Cornell Law School Library
Gerbert DB. Laube Collection

1948 Memorial Gift
of the
Students of the Gornell Law Srhool
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DATE DUE

3 1924 070 152 396

 

GAYLORD PRINTROINU.S A.
LOCKE

ON

CIVIL GOVERNMENT
TWO TREATISES

ON

CIVIL GOVERNMENT

BY

JOHN LOCKE

PRECEDED BY SIR ROBERT FILMER’S “ PATRIARCHA ’°

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY HENRY MORLEY

LL.D., LATE PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH LITERATURE AT
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON

 

LONDON

GEORGE ROUTLEDGE AND SONS, LimiTED
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON AND CO.
INTRODUCTION.

—

From the time of the differences between James I. and he
Parliament in 1610, to the Revolution of 1688, our history and
literature contain records of energetic difference about the limit of
authority. There was a problem to be solved that touched the
interests and stirred passions of men, until some fought, while
others reasoned, and all human forces were spent on labour to get
the problein solved. It seemed for a while that the right answer was
the Commonwealth. Buta Commonwealth sustained by the genius
of one man was monarchy. After Cromwell’s death, it became
clear that the answer to the problem had not yet been found.
Stuarts were tried again, and Charles II. and James II. served the
country most effectually by betrayal of the trusts confided to them.
Their shortcomings ensured us against risk of another Civil War.
Liberty seemed to be dying, but in the worst signs of the disease
there was Nature at work on her own way of cure.

With the Revolution came John Locke as its interpreter. John
Locke had been born in August, 1632, and was a year younger than
John Dryden, who was born in August, 1631. After passing from
Westminster School to Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied at
first natural science, and made medicine his profession, Locke was
brought by accident into friendly relation with Lord Ashley,
afterwards that Earl of Shaftesbury whom Charles II. sought
to strike down, and against whom Dryden wrote “ Absalom
and Achitophel.” In Shaftesbury, Locke found a friend. In
January, 1683, Shaftesbury, withdrawn for safety to Holland, died
at Amsterdam, In the autumn of that year Locke took refuge
abroad, and found congenial friends also at Amsterdam. From his
exile in Holland he returned in February, 1689, in the same ship
that brought the Princess Mary. His Latin Efzstola de Tolerantia,
on behalf of Religious Liberty, had been written in 1685, and it was
published at Gouda, by his friends abroad, in the spring of 1689. In
September, an English translation, made by William Popple, of
this “Letter concerning Toleration,” was published in London.
Locke was then printing his most famous work, the “ Essay con-
cerning Human Understanding,” of which the aim was to define
the bounds of human knowledge, dissuade from vain speculation,
and persuade men to economize their force of thought. At the
beginning of the year 1690, Locke’s “ Essay concerning Human
Understanding” was first published at the “ George,” in Fleet Street,
near St. Dunstan’s Church. He had been at work on it for sixteer
years, and for the copyright he was paid thirty pounds.
6 INTRODUCTION.

About the same time Locke published the “Two Treatises of
Government,” which are now in the reader’s hands. They had been
licensed for printing on the 23rd of August, 1689.

This argument for Civil Liberty was but a few months old when
attacks upon his arguments for Religious Liberty in the ‘ Letter
concerning Toleration,” compelled Locke to defend his position.
He did this in a “ Second Letter on Toleration,” which was pub-
lished in June, 1690, followed afterwards by a “ Third Letter con-
cerning Toleration,” in June, 1692. :

In the next year, 1693, Locke sought to deepen the foundations
of another of the great supports of civilized society, by publishing
his “Thoughts concerning Education.” Still seeking to add
strength to the foundations of his country’s power and well-being,
his next work was in aid of religious faith ; a book on “ The Reason-
ableness of Christianity,” published in the summer of 1695, nine
years before his death. Thus he had dealt in a few years imme-
diately following the Revolution of 1688-9 with all that is most
vital in the constitution of a State. :

Here we are concerned especially with Locke’s part in the argu-

-Gment upon the limit of authority. Richard Hooker, arguing in
1593 for the Church as established by Elizabeth against those who
objected to a Church Polity with laws and usages of human insti-
tution, proposed in the first book of his “ Laws of Ecclesiastical
Polity” to consider what is the foundation of law. His purpose was

>to prove that laws are the product of man’s reason, means adapted
to an end; maintained by the majority so long as they attain their
end, and subject to change with change of circumstance, by the
same action of human reason in readjusting means for the
more certain attainment of the end desired. Hookers pur-
pose was to show that the Puritans were wrong when they desired
to found upon Revelation, and draw wholly from the Bible those
arrangements for Church government which had been adopted by
the use of Reason—which also is God’s gift—to the conditions which
it seemed to the majority most necessary to observe at that time
for due maintenance of the Church in England. With the Church
wholly in his mind, Hooker hardly thought of the possible applica-
tions of his argument to Civil Polity; but if he had thought much of
them he would not have avoided saying what he thought was true.

But the pure-minded Hooker was the great defender of the
Church Establishment ; his name, therefore, in the days of conflict,
of which Locke’s ‘‘ Two Treatises” were a product, was as that of a
great captain of their own in the ears of men who battled, often
as honestly but seldom as reasonably, for the maintenance of old
forms of authority in Church and State. Yet the foundation of
Hooker’s argument was the foundation also of Locke’s ; and Locke
had especial satisfaction when, in his “ Two Treatises of Civil
Government,” he quoted Hooker as the “judicious Hooker.” That
adjective, “the judicious,” was made current by Locke’s use of it in
this book, and thus turned what had seemed to his advercesin=
INTRODUCTION, 7

their best gun against themselves. Revelation, Hooker had taught,
is concerned only with matter of faith, for all else God has given to
man Reason as his guide. Men equal by Nature seek communion 4
and fellowship with others, to supply the defects that are in them
when living singly and solely by themselves. This was the cause
of men’s uniting themselves at the first in politic societies ; which
societies could not be without government, nor government without
a distinct law of its own, serving to direct even Nature depraved
to a right end. All men desire to lead in this world a happy<
life. That life is led most happily wherein all virtue is exercised”
‘without impediment or let. To take away mutual grievances
and wrongs there was no way but by aii agreement among men, <
ordaining some kind of government public, and by yielding them-
selves subject thereunto. Strifes and troubles would be endless,
except they gave their common consent all to be ordered by some
whom they should agree upon; without which consent there was
no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge
over another. So that, in a word, all public rule, of what kind
soever, seemeth evidently to have risen from deliberate advice,
consultation, and composition between men, judging it convenient
and behoveful. These views of Hooker on the social compact are
chiefly given in his own words. He goes on to show that if they began
by resting central authority in the will of a ruler, “they saw that
to live by one man’s will became the cause of all man’s misery.
. ... By the natural law whereunto God hath made all subject, the
lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of
men belongeth so properly unto the same entire societies, that for
any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise
the same of himself, and not either by express commission imme-
diately and personally received from God, or else by authority
derived at the first from their consent upon whose persons they
impose the laws, it is no better than mere tyranny.” Laws, said
Hooker, are available by consent ; utterly without our consent, we
could be at no man’s commandment living.

In the reign of Charles I. the chief English philosopher was
Thomas Hobbes, who was born at Malmesbury in 1588, became
at Oxford a distinguished scholar, and was tutor to Lord Caven-
dish, afterwards Earl of Devonshire. He lived to be a very old
man, and was at home at Chatsworth with three generations of
the family. The pressing questions of the day directed the course
of Hobbes’s philosophy into considerations of the limit of autho-
rity. He spent his best energies in the endeavour to set forth af
system of political philosophy. Like Hooker, he founded govern- ,
ment upon a social compact among men by nature equal, each of
whom gave up to the central power some part of his private right,
in order that each might be protected by the strength of all. But
Hobbes diverged widely from Hooker at the next stage of the
argument. Hooker had said that if the government so established
shanld fail to fulfil its purpose, those who established it might
8 INTRODUCTION.

> undo and re-shape it. Hobbes said that the authority when once
established became absolute. There was no power to take back
what was given. Absolute government was the form thus esta-
blished ; and this form was best. Especially in his “ Leviathan,”
first published under the Commonwealth, in 1651, Hobbes set
forth his view of “the Matter, Form, and Power of a Common-
wealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil.” The State was a great body
politic, as Leviathan was a great body natural, and the body politic,
like the body natural, could be well ruled only when all members
were subject to the control of a single head. In the Church as in
the State, according to Hobbes, there should be one directing will,
and that the King’s. It was for the King to say what doctrines are
fit for peace and to be taught the subject.

Sir Robert Filmer was among Royalists of the time of Charles I.,
who held that Hobbes had conceded too much when he based his
theory of absolute sovereignty upon a social compact among men
equal by nature. There never was a time, said Filmer, when men
were equal. When there were only two in the world, one was the
master. When children were born, Adam was master over them.
Authority was founded by God Himself in Fatherhood. Out of
Fatherhood came Royalty, the Patriarch was King. Sir Robert
Filmer wrote several political pieces that were published in the
reign of Charles I. One of them boldly asserted that Parliament was
an evil; they all maintained extreme views of the irresponsibility
of kings. Filmer sought for his views the authority of Aristotle,
in his “Observations upon Aristotle’s Politics.” But Aristotle
based his teaching on the various conditions of the little
States of Greece—accepted actual conditions that are not re-
peated in the modern States of Europe—built his arguments upon
acceptance of a form of citizenship that included slave labour
as a means of giving leisure for the cultivation of free citizens. ‘
Filmer died in 1653, leaving treatises unprinted, of which two
were published by his son when the contest about the limit of
authority became keener as the combatants drew nearer to the
crisis of the Revolution. The more important of these was the
“Patriarcha,” first published in 1680. It was an attempt at the
full statement of his argument. Much of the hottest battle of
opinion was along its lines. Therefore, when Locke endeavoured
immediately after the Revolution, to show what were the founda.
tions of Civil Government, he began by sweeping off the fallacies
with which they had been overlaid. He disposed, in his first essay,
of the speculation of Sir Robert Filmer, and showed what are not
the foundations of Civil Authority, and, in his second essay, he then
endeavoured to show what they are. For the better understanding
and enjoyment of Locke’s “Two Treatises of Civil Government,”
they are here preceded by the “ Patriarcha.” :

H. M.

Fariuary, 1884.
PATRIARCHA;

OR, THE

NATURAL POWER

OF

KINGS.

 

By THE LEARNED SiR ROBERT FILMER, Bart.

 

* Libertas . . . . populi, quem regna coercent
Libertate perit . . . .”—Lucan, Lib. iii.

“* Fallitur egregio quisquis sub principe credit
Servitium ; nunquam libertas gratior extat
Quam sub Rege pio . . . .”=-CLAUDIAN.
PATRIARCHA,

CHAPTER I.
That the first Kings were Fathers of Families.

SincE the time that school divinity began to flourish there
hath been a common opinion maintained, as well by divines
as by divers other learned men, which affirms,—

“ Mankind ‘is naturally endowed_and born with freedom
"from all subjection, and af liberty to choose what form of.
government it please, and that the power which any one
man hath over others was at first bestowed according to the
discretion of the multitude.”

This tenet was first hatched in the schools, and hath been
fostered by all succeeding Papists for good divinity. The
divines, also, of the Reformed Churches have entertained it,
and the common people everywhere tenderly embrace it as
being most plausible to flesh and blood, for that it pro-
digally distributes a portion of liberty to the meanest of the
multitude, who magnify liberty as if the height of human
felicity were only to be found in it, never remembering that
the desire of liberty was the first cause of the fall of Adam.

But howsoever this vulgar opinion hath of late obtained
a great reputation, yet it is not to be found in the ancient
fathers and doctors of the primitive Church. It contradicts
the doctrine and history of the Holy Scriptures, the constant
practice of all ancient monarchies, and the very principles
of the law of nature. It is hard to say whether it be more
erroneous in divinity or dangerous in policy. —

Yet upon the ground of this doctrine, both Jesuits and
some other zealous favourers of the Geneva discipline have

é
42 PATRIARCHA.

built a perilous conclusion, which is, that the people or
multitude have power to punish or deprive the prince if he
transgress the laws of the kingdom; witness Parsons and
Buchanan ; the first, under the name of Dolman, in the third
chapter of his first book, labours to prove that kings have
been lawfully chastised by their commonwealths. The
latter, in his book “ De jure Regni apud Scotos,”, maintains
a liberty of the people to depose their prince. Cardinal
Bellarmine and Calvin both look asquint this way. :

This desperate assertion whereby kings are made subject
to the censures and deprivations of their subjects follows (as
the authors of it conceive) as a necessary consequence of
that former position of the supposed natural equality and
freedom of mankind, and liberty to choose what form of
government it please.

And though Sir John Heywood, Adam Blackwood, John
Barclay, and some others have learnedly confuted both
Buchanan and Parsons, and bravely vindicated the right of
kings in most points, yet all of them, when they come to
the argument drawn from the natural liberty and equality of
mankind, do with one consent admit it for a truth un-
questionable, not so much as once denying or opposing it,
whereas if they did but confute this first erroneous principle
the whole fabric of this vast engine of popular sedition
would drop down of itself.,

The rebellious consequence which follows this prime
article of the natural freedom of mankind may be my
sufficient warrant for a modest examination of the original
truth of it; much hath been said, and by many, for the
affirmative ; equity requires that an ear be reserved a little
for the negative.

In this discourse I shall give myself these cautions :

First, Lhave nothing to do to meddle with mysteries of
state, such arcana imperiz, or cabinet councils, the vulgar
may not pry into. An implicit faith is given to the meanest
artificer in his own craft ; how much more is it, then, due
to a prince in the profound secrets of government, the
causes and ends of the greatest politic actions and motions.
of state dazzle the eyes and exceed the capacities of all
men, save only those that are hourly versed in the managing
public affairs: yet since the rule for each man to know in
PATRIARCHA., 13

‘what to obey his prince cannot be learnt without a relative
knowledge of those points wherein a sovereign may com-
mand, it is necessary when the commands and pleasures of
superiors come abroad and call for an obedience that every
man himself know how to regulate his actions or his suffer-
ings, for according to the quality of the thing commanded
an active or passive obedience is to be yielded, and this is
not to limit the prince’s power, but the extent of the sub-
ject’s obedience, by giving to Cesar the things that are’
Ceesar’s, &c.

._ Secondly, I am not to question or quarrel at the rights or
liberties of this or any other nation ; my task is chiefly to
inquire from whom these first came, not to dispute what or
how many these are, but whether they were derived from
the laws of natural liberty or from the grace and bounty of
princes. My desire and hope is that the people of England
may and do enjoy as ample privileges as any nation under
heaven ; the greatest liberty in the world (if it be duly con-
sidered) is for a people to live under a monarch. It is the
Magna Charta of this kingdom ; all other shows or pretexts
of liberty are but several degrees of slavery, and a liberty
only to destroy liberty.

If such as maintain the natural liberty of mankind take.
offence at the liberty I take to examine it, they must take
heed that they do not deny by retail that liberty which they
affirm by wholesale. For if the thesis be true, the hypo-
thesis will follow, that all men may examine their own
charters, deeds, or evidences by which they claim and hold
the inheritance or freehold of their liberties.

Thirdly, Y must not detract from the worth of all those
learned men who are of a contrary opinion in the point of
natural liberty. The profoundest scholar that ever was
known hath not been able to search out every truth that is
discoverable ; neither Aristotle in philosophy, nor Hooker
in divinity. They are but men, yet I reverence their
judgments in most points, and confess myself beholding
to their errors too in this ; something that I found amiss in
their opinions guided me in the discovery of that truth
which (I persuade myself) they missed. A dwarf sometimes
may see that which a giant looks over ; for whilst one truth
is curiously searched after, another must necessarily be
14 PATRIARCHA.

neglected. Late writers have taken up too much upon
trust from the subtile schoolmen, who to be sure to thrust
down the king below the pope, thought it the safest course
to advance the people above the king, that so the papal
power might take place of the regal. Thus many~an
ignorant subject hath been fooled into this faith, that a man
may become a martyr for his country by being a traitor to
his prince ; whereas the new coined distinction of subjects
into royalists and patriots is most unnatural, since the
relation between king and people is so great that their
well-being is so reciprocal.

2. To make evident the grounds of -this question about
the natural liberty of mankind, I will lay down some pasy
sages of Cardinal Bellarmine, that may best unfold the state
of this controversy. “Secular or civil power (saith he) is in-
stituted by men; it is in the people, unless they bestow it on
a prince. This power is immediately in the whole multi-
tude, as in the subject of it ; for this power is in the divine
law, but the divine law hath given this power to no particular
man—if the positive law be taken away, there 1s left no
reason why amongst a multitude (who are equal) one rather
than another -should bear rule over the rest. Power is
given by the multitude to one man, or to more by the same
law of nature; for the commonwealth cannot exercise this
power, therefore it is bound to bestow it upon some one
man, or some few. It depends upon the consent of the
multitude to ordain over themselves a king, or consul, or
other magistrates ; and if there be a lawful cause, the multi-
tude may change the kingdom into an aristocracy or demo-
cracy.” Thus far Bellarmine, in which passages are com-
prised the strength of all that ever I have read or heard
produced for the natural liberty of the subject.

Before I examine or refute these doctrines, I must a little
make some observations upon his words.

First, he saith, that by the law of God, power is imme-
diately in the people; hereby he makes God to be the
immediate author of a democratical estate ; for a democracy
is nothing else but the power of the multitude. If this be
true, not only aristocracies but all monarchies are altogether
unlawful, as being ordained (as he thinks) by men, whereas
God himself hath chosen a democracy.
PATRIARCHA. 15

Secondly, he holds, that although a democracy be the
ordinance of God, yet the people have no power to use the
power which God hath given them, but only power to give
away their power ; whereby it followeth, that there can be
no democratical government, because he saith the people
must give their power to one man, or to some few ; which
maketh either a regal or aristocratical estate, which the
multitude is tied to do, even by the same law of nature
which originally gave them the power. And why then doth
he say, the multitude may change the kingdom into a
democracy ?

Thirdly, he concludes, that if there be a lawful cause, the
multitude may change the kingdom. Here I would fain
know who shall judge of this lawful cause? If the multitude
(for I see nobody else can) then this is a pestilent and
dangerous conclusion.

3. I come now to examine that argument which is used by
Bellarmine, and is the one and only argument I can find
produced by my author for the proof of the natural liberty
of the people. It is thus framed: That God hath given or
ordained power, is evident by Scripture ; but God hath given
it to no particular person, because by nature all men are
equal; therefore he hath given power to the people or
multitude.

To answer this reason, drawn from the equality of man-
kind by nature, I will first use the help of Bellarmine him-
self, whose very words are these: “If many men had been
together created out of the earth, they all ought to have been
princes over their posterity.”, In these words we have an
evident confession, that creation made man prince of his
posterity. And indeed not only Adam, but the succeeding
patriarchs had, by right of fatherhood, royal authority over
their children. Nor dares Bellarmine deny this also. That
the patriarchs (saith he) were endowed with kingly power,
their deeds do testify ; for as Adam was lord of his children,
so his children under him hada command and power over
‘their own children ; but still with subordination to the first
parent, who is lord-paramount over his children’s children to
all generations, as being the grandfather of his people.

4. I see not then how the children of Adam, or of any
man else, can be free from subjection to their parents. And
16 PATRIARCHA.

this subjection of children being the fountain of all regal
authority, by the ordination of God himself ; it follows, that
civil power, not only in general is by divine institution, but
even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents,
which quite takes away that new and common distinction
which refers only power universal and absolute to God, but
power respective in regard of the special form of government
to the choice of the people.

This lordship which Adam by command had over the
whole world, and by right descending from him the patriarchs
did enjoy, was as large and ample as the absolutest do-
minion of any monarch which hath been since the creation,
For dominion of life and death we find that Judah, the
father, pronounced sentence of death against Thamar, his
daughter-in-law, for playing the harlot. “Bring her forth
(saith he), that she may be burnt.” Touching war, we see
that Abraham commanded an army of 318 soldiers of his
own family. And Esau met his brother Jacob with 400 men
at arms. For matter of peace, Abraham made a league with
Abimelech, and ratified the articles with an oath. These

‘acts of judging in capital crimes, of making war, and con-
cluding peace, are the chiefest marks of sovereignty that are
found in any monarch. St hides Ihe

5. Not only until the Flood, but after it, this patriarchal
power did continue, as the very name patriarch doth in part
prove. The three. sons of Noah had the whole world di-
vided amongst them by their father; for of them was the
whole world overspread, according to the benediction given
to him and his sons: “ Be fruitful and multiply, and re-
plenish the earth.” Most of the civilest nations of the earth
labour to fetch their original from some one of the sons or
nephews of Noah, which were scattered abroad after the
confusion of Babel. In this dispersion we must certainly
find the establishment of regal power throughout the king-
doms of the world.

Tt is a common opinion that at the confusion of tongues
there were seventy-two distinct nations erected, all which were
not confused multitudes, without heads or governors, and at
liberty to choose what governors or government they pleased,
but they were distinct families, which had fathers for rulers
over them, whereby it appears that even in the confusion God
PATRIARCHA. iq

was careful to preserve the fatherly authority by distributing
the diversity of languages according to the diversity of
families, for so plainly it appears by the text. First, after the
enumeration of the sons of Japhet, the conclusion is, “ By
these were the isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands,
every one after his tongue, after their families, in their
nations.” So it is said: “These are the sons of Ham after
their families, after their tongues, in their countries, and in
their nations.” The like we read : “These are the sons of
Shem after their families, after their tongues, in their lands,
after their nations. These are the families of the sons of
Noah after their generations in their nations, and by these
were these nations divided in the earth after the Flood.”

In this division of the world, some are of opinion that Noah
used lots for the distribution of it; others affirm he sailed
about the Mediterranean Sea in ten years, and as he went
about, appointed to each son his part, and so made the
division of the then known world into Asia, Africa, and
Europe, according to the number of his sons, the limits of
which three parts are all found in that Midland Sea.

6. But howsoever the manner of this division be uncertain,
yet it is most certain the division itself was by families from
Noah and his children, over which the parents were heads
and princes.

Amongst these was Nimrod, who no doubt (as Sir Walter
Raleigh affirms) was by good right lord or king over his
family ; yet against right did he enlarge his empire by seizing
violently on the rights of other lords of families ; and in this
sense he may be said to be the author and first founder of
monarchy. And all those that do attribute unto him the
original regal power do hold he got it by tyranny or usurpa-
tion, and not by any due election of the people or multitude,
or by any faction with them.

As this patriarchal power continued in Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob, even until the Egyptian bondage, so we find it
amongst the sons of Ishmael and Esau. It is said, ‘‘ These
are the sons of Ishmael, and these are their names by their
castles and towns, twelve princes of their tribes and families.
And these are the names of the dukes that came of Esau,
according to their families and their places by their nations.”

7. Some, perhaps, may think that these princts and dukes
38 PATRIARCHA.

of families were but some petty lords under some greater
kings, because the number of them are so many that their
particular territories could be but small, and not worthy the
title of kingdoms ; but they must consider that at first kings
had no such large dominions as they have nowadays. We
find in the time of Abraham, which was about 300 years after
the Flood, that in a little corner of Asia nine kings at once
met in battle, most of which were but kings of cities apiece,
with the adjacent territories, as of Sodom, Gomortha,
Shinar, &c. In the same chapter is mention of Melchise-
dek, king of Salem, which was but the city of Jerusalem.
And in the catalogue of the Kings of Edom, the names of
each king’s city is recorded, as the only mark to distinguish
their dominions. In the land of Canaan, which was but a
‘small circuit, Joshua destroyed thirty-one kings, and about
the same time Adonibesek had seventy kings whose hands
and toes he had-cut off, and made them feed under his table.*
A few years after this, thirty-two kings came to Benhadad,
king of Syria, and about seventy kings of Greece. went to the
Wars of Troy. Czsar found more kings in France than
there be now princes there, and at his sailing over into this
island he found four kings in our county of Kent. These
heaps of kings in each nation are an argument their
territories were but small, and strongly confirms our assertion
that erection of kingdoms came at first only by distinction
of families.

By manifest footsteps we may trace this paternal govern-
ment unto the Israelites coming into Egypt, where the
exercise of supreme patriarchal jurisdiction was intermitted,
because they were in subjection to a stronger prince. After
the return of these Israelites out of bondage, God, out of a
special care of them, chose Moses and Joshua successively to
govern as princes in the place and stead of the supreme
fathers; and after them likewise for a time He raised up
Judges to defend His people in time of peril. But when God
gave the Israelites kings, He re-established the ancient and
prime right of lineal succession to paternal government.
And whensoever He made choice of any special person to
be king, He intended that the issue also should have benefit
thereof, as being comprehended sufficiently in the person

* I Kings xx, 16.
PATRIARCHA. 419

of the father, although the father only was named in the
grant.

8. It may seem absurd to maintain that kings now are
the fathers of their people, since experience shows the con-
trary. It is true, all kings be not the natural parents of
their subjects, yet they all either are, or are to be reputed,
the next heirs to those first progenitors who were at first
the natural parents of the whole people, and in their right
succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction ; and such
‘heirs are not only lords of their own children, but also of
their brethren, and all others that were subject to their
fathers. And therefore we find that God told Cain of his
brother Abel, ‘“ His desires shall be subject unto thee, and
thou shalt rule over him.” Accordingly, when Jacob bought
his brother’s birthright, Isaac blessed him thus: “ Be lord
a ae brethren, and let the sons of thy mother bow before

ee.”

As long as the first fathers of families lived, the name of
patriarchs did aptly. belong unto them; but after a few
‘descents, when the true fatherhood itself was extinct, and
only the right of the father descends to the true heir, then
the title of prince or king was more significant, to express
the power of him who succeeds only to the right of that
fatherhood which his ancestors did naturally enjoy. By
this means it comes to pass, that many a child, by succeed-
ing a king, hath the right of a father over many a grey-
headed multitude, and hath the title of Pater Patric.

g. It may be demanded what becomes of the right of
fatherhood in case the Crown does escheat for want of an
heir, whether doth it not then devolve to the people?
The answer is: It is but the negligence or ignorance of the
people to lose the knowledge of the true heir, for an heir
there always is. If Adam himself were still living, and now
ready to.die, it is certain that there is one man, and but one
in the world, who is next heir, although the knowledge who
should be that one man be quite lost. :

_ (2.) This ignorance of the people being admitted, it doth
not by any means follow that, for want of heirs, the supreme
power is devolved to the multitude, and that they have
power to rule and choose what rulers they please. No; the

* Gen. xxvii. 29.
26 PATRIARCHA,

kingly power escheats in such cases to the princes and inde-
pendent heads of families, for every kingdom is resolved
into those parts whereof at first it was made. By the uniting
of great families or petty kingdoms, we find the greater
monarchies were at the first erected ; and into such again, as
into their first matter, many times they return again. And
because the dependency of ancient families is oft obscure or
worn out of knowledge, therefore the wisdom of all or most
princes have thought fit to adopt many times those for heads
of families and princes of provinces whose merits, abilities,
or fortunes have ennobled them, or made them fit and capable
of such regal favours. All such prime heads and fathers
have power to consent in the uniting or conferring of their
fatherly right of sovereign authority on whom they please ;
and he that is so elected claims not his power as a donative
from the people, but as being substituted properly by God,
from whom he receives his royal charter of an universal father,
though testified by the ministry of the heads of the people.

Ifit please God, for the correction of the prince or pun-
ishment of the people, to suffer princes to be removed and
others to be placed in their rooms, either by the factions of
the nobility or rebellion of the people, in all such cases the
judgment of God, who hath power to give and to take away
kingdoms, is most just; yet the ministry of men who execute
God's judgments without commission is sinful and damnable.
God doth but use and turn men’s unrighteous acts to the
performance of His righteous decrees. __

10. In all kingdoms or commonwealths in the world,
whether the prince be the supreme father of the people or
but the true heir of such a father, or whether he come to the
Crown by usurpation, or by election of the nobles or of the
| people, or by any other way whatsoever, or whether some -
few or a multitude govern the commonwealth, yet still the
authority that is in any one, or in many, or in all these, is
the only right and natural authority of a supreme father.
There is, and always shall be continued to the end of the
world, a natural right of a supreme father over every multi-
tude, although, by the secret will of God, many at first do
most unjustly obtain the exercise of it.

To confirm this natural right of regal power, we find in
the Decalogue that the law which enjoins obedience to
PATRIARCHA., 2!

kings is delivered in the terms of “ Honour thy father,” as
if all power were originally in the father. If obedience to
parents be immediately due by a natural law, and subjection
to princes but by the mediation of a human ordinance,
what reason is there that the laws of nature should give
place to the laws of men, as we see the power of the father
over his child gives place and is subordinate to the power
of the magistrate ? 3

If we compare the natural rights of a father with those of
a king, we find them all one, without any difference at all
but only in the latitude or extent of them: as the father
over one family, so the king, as father over many families,
extends his care to preserve, feed, clothe, instruct, and defend
the whole commonwealth. His war, his peace, his courts of
justice, and all his acts of sovereignty, tend only to preserve
and distribute to every subordinate and inferior father, and
to their children, their rights and privileges, so that all the
duties of a king are summed up in an universal fatherly care
of his people. S

CHAPTER II.
It is unnatural for the People to govern or choose Governors.

1. By conferring these proofs and reasons, drawn from
the authority of the Scripture, it appears little less than a
paradox which Bellarmine and others affirm of the freedom
of the multitude, to choose what rulers they please. —

Had the patriarchs their power given them by their own
children? Bellarmine does not say it, but the contrary.
If then, the fatherhood enjoyed this authority for so many
ages by the law of nature, when was it lost, or when for-
feited, or how is it devolved to the liberty of the multitude?

Because the Scripture is not favourable to the liberty of
the people, therefore many fly to natural reason, and to the
authority of Aristotle. I must crave liberty to examine
or explain the opinion of this great philosopher ;_ but
briefly, I find this sentence in the third of his “ Politics,”

i 1
22 PATRIARCHA,

cap. 16: Soxel dé row ofdé ard piow elva rd Kiftov eva
mdvrav evar rév rodtrev, Grov ouvéornxer && dpoiwy 4 mdds.
It seems to some not to be natural for one man to be lord
of all the citizens, since a city consists of equals. D.
Lambine, in his Latin interpretation of this text, hath
‘omitted the translation of this word [row] by this means
he maketh that to be the opinion of Aristotle, which
Aristotle allegeth to be the opinion but of some. This _
negligence, or wilful escape of Lambine, in not translating
a word so material, hath been an occasion to deceive
many, who, looking no further than this Latin translation,
have concluded, and made the world now of late believe,
that Aristotle here maintains a natural equality of men;
and not only our English translator of Aristotle’s “ Politics”
is, in this place, misled by following Lambine, but even
the learned Monsieur Duvall, in his “ Synopsis,” bears them
company; and yet this version of Lambine’s is esteemed
the best, and printed at Paris, with Causabon’s correctéd
Greek copy, though in the rendering of this place ‘the
elder translations have been more faithful; and he that
shall compare the Greek text with the Latin shall find that
Causabon had just cause in his preface to Aristotle’s works
to complain that the best translations of Aristotle did need
correction. To prove that in these words, which seem to
favour the equality of mankind, Aristotle doth not speak
according to his own judgment, but recites only the opinion
of others, we find him clearly deliver his own opinion, that
the power of government did originally arise from the
right of fatherhood, which cannot possibly consist with that
natural equality which men dream of ; for, in the first of his
“ Politics” he agrees exactly with the Scripture, and lays this
foundation of government. “The first society (saith he),
made of many houses is a village, which seems most
naturally to be a colony of families or foster-brethren of
children and children’s children. And, therefore, at the
beginning, cities were under the government of kings, for
the eldest in every house is king. And so for kindred sake
it is in colonies. And in the fourth of his “ Politics,” cap. 2,
he gives the title of the first and divinest sort of govern-
ment to the institution of kings, by defining tyranny to be
a digression from the first and divinest.
= PATRIARCHA. 23

. Whosoever weighs advisedly these passages will find
little hope of natural reason in Aristotle to prove the:
natural liberty of the multitude. Also before him the
divine Plato concludes a commonweal to be nothing else
but a large family. I know for this position Aristotle
quarrels with his master, but most unjustly; for therein
he contradicts his own principles, for they both agree to
fetch the original of civil government from the prime
government. No doubt but Moses’s history of the
creation guided these two philosophers in finding out of |
this lineal subjection deduced from the laws of the first*
parents, according to that rule of St. Chrysostom, ‘God
made all mankind of one man, that he might teach the
world to be governed by a king, and not by a multitude.”

The ignorance of the creation occasioned several errors
amongst the heathen philosophers. Polybius, though other-
wise a most profound philosopher and judicious historian,
.yet here he stumbles; for in searching out the original of
civil societies, he conceited that multitudes of men after a
deluge, a famine, or a pestilence, met together like herds of
cattle without any dependency, until the strongest bodies
and boldest minds got the mastery of their fellows; “even
as it is (saith he) among bulls, bears, and cocks.”

And Aristotle himself, forgetting his first doctrine, tells
us the first heroical kings were chosen by the people for

‘their deserving well of the multitude, either by teaching

them some new arts, or by warring for them, or by gathering
them together, or by dividing land amongst them; also
Aristotle had another fancy, that those men who prove wise
of mind, were by nature intended to be lords and govern ;
and those which were strong of body were ordained to obey,
and to be servants. But this is a dangerous and uncertain
rule, and not without some folly; for if a man prove both
wise and strong, what will Aristotle have done with him? as
he was wise, he could: be no servant, and as he had strength,
he could not be a master; besides, to speak like a philo-
sopher, Nature intends all things to be perfect both in wit
and strength. The folly or imbecility proceeds from some -
error in generation or education ; for Nature aims at perfec-
tion in all her works. .

2. Suarez, the Jesuit, riseth up against the royal authority
24 PATRIA RCHA.

of Adam, in defence of. the freedom and liberty of the people,
and thus argues :—“ By right of creation (saith he) Adam
had only economical power, but not political. He had a
power over his wife, and a fatherly power over his sons,
whilst they were not made free. He might also, in process
of time, have servants and a complete family, and in that
family he might have complete economical power, But
after that families began to be multiplied, and men to be
separated and become the heads of several families, they
had the same power over their families. But political power
did not begin until families began to be gathered together
into one perfect community ; wherefore, as the community
did not begin by the creation of Adam, nor by his will
alone, but of all them which did agree in this community,
sO we cannot say that Adam naturally had political primacy
in that community ; for that cannot be gathered by any
natural principles, because by the force of the law of Nature
alone it is not due unto any progenitor to be also king of
his posterity. And if this be not gathered out of the prin-
ciples of Nature, we cannot say, God by a special gift or
providence gave him this power, for there is no revelation
of this, nor testimony of Scripture.” Hitherto Suarez.
Whereas he makes Adam to have a fatherly power over
his sons, and yet shuts up this power within one family, he
seems either to imagine that all Adam’s children lived within
one house and under one roof with their father, or else, as
soon as any of his children lived out of his house they ceased
to be subject, and did thereby become free. For my part
I cannot believe that Adam (although he were sole monarch
of the world) had any such spacious palace as might contain
any such considerable part of his children. It is likelier
that some mean cottage or tent did serve him to keep his
court in. It were hard he should lose part of his authority
because his children lay not within the walls of his house.
But if Suarez will allow all Adam’s children to be of his
family, howsoever they were separate in dwellings, if their
habitations were either contiguous or at such distance as
might easily receive his fatherly commands; and that all
that were under his commands were of his family, although
they had many children or servants married, having them-
selves also children, then I see no reason but that we
PATRIARCHA, — 25

may call Adam’s family a commonwealth, except we will
wrangle about words, for Adam, living 930 years, and seeing
seven or eight descents from himself, he might live to com-
mand of his children and their posterity a multitude far
bigger than many commonwealths and kingdoms.

3. I know the politicians and civil lawyers do not agree
well about the definition of a family, and Bodin doth seem
in one place to confine it to a house; yet in his definition
he doth enlarge his meaning to all persons under the obe-
dience of one and the same head of the family, and he
approves better of the propriety of the Hebrew word for
a family, which is derived from a word that signifies a
head, a prince, or lord, than the Greek word for a
family, which is derived from ofkots, which signifies a
house. Nor doth Aristotle confine a family to one house,
but esteems it to be made of those that daily converse
together ; whereas, before him, Charondas called a family
homosypioi, those that feed together out of one common
pannier. And Epimenides the Cretian terms a family
homocapnoi, those that sit by a common fire or smoke. But
let Suarez understand what he please by Adam’s family, if
he will but confess, as he needs must, that Adam and the
patriarchs had absolute power of life and death, of peace
and war, and the like, within their houses or families, he
TMaust give us leave, at least, to call them kings of their
houses or families ; and if they be so by the law of Nature,
‘what liberty will be left to their children to dispose of ?

Aristotle gives the lie to Plato, and those that say
political and economical societies are all one, and do not
differ specie, but only mudtitudine and faucitate, as if there
were no difference betwixt a great house and a little city.
All the argument I find he brings against them is this :

The community of man and wife differs from the commu-
nity of master and servant, because they have several ends.
The intention of Nature, by conjunction of male and female,
is generation ; but the scope of master and servant is pre-
servation, so that a wife and a servant are by Nature dis-
tinguished, because Nature does not work like the cutlers
of Delphos, for she makes but one thing for one use. If
we allow this argument to be sound, nothing doth follow
but only this: That conjugal and despotic communities do

.
26 PATRIARCHA.,

differ. But it is no consequence that therefore. economical
and political societies do the like ; for though it prove a
family to consist of two distinct communities, yet: it follows
not that a family and a commonwealth are distinct, because;
as well in the commonweal as in the families, both these
communities are found.*

And as this argument comes not home to our point, so it
is not able to prove that title which it shows for; for if it
should be granted (which yet is false) that generation and
preservation differ about the zxdividuum, yet they agree in
the general, and serve both for the conservation of man-
kind ; even as several servants differ in the particular ends
or offices, as one to brew and another to bake, yet they
agree in the general preservation of the family. Besides,
Aristotle confesses, that amongst the barbarians (as he
calls all them that are not Grecians) a wife and a servant
are the same, because by Nature no barbarian is fit to
govern. It is fit the Grecians should rule over the barba-
rians ; for by Nature a servant and a barbarian is all one.
Their family consists only of an ox for a man-servant and a
wife for a maid ; so-they are fit only to rule their wives and
their beasts. Lastly, Aristotle (if it had pleased him) might
have remembered that Nature doth not always make one
thing but for one use. He knows the tongue serves both
to speak and to taste.

4. But to leave Aristotle and return to Suarez ; he saith
that Adam had fatherly power over his sons whilst they
were not made free. Here I could wish that the Jesuit had
taught us how and when sons become free; I know no
means by the law of Nature. It is the favour, I think, of
the parents only, who when their children are of age and
discretion to ease their parents of part of their fatherly care,
are then content to remit some part of their fatherly autho-
rity ; therefore the custom of some countries doth in some
cases enfranchize the children of inferior parents, but many
nations have no such custom, but, on the contrary, have
strict laws for the obedience of children. The judicial law
of Moses giveth full power to the father to stone his dis-
obedient son so it be done in presence of a magistrate, and
yet it did not belong to the magistrate to mquire and

* Aristotle, “ Politics,” lib. i. cap. 2.
PATRIARCHA, 29

examine the justness of the cause, but it was so decreed lest
the father should in his anger suddenly or secretly kill his son.

Also by the laws of the Persians and of the people of the
Upper Asia, and of the Gauls, and by the laws of the West
Indies, the parents have power of life and death over their
children,

The Romans, even in their most popular estate, had this
law in force, and this power of parents was ratified and
amplified by the laws of the Twelve Tables, to the enabling
of parents to sell their children two or three times over.
By the help of the fatherly power Rome long flourished,
and oftentimes was freed from great dangers. The fathers
have drawn out of the very assemblies their own sons when,
being tribunes, they have published laws tending to sedition.

Memorable is the example of Cassius, who threw his son
headlong out of the Consistory, publishing the law Agraria,
for the division of lands, in the behoof of the people, and
afterwards, by his own private judgment, put him to death
by throwing him down from the Tarpeian Rock, the magis-
trates and people standing thereat amazed, and not daring
to resist his fatherly authority, although they would with all
their hearts have had that Jaw for the division of land, by
which it appears it was lawful for the father to dispose of
the life of his child contrary to the will of the magistrates
_ or people. The-Romans also had a law that what the
children got was not their own, but their father’s, although
Solon made a law which acquitted the son from nourishing
of his father if his father had taught him no trade whereby
to get his living.

Suarez proceeds, and tells us that in process of time
Adam had complete economical power. I know not what
this complete economical power is, nor how or what it doth
really and essentially differ from political. If Adam did or
might exercise the same jurisdiction which a king doth now
in 4 commonwealth, then the kinds of power are not dis-
_ tinct, and though they may receive an accidental difference

by the amplitude or extent of the bounds of the one beyond
the other, yet’since the like difference is also found in
political estates, it follows that economical and political
_ power-differ no otherwise than a little commonweal differs
from a great one. Next, saith Suarez, community did not
28 PATRIARCHA,

begin at the creation of Adam. It is true, because he had
nobody to communicate with ; yet community did presently
follow his creation, and that by his will alone, for it was in
his power only (who was lord of all) to appoint what his
sons should have in proper.and what in common; so that
propriety and community of goods did follow originally
from him, and it is the duty of a father to provide as well
for the common good of his children as the particular.

Lastly, Suarez concludes that by the law of Nature alone
it is not due unto any progenitor to be also king of his pos-
terity. This assertion is confuted point-blank by Bellarmine,
who expressly affirmeth that the first parents ought to have
been princes of their posterity. And until Suarez bring
some reason for what he saith, I shall trust more to
Bellarmine’s proofs than to his denials.

5. But let us condescend a while: to the opinion of
Bellarmine and Suarez, and all those who place supreme
power in the whole people, and ask them if their meaning
be that there is but one and the same power in all the
people of the world, so that no power can be granted except
all the men upon the earth meet and agree to choose
a governor.

An answer is here given by Suarez, that it is scarce
possible nor yet expedient that all men in the world should
be gathered together into one community. It is likelier that
either never, or for a very short time, that this power was in-
this manner in the whole multitude of men collected, but
a little after the creation men began to be divided into
several commonwealths, and this distinct power was in each
of them. <

This answer of scarce possible nor yet expedient: It is
likelier begets a new doubt how this distinct power comes
to each particular community when God gave it to the
whole multitude only, and not to any particular assembly of
men. Can they show or prove that ever the whole mul-
titude met and divided this power which God gave them in
gross by breaking into parcels and by appointing a distinct
power to each several commonwealth? Without such a
compact I cannot see (according to their own principles)
how there can be any election of a magistrate by any com-
monwealth, but by a mere usurpation upon the privilege of
PATRIARCHA, 29

the whole world. If any think that particular multitudes at
their own discretion had power to divide themselves into
several commonwealths, those that think so have neither
reason nor proof for so thinking, and thereby a gap is
opened for every petty factious multitude to raise a new
commonwealth, and to make more commonweals than there
be families in the world. But let this also be yielded them,
that in each particular commonwealth there is a distinct
power in the multitude. Was a general meeting of a whole
kingdom ever known for the election of a prince? Is there
any example of it ever found in the whole world? To
conceit such a thing is to imagine little less than an im-
possibility, and so by consequence no one form of govern-
ment or king was ever established according to this supposed
law of Nature. ,

6. It may be answered by some, that if either the
greatest part of a kingdom, or if a smaller part only by
themselves, and all the rest by proxy; or if the part not
concurring in election, do after, by a tacit assent, ratify the
act of others, that in all these cases, it may be said to be
the work of the whole multitude.

As to the acts of the major part of a multitude, it is true,
that by politic human constitutions, it is oft ordained
that the voices of the most shall overrule the rest; and
such ordinances bind, because where men are assembled by
a human power, that power that doth assemble them can
also limit and direct the manner of the execution of that
power, and by such derivative power, made known by law
or custom, either the greater part, or two thirds, or three
parts of five, or thelike, have power to oversway the liberty
of their opposites. But in assemblies that take their
‘authority from the law of Nature, it cannot be so ; for what
freedom or liberty is due to any man by the law of Nature,
no inferior power can alter, limit or diminish ; no one man,
nor a multitude, can give away the natural right of another.
The law of Nature is unchangeable, and howsoever one man
may hinder another in the use or exercise of his natural
right, yet thereby no man loseth the right of itself; for the
right and the use of the right may be distinguished, as
right and possession are oft distinct. Therefore, unless it
can be proved by the law of Nature that the major, or some
30 PATRIARCHA,

other part, have power to overrule the rest of the multitude,
it must follow that the acts of multitudes not entire, are not
binding to all, but only to such as consent unto them.

7. As to the point of proxy; it cannot be showed or
proved that all those that have been absent from popular
elections, did ever give their voices to some of their fellows.
I ask but one example out of the history of the whole
world : let the commonweal be but named wherever the
multitude, or so much as the greatest part of it consented,
either by voice or by procuration, to the election of a
prince. The ambition sometimes of one man, sometimes
of many, or the faction of a city or citizens, or the mutiny
of an army, hath set up or put down princes ; but they have
never tarried for this pretended order by proceeding of the
whole multitude.

Lastly, if the silent acceptation of a governor by part of
the people be an argument of their concurring in the
election of him, by the same reason the tacit assent of the
whole commonwealth may be maintained ; from whence it
follows that every prince that comes to a crown, either by
succession, conquest, or usurpation, may be said to be
elected by the people, which inference is too ridiculous ; for
in such cases the people are so far from the liberty of
specification that they want even that of contradiction.

8. But it is in vain to argue against the liberty of the
people in the election of kings, as long as men are
persuaded that examples of it are to be found in Scripture.
It is fit, therefore, to discover the grounds of this error. It
is plain by an evident text, that it is one thing to choose a
king, and another thing to set up a king over the people;
this latter power the children of Israel had, but not the
former. This distinction is found most evident in Deut.
xvil. 15, where the law of God saith: “ Him shalt thou set
: king over thee, whom the Lord shall choose ;” so God must
eligere, and the people only do comstituere Mr." Hooker,
in his Eighth Book. of Ecclesiastical Policy, clearly expounds
this distinction ; the words are worthy the citing: “Heaps
of Scripture (saith he) are alleged concerning the solemn
coronation or inauguration of Saul, David, Solomon, and
others, by nobles, ancients, and the people of the common-
wealth of Israel; as if these solemnities were a kind of
PATRIARCHA, 31

deed, whereby the right of dominion is given, which strange,
untrue, and unnatural conceits are set abroad by seedmen
of rebellion, only to animate unquiet spirits, and to feed
them with possibilities of aspiring unto the thrones, if they
can win the hearts of the people, whatsoever hereditary
title any other before them may have. I say these unjust
and insolent positions I would not mention were it not
thereby to make the countenance of truth more orient. For
unless we will openly proclaim defiance unto all law, equity,
and reason, we must (for there is no other remedy) ac-
knowledge that in kingdoms hereditary, birthright giveth
right unto sovereign dominion, and the death of the pre-
decessor putteth the successor by blood in seisin. Those
public solemnities beforementioned do either serve for an
open testification of the inheritor’s right, or belong to the
form of inducing of him into possession of that thing
he hath right unto.” This is Mr. Hooker’s judgment of the
Israelites’ power to set a king over themselves. No doubt
but if the people of Israel had had power to choose their
king, they would never have made choice of Joas, a child
but of seven years old, nor of Manasses, a boy of twelve ;
since (as Solomon saith) ‘Woe to the land whose king is a
child.” Nor is it probable they would have elected Josias,
but a very child, and a son to so wicked and idolatrous a
father, as that his own servants murdered him ; and yet all
the people set up this young Josias, and slew the con-
spirators of the death of Ammon his father, which justice of
the people God rewarded by making this Josias: the most
religious king that ever that nation enjoyed.

g. Because it is affirmed that the people have power to
choose as well what form of government as what governors
they please ; of which mind is Bellarmine in those places
we cited at first. Therefore it is necessary to examine the
strength of what is said in defence of popular common-
weals against this natural form of kingdoms which I main-
tained. HereI must first put the Cardinal in mind of what
he affirms in cold blood in other places, where he saith:
“‘God, when He made all mankind of one man, did seem
openly to signify that He rather approved the government
of one man than of many.” Again, God showed His
opinion when he endued, not only men, but all creatures
32 PATRIARCHA.

with a natural propensity to monarchy ; neither can it be
-doubted but a natural propensity is to be referred to God,
who is author of Nature. And again, in a third place,
what form of government God confirmed by His authority
may be gathered by that commonweal which He instituted
amongst the Hebrews, which was not aristocratical (as
Calvin saith) but plainly monarchical. ~ .

10. Now, if God (as Bellarmine saith) hath taught us by
natural instinct, signified to us by the creation, and con-
firmed by His own example, the excellency of monarchy,
why should Bellarmine or we doubt but that it is natural?
Do we not find that in every family the government of one
alone is most natural? God did always govern His own
people by monarchy only. The patriarchs, dukes, judges,
and kings were all monarchs. There is not in all the
Scripture mention or approbation of any other form of
government. At the time when Scripture saith: ‘‘ There
was no king in Israel, but that every man did that which
was right in his own eyes ;” even then, the Israelites were
under the kingly government of the fathers of particular
families ; for, in the consultation after the Benjamitical war,
for providing wives for the Benjamites, we find the elders
of the congregation bear only sway. Judges xxi. 16. To
them also were complaints to be made, as appears by verse
22. And though mention be made of all the children of
Israel, all the congregation, and all the people, yet by the
term of all the Scripture means only all the fathers, and not
all the whole multitude, as the text plainly expounds itself
in 2 Chron. i. 2, where Solomon speaks unto all Israel, to
the captains, the judges, and to every governor, the chief of
the fathers; so the elders of Israel are expounded to be
the chief of the fathers of the children of Israel. 1 Kings
vill. 12 ; 2 Chron. v. 2.

At that time also, when the people of Israel begged a
king of Samuel, they were governed by kingly power. God,
out of a special love and care to the house of Israel, did
choose to be their King Himself, and did govern them at
that time by His Viceroy Samuel and his sons, and there-
fore God tells Samuel: “They have not rejected thee but
Me, that I should not reign over them.” It seems they did
not like a king by deputation, but desired one by success-
PATRIARCHA. 33

sion like all the nations. All nations belike had kings then,
and those by inheritance, not by election; for we do not
find the Israelites prayed that they themselves might choose
their own king ; they dream of no such liberty, and yet
they were the elders of Israel gathered together. If other
nations had elected their own kings, no doubt but they
would have been as desirous to have imitated other nations
as well in the electing as in the having of a king.

Aristotle, in his book of ‘ Politics,” when he comes to com-
pare the several kinds of government, he is very reserved in
discoursing what form he thinks best : he disputes subtilely

_ to and fro of many points, and judiciously of many errors,
but concludes nothing himself. In all those books I find
little commendation of monarchy. It was his hap to live
in those times when the Grecians abounded with several
commonwealths, who had then learning enough to make
them seditious. Yet, in his “Ethics,” he hath so much good
manners as to confess in right down words that ‘ monarchy
is the best form of government, and a popular esiate the
worst.” And though he be not so free in his politics, yet
the necessity of truth hath here and there extorted from
him that which amounts no less to the dignity of monarchy;
he confesseth it to be, first, the natural, and the divinest
form of government ; and that the gods themselves did live
under a monarchy. What can a heathen say more?

Indeed, the world for a long time knew no other sort of

. government, but only monarchy. The best order, the

_.., greatest strength, the most stability, and easiest government

are to be found all in monarchy, and in no other form of
government. The new platforms of commonweals were
first hatched in a corner of the world, amongst a few cities
of Greece, which have been imitated by very few other
places. Those very cities were first, for many years,
governed by kings, until wantonness, ambition, or faction of
the people, made hem attempt new kinds of regimen ;
all which mutations proved most bloody and miserable to
the authors of them ; happy in nothing but that they con-
tinued but a small time.

11. A little to manifest the imperfection of popular
government, let us but examine the most flourishing

democracy that the world hath ever known ; I mean that of
: B
34 PATRIARCHA.

Rome. First, for the durability ;. at the most, it lasted but
480 years (for so long it was from the expulsion of Tarquin
to Julius’ Cesar). Whereas both the Assyrian monarchy
lasted, without interruption, at the least twelve hundred
years, and the Empire of the East continued 1,495 years.

(2.) For the order of it, during these 480 years, there was
not any one settled form of government in Rome ; for after
they had once lost the natural power of kings, they. could
not find upon what form of government to rest: their
fickleness is an evidence that they found things amiss in
every change. At the first they chose two annual consuls
instead of kings. Secondly, those did not please them long
but they must have tribunes of the people to defend their
liberty. Thirdly, they leave tribunes and consuls, and
choose them ten men to make them laws. Fourthly, they
call for consuls and tribunes again, sometimes they- choose
dictators, which were temporary kings, and sometimes
military tribunes, who had consular power. All these
shiftings caused such notable alteration in the government,
as it passeth historians to find out any perfect form of regi-
men. in so much confusion; one while the Senate made
laws, another while the people. The dissensions which
were daily between the Nobles and the Commons bred
those memorable seditions about usury, about marriages,
and about magistracy. Also the Grecian, the Apulian, and
the Drusian seditions filled the market-places, the temples, |
‘and the Capitol itself, with blood of the citizens ; the Social
War was plainly civil; the wars of the slaves, and the other
of the fencers; the civil wars of Marius and Sylla, of
Cataline, of Czesar, and Pompey the Triumvirate, of Augus-
tus, Lepidus, and Antonius ; all these shed an ocean of
blood within Italy and the streets of Rome.

Thirdly, for their government, let it be allowed that for
some part of this time it was popular, yet it was popular as
to the city of Rome only, and not as to the dominions, or
whole empire of Rome; for no democracy can extend
further than to one city. It is impossible to govern a
kingdom, much less many kingdoms, by the whole people,
or by the greatest part of them.

_ 12, But you will say, yet the Roman empire grew all up
under this kind of popular government, and the city became
PATRIARCHA. 35

mistress of the world. It is not so; for Rome began her
empire under kings, and did perfect it under emperors ; it
did only increase under that popularity: her greatest exal-
tation was under ‘Trajan, as her longest peace had been
under Augustus. Even at those times when the Roman
victories abroad did amaze the world, then the tragical
slaughter of citizens at home deserved commiseration from
their vanquished enemies. What though in that age of her
popularity she bred many admired captains and command-
ers (each of which was able to lead an army, though many
of them were but ill requited by the people) yet all of
them were not able to support her in times of danger ; but
she was forced in her greatest troubles to create a dictator
(who was a king for a time) thereby giving this honourable
testimony of monarchy, that the last refuge in perils of
States is to fly to regal authority. And though Rome’s
popular estate for a while was miraculously upheld in glory
by a greater prudence than her own, yet in a short time,
‘ after manifold alterations, she was ruined by her own hands.
“Suis et ipsa Roma viribus ruit:” for the arms she had
prepared to conquer other nations were turned upon herself,
and civil contentions at last settled the government again
into a monarchy. —

13. The vulgar opinion is, that the first cause why the
democratical government was brought in was to curb the
tyranny of monarchies. But the falsehood of this doth best
appear by the first flourishing popular Estate of Athens,
which was founded, not because of the vices of their last
king, but that his virtuous deserts were such as the people
thought no man worthy enough to succeed him ; a pretty
wanton quarrel to monarchy! For when their king Codrus
understood by the oracle that his country could not be
saved unless the king were slain in the battle, he in
disguise entered his enemy’s camp, and provoked a common
soldier to make him a sacrifice for his own kingdom, and
with his death ended the royal government ; for after him
was never any more kings of Athens. As Athens thus
for love of her Codrus changed the government, so Rome,
on the contrary, out of hatred to her Tarquin, did the like.
And though these two famous commonweals did for con-
trary-causes abolish monarchy, yet they both See in this,

2
36 PATRIARCHA.,

that neither of them thought it fit to change their State into
a democracy : but the one chose archontes, and the other
consuls to be their governors ; both which did most resem-
ble kings, and continued until the people, by lessening the
authority of these their magistrates, did by degrees and
stealth bring in their popular government. And I verily
believe never any democratical State showed itself at first
fairly to the world by any elective entrance, but they all
secretly crept in by the back-door of sedition and faction.

14. If we will listen to the judgment of those who should

best know the nature of popular government, we shall find
no reason for good men to desire or choose it. Xenophon, '
that brave scholar and soldier, disallowed the Athenian
commonweal, for that they followed that form of government
wherein the wicked are always in greatest credit, and virtuous
men kept under. They expelled Aristides the Just; Themi-
stocles died in banishment; Miltiades in prison; Phocion,
the most virtuous and just man of his age, though he had
-been chosen forty-five times to be their general, yet he was
put to death with all his friends, kindred, and servants, by
the fury of the people, without sentence, accusation, or any
cause at all. Nor were the people of Rome much more
favourable to their worthies ; they banished Rutilius, Me-
tellus, Coriolanus, the two Scipios, and Tully. The worst
men sped best ; for as Xenophon saith of Athens, so Rome
was a sanctuary for all turbulent, discontented, and seditious
spirits. The impunity of wicked men was such that upon
pain of death it was forbidden all magistrates to condemn |
to death, or banish any citizen, or to deprive him of his
liberty, or so much as to whip him for what offence soever he
had committed, either against the gods or men.

The Athenians sold justice as they did other merchandise,
which made Plato call a popular Estate a fair, where every-
thing is to be sold. The officers, when they entered upon
their charge, would brag they went to a golden harvest. The
corruption of Rome was such that Marius and Pompey
durst carry bushels of silver into the assemblies to purchase
the voices of the people. Many citizens under their grave
gowns came armed into their public meetings, as if they
went to war. Often contrary factions fell to blows, some-
times with stones, and sometimes with swords. The blood
PATRIARCHA, 37

hath been sucked up in the market places with sponges ;
the river Tiber hath been filled with the dead bodies of the
citizens, and the common privies stuffed full with them.

If any man think these disorders in popular States were

but casual, or such as might happen under any kind of
government, he must know that such mischiefs are unavoid-
‘able, and of necessity do follow all democratical regimens ;
and the reason is given, because the nature of all people is
to desire liberty without restraint, which cannot be but
where the wicked bear rule; and if the people should be
so indiscreet as to advance virtuous men, they lose their
power : for that good men would favour none but the good,
which are always the fewer in number, and the wicked and
vicious (which is still the greatest part of the people) should
be excluded from all preferment, and in the end, by little
and little, wise men should seize upon the State, and take it
from the people. | .

I know not how to give a better character of the people
than can be gathered from such authors as lived amongst or
near the popular States. Thucydides, Xenophon, Livy,
Tacitus, Cicero, and Sallust have set them out in their
colours. { will borrow some of their sentences.

“There is nothing more uncertain than the people;
their opinions are as variable and sudden as tempests ;
there is neither truth nor judgment in them; they are not
led by wisdom to judge of anything, but by violence and
rashness ; nor put they any difference between things true
and false. After the manner of cattle, they follow the herd
that goes before; they have a custom always to favour the
worst and the weakest ; they are most prone to suspicions,
and use to condemn men for guilty upon any false sug-
gestion ; they are apt to believe all news, especially if it be
sorrowful ; and, like Fame, they make it more in the believ-
ing ; when there is no author, they fear those evils which
themselves have feigned ; they are most desirous of new
stirs and changes, and are enemies to quiet and rest ; what-
soever is giddy or headstrong, they account manlike and
courageous ; but whatsoever is modest or provident seems
sluggish; each man hath a care of his particular, and
thinks basely of the common good ; they look upon ap-
proaching mischiefs as they do upon thunder, only every
38 PATRIARCHA.

nan wisheth it may not touch his own person; it is the
nature of them, they must serve basely or domineer proudly ;
for they know no mean.” Thus do they paint to the life
this beast with many heads. Let me give you the cypher
of their form of government: as it is begot by sedition, so
-it is nourished by arms; it can never stand without wars,
either with an enemy abroad, or with friends at home. The
only means to preserve it is to have some powerful enemies
near, who may serve instead of a king to govern it, that so,
though they have not aking amongst them, yet they may
have as good as a king over them; for the common danger
of an enemy keeps them in better unity than the laws they
make themselves.

15. Many have exercised their wits in parallelling the
inconveniences of regal and popular government ; but if we
will trust experience before speculations philosophical it
cannot be denied but this one mischief of sedition, which
necessarily waits upon all popularity, weighs down all the
inconveniences that can be found in monarchy, though they

-were never so many. It is said, ‘Skin for skin, yea, all.
that a man hath will he give for his life ;” and a man will
give his riches for the ransom of his life. The way then to
examine what proportion the mischiefs of sedition and
tyranny have one to another is to inquire in what kind
of government most subjects have lost their lives. Let
Rome, which is magnified for her popularity, and villified
for the tyrannical monsters, the emperors, furnish us with
examples. Consider whether the cruelty of all the tyrannical
emperors that ever ruled in this city did ever spill a quarter
of the blood that was poured out in the last hundred years
of her glorious commonwéalth. The murders by Tiberius,
Domitian, and Commodus, put all together, cannot match
that civil tragedy which was acted in that one sedition
between Marius and Sylla, nay, even by Sylla’s part alone
(not to mention the acts of Marius) were fourscore and ten
senators put to death, fifteen consuls, two thousand and six
hundred gentlemen, and a hundred thousand others.

This was the height of the Roman liberty; any man
might be killed that would. A favour not fit-to be granted
under a royal government. The miseries of those licen-
tious times are briefly touched by Plutarch in these words:
PATRIARCHA. 39

Sylla (saith he) fell to shedding of blood, and filled all
Rome with infinite and unspeakable murders. This was not
only done in Rome, but in all the cities of Italy throughout-
there was no temple of any god whatsoever, no altar in any-
body’s house, no liberty of hospital, no father’s house,
which was not embrued with blood and horrible murders ;
the husbands were slain in the wives’ arms, and the children
in the mothers’ laps; and yet they that were slain for private
malice were nothing in respect of those that were murdered
only for their goods. . . . . He openly sold their goods
by the crier, sitting so praudly in his chair of state, that it
grieved the people more to see their goods packed up by
them to whom he gave, or disposed them, than to see them
taken away. Sometimes he would give a whole country, or
the whole revenues of certain cities, unto women for their
beauties, or to pleasant jesters, minstrels, or wicked slaves
made free. And to some he would give other men’s wives
by force,’and make them be married against their wills.
Now let Tacitus and Suetonius be searched, and see if all
their cruel emperors can match this popular villany in such
an universal slaughter of citizens, or civil butchery. God
only was able to match him, and over-matched him, by
fitting him with a most remarkable death, just answerable
to his life ; for as he had been the death of many thousands
of his countrymen, so as many thousands of his own
kindred in the flesh were the death of him, for he died of
an impostume, which corrupted his flesh in such sort that it
turned all to lice. He had many about him to shift him
continually night and day ; yet the lice they wiped from him
were nothing to them that multiplied upon him ; there was
neither apparel, linen, baths, washings, nor meat itself, but
was presently filled with swarms of this vile vermin. I cite
not this to extenuate the bloody acts of any tyrannical
princes, nor will I plead in defence of their cruelties ; only
in the comparative I maintain the mischiefs to a State to be
less universal under a tyrant king; for the cruelty of such
tyrants extends ordinarily no further than to some particular
‘men that offend him, and not to the whole kingdom. It is
truly said by his late Majesty King James: A king can
never be so notoriously vicious but he will generally favour
justice, and maintain some order, except in the particulars
40 PATRIARCHA,

wherein his inordinate lust carries him away. Even crue
Domitian, Dionysius, the tyrant, and many others are com-
mended by historians for great observers of justicé. A
natural reason is to be rendered for it. It is the multitude
of people, and the abundance of their riches, which are the
only strength and glory of every prince. The bodies of his
subjects do him service in war, and their goods supply his
present wants; therefore, if not out of affection to his
people, yet out of natural love to himself, every tyrant
desires to preserve the lives and protect the goods of his
subjects, which cannot be done but by justice, and if it be
not done, the prince’s loss is the greatest,; on the contrary,
ina popular State every man knows the public good. doth
not depend wholly on his care, but the commonwealth may
well enough be governed by others though he tend only his
private benefit, he never takes the public to be his own
business. . Thus, as in a family, where one office is to be
done by many servants, one looks upon another, and every
one leaves the business for his fellow until it is quite
neglected by all; nor are they much to be blamed for their
negligence, since it is an even wager their ignorance is as
great. For magistrates among the people, being for the
most part annual, do always lay down their office before
they understand it ; so that a prince of a duller understand-
ing, by use and experience, must needs excel them.
Again, there is no tyrant so barbarously wicked but his
own reason and sense will tell him that though he be a god,
yet he must die like a man; and that there is not. the
meanest of his subjects but may find a means to revenge
himself of the injustice that is offered him. Hence: it is
that great tyrants live continually in base fears, as did
Dionysius the elder; Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero, are
noted by Suetonius to have been frighted with panic fears.
But it is not so where wrong is done to any particular per-
son by a multitude. He knows not who hurt him, or who to
complain of, or to whom to address himself for reparation.
Any man may boldly exercise his malice and cruelty in all
popular assemblies. There is no tyranny ‘to be compared
to the tyranny of a multitude.

