillas to storm the narrow,
wooded pass which led to the enemy’s position. But scarcely had
these advanced than a terrible disaster overtook his main body. A
chance shot struck an open tumbril of ammunition and exploded it,
and this was immediately followed by the explosion of twelve others
standing near. The catastrophe threw the Brigade into the greatest
alarm and confusion, but fortunately, owing to the wooded and hilly
nature of the country, Holkar’s Cavalry were unable to take full advan-
tage of it. With the wonderful presence of mind and resource in
moments of crisis that never failed him, De Boigne retrieved the
disaster. Returning to his main body he collected and reformed the
broken soldiery in time to meet the onslaught of the enemy’s cavalry,
who, as soon as they came under his fire began to waver. De Boigne
then ordered his regular horse forward, and leading them in person,
attacked the hesitating foe, and turned a doubtful day into a complete
victory.

The punishment of the battle fell on the Chevalier Dudrenec’s corps.
These were unable to keep up with the cavalry in their rapid flight,
and in self-defence faced round and attempted to stem the pursuit.
With the utmost determination and gallantry they contested the
ground until they were practically annihilated. Dudrenee alone
escaped unhurt, every European officer in his force being killed
or wounded, whilst thirty-eight of his guns were captured. The
shattered wreck of Holkar’s army made a precipitate flight across the
Chambal into Malwa, where their prince, in impotent rage, swooped
down upon Sindhia’s undefended capital of Ujjain and sacked it.
76 DE BOIGNE.

The battle of Lakhairi decided for seven years the doubtful contest
that had hitherto smouldered between the houses of Ujjain and Indore.
It made Sindhia the sole master of the Mardthé, acquisitions in Hin-
dustan, and humbled the pride if it did not actually break the heart of
Takuji Holkar, who never showed fight again, and died four years
later. The one redeeming feature of the defeat was the valour dis-
played by the Chevalier Dudrenec’s disciplined brigade. Short-lived
and ill-fated though it had been, it had still proved its worth, and
shortly afterwards Holkar was induced by this officer to raise another
corps on similar lines.

The quarrel between Sindhia and Holkar, and the absence of the
former from Hindustan, now prompted Partéb Sing of Jaipur to
throw off the yoke of a tributary and declare his independence. He
was a ruler not wanting in spirit, nor deficient in judgment, but on
this occasion his conduct was both impolitic and pusillanimous, for he
lacked the courage and the energy to carry into effect a determination
he had arrived at too hastily. No sooner was De Boigne informed
of Partib Sing’s refusal to pay his tribute, than, with his usual
vigour and promptitude, he marched from Lakhairi to Jaipur. The
Rajah fell back before him, and shut himsclf up in his capital, and at
the last moment, rather than sustain a sicge, tendered his sulnission
and paid the fine demanded of nearly a million sterling.

Matters being thus settled Partib Singh invited De Doigne to his
capital, and entertained him in a style of unparalleled magnificence.
From Jaipur the General marched his Brigade back to the Doab,
stopping on the way to visit the Rajah of Ulwar at Macheri. Here
he narrowly escaped assassination whilst attending the chief’s durbar.
During the ceremony one of the Rajah’s attendants, approaching his
master, asked, in a whisper, if he would authorise the assassination of
De Boigne, which could be accomplished when he was leaving the
palace. To his credit, be it recorded, the Prince of Ulwar recoiled in
horror from the foul suggestion, and in consequence no attempt was
made to carry it out. De Boigne’s Vakil overheard the proposal,
which was whispered in a vernacular the General did not understand,
and communicated it to him, but De Boigne not only made no com-
ment, but never alluded to the incident in any way afterwards.

De Boigne had now reached the zenith of his greatness, and when
he returned to Delhi at the head of his victorious army, he was the
autocrat of Hindustan. He had vanquished all Sindhia’s enemies,
and there was not one left that dared to so much as raise a hand.
The power of Holkar was broken, and the rebellious spirit of Rajputana
reduced, whilst Delhi was humbled to the position of a city occupied
DEATH OF MADHOJI SINDHIA. q7

by an enemy. Shah ‘Alam, the blind Emperor, was suffered to exist—
a mere symbol of authority—in order that the fiction of governing in
his name might be preserved. All the power lay in De Boigne’s hands,
for Gopal Rao had recently been suspected by Sindhia of participation
in the hostile intrigues of Nana Farnavis, and deposed from his office
of Viceroy of Hindustan, which was conferred upon De Boigne, with
whom the Bhao, in his misfortunes, had taken refuge, and by whom
he was protected, even as Ismail Beg had been, from the malice of a
wanton and cruel revenge.

With Sindhia De Boigne was paramount, for the Maratha Chief
although treacherous by nature and suspicious by disposition, trusted
his European General implicitly, and treated him as honourably as he
trusted him. Never did any European gain from a native prince such
confidence and esteem as De Boigne won from Madhoji, who frequently
remarked that though he owed his being and his heritage to his father,
it was De Boigne who taught him how to enjoy the one, and make
use of the other. Assuredly this was the case, for it was De Boigne’s
battalions ‘‘ before whose bayonets terror recoiled, and whose grape
scattered armies in flight” that raised up Sindhia to his supreme
position, and kept him there.

That De Doigne was worthy of the great responsibilities to which
he was called, history bears witness. Although surrounded by temp-
tations which appealed to his ambition, his vanity, and his cupidity,
he never abused his opportunities, but, on the contrary, made the noble
use of them, that stamps him as a good as wellasa great man. In
the exalted rank he had attained, the power for evil was as potent as
the power for good, and he chose to exert the latter. Foremost in
war, he was also foreimost in peace, and the welfare and social improve-
ment of those he ruled, were his sincere aim. In battle his fearless
courage and military genius inspired with confidence the ignorant and
barbarous peoples he trained to arms, but when the fight was finished
he tempered the brutality of the times by an exercise of humanity
that made its mark on the decade. The ferocity of war, and the
savage reprisals of victory were curbed by the enforcement of a rigid
discipline ; and slaughter, devastation, and rapine were sternly re-
pressed. He never suffered the disgrace of defeat, and he never
permitted the greater moral disgrace that too often attached to the
unlicensed excesses of conquest in the East. Loyal as he was to
Sindhia, he was equally loyal to his own sense of rectitude, and feared
not to champion the claims of humanity when the occasion arose.
Often did he stand between Madhoji and the hasty wrath that would
have been guilty of a mean or wicked action, shielding those whom
78 DE BOIGNE.

the despotism of an Oriental revenge threatened, until the fierce storm
of passion had passed and justice was allowed to resume its sway.
That De Boigne could so act, and did so act, and yet to the last
retained his master’s esteem and confidence, proved that his moral
victories were even greater than those which he won with his sword.

From June, 1793, to February, 1794, Madhoji remained at Poonah,
endeavouring to gain over the young Peshwd, and circumvent the
crafty machinations of his many enemies at Court. The signal defeat
of Holkar at Lakhairi made the task even more difficult than before,
for the universal jealousy it aroused increased Sindhia’s unpopularity
in the Deccan capital, whilst his schemes were too aibitious to find
immediate adherents. The time passed in intrigue and counter
intrigue, plot and counter plot, until at last his efforts began to be
rewarded, and the young Peshwa, chafing under the austere direction
of Nana Farnavis, evinced a decided inclination to throw off the yoke
and submit himself to the more attractive guidance of his great
vassal. Madhoji was rough, but he was genial, and he cloaked his
shrewdness under an apparently open and hearty nature. There was
a certain freedom in his manner which was attractive, and he
assiduously laboured to please. It almost seemed as if the same
good fortune that had crowned his arms in the north was going to
crown his diplomacy in the south, when, in this moment of success,
there came a sudden summons to him—a summons that kings and
subjects alike must obey, and which shatters all hopes and ambitions,
even as it terminates all fears and sufferings. Tarly in February
1794, the old Patél, whilst residing at Wanaoli, near Poonah, was
seized with a violent fever, and on the twelfth of the month, in the
sixty-fourth year of his age, Madhoji Sindhia, the greatest prince,
with the exception of Sivaji, that the Maratha nation ever produced,
breathed his last.

Gifted with great political sagacity, skilled in artifice, and a master
of intrigue, Madhoji’s schemes were ambitious, but practicable. Had
he lived there is little doubt but that he would have fulfilled a portion,
at least, of the task he set himself, and founded an independent
dynasty which might have claimed a place by the side of the greatest
in India. His military talents were of the first rank, and he was not
less a great statesman than a great soldier. It was the combination
of the highest qualities of each that enabled him to reccgnise the
merits of De Boigne and adapt them to his purpose. Boldly breaking
free from the trammels of long-established custom, he superseded an
untrained multitude with a comparatively small, but compact and
highly disciplined army, which formed a powerful weapon in his
DEATH OF MADHOJI SINDHIA. 79

hands. His enterprise met with its due reward, for it raised him up
to ® position which knew no compeer, and feared no rival. The
fighting machine he called into existence made him invincible.
Before his death, in addition to his vast possessions in Central India
and Malwa, across the Chambal Rajputana was his vassal, and
Hindustan his own. From the Deccan in the south to the Siwalike
in the north, from the valley of the Ganges in the east to the deserts
of Bikanir in the west, the sway of the old Patél was undisputed.
The kingdom he left behind him was the most powerful in all India,
and it owed its circumstance not less to the statesmanship of Madhoji
Sindhia than to the battalions of Benoit De Boigne.
CHAPTER VII.
ACCESSION OF DAULAT RAO SINDHIA. DE BOIGNE RESIGNS HIS COMMAND.
1794-5.

ADHOJI SINDHIA left no children, and was succeeded by his
grand nephew, Daulat Rao Sindhia, a youth of fifteen, who was
entirely under the influence of a crafty Brahmin named Baloba
Tantia, whom he appointed his minister. Tantia, in common with
most of the leading Maratha chieftains, was inimical to De Boigne,
and jealous of his enormous power. But it was impossible to attempt
any change in the complicated nilitary and political machine that
controlled Hindustan, and the General was confirmed in the command
of the army, the guardianship of the Emperor’s kingdom, and the
government of all the Maratha possessions north of the Chambal

On his accession Daulat Rao Sindhia decided to remain at Poonah
and continue his uncle’s policy, which had been directed towards the
attainment of a preponderating influence at the Court of the Peshwa.
His position was soon considerably strengthened by the arrival of
De Boigne’s First Brigade, under the command of Major Perron,
which had been ordered down to the Deccan by Madhoji shortly
before his death. This secured the young chief a force suflicient to
awe the Peshwa, and assure the ascenuancy of his own views. More-
over, about the same time Hessings’s and Filoze’s corps were con-
siderably augmented.

On the death of his old master De Boigne’s conduct was governed
by those principles of honour and rectitude which distinguished his
whole career. So great was his power that it is no exaggeration to
say he might have made Hindustan his own; but the temptation was
rejected, and the soldier of fortune who had so loyally served Madhoji
Sindhia wavered not for an instant in his allegiance to the boy prince
who succeeded him.

Often throughout his career had De Doigne been the recipient of

tempting overtures from neighbouring powers, who sought to detach
80
DE BOIGNE RESIGNS HIS COMMAND. 81

him from the Mardath4 interest, and secure his services for them-
selves, and many of these offers were now repeated. Shah ’Alam,
who in his impotent blindness and degrading confinement, still
hugged the delusion of majesty, proposed to confer on De Boigne
the high office of Wazir, if he would employ his Brigades in restoring
an independent Mughal Empire. Zeman Shah, the king of Cabul,
sent his ambassadors to the General, with offers so dazzling, that they
amounted to an equal share in his throne if De Boigne would set up
the dominion of the Abdali in India. But these and many other
overtures were all declined, and De Boigne remained true to the
young master of the house he had so long served, and whose fortunes
he had raised to such a commanding eminence in the community of
Indian nations.

It was a noble decision that recognised the path of duty so clearly
and followed it so unhaltingly. For it was the decision of a proud,
ambitious man in the flood tide of his successful career, on whose
actions no restraint was placed save that of conscience. De Boigne
was at this time but forty-three years old, and in the very prime of
life, and there was afforded to him a possibility of obtaining indepen-
dent sovereign power. But he rejected the temptation ; and in the
renunciation there was a finer credit than any which the grandeur of
an usurped crown could have conferred.

Upon the accession of Daulat Rao Sindhia De Boigne’s over-
whelming strength enabled him to keep the peace in Hindustan, and
overawe those projected rebellions against existing authority which
always follow the succession of Oriental rulers. Three small out-
breaks occurred at Datia, Narwar, and Sohdwalgarh, but were
speedily suppressed by Majors Frémont, Sutherland, and Gardner,
who were severally detached to reduce the refractory chiefs implicated.
With these exceptions no record exists of any extensive military
operations undertaken north of the Chambal, during the period that
intervened between Madhoji Sindhia’s death, and the General’s de-
parture for Europe.

But although his sword was allowed to rest in its sheath there were
many civil and political duties which claimed De Boigne’s attention
at this time, and two of them are especially interesting. One was
the condition of the Ti at Agra, the other the circumstances of the
Emperor Shah ’Alam. An interest in both matters was evinced by
Colonel John Murray, an officer of the Company holding a high
post under Government at Calcutta, who, on the 22nd of February,
1794, wrote to De Boigne, inquiring if any steps were being taken to
preserve the unique mausoleum raised to Mumtaz-i-Mahal at Agra,

6
82 DE BOIGNE.

and stating that “he had repeatedly heard that this monument of
Eastern magnificence and refinement was likely to fall soon into
irrevocable decay, unless means were taken without loss of time to
prevent it.”

De Boigne, in reply to this inquiry, wrote :—‘‘ I have been honoured

with your kind favour of the 22nd ultimo, which has given me much
pleasure in finding myself noted by you, and thought capable of
effecting the liberal views and honourable wishes you have in the
preservation of the Tage.” He then went on to state that he had
already once or twice spoken to Madhoji Sindhia on the subject of
preserving the mausoleum “but he did not appear to value more than
the richness of the material.” A small allowance had been sanctioned
for the expenses of keeping it in good repair, “ but the avarice and
parsimony of the Hindoo caste in general, and the Mahrattos in
particular, as also their abhorrence of all that is Mahomedan will for
ever impede the application of the allowance to its real purpose . .
I shall certainly use my best endeavours, and take advantage of the
little influence I have with the Prince, to have the allowance already
made, applied to the repairs of it, and if possible to have something
more added ‘to it, if the former is thought insufficient. . . . Was ever
Scindia endowed with those noble principles you possess, and which
guide your actions in this desire of yours, yet the Pundits, who have
the management of all business at Court, will never put aside the old
way of embezzling the half of what is to pass by their hands, which is
so familiar in every transaction, that it is not thought so much as to
take any notice ofit.. . If I am so happy as to meet with success
in my exertions to execute your commands, that honour shall be
yours, and positively to you alone shall be indebted for the pleasure
they shall enjoy in the admiration of that superb monument. If
otherwise, and that the decay of it cannot be much retarded, you shall
have the self-satisfaction of having wished and done your utmost for
its preservation, and I, at your request, to have followed your steps in
that noble career. Requesting the favour to be at all times honoured
with your commands, and with a place in your acquaintance, permit
me to be, with unfeigned regard, Sir, your most obedient and very
humble servant, Br. Dr Botenr.”

The “ Dream in Marble” still stands to witch all pilgrims to Agra
with its exquisite beauty. It’s costly splendour may be estimated
from the fact that upon this single edifice over three million pounds
sterling were expended, and this, too, in a country where labour was
the cheapest item in building work. It is formed of the finest white
marble inlaid with precious stones, and although bearing many marks
DE BOIGNE RESIGNS HIS COMMAND. 83

of Vandal Maratha hands, still the Td exists in all its original exquisite
symmetry of form. Tor their share in its preservation posterity owes
a debt of gratitude to Colonel John Murray and Benoit De Boigne.

Colonel Murray was evidently encouraged by the tone of De
Boigne’s letter to address him on another subject which he had at
heart. This was the ill-treatment the Emperor Shah ’Alam was
experiencing at the hands of his Maraéth4 appointed custodian
Nizam-ul-Din. This man was by profession a Dervish, and often
alluded to as the “ Cowric Father,” from the circumstance that alms
in the shape of Cowries, or shells (the lowest form of currency in
India), were often thrown to fakirs of his persuasion. Writing on
the 10th of October, 1794, Colonel Murray thanks De Boigne for the
attention paid to his letter regarding the preservation of the Taj, and
now begs to enlist his sympathies on behalf of the blind Emperor,
asking him “ to use his pious endeavours to mitigate the sufferings of
this fallen and ill-used family,” and enclosing the following extract
from a letter, written by a friend of De Boigne at Delhi, to a corre-
spondent in the Company’s service :—

“Scindia sets Shah Nizam-ool-Deen over the Badshaw as the
greatest scoundrel they could find. He does not give a farthing ot
money to the Badshaw, or any of his people, affecting to console the
poor old king that it is all the better for him, as no temptation can
remain for another Gholam Cadir to seize upon him for the sake of
plunder. Regularly every day he furnishes the old King with two
seers (4 lbs.) of pillaw and eight seers of meat for himself to get cooked
as he likes. ‘This, with two loaves of bread, about the length each of
a cubit, to suffice for breakfast, dinner, and supper, and he may get
masdla (spices and condiments) where he can. This, however,
though it is to serve for five persons, and the poor servants who can
pick at it a bit afterwards, is living in clover in comparison with the
rest of the Royal Household. They, poor creatures, without dis-
tinction, Princes and Princesses, nay Queens and all eunuchs and
female slaves, have exactly delivered out to them to bake into cakes
two seers a day of barley flour for every three of them, which they are
to bake for themselves, and are thus afforded two-thirds of a seer of
food a day. For liquors, from the King to the turnspit, they have
nothing but water. The King’s quincuncial party at dinner every day
is made out of himself and his doctor, his son and heir, and u little
favourite daughter, and the mighty boon of being one at this fine
extra fare is fairly allotted to his 200 Begums, one after another in
turn ; so that of the poor Queens each has a prospect, of what to them,
84 DE BOIGNE.

after their miserable fare, must be a high treat indeed, a dinner and
a halfayear! I asked if the old gentleman would not wish to regale
himself with beef now and then? Yes, he longs for it, but where is
he to get it? The servants often apply in great misery to the
unfeeling father (Nizam-ool-Deen) for a little wages, when, after
having been three or four months without a farthing, he will perhaps
only bestow on them three or four annas, on another perhaps as much
as eight annas, The old Nizam (of Hydrabad) sent the King six years
ago 6,000 gold mohurs. They every farthing got into the Cowrie
Father's hands, and remain there !’’

Such was the pitiful condition to which the Emperor of Hindustan
was reduced when Colonel John Murray, impelled by a feeling of
humanity, wrote to De Boigne. It was not until the month of March
in the following year that the latter replied to the letter, for it reached
him during a time when he was prostrated with illness, and incapa-
citated from work. But as soon as he had recovered, and insti-
tuted the necessary inquiries, he sent the following answer to Colonel
Murray, dated from Koil, the 12th of March, 1795 :—

“Dear Sirz,—I can’t but with propriety begin by making you
strong and warm apologies for my having been so long in acknow-
ledging your kind favour last received in its due time, and delivered
to me by Lieutenant Robert Murray. Be pleased to believe, my dear
sir, that the cause don’t come from any neglect or forgetfulness. Too
proud in the honour of your remembrance and correspondence, I
have had so bad a state of health for these six months, that with the
greatest difficulties have I been able to attend in part to the duties of
my station, which, indeed, are too great to leave me a moment's
quietness of mind or body. On that account, and confiding in your
kindness and liberality, I have some hope that you'll be pleased to
forgive me.

. “In regard to your observations of the King Shah Allum and
family’s situation, they are but too right. However, not quite so bad
as by the paper you have been pleased to send me, the author having
somewhat exaggerated or been misinformed. Could the old man
know the interest you take in his misfortunes, which are great indeed,
he could not but admire the goodness and sensibility of your heart,
which is above all praise; and myself, as if informed with your
liberal intentions, feel as you do for the unfortunate. I have been for
near these two years past endeavouring to alleviate the miseries of
that family, and have been perhaps rather troublesome to the late
DE BOIGNE RESIGNS HIS COMMAND. 85

Madhajee Scindia in that respect. I will not disguise that the prin-
cipal motives of my exertions were not so pure as yours, they being
rather intended to the reputation of the prince, my master, and
perhaps my own, knowing that the king’s miseries could not but
tarnish it in the eyes of the world. He always promised me that at
his return in Indostan he would certainly attend to my application in
ameliorating his situation, and had he lived no doubt something
would have been done. After his death I have continued my impor-
tunities to the young prince, which has occasioned, as you may have
heard, some advances to the Soubahdar of Delhy, Shawjee, that Fakir
having been obliged to pay lately 150,000 rupees, which the Mahratta
chiefs have taken from him without the king’s benefitting by it,
except about 25,000 in nuzzars and goods presented to him. At the
same time it has been settled that the former, or present allowance
of the king, should be increased by 5,000 rupees a month. A few
villages have been ceded in Jaghir to some of the Begums and Prin-
cesses, and I have put myself Mirza Akber Shah’s eldest son in
possession of a province called Kotte Kassim, producing about 30,000
rupees per annum, which he held also in Jaghir before the late
troubles in Indostan. All this, which is not much, has been done
now, and not, I assure you, without my encountering the greatest
difficulties, the present government and the Mahratta chiefs having
not the smallest intention or wish to ameliorate the situation of that
poor old man; and it may be said the little already done to have
been done entirely by deference to him than to the King—which
brings us to say, O! Tempora! O! Mores! The province in Shawjee’s
possession intended for the support of the royal family may produce
about seven lakhs per annum. Should that sum be employed to that
purpose, it would be quite, if not above, sufficient. But Shawjee, as
a Fakir, takes the greatest part of it for himself, and a great deal
must be given to the Mahratta chiefs, to be supported and continued
in his office. Who is not acquainted perfectly with the Mahratta
character—particularly the Pundits—can have no idea of their
avarice and insensibility and bad faith. It may be said they have
all the vices known, without any of the virtues, which gives reason to
suppose that the Empire is soon to fall. Being forced, against my
wish, to enter into all the details of government since the death of
Madhajee Shah, I have the opportunity to know them better than I
have been able to learn in ten years before.

“ Being so far advanced in your wishes and good intentions in regard
of that miserable family, I shall continue to employ my best exertions,
and the little influence I have in the Government, to do what may put
86 DE BOIGNE.

them out of physical want, and which 50,000 rupees a month will
entirely do. Where so fortunate, I shall with a heartfelt satisfaction
give you due intimation of it, persuaded that it will be an enjoyment
to you.

“Do me the honour of your remembrance and of your commands.
My punctuality in the execution of them will prove to you my being
with regard and esteem,

“Your most humble and very obedient servant,

“Br. De Boicne.”

In this letter it is important to note De Boigne’s opening statement
regarding his ill health, for the time was now approaching when
its continuance obliged him to resign his post, although other reasons
were advanced for his retirement. The letter is pervaded with a
spirit of modesty, almost approaching Lumility, which to English
ears sounds strangely, when coming from one who wielded such
immense power as tle writer. A great deal of this is, no doubt, to
be traced to what has been conventionally termed “ French polite-
ness,” and it certainly would not have been so noticeable if the letter
had been expressed in I'rench. Its whole tone conveys indisputable
evidence of the cordial feeling existing between De Boigne and the
East India Company, and the establishment of a friendly correspon-
dence between him and one of the leading Government officials at
Calcutta.

Itis not improbable that it was this established and friendly com-
munication which gave rise to an incident that occurred about this
time, and requires special mention ; for it illustrates the remarkable
consolidation of De Boigne’s power, and adds a crowning prestige to
his career. In 1795 a mutiny broke out amongst the officers of the
Company’s army in Bengal, due to circumstances into which it is not
necessary to enter here, and in this emergency either the Governor-
General Sir John Shore applied to De Boigne for assistance, or it was
offered spontaneously. Colonel Meadows Tayler, in his admirable
history, states that the Company was the applicant, but from Lord
Cornwallis’s correspondence it would appear that in the first instance
the offer came from De Boigne. It matters little which, for the fact
remains that a cavalry regiment, officered by Europeans, was placed
at the disposal of the Governor-General. No incident in De Boigue’s
life is so significant as this, and yet, with customary indifference to
all matters relating to independent iuilitary adventure in the East,
it is left unmentioned by many of the historians of India, and slurred
over by nearly all the rest. But it was assuredly no slight cireum-
DE BOIGNE RESIGNS HIS COMMAND. 87

stance that, in a serious crisis of its affairs, the Great Company
Buhadur accepted from this Soldier of Fortune assistance with
which to quell a mutiny in its own army, and found it accorded with
a promptitude which testified both to De Boigne’s power and his
friendly disposition towards the English.

Although Hindustan was peaceful, trouble soon broke out in the
Deccan, where a demand for Chout, or tribute, by the Mardthas led
to a war between them and Nizam Ali Khan, of Haidarabad. De
Boigne’s First Brigade, under Major Perron, was ordered by Sindhia
to co-operate with the Peshwa’s forces, and mainly through its instru-
mentality a great victory was gained by the Mardthas on the 11th of
March, 1795. A detailed account of the contest will be found recorded
in the life of Perron. Although the actual loss on the field was slight,
Kardla (or Parinda, as it is sometimes called) was one of the most
noteworthy battles of the period, not only from its results, but because
of the number of disciplined and European-led troops engaged in it.
These amounted to nearly 40,000 men, and included on the side of the
Marathis De Boigne’s First Brigade, the independent corps of John
Hessing and Michael Filoze, the former by this time increased to four
and the latter to six battalions, and the Chevalier Dudrenec’s brigade,
which was contributed by Holkar. On the side of the Nizam there
were eleven battalions of Colonel Raymond’s army, and the indepen-
dent corps of Majors Boyd and Finglass. With the exception of
Lakhairi, which bore very much the aspect of civil war, Kardla was
the only occasion on which the native powers of India employed
large bodies of trained infantry and European tactics in their contests
with one another, and the victory, gained chiefly by De Boigne’s
battalions, over an enemy similarly armed, drilled, and commanded,
and admirably handled, added very considerably to the reputation of
the famous Brigades of Hindustan.

But Kardla did more than this. It confirmed a disposition which
many of the Maratha chiefs had long evinced for entertaining discip-
lined bodies of regular infantry, and hereafter most of them are found
employing corps trained and commanded by Europeans. Holkar
increased his establishment by the addition of two brigades, under
Majors Plumet and William Garduer. Major W. H. Tone was ordered
to raise a force for the Peshwé#, into whose service Major Boyd also
entered. Lakwa Dida cugaged Captain Butterfield aud the younger
Sangster for a similar purpose, and Aibaji Inglia conunnissioned
James Shepherd and Joseph Bellasis, both excellent officers, and
worthy of a better master, to drill battalions for him. Appa Khandi
Rio was singularly fortunate in securing such a commander as
88 DE BOIGNE.

George Thomas, Ali Bahadur, of Bundelkhand, and Raghioji
Bhonsla, of Berar, each had their trained battalions, and Daulat Rao
Sindhia, in addition to the formidable army created by De Boigne,
entertained no less than four other independent corps under the
commands of Colonels John Hessing, and Michael Filoze, Captain
Brownrigg, and Colonel Saleur, who was at the head of the Begum
Somru’s contingent. Within five years a complete change took place
in the various armies of the Mardth4 Confederation, and the Western
system of military organisation superseded the old native method.
No chief of importance considered his army complete unless it con-
tained disciplined infantry and European officers.

In the face of this almost universal adoption of the European
system it is strange to find that the innovation proved of doubtful
advantage. Regular corps were delicate machines, requiring special
knowledge and expert handling to keep them in order. They were
apt to become dangerous to those who employed them when not
punctually paid and properly controlled. The radical changes their
introduction brought about in Maratha warfare were not suited to
the national character of the people. The Mardthas were essentially
cavaliers, fitted only for predatory campaigns. Rapid retreats formed
as important an element in the economy of their operations, as daring
incursions, and a horse was a sine quad non for any display of confi-
dence and courage, of which they possessed but a very moderate
share. The introduction of infantry and artillery involved pitched
battles, and afforded no scope for those marvellously quick, and hence
demoralising advances, and those equally swift strategic movements
to the rear, which distinguished the wild Deccan horseman of the
past. The result was that before long the Mardthas, as a nation,
began to lose that which they could least spare—their courage, and
also much of their former mobility, and confidence in distant enter-
prises. And there were those who prophecied that the very innova-
tions which had created Madhoji Sindhia’s power, would in the end
prove the ruin of his race. Colonel James Skinner describes an
incident which admirably illustrates this distrust of the new military
policy. When Daulat Rao Sindhia gave orders for the erection of a
permanent Cantonment at Ujjain, Gopal Rao, who had been restored
to favour after Madhoji’s death, and was now Commander-in-chief of
the Marathi army (a term used in these pages to distinguish the
national cavalry from the mercenary trained infantry), made a strik-
ing remark in open Durbar. “Our fathers,” he said, “the first
founders of the Maratha power, made their houses on the backs of
horses; gradually the house came to be made of cloth, and now you
Di BOIGNE RESIGNS HIS COMMAND. 89

are making it of mud. Take care that in a short time it does not
turn to mud, and is never built again.” Daulat Rao Sindhia laughed,
and replied, “‘ Who is there dare oppose me so long as I have my
infantry and guns?” ‘ Beware,” answered the old Maratha general,
‘it is those very infantry and guns which will be your ruin.”

A similar prediction came from a source even more illustrious. In
a speech in the House of Commons Sir Philip Frances quoted an
opinion on this point passed by Warren Hastings. “Sir,” said the
great Pro-Consul to him, “ the danger you allude to in the progress
the Mardthas are making in the art of casting cannon, in the use and
practice of artillery, and in the discipline of their armies is imaginary.
The Mardathas can never be formidable to us in the field on the prin-
ciples of an European army. They are pursuing a scheme in which
they can never succeed, and by doing so they detach themselves from
their own plan of warfare, on which alone, if they acted wisely, they
would place dependence.” A similar opinion was expressed by the
Duke of Wellington.

But history proves that the Mardthas, or at least the mercenaries
they employed, could be, and were, formed into excellent armies,
drilled and disciplined to a high state of efficiency. Nevertheless,
Warren Hastings’ condemnation of their unwisdom in deserting their
own military system found ample illustration in the Pindari Wars,
and in Laswari and Assaye. The genius of De Boigne, whilst it
transformed savage irregulars into staunch and disciplined soldiery,
created an enormous standing army, that raised the fear and jealousy
of the English, and proved a vulnerable body, capable of being
attacked and brought to bay. It was unable to elude flight as the
mounted Maratha hordes of the past had done, and as Jaswant Rao’s
Pindaris were yet again to do, and when it passed under the com-
mand of a leader who lacked the political prudence of De Boigne, it
became a menace, and by courting the very danger he warned it
against, met the doom the greybeards of the nation predicted.

Kardla was the last battle in which De Loigne’s Brigades were
engaged during the period of his command. Towards the end of
1795 his health began to fail aud his constitution to show signs of
yielding to the enormous strain imposed upon it. Rest and change
of climate were unperative. For eighteen unbroken years he had
laboured under an Indian sun. There existed for him no snow-
fanned Simla, no breezy Utakainand, where he might snatch annual
repricves from the furnace blasts of the plains. Imagine a modern
Indian Viceroy spending eightcen years in the plains! Conceive a
contemporary commander-in-chief completing eighteen annu tours
90 DE BOIGNE.

of inspection without a holiday to the Hills. Yet this was what De
Boigne had done. Little wonder that the time had arrived when he
felt he must relinquish the reins of power, or risk their dropping from
stiffened fingers, never to be picked up again. It has been asserted
that he resigned his post because some fancied storm was brewing,
and that his departure was the result of a prudent discretion. But
what storm could have shaken the foundations of the power that
absolutely ruled Hindustan? Perron—base, braggart Perron—
boasted in after years that by his intrigues he had compelled his
general to resign. But to this vainglorious assertion the lie is given
in a letter written to De Boigne by Daulat Rao Sindhia within a few
months of their parting. “ You are the pillar of my State, the right
arm of my victory,” runs a passage in it; ‘‘ your presence is required
in my councils and my Brigades. Come, with all speed. Without
fail. It is my order and my petition to you.”

All suggested reasons for De Boigne’s resignation may be dismissed
save the one that really occasioned it—his broken health. It was not
without a deep regret that he bowed to the inevitable necessity, and
asked to be relieved of his command. At first Daulat Rao Sindhia
refused his consent, or to allow his general to depart. But De Boigne
persisted, and sanction was unwillingly accorded on the understanding
that if his health was re-established by a change to Europe he would
return and resume his post. His parting admonition to the Prince
was to avoid all contest with the English, and disband his battalions
rather than excite their jealousy, or risk a war with them.

And thus it came to pass that in December, 1795, the curtain drew
up on the last scene of the romantic drama of Indian military
adventure which these pages have attempted to depict, and on the
plain of Agra, where seven years before he had fought that stubborn
battle which won an empire for Madhoji Sindhia, De Boigne paraded
his battalions in review for the last time.

It was no ordinary occasion that witnessed the solemn parting
between the chief and the army of his creation. The scenc is one ima-
gination can help to depict. The General, tall, gaunt, and martial, his
rugged features showing signs of failing health, is seated on his charger.
He watches with sadness in his piercing eyes his veterans passing
before him for the last time. The sword, that has so often led the way
to victory, now, and for the first time, trembles in his hand as he brings
it to the salute. Rank after rank, regiment after regiment, file past,
of dusky Asiatics who deem this nan their God, and cannot com-
prebend why he should leave them now. Before him they would
svot them Glves down, and pressing their foreleads to his feet, call
DE BOIGNE RESIGNS HIS COMMAND. 91

him “ Father,’ and appeal to him to stay, but for that stern dis-
cipline which he has taught them, and which bids them to face
neither to right nor to left, but march obediently on.

And he who watches them? What stirring memories the sight of
those serried ranks must have aroused ! What ghosts of dead soldiers,
perchance, stalked after them, summoned by that last revcillé from
their forgotten sepulchres in the wind-swept deserts of Rajputana,
the sultry plains of Central India, or the fertile valleys of the Green
Doab! And, ah! what spectre hosts of slaughtered foemen—gallant
Mughals and chivalrous Rajputs, fierce Rohillas and stubborn Jats—
could have crept into the presence of that great white chief, had he
possessed the power to call the dead from their graves. In the
accomplishment of his high career there was much to rejoice over,
much to be proud of ; but the course of conquest is marked by many
monuments, and there are those which are crowded with the records
of the dead, as well as those which commemorate the achievements
of the living.
CHAPTER VIII.
DE BOIGNE RETURNS 10 EUROPE.—HIS MARRIAGE, OLD AGE, AND DEATH.
1796-1830.

N Christmas Day, 1795, De Boigne left Koil under escort of his
bodyguard, and set out for the Company’s territory. ‘“ He was
attended,’ writes a correspondent of one of the journals of the day,
“by 610 cavalry, 4 elephants, 150 camels, and many bullock-
waggons laden with his effects. His cavalry cut a good appearance,
being dressed in a uniform of green jackets with red turbans, the
folds of which were intermixed with silver wire. They seemed to be
very well disciplined, and each horseman was armed with a pair of
pistols, a gun, and a sword.”

Making his way to Lucknow, De Boigne halted some time at that
place arranging his affairs, which he left in charge of General Claude
Martine. From thence he proceeded to Calcutta, where he was
honourably received by the Governor-General. The horses and
equipment of his bodyguard were purchased by the British Govern-
ment, and the troopers enlisted in the Company’s service, in which
they remained for two years, until Lord Wellesley, in an hour of
retrencliment, transferred the corps to the Nawab Wazir of Oudh.

It was not until September, 1796, that De Boigne finally quitted
India. He sailed in the ship Cromberg, and reached Iingland early
in the year 1797, carrying with him a fortune of £400,000, the result
of nineteen years of adventure in the Kast.

On his arrival he took up his residence near London, for the war
on the Continent offered little prospect of repose in his native Savoy.
His health, much improved by the long voyage, was soon completely
re-established, and it seemed probable that he would return to
India, for he had actually commenced preparations for so doing,

when a pretty face and a musical voice—‘‘ A voice which must be
92
HIS MARRIAGE, OLD AGE, AND DEATH. 93

mine,” as he remarked even before he saw the face—changed his
destiny.

It happened one day that he was at a concert where a young
girl—Mdlle. Eleonora Adéle D’Osmond, daughter of the Marquis
D’Osmond, afterwards French Ambassador to England—was one of
the performers. Her beanty and her sweet singing conquered the
heart of the war-worn old soldier; and, although she was only seven-
teen years old, he proposed for her hand and was accepted. They
were married on the 11th of June, 1798. There was a fitting touch of
romance in the union not out of keeping with De Boigne’s past; but
unfortunately the marriage did not turn out happily. They lived
together in London and Paris for some years, but the disparity in age
was too great, and in 1804 they separated, no children having been
born. De Boigne provided handsomely for the Countess, and she
returned to her father’s home, and accompanied him to London
when he was appointed French Ambassador to the Court of St. James.
In 1819 she scttled at Paris, and became the centre of a select coterie
in high life, her salons being thronged with the most distinguished
people of the period. Once every year she visited her husband at
Chambéry for a few weeks, assuming her position as mistress of his
house and entertaining his numerous friends. She always expressed
the highest respect for his character, and it is said that the honours
which were subsequently conferred upon him by Louis XVIII. were
due to her solicitations as much as to De Boigne’s well-known
royalistic principles. The Countess De Boigne survived her husband
many years, and died as recently as 1866.

De Boigne’s history for the six years succeeding his marriage, has
been the subject of remarkable and persistent misrepresentation at the
hands of English writers. It has been stated, and repeated with cir-
cumstantial detail, that in 1802 the General, at the invitation of
Napoleon Bonaparte, removed to Paris, and became the First Consul’s
Privy Counsellor and Adviser in those designs against the English
power in India, which led to the second Marath4 war, and the exter-
mination of Sindhia’s regular army. After a long and laborious in-
vestigation of the matter, it seemed to the compiler that this statement
was fairly well attested, even though he failed to find it corroborated
by any of the records in the India Office, opened to his inspection,
and which he carefully searched for its confirmation. It was not until
the view was accepted that De Boigne did actually assist Napoleon
Bonaparte with his counsel, and this chapter was in print, that a
refutation was received. It came from the best living authority, the
present Count de Boigne, whose letter is printed in eatenso later on.
94 DE BOIGNE.

As the excision of the discredited passages would greatly interfere with
the construction of the story, and render unintelligible several refer-
ences in the sketch of Perron’s life, it has been thought best to leave
them as they originally stood—for they contain much historical narra-
tive that is correct—and to refute the personal misrepresentation they
contain by the publication, side by side with it, of Count de Boigne’s
denial of his grandfather's alleged transactions with Bonaparte.

In the year 1802, the peace of Amiens—if, indeed, that term can
be applied to a cessation of hostilities that was little more than an
armistice—had just been concluded, and the opportunity was favour-
able for the perfection of those designs against India which the First
Consul had long premeditated. The conquest of the British posses-
sions in the Hast was one of his most cherished ambitions, and towards
the furtherance of this object he had undertaken the Egyptian cam-
paign, and entered into intrigues with the ruler of Mysore; but the
battle of the Nile and the capture of Seringapatam put a period to
both these attempts. By the Treaty of Amiens, through an incon-
ceivable oversight on the part of English diplomacy, Pondicherry and
the other possessions in India which had been wrested from her
during the late war were restored to France. This gave Bonaparte a
foothold in the country sufficient for his purpose. Hitherto the
French had been foiled in every endeavour to re-establish their power
in India. In direct conflict with the English they had been defeated
and driven out of the land. After Raymond’s death his army, which
practically dominated Haidarabad in the French interest, was dis-
armed and disbanded by Lord Wellesley in 1798. In Mysore, Tipt
Sultan was dead, and the French auxiliaries prisoners of war in the
hands of the English. Southern India was swept clean of French-
men. But Bonaparte, undiscouraged and indefatigable, projected
fresh schemes of conquest in 1802, and began to build sanguine hopes
of success in a quarter hitherto untried. Generel Perron, who suc-
ceeded De Boigne, was paramount at Delhi, and had recently
opened communications with the French Government, and made
certain proposals which commended themselves to the First Consul.
De Boigne was now in Paris, and in touch with Hindustan, being
in correspondence with Perron and other of his old officers, whilst his
local knowledge and experience were unique. Of his ability and
advice Bonaparte is reported to have availed himself, for it appeared
to him that the Maratha nation, from its constitution, its habits, and
its territorial importance, held out the most hopeful prospects that
had yet offered for the furtherance of French ambition and the
destruction of the English power in India.
HIS MARRIAGE, OLD AGE, AND DEATH. 95

The great want that existed in Perron’s army was that of trained
officers. To supply this deficiency Bonaparte, under the colourable
pretext of colonial defence, despatched to Pondicherry a fleet of
six men-of-war, which sailed from France under Monsieur Lenois,
a distinguished naval officer. It transported 1,400 picked troops
commanded by General Decaen. Amongst these were 200 young
Frenchmen, who, although they shipped in the guise of private
soldiers, were gentlemen by birth, thoroughly trained in the duties
of officers, and provided with a proper equipment. They were, in
addition, one and all fired with a determination to follow in the
footsteps of De Boigne, and carve out for themselves kingdoms and
principalities. It was intended that after landing at Pondicherry
these young adventurers should make their way to Delhi in small
bodies, through the territories of the Rajah of Berar, whose seaboard
of Cuttack could be reached by country boats in forty-eight hours
during the south-west monsoon. At Delhi they were to take service
under Perron, so that, when the time was ripe, the army of Hin-
dustan, efficiently officered and led, might co-operate with Bonaparte
in his intended invasion of India, and crush by one concerted blow
the English power in the East. War was to be declared and carried
on in the name of the Emperor Shah ’Alam, whose rescue from
British tyranny was assigned as the ostensible object of this dis-
interested scheme.

Unfortunately for these aspiring young cadcts, their hopes were
blighted by the sagacity and acumen of the Marquis Wellesley,
who mistrustced their coming, and whose suspicions were subsequently
confirmed by the copy of a secret document obtained from one of
General Decaen’s officers. This was entitled “A Memorial on the
present importance of India, and the most efficacious means of Re-
establishing the French Nation in its ancient splendour in that
Country.” It detailed the French scheme in full, and after
denouncing “the treatment received from a company of merchant
adventurers by the Einperor of Hindustan, the sole branch of the
illustrious house of Taimur,” went on to assert that “the English
Company, by its ignominious treatment of the great Mughal, has
forfeited its rights and privileges in Bengal,” and that “the Emperor
of Delhi has a real and indisputable right to transmit to whomsoever
he may please to select the sovereignty of his dominions, as well as
the arrears (of tribute) due from the English.” . . . ‘These arrears,”
concluded the ingenuous document, “ with the interest of the country
added, amount to four hundred and fifty-two livres Tournois, a sum
which greatly exceeds the value of the Company’s moveable capital.”
96 DE BOIGNE.

“A pretty comfortable prospect,’ comments a contemporary his-
torian, “for the new legacy-hunter, Bonaparte, of a bequest, at the
demise of an old man past eighty years, of All Hindustan and nineteen
millions seventeen hundred and seventy-five pounds sterling!”

Lord Wellesley thus deals with this document in one of his dispatches,
or rather with the scheme by which Donaparte hoped to constitute
himself legatee of the Mughal’s millions :—

“The system of introducing French adventurers into the armies of
the Native States, for the improvement of their discipline and efficiency,
has been found the readiest and most effectual means of establishing
the influence and authority of the French in the government of those
States, and of erecting an independent territorial and military power,
within the limits of a foreign dominion. .. . Under the continuance
of peace between England and France, and between the British
Government and the Mahratta States, the progress of French intrigue
and aggrandisement of the French power in India would be most
rapid and dangerous to oursecurity. In the prosecution of these views
the French would manifestly derive essential aid from the possession
of the person and family of the Emperor Shah Allum, and under the
plea of restoring that monarch to his hereditary dominion, the power
of France in India might be directed to the subversion of every state,
and the appropriation of every territory unprotected by alliance with
the British Nation. . . . By successful intrigue M. Perron has obtained
the office of Commandant of the Fortress of Delhi, which is the resi-
dence of the royal family, and thus secured the person and nominal
authority of the Emperor. The Mogul has never been an important
or dangerous instrument in the hands of the Mahrattas, but the
augmentation of M. Perron’s influence and power, and the growth of
the French interest in Hindustan, have given a new aspect to the con-
dition of the Mogul, and that unfortunate prince may become a
powerful aid to the cause of France in India, under the direction of
French agents.”

The practical application of these views was found in the precautions
Lord Wellesley took to prevent any member of General Decaen’s
Expedition from finding his way to Delhi. On their arrival at Pondi-
cherry the two hundred French officers found, to their intense disgust
and mortification, that they were virtually “en cage” within its
narrow boundaries. They never left the desolate strip of territory,
and, when a little later hostilities broke out again between Eng-
land and France, these miserable men were all made prisoners of
war.

Meanwhile it has been stated that De DBoigne, seduced from his
HIS MARRIAGE, OLD AGE, AND DEATH. 97

former sympathies with the English, became a highly distinguished
personage at the Tuilleries, and was elevated to the dignity of a
Privy Counsellor. Doubts have, however, been thrown upon this
episode in his history. His biographer, M. St. Genis, omits mention
of it, although he makes allusion to “an unfounded remark of Bona-
parte ’’ which had obtained currency and conveyed the impression that
the First Consul had been angered at a refusal on De Boigne’s part
to procecd to India at the head of an invading expedition. St. Genis
adds that although De Boigne had taken up his abode within the
limits of the Empire, he had no sympathy with Napoleon, and pro-
bably distrusted the solidity of his power; and that notwithstanding
the advantageous opening his military talents might have found
in the Imperial service, he was averse to such employment on several
grounds, and the Emperor knew him too well to spare him the
necessity of a refusal. On the other hand it is asserted that De
Boigne did actually advise and assist Bonaparte in his designs
against the English Empire in the East. In a pamphlet printed in
1804 and entitled “ Brief Remarks on the Mahratta War, and the
Rise and Progress of the French Establishment in Hindustan under
Generals De Boigne and Perron,” which, though published anony-
mously, bears evidence of particular knowledge, there is a circum-
stantial account of the matter as herein narrated, and one of the
principal points put forward seems to be corroborated by a passage
in a letter from Perron to De Boigne, dated the 28th of February,
1802, and published in M. St. Genis’ work. Perron writes as follows
(the letter will be found quoted in his life):—“ Yes; I will receive
with great satisfaction all the persons you recommend for appoint-
ments in the Brigades.”

Again, in “ A Letter on the Present Crisis of Affairs in India,” written
in 1807 by Major Ambrose, who had been an officer in Holkar’s ser-
vice, and who refers to De Boigne’s residence at Paris as a matter of
common notoriety, one of the arguments put forward is, that ‘ Napo-
leon possesses the advantages of De Boigne’s abilities to guide him.”
In a third ‘‘India Tract,’’—to use the generic name by which these
publications were known—written in 1812 by “ A Field Officer on the
Bengal Establishment of thirty years’ service,” and entitled “ A Dis-
sertation on the Defence of the British Territorial Possessions in
Hindustan,” the following passage occurs :—

“When a single adventurer like De Boigne, with but slender
talents (sic), and without the countenance or support of any European
prince, was able to raise and discipline, in the North of India, such an
army as we had to contend against in 1803-4, we cannot surely be

7
98 DE BOIGNE.

surprised if men of genius and talents, selected by Bonaparte, and
supported with all the influence of his great name and extensive
resources, should succeed in forming a powerful army in that country.
That De Boigne was received with distinguished attention, and
consulted on this very point is well known; and that he recom-
mended the measure as easy and practicable, and the first and most
certain step towards the conquest of Ilindustan, there can be very
little doubt.”

But perhaps the most important reference is contained in a chance,
but significant, remark in a letter of Lord Wellesley to General
Lake, under date of the 8th of July, 1803, which concludes with the
sentence :—

““M. Du (sic) Boigne (Sindhia’s late General) is now the chief confi-
dante of Bonaparte. He is constantly at St. Cloud. I leave you
to judge why and wherefore.”

Recent information has denounced these assertions and suggestions
as incorrect. In June, 1892, the following communication was re-
ceived from the present Count de Boigne, and is inserted with
peculiar satisfaction, for it is pleasant to be assured that his grand-
father was innocent of the hostility towards the English with which
he has been charged :—

“Tn 1802 the General was in Savoy, and signed authentic deeds,
which I have in my possession, together with letters which General
Perron wrote to him from Hindustan.

“He was never a Privy Counsellor to Bonaparte, and in all his
family papers I do not find a single word which might lead one to
suppose that he ever saw him, or had anything to do with him.

‘During the whole of the reign of Bonaparte the General led a
perfectly secluded life. It was only at the Restoration that he was
appointed Marshal, Knight of St. Louis, and of the Legion of Honour,
by King Louis XVIII. He had married Mdlle. D’Osmond, and his
father-in-law was the first French Ambassador in London after the
return of the Bourbons.

“Jn 1815, after Savoy was united to the kingdom of Sardinia, he
was appointed Lieutenant-General, and received the Grand Cross of
St. Maurice et Lazarre.

“ All this proves he never had any transactions with Bonaparte.

“As to his connection with the English and the advice he gave to
Sindhia, the General felt that, in spite of the splendid army he had
created for him, the Prince would be beaten if Le waged war against
HIS MARRIAGE, OLD AGE, AND DEATH. gy

the English. When he left him, he told him that, notwithstanding
the pride he felt in the Brigades, he advised the Prince to disband
them rather than go to war with the English.

“Tt seems to me, therefore, that the information you have received
is not correct. It is in contradiction to the facts, and I can under-
stand why you failed to find any confirmation of it in the Records of
Government,

“Cre. Dr Boiane.”

This disposes of an accusation, which, with the marvellous fertility
of falsehood, has blossomed from the dust of nearly ninety years ago.

Early in 1808 De Boigne purchased a fine estate on the outskirts of
his native town of Chambéry, in Savoy, where he built himself a
magnificent mansion named “ Buisson,” wherein he spent the last
twenty-seven years of his life, enjoying the princely fortune le had
acquired. During this period his bounties to the poor, the sick, the
aged, and to religious institutions were immense, and conceived in a
spirit of the broadest philanthropy. The principles which governed
him cannot be better illustrated than by a quotation from an address
he delivered in 1822, on the occasion of opening a hospital with which
he had endowed his native town. “‘ If Divine Providence,” he said,
“‘deigned to crown with a special grace the career of arms I followed,
He also loaded me with favours far greater than my poor talents could
have expected, and, I may add, greater than I deserve. My wants
were never great, and I experienced no particular ambition for riches.
From wy forefathers I inherited nothing, and all that I have, I
received from heaven. For this reason I consider I should use these
gifts in a way acceptable to Him who gave them. Gratitude and our
Holy Religion enjoin this as a duty, and suggest that the proper use
to make of my wealth is to succour the unfortunate. Therefore, on
my return to my native land, to which my heart has ever clung with
affection, my first work, my first thought, was to invite my fellow
citizens to share the benefits so liberally entrusted to my keeping
by Providence.”

These are noble words, and how nobly De Boigne acted up to them,
a list of his charities can testify. During the latter years of his
life the sums he expended on philanthropical objects reached the
enormous total of 38,678,000 francs. He built and endowed two
hospitals, a lunatic asylum, an institute for teaching trades to young
girls, an almshouse, a college, and a public library. Nor did his bene-
factions cease with his life, for in his will he supplemented them with
further princely bequests.
100 DE BOIGNE.

Honours were heaped upon De Boigne in his old age. King Victor
Emanuel of Sardinia created him a count and a lieutenant-general in
his army, and decorated him with the Grand Cross of the Order of St.
Maurice and St. Lazarus. Louis XVIII. appointed him a Marechal
de Camp, and a knight of the Legion of Honour, and conferred on
him the Order of St. Louis. His native town of Chambéry delighted
to honour him. During his life time his bust in marble was unveiled
by the King in the public library, and one of the finest streets in the
city perpetuates the name of her greatest son, and contains a beautiful
monumental fountain erected to his memory.

It has been mentioned that De Boigne had no children by his
marriage with Mdlle D’Osinond. But there were two born to him by
a marriage contracted ‘according to the usages of the country, with
the daughter of a Persian colonel in India.” These were a son named
Ali Bux, born at Delhi in 1792, and a daughter named Bunoo. They
accompanied their father to IMurope, and were subsequently baptized,
receiving the names of Charles Alexander and Anna. The latter died
at Paris in 1810, but Charles grew up and married the daughter of a
French nobleman, by whom he had a family. He succeeded his
father in the title, and lived a life of unostentatious benevolence,
dying in 1853, when the estate passed to his son, the present Count
de Boigne.

In his old age De Boigne dispensed a lordly lospitality, and especially
welcome to his house were any English oflicers who had been in India.
Both Colonel Tod and Grant Dull, in the works with which their
names are associated, make special mention of this, and cach pays a
tribute to the courtesy and hospitality experienced at Buisson. As
illustrating the simplicity of De Boigne’s ménage, it may be men-
tioned that to the end of his days his sole Major Domo was an old
native servant whom he had brought from India, and who directed all
his household arrangements.

One who knew De Boigne well has thus described his appearance
two years before his death ;—‘‘ His frame and stature were Herculean,
and he was full six feet two inches in height. His aspect was mild and
unassuming, and he was unostentatious in his habit and demeanour,
preserving at his advanced age all the gallantry and politeness of the
vielle cour. He disliked, from modesty, to advert to his past deeds,
and so seemed to strangers to have lost his memory. But in the
society of those who could partake of the emotions it awakened, the
name of Merta always stirred in him associations whose call he could
not resist. The blood would mount to his temples, and the old fire
came into his cyes, as he recalled, with inconceivable rapidity and
HIS MARRIAGH, OLD AGH, AND DEATH. 101

eloquence, the story of that glorious day. But he spoke of himself as
if it were of another, and always concluded with the words, ‘ My past
appears a dream 1?”

But it was no dream—that glorious past of his—which he looked
back upon. The vista of many years stretched between him and the
epoch his deeds made memorable, but through its gathering shadows
vivid, distinct and brilliant, glittered the star of victory—the splendour
of actual accomplishment.

Almost on the fortieth anniversary of the battle of Patan, Death
came and gently summoned away the brave old Adventurer whom he
had so often spared on Indian battlefields. On the 21st June, 1830,
amidst the prayers of the aged and the helpless, and the blessings of
the sick and the needy, full of years, full of honours, peacefully, in
his bed, died Benoit La Borgne, Count De Boigne.’
CHAPTER Ix,
THE CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENT OF DE BOIGNE,

TE, BOIGNE’S Indian career lias been described as a series 0

ambitious plans ; yet however exalted their aim they all found a
justification in results. Toa high intent he added w sustained dili-
gence and a determination that never faltered until each design he
undertook was completed. He scorned delights and lived laborious
days. Work—sheer hard work—was the secret of his success. With-
out it even his genius must have failed in achieving the ends he
attained. Moreover, he weighed those ends well. A certain practical
caution governed all his enterprises, and his prudence never permitted
him to be carried away by his enthusiasm. This characteristic he
exhibited in his financial arrangements, in his business aptitude, and
in his attention to detail. No mutiny occurred in the army he
created, yet the histories of prior and contemporaneous corps teem
with instances of insubordination, desertion, and revolt, consequent
upon irregularity of payment. De Boigne’s penetrating perception
marked this weak spot, and discounted its danger by obtaining from
Madhoji Sindhia the territorial assignment that supplied him with a
fixed income, secured him from dependence on an untrustworthy
treasury, and placed his Brigades from the very first on the only sound
footing possible to a mercenary army.

The amount, as well as the variety, of work accomplished by De
Boigne was astonishing. Lewis Ferdinand Smith thus describes his
routine of daily duty :—

“De Boigne was active and persevering to a degree which can only
be conceived or believed by those who were spectators of his inde-
fatigable labours. I have seen him daily and monthly rise with the
sun, survey his arsenal, view his troops, enlist recruits, direct the vast
movements of three brigades, raise resources, and encourage manu-
factures for their arms, ammunition, and stores; harangue in his
durbar, give audience to ambassadors, administer justice, regulate the
CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENT OF DE BOIGNE. 103

civil and revenue affairs of a Jaidad of twenty lakhs of rupees, listen
to a multitude of letters from various parts, on various important
matters, dictate replies, carry on an intricate system of intrigue in
different courts, superintend a private trade of lakhs of rupees, keep
his accounts, his private and public correspondence, and direct and
move forward a most complex political machine. Such was his
laborious occupation from sunrise till past midnight, and this was not
the fortuitous avocations of a day, but the unremitting employment of
nine or ten years. To this exhausting and unceasing toil he sacrificed
one of the firmest and most robust constitutions ever formed by
nature.”

Living in sovereign magnificence, and wielding quasi-sovereign
power, De Boigne was called upon to exercise the most important
duties of State. For this he was fitted, for he was a consuminate
diplomatist, skilled in directing the most complicated affairs, and he
added to a complete mastery of Oriental intrigue the political subtlety
of the Italian school. His knowledge of the world was profound, and
he understood the art of moulding to his purpose the minds of those
he had to deal with. He was an acute observer of the dispositions of
men, a rapid judge of character, and gifted in a remarkable degree
with the power of gaining the confidence of others. But he never
divulged his own affairs, and, as one of his commentators has observed,
“there is this remarkable thing about him, that during the whole of
his Indian career his only secretary was his writing-desk, which knew
neither his business nor his fortune, for both of those he kept com-
pletely to himself.”

To the end of his stay in India De Boigne carried on the mercantile
business he established at Lucknow in 1789, the books and correspon-
dence of which he wrote up with his own hand. All these multi-
farious occupations, military, political, administrative, and commercial
were conducted without assistance from others, for it was a frequent
assertion of his that any ambitious person who reposed confidence in
another risked the destruction of his own views. He never deputed
authority, preferring to labour eighteen hours a day, and day after
day, rather than delegate to a subordinate the control of any matter
of importance.

It has been stated that this tenacity of power degenerated at times
into a positive greed of authority, and led him to view in an unworthy
light the successes and efforts of others, and he has been taxed with a
jealousy that on occasions administered ungenerous rebuke where
commendation was justly due. How far this was true it is impossible
to estimate now, but it is certainly not corroborated by the singular
104 DE BOIGNE.

esteem evinced towards him by his subordinates. In considering
these charges it must not be forgotten that the men who filled the
higher appointments in De Boigne’s Brigades were in many cases
illiterate persons of humble birth, whose mental calibre unfitted them
for positions of responsibility, although doubtless in the artificial
exaltation of their lives they considered themselves equal to any duty,
and entertained opinions of their own qualifications not shared by
their chief.

De Boigne has also been accused of greed and avarice, and de-
scribed as mean and grasping in pecuniary matters, and this by one
who knew him well and respected him highly. How far this failing
was a part of his nature, and how far it was due to the spirit of the
times and his surroundings is a moot point. India of the last century
was above everything else the Land of the Pagoda Tree, and the
raison @étre of the Pagoda Tree was to be shaken violently. Men
went to the East to make fortunes as quickly as they could, and then
return to Europe. The intention was never disguised. The question,
therefore, of De Boigne’s avarice, may be fairly judged by the degree
of his fortune. Let us compare the harvest of his life with that of
others. In eleven years he saved from his pay, from his administra-
tion of a vast territory, and from his commercial speculations, a sum
of £400,000. But Perron, who succeeded him, accumulated in nine
years a capital which has been variously assessed at from three-quar-
ters of a million to two millions sterling, and this without any assist-
ance from the profits of business. Bourguien, who merely commanded
a brigade under Perron, was credited with taking ‘‘an equal sum”
out of the country, but this refers to the actual amount Perron suc-
ceeded in conveying to Europe, which was not more than £500,000.
But these examples of money-minting pale before the financial
achievements of a certain Colonel Hannay, who entered the service
of the Naw4b Wazir of Oudh in 1778. Hannay was a Company’s
officer, and for very cogent reasons obtained permission to serve on
the further side of a boundary which creditors could not cross and
where writs did not run. He received the command of a considerable
force, and was assigned the districts of Daraitch and Gorakhpur for
its support. These he depopulated in three years by his exactions.
“He entered the Nawéb’s service,” remarks a contemporary writer,
“aman in debt, and left it three years afterwards with a fortune of
£300,000.” With such instances before us the savings that De Boigne
amassed appear reasonable when his length of service, his enormous
income, the gifts he received from Sindhia, his mercantile business at
Lucknow, and all his incidental sources of emolument are considered,
CIIARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENT OF DE BOIGNE. 105

Finally, the accusation of ‘avarice that verged on the contemptible”
may fairly be met by a reference to the princely philanthropy of his
declining years, and in this connection it is proper to quote the
remarks of the Marquis de Faverges, who, in discussing his character,
says: ‘‘ He gave coldly, but always decidedly. He counted the money
which came and went, more from business habit than from actual
avarice, but he never withheld a halfpenny. He gave much and un-
ostentatiously, but without any desire to hide it, although his secret
charities were considerable.”

It is difficult to reconcile this conflicting testimony, but whilst the
accusation rests on individual statements, the refutation exists in
the charitable gifts and bequests enjoyed to this day by the inhabitants
of Chambéry. And it must be noted that in the speech De Boigne
made on the occasion of opening a hospital in that town, he cate-
gorically disclaimed ‘“‘ any particular ambition for riches.”

On the other hand, against these possible detractions must be set
many good and noble qualities. Above all stands De Boigne’s
staunch and unswerving loyalty, which, in the face of the many
enticing offers that appealed especially to the avarice he has been
charged with, never faltered for a moment. His sense of justice was
singularly well balanced between severity and mildness, and his
orders commanded respect, no less from the firmness with which he
enforced them, than for the impartiality he displayed in arriving at a
decision. His manners were polite and elegant, his disposition affable
and vivacious, and he was not wanting in a sense of humour. He was
modest, and good-natured in his behaviour towards his subordinates,
although he could show himself stern and implacable if opposed or
thwarted, but he possessed an entire command over his passions, and
was an adept in the art of dissimulation—gifts of inestimable advan-
tage in dealing with the natives.

De Boigne’s achievements are the best testimony to the high order
of his military talent. As w general he may take his stand amongst
the greatest India has ever produced. In times of crisis and sudden
danger his presence of mind was incomparable, and his judgment in
guaging difficulties and deciding on the course to follow was as quick
as it was correct. TIlis retreats were the result of cowardice, treachery,
or incompetence on the part of those with whom he was associated,
for he never lost a battle, nor was himself worsted in fight, while his
victories were all of his own winning. Patan, Merta, and Lakhairi,
although hidden from view in the turbid flood of Indian strife, were
achievements that can be compared with the most brilliant the
Company’s Sepoy regiments ever performed, and if their particular
106 DE BOIGNE.

record is lost in the tumult of Eastern warfare, they deprive its annals
of a glorious chapter, that might fitly preface the victories of Laswari
and Assaye.

Asa general De Boigne was not only successful in carrying out
extended campaigns of conquest, and directing battles splendid with
vigour, but could inspire mercenary armies with courage and con-
fidence, and, above all, with patience. No troops in Asia suffered
greater proportionate losses in war, or underwent more trying fatigues
than his famous brigades, which, during twelve years of incessant
activity, were constantly marching and fighting. And yet they were
sustained by no patriotic spirit, inspired by no national sentiment,
bound together by no common cause. They were merely a hireling
soldiery, risking their lives for stipulated payment, and as often
opposed to men of their own creed or caste as allied with them. Not-
withstanding which they conducted themselves with a loyalty and
heroism that could not be excelled by any national army. The con-
quests between the Chambal and the Siwaliks were of countries
inhabited by savage and warlike peoples, from whose very midst De
Boigne raised the battalions that held the territory in an iron grip,
and drew from it revenues richer and more regular than had been
extorted by any previous conqueror.

A noble trait in De Boigne’s character was his earnest endeavour
to mitigate the horrors of war and minimise its evils. His humanity
evoked blessings from the battlefield, where only despair had moaned
before. Officers and soldiers who were wounded in his service
received pecuniary compensations commensurate with the severity of
their sufferings, and men permanently disabled were awarded grants
of land, which passed to their heirs, whilst special provision was made
for the relatives of those who were killed in action. The tortures of
the battlefield were ameliorated by the establishment of a medical
department, to which an ambulance corps was attached. These re-
forms were half a century in advance of the times, and were benign
innovations such as no native powers had ever dreamt of before.

What wonder that his soldiers loved this chief, whose heart was
so full of solicitude for their welfare! What wonder that one of his
old officers, in writing to him, expressed himself in the following
terms: ‘‘ You must return to us. We await your coming as that of
the Messiah. You will be like a saint, so highly are you venerated
and adored. Above all by the troops, who, in their songs, invoke
your name only.” Do not the echoes of these songs, chanted by a
rude soldiery around their Indian camp fires, come floating over many
years to tell us what manner of man their leader was? Does not
CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENT OF DE BOIGNE. 107

that message, with its unlaboured eloquence, touch our hearts to-day,
even as it must have touched the heart of him to whom it was
addressed nearly a century ago? It is very plain to see that, above
and beyond the respect his military talents commanded, there existed
an affection for De Boigne that made every individual soldier in his
army an adherent, and inspired his battalions with the magic strength
of a personal devotion. When he left India he carried with him, not
only the esteem of his master and the admiration of his officers, but
the love of the humblest soldier who served under him.

By his enemies De Boigne was respected, for in the hour of their
defeat le treated them with mercy and consideration. “It is not the
least merit of General De Boigne as a military man,” writes the
Bengal Journal in 1790, ‘to have tempered, by an admirable perse-
verance, the ferocious and almost savage character of the Mahrattas.
He subjects to the discipline and civilisation of European armies
troops hitherto deemed barbarians; and licentiousness and rapine,
heretofore so common among them, have now become infamous even
in the estimation of the meanest soldier.” Despite this humave
departure from the repressive customs of the times, when slaughter
followed victory, and pitiless oppression stalked in the path of con-
quest, De Boigne’s personal prestige suffered no diminution, and
“latterly the very name of De Boigne conveyed more terror than the
thunder of his cannons.”

De Boigne’s genius in war and his abilities in diplomacy more than
quadrupled the extent of Madhoji Sindhia’s dominions and influence.
The unbroken successes of his “ Invincible Army”—as it came to be
called—inspired that prince with a belief in the European methods of
warfare, and weaned him from his racial prejudices in favour of
cavalry to an appreciation of infantry for heroic defence and irresis-
tible attack. His conversion was not without fruit, for “ the military
talent of De Boigne and the valour of his battalions were the grand
instruments which made Madhoji Sindhia the most powerful prince
in India.”

De Boigne was a born leader of men. ‘‘There was something in
his face and bearing,” writes the authority so often quoted, “‘ that
depicted the hero, and compelled implicit obedience. In deportment
he was commanding, and walked with the majestic tread of conscious
greatness. The strong cast of his countenance and the piercing ex-
pression of his eyes, indicated the force and power of his mind. On
the grand stage, where he acted so brilliant and important a part for
ten years, he was at once dreaded and idolised, feared and admired,
respected and beloved,”
108 DE BOIGNE.

Certes in the history of the decade in which he flourished De
Boigne stands out, a splendid solitary figure, distinct and distin
guished above all others. We recognise in him an adventurer of a
rare and noble type. Nor is that glamour of romance wanting which
can invest with acertain heroic charm the personalities brought under
its influence. The circumstances of his career always remind us
that he was a free lance in a farland. We see him organising armies,
winning battles, conquering countries, and ruling territories in a
picturesque scene, rich with Oriental colouring, martial with pagan
hosts, peopled with dusky races, and instinct with barbaric splendour.
He carries us away out of our cold, conventional European climate,
into the warm glow of an Asiatic land, where the conditions of life
are strange and startling, and its possibilities illimitable. We follow
him, step by step, across arid deserts, through tropical jungles, over
desolate hills, past districts prodigal in their fertility, to that stately
marble palace on Jumna’s bank, where a blind Emperor, the colophon
of one of the greatest empires Asia has ever seen, finds in this self-
made soldier of fortune a protector, a patron, and the regent of his
throne. More wondrous than a fairy tale, more dazzling than a
dream, stranger than the strangest fiction, it is difficult to realise
the magnitude of De Boigne’s achievement. In this prosaic age,
when the daily occurrences of a generally humdrum East are read at
our breakfast tables the next morning, and we are reconciled to a
Government that prosecutes sedition in a police court, and exercises
self-restraint as an election sop, it is hard to realise that less than a
hundred years ago India was a dark continent to our forefathers. Yet
such it indubitably was when De Boigne carried the military systems
of Europe into the heart of Hindustan, and without favour of political
opponents or license of a criminal procedure code, established his sway
in the Empire of Akbar and Aurangzebe.
 

GEORGE THOMAS.

fallion in Francklin's “ Military Mentors of

[From a me
Mr. George Thomas.”\
GEORGE THOMAS.

CHAPTER I.

GEORGE THOMAS LANDS IN INDIA. EARLY VICISSITUDES. ENTERS THE
BEGUM SOMRU’S SERVICE.

1756-1793.

[Although in the chronological order of events the Life of General Perron
should follow that of De Boigue, there is a carcer—that of George Thomas—so
overlapped by both, that it is most conveniently inserted between the sketches of
the two greater Adventurers. ]

 

a aS TLORGE THOMAS was born in Tipperary in the year
LE |

 

 

\y By 1756. Ilis parents were people of lumble position,
cS; a a % 2 .

Pt ‘| unable to afford him any education, and at an early

( A : age he adopted the seafaring profession, and came out

x3 to India whilst he was quite a boy. The circumstances

 

under which he left this calling are variously related.
He has been described as ‘‘a quartermaster in the Navy, or, as some
affirm, only a common sailor, who landed at Madras in 1781 or 1782”;
whilst another account states that he was a cabin boy on board a
trading ship on the Coromandel coast, from which he ran away.
Whatever his exact condition when he arrived in India, it is certain
he began life in a very humble capacity as a sailor. On leaving his
ship he made his way ‘‘ up-country ’’—an expression synonymous with
‘“inland’”’ in India—and spent some years in the Karnatic with the
Poligars, a semi-independent and exceedingly lawless class of chiefs
inhabiting mountainous and jungle districts, and of whom there were
a considerable number in the hill tracts of Southern India.

After a residence of about five years amongst these people, Thomas

appears to have found his way to Haidarabad, in the Deccan, where
309
110 GHORGE THOMAS.

he took service as a private soldier in the army of Nizam Ali Khan.
But he did not stay here long, for in 1787 he left the Deccan and
made his way to Delhi. Ii is a pity there is no record of this journey,
for it must have been full of adventure and incident. TEven in these
modern days the march of a solitary European from one capital to
the other would not be altogether free from danger. A hundred years
ago the undertaking must have been perilous in the extreme, and
nothing but a stout heart and a strong frame could have successfully
traversed the thousand miles between the two cities, through countries
which were in a constant state of disturbance and commotion, and
infested with numerous bands of robbers and predatory chieftains,
who levied blackmail on every traveller, and acknowledged allegiance
to no authority.

Despite all dangers and difficulties, Thomas completed his journey,
and arrived at the Mughal capital in safety. This was before the final
occupation of Delhi by the Mardthds, and when the influence of
Ghulam Kadir and Ismail Beg was paramount there. The only body
of regular troops in Hindustan was that belonging to the Begum
Somru, to whom Thomas offered his services. She held the fief of
Sardhana, a district lying about forty-five miles north of Delhi, where
her troops were cantoned. Thomas’s application was entertained, and
he was appointed to a subordinate command in the Begum’s army.
Before long the handsome Irishman attracted his mistress’s attention.
He was a tall, soldierly fellow, endowed with a pleasing address for
one of his station, and gifted with the honied speech of lis country-
men, and, except when his temper was aroused, gentle in his manners,
though not without that dash and spirit which always commends itself
to womankind.

Before long he obtained the Begum’s confidence and favour, and
she gave him in marriage a slave girl whom she had adopted, and
promoted him to the command of a battalion in her foree. He soon
found an opportunity of distinguishing himself. In 1789 the Begum,
in her capacity of feudal vassal to Shah ’Alaim, was engaged in assisting
the Emperor to reduce certain revolted districts which had been
restored to him when he regained his nominal independence after the
defeat of the Marathas at Lalsét. These were in the possession of a
discontented noble named Najaf Kuli Khan, who refused to render
allegiance, and took up w position of defiance in uw strong fortress
named Gokalgarh, a little to the north-west of Agra, which latter
place Ismail Beg was engaged in besieging. Shah ’Alam had invested
the rebel’s stronghold, and erected trenches around it. But the Imperial
army was in a shamefully demoralised condition, and one niglit the
ENTERS THE BEGUM SOMRU'’S SERVICE. 111

officers and soldiery having recklessly abandoned themselves to a
debauch, Najaf Khan, determined to profit by the enemy’s folly,
and, marching silently out of his entrenchments, attacked the royal
troops as they lay buried in a drunken slumber. The investing
lines were quickly carried, and a dreadful slaughter commenced. The
terror excited by the sudden and vigorous attack was so great that a
panic seized the royal army, which was soon in confusion and on
the point of flight. The Emperor himself was exposed to the greatest
danger, many persons around him being killed, and he was preparing
to withdraw from the field, when the Begum Somru, whose camp
was pitched a short distance off, perceived his peril, and, unaffected
by the panic, determined to support her sovereign. A hundred men
and a six-pounder gun, under the command of Thomas, were hastily
ordered to advance, whilst the Begum, seated in her palanquin,
accompanied them to the scene of conflict, and gave the order to
open fire. Thomas’s native sense of chivalry was aroused by the
spectacle of a woman on the field of battle, and he supported her with
such determination that after a short but desperate struggle, Najaf
Khan was beaten back and the Emperor rescued from his critical
position. In grateful recognition of assistance so timely rendered,
Shah ’Alam summoned the Begum to his Durbar, and, after praising
her for her gallantry, and thanking her for her service, loaded her with
honours, and bestowed on her the title of ‘His most beloved daughter.”
Nor was Thomas unrewarded, for not only was his reputation estab-
lished by the incident, but he received a very valuable khilwt, or
present, from His Majesty.

Not long after this the Begum was entrusted with the defence of
the northern Mughal districts against the incursions of the Sikhs, and
a valuable Jaidid assigned to her as payment for this special service,
to the management of which she appointed Thomas, who took up his
quarters at a fort called Tappal, the principal place im it. It was a
wonderful piece of promotion, for it elevated lim to the position of
Military Governor and Civil Administrator of an extensive territory.
Despite his inability to read and write, he seems to have handled the
reins of management with considerable ability, for he doubled the
revenues of the Jaidid before long, and established the Begum’s
authority in a district which had never previously acknowledged any
master but the drawn «word. In the intervals of collecting rents and
dispensing justice Thomas was frequently called away northwards to
repel the periodical incursions of the Sikhs, a task in which he distin-
guished himself no less by his personal prowess than by his uniform
success. Unfortunately no chronicles exist of these border frays of a
112 GEORGE THOMAS.

past century. Advanced or retired boundary pillars formed the only
records of frontier warfare in India. But in various and successive
actions against the Sikhs Thomas, by his courage and energy, made
his rule respected, and for long years after tradition handed down the
legendary deeds of the mighty Jehazi-Sahib, or sailor, who first taught
the sons of Nanak to respect the marches of the Great Mughal.

By these successes Thomas gained considerable influence over the
mind of the Begum, but there were many Europeans in her force,
chiefly Frenchmen, between whom and him a violent hatred soon
developed. They monopolised the chief posts, and drew large emolu-
ments, although, as he quickly observed, they were of little use except
to keep their mistress in a chronic state of pecuniary difficulty. Their
jealousy of and hostility to the English interloper were undisguised ;
but in spite of their machinations he retained for a considerable time
the place he had gained in the Degum’s favour, for he was always
ready to fight, which her other officers were not, and when he fought
he won. This in itself made him a valuable acquisition to a force
whose records in the tented field were none too glorious; but as, in
addition to his military abilities, Thomas possessed the charm of
personal attraction, he soon became chief adviser and counsellor to
the “ Witch of Sardbina,”’ as the Begum was called. But this success,
obtained at the expense of others, increased the circle of his enemies
and made them desperate. Envy and jealousy entered into a plot,
and under the leadership of an officer named Le Vassoult a cabal was
formed to bring about ‘Thomas’s ruin. The season chosen was during
one of his periodical expeditions against the Sikhs. Taking advantage
of his absence, the conspirators presented themselves in a body before
the Begum, and by artful arguments persuaded her that Thomas har-
boured treacherous designs against her independence, and that his
reason for desiring to procure the dismissal of her French officers was
that he might make himself sole and undisputed master of her posses-
slons.

This plot, which was brought to a head in 1792, was entirely
successful. It was cunningly contrived, being calculated to raise tlic
Begum ’s fears by suggesting a danger that bore an air of probability,
for the subversion of authority was at the root of every conspiracy in
those times. The Begum at once became alarmed, but, on being
assured of their protection and fidelity by her French oflicers, anxiety
gave way to anger, and she visited her wrath upon Thomas's wife,
who communicated with her husband. Back he came at once from
the frontier, rescued his family, and carried them to Tappal, where
he erected the standard of rebellion.
ENTERS THE BEGUM SOMRU’S SERVICE. 113

No doubt he was driven to this by the force of circumstances,
for George Thomas’s worst enemy could never have accused him of
treachery. But still his conduct seemed to confirm the accusations
made against him, and the Begum Somru forthwith marched with an
overpowering force to regain her district. Tappal was invested, and
Thomas compelled to surrender. And then the Begum, with a mag-
nanimity which could hardly have been expected of her, and had in it
a touch of both inconsistency and tenderness, spared his life, and
permitted him to depart unmolested.

When Thomas evacuated Tappal his worldly wealth did not exceed
fifty pounds. It was not much to show for five years’ meritorious
service, but it may fairly be adduced as evidence of his integrity ;
for during his administration of a district producing a revenue of
nearly £10,000 a year, many opportunities must have occurred of
enriching himself by methods which, however deprecated in the West,
were regarded in India as not only fortuitous, but legitimate.

His prospects, as he summed them up, were far from encouraging.
After cleven years of active adventure he found himsclf little richer
than when he began. Heroic measures were necessary, and he adopted
them forthwith. Having expended his small capital in arming a
band of desperate followers, he stormed and captured a large village
near Delhi, from which he plundered a considerable sum of money.
With the sinews of war thus obtained he increased his force to 250
mounted men, and marched them to Anupshalhr, the frontier British
station, there to await events. After putting his followers through a
course of training until they presented a semblance of discipline, he
offered the services of his party to Ali Bahadur, one of the leading
Maratha princes, who had established an independent rule in Bundel-
khand. But a difficulty arising about terms, the negotiations were
broken off, and shortly after this Thomas received proposals from a
chief named Appa Khandi Rado, with promise of a suitable provision,
and these being acceptable, le entered his service early in 1798.
CHAPTER IT.
UNDER APPA KHANDI RAO.
1793-1797.

ao KHANDI RAO was ove of Madhoji Sindhia’s principal
chieftains, and had played an important part in the conquest
of Hindustan. More recently he had been engaged in the invasion of
Bundelkhand, but his arms had not met with success, and owing to
this his troops were several months in arrears of pay, and when their
leader’s continued ill-fortune seemed to destroy all hopes of recovering
what was due to them, they broke out into mutiny. This so angered
Sindhia that he summarily dismissed the chief from lis service, and
Appw’s proud and haughty spirit was brooding over this disgrace when
he sought the assistance of George Thomas.

It will be remembered that it was under Appa Khandi Rao that De
Loigne—now in his zenith—entered Sindhia’s service with the two
battalions which comprised his first command. His extraordinary
success, and the power he had attained, inspired Appa with confi-
dence in the merits of European courage and intelligence. Although
Thomas’s small band of ragamuffins must have presented a ludicrous
contrast to De Boigne’s trained and equipped battalions, the chief re-
membered how modestly the latter began his career, and Thomas’s
impoverished condition and needy appearance did not necessarily
prejudice him. Vicissitudes of fortune were the rule, not the exception,
in Hindustan—only a few weeks previously Thomas himself had been
thrashing the Sikhs in the northern provinces of Delhi, and enjoying
a position of importance and confidence in the service of the Begum
Somru. It mattered little his being temporarily under a cloud. What
he had done in the past, that he could do in the future, and Appa was
in urgent need of some one to collect his revenues, since his own
mutinous troops could no longer be depended upon for that very

essential service. The man who had enforced taxes from the Tappal
Ld
UNDER APPA KHANDI RAO. 115

districts, could extort them from Appa’s, whicl: adjoined them in the
Mewatti country.

So Thomas was engaged, and ordered to raise a battalion of 1,000
regular infantry and 100 horse. But this required money, a commo-
dity Appa could not command, and, therefore, in lieu of a monthly
payment, he assigned to his new commander the districts of Tijara,
Tapukra, and Firozpur, the revenues of which were to be applied to the
expenses of the corps. They formed a portion of Appa’s own territory
of Rewari, which had formerly belonged to Ismail Beg, and lay about
forty miles south of Delhi. Their assignment answered a double pur-
pose: it secured the payment of a battalion by which Appa hoped to
re-establish his fortunes, and it brought the districts themselves under
his authority, which was comforting to his feelings and agreeable to
his dignity, for, as a matter of practical finance, he had never been
able to collect any revenue from them himself, owing to their chronic
state of rebellion. They had, indeed, been to him a bane rather than
a blessing, for whenever he sent a force against them, the peasantry
fled for refuge to the hilly tracts around, and directly his troops re-
tired, sallied forth and committed fresh depredations on the surrounding
country. This unsatisfactory state of affairs made it both cheap and
profitable to sublet the district to any one who would undertake to pay
himself out of the proceeds, and keep the unruly inhabitants in peace
and subjection,

Thomas had no misgivings as to his ability to collect revenue, for
his methods were as sure as they were summary, and he accepted the
proposal, with the single stipulation that accounts should be balanced
every six months, and the difference adjusted. This being agreed to,
he received two cannons and a supply of ammunition, and began the
enlistment of men. Service under European commanders was popular
with the natives, and there would have been no difficulty in filling his
ranks had he enjoyed the command of a little ready cash. As it was,
the problematical revenues of Tijara, Tapukra, and Firozpur did not
pass current, and it was with great difficulty he recruited 400 men.
With these he decided to take possession of his Jaidad, hoping to
extract a reality out of its shadowy resources; but scarcely had he
marched half way toward it than he was recalled in hot haste by Appa,
and ordered to accompany that chief to Delhi, to guard against any
possible commotion that might arise owing to the death of Modhoji
Sindhia, news of which had just reached Hindustan.

There were several chiefs collected at the capital, who joined in
maintaining the Mardthd authority under General De Boigne. They
were honourably received by the Emperor, to whom Thomas, in due
116 GEORGE THOMAS.

turn, presented his nazzar, or offering, and from whom he received a
valuable khilut. He remained at the capital for some time, during
which he was successful in recruiting his force up to 700, and then ob-
tained leave to depart in order to tuke possession of his assigned
districts, and raise from them the funds, which were now more
urgently needed than ever. But scarcely had he marched his party
out of the capital than they mutinied for their pay, aud began to dis-
perse and plunder the surrounding country, after the manner fashion-
able at that period.

It was with the greatest difficulty Thomas whipped in his riotous
pack, and returned with them to Delhi, where he represented to Appa
the impossibility of doing anything without means. ‘The chief found
a truly Oriental escape out of this difficulty by getling very angry ;
but Thomas, who seldom avoided a fight if he could help it, gave his
master back word for word, and a rupture seemed inminent, until
Appa compromised the matter by advancing Rs.14,000, and executing
a bond for the rest of the claims, which, it is perhaps superfluous to
add, was never honoured. The payment on account, however, enabled
Thomas to satisfy his niutineers, and in July, 1794, he set out for the
third time to take possession of his Jaidad.

His route lay through the Jumna Jaghir of the Begum Somru,
which Thomas had administered for such along time. The opportu-
nity was irresistible, and he plundered it, exacting a heavy fine from
a village called Garith. It was a very sorry return for the generous
treatment he liad received from the Begun; but it is probable his
vindictiveness was directed, not against her, but against the French
faction, which directed affairs at Sardhana, and had brought about
Thomas's downfall.

Continuing lis march after this little interlude, Thomas duly reached
his domains. It was a dark and rainy monsoon night when he arrived
at Tijaira, the place of chief importance. He pitched his camp a short
distance from its walls, and his men, fatigued after a long and harass-
ing march, lay down to rest. That night his new subjects gave him
« taste of their quality by creeping into his encampment and steal-
ing a valuable horse, which had been picketted in its very centre.

The impudence of this proceeding aroused Thomas's wrath, and he
instantly determined to inflict condign punishment on the vagabond
thieves who were so wanting in veneration for constituted authority.
So he detached a party to discover the village to which the horse had
been taken ; but they had not gone far before they were attacked, and
obliged to retire. Seeing this, Thomas ordered his cavalry to ad-
vance and cover the retreat of the detachment, whilst he himself led
UNDER APPA KHANDI RAO. 117

out the main body of his infantry; but by this time the enemy had
been considerably reinforced, and showed a formidable front. Thomas,
taking the lead of his centre column, boldly advanced and set fire to
the village, which was the point of attack, but as he was doing so, his
right and left wings were seized with a sudden panic, and fled in pre-
cipitation. Their example affected the centre, who immediately
followed, abandoning their wounded, and leaving Thomas with only
a dozen faithful men and a few cavalry to support him.

It was a moment of extreme peril. Dut it was in such crises that
Thomas displayed those splendid qualities of audacity and defiance
which distinguished his whole career. Falling slowly back on one of his
guns which had become embarrassed in the bed of a stream, he en-
couraged his small party to exert themselves in extricating it, and had
just succeeded, when the enemy, confident of victory now, renewed
the attack with furious energy.

The native commander of Thomas’s cavalry, a man of distinguished
bravery, stood nobly by his master, and, with a few others, threw
themselves between the enemy and the gun which was the object of
their charge. Their intrepidity cost them their lives; but their gallant
effort allowed time for the piece to be loaded, and the next minute
a well-directed fire of grape was poured into the advancing foe. The
timely discharge saved Thomas and the few brave fellows that sur-
vived, and after half a dozen more rounds the enemy drew off and
retired into the surrounding ravines.

Thomas now collected his fugitives, but when he had mustered
them, found his force reduced to 300 men. With these he again ad-
vanced to give battle; but the enemy, satisfied of his prowess, declined
to renew the contest.

Although his first experience had been so disastrous, the gallantry
and ability with which he retrieved the reverse created a great effect,
and spread a dread amongst the people who had opposed him. Serious
as was Thomas’s loss in action, the Mewadttis had suffered more, and
the immediate consequence was that their headmen made overtures
for peace, which led to an amicable adjustment of terms. It was
agreed that a year’s revenue should be paid, and the stolen property
restored, hostages being given for the performance of these conditions.

Tijava was the strongest place in the district, and inhabited by the
most refractory people. Only a few weeks before the date of Thomas’s
victory the Begum Somru’s whole force had failed in an attack upon
the town, and been compelled to retire. Its occupation by Thomas
led to the immediate submission of the rest of the district; but he
was so pleased with the spirit and fighting qualities of the people
118 GEORGE THOMAS.

that he offered to enlist any of them who chose to serve him, and this
being well responded to, he had no difficulty in bringing up his
battalion to the sanctioned strength.

Orders now reached Thomas from Appa to assist the collector of the
district of Kishnagar in getting in the revenue due. Having no belief
in conciliatory measures, but holding the opinion that the turbulent
people of the province could only be coerced into obedience, Thomas
at once entered into a vigorous punitive campaign, carrying fire and
sword into their midst. His expedition concluded with the subjuga-
tion of the town of Jhajjar, a place of considerable importance, after
which he returned to Tijara.

Upon the surrender of Jhajjar, Appa gave Thomas an order on the
collector of that town for a sum sufficient to pay the arrears due to
the battalion ; but just at this time the chief’s own troops mutinied
for their long-withheld pay, and the money was diverted to satisfy
their claims. Whereupon Thomas marched to the Bahadurgarh
district, to raise a contribution to meet his needs. In his route he
found the smaller villages all deserted, and considerable numbers of
armed persons collected in a threatening manner in the larger ones.
His force, thinned by frequent desertions, had dwindled down to 300
men, whose discipline was extremely unsatisfactory. Notwithstanding
which, having arrived at a place called Mandaka, and found the in-
habitants ready to resist him by arms, he attacked them without a
moment’s hesitation, and after giving them a severe beating, sacked
their village of Rs. 4,000.

The extraordinary vigour and success of Thomas’s short campaign
began to arouse the apprehensions of the Maratha authorities at
Delhi, who felt obliged to take note of the influence he was acquiring
within such a short distance of the capital. At the instigation of the
Begum Somru, whose resentment had been aroused by the recent
attack upon her Jumna Jaghir, a combined force was sent to watch
Thomas, who thereupon deemed it prudent to remove to a distance,
and, in consequence, retired to headquarters.

Scarcely had he reached Tijara than he received an urgent message
from Appa, calling on him to advance with all speed to Kot Puthiy, a
fort about forty miles distant, where the chief was detained by his
mutinous troops, who had been tampered with by Gopdl Rao Bhiao,
Daulat Rao Sindhia’s viceroy in Hindustan. Appa was fearful of
being delivered up to his enemies, and implored Thomas to rescue
him without fail, for he could no longer rely on his officers, who had
all been bought over by Gopal Rao.

Although it was raining heavily, and the afternoon far advanced
UNDER APPA KHANDI RAO. 119

when Thomas received the summons, he did not hesitate for a moment
in obeying it. The fall of his master meant his own ruin, for if Sindhia
resumed Appa’s territory, as he seemed inclined to do, Tijara, Tapikra
and Firozpur would naturally go with it. Instantly collecting his
men, Thomas marched all night and the greater portion of the follow-
ing day and night, through constant rain and over heavy roads, and at
two o’clock on the second morning arrived before Két Putli. His
sudden appearance, and the inclement state of the weather, prevented
any opposition from the mutineers, who had surrounded Appa and his
few faithful followers, and Thomas was able to march up to the fort,
encamp under its walls, and send in a supply of provisions, of which
the chief stood in great need.

As nearly all Appa’s troops were in mutiny, it was impossible to re-
establish his authority with the small force remaining loyal, and under
these circumstances Thomas recommended that an effort should be
made to come to terms with Sindhia. Of this advice Appa approved ;
but he, nevertheless, sought an early opportunity of placing himself and
his family in safety, and the next day made his way to Thomas’s camp,
a proceeding not unattended with danger. It was now determined to
fall back upon Kanaund, Appa’s principal stronghold, and the order
was given to strike camp and march. But no sooner had a start been
made, than the mutineers began to follow in pursuit, and in a short
time overtook and surrounded Thomas’s force. The position now
became very critical, and as a last resource Thomas urged Appa to
mount his elephant, and lead an attack, believing such behaviour
would have an inspiriting effect upon the men who defended him, and
who were disheartened at the position in which they found themselves.
Appa, who was a courageous chicf, at once adopted the suggestion,
which met with complete success. No sooner was a bold front shown
than the mutineers first came to a halt, and then retreated, leaving
the way clear for Thomas to conduct his master in safety to Kanaund.

The danger had been great, and the deliverance dashing, and
in gratitude for his exertions, Appa presented Thomas with a khilué
of Rs.3,000, with which to purchase an elephant and palanquin
suitable to his dignity. furthermore, to mark his appreciation of the
gallant and faithful conduct of the regular troops, he ordered a con-
siderable increase in their numbers, and assigned to Thomas in
perpetuity the districts of Jhajjar, Bairi, Mandoti, and Pathoda, which
were situated to the westward of Delhi, and yielded an annual revenue
of a lakh and a half of rupees.

This marked a distinct step in Thomas’s fortunes, for in all the
changes and vicissitudes he subsequently experienced, he clung to
120 GEORGE THOMAS.

Jhajjar to the end, and only surrendered it at the termination of his
career.

Appa being safely established at Kaénaund, where he was in a
position to hold his own, Thomas was permitted to depart in order
to take possession of his new territory, but before he had completed
doing so, a serious disturbance broke out in one of his master’s
frontier districts, which was under the charge of a Brahmin official
named Ganga Bishen, who possessed great influence, and was able to
bring 14,000 fighting men into the field. Discontented with the exacting
rule of Appa, and encouraged by recent events, Ganga Bishen entered
into negotiations to transfer his allegiance to Gopdl Rao Bhiao, and
surrender to Sindhia the district he held from Appa. This intelligence
being communicated to the latter, he sent orders to Thomas to seize
the rebel, who at once retreated to u mountainous part of the
Mewitti country, and shut himself up in a strong hill fort.

In order to lull suspicion, Thomas allowed a short time to elapse
before making any movement. He then, after a sudden and swift
night march, presented himself before the rebel’s stronghold, and by
a clever stratagem, secured his person, and sent him to Appa. But
the fort still hold out, being occupied by a garrison of 1,000 men,
under the command of Ganga Bishen’s nephew ; and it was necessary
to reduce it. As it was known to be well supplied with provisions
and ammunition, nothing but a long and tedious blockade seemed
possible, and the better to ensure success, Thomas began the construc-
tion of a chain of posts or redoubts around the place.

Whilst employed in erecting these, he experienced a desperate
adventure, in which he narrowly escaped losing his life. Shortly
after the completion of one of his principal redoubts, he had retired
to rest one night, when he was awakened by a great shouting and
commotion. Hurrying to an eminence near at hand, he saw that the
garrison had made a sortie, and possessed themselves of this redoubt,
in which was stored all his reserve arms and ammunition. Whilst
he was reconnoitring the position, a small band of the enemy caught
sight of him, and immediately bore down towards where he was
standing. In his haste Thomas had not armed himself, but at this
moment a faithful servant rushed up with his sword, which he had
just time to grasp when the attackers reached him, and he found him-
self confronted by half a dozen dangerous men.

These discharged their matchlocks, and threw several spears at him,
but fortunately with an unsuccessful aim. Perceiving a stand of
colours, which his own men had abandoned, Thomas stooped down
to pick them up, and the enemy, concluding from the motion of his
UNDER APPA KHANDI RAO. 121

body that he was wounded, dashed forward, hoping to overpower him
by force of numbers and a simultaneous onslaught. But they had
under-estimated the prowess of the Jehazi Sahib. Nothing daunted
by overwhelming odds, he gallantly met them, and although he was
obliged to loose his hold of the colours, he succeeded in beating his
assailants off, and on being reinforced by his men, drove them back
into the fort. Faint from loss of blood, he could not follow up the
advantage, but was compelled to retire to his trenches, where his
wounds were dressed, and his pusillanimous followers recalled to a
sense of their duty.

The principal points in the lines of investment were now
strengthened, and the siege vigorously enforced ; but Ganga Bishen’s
nephew held out as resolutely, and Thomas’s troops soon began to
suffer hardships. Supplies ran short, and sickness broke out. The
camp equipment was of a miserable description, Thomas’s tent being
the only one in the field, and this, with characteristic generosity, he
gave up for use as a hospital. The weather was inclement, with
incessant rain, and was made the harder to bear from the great
scarcity of blankets and warm clothing. As usual Thomas’s funds were
exhausted, and in order to raise sufficient money to purchase the
more urgent necessaries his men required, he sold his horses. It was
by such generous sacrifices as these that Thomas endeared himself to
his soldiers, and won from them that personal devotion which he
always enjoyed. In the piping times of peace his liberality was
prodigal, and in seasons of adversity, when there was no pay in the
treasure chest, and no grain in the camp bazaar, he never failed to
identify himself with his followers, sharing with them their trials,
their discomforts, and their dangers.

The siege of Ganga Bishen’s fort lasted for some time, but after
two mines had been sprung with considerable effect, the garrison
capitulated, .and Appa’s authority was asserted. Thomas then re-
turned to Jhajjar, where he collected the revenue due, paid his troops
their arrears, and allowed them the rest needful after their late severe
exertions.

Towards the end of 1794, Gopal Rao Bhiao, Sindhia’s viceroy in
Hindustan, was disgraced, and superseded by General De Boigne, who
delegated much of lis authority to Lakwa Dada, a distinguished and
favourite chief of the late Madhoji Sindhia. Lakwa now appeared in
the vicinity of Appa’s territory at the head of a large Maratha army,
and the latter, considering it politic to pay his respects in person,
visited his camp.

But although Appa was well received, the occasion was taken to
122 GEORGE THOMAS.

demand from him arrears of tribute which were stated to be due; and
when he desired to depart permission was withheld, and he was
practically detained a prisoner pending the settlement of what was
claimed from him. Although the whole amount was only two lakhs
of rupees, and many persons in Appa’s family could easily have
afforded him assistance in his distress, not a man was found who
would advance anything. Being unable to raise the required sum,
Appa, to secure his freedom, was obliged to make over his districts in
mortgage to a Maratha chief, named Bapu Farnavis, and furthermore
to enter into an agreement to pay the troops Bapu proposed to keep
up to collect the revenue. ‘In short,” observes Thomas in his
memoirs, “it was plain to see that whoever might hereafter, by
chance of war, obtain possession of the districts in question, it was
evident that by these concessions Appa had for ever done away with
his own right.” Amongst the pargannahs thus surrendered were
these of Tijara, Taptikra and Firozpur, which belonged to Thomas,
to whom the loss was a severe one, but with a magnanimity highly
to his credit he observed that ‘since his principle was ruined he had
no cause for complaint,” and made no claim for compensation from
that part of his master’s territory still remaining to him.

Appa Khandi Rao’s prestige and authority were much shaken by
this sequestration of his property, and his detention in Lakwa Dada’s
camp, and the inhabitants of his remaining districts deemed the
opportunity a good one for refusing the payment of their taxes, and
breaking into rebellion. But they had reckoned without their master’s
tax-gatherer. Thomas at once marched against them at the head of
800 men, and in a short time captured several of their principal places,
some by day and others by night assaults, and soon reduced them to
submission. His promptitude in planning, and vigour in executing,
punitive expeditions of this description were remarkable. Having
exacted heavy fines from a large portion of the malcontents, he came
at length to w place called Bairi, where he met with a desperate
resistance, the description of which is best told in his own words.

“Jn the fort of Byree, exclusive of the garrison, were 300 Rajpoots
and Jhats, who had been hired for the express purpose of defending
the place, and it was here that I was in the most imminent danger of
losing the whole of my party. We had stormed the fort and were
beat back with loss. One of my sirdars (officers) was wounded, and
from the confusion that occurred was left bchind in the hands of the
enemy. The danger was every moment increasing, the town being
set on fire in several places, and our retreat nearly cut off by the
flames that surrounded us.
UNDER APPA KHANDI RAO. 123

“Tn this situation we had the additional mortification to perceive
the merciless enemy seize on the wounded officer, and with savage
barbarity precipitate him into the fire. Equally animated and
enraged by the spectacle, my troops now rushed forward to the
attack, with an ardour that was irresistible. Having gained entire
possession of the fort, the soldiers, with clamorous expressions of
revenge, insisted on the death of every one of the garrison that
remained, and I was not inclined to refuse. But it cost us dear, the
enemy to a man making a brave resistance. This contest was con-
tinued so long as to afford time to those who had retreated to return ;
by these means we were engaged again, and at one time almost over-
powered, but receiving a reinforcement of our own party, the enemy by
slow degrees began again to retreat. I pursued with the cavalry :
the enemy once more made a stand in the jungles adjoining the
town, when, after a second desperate conflict, they gave way on all
sides, and most of them were cut to pieces.”

The expedition which was concluded by this vigorous exploit had
been ashort but severe one. Now that it was finished, the recogni-
tion awaiting Thomas was not such as he expected, for scarcely had
he completed the objects of his march than he received a communi-
cation from Appa, informing him that, owing to his straitened means,
he found it impossible to retain the services of the battalion, and he
therefore desired it to be dismissed, and Thomas to repair to his
camp in the country of the Rao Rajah.

It was certainly a brief and summary way of terminating the con-
tract that existed between the soldier and his master, and had the
merit of simplicity ; but it quite ignored the fact that Thomas’s troops
were in considerable arrears of pay, and that without a settlement of
their claims it was impossible to disband them. Their commander,
therefore, marched to Appa’s camp, which was pitched near Ulwar,
and in the interview which followed, was informed by the chief, who
spoke with visible uneasiness, that the Maratha commanders noticing
Thomas’s influence and his energetic conduct, considered him a
dangerous personage, and one who might, if occasion arose, act against
Sindhia himself, and they had therefore requested Appa to discharge
him.

Thomas, on hearing this, at once repaired to Lakwa Dida, whom
he taxed with endeavouring to procure his ruin; but the Maratha
general not only denied that he had ever disapproved of Thomas’s
conduct, but offered him the command of 2,000 men in Sindhia’s
service, if he felt inclined to leave Appa.

This was putting a new complexion on affairs, for the proposal em-
124 GEORGE THOMAS.

braced a promotion which few men would have hesitated to accept.
But it failed to tempt Thomas, whose idea of duty stretched before
him straight asa die. Mercenary soldier and adventurer though he
was, no truer or more faithful servant than this wandering Irishman
ever pledged his word. Appa’s districts had now broken out again
into a state of open rebellion, and Thomas “ considered himself under
obligations which could not be passed over; for if he now quitted his
master it would in all probability prove his utter ruin, and he there-
fore resolved to adhere to Appa Khandi Rado, and endeavour to retrieve
his affairs.”

On Thomas’s return from Lakwa’s camp, he went to interview
Appa, who excused himself for his late conduct, the reasons for which
are hard to understand. But he managed to satisfy Thomas (who
on more than one occasion in his career gave evidence of a confiding
and complacent disposition), and induced him to undertake the sub-
jugation of the revolted districts. Before he could start, however, there
came a request from Lakwa Dada, for Appa’s battalion to assist in the
reduction of the fort of Sohdwalgarh, which had refused to pay its
stipulated tribute to the Marathas, and, with his master’s consent,
Thomas marched his men to join the forces already engaged in
besieging the place.

On his arrival Thomas’s post was assigned to him, but his men,
being now several months in arrears of pay,* refused to fight, and in
order to satisfy their demands he was again compelled to sell his
property, and distribute the proceeds before his soldiers would return
to their duty.

Sohdwalgarh had been for some time invested by four of General
De Boigne’s battalions, under command of Major Gardner. The
enemy, in the hopes of compelling the Marathas to raise the siege,
had taken possession of the ravines in the neighbourhood, which led
to several skirmishes, occasioning losses on both sides. Soon after
Thomas’s arrival a council of war was summoned to consider the best
means of reducing the place, and Major Gardner proposed the advance
of a second parallel, but this could not be effected without first
capturing a very strongly fortified outpost, which no one appeared
inclined to attack.

Thomas, who was present at the council, volunteered no advice, but
his mind was already made up to take the redoubt. That same
evening he carefully reconnoitred its approaches, and decided how to

* The chronic state of arrears in which Thomas's troops seemed to exist is
difficult to understand. It is probable that his frequent assertions of having
“paid them up’? meant only small payments on account.
UNDER APPA KHANDI RAO. 125

assault it, and early the next morning, without acquainting any one of
his design, mustered his troops, formed them into columns, and,
advancing whilst the enemy were off guard, completely surprised
them. Having stormed the outworks he effected an entry into the
redoubt itself, and maintained his position until he was reinforced
from the Maratha camp, whereupon the enemy evacuated the place,
and he established himself in the position he had won.

The second parallel was now advanced, and the fort so closely
invested, that the commandant, despairing of succour from without,
negotiated for terms, and a ransom of two lakhs of rupees was
demanded, which he agreed to pay. Thomas received a share suffi-
cient to reimburse him for all the expenses he had incurred, and
then returned to his own country. This he found in the usual
rebellious state, and the better to keep it in order, he divided his
force into two battalions, one of which he employed in the collection
of revenue, and kept the other stationed at Jhajjar.

And now another danger threatened him. For some months past the
Begum Somru had been trying by every means in her power to effect
Thomas’s ruin, and had even gone so far as to bribe the Maratha
officials to advise his dismissal. To this hostile course of action she
was incited by her French officers, and especially by Thomas’s old
enemy, Le Vassoult, to whom, about this time, the Begum was secretly
married. His influence being now paramount, he persuaded her to
attack Thomas’s districts, and she accordingly ordered her army to
Thiru, a place about twenty-five miles south-east of Jhajjar. The
force consisted of 4 battalions of infantry, 400 cavalry, and 20 guns,
and it was publicly given out that the object of the expedition was a
war of revenge against her former officer.

Thomas immediately called in his detachments to headquarters,
where he concentrated all his troops, which now amounted to 2,000
regular infantry, 200 cavalry, and 10 pieces of artillery. With these
he prepared to meet the threatened invasion; but before the Begum
could put her intention into execution, a mutiny broke out in her
army, and she was obliged to return to Sardhana, whilst Thomas,
freed from the impeuding danger, once more turned his attention to
the ever-constant necessity of keeping his own districts in order.

Since Appa’s reverse of fortune his country had been placed under
a joint management, as Lakwa Dada insisted on his officials being
associated in the collection of the revenue. This surveillance was
strongly resented by Appa, whom it greatly humiliated, and he there-
fore intrigued to sow dissensions between Lakwa and his local deputy
Bapu Farnavis, and having succeeded in setting the two quarrelling,
126 GEORGE THOMAS.

determined, whilst they were occupied with one another, to reassert
his own independence.

Withdrawing into his stronghold of Kanaund, which he fortified
very strongly, he sent orders to Thomas to summarily dismiss the
Maratha collectors and officials employed by Lakwa Dada. These in-
structions were promptly carried into effect, although their execution
gave rise to much severe fighting and loss of life. Appa next marched
out and laid seige to Narnal, a large and populous town sixteen miles
south of Kanaund, where Thomas joined him, and the chief was so
delighted with the thorough way in which his work had been per-
formed, that he presented him with several valuable presents, in-
cluding an elephant and a palanquin.

Narnal was under the command of one of Lakwa Dada’s Brahmin
officials, who, on hearing of Thomas’s arrival, came to him secretly
at night, and offered to surrender the town and fort if the safety of
his own person and property were guaranteed. To this Thomas
agreed, and the gates were opened the next morning to the besiegers.
But now a difficulty arose, for Appa, being in desperate want of
money, desired to extort a heavy fine from the Brahmin, who was
known to be a rich man, and demanded his surrender from Thounas.
The request was at once refused, with an explanation of the circum-
stances under which the ian had given himself up. Upon this Appa
became very angry, and declared that the slight lowered him in the
estimation of his followers, and that it was not within Thomas’s
power to grant terms and protection to the chief's enemies. But
Thomas, whose loyalty to his word of honour was his finest trait,
refused to yield, and the result was a serious rupture between him
and Appa.

A few days later Thomas was requested to attend his master, and
at once complied. Having arrived at the house where Appa had
taken up his quarters, he was informed that the chief was ill and
confined to his bed in an upper chamber, to which Thomas was
desired to ascend. Suspecting no treachery, and anxious to avoid
giving any cause for offence, he left his escort below and went upstairs
unattended, whien, to his surprise, he found Appa apparently perfectly
well, and waiting to receive him.

A conversation ensued, and it soon became evident that the sur-
render of the Biahmin was the main object of the interview. Thomas
listened to all lis master had to say, and then replied that his pledged
word involved his personal honour and could not be broken, and that
no consideratian would induce him to yield to Appa’s request. On
hearing this the chief, making some excuse, rose and left the room,
UNDER APPA KHANDI RAO. 127

from which he had no sooner departed, than it was filled with armed
men.

‘The trap he had fallen into was now apparent to Thomas, but so
fay from showing auy alarm or timidity, he calmly retained his seat
with an air of imperturbability—a course of conduct that was not
without its effect upon the intruders. Presently a letter was handed
him from Appa, which proved to be a sort of ultimatum, demanding
the immediate surrender of the Lralimin.

This brought matters to a crisis. Many a man in such a dilemma
would have salved his conscience with the reflection that he had done
everything in his power to keep his promise, and that to resist any
longer was only to wantonly imperil the one life that stood between
the proposed victim and his destruction. But this was not the view
Thomas took of the matter, for be spurned such a surrender of
principle as it involved, and instantly refused compliance. Then,
rising to his feet, he demanded, in an imperious tone, to be conducted
to Appa’s presence. His audacity saved him, and before any one
could interpose he strode out of the room and into the adjoining
chamber, where the chief had retired.

At the sudden apparition of the tall resolute Irishman, whom he
had imagined a prisoner, Appa was completely taken aback. There
was danger in Thomas's flashing eye, and an actual threat in the
action of his hand, as it sought the hilt of his sword. Before this
exhibition of daring the Maratha chief quailed, and seeing his hesita-
tion, Thomas, with the exquisite guile and gallantry of his country-
men, relieved himself of a conventional compliment, and accomplished
his departure unmolested.

On his return to camp he despatched his diwidén, or head native
official, to Appa to inform him that, “compelled by a just indignation
against the treachery of his proceeding, he would no longer serve
him.” In this determination Thomas was supported by his troops,
who, fired at the insult offered their leader, declared they would no
longer remain in Appa’s service.

The incident illustrates very vividly the dangers that surrounded a
soldier of fortune in India in those days. Craft and treachery were
component parts of the Maratha nature, and the European, with his
code of honour, was at a disadvantage in dealing with men who had
none. Appa’s original request was one that would have been com-
plicd with by any native without demur or hesitation, and the means
he took to try and enforce it was consistent with established custom,
and would probably have been considered rather clever. The fact
that Thomas lad for a long time devoted himself with unconimon
128 GEORGE THOMAS.

energy and fidelity to the chief's cause, weighed as nothing against
the gratification of avarice or malice, and Appa would have sacrificed
his officer without a sigh rather than forego the accomplishment of
his personal desire.

And now that he had failed to coerce or intimidate him lis conduct
was equally despicable. He feared losing not only his European, but
the regular infantry as well. So he began to invent excuses for his
treachery, trying to explain it away, and in order to re-establish confi-
dence came tle next day in person to Thomas’s camp, and succeeded
in persuading him to withdraw his resignation and return to his
allegiance. It is difficult to comprehend how Thomas could have
consented to overlook what had occurred, but it is possible that he
hesitated before relinquishing an established position with a chief of
standing, and one that was not without certain substantial advan-
tages. At any rate matters were amicably adjusted, and before Appa
left he and Thomas were on their old footing.

The collection of the revenue in the Mewadtti district was the next
task that engaged Thomas’s attention. Here he found the Maratha
officials again interfering and quarrelling with Appa’s, but by punish-
ing some, and couciliating others, he brought matters into a favour-
able train for settlement. In the course of these proceedings, however,
le was under the necessity of storming wu fort, in which he captured
a valuable booty of cannon, bullocks, and other transport animals.
On hearing of this success Appa claimed as his right the artillery
taken, but Thomas as strenuously insisted that the guns belonged to
the troops who had fought for them. This divergence of opinion led to
another rupture, and Appa, highly incensed at his officer’s insubordi-
nation and growing ideas of independence, determined, if possible,
to finally effect his downfall.

To this end he entered into communication with a body of
Ghussains, who were proceeding on their annual pilgrimage to
Hardwar, and happened to be encamped in the neighbourhood. These
people belonged to a formidable sect of Hindu mendicants, accustomed
to engage in military service when any offered, and large bodies of
them were frequertly to be met with travelling from place to place,
and levying contributions wherever they went. ‘They often attached
themselves to the service of a particular chief, and for sudden attacks
or reprisals no men could be found better fitted, for they were
inured to pain and privation by the nature of their calling, and were
absolutely indifferent to death.

In consideration of a reward of Rs.10,000 the leader of this band of
Ghussains agreed to make an attack on Thomas; but, luckily, particulars
UNDER APPA KHANDI RAO. 129

of this atrocious arrangement were communicated to him by the agents
he employed in Appa Khandi Rio’s camp. Deeply incensed at the
premeditated treachery Thomas determined to defeat it, and making
a night march against the Ghussains, fell upon them unawares, and
completely turned the tables on the would-be assassins, for he routed
them with immense slaughter, and sent the few survivors in headlong
flight to Delhi, as though the devil himself were after them. Having
thus asserted himself, Thomas wrote to Appa, denouncing his base
conduct, and declining to remain any longer in the service of one who
could be guilty of such a shameful act.

A Marathé is seldom at a loss for an excuse, and Appa absolved
himself from all responsibility for the deed, by laying the blame on
his servants ; vowing that they alone were guilty, he himself having
been ill, and unable to attend to any business. He then went on to
expatiate upon the gravity of his disorder, which had taken a dangerous
turn and was growing worse every day, and capped all by expressing
a wish for a personal interview with Thomas, before it was too late, in
order that he m‘ght place under his charge the heir and successor he
had chosen, and for whose youth and inexperience he desired to enlist
his officer’s favour.

This invitation was both surprising and awkward, for though it was
true that Appa’s health was failing, Thomas was not prepared to place
any further reliance on his word. On the other hand, it was difficult to
refuse such a request from so powerful a chief. Happily the necessity
of coming to a decision in this difficult dilemma was obviated by in-
telligence of a raid made by a numerous body of Sikhs into the Doab
districts north of Delhi, where, after defeating and almost extermin-
ating the Maratha troops stationed for the defence of the frontier, they
were committing great depredations in the vicinity of Saharanpur.

Although Appa Khandi Rao had no particular connection with
Saharanpur, he thought that, in common with the other Maratha chiefs,
he ought to exert himself to prevent further incursions, the more
especially as his own districts would in all probability be the next to
suffer from these desperate marauders. He therefore ordered Thomas
to march his whole force northward, and attack the Sikhs wherever
he encountered them in Maratha territory.

The commission was one to Thomas’s taste. He had the Irishman’s
irresistible love of a row, and never lagged when fighting was in pros-
pect. Moreover, the expedition relieved him from his quandary with
regard to Appa’s invitation. Crossing the Jumna, a little to the north
of Delhi, he advanced rapidly towards the enemy. But the Sikhs
knew the Jihazi Sahib of old, having often felt the weight of his
130 GEORGE THOMAS.

sword when he was in the service of the Begum Somru, and entrusted
with the defence of these very districts. To quote Thomas’s own
words, “‘he had on more than one occasion given them samples of his
method of fighting,” and the information thus conveyed sufficed. They
had no stomach now to meet the fiery Irishman, whose prowess was
already a password along the frontier, and on hearing of his approach
effected a rapid retreat into their own territory.

When Lakwa Dada heard how promptly and efficiently Thomas had
retrieved the disgraceful defeat of the Maratha troops and cleared the
country of the Sikhs, he requested Appa to allow his officer to raise a
body of 2,000 men for the protection of the province of Saharanpur and
other parts of the Maratha possessions. To this Appa, unable to dis-
oblige so powerful a chief, reluctantly consented, and the districts of
Panipat, Sonpat, and Karnal, were assigned to Thomas in Jaidad, for
the upkeep of a special frontier force of 2,000 infantry, 200 cavalry,
and 16 guns. These districts were contiguous to Thomas’s own jaghir
of Jhajjar, and their acquisition made him paramount lord over an
extensive domain. Pinipat itself was an historical city of great an-
tiquity. It stood in the centre of a large plain, which had been the
scene of two decisive battles in the history of Hindustan, and although
it had ceased to be an emporium of commerce, as it had once been for
the caravans of Kabul, Lahore, and Persia, it still remained a place of
considerable importance.

No sooner had Thomas established himself in this new territory
than a pathetic appeal for help reached him from his old mistress
the Begum Somru. Her marriage with Le Vassoult had led to a
mutiny in her force, and in a vain endeavour to escape from Sardhana,
her husband met his death, and she herself was deposed from authority,
and confined a prisoner at her capital, her step-son, Zaffar Yab Khan,
otherwise known as Balthazar Sombre, being elevated to the govern-
ment. The Begum now wrote to Thomas in most abject and des-
ponding terms, throwing herself on his clemency, and begging him to
come to her aid, as she had no one else to look to. She declared that
she was living in imminent dread of being poisoned, and offered to pay
any sum of money he might demand if he would only reinstate her
in power.

Thomas possessed in a very marked degree the virtues of chivalry
and generosity, and could never turn a deaf ear to the pleadings of
lovely woman in distress. According to his recorded description the
Begum was at this time forty-five years of age, small in stature and
inclined to be plump. Her complexion was very fair, and her eyes
black, large, and animated. Her dress ‘“ perfect Hindostany ” and of
UNDER APPA KHANDI RAO. 131

the most costly material. She spoke the Persian and Hindustani
languages with fluency, and in conversation was ‘‘ engaging, sensikle
and spirited.” He resolved to help her, and on receipt of her letter
induced Bapu Sindhia, the Maraéth4 governor of Saharanpur, by an
offer of Rs.120,000 (£15,000), to move some troops towards Sardhdna.
I’'rom his former experience Thomas felt convinced that unless he
could gain over a portion of the Begum’s rebellious soldiery, who had
now sworn allegiance to Balthazar Sombre, not only would his exer-
tions be fruitless, but the Princess herself would be exposed to the
greatest personal danger. So he set on foot an intrigue for this purpose
in which he was successful. He then marched with his force, and
encamped at the village of Kataoli, twelve miles to the north of
Sardhana, where he publicly announced that unless the Begum was
reinstated in authority, he would accord no mercy to those who re-
sisted ; and to give additional weight to his proclamation he stated that
he was acting under the authority of Sindhia.

This intimation was at first attended with the desired effect, for a por-
tion of the troops belonging to the Sardhana State immediately re-
sponded by confining Balthazar Sombre and declaring for the Begum.
But Thomas knew well that no reliance could be placed on their capri-
cious temper, for mutiny came to them as a periodical relaxation in
the monotony of life: so he lost no time in pinning them to their
declaration by advancing towards Sardhina. But before he reached
the place a counter revolution had already proclaimed the restoration
of Balthazar Sombre.

Thomas now determined on a coup de main. Ordering four hundred
of his infantry to follow with all expedition, he galloped forward, escorted
by only fifty cavalry, on whom he could thoroughly depend. Balthazar
Sombre on seeing the weakness of this escort at once jumped at the
conclusion that he had got Thomas into his power, and gave orders
for an attack, but at this moment the infantry were perceived in the
distance, and the mutineers believing the whole Marathé army was
at hand, sought safety in a third revolution, deposed Balthazar nemine
contradicente, and tendered their humble submission to Thomas.
Before sunset the Begum Somru was restored to power, and an oath
of fidelity—such as it was worth—extracted from her troops, whilst
Balthazar Sombre, who was a poor debauched semi-imbecile half-caste,
was plundered of all his property, and conducted a prisoner to Delhi,
where he was incarcerated.

After reinstating the Begum Thomas marched his force to a large
town named Samli, situated on the Sikh frontier, the commandant
of which place had encouraged the Sikhs in their late incursion, by
182 GEORGE THOMAS.

communicating to them the defenceless condition of the Upper Provinces.
Saili was situated forty-five miles from Sardhéna, and Thomas covered
the distance in twenty-four hours. An action took place in the open, in
which the commandant, after a stubborn resistance, was defeated and
compelled to retreat into the town, and Thomas, anxious to bring the
affair to a speedy conclusion, gave orders for an assault the same
evening, when the fort was carried by storm, and nearly all the garrison
put to the sword.

It was by these long and rapid marches, and by these sudden and
vigorous attacks, that Thomas won most of his victories. There never
existed a man who more conscientiously observed the maxim “ Never
put off till to-morrow what you can do to-day.” Fearless, impatient,
impetuous, the Jehazi Sahib could brook no delay when his fighting
blood was aroused, and his very audacity imposed on his enemies, so
that they came to regard him as irresistible and invincible.

Having arranged affairs at Samli, and appointed a new governor,
Thomas next repaired to Bapu Sindhia’s camp, to whom, under orders
from Appa, he was now attached. Bapu was engaged in the reduction
of Laknoti, a place of considerable strength, situated on the east bank
of the Jumna a little to the north of Samli, and occupied by the Sikhs.
A practicable breach having been effected, preparations were made for
an assault, but the commandant, seeing he was likely to be unsuccessful
in defending the fort, in order to save effusion of blood, came privately
to Thomas’s tent, and made terms for the surrender of the place, which
were faithfully and punctually carried out on the following morning.

The next matter of importance in Thomas’s career was the receipt of
a letter from Appa, in which that chief informed him that from con-
tinued illness his pains were augmented to a degree which had become
intolerable, and no hope remaining of recovery from his cruel distemper,
he had determined to put a period to his misery by voluntary death.
For this purpose he was on his way to the Ganges, but he requested
Thomas to come to see him once more before the scene closed for ever.
On receipt of this intelligence Thomas set out immediately to afford,
such consolation as he could to his desponding chief; but he had not
marched far when intelligence reached him that Appa had committed
suicide by drowning himself in the river Jumna.

Thus perished, in 1797, one of Madhoji Sindhia’s most intrepid and
enterprising chieftains, and a man who had played no inconsiderable
a part in the Maratha conquest of Hindustan. Appa had been engaged
in the battles of Lalsot, Chaksana, and Agra, and the occupation of
Delhi. He was a typical Maratha, whose mind was never free from
intrigue and treachery, and his conduct towards Thomas had at times
UNDER APPA KHANDI RAO. 133

been as base as it was unintelligible, for he had no abler or more loyal
soldier in his service than the European whose life he twice attempted
to take. On the other hand Appa was a brave and skilful general,
whose later misfortunes were due to political causes, and who, during
a troublous time in the history of Hindustan, held his own against
many and powerful enemies, and retained his distinguished position
until his death.
CHAPTER III.
THE CONQUEST OF HARIANA.
1797-1798.

HE death of Appa Khandi Rao was a severe blow to Thomas.
Although the chief had often been capricious and treacherous in
his conduct, he had at times shown he could appreciate the high
qualities of his European officer, and as he represented an established
power in Maratha politics there was a substantial advantage in being
connected with him. A great deal could be done in India under the
name of authority, even though the power invoked was a shadowy
unreality. Tor twenty years Hindustan had been ruled in the name
of Shah ’Alam, and notwithstanding that he was blind, helpless, and
a prisoner, edicts continued to be issued in his name, and rewards,
titles, and privileges conferred by his favour.

Appa Khandi Rado was succeeded in his possessions by his nephew
Viaman Rao, or Bawan Rao as the name is sometimes written.
Vaman Raéo was a vain, inexperienced youth, better fitted for
the calling of an accountant than the career of a soldier. He was
entirely in the hands of intriguing Brahmins and crafty courtiers, who
crowded his capital at Rewari, and were jealous of the authority and
influence of Thomas, to whom Appa, in his last moments, had en-
trusted the protection of his heir. They soon persuaded the young
chief to renounce his guardian, and demand from him the restitution
of the district, which had been granted as a reward for honourable
services. Thomas was naturally indignant at this treatment, and
peremptorily refused to surrender his Jaidad, but conscious that a
quarrel between Vaman Rao and himself could only involve both in
very serious difficulties, he endeavoured to compromise matters by
offering to pay a sum of money to be confirmed in his possessions,
this species of succession duty being in accordance with the custom of

the country.
131
THE CONQUEST OF HARIANA. 185

But Vaman Rao, instigated by his advisers, would not agree to this,
and was foolhardy enough to resort to force. Without notice or
warning he occupied with his undisciplined rabble a large village
called Kosli, which formed part of Thomas’s possessions. The latter,
with a forbearance not usual with him, curbed his inclination to fight,
and endeavoured to avoid a breach of the peace. This encouraged
Vaman Rao, who on being joined by large bodies of local peasantry,
became too formidable to be ignored, and Thomas felt obliged to bring
the business to an issue. He accordingly attacked the chief’s troops,
and the affair was quickly decided. Vaman Rdo’s soldiery broke at
the first onslaught and fled in all directions, and the greater part of
them having taken refuge in the fort of Kosli were besieged therein.
After erecting batteries, Thomas ordered grates for heating shot to
be made ready, and this being done, fired so successfully with red hot
balls as to quickly set the place on fire, and compel a surrender at
discretion.

It was now agreed that an interview should take place between
Thomas and Vaman Rao at Kanaund, for at the first sign of defeat the
chief had shut himself up in that stronghold. But when Thomas
arrived, Viaman Rao pretended to be fearful of treachery, and refused
to come out of the fort, whilst Thomas, for similar reasons, was un-
willing to enter it. The negotiations were in consequence broken off,
and leaving matters in statwo quo the latter marched his troops north,
where his presence was required to repel an incursion of the Sikhs.
He took the precaution, however, of leaving a force to defend Jhajjar
against any attack that might be made on it in his absence, and then
directed his way to Karnal, where he soon had his hands full of
fighting. Four successive actions took place, which resulted in a loss
of 500 men on Thomas’s side, and 1,000 on that of the enemy. A
mutual desire for peace was the result of this blood-letting, and a
treaty was concluded by which the Sikhs agreed to evacuate the
villages they had taken possession of.

Vaman Rao did not neglect the opportunity of attacking Jhajjar
during its master’s absence, but the garrison left in it resisted him
successfully, and on Thomas’s return the chief thought fit to retire.

The differences between Thomas and his old master’s heir had been
fomented in a great measure by a specious and wily native named
Kashmiri Bholi, who was the zemindar, or headman, of a large and
populous district called Dadri, which lay to the west of Jhajjar.
Thomas now determined to punish this individual, and falling upon
him suddenly extorted a heavy fine. No sooner had he effected this
than he was summoned by Bapu Sindhia, the governor of Saharanpur,
136 GHOLGH THOMAS.

to assist in repelling an invasion of Rohillas on the eastern frontier of
the province, to which they had been incited by a Sikh chief named
Nihal Sing, who had himself assembled a large body of his country-
men to assist by a diversion on the western boundary. On Thomas’s ap-
proach the latter at once withdrew, and meanwhile Bapu having driven
back the Rohillas, Thonas’s assistance was not required, so he turned
aside to Sonpat, one of the districts recently assigned to him, and en-
camped there a short time, making himself acquainted with its re-
source. Soon rumours of the arrival at Lahore of Zeman Shah, the
King of Kabul, created general consternation in Hindustan, and
caused Bapu Sindhia to summon a council of war, to which Thomas
was invited, the districts he was deputed to guard being in the very
path of the projected invasion, and the place where the Afghan army
should most properly be met.

Unfortunately at this critical juncture Thomas’s troops, being in
arrears of pay, became clamorous for their dues. This, at a time
when their services might at any moment be urgently required, gave
the greatest offence and dissatisfaction to Bipu, and caused a serious
misunderstanding between him and Thomas. The result was that the
latter marched away in disgust, and was at once followed and at-
tacked by a force sent after him by the Maratha chief, but in the
action that took place Bipu’s general was wounded, and drew off his
troops. An amicable arrangement might now have been effected had
not the Sikhs, delighted at the breach between the governor of
Saharanpur and his Warden of the Marches, intrigued successfully
to widen it and bring about a renewal of hostilities.

This was a serious matter, for with Bapu Sindhia against him on
one side, and Vaman Ido on the other, each threatening to sequestrate
his assigned districts, Thomas was placed in a dangerous predica-
ment. After considering his situation, he determined to fall back on
Karnal; but in order to accomplish this he had to cross the Jumna,
and Bapu, who was determined to dispute his passage, having strongly
reinforced his defeated troops, took the command in person, and
getting between ‘Thomas and the river opposed his progress. <A des-
perate engagement ensued, but the latter, although greatly outnum-
bered, was successful in holding his own and eventually effected his
object.

Baipu Sindhia was now joined by many of the country. people,
and further reinforced by troops sent out by Ragoji, the Maratha
general at Delhi, as well as by some of the Begum Somrv’s battalions
—a poor reward to Thomas for the aid he had recently afforded that
princess. As Sardbina was a tributary state to the Mardthas, she was
THE CONQUEST OF HARIANA. 187

probably acting from necessity not choice. With this combined force
Bapu crossed the Jumna, and by a rapid march took up a position
between Thomas and Jhajjar with the intention of cutting off his
retreat to his Jaidad.

Thomas’s position was nowvery critical, for he was short of provisions
and completely isolated, and there was only one resource left to him,
namely, to fight his way through the enemies’ forces. This he at once
determined to do, and forming his men into line, gave battle. Bapu
now looked upon success as assured, and engaging Thomas’s front
with his infantry, sent his cavalry to charge him in flank. These
attacked him again and again, but were on each occasion driven back
by steady and well-directed volleys, poured into them by Thomas's
right and left wings, who changed front to repulse them. After each
charge Thomas moved his force forward, and as the attacks became
weaker and weaker gradually made good his advance, until at length
he found the road to Jhajjar clear and effected his escape. Bapu,
disheartened by his heavy loss, made no attempt to pursue, but con-
tented himself with re-occupying the districts of Panipat, Sonpat and
Karnal, which Thomas, of necessity, had to abandon.

Dispossessed of his principal source of revenue, Thomas was now com-
pletely crippled, and left with no adequate means to pay his troops, who
numbered 3,000 men. He had hitherto occupied « position analagous
to that of other Kuropean adventurers in the Marathi service, to
whom territory was assigned for the upkeep of their corps. But his
summary dismissal from his appointment of Frontier Warden, and the
resumption of his districts by Bapu, left him not only without a master,
and without a territory, but encumbered with an army heavily in
arrears of pay, which had recently mutinied and might at any time
mutiny again, and with only the revenues of the comparitively small
district of Jhajjar to draw upon. These were altogether insufficient
for the support of such a large force as he had enlisted.

This reverse marks a distinct departure in Thomas's career.
Hitherto he had been a mercenary, fighting other peoples battles for
stipulated payment, and acting under such authority or license as
passed current in those wild times and places. But the fountain of re-
muneration was now dried up, and he was thrown solely on his own
resources. Needs must when necessity drives, and from this hour
Thomas threw off all disguise, and became a frecbooter pure and
simple. There was no attempt at concealment. He began forthwith to
support himself by fillibustering raids on the towns and villages of
his neighbours, without any regard whatever to the elementary laws
of mewn and tuum. He sold his troops for specific reward, or let
138 GEORGE THOMAS.

them out “by the job,” with license to pillage and plunder like any
Pindari. His attacks were indiscriminate, the occasion of his im-
pecuniosity being the certain signal for a foray in the nearest territory
where he could hope to levy fines.

This course of life which he now entered upon cannot be defended
or excused. The most that can be said for it is that it was in keeping
with the ideas of the times, and in harmony with the Maratha system
which dominated Hindustan. Thomas, in his isolated and adven-
turous career, surrounded by enemies and befriended by no one, was
fighting for very existence. Both his livelihood and personal safety
depended upon the men who followed his standard ; had they rebelled
against him his life would not have been worth an hour’s purchase.
Money was the sole power able to control them, and when his assign-
ment was forfeited his only means of raising money went with it.
There were but two courses open to him: flight into British territory,
or a bold bid for independence. His daring and ambitious nature
rebelled against the ignominious escape offered by the former: to
achieve the latter it was necessary to throw all conventional restraint
to the winds, and boldly usurp a position, which, whilst raising every
man’s hand against his, would make him his own master. This was
the course George Thomas chose.

Upon his arrival at Jhajjar the troops at once demanded their pay,
and in order to satisfy their claims he marched them against Harichu,
a large and populous town belonging to the Rajah of Jaipur, and
“levied a contribution” from it. Without reason or right other than
his own necessity, he called on the governor of the town to pay him a
“ransom” of a lakh of rupees, which being denied, he stormed and
took possession of the place. The fort, which defended the town, and
stood separate from it, still held out; but when Thomas prepared for
a second assault, the commandant offered Rs.52,000, and this was
accepted. But during the negotiations the town had “ unfortunately
been set on fire, and burnt so fiercely that goods to the amount of
several lakhs of rupees were totally consumed.”’

This episode is related by Thomas with a candour which, in a less
reprehensible matter, would be a naive. There is a directness of
description and a precision of narrative in his treatment of the subject
which has a copybook simplicity. Hc volunteers no explanation,
advances no theory of justification, attempts no excuses, but merely
mentions that he wanted money to pay his men, and so he went to
Harichu and took it.

Perhaps this bold and lawless action had an effect on Viman Rao,
whose adjacent territories might be the next to tempt “ contribution.”
THR CONQUEST OF HARIANA. 139

At any rate he chose the moment to re-open negotiations, and con-
ducted them in such a conciliatory spirit, that the differences between
the two were adjusted and Thomas was confirmed in his possession of
Jhajjar. In return for this he employed himself in reducing several
of the chief's refractory zemindars to obedience, and in forcing from
them the payment of their arrears of revenue. This incidental ex-
pedition carried him again towards the borders of the Jaipur territory,
the proximity of which suggested another raid. And so he repeated
his former experiment, this time under a pretence of punishing, what
he was pleased to call, “a nest of banditti,” who had at some remote
date invaded Vaman Rao’s country, the memory of which iniquity
aroused a virtuous indignation in Thomas’s bosom, and compeiled
him to attack them in force, and annihilate “the thievish tribe” before
returning to his headquarters at Jhajjar.

He now determined to allow his men a short rest and recreation
after their sixteen months incessant campaign, the more especially as
it was the month of May, and the intense heat of the season militated
against operations in the field. It was during this short period of
inaction that there came to Thomas’s imagination the ambitious
design of erecting for himself an independent principality, over which
he might rule with sovereign power.

To the north-west of Jhajjar lay a tract of territory known as
Haridna, or the Green Land. Perchance the name reminded him
of the Green Isle far away, from which he had come, and for which
he felt the passionate devotion of an Irishman. Although at the
present day a populous and settled district, replete with railways, roads,
jails, court-houses, and missionaries, and hallowed with the privileges
of local self-government, Haridna at the end of the last century was a
veritable No Man’s Land, acknowledging no master, and tempting
none. In turn the prey of many succeeding invaders, it had for
many years been a recognised battle-ficld for contending powers. It
covered an area of nearly three thousand square miles of country so
wild and barren that it had been a favourite hunting ground for Firoz
Tughlak, a renowned king of Delhi, the ruins of whose buildings were
still to be seen, and also the remains of a canal, excavated in the year
1856, to supply the place with water from the Jumna. This was
rendered necessary by the natural dryness of the region—the name
Hariina being appropriate to only a small portion of it—for there
was little or no surface water to be found, the only supply, not
brackish, being obtained from wells, most of which had to be sunk
to a depth of over a hundred feet.

So far back as 1036, Hansi, the capital town of Haridna, had been
140 GEORGE THOMAS.

in existence, and was, indeed, a place of considerable importance.
When Massoud, the son of the famous Mahmud of Gazni, invaded
India, he found it fortified and strongly garrisoned by Hindus, who
believed it could never fall into the hands of the Muhammadan. It
was, however, taken by storm after a short siege of six days, and
plundered of the immense treasures it contained. Lying as it did in
the direct road of the Western approach to India, it became thereafter
the victim of many invading armies, and owing to this cause was
almost a depopulated wilderness when Thomas determined to make
himself master of it.

Having matured his plans and waited until the approach of the
rainy season, Thomas reinforced his army, provided it with everything
necessary to ensure success, and commenced his march. His first
attack was directed against the town and fort of Kanhori, tle inhabi-
tants of which were notorious for “thievish depredations,’ which
shocked Thomas. Advancing with his usual celerity, he attempted,
according to his custom, to take the place by storm, but was prevented
by the spirited resistance of the enemy, who compelled him to retreat
with a loss of 8300 men.

This was an unfortunate prelude to his scheme of conquest, and
would have induced most aspirants to forego such ambitious designs.
But Thomas was a man whose persistence equalled his courage.
Like an illustrious fellow-countryman of his, who, half a century later,
distinguished himself not many miles from this very spot, he ‘‘ never
was bate and never would be bate!” A repulse only raised his fury
and stirred him to fresh endeavour, and when his troops fell back,
baffled and defeated from the walls of Kanhori, he issued orders for
the fortification of the camp, with the stern determination of retrieving
the disaster.

A regular siege of the fort was now commenced, but constant and
heavy rain prevented the erection of batteries, and so a fortified chain
of posts was erected round the town, by which it was cut off from all
external aid. Before long the garrison were in straits for provisions,
and began to suffer great distress, and they made several fierce sallies,
attempting to fight their way through in investing lines.

During one of these encounters Thomas experienced another of
those desperate adventures and escapes with which the history of his
life abounds. A sortie was directed against the redoubt which he
himself occupied, and in the confusion of the attack a sudden panic
seized his troops, and the greater portion ran away, leaving him in a
most critical position, for only five of lis infantry remained with him,
these being selected soldiers to whom lad been allotted the particular
THE CONQUEST OF HARIANA. 141

charge of his firearms, consisting of pistols and blunderbusses of a
large size. With these, and the assistance of a few cavalry who came
to his aid, he maintained the post for a considerable time against every
effort of the enemy to dislodge him, and at length by repeated and
well-directed discharges compelled them to retire.

A few days after this occurrence, the weather becoming finer,
Thomas was able to erect a battery, from which he fired with such
good effect as to bring down a portion of the wall of the fort. This
emboldened him to attempt another assault, but night coming on,
he was obliged to defer it till the following morning, when he found
the enemy had evacuated the place.

The best and bravest inhabitants of the Haridina district resided in
the fort of Kanhori, men of desperate courage, nurtured in battle, and
inured to invasion, and who lived by the sword and recognised no
other form of government. The defeat of so formidable a faction had
a salutary effect on the rest of the district, which offered but a slight
resistance. In a short time Thomas gained complete possession of
the whole of the southern portion of the territory; but it cost him
much trouble to extend his rule over the north-western parts, which
were occupied by the Sikhs and a predatory tnbe called Bhattis.
These he successfully engaged and defeated, driving the former back
across the river Ghaggar, which he made his boundary in that direc-
tion.

The conquest of Hariina was now complete, and Thomas pro-
claimed his rule over an extent of territory which had formerly
contained nearly a thousand towns and villages, and produced an
annual revenue of Rs.1,430,000 (£178,750). But the number of the
former was now reduced to little more than a quarter, and only yielded
Rs.286,000 a year. The products of the country consisted chiefly of
grain, and were dependent upon the rainfall. In favourable seasons
the Ghaggar—of evil reputation to Simla-bound travellers of the pre-
sent day—-overflowed its banks and inundated the northern pargannahs.
On the subsiding of the waters a rich greasy deposit remained on
the land, which produced amazing crops of wheat and grass. So
stimulating were the effects of this pasturage that the cattle grazed
on it were celebrated for their excellence, and this character they
retain to the present day. In the southern and western parts of the
country the soil was sandy and the rainfall small, the consequence
being that cultivation was very sparse. During the summer months
the heat was intense, but upon the whole the climate was sufficiently
salubrious, and in the winter very cold and bracing.

For the capital of his new domains Thomas selected the town of
142 GEORGE THOMAS.

Hansi. The state of desolation into which this place had fallen may
be estimated from a legend which long ran current in the Panjab that,
when Thomas occupied the city, its sole inhabitants were a fakir, or
holy mendicant, and two lions—emblems of its poverty and its deserted
state. It had, however, the advantage of being centrally situated on
an elevated spot of ground, the highest for many miles round. The
ruins of the former city lay at the foot of the fortress, which was
built on one of those huge mounds of earth common to this part of
the Panjab and the mud walls of the citadel were of such enormous
thickness as to prove impervious to shot. A large reservoir in the
centre caught and retained the rain-water, and there were several wells
in the immediate vicinity, although the surrounding country was an
arid waste of desert, through which approach for any large body of
men was rendered almost impossible by the absence of water. The
district harboured many tigers, and a few lions, it being the only place
in India, except Guzerat, where the latter species of ferae existed.
Even as late as 1830 they were to be found there.

The plain around Hansi might almost be termed a cemetery, for
it was computed that not less than 40,000 of the followers of the
Prophet had found a resting-place within a short circuit of its walls
during the centuries of warfare it had witnessed between Hindu and
Mubhammadan. The inhabitants of the district were endowed with
great personal bravery, and were expert in the use of arms, particularly
in the exercise of the lance, sabre, and matchlock. Many instances
of their resolution and courage were recorded, and in recent years
they had successfully resisted the attacks of Mughals and Mardthis,
and forced their armies to retreat. But, although fearless in fight,
they were cruel, treacherous, and vindictive, and singularly callous of
shedding blood or taking life in their domestic quarrels, The greater
part of the population at the time of Thomas’s annexation were Hindus,
and their occupation agricultural.

Thomas’s first care was to rebuild the walls of the fort, which had
long fallen into ruin, and repair the dofences of the town that lay
under its ramparts. The decay of ages had eaten into the red-brick
masonry, so that it crumbled to the touch, the streets were empty
and the houses roofless and tenantless. But by degrees and by gentle
treatment Thomas attracted nearly 6,000 people to take up their
residence in the place, and to these he allowed every lawful indulgence,
and guaranteed the protection of their lives, liberty, and property.

What more he did is best told in his own words, by quoting the
following famous passage in his memoirs, which has been reproduced
by nearly every writer who has had occasion to mention him :—
THE CONQUEST OF HARIANA. 143

“At Hansi I established a mint and coined my own rupees,* which
I made current in my army and country. As from the commencement
of my career at Jhujhur I had resolved to establish an independency,
I employed workmen and artificers of all kinds, and I now judged that
nothing but force of arms could maintain me in my authority. I
therefore increased their numbers, cast my own artillery, commenced
making muskets, matchlocks, and powder—and, in short, made the
best preparations for carrying on an offensive and defensive war, till,
at length, having gained a capital and a country bordering on the
Sikh territories, I wished to put myself in a capacity, when a favour-
able opportunity should offer, of attempting the conquest of the Punjaub,
and aspired to the honour of planting the British standard on the banks
of the Attock!”’

One other act of Thomas’s must be mentioned. Very early in his
rule he instituted a system of pensions and compensations for his
soldiers, and those who were wounded in his service received sufficient
for their wants, whilst half of the pay of their rank was granted to the

* Through the kindness of General Sir A. Cunningham the following engraving
of a George Thomas rupce has been obtained :—

Reverse. Obverse.

FS Sz

   

JALUS (REIGN), SIKAH SAHEB,

42 OF SHAH ’ALAM. A.H. 1214
(a.D. 1799-1800). (A.D. 1799-1800).

General Cunningham writes : —

‘“T believe this rupee to have been struck by George Thomas.

“The middle line of the obverse reads Sihah Saheb, which is never used for
the money of aking. Saheb Kirdn Sani is used as a title of kings, but always
in combination with the name of the king.

‘¢The Hegira date on the obverse is 1214—a.p. 1799-1800.

“The Reign (Jaliis) date on reverse is 42 of Shah ’Alam=a.p. 1799-1800.

“‘T hope this coin may be proved to belong to George Thomas. The date is
correct. The beginning of the name of Hénsi is at the left hand of the top line
of the Reverse. The mint city of the kings was Hisdér ; but Hdnsi was a very
famous fortress which resisted the arms of the early Ghazni kings, and was
accordingly known as the ‘ Maiden Fortress.’ ”’

An additional interest is attached to this engraving, from the fact that the
coin it is copied from is probably unique.
144 GEORGE THOMAS.

widows and children of men killed in action. These liberal provisions
absorbed a sum of Rs.50,000 a year, which was more than a tenth of
Thomas’s entire revenue—a proportion far in excess of that allotted to
such philanthropical purposes, even in the most civilised countries.

It is a pleasant page in his chequered career to dwell upon. And
so let the chapter close on George Thomas, emancipated trom his lust
of battle, and settling down for a brief space in his erratic life to
cultivate the paths of peace and improvement, and patronise the rude
arts of those rude days.
 

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Ta

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TN

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MADHOJL SINDHIA.

[Fron a plate in bianchlin ss History of the Reign of Shah- Aulus.”
CHAPTER IV.
THE JAIPUR CAMPAIGN.
1799.

Y the time Thomas had established himself at Hariana, and
outlined a system of administration, his exchequer was ex-
hausted, and he was called upon to solve the problem of finance.
When he had money at his command he was a lavish paymaster,
and in cantonments spoilt his men with kindness, often in his im-
providence expending his last rupee on them with cheerful reckless-
ness. At this particular time he had extremely heavy calls on his
resources, for he was preparing for the great project which had become
the central idea of his mind and his ambition. This was the conquest
of the Panjab, or, as he expressed it, the planting of the British
standard on the banks of the Attock river. With this object in view,
he commenced casting cannon, manufacturing small arms, and pur-
chasing warlike stores and material, and these expenses soon brought
him to the end of his means. Whereupon he took stock of his
position to see if he was properly prepared for the great under-
taking he aspired to carry through; but on a review of his troops
his force appeared insufficient. He therefore decided on what he
pleasantly terms an “ excursion” into Jaipur territory, which place,
he gratefully adds, “lad hitherto afforded a never-failing supply to
his necessities, and whose ruler was, in consequence, become his
bitter enemy.”

It happened just about this time that the Rajah of Jaipur was in
arrears with the payment of his tribute to the Marathas, and Vaman
Rao was ordered to invade his country and collect what sums he
could. Of the amount so realised he was authorised to retain ten-
sixteenths to pay himself for his trouble and exertion, and the balance
was to be remitted to the Maratha treasury.

For the delicate detail of accounts, and especially for crediting

10 145
146 GHORGE THOMAS.

himself with a bigger ten-sixteenths than so exact a science as
mathematics legitimately allows, Vaman Ro was most admirably
qualified. But the coarse and brutal preliminary of invading Jaipur
territory and by force of arms coercing a nation of warriors into
paying tribute was quite out of his line. Partib Sing’s army con-
sisted of 80,000 cavalry and 18,000 infantry, with a numerous and
well-appointed artillery. The order to compel the lord of so many
legions to pay up tribute quite staggered the little quill-driving,
copper-counting chief, and he immediately wrote pressing letters to
Thomas urging him to assist in the proposed expedition. Thomas,
however, possessed with the delirium of Panjab conquest, was un-
willing to enter into a» campaign which he knew must prove an
extended one, preferring the small but quick profits of rapid raids, and
partly from this reason, partly from prudential motives, declined the
invitation. He foresaw that to put into the field a body of troops
sufficient for an invasion like the one proposed could only be accom-
plished with a full treasury, whereas his was as dry as the sands of
his own deserts. This he explained to Viman Rao, but the chief had
become fascinated with the commission and was not to be denied.
It seemed to him that if Thomas could be prevailed upon to do the
fighting, he himself could cope with the accounts, and as this pro-
mised substantial pecuniary results (Jaipur being rich in resources of
every kind) he pressed his proposals home, and finally sent a Vakil
to Thomas with the offer of a sum of money down. This argument
was irresistible, and Thomas consented to accompany the chief on his
expedition.

The Haridna force at this time consisted of three battalions of
400 men each, 800 Rohilla irregulars, 200 Hariina irregulars, 90
cavalry, and 14 picces of artillery—in all nearly 2,000 men. Vaman
Rao’s troops numbered one battalion of infantry, 600 irregulars, 900
cavalry, and four guns; so that the combined forces amounted to
about 4,000 strong. Having effected a junction, the march for Jaipur
territory was commenced early in 1799.

On entering the country a detachment of the Rajah’s troops,
stationed on the frontier to collect revenue, retreated, and the head-
man of the district sent a Vakil into Thomas’s camp and agreed to
pay two lakhs of rupees as tribute. This offer was accepted, and the
march being resumed several other chiefs were compelled to submit,
and for a month the invaders continued their progress without
opposition, their mere presence suflicing to enforce their demands.

But meanwhile Partab Sing had not been idle. Having collected
his troops, he now marched to the relief of his northern districts,
THE JAIPUR CAMPAIGN. 147

wherein Thomas and Vaman Rao were disporting themselves, with a
resolution to punish them and give battle whenever he met them.
Nearly the whole of the Jaipur mercenary and feudal troops were
assembled in this army, which amounted to not less than 40,000
fighting men.

Buoyed up by a false sense of security begotten of their unopposed
progress, Thomas and Vaman Rao had pushed on too far, and sud-
denly discovered they were cut off in the middle of a hostile country
without any source of supply or base of operations to fall back
upon—a disregard of military caution which involved their small flying
column in a very hazardous position. In this dilemma Vaman Rao
counselled retreat, deeming it impossible to encounter so large a force
as that threatening them, and which was, moreover, composed chiefly
of Rajputs, whose bravery was traditional. In combatting these
arguments and frustrating so pusillanimous a design, Thomas remon-
strated strongly against a retrograde movement, and reminded Vaman
Rao that he had in the first instance insisted on undertaking the
expedition, and that there existed no cause to prevent at least one
trial of strength with the enemy, the troops being faithful and eager
to engage. As for a retreat, without an exertion on their part,
“ This,” Thomas declared, ‘‘ would be a dishonour to myself and my
progenitors, who never turned their backs on an enemy.” But the
argument which finally prevailed with the chief was the warning that
he could never again expect to be employed by Sindhia, or any other
chief under his authority, if he retreated now without striking a blow.
In the end, Viaman Rao agreed to risk an engagement, and with this
determination marched to Fatehpur, a prosperous and important
town in the Shekhawati district, where there was a prospect of
finding a supply of grain sufficient for the troops, and securing a
strong defensive position.

Early information of Thomas’s approach was conveyed to the
inhabitants of this place, who, as a preliminary measure of re-
sistance, filled up all the wells in the surrounding country, and thus
rendered it waterless in the direction from which the invaders were
advancing. Unaware of this, Thomas pushed on, only to discover,
when it was too late to rectify his mistake, the serious danger to
which his force was exposed. For on the last day he was obliged to
make a forced march of twenty-five miles over deep sand, through
which, as the long, hot afternoon wore on, his jaded troops could
scarcely plough their way, their feet sinking ankle-deep into the
yielding surface. When at length the walls of Fatehpur loomed in
sight, the town was found fully prepared to resist, and the last well
148 GEORGE THOMAS.

outside its gates was just being filled up by a body of 400 men, who
had been detached for the task.

The capture of this solitary water supply now became an object of
supreme importance, as Thomas at once realised. It was no time for
hesitation, and without further ado he collected his little band of
regular cavalry, who needed no stimulus beyond the cravings of their
own unendurable thirst, and charged the force defending the well.
The skirmish was at first obstinate, but two of the enemy’s officers
being killed, their men fell back, and the well was happily preserved.
It was a narrow escape from a great disaster, for if the comparatively
unfatigued cavalry had failed in their attack, the exhausted infantry,
who had toiled on foot during the whole of a day, ‘“ the service of
which was uncommonly severe,” could not have retrieved defeat, and
Thomas’s army must either have been annihilated in an unequal
fight, or in an almost impossible retreat have perished from thirst
and fatigue.

The camp was now pitched, and the troops obtained the rest and
refreshment needed, and by morning were ready for work again.
But the city being full of people, Thomas desired to treat for its
surrender, in order to save the effusion of blood which must neces-
sarily ensue from an assault. He therefore suggested the payment of
a ransom, but no sooner was the word ‘negotiation’? whispered than
Vaman Rao came to the front, and demanded ten lakhs of rupees.
The townspeople, being encouraged to hold out by the hope of
receiving assistance from the Rajah of Jaipur, who was rapidly
advancing to their relief, responded by offering to pay one lakh, and
nothing definite was arrived at when night put a stop to the negotia-
tions. Whereupon Thomas, who disbelieved in the policy of pro-
crastination, formed his troops, and stormed and captured the place
the next morning.

This was scarcely effected than intelligence of Partab Singh’s
approach was announced. Thomas, in consequence, decided to fortify
his camp, which he did in the following ingenious way. There grew
in the neighbourhood an abundance of a species of wild thorn-tree
common to that part of India, and he caused a large number of
these to be cut down and piled one upon another in the front and
flanks of the camp, with their branches closely interwoven. Being
strengthened and secured with ropes, they formed an almost
impenetrable chevaux de frise, the weight and solidity of which
were increased by a large quantity of sand thrown between the
branches and piled up over their butts. It was not practicable to dig
trenches, as the soil was too loose, but the abattis, or breastwork,
THE JAIPUR CAMPAIGN. 149

described was found ample both to ward off the charge of the enemy’s
horse, and to protect the camp generally. Some of the wells in the
vicinity having by this time been cleared out and opened afresh for
use, batteries were erected for their defence. In the immediate
rear of the camp stood the town of Fatehpur, which was fortified in the
best manner the shortness of the time admitted. Nor did Thomas
neglect the precaution of collecting a large supply of provisions and
grain, and by the time he had completed these preparations the
vanguard of the Jaipur army appeared in sight.

Partdb Singh encamped at a distance of six miles, and then pushed
forward a strong detachment of cavalry and infantry to clear the
wells in his front. He was allowed to do so for two days without
interruption, whilst Thomas further secured his position; but on the
second night the latter marched out to attack the enemy’s main park
of artillery with two battalions of infantry each 400 strong, 8 guns,
and his 90 regular cavalry, whilst he detached his third battalion to
disperse the advance party engaged in clearing out the wells. He
had kept his intentions hidden from Vaman Rao, whose troops were,
in point of fact, asleep when Thomas left camp. The reason for this
secrecy was the knowledge that if he acquainted the Marathas with
his scheme the enemy would certainly hear of it; for Viman Rao’s
countrymen were quite unable to hold their own counsel, and the
gossip of their camps always reached the ears of the enemy. So
Thomas contented himself with leaving a letter for the chief,
explaining his plan of action, and requesting him to follow with his
cavalry in the morning, and leave his infantry to guard the camp.

Unfortunately, soon after Thomas started an accident happened
to one of his tumbrels, and occasioned such delay, that dawn
began to break before the mishap was repaired. This rendered it
impossible to carry out his original design of a surprise, for, to
Thomas’s mortification on arriving within sight of the Jaipur main
camp, he perceived the enemy assembled under arms and ready to
meet him. He therefore diverted his attack and advanced against
the party at the wells, which numbered about 7,000 men. These
received him with a show of resistance, but the spirit aud vigour
with which he made his attack soon obliged them to fall back upon
their main body, after sustaining considerable loss. Having obtained
possession of the wells, which they had cleared out, Thomas filled
them up again, and after capturing several horses and many head of
cattle, returned to camp. On his way back he met the Maratha
cavalry, who seemed much out of humour at not having been con-
sulted on so important an occasion, but Vaman Rao rebuked them,
150 GEORGE THOMAS.

telling them plainly that their delay in preparing for action and fol-
lowing Thomas was the real cause of their having missed sharing in
the victory. Thomas and his officers received khilwts from the chief,
and to prevent animosities and jealousies similar marks of honour
were bestowed, though with reluctance, on the commanders of the
Maratha cavalry.

Thomas now determined to force on a general engagement, but
found his intention anticipated by the enemy, who, at daybreak the
next morning sallied out in order of battle. In returning to his
encampment on the previous day he had prudently reconnoitred the
ground, and determined in his own mind the spot on which he would
engage. Towards this he now made his way; but aware that no
reliance could be placed upon the Marathas, he left a battalion of his
infantry and four six-pounder guns to defend the camp and protect
his rear, which would otherwise have been open to attack by the
enemy. The force with him consisted of 800 regular infantry, 200
Rohillas, 90 cavalry, and 10 pieces of artillery. Viaman Raéo’s Maratha
cavalry accompanied him at tlie start, but no sooner did they see the
immense host with which they had to contend than they gave tlem-
selves up for lost, and left Thomas to fight the battle alone, nor once
during the whole day did they afford him any assistance.

After some manceuvring on either side Thomas was glad to find the
Rajput forces voluntarily distributing themselves in a manner con-
formable with his plan of battle. Their right wing, consisting of the
feudal cavalry, was directed against his camp, and so certain were
they of victory that on catching sight of the defences which had been
built up, they laughed at the idea of ‘\a few bushies,’’ as they con-
temptuously termed them, retarding their progress, or resisting the
impetuosity of their attack. The left wing, consisting of 4,000
Rohillas, 3,000 Ghussains, and 6,000 irregular infantry, commanded
by the chiefs of their respective districts, advanced at the same time
with hasty strides and loud shouts to take possession of the city, the
loss of which would have been attended with the most serious conse-
quences. The main body, or centre of the enemy, was composed of
10 battalions of infantry, 22 pieces of artillery, and the body-guard of
the Rajah, the latter numbering 1,600 chosen men, armed with
matchlocks and sabres. This division was commanded iu person by
Rajah Roraji Khavis, the gencralissimo of the Jaipur forces.

It was fortunate for Thomas that he had chosen such a strong
position, for this alone enabled him to sustain the unequal combat.
No sooner did the Maradthis, who were posted in the rear, observe
the Rajput cavalry advancing against them in close and compact
THE JAIPUR CAMPAIGN. 151

order, than they sent urgent entreaties to Thomas for reinforcements.
Although it was imprudent to spare them, he ordered four companies
from the battalion which had been left for the protection of the camp
to march out and strengthen the troops in the field, whilst with five
companies and three guns he advauced to repel the attack of the
Rajah’s body-guard, leaving his main body under the command of
an Englishman named John Morris, who, though a brave man, was
better adapted to conduct a forlorn hope than direct the movement
of troops on the field of battle. Thomas, by a skilful mancuvre,
obtained possession of a high sand bank, whereby the enemy were
placed between two fires, and could neither charge him nor attack
the camp without exposing their rear to danger. Whereupon they
began to draw off, sullenly and slowly, but presently, perceiving the
weakness of his small squadron of regular cavalry, made a sudden
and furious charge upon the little body of ninety mounted men, killing
the commander and several of the troopers. Thomas instantly ad-
vanced two companies of grenadiers to their assistance, and these
brave fellows, after giving a single volley, charged the great body of
cavalry with their bayonets, and compelled them to retreat, thereby
affording the extraordinary illustration of infantry attacking and
routing a mounted force.

During this time the enemy’s left wing had advanced and made an
assault upon the city, from which they were driven back by the troops
Thomas had posted for its defence. These consisted of his Hariina
infantry and 100 Rohillas, who, having occupied the highest and
strongest of the houses, were able to maintain themselves against all
attacks except those of artillery. Of this circumstance the enemy
now became aware, and summoning reinforcements of six pieces of
cannon to their aid, returned to the assault. Whereupon Thomas,
having beaten off the cavalry, proceeded to the relief of the garrison
defending the town, and attacked the enemy’s left flank so vigorously
that he compelled them to limber up their artillery and retire again.
By this time their main body had become a confused mass, without
regularity or method, having been in turn disordered by the retreat
of the right and left wings, which Thomas had defeated one after
another. Dut notwithstanding this Roraji determined to risk the
final issne of the day in w general charge. ‘Tle ardour of his troops,
however, proved unequal to the call, and Thomas, pereciving them
wavering, opened a heavy artillery fire of grape shot upon them,
before which they precipitately retreated. He now desired to pursue
them with those of his companies which had suffered least during the
fight, but unfortunately the bullocks attached to his artillery had been
152 GEORGE THOMAS.

stationed for protection behind a sandbank some distance in the rear,
and could not be brought up quickly enough. On perceiving this, the
Maratha cavalry, who all through the action had stood aloof, galloped
up and offered their services, and Thomas, having procured a sufti-
cient number of bullocks for one gun, advanced with that and a
battalion of infantry, whilst the Marathd horse made a great show of
accompanying him.

The enemy were now retiring in all directions, and Thomas first
turned his attention to a pair of 24-pounder guns which they had
abandoned, and directed them to be taken to the rear. But at this
moment a large body of Rajput cavalry, under the chief of Chimu,
rallied, and fired with a determination to redeem their honour and
recapture the lost guns, formed a gol, or dense band of feudal chivalry,
and charged down on Thomas. Whereupon his cowardly Maratha
allies, without waiting to sustain a single impact, turned and fied.
Thomas immediately drew up his infantry as well as the shortness
of the time admitted, but before the line was completely formed the
panic-stricken cavalry, reckless of where they were riding, dashed
through his left wing, closely followed by the Rajputs, who began to
cut down a great number of his men. These gallant fellows made a
heroic resistance, many of them, even in the agonies of death, seizing
hold of the bridles of the enemies’ horses, in their attempts to impede
their progress. The moment was critical, and it seemed as if the
battalion must be exterminated. But Thomas, ever resourceful and
undaunted, loaded his single gun up the very muzzle, and with about
150 of his men, who bravely resolved to conquer or die with him, awaited
the event with fortitude. After permitting the enemy to approach to
within forty yards, the order was given to fire, and simultaneously
with the discharge of the 6-pounder, the men delivered a volley of
musketry with such cool precision and effect, that great numbers of
the enemy were killed or wounded. Twice, before they could
recover themselves, did Thomas’s little force reload and fire, and
after their third discharge the Rajputs turned and fled, bearing away
with them the chief of Chimu, sorely wounded, from the field.

Meanwhile the Maratha cavalry, who had been the chief cause of
this disaster, were flying helter-skeltcr towards the camp. But here,
by Thomas's orders, previously conveyed, they were rcfused admit-
tance, and in consequence fell into the hands of a small party of
the Rajputs, who had followed in their rear, and put many of them to
death without mercy.

The enemy’s infantry, when they saw the success which had at
first attended the charge of the chief of Chumu, seemed disposed to
THE JAIPUR CAMPAIGN. 153

return to the contest, and Thomas, collecting the remains of his
gallant battalion, prepared to receive them. But by this time the
day was drawing to a close, and the exhibition of his dogged resolu-
tion convinced Roraji that it was best to retire ; and so he drew off,
leaving Thomas to return to his fortified camp with the remnants of
his force. The casualties during the day on Thomas’s side amounted
to 800 men, or 25 per cent. of his troops actually engaged in the open.
Amongst the wounded was the gallant John Morris. The enemy lost
2,000 men, and were compelled to abandon a vast number of horses
and other valuable effects.

Thus ended the battle of Fatehpur, in which Thomas, with less
than 2,000 men, successfully defended a large city, and an extensive
fortified camp, and defeated in the open field an army of 40,000 men
well supplied with artillery. In reviewing this achievement there
are many points to admire: the engineering skill with which he
protected his encampment; the ability with which he defended a
hostile town with a mere handful of irregular soldiery; his strategy
in occupying the advantageous position from which he gave battle;
his generalship in dividing the enemy and defeating them in detail ;
the marvellous resolution with which he retrieved disaster; and the
courage and vigour he displayed at all times throughout the day.
When the overwhelming numerical superiority opposed to him is
considered, and the ever-present consciousness of danger which he
laboured under from the cowardly and untrustworthy conduct of his
allies, we must accord to him the merit of having won a very remark-
able victory by the display of the highest qualities of a soldier and a
general.

On the following morning Thomas notified to Roraji that he might
send proper persons to bury the dead, and carry away the wounded
without interruption on his part. This civility was received with
attention, and presently a request came to treat for peace. At the
prospect of renewed negotiation, Vaman Rao, whose name, it will be
noted, does not appear once in the description of the battle, came
forward again, and took the conduct of it into bis own hands. As a
preliminary stipulation he insisted on a heavy payment to indemnify
him for the loss he had sustained, but Roraji objected, saying he
was not authorised by Partab Sing to disburse so large a sum
without express orders. On receiving this answer Thomas suspected
that the enemy only desired time to procure reinforcements, and
urged Vaman Rao to renew the attack. Although the Maratha chief
was averse to this proposal, fearing the risk of another engagement,
and overruled Thomas’s advice, in the end the negotiations were
154 GEORGE THOMAS.

broken off, and the enemy, having collected the scattered remains of
their forces, took post on their former ground. A resumption of
hostilities was now imminent, but at this juncture orders came from
Daulat Rao Sindhia for Vaman Rao to discontinue the war, and others
of similar import from General Perron, who had recently been in-
vested with the government of Hindustan.

And now the enemy of their own accord offered to pay the sum of
Rs.50,000, but this was most unaccountably rejected by Vaman Rao,
who soon had cause to repent his folly, for during the recent negotia-
tions considerable reinforcements had arrived in the Jaipur camp,
and, despite Sindhia’s instructions, hostilities were recommenced
with redoubled vigour on both sides.

Soon Thomas’s troops began to suffer great inconvenience from
the scarcity of forage, which they were obliged to collect from a
distance of twenty miles, and were sorely harassed by detached parties
of the enemy when bringing it into camp. To add to their diffi-
culties the Rajah of Bikanir arrived with reinforcements of 5,000
men for the Jaipur army. The Mardthas in Thomas's camp were
useless, except to plunder and destroy the unresisting peasantry, and
he had only his own decimated troops on which to rely. In this situa-
tion, and forage continuing to decrease, a council of war was called,
and it was unanimously agreed to attempt a retreat to their own
country.

In accordance with which resolution camp was struck, and before
daybreak the next morning the troops began to file off. But scarcely
were they in motion than the enemy advanced to the attack in great
force. While it continued dark confusion prevailed everywhere, none
being able to distinguish foes from friends, but on the appearance of
daylight Thomas collected his men, and forming them into proper
line of battle, compelled the enemy to sheer off. The march was
then resumed, but the Rajputs continued to hang on his rear, annoy-
ing it with the fire of artillery and an immense quantity of rockets.
He pushed on, however, at a rapid rate, and soon left their heavy
guns behind, the rocket and imatchlock men alone continuing the
pursuit.

The day was intensely hot, and the disheartened troops suffered
severely from want of water. The fiery desert wind blew over the
sandy plain in furnace breaths, whilst on the horizon a delusive
mirage dazzled and glittered, presenting alluring pictures of green
islands floating amidst lakes of cool water, which faded away or
receded, even as they appeared to be within reach. The tramp of
shufiling feet over the loose sand churned up clouds of impalpable
K

THE JAIPUR CAMPAIGN. 155

dust, which aggravated the thirst and discomfort the column suffered.
Fortunately these trials operated as much against the pursuers as the
pursued. For fifteen weary hours Thomas's little army fought its
desperate way, with certain death behind it, and in front an uncer-
tainty of relief almost as terrible. ‘‘The service was severe,”
writes Thomas, in his brief, soldierly language, “and in the highest
degree fatiguing. At length, after a toilsome march, we arrived in
the evening ata village where we fortunately met with two wells con-
taining plenty of excellent water.”

So great was the rush to these that two men were precipitated into
them, one of whom was drowned, and the other rescued with the
greatest difficulty. After this an armed force was stationed to protect
the approaches till, by degrees, most of the troops received a small
supply, the confusion ceased, and order was restored.

The enemy had meanwhile encamped three miles in the rear, and
Thomas made up his mind to attack them on the following day. But
when morning broke he plainly realised that his men had lost their
accustomed bearing, and were too dispirited for fighting. All he
could do was to continue the retreat. Before long many began to
succumb to exhaustion, for the march was accompanied by circum-
stances fully as distressing as those of the previous day. The enemy,
encouraged by theix advantage, frequently appeared inclined to
charge, and Thomas was forced to keep up a constant fire from his
artillery in the rear. So disheartened were his men that, in order to
encourage them, he dismounted from his horse and marched on foot
at their head during the whole of the day.

This is a characteristic incident, and displays at their best those
personal qualities which made Thomas so greatly beloved by those
who followed his fortunes. A native general in retreat either
spurred away on a fleet horse, or was carried along on the fastest
elephant, regardless of everything except his own safety or comfort.
Not so with this fighting Irishman, who in his career never proved
false to a friend, or deserted a dependent in distress or danger. He
shared with his soldiers their perils and their privations, as well as
their victories, and never asked them to undertake a task he was not
ready to join in, or a risk he was not prepared to undergo.

There is the material for a fine picture in this retreat from Fateh-
pur. At the head of his dispirited army marches Thomas with lifted
head and determined stride. Behind him plods the long straggling
column of soldiery, the men turning their eyes first to the illimitable
waste of desert around, and then to their indomitable leader, who
holds his steadfast compass course, and in whom all their hopes are
156 GEORGE THOMAS.

centred. The jaded cattle drag the guns slowly and toilfully through
the deep sand. Anon a halt is called, a gun unlimbered, and a few
defiant shots fired at the enemy. Like minute guns the dull reports
die away after each discharge, and the heavy smoke hangs sullenly
in the still air. Then the order is given to limber up again, and
once more assuming his position at the head of the column, the tall,
fierce Irishman leads the way into the desolate expanse ahead.

Towards sunset a large town was reached, where the distressed
truops were gratified by the sight of five wells of water, and were
able to assuage their thirst, while the enemy, who had by this time
outmarched their enthusiasm, gave up the pursuit, and returned to
Fatehpur.

Thomas was now able to direct his attention to the condition of his
men. The locality was a favourable one for a halt, and he deter-
mined to camp here till they were recovered from their recent
fatigues. The sick and wounded were conducted to a place of safety,
and properly cared for. Supplies and water being in abundance, all
fared well, and a few days’ rest made a wonderful change. Before a
week had passed, with bodies fortified and spirits revived, and, above
all, with an increased faith in the ikbdl, or good fortune, of their
commander, Thomas’s battalions were ready for a renewal of active
operations.

He desired nothing better, for fighting was his second nature.
Hostilities were recommenced in the enemy’s country, and by a
succession of exactions and fines, sufficient money obtained to defray
the expenses of the expedition, and satisfy the arrears of pay due to
the troops. Before long the Rajah of Jaipur, sensible of the injury
his territory would sustain by a prolongation of these depredations,
sent persons to sue for peace, and the evacuation of his territory, and
Vaiman Rao, having been reduced to a more moderate frame of mind,
accepted the terms now offered, and peace was declared.

Thomas was now free to return to Hariana, but instead of doing
this he determined to retaliate on the Rajah of Bikanir, and punish
him for the assistance he had recently afforded to the Jaipur prince.
Surut Singh, the ruler of Dikanir, kept up a very respectable army
of mercenaries and feudal levies, the whole amounting to 8,000 men,
two-fifths of whom were cavalry, and the remainder infantry and
artillery. There were several European officers in his service, who
resided in the fort of Bikanir, and disciplined his troops. The country
was a dry and waterless one, the approach to which must be attended
with privations similar to those Thomas had recently experienced.
Profiting by the past, he took measures to protect himself against a
THE JAIPUR CAMPAIGN. 157

recurrence of misfortunes by preparing a number of water bags, made
of skins, for the use of his army, whereby he overcame the difficulty
of traversing waterless deserts.

Strut Singh, on receiving intimation of the intended invasion,
prepared to repel it, but being weak in artillery, and knowing he
could not stand against Thomas in the plain, confined his defence
to strongly garrisoning his frontier towns, hoping to tire the invaders
out with repeated attacks on entrenched positions and fortified strong-
holds. But assaults of this description never came amiss to Thomas.
The first he made was upon the village of Jeitpur, which was about
seven marches north-east of the Rajah’s capital, and defended by
3,000 men. Resolving on an immediate storm, Thomas carried it
with a loss of 200 men, and exacted a heavy ransom before consenting
to spare the lives and property of the inhabitants. This example of
his methods of warfare was sufficient to intimidate the country round.
Hereafter he met with but little serious opposition, for the Raéjah’s
troops deserted in great numbers, and only a few Rajputs remained
faithful to his cause.

Under circumstances so unfavourable Strut Singh despatched a
Vakil to Thomas’s camp to sue for peace, agreeing to pay an indemnity
of two lakhs of rupees, half of which was to be delivered on the spot,
and for the remainder bills given upon certain wealthy bankers of
Jaipur. These terms Thomas accepted, and commenced his return
to Hansi; but when, a short time afterwards, he presented the drafts
for encashment, they were dishonoured. He contented himself with
a protest at the time, but in his soul he determined that when occa-
sion offered he would severely punish these reprehensible frauds upon
his confiding uature.
CHAPTER V.
TROUBLES WITH THE SIKHS.—THE EXPEDITION TO UDAIPUR.
1799-1800.

T was early in the summer of 1799 that Thomas returned to Hansi
from the Jaipur and Bikanir campaigns, and about this time Lak-
wa Dada, the Marath& commander-in-chief, being suspected of sym-
pathy with the rebellion of the Bhais, fell into disgrace with Daulat
Rado Sindhia, and was superseded by another chief named Ambaji
Inglia. Lakwa’s downfall suggested to Thomas the feasibility of re-
gaining possession of the districts which had been sequestrated from
Appa Khandi Rao, and these he now occupied, intending to present
them to Vaman Rao. But Ambaji and General Perron, hearing of this
action, requested Thomas to withdraw; and he, after consulting with
Vaman Rao, who advised compliance, consented to do so. In recom-
pense for this the Maratha government gave Thomas the district of
Badhli, which he added to his other possessions.

By this time Thomas had become a confirmed filibuster, whose
restless spirit could not endure peace, or brook inaction. Rather than
remain idle, he now turned his attention to the Sikh states on his
northern frontier, and marched against Jhind, a town belonging toa
chief named Bagh Singh, who had evinced hostility to Thomas from
the first moment of his establishing himself at Haridna.

Following his usual tactics, Thomas made a sudden march, and at-
tempted to storm Jhind by surprise. But he had underrated its
strength, and, after a stubborn conflict, found himself driven back
with a loss of 400 men. The defeat was as serious as it was unex-
pected ; but Thomas was undismayed, and instead of retreating, he
fortified his camp and settled down to blockade the place, in the hopes
of compelling the garrison of 3,000 men to surrender.

Adjacent to Jhind lay the territories of Sahib Singh, the Sikh chief

of Patijla. He was himself an indolent, weak-minded man, but
158
TROUBLES WITH THE SIKGHS. 159

possessed a sister named Kuntr, a woman of masculine and intrepid
spirit, and she now marched at the head of a large force to the relief
of the besieged town. On the way she was joined by an individual,
who, according to Thomas’s etymology, rejoiced in the name of Bug-
heel Sing, and several other Sikh chiefs. Directly these arrived with-
in striking distance Thomas attacked them, and compelled them to
retire, driving them in panic through their own camp, which being
built of straw huts was easily set on fire, and consumed.

After a few days Kunur rallied the enemy, and returned to the
contest with increased numbers, and, by the shameful supineness of
two of Thomas's officers, surprised and obtained possession of two of
his redoubts, in which many of his best men were cut to pieces. This
reverse encouraged the country people, who had hitherto been held in
awe, to declare openly against Thomas, and cut off his supplies of
provisions, so that he was compelled to raise the seige of Jhind and
commence his return to Hansi. By this time the enemy had in-
creased to 10,000 strong, and directly he began his retreat they followed
in his rear, and simultaneously the Chief of Patidla took the field
against him, with a large additional force and several pieces of heavy
artillery.

A retrogade movement in these countries was always deemed
equivalent to a defeat, and the peasantry now rose in a mass to
oppose Thomas’s progress. In order to allay their increasing hostility
he publicly gave out that he was going to Jaipur, hoping thereby to
induce them to relinquish the pursuit. But they were not to be im-
posed upon by this ruse, and hovered on his rear and flanks, repeatedly
attacking him, and as often being repulsed. Dy a forced march the
Sikhs managed to get between him and Hansi, and encamped at a
place called Narnaund, with the intention of stopping his way. In
this crisis, Thomas, with his usual defiance, resolved on assuming the
offensive again, and suddenly ordering a night march, arrived by day-
break before the enemy’s camp. Instantly attacking them, he in-
flicted a severe defeat. Their tents, baggage, the howdahs of their
elephants, their bazaar, 1,000 saddles and 200 horses fell into his
hands, and had it not been for his troops getting out of control and
dispersing for plunder, he would have captured their artillery and
elephants as well.

The Sikhs fled to Jhind, but on their arrival there were refused ad-
mittance by Sahib Singh’s sister, who taunted them for their cowardice,
and offered to take the field in person herself, to show them how to
fight. Ashamed in being exceeded in spirit by a woman, they returned
to attack Thomas, whom they found encamped near a large town, where
160 GEORGE THOMAS.

he had left his heavy baggage. Their resolution now was to conquer
or perish; but whilst deliberating overnight on the tactics they should
employ, their camp was unexpectedly attacked by a numerous and
daring banditti, who sounded their trumpets with such loud alarms,
that the Sikhs thought it was Thomas himself, and abandoned the
place with great precipitation.

Their panic was so ludicrous and humiliating that it lost for them
the reputation for prowess they had previously enjoyed. They were
now as desirous of peace as they had before been impatient for
war, and made overtures which resulted in an accommodation being
arrived at, by which each side remained in possession of the districts
they held before the siege of Jhind. This treaty satisfied everybody
except the Rajah of Patidla, who refused to ratify it, although his
spirited sister did so, in spite of his remonstrances. Whereupon he
displayed his resentment by seizing her person and placing her in
confinement ; but Thomas, on hearing of this, deemed it his duty to
interfere, and by threats compelled the release of the brave lady.

Thus ended Thomas’s first offensive campaign against the Sikhs.
Begun impetuously, at one time it nearly found a premature end in
defeat; but his own right hand retrieved reverse, and turned disaster
into victory. Although the way led to no substantial results, it illus-
trated Thomas’s qualities in danger, and the amazing vigour with
which he could turn upon an exultant and victorious foe, and scatter
them in flight at the very moment when they believed they had him
in their power.

Shortly after his return to Hansi Thomas received a proposal of
temporary employment from Ambaji Inglia, who offered him a subsidy
of Rs.50,000 a month, to assist in driving Lakwa Dada out of the
province of Méwar. Having no particular war on hand, Thomas
accepted Ambaji’s offer, and prepared to lead his army against the
revolted chief, who had assembled a great force and taken the field
in the vicinity of Udaipur.

This expedition was a more extended one than any Thomas had
hitherto undertaken, and during his march southwards a mutiny broke
out amongst his troops, occasioned by a delay in the payment of their
arrears. To excuse their unmilitary conduct they explained, that as
they were proceeding to the Deccan, their families would suffer great
hardships by their long absence, and they therefore expected extra
pay. Although there appeared some reason in their demand, Thomas
considered that to yield compliance would form a dangerous precedent,
and resolved to resist. Whereupon the mutineers grew outrageous,
and plotted to seize and confine him; but this he evaded by encamping
TROUBLES WITH THE SIKGS. 161

apart from them with the soldiers who were still faithful. He then
called in a body of cavalry to his assistance, upon which the mutineers
advanced to attack him. Determined to repress their insolence at all
hazards, he mounted his horse and rode out to meet them; several
shots were fired, but none struck him, and seizing the leaders he
instantly caused one to be blown from the mouth of a cannon.
Whereupon the remainder, perceiving the fate of their comrades, re-
turned to their duty. ‘

When nearing Udaipur, information was received that Sindhia had
pardoned Lakwa Dada, so that there no longer existed any necessity
for a campaign. But Thomas, who only consulted the interest of
Ambaji Inglia, in whose personal service he was now engaged, and
from whom he had received positive orders to fight Lakwa wherever he
came up with him, did not think himself at liberty to desist, and con-
tinued his march, and being presently joined by General Perron’s
Second Brigade under Colonel Sutherland, the united forces advanced
against the rebel. The latter was encamped near a pass leading
to Udaipur, which was so narrow that it only admitted of the passage
of a single gun at atime, and here, safe in the knowledge that the
Rana of Udaipur was favourably inclined towards him, he had taken
up an exceedingly strong position.

A plan of attack was now concerted between the two commanders,
and the following morning fixed for carrying it into execution. But
during that night Colonel Sutherland, without assigning any cause,
and to Thomas’s utter astonishment, struck camp and marched away,
leaving to the latter the sole conduct of the operations against Lakwa
Dada.

Colonel Sutherland's withdrawal inspired the rebel chief with confi-
dence, and he became haughty and unreasonable in proportion to the
improvement in the aspect of his affairs, sending letters to various
chiefs 10 the district, summoning them to join him. But Thomas had
no intention of waiting for them to do so, and three days later, leaving
Ambaji with his troops to protect the baggage, advanced against
Lakwa in order of battle. The action was however, prevented by the
bursting of a tremendous storm of rain, thunder, and lightning, which
compelled a halt. It happened that Thomas had arrived at a position
favourable for cavalry to attack, and the enemy being exceedingly
strong in that arm, he thought it prudent to change ground, and
manceuvred so as to gain possession of an eminence where he would
have no such fear. When the storm abated, Lakwa, who had been
within sight all this time, advanced with his army, but, losing a number
of men during his approach from Thomas’s artillery fire, and per-

11
162 GEORGE THOMAS.

ceiving the full strength of the position to be attacked, he thought it
best to retire ; and Thomas, after a severe and fatiguing service, which
lasted during the whole of the day, returned to his camp in the
evening.

At midnight Lakwa sent Vakils to Thomas with some letters from
Sindhia, in which the Prince repeated his commands for the cessation
of hostilities on both sides, and nominated Lakwa to the government
of all the Maratha’ possessions north of the Narbada. In consequence
of this, a council of war was called, at which Thomas announced that
as he was employed by Ambaji for the express purpose of reducing the
province of Méwar to his authority, he could consent to no terms in
which the evacuation of that country was not a leading article.

After much discussion, a proposal was made that both armies
should march to the northern frontier of the district, and there await
fresh orders from Sindhia. Thomas’s assent was reluctantly given, as
he doubted the sincerity of Lakwa, believing that the chief only de-
sired to gain time in order that he might be reinforced by a body of
troops who were marching to join him from Ajmir, which city, with
the surrounding territory, belonged to him. The two armies now
commenced their journey northwards, but owing to heavy rain, it
took thein fifteen days to cover the distance to Shalipura, although it
was only seventy-five miles. On arriving there Lakwa Dada was
joined by his Ajmir troops, whom he had been expecting, and now
peremptorily refused to evacuate the territory in dispute.

Hostilities were at once resumed by Lakwa taking the offensive.
Thomas had prudently pitched his camp on ground surrounded
by ravines on all sides, which secured him from the danger of cavalry
attacks. A council of war being called, it was decided that Ambaji’s
army, which was in an exposed position, should shift quarters, and
encamp in Thomas’s rear so as to be under his protection; but before
this could be accomplished, Lakwa, sensible of his error in not having
at first occupied the ground secured by Thomas, advanced to take a
redoubt that defended it, near to which one of Ambaji’s battalions
happened to be cooking their morning meal, the preparation of which
had delayed them in falling back into a place of safety. This battalion
was charged by Lakwa’s cavalry and cut to pieces. Thomas no sooner
heard of this than he formed his men and hastened to retrieve the
disaster; but heavy rain again coming on, the ravines were soon
swollen with water, which put an end to all hostilities for that
day.

The rain continued without intermission for a week, during which
no opportunity occurred for a general action, though frequent skir-
TROUBLES WITH THE SIKHS. 168

mishes took place. In order to bring these about Thomas constantly
changed the colours and uniforms of his men, and by this ruse often
succeeded in getting to close quarters with the enemy, and opening a
siuart cannonade, whicli caused them considerable loss in men and
horses. On one occasion he nearly killed Lakwa himself, but the
chief managed to get out of range by the fleetness of his steed.

Intelligence now reached Thomas that General Perron, taking ad-
vantage of the undefended state of Jhajjar, had invaded it. This in-
formation he was most anxious to keep secret, fearing that a knowledge
of it might prejudice his position; but Lakwa had been similarly in-
formed, and, as he was strongly hostile to General Perron, he made
Thomas very handsome proposals to join his standard. As Thomas
was in the service of Ambaji, who was General Perron’s native colleague
in both the government of Hindustan and the command of Sindhia’s
army, this invasion of Jhajjar was a distinctly treacherous act, which
might have reasonably served as an excuse for Thomas to desert his
allegiance, and accept Lakwa’s offer of service. But, with all his
lawlessness and aggression, there never breathed a more faithful
soldier of fortune than George Thomas, and he rejected the proposals,
saying, that although at the termination of the present campaign he
might leave Ambaji’s service, he could never become an enemy to that
chief, nor connect himself with those who were. This answer greatly
displeased Lakwa, whose Maratha morality was unable to comprehend
the European code of honour, and in open durbar he complained of
Thomas, declaring him to be a man of the most unaccountable charac-
ter: for, although he had received repeated orders from Sindhia to
cease hostilities, he disobeyed them, and Lakwa could only suppose
he was bent upon extirpating the Prince’s authority, and establishing
his own.

Lakwa now began to try other expedients to rid himself of this
pertinacious antagonist, and sent emissaries into Thomas’s camp to
stir up a mutiny amongst his troops; but these men being discovered,
were seized and put into confinement, and there detained during the
rest of the campaign, whilst Thomas conciliated his soldiers by an
assurance of speedily conducting them back to their own country.

Lakwa’s force at the time amounted to 9,000 cavalry, 6,000 regular
infantry, 2,000 Rohillas, and 6,000 mercenaries, with 90 pieces of
artillery. To oppose this formidable army Thomas could only muster
six battalions of infantry, much reduced by desertion and casualties in
the field, 300 Rohillas, 150 cavalry, and 22 guns, the whole not
numbering more than 2,400 men. The disparity in numbers was
enormous ; but, in addition to_fighting, Thomas was called upon to
164 GEORGE THOMAS,

provide for the safety of Ambaji, guard the camp, procure supplies of
forage and provisions, and convoy them into the place.