16, What though the government of the people be a
thing not to be endured, much less defended, yet many,
PATRIARCHA. 4t

men please themselves with an opinion that though the
people may not govern, yet they may partake and join with
a king in the government, and so make a State mixed of
popular and regal power, which they take to be the best-
tempered and equallest form of government. But the
vanity of this fancy is too evident, it is a mere impossibility
or contradiction ; for if a king but once admit the people to
be his companions, he leaves to be a king, and the State
becomes a democracy; at least, he is but a titular and no
real king, that hath not the sovereignty to himself; for the
having of this alone, and nothing but this, makes a king to
be aking. As for that show of popularity which is found
in such kingdoms as have general assemblies for consulta-
tion about making public laws, it must be remembered
that such meetings do not share or divide the sovereignty
with the prince, but do only deliberate and advise their
Supreme Head, who still reserves the absolute power in
himself: for if*in such assemblies the king, the nobility, and
people have equal shares in the sovereignty, then the king
hath but one voice, the nobility likewise one, and the
people one, and then any two of these voices should have
power to overrule the third; thus the nobility and com-
mons together should have power to make a law to bind
the king, which was never yet seen in any kingdom, but if
it could, the State must needs be popular and not regal.
17. Ifit be unnatural for the multitude to choose their gov-
ernors, or to govern or to partake in the government, what
can be thought of that damnable conclusion which is made
by too many, that the multitude may correct or depose their
prince, if need be? Surely the unnaturalness and injustice of
this position cannot sufficiently be expressed ; for admit that
a king make a contract or paction with his people,-either
originally in his ancestors, or personally at his coronation
(for’both these pactions some dream of but cannot offer
any proof for either) yet by no law of any nation can a
contract be thought broken, except that first a lawful trial
be had by the ordinary judge of the breakers thereof, or
else every man may be both party and judge in his own
case, which is absurd once to be thought, for then it will
lie in the hands of. the headless multitude when they please
to cast off the yoke of gévernment (that God hath laid upon
42 PATRIARCHA

them) to judge and punish him, by whom they should be
judged and punished- themselves. Aristotle can tell us
what judges the multitude are in their own case, of
mdciorot padAoe xpiral wept Trav olkeiwv. The judgment of the
multitude in disposing of the sovereignty may be seen in
the Roman history, where we may find many good empe-
rors murdered by the people, and many bad elected by
them. Nero, Heliogabalus, Otho, Vitellius, and such other
monsters of nature, were the minions of the multitude, and
set up by them. Pertinax, Alexander, Severus, Gordianus,
Gallus, Emilianus, Quintilius, Aurelianus, Tacitus, Probus,
and Numerianus, all of them good emperors in the judg-
ment of all historians, yet murdered by the multitude.

18. Whereas many out of an imaginary fear pretend the
power of the people to be necessary for the repressing of
the insolences of tyrants; wherein they propound a remedy
far worse than the disease. Neither is the disease indeed so
frequent as they would have us think. Let us be judged by
the history even of our own nation. We have enjoyed a |
succession of kings from the Conquest now for above 600
years (a time far longer than ever yet any popular State
could continue), we reckon to the number of twenty-six of
these princes since the Norman race, and yet not one of
these is taxed by our historians for tyrannical government.
It is true, two of these kings have been deposed by the
people and barbarously murdered, but neither of them for
tyranny: for, as a learned historian of our age saith,
“Edward II. and Richard II. were not insupportable
either in their nature or rule, and yet the people more
upon wantonness than for any want, did take an un-
bridled course against them.” Edward II., by many of
our historians is reported to be of a good and virtuous
nature, and not unlearned ; they impute his defects rather
to fortune than either to counsel or carriage of his affairs ;
the deposition of him was a violent fury, led by a wife
both cruel and unchaste, and can with no better counte-
nance of right be justified, than may his lamentable both
indignities and death itself. Likewise the deposition of
King Richard I]. was a tempestuous rage, neither led or
restrained by any rules of reason or of State.....
Examine his actions without a distempered judgment, and
PATRIARCHA., 43

you will not condemn him to be exceeding either insuffi-
cient or evil; weigh the imputations that were objected
’ against him, and you shall find nothing either of any truth
or of great moment.” Hollingshed writeth, “‘‘That he was
most unthankfully used by his subjects; for, although,
through the frailty of his youth he demeaned himself more
dissolutely than was agreeable to the royalty of his estate,
yet in no king’s days where the commons in greater
wealth, the nobility more honoured, and the clergy less
wronged, who, notwithstanding, in the evil-guided strength
of their will; took head against him, to their own headlong
destruction afterwards, partly during the reign of Henry, his
next successor, whose greatest achievements were against
his own people in executing those who conspired with him
against King Richard. But more especially in succeeding
times when, upon occasion of this disorder, more English
blood was spent than was in all the foreign wars together
which have been since the Conquest.”

Twice hath this kingdom been miserably wasted with
civil war, but neither of them occasioned by the tyranny
of any prince. The cause of the Barons’ wars is by good
historians attributed to the stubbornness of the nobility, as
the bloody variance of the houses of York and Lancaster,
and the late rebellion, sprang from the wantonness of the
people. These three unnatural wars have dishonoured our
nation amongst strangers, so that in the censures of king-
doms the King of Spain is said to be the king of men,
because of his subjects’ willing obedience; the King of
France king of asses, because of their infinite taxes and
impositions ; but the King of England is said to be the
king of devils, because of his subjects’ often insurrections
against and depositions of their princes.

 
44 PATRIARCHA.

X

CHAPTER III.

Positive Laws do not Infringe the Natural and Fatherly Power
of Kings.

_ 1. HiTHERTo I have endeavoured to show the natural
institution of regal authority, and to free it from subjection
to an arbitrary election of the people. It is necessary also
to inquire whether human laws have a superiority over
princes, because those that maintain the acquisition of
royal jurisdiction from the people do subject the exercise
of it to positive laws. But in this also they err; for as
kingly power is by the law of God, so it hath no inferior
law to limit it.

The father of a family governs by no other law than by
his own will; not by the laws and wills of his sons or
servants. There is no nation that allows children any
action or remedy for being unjustly governed ; and yet, |
for all this, every father is bound by the law of nature to
do his best for the preservation of his family ; but much
more is a king always tied by the same law of nature to
keep this general ground, that the safety of the kingdom
be his chief law ; he must remember that the profit of every
man in particular, and of all together in general, is not
always one and the same; and that the public is to be
preferred before the private; and that the force of laws
must not be so great as natural equity itself, which cannot
fully be comprised in any laws whatsoever, but is to be
left to the religious achievement of those who know how
to manage the affairs of State, and wisely to balance the
particular profit with the counterpoise of the public,
according to the infinite variety of times, places, persons—
a proof unanswerable for thé superiority of princes above
laws is this, that there were kings long before theré were
any laws. For a long time the word of a king was the
only law; and if practice (as saith “Sir Walter Raleigh)
declare the greatness of authority, even the best kings of
Judah and Israel were not tied to any law; but they did
whatsoever they pleased in the greatest matters.
’

PATRIARCHA, 45

2. The unlimited jurisdiction of kings is so amply de-
scribed by Samuel, that it hath given occasion to some to
imagine that it was but either a plot or trick of Samuel to
keep the government himself and family by frighting the
Israelites with the mischiefs in monarchy, or else a prophe-
tical description only of the future ill-government of Saul.
But the vanity of these conjectures are judiciously disco-
vered in that majestical discourse of the true law of free
monarchy, wherein it is evidently shown that the scope of
Samuel was to teach the people a dutiful obedience to their
king, even in those things which themselves did esteem
mischievous and inconvenient ; for, by telling them what a
king would do, he indeed instructs them what a subject
must suffer, yet not so that it is right for kings to do injury,
but it is right for them to go unpunished by the people if
they do it. So that in this point it is all one whether Samuel
describe a king or a tyrant, for patient obedience is due to
both ; no remedy in the text against tyrants, but in crying
‘and praying unto God in that day. But howsoever in a
rigorous construction Samuel’s description be applied to a
tyrant, yet the words by a benign interpretation may agree
with the manners of a just king, and the scope and coher-
ence of the text doth best imply the more moderate or
qualified sense of the words; for, as Sir W. Raleigh con-
fesses, all those inconveniences and miseries which are
reckoned. by Samuel as belonging to kingly government
were not intolerable, but such as have been borne, and are
still borne, by free consent of subjects towards their princes.
Nay, at this day, and in this land, many tenants, by their
tenures and services, are tied to the same subjection even
to subordinate and inferior lords: to serve the king in his
wars and to.till his ground is not only agreeable to the
nature of subjects but much desired by them, according to
their several births and conditions. ‘The like may be said
for the offices of women servants, confectioners, cooks, and
bakers ; for we cannot think that the king would use their
labours without giving them wages, since the text itself men-
‘tions a liberal reward of his servants.

As for the taking of the tenth of their seed, of their vines,
and of their sheep, it might be a necessary provision for
their king’s household, and so belong to the right of tribute ;
46 PATRIARCHA.

for whereas is mentioned the taking of the tenth, it cannot
agree well to a tyrant, who observes no proportion in fleecing
his people. ;
Lastly, the taking of their fields, vineyards, and olive
trees, if it be by force or fraud, or without just recompense,
to the damage of private persons only, it is not to be
defended ; but if it be upon the public charge and general
consent, it might be justified as necessary at the first erec-
tion of a kingdom, for those who will have a king are
bound to allow him royal maintenance by providing revenues
for the Crown, since it is both for the honour, profit, and
safety, too, of the people to have their king glorious, power-
ful, and abounding in riches. Besides, we all know the
lands and goods of many subjects may be ofttimes legally
taken by the king, either by forfeitures, escheat, attainder,
outlawry, confiscation, or the like. Thus we see Samuel’s
character of a king may literally well bear a mild sense, for
greater probability there is that Samuel so meant, and the.
Israelites so understood it; to which this may be added,
that Samuel tells the Israelites: “This will be the manner
of the king that shall reign over you, and ye shall cry
because of your king which ye shall have chosen you”—that
is to say, thus shall be the common custom or fashion or
proceeding of Saul your king; or, as the vulgar Latin
renders it, “This shall be the right or law of your king”—
not meaning, as some expound it, the casual event or act
of some éndividuum vagum, or indefinite king, that might
happen one day to tyrannize over them. So that Saul, and
the constant practice of Saul, doth best agree with the literal
sense of the text. Now that Saul was no tyrant, we may note
that the people ‘“‘asked a king, as all nations had.” God
answers, and bids Samuel to ‘hear the voice of the people
in all things which they spake,” and “appoint them a king.”
They did not ask a tyrant, and to give them a tyrant when
they asked a king had not been to hear their voice in all
things, but rather when they asked an egg to have given
them a scorpion, unless we will say that all nations had
tyrants. Besides, we do not find in all Scripture that Saul
was punished, or so much as blamed, for committing any of
those acts which Samuel describes; and if Samuel’s drift
had been only to terrify the people, he would not have.
PATRIARCHA, 47

forgotten to foretell Saul’s bloody cruelty in murdering
eighty-five innocent priests, and smiting with the edge of the
sword the city of Nob; both man, woman, and child. Again,
the Israelites never shrank at these, conditions proposed by
Samuel, but accepted of them, as such as all other nations
were bound unto; for their conclusion is: “ Nay, but we
will have a king over us, that we also may be like all the
nations, and that our king may judge us, and go out before
us to fight our battles’—-meaning he should earn his privi-
leges by doing the work for them, by judging them, and
fighting for them. Lastly, whereas the mention of the
people’s crying unto the Lord argues they should be under
some tyrannical oppression, we may remember that the
people’s complaints and cries are not always an argument
of their living under a tyrant. No man can say King
Solomon was a tyrant, yet all the congregation of Israel
complained that Solomon made their yoke grievous, and
therefore their prayer to Rehoboam is: “ Make thou the
grievous service of thy father Solomon, and his heavy yoke
which he put upon us, lighter, and we will serve thee.” To
conclude : It is true Saul lost his kingdom, but not for being
- too cruel or tyrannical to his subjects, but by being too
merciful to his enemies. His sparing Agag when he should
have slain him was the cause why the kingdom was torn
from him.
3. If any desire the direction of the New Testament, he
may find our Saviour limiting and distinguishing royal
. power, “‘ By giving to Cesar those things that were Czesar's,
and to God those things that were God’s.” “ Obediendum est
in quibus mandatum Dei non impeditur ?” We must obey
where the commandment of God is not hindered ; there is
no other law but God’s law to hinder our obedience. It
was the answer of a Christian to the Emperor: “ We only
worship God, in other things we gladly serve you.” __ And
it seems Tertullian thought whatsoever was not God’s was
the Emperor’s, when he saith: “ Bene opposuit Casart pecu-
niam, te ipsum Deo, alioqui quid erit Det, si omnia Caesaris ”
Our Saviour hath well apportioned our money for Cesar,
and ourselves for God, for, otherwise, what shall God’s
share be if all be Casar’s. The Fathers mention no reserva-
tion of any power to the laws of the land or to the people.
48 PATRIARCHA.

St. Ambrose, in his apology for David, expressly saith:
“ He was a king, and therefore bound to no laws, because
kings are free from the bonds of any fault.” St. Augustine
also resolves: “ Jmperator non est subjectus legibus, qut
habet in potestate alias leges ferre:’ The Emperor is not
subject to laws, who hath power to make other laws. For,
indeed, it is the rule of Solomon that “‘ We must keep the
king’s commandment,” and not to say, ‘ What dost thou ?”
because “ Where the word of a king is there is power,” and
all that he pleaseth he will do. :

If any mislike this divinity in England, let him but
hearken to Bracton, Chief Justice in Henry III.’s days,
which was since the institution of Parliaments. His words
are, speaking of the King: ‘ Omnes sub eo, et ipse sub
nullo, nisi tantum sub Deo, &c. :’ All are under him, and
he under none but God only; if he offend, since no writ
can go against him, their remedy is by petitioning him to
amend his fault, which, if he shall not do, it will be punish-
ment sufficient for him to expect God as a revenger ; let
none presume to search into his deeds, much less to oppose
them.

When the Jews asked our Blessed Saviour whether they |
should pay tribute, He did not first demand what the law
of the land was, or whether there was any statute against it,
nor inquired whether the tribute were given by consent
of the people, nor advised them to stay their payment till
they should grant it; He did no more but look upon the
superscription, and concluded: “This image you say is
Ceesar’'s, therefore give it to Czesar.” Nor must it here be
said that Christ taught this lesson only to the conquered
Jews, for in this He gave direction for all nations, who are
bound as much in obedience to their lawful kings as to any .
conqueror or usurper whatsoever.

Whereas, being subject to the higher powers, some have
strained these words to signify the laws of the land, or else
to mean the highest power, as well aristocratical and demo-
cratical as regal. It seems St. Paul looked for such inter-
pretation, and therefore thought fit to be his own expositor,
and to let it be known that by power he understood a
monarch that carried a sword: “ Wilt thou not be afraid of
the power?” that is, the ruler that carrieth the sword, for
PATRIARCHA. 49

#

“‘he is the minister of God to thee... . for he beareth
noi the sword in vain.” It is not the law that is the
‘inister of God, or that carries the sword, but the ruler or
‘+ Magistrate ; so they that say the law governs the kingdom,
may as well, say that the carpenter’s rule builds a house,
and not the carpenter, for the law is but the rule or instru-
ment of the ruler. And St. Paul concludes: “For this
cause pay you tribute also, for they are God’s ministers,
attending continually upon this very thing. Render there-
fore tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom
custom.” He doth not say give as a gift to God’s minister,
but dmi8ore—render or restore tribute as a due. Also
St. Peter doth most clearly expound this place of St. Paul,
where he saith : “ Submit yourselves to every ordinance of
man for the Lord’s sake, whether it be to the king as
supreme, or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by
him.” Here the very self-same word (supreme or
Umepexoveats) which St. Paul coupleth with power, St.
Peter conjoineth with the king, Baoidei ds dmepéxorte,
thereby to manifest that king and power are both one. Also
St. Peter expounds his own words of human ordinance to
be the king, who is the ex loguens, a speaking law; he
cannot mean that kings themselves are a human ordinance
since St. Paul calls the Supreme Power the ordinance of
God, and the wisdom of God saith: “ By Me kings reign.”
But his meaning must be that the laws of kings are
human ordinances. Next, the governors that are sent by
‘ him, that is, by the king, not by God, as some corruptly
would wrest the text, to justify popular governors as autho-
tized by God ; whereas, in grammatical construction (him),
the relative must be referred to the next antecedent, which is
king ; besides, the antithesis between “supreme” and “‘ sent”
proves plainly that the governors were sent by kings, for
if the governors were sent by God, and the king be a
human ordinance, then it follows that the governors
were supreme and not the king; or if it be said that
both king and governors are sent by God, then they are
both equal, and so neither of them supreme. Therefore St.
Peter's meaning is, in short: Obey the laws of the king or
of his ministers. By which it is evident that neither St.
Peter nor St. Paul intended other form of government than
50 PATRIARCHA.

only monarchical, much less any subjection of princes to
human laws.

That familiar distinction of the Schoolmen, whereby they
subject kings to the directive, but not to the co-active power
of laws, is a confession that kings are not bound by the
positive laws of any nation, since the compulsory power of.
laws is that which properly makes laws to be laws by bind-
ing men by rewards or punishment to obedience ; whereas
the direction of the law is but like the advice and direction
which the king’s council gives the king, which no man says
is a law to the king. : $

4. There want not those who believe that the first inven-
tion of laws was to bridle and moderate the over-great power
of kings; but the truth is, the original of laws was for, the
keeping of the multitude in order. Popular estates could
not subsist at all without laws, whereas kingdoms were
governed many ages without them. The people of Athéns,
as soon as they gave over kings, were forced to give power to
Draco first, then to Solon, to make them laws, not to bridle
kings but themselves ; and though many of their laws were very
severe and bloody, yet for the reverence they bare to their
law-makers they willingly submitted to them. Nor did the
people give any limited power to Solon, but an absolute

' jurisdiction, at his pleasure to abrogate and confirm what
he thought fit, the people never challenging any such power
to themselves. So the people of Rome gave to the ten
men, who were to choose and correct their laws for the
Twelve Tables, an absolute power, without any appeal to the
people.

5. The reason why laws have been also made by kings
was this: When kings were either busied with wars, or dis-
tracted with public cares, so that every private man could
not have access to their persons to learn their wills and
pleasure, then of necessity were laws invented, that so every
particular subject might find his prince’s pleasure deciphered
to him in the tables of his laws, that so there might be no
need to resort unto the king ; but either for the interpretation
or mitigation of obscure or rigorous laws, or else in new
cases, for a supplement where the law was defective. By
this means both king and people were in many things eased.
First, the king, by giving laws, doth free himself of great and
PATRIARCHA. 51

intolerable troubles, as Moses did himself by choosing elders.
Secondly, the people have the law as a familiar admonisher
and interpreter of the king’s pleasure, which being published
throughout the kingdom, doth represent the presence and
majesty of the king. Also the judges and magistrates (whose
help in giving judgment in many causes kings have need to
use) are restrained by the common rules of the law from using
their own liberty to the injury of others, since they are to
judge according to the laws, and not follow their own
opinions.

6. Now albeit kings who make the laws be (as King
James teacheth us) above the laws, yet will they rule their
subjects by the law; and a king, governing in a settled
kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant,
so soon as he seems to rule according to his laws; yet
where he sees the laws rigorous or doubtful he may mitigate
and interpret. General laws made in Parliament may, upon
known respects to the king, by his authority be mitigated or
suspended upon causes only known to him. And although
a king do frame all his actions to be according to the laws,
yet he is not bound thereto but at his good will and for
good example, or so far forth as the general law of the safety
of the commonweal doth naturally bind him ; for in such
sort only positive laws may be said to bind the king, not by
being positive, but as they are naturally the best or only
means for the-preservation of the commonwealth. By this
means are all kings, even tyrants and conquerors, bound to
preserve the lands, goods, liberties, and lives of all their
subjects, not by any municipal law of the land, so much as
the natural law of a father, which binds them to ratify the
acts of their forefathers and predecessors in things necessary
for the public good of their subjects.

4. Others there be that affirm that, although laws of them-
selves do not bind kings, yet the oaths of kings at their
coronations tie them to keep all the laws of their kingdoms.
How far this is true, let us but examine the oath of the
kings of England at their coronation, the words whereof are
these: “Art thou pleased to cause to be administered
in all thy judgments indifferent and upright justice, and to
use discretion with mercy and verity? Art thou pleased
that our upright laws and customs be observed, and dost
52 PATRIARCHA.

thou promise that those shall be protected and maintained
by thee?” These two are the articles of the king’s oath,
which concern the laity or subjects in general, to which the
king answers affirmatively, being first demanded by the
Archbishop of Canterbury: “ Pleaseth it you to confirm
and observe the laws and customs of ancient times, granted
from God, by just and devout kings, unto the English
nation, by oath unto the said people, especially the laws,
liberties, and customs granted unto the clergy and laity by
the famous King Edward?” We may observe, in these
words of the articles of the oath, that the king is required
to observe not all the laws, but only the upright, and that
with discretion and mercy. The word “upright” cannot
mean all laws, because in the oath of Richard II. I find
evil and unjust laws mentioned, which the king swears to
abolish; and in the old Abridgment of Statutes, set
forth in Henry VIII.’s days, the king is to swear
wholly to put out evil laws, which he cannot do if he be
bound to all laws. Now, what laws are upright and what
evil who shall judge but the king, since he swears to
administer upright justice with discretion and mercy (or, as
Bracton hath it) eguitatem precipiat, et misericordiam. So
that, in effect, the king doth swear to keep no laws but such
as, in his judgment, are upright, and those not literally always,
but according to equity of his conscience, joined with
mercy, which is properly the office of a chancellor rather than
of a judge ; and if a king did strictly swear to observe all
the laws, he could not, without perjury, give his consent to
the repealing or abrogating of any statute by Act of Parlia-
ment which would be very mischievable to the State.

But let it be supposed for truth that kings do swear to
observe ali the laws of their kingdom, yet no man can
think it reason that kings should be more bound by their
voluntary oaths than common persons are by theirs. Now,
if a private person make a contract, either with oath or
without oath, he is no further bound than the equity and
justice of the contract ties him ; for a man may have relief
against an unreasonable and unjust promise, if either deceit,
or error, or force, or fear induced him thereunto; or if it
be hurtful or grievous in the performance. Since the laws
in many cases give the king a prerogative above common
PATRIARCHA, 53

persons, I see no reason why he should be denied the
privilege which the meanest of his subjects doth enjoy.

Here is a fit place to examine a question which some
have moved: Whether it be a sin for a subject to disobey
the king if he command anything contrary to his laws?
For satisfaction in this point we must resolve that not only
in human laws, but even in divine, a thing may be com-
manded contrary to law, and yet obedience to such a
command is necessary.. The sanctifying of the Sabbath is
a divine law ; yet if a master command his servant not to
go to church upon a Sabbath Day, the best divines teach
‘us that the servant must obey this command, though it may
be sinful and unlawful in the master; because the servant
hath no authority or liberty to examine and judge whether
his master sin or no in so commanding ; for there may be a
just cause for a master to keep his servant from church, as
appears Luke xiv. 5. Yet it is not fit to tie the master to
acquaint his servant with his secret counsels or present
necessity ; and in such cases the servant’s not going to
church becomes the sin of the master, and not of the
servant. The like may be said of the king’s commanding a
man to serve him in the wars: he may not examine whether
the war be just or unjust, but must obey, since he hath no
commission to judge of the titles of kingdoms or causes of
war ; nor hath any subject power to condemn his king for
breach of his own laws.

8. Many will be ready to say it is a slavish and dangerous
- condition to be subject to the will of any one man who is
not subject to the laws. But such men consider not (1)
That the prerogative of a king is to be above all laws, for
the good only of them that are under the laws, and to
defend the peoples’ liberties, as his Majesty graciously
affirmed in his speech after his last answer to the Petition
of Right. Howsoever, some are afraid of the name of pre-
rogative, yet they may assure themselves the case of subjects
would be desperately miserable without it. The Court of
Chancery itself is but a branch of the king’s prerogative to
relieve men against the inexorable rigour of the law, which
without it is no better than a tyrant, since summum jus is
summa injuria. General pardons, at the coronation and in
parliaments, are but the bounty of the prerogative. (2)
84 PATRIARCHA.

There can be no laws without a supreme power to com-
mand or make them. In all aristocracies the nobles are
above the laws, and in all democracies the people. By the
like reason, in a monarchy the king must of necessity be
above the laws ; there can be no sovereign majesty in him
that is under them ; that which ‘giveth the very being to a
king is the power to give laws; without this power he is
but an equivocal king. It skills not which way kings come
by their power, whether by election, donation, succession,
or by any other means; for it is still the manner of the
government by supreme power that makes them properly
kings, and not the means of obtaining their crowns.
Neither doth the diversity of laws, nor contrary customs,
whereby each kingdom differs from another, make the forms
of commonweal different, unless the power of making laws
be in several subjects. ;

For the confirmation of this point, Aristotle saith that a
perfect kingdom is that wherein the king rules all things
according to his own wil], for he that is called a king
according to the law makes no kind of kingdom at all:
This, it seems, also the Romans well understood to be most
necessary in a monarchy; for though they were a people
most greedy of liberty, yet the senate did free Augustus
from all necessity of laws, that he might be free of his own
authority and of absolute power over himself and over the
laws, to do what he pleased and leave undone what he listed ;
and this decree was made while Augustus was yet absent.
Accordingly we find that Ulpian, the great lawyer, delivers it
for a rule of the civil law: “Princeps legibus solutus est :’? The
prince is not bound by the laws.

9. If the nature of laws be advisedly weighed, the ne-
cessity of the princes being above them may more manifest
itself. We all know that a law in general is the command of
a superior power. Laws are divided (as Bellarmine divides
the Word of God) into written and unwritten, not for that it
is not written at all, but because it was not written by the
first devisers or makers of it. The common law (as the
Lord Chancellor Egerton teacheth us) is the common custom
of the realm. Now, concerning customs, this must be con-
sidered, that for every custom there was a time when it was
no custom, and the first precedent we now have had no pre-
PATRIARCHA, 55

cedent when it began; when every custom began, there was
something else than custom that made it lawful, or else the
beginning of all customs were unlawful. Customs at first
became lawful only by some superior which did either com-
mand or consent unto their beginning. And the first power
which we find (as it is confessed by all men) is the kingly
power, which was both in this and in all other nations of the
world long before any laws or any other kind of government
was thought of ; from whence we must necessarily infer that
the common law itself, or common customs of this land,
were originally the laws and commands of kings at first un-
written. -

Nor must we think the common customs (which are the
principles of the, common law, and are but few) to be such,
or so many, as are able to give special rules to determine
every particular cause. Diversity of cases are infinite, and
impossible to be regulated by any law, and therefore we find
even in the Divine laws which are delivered by Moses, there
be only certain principal laws which did not determine, but
only direct, the High Priest or magistrate, whose judgment
in special cases did determine what the general law intended.
It is so with the common law, for when there is no perfect
rule judges do resort to those principles or common law
axioms whereupon former judgments in cases somewhat like
have been delivered by former judges, who all receive
authority from the king in his right and name to give
sentence according to the rules and precedents of ancient
times ; and where precedents have failed the judges have
resorted to the general Jaw of reason, and accordingly given
judgment without any common law to direct them. Nay,
many times where there have been precedents to direct, they,
upon better reason only, have changed the law both in
causes criminal and civil, and have not insisted so much on
the examples of former judges, as examined and corrected
their reasons ; thence it is that some laws are now obsolete
and out of use, and the practice quite contrary to what it
was in former times, as the Lord Chancellor Egerton proves
by several instances.

Nor is this spoken to derogate from the common law, for
the case standeth so with the laws of all nations, although
some of them have their laws and principles written and
56 PATRIARCHA.

established ; for witness to this we have Aristotle his testi-
mony in his “‘ Ethics,” and in several places in his “ Politics ?
I will cite some of them. “Every law,” saith he, “ isin the
general, but of some things there can be no general law... .

when therefore the law speaks in general, and something falls
out after besides the general rule, then it is fit that what the
law-maker hath omitted, or where he hath erred by speak-
ing generally, it should be corrected or supplied, as if- the
law-maker himself were present to ordain it. The governor,
whether he be one man or more, ought to be lord over all
those things whereof it was impossible the law should ex-
actly speak, because it is not easy to comprehend all things
under general rules . . . . whatsoever the law cannot de-
termine, it leaves to the governors to give judgment therein,
and permits them to rectify whatsoever upon trial they find
to be better than the written laws.”

Besides, all laws are of themselves dumb, and some or
other must be trusted with the application of them to par-
ticulars, by examining all circumstances, to pronounce when
they are broken, or by whom. This work of right applica-
tion of laws is not a thing easy or obvious for ordinary
capacities, but requires profound abilities of nature for the
beating out of the truth: witness the diversity and sometimes
the contrariety of opinions of the learned judges in some
difficult points.

10. Since this is the common condition of laws, it is also
most reasonable that the law-maker should be trusted with
the application or interpretation of the laws, and for this
cause anciently the kings of this land have sitten personally
in courts of judicature, and are still representatively present
in all courts ; the judges are but substituted, and called the
king’s justices, and their power ceaseth when the king is in
place. To this purpose Bracton, that learned Chief Justice ~
in the reign of Henry III., saith, in express terms, “In
doubtful and obscure points the interpretation and will of
our lord the king is to be expected, since it is his part to
interpret who made the law;” for, as he saith in another
place, “‘ Rex et non alius debet judicare, st solus ad id sufficere
possit, &c. :” ‘Vhe king, and nobody else, ought to give judg-
ment, if he were able, since by virtue of his oath he is
bound to it. Therefore the king ought to exercise power as
‘PATRIARCHA. 7

the vicar or minister of God, but if our lord the king be not
able to determine every cause, to ease part of his pains by
distributing the burden to more persons, he ought to choose
wise men fearing God, &c., and make justices of them.”
Much to the same purpose are the words of Edward I. in
the beginning of his book of “ Laws,” written, by his
appointment, by John Briton, Bishop of Hereford: “We
will,” saith he, “that our own jurisdiction be above all the
jurisdictions of our realm, so as in all manner of felonies,
trespasses, contracts, and in all other actions, personal or
real, we have power to yield such judgments as do appertain
without other process wheresoever we know the right truth
as judges.”’ Neither may this be taken to be meant of an
imaginary presence of the king’s person in his courts, because
he doth immediately after in the same place severally set
forth by themselves the jurisdictions of his ordinary courts,
but must necessarily be understood of a jurisdiction remain-
ing in the king’s royal person. And that this, then, was no
new-made law, or first brought in by the Norman Conquest,
appears by a Saxon law made by King Edgar in these
words, as I find them in Mr. Lambert: “ Memo in Lite
regem appellato, nist quidem domi justitiam consequi, aut
impetrare non poterit, sin summo jure domi urgeatur, ad
regem, ut is onus aligua ex parte allevet, provocato :” Let no
man in suit appeal to the king unless he may not get right
at home ; but if the right be too heavy for him, then let him
go to the king to have it eased. ‘

As the judicial power of kings was exercised before the
Conquest, so in those settled times after the Conquest,
wherein parliaments were much in use, there was a high
court following the king, which was the place of sovereign
justice both for matter of law and conscience, as may
appear by a parliament in Edward I.’s time taking order,
“That the Chancellor and the Justices of the Bench should
follow the King, to the end that he might have always at
hand able men for his direction in suits that came before
him.” And this was after the time that the Court of Com-
mon Pleas was made stationary, which is an evidence that
the king reserved a sovereign power by which he did supply
the want or correct the rigour of the common law, because
the positive law, being grounded upon that which happens
88 PATRIARCHA,

for the most part, cannot foresee every particular which time
and experience bring forth.

12. Therefore, though the common law be generally good
and just, yet in some special case it may need correction
by reason of some considerable circumstance falling out,
which at the time of the law-making was not thought of.
Also sundry things do fall out, both in war and peace, that
require extraordinary help, and cannot wait for the usual
care of common law, the which is not performed, but alto-
gether after one sort, and that not without delay of help and
expense of time ; so that, although all causes are, and ought
to be, referred to the ordinary process of common law, yet
rare matters from time to time do grow up meet, for just
reasons, to be referred to the aid of the absolute authority
of the prince; and the statute of Magna Charta hath been
understood of the institution then made of the ordinary
jurisdiction in common causes, and not for restraint of the
:sabsolute authority serving only in a few rare and singular
cases, for though the subjects were put to great damage by
false accusations and malicious suggestions made to the
king and his council, especially during the time of King
Edward III., whilst he was absent in the wars in France,
insomuch as in his reign divers statutes were made that
provided none should be put to answer before the king and
his council without due process; yet it is apparent the
necessity of such proceedings was so great that both before
Edward III.’s days, and in his time, and after his death,
several statutes were made to help and order the proceed-
ings of the king and his council. As the parliament in
28 Edward I., cap. 5, did -provide: “ That the Chancellor
and Justices of the King’s Bench should follow the King,
that so he might have near unto him some that be learned
in the laws, which be able to order all such matters as shall
come unto the court at all times when need shall require.”
By the statute of 37 Edward III., cap. 18, taliation was
ordained, in case the “‘ suggestion to the King proved un-
true.” Then 38 Edward III., cap. 9, takes away taliation,
and appoints imprisonment till the king and party grieved
be satisfied. In the statutes of 17 Richard II. cap. 6, and
15 Henry VI., cap. 4, damages and expenses are awarded
in such cases. In all these statutes it is necessarily im-
PATRIARCHA., 59

plied that complaints upon just causes might be moved
before the king and his council.

At a parliament at Gloucester, 2 Richard II., when the
Commons made petition, ‘‘ That none might be forced by
writ out of Chancery, or by Privy Seal, to appear before the
‘King and his Council to answer touching freehold,” the
king’s answer was: “He thought it not reasonable that he
should be constrained to send for his lieges upon causes
reasonable ; and albeit he did not purpose that such as
were sent for should answer (finalment) peremptorily touch-
ing their freehold, but should be remanded for trial thereof
as law required ; provided always,” saith he, ‘‘that at the
suit of the party where the King and his Council shall: be
credibly informed that, because of maintenance, oppression,
or other outrages, the common law cannot have duly her
course, in such case the counsel for the party.”

Also, in the thirteenth year of his reign, when the Com-
mons did pray that, upon pain of forfeiture, the chancellor
or council of the king should not, after the end of the
parliament,'make any ordinance against the common law,
the king answered : “Let it be used as it hath been used
before this time, so as the regality of the king be saved,
for the king will save his regalities as his progenitors have
done.”

Again, in the fourth year of Henry IV., when the Com-
mons complained against subpoenas and other writs grounded
upon false suggestions, the king answered : “ That he would
give in charge to his officers, that they should abstain more
than before time they had, to send for his subjects in that
manner. But yet,” saith he, “it is not our intention that
our officers shall so abstain, that they may not send for
our subjects in matters and causes necessary, as it hath
been used in the time of our good progenitors.”

Likewise when, for the same cause, complaint was made
by the Commons, anno 3, Henry V., the king’s answer
was: “Le roy sadvisera:” The king will be advised, which
amounts to a denial for the present by a’ phrase peculiar
for the king’s denying to pass any Bill that hath passed the
Lords and Commons.

These complaints of the Commons, and the answers of
the king, discover that such moderation should be used,
60 PATRIARCHA.

that the course of the common law be ordinarily maintained,
lest subjects be convented before the king and his council
without just cause, that the proceedings of the council-
table be not upon every slight suggestion, nor to determine
finally concerning freehold of inheritance. And yet that
upon cause reasonable, upon credible information, in
matters of weight, the king’s regality or prerogative, in
sending for his subjects, be maintained, as of right it ought,
and in former times hath been constantly used.

King Edward L., finding that Bogo de Clare was dis-
charged of an accusation brought against him in parliament,
for that some formal imperfections were found in the com-
plaint, commanded him nevertheless to appear before him
and his council, “ad factendum et recipiendum quod per
regem et ejus concilium fuerit faciendum ;’ and so pro-
ceeded to an examination of the whole cause.—8 Edward I.

Edward III., in the Star Chamber (which was the ancient
Council Chamber at Westminster) upon the complaint of
Elizabeth Audley, commanded James Audley to appear be-
fore him and his council, and determined a controversy
hetween them touching lands contained in the covenants
of her jointure.—‘ Rot. Clause,” de an. 41 Edward III.

Henry V., in a suit before him and his council for the
titles of the manors of Seere and St. Lawrence, in the Isle
of Thanet in Kent, took order for sequestering the profits
till the right were tried, as well for avoiding the breach of
the peace, as for prevention of waste and spoil.—‘ Rot.
Patin,” anno 6, Henry V.

Henry VI. commanded the justices of the bench to stay
the arraignment of one Verney, of London, till they. had
other commandment from him and his council, because
Verney, being indebted to the king and others, practised to
be indicted of felony, wherein he might have his clergy, and
make his purgation, of intent to defraud his creditors.—34
Henry VI. “ Rot. 37 in Banco Regis.”

Edward IV. and his council in the Star Chamber heard
the cause of the master and poor brethren of St. Leonards
in York, complaining that Sir Huge Hastings and others
withdrew from them a great part of their living, which con-
sisted chiefly upon the having of a thrave of corn of every
plough land within the counties of York, Westmoreland,
PATRIARCHA. 61

Cumberland, and Lancashire.—‘“ Rot. Paten” de anno 8
Edward IV , part iii, memb. 14.

Henry VII. and his council, in the Star Chamber,
decreed that Margery and Florence Becket should sue no
further in their cause against Alice Radley, widow, for
lands in Woolwich and Plumstead in Kent, for as much as
the matter had been heard, first, before the council of King
Edward IV., after that, before the President of the
Requests of that king, Henry VII., and then, lastly, before
the council of the said king.—x Henry VII.

What is hitherto affirmed of the dependency and subjection
of the common law to the sovereign prince, the same may
be said as well of all statute laws; for the king is the sole
immediate author, corrector, and moderator of them also ;
so that neither of these two kinds of laws are or can be any
diminution of that natural power which kings have over their
people by right of fatherhood, but rather are an argument to
strengthen the truth of it; for evidence whereof we may in
some points consider the nature of parliaments, because in
them only all statutes are made.

12. Though the name of “ parliament” (as Mr. Camden
saith) be of no great antiquity, but brought in out of France,
yet our ancestors, the English Saxons, had a meeting, which
they called “ the assembly of the wise”; termed in Latin,
conventum magnatum, or, preesentia regis, procerumd., pre-
laterumg. collectorum. The meeting of the nobility ; or the
presence of the king, prelates, and peers assembled ; or, in
general, magnum concilium, or commune concilium ; and many
of our kings in elder times made use of such great assemb-
lies for to consult of important affairs of state, all which
meetings in a general sense, may be termed “ parliaments.”

Great are the advantages which both the king and people
may receive by a well-ordered parliament ; there is nothing
more expresseth the majesty and supreme power of a king
than such an assembly, wherein all his people acknowledge
him for sovereign lord, and make all their addresses to him
by humble petition and supplication ; and by their consent
and approbation do strengthen all the laws which the king
at their request and by their advice and ministry shall
ordain. Thus they facilitate the government of the king,
by making the laws unquestionable, either to the subordinate
62 PATRIARCHA.,

magistrates, or refractory multitude. The benefit which
accrues to the subject by parliaments is, that by their
prayers and petitions kings are drawn many times to redress
their just grievances, and are overcome by their importunity
to grant many things which otherwise they would not yteld
unto : for the voice of a multitude is easier heard. -Many
vexations of the people are without the knowledge of the
king, who in parliament seeth and heareth his people him-
self ; whereas at other times he commonly useth the eyes and
ears of other men.

Against the antiquity of parliaments we need not dispute,
since the more ancient they be, the more they make for the
honour of monarchy; yet there be certain circumstances
touching the forms of parliaments which are fit to be con-
sidered.

First, we are to remember that until about the time of the
Conquest there could be no parliaments assenibled of the
general States ef the whole kingdom of England, because
till those days we cannot learn it was entirely united into one
kingdom, but it was either divided into several kingdoms
or governed by several laws. When Julius Cesar landed,
he found four kings in Kent, and the British names of
Dammonii, Durotriges, Belgz, Attrebatii, Trinobantes, Iceni,
Silures, and the rest, are plentiful testimonies of the several
kingdoms of Britains when the Romans left us. The Saxons
divided us into seven kingdoms ; when these Saxons were
united all into a monarchy, they had always the Danes their
companions or their masters in the empire till Edward the
Confessor’s days, since whose time the kingdom of England
hath continued united as now it doth; but for a thousand
years before we cannot find it was entirely settled during the
time of any one king’s reign. As under the Mercian law,
the West Saxons were confined to the Saxon laws, Essex,
Norfolk, Suffolk, and some other places were vexed with
Danish laws ; the Northumbrians also had their laws apart.
And until Edward the Confessor’s reign, who was next but
one before the Conqueror, the laws of the kingdom were so
several and uncertain that he was forced to cull a few of the
most indifferent and best of them, which were from him called
St. Edward’s laws. Yet some say that Edgar made those
laws, and that the Confessor did but restore and mend them.
PATRIARCHA., 63

Alfred also gathered out of Mulmutius laws such as he trans-
lated into the Saxon tongue. Thus during the time of the
Saxons the laws were so variable that there is little or no
likelihood to find any constant form of parliaments of the
whole kingdom.

13. A second point considerable is, whether in such
patliaments as was in the Saxons’ times, the nobility and
clergy only were of those assemblies, or whether the
Commons were also called? Some are of opinion that
though none of the Saxon laws do mention the Commons,
yet it may be gathered by the word “wisemen,” the
Commons are intended to be of those assemblies, and they
bring (as they conceive) probable arguments to prove it from
the antiquity of some boroughs that do yet send burgesses,
and from the proscription of those in ancient demesne not
to send burgesses to parliament. If it be true that the West
Saxons had a custom to assemble burgesses out of some of
their towns, yet it may be doubted whether other kingdoms
had the same usage, but sure it is that during the Heptarchy
the people could not elect any knights of the shire because
England was not then divided into shires.

On the contrary, there be of our historians who do
affirm that Henry I. caused the Commons first to be
assembled by knights and burgesses of their own appoint-
ment, for before his time only certain of the nobility and
prelates of the realm were called to consultation about the
most important affairs of state. If this assertion be true, it
seems a mere matter of grace of this king, and proves not
any natural right of the people originally to be admitted to
choose their knights and burgesses of. parliament, though it
had been more for the honour of parliaments if a king,
whose title to the Crown had been better, had been author
of the form of it, because he made use of it for his unjust
ends. For thereby he secured himself against his competitor
and elder brother by taking the oaths of the nobility in
parliament and getting the Crown to be settled upon his
children. And as the king made use of the people, so they,
by colour of parliament, served their own turns; for after
the establishment of parliaments by strong hand and by the
sword, they drew from him the Great Charter, which he
granted the rather to flatter the nobility and people, as Sir
64 PATRIARCHA..

Walter Raleigh, in his “Dialogue of Parliaments,” doth
affirm in these words: “ The Great Charter was not originally
granted legally and freely, for Henry I. did but usurp
the kingdom, and therefore the better to assure himself
against Robert, his elder brother, he flattered the nobility
and people with their charters; yea, King John that con-
firmed them, had the like respect, for Arthur, Duke of
Britain, was the undoubted heir of the Crown, upon whom
King John usurped, and so to conclude, these charters had
their original from kings de facto, but not de jure . . . the
Great Charter had first an obscure birth by usurpation, and
was secondly fostered and showed to the world by re-
bellion.”

15. A third consideration must be, that in the former
parliaments, instituted and continued since King Henry
I’s time, is not to be found the usage of any natural
liberty of the people ; for all those liberties that are claimed
in parliament are the liberties of grace from the king, and
not the liberties of nature to the people ; for if the liberty
were natural, it would give power to the multitude to
assemble themselves when and where they please, to bestow
sovereignty, and by pactions to limit and direct the exercise
of it. Whereas, the liberties of favour and grace which
are claimed in parliaments are restrained both for time,
place, persons, and other circumstances, to the sole pleasure
of the king. The people cannot assemble themselves, but
the king, by his writs, calls them to what place he pleases ;
and then again scatters them with his breath at an instant,
without any other cause showed than his will. Neither is
the whole summoned, but only so many as the king’s.
writs appoint. The prudent King Edward I. summoned
always those barons of ancient families that were most wise
to his parliament, but omitted their sons after their death if
they were not answerable to. their parents in understanding.
Nor have the whole people voices in the election of knights
of the shire or burgesses, but only freeholders in the
counties, and freemen in the cities and boroughs ; yet in
the City of Westminster all the householders, though they
be neither freemen nor freeholders, have voices in thcir
election of burgesses. Also during the time of parliament,
those privileges of the House of Commons of freedom of
PATRIARCHA, 65

Speech, power to punish their own members, to examine the
proceedings and demeanour of courts of justice and officers,
to have access to the king’s person, and the like, are not due
by any natural right, but are derived from the bounty or in-
dulgence of the king, as appears by a solemn recognition
of the House ; for at the opening of the parliament, when
the Speaker is presented to the king, he, in the behalf and
name of the whole House of Commons, humbly craves of
his Majesty, “ That he would be pleased to grant them their
accustomed liberties of freedom of speech, of access to his
person, and the rest.” These privileges are granted with a
condition implied that they keep themselves within the
bounds and limits of loyalty and obedience ; for else why
do the House cf Commons inflict punishment themselves
upon their own members for transgressing in some of these
points ; and the king, as head, hath many times punished
the members for the like offences. The power which the
king giveth in all his courts to his judges or others to
punish doth not exclude him from doing the like by way of
prevention, concurrence, or evocation, even in the same
point which he hath given in charge by a delegated power;
‘for they who give authority by commission do always
retain more than they grant. Neither of the two Houses
claim an infailibility of not erring, no more than a general
council can. It is not impossible but that the greatest may
be in fault, or at least interested or engaged in the de-
linquency of one particular member. In such cases it
is most proper for the head to correct, and not to expect
the consent of the members, or for the parties peccant to be
their own judges. Nor is it needful to confine the king in
such cases within the circle of any one court of justice, who
is supreme judge in all courts. And in rare and new cases
rare and new remedies must be sought out; for it is a rule
of the common law “Ja novo casu, novum remedium est
apponendum”; and the Statute of Westminster, 2, cap 24,
giveth power, even to the clerks of the Chancery, to make
new forms of writs in new cases, lest any man that came to
the King’s Court of Chancery for help should be sent
away without remedy. A precedent cannot be found in
every case ; and of things that happen seldom, and are not
common, there cannot be a common custom. Though
c
66 PATRIARCHA.

crimes exorbitant do pose the king and council in finding
a precedent for a condign punishment, yet they must not
therefore pass unpunished.

I have not heard that the people by whose voices the
knights and burgesses are chosen did ever call to ar
account those whom they had elected ; they neither give
them instructions or directions what to say or what to do in
parliament therefore they cannot punish them when they’
come home for doing amiss. If the people had any such
power over their burgesses, then we might call it the
natural liberty of the people with a mischief. But they are
so far from punishing that they may be punished them-
selves for intermeddling with parliamentary business; they
must only choose, and trust those whom they choose to do
what they list, and that is as much liberty:‘as many of us
deserve for our irregular elections of burgesses. ‘

15. A fourth point to be considered is, that in parliament
all statutes or laws are made properly by the king alone, at
the rogation of the people, as his Majesty King James, of
happy memory, affirms, in his true ‘‘ Law of Free Monarchy,”
and, as Hooker teacheth us, “That laws do not take their
constraining force from the quality of such as devise them,
but from the power that doth give them the strength of
laws.” “Ze roy de veult” (the king will have it so) is the in-
terpretive phrase pronounced at the king’s passing of every Act
of Parliament. And it was the ancient custom for a long time,
till the days of Henry V., that the kings, when any Bill was
brought unto them that had passed both Houses, to take and
pick out what they liked not, and so much as they chose
was enacted for a law ; but the custom of the later kings hath
been so gracious as to allow always of the entire Bill as it
hath passed both Houses.

16. The parliament is the king’s court, for so all the oldest
statutes call it, “the king in his parliament.” But neither
of the two Houses are that supreme court, nor yet both of
them together ; they are only members, and a part, of the
body, whereof the king is the head and ruler. The king’s
governing of this body of the parliament we may find most:
significantly proved, both by the statutes themselves, as alsc

by such precedents as expressly show us how the king, ©...

sometimes by himself, sometimes by his council, and
PATRIARCHA. 67

other times by his judges, hath overruled and directed
the judgments of the Houses of Parliament. For the
king, we find that Magna Charta, and the Charter of
Forests, and many other statutes about those times, had
only the form of the king’s letters-patents, or grants under the
great seal, testifying those great liberties to be the sole act
and bounty of the king. The words of Magna Charta begin
thus: “ Henry, by the grace of God, &c. To all our Arch-
bishops, &c., and our faithful subjects, greeting. Know ye,
that we, of our mere free will, have granted to all freemen
these liberties.” Inthe same style goeth the Charter of
Forests and other statutes. Sta/utum Hibernia, made at
Westminster, g February, 14 Henry III., is but a letter of the
king to Gerard, son of Maurice, Justice of Ireland. The
Statute de anno bissextili begins thus: “ The King to his
Justices of the Bench, greeting,” &c. Lxplanationes statuti
Glocestrie, made by the king and his justices only, were re-
ceived always as statutes, and are still printed amongst them.

“The statute made for correction of the twelfth chapter
of thé Statute of Gloucester, was signed under the great seal,
and sent to the justices of the bench, after the manner of a
writ-patent, with a certain writ closed, dated by the king’s
hand at Westminster, requiring that ‘they should do, and
execute all and everything contained in it, although the

et same do not accord with the Statute of Gloucester in all
things.”

The Statute of Rutland is the king’s letters to his trea-
-surer and barons of his Exchequer and to his chamberlain.

The Statute of Circumspecte Agis runs: “ The king to his
judges sendeth greeting.”

There are many other statutes of the same form, and
some of them which run only in the majestic terms of,
“The King commands,” or “ The King wills,” or, “ Our
Lord the King hath established,” or, ‘‘ Our Lord the King
hath ordained,” or, ‘‘ His Especial Grace hath granted,”
without mention of consent of the Commons or people,
insomuch that some statutes rather resemble proclama-
tions than Acts of Parliament. And indeed some of them

\ were no other than mere proclamations, as the Provisions of

Merton, made by the king at an assembly of the prelates and

ooo nobility, for the coronation of the king and his Queen Eleanor,
C2
68 PATRIARCHA.,

which begins, “ Provisum est in curia domint regis apud
Merton.” Also a provision was made 19 Henry III., “ De
asstsa ultime prosentationis,” which was continued, and
allowed for law, until Tit. West 2 an. 13 Edward L,, cap.
5, which provides the contrary in express words. This
provision begins: ‘“ Jrouwlsum fuit coram dom. rege,
archiepiscopis, episcopis et baronibus quod,” &c. It seems
originally the difference was not great between a pro-
clamation and a statute. This latter the king made by
common council of the kingdom. In the former he had
but the advice only of his great council, of the peers, or of
his privy council only. For that the king had a great
council besides his parliament appears by a record of
5 Henry IV. about an exchange between the king and the
Earl of Northumberland, whereby the king promiseth to
deliver to the earl linds to the value, by the advice of par-
liament, or otherwise by the advice of his grand council,
and other estates of the realm, which the king will assemble,
in case the parliament do not meet.

We may find what judgment in later times parliaments
have had of proclamations by the statute of 31 of Henry VL,
cap. 8, in these words: ‘“Forasmuch as the King, by the
advice of his Council, hath set forth proclamations which
obstinate persons have contemned, not considering what
a king by his royal power may do, considering that sudden
causes and occasions fortune many times which do require
speedy remedies, and that by abiding for a Parliament in
the mean time might happen great prejudice to ensue to the
realm, and weighing also that his Majesty, which by the
kingly and regal power given him by God may do many
things in such cases, should not be driven to extend the
liberties and supremacy of his regal power and dignity by
wilfulness of froward subjects: It is therefore thought fit
that the King, with the advice of his honourable Council,
should set forth proclamations for the good of the people
and defence of his royal dignity, as necessity shall
require.”

This opinion of a House of Parliament was confirmed
afterwards by a second parliament, and the statute made
proclamations of as great validity as if they had been made
in patliament. This law continued until the government
PATRIARCHA, 69

of the State came to be under a Protector, during the
minority of Edward VI., and in his first year it was repealed.

I find also that a parliament in the eleventh year of
. Henry VII. did so great reverence to the actions or
ordinances of the king, that by statute they provided a
remedy or means to levya benevolence granted to the king,
although by a statute made not long before all benevolences
were damned and annulled for ever.

Mr. Fuller, in his arguments against the proceedings of
the High Commission Court, affirms that the statute of
2 Henry IV., cap. 15, which giveth power to ordinaries
to imprison and set fines on subjects, was made without
the assent of the Commons because they are not mentioned
in the Act. If this argument be good, we shall find very
many statutes of the same kind, for the assent of the
Commons was seldom mentioned in the elder parlia-
ments. The most usual title of parliaments in Edward ITII.,
Richard II., the three Henrys, IV., V., VI., in Edward IV.
and Richard III.’s days, was: ‘The King and his Parlia-
ment, with the assent of the Prelates, Earls, and Barons, and
at the petition, or at the special instance, of the Commons,
doth ordain,”

The same Mr. Fuller saith that the statute made against
Lollards was without the assent of the Commons, as appears
by their petition in these words: “The Commons beseech
that whereas a statute was made in the last Parliament,” &c.,
which was never assented nor granted by the Commons,
but that which was done therein was done without their
assent.

17. How far the king’s council hath directed and swayed
in parliament hath in part appeared by what hath been
already produced. For further evidence we may add the
statute of Westminster, the first which saith : “These be the
Acts of King Edward I., made at his first parliament
general by his Council, and by the assent of Bishops,
Abbots, Priors, Earls, Barons, and all the Commonalty of
the Realm, &c.” The Statute of Bigamy saith: “In
presence of certain Reverend Fathers, Bishops of England,
and others of the King’s Council, forasmuch as all the King’s
Council, as well Justices as others, did agree that they
should be put in writing and observed” The Statute of
yo PATRIARCHA,

Acton, Burnel saith: “The King, for himself and by
his Council, hath ordained and established.” :

In Articuli super Chartas, when the Great Charter was
confirmed, at the request of his prelates, earls, and barons,
we find these passages: “1. Nevertheless the King and his
Council do not intend by reason of this Statute to diminish
the King’s right, &c.; 2. And notwithstanding all. these
things before-mentioned or any part of them, both the King
and his Council and all they that were present at the making
of this ordinance, will and intend that the right and preroga-
tive of his Crown shall be saved to him in all things.” Here
we may see in the same parliament the charter of the
liberties of the subjects confirmed and a saving of the king’s
prerogative. Those times neither stumbled at the name, nor
conceiyed any such antipathy between the terms as should
make them incompatible.

The Statute of Escheators hath this title: “At the Parlia-
ment of our Sovereign Lord the King, by his Council it was
agreed, and also by the King himself commanded.” And
the.Ordinance of Inquest goeth thus: “It is agreed and
ordained by the King himself and all his Council.”

The statute made at York, 9 Edward IIL., saith, ‘‘ Whereas
the knights, citizens and burgesses desired our Sovereign
Lord the King in his Parliament, by their petition, that for
his profit and the commodity of his Prelates, Earls, Barons,
and Commons, it may please him to provide remedy ; our
Sovereign Lord the King sesE the profit of his people
by the assent of his Prelates, Farls, Barons, and’ other ~
nobles of his Council being there, hath ordained.” .

In the parliament primo Edward III., where Magna
was confirmed, I find this preamble: ‘At the request
of the commonalty by their petition made before the King
and his Council in Parliament, by the assent of the Prelates,
Earls, Barons, and other great men assembled, it was
granted.”

‘The Commons presenting a petition unto the King, which
the King’s council did mislike, were content thereupon to
mend and explain their petition ; the form of which petition
is in these words: “To their most redoubted Sovereign Lord
the King, praying the said Commons, that, whereas they
have prayed him to be discharged all manner of articles of
*

PATRIARCHA. 71

the Eyre, &c. Which petition seemeth to his Council to be
prejudicial unto him and in disinherison of his Crown if it
were so generally granted. His said Commons, hot willin
nor desiring to demand things of him which should fal
in disinherigson of him or his Crown perpetually, as of
escheators, &c., but of trespasses, misprisons, negligences,
and ignorances, &c.” ‘

In the time of Henry III. an order or provision was
made, by the king’s ‘council, and it was pleaded at the
common law in bar to a writ of dower. The plaintiff’s
attorney could not deny it, and thereupon the judgment
was ideo sine die. It seems in those days an order of the
council board was either parcel of the common law or
above it.

The reverend judges have had regard in their procéed-
ings that before they would resolve or give judgment in
new cases, they consulted with the king’s privy council.
In the case of Adam Brabson, who was assaulted by R. W.
in the presence of the justices of assize at Westmiister, the
judges would have the advice of the king’s couhcil. For
in a like case, because R. C. did strike a juror at West-
minster, which passed in an inquest against one of his
friends, “It was adjudged by all the council that his right
hand should be cut off and his lands and goods forfeited to
the king.” .

Green and Thorp were sent by judges of the bench to
the king’s council to demand of them whether by the
statute of 14 Edward III., cap. 16, a word may be amended
in a writ; and it was answered that a word may well be
amended, although the statute speak but of a letter or
syllable.

In the case of Sir Thomas Oghtred, knight, who brought
a formedon against a poor man and his wife, they came
and yielded to the demandant, which seemed suspicious to
the court, whereupon judgment was stayed; and Thorp
said, “‘ That in the like case of Giles Blacket it was spoken
of in Parliament, and we were commanded that when any
like case should come we should not go to judgment without
good advice.” Therefore the judges’ conclusion was “ Swes
au counseil et comment ils voillet que nous devomus faire,
nous volume faire, et auuterment nient én cest casc:” Sue
42 PATRIARCHA.

to the council, and as they will have us to do, we will ; and
otherwise not in this case.

18. In the last place we may consider how much hath
been attributed to the opinions of the king’s judges by
parliaments, and so find that the king’s council hath
guided and ruled the judges, and the judges guided the
parliament.

In the parliament of 28 Henry VI., the Commons made
suit : “That William de la Poole, Duke of Suffolk, should
be committed to prison for many treasons and other crimes.
The lords of the Higher House were doubtful what answer
to give; the opinion of the judges was demanded. Their
opinion was that he ought not to be committed, for that the
Commons did not charge him with any particular offence,
but with general reports and slanders.” This opinion was
allowed.

In another parliament, 31 Henry VI. (which was pro-
rogued) in the vacation the Speaker of the House of Com-
mons was condemned in a thousand pounds damages in an
action of trespass, and was committed to prison in execu-
tion for the same. When the parliament was reassembled
the Commons made suit to the King and Lords to have
their Speaker delivered ; the Lords demanded the opinion
of the judges, whether he might be delivered out of prison
by privilege of parliament? Upon the judges’ answer it
was concluded: ‘‘ That the Speaker should still remain in
prison according to the law, notwithstanding the privilege
of parliament and thar he was the Speaker,” which resolu-
tion was declared to the Commons by Moyle, the king’s
serjeant-at-law ; and the Commons were commanded, in
the king’s name, by the Bishop of Lincoln (in the absence
of the Archbishop of Canterbury, then Chancellor) to choose
another Speaker.”

In septimo of Henry VIII. a question was moved in
parliament: “Whether spiritual persons might be con-
vented before temporal judges for criminal cases.” There
Sir John Fineux and the other judges delivered their
opinion: “That they might and ought to be ;” and their
opinion was allowed and maintained by the king and
lords and Dr. Standish, who before had holden it. The
same opinion was delivered from the bishops.
PATRIARCHA., 73

If a writ of error be sued in parliament upon a judgment
given in the King’s Bench, the lords of the Higher House
alone (without the Commons) are to examine the errors ;
the Lords are to proceed according to law, and for their
judgment therein they are to be informed by the advice and
counsel of the judges, who are to inform them what the law
is, and so to direct them in their judgment, for the Lords
are not to follow their own opinions or discretions other-
wise. So it was in a writ of error brought in parliament by
the Dean and Chapter of Lichfield against the Prior and
Covent of Newton-Panel, as appeareth by record. See
Flower Dew’s case, p. 1, h. 7, fol. 19.
TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT.

IN THE FORMER
THE FALSE PRINCIPLES AND FOUNDATION
OF SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE
DETECTED AND OVERTHROWN.

THE LATTER IS AN

ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT,
AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
Two Treatises or GoveRNMENT.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER IL.

1. SLAVERY is So vile and miserable an estate of man,and so
directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our
nation, that it is hardly to be conceived that an “ Englishman,”
much less a “gentleman,” should plead for it. And truly
I should have taken this, as any other treatise which would
persuade all men that they are slaves, and ought to be so,
for such another exercise of wit as was his who writ the
encomium of Nero, rather than for a serious discourse meant
in earnest, had not the gravity of the title and epistle, the
picture in the front of Sir Robert’s book, and the applause
that followed it, required me to believe that the author and
publisher were both in earnest. I therefore took the
“ Patriarcha” of Sir R. Filmer into my hands with all the
expectation, and read it through with all the attention, due
to a treatise that made such a noise at its coming abroad,
and cannot but confess myself mightily surprised that, in a
book which was to provide chains for all mankind, I should
find nothing but a rope of sand, useful, perhaps, to such
whose skill and business it is to raise a dust, and would.
blind the people the better to mislead them, but is not of
any force to draw those into bondage who have their eyes
open, and so much sense about them as to consider that
chains are but an ill wearing, how much care soever hath
been taken to file and polish them.

2. If any one think I take too much liberty in speaking
78 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

so freely of a man who is the great champion of absolute
power, and the idol of those who worship it, I beseech him
to make this small allowance for once to one who, even
after the reading of Robert’s book, cannot but think him-
self, as the laws allow him, a freeman, and I know no fault
it is to do so, unless any one better skilled in the fate of it
than I, should have it revealed to him that this treatise,
which has Jain dormant so long, was, when it appeared in
the world, to catry by strengths of its arguments all liberty
out of it, and that from thenceforth our author’s short
model was to be the pattern in the Mount and the perfect
standard of politics for the future. His system lies in a
little compass. It is no more but this:  .

That all government is absolute monarchy; and the ground
he builds on is this:

That no man is born free.

3. Since there have been a generation of men sprung up
in the world that would flatter princes with an opinion that
they have a Divine right to absolute power, let the laws
by which they are constituted and are to govern, and
the conditions under which they enter upon their autho-
rity be what they will, and their engagements to observe
them never so well ratified by solemn oaths and promises,
they have denied mankind a right to natural freedom,
whereby they have not only, as much as in them lies, ex-
posed all subjects to the utmost misery of tyranny and
oppression, but have also so unsettled the titles and shaken
the thrones of princes (for they, too, by these men’s doc-
trine, except only one, are all born slaves, and by Divine
right are subjects to Adam’s right heir), as if they had
designed to make war upon all government and subvert the
very foundations of human society.

4. However, we must believe them upon their own bare
words, when they tell us we are all born slaves; and there
is no remedy for it, we must continue so. Life and thral-
dom we entered into together, and can never be quit of the
one till we part with the other, though I do not find Scrip-
ture or reason anywhere say so, however these men would
persuade us that Divine authority hath subjected us to the
unlimited will of another: an admirable state of mankind,
and that which they have not had wit enough to find out
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 79

till this latter age. For, however, Sir Robert Filmer seems to
condemn the novelty of the contrary opinion (‘ Patriarcha,”
p- 11), yet I believe it will be hard for him to find any other
age or country of the world but this which have asserted
monarchy to be jure Divino. And heconfesses (‘‘Patriarcha,”
~ p- 12), ‘“‘ That Heyward, Blackwood, Barclay, and others that
have bravely vindicated the right of kings in most points,
never thought of this, but with one consent admitted the
natural liberty and equality of mankind.” ;
By whom this doctrine came at first to be broached and
brought in fashion amongst us, and what sad effects it gave
rise to, I leave to historians to relate, or the memory of those
who were contemporaries with Sibthorp and Manwering to
recollect ; my business at present being only to consider
what Sir R. F., who is allowed to have carried this argument
farthest, and is supposed to have brought it to perfection,
has said in it; for from him every one who would be as
fashionable as French was at Court has learned and runs
away with this short system of politics—viz., men are not
born free, and therefore could never have the liberty to
choose either governors or forms of government ; princes
have their power absolute and by Divine right, for slaves
could never have a right to compact or consent ; Adam was
an absolute monarch, and so are all princes ever since.

CHAPTER UW.
Of Paternal and Regal Power.

6. Sir R, F.'s great position is, that “men are not naturally
free ;” this is the foundation on which his absolute monarchy
stands, and from which it erects itself to an height that its
power is above every power, caput inter nubila; so high
above all earthly and human things that thought can
\

80 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

scarce reach it, that promises and oaths which tie the
infinite Deity cannot confine it. But if this foundation
fails, all his fabric falls with it, and governments must be
left again to the old way of being made by contrivance
and the consent of men (tvOpdmwy xriots) making use of
their reason to unite together into society. To prove this
grand position of his, he tells us (p. 15): ‘ Men are born in
subjection to their parents,” and, therefore, cannot be free.
And this authority of parents he calls, “royal authority”
(pp. 15-16), “fatherly authority,” “‘right of fatherhood”
(pp. 15-19). One would have thought he would in the
beginning of such a work as this, on which was to depend
the authority of princes and the obedience of subjects, have
told us expressly what that fatherly authority is; have
defined it, though not limited it, because in some other
treatises of his he tells us “it is unlimited, and unlimit-
able ;’* he should at least have given us such an account
of it that we might have had an entire notion of this
“fatherhood” or “fatherly authority” whenever it came in. our
way in his writings. This I expected to have found in the
first chapter of his ‘Patriarcha.” Butt instead thereof
having, firstly, ex passant, made his obeisance to the arcana
imperit (p. 12); secondly, made his compliment to the “rights
and liberties of this or any other nation” (p. 13), which he
is going presently to null and destroy; and, thirdly, made
his leg to those learned men who did not see so far into the
matter as himself (p. 13), he comes to fall on Bellarmine

-(p. 14), and by a victory over him establishes his “ fatherly

authority” beyond any question; Bellarmine being routed by
his own confession (p. 15), the day is clear got, and there
is no more need of any forces; for having done that I
observe not that he states the question, or rallies up any
arguments to make good his opinion, but rather tells us the
story, as he thinks fit, of this strange kind of domineering
phantom, called the “fatherhood,” which, whoever could
catch, presently got empire and unlimited absolute power.

* “Tn grants and gifts that have their original from God or Nature,
as the power of the father hath, no inferior power of man can limit or
make any law of prescription against them.”—O., p. 158.