As soon as the rain abated hostilities were actively resumed, and
several actions took place, in most of which Thomas was successful,
frequently driving the enemy back to their camp. On one occasion
Lakwa escaped total defeat by a very narrow chance. Having
formed his whole army into order of battle, he advanced suddenly
against Thomas, who at the time had only two battalions with him
in the front, and was obliged to fall back, the enemy following close
on his rear till he reached the outskirts of his encampment. Here he
was reinforced Ly three other battalions and a supply of ammunition,
of which lie had nearly run out. Whereupon he faced round, and
resolutely mecting his pursuers compelled them to retire quicker than
they had advanced. So great was their consternation and confusion
that Thomas inflicted the greatest slaughter, and it was only the
darkness of night, which had overtaken the combatants, that saved
Lakwa from a crushing defeat.

But not long after this there occurred a disaster which led to the
termination of the campaign. Between the rival armies flowed a
nullah, or stream, the north side of which was occupied by Lakwa,
and the south by Thomas and Ambaji. Shortly after the action
above described, Ambaji obtained possession of one of the enemy’s
redoubts on the north side of this nullah, and garrisoned it with tree
battalions of infantry, 1,000 Ghussains, and six guns. No sooner
was this accomplished than heavy rain came on, and continued
without intermission for twenty-four hours. This caused two large
tanks to overflow, and, breaking their banks, they discharged tliir
contents into the nullah, which soon became so full of water as to be
impassable, whereby all communications were cut off with the newly-
captured redoubt. Perceiving this Lakwa attacked the post with
great vigour, his men advancing to the assault through rushing water,
which in places rose up to their recks. Such intrepid conduct struck
terror into the garrison, who became panic-stricken, and, except the
Ghussains, surrendered without firing a shot. The latter refused to
yield, and after a brave, but fruitless resistance, were cut to pieces.
This disaster seemed to crush all the spirit out of Ambaji’s army, for
directly after it his men refused to fight, and began to desert in great
numbers. Lakwa, being informed of this, induced the Shahputra
chief, near to whose capital the armies were encamped, and who had
hitherto remained neutral, to declare against Thomas, and withhold
supplies of grain. Although the latter had provisions sufficient for
twenty days’ consumption of his own men, Ambaji had not more than
TROUBLES WITH THE SIKHS. 165

enough for three, whilst Thomas himself was short of ammunition,
his reserve having been left at Singd4nah, thirty miles distant. It
was imperative to obtain a fresh supply, but he did not think it
prudent to risk sending a small detachment for it, and therefore
determined to fall back on this base. But he could not bring himself
to abandon Ambaji’s sick and wounded, of whom there were a large
number in camp, and generously advanced money for their transport
to a place of safety. During this retreat, although pursued and har-
rassed by cavalry sent ont by Lakwa, he defended himself so success-
fully that after several futile attempts the enemy drew off, and he
completed the remainder of his march unmolested, and brought his
whole force safely to Singdinal.

His conduct on this occasion appears to have touched a tender
chord in Ambaji’s breast. The chief lad tacitly acquiesced in
Perron’s recent attack on Thomas’s districts, both he and the general
supposing at the time that Lakwa had finally evacuated Méwar,
and there would be no further occasion for Thomas’s services, while
the distressed condition of the latter, far away from home, and
weakened by a long and arduous campaign, made the opportunity
for seizing his country a favourable one. But now that a reverse had
heen sustained, and Ambaji saved from annihilation by Thomas’s
faithful adherence to his interests, the chief grew ashamed of his
treachery, and began to excuse the recent attacks on Jhajjar, ascribing
them to the enmity of General Perron. Thomas, from prudential
motives, accepted this disclaimer, and pretended to be satisfied, and
shortly afterwards information reached him that the villages occupied
had been restored, and so he allowed the matter to drop.

Having supplied his troops with ammunition at Sing4nah, Thomas
returned to the attack on Lakwa, who had meanwhile invested a fort
forty-five miles to the north-east of that place. Advancing by slow
and easy marches through the districts of a chief named Agaji Merta,
Thomas took occasion to punish this individual for his hostility on a late
occasion, when he incited the country people to rise against Ambaji.
A few days after this he arrived within twelve miles of Lakwa’s army,
and made dispositions to attack him the next morning, but the chief,
deeming himself unequal to the contest, struck camp, abandoned
the fort he was endeavouring to reduce, and quitted the boundary in
dispute, and by a couple of forced marches reached his own district of
Ajmir.

Thomas’s commission was now fulfilled : he had driven Lakwa out
of Méwar, and this being accomplished he turned his attention
towards reimbursing Ambaji for the expenses he had been put to,
166 GEORGE THOMAS.

and entered on the congenial task of levying contributions. Deogarh
and Amét, two strong towns, were in turn attacked and forced to
purchase their safety, aud then Kosital and Lusain were stormed, and
heavy ransoms exacted. So successful was the raid that the fines
collected amounted to four lakhs of rupees, a sum considerably in
excess of the expense incurred by Ambaji, and this handsome har-
vest would have been increased but for a new development of
affairs.

Ambaji, at the commencement of this campaign, had entered into
an understanding with General Perron, by which it was mutually
agreed that should Sindhia at any time reinstate Lakwa Dada, who
was avowedly hostile to the General, the two should act in concert,
and by their combined efforts preserve their respective possessions.
A separate stipulation of this treaty was that Ambaji was to retain
Méwar. But Perron now began to entertain a jealousy against
Ambaji, and entered into a secret understanding with Lakwa, whom
he gained over to his own interests. Such, at least, is Thomas’s
version of current politics; but it seems more probable that Perron,
having learnt of Lakwa’s restoration to favour, shaped his course
accordingly, for not long afterwards the chief was appointed to his
former post of commander-in-chief of the Maratha army in Upper
India.

The upshot of this intrigue was that letters from Sindhia were now
produced, desiring Ambaji to retire from Méwar, and Perron wrote
recommending compliance, and threatening in case of refusal to assist
Lakwa Dada by force of arms. Under these circumstances Ambaji
ordered Thomas to deliver over the country in dispute and withdraw
his troops.

Thomas had no option but to comply, though it touched him to the
quick to tamely yield up that which he had won with so much hard
fighting. No sooner had he done so than he heard General Perron
was marching to Jaipur, and simultaneously Ambaji desired him to
proceed to Datia in Bundelkhand, a place 200 miles to the eastward.
Thomas was preparing to obey, for he still considered himself bound
to Ambaji, when a contrary order arrived, directing him to join the
united forces of that chief and Lakwa Dada, who had exchanged visits
of amity. From such contradictory instructions Thomas suspected
treachery, and knowing Lakwa was highly incensed against him,
declined to place himself in his power, but determined instead to
return to Haunsi.

Whereupon Lakwa threw off his mask, and would have sent a force
after Thomas, but for his inability to raise funds sufficient for the
TROUBLES WITH THE SIKGS. 167

purpose. Thomas retaliated by levying contributions on the pro-
vince of Ajmir, through which he directed his return journey, con-
sidering himself now in a state of actual hostility with the chief.

His position had by this time become exceedingly precarious.
Lakwa’s army was only thirty miles to the eastward, and at Jaipur,
which lay between him and his destination, General Perron was
endeavouring to induce Partib Singh to cut off his retreat. To
add to his cares a grievous disease attacked his troops, who were
suffering from the effects of drinking the unwholesome water of the
mountainous country of Méwar, and a third of them were stricken
with sickness. Fortunately Lakwa’s soldiery were in a state of open
mutiny, whilst Perron and the Rajah of Jaipur were overawed by the
presence of Colonel Collins, the British resident. This officer, towards
the end of 1799, arrived at Jaipur to demand the surrender of Wazir
Ali, the spurious Nawab of Oudh, who after occasioning much trouble
by his opposition to the English in that country, sought refuge from
their anger in Rajputana.

In this state of affairs Thomas, after eluding every attempt to
oppose his progress, and successfully levying contributions to the
extent of two lakhs of rupees, made good his retreat past Jaipur.
Almost his last exploit was the capture of a strong fort named Suraj-
garh, belonging to Patib Singh, from which he exacted a fine of
Rs.50,000. After this he prudently accelerated his homeward journey,
and arrived at Hansi towards the end of 1799.

Apart from the question of its morality, this flying campaign was
certainly one of the most brilliant and dashing that Thomas ever
executed. In less than five months he had led his little foree a dis-
tance of nearly 1,000 miles, had fought a succession of battles, had
obliged Lakwa Dada to evacuate Méwar, and had finally marched his
victorious troops safely home through a hostile country, from which,
even as he retreated, he extorted several heavy fines. The districts
he had traversed were cither dry and waterless deserts, or difficult
and pathless ranges of hills, and the elements had been against him
during the greater part of the campaign. Yet such was the vitality
and mobility of his foree that he successfully overcame all these
obstacles, and carried his men triumphantly back to the point from
whence they started.

Thomas was now inclined to allow his troops some repose after
their late exertions, but an excuse for fighting presenting itself, he
could not resist the temptation of taking the field again. It occurred
to him to make an incursion into the Sutlej states, and punish Sahib
Singh of Patidla, who had maltreated his sister for entering into
168 GEORGE THOMAS.

negotiations with Thomas in the previous year. Moreover, during
Thomas’s absence in Méwar, the chief had committed depredations in
Haridna, and this was a crime that could not be overlooked. So
preparations were made to chastise him, when, at the last moment,
he agreed to surrender certain villages, and pay an indemnity for the
damage he had done, and thus avoid hostilities.

But raid and foray had become essential to Thomas, who found it
impossible to remain inactive and at peace. He and his men were
prepared to fight, and were not to be baulked of their design by the
pusillanimity of Sahib Singh. A pretext for another expedition was
afforded by the remembrance of the dishonoured bills which
Thomas had received from the Rajah of Bikanir, and he forthwith
determined on an invasion of Surut Singh’s country.

This prince had recently obtained an advantage over his neighbours,
the Bhattis, an extraordinary race of people inhabiting a jungle tract
of country to the north-west of Hansi. When Thomas reached the
frontiers of Bikanir the Bhattis, hearing of his intended expedition,
offered him Rs.40,000 to capture and deliver over to them a strong
fort which Strut Singh had erected nine miles south-west of their
capital of Batinda, whereby they were much incommoded and
menaced. Thomas cheerfully accepted the commission, and, altering
his route, soon reached the city of Batnér, which in the geographical
light of these times was regarded as the most western habitation in
that part of India.

The fort which the Rajah of Bikanir had erected was garrisoned by
a large force of infantry and cavalry, and, from its natural position,
was almost inaccessible to an enemy, there being no water obtainable
within a circuit of twelve miles. But Thomas had preparcd himself
for w desert campaign, and, bringing up his artillery with him,
battered a breach in the walls almost before the garrison realised he
was attacking them. He soon made the necessary preparations for
storming the place, when the enemy capitulated on being permitted
to march out with the honours of war, and Thomas put the Bhattis
in possession of the fort, and received from them the stipulated reward
of Rs.40,000.

He now continued his march towards Bikanir, storming and cap-
turing several places, and fighting various skirmishes. In these his
losses were heavy, which, added to sickness consequent upon the
wnhealthiness of the climate, reduced his fighting strength to one-
third of its original number, and compelled him to suspend his
advance and fortify his camp for defence. Many attempts were
made by the enemy to carry his entrenchments, but his vigilance and
TROUBLES WITH THE SIKHS. 169

energy foiled all, and the health of his force improving, he presently
struck camp and returned towards his own country. On his way he
came across a town called Futehbad, which he burnt, and would in
all probability have taken possession of the adjacent country, and added
it on to Haridna, which it adjoined, had not the enemy received assist-
ance from the Rajah of Patidla, who, deeming the present moment a
favourable one to work his revenge for past injuries, sent a contingent
of 1000 cavalry to act against Thomas. The latter, not feeling strong
enough to prosecute hostilities, returned to Jhajjar, where he allowed
his people to recuperate after the distempers they had contracted
during the campaign, and recruited his battalions to their full
strength.

This was in March 1800, about which time Lakwa Dada, through
the intrigues of Perron at Sindhia’s durbar, had been again super-
seded in his command. To hasten the chief's downfall, and, if possible,
to take him prisoner, the General marched against him at Sounda,
in the Datia district, where he stormed his camp, and forced him
to fly for his life to Jodhpur. Perron, whose designs against Haridna
Thomas had reason to distrust, being thus occupied, the latter did
not choose to remain idle long. Large arrears of revenue were due to
him from his northern districts, and he resolved to march thither and
enforce payment. On his route he incidentally punished a numerous
and daring banditti who had frequently annoyed him by their pre-
datory attacks, and who, having been joined by a number of the
peasantry, were assembled in considerable force at the village of
Safidin, just outside Thomas’s north-eastern boundary. Confiding
in their superior numbers, the robbers issued boldly forth, on his
approach, to give him battle on the plain in front of the town. But
their temerity proved their destruction, for Thomas not only routed
them, but followed so close on their heels, that his troops entered the
fort with the fugitives, and put to death no less than 700 within its
walls. Thomas’s own loss on this occasion was considerable ; but the
victory struck such a terror throughout the country that the
remaining districts submitted without a struggle.

FEmboldened by this success, Thomas now determined to cross the
boundary and levy contributions in the district of Saharanpur, which
was being administered by Sambunath, one of Lakwa Dada’s
collectors, who had remained true to the chief's cause in the hour of
his fall. Sambunath was in the Dodb at the head of a numerous,
but disorderly rabble, and lad lately sustained some smart skirmishes
with the troops sent against him by Perron. Taking advantage of
the anarchy in which the district was thrown, Thomas made a
170 GEHORGH THOMAS.

rapid dash through its upper portion, and extorted several heavy
fines before his presence there was suspected.

Soon after this Perron advanced in person against Sambunath, and
at the same time caused letters to be delivered to Thomas, which he
pretended emanated from the Peshwa, and directed the recipient to
assist Lakwa Dada. These letters Thomas at once recognised as
forgeries, intended to tempt him into an attitude of declared hostility
against Sindhia, which would have given Perron an excuse for
declaring war against him. This crafty plot made Thomas regret
tbat he had not in the first instance taken Sambunath’s part, who
might then not only have saved himself from defeat, but crushed, or at
least shaken the power of Perron himself. It was, however, too late
to do anything now, so he contented himself with offering Sambunath
an asylum at Hansi, and advising him not to think of opposing his
wretched troops to Perron’s. But the former, confiding in the pro-
testations of his followers, rashly determined to fight. He was soon
convinced of his error, for on the approach of Perron, his troops
deserted him, and some endeavoured by treacherous means to seize
his person and deliver him up a prisoner. He effected his escape,
however, and found refuge in the Sikh country.

Thomas now received intelligenee that several of his own districts
in the vicinity of Hénsi were in a state of actual rebellion, and had
plundered the merchants resorting to them of a very considerable
sum of money. Amongst others guilty of this reprehensible conduct
were Balhali, Sordni, Jamalpur, and Bihdl. The latter place con-
tained 10,000 inhabitants, who enjoyed a character for remarkable
bravery, having defeated several armies which, at various times,
attempted their reduction, and on one occasion successfully resisted
the Mughal noble Ismail Beg, who fruitlessly endeavoured to sub-
due them with a force of 16,000 men and 100 guns. The population
of Bihél consisted chiefly of Rathér Rajputs, who possessed the
finest qualities of courage and resolution.

This rebellion broke out in June 1800, just as the rainy season
was commencing, and Thomas was sensible that if it was not quickly
crushed, the most serious consequences would ensue to the cultiva-
tion, on which the revenues depended. He therefore marclied
against the place without delay and found it garrisoned by 3,000
men, who, although well armed, were badly supplied with provisions.
With a discretion he did not ordinarily display, Thomas decided
not to storm it, thinking from the numbers and bravery of the
defenders that the event might prove doubtful, and certainly lead to
an immense loss of life. So he fell back on the slower, but surer
TROUBLES WITH THE SIKHS. 171

method of a blockade, and erected a chain of forts around the town,
and also completely encircled it with a ditch twelve feet deep, which
prevented any provisions reaching the garrison, and soon reduced
them to a condition of severe distress. This was further augmented
when mcans were found to diminish their water supply, and force
them to the necessity of drinking from the wells within the fort,
which, being bitter in quality and unwholesome, soon caused sickness
to break out. At last the garrison was reduced to one-third of its
original number, and Thomas, desirous of putting an end to the siege,
drew out his troops with intent to storm the place. Seeing this, and
satisfied of his resolution, the enemy capitulated at the last moment,
and paid a fine of Rs.30,000 to be forgiven and allowed to return to
their allegiance.

In August Thomas returned to his quarters at Hansi, and was soon
after this visited by a man named Usuf Ali Khan, « native agent sent
by Colonel Collins, the British resident at Sindhia’s court, on a
political mission to the Sikhs. Usuf Ali, in his report to Colonel
Collins, mentions that he was received with the greatest courtesy
by Thomas ‘on account of the Colonel’s letter,” and provided by
him with an escort to Rohtak.

For the next four months Thomas was busy completing his
ammunition and stores for his next campaign, on which he entered in
December 1800. This was the last aggressive one he undertook, and
also the most important, being directed against the Sikh states of the
Sutlej district
CHAPTER VI.
TIE INVASION OF THE SUTLEJ STATES.
1801.

N an earlier chapter it has been shown how the range of Thomas’s
ambition was not confined to the establishment of an independent
rule over the principality of Haridna, but nurtured far more extended
schemes of conquest in the Land of the Five Rivers. The Panjab
dangled a rich prize to an invader. Its fertile plains yielded harvests
twice a year: it was well watered and well wooded: its annual
revenues were two million sterling: it contained populous cities, the
resorts of merchants and caravans from tle far countries of Central
Asia; and, finally, the Sikh nation, who inhabited it, was divided and
subdivided into countless elans and confederacics, whose internal
dissensions and jealousies nullified the effect of their numbers, and
made their country an casier prey to an invading army than if they
had been a united people.

Thomas knew the Sikls and their ways well. During fifteen years
he had exchanged many hard knocks with them, and beaten
them times without count. Along their frontier his name was one to
conjure with, for it was feared and dreaded by the sons of Nanak. In
addition to his old designation of Jehazi Sahib, he received about
this time the more honourable one of Jowruj Jung, which, being
interpreted, means “ George the Conqucror.” A conqueror Thomas
was, and he now proved his further claim to the title by aspiring to
the conquest and consolidation under his own government of all the
petty states into which the Panjab was divided, and the proclamation
of his rule over the broad territory that stretched between the Jumna
and the Indus.

His design is thus summarised in his memoirs by his biographer,
Captain TFrancklin :—

“When Thomas first fixed his residence at Hansi, he conceived,

172
THE INVASION OF THE SUTLEJ STATES. 173

and would, if unforeseen circumstances had not occurred, have
executed the bold design of extending his conquests to the mouth of
the Indus. This was to have been effected by a fleet of boats, con-
structed from timber procured in the forests near the city of Ferozpur,
on the banks of the Sutlej river. He then intended proceeding down
the river with his army, and settling the countries he might subdue
on his route—a daring enterprise and conceived in the true spirit of
an ancient Roman. On the conclusion of this design it was his
intention to turn his arms against the Punjaub, which he expected to
reduce in the course of a couple of years, and which, considering the
wealth he would then have acquired, and the amazing resources he
would have possessed, must have established his authority on a firm
and solid basis.”

With the advantage of our modern geographical knowledge we are
able to properly estimate the full scope of this enterprise. The
territory this audacious Irishman proposed to invade, includes the two
vast provinces which now constitute the entire western frontier of
the British Empire in India. Their annexation cost the English three
great wars. Well might Captain Irancklin write that the scheme
“ was conceived in the true spirit of an ancient Roman.” A conquest
whose limits were determined by Karachi, Lahore, and Delhi, was a
task worthy of a heroic age.

Although it was ambition which first led Thomas to the considera-
tion of this delirious scheme, there were other causes that operated in
commending it to lis mind. He was conscious of the increasing
jealousy and hostility of General Perron, whose encroaching arms and
despotic power threatened to swallow up the little principality of
Hlariima. From such an inconsiderable base of operations as Hansi,
Thomas could not hope to successfully resist the wealth of men and
material possessed by Perron. But with the Panjab at his back
there was no hostile combination he would have feared, and with that
magnificent recruitivug ground to draw upon, le could have created
an army that might reasonably hope to cope with the Brigades of
Hindustan.

To the dangers and difficulties of the project Thomas was not blind:
but he feared those which lurked in his rear, not those which existed
in front. And it was with a view of securing himself against an
attack from Sindhia that about this time he made definite overtures
to the British Government. In these he announced his intention of
declaring war against the Sikhs, who were, he observed, equally the
enemies of the Marithas and the English. To enable him to attaek
them with confidence he desired an assurance of neutrality from
174 GEORGE THOMAS.

General Perron, under guarantee from the Governor-General. In
return for this Thomas offered “to advance and take possession of
the Punjaub, and give up his army to the direction and control of the
English; to take the country, and, in short, to become an active
partisan in their cause. By this plan,” he explained, “I have nothing
in view but the welfare of my King and country; it is not to better
myself that I have thought of it; but I should be sorry to see my
conquests fall to the Mahrattas, for I wish to give them to my King,
and to serve him the remainder of my days. This I can only do as
a soldier in this part of the world?”

Political considerations made it quite impossible for the Marquis
Wellesley to entertain these proposals. They were advanced at
a time when he had his hands fully occupied with the expedition to
Egypt, and the unsettled state of affairs in the Deccan, where signs of
trouble were looming which would require all the resources of the
English power to successfully oppose. In consequence of this
Thomas’s design of an invasion of the Panjab was never carried
out in its entirety, but was confined to the short but brilliant
campaign which he undertook in the year 1801.

A plausible excuse for the formality of a declaration of war against
the Sikhs was afforded by the conduct of the Rajah of Patidla, who,
in the preceding year, had broken his treaty of peace with Thomas,
and assisted his enemies to harass him during his return from the
Bikanir expedition. Sahib Singh of Patiila, whose forces consisted of
1,500 cavalry and 1,000 infantry, was at this time engaged in laying
siege to w fort in which his Amazonian sister Kuntr had taken refuge
trom his resentment. Thomas, with his native chivalry, determined
to march to this lady’s relief, but on his approach Sahib Singh
hurriedly raised the seige and retired within the fortifications of
Sun4m, a large town thirty miles to the west of Patidla. Thomas
followed on luis track with the intention of storming the place, but was
deterred from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Tara Singh, an
ally and son-in-law of Sahib Singh, who brought with him a large
force. The appearance of these reinforcements gave confidence to the
surrounding peasantry, and they rose en masse to join the Patidla
chief. Thomas accordingly determined on more prudential tactics,
and striking camp marched twenty-four miles to a town called Belad.
But he was followed by a large body of the enemy’s cavalry, who
concealed themselves in a neighbouring jungle, intending to make
a sudden attack on his rear when he advanced to the storm.

Belad was a strongly fortified place, as indeed were all the towns
and villages in the district, owing to its constant state of warfare.
THE INVASION OF THE SUTLEJ STATES. 175

The walls were nine feet in thickness, and it was surrounded by
a ditch twenty feet deep, and defended by a numerous garrison.
Nevertheless Thomas, who was apprised of the proximity of the
Patidla troops, determined to storm it without any loss of time, and
before the latter could form a junction with the garrison, or afford
external aid.

Fortune favoured him, and he carried the place by w vigorous
assault, with a loss of only cighty of his own people. A rancorous
enmity had long existed between his troops, who were chiefly
Muhammadans, and the Sikhs, and in the heat of racial conflict, despite
all his attempts to stay the slaughter, no less than 500 of the garrison
were put to the sword. Upon which the townspeople who survived,
ransomed their lives by the payment of a large sum of money.

Having thus established himself in a situation of strength and safety,
Thomas directed his attention to dividing the force that had followed
him, and gradually increased to not less than 10,000 men, intending if
possible to attack and defeat them in detail. He also experienced an
inclination ‘‘ to explore the neighbouring country and raise contribu-
tions.” To effect these objects he presently marched to a central
position between the towns of Patiala and Sundm, but soon changed
luis intention on a chance presenting itself of punishing Tara Singh,
whose assistance to Sahib Singh had obliged Thomas to raise the
siege of Sunim. Tari Singh’s capilal was at a place called Malér
Kotla, which lay a short distance to the north-west of Tlomas’s
position, and he now perceived an opportunity of attacking it by
surprise in the absence of its chief, which he at once proceeded to
put into execution. The road lay through a thick jungle, well
adapted for ambuscade, and as his men were making their way along,
a smart firing was suddenly heard in the front. Hurrying forward
Thomas found his advance guard had been attacked by a superior
force of the enemy, just as they were emerging into an extensive open
plain, and presently discovered that this was a ruse to draw his
observation away from a large and populous town named Bhat,
situated close at hand, and belonging to Tara Singh.

Having received information of the proximity of this place, Thomas
marched against it. The walls of the fort were twelve feet thick and
thirty feet high, with four strong bastions, well fortified with cannon,
commanding the town below, as well as the plain adjoining. It was
defended by 3,000 troops, and in all respects a place diflicult to take ;
but Thomas was determined to capture it, and resolved on an im-
mediate assault. Dividing his force into two columns, he led one
himself against the centre of the town, whilst one of his officers
176 GEORGE THOMAS.

named Hopkins led the other against the eastern angle. The affair
was desperate, for though the town was soon set on fire, the enemy
made a brave and stubborn resistance. Hopkins, advancing with the
utmost gallantry, stormed the quarter assigned to him, but, in the
moment of victory, fell wounded, and several other officers were
killed or disahled by the tremendons fire kept up from the bastions.
The affair now began to present a doubtful aspect, especially when
a large body of the Patiala cavalry made their appearance in the rear,
just as Thomas’s troops, although in actual possession of the town,
were beginning to waver and show signs of retreating, either because
of the excessive heat thrown out from the burning buildings, or from
the uncommonly severe fire poured down upon them from above.
The danger was, however, averted by Thomas’s presence of mind.
Bringing up a 6-pounder gun close to the gates of the citadel, he
demolished them by repeated discharges. Whereupon the enemy
gave up the contest, and by timely submission saved a further effusion
of blood on both sides, and paid a ransom of Rs.50,000.

Although Taéré Singh was a Sikh, a great portion of the population
of Malér Kotla were Muhammadans, who, when they heard of the
capture of Bhat, showed a disposition to join Thomas, and eventually
paid him a contribution, and united their troops with his.

Meanwhile the Rajah of Patiala had not been idle. To the east-
ward of his capital was the district of Shahabad, belonging to w Sikh
chief of the name of Karram Singh, to whose son Sahib Singh offered
his daughter in marriage if he would assist against Thomas. The
proposal being accepted, 5,000 of the Shahabad troops joined the
Patidila army, and on their arrival a grand council of war was held,
whereat it was resolved that a general combination of the Sikh states
should be formed to expel Thomas from the country.

For by this time Thomas had fully justified his claim to the title of
Jowruj Jung. He had become a veritable scourge to the Sutlej
states, and made his shadow dreaded wherever it fell. Victory
followed his arms, and none seemed capable of resisting him. The
confederation of such discordant elements as the Sikh clans was the
best testimony to his power and prestige. Information of this alliance
soon reached him through his spies, but it raised no serious appre-
hensions in his breast, for he considered that the diversity of interests
and counsels that prevailed in the enemy's camp, and the well-known
jealousies of their chiefs, would render it difficult for them to act in
harmony, or carry out auy preconcerted plan with loyally to one

another.
But at this juncture an event occurred which tempted Thomas
THE INVASION OF THE SUTLEJ STATES. 177

from the path of prudence, and turned the scale of circumstances
against him. Adjoining the Malér Kotla country was the territory
of Rai Elias, a youth who had recently succeeded his father, Rai
Kallin, in his inheritance. Rai Elias’s district ran contiguous with
the Sutlej river, and included the important cities of Ludhiana and
Firozpur. In consequence of his tender age his mother had assumed
the reins of government, but from inexperience, and the disadvantages
of her sex, proved wholly unable to rule a country producing a revenue
of five lakhs of rupees, and surrounded by enemies eager to prey on
it. Taking advantage of her weakness the Sikhs had attacked her
son’s districts in the previous year, and taken possession of a great
portion of them, only a few strong forts remaining to the Rani. Soon
after this Zamin Shah, the King of Kabul, arrived at Lahore, which
was only seventy miles distant from Rai Elias’s capital, and to him
the Rani appealed for assistance to reinstate her son in his authority.
Hearing of this the Sikhs evacuated the villages they had occupied,
and the peasantry returned to their allegiance, and matters were
beginning to assume a brighter aspect when a fresh danger arose,
which reduced the Réni to even deeper misfortunes than those from
which she had just emerged.

A certain Sikh named Sahib Singh (not to be confounded with the
ruler of Patiala) who was a Behdi of the race of Nanak, the founder
and prophet of the Sikh nation, counterfeited religious inspiration, and
having by fraud and artifice imposed on his countrymen, collected
a large force and proceeded to possess himself of the country of Rai
Elias. As Zaman Shah had by this time returned to Kabul, no help
could be expected from that sovereign, and the Rani was soon
reduced to a truly deplorable situation, and obliged in her extremity
to sue for terms from her enemies. A treaty was drawn up by which
she agreed to pay a sum of two lakhs of rupees to the Sikhs as
ransom, but Sahib Singh, the imposter, refused to approve it, and
demanded the surrender of the whole of her country. As a last
resource the Rani sent her young son to make an appeal in person,
and try to obtain an abatement of these harsh terms ; whereupon the
youth was treacherously seized and retained a prisoner by Sahib
Singh, but was shortly released by a Sikh chief named Karram Singh,
whose credulity could no longer be imposed upon by the pretended
prophet, and who detached himself from his cause and carried Rai
Elias to a place of safety. Sahib Singh immediately returned to the
attack of the Rani’s country, and was occupied in the siege of
Ludhiana, one of the chief towns in it, when Thomas appeared upon
the scene and captured Bhit.

12
178 GEORGE THOMAS.

In this situation of her affairs the Rani determined to apply to
Jowruj Jung for assistance in expelling Sahib Singh, and despatched
a confidential agent to his camp, offering him a lakh of rupees to
reinstate her son in power, and promising him an annual tribute of
Rs.50,000 a year to guarantee the youth in undisturbed possession.
Although this proposal seemed likely to drag Thomas into a pro-
longed war he was so touched by “ the fallen condition of an ancient
and honourable family” that he acceded to it. Lovely woman in
distress never appealed in vain to this susceptible Irishman, and
whether it was the Witch of Sardhana, the Amazon of Patiala, or the
widow of Ludhiana, it needed but a woman’s cry to bring him to the
rescue.

Hearing of these negotiations Sahib Singh, the imposter, wrote to
Thomas, threatening him with punishment, and warning him “‘if he
wished for quarter ” to send a Vakil at once to ‘“ the successor of
Nanak and the Sovereign of the Sikh nation ”—such being the dignity
to which the Behdi laid claim. and he concluded his letter by
recommending “implicit obedience to his commands.”

The idea of Thomas “ wishing for quarter” at the hand of a Sikh
was distinctly precious: and there was a splendid audacity of ex-
pression in the recommendation of “implicit obedience” from Jowruj
Jung. TFiqually indignant at the impertinence of the language and
the menace, Thomas replied that he was accustomed to receive, not
to send Vakils, and that Sahib Singh had better pay down his con-
tribution before he was compelled, and immediately evacuate the
country of Rai Elias. This answer brought matters to a point, and
the imposter prepared to make good his threats.

Meanwhile Rai Elias left the Rajah of Patiala, with whom he had
taken refuge after leaving Karram Singh, and came of his own accord
to Thomas’s camp. ‘“ The comely appearance of the youth,” observes
the Irishman, “his fallen condition, and above all the confidence he
showed in placing his whole reliance on one against whom he was so
lately leagued in enmity, altogether influenced me in his favour, and
determined me to use every exertion to support his cause.”

The Rajah of Patiala now joined the imposter to make common
cause against their common enemy. Thomas at once advanced
against them, upon which “the Sovercign of the Sikhs” inconti-
nently fled, his followers evacuating the country faster than Thomas
could occupy it. So rapid was the Behdi’s retreat that in one place
his bed, palanquin, tent and baggage were all found abandoned. Tis
discomfiture was complete, and he never afterwards occasioned any
disturbance.
THE INVASION OF THE SUTLEJ STATES. 179

The Rani and her son were now put in possession of their territory,
and after the most active of the rebels had been seized and punished,
the authority of the young chief was re-established. But although the
imposter was no more, the Rajah of Patiala still kept the field, and was
joined by several other chiefs. He now advanced at the head of 15,006
men against Thomas, with the intention of driving him out of the
country. Several skirmishes took place, but without any substantial
results, neither party being desirous of risking a general engagement.
And so hostilities continued to be carried on in a desultory manner, the
Sikhs contenting themselves with cutting off supplies from Thomas’s
camp, and preventing him from collecting forage. But as all this
occurred within Rai Elias’s territory, and occasioned great loss by
stopping the cultivation of the land, Thomas desired to carry the
war into the enemy’s country. To this, however, the Rani would
not consent, pressing him to stay by her while the Sikhs remained
in the neighbourhood.

So long as prudence allowed, he listened to these solicitations, but at
last a time came when his ammunition began to fall short, and he was
reluctantly compelled to make preparations for his return to Hansi to
obtain a supply. And so, much against her will, he left the Rani to
sustain her authority by herself, and began his march home-
wards.

The Sikhs at once closed in upon his rear and began to harass him.
This behaviour incited him to retaliate by devastating their country
through which he passed. And there was a further satisfaction in
knowing that his pursuit by the whole force of the enemy was operat-
ing favourably for Rai Elias, since it drew the Sikhs away from his
districts, which, for a time at least, would be freed from their
depredations.

Previous to his setting out on this campaign Thomas had effected a
treaty with two powerful Sikh neighbours, Bagh Singh of Jhind, and
Lal Singh of Kaithal, by which they solemnly agreed to live in amity,
and particularly to abstain from invading Haridna during Thornas’s
absence. But now these treacherous chiefs, perceiving the strong
combination that had been formed against him, broke their faith, and
joined his enemies. They had not, however, rightly reckoned the
character of the man whose feelings they thus outraged. Thomas,
by forced marches, forged ahead of his pursuers, and led his troops
against the fort of Kanhori, which belonged to Lal Singh, and taking
it by storm, put the garrison to the sword. The capture of this place,
which was only forty-five miles distant from Patiila, was of the
greatest importance to him, for its situation near the Ghaggar
180 GHORGE THOMAS.

river, and on the borders of his own districts, afforded Thomas an
excellent advance depét for stores and ammunition, and he accordingly
repaired the fortifications and garrisoned it with a large force.

This done he collected hostages from the surrounding country as
security for its peaceful behaviour, and marched to Retara, another
strong fort, belonging to the Kaithal chief, and was on the point of
storming this when the garrison of 500 men, dreading a similar fate
to that experienced by the inhabitants of Kanhori, appealed for quarter,
and were granted it on payment of a substantial contribution, and the
surrender of the fort with its contents to Thomas.

From Retéra Thomas returned to Hansi, where he learnt that
during his absence Bapu Sindhia, the Marath4 general, had invaded
Haridna under orders from General Perron, but had fallen back on
Delhi, where the main army was encamped, directly information
reached him that Thomas was returning to his capital.

The main Sikh army, which had not relinquished the pursuit, now
began to suffer seriously from want of water and supplies, and were
eventually compelled to abandon active operations for the present,
and drawing off encamped in the neighbourhood of Kaithal, there to
await the bursting of the monsoon rains before recommencing hostili-
ties. But no consideration of this sort hindered Thomas when he was
on the war-path. He had still to punish the Rajah of Jhind, and
marching to that chief's district, he exacted a fine, and took hostages.
Thence he passed on to lay siege to Safidun, a town dependent on the
same ruler. This place was built of brick and surrounded by walls of
uncommon height and strength, so that it was impossible to take it by
a sudden assault. Thomas therefore erected three redoubts around it,
which he fortified with eighteen 12- and 6-pounder guns, and opened a
bombardment, keeping up an incessant fire from early dawn till three
o’clock in the afternoon, at which hour, fearing the place miglit be
reinforced during the night, he determined on a storm. The garrison
consisted of 700 men, 300 of whom remained in the fort, whilst the
rest sallied bravely out and attacked Thomas’s advanced posts on the
first signs of his intention to assault, but most of them, including some
chiefs of distinction, were put to the sword as they clambered their
way out of the deep ditch surrounding the place. And now Thomas
in his turn delivered his attack, and attempted to mount the breach
which his guns had made. But his sealing ladders proved too short,
and his men were involved in the greatest difficulty, being entirely
exposed to the enemy’s fire without any possibility of returning it.
After a desperate conflict of two hours he was compelled to draw off
with a loss of 450 of his best troops, The gallant Hopkins, who had
THE INVASION OF THE SUTLEJ STATES. 181

been, as usual, conspicuous by his ardour during the assault, was again
severely wounded.

But the enemy had also suffered greatly in the earlier part of the
day, and now attempted to escape by cutting their way through
Thomas’s line. In this they were successful, and reached the shelter
of a thick forest in the neighbourhood, whilst the victors marched in
and occupied the abandoned fort.

It does not speak much for the national spirit of the Sikhs that
during this time their main army lay within twenty-seven miles of
Safidun, and yet never attempted to relieve their brethren in distress.
It was also a fortunate occurrence for Thomas that Bapu Sindhia,
who was encamped fourteen miles to the south, made no hostile
movement. Encouraged by this immunity from attack Thomas now
marched against the main Sikh army at Kaithal, to renew the war
which had been suspended; but his late feats had struck a chill into
the hearts of his enemies, who recognised that Jowruj Jung was a
masterful man, to whom it was better to submit than offer resis-
tance. So soon as his intentions became evident to the Chief of
Patiala and his allies they sent four Vakils to negotiate for peace,
thus admitting his advantage.

Thomas, despite his exhibition of energy and vigour, was sincerely
desirous of terminating the war; for he was informed that General
Perron was preparing to march from Delhi for the avowed purpose of
assisting the Sikhs. Although this was not exactly the case, it was
certain that Perron was bent on measuring swords with Thomas.
Added to these considerations was the occurrence of disturbances
which had broken out near Hansi, and required care to avert danger.
Thomas, therefore, wisely decided to profit by the enormous prestige
he now enjoyed, and agreed to terms. It was settled that the Sikhs
should pay him an indemnity of Rs.135,000, and renounce all preten-
sions to the country of Rai Elias; that the Chief of Patidla should be
reconciled to his sister, Kunur, who was to be reinstated in the property
confiscated from her; that certain districts on the frontier should be
ceded to Thomas; and finally that the Chief of Patidla should sub-
sidise two battalions of infantry, who were to be stationed to keep order
on the boundary, as a safeguard to either party.

It was a treaty which did honour to Thomas, not only because it
asserted his complete mastery over his enemies and secured him solid
advantages, but because two of its principal stipulations showed how
the protection of the weak, and the rehabilitation of an injured woman
had a first place in his warm Irish heart, and evoked the support of
his chivalrous nature.
182 GEORGE THOMAS.

“Thus,” he observes in his memoirs, “ended a campaign of seven
months, in which I had been more successful than I could possibly
have expected when I first took the field with a force consisting of
5,000 men and 36 pieces of cannon. I lost in killed, wounded
and disabled, nearly one-third of my force; but the enemy lost 5,000
persons of all descriptions. I realised near Rs.200,000, exclusive of
the pay of my army, and was to receive an additional Rs.100,000 for
the hostages which were delivered up. I explored the country, formed
alliances, and, in short, was Dicraror in all the countries belonging to
the Sikhs south of Sutlej.”

Directly this treaty was concluded Thomas made an astonishingly
rapid march back to Hansi, to the consternation and amazement of
General Perron, who was actively preparing for an attack on that
town, in the belief that its master was many miles away. This extra-
ordinary display of vitality confounded Perron, who, in the changed
aspect of affairs, began to consider the advisability of substituting
negotiations for action.

But the star of Jowruj Jung had passed its meridian height and was
now on the decline. Once or twice it was destined to blaze brightly
out through the dark clouds that shrouded its setting; but the cam-
paign that carried him conquering to the Sutlej and safely back was
his last victorious effort. Conceived in a spirit of the boldest enter-
prise ; conducted with an audacity as successful as it was splendid,
and concluded with a vigour that astounded his enemies, it fitly crowns
the dashing and defiant career of this gallant Irish adventurer. And
more than this, it compels the belief that under a happier destiny he
might have carried into effect the ambitious scheme of conquest which
he marked out for achievement, but never lived to realise.

The end was drawing near: his work was nearly done. But its
memory was to remain. For in many a Panjab village, for many a
long year after he had passed from the scene of his exploits, the
whisper of the name of Jowrujy Jung could hush children into silence,
and bring a keen alert look into the grave dusky faces of grey-bearded
warriors, who remembered how, in the days of their youth, the sword
blows of the sailor Sahib were wout to fall fast and thick amongst
flying Sikh armies, scourging and scattering them like the flail of the
threslier descending upon the trampled sheaves of corn.
CHAPTER VII.
WAR WITH PERRON. THE BATTLE OF GEORGEGARU.
1801.

HE extraordinary success of Thomas’s career, the alarming growth

of his power, and his singularly ambitious nature, had for some
time marked him out as an object of suspicion to Daulat Rao Sindhia
and of jealousy to General Perron. More than once the Maratha
prince had in the past offered service to Thomas, and these offers
had recently been revived, but Thomas refused them, owing to his
disinclination to serve in conjunction with Perron, whom he cordially
hated. And so no arrangement was concluded, and meanwhile Thomas
gradually increased his force to eight battalions of regular infantry of
750 men each, 1,500 Rohillas, 2,000 garrison troops, 1,000 cavalry,
and 50 guns. This little army, from a numerical point of view,
was sufficiently powerful to create distrust, but it was rendered doubly
formidable from the prowess and prestige of its commander, “ who
lad a spirit and elevation of mind not to be subdued by accident, or
depressed by ill-fortune,” and from the valour and confidence which
animated all ranks after an almost unbroken career of victory.

The recent invasion of the Sutlej states had raised Thomas to w
distinct place in the community of Indian powers, whilst the lawless
and predatory instinct that swayed him made his army a source of
constant terror to the neighbouring countries he so frequently
devastated and laid under contribution, Even to the Maratha
power itself Jowruy Fung lad become w standing inenace, for his
proximily to Delhi, and the dash and daring of his system of
warfare, made a coup de main against the capital and the person
of the mperor not outside the bounds of possibility.

This in itself was a sufficient reason for Perron’s determination to
miexsure swords with the conqueror of Hariina. But there was
another consideration which influenced him, and that was Thomas’s

183
184 GHEORGHE THOMAS.

notorious hatred of Frenchmen. Jowruj Jung suffered from the
acutest form of Francophobia prevalent at a time when the disease
was very virulent. It was on this ground that he refused Sindhia’s
proposals, explaining that “M. Perron and himself being subjects of
different nations then in a state of actual hostility against each other,
it was impossible they could ever act in concert or with cordiality.
He was moreover convinced that as a Frenchman and possessed of a
national enmity against him, M. Perron would always be induced to
represent his actions in a light most unfavourable to his interests.”
This inference was certainly sufficiently justified by Perron’s
behaviour towards the British officers in his army. He was at this
time bent on the establishment of a French dominion in Hindustan,
to which end he had entered into negotiations with the French
Government. These schemes and ambitions undoubtedly influenced
his policy towards Thomas, for it was impossible for him to view with
equanimity the existence on his weakest flank of a growing power,
whose sympathies were intensely British. He therefore urged upon
Sindhia the necessity of crushing the army of the audacious adventurer
of Hansi, whose increasing fame threatened to eclipse that of Perron
himself.

Whatever Perron suggested, Sindhia of necessity approved and
sanctioned, for he was too harassed and tormented by difficulties in the
Deccan to exert any real authority in Hindustan. But true to the
traditions of craft and intrigue that governed the Maratha mind,
Daulat Rao first attempted a diplomatic solution, and once more
repeated his invitation to Thomas to join his standard. Thomas met
the proposal with his former reply. “Principles of honour,” he
wrote, ‘forbid me from acting under the command of a Frenchman.
But should you think proper to appoint me to the management of
operations, either offensive or defensive, in any part of the Deccan,
Hindostan, or the Punjaub, I am ready and willing to undertake the
charge so soon as the necessary arrangements for the payment of my
troops can be completed.”

To this Sindhia, under Perron’s direction, replied “‘ That it was im-
possible to consent to such a proposal, as it would create an unfavour-
able precedent; and he recommended Thomas to curb his national
enmity, and consider the matter in a light more favourable for the
interests of the service.”

Such was the position of affairs at the end of the Sutlej campaign,
when it became evident that a conflict between Thomas and Perron
could be no longer deferred. The Siklis, smarting under the defeat
they had suffered, helped to bring matters to a head by opening nego-
WAR WITH PERRON. 185

tiations with Perron, to whom they offered a subsidy of five lakhs of
rupees and a contingent of 10,000 cavalry, if he would undertake
the destruction of their dreaded enemy.

This offer came at an opportune moment, for Perron was fully
determined in his mind to bring matters to a summary conclusion,
either by force of arms, or by absorbing Thomas’s army in his own.
So he wrote a sort of ultimatum to Thomas, requesting him to send a
Vakil to confer upon the proposals recently made by Sindhia. But
no sooner was this communication despatched than news reached
Delhi of the disastrous defeat of Sindhia’s forces at Ujjain by Holkar,
which in a moment changed the aspect of affairs. Orders followed for
Perron to temporise with Thomas, and proceed immediately to the
Deccan with all his troops, to assist in re-establishing his master’s
power, which had received a serious shock.

This was an ominous blow to Perron. His personal interests were
centred in Hindustan, a withdrawal from which would be fatal. The
negotiations which he had recently opened with the French Govern-
ment required both the consolidation of his power at Delhi, and that
it should be supreme there. To detach all, or even a portion of his
troops to Ujjain would be political suicide. It was far more important
to him to destroy Thomas than to defeat Holkar. The temporary
success of the latter might even be advantageous to his personal
schemes if it weakened Sindhia: for Daulat Rao’s weakness was
Perron’s strength so long as the latter could keep his Brigades around
him. Rumours reached him of several alliances which Thomas was
negotiating with the Begum Somru, the Rajahs of Jaipur and Ulwar,
with sundry Sikh chiefs, with Lakwa Dada, and with Jaswant Rao
Holkar himself. Asa fact, Holkar had repeatedly urged Thomas to
commence hostilities, and promised to assist him with men and
money. Thomas was also in communication with Jean Baptiste la
Fontaine, who commanded six battalions of Filoze’s party in the ser-
vice of Sindhia. This pairing of opposite cards comes on the authority
of Lewis Ferdinand Smith, who writes : “ Such are the singularity and
treachery of Eastern politics, that two of Scindia’s Brigades, Sombre’s
and Filoze’s, had agreed to assist Thomas against Daulat Rao’s com-
mander-in-chief Perron!” For the moment it almost appeared as
though Thomas would be successful in forming an overwhelming com-
bination against his enemies, whilst he was considerably augmenting his
own force, having made preparations to raise six more battalions, the
recruits for which were on their way to join him, and the arms ready
for them. A careful review of the comparative strength of Thomas and
Peyyon at this time seems to favour the former.
186 GEORGE THOMAS.

Perhaps Perron realised this; but he had gone too far to draw back.
The very existence of his power depended upon the destruction of
Thomas’s. It was impossible for him to obey Sindhia’s orders and
march with his battalions to the Deccan, leaving Hindustan shorn of
troops. So under various pretexts he avoided starting for Ujjain, and
ineanwhile cogitated on an extremely clever scheme which, if success-
ful, would at one and the same time undermine Thomias’s power, and
pacify Sindhia’s importunity. This was nothing more or less than
sending Thomas to do the work in the Deccan, and retaining his
own Brigades intact in Hindustan. With this design in his mind
Perron received the Vakil Thomas sent him with marked favour, and
presently requested a personal interview with his master.

Thomas consented, and the fort of Bahadurgarh was fixed for the
meeting. Thither Perron sent his Third Brigade of 10 battalions
of infantry under Bourguien and 2,000 regular horse, following them
from his headquarters at Koil, about the middle of August. At
the same time Thomas marched out of Hansi to attend the interview.
On approaching Bahadurgarh, which was situated a few miles to the
north-west of Delhi, he was met by Captain L. F. Smith, who was
deputed to conduct him to the place of meeting. Thomas was not
altogether without suspicion of Perron’s good faith, and this distrust
was increased by information which reached him that the General had
recently put to death a Sikh chief, who had revolted from Sindhia, and
of whose person he had obtained possession by treacherous means.
Thomas, therefore, took with him as a personal escort, two of his most
approved battalions and 800 cavalry, and on the 19th of August,
1801, arrived and encamped two miles’ distant fron: Perron’s lines at
Bahadurgarh.

The next day an interview took place. Thomas was determined to
observe the greatest circumspection, but both he and Perron were too
cunning to deceive each other long. One canimagine the meeting of
the vain-glorious Frenchman and the hot-headed Irishman, each in
his own way typical of the European nations they represented. Both
were self-made men, sprung from the same low strata of seafaring life ;
both lad fought their way to distinction and power by similar
methods, and reached an extraordinary elevation. Both, doubtless,
laboured under exaggerated ideas of the etiquette aud conduct required
in diplomatic dealing. The mind pictures the foreed Gallic politeness
of the one, and the Tipperary puuctilio of the other, as they attempted
to disguise the racial hatred that filled their hearts. Perron with his
solitary hand—he lad lost one at the siege of Kéiuaund in 1793—
waving the great, tall Irishman into the place of honour, must have
WAR WITH PERRON. 187

adjured the scélérat under his breath ; and Thomas cursed the d——d
Frenchman as he glared down on him and passed to his seat. But the
pantomime of politeness passed off well enough, and although no busi-
ness was transacted, the way was paved for future negotiations.

Several conferences took place after this, and when the first sense of
distrust and awkwardness wore off, friendly relations were established,
if not between Perron and Thomas, at least between the latter and the
European officers of Bourguien’s Third Brigade, with whom he dined
repeatedly. Amongst these was Colonel (then Captain) James Skin-
ner (to whose excellent memoirs much of the following matter is
indebted), who states that ‘‘all seemed to be going on well,” and
describes Thomas’s troops as ‘‘ looking well, but not over-disciplined ;
but his artillery was very fine and the bullocks particularly good and
strong.” Captains Hearsey, Hopkins, and Birch, three of Thomas’s
officers, were in his camp, as well as some Europeans acting as ser-
geants in his artillery, so that he must have made a very creditable
show.

Thomas had already reccived information about Sindhia’s defeat at
Ujjain and the unfavourable aspect of the Prince’s affairs, and this
naturally strengthened his hand, and led him to hope that the negotia-
tions would be productive of an amicable adjustment of all former difii-
culties, and lead to future tranquillity and a good understanding
between him and Perron. But when the latter indicated the con-
ditions on which it was proposed to entertain Thomas’s services, the
demand was equally sudden and unexpected, and quite took Thomas
aback. He was to surrender his district of Jhajjar, but to be permitted
to retain the fort of Hansi; he was to rank as a colonel in Sindhiia’s
service, with a pay of Rs.60,000 a month for his corps, but to serve
under Perron’s orders. These terms were unfavourable and unaccept-
able in themselves, but they were made impossible by the additional
condition that Thomas, directly he agreed to them, would be required
to detach four of his battalions for service against Holkar in the
Deccan.

In Thomas’s acutely suspicious Irish nature this last proviso aroused
the strongest distrust. It seemed to him that Perron wished to follow
the political maxim Divide ct Inpera, and he believed the stipulation
was a distinct attempt to undermine his power, and that as soon as
Holkar was defeated, his own turn would come to be dealt with, when
he would be compelled to accept any terms Perron might choose to
impose. Ie therefore peremptorily refused compliance, and abruptly
breaking off the conference, marched back to Hinsi and prepared for
war.
188 GHORGE THOMAS.

That he was mistaken in this step is proved by results, for service
under Sindhia could never have led to such absolute ruin as overtook
Thomas before four months had passed away. He has been blamed
for want of judgment in neglecting “the only rational chance left
him of realising with greater certainty a higher station as a soldier
than he could ever hope to do by his own unaided resources against
the jealous enmity of the most potent prince in Hindustan.” Although
by the light of subsequent events the wisdom of this criticism is made
apparent, it is easy to understand the grounds which influenced
Thomas in his choice. In the first place he could not foresee that all
his projected alliances were to fail him, and he had in theory an
exceedingly strong combination at-his back. Then he was a victorious
and independent leader treating for terms, not a defeated general suing
for them, who had no choice but to submit to the humiliation of sur-
rendering territory he had held and governed fornine years. He was
at the head of a marvellously spirited force, fresh from a brilliant
campaign, in which it had proved its superiority over enormous nume-
vical odds. Perron might certainly bring bigger battalions into the
field, but the recent defeat at Ujjain had gravely shaken the prestige of
Sindhia’s regular infantry. Lastly, there was Thomas’s own nature,
his unconquerable pugnacity, his firm faith in his own fortune, and his
cherished ambitions for supreme power which prevented his giving
way. Visions of glory blinded him; his eyes still turned towards the
far Panjab ; his mind was filled with schemes of conquest and acqui-
sition. It was intolerable to him to serve under another in an inglori-
ous réle of subordination ; but altogether repugnant when that other
was aTrenchman. And it was this sentiment, more than any other,
that urged him to enter into u struggle with the master of forty
thousand fighting men, rather than yield up an independence which
he had won with his own right hand, and lower his sword in salute to
a chief whom he despised.

War was formally declared, and both sides began to make ready.
But Perron set off for Koil with such impolitic precipitation that Lewis
Ferdinand Smith refers to his departure as “ the flight of Perron from
his army.” He left Major Louis Bourguien, who was in command of
the Third Brigade, to conduct the operations, and this officer, after
being strengthened with 60 guns and reinforced by 6,000 Sikh
cavalry, entered Thomas’s territory early in September, and march-
ing to Jhajjar, which was unfortified, occupied it without oppo-
sition. He then attempted to capture Georgegarh, a strong fort
five miles to the south, garrisoned by 800 of Thomas's troops,
but the officer entrusted with the attack being repulsed, Bourguien
WAR WITH PERRON. 189

left Captain L. F. Smith with three battalions of infantry and a
battering train to lay siege to it, and himself marched to Jhind,
whither he heard Thomas had gone. On arriving here he was told
his quarry had moved off to Patiala, and at once started in pursuit ;
but this had merely been a feint on Thomas’s part to draw off Bour-
guien’s main army, and he now retraced his steps to Hansi with
incredible rapidity, completed his ammunition and other stores, left a
body of Rohillas to defend the place, and then swooped down on
Smith at Georgegarh, covering the last seventy-six miles in two days,
whilst the blundering Bourguien, discovering too late the trap into
which he had fallen, came following after.

Thomas’s sudden approach was the signal for Smith to raise the siege
of Georgegarh, and fall back on Jhajjar. But Thomas was not to
be foiled, and without resting his men, dashed forward to cut Smith
off. His troops, however, from some unaccountable reason, lost their
road in the darkness of the night, and when in the early morning
Thomas came up with the retreating enemy he found he had only one
battalion supporting him.

Smith’s rear-guard was under the command of a gallant old native
officer, named Puran Singh, who immediately drew up his battalion
in line in order to cover the retreat of the artillery and baggage,
whilst Smith opened a slight cannonade, and then continued his flight.
This gave time for some of Thomas’s laggards to come up, but being
in a state of extreme fatigue, and only commanded by a native officer
named Martdiza Khan, they incautiously advanced through a field of
high standing corn, without reconnoitring their front, and suddenly
found themselves attacked by Puran Singh, who charged them with
great spirit and beat them back with a loss of four of their guns.

Hearing of this disaster Thomas immediately advanced to the relief,
and leading his men, sword in hand, fell upon the enemy, and after a
severe conflict completely defeated them, and recaptured the four guns.
Puran Singh was wounded and taken prisoner, and a great number
of his men killed or disabled, only a mere remnant escaping; for
although Smith was but a short distance ahead, he did not return to
their assistance, but busied himself with securing the safety of his
guns and baggage.

Thomas, whose loss was under 100 men, now fell back on George-
garh, his troops being so exhausted with fatigue as to be unable
to continue the pursuit; and only a few cavalry were sent after the
fugitives, and these picked up several stands of colours and small
arms. Skinner, in his memoirs, blames Smith for his supine conduct
on this occasion ; but Thomas observes, ‘‘Had it not been for the
190 GEORGE THOMAS.

soldier-like precautions taken by Captain Smith in sending forward
his artillery and baggage, while he made head with his infantry, the
whole would have infallibly have been captured ; as it was he lost the
greater part of his ammunition and baggage.”

This action occurred on the 27th of September, and on the following
morning Thomas was preparing to renew the attack when his scouts
brought information of Bourguien’s approach. His troops being
fatigued and many of them dispersed in search of plunder, Thomas
did not deem it advisable to hazard an immediate engagement, and
the relieving force, which turned out to be Bourguien’s 2,000 regular
cavalry, under the command of Captain IF. E. Smith, « brother of
Captain L. F. Smith, made good their way to Jhajjar, and saved the
two battalions and the battering train there from a very serious
danger.

Bourguien himself, with his infantry, arrived on the 29th, the men
harassed, fatigued, and famished after a march of sixty miles in thirty-
six hours; yet, with incredible imbecility, their leader determined
on an immediate attack. On reconnoitring Thomas’s position he
found him drawn up in one line, with Georgegarh and a large fortified
village on his right flank, a strong redoubt, in which were stationed
600 Rohillas and 4 pieces of artillery, on his left; and another
large walled village in his rear. ven under favourable circum-
stances the position would have been a strong one to attack, but
under existing conditions an assault by Bourguien’s exhausted and
worn-out troops was madness.

Notwithstanding which the Frenchman ordered the advance at
three o’clock in the afternoon, but, with a prudent regard for his own
safety, directed operations from a point far away in the rear, where he
faithfully kept bis post during the rest of the fight, full of importance,
but out of danger. Obedient to orders, and with a calm intrepidity
worthy of its reputation, the Brigade advanced in open columus of
companies against Thomas’s entrenchments. The route lay through
heavy sand, and they were exposed to a dreadful and well-directed
fire from 50 guns. Two battalions, with a couple of cannon, were
detached to make a diversion on Thomas’s rear, whilst the main body
proceeded straight against his position.

Thomas had chosen his ground with his usual ability, and so
divided his forces as to oppose a front to the enemy at each point
threatened. The position gave him a considerable advantage, for
knowing that his men were unaccustomed to artillery fire, he selected
a place whore the soil was so loose and sandy that it deadened the
shot, and prevented them from ricochetting. The total number of
WAR WITH PERRON. 191

troops under his command consisted of 10 battalions of infantry, 600
Rohillas, 500 cavalry, and 54 guns.

About four o’clock the two armies were within musket shot, and
Bourguien’s men began to push briskly on, with their guns at the
drag ropes. But Thomas, with rapid discharges of round and grape
shot, mowed them down by scores, whilst his own troops were in a
great measure sheltered by a breastwork of sand which they had
hastily thrown up. A few minutes of this hot work threw Bour-
guien’s main body into confusion, which must have resulted in
irretrievable disaster, had not his cavalry made a spirited charge on
Thomas’s centre, and pressed it so hard that it began to give way,
and the rest of his line to waver.

This rendered an immediate movement necessary, and Captain
Hopkins with the right wing, and Captain Birch with the left, were
ordered to advance and charge with bayonets. Each moved out with
two battalions in columns of companies, and then formed in front of
the enemy ‘with as great calmness and precision as if they had been
at review,” and after delivering their fire dashed forward with fixed
bayonets, and drove Bourguien’s line back. But Bourguien’s gunners
would not abandon their pieces, and, serving them with great resolu-
tion, kept up a heavy fire, which created immense havoc, and so
encouraged the cavalry, who had temporarily drawn off, that they
charged again. But being bravely met and repulsed with loss, they
retreated a second time, and were pursued for a considerable distance
by Thomas’s horse.

And now there came one of war’s mischances to operate against
the victory which seemed almost assured to Thomas. Captain
Hopkins, his second in command and in gallantry, his alter ego,
was struck by a cannon ball, which carried away one of his legs. On
seeing their leader fall his men immediately lost heart, and retired in
disorder, carrying him with them. Whereupon Bourguien’s left wing
rallied, and reoccupied the position they had abandoned, and after a
little time attempted to advance to the storm again; but the fire
along the line from Thomas’s guns was so murderous, that at last the
whole Brigade was ordered to lie down and avail themselves of such
shelter as the undulating surface of the ground afforded. In the
same way Thomas’s troops crouched behind the sand hillocks that
protected thein, and in this position the two armies remained until
sunset, neither daring to expose itself by an advance or a retreat, but
continuing to keep up a constant fire. When at last night drew its
curtain over the bloody plain, the worn-out soldiers, utterly ex-
hausted, bivouaced on the open field they had so desperately contested.
192 GEORGE THOMAS.

At sunrise the next morning Bourguien hung out a flag of truce,
and an armistice was granted for six hours, during which the wounded
were conveyed to the rear and the dead buried. At noon the flag was
hauled down, but neither party displayed any inclination to renew the
engagement, and after a few rounds of cannon shot Bourguien drew
off unmolested, leaving Thomas master of the field.

Thus ended the severest battle that was ever fought between the
disciplined armies of Hindustan up to that date. The troops opposed
had been nearly equally matched, for though Bourguien commanded
8,000 men, and Thomas only 5,000, the latter’s deficiency in numbers
was made up by the greater strength of his position, the comparative
freshness of his men, and his own immeasurably superior military
skill.

The loss on both sides was enormous, but from the conflicting
nature of the returns it is difficult to state the exact numbers.
Captain Skinner, who was present at the battle, puts down Bour-
guien’s casualties at between 8,000 and 4,000, but Thomas assesses
them at 2,000, whilst Captain L. F. Smith states “that above
1,100 men were killed and wounded, which was nearly one-third
of the number engaged.” But Bourguien had 7,500 infantry at
the very least, so that Thomas’s estimate is probably the most
correct. Skinner’s must certainly be accepted cautiously, for his
memory for dates and figures is peculiarly incorrect as a rule. Out
of seven European officers engaged in the attack, Lieutenant
M’Culloch was killed, Lieutenant Emilius Felix Smith mortally
wounded, and Captains Oliver and Rabells wounded.

Thomas lost 700 men by his own account, though Skinner puts it
down at 2,000. The destruction of artillery on both sides was very
great. Twenty-five of Bourguien’s tumbrels were blown up, and
fifteen of his guns dismounted, owing to the sandy soil from which
they were fired preventing a proper recoil, and so causing the axle-
trees to snap. In the same way Thomas lost twenty pieces of
cannon, only a few of which were dismounted by the enemy’s shot
striking them.

But a far greater loss to him was the death of Captain Hopkins,
who succumbed to his wound a few hours after the action. ‘He was
worth more than a couple of battalions to Thomas,” writes one who
knew him, ‘“‘and had the latter possessed another such officer the
undecided day of Georgegarh would have been turned into victory.”
As these words are being penned, ninety years have passed to the very
day since Hopkins fell in battle. The coincidence of date comes
suddenly and with something of a shock, even as the ink that records
WAR WITH PERRON. 193

his death is wet. God knows under what insignificant dot of land in
that distant country lie mouldering the bones of this gallant ad-
venturer. Lut laying down the pen, and musing for an idle moment,
a forlorn pity steals over the mind as one thinks of how he was cut off
in the bright spring-tide of his youth, squandering all that human
nature holds most dear in the insignificant service he belonged to.
Expatriated, remote, unknown, he died a soldier’s death, acquitting
himself as nobly as if he had been fighting under the flag of his own
country, instead of in a cause that yielded little credit, and less
renown. Thrice in these pages, within the compass of a year, the
brief chronicle of Hopkins’ bravery finds mention: twice wounded,
the third time dead, and so forgotten—pvor dropped atom in the
world’s dust!

Indecisive as was the battle of Georgegarh, the advantage remained
with Thomas. Had he availed himself of his opportunity he would
have added a crowning success to his career. Colonel Skinner
admits this when he writes: ‘‘We had always heard that Thomas
was a brave, active, and clever soldier, and an able general. But we
were surprised that he now permitted us to remain for fifteen days
without attempting to attack us, or make good his retreat to Hinsi :
for there was no doubt in our minds that had he tried either plan he
would have succeeded. The state of our guns and the spirits of our
soldiery was such that, had Thomas shown any inclination to move
towards us, we should have got out of his reach, for our commander,
Major Louis Bourguien, was not only a coward, but a fool. He was
one of those who got on by flattery, and had it not been for Major
Bernier, a Frenchman, we should certainly have lost the day; for the
Major was not seen at all during the battle, and our being saved
from total destruction was entirely owing to the exertions of Major
Bernier, who was a brave and able soldier.”’

There is a humiliating confession in this passage, and one cannot
but hope that De Boigne never learnt to what a low ebb “ the spirits
of lis soldiery” had been reduced. Perron, when he wrote to his
old chief in the following February, and boasted that ‘“*he had been
obliged to entirely destroy that scoundrel Thomas,” omitted to touch
on this incident, or to mention how Captain Drugeon, the general’s
deputy at Delhi, collected all the doctors in the city and bundled
them off to the front to tend the wounded, whilst Perron himself
raised new troops, and hurried forward reinforcements with feverish
haste.

Captain Lewis Ferdinand Smith takes even a stronger view than
Skinner of the possibilities opened to Thomas by the battle of

13
194 GEORGE THOMAS.

Georgegarli, as the following passage will show:—‘‘ Had Thomas
taken advantage of Bourguien’s ignorance and folly, and sallied out
on the beaten troops of Perron, he would have overturned his power.
But Thomas was, in this critical moment, confused and confounded,
though he had shown feats of valour during the action . . . Had he
acted with his usual boldness, caution and activity, the forces under
Bourguien must have been destroyed; the allies of Thomas would
have thrown off the mask, and openly taken his part; and before
Perron could have collected another efficient force, Thomas would
have been master of Delhi and the king’s person, and probably have
extinguished Perron’s power and authority. Scindia would have
quietly transferred that power to Thomas, for he would have been
equally indifferent who governed Hindostan, Perron or Thomas, as
he must, from impotency to resist, have bowed to the will and power
of every aspiring mind who commanded large bodies of regular
infantry.”

It was in this supreme moment of his career that Thomas fell.
Fell from an estate so high, that its possibilities are scarcely credible
when we consider the character of the man who might have grasped
them, and learn the reason why he failed to do so. That reason has
not hitherto been hinted at, but it had long existed. When Thomas
required his faculties to be clearest, his understanding unclouded, and
his energies strung to their highest pitch, he gave way to drink!
Alas! for the unheroing of this hero, that he should have sold
himself so cheaply, so vulgarly, so wantonly. Who shall diagnose
a drunkard’s reasons? Perchance Thomas was over-affected by the
death of gallant Hopkins, and his impressionable Irish nature sought
the solace which countrymen of his class not unfrequently fly to on
such occasions : perchance it was the very devilry of drink that drove
him to the bottle; or a more charitable explanation may lie in the
stimulant required by the unendurable fatigue of over-taxed physical
effort, or the terrible strain of mental anxiety. It matters little
which. The pitiable truth remains that in the momentous crisis of
his life Thomas surrendered himself to the demon that enslaved
him, and in one wild, reckless debauch, sacrificed everything.

Those who have followed him thus far in the erratic course of his
adventurous career, and who, in noting each step in it, have sighed
over his lawlessness and condemned his abandonment, but have yet
been cajoled into admiration for the man militant, may surely, in this
moment of his weakness and his folly, as they see him distraught and
undone, blindly seeking his own destruction, spare one regret for the
lost man. Remembering only, out of their charity, those things which
WAR WITH PERRON. 198

lie to lis credit: the loyalty that never deserted a friend, the chivalry
that so oftentimes succoured tle weak, the enterprise which raised
him to the height from which he fell, and the invincible spirit tlat
sustained him through twenty years of war and battle in the East.
CHAPTER VIII.
GATHERING TOILS. A DASH FOR HANSI.
1801.

Of a fortnight after the battle of Georgegarh Thomas resigned the
entire conduct of his affairs to Captain Hearsey, who, instead of
pressing forward to attack, or retiring on Hansi, began to fortify the
camp—a proceeding that halted half way between an advance to
victory and w retreat to safety. The reason le gave for his action
was that he expected assistance from Lakwa Dada, but this chief was
fully employed in defending himself against Ambaji Inglia’s English
officer, James Shepherd, and was, moreover, in a state of pecuniary
embarrassment, for it had recently been publicly reported he had been
obliged to sell his jewels to raise money to pay his troops.

It is difficult to understand the considerations which induced
Hearsey to repose confidence in the faith of a Marathi, and on the
streugth of it take up a position in an open camp instead of falling
back on Hansi, which was not only Thomas’s capital and arsenal and
the base of his supplies, but a fortress of great strength, and capable
of opposing an indefinite resistance to Perron. Ignoring this, Hearsey
elected to fortify what was little better than an open cantonment,
completely cut off from all resources, and without any corresponding
advantage in return.

While Thomas drank the golden moments away, and Hearsey
thought only of holding an untenable position, reinforcements kept
reaching the enemy daily. Drugeon, Perron’s deputy commandant
at Delhi, hurried forward all the available troops he could spare.
Perron detached five battalions of the Second Brigade from Koil,
and five more from Hessing’s corps at Agra: Bapu Sindhia, the
Maratha Sttbahdar of Saharanpur, contributed a large force of cavalry,
and the chiefs of Bhartpur and Hathras supplied their quota of troops.

Last of all, a great many of the Sikh chiefs joined Thomas's enemies,
196
GATHERING TOILS. 197

amongst them being Sahib Singh of Patidla, whose Amazonian sister,
Kuni, died on the 15th of September, at the early age of twenty-
eight.

Perron, when he heard of Bourguien’s defeat, was furious, and
despite that officer’s solemn asseveration that “ God knew he had
done his best,” superseded him by Major Pedron, who commanded
the Second Brigade. This officer immediately started for the front,
and shortly after he had assumed command at Georgegarh, a cordon
of 80,000 men and 110 pieces of artillery was drawn round Thomas.
This army was made up of twenty-two battalions of regular infantry,
including ten of the Third Brigade, five of the Second Brigade, five of
Hessing’s, and two of the Begum Somruv’s (the authority quoted is
that of Colonel Skinner), with 2,000 regular Hindustani horse, and
about 12,000 Sikh and Maratha cavalry. One of Pedron’s first acts
was to advance his line and secure possession of a large tank or reser-
voir of water, a short distance outside Georgegarh, which left Thomas
with only three wells to depend on. Very soon the enormous display
of force brought against him overawed the surrounding peasantry, who
submitted to Pedron, and discontinued their usual supplies of provi-
sions to the beleaguered camp, by which the difficulties within it were
very considerably augmented.

And now, when it was too late, Thomas pulled himself together and
resumed the command of his troops. He soon realised that he was
too weak to draw out bis army in open field and give battle, and that
all he could do was to remain within his lines and act on the defensive.
Something of his old energy and resource began to return to him, and
he set to work to fortify the camp in the best manner possible, build-
ing around it a hedge of the same kind of thorn trees he had utilised
in his defence of Fatehpur, and found so efficacious. He then took a
careful stock of his provisions, and found they were sufficient for a
month’s consumption. Having thus arranged everything for the
security of the camp, he braced himself to hold out until assistance
arrived from Lakwa Dada, who, at the commencement of hostilities,
had given him frequent assurances of support.

It was now nearly the middle of October. Soon skirmishes began
to take place daily, and Thomas made frequent sorties and attacked
Pedron’s entrenchments, but was never able to capture any of them.
Isolated duels were often fought in the open plain between the two
camps by detached parties from either army, but although Thomas’s
troops behaved with signal gallantry, they were always overpowered
by superior numbers and driven back within their own lines again.
On the 18th of October a grand concerted attack was made in conjune-
198 GEORGH THOMAS.

tion with some troops Viman Rio had sent to Thomas’s assistance,
but it failed, and the latter lost 400 men without effecting anything
decisive. The following day, Rahmén Khan, one of his Afghan mer-
cenaries, made a gallant sortie with 2,000 men, but only to be driven
back by a heavy cannonade from Pedron’s well-posted guns. And so
a fortnight passed, marked by frequent conflicts, in which nothing
was gained, and by the end of it Thomas’s provisions had shrunk alarm-
ingly, for his foraging parties found it impossible to avoid the Sikh
and Maritha cavalry that swarmed round the camp, and prevented
them from replenishing his fast diminishing stock. Day followed
day, and one week another, and there was no sign of Lakwa Dida’s
coming. The investing lines were drawn closer and closer, and tlie
weak points in them strengthened, until at last a complete hlockade
was established, whilst, to complete his troubles, the water in Thomas's
three wells began to show signs of failing.

The Asiatic soldier, no matter how heroically led and commanded,
is a fatalist at heart, and this prejudices him for defensive operations,
for, curiously enough, his fatalism always anticipates the worst, and
when he touches his forehead and says ‘‘ Kismet,” he is prepared to
accept defeat. When food ran short, and water began to be stinted,
a portion of Thomas’s troops commenced crying ‘‘ Kismet.” Previous
to the declaration of war he had enlisted several bands of Afghaus to
swell his ranks for the coming contest, and to the untrustworthiness
of these treacherous mercenaries his ruin can in a great measure be
traced. Pedron was not slow to avail himself of these facts, and
began to intrigue with the malcontents in the besieged camp, and
bring corrupt influences to bear upon them. The families of several
of Thomas’s native officers resided in Perron’s territory, and their
dependent situation was taken advantage of to effect their master’s
downfall. Perron, being acquainted with their circumstances, had, at
the commencement of the war, placed guards over the houses of many
of these individuals, notably over those of Shitib Khan, who was
commandant of the fort of Georgegarh, and Khairait Khan, who com-
manded Thomas’s first matchlock regiment, both of whose families
resided in villages belonging to Perron. These native officers were
now pressed to desert their colours under pain of their property being
confiscated, and their women folk multreated—a threat more potent
in the East than fire or sword. Bribes, threats, and promises were
all freely used to induce them and others similarly situated to forsake
their allegiance. To this unfair and ignoble pressure many succumbed,
not a few being selected men, who had been the recipients of thic
greatest kindness trom Thomas, and whom he had raised from low
GATHERING TOILS. 199

stations in his army to appointments of authority and command. Yet,
in the hour of his sore distress, they scrupled not to prove traitors to
their salt, and joined his enemies.

But there was even fouler treachery than this at work in the camp,
for incendiary fires began to break out, In the fort of Georgegarh,
where Shitiéb Khan commanded, several stacks of hay, which formed
the chief forage supply were destroyed, whilst the small remaining
store of grain was made away with by means equally nefarious. Not
content with this, these perfidious men were constantly instilling
into the minds of the troops the peril of their situation, and the im-
possibility of saving themselves except by submitting to the enemy
and joining them, as they were daily invited to do. Of these traitorous
designs Thomas was not informed until it was too late, when their
truth was brought home to him by the sudden increase in desertions.

Meanwhile Lakwa Dida did not arrive, and, disheartened by
Thomas’s misfortunes, several other chiefs, who had promised him
their assistance, not only withheld it, but actually joined his enemies.
Constant and authentic information of all that was passing in his
camp reached Pedron, who, on the 28rd of October, hoisted a flag,
and publicly announced that all deserters from Georgegarh taking
refuge under it should receive quarter. That night two of Thomas’s
newly-raised battalions marched out, and availed themselves of this
proclamation, and three days later, Sharif Khan and Hamza Khan,
two Afghan mercenaries, whom he had recently entertained, followed
their base example, and passed over to Pedron with all their men.

Amidst all these dangers and difficulties Thomas was the only
person who never lost heart, but unceasingly endeavoured to buoy
up the spirits of his people with the assurance that help was coming.
To Lakwa Dada he sent frequent and urgent messages, and as con-
stantly heard from him, one letter, full of the usual specious promises,
reaching him as late as the 3rd of November. Vaman Rao also wrote
encouraging Thomas to persevere, and stating he was sending rein-
forcements. But they were all words, idle words, and neither Lakwa
Dada’s nor Vaman Rao’s standards ever appeared.

On the 6th of November Thomas dctermined to make a last effort,
and with a body of cavalry endeavoured to surprise Pedron’s camp by
a night attack. But traitors had given information of the intended
attempt, and the sortie was met with a discharge of musketry, artillery
and rockets from an enemy fully prepared and admirably posted, and
the attempt resulted in failure and defeat. By this time Thomas was
reduced to the direst straits. The grain in the camp was finished, and
the scanty supply that his foraging parties collected at a great expense
200 GEORGE THOMAS.

of life, was sold at the price of blood. His cattle had nearly all been
killed, his water supply was almost exhausted, and his troops were
kept alive on meat rations, a form of food not only unsuitable but
positively injurious to men accustomed to grain diet. Finally, his
ammunition began to run short, and threatened to leave him without
the means, as well as without the men, to fight. In this extremity
there remained to him but one single chance. A large convoy of
grain had been despatched by Vaman Rao, and his hopes were all
centred on its reaching him safely. It was due on the 10th of
November, but on the previous night a detachment of Pedron’s horse
discovered and captured it. In a spirit of Oriental brutality the noses
of the camel drivers conveying it were cut off and sent with taunts
into Thomas's starving camp, early on the following morning. At
the same hour he learnt of the desertion on the previous night of his
most trusted Afghan chief, a man named Ali Ghél, in whom he had
hitherto reposed the greatest confidence, and whose loyalty had never
been doubted.

In such a pass the bravest man might without dishonour have given up
an unequal fight; but submission never entered Thomas’s mind. “In
this distress,” he writes, “I had no resource but either to attack the
enemy by night, to sally forth and try the event of a contest by
day, or to attempt a retreat, leaving the infantry to make the best
terms they could with the enemy.’’ No idea of surrender is apparent
here, though it must have been the uppermost thought in the mind
of every other man in the camp. But Jowrwj Jung never belied his
reputation for a moment. The word defeat was not in his dictionary:
and when circumstances obtruded it, the letters shaped themselves
into defiance. Fight by day, or fight by night, or, at worst, a dash
through those investing lines, sword in hand, and his horse’s head
pointed for Hansi, were still “resources” left him. After a short
consideration he determined to hazard the first, and attempt to fight
his way past the enemy, and reach his capital.

He accordingly gave the necessary directions for carrying this
resolution into effect; but his soldiers, suspecting his intention, began
to pack up their baggage and openly desert the camp. Upon this,
Thomas assembled his officers and inquired of them the cause of the
commotion stirring in the lines. They replied that no further reliance
could be placed on the troops, who, confounded by their difficulties,
would no longer remain true to their colours. On hearing this, Thomas
proceeded in person to the lines, and endeavoured to reanimate his
men, but hunger and thirst and want and privation had laid their
hands upon his followers, and with the fatalism of their race they
GATHERING TOILS. 201

had accepted the decree of Fate, convinced that the star of Jowruj
Jung had set.

But Thomas relaxed not his efforts. ‘To encourage the drooping
spirits of his people’ (!) he gave orders for an attack to be made on
one of the enemy’s advanced posts which, from its situation, appeared
easy to be taken. But a difficulty arose regarding bullock drivers,
who had all deserted the camp. Some sepoys, however, encouraged
by the promise of a liberal reward, undertook the office, and a select
detachment quitted the camp. But whether from being infected
with the depression of spirits that prevailed, or because they were
really unfit for the work assigned them, the sepoys conducted them-
selves in so awkward a manner, and made so little exertion in getting
on the guns, that it was necessary to recall them to camp.

Shortly after this his spies brought Thomas information that the
enemy, having been apprised of his intention to force his way to
Hansi, had formed line ready to oppose his progress. And it now
seemed to him that, in the present discontented state of his troops, if
he attempted to carry out his design, the termination must be defeat
and disgrace.

The end was drawing near. At sunset Thomas summoned a
council of war, and submitted to his officers the circumstances of
their situation. They gave it as their unanimous opinion that
nothing remained but an unconditional surrender to the enemy.
Long and earnestly did their leader try to persuade them that a
retreat to Hansi was still practicable; but his exertions were ineffec-
tual, and he was forced to confess that ‘‘a dismal aspect presented
itself on all sides.’ The spirit of resistance was crushed out of the
camp, saving only the inextinguishable spark glowing by comparison
more brilliantly than ever in the bosom of its chief.

Searcely was the council of war dismissed thaua Thomas learnt
that a body of Rohillas stationed over the wells had gone over to the
enemy. Other troops were at once appointed to guard the posts thus
abandoned, but to his sorrow Thomas found that the spirit of
desertion had seized on the Muhammadan soldiery in general, the
cavalry alone excepted. At seven o’clock in the evening the whole of
the troops stationed on out-post duty followed the example of the
Rohillas, and it became apparent that Pedron was making pre-
parations for a general assault. Simultaneously an incendiary fire
broke out in the last stack of hay, which, as Thomas afterwards
learnt, was a preconcerted signal between the traitors in his camp
and the enemy. Even as the flames leapt forth into the dark night,
word was brought him that Shitéb Khan, who commanded at
202 GEORGE THOMAS.

Georgegarh, and although secretly in league with Pedron, had up to
now preserved an appearance of loyalty, was mounting his horse
preparatory to leaving the fort, attended by all his people and their
effects, and that a party of the Marathi troops had approached the
walls in order to escort these deserters to safety, and occupy the
abandoned post.

Thomas’s soldiery were now openly deserting the camp in all
directions, and the only battalion that remained faithful was the one
formerly commanded by Hopkins. It had entered on the campaign
700 strong, but the severe service of the last two months had reduced
it to little more than 200. ‘ These,” writes Thomas in his memoirs,
with pathetic brevity, “were the only men that stood true to my
interests.”

Even the splendid spirit of Jowruj Jung was dismayed now. New
dangers and calamities sprung up on every side. Within and without
the camp all were against him. The enemy were preparing to
advance in overwhclming numbers, and it was evident that in
another hour all would be over. And s0, at nine o’clock on the night
of the 10th of November, 1801, George Thomas mustered his Europeans
and 300 of his chosen cavalry, and putting himself at their head, led
the way out of the doomed camp.

Prosper him, kind Fate! Prosper a brave man’s ride to-night!
No worthier object of tly kind decree ever appealed for thy aid. No
stouter heart ever faced thee than this gallant Irishman, who
gallops now for life and liberty !

The direction Thomas took was that in which Major George
Hessing’s Brigade was encamped, and against its five battalions he
made his last daring charge. He succeeded in breaking through
them, but the alarm was at once given, and the whole of Pedron’s
cavalry turned out in pursuit. Overtaking the little band of fugitives
before they had gone far, they attacked them with vigour, and the
escort, disheartened by late events, lost their accustomed courage
and scattered and melted away, leaving Thomas with four
Europeans—Captains Hearsey and Birch and two sergeants—to fly
for their lives. And so, alone and unattended, “into the midnight
they galloped abreast.”

The horse Thomas rode was a favourite animal, of a very superior
Persian breed, and of the highest spirit. He proved himself “a horse
without peer” that night. The enemy continuing the pursuit,
Thomas was compelled to make a circuituous route to avoid falling in
with their straggling parties, and traversed double the actual distance
between Georgegarh and Hiansi in reaching his destination. His
GATHERING TOILS. 208

gencrous steed covered the journey of 120 miles without halt or stay,
and by nightfall of the 11th of November carricd his master safely into
his capital.

Fifty guns and all Thomas’s camp and baggage fell into Pedron’s
hands. The few faithful troops left behind laid down their arms,
rejecting with contempt the offers of service made them hy the
victors. Their personal attachment to Thomas survived his downfall,
and several of his old native officers, who had been in his service for
along time, “rent their clothes and turned beggars, swearing they
would never scrve as soldiers again.”
CHAPTER IX.
ONE IRISH SworD!
1801.

PON reaching Hansi, Thomas’s first care was directed towards

its defences, and warned by bitter experience of the treacherous
disposition of his Muhammadan soldiery, he committed the charge of
the fort to his faithful Rajputs, whom on all occasions, and in most
trying situations he found worthy of confidence. Two pieces of
artillery were all that remained in the fort fit for service, but
the dilatory advance of the enemy allowed time for eight new
cannon to be cast and mounted. All the wells within a radius
of several miles of the city were filled up, and the tanks defiled
with beef and pork,so as to render their water undrinkable to
either Hindu or Musalmain. Just outside Hansi Thomas threw
up three strongly-fortified outworks—one commanding the south-
eastern gate, a second the southern, and a third the western gate, and
these were manned with Rohilla troops. It is difficult to estimate
the exact strength of the force that remained to him: Skinner
puts it down at 5,000 men, but Thomas states there were only 1,200
adhering to his interests, of whom 300 were Rajputs. The latter
estimate is probably the correct one: but whatever the number of his
men, he had lost confidence in all except his Rajputs, and so critical
did he consider his situation that he took up his residence within
the fort and was careful to keep a strict guard during the night to
avert treachery.

After his success at Georgegarh, Major Pedron brought the Third
Brigade up to its full strength by drafting into it a sufficient number
of men from the Second to fill the vacancies created by death and
casualties, and conceiving the campaign practically finished, returned
to Aligarh, leaving Major Louis Bourguien with ten full battalions of
infantry, 500 Hindustani horse, and 5,000 Sikh cavalry to follow

Thomas and effect the coup de griice.
204
ONE IRISH SWORD / 205

Bourguien set forward in a leisurely way, marching by easy stages
and possessing himself of the wells in the vicinity of Hansi, which he
stopped to clear out. It was not until towards the end of November
that he reached the town, and after reconnoitring its environs several
times, formed his plan of attack. It was first necessary to capture
the outworks which defended the gates, and an assault upon them was
ordered. Three columns, of two battalions each, advanced at day-
break, led by Captain Skinner, Major Bernier, and Lieutenant
Mackenzie. They succeeded so easily, that Thomas ascribed their
victory to treachery. It is certain that Skinner and Mackenzie met
with but a nominal resistance, the garrisons scrambling out and
running away as the stormers advanced ; but, according to Skinner’s
account, Major Bernier was obstinately opposed, for, by getting
between the town and the outwork he was attacking, he cut off the
retreat of the troops defending it, who fought well and drove the
stormers back. Bernier rallied them, but was killed in the act of
doing so, upon which his men rushed forward and carried the place,
putting every soul in it to death. Considerable doubt is, however,
thrown on this account by the recent discovery of a marble tomb
stone, which was erected over Bernier’s grave, and the inscription on
which states that he was killed on the 10th of December at the
storming of Hansi. The outpost affair above described occurred in
November, and it is probable that Skinner’s memory was at fault in
making it the occasion of Dernier’s death. The total loss on
Bourguien’s side was very small, and the three captured works
were now fixed upon as points for his trenches. Batteries being
erected, a heavy fire was opened upon the walls of the town, and,
although the defenders kept up a smart return, a breach was effected,
and three columns, numbering 1,500 men each, were told off for the
storm.

At dawn of day on the 10th of December the signal for attack was
given. Captain Skinner and Lieutenants Skinner and Mackenzie were
the officers in command of the columns. The elder Skinner found
himself opposed by Lieutenant Birch, whilst his brother and Mackenzie
stormed the points defended by Captain Hearsey and a native officer
named Tlias Beg. The two lieutenants made good their way after
some resistance, but Captain Skinner was twice beaten back by
Birch, who defended his post well. Burning thatch, powder pots, and
every missile that came to hand were showered down upon the
stormers, greatly distressing and disheartening them. At a third
attempt, however, they made good their footing, and just as Skinner
clambered up the breach, he saw Birch about twenty yards off
206 GHORGE THOMAS.

taking aim at him with a double barrelled guu, both of which barrels
he discharged. Fortunately he missed his mark and Skinner iminedi-
ately ‘levelled his javelin,” and darting it at Birch, took off his hat,
whereupon the latter set off running and joined his party who had
already left the walls.

Bourguien’s three columns now converged towards the centre of the
town, driving the enemy before them, until Thomas came up with his
reserves to the relief. Attacking the younger Skinner he beat him
back to the walls of the town; but the latter, being joined by his
brother, advanced again, and obliged Thomas to retire. The three
columns now effected a junction in the central bazaar, which became
the scene of a desperate conflict. Thomas having ordered up a
6-pounder, brought it to bear on the stormers, and by several discharges
of grape expelled them from the bazaar, but they, being reinforced by
a reserve battalion and two 9-pounders, were able to retake the
position. The contest was now carried on at closest quarters, the
fighting being hand to hand. Young Skinner approached so near to
Thomas that he made a sabre cut at him and would have disabled him
but for the protection afforded by his armour. Thrice the tide of
battle ebbed to and fro, now one party, now the other, gaining ground.
The narrow side streets were choked with the bodies of the dead, and
wounded who had crawled out of the way, and the central bazaar ran
red with blood. Desperate defence was opposed to obstinate attack
from morning until noon, when the superiority of Bourguien’s numbers
began to tell, and after disputing every inch of ground with the most
determined valour and resolution, Thomas was compelled to withdraw
into the fort and abandon his capital to his encmies.

The loss of life, in comparison to the numbers engaged, was enor-
mous. Skinner puts down the killed and wounded on Bourguien’s
side at 1,600, but due allowances must be made for his habitual
exaggeration. Amongst the wounded was Lieutenant Mackenzie,
and several native officers were killed. Thomas records that after
the fight only 700 men remained to him, and this would make his
loss about 500. Directly victory was assured, Bourguien, who had
watched the conflict from a strategic, but sate, position in the rear,
marched into the town with two battalions and 3,000 dismounted
troopers, and relieved the combatants who were allowed to retire to
the rear.

The following morning Bourguien’s battering guns were dragged
into Hansi, and trenches dug within two hundred yards of the fort.
Fight 18-pounders being run into position in the central bazaar,
their fire was brought to bear upon the walls of the citadel. Thomas
ONE IRISH SWORD! 207

made every disposition to defend himself, but his troops had lost heart
and were no longer the sarne men whom he had so often led to victory
in the past. From time to time they followed him out to the attack,
but they fought with the conviction of coming defeat, and although he
sometimes succeeded in driving the enemy out of the trenches, he
was unable to maintain any temporary advantage.

The bombardment itself produced but little effect, for the balls of
the cannon merely buried themselves in the mud walls of the fort
without in the least degree shaking their solidity. On this becoming
apparent it was decided to commence mining, and Bourguien’s sappers
advanced to within ten yards of the crown-work. But meanwhile
the condition of affairs within the fort fell from bad to worse. Pro-
visions were scarce, and the danger from shot and shell so constant
as not to leave a moment’s rest. The spirit of mutiny appeared
amongst the Muhammadan troops, and numerous desertions occurred,
s0 that it was soon apparent that only time was wanting to complete
the tale of Thomas’s ruin.

Bourguien now began to intrigue with the garrison in the fort.
Letters offering them six months’ pay and permanent service under
the Maratha flag were rolled round arrows and shot over the ramparts,
and replied to by the same method. Before long these insidious
proposals began to bear fruit. There were still a faithful few around
Thomas, but they were in the minority, and Bourguien was assured
by those he tampered with that in a short time they would be
able to arrange an accommodation for the fort to be surrendered and
its master delivered up.

But in this the darkest hour of that dark time Jowruj Jung found
in his enemy’s camp hearts touched by his splendid spirit, and who
would not suffer this gallant soldier to become the victim of such foul
treachery as that premeditated. Lewis Ferdinand Smith, the two
Skinners and Mackenzie were respectable and honourable men, and
unable to acquiesce in deeds of shame. Bourguien had boasted how
he would ill-use “that blackguard Irishman ” when he once got hold
of him, vowing he should be confined in prison, a threat he was quite
capable of carrying into execution. ‘‘ But this,” writes Skinner, “was
language we did not admire, and we felt indignant at this underhand
treachery, and agreed that it would be disgraceful if Thomas fell
through such intrigue.’ And so these officers, some English, some
countryborn, waited upon Bourguien and remonstrated against what
was going on, and, partly by protest, partly by persuasion, prevailed
upon him to allow Thomas the barren honours of w capitulation,
pointing out that much more credit would result from such a course
208 GEORGE THOMAS.

than if the end was secured by unfair means. For a long time
Bourguien resisted, but ‘one day, after tiffin, when the wine he had
drunk had put him in high spirits and good humour,” they pressed
their point, and at last he consented, calling out in his broken English,
“Well, gentlemen, you do as you like. I give power. Only he be
one dam Englishman.”

Thomas was aware of the conspiracy ripening against him, but
powerless to prevent it. The Rajputs still remained faithfal, and it
was his intention to hold out as long as it was possible; but it was
plain to see that the end was near, and that nothing could save him.
When, therefore, Captain Smith was deputed to visit him, under a
flag of truce, with the offer of honourable terms, Thomas received him
with gratitude, and on learning he had been sent by the whole of the
English officers to save him from dishonour, thanked him and begged
he would return and say any terms the officers recommended would
be accepted. After some trouble, Bourguien was prevailed upon to
sanction the following: that Thomas should be permitted to depart
with all his money and private property to British territory, and his
troops allowed to march out with all their private arms, and the
honours of war; but that everything else in the fort was to be made
over to the victors.

Thomas’s acceptation of these terms may be best recorded in his
own words :—

“Considering, therefore, that I had entirely lost my party, and with
it the hopes of at present subduing my enemies, the Sikhs, and the
powers in the French interest ; that I had no expectation of succour
from any quarter, Luckwa having gone to Joudpore; that if hostilities
continued my resources in money would have failed ; in this situation
I agreed to evacuate the fort.”

And so the curtain fell on the rule of Jowruj Jung, and the princi-
pality he founded. Won by the sword, and held by the sword, it was
surrendered at the sword’s point. Crowded are its brief but brilliant
annals with tales of lawless, yet dauntless daring and audacious energy,
and fitly closed by the heroism of the last grand struggle, when
against dangers that appalled, and overwhelming numbers that
crushed, the unconquerable spirit of George Thomas resisted for long
weeks of unequal strife and constant battle the might of Perron’s
power.

On the 20th of December, 1801, the terms of surrender were drawn
out and signed, and a cessation of hostilities declared. It was agreed
that possession of the fort should be given up in two days. An inter-
view followed between Bourguien and Thomas, at the bungalow of
ONE IRISH SWORD! 209

the latter, which was situated upon the banks of the Umtee tank in
the town of Hansi. All Bourguien’s officers were assembled to receive
the defeated soldier. His behaviour was dignified and courteous, and
he was particularly gracious to the younger Skinner, ‘‘ whom he em-
braced,” and showed him the cut he had received from him on his
belt during the fight of the 10th of December. His demeanour had a
marked effect on Bourguien, who treated him with greg politeness and
invited him and his two officers, Birch and Hearsey, to dinner on the
next day.

Thomas accepted the invitation, and about seven o’clock on the
following evening rode into camp, attended by 50 of his cavalry.
His bearing was now greatly changed from that of yesterday, and he
showed signs of deep dejection, as though bowed down by the weight
of his misfortunes. At eight o’clock dinner was served in a large tent
and all sat down. With the chivalrous sympathy all brave soldiers
feel for a fallen foe, Bourguien’s officers tried their utmost to cheer
their guest, carefully framing their conversation so as to avoid all
reference to recent events, and endeavouring to enlist his interest in
other topics. Presently the wine began to flow, and Thomas sought
comfort in its fickle cheer. By eleven o'clock at night the whole
company was ‘pretty merry,” and drinking the health of “General
Perron” and ‘George Thomas,” and Thomas himself seemed quite

happy.
Suddenly, stirred by some evil and ungenerous impulse, Louis

Bourguien raised his glass aloft, and from his seat at the head of the
table, called loudly out: ‘‘ Let us drink to the success of Perron’s
arms!”

In a moment the sounds of laughter and carouse died away, and an
ominous hush succeeded, as those present rebelled against the toast
and in testimony turned their glasses up.

As Thomas realised the import of that action, and the generous
sympathy it conveyed, his impulsive Irish nature yielded to the insult,
and to the condemnation it had evoked, and he burst into tears.

But only fora moment. The next he was Jowruj Jung once more,
fierce and furious. Springing to his feet he confronted the man who
could thus taunt him in the hour of his misfortune, and laying his
hand on his sword hilt, called out to Bourguien that it was to his own
ill-fate his fall was due, and not to the prowess of the low braggart
who insulted him. Then, drawing his sword and waving it over his
head, he cried aloud :

“Ono Irish Sword is still sufficient for a hundred Frenchmen.”

One Irish Sword! And what a sword it was. Sikh and Rohilla

14
210 GEORGE THOMAS.

Rajput and Pathan had fled before it. It had shielded the Mugha
provinces of Saharanpur from invasion, and reinstated the Witch of
Sardhana on her throne; it had scourged the lawless Mewatti
districts into submission, and established a ruler in rebellious
Rewari; Jaipur and Bikanir had paid it tribute, Batinda had
bought its clemency, Harid4na knew its weight, and Udaipur its
reach; it had earried conquest to the banks of the gleaming Sutlej,
and, but three months since, had defeated the battalions that were
still known as “ De Boigne’s.” One Irish Sword—sufiicient for a
hundred Frenchman, truly, as it flashed out now in the dimly-lighted
tent. More than sufficient for Louis Bourguien, who felt the magic
of its latent power, and in a palsy of terror jumped from his chair,
and rushing out of the tent, called for his guard to protect him.

Thomas's troopers, who were outside, crowded in at the first sound
of high words. For a moment it seemed as though a fight was
imminent, but the European officers present assured them that it was
“only the Sahib drunk,” and bade the men keep off, whilst Thomas in
the midst kept wildly waving his sword an calling out in
Hindustani to ‘See! see! how he had made the d——d Frenchman
run like a jackal.”’

A dramatic scene. Picture the great Irishman, swaying to and fro,
as he lunges and thrusts with his sword into the empty air, in the
intensity of his excitement. In his face the flush of wine, in his eyes
the glitter of passion, in his attitude the ferocity of insulted honour.
The swarthy troopers, thronging in, press forward with clank of steel
and angry cries; the turbaned servants huddle in the doorways; with-
out the hurried cry to arms, and shouting and confusion swelling the
clamour; within the tent all have risen from the littered table, and
are crowding round Thomas, striving to pacify him, whilst he
wrestles and towers above them, waving his sword and glaring at the
empty chair from whence the master of the feast has fled.

It required the greatest persuasion to prevail upon him to sheath
his weapon. The natives were hustled out, and after Thomas had
been induced to resume his seat, it was explained to him that the
wine Bourguien had taken was the cause of his forgetting himself,
and that no insult had been intended. With the inconsistency of
intoxication, Thomas agreed to make it up, whereupon the Frenchman
ventured to return, and shaking hands begged Thomas’s pardon.

Peace being thus restored, the wine flowed again, and it was soon
evident that the banquet was degenerating into an orgies. The elder
Skinner was orderly officer of the day, and seeing how matters were
shaping, withdrew and rode off to the town, which was occupied by
ONE IRISH SWORD! 211

Bourguien’s troops, to caution the men not to challenge Thomas on
his return to the fort. Unfortunately he omitted to warn the guard
posted at the south-eastern gate, which was the one Thomas entered
by, and in consequence on the arrival of the latter about midnight,
he was saluted with the usual challenge “ Who-Kum-Dar ?”

“Sahib Bahadur!” (the great master), was the reply from
Thomas’s troopers, that being the name by which he was always
known.

The sentry replied that he knew of no Sahib Bahadur, and could
let no one pass without permission from his officer. Thomas heard
this, and turning round to his men asked them,

“Could any one have stopped Sahib Bahadur at this gate but one
month ago?”

“No, no!” they answered, with the effusive concurrence typical of
the native character. Whereupon Thomas dismounted, and drawing
his sword, made a slash at the poor sentry and cut off his right hand.
The guard immediately fell in and Thomas’s life was in danger, but
just at this moment Skinner came up and further mischief was
avoided.

He found Thomas staggering up and down, his naked sword in his
hand, and Hearsey and several of his troopers trying to lay hold of
him. At length one of the latter caught him from behind, and he
was disarmed. He then submitted to be placed in a palanquin, and
in this conveyance the Lord of Hansi was carried into his fort for the
last time.

The next morning, on recovering his senses, Thomas learnt from
Hearsey what had happened. Whereupon he sent for the trooper he
had maimed and gave him Is.500, and wrote to Bourguien apologising
for his conduct.

Alas, for that Irish sword! The pity that it should be sullied by
the stain of this cowardly act. In all his excesses Thomas never
plumbed a deeper degradation of drink than this pitiable incident
displays. Would that, if happen it must, it had happened on any
other night than that on which, in a flash of defiance that lifted
him high above his misfortunes, he bearded Bourguien at his own
table, and claimed for his Irish sword that it was still sufficient for a
hundred Frenchmen !
CHAPTER X.
THE DEATH AND CHARACTER OF GEORGE THOMAS.
1802.

N the 29th of December, 1801, George Thomas evacuated Hansi,

and three days later, under escort of a battalion of Bourguien’s

infantry commanded by Captain Smith, started for Anupshahr—the

very place from which he had commenced his adventurous career exactly

eight years before. He carried with him the wreck of his fortune, to

the value of about one lakh of rupees, in money, jewelry, shawls and
other property, and was accompanied by his wife and family.

From Anupshahr Thomas proceeded by river to Benares, which he
reached in March. Here he met the Governor-general’s fleet of
boats on its way to Lucknow, and was invited by Lord Wellesley to
an interview, in the course of which Thomas afforded the Governor-
general a great deal of valuable information about the countries
beyond Delhi, and the strength of the armies of the native princes in
the western parts of India. In connection with this meeting there is
a characteristic anecdote recorded, which must not be omitted. In
order to illustrate Thomas’s remarks a map of India was laid on the
table, in which, as was and is still customary, the British possessions
were coloured red. On this being explained to Thomas, he swept his
great hand across the chart from end to end with the emphatic
comment, “ All this ought to be red!”

Therein breathed the true spirit of Jowruj Jung. Red that map
was destined to be, and the great statesman he addressed little
suspected how soon. And in this connection it is curious to observe
that nearly forty years later, Ranjit Singh, the old Lion of Lahore,
made an almost identical observation under similar circumstances,
for when a map of India happened to be placed before him and the
theory of its colouring explained, he fixed on it that one penetrating
eye of his, “ which was equal to any other man’s two eyes,” and

almost in Thomas’s words remarked, ‘‘ It will all be red soon.”
212
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DEATH AND CHARACTER OF GEORGE THOMAS. 218

Thomas remained some time at Benares arranging his affairs, and
it was here that he dictated his memoirs to Captain Francklin. “ He
proposed,” writes his biographer, “to deliver his information in the
Persian language, adding, that from constant use, it had become
more familiar to him than his native tongue. This offer, for obvious
reasons, was declined; but it proves Mr. Thomas’s capacity under
every disadvantage arising from a want of regular education, and I
have no hesitation in declaring my opinion that if Mr. Thomas had
found leisure to cultivate his mind, his progress in the most useful
branches of literature would have been surprisingly rapid. He spoke,
wrote, and read the Hindustani and Persian languages with un-
common fluency and precision.”

It was Thomas’s wish to return to Ireland with his family and
fortune, and pass his days in retirement in his native land. With
this aim in view he left Benares, and commenced his journey to
Calcutta by river. But misfortunes had broken his daring mind and
impaired his robust constitution, and he succumbed, a victim to his
own fatal weakness, on the 22nd of August, 1802, in the forty-sixth year
of his age. He died near the military cantonment of Bahrampur, in
the burying ground of which place his remains were interred.

Captain Francklin states that a monument was being erected to
Thomas’s memory at the time when he was finishing his memoirs.
Anxious to include in these pages the epitaph which his contemporaries
placed over George Thomas, particular endeavours have been made
to secure the same, but without success. ‘“‘I have searched every
cemetery in Berhampur, English and Dutch,” writes an esteemed and
courteous correspondent, “ but no trace of George Thomas’s tomb can
be found. In the cemetery now in use there are many old tombs
without any name plates left on them: the plates have fallen out, and
where they have been picked up whole, they have been inserted in
the wall. I have no doubt that Mr. Thomas’s plate has fallen out
and been broken—if it ever existed.” The illustration shows the pro-
bable site of his grave.

In appearance Thomas was a singularly fine and tall man, standing
upwards of six feet in height, and his limbs and body were massive
and well proportioned. His constitution was an iron one, and his
physical strength enormous, whilst his dexterity with the sword was
such that he could decapitate a bullock with a single stroke. His
countenance was bold and open, and his bearing manly and erect.
“ From the constant and active use of his limbs, during his long and
arduous warfare’? writes Francklin, “he had contracted a certain
214 GEORGE THOMAS.

elevation of the head, which gave him an air of stiffness, but, at the
same time, added to his martial appearance, and seemed to indicate
something of the intrepidity of spirit which wholly possessed his
conduct to the last hour of his life.””

The life which was brought to a premature close at Bahrampur
presents a strange admixture of strength and weakness, and the
contrast enables us to see the actual clay of which the man was
moulded. Although this circumstance may dispel much of the
glamour that surrounds Thomas’s romantic career, the knowledge
of his frailty heightens our astonishment at his achievement.
For it reveals the fact that this fearless Irishman, who, cutting him-
self adrift from all communication with his fellow-countrymen,
plunged into an unknown land, raised himself from the position of a
private soldier in a native army to that of an independent prince,
waged indiscriminate war, invaded foreign territories, fought battles,
stormed fortresses, and pillaged towns, premeditated the conquest of
the Panjab, and pitted his strength against Perron when the latter
was in the zenith of his power—this Irishman, we find, was a very
human hero after all. From the summit of his success as independent
ruler of Hansi and self-elected scourge of the Sikh states, it is a deep
drop into the abyss of that fatal fortnight at Georgegarh, and an
acquaintance with these facts creates a wonder, not how he rose but
how he fell. We find it, indeed, more difficult to understand his
exhibition of weakness than his display of strength.

There is, of course, very much that is unrecorded in Thomas’s life.
Francklin’s memoir is, at best, a mere summary of facts, without a
comment or an explanation conceded. What Thomas did—he did.
No analysis of motive elucidates his actions, even when they are
most lawless. Perhaps it is better so. It is to be feared that the
philosophy of Jowruj Jung savoured too much of “the good old plan”
to permit of his history being too closely scrutinised.

But passing from his motives to his deeds there comes to us much
that compels our admiration. The romanceful pages of Indian
adventure contain no epic more stirring than that of George Thomas.
Whether he is striding forward to conquest, or standing defiant in
resistance he amazes us with his prodigious daring and his un-
conquerable resolution. Without a single advantage of birth or
education, without means and without friends, he fought his way to
success. Suffering in its acutest form from an Irishman’s irresistible
propensity for fighting, Thomas’s Indian career was one prolonged
battle. Never resting for one moment on his arms, he faced about
from one victory or repulse, only to attack another foe. Nothing
DEATH AND CHARACTER OF GHORGE THOMAS. 215

dismayed him, nothing stopped him. He led his flying columns
thirty, forty, and fifty miles a day into the heart of an enemy’s
country; he sacked villages of their cooking-pots and household
utensils for metal to cast him cannon; he seldom saw a fortress but
he stormed it there and then; never met a foe but he forthwith
offered fight. He did not know what it was to be defeated, and was
most dangerous when other men would have been most despairing.
And yet, with all his lust of battle and his lawless extravagance,
there comes, ever and anon, some strangely touching incident to
reveal the finer nature of the man, as when we find him forgiving a
treacherous master, championing a deposed prince, or assisting some
weak and oppressed woman in her distress, with a nobility of
character, a disinterestedness of design, and a chivalry of feeling that
would have become many a better man.

Let contemporary opinion speak for Thomas’s character.

“Thomas was formed by nature,’ writes Captain Francklin, “ to
execute the boldest designs, and though uncultivated by education he
possessed a native and inherent vigour of mind, which qualified
him for the performance of great actions, and placed him on a level
with distinguished officers of his day. His knowledge of the different
tribes and nations that composed the interior of the vast peninsula
of India was various, extensive and correct, and no man, perhaps,
ever more thoroughly studied, or properly appreciated the Indian
character at large. In his manners he was gentle and inoffensive,
and possessed a natural politeness, and evinced a disposition to
please, superior to most men. He was a loyal subject to his king,
and a real and sincere well-wisher to the prosperity and permanence
of the British Empire in the East. He was open, generous, charit-
able and humane, and his behaviour towards the families of those
persons who fell in his service evinces a benevolence of heart,
and a philanthropy of spirit highly honourable to his character.
But with these good qualities the impartiality of history demands
that we should state his errors, and endeavour to discover some
shades in a character otherwise splendid. A quickness of temper,
liable to frequent agitation and the ebullitions of hasty wrath, not
unfrequently rendered his appearance ferocious; yet this only occurred
in instances when the conviviality of his temper obscured his reason,
and for this, on conviction, no man was ever readier to make every
acknowledgment and reparation in his power. Perfect correctness of
conduct cannot be expected from a character like the one under con-
sideration, as a seclusion from civilised life and long absence from the
exercise of those duties which constitute the chief enjoyment of social
216 GHORGE THOMAS

happiness, must necessarily have tinctured the manners of the man
with some portion of the spirit of the barbarians with whom he was
so long intimate. Upon the whole, however, we may be justified in
remarking that on a review of the life and actions of this very extra-
ordinary man, it is difficult which most to admire—the intrepidity of
spirit by which he was incited to the performance of actions which, by
their effect, raised him from the condition of a private subject to rank
and distinction among princes, or the wonderful and uncommon at-
tachment generally exhibited towards his person and interest by the
natives of every description who fought and conquered with him in
his long and arduous career, and whose assistance exalted him for a
time to a height of respectahility and consequence that seldom falls to
the lot of an individual.”

In these lines Captain Francklin has laboured much to disguise
Thomas’s failings; but reading carefully between them it is easy to
recognise the particular vices and shortcomings they indicate. No
one could believe the debauch of Georgegarh was a new and sudden
folly ; it was, alas, the climax of a long course of dissipation. And
for the rest it is enough to mention that Thomas so far conformed to
the customs of the country as to keep a harem. After his death an
exceedingly numerous progeny found an asylum at Sardhana, through
the indulgence and charity of the Begum Somru, only in process of
time to become merged in the native population of the country ;
although one, who bore his father’s name, rose to the position of an
officer in her army.

The following testimony of Lewis Ferdinand Smith is, perhaps,
more valuable than that of Captain Francklin, for he was brought
into earlier and more intimate relations with Thomas.

“Thomas was a bold, enterprising adventurer, who stepped over
difficulties which would have disheartened many daring minds. He
was coarse and illiterate, but his courage was undaunted, his perse-
verance invincible, and his activity indefatigable. He had a strong
judgment, cautious prudence, and great natural powers, was generous
and hospitable, and often insinuating from inclination: and his ambi-
tion required the operation of all these three qualities. All ambitious
characters must be generous: it is one of the most powerful instru-
ments to forward their views. Thomas’s conduct had been sur-
prisingly admirable until the moment when he required the exertion
of all his uncommon powers. At this critical moment he failed, and
failed astonishingly. I can only ascribe it to his being confounded at
the difficulties which opposed him, to his want of European officers,
and to the treachery of his native commanders.
DEATH AND CHARACTER OF GEORGE THOMAS. 217

“TI was intimately acquainted with him, and had asincere respect for
his character. With some oddities, and many singularities, he was
an uncommon character, and his exertions towards station, power,
riches and glory, were still more uncommon. He was extraordinarily
ambitious, which was the principal cause that led to his ruin. He
would be all or nothing. To serve under the orders of another was
an inglorious dependence in his estimation of things. Courage he
possessed to an eminent degree, and he certainly had abilities, if a
clear head, a solid judgment, and an acute discernment can be called
by that name.’’

To Thomas’s military talents several competent critics have borne
testimony. Writes a contributor in the Calcutta Review :—“ We find
this uneducated and dissipated adventurer casting guns at Hansi,
strengthening his flanks in action against large bodies of cavalry with
abbatis, and altogether demeaning himself as a soldier in a manner
that would have done credit to the school of Wellington and Napo-
leon.” And another in the same journal: ‘This remarkable man,
by dint of perseverance, military skill, and great personal valour,
carved out for himself a small principality, and had there been only
natives to contend against would have held it. In him was pre-
eminently displayed the energy of character which distinguishes the
European from the Asiatic. We find him refusing to desert the cause
of friends, bringing into subjection a district previously uncontrollable,
building forts, casting cannon, and training levies. To support the
widow of a Mahomedan prince, who had appealed to him for help, he
marched through a hostile country, in open warfare with the chiefs of
it, whom he defeated in more than one battle, and he was the first
Englishman to plant his foot on the banks of the Sutlez, although
that honour is usually ascribed to Lord Lake.”

Colonel James Tod, the author of The Annals of Rajas’than,” thus
summarises Thomas’s character in the pages of the Asiatic Journal -

‘In Thomas was seen the union of wild energy, considerable fore-
sight, and daring intrepidity, with gigantic form and strength, which
placed him among the most conspicuous of all who carved their way
to fortune in that wild field. Nor is there any reasonable doubt that,
but for the brilliant close of his career in the unequal but unavoidable
contest with Perron, he would have made Lahore his capital. For
the Sikhs quailed before the name of Thomas, who spoke of them as
soldiers with contempt, and treated them to hard knocks. With 500
of his Rohilla cavalry he would at any time have disposed of thrice
that number of sikh horse.”

This long list of quotations may be concluded by an extract from
218 GLORGE THOMAS.

the Edinburgh Review. ‘If we can forgive Thomas what, at that
time and under his circumstances, was rarely accounted a crime, that
he shed blood, and that very largely, in the quarrels of others with
which he had no concern, and that he manifested very violent out-
bursts of temper, we shall still, to do him justice, be obliged to admit
that he displayed many and very striking traits of generosity and
benevolence ; that he was scrupulously true to his engagements; that
he never deserted or betrayed a friend or an ally; and that he pos-
sessed in an uncommon measure those noble qualities which secured
to him the devoted attacliment of all, of whatsoever race, who served
under him.”

In estimating the character and career of George Thomas, after a
lapse of nearly a hundred years, we must divest ourselves of many
modern ideas, and judge him by the standard of the times in which
he lived, and the scenes in which he laboured. They were barbarous
times and savage scenes. In the world which he penetrated, only the
strongest arm and sharpest sword, the shrewdest brain and least
scrupulous conscience, met with success. Moral obligations were
unknown in the Mardth4 Empire. The ethics of the sons of Sivaji
were simple. Might was right, and the end justified the means.

The starting point from which Thomas began his career did not
qualify him for the exhibition of any extraordinary virtue or forbear-
ance. A common sailor at the end of the last century was familiarised
to despotism and tyranny. His personal liberty extended no further
than the hail of the press gang: his professional duties were inculcated
and exacted with a Spartan severity ; and he was rendered callous of
life by the cheerful way in which he was called on to kill or be killed.
Ata time when the high seas swarmed with privateers and pirates,
the lawlessness of maritime warfare was notorious, and battle and
chase were the conditions, not the exceptions, of naval life. This was
the school in which George Thomas was educated, and in scrutinising
his conduct and his humanity, we must remember that he sprang
from the lowest strata of society in a civilised country, where men
were transported for pilfering trifles, and hung for stealing sheep.
The brutality of the repressive laws of the eighteenth century exceeded
the brutality of those who broke them, and if Thomas held life cheap
in war, the country he belonged to held it cheaper in peace.

To pass from Thomas’s merits as a man to his claims as a soldier is
a pleasant transition. He was a born leader, wu general by intuition.
He enjoyed the precious gift of endearing men to his person, making
them not merely soldiers but zealots in his cause. He inspired con-
fidence, courage, and enthusiasm. He could rally panic-stricken
DEATH AND CHARACTER OF GEORGE THOMAS. 219

battalions by the magic of his presence, and lead them to victory
where they had but just fallen back in defeat. His troops followed
him, without question or concern, on distant and hazardous enter-
prises into regions terrible with vague dangers and unknown risks.
In the record of his military achievements it is difficult to particularise
any as more brilliant than the rest, but taking them at haphazard,
and as they occur to the running pen, what more dashing episode
could be adduced than his isolated fight at Fatehpur? what more
masterly retreat than his withdrawal from Udaipur ? what more
vigorous advance than his invasion of the Sutlej states ? and, above and
beyond all, what more defiant and heroic resistance than that which
his invincible resolution rendered possible at Georgegarh and Hansi ?

To complete the estimate of his military abilities contrast the con-
ditions under which he fought and conquered with those existing in
modern warfare. In the Sikhs, Rajputs and Hindustanis, whom
Thomas engaged, he found enemies as brave and daring as any exist-
ing in the present day. He met them on a common ground with
common arms. His superiority lay in his genius and his gallantry,
not in machine guns and breach-ioaders. The troops he led were
composed of the came elements as the troops he conquered; they
possessed no leaven of British bayonets. The muskets he manu-
factured and the cannon he cast were not a whit better than those
whose muzzles were pointed towards him. The forts he stormed and
captured were stronger by nature than the redoubts he erected to
reduce them, or the armed camps le defended. The leagues he
marched were trudged on foot, ofttimes through unexplored countries
and trackless deserts, where the sun by day and the north star by
night guided his daring course; no troopships or transport trains
delivered him on the confines of an enemy’s country, surveyed and
mapped for campaign. A commissariat system and a medical staff
entered not into the philosophy of his warfare. It was not the for-
tuitous advantages of money, a superior equipment and an advanced
civilisation that enabled him to overcome numerical superiority, but
his own single intelligence and valour. No hope of public appreciation
or reward spurred him on to effort : he was sustained only by his own
dauntless resolve. Far beyond the farthest ken of his fellow-country-
men George Thomas at Hansi was the splendid solitary advance
picket of English Empire in the Panjab.

Surely when we reflect on what he did, we may acquit him of his
lawlessness and forgive his frailty. Who can help but admire this
reckless, resolute Irishman, as he emerges breathless out of the great
tumult of his times, and plants his foot upon the walls of Hansi?
220 GEORGE THOMAS.

Whose heart can remain unthrilled when, with a touch that con-
quers it, George Thomas, begirt with enemies, fallen and defeated,
draws his Irish sword and hurls defiance at his French conqueror ?
And who can help but love this vagabond adventurer when he sweeps
his great hand athwart the map of India, and vows it sheuld all be
red 2

To-day that map is all red. It is dyed deep with the blood of
conquered Mardétha, Afghan, Sikh, Rajput, Mughal, Sindian, Baluchi,
Rohilla, Gurkha, and Burmese. With ceaseless spread the emblem-
atic colour has increased and covered all. What then if Jowruj Jung
swept his neighbour’s borders in foray, or seized a district and pro-
claimed his rule? Shall we condemn him with that map before us ?
Let us not seek our own justification, nor question his. Let it
suffice that in our Panjab Province, where peaceful tillage has followed
perpetual warfare, and battle-fields have been turned into quiet
pasture lands, the spirit of British adventure was typified by George
Thomas, the van of British Conquest was led by Jowruj Jung.

 
PERRON.

 

CHAPTER I.
HIS BIRTH AND EARLY CAREER.
1755-1796.

HE events recorded in the preceding pages will have made the
name of Perron familiar to the reader, and the time has now
come to deal with the career of this adventurer. But in order to do so
satisfactorily, it is necessary to go back a little and bring his history
up to the point when De Boigne resigned the command of the army
of Hindustan, and thereafter continue the narrative which was
interrupted by the interpolation of the life of George Thomas.

Pierre Cuillier, better known to history as General Perron, was
born in 1755 at Chateau du Loire, Sarthe, France. His father was a
cloth merchant, who failed in business whilst Perron was yet in his
teens, and the boy was early thrown upon his own resources. After
making a fruitless appeal for assistance to a rich relative, Perron
determined to trust to his own endeavours, and early in 1774 laid out
his modest capital in a speculative investment of handkerchiefs, and
set out for Nantes with the object of disposing of them. Not meeting
with success in this venture, he deserted commerce, and obtained a
situation in the cannon foundry at Nantes, where he mastered the
technicalities of casting guns. He then enlisted in a regiment of
volunteers under orders for the Isle of France, where he arrived in
the same year. Later on he appears to have transferred his services
to the navy, for in 1780 he came out to India, according to one report
as a common sailor, to another as a petty officer on board the French
frigate Sardine, under the famous Admiral Suffrein. The period was

one when French military adventurers were welcomed in the native
221
222 PERRON.

states of Southern India, and it was doubtless a knowledge of this fact
that induced Perron to desert his ship, in company with three of his
messmates, and land on the Malabar coast. Making his way into
the interior, he journeyed up country until he reached Upper India,
where, about the year 1781, he entered the Rana of Gohad’s corps,
commanded by the Scotchman Sangster, under whom there were
two other Europeans serving, Tom Legge, and Michael Filose.

Pierre Cuillier now discurded his patronymic and assumed the
nom de guerre of Perron, which was the diminutive form of his
Christian name. This fashion of adopting a Christian name or alias
on entering the employ of the country princes was a common one at
the period. Thus Walter Reinhard became Summers, which was
corrupted into Sombre, and so, in native speech, to Somru. George
Hessing was known as Jorus Sahib, Louis Bourguien, as Looce
Sahib, George Thomas as the Jehazi Sahib, and James Shepherd as
James Sahib. People who retained their surnames suffered dreadful
atrocities at the lips of the natives. Robert Sutherland, for instance,
was known as Sutluj Sahib, and Captain Symes as Sunk Sahib,
while Captain Brownrigg was even more unfortunate, for his
patronymic was twisted into Burrandee Sahib. The designation that
Perron assumed was itself corrupted by native pronunciation into
Peeroo Sahib—a not altogether happy one for its possessor, since
Peeroo is the Hindustani for a turkey.

Perron began his new career in a very humble capacity, and it was
not until two years had passed that he rose to non-commissioned
rank. It is probable his first introduction into the native service was
as an artilleryman, or at best an overseer in Sangster’s Foundry.
But his circumstances enabled him to marry, and he was united
to a Mdlle. Deridon, whose family resided at Pondichery and whose
brother “a half-caste Frenchman” was a military adventurer in
Upper India.

Upon the defeat of the Rana of Gohad and the disbandment of his
battalion, Perron entered a corps, commanded by an officer named
Lestineau, in the service of the Jat Rajah of Bhartpur, obtaining an
appointment as quartermaster-sergeant on a pay of Rs.G0 a month.
This was probably about the year 1784. He remained in the service
some time, and was present at the battles of Chaksana and Agra, and
assisted in the occupation of Delhi by the Marathas in 1789, when his
chief was in alliance with Madhoji Sindhia. It was on this occasion
that Lestineau, having been detached to assist in the pursuit of
Ghulam Kadir at Meerut, possessed himself of that person’s saddle-
bags, which were filled with jewels looted from the palace at Delhi,
HIS BIRTH AND EARLY CAREER. 223

and with this plunder and tlie regimental pay due to his battalion
absconded, leaving his corps under the charge of his second in
command, Mons. J. Pillet, who proved unequal to the task of keeping
the exasperated soldiery in order, for they mutinied directly they
became aware of Lestineau’s flight, and were in consequence dis-
banded by Madhoji Sindhia’s orders.

Perron being thus thrown out of employment applied for service to
Rana Khan, a general of high standing in Sindhia’s army. From this
chief he received the command of a battalion, which was, however,
soon broken up, and Perron found himself once again adrift on the
world. A friend named Montigny now interested himself on his
behalf, and recommended him to the Begum Somru for employment,
but as that lady’s military force was fifteen months in arrears of pay
at this time, she did not feel justified in increasing her establishment,
and Perron found his application unsuccessful, despite the very
strong recommendations he had received. This was in 1790, by
which time he had been more than nine years in India, and was
apparently little further advanced in life than when he first sought his
fortune in the East.

But now came the turning point of his career. General De Boigne,
who had recently been commissioned by Modhoji Sindhia to raise his
First Brigade, was looking out for officers. Perron was personally
known to him, and he had formed a favourable opinion of his
capacity as a brave soldier, and an artisan skilled in the work of a
cannon foundry. So he appointed him captain-lieutenant in the
new Brigade, and gave him the command of the Burhénpur
battalion.

Perron soon ingratiated himself with his chief by his courage,
activity and great punctuality in his duties. He was a subordinate
after De Boigne’s heart, being diligent, energetic and indefatigable,
finding a pleasure in his work, and taking a pride in bringing his
battalion to the highest pitch of efficiency and discipline.

Towards the end of 1790 there occurred the campaign against the
princes of Jaipur and Jodhpur, which witnessed the battles of Patan
and Merta. Perron was present at both, and at the former
particularly distinguished himself. When De Boigne returned to
headquarters, Perron was left behind to settle the newly annexed
district of Ajmir, and this task he carried out with considerable
ability. In 1792 he marched back to the Dodb, but was soon selected
for further special employment. De Boigne had determined to
reduce the fort of Kanaund, which still held out against the Maratha
rule, and sent Perron with four battalions to capture it.
224 PERRON.

Kanaund was an exceedingly strong fortress in the Rewari territory,
and had formerly been held by Najaf Kuli Khan, one of the leading
nobles at the court of the emperor Shah’Alam. On Najaf Khan’s
decease the possession of the fort passed to his widow, who, when De
Boigne summoned her to surrender, seemed inclined to obey, for,
before his death, her husband had specially warned her not to attempt
to resist the general. But whilst negotiations were going on a new
ally suddenly came to her assistance. This was none other than
Ismail Beg, who after the battle of Merta, had submitted to the
Marathé rule, and, it is said, accepted service under Sindhia. But his
sympathies were always with the old régime, and Holkar, aware of
this, instigated him to revolt, pointing out the excellent opportunity
that offered of joining forces with Najaf Khan’s Begum. This
urtifice, by which Takuji Holkar hoped to weaken his rival Sindhia,
and so improve his own prospects in Hindustan, was a very trans-
parent one; but the shallowest excuse was sufficient to tempt the
gallant Mughal noble to strike another blow for the Faith, and he
accepted the suggestion with avidity. Renouncing his allegiance to
Sindhia, he wrote to the Begum to hold out against the conqueror
of their common country, and hurried to her assistance with an
army of 20,000 men and 30 guns.

Upon hearing of this De Boigne ordered Perron to advance with
all speed, give battle to Ismail Beg, and bring him in dead or alive.
Marching to Kanaund, Perron found the allies encamped under the
walls of the fort, and at once engaged them. It was the first
important battle in which he held chief command, and he acquitted
himself very creditably. In less than two hours he inflicted a severe
defeat on the enemy, killing 2,000 of them, capturing all their guns
and driving Ismail Beg and his beaten troops into the fort for
shelter.

The siege of the place was now undertaken, but Ismail Beg,
although vanquished in open fight, maintained a brave defence for
four months. The thickness of the mud walls of Kanaund proved
impervious to Perron’s battering train, and he was unable to effect a
practicable breach, whilst his strength in men was insufficient to take
the stronghold by assault. It seemed as though the blockade would be
a very slow business, when an accident occurred which accelerated it.
One day the Begum, whilst playing a game of chess with an eunuch,
was killed by a chance stone shot, whereupon the garrison became
disheartened and broke into mutiny against Ismail Beg, who had
been instrumental in persuading their late mistress to resist. Hoping
to gain more favourable terms for themselves they conspired to
HIS BIRTH AND EARLY CAREER. 225

deliver him up to the besiegers, but this plot coming to his ears,
Ismail Beg anticipated their action by surrendering to Perron, who
promised on his own faith and that of De Boigne’s to spare his life,
and honourably redeemed his word despite Madhoji Sindhia’s wrath
and opposition.

During the siege of Kanaund an accident happened to Perron which
maimed him for life. Whilst experimenting with some hand grenades
one of them burst as he was in the act of throwing it, and so
shattered his hand that he was obliged to submit to amputation, and
thereafter he was often known among the natives as Hkdust, or The
One-handed. But his success at Kanaund was rewarded by his
promotion to the rank of major, and on the creation of De Boigne’s
Second Brigade, he was appointed to the command of it, Major
Frémont, as senior officer, obtaining that of the First. Thus in less
than three years from the date of his entering Sindhia’s service,
Perron found himself in a post almost analogous to that of a general
of division, and with a force of 8,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, and 40
guns under his command, whilst his pay and emoluments were
probably not less than Rs.2,000 a month. This was a rapid and
wonderful rise for a man who had but recently been fruitlessly
seeking service, and lamenting the loss of an employment that
brought him in Rs.720 a year.

During the rest of this year and in the early part of 1793 Perron
was associated with Ambaji Inglia and Rana Khan in the subjuga-
tion of Méwar, and assisted in establishing the former as Subahdar or
lord lieutenant of that district. Madhoji Sindhia himself acecom-
panied the army engaged in this work, and when the objects of the
expedition were completed, marched to Poonab, whilst Perron and his
Brigade returned to headquarters in Hindustan. But he was not
allowed to remain here long, for early in 1794 he was transferred
to the command of the First Brigade and ordered to the Deccan
to strengthen Sindhia’s position there. Before he arrived, however,
that prince was dead and succeeded by his nephew, Daulat Rao
Sindhia, whose peaceful succession was in a great measure due to the
opportune arrival in the month of March of Perron and his ten fine
battalions.

In the following year there came to Perron one of those oppor-
tunities which, if rightly used, often lay the foundations of future
greatness. A disagreement had long existed between the Mardathas
and the Nizam of Haidarabad, relative to a claim for chowé or tribute,
demanded by the former and long resisted by the latter. The sum
had now increased to nearly threc millions sterling, and Nana

15
226 PERRON.

Farnavis, the Peshwa’s prime minister, determined to exact it, and
called upon the Nizam for an immediate settlement. An angry and
insulting answer was returned, which was immediately followed by a
declaration of war, and in January, 1795, both powers took the field.

The Peshwa was assisted by his tributary chiefs. Daulat Rao
Sindhia supplied the strongest contingent, which included De Boigne’s
First Brigade under Perron, Michael Vilose’s independent corps of six
battalions, and Colonel John Hessing’s of four, and a large force of
irregular cavalry. Takuji Holkar sent a brigade of four battalions of
regular infantry under the Chevalier Dudrenec, who had been com-
missioned to raise and discipline another corps after his disastrous
defeat at Lakhairi. Raghoji Bhonsla, the Rajah of Berar, and other
lesser chiefs of the Deccan sent in contingents, and the allied army
numbered 140,000 men, of whom 24,000 were disciplined infantry.
Daulat Rao Sindhia took command of his own troops in person, but
the actual direction in the field was left to Perron.

To oppose this formidable host the Nizam Ali Khan collected an
army of 110,000 men, including 17,000 disciplined infantry, of which
11,000 were under the command of Colonel Raymond, a French officer
of high character and repute, and the remaining 6,000 belonged to two
independent corps commanded by an American named Boyd, and an
Englishman named Finglass.

Upon the 11th of March, 1795, the two armies met near a place
called Purinda, whither the Nizam was marching from Kardla, by
which name the battle that ensued is generally known. The Marathas
appeared in great force upon the Nizam's right, on some rising ground,
from whence they were able to open a distant cannonade on the rear
of the Haidarabad army. The Nizam’s troops were at ouce drawn
out in line of battle, and Raymond advancing with his infantry and
24 guns took up a position on an elevated piece of ground in front,
supported by a large body of cavalry. Upon this Pareshram Bhao,
the Peshwd's commander-in-chief, formed his army to receive the
attack, taking the centre station himself, with the Peshwa’s cavalry
and the Chevalier Dudrenec’s brigade, whilst he placed the Rajah of
Berar’s contingent on the right, and Daulat Rado Sindhia’s infantry on
the left wing. The action commenced with an attack on the Maratha
centre by the Nizam’s cavalry, who were much elated at a slight
advantage they had gained on the previous day over an advance
guard of the Peshwé’s household troops. They now charged with great
gallantry, wounding Pareshram Bhao, and driving the Maratha centre
back in confusion. But whilst they were thus carrying everything
before them in the centre, the regular infantry on both sides had
HIS BILTH AND EARLY CAREER. 227

advanced to within musket shot of one another. Perron, by skilful
mancuvring, obtained a decided advantage of position, and, having
posted 35 guns on an eminence, opened a destructive fire. Raymond
was immediately deserted by the Nizam’s cavalry, but his infantry
stood their ground well, and had they been permitted to fight out the
ducl, it is possible they might have won the day. The fate of the
battle was, lowever, destined to be decided by one of those domestic
considerations which often have a preponderating influence in Asiatic
contests. The Nizain, with the imbecile infatuation of an Oriental
potentate, had carried his womenfolk with him on the campaign, and
early in the battle, his favourite wife, terrified by the roar of the
cannon, implored him to retire. To pacify her fears le ordered
Ltaymond’s brigade to fall back for her protection. Its commander
resisted to the ulmost this fatal and supine act of pusillanimity, until
frequent and repeated commands left him no chvice but to obey, and
about sunset he began to retire. Darkness soon closed over the scene
of battle, but Perron, whose long experience of Indian warfare had
taught him the importance of pressing home an advantage, made
every effort to follow, persisting in the pursuit as long as it was
possible, and keeping up a desultory fire in the dark.

Meanwhile the orders and counter-orders that reached Raymond
were so confusing that in attempting to carry them out his men were
perfectly bewildered, and at last, worn out with fatigue and vocifera-
tion, they sank to rest in bivouac upon the field. But about eleven
o'clock an accidental encounter between the advance pickets of the two
aries started the battle afresh. Perron, from his advanced position,
immediately opened uw heavy fire with artillery and rockets, where-
upon a panic seized the Nizam’s soldiery, and abandoning their guns
and camp they fled towards Kardla, a small fort so surrounded by
hills that it formed a veritable cwl-de-sac.

Within the walls of this fort the Nizam took refuge, and for some
time Raymond gallantly defended his master. But when Perron
dragged up his heavy artillery and brought it to bear on the place,
surrender became inevitable, and the Nizam sued for terms. An
indemnity of three millions sterling was extorted from hin, besides
territory yielding a revenue of nearly three and a half lakhs of rupees
annually, and for the due fulfilment of these stringent terms he was
compelled to send his prime minister as a hostage to Poonah.

Kardla was a decisive battle, but never was such a substantial
victory won with less bloodshed. Although there were uearly a
quarter of a million men contending in the field, the losses on either
side were infinitesimal, and the Nizam owed his defeat to Lis own
228 PERRON.

cowardice and folly. But Perron’s reputation as an able general was
at once established, and thereafter he found signal favour in the sight
of his master, Daulat Rao Sindhia.

In 1795 Sindhia left Poonah, and proceeded as far as the Godaveri
river on his return to Hindustan, where his presence was required
owing to De Boigne having announced his intention of resigning his
command. Lut on the 25th of October, Madhu Rao, the Peshwa, com-
mitted suicide at Poonah. In the hyperbolical language of a native
historian, which is worth quoting for its quaintness, ‘The Peshwa
was one day amusing himself flying kites on a terrace of his palace,
when, as Fate ordained, the string of his life being short, his foot
slipped and he fell over the parapet, and the kite of his soul flew away
into the air!’ Immediately on receipt of this intelligence, Sindhia,
by the advice of his prime minister, Balloba Tantia, returned to
Poonah with his whole army to contest the succession of Baji Rao,
whom the late Peshwd had appointed his heir, and who had been
immediately installed by Nana Iarnavis, the powerful and determined
enemy of the House of Ujjain.

De Boigne still persisted in his determination to retire from Daulat
Tio’s service and return to Europe. In after years Perron boasted
that it was his intrigues which obliged the general to quit the country,
but it is probable that the wish was father to the thought. Still it
cannot be contested that Perron was at this time in high favour with
Sindhia, and in constant attendance upon his person. In December
De Boigne finally quitted Hindustan. It would have been in ac-
cordance with Indian custom had he recommended a successor, but it
is established on the best authority that le did not do so; on the con-
trary, he advised Daulat Rao to demolish his Lrigades rather than
put them under the comiuand of one person, as such power ought not
to be entirely trusted to a single will and influence. Directly after
his departure a keen coipetition arose between Perron and Robert
Sutherland for the post rendered vacant. Major F'rémont, the senior
officer in the force, died about this time, leaving Sutherland at the
head of affairs in Hindustan, who conceived this gave him a sort of
claim to the permanent appointment. But he was too far from the
seat of government to press his interests, being engaged in the reduc-
tion of Bundelkhand, which occupied him for six months. On the
other hand Perron was daily at Sindhia’s court, and, by the death of
Frémont, was left senior officer in the Brigades. He made the inost of
his opportunities, and succeeded so well that before the end of the
year he was promoted to the rank of general and appointed to the
chief command of De Boigue’s army.
CHAPTER II.
PERRON ASSUMES COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF HINDUSTAN.

1797-1800.

HE army which De Boigne left behind him in Sindhia’s service

consisted of 24,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 120 guns, besides
garrison troops and irregulars. The battalions were veteran and
undefeated, and their spirit and organisation unexcelled. It was an
army the command of which might have filled with pride any soldier
in India, whether king’s or Company’s officer or adventurer. Behind it
was w proud record of achievement; it was well disciplined, well
paid, and well equipped; and in addition animated by that esprit de
corps which lifts men out of themselves, and by identifying them
with the flag they serve, doubles their individual worth. De Boigne’s
battalions were proud of their prestige and jealous of their honour,
and upheld by a resolution to sustain the reputation they had won on
many battle-fields, and, where possible, to increase it. They were, in
short, « worthy monument to the man who had created them,

Such was the army to the command of which Perron succeeded in
September 1796. Making over the First Brigade to Captain Drugeon,
he set out for Mattra, where he arrived in February 1797, and took
over charge from Jaggu Bapu, the Maratha general. By his
commission he was invested with the full powers exercised by De
Boigne, and one of his first acts was to take possession of the Jaidad
in the Dodb. Here, in October of the following year, he fixed his
headquarters, considerably enlarging the cantonment of Koil and
strengthening the already formidable defences of Aligarh, which
defended the place. During his first year of office he had little
leisure to attend to external affairs, being fully employed in
acquainting himself with the details of the Brigades, and the
administration of the territory assigned for their upkeep. After he

had established his power and authority within his own boundaries
229
230 PERRON.

he turned his attention to the more extended responsibilities of his
post. The first matter that occupied him was the state of affairs at
Delhi. Directly after Perron’s appointment to the supreme command
of Hindustan, Sindhia had issued orders to the Maratha governor of
Delhi to make over charge of the city. But Balloba Tantia, Sindhia’s
prime minister and a determined enemy to Perron, secretly trans-
mitted contrary instructions to the capital, ‘‘an occurrence ’”’ observes
a contemporary historian “by no means uncommon in the singular
absurdity of Mahratta politics.’ The Hindu governor of Delhi, only
too glad to retain his post, refused to surrender the city, and in May,
1798, Perron ordered Major Pedron, with four battalions, to lay siege
to it, and obtain possession by blockade, bribery, or intrigue, but to
avoid a bombardment for fear of offending the blind emperor, whose
titular authority it was a matter of policy to recognise and respect.
After a close blockade of five weeks Sutherland arrived and the gates
were opened to the impulse of gold, and the unfortunate Shah ’Alam
released from the fears and privations occasioned by the conduct
of his recent guardian, Nizam-ul-Din, the Cowrie Fakir. Perron
appointed Captain Le Marchant governor of the capital and custodian
of the king's person, while Pedron returned to Koil, where the
Second Brigade, commanded by Sutherland, to which he belonged,
was cantoned, the Third Brigade, under Colonel Pohlman, being
stationed at Mattra.

The insubordinate example of the Maratha governor of Delhi en-
couraged the commandant of Agra to resist. This person was a brother
of Balloba Tantia, and refused to yield up possession of the fort to
Perron, who being at the time busily employed in strengthening the
defences of Aligarh, made no move until he had completed the task.
He then marched against Agra with six battalions and arrived
unexpectedly before the walls on the 17th of February, 1799. The town
was taken completely by surprise, and Perron entered it without oppo-
sition, proclaiming his authority by beat of drum. But the fort and
citadel held out, and an investment was necessary. A siege followed
and lasted fifty-eight days, at the end of which a successful mine
was exploded and destroyed a salient bastion on the north-east front.
Whereupon, to avoid the calamity of an assault, the garrison sur-
rendered on condition of being allowed to march out with the
honours of war. From first to last the capture of this place cost
Perron 600 men, and it was an achievement not unworthy of
the reputation of De Boigne’s battalions, for Agra was the strongest
fortress in Hindustan, and defended by a force of 4,000 men.

With the possession of the Key of India Perron’s power was
COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF HINDUSTAN. 231

completely established. “He had now the entire and merited
confidence of Sindhia,” writes one of his officers in a contemporary
journal, “and was invested with the full and uncontrolled government
of all Sindhia’s possessions from the Chumbul to Patedla—a
country, even in its ruinous state, yielding a revenue of one million
sterling. He was authorised to raise armies and retain or discharge
troops, and no European, not even De Boigne, ever possessed such
confidence and power.”

This at first sight may seem a strangely rapid rise, but it is
intelligible when the circumstances which favoured Perron are
considered. Déulat Rao Sindhia on his accession to power threw
himself completely into Deccan politics. His predominant desire
was to render his influence supreme at Poonah. But he had two
obstacles to contend against: the first was the craft and power of
Nana Farnavis, the Peshwé’s prime minister, whose opposition pro-
longed the contest for ascendancy from month to month and year
to year; and the second was his own natural weakness of character,
and the base elements of government with which he surrounded him-
self. Daulat Rao altogether lacked the genius of his uncle Madlioji,
and possessed little real ability. He squandered his time in riot and
dissipation, and indulged in the worst vices of a debauched Oriental
sovereign. Such a nature as his, out of very inertness, surrendered
the power it should have wielded to hands that were itching to grasp
it. With Perron the beginning was more than half of the whole.
His appointment to the command of the army of Hindustan assured
everything else ; since the country was held solely by that army, his
battalions constituting the real power behind Sindhia’s throne. Left
to himself in the north, Perron assiduously employed his time and
resources in increasing his strength, He made Koil an immense
fortified camp, and laboured to render Aligarh impregnable. ‘The
strength of the place cannot be described—a seventy-four might sail
in the ditch,” wrote Lord Lake of the fortress four years later. Its
position was admirably chosen, for from his headquarters there
Perron held both Delhi and Agra in check. Beneath the walls of
Aligarh he built himself a palatial residence—it still existed in 1871,
and was used as a settlement office—and assumed sovereign state.
During the seven years of his rule the dominion of Hindustan lay not
at Delhi, nor at Poonah, but in the vast fortified camp of Koil, from
whence the chief of many legions issued orders to the princes of the
neighbouring districts and Rajputana, and so far as Upper India was
concerned was the master of both the emperor Shah ‘Alam and
Daulat Rao Sindhia.
232 PERRON.

There is a very interesting article in the Asiatic Review for 1799,
which confirms this estimate of Perron’s power. ‘‘ General Perron,”
(it runs) “a French officer of great experience and consummate
ability, both as a statesman and a soldier, represents Dowlut Rao
Scindia in Hindostan, and is invested with the most full and absolute
authority over every department, both civil and military. This
power, which exceeds that of any prince, he exercises with great
moderation, and at the same time with a degree of judgment and
energy that evinces very superior talents. Amongst his European
officers none have a character for superior capacity, although very
good soldiers. Yet having risen from very low situations, and not having
the advantage of education, none of them have displayed any abilities
out of their professional line. But this deficiency in his officers he
may easily remedy (and no doubt will) as soon as peace takes place
in Europe, when innumerable military adventurers will flock to his
standard, qualified for the highest situations civil and military. The
Mahratta ports on the Malabar coast, from whence supply of
ordnance and arms and military stores have occasionally been
procured, will afford them an easy access, so that before long we may
expect to see the northern parts of Hindustan swarming with needy
and intriguing Frenchmen.”

Whilst Perron was thus engaged in establishing and consolidating
his power in the north, troubles were brewing in the south, occasioned
by the rebellion of the Bhais. The Bhais were the widows of the
late Madhoji Sindhia, and had never acquiesced in the accession of
Daulat Rao. There were three of these ladies, one of whom,
Bhagirthi, was young and beautiful. Daulat Rado, as in honour
bound, promised to make ample provision for his aunts, and they
continued to reside at his court. But time passed and no measures
were taken to ensure their permanent establishment. Presently it
was whispered that an intrigue was in progress between Bhagirthi
Bhai and Daulat Rao, and the two elder widows, hearing of it, were
scandalised, and expressed their abhorrence at the incestuous
criminality. For this they were barbarously ill-treated by Ghatkay
Rao, one of Sindhia’s creatures in authority. This wretch not only
imprisoned the elder widows, but caused them to be flogged. Such
degrading treatment aroused the wrath of the Shenwi Brahmins, a
high caste of men who had monopolised all the principal offices of
government under Madhoji Sindhia; and these now openly
espoused the cause of the widows against the young chief. Much
discussion and dissension ensued, until it was agreed that the Bhais
should reside at Burhanpur. For this purpose they left Poonah, but
COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF HINDUSTAN. 233

had not proceeded far before they were treacherously seized and
thrown into confinement in the fort of Ahmednagar, and after a short
imprisonment brought back to Daulat Réo’s camp. Before long,
however, they found means of escaping, and threw themselves upon
the protection of Amrat Rio, who was brother to the Peshwa, and a
very powerful personage. Just prior to this, Daulat Rio married the
daughter of his minion Ghatkay Rio. She was a woman of singular
beauty, who exercised a complete control over her husband, and her
influence elevated her father to the post ot prime minister in
succession to Balloba Tantia. No sooner was Ghatkay Rao in power,
than he urged Sindhia to crush the conspiracy of the Bhais at once.
This advice was adopted, and five battalions of infantry were
detached from Drugeon’s Brigade under command of Captain Du
Prat to surprise Amrat Réo’s camp, and seize the refugees; but the
attempt failed, and Du Prat was beaten and obliged to retreat.
Resource was now had to further negotiation, and with all the duplicity
of his Maratha nature Sindhia promised to provide his aunts with a
suitable establishment if they would return to his protection. Where-
upon, trusting in his good faith, Amrat Rao come to Poonah to
arrange the matter, but was attacked by two battalions and twenty-
five guns under Drugeon, who, without warning, opened fire upon
him and dispersed his troops. This gross act of treachery constituted
a declaration of war against the Peshwa himself, in whose govern-
ment Amrat Rado now filled the post of prime minister. A coalition
of chiefs was immediately formed against Sindhia, who became
alarmed ; the more so as Perron was at this time occupied in the
siege of Agra, which he had not yet reduced, and where the faction
of the late prime minister, Balloba Santia, still held out. A general
rising against Sindhia’s authority in Hindustan and the Deccan
threatened, and he was now anxious to lay the storm he had raised.
But Ghatkay Rao, who had been the primary cause of all the trouble,
having tasted blood, thirsted for more, and disregarding Sindhia’s
orders to effect a settlement with the revolted chiefs, increased the
danger of the situation by perpetrating innumerable fresh outrages.
At last Daulat Rio was obliged to order Ghatkay’s arrest, which was
accomplished by two of his European officers, Filoze and Hessing.
After this a peace was patched up with the Peshw4, but in the mean-
time the Bhais had retreated to Kolapur, where they were joined by
the leading Shenwi Brahmins, amongst whom was Lakwa Dada,
one of Madhoji’s best generals, who had recently been dismissed from
his appointment of commander-in-chief of the Mardithi army on
account of his attachment to the ex-minister Balloba Tantia, who
234 PERRON.

had naturally been one of Ghatkay’s first victims, and was now
languishing in a cruel confinement.

Large bodies of mounted soldiery flocked to Lakwa Dada ‘as soon as
he erected the standard of rebellion, and openly declared for the
widows of the old prince. Daulat Réo attempted in vain to allay
the increasing storm. No sooner had his regular battalions under
Du Prat, Drugeon, Filoze, and Hessing repressed the attacks made
on his territories by the rebels and returned to camp, than the latter
faced about and followed them. The flame spread through Hindustan,
and Lakwa Dada soon found himself at the head of an army of 20,000
cavalry, 15 battalions of infantry, and 20 guns, and sustained
by the immense prestige which still attached to the service of the
widows of the old prince.

It was at this critical moment in his affairs that Daulat Rao desired
Perron to advance against Lakwa Dada, and at the same time appointed
another chief, named Ambaji Inglia, to the head of the Maratha
army, and ordered him to co-operate with the regular Brigades.

Perron was at first disposed to underrate the strength of the
rebellion, and contented himself with sending two battalions, under
Captain Butterfield, to assist Ambaji. ‘With these the latter marched
to Kotah, where he met the insurgents and engaged them; but Ambaji’s
troops had been tampered with by Lakwa Dada, who was a master of
intrigue, and lost the battle. Of the 1600 regular infantry under
Butterfield, one-third were killed or wounded, the whole brunt of the
action falling upon them, whilst Ambaji’s Marathd cavalry showed
scarcely any fight at all.

Perron now ordered Sutherland, with the Second Brigade, to rein-
force the defeated army, upon which Lakwa Dada fell back on the fort
of Chitturgarh. Ambaji, at the same time, made great preparations
to retrieve his defeat, and engaged George Thomas, with 6 battalions
of regular infantry and 60 guns, on a monthly pay of Rs.60,000.
Supported by Sutherland and Thomas, the chief advanced against
Chitttr about the middle of the year 1799, his army consisting of
20,000 horse and 14,000 infantry. A good deal of desultory skirmish-
ing ensued, but no really heavy fighting, nor were any substantial
results achieved by either party. Meanwhile Sutherland’s and
Thomas’s troops, being far removed from their headquarters, fell into
arrears of pay, and this led to a general plundering of the country
round, and very soon every village within fifty miles was pillaged and
deserted.

Perron had always been jealous of Colonel Sutherland, and he now
gave w ready ear to a report that he was secretly intriguing with
COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF HINDUSTAN. 235

Lakwa Dada instead of fighting him. The colonel was therefore
suspended, and Major Pohlman sent from Mattra to take command of
his Brigade. Captain Butterfield fell a victim to Perron’s malice at
the same time, and was driven to leave Sindhia’s service ; but Suther-
land managed to clear himself, and after a short time was sent to
the Deccan, to take over charge of the First Brigade from Du Prat,
who had recently superseded Drugeon fallen into disgrace.

Major Pohlman had no opportunity of distinguishing himself
against Lakwa Dada, for scarcely had he taken over the command
than news came that Zaman Shah, the King of Kabul—a grandson of
Ahmed Shah Abdali, whose name was dreaded by the Marathas—was
preparing for an invasion of India, with the intention of re-establish-
ing a Mahomedan empire. This threatened danger brought about an
immediate concord amongst the Marathas, and all internal feuds and
jealousies were forgotten. Daulat Rao Sindhia released Balloba
Tantia, Lakwa Dada’s staunch friend, from confinement, and rein-
stated lim in his former post of prime minister; whereupon Lakwa
and Ambaji exchanged visits of amity, and shortly afterwards the
former, through the influence of Balloba, was again elevated to the
post of commander-in-chief. This typical example of the glorious
uncertainty of office in a Maratha administration left Ambaji without
employment ; and feeling hurt at a humiliation he had not deserved,
he entered into retirement for a season.

All the Maratha troops, regular and irregular, were now ordered to
concentrate at Mattra, where a formidable army was collected in
December, 1799, under the chief command of Perron, who marched
thither from Koil. From Mattra the army advanced to Delhi, to take
up a@ position to oppose Zaman Shah, and here for some time the
immense host was encamped. It included in its ranks Perron’s Second
and Third Brigades, under Pohlman and Pedron, 100,000 Maratha
cavalry of Lakwa’s, and 200 guns. So critical was the danger con-
sidered, that Perron decided to further augment his army, and
directed Major Pedron to raise a Fourth Brigade. The English also
assembled a large force at the frontier station of Anupshahr under
General Craig, to assist in repulsing the Afghan invasion. Fortunately
for the peace and security of Hindustan, an outbreak at Kabul obliged
Zaman Shah to return to his capital, and so the danger passed away.

A small insurrection in the Saharanpur district next engaged
Perron’s attention. Here a religious impostor, whose real name was
Sultan Shah, gave himself out to be Ghulam Kadir, asserting that it
was not that miscreant who had been captured and killed at Meerut
in 1789, and proclaiming his authority over the territories of the
236 PERRON.

Rohilla adventurer whom he represented himself to be. Perron
detached Captain Smith, with three battalions and some of the Begum
Somru’s troops, to bring the impostor to book, and he was easily
defeated, and sent flying for refuge to the Sikhs, who had assembled
in force near Karnal, with the object of assisting Zaman Shah.

Perron now advanced to Karn4l, and summoned all the Sikh chiefs
between the Sutlej and the Jumna to appear before him and tender
their submission. These included the Rajahs of Patidla, Jhind,
Kaithal, and Tanésur, who had long been a source of annoyance and
danger to the northern frontier of Hindustan. At first they seemed
inclined to resist; whereupon Perron, with a number of local chiefs
who were burning to avenge past injuries, and who brought with them
10,000 cavalry, advanced with his Third Brigade to Tanésur. This
prompt exhibition of strength overawed the Sikhs, and they submitted
to the terms imposed, and signed the treaty required from them.*
Perron then returned to Delhi, chastising, on his route, several large
villages which had been backward in paying their revenue, amongst
them being some over which George Thomas claimed authority. This
invasion of the latter’s rights—not the first instance of its kind—tended
to increase the ill-feeling already existing between the two adventurers,
and sowed the seeds of troubles that were to find their harvest at
Georgegarh and Hansi two years later.

* “Tt was about this time that Perron sent presents to Ranjit Singh, of Lahore,
with proposals for a treaty of amity and friendship. Bagh Singh of Jhind,
who was Ranjit Singh’s maternal uncle, was induced to use his influence in
bringing about this treaty, but Ranjit declined Perron’s overtures, still in
such a manner as to avoid giving offence. He had, prior to this time, entered
into negotiations with the Marquis of Wellesley ; and he explained that it was
‘a difficult matter to maintain a friendship with both parties.’ In the end he
patched up an understanding with Perron, explaining to Colonel Collins, who
had been the medium of the English negotiations, that ‘although my friendship
for you and the most noble the Governor-general is great beyond the possibility
of words, yet I must preserve appearances with General Perron, in consideration
of what is due by me to the will of my uncle, Bhig Singh.’

‘CA little later Perron proposed to Ranjit Singh to join him in attacking
George Thomas at Hausi, but this the Sikh chief refused to agree to.’’—Extract,
“ Bombay State Papers.”’
CHAPTER III.
THE BATTLE OF MALPURA, AND THE STORM OF SOUNDA.
1800-1801.

peeahy in the year 1800 Lakwa Dada advanced into Rajputana, to
collect the tribute due from that country. He was supported by
Perron’s Second Brigade under Major Pohlman, and by the Chevalier
Dudrenec’s corps. Partab Singh, driven to exasperation by the
exactions of Perron, had determined to throw off the Maratha yoke, if
possible, and assert his independence. To this end he collected a
powerful army at his camp at Sanganir, a few miles south of Jaipur,
where on the 4th of April he was joined by 10,000 Rathor cavalry
from Jodhpur, who, for the first time since their defeat by De Boigne
at Merta, ventured to take the field against Sindhia. Hearing of
these preparations, Perron sent an ultimatum to Partéb Singh, calling
upon him to pay his arrears of tribute immediately ; and the demand
being refused, Lakwa Dada was deputed to enforce it.

Upon the rejection of Perron’s ultimatum great activity prevailed
in the Jaipur camp. The Rajah mounted his state elephant and
reviewed his troops; there was a vast amount of saluting with
cannons, rockets, and small arms; rich sacrifices were offered to the
gods, lakhs of eleemosynary rupees distributed to the Brahmins, and
alms in abundance bestowed on the poor.

By this time Lakwa’s army had approached to within fighting
distance, and the 15th of April being declared a propitious day by the
court astrologers, Partib Singh’s forces moved out to battle. Lakwa
had chosen a good position near Malpura, where he formed his army
in two lines to meet the attack, the advance one consisting of the
regular infantry under Pohlman and Dudrenee, and the supporting
one of the Maratha cavalry, who were stationed a thousand paces in
the rear; whilst 5,000 of Perron’s Hindustani horse defended the
flanks of his Brigade.

237
238 PERRON.

At four o’clock in the morning the battle began with a brisk artillery
fire. Presently Pohlman, who was on the right of the line, determined
on a forward movement, and led his Brigade on, but with orders to
withhold their fire until quite close to the enemy. ‘With their accus-
tomed discipline and intrepidity the troops obeyed, but the cowardly
Maratha cavalry held back, leaving the infantry, as usual, to fight the
battle alone; in consequence of which Polilman was soon hard pressed,
and at one time in imminent danger of being overwhelmed by
numbers. But he displayed generalship equal to the emergency. By
a skilful and judicious movement he massed lis six battalions into
square—a formation long warfare against cavalry had made them
familiar with—and presented a front to the enemy on all sides; and
thus drawn up they met and resisted every charge. After a desperate
defence, in which the artillery played an important part, Pollman
gradually drove the Jaipur troops back, and captured 40 of their
guns and 30 stand of colours, but not without heavy loss, for
1000 of his men, or nearly 17 per cent. of the force engaged, were
killed and wounded.

On the left of the line the Chevalier Dudrenec fared differently.
His troops were composed of newly-raised levies, who lacked the
discipline that enabled Pohlman’s veterans to stand firm and avoid
panic. Dudrenec himself was a gallant soldier, well schooled in
adversity, and if experience of disaster could make a great general,
he would have had every claim to that distinction. But he was fated
to suffer yet another catastrophe on this day. It fell to the Rathors
of Jodhpur to oppose his portion of the line, and they had meimories
to obliterate such as could only be blotted out with blood; they had
historical reproaches to silence, whose cutting echoes rang through a
decade of shame, and could only be drowned in the din of battle ;
and ribald rhymes to put a period to, whose sting could only be stayed
by the clash of steel. To-day they sought the revanche of Merta,
and 10,000 sons of Marwar were eager to fulfil their duty.

There is a stirring and vivid description of their charge against
Dudrenec’s corps in Colonel James Skinner’s mennoirs, which depicts
the episode in language singularly glowing and graphic; and
although it is not free from old “ Sikander’s ” habitual exaggeration,
no apology is necessary for quoting it im extenso. These are Skinnev’s
words:

“We now saw the Chevalier Dudrenec’s Brigade, which was on our
left, charged by the Rhattores. He received them nobly, but was cut
to pieces by them: out of 8,000 men he had not 200 left. The
Rhattores, more than 10,000 in number, were seen approaching from
THE BATTLE OF MALPURA. 239

a distance, the tramp of their immense and compact body rising like
thunder above the roar of battle. They came on, first at a slow hand
gallop, which increased in speed as they approached. The well-served
guns of the Brigade showered grape upon this dense mass, mowing
down hundreds at each discharge, but this had no effect in arresting
their progress. On they came like a whirlwind, trampling over 1,500
of their own body destroyed by the cannon of the Brigade. Neither
the murderous volleys from the muskets nor the serried hedge of
bayonets could check or shake them. They poured like a torrent on
and over the Brigade, and rode it fairly down, leaving scarce a vestige
of it remaining, as if the sheer weight of their mass had ground it to
pieces. Then, as if they had met with but a slight obstacle, they
looked not even behind them at the fallen, but went on, unshaken,
and still in their formidable mass, to attack the cavalry of the second
line. These ran like sheep, while the Rhattores pursued them, cutting
them down for several miles. In this charge Captain Paish and
several other officers were killed, and Dudrenec only escaped by
throwing himself down amongst the dead.”

The impetuous frenzy of the Rdathors, drunk with victory and
revenge, proved their ruin. By their blind pursuit of the Maratha
cavalry, they put themselves out of the action as completely as if they
themselves had been io flight, and this just at the time when their
presence was most needed ; for Pohlman had now beaten back the
Jaipur troops, and advancing in his turn, recaptured two of Dudrenec’s
lost guns. Upon this Partib Singh, with 6,000 of his chosen body-
guard, determined to emulate the feat of the Rathors, and charge
Pohlman. But the latter, seeing him moving down on his elephant,
divined his purpose, and immediately ordered his guns to the front of
the line; and by the time the Rajah had approached to within two
hundred yards, the word was given to fire, and a discharge of artillery
instantly followed. Partib Singh’s elephant was killed, but not-
withstanding this, his bouyguard twice attempted to charge, but were
beaten back each time. On the second occasion the Rajah mounted
his horse, and turning tail fled to his capital, followed by his cavalry,
who never drew rein until they found refuge within the walls of
Jaipur, forty-five miles distant.

Pohlman's battalions were now left in sole possession of the field.
About midday the Rathors were seen returning from the chase of the
Maratha cavalry, beating their drums in token of victory. On nearing
Poblman’s camp they observed the Jaipur colours, which had been
captured, floating above it; and this circumstance led them to suppose
that Partab Singh had been as successful as themselves and was in
240 PERRON.

possession, and they rode up in loose order to be cruelly undeceived
by a discharge of grape poured into them from thirty guns. When
they realised the fatal mistake into which they had fallen they made
a gallant effort to retrieve it. Twice they charged, notwithstanding
their fatigued condition, but were repulsed, although many brave
individuals broke through the square formed to receive them, and met
their death at the bayonet’s point. But the task was an impossible
one, and at last they drew off, and finding the Jaipur camp
abandoned, followed the direction of flight taken by Partab Singh,
victims of their blind impetuosity and an undeserved misfortune.

Pohlman’s Brigade now advanced to occupy the enemy’s deserted
lines. It was a magnificient encampment, crowded with sumptuous
tents of the most luxurious description, belonging to the various
chiefs. Two large bazaars ran down the centre, filled with movable
shops, in which every imaginable article was exposed for sale. But
not a trader remained behind to recommend his wares, not a trooper
to strut and swagger down the streets, for the great host that had
thronged this tented city but yesterday had melted away into
nothingness.

In the centre of the camp was Rajab Patib Singh’s wooden
pavilion, or palace. It was a beautiful structure, covered with
embroidery and crimson velvet, and the interior a blazing sheen of
gold and silver brocade. Two golden idols guarded it, whose flashing
diamond eyes peered into vacuity—two golden idols before whom
the might of Jaipur had ofttimes bowed in adoration. But, impotent
as Baal of old, they were, by the irony of circumstances, the very first
treasures to be looted from the camp, which soon became a scene of
plunder and confusion.

The losses on both sides at the battle of Malpurah were heavy.
The Maratha cavalry had been cut to pieces by the Rathors, whose
own ranks, on their return from the chase, had been decimated by
Pohlman’s fire. Dudrenec’s Brigade, which, according to Smith’s
authority, numbered about 4,000 fighting men, lost between five and
six hundred killed and wounded, whilst Pohlman’s list of casualties
totalled 186. But heavier than all of these was the slaughter that
liad taken place in the ranks of the Jaipur army. Partab Singh
never recovered the blow to his power and prestige which was dealt
him on this eventful day. Of the eighty pieces of cannon which he
had brought into the field, he lost seventy-four, together with all his
camp, baggage and warlike stores.

On the 10th of May Perron arrived from the Sikh country north of
Delhi, where le had been engaged in reducing his neighbours to
THE BATTLE OF MALPURA. 241

order and obedience at Karnal. He brought with him reinforce-
ments of five battalions of infantry and his bodyguard of 500 cavalry,
known as the Khasi Risila. Having taken over the chief command
from Lakwa Dada, he was preparing to advance against Jaipur, when
Partib Singh sent in his submission, and was granted peace on a
payment of twenty-five lakhs of rupees.

A treaty having been drawn out and signed, the Rajah invited
Perron and his European officers, sixteen in number, to visit his
capital and experience his hospitality. The invitation was accepted,
but not without certain qualms as to its prudence. The Rajah, with
a cavalcade of twenty elephants, met his guests outside the gates of
his capital, and escorted them to the ‘‘ Palace of the Winds,” under a
salute of twenty-one guns. Colonel Skinner, who was present,
describes the city as “the handsomest ever seen; the streets were
broad, the houses regular on both sides, the bazaars extremely fine,
and the place full of inhabitants, who seem prosperous and happy.”
This description, recorded nearly a century ago, would hold good in
the present day, for modern Jaipur is without exception the cleanest
and most beautiful city in the native states of India, and enjoys the
distinction of being the only one lighted with gas !

Perron’s ceremonial visit passed off with great éclat, despite fear
and distrust on both sides at the commencement. A grand entertain-
ment in the Hindu style was prepared, whereat nazzars were
presented and khiluts bestowed. This was followed by a banquet, at
which (observes Skinner) a choice assortment of Hindustani liquors
were on the table, and the whole wound up with elephant battles,
tiger and buffalo fights, and the inevitable Natch Dance, when several
sets of handsome girls were introduced.

The defeat of the Rajah of Jaipur had a salutary effect upon his
kinsman of Jodbpur, who, without further trouble, paid up the arrears
of tribute due from him, amounting to twelve lakhs of rupees, and
tendered his formal submission to the Maratha rule.

Affairs in Rajputana being thus satisfactorily arranged, Perron
returned to Koil towards the end of July, leaving Pohlman and six
battalions to reduce the fort of Jajpur, which belonged to a chief
named Kasri Singh, who had long harassed the Rajah of Kotah, an
ally of the Marathas in the late campaign. Jajpur was a stone
fortress, built on the summit of a steep hill, and from its position and
the solidity of its masonry, a place of unusual strength. Kasri
Singh refused to surrender to Pohlman’s summons, and measures
were taken to forcibly dispossess him. A large battering train was
brought to bear on the walls of the town, and a breach soon effected,

16
242 PERRON.

and the following night, on a given signal, the troops advanced and
occupied it without much difficulty. The fort now remained to be
taken, and it was found necessary to make regular approaches. A
fortnight was consumed in advancing the lines to within two hundred
yards, during which the Rajput garrison made many vigorous sallies.
When everything was ready the bombardment was opened, and a
portion of the wall being battered down, a storm ordered. The
six battalions were formed into two columns; Pohlman leading one,
and Captain Donelly, his second in command, the other, and just
before dawn the signal for attack was given by lighting a port-fire,
and the troops rushed forward. But the garrison was prepared to
receive them, and saluted the assailants with a tremendous fire from
cannon and small arms. The stormers pressed gallantly forward,
and reached the breach, but found it impracticable. The garrison
secing this, increased their exertions, rolling down large stones and
discharging powder-pots and burning thatch upon the foe below, which
caused the greatest havoc and confusion in all ranks. Captain
Donelly, a gallant Irishman, and Lieutenant Exshaw lost their lives
in this affair, and 800 men were killed and wounded before the
battalions retired. Four days later the assault was renewed, and this
time, in spite of the heroic defence of the Rajputs, the fort was
captured and all the garrison killed and wounded with the exception
of Kasri Singh and about 400 of his followers. Pohlman, himself a
gallant officer, could feel for these brave men, and offered them
terms which, seeing all was lost, they accepted, and marched out
with the honours of war.

During the next few weeks Pohlman was engaged in reducing
several refractory local chiefs, who refused to pay their tribute until
compelled by force, after which he marched his Brigade back to
Delhi, after a short but successful campaign.

Whilst this expedition had been in progress in Rajputana there
had been another shuffling of the cards in the Deccan. Early in the
year Daulat Rao’s wife had induced him to liberate from confinement
her father, Ghatkay Rao. This wretch soon regained his former evil
influence over his son-in-law, and intrigued successfully against
Balloba Tantia, the minister in power. Before long Balloba fell into
disgrace, and in June was seized and imprisoned in the fortress of
Ahmednagar, where he shortly afterwards died by poison. This
event had a disastrous effect on the fortunes of Lakwa Dada, who
owed his restoration to power to the friendship of the late minister,
and now felt certain that his own downfall was at hand; notwith-
standing that Sindhia, with characteristic deceit, wrote to him to be
THE BATTLE OF MALPURA. 243

under no apprehension, but to continue zealously in the performance
of his duties as commander-in-chief. But in spite of these
reassurances, within a very few weeks Ambaji Inglia was
summoned from his retirement and appointed to supersede Lakwa
Dada, who had already sent his family to Jodhpur for safety, where
he now proceeded to join them and entered into an alliance with the
prince of that country.

Directly after his restoration to favour, Ghatkay Rio recommenced
urging Daulat Rado to crush once for all the rebellion of the Bhais,
by putting to death every man of note who was suspected of sym-
pathy with them, knowing that by such a course of policy many
powerful rivals would be removed from his own path. Sindhia
listened favourably to these suggestions, and sanctioned a wholesale
slaughter of the leading chieftains, who had been favourite officers
and ministers under his uncle Modhoji, and were all men of high
rank and ability. This atrocious proceeding at once alienated the
affections of Sindhia’s subjects: but it did more than this, for it struck
a death-blow at the Maratha national army, and left Daulat Rado
almost solely dependent upon his regular Brigades and his Huropean
officers.

Such of the chieftains as were able to escape, fled for refuge to
Sindhia’s enemies, and disorders threatened on every side. Lakwa
Dida was now formally dismissed from an office which he had in
practice abdicated, and this gave the signal for a general insurrection
to break out. The Holkars, who, since their defeat by De Boigne at
Lakhairi, had scarce lifted their heads, now began to assert themselves,
and under the direction of Jaswant Rao, a natural son of old Takuji,
who died in 1797, raised the standard of their house, to which vast
numbers of Sindhia’s late adherents began to flock.

Scarcely had Perron returned to Koil in July than news of
Lakwa Dada’s defection reached him. He at once prepared to
return to Rajputana to attack the rebel and his new ally of Jodhpur,
but was delayed by the breaking out of an insurrection north of
Delhi, where Sambunath, the subahdar of Saharanpur, a faithful
adherent of Lakwa, declared for his patron directly he heard of his
supersession, and, collecting an army, audaciously avowed his
intention of invading Perron'’s Jaidad. The danger from such an
exhibition of insubordination existed more in its example than in its
action, and it was imperative to crush it in the bud. Captain Smith
was at once detached to attack Sambunath; but although he inflicted
a slight defeat, more energetic measures were necessary. Perron
therefore deferred his advance against Lakwa Dada, and on the 22nd
244 PERRON.

of July took over the command of Captain Smith’s force, and gave
battle to Sambunadth at Katdoli. The action was short but decisive,
and resulted in a complete victory for Perron. Utterly beaten and
routed, Sambunath fled to the Sikh territory and the general returned
to Delhi with such laurels as he might reasonably claim from success
against an individual whom George Thomas contemptuously termed
‘‘a, grain merchant.”

Perron stopped a short time at the capital, watching the progress of
events, and whilst there paid his respects to the blind Emperor with
much pomp and ceremony. The formality of “entering into the
presence” was one he never omitted to observe when occasion
allowed, for the nominal authority of the Mughal was the most
powerful moral factor in his hand.

Just about this time Partaéb Singh was going to be married, and as
Perron had promised to attend the ceremony he determined to visit
Jaipur, and from thence march to the attack of Lakwa Dada.
Collecting a strong force he set out for Rajputana, but on arriving at
Balahera on the 14th of November, learnt that the rebel chief had
left Jodhpur and joined the Bhais in Malwa. This necessitated a
change of plans, but as it was important for political reasons that
Perron should keep his Jaipur engagement, he detached Major
Bourguien to capture Ajmir, which belonged to Lakwa, and him-
self proceeded to Jaipur to be present at the nuptials of Partab
Singh on the 26th of November, and add to the ceremonial that
éclat so precious to Oriental minds. It was not until January, 1801,
that he left this city, and in fulfilment of his original design of
attacking Lakwa Dada set out for Malwa, where that chief was last
reported to be. On his way he levied a heavy fine from the Rajah of
Unaria, a recalcitrant chief who had lately defeated one of Perron’s
detached battalions under Skinner. At this place he learnt that
Lakwa had evacuated Malwa and gone to Datia in Bundelkhand,
taking the Bhais with him, and tired of his fruitless hunt Perron
determined to discontinue it, and retraced his steps to his head-
quarters at Koil, from which he had been too long absent.

Meanwhile Ambaji Inglia, the new Maratha commander-in-chief,
was ordered to take up the chase of Lakwa, who had now entrenched
himself at Sounda, in the territory of the Rajah of Datia, and was at
the head of an army of 6,000 cavalry, 3,000 Bundela troops, and a
small party of 200 sepoys, commanded by Colonel W. H. Tone,
and 16 guns. The position he had chosen was an exceedingly
strong one. In his rear was the fort of Sounda: in his front a
network of ravines extending for seven miles: and his flanks
THE BATTLE OF MALPURA. 245

were defended by broken country and several strong forts. Through
these natural defences there were only three clear passes or passages
for the advance of an enewy, all strongly protected with infantry and
artillery.

Ambaji Inglia, acting under orders from Sindhia, collected at
Gwalior an army of 5,000 horse and three brigades of regular infantry.
Of these latter one was sent him by Perron, consisting of eight
battalions under the command of Colonel Pedron; a second was one
in his own employ, officered by two Englishmen, named James
Shepherd and Joseph Bellasis, and the third an inferior corps
commanded by a native named Kaleb Ali. But having assembled
this army Ambaji hesitated to march against Lakwa, who was
not so much the enemy of Sindhia as the champion of the Maratha
chieftains against the tyranny of Ghatkay Rao, a personage as hateful
to Ambaji himself as to any one, whilst the latter’s feelings towards
Lakwa were, at the bottom, not unfriendly. When at length an
advance could no longer be delayed, Ambaji deputed his brother Bala
Rao to take command, and himself remained at Gwalior.

In March, 1801, the army moved towards Sounda, and a series of
small skirmishes soon took place, but nothing decisive was effected.
Perron now began to recognise the gravity of the situation, for Lakwa
Dada and the Bhais had by this time prevailed upon Jaswant Rao
Holkar, and Ali Bahadur, a powerful independent chief in Bundel-
khand, to support the rebellion. Thus a most formidable confederation
was projected which threatened Daulat Rao’s authority, and thereby
shook the very foundations of Perron’s own position. In fact the insur-
rection of the Bhais, as it was still termed, was assuming such pro-
portions that it seemed likely to change the existing balance of power
in the Maratha Empire, and opened an actual danger of Sindhia being
crushed by a hostile alliance of all the other chiefs in the Deccan,

This induced Perron to proceed to Sounda in person, and he arrived
in May with an escort of a battalion of infantry and 2,000 Hindustani
horse. He found anything but a satisfactory condition of affairs.
Pedron, overawed by the natural strength of Lakwa Dada’s position,
had done nothing except engage in a few unimportant skirmishes.
This dilatory conduct angered Perron, who determined to bring
matters to an immediate issue, and gave the order for a general
assault on the enemy’s entrenchments, and at dawn of day on the
3rd of May the troops went into action.

They were divided into three columns to attack the three passes
that led to Lakwa’s camp. The right consisted of four battalions
under Pedron; in the centre were Shepherd, Bellasis and Kaleb Ali
246 PERRON.

with their brigades ; and on the left were five battalions and 2,000
Hindustani horse under Captain Symes. The pass which Pedron
attacked was held by Colonel Tone, who fought with great gallantry,
until he was overpowered, and with his officers taken prisoner. In
the centre Shepherd and Bellasis were opposed by a chief named
Barar Singh, whom they drove back. But the left wing under Captain
Symes met with a serious reverse at the hands of the gallant old
Rajah of Datia, and sustained great slaughter.

Perron on hearing of this disaster sent to Pedron for reinforcements
of two battalions, and, placing himself at their lead, advanced to
Symes’s assistance. After rallying and reforming the routed troops,
he led them back to the assault with the greatest personal daring and
courage. Inspirited by his presence and example the men answered
to his appeal, and the position was now stormed with complete success.
The old Rajah of Datia fought until he was killed, whilst Perron
was himself wounded by a spear thrust during an attack which he
pressed home until it came to hand to hand work.

This decided the battle. Barar Singh was killed fighting bravely,
and Lakwa Dada, seriously wounded by a musket shot in the foot,
escaped with the greatest difficulty. The Bhais fled on horseback,
and all the rebel troops dispersed, whilst their sixteen guns were
taken and their camp plundered. The day was not, however, won
without serious loss, for the resistance offered was obstinate. In
Pedron’s column nearly a thousand men were killed and wounded,
amongst the latter being two European officers. In the centre column
Bellasis and three other officers were killed, and 1,500 men placed
hors de combat: whilst on the left Captain Symes and Lieutenant
Paish were wounded, and nearly half their men cut up. Had it not
been for Perron’s prompt and gallant assistance the whole of this
column would have been annihilated.

Perron behaved with great humanity and kindness to Colonel Tone,
Captain Evans and the other European officers who were taken
prisoners. To the former he offered service in Sindhia’s army, but
this was declined. Whereupon all the captives were permitted to
retire to Holkar’s territory, Perron furnishing them with Rs.10,000 to
defray their expenses and enable them to re-establish their fortunes.

All this time Major Bourguien had been doing but little in Ajmir,
which, it will be remembered, was Lakwa Dada’s own province.
Having arrived before the fort in December, 1800, he endeavoured to
storm it on the eighth of the month, but was driven back by the
garrison. He then, in expressive Oriental phraseology, ‘‘ sat down ’’
before it, and after fruitlessly attempting its reduction by siege, bom-
THE BATTLE OF MALPURA. 247

barded it with a more powerful metal than iron, and after five long
months gained possession of the place by bribery on the 8th of May,
1801; so that in one week Lakwa DaAda sustained two crushing defeats
at points so far distant as Ajmir and Sounda. But before news of the
fall of the former place reached Perron he was so disgusted with
Bourguien’s incompetence that he sent Captain Symes to supersede
him.

From Sounda Perron returned to Koil, which he reached early in
June, having in one short but brilliant campaign broken up the rebel-
lion of the Bhais and asserted Sindhia's supremacy.
CHAPTER IV.
PERRON PARAMOUNT. THE BATTLE OF UJJAIN.
1801.

ERRON was now at the zenith of his career. He had brought all
Hindustan into subjection, and was supreme within the boun-
daries of Sindhia’s northern possessions. When he succeeded to De
Boigne’s post two formidable enemies stood in his way, Balloba Tantia
and Lakwa Dada. The former was dead, the latter a fugitive, and
for the moment no shadow of opposition stood between Perron aud
his will. From Kotah in the south to Saharanpur in the north, from
Jodhpur in the west to Koil in the east, his power was paramount.
An enumeration of the territories Perron governed at this time,
and the countries and states he dictated to, will give an idea of the
enormous extent of his influence. In the vast Jaidad he held, and
which included the richest districts of the Dodb, he enjoyed the
rights and privileges, and lived in the state and dignity, of an actual
sovereign. The Subahs, or governorships, of Saharanpur, Panipat,
Delhi, Narnol, Agra, and Ajmir, were directly under his control: he
drew their revenues and ordered their government. He directed the
polities of, and received tribute from, the Rajahs of Jaipur and
Jodhpur, and many lesser Rajput chiefs, and claimed authority, if
he did not actually exercise it, over the Sikhs between the Jumna and
the Sutlej. Within Hindustan proper he owned the monopoly of the
salt and customs duties, the two most valuable sources of revenue
that existed, and enjoyed the exclusive privilege of coining money,
and his annual revenue was estimated at £1,632,000 sterling. His
possession of the person of the Emperor, Shah ’Alam, enabled him
to invoke the Imperial authority for all his actions, and he enforced
his will by the terror his disciplined army inspired.
It is not wonderful that such marvellous success turned Perron’s
head. From hawking handkerchiefs in a French provincial town to
248
THE BATTLE OF UJJAIN. 249

ruling Hindustan was an advancement in life that might have dazzled
the most sober brain. From serving as a sailor on board a French
frigate to commanding an army of 40,000 men was a promotion that
finds few parallels in history. Brave in the field, and not overbearing
in the camp, Perron had hitherto been respected by his Huropean
officers and beloved by his troops, and, until now, retained the charac-
ter De Boigne had conceived of him, namely, that he was a gallant
soldier and a man of plain sense.

But in 1801 a change became apparent in Perron’s nature which
soon began to influence his behaviour. He grew intoxicated with
success. The subtle oil of Oriental flattery was poured into his ears,
and he learnt to love it. Great schemes suggested themselves to his
mind, and he indulged in dreams of establishing an independent
kingdom for himself, or winning a place in his country’s history by
restoring to France the dominion of the East. On his elevation to his
present post he had entered into correspondence with Piron, the suc-
cessor of Raymond at Haidarabad, and with the French faction of
Mysore, with whose revolutionary political principles he was in entire
sympathy. Had Fortune permitted such a combination Perron would
have joined these countrymen of his in a concerted endeavour to
establish again the French power in India. But Lord Wellesley broke
up Piron’s force at Haidarabad, and Tipu Sultan’s French auxiliaries
surrendered to the English at Seringapatam, so that the only hope re-
maining to the French of reviving their ancient rule in the East was
centred in Perron, for he was now the sole representative of the
French struggle in India. The réle of a national champion appealed
to his vanity and pride, and he shaped his policy accordingly, and
displayed a decided preference for Republican principles. He did not
realise that the presence of a French army—for so his Brigades came
to be called—in the very heart of Hindustan must raise the jealousy
of the English; or, if he did, he was prepared to incur the risk, for he
began, without any disguise, to pursue a course of favouritism in order
to advance the views he had adopted.* He ignored the claims of merit

* The following footnote in Kaye’s ‘‘ Life of Lord Metcalfe”’ is interesting. It
is an extract from a letter of the latter, dated the 22nd of March, 1802.—‘‘ Camp,
Kashulghur.—Here I found four more battalions of Perron’s troops. One of
the officers came to visit me, anxious to hear of his father, Colonel —-. I
obtained some information from him relative to the Mahratta service. It
appears that promotion depends on General Perron, who is naturally disposed
to favour his own countrymen. So far, however, as the rank of captain, every
officer obtains a step annually—1.c. in four years a man must be a captain.
The rule extends no higher. The uniform of the Sepoys is the same as the
Company’s ; so are the accoutrements, with the exception that they carry a
250 PERRON.

and the rights of regimental seniority, and filled all the posts of com-
mand in his Brigades with his own countrymen, who were pitch-forked
over the heads of Europeans of other nationalities, without justice
and without desert. This policy naturally excited the enmity and dis-
satisfaction of all foreigners serving under him and created a spirit
which weakened his army. It was a gross departure from the prin-
ciples laid down by De Boigne, who, above all things, was impartial,
and never gave preference to any individual, but promoted each man
by seniority, or for acknowledged merit. In pursuing an opposite
course Perron hardly took the trouble to dissemble. He tolerated his
English officers only from necessity, fully prepared to discharge them
when the occasion arose, whilst every adventurer who could boast a
French extraction, was pushed forward into appointments of respon-
sibility and emolument, irrespective of claim or talent. That even-
tually these favoured countrymen of his rewarded his preference by
disloyalty and ingratitude was but a just retribution. His downfall,
indeed, was brought about by the very men whom he now raised from
insignificance to power. This can create little surprise when their
characters are considered. ‘‘ Low they were,” writes one of the super-
seded Iinglish officers, “in every sense of the word. Low in birth,
in education, and in principle. Perron’s army became a miniature
of the French Revolution. Wretches were raised from cooks and
barbers to become colonels and brigadiers, and absurdly entrusted
with the command of troops, and showed into paths to acquire lakhs
of rupees. This was the quintessence of egalité, the acme of French
Revolution, the principles of which were now generally affected in
the Force.”

As a natural consequence every Iinglish officer in the Brigades soon
came to detest Perron. Their supersession by illiterate and reprobate
Frenchmen was sufficient to raise their indignation. How unjustly
they suffered may be gathered from the fact that in the period of
twenty years between 1783 and 1808, during which De Boigne’s
battalions flourished, only four Frenchmen were killed in active
service, whilst fifteen British-born officers met their death on the field
of battle. These partisan prejudices which Perron displayed were
destructive not only of the esprit de corps that had previously in-
spired his army, but of the political harmony which should have
existed between the Marathds and the English. To the promotion
of a good feeling between the two powers De Boigne had particularly
sword as well as a bayonet and musket. The band, which was in full tune,

as they marched by my little camp, played nothing but marches—perfectly in
the European style.’’
THE BATTLE OF UJJAIN. 251

addressed himself, but under Perron this friendship soon changed to
mutual distrust and hostility.