+ “The Scripture teaches that supreme power was originally in the
father without any limitation.”"—O., p. 245.
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 81

He assures us how this fatherhood began in Adam, con-

tinued its course, and kept the world in order all the time of
the patriarchs till the Flood, got out of the ark with Noah

and his sons, made and supported all the kings of the earth

till the captivity of the Israelites in Egypt, and then the

poor fatherhood was under hatches till ‘‘God, by giving the

Israelites kings, re-established the ancient and prime right

of the lineal succession in paternal government.” This is

his business from pp. 15-19. And then, obviating an

objection, and clearing a difficulty or two with one half

reason (p. 20), pon he etre sent oe

he ends the first chapter. ope it is no injury to call an

half-quotation an half-reason, for God says, ‘‘ Honour thy -
father and mother,” but our author contents himself with

half, leaves out “thy mother” quite, as little serviceable to

his purpose ; but of that more in another place.

7. Ido not think our author so little skilled in the way
of writing discourses of this nature, nor so careless of the
point in hand, that he by oversight commits the fault that
he himself in his “Anarchy of a Mixed Monarchy” (p. 239),
objects to Mr. Hunton in these words: “ Where first I
charge the a that he hath not given us any defini-
tion or description of monarchy in general, for by the rules
of method” he should have first defined. And by the like
rule of method Sir Robert should have told us what his
“fatherhood” or ‘‘fatherly authority” is, before he had told us
in whom it was to be found, and talked so much of it. But,
perhaps, Sir Robert found that this “fatherly authority,” this
power of fathers and of kings—for he makes them both the
same (p. 2r)—would make a very odd and frightful figure,
and very disagreeing with what either children imagine of
their parents or subjects of their kings, if he should have
given us the whole draught together in that gigantic form
he had painted it in his own fancy, and, therefore, hke a
wary physician, when he would have his patient swallow
some harsh or corrosive liquor, he mingles it with a large
quantity of that which may dilute it, that the scattered
parts may go down with less feeling and cause less
aversion.

8. Let us then endeavour to find what acccunt he gives
us of this “fatherly authority,” as it lies scatiered in the

 
82 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

several parts of his writings. And first as it was veste? in
Adam, he says, ‘(not only Adam, but the succeeding patri-
archs, had, by right of fatherhood, royal authority over their
children” (p.15). ‘This lordship, which Adam by command
had over the whole world, and by right descending from him,
the patriarchs did enjoy, wasas large and ampleas the absolute
dominion of any monarch which hath been since the creation”
(p. 15). “Dominion of life and death; making war and
concluding peace” (p. 15). ‘‘ Adam and the patriarchs had
absolute power of life and death” (p.25). ‘ Kings, inthe right
of parents, succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction”
(p.19). ‘As kingly power is by the law of God, so it hath no
inferior law to limit it, Adam was lord of all” (p. 27). “ The
father of a family governs by no other law than by his own
will” (p. 44). ‘The superiority of princes is above laws”
(p.44). “The unlimited jurisdiction of kings is so amply
described by Samuel” (p. 45). ‘‘ Kings are above the laws”
(p. 50). And to this purpose see a great deal more which our
author delivers in Bodins’s words :—“ It is certain that all
laws, privileges, and grants of princes have no force but
during their life, if they be not ratified by the express consent
or by sufferance of the prince following, especially privileges”
(O., p. 279). ‘The reason why laws have been also made
by kings was this-- when kings were either busied with wars,
or distracted with public cares, so that every private man
could not have access to their persons, to learn their wills
and pleasure, then were laws of necessity invented, that so
every particular subject might find his prince’s pleasure
deciphered unto him in the tables of his laws” (p. 92). “Ina
monarchy the king must by necessity be above the laws”
(p. 100). “A perfect kingdom is that wherein the king
rules all things according to his own will” (p. 100). “ Neither
common nor statute laws are or can be any diminution of
that general power which kings have over their people by
right of fatherhood” (p. 115). ‘‘ Adam was the father, king
and lord over his family ; a son, a subject, and a servant, or
slave, were one and the same thing at first. ‘The father had
power to dispose or sell his children or servants, whence we
find that at the first reckoning up of goods in Scripture the
man-servant and the maid-servant are numbered among the
possessions and substance of the owner, as other goods
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 83

were” (O., pref). “God also hath given to the father a right
or liberty to alien his powet over his children to any other ;
whence we find the sale anid gift of children to have been
much in use in the beginning of the world, when men had
their servants for a possession and an inheritance, as well ds
other goods, whereupon we find the power of castrating and
making eunuchs much in use in old times” (O., p. 155). “Law
is nothing else but the will of him that hath the power of the
supreme father” (O., p. 223). “It was God’s ordinance that
supremacy should be unlimited in Adam, and as large as
all the acts of his will; and as in him, so in all others that
have supreme power” (O., p. 245).

g. I have been fain to trouble my reader with these several
quotations in our author’s own words, that in them might be
seen his own description of his “fatherly authority” —as it lies
scattered up arid down in his writings—which he supposes
was first vested in Adam, and by right belongs to all princes
ever since. This “fatherly authority,” then, or “ right of father-
hood,” in our author’s sense is a Divine, unalterable right of
sovereignty, whereby a father or a prince hath an absolute,
atbitrary, unlimited, and unlimitable power over the lives,
liberties, and estates of his children or subjects, so that he
may take or alienate their estates, sell, castrate, or use their
persons as he pleases—they being all his slaves, and he lord
and proprietor of everything, andhis unbounded will their law.

ro. Our author, having placed such a mighty power in
Adam, and upon that supposition founded all government
and all power of princes, it is reasonable to expect that he
should have proved this with arguments clear and evident,
suitable to the weightiness of the cause. That since men
had nothing else left them, they might in slavery had such
undeniable proofs of its necessity that their consciences
might be convinced, and oblige them to submit peaceably
to that absolute dominion which their governors had a right
to exercise over them; without this, what good could our

-author do, or pretend to do, by erecting such an unlimited
power, but flatter the natural vanity and ambition of men—
too apt of itself to grow and increase with the possession of
any power? And by persuading those who, by the consent
of their fellow men, are advanced to great but limited
degrees of it, that, by that part which is given them, they
84 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

have a right to all that was not so, and therefore may do
what they please, because they have authority to do more
than others, and so tempt them to do what is neither for
their own nor the good of those under their care, whereby
great mischiefs cannot but follow.

11. The sovereignty of Adam being that on which as a
sure basis our author builds his mighty absolute monarchy, I
expected that in his “ Patriarcha” this his main supposition
would have been proved and established with all that
evidence of arguments that such a fundamental tenet re-
quired, and that this on which the great stress of the business
depends would have been made out with reasons sufficient
to justify the confidence with which it was assumed, But in
all that treatise I could find very little tending that way ; the
thing is there so taken for granted without proof that I could
scarce believe myself when, upon attentive reading that
treatise, I found there so mighty a structure raised upon the
bare supposition of this foundation ; for it is scarce credible
that in a discourse where he pretends to confute the “erroneous
principle” of man’s “natural freedom,” he does it by a bare
supposition of “‘Adam’s authority,” without offering any proof
for that “authority.” Indeed he confidently says that “Adam
had royal authority” (pp. 15 and 16), “ Absolute lordship
and dominion of life and death” (p. 16), ‘(An universal
monarchy” (p. 31), ‘Absolute power of life and death”
(p. 25). He is very frequent in such assertions, but, what is
strange in all his whole “ Patriarcha,” I find not one pretence
of a reason-to establish this his great foundation of govern-
ment, not anything that looks like an argument but these
words : “ J’o confirm this natural right of regal power, we
find in the Decalogue that the law which enjoins obedience
to kings is delivered in the terms, ‘ Honour thy father,’ as
if all power were originally in the father.” And why may I
not add as well, that in the Decalogue the law that enjoins
obedience to queens is delivered in the terms of “ Honour
thy mother,” as if all power were originally in the mother?
The argument, as Sir Robert puts it, will hold as well fou
ong as the other, but of this more in its due place.

12. All that I take notice of here is, that this is all our
author says in this first or any of the following chapters to
prove the “absolute powerof Adam,” which is his great prin-
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 85

ciple, and yet, as if he had there settled it upon sure de-
monstration, he begins his second chapter with these words:
“ By conferring these proofs and reasons drawn from the
authority of the Scripture.” Where those “ proofs and reasons”
for Adam’s sovereignty are, bating that of “ Honour thy
father,” above mentioned, I confess I cannot find, unless
what he says (p. 14), “In these words we have an evident
confession—viz., of Bellarmine—that creation made man
prince of his posterity,” must be taken for proofs and reasons
drawn from Scripture or for any sort of proofs at all, though
from thence by a new way of inference in the words
immediately following: “And indeed (he concludes) the
royal authority of Adam” sufficiently settled in him.

13. If he has in that chapter, or anywhere in the whole
treatise, given any other proofs of “ Adam’s royal authority”
other than by often repeating it, which, among some men,
goes for argument, I desire anybody for him to show me the
place and page, that I may be convinced of my mistake and
acknowledge my oversight. If no such arguments are to be
found, I beseech those men who have so much cried up this
book, to consider whether they do not give the world cause -
to suspect that it is not the force of reason and argument
that makes them for absolute monarchy, but some other by
interest, and ‘therefore are resolved to applaud any author
that writes in favour of this doctrine, whether he support it
with reason or no. But I hope they do not expect that
rational and indifferent men should be brought over to their
opinion, because this their great doctor of it, in a discourse
made on purpose, to set up the “absolute monarchical power.
of Adam” in opposition to the “natural freedom” of man-
kind, has said so little to prove it, from whence it is rather
naturally to be concluded that there is little to be said.

14. But that I might omit no care to inform myself in our
author’s full sense, I consulted his ‘ Observations on Aris-
totle, Hobs,” (&c:, to see whether, in disputing with others,
he made use of any arguments for this his darling tenet of
“ Adam’s sovereignty,” since, in his treatise on the “ Natural
Power of Kings,” he had been so sparing of them; and in
his “ Observations on Mr. Hobs’s ‘Leviathan,’” I think he has .
put in short all those argurn ogether, which in his
writings I find him anywhere to make use of ; his words are
86 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

these :—“ If God created only Adam, and of a piece of him
made the woman, and if by generation from them two, as
parts of them, all mankind be propagated ; if also God gave
to Adam, not only the dominion over the woman and the
children that should issue from them, but also over the
whole earth to subdue it, and over all the creatures on it, so
that, as long as Adam lived, no man could claim or enjoy
anything but by donation, assignation, or permission from
him, I wonder,” &c. (O., 165). Here we have the sum of all
his arguments for “« Adam’s sovereignty” and against “ natural
freedom,” which I find up and down in his other treatises,
which are these following :—‘‘God’s creation of Adam,”
“The dominion He gave him over Eve,” and “The do-
minion he had as father over his children,” all which I shall
particularly consider. .

 

CHAPTER III. S

Op Adam's Title to Sovereignty by Creation. .

15. SiR Roperr in his preface to his “ Observations on
Aristotle’s ‘ Politics,’” tells us—“ A natural freedom of man-
kind cannot be supposed without the denial of the creation of
Adam;” but how Adam's being created, which was nothing
but his receiving a being immediately from Omnipotency
and the hand of God, gave Adam a sovereignty over any-
thing, I cannot see, nor, consequently, understand how a
“supposition of natural freedom is a denial of Adam’s crea-
tion,” and would be glad anybody else (since our author did
hot vouchsafe us the favour) would make it out for him ; for
I find no difficulty to suppose the “ freedom of mankind,”
though I have always believed the “creation of Adam." He
was created or began to exist by God’s immediate powet,
without the intervention of parents, or the pre-existence of
any of the same species to beget him, when it pleased God
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 87

he should ; and so did the lion, the king of beasts, before
him, by the same creating power of God; and if bare
existence by that power, and in that way, will give dominion
without any more ado, our author, by this argument, will
make the lion have as good a title to it as he, and certainly
the ancienter. No ; for “‘ Adam had his title by the appoint-«
ment of God,” says our author in another place. Then, bare
creation gave hirn not dominion; and one might have sup-
posed mankind free without “ denying the creation of Adam,”
since it was God’s “ appointment” made him monarch.

16. But let us see how he puts “ his creation ” and this “ ap-
pointment” together. “ By the appointment of God,” says
Sir Robert, “as soon as Adam was created, he was monarch
of the world, though he had no subjects ; for though there
could not be actual government till there were subjects, yet,
by the right of nature, it was due to Adam to be governor

_ Of his posterity, though not in act, yet at least in habit,

Adam was a king from his creation.” Iwish he hadtoldus |

here what he meant “by God’s appointment.” For whatsoever
.Providence orders, or the law of nature directs, or positive re-
~velation declares, may be said to be “‘by God’s appointment ;”
‘but I suppose it cannot be meant here in the first sense—that
is by Providence ; because that would be to say no more
but that,. “as soon as Adam was created,” he was de facto
monarch, because, “ by right of nature, it was due to Adam to
be governor of his posterity.” But he could not de facto be
by Providence constituted the governor of the world at a
time when there was actually no government, no subjects to
be gaverned, which our author here confesses. ‘“ Monarch of
the world” is also differently used by our author, for some-
times he means by it a proprietor of all the world, exclusive
of the rest of mankind, and thus he does in the same page
of his preface before cited :—‘* Adam,” says he, “ being com-
manded to multiply and people the earth, and to subdue it,
and having dominion given him over all creatures, was therez
by the monarch of the whole world ; none of his postextty
had any right to possess anything but by his grant or per-
mission, or by succession from him.” (2) Let us understand,
then, by “ monarch,” proprietor of the world, and by “ap-
pointment,” God’s actual donation and revealed positive grant
made to Adam (Gen. i. 28), as we see Sir Robert himself
4

88 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

does in this parallel place, and then his argument will stand
thus :—“ By the positive grant of God, as soon as Adam was
created, he was proprietor of the world, because by the right
of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his
posterity ;” in which way of arguing there are two manifest
falsehoods. Firstly, it is false that God made that grant to
Adam as soon as he was created, since, though it stands in
the text immediately after his creation, yet it is plain it could
not be spoken to Adam till after Eve was made and brought
to him ; and how, then, could he be “monarch by appoint-
ment as soon as created,” especially since he calls, if I mistake
not, that which God says to Eve (Gen. ili. 16), “the original
grant of government,” which, not being till after the Fall, when
Adam was somewhat, at least in time, and very much distant
in condition, from his creation, I cannot see how our author
can say, in this sense, that, “ by God’s appointment, as soon
as Adam was created, he was monarch of the world.”
Secondly, were it true that God’s actual donation “ appointed
Adam monarch of the world as soon as he was created,” yet
the reason here given for it would not prove it, but it would
always be a false inference, that God, by a positive donation,
appointed Adam “ monarch of the world because, by right of
nature, it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity ;”
for, having given hin the right of government by nature,
there was no need of a positive donation, at least it will never
be a proof of such a donation.

17. On the other side, the matter will not be much mended
if we understand “ by God’s appointment” the Jaw of nature
(though it be a pretty harsh expression for it in this place),
and by “monarch of the world” sovereign ruler of mankind ;
for then the sentence under consideration must run thus:
“ By the law of nature, as soon as Adam was created, he
was governor of mankind, for by right of nature it was due
to Adam to be governor of his posterity ;’ which amounts
to this : he was governor by right of nature because he was
governor by right of nature. But supposing we should
grant that a man is “ by nature governor” of his children,
Adam could not hereby be “ monarch as soon as created ;”
for this right of nature being founded in his being their father,
how Adam could have a “natural right” to be “governor”
before he was a father, by which only he had that “ right,” is,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 89

methinks, hard to conceive, unless he will have him to be a
father before he was a father, and to have a title before he
had it.

18. To this foreseen objection our author answers very
logically : ‘‘ He was governor in habit and not in act.” A
very pretty way of being a governor, without government, a
father, without children, and a king, without subjects. And
thus Sir Robert was an author before he wrote his book—not
“in act,” it is true, but ‘‘in habit ;” for when he had once pub-
lished, it was due to him “by the right of nature” to be an
author, as much as it was “‘to Adam to be governor of his
children” when he had begot them. And if to be sucha
“monarch of the world”—an absolute monarch “in habit but
ot in act’—will serve the turn, I should not much envy it to
any of Sir Robert’s friends that he thought fit graciously to
bestow it upon. Though even this of “act” and “habit,” if it
signified anything but‘our author’s skill in distinctions, be not
to his purpose in this place ; for the question is not here
about Adam’s actual exercise of government, but actually
having a title to be governor.. Government, says our author,
was “due to Adam by the right of nature.” What is this
right of nature? A right fathers have over their children
by begetting them : “ Generatione jus acquiritur parentibus in
“iberos,” says our author, out of “Grotius” (O., 223). ‘The
right then follows the begetting, as arising from it; so that,
according to this way of reasoning or distinguishing of our
aathor, Adam, as soon as he was created, had a title only “in
habit and not in act;” which, in plain English, is, he had
actually no title at all.

19. To speak less learnedly and more intelligibly, one
may say of Adam: “He was in a possibility of being
governor, since it was possible he might beget children,
and thereby acquire that right of nature, be it what it will,
to govern them that accrues from thence.” But what connec-

-tion this has with “ Adam’s creation,” to make him say that
“as soon as he was created he was monarch of the world’”—
for it may be as well said of Noah that as soon as he was
born he was monarch of the world, since he was in possi-
bility (which, in our author’s sense, is enough to make a
monarch—a monarch in habit) to eutlive all mankind but his
own posterity—I say, what such necessary connection there
go TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

is betwixt Adam’s creation and his right to government, sa
that a “‘natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed
without the denial of the creation of Adam,” I confess, for
my part, I do not see; nor how those words, “ by the
appointment,” &c. (O., 254), however explained, can be put
together to make any tolerable sense, at least to establish
this position, with which they end—-viz., “ Adam was a king
from his creation,” a king, says our author, “not in act but
in habit”—z.e., actually no king at all. /

20. I fear I have tired my readers’ patience by dwelling
longer on this passage than the weightiness of any argument
in it seems to require; but I have unavoidably been en-
gaged in it by our author’s way of writing, who, huddling
several suppositions together, and that in doubtful and
general terms, makes such a medley and confusion, that it
is impossible to show his mistakes without examining the
several senses wherein his words may be taken, and with- ©
out seeing how in any of these various meanings they will
consist together and have any truth in them; for, in this
present passage before us, how can any one argue against
this position of his, that “Adam was a king from his
creation,” unless one examine whether the words, “ from
his creation,” be to be taken, as they may, for the time of
the commencement of his government, as the foregoing words
import, ‘as soon as he was created he was monarch,” or
for the cause of it, as he says (p. 14): ‘“ Creation made man
prince of his posterity ”? How, farther, can one judge of the
truth of his being thus king till one has examined whether
king be to be taken, as the words in the beginning of this
passage would persuade, on supposition of his * private
dominion,” which was by God’s positive grant, “monarch
of the world by appointment ;” or king on supposition of -
his fatherly power over his offspring, which was by Nature
“due by the right of nature’—whether I say king be to be
taken in both, or one only of these two senses, or in
neither of them, but only this, that creation made him
prince in a way different from both the other? For though
this assertion, that ‘‘ Adam was king from. his creation ” be
true in no sense, yet it statids here as an evident conclu-
sion drawn from the ptéceditg words, though in truth it be
but a bare assertion joinéd to other assertions of the same
1

TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 9

kind, which, confidently put together in words of undeter-

mined and dubious meaning, look like a sort of arguing,

when there is indeed neither proof nor connection—a way

very familiar with our author, of which, haying given the

reader a taste here, I shall, as much as the argument will

permit me, avoid touching on hereafter, and should not

have done it here were it not to let the world see howd
incoherences in matter and suppositions, without proofs,’
put handsomely together in good words and a plausible

style, are apt to pass for strong reason and good sense till

they come to be looked into with attention.

CHAPTER IV.
Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty by Donation (Gen. i. 28),

/ 21. Havine at last got through the foregoing passage,
where we have been so long detained, not by the force of
arguments and opposition, but the intricacy of the words
and the doubtfulness of the meaning, let us go on to his
next argument—for Adam’s sovereignty. Our author tells us,
in the words of Mr. Selden, that “Adam, by donation
from God (Gen, i. 28), was made the’ general lord of all
things, not without such a private dominion to himself as
without his grant did exclude his children. This determi-
nation of Mr. Selden,” says our author, “ is consonant to
the history of the Bible and natural reason” (O., 210).
And in his preface to his “ Observations on Aristotle” he says
thus: “The first government in the world was monarchical
in the father of all flesh, Adam, being commanded to
multiply and people the earth and to subdue it, and,
having dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby
the monarch of the whole world ; none of his posterity had
any right to possess anything but by his grant or permis-
sion, or by succession from him ; ‘the earth,’ saith the
92 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMEN?7.

Psalmist, ‘hath he given to the children of men,’ which
shows the title comes from fatherhood.”

22. Before I examine this argument and the text on
which it is founded, it is necessary to desire the reader to
observe that our author, according to his usual method,
begins in one sense and concludes in another. He begins
here with “ Adam’s propriety or private dominion by dona-
tion,” and his conclusion is—“ which shows the title comes
from fatherhood.”

23.. But let us see the argument. The words of the text
are these: ‘And God blessed them, and God said unto
them, Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth and
subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and
over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that
moveth upon the earth” (Gen. i. 28), from whence our
author concludes that ‘‘Adam, having here dominion
given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of
the whole world,” whereby must be meant that either this
grant of God gave Adam property, or, as our author calls
it, ‘‘ private dominion,” over the earth and all inferior or
irrational creatures, and so consequently that he was
thereby monarch ; or, secondly, that it gave him rule and
dominion over all earthly creatures whatsoever, and
thereby over his children, and so he was monarch ; for, as
Mr. Selden has properly worded it, “Adam was made
general lord of all things,” one may very clearly under-
stand him, that he means nothing to be granted to Adam
here but property, and therefore he says not one word of
Adam’s “monarchy.” But our author says, “ Adam was
hereby monarch of the world,” which, properly speaking,
signifies sovereign ruler of all the men in the world, and so
Adam, by this grant, must be constituted such a ruler. If
our author means otherwise, he might, with much clearness,
have said that “ Adam was hereby proprietor of the whole
world.” But he begs your pardon in that point; clear, dis-
tinct speaking not serving everywhere to his purpose, you
Must not expect it in him as in Mr. Selden, or other such
writers.

24. In opposition, therefore, to our author’s doctrine,
that “Adam was monarch of the whole world,” founded on

this place, I shall show :—
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 9S

Firstly, that by this grant (Gen. i. 28) God gave no im-
mediate power to Adam over men, over his children, over
those of his own species, and so he was not made ruler or
“ monarch ” by this charter.

Secondly, that by this grant God gave him not “ private
dominion ” over the inferior creatures, but right in common
with all mankind, so neither was he “ monarch” upon the
account of the property here given him.

25. Firstly, that this donation (Gen. i. 28) gave Adam
no power over men, will appear if we consider the words
of it. For since all positive grants convey no more than
the express words they are made in will carry, let us see
which of them here will comprehend mankind or Adam’s
posterity ; and those I imagine, it any, must be these—
“every living thing that moveth ;’ the words in the
Hebrew are nvoin nn—ie., bestiam reptantem, of which
words the Scripture itself is the best interpreter. God
having created the fishes and fowls the filth day ; the be-
ginning of the sixth He creates the irrational inhabitants of
the dry land, which (ver. 24) are described in these
words: “Let the earth bring forth the living creature
after his kind; cattle and creeping things and beasts of the
earth after his kind ;” and (ver. 2}: ‘“ And God made the
beasts of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their
kind, and everything that creepeth on the earth after his
kind.” Here, in the creation of the brute inhabitants of
the earth, he first speaks of them all under one general
name of “living creatures,” and then afterwards divides
them into three ranks: 1. Cattle or such creatures as were
or might be tame, and so be the private possession of
particular men; 2. mn, which (vers. 24 and 25) in our
Bible is translated “ beasts,” and by the Septuagint, @ypia,
—“ wild beasts,” and is the same word that here in our
text (ver. 28), where we have this great charter to Adan, is
translated “living thing,” and is also the same word used
(Gen. ix. 2) where this grant is renewed to Noah, and there
likewise translated “beast ;” 3. The third rank were the
creeping animals, which (vers. 24 and 25) are comprised
under the word nivprn, the same that is used here (ver.
28), and is translated “moving,” but in the former verses
“creeping,” and by the Septuagint in all these places
94 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

épmera, or reptiles, from whence it appears that the
words, which we translate here 1 in God’s donation (ver. 28),
“living creatures moving,” are the same which, in the
history of the creation (vers. 24 and 25), signify two ranks
of terrestrial creatures—viz , wild beasts and reptiles, and
are so understood by the Septuagint.

26. When God had made the irrational animals of the
world, divided into three kinds, from the places of their
habitation—viz., “fishes of the sea, fowls of the air,” and living
creatures of the earth, and these again into “ cattle, wild
beasts, and reptiles,” He considers of making man, and the
dominion he should have over the terrestrial world (ver. 26),
and then He reckons up the inhabitants of these three
kingdoms ; but in the terrestrial leaves out the second rank
mn, or wild beasts ; but here (ver. 28), where He actually
executes this design and gives him this dominion the text
mentions “the fishes of the sea, and fowls of the air,”
and the terrestrial creatures in the words that signify the
wild beasts and reptiles, though translated “ living thing that
moveth,” leaving out cattle. In both which places, ‘though the
word that signities “‘ wild beasts” be omitted in one, and that
which signifies “ cattle” in the other, yet since God certainly
executed in one place what He declares he designed in the
other, we cannot but understand the same in both places,
and have here only an account how the terrestrial irrational
animals, which were already created and reckoned up at
their creation in three distinct ranks of “cattle,” “wild beasts,”
and “reptiles,” were here (ver 28) actually put under the
dominion of man, as they were designed (O., 26.) Nor do
these words contain in them the least appearance of any
thing that can be wrested to signify God’s giving one man
dominion over another, Adam over his posterity. .

27. And this further appears from Gen. ix. 2, where God,
renewing this charter to Noah and his sons, He gives them da-
minion over ‘ the fowls of the air,” and “the fishes of the sea,”
and “the terrestrial creatures,” expressed by nn and wn,
“wild beasts and reptiles,” the same words that in the text
before us (Gen. i. 28) are translated “ every moving thing that
moveth on the earth,” which by no means can comprehend
man, the grant being made to Noah and his sons, all the men
then living, and not to one part of men over another, which is
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMEN.. 98

yet more evident from the very next words (ver. 3), where
God gives every wr, “every moving thing,” the very words
used (chap. i, 28) to them for food. By all which it is plain
that God’s donation to Adam (chap. i. 28), and His designa-
tion (v. 26), and His grant again to Noah and his sons,
refer to, and contain in them neither more uor less than the
works of the Creation, the fifth day, and the beginning
of the sixth, as they are set down from ver. 20 to 26,
inclusively of chap. i, and so comprehend all the species
of irrational animals of the terraqueous globe, though all the
words whereby they are expressed in the history of their
creation are nowhere used in any of the following grants,
but some of them omitted in one, and some in another;
from whence I think it is past all doubt that man cannot be
compreherided in this grant, nor any dominion over those
of his own species be conveyed to Adam. All the terrestrial
irrational creatures are enumerated at their creation (ver.
25), under the names, “beasts of the earth,” “cattle and
creeping things ;’ but man being not then created, was
not contained under any of those names, and therefore
whether we understand the Hebrew words right or no, they
cannot be supposed to comprehend man in the very same
history, and the very next verses following, especially since
that Hebrew word, wo> which (if any) in this donation to

Adam (chap. i. 28), must comprehend man, is so plainly used -

in contradistinction to him, as Gen. vi. 20, vii. 14, 21, 23,
Gen. viii, 17, 19. And if God made all mankind slaves to
Adam and his heirs, by giving Adam dominion over every
living thing that moveth on the earth (chap. i. 28), as our
author would have it, mé thinks Sir Robert should have
carried his monarchical power one step higher, and satisfied
the world that princes might have eat their subjects too, since
God gave as full power to Noah and his heirs (chap. ix. 2),
to eat every living thing that moveth, as He did to Adar
to have dominion over them, the Hebrew words in both
places being the same. ~

28. David, who might be supposed to understand the
donation of God in this text, and the right of kings too, as
Well as our author in his comment on this place—as the
learned and judicious Ainsworth calls it—in Psalm viii.
finds here no such charter of monarchical power. His words
06 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

are :—‘ Thou hast made him,” ze., man, the son of man,
“a little lower than the angels, Thou madest him to have
dominion over the works of Thy hands, Thou hast put all
things under his feet, all sheep and oxen, and the beasts of
the field, and the fowl of the air, and fish of the sea, and
whatsoever passeth through the paths ofthe sea.” In which
words, if any one can find out that there is meant any
inonarchical power of one man over another, but only the
dominion of the whole species of mankind over the inferior
species of creatures, he may, for aught I know, deserve to
be one of Sir Robert’s monarchs in habit, for the rareness
of the discovery. And by this time I hope it is evident that
He that gave “dominion over every living thing that moveth
on the earth,” gave Adam no monarchical power over those
of his own species, which will yet appear more fully in the
next thivg I am to show. ;

29. (2) Whatever God gave by the words of this grant
(Gen. 1. 28), it was not to Adam in particular, exclusive of all
other men ; whatever dominion he had thereby, it was not a
private dominion, but a dominion in common with the rest
of mankind. That this donation was not made in patticular
to Adam appears evidently from the words of the text, it
being made to more than one—for it was spoken in the
plural number—God blessed “them,” and said unto “them,”
have dominion. God says unto Adam and Eve, have do-
minion; thereby, says our author, Adam was monarch of the
world ; but the grant being to them, ze, spoke to Eve also—
as many interpreters think with reason that these words were
not spoken till Adam had his wife—must not she, thereby,
‘be lady, as well as he Jord, of the world? If it be said that
Eve was subjected to Adam, it seems she was not so to him
as to hinder her dominion over the creatures, or property in
them, for shall we say that God ever made a joint grant to
two, and one only was to have the benefit of it ?

_30- But, perhaps, it will be said, Eve was not made till
afterward. Grant it so; what advantage willour author get
by it? the text will be only the more directly against him,
and show that God, in this donation, gave the world to man-
kind in common, and not to Adam in particular. The word
“them” in the text must include the species of man, for it is
cextain “them” can by no means signify Adam alone. Jn
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. oF

She 26th verse, where God declares his intention to give this
dominion, it is plain He meant that He would make a species
of creatures that should have dominion over the other species
of this terrestrial globe. The words are :—‘ And God said,
let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let
them have dominion over the fish,” &c. ‘“ They,” then, were
to have dominion. Who? Even those who were to have
the image of God: the individuals of that species of man
that He was going to make ; for that “ them” should signify
Adam singly, exclusive of the rest that should be in the
world with him, is against both Scripture and all reason.
And it cannot possibly be made sense if “ man,” in the
former part of the verse, do not signify the same with “ them”
in the latter ; only man there, as is usual, is taken for the
species, and “them,” the individuals of that species; and
we have a reason in the very text: for God makes him “in
his own image after his own likeness,” makes him an intel-
lectual creature, and so capable of dominion. For wherein-
soever else the image of God consisted, the intellectual
nature was certainly a part of it, and belonged to the whole
speciés, and enabled them to have dominion over the inferior
creatures ; and therefore David says, in the 8th Psalm above
cited, “‘Thou hast made him little lower than the angels,
thou hast made him to have dominion.” It is not of Adam
King David speaks here, for (ver. 4) it is plain it is of
man and the son of man, of the species of mankind.

31. And that this grant spoken to Adam was made to him
and the whole species of man is clear from our author’s own
proof out of the Psalmist. ‘‘‘ The earth,’ saith the Psalmist,
‘hath He given to the children of men,’ which shows the
title comes from fatherhood ;” these are Sir Robert’s words
in the preface before cited ; and a strange inference it is he
makes—God hath given the earth to’ the children of men,
ergo, the title comes from fatherhood. It is a pity the pro-
priety of the Hebrew tongue had not used fathers of men,
instead of children of men, te express mankind, then indeed
our authdr might have had the countenance of the sound of
the words, to have placed the title in the fatherhood ; but to
conclude that the fatherhood had the right to the earth, be-
cause God gave it to the children of men, is a way of arguing

peculiar to our author, and a man must have a great mind to
>
‘90 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

go contrary to the sound as well as sense of the words before
he could light on it. But the sense is yet harder and more
remote from our author’s purpose ; for, as it stands in his
preface, it is to prove Adam’s being monarch, and his reason-
ing is thus:—-God gave the earth to the children of men,
ergo, Adam was monarch of the world. I defy any man to
make a more pleasant conclusion than this, which cannot be
excused from the most obvious absurdity, till it can be
shown that, by children of men, he who had no father, Adam,
alone is signified. But whatever our author does, the Scrip-
ture speaks not nonsense.
32. To maintain this property and private dominion of
. Adam, our author labours in the following page to destroy
the community granted to Noah and his sons in that parallel
place (Gen. ix. 1, 2, 3), and he endeavours to do it two
ways.
1st. Sir Robert would persuade us, against the express
words of the Scripture, that what was here granted to Noah
was not granted to his sons in common with him ; his words
are; “As for the general community between Noah and his
sons, which Mr. Selden will have to be granted to them
(Gen. ix. 2), the text doth not warrant it.” What warrant
our author would have when the plain express words of
Scripture, not capable of another meaning, will not satisfy
him who pretends to build wholly on Scripture, is not easy
to imagine. The text says: “God blessed Noah and his —
sons, and said unto them,” z¢., as our author would have it,
“unto him,” “for,” saith he, “ although the sons are there
mentioned with Noah in the blessing, yet it may best be
understood with a subordination or benediction in suc-
cession” (O. 211). That, indeed, is best for our author to be
understood which best serves to his purpose, but that truly
may best be understood by anybody else which best agrees
with the plain construction of the words, and arises from the
obvious meaning of the place, and then with subordination
and in succession will not be best understood in a grant of
God, where He Himself put them not, nor mentions any
such limitation. But yet our author has reasons why it may
best be understood so. ‘The blessing,” says he, in the
following words, “might truly be fulfilled if the sons either
under or after their father enjoyed a private dominion,”
oa
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 99

(O. 211), which is to say, that a grant, whose express words
give a joitit title in present, for the text says, “into your
hands they are delivered,” may best be understood with a
subordination or in succession, because it is possible that in
subordination or succession it may be enjoyed, which is all
one as to Say that a grant of anything in present possession
may best be understood of reversion, because it is possible
one may live to enjoy it in reversion. If the grant be, indeed,
to a father and his sons, who is so kind as to let his children
enjoy it presently in common with him, one may truly say as
to the event one will be as good as the other; but it can
_hever be true that what the express words pratit in possession
and in common may best be understood to be in reversion.
The sum of all his reasoning amounts to this; God did not
give to the sons of Noah the world in common with their
father, because it was possible they might enjoy it under or
after him—a very good sort of argument against an express
text of Scripture ; but God must not be believed, though He
speaks it Himself, when He says He does anything which
will not consist with Sir Robert’s puppies.

33. For it is plain, however he would exclude them, that
part of this benediction, as he would have it in succession,
must needs be meant to the sons, and not to Noah himself
at all. “ Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth,”
says God in this blessing; this part of the benediction, as
appears by the sequel, concerned not Noah himself at all,
for we read not of any children he had after the Flood, and
in the following chapter, where his posterity is reckoned up,
there is no mention of any, and so this benediction in suc-
cession was not to take place till 350 years after, and to save
our author’s imaginary monarchy, the peopling of the world
must be deferred 350 years ; for this part of the benediction
cannot be understood with subordination, unless our author
will say that they must ask leave of their father Noah to he
with their wives. But in this one point our author is constant
to himself in all his discourses, he takes only care there
should be monarchs in the world, but very little that there
should be people, and, indeed, his way of government is not
the way to people the world, for how much absolute
monarchy helps to fulfil this great and primary blessing of -
God Almighty: “Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the

D2

7. a
109 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

earth,” which contains in it the improvement, too, of arts
and sciences, and the conveniences of life, may be seen in
those large and rich countries which are happy under the
Turkish Government, where are not now to be found one-
third, nay, in many, if not most parts of them, one-thirtieth,
perhaps I might say, not one-hundredth of the people that
were formerly, as will easily appear to any one who will
compare the accounts we have of it at this time with ancient
’ history, but this by the by.

34. The other parts of this benediction or grant are so
expressed that they must needs be understood to belong to
Noah’s sons, not with a subordination or in succession, but
as far forth and equally as to Noah himself. ‘ The fear of
you and the dread of you,” says God, “shall be upon every
beast,” &c. Will anybody but our author say that the
creatures feared and stood in awe of Noah only, and not
of his sons without his leave, or till after his death. And
the following words, “ Into your hands they are delivered,”
are they to be understood as our author says, if your father
please, or they shall be delivered into your hands hereafter.
If this be to argue from Scripture, I know not what may
not be proved by it, and I can scarce see how much this
differs from that fiction and fancy, or how much a surer
foundation it will prove than the opinions of philosophers and
poets, which our author so much condemns in his preface.

35. But our author goes on to prove that “it may best
be understood with a subordination or a benediction in
succession, for (says he) it is not probable that the private
dominion which God gave to Adam, and by his donation,
assignation, or cession to his children, was abrogated, and
a community of all things instituted between Noah and
his sons. Noah was left the sole heir of the world; why
should it be thought that God would disinherit him of his
birthright and make him, of all men in the world, the only
tenant in common with his children ?” (O. ii. rr.)

36. The prejudices of our own ill-grounded opinions,
however by us called probable, cannot authorize us to
understand Scripture contrary to the direct and plain mean-
ing of the words. I grant it is not probable that Adam’s
private dominion was here abrogated, because it is more
than improbable, for it never will be proved that ever Adam
\

TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. ro

had any such private dominion ; and since parallel places
of Scripture are most probable to make us know how they
may be best understood, there needs but the comparing
this blessing here to Noah and his sons after the Flood with
that to Adam after the Creation (Gen, i. 28), to assure any
one that God gave Adam no such private dominion. It is
probable, I confess, that Noah should have the same title,
the same property and dominion after the Flood that Adam
had before it. But, since private dominion cannot consist
with the blessing and grant God gave to him and his sons
in common, it is a sufficient reason to conclude that Adam
had none, especially since in the donation made to him
there are no words that express it, or do in the least favour
it. And then let my reader judge whether it may best be
understood, when in the one place there is not one word
for it, not to say, what has been above proved, that that
text itself proves the contrary, and in the other the words
and sense are directly against it.

37- But our author says, “ Noah was the sole heir of the
world ; why should it be thought that God would disinherit
him of his birthright?” Heir, indeed in England signifies
the eldest son who is by the law of England to have all
his father’s land ; but where God ever appointed any such
“heir of the world” our author would have done well to have
showed us, and how “God disinherited him of his birthright,”
or what harm was done him if God gave his sons a right to
make use of a part of the earth for the support of them-
selves and families, when the whole was not only more than
Noah himself, but infinitely more than they all could make
use of, and the possessions of one could not at all prejudice,
or, as to any use, straighten that of the other.

38. Our author, probably foreseeing he might not be very
successful in persuading people out of their senses, and, say
what he could, men would be apt to believe the plain words
of Scripture and think as they saw, that the grant was
spoken to Noah and his sons jointly—he comes, too, to
insinuate as if this grant to Noah conveyed no property, no
dominion ; because subduing the earth and dominion over
the creatures are therein omitted, nor the earth once named.
“And therefore,” says he, “ there is a considerable difference
between these two texts. The first blessing gave Adam a
164 2WO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

dominion ovet thé earth and all creatures, the latter allows
Noah liberty to use the living creatures for food. Here is
no alteration or diminution of his title to a property of all
things, but an enlargement only of his commons” (O., 211).
So that, in our author’s sense, all that was said here to
Noah aiid his sons gave them no dominion, no property,
but only enlarged the commons—their commons, I should
say, since God says, “To you are they given,” though our
author says his, for a8 for Noah’s sons, they, it seems, by
Sir Robert’s appointment, during their father’s lifetime, were
to. keep fasting days. : /

39. Any one but our author would be mightiiy suspected
to be blinded with prejudice that in all this blessing to
Noah and his sons could see nothing but only an enlarge-
ment of commons. For as to dominion which our author
thinks omitted, “the fear of you and the dread of you,” says
God, “Shall be upon every beast,” which I suppose, expresses
the dominion, or superiority was designed man over. the
living creatures, as fully as may be, forin that fear and dread
seems chiefly to consist what was given to Adam over the
inferior animals, who as absolute a monarch as he was,
could not make bold with a lark or a rabbit to satisfy his
hunger, and had the herbs but in common with the beasts,
as is plain from Gen. i. 2, 9 dnd 30. In the next place, it
is manifest that in this blessing to Noah and his sons, pro-
perty is not only given in clear words, but in a largér extent
than it was to Adam. “ Into your hands they afe given,” says
God to Noah and his sons, which words, if they give not
property, nay, property in possession, it will be hard to find

_words that can, since there is not a way to express a man’s
being possessed of anything more natural, nor more certain
than to say, it is “delivered into his hands.” And (ver. 3)
to show that they had then given them the utmost property
man is capable of, which is to have a tight td deéstroy any
thing by using it, “ every moving thing that liveth,” saith God,
“shall bé meat for you,” which was not allowed to Adam in.
his charter. This our author calls “a liberty of using them
for food, and only an enlargement of commons, but no
alteration of property” (O. 211). What other property man
can have in the creatutés, but the “liberty ofusing them,” is
hard to be understood. So that if the first blessing, as out
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 1093

author says, “gave Adam dominion over the creatures,” ax
the blessing to Noah and his sons gave them “such a liberty
to use them” as Adam had not, it must needs give them
something that Adam, with all his sovereignty, wanted—some-
thing that one would be apt to take for a greater property ;
for certainly he has no absolute dominion over even the
brutal part of the creatures, and the property he has in
them is very narrow and scanty who cannot make that use
of them which is permitted to another. Should any one, who
is absolute lord of a country, have bidden our author “subdue
the earth,” and given him dominion over the creatures in it,
put not have permitted him to haye taken a kid or a lamb
out of the flock to satisfy his hunger, I guess he would
scarce have thought himself lord or proprietor of that land,
or the cattle on it, but would have found the difference be-
tween having dominion which a shepherd may have, and
having full property.as an owner, so that had it been his own
case, Sir Robert, I believe, would have thought here was an
alteration, nay, an enlarging of property, and that Noah and
his children had by this grant, not only property given
them, but such a property given them in the e¢reatures
as Adam had not, for however in respect of one
another men may be allowed to have property in their
distinct portions of the creatures, yet in respect of God the
maker of heaven and earth, who is sole lord and proprietor
of the whole world, man’s propriety in the creatures is
nothing but that “liberty to use them” which God has per-
mitted, and so man’s property may be altered and enlarged
as we see it was here, after the Flood, when other uses of
them are allowed which before were not ; from all which I
suppose it is clear that neither Adam nor Noah had any
‘private dominion,” any property in the creatures, exclusive
of his posterity, as they should successively grow up into
need of them, and come to be able to make use of them.
40. Thus we have examined our author’s argument for
Adam’s monarchy, founded on the blessing pronounced
(Gen, i. 28). Wherein I think itis impossible for any sober
reader to find any else but the setting of mankind above the
other kinds of creatures in this habitable earth of ours. It
is nothing but the giving to man, the whole species of man,
as the chief inhabitant, who is the image of his Maker, the
104 -7WO TREATISES OF GOVaRNMENT,

dominion over the other creatures. This lies so obvious in
the plain words, that any one but our author would have
thought it necessary to have shown how these words that
seemed to say the quite contrary gave Adam monarchical
absolute power over other men, or the sole propriety in all
the creatures, and me thinks in a business of this moment,
and that whereon he builds all that foliows, he should have
done something more than barely cite words which apparently
make against him. For, I confess, I cannot see anything in
them tending to “ Adam’s monarchy or private dominion,”
but quite the contrary. And I the less deplore the dulness of
_my apprehension herein, since I find the Apostle seems to
have as little notion of any such private dominion of Adam
as I, when he says, “ God gives us all things richly to enjoy,”
which he could not do if it were all given away already to
monarch Adam, and the monarchs, his heirs and successors.
Toconclude, this text isso far from proving Adam sole proprie-
tor, that, on the contrary, it is a confirmation of the original
community of all things amongst the sons of men, which
appearing from this donation of God, as well as other places
of Scripture, the sovereignty of Adam, built upon his private
dominion, must fall, not having any foundation to support it.

41. But yet if, after all, any one will needs have it so, that
by this donation of God Adam was made sole proprietor of
the whole earth, what will this be to his sovereignty, and
how will it appear that propriety in land gives a man power
over the life of another, or how will the possession even of
the whole earth give any one a sovereign arbitrary authority
over the persons of men? The most specious thing to be
said is, that he that is proprietor of the whole world may
deny all the rest of mankind food, and so at his pleasure
starve them, if they will not acknowledge his sovereignty
and obey his will. If this were true, it would be a good
argument to prove that there was never any such property,
that God never gave any such private dominion, since it is
more reasonable to think that God, who bid mankind in-
crease and multiply, should rather Himself give them all a
right to make use of the food and raiment and other conve-
niences of life, the materials whereof He had so plentifully
provided for them, than to make them depend upon the
‘will of a man for their subsistence, who should have power
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 105

to destroy them all when he pleased, and who, being no
better than other men, was in succession likelier, by want
and the dependence of a scanty fortune, to tie them to hard
service than by liberal allowance of the conveniences of life
promote the great design of God—“‘increase” and “multiply.”
He that doubts this let him look into the absolute monar-
chies of the world, and see what becomes of the conveniences
of life and the multitudes of people.

42. But we know God hath not left one man so to the
mercy of another that he may starve him if he please. God,
the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of His children
such a property in his peculiar portion of the things of this
world but that he has given his needy brother a right in
the surplusage of his goods, so that it cannot justly be
denied him when his pressing wants call for it ; and, there-
fore, no man could ever have a just power over the life of
another by right of property in land or possessions, since
it would always be a sin in any man of estate to let his
brother perish for want of affording him relief out of his
‘plenty ; for as justice gives every man a title to the product
of his honest industry and the fair acquisitions of his ances-
tors descended to him, so “ charity” gives every man a title to
so much out of another's plenty as will keep him from
extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise.
And a man can no more justly make use of another’s neces-
sity to force him to become his vassal, by withholding that
relief God requires him to afford to the wants of his brother,
than he that has more strength can seize upon a weaker,
master him to his obedience, and, with a dagger at his
throat, offer him death or slavery.

43. Should any one make so perverse an use of God’s
blessings, poured on him with a liberal hand—should any one
be cruel and uncharitable to that extremity, yet all this
would not prove that propriety in land, even in this case,
gave any authority over the persons ci men, but only that
compact might; since the authority of the rich proprietor
and the subjection of the needy beggar began not from the
possession of the lord, but the consent of the poor man,.
who preferred being his subject to starving. And the man
he thus submits to can pretend to no more power over him
than he has consented to upon compact, upon this ground:
1066 WO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

A man’s having his stores filled in a time of scarcity, having
money in his pocket, being in a vessel at sea, being able to
swim, &c., may as well be the foundation of rule and doinin-
ion 4s being possessor of all the land in the world, any of
these being sufficient to enable me to save a man’s life, who
would perish if such assistance were denied him. Ard any-
thing by this rule that may be an occasion of working upofi
another’s necessity to save his life or anything dear to him
at the rate of his freedom may be made a foundation of
sovereignty as well as property. From all which it is clear
that though God should have given Adam private dominion,
yet that private dominion could give him no sovereignty.
But we have already sufficiently proved that God gave him
no private dominion.

 

CHAPTER V.
Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty by the Subjection of Eve,

44 THE next place of Scripture we find our author build
his monarchy of Adam on is Gen. iii. 26: “ And thy desire
shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.”
“‘ Here we have,” says he, “ the original grant. of govern-
ment,” from whence he concludes, in the following part of
the page (O., 244) “ that the supreme power is settled in the
fatherhood, and limited to one kind of government—that is
to monarchy ;” for let his premises be what they will, this is

» always the conclusion ; let but “rule” in any text be but once
named, and presently “absolute monarchy” is by Divine right
established. If any one will but carefully read our author’s
own reasoning from these words (O., 244), and consider,
among other things, “the line and posterity of Adam,” as
he there brings them in, he will find some difficulty to make
sense of what he says; but we will allow this at present to
ZWO FREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 107

his peculiar way of writing, and congider the force of the
text in hand. The words are the curse of God upon the
woman for having been ‘the first and forwardest in the dis-
obedience; and if we will consider the occasion of what
God says here to our first parents, that He was denouncing
judgment and declaring His wrath against them both for
their disobedience, we cannot suppose that this was the
time wherein God was granting Adam prerogatives and
privileges, investing him with dignity and authority, elevat-
ing him to dominion and monarchy; for though as a
helper jn the temptation as well as a partner in the trang-
gression, Eve was laid below him, and so he had accident-
ally a superiority over her for her greater punishment ; yet
he, too, had his share in the Fall as well as the sin, and
was laid lower, as may be seen in the following verses ;
and it would be hard to imagine that God, in the same
breath, should make him universal monarch over all man-
kind, and a day-labourer for his life. Turn him out of
Paradise “to till the ground” (ver. 23), and at the same
time advance him to a throne and all the privileges and
ease of absolute power.

45. This was not a time when Adam could expect any
favours, any grant of privileges from his offended Maker.
If this be the “original grant of government,” as our author
tells us, and Adam was now made monarch, whatever Sir
‘Robert would have him, it is plain God made him but a
very poor monarch, such an one as our author himself
would have counted it no great privilege to be. God sets
him to.work for his living, and seems rather to give him a
spade into his hand to subdue the earth, than a sceptre to
rule over its inhabitants. “In the sweat of thy face thou
shalt eat thy bread,” says God to him (ver. 19), This was
unavoidable, may it perhaps be answered, because he was |
yet without subjects, and had nobody to work for him ; but
afterwards, living as he did above goo years, he might
have people enough whom he might command to work for
him: “No,” says God, “not only whilst thou art without
other help save thy wife, but as long as thou livest shalt
thou live by thy labour.” “In the sweat of thy face shalt
thou eat thy bread, till thou return unto the ground, for out
of it wast thou taken ; for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt
108 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMEN1},

‘thou return” (ver. 19). It will perhaps be answered again
in favour of our author, that these words are not spoken
personally to Adam, but in him, as their representative to
all mankind, this being a curse upon mankind because of
the Fall.

46. God, I believe, speaks differently from men, because
He speaks with more truth, more certainty ; but when He
vouchsafes to speak'to men, I do not think He speaks
differently from them in crossing the rules of language in
use amongst them; this would not be to condescend to
their capacities, when He humbles Himself to speak to
them, but to lose His design in speaking what, thus
‘spoken, they could not understand. And yet thus must we
think of God, if the interpretations of Scripture necessary to
maintain our author's doctrine must be received for good ;
for, by the ordinary rules of language, it will be very hard
to understand what God says ; if what He speaks here, in
the singular number, to Adam, must be understood to be
spoken to all mankind, and what He says in the plural
number (Gen. i. 26 and 28), must be understood of
Adam alone, exclusive of all others ; and what He says to
Noah and his sons jointly must be understood to be meant
to Noah alone (Gen. ix.).

47. Further, it is to be noted, that these words here of
Gen. iii. 16, which our author calls “the original grant of
government,” were not spoken to Adam, neither, indeed,
was there any grant in them made to Adam, but a punish-
ment laid upon Eve ; and if we willtake them as they were
directed in particular to her, or in her, as a representative
to all other women, they will at most concern the female
sex only, and import no more but that subjection they
should ordinarily be in to their husbands ; but there is here
no more law to oblige a woman to such a subjection, if the
circumstances either of her condition or contract with her
husband should exempt her from it, than there is that she
should bring forth her children in sorrow and pain if there
could be found a remedy for it, which is also a part of the
same curse upon her, for the whole verse runs thus: “ Unto
the woman He said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and
thy conception ; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children,
and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 109

over thee.” It would, I think, have been a hard matter
for anybody but our author to have found out a grant of
“monarchical government to Adam” in these words,
which were neither spoke to nor of him; neither will any
one, I suppose, by these words think the weaker sex, as
by a law so subjected to the curse contained in them, that
it is their duty not to endeavour to avoid it. And will
any one say that Eve, or any other woman, sinned if she
were brought to bed without those multiplied pains God
threatens her here with, or that either of our Queens, Mary
or Elizabeth, had they married any of their. subjects, had
been by this text put into a political subjection to him, or
that he thereby should have had “ monarchical rule” over
her? God in this text gives not, that I see, any authority
to Adam over Eve, or men over their wives, but only fore-
tells what should be the woman’s lot, how by His Provi-
dence He would order it so that she should be subject to
her husband, as we see that generally the laws of mankind
and customs of nations have ordered it so, and there is, I
grant, a foundation in Nature for it.

48. Thus when God says of Jacob and Esau that “the
elder should serve the younger” (Gen. xxv. 23), nobody
supposes that God hereby made Jacob Esau’s sovereign, but
foretold what should de facto come to pass.

But if these words here spoke to Eve must needs be
understood as a law to bind her and all other women
to subjection, it can be no other subjection than what every
wife owes her husband, and then if this be the “ original grant
of government” and the “foundation of monarchical power,”
there will be as many monarchs as there are husbands. If
therefore these words give any power to Adam, it can be
only a conjugal power, not political—the power that every
husband hath to order the things of private concernment in
his family, as proprietor of the goods and land there, and to
have his will take place in all things of their common
concernment before that of his wife; but not a political
power of life and death over her, much less over any-
body else. : :

49. This I am sure. If our author will have this text to be
a “grant, the original grant of government,” political govern-
ment, he ought to have proved it by some better arguments
rio TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

than by barely saying, that “thy desire shall be unto thy hus-
band,” was a law whereby Eve and all that should come of
her were subjected to the absolute monarchical power of
Adam and his heirs. “ Thy desire'shall be to thy husband,”
is too doubtful an expression, of whose signification
interpreters are not agreed, to build so confidently on, and
in a matter of such moment and so great and general
concernment ; but our author, according to his way of writing,
having once named the text, concludes presently without
any more ado that the meaning is as he would have it; let
the words “rule” and “ subject” be but found in the text or
margin, and it immediately signifies the duty of a subject
to his prince, and the relation is changed ; and though God
says “ husband,” Sir Robert will have it “ king.” Adam has
presently ‘absolute monarchical power” over Eve, and not
only Eve, but “all that should come of her,” though the
Scripture says not a word of it, nor our author a word to prove
it. But Adam must for all that be an absolute monarch, and
so to the end of the chapter quite down to chap. i. And here
I leave my reader to consider whether my bare saying, with-
out offering any reasons to evince it, that this text gave not
Adam that “ absolute monarchical power” our author sup-
poses, be not as sufficient to destroy that power as his bare
assertion is to establish it, since the text mentions neither
“prince” nor ‘“ people,” speaks nothing of “absolute” or
“ monarchical” power, but the subjection of Eve, a wife to her
husband. And he that would treat our author so, although he
would make a short and sufficient answer to the greatest part
of the grounds he proceeds on, and abundantly confute them
by barely denying ; it being a sufficient answer to assertions
without proof to deny them without giving a reason, and
therefore should I have said nothing but barely denied that
by this text “the supreme power” was settled and founded
by Ged himself, in the fatherhood, limited to monarchy, and
that to Adam’s person and heirs, all which our author notably
concludes from these words, as may be seen in-the same
page (O., 244), and desired any sober man to have read the
text, and considered to whom and on what occasion it was
spoken, he would no doubt have wondered how our author
found out “ monarchical absolute power” in it, had he not had
an exceeding good faculty to find it himself, where he could
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 11%

not show it others; and thus we have examined the two
places of Scripture, all that I remember our author brings to
prove “ Adam’s sovereignty,” that “ supremacy,” which, he
says, “it was God’s ordinance should be unlimited in Adam,
and as large as all the acts of his will” (O., 254), viz—
Gen. i. 28, and Gen. iii. 16, one whereof signifies only the
subjection of the inferior ranks of creatures to mankind, and
the other the subjection that is due from a wife to her hus-
band, both far enough from that which subjects owe the
governors of political societies.

‘

 

CHAPTER VI.
Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty by Fatherhood,

50. THERE is one thing more, and then I think I have
given you all that our author brings for proof of Adam’s
sovereignty, and that is a supposition of a natural right of
dominion over his children by being their father, and this title
of “fatherhood” he is pleased with, that you will find it brought
in almost in every page, particularly, he says, “not only
Adam but the succeeding patriarchs had by right of father-
hood royal authority over their children” (p. 15). And in
the same page, “This subjection of children being the.
fountain of all regal authority,” &c. This being as one
would think by his so frequent mentioning it the main basis
of all his frame, we may well expect clear and evident
reason for it, since he lays it down as a position necessary
to his purpose, that “every man that is born is so far from
being free, that by his very birth he becomes a subject of
him that begets him” (O., 156). So that Adam being the
only man created, and all ever since being begotten, no
body has been born free. If we ask how Adam comes by
this power over his children, he tells us here it is by begetting
112 FWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

them. And so again (O., 223), “ This natural dominion of
Adam,” says he, “may be proved out of Grotius himself,
who teacheth that generatione jus acquiritur parentibus in
liberos.” And, indeed, the act of begetting being that
which makes a man a father, his right of father over his
children can naturally arise from nothing else.

51. Grotius tells us not here how far this jus ix liberos,
this power of parents over their children, extends, but our.
author, always very clear in the point, assures us it is
“supreme power,” and like that of absolute monarchs over
their slaves, absolute power of life and death. He that
should demand of him how or for what reason it is that be-
getting a child gives the father such an absolute power over
him, will find him answer nothing ; we are to take his word
for this as well as several other things, and by that the laws
of nature and the constitutions of government must stand
and fall. Had he been an absolute monarch, this way of
talking might have suited well enough ; pro ratione voluntas,
may there be allowed. But it is but an ill way of pleading
for absolute monarchy, and Sir Robert’s bare sayings will
scarce establish it; one slave’s opinion without proof is not
of weight enough to dispose of the liberty and fortunes of
all mankind; if all men are not as I think they are,
naturally equal, I am sure all slaves are, and then I may,
without presumption, oppose my single opinion to his, and
be as confident that my saying that begetting of children
makes them not slaves to their fathers, sets all mankind
free, as his affirming the contrary makes them all slaves.
But that this position, which is the foundation of all their
doctrine who would have monarchy to be juve Divino, may
have all fair play, let us hear what reasons others give for it,
since our author offers none.

52. The argument I have heard others make use of to
prove that fathers, by begetting them, come by an absolute:
power over their children is this: that “fathers have a
power over the lives of their children because they give
them life and being,” which is the only proof it is capable
of, since there can be no reason why naturally one man
should have any claim or pretence of right over that ‘in
another which was never his, which he bestowed not, but
was received from the bounty of another. First, I answer
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 113

that every one who gives another anything, has not always
thereby a right to take it away again; but, secondly, they
who say the father gives life to his children are so dazzled
with the thoughts of monarchy that they do not, as they
ought, remember God who is the “author and giver of life ;”
it is in Him alone we live, move, and have our being.
How can he be thought to give life to another that knows
not wherein his own life consists? Philosophers are at a loss
about it after their most diligent inquiries ; and anatomists
after their whole lives and studies spent in dissections and
diligent examining the bodies of men, confess their igno-
rance in the structure and use of many parts of man’s body,
and in that operation wherein life consists in the whole;
and doth the rude ploughman or the more ignorant volup-
tuary frame or fashion such an admirable engine as this is
and then put life and sense into it? Can any man say he.
formed the parts that are necessary to the life of his child?
or can he suppose himself to give the life and yet not know
what subject is fit to receive it, nor what actions or organs
are necessary for its reception or preservation ?

53- To give life to that which has yet no being is to
frame and make a living creature, fashion the parts and
mould and suit them to their uses, and, having proportioned
and fitted them together, to put into them a living soul.
He that could do this might indeed have some pretence to
destroy his own workmanship. But is there any one so bold
that dares thus far arrogate to himself the incomprehensible
works of the Almighty, who alone did at first and continues
still to make a live soul? He alone can breathe in the breath
of life. If any one thinks himself an artist at this, let him
number up the parts of his child’s body which he hath
made, tell me their uses and operations, and when the living
and rational soul began to inhabit this curious structure,
when sense began, and how this engine he has framed
thinks and reasons. If he made it let him, when it is out
of order, mend it, at least tell wherein the defects lie!
“Shall he that made the eye not see?” says the Psalmist
(Psalm xciv. 9). See these men’s vanities. The structure of
one part is sufficient to convince us of an allwise Contriver,
and he has so visible a claim to us as his workmanship
that one of the ordinary appellations of God in Scripture
114 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

is “Géd our maker and the Lord our tnaker.” Attd there-
fore, though our author, for the magnifying his ‘‘ fatherhood,”
be pleased to say (O., 159), “That even the power which
God himself exerciseth over mankind is by right of father-
hood,” yet this fatherhood is such an one as utterly ex-
cludes all pretence of title in earthly parents ; for He is
King because He is indeed maker of us all, which no
parents can ptetend to be of their children.

54. But had men skill and power to make their children,
it is not so slight a piece of workmanship that it can
be imagined they could make them without designing it.
What father of a thousand, when he begets a child, thinks
farther than the satisfying his present appetite? God, in his
infinite wisdom, has put strong desires of copulation into
the constitution of mien, thereby to continue the race of
mankind, which he doth most commonly without the inten-
tion, and often against the consent and will of the begetter:
And, indeed, those who desire and design children are but
the occasions of their being, and when they design and
wish to beget them do little more towards their making
than Deucalion and his wife in the fable did towards
the making of mankind by throwing pebbles over their
heads.

55. But grant that the parents made their children, gave
them life and being, and that hence there followed an
absolute power; this would give the father but a joint
dominion, with the mother, over them; for nobody can
deny but that the woman hath an equal sharé, if not the
greater, as nourishing the child a long time in her own
body out of her own substance. There it is fashioned, and
from her it receives the materials and principles of its con-
stitution ; and it is hatd to imagine the tatiorial soul should
presently inhabit the yet unformed embryo, as soon as the
father has done his part in the act of generation, that if it
must be supposed to derive anything from the parents it
must certainly owe most to the mother. But, be that as
it will, the mother cannot be denied an equal share in
begetting of the child, and so the absolute authority of the
father will not arise from hence ; our authot, indeed, is of
another mind; for he says, ‘We know that God, at the
Création, gave the sovereignty to the man over the woman,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 315

as being the nobler and principal agent in generation” ~
(O., o. I remember not this in my Bible, and when the
place is brought where God “at the Creation” gave the sove-
reignty to man over the woman, and that for this reason,
because “he is the-nobler and principal agent in generation,”
it will be time enough to consider and answer it. But it is
no new thing for our author to tell us his own fancies for
certain and divine truths, though there be often a great
deal of difference between his and divine revelations ; for
God, in the Scripture, says, “ His father and his mother that
begot him,”

56. They who allege the practice of mankind for “ exposing
or selling” their children as a proof of their power over
them, are, with Sir Robert, happy arguers, and cannot but
recommend their opinion by founding it on the most
shameful action and most unnatural murder human nature
is capable of. The dens of lions and nurseries of wolves
know no such cruelty as this. These savage inhabitants of
the desert obey God and Nature in being tender and careful
. of their offspring. ‘They will hunt, watch, fight, and almost
starve for the preservation of their young—never part with
them, never forsake them till they are able to shift for
themselves, And js it the privilege of man alone to act
more contrary to Nature than the wild and most untamed part
of the creation? Doth God forbid us, under the severest
penalty, that of death, to take away the life of any man, a
stranger, and upon provocation? and does He permit us to
destroy those He has given us the charge and care of, and
by the dictates of Nature and reason, as well as His revealed
command, requires us to preserve? He has in all the parts
of the creation taken a peculiar care to propagate and con-
tinue the several species of creatures, and makes the indivi-
duals act so strongly to this end that they sometimes neglect
their own private good for it, and seem to forget that general
rule, which Nature teaches all things, of self-preservation
and the preservation of their young, as the strongest prin-
ciple in them overrules the constitution of their particular
natures. Thus we see, when their young stand in need of
it, the timorous come valiant, the fierce and savage, kind, and
the ravenous, tender and liberal.

57. But if the examples of what hath been done be the

a
116 ZYWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

rule of what ought to be, history would have furnished our
author with instances of this “absolute fatherly power” in its
height and perfection, and he might have shown us in Peru
people that begot children on purpose to fatten and eat
them. The story is so remarkable that I cannot but set it
down in the author’s words : “ In some provinces,” says he,
“‘they’were so liquorish after man’s flesh that they would
not have the patience to stay till the breath was out of the
body, but would suck the blood as it ran from the wounds
of the dying man. They had public shambles of man’s
flesh, and their madness herein was to that degree that they
spared not their own children which they had begot on
strangers taken in war; for they made their captives their
mistresses, and choicely nourished the children they had by
them, till about thirteen years old they butchered and ate
them ; and they served the mothers after the same fashion
when they grew past child-bearing and ceased to bring them
any more roasters.”—-GARCILASSO DE LA VEGA, Hist. des
Yncas de Peru, \. i. c. 12.

58. Thus far can the busy. mind of man carry him toa
brutality below the level of beasts when he quits his reason,
which places him almost equal to angels. Nor can it be
otherwise in a creature whose thoughts are more than the
sands and wider than the ocean, where fancy and passion
’ must needs run him into strange courses if reason, which
is the only star and compass, be not that he steers by.
The imagination is always restless and suggests variety of
thoughts, and the will, reason being laid aside, is ready for
every extravagant project; and, in this state, he that goes
farthest out of the way is thought fittest to lead, and is sure
of most followers; and when fashion hath once established
what folly or craft began, custom makes it sacred, and it
will be thought impudence or madness to contradict or
question it. He that will impartially survey the world will
find so much of the religion, government, and manners of
the nations of the world brought in and continued by these
means, that he will have but little reverence for the practices
‘which are in fashion amongst men, and will have reason to
think that the woods and forests, where the irrational un-
taught inhabitants keep right by following Nature, are fitter
to give us rules than cities and palaces, where those that
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 114

call themselves civil and rational go out of their way by the
authority of example.

59. Be it, then, as Sir Robert says, that “ anciently” it was
“usual” for men to “sell and castrate their children” (O., 155).
Let it be that they expose them ; add to it, if you please—
for this is still greater power—that they begat them for their
tables to fat and eat them. If this proves a right to do so,
we may, by the same argument, justify adultery, incest, and!
sodomy, for there are examples of these, too, both ancient
and modern. Sins which, I suppose, have their principal
aggravation from this, that they cross the main intention of
Nature, which willeth the increase of mankind and the con-
tinuation of the species in the highest perfection and the
distinction of families, with the security of the marriage bed,
as necessary thereunto.

60. In confirmation of this natural authority of the father,
our author brings a lame proof from the positive command
of God in Scripture; his words are, “To confirm the

_ natural right of regal power, we find in the Decalogue that the
Jaw which enjoins obedience to kings is delivered in the
term, ‘ Honour thy father’ (p. 19); whereas many confess
that government only in the abstract is the ordinance of God,
they are not able to prove any such ordinance in the
Scripture, but only in the fatherly power ; and therefore we
find the commandment that enjoins obedience to superiors
given in the terms ‘Honour thy father;’ so that not only the
power and right of government, but the form of the power
governing, and the person having the power, are all the
ordinances of God. The first father had not only simply
power, but power monarchical, as he was father immediately
from God” (O., 254). To the same purpose the same law is
cited by our author in several other places, and just after the
same fashion—that is, “ and mother,” as apocryphal words, are
always left out—a great argument of our author's ingenuity, u
and the goodness of his cause which required in its defender
zeal to a degree of warmth able to warp the sacred rule of
the Word of God to make it comply with his present
occasion-—a way of proceeding not unusual to those who
embrace not truths, because reason and revelation offers $
them, but espouse tenets and parties for ends different from
truth, and then resolve, at any rate to defend them, and so

4
118 ZFWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

do with the words and sense of authors they would fit to
their purpose, just-as Procustes did with his guests, top or
stretch them, as may best fit them to the size of their
notions, and they always prove like those so served,
deformed and useless. :

61. For had our author set down this command without.
garbling, as God gave it, and joined “mother” to father, every
reader would have seen that it had made directly against
him, and that it was so far from establishing the ‘“ monarchical
pawer of the father” that it set up the mother equal with him,
and enjoined nothing but what was due in common to both
father and mother, for that is the constant tenor of the

‘Scripture, ‘‘ Honour thy father and thy mother” (Exod. xx.) ;
“ He that smiteth his father or mother shall surely be put to
death” (xxi. 15); “ He thatcurseth his father or his mother
shall surely be put to death” (ver. 17), repeated Lev. xx. 9,
and by our Saviour (Matt. xv. 4); “ Ye shall fear every man
his mother and his father” (Lev. xix. 3) ; “If a man have a
rebellious son which will not obey the voice of his father or
the voice of his mother, then shall his father and his mother
lay hold on him, and say this our son is stubborn and
rebellious, he will not abey our voice” (Deut. xxi. 18-21) ;
“ Cursed be he that setteth light by his father or his mother”
(xxviii. 16); “ My son, hear the instructions of thy father,
and forsake not the law of thy mother,” are the words of
Solomon, a king who was not ignorant of what belonged to
him as a father or a king, and yet he joins father and mother
together in all the instructions he gives children quite through
his book of Proverbs. “ Woe unto him that sayeth unto his
father, What begettest thou ? or to the woman, What hast thou
brought forth?” (Isa. xi. 5, 10) ; ‘‘ In thee have they set light
by father or mother’ (Ezek, xxviii. 2) ; “ And it shall come
to pass that when any shall yet prophesy, then his father
and his mother that begat him shall say unto him, Thou shalt
not live, and his father and his mother that begat him shall
thrust him through when he prophesieth” (Zech. xiii. 3).
Here not the father only, but father and mather jointly, had
power, in this case, of life and death. Thus ran the law of
the Old Testament, and in the New they are likewise joined,
in the obedience of their children (Eph. vi. 1). The rule jis,
“ Children, obey your parents,” and J do not remember that
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 119

I atiywhere tead “ Children, obey your father,” and ho more.
The Sctipture joins “ mother” too, in that homage which is
due from children, and had there been any text where the
honour or obedience of children had been directed to the
“father” alone, it is not likely that our author, who pretends to
bitild all upon Scripture, would have omitted it—nay, the
Scripture makes the authority of “father and mother,” in
respect of those they have begot, so equal, that in some
places it neglects even the priority of order which is thought
dué to the father, and the “mother” is put first, as Lev. xix. 3,
from which so constantly joining father and mother together,
as is found quite through the Scripture, we may conclude
that the honour they have a title to from their children is one
common right belonging so equally to them both that
neither can claint it wholly, tieither can be excluded.

62. One would wonder, then, how our author infers from
the Fifth Commandment that all power was originally in the
father. How he finds monarchical powet of government,

_ settled and fixed by the Commandment,“ Honour thy father”
ard thy mother, if all the honour due by the Commandments,
be it what it will, be the only right of the “ father,” because he,
as our author says, “ has the sovereignty over the woman, as
being the nobler and principal agent in generation,” why
did God afterwards all along join the “ mother” with him, to
share in this honour? Can the father by this sovereignty of
his discharge the child from paying this “ honour” to his
“ mother’? The Scripture gave no such licence to the Jews,
and yet there were often breaches wide enough betwixt hus-
band and wife, even to divorce and separation ; and I think
nobody will say a child may withhold honour from his mother,
or, as the Scripture terms it, “ set light by her,” though his
father should command him to do so, no more than the
mother could dispense with him for neglecting to “ honour”
his father, eierey it is plain that this command of Go¢
gives the father no sovereignty, no supremacy. —

63. I agree with our author, that the title to this “ honour”
is vested in the parents by nature, and is a right which accrues
to them by their having begotten their children, and God
by many positive declarations has confirmed it to them; I
os allow our author’s rule, that “in grants and gifts that have
their original from God and Nature, as the power of the
120 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

father (let me add, and mother, for whom God hath joined
together let no man put asunder), no inferior power of men
can limit, nor make any law of prescription against them”
(O., 158). So that the mother having by this law of God a
right to honour from her children which is not subject to the
will of her husband, we see this “absolute monarchical
power of the father” can neither be founded on it, nor
consist with it; and he has a power very far from “ mon-
archical,” very far from that absoluteness our author contends
for, when another has over his subjects the same power he
hath, and by the same title, and therefore he cannot forbear
saying himself that “he cannot see how any man’s children
can be free from subjection to their parents” (p. 15), which,
in common speech, I think signifies “ mother” as well as
father; or if parents here signifies only father, it is the first
time I ever yet knew it to do so, and by such an use of
words one may say anything.

64. By our author’s doctrine, the father having absolute
jurisdiction over his children, has also the same over their
issue, and the consequence is good, were it true, that the
father had such a power, and yet I ask our author whether
the grandfather by his sovereignty could discharge the grand-
child from paying to his father the honour due to him by -
the Fifth Commandment ; if the grandfather hath, “by right of
fatherhood,” sole sovereign power in him, and by “ honour thy
father’ be commanded that obedience which is due to the
sovereign, it is certain the grandfather might dispense with
the grandson’s honouring his father, which since it is evident
in common sense he cannot, it is evident ‘“ honour thy father
and mother” cannot mean an absolute subjection to a
sovereign power, but something else. ,The nght, therefore,
which parents have by nature, and which is confirmed to
them by the Fifth Commandment, cannot be that political
dominion, which our author would derive from it, for that
being in every civil society supreme somewhere, can
discharge any subject from any political obedience to any
one of his fellow subjects. But what law of the magistrate
can give a child liberty not to “honour his father and
mother”? it is an eternal law, annexed purely to the
relation of parents and children, and so contains nothing of
the magistrate’s power in it, nor is subjected to it.
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 121

65. Our author says, “ God hath given toa father a right or
liberty to alien his power over his children to any other” (O.,
155). I doubt whether he can “alien” wholly the right of
“honour” that is due from them. But be thatas it will, this I
am sure, he cannot “alien” and retain the same power ; if
therefore the magistrate’s sovereignty be, as our author would
have it, “ nothing but the authority of a supreme father” (p.
21), it is unavoidable that, if the magistrate hath all this pa-
ternal right, as he must have if “ fatherhood” be the fountain
of all authority, then the subjects, though fathers, can have
no power over their children, no right to honour from them ;
for it cannot be all in another’s hands and a part remain
with them ; so that according to our author's own doctrine
“honour thy father and mother” cannot possibly be under-
stood of political subjection and obedience, since the laws,
both in the Old and New Testament, that commanded
children to “honour and obey their parents,” were given to
such whose fathers were under such government, and fellow
subjects with them in political societies ;and to have bid them
“ honour and obey their parents” in our author’s sense had
been to bid them be subjects to those who had no title to it,
the right to obedience from subjects being all vested in
another ; and instead of teaching obedience, this had been to
foment sedition, bysetting up powers that were not ; if there-
fore this command, “ Honour thy father and mother,” con-
cern political dominion, it directly overthrows our author's
monarchy, since it being to be paid by every child to his father,
even in society, every father must necessarily have political
dominion, and there will be as many sovereigns as there are
fathers ; besides that, the mother, too, hath her title, which
destroys the sovereignty of one supreme monarch. But if
‘honour thy father and mother” mean something distinct
from political power, as necessarily it must, it is besides our
author’s business, and serves nothing to his purpose.

66. “The law that enjoins obedience to kings is delivered,”
says our author, “in the terms, ‘ Honour thy father,’ as if all
power were originally in the father” (O., 254). And that law
is also delivered, say I, in the terms, “honour thy mother,”
as if all power were originally in the mother, I appeal whether
the argument be not as good on one side as the other—

“6 father” and “mother” being joined all along in the Old
122. TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

and New Testament, where honour or obedience is enjoined
children, Again, our author tells us (O., 254), “that this
command, ‘honour thy father,’ gives the right to govern,
and makes the form of government monarchical.” | To
which I answer, that, if by “honour thy father,” be meant
obedience to the political power of the magistrate, it con-
cerns not any duty we owe to our natural fathers, who are
subjects because they, by our author’s doctrine, are divested
of all that power—it being placed wholly in the prince-—
and so, being equally subjects and slaves with their children,
can have no right, by that title, to any such “honour or obedi-
ence” as contains in it political subjection. If “ honour thy
father and mother ” signifies the duty we owe our natural
- parents, as by our Saviour’s interpretation (Matt. xv. 4, and
all the other mentioned places) it is plain it does, ther it
cannot concern political obedience, but a duty that is owing
to persons who have no title to sovereignty, nor any political -
authority, as magistrates over subjects, for the person of a
private father and a title to obedience due to the supreme
magistrate, are things inconsistent, and therefore this com-
mand, which must necessarily comprehend the persons of
our natural fathers, must mean a duty we owe them, distinct
from our obedience to the magistrate, and from which the
most absolute power of princes cannot absolve us. What
this duty is, we shall, in its due place, examine.

67. And thus we have at last got through all that in our
author looks like an argument for that “ absolute, unlimited
sovereignty,” described sect. 8, which he supposes in Adam,
so that mankind ever since have all been born “ slaves,” with-
outany title to freedom. But if Creation, which gave nothing
but a being, “made” not Adam “ prince of his posterity,” if
Adam (Gen. i.28) was not constituted lord of mankind, nor had
a “ private dominion” given him, exclusive of his children, but
only a right and power over the earth and inferior creatures,
in common with the children of men ; if also (Gen. iii. 16)
God gave not any political power to Adam over his wife and
children, but only subjected Eve to Adam, as a punishment,
or foretold the subjection of the weaker sex, in the ordering
the common concernments of their families, but gave not
thereby to Adam, as to the husband, power of life and death,
which necessarily belongs to the magistrate ; if fathers, by
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 123

begetting their children, acquire no such power over them;
and if the command, “honour thy father and mother,” give
it not, but only enjoins a duty owing to patents equally,
whether subjects or not, and to the “mother” as well as the
“father;” if all this be so, as I think, by what has been said,
is very evident, then man has a “natural freedom,” notwith-
standing all our author confidently says to the contrary, since
all that share in the same common nature, faculties, and
powers are in nature equal, and ought to partake in the
same common rights and privileges, till the manifest appoint-
ment of God, who is “ Lord over all, blessed for ever,” can
be produced to show any particular person’s supremacy, or a
man’s own consent subjects him to a superior. This is so
plain that our author confesses that “Sir John Heyward,
Blackwood, and Barclay, the great vindicators of the right
of kings, could not deny it, but admit, with one consent, the
natural liberty and equality of mankind,” for a truth unques-
tionable. And our author hath been so far from producing
anything that may make good his great position, that ‘“‘ Adam
was absolute monarch,” and so “men are hot naturally free,”
that even his own proofs make against him, so that, to use
his own way of arguing, “ This first erroneous principle failing,
the whole fabric of this vast engine of absolute power and
tyranny drops down of itself,” and there needs no more to be
said in answer to all that he builds upon so false and frail a
foundation.

68. But to save others the pains, were there any neéd,
he is not sparing himself to show, by his own contradic-
tions, the weakness of his own doctrines ; Adam’s absolute
and sole dominion is that which he is everywhere full of,
and all along builds on, and yet he tells us (p. 15) “that
as Adam was lord of his children, so his children under
him had a command and power over their own children.”
The unlimited and undivided sovereignty of Adam’s father-
hood, by our author’s computation, stood but a_ little
while, otily during the first generation ; but as soon as he
had grandchildren, Sir Robert could give but a very ill,
account of it. .Adam as father of his children, saith he,
“ hath an absolute, unlimited, royal power over them, and
by virtue thereof over those that they begot, and so to all
generations,” and yet “his children ”—via.,, Cain and Seth,
224 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

have a paternal power over their children at the same time,
so that they are at the same time “ absolute lords,” and yet
“subjects and slaves.” Adam has all the authority as ‘‘grand-
father of his people,” and they have a part as fathers. He
is absolute over them and their posterity, by having begot-
ten them, and yet they are absolute over their children by
the same title. “No,” says our author, “ Adam’s children
under him had power over their own children, but still with
subordination to the first parent.” A good distinction that
sounds well, and it is pity it signifies nothing, nor can be
reconciled with our author’s words. I readily grant that,
supposing “ Adam’s absolute power” over his posterity, any
of his children might have from him a delegated, and soa
“subordinate” power over a part or all the rest. But that
cannot be the power our author speaks of here ; it is nota
power by grant and commission, but the natural paternal
power he supposes a father to have over his children, for,
first, he says, as “ Adam was lord of his children, so his
children under him had a power over their own children.”
They were then lords over their own children after the
same manner, and by the same title that Adam was—v.e.,
by right of generation—by right of “fatherhood” ; secondly,
it is plain he means the natural power of fathers, because
he limits it to be only “over their own children” ; a delegated
power has no such limitation as only over their own child-
ren, it might be over others as well as their own children ;
thirdly, if it were a delegated power, it must appear in
Scripture, but there is no ground in Scripture to affirm that
Adam’s children had any other power over theirs than what
they naturally had as fathers.
’ 69. But that he means here paternal power and no other
is past doubt from the inference he makes in these words
immediately following: “I see not then how the children
of Adam or of any man else can be free from subjection to
their parents,” whereby it appears that the “‘ power” on one
side and the “subjection” on the other our author here speaks
of, is that “natural power” and “subjection” between parents
and children ; for that which every man’s children owed
could be no other, and that our author always affirms to be .
absolute and unlimited. » This natural “power” of parents
over their children Adam had over his posterity, says our
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 125

author; and this “power” of parents over their children, his
children had over theirs in his lifetime, says our author also ;
so that Adam, by a natural right of father, had an absolute, ;
unlimited power over all his posterity, and at the same time
his children had by the same right absolute unlimited
power over theirs; here then are two absolute unlimited
powers existing together, which I would have anybody
reconcile one to another or to common sense; for the salvo
he has put in of “subordination” makes it more absurd. To
have one “ absolute, unlimited,” nay “ unlimitable power” in
Subordination to another, is so manifest a contradiction
that nothing can be more. ‘Adam is absolute prince with
the unlimited authority of fatherhood over all his posterity.”
All his posterity are then absolutely his subjects, and, as our
author says,.“his slaves.” ‘Children and grandchildren are
equally in this state of subjection and slavery, and yet, says
our author, “the children of Adam have paternal (z.¢., abso-
lute, unlimited) power over their own children,” which, in
plain English, is, they are slaves and absolute princes at the
same time and in the same government, and one part of
the subjects have an absolute unlimited power over the
other by the natural right of parentage.

zo. If any one will suppose in favour of our author that
he here meant that parents who are in subjection them-
selves to the absolute authority of their father, have yet
some power over their children, I confess he is something
nearer the truth, but he will not at all hereby help our
author, for he, nowhere speaking of the paternal power,
but as an absolute unlimited authority, cannot be supposed
to understand anything else here, unless he himself had
limited it and showed how far it reached; and that he
means here paternal authority in that large extent is plain
from the immediate following words: “This subjection of
children being,” says he, “the fountain of all regal
authority” (p. 15). The “subjection” then, that in the former
line, he says, “‘every man is in to his parents,” and conse-
quently what Adam’s grandchildren were in to their parents,
was that which was the fountain of all “regal authority”—#.¢,
according to our author’s “absolute, unlimitable” authority ;
and thus Adam’s children had “ regal authority” over their
children, whilst they themselves were subjects to their
126 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

father, and fellow subjects with their children. But let him
mean as he pleases it isplain he allows ‘‘ Adam’s children to
have paternal power” (p. 15), as all other fathers to have
“paternal power over their children” (O., 156). From whence
one of these two things will necessarily follow, that either
Adam’s children even in his lifetime had, and so all other
fathers have, as he phrases it (p. 15), “ by right of father-
hood royal authority over their children,” or else that “ Adam
by right of fatherhood had not royal authority ;” for it must
be that paternal power does, or does not, give “royal autho-
rity” to them that have it; if it does not, then Adam could
not be sovereign by this title, nor anybody else, and then
there is an end ofall ourauthor’s politics at once ; ifit does
give “royal authority,” then every one that has “ paternal
power” has “royal authority,” and then by our author’s patri-
archal government there will be as many kings as there
are fathers,

71. And thus, what a monarchy he hath set up let him
and his disciples consider. Princes certainly will have great
reason to thank him for these new politics, which set up as
many absolute kings in every country as there are fathers of
children. And yet who can blame our author for it, it lying
unavoidably in the way of one discoursing upon our author's
principles? For, having placed an ‘‘absolute power” in
“fathers by right of begetting,” he could not easily resolve
how much of this power belonged to a son over the children
he had begotten ; and so it fell out to be a very hard matter
to give all the power, as he does, to Adam, and yet allow a
part in his lifetime to his children, when they were parents,
and which he knew not well how to deny them. This makes
him so doubtful in his expressions, and so uncertain where
to place this absolute natural power, which he calls father-
hood. Sometimes Adam alone has it all,.as p. 16, O., 244,
245, and preface.

Sometimes “ parents” have it, which word scarce signifies
the father alone (pp. 15, 23).

Sometimes “children” during their father’s lifetime, as

15.
. Sometimes “ fathers of families,” as pp. 44 and 45,

Sometimes “ fathers” indefinitely (O., 155).-

Sometimes “the heir to Adam” (O., 253).
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 1297

Sometimes “the posterity of Adam” (244, 246).

Sometimes “ prime fathers, all sons or grandchilden of
Noah” (O., 244).

Sometimes “the eldest parents” (p. 15).

Sometimes all kings (p. 23).

Sometimes all that have supreme power (O., 245).

Sometimes “heirs to those first progenitors, who were at
first the natural parents of the whole people” (p. 23),

Sometimes an elective king (p. 21).

Sometimes those, whether a few or a multitude, that govern
the “commonwealth” (p. 21).

Sometimes he that can catch it—an “usurper” (p. 21,
O., 155). :

72. Thus this “new nothing” that is to carry with it all
power, authority, and government—this “ fatherhood,” which
is to design the person and establish the throne of monarchs,
whom the people are to obey—may, according to Sir Robert,
come into any hands, anyhow, and so by his politics give to
democracy royal authority and make an usurper a lawful
prince. And if it will do all these fine feats, much good
do our author and all his followers with their omnipotent
“fatherhood,” which can serve for nothing but to unsettle
and destroy all the lawful governments in the world, and to
establish in their room disorder, tyranny, and usurpation.

 

CHAPTER VII.

Of Fatherhood and Propriety considered together as Fountains of
Sovereignty.

73. In the foregoing chapters we have seen what Adam’s
monarchy was in our author’s opinion, and upon what titles
he founded it. And the foundations which he lays the chief
stress on, as those from which he thinks he may best derive
monarchical power to future princes, are two—viz., “ Father-
hood” and “ Property ;” and therefore the way he proposes to
28 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

“remove the absurdities and inconveniences of the doctrine
of natural freedom,” is “to maintain the natural and private
dominion of Adam” (O., 222). Conformable hereunto he
tells us “the grounds and principles of government necessarily
depend upon the original of property” (O., 108). “The sub-
jection of children to their parents is the fountain of all
regal authority” (p. 15) ; and “all power on earth is either
derived or usurped from the fatherly power, there being no
other original to be found of any power whatsoever” (O.,
158). I will not stand here to examine how it can be said
without a contradiction that the “ First ground and principles
of government necessarily depend upon the original of pro-
perty,” and yet “‘ That there is no other original of any power
whatsoever but that of the father.” It being hard to under-
stand how there can be “no other original” but “fatherhood,”
and yet that the “grounds and principles of government
depend upon the original of property,” “ property” and
“fatherhood” being as far different as lord of a manor and
father of children ; nor do I see how they will either of them
agree with what our author says (O., 244) of God’s sentence
against Eve (Gen. ili. 16), “That it is the original grant of
government.” So that, if that were the original, government
had not its “ original,” by our author’s own confession, either
from “ property” or “ fatherhood ;” and this text, which he
brings as a proof of Adam’s power over Eve, necessarily con-
tradicts what he says of the “ fatherhood,” that it is the “sole
fountain of all power; for if Adam had any such regal power
over Eve, as our author contends for, it must be by some other
title than that of begetting.

74. But Ileave him to reconcile these contradictions, as
well as many others which may plentifully be found in him
by any one who will but read him with a little attention,
and shall come now to consider how these two originals of
government, ‘‘ Adam’s natural and private dominion,” will
consist and serve to make out and establish the titles of
succeeding monarchs, who, as our author obliges them, must
all derive their power from these fountains. Let us then
suppose Adam made by God’s donation lord and sole pro-

_prietor of the whole earth, in as large and ample a manner
as Sir Robert could wish, let us suppose him also by right
Of fatherhood absolute ruler over his children with an un-
LWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 129

limited supremacy : I ask them,upon Adam’s death what be-
comes of his “ natural” and “ private dominion”? and I doubt
not it will be answered, that they descended to his next
heir, as our author tells us in several places ; but that cannot
possibly convey both his “ natural” and “ private dominion”
to the same person ; for should we allow that all the pro-
priety, all the estate of the father ought to descend to the
eldest son, which will need some proof to establish it, and
so he have by that title all the “private dominion” of the
father, yet the father’s “ natural dominion,” the paternal power,
cannot descend to him by inheritance ; for being a right that
‘accrues to aman only by “ begetting,” no man can have this

natural dominion over any one he does not “beget,” unless it '

can be supposed that a man can have a right to anything
without doing that upon which that right is solely founded.
For if a father by ‘‘begetting,” and no othertitle, has “natural
dominion” over his children, he that does not beget them
cannot have this “ natural dominion” over them, and there-
fore be it true or false that our author says (O., 156) that
“every man that is born, by his very birth, becomes a subject
to him that begets him,” this necessarily follows—viz. ; that
a man by his birth cannot become a subject to his brother
who did not beget him, unless it can be supposed that a
man by the very same title can come to be under the
“natural and absolute dominion” of two different men at
Once, or it be sense to say that a man by birth is under the
“ natural dominion” of his father only because he begat him,
and aman by birth also is under the “ natural dominion” of
his eldest brother, though he did not beget him.

75- If, then, the “ private dominion” of Adam, his property
in the creatures, descended at his death all entirely to his
eldest son, his heir (for if it did not there is presently an end
of all Sir Robert’s monarchy and his “ natuval dominion”) the
dominion a father has over his children by begetting them,
belonged equally to all his sons who had children by the
same title their father had it immediately upon Adam’s de-
cease ; the sovereignty founded upon “ property,” and the
sovereignty founded upon “‘fatherhood,” come to be divided,
since Cain, as heir, had that of “ property” alone, Seth and the
other sons that of “fatherhood” equally with him. This is the

best can be made of our author’s doctrine and of the two
BE
146 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

titles of sovereignty he sets up in Adam, one of them will
either signify nothing, or if they both must stand they can
serve only to confound the rights of princes, and disorder
government in his posterity ; for by building upon two titles
to dominion, which cannot descend together, and which-he
allows may be separated, for he yields that “‘ Adam’s children
had their distinct territories by right of private dominion”
(O., 210, p. 40). He makes it perpetually a doubt upon his
principles where the sovereignty is, or to whom we owe our
obedience, since “ fatherhood” and “ property” are distinct
titles, and began presently upon Adam’s death to bein dis-
tinct persons. And which then was to give way to the other?

76. Let us take the account of it as he himself gives it
us. He tells us, out of Grotius, that “ Adam’s children by
donation, assignation, or some kind of cession before he
was dead, had their distinct territories by right of private
dominion ; Abel had his flocks and pastures for them, Cain
had his fields for corn and the land of Nod, where -he built
him a city” (O., 210). Here it is obvious to demand which
of these two, after Adam’s déath, was sovereign. “ Cain,”
says our author (p. 23). By what title? ‘As heir for heirs
to progenitors, who were natural parents of their people,
are not only lords of their own children, but also of their
brethren,” says our author (p. 19); What was Cain heir to?
Not the entire possessions, not all that which Adam had
“private dominion” in; for our author allows that Abel, by
a title derived from his father, “had his distinct territory for
pasttire by right of private dominion.” What, then, Abel had
by “ private dominion” was exempt from Cain’s dominion,
for he could not have “ private dominion” over that which
was under the private dominion of another, and therefore
his sovereignty over his brother is gone with this “ private
dominion ;” and so there are presently two sovereigns, and
his imaginary title of “ fatherhood” is out of doors, and Cain
is no prince over his brother, or else if Cain retain his sove-
reignty over Abel, notwithstanding his “ private dominion,”
it will follow that the “ first grounds and principles of govern-
ment” have nothing to do with property, whatever our
author says to the contrary. It is true Abel did not outlive
his father Adam, but that makes nothing to the argument,
which will hold good against Sir Robert in Abel's issue, or
IWQ TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 131

in Seth, or any of the posterity of Adam not descended
from Cain. ‘
77. The same inconvenience he runs into about “the
three sons of Noah,” who, as he says (p. 15), “ had the whole
world divided amongst them by their father.” I ask, then,
in which of the three shall we find “the establishment of:
regal power” after Noah’s death? If in all three, as our
author there seems to say, then it will follow that regal power
is founded in property of land and follows “ private domin-
ion,” and not in “paternal power” or “natural dominion ;”
and so there is an end of paternal power as the fountain
of regal authority, and the so much magnified “ fatherhood”
quite vanishes. If the “regal power” descended to Shem, as
eldest and heir to his father, then “ Noah’s division of the
world by lot to his sons or his ten years’ sailing about the
Mediterranean to appoint each son his part,” which our
author tells of (p. 20) was labour lost. His division of the
world to them was to ill or to no purpose, for his grant to
Cham and Japhet was little worth if Shem, notwithstanding
this grant, as soon as Noah was dead was to be lord over
them. Or, if this grant of “ private dominion” to them over
their assigned territories were good, here were set up two
distinct sorts of power, not subordinate one to the other,
with all those inconveniences which he musters up against the
“ power of the people” (Q., 158) and which I shall set down
in his own words, only changing “ property” for “‘ people.”
All power on earth is either derived or usurped from the
fatherly power, there being no other original ta be found
of any power whatsoever ; for if there should be granted
two sorts of power, without any subordination of one to
the other, they would be in perpetual strife which should
be supreme, for two supremes cannot agree. If the fatherly
power be supreme, then the power grounded on private
dominion must be rubordinate and depend on it, and if the
power grounded on property be supreme, then the fatherly
power must submit to it and cannot be exercised without
the licence of the proprietors, which must quite destroy the
frame and course of nature.” This is his own arguing
against two distinct independent powers, which I have set
down in his own words, only putting power rising from pro-
perty for “ power of the people,” and when he has answered
E2
132 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

what he himself has urged here against two distinct powers,
we shall be betier avle to see how, with any tolerable sense,
he can deriv? all regal authority “from the natural and
private dominion of Adam,” from “fatherhood” and “ pro-
perty” together, which are distinct titles that do not always
meet in the same person, and it is plain by his own con-
fession, presently separated as soon both as Adam’s and
Noah's death made way for succession, though our author
frequently, in his writings, jumbles them together, and omits
not to make use of either where he thinks it will sound best
to his purpose ; but the absurdities of this will more fully
appear in the next chapter, where we shall examine the ways
of conveyance of the sovereignty of Adam to princes that
were to reign after him.

CHAPTER VIII.
Of the Conveyance of Adam's Sovereign Monarchical Power.

78. Str, RoBert having not been very happy in any proof
he brings for the sovereignty of Adam, is not much more
fortunate in conveying it to future princes, who, if his
politics be true, must all derive their titles from him. The
ways he has assigned, as they lie scattered up and down in
his writings, I will set down in his own words. In his preface
he tells us that ‘“ Adam being monarch of the whole world,

none of his posterity had any right to possess anything but.

by his grant or permission, or by succession from him.”
Here he makes two ways of conveyance of anything Adam
stood possessed of, and those are “ grant” or “ succession.”
“* All kings either are, or are to be, reputed the next heirs to
those first progenitors who were at first the natural parents
of the whole people” (p. 23). “ There cannot be any multi-
tude of men whatsoever but that in it, considered by itself,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 133

there is one man amongst them that in nature hath a right
to be the king of all the rest, as being the next heir to
Adam” (O., 253). Here, in these places, ‘‘inheritance” is the
only way he allows of conveying monarchical power to
princes (O., 155). ‘ All power on earth is either derived or
usurped from the fatherly power” (O., 158). “‘ All kings that
now are, or ever were, are or were either fathers of their
people, or the heirs of such fathers, or usurpers of the right
of such fathers” (O.,253). And here he makes “inheritance”
or “usurpation” the only ways whereby kings come by this
original power, but yet he tells us “this fatherly empire, as it
was of itself hereditary, so it was alienable by patent and
seizable by an usurper” (O., 190). So then here inheri-
tance, grant, or usurpation will convey it; and, last of all,
which is most admirable, he tells us (p. 54), ‘It skills not
which way kings come by their power, whether by election,
donation, succession, or by any other means, for it is still the
manner of the government by supreme power that makes
them properly kings, and not the means of obtaining their
Crowns,” which I think is a full answer to all his whole
“hypothesis” and discourse about Adam’s royal authority as
the fountain from which all princes were to derive theirs ;
and he might have spared the trouble of speaking so much
as he does, up and down, of heirs and inheritance, if to
make any one “properly a king,” needs no more but ‘‘govern-
ing by supreme power, and it matters not by what means
he came by it.”

79. By this notable way, our author may make Oliver as
_ “ properly king” as any one else he could think of, and had
he had the happiness to live under Massanelio’s government,
he could not by this his own rule have forborne to have done
homage to him with “O King, live for ever!” since the
manner of his government by supreme power made him
“properly” king who was, but the day before, properly a
fisherman. And if Don Quixote had taught his squire to
govern with supreme authority, our author, no doubt, could
have made a most loyal subject in Sancho Pancha’s island, °
and he must have deserved some preferment in such
governments, since I think he is the first politician who,
pretending to settle government upon its true basis, and to
establish the thrones of lawful princes, ever told the world
134 ZWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

that he was “ properly a king whose manner of government
was by supreme power by what means soever he obtained it,”
‘which, in plain English, is to say that regal and supreme
power is properly and truly his who can, by any means, seize .
upon it, and if this be to be “ properly a king,” I wonder
how he came to think of, or where he will find, an “ usurper.”
8q. This is so strange a doctrine, that the surprise of it
hath made me pass by, without their due reflection, the con-
tradictions he runs into by making sometimes “inheritance”
alone, sometimes only “ grant” or “ inheritance,” sometimes
only “inheritance” or “usurpation,” sometimes all these
three, and, at last, “ election” or “ any other means” added
to them, the ways whereby Adam’s royal “authority,” that is,
his right to supreme rule, could be conveyed down to future
kings and governors, so as to give them a title to the obedi-
ence and subjection of the people; but these contradictions
lie so open, that the very reading of our author’s own words
will discover them to any ordinary understanding, and though
what I have quoted out of him, with abundance more of
the same strain and coherence which might be found in
him, might well excuse me from any further trouble in this
argument, yet having proposed to myself to examine the
main parts of his doctrine, I shall a little more particularly
consider how “inheritance,” “grant,” “usurpation,” or
“ election” can any way make out government in the world
upon his principles or derive any lawful title to any one’s
obedience from this regal authority of Adam, had it been
never so well proved that he had been absolute monarch
and lord of the whole world. ,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, +38

CHAPTER IX.
Of Monarchy by Inheritance from Adam.

81, THouGH it be hever so plain that there ought to be
government in the world; nay, should all men be of our
author’s mind that Divine appointment had ordained it to
be “monarchical,” yet, since men cannot obey any thing that
cannot command, and ideas of government in the fancy,
though never so perfect, never so right, caniiot give laws
nor prescribe rules to the actions of met, it would be of
no behoof for the settling of order and establishment of
government in its exercise and use amotigst men, unless
there were a way also taught how to know the person to
whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this
dominion over others. It is in vain, then, to talk of sub-
jection and obedience without telling us whom we are to
obey ; for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought
to be magistracy and rule in the world, yet I am neverthe-
less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath
right to my obedience; since if there be no marks to know
him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from
other meh, it may be myself as well as any other; and,
therefore, though submission to government be every one’s
duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the
direction and laws of such mén as have authority to com-
mand, it is not enough to make a man a subject to convince
him that there is “regal power” in the world, but theré must
be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this
“tegal power” of right belongs; and a man can never bé
obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he
can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to
exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there
would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes:
he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed,
and crowns ard sceptres would becomé the inhetitance
otly of violence and rapine; men, too, might as often and
as innocently change their governors as they do their

/
136 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right
to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow.
To settle, therefore, men’s consciences under an obligation
to obedience, it is necessary that they. know not only that
there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person
who, by right, is vested with this power over them.

82. How successful our author has been in his attempts
to set up a “‘monarchical absolute power” in Adam, the
reader may judge by what has been already said, but were
that ‘‘absolute monarchy” as clear as our author would desire
it, as I presume it is the contrary, yet it could be of no use
to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he
also make out these two things:

Firstly, that this ‘‘ power of Adam” was not to end with
him, but was upon his decease conveyed entire to some
other person, and so on to posterity.

Secondly, that the princes and rulers now on earth are
possessed of this “power of Adam,” by a right way of con-
veyance derived to them.

83. Ifthe first of these fail, the “power of Adam,” were it
never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the
present government and societies in the world ; but we must
seek out some other original of power for the government
of polities than this of Adam, or else there will be none at
all in the world. If the latter fail, it will destroy the autho-
rity of the present governors, and absolve the people from
subjection to them, since they having no better a claim than
others to that power, which is alone the fountain of all
authority, can have no title to rule over them.

84. Our author having fancied an absolute sovereignty in
Adam, mentions several ways of its conveyance to princes
that were to be his successors, but that which he chiefly
insists on is that of “ inheritance,” which occurs so often in
his several discourses, and I having in the foregoing chapter
quoted several of these passages, I shall not need here
again to repeat them. This sovereignty he erects, as had
been said, upon a double foundation—viz., that of “property”
and that of “ fatherhood ;” one was the right he was supposed
to have in all creatures—a right to possess the earth, with
the beasts, and other inferior ranks of things, in it, for his
private use, exclusive of all other men; the other was the
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 137

right he was supposed to have to rule and govern men, all
the rest of mankind.

85. In both these rights, there being supposed an ex-
clusion of all other men, it must be upon some reason
peculiar to Adam that they must both be founded.

That of his “‘ property,” our author supposes, to arise from
God’s immediate “donation” (Gen. i. 28), and that of “father-
hood” from the act of “ begetting.” Now in allinheritance, if the
heir succeed not to the reason upon which his father’s right
was founded, he cannot succeed to the right which fol-
lowed from it ; for example: Adam had a right of property
in the creatures upon the “donation” and “ grant” of God
Almighty, who was Lord and Proprietor of them all ; let this
be so as our author tells us ; yet, upon his death, his heir
can have no title to them, no such right of “ property” in
them, unless the same reason—viz., God’s “ donation” —vested
a right in the heir too; for if Adam could have had no
property in, nor use of, the creatures without this positive
“donation” from God, and this “ donation” were only personally
to Adam, his “heir” could have no right by it, but upon his
death it must revert to God the Lord and Owner again ;
for positive grants give no title farther than the exnress
words convey it, and by which only it is held, and thus if,
as our author himself contends, that “donation” (Gen. i. 28)
were made only to Adam personally, his heir could not
succeed to his property in the creatures, and if it were a
donation to any but Adam, let it be shown that it was to his
heir in our author's sense—z.e., to one of his children exclu-
sive of all the rest.

86. But not to follow our author too far out of the way,
the plain of the case is this: God having made man, and
planted in him, as in all other animals, a strong desire of
self-preservation, and furnished the world with things fit for
food and raiment and other necessaries of life, subservient
to His design that man should live and abide for some time
upon the face of the earth, and not that so curious and
wonderful a piece of workmanship by its own negligence
or want of necessaries should perish again presently, after
a few moments’ continuance—God, I say, having made
man and the world, thus spoke to him—that is, directed
him by his senses and reason (as He did the inferior animals
138 Z7WQ TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

“by their sense and instinct which He had placed in them to
that purpose) to the use of those things which were serviceable
for his subsistence, and gave him the means of his “ preser-
vation,” and therefore I doubt not, but before these words
were pronounced (Gen, i. 28, 29), if they must be under-
stood literally to have been spoken, or without any such
verbal “donation,” man had aright to a use of the creatures”
by the will and grant of God ; for the desire, strong desire
of preserving his life and being having been planted in _
him as a principle of action by God himself, reason,
“which was the voice of God in him,” could not but teach
him and assure him that, pursuing that natural inclination
he had to preserve his being, he followed the will of his
Maker, and therefore had a right to make use of those
creatures which by his reason or senses he could dis-
cover would be serviceable thereunto, and thus man’s
“property” in the creatures was founded upon the right he
had to make use of those things that were necessary or
useful to his being. .

87. This being the reason and foundation of Adam’s
“property,” gave the same title, on the same ground, to all
his children, not only after his death, but in his lifetime ;
so that here was no privilege of his “ heir’ above his other
children which could exclude them from an equal right to
the use of the inferior creatures for the comfortable pre-
servation of their beings ; which is all the “ property” man
hath in them; and so Adam’s sovereignty built on “ property,”
or, as our author calls it, “private dominion,” comes to
nothing. Every man had a right to the creatures by the
same title Adam had—viz., by the right every one had to
take care of and provide for their subsistence, and thus
men had a right in common, Adam’s children in common
with him, But if any one had begun and made himself a
property in any particular thing (which how he or any one
else could do shall be shown in another place), that thing,
that possession, if he disposed not otherwise of it by his
positive grant, descended naturally to his children, and
they had a right to succeed to it and possess it.

88. It might reasonably be asked here, how come
children by his right of possessing, before any other, the
properties of their parents upon their decease, for it being
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 149

personally the parents, when they die, without actually
transferting their right to another, why does it not return
‘again to the common stock of mankind? It will perhaps
be answered that common consent hath disposed of it to
the children. Common practice, we see, indeed, does so
dispose of it; but we cannot say that it is thé common con-
sent of mankind, for that hath never been asked nor
actually given; and if common tacit consent had estab-
lished it, it would make but a positive and not natural
tight of children to inherit the goods of their parents; but
where the practice is universal, it is reasonable to think the
cause is natural, The ground, then, I think to be this: the
first and strongest desire God planted in men, and wrought
into the vefy principle of their nature, being that of self-
preservation, is the foundation of a sight to the creatures for
their particular support and use of each individual person
himself. But, next to this, God planted in men a strong
desire also of propagating their kind, and continuing them-
selves in their posterity, and this gives children a title to
share in the “ property” of their parents, and a right to inherit
their possessions. Men are not proprietors of what they
have merely for themselves, their children have a title to
part of it, and have their kind of right joined with their
parents, in the possession which comes to be wholly theirs,
when death, having put an end to their parents’ use of it,
hath taken them from their possessions, and this we call
inheritance. Men being by a like obligation bound to pre-
serve what they have begotteri, as to preserve themselves,
their issie come to have a right in the goods they are pos-
sessed of. And that children have such a right is plain
from the laws of God, and that men are convinced that
children have such a right is evident from the law of the
land, both which laws require parents to provide for their
’ children.

89. For children being, by the course of nature, born
weak, and unable to provide for themselves, they have by
the appointment of God Himself, who hath thus ordered
the course of nature, a right to be nourished and maintained

’ by their parents, nay, a right not only to a bare subsistence,
_ but to the conveniences and comforts of life as far as the
' coriditions of their parents can afford it ;and hence it comes
140 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

that when their parents leave the world, and so the care due
to their children ceases, the effects of it are to extend as far
as possibly they can, and the provisions they have made in
their lifetime are understood to be intended as Nature
requires they should, for their children, whom after them-
selves they are bound to provide for, though the dying
parents, by express words, declare nothing about them,
nature appoints the descent of their property to their
children, who thus come to have a title and natural right of
inheritance to their father’s goods, which the rest of mankind
cannot pretend to.

go. Were it not for this right of being nourished and
maintained by their parents, which God and nature has
given to children, and obliged parents to, as a duty, it
would be reasonable that the father should inherit the estate
of his son, and be preferred in the inheritance before his
grandchild, for to the grandfather there is due a long score
of care and experience laid out upon the breeding and
education of his son, which one would think in justice
ought to be paid, but that having been done in obedience
to the same law whereby he received nourishment and
education from his own parents, this score of education re-
ceived from a man’s father is paid by taking care and
providing for his own children (is paid, I say, as much as is
required of payment by alteration of property, unless
present necessity of the parents require a return of goods
for their necessary support and subsistence ; for we are not
now speaking of that reverence, acknowledgment, re-
spect, and honour that is always due from children to their
parents, but of possessions and commodities of life
valuable by money) ; but yet this debt to the children does
not quite cancel the score due to the father, but only is
made by nature preferable to it. For the debt a man owes
his father takes place, and gives the father a right to inherit
the son’s goods, where, for want of issue, the right of
children doth not exclude that title. And therefore a man
having a right to be maintained by his children where he
need it, and to enjoy also the comforts of life from them,
when the necessary provision due to them and their children
will afford it, if his son die without issue, the father has a
Tight in nature to possess his goods and inherit his estate

\
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 14t

(whatever the municipal laws of some countries may
absurdly direct otherwise), and so again his children and
their issue from him, or, for. want of such, his father and
his issue ; but where no such are to be found—ze., no
kindred—there we see the possessions of a private man
revert to the community, and so in politic societies come
into the hands of the public magistrate, but in the state of
nature become again perfectly common, nobody having a
right to inherit them, nor can any one have a property in
them otherwise than in other things common by nature, of
which I shall speak in its due place.

gt. I have been the larger in showing upon what ground
children have a right to succeed to the possession of their
father’s properties, not only because by it it will appear that
if Adam had a property (a titular insignificant useless
property ; for it could be no better, for he was bound to
nourish and maintain his children and posterity out of it)
in the whole earth and its product, yet all his children
coming to have by the lawof nature and right of inheritance
a joint title, and right of property in it after his death,
it could convey no right of sovereignty to any one of his
posterity over the rest, since every one having a right of in-
heritance to his portion, they might enjoy their inheritance,
or any part of it in common, or share it, or some parts of it,
by division, as it best liked them, but no one could pretend
to the whole inheritance, or any sovereignty supposed
to accompany it, since a right of inheritance gave every one
of the rest, as well as any one, a title to share in the goods
of his father. Not only upon this account, I say, have I
been so particular in examining the reason of children’s in-
heriting the property of their fathers, but also because it
will give us farther light in the inheritance of “rule” and
“ power,” which in countries where their particular municipal
laws give the whole possession of land entirely to the first
born, and descent of power has gone so to men by this
custom, some have been apt to be deceived into an opinion
that there was a natural or Divine right of primogeniture’
to both “ estate” and “power,” and that the inheritance
of both “rule” over men and property in things sprung
from the same original, and were to descend by the same

rules.
142 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

92. Property, whose original is from the riglit a man Hag
to use any of the inferior creatures for the subsistence and
comfort of his life, is for the benefit and sole advantage of
the proprietor, so that he may even destroy the thing that he
has property in by his use of it, where need requires ; but
government, being for the preservation of every man’s right
and property, by preserving him from the violence or injury
of others, is for the good of the governed ; for the magistrate
sword being for a “terror to evil doers,” and by that terror
to enforce men to observe the positive laws of the society,
made conformable to the laws of nature, for the public good,
that is, the good of every particular member of that society,
as far as by common rules it can be provided for, the sword
is not given the magistrate for his own good alone.

93. Children, therefore, as has been showed, by the de-
pendence they have on their parents for subsistence, have a
right of inheritance to their father’s property, as that which
belongs to them for their proper good and behoof, and there-
fore are fitly termed goods, wherein the first-born has not a
sole or peculiar right by any law of God and nature—his
and his brethren’s being equally founded on that night they
had to maintenance, support, and comfort from their parents,
and on nothing else. But government, being for the benefit
of the governed, and not the sole advantage of the governors
(but only for theirs with the rest, as they make a part of that
politic body, each of whose parts and members are taken
care of, and directed in their peculiar function for the good
of the whole by the laws of the society), cannot be inherited
by the same title that children have to the goods of their
fathers. The right a son has to be maintained and pro-
vided with the necessaries and conveniences of life out
of his father’s stock gives him a right to succeed to
his father’s “property” for his own good, but this can
give him no right to succeed also to the “rule” which his
father had over other men; all that a child has right
to claim from his father is nourishment and education,
and the things nature furnishes for the support of life;
but he has no right to demand “rule” or “dominion” from
him. He can subsist and receive from himi the portion of
good things and advantages of education naturally due to
him without “ empire” and “dominion,” that (if his father hath

af
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 143

any) was vested in him for the good and behoof of others ;
and therefore the son cannot claim or inherit it by a title,
which is founded wholly on his own private good and
advantage.

94. We must know how the firsttuler from whom any one
claims came by his authority, upon what ground any one has
“empire,” what his title is to it, before we can know who has
a right to succeed him in it and inherit it from him. If the
agreement and consent of men first gave a sceptre into any
one’s hand or put a crown on his head, that also must direct
its descent and conveyance; for the same authority that
made the first a lawful “ruler” must make the second too, and
so give right of succession. And in this case inheritance
or primogeniture can in itself have no right, no pretence to
it, any farther than that consent which established the form
of the government hath so settled the succession; and thus
we see the succession of Crowns, in several countries, places
it on different heads, and he comes by right of succession to
be a prince in one place who would be a subject in another.

95. If God, by His positive grant and revealed declaration,
first gave “rule” and ‘‘ dominion” to any man, he that will claim
by that title must have the same positive grant of God for
his succession ; for if that has not directed the course of its
descent and conveyance down to others, nobody can succeed
to this title of the first ruler, and hereto children have no
right of inheritance, and primogeniture can lay no claim
unless God, the Author of this constitution, hath so ordained
it. Thus we see the pretensions of Saul’s family, who
received his crown from the immediate appointment of God,
ended with his reign; and David, by the same title that
Saul reigned—viz., God’s appointment—succeeded in his
throne to the exclusion of Jonathan and all pretensions of
paternal inheritance. And if Solomon had a right to
succeed his father, it must be by some other title than that
of primogeniture. A cadet or sister's son must have the
preference in succession if he has the same title the first
lawful prince had. And in dominion that has its foundation
only in the positive appointment of God himself, Benjamin,
the youngest, must have the inheritance of the crown if
God so direct, as well as one of that tribe had the first
possession, ©
144 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

96. If “paternal right,” the act of “ begetting,” give a man
“rule” and “dominion,” inheritance or primogeniture can‘give
no title; for he that cannot succeed to his father’s title,
which was “ begetting,” cannot succeed to that power over
his brethren which his father had by paternal right over them.
But I shall have more to say on this by-and-by. This is plain,
in the meantime, that any government, whether supposed to
* be at first founded in “paternal right,” ‘consent of the
people,” or the ‘positive appointment of God himself,”
which can supersede either of the other, and so begin a new
government upon a new foundation—I say, any govern-
ment begun upon either of these can, by right of succession,
come to those only who have the title of him they. succeed
to. Power founded on ‘‘contract” can descend only to him
who has right by that contract; power founded on “ beget-
ting” he only can have that “begets ;” and power founded
on the positive “ grant” or “donation” of God, he only can
have by right of succession to whom that grant directs it.

97. From what I have said I think this is clear—that a
right to the use of the creatures being founded onginally in
the right a man has to subsist and enjoy the conveniences
of life, and the natural right children have to inherit the
goods of their parents, being founded in the'right they have
to the same subsistence and commodities of life out of the
stock of their parents, who are therefore taught by natural
love and tenderness to provide for them as a part of them-
selves, and all this being only for the good of the proprietor
or heir, it can be no reason for children’s inheriting of “rule”
and “dominion,” which has another original and a different
end ; nor can primogeniture have any pretence to a right of
solely inheriting either “ property” or “ power,” as we shall,
in its due place, see more fully. It is enough to have shown
here that Adam’s “property” or “ private dominion” could
not convey any sovereignty or rule to his heir, who, not
having a right to inherit all his father’s possessions, could not
thereby come to have any sovereignty over his brethren ; and
therefore, if any sovereignty, on account of his “ property,”
had been vested in Adam—which in truth there was not—yet
it would have died with him.

98. As Adam's sovereignty—if he had, by virtue of being
proprietor of the whole world, had any authority over men—
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 145

could not have been inherited by any of his children over
the rest, because they had all title to divide the inheritance,
and every one had a right to a portion of his father’s posses-
sions, so neither could Adam’s sovereignty by right of “father-
hood,” if any such he kad, descend to any one of his children;
for it being, in our author's account, a right acquired by
“ begetting” to rule over those he had begotten, it was not a
power possible to be inherited, because the right being con-
sequent to and built on an act perfectly personal, made that
power so too, and impossible to be inherited ; for paternal
power being a natural right, arising only from the relation of
father and son, is as impossible to be inherited as the rela-
tion itself. And a man may pretend as well to inherit the
conjugal power the husband, whose heir he is, had over his
wife, as he can to inherit the paternal power of a father over
his children ; for the power of the husband being founded
on contract and the power of the father on “‘ begetting,” he
may as well inherit the power obtained by the conjugal
contract, which was only personal, as he may the power
obtained by begetting, which could reach no farther than
the person of the begetter, unless begetting can be a title to
power in him that does not beget.

99. Which makes it a reasonable question to ask, Whether
Adam, dying before Eve, his heir (suppose Cain or Seth)
should have had, by right of inheriting Adam’s “ fatherhood,”
sovereign power over Eve his mother? For Adam’s “ father-
hood” being’ nothing but a right he had to govern his children
because he begot them, he that inherits Adam’s “ father-
hood” inherits nothing, even in our author's sense, but
the right Adam had to govern his children because he begot
them ; so that the monarchy of the heir would not have
taken in Eve, or, if it did, it being nothing but the “ father-
hood” of Adam descended by inheritance, the heir must have
right to govern Eve because Adam begot her, for “ father-
hood” is nothing else.

100. Perhaps it will be said by our author that a man
can alien his power over his child, and what may be trans-
ferred by compact may be possessed by inheritance. I
answer, a father cannot alien the power he has over his
child. He may perhaps to some degree forfeit it, but can-
not transfer it ; and if any other man acquire it, it is not by
146 ZWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

the father’s grant, but some act of his own. For example,
a father, unnaturally careless of his child, sells or gives him
to another man, and he, again, exposes him ; a third man
finding him, breeds up, cherishes, and provides for him as
his own. I think in this case nobody will doubt but that
the greatest part of filial duty and subjection was here
owing, and to be paid to, this foster-father ; and if anything
could be demanded from him, by either of the other, it
could be only due to his natural father, who perhaps might
have forfeited his right to much of that duty comprehended
in the command, “ Honour your parents,” but could trans-
fer none of it to another. He that purchased and neglected
the child, got, by his purchase and grant of the father, no
title to duty or honour from the child, but only he acquired
it who, by his own authority, performing the office and care
of a father to the forlorn and perishing infant, made himself,
by paternal care, a title to proportionable degrees of paternal
power. ‘This will be more easily admitted upon considera-
tion of the nature of paternal power, for which I refer my
reader to the Second Book.

rox. To return to the argument in hand, this is evident :
That paternal power arising only from ‘‘begetting” (for in that
our author places it alone), can neither be “ transferred” nor
“ inherited ;” and he that does not beget can no more have
paternal power which arises from thence, than he can have
a right to anything who performs not the condition to which
only it is annexed. If one should ask by what law has a
father power over his children, it will be answered, no daubt,
by the law of Nature, which gives such a power over them
to him that begets them. If one should ask likewise by what
law does our author’s heir come by a right to inherit, I
think it would be answered by the law of Nature too; for I
find not that our author brings one word of Scripture to
prove the right of such an heir he speaks of. Why, then,
the law of Nature gives fathers paternal power over their
children because they did “beget” them, and the same law of
Nature gives the same paternal power to the heir over his
brethren who did not ‘f beget” them, whence it follows that
either the father has not his paternal power by begetting, or
else that the heir has it not at all. For it is hard to under-
stand how the law of Nature, which is the law of reason, can
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ign

give the paternal powet to the father over his children fot
the only reason of “‘begetting,” aiid to the first-born over his
brethren, without this only reason—/.e., for no reason at all.
And if the eldest by the law of Nature can inherit this
paternal power without the only reason that gives a title to
it, so may the youngest as well as he, and a stranger as well
as either; for where there is no reason fot dtiy one, as there is
not but for him that begets, all have an equal title. I am
Sure our author offers no reason, and when anybody does,
we shall see whetler it will hold or no.

102. In the mean time, it is as good Sensé to say that by
the law of Nature a man has right to inherit the property
of another because he is of kin to him and is known to be
of his blood, and therefore by the same law of Nature an
utter stranger to his blood has right to inherit his estate,
as to say that by the law of Nature he that begets them has
paternal power over his children, and therefore by the law
of Nature the heir that begets them not has this paternal
power over them. Or, supposing the law of the land gave
absolute power over their children to such only who nursed
them and fed their children themselves, could anybody
pretend that this law gave any one who did no such thing
absolute power over those who were not his children?

103. When, therefore, it can be showed that conjugal
power can belong to him that is not an husband, it will also,
I believe, be proved that our author's paternal’ power
acquired by begetting may be inherited by a son, and that
abrother as heir to his father’s power may have paternal
power over his brethren, and by the same rule conjugal
power too ; but till then, I think we may rest satisfied that the
paternal power of Adam, this sovereign authority of ‘‘ father-
hood,” were there any such, could not descend to nor be in-
herited by, his next heir. “Fatherly power,” I easily grant our
author, if it will do him any good, can never be lost, because
it will be as long in the world as there are fathers ; but none
of them will have Adam’s paternal power, or derive theirs
from him, but every one will have his own, by the same
title Adam had his—viz., by “‘ begetting,” but not by inherit-
ance or succession ; no more than husbands have their
conjugal power by inheritance from Adam. And thus we see,
as Adam had no such “ property,” no such “ paternal power”
148 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

as gave him “ sovereign” jurisdiction over mankind ; so like-
wise his sovereignty built upon either of these titles, if he had
any such, could not have descended to his heir, but must
have ended with him. Adam, therefore, as has been
proved, being neither monarch, nor his imaginary mon-
archy hereditable, the power which is now in the world
is not that which was Adam’s ; since all that Adam could
have, upon our author’s grounds, either of ‘ property” or
“ fatherhood,” necessarily died with him, and could not be
conveyed to posterity by inheritance. In the next place
we will consider whether Adam had any such heir to inherit
his power as our author talks of.

CHAPTER X,
Of the Heir to Monarchical Power of Adant.

104. Our author tells us (O., 253), ‘‘ That it is a truth
undeniable that there cannot be any multitude of men what-
soever, either great or small, though gathered together from
the several corners and remotest regions of the world, but
that in the same multitude, considered by itself, there is one
man amongst them that in Nature hath a right to be king of
all the rest, as being the next heir to Adam and all the other
subject to him ; every man by nature is a king or a subject.”
And again (p. 20), “If Adam himself were still living and now
ready to die, it is certain that there is one man, and but one
in the world, who is next heir.” Let this ‘‘ multitude of men”
be if our author pleases, all the princes upon the earth, there
will then be, by our author’s rule, “ one amongst them that
in nature hath a right to be king of all the rest, as being the
right heir to Adam.” An excellent way to establish the
titles of princes, and settle the obedience of their subjects,
by setting up an hundred or perhaps a thousand titles, if
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 149

there be so many princes in the world, against any king
now reigning, upon our author's grounds} as good as his
own. If this right of “heir” carry any weight with it, if it
be the “ordinance of God” as our author seems to tell us
(O., 244), must not all be subject to it, from the highest
to the lowest ? Can those who wear the name of princes,
without having the right of being “heirs to Adam,” demand
obedience from their subjects by this title, and not be bound
to pay it by the same law? Either governments in the world
are not to be claimed and held by this title of Adam’s heir,
and then the starting of it is to no purpose, the being or not
being Adam’s heir signifies nothing as to the title of dominion,
or if it really be, as our author says, the true title to govern-
ment and sovereignty, the first thing to be done is to find
out this true heir of Adam, seat him in his throne, and then
all the kings and princes of the world come and resign up
their crowns and sceptres to him, as things that belong no
more to them than to any of their subjects.

105. For either this right in nature of Adam’s heir to be
king over all the race of men (for altogether they make one
“multitude”) is a right not necessary to the making of a lawful
king, and so there may be lawful kings without it, and then
kings, titles, and power depend not on it ; or else all the kings
in the world but one are not lawful kings, and so have no
right to obedience ; either this title of heir to Adam is that
whereby kings hold their crowns and have a right to subjec-
tion from their subjects, and then one only can have it, and
the rest, being subjects, can require no obedience from other
men, who are but their fellow-subjects, or else it is not the
title whereby kings rule and have a right to obedience from
their subjects, and then kings are kings without it. And
this dream of the natural sovereingty of Adam’s heir is of no
useto obedience and government ; for if kings have a right to
dominion and the obedience of their subjects who are not,
nor can possibly be, heirs to Adam, what use is there of such
atitle when we areobliged to obey without it ? If they have
not, we are discharged of our obedience to them, for he that
has no right to command, I am under no obligation to obey ;
and we are all free tiilour author, or anybody for him, will
show us Adam’s right heir. If there be but one heir of Adam,
there can be but one lawful king in the world, and nobody
ito TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

in conscience can be obliged to obedience till it be resolved
who that is, for it may be any one who is not known to be
of a younger house, and all others have equal titles. if
there be more than one heir of Adam, every one is his heir,
and so every one has regal power ; for if two sons can be
heirs together, then all the sons are equally heirs, and so all
are heirs, being all sons, or sons’ sons of Adam ; betwixt these
two the right of heir cannot stand, for by it either but one
only man, or all men are kings, and, take which you please, it
dissolves the bonds of government and obedience, since if
all men are heirs, they can owe obedience to nobody ; if only
one, nobody can be obliged to pay obedience to him till
he be known dnd his title made out.

 

CHAPTER XI.
Who Heir?

106. THE gteat question which, in all ages, has disturbed
mankind, and brought on them the greatest part of those
mischiefs which have ruined cities, depopulated countries,
and disordered the peace of the world, has been, not whether
there be power in the world, nor whence it came, but who
should have it. The settling of this, therefore, being of no
smaller moment than the security of princes, and the peace
and welfare of their estates and kingdoms, a writer of poli-
tics, one would think, should take great care in settling this
point, and be very clear in it ; for if this remain disputable,
all the rest will be to very little purpose. And by dressing
up power with all the splendour and temptation absoluteness
can add to it, without showing who has a right to have it,
is only to give a greater edge to man’s natural ambition,
which, of itself, is but too apt to be intemperate, and to set
men on the more eagerly to scramble, and so lay a sure and
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 151

Jasting foundation of endless contention and disorder, instead
of that peace and tranquillity, which is the business of govern-
ment and the end of human society.

107. This our author is more than ordinarily obliged to
do, because he affirming that “‘the assignment of civil power
is by Divine institution,” hath made the conveyance, as well
as the power itself, sacred ; so that no power, no considera-
tion, can divert it from that person to whom, by this Divine
right, it is assigned ; no necessity or contrivance can substitute
another person in his room. For if “ the assignment of civil
power be by Divine institution,” and Adam’s “heir,” he to
whom it is thus “ assigned ”—as we see in the foregping chap-
ter—our author tells us it would be as much sacrilege for any
one to be king who was not Adam’s heir, as it would have been
amongst the Jews for any one to have been “ priest” who had
not been of Aaron’s posterity ; for “‘ not only” the priesthoad
“in general being by Divine institution, but the assignment of
it” to the sole line and posterity of Aaron made it impossible
to be enjoyed or exercised by any one but those persons who
are the offspring of Aaron, whose succession therefore was
carefully observed, and by that the persons who had a right
to the pnesthood certainly known.

108. Let us see, then, what care our author has taken tq
make us know who is this “heir,” who, “ by Divine institu-
tion, has aright to be king over all men.” The first account of
him we meet with is (p. 12) in these words :—“ ‘This subjec-
tion of children, being the fountain of all regal authority,
by the ordination of God himself, it follows that civil power,
not only in general, is by Divine institution, but even the
assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents.” Matters
of such consequence as this is should be in plain words, as
little liable as might be to doubt or equivocation ; and I
think, if language be capable of expressing anything distinctly
and clearly that of kindred, and the several degrees of near-
ness of blood, is one. It were, therefore, to be wished that
our author had used a little more intelligible expressians
here, that we might have better known who it is to whom e the
assignment of civil power” is inade by ‘“ Divine institution,”
or at least would have told us what he meant by “eldest
parent ;” for, I believe, if land had been assigned or granted
to him, and the “eldest parents” of his family, he would
1s2. TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

have thought it had needed an interpreter, and it would
scarce have been known to whom next it belonged.

109. In propriety of speech—and certainly propriety of
speech is necessary in a discourse of this nature—“ eldest
parents” signifies either the eldest men and women that have
had children, or those who have longest had issue, and then
our author’s assertion will be that those fathers and mothers
who have been longest in the world, or longest fruitful, have,
by “ Divine institution,” a right to “civil power ;” if there be
any absurdity in this, our author must answer for it; and if his
meaning be different from my explication, he is to be blamed
that he would not speak it plainly. This I am sure, “parents”
cannot signify heirs male, nor “ eldest parents,” an infant
child, who yet may sometimes be the true heir, if there can be
but one. And we are hereby still as much at a loss who
civil power belongs to, notwithstanding this “ assignment by
Divine institution,” as if there had been no such assignment
at all, or our author had said nothing of it. This of “eldest
parents” leaving us more in the dark who, by “ Divine institu-
tion,” has a right to ‘‘civil power” than those who never heard
anything at all of heir or descent, of which our author is so
full; and though the chief matter of his writings be to teach
obedience to those who have a right to it, which, he tells us,
is conveyed by descent, yet who those are to whom this
right by descent belongs, he leaves, like the philosopher's
stone in politics, out of the reach of any one to discover
from his writings.