But this was not the only enmity Perron raised against himself and
his master. As his power and influence increased Sindhia'’s Maratha
chiefs found their own declining, and with each augmentation of the
regular Brigades their feudal troops became of less and less account,
and fewer prizes fell to their share. It was evident their occupation
was slipping away, and with it those hereditary privileges and emolu-
ments so dear to the native heart. Political extinction and pecuniary
ruin threatened them, and the desperate condition of their prospects
soon instigated them to plot against the foreigner who had usurped
their rights and to enter into intrigues to effect his ruin.

Heedless of these gathering dangers Perron pursued his course.
Behind his political ambition there was an even greater incentive
to personal exertion, and that was his love of money. The harvest
was rich, the season prosperous, the husbandman in humour, and he
reaped and reaped. His pay and allowances were enormous. As
commander-in-chief of the Imperial army he drew Rs.15,000 per
mensem, with a liberal extra for “ table expenses.” For the support
of his bodyguard he received a monthly sum of Rs.32,000. On all the
revenue collections of the Jaidad his commission was 5 per centum,
and the same on the revenues of the Subals he administered. In
every political arrangement he sanctioned, or entered into with the
neighbouring princes and feudatory states, he exacted a nazzar, or
complimentary donation, of 25 per cent. The wealth of the man was
prodigious. On the lowest calculation, exclusive of the pay of his troops,
he enjoyed a monthly emolument of Rs.100,000, which, at the exchange
of the day, represented an annual income of over £150,000. In ad-
dition to this there must have been many other sources of gain open
to him, for his savings in seven years were variously estimated at
from one to two millions sterling.

It is now necessary to turn to a contemplation of the state of affairs
in the Deccan, where Daulat Rao Sindhia bad been so long delayed,
to the advantage of his European deputy in Hindustan.

Early in the year 1800 Nana Farnavis, the great Marathé minister,
died, and a dispute immediately broke out between Sindhia and the
Peshwa over the division of the immense property left by the deceased.
Daulat Rao illustrated the practical application of the adage that
possession is nine points of the law, by seizing the Nana’s Jaghir, or
territory, under pretext of a claim of a million sterling against}the
estate. Plot and counterplot succeeded, too long and too complicated
252 PERRON.

to be detailed here, inextricably interwoven as they were with the
insurrection of the Blais, whose cause the Peshwa espoused after the
barbarous reprisals and bloodthirsty executions Sindhia had ordered,
and which, as explained in a previous chapter, left the latter without
any friends or adherents amongst his own countrymen, except his
father-in-law, Ghatkay Rao. Disorders and turmoils broke out on
every side, and their occurrence prompted Jaswant Réo Holkar to
take advantage of the difficulty in which his rival was plunged, to
reassert the political influence of his family, which, since the death of
Takuji Holkar, had fallen to a very low ebb.

In order to explain Jaswant Rao’s standing it is necessary to go
back a little and pick up the thread of the narrative at the point where
mention of the house of Holkar ceased. After Takdji’s crushing
defeat at Lakhairi in 1793 he retired to his capital, where, in 1797,
he followed his life-long rival, Madlhoji Sindhia, to the burning ghaut.
Takuji left behind him four sons, two legitimate and two natural ones.
Of the former, the elder and acknowledged heir was Khasi Rao, but
he was weak in intellect and deformed in person, whilst the younger
brother, Malhar Rao, was brave and aspiring. A contest for the suc-
cession took place between these two, and Khasi Rado, with fatal
weakness, applied to Sindhia for assistance. So excellent an oppor-
tunity of increasing his importance and influence was precisely what
Daulat Rao desired. He became for a time the champion of the
rightful heir of the house of Holkar, and in the struggle that ensued
Malhar Rao lost his life in battle, and his infant son, Khandi Rao, fell
into Sindhia’s hands. Khasi Rao was now left nominally in full
possession of the Government, but, in reality, wholly dependent on
Sindhia.

During the struggle between Khasi Rao and Malhar Rao, the two
natural sons, Jaswant Rao and Ithal Rao, supported the latter, and
when he was killed were forced to flee. Ithal Rao sought refuge
at Kolapur, and eventually met « violent death at the hands of his
enemies. Jaswant Rao, in the first instance, found protection at
Nagpur, and later on, after numerous vicissitudes, in which his life was
often in danger, at Dhar. Being a chief of great personal gallantry
and talent he was soon able, in the distracted state of politics, to
gather around him many adherents of his father who were prevented
from supporting the cause of Khasi Rao by his connection with
Sindhia. Having collected a formidable following Jaswant Rao
entered on the life of a professional freebooter, directing his enter-
prises chiefly against Sindhia’s territories. One of his first acts was
to enter into an alliance with a celebrated Pathadn soldier of fortune,
THE BATTLE OF UJJAIN. 253

named Amir Khan, who was at the head of a band of free lances,
and lived by rapine and foray. Amir Khan’s peculiar ability, audacity,
and fame in predatory expeditions marked him out as a fit auxiliary
for the schemes Jaswant Rio meditated, and the Pathan, on his part,
was not blind to the advantage of connecting himself with a chief of
such high dignity as Jaswant Rao, “through whom” (to quote from
his memoirs) “a road might be opened to the management of great
affairs, even to the very highest, from behind the curtain.”

It was not long before Khasi Rio proved mentally incapable of
ruling, and when this became notorious Jaswant Rao had no difficulty
in strengthening his position by proclaiming that he was acting on
behalf of Khandi Rao, the nephew and heir of Khasi Rao, and in the
name of this infant he assamed the headship of the house of Holkar.
His singular success and the depredations he committed in Sindhia’s
Narbada districts soon roused the latter to action, and a detachment
of regular infantry was sent against him under the command of the
Chevalier Dudrenec. This officer, on the death of Takdji, had cast in his
lot with Khasi Rao, a political error which soon became apparent to
him, but never more clearly than on this occasion when he was
defeated by Jaswant Rado, whose reputation was thereby vastly in-
creased. The reverse he sustained decided Dudrenec to change his
allegiance, and declaring his conviction that Khasi Rao was incapable
of governing, he passed over with all his battalions to the service of
Jaswant Rao.

Jaswant Rdo’s fortunes were now in the ascendant, and he began to
dream of re-establishing the old glory and influence of his house.
Soon his improved circumstances required that he should conform to
the respectability expected in a chief of position, and he reformed his
vagabond army, introduced a certain degree of discipline into its
ranks, and augmented his regular battalions, so as to put himself on a
more equal footing with Sindhia. Several European officers were
engaged to raise corps for him, and men of character and ability
tempted to enter his service by liberal terms of remuneration. As
there happened to be a greater number of French adventurers in the
Deccan than of any other nationality, three-fourths of the Europeans
introduced into his service belonged to that country. In addition to
Dudrenec’s Brigade two others were raised, each consisting of four
battalions. One was commanded by Captain Gardner, but he did not
remain long in the service, being succeeded by Captain Dodd. The
other was under Captain Plumet, “a Frenchman and a gentleman ;
two qualities which were seldom united in the Maliratta army.” The
successes achieved by these infantry Brigades soon enabled Holkar to
254 PERRON.

pay them with tolerable punctuality, and for a time he continued to
devastate Sindhia’s territories in the vicinity of Ujjain without oppo-
sition, Sindhia was, in fact, sacrificing everything to maintain his
influence at Poonah, where the political firmament continued to be
much disturbed. But a time came when he could no longer dis-
regard the rapidly growing power of Jaswant Rao, and he felt
compelled to take action against him, or run the risk of his own
Malwa districts being harried into a wilderness. And so in 1801 he
left the Peshwa’s court, and accompanied by an enormous army set
out on his return to Ujjain.

His progress was so slow that it allowed Jaswant Rio ample time
to call in all his scattered detachments and concentrate them in the
neighbourhood of Sindhia’s capital, with the intention of swooping
down upon it in one final raid. When Daulat Rao reached the Tapti
he heard of the threatened danger, and in his alarm sent forward
Major George Hessing with three of his battalions and one from
Fidele Filoze’s corps to protect the city. Dy this time the rainy
season had broken, and the country was in a state most difficult for an
army to traverse, notwithstanding which Hessing made an astonishingly
rapid route and reached Ujjain by the end of June. A few days after
his departure from Sindhia’s camp the chief’s anxiety increased, and
he ordered Lieutenant MacIntyre, with the fourth battalion from
Hessing’s Brigade, and a second from, Filoze’s, to follow and support
the advanced column. Three days later he detached two of Suther-
land's battalions from the First Brigade, under Captain Gautier, to
further strengthen Hessing, and finally crowned his imbecility by
closing up the rear, after another interval, with two more of Suther-
land’s battalions and a park of artillery under Captain Brownrigg.

There was thus an échelle of small isolated detachments, with
twenty, thirty, and forty miles between each, marching against an
enemy whose entire strength was concentrated on the objective point.
Jaswant Rao was too able a general to let such an opportunity slip,
and at once prepared to attack the detachments in detail. Passing
by Hessing, who had reached Ujjain, he fell upon MacIntyre at Nuri
and compelled him to surrender. Elated with success he pushed on
to attack Brownrigg, who, on hearing of the disaster, had crossed the
Narbada and effected a junction with Gautier near the town of Satwas,
where he took up a very strong position. The force under his com-
mand only amounted to four battalions of infantry and a hundred
Rohillas, with, however, a very strong park of artillery. Holkar’s
army, according to a Bombay paper published at the time, consisted
of fourteen regular battalions, under Plumet, 5,000 Rohillas, 50,000
THE BATTLE OF UJJAIN. 255

Mardthé cavalry, 27 heavy guns, and 42 light field-pieces; but this
appears an exaggerated estimate. Still it is certain he had an
immense numerical superiority over Brownrigg. The battle com-
menced at seven o’clock in the morning with a discharge of round
and grape shot from Jaswant Rao’s guns. An artillery duel suc-
ceeded, and lasted for four hours, when an attempt was made to
advance and storm Brownrigg’s position. But he defended himself
with such resolution and judgment that all Holkar’s attacks were
unavailing, whole files of his infantry being cut to pieces by the
chain shot discharged against them. Before long the men became
demoralised and refused to advance, and Major Plumet being taken
prisoner,* Holkar decided on a retreat, which he did not effect with-
out enormous loss. Brownrigg’s casualties were only 107, but
amongst them was his gallant fellow-countryman, Lieutenant Row-
botham.

Jaswant Réo now retired to Indore, from whence he sent urgent
messages to Amir Khan to join him with all speed. But the Pathan
chief was a man of obstinate metal, and preferred to retrieve Holkar’s
reverse rather than commit himself to a retrograde movement. So
he boldly advanced against Ujjain to attack Hessing, whereupon
Holkar plucked up heart, and, hurrying forward with two brigades of
infantry, effected a junction with his ally. On the 2nd of July, 1801,
the combined forces moved against the city. They found Hessing
drawn up ready to receive them, his force in a square formation, with
its rear defended by the battlements of the capital. Jaswant Rao
divided his army into two equal divisions, making over the command
of one to Amir Khan and leading the other himself. The Pathan
opened the action by dispersing Hessing’s considerable body of Maratha
horse by a charge of his own cavalry, and then directed a heavy
cannonade upon the four battalions of regular infantry. These were
soon thrown into confusion, upon which their commander, a half-caste
son, by a native woman, of gallant old John Hessing, failed to demon-
strate the doctrine of heredity, and fled at an early stage of the action,
leaving his officers to meet the advance of Plumet’s brigade, which
was now commanded by a Frenchman named Fleury. The result
was soon placed beyond doubt, for, although Hessing’s officers behaved
with conspicuous gallantry, freely sacrificing their lives in the defence
of their colours, they were completely overpowered, and, towards the
close of the action, annihilated by a spirited charge of the Pathan.
cavalry under Amir Khan himself. ‘To the end,” writes a contem-
porary observer, ‘they behaved with all that cool and collected

* So stated in the newspaper quoted from—but the fact is doubtful.
256 PERRON.

fortitude which belongs to true heroism, and fell covered with honour-
able wounds.” Of the twelve officers engaged, eight were killed
and three wounded and made prisoners, Hessing alone escaping to
Bairingarh by a craven flight. Those who lost their lives were
Captain-Lieutenant John Macpherson, a son of Captain Macpherson
in the Company’s service; Lieutenant John Graham, son of Ensign
Graham in the same; Lieutenant Edward Montague, son of Colonel
Montague of the Bengal Artillery; Lieutenant Doolan, Ensigns
Haddon and Urquhart, all of Hessing’s brigade, and Lieutenants
Lany and Meadows of Filoze’s corps. Amongst the wounded were
Lieutenant Humpherstone, Captain Dupont and Major Deridon, the
latter a half-bred Frencliman, whose sister Perron had married. He
was eventually ransomed by Colonel John Hessing, of Agra (who
was also a connection of his), by a payment of Rs.40,000, which sum
Sindhia afterwards refunded with unusual generosity. The heads of
the dead officers were cut off and carried to Holkar, who rewarded
this atrocious act of mutilation with a payment of Rs.1,000 for each.
Holkar bought the victory dear, although he captured 20 guns. In
Amir Khan’s memoirs it is stated that 200 Europeans were killed in
the battle, which the editor, in a footnote, explains “ probably in-
cluded all classes of Christians, so that the number slain may have
been nearly as stated in the text”; but this appears very doubtful,
and the sportive fancy of the Amir’s biographer, Baséwan Lal, probably
added a redundant cipher to the right hand of the total. Hessing’s
camp was plundered and an immense booty of stores, elephants,
horses, kettle-drums, and standards fell into the hands of the victors
in addition to the guns. The next day the city of Ujjain was given
over to pillage, and sacked with all the thoroughness peculiar to
Asiatic freebooters, gifted with a genius for the discovery of cachés
and secret hiding-places.

Holkar’s prestige was enormously increased by the victory of Ujjain,
and overtures for an alliance were now made to him by Lakwa Dada,
the champion of the Bhais, who, although wounded, was still able to
intrigue. This chief proposed a combination between Ali Bahadur,
of Bundelkhand, Jaswant Rio Holkar, and himself against Sindhia,
and a formidable alliance was thus promoted, which seriously threatened
the great house of Ujjain.

Sindhia was at Burhanpur when news reached him of the disaster
that had overwhelmed Hessing’s brigade. “ He writhed in an agony
of vexation and rage at hearing of it,” writes the quaint native historian
already quoted. His first act was to send orders to Perron at Delhi
to hurry to his support. The moment wag critical, [very day helped
THE BATTLE OF UJJAIN. 257

to fan into flame the mouldering embers of long pent-up hatred and
jealousy that existed against him in the Deccan, and Daulat Rao
urged on Perron the supreme necessity of using every exertion in
bringing his brigades south, and simultaneously recalled to his head-
quarters the troops he had left at Poonah to maintain his authority
there, These included 10,000 Mardthé cavalry under Ghatkay Rao,
and the remaining five battalions of the first brigade under Colonel
Robert Sutherland. As soon as they joined, Sindhia’s confidence began
to return, and he only awaited Perron’s arrival to inflict a crushing
blow on the baseborn upstart of the rival house who had lowered his
pride and defeated his regular infantry.

17
CHAPTER V.
THE WAR WITH GEORGE THOMAS.
1801.

Aree the middle of 1801 a danger which had for some time past
been troubling Perron began to assume formidable proportions.
This was the singular rise to power of George Thomas, whose history
las already been related. Between the two adventurers enmity had
long existed, for they were antagonistic at every point and hated each
other as cordially as Briton and Frenchman could hate at that period.
Perron was both jealous and fearful of Thomas’s increasing influence,
which had been greatly augmented by the recent brilliant campaign
against the Sikhs of the Sutlej States. More than once during the
past year the Frenchman had made a sly attack on Jhajjar territory,
thereby raising the wrath and indignation of its master. A
common instinct told both that sooner or later their differences would
have to be decided by the sword, and the Irishman, with whom there
was never any time like the present for fighting, was getting ready for
the fray. Perron, on his part, having disposed of Lakwa Dada, felt
himself free to approach this new difficulty. For some time past he
had urged on Sindhia the necessity of crushing Thomas’s power, and
a treaty liad been approved by the chief, framed with the object of
reducing Jowruj Jung to a position of subordination to Perron. To
impose this treaty upon Thomas, Perron came to Delhi in June, 1801,
and wrote to him to send a vakil to confer on the matter. Thomas,
who had concluded peace with the Sikhs, and withdrawn to his capital
to prepare himself for resistance, in view of a possible rupture, so far
acquiesced in Perron’s wish as to depute an agent to attend the
General.
Such was the condition of affairs on the 8th of July, when the
battle of Ujjain occurred, and Sindhia ordered Perron to proceed at

once to the Deccan with two complete brigades and all the Hindustani
258
THE WAR WITH GEORGE THOMAS. 259

horse. This was tantamount to the evacuation of Hindustan, for
compliance with these orders would have left Upper India defenceless,
saving for a few garrison troops.

But Hindustan was as completely under Perron’s sway as his own
Jaidad, for it was held and controlled by the army he commanded.
Although for the sake of form he cited the Emperor’s name as
authority for his actions, and from time to time, at Darbar, confessed
himself Sindhia’s humble and obedient servant, Perron was the
paramount lord and master of the country so long as his brigades
were at his back. And now these brigades were summoned to the
south.

It was impossible to let them go: to proceed there himself would
be an act of abdication. His own duty and Sindhia's sore distress
had no weight in his mind while that terrible Irishman paraded his
troops and won his victories on the western confines of Delhi. What
mattered Daulat Réo’s danger, when danger threatened Perron ?
Charity begins at home, and the former must be met with temporising
promises, the latter with the brigades, unless perchance—it was a
brilliant idea that occurred to him—he could induce Thomas to under-
take the fighting in the Deccan, and leave him, with his troops
intact, in Hindustan.

For some time past it had been apparent that the General was neglect-
ing Sindhia’s interests and consulting only his own. This behaviour was
confirmed now, for on receiving Daulat Rao’s orders to proceed to his
aid Perron at once lapsed into protestations, and with these began
and ended his response to his master’s appeal. His sense of loyalty
and his sentiments of gratitude to a prince who had loaded him with
favours and raised him to his high station were lost in apprehensions
of his own danger, and with a supreme selfishness he sacrificed
everything to his own interests.

There exists a very detailed record of Perron’s behaviour, during this
critical period of Sindhia’s affairs, in some Persian Akbars, or news-
papers, printed at the time, and the following extracts, thrown into a
narrative form, exhibit the true character of the man of whom they
treat.

The chronicle commences on the 28th of June, 1801, when intima-
tion was received at Delhi that Thomas had made peace with the
Sikhs, and was preparing for hostilities with Perron, from whom he
lad just received proposals for a political arrangement. In the success
of these Thomas evidently had very little faith, for he opened com:
munications with Lakwa Dada, who was in Datia territory, pro-
posing an alliance against the Frenchman.
260 PHRLRON.

Ten days later, on the 8th of July, Perron reecived information of
the defeat of Hessing at Ujjain, and simultaneously urgent orders
reached him from Sindhia to march to the Deccan with his brigades.
To these he sent a reply saying he would start at once. On the
15th of the month he moved out one stage from Delhi, with the
ostensible intention of proceeding south, but having encamped at
Barahpula, remained there fast, showing no inclination to continue
his march. Here, on the 19th, he received a visit from Bapu Sindhia,
his deputy-governor in the Saharanpur province. As this district
adjoined Thomas’s territory and that of the Sikhs with whom he had
recently been at war, Bapu was certainly the person most qualified to
afford information about Thomas, to obtain which was probably the
reason of his being summoned to attend Perron, for a long “ con-
sultation ’’’ was reported to have taken place. The following day
Perron returned to Delhi with four of his Muropean officers, and went
through the formal ceremony of being ‘‘ admitted to the presence” of
the Emperor, to whom the usual offerings were presented, and from
whom the customary gifts were, in turn, received.

For the next fortnight Perron remained at Delhi, trying to bring to
an issue the negotiations with Thomas, for on the 7th of August it
was publicly given out that “the General was diverted from his
purpose of marching to Scindia’s aid by important business negotia-
tions with Thomas, by which he hopes to obtain four of that person’s
battalions and 20,000 Sikh horsemen to send to Oojein.” And yet in
the very same issue it is stated that “on Perron’s speedy arrival
depends the fate of Scindia, whose situation has become critical.”

On the 8th of August Perron “ called in his detachments,” and it
was notified that ‘‘ immediately after his interview with Thomas the
General intends to march against Holker.” Another day passed, and
he wrote to one of his native ofticials that ‘‘ after two or three days,
having adjusted matters of great urgency, I will set out to join
Scindia.” On the same date, with his usual punctilio in revenue col-
lections, he sent a warning to the Rajah of Jaipur to be up to time in
the payment of his tribute.

Four days later the receipt of another urgent letter from Sindhia
was announced, which conveyed the information that Holkar’s army
was only fifteen miles distant, and that many of Daulat Réo’s chiefs
had deserted to the enemy, and once more urged Perron to join him
with all speed. On the 19th of August rumours reached Delhi that
matters were still more critical, ‘‘ all the Deccan chiefs having joined
Jeswunt Rio Holker,” but still Perron made no sign of starting, for
negotiations with Thomas were coming to a head, and his whole
THE WAR WITH GHORGE THOMAS. 261

attention was monopolised by them. The next day he moved out to
Sitaram Ka Serai, near Bahadurgarh, where an interview took place
between him and Jowruj Jung. It appears to have been hedged
about with the ceremonial and dilatoriness of Oriental diplomacy, for
a week later he was still at the same place.

The next entry occurs on the 5th of September. The Emperor
Shah ’Alam having constantly inquired, ‘‘ When is General Perron
going to Oojein?” and as constantly been informed, ‘‘In two or
three days,”’ relieved himself of the sage opinion that ‘he did not
think the General showed any intention of going at all!” and almost
at the same date Rajah Partab Singh, of Jaipur, who had evidently
been following Perron’s movements with a profound interest, an-
nounced in open court that his agent at Delhi had written him saying
that ‘‘ Perron holds forth an intention of joining Scindia, but that in
reality he entertains no such design, and has commenced a secret
correspondence with Luckwadada.” Commenting on which the Rajah
observed that “the General seems to have detached himself from
Scindia, and has not acted well in so doing.”

This side-light thrown on the negotiations between Perron and
Thomas is interesting, in so far as it suggests a reason why the latter
was disappointed later on in receiving the assistance he expected from
Lakwa Dada, whose notoriously treacherous character would be quite
equal to encouraging Thomas to resist, and coming to a secret under-
standing with Perron to stand neutral.

On the 12th of September it was reported that Perron was going to
the camp of Ali Bahadur, one of the allies in the confederation against
Sindhia, to settle certain affairs, and about the same time the report
of his negotiations with Lakwa Dada was confirmed.

On the 16th of September Perron returned to Delhi, all attempts to
come to an understanding with Thomas having proved futile. Shortly
after his arrival he paid his respects to the Emperor, but ‘‘on receiving
an express went off to Coel.” A week later it was reported at the
capital that Daulat Rao Sindhia continued repeatedly writing to
Perron, urging him by every means in his power to help him, and was
at the same time so sanguine of response that he “‘ only ” awaited the
arrival of the General to attack Holkar. It is instructive to read,
side by side with this, that “it is publicly reported in Hindustan that
General Perron has withdrawn from the contest with Jeswunt Rao
Holker !”

On the 26th of September Drugeon, Commandant of the fort of
Delhi and custodian of the Emperor’s person, received a letter from
Perron, the contents of which he made known, They were to the
262 PHRRON.

effect that Perron’s “wish had been to remain at Delhi, but the
necessity of sending troops to Daulat Rao Sindhia obliged him to
repair suddenly to Koil, and he had sent a brigade, with military
stores and ammunition; to Daulat Rao.”

Here, at last, he seems to have awakened to a sense of his duty,
but, as will presently be seen, the good intention withered in the
bud.

On the 29th of September came the news of the defeat of Captain
Smith’s force at Georgegarh by Thomas, followed two days later by
alarming intelligence of a sanguinary battle, in which Bourguien and
his brigade had been defeated and lost 3,000 men, whilst the Irishman
had regained Georgegarh, and was in possession of it. No sooner did
Perron hear of this than he sent immediate orders to Drugeon at
Delhi to entertain fresh levies, despatched Pedron to the front with
reinforcements of five battalions, and ordered George Hessing, who
had evidently arrived at Agra from Ujjain, to march to Bourguien’s
assistance with four battalions. At the same time he collected all the
available troops at Koil, and gave out that he intended to take the
command in person against Thomas.

The total force at this time under Perron’s command in Hindustan
consisted of three brigades of infantry, 5,000 Hindustani horse, and
the garrison troops. Of these, two brigades—the third under Bourguien
and the fourth under Pedron—and most of the cavalry were employed
against Thomas at Georgegarh. It is probable that Pedron’s brigade
was the one which Perron informed Drugeon ‘had been sent’ to
Ujjain. But it is possible that when he so wrote he was referring to
the second brigade, under Pohlman, whose headquarters were at Mattra.
Whichever it was it is very certain that neither proceeded very far
towards the destination indicated. Pedron’s, as has been shown, was
diverted to Georgegarh, and for Pohlman’s there was a more remarkable
task assigned. It appears that some time previous to this Perron, in
the novel capacity of a pawnbroker, had lent Partéb Singh, of Jaipur,
a large sum of money, for the security of which the Rajah had pledged
his jewels. Perron now wanted his money back. It is not difficult
to conjecture what doubts and fears were passing through his mind
and making him anxious to realise his capital. And it is evident that
the recovery of his cash was a far more important business in his eyes
than the relief of Sindhia, for Pohlman, who might certainly have been
spared for the Deccan, was deputed, instead, to perform bailiff’s work,
and obtain from Partib Singh an immediate settlement of his account,
under pain of his territory being laid waste.

It is interesting to observe how Pohlman performed this honourable
THE WAR WITH GEORGE THOMAS. 263

commission. Having summoned Partib Singh to pay up, he did not
wait for a reply, but added a point to his demand by marching from
Chaksu to Hararu, where he began plundering the country a few
miles south of Jaipur. The Rajah at once sent Pohlman the baldnce
of his debt, amounting to Rs.95,000, and asked for the restoration of
his jewels. But he was met with a counterclaim from the bailiff-
general in possession of his country, who presented a statement of
account showing a balance of two lakhs of rupees. The debtor denied
the correctness of the figures, as debtors unskilled in the casting of
compound interest are apt to do in India, and his agents refused to
part with the money they had brought, especially after eliciting from
Pohlman the acknowledgment that he had not got the jewels with
him, but had sent for them, and expected them to arrive in four or
five days. This delay allowed an extension of time for pillaging, and
Pohlman resumed the congenial work until the Rajah bought him off
with a payment of Rs.40,000 on account. Whereupon Pohlman con-
sented to hold his hand, and marched south to Tonk—an outlying
district belonging to Holkar—where he expelled the garrison from the
chief town and took possession of it.

Returning now to Delhi, news was received there on the 8th of
October of the death of Emilius Felix Smith, just as Drugeon
was sending off 200 newly raised cavalry to the front. On the
12th Perron, who was still at Koil, was reported to have severely
censured Bourguien for his misconduct of the campaign, and super-
seded him by Pedron, “ who will now have a chance of displaying
his valour.” Between this and the 25th of October there were
constant reports of Thomas’s brave defence (which have been
incorporated in the sketch of his life), and on the latter date Perron,
never unmindful of the main chance, called upon the Rajah of Jaipur
to pay up his tribute, promising, if he did so punctually, that, as soon
as Thomas was reduced, he would march into the Rajah’s territory and
put him in possession of certain revolted districts, in fulfilment of a
promise previously given. On hearing which Partab Singh, who
was a prince ever in trouble with his own tributaries, sadly observed
that ‘‘ General Perron had entered into many similar engagements,
but never performed any of them, and that he regarded nothing but
lis own interests.” Which, on the face of it, seemed a reasonable
remark to make.

Such is the tale of Perron’s ingratitude, faithlessness, and treachery
disclosed by the Persian newspapers of the period. Nor are all these
reports mere idle gossip, emanating from irresponsible sources, for in
the majority of instances the authority quoted is that of Mohan Lal
264 PERRON.

Perron’s own vakil, or agent, resident with the Emperor, whose duty
it was to daily report his master’s actions to the King of Kings. The
truth was that Perron not only had no intention of assisting Sindhia,
but even desired that he should be hard pressed by Holkar. This is
confirmed by a letter from Colonel Collins, the Resident at Daulat Réo’s
Court, to the Governor-general, in which the following passage occurs,
which bears upon the events just recorded :—

“The Mahratta Chiefs and Sirdars, envious of Perron, do not scruple
to affirm that he by no means wishes the total ruin of Holker, since
in this event Scindia would be unable to repair to Hindostan to take
upon himeelf the chief direction of affairs in that quarter. . . . General
Perron has been given to understand that he must relinquish the
collection of all the districts which he now possesses in Hindostan,
excepting those appertaining to his Jaidad, the annual revenues of
which are estimated at 40 lakhs, while at present the General
collects nearly 80.”

It must here be observed that Colonel Collins under-estimated very
considerably the annual collections made by Perron, towards whon, it
may be added, he entertained a very friendly feeling. Moreover, the
inference that Perron’s reported desire for Holkar’s success were to
be traced to the envy and malice of unscrupulous Maratha chiefs seems
unjust. Perron’s own actions afforded very strong grounds for this
suspicion, which is amply corroborated by the day-to-day record of
his doings between the 28th of June and the 15th of October of the year
under review. No one who has followed his sinuous course during
these four months can have any doubts left as to his real character.
He was no longer ‘the brave and faithful soldier ” he once had been,
but a traitor, who had thrown off all disguise, and was fighting for his
own hand alone. His greed of power and gold had overshadowed
everything else, and he cared not how desperate was the cause of the
master who had lavished so many favours on him and raised him to
so high an estate when his own paltry lakh of rupees was at stake.
There was ample work for the army of Hindustan in crushing that
defiant Irishman, who could not comprehend the meaning of defeat,
at Georgegarh ; but if, perchance, a brigade could be spared, it
might, in Perron’s opinion, be more profitably employed in doing
bailiffs work in Rajputana than in propping up the tottering power
of Daulat Rao Sindhia in the Deccan.

Sindhia’s position was indeed critical while all this procrastina-
tion was going on. The alliance against him was overwhelming,
for Raguji Bhonsla of Berar, a chief of the first magnitude in
the Marathi Confederation, had decided to join Holkar, Lakwa
THE WAR WITH GEORGE THOMAS. 265

Dada, Ali Bahadur, and all the lesser chiefs who were leagued
against Daulat Rao. The only person of importance who remained
true to Sindhia, was his generalissimo, Ambaji Inglia, who was in
the neighbourhood of Jararu, where his battalions, under James
Shepherd, were successfully holding Lakwa Dada in check.

Sindhia, in this distressful situation, was anxious to stay the storm
his ambition had been mainly instrumental in raising; but the
Peshwa, who had sided with his enemies, refused to listen to any
overtures for reconciliation, until Daulat Rio had made peace with
the Bhais, who continued as greatly incensed as ever against their
nephew. Moreover, Baji Rio demanded a nazzarina, or peace
offering, of fifteen lakhs of rupees, and this was highly inconvenient to
Sindhia, who was in his chronic state of impecuniosity, and engaged
in a costly campaign. There seemed, indeed, to be more money in
Jaswant Raéo’s camp than in his rival’s, for the former was constantly
sending remittances and reinforcements to Lakwa Dada, with which
to oppose Ambaji’s attack and Perron’s anticipated march from
Delhi to Ujjain, it being taken for granted that the General, as he had
publicly announced, would at once proceed to his master’s assistance.
At Agra, Colonel John Hessing held the fort, but he was so weakened
by the despatch of his son and the four battalions to Georgegarh, that
he was utterly unable to help Sindhia, and, on the contrary, was
continually urging Perron to send him reinforcements as Lakwa
Dada’s intrigues had created great disturbances in his government.
In short, as far as Hindustan was concerned, there seemed to be no
possible hope of help reaching Sindhia so long as Thomas held out
and monopolised the attention of 16,000 regular infantry and the
Hindustani horse.

But now, when matters were at their worst and nothing but
danger, difficulty, and disappointment seemed to surround Sindhia, a
saviour arose in his own camp, in the person of Robert Sutherland,
Colonel-Commandant of the first brigade. It will be remembered that
after De Boigne’s resignation Sutherland tried hard to obtain his post,
but fortune had been against him and Perron won the prize. The
competition left a feeling of hatred and jealousy in Perron’s heart,
which had on more than one occasion influenced his treatment of the
Scotchman. Anxious to expel him from Hindustan, he had manu-
factured a charge against him of entering into treasonable cor-
respondence with Sindhia’s enemies, and found in it an excuse to
transfer him to the Deccan, giving the command of his brigade to
Pohlman. Sutherland had been impotent to do anything but obey.
But the very measure intended to punish and undo him, now gave
266 PERRON.

the Scotchman the opportunity of proving his merit, for he found
himself filling the chief post of defence at his master’s side, which
Perron had basely declined.

For nearly three months after the battle of Ujjain Sindhia did
little but wait for Perron to arrive, and endeavour, by every means in
his power, to strengthen his forces. At last he gave up all hope of
assistance from Hindustan, and determined to try and retrieve his
fortunes with such means as he had at his disposal. On the 24th of
September he crossed the Narbada, on the south bank of which he had
been compulsorily encamped since the rainy season commenced, and
entered Malwa with eight battalions of Sutherland’s brigade and four
of Filoze’s. A week later he formed a junction with 14,000 Maratha
horse and encamped on the banks of the Kotah Sind River. Here he
remained with his heavy baggage, sending Sutherland forward to
avenge the sacking of Ujjain by retaliating on Holkar’s capital of
Indore, an undertaking which the troops approached in the highest
spirits.

Jaswant Rao immediately advanced towards the defence of his
capital, and on the 13th of October the two armies met outside its
walls. The Indore force consisted of ten battalions of regular infantry,
5,000 Rohillas, 12,000 Maratha cavalry, and 15,000 Pathan horse under
Amir Khin. But Holkar was without European officers, which was
a serious loss to him. The reason of this is not very clear: according
to one authority he had dismissed all in his employ on the suspicion
that they were unfaithful to him ; but Major Ambrose, an officer in his
service, states that he was “deserted” by his Europeans just before
this action, and that this was the cause of his defeat.

After sending off his baggage and reserves to the further side of
Indore, Holkar, during the night, changed ground, and placed the
city between him and the enemy, taking post behind a deep ravine to
the north of it, and training his guns so as to sweep this defence,
whilst Amir Khan, with 15,000 horse, threatened the enemy’s rear from
a place about five miles distant.

Sutherland commenced the attack on Holkar’s position early on the
morning of the 14th, his twelve battalions moving briskly forward,
animated by a determination to avenge their officers and comrades
slain at Ujjain. Owing to the change of ground made by the enemy
during the night, Sutherland was obliged to manceuvre his army to
the right, over some difficult and broken country, before he could form
it in line of battle for attack, and it was not until three o'clock in the
afternoon that the action began. Having detached his Maratha
cavalry to keep Amir Khan in check, the Colonel advanced against the
THE WAR WITH GEORGE THOMAS. 267

nullah which protected Holkar, and was met with a tremendous
fire from 95 guns. But it could not stay the steady and irre-
sistible assault of the regular battalions, who forced the ravine and
captured the guns in their position. At this critical moment
Amir Khan, having defeated the Maratha cavalry, came charging
down to the relief of Jaswant Rao. Whereupon Sutherland boldly
faced round with a portion of his force and opened a heavy fire of
grape and round shot upon the Pathdn as he was struggling through
the ravine from which the brigade had just emerged, and the Amir’s
horse being killed he fell to the ground; whereupon his men,
supposing him dead, took flight. This was the turning-point of the
battle. Sutherland’s infantry now stormed Holkar’s entrenchments,
which they carried splendidly, and by six o’clock in the evening the
victory was won and the enemy dispersed in full flight. Holkar lost
all his guns, 160 tumbrils, and his baggage, and, attended by his
cavalry, fled headlong to Maheswar ; and the next morning Sindhia’s
standard floated over Indore, and Ujjain was avenged. An
incident happened in this battle, mention of which should not be
omitted. Fidele Filoze, who commanded four of the battalions
engaged, belonging to his brigade, had a short while before entered
into a traitorous correspondence with Holkar, and when the action
commenced, with a dastardly treachery, fired into Sutherland’s troops.
Happily this diabolical act failed in its intention, and the perpetrator
was apprehended and confined in prison, where he shortly after-
wards committed suicide. Sutherland’s loss at Indore was 400 men
killed and wounded. It is needless to add that Holkar’s capital was
thoroughly pillaged, and, indeed, rased to the ground by Sindhia’s
predatory horse, who, however useless in fight, were masters of the
art of extracting the last grain of rice from any city given over to
them to loot,

The victory of Indore might have been turned into a decisive battle
of Maratha history by Sindhia if he had followed up his advantage.
But he over-estimated his success, and deluded himself into the idea
that Jaswant Réo’s power was crushed out. But this was not the
case, and Daulat Rao’s imprudent assumption led to the gravest
results. Holkar and his fidus achates, Amir Khan, soon resumed their
former course of aggression and plunder, attracting to their camp all
the discontented soldiery in Central India, so that it quickly became
filled with rude and reckless freebooters, who came to be known by the
generic term of Pindaris, and whose deeds and misdeeds during the
next eighteen years laid desolate many of the fairest provinces of the
peninsula, and constituted a period to which the natives gave the
268 PERRON.

expressive appellation of the Gardi-ka-Wakht, or, ‘‘Time of Trouble.”
No longer able to pay his troops, Holkar gave them free license to
support themselves by plunder, though he continued to keep up his
regular infantry, who, after Dudrenec’s desertion to Perron, which
shortly took place, found a gallant leader in the person of a young
English officer named Vickers.

Sindhia’s unexpected success in the Deccan gave Perron breathing
space; but the relief was only temporary, and the effects that followed
very serious. Ina short time his personal fortunes were as seriously
threatened as Daulat Rao’s had been before Sutherland’s victory.
Thomas still continued to hold out at Georgegarh, with that un-
conquerable spirit of his that upset all calculations. And now
Colonel Sutherland’s star was in the ascendant, and the distrust and
jealousy with which Perron regarded this officer were intensified to
an enormous degree, and he even began to be fearful of being
supplanted by the Scotchman, who had been his rival in the past.
As yet he could do nothing to avert the threatened danger, for he
dared not leave Hindustan while Thomas was undefeated. And so
he vacillated in an agony of indecision, uncertain whether to proceed
to the west and put his fortunes to the test of an assault on the
fortified camp that was resisting all Pedron’s endeavours, or to hurry
to the south and re-establish his influence at Sindhia’s Court.

On the 10th of November Georgegarh fell, but even as Perron was
congratulating himself on his long-deferred success, he heard of
Thomas’s escape to Hansi. The capture of the man was far more
important than the capture of his outlying camp, and the victory was
robbed of its chief importance by the failure to obtain possession of
Thomas’s person. Then came tidings of the fresh resistance at
Hansi, and the knowledge that the task of seizing Thomas had been
confided to Bourguien. The incapacity of this officer was known to
Perron, and he sickened at heart as he reflected how his interests
were in the keeping of 2» man who had always failed in every task
allotted to him. Week after week Perron waited, in feverish anxiety,
at Koil, eagerly drinking in the daily news from the seat of war,
elevated for a moment when he heard of some temporary success,
depressed again when reverses were reported: hugging himself with
joy when he learnt that Jowruj Jung had been beaten back into his
citadel, downcast when it was made evident that there was still fight
left in the terrible Irishman.

To add to his troubles the constant messages that continued to
arrive from Daulat Réo were now couched in very different language
to that affected before the battle of Indore. In their growing
THE WAR WITH GEORGE THOMAS. 269

insistence there were ominous expressions of anger; they were no
longer appeals, but sharp commands, with a warning ring in them
that indicated danger and menace.

The tension was terrible, but at last the reprieve came. Bourguien
the incompetent, for the first time in his life, was guilty of achieve-
ment. Thomas surrendered. The news reached Koil early in
January, 1802, and with a great gasp of relief Perron heard that his
enemy had been delivered into his hands.
CHAPTER VI.
PERRON VISITS UJJAIN. THE BATTLE OF POONAH.
1802.

fl ges defeat of Thomas and destruction of his power cleared a very
serious danger from Perron’s path and left him free to concen-
trate his endeavours on re-establishing his interest at Sindhia’s Court.
Whilst the Irishman was undefeated it was Perron’s policy to belittle
his importance, but after the fall of Hansi the vanquished adventurer
became a national enemy, who had threatened the disintegration of
the Maratha Empire, and in his letters to Sindhia Perron made as
much of his victory over Thomas as if he had defeated a Cesar or an
Alexander.

The reason of this change cf opinion was not far to seek. Perron
wanted an excuse to explain his long and systematic disobedience of
Sindhia’s orders to march to the Deccan. The campaign against
Thomas offered a plausible exculpation, and the more he extolled its
importance the greater credit would be reflected on himself for
destroying such a formidable public enemy. Moreover, Perron was
now as anxious to proceed to Ujjain as he had before been unwilling.
Colonel Collins, the English resident, had recently joined Daulat
Rio’s camp, and Perron distrusted him, fearing he might have come to
initiate a policy hostile to the brigades, similar to that under which,
four years previously, the British Government had broken up and dis-
banded Raymond’s corps at Haidarabad. This was one of the
reasons that made a visit to Ujjain necessary, whilst another was
Perron’s jealousy of Sutherland, who, since the battle of Indore, had
risen high in Sindhia’s favour—a state of affairs highly detrimental to
the General, since the Scotchiman was next to him in seniority. In
fact Perron felt it was imperative to counteract the growing influence
of this successful subordinate, who already held their master’s ear,
and at the same time learn the real tenor of Colonel Collins’s instruc-

tions, and so he determined to proceed to the south.
270
 

i

    
  

 

 

 

 

     

   
 
 
 

SL

= —
SSS SSS =

       

 

THE EMPEROR SHAH 'ALAM.

[From a plate in Francklin's “‘ History of the Reign of Shah-Aulum.”)
THE BATTLE OF POONAH. 271

Matters in Hindustan were now in afairly settled state. Bourguien’s
brigade had overawed the Sikh country, and that bold brigadier was
engaged in levying tribute from his recent allies, under guise of
collecting a contrjbution towards the expenses of the war, so that the
cost of expelling Thomas was defrayed by the chiefs of Patiala, Jind,
and Kaithal. At Delhi Drugeon kept watcli and ward over the blind
Emperor—a close one, too, in every sense of the word, for in January
of this year Shah ’Alam wrote to Sindhia in terms of mild
remonstrance, saying that ‘“‘ Although General Perron certainly made
a monthly remittance of the royal stipend, it would still be more
agreeable if Dowlut Rado would do so himself, under his own
immediate supervision.” Pedron had returned to Koil with the
fourth brigade (for the command of which the Chevalier Dudrenec
had lately been engaged), and George Hessing to Agra, with his four
battalions, to reinforce his father in command there. All things
were in order, and Perron could safely be spared. His departure
was accelerated by a report which found publicity in the Persian
akbars at Delhi in February to the effect that ‘Dowlat Rao Scindia
had several times written to General Perron requiring his personal
attendance, but without effect; and that His Highness was accord-
ingly so much exasperated at the General’s neglect of orders, that he
instantly broke and disbanded the regiments under his command.”

This was the climax, and at the end of the month Perron left Koil,
and, escorted by his bodyguard of 500 horse, started for Ujjain. A
letter written by him at this period is given in the appendix of
M. St. Genis’ “Life of De Boigne,” and the following translation of
it may conveniently be inserted here :—

‘Camry BanpaRgs,
“ February 28, 1802.

“My pyar GENERAL,—Since your departure from this country
there have been nothing but troubles. Tour years ago the widows of
the old Prince fled from their nephew, the reigning Prince, and
collected a considerable force in opposition to him,

“Three years ago Luckwadada, who also turned traitor to the
Prince, took the part of the widows. I was obliged to march against
these two factions who opposed us. Having brought them to action I
was fortunate enough to defeat them. Luckwadida was wounded
in the battle, and since his defeat the widows have petitioned the
Prince to grant them terms.

“He has just pardoned them, and they have returned to their
allegiance. Luckwadada died of his wounds; had he got the better
of me he would never have spared me.
272 PERRON.

“Jeswunt Rao, of the house of Holker, has also been at war with
the Prince for the last two years. He is plundering and desolating
the country everywhere, and I am on the march against him with my
cavalry.

“A man named George Thomas, who took advantage of my stay in
the Deccan to raise a party of 12,000 inen with 60 guns, seized a
considerable tract of territory on the Sikh frontier, where he built a
strong fort and devastated all the countryside even up to the walls
of Delhi. I was obliged to destroy his force with my third brigade,
and I have allowed the scoundrel to go, but prohibited him from
again entering the Prince’s territory.

“You are a soldier, my dear General, and you know that we
always lose brave soldiers in the time of war. M. Rostock, whom you
recommended to me, was killed at the battle of Indore. M. Bernier,
one of the best and bravest officers in the brigades, met the same
fate; also the younger Smith, Donelly, your protégé, and several
others whom you do not know.

“At the present moment the Prince has only Jeswunt Rao to
subdue to assure complete peace in his immense possessions. The
brigades, of which you yourself, my dear General, were the
creator, and in which your name is daily invoked, are as eflicient as
ever. It is in reality you who have conquered this immense territory.

“Following your example in the discipline which I insist on, and
which is not only most necessary for an army, but the basis of its
success, I have been everywhere victorious with the brigades. My
command is made happy by the attachment and confidence which the
troops express for me, and I have always won, remaining master of
the situation even under the most critical circumstances.

“You recommended M. Drugeon to me. A year ayo I reinstated
him in the brigades, but in consideration of the ability which you
know he possesses, I appointed him to an even more honourable
situation than any I could have given him in the army itself. I have
made him Governor of the fort of Delhi and guardian of the
Emperor’s person. In giving him this post I have overlooked his
former shortcomings, and I feel perfectly compensated by the interest
you take in his welfare.

“Yes; I will receive with pleasure any one whom you may
recommend for an appointment in the brigades. My friendship for
you demands this, and it is also due to you as the creator of the brave
soldiers who compose this force. It is the least I can do for you, and
both my duty and gratitude require that I should not fail in fulfilling
your wishes. “ CUILLIER Perron.”
THE BATTLE OF POONA. 278

After forming a junction with Pohlman’s brigade on the road,
Perron marched to Ujjain, which he reached on the 20th of
March, 1802. Colonel Sutherland’s brigade arrived at the same
time from an expedition to the Barinda River, where it had been
employed.

The story of Perron’s reception at Sindhia’s Court is so graphically
related in Colonel Skinner's memoirs that the account must be
borrowed in extenso. This is how it runs :—

‘“* His reception was not of a nature to gratify an officer like Perron.
It was not until the 25th that he was invited to call upon the
Maharajah, and then, having proceeded to durbar with 200 horsemen,
he was kept waiting at the gates for two hours while Scindia was
amusing himself by flying kites. Nota chief came out to meet him,
while he sat in company with certain discontented chiefs of note, among
whom was old Gopal Rao Bhow, who was at the head of the army.
This officer, addressing Perron, said, ‘Observe to what the old
Pateil’s reign has come! Good soldiers are all forgotten: none but
dirty time-servers and flatterers can get on. But mark my words, he
will soon find out his error, but not until too late to mend it.’ To
this Perron replied that he was but a servant, and all he knew was to
obey. This sort of conversation went on until the choleedars announced
the approach of Scindia, when we all rose, and Perron went up and
presented his nuzzwr. Scindia just touched it, and asked him if he
was well; to which Perron made the usual reply, ‘By your favour,’
and then we all in turn presented our nwzzurs, and were desired to
sit down.

“Tn half an hour Scindia dismissed the durbar, and desired
Perron to return to camp, which he did, completely disgusted with the
cold and slighting reception he had received from his master. Eight
days now passed without the slightest notice or message from Scindia
to Perron, and Gopal Rao Bhow, a great friend of the latter, signified
to him he had best be on his guard, as the Maharajah had resolved
to lay hold of him. Several secret visits passed at this time between
Perron and Gopal Rao Bhow, whilst Colonel Sutherland and Major
Brownrigg were intriguing against the former.

“ Perron, aware of the intrigues of his enemies, became depressed
and perturbed, when at length matters seemed likely to be brought to
a crisis, A day was appointed for holding a durbar, to which Perron
and all his European officers were invited. At the durbar Scindia,
together with his father-in-law, Shirzee Rio Ghatkay, had formed a
plot to Jay hold of him, and had employed 500 Pathans, belonging to
Bahadhur Khan, a chief then at Malaghur, and several others of his

18
274 PERRON.

own favourites and companions in vice and debauchery to carry the
purpose into effect.

‘“‘ Perron, however, was made aware of this plot, and ordered all the
native officers of both brigades, as low as the rank of jemadar, as
well as all the European officers, to come fully armed to attend his
visit to Scindia. Our full uniform included a brace of pistols
attached to our sword-belts; and these he directed us to bring loaded.
We amounted in all to 300 native and 30 European officers, and
in this state of preparation marched to the durbar, which was held
in a large tent pitched for the occasion.

“At the hour of nine in the morning, headed by Perron, we
reached the tent. Scindia rose to receive us, and we all presented
our nuzzars. We were then directed to sit down on the left side of
the presence, the right being occupied by the Pathans, who regarded
us very fiercely. When we were seated, Scindia, turning to Perron,
observed that the invitation had been extended to himself and his
European officers only, to which Perron replied that in arranging his
suite he had only followed the old rule laid down by himself and his
uncle; and this answer silenced him. All this time we sat quiet,
eyeing each other, whilst much whispering went on between Scindia,
Gopal Rao, and Shirzee Rao. I believe it was Gopal Rao who
persuaded him not to attempt any violence, for that not only himself,
but the whole party would be cut to pieces by the fine body of men
whom Perron had brought in.

‘“‘Scindia then ordered the Pathdns to retire, and they all got up,
looking as if they would eat us, while our men sat laughing at them
with the most perfect unconcern.

“When they were gone Scindia and Shirzee Rao began to flatter and
endeavoured to throw Perron off his guard. But he, assisted as he
was by his old friend Gopal Rao, was too old a soldier to be so
cajoled; and so khilwts were ordered for us all, and after receiving
them we presented our nuzzurs, which Scindia graciously accepted.
Beetul was then handed round, and we received leave to retire.

“Perron then got up, and taking off his sword, laid it down at
Scindia’s feet, saying that he had grown old in the service, and that
it did not become him to be disgraced by dissolute knaves and bullies ;
that all he wanted was his discharge. Then, addressing us, he said
that henceforth we must look to Scindia, for that he, for his part,
was too old now to brook affronts and must retire. Scindia on this rose
and embraced Perron, telling him that he regarded him as his uncle,
and that he had no idea what offended him. Compliments without
measure passed between both parties, but on taking leave Perron
THE BATTLE OF POONAH. 275

cautioned Scindia to beware of Shirzee Réo Ghatkay, for he would be
his ruin—a caution in which all the old Mahratta chiefs joined cordially
and applauded the part which Perron had taken.

“At length we reached camp, where several days were occupied in
the transmission of messages to and from the Court, and in visits
from chieftains who were sent to make matters up. But Perron was
too indignant to be pacified. Colonel Sutherland in the meantime
was sent to the second brigade and Colonel Pohlman to the first,
while Major Brownrigg was put in arrest under fixed bayonets. On
the 15th of April Perron marched with the second brigade for
Hindostan.”’

The light in which Perron’s conduct is here depicted is a very
favourable one, but Skinner was somewhat of a partisan officer, and
allowance must be made for his sympathies, and also for a certain
faultiness of memory. The account of Perron’s visit that comes to
us from other sources somewhat modifies the impression that
Skinner’s version leaves. Lewis Ferdinand Smith states that “a
storm was brewing at Oojein, and Perron was obliged to risk his
anthority, and even his personal safety, by proceeding there. But
he had motives for this dangerous step, wishing to find out by closer
inspection what were the views of Colonel Collins, the British
Resident, Perron being jealous of the Company. Moreover, he began
to dread Colonel Sutherland, who commanded the first brigade.”
There was good cause for this, if any trust may be placed in a report
which appeared in the Persian akbars about this time, and which
stated that Sindhia had actually transferred the command of the
brigades to Sutherland. But Perron, although “ determined to quit
his station and resign his authority if he could not quell the storm
that was rising against him, succeeded in doing so. Perhaps his
apprehensions were greater than the real danger. Perhaps the five
lakhs he gave Scindia dissipated the dangers he feared, and which
threatened his ambition.” Herein we have a much more likely
explanation of his success than that which Skinner puts forward. It
was not Perron’s injured dignity that influenced Sindhia, but his hard
cash. Daulat Rao was a dissolute, vicious prince, who cared nothing
for character: a good man in distress awakened no compassion in his
heart. But a wicked man—and assuredly Perron had been wickedly
treacherous during the past year—with five lakhs of rupees was
worthy to be taken to his bosom t

While it lasted the contest between Perron and Sutherland must
have been a sharp one, but the former triumphed, and secured the
Scotchman’s transfer to the second brigade, which was to return to
276 PERRON.

Hindustan with the General, where it is not difficult to imagine the
treatment that would have been meted out to the vanquished sub-
ordinate. Sutherland, however, had no intention of subjecting him-
self to such a risk, for “he took some offence at an expression of
Perron’s and his extraordinary behaviour and left Oojein for Agra with
a hundred horsemen.” Whereupon the General “ composed the minds
of the troops when Sutherland left them without permission, and
promised them another officer of equal rank to command their
brigade.”

Early in May Perron commenced his return march to Hindustan,
and on the 14th reached Jaipur, where doubtless there was a little
account to be squeezed out of Partab Singh. But although the
General returned to Koil with his former power and in perfect safety,
still it was clear to every discerning eye that his influence with
Daulat Rao was diminished. This is confirmed by letters written
by Colonel Collins to the Governor-general soon after Perron’s
departure, in which the following passages occur :—

“T hear on very good authority that it is Scindia’s intention as
soon as he can get to Agra to deprive Perron of the command of the
fortresses he possesses in Hindostan’’?; and two months later,
“General Perron has been peremptorily directed by Scindia to give
up all the mehals in his possession not appertaining to his Jaidad.
I understand that Perron is highly displeased with the conduct of
Scindia’s ministers, and that he entertains serious intentions of
relinquishing his present command.”

The Asiatic Register, in a communication dated June 2, 1802, very
clearly summarises what Perron actually accomplished by his visit
to Sindhia’s Court :—

“We learn by a letter from Oojein that Scindia has dismissed the
whole of the British officers in his service. There is no doubt that
this is to be ascribed to the influence of General Perron, who has
long been jealous of the introduction of English officers into Scindia’s
army, and has occasionally exerted every artifice of intrigue to
frustrate their views and to impress the Prince with a notion that
though these men came into his dominions in the character of
independent adventurers, they are generally emissaries of the British
Government, in whom it was impossible and highly unsafe to confide ;
and Scindia listened to these untruths and acted on them.”

Perron made the best use of his renewed opportunities, and in the
shuffling of commands that resulted Major Brownrigg was the only
Englishman who kept his post. He was last heard of, upon Skinner’s
authority, under fixed bayonets, but he appears to have been restored
THE BATTLE OF POONAH. 277

to favour, for le was appointed to the command of the fifth brigade,
which was raised shortly after this. The rest of Sindhia’s army
passed entirely under the hands of foreigners. Pohlman, a German,
commanded the first brigade ; George Hessing, a Dutchman, and
nephew to Perron, the second; Louis Bourguien, also a relative of
Perron, the third; Dudrenec, a Frenchman, the fourth. This
officer was also promoted to second in command, and destined to
succeed the general when he retired. The independent corps, affiliated
to Perron’s command, were those of Jean Baptiste Filoze, an Italian,
and also a relative of the general, and the Begum Somru’s under
Colonel Saleur, a Frenchman. John Hessing, a Dutchman, com-
manded the fort of Agra, Drugeon, a Savoyard, that of Delhi, and
Pedron, a Frenchman, had charge of Aligarh. Deridon, Perron’s
brother-in-law, algo filled a high post. Thus every Englishman in
the force, with the exception of Brownrigg, was debarred from
superior employment, although the British subjects in the brigades
numbered not less than forty. Country-borns—a very large factor in
the foree—who could boast a British origin fared no better; and so
gross was the favouritism and injustice Perron displayed, that even
the natives could not conceal their contempt for it.

These intrigues and jealousies which contaminated Sindhia’s court and
brigades had a lamentable effect upon his interests. His own country-
men were estranged, and their complete supersession by the regular
troops shut them out from every opportunity of following a soldier’s
career, and they ceased to be a martial people. Daulat Ro himself
plunged deeper and deeper into the mire of vice and degradation,
neglecting state affairs and ignoring the duties of government, and
Perron, on his return to Hindustan, soon became as independent as he
had been before his visit to Ujjain. Little of importance occurred
during the rest of the year 1802, the only matters recorded being
some desultory fighting against Holkar’s Pindaris in the Deccan, and
a visit paid by Perron to the Sutlej, where Bourguien with the third
brigade was trying to reduce the Sikhs to the same state of subjection
as the Rajputs, and was, as usual, ‘‘ waiting for reinforcements.”

All the time these matters had been taking place in Sindhia’s
possessions Jaswant Rao Holkar had not been idle. He and Amir
Khan engaged in an extensive and lawless campaign, during which
Rajputana was plundered and Khandesh devastated. Holkar’s
Pindari army might appropriately be likened to the mountain
torrent, which gathers volume in its course. In a predatory
expedition there is nothing which succeeds like success. Malwa was
full of disbanded soldiery, to whom Jaswant Rao’s remunerative
278 PERRON.

rapine constituted a call to arms. From all quarters he was joined
by wild Deccan horsemen thirsting to share the pillage of his route.
Before a year had passed he completely recovered from the shock of
Indore, and was at the head of a mighty host, full of the dash and
daring acquired by a long course of successful foray, and made the
more formidable by two complete brigades of regular infantry in-
cluded in its numbers.

Holkar now began to turn his steps towards the Deccan, intent on
once more regaining his influence in the councils of the Peshwa. As
soon as his intention became apparent, the Court at Poonah took
alarm, and endeavoured by every means to stay his advance. He
was even desired to formulate his demands, and immediate attention
was promised to them, provided he would only remain north of the
Godavari. But this Holkar declined to do. Personal as well as
political motives guided his course. He had a brother’s murder to
revenge, for Baji Réio, the Peshwa, had in the previous year not only
ordered the death of Ithal Réo, Jaswant Réo’s younger brother, but
gazed on the execution as it was being carried out with all the
shocking barbarity of Oriental savagery.

On the 7th of October Holkar’s infantry brigades, under the
command of a trusted chief named Fateh Singh, came upon the
Peshwa’s army, and after a short, but decisive, action completely
defeated it, and captured all its cannon. Two days later Jaswant
R4o, who had been elsewhere engaged with his cavalry, effected a
junction with Fateh Singh’s force, and at once marched towards
Poonah.

The Deccan capital was now at Holkar’s mercy, and with it the
Peshwa, who was the key of the power which controlled the Maratha
Confederacy. On Jaswant Réo’s approach overtures for peace were
opened by Baji Raéo, but they led to nothing. Holkar’s real object
was to obtain possession of the Peshwa’s person, but the latter would
not consent to a meeting; for, in the language of a native historian, “ the
word treachery was in the page of his dealings with the Holkar family,
and his eye fell on it, and he feared to trust himself in the power of
Jeswant Réo.” But nothing short of this would satisfy Holkar, who
was determined to establish himself in u position where he could
enforce his ascendancy to the exclusion of Sindhia’s influence

Daulat Rao had been roused to action by Jaswant Rao’s rapid
advance, and directly he realised that it was the intention of the latter
to attack Poonah, he sent an army from Ujjain to assist the Peshwa.
This force successfully made its way to the capital, but it was
utterly inadequate for the performance of the work assigned to it.
THE BATTLE OF POONAH. 279

Holkar, however, before proceeding to war, determined to make an
attempt to divide his enemies, hoping to overawe the Peshwa into
neutrality, whilst he himself first settled matters with Sindhia. So
he wrote a diplomatic letter to Baji Rado, saying ‘‘ that the Holker
and Scindia factions were the same in the balance to His Highness ;
for him therefore to show partiality to the one and estrangement to
the other, much less to side absolutely with either, was not the part of
the High Lord of both. That it would be more becoming to his
dignity to keep up a friendly understanding with the two parties, and
bring about a friendly reconciliation, or if precluded from adopting
this course, that at any rate he should give protection and counten-
ance to neither, but stand aloof from the contest, and leave them to
settle matters as they might.”

In explanation of this it may be observed that Sindhia still held
possession of the person of Jaswant Réo’s nephew, Khandi Rao, the
infant son of Malhar Rao, and the rightful heir of the house of
Holkar. For political reasons Jaswant Rao had constituted himself the
champion of the child chief, claiming to be his proper guardian. It
was therefore a matter of great importance to procure the release of
this youth, and Holkar informed the Peshwa that his present action
was due to this necessity.

Of course Baji Rao would not consent to disconnect himself from
Sindhia, whom he had taken into favour again after his victory over
Holkar at Indore. The Peshwa had no choice in the management of
his political machine, except to use one chief against another, and so
preserve a balance between them, which left him with the nominal
control. When Sindhia grew too powerful the Peshwa sided with
Holkar, Lakwa Dada and the Bhais, and now that Jaswant Rao’s
star was dominant Baji Rao, as a matter of course, threw himself into
Sindhia’s arms. It is impossible in the limits of a short sketch to
follow the shifting currents of Maratha intrigue and diplomacy, but
the explanation afforded will make the present situation intelligible.

Negotiations being unsuccessful, both armies prepared for battle,
and on Sunday the 25th of October 1802, their lines were formed for
action on the plain outside Poonah. Sindhia’s forces consisted of
four battalions of Pohlman’s brigade, under Captain Dawes, and
seven battalions of Ambaji Inglia’s under a Mahomedan commander,
with 10,000 Maratha cavalry and 80 guns. The Peshwa only con-
tributed four very inferior battalions of infantry, under native officers,
and 6,000 cavalry. The position the allied forces took up was a strong
one, their rear being protected by the city of Poonah.

Holkar brought into the field an army superior in both numbers and
280 PERRON.

quality. His regular infantry consisted of four battalions under
Major Harding, five under Major Vickers, and four under Major
Armstrong. There were also three others under anative commander,
and 5,000 irregular Rohilla infantry. His cavalry numbered 25,000,
and he had 100 capital guns.

It was due to the spirited representations of Captain Dawes that
battle was offered to a force so superior in every way. Dawes was a
gallant soldier, and strongly advised fighting, although there were but
four European officers in the allied armies. The troops were accord-
ingly formed for action, and Jaswant Rao eagerly responded to the
challenge. Dawes himself took post in the centre, with the artillery.
On the right were the Poonah troops, and on the left the Maratha
cavalry. At 9.30 a.m. the action commenced with a sharp and inces-
sant cannonade, which lasted for four hours, and showed great
determination on both sides. An advance was then attempted by
Dawes, and for a time the superior discipline of his battalions began
to tell; for, owing to a misunderstanding, Jaswant Rao’s cavalry were
ordered to make an ill-timed charge on Dawes’s left flank, during
which they were exposed to the grape of the artillery in such re-
peated discharges as to threaten the loss of the day altogether, for seeing
them wavering Dawes’s cavalry attacked them with fatal effect. “The
confusion,” writes the quaint native historian already quoted, ‘‘ was
like that of the Day of Judgment: no one knew where he was or
what he was about. The slaughter was great, and the flight of
Holker’s troops had commenced.”

Jaswant Rao, who had taken up his station on an eminence, in order
to direct the operations of the field, perceived this critical pass to which
his arms had come. It roused him to a great and worthy effort.
Springing on his horse, he drew his sword, and calling out, ‘‘ Now or
never to follow Jaswant Rao!” spurred to the front, rallied the fugitives,
collected a compact body around him, and turning round charged back
again upon the enemy.

As he reached them he found Ambaji’s battalions already beginning
to waver before the steady attack of Major Harding, whose brigade had
advanced to the rescue of the cavalry. Against these Holkar dashed,
and scattered them like chaff, and then turned his charge upon
Dawes, whose troops had up to this time behaved with a courage and
discipline worthy of their reputation. As Dawes saw the Chief and
his squadrons approaching, he attempted to oppose a proper resistance,
but his small body of men was completely overwhelmed by the
sheer weight of numbers and thrown into confusion. They fought
desperately to the very last, and as became the best traditions they had
THE BATTLE OF POONAH. 281

inherited from the days of De Boigne. It was not until three of their
officers were killed, and the fourth taken prisoner, and 600 men out
of their total strength of 1,400 killed and wounded, that they sur-
rendered. During the latter part of the action a terrible explosion
took place in their very midst, caused by a cannon shot striking one
of their tumbrils, and this added to their disorder, and hastened their
defeat. Almost immediately after this catastrophe Dawes was killed,
and a similar fate befel Captain Catts and Ensign Douglas. This left
the force with only one officer—a Frenchman named Hanove—who
behaved with great intrepidity, carrying with him the colours of the
corps, until he was made prisoner.

Jaswant Rao, to whose personal bravery and spirit the victory was
due, was wounded in the act of spearing one of Dawes’s artillerymen
at his gun, to the very muzzle of which the chief had charged.
Major Harding, who joined him, and rode by his side, was killed by
almost the last cannonshot fired. Holkar lost 1,600 men in this
action, whilst on the side of the allies the killed and wounded
amounted to 5,000. Sixty-five guns were captured, of which twenty
belonged to Dawes's battalions. It is worthy of note that, during
eighteen years of arduous active service and continual fighting, these
were the first guns lost by any of De Boigne’s old brigades since their
formation. The whole of Sindhia’s baggage and camp were taken,
and his army, bereft of their officers, was routed and dispersed, and
fled in all directions.

The consequences of this defeat were far more more disastrous to
the Peshwa than to Sindhia. Early in the morning Baji Rao, not
doubting success, left his palace with the intention of being present
at the action. But the noise of the firing frightened him, and he
withdrew to a place some distance south of Poonah. Almost before a
shot was fired his troops deserted Dawes, and retired within the walls
of the city, and as soon as Baji Rao heard of the impending issue of
the day, he fled, attended by 7,000 followers, to the fort of Singarh,
from whence he proceeded to Mhar, on the sea coast. Here he em-
barked on board an English ship, provided for his reception by the
Government of Bombay, and was landed at Bassein, a fugitive from
his throne, and indebted for his safety to the very nation from whom
it had been the policy of the Maratha nation to consistently hold aloof.
CHAPTER VII.
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH.
1802-1803.

“ TESWANT RAO HOLKER has taken possession of Poonah, and
greatly harassed that city and His Highness the Peishwa. I am
therefore obliged to march towards Poonah to oppose the Holkers, and
immediately on receipt of this letter you will hasten your march with
all your troops under your command and meet us at that place. Our
endeavours must be strenuously exerted to baffle the Holkers in all
their hostile designs, and to secure the country from their infamous
depredations now and hereafter. It will be necessary to use every
means in our power to crush and overwhelm them at once, that they
may never again have sufficient ability to do us similar mischief.”

Thus wrote Daulat Rio Sindhia to General Perron on the 16th of
November, 1802, after the defeat of his and the Peshwéa’s troops at
Poonah. On receiving this letter Perron made some show of obedi-
ence by directing Bourguien, who was at Jind, to proceed to the
Deccan with the third brigade. But here his efforts began and
ended: the order was not carried out—probably there was never any
serious intention of having it executed—and Perron confined himself
to copious protestations, declaring he was about to march south ‘‘im-
mediately ’’—a formula that had an elasticity about it not contem-
plated by the framers of language.

Other reinforcements, however, reached Sindhia. Ambaji, his
Maratha general, despatched five of the Begum Somrv’s battalions,
and Raghuji Bhonsla of Berar sent a large body of horse. On these
joining him Daulat Rao marched with his army six or eight miles out
of Ujjain on the 1st of December, with the intention of proceeding to
Poonah, but his further progress was arrested by sickness which
broke out amongst his troops, and by a belief that he was not strong

enough to risk a conflict with Holkar, and reinstate the Peshwa, who
282
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH. 283

was continually urging him to come to his assistance, and drive
Jaswant Rao out of the capital.

Perron was fully.aware how critical the moment was. Holkar was
not only in possession of Poonah, but had declared Baji Rao deposed,
and elevated to the masnad, the Peshwa’s brother, Amrat Rao, whom
he desired to use as his tool, usurping the real authority himself.
Driven from his country, a fugitive and afraid, it was hopeless to ex-
pect Baji R&o to accomplish his own restoration. There were but two
courses open to him: either to trust to Sindhia to reinstate him, or to
throw in his lot with the English, as the Nizam of Haidarabad had
done two years previously, and accept from them the services of a
contingent force to replace him in power and keep him there. But
this would be tantamount to the surrender of the independence of the
Maréth& Empire, and Baji Ro naturally hesitated before committing
himself to such an irrevocable step.

During the two months of indecision that followed, Baji Rao re-
peatedly appealed to Sindhia for military assistance against Holkar,
warning him that if help was deferred he would be compelled, from
sheer necessity, to apply to the British Government to reinstate him.
Sindhia as repeatedly despatched express messengers to Perron, com-
manding him to send down troops to the Deccan at once, as without
reinforcements Daulat Réo dared not risk a battle. But Perron pursued
a line of conduct similar to that which he had adopted in the previous
year. He was afraid of throwing too much power into his master’s
hands, which might ultimately be turned against himself. So long as
he kept three complete brigades under his personal control in Hin-
dustan, he had nothing to fear from his enemies at the Ujjain Court ;
but the transfer of one of them from Delhi to the Deccan would
destroy his preponderance of power, and prejudice the political plans
he had in view. So he avoided compliance with Sindhia’s commands,
and affected an excuse for his disobedience in the refractory conduct
of Partib Singh.* Instead of marching to Ujjain he led his troops
to Jaipur, announcing that he expected to be absent on this expedition
for some time. But Partib Singh, scared at Perron’s approach, im-
mediately paid the fine demanded, whereupon the general, instead

* A “news letter’? in a Persian journal states that in August, 1802,
the Rajah of Jaipur wrote several letters to Ghat-kay Rio, Daulat Réo’s
father-in-law, and Prime Minister, complaining of the conduct of General
Perron, and stating some other matters of moment to himself. These letters
were intercepted by Perron’s Harkarras, or news runners, and brought to him.
Their contents ‘‘ effaced all the impressions of friendship he felt for the Rajah,
and determined him to take vigorous measures to ruin the Prince.”
284 PERRON.

of proceeding to the seat of war in the Deccan, returned to his head-
quarters at Koil.

And this at a moment when kingdoms were toppling! The Peshwa,
Holkar, Sindhia, all were threatened directly or indirectly by the
existing state of affairs. One masterly stroke would have assured the
complete ascendancy of Sindhia’s influence ; for had he driven Holkar
out of Poonah, and reinstated the Peshwa, Daulat R4o’s power would
have become unassailable. It needed but Perron’s co-operation to
make this a certainty: but that co-operation was withheld, and the
failure and ruin which followed were solely due to the general’s
treachery. Baji Rado, beholden for his personal safety to the English
at his elbow, could hold out no longer. Sindhia was even invited by
Colonel Collins, the British Resident, to assist in the restoration of
his suzeraine, but his anxiety to be the sole agent in the matter would
not permit him to act in concert with a foreign power, and one which
he especially feared and dreaded. So he temporised with Colonel
Collins, and carried on an active correspondence with Baji Rao,
promising help, which never came, until the latter grew despairing
as he daily received the stereotyped reply that Sindhia ‘‘ would march
as soon as he was strong enough,” whilst every hour consolidated the
power of Holkar at Poonah, and tended to make the elevation of
Amrat Ré&o to the masnad an established and recognised state of
things.

At last the Peshwa could no longer defer coming to a decision,
and on the 31st of December, 1802, the die was cast, and he
appended his signature to the Treaty of Bassein. It sounded the
death-knell of Mardthé Independence, and, by a retributive justice,
of Perron’s own power, for his subsequent fall was distinctly traceable
to this event. By the Treaty of Bassein the Peshwa was reduced to
the status of a protected prince, and accepted from the Company the
services of a subsidiary force of 6,000 regular native infantry, with
the usual proportion of guns, and European officers, and artillerymen.
In return for this he assigned to his deliverers vast districts in Guzerat,
and on the Narbada and Tapti Rivers, which yielded a revenue of
twenty-six lakhs of rupees. Moreover, the treaty contained a clause
directed against adventurers of Perron’s class, for by the eleventh
article the Peshwa agreed, in the event of a war between the English
and any European nation, to ‘discharge any European or Europeans
in his service, belonging to such nation, who shall have meditated
injury towards the English, or entered into intrigues hostile to their
interests.”

Perron’s relations with the French Government were within the
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH. 285

knowledge of the Marquis Wellesley. Colonel Skinner mentions
that in 1801 the general ‘was so puffed up with riches and power
that he allowed himself to be persuaded by his flatterers into sending
an ambassador to Bonaparte, and Monsieur Desoutée was the person
despatched; but the purport or result of the embassy was never
known.” But if not actually known, it may reasonably be suspected
that it led to the Expedition which the First Consul ordered. His
designs against India have been fully explained in the sketch of De
Boigne’s life, and need not be here repeated, But Perron’s share in
them must be noted. Perron was a Frenchman and a revolutionist,
in close sympathy with the principles which the French nation
affected at this period, and after his own personal advantage he
honestly desired his country’s welfare. He perceived how favour-
able was the opportunity afforded by the internal commotions in
Hindustan for the establishment of a French dominion in India,
and was prepared to assist that consummation. There is but little
doubt that the elaborate project formed at Paris owed much to
his practical suggestion, for it could scarcely have been any other
person who pointed out the route by which the Expeditionary
French officers were to reach his headquarters through Cuttack.
It is known that Perron pressed his views on the attention
of Bonaparte, and that an important communication from him
reached Paris during the national rejoicing over the Peace of Amiens,
It could not have arrived at a more seasonable period, for the treaty
of 1802 opened every desirable avenue for the prosecution of the
schemes suggested. An arrangement was actually settled for the
assignment to the Government of France of all the districts that
Perron held, the transfer of which was to be confirmed by the
Emperor Shah Alam, in whose name, and under whose authority
everything was to be done.

Perron’s policy in Hindustan was subordinated to this scheme, for
the success of which he worked and waited, and sacrificed Sindhia.
The three brigades which Perron kept under his immediate command,
refusing to spare any of them for the Deccan, were required for its
accomplishment. They were regarded as “the French army of
Hindustan,” and contemporary writers constantly refer to them by
that designation. Perron only awaited a full complement of officers
from France to co-operate in any attack on the English which the
First Consul might order. But, unfortunately for Perron’s plot and
Bonaparte’s plans, Lord Wellesley anticipated them, and the Treaty
of Bassein was one of the countermoves in this game of politics. It
established the paramount influence of the English in the Maratha
286 PERRON.

dominions, and at the same time cut the ground from under the feet
of the French faction. ‘There is every reason to believe,” writes
Lord Wellesley in his “History of the Mahratta War,” “that the
Government of France intended to make the unfortunate Emperor
of Hindustan the main instrument of their designs in India, and to
avail themselves of the authority of His Majesty’s name to re-
establish their influence and power. A plan to this effect was
actually submitted to the Chief Consul of France, in 1801, by an
officer, who afterwards accompanied General Decaen to India, in
1803." This plan resulted in the despatch of the Expedition to
India, which was preparing to sail from France at the time that the
battle of Poonah took place, and Perron was probably aware of it
when he received Sindhia’s urgent orders to join him ‘“ with all his
troops’"’—the very troops who were to be officered by the expected
French expedition. To detach them to the Deccan under such
circumstances was manifestly impossible, and so, from November
to February, Perron evaded obedience, expecting at any moment
to hear of the arrival of the force which would so immeasurably
strengthen his hand as to make him independent. But the French
fleet was delayed, and did not appear off Pondicherry till June, 1803.
Before that time Perron was in difficulties, for Sindhia grew ‘‘ warm
and positive” in his tones, and the Frenchman had not sufficient
staying power to hold out. Hope deferred made his heart sick, and
he submitted to pressure, which a stronger man might have resisted
for a much longer time. In February, 1803, he sent Sindhia the
fourth brigade, under the Chevalier Dudrenec, and half the newly-
raised fifth brigade, under Captain Brownrigg, thus detaching nearly
half his army to the Deccan. It was the acknowledgment of his
defeat, and he confirmed it by tendering his resignation at the same
time.

There is only one explanation of this sudden and complete collapse
of Perron’s policy. He suspected the designs of the British Govern-
ment against the French military adventurers in the MarAthé service,
and wished to secure his own personal safety and his large fortune
before any further political complications ensued. Disappointed in
the long deferred arrival of the French Expedition, it was now
evident that with the English paramount at Poonah, the accomplish-
ment of his plans was impossible. The auspicious moment had, in
fact, passed away; and even as Sindhia’s projects and ambitions
had been destroyed by Perron withholding assistance from him, so
were Perron’s own schemes ruined by the untoward delay in the
arrival of the aid from France, which he had so long expected. It is
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH. 287

curious to note how in his downfall Perron suffered, step by step,
from almost identically similar disasters as those which, through his
influence, contributed to his master’s undoing.

At the same time that Perron tendered his resignation to Sindhia,
he applied to General Lake, the Commander-in-chief at Cawnpore,
for leave to proceed to Lucknow, with an escort of 200 cavalry
and 400 infantry, on his return to Europe. General Lake forwarded
the application to the Marquis Wellesley, who replied that he was
strongly disposed to accelerate Perron’s departure from Sindhia’s
service, conceiving it to be an event which promised much advantage
to the British interests in India. A willing guarantee was accorded
for the general’s safeguard from Lucknow to Calcutta, necessary
orders issued for his suitable reception and treatment, with every
mark of respect and consideration, and he was assured that a proper
guard of Sepoys for his route would be provided, and at the Presidency
the Governor-General proposed to receive him in a manner con-
formable to his wishes, and to use every means to facilitate his voyage
to Europe.

Perron’s resignation reached Sindhia towards the end of February,
1803, just as Colonel Collins, the British Resident, returned to the
Marath4 prince’s camp at Burhanpur, after a temporary absence,
bringing with him a copy of the Treaty of Bassein, whose terms he
now disclosed. In a moment the whole political atmosphere was
changed. Although Sindhia affected to consider that there was
nothing in the treaty he could object to, it put a period, with one
dash of the pen, to the whole policy of aggrandisement to which he
and his uncle before him had devoted their entire energies for the
last decade; for it placed the head of the Mardth4’s under the pro-
tection of the one power they most desired to keep out of the nation’s
councils, No instrument could have been more complete in its attack
on the existing condition of things, or more unacceptable to the
Marith&s at large. Every Deccan chief was startled, and, in the
face of this common danger, all internal enmities and jealousies were
relegated to the background. The note of alarm was sounded by
Raghuji Bhonsla, of Berar, who at once proposed an alliance between
Sindhia, Holkar, and himeelf, for the purpose of expelling the English
and restoring the national independence of the Peshwa. All the
minor chiefs concurred in the determination to resist, and, if possible,
overthrow the new regime. In this crisis of affairs Sindhia wrote to
Perron, declining to accept his resignation, and informing him of
the Treaty of Bassein, and the proposed general alliance against the
Company.
288 PERRON.

A false ray of hope shone out on Perron, who thought he saw the
silver lining behind the black cloud of disappointment. It is not
impossible that he was further encouraged by advices of the forward
state of the French expedition destined to strengthen him. At any
rate he decided to see out the storm that was now gathering in the
Deccan, and consented to withdraw his resignation and remain in
Sindhia’s service for another year.

War, although within a measurable distance, was not at this time
declared. But at Sindhia’s request Perron drew out a plan of
campaign to be followed in the event of hostilities. It was one that
did credit to his ability as a general, and, although it was never
carried into effect, its details are worth recording.

The forces of the Confederate chiefs were apportioned as follows :
Sindhia, with 85,000 Marath4 cavalry, was to penetrate into the
Haidarabad territory and compel the Nizam, who was in alliance
with the English, to withdraw his forces from the seat of war in the
Deccan. Raghuji Bhonsla, with 30,000 horse, was to enter Bengal,
cut off General Lake in Oudh, and carry fire and sword into the rich
districts of the Ganges. Holkar, with another 30,000 horse, was to
invade Benares and Behar, and Shamshir Bahadur (a son of Ali
Bahadur, who had recently died) and Ambaji Inglia, with 20,000
cavalry, were to desolate Oudh and the British Doab provinces.
This disposed of the mounted native armies. The infantry were
detailed for defensive work. Perron, with three brigades of twenty-
four battalions, was to defend the passage of the Jumna. Holkar's
infantry, under Vickers, was to oppose the English in Surat. Sindhia’s
Deccan brigades, consisting of Perron’s first under Pohlman, half
the fifth under Brownrigg, four battalions of the Begum Somru’s
under Saleur, and four battalions of the late Fidéle Filoze’s under
Dupont—in all twenty battalions were to defend the Adjanta Ghat ;
and, finally, fifteen irregular battalions of Raghuji Bhonsla’s, under
native commanders, were to bar the passage of the Kasabéri Ghat.
It was a skilful and comprehensive plan of campaign, which appor-
tioned defensive work for 94 battalions of infantry at four widely
divided points, and offensive operations for 115,000 cavalry. Had it
been carried out in its entirety it must have resulted in a long and
bloody war. But the ignorance, distrust, and supineness of the
Mardthas, and the treachery of Holkar, who withdrew from the alliance
at the last moment, ruined all hope of success.

From March to August, 1803, Colonel Collins, the British Resident,
remained in Sindhia’s camp, vainly endeavouring to obtain from that
chief and the Rajah of Berar the withdrawal of their armies from
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH. 289

the frontiers of the Nizam’s territory, where they were encamped,
and which they threatened. But Sindhia, in reply, demanded the
previous retirement from the territories of the Peshwa of the army
of observation assembled under the command of Major-General
Arthur Wellesley. To consent to this was impossible while the
Maratha forces retained their commanding position and menaced
Haidarabad. In the Governor-General’s words, ‘‘It would have
submitted the dignity, honour, and interests, if not the very existence,
of the British Government in India to the most faithless, sanguinary,
rapacious, and violent of Mahratta adventurers. We should have
forfeited the opinion of the native powers, which forms a main pillar
of the fabric of our Empire; we should have been degraded by the
native states of Hindustan and the Deccan to the rank of a secondary
power in India; of a power secondary to Daulat Rao Scindia, whose
military strength rests upon the support of French adventure, enter-
prise, and skill.”

During these negotiations Perron strenuously advised Sindhia not
to form any connection with the British Government nor to enter
into their plans, vowing that he was ready to sacrifice his life and his
fortune in defending the cause of his prince. No explanation is given
of this newly-developed loyalty and enthusiasm, nor does any suggest
itself for Perron’s conduct during this period, except the arrival at
Pondicherry, on the 15th of June, of General Decaen’s expedition
from France. Of this he probably received early intimation. What-
ever professions he made to Sindhia he certainly substantiated by
the uncommon energy with which he prepared for war. On the 26th
of June he directed Bourguien to withdraw the third brigade from
the Panjab and canton it at Panipat, whilst the second, under
George Hessing, was concentrated at Sikandra, near Agra. At
Aligarh, where Pedron was in command, the most elaborate prepara-
tions were made for hostilities. On the 25th of July old Colonel
John Hessing died at Agra, and Perron instantly proceeded there
and appointed Colonel George Hessing to the command of the fort,
sending a French officer named Geslin to take over charge of his
brigade, which had marched to Delhi.

Notwithstanding all this energy and the display of loyalty which
these preparations seemed to indicate on the part of Perron, he was
fated to feel the reaction of his former treachery to Daulat Rao
Sindhia. At the very moment when he was really working honestly
in his master’s interests intrigues against him were being brought to
a successful issue in the Court he served. Ambaji Inglia had long
coveted the Subahdari of Hindustan. Despite Perron’s protesta-

19
290 PERRON.

tions of fidelity there existed a deep-set feeling of distrust against him
in Sindhia’s breast. His past actions rose up to condemn him, and
Ambaji, by a timely gift of twenty-five lakhs of rupees, was able to
gain his ends, and in the month of August, on the very eve of the
declaration of war, was appointed to the chief command of Hindustan,
with instructions to supersede Perron, who was to be subordinate to
his orders. “By this action,” writes Lewis Ferdinand Smith,
“Scindia delivered Perron over to his most implacable enemy, for
Ambajee would have assuredly drained Perron’s purse if he had
spared his life.”

On the 8rd of August Colonel Collins left Sindhia’s camp, and the
British Government forthwith declared war, and proceeded to carry
into execution the plan of military operations previously determined
upon.

Perron was actually the last man iu the Maratha councils to hear
of it, and even then the notification came to him from General Lake
himself after the British advance had begun. In this tremendous
crisis of his life the master of many intrigues was destined to find
himself undone by the craft and treachery which disclosed themselves
around him. He was unaware that Ambaji Inglia was hastening to
Hindustan to wrench the baton from his hands; or that the Chevalier
Dudrenec, whom he had given service to and destined for his successor,
had declared his allegiance to the new commander-in-chief. But the
cruellest blow of all was yet to come, for Louis Bourguien, Perron’s
bosom friend and most trusted lieutenant, “ whom he had raised from
obscurity to rank and riches, with outrage and injustice to other
oflicers,”’ was the first in Upper India to revolt against the hand that
had lifted him from the gutter, and ere many days had past to
declare the deposition and attempt the life of the man before whose
frown Hindustan had trembled for seven years.
CHAPTER VIII.
LORD WELLESLEY’S DESPATCHES.
1803.

O far the narrative has followed Perron and his fortunes from the
Maratha point of view. In order to assist a broader estimate of
his political, and even international, importance, it is necessary to
extract a few passages from the Marquis Wellesley’s despatches and
correspondence, which will illustrate the high elevation attained by
this self-made soldier of fortune.
The first reference to Perron in those voluminous writings occurs in
a letter, dated from the Cape of Good Hope in February, 1798, and
addressed to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, President of the
Board of Control. It merely indicates Lord Wellesley’s knowledge
that “Scindia employs about 20,000 Sepoys, disciplined by Europeans
or Americans. The commander is named Perron, a Frenchman.”
The next reference is in June, 1799, by which time the Governor-
General has become alive to the influence French adventurers were
exerting in the Maratha States, for addressing the same correspondent,
he writes:—‘‘I shall endeavour to render the cession of territory
(after the Mysore war) the instrument of annihilating every remnant
of a French party in that quarter,” and a few days later adds, “I am
anxious to find some mode of engaging the interests of Scindia in the
new settlement of Mysore, under the condition of dismissing all the
French officers from his service, and (if possible) under that of his
delivering them over to our Government for the purpose of being
sent to Europe.” On the 4th of July, in a despatch to Colonel
Palmer, the Resident at Poonah, he further emphasises this desire.
“The whole system of my policy is an earnest of my anxiety to
expel the French from the service of Scindia.”
But the action of this policy was delayed by another circumstance

which demanded Lord Wellesley’s attention and heavily taxed his
291
292 PERRON.

resources. This was the invasion of Egypt by Bonaparte, which was
a blow aimed directly at India, and all current intentions had to be
suspended in order to assist in repelling this new danger by
despatching a powerful contingent, under General Baird, to co-
operate with General Abercrombie in the Delta of the Nile.

But although Lord Wellesley’s local policy was necessarily deferred,
it was by no means abandoned, and in 1802, on the termination of
the Egyptian campaign, his attention was once more focussed on
affairsinthe Deccan. ‘The distractions in the Mahratta Empire,” he
writes, ‘occasioned a combination of circumstance of the utmost
importance to the stability of the British power in India, yet pre-
senting a conjunction of affairs which appeared to afford the most
advantageous opportunity that has ever occurred for improving the
British interests in that quarter on solid and durable foundations.”’

This was writtenjjust after the battle of Poonah, when Jaswant
R&o Holkar had defeated the combined armies of Sindhia and the
Peshwa, and the latter, a fugitive from his capital, was indebted for
his personal safety to British protection. In the diplomatic trans-
actions which followed the treaty of Bassein was conceived and
executed, and the road opened for the attack on the “ French army
of Hindustan,” which the Governor-General had so long desired.

On the 27th of March, 1803, the name of Perron again appears in Lord
Wellesley’s despatches, on the occasion of his acknowledging a letter
from General Lake, which enclosed an application from Perron to be
allowed to proceed to Europe through the Company’s territories. To
this sanction was accorded; but before it reached Perron he had
changed his mind, and decided to throw in his lot with Sindhia in
the crisis that had just arisen, and was instigating him to resist all
the demands of the English. Swayed by his advice, Daulat Rao
refused all accommodation, and at last became threatening and
insolent in his tone, when, as a final resource, a separate treaty was
offered to him. Upon his rejection of this the Commander-in-chief
was ordered to make preparations for war, and in a despatch dated
the 28th of June, 1803, the Governor-General laid down the following
objects to be attained by force of arms :—

1. The seizure of all Sindhia’s possessions between the Ganges and
the Jumna: in other words, Perron’s Juidad.

2. To take the person of the Mughal Shah ‘Alam under British
protection : he was at the time in Perron’s custody.

3. The immediate reduction of the forces under the command of
Perron.

4. The formation of alliances with the Rajputs and other inferior
LORD WELLESLEY’S DESPATCHES. 293

states beyond the Jumna for the pupose of excluding Sindhia from
the northern districts of Hindustan: these states were tributary to
Perron,

5. The occupation of Bundelkhand.

It is very plain to see that the objective of the campaign was
nothing more or less than Perron. Without the Frenchman there
would have been no war at all: it was his brigades which gave Sindhia
confidence to resist and the British Government the incentive to
attack. As witness the Governor-General’s note on the subject :—

‘«M. Perron’s forces are said to be at present collected at Coel, and
to consist of about 8,000 infantry and an equal number of cavalry.*

“Scindia, it is generally believed, has no confidence in M. Perron’s
attachment to his government. In the eventof a war with the British
Government it is probable that Scindia will endeavour to propitiate
M. Perron, and the prospect of this crisis of affairs, which would render
M. Perron’s conduct an object of attention to both states, may have
contributed to induce M. Perron to postpone his avowed intention of
relinquishing Scindia’s service, in the hope of more advantageous
offers from Scindia or from the British Government. A considerable
number of the Sepoys who were discharged from the British Army at
the late reduction are said to have entered into M. Perron’s service.
. .. It is supposed that Scindia’s European officers might be induced
to resign the service by offers of present subsistence and of a future
establishment in the service of some of the allies or tributaries of the

* These refer to the local forces at Koil only, for in the Marquis Wellesley’s
‘‘ History of the Mahratta War " Sindhia's army, regular, and irregular, in June,
1803, was estimated as follows :—

Names and Description of Corps. No. of Battalions. No.of Men. No. of Guns.
lst Brigade. M. Louis Bourguien 8 7,000 50
2nd_sa, M. Hessing a 5,600 50
3rd, M. Pohlman .. 8 6,000 80
4th. 4, M. Dudernaigue 7 5,000 70
5th . Ned. 4,000
Corps under M. Dupon , @ 2,000 about 20
Major Brownrigg’s Corps .. . 56 2,250 30
Begum Somru’s Corps 4 a 2,400 20
Late Filoze’s Brigade aa a« “8 3,000 60
Ambaji Inglia’s Brigade .. es -. 16 i 6,400 84
Grand Total .. 72 43,650 464

N.B.—The force in this estimate is exclusive of the troops employed in
garrisons, of irregular infantry Mewattis, &c., the number of which is con-
siderable.
294 PERRON.

British Government. It must be ascertained whether it would be
safe or practicable to detach M. Perron, or any of the European
officers in Scindia’s service, or any of Scindia’s troops from their
employment with Scindia, and whether any and what emissary
should be sent to M. Perron or to the officers.”

Ten days after the date of these instructions Lord Wellesley writes
to General Lake: “I wish you to understand that I consider the
reduction of Scindia's power in the North-west Frontier of Hindustan
to be an important object in proportion to the probability of a war
with France. M. du Boigne (sic), Scindia’s late general, is now the
chief confidant of Bonaparte. He is constantly at St. Cloud. I leave
you to judge why and wherefore.”