1to. This obscurity cannot be imputed to want of lan-
guage in so great a master of style as Sir Robert is, when he
is resolved with himself what he would say, and therefore I
fear, finding how hard it would be to settle rules of descent
by Divine institution, and how little it would be to his
purpose, or conduce to the clearing and establishing the
titles of princes if such rules of descent were settled, he
chose rather to content himself with doubtful and general
terms, which might make no ill sound in men’s ears, who
were willing to be pleased with them, rather than offer any
clear rules of descent of this “fatherhood” of Adam, by which
men’s consciences might be satisfied to whom it descended,
and know the persons who had a right to regal power, and
with it to their obedience.
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 153

111. How else is it possible that laying so much stress as
he does upon “ descent,” and ‘‘ Adam’s heir,” “ next heir,”
* true heir,” he should never tell us what “ heir” means, nor
the way to know who the “ next” or “true heir” is. This I
do not remember he does anywhere expressly handle, but
where it comes in his way very warily and doubtfully touch ;
though it be so necessary, that without it all discourses of
government and obedience upon his principles would be to
no purpose ; and “ fatherly power,” never so well made out,
will be of no use to anybody; hence he tells us (O., 244)
“That not only the constitution of power in general, but the
limitation of it to one kind—z.e., monarchy—and the de-
termination of it to the individual person and line of Adam
are all three ordinances of God. Neither Eve nor her children
could either limit Adam’s power or join others with him; and
what was given unto Adam was given in his person to his pos-
terity.” Here, again, our author informs us that the “ Divine
ordinance” hath limited the descent of Adam’s monarchical
power to whom? “To Adam’s line and posterity,” says our
author, a notable limitation, a limitation to all mankind ;
for if our author can find any one amongst mankind that is
not of the “line” and “ posterity” of Adam, he may perhaps
tell him who this next heir of Adam is; but for us I despair
how this “ limitation” of Adam’s empire to his “line” and
“posterity” will help us to find out “one heir.” This “limita-
tion,” indeed, of our author will save those the labour who
would look for him amongst the race of brutes, if any such
there were, but will very little contribute to the discovery of
-¢¢one next heir” amongst men, though it make a short and easy
determination of the question about the descent of Adam’s
regal power by telling us that the line and posterity of Adam
is to have it—that is, in plain English, any one may have it,
since there is no person living that hath not the title of being
of the “line” and “ posterity” of Adam, and while it keeps
there, it keeps within our author’s limitation by God’s ordi-
nance. Indeed (p. 23), he tells us that “ such heirs are not
only lords of their own children, but of their brethren,”
whereby, and by the words following, which we shall con-
sider anon, he seems to insinuate that the eldest son is heir,
but he nowhere, that I know, says it in direct words, but by
the instances of Cain and Jacob, that there follow, we may
184 TWO TREATISES OF GO VERNMENT.

allow this td bé so far his opinion concerning heirs, that
where there are diversé children, the eldest son lias the right
to be heir; that primogeniture cannot give any title to pa-
ternal power we have already showed; that a father may
have a natural right to some kind of power over his children
is easily granted ; but that an elder brother has so over his
brethren remains to be proved. God or Nature has not ainy-
where, that I know, placed such jurisdiction in the firstborn,
nor can reason find any such natural superiority amongst
brethren. Thelaw of Moses gave adouble portion of thegodds
and possessions to the eldest, but we find not anywhere that
naturally, or by “God’s institution,” superiority or dominion
belonged to hii, and the instances there brought by our
author are but sléiider proofs of a right to civil power and
dominion in the firstborn, and do rather show the contraty.
112. His words are in the forecited place: “And therefore
we find God told Cain of his brother Abel: ‘His desire
shall be subject unto thee, and thou shalt rule over him.’”
To which I answer, first, these words of God to Cain are
by many interpreters with gréat reason understood in a
quite different sense than what our author uses them in;
secondly, whatever was meant by them it could not be that
Cain, as elder, had a ttatural dominion over Abel, for the
words are conditional : “If thou doest well,” and so personal
to Cain, and whatever was signified by them, did depend
on his carriage and not follow his birthright, and therefore
could by no means be an establishment of dominion in the
firstborn in general ; for before this Abel had his “distinct
territories by right of private dominion,” as our author him-
self confesses (O., 210), which he could not have had to the
prejudice of the heir’s title “if by divine institution” Cain as
heir were to inherit all his father’s dominion ; thirdly, if this
were intended by God as the charter of primogeniture and
the grant of dominion to elder brothers in general, a8 such,
by right of inheritance, we might expect it should have in+
cluded all his brethren ; for we may well suppose Adani,
from whom the world was to be peopled by this time, that
these were grdwn up to be men, had more sons than these
two, whereas Abel himself is not so much as named; and thé
Words in the origiital can scarce, with any good constric-
tion, bé applied to hii ; fourthly, it is too much to build a
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 455

doctrine of so mighty consequence upon so doubtful ang
obscure a place of Scripture, which may be well, nay, better
understood in a quite different sense, and so can be but
an ill proof, being as doubtfyl as the thing to be proyed by
it, especially when there is nothing else in Scripture or
reason to be found that favours or supports it.

_ 113. It follows (p.23): “ Accordingly when Jacob bought
his brother's birthright, Isaac blessed him thus: ‘ Be Jord
over thy brethren, and let the sons of thy mother bow
before thee ;” another instance, I take it, brought by our
author to evince dominion due to birthright, and an admir-
able one it is; for it must be no ordinary way of reasoning
ina man that is pleading for the natural power of kings,
and against all compact to bring for proof of it, an example
where his own account of it founds all the right upon com-
pact, and settles empire in the younger brother, unless
buying and selling be no compact ; for he tells us, “when
Jacob bought his brother’s birthright.” But, passing by
that, let us consider the history itself, with what use our
author makes of it, and we shall find these following mis-
takes about it :—

Firstly, That our author reports this as if Isaac had given
Jacob this blessing immediately upon his purchasing the
ff birthright,” for he says ‘* when Jacob bought,” “Isaac blessed
him,” which is plainly otherwise in the Scripture ; for it
appears there was a distance of time between; and if we
will take the story in the order it lies, it must be no small
distance. All Isaac’s sojourning in Gerar, and transactions
with Abimelech (Gen. xxyi.) coming between, Rebecca being
then beautiful and consequently young; but Isaac when he
blessed Jacob was old and decrepit. And Esay also com-
plains of Jacob (Gen. xxvii, 36) that ‘‘two times” he had sup-
planted him ; “he took away my birthright,” sayshe, “ and
behold now he hath taken away my blegsing ;” words that,
I think, signify distance of time and difference of action.

Secondly, Another mistake of our author’s 1s, that he
supposes Isaac gave Jacob the “ blessing,” and bid him be
“Jord over his brethren,” because he had the “ birthright ;” for
qur author brings this example to proye that he that has
the “ birthright,” has thereby a right to pe “lord over his
brethren ;” but it is alsq manifest by the text, that Isaac had
136 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

no consideration of Jacob’s having bought the birthright, for
when he blessed him, he considered him not as Jacob, but
took him for Esau; nor did Esau understand any such con-
nection between “birthright” and the “ blessing ;” for he says,
“he hath supplanted me these two times; he took away
my birthright, and behold now he hath taken away my
blessing ;” whereas had the “ blessing,” which was to be “Jord
over his brethren,” belonged to the “ birthright,” Esau could
not have complained of this second as a cheat, Jacob
having got nothing but what Esau had sold him when he
sold him his “ birthright ;’ so that it is plain dominion, if
these words signify it, was not understood to belong to the
“ birthright.”

114. And that in those days of the patriarchs dominion
was not understood to be the right of the heir, but only a
greater portion of goods, is plain from Gen. xxi. 10; for
Sarah, taking Isaac to be heir, says, “ Cast out this bond-
woman and her son, for the son of this bondwoman shall
not be heir with my son,” whereby could be meant nothing
but that he should not have a pretence to an equal share
of his father’s estate after his death, but should have his
portion presently and be gone. Accordingly we read
(Gen. xxv. 5, 6), that “Abraham gave all that he had unto
Isaac, but unto the sons of the concubines which Abraham
had, Abraham gave gifts, and sent them away from Isaac
his son, while he yet lived.” That is, Abraham having
given portions to all his other sons and sent them away,
that which he had reserved, being the greatest part of his
substance, Isaac, as heir, possessed after his death ; but by
being heir he had no right to be “lord over his brethren ;”
for if he had, why should Sarah desire to rob him of one
of his subjects, his slaves, by desiring to have him sent
away.

115. Thus, as under the law, the privilege of “ birthright”
was nothing but a double portion, so we see that before
Moses in the patriarch’s time, from whence our author
pretends to take his model, there was no knowledge, no
thought that birthright gave rule or empire, paternal or kingly
authority to any one over his brethren; which, if it be not
plain enough in the story of Isaac and Ishmael, let them
look into 1 Chron. v. 12, and there he may read these
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 157

words, “Reuben was the firstborn, but forasmuch as he
defiled his father’s bed, his birthright was given unto the
sons of Joseph, the son of Israel, and the genealogy is not
to be reckoned after the birthright; for Judah prevailed
above his brethren, and of him came the chief ruler, but
the birthright was Joseph’s,” and what this birthright was,
Jacob blessing Joseph (Gen. xlviii. 22), telleth us in these
words: “ Moreover, I have given fhee one portion above
thy brethren, which I took out of the hand of the Amorite
with my sword and with my bow ;” whereby it is not only
plain that the birthright was nothing but a double portion,
but the text in Chronicles is express against our author’s
doctrine ; shows that dominion was no part of the birthright ;
for it tells us that Joseph had the birthright, but Judah the
dominion. But one would think our author were very fond
of the very name of “ birthright,” when he brings this instance
of Jacob and Esau to prove that dominion belongs to the
heir over his brethren.

116, Firstly, because it will be but an ill example to prove
that dominion by God’s ordination belonged to the eldest
son, because Jacob, the youngest, here had it, let him come
by it how he would ; for if it prove anything, it can only
prove, against our author, that the ‘‘ assignment of dominion
to the eldest is not by divine institution,” which would then
be unalterable. For, if by the law of God or Nature,
absolute power and empire belongs to the eldest son and
his heirs, so that they are supreme monarchs, and all the
rest of their brethren slaves, our author gives us reason
to doubt whether the eldest son has a power to part with it
to the prejudice of his posterity, since he tells us (O., 158),
that “In grants and gifts that have their original from God
or Nature, no inferior power of man can limit or make any
law of prescription against them.” .

117. Secondly, because this place (Gen. xxvii. 29),
brought by our author, concerns not at all the dominion of
one brother over the other, nor the subjection of Esau to
Jacob ; for it is plain in the history that Esau was never
subject to Jacob, but lived apart in Mount Seir, where he
founded a distinct people and government, and was himself
prince over them as much as Jacob was in his own family.
The words, if one consider, “‘ thy brethren” and “thy mother’s
}
358 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

sons in them,” can never he understood Jiterally of Esau or the
personal dominion of Jacgb over him ; for the words “sons”
and “brethren” cquld not be used literally by Isaac, who
knew Jacob had only one brother ; and these words are so
far from being true in a literal sense, or establishing any
dominion in Jacob over Esau, that in the story we find the
quite contrary ; for (Gen. xxxii.) Jacob seyeral times calls
Esau “lord” and himself his servant ; and (Gen. xxxiii.) “he
bowed himself seven times to the ground to Esau.” Whether
Esau, then, were a subject and vassal (nay, as our author
tells us, all subjects are slaves) to Jacob, and Jacob his
sovereign prince by birthright, I leave the reader to judge
and believe, if he can, that these words of Isaac, ‘ Be lord
over thy brethren, and let thy mother’s sons bow down to
thee,” confirmed Jacob in a sovereignty oyer Esau upon
the account of the birthright he had got from him.

118. He that reads the story of Jacob and Esau will find
there was never any jurisdiction or authority that either of
them had over the other after their father’s death ; they lived
with the friendship and equality of brethren ; neither ‘ Jord,”
neither “slaye” to his brother, but independent each of other ;
were both heads of their distinct families; where they re-
ceived no laws from one another, but lived separately, and
were the. roots out of which sprang two distinct peoples
under two distinct governments. This blessing, then, of
Isaac, whereon our author would build the dominion of the
elder brother, signifies no more but what Rebecca had been
told from God (Gen. xxv. 23): Two nations are in thy womb,
and two manner of people shall be separated from thy bowels ;
and the one people shal} be stronger than the.other people,
and the elder shall serve the younger.” And so Jacob blessed
Judah (Gen, xlix.), and gave him the sceptre and dominion ;
from whence our author might have argued as well that
jurisdiction and dominion belongs to the third son over his
brethren, as well as from this blessing of Isaac that it belonged
to Jacob, they being both predictions of what should long
after happen to theirposterities, and not the declaring the right
author’s two great and only arguments to prove that “ heirs
are lords of their brethren”—First, Because God tells Cain
(Gen. iy.) that howeyer sin might set upon him he ought or
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 159

titight be master of it; for the most learned interpreters under-
stand the words of sin, arid not of Abel, and give so strong
reasons for it that nothing can convincingly be inferred
from so doubtful a text to our author’s purpose. Second,
because in this of Gen. xxvii., Isaac foretells that the Israelites,
the posterity of Jacob, should have dominion over the
Edomites, the posterity of Esau. ‘Therefore, says our author,
“heirs are lords of their brethren.” I leave any one to judge
of the conclusion.

119. And now we see how our authof has provided for
the descending and conveyance down of Adam’s monarchical
power or paternal dotninidn to posterity, by the inheritance
of his heir, sticceeding to all his father’s authority, and
becoming upon his death as much lord as his fathér was,
“not only over his own children, but over his brethren,” and
all descended from his father, and so 7” infinitum. But yet,
who this heir is he does not once tell us, and all the light we
have from him in this so fundamental a point is only that in
his instance of Jacob, by using the word “birthright” as that
which passed from Esau to Jacob, he leaves us to guess
that by heir he means the eldest son ; though I do not re-
member he anywhere meiitions expressly the title of the
firstborn, but all along keeps himself under the shelter of
the indefinite term “heir.” But taking it to be his meaning,
that the eldest son is heir (for if the eldest be not, there will
be no pretence why the sons should not be all heirs alike),
and so by right of primogeniture has dominion over his
brethren, this is but one step towards the settlement of
Succession, and the difficulties remain still as much as ever,
till he can show us who is méant by right heir, in all those
cases which may happen where the present possessor hath
no son. But this he silently passes over, and perhaps wisely
too; for what can be wiser, after one has affirmed that
“ the person having that power, as well as the power and form
of government, is the ordinatice of God and by Divine in-
stitution” (vid. O., 254, p. 15), than to be careful not to start
any question concerning the person, the resolution whereof
will certainly lead him into a confession that God and Nature
hath determined nothing about him. And if our author
cannot show who, by right of N ature or a clear positive law
of ‘God, has the next right to inherit the dominion of this
y

160 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT:

natural monarch he has been at such pains about, when he
died without a son, he might have spared his pains in all
the rest ; it being more necessary to settle men’s consciences.
and determine their subjection and allegiance, to show them
who, by original right, superior and antecedent to the will
or any act of men, hath a title to this “ paternal jurisdiction,”
than it is to show that by Nature there was such a “ jurisdic-
tion ;” it being to no purpose for me to know there is such a
“ paternal power” which I ought and am disposed to obey,
unless where there are many pretenders, I also know the
person that is rightfully invested and endowed with it.

120. For the main matter in question being concerning
the duty of my obedience, and the obligation of conscience
I am under to pay it to him that is of right my lord and ruler,
I must know the person that this right of paternal power
resides in, and so empowers him to claim obedience from
me; for let it be true what he says (p. 15), that “ civil power
not only in general is by Divine institution, but even the,
assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents ;” and
(O., 254), “that not only the power or right of government,
but the form of the power of governing, and the person having
that power, are all the ordinance of God ;” yet unless he
shows us im all cases who is this person “ ordained” by God,
who is this “eldest parent,” all his abstract notions of mon-
archical power will signify just nothing, when they are to be
reduced to practice, and men are conscientiously to pay their
obedience. For “ paternal jurisdiction” being not the thing
to be obeyed, because it cannot command, but is only that
which gives one man a right which another hath not; and
if it come by inheritance another man cannot have to com-
mand and be obeyed, it is ridiculous to say, I pay obe-
dience to the “paternal power” when I obey him to whom
paternal power gives no right to my obedience ; for he can
have no Divine right to my obedience who cannot show his
Divine right to the power of ruling over me, as well as that
by Divine right there is such a power in the ‘world.

121. And hence not being able to make out any prince’s
title to government, as heir to Adam, which, therefore, is of
no use, and had been better let alone, he is fain to resolve
all into present possession, and makes civil obedience as
due to an usurper as to a lawful king, and therepy the
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 161

usurper’s title as good. His words ate (O., 253), and they
deserve to be remembered: “If an usurper dispossess the
true heir, the subject’s obedience to the fatherly power must
go along and wdit upon God's providence.” But I shall
leave his title of usurpers to be examined in its due place,
and desire my sober reader to consider what thanks princes
owe such politics as this, which can suppose “ paternal power”
—ieé., aright to government—into the hands of a Cade,
or a Cromwell, and so all obedience being due to paternal
power, the obedience of subjects will be due to them by the
same right, and upon as good grounds as it is to lawful
princes; and yet this, as dangerous a doctrine as it is, must
necessarily follow from making all political power to be
nothing else but Adam’s paternal power by right and
“ Divine institution,” descending from him without being
able to show to whom it descended, or who is heir to it.

122. For I say to settle government in the world, and to
lay obligations to obedience on any man’s conscience, it is
as necessary (supposing with our author that all power be
nothing but the being possessed of Adam’s “ fatherhood”) to
satisfy him who has a right to this ‘‘power ;” this “fatherhood”
when the possessor dies without sons to succeed imme-
diately to it, as it was to tell him that upon the death of
the father the eldest son had a right to it; for it is still to be
remembered that the great question is, and that which our
author would be thought to contend for, if he did not some
times forget it, what persons have a right to be obeyed, and
not whether there be a power in the world which is to be
called “paternal,” without knowing in whom it resides, for
soit be a power—.e., right to govern—it matters not whether
it be called “paternal,” “ regal,” “ natural,” or “ acquired”
“supreme fatherhood,” or “supreme brotherhood,” pro-
vided we know who has it.

123. I go on then to ask whether, in the inheriting of this
“paternal power,” this “supreme fatherhood,” the grandson
by a daughter hath a right before a nephew by a brother?
Whether the grandson by the eldest son, being an infant,
before the younger son, 2 man and able? Whether the
daughter before the uncle? or any other man descended by
a male line? Whether a grandson by a younger daughter
before a granddatightet by an elder daughter? Whether the

F
162 ZWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

elder son by a concubine before a younger son by a wife?
From whence also will arise many questions of legitimation,
and what in nature is the difference betwixt a wife and a
concubine? For as to the municipal or positive laws of men,
they can signify nothing here. It may further be asked,
whether the eldest son being a fool shall inherit this “ pa-
ternal power’ before the younger, a wise man? and what
degree of folly it must be that shall exclude him? and who
shall be judge of it? Whether the son of a fool excluded
for his folly before the son of his wife’s brother who reigned ?
Who has the “paternal power” whilst the widow queen is
with child by the deceased king, and nobody knows whether it
will be a son ora daughter? Which shall be heir of two
male twins, who, by the dissection of the mother, were laid
open to the world? Whether a sister by the half blood
before a brother’s daughter by the whole blood ?

124. These, and many more such doubts, might be pro-
posed about the titles of succession and the right of in-
heritance, and that not as idle speculations, but such as in
history we shall find, have concerned the inheritance of
crowns and kingdoms ; and if ours want them, we need not
go farther for famous examples of it than the other kingdom
in this very island,,which, having been fully related by the
ingenious and learned author of “ Patriarchanon Monarcha,”
I need say no more of; and till our author hath resolved
all the doubts that may arise about the next heir, and
showed that they are plainly determined by the law of
Nature, or the revealed law of God, all his suppositions of a
“‘ monarchical,” “ absolute,” “ supreme,” “ paternal power in
Adam,” and the descent of that power to his heir, and so on
—if, I say, all these his suppositions were as much demonstra-
tions as they are the contrary, yet they would not be of the
least use to establish the authority or make out the title of
any one prince now on earth, but would rather unsettle and
bring all into question. For let our author tell us as long as
he please, and let all men believe it too, that Adam had a
“paternal,” and thereby a “ monarchical power ;” that this
(the only power in the world) “ descended to his heirs,” and
that there is no other power in the world but this, yet, ifit be
not past doubt to whom this “‘ paternal power descends,” and
whose now it is, nobody can be under any obligation of
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 163

obedience unless any one will say that Iam bound to pay
obedience to “ paternal power” in aman who has no more
“ paternal power” than I myself, which is all one as to say, I
obey a man because he has a right to govern ; and if I be
asked how I know he has a 1ight to govern, I should answer
it cannot be known that he has any at all; for that cannot
be the reason of my obedience which I know not to be, so
much less can that be a reason of my obedience which no
body at all can know.

125. And therefore all this ado about Adam’s “ father-
hood,” the greatness of its power, and the necessity of its sup-
posal, helps nothing to the establishing the power of those that
govern, or determine the obedience of subjects who are to
obey, if they cannot tell whom they are to obey, or it cannot
be known who are to govern, and who to obey; and this
*‘ fatherhood,” this ‘‘monarchical power of Adam” descending
to his heirs, would be of no more use to the government of
mankind than it would be to the quieting of men’s con-
sciences, or securing their healths, if our author had assured
them that Adam had a “power” to forgive sins or cure
diseases which by Divine institution descended to his heir,
whilst this heir is impossible to be known. And should not
he do as rationally who, upon this assurance of our author,
went and confessed his sins, and expected a good abso-
lution, or took physic with expectation of health from any
one who had taken on himself the name of priest or
physician, or thrust himself into those employments, saying,
‘I acquiesce in the absolving power descending from Adam,
or [ shall be cured by the medicinal power descending from
Adam, as he who says, I submit to, and obey the “ paternal
power” descending from Adam, when it is confessed all these
powers descend only to his single heir, and that heir
is unknown.

126. It is true the civil lawyers have pretended to
determine some of these cases concerning the succession of
princes, but by our author’s principles they have meddled
in a matter that belongs not to them; for if all political
power be derived only from Adam, and be to descend only
to his successive heirs by the “ordinance of God” and
“ Divine institution,” this is a right antecedent and paramount
to all government, and therefore the positive laws of men

F2
164 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

cannot determine that which is itself the foundation of all law
and government, and is to receive its rule only from the law
of God and Nature. And that being silent in the case, I am
apt to think there is no such right to be conveyed this
way; I am sure it would be to no purpose if there were ;
and men would’be more at a loss concerning government
and obedience to governors than if there were no such
right ; since by positive laws and compact, which “ Divine
institution” (if there be any) shuts out, all these endless
inextricable doubts can be safely provided against ; but it
can never be understood how a Divine natural right,
and that of such moment as is all order and peace in
the world, should be conveyed down to posterity without
any plain, natural or Divine rule concerning it. And
there would be an end of all civil government if the
“assignment” of civil power were by ‘ Divine institution”
to the heir, and yet “by that Divine institution” the
person of the heir could not be known. This ‘“ paternal
regal power,” being by Divine right only his, it leaves no
room for human prudence or consent to place it anywhere
else ; for if only one man hath a Divine right to the obedience
of mankind, nobody can claim that obedience but he that
can show that right ; nor can men’s consciences by any other
pretence be obliged to it. And thus this doctrine cuts up
all government by the roots.

127. Thus we see how our author, laying it for a sure
foundation that the very person that is to rule is “the ordi-
nance” of God and by “ Divine institution,” tells us at large
only that this person is the heir, but who this heir is he
leaves us to guess; and so this “ Divine institution” which
assigns it to a person whom we have no rule to know is
just as good as an assignment to nobody at all. But what-
ever our author does, “ Divine institution” makes no such
ridiculous assignments, nor can God be supposed to make
it a sacred law that one certain person should have a right
to something, and yet not give rules to mark out and know
that person by, or give an heir a Divine right to power, and
yet not point out who that heiris. It is rather to be thought
that an heir had no such right by “ Divine institution” than
that God should give such a right to the heir, but yet leave
it doubtful and undeterminable who such heir is,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 16s

_ 128. IfGod had given the land of Canaan to Abraham, and
in general terms to somebody after him, without naming his
seed, whereby it might be known who that somebody was,
it would have been as good and useful an assignment to
determine the right to the land of Canaan as it would to
the determining the right of crowns, to give empire to
Adam and his successive heirs after him, without telling
who his heir is ; for the word “heir,” without a rule to know
who it is, signifies no more than somebody I know not
whom. God, making ita “ Divine institution” that men
should not marry those who were “near of kin,” thinks it
not enough to say, “none of you shall approach to any
that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness ;”
but, moreover, gives rules to know who are those “near of
kin” forbidden by “ Divine institution,” or else that law would
have been of no use, it being to no purpose to lay restraint
or give privileges to men in such general terms as the
particular person concerned cannot be known by; but God
not having anywhere said the next heir shall inherit all his
father’s estate or dominion, we are not to wonder that He
hath nowhere appointed who that heir should be ; for never
having intended any such thing, never designed any heir in
that sense, we cannot expect He should anywhere nominate
or appoint any person to it, as we might, had it been other-
wise ; and therefore in Scripture, though the word “heir”
occur, yet there is no such thing as heir in our author's sense,
one that was by right of Nature to inherit all that his father
had, exclusive of his brethren ; hence Sarah supposes that if
Ishmael stayed in the house to share in Abraham’s estate
after his death, this son of a bondwoman might be heir
with Isaac, and therefore, says she, “Cast out this bond-
woman and her son, for the son of this bondwoman shall
not be heir with my son.” But this cannot excuse our
author, who, telling us there is in every number of men one
who is “ right” and next “heir to Adam,” ought to have told
us what the laws of descent are, but having been so sparing
to instruct us by rules how to know who is heir, let us see, in
the next place, what his history out of Scripture, on which
he pretends wholly to build his government, gives us in this
necessary and fundamental point. : :

129. Our author, to make good the title of his book

)
166 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

(p. 15), begins his history of the descent of Adam’s regal
power (p. 15) in these words: “ This lordship which Adam
by command had over the whole world, and by right de-
scending from him, the patriarchs did enjoy was as large,”
&c. How does he prove that the patriarchs by descent did
enjoy it? For “dominion of life and death,” says he, “ we
find Judah, the father, pronounced sentence of death against
Thamer, his daughter-in-law, for playing the harlot” (p. 15).
How does this prove that Judah had absolute and sovereign
authority—“ he pronounced sentence of death”? The.pro-
nouncing of sentence of death is not a certain mark of
sovereignty, but usually the office of inferior magistrates.
The power of making laws of life and death is indeed a mark
of sovereignty, but pronouncing the sentence according to
those laws may be done by others, and therefore this will
but ill prove that he had sovereign authority—as if. one
should say, ‘‘Judge Jefferies pronounced sentence of death
in the late times, therefore Judge Jefferies had sovereign
authority.” But it will be said, “ Judah did it not by com-
mission from another, and therefore did it in his own right.”
Who knows whether he had any right at all? Heat of
passion might carry him to do that which he had no autho-
rityto do. “ Judah had dominion of life and death.” How
does that appear? He exercised it; he “ pronounced sen-
tence of death against Thamer.” Our author thinks it very
good proof that, because he did it, therefore he had a right
to do it. He lay with her also. By the same way of proof,
he had a right to do that too. If the consequence be good
from doing to a right of doing, Absalom, too, may be
reckoned amongst our author’s sovereigns, for he pronounced
such a sentence of death against his brother Amnon, and
much upon a like occasion, and had it executed, too—if that
be sufficient to prove a dominion of life and death.

But allowing this all to be clear demonstration of sove-
reign power, who was it that had this “ lordship by right
descending to him from Adam, as large and ample as the
absolutest dominion of any monarch”? “ Judah,” says our
author—Judah, a younger son of Jacob, his father and elder
brethren living ; so that, if our author’s own proof be to be
taken, a younger brother may, in the life of his father and
-elder brothers, “by right of descent,” enjoy Adam’s mon-
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 167

archical power ; and if one so qualified may be monarch by
descent, I know not why every man may not; and if Judah,
his father and elder brother living, were one of Adam’s heirs,
I know not who can be excluded from this inheritance. All
men by inheritance may be monarchs as well as Judah.

130. Touching war, we see that Abraham commanded
an army of 318 soldiers of his own family, and Esau met
his brother Jacob with 4oo men at arms. For matter of
peace, Abraham made a league with Abitmelech, &c.
(p. 15). Is it not possible for a man to have 318 men in
his family without being heir to Adam? A planter in the
West Indies has more, and might, if he pleased (who
doubts) muster them up and lead them out against the
Indians, to seek reparation upon any injury received from
them, and all this without the “absolute dominion of a
monarch descending to him from Adam.” Would it not be
an admirable argument to prove that all power by God’s
institution descended from Adam by inheritance, and that
the very person and power of this planter were the “ ordin-
ance of God,” because he had power in his family over
servants born in his house and bought with his money.
For this was just Abraham’s case: those who were rich in
the patriarch’s days, as in the West Indies now, bought men
and maid-servants, and by their increase as well as pur-
chasing of new, came to have large and numerous families,
which, though they made use of in war or peace, can it be
thought the power they had over them was an inheritance
descended from Adam, when it was the purchase of their
money? Aman’sriding in an expedition against an enemy,
his horse bought in a fair, would be as good a proof that the
owner “ enjoyed the lordship which Adam by command had
over the whole world by right descending to him,” as
Abraham’s leading out the servants of his family is that the
patriarchs enjoyed this lordship by descent from Adam,
since the title to the power the master had in both cases,
whether over slaves or horses, was only from his purchase ;
and the getting a dominion over anything by bargain and
money is a new way of proving one had it by descent and
inheritance. ;

131. Butmaking war and peace are marks of sovereignty,”
let it be so in politic societies. May not therefore a man in
168 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

the West Indies, who hath with him sons of his own friends,
or companions, soldiers under pay, or slaves bought with
money, or pethaps a band made up of all these, make wat
and peace, if there should be occasion, and “ratify the
articles too with an oath,” without being a sovereign, an ab+
solute king over those who went with him? He that says he
cannot; must then allow many masters of ships, many pri-
vate planters to be absolute monarchs, for as much as this
they have done. War and peace cannot be made for
politic societies but by the supreme power of such societies,
because war or peace, giving a different motion to the
force of such a politic body, none can make war ot
peace but that which has the direction of the force of the
whole body, and that in politic societies is only the
supreme power. In voluntary societies for the time, he
that has such a power by consent may make war and peace,
and so may a single man for himself; the state of war not
consisting in the number of partisans, but the enmity of the
parties where they have no superior to appeal to.

132. The actual making of war or peace is no proof of
any other power, but only of disposing those to exercise or
cease acts of enmity for whom he makes it; and this power in
many cases any one may have without any politic supremacy ;
and therefore the making of war or peace will not prove that
every one that does so is a politic ruler, much less a king;
for then commonwealths must be kings too, for they do as
certainly make war and peace as monarchical governments.

133. But grant this “amark of sovereignty” in Abraham,
is it a proof of the descent to him of Adam's “ sovereignty”
over the whole world? If it be, it will surely be as good a
proof of the descent of Adam’s “lordship” to others too.
And then commonwealths, as well as Abraham, will be
heirs to Adam, for they make “war and peace” as well as he.
If you say that the “lordship” of Adam doth not by right
descend to commonwealths, though they make war and
peace, the same say I of Abraham, and then there is an
end of your argument ; if you stand to your argument and
say those that do make war and peace, as commonwealths
do without doubt, do “inherit Adam’s lordship,” there is an
end of your monarchy, unless you will say that common-
wealths by descent enjoying Adam’s lordship are mon-
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 169

archies, and that indeed would be a new way of making all
the government in the world monarchical. —

_ 134. To give our author the honour of this new inven-
tion, for I confess it is not I have first found it out by
tracing his principles, and so charged it on him, it is fit my
readers know that (as absurd as it may seem) he teaches it
himself (p. 21), where he ingeniously says, “In all king-
doms and commonwealths in the world, whether the prince
be the supreme father of the people, or but the true heir to
such a father, or come to the Crown by usurpation or elec-
tion, or whether some few or a multitude govern the com-
monwealth, yet still the authority that isin any one, or in
many, or in all these, is the only right and natural authority
of supreme father,” which right of “fatherhood,” he often
tells us, is “regal and royal authority ;” as particularly
(p. 15) the page immediately preceding this instance of
Abraham. This regal authority, he says, those that govern
commonwealths have ; and if it be true that regal and royal
authority be in those that govern commonwealths, it is as
true that commonwealths are governed by kings ; for if regal
authority be in him that governs, he that governs must needs
be a king ;and so all commonwealths are nothing but down-
right monarchies ; and then what need any more ado about
the matter; the governments of the world are as they should
be; there is nothing but monarchy in it. This, without
doubt, was the surest way our author could have found to
turn all other governments but monarchical out of the world.

135. But all this scarce proves Abraham to have been a
king as heir to Adam. If by inheritance he had been king,
Lot, who was of the same family, must needs have been his
subject, by that title before the servants in his family ; but
we see they lived as friends and equals; and when their
herdsmen could not agree, there was no pretence of juris-
diction or superiority between them, but they parted by con-
sent (Gen. xiii.) ; hence he is called both by Abraham and
by the text Abraham’s brother, the name of friendship and
equality, and not of jurisdiction and authority, though he
were really but his nephew. And if our author knows that
Abraham was Adam’s heir anda king, it was more, it seems,
than Abraham himself knew, or his seryant whom he sent
awaoing for his son; for when he sets out the advantages of
170 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

the match (Gen. xxiv. 35), thereby to prevail with the young
woman and her friends, he says, ‘I am Abraham’s servant,
and the Lord hath blessed my master greatly, and he is
become great, and he hath given him flocks and herds, and
silver and gold, and menservants and maidservants, and
camels and asses, and Sarah, my master’s wife, bare a
son to my master when she was old, and unto him hath he
given all he hath.” Can one think that a discreet servant,
that was thus particular to set out his master’s greatness,
would have omitted the crown Isaac was to have, if he had
known of any such? Can it be imagined he should have
neglected to have told them, on such an occasion as this,
that Abraham was a king, a name well known at that time,
for he had nine of them his neighbours, if he or his master
had thought any such thing, the likeliest matter of all the
rest to make his errand successful P

136. But this discovery, it seems, was reserved for our
author to make two or three thousand years after, and let him
enjoy the credit of it; only he should have taken care that
someof Adam’s land should have descended to this his “heir,”
as well as all Adam’s lordship ; for though this lordship which
Abraham—if we may believe our author—as well as the other
patriarchs, “ byright descending to him did enjoy, was as large
and ample as the absolutest dominion of any monarch which
hath been since the Creation ;” yet his estate, his territories,
his dominions were very narrow and scanty, for he had not
the possession of a foot of land till he bought.a field and a
cave of the sons of Heth to bury Sarah in.

137. The instance of Esau, joined with this of Abraham,
to prove that the “lordship which Adam had over the whole
world, by right descending from him, the patriarchs did enjoy,”
is yet more pleasant than the former. ‘Esau met his brother
Jacob with four hundred men at arms ;” he, therefore, was a
king by right of heir to Adam. Four hundred armed men,
then, however got together, are enough to prove him that
leads them to be aking and Adam’s heir. There have been
Tories in Ireland (whatever there are in other countries)
who would have thanked our author for so honourable an
opinion of them, especially if there had been no body near
with a better title of five hundred armed men, to question
their royal authority of four hundred. It is a shame for men

‘.
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 17%.

to trifle so—to say no worse of it—in so serious an argument.
Here Esau is brought as a proof that Adam’s lordship,
“‘ Adam’s absolute dominion, as large as that of any monarch,
descended by right to the patriarchs ;” and in this very chap-
ter (p. 23) Jacob is brought as an instance of one that “by
birthright was lord over his brethren.” So we have here two
brothers absolute monarchs by the same title, and at the same
time heirs to Adam ; the eldest heir to Adam because he met
his brother with four hundred men, and the youngest heir to
Adam by “birthright.” “ Esau enjoyed the lordship which
Adam had over the whole world, by right descending to him,
in as large and ample manner as the absolutest dominion of
any monarch,” and, at the same time, “Jacob lord over him
by the right heirs have to be lordsover their brethren.” Rzsum
teneatis, I never, I confess, met with any man of parts so dex-
terous as Sir Robert at this way of arguing. But it was his
misfortune to light upon principles that could not be accom-
modated to the nature of things and human affairs, nor could
be made to agree with that constitution and order which God
had settled in the world, and, therefore, must needs often
clash with common sense and experience.

138. In the next section he tells us: “This patriarchal
power continued not only till the Flood, but after it, as the
name ‘ patriarch’ doth in part prove.” The word “ patriarch”
doth more than “ in part prove” that “‘ patriarchal power” con-
tinued in the world as long as there were patriarchs; for it is
necessary that patriarchal power should be whilst there are
patriarchs, as it is necessary there should be paternal or con-
jugal power whilst there are fathers or husbands ; but this is
but playing with names. That which he would fallaciously
insinuate is the thing in question to be proved, and that
is, that ‘the lordship which Adam had over the world,” the
supposed absolute universal dominion of Adam, by “ right
descending from him, the patriarchs did enjoy ;” if he affirms
such an absolute monarchy continued to the Flood in the
world, I would be glad to know what records he has it from,
for I confess I cannot find a word of it in my Bible. If by
“patriarchal power” he means anything else, it is nothing to
the matter in hand. And how the name “patriarch,” in “‘some
part proves” that those who are called by that name had
absolute monarchical power, I confess I do not see, and,
142 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

therefote, I think, needs rio answer till the argument from it be
made out a little clearer.

139. “The three sons of Noah had the world,” says our
author, “ divided amongst them by their father, for of them
was the whole world overspread” (p. 16). The world might
be overspread by the offspring of Noah’s sons, though he
never divided the world amongst them, for the “‘ earth” might
be “replenished” without being divided. All our author’s
argument here, therefore, proves no such division. However,
IT allow it to him, and then ask, The world being divided
amongst them, which of the thrée was Adam’s heir? If
Adam’s “lordship,” Adam’s “monarchy,” by right descended
only to the eldest, then the other two could be but his “ sub-
jects,” his “slaves.” If by right it descended to all three
brothers, by the same right it will descend to all mankind,
and then it will be impossible what he says (p. 23), that
‘heirs are lords of their brethren,” should be true, but all
brothers, and consequently all men, will be equal and inde-
pendent, all heits to Adam’s monarchy, and consequently all
monarchs too, one as much as another. But, it will be
said, “ Noah their father divided the world amongst them ;”
so that our author will allow more to Noah than he will to
God Almighty, for (O., 212) he thought it hard that God
himself should give the world to Noah and his sons, to the
Ptejudice of Noah’s birthright. His words are: “Noah
was left sole heir to the world. Why should it be thought
that God would disinherit him of his birthright, and make
him, of all men in the world, the only tenant in common
with his children ?” And yet here he thinks it fit that Noah
should disinherit Shem of his birthright, and divide the world
betwixt him and his brethren. So that this “ birthright,”
when our author pleases must, and when he pleases must not,
be sacred and inviolable.

140. If Noah did divide the world between his sons, and
his assignment of dominions to them were good, there is an
end of Divine institution, and all our author’s discourse of
Adam’s heir, with whatsoever he builds on it, is quite out of
doors. The natural power of kings falls to the ground ; and
then the form of the power governing, and the person having
that power will be all ordinance of man arid not of God, as
our author says (O., 254). For if the right of the heir be
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 143

the ordinance of God, a Divine right, no man, father or not
father, can alter it. If it be not a Divine right, it is only
human, depending on the will of man, and so where human
institution gives it not, the first-born has no right at all above
his brethren, and men may put government into what hands
and under what form they please.

141. He goes on: ‘Most of the civilest nations of the
earth labour to fetch their original from some of the sons
or nephews of Noah” (p. 16). How many do most of the
civilest nations amount to, and who are they? I fear the
Chinese, a very great and civil people, as well as several
other people of the east, west, north, and south, trouble not
themselves much about this matter. All that believe the
Bible (which I believe are our author’s “ most of the civilest
nations”) must necessarily derive themselves from Noah ; but
for the rest of the world, they think little of his sons or
nephews. But if the heralds and antiquaries of all nations
(for it is these men generally that labour to find out the
otiginals of nations), or all the nations themselves, should
labour t6 fetch their originals from some of the sons or
nephews of Noah, what would this be to prove that the
“lordship which Adam had over the whole world by right
descended to the patriarchs,” who ever, nations or races of
men, “labour to fetch their original from,’”’ may be con-
cluded to be thought by them, men of renown, famous to
posterity, for the greatness of their virtues and actions. But
beyond these they look not, nor consider who they were
heirs to, but look on them as such as raised themselves by
their own virtue to a degree that would give a lustre to those
who, in future ages, could pretend to derive themselves from
them. But if it were Ogygis, Hercules, Brahma, Tamber-
lain, Pharamond, nay, Jupiter and Saturn, be names from
whence divers races of men, both ancient and modern, have
laboured to derive their original, will that prove that those
men “enjoyed the lordship of Adam, by right descending
to them”? If not, this is but a flourish of our author's to
mislead his reader, that in itself signifies nothing.

142. And, therefore, to as much purpose is what he tells
us (p. 17) concerning this division of the world, “that some
say it was by Lot, and others that Noah sailed round the
Mediterranean in teti years, atid divided the world into
174. TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

Asia, Africa, and Europe ;” portions for his three sons..
America then, it seems, was left to be his that could catch
it. Why our author takes such pains to prove the division
of the world by Noah to his sons, and will not leave out an
imagination, though no better than a dream, that he can
find anywhere to favour it, is hard to guess, since such a.
“division,” if it prove anything, must necessarily take away
the title of Adam’s heir, unless three brothers can altogether
be heirs of Adam. And, therefore, the following words;
“ Howsoever the manner of this division be uncertain, yet it
is most certain the division itself was by families from Noah
and his children, over which the parents were heads and
princes” (p. 17). If allowed him to be true, and of any force
to prove, that all the power in the world is nothing but the
lordship “of Adam’s descending by right,” they will only prove
that the fathers of the children are all heirs to this lordship
of Adam ; for if in those days Cham and Japhet, and other
parents besides the eldest son, were heads and princes over
their families, and had a right to divide the earth by families,
what hinders younger brothers being fathers of families, from
having the same right? How Cham or Japhet were princes by
right descending to him, notwithstanding any title of heir in
his eldest brother, younger brothers by the same right
descending to them are princes now; and so all our author’s
natural power of kings will reach no farther than their own
children, and no kingdom by this natural right can be
bigger than a family. For either this “lordship of Adam
over the whole world” by right descends only to the eldest
son, and then there can be but one heir, as our author says
(p. 23), or else it by right descends to all the sons
equally,” and then every faiher of a family will have it, as
well as the three sons of Noah; take which you will, it
destroys the present governments and kingdoms that are now
in the world ; since whoever has this “natural power of a
king” by right descending to him must have it either as our
author tells us Cain had it, and be lord over his brethren,
and so be alone king of the whole world, or else, as he tells
us here, Shem, Cham, and Japhet, had it, three brothers,
and so be only prince of his own family, and all families
independent one of another. All the world must be only
one empire by the right of the next heir, or else every family
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 175

be a distinct government of itself, by the “lordship of Adam’s
descending to parents of families.” And to this only tends
all the proofs he here gives us of the descent of Adam’s
lordship. For, continuing his story of this descent, he says:

143. “In the dispersion of Babel we must certainly find
the establishment of royal power throughout the kingdoms
of the world” (p. 16). If you must find it, pray do, and you
will help us to a new piece of history. But you must show
it us before we shall be bound to believe that regal power
was established in the world upon your principles ; for that
regal power was established “in the kingdoms of the world”
I think nobody will dispute ; but that there should be king-
doms in the world whose several kings enjoyed their crowns
“by right descending to them from Adam,” that we think not
only apocrypha, but also utterly impossible; and if our
author has no better foundation for his monarchy than a
supposition of what was done at the dispersion of Babel,
the monarchy he erects thereon, whose top is to reach to
heaven to unite mankind, will serve only to divide and scatter
them as that tower did, will produce nothing but confusion.

144. For he tells us the nations they were divided into
were distinct families, which had fathers for rulers over
them ; whereby it appears that even in the confusion, “ God
was careful to preserve the fatherly authority by distribut-
ing the diversity of languages according to the diversity of
families” (p. 16). It would have been a hard matter for any
one but our author to have found out so plainly in the text
‘he here brings that all the nations in that dispersion were
governed by fathers, and that “‘God was careful to preserve
the fatherly authority.” The words of the text are: “‘ These
are the sons of Shem after their families, after their tongues
in their lands, after their nations ;” and the same thing is said
of Cham and Japhet after an enumeration of their posteri-
ties, in all which there is not one word said of their
governors, or forms of government, of “fathers” or “fatherly
authority.” But our author, who is very quicksighted to
spy out “‘ fatherhood” where nobody else could see any the
least glimpses of it, tells us positively their “rulers were
fathers, and God was careful to preserve the fatherly
authority.” And why? Because those of the same family
spoke the same language, and so of necessity in the divi-
176. TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

sion kept together, just as if one should argue thus:
Hanibal, in his army consisting of divers nations, kept
those of the same language together; therefore, fathers were
captains of each band, and Hanibal was careful of the
“fatherly authority ;” or, in peopling of Carolina, the English,
French, Scotch, and Welch, that are there, plant them-
selves together, and by them the country is divided “in their
lands after their tongues, after their families, after their
nations,” that, therefore, care was taken of the “ fatherly
authority ;” or, because in many parts of America every little
tribe was a distinct people, with a different language, one
should infer that, therefore, “God was careful to preserve
the fatherly authority,” or that, therefore, their rulers
“enjoyed Adam’s lordship by right descending to them,”
though we know not who were their governors, nor what
their form of government, but only that they were divided into
little independent societies, speaking different languages.
145. The Scripture says not a word of their rulers or
forms of government, but only gives an account how man-
kind came to be divided into distinct languages and
nations ; and therefore it is not to argue from the authority
of Scripture to tell us positively ‘‘fathers” were their “rulers,”
when the Scripture says no such thing, but to set up fancies
of one’s own brain when we confidently aver matter of fact,
where records are utterly silent; and, therefore, the same
ground has the rest that he says: ‘that they were not con-
fused multitudes without heads and governors, and at liberty
to choose what governors or governments they pleased.”
146. For I demand, when mankind were all yet of one lan-
guage, all congregated in the plain of Shinar, were they then
all under one monarch, “who enjoyed the lordship of Adam
by right descending to him”? If they were not, there was
then no thoughts, it is plain, of Adam’s heir, no right to
government known then upon that title, no care taken by
God or man of Adam’s “fatherly authority.” If when man-
kind were but one people, dwelt all together, and were of
one language, and were upon building a city together, and
when it was plain they could not but know the right heir,
for Shem lived till Isaac’s time, a long while after the
division at Babel—if then, I say, they were not under the
monarchical government of Adam’s fatherhood by right
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 149

descending to the heir, it is plain there was no regard had
to the “fatherhood,” no monarchy acknowledged due to
Adam’s heir, no empire of Shem’s in Asia, and con-
sequently no such division of the world by Noah as our
author has talked of. And as far as we can conclude any-
thing from Scripture in this matter, it seems from this place
that if they had any government it was rather a common-
wealth than an absolute monarchy; for the Scripture tells
us (Gen. xi.), “they said”—it was not a prince commanded
the building of this city and tower, it was not by the com-
mand of one monarch, but by the consultation of many, a
free people—‘“ let us build us a city’—they built it for them-
selves as free men, not as slaves for their lord and master—
“that we be not scattered abroad;” and for having a city
once built, fixed habitatious to settle their bodies and
families. ‘This was the consultation and design of a people
that were at liberty to part asunder, but desired to keep in
one body, and could not have been either necessary or
likely in men tied together under the government of one
monarch ; who if they had been, as our author tells us, all
slaves under the absolute dominion of a monarch, needed
not have taken such care to hinder themselves from wan-
dering out of the reach of his dominion, I demand whether
this be not plainer in Scripture than anything of Adam’s
heir or “fatherly authority.”

147. But if being, as God says (Gen. xi. 6), one people,
they had one ruler, one king by natural right, absolute and
supreme over them, ‘“ what care had God to preserve the pa-
ternal authority of the supreme fatherhood,” if, on a sudden,
He suffers seventy-two (for so many our author talks of) “ dis-
tinct nations” to be erected out of it, under distinct governors,
and at once to withdraw themselves from the obedience of
their sovereign, This is to entitle God’s cate how and to what
we please. Can it be sense to say, that God was careful to
preserve “ fatherly authority” in those who had it not? For if
these were subjects under a supreme prince, what authority
had they, when, at the same time, He takes away the true
“supreme fatherhood” of the natural monarch? Can it he
reason to say, that God, for the preservation of “ fatherly
authority,” lets several new governments, with their governors,
start up, who could not all have “ fatherly authority ;” and is it
178 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

not as much reason to say, that God is careful to destroy
“ fatherly authority” when He suffers one who is in possession
of it to have his government torn in pieces, and shared by
several of his subjects ; and would it not be an argument just
like this for monarchical government to say, when any
monarchy was shattered to pieces, and divided amongst
revolted subjects, that God was careful to preserve monar-
chical power by rending a settled empire into a multitude
of little governments? If any one will say that what
happens in providence to be preserved, God is careful to
preserve as a thing, therefore to be esteemed by men as
necessary or useful, it is a peculiar propriety of speech,
which every one will not think fit to imitate. But this, I
am sure, is impossible to be either proper or true speak-
ing, that Shem, for example (for he was then alive), should
have “fatherly authority,” or sovereignty by right of “ father-
hood,” over that one people at Babel; and that the next
moment, Shem yet living, seventy-two others should have
“ fatherly authority,” or sovereignty by right of “‘ fatherhood,”
over the same people, divided into so many distinct
governments. Either these seventy-two fathers actually
were rulers just before the confusion, and then they were
not one people, but that God Himself says they were a
commonwealth ; and then, where was monarchy? Or else,
these seventy-two fathers had “ fatherly authority” but knew
it not. Strange, that ‘‘ fatherly authority” should be the
only original of government amongst men, and yet all
mankind not know it! And, stranger yet, that the confu-
sion of tongues should reveal it to them all of a sudden ;
that in an instant these seventy-two should know that they
had “ fatherly power,” and all others know that they were to
obey it in them, and every one know that particular “ fatherly
authority” to which he was a subject! He that can think
this arguing from Scripture, may from thence make out
what model of an Eutopia will best suit with his fancy
or interest, and, this “ fatherhood” thus disposed of, will
justify both a prince who claims an universal monarchy,
and his subjects who, being fathers of families, shall quit
all subjection to him, and canton his empire into less
governments for themselves; for it will always remain a
doubt in which of these the fatherly authority resided till
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 179

our author resolves us whether Shem, who was then alive,
or these seventy-two new princes, beginning so many new
empires in his dominions and over his subject, had right to
govern, since our author tells us that both one and the
other had “ fatherly” (which is supreme) authority, and are
brought in by him as instances of those who did “enjoy the
lordships of Adam by right descending to them, which was
as large and ample as the absolutest dominion of any
monarch.” ‘This at least is unavoidable, that if ‘God was
careful to preserve the fatherly authority in the seventy-two
new erected nations,” it necessarily follows that He was as
careful to destroy all pretences of Adam’s heir ; since He
took care, and therefore did preserve the fatherly authority
in so many (at least seventy-one) that could not possibly
be Adam’s heirs, when the right heir (if God had ever
ordained any such inheritance) could not but be known,
Shem then living, and they being all one people.

148. Nimrod is his next instance of enjoying this
patriarchal power (p. 20); but I know not for what reason
our author seems a little unkind to him, and says that he
“against right enlarged his empire, by seizing violently on
the rights of other lords of families.” ‘These “lords of
families” here were called ‘fathers of families” in his
account of the dispersion at Babel. But it matters not
how they are called, so we know who they are; for this
fatherly authority must be in them, either as heirs to Adam,
and so there could not be seventy-two, nor above one at
once, or else as natural parents over their children ; and so
every father will have “ paternal authority” over his children
by the same right, and in as large extent as those seventy-
two had, and so be independent princes over their own
offspring. And his “lords of families,” thus understood,
he gives us a very pretty account of the original of monarchy
in the following words: “ And in this sense he may be said
to be the author and founder of monarchy”—viz., as against
right seizing violently on the rights of fathers over their
children, which paternal authority, if it be in them by right
of nature (for else how could those seventy-two come by
it ?), nobody can take from them without their own consents ;
and then I desire our author and his friends to consider how
far this will concern other princes, and whether it will not,
180 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

according to his conclusion of that paragraph, resolve all
regal power of those whose dominions extend beyond
their families either into tyranny and usurpation, or election
and consent of fathers of families, which will differ very little
from consent of the people.

149. All his instances in the next section (p. 21) of the
twelve dukes of Edom, the nine kings in a little corner of Asia
in Abraham's days, the thirty-one kings in Canaan destroyed
by Joshua, and the care he takes to prove that these were all
sovereign princes, and that every town in those days had a
king, are so many direct proofs against him that it was not
the “lordship” of Adam “by right descending” to them that
made kings ; for if they had held their royalties by that title, .
either there must have been but one sovereign over them all,
or else every father of a family had been as good a prince
and had as good a claim to royalty as these. For if all the
sons of Esau had each of them, the younger as well as the
eldest, the right of “fatherhood,” and so were soveréign
princes after their father’s death, the same right had their
sons after them, and so on to all posterity ; which will limit
all the natural power of fatherhood only to be over the issue
of their own bodies and their descendants ; which power of
fatherhood dies with the head of each family, and makes
way for the like power of fatherhood to take place in each
of his sons over their respective posterities ; whereby the
powet of fatherhood will be preserved indeed and is in-
telligible, but will not be at all to our author's purpose, nor
are any of the instances he brings proofs of ary power they
had by title of fatherhood as heirs of Adam’s paternal
authority nor by virtue of their own. For Adam’s “ father-
hood” being over all mankind, it could descend but to one
at once, and from him to his right heir only, and so there
could by that title be btit one king in the world at a time ;
and by right of fatherhood, not descending from Adam, it
must be only as they themselves were fathers, and so could
be over none but their own posterity. So that if those twelve
dukes of Edom, of Abraham, and nine kings his neighbours ;
if Jacob and Esau and thirty-one kings in Canaan, the
seventy-two kifigs mutilated by Adonibeseck, the thirty-two
kings that came to Benaded, the seventy kings of Greece
making war at Troy, were, as our author conterids, all of
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 181

them sovereign princes; it is evident that kings derived
their power from some other original than “fatherhood,” since
some of these had power over more than their own posterity ;
and it is demonstration they could not be all heirs to Adam.
For I challenge any man to make any pretence to power
by right of ‘‘ fatherhood,” either intelligible or possible in any
one otherwise than either as Adam’s heir or as progenitor
over his own descendants naturally sprung from him. And
if our author could show that any one of these princes, of
which he gives us here so large a catalogue, had his autho-
rity by either of these titles, I think I might yield him the
cause, though it is manifest they are all impertinent and
directly contrary to what he brings them to prove—viz.,
that the “lordship” which Adam “had over the world by
tight descended to the patriarchs.”

150. Having told us (p. 20) that “the patriarchal govern-
ritent continued in Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob until the
Egyptian bondage” (p. 21), he tells us, ‘ By manifest footsteps
We may trace this paternal government unto the Israelites
coming into Egypt, where the exercise of supreme patriarchal
government was intermitted, because they were in subjec-
tion to a stronger prince.” What these footsteps are of
paternal government in our author’s sense—z.e, of absolute
thonatchical power descending from Adam, and exercised by
right of fatherhood, we have seen—that is, for 2,290 years—
no footsteps at all; since in all that time he cannot produce
any one example of any person who claimed or exercised
regal authority by right of “fatherhood,” or show any one
who, being a king, was Adam’s heir. All that his proofs
amount to is only this, that there were fathers, patriarchs,
atid kings in that age of the world; but that the fathers
and patriarchs had any absolute arbitrary power, or by what
titles those kings had theirs, and of what extent it was, the
Scripture is wholly silent. It is marifest by right of
“ fathertiood” they neither did nor could claim any title to
dominion and empire. :

1g1. To say “that the exefcise of supreme patriarchal
government was intermitted because they were in subjection
to a sttonget prince,” proves nothing but what I befote
suspected—viz., that “patriarchal jurisdiction or government”
was a fallacious expression, and does not in out author
182. TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

signify what he would yet insinuate by it, “ paternal” and
“regal power,” such an absolute sovereignty as he supposes
was in Adam.

152. For howcan he say that “ patriarchal jurisdiction was
intermitted in Egypt,” where there was a king, under whose
regal government the Israelites were? If “ patriarchal” were
“ absolute monarchical jurisdiction,” and if it were not, but
something else, why does he make such ado about a power
not in question and nothing to the purpose? The exercise
of “ patriarchal” jurisdiction, if “ patriarchal” be “regal,” was
not intermitted whilst the Israelites were in Egypt. It is true
the exercise of “regal” power was not then in the hands of
any of the promised seed of Abraham, nor before neither
that I know; but what is that to the intermission of “ regal
authority, as descending from Adam,” unless our author will
have it that this chosen line of Abraham had the right of
inheritance to Adam’s lordship ; and then, to what purpose
are his instances of the seventy-two rulers, in whom the
fatherly authority was preserved in the confusion at Babel
of Esau, and the twelve dukes of Edom? Why are these
brought as examples of the exercise of true ‘‘ patriarchal
government” and joined with those of Abraham and Judah ?
If the exercise of “ patriarchal jurisdiction” were intermitted
in the world, whenever the posterity of Jacob had not
supreme power, I imagined monarchical government would
have served his turn in the hands of Pharaoh or anybody.
But one cannot easily discover in all places what his dis-
course tends to; as, particularly in this place, it is not
obvious to guess what he drives at when he says, “The
exercise of supreme patriarchal jurisdiction in Egypt,” or
how this serves to make out the descent of Adam’s lord-
ship to the patriarchs or anyborly else.

153. For I thought he had been giving us out of Scripture
proofs and examples of monarchical government founded on
paternal authority, descending from Adam, and not, a
history of the Jews, amongst whom yet we find no kings till
many years after they. were a people, and no mention of
their being heirs to Adam, or kings by paternal authority
when they had them; I expected, talking so much as he
does of Scripture, that he would have produced thence

. series of monarchs whose titles were clear to Adam’s
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 183

“fatherhood,” and who, as heirs to him, owned and exercised
paternal jurisdiction over their subjects, and that this was
the true patriarchical government, whereas he neither proves
that the patriarchs were kings, nor that either kings or
patriarchs were heirs to Adam, or so much as pretended to
it; and one may as well prove that the patriarchs were all
absolute monarchs, that the power both of patriarchs and
kings was only paternal, and that this power descended to
them from Adam. I say all these propositions may be as well
proved by a confused account of a multitude of little kings
in the West Indies, out of Ferdinando Soto, or any of our
late histories of the Northern America, or by our author’s
seventy kings of Greece, out of Homer, as by anything he
brings out of Scripture in that multitude of kings he has
reckoned up.

154. And methinks he should have let Homer and his
Wars of Troy alone, since his great zeal to truth or mon-
archy carried him to such a pitch of transport against
philosophers and poets, that he tells us in his preface that
there “ are too many in these days who please themselves in
running after the opinions of philosophers and poets, to find
out such an original of government as might promise them
some title to liberty, to the great scandal of Christianity,
and bringing in of Atheism.” And yet these heathen phi-
losophers, Aristotle and poet Homer, are not rejected by our
zealous Christian politician whenever they offer anything
that seems to serve his turn.

But to return to his Scripture history. Our author further
tells us (p. 22), that “ after the return of the Israelites out of
bondage, God, out of a special care of them, chose Moses
and Joshua successively to govern as princes in the place
and stead of the supreme fathers.” If it be true, that they
“returned out of bondage,” it mustbe into a state of freedom,
and must imply that both before and after this bondage they
were free; unless our author will say that changing of
masters is returning “out of bondage,” or that a slave “ re-
turns out of bondage” when he is removed from one galley to
another. If then they “returned out of bondage,” it is plain
that in those days, whatever our author in his preface says
to the contrary, there was difference between a son, a
subject, and a slave, and that neither the patriarchs before,
484. TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

nor their rulers after this “ Egyptian bondage, numbered their
sons or subjects amongst their possessions,” and disposed of
them with as absolute a dominion as they did ‘‘ their other
goods.”

155. This is evident in Jacob, to whom Reuben offered
his two sons as pledges, and Judah was at last surety for
Benjamin’s safe return out of Egypt, which all had been
vain, superfluous, and but a sort of mockery, if Jacob had
had the same power over every one of his family as he had
over his ox or his ass, as an owner over his substance, and
the offers that Reuben or Judah made had been such
a security for returning of Benjamin, as if a man should take
two lambs out of his lord’s flock and offer one as security
that he will safely restore the other.

156. When they were out of this bondage, what then ?—
“ God, out of a special care of them, the Israelites.” It is well
that once in his book he will allow God to have any care of
the people, for in other places he speaks of mankind as if
God had no care of any part of them, but only of their
monarchs, and that the rest of the people, the societies of
men, were made as so many herds of cattle, only for the
service, use and pleasure of their princes.

157. Chose Moges and Joshua successively to govern as
princes ; a shrewd argument our author has found out to
prove God’s care of the fatherly authority, and Adam’s heirs,
that here, as an expression of His care of His own people, He
chooses those for princes over them that had not the least
pretence to either Moses of the tribe of Levi, and Joshua of
the tribe of Ephraim, neither of which had any title of
fatherhood. But, says our author, they were in the place and
stead of the supreme fathers. If God had anywhere as
plainly declared His choice of such fathers to be rulers as
He did of Moses and Joshua, we might believe Moses and
Joshua were in ‘their place and stead ;” but that being the
question in debate, till that be better proved, Moses being
chosen by God to be ruler of His people will no more prove
that government belonged to Adam’s heir or to the “ father-
hood” than God's choosing Aaron of the tribe of Levi to be
priest will prove that the priesthood belonged to Adam’s
heir or the “ prime fathers ;” since God could choose Aaron
to be priest, and Moses ruler in Israel, though neither
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 188

of those offices weré settled on Adams heir or the “ father-
ood.”

1§8. Our author goes on :—“ And after them likewise for
a time he raised up judges, to defetid his people in titie
of peril” (p. 22). This proves fatherly atithotity to be the
original of government, and that it descended ftom Adam to
his heirs, just as well as what went befote, only here our
author seems to confess that these judges, who were all
the governots they then had, were only men of valour,
whom they made their generals to defend them in time of
peril. And cannot God raise up such men unless fatherhood
have a title to government ?

159. Btit, says our author, when God gave the Israelites
kings, He re-established the ancient and prime right of lineal
succession to paternal government (p. 22).

160. How did God “‘re-establish” it? By alaw?—a positive
command? Wefindnosuch thing. Our author means, then,
that when God gave them a king, in giving them a king,
He “ re-established the tight,” &c. To re-establish de facto
the right of lineal succession to paternal government is to
put 4 man in possession of that government which his fathers
did enjoy, and he, by lineal succession, had a tight to ; for,
first, if it were another government than what his ancestors had,
it was not sticceeding to an “ancient right,” but beginning
a new one; for if 4 prince should give a man, besides his
ancient patrimotty, which, for some ages, his family had been
dissefsed of, an additional estate, never before in the pos-
session of his ancestors, he could not be said to “ te-establish
the right of litieal succession” to any more than what had
been formerly enjoyed by his ancestors. If, therefore, the
power the kings of Istael had were anything more than Isaac
or Jacob had, it was not the “re-establishing” in them the
tight of siiccession to a powet, but giving them a new power,
however you please to call it, “ patertal” or not ; and whether
Tsaac and Jacob had the same power that the kings of Israel
had, I desite any one, by what has been above said, to con-
sider, and I do not think they will find that either Abrahai,
Isaac, or Jacob had any regal power at all.

161. Next, there can be no “re-establishment of the
prime and ancient right of lineal succession” to anything,
unless he that is put in possession of it has the right to
186 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

succeed, and be the true and next heir to him he succeeds to.
Can that bea re-establishment which begins in a new family,
or that the “reestablishment of an ancient right of lineal
succession,” when a crown is given to one who has no right of
succession to it, and who, if the lineal succession had gone
on, had been out of all possibility of pretence to it? Saul,
the first king God gave the Israelites, was of the tribe of
Benjamin. Was “the ancient and prime right of lineal suc-
cession re-established” in him? The next was David, the
youngest son of Jesse, of the posterity of Judah, Jacob’s
third son. Was “the ancient and prime right of lineal suc-
cession to paternal government re-established” in him? or in
Solomon, his younger son, and successor in the throne? or
in Jeroboam over the ten tribes? or in Athaliah, who reigned
six years, an utter stranger to the royal blood? If “ the ancient
and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government”
were “re-established” in any of these or their posterity, “the
ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal
government” belongs to younger brothers as well as elder,
and may be re-established in any man living for whatever
younger brothers, by “ancient and prime right of lineal suc-
cession,” may have, as well as the elder, that every man living
may have a right to by lineal succession, and Sir Robert as
well as any other. And so what a brave right of lineal succes-
sion to his “ paternal” or “ regal” government our author has
re-established for the securing the rights and inheritance of
crowns, where every one may have it, let the world consider.
162. But, says our author, however (p. 23), ‘‘ Whensoever
God made choice of any special person to be king, He
‘intended that the issue also should have benefit thereof,
as being comprehended sufficiently in the person of the
father, although the father was only named in the grant.”
This yet will not help out succession, for if, as our author
says, the benefit of the grant be intended to the issue of
the grantee, this will not direct the succession, since, if
God give anything to a man and his issue in general, the
claim cannot be to any one of that issue in particular ; every
one that is of his race will have an equal right. If it be
said our author meant heir, I believe our author was as
willing as anybody to have used that word, if it would have
served his turn; but Solomon, who succeeded David in
ZWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 184

the throne, being no more his heir than Jeroboam, who
succeeded him in the government of the ten tribes, was his
issue, Our author had reason to avoid saying that God
intended it to the heirs when that would not hold in a
succession, which our author could not except against, and
so he has left his succession as undetermined as if he had
said nothing about it; for if the regal power be given by
God to a man and his issue, as the land of Canaan was to
Abraham and his seed, must they not all have a title ‘to it—
all share in it? And one may as well say that by God’s
grant to Abraham and his seed the land of Canaan was to
belong only to one of his seed exclusive of all others, as
by God’s grant of dominion to a man and “ his issue” this
dominion was to belong all to one of his issue exclusive of
all others.

163. But how will our author prove that, whensoever
God made choice of any special person to be a king, he
intended that the (I suppose he means his) issue also should
have benefit thereof. Has he so soon forgot Moses and
Joshua, whom in this very section he says, “ God, out of a
special care, chose to govern as princes,” and the judges
that God raised up? Had not these princes, having the
authority of the “ supreme fatherhood,” the same power that
the kings had? and being specially chosen by God Himself,
should not their issue have the benefit of that choice as
well as David or Solomon? If these had the paternal
authority put into their hands immediately by God, why had
not their “issue” the benefit of this grant in a succession to
this power? Or, if they had it as Adam’s heirs, why did
not their heirs enjoy it after them by right descending to
them, for they could not be heirs to one another? Was
the power the same and from the same original in Moses,
Joshua, and the Judges as it was in David and the Kings?
and was it inevitable in one and not in the other? If it.
was not “ paternal authority,” then God’s own people were
governed by those that had not “ paternal authority,” and
those governors did well. enough without it. If it were
“paternal authority,” and God chose the persons that were
to exercise it, our author’s rule fails, that “ whensoever God
makes choice of any person to be supreme ruler (for I
suppose the name king has no spell in it, it is not the title
188 TWO. TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

but the power makes the difference) he intends that the
issue also should have the benefit of it ;” since from their
coming out of Egypt to David’s time (400 years) the issue
was never ‘‘so sufficiently comprehended in the person of the
father” as that any son, after the death of his father, succeeded
to the government amongst all those judges that judged
Israel. If to avoid this it be said God always chose the
person of the successor, and so, transferring the “ fatherly
authority” to him, excluded his issue from succeeding to it,
that is manifestly not so im the story of Jephtha, where he
articled with the people, and they made him judge over
them, as is plain (Judges xi.).

164. It is in vain, then, to say that “whensoever God
chooses any special person” to have the exercise of “ paternal
authority” (for if that be not to be king, I desire to know
the difference between a king and one having the exercise
of “ paternal authority”), “He intends the issue also should
have the benefit of it,” since we find the authority the judges
had ended with them, and descended not to their issue ; and
if the judges had not “paternal authority,” I fear it will trouble
our author or any of the friends to his principles to tell who
had then the “ paternal authority"—that is, the government
and supreme power amongst the Israelites; and I suspect
they must confess that the chosen people of God continued a
people several hundreds of years without any knowledge or
thought of this “paternal authority,” or any appearance of
monarchical government at all. :

165. To be satisfied of this, he need but read the story
of the Levite, and the war thereupon with the Benjamites,
in the three last chapters of Judges, and when he finds that
the Levite appeals to the people for justice, that it was the
tribes and the congregation that debated, resolved, and
directed all that was done on that occasion, he must
conclude either that God was not “careful to preserve the
fatherly authority” amongst His own chosen people, or else
that the “fatherly authority” may be preserved where there
is no monarchical government. If the latter, then it will
follow that though “fatherly authority” be never so well
proved, yet it will not infer a necessity of monarchical

overnment ; if the former, it will seem very strange and
improbable that God should ordain ‘‘fatherly authority” to be
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 189

so sacred amongst the sons of men, that there could be no
power nor government without it ; and yet that amongst His
own people, even whilst he is providing a government for
them, and therein prescribes rules to the several states and
relations of men, this great and fundamental one, this most
material and necessary of all the rest, should be concealed
and lie neglected for 400 years after.

166. Before I leave this, I must ask how our author
knows that “‘ whensoever God makes choice of any special
person to be king, He intends that the issue should have the
benefit thereof.” Does God by the law of Nature or revela-
tion say so? By the same law also He must say which of
his “ issue” must enjoy the crown in succession, and so point
out the heir, or else leave his “ issue” to divide or scramble
for the government ; both alike absurd, and such as will de-
stroy the benefit of such grant to the “issue.” When any
such declaration of God’s intention is produced, it will be
our duty to believe God intends it so, but till that be done,
our author must show us some better warrant before we shall
be obliged to receive him as the authentic revealer of God’s
intentions.

167. “The issue,” says our author, “is comprehended
sufficiently in the person of the father, although the father
only was named in the grant.” And yet God, when He gave
the land of Canaan to Abraham (Gen. xiii. 15), thought fit to
put “his seed” into the grant too, so the priesthood was given
to “ Aaron and his seed” ; and the crown God gave not only
to David, but “his seed” also; and however our author
assures us that God “ intends that the issue should have the
benefit of it when He chooses any person to be king,” yet we
see that the kingdom He gave to Saul, without mentioning his
seed after him, never came to any of his issue ; and why, when
God chose a person to be king, He should intend that his
“ issue” should have the benefit of it more than when He
chose one to be judge in Israel, I would fain know a reason ;
or why does a grant of “ fatherly authority” to a king more
comprehend the “ issue” than when a like grant is made to
a judge? Is “ paternal authority” by right to descend to the
“issue” of one and not of the other? There will need some
reason to be shown of this difference, more than the name,
when the thing given is the same “ fatherly authority,” and
190 ZWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

the manner of giving it God’s choice of the person; for I
3 : i

suppose our author, when he says “ God raised up judges,

will by no means allow they were chosen by the people.

- 168. But since our author has so confidently assured us of
the care of God to preserve the “fatherhood,” and pretends
to build all, he says, upon the authority of the Scripture, we
may well expect that that people whose law, constitution,
and history is chiefly contained in the Scripture, should
furnish him with the clearest instances of God’s care of pre-
serving of the fatherly authority in that people'who, it is
agreed, He had a most peculiar care of. Let us see, then,
what state this “ paternal” authority or government was in
amongst the Jews, from their beginning to be a people. It
was omitted, by our author’s confession, from their coming
into Egypt till their return out of that bondage—above 200
years. From thence till God gave the Israelites a king—
about 400 years more—our author gives but a very
slender account of it, nor, indeed, all that time are there
the least footsteps of paternal or regal government amongst
them. But then, says our author, “God re-established
the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal
government.”

169. What a “lineal succession to paternal government”
was then established we have already seen. I only now
consider how long this lasted, and that was to their captivity,
about 500 years; from whence, to their destruction by the
‘Romans, above 650 years after, the “ancient and prime right
of lineal succession to paternal government” was again lost,
‘and they continued a people in the promised land without
it; so that, of 1750 years that they were God’s peculiar
people, they had hereditary kingly government amongst
them not one-third of the time, and of that time there is not
the least footsteps of one moment of “ paternal government,
nor the re-establishment of the ancient and prime right of
lineal succession to it,” whether we suppose it to be de-
rived, as from its fountain, from David, Saul, Abraham,
or, which upon our author's principles is the only true,
‘from Adam. ....

~~
LWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 191

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

1. Ir having been shown in the foregoing discourse :

Firstly, That Adam had not, either by natural right of
fatherhood or by positive donation from God, any such
authority over his children, nor dominion over the world,
as is pretended.

Secondly, That if he had, his heirs yet had no right to it.

Thirdly. That if his heirs had, there being no law of
Nature nor positive law of God that determines which is
the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of suc-
cession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have
been certainly determined.

Fourthly, That if even that had been determined, yet the
knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adam’s posterity
being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of man-
kind and families of the world, there remains not to one
above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and
to have the right of inheritance.

All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made
out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should
make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of autho-
rity from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power,
‘ Adam’s private dominion and paternal jurisdiction ;” so
that he that will not give just occasion to think that all
government in the world is the product only of force and \
violence, and that men live together by no other rules but
that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay aj
foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult,
sedition, and rebellion (things that the followers of that
hypothesis so loudly cry out against), must of necessity
find out another rise_of government, another original of
political power, and another way of designing and knowing
192 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

the persons that have it than what Sir Robert Filmer hath
taught us. 2

z. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss to set
down what I take to be political power. That the power
of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from
that of a father over his children, a master over his servant,
a husband over his wife, and a lord over his slave. All
which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the
same man, if he be considered under these different rela-.
tions, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from
another, and show the difference betwixt a ruler of a
commonwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a
galley.

3- Political power, then, I take to be a right of making
laws, with penalties of death, and consequently all less
penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and
of employing the force of the community in the execution
of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth
from foreign injury, and all this only for the public good.

CHAPTER II.
Of the State of Nature.

4. To understand political power aright, and derive it
from its original, we must consider what estate all men are
naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order
their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons
as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature,
without asking leave or depending upon the will of any

other man.

> _A state also of equality, wherein all the power and juris-
diction is reciprocal, no one having more than another,
there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the
same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same
advantages) of Nature, and the use of the same faculties,
TWO TREATISES OF GQVERNMENT. 1%,

should also be equal one amongst another, without subordiy
nation or subjection, unless the lord and master of them
2.1 should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one
above another, and confer on him, by an evident and
~.ear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and
sovereignty.

5. This equality of men by Nature, the judicious Hooker
looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question,
that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual
love amongst men on which he builds the duties they owe
one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims
of justice and charity. His words are —

“ The like natural inducement hath brought men to know
that it is no less their duty to love others than themselves,
for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all
have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good,
even as much at every man’s hands, as any man can wish
unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of
my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy
the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men weak,
being of one and the same nature : to have anything offered
them repugnant to this desire must needs, in all respects,
grieve them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I must
look to suffer, there being no reason that others should
show greater measure of love to me than they have by me
showed unto them ; my desire, therefore, to be loved of my.
equals in Nature, asmuch as possible may be, imposeth upon
“me a natural duty of bearing to. themward fully the like
affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves
and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and
canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no
man is ignorant.” (Eccl. Pol. lib. i.)

6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not
a state of license ; though man in that state have an un-
controllable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions,
-yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any
creature in his possession, but wi ere some nobler use than
its bare preservation calls for it." be state of Nature has a .
law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and
reason, which is that law, teaches ah mankind who will but
congult it, that being all equal and independent, no one

G
194 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or posse.
sions ; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent
and infinitely wise Maker ; all the servants of one sovereign
Master, sent into the world by His order and about His
business ; they are His property, whose workmanship they
are made to last during His, not one another’s pleasure. And,
being furnished with like faculties, sharing all im one com-
munity of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such sub-
ordination among us that may authorize us to destroy one
another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the
inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one as he is
bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station
wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation
comes not in competition, ought he as much as he can to
preserve the rest of mankind, and not unless it be to
do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or
what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty,
health, limb, or goods of another. ,

q. And that all men may be restrained from invading
other’s-rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the
law of Nature be observed, which willeth the peace and
> preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law

of Nature is in that state put into every man’s hands,
whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of
that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. For
the law of Nature would, as all other Jaws that concern
men in this world, be in vain if there were nobody that in.
the state of Nature had a power to execute that law, and
thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders ; and if
any one in the state of Nature may punish another for any
evil he has done, every one may do so. For in that state of<
perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or
jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in pro-
secution of that law, every one must needs have a right
to do.

8. And thus, in the state of Nature, one man comes by a
power over another, but yet no absolute or arbitrary power
to use a criminal when he has got him in his hands, accord-
ing to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of
his own will, but only to retribute to him so far as calm
reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his

o
“LWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 195

transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation
and restraint. For these two are the only reasons why one
man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call
punishment. In transgressing the law of Nature, the
offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of
reason and common equity, which is that measure God has
set to the actions of men for their mutual security, and so
he becomes dangerous to mankind ; the tie which is to secure
them from injury and violence being slighted and breken by
him, which being a trespass against the whole species, and
the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of
Nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to
preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it
is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may
bring such evil on any one who hath transgressed that law,
as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter
him, and, by his example, others from doing the like mischief.
And in this case, and upon this ground, every man hath a
right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law
of Nature.

g. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine
to some men; but before they condemn it, I desire them
to resolve me by what right any prince or state can put to
death or punish an alien for any crime he commits in their

‘country? It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction
they receive from the promulgated will of the legislature,
reach not a stranger. They speak not to him, nor, if they
did, is he bound. to hearken to them. The legislative
authority by which they are in force over the subjects of
that commonwealth hath no power over him. \ Those who
have the supreme power of making laws in England,
France, or Holland are, to an Indian, but like the rest of
the world—men without authority. And therefore, if by
the law of Nature every man hath not a power to punish
offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require,
I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish
an alien of another country, since, in reference to him, they
can have no more power than what every man naturally
may have over another.

10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the laws,
and varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man

G2
196 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the
principles of human nature and to be a noxious creature,
there is commonly injury done, and some person or other,
some other man, receives damage by his transgression ; 1h
which case, he who hath received any damage has (besides
the right of punishment common to him, with other men)
a particular right to seek reparation from him that hath done
it. And any other person who finds it just may also join
with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from
the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm
he hath suffered.

11. From these two distinct rights (the one of punishing
the crime, for restraint and preventing the like offence,
which right of punishing is in everybody, the other of taking
reparation, which belongs only to the injured party) comes
it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath
the common right of punishing put into his hands, can
often, where the public good demands not the execution of.
the law, remit the punishment of criminal offences by his
own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due
‘to any private man for the damage he has received. That
he who hath suffered the damage has a right to demand in
his own name, and he alone can remit. The damnified
person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods
or service of the offender by right_of self-preservation, as
every man has a power to punish the crime to prevent its
being committed again, by the right he has of preserving
all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in
order to that end. And thus it is that every man in the state
of Nature has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter
others from doing: the like injury (which no reparation can
compensate) by the example of the punishment that attends
it from everybody, and also to secure men from the attempts
of a criminal who, having renounced reason, the conimon
rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the
unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one,
declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be
destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts
with whom men can have no society nor security, And
upon this is grounded that great law of Natute, « Whoso

sheddeth man’s blood by man shall his blood be shed.” And
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. ‘97

Cain was so fully convinced that every one had a right to
destroy such a criminal, that, after the murder of his brothet,
he cries out, “ Every one that findeth me shall slay me,” 0
plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.

12. By the same reason thay a man in the state of
Nature punish the lesser breaches of that law, it will, perhaps,
be demanded, with death? I answer: Each transgression -
may be punished to that degree, and with so much
severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the
offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from
doing the like. Every offence that can be committed in
the state of Nature may, in the state of Nature, be also
punished equally, and as far forth, as it may, in a common-
wealth. For though it would be beside my present
purpose to enter here into the particulars of the law of
Nature, or its measures of punishment; yet it is certain
there is such a law, and that too as intelligible and plain to
a rational creature and a studier of that law as the positive
laws of commonwealths, nay, possibly plainer; as much as
reason is easier to be understood than the fancies and in-
tricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden
interests put into words ; for truly so are a great part of the
municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right as
they are founded on the law of Nature, by which they are
to be regulated and interpreted. ro

13. To this strange doctrine—viz., That in the state of
Nature every one has the executive power of the law of
Nature, I doubt not but it will be objected that it is un-

reasonable for men to be judges in their cases, that
selflove Will -Tnake-menpartiat-To Themselves amtcthele
friends; and, on the Other sidé, itfnatitire, passton,—and
revenge will carry them too far in punishing others, and
hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and
that therefore God hath certainly appointed government td
restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant
that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconve-
niencies of the state of Nature, which must certainly be
great where men may be judges in their own case, since it
1s easy to be imagined that he who was so unjust as to do his
brother an injury will scarce be so just as to condemn him-
self for it. But I shall desire those who make this objéc-
198 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

tion to remember that absolute monarchs are but men; and
if government is to be the remedy of those evils which
necessarily follow from men being judges in their own
cases, and the state of Nature is therefore not to be endured,
I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how
much better it is than the state of Nature, where one man
commanding a multitude has the liberty to be judge in his
own case, and may do to all his. subjects whatever he
pleases without the least question or control of those who
execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether
led by reason, mistake, or passion, must be submitted to?
which men in the state of Nature are not bound to do one
to another. And if he that judges, judges amiss in his own
or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of
mankind.

14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are,
or ever were, there any men in such a state of Nature? To
which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since
all princes and rulers of “independent” governments all
through the world are in a state of Nature, it is plain the
world never was, nor never will be, without numbers of men
in that state. I have named all governors of “independent”
coinmunities, whether they are, or are not, in league with
others; for it is not every compact that puts an end to
the state of Nature between men, but only this one of
agreeing together mutually to enter into one community,
and make one body politic ; other promises and compacts
men may make one with another, and yet still be in the
state of Nature. The promises and bargains for truck, Se.
between the two men in Soldania, in or between a Swiss
and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to
them, though they are perfectly in a state of Nature in
reference to one another for truth, and keeping of faith
belongs to men as men, and not as members of society.

15. To those that say there were never any men in the
state of Nature, I will not only oppose the authority of the
judicious Hooker (Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. ro), where he
says, “the laws which have been hitherto mentioned”—#e.,
the laws of Nature—‘“do bind men absolutely, even as they
are men, although they have never any settled fellowship,
never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 199

sr not to do; but for as much as we are not by ourselves
sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things
needful for such a life as our Nature doth desire, a life fit
for the dignity of man, therefore to supply those defects and
imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by
ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and
fellowship with others ; this was the cause of men uniting
themselves as first in politic societies.” But I, moreover,
affirm that all men are naturally in that state, and remain
so till, by their own consents, they make themselves
members of some politic society, and I doubt not, in the
sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear.

/

 

CHAPTER III,
Of the State of War,

16, THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruc- |
tion; and therefore declaring by word or action, not a
passionate and hasty, but sedate, settled design upon
another man’s life puts him in a state of war with
him ‘against whom he has declared such an intention,
and so has exposed his life to the other’s power to
be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him
in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reason-!
able and just I should have a right to destroy that which;
threatens me with destruction ; for by the fundamental law
of Nature, man being to be preserved as much as. possible,
when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocen
is to be preferred, and one may destroy a man who make
war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, fo!
the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion, becaus
they are not under the ties of the common law of reason,
have no other rule but that of force and violence, and s
may be treated as a beast of prey, those dangerous an
noxious creatures that will be sure to destroy him whep-
ever he falls into their power.
a00 «TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

ry, And henee it is that he who attempts to get another
man into his absolute power does thereby put himself into
a state of war with-him; it being to be understood as a <
declaration of a design upon his life. For I have reason toj
conclude that he who would get me into his power withqut
my consent would use me as he pleased when he had got
me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it;
for nobody can desire to have me in his absolute power
unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against
the right of my freedom—z.e.,, make me a slave. To be fre
from such force is the only security of my preservation, an
reason bids me laok on him as an enemy to my preserva-
tion who would take away that freedom which is the fence
to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me
tithereby puts himself into a state of war with me. He that
in the state of Nature would take away the freedom that
belongs to any one in that state must necessarily be sup-
posed to have a design to take away everything else, that
freedom being the foundation of all the rest ; as he that in
the state of society would take away the freedom belonging
to those of that society or commonwealth must be sup-
posed to design to take away from them everything else,
and so be looked on as in a state of war.

38. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief who has
not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his
life, any farther than by the use of force, so to get him in
his power as to take away his money, or what he pleases,
from him ; because using force, where he has no right to get
me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have
no reason to suppose that he who would take away my
liberty would not, when he had me in his power, take
away everything else. And, therefore, it is lawful for me to
treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war
with me—vz.e, kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he
justly expose himself whoever introduces a state of war,
and is aggressor in it.

1g. And here we have the plain difference between the
state of Nature and the state of war, which however some
men have confounded, are as far distant as a state of peace,
goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation ; and a state
of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction are
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 201

one from another. Men living together according or
reason without a common superior on earth, with authority §
to judge between them, is properly the state of Nature. But |
force, or a declared design of force upon the person of |
another, where there is no common superior on earth t
appeal to for relief, is the state of war; and it is the want
of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even
against an aggressor, though he be in society and a fellow-
subject. Thus, a thief whom I cannot harm, but by appeal
to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill
when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat,
because the law, which was mdde for my preservation,
where it cannot interpose to sécure my life from present
force, which if lost is capable of no reparation, permits me
my own defehce and the right of war, a liberty to kill thu
aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal?
to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for
remedy in a casé where the mischief may be irreparable.
Want of a common judge with authority puts all men ina
state of Nature ; force without right upon a man’s petson
makes a state of war both where there is, and is not, a
common judge.

20. But when the attual force is over, the state of war
ceases between those that are in society and are equally
on both sides subject to the judge; and, therefore, in such
controversies, where the question is put, “‘Who shall be
judge?” it cannot be meant who shall decide the contro-
versy ; every one knows what Jephtha here tells us, that
“the Lord the Judge” shall judge. Where there is no
judge on earth the appeal lies to God in Heaven. That
question then cannot mean who shall judge, whethet another
hath put himself in a state of war with me, and whether
I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to Heaven in it? Of that I
myself can only be judge in my own conscience, as I will
answer it at the great day to the Supreme Judge of all
men.
202 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

CHAPTER IV.
Of Slavery.

22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any
' superior power on earth, and not to bé under the will or
legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of
Nature for his rule. The liberty of man in society is to be
under no other legislative power but that established by con-
sent in the commonwealtn nor under the dominion of any
, will, or restraint of any ‘?w, but what that legislative shall
enact according to the ..ast put in it. Freedom, then, is
not what Sir Robert Fil.ner tells us (O. A., 55): “A liberty
for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and
not to be tied by any laws ;” but freedom of men under|
§government is to have a standing rule to live by, common
to every one of that society, and made by the legislative
power erected in it. A liberty to follow my own will in all
things where that rule prescribes not, not to be subject to
the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another
man, as freedom of nature is to be under no other restraint
but the law of Nature.

23. This freedom from absolu e, arbitrary power is so
necessary to, and closely joined with, a man’s preservation,
that he cannot part with it but by what forfeits his preser-
vation and life together. For a man, not having the power
of his own life, cannot by compact or his own consent en-"
slave himself to any one, nor put himself under the abso-
lute, arbitrary power of another to take away his life whén
he pleases. Nobody can give more power than he has
himself, and he that cannot take away his own life cannot
give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault
forfeited his own life by some act that deserves death, he to
whom he has forfeited it may, when he has him in his
power, delay to take it, and make use of him to his own
service ; and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever
he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of
{ his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master,

to draw on himself the death he desires,

N
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 203

24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is
nothing else but the state of war continued between a
lawful conqueror and a captive, for if once compact enter
between them, and make an agreement for a limited power
on the one side, and obedience on the other, the state of
war and slavery ceases as long as the compact endures ; for,
as has been said, no man can by agreement pass over to
another that which he hath not in himself—a power over |
his own life.

I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other
nations, that men did sell themselves; but it is plain this
was only to drudgery, not to slavery ; for it is evident the
person sold was not under an RES, arbitrary, despotical
power, for the master could not have power to kill him at
any time, whom at a certain time he was obliged to let go
free out of his service ; and the master of such a servant
was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life that
he could not at pleasure so much as maim him, but the loss
of an eye or tooth set him free (Exod. xxi.).

 

CHAPTER V.
Of Property.

25. WHETHER we consider natural reason, which tells us
that men, being once born, have a right to their preserva-
tion, and consequently to meat and drink and such other
things as Nature affords for their subsistence, or “ revela-
tion,” which gives us an account of those grants God made
of the world to Adam, and to Noah and his sons, it is
very clear that God, as King David says (Psalm cxv. 16),
“has given the earth to the children of men,” given it to
mankind in common. But, this being supposed, it seems
to some a very great difficulty how any one should ever
come to have a property in anything, I will not content
myself to answer, that, if it be difficult to make out “ pro-
perty” upon a supposition that God gave the world to
204 FWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

Adam and his posterity in common, it is impossible that
any man but one universal monarch should have any
“property” upon a supposition that God gave the world
to Adam and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all-the
rest of his posterity; but I shall endeavour to show how
men might come to have a property in several parts of that
which God gave to mankind in common, and that without
any express compact of all the commoners.
“ 26, God, who hath given the world to men in common,
hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best
iadvantage of life and convenience. ‘The earth and all that
is theréin is given to men for the support and comfort of
their being. | And though all the fruits it naturally produces,
and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they
are produced by the spontaneous hand of Nature, and
nobody has originally a private dominion exclusive of the
rest of mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their
natural state, yet being given for the use of men, there must
of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or.
other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial, to
any particular men. The fruit or venison which nourishes
the wild Indian, whe knows no enclosure, and is still a
tenant in common, must be his, and so his—ze., a part of
him, that another can no longer have any right to it before it
can do him any good for the support of his life.
27. Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common
o all men, yet every man has a “‘property” in his own
‘ person.” § This nobody has any right to but himself. The
“labour” of his body and the “work” of his hands, we may
Say, are properly his. | Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the
state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed
his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own,
and thereby makes it his property. It being by him re-
moved from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath
by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the
common right of other men. For this “labour” being the un-
questionable property of the labourer, no man but he can
have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where
there is enough, and as good left in common for others.
28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up
under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the

   
  
 
PWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, = 205

wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. Nobody
ean deny but the nourishment is his. I ask, then, when did
they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he ate?
or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or
when he picked them up? And it is plain, if the first,
gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That
labour put a distinction between them and common. That
added something to them more than Nature, the common
mother of all, had done, and so they became his private
right. And will any one say he had no right to those acorns
or apples he thus appropriated because he had not the
consent of all mankind to make them his? Was ita robbery
thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common P
If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved,
notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in
commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking
any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state
Nature leaves it in, which begins the property, without which
the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that
part does not depend on the express consent of all the
commoners. Thus, the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my
servant has cut, and the ore I have digged in any place,
where I have a right to them in common with others,
become my property without the assignation or consent of
_anybody. The labour that was mine, removing them out of
that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in
them.

29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner
necessary toa any one’s appropriating to himself any part of
what is given incommon. Children or servants could not cut
the meat which their father or master had provided for them
in common without assigning to every one his peculiar part.
Though the water running in the fountain be every one’s, yet
who can doubt but that in the pitcher is his only who drew
it out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of Nature].
where it was common, and belonged equally to all her
children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.

30, Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian’s

vho hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods who hath
bestowed his labour upon it, though, before, it was the
common right of every one. And amongst those who are
206 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and
multiplied positive laws to determine property, this origina]
‘law of Nature for the beginning of property, ‘in what was
before common, still takes place, and by virtue thereof, what
fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remain-
‘ing common of mankind; or what ambergris any one
takes up here is by the labour that removes it out of that
common state Nature left it in, made his property who takes
that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any
one is hunting is thought his who pursues her during the
chase. For being a beast that is still looked upon as common,
and no man’s private possession, whoever has employed
so much labour about any of that kind as to find and pursue
her has thereby removed her from the state of Nature
wherein she was common, and hath began a property.

31. It will, perhaps, be objected to this, that if gathering
the acorns or other fruits of the earth, &c., makes a right to
them, then any one may engross as much as he will. To
which I answer, Not so. The same law of Nature that does"
by this means give us property, does also bound that
property too. “God has given us all things richly”
(1 Tim. vi. 12). Is the voice of reason confirmed by in-
Spiration? But how far has He given it us—“ to enjoy?” As
much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life
before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property
in. Whatever is beyond this is more than his share, and
belongs to others. pote waa Ipede by Gofl fer man to
spoil or destroy. And thus considering the plenty—of
ETUTaT provisions there was a long time in the world, and the
few spenders, and to how small a part of that provision the
industry of one man could extend itself and engross it to the
‘prejudice of others, especially keeping within the bounds set
by reason of what might serve for his use, there could be
then little room for quarrels or contentions about property
so established.

32. But the chief matter of property being now not the
fruits of the earth and the beasts that subsist on it, but the
earth itself, as that which takes in and carries with it all the
rest ; I think it is plain that property in that too is acquired
as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, im-
proves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 204

his property. He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it
from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right to say
everybody else has an equal title to it, and therefore he
cannot appropriate, he cannot enclose, without the consent
of all his fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when He
gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man
also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it
of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue
the earth—z.e., improve it for the benefit of life and therein
lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour.
He that, in obedience to this command of God, subdued,
tilled, and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it some-
thing that was his property, which another had no title to,
nor could without injury take from him.

33- Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by
improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there
was still enough and as good left, and more than the yet
unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never
the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself.
For he that leaves as much as another can make use ot
does as good as take nothing at all. Nobody could think
himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he
took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same
water left him to quench his thirst. And the case of land and
water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.

34. God gave the world to men in common, but since
He gave it them for their benefit and the greatest conveni-
encies of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot
be supposed he meant it should always remain common
and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious
-and rational (and labour was to be his title to it); not to
the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and con-
tentious. He that had as good left for his improvemen
as was already taken up needed not complain, ought not to

h

   
   
  

mproved by anot e
if he did it is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains,
which he had no right to, and not the ground which God
had given him, in common with others, to labour on, and
whereof there was as good left as that already possessed ;
and more than he knew what to do with, or his industry
could reach to. ,
208 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

35. It is true, in land that is common in England or any
other country, where there are plenty of people under go-
vernment who. have money and commerce, no one ean
enclose or appropriate any part without the consent of: all
his fellow-commoners ; because this is left comimon by com-
pact—-z.¢., by the law of the land, which is not to be violated.-
And, though it be common in respect of some men, it Is
not so to all mankind, but is the joint propriety of this
country, or this parish. Besides, the remainder, after such
enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the com-
moners as the whole was, when they could all make use of
the whole ; whereas in the beginning and first peopling of
the great common of the world it was quite otherwise. The
law man was under was rather for appropriating. God com-
manded, and his wants forced him to labour. That was his
property, which could not be taken from him wherever
he had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating the
earth and having dominion, we see, are joined together.
The one gave title to the other. So that God, by com-
manding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate.
And the condition of human life, which requires labour
and materials to work on, necessarily introduce private
possessions.

36. The measure of property Nature, well set, by the
extent of men’s labour and the conveniency of life. No
man’s labour could subdue or appropriate all, nor could his
enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was
impossible for any man, this way, to entrench upon the
right of another or acquire to himself a property, to the
prejudice of his neighbour, who would still have room-for
as good and as large a possession (after the other had taken

Nout his) 28 | before it was appropriated Which measure did
confine every man’s possession to a very moderate pro-
portion, and such as he might appropriate to himself with-
out injury to anybody in the first ages of the world, when
men were more in danger to he lost, by wandering from
their company, in the then vast wilderness of the earth than
to be straitened for want of room to plant in. And the
same measure may be allowed still, without prejudice to
anybody, as full as the world seems. . For, supposing a man
or family, in the state they were at first, peopling of the
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 209

world by the children of Adam or Noah, let him plant in.
some inland vacant places of America. We shall find that
the possessions he could make himself, upon the measures
we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this
day, prejudice the rest of mankind or give them reason to
complain or think themselves injured by this man’s encroach-
ment, though the race of men have now spread themselves
to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed the
small number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of
ground is of so little value without labour that I have heard
it affirmed that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to
plough, sow, and reap, without being disturbed, upon land
he has no other title to, but only his making use of it. But,
on the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden
to him who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently
waste land, has increased the stock of corn, which they
wanted, But be this as it will, which I lay no stress on,
this I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety—
viz., that every man should have as much as he could make
use of, would hold still in the world, without straitening any-
body, since there is land enough in the world to suffice
double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and
the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced
{by consent) larger possessions and a right to them ; which,
how it has done, I shall by-and-by show more at large.

37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the
desite of having more than men needed had altered the
intritisic value of things, which depends only on their use-
fulness to the life of man, or had agreed that a little piece
of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or
decay, should be worth a great piece of flesh or a whole
heap of corn, though men had a right to appropriate by
their labour, each one to himself, as much of the things of
Nattire as he could use, yet this could not be much, nor to
the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still
left, to those who would use the same industry.

Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as
much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed as many of
the beasts as he could—he that so employed his pains about
any of the spontaneous products of Nature as any way to
alter them from the state Nature put them in, by placing
210 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

‘any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety
in them ; but if they perished in his possession without then
due-use—if the fruits rotted or the venison putrefied before

e could spend it, he offended against the common law ol
Nature, and was liable to be punished: he invaded his
neighbour's share, for he had no right farther than his use
called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him
conveniencies of life.

38. The same measures governed the possession of land,
too. Whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made
useof before it spoiled, that was his peculiar right ; what-
soever he enclosed, and could feed and make use of, the
cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass ot
his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting
perished without gathering and laying up, this part of the
earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked
on as waste, and might be the possession of any other.
Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as much ground as
he could till and make it his own land, and yet leave
enough to Abel’s sheep to feed on: a few acres would serve
for both their possessions. But as families increased and
industry enlarged their stocks, their possessions enlarged
with the need of them; but yet it was commonly without
any fixed property in the ground they made use of till they
incorporated, settled themselves together, and built cities,

and_then, by consent, they came in time—to set out the
bounds of their_disti itories agree on limi
between them _and their neighbours, and by laws within
th i led tl : ; ees mah

e
society.. For we see that in that part of the world which
was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled,
even as low down as Alraham’s time, they wandered with
their flocks and their herds, which was their substance,
freely up and down—and this Abraham did in a country
where he was a stranger; whence it is plain that, at least, a
great part of the land lay in common, that the inhabitants
valued it not, nor claimed property.in any more than they
made use of ; but when there was not room enough in the
same place for their herds to feed together, they, by consent,
as Abraham and Lot did (Gen. xiii. 5) separated and enlarged
their pasture where it best liked them. And for the same
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 211

reason, Esau went from his father and his brother, and
planted in Mount Seir (Gen. xxxvi. 6).

39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion
and property in Adam over all the world, exclusive of all
other men, which can no way be proved, nor any one’s
property be made out from it, but supposing the world,
given as it was to the children of men in common, we see
how labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels
of it for their private uses, wherein there could be no doubt
of right, no room for quarrel.

40. Nor is it so strange as, perhaps, before consideration,
it may appear, that the property of labour should be able to
overbalance the community of land, for it is labour indeed
that puts the difference of value on everything ; and let
any one consider what the difference is between an acre of
land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or
barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common
without any husbandry upon it, and he will find that the
improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the
value. I think it will be but a very modest computation to
say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life of
man, nine-tenths are the effects of labour. Nay, if we will
rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up
the several expenses about them—what in them is purely
owing to Nature and what to labour—we shall find that in
most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be
put on the account of labour.

41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything
than several nations of the Americans are of this, who are
rich in land and poor in all the comforts of life; whom
Nature, having furnished as liberally as any other people
with the materials of plenty—ze., a fruitful soil, apt to pro-
ducé in abundance what might serve for food, raiment, and
delight ; yet, for want of improving it by labour, have not
‘one hundredth part of the conveniences we enjoy, and
a king of a large and fruitful territory there feeds, lodges,
and is clad worse than a day labourer in England.

42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of
the ordinary provisions of life, through their several pro-
gresses, before they come to our use, and see how much
they receive of their value from human industry. Bread,
212 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

wine, and cloth are things of daily use and great plenty ; yet
notwithstanding acorns, water, and leaves, or skins must be
our bread, drink and clothing, did not labour furnish us
with these more useful commodities. For whatever bread is
more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk
than leaves, skins or moss, that is wholly owing to labour
and industry. Theone of these being the food and rai-
ment which unassisted Nature furnishes us with ; the other
provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us,
which how much they exceed the other in value, when any
one hath computed, he will then see how much labour
makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy
in this world ; and the ground which produces the materials
is scarce to be reckoned in as any, or at most, but a very
small part ok it; so little, that even amongst us, land that is
left wholly to Nature, that hath no improvement of pastur-
age, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and
we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than
nothing. ;

43. An acre of land that bears here twenty bushels of
wheat, and another in America, which, with the same
hosbandry, would do the like, are, without doubt, of the
same natural, intrinsic value. But yet the benefit mankind
receives from one in a year is worth £5, andthe other
possibly not worth a penny ; if all the profit an Indian res
ceived from it were to be valued and sold here, at least I
may truly say, not one thousandth. It is labour, then,

_which puts the greatest part of value«upon land, without
which it would scarcely be worth anything ; it is to that we
owe the greatest part of all its useful products ; for all that
the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more worth
than the product of an acre of as good land which lies waste
is all the effect-of labour. For it is not barely the plough.
man’s pains, the reaper’s and thresher’s toil, and the baker's
sweat, is to be counted into the bread we eat ; the labour of
those who broke the oxen, who digged and wrought the iron,
and stones, who felled and framed the timber employed
about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which
are a vast number, requisite to this corn, from its sowing to
its being made bread, must all be charged on the account
of labour, and received as an effect of that ; Nature and the
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 213

earth furnished only the almost worthless materials as in
themselves. It would be a strange.catalogue of things that
industry provided and made use of about every loaf of
bread before it came to our use if we could trace them;
iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime,
cloth, dyeing-drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all the
materials made use of in the ship that brought any of the
commodities made use of by any of the workmen, to any
part of the work, all which it would be almost impossible,
at least too long, to reckon up.

44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of
Nature are given in common, man (by being master of him-
self, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or
labour of it) had still in himself the great foundation of pro-
perty; and that which made up the great part of what he
applied to the support or comfort of his being, when inven-
tion and arts had improved the conveniencies of life, was
perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others,.

45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of pro-
perty, wherever ‘any one was pleased to employ it, upon
what was common, which remained a long while, the far
greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use of.
Men at first, for the most part, contented themselves with
what unassisted Nature offered to their necessities ; and
though afterwards, in some parts of the world, where the in-
crease of people and stock, with the use of money, had
made land scarce, and so of some value, the several com-
munities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and,
by laws, within themselves, regulated the properties of the
private men of their society, and so, by compact and agree-
ment, settled the property which labour and industry began.
And the leagues that have been made between several states
and kingdoms, either expressly or tacitly disowning all claim
and right to the land in the other’s possession, have, by
common consent, given up their pretences to their natural
common right, which originally they had to those countries ;
and so have, by positive agreement, settled a property
amongst themselves, in distinct parts of the world ; yet there
are still great tracts of ground tobe found, which the inhabi-
tants thereof, not having joined with the rest of mankind in
the consent of the use of their common money, lie waste,
214. TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

and are more than the people who dwell on it, do, or can
make use of, and so still lie in common; though this can
scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have con-
sented to the use of money.

46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of
man, and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first
commoners of the world look after—as it doth the Ameri-
cans now—are generally things of short duration, such as—
if they are not consumed by use—will decay and perish of
themselves. Gold, silver, and diamonds are things that fancy or
agreement hath put the value on, more than real use and the
necessary support of life. Now of those good things which
Nature hath provided in common, every one hath a right
‘(as hath been said) to as much as he could use, and had a
property in all he could effect with his labour; all that his

_ industry could extend to, to alter from the state Nature had
put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred bushels of
acorns or apples had thereby a property in them ; they were
his goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look that
he used them before they spoiled, else he took more than
his share, and robbed others. And, indeed, it was a foolish
thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could
make use of. If he gave away a part to anybody else, so
that it perished not uselessly in his possession, these healso ©
made use of. And if he also bartered away plums that
would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last good
for his eating a whole year, he did no injury ; he wasted not
the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of
goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished
uselessly in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for
a piece of metal, pleased with its colour, or exchange his
sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond,
and keep those by him all his life, he invaded not the right
of others ; he might heap up as much of these durable things
as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds.of his just
property not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the
perishing of anything uselessly in it.

47. And thus came in the use of money; some lasting

"thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that, by
mutual consent, men would take in exchange for the truly
=seful but perishable supports of life.
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 215

48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give
men possessions in different proportions, so this invention
of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge
them. For supposing an island, separate from all possible
commerce with the rest of the world, wherein there were
but a hundred families, but there were sheep, horses, and
cows, with other useful animals, wholesome fruits, and land
enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many,
but nothing in the island, either because of its commonness
or perishableness, fit to supply the place of money. What
reason could any one have there to enlarge his possessions
beyond the use of his family, and a plentiful supply to its
consumption, either in what their own industry produced,
or they could barter for like perishable, useful commodities
with others? Where there is not something both lasting
and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men
will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were it
never so rich, never so free for them to take. For I ask,
what would a man value ten thousand or an hundred thou-
sand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated and well
stocked, too, with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts
of America, where he had no hopes of commerce with cther
parts of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of the
product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we
should see him give up again to the wild common of Nature
whatever was more than would supply the conveniences of
life, to be had there for him and his family.

49. Thus, in the beginning, all the world was America,
and more so than that is now; for no such thing as money
was anywhere known. Find out something that hath the
use and value of money amongst his neighbours, you shall
see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his pos-
sessions.

50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life
of man, in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its
value only from the consent of men—whereof labour yet
makes in great part the measure—it is plain that the consent
of men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal pos-
session of the earth—I mean out of the bounds of society
and compact ; for in governments the laws regulate it ; they
having, by consent, found out and agreed in = way how a
216 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

man may, rightfully and without injury, possess more than
he himself can make use of by receiving gold and silver,
which may continue long in a man’s possession without de-
éaying for the overplus, and agreeing those metals should
have a value.

sr. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without
any difficulty, how labour could at first begin a title of pro»
perty in the common things of Nature, and how the spending
it upon our uses bounded it ; so that there could then be no
reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about the
largeness of possession it gave. Right and conveniency
went together. For as a man had a right to all he could
employ his labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour
for more than he could make use of. This left no room for
controversy about the title, nor for encroachment on the
right of othets. What portion a man carved to himself was
easily seen ; and it was useless, as well as dishonest, to carve
himself too much, or take more than he needed.

 

CHAPTER VI.
Of Paternal Power.

52. Ir may perhaps be censured an impertinent criticism
in a discourse of this nature to find fault with words and
names that have obtained in the world. And yet possibly
it may not be amiss to offer new ones when the old are apt
to lead men into mistakes, as this of paternal power
probably has done, which seems so to place the power
of patents over their children wholly in the father, as if the
mother had no share in it; whereas if wé consult reason or
revelation, we shall find she has an equal title, which may
give one reason to ask whether this might not be more
ptoperly called parental power? For whatever obligation
Nature and the right of generation lays on children, it must
certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 214

it. And accordingly we see the positive law of God every-
where joins them together without distinction, when it
commands the obedience of children ; ‘“‘ Honour thy father
and thy mother” (Exod. xx. 12); “ Whosoever curseth his
father or his mother” (Lev. xx. 9); “‘ Ye shall fear every
man his mother and his father” (Lev. xix. 3); ‘“ Children
obey your parents,” &c. (Eph. vi. 1), is the style of the Old
and New Testament.

53. Had but this one thing kLcu well considered without
ooking any deeper into the matter, it might perhaps have
kept men from running into those gross mistakes they have
made about this power of parents, which however it might
without any great harshness bear the name of absolute
dominion and regal authority, when under the title of
“ paternal” power, it seemed appropriated to the father ; would
yet have sounded but oddly, and in the very name shown the
absurdity, if this supposed absolute power over children had
been called parental, and thereby discovered that it belonged
to the mother too. For it will but very ill serve the turn of
those men who contend so much for the absolute power and
authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that the mother
should have any share in it. And it would have but ill
supported the monarchy they contend for, when by the
very name it appeared that that fundamental authority from
whence they would derive their government of a single
person only was not placed in one, but two persons jointly.
But to let this of names pass.

54. Though I have said above (2) “ That all men by
nature are equal,” I cannot be supposed to understand all
sorts of equality.” Age or virtue may give men a just pre-
cecency. Excellency of parts and merit may place others
above the common level. Birth may subject some, and
allianee or benefits others, to pay an observance to those to
whom Nature, gratitude, or other respects, may have made
it due; and yet all this consists with the equality which all
men are in in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over
another, which was the equality I there spoke of as proper
to the business in hand, being that equal right that every
man hath to his natural freedom, without being subjected to
the will or authority of any other man.

‘5s. Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of
‘218 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

equality, though they are born to it. Their parents have a.
sort of rule and jurisdiction over them when they come into
the world, and for some time after, but it is but a temporary
one. The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling
clothes they are wrapt up in and supported by in the
weakness of their infancy. Age and reason as they grow
up loosen them, till at length they drop quite off, and leave
a man at his own free disposal.

56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind
in full possession of their strength and reason, and so was
capable from the first instance of his being to provide for
his own support and preservation, and govern his actions
according to the dictates of the law of reason God had im-
planted in him. From him the world is peopled with his
descendants, who are all born infants, weak and helpless,
without knowledge or understanding. But to supply the.
defects of this imperfect state till the improvement of
growth and age had removed them, Adam and Eve, and
after them all parents were, by the law of Nature, under an
obligation to preserve, nourish and educate the children they
had begotten, not as their own workmanship, but the work-
manship of their own Maker, the Almighty, to whom they
were to be accountable for them.

57. The law that was to govern Adam was the same that
was to govern all his posterity, the law of reason. But his
offspring having another way of entrance into the world,
different from him, by a natural birth, that produced them
ignorant, and without the use of reason, they were not
presently under that law. For nobody can be under a law
that is not promulgated to him; and this law being pro-
mulgated or made known by reason only, he that is not
come to the use of his reason cannot be said to be under
this law; and Adam’s children being not presently as soon
as born under this law of reason, were not presently
free. For law, in its true notion, is not so much the limita-
tion as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to
his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the
general good of those under that law. Could they be
happier without it, the law, as a useless thing, would of
itself vanish ; and that ill deserves the name of confinement,
which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices. So that
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 219

however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not tot!
abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freegom. For
in all the states of created beings, capable of laws, where
there is no law there is no freedom. For liberty is to be
free from restraint and violence from others, which cannot
be where there is no law; and is not, as we are told,
“fa liberty for every man to do what he lists.” For who
could be free, when every other man’s humour might
domineer over him? But a liberty to dispose and order
freely as he lists his person, actions, possessions, and
his whole property within the allowance of those laws under
which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary
will of another, but freely follow his own.

58. The power, then, that parents have over their children
arises from that duty which is incumbent on them, to take
care of their offspring during the imperfect state of child-.
hood. To inform the mind, and govern the actions of their
yet. ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place and ease
them of that trouble, is what the children want, and
the parents are bound to. For God having given man an
understanding to direct his actions, has allowed him a
freedom of will and liberty of acting, as properly belonging
thereunto, within the bounds of that law he is under. But
whilst he is in an estate wherein he has no understanding of
his own to direct his will, he is not to have any will of his
own to follow. He that understands for him must will for
him too; he must prescribe to his will, and regulate
his actions, but when he comes to the estate that made his
father a free man, the soniis a free man too.

59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether
natural or civil. Is a man under the law of Nature? What
made him free of that law? what gave him a free disposing
of his property, according to his own will, within the
compass of that law? I answer, an estate wherein he might
be supposed capable to know that law, that so he might
keep his actions within the bounds of it. When he has
acquired that state, he is presumed to know how far that
law is to be his guide, and how far he may make use of his
freedom, and so comes to have it ; till then, somebody else
must guide him, who is presumed to know how far the law
allows a liberty. If such a state of reason, such an age of
220 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

discretion made him free, the same shall make his son free
too. Is aman under the law of England? what made him
free of that law—that is, to have the liberty to dispose of
his actions and possessions, according to his own will, within
the permission of that law ? a capacity of knowing that law.
Which is supposed, by that law, at the age of twenty-one,
and in some cases sooner. If this made the father free, it
shall make the son free too, Till then, we see the law allows
the son to have no will, but he is to be guided by the will of
his father or guardian, who is to understand for him. And
if the father die and fail to substitute a deputy in this trust, if

~he hath not provided a tutor to govern his son during his
minority, during his want of understanding, the law takes
care to do it: some other must govern him and be a will to
him till he hath attained to a state of freedom, and his
understanding be fit to take the government of his will. But
after that the father and son are equally free, as much as
tutor and pupil, after nonage, equally subjects of the same
law together, without any dominion left in the father over the
life, liberty, or estate of his son, whether they be only in the
state and under the law of Nature, or under the positive
laws of an establishéd government.

60. But if through defects that may happen out of the
ordinary course of Nature, any one comes not to sucha
degree of reason wherein he might be supposed capable of
knowing the law, and so living within the rules of it, he is
never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to
the disposure of his own will; because he knows no bounds
to it, has not understanding, its proper guide, but is con-
tinued under the tuition and government of others all the
time his own understanding is incapable of that charge.
And so lunatics and idiots are never set free from the
government of their parents: ‘Children who are not as yet
come unto those years whereat they may have, and
innocents, which are excluded by a natural defect from ever
having.” Thirdly, “‘Madmen, which, for the present, cannot
possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves,
have, for their guide, the reason that guideth other men
which are tutors over them, to seek and procure their good
for them,” says Hooker (Eccl. Pol., lib. i, s. 7). All which
seems no more than that duty which God and Nature has laid
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMEN?. 221

on tan, as well as other creatures, to preserve their offspring
they can be able to shift for themselves, and will scarce
amount to an instance or proof of parents’ regal authority.
61. Thus we are born free as we are born rational; not
that we have actually the exercise of either: age that brings
one, brings with it the other too. And thus we see how
natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist
together, and are both founded on the same principle. A
child is free by his father’s title, by his father’s understanding,
which is to govern him till he hath it of his own. The ftee-
dom of a man at years of discretion, and the subjection of a
child to his parents, whilst yet short of -it, are so consistent
and so distinguishable that the most blinded contenders for
monarchy, “ by right of fatherhood,” cannot miss of it; the
most obstinate cannot but allow of it. For were their
doctrine all true, were the right heir of Adam now known,
and, by that title, settled a monarch in his throne, invested
with all the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert Filmer
talks of, if he should die as soon as his heir were born, must
not the child, notwithstanding he were never so free, never
so much sovereign, be in subjection to his mother and nurse,
to tutors and governors, till age and education brought him
reason and ability to govern himself and others? The
tiecessities of his life, the health of his body, and the in-
formation of his mind would require him to be directed by
the will of others and not his own; and yet will any one
think that this restraint and subjection were inconsistent
with, or spoiled him of, that liberty or sovereignty he had a
right to, or gave away his empire to those who had the
government of his nonage? This government over him
. only prepared him the better and sooner for it. If anybody
should ask rie when my son is of age to be free, I shall
answer, just when his monarch is of age to govern. “ But at
what time,” says the judicious Hooker (Eccl. Pol., lib. i, s. 6),
“a tnari may be said to have attained so far forth the
use of reason as sufficeth to make him capable of thosé-laws
whereby he is then bound to guide his actions ; this is a
eat deal more easy for sense to discern than for any one,
oy skill and learning, to determine.”
62. Commonwealths themselves take notice of, and allow
‘that there is a time when men ate to begin to act like free
222 TWO TREATISES OF GO VERNMENT,

men, and therefore, till that time, require not caths of fealty
or allegiance, or other public owning of, or submission to the
government of their countries.

63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting ac.
cording to his own will, is grounded on his having reason,
which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern
himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the
freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an un-
restrained liberty, before he has reason to guide him, is not
the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free, but
to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon him toa
state as wretched and as much beneath that of a man as
theirs. This is that which puts the authority into the
parents’ hands to govern the minority of their children.
God hath made it their business to employ this care on their
offspring, and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of
tenderness and concern to temper this power, to apply it as
His wisdom designed it, to the children’s good as long as
they should need to be under it.

64. But what reason can hence advance this care of the
parents due to their offspring into an absolute, arbitrary
dominion of the father, whose power reaches no farther
than by such a discipline as he finds most effectual to give
such strength and health to their bodies, such vigour and
rectitude to their minds, as may best fit his children to be
most useful to themselves and others, and, if it be necessary
to his condition, to make them work when they are able for
their own subsistence; but in this power the mother, too,
has her share with the father.

65. Nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any
peculiar right of Nature, but only as he is guardian of his
children, that when he quits his care of them he loses his
power over them, which goes along with their nourishment
and education, to which it is inseparably annexed, and
belongs as much to the foster-father of an exposed child as
to the natural father of another. So little power does the
bare act of begetting give a man over his issue, if all his
care ends there, and this be all the title he hath to the name
and authority of a father. And what will become of this
paternal power in that part of the world where one woman
hath more than one husband at a time? or in those parts
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 223

America where, when the husband and wife part, which
happens frequently, the children are all left to the mother,
follow her, and are wholly under her care and provision ?
And if the father die whilst the children are young, do they
not naturally everywhere owe the same obedience to their
mother, during their minority, as to their father, were he
alive? And will any one say that the mother hath a legislative
power over her children that she can make standing rules
which shall be of perpetual obligation, by which they ought
to regulate all the concerns of their property, and bound
their liberty all the course of their lives, and enforce the
observation of them with capital punishments? For this is
the proper power of the magistrate, of which the father hath
not so much asthe shadow. His command over his children
is but temporary, and reaches not their life or property. It
is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of their non-
age, a discipline necessary to their education. And though
a father may dispose of his~own possessions as he pleases
when his children are out of danger of perishing for want,
yet his power extends not to the lives or goods which either
their own industry, or another’s bounty, has made theirs, nor
to their liberty neither, when they are once arrived to the
enfranchisement of the years of discretion. The father’s
empire then ceases, and he can from thenceforward no more
dispose of the liberty of his son than that of any other man.
And it must be far from an absolute or perpetual jurisdic-
tion from which a man may withdraw himself, having license
from Divine authority to “leave father and mother and
cleave to his wife.”

66. But though there be a time when a child comes to
be as free from subjection to the will and command of his
father as he himself is free from subjection to the will of
anybody else, and they are both under no other restraint
but that which is common to them both, whether it be the
law of Nature or municipal law of their country, yet this
freedom exempts not a son from that honour which he
ought, by the law of God and Nature, to pay his parents,
God having made the parents ‘instruments in His great
design of continuing the race of mankind and the occasions
of life to their children. As He hath laid on them an obli-
gation to nourish, preserve, and bring up their offspring, so
224 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

He has laid on the children a perpetual obligation of
nonouring their parents, which, containing in it an inward
ésteem and reverence to be shown by all outward expressions,
ties up the child from anything that may ever injure or
affront, disturb or endanger the happiness or life of those
from whom he receiyed his, and engages him in all actions
of defence, relief, assistance, and comfort of those by whose
«means he entered into being and has been made capable of
any enjoyments of life. From this obligation no state, no
freedom, can absolve children. But this is very far from
giving parents a power of command over their children, or
an authority to make laws and dispose as they please of
their lives or liberties. It is one thing to owe honour,
respect, gratitude, and assistance; another to require an
absolute obedience and submission, The honour due to
parents a monarch on his throne owes his mother, and yet
this lessens not his authority nor subjects him to her govern-
ment. é
67. The subjection of a minor places in the father a tem-
porary government which terminates with the minority of
the child ; and the honour due from a cnild places in the
parents a perpetual right to respect, reverence, support, and
compliance, to more or less, as the father’s care, cost, and
kindness in his education has been more or less, and this
ends not with-minority, but holds in all parts and conditions
of aman’s life, The want of distinguishing these two powers
which the father hath, in the right of tuition, during minority,
and the right of honour all his life, may perhaps have caused
a great part of the mistakes about this matter. For, to speak
properly of them, the first of these is rather the privilege of
children and duty of parents than any prerogative of paternal
power. The nourishment and education of their children is
a charge so incumbent on parents for their children’s good,
that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it. And
though the power of commanding and chastising them go
along with it, yet God hath woven into the principles of
human nature such a tenderness for their offspring, that there
is little fear that parents should use their power with too
much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe side, the
strong bias of nature drawing the other way. And therefore
God Almighty, when He would express His gentle dealing
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 225

with the Israelites, He tells them that though He chastened
them, “He chastened them as a man chastens his son” (Deut. .
vill. 5)—z.e., with tenderness and affection, and kept them
under no severer discipline than what was absolutely best
for them, and had been less kindness to have slackened.
This is that power to which children are commanded
obedience, that the pains and care of their parents may not
be increased or ill-rewarded.

68. On the other side, honour and support all that which
gratitude requires to return; for the benefits received by
and from them is the indispensable duty of the child and
the proper privilege of the parents. This is intended for the
parents’ advantage, as the other is for the child’s ; though
education, the parents’ duty, seems to have most power,
because the ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in
need of restraint and correction, which is a visible exercise
of rule and a kind of dominion. And that duty which is
comprehended in the word “ honour” requires less obedience,
though the obligation be stronger on grown than younger
children. For who can think the command, “ Children
obey your parents,” requires in a man that has children of
his own the same submission to his father as it does in his
yet young children to him, and that by this precept he were
bound to obey all his father’s commands, if, out of a conceit
of authority, he should have the indiscretion to treat him
still as a boy

69. The first part, then, of paternal power, or rather duty,
which is education, belongs so to the father that it terminates
at a certain season. When the business of education is
over it ceases of itself, and is also alienable before. Fora
man may put the tuition of his son in other hands; and
he that has made his son an apprentice to another has
discharged him, during that time, of a great: part of his
obedience, both to himself and to his mother. But all the
duty of honour, the other part, remains nevertheless entire :
tothem; nothing can cancel that. It is so inseparable from
them both, that the father’s authority cannot dispossess the
mother of this right, nor can any man discharge his son
from honouring her that bore him. But both these are
very far from a power to make Jaws, and enforcing them
with penalties that may reach estate, liberty, limbs, and life.

H
226 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

The power of commanding ends with nonage, and though
after that honour and respect, support and defence, and
whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest
benefits he is naturally capable of be always due from a son
to his parents, yet all this puts no sceptre into the father’s
hand, no sovereign power of commanding. He has no
dominion over his son’s property or actions, nor any right
that his will should prescribe to his son’s in all things;
however, it may become his son in many things, not very
inconvenient to him and his family, to pay a deference
to it.

_7o. A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient or
wise man, defence to his child or friend, relief and support
to the distressed, and gratitude to a benefactor, to such a
degree that all he has, all he can do, cannot sufficiently pay
it. But all these give no authority, no right of making laws
to any one over him from whom they are owing. And itis -
plain all this is due, not to the bare title of father, not only
because, as has been said, it is owing to the mother too,
but because these obligations to parents, and the degrees
of what is required of children, may be varied by the
different care and kindness, trouble and expense, is often
employed upon one child more than another.

71. This shows the reason how it comes to pass that
parents in societies, where they themselves are subjects,
retain a power over their children and have as much right
to their subjection as those who are in the state of Nature,
which could not possibly be if all political power were only
paternal, and that, in truth, they were one and the same
thing ; for then, all paternal power being in the prince, the
subject could naturally have none of it. But these two
powers, political and paternal, are so perfectly distinct and
separate, and built upon so different foundations, and given
to so different ends, that every subject that is a father has
as much a paternal power over his children as the prince
has over his. And every prince that has parents ewes them
as much filial duty and obedience as the meanest of his
subjects do to theirs, and can therefore contain not any
part or degree of that kind of dominion which a prince or
magistrate has over his subject.

72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 324

their children, and the obligation on children to honour
their parents, contain all the power, on the one hand, ahd
submission on the other, which are proper to this relation ;
yet there is another power ordinarily in the father, whereby
he has a tie on the obedience of his-children, which, though
it be common to him with other men, yet the occasions of
showing it, almost constantly happening to fathers in their
private families and in instances of it elsewhere being rare,
and less taken notice of, it passes in the world for a part
of “paternal jurisdiction.” And this is the power. men
generally have, to bestow their estates on those who please
them best. The possession of the father being the ex-
pectation and inheritance of the children ordinarily, in
certain proportions, according to the law and custom of
each cotintry ; yet it is commonly in the father’s power to
bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand, according
as the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with
his ‘will and humour.

73. This is no small tie to the obedience of children ;
and there being always annexed to the enjoyment of land
a submission to the government of the country of which
that land. is a part, it has been commonly supposed
that a father could oblige his posterity to that government
of which he himself was a subject, that his compact held
them ; whereas, it beirig only a necessary condition annexed
to the land which is under that government, reaches only
those who will take it on that condition, and so is no
natural tie or engagement, but a voluntary submission ;
for every man’s children being, by Nature, as free as him-
self or any of his ancestors ever were, may, whilst they are
in that freedom, choose what society they will join them-
selves to, what commonwealth they will put themselves
under. But if they will enjoy the inheritance of their
ancestors, they must take it on the same terms their
ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions annexed
to such a possession. By this power, indeed, fathers
oblige their children to obedience to themselves even when
they are past minority, and most commonly, too, subject
them to this or that political power. But neither of these
by any peculiar right of fatherhood, but by the reward they
have in their hands to enforce and recompense such a

H2
228 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

compliance, and is no more power than what a Frenchman
has over an Englishman, who, by the hopes of an estate he
will leave him, will certainly have a strong tie on his
obedience ; and if when it is left him, he will enjoy it, he
must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to the
possession of land in that country where it lies, whether it
be France or England. .

74. To conclude, then, though the father’s power of com-
manding extends no farther than the minority of his
children, and to a degree only fit for the discipline and
government of that age; and though that honour and
respect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which
they indispensably owe to their parents all their lifetimes,
and in all estates, with all that support and defence, is due
to them, gives the father no power of governing—ze,
making laws and exacting penalties on his children ;
though by this he has no dominion over the property or
actions of his son, yet it is obvious to conceive how easy it
was, in the first ages of the world, and in places still where
the thinness of people gives families leave to separate into
unpossessed quarters, and they have room to remove and
plant themselves in yet vacant habitations, for the father of
the family to become the prince of it ;* he had been a
ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children ; and
when they were grown up, since without some government
it would be hard for them to live together, it was likeliest
it should, by the express or tacit consent of the children,

* “Tt isno improbable opinion, therefore, which the arch-philosopher
was of, That the chief person in every household was always, as it were,
aking; so when numbers of households joined themselves in civil socie-
ties together, kings were the first kind of governors among them, which
is also, as it seemeth, the reason why the name of fathers continued still
in them, who of fathers were made rulers; as also the ancient custom
of governors to do as Melchizedec; and being kings, to exercise the
office of priests, which fathers did, at the first, grew, perhaps, by the
same occasion. Howbeit, this is not the only kind of regimen that has

‘been received in the world. The inconveniencies of one kind have
caused sundry other to be devised, so that, in a word, all public regi-
men, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have risen from the
deliberate advice, consultation and composition between men, judging
it convenient and behoveful, there being no impossibility in Nature,
considered by itself, but that man might have lived without any public
regimen.’’—Hooker, Eccl. lib. i. sect. 10.
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 229

be in the father, where it seemed, without any change,
barely to continue. And when, indeed, nothing more was
required to it than the permitting the father to exercise
alone in his family that executive power of the law of
Nature which every free man naturally hath, and by that
permission resigning up to him a monarchical power whilst
they remained in it. But that this was not by any paternal
right, but only by the consent of his children, is evident
from hence that nobody doubts but if a stranger, whom
chance or business had brought to his family, had there
killed any of his children, or committed any other fact, he
might condemn and put him to death, or otherwise have
punished him as well as any of his children, which was im-
possible he should do by virtue of any paternal authority
over one who was not his child, but by virtue of that
executive power of the law of Nature which, as a man, he
had a right to; and he alone could punish him in his
family where the respect of his children had laid by the
exercise of such a power, to give way to the dignity and
authority they were willing should remain in him above the
rest of his family.

75. Thus it was easy and almost natural for children, by
a tacit and almost natural consent, to make way for the
father’s authority and government. They had been accus-
tomed in their childhood to follow his direction, and to
refer their little differences to him; and when they were
men, who fitter to rule them? Their little properties and
less covetousness seldom afforded greater controversies ;
and when any should arise, where could they have a fitter
umpire than he, by whose care they had every one been
sustained and brought up, and who had a tenderness for
them all? It is no wonder that they made no distinction
betwixt minority and full age, nor looked after one-and-
twenty, or any other age, that might make them the free
disposers of themselves and fortunes, when they could have
no desire to be out of their pupilage. The government
‘they had been under during it continued still to be more
their protection than restraint; and they could nowhere
find a greater security to their peace, liberties, and fortunes
than in the rule of a father. - . ;

76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an insensible
230 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

change, became the politic monarchs of them too ; and as
they chanced to live long, and leave able and worthy heirs
for several successions or otherwise, so they laid the foun-
dations of hereditary or elective kingdoms under several
constitutions and manors, according as chance, contrivance,
or occasions happened to mould them. But if princes have
their titles in the father’s right, and it be a sufficient proof
of the natural right of fathers to political authority, because
they commonly were those in whose hands we find, de
facto, the exercise of government, I say, if this argument
be good, it will as strongly prove that all princes, nay,
princes only, ought to be priests, since it is as certain that
in the beginning “the father of the family was priest, as
that he was ruler in his own household.”

 

CHAPTER VII.
Of Political or Civil Society,

77. Gop, having made man such a creature that, in His
own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put
him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and
inclination, to drive him into society, as well as fitted him
with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it
The first society was between man and wife, which gave
beginning to that between parents and children, to which,
in time, that between master and servant came to be added.
And though all these might, and commonly did, ineet toge-
ther and make up but one family, wherein the master or
mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family, each
of these, or all together, came short of ‘‘ political society,”
as we shall see if we consider the different ends, ties, and
bounds of each of these.

78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact
between man and woman, and though it consist chiefly in
such a communion and right in one another’s bodies as is
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 231

necessary to its chief end, procreation, yet it draws with it
mutual support and assistance, and a communion of interests
too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection,
but also necessary to their common offspring, who have a
right to be nourished and maintained by them till they are
able to provide for themselves.

79. For the end of conjunction between male and female
being not barely procreation, but the continuation of the
species, this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to
last, even after procreation, so long as is necessary to the
nourishment and support of the young ones, who are to be
sustained by those that got them till they are able to shift
and provide for themselves. This rule, which the infinite
wise Maker hath set to the works of His hands, we find the
inferior creatures steadily obey. In those vivaporous animals
which feed on grass the conjunction between male and female
lasts no longer than the very act of copulation, because the
teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the young till it
be able to feed on grass, the male only begets, but concerns
not himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance he
can contribute nothing. But in beasts of prey the conjunc-
tion lasts longer, because the dam, not being able well
to subsist herself and nourish her numerous offspring by
her own prey alone (a more laborious as well as more dan-
gerous way of living than by feeding on grass), the assistance
of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common
family, which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for
themselves, but by the joint care of male and female. The
same is be observed in all birds (except some domestic ones,
where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding and
taking care of the young brood), whose young, needing
food in the nest, the cock and hen continue mates till the
young are able to use their wings and provide for them-
selves.

_ 80. And herein, I think, lies the chief, if not the only
reason, why the male and female in mankind are tied toa
longer conjunction than other creatures—viz., because the
female is capable of conceiving, and, de facto, is commonly
with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, lon

before the former is out of a dependency for support on his
parents’ help and able to shift for himself, and has all the

?
232 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

assistance is due to him from his parents, whereby the father,
who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under
an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same
woman longer than other creatures, whose young, being able
to subsist of themselves before the time of procreation returns
again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are at
liberty till Hymen, at his usual anniversary season, summons
them again to choose new mates. Wherein one cannot but
admire the wisdom of the great Creator, who, having given
to man an ability to lay up for the future as well as supply
the present necessity; hath made it necessary that society of
man and wife should be more lasting than of male and
female amongst other creatures, that so their industry might
be encouraged, and their interest better united, to make
provision and lay up goods for their common issue, which
uncertain mixture, or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal
society, would mightily disturb.

81. But though these are ties upon mankind which make’
the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in a man than the
other species of animals, yet it would give one reason to
inquire why this compact, where procreation and education
are secured and inheritance taken care for may not be made
determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon
certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts,
there being no necessity, in the nature of the thing, nor to
the ends of it, that it should always be for life—I mean, to
such as are under no restraint of any positive law which
ordains all such contracts to be perpetual.

82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one
common concern, yet having different understandings, will
unavoidably sometimes have different wills too. It there-
fore being necessary that the last determination (2¢., the
rule) should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the
man’s share as the abler and the stronger. But this, reach-
ing but to the things of their common interest and property,
leaves the wife in the full and true possession of what by
contract is her peculiar right, and at least gives the husband
no more power over her than she has over his-life; the
power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute
monarch that the wife has, in many cases, a liberty to sepa-
rate from him where natural right or their contract allows
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 233

it, whether that contract be made by themselves in the state
of Nature or by the customs or laws of the country they
live in, and the children, upon such separation, fall to the
father or mother’s lot as such contract does determine.