On the 18th of July a secret and confidential memorandum is
despatched to the Commander-in-chief, in which the following
passage occurs :—

“The defeat of Perron is certainly the first object of the campaign.
The Commander-in-chief will consider what advantage can be
derived from any negotiations with Perron or Hessing (for Agra).
My opinion is that it might be dangerous to attempt any negotiation
with any of Scindia’s officers until we shall be masters of the field.

.. The Rajput and Jaut Rajahs are disgusted with Mahratta rule,
but their dread of Perron’s power exceeds their wish to be relieved,
and the same observation applies to the Sikh chiefs. . . . Colonel
Sutherland, lately dismissed from the command of a brigade by
Perron, might be able to give much valuable information, and be
instrumental in drawing over other officers from Perron. . . . I shall
cheerfully sanction any obligations or expenses incurred for the
purpose of conciliating the officers or ministers of the Confederates.”

On the 25th of July, in a secret despatch to Lord Castlereagh, the
Governor-General writes: ‘The state of preparation required by the
position and strength of Scindia’s French corps, under the command
of M. Perron, has already compelled me to restore the native corps to
the war establishment.”

Two days later, in a despatch to the Commander-in-chief, Lord
Wellesley more particularly explains his opinions: “ The regular
infantry in the service of Scindia, under the command of European
officers, is supported by funds derivable almost exclusively from the
territorial possessions of that chief, situated between the Jumna and
the Ganges, and the mountains of Kamaon. A considerable portion,
if not the whole, of the territory has been assigned to M. Perron, a
French officer who has succeeded M. du Boigne (sic) in the chief
command of Scindia’s regular infantry. M. Perron has formed his
LORD WELLESLEY'S DESPATCHES. 295

territory into an independant state, of which Scindia’s regular
infantry may justly be termed the national army. The inhabitants
of the districts comprehended in M. Perron’s Jaghir consider that
officer as their immediate sovereign, while the troops supported from
the revenues of the country regard M. Perron as the immediate
executive authority from which the army is to receive orders, sub-
sistence, and pay. Possessing such means, M. Perron dictates with
the authority of a sovereign state of a superior rank, and with the
vigour of efficient military power, to the petty states occupying the
countries to the southward of the Jumna, and by the terror of his
name and arms holds in abject submission the Rajput states of
Jeypore and Jodpore, together with the Jhauts and the state of Gohud,
extendiag his influence even to Bundelkhand and to the country
occupied by the Sikhs. Scindia retains no efficient control over M-
Perron, or over his regular troops. Various instances must be
familiar to your Excellency’s knowledge in which M. Perron has
either openly disobeyed, or systematically evaded the orders of
Scindia, especially in the late crisis of that chiefs affairs. M. Perron
has for some time past manifested a systematic disposition to remove
all British subjects from the command of Scindia’s regular infantry,
and to introduce French officers under his own immediate patronage.
M. Perron is supposed to have amassed a considerable fortune, and
your Excellency is intimately acquainted with his anxious desire to
retire to Europe, and to dispose of his actual command, and of his
territorial possessions to some person of the French nation. To these
considerations it is important to add that M. Perron is in possession of
the person of the unfortunate emperor, Shah Allum, and consequently
is master of the nominal authority of that unhappy prince, and
therefore may transfer this valuable possession, with his property of
any other description, to any French adventurer or officer who may
be enabled to complete such a purchase. Thus the coincidence of
various extraordinary and uncontrollable accidents, and the weakness
of Scindia’s personal character, have contributed to found an
Independant French State on the most vulnerable part of the
Company’s frontier. Under the influence of a succession of French
adventurers, this state must be exposed to the intrigue of the French
in India, and even to the ambition and hostile spirit of the person
who now rules the French nation. Nor could an instrument of
destruction more skilfully adapted to wound the heart of the British
nation be presented to the vindictive hand of the First Consul of
France. This French state actually holds possession of the person
and nominal authority of the Mogul, maintains the most efficient
296 PERRON.

army of regular native infantry and the most powerful artillery
existing in India with the exception of the Company’s troops, and
exercises a considerable authority over the neighbouring states, from
the banks of the Indus to the confluence of the Ganges and Jumna.
In the present crisis, when every circumstance announces the
probability of a renewal of the war with France, and urges the
necessity of resorting to every practicable measure of precaution and
security, the safety of the British dominions requires the reduction of
M. Perron’s military resources and power, independantly of any
question which might exist between Scindia and the British Govern-
ment.”

This explicit declaration of the views and opinions of the Marquis
Wellesley amply confirms the testimony previously adduced of
the high political position held by Perron. His Jaidad was “an
Independent French State,” in which he “ dictated with the authority
of a sovereign of high rank,” and his army constituted “a menace to
the British dominion in India.” This was the height of power and
influence to which the runaway sailor from a French frigate had
raised himself. It was an elevation even more astounding than De
Boigne’s, an usurpation of authority more audacious than that of George
Thomas. Had Perron resigned his post at this moment he would
have left behind him a reputation second to no adventurer’s in India.
But the splendour of his success was to be marred by the squalor of
his dawnfall. He lacked the respectable dignity of De Boigne and
the dauntless defiance of George Thomas; and in the last few days of
his power, when summoned to face the culminating crisis of his life,
he showed a weakness of purpose that prejudices all his previous
achievements, and his exit from the scene wherein he had played so
prominent a part was that of a poltroon, clutching his money bags
and crying for quarter before he had struck a single blow.
CHAPTER IX.
PERRON DE PROFUNDIS.
1803.

PON the declaration of war by Lord Wellesley, Sindhia’s Regular
Brigades numbered over 39,000 men, with 5,000 Hindustani
horse and 464 guns. In addition to these there were 35,000 Maratha
cavalry and fifteen battalions of infantry belonging to Ambaji Inglia,
and also sundry garrison troops, so that the entire strength was not
far short of 90,000 men-at-arms. The Rajah of Berar contributed
fifteen battalions of infantry, 30,000 horse,‘and 60 guns, and Shamshir
Bahadur 10,000 troops of sorts. The Confederate army was divided
as follows :—

With Sindhia, in the Deccan, were Perron’s First Brigade, under
Colonel Pohlman, four battalions of Jean Baptiste Filoze’s corps, under
Dupont, and four battalions of the Begum Somru’s, under Colonel
Saleur. These totalled 10,400 men. The Rajah of Berar’s infantry
was estimated at 6,000, and the combined Maratha cavalry at 50,000.
The cannon numbered 190 pieces.

Ein route to Hindustan were Perron’s Fourth Brigade, under
Dudrenee, and five battalions of the Fifth Brigade under Brownrige
—in all nearly 8,000 men. Ambaji’s infantry and cavalry increased
the total to about 25,000 of all arms.

At Ujjain was stationed Jean Baptiste Filoze’s party of six bat-
talions, numbering 3,000 men, with 60 guns. They were destined for
the defence of the capital, and had no share in any of the historical
actions of the war.

With Perron in Hindustan were the Second and Third Brigades,
under Bourguien and Geslin, at Delhi. Two battalions of the Fifth
Brigade and 5,000 Hindustan horse af Koil, and at Aligarh the
garrison troops under Pedron, and a similar body at Agra under
George Hessing. In addition there were about 10,000 Maratha
cavalry.

297
298 PERRON.

As far back as the month of March Sindhia had ordered Perron to
bring his army into a state of readiness to take the field, and these
instructions were faithfully executed. By the end of June it became
publicly known that war was inevitable. Perron was busy with his
preparations at Aligarh, and orders were issued to all the feudatory
chiefs in Northern India to rally to the standard. The Emperor’s
royal tent was pitched at Delhi, and it was proclaimed that Sindhia
was about to take up arms against the English in order to defend the
Mughal from tyrants who sought to usurp his throne. The Second
and Third Brigades were massed at the capital and the Fourth was
on its way to join them, after its fruitless march to the Deccan.
Shah ’Alam was invited to place himself at the head of the army—a
proposal the helpless old man was not in a position to decline
Harstk Rai, Perron’s chief banker, was sent to the capital to advance
whatsoever money might be required for the troops. In short, all
that was possible was done to put the army on a sound war footing,
and bring every available man into the field.

It is beyond doubt that Perron’s fixed determination was to fight.
However spurious his lip-loyalty had been in the past, he now girded
his loins for war. One can only surmise the reason for this. It was
certainly not his fidelity to his master’s cause, for he had displayed
his insensibility to this too often; nor was it to secure his fortune, for
he had declined the offer of a safe conduct to Calcutta, which had
been recently guaranteed him ; nor could it have been for the pure
love of fighting, for although Perron had in the past shown himself
a gallant man, he was never carried away by that lust of battle
which distinguished George Thomas. Lord Wellesley suggested that
he stayed on, hoping in the event of war to find two powers bidding
for his sword; but this was disproved by his declining overtures sub-
sequently made to him by General Lake. There remains only one
solution to account for his line of conduct—his relations with the French
Government. He was too deeply committed to dare to withdraw from
Hindustan, especially with the knowledge that General Decaen’s
expedition, which had been despatched not improbably on his appli-
cation, was at Pondicherry. This in itself made his return to France
without striking a blow impossible. Had he deserted his post at the
eleventh hour he could never have faced the First Consul, to whom he
had sent an ambassador offering him the dominion of Hindustan.
It was necessity, not choice, which made him apparently loyal to
Sindhia, and decided him to see the contest out; to which end he
sent his family and treasure to Agra, and made every preparation to
resist General Lake,
PERRON DE PROFUNDIS. 299

But there was one power with which Perron had not reckoned, and
whose attack he had not even anticipated. This was the enmity
behind him. One cannot but feel a compassion for this faithless man
when one learns the reason of his downfall. For even as he was
bracing himself for the momentous struggle, working with energy
and ability, hurrying from post to post, and doing everything in his
power to safeguard Sindhia’s interests, intrigue and treachery were
leagued against him in secret and plotting his downfall. As he had
meted it out to his master, so it was to be meted out to him.

Just before the declaration of war, Lord Wellesley issued a very
judicious proclamation inviting all the English officers in Maratha
employ to quit their stations and come over to the British Govern-
ment, under promise of pensions graduated to their rank. Most of
the adventurers in Sindhia’s army took advantage of this. Amongst
them were Captain Carnegie, a Scotchman, and Captain Stewart, a
country-born—both in the Second Brigade—who at an early date
signified to Perron their intention of leaving the service. Hearing
which the General grew furious, and summarily dismissed seven
other British-born officers, ordering them to quit Maratha territory
forthwith, and following this action by a general discharge of all
British and British country-born subjects in the brigades. It was a
swift and prompt way of cutting the Gordian knot, and was resented
by not a few, who remonstrated against the sweeping decision. But
Perron’s wrath was roused, and the only reply he vouchsafed was a
warning to them not to be found within reach of the Marithé camp
after a certain date. His conduct is hardly to be wondered at: for
many months past he had been unpopular with his English sub-
ordinates, whom he had mortified and disgraced in the most unjust
way. Such men were not the ones to rely on in this extremity: their
prejudices were fixed and antagonistic to him. Fully realising this,
Perron determined to expel them from his service, and to repose his
confidence on his own countrymen alone, especially on those related
to him by marriage or bound to him by ties of gratitude. Herein he
made his last and most fatal mistake.

On the 20th of August Perron heard of General Lake’s advance.
He immediately wrote to the British Commander-in-chief, expressing
his surprise and demanding to be informed if war had been declared
against Sindhia. In reply, General Lake explained his march in
general terms, and at the same time invited Perron to send a con-
fidential officer to confer. This was in accordance with instructions
received from Lord Wellesley, who had shortly before written to the
Commander-in-chief in the following terms :—
800 PERRON.

“Tt would be highly desirable to detach M. Perron from Scindia’s
service by pacific negotiation. M. Perron’s inclination certainly is to
dispose of his power to a French purchaser. I should not be sur-
prised if he were found to be ready to enter into terms with your
Excellency, provided he could obtain a sufficient security for his
personal interests. I empower your Excellency to conclude any
agreement for the security of M. Perron’s personal interests and
property, accompanied by any reasonable remuneration from the
British Government, which shall induce him to deliver up the whole
of his military resources and power, together with all his territorial
possessions and the person of the Mogul and the heir-apparent, into
your Excellency’s hands.”

Perron sent no‘reply to General Lake’s letter until the 27th of
August, when he wrote expressing an earnest desire to find some con-
venient means of avoiding hostilities, but declining the proposition of
sending a confidential officer to the British camp, on the grounds that
such a step would excite the jealousy of Sindhia. But, asa counter pro-
posal, he suggested that General Lake should send an officer to him.
With this the latter did not think fit to comply, but in conveying his
refusal he mentioned that the aim of the proposed conference with a
confidential officer of Perron had no reference to the public affairs of
the British Government, but to the private interests of Perron, and to
the means of executing with ease and safety his recent design of
withdrawing from Sindhia’s service.

Perron’s reply was one that did him honour. He stated that it
was his intention to stay by Sindhia during the present crisis, and
that it was impossible for him to retire until his successor was
appointed. But he added that he would send his aide-de-camp to
General Lake, and, in consequence, Mr. Beckett attended the Com-
mander-in-chief on the 29th. But the conversation that ensued was
of a vague character, excepting that Beckett would not agree to any
proposition for Perron’s surrender, and he withdrew without any
arrangement being concluded.

General Lake had during these communications steadily continued
his march, and when they were concluded he was at the gates of
Aligarh. Directly Mr. Beckett had left the camp the British army
moved out to attack Perron, whose force consisted of about 15,000
cavalry, which included his own 5,000 regular Hindustani horse.
The position they had taken up was a strong one and favourable for
defence, their front being covered by an extensive swamp, which was
unfordable in many parts, whilst their right flank was protected by
the fortress of Aligarh, and their left derived considerable advantage
PERRON DE PROFUNDIS. 301

from the nature of the ground. Directly Perron observed indications
of the hostile movement in the British camp he struck his own tents
and drew up his cavalry in line of battle.

General Lake determined to try and turn the left flank of the
enemy, and, forming his cavalry up in two lines and his infantry in
three or four, as the confused nature of the ground permitted,
advanced to the attack. As he was executing this mancuvre a fine
opportunity was afforded Perron of making a bold charge with his
cavalry upon an enemy who numbered only two men to his three ;
but he did not dare to strike a blow, being intimidated and con-
founded; and his indecision ran through the ranks. No sooner had
General Lake fired a few rounds from his galloper-guns than Perron’s
force turned and fied. The irregular portion disbanded and dispersed
to their homes, and the 5,000 Hindustani horse followed their chief
in retreat to Mandu, a large village eight miles south of Koil.

Amongst the British officers whom Perron had recently dismissed
from Sindhia’s service were Skinner and Stewart (country-borns),
Fergusson and Carnegie (Scotchmen), and Lucan and Henessy
(Irishmen)—the latter a deserter from the 14th Native Infantry, in
which he had been sergeant-major. They had started from Koil on
the day previous to the battle, and were proceeding southward to
Agra, where their families resided. About midday on the 29th, being
encamped by the roadside during the heat of noon, they saw the
Maratha horse galloping towards them in a disorderly manner, as
they fled from the fight. Presently Perron himself dashed up “in
confusion and without his hat.” Skinner, who at that time was
bound by no tie to the British interest, had made up his mind to
apply to Sindhia for redress, since his remonstrance against summary
dismissal had been of no avail with Perron. This is how the story of
what now occurred is told in his memoirs :-—

“Skinner went up to Perron immediately, and told him he had
come to again remonstrate against his dismissal, and had determined
to remain in the service and share his fortunes. ‘Ah! no, no,’
replied Perron, ‘itis all over. These fellows [the horse] have behaved
ill; do not ruin yourself; go over to the British; it is all up with
us!’ ‘By no means,’ replied Skinner. ‘Itis not so. Let us rally
yet and make a stand. You may depend upon having many yet to
fight for you.’ But Perron still shook his head, and after a little
while said in his bad English, ‘Ah, no, Monsieur Skinner. I not
trust. I not trust. I ’fraid you all go.’ Skinner on this got angry,
and retorted, saying that in that case it was Perron who was the
traitor, if he meant to proceed in that way; if, on account of one or
302 PERRON.

two ingrates, he should lose to his master the services of many
faithful persons, this was the way to ruin the cause. But that if he
persevered in doing all for the best, no doubt he might still hold the
country and effectively serve his master. But Perron, who had made
up his mind on the matter, still refused to have anything more to do
either with him or any of his brother officers, on which Skinner
declared he would go to Sindhia himself and complain. Perron
answered impatiently, and bidding no further parley, shook his head
and rode off, saying, ‘Good-bye, Monsieur Skinner. No trust, no
trust!’ ‘Then you may go to the devil!’ roared Skinner after him.”

Perron pursued his way to Hathras, where he made over the com-
mand of the Hindustani horse to Monsieur Fleurea, and ordered him
to go to Cawnpore, destroying the country as he went. Perron him-
self retreated to Agra, where his family, and a great portion of his
wealth in precious stones, jewels, and shawls, had been sent.

The following day, the 30th of August, General Lake sent a summons
to Colonel Pedron to surrender Aligarh. Pedron was not disinclined to
listen to terms, but he simultaneously received a letter from Perron,
who either divined or was informed of the Commandant’s weakness,
and this document is worth quoting, if only to exhibit the singular
effrontery of the man who, having himself shamefully avoided battle
under the walls of Aligarh two days previously, could write in the
strain he now adopted :—

“To Colonel Pedron.

“ Sir,—You will have received the answer you are to make to the
propositions of General Lake. I never could have believed that for
an instant you could have thought of capitulation.

“ Remember you are a Frenchman, and let no action of yours tarnish
the high character of the nation.

“T hope in a few days to send back the English commander as fast,
or faster, than he came. Make yourself perfectly easy on the subject.
Either the Emperor’s army or the army of General Lake shall find a
grave before the fort of Alyghur. Do your duty; and defend the fort
while one stone remains upon another.

‘Once more remember your nation. The eyes of millions are fixed
upon you.

“T am, ete.,
“C, Perron.”

Of a surety a characteristic letter, with its vainglorious vauntings
and its ineffable French vanity. Nor must notice be omitted of the
PERRON DE PROFUNDIS. 303

reference to the Emperor’s—not Sindhia’s—army, by whose valour
and heroism so great store was set. And yet, even as he invoked its
courage and protested its fidelity till death, that army was renouncing
Perron and swearing allegiance to Brigadier-General Louis Bourguien,
ex-cook of Calcutta, and guondam pyrotechnist of Lucknow, awhile it
clamoured for the life of the man who cited its virtues.

The fortress of Aligarh had been rendered strong by all the skill and
pains which science could bestow, and Perron reposed the most im-
plicit confidence in Pedron. But the latter—‘a stout, elderly man,
dressed in a green jacket with gold lace and epaulets ’—was not made
of that stern metal requisite for defending a place ‘‘ while one stone
remained upon another.” On the contrary, he would have hailed
capitulation with relief, had not the garrison refused to agree with
him. The troops in the fort consisted of 800 regulars, 1,000 Rajputs,
and 1,200 irregulars, and a squadron of horse. These men resolved to
defend the place to the end, and deposing Pedron, elected for their
commander a Bahadari Rajput named Baji Rao, who signalised his
accession to office by confining “ the stout, elderly man in green,” and
occupying the place of honour in charge of the gate and outer fort.

General Lake, finding his summons disregarded and his terms
refused, assaulted the stronghold on the 4th of September, with 500
Europeans and three battalions of Sepoys. This force left the camp
at 2a.m., and reached the walls alittle beforedawn. Lieutenant Lucan,
the Irishman who had recently left Sindhia’s service, and had since
been received by General Lake, volunteered to lead the storming party.
A picquet of 50 men with a 6-pounder gun had been stationed by Baji
Rao about fifty yards from the fort, and this was quickly driven back
by the forlorn hope, who captured the gun afler a desperate tussle.
They then made for the moat, which was so broad and deep that a
three-decker might have floated in it, and crossed it by a narrow
causeway leading to the gate, which was raked by two or three guns,
and flanked by a bastion, from whence a most destructive fire was kept
up. Scaling-ladders were now applied to the walls and an attempt made
to mount them, but the stormers were repulsed. A 12-pounder was
then run up to the gate, and after five shots it was blown open. The
conflict now became a hand-to-hand one, the garrison fighting with
stubborn bravery, but by degrees the attacking force made good its
footing, and eventually succeeded in capturing what had hitherto been
regarded as an impregnable fortress. The Rajputs ‘ fought like lions,”
and Baji Rao was killed, with 2,000 of the defenders. Gallant and
loyal men they were, as the following extract from General Lake’s
letter of the 4th of September shows: ‘‘Ihad tried every method to
304 PERRON.

prevail upon these people to give up the fort, and offered a very large
sum of money, but they were determined to hold out, which they did
most obstinately, and, I may say, most gallantly. From the extvra-
ordinary strength of the place, and being obliged to win it inch by inch,
it being so determinedly defended, in my opinion British valour never
shone more conspicuous.”’

The English loss at the storming of Aligarh was very heavy, no less
than 223 officers and men being killed and wounded. One hundred
and nine guns were captured, exclusive of wall-pieces, and a vast
quantity of warlike stores and material, including thousands of regi-
mental uniforms, chiefly blue jackets with red facings, made after the
French fashion. Pedron, in spite of himself, had the honour of being
made a prisoner of war.

The intrepid coup de main on the fort of Aligarh was a mortal blow,
not only to Perron, but toSindhia. It created a panic in the minds of
the natives, and astonished every prince in Hindustan, giving them
exaggerated ideas of European valour and prowess.

It will be remembered that M. Fleurea had been detached with
Perron’s 5,000 Hindustani horse to harry the country towards Cawn-
pore. He carried out his orders, and to him belongs the single success
achieved by any portion of Sindhia’s regular army during the war.
Making his way to Shikohabad, a small out-post in the Company’s
frontier district of Etawah, held by Lieutenant-Colonel Coningham,
with five companies of the 11th Native Infantry and one gun, Fleurea
attacked it on the 2nd of September. From four in the morning till
two o’clock in the afternoon the garrison resisted all his attempts with
great spirit and resolution, and ultimately obliged him to fall back.
The attack was, however, resumed on the 4th, and Colonel Coning-
ham, through the failure of his ammunition, was compelled to capitu-
late after two hours’ fighting, and to give his parole that none of the
garrison should serve against Sindhia during the continuance of the
war. He retired to Cawnpore with his arms, ammunition, and all
his private property, the cantonment being burnt and pillaged, but
Mrs. Wilson, an ofticer’s wife, was carried off by the Mahrattas. Colonel
Coningham lost four of his officers and 63 Sepoys killed and wounded,
whilst Fleurea purchased his victory dearly, at the expense of seven
officers and 500 men. No sooner had these terms been arranged than
news arrived of the fall of Aligarh. Fleurea’s troopers refused to
believe the fort had been taken by assault, but maintained that it
had been treacherously surrendered by Perron, and immediately made
their way to Agra in great indignation, expecting to find the general
there. He had, however, removed with his family and effects to
PERRON DE PROFUNDIS. 805

Mattra, taking with him his bodyguard of 800 horsemen, mounted
from his own stable, and here Fleurea’s horse joined him—a reinforce-
ment which, as events happened, proved highly inconvenient.

For within the period of one short week that had elapsed since his
flight from Aligarh Perron was destined to see the whole fabric of his
power fall in fragments to the ground, and the army he had so long
commanded arrayed in revolt against him. More bitter to bear than
this was the revelation that his bosom friend Bourguien was at the
head of the mutiny which declared their chief’s deposition.

Bourguien had received early intelligence of Ambaji’s appointment
to supersede Perron, and on the first rumour reaching him began to
plot and intrigue against his chief, and publicly announced that he
had gone over to the English. A semblance of confirmation was given
to this by Perron’s supine conduct at the battle of Koil; and no
sooner did news of the abortive resistance reach Delhi, than Bourguien
threw off all disguise, and called on the Third Brigade to elevate him
to the supreme control, which they forthwith did. He then attempted
to win over the Second, under Monsieur Geslin, but this officer stood
true to Perron, and denounced Bourguien. But the spirit of mutiny
was abroad, and his men placed Geslin and all their officers of the
Second Brigade in arrest under fixed bayonets, and declared for Bour-
guien. The latter now demanded an audience with the Emperor, and
procured from him a Khilut of investure as Commander-in-chief of
the Imperial army. The blind and helpless monarch, in no position
to withhold favours, acquiesced with the simple faith that distinguished
all his actions whenever he was complimented by the request for an
exhibition of his regal authority. Never, surely, did such « stalking
horse exist for knaves to veil their designs, as poor old Shah ’Alam,
who deputed more authority from a prison than many a sovereign
has done from a throne.

But Bourguien had not reckoned with Captain Drugeon, the keeper
of the King. Drugeon had been in trouble once, but had experienced
Perron’s clemency and forgiveness. He remembered this now, and in
the moment of his chief's downfall struck a loyal blow on his behalf.
Resisting Bourguien’s demand to deliver up to him all the public
treasure, Drugeon turned out his garrison of 5,000 men and expelled
the usurper from the fort, at the same time informing the Emperor
that he would obey no one except he had Perron’s orders.

Bourguien immediately laid siege to the citadel of Delhi, and
planted a battery of eight guns in front of the Rajghdt bastion,
which he battered for two days and laid level with the ground. Where-
upon the Emperor begged him to suspend operations, saying he would

20
306 PERRON.

contrive to make Drugeon obey orders. Bourguien having in the
meantime secured the person of Perron’s chief banker, Harsik Rai,
found sufficient occupation in squeezing several lakhs of rupees out of
him—at which interesting point the story stops.

The usurpation of Perron’s office was not sufficient for Bourguien,
who, with truly Oriental thoroughness, determined to avoid half
measures, and complete the work he had begun. He now wrote to
the native officers of the Hindustani horse at Mattra, denouncing
Perron asa traitor, and ordering them to seize him, and, if necessary,
put him to death. It seems scarcely credible that a man who owed
everything he possessed to Perron should have been guilty of such
black and dastardly treachery. But its confirmation comes circum-
stantially, and on the authority of Skinner, Smith, and Perron himself,
who adds that his assassination was only prevented by the presence of
mind of his aide-de-camp.

This was the last drop in the bitter cup, already filled to overflowing.
A concatenation of disasters, misfortunes, and dangers was crushing
Perron as suddenly as swiftly. First came the fall of Aligarh; then
his supersession by Ambaji Inglia, his implacable enemy. Simulta-
neously the revolt of the Second and Third Brigades, and the news that
the commander of the Fourth Brigade had already pronounced for
Ambaji, despite the fact that Dudrenec had been selected by Perron as
his own successor. Lastly came this attempt on his life, instigated by
Bourguien, at the hands of the cavalry who had come hurrying in from
Shikohébad, already incited against Perron by the news of the fall of
Aligarh, which seemed to them primd facic evidence of his treachery.
All these slings and arrows of outrageous fortune crowded in together,
and struck home, one after another, within the period of a few hours.

No wonder that Perron was “confounded with the dangers which
surrounded him,” and determined to throw himself on the liberality
of the British Government for protection and safety. But in order to
accomplish this he was obliged to employ stratagem. Mustering
his Hindustani horse he harangued them, condemning Bourguien’s
conduct, and assuring them of his own loyalty. He declared he
would at once march to punish the mutineers and then, if they
would follow him faithfully, drive the British out of the Dodb. These
were brave words, but he had braver material behind them. As an
earnest of his good intentions, he handed over three lakhs of rupees
to the native officers to be distributed amongst the men. It was an
astute piece of liberality, and resulted, as Perron had counted, in the
soldiery quarrelling over the division. Meanwhile he prepared their
minds for his departure, by announcing that he would cross the Jumna
that evening, with his bodyguard, en rowte for Delhi.
PERRON DE PROFUNDIS. 307

Everything turned out according to his desires. By sunsct he had
placed the river between him and his Hindustani horse, and, by
bribing the ferrymen, secured the retainment of every boat on his side
of the stream for the rest of the night. He then left, saying he was
going to encamp a short distance ahead; instcad of which he made a
forced march of thirty miles to Sasni, sending on an express to General
Lake to inform him that he had resigned Sindhia’s service, and
desired to renew his application to retire within the Company’s
territories to Lucknow.

In this letter, which reached General Lake on the 7th of September,
Perron mentioned that he had just heard of the appointment of his
successor, which relieved him of all obligations to remain at his post,
and further observed that the treachery and ingratitude of his European
officers convinced him that further resistance to the British was
useless.

The Commander-in-chief immediately complied with Perron’s
request, and detached a British officer to meet him and conduct him
in safety to Lucknow. He also permitted Perron to retain his body-
guard as an escort, and provided for his reception in the Company’s
territories with every mark of respect and honour. This course of
action was later on approved by the Governor-General, who wrote : “ I
consider the retirement of General Perron in the present crisis of
affairs to be an event highly favourable to the success of the British
arms, and to the interests of the British Government in India. It
must also diminish the confidence which the Native powers of India
have been accustomed to repose in the fidelity of their French
officers.”

Thus in ten days from General Lake’s arrival before Aligarh
Perron’s power was dissolved, and himself a fugitive in the British
camp. Never surely did a master of so many legions fall so swiftly,
and so ignominiously Not asingle blow had he struck to uphold that
sovereign power which he had wielded for seven years. All his brave
schemes, his elaborate plans of campaign, his protestations of fidelity,
his vauntings, and his vanity had melted into nothingness at the first
sight of the British flag flying in the heart of his domain. With a lie
on his lips, and his trembling hands squandering gold to bribe the
soldiery he dared not trust, Perron fled from his kingdom, followed
by the execrations of his troops and the exultant denunciation of his
fellow-countrymen.

The causes which led to this dramatic downfall were many. In
the first place Perron had calculated that the British army would
wait for the termination of the rainy scason before starting from
308 PERRON.

Cawnpore, whereas General Lake marched out in mid monsoon. He
considered that Aligarh would sustain a siege of at least two months,
during which time he would be able to bring up his brigades and fight
an advantageous battle beneath its walls. But his impregnable for-
tress fell in a single day, and this, in itself, appalled him. His sudden
supersession by Ambaji, under whom he was ordered to serve, con-
fronted him with actual danger to his person and property. The
defection of his brigadcs, one after another, paralysed him and left him
helpless. But, above all, the treachery of his bosom friend Bourguien
crowned his tribulations, and forced from him the et tw Brute that
bows its head in despair, and resigns itself to fate.
CHAPTER X.
BOURGUIEN IN EXCELSIS.
1808.

ERRON'’S flight left the road completely clear for Louis Bourguicu,
who was a man as weak as he was wicked, as conceited as le
was incompetent, and as timid as he was treacherous. It was in
keeping with his character that he should seek to make a stepping-
stcne of his benefactor. From time to time Bourguien’s shadow has
fallen across these pages, yet never once gloriously. Whether at
Ajmir, endeavouring to bribe an enemy he could not beat, or at
Georgegarh keeping out of range of fire, or at Hansi, entering into
foul intrigue to ruin a brave man, he is always an inflated, low-born
fellow, fitted only to handle his native skewers, or discharge the
rockets of braggadocio. Lut he never fell so despicably low as when
he proved a traitor to Perron, who had paid him the compliment of
believing in him, At the first whisper of omen, this renegade
braggart, whom every consideration should have impelled to remain
true to his chief, was the first to declare against him, and on the
lofty grounds—forsooth—of loyalty to Sindhia’s service! Louis
Bourguien apostrophising the code of honour is an idea too precious
to be lost!

It has been shown how Bourguien tampered with the brigades at
Delhi, and induced them to elect him to their head, and how Geslin
and Drugeon opposed him without success. He gained the day, and
was for a time in nominal command of the Imperial army. ‘ But,”
says Lewis Ferdinand Smith, ‘‘ he baffled his own ends. If once the
reins of subordination are thrown aside, and the soldiery encouraged
to revolt, it is difficult to check or repress the commotion which often,
like a dangerous instrument in feeble hands, recoils on Lim who holds
it. Such was the result of the mutinous spirit Bourguien had infused

into the troops of the two brigades. Licentious with impunity, they
309
310 PERRON.

despised the orders of him who had taught then to despise their own
Commander-in-chief.”

After the fall of Aligarh Delhi became the rallying point for the
troops Perron had deserted. Thither rode Fleurea’s 5,000 Hindustani
horse, convinced now that Bourguien was a true man, since he had
warned them of the general’s defection. When they arrived at the
capital they found the brigades—which included eighteen battalions
and 110 pieces of cannon—in a state of mutinous confusion and
anarchy. Simultaneously news arrived that General Lake, with rapid
marches, was approaching. A change at once came o’er the spirit of
Bourguien’s dream, and he endeavoured to persuade the troops to
retire to Hariana.

This opened their eyes and convinced them that their new general
was as craven and untrustworthy as their discarded one. Never in the
history of the brigades had battle been shirked, as it was now pro-
posed to shirk it. The spirit of the men rebelled against the
cowardice of their officers, and they forthwith deposed Bourguien and
placed him in confinement, electing 1 Native name Sarwar Khan to
the chief command.

Such is Skinner’s version of the progress of events at Delhi during
the few days preceding General Lake’s arrival. But Bourguien must
have been released almost immediately, for he personally superin-
tended the preparations for defence, and wasin command at the battle
that shortly took place. On the Yth of September he moved his two
brigades down to Patbarghat and began to cross the Jumma, and by the
11th twelve battalions of infantry, 5,000 Hindustani horse, and 70 pieces
of cannon had effected the passage, when the arrival of the British
army compelled iim to form his troops for battle, which he did in
tolerably good order, but taking care to keep himself, with some
cavalry, out of reach of fire.

General Lake was unaware of the proximity of the enemy, for they
were entirely concealed from view by the high grass jungle which in-
tervened. Having completed a fatiguing march of eighteen miles,
and reached the banks of the Hindun river, six miles distant from
Delhi, the British army began to pitch their tents ; and some of the
Sepoys were actually engaged in cooking their food, when a large body
of Bourguien’s horse suddenly appeared so close at hand that the
grand guard and advanced pickets were at once turned out. The
enemy’s numbers increasing, General Lake went to the front to re-
connoitre, accompanied by three regiments of cavalry. He found
Bourguien’s army drawn up in complete order of battle, on rising
ground, and with their guns strongly posted.
BOURGUIEN IN EXCELSIS. 311

It was not a favourable hour to accept battle, for the time was mid-
day, and the British troops wearied with a long march, having been
in motion since three o’clock in the morning. The heat was intense,
and under the fierce rays of a September sun many of the Euro-
peans had been prostrated by sunstroke. General Lake’s entire force
consisted of 4,500 men, and included one King’s regiment (the 76th),
seven battalions of Sepoys, the 27th Dragoons, and two regiments of
Native cavalry. With these he had to oppose nearly 10,000 regular
infantry, 5,000 Hindustani horse, and 70 guns, posted in an advan-
tageous position.

Bourguien opened the action with a heavy cannonade, which caused
General Lake to send orders for the infantry and artillery to move up
instantly to the front. They were quickly formed, and marched for-
ward in columns of grand divisions from each battalion, but it was at
least an hour before they joined the general; and all this time his
cavalry was exposed to a constantjand well-directed artillery fire, which
occasioned heavy loss. At last the Commander-in-chief (whose horse
had been shot under him), perceiving the enemy were so strongly posted
as to make an attack not only difficult but hazardous, determined to
draw them on to more level ground by a feint, and ordered the
cavalry to retire with the double object in view of enticing the enemy
from their position, and effecting a more rapid junction with the
infantry, than if he had waited for them to come up. The manceuvre
was entirely successful, for Bourguien’s battalions immediately left
their ground, and pursued the retreating cavalry with exultant shouts
of victory. But they halted dead when suddenly the British infantry
came in sight. General Lake’s cavalry at once opened from the centre
to permit the infantry to pass through to the front, then the line was
swiftly formed, whilst the cavalry massed and took up a position about
forty yards in the rear of the right wing.

The order was now given for a general advance. Led by the Com-
mander-in-chief in person, and amidst a tremendous fire of round, grape,
and chain-shot, the regiments pressed forward in one steady desperate
assault of bayonet against cannon. The men fell by scores, but they
never took their muskets from their shoulders till within a hundred
paces. Then the charge was sounded, and immediately the whole
line gave a single volley and doubled forward upon Bourguien’s guns
and battalions with such impetuosity, that the latter refused to meet
them, and, turning rightabout face, fled from the field. As soon as
the infantry charge was spent, General Lake gave the order to break
up into columns of companies, leaving gaps through which the
cavalry charged with the galloper guns, and falling upon the flying
312 PHERRON.

foe, rendered the victory a complete one. The battle was fought
within sight of the minarets of Delhi, and before sunset the British
army was encamped on the east bank of the Jumna, opposite the city.

It was the first time in their famous career that De Boigne’s
battalions had given way without showing stubborn fight. Had he
who created them commanded them, there would have been a
different tale to tell, but, deserted by their officers, and left without
proper control or direction, they obeyed the instincts which have
always asserted themselves in Asiatic troops when bereft of leaders.
Bourguien and his French officers were thie first to fly from the field,
and, accompanied by a few horsemen, who afforded them an example
of fidelity, they sought refuge in Delhi. ‘Here the miscreant” (to
quote General Lake’s despatch), ‘‘after plundering the city, took him-
self and his vagabonds offon the morning of the 12th, and the country
people were so enraged at being plundered by Bourguien, that they
retaliated by plundering the baggage of his fugitive troops.”

In the battle of Delhi General Lake lost 477 men killed and
wounded, of whom 181 belonged to the ranks of the gallant 76th.
In Bourguien’s army 3,000 men were killed and wounded, and 68 guns,
87 tumbrils of ammunition, and two tumbrils of treasure captured. The
report of the ordnance taken is an interesting document, and reflects
credit on the handiwork of Sangster. Colonel Horsford thus describes
the captured pieces : ‘‘ The iron guns (eight in number) are of Europe
manufacture. The brass guns, mortars, and howitzers have been cast
in India, one Portuguese three-pounder excepted. Some bear an in-
scription of having been made at Muttra, others at Agra; but the
whole are evidently from the designs and execution of an European
artist. The dimensions are in general those of the French, and the
workmanship is of as high a finish as any in the Company’s arsenal.
The whole of the guns are furnished with well-made elevating screws
of the latest French improvement.”

Three days after the battle of Delhi General Lake began the cross-
ing of the river, and on the 16th of September paid his first visit to
the Emperor, Shah ’Alaim. His progress to the palace was slow, for
the streets were thronged with the populace, eager to behold the
English general who had emancipated them from the bondage of the
French adventurers. General Lake found the great Mughal seated
under a small tattered canopy in a mockery of regal state. The aged
monarch showed signs of all the oppressions of old age, degraded
authority, and extreme poverty, and his miserable appearance was
eloquent of his recent sufferings. “ It reflected,” writes Major Thorn,
“indelible disgrace upon the merciless oppressors who had usurped
BOURGUIEN IN EXCELSIS. 318

his dominion,” and Lord Wellesley records that, ‘‘in the metaphorical
language of Asia, the Native news-writers, who described this extra-
ordinary scene, have declared that His Majesty’s deliverance restored
the sight to his eyes from excess of joy.” In addition to many other
marks of royal favour and condescension, the Emperor was graciously
pleased to confer upon General Lake the pleasing if voluminous title
of ‘The Sword of State; the Hero of the Land; the Lord of the Age;
and the Victorious in War.” His Majesty, it may be observed, was a
poet, and given to composing verses. A not inelegant translation of
one of his elegies is given in the Appendix to Francklin’s ‘“‘ Life of
Shah Allum.”

The views expressed above concerning the actual condition in which
Shah ’Alam was confined must be accepted with a certain amount of
reserve. It was almost an axiom in 1803 that a Frenchman could do
no good. Mills, the historian, is inclined to consider that the Emperor
was very fairly treated, even though Lord Wellesley talks of his ‘‘ de-
liverance from degradation and bondage.’ That the poor old man
was most cruelly used in the past has been shown in the sketch
of De Boigne’s life, but there is evidence that his condition was
much ameliorated when Drugeon was appointed his keeper. Up to
that time Shah ’Alam was nearly starved by Shabji the Fakir.
After this there is an indication that the Emperor was far from satis-
fied, for he wrote to Sindhia, requesting that his allowance might be
paid by that Prince himself, and not allowed to filter through channels
which evidently showed aleakage. The income allotted to Shah ’Alam
was nine lakhs of rupees annually, but Major Thorn asserts that
“not more than Rs.50,000 were actually appropriated for that purpose,
so that the descendant o Timur (who was at the time eighty-three
years of age) and his immense household were often in want of the
common necessaries of life.” The suggestion immediately forces
itself forward—who had the eight and a half lakhs unaccounted for ?
Not Drugeon, for his savings amounted to only Rs. 30,000. He was,
moreover, merely the deputy of Perron, to whom Sindhia granted
the Soubalhdari of Delhi in place of Shahji.

Lord Wellesley thus summarises the situation after the occupation
of the capital. ‘By the success of our arms interesting purposes of
humanity were accomplished, and so far as the object is regarded in
a political point of view, His Majesty Shah ’Allum being placed under
the protection of the British Government, no other power can now
avail itself of the weight and influence which the Emperor’s name
must ever possess amongst the Mahomedan inhabitants of Hindostan.
The attention of the Governor-General is now directed to the forma-
314 PERRON.

tion of a permanent arrangement for the future dignity and comfort
of His Imperial Majesty. . . . He has also given directions to provide
for the nobility and the great officers of state at Dellii, whose fortunes
have been destroyed by the successful usurpation of Scindia’s French
adventurers.”

Thus, after a life of singular trial and vicissitude, Shah ’Alam found
a suitable repose in his extreme old age. But the fact must not be
lost sight of that the British Government never attempted to restore
that authority and power which ‘‘Scindia and the French adventurers
had usurped,” but merely appropriated it itself. The moral justifica-
tion for this does not appear to be discussed in any official work on
the subject.

Three days after the battle of Delhi Louis Bourguien surrendered,
with four of his officers, whose names are given as Gessin (? Geslin),
Guerinnier, Del. Perron, and Jean Pierre. It is also probable that
Drugeon asked and obtained quarter at the same time, for there is a
reference in one of General Lake’s despatches to a sum of five and a
half lakhs of rupees ‘“‘ captured in the hands of M. Drugeon,” which
was divided as prize-money. Bourguien and the officers with him
were confined under a strong guard, and alittle later sent to Fateligarh,
from whence they were deported to the Presidency. Their surrender
was accelerated by the dangers that threatened them from the enraged
populace of the capital, to escape whose resentment they were very
glad to solicit British protection.

Thus, within the space of a fortnight (including the interregnum
during which he was imprisoned by his own troops), began, flourished,
and ended the reign of Brigadier-General Bourguien. Begotten in
treachery, conducted with cowardice, and concluded in defeat and
dishonour, Louis Bourguien’s Indian career found a fitting termina-
tion. It will not, perhaps, surprise the reader to learn that on the
achievement of his last fortnight he founded a claim to having vali-
antly endeavoured to save the Maratha Empire from destruction.
CHAPTER XI.
LASWARI AND ASSAYE.
1803.

FTER establishing matters on a sound footing at Delhi, General
Lake marched, on the 24th of September, for Agra, leaving the
capital and the Emperor’s person in charge of Colonel Ochterlony,
who was supported by a battalion and a half of the Company’s Native
infantry, and two newly-raised regiments of Najzbs, recruited from men
recently in Perron’s service, and commanded by Lieutenants Birch and
Woodwill, ex-officers in Sindhia’s employ. It should also be men-
tioned that immediately after the battle of Delhi eight Risdlas or
squadrons of the Hindustani horse came over to General Lake, and
were taken into British employ, Captain Skinner being appointed to
command them. These subsequently became a famous regiment,
kvown as Skinner's Irregular Horse.

There were six battalions of Perron’s Second and Third Brigades
which had failed to cross the Jumna in time to participate in the
battle of the 11th. So soon as the day was lost they fled to Fatehpur
Sikri, where they divided. Three, under Sarwar Khan, effected a
junction with the Fourth Brigade, which was on its way from the
Deccan, under Dudrenec, to join the army at Delhi. The Chevalier,
and two of his officers, Major Lewis Ferdinand Smith and Lieutenant
Lapenet, now left their troops, and surrendered to Colonel Vandeleur
at Mattra on the 30th of September, the command of the Fourth
Brigade being taken over by Sarwar Khan. The other three Delhi
battalions pushed on to Agra, where they joined four battalions and
twenty-six pieces of cannon belonging to Perron’s Fifth Brigade,
which had also been dispatched from the Deccan, under Major
Brownrigg, to strengthen the forces in Upper India. These seven
battalions, being denied entrance to the fort by the garrison, took up
a position on the glacis outside. The troops in Agra consisted of

4,000 fighting men, under Colonel George Hessing. They had broken
815
316 PERRON.

into mutiny alter Perron’s defection, and made Hessing a prisoner, as
well as the European officers under him. In the fort was treasure
amounting to twenty-five lakhs of rupees (£300,000 sterling), which
had been sent there by Perron for safety when hostilities first
threatened, and of which particular mention will be made later on.
The revolted garrison desired to divide this treasure, but their mutual
jealousies prevented them from agreeing to any plan of apportion-
ment, and the singular circumstance was presented of these muti-
neers guarding their precious charge from each other with the utmost
vigilance. When they heard of the arrival of Brownrigg’s battalions,
and those from Delhi, they dreaded their strength and unanimity,
and refused to admit them into the fort. But still they did not dare
to broach the treasure themselves, being intimidated by their Euro-
pean prisoners, Colonels George Hessing and Robert Sutherland,
Majors Brownrigg and Deridon, and Captains Harriot, Marshall, and
Atkins, who warned them that if the money were tampered with their
lives would answer for it when the British arrived,

On the 2nd of October General Lake reached Mattra, and, forming
a junction with Colonel Stevenson’s detachment, moved on to Agra,
where, at 2 p.m. on the 4th, a summons was sent to the garrison to
surrender. But within the fort all was anarchy and confusion, and
not even a reply was returned.

The seven battalions, however, who were encamped on the glacis
had preserved their discipline, and now prepared to show fight,
which, considering that they were locked out of the fort by their
fellows, exhibited uncommon spirit and resolution. So long as they
held their position it was impossible for General Lake to make any
approaches against Agra, and accordingly he determined to dislodge
them. This he effected on the 10th, with nine battalions of Native
infantry, but it cost a long and severe fight, and his loss was nine
officers and 218 men killed and wounded. The seven battalions
resisted stubbornly, and it was not until they had lost 600 men, and
all their twenty-six guns that they yielded. “The enemy,” wrote
General Lake in his despatch describing the action, ‘fought most
desperately. I understand they are supposed to be the best Perron
had, and they were so advantageously posted that it was almost im-
possible to get at them.’’ Two days after the battle the survivors of
these seven battalions, amounting in all to about 2,500 men, tendered
their submission, under promise of being taken into the Company’s
service on the same pay as they had received in Sindhia’s, and march-
ing over to the British lines on the 13th of October, encamped along
side of their conquerors.
LASWARI AND ASSAYE. 817

The siege of Agra was now commenced, Although Sarwar Khan
with the Fourth Brigade, the three Delhi battalions (in all about
9,000 infantry), and 1,500 Hindustani horse, was encamped within
thirty miles, he made no attempt to relieve the fort; this could not
have been from want of spirit, for his troops had plenty of fight in
them, as they showed before the month was out, and their supine
attitude can only be attributed to the want of intelligent direction, due
to their desertion by their European officers.

A breaching battery having been erected within 350 yards of the
south-east side of Agra fort, preparations were made for a bombard-
ment. But before it was opened the garrison released Colonel Suther-
land from confinement, and sent him to ask for terms. He brought
a letter signed by Hessing, as commandant of the fort, who wrote
that “his soldiery had become a little more reasonable from his
having repeatedly told them that any further resistance on their part
would avail them nothing, but on the contrary exasperate the English.”
They were now prepared to deliver up the fort, guns, stores, &c., on
condition of protection to themselves and their private property.
“But,” added Hessing, “should any unforseen deviation from this
proposal take place, as we are still their prisoners, we hope your
Iixcellency will not impute to us the blame.”

In reply, General Lake sanctioned the terms asked for, but particu-
larly specified that no treasure was to be taken out of the fort. He
granted one hour’s grace in which to confirm the agreement. This
answer was taken by Captain Salkeld, but after receiving it fresh
difficulties and divergences of opinion arose amongst the garrison,
and in the midst of them the firing recommenced from the fort,
whereupon Captain Salkeld immediately retired.

In consequence of this treacherous act all negotiations were decreed
ended, and the breaching battery opened on the morning of the 17th,
doing considerable damage to the high stone bastions and rampart.
A few hours sufficed to bring the garrison to their knees, and the next
morning the place capitulated, and the English marched in. The
defeated troops, amounting to 4,000 men, were permitted to depart,
and some of them joined the British service, whilst others dispersed
to their homes. Twenty tumbrils laden with treasure, amounting to
twenty-four lakhs, were taken, and the amount distributed as prize-
money. The ordnance captured consisted of 76 brass and 86 iron
guns, including a famous piece known as “The Great Gun of Agra,”
which was composed of many metals, including all the precious ones,
and discharged a ball measuring twenty-two inches in diameter, and
weighing 1,500 lbs. General Lake attempted to send this “ Agra
318 PERRON.

Infant’ as a trophy to Calcutta, but it was swamped in the Jumna,
and under the golden sands of that river found a final resting-place.

In less than two months Aligarh Delhi and Agra had been captured,
and three battles won, by which the Second, Third, and Fifth Brigades
had been practically destroyed-—only the Fourth, and three of the
escaped Delhi battalions, remained undefeated, but this force had been
gradually swollen by the daily arrival of refugees and small, dispersed
parties from Delhi and Agra, so that it now numbered twelve or four-
teen battalions, furnished with seventy-four pieces of artillery. Against
this formidable force General Lake turned his arms. “If I can get
hold of the brigades of the Deccan,” he writes, “not a Frenchman
will be left in the country.”” He had information of their position. and
at first made overtures to their commander, Sarwar Khan, to desert
Sindhia’s cause, offering him very tempting pecuniary inducements.
But this native was as faithful as he was gallant, and rejected them.
It speaks well for the loyalty and discipline of De Boigne’s battalions
that in those dark days, when they were deserted by all, or nearly all,
their European officers, and were aware that every action hitherto
fought had gone against them, they still maintained themselves as an
army and stood to their guns. How nobly they held out to the very
end let the story of Laswari show.

When Sarwar Khan heard of the fall of Agra he marched from
Fatehpur Sikri, where he was encamped, to Bhartpur, to gain the pro-
tection of the fort. The Rajah, however, refused him admittance,
whereupon he prevailed on a local Maratha chicftain to join him with
about 5,000 irregular cavalry, and commenced his march towards the
Méwatti country, levying contributions as he went.

General Lake started from Agra in pursuit of these troops on the
27th of October, and on the Ist of November overtook them at the
village of Laswari, after a forced march of twenty-six miles, performed
at night, during which the cavalry had outstripped the infantry.
When he came upon the enemy at sunrise he had only three regi-
ments of dragoons and five of Native cavalry with him, but with
these he determined to make an immediate attack without waiting for
the arrival of the infantry. So he placed himself at their head, and
led them forward. There never was a more gallant general than
Gerard Lake, who was “a man of action” in the boldest sense of the
word. Throughout this Marathi war we find him ever heading
charges in person, just as if he had been the colonel of a cavalry corps,
and constantly having his horses shot under him on the field of
battle.

He now attacked and forced the enemy’s first line in the face of a
LASWARL AND ASSAYE. 319

tremendous discharge of grape and musketry, which created great
slaughter amongst his squadrons, whose progress was seriously
impeded by chains fastened to the enemy’s cannon and running from
one battery to another. ‘ Sarwar Khan’s battalions reserved their
fire,” writes Major Thorn, “ till our cavalry came within a distance of
twenty yards of the muzzles of their guns, which, being concealed by
the high-grass jungle, became perceptible only when a fierce discharge
of grape and double-headed shot mowed down whole divisions, as the
sweeping storm of hail levels the growing crop of grain to the earth.
But, notwithstanding the shock of this iron tempest, nothing could
repress the ardour of the cavalry, whose velocity overcame every resis-
tance. Having penetrated the enemy’s line, they immediately formed
again, and charged backwards and forwards three times amidst the
continued roar of the cannon and an incessant shower of grape, and
chain-shot, with surprising order and effect. The scene of horror was
heightened and the work of destruction increased by the disadvantage
under which our cavalry had to act; for no sooner had they charged
through than the artillerymen of the enemy (who, to save themselves,
had taken shelter under their guns), directly our men had passed, re-
loaded them and fired upon our rear.” So determined was this resis-
tance and so galling the fire, that at last General Lake found it
necessary to withdraw out of reach of the enemy’s guns, and await the
assistance of the infantry to continue the battle.

It was not until noon that the rest of the troops came up, after
having covered a distance of twenty-five miles since three o’clock in
the morning. A short rest being absolutely necessary, two hours
were allowed the fatigued troops in which to recover themselves.
Taking advantage of this deluy, Sarwar Khan fell back and concen-
trated his battalions around the village of Mehalpur, placing the Fourth
Brigade on the left, and the refugees of the Second and Third Brigades,
who had redeemed their character, lost at Delhi, by repelling the
cavalry charge, on the right, whilst the cavalry was stationed in the
rear. In front of his position was a tank or large pond of water, the
embankment of which he cut, and so flooded the space between the
two armies. His front was covered by his guns, which were posted
with great judgment.

Soon after noon General Lake formed his infantry into two columns,
and directed one to support the other in turning the right flank of the
enemy, while the cavalry were detached to make a hostile demonstra-
tion against their front. The renewed action opened with a tremen-
dous cannonade, and as soon as Sarwar Khan perceived the plan of
the attack, he threw back his right wing so as to bring it at almost
320 PERRON.

right angles with his front and left wing, both rears being protected by
the village of Mehalpur. The gallant 76th led the way against this
position, supported with equal alacrity by the 12th Native Infantry.
When they arrived within a hundred and fifty paces of the enemy’s
line their ranks were being so mown down by Sarwar Khan’s admir-
ably-served guns, that, sooner than risk a temporary halt whilst wait-
ing for the reserves to come up, General Lake ordered a bayonet
charge. The men responded magnificently, and rushing forward with
a ringing British cheer, were soon in the thick of a mélée, wherein not
even a spirited charge of the enemy’s cavalry could dismay them;
and when, in turn, the British cavalry spurred forward to attack, the
day was won.

But splendid as was the advance, equally splendid was the resist-
ance. On the field of Laswari De Boigne’s battalions surrendered not
only their glorious career, but their existence as an army and their
lives as men. There was no confusion, no fear, no rout: to the end
they were staunch, disciplined veterans, on whose colours were em-
blazoned Patan, Merta, and Lakhairi, and worthily they sustained their
proud heritage. Their breasts met the opposing British bayonets
as inch by inch they contested every point, refusing to give way until
they had lost the whole of their guns, and even then, although their
situation had become desperate, they continued to maintain the same
courage and disposition. When at last, out-fought by British
persistance, they fell back, it was in steady retreat and good order.
But it was too late to escape. They were broken in column, and cut
to pieces by the British cavalry, who detoured and took them in rear,
sabreing all except 2,000 men. These, being hemmed in on all sides,
and without a loophole for escape, surrendered as prisoners of war.
They were the sole survivors of fourteen battalions numbering 9,000
men who had been ranged in the field that morning! The annals of
Indian warfare contains no more dreadful sacrifice at the shrine of
duty.

The battle was over by four o’clock in the afternoon. The enemy’s
camp was captured as it stood, with all their baggage, 74 guns, and 44
stands of colours. The loss on the British side amounted to 834 men
killed and wounded of all grades, including 42 officers. Major-
General Ware and Colonel Vandeleur were amongst the killed. The
Commander-in-chief had two horses shot under him, and his son,
Major George Lake, was wounded in the act of tendering his charger
to his father.

No sketch of the battle of Laswari could do complete justice to the
vanquished, if it omitted to quote General Lake’s secret despatch to
LASWARI AND ASSAYE. 321

Lord Wellesley, dated trom the field of battle on the 2nd of November,
1803. The following is an extract from it :—

“The enemy’s battalions are most uncommonly well appointed,
have a most numerous artillery, as well served as they possibly can be,
the gunners standing to their guns until killed by the bayonet. All
the Sepoys of the enemy behaved exceedingly well, and if they had
been commanded by French officers, the affair would, I fear, have
been catremely doubtful. I never was in so severe a business in my
life, and pray God I never may be in such a situation again. Their
army is better appointed than ours; no expense is spared whatever,
and they have three times the number of men to a gun we have.
Their bullocks, of which they have many more than we have, are of
a very superior sort. All their men’s knapsacks and baggage are
carried upon camels, by which means they can march double the
distance. ... These fellows fought like devils, or rather heroes, and
had we not made a disposition for attack in a style that we should
have done against the most formidable army we could have been
opposed to, I verily believe, from the nosition they had taken, we
might have failed.”

Skinner, in his memoirs, strikes a more human note, as indeed he
often does in his record of these stirring times.

“As General Lake was returning from the battle some of the
Europeans cheered him. He took off his hat and thanked them, but
told them to despise death, as those brave fellows had done, pointing
to the Mahrattas who were lying thick about their guns. All these
guns were captured, with several thousand prisoners, besides killed
and wounded, the number of which on the Mahratta side was very
great. But it was never properly ascertained, as I believe the field
was never cleared, and the poor fellows were left to the wild
beasts !”

At Laswari the destruction of the last of Perron’s battalions in
Hindustan was completed. Twelve had been routed at Delhi, seven
at Agra, and ten more here, exclusive of the dispersed fugitives from
the previous battles. In the fortresses of Aligarh, Agra, and Delhi,
about 13,000 garrison troops had been broken up, and the 5,000
Hindustani horse never paraded again. The total amounted to
nearly 40,000 men, of whom twelve weeks after the declaration of war
not a vestige remained in opposition. At least-one third of them had
been actually killed or wounded in fight—a return which illustrates
their bravery and devotion to a lost cause far better than any
words can hope to do. Without detracting from the merits of the
victors, the observation may be permitted, that had it been possible to

21
322 PERRON.

deprive the British army, suddenly and without warning, of all their
commissioned officers at the commencement of the campaign, it is
doubtful whether the record at the end of it would have illustrated
such devotion true to death as ennobled the passing of De Boigne’s
Battalions.

Whilst General Lake was winning victories, and Perron’s army
crumbling away in Hindustan, the same process had been going on in
the Deccan, where Sindhia and Bhonsla were opposed by General
Arthur Wellesley. The force in the south consisted of the First Bri-
gade under Major Pohlman ; four battalions of the late Fidele Filoze,
now conamanded by Major Dupont, and generally referred to as
Dupont’s Corps ; five battalions of the Begum Somru’s under Colonel
Saleur ; and Sindhia’s grand park of artillery of 52 guns, which, added
to those of the Brigades, brought up the total to 115 pieces in the field.
In addition to these troops there were 35,000 irregular Maratha
cavalry.

General Wellesley’s first exploit was the capture of Ahmednaggar,
a strong fortress near Poonah, garrisoned by 3,000 men, “ including
1,000 Sepoys, in white jackets, commanded by three French officers,
a little dark coloured, who wore blue clothes.” The General then
iarched against the combined armies of Sindhia and the Rajah of
Berar. These, on the 24th of August, had entered the territories of
the Company’s ally, the Nizam of Haidarabad, by the Adjanta Ghat,
and reached Jalnapur, a place forty miles east of Aurangabad. After
some marching and countermarching, which only gave opportunity
for a little skirmishing, General Wellesley managed to come within
striking distance of an enemy, whose disposition had been to avoid
action. Although at the moment a considerable portion of his troops
was detached at a distance under Colonel Stevenson, whereby he was
much weakened, the General determined not to lose the chance
afforded for a battle. Leaving his baggage under guard of a battalion
and a half of Sepoys at Naulnér, he marched, on the 23rd of September,
with the 74th and 78th King’s Regiments, the 19th Light Dragoons,
four battalions of Native infantry, and four regiments of Native cavalry
to the place where the enemy were known to be encamped near the
fortified village of Assaye, where he arrived at one o'clock in the
afternoon, after a fatiguing march of twenty-two miles, and found
the cnemy strongly posted in a triangular piece of ground, between
the junction of two small rivers, the Kaitni and Juah. He deter-
mined to attack at once, and having crossed the former by a ford,
near its junction with the Juah, formed his infantry in two lines,
with the cavalry as a reserve iu a third, and from the apex of the
LASWARI AND ASSAYE. 3u38

triangle wheeled down upon the foe, who quickly ran their guns into
line to oppose him. Notwithstanding the terrible artillery fire poured
into them, the British troops advanced with undaunted firmness, but
the execution in their ranks was so great, and especially amongst the
men and bullocks of the artillery, that their cannon had to be left
behind, and the infantry and cavalry, led in person by General
Wellesley, advanced without any support whatever from their artillery
to attack a line of 115 guns.

The Mardthas, numerous and daring as they were, stood astounded
and appalled at the audacious spirit of the comparatively insignificant
array that thus presumed to attack their formidable host. The total
number of men under General Wellesley’s conimand did not exceed
4,500, of which only one third were Europeans, whilst the enemy
numbered 50,000, of whom 10,500 were disciplined infantry.

Moving rapidly forward the Lritish troops fired but a single volley,
and stormed the first line of guns at the point of the bayonet. Then
advancing again, in equally good order to the second line, they
captured that as well. But meanwhile many of the artillerymen of
the first line, who had thrown themselves down aud simulated death
as the British regiments passed over them, rose, and manning their
guus again, turned them round and poured grape and chain shot into
the rear of the victors, who were obliged to return and drive them away
from their pieces. Encouraged by this seeming retreat, some of
Sindhia’s battalions, who had been retiriug in good order, halted,
faced about, and advanced to the attack, whilst their cavalry were
emboldened to charge." This was the critical point of the battle,

* The following interesting Native accouut of the battle of Assaye from the
pages of ‘‘Pandurang Hiri” is perhaps uot geuerally known, and is here
inserted as confirming with singular accuracy the account above given, which
has been culled from English sources: ‘‘ At Assaye we opposed a great Euglish
general. He attacked our left wing, and we changed the position of our guns
and infantry. The English advanced to the attack; our fire was dreadfully
destructive to them, and we so thinned the right of their line, that a body of
our cavalry was induced to charge it, of which number I was one. We thought
ourselves to be doing business pretty satisfactorily, until we found that the
cuemy’s cavalry was in reserve to intercept us. They repulsed us with great
slaughter. These English are large, powerful meu—perfect war-tigers—and the
weight of their subres almost annihilated my poor troopers. They unhorsed
numbers of us merely by riding against us—I was so served for one, and, with
many others, feigued myself dead. Our army being routed, fled, aud the
Euglish pursuing them, left the guus they had captured in the rear. These I
proposed to turn upon them; we got up and did so with great effect. It was
clear we made our shot tell pretty well, for a body of the Topee Wallahs, with
their general at their head, rode up to put a stop to the firing. ‘The General had
324 PERRON.

and, realising the danger, General Wellesley put himself at the head
of the 78th Regiment and charged the Marathis who had manned
the guns, whilst at the same moment the 19th Dragoons, who drew
only 350 sabres, and the Native cavalry delivered their attack. After
a bloody and perilous contest General Wellesley, who had a horse
shot under him, and was exposed to the most imminent danger,
achieved his object by recovering the cannon, whilst Colonel Maxwell,
with the cavalry, so vigorously attacked the enemy’s main line of
infantry, which had reformed, that he completed their overthrow, but
with the loss of his own life.

Although defeated and thrown into confusion, Sindhia’s regular
infantry fought to the end with the desperate fury of men stung by
a sense of shame at having to yield to an inferior force. For three
hours the sanguinary conflict raged, at the end of which British
resolution triumphed over Asiatic valour, and the glorious name of
Assaye was added to the battle-roll of Iingland’s victories. Daulat
Rao Sindhia and the Rajah of Berar fled from the field soon after
the commencement of the action, as did the Maratha cavalry, who
beliaved in a dastardly way. Pohlman left 1,000 men on the field,
whilst the country round about was covered with his wounded. The
whole of the enemy’s camp equipage and military stores, with 95
guns and 100 tumbrils, fell into General Wellesley’s hands. On the
British side the loss in killed and wounded amounted to 1,566 (of
whom 600 were Europeans), or more than a third of the total number
engaged. Such a percentage of loss had never previously been re-
corded in any general action since the establishment of the English
power in India. The 74th King’s Regiment was half annihilated,
17 officers and 384 men being struck down: they were 700 strong
when they went into action. Sindhia’s Prime Minister, Jadu Rao,
received a wound, from the effects of which he afterwards succumbed,
and an European of distinction was found dead on the field. It is
difficult to surmise whom this could have been ; he was probably one
of the following, whose names appear in General Wellesley’s despatches
as serving with the enemy.

Brigade-Major D’Orton.

Captain Gautier.

Captain-Lieutenant Mercier.

Captain-Lieutenant Honoré.

Ensign Wroughton.

Ensign Perrin.

; Ensign Mars.

; Ensign Cameron.

Ensign Brown.

| Cadet Songster (? Sangster).

his horse killed under him. At this time our troops still hovered about one part
of the English linc. At leugth we ficd, leaving uinety-eight pieces of cannon
and seven standards in the hands of the English.”
LASWARI AND ASSAYE. 325

Reviewing the battle of Assaye, it was acknowledged by all the
officers present, who had witnessed the power of the French artillery
in the wars of Europe, that the enemy’s guns on this occasion were
equally well served, and that they fought with a prowess worthy of a
European nation. ‘The battle,” wrote General Wellesley in a private
letter to Colonel Collins, “ was the most severe I have ever fought in
India. Sindhia’s infantry behaved well. They were driven from their
guns only by the bayonet, and some of their corps retreated in great
order and formed again.” Lord Wellesley, the Governor-General,
termed it a matchless victory. It swept out of existence all that re-
mained of De Boigne’s battalions, and cleared the way for the treaty
made with Daulat Rao Sindhia on the 30th of December, 1803, by
which Hindustan was closed to French influence and intrigue for ever.

The two great battles won by Lake and Wellesley rank amongst
the most notable gained by the English in India, because our
arms overcame a brave and powerful enemy, whose defeat meant
something more than the mere addition of another inscription on
the crowded page of British achievement. The foemen were worthy
of our steel; the fight was hard and desperate; the victory one to be
proud of; the results commensurate. For they added to our Eastern
possessions the rich Doab districts between the Ganges and the Jumna,
including the cities and forts of Delhi, Agra, and Aligarh; the greater
portion of the province of Bundelkhand; the whole of Cuttack and
Orissa; and a large extent of territory in Guzerit. It left us in posses-
sion of the entire seaboard of India, and was the most important exten-
sion of frontier our Indian conquests have ever known, since it secured
{o us not merely the supremacy, but practically the annexation of the
whole of the peninsula; for round the independent states that still
remained the cordon of the red line was closely drawn, supported in
its rear by the oceans of which our navy was the master. Finally,
there was left to our enemies but a single road to India—the long and
dreary one through Central Asian deserts, over which they are still
toiling.

Commenting on these two battles, thus writes an eloquent. his-
torian in 1807 “‘ At Assaye and Laswaree the infantry of the enemy
stood till the English bayonets came to their breasts; the artillerymen
served their guns without receding an inch, till they fell under the
wheels of their own cannon; the cavalry charged to the very muzzles
of the English firelocks. There is not in the records of human courage
a more desperate engagement than that which was fought between the
British army commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley and the Mahrattas,
aided by the French regular battalions, on the plains of Assaye,
326 PERRON.

Had the liberties of Europe been contested with equal bravery, the
Continent would not at this day be laid prostrate at the heel of
France.”

Thus passed away De Boigne’s battalions, which had in twenty
years increased from two to forty, and preserved an almost unbroken
record of victory until they met the English. Great in their rise,
they were not less great in their fall, but worthy to the last of the
traditions and achievements which made their career illustrious.
CHAPTER XII.
PERRON’S RETIREMENT, CHARACTER, AND DEATH.
1803-1834.

ITER his surrender to General Lake, Perron, with his secretary
and aide-de-camp, Beckett, an Englishman, and his cavalry
commandant, Fleurea (who had effected his escape with great diffi-
culty from the Hindustani horse), proceeded to Lucknow, which
they reached on the Ist of October. Under special orders from the
Governor-General, Perron was treated with the respect and distinc-
tion due to his rank in Sindhia’s army, and received the customary
salutes and marks of attention. The Resident at Lucknow was, how-
ever, ordered to accelerate his departure for Calcutta, but notwith-
standing this his start was delayed by several circumstances.

Soon after his arrival at the Oudh capital Perron wrote to Lord
Wellesley, stating that at the time of quitting Sindhia’s service he
had deposited twenty-two lakhs of rupees in the keeping of a Native
banker, besides other valuable personal property, and that, on re-
quiring their restoration, he was informed the money and valu-
ables were at Agra, and could not therefore be delivered up. In
consequence he was obliged to leave the money behind him, and now
requested that it might be restored.

This was the treasure which had induced the garrison at Agra to
depose and confine their European officers; but they had been fright-
ened to divide it owing to the warnings of Colonel George Hessing,
and the money was found intact when General Lake captured the
fortress. He questioned all Sindhia’s European officers about it, who
declared it was public treasure, and not Perron’s private property.
It was clearly in the possession of the garrison at the time of taking
Agra, and although the terms of capitulation permitted the troops
to carry their private property away with them, they left this
money behind. General Lake, on these grounds, declared it to be

327
328 PERRON.

lawful prize money, and in this view he was supported by the
Governor-General, who, in answer to Perron’s application, informed
him that when he was allowed to retire into the Company’s territory,
the safeguard granted only extended to his person and the property
he carried with him, and that the British Government could not
guarantee the safety of anything he had left behind in the hands of
an enemy with whom the English were at war.

Of this incident Perron, who was naturally much exasperated at
losing more than a quarter of a million sterling at one fell swoop,
made considerable capital on his return to Europe, by which time the
sum in question appears to have more than quadrupled itself, whilst
its confiscation came to be described as an actual robbery on the part
of the British Government. Major Thorn distinctly traverses this
statement, for he says, ‘‘ Perron, with a singular effrontery, but with
an address peculiar to adventurers, being no doubt well acquainted
with the deposit of the treasure at Agra, laid claim to twenty-two
lakhs taken there.” In this there is a suggestion of mala fides, which
is not confirmed by Louis Ferdinand Smith, who states that ‘ before
the declaration of war Perron sent all his ready money to the fort of
Agra.” Itis not improbable that the treasure was derived from his
Jaidad revenue collections, and that technically it was Perron’s; but
it had passed out of his keeping and control into that of his mutinous
troops, and he lost it, not unfairly, but by the chances of war. Its
loss by no means crippled him, for in addition to the property he was
able to convey away, he had a large sum of money (estimated by one
authority at £280,000) invested in the East India Company’s funds!
In pecuniary investments this shrewd Frenchman ran with the hare
and hunted with the hounds.

On the 8th of October Perron left Lucknow for Calcutta, from
whence he retired to Chandernagore, where he resided for some time
in the neighbourhood of the French settlement. It was not until the
following year that he embarked for Europe, nor until September,
1805, that he landed at Hamburg, where de Bourienne was the French
Consul, from whose memoirs the following passage is extracted :—

“Tavery one has heard speak of the famous General Perron, who
has played such a great véle amongst the Mahrattas. In 1805 he
arrived at Hamburg and applied to me for a passport, and I had a
most interesting conversation with him about his truly extraordinary
adventures. He said that he had possessed more than fifty million
francs, but that in order to obtain permission to leave India he had
been obliged to pay the English three-quarters of the money. Most
ef his goods were magnificent cashmeres. He was good enough to
PERRONS RETIREMENT, CHARACTER, AND DEATH. 329

offer me one. General Perron had only one arm. He was accom-
panied by two copper-coloured children—a boy and a girl—the off-
spring of an Indian mother. Their costume attracted considerable
attention wherever they went. They did not speak a word of French.
Their father exhibited great affection for them, and caressed them
continually.

‘“‘ Some days after General Perron’s arrival Bourguien also arrived
and applied for a passport for France. He was at daggers drawn
with Perron, who spoke of him with similar bitterness. They pro-
fessed a profound contempt for each other, and accused each other of
being the cause of the ruin of the Mahrattas. Both had immense
fortunes. I do not know what has become of Bourguien, but General
Perron retired to a magnificent estate which he bought in the neigh-
bourhood of Vendéme.”’

Perron, after landing, proceeded to Paris, where he was coldly
received by Bonaparte. He did not remain long in the capital,
but withdrew to a domain which he purchased at Fresnes, near
Montoire, in the department of Loire et Cher. His mother and
sisters were alive when he returned to France, and received
him with open arms. Soon after he had settled down he married
a Madamoiselle Du Trochet, by whom he had a large family.
Two of his daughters by this union were subsequently married
to two members of the Rochefoucauld family, one of whom, the
Countess Frederic de Rochefoucauld, died so recently as March,
1892, whilst the ‘‘copper-coloured damsel’’ gave her hand to
M. Alfred de Montesquiou. In his luxurious retirement at Fresnes
Perron passed nearly thirty years, but towards the end of his life he
was suspected of republicanism and subjected to police surveillance
by the French Government, and, in the words of a French author,
“found in his own country misery and persecution.”’

Of the three careers of military adventure which have been
sketched in this work, Perron’s was, without doubt, the most re-
markable. Starting from a beginning as humble as that of George
Thomas, he obtained a political power exceeding that of Do Boigne,
notwithstanding which he leaves us with the conviction that of the
three he was the inferior man. He lacked the daring and the per-
sonal attraction that distinguished Thomas, and he wanted the
dignity and straightforwardness of De Boigne. Net that Perron was
deficient in personal courage or self-esteem : no one could impugn his
spirit during the earlier part of his career, nor deny his appreciation
of position towards its close. But there came a time when he pre-
330 PERRON.

ferred to gain his ends by cunning and intrigue rather than by good
honest fighting, when he stooped to grossest favouritism, and was
guilty of injustice and treachery, and when his proper pride degene-
rated into vulgar vanity, and his actions gave the lie to his protesta-
tions of courage and fidelity.

It is, perhaps, difficult for an Englishman to approach the consider-
ation of Perron’s character without prejudice. Had he carried his
pronounced hostility towards the British nation to its legitimate end,
and fought us in the field of battle, he might have claimed more
from our generosity than he can from our impartiality. But he
declined to cross swords, preferring rather to accept quarter, which he
repaid by copious abuse when his personal safety was no longer at
risk, and this rouses our indignation and ranges us against him.

And when we come to judge his career as a whole we cannot but
condemn much that was evil init. His later loyalty to Sindhia, and
his creditable rejection of General Lake’s overtures, do not condone
his long course of faithlessness and treachery during the war with
Holkar, when he sacrificed his master’s interests with callous uncon-
cern. His courage at Sounda is obliterated by his craven retreat at
Koil. We cannot help reading with contempt his appeal to Pedron to
hold the fort at Aligarh, when we remember his own spiritless sur-
render a week later. And if his fall was due to his desertion by his
chosen favourites, Bourguien and Dudrenec, their defection suggests
how little there must have been that was lovable in their chief.
The recriminations Perron entered into with Bourguien at Hamburg
display his smallness of mind, as does also his vainglorious boast that
by his intrigues he compelled De Boigne to resign his post. This
latter assertion comes to us on the authority of General Belliard, who
was in a confidential post under Bonaparte in Egypt, where he had
charge of all the First Consul’s intrigues and correspondence with
the Native states of India. This officer records that, on his return to
Turope, Perron boasted that he had compelled De Boigne to quit
Sindhia’s service. De Boigne never stooped to notice, far less
to reply to these allegations, which only leave in our minds
a wonder that Perron should so self-convict himself of baseness.
That Perron was cunning, grasping, and avaricious, his financial feats
clearly show. Who shall say from how many helpless wretches,
and by what dire exactions, his fortune was accumulated ? If—as he
stated—it amounted to two millions sterling, its very magnitude is
its own condemnation, for such a vast sum could never have been
honestly accumulated in the time and cireymstances which were open
to him,
PERRON'S RETIREMENT, CHARACTER, AND DEATH. 331

This is the dark side of the picture. On the other hand it cannot
be denied that Perron made the most of his opportunities, and if he
succeeded to a great position by favour of fortune and intrigue, he
held and improved his station by his own energy and determination.
He was as industrious as he was able. Colonel Collins bears testi-
mony to the former quality in a letter addressed to the Governor-
General in March, 1802, just after Perron’s visit to Ujjain. “I
noticed” (he writes) “the unwearied attention of General Perron to
improve and strengthen the works of the different fortresses garrisoned
by his troops, and mentioned [to the Mahratta ministers] the high
estimate in which he was held by all the Rajpoot and Sikh sirdars,
who were chiefly guided by his counsel and direction.” As to Perron’s
ability, the singular success with which he wielded the power left to
him by De Boigne admits no doubt of it. His methods may have been
questionable, and his administration unjust and venal, but he held
the reins with a firm and skilful hand. His reputation as a soldier
was established by the capture of Kanaund and the victory of Kardla.
His subjugation of Rajputina and his defeat of Lakwa Dida were
masterly, vigorous, and brave demonstrations of military capacity.
The plan of campaign which he proposed for the war against the
British does credit to his powers of organisation and his talent as a
general, and had it been carried out in its entirety would have resulted
in a long and bloody struggle for supremacy. Of his contest with
George Thomas perhaps the best that can be said of it is that Perron
won ; if he exhibited signs of personal weakness in its conduct; if, as
has been suggested, his courage was doubtful, he at least continued to
keep his grip on Hindustan throughout the crisis, and when it was
over immediately advanced his power to the Sutlej. Iven when his
influence with Sindhia was gone, and he was peremptorily ordered to
give up possession of all the districts he held, except his own Jaidad,
he evaded obedience, and to the end retained his government intact.
Throughout his career he was opposed by many enemies, but he
triumphed over all. The three most powerful ones were Balloba
Tantia, Lakwa Dada, and George Thomas: they all died in flight or
defeat. Ambaji Inglia alone prevailed over him, and the victory he
purchased with gold was a dear and empty one.

In addition to these internal foes, there was a far more powerful
external hostility opposed to him. The consideration in which the
Marquis Wellesley held Perron’s influence towards the end of his
career has been shown. But it was not only in 1803 that the Gover-
nor-General considered him dangerous; so far back as 1798, when
Zeman Shah’s invasion threatened India, Lord Wellesley wrote tq
332 PERRON.

Colonel Collins in the following terms: “ Your particular attention
must be given to the conduct of M. Perron. We must counteract any
atiempt from him to establish a state in Hindustan. He would
undoubtedly assist Zeman Shah, and perhaps enter into his service iu
the event of Scindia’s fall. . . . Icannot believe that M. Perron would
give a cordial support to any cause that we might favour. We must
never forget that he is a Frenchman.”

In the face of this determination Perron did establish “a state in
Hindustan,” as Lord Wellesley admitted four years later. ‘General
Perron,” he recorded, “has obtained the exercise of sovereign
authority over a territory whose annual revenues amount to near two
millions sterling, and has negotiated treaties and alliances with several
petty states in his own name.”

When we consider what Perron was—a runaway sailor from a
French frigate—and what he became—a person exercising sovereign
authority over Hindustan—and this in spite of the active opposition of
many enemies in the court he served, and Lord Wellesley’s expressed
intention of opposing him, we must allow him the full credit of an
achievement as extraordinary as it was great.

It has been asserted that the Marquis Wellesley over-estimated
Perron’s power, and that the adventurer was not such a dangerous
individual as the Governor-General found it convenient to make out.
It was not the man but the principle that Lord Wellesley feared.
He regarded Perron as the active representative of the French inte-
rest in India. It is known that Perron was in friendly communica-
tion with Raymond, and after that officer’s death with his successor,
Piron, at Haidarabad; and also with the French faction in Mysore.
The alliance of these three parties, which was solely prevented by
Lord Wellesley’s sagacity and statesmanship, would have threatened
the English with a graver peril from French ambition than any
actually experienced. When Piron’s corps was broken up, and Tipu’s
French auxiliaries surrendered at Seringapatam half the danger of the
situation was demolished. But there still remained sufficient to
require the most eager vigilance and precaution ; and when Perron
sought the countenance and help of Bonaparte, the final contest could
no longer be safely delayed, nor the means taken to secure success too
carefully guarded. The simultaneous and marvellously rapid victories
of Generals Lake and Wellesley gave rise to an impression that the
enemy they vanquished could not have been so formidable as the
Governor-General asserted, and on these grounds he was publicly
attacked by many persons, notably by Sir Philip Frances—one of
those virtuous instruments of chastisement not altogether unknown in
PERRON’S RETIREMENT, CHARACTER, AND DEATH. 333

modern parliaments—and by the discredited historian James Mills.
But their argument that because Perron’s Brigades were so soon
defeated aud dispersed, therefore they could not have been as power-
ful as Lord Wellesley represented, was unjust to many. It was
unjust to De Boigne’s stubborn battalions, who displayed such heroic
courage at Laswdri and Assaye, and although deserted by their Euro-
pean officers fought with a valour that has never been equalled by any
Native-led armies in India. It was unjust to Perron, for no one can
deny that he kept his army up to its ancient standard of excellence—
and indeed the rank and file who fought to the death were far more
worthy of praise than the officers who left them before a shot was
fired. It was unjust to General Lake and General Wellesley, since it
belittled their achievements by suggesting that their victories were too
cheaply won, when the very opposite was the case. And, lastly, it
was unjust to the Governor-General, whose statesmanlike policy had
weakened the effect of Perron’s power by previously destroying those
who would have been his allies in an international struggle between
France and England for the possession of India.

As regards Perron himself, it is true that his influence was waning
when the war broke out. He had passed his zenith, and his personal
power was on the decline. At a defined period in his career this
change became manifest, and it was due in a principal degree to his
own faults and failings. Skinner describes the commencement of this
moral decadence in 1801. “ Perron now began to feel his power, and
to change his manner. Instead of being, as formerly, a good, plain,
honest soldier, beloved by his soldiery and esteemed by all about him,
he began to turn his ears to flattery, and to neglect merit, while his
favourites got all the good appointments, and he himself only thought
of amassing money.” No personal government could safely pursue
such a course without risk: it was bound to end in danger and dis-
aster. When once the controlling hand entrusted the reins to incom-
petent subordinates, and began to grope for gold, the whole fabric of
administration was weakened. Lewis Ferdinand Smith confirms this.
“Unfortunately for Perron,” he writes, ‘‘every low Frenchman he
advanced with outruge to others repaid his unjust preference with
ingratitude. His army was a miniature of the French Revolution.
Wretches were raised from cooks, bakers, and barbers to majors and
colonels, and absurdly entrusted with the command of brigades. . . .
I speak the calm language of impartiality. I lave no personal dis-
like to Perron, nor have I received more injury from him than any
other British subject who had the mortifying misfortune to resort to
him for service. Every low Frenchman was put over us in rank.
334 PERRON.

This would not have been so unjust if they had superior, or even equal
merit.”’

As regards Perron’s final surrender, Smith judges it leniently. “I
do not approve of Perron’s principles, nor do I admire his character,
but impartiality obliges me to declare that I do not think he wanted
either sense, prudence, or principle in quitting Scindia’s service when
he did, and seeking protection to his person and property from the
British Government. I condemn him for not advising Scindia to
avoid hostilities.”

De Boigne’s opinion of Perron has been quoted in an earlier part o1
this sketch : he described him as ‘ta man of plain sense, of no talent,
but a brave soldier.”

Such are the views of three of Perron’s contemporaries. De
Boigne’s we may accept as reflecting truthfully Perron’s character
and disposition in the earlier part of his career, and before success
had turned his head. With regard to Skinner’s and Smith’s opinions,
even admitting the unavoidable prejudice that existed in their minds,
there is no reason why we should hesitate to give weight to their
judgment. Had Perron’s resignation occurred just after lhe won the
battle of Sounda, his name might have been handed down to posterity
with De Boigne’s. But, like many another great man, his meridian
splendour was dimmed by the dark clouds that shrouded his decline.

“We must never forget that he is a Frenchman,” wrote Lord

Wellesley of Perron, in 1798. Assuredly we never can forget it, for
he was a typical son of France, and displayed all the strength and all
the weakness of the national character. How earnest he was in his
patriotism it is difficult to estimate; how much may be forgiven
him on the plea of it is still more difficult to decide. ‘‘ Remember
you are a Frenchman, and let no action of yours tarnish the character
of your nation” were Perron’s own words to Pedron, when he
exhorted him to hold the fort of Aligarh against the English. ‘ Once
more remember your nation,” he reiterates; and then with a true
ouch of Gallic vanity, ‘‘ The eyes of millions are fixed upon you.”
If those were Perron’s actual thoughts, how much more focussed,
must he have considered, the eyes of France upon himself? But the
knowledge, however much it influenced his actions, did not make him
strong, and within a week he was tendering in surrender the sword
which he had never drawn from its sheath.

The severest condemnation of Perron comes from one of his own
countrymen. ‘ Perron,” writes a French critic in 1622, ‘* under the
protection of the British Government, escaped the just vengeance of
the Marathas, Sikhs, Rajputs, and all the people of India. He has
PERRON'S RETIREMENT, CHARACTER, AND DEATH. 335

returned to France to exhibit before our eyes, as a trophy of his
infamy, the diamonds and the millions he stole from the miserable
Sindhia whom he betrayed. His infamous treachery was so odious
to the Indians that his name was long execrated by them. The con-
duct of this traitor assured to the English the supremacy of Hindu-
stan, and has done more harm to the name of France than fifty years
of misconduct and misfortune could have accomplished.”

He died at his Chiteau of Fresnes in 1834, in the seventy-ninth
year of his age, and there he lies buried. And though it may seem
strange, yet it is true, that Death, ‘ Eloquent, Just, and Mighty,” has
denied to this famous Frenchman “those two narrow words, Hic
jacet.” For Pierre Cuillier, the last representative of the French
power in India, and who, for seven years, ruled in kingly state and
with sovereign authority the fairest provinces of Hindustan, sleeps
in an unmarked grave, above which posterity may not even read the
name of Perron,
 

LIEUT.-COLONEL JAMES SKINNER, C.B.

[From a plate in the“ Military Memotr of Lient,-Col. James Skinner, C.B.' |
APPENDIX.

—»~4—

MBROSE, R. L., MAJOR.—Major R. L. Ambrose was an English
officer in Jaswant R4o Holkar’s service, of whom little or nothing
is known, excepting that he was the author of an Indian tract en-
titled “ A letter on the present crisis of affairs in India, addressed to
Edward Parry, Chairman of the Honourable Court of Directors of
the Honourable East India Company.” The following extracts from
the pamphlet are of interest, as touching on the subject of military
adventure in India :—

“Holker detested—justly detested—the name of a Frenchman,
when he reflected that by the Chevalier Dudernaigue and Monsieur
Plumet, to whom in the first instance he entrusted the command of
his brigades, he was deserted on the near approach of Scindia’s army,
and left with his infantry, deprived of officers, to the defeat which he
experienced at Indore. So highly irritated was he that he never
mentioned the country without signs of abhorrence, and it was his
express orders to the commanders of brigades subsequently appointed,
that on no account whatever should they afford employment to indi-
viduals of a nation by him entitled the Duggerbdz, or Faithless, . . .

“Tt is well known, to those conversant with the affairs of the East,
that there are in that country many hundreds of thousands, soldiers
by profession, who wander continually from service to service, from
prince to prince, as the pressure of the moment requires their assistance
and promises them employ. Gain is their god, and it is so perfectly
immaterial to them whom they serve, while they are paid, and the
minutie of their caste attended to, that an utter stranger, with
efficient funds, might at any time raise an army in Hindustan, who
would follow him and fight his battles as long as his resources were
sufficient for the current expenses of the day. Born soldiers, without
any other profession than that of arms, these men eagerly flock to the
standard of any adventurer, however desperate his prospects, if he
only possesses the swmmum bonum of their happiness. In the minds

22 337
338 APPENDIX.

of these people no such sentiment as amor patria is to be found,
above affection for a few clods of earth or stumps of trees, merely from
their having been imprinted on their recollection from the sportive
period of infancy. The Indian is, in this point, a citizen of the world.
It not unfrequently happens that fathers, sons, and brothers embrace
different services, and meet in battle array on the ensanguined plain
against each other, perhaps unwittingly to fall by each other’s hands.”

Armstronc, Masor.—Major Armstrong succeeded Major Plumet in
the command of Holkar’s Second Brigade of regular infantry in 1802,
and distinguished himself at the battle of Poonah in the same year.
On the breaking out of the war with the English in 1803, Armstrong
determined to quit the chief. But he did not effect this without the
greatest difficulty, and was obliged to sacrifice all his arrears and
most of his property, barely saving his life by a secret flight. Had his
intention been suspected he would assuredly have shared the cruel
fate of Vickers, Dodd, and Ryan, whom Holkar barbarously put to
death for refusing to fight against their own countrymen. Major
Armstrong lived to enjoy a pension of Rs.1,200 a month from the
British Government, as a compensation for his loss of employ.

Baours, Masor [orthography doubtful ; also written Bahors].—
Major Baours was a Frenchman, and began his career in the Begum
Somru’s force, to the command of which he succeeded in 1783, after
the murder of Pauly at Delhi. When De Boigne raised his first
brigade Baours gladly left the Begum’s employ to take the command
of a battalion in Sindhia’s service. His career was, however, soon cut
short, for he was killed at the battle of Patan in 1790.

Beutasis, JosepH Harvey, Caprain.—This fine young adventurer
was probably a cadet of a well-known Bombay family of the same
name, one member of which rose to the command of the artillery in
the Peshwa’s service. Captain Bellasis was originally an ensign in the
Honourable Company’s Corps of Engineers, but was impelled by his
pecuniary embarrassments to seek to retrieve his fortunes in the service
of the Native princes, and in a rash moment resigned his commission,
and penetrated into the Maraéthé dominions. He had seen and heard
of many adventurers who had reached the summit of ambition, power,
and riches as soldiers of fortune in the interior of India, and who did
not possess greater talents or stouter resolution than himself; for he
was a young man allowed by all to be an honour to his profession.
His courage was undaunted, his integrity irreproachable, and his
APPENDIX. 339

generosity unbounded. He had an excellent knowledge of military
science, was elegant in person, and endowed with great activity of
body and energy of mind, and was, moreover, an excellent scholar,
conversant with Greek and Latin, and understanding music and
painting. To these accomplishments he added a fascinating address
and an open disposition. Such was the young English gentleman
who in 1796 cut himself adrift from his fellow countrymen, and entered
the service of the Marathé chief, Ambaji Inglia, for whom he raised
four battalions of regular infantry. He soon found out the mistake he
had made. Ambaji was “tainted with the worst principles of the
worst Asiatic,” and Bellasis lacked the powers of intrigue, the as-
siduity and the duplicity necessary to rise in such a service. Yet he
tried hard to do his duty, and it is recorded that Ambaji’s battalions
would have been ‘as fine as any in Hindustan, if the parsimony of
the chief had not rendered futile their commander’s labour and
genius.” In 1797 Bellasis was engaged in the storm of Lohar, and
in an assault of uncommon boldness his battalions suffered heavily.
Notwithstanding this, he was ordered, immediately after the capture,
to march his shattered and fatigued corps to storm another fort, named
Gopalpur, fifteen miles distant, leaving his dead unburied, and his
wounded unattended to. Such inhuman orders could only be justified
by the most cruel necessity, and Bellasis, with the fine feelings of a
soldier and the propriety of a commander, refused to obey them. This
refusal, which was eagerly expected, was made the pretext for dis-
charging him and his battalions, and plundering their effects. Two
years later his distress and his necessities drove him once more into
Ambaji’s service, and he obtained the command of two battalions in
James Shepherd’s party. With these he took part in the siege of
Sounda, and whilst gallantly leading his men on to victory was shot
through the head in the assault on Lakwa Dada’s entrenchment.

Bernier, Aucustine, Masor [spelt Bunnear and Burnear by con-
temporary writers].—Major Bernier was a French adventurer, and
began his Indian career in the service of the Begum Somru, and was
one of the witnesses to that lady’s marriage with Le Vassoult in 1793.
Later on he commanded a battalion in Perron’s Third Brigade, under
Louis Bourguien. Bernier was a brave and able soldier, and Skinner
states that at the battle of Georgegarh in 1801 he saved Bourguien
from a disastrous defeat by his ability and courage. He was killed a
few weeks later at the grand assault on the town of Hansi—a fact
which, it is curious to note, was brought to light so recently as Novem-
ber, 1891, for Skinner erroneously states that Bernier was killed in the
340 APPENDIX.

attack on Thomas's outposts whilst rallying his men, who had been
beaten back. A correspondent of a Lahér paper thus writes on the
date above mentioned :—

“A marble tomb, in a broken condition, has been found by Mr.
Stanley Skinner in his village of Barsi, close by Hansi, bearing an
inscription to this effect: ‘ J'o the memory of Augustine Bernier, late
Major in the service of H.H. Dowlut Rio Scindia. Killed in the
storm of Hinsi, on 10th December, 1801, while gallantly leading on
his troops. Aged 82 years.’”

Bernier was a great favourite with his soldiery, by whom, as well
as by his fellow officers, his death was deeply regretted.

Bircu, LizurEenant.—Lieutenant Birch was originally an officer in
George Thomas’s army, in which he fairly distinguished himself. He
proved faithful to his chief during the long and trying siege of George-
garh, and accompanied him in his flight to Hansi, which he helped to
defend until Thomas was forced to capitulate. Birch then appears to
have joined Perron’s service, for he remained in Hindustan, and was
one of the officers in Mardth& employ who took advantage of Lord
Wellesley’s proclamation offering pensions to all British subjects who,
on the declaration of the war, left the Mardthds and passed over to
the English. Birch appears to have been awarded a pension of Rs.300
a month, and after the battle of Delhi, when General Lake left Colonel
Ochterlony in command of the Capital, received the command of two
Najib battalions raised to assist in holding the city. Soon afterwards
they were detached against Bapt Sindhia, Daulat Réo’s governor
in the Saharanpur district, but were shockingly beaten, and lost four
of their guns—a catastrophe which so incensed Colonel Ochterlony
that he refused to entrust any more of the Company’s artillery to
Sindhia’s late officers, many of whom were now in the British service
and in command of newly raised levies, recruited from the dispersed
remnants of Perron’s Brigades. Birch, after his defeat by Bapu, re-
assembled his battalions, and was stationed on the Punjab frontier,
where, in 1804, he assisted Skinner to defeat a large body of Sikhs.

Boyp, J. P., CoLonet.—Boyd was an American. When Raymond
increased his corps at Haidarabad to such an extent as to make it too
formidable, the British Government, as a counterpoise, suggested to the
Nizam that he should raise two fresh corps, to be commanded by officers
whose sympathies were with the English. Boyd, who owned a party
described as “a ready formed and experienced corps of 1,800 men,”
was engaged, and in 1795 took part in the battle of Kardla. In the
APPENDIX. 341

following year, when Raymond was at the height of his power, and it
was rumoured that he premeditated an attack on the British Resident’s
camp, Boyd and Finglass (another English adventurer in command
of a corps) at once paraded their troops, and signified their intention
of supporting the Company’s cause. The trouble, however, passed
over, and they were not called upon to act. A few months later
misunderstandings arose between Boyd and the Court of Haidarabad,
fermented probably by Raymond, and the American quitted the
service, taking his party with him. He was next engaged by the
Peshwa of Poonah, who paid him a salary of Rs. 3,000 a month. In
October, 1796, Boyd assisted in the operations which resulted in
Baji Rao being seated on the masnad as Peshwa, after the tragical
death by suicide of Madhu Rio. The next year he was raised to the
command of the Peshwa’s regular Brigade, and the last mention of
him is in connection with some local disturbances which broke out at
Poonah in 1797.

Bourcuien, Louis, CoLonet [spelt also Bourguienne, Bourquoin,
Bourquin, and Bourkin].—This individual, who was known amongst
the Natives as Looce Sahib, was a Frenchman, whose real name was
Louis Bernard. He came to India in Admiral Suffrein’s fleet, land-
ing at Pondicherry, where he remained some time. He then made
his way to Calcutta, and enlisted in a mercenary regiment of
foreigners in the Company’s service, known as Captain Doxat’s
Chasseurs. Upon the reduction of that force Bourguien turned his
attention to civil pursuits, and for some time exercised the calling of
a cook at Calcutta, his craft in culinary matters being superior to his
skill in military ones. Later on he started business as a manufacturer
of fireworks, and in this capacity accompanied a gentleman named
Gairard, the proprietor of the Vauxhall Gardens at Calcutta, to
Lucknow. He then returned to the military profession, and obtained
an appointment in the Begum Somru’s force, from which he
entered that of De Boigne about the year 1794, when he is found
rated as w lieutenant on a pay of Rs. 200 a month, No mention
of his name appears again until August, 1800, when he joined the
Rajah of Jaipur, with one of Perron’s battalions, to assist against
Lakwa Dada. Soon after this he was detached to capture Ajmir,
but the fort proved too strong to be taken, and he was defeated in
December and obliged to fall back. He then invested the place,
and on the 7th of May, 1801, secured its surrender by bribery. But
meanwhile General Perron had become greatly dissatisfied with his
conduct of the siege, and sent Captain Symes to supersede him.
342 APPENDIX.

Bourguien was so enraged at this that he offered his services to
the Rajah of Jaipur, but Partéb Singh declined to accept them
for fear of disobliging General Perron, by whom he had recently
been reduced to a state of abject submission. So Bourguien swal-
lowed his mortification, and retained his appointment in Sindhia’s
army. He seems to have been undeservedly fortunate, for in a few
weeks he was promoted to the command of the Third Brigade, and
in August entrusted with the conduct of the war against George
Thomas. A full account of this campaign has been given in the
sketch of Thomas’s life. Although at the head of ten fine battalions
of infantry and a large body of Hindustani horse, Bourguien was
outwitted and outmanceuvred by Thomas, and finally defeated at the
battle of Georgegarh. This led to his supersession for incapacity for
the second time within the year, but after Pedron had retrieved affairs
Bourguien was once again entrusted with the command of operations,
and eventually forced Thomas to surrender at Hansi. He was then
detached with his brigade to collect tribute in the Sutlej states, and
in November, 1802, we find him at Jind negotiating matters of con-
siderable importance with Rajah Bagh Singh. He remained in the
Sikh country till the middle of 1803, his last exploits being the capture
of Rohtak, and the levying of a tribute of Rs.15,000 from the Karnal
district. In June of this year, when war with the English was im-
minent, Perron ordered Bourguien to encamp at Panipat, and shortly
afterwards to march down and occupy Delhi. In August hostilities
broke out, and simultaneously Ambaji Inglia was appointed to super-
sede Perron. Bourguien, although a “bosom friend” of the General
—Skinner states they were relatives—was the first to revolt against
him, and the chief instrument in effecting his downfall. The events
leading up to the battle of Delhi, and Bourguien’s brief tenure of
power, lave been fully recorded. He surrendered to General Lake
shortly after the British victory, and was deported to Calcutta, from
whence, in course of time, he found his way to Hamburg, and so to
France. He retired with ‘an immense fortune,” and there his
history ends. ‘‘ He was not only a coward, but a fool,” was Skinner’s
brief commentary on him, and Smith describes him as being ‘‘as
wicked as he was weak.” He gained a certain reputation from the mere
fact of his being in nominal command of the enemy at the battle of
Delhi, but it was a totally spurious one, for he was the first to fly the
field. With the exception of Sombre, and perhaps Michael and Fidéle
Filoze, there is no more contemptible character amongst the military
adventurers of Hindustan than Louis Bourguien, cook, pyrotechuist,
and poltroon.
APPENDIX. 343

Brownricc, Masor.—Major Brownrigg was known as Burandee
Sahib amongst the natives, but there is no proof that this derogatory
designation was anything but an unhappy corruption of his proper
name. He was an Irishman by birth, and a very brave and able
officer, much liked by his soldiery, and highly esteemed by Daulat
Réo Sindhia, for whom he raised an independent corps. He is first
heard of in 1799, when he stormed and captured the fort of Kolapur,
near Poonah. During the next year he was chiefly employed in
opposing Pareshram Bhio, the Peshwa’s commander-in-chief, during
the political revolutions and disorders that prevailed in the Deccan.
He then accompanied Sindhia to Malwa, and in July, 1801, made his
famous defence against Jaswant Rio Holkar, who, after defeating
MacIntyre, attacked Brownrige’s entrenched camp near the Narbada.
Brownrigg’s force was vastly inferior in numbers, not exceeding four
battalions, but his position was an exceedingly strong one, with the
river in his rear, and his front and flanks intersected by ravines,
which prevented Holkar’s cavalry from acting. He was, moreover,
well supplied with artillery, being accompanied by Sindhia’s grand
park. He defended his position with great judgment and intrepidity,
and finally obliged Holkar to retreat, leaving two guns behind him.
Three months after this Brownrigg assisted Sutherland in winning
the notable battle of Indore, in which Holkar’s entrenchments were
stormed at the point of the bayonet, and all his guns taken. By this
time Brownrigg had risen very high in Sindhia’s favour, which made
him an object of jealousy to Perron, who, when he came to Ujjain, in
March, 1802, found means to encompass his disgrace, and Skinner
mentions him as having been ‘“‘ put in arrest under fixed bayonets”
for intriguing against the General. What became of Brownrigg’s
corps after this is not quite clear, but it is possible it was incorporated
in Perron’s army, for a few months later Brownrigg was at Koil,
from whence, a little while before the breaking out of the war with
the English, he was sent back to the Deccan in command of five
battalions of the newly raised Fifth Brigade. Sindhia, however, soon
ordered him back to reinforce Perron’s army in Hindustan, and he
reached Agra just after the battle of Delhi had been fought. Although
Brownrigg’s battalions were refused entry into the fort, he was per-
mitted to join Hessing, Sutherland, and the other European officers
residing there, and shared with them the confinement they were
presently placed in by the revolted garrison. After the fall of Agra,
Brownrigg entered the British service, obtained the command of some
irregular levies, and was employed in the war against Jaswant Rio
Holkar. He fell in an unequal conflict before Sirsa, in the Haridna
344 APPENDIX.

district, on the 19th of February, 1804, his troops being overpowered
by superior numbers and defeated for want of good arms. It was the
first repulse he had experienced in the course of twelve years of active
and arduous service. He was an amiable man and a fine soldier,
whose defeat of Holkar in 1801 was one of the most brilliant episodes
of Maratha civil strife.

BUTTERFIELD, Caprain.—Captain Butterfield was the son of an
officer in the Honourable Company’s service. He appears to have
sought a career in the Native courts early in life, and before 1790
was employed by the Rajah of Karaoli, whom he quitted in order to
enter the service of Thakur Durjan Lal, a Rajput chief, from which he
was tempted away by the superior inducements of Sindhia’s army.
It is probable that he joined De Boigne when the Second Brigade
was raised, for in 1794 he had risen to the rank of a captain, though
on a pay of only Rs. 200 a month. Some years later he was still a
captain in the Second Brigade under Colonel Sutherland. When
Lakwa Dada joined the rebellion of the Bhais, Ambaji Inglia was
ordered to attack him, and Butterfield, with two battalions and ten
pieces of cannon, acted under the chief. Marching to Kotah they
engaged the Bhais army at a place called Chand-khori, when Ambaji’s
irregular troops deserted, and the whole brunt of the attack fell upon
Butterfield’s two battalions. After fighting for two hours it became
apparent that not only cowardice but treachery was rife in Ambaji’s
army, for some of his troops went over to Lakwa, in consequence of
which Butterfield was forced to retire, and lost a great number of
men before he could get to a place of safety. Eventually he made
good his retreat to Shérgarh. For his conduct on this occasion he
received a very flattering letter from Perron. No further mention of
his services can be found.

Dawes, Caprain.—Captain Dawes was an officer in Perron’s First
Brigade under Sutherland. Little is known of his career. In Feb-
ruary, 1802, he was detached by Daulat Rao Sindhia to pursue Holkar
after his defeat at Indore. Dawes had only four battalions of regular
infantry and six ragamuffin battalions belonging to Ambaji, and
was unable to effect anything of importance, or stay Holkar’s rapid
predatory course, though he carried on a desultory campaign in
Khandésh for some months, and won a few small skirmishes. When
Holkar advanced against Poonah, Dawes was sent to oppose him.
His army was utterly inadequate for the work, and inferior in every
respect to Jaswant Rao’s, notwithstanding which he strongly urged
APPENDIX. 345

Sudaseo Bhao, the Maratha general, to force a battle. The defeat
which followed is historical, and was the indirect cause of the war
between the English and Sindhia in the following year. Dawes’s
battalions behaved with signal courage, fully sustaining their reputa-
tion, but they were completely overpowered. Of their four officers,
three — Dawes, Catts, and Douglas— were killed, and one taken
prisoner. The guns lost on this occasion were the first ever captured
in action from any of De Boigne’s battalions.

Derripon, Louis, Masor [spelt also Deridan, Derridoven, and
Dareebdoon].—Major Derridon was a half-bred Frenchman and
brother-in-law to General Perron, who married his sister. He was
also related to Colonel John Hessing, probably in the same degree, for
the Colonel’s son, George Hessing, is described by Skinner as Perron’s
nephew. Major Derridon commanded a battalion in Hessing’s corps,
and was present at the battle of Ujjain, when Holkar defeated four of
Sindhia’s battalions, and killed nearly all their officers. In this action
Derridon was wounded and taken prisoner, and Colonel John Hessing
paid Rs. 40,000 to ransom him from Holkar, though Sindhia, according
to a local paper published at the time, subsequently refunded the
amount. Derridon then repaired to Hindustan, and when Perron
discharged most of his English officers in 1802, received a high
appointment in his army. He was at Agra when the fort was
captured by General Lake in 1803. Lady Fanny Parkes, in her
“Wanderings of a Pilgrim in Search of the Picturesque,” incidentally
mentions that this officer was living at Koil in 1838, “in a house
formerly the property of General Perron.’”’ His grandsons were
owners of the same property as late as 1871.

Dopp, Masor.—Major Dodd was an Englishman, and succeeded
Captain Gardner in the command of a brigade in Jaswant Rao
Holkar’s service, which was composed of four battalions of infantry,
200 cavalry, and 20 guns. Itis probable he took part in the battle of
Poonah. He was one of the British officers beheaded by Holkar in
1804 for refusing to fight against their own countrymen.

Donetty, Captain.—Captain Donelly was an Irishman, and com-
manded a battalion in Perron’s Second Brigade, under Colonel Polil-
man. All that is known of him is that he was killed at the storming
of Shahpira in 1799, when Pohlman was beaten back with a loss of a
thousand men killed and wounded. Perron in a letter to De Boigne
mentions the death of this ofticer, whom he refers to as “ your protegé,
Donelly.”’
346 APPENDIX.

Druceon, Carrain.—Captain Drugeon was a Savoyard by birth,
and a countryman of De Boigne. He was born at Hyenne, near
Chambéry where his father resided in the chiteau of Bergen. The
circumstance of his brother having risen to the rank of a general in the
Sardinian army seems to indicate that Captain Drugeon was a man of
good family. In 1787 he was at Paris, and probably came out to India
in the French service. He was one of De Boigne’s oldest officers, and
in May, 1794, was Brigade-Major of the Second Brigade, and drawing
Rs. 400 a month pay. When Perron was transferred to the command
of the First Brigade and sent to the Deccan, Drugeon accompanied him,
and succeeded to his command in 1797, when he was promoted to De
Boigne’s vacated post. Drugeon saw some fighting at Poonah, but not
of a very creditable kind. In June, 1798, after the Bhais had fled for
protection to Amrat Rao, that chief was induced by Sindhia to repair to
Poonah for negotiation. But no sooner had he encamped on the out-
skirts of the city than Ghatkay Rao, Sindhia’s father-in-law, made a
treacherous attack upon him with two Brigades of infantry under
Drugeon’s command. Opening fire from twenty-five guns upon Amrat
Rao’s unsuspecting troops, he speedily threw them into confusion, and
then charging with the infantry put them to flight and plundered their
camp. Soon after this Drugeon appears to have fallen into some grave
trouble, for « local paper records that he was deposed by his own
officers, and, under orders from Perron, superseded by Colonel Duprat.
He attributed his disgrace to the machinations of his enemies. In
1800, partly at the request of De Boigne, who appears to have retained
a regard for him, he was restored to Perron’s favour, and appointed to
the commandantship of the fort at Delhi, and ten months later to the
charge of the Emperor’s person, on a salary of Rs. 800 a month.
About this time he wrote an interesting letter to De Boigne, from
which many of the following particulars are gleaned. He mentioned
he had saved Rs.30,000, which he had invested in the Company’s
Funds, and hoped to be able to pay for his passage to Kurope without
trespassing on this capital, which would constitute a sufficient provi-
sion for his old age. He deplored De Boigne’s departure, declaring
that his presence was necessary to re-establish Sindhia’s fortunes on a
sound basis, and that his return would be hailed like that of a Messiah,
‘(in such veneration and adoration are you held, especially by the
troops, who invoke your name only in their songs.” As for Perron,
Drugeon describes him as “like the King of Prussia for power, and
like a Croesus as regards riches, which fall on him night and day like
the most abundant rain, in the form of rupees. He is courted by all
the rajahs and chiefs of the country and also by Sindhia, who is afraid
APPENDIX. 347

of him. ‘You have made the soup, which he has only the trouble of
supping.” His own misfortunes, Drugeon goes on to state, had been
very heavy. ‘If my jealous enemies,” he protests, “had not done
me an ill turn with Perron, I would have been a rich man to-day. I
try to forget them—for what can I do? God Almighty cannot undo
what has already been done.” Such is his philosophical reflection,
but doubtless he found a balm to his wounded spirit in the fact that
the Emperoyr’s person, his correspondence, and all his household were
entrusted to his care. After detailing some local news, which has
been incorporated in the sketch of Perron’s life, Drugeon goes on to
say: “I very much desire to return to Europe, but I am hindered
from doing so by an entanglement with a lady of the country, whom
I love very much, and whom I have taken up with to assist me to
forget my past cares. As to taking her with me, can I do so? I do
not at all wish to desert her. Kindly give me your advice. She is a
nicce to the Naw4b Stliman Khan, and a widow, seventeen years old,
and is incessantly telling me she would rather die than leave me. I
am speaking to you as a confessor, and I await your answer before
deciding anything.”

Drugeon remained at Delhi till the breaking out of the war with the
English, and is constantly referred to in the Persian newspapers of
the period. Much of the information concerning Perron’s movements
recorded in the life of that adventurer has been gleaned from the
published reports which Drugeon made to the Emperor. In August,
1803, when Bourguien revolted against Perron, and stirred up a
mutiny in the Second and Third Brigades, Drugeon resisted him, and
after refusing to surrender the treasure he had charge of, turned him
out of the fort, which he prepared to defend with the 5,000 men form-
ing its regular garrison. After the capture of Delhi by the British,
Drugeon, who seems to have stuck to the treasure, attempted to
“deposit it” with the Emperor, but the transaction was regarded by
General Lake as a “fraudulent transfer,’ and it was distributed
as prize money to the troops. Drugeon was deported to Calcutta,
and eventually found his way to Europe, and died at Nice in 1824.

DuprENEC, THE CHEVALIER [written also Du Drenec, Du Dernaig,
Duderneg, Du Dernec, Dodernaigue, Dudernaigue, and Dudernek.
Known to the natives as Hazwr Beg].—Had the history of the Chevalier
Dudrenec been properly recorded, it would without doubt have afforded
as interesting a career of romance and adventure as any in these pages.
The following fragmentary particulars have been pieced together from
a great variety of sources, and even in their skeleton form suggest a
348 APPENDIX.

remarkably eventful life. Dudrenec was a native of Brest, in France,
and a gentleman of refinement, education, and agreeable manners,
He came of a good family, his father being a commodore in the
French navy. The Chevalier arrived in India about the year 1778,
as a midshipman on board a French man-of-war. Leaving his ship,
he made his way to Delhi, where he obtained employment in Madoc’s
corps in 1780, two of his fellow officers being the Count de Moidavre
and the Chevalier Cressy. With Madoc’s party he served in turns
the Rajabs of Bhartpur and Gohad, and Najaf Kuli Khan, the Wazir
of the Emperor Shah ’Alam. About the year 1782 Madoc retired, and
Drudenec entered the service of the Begum Somru, whose force was
at this time commanded by Pauly. With this lady he remained till
1791, a little previous to which he obtained the command of her
troops. But he resigned the appointment to enter the service of
Tukaji Holkar, who offered him Rs. 3,000 a month to raise and
discipline a brigade of four battalions of regular infantry. In the
following year this force suffered an annihilating defeat from De Boigne,
at the battle of Lakhairi, when all its guns were captured, and its ranks
broken and dispersed. Dudrenec only saved his life by throwing him-
self down amongst the dead, and simulating death. But his battalions
had shown such stubborn fighting powers before they were destroyed,
that Tukaji Holkar listened to their commander’s representations and
consented to raise another brigade, advancing Dudrenec a large sum
for this purpose. The new force was enlisted in 1793, and two years
later took part in the battle of Kardla, being associated with Perron’s
battalions and sharing with them the honour of a somewhat easy and
bloodless victory. From the seat of war they returned to Indore,
where they reposed in peace for three or four years, and by 1797 their
strength had increased to six battalions. On the death of Tukaji
Holkar, Dudrenee was much puzzled whether to cast in his lot with
the imbecile but rightful heir, Kasi Rao, or with the dashing but ille-
gitimate Jaswant Rio. He declared for the former, and for a time
carried on a campaign against Jaswant Rao, whom he at first
defeated, but at whose hands he sustained a serious reverse in 1798.
After this Amir Khan, Holkay’s brilliant ally and jidus achates, found
means to tamper with Dudrence’s troops, and by offering them in-
creased pay gained over a great number, and created a mutiny amongst
the rest, when they were encamped at Mahéshwar. The Pathdn chief,
galled at a defeat received at the hands of the Chevalier, had vowed
not to wear a turban till he had reduced Dudrenec. This came to the
knowledge of the latter when he was at Mahéshwayr, in great straits
for want of provisions, and he sent a vakil to Amir Khan offering to
APPENDIX. 349

come to terms with Jaswant Réo. The Amir reported the overture to
Holkar, who, with characteristic perfidy, proposed to allure the French-
man to an interview and then assassinate him. But the Pathan,
though not a man of many scruples, could not bring himself to
consent to this, and, after some persuasion, extracted a promise of
honourable terms for the Frenchman. Armed with this authority, he
proceeded to Jimghat, near Mahéshwar, to receive the Chevalier’s
surrender. Dudrenec met himsome distance out from his camp, gave
him a salute with all honours, and invited him to his tent, where
he first desired him to be seated, and then pointing to the silk hand-
kerchief Amir Khan wore in lieu of a turban, took off his own head
covering, and, with jommed hands, said: ‘‘As your vow prevents you
from wearing a turban till you have conquered me, see, the object is
accomplished! Bareheaded I lay my head’s covering before you, and
acknowledge my defeat. Nay, if you wish to make me your prisoner,
here is my sword. I surrender it, and you may take me to your
camp.” This, being conformable with the European custom, pleased
Amir Khan very much, and he expressed himself fully satisfied with
the speech. The Chevalier then gave the Amir his own turban, and
put on the silk handkerchief the Pathan was wearing, after which he
escorted him to Mahéshwar. Having transferred to him all his jewels,
stores, and treasures, he accompanied him to the Marath4 camp, to be
presented to Jaswant Rao. In consequence of the protection extended
by Amir Khan, Holkar dared not harm Dudrenee, but he still designed
evil against him in his heart. ‘‘ Whereupon,” to take up the thread
of the narrative from the pages of a Native historian, “it happened
that on that very night the Maharajah was sitting on the bank of the
Narbada river, amusing himself with firing at a mark, when the match-
lock burst and inflicted a severe wound in the eye, by which he entirely
lost the sight of it. Of a truth He that knows all things, secret and
divulged, is not to be deceived! In the twinkling of an eye, upon the
eye of the Maharajah fell this just retribution for the treacherous
designs he meditated against Hazur Beg.” In the end Holkar
accepted Dudrenec’s submission, and restoring him to the command
of his brigade, sent him, in 1798, to occupy and administer the districts
of Tonk and Rampura, where he remained two years.

In 1800, when Lakwa Dida was restored to favour by Sindhia, he
appears to have obtained Dudrenec’s assistance for the subjugation of
Jaipur, in which Holkar was probably interested. On the 12th of
March of that year the Chevalier effected a junction with Perron’s
second brigade, commanded by Pohlman, and shortly afterwards was
engaged with his corps at the battle of Malpura. A spirited account
350 APPENDIX.

of the charge of the Rathor cavalry, which destroyed 500 of his force,
exists in the pages of Skinner's memoirs, and has been already quoted
in the sketch of Perron’s life.

In August of the foliowing year Dudrenec, having made up his
mind to leave Holkar, showed an inclination to follow the fortunes
of Lackwa Dada, who had been again disgraced and deposed from
office by Sindhia, but he eventually decided on joining Perron’s service,
being invited ta do so by the General himself, who offered him the
post of second in command, vice Sutherland dismissed, and a brigade.
Dudrenee was at this time at Ramptra, where he always kept his
family and property under the protection of Zalim Singh. He had
the greatest difficulty in escaping, for his troops, who refused to follow
his fortunes, pelted him out of camp, and then, at the instigation of
a Native named Shamrao Nadik, surrounded his house, with the
intention of putting him to death. He was saved by the intervention
of Zalim Singh, the regent of the ruler of the territory. Jaswant Rao,
on hearing of this, demanded his surrender from the old Rajput, but
the latter refused to perpetrate such an act of treachery, and in the
end a small sum of money was paid by Dudrenee to Holkar, by way
of compensation, and he was permitted to depart to Hindustan with all
his money and belongings.

On arriving at Koil Dudrenec entered Perron’s army, and early in
1803 was given the command of the Fourth Brigade. In February of
the same year he marched to the Deccan to reinforce Sindhia, but
just before the breaking out of the war with the English he was sent
back to Hindustan, and left Daulat Rao’s camp at Jalgion on the 18th
of July. About this time Ambaji Inglia was appointed to supersede
Perron in the command of the Brigades, and Dudrenec exhibited more
attachment to the Native than to the European Commander-in-chief
—a desertion which stung Perron acutely. On his way to Delhi
Dudrenec received information of Bourguien’s defeat, and seeing little
prospect of ultimate success, abandoned his command, and on the
30th of November surrendered to Colonel Vandaleur at Mattra. Thus
ended a career full of adventure, incident, and peril. The Chevalier
seems to have been a singularly unfortunate commander, for he
suffered several disastrous defeats. His faithlessness had such an
effect on Jaswant Rio Holkar, that he withdrew all countenance from
any whose nationality was French, and after the Chevalier’s defection
gave orders that no adventurer of his nation should be allowed to
enter his service. As will be seen by this slight sketch (in which, it is
to be feared, there are many inaccuracies due to an attempt to
reconcile divergent statements and dates), Dudrenec served no less
APPENDIX. 351

than seven different masters during the period of his Indian career.
It is difficult to see how he deserves the many encomiums that have
been passed on him by various writers, for there is no record of
his having won any substantial victory. His surrender to Amir
Khan was singularly spiritless, and his notions of loyalty were
decidedly questionable.

Dupont, Jonn James, Masor.— Major Dupont was a native of
Holland, and an officer in Filoze’s corps. After the suicide of Fidéle
Filoze he succeeded to the command of four of the battalions and was
with Sindhia when war with the English broke out. His force took
part in the battle of Assaye, where they shared in the defeat and disper-
sion of Daulat Rdo’s army. According to one account Dupont was
engaged in the battle of Ujjain in 1801, where he was wounded and
made prisoner with Derridon and Humphertson.

Duprat, CoLoneL.—Colonel Duprat was a Frenchman and an
officer in Perron’s army. He succeeded Drugeon in the command of
the First Brigade at Poonah in 1798, but only held the post for a year,
being relioved by Colonel Sutherland. He was in command of five
battalions of infantry which attempted to surprise the camp of Amrat
Rao, the Peshwa’s brother, after the Bhais had fled to him for protec-
tion. This occurred on the night of the 7th of June, 1798. He failed
in the attempt, and being briskly attacked in return, was compelled to
draw off, and it was not without considerable loss that he made good
his retreat. In the negotiations which followed the affair Amrat Rao
was prevailed on to come to Poonah, when Drugeon treacherously
attacked and defeated him. Duprat’s name does not appear in any
subsequent records.

Evans, Captain [also spelt Evens].—Very little information is avail-
able concerning this officer. He appears to have commanded the
Begum Somru’s party after Baours left it in 1789. He then entered
De Boigne’s service and rose to the rank of captain on a pay of
Rs. 400 per mensem. Skinner mentions an officer of this name as
having been taken prisoner with Colonel W. H. Tone at the storm of
Sounda, and from another passage it is made apparent that he passed
into Holkar’s service. When war broke out with the English in 1803
a Captain Evens availed himself of Lord Wellesley’s proclamation and
“came in,” receiving a pension equal to the pay he drew in the service
of the state he was serving. But it is difficult to believe that an
officer who commanded Somru’s party so far back as 1789 was only
352 APPENDIX.

a captain in 1803, and there may have been two adventurers of the
same, or similar, names.

Fivozr, Finite, Coronet [also spelt Filose, Felose, and Feloze].
—Fidéle Filoze was the son of Michael Filoze by a Native woman.
When his father found it prudent to hastily resign Sindhia’s service
and leave Poonah, the command of his eleven battalions was divided
between his two sons Fidcle and Jean Baptiste Filoze. Fidele, how-
ever, retained eight of these with him in the Deccan and sent three
only to his brother who was at Delhi. The first mention of Fidéle is
in 1798, when he and George Hessing were directed by Sindhia to
arrest Ghatkay Rado, whose gross misconduct and contempt for the
prince’s authority had become intolerable, and this task they effected
with great dexterity. Soon after this Fidéle succeeded to the
command of his father’s battalions. In 1801 he accompanied Daulat
Rao to Malwa, and on reaching the Narbada one of his battalions was
detached under Colonel George Hessing to protect Ujjain, and a
second shortly followed under Captain MacIntyre. Both were
defeated and dispersed, the former at Ujjain, the latter at Nuri. The
remaining six battalions took part in the battle of Indore in October of
the same year, and directly afterwards Fidéle was accused of a foul
act of treachery, in having fired into Sutherland’s troops as they
advanced. It was asserted he had entered into a secret understanding
with Holkar, and on these grounds he was seized and confined.
According to one account he cut his throat in prison, in order to avoid
the disgrace of condign punishment, but another states that the act was
done ina fit of delirium following fever. Smith, though admitting his
treason, somewhat unaccountably describes him as “on the whole a
good, ignorant man,” but he has been depicted in a much less favour-
able light by others, and Drugeon condemns him as a traitor who
worked to ruin a master who had loaded him with favours. This is
probably the more correct estimate of his character.

Fitoze, Jean Baptiste DE LA Fontainr, Cotonet [known to the
Natives as Jin Batteejis].—Baptiste Filoze, as this individual is
always called, was the younger son of Michael Filoze. When his
father fled the country Baptiste was at Delhi, where his brother Fidéle
sent him three of the eleven battalions they had inherited, and to
these Baptiste added three more which he raised in Hindustan. This
force assisted in the war against George Thomas in 1801, but was in
a sorry state of discipline, and extremely insubordinate, the three
original battalions being on one occasion expelled from Delhi by the
APPENDIX. 353

Emperor Shah ’Alam’s orders on account of their atrocious conduct.
This appears to be the single recorded instance of that king of
kings having voluntarily promulgated a decree which was carried
into effect, and both the order and its prompt execution seem to
indicate that Baptiste’s battalions were a public nuisance. After the
fall of Georgegarh Baptiste—who, according to Thomas’s memoirs,
carried on a traitorous correspondence with him—returned to Delhi,
and Smith says that Perron procured the transfer of these six
battalions to his command by intrigue, and that they formed the
foundation of the Fourth Brigade. This was probably the case, for in
1802 Baptiste proceeded to Ujjain to take over the command of the
Deccan battalions left vacant by the suicide of his brother Fidéle.
When war broke out with the English his force consisted of eight
battalions of infantry, 500 cavalry, and 45 guns. Four of these were
beaten and dispersed at Assaye under Dupont, and Baptiste, with the
remaining four, escaped a similar fate by the circumstance of his
having been left to guard Ujjain. When he heard of Sindhia’s
crushing defeat, he saved himself by hurrying off to Rajputana, but
rejoined the prince on the conclusion of the war, and remained in his
service for many years afterwards, being the single military adventurer
of Hindustan who survived the disasters of 1803. People of his name,
and probably his descendants, are to this day employed in the court
of Sindhia, and Sir Michael Filoze is a highly respectable architect at
Gwalior. In Broughton’s “Mahratta Camp” there are several
references to Baptiste Filoze, whose circumstances in 1809 were far
from happy, for serious disturbances were constantly occurring in his
corps, which was seldom out of a state of regular mutiny, owing to the
men being in arrears of pay, and the tyrannical treatment they
experienced from Baptiste. On one occasion he was removed from
the command, after he and his European officers had been seized and
confined, some being flogged, while others, with a refinement of
cruelty, had their ears nipped in gunlocks, after which they were all
expelled from the lines. They numbered forty, chiefly half-castes, but
two or three were Englishmen. A little later on Baptiste was rein-
stated, through the interest of friends at court, who described him as
“one of the greatest generals of the day”; which elicited the shrewd
comment from Sindhia “‘ that he had generally found these very great
generals were also very great rogues.” However, Baptiste obtained
his reappointment, and evidently prospered, as the following extract
from Colonel Sleeman’s “ Rambles of an Indian Official ” testifies :—
“ After the Dusera festival in November every year, the Pindaris go
‘Kingdom taking’ as regularly as English gentlemen go partridge
28
354 APPENDIX.

shooting on the Ist of September. I may give as a specimen the
excursion of Jean Baptiste Filoze, who sallied forth on such an expedi-
tion at the head of a division of Scindia’s army just before the Pindari
War. From Gwalior he proceeded to Kerowlee, and took from the
chief of that territory the district of Subughur, yielding four lakhs
annually. He then took the territory of the Rajah of Chundeylee, one
of the oldest of the Bundlecund chiefs, which yielded about seven
lakhs of rupees. The Rajah got an allowance of Rs. 40,000 a year. He
then took the territories of the Rajahs of Ragooghur and Bahadhur-
ghur, yielding three lakhs a year, and the three princes got Rs. 50,000
a year for subsistence amongst them. He then took Lopar, yielding
two lakhs and a half, and assigned the Rajah Rs. 25,000. He then
took Gurha Kotlah whose chief gets subsistence from the British
Government. Baptiste had just completed his Kingdom taking when
our armies took the field against the Pindaris, and on the termination
of the war in 1817 all these acquisitions were confirmed and guaranteed
to Scindia.” Writing in 1833 Colonel Sleeman adds: “The present
Gwalior force consists of three regiments of infantry under Colonel
Alexander, six under Apajee, eleven under Colonel Jacob (Broughton
mentions them as excellently disciplined in 1807, their commander
enjoying a Jaidad and paying them regularly), and five under Colonel
Jean Baptiste Filoze.”

Baptiste remained at Gwalior till the breaking out of hostilities
between the ruling Sindhia and the English in 1843. He was then
commander-in-chief of the State army, which consisted of 30,000
regular troops and the famous park of artillery which had remained
with it since the days of De Boigne. Just before the battles of Maha-
rajapir and Pannidr, Baptiste arranged that he should be locked up
by his own men so as to avoid fighting the English. The reason of
this was that he had £40,000 invested in Company’s paper. With
the exception of two, all the other officers of his army withdrew from
the contest, knowing the hopelessness of success. The war was begun
and concluded with these two battles, both fougut on the same day,
and after it Baptiste and his officers were removed from their com-
mands and employment of every kind.

Thus Baptiste’s career is traced for forty-seven years in the service
of Sindhia—a record no other military adventurer can boast of.

Fitoze, Micaart, CotoneLt.— Michael Filoze was a low-bred
Neapolitan of worthless character, yet not without a certain address
and cunning that enabled him to advance his interests. In his
native country he had followed the calling of a muleteer, before
APPENDIX. 355

he enlisted in the French army and came out to Madras, from
whence, after several vicissitudes, he made his way to Delhi, and
enlisted in the Rana of Gohad’s service, in the corps commanded by
Madoc. De la Fontaine, a Frenchman, was a fellow officer, and it
was evidently after him that Michael named his son Baptiste, who
was born at Gohad in 1773. In 1782, when the Rana was defeated
by Sindhia and his battalion broken up, Michael Filoze lost his
employment, and it has been stated that during the next eight
years he served one of the Native states of Southern India. But
if so, he evidently returned to Hindustan, for about the year 1790
he found means to recommend himself to De Boigne, who ap-
pointed him to the command of a battalion in his First Brigade.
It was some time before he rose to any substantial rank, for in
May, 1794, he was only rated at a pay of Rs.300 per month. In
the previous year he had been selected to accompany Madhoji
Sindhia to the Deccan, and later on he successfully intrigued to
get his battalion made into a separate command, independent of
De Boigne’s. It formed the nucleus of the corps he raised, which
eventually numbered eleven battalions. In 1797 Michael Filoze
found it prudent to fly from Poonah, under the following circum-
stances. Nana Farnavis, the Peshwa’s prime minister, and the most
able statesman in Marathé history, was induced to return a formal
visit of ceremony paid him a few days previously by Daulat Rao
Sindhia, of whom he was suspicious and distrustful. But Michael
Filoze pledged his word of honour for the safety of the old minister,
and so overcame his scruples; notwithstanding which the Neapolitan
seized Nana and made him over a prisoner to Sindhia. This per-
fidious act excited the just indignation of all the European officers
in the service of the Native states, whose general character was
impugned by it, and who, in Grant Duff’s words, “ though mere
soldiers of fortune, were as distinguished for good faith as daring
enterprise.” The Mardthas themselves excused Michael's treachery,
saying that he was ignorant of what was intended, and ascribing
it to sudden coercion by Ghatkay Rao. It should further be
mentioned that in a letter to a current newspaper Michael Filoze
strenuously denied his guilt. The Nana was too powerful a person-
age to be kept a prisoner long; for a time he was confined in the fort
of Ahmednagar, but in the following year he obtained his liberty by
a payment of ten lakhs of rupees. Directly Filoze heard he was
treating for his liberty, and likely to obtain it, he decamped to
Bombay, leaving the command of his eleven battalions to his sons.
Drugeon, who brands Michael Filoze as a traitor, mentions that he
356 APPENDIX.

set out for Europe, “but died’—whether on the voyage or after his
arrival there is not specified. Grant Duff confirms Drugeon’s estimate
of this adventurer’s character, as does Smith, who describes Filoze’s
party as one that ‘‘ never performed any action of military or political
consequence.”

Finecuass, Captrain.—This officer was an Englishman, and formerly
a quarter-master in the 19th Dragoons, where he bore a good cha-
racter. He and Colonel Boyd, at the head of two independent parties,
were introduced into the service of the Nizam of Haidarabad as a
counterpoise to Raymond's overgrown power. In the year 1795
Finglass’s corps numbered about 800 men, and took part in the
battle of Kardla, where it shared in the defeat the Nizam brought
upon himself by his pusillanimity. After this it was increased, and
in 1798 numbered 6,000 men. Early in this year Raymond died, and
was succeeded by Piron in the command of the “French army”
of 14,000, which was disbanded in the following October by
Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, under orders from the Governor-
General. With the dispersion of these troops, and the cessation of
the danger they threatened, it became a question whether or not
Finglass should be allowed to retain his corps. In the end Lord
Wellesley sanctioned its continuance, and, furthermore, permitted
Finglass from time to time to purchase ordnance, ordnance stores,
and muskets at Fort St. George. Itis possible that the Haidarabad
reformed troops, now in the service of the Nizam, can carry their
traditions back to the days of Captain Finglass.

Frevurea, Carrain [also written Fleury|.—Captain Fleurea was
a Frenchman and a cavalry officer in Perron’s army. After the
battle of Koil in 1803, when Perron precipitately fled to Agra, he
detached Fleurea, with 5,000 Hindustani horse, to carry fire and
sword into the Company’s district of Cawnpore. Fleurea came across
a small British outpost at Shikéabad, commanded by Colonel Con-
ingham, and after four days’ fighting forced it to surrender. It was
not a very brilliant performance, but still the single advantage gained
by any of Perron’s troops during the war. On hearing of the fall of
Aligarh, Fleurea’s troopers carried him back to Agra, from whence he
made his escape with great ditliculty after Perron’s flight, joining the
General at Lucknow, and accompanying him to Calcutta.

Frimont, Cotonen [spelt also Frimont and Fremond].—Colonel
Frémont was a Royalist and commander of the French forces at
APPENDIX. 357

Chandernagore. But he quitted the service, as did most of the other
officers in 1790, on the breaking out of the French Revolution. Pro-
ceeding up country, he applied to De Boigne for employment, and
was appointed to the command of one of the two original battalions,
and, when the Second Brigade was formed, promoted to the head of
the First with a salary of Rs. 1,400 a month. In 1792 he distinguished
himself at the storm of Balahiri, a hill fort forty-five miles east of
Jaipur, on which occasion Captain Bulkeley was killed. An interest-
ing account of this campaign appears in The World (a newspaper
printed at Calcutta), in the following letter, dated from a place called
‘“ Ringhass,” on August 6 and 10, 1792 :—

“We arrived at this place on the 5th, our force consisting of the
Second Brigade and 15,000 regular Mahratta horse, but excluding
irregulars. This is a stone fort, upon a scientific plan of construction,
surrounded by a ditch thirty feet deep, twenty-four feet wide, and
capable of defence with such men and discipline as ours. It belonged
to the Rajah Deby Sing, a tributary to the Jeypore Raéjah, to whom
he has refused the established tribute, amounting to two lakhs and a
half, offering only a small portion. We arrived early, and after
summoning the place to that effect, at nine o’clock we opened our
trenches, and kept up a severe fire on the place till ten o’clock, by
which time we had effected a capital breach between one of the
bastions and a head of the curtain. The garrison had but few guns,
with which, and musketry, they contrived to annoy us heartily. We
opened two mortars after dark, which created, as was intended,
dreadful confusion among them.

“Captain Chambaud’s battalion and a select body of Rohillas were
ordered for the storm in two divisions, with orders not to spare the
sword. The time, three in the morning. However, the order had
reached the garrison, and by a capitulation at half-past two they
saved the lives of the remaining people. Deby Sing had quitted the
fort previously, leaving injunctions to his officers not to surrender on
any terms. The garrison are all prisoners now with us, and the stock
of provisions and stores is valuable to us. The valuable property was
carried off to the Rajah ; however, what was left more than pays the
amount offered.

“Deby Sing has another strong fort, called Sikker, about eight
cos distant, where he has resolved to hold out, and we are determined
to bring him to implicit obedience or bondage. He has a chosen
force, a strong fort, good guns, and three months’ provisions, and the
country around is without water.”

Frémont brought this expedition to a successful conclusion. The
358 APPENDIX.

next mention of him is two years later, at Datia, whither he was
sent to punish the Rajah. The following account of this campaign is
extracted from the “‘ Asiatic Researches.” “Gopal Rao Bhow marched
against Dutieya (in 1794) to compel payment of tribute and exact a
fine. He was opposed. An engagement ensued, in which the
Dutieya troops charged, sword in hand, the veteran battalions of
De Boigne, which were commanded by Major Fremont, an officer of
ability and experience. The Bundélhas showed no fear of the musket
and bayonet, and there were several instances of grenadiers cut down,
while their bayonets were buried in the breast of their assailants’
horse. The Brigade lost 300 men in the attack, and Major Frimont
himself assured me that nothing but a continual discharge of grape
from the guns prevented it from utter destruction.” In another
account the victory is attributed to the judicious disposition of Fré-
mont’s artillery, and the gallantry of his men in some severe close
fighting, in which they routed the enemy with considerable slaughter.

In 1795 or 1796 Frémont died, and this left Perron the senior
officer in the force, and paved the way for his promotion to the
chief command.

GARDNER, WiLLiam Linarus, CoLtoneL. —In its social aspect
Colonel Gardner’s life is the most romantic of any recorded in these
pages. Born in 1770, he was a great grandson of William Gardner,
of Colleraine, and a nephew of Alan, first Baron Gardner, a distin-
guished admiral in the British navy, who received the thanks of
Parliament for his services. Colonel Gardner was educated in
France, and came out to India in the King’s service, and after rising
to the rank of captain quitted it to enlist under the banners of the
Native princes. There was a Scotch officer of the same name who
entered Sindhia’s service in 1792, was Brigade-Major of the First
Brigade in 1793, commanded the Second ‘Brigade in 1794, and was at
the storm and capture of Sohawalgarh in 1795, where he was assisted
by George Thomas. But as his Christian name is given as James in
one place it is doubtful whether he was the same individual as the
officer under notice. Colonel William Gardner entered Jaswant Rio
Holkar’s service in 1798, and raised a brigade of regular infantry for
that chief. But a disagreement arose between them, and Gardner
left him. The story of his escape is thus told by himself :—

“One evening, when in Holkar’s service, I was employed as an
envoy to the Company’s forces, with instructions to return within a
certain time. My family remained in camp. Suspicion of treachery
was caused by my lengthened absence, and accusations were brought
forth against me at the durbar held by Holkar on the third day follow
APPENDIX. 359

ing that on which my presence was expected. I rejoined the camp
while the durbar was in progress. On my entrance the Maharajah,
in an angry tone, demanded the reason of my delay, which I gave,
pointing out the impossibility of a speedier return. Whereupon
Holkar exclaimed, in great anger, ‘Had you not returned this day I
would have levelled the khandts of your tent.” I drew my sword
instantly and endeavoured to cut His Highness down, but was pre-
vented by those around him; and before they had recovered from the
amazement and confusion caused by the attempt, I rushed from the
camp, sprang upon my horse, and was soon beyond the reach of
recall.”

To account for Colonel Gardner’s indignation it must be explained
that he was married to a Native lady, and that the khandés, or can-
vas walls of his tent, represented the privacy of the zendua, and to
have cut them down implied the exposure of the inmates, an insult
for which there could be no atonement. Through the influence of
friends Colonel Gardner’s wife and family were allowed to join him
shortly afterwards—a piece of generosity hardly to be expected from
such a character as Jaswant Réo Holkar.

The story of Colonel Gardner’s marriage, as related by himself to
Lady Fanny Parkes, is one of romantic interest. He was married by
Muhammadan rites to a princess of the house of Cambay, a state on
the western seaboard of India, and probably when he was an officer
in the British service. This is his description of the incidents leading
to the union :—

‘When a young man I was entrusted to negotiate a treaty with one
of the Native princes of Cambay. Durbars and consultations were
continually held. During one of the former, at which I was present,
a curtain near me was gently pulled aside, and I saw, as I thought,
the most beautiful black eyes in the world. It was impossible to think
of the treaty: those bright and piercing glances, those beautiful dark
eyes completely bewildered me.

“T felt flattered that a creature so lovely as she of those deep black,
loving eyes should venture to gaze upon me. To what danger might
not the veiled beauty be exposed should the movement of the purdah
be seen by any of those present at the durbar? On quitting the
assembly I discovered that the bright-eyed beauty was the daughter
of the prince. At the next durbar my agitation and anxiety were
extreme to again behold the bright eyes that haunted my dreams and
my thoughts by day. The curtain was again gently waved, and my
fate was decided.

‘“«T demanded the princess in marriage. Her relations were at first
360 APPENDIX.

indignant, and positively refused my proposal. However, on mature
deliberation, the ambassador was considered too influential a person
to have a request denied, and the hand of the young princess was
promised. The preparations for the marriage were carried forward.
‘Remember,’ said I, ‘it will be useless to attempt to deceive me.
I shall know those eyes again, nor will I marry any other !’

“On the day of the marriage I raised the veil from the countenance
of the bride, and in the mirror that was placed between us, in accor-
dance with the Mahomedan wedding ceremony, I beheld the bright
eyes that had bewildered me. I smiled. The young Begum smiled
too.”

This young princess was only thirteen years old when she was
married: ‘An event,” says Colonel Gardner, ‘‘ which probably saved
both our lives.” She was eventually adopted as a daughter by Akbar
Shah, who succeeded Shah ’Alam as Emperor of Delhi. For over
forty years husband and wife lived a life of perfect happiness, and
she died of a broken heart in August, 1835, six months after Colonel
Gardner.

Subsequently to his departure from MHolkar’s service Colonel
Gardner had another very narrow escape for his life. In 1803 he
was confined a prisoner by Amrat Rao, who, when war broke out with
the English, caused Gardner to be fastened to a gun, and threatened
with immediate execution if he refused to take the field against his
fellow countrymen. The Colonel remained staunch, and in the hope
of wearying him out, his execution was suspended, and he was placed
in charge of a guard, who had orders never to quit sight of him for
a single instant. Walking one day along the edge of a steep cliff,
which led by a precipitous descent to the river Tapti, Gardner was
suddenly inspired to make a daring dash for liberty, and perceiving
a place fitted for his purpose, he called out “ Bismillah!” (“In the
name of God”), and flung himself down a declivity some forty or fifty
feet deep. None were inclined to follow him, but an alarm was
sounded. Recovering his feet, he made for the river, and plunged into
it; but after swimming for some distance he found pursuers were gaining
on him, and sought shelter in a friendly covert, where, with merely his
mouth above water, he waited until they had passed. He then landed
on the opposite side, and proceeded by unfrequented paths to a town in
the neighbourhood, which was under the command of a Native whom
he knew, and who afforded him protection. After remaining in
hiding for some time, he ventured out in the disguise of a grass cutter,
and reached the British outposts in safety.

At one time it would appear, from a passage in Major Thorn’s “War
APPENDIX. 361

in India,” that Colonel Gardner was in the service of the Rajah of
Jaipur ; but in 1804 he returned to his allegiance to the British Govern-
ment and raised a famous cavalry corps known as “ Gardner’s Horse,”
which achieved a great reputation. His best services, both in the field
and in diplomacy, were performed under the King’s flag. He had a
profound knowledge of the native character, and had adopted many
of the ideas and opinions of the people with whom he passed a great
portion of his life. But this did not prevent him from being an
acceptable companion to his own countrymen, with whom he was
always a great favourite. Lewis Ferdinand Smith describes him as
“a gentleman and a soldier of pleasing address and uncommon
abilities.” His figure was tall and commanding, and his handsome
countenance and military air rendered his appearance very striking.
Lady Fanny Parkes, from whose interesting ‘‘ Wanderings of a
Pilgrim ” many of the foregoing facts have been gleaned, formed an
intimate friendship with Colonel Gardner, and speaks of him, in his
old age, in terms of the warmest admiration and regard. For many
years prior to hisdeath he resided on his jaghir, or estate, at Khasganj,
sixty miles from Agra. His Begum bore him two sons and a daughter.
His eldest son James married a niece of the Emperor Akbar Shah.
The younger, Alan, was united to Bibi Sahiba Hinga, and left two
daughters, Suzan and Harmuzi. The latter was married in 1836 to
her relative, William Gardner, a nephew of the second Baron Gardner.
Their son, Alan Hyde Gardner, succeeded to the title, and is the
present holder of it. He married in 1879 Jane, a converted princess
of the House of Delhi, and has an heir, born in 1881. Thereis a most
interesting pedigree of this family on p. 420 (vol. i.) of the “ Wander-
ings of a Pilgrim,” which illustrates in a very curious way the thread of
connection by intermarriage between the heirs and descendants of an
English Barony, the Imperial House of Taimur, the Kings of Oudh
and the Princes of Cambay. The degree of relationship is too intricate
to be explained in detail, but the present Lord Gardner is grandson of
a Prince of Cambay, and nephew to a late Emperor of Delhi, and
a late King of Oudh. This sketch cannot be more suitably concluded
than by an extract from Dod’s Peerage.

“ GarDNER (Ireland) created 1800. Baron Gardner, 1806 (United
Kingdom), by which title he holds his seat in the House of Lords.
Baronet, 1794 (Great Britain). Alan Hyde Garduer, son of the late
Stewart William Gardner, grandson of the first baron. B. 1836: M.
1879, Jane, daughter of Angam Shckoe. Succeeded his kinsman in
1883. Residence, Village Munowta, near Nadri, Etah district. Heir,
Son Alan Legge, born October 25, 1881,”
362 APPENDIX.

Grstin, Masor.—Major Geslin was a Frenchman, and commanded
a battalion in Perron’s Second Brigade. When the war of 1803 broke
out he was appointed to succeed George Hessing in command of the
brigade, the latter being sent to take up the commandantship of the
fort of Agra, rendered vacant by the death of his father, Colonel John
Hessing. Geslin, meanwhile, joined Bourguien at Delhi, and opposed
him when he revolted against Perron’s authority, and usurped his
command. Bourguien, having failed in every attempt to seduce
Geslin from his allegiance, incited the brigade to mutiny and place
the Major under arrest, which they did. After the battle of Delhi,
Geslin was one of the officers who surrendered to Lord Lake, and
were deported to Calcutta.

Harpine, Masor.— Major Harding was a very gallant young
English adventurer, whose eareer though short was brilliant. He
raised a brigade of four battalions for Jaswant Rao Holkar, which he
brought to a high state of efficiency and discipline. He met his death
at the battle of Poonah, whilst charging Dawes’s guns side by side
with Holkar. In the very moment of victory he received a cannon
shot in the shoulder, almost the last one fired in the action. Jaswant
Rao, although wounded in three places, immediately hurried to the
spot where Harding was lying, to afford him assistance and consola-
tion. But the wounded officer was sinking fast, and he only had time
to express a wish to be laid to rest by the side of his fellow country-
men in the burial place of the British Residency at Poonah—a dying
request that was scrupulously fulfilled.

Harriott, Caprain.—Captain Harriott was an Englishman, and an
officer in Perron’s Fifth Brigade. He was one of the Europeans con-
fined by the mutinous troops at Agra, previous to the capture of that
fortress by General Lake. Taking advantage of the terms of Lord
Wellesley’s proclamation, he passed over to the British Government,
and obtained the command of one of Sindhia’s battalions which were
taken into the Company’s service after the war, and saw some fighting
with itin the Haridna district in 1804.

Hearsey, Cartain.—Captain Hearsey was one of Thomas’s officers,
and assumed temporary charge of the camp at Georgegarh after the
memorable battle of the 4th of September, 1801. It was owing to his
error of judgment in not retiring to Hansi, that Thomas’s fall was in-
directly due. He appears to have possessed very little military ability,
but was faithful to his chief, and not only accompanied him jn his flight
APPENDIX. 363

to Hansi, but fought bravely to the end. After Thomas’s fall Hearsey
entered the service of some Native state, whether Sindhia’s or
Holkar’s it is impossible to say; but he was one of the officers who
availed themselves of Lord Wellesley’s proclamation in 1803, and
received a pension of Rs. 800 a month from the British Government.

Hessine, Grorgn, CoLoneL.—George Hessing was a half-caste
Dutchman, being a son of Colonel John Hessing by a ‘Native
woman.” But though Grant Duff describes the mother in these
terms, there is little doubt but that she was a sister of Major
Derridon and Madame Perron, for Skinner mentions that George
Hessing was the General’s nephew. Hessing was known amongst
the Natives as Jorus Sahib, a corruption of his Christian name, which
cannot bear comparison with the sonorous Jowruj applied to Thomas.
The first mention of George Hessing is in 1798, when, in conjunction
with Fidéle Filoze, he expertly effected the capture of Ghatkay Rao.
In 1800, on the retirement of his father, he succeeded to the command
of a brigade of four battalions, which he quickly increased to eight.
The next year he accompanied Sindhia to Malwa, and on reaching
the Narbada was sent forward to protect Ujjain against a threatened
attack by Holkar. Although it was in the rainy season, and the
country flooded with water, Hessing made an astonishingly rapid
march, and arrived atthe capital in June. Amir Khan soon attacked
him, and kept him in play till Holkar defeated MacIntyre and
attempted to repeat the success against Brownrigg; but being re-
pulsed by the latter officers, he joined Amir Khan, and made a con-
certed assault on Hessing’s entrenchments outside the walls of Ujjain.
Hessing behaved in a most cowardly manner, flying at an early
period of the action, and leaving his troops to be annihilated, and his
eleven European officers killed or wounded and taken prisoners.
Just previous to the battle of Ujjain he had despatched four of his
battalions to his father at Agra, whither he now made his way. He
was soon called upon to march with these to assist in the war against
George Thomas, and it was through his lines that Jowruj Jung cut
his way when he escaped to Hansi. After this Hessing returned to
Agra. Smith states that his four battalions were taken over by Perron
in 1803, and made the foundation of the Fifth Brigade, Hessing being
promoted to the command of the Second, in succession to Robert
Sutherland ; but he did not hold the appointment long, for his father
died in July, and he was transferred to the commandantship of Agra.
He was here when General Lake captured the fort, but not in com-
mand, for he had been previously deposed and confined by his
364 APPENDIX,

mutinous troops. At the last moment he was put forward to negotiate
terms for the garrison. Skinner asserts that he was “ too rich a man
to defend the fort well, and soon found means to dissatisfy the
garrison,” but this opinion seems ill founded. Hessing’s fortune was
estimated at five lakhs of rupees, besides money in the Company’s
funds. After his surrender he retired to Chinstra for some time, and
eventually removed to Calcutta, where he died on the Gth of
January, 1826, aged forty-four years.

Hessine, Joun, Cotonet.—Colonel Hessing was a native of Holland,
and was born in 1740. He came to India in 1764, and entered the
service of the Native princes. After many adventures, no records of
which appear to exist, he joined De Boigne, and obtained the com-
mand of one of the first two battalions the General raised. He was
present at the battles of Lalsot, Chaksana, Agra, and Patan. After
the latter he quarrelled with his commander and left him. Soon after
this he was specially employed by Madhoji Sindhia to raise a body-
guard for that chief, and accompanied him to Poonah in 1792. By
degrees Hessing increased his party to a small brigade of four batta-
lions. In 1800 ill-health obliged him to resign his command in favour
of his son George, and, ‘‘covered with wounds received in war,” the
fine old Dutchman retired to fill the post of Commandant of the Fort
of Agra. Here “in his judicial capacity he so tempered justice with
mercy, that he was universally loved and esteemed, and in this
honourable retreat passed the remaining years of his life, spending
with liberality a well-earned fortune.” He had many opportunities
of extending hospitality to British officers, who visited Agra for amuse-
ment or curiosity. Lord Metcalfe, then a young civilian and Assistant
Resident at Daulat Rio Sindhia’s camp, met John Hessing at Agra in
March, 1801, and thus describes the incident:—“TI breakfasted by
invitation with the Dutch Commandant, Colonel J. Hessing. I found
him with his son, who commanded in the engagement at Oojein,
where his battalions were defeated; a Mr. Marshall, an Englishman,
and two others, whose names I have not learnt. The breakfast
consisted of kedgeree (rice and eggs), fish, game, fowls, curry and rice,
stews, oranges, pears, pomegranates, eggs, bread-and-butter, cakes of
all kinds, pancakes, and a number of other dishes which have escaped
my recollection—amongst others I have forgotten to enumerate clieese.
The Dutchman was as polite as a Dutchman could be, and very well
meaning, I am certain. On the following day I breakfasted and dined
with him again.”

John Hessing died on the 21st of July, 1803, aged sixty-three years, of
APPENDIX. 365

which thirty-seven had been spent as an adventurer in military service
in India. From some passages in Skinner’s “ Memoirs” it appears the
Colonel was father-in-law to Robert Sutherland, and it seems certain
that his wife was a sister of Madame Perron. Smith describes John
Hessing as “a good, benevolent man and a brave soldier.” A beau-
tiful mausoleum was erected to his memory in the Catholic burial
ground at Agra. It was designed in imitation of the T4j, and cost a
lakh of rupees!

Hopxins, Carrarn.—Captain Hopkins was the son of a field officer
in the Honourable Company's service, and one of George Thomas’s
officers. He was an extremely gallant man, greatly beloved by his
chief, whom he accompanied in the invasion of the Sutlej States,
where he was twice wounded whilst gallantly storming Native forts.
He met his death at the battle of Georgegarh. Thomas was deeply
affected by his loss, and thus refers to him in his memoirs :—‘‘ The
firmness of his behaviour during the whole period of his service, as
well as the manly resignation which he exhibited at the close of life,
stamps his character as that of an amiable man and a brave and
gallant soldier.” And Skinner gives it as his opinion that, “ had
Thomas possessed another officer like Captain Hopkins, he would
have gained the day at Georgegarh.” Hopkins’s battalion was the
only one that remained faithful to Thomas to the last. When Thomas
retired into British territory, after his surrender at Hansi, he sent a
present of Rs. 2,000 to Hopkins’s sister, who had just been left an
orphan by the death of her father, with a promise that if this sum
was not thought enough, he would extend further benevolence to her
out of his ruined fortunes.

Lrcer, THomas.—The name of ‘‘Tom Legge” has been rescued
from oblivion by the graphic pen of Coloned Tod, the author of ‘‘The
Annals of Rajasthan,” and from a contribution of his to the Asiatic
Journal the following particulars are excerpted :—Legge was a native
of Danagadee, in the north of Ireland, his father being a shipowner
in a small way, and engaged in the emigrant-carrying trade to
America. Tom Legge was very wild in his youth, and, rejecting all
his father’s offers to establish him in a respectable calling, ran away
from home and shipped on board the Swallow, sloop of war, bound
for Madras. Arrived in India, his vagrant principle asserted itself,
and, deserting his ship, he tramped his way to Haidarabad, in Sind,
supporting himself by begging. This must have been about the year
1775. He stayed in the lower Indus districts for five or six years,
366 APPENDIX.

and then proceeded to Multan, and from thence through the desert to
Jaipur. After a short residence in Rajputana he entered the service
of the Jat Rana of Gohad, being appointed to a post in Sangster’s
corps. From this officer Legge learnt the art of casting cannon and
whatever belonged to their management, and with the possession of
this knowledge, and the revival of the errant principle within him,
he resumed his travels. Bidding farewell to Sangster, he steered his
course to Kabul, where his talents gained him a situation on a pay of
three rupees a day. Here he remained some years, receiving very
kind treatment, and rendering himself so useful that, when he desired to
leave, he was obliged to escape by stealth. Journeying north, he crossed
the Hindu Kush and entered Badakshan, and was so well received
that he stayed there for a considerable time and contracted a left-handed
marriage. On quitting this country he went to Bokhara, where he
exercised his art for some time, and there, as elsewhere, his only
difficulty was to get away. He afterwards visited Herat and Kan-
dahar, and in this mode of life spent twenty years, serving almost
every power between the Indus and the Caspian. At length, tired of
this nomad existence, he set out for Jaipur, where he determined to
settle down for the rest of his days. Here he married a daughter of
Dr. de Silva, a grandson of the celebrated Favier de Silva, whom the
King of Portugal sent out to assist the astronomical studies of Jai Singh,
the prince who founded Jaipur. This alliance obtained for Legge
the command of a Najib battalion in the Jaipur army, but his first
service with it proved his last, for in storming the stronghold of a
refractory chief he received two wounds. It was shortly after this
that he came to Colonel Tod’s camp to obtain medical assistance.
‘““T was poked down with a pike, and shot through my thigh, and I’ve
come to your honour’s camp to get cured, for they can make no hand
at it at Jaipur,” was his explanation of his appearance, and the
speech was intermingled with forcible and patriotic expressions of joy
at seeing the British flag waving in front of the Colonel’s tent. His
stay here extended for some months, during which Colonel Tod heard
all the incidents of his adventurous life, and records the pleasure he
felt ‘‘in listening to the variegated history of this singular being, who
had retained, amidst these strange vicissitudes, an artlessness of
manner and goodness of heart which were displayed in many notable
instances during his abode of some months in our camp.” Legge was
in many ways an eccentric and cosmopolitan character. He practised
the healing art, alchemy, and divination. He was very benevolent,
and his accurate memory had mastered and retained an extraordinary
stock of wild Central Asian legends, which he used willingly to retail
APPENDIX. 367

to any one who would listen to him. He suffered from a delusion
that during his wanderings he had discovered the Garden of Kden.
The road which led to it was through a spacious and dark cavern, and
an angel with flaming wings guarded its entrance. Deep down in
the heart of a mountain was situated a beautiful garden, filled
with delicious fruit, with piles of gold bricks at one end, and of silver
at the other, and various other marvels. The location of this imagi-
nary spot was in the Hindu Kho. Another striking and praiseworthy
characteristic of Tom Legge’s was his reverence for the Bible, a copy
of which he carried about with him in all his travels and wanderings.
The doctor who attended Tom Legge was a Scotchman, and although
his patient’s brogue could not be mistaken, there was blended with it
a strong Scotch accent, and the doctor fancied he recognised a country-
man. ‘At this Tom’s meek spirit took fire; the qguaere involved a
double insult, to his country and to his veracity, and he exclaimed with
warmth, ‘You may take me for a Spaniard or a Portugese, or what
you plase, sir, but I tell you nothing but the truth, your honour, when
I say I’m an Irishman.’ Colonel Tod instantly poured the oil of
gladness on his wounded spirit by saying he did not doubt his word,
but that the doctor was a Scotchman, and wished to know whether,
from his accent, he might not claim Tom as a fellow-countryman.
Tom’s countenance brightened as he rejoined, with a tone and expres-
sion which could only come from a genuine son of Erin, ‘Sure, an’ was
not me mother a Mackintosh ?’”

Tom’s wound did not heal, and he felt himself slowly wasting away.
“T do not fear death, your honour,” he said to Colonel Tod, “and
could I get my life written and my boy sent to Calcutta I should die
contented.” At length he expressed a desire to return to Jaipur, and
everything necessary was provided him; but he had not long quitted
the camp before despair overtook him, and, throwing away his clothes,
he took up his post in a deserted tomb and proclaimed himself a
Fakir. In this condition he was discovered by the wife of Sindhia’s
General, Jean Baptiste Filoze. She acted the good Samaritan towards
him, but it was too late, and poor Tom Legge died shortly afterwards
in the year 1808. Alas! the pity of it that his book was never written.
Literature might have been the richer by another work like “Tom
Coryat’s Crudities.”

Le Marcuant, Caprarn [also written Le Marchand].—Captain Le
Marchant was a Frenchman, and entered De Boigne’s service about
the year 1792. In 1794 he had risen to the rank of captain, and was
drawing Rs.300 a month pay. Four years later Perron appointed him
368 APPENDIX.

“Prefect” of Delhi, and there, in command of two battalions, he
faithfully discharged the trust reposed in him, and proved himself an
active and diligent officer. He died in November, 1799, and his widow
assumed the command of his battalions, and refused to surrender
them to a successor. In March, 1800, a Native was appointed to the
post, but the spirited widow declined to recognise his authority, and
Perron was obliged to send Emilius Felix Smith to dislodge the defiant
lady. She had taken up a strong position, and fortified it with four
guns, but despite her gallant resistance she was eventually compelled
to surrender, after having held her late husband’s appointment for four
months. The custom of a widow succeeding to the command and
emoluments enjoyed by her husband was not an uncommon one in
India. The example of the Begum Somru naturally suggests itself,
but others can be adduced as illustrating this somewhat singular system
of succession. There was in 1790 in the Peshwa’s service a corps
commanded by a European named Yvon, on whose death an English-
man named Robinson was appointed to succeed him. But Mrs. Yvon
immediately hurried to Dharwar, where the corps was stationed,
deposed Robinson, caused him to be imprisoned, and assumed the
command herself. Another instance occurred in the service of Haidar
Ali of Mysore. A Portugese officer named Mequinez, who had on
one occasion rendered signal service to the prince, was slain in a battle
with the Mardthas. Haidar Ali immediately conferred the command
of his battalion upon the widow, Madame Mequinez, and invested
her with the rank of colonel, which she was to enjoy until her son
became old enough for the post. This lady accompanied the regiment
everywhere ; its colours were carried to her house, and she had a
private sentinel at her door. She received the pay of the force, and
caused it to be distributed, and the deductions made from it, in her
own presence. When the regiment was drilled and paraded she
inspected it herself, but in time of war her second in command led it
into action. Her fate was rather a humiliating one. She married a
“mongrel Portugese sergeant’; whereupon Haidar Ali reduced her
to a sergeant’s rank and pay, because, by her own voluntary action,
she had degraded herself !

Lestineau, Monsieur [also written Lesteneau],—Lestineau was a
Frenchman, and commanded a regular corps in the service of Ranjit
Singh, the Rajah of the Jats, about the year 1788. After the defeat of
Lalsét, Madhoji Sindhia entered into an alliance with Ranjit Singh,
and thus it happened that Monsieur Lestineau’s corps acted with the
Marathas in the battles of Chaksina and Agra. In the former his
APPENDIX. 369

troops were stationed on the right wing, and shared with De Boigne’s
two battalions the barren honours of the day, and after making a
staunch and gallant resistance, were forced to retire owing to the
desertion of the Mar4tha cavalry. Lestineau and his corps accom-
panied the Mardth4s to Delhi after the victory of Agra, and he was
detached to assist in the pursuit of Ghulam Kadir, who had fled to
Meerut. When Ghulém was captured, his saddle-bags, stuffed with
the jewels which the miscreant had looted from the Emperor’s palace,
fell into Lestineau’s hands, who with these, and the pay of his
battalion, absconded shortly after his return to the capital. He
reached British territory in safety, and eventually found his way to
Europe, with his ill-gotten wealth.

Le Vassoutt, CoLonet [spelt also Le Vassou, Le Vaisseau, Le
Vaisseaux, Le Vaissaux, Le Vassoo].—Le Vassoult—assuming this to
be the proper orthography of his name—was a Frenchman, and a
person of talent, good birth, and pride of character. He entered the
Begum Somru’s corps, and after rendering his mistress essential ser-
vice in the management of her artillery, was promoted to the command
of itin 17938. Two years later, in order to obtain complete control of
her party, he married the Begum. He always felt a profound con-
tempt for the officers in the force, and refused to sit at meals with
them, treating them in a haughty manner, and attempting to reform
the character of the troops with stern severity. This speedily led to
a mutiny, and Le Vassoult lost his life under circumstances which
will be found fully related under the heading of “ Sombre.”

Lucan, Caprain [also spelt Luccan].—Captain Lucan was an Irish-
man, and an officer in Perron’s army. When the war of 1803
occurred, he availed himself of the Governor-General’s proclamation,
and left Sindhia’s service. At the storm of Aligarh he volunteered to
show Lord Lake’s troops the way to the gate, and the Commander-in-
chief mentions him in the following terms in his despatch of the 4th
of September, 1803, announcing the capture of the fortress :—“TI feel I
shall be wanting in justice to the merits of Mr. Lucan, a native of Great
Britain, who recently quitted the service of Sindhia to avoid serving
against his country, were I not to recommend him to your Lordship’s
particular attention. He gallantly undertook to lead Colonel Monson’s
storming party to the gate, and point out the road through the fort,
which he effected in a most gallant manner, and Colonel Monson has
reported having received infinite benefit from his service.’’ Lucan
was rewarded with a commission in the 74th Regiment, and a donation

24
370 APPENDIX.

of Rs. 24,000— for the job,” as Skinner somewhat disparagingly puts
it. General Lake mentions Lucan again in his despatch of the 10th
of October following :—‘‘ To Mr. Lucan’s information and exertions on
this occasion [the battle before Agra] as well as on every other, I
feel myself very much indebted.” Subsequently Captain, or as he
ought perhaps to be called, Lieutenant Lucan was appointed to the
command of a large body of irregular cavalry, and attached to the
force under Colonel Monson, which was employed in keeping Holkar
in check. Monson met with a disastrous defeat after a short
campaign in Holkar’s territory, and Lucan was detached to pro-
tect his rear. When the troops were leaving Ramptra he might
have saved himself if he had retreated directly Jaswant Réo’s advance
guard came in sight. But he desired to win a name for himself, and
thought he might do so by making a brilliant charge before falling
back. He was deserted by most of his men, and soon surrounded by
Holkar’s best cavalry, and after sustaining a gallant fight, in which
his few faithful troops were cut to pieces, he was wounded and taken
prisoner. He was confined at Kotah, and shortly afterwards died,
according to various accounts, by poison, by torture, or from the
effects of his wounds. In the “ Life of Amir Khan,” by Bhosawan Lal,
it is made to appear that Lucan fell in hand-to-hand conflict with
Holkar himself, and the apocryphal exploit is commemorated by
some Persian verses, of which Prinsep gives the following metrical
translation :—

“The Maharaj at Lucan flew,
As swoops the falcon on its prey,
His water-tempered blade he drew
And streams of gushing blood found way !

The broken host took flight and fled,
Death was among them freely dealt,

Sepoys and soldiers, black and white,
The sword’s keen edge in plenty felt.

A Raging Lion, Jeswunt Rao,

Came upon Lucan, brave and bold,
And striking at his neck one blow,

His head upon the green sward rolled.

The army saw their leader’s fate
And forthwith in confusion turned ;
Such the reward of those, whose hate,
Like Lucan’s against Holkar burned.”
APPENDIX. 3871

It is, perhaps, as well to mention that, despite these circumstantial
and gory details, the above incident is purely imaginary.

MacIntyre, Caprain.—Nothing is known of this adventurer, except
that ,he was an officer in Hessing’s or Filoze’s brigades, and was
detached by Sindhia in June, 1801, to support the former at Ujjain
with two battalions. He was cut off by Jaswant Rao Holkar at
Nuri, twenty-seven miles distant from the capital, and compelled to
surrender.

MacKenziz, Lizutenant.—Lieutenant MacKenzie was an officer
commanding a battalion in Perron’s Third Brigade under Bourguien.
He was present during the campaign against Thomas, and behaved
with gallantry at the final assault on Hansi, where he was wounded.

Mapoc, Cotonet [spelt also Médoc].—Next to Sombre’s, Madoc’s
was the oldest ‘‘ party” in Hindustan. Madoc was an illiterate and
ignorant Frenchman, who had formerly been a private in the French
army in Southern India, from which he deserted in 1774, and found
his way to Delhi, where he entered the service of Najaf Khan, for
whom he raised a corps of five battalions of infantry, 500 cavalry, and
20 guns. He gathered around him several very respectable and com-
petent officers, amongst whom were the Count de Moidavre and the
Chevaliers Dudrenec and Cressy. Colonel Malleson states that Madoc
commenced his career as early as 1757, and that he was one of Sombre’s
officers, and served at the battle of Buxar. He was a gallant man, but
deficient in military knowledge, and with more enterprise and bravery
than prudence and science, and his battalions generally failed in their
attacks from the rash impetuosity of their commander. After leaving
Najaf Khan’s service, Madoc entered that of the Rana of Gohad in
1776, and a little later experienced a disastrous defeat in the defiles
of Bidna in the Méwatti district, where his force was attacked by a
large band of Rohillas, during a heavy storm of rain, and annihilated,
twelve of his European officers being killed, and all his guns and
baggage captured. Madoc escaped by flight, and found refuge at
Fatehpur, from whence he repaired to Agra, and set to work to cast
new guns and raise and discipline another corps. When it was ready
for service, by a species of transaction not uncommon in those days,
he sold it to the Rana of Gohad in 1782, and its command devolved
on Major Sangster. Madoc, having realised a small fortune, retired
to Europe, where he was not long afterwards killed in a duel.
372 APPENDIX.

MarsHat., James, Caprain.—Captain Marshall was a Scotchman,
and a gentleman of good family and education. He began lifo as a
midshipman in the Company’s navy, but in a spirit of adventure left
the sea, and took service with the Native princes, obtaining the
command of a battalion in Hessing’s corps. He is spoken of by a
contemporary as a brave soldier, an intelligent officer, and a man of
liberal sentiments and amiable manners. Little is known of his active
career in Sindhia’s service, except that he was one of the officers who
was confined by the revolted troops at Agra in 1808, and it is probable
he was engaged in the war against George Thomas. Having sur-
rendered to General Lake in terms of the Governor-General’s procla-
mation, he was awarded a pension of Rs. 500 a month by the British
Government, and shortly afterwards appointed to the command of
some newly-raised levies, and sent to keep order in the Haridna
district. He was shot through the heart about the year 1804, whilst
gallantly storming a town, in the discharge of his duty to his King and
country. ‘‘Such characters are rarely seen,’ writes Lewis Ferdinand
Smith. ‘I knew him long, and he was esteemed and respected by all
who were acquainted with his many excellent and amiable qualities.
He was cut off in the flower of his life. As he received the fatal bullet,
he grasped the hand of his friend, Captain Harriott, smiled at him,
and dropped back dead.”

Marine, CLaupE, GENERAL [also written Claud Martin].—Claude
Martine was a Frenchman. He was born in the year 1732 at Lyons,
where his father carried on the business of a silk manufacturer. It was
intended that he should follow the same calling, but his adventurous
spirit would not submit to so tame a career, and running away from
home at an early age, he enlisted in the French army. He soon dis-
tinguished himself by his activity and energy, and was advanced from
an infantry to a cavalry regiment. In 1757 the Count de Lally was
appointed to the government of Pondicherry, and requiring volunteers
for his bodyguard, Martine made application to be enrolled, and was
accepted. Accompanying Lally to India, he arrived there in 1758,
but had not been long in the country before he began to experience
trouble. Lally’s ideas of discipline were inordinately severe, and his
behaviour and manners toward his subordinates harsh and tyrannical.
His treatment might have been necessary, for a large portion of his
bodyguard had been recruited from military criminals and deserters
under sentence, who were drafted into it asa punishment. But Lally’s
sternness had the effect of increasing rather than diminishing the in-
subordination, and when, a little later, Coote advanced and laid siege
APPENDIX. 373

to Pondicherry, the whole of the Governor’s bodyguard deserted en
masse to the English, by whom they were well received. On the
return of the British troops to Madras, Martine volunteered to raise a
corps of French chasseurs from amongst the prisoners of war, for
service under the Company’s flag. His proposal was entertained, and
he received a commission as ensign. Shortly afterwards he was
ordered to Bengal with his corps, but, during the voyage, the ship in
which he sailed sprang a leak, and it was only with the greatest diffi-
culty that he saved his men in the boats, and eventually landed them
safely in Calcutta. In due course he was promoted to the rank of
captain, but in 1764 his men mutinied, notwithstanding his exertions
to keep them faithful, and the corps was broken up. Martine’s conduct
on this occasion was greatly commended by the authorities, and, being
an able draughtsman, he was rewarded by an appointment in the
north-eastern districts of Bengal, where he was sent to survey the
country. His work was so satisfactory that, on its completion, a
similar appointment was found for him in the province of Oudh.

This was the turning-point in his career, which had hitherto been
more eventful than profitable. Having fixed his headquarters at
Lucknow, he employed his leisure in exercising his ingenuity in
several branches of mechanics, and, amongst other things, manufac-
tured “the first balloons that ever floated in the air of Asia.” This
brought him under the notice of the Nawdb, who conceived so high an
opinion of his abilities, and especially his skill in gunnery, that he
solicited permission from the Bengal Government for Martine’s ser-
vices to be transferred to him, and this being granted, the adventurer
was appointed superintendent of the Nawab’s park of artillery and
arsenal,

Martine did not neglect the opportunities thus opened out to him,
and speedily ingratiated himself with his new master, whose con-
fidential adviser he became. In the many political changes that took
place in Oudh during the next twenty years the Frenchman always
contrived to remain on the right side, making himself indispensable
in negotiations between the Nawab and the Company. At the same
time he was careful not to push himself forward into public notice,
preferring to remain the power behind the throne; and although be
seldom appeared at Darbar, he had more real influence than the
Nawab’s ministers in shaping the course of events.

Martine’s salary was largely increased, and he enjoyed, in addition,
extensive sources of emolument, such as were always open to men in
positions of confidence in the Native courts. He became the recog-
nised channel for petitions from all who desired any favour from the
374 APPENDIX.

Government, and in this capacity enormous bribes and presents of
great value found their way into his hands. He educated the Nawab
into an appreciation of the products of Europe, and then acted as his
agent in procuring them. He established extensive credits with the
Native bankers, and so obtained a large share in the profitable public
loans made to his master. Finally his position at Court was esteemed
so secure that, in u country distracted by war and internal troubles,
he soon became a sort of “safe deposit” for the valuables of the
Nawab’s subjects, charging a commission of 12 per cent. for the
custody of articles committed to his care. By these and similar
methods he acquired an immense fortune during his long residence at
Lucknow.

Martine’s pleasure in life seems to have been limited to the mere
accumulation of riches, for he derived none from spending them.
In his peculiar way he was sufficiently hospitable, but his table was
not calculated to attract guests, either by the elegance of the enter-
tainment or the geniality of the host. Of his private bounty during
his life very few instances are recorded, though it is known that from
time to time he assisted his family at Lyons. The principal object of
his ambition or vanity seems to have been the attainment of military
rank, a fact the truth of which is emphasised by the epitaph he wrote
for his own tomb. During the time he resided at Lucknow his pro-
motion in the Company’s service continued; for although he
relinquished his pay and allowances, he retained his commission.
In 1790, at the commencement of the first war with Tipu Sultan, he
presented the Company with a number of fine horses to mount a
troop of cavalry, and in return was gazetted to the rank of colonel,
thus achieving the object for which the gift was made. Six years
later, when the Company’s officers received brevet rank from the
King, Martine’s name was included in the Gazette, and to his infinite
satisfaction he became a major-general. Lord Teignmouth described
him in 1797 as a man of inuch penetration and observation, whose
language would be elegant if it corresponded with his ideas; but he
talked very broken English, interlarding every sentence with “ What
do you call it ?”"—* Do you see?”

Amongst the most remarkable points connected with Martine was
his house at Lucknow, which was a castellated edifice built on the banks
of the River Gumti, and designed for defence if necessary. It was
constructed strictly on hygienic principles, for it contained a series of
rooms—or flats,as we should call them in these modern days—
adapted to the varying temperature of the different seasons of the
year. Thus in the hot season he resided in a subterranean suite of
APPENDIX. 375

chambers, which were always cool and sheltered from the fierce glare
and heat outside. When the rainy season came on, he ascended to an
upper story high above the ground level and its malaria, In the
cold weather he changed quarters again, and descended to the ground-
floor. The house was fitted with many curious mechanical con-
trivances for comfort ; the ceilings of the different apartments were
formed of elliptic arches, ornamented most elaborately, whilst the
exterior decorations were equally fanciful and florid. The furniture
was on a par with the building, and the walls of the rooms were
covered with glasses, prints, and pictures, estimated at many thousand
pounds in value. Not the least curious feature in this building—
which was called Constantia, from the motto Labore et Constantia
carved on its front—was a room containing a vault designed for
Martine’s place of sepulture. He built this because the Nawab refused
to pay him the price he asked for the edifice; whereupon, in a fit
of pique, he declared that his tomb should be handsomer than any
palace in the kingdom. His subsequent interment therein had the
effect of desecrating the place in the eyes of the Muhammadans, for
no followers of the Prophet can inhabit a tomb.

For the last fifteen years of his life Martine suffered greatly from
stone. He cured himself once by a successful though crude and
painful course of treatment; but a recurrence of the disease ter-
minated his life in the year 1800, at the age of sixty-two.

On the ist of January of the same year he executed an extra-
ordinary will, which he drew up himself. It contained over forty
clauses, and began by acknowledging with penitence that self-interest
had been his guiding principle through life. His fortune, amounting
to nearly half a million sterling, he bequeathed in innumerable
legacies. Amongst them were three to the poor of Calcutta, Chan-
dernagore, and Lucknow, the interest of which was to be doled daily
at certain fixed places, distinguished by tablets bearing an inscription
in English, French, or Persian, according to the location, and notifying
that the alms distributed were the gift of General Martine, and to
be so disbursed in perpetuity. He left a large sum in trust to the
Government of Bengal for the establishment and endowment of a
school to be called La Martinicre, which still exists, and where on the
anniversary of his death a sermon was to be preached, followed by a
public dinner, at which the toast of ‘The Memory of the Founder”
was to be drunk in solemn silence. To his relatives and the town of
Lyons he bequeathed large legacies, and two separate sums to that
city and Calcutta, their interest to be devoted to releasing poor
debtors from gaol on the anniversary of his death. He left directions
376 APPENDIX.

that his house Constantia should never be sold, but serve as a mauso-
leum for his remains, and he committed it to the care of the ruling
power in the country for the time being. Such were the elaborate
precautions taken by this eccentric man to keep his memory alive and
hand it down to posterity.

The thirtieth clause in his will was perhaps the most remarkable of
all. It ran as follows: ‘“‘ When I am dead, I request that my body
may be salted, put in spirits, or embalmed, and afterwards deposited
in a leaden coffin made of some sheet lead in my godown, which is
to be put in another of sissoo wood, and then deposited in the cave in
the small round room north-east in Constantia, with two feet of
masonry raised above it, which is to bear the following inscription :—

“ Masor-GENERAL CLAUDE MartINE,
Born at Lyons, January, 1738.
Arrived in India as a common soldier, and died at [Lucknow, the
18th of September, 1800] a major-general ;
and he is buried in this tomb.
Pray for his soul.”

His wishes were faithfully fulfilled, and when Lady Fanny Parkes
visited the tomb in 1831 she mentions that a bust of the General
adorned the vault, lights were constantly burning before the tomb,
and the figures of four Sipahis, as large as life, with their arms
reversed, stood in niches at the side of the monument. In the
centre of the vault was a large plain slab bearing the inscription
above recorded.

Perchance it sufficiently summarises Martine’s life, for his career
was disfigured by much that was ignoble and inglorious. Yet, conning
it after the lapse of nearly a hundred years, one cannot help reflecting
on the achievements of the man epitomised in the few terse words.
Dynasties have died out, thrones have tottered and fallen, kingdoms
lave crumbled into dust and been forgotten since this private soldier
sought to perpetuate his name; and it is not an unpleasing thought
that the atonement of his testamentary charity still keeps alive the
pious memory of the founder of La Martiniére.

Montaaur, Epwarp, Lizutenant.—Lieutenant Montague was the
son of Colonel Montague, of the Bengal Artillery, and an officer in
Hessing’s brigade. He was killed at the battle of Ujjain in 1801.
He is described in an obituary notice published at the time as a most
accomplished young man, who had been educated at the Royal
APPENDIX. 377

Military Academy at Kensington, and received a more ample
education than was generally esteemed necessary for the army.
Tempora mutantur; a8 witness the groups of great-brained, young
aspirants, who periodically cluster round the doors of Burlington
House to prove their sufficient intellectual powers.

Morais, Joun.—John Morris was an Englishman, and commanded
one of George Thomas's battalions. He is only mentioned once in
Thomas’s memoirs—namely, in the description of the battle of
Fatehpur, where he distinguished himself and was wounded. ‘He
was a brave man,” wrote his master, “but better adapted to con-
duct a forlorn hope than direct the motions of troops on the field of
battle.”

PaisH, CapTain.—There appear to have been two officers of this
name. One, a captain in the Chevalier Dudrenec’s corps, was killed at
the battle of Malpura in 1799, in the charge of Rathor cavalry that
overwhelmed the force; the other, a lieutenant in Perron’s Fourth
Brigade, was wounded in the storm of Sounda, in 1801. As both inci-
dents are gleaned from Skinner’s memoirs, it is possible that they
refer to one and the same individual, and that he was only wounded,
not killed, in the first action.

Pauxy, CoLongex (PAox1).—Colonel Pauly was a German, and selected
by the Begum Somru to command her husband’s party after Sombre’s
deathin 1778. He engaged too much in Oriental politics, and espoused
the cause of Prince Jiwan Bakht, who, in 1782, desired to rid Shah
’Alam of some of his unruly nobles, and undertook to secure the arrest
of a powerful minister named Mirza Shafi Khan; whereupon the
latter fled, and the Emperor appointed Jiwan Bakht Amir-ul-Umra,
or Chief of the Nobles. But Mirza Shafi entered into an alliance with
several other rebel nobles, and, collecting a large army, marched against
Delhi, sending forward a vakil to Shah ’Alam, demanding his restora-
tion to power. The Emperor was intimidated, and summoned a council,
at which Jiwan Bakht proposed to sally forth and fight the rebels, a
line of action which Pauly strongly supported, undertaking to defeat
Mirza Shafi’s following with his battalions of regulars. But the
Emperor was too frightened to act boldly, and ordered Pauly to
enter into an amicable arrangement. The German obeyed, and a
general reconciliation of all parties was outwardly agreed to, but
scarcely had Pauly entered the rebels’ camp to arrange for carrying
the agreement into effect, than a party of horse, who had been placed
378 APPENDIX.

in ambuscade, fell upon him, and, dispersing his escort, “ by a bloody
process cut off the head of Mr. Pauly.”

Pepron, CoLonet.—Colonel Pedron was a Frenchman, and a
native of Hennebon, near L’Orient. He served in Monsieur Law’s
corps at Lucknow in 1760. Law, it may be mentioned, was a son of
the financial genius known as “ Mississippi” Law, whose speculative
enterprises in France produced a parallel to our South Sea Bubble in
England. Law was at Chandernagore in 1756 when Clive captured it,
but managed to make his escape into the Upper Provinces with about
250 of his countrymen, whom he kept together till the year 1761,
when he was defeated and forced to surrender to Major Carnac. But
prior to this a great number of his Europeans deserted, and amongst
them was Pedron, who returned to Oudh, and took service with the
Nawab Wazir at Lucknow. When the French were expelled from
that ruler’s dominions at the instigation of the English, Pedron ob-
tained employment under the Rajah of Berar. After this a great
blank occurs in his history, for he is not heard of again till 1790, when
he entered De Boigne’s First Brigade as a lieutenant, and was posted
to Mattra, and shortly afterwards purchased his majority. In 1795
he was promoted to the command of the Third Brigade, and must
have been a man of considerably over fifty years of age. In 1799 he
was engaged in the siege of Delhi, which the Native commandant,
despite Sindhia’s orders, refused to deliver over to Perron: After a
blockade of five weeks the gates were opened “ to the impulse of gold,”
but whether to Pedron or to Sutherland is doubtful, as the honour has
been assigned to both. In 1800 Pedron raised the Fourth Brigade
when the threatened invasion of Hindustan by Zeman Shah caused
Perron to increase his army. His next service was against Lakwa
Dada at Sounda in 1801, but he affected so little with his eight battalions
that Perron proceeded in person to the seat of war, and stormed the
rebel chief’s entrenchments. Soon after this hostilities were declared
against George Thomas, and when Bourguien demonstrated his utter
incapacity, Pedron was sent to supersede him. That he was success-
ful was again due, in a great measure, to the “impulse of gold” —a
metal in which he seems to have had more faith than in steel, for he
displayed little military talent, and no courage, whilst the methods he
adopted of tampering with Thomas’s troops were not such as commend
themselves to European notions of honourable warfare. But he gained
his ends, and after Thomas’s flight to Hansi, made over the command
to Bourguien again, and returned to Aligarh to recruit his brigade,
which had been weakened by casualties and transfers to the Third.
APPENDIX. 379

Here he remained for eighteen months in charge of Perron’s head-
quarters, and when the rupture with the British Government occurred
in 1803 he was entrusted with the defence of the fort, and was the
recipient of the famous letter from Perron which exhorted him to
hold the place while one stone remained upon another. But this
desperate resolution was not in Pedron, and he was anxious to sur-
render without a blow, and only prevented from doing so by the spirit
of the troops under him, who, on the first indication of his weakness,
deposed and confined him, and elected a Rajput named Baji Rao to
the command. Aligarh was taken by storm on the 4th of September,
and Pedron was made a prisoner of war, or to be more exact, was
transferred from Maratha to English bondage. Thorn describes him
as ‘‘ an elderly man, clad in a green jacket, with gold lace and epau-
lettes ’’—which is the last record discovered of this adventurer.

Prutet, J., Caprain.—Captain Pillet was a Frenchman, in Les-
tineau’s corps, in the service of the Rana of Gohad, to the command
of which he succeeded by seniority when Lestineau absconded after
securing Gulam Kadir’s saddle-bags. He was, however, unable to
control the men, who broke into mutiny and were disbanded. Pillet
subsequently entered the service of the Rajah of Jaipur, and about the
year 1794 made a long report to the British Government on the
resources of that country, with a view to an alliance. As the leading
feature of the proposal was that the Rajah should keep up an army of
50,000 men, and the Company pay for it, it did not receive that atten-
tion which doubtless both Partab Sing and Pillet fondly hoped.