83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained
under politic government, as well as in the state of Nature,
the civil magistrate doth not abridge the right or power of
either, naturally necessary to those ends—viz., procreation
and mutual support and assistance whilst theyare together, but
only decides any controversy that may arise between man and
wifeabout them. If it were otherwise, and that absolute
sovereignty and power of life and death naturally belonged to
the husband, and were necessary to the society between man
and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of these coun-
tries where the husband is allowed no such absolute authority.
But the ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the
husband, it was not at all necessary to it. The condition
of conjugal society put it not in him; but whatsoever might
consist with procreation and support of the children till
they could shift for themselves—mutual assistance, comfort,
and maintenance—might be varied and regulated by that -
contract which first united them in that society, nothing
being necessary to any society that is not necessary to the
ends for which it is made.

84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the
distinct rights and powers belonging respectively to them, I
have treated of so largely in the foregoing chapter that I
shall not here need to say anything of it; and I think it is
plain that it is far different from a politic society. —

85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but
given to those of far different condition ; for a free man
makes himself a servant to another by selling him for
a certain time the service he undertakes to do in exchange
for wages he is to receive ; and though this commonly puts
him into the family of his master, and under the ordinary
discipline thereof, yet it gives the master but a temporary
power over him, and no greater than what is contained in
the contract between them. But there is another sort
of servants which, by a peculiar name we call slaves who
being captives taken in a just war are, by the right of
Nature, subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary
234 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

power of their masters. These men having, as I -say,
forfeited their lives and, with it, their liberties, and lost
their estates, and being in the state of slavery, not capable
of any property, cannot in that state be considered as
any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the pre-
servation of property.

86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with
all these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants and
slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family, which
what resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices,
and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet is very
far from it both in its constitution, power, and end; or if it
must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the
absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a
very shattered and short power, when it is plain by what
has been said before, that the master of the family has
a very distinct and differently limited power both as to time
and extent over those several persons that are in it;
for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family,
ahd his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there
be any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative
power of life and death over any of them, and none too but
what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. And he
certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family
who has but a very limited one over every individual in it.
But how a family, or any other society of men differ from
that which is properly political society, we shall best see by
considering wherein political society itself consists.

87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to
perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the
rights and privileges of the law of Nature, equally with any
Other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature
a power not only to preserve his property—that is, his life,
liberty, and estate against the injuries and attempts of other
men; but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law
in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with
death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in
his opinion, requires it. But because no political society cah
be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to
preserve the property, and in order thereunto punish the
offences of all those of that society, there, and there only,

~
FWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 238

is political society where eyery one of the members hath
quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of
the community in all cases that exclude him not from
appealing for protection to the law established by it. And
thus all private judgment of every particular member being
excluded, the community comes to be umpire, and by
understanding indifferent rules and men authorized by the
community for their execution, decides all the differences
that may happen between any members of that society con-
cerning any matter of right, and punishes those offences
which any member hath committed against the society with
such penalties as the law has established ; whereby it is easy
to discern who are, and are not, in political society together.
Those who are united into one body, and have a common
established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority
to decide controversies between them and punish offenders,
are in ¢ivil society one with another; but those who have
no’ such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the
state of Nature, each being where there is no other, judge
for himself and executioner; which is, as I have before
showed it, the perfect state of Nature.

88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set
down what punishment shall belong to the several trans-
gtessions they think worthy of it, committed amongst the
members of that society (which is the power of making
laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done
unto any of its members by any one that is not of it
(which is the power of. war and peace); and all this for
the preservation of the property of all the members of that
society, as far as is possible. But though every man entered
into society has quitted his power to punish offences against
the law of Nature in prosecution of his own private judg-
ment, yet with the judgment of offences which he has
given up to the legislative, in all cases where he can appeal
to the magistrate, he has given up a right to the common-
wealth to employ his force for the execution of the judg-
ments of the commonwealth whenever he shall be called to
it, which, indeed, are his own judgments, they being made by
himself or his representative. And herein we have the
original of the Yegislative and executive power of civil
society, which is to judge by standing laws how far offences

t
236 | TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

are to be punished when committed within the common-
wealth; and also by occasional judgments founded on
the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from
without are to be vindicated, and in both these to employ
\ all the force of all the members when there shall be need.
89. Wherever, therefore, any number of men so unite into
one society as to quit every one his executive power of the
{ine of Nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there
only is a political or civil society. And this is done wher-
ever any number of men, in the state of Nature, enter into
society to make one people one, body politic under one
supreme government; or else when any one joins himself
to, and incorporates with any government already made.
For hereby he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the
legislative thereof, to make laws for him as the public good
of the society shall require, to the execution whereof his
own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts
men out of a state of Nature into that of a commonwealth,
by setting up a judge on earth with authority to determine
all the controversies and redress the injuries that may
happen to any member of the commonwealth, which judge
is the legislative or magistrates appointed by it. And
wherever there are any number of men, however associated,
that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they
are still in the state of Nature.
go. And hence it is evident that absolute monarchy, which
by some men is counted for the only government in
the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so
can be no form of civil government at all. For the end of
civil society being to avoid and remedy those incon-
veniencies of the state of Nature which necessarily follow
from every man’s being judge in his own case by setting up
a known authority to which every one of that society may
appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may
arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey.*
Wherever any persons are who have not such an authority
* “The public power of all society is above every soul contained in
the same society, and the principal use of that power isto give laws unto
all that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there
be reason~showed which may necessarily enforce that the law of reason

or E oa doth enjoin the contrary.”—Hooker. Eccl. Pol. lib, i.
sect, 16, “
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 237

to appeal to, and decide any difference between them there,
those persons are still in the state of Nature. And so
1s every absolute prince in respect of those who are under
his dominion.

gi. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative
and executive, power in himself alone, there is no judge to oy
found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly and
indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whence
relief and redress may be expected of any injury or incon-
veniency that may be suffered from him, or by his order. So
that such a man, however entitled, Czar, or Grand Signior, or
how you please, is as much in the state of Nature, with all
under his dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind. For
wherever any two men are, who have no standing rule and
common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination
of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in
the state of Nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it,
with only this woeful difference to the subject, or rather
slave of an absolute prince.* That whereas, in the ordinary
state of Nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and
according to the best of his power to maintain it ; but when-
ever his property is invaded by the will and order of his
monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society
ought to have, but, as if he were degraded from the common
state of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or

* “To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries, and wrongs—
z.¢., such as attend men in the state of Nature, there was no way but
only by growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves
by ordaining some kind of government public, and by yielding them-
selves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule
and govern, by them the peace, tranquillity, and happy estate of the
rest might be procured. Men always knew that where force and injury
was offered, they might be defenders of themselves, They knew that,
however men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done
with injury unto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men and
all good means to be withstood. Finally, they knew that no man
might, ‘in reason, take upon him to determine his own right, and
according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in
as much as every man is towards himself, and them whom he greatly
affects, partial ; and therefore, that strifes and troubles would be end-
less, except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some
whom they should agree upon, without which consent there would be
no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over
another.”’—Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. 1. sect. 10.
238 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

defend his right, and so is exposed to all the misery and in-
conveniencies that a man can fear from one, who being in
the unrestrained state of Nature, is yet corrupted with
flattery and armed with power.
g2. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men’s
bloods, and corrects the baseness of human nature, need
read but the history of this, or any other age, to be con-
vinced of the contrary. He that would have been insolent
and injurious in the woods of America would not probably
be much better in a throne, where perhaps learning and re-
ligion shall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his
subjects, and the sword presently silence all those that dare
question it. For what the protection of absolute monarchy
is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes
to be, and to what a degree of happiness and security it
carries civil society, where this sort of government is grown
to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon
may easily see.
93- In absolute monarchies, indeed, as well as gther
governments of the world, the subjects have an appeal to the
‘Jaw, and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain
any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects them-
selves, one amongst another. This every one thinks neces-
sary, and believes; he deserves to be thought a declared
enemy to society and mankind who should go about to take
it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind
and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to another,
there is reason to doubt. For this is no more than what
every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness,
may, and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurt-
ing or destroying one another, who labour and drudge only
for his pleasure and advantage ; and so are taken care of,
not out of any love the master has for them, but love of
himself, and the profit they bring him. Forif it be asked
what security, what fence is there in such a state against
the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler, the
very question can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell
you that it deserves death only to ask after safety. Betwixt
subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures,
laws, and judges for their mutual peace and security. But
as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 239

such circutistances ; because he has a power to do more
hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask how
you may be guarded from harm or injury on that side,
where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice
of faction and rebellion. As if when men, quitting the state
of Nature, entered into society, they agreed that all of them
but one should be under the restraint of laws; but that he
should still retain all the liberty of the state of Nature, in-
creased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This
is to think that men are so foolish that they take care to
avoid what imischiefs may be done them by polecats or
sees but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by
ions.
94. But, whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people’s
understandings, it never hinders men from feeling; and
when they perceive that any man, in what station soever, is
out of the bounds of the civil society they are of, and that
they have no appeal, on earth, against any harm they may
receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the
state of Nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so;
and to take care, a5 Soon as théy can, to have that safety and
security, in civil society, for which it was first instituted, and
for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though
perhaps at first, as shall be showed more at large hereafter,
in the following part of this discourse, some one good and
excellent man having got a pre-eminency amongst the rest,
had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as to a
‘kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration
of their differences, by a tacit consent. devolved into his
’ hands, without any other caution but the assurance they
had of his uprightness and wisdom ; yet when time giving
authority, and, as some men would persuade us, sacredness
to customs, which the negligentand unforeseeing innocence
of the first ages began, had brought in successors of another
stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under
the government as then it was* (whereas government has

* “At the first, when some certain kind of regimen was once ap-
pointed, it may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the
manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discre-
tion which were to rule till, by experience, they found this for all parts

very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy
did indeed but increase the sore which it should have cured, They
240 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

no other end but the preservation of property), could never
be safe, nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till
the legislative was so placed in collective bodies of men,
call them senate, parliament, or what you please, by which
means every single person became subject equally, with
other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as
part of the legislative, had established ; nor could any one,
by his own authority, avoid the force of the law, when once
made, nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption,
thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his
dependants. No man in civil society can be exempted from
. the laws ofit. For if any man may do what he thinks fit and
there be no appeal on earth for redress or security against
any harm he shall do, I ask whether he be not perfectly still
in the state of Nature, and so can be no part or member of
that civil society, unless any one will say the state of Nature
and civil society are one and the same thing, which I have
never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to
affirm.*

 

CHAPTER VIII
Of the Beginning o Political Societies,

95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature all free,

Ws equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this
estate and subjected to the political power of another
without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with
other men, to join and unite into a community for their
comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one amongst
another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a
greater security against any-that are not of it. This any

saw that to live by one man’s will became the cause of all men’s misery.
This constrained them to come unto laws wherein all’ men might see
their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them.”
—Hooker, Eccl. Pol., lib. i. sect. 10.

* «Civil law, beirig the act of the whole body: politic, doth theres
fore overrule each several part of the same body.”—Hooker, iid.
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 241

number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom
of the rest ; they are left, as they were, in the liberty of the
state of Nature. When any number of men have so con-
sented to make one community or government, they are
thereby presently incorporated, and_make one body politic,
wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the
rest.

96. For, when any number of men have, by the consent
of every individual, made a community, they have thereby
inade that community one body, with a power to act as one
body, which is only by the will and determination of the
majority. For that which acts any community, being only
thé consent of the individuals of it, and it being one body,
must move one way, it is necessary the body should move
that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the
consent of the majority, or else it is impossible it should
act or continue one body, one community, which the con-
sent of every individual that united into it agreed that it
should ; and so every one is bound by that consent to be
concluded by the majority. And therefore we see that
in assemblies empowered to act by positive laws where no
number is set by that positive law which empowers them,
the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and
of course determines as having, by the law of Nature and
reason, the power of the whole.

97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to
make one body politic under one government, puts himself
under an obligation to every one of that society to submit
to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded
by it ; or else this original compact, whereby he with others
incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be
no compact if he be left free and under no other ties than
he was in before in the state of Nature. For what appear-
ance would there be of any compact? What new engage-
ment if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the
society than he himself thought fit and did actually consent
to? This would be still as great a liberty as he himself had
before his compact, or any one else in the state of Nature,
who may submit himself and consent to any acts of it if he

thinks fit. es a4 aie!
g8. For if the consent of the majority shall not in reason
242 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every
individual ; nothing but the consent of every individual can
make anything to be thé act of the whole, which, consider-
ing the infirmities of health and avocations of business,
which in a number though much less than that of a
commonwealth, will necessarily keep many away from thé
public assembly ; and the variety of opinions and contrariety
of interests which unavoidably happen in all collections of
men, it is next impossible ever to be had. And, therefore,
if coming into society be upon such terms, it will be only
like Cato’s coming into the theatre, tantum ut exiret. Such
a constitution as this would make the mighty leviathan of.a
shorter duration than the feeblest creatures, and not let it
outlast the day it was born in, which cannot be supposed
till we can think that rational creatures should desire ard
constitute societies only to be dissolved. For where the
majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act
as one body, and consequently will be immediately dis-
solved agaih.

99. Whosoever, therefore, out of a state of Nature unite
into a community, tiust be understood to give up all the
power necéssary to the ends for which they unite intd
society to: the majority of the community, unless they ex-
pressly agreed in any number greater than the majority.
And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one
political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs
be, between the individuals that enter into or make up a
commonwealth. And thus, that which begins and actually
constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent
of any number of freemen capable of majority, to unite and
incorporate into such a society. And this is that; and that
only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful:
government in the world. ;

100. To this I find two objections made: 1. That there
are no instances to be found in story of a company of men,
independent and equal one amongst another, that met to-
gether, and in this way began and set up a government,
2. It is impossible of right that men should do so, because
all men, being born under government, they ate to submit
to that, and are not at liberty to begin a new one.

tor. To the first there is this to answer: That it is not
ZWOQ TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 243

at all to be wondered that history gives us but a yery little
account of men that lived together in the state of Nature.
The inconveniencies of that condition, and the love and
want of society, no sooner brought any number of them
together, but they presently united and incorporated if they
designed to continue together. Ald if we may not suppose
men ever to have been in the state of Nature, because we
hear not much of them in such a state, we may as well sup-
pose the armies of Salmanasser or Xerxes were never
‘children, because we hear little of them till they were men
and embodied in armies. Government is everywhere ante-
cedent to records, and letters seldom come in amongst a
people till.a long continuation of civil society has, by other
more necessary arts, provided for their safety, ease, and
jlenty. And then they begin to look after the history of
heir founders, and search into their original when they
have outlived the memory of it. For it is with common-
wealths as with particular persons, they are commonly
ignorant of their own births and infancies; and if they
know anything of it, they are beholding for it to the acci-
dental records that others have kept of it. And those that
we have of the beginning of any polities in the world,
excepting that of the Jews, where God Himself immediately
interposed, and which favours not at all paternal dominion ;
are all either plain instances of such a beginning as I have
mentioned, or at least have manifest footsteps of it, |
102. He must show a strange inclination to deny evident
matter of fact, when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who
will not allow that the beginning of Rome and Venice were
by the uniting together of several men, free and independent
one of another, amongst whom there was no natural superi-
ority or subjection. And if Josephus Acosta’s word may be
taken, he tells us that in many parts of America there was
no government at all. “ There are great and apparent con-
jectures,” says he, “that these men (speaking of those of
Peru) for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths,
but lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida—the Cheri-
quanas, those of Brazil, and many other nations, which have
no certain kings, but, as occasion is offered in peace or war,
they choose their captains as they please” (lib. 1. cap. 25).
If it be’said, that every man there was born subject to his
244 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

father, or the head of his family, that the subjection due
from a child to a father took not away his freedom of
uniting into what political society he thought fit, has been
already proved; but be that as it will, these men, it is
evident, were actually free ; and whatever superiority some
politicians now would place in any of them, they themselves
claimed it not; but, by consent, were all equal, till, by the
same consent, they set ea oe themselves. So that their
politic societies all began from a voluntary union, and the
mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice-of their
governors and forms of government.

103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta, with
Palantus, mentioned by Justin, will be allowed to have
been freemen independent one of another, and to have set
up a government over themselves by their own consent.
Thus I have given several examples out of history of people,
free and in the state of Nature, that, being met together,
incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if the want
of such instances be an argument to prove that government
were not nor could not be so begun, I suppose the contenders
for paternal empire were better let it alone than urge it
against natural liberty ; for if they can give so many instances
out of history of governments began upon paternal right, I
think (though at least an argument from what has been to
what should of right be of no great force) one mighty with-
out any great danger, yield them the cause. But if I might
advise them in the case, they would do well not to search
too much into the original of governments as they have
begun de facto, lest they should find at the foundation of
most of them something very little favourable to the design
they promote, and such a power as they contend for.

104. But, to conclude: reason being plain on our side
that men are naturally free; and the examples of history
showing that the governments of the world, that were begun
in peace, had their beginning laid on that foundation, and |
were made by the consent of the people ; there can be little
room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been
the opinion or practice of mankind about the first erecting
of governments.

105. I will not deny that if we look back, as far as history
will direct us, towards the original of commonwealths, we
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 245

shall generally find them under the government and adminis-
tration of one man. And I am also apt to believe that
where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself, and
continued entire together, without mixing with others, as it
often happens, where there is much land and few people,
the government commonly began in the father. For the
father having, by the law of Nature, the same power, with
every man el§e, to punish, as he thought fit, any offences
against that law, might thereby punish his transgressing
children, even when they were men, and out of their pupil-
age ; and they were very likely to submit to his punishment,
and all join with him against the offender in their turns,
giving him thereby power to execute his sentence against
any transgression, and so, in effect, make him the law-maker
and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his
family. He was fittest to be trusted; paternal affection
secured their property and interest under his care, and the
custom of obeying him in their childhood made it easier to
submit to him rather than any other. If, therefore, they
must have one to rule them, as government is hardly to be
avoided amongst men that live together, who so likely to be
_ the man as he that was their common father, unless negli-
gence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body, made
him unfit for it. But when either the father died, and left
his next heir—for want of age, wisdom, courage, or any other
qualities—less fit for rule, or where several families met and
consented to continue together, there, it is not to be doubted,
but they used their natural freedom to set up him whom they
judged the ablest and most likely to rule well over them.
Conformable hereunto we find the people of America, who—
living out of the reach of the conquering swords and spread-
ing domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico—
enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, ceteris paribus,
they commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king ; yet,
if they find him any way weak or incapable, they pass him
by, and set up the stoutest and bravest man for their ruler.
106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us
any account of peopling the world, and the history of nations,
we commonly find the goyernment to be in one hand, yet it
destroys not that which I affirm—viz, that the beginning
of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals
246 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

to join into and make one society, who, when they are thus
incorporated, might set up what form of government they
thought fit. But this having given occasion to men to mis-
take and think that, by Nature, government was monarchi-
cal, and belonged to the father, it may not be amiss here to
consider why people, in the beginning, generally pitched
upon this form, which, though perhaps the father’s pre-emi-
nency might, in the first institution of some commonwealths,
give a rise to and place in the beginning the power in one
hand ; yet it is plain that the reason that continued the form
of government in a single person was not any regard or
respect to paternal authority, since all petty monarchies—
that is, almost all monarchies, near their original, have been
commonly, at least upon occasion, elective.

107. First, then, in the beginning of things, the father’s
government of the childhood of those sprung from him
having accustomed them to the rule of one man, and taught
them that where it was exercised with care and skill, with
affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to pro-
cure and .preserve men (all the political happiness they
sought for in society), it was yo wonder that they should
pitch upon and naturally run into that form of government
which, from their infancy, they had been all accustomed to,
and which, by experience, they had found both easy and
safe. To which, if we add, that monarchy being simple and
most obvious to men, whom neither experience had instructed
in forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of
empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of pre-
rogative or the inconveniencies of absolute power, which
monarchy, in succession, was apt to lay claim to and bring
upon them ; it was not at all strange that they should not
much trouble themselves to think of methods of restraining
any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the
authority over them, and of balancing the power of govern-
ment by placing several parts of it in different hands.
They had neither felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion,
nor did the fashion of the age, nor their possessions or way
of living, which afforded little matter for covetousness or
ambition, give them any reason to apprehend or provide
against it; and, therefore, it is no wonder they put them-
selves into such a frame of government as was not only, as I
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 247

said, most obvious and simple, but also best suited to their
present state and condition, which stood more in need of
defence against foreign invasions and injuries than of multi-
plicity of laws where there was but very little property, and
waiited not variety of rulers and abundance of officers to
direct and look after their execution where there were but
few trespasses and few offenders. Since, thén, those who
liked one another so well as to join into society cannot but
be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship
together, and some trust one in another, they could not
but have greater apprehensions of others than of one
another; and, therefore, their first care and thought cannot
but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves against
foreign force. It was natural for them to put themselves
under a frame of government which might best serve to that
end, and choose the wisest and bravest man to condtict
them in their wars and lead them out against their enemies,
and in this chiefly be their ruler. ;

108. Thus we see that the kings of the Indians, in
America, which is still a pattern of the first akes in Asia
and Europe, whilst the inhabitants were too few for the
country, and want of people and money gave men_no temp-
tation to enlarge their possessions of land or céMtest for
wider éxtent of ground, are little more than generals of their
armies ; and though they conimand absolutely in war, yet at
home, and in time of peace, they exercise very little domi-
nion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty, the resolu-
tioiis of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people
or in a council, though the war itself, which admits not of
pluralities of governors, naturally devolves the command
into the king’s sole authority. ; ; :

109. Arid thus, in Israel itself, the chief business of their
judges and first kings seems to have been to be captains in
war and leaders of their armies, which (besides what is signi-
fied by “going out and in before the people,” which was,
to march forth to war and home again in the heads of their
forces), appears plainly in the story of Jephtha, The
Ammonites friaking war upon Israel, the Gileadites, in fear,
send to Jephtha, a bastard of their family, whom they had
cast off, anid article with him, if he will assist them against
the Afnmionites, to make him their ruler, which they do in
248 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

these words: ‘‘ And the people made him head and captain
over them” (Judges xi. 11), which was, as it seems, all one as
to be judge. ‘And he judged Israel” (Judges xii. 7)—that
is, was their captain-general—“ six years.” So when Jotham
upbraids the Shechemites with the obligation they had to
Gideon, who had been their judge and ruler, he tells them :
“ He fought for you, and adventured his life for, and deli-
vered you out of the hands of Midian” (Judges ix. 17).°
Nothing mentioned of him but what he did as a general,
and, indeed, that is all is found in his history, or in any of
the rest of the judges. And Abimelech particularly is called
king, though at most he was but their general. And when,
being weary of the ill-conduct of Samuel’s sons, the children
of Israel desired a king, “like all the nations, to judge them,
and to go out before them, and to fight their battles” (1 Sam.
viii. 20), God, granting their desire, says to Samuel, “I
will send thee a man, and thou shalt anoint him to be
captain over my people Israel, that he may save my people
out of the hands of the Philistines” (ix. 16). As if the
only business of a king had been to lead out their armies
and fight in their defence; and, accordingly, at his inaugu-
ration, pouring a vial of oil upon him, declares to Saul that
“the Lord had anointed him to be captain over his in-
heritance” (x. 1). And therefore those who, after Saul’s
being solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at
Mispah, weré unwilling to have him’ their’ king, make no
other objection but this, ‘‘ How shall this man save us?”
(v. 27), as if they should have said: “‘ This man is unfit to
be our king, not having skill and conduct enough in war to
be able to defend us.” And when God resolved to transfer
the government to David, it is in these words : .“ But now
thy kingdom shall not continue: the Lord hath sought him
a man after His own heart, and the Lord hath commanded’
him to be captain over His people” (xiii. 14). As if the
whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their
general ; and therefore the tribes who ‘had stuck to Saul’s
family, and opposed David’s reign, when they came to
Hebron with terms of submission to him, they tell him,
amongst other arguments, they had to submit to him as to
their king, that he was, in effect, their king in Saul’s time,
and therefore they had no reason but to receive him as
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 249

their king now. “Also,” say they, “in time past, when
Saul was king over us, thou wast he that leddest out and
broughtest in Israel, and the Lord said unto thee, Thou
cua ‘i my people Israel, and thou shalt be a captain over
srael.

110. Thus, whether a family, by degrees, grew up into a
commonwealth, and the fatherly authority being continued
on to the elder son, every one in his turn growing up under
it tacitly submitted to it, and the easiness and equality of it
not offending any one, every one acquiesced till time seemed
to have confirmed it and settled a right of succession by
prescription ; or whether several families, or the descendants
of several families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or business
brought together, united into society ; the need of a general
whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in
war, and the great confidence the innocence and sincerity
of that poor but virtuous age, such as are almost all those
which begin governments that ever come to last in the
world, gave men one of another, made the first beginners of
commonwealths generally put the rule into one man’s hand,
without any other express limitation or restraint but what
the nature of the thing and the end of government required.
It was given them for the public good and safety, and to
those ends, in the infancies of commonwealths, they com-
monly used it; and unless they had done so, young societies
could not have subsisted. Without such nursing fathers,
without this care of the governors, all governments would
have sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their
infancy, the prince and the people had soon perished
together. : os

-i11. But the golden age (though before vain ambition,
and amor sceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence had corrupted
men’s minds into a mistake of true power and honour) had
more virtue, and consequently better governors, as well as
less vicious subjects; and there was then no stretching
prerogative on the one side to oppress the people, nor,
consequently, on the other, any dispute about privilege, to
lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate ; and so no
contest betwixt rulers and people about governors or go-
vernment.* Yet, when ambition and luxury, in future ages,

* ‘At first, when some certain kind of regimen was once approved,
250 TWO TREATIS#“S OF GOVERNMENT.

would retain and increase the power, without doing the
business for which it was given, and aided by flattery, taught
princes to have distinct and separate interests from their-
people, men found it necessary to examine more carefully
the original and rights of government, and to find out ways
to restrain the exorbitances and prevent the abuses of that
power, which they having entrusted in another’s hands, gnly
for their own good, they found was made use of to hurt
them.

112. Thus we may see how probable it is that people
that were naturally free, and, by their own consent, either
submitted to the government of their father, or united
together, out of different families, to make a government,
should generally put the rule into one man’s hands, and

‘.choose to be under the conduct of a single person, without
so much, as by express conditions, limiting or regulating his
power, which they thought safe enough in his honesty and
prudence ; though they never dreamed of monarchy being
jure Divino, which we never heard of among mankind till
it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age, nor
ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion or
to be the foundation of all government. And thus much
may suffice to show that, as far as we have any light from
history, we have reason to conclude that all peaceful be-
ginnings of government have been laid in the consent of
the people. I say “ peaceful,” because I shall have occasion,
in another place, to speak of conquest, which some esteem
a way of beginning of governments.

The other objection, I find, urged against the beginning
of polities, in the way I have mentioned, is this, viz. :—

113. “That all men being born under government, some
or other, it is impossible any of them should ever be free
and at liberty to unite together and begin a new one, er

it may be nothing was then further thought upon for the manner of
governing, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which
were to rule till, by experience, they found this for all parts very incop-
venient, so as the thing which they had devised fora remedy did
indeed but increase the sore which it should-have cured. They saw
jat to live by one man’s will became the cause of all men’s misery.
This constrained them to come unto laws wherein all men might see
their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them.”

-~Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i, sect. 10. ue
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 28

ever be able'to erect a lawful government.” If this argu-

ment be good, I ask, How came so many lawful monarchies

into the world? For if anybody, upon this supposition, can

show me any one man, in any age of the world, free to begin

a lawful monarchy, I will be bound to show him ten other,
freé men at liberty, at the same time, to unite and begin
anew government under a regal or any other form. It being

demonstration that if any one born under the dominion of
another may be so free as to have a right to command

others in a new and distinct empire, every one that is born

under the dominion of another may be so free too, and may

become a ruler or subject of a distinct separate government.

And so, by this their own principle, either all men, however

born, are free, or else there is but one lawful prince, one

lawful government in the world; and then they have

nothing to do but barely to show us which that is, which,

when they have done, I doubt not but all mankind will

easily agree to pay obedience to him.

114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their objection
to show that it involves them in the same difficulties that it
doth those they use it against, yet I shall endeavour to
discover the weakness of this argument a little farther.

“All men,” say they, “dre born under government, and
therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one.
Every one is born a subject to his father or his prince, and
is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection and
allegiance.” It is plain mankind never owned nor con-
sidered any such natural subjection that they were born in,
to one or to the other, that tied them, without their own
consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs.

115. For there are no examples so frequent in history,
both sacred and profane, as those of men withdrawing
themselves and their obedience from the jurisdiction they
were born under, and the family or community they were
bred up in, and setting up new governments 1n other places,
from whence sprang all that number of petty common-
wealths in the beginning of ages, and which always multi-
plied as long as there was room enough, till the stronger
or more fortunate swallowed the weaker; and those great
ones, again breaking to pieces, dissolved into. lesser domi:
nions ; all which are so many testimonies against paternal
252 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

sovereignty, and plainly prove that it was not the natural
right of the father descending to his heirs that made go-
vernments in the beginning; since it was impossible, upon
that ground, there should have been so many little king-
doms but only one universal monarchy if men had not been
at liberty to separate themselves from their families and
their government, be it what it will that was set up in it,
and go and make distinct commonwealths and other go-
vernments as they thought fit.

116. This has been the practice of the world from its first
beginning to this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to
the freedom of mankind, that they are born under con-
stituted and ancient polities that have established laws and
set forms of government, than if they were born in the -
woods amongst the unconfined inhabitants that run loose in
them. For those who would persuade us that by being
born under any government we are naturally subjects to it,
and have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of
the state of Nature, have no other reason (bating that of
paternal power, which we have already answered) to pro-
duce for it, but only because our fathers or progenitors
passed away their natural liberty, and thereby bound up
themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to
the government which they themselves submitted to. It
is true that whatever engagements or promises any one made
for himself, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot
by any compact whatsoever bind his children or posterity.
For his son, when a man, being altogether as free as the
father, any act of the father can no more give away the
liberty of the son than it can of anybody else. He may, in-
deed, annex such conditions to the land he enjoyed, as a
subject of any commonwealth, as may oblige his son to be
of that community, if he will enjoy those possessions which
were his father’s, because that estate being his father’s pro-
perty, he may dispose or settle it as he pleases.

117. And this has generally given the occasion to the
mistake in this matter ; because cornmonwealths not per-
mitting any part of their dominions to be dismembered, nor
to be enjoyed by any but those of their community, the son
cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father but
under the same terms his father did, by becoming a member
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 253

of the society, whereby he puts himself presently under
the government he finds there established, as much as any
other subject of that commonweal. And thus the consent
of free men, born under government, which only makes
them members of it, being given separately in their turns, as
each comes to be of age, and not in a multitude together,
people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all,
-Or not necessary, conclude they are naturally subjects as
they are men. r

118. But it is plain governments themselves understand it
otherwise ; they claim no power over the son, because of that
they had over the father; nor look on children as being
their subjects, by their fathers being so. If a subject of
England have a child by an Englishwoman in France,
whose subject is he? Not the King of England’s; for he
must have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it.
Nor the King of France’s, for how then has his father a
liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleases; and
whoever was judged as a traitor or deserter, if he left, or
warred against a country, for being barely born in it of
parents that were aliens there? It is plain, then, by the
practice of governments themselves, as well as by the law
of right reason, that a child is born a subject of no country
nor government. He is under his- father’s tuition and
authority till he come to age of discretion, and then he is a
free man, at liberty what government he will put himself
under, what body politic he will unite himself to. For if
an Englishman’s son born in France be at liberty, and may
do so, it is evident there is no tie upon him by his father
being a subject of that kingdom, nor is he bound up by
any compact of his ancestors; and why then hath not his
son, by the same reason, the same liberty, though he be
born anywhere els Since the power that a father hath
naturally over his children is the same wherever they be
born, and the ties of natural obligations are not bounded
by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths.

11g. Every man being, as has been showed, naturally
free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection to
any earthly power, but only his own consent, it is to be
considered what shall be understood to be a sufficient
‘declaration of a man’s consent to. make him subject to the
ae4 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

laws of any government. There is 4 common distinction of
an exptéess and a tacit consent, which. will concern our
present case. Nobody doubts but an express consent of
any man, entering into any society, makes him a perfect
member of that society, a subject of that government.
The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit
consent, and how far it binds—ze., how far any oné shall be
looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any
government, where he has made no expressions of it at all.
And to this I say, that every man that hath any possession
or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any govern-
ment doth hereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth
obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during
such enjoyment, as any one under it, whether this his
possession be of land to him and his heirs for ever, or a
lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling
freely on the highway; and, in effect, it reaches as far as
the very being of any one within the territories of that
government.

120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider
that every man when he at first incorporates himself into
any commonwealth, he, by his uniting himself thereunto,
annexed also, and submits to the community those pos-
sessions which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already
belong to any other government. For it would be a diréct
contradiction for any one to enter into society with others
for the securing and regulating of property, and yet to sup-
pose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws
of the society, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of
that government to which he himself, and the property of
the land, is a subject. By the same act, therefore, whereby

_ any one unites his person, which was before’ free, to any

commonwealth, by the same he unites his possessions,
which were before free, to it also; and they become, both
of them, person and possession, subject to the government
and dominion of that commonwealth as long as it hath a
being. Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inherit-
ance, purchases permission, or otherwise enjoys any part of
the land so annexed to, and under the government of that -
commonweal, inust take it with the cotidition it is under—
that is, of submitting to the government of the common-
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 255

wealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any
subject of it.

12i. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction
only over the land and reaches the possessor of it (before
he has actually incorporated himself in the society) only as
he dwells upon and enjoys that, the obligation any one
is under by virtue of such enjoyment to submit to the
government begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that
whenever the owner, who has given nothing but sucha
tacit consent to the government will, by donation, sale or
otherwise, quit the said possession. He is at liberty to go
and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth, or
agree with others to begin a new one zm vacuis /ocis, in any
part of the world they can find free and unpossessed ;
whereas he that has once, by actual agreement and any
express declaration, given his consent to be of any com-
monweal, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be,
and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be
again in the liberty of the state of Nature, unless by any
calamity the government he was under comes to be diss
solved. :

122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living
quietly and enjoying privileges and protection under them,
makes not a man a member of that society; it is onlya
local protection and homage due to and from all those who,
not being in a state of war, come within the territories
belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force
of its law extends. But this no more makes a man a
member of that society, a perpetual subject of that com-
monwealth, than it would make a man a subject to another
in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some
time, though, whilst he continued in it, he were obliged to
comply with the laws and submit to the government he
found there. And thus we see that foreigners, by living all
‘their lives under another government, and enjoying the
privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even
in conscience, to submit to its scene as far forth
as any denizen, yet do not thereby come to Be subjects or
members of that commonwealth. Nothing can make any
man so, but his actually entering into it by positive engage-
ment and express ‘promise and compact, This is that
256 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

which, I think, concerning the beginning of political socie-
ties, and that consent which makes any one a member of
any commonwealth.

 

CHAPTER IX.
Of the Ends of Political Society and Government.

123. Ir man in. the state of Nature be so free as has’
been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and
possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody,
why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject
himself to the dominion and control of any other power?
To which it is obvious to answer, thatfthough in the state
of Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is
very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of
others ; for all being kings as much as he, every man his
equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and

_ justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state
is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to
quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears and

‘continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he
seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who
are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call

by the general name—property. ora,

124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting
into commonwealths, and putting themselves under govern-
ment, is the preservation of their property; to which in
the state of Nature there are many things wanting.

Firstly, There wants an established, settled, known law,
received and allowed by common consent to be the standard
of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all
controversies between them. For though the law of Nature
be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men,
being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 257

of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to
them in the application of it to their particular cases.

125. Secondly: in the state of Nature there wants a known
and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differ-
ences according’to the established law. For every one in
that state being both judge and executioner of the law of
Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and re-
venge 1s very apt to carry them too far, and with too much
heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and uncon-
cernedness, make them too remiss in other men’s.

-126. Thirdly: in the state of Nature there often wants
power to back and support the sentence when right, and to
give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended
will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good
their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the
punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those
who attempt it.

127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of
the state of Nature, being but in an ill condition while they
remain in it are quickly driven into society. Hence it
comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live
any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that
they are therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain
exercise of the power every man has of punishing the trans-
gressions of others, make them take sanctuary under. the
established laws of government, and therein seek the pre-
servation of their property. It is this makes them so will-
ingly give up every one his single power of punishing to be
exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it amongst
them, and by such rules as the community, or those autho-
rized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this
we have the original night and rise of both the legislative
and executive power as well as of the governments and
societies themselves.

128. For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he
has of innocent delights, a man has two powers. The first
is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of
himself and others within the permission of the law of
Nature ; by which law, cominon to them all, he and all the
rest of mankind are one community, make up_one society
distinct from all other creatures, and were it not for the

corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, ee would
258 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

be no need of any other, no necessity that men should
separate from this great and natural community, and asso-
ciate into lesser combinations. The other power a man has
in the state of Nature is the power to punish the crimes
committed against that law. Both these he gives up when’
he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular

political society, and incorporates into any ‘commonwealth
separate from the rest of mankind.

129. The first power—viz., of doing whatsoever he
thought fit for the preservation of himself and the rest of
mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the
society, so far forth as the preservation of himself and the
rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society
in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of
Nature,

130. Secondly. The power of punishing he wholly gives
up, and engages his natural force, which he might before
employ in the execution of the law of Nature, by his own
single authority,as he thought fit, to assist the executive
power of the society as the law thereof shall require. For
being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many con-
veniencies from the labour, assistance, and society of others
in the same community, as well as protection from its whole
strength, he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty,
in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety
of the society shall require, which is not only necessary but
just, since the other members of the society do the like.

131. But though men when they enter into society give
up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the’
state of Nature into the hands of the society, to be so far
disposed of by the legislative as the good of the society shall
require, yet it being only with an intention in every one
the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property (for
no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition
with an intention to be worse), the power of the society or
legislative constituted by them can never be supposed to ex-
tend farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure
every one’s property by providing against those three defects
above mentioned that made the state of Nature so unsafe
; and uneasy. And so, whoever has the legislative or supreme
power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by
established standing laws, promulgated and known to the
TWO TREATISES UF GOVERNMENT. 289

people, and not by extemporary decrees, by indifferent and
upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those
laws ; and to. employ the force of the community at home
only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or
redress foreign injuries and secure the community from in-
roads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no
other end but the peace, safety, and public good of the
people:

 

CHAPTER X.
Of the Forms of a Commonwealth,

132. The majority having, as has been showed, upon
men’s first uniting into society, the whole power of the
community naturally in them, may employ all that power in
making laws for the community from time to time, and
executing those laws by officers of their own appointing,
and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy ;
or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of
a few select men, and their heirs or successors, and then
it is an oligarchy; or else into the hands of one man, and
then it is a monarchy; if to him and his heirs, it is a
hereditary monarchy ; if to him only for life, but upon his
death the power only of nominating a successor, to return to
them, an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these
make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they
think good. And if the legislative power be at first given
by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives,
or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert
to them again, when it is so reverted the community may
dispose of it agaifi anew into what hands they please, and
so constitute a new form of government; fot the form
of government dépending upon the placing the supreme
power, which is the legislative; it being impossible to con-
ceive that an inferidf power should pres¢ribe to a superior,
or any but the supreme make laws, according as the power
of making laws is placed, such is’ the form of the common-

wealth.
12
260 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

133. By “commonwealth” I must be understood all
along to mean not a democracy, or any form of govern-
ment, but any independent. community which the Latins
signified by the word «tas, to which the word which
best answers in our language is “ commonwealth,” and most
properly expresses such a society of men which “ commu-
nity” does not (for there may be subordinate communities
in a government), and “city” much less. And therefore, to
avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the word “ common-
wealth” in that sense, in which sense I find the word used
by King James himself, which I think to be its genuine
signification, which, if anybody dislike, I consent with him
to change it for a better.

CHAPTER XI.
Of the Extent of the Legislative Power.

134. THE great end of men’s entering into society being
the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and
the great instrument and means of that being the laws

‘established in that society, the first and fundamental
| positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the
\legislative power, as the first and fundamental natural law
‘which is to govern even the legislative.y Itself is the preser-
vation of the society and (as far as will consist with the public
good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the
isupreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and un-
alterable in the hands where the community have once
placed it. Nor can any edict of anybody else, in what
form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed,
have the force and obligation of a law which has not its
sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen
and appointed ; for without this the law could not have that
which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent
of the society, over whom nobody can have a power to
make laws* but by their own consent and by authority
* “The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic

societies of men, belonging so properly unto the same entire societies,
‘that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 261

received from them; and therefore all the obedience,
which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to
pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and
is directed by those laws which it enacts. Nor can any
oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic
subordinate power, discharge any member of the society
from his obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to
their trust, nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the
laws so enacted or farther than they do allow, it being
ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey
any power in the society which is not the supreme.

135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or
more, whether it be always in being or only by intervals,
though it be the supreme power in every commonwealth ;
yet, first, it is not, nor can possibly be, absolutely arbjtrary
over the lives and fortunes of the people. For it being but)’
the joint power of every member of the society given up to
that person or assembly which is legislator, it can be no
more than those persons had in a state of Nature before
they entered into society, and gave it up to the community.
For nobody can transfer to another more power than he has!
in himself, and nobody-has an absolute arbitrary power
over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, =)

 

take away the life or property of another. A man, as has
been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power
of another ; and having, in the state of Nature, no arbitrary
power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but
only so much as the law of Nature gave him for the preser-
vation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all he
doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the

exercise the same of himself, and not by express commission imme-
diately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived
at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it
is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not, therefore, which
public approbation hath not made so.”—Hooker, Eccl. Pol., lib. i.,
sect. 10. ‘‘Of this point, therefore, we are to note that such men
naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politic mul-
titudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent we could in such
sort be at no man’s commandment living. And to be commanded, we
do consent when that society, whereof we be a part, hath at any time
before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal
agreement. : :

‘‘ Laws therefore human, of what kind soever, are available by con-
sent.” —Hooker Eccl, Fol.
263 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more!
ithan this, Their power in the tftmost bounds of it is|
limited to the public good of thé society.* Itis a power
| that hath no other end biit preservation, and therefore can
‘never have a right to destroy, efislave, of designedly to
impoverish the subjects; the obligations of the law of
| Nature cease not in society, but only in many cases até
drawn éloser, arid have, by human laws, known /penalties
annexed to them to enforce their observation. /Thus the
| law of Nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legis-
| lators as well as others.’ ‘The rules that they make for.
' other men’s actions must, as well as their owfi and other
} men’s actions, be conforriable to the law of Nature—z.c., to
the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the
fundamental law of Nature being the preservation of mans
kind, rio human sanction can be good or valid against it._/
136. Secondly, the legislative or supreme authority can-
not asstime to itself a power to rule by extemporary
arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice and
decide the rights of the subject: by promulgated standing
laws, ft and known authorized judges. For the law of Nature
being unwritten, and so néwhete to be found but in the

 

* “Two foundations there are which bear up public societies ; the
one a natural inclination whereby all men desire sociable life and fellow-
ship ; the other an order, expressly or secretly agréed upon, touching
the manner of their union in living together. The latter is that which
we call the law of a commonweal, the very soul of a politic body,
the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on work
in such actions as the common good requireth. Laws politic, ordained
for external order and regimen amongst men, are never framed as they
should be, unless présitming’ thé will of man to be inwardly obstinate,
rebellious, and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his
fhatuté { in 4 word, unless presuniing man to be in regard of his des
praved mind, little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide
notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that they be no hind«
tance unto the common good, for which societies are instituted. Unless
they do this they are not perfect.’—Hooker, Eccl. Pol., lib. i,
sect. ro.

+ “Human laws are measures in respect of men.whose actions they
must direct, howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher
rules to be measured by, which rules aré two—the law of God and the
‘Taw of Nature ; so that laws himan must be made according to the
general! laws of Nature, arid without contradiction to any positive law of
Scripture, otherwise they are ill made.”—Jéid., lib. iii., sect. 9.

“To éonstrain men to anythitg inconvenient doth seem unreason-
able.” —/éid., lib, i, sect. 10,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 463

minds of men, they who, through passion or interest, shall
miscite or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their
mistake where there is no established judge; and so it
serves not as it ought, to determine the rights and fence the
properties of those that live under it, especially where
every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too,
and that in his own case; and he that has right on his side,
having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force
enough to defend himself from injuries or punish delin-
quents. To avoid these inconveniencies which disorder
men’s properties in the state of Nature, men unite into
societies that they may have the united strength of the
whole society to secure and defend their properties, and
may have standing rules to bound it by which every one
may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up
all their natural power to the society they enter into, and
the community put the legislative power into such hands as
they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed
by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property
will still be at the same uncertainty as it was in the state of
Nature.

137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without
settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with ‘the
ends of society and government, which men would not quit
the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves
up under were it not to preserve their lives, liberties, and
fortunes ; and by stated rules of right and property to
secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that
they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give any
one or more an absolute arbitrary power over their persons
and estates, and put a force into the magistrate’s hand to
execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them ; this were
to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of
Nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right
against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms
of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man or
many in combination. Whereas by supposing they have
given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and
will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and

.armed him to make a prey of them when he pleases; he
being in a much worse condition that is exposed to the
arbitrary power of one man who has the command of a

ae
' 264 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

hundred thousand than he that is exposed to the arbitrary
power of a hundred thousand single men, nobody being
secure, that his will who has such a command is better than
that of other men, though his force be a hundred thou-
sand «times stronger. And, therefore, whatever form the
commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern
by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dic-
tates and undetermined resolutions, for then mankind will
be in a far worse condition than in the state of Nature if
they shall have armed one or a few men with the joint
power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the
exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts,
or unrestrained, and till that moment, unknown wills, with-
out having any measures set down which may guide and
justify their actions. For all the power the government
has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought
not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be
exercised by established and promulgated laws, that both
the people may kriow their duty, and be safe and secure
within the limits of the law, and the rulers, too, kept
within their due bounds, and not be tempted by the power
they have in their hands to employ it to purposes, and by
such measures as they would not have. known, and own not
willingly. age.

138. Thirdly, the supreme power not take from any
man any part of his property without his own consent. \For
€ preservation of property being the end Of government,

and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily
supposes and requires that the people should have pro-
perty, without which they must be supposed to lose that by
entering into society, which was the end for which they
entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to
‘own.\ Men, therefore, in society having property, they
have such a right to the goods, which by ‘the law of the
community are theirs, that nobody hath a right to ‘take
them, or any part of them, from them without their own
consent ; without this they have no property at all. For I
have truly no property in that which another can by right
take from me when he pleases against my consent. Hence’
it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative
power of any commonwealth can do what it will, and dis-
pose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any

  
   
  
  
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 265

part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in
governments where the legislative consists wholly or in part
in assemblies which are variable, whose members upon the
dissolution of the assembly are subjects under the common
laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in govern-
ments where the legislative is in one lasting assembly,
always in being or in one man as in absolute monarchies,
there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have
a distinct interest from the rest of the community, and so
will be apt to increase their own riches and power by taking
what they think fit from the people. For a man’s property
is not at all secure, though there be good and equitable
laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow-
subjects, if he who commands those subjects have power
to take from any private man what part he pleases of his
property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.

139. But government into whosesoever hands it is put,
being as I have before showed, entrusted with this condition,
and for this end, that men might have and secure their
properties, the prince or senate, however it may have power
to make laws for the regulating of property between
the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have
a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the

~ subjects’ property, without their own consent; for this

would be in effect to leave them no property at all. And to
let us see that even absolute power, where it is necessary,
is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited by that
reason, and confined to those ends which required it in
some cases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the
common practice of martial discipline. For the preserva-
tion of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, re-
quires an absolute obedience to the command of every
superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute
the most dangerous or unreasonable of them ; but yet we
see that neither the serjeant that could command a soldier
to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach
where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier
to give him one penny of his money ; nor the general that
can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or
not obeying the most desperate orders, cannot yet with all
his absolute power of life and death dispose of one farthing
of that soldier’s estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom
266 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

yet he can command anything, and hang for the least
disobedience. Because such a blind obedience is necessary
to that end for which the commander has his power—viz.,
the preservation of the rest, but the disposing of his goods
has nothing to do with it.

140. It is true governments cannot be supported without
great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of
the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for

-the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own

consent—ze., the consent of the majority, giving tt either by
themselves or their representatives chosen by them ; for if
any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on
the people by his own authority, and without such consent
of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law
of property, and subverts the end of government. For
what property have I in that which another may by right
take when he pleases to himself ?

141. Fourthly. The legislative cannot transfer the power
of making laws to any other hands, for it being but a dele-
gated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass
it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form
of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legis-
lative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And
when the people have said, “We will submit, and be
governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms,”
nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them;
nor can they be bound by any laws but such as are enacted
by those whom they have chosen and authorized to make
laws for them. : :

142, These are the bounds which the trust that is put in
them by the society and the law of God and Nature have
set to the legislative power of every commonwealth, in all
forms of government. First: They are to govern by
promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular
cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the
favourite at Court, and the countrymanat plough. Secondly :
These laws also ought fo be designed for no other end.
ultimately but the good of the people. Thirdly: They
must not raise taxes on the propetty of the people without
the consent of the people given by themselves or their
deputies. And this properly concerns only such govern-
ments where the legislative is always in being, or at least
.

TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 267

where the people have not reserved any part of the legis-
lative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by them-
selves, Fourthly: Legislative neither must nor can transfer
the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it any-
where but where the people have.

 

CHAPTER XII.

Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the
Commonwealth.

143. THE legislative power is that which has a right to

direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed :

for preserving the community and the members of it.
Because those laws which are constantly to be executed, and
whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little
time ; therefore there is no need that the legislative should
be always in being, not having always business to do. And
because it may be too great temptation to human frailty,

apt to grasp at power, for the same persons who have the.

power of making laws to have also in their hands the power
to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves
from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law,
both in its making and execution, to their own private
advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest
from the rest of the community, contrary to the end
of society and government. Therefore in well-ordered
commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so con-
sidergd as it ought, the legislative power is put into the
hands of divers persons who, duly assembled, have by
themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws,
which when they have done, being separated again, they are
themselves subject to the laws they have made ; which is a
new and near tie upon them to take care that they make
them for the public good.

144. But because the laws that are at once, and in
a short time made, have a constant and lasting force, and
need a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto,
therefore it is necessary there should be a power always in
being which should see to the execution of the laws that are
268 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and
executive power come often to be separated.

145. There is another power in every commonwealth
which one may call natural, because it is that which
answers to the power every man naturally had before he
entered into society. For though in a commonwealth the
members of it are distinct persons, still, in reference to one
another, and, as such, are governed by the laws of the
society, yet, in reference to the rest of mankind, they make
one body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in
the state of Nature with the rest of mankind, so that the
controversies that happen between any man of the society
with those that are out of it are managed. by the public, and
an injury done to a member of their body engages the whole
in the reparation of it. So that under this consideration the
whole community is one body in the state of Nature in
respect of all other states or persons out of its community.

146. This, therefore, contains the power of war and
peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all
persons and communities without the commonwealth, and
may be called federative if any one pleases. So the thing
be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.

147. These two powers, executive and federative, though
they be really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending
the execution of the municipal laws of the society within
itself upon all that are parts of it, the other the management
of the security and interest of the public without with all
those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they
are always almost united. And though this federative power
in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to
the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be
directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws than the
executive, and so must necessarily be left to the prudence
and wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for
the public good. For the laws that concern subjetts one
amongst another, being to direct their actions, may well
enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference
to foreigners depending much upon their actions, and the
variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part
to the prudence of those who have this power committed to-
them to be managed by the best of their skill for the ad-
vantage of the commonwealth.
IWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 269

148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative
power of every community be really distinct in themselves,
yet they are hardly to be separated and placed at the same
time in the hands of distinct persons. For both of them
requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is
almost impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth
in distinct and not subordinate hands, or that the executive
and federative power should be placed in persons that might
act separately, whereby the force of the public would be
under different commands, which would be apt some time or
other to cause disorder and ruin. ‘

x

CHAPTER XIII.
Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth.

149. THOUGH in a constituted commonwealth standing
upon its own basis and acting according to its own nature—
that is, acting for the preservation of the community, there
can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to
which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the legis-
lative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends,
there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove
or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act
contrary to the trust reposed in them. For all power given

‘with trust for the attaining an end being limited by that end

’

whenever that end is manifestly neglected or opposed, the
trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve
into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew
where they shall think best for their safety and security.
And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme
power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of
anybody, even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so
foolish or so wickéd as to lay and carry on designs against
the liberties and properties of the subject. For no man or
society of men having a power to deliver up their preserva-
ion, or consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and
arbitrary dominion of another, whenever any one shall go
about to bring them into such a slavish condition, they will

‘
270 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

always have a right to preserve what they have not a power
to part with, and to rid themselves of those who invade this
fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-preservation
for which they entered into society. And thus the community
may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power,
but not as considered under any form of government,
because this power of the people can never take place till
the government be dissolved. . :

150. In all cases whilst the government subsists, the

: legislative is the supreme power. For what can give laws to
another must needs be superior to him, and. since the
legislative is no otherwise legislative of the society but by the
right it has to make laws for all the parts, and every member
of the society prescribing rules to their actions, and giving
power of execution where they are transgressed, the legisla-
tive must needs be the supreme, and all other powers in any
members or parts of the society derived ffom and subordinate
to it.

151. In some commonwealths where the legislative is not
always in being, and the executive is vested in a single
person who has also a share in the legislative, there that
single person, in a very tolerable sense, may also be called
supreme ; not that he has in himself all the supreme power,
which is that of law-making, but because he has in him the
supreme execution from whom all inferior magistrates derive
all their several subordinate pqwers, or, at least, the greatest
part of them; having also no legislative superior to him,
there being no law to be made without his consent, which
eannot be expected should ever subject him to the other
part of the legislative, he is properly enough in this sense
supreme. But yet it is to be observed that though oaths of
allegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as
supreme legislator, but as supreme executor of the law made
by a joint power of him with others, allegiance being nothing
‘but an obedience according to law, which, when he violates,
he has no right to obedience, nor can claim it otherwise
than as the public person vested with the power of the law,
and so is to be consideyed as the image, phantom, or
representative of the commonwealth, acted by the wyjl of the
society declared in its laws, and thus he has no will, no
power, but that of the law. But when he quits this
representation, this public wijl, and acts by his own private
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 241

will, he degrades himself, and is but a single private person
without power and without will; the members owing no
obedience but to the public will of the society.

152. The executive power placed anywhere but in a
person that has also a share in the legislative is visibly
subordinate and accountable to it, and may be at pleasure
changed and displaced ; so that it is not the supreme execu-
tive power that is exempt from subordination, but the
supreme executive power vested in one, who having a share
in the legislative, has no distinct superior legislative to be
subordinate and accountable to, farther than he himself
shall join and consent, so that he is no more subordinate
than he himself shall think fit, which one may certainly
conclude will be but very little. Of other ministerial and
subordinate powers in a commonwealth we need not speak,
they being so multiplied with infinite variety in the different
customs and constitutions of distinct commonwealths, that
it is impossible to give a particular account of them all.
‘Only thus much which is necessary to our present purpose
wé may take notice of concerning them, that they have no
manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by
positive grant and commission delegated to them, and are
all of them accountable to some other power in the common-
wealth. :

153. It is not necessary—no, nor so much as convenient—

.. that the legislative should be always in being; but abso-
' Jutely necessary that the executive power should, because
there is ‘not always need of new laws to be made, but always
‘need of execution of the laws that are made. When the
legislative hath put the execution of the laws they make into
other hands, they have a power still to resume it out of those
hands when they find cause, and to punish for any mal-
administration against the laws. The same holds also in
“regard of the federative power, that and the executive being
both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative, which, as
has been showed, in a constituted commonwealth is the
supreme, the legislative also in this case being supposed

to consist of several persons ; for if it be a single person it
cannot but be always in being, and so will, as supreme, na-
turally have the supreme executive power, together with the
legislative, may assemble and exercise their legislative at the
times that either their original constitution or their own
272 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

adjournment appoints, or when they please, if neither of
these hath appointed any time, or there be no other way
prescribed to convoke them. For the supreme power being
‘placed in them by the people, it is always in them, and they
may exercise it when they please, unless by their original ’
constitution they are limited to certain seasons, or by an act
of their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain
time, and when that time comes they have a right to assemble
and act again.

154. If the legislative, or any part of it, be of represen-
tatives, chosen for that time by the people, which afterwards
return into the ordinary state of subjects, and have no share
in the legislature but upon a new choice, this power of
choosing must also be exercised by the people, either at cer-
tain appointed seasons, or else when they are summoned to
it; and, in this latter case, the power of convoking the legis-
lative is ordinarily placed in the executive, and has one of
these two limitations in respect of time :—that either the
original constitution requires their assembling and acting at
certain intervals ; and then the executive power does nothing
but ministerially issue directions for their electing and as-
sembling according to due forms ; or else it is left to his
prudence to call them by new elections when the occasions °
or exigencies of the public require the amendment of old
or making of new laws, or the redress or prevention of any
inconveniencies that lie on or threaten the people.

155. It may be demanded here, what if the executive
power, being possessed of the force of the commonwealth,
shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting
of the legislative, when the original constitution or the public
exigencies require it? I say, using force upon the people,
without authority, and contrary to the trust put in him that
does so, is a state of war with the people, who have a right
to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their power.
For having erected a legislative with an intent they should
exercise the power of making laws, either at certain set
times, or when there is need of it, when they are hindered
by any force from what is so necessary to the society, and
wherein the safety and preservation of the people consists,
the people have a right to remove it by force. In all states
and conditions the true remedy of force without authority
is to oppose force to it. The use of force without authority
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 273

always puts him that uses it into a state of war as the
aggressor, and renders him liable to be treated accordingly.

156. The power of assembling and dismissing the legis-
lative, placed in the executive, gives not the executive a
superiority over it, but is a fiduciary trust placed in him for
the safety of the people in a case where the uncertainty and
variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady fixed
tule. For it not being possible that the first framers of the
government should by any foresight be so much masters of
future events as to be able to prefix so just periods of return
and duration to the assemblies of the legislative, in all times
to come, that might exactly answer all the exigencies of the
commonwealth, the best remedy could be found for this de-
fect was to trust this to the prudence of one who was always
to be present, and whose business it was to watch over the
public good. Constant, frequent meetings of the legislative,
and long continuations of their assemblies, without necessary
occasion, could not but be burdensome to the people, and
must necessarily in time produce more dangerous incon-
veniencies, and yet the quick turn of affairs might be some-
times such as to need their present help ; any delay of their
convening might endanger the public; and sometimes, too,
their business might be so great that the limited time of their
sitting might be too short for their work, and rob the public
of that benefit which could be had only from their mature
deliberation. What, then, could be done in this case to pre-
vent the community from being exposed some time or other
to imminent hazard on one side or the other, by fixed intervals
and periods set to the meeting and acting of the legislative,
but to entrust it to the prudence of some who, being present
‘and acquainted with the state of public affairs, might make
use of this prerogative for the public good? And where else
could this be so well placed as in his hands who was entrusted
with the execution of the laws for the same end? Thus,
supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and
sitting of the legislative not settled by the original constitution,
it naturally fell into the hands of the executive ; not as an
arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure, but with this
trust always to have it exercised only for the public weal, as
the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require.
Whether settled periods of their convening, or a liberty left
to the prince for convoking the legislative, or perhaps a mix-
244 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

ture of both, hath the least inconvenience attending it, it is
not my business here to inquire, but only to show that, thougli
the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking
and’ dissolving such conventions of the legislative, yet it is
not thereby superior to it.

157. Things of this world are in so constant a flux that
nothing remains long in the same state. Thus people,
riches, trade, power, change their stations; flourishing
mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in time neglected
desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented places grow into
populous countries filled with wealth and inhabitants. But
things not always changing equally, and private interest
often keeping up customs and privileges when the reasons
of them are ceased, it often comes to pass that in govern-
ments where part of the legislative consists of representatives
chosen by the people, that in tract of time, this representa:
tion becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the
reasons it was at first established upon. To what gross
absurdities the following of custom when reason has left it
may lead, we may be satisfied when we see the bare name
of a town, of which there remains not so much as the ruins,
where scarce so much housing as a sheepcote, or more in-
habitants than a shepherd is to be found, send as many»
penal to the grand a of law-makers as a
whole county numerous in people and powerful in riches.
This strangers stand amazed at, and every one must cotifess
needs a remedy; though most think it hard to find one
because the constitution of the legislative beiig the original
and supreme act of the society, antecedent to all positive
laws in it, and depending wholly on the people, no inferior
power can alter it. And, therefore, the people when the
legislative is once constituted, having in such a government
as we have been speaking of, no power to act as long as the
government stands, this inconvenience is thought incapable
of a remedy.

158. Salus-populi suprema léx is certainly so just and
fundamental a rule, that he who sincerely follows it can-
not dangerously err. If, therefore, the executive who has
the power of convoking the legislative, observing tather
the true pepe than fashion of representation, repulates
not by old custom, but true reason, the number of members
in all places, that have a right to be distinctly represented,
TWQ TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.  245'

which no part of the people, however incorporated, can
pretend to, but in proportion to the assistance which it
affords to the public, it cannot be judged to have set up a
new legislative, but to have restored the old and true one,
and to have rectified the disorders which succession of time
had insensibly as well as inevitably introduced ; for it being
. the interest as well as intention of the people to have a fair
and equal representative, whoever brings it nearest to that
is an undoubted friend to and establisher of the goyern-
ment, and cannot miss the consent and approbation of the
community; prerogative being nothing but a power in the
hands of the prince to provide for the public good in such
cases which, depending upon unforeseen and uncertain
occurrences, certain and unalterable laws could not safely
direct. Whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good
of the people, and establishing the government upon its true
foundations is, and always will be, just prerogative. The
power of erecting new corporations, and therewith new
representatives, carries with it a supposition that in time the
measures of representation might yary, and those have a just
right to be represented which before had none; and by the
same reason, those cease to have a right, and be too incon-
siderable for such a privilege which before had it. It is not
a change from the present state which, perhaps, corruption
or decay has introduced, that makes an inroad upon the
government, but the tendency of it to injure or oppress the
people, and to set up one part or party with a distinction
from. and an unequal subjection of the rest. Whatsoever
cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the
society and people in general, upon just and _ lasting
measures, will always, when done, justify itself ; and when-
ever the people shall choose their representatives upon just
and undeniably equal measures, suitable to the original
frame of the government, it cannot be doubted to be the
will and act of the society, whoever permitted or proposed

to them so to do.

 
276 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER XIV.

> Of Prerogative.

159. WHERE the legislative and executive power are in
distinct hands, as they are in all moderated monarchies and
well-framed governments, there the good of the society
requires that several things should be left to the discretion
of hirn that has the executive power. For the legislators
not being able to foresee and provide by laws for all that
may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws,
having the power in his hands, has by the common law of
Nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society,
in many cases where the municipal law has given no direc-
tion, till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to
provide for it ; nay, many things there are which the law can
by.no means provide for, and those must necessarily be left
to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his
hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and
advantage shall require; nay, it is fit that the laws them-
selves should in some cases give way to the executive
power, or rather to this fundamental law of Nature and
government—-viz., that as much as may be all the members
of the society are to be preserved. For since many acci-.
dents may happen wherein a strict and rigid observation of
the laws may do harm, as not to pull down an innocent
man’s house to stop the fire when the next to it is burning;
and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the
law which makes no distinction of persons, by an action
that may deserve reward and pardon; it is fit the ruler
should have a power in many cases to mitigate the severity
of the law, and pardon some offenders, since the end of
government being the preservation of all as much as may
be, even the guilty are to be spared where it can prove no
prejudice to the innocent.

160. This power to act according to discretion for the
public good, without the prescription of the law and some-
times even against it, is that which is called ‘prerogative ;
for since in some governments the law making power is not
always in being and is usually too numerous, and so too
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 277

slow for the dispatch requisite to execution, and because,
also, it is impossible to foresee and so by laws to provide
for all accidents and necessities that may concern the public,
or make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed
with an inflexible rigour on all occasions and upon all
persons that may come in their way, therefore there is a
latitude left to the executive power to do many things of
choice which the laws do not prescribe.

161. This power, whilst employed for the benefit of the
community and suitably to the trust and ends of the go-
vernment, is undoubted prerogative, and never is questioned.
For the people are very seldom or never scrupulous or nice
in the point or questioning of prerogative whilst it is in any
tolerable degree employed for the use it was meant—that
is, the good of the people, and not manifestly against it.
But if there comes to be a question between the executive
power and the people about a thing claimed as a pre-
rogative, the tendency of-the exercise of such prerogative,
to the good or hurt of the people, will easily decide that
question. ;

162. It is easy to conceive that in the infancy of govern-
ments, when commonwealths differed little from families in
number of people, they differed from them too but little in
number of laws ; and the governors being as the fathers of
them, watching over them for their good, the government
was almost all prerogative. A few established laws served
the turn, and the discretion and care of the ruler supplied
the rest. But when mistake or flattery prevailed with weak
princes, to make use of this power for private ends of their
own and not for the public good, the people were fain, by
express laws, to get prerogative determined in those points
wherein they found disadvantage from it, and declared
limitations of prerogative in those cases which they and
their ancestors had left in the utmost latitude to the wisdom
of those. princes who made no other but a right use of it—
that is, for the good of their people. ;

163. And therefore they have a very wrong notion of
government who say that the people have encroached upon
the prerogative when they have got any part of it to be
defined by positive laws. For in so doing they have not
pulled from the prince anything that of right belonged to
him, but only declared that that power which they in-
278 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

definitely left in him or his ancestors’ hands, to be exercised
for their good, was not a thing they intended him, when he
used it otherwise. For the end of government being the
good of the community, whatsoever alterations are made in
iit tending to that end cannot be an encroachment upon any-
body; since nobody in government can have a right tend-
ing to any other end; and those only are encroachments
which prejudice or hinder the public good. ‘Those who say
otherwise speak as if the prince had a distinct and separate
intérest from the good of the community, and was net made
for it; the root and source from which spring almost all
those evils and disorders which happen in kingly govern-
ments. And, indeed, if that be so, the people under his
government are not a society of rational creatures, entered
into a community for their mutual good, such as have set
rulers over themselyes, to guard and promote that good ;
but are to be looked on as a herd of inferior creatures under
the dominion of a master, who keeps them and works them
for his own pleasure or profit. If men were so yoid of
reason and brutish as to enter into society upon such terms,
prerogative might indeed be, what some men would have
it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the people.