Pinon, Cotonex [often mis-spelt Perron].—Colonel Piron, who is
constantly confounded in historical books with General Perron, was a
native of Alsace. He was in the service of the Nizam of Haidarabad,
and second in command to the famous adventurer Raymond, who
raised a brigade of seventeen battalions for that ruler. Piron was an
outrageous Jacobin, and in close touch with the French Republican
faction in Mysore. On Raymond’s death, in March, 1798, he succeeded
to the command of the 14,000 men comprising the force, which was
supported by a Jaidad yielding eighteen lakhs of rupees annually, and
included a strong train of artillery and a complete military equipment.
One of his first acts was to send to Perron, Sindhia’s general, a silver
tree and Cap of Liberty as a souvenir. His corps always hoisted the
French national flag, and the lapels and epaulettes of the Sepoys’
uniforms were embroidered with the words Liberté et Constitution.
Piron and all his officers entertained ambitious designs, and considered
380 APPENDIX.

themselves as forwarding the interests of France. Their undisguised
hostility to the English and pronounced principles soon compelled
Lord Wellesley to take action against them, and he determined to
effect the disbandment of the force. Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts,
assisted by John Malcolm, was told off for the task, and effected it with
complete success on the 22nd of October, 1798, the operation being
facilitated by the fact of the troops being in a state of open mutiny,
and Piron and his officers in danger. The following account of
the dispersal of this “‘ French Army” (as Lord Wellesley calls it) is
extracted from Kaye's “ Life of Malcolm.”

“Having reported to Colonel Roberts the favourable aspect of
affairs, Malcolm drew up his detachment on the heights facing the
French lines. There he was speedily joined by the European officers
of the French corps, elate with joy at their escape from the hands of
their infuriate soldiery, and actually, in the conjuncture that had
arisen, regarding the English as friends and deliverers. The rest was
soon accomplished. The Sepoys left their guns, laid down their arms,
and in the presence of the two lines of British troops, moved off in a
deep column to a flag planted on the right of the ground. Not a shot
was fired, not a drop of blood was shed. Eleven or twelve thousand
men were dispersed in a few hours; and before sunset the whole can-
tonment, with all their storehouses, arsenals, gun foundries, and powder
mills, were completely in our possession. The celebrated French
corps of Hydrabad had passed into tradition.”

Piron and his compatriots confessed themselves very grateful, not
only for their rescue from a grave peril, but for the humanity with
which they were subsequently treated. Itis difficult to estimate the
exact qualities of this adventurer. Major Kirkpatrick, the Resident
at Haidarabad, writing in 1797, describes him as younger than Ray-
mond, and far more enterprising and active, and particularly fond
of the military profession. But Sir John Malcolm, then Kirkpatrick’s
assistant, who had equally good opportunities of forming an opinion,
records that ‘“ Piron is a rough, violent democrat, a man with more
hostile dispositions to us than his predecessor Raymond, but less
dangerous ; being wa stranger to that temper and those conciliatory
manners by which the latter won his way to greatness. Piron has
no ability, and his authority is far from being generally acknow-
ledged.’” Events proved Piron was totally unfitted to step into the
post made vacant by Raymond’s death. He died at Chandernagore
in 1805.

Piumet, Masor.—Major Plumet was ‘‘a Frenchman and a gentle-
APPENDIX. 881

man—two qualities which were seldom united in the Mabhratta
Empire.” Such is Smith’s dictum. Plumet raised a party for
Jaswant Rio Holkar in 1798, and had « principal share in securing
the victory of Ujjain, although a short time previously he had sustained
a reverse when he attacked Major Brownrigg’s position onthe Narbada.
According to one historian, he was wounded and taken prisoner in
the latter affair, and not present at Ujjain; but another, with equal
insistence, accords to him the honour of that day. He soon found
Holkar “too cruel, cunning, capricious, and ungrateful,” and left his
service. Major Ambrose states that Plumet deserted his chief on the
eve of the battle of Indore, and so conduced to the defeat which
Jaswant Rao sustained, and that this behaviour caused Holkar to
brand all Frenchmen as “‘Duggerbaz,” or Faithless. Major Plumet,
after his brief career in the Deccan, retired to the Isle of France.

Poutman, CoLonet [also written Pholman and Balaman].—Colonel
Pohlman was a native of Hanover, and a sergeant in a regiment com-
posed of men of that nationality, formerly quartered at Madras, and
one of several similar mercenary corps of foreigners in the Company’s
service, such as Doxat’s Chasseurs, the Swiss Regiment de Meuron,
and Claude Martine’s company. Pohlman entered De Boigne’s brigades
about the year 1792 or 1793, and was a captain on the modest pay of
Rs. 200 a month in 1794. In April of the following year he was in
command of a Najib battalion in the Second Brigade at Mattra, to
which James Skinner was posted when he first joined the service.
Between this and 1799 he probably saw a good deal of service, for
it is a period of which Skinner has much to relate. arly in 1799
Perron distrusted Sutherland, who was in command of the Second
Brigade, and removed him from his post, which he bestowed on
Pohlman, who shortly afterwards sustained a severe reverse in
an unsuccessful attack upon the fort of Shapira, when six of his
battalions were beaten back with a loss of two officers and 1,000 men
killed and wounded. Eventually he captured the place, when, it is
pleasant to record, he treated the gallant Rajput garrison with great
humanity and consideration, permitting them and their women-folk
to march out with all the honours of war, and the respect due to their
heroic defence. In the following May, Pohlman commanded at the
important battle of Malptra, when his force consisted of his own
brigade of eight battalions, five of the Chevalier Dudrenec’s, and 5,000
cavalry. He inflicted a severe defeat on Rajah Partab Singh, and
captured 74 of his guns. This was the action in which Dudrenec’s
corps was ridden down by the Rathors, and the victory was solely dua
882 APPENDIX.

to Pohlman’s good generalship. For the next two years he appears
to have been quartered in Rajputana, to enforce payment of the
tribute due, and keep the country under control whilst Perron’s other
brigades were engaged in the wars against Holkar, Lakwa Dada, and
George Thomas, in none of which Pohlman seems to have had any
part. In 1802 he escorted Perron to Ujjain, and here, for the second
time, superseded Sutherland, who was obliged to leave the service
owing to Perron’s hostility. Pohlman and the First Brigade remained
with Sindhia in the Deccan till war broke out with the English. It
is uncertain whether he was in command of Sindhia’s infantry at the
battle of Assaye, in which his brigade fought well, the artillery being
splendidly served, and the men sustaining a stubborn fight against the
genius of Wellesley and the valour of British troops for three hours.
Pohlman eventually entered the Company’s service, though without
rank, and re-enlisted some of his old soldiers to form an irregular
infantry corps. He is described as an exceedingly cheerful and enter-
taining character, who lived in the style of an Indian prince, kept a
seraglio, and always travelled on an elephant, attended by a guard of
Mughals, all dressed alike in purple robes, and marching in file in the
same way as a British cavalry regiment; notwithstanding which
melodramatic weakness, Pohlman was certainly one of Perron’s most
competent officers.

RaymonD, FRANcoIs DE, GENERAL.—Frangois de Raymond (whose
name Colonel Malleson givesas Michel Joachim Marie Raymond) was
born at Serignac, in Gascony, in 1755. He came out to India early in
life, and in 1775 obtained employment as sub-lieutenant in a battalion
commanded by the Chevalier de Lassé, in the service of Haider Ali
of Mysore. His conduct brought him to the notice of the military
authorities, and he received a commission as captain in the French
army in 1788, and was appointed aide-de-camp to the famous Bussy.
Three years later, on Bussy’s death, Raymond entered the service of
the Nizam Ali Khan of Hajidarabad, for whom he raised a small
corps of 800 men, hiring the weapons with which they were armed
from a French merchant on the coast, at the rate of eight annas per
mensem for each musket. When the confederate war against Tipu
Sultan broke out, and the English, Marathds, and the Nizam were
leagued against the ruler of Mysore, Raymond’s command was raised
to 700 men, and he distinguished himself so much in the campaign
that he grew into great favour with Ali Khan, and his force was
augmented to 5,000 men, his own pay being increased to Rs. 5,000 a
month. At the battle of Kardla in 1795 Raymond’s battalions
APPENDIX. 883

numbered 10,840 men, with 28 guns and 46 tumbrils. The regularity
with which this force was paid enabled him to fill its ranks with
deserters from the Company’s services, to whom he held out tempting
inducements. He is also said to have encouraged French prisoners
of war on parole to escape and take service under his flag. The
battle of Kardla was the only occasion except the Mysore war in which,
during a service of seventeen years, Raymond met a foreign foe. He
was forced to retire from the field, but was not defeated, for the retreat
was solely due to the Nizam’s pusillinamity, and ordered at a moment
when Raymond’s battalions were stoutly and, peradventure, success-
fully holding their own. He was next employed in reducing to sub-
mission the Nizam’s rebellious son and heir, Ali Jah. In this he met
with stout resistance, and was obliged to send for reinforcements to
one of his subordinates named Baptiste, on being joined by whom he
quickly brought the expedition to a conclusion, and secured the person
of Ali Jah, who committed suicide, leaving Sikander Jah heir to
the throne. This Prince was accustomed to swear ‘‘by the head of
Raymond,” whom he regarded as the first of men, with the single
detraction that he belonged to a nation that had murdered its king
and queen. After the battle of Kardla Raymond tried hard to obtain
the Karpa district, which would have enabled him to co-operate with
any French force making a descent on the Coromandal coast, with or
without the concurrence of the Nizam. He already possessed an im-
mense military territorial assignment which yielded fifty-two lakhs of
rupees a year, in addition to an estate or Jaghir of his own, the income
of which was Rs. 50,000. His salary was princely, and in the style of
his domestic life he collected round him every luxury and elegance
within the reach of a European in India. Previous to his death
he further increased his force, which he considered “ A French body
of troops, employed and subsidised by the Nizam,” to over 14,000
men, with a complete train of artillery, chiefly brass ordnance,
worked by a well-trained corps of Europeans, and drawn by 5,000
bullocks. His cavalry numbered 600. He possessed, in his own
right, all the guns and military equipage belonging to the force. The
physique of his soldiers was not to be compared with that of the
stalwart and warlike warriors whom De Boigne and Perron enlisted
from the fine recruiting grounds of Upper India, but the men were
well disciplined, and their parade appearance was good, whilst the
service itself was extremely popular with the Natives.

Raymond was an ambitious and intriguing man, and one who
understood the art of gaining his ends by engaging manners and
conciliatory demeanour. After the battle of Kardla he began to
384 APPENDIX.

assume an almost kingly state, for his power made him the arbitrator
of Haidarabad. All his regimental returns were headed Corps de
Frangois de Raymond, and he was received in his own cantonments
with a royal salute. He stood in a position which would have enabled
him, in the event of the Nizam’s death, to elevate whom he pleased to
the throne, and the overpowering influence which he acquired in the
country was a serious menace to English interests. He was in close
touch with the Government of France, and with Tipu Sultan of Mysore,
and engaged in intrigues which had for their object an alliance against
the British power in the East. He was also in correspondence with
some of the European officers in Sindhia’s service, and an interesting
letter exists which he addressed to Michael Filoze in January, 1798,
on the subject of the treacherous seizure of Nana Farnavis, the
Peshwa’s Prime Minister. This is worth quoting as showing Ray-
mond’s honourable feelings, and because of a rather quaint adaptation
it contains of the “Rights of Man” theory to eighteenth century Maratha
politics—probably the first and last time the argument was used in
such a connection. ‘A report prevails,” writes Raymond, “ that
Nana Farnavis has been arrested contrary to the Rights of Man and
to the clauses of the treaty for which you [Filoze] were security. Ihave
no other interest in speaking of this but that which I take for every
European whose reputation is dear to me.” Then he goes on to request
Filoze to obtain the Nana’s restoration to liberty, and offers him a
position and emoluments, “one-fourth more than you have with
Scindia, and a jaghir of one lakh of rupees annually.” The reason
of this liberality is not obvious in the letter, but it suggests many
inferences. The epistle concludes: ‘‘I will be shortly on your
frontiers, when we shall be able to keep up a correspondence. Burn
this letter if it should not suit you ; but write to me. Raymond.”

Two months later Raymond died—according to some accounts by
poison—at the early age of forty-three, and in the enjoyment of a
degree of power and consequence never reached by any other military
adventurer in Southern India.

Raymond’s character has been variously estimated by different
writers. Major Thorn describes him as ‘‘a man of extensive know-
ledge and equal activity.” Kaye, in his “Life of Malcolm,” views
his character in the following light: “ Raymond was a man of great
ability and address. . . . Had he lived the taking of his men (in 1798)
would not have been an easy task. . . . His troops were admirably
disciplined and equipped. Their store-rooms well filled with arms
and accoutrements, and clothing from Europe of excellent quality,
and they could with ease have armed 12,000 more men in a few
APPENDIX. 385

months. They cast excellent cannon, and made serviceable muskets
in their different foundries, all of which, as well as their powder-
mills, were under the direction of able and scientific Europeans.”
Malcolm’s opinion has already been quoted in another page, namely,
that Raymond was a man of “temper and conciliatory manners, by
which he won his way to greatness.’ But it has been reserved for a
contemporary historian, on grounds which it is a little difficult to
understand, to elevate Raymond to the position of a national hero.
“This remarkable man,” writes Colonel Malleson, “is referred to by
many English writers simply as ‘an adventurer named Raymond.’
That he was an adventurer is true, but he was one in the best sense
of the term—chivalrous, daring, trustworthy, and a splendid or-
ganiser; one of those adventurers who, like Garibaldi in our own
days, leave their mark on the history of the country in which their
deeds have been achieved. . . . It may be said that no Indian Prince,
not even Madhajee Scindia, or his suecessor, Dowlut Rao, ever had a
finer or more efficient body of troops in his service [than those which
Raymond raised]. In the campaign against the Mahrattas in 1796 (?),
it was Raymond and his troops who repulsed the charge of the
Mahratta cavalry and would have beaten them back altogether had
not the Nizam and his troops abandoned the field. His reputation,
great at the time, still survives, and it may be said with truth that
the name of no European connected with India has survived seventy-
six years after the demise of his body, to live with such eternal green-
ness in the hearts of the people of the country as does the name of
Raymond in the memories and traditions of the great families of
Hydrabad.”

Those who have read these pages will hardly feel inclined to agree
with this estimate of Raymond’s superior talents as a military ad-
venturer. A soldier of fortune is judged by his deeds, and Raymond’s
achievements in the tented field cannot for a moment bear comparison
with those of De Boigne, Perron, or Thomas.

Passing to the other side of the picture, we have the opinion of
Major Kirkpatrick, who was British Resident at Haidarabad in 1797,
and wrote of Raymond as “by no means a man of vigorous mind or
decided character, and very hard, and wanting liberality in pecuniary
matters, which makes him much disliked by all his officers, except
one or two he favours. He never showed himself to be much of a
soldier, but was artful, and had an arranging head and conciliating
manners when they suited his purpose.” Captain Fraser, in “ Our
Faithful Ally the Nizam,” describes Raymond as wanting in charac-
ter, promptitude, and decision. Colonel Beatson, in his History of

25
386 APPENDIX.

the war with Tipu Sultan, bas recorded the following opinion of the
adventurer and his party :—‘‘ The corps commanded by Colonel
Raymond, which, during the last war in Mysore, amounted to no
more than 1,500 men, was at that period so defective in point of
discipline as to be rather an object of contempt than jealousy to the
Government of India. It has gradually augmented its numbers and
improved its discipline under the command of the late Monsieur
Raymond, until it nearly reached the number of 14,000, and had
obtained a degree of discipline superior in every respect to that of any
Native infantry in India, excepting the Sepoys in the Company’s
service. The corps formed the largest and most efficient branch of
the military establishment of His Highness the Nizam, and the
French officers had acquired a considerable ascendancy in his do-
minions and councils, and had manifested on several occasions the
symptoms of a disposition so arrogant, overbearing, and adventurous,
as to excite alarm in the minds of His Highness and his ministers.”

The last quotation must be from the despatches of the Marquis
Wellesley. ‘‘ Raymond’s force was avowedly designed to cope with
one De Boigne had created for the Mahrattas, and was organised on
very similar lines. Each regiment was officered by two Europeans,
and there was a field train of fifty guns, and a small body of dis-
ciplined cavalry attached. The former was served by European
gunners, many of them deserters from the Company’s service. The
parade appearance of the force was good, but the discipline was far
from strict, and the slackness in this respect, combined with the
regularity of pay, made the service a very popular one with the
Natives, so that there was no difficulty in keeping the brigade up to
its full strength. All the officers were Frenchmen, devoted to the
doctrines of Jacobinism, and any amongst them who evinced Royalist
tendencies were speedily dismissed. They fought under the French
flag, and the Cap of Liberty was engraved on their buttons. Raymond
was not a man of any great capacity or vigour, but in craft and
intrigue he was an adept, and sustained his position by surrounding
himself with a few favourites, who supported him through thick and
thin. With his other officers he was far from popular, being a hard
man, and in pecuniary matters extremely illiberal; for, although he
derived vast revenues from enormous territorial assignments, he could
never divest himself of his inherent avarice and meanness.”’

Rozerts, Lirutenant.—Lieutenant Roberts was an Englishman,
and commanded a battalion of infantry in De Boigne’s First Brigade
in 1790, He was present at the battles of Pathan and Merta, and
APPENDIX. 387

was severely wounded at the latter by a missile from a weapon known
as an “organ,” and which consisted of several gun barrels so joined
together as to fire at once. Whereby it would seem that the Mitrail-
leuse was of Rajpttanic origin !

Ryan, Masor.—-This unfortunate officer was an Irishman, and
commanded a battalion in the service of Jaswant Rao Holkar. His
only claim to be remembered is as a victim to that chief's treachery,
for he was one of the three British subjects who were cruelly
beheaded in 1804 for refusing to take the field against their fellow
countrymen.

Satzur, Cotonet [also spelt Suleur and Saleure].—Colonel Saleur
was a Swiss or French officer, who succeeded to the command of the
Begum Somru’s corps, after the suicide of Le Vassoult in 1795. He
had taken no part in the mutiny which led to his predecessor’s death,
but had, on the contrary, done everything in his power to prevent it.
He was described as the ‘only respectable officer” who signed the
Covenant entered into between the Begum and her rebellious soldiery.
Saleur, who had been in the force almost since its commencement,
increased its strength to six battalions, with 40 guns and 200 cavalry,
aud in 1802 marched with five battalions to join Sindhia in the Deccan
after the defeat of Ujjain. The men were in a state of mutiny the
whole way, as many of the colonel’s letters, written in French, to
his mistress testified. When war broke out with the English, Saleur’s
troops were with Sindhia, but only one battalion took part in the
battle of Assaye, the other four having been left behind to guard the
Maratha: camp and baggage, and owing to this circumstance they
escaped destruction; and Colonel Saleur marched them safely to
Burhanpur, and from thence back to Sardhina. Saleur was one of
the witnesses of the Begum’s marriage to Le Vassoult in 1793.

Sanestrer, Masor.—Major Sangster was a Scotchman, and a person
of skill and ingenuity. In 1782 he obtained the command of the
disciplined battalion of infantry which Madoc raised at Agra and
sold to the Rana of Gohad. It consisted of 1,000 well-trained Sepoys
and a respectable train of artillery. Sangster was skilled in the art
of casting cannon, and those he turned out could compare with the
best the Company manufactured, whilst his muskets, produced at a
cost of ten rupees each, were excellent in every respect. When De
Boigne raised his first two battalions, he engaged Sangster (whose
master had been forced to surrender to Sindhia), and appointed him
3888 APPENDIX.

to the charge of the arsenal at Agra. He appears to have led a very
busy life, for in process of time other arsenals and magazines were
established at Mattra, Delhi, Gwalior, Kalpi, and Gohad, of all of
which he had the superintendence. The cannon balls were cast at
Gwalior, where there were very fine iron mines, and gunpowder was
manufactured at Agra, the saltpetre and sulphur being imported from
Bikanir. No mention of Sangster can be found after De Boigne’s
resignation, though in 1801 a report appears in one of the Persian
journals that “Lakwa Dada has employed Mr. Sangster’s son to
raise and discipline a battalion for him,’ which seems to indicate
that the father was still in the country. Young Sangster was probably
the cadet “ Songster” who surrendered to General Wellesley after the
battle of Assaye.

SHEPHERD, JAMES, COLONEL [known to the Natives as Jamus Sahib],
~James Shepherd was an Englishman of unusual enterprise and
courage. When hardly emerged from childhood, he deserted his
ship in Calcutta, and accompanied an officer to De Boigne’s camp in
the quality of a menial servant. He afterwards lived in the same
capacity with a gentleman at Fatehpur. Shepherd was described as
well calculated for the Native service, being a good-looking man and
endowed with pliability of temper. About 1799 he took service
under Ambaji Inglia, for whom he raised a brigade of regular
infantry, which numbered five battalions, with 500 cavalry and 25
guns. Ambaji was a penurious chief, and stinted his officer in
money, or he would have created a much more efficient force than
one which is sometimes alluded to as the ‘‘ragamuffin battalions.”
Shepherd was engaged in the attack on Lakwa Ddéda’s position at
Sounda in 1801, when he materially assisted in defeating that chief,
but lost four of his European officers killed or wounded—poor Bellasis
amongst the former—and a great number of his men. He was
detached to pursue Lakwa Dada after his flight, and kept him in play
during Perron’s campaign against George Thomas. It is a pity there
is no detailed record of Shepherd’s services, for he is stated to have
seen much and been frequently wounded. ‘‘ Without birth, educa-
tion, or protection,” writes Smith, ‘‘he rose from obscurity to con-
sequence by his bravery, his perseverance, and his fidelity; his
diligent toil and bold enterprise deserved all the success he won.”
On the breaking out of the war with the English, Shepherd and his
party passed over to the Company’s service, and he distinguished
himself in Bundelkhand in 1804, where he gave the celebrated Free-
booter Amir Khan a sound beating at Maltion Ghaut, and on the 24th
APPENDIX. 889

of June completed his discomfiture by entirely defeating and dis-
persing his force near Kinch. Shepherds corps at this time consisted
of 8,180 men, and was highly praised for its efficiency when General
Lake reviewed it in 1805.

Skinner, James, LizruTENANT-CoLoneL, C.B.—This compilation is
so much indebted to ‘The Military Memoirs of Lieutenant-Colonel
James Skinner, C.B.,” that although that delightful and graphic
biography of the stout old adventurer exists, a sketch of his career
must be included in these pages, and the following has been condensed
from the above work :

James Skinner was born in 1778. His father was a native of
Scotland, and an officer in the Company’s service, and his mother a
Rajputni, the daughter of a Rajput landholder in the Mirzapur
country. She was taken prisoner in the war with Chait Singh, the
Rajah of Benares, during an action near Bijaigarh, and came under
the protection of Ensign Skinner, to whom she bore six children,
three sons and three daughters. The latter were all married to
gentlemen in the Company’s service. David, the eldest son, went to
sea; James, the second, and the subject of this sketch, became a
military adventurer; and Robert, the youngest, followed in his
footsteps.

Skinner’s mother died by her own hand in 1790, because if was
decided that her daughters should be sent to school, and she con-
ceived this would be a violation of the sanctity of the purdah, and
that their Rajput honour would be destroyed in consequence. After
her death James and Robert were sent to a charity school, their
father being still only a lieutenant, and unable to pay for their
education. However, when he obtained his captaincy in 1793, he
removed his sons to a boarding-school, where the charge was Rs. 30 a
month for each. Two years later James was bound apprentice to a
printer, on a seven years’ indenture, and sent to the office to learn his
business.

Three days sufficed to disgust him with his proposed calling, and
he determined to run away to sea. On the third night he effected his
escape, with sixpence in his pocket, on which he contrived to live for
six days. When his money was exhausted he wandered about the
Caleutta bazaar, working for any one who would hire him, and for
some time picked up a precarious living by carrying loads or pulling
the drill for Native carpenters at a pay of threepence a day. But
before long he was recognised by a servant of his elder sister, Mra.
Templeton, who forthwith bore him away to his master’s house
390 APPENDIX.

After getting a good rating from his uncle, he was set to work to
copy law papers, and remained so employed for three months, until
his godfather, Colonel Burn, arrived at the Presidency. This gentle-
man, finding that young Skinner burned to be a soldier, gave him
Rs. 300 and sent him to Cawnpore, where Captain Skinner’s regiment
was stationed, and whither the Colonel was soon returning.

Here Skinner arrived in April, 1795, and a fortnight later his
godfather followed, and furnished him with a letter of introduction
to General de Boigne at Koil. Proceeding there the youngster was
very kindly received by the great man, who gave him an ensign’s
appointment in his brigades, on a pay of Rs. 150 a month, and posted
him to a Najib battalion, commanded by Captain Pohlman, at
Mattra.

Shortly after this De Boigne retired, and the temporary command
of the army devolved upon Colonel Robert Sutherland, who was at
the head of the Second Brigade, to which Skinner’s battalion belonged.
Skinner’s first experience of active service was during a campaign in
Bundelkhand, where Sutherland and Lakwa Dada were engaged in
reducing several refractory chiefs and rajahs to obedience. Here he
assisted in two field-battles, and the storm and capture of five or six
forts, which intensified his military aspirations. He now made it
his study to master all the modes of Native warfare, and became pro-
ficient in the use of the Maratha spear, the bow and arrow, and the
sword exercise.

In 1796 Perron was appointed to the supreme command of the
army of Hindustan, and arrived at Mattra in February of the follow-
ing year. Soon after this the rebellion of the Bhais broke out, and a
large force was ordered to assemble at Gwalior, under Captain Butter-
field, to which Skinner’s battalion was attached. The first action in
the campaign was the battle of Chandkhori, where, owing to his
desertion by the Maratha cavalry, Butterfield was defeated and
obliged to fall back with a loss of 500 men. Skinner defended his
rear during the retreat to a fort called Shérgarh, behaving very
gallantly in the face of great difficulties and dangers, and bringing
off his guns with safety. Tor this he received great commendation
from Captain Butterfield, and General Perron hearing of it promoted
him to the rank of lieutenant with the pay of Rs. 200 a month.

The Bhais had now been joined by Lakwa Dada, and retired to
Chiturgarh in Udaipur, and thither Ambaji Inglia, the new Maratha
commander-in-chief, followed them. Captain Butterfield was again
in command of the infantry, and Skinner, now promoted to the
charge of two battalions, accompanied him. A great deal of
APPENDIX. 391

skirmishing took place, but nothing decisive was effected. Nor were
matters mended when Ambaji was joined by Colonel Sutherland and
George Thomas, who had been temporarily engaged by the chief.
The campaign, which was not without adventure for Skinner himself,
was cut short by political considerations, and Colonel Sutherland
being suspected of treachery by Perron, was superseded, and his
command conferred on Major Pohlman, an officer under whom
Skinner subsequently saw much service. It may be observed that
Skinner did not care much for Sutherland, and there was a quarrel
between the two before the Colonel left the brigade.

Soon after assuming command Pohlman was directed to take a
fort called Jéjpur, which was in the possession of a refractory Rajput
chief named Kasri Singh. In the first assault he suffered a severe
repulse, but four days later succeeded in carrying the place by storm.
This was one of the hottest affairs Skinner was ever engaged in. In
Pohlman’s life the name of this fort is given as Shapura on very good
authority, but from internal evidence it seems more likely that
Skinner’s location of the scene is the right one, there being a strong
fort at Jajpur and none at Shapura. From here the brigade marched
to Delhi, at the siege and capture of which, as well as at that of
Agra, Skinner was present, both cities having refused to acknowledge
Perron’s authority.

The next action in which Skinner was engaged was the battle of
Malpura, in which he showed distinguished gallantry. Lord William
Bentinck, when he was Governor-General of India, mentions an
incident in this battle in one of his political despatches to the Court
of Directors on the subject of Skinner’s public services. ‘I cannot
refrain,” he writes, “(from relating an anecdote told me by an old
Sirdar in the Jeypore service. He had a command in the battle of
Buxar in 1764, and he must have been a hundred years of age; but
he had still retained the erectness of youth, a fine martial appearance,
and his faculties unimpaired. He described to me, with a manner
and expression glowing with gratitude, how in the battle of Jeypore
(t.¢c., Malpura), Colonel James Skinner, then a youth, led a charge
of cavalry, captured a field battery which the Sirdar commanded,
and then, by his humane and decided interference, saved his life.”
It is worthy of Skinner’s habitual modesty that he does not relate
this incident in his own description of the battle, but merely mentions
how he nearly lost his own life in the final repulse of the Rathors,
being attacked by one of them, who charged into the centre of the
square and killed his horse, Skinner only escaping with his life by
an undignified retreat under a tumbril, After the battle Skinner was
392 APPENDIX.

the first to reconnoitre the Jaipur camp, into which he rode boldly,
only to find it deserted. Here he looted two golden idols with
diamond eyes, belonging to Rajah Partab Singh, and trinkets to the
value of Rs. 2,000, amongst them being “a brass fish, with two
chowrees hanging down like moustachios.” This curious object
proved to be the Mahi maratib, or Fish of Dignities, a decorative
symbol conferred by the Mughal emperors on rajahs of the highest
rank, and equivalent to the Three horse tails of the Turkish Empire,
or the Button of the Chinese mandarin. In this instance the decora-
tion had been conferred on Rajah Partéb Singh. Skinner presented
this valuable acquisition to the Maradthé General, and received in
return a handsome khilat and considerable commendation.

A few days after this Perron joined the army, and Skinner visited
Jaipur in his suite. From here he was detached, in independent
command, to attack a fort near the Chambal river, belonging to u
Rajput chief named Ram Pal Singh. On arriving before this place,
he found the low mud walls so nearly level with the crest of the
glacis, that there was no touching the bastions with the battering
train. He therefore opened trenches, and advanced by regular
approaches to the glacis, and then ordered a mine to be carried under
it. When this was sprung his three battalions rushed forward to the
assault, and after one rather severe check the place was taken.
Skinner was next ordered to assist the Karaoli Rajah, who had fallen
out with his neighbour of Unidra, and hired several battalions,
(amongst them Skinner’s from Perron), to fight his battles for him.
The force consisted of six battalions of infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and
twenty guns; of these the only efficient troops were Skinner’s.

The scene of the campaign was between the territory of Tonk and
the Bands river, and here the two armies came in sight of one
another. But the Karaoli chief was a coward, and an impecunious
one to boot, and could not find money to pay his mercenaries, who
became so dissatisfied and insubordinate, that Skinner sent for rein-
orcements to Colonel Pohlman. But before they arrived the Uniara
Rajah took advantage of the troubles in his enemy’s camp, and intri-
gued with the discontented levies, and a little later moved out to
give battle; whereupon the whole of the Karaoli infantry, with the
exception of Skinner’s battalion, deserted to the enemy,

On seeing this, Skinner commenced a retreat towards a deserted
village in his rear, which he gained with difficulty, drivirg off two
of the enemy’s battalions who charged him. Then the whole of their
cavalry and infantry, amounting to 6,000 men, came on to the attack,
and upon this Skinner recognised it was hopeless to attempt to hold
APPENDIX. 393

the village. So he decided to retreat, if possible, to Tonk, which was
six miles distant, and evacuated his position, but was immediately
attacked by the two battalions who had previously charged him,
and were now aided by their cavalry. These Skinner repulsed, but
not without the loss of one of his five guns, and his horse was killed
under him. The remainder of the enemy now came up fast, and
Skinner found further progress impossible, so he drew up his men on
a level plain, and then made them a short but spirited speech, telling
them they could but die once, and exhorting them to fight, and, if
needs be, fall like good and brave soldiers.

Allowing the enemy to approach to within fifty yards, Skinner gave
them a volley and then charged. Those in front gave way, and he
captured their guns ; but their flanks wheeled into action, and galled
him terribly; whereupon Skinner threw his men into a square, and,
as a last resource, attempted to gain some ravines about three quarters
of a mile away. But it was to no purpose; the enemy, inspirited by
his retreat, charged again and again, captured three more of his
guns, and destroyed so many of his men that he had but 300 and a
single field piece left. Driven to desperation, he called on his men
to make a final sally, but as he was in the act of leading them forward
he was shot through the groin by a matchlock man, and fell to the
ground, and the remnants of his brave but unfortunate battalion were
destroyed.

This happened about three o’clock in the afternoon, and he did not
regain consciousness till the next morning, when he found himself
despoiled of everything except his pantaloons. Around him were
heaps of his dead and wounded Native officers and soldiers, among
them a Subahdar with his leg shot off below the knee, and a Jemadar
with a pike thrust through the body. All were tortured with thirst,
and unable to move; and thus they remained in helpless agony
through the long hot day, praying for death. Night came at last, but
neither release from suffering nor assistance. The moon was full and
clear, and about midnight it was very cold. So dreadful did the
night appear that Skinner vowed to himself that if he survived it he
would never go soldiering again, and if he lived to recover, that he
would build a church to the God of his white father. The wounded
on ail sides were moaning and crying out for water, and the jackals
kept flitting about like four-legged ghouls, tearing the dead, and
coming closer and closer to the living, and were only kept off by
stones feebly thrown at them.

Next morning an old man and woman came to the battlefield
carrying a basket and a pot of water. To every wounded man the
394 APPENDIX.

latter gave a piece of joari bread and a drink of water. This revived
Skinner, but as the woman was a Chumarin (an outcaste) the Subah-
dar, who was a high-class Rajput, would take nothing from her hands,
saying that a little more or less suffering was nothing, and that he
preferred to die unpolluted.

Skinner was eventually rescued by a party of the Unidra Rajah’s
men, who came to the field to bury the dead, and send the wounded
into camp. The poor Subahdar now got some water, and he and
Skinner and the rest were lifted in sheets and taken to the Rajah’s
encampment. After a month the chief gave Skinner his liberty.
It is pleasant to learn that the brave Subahdar also recovered, and
that Skinner sent the poor Chumarin woman a present of a thousand
rupees, and a message that he considered her in the light of a mother.

His wound now obliged Skinner to take leave, and in February he
went down to Calcutta, where he stayed several months with his
sister, Mrs. Templeton, returning to his duties in the month ol
January, 1801. In the May following he was engaged in the storm
of Sounda, having in the interval been transferred from the Second to
the Third Brigade, which, under Pedron, had been entrusted with this
attack. The column to which Skinner was attached lost three officers
and 1,000 men killed and wounded, but captured Lakwa Dada’s guns.
The casualties are Skinner’s, and the prudent reader will do well to
divide all his figures by three or four, and sometimes more; but in
this sketch they are all given as he estimates them. After the victory
Skinner returned with his corps to Aligarh.

Two months later he was again sent on active service, this time
against George Thomas. The Third Brigade was now commanded by
Louis Bourguien, an officer for whom Skinner had no respect what-
ever. The events of the war have already been very fully detailed
(chiefly from Skinner’s memoirs), and need not be repeated ; although
it may be noted that Skinner considers the battle of Georgegarh the
severest one in which he was present during his military career. Later
on he had a creditable share in securing for Thomas the terms which
enabled him to surrender with honour to himself, and Skinner’s con-
duct on this occasion, unassumingly related by himself, is worthy of
the highest praise.

In March, 1802, Skinner, who had been posted back to his old
brigade, the Second, accompanied Perron to Ujjain, and was present
at the memorable Darbar when Daulat Rao Sindhia’s intended
treachery was averted by the cunning and precaution of Perron.
Skinner returned to Hindustan with the General, and a period of
comparative inaction followed, till war broke out with the English in
APPENDIX. 395

August, 1803. On the 28th of that month all the British subjects in
Perron’s brigades were summarily dismissed the service, and a few
days later Skinner joined General Lake’s camp, under circumstances
which his dark complexion rendered somewhat mortifying to the
amour propre of a gallant man. But this was compensated by the
treatment he received from the Commander-in-chief, who took a great
fancy to him, and shortly afterwards, when 2,000 of Perron’s Hindu-
stani horse came over to the English after the battle of Delhi,
appointed him to the command. On this occasion occurred an inci-
dent which shows how Skinner was beloved by his soldiery. When
the troopers were asked whom they would have for their commander,
with one voice they shouted— Sikander Sahib,” that being the
appellation, half name, half sobriquet, given Skinner by the Natives.
His own cognomen they pronounced Is-kinner, which they changed
into Sikander, associated in their minds with Alexander the Great, as
a compliment to Skinner’s dauntless valour, which was a bye-word
amongst them.

With Skinner’s subsequent career it is not in the province of this
compilation to deal. Perron’s 2,000 Hindustani horse became a
famous British irregular cavalry corps, known as Skinner’s Horse,
or more familiarly and affectionately as The Yellow Boys. They and
their leader covered themselves with glory during the next thirty
years, and their exploits and achievements won for Skinner the sub-
stantive rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the British Army, and the
coveted distinction of the C.B. A valuable jaghir in the Aligarh
district was also conferred upon him. For many years his head-
quarters were at George Thomas’s old capital of Hansi (near to which
some of his descendants are still living), and he performed able service,
although his after life was not unchequered with some disappoint-
ments which he did not deserve. He made a host of friends, and
found many admirers, amongst them such distinguished men as Lord
Lake, Sir John Malcohn, Lord Metcalfe, Lord Minto, the Marquis of
Hastings, Lord Combermere, and Lord William Bentinck. It is
goodly roll of patrons and acquaintances for the offspring of a Com-
pany’s ensign anda Rajputni girl, and one whose only introduction to
high society was his own sterling worth !

Many anecdotes are related of Skinner, but only two or three can
be here recorded. Perhaps his most remarkable characteristic was
his modesty and utter contempt of all assumption. To the end of his
life an old spoon was placed on his breakfast table every morning to
remind him of his own humble origin and early days. In fulfilment
of the vow he made on the battlefield of Unidra, to build a church to
396 APPENDIX.

the God of his father if his life were spared, he erected the edifice of
St. James at Delhi, at a cost of £20,000, and in the same spirit of
modest humility before noted, often expressed a desire that when he
died he should be buried, not within it, but under the door sill, so that
all persons entering might trample upon “the chief of sinners.”

Skinner’s domestic habits were in some respects more Muhammadan
than Christian, and he left behind him a numerous family by sundry
wives, of whom he had at least fourteen. His eldest son, Hercules
Skinner, was educated in England, and through the influence of Lord
William Bentinck received a commission in the Hydrabad Contin-
gent, much to his father’s delight. In 1836 Colonel Skinner was
confirmed, and during his latter years was sincerely pious, constantly
studying the Bible, and preparing himself for his end. He died at
Hansi on the 4th of December, 1841, aged sixty-three years, and was
buried there with military honours. But a little later his remains
were disinterred, and carried to Delhi to be deposited by the side of
his dearly loved friend and comrade, William Fraser (brother to his
biographer), under the altar of St. James’s Church. It had been his
wish to be buried near Fraser, and it was felt proper that this wish
should be fulfilled.

On the 17th of February 1842, accompanied by the whole of his
corps, and a great concourse of people, the coffin was carried from Hansi
to Sitaram-ka-Sarai, on the outskirts of Delhi. Here all that was
mortal of the gallant old adventurer was met by the civilians and
military officers of the station, and a vast multitude from the city, and
so escorted to its final resting-place. ‘‘None of the Emperors of
Hindustan,” said the Natives, ‘‘ were ever brought into Delhiin such
state as Sikander Sahib !”

SxinnER, Ropert, Masor.—Robert Skinner was the younger brother
of Colonel James Skinner. He entered Perron’s army in November,
1800, with an ensign’s commission, and was posted to do duty with
his brother’s battalion. The introduction of the young subaltern to
his men was a characteristic one. The elder Skinner called his most
trusty Native officers together, fine old soldiers, with scarred faces and
grizzled beards, and steady, intrepid fellows every one of them. Then
he drew himself up in military fashion, and pointing to Robert, said,
“This is my brother; see ye be his protectors!” The veterans,
stroking their beards, and carrying their hands on their foreheads,
replied with grave emphasis—“ On our heads be it!’” James Skinner
was not quite confident of his brother’s discretion, and selected this
method of safeguarding his inexperience,
APPENDIX. 397

Robert Skinner was present at the attack on Ram Pal Singh’s fort
near the Chambal, where he was wounded by a bullet in the neck, and
obliged to return to Aligarh to recover. He rejoined his brother after
the defeat of Unidra, and was soon afterwards promoted to the rank
of lieutenant, and given the command of a battalion in the Second
Brigade under Pohlman. The next occasion on which the two
brothers served side by side was in the war against George Thomas.
At the battle of Georgegarh the following incident occurred, touchingly
related by Fraser in Skinner’s memoirs: ‘‘ James and Robert Skinner
were engaged at different parts of the field, so that neither knew how
the other fared. The cannonade was so fierce and continuous, and
the slaughter so great, that all was smoke and carnage, and there was
little communication between the different battalions engaged. When
the battle ceased, a report came to James that his brother had been
killed, whilst a similar one reached Robert as to James. Both, moved
by one impulse, ran to the bloody field, without thinking of rest or
refreshment, and sought all over for the body of the brother, but in
the darkness, amidst the thousands of corpses, torn and mutilated by
the cannon shot, neither found what he sought, and after a weary
and fruitless search, they returned to the tent of their commanding
officer to make their report. By a singular chance they entered from
opposite sides at the same moment, and the first thing that met their
eyes was the object on which their thoughts were dwelling. They
saw nothing else, but ran and embraced, calling out each other’s names
before the officers that filled the tent.”

Robert Skinner was engaged at the siege and storm of HAansi, and
at the latter led one of the three assaulting columns. In the hand to
hand street fighting he approached so close to Thomas on one occa-
sion, that ‘he got a cut at him, but his armour saved Thomas.” It
was characteristic of Thomas’s generous nature that after his sur-
render he was “ particularly gracious to the younger Skinner, whom
he embraced, and showed him the cut he had received from him on
his belt.”

_ On the occurrence of the war with the English in 1803, Robert
Skinner, after being dismissed from Perron’s army, repaired to
Sardhana, and took service with the Begum Somru, and when General
Lake arrived at Sikandra was deputed by that lady to make terms for
her, which he did successfully. Subsequently Skinner entered the
Company’s service, and was given the local rank of lieutenant, and
appointed to the cavalry corps his brother commanded. In this he
continued to serve for many years, performing excellent services, and
winning many encomiums. In 1815 James Skinner, with the
398 APPENDIX.

generosity of disposition and brotherly affection which so distinguished
his nature, desired to sever from his corps a portion to be made into
a separate command for his brother, whose interests he thus hoped
to forward. But Lord Hastings, the Governor-General, preferred the
force being left intact, and Robert Skinner remained in command of
the second regiment in it, but was promoted to the rank of local
Major. In 1819 the Government granted him in perpetuity a small
jaghir in the district of Aligarh ; but he did not live to enjoy it long,
for his death occurred in 1821, before he had reached his fortieth
year.

Suity, Lewis FerpinanD, Masor.—Major Lewis Ferdinand Smith,
as the historian of the military adventures of Hindustan, and as an
adventurer himself, and a writer of considerable ability, deserves a far
more complete biography than can, unhappily, be compiled; for he
was a modest soldiery man, who preferred to write of the achieve-
ments of others, not of his own deeds. Of his early career little is
recorded. He was the son of Major Lewis Smith, an officer in the
Honourable Company’s service, and entered Sindhia’s army during the
time that De Boigne was in command, though at what precise date it
is impossible to say. He evidently knew De Boigne well and inti-
mately, for in 1796 and 1797 he contributed two excellent letters, de-
scriptive of the General’s life and career, to the Calcutta Telegraph—
a; curious name for a newspaper in the last century, although, so far
back as 1767, Edgeworth had invented his Telelograph, contracted
into Tellograph, “a machine which describes words at a distance.”
This digression is, however, parenthetical. In the two letters alluded
to, Smith indicates that he had a long daily intercourse with De Boigne.
His first independent command on active service seems to have been
in 1798, when he defeated the forces of the Bhopal State in an engage-
ment, when he was at the head of a battalion of infantry and 100
cavalry. In December of the following year he was entrusted with
the conduct of a more considerable campaign. An impostor named
Sultan Shah gave himself out to be Ghulam Kader, the miscreant
who blinded the Emperor Shah ’Alam in 1788, and whom he declared
had never been killed, but escaped and reached Mecca. Sultan
Shah, claiming this personality, pretended he had been ordered
by the Prophet to recover Hindustan from the Mardathds, and
re-establish the Muhammadan Empire. He appeared in arms in the
province of Saharanpur, where he was opposed by a Maratha official
named Ramchander Palkia, whom he easily defeated. The éclat of
this victory brought him a number of followers, and Perron found it
APPENDIX. 399

necessary to send Major Smith with three battalions against him.
Smith was strengthened by some of tle Begum Somru’s troops, and
the combined force marched against Sultan Shah, and on the 22nd of
November, 1799, came upon him at the village of Délun, near the Kali
Nadi. Smith at once crossed the river, but the Begum’s battalions
remained where they were, “for more security,” as a contemporary
chronicler quaintly puts it. An action took place, and the Impostor’s
army, which consisted of 10,000 Rohillas, 400 cavalry, and some small
field pieces showed poor fight. Smith advanced quickly to within
grape-shot range, and then poured several discharges into the enemy,
who forthwith took to flight, and were chased for a considerable
distance.

The next record of Smith’s services is during the war with George
Thomas, in which his achievements at first were less satisfactory. He
was in command of a battalion of Bourguien’s Brigade, and de-
tached with this and two others to beseige Georgegarh, whilst the
Colonel followed Thomas on a wild-goose chase into the Sikh country.
The latter doubled back, shook off his pursuers, and swooped down on
Smith, with a greatly superior numericalforce. Smith at once raised
the siege, and retreated upon Jhajjar. ‘“‘ Why Thomas did not follow
me,” he writes in his book, ‘I cannot say. If he had continued the
pursuit I must have lost all my guns, and my party would have been
completely destroyed. But Thomas spared me and remained at
Georgegarh.” Smith was rescued from his perilously weak position
by his brother’s arrival next day; but he did not forget Thomas’s
moderation, and amply repaid it. He was present throughout the whole
of the campaign, and accompanied Bourguien to Hansi; and when the
latter had “subdued the garrison with gold, which in India is more
irresistible than in Europe,” Smith came forward to assist Thomas to
obtain honourable terms of surrender.

In 1803 Smith accompanied Dudrenec’s Brigade to the Deccan, and
later in the year returned with it to Hindustan, and surrendered to
Colonel Vandeleur at Mattra, a few days after the battle of Delhi,
availing himself of the Governor-General’s proclamation offering
pensions to all british subjects in the Maratha employ who resigned
their posts, and being awarded one of Rs. 1,200 a month. “I have
lost,” he writes, ‘‘the hopes of an independent fortune, which I
would have acquired from my rank, the result of my long service, in
spite of Perron’s injustice ; and I should have starved had it not been
for the political and munificent generosity of the Most Noble the
Governor-General in allowing liberal provisions to the British
officers, who were obliged to quit Scindia’s service on the declaration
400 APPENDIX,

of war. We should have been wanting in principle, and in duty to
our country, had we continued to serve its enemies.” Besides being
the author of “A Sketch of the Regular Corps in the Service of the
Native Princes of India,” Smith contributed several papers to the
Asiatic Annual Register and other publications, for his style of com-
position can easily be recognised in many of the “ Newsletters”
which appeared in Indian newspapers during the time that Perron
flourished.

Smita, Emiurus Fenix, Caprain.—Captain E. F. Smith was a
younger brother of Lewis Ferdinand Smith, and was born in Rohil-
khand in 1777. He entered Sindhia’s service at a very early age, but
left on obtaining a commission in the 36th Regiment. This, how-
ever, he subsequently resigned in order to remain with his brother, and
to this end re-entered Sindhia’s service in 1800. Soon after this he was
engaged in the reduction of two rebel battalions, commanded by the
widow of Captain Le Marchant, who had refused submission to Perron’s
orders. He then obtained an appointment in the Hindustani Horse,
and accompanied Bourguien on the campaign against George Thomas.
When his brother was defeated at Georgegarh, and obliged to fall
back on Jhajjar, Emilius hurried to the relief at the head of his cavalry,
and ‘performed an astonishing rapid movement of eighty miles in ten
hours, fraternal affection giving impulse to his course.” Two days later
he commanded the left wing of Bourguien’s army at the battle of
Georgegarh ; and whilst gallantly leading it to the charge, his leg was
severely shattered by a four-pounder cannon-ball. He was removed to
Jhajjar, where he bore the tortures of an unskilful operation with
manly fortitude, but sank under the fever which the wound and shock
to the system induced. He died on the 8th of October, 1801, aged
twenty-four years. Just before he expired he said with a sigh—“ Ah,
why did I not fall on the plains of Egypt with my regiment. I should
then have died without a regret.” He fell a sacrifice to his ardour
for his profession. He was a young man of fine character, affec-
tionate disposition, and good education. Something of a poet, too,
for many fugitive pieces from his pen found a corner in the Caleutta
periodicals of the day.

Sompre, on Somru.—His infamy rather than his achievements
have rescued the name of this notorious adventurer from oblivion, and
awarded it an unenviable niche in Indian history. Sombre’s real
name was Walter Reinhard, and he was reputed to be the son of a
butcher at Saltsburg, where he was born in 1720. At the age of thirty
APPENDIX. 401

he came out to Pondicherry on board a French frigate, from which
he deserted in order to enlist in the French army of Southern India.
To hide his identity he assumed the naine of Somers as a nom de
guerre, but his saturnine features and lowering mien soon caused its
corruption into the sobriquet of Sombre, which in turn was twisted by
Native pronunciation into Somru.

Sombre appears to have spent some years in the Carnatic and
Southern India before he made his way to Bengal. Arrived here, he
first. of all enlisted as a private soldier in a Swiss battalion in the
employ of the Company, but eighteen days’ experience of it sufficed,
and he crossed the boundary into Chandernagore, and was appointed
a sergeant in Mons, Law’s force. But he was soon discontented with
this, and once more abandoning his allegiance, proceeded to the Upper
Provinces, where he assumed the Native style of dress, and entered
the service of Surdj-ud-Daula, the Nawab of Bengal, as a common
trooper. This situation proved even less to his liking than his previous
ones, and for the next two or three years he appears to have led a
restless and vagabond existence, till 1760, when he joined the rebel
Faujdér of Parnea, by whom he was appointed to the command of a
small force, with instructions to drill it in the European method and
bring it into discipline. In a few months the Faujddr suffered a
reverse, which naturally determined Sombre to desert him. The
adventurer now accepted a similar post under an Armenian name,
Gregory, a member of a Calcutta family of repute, and the virtual
minister of Kassim Ali Khan, who had succeeded Surd4j-ud-Daula as
Nawab of Bengal. Fortune favouring Sombre, he was promoted to
the command of two battalions. In 1763 a rupture occurred between
Kassim Ali and the Company, and the former, enraged at the ill
success of his arms, treacherously attacked and captured a large body
of English residents at Patna, and in a spirit of wanton and blood-
thirsty revenge, ordered them to be executed.

But the deed was too dark and foul a one for any of Kassim Ali’s
Native officers to undertake, and it was reserved for Sombre to ingra-
tiate himself with his master by carrying out the crime. The details
of this “‘execrable villainy ” are thus given in the “‘ Annual Register.”
“ Somers invited above forty officers and other gentlemen, who were
amongst these unfortunate prisoners, to sup with him on the day he
had fixed for the execution, and when his guests were in full security,
protected as they imagined by the laws of hospitality, as well as by
the right of prisoners, he ordered the Indians under his command to
fall upon them and cut their throats. Even these barbarous soldiers
revolted at the orders of this savage European. They refused at first

26
402 APPENDIX.

to obey, and desired that arms should be given to the English, and
that they would then engage them. Somers, fixed in his villainy,
compelled them with blows and threats to the accomplishment of
that odious service. The unfortunate victims, though thus suddenly
attacked and wholly unarmed, made a long and brave defence, and
with their plates and bottles even killed some of their assailants, but
in the end they were all slaughtered. Proceeding then, with a file of
Sepoys, to the prison where a number of the prisoners then remained,
he directed the massacre, and with his own hands assisted in the
inhuman slaughter of one hundred and forty-eight defenceless Euro-
peans confined within its walls—an appalling act of atrocity that has
stamped his name with infamy for ever.” Justice requires it to be
added that in one account of this tragedy, it is asserted that
Sombre’s own life would have been forfeited had he refused to carry
out Kassim Ali’s commands.

British troops were soon marching up from Calcutta to avenge this
foul deed, and Kassim Ali Khan’s army was defeated. But before
this happened Sombre had been invited by the Nawdb Wazir of Oudh
to enter his service, and seizing the opportunity of Kassim Ali's dis-
tress, renounced his allegiance, extorted by violence the arrears of pay
due to him, and then marched his two battalions to Lucknow, where
he entered on his new appointment.

By the end of 1763 Sombre’s force had increased to four battalions
of infantry, one of cavalry, and a strong complement of artillery, and
their commander enjoyed a high influence at Court, until war broke
out with the English, and the Nawab Wazir was defeated at the battle
of Buxar, and compelled to sue for peace, when one of the principal
conditions insisted on by the English was the surrender of Sombre.
The Naw4b accepted the stipulation in theory, but pointed out that,
in practice, Sombre was in command of an armed force, which made
his apprehension impossible. He proposed, as an alternative, to
poison or assassinate the adventurer, but this suggestion was declined.
Meanwhile Sombre, suspecting the tenor of the protracted negotia-
tions, took advantage of the delay to surround and plunder the
Nawab’s Begums, who had been entrusted to him for protection, and
also to rob his late master, Kassim Ali, who was at the time a refugee
at the Oudh Court. Having thus acquired a large sum of money by
methods perfectly in keeping with his past career, he secured the
fidelity of his force by paying it up in full, and then marched to
Rohilkhand. Here he entered the service of the Afghan chief, Hafiz
Ttaimat Ali—the benevolent Rohilla ruler of Macaulay’s essay on
Warren Hastings. But fear of the English soon drove him to leave
  
    
  

  

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THE BEGUM SOMBRE.

(fx0m a medallion in Sleeman's “ Rambles and Recollections
of an Indian Official |
APPENDIX. 403

the neighbourhood, and marching to Dig, he enlisted under the banners
of the Jat Rajah of Bhartpur. His connection with this potentate was
of a very short duration, for in a few months he was serving the Rajah
of Jaipur in uw similar capacity, but the Rajput prince soon dismissed
a mercenary whom he found too villainous for his service, and Sombre
finally tendered his sword to Najaf Khan, the Wazir of Shah Alam,
the Emperor of Delhi, and a nobleman who seldom refused the pro-
posals of any military adventurers, and who agreed to pay Sombre
Rs. 65,000 a month for the services of his party.

Up to this period of his career Sombre had served twelve or fourteen
different masters, but he remained in the service of the Court of
Delhi until his death. This fixity of employment was probably due to
his having been assigned a rich jaghir or estate at Sardhana, a dis-
trict some forty miles north of the capital, where he built and fortified
his headquarters, and settled down.

From the time that he had quitted civilisation and Chandernagore,
Sombre had adopted the native dress, and with it the custom of keep-
ingaharem. At Sardhéna he fell in love with a very beautiful, and
eke remarkable woman, concerning whose parentage there are various
accounts. One historian asserts that she was the daughter of a
decayed Mughal nobleman, another that she was a Kashmiri dancing-
girl, and a third that she was by birth a Syudani, or lineal descendant
of the Prophet. Sombre was already married to a woman of the
Massalman faith, who was still alive; but this did not prevent him
from repeating the ceremony with this girl who had taken his fancy.
His connection with her laid the foundation of the fortunes of his
family, for the Begum Somru, as she came to be called, was not less
notable for her beauty than for her extraordinary cleverness and force
of character. She soon gained a great ascendancy over Sombre, and
it was in a great measure owing to her influence that he abandoned
his roving life and settled down permanently at Sardhana.

Sombre was an illiterate man who could neither read nor write,
though he spoke Persian and Hindustani fluently. It is to his credit
that he was never ashamed of his humble origin, and although his
services were eagerly courted and bid for, and he enjoyed a position of
considerable political power in the country, he despised show, and
preferred a plain unostentatious mode of life. But with this single
statement the category of his virtues is begun and ended. He pos-
sessed a certain degree of low and crafty intelligence, but was utterly
destitute of military skill, martial spirit, or personal courage, whilst,
cousidering the possibilities open to him, he was singularly devoid of
enterprise and ambition. Shortly after entering Najaf Khan's service,
404 APPENDIX.

he was offered a large and important Jaidad, or military assignment
of territory, which would have raised him to a princely position, but
he preferred a monetary monthly payment, and refused the proposal.
It is probable he feared the risk involved in occupying an extended
territory necessitating the distribution of his troops, and preferred to
keep them together and concentrated about his person. For it is
known that after the massacre of Patna he suffered agonies of
remorse and fear, and lived in the miserable and constant terror of
being betrayed into the hands of the English to expiate his crime. To
prevent such a fate he always carried poison about his person, with
which to terminate his existence if necessary, and if his courage served
him.

Sombre’s disposition was merciless, cruel, and bloodthirsty, and he
was totally wanting in honour and fidelity. Avaricious and unscru-
pulous to an astounding degree, he bartered his sword to the highest
bidder, with the eagerness of a huckster disposing of perishable goods,
and changed his fealty with the same unconcern that he changed his
coat. His force was officered by Europeans, but few, if any, of them
were men of respectability, and those he engaged were generally the
very dregs and dross of society. The consequence was that his troops
were generally in a state of pronounced mutiny and insubordination,
committing every imaginable outrage upon the persons of their officers,
whom they despised. They seldom obtained their pay until they had
put their commander into confinement, and made him dig up his
hidden treasure, if he had any, or borrow from bankers if he had
none. If the troops were impatient it was their custom to divest
Sombre of his trousers and straddle him across a hot gun. When one
battalion had extracted its dues, he was often handed over to another
to be further squeezed. In later years the Begum herself was subjected
to the starving process, but Colonel Sleeman is the authority for
stating that she was never actually grilled on a gun. The same
writer states that it was Sombre’s invariable rule when engaged in
active service to draw up at a safe distance and await the course of
events. If victory declared for the enemy he sold his unbroken force
to the foe for a cash payment; if his own friends won, he promptly
assisted them in plundering, and so secured all the tangible fruits of
victory.

Lewis Ferdinand Smith has left on record a scathing criticism of
Sombre’s character as a soldier, and of the merits and qualities of his
corps. ‘Sombre’s party,” he writes, “have never been conspicuous
for their military achievements, nor famed for their military trophies.
They never lost a gun and never gained one, until they were defeated
APPENDIX. 405

by the British army near Adjanta Ghat (Assaye). But they were
remarkable for their excellent retreats. Sombre made it a rule in
every action to draw his men out in line, fire a few shots, and then
form square and retreat. This rule his party has ever since adhered
to with inflexible exactitude; by which singular mode of prudent war-
fare they have acquired no laurels, yet preserved their reputation.
They have been the most mutinous troops in India, and woe to the
unfortunate European who was compelled by his necessities to enter
into this party. Disgrace, if not death, attended them, from the fre-
quent revolts of the soldiers, when they regularly wreaked their
ire with clubs upon the shoulders of their European officers.”

The latter years of Sombre’s life were rendered a perfect purgatory
to him by his distrust and suspicion of all around him. He died at
Agra on the 4th of May, 1778, aged fifty-eight years, and was buried
in the garden of his residence there. But three years later his widow,
the Begum Somru, on being baptized and received into the Roman
Catholic faith, caused his remains to be disinterred and deposited in
the churchyard of that city. The following is the Portugese in-
scription over his resting-place, in Padretola, Agra :—

AQUIIAZ EO AOS4
OWALT DE MAYO
ERREINHA NOANNO
RD. MORR DE 1778

After Sombre’s death the command of his party, its pay, and the
jaghir of Sardhana, were continued to the Begum Somru, who was
always known by that name, although on her entry into the church she
had been christened Joanna Nobilis. By means of her uncommon
ability, gallantry, and masculine force of character, she proved herself
equal to the responsibility. She gave the command to a German
named Pauly, perhaps because he was a countryman of her
husband, but, it has been suggested, from more tender reasons,
and gradually entertained a considerable body of Europeans, both as
officers and to work her artillery, which numbered forty pieces of
cannon. These Europeans were of all nationalities, English, French,
Germans, Swiss, Portugese, Armenians, and half-castes, many of them
being deserters from the Company’s service. At one time the Begum
employed over two hundred in her force.

But she was unfortunate in her officers, for the respectable ones all
left her, and the others were a worthless, dissolute set of men, whose
outrageous conduct often incited the troops to mutiny. Pauly was
murdered “ by a bloody process” in 1783 ; Baours, who succeeded him,
406 APPENDIX.

retired, so next did Evans and Dudrenee, all three disgusted with the
“beastly habits” of their European subordinates. It was about this
time that George Thomas rose to a position of importance, if not the
actual control of her force ; he, too, was forced to leave. It will be
remembered that he was the officer concerned in the spirited suecour
which the Begum afforded to the Emperor Shah ’Alam, when he was
trying to reduce Najaf Kuli Khan in 1788, Thomas departed about
17938, when the command of the party devolved upon Le Vassoult, a
gallant and good-looking soldier, with whom the Begum carried on an
intrigue. She was presently married to him by Father Gregorio, a
Carmelite monk, Major Bernier and Colonel Saleur being the witnesses
of the marriage, which was kept secret. Colonel Sleeman states that
Le Vassoult proposed for her hand as the best method of securing his
ascendancy over Thomas, to whom he was always hostile. Le Vas-
soult was a gentleman by birth and education, and a soldier of honour-
able feelings; but he was stern and haughty by nature, and £0
thoroughly despised his subordinates that, after his marriage, he
refused to associate with them on equal grounds, or admit them to a
seat at his table. The Begum in vain endeavoured to persuade her
husband to alter his demeanour, urging that their personal safety
required that the officers should be conciliated. But her warnings
were disregarded. They proved too true; Le Vassoult’s subordinates
took umbrage, and declared that no man should command them who
would not meet them on terms of perfect social equality. The troops
sided with the officers, and determined to depose the Begum, and
elevate Balthazar Sombre, a son of Sombre by his first wife, to the
government. This woman was still living, nor, indeed, did she die
till 1838, when she must have been over a hundred years old. She
was buried at Sardhdna, the cemetery of which place, it is curious to
note, contained the bones of many centenarians.

Matters with the mutineers were brought to a crisis by Le
Vassoult’s harsh treatment of a German officer named Legois (a friend
of George Thomas), who was degraded for endeavouring to dissuade the
Begum from making an attack on Haridna. This arbitrary abuse of
power disgusted the troops, who had fought under Legois for many
years, and were incensed at seeing him superseded by a junior officer.
After rémonstrating in vain with Le Vassoult, they suddenly broke
out into open mutiny. The Begum and her husband now became
frightened, and determined to seek an asylum in the Company’s
territory. Neither of them understood English, but Le Vassoult,
with the aid of a grammar and dictionary, managed to communicate
his wishes to Colonel McGowan, who commanded the advance post
APPENDIX. 407

of the British army at Anupshahr. After some difficulty sanction
was accorded, but a stipulation was made that Le Vassoult should be
treated as a prisoner of war on parole, and reside with his wife at the
French settlement of Chandernagore. This was in May, 1795.

The Begum’s troops had, however, obtained information of what
was going on, and immediately summoned Balthazar Sombre—or, as
he was more commonly called, from a title bestowed on him by the
Emperor Shah ’Alam, Zafar Yab Khan—from Delhi to assume the
government of the Sardhana State. Meanwhile Le Vassoult and the
Begum managed to slip away, but their departure being discovered,
a detachment was sent in pursuit to capture them. An agreement
existed between the Begum and Le Vassoult, that in the event of
their falling into the hands of the mutineers, neither should survive the
other. In the commotion that ensued, consequent upon their being
overtaken and surrounded, the Begum drew a dagger, and in a half-
hearted way slashed herself slightly in the breast. Her attendants
seeing the blood flow shouted out that their mistress had killed herself.
Le Vassoult, who was riding a short distance ahead, hearing the
tumult, inquired what it arose from. He was told that his wife was
dead. A second time he repeated the question, and received the
same answer. He then drew a pistol from his holster, and although
he might easily have galloped off and saved himself, placed the
muzzle to his mouth and pulled the trigger. The ball passed through
his brain, and he sprang from his saddle a full foot into the air, before
he fell dead to the ground. His corpse was subjected to every in-
dignity and insult that the gross and bestial imagination of his officers
and men could conceive, and left to rot, unburied, on the ground.

The Begum, who was only slightly injured, was carried back
a captive to Sardhana, and kept chained to a gun for seven days, and
deprived of all food except such as was conveyed to her by stealth by
her female servants. Balthazar Sombre was seated on the masnad.
He was a detestable compound of ignorance, weakness, cruelty, and
debauchery, and it was not long before it became evident his rule
had not a single element of stability.

The actual instrument of his deposition, and the Begum’s re-
establishment in power, was George Thomas, with whom she found
means to communicate. He generously laid aside old animosities,
and responded to ler appeal for help. Balthazar Sombre was sent
a prisoner to Delhi, where he died, somesay by poison, in 1803,
leaving a daughter, subsequently married to Colonel Dyce, whose
son became famous as the principal personage in the great Dyce-
Sombre law-suit.
408 APPENDIX.

The command of the Begum’s force was now bestowed on Colonel
Saleur, who, with thirty other European officers, signed a document
swearing fidelity and allegiance to their mistress. As illustrating the
class of men who filled the posts of command in this party, it may be
mentioned that Saleur was the only one who could write his name,
most of the others affixing their seals, whilst a few, to show the
superiority of their accomplishments, subscribed two or three letters
of the alphabet, not necessarily those representing their proper initials,
but such as they happened to be able to form. The covenant was
drawn out by a Muhammadan scribe in Persian, and as his conscientious
scruples prevented him from acknowledging Christ as the son of God,
the precious document was superscribed—“ In the name of God, and
of His Majesty Christ ! ”

The Begum never publicly declared her marriage to Le Vassoult,
and immediately after his death resumed her former name. So
anxious was she to bury in oblivion an episode which certainly evinced
weakness in a woman usually strong minded, and already well
advanced in years, that she stipulated in her will that her heir,
whose family patronymic was Dyce, should in addition assume the
name of Sombre. To complete the story of poor Le Vassoult’s fate it
should be added that doubts have been cast upon the bond fides of the
agreement which the Begum originated, that in the event of capture
at the hands of the mutineers neither should survive the other. This
and her subsequent mock wound have been denounced as a piece of
treachery on her part, designed to rid herself of her husband. There
is, however, no actual proof of this, and Colonel Sleeman, writing in
1836, mentions that he heard “‘ from grave old Native gentlemen, who
were long in her service, that there really was too much truth in the
story of her intimacy with the gallant young Frenchman, though God
forgive them for saying so of a lady whose salt they had eaten for so
many years.’ Under these circumstances the inhuman atrocity of
the above suggestion is hardly conceivable.

Colonel Saleur raised the Begum Somru’s party to six battalions ot
infantry, increased the artillery, and addedacavalry force. The corps
is often mentioned in the political history of the next eight years, but
it never distinguished itself, nor did the Begum lapse a second time
from the path of prudence. Amidst the kaleidoscopic changes of
Hindustan, she managed to preserve her power and independence
intact, until her army, famous in peace, if not in war, met the
English on the plain of Assaye. But even here fortune favoured
them, for four of her five battalions, being left to guard the Maratha
camp, made good their escape, and only one was destroyed.
APPENDIX. 409

Just before the declaration of war in 1803, Robert Skinner joined
the Begum's service, and after the fall of Aligarh was deputed to
arrange for her submission to General Lake. James Skinner tells the
story so well in his memoirs that its quotation cannot be resisted.
‘“When the Begum came in person to pay her respects to General
Lake, an incident occurred of a curious and characteristic description.
She arrived at head-quarters just after dinner, and being carried in her
palanquin at once to the reception tent, the General came out to meet
and receive her. As the adhesion of every petty chieftain was, in
those days, of consequence, Lord Lake was not a little pleased at the
early demonstration of the Begum’s loyalty, and being a little elevated
by the wine which had just been drunk, he forgot the novel circum-
stance of its being a Native female, instead of some well-bearded chief,
so he gallantly advanced, and, to the utter dismay of her attendants,
took her in his arms and kissed her! The mistake might have been
awkward, but the lady’s presence of mind put all right. Receiving
courteously the proffered attention, she turned calmly round to her
astonished attendants and observed, ‘It is the salute of a padre
(priest) to his daughter.’ The Begum professes Christianity, and thus
the explanation was perfectly in character, though more experienced
spectators might have smiled at the appearance of the jolly red-coated
clergyman exhibited in the person of the General.”

The Begum lived for many years after this in friendly intercourse
with the British. Bishop Heber saw her in 1825, and described her as
“a very queer looking old woman, with brilliant but wicked eyes, and
the remaing of beauty in her features.” “Queer and wicked” she had
been in some of her actions, as the following anecdote shows. One
day two of her slave girls set fire to her houses at Agra in order to
make off with their paramours, two soldiers of the guard left in charge
of them. These houses had thatched roofs, and contained all the
Begum’s valuables. The fire was put out with much difficulty and
great loss of property, and the two slave girls were soon after dis-
covered in the bazaar at Agra, and brought into the Begum’s camp.
She ordered the affair to be investigated by a drum-head court-
martial, and in the usual summary fashion. Their guilt being
established they were first of all flogged until they were senseless, and
then buried alive in a pit dug in front of her tent. Another version of
this atrocious story, related in Heber's narrative, states that the girls
were buried in a hole dug in the floor of the Begum’s own chamber,
and that she had her bed drawn over it, and smoked her hookah
unconcernedly over this living grave. But Colonel Sleeman, who was
at the pains of sifting the story, vouches for the correctness of the
410 APPENDIX.
former version—although it is but one degree less horrible—which he
heard from an old Persian merchant named Aga, to whom the slave
girls originally belonged. “The Begum’s object,” explained the old
Aga, “was to make a strong impression upon the turbulent spirit of
her troops by a severe example, and she was entirely successful.”
‘When the Begum submitted to the English, her force consisted of
six battalions of infantry, 400 horse, and a party of artillery served
chiefly by Europeans. She possessed a good arsenal, well stored, and
a foundry for cannon, both built within the walls of the fortress of
Sardhana. The cost of the upkeep of her military establishment was
about four lakhs of rupees a year, and her other expenses were not
less than two, but the revenues from her jaghir of Sardhana were
sufficient to cover both. When she accepted British protection her
income increased very greatly, and there were no longer any calls for
the payment of her troops, which were disbanded. She thus became
immensely rich, and devoted large sums to charitable and religious
institutions. Amongst other gifts, she sent to the Pope at Rome
Rs. 150,000, to the Archbishop of Canterbury Rs. 50,000, and to the
Bishop of Calcutta Rs. 100,000. To Catholic Missions in India she
subscribed Rs. 130,000 ; and for distribution to the deserving debtors
of Calcutta Rs. 50,000. She also built a handsome Roman Catholic
Church and a Protestant Chapel at Meerut, to which place she re-
moved her residence during her latter years. The Roman Catholic
bishop here was an Italian from Milan, named Julius Cesar. He
was the medium of her donation to the Pope, for which he received
his bishopric. His Holiness made the Begum’s recognised heir and
step-grandson—Dyce-Sombre—a Chevalier of the Order of Christ,
besides presenting him with a splint from the real cross as a relic.
The Begum was very diminutive in person, but possessed a
wonderful dignity of carriage, and an uncommon resolution of
manner. At Meerut she entertained from time to time several
Governors-General and Commanders-in-chief. During the closing
years of her life an immense army of pensioners enjoyed her bounty,
and she acquired the character of a kind-hearted and benevolent
woman. She died in 18386, leaving behind her a fortune of £700,000,
a large portion of which was bequeathed to charities, and the rest to
Mr. Dyce-Sombre, who married an English lady of title, and his two
sisters, one of whom married an English officer, Captain Troup,
and the other an Italian gentleman, Signor Sabroli.

SurHERLAND, RoBert, CoLonet [known to the Natives as Sutlej
Sahib].—Sutherland was a Scotchman, and originally an officer in the
APPENDIX. 411
73rd Regiment, from which he was cashiered, He entered De Boigne’e
First Brigade in 1790, and in May, 1794, was still only a lieutenant on a
pay of Rs. 200 a month. Soon after this promotion came to him, and
he obtained the command of the Third Brigade, and on the death of
Colonel Frémont in 1795 was transferred to that of the Second. When,
at the end of this year, De Boigne retired Sutherland was senior officer
in Hindustan, and acted as chief commander of the troops. Perron
was, however, considerably senior to him, and being in the Deccan
with Daulat Rao Sindhia, had little difficulty in obtaining the succession
to De Boigne’s appointment, in spite of all Sutherland’s endeavours to
secure it for himself. This was the beginning of a long and jealous
feud between the two adventurers, which only terminated with the
Scotchman’s resignation in 1802. It is probable, though not actually
recorded, that Sutherland was present at the battles of Patan and
Merta. In 1796 he was employed in the reduction of some revolted
districts in Bundelkhand, bringing into obedience several petty rajahs,
during which (in Skinner’s words) he fought two general actions and
captured half-a-dozen forts. His next service was against Lakwa
Dada at Chiturgarh. This was the occasion when Thomas complained
of Sutherland’s conduct in having arranged a concerted attack on the
rebel chief over night, and then unaccountably drawn off his forces
without any assigned reason. Skinner records an incident which
happened during this campaign, and does not rebound very much to
Sutherland’s credit. It appears that during the desultory progress of
the war, Skinner was one morning exercising his horse ‘“ in full
armour,” and chanced to meet Harji Sindhia, a Maratha chieftain,
and a relative of Daulat Rao. Harji invited Skinner to join him in
his ride to a river close by, whither he was bound, at the request of
the Mardthé General, Ambaji Inglia, to look for a ford. This ex-
pedition was subsequently proved to be a snare laid by Ambaji, in
collusion with Lakwa Dada—the enemy he was supposed to be fight-
ing against—to bring about the destruction of Harji, to whom both the
chiefs were hostile. As they rode along Skinner’s suspicions were
aroused, and he warned Harji, who was attended by 500 of his men,
to be on his guard. His fears were not ill-founded, for almost im-
mediately afterwards they fell into an ambuscade, and were attacked
by a thousand of Lakwa Dada’s cavalry. Skinner and Harji im-
mediately offered fight, and eventually succeeded in beating the
enemy off, though not before the former’s horse was wounded by a
sabre cut, and he bimself had received two or three sword blows on
the body, from which he was only saved by his armour. Harji was
wounded, but Skinner fortunately cut down the man who was attack-
412 APPENDIX.

ing him. Returning to camp, Harji invited Skinner to his tent, where
all sat down in Darbar. Then the chief arose and said, “All those
who fought with me this day were my servants, and did but perform
their duty; but you are my friend, and fought for me as a friend.”
He then took a pair of gold bangles set with diamonds, and put them
round Skinner’s wrists, and also gave him a sword, a shield, and a fine
horse.

When Colonel Sutherland heard of this he blamed Skinner for what
had passed, and told him he should report the circumstance of his
accompanying the chief, without leave, to Perron. But a little later
he caused intimation to be conveyed. to Skinner that if he would give
him the horse he had received from Harji, nothing should be said of
what had happened. Skinner sent back word he would give the
bangles, but not the horse, the sword, or the shield. At this Suther-
land was much incensed, and his anger was increased when he learnt
that Harji had himself written to Perron praising Skinner’s conduct.

“Soon after this,” adds Skinner, with quiet satisfaction, “ the Colonel
himself was discovered intriguing with the Maratha chiefs, and Perron
discharged him, bestowing his command on Major Pohlman.” This
incident is related because it shows the existence of an old-standing
quarrel between Sutherland and Skinner, and, in a measure, explains
some of the strictures the latter, in his memoirs, takes occasion to pass
upon the Scotchman.

Not long after this, Sutherland, having been forgiven through the
interest of his father-in-law, Colonel John Hessing, was sent to the
Deccan to take over the command of the First Brigade. The side-light
here is interesting, for it establishes a connection by marriage between
Perron and Sutherland, since the General and Hessing had married
sisters. In another part of his memoirs Skinner mentions that Filoze
and Bourguien were both related to Perron, but without mentioning
the degree of connection. It would thus appear that there was a
regular family party in command of Sindhia’s brigades, for Perron,
the two Hessings, Sutherland, Derridon, the Filoze’s, and Bourguien
must all have been more or less connected by marriage ties. Suther-
land, indeed, was nephew by marriage to Perron, having married the
General’s niece; but, despite this, they cordially hated one another,
and the Frenchman lost no opportunity of mortifying and vexing the
Scotchman, with the object of getting rid of him, for it did not suit his
policy that his second in command should be a British subject.

Sutherland assumed command of the First Brigade in 1799. Previous
to this his principal services had been the storming and capture of
Narwar with four battalions in 1795, and the siege and capture of Tori
APPENDIX. 413

Fatehpur in 1796, at the head of eight battalions. In the Deccan he
was chiefly engaged in helping Daulat Rao Sindhia to consolidate his
power at Poonah, and it was not until 1801 that an opportunity
occurred for him toreally distinguish himself. In this year Sindhia
returned to Malwa, leaving Sutherland and a portion of the First
Brigade behind to support his interests at the Deccan capital during
his absence. Then came the disastrous defeat of Ujjain, and Suther-
land was at once summoned to his master’s aid. As soon as the rainy
season slackened, and the Narbada became fordable, Sutherland was
detached to retrieve the defeat sustained in June. With fourteen
battalions of regular infantry and 20,000 Mardtha horse he gave battle
to Jaswant Rao Holkar and Amir Khan on the plain outside the city
of Indore, where the latter had taken up a strong position. After an
obstinate contest he gained a complete victory, drove Holkar and his
troops from their entrenchments, took 98 guns, 160 tumbrils, and all
the baggage, and wound up the exploit by plundering Indore. He
lost 400 men in the action, which was a very severe one. Although a
detailed account of this battle has been given in the sketch of Perron’s
life, it will not be out of place to quote the following description of it
from the pages of ‘‘Pandurang Hari,” which gives a graphic idea of
the fight from a Hindu point of view. Pandurang Hari, it may be
mentioned, was at the time a cavalry officer in Holkar’s Maratha
Horse.

“T had just entered upon my,new service when despatches arrived
with orders for us to march to Indore, Holker’s capital. ... A
Mahratta army consists in general of horse and foot of every neigh-
bouring nation, religion, and, costume. It makes a very motley
appearance, as it is under no discipline, and destitute of regular
uniform. Few of the men in the same line, either cavalry or infantry,
have weapons of a like form. Some are armed with sword and shield,
others with matchlocks or muskets. Some carry bows and arrows,
others spears, lances, or war rockets. Many are expert with the
battleaxe, but the sabre is indispensable to all. The men in armour,
of whom there are many to make up the variety, cut a very curious
appearance. A helmet covers not only the head and ears, but pro-
tects the shoulders. The body is cased in iron network, or in a thick
quilted vest. They give preference to the two-edged sword before the
curved one used by the Persians and Arabs. . . . Every rdjah, prince,
or leader is responsible among the Mahrattas to the Peishwa, or head
of the empire, for his general conduct. He pays tribute for his district,
and attends when summoned with his quota of men, which is regu-
lated by his wealth and population. He is supreme in command over
414 APPENDIX.

his corps, which is attached alone to him and to his fortunes, and ad-
heres to whatever party he supports. . . . After a fatiguing march we
reached Indore, the capital of Jeswant Rio Holker. Our preparations
were now complete, and we were confident of success. Our cavalry
was a strange rabble, mounted on tall and short horses of every colour
and kind. Saddles were always slipping off for want of girths ; strings
fastened to any old pieces of iron by way of bits, supplied bridles; old
turbans served for martingales, and tent ropes for cruppers. The in-
-fantry was just as wretchedly accoutred as the cavalry. Everything
was wanting and nothing regular. Here voices might be heard roaring
out for ball, and there for muskets or arms. Those who were not
fortunate enough to procure any weapon at all, supplied the deficiency
by a bamboo pole, which they dignified with the designation of a spear.
. .. The eventful day at length dawned. I awoke carly, and opening
my tent, looked abroad. All was dark and misty. Soon it was all
alive in the camp, and as the day advanced clamour, turmoil, and
preparation increased. The drums roared on every hand the call to
arms. The war-elephants, caparisoned and ready, yelled with im-
patience, and towered loftily over all other living objects. The neigh-
ing of horses, the clash of arms, the buzz of impatient voices, the
sounds of command, the march of the irregular and confused masses
to their stations, was an impressive scene. Soon the firing of guns,
at first slow and‘irregular, then more rapidly, convinced me the work
of death had begun in some quarter, and it seemed speedily extending
itself towards the station of my troop, which I had joined, well mounted,
and with which I remained, with u fluttering heart, in awful suspense.
The current of battle now rolled close by me, and action soon took
away all reflection, for we had enough upon our hands. Our men
were all lean kine, and too scantily fed to be much heavier than
skeletons. Our horses were in little better condition, and when
Scindia’s cavalry came down on us we were knocked off on the ground
before we could strike a blow. In vain I tried to rally and remount
my men. I succeeded in prevailing upon only a few to rally ; the best
part of them turned tail and fled without once looking behind. Thus
the division to which I was attached was speedily disposed of. Our
infantry getting mixed with the cavalry that had been driven back by
Scindia, was taken by it for the infantry of that chief, instead of our
own, and the sabre began to cut among them as if they were a field of
standing corn. I laboured in vain to rectify the mistake, and stay the
carnage of our own men. My voice was lost in the scene of death and
discord, the rush of rockets, and the groans of the dying. How long
this scene might have continued before it could have been put an end
APPENDIX. 415

to I cannot tell, if the attention of the cavalry had not been drawn to
something, which even in the heat of battle was truly appalling to the
sight, and made them, even there, think of self-preservation. A
wounded elephant rushed in among them, mad with the pain of a ball
he had just received, and rolled his unwieldy bulk through and over
the slashed infantry, and among the terrified horse. Beast and rider
were overturned and crushed beneath his tread, and all that lay in his
path became victims to his fury. This effectually put a stop to the
havoc the cavalry had begun, as the horses took fright and bore their
riders off the field of action, leaving their own broken infantry to be
trampled to death by the enraged beast. At this moment the cavalry
of Scindia charged our artillery and captured it all together with our
baggage. This was decisive. Jeswant Rao Holker saw his world-
conquering heroes disperse in every direction, and the battle terminated
ia leaving Scindia no enemies in view, the pursued soon leaving their
conquerors far in the rear. The virtue of leanness, which served us
so ill in the battle, was now of singular service in making our escape.”

Pandurang Hari makes a mistake in describing Sindhia as present
in person at the battle, for he was some miles in the rear with his
baggage, and Sutherland was in command of the victorious army.
It is curious that no mention is made of the regular infantry in this
spirited description of the fight. The victory established Sutherland’s
reputation and confirmed him in his master’s favour; so much so
that at one time it was announced he had been appointed to super-
sede Perron, whose jealousy operated as much as any other cause in
bringing him to Ujjain in March, 1802.

Perron soon obtained Sindhia’s ear, and although Sutherland
intrigued assiduously, he was disgraced and transferred to the
command of the Second Brigade, which had escorted Perron down
from Hindustan. This humiliation and ‘a remark of Perron’s”
caused the Scotchman to throw up his commission in disgust, and he
returned to Agra ‘‘ without leave,” accompanied by a.hundred cavalry.
Sindhia, it was stated, was very much distressed at his departure, and
Perron went personally to pacify his brigade, and promised them a
new commander of equal rank.

Sutherland remained at Agra till the breaking out of the war with
the English, and was one of the officers confined by the mutinous
Agra garrison. He was associated with George Hessing in arranging
the terms of capitulation, and the bearer of the letter to General
Lake which ‘(demanded a cessation of hostilities’? on the 13th of
October, 1803. Two or three days after this he and all the European
officers in the place found protection under the British flag.
416 APPENDIX.

On the whole, Sutherland seems to have been a good officer, though
doubtless his social qualities were not so commendable as his military
abilities. His victory at Indore justifies his claim to be considered a
more competent commander than most of his contemporaries. On
his withdrawal from Sindhia’s service he obtained a pension of
Rs, 800 a month, under favour of the Governor-General’s proclama-
tion, which he enjoyed for some years. He died at Mattra, but the
date of his death is not known.

Symes, Caprain [known to the natives as Sunk Sahib].—Captain
Symes was the commandant of a Najib, or matchlock, battalion in
Perron’s First Brigade, and was wounded at the storm of Sounda.
After this he was sent to supersede Bourguien, who had been
fruitlessly endeavouring to capture Ajmir. From thence he pro-
ceeded to Tonk, which place he garrisoned for some time, until
Jaswant Rao Holkar attacked him, and forced him to retreat to
Ramptra. He died at Sikandra a short time before the war broke
out with the English.

Tone, Wititram Henry, CoLtoneLt.—Colonel W. H. Tone was an
Irishman, and brother to the famous Irish rebel, Theobald Wolfe
Tone. William was born in August, 1764, his grandfather being a
respectable farmer near Naas, in county Kildare, and his father a
coachmaker, who was ruined by litigation over the family property.
Tone was intended for a commercial life, and bound apprentice at the
age of fourteen to an eminent bookseller. This enabled him to
indulge his passion for reading, and he perused every book of voyages
and travels which he could find, and also some of military history and
adventure. This literature heated an imagination naturally warm
and enthusiastic to such a degree that, at the age of sixteen, he ran
away to London, and entered as a volunteer in the Kast India Com-
pany’s service. His first experience was unfortunate, for instead of
finding his way to India, as he desired, he was sent to the Island of
St. Helena, on which barren rock he remained in garrison for six
years, and then returned to Europe. It was highly to his honour
that, though he entered into such execrable society as the troops in
the Company’s service were composed of, and at such an early age,
he passed through the ordeal without being affected by the contagion
of their manners or their principles. He even found means in that
degraded situation and remote spot to cultivate his mind to a certain
degree, so that his brother, Wolfe Tone, was much surprised when he
met him in London, after a separation of eight years, to find him
APPENDIX. 417

with the manners of a gentleman and a considerable acquaintance
with the best parts of English literature. Tone had a natural talent
for poetry, which he much improved, and composed several very
elegant sets of verses. He was a handsome, well-made man with a
good address, and extremely well received among women, whom he
loved to excess. He was as brave as Cesar and devoted to soldiering.

Having remained three or four years in Europe, by which time his
father was utterly ruined by the law-suit alluded to, Tone resolved
to try his fortune in India, from which step his brother did not
attempt to dissuade him. Re-entering the Company’s service in 1792,
he arrived at Madras at the end of that year. With an advantageous
figure, a good address, and considerable talents, he recommended
himself so far to the colonel of the regiment in which he served, that
he obtained his discharge and letters of introduction to persons at
Calcutta, where he was advised to push his fortures. A small military
command enabled him to defray the expenses of the voyage, and
procured him a gratification of £50 on his arrival at his destination
as a reward for his exertions in quelling a dangerous mutiny which
broke out amongst the black troops under his command on board,
who had formed a scheme to run away with the ship. At Calcutta
the persons to whom he had come recommended introduced him to a
French officer named Marigny, who was second in command of the
Nizam of Haidarabad’s army, and happened to be at the Pre-
sidency purchasing military stores for his master. Marigny gave
Tone an appointment in the Nizam’s service, and promised him the
command of a battery of artillery as soon as they should arrive at
Haidarabad. The stores being purchased, Tone marched with the
First Division, of which he had the command, and arrived safely at
the Nizam’s capital. After some time, Marigny followed; but by an
unforeseen accident all Tone’s hopes were blasted. A quarrel took
place between Marigny and Raymond, the Frenchman in command,
in which Tone, with an honourable indiscretion, sided with his friend.
The consequence was that Marigny was put in irons, and Tone only
escaped a similar fate by appealing, as a British subject, to the
Resident at the Nizam’s Court for protection. This circumstance,
together with the breaking out of the war between the French and
English, put an end to all prospects of his advancement, as all the
Europeans in the Nizam’s army were Frenchmen.

So Tone set out to return to Calcutta. On his journey, having
travelled four hundred miles, and with two hundred yet to travel,
which must have brought him into the district of Orissa, he dis-
mounted from his horse to shoot in a jungle by the roadside. On his

27
418 APPENDIX.

return he found his servants and horses in the hands of five ruffians,
who were engaged in plundering his baggage. He immediately ran
up and fired at them, and shot one in the stomach, whereupon
another returned the fire with one of Tone’s own pistols, which they
had seized, and wounded him in the foot. They then made off with
their booty, and in this distressed condition the unfortunate Irishman
had to travel two hundred miles in a burning climate and without
resources. But his courage and good constitution supported him,
and he at length arrived at Calcutta, where he speedily recovered his
health. His friends there had not forgotten him, and when an
opportunity offered of Major Palmer proceeding to Poonah to take
up the appointment of Resident at the Court of the Peshwa of
the Marathas, they procured Tone a strong recommendation to that
Court, and he set off with Major Palmer in high spirits and health,
and with expectations of the command of a battery of artillery at
least.

So far Tone’s history has been extracted from the memoirs of bis
brother Wolfe Tone. Carrying the narrative forward, it would appear
he reached Poonah about the year 1796, and found employment in
Boyd’s corps. Two years later he was selected by Amrat Rao, the
Peshwa’s brother, to command a proposed brigade of regular infantry,
all the officers of which were to be British subjects, but the idea was
abandoned. In 1801 he was in command of two hundred Sepoys
assisting Lakwa Dada and the Bhais at the defence of Sounda,
where he was defeated by Perron’s troops and obliged to surrender.
The General behaved very kindly to him and his officers, supplying
them with a handsome camp equipage, such as tents, camels,
horses, &c. To the Colonel he offered service in hie own army, but
it was declined, and Tone was permitted to retire to Mahéswur,
the capital of Holkar, and furnished with Rs. 10,000 for his expenses,
and to enable him and his comrades in misfortune to recover their
shattered fortunes.

Tone was killed in the following year, being struck by a bullet in
the right temple in an action near Choli Mahéswur while serving with
Holkar. His brother’s biographer (his own nephew), writing in 1827,
does not seem to have been aware of this, or, at least, does not spe-
cifically mention it.

Tone was the author of a pamphlet entitled “Some Institutions of
the Mahratta People,’ which has been frequently quoted by various
historians, so that he evidently cultivated his taste for literature to
the end. Grant Duff, in his “History of the Mahrattas,” refers in
very appreciative terms to three letters which Tone had published,
APPENDIX. 419

giving an accurate account of affairs at Poonah in 1796. “I have
examined minutely,” he writes, “all which that intelligent gentleman
wrote respecting the Mahrattas. What he saw may be relied upon ;
as to what he heard, I am less surprised that he should have fallen
into error than that he should have obtained information so nearly
correct.” Smith describes Tone as a man of “ undaunted valour and
persevering enterprise ; an unfortunate gentleman whose abilities and
integrity were as great as his misfortunes had been undeservedly
severe,” and criticises his ‘‘ Institutions” as “both elegant and
accurate.” ‘Every one who was brought into contact with William
Henry Tone writes well of him, and leaves us with the impression
that he was a brave and amiable man.

Vickers, Masor.—Major Vickers was a half-caste, and an exceed-
ingly gallant young soldier. He entered Perron’s army as a lieutenant
in the Second Brigade, under Major Pohlman, and commanded one
of the trenches in the siege of Jhajgarh, displaying great bravery in
leading the storm of that formidable place. When the Chevalier
Dudrenee deserted Holkar’s service, Vickers was appointed to the
command of his corps, and behaved with great courage at the battle
of Poonah, in October, 1802, his intrepidity and steadiness conducing
much towards the victory, and being at the time a theme of admiration
amongst all military men. In 1804, when war broke out between
Holkar and the British, the chief sent for Vickers, and asked him if
he would fight against his countrymen. The young man positively
refused to do so, as did also two other adventurers—Dodd and Ryan.
Whereupon Jaswant Rao, assigning as a justification a treasonable
correspondence which he accused them of carrying on, ordered all
three to be beheaded, and the sentence was carried into effect at
Nahar Maghana (Tiger’s Hill) in the month of May, 1804. Their
heads were fixed on lances in front of Jaswant Rao’s camp, and a
publie crier proclaimed that such would be the fate of any European
who might fall into Holkar’s clutches.

FINIS.
The Gresham Press,
UNWIN BROTHERS,

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