164. But since a rational creature cannot be supposed,
when free, to put himself into subjection to another for his
own harm (though where he finds a good and a wise ruler
he may not, perhaps, think it either necessary or useful to
set precise hounds to his power in all things), prerogative
can be nothing but the people’s permitting their rulers to do
several things of their own free choice where the law was
silent, and sometimes tog against the direct letter of the
law, for the public good and their acquiescing in it when sa
done, For as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust
put into his hands and careful of the good of his people,
cannot haye too much prerogative—that is, power to do
good, so a weak and ill prince, who would claim that
power his predecessors exercised, without the direction. of
the law, as a prerogative belonging to him by right of his
office, which he may exercise at his pleasure to make or
promote an interest distinct from that of the public, gives
the people an occasion to claim their right and limit that.
power, which, whilst it was exercised for their good, they
were content should be tacitly allowed.
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 249

165. And therefore he that will look into the history
of England will find that prerogative was always largest in
the hands of our wisest and best princes, because the people
observing the whole tendency of their actions to be the
public good, or if any human frailty or mistake (for
princes are but men, made as others) appeared in some
small declinations from that end; yet it was visible the
main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the
public. The people, therefore, finding reason to be satisfied
with these princes, whenever they acted without, or contrary
to the letter of the law, acquiesced in what they did, and
without the least complaint, let them enlarge their prero-
gative as they pleased, judging rightly that they did nothing
herein to the prejudice of their laws, since they acted con-
formable to the foundation and end of all Jaws—the public

‘ood.

= 166. Such God-like princes, indeed, had some title to
arbitrary power by that argument that would prove absolute
monarchy the best government, as that which God Himself
governs the universe by, because such kings partake of His
wisdom and goodness. Upon this is founded that saying,
“That the reigns of good princes have been always most
dangerous to the liberties of their people.” For when their
successors, managing the government with different thoughts,
would draw the actions of those good rulers into precedent
and make them the standard of their prerogative—as if what
had been done only for the good of the people was a right
in them to do for the harm of the people, if they so pleased
—it has often occasioned contest, and sometimes public dis-
orders, before the people could recover their orginal right
and get that to be declared not to be prerogative which
truly was never so; since it is impossible anybody in the
society should ever have a right to do the people harm,
though it be very possible and reasonable that the people
should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative
of those kings or rulers who themselves transgressed not the
bounds of the public good. For “ prerogative is nothing
but the power of doing public good without a rule.”

167. The power of calling parliaments in England, as
to precise time, place, and duration, is certainly a prerogs-
tive of the king, but still with this trust, that it shall be
miade use of for the good of the nation as the exigericies
280 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

of the times and variety of occasion shall require. For it
being impossible to foresee which should always be the
fittest place for them to assemble in, and what the best
season, the choice of these was left with the executive
power, as might be best subservient to the public good and
best suit the ends of parliament.

168. The old question will be asked in this matter of
prerogative, “ But who shall be judge when this power is
made a right use of?” I answer: Between an executive
power in being, with such a prerogative, and a legislative
that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be
no judge on earth. As there can be none between the
legislative and the people, should either the executive or
the legislative, when they have got the power in their
hands, design, or go about to enslave or destroy them, the
people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases
where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to
Heaven ; for the rulers in such attempts, exercising a power
the people never put into their hands, who can never be
supposed to consent that anybody should rule over them
for their harm, do that which they have not a right to do.
And where the body of the people, or any single man, are
deprived of their right, or are under the exercise of a power
without right, having no appeal on earth they have a liberty
to appeal to Heaven whenever they judge the cause of
sufficient moment. And therefore, though the people can-
not be judge, so as to have, by the constitution of that
society, any superior power to determine and give effective
sentence in the case, yet they have reserved that ultimate
determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind,
where there lies no appeal on earth, by a law antecedent
and paramount to all positive laws of men, whether they
have just cause to make their appeal to Heaven. And this
judgment they cannot part with, it being out of a man’s
power so to submit himself to another as to give him a
liberty to destroy him ; God and Nature never allowing a
man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preserva-
tion, And since he cannot take away his own life, neither
can he give another power to take it. Nor let any one
think this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder ; for this
operates not till the inconvenience is so great that the
majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 281

have it amended. And this the executive power, or wise
princes, never need come in the danger of ; and it is the thing
of all others they have most need to avoid, as, of all others,
the most perilous.

CHAPTER XV.
Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power considered together.

169. THouGH I have had occasion to speak of these
separately before, yet the great mistakes of late about
government having, as I suppose, arisen from confounding
these distinct powers one with another, it may not perhaps
be amiss to consider them here together.

170. First, then, paternal or parental power is nothing
but that which parents have over their children to govern
them, for the children’s good, till they come to the use of
reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein they may be sup-
posed capable to understand that rule, whether it be the
law of Nature or the municipal law of their country, they
are to govern themselves by—capable, I say, to know it,
as well as several others, who live as free men under that
law. The affection and tenderness God hath planted in
the breasts of parents towards their children makes it
evident that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary
government, but only for the help, instruction, and preser-
vation of their offspring. But happen as it will, there is,
as I have proved, no reason why it should be thought to
extend to life and death, at any time, over their children,
more than over anybody else, or keep the child in subjec-
tion to the will of his parents when grown to a man and the
perfect use of reason, any further than as having received
life and education from his parents obliges him to respect,
honour, gratitude, assistance, and support, all his life, to
both father and mother. And thus, it is true, the paternal
is a natural government, but not at all extending itself to
the ends and jutisdictions of that which is political. The
power of the father doth not reach at all to the property of
the child, which is only in his own disposing.
382. TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

171. Secondly, political power is that power which every
man having in the state of Nature has given up into the
hands .of the society, and therein to the governors whom
the society hath set over itself, with this express or tacit
trust, that it shall be employed for their good and the pre-
servation of their property. Now this power, which every
man has in the state of Nature, and which he parts with to
the society in all such cases where the society can secure

“him, is to use such means for the preserving of his own
property as he thinks good and Nature allows him; and to
punish the breach of the law of Nature in others so as
(according to the best of his reason) may most conduce to
the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind ; so that
the end and measure of this power, when in every man’s
hands, in the state of Nature, being the preservation of
all of his society—that is, all mankind in general. It
can have no other end or measure, when in the hands of
the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that society
in their lives, liberties, and possessions, and so cannot be an
absolute, arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes,
which are as much as possible to be preserved. But a
power to make laws, and annex such penalties to them as
may tend to the preservation of the whole, by cutting off
those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt that they
threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity
is lawful. And this power has its original only from com-
pact and agreement and the mutual consent of those who
make up the community.

172. Thirdly, despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary
power one man has over another, to take away his life
whenever he pleases; and this isa power which neither
Nature gives, for it has made no such distinction between
one man and another, nor compact can convey. For man,

. Rot having such an arbitrary power over his own life, can-
‘hot give another man such a power over it, but it is the
effect only of forfeiture which the aggressor makes of his
own life when he puts himself into the state of war with.
another. For having quitted reason, which God hath given
to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the peaceable
ways which that teaches, and made use of force to compass
his unjyst ends upon another where he has no right, he
renders himself liable to be destroyed by his adversary
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 483

whenever he. can, as any other noxious and brutish creature
that is destructive to his being. And thus captives, taken
in a just and lawful war, and such only, are subject to a
despotical power, which, as it arises not from compact, so
neither is it capable of any, but is the state of war con-
tinued. For what compact can be made with a man that is
not master of his own life? What condition can he per-
form? And if he be once allowed to be master of his own
life, the despotical, arbitrary powet of his master ceases.
He that is master of himself and his own life has aright, too,
‘to the means of preserving it ; so that as soon as compact
enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits his absolute powet
and puts an end to the state of war who enters into condi+
tions with his captive.

173. Nature gives the first of these—viz., paternal power
to parents for the benefit of their children during their
minority, to supply their want of ability and understanding
how to manage their property. (By property I must be
understood here, as in other places, to mean that property
which men have in their persons as well as goods.) Volun-
tary agreement gives the second—viz., political power to
governors, for the benefit of their subjects, to secure them
in the possession and use of their properties. And forfei-
ture gives the third—despotical power to lords for their own
benefit over those who are sttipped of all property.

174. He that shall consider the distinct rise and extent,
and the different ends of these several powers, will plainly
see that paternal power comes as far short of that of the
magistrate as despotical exceeds it ; and that absolute do-
minion, however placed, is so far from being one kind of
civil society that it is as inconsistent with it as slavery is
with property. Paternal power is only whete minority
makes the child incapable to manage his property ; political
where men have property in their own disposal; and des-
potical over such as have no property at all.
284 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMEN®,

CHAPTER XVI.

Of Conquest.

175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other
rise than that before mentioned, nor polities be founded on
anything but the consent of the people, yet such has been
‘the disorders ambition has filled the world with, that in the
noise of war, which makes so great a part of the history of
mankind, this consent is little taken notice of; and, there-
fore, many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent
of the people, and reckon conquest as one of the originals
of government. But conquest is as far from setting up any
government as demolishing a house is from building a new
one in the place. Indeed, it often makes way for a new
frame of a commonwealth by destroying the former ; but,
without the consent of the people, can never erect a new
one.
176. That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state
of war with another, and unjustly invades another man’s
right, can, by such an unjust war, never come to have a
right over the conquered, will be easily agreed by all men,
who will not think that robbers and pirates have a right of
empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master,
or that men are bound by promises which unlawful force
extorts from them. Should a robber break into my house,
and, with a dagger at my throat, make me seal deeds to con-
vey my estate to him, would this give him any title? Just
such a title by his sword has an unjust conqueror. who
forces me into submission. The injury and the crime is
equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown or some
petty villain. The title of the offender and the number of
his followers make no difference in the offence, unless it be
to aggravate it. The only difference is, great robbers
punish little ones to keep them in their obedience ; but the
great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs, because
they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world,
and have the power in their own possession which should
punish offenders. What is my remedy against ‘a robber
that so broke into my house? Appeal to the law for justice.
But perhaps justice is denied, or I am crippled and cannot
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 285

stir ; robbed, and have not the means to do it. If God has
taken away all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing
left but patience. But my son, when able, may seek the
relief of the law, which I am denied; he or his son may
renew his appeal till he recover his right. But the con-
quered, or their children, have no court—no arbitrator on
earth to appeal to. Then they may appeal, as Jephtha did,
to Heaven, and repeat their appeal till they have recovered
the native right of their ancestors, which was to have such a
legislative over them as the majority should approve and
freely acquiesce in. If it be objected this would cause end-
less trouble, I answer, no more than justice does, where
she lies open to all that appeal to her. He that troubles
his neighbour without a cause is punished for it by the
justice of the court he appeals to. And he that appeals to.
Heaven must be sure he has right on his side, and a right,
too, that is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal, as he
will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived, and will

sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs
he hath created to his fellow-subjects—that is, any part of
mankind. From whence it is plain that he that conquers
in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection
and obedience of the conquered.

177. But supposing victory favours the right side, let us
consider a conqueror in a lawful war, and see what power
he gets, and over whom.

First, it is plain he gets no power by his conquest over
those that conquered with him. They that fought on his
side cannot suffer by the conquest, but must, at least, be as
much free men as they were before. And most commonly
they serve upon terms, and on condition to share with their
leader, and ,enjoy a part of the spoil and other advantages
that attend the conquering sword, or, at least, have a part of
the subdued country bestowed upon them.. And the
conquering people are not, I hope, to be slaves by conquest,
and wear their laurels only to show they are sacrifices to
their leader’s triumph. They that found absolute monarchy
upon the title of the sword make their heroes, who are the
founders of such monarchies, arrant “ draw-can-sirs,” and
forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on their
side, in the battles they won, or assisted them in the subdu-
ing, or shared in possessing the countries they mastered.
286 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

We are fold by some that the English monarchy is founded
in the Norman Conquest, and that our princes have thereby
a title to absolute dominion, which, if it were true (as by the
history it appears otherwise), and that William had a right to
make war on this island, yet his dominion by conquest could
reach no farther than to the Saxons and Britons that were
. then inhabitants of this country. The Normans that came
’ with him and helped to conquer, and all descended from
them are free men and no subjects by conquest, let that give
what dominion it will. And if I or anybody else shall claim
freedom as derived from them, it will be very hard to prove.
the contrary ; and it is plain, the law that has made no dis-
tinction between the one and the other intends not there
should be any difference in their freedom or privileges.

¥78. But supposing, which seldom happens, that the
conquerors and conquered never incorporate into one
people under the same laws and freedom; let us see next
what power a lawful conqueror has over the subdued, and
that I say is purely despotical. He has an absolute power
ovet the lives of those who, by an unjust war, have forfeited
them, but not over the lives or fortunes of those who,
engaged not in the war, nor over the possessions even of
those who were actually engaged in it.

179. Secondly, I say, then, the conqueror gets no power
but only over those who have actually assisted, concurred, or
consented to that unjust force that is used against him. For
the people having given to their governors no power to do
an unjust thing, such as is to make an unjust war (for they
never had such a power in themselves), they ought not to be
charged as guilty of the violence and injustice that is com-
mitted in an unjust war any farther than they actually abet
it, no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence
or Oppression their governors should use upon the people
themselves or any part of their fellow-subjects, they having
empowered them no more to the one than to the other.
Conquerors, it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make
the distinction, but they willingly permit the confusion of
war to sweep all together ; but yet this alters not the right ;
fot the conqueror’s power over the lives of the conquered
being only because they have used force to do or maintain
an injustice, he can have that power only over those who
have concurred in that force; all the rest are innocent, and
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 287

he has no more title aver the people of that country who
have done him no injury, and so have made no forfeiture of
their lives, than he has over any other who, without any
eee or provocations, have lived upon fair terms with

m.

180, Thirdly, the power a conqueror gets over those he
overcomes in a just war is perfectly despotical ; he has an
absolute power over the lives of those who, by putting them-
selves in a state of war, have forfeited them, but he has not
thereby a right and title to their possessions. This I doubt
not but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being
$0 quite contrary to the practice of the world; there being
nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominion of
countries than to say such an one conquered it, as if con-
quest, without any more ado, conveyed a right of possession.
But when we consider that the practice of the strong and
powerful, how universal soever it may be, is seldom the
rule of right, however it be one part of the subjection of the
conquered not to argue against the conditions cut out to them
by the conquering swords.

181. Though in all war there be usually a complication of
force and damage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm
the estate when he uses force against the persons of those
he makes war upon, yet it is the use of force only that puts
a man into the state of war. For whether by force he begins
the injury, or else having quietly and by fraud done the
injury, he refuses to make reparation, and by force maintains
it, which is the same thing as at first to have done it by
force ; it is the unjust use of force that makes the war. For
he that breaks open my house and violently turns me out of
doors, or having peaceably got in, by force keeps me out,
does, in effect, the same thing ; supposing we are in such a
state that we have no common judge on earth whom I may
appeal to, and to whom we are both obliged to submit, for
of such I am now speaking. It is the unjust use of force,
then, that puts a man into the state of war with another, and
thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life.
For quitting reason, which is the rule given between man
and man, and using force, the way of beasts, he becomes
liable to be destroyed by him he uses force against, as any
savage ravenous beast that is dangerous to his being.

182. But because the miscarriages of the father are no
988 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

faults of the children, and they may be rational and peaces
able, notwithstanding the brutishness and injustice of the
father, the father, by his miscarriages and violence, can
forfeit but his own life, but involves not his children in his
guilt or destruction. His goods which Nature, that willeth
the preservation of all mankind as much as is possible, hath
made to belong to the children to keep them from perishing,
do still continue to belong to his children. For supposing
them not to have joined in the war either through infancy
-or choice, they have done nothing to forfeit them, nor has
the conqueror any right to take them away by the bare right
of having subdued him that by force attempted his destruc-
tion, though, perhaps, he may have some right to them to
repair the damages he has sustained by the war, and the _
defence of his own right, which how far it reaches to the
possessions of the conquered we shall see by-and-by; so
that he that by conquest has a right over a man’s person, to
destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby a right over his
estate to possess and enjoy it. For it is the brutal force the
aggressor has used that gives his adversary a right to take
away his life and destroy him, if he pleases, as a noxious
creature ; but it is damage sustained that alone gives him
title to another man’s goods; for though I may kill a thief
that sets on me in the highway, yet I may not (which seems
less) take away his money and let him go; this would be
robbery on my side. His force, and the state of war he put
himself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to
his goods. The right, then, of conquest extends only to the
lives of those who joined in the war, but not to their estates,
but only in order to make reparation for the damages
received and the charges of the war, and that, too, with
reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children.
183. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side
as could be supposed, he has no right to seize more than
the vanquished could forfeit; his life is at the victor’s
mercy, and his service and goods he may appropriate
to make himself reparation; but he cannot take the goods
of his wife and children, they too had a title to the goods
~ he enjoyed, ard their shares in the estate he possessed. For
example, I in the state of Nature (and all commonwealths
are in the state of Nature one with another) have injured
another man, and refusing to give satisfaction, it is come té
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 289
a state of war wherein my defending by force what I
had gotten unjustly makes me the aggressor. I am con-
quered ; my life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not my
wife’s and children’s. ‘They made not the war, nor assisted
nit. I could not forfeit their lives, they were not mine to
forfeit. My wife had a share in my estate, that neither could
I forfeit. And my children also, being born of me, had a
right to be maintained out of my labour or substance. Here
then is the case: The conqueror has a title to reparation for
damages received, and the children have a title to their
father’s estate for their subsistence. For as to the wife’s
share, whether her own labour or compact gave her a title
to it, it is plain her husband could not forfeit what was hers.
What must be done in the case? Ianswer: The fun-
damental law of Nature being that all, as much as may be,
should be preserved; it follows that if there be not enough
fully to satisfy both—viz., for the conqueror’s losses and
children’s maintenance, he that hath and to spare must
remit something of his full satisfaction, and give way to the
pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to
perish without it.

184. But supposing the charge and damages of the war
are to be made up to the conqueror to the utmost farthing,
and that the children of the vanquished, spoiled of all their
father’s goods, are to be left to starve and perish, yet
the satisfying of what shall, on this score, be due to the con-
queror will scarce give him a title to any country he shall
conquer. .For the damages of war can scarce amount
to the value of any considerable tract of land in any part
of the world, where all the land is possessed, and none lies
waste. And if I have not taken away the conqueror’s
land which, being vanquished, it is impossible I should,
scarce any other spoil I have done him can amount to the
value of mine, supposing it of an extent any way coming
near what I had overrun of his, and equally cultivated too.
The destruction of a year’s product or two (for it seldom
reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually can be
done. For as to money, and such riches and treasure taken
away, these are none of Nature’s goods; they have but
a phantastical imaginary value; Nature has put no such
upon them. They are of no more account by her standard

than the Wampompeke of the Americans to an European
K
290 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

prince, or the silver money of Europe would have been
formerly to an American. And five years’ product is
not worth the perpetual inheritance of land, where all
is possessed and none remains waste, to be taken up by
him that is disseised, which will be easily granted, if one do
but take away the imaginary value of money, the dis-
proportion being more than between five and five thousand ;
though, at the same time, half a year’s product is more
worth than the inheritance, where there being more land
than the inhabitants possess and make use of, any one has
liberty to make use of the waste. But there conquerors take
little care to possess themselves of the lands of the
vanquished. No damage therefore that men in the state of
Nature (as all princes and governments are in reference to
one another) suffer from one another, can give a conqueror

‘ power to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished, and

turn them out of that inheritance which ought to be
the possession of them and their descendants to all genera-
tions. The conqueror indeed will be apt to think himself
master ; and it is the very condition of the subdued not to
be able to dispute their right. But, if that be all, it gives no
other title than what bare force gives to the stronger over the
weaker ; and, by this reason, he that is strongest will have
a right to whatever he pleases to seize on.

185. Over those, then, that joined with him in the war, and
over those of the subdued country that opposed him not,
and the posterity even of those that did, the conqueror,
even in a just war, hath, by his conquest, no right of
dominion. They are free from any subjection to him, and
if their former government be dissolved, they are at liberty
to begin and erect another to themselves.

186. The conqueror, it is true, usually by the force he has -
over them, compels them, with a sword at their breasts, to
stoop to his conditions, and submit to such a governmentas
he pleases to afford them; but the inquiry is, what right he
has to do so? If it be said they submit by their own
consent, then this allows their own consent to be necessary
to give the conqueror a title to rule over them. It remains
only to be considered whether promises, extorted by force,
without right, can be thought consent, and how far they
bind. To which I shall say, they bind not at all; because
whatsoever another gets from me by force, I still retain the
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 201

right of, and he is obliged presently to restore. He that
forces my horse from me ought presently to restore him, and
T have still a right to retake him. By the same reason, he
that forced a-promise from me ought presently to restore it
—i.e., quit me of the obligation of it; or I may resume it
myself—z.e., choose whether I will perform it. For the law
of Nature laying an obligation on me, only by the rules
she prescribes, cannot oblige me by the violation of her
rules ; such is the extorting anything from me by force. Nor
does it at all alter the case, to say I gave my promise, no
more than it excuses the force, and passes the nght, when I
put my hand in my pocket and deliver my purse myself to
a thief who demands it with a pistol at my breast.

187. From all which it follows that the government of a
conqueror, imposed by force on the subdued, against whom
he had no right of war, or who joined not in the war against
him, where he had right, has no obligation upon them.

188. But let us suppose that all the men of that com-
munity being all members of the same body politic, may be
taken to have joined in that unjust war, wherein they are
subdued, and so their lives are at the mercy of the con-
queror.

189. I say this concerns not their children who are in
their minority. For since a father hath not, in himself, a
power over the life or liberty of his child, no act of his can
possibly forfeit it ; so that the children, whatever may have
happened to the fathers, are free men, and the absolute
power of the conqueror reaches no farther than the persons
of the men that were subdued by him, and dies with them ;
and should he govern them as slaves, subjected to his abso-
lute, arbitrary power, he has no such right of dominion over
their children. He can have no power over them but by
their own consent, whatever he may drive them to say or do,
and he has no lawful authority, whilst force, and not choice,
compels them to submission. *

190. Every man is born with a double right. First, a
right of freedom to his person, which no other man has a
power over, but the free disposal of it lies in himself.
Secondly, a right before any other man, to inherit, with his
brethren, his father’s goods. ;

19x. By the first of these, a man is naturally free from
subjection to any government, though he be born ina place

K2
292 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

under its jurisdiction. But if he disclaim the lawful govern--
ment of the country he was born in, he must also quit the
right that belonged to him, by the laws of it, and the pos-
sessions there descending to him from his ancestors, if it
were a government made by their consent.

192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country, who
are descended and derive a title to their estates from those
who are subdued, and had a government forced upon them,
against their free consents, retain a right to the possession
of their ancestors, though they consent not freely to the
government, whose hard conditions were, by force, imposed
on the possessors of that country. For the first conqueror
never having had a title to the land of that country, the
people, who are the descendants of, or claim under those
who were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by
constraint, have always a right to shake it off, and free them-
selves from the usurpation or tyranny the sword hath
brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under such
a frame of government, as they willingly and of choice con-
sent to (which they can never be supposed to do, till either
they are put in a full state of liberty to choose their govern-
ment and governors, or at least till they have such standing
laws, to which they have, by themselves or their representa-
tives, given their free consent, and also till they are allowed
their due property, which is so to be proprietors of what
they have that nobody can take away any part of it with-
out their own consent, without which, men under any go-
vernment are not in the state of free men, but are direct
slaves under the force of war). And who doubts but the
Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient possessors of
that country, may justly cast off the Turkish yoke they have
so long groaned under, whenever they have a power to do it ?

193. But granting that the conqueror, in a just war, hasa
right to the estates, as well as power over the persons of the
conquered, which, it is plain, he hath not, nothing of abso-
lute power will follow from hence in the continiiance of the
government. Because the descendants of these being all
free men, if he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit
his country, without which it would be. worth nothing,
whatsoever he grants them they have so far as it is granted
property in; the nature whereof is, that, without a man’s
own consent, it cannot be taken from him.
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 293

194. Their persons are free by a native right, and their
properties, be they more or less, are their own, and at their
own dispose, and not at his ; or else it is no property. Sup-
posing the conqueror gives to one man a thousand acres, to
him and his heirs for ever; to another he lets a thousand
acres, for his life, under the rent of £50 or £500 per
annum. Has not the one of these a right to his thousand
acres for ever, and the other, during his life, paying the said
rent? And hath not the tenant for life a property in all
that he gets over and above his rent, by his labour and in-
dustry, during the said term, supposing it be double the
rent? Can any one say, the king, or conqueror, after his
grant, may, by his power of conqueror, take away all, or part
of the land, from the heirs of one, or from the other, during
his life, he paying the rent? Or, can he take away from
either the goods or money they have got upon the said
land at his pleasure? If he can, then all free and volun-
tary contracts cease, and are void in the world ; there needs
nothing but power enough to dissolve them at any time,
and all the grants and promises of men in power are but
mockery and collusion. For can there be anything more
ridiculous than to say, I give you and yours this for ever,
and that in the surest and most solemn way of conveyance
can be devised, and yet it is to be understood that I have
right, if I please, to take it away from you again to-morrow ?

‘195. I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt
from the laws of their country, but, this I am sure, they owe
subjection to the laws of God and Nature. Nobody, no
power can exempt them from the obligations of that eternal
law. Those are so great and so strong in the case of pro-
mises, that Omnipotency itselfcan be tied by them. Grants,
promises,’ and oaths are bonds that hold the Almighty,
whatever some flatterers say to princes of the world, who,
all together, ‘with all their people joined to them, are, in
comparison of the great God, but as a drop of the bucket,

or a dust on the balance—inconsiderable, nothing !

_  196.. The’short'of-the case in conquest, is this : The con-
queror, if he have a just cause, has a despotical right over
the persons of all that actually aided and concurred in the
war against him, and a right to make up his damage and
cost out of their labour and estates, so he injure not the
right of any other. Over the rest of the people, if there’
294 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

were any that consented not to the war, and over the
children of the captives themselves or the possessions of
either he has no powet, and so can have, by virtue of con-
uest, no lawful title himself to dominion over them, or de-
rive it to his posterity ; but is an aggréssor, and puts himself
in a state of wat against them, arid has no better a right of
principality, he, nor any of his successors, than Hingat, or
Hubba, the Danes, had here in England, or Spartacus, had
he conquered Italy, which is to have their yoke cast off as
soon as God shall give those under their subjection courage
and opportunity to do it. Thus, notwithstanding whatever
title the kings of Assyria had over Judah, by the sword, God
assisted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that con-
quering empire. ‘And the Lord was with Hezekiah, and
he prospered ; wherefore he went forth, and he rebelled
against the king of Assyria, and served him not” (2 Kings
xviii. 7). Whence it is plain that shaking off a power, which
force, and not right, hath set over any one, though it hath
the name of rebellion, yet is no offence before God, but |
that which He allows and countenances, though even pro-
mises and covenants, when obtained by force, have inter-
vened. For it is very probable, to any one that reads the
story of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians
subdued Ahaz, and deposed him, and made Hezekiah king
in his father’s lifetime, and that Hezekiah, by agreement,
had done him homage, and paid him tribute till this time.

CHAPTER XVII.
Of Usurpation.

197. As conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so
usurpation is a kind of domestic conquest, with this differ-
ence—that an usurper can never have right on his side, it
being no usurpation but where one is got into the posses-
sion of what another has right to. This, so far as it is usur-
pation, is a change only of persons, but not of the forms and
rules of the government ; for if the usurper extend his power
beyond what, of right, belonged to the lawful princes or
TWO TREATISES Ok GOVERNMENT. 29

governors of the commonwealth, it is tyranny added to
usurpation,

198. In all lawful governments the designation of the
persons who are to bear rule being as natural and necessary
a part as the form of the government itself, and that which
had its establishment originally from the people—the
anarchy being much alike to have no form of government
at all, or to agree that it shall be monarchical, but to
appoint no way to design the person that shall have the
power, and be the monarch—all commonwealths, there-
fore, with the form of government established, have rules
also of appointing and conveying the right to those who are
to have any share in the public authority ; and whoever gets
into the exercise of any part of the power by other ways
than what the laws of the community have prescribed
hath no right to be obeyed, though the form of the common-
wealth be still preserved, since he is not the person the laws
have appointed, and, consequently, not the person the people
have consented to. Nor can such an usurper, or any deriv-
ing from him, ever have a title till the people are both at V
liberty to consent, and have actually consented, to allow and
confirm in him the power he hath till then usurped.

CHAPTER XVIII.
Of Tyranny.

199. As usurpation is the exercise of power which another
hath a right to, so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond
right, which nobody can have a right to ; and this is making
use of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good
of those who are under it, but for his own private, separate
advantage. When the governor, however entitled, makes
not the law, but his will, the rule, and his commands and
actions are not directed ‘to the preservation of the properties
of his people, but the satisfaction of his own ambition,
revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion.

200. If one can doubt this to be truth or reason because
it comes from the obscure hand of a subject, I hope the

1
=

a

206 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

authority of a king will make it pass with him. King James,
in his speech to the Parliament, 1603, tells them thus: “I
will ever prefer the weal of the public and of the whole
commonwealth, in making of good laws and constitutions,
to any particular and private ends of mine, thinking ever
the wealth and weal of the commonwealth to be my
greatest weal and worldly felicity—a point wherein a lawful
king doth directly differ from a tyrant; for I do acknow-
ledge that the special and greatest point of difference that
is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant is this—
that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his
kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of
his desires and unreasonable appetites, the righteous and
just king doth, by the contrary, acknowledge himself to be
ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his
people.” And again, in his speech to the Parliament, 1609,
he hath these words: “ The king binds himself, by a double
oath, to the observation of the fundamental laws of his king-
dom_—tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound to protect,
as well the people as the laws of his kingdom ; and expressly
by his oath at his coronation ; so as every just king, in a
settled kingdom, is bound to observe that paction made
to his people, by his laws, in framing his government agree-
able thereunto, according to that paction which God made
with Noah after the deluge: ‘Hereafter, seed-time, and
harvest, and cold, and heat, and summer, and winter, and
day, and night, shall not cease while the earth remaineth.’
And therefore a king, governing in a settled kingdom, leaves -
to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as soon as he
leaves off to rule according to his laws.” And a little after :
“ Therefore, all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will
be glad to bound themselves within the limits of their laws,
and they that persuade them the contrary are vipers, pests,
both against them and the commonwealth.” Thus, that
learned king, who well understood the notions of things,
makes the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist
only in this: that one makes the laws the bounds of his
power and the good of the public the end of his govern-
ment; the other makes all give way to his own will and
appetite.

201. It is a mistake to think this fault is proper only to
monarchies. Other forms of government are liable to it as
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 203

well as that; for wherever the power that is put in any
hands for the government of the people and the preserva-
tion of their properties is applied to other ends, and made
use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary
and irregular commands of those that have it, there it pre-
sently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one
or many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as
well as one at Syracuse ; and the intolerable dominion of
the Decemviri at Rome was nothing better.

202, Wherever law ends, tyranny: begins, if the law be
transgressed to another’s harm ; and whosoever in authority
exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of
the force he has under his command to compass that upon
the subject which the law allows not, ceases in that to be
a magistrate, and acting without authority may be opposed,
as any other man who by force invades the right of another.
This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that
hath authority to seize my person in the street may be opposed
as a thief and a robber if he endeavours to break into my house
to execute a writ, notwithstanding that I know he has such a
warrant and such a legal authority as will empower him to
arrest me abroad. And why this should not holdin the highest,
as well as in the most inferior magistrate, I would gladly
be informed. Is it reasonable that the eldest brother, because ,,
he has the greatest part of his father’s estate, should thereby '
have a right to take away any of his younger brothers’ por-
tions? Or, that a rich man, who possessed a whole country,
should from thence have a right to seize, when he pleased,
the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being
rightfully possessed of great power and riches, exceedingly
beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam, is so far
from being an excuse, much less a reason for rapine and
oppression, which the endamaging another without authority
is, that it is a great aggravation of it. For the exceeding
the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great than a
petty officer, no more justifiable in a king than a constable.
But so much the worse in him as that he has more trust put
in him, is supposed, from the advantage of education and
counsellors to have better knowledge and less reason to do
it, having already a greater share than the rest of his
brethren. ;

203. May the commands, then, of a prince be opposed?
298 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

May he be resisted, as often as any one shall find himself
aggrieved, and but imagine he has not right done him?
This will unhinge and overturn all polities, and instead of
government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and con-
fusion.

204. To this I answer: That force is to be opposed to
nothing but to unjust and unlawful force. Whoever makes
any opposition in any other case draws on himself a just
condemnation, both from God and man; and so no such
danger or Confusion will follow, as”is often suggested.
For—

205. First. As in some countries the person of the
prince by the law is sacred, and so whatever he commands
or does, his person is still free from all question or violence,
not liable to force, or any judicial censure or condemnation.
But yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any
inferior officer or other commissioned by him, unless he
will, by actually putting himself into a state of war with his
people, dissolve the government, and leave them to that
defence, which belongs to every one in the state of Nature.
For of such things, who can tell what the end will be?
And a neighbour kingdom has showed the world an odd
example. In all other cases the sacredness of the person
exempts him from all inconveniencies, whereby he is secure,
whilst the government stands, from all vidlence and harm
whatsoever, than which there cannot be a wiser constitution.
For the harm he can do in his own person not being likely
to happen often, nor to extend itself far, nor being able by
his single strength to subvert the laws nor oppress the body
of the people, should any prince have so much weakness and
ill-nature as to be willing to do it. The inconveniency of
sore particular mischiefs that may happen sometimes when
a heady prince comes to the throne are well recompensed
by the peace of the public and security of the government
in the person of the chief magistrate, thus set out of the
reach of danger ; it being safer for the body that. some few
private men should be sometimes in danger to suffer than
that the head of the republic should be easily and upon slight
occasions exposed. ;

206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging only to the

1 king’s person, hinders not but they may be questioned,
opposed, and resisted, who use unjust force, though they
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 299

pretend a commission from him which the law authorizes
not ; as is plain in the case of him that has the king’s writ
to arrest a man which is a full commission from the king,
and yet he that has it cannot break open a man’s house to
do it, nor execute this command of the king upon certain
days nor in certain places, though this commission have no
such exception in it; but they are the limitations of the
law, which, if any one transgress, the king’s commission ex-’
cuses him not. For the, king’s authority being given him
only by the law, he cannot empower any one to act against +
the law, or justify him by his commission in so doing. The
commission, or command of any magistrate where he has
no authority, being as void and insignificant as that of any
ptivate man, the difference between the one and the other
being that the magistrate has some authority so far and to
such ends, and the private man has none at all; for it is
not the commission but the authority that gives the right of 1
acting, and against the laws there can be no authority. But
notwithstanding such resistance, the king’s person and
authority are still both secured, and so no danger to governor
or government.

207. Thirdly. Supposing a government wherein the per-
son of the chief magistrate is not thus sacred, yet this doc-
trine of the lawfulness of resisting all unlawful exercises of
his power will not, upon every slight occasion, endanger
him or embroil the government ; for where the injured
party may be relieved and his damages repaired by appeal
to the law, there can be no pretence for force, which is only
to be used where a man is intercepted from appealing to the
law. For nothing is to be accounted hostile force but»
where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal, and it 1s
such force alone that puts him that uses it into a state of
war, and makes it lawful to resist him. A man with a
sword in his hand demands my purse in the highway, when
pethaps I have. not 12d. in my pocket. This man I”
may lawfully kill, To another I deliver £100 to hold
only whilst I alight, which he refuses to restore me when
I am got up again, but draws his sword to defend the
possession of it by force. I endeavour to retake it. The
mischief this man does me is a hundred, or possibly a
thousand times more than the other perhaps intended me
(whom I killed before he really did me any); and yet I
300 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

might lawfully kill the one and cannot so much as hurt the
other lawfully. The reason whereof is plain ; because the
one using force which threatened my life, I could not have

# time to appeal to the law to secure it, and when it was gone
it was too late to appeal. The law could not restore life
to my dead carcass. The loss was irreparable ; which to
prevent the law of Nature gave mea right to destroy him
who had put himself into a state of war with me and
threatened my destruction. But in the other case, my life
not being in danger, I might have the benefit of appealing
to the law, and have reparation for my £100 that way.

208, Fourthly : but if the unlawful acts done by the magis-
trate be maintained (by the power he has got), and the
remedy, which is due by law, be by the same power ob-
structed, yet the right of resisting, even in such manifest
acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight occasions,

sidisturb the government. For if it reach no farther than
some private men’s cases, though they have a right to defend
themselves, and to recover by force what by unlawful force is
taken from them, yet the nght to do so will not easily
engage them in a contest wherein they are sure to perish ; it
being as impossible for one or a few oppressed.men to
disturb the government where the body of the people do
not think themselves concerned in it, as for a raving
madman, or heady malcontent to overturn a well-settled
state, the people being as little apt to follow the one as the
other.

20g. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the

¥ majority of the people, or if the mischief and oppression
has light only on some few, but in such cases as the pre-
cedent and consequences seem to threaten all, and they are
persuaded in their consciences that their laws, and with
them, their estates, liberties, and lives are in danger,
and perhaps their religion too, how they will be hindered
from resisting illegal force used against them I cannot tell,
This is an inconvenience, I confess, that attends all govern-
ments whatsoever, when the governors have brought it to
this pass, to be generally suspected of their people, the most
dangerous state they can possibly put themselves in;
wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so easy
to be avoided. It being as impossible for a governor, if he
really means:the good of his people, and the preservation
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. — 301

of them and their laws together, not to make them see and
feel it, as it is for the father of a family not to let his
children see he loves and takes care of them.

_210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one .
kind, and actions of another, arts used to elude the law, and
the trust of prerogative (which is an arbitrary power in some
things left in the prince’s hand to do good, not harm, to the
people) employed contrary to the end for which it was
given; if the people shall fd the ministers and sub-
ordinate magistrates chosen, suitable to such ends, and
favoured, or laid by proportionably as they promote or
oppose them; if they see several experiments made of
arbitrary power, and that religion underhand favoured,
though publicly proclaimed against, which is readiest to in-
troduce it, and the operators in it supported as much as may
be ; and when that cannot be done, yet approved still, and
liked the better, and a long train of acting show the
counsels all tending that way, how can a man any more
hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind which
way things are going ; or, from casting about how to save
himself, than he could from believing the captain of a ship
he was in was carrying him and the rest of the company to
Algiers, when he found him always steering tiat course,
though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of men and
provisions did often force him to turn his course another
way for some time, which he steadily returned to again as
soon as the wind, weather, and other circumstances would
let him ?

 

CHAPTER XIX.
Of the Dissolution 01 Governments.

211. He that will, with any clearness, speak of the
dissolution of government, ought in the first place to
distinguish between the dissolution of the society and the
dissolution of the government. ‘That which makes the
community, and brings men out of the loose state of
Nature into one politic society, is the agreement which every
-one has with the rest to incorporate and act as one body,
302 + TWO- TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

and so be one distinct commonwealth. The usual, and
almost only way whereby this union is dissolved, is the in-
road of foreign force making a conquest upon them. For in
that case (not being able to maintain and support them-
selves as one entire and independent body) the union
belonging to that body, which consisted therein, must
necessarily cease, and so every one return to the state he
was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself and provide
for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other society.
Whenever the society is dissolved, it is certain the govern-
‘|ment of that society cannot remain. Thus conquerors’
swords often cut up governments by the roots, and mangle
societies to pieces, separating the subdued or scattered
multitude from the protection of and dependence on that
society which ought to have preserved them from violence.
The world is too well instructed in, and too forward to allow
of this way of dissolving of governments, to need any more
to be said of it; and there wants not much argument to
prove that where the society is dissolved, the government
cannot remain; that being as impossible as for the frame of
a house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and
displaced by a whirlwind, or jumbled into a confused heap
by an earthquake.
212. Besides this overturning from without, governments
* are dissolved from within :
First. When the legislative is altered, civil society being
a state of peace amongst those who are of it, from whom
the state of war is excluded by the umpirage which they
have provided in their legislative for the ending all
differences that may arise amongst any of them; it is in
their legislative that the members of a commonwealth are
united and combined together into one coherent living
body. This is the soul that gives form, life, and unity to the
commonwealth ; from hence the several members have their
mutual influence, sympathy, and connection ; and therefore
when the legislative is broken, or dissolved, dissolution and
Geath follows. For the essence and union of the society
consisting in having one will, the legislative, when once esta-
blished by the majority, has the declaring and, as it were,
keeping of that will. The constitution of the legislative is
the first and fundamental act of society, whereby provision
is made for the continuation of their union under the

t
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 304

direction of persons and bonds of laws, made by persons

authorized thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the
people, without which no one man, or number of men,

amongst them can have authority of making laws that shall

be binding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall take

upon them to make laws whom the people have not

appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, which

the people are not therefore bound to obey ; by which

means they come again to be out of subjection, and may

constitute to themselves a new legislative, as they think

best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those who,

without authority, would impose anything upon them. Every.
one is at the disposure of his own will, when those who had, '
by the delegation of the society, the declaring of the public

will, are excluded from it, and others usurp the place, who

have no such authority or delegation.

213. This being usually brought about by such in the
commonwealth, who misuse the power they have, it is hard
to consider it aright, and know at whose door to lay it,
without knowing the form of government in which it
happens. Let us suppose, then, the legislative placed in
the concurrence of three distinct persons :—First, a single
hereditary person having the constant, supreme, executive
power, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving
the other two within certain periods of time. Secondly, an
assembly of hereditary nobility. Thirdly, an assembly of
representatives chosen, fro tempore, by the people. Sucha
form of government supposed, it is evident—

214. First, that when such a single person or prince sets
up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws which are the

ill of the society declared by the legislative, then the

yislative is changed. For that being, in effect, the legisla-

- whose rules and laws are put in execution, and required
to"@e obeyed when other laws are set up, and other rules
pretended and enforced than what the legislative, consti-
tuted by the society, have enacted, it is plain that the
legislative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, not
being thereunto authorized, by the fundamental appoint-
ment of the society, or subverts the old, disowns and over-
turns the power by which they were made, and so sets up a
new legislative. : ae

215. Secondly, when the prince hinders the legislative
304 Thu £KeALISES OF GOVERNMENT.

rom assembling in its due time, or from acting freely,
ursuant to those ends for which it was constituted, the
legislative is altered. For it~is not a certain number of
men—no, nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom
‘of debating and leisure of perfecting what is for the good
.of the society wherein the legislative consists ; when these|
are taken away, or altered, so as to deprive the society o!
the due exercise of their power, the legislative is trul
altered. For it is not names that constitute governments,
but the use and exercise of those powers that were intended
to accompany them; so that he who takes away the free-
dom, or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due
seasons, in effect takes away the legislative, and puts an
end to the government.
236. Thirdly, when, by the arbitrary power of the prince,
\the electors or ways of election are alter i

consent and contrary to the common interest of the people,
there a[s0_the legislative Iso_t he legislative -te-altered. 7 For if others than
those whom the society hath authorized thereunto do choose,
or in another way than what the society hath prescribed,
those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the
people.

217. Fourthly, the delivery also of the people into the
subjection of a foreign power, either by the prince or by
the legislative, is certainly a change of the legislative, and
so a dissolution of the government For the end why
people entered into society being to be preserved one
entire, free, independent society, to be governed by its own
laws, this is lost whenever they are given up into the power
of another.

218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolu-
tion of the government in these cases is to be imputed to
the prince is evident, because he, having the force, trea-
sure, and offices of the State to employ, and often persuad-
ing himself or being flattered by others, that, as supreme
magistrate, he is incapable of control; he alone is in a
condition to make great advances towards such changes
under pretence of lawful authority, and has it in his hands
to terrify or suppress opposers as factious, seditious, and
enemies to the government ; whereas no other part of the
legislative, or people, is capable by themselves to attempt
any alteration of the legislative-without open and visible
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 305

rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which, when it
prevails, produces effects very little different from foreign
conquest. Besides, the prince, in such a form of govern-
ment, having the power of dissolving the other parts of the
legislative, and thereby rendering them private persons,
they can never, in opposition to him, or without his con-
currence, alter the legislative by a law, his consent being
necessary to give any of their decrees that sanction. But
yet so far as the other parts of the legislative any way
contribute to any attempt upon the government, and do
either promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder such
designs, they are guilty, and partake in this, which is cer-
‘tainly the greatest crime men can be guilty of one towards
another.

219. There is one way more whereby such a government
may be dissolved, and that is: When he who has the
supreme executive power neglects and abandons that
charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put
in execution; this is demonstratively to reduce all to
anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the government.
For laws not being made for themselves, but to be, by
their execution, the bonds of the society to keep every
part of the body politic in its due place and function.
When that totaliy ceases, the government visibly ceases,
and the people become a confused multitude without order
or connection. Where there is no longer the administra-
tion of justice for the securing of men’s rights, nor any re-
maining power within the community to direct the force, or

ae for the necessities of the public, there certainly is
no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed it
is all one as if there were no laws, and a government with-
out laws is, I suppose, a mystery in politics inconceivable
to human capacity, and inconsistent with human society.

220. In these, and the like cases, when the government
is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for them-

ffselves by erecting a new legislative differing from the other
by the change of persons, or form, or both, as they shall find it
most for their safety and good. / For the society can never,
y the fault of another, ose the native and original right it
has to preserve itself, which can only be done by a settled
legislative and a fair and impartial execution of the laws
made by it. But the state of mankind is not so miserable
306 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

that they are not capable of using this remedy till it be too
late to look for any. To tell peoplé they may provide for
themselves by erecting a new legislative, when, by oppres-
sion, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreign power,
their old one is gone, is only to tell them they may expect
relief when it is too late, and the evil is past cure. This
is, in effect, no more than to bid them first be slaves, and
then to take care of their liberty, and, when their chains are
" on, tell them they may act like freemen. ‘This, if barely so,
is rather mockery than relief, and men can never be secure
from tyranny if there be no means to escape it till they are
perfectly under it ; and, therefore, it is that they have not
only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.
221. There is, therefore, secondly, another way whereby
> governments are dissolved, and that is, when the legislative,
or the prince, either of them act cogtrary to their trust.
First: the legislative acts against the trust reposed in
them when they endeavour to invade the property of the,
subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the com-
mumity, masters or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties,
or fortun : :
» 222, The reasons why men enter into society is the
'preservation of their property; and the end while they
choose and authorize a legislative is that there may.
be laws made, and rules set, as_guards and fences to
the prtoperties of all the society, to limit the power,
and moderate the dominion of every part and eae
of the society. For since it can never be supposed to
e the will of the society that the legislative should
have a power to destroy that which every one designs to
secure by entering into society, and for which the people
submitted themselves to legislators of their own making;
whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and
I destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to
slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a
state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved
from any farther obedience, and are left to the common
refuge which God hath provided for all men against force
and violenee. 'Whensoever, therefore, the legislative: shall :
transgress this fundamental rule of society, and either by
ambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavour to grasp
themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 404

power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people;
by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had
put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves
to the people, who have a right to resume their original
liberty, and by the establishment of a new legislative (such
as they shall think fit), provide for their own safety and.
security, which is the end for which they are in society.
What I have said here concerning the legislative in general
holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who
having a double trust put in him, both fo havea part in the
legislative and the supreme execution of the law, acts
against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary
will as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his
trust when he employs the force, treasure, and offices of
the society to corrupt the representatives, and gain them to
his purposes, when he openly pre-engages the electors, and
prescribes, to their choice, such ‘whom he has, by solici-
tation, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs,
and employs them to bring in such who have promised
beforehand what to vote and what to enact. Thus to regu-
late candidates and electors, and new model the ways of
election, what is it but to cut up the government by the
toots, and poison the very fountain of public security? For
the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their.
representatives as the fence > ely properties could do it
for no other end but that they might always be freely
chosen, and so chosen, freely act and advise as the neces-
sity of the commonwealth and the public good should, upon
examination and mature debate, be judged to require.
This, those who give their votes before they hear the
debate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not
capable of doing. To prepare such an assembly as this,
and endeavour to set up the declared abettors ct his own
will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-
makérs_0 ociety, is certainly as great.a breach of trust,
afid as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the.
government, as is possible to be met with. To which, if
one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to
the same end, and all the arts of perverted law made use of
to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of such a
design, and will not comply and consent to betray the

liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is

 
308 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

doing. What power they ought to have in the society who
thus employ it contrary to the trust went along with it in its
first institution, is easy to determine ; and one cannot but
see that he who has once attempted any such thing as this
cannot any longer be trusted.

223. To this, perhaps, it will be said that the people
being ignorant and always discontented, to lay the foun-
dation of government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain

ft humour of the people, is to expose it to certain ruin ; and
no government will be able long to subsist if the people may
set up a new legislative whenever they take offence at the
old one. To this I answer, quite the contrary. People are
not so easily got out of their old forms as some are apt to
suggest. ‘They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend
the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accus-
tomed to. And if there be any original defects, or adven-
titious ones introduced by time or corruption, it is not an
easy thing to get them changed, even when all the world
sees there is an opportunity for it. This slowness and
aversion in the people to quit their old constitutions has in
the many revolutions have been seen in this kingdom, in
this and former ages, still kept us to, or after some interval
of fruitless attempts, still brought us back again to our old
legislative of king, lords and commons ; and whatever pro-
vocations have made the crown be taken from some of our
princes’ heads, they never carried the people so far as to
place it in another line.

224. But it will be said this hypothesis lays a ferment
for frequent rebellion. To which I answer:

First: no more than any other hypothesis. For when
the people are nade miserable, and find themselves exposed
to the ill usage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors
as much as you will for sons of Jupiter, let them be sacred
and divine, descended or authorized from Heaven ; give
them out for whom or what you please, the same will
happen. The people generally ill treated, and contrary to

i Tight, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves
of a burden that sits heavy upon them. They will wish and
seek for the opportunity, which in the change, weakness,
and accidents of human affairs, seldom delays long to offer
itself. He must have lived but a little while in the world,
who has not seen examples of this in his time; and he must
7WO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 309

have read very little who caanot produce examples of it in
all sorts of governments in the world.

225. Secondly: I answer, such revolutions happen nott#
upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great
mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient
laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the
people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of
abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same
way, make the design visible to the people, and they
cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whither they are
going, it is not to be wondered that they should then rouse
themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands
which may secure to them the ends for which government
was at first erected, and without which, ancient names and
specious forms are so far from being better, that they are
much worse than the state of Nature or pure anarchy ; the
inconveniencies being all as great and as near, but the
remedy farther off and more difficult.

226. Thirdly : I answer, that this power in the people of
providing for their safety anew by a new legislative when
their legislators have acted contrary to their trust by in-
vading their property, is the best fence against rebellion, and
the probablest means to hinder it. For rebellion being an
opposition, not to persons, but authority, which is founded
only in the constitutions and laws of the government ; those,
whoever they be, who, by force, break through, and, by force,
justify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels.
For when men, by entering into society and civil government,
have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation
of property, peace, and unity amongst themselves, those who
set up force again in opposition to the laws, do rebellare—
that is, bring back again the state of war, and are properly
rebels, which they who are in power, by the pretence they
have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their
hands, and the flattery of those about them being likeliest to
do, the properest way to prevent the evil is to show them the
danger and injustice of it who are under the greatest tempta-
tion to run into it. f

227. In both the forementioned cases, when either the
legislative is changed, or the legislators act contrary to the
end for which they were constituted, those who are guilty
are guilty of rebellion. For if any one by force takes away

»
310 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

the established legislative of any society, and the laws by
them made, pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away
the umpirage which every one had consented to for a peace-
able decision of all their controversies, and a bar to the state
of war amongst them. They who remove or change the
legislative take away this decisive power, which nobody can
have but by the appointment and consent of the people, and
so destroying the authority which the people did, and nobody
else can set up, and introducing a power which the people
hath not authorized, actually introduce a state of war, which
is that of force without authority ; and thus by removing the
legislative established by the society, in whose decisions the
people acquiesced and united as to that of their own will,
they untie the knot, and expose the people anew to the state
of war. And if those, who by force take away the legislative,
are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has been shown, can
be no less esteemed so, when they who were set up for the
protection and preservation of the people, their liberties and
properties shall by force invade and endeavour to take them
away; and so they putting themselves into a state of war
with those who made them the protectors and guardians of
their peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggravation,
rebellantes, rebels.
228. But if they who say it lays a foundation for rebellion
mean that it may occasion civil wars or intestine broils to
tell the people they are absolved from obedience when
illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties,
and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were
their magistrates when they invade their ae contrary:
to the trust put in them, and that, therefore, this doctrine is
not to be allowed, being so destructive to the peace of the
world ; they may as well say, upon the same ground, that
honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this
may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come
in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends
his own right, but on him that invades his neighbour’s. If
the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has for
peace sake to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I
desire it may be considered what a kind of peace there will
be in the world which consists only in violence and rapiney
and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of
robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.  3%1

admirable peace betwixt the mighty and the mean, when the
lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat to be torn by the
imperious woif? Polyphemus’s den gives us a perfect
pattern of such a peace. Such a government wherein
Ulysses and his companions had nothing to do but quietly
to suffer themselves to be devoured. And no doubt Ulysses,
who was a prudent man, preached up pagsive obedience, and
exhorted them to a quiet submission by representing to them
of what concernment ‘peace was to mankind, and by showing
the inconveniencies might happen if they should offer to
resist Polyphemus, who had now the power over them.

229. The end of government is the good of mankind ; and 4
which is best for mankind, that the copie wort be always
exposed to the boundless will of tyranny, or that the -rulers
should be sometimes liable to be opposed when they grow
exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the
destruction, and not the preservation, of the properties of
their people Pres SO

~230. Nor let any one say that mischief can arise from
hence as often as it shall please a busy head or turbulent
spirit to desire the alteration of the government. It is true
such men may stir whenever they please, but it will be only
to their own just ruin and perdition. For till the mischief
be grown general, and the ill designs of the rulers become
visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part, the
people, who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves *
by resistance, are not apt to stir. The examples of particular
injusticé or oppression of here and there an unfortunate
man moves them not. But if they universally have a per-
suasion grounded upon manifest evidence that designs are
carrying on against their liberties, and the general course and
tendency of things cannot but give them strong suspicions ot
the evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed
for it? Who can help it if they, who might avoid it, bring
themselves into this suspicion? Are the people to be blamed
if they have the sense of rational creatures, and can think of
things no otherwise than as they find and feel them? And
is it not rather their fault who put things in such a posture
that they would not have them thought as they are? I
grant that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private
men have sometimes caused great disorders in common-
wealths, and factions have been fatal to states and kingdoms,
gt2 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

But whether the mischief hath oftener begun in the people’s
wantonness, and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of
their rulers, or in the rulers’ insolence and endeavours to get
and exercise an arbitrary power over their people, whether
oppression or disobedience gave the first rise to the disorder,
I leave it to impartial history to determine. This I am sure,
whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about to
invade the rights of either prince or people, and lays the
foundation for overturning the constitution and frame of any
just government, he is guilty of the greatest crime I think
a man is capable of, being to answer for all those mischiefs
of ‘blood, rapine, and desolation, which the breaking to
pieces of governments bring on a country; and he who
does it is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and
pest of mankind, and is to be treated accordingly. .

231. That subjects or foreigners attempting by force on
the properties of any people may be resisted with force is
agreed on all hands; but that magistratés doing the same
thing may be resisted, hath of late been denied ; as if those
who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law
had thereby a power to break those laws by which alone
they were set in a better place than their brethren ; whereas
their offence is thereby the greater, both as being ungrateful
for the greater share they have by the law, and breaking
also that trust which is put into their hands by their
brethren. .

232. Whosoever uses force without right—as every one
does in society who does it without law—puts himself into
a state of war with those against whom he so uses it, and in
that state all former ties are cancelled, all other rights cease,
and every one has a right to defend himself, and to resist the
aggressor. This is so evident that Barclay himself—that
great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings— -is
forced to confess that it is lawful for the people, in some
cases, to resist their king, and that, too, in a chapter
wherein he pretends to show that the Divine law shuts up
the people from all manner of rebellion. Whereby it is
evident, even by his own doctrine, that since they may, in
some cases, resist, all resisting of princes is not rebellion.
His words are these: ‘Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus
tyrannicz crudelitati et furori jugulum semper prebebit ?
Ergone multitudo civitates suas fame, ferro, et flamma
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 313

vastari, seque, conjuges, et liberos fortunz ludibrio et
tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vite pericula omnesque
fmiserias et molestias 4 rege deduci patientur? Num illis
quod omni animantium generi est a natura tributum,
denegari debet, ut sc. vim vi repellant, seseque ab injuria
tueantur? Huic breviter responsum sit, populo universo
negari defensionem, que juris naturalis est, neque ultionem
que preter naturam est adversus regem concedi debere.
Quapropter si rex non in singulares tantum personas
aliquot privatum odium exerceat, sed corpus etiam reipub-
lice, cujus ipse caput est—z.c., totum populum, vel insignem
aliquam ejus partem immani et intolerand4 szvitia seu
tyrannide divexet; populo, quidem hoc casu resistendi ac
tuendi se ab injuriad potestas competit, sed tuendi se
tantum, non enim in principem invadendi: et restituendz
injuriz illate, non recedendi 4 debita reverentia propter
acceptum injuriam. Presentem denique impetum pro-
pulsandi non vim preeteritam ulciscendi jus habet. Horum
enim alterum a natura est, ut vitam scilicet corpusque
tueamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, ut inferior de
superiori supplicium sumat. Quod itaque populus malum,
antequam factum sit, impedire potest, ne fiat, id postquam
factum est, in regem authorem sceleris vindicare non
potest, populus igitur hoc amplitis quam privatus quispiam
habet : Quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto
Buchanano, nullum nist in patientia remedium superest.
Cum ille si intolerabilis tyrannis est (modicum enim ferre
omnino debet) resistere cum reverentia possit.”—Barclay,
“ Contra Monarchomachos,” |. iii., c. 8.

In English thus :—

233. “ But if any one should ask: Must the people, then,
always lay themselves open to the cruelty and rage of
tyranny—must they see their cities pillaged and laid in
ashes, their wives and children exposed to the tyrant’s lust
and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their king
to ruin and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet
sit still—must men alone be debarred the common privilege
of opposing force with force, which Nature allows so freely
to all other creatures for their preservation from injury? I
answer : Self-defence is a part of the law of Nature; nor
can it be denied the community, even against.the king
himself ; but to revenge themselves upon him must, by no
314 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

means, be allowed them, it being not agreeable to that
law. Wherefore, if the king shall show an _ hatred, not
only to some particular persons, but sets himself against the
body of the commonwealth, whereof he is the head, and
shall, with intolerable ill-usage, cruelly tyrannize over the
whole, or a considerable part of the people; in this case
the people have a right to resist and defend themselves
from injury; but it must be with this caution, that they
only defend themselves, but do not attack their prince.
They may repair the damages received, but must not, for
any provocation, exceed the bounds of due reverence and
respect. They may repulse the present attempt, but must
not revenge past violences. For it is natural for us to
defend life and limb, but that an inferior should punish a
superior is against nature. ‘The mischief which is designed
them the people may prevent before it be done, but, when
it is done, they must not revenge it on the king, though
author of the villany. This, therefore, is the privilege of
the people in general above what any private person hath:
That particular men are allowed, by our adversaries them-
selves (Buchanan only excepted), to have no other remedy
but patience; but the body of the people may, with

| respect, resist intolerable tyranny, for when it is but mode-

rate they ought to endure it.”

234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power
allows of resistance.

235. It is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to
no purpose :

First. He says it must be with reverence.

Secondly. It must be without retribution or punishment ;
and the reason he gives is, “because an inferior cannot
punish a superior.”

First. How to resist force without striking again, or how
to strike with reverence, will need some skill to make intelli-
gible. He that shall oppose an assault only with a shield
to receive the blows, or in any more respectful posture,
without a sword in his hand to abate the confidence and
force of the assailant, will quickly be at an end of his resist-
ance, and will find such a defence serve only to draw on
himself the worse usage. This is as ridiculéus a way of
resisting as Juvenal thought it of fighting; Udi tu pulsas,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 318

ego vapulo tantum. And the success of the combat will be
unavoidably the same he there describes it :

“ Libertas pauperis hec est ;
Pulsatus rogat, et pugnis concisus, adorat,
Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.”

This will always be the event of such an imaginary resist-
ance, where men may not strike again. He, therefore, who
may resist must be allowed to strike. And then let our
author, or anybody else, join a knock on the head or a cut
on the face with as much reverence and respect as he thinks
fit. He that can reconcile blows and reverence may, for
aught I know, deserve for his pains a civil, respectful cudgel-
ling wherever he can meet with it.

Secondly. As to his second—“ An inferior cannot punish
a superior’—that is true, generally speaking, whilst he is his
superior. But to resist force with force, being the state of
war that levels the parties, cancels all former relation of
reverence, respect, and superiority ; and then the odds that
remains is—that he who opposes the unjust aggressor has
this superiority over him, that. he has a right, when he
prevails, to punish the offender, both for the breach of the
peace and all the evils that followed upon it. Barclay,
therefore, in another place, more coherently to himself,
denies it to be lawful to resist a king in any case. But he
there assigns two cases whereby a king may unking himself.
His words are:

. Quid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo
sese erigere atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma
capere et invadere jure suo suaque authoritate liceat? Nulli
certe quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex divinis id obstat,
Regem honorificato, et qui potestati resistit, Dei ordina-
tioni resistit; non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est
quam si id committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse de-
sinat. Tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit atque in privatis
constituit liber ; hoc modo populus et superior efficitur, re-
verso ad eum scilicet jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum
in interregno habuit. At sunt paucorum generum commissa
ejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt. At ego cum plurima
animo perlustrem, duo tantum invenio, duos, inquam, casus
quibus ‘rex ipso facto ex rege non regem se facit et omni
316 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,

honore et dignitate regali atque in subditos potestate desti-
tuit; quorum etiam meminit Winzerus. Horum unus est,
si regnum disperdat, quemadmodum de Nerone fertur, quod
is nempe senatum populumque Romanum atque adeo urbem
ipsam ferro flammaque vastare, ac novas sibi sedes quzrere
decrevisset. Et de Caligula, quod palam denunciarit se
neque civem neque principem senatul amplius. fore, imque
animo habuerit, interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo,
quoque Alexandriam commigrare, ac ut populum uno ictu
interimeret, unain ei cervicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis
meditatur et molitur serio, omnem regnandi curam et ani-
mum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit,
ut dominus servi pro derelicto habiti, dominium.

236. ‘Alter casus est, si rex in alicujus clientelam se
contulit, ac regnum quod liberum 4 majoribus et popuio tra-
ditum accepit, alienze ditioni mancipavit. Nam tunc quam-
vis forte non e4 mente id agit populo plane ut incommodet ;
tamen quia quod preecipuum est regize dignitatis amisit, ut
summus scilicet in regno secundum Deum sit, et solo Deo
inferior, atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel in-
vitum, cujus libertatem sartam et tectam conservare debuit,
in alterius gentis ditionem et potestatem dedidit ; hac velut
quadam regni abalienatione effecit, ut nec quod ipse in regno
imperium habuit retineat, nec in eum cui collatum voluit,
juris quicquam transferat, atque ita eo facto liberum jam
et suze potestatis populum relinquit, cujus rei exemplum
unur: annales Scotici suppeditant.”—-Barclay, ‘‘ Contra Mo-
narchomachos,” lib. iii., c. 16.

Which may be thus Englished :—

237. ‘“ What, then, can there no case happen wherein the
people may of right, and by their own authority, help them-
selves, take arms, and set upon their king, imperiously do-
mineering over them? None at all whilst he remains a king.
“Honour the king,’ and ‘he that resists the power, resists
the ordinance of God,’ are Divine oracles that will never
permit it. The people, therefore, can never come by a power
over him unless he does something that makes him cease to
be a king; for then he divests himself of his crown and
dignity, and returns to the state of a private man, and the
people become free and superior; the power which they
had in the interregnum, before they crowned him king, de-
volving to them again. But there are but few miscarriages
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 317

which bring the matter to this state. After considering it’

well on all sides, I can find but two. Two cases there are,
I say, whereby a king, ¢so facto, becomes no king, and loses
all power and regal authority over his people, which are also
taken notice of by Winzerus. The first is, if he endeavour
to overturn the government—that is, if he have a purpose
and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it is
recorded of Nero that he resolved to cut off the senate and
people of Rome, lay the city waste with fire and sword, and
then remove to some other place; and of Caligula, that he
openly declared that he would be no longer a head to the
people or senate, and that he had it in his thoughts to cut
off the worthiest men of both ranks, and then retire to
Alexandria ; and he wished that the people had but one
neck that he might despatch them all at a blow. Such de-
signs as these, when any king harbours in his thoughts, and
seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and
thought of the commonwealth, and, consequently, forfeits
the power of governing his subjects, as a master does the
dominion over his slaves whom he hath abandoned.

238. “The other case is, when a king makes himself the
dependent of another, and subjects his kingdom, which his
ancestors left him, and the people put free into his hands, to
the dominion of another. For however, perhaps, it may not
be his. intention to prejudice the people, yet because he has
hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity—viz., to be
next and immediately under God, supreme in his kingdom ;
and also because he betrayed or forced his people, whose
liberty he ought to have carefully preserved, into the power

and dominion of a foreign nation. By this, as it were,

alienation of ‘his kingdom, he himself loses the power he
‘had in it before, without transferring any the least right to
those on whom he would have bestowed it; and so by
this act sets the people free, and leaves them at their own
disposal. One example of this is to be found in the
Scotch annals.” :

239. In these cases Barclay, the great champton of abso-
lute monarchy, is forced to allow that a king may be
resisted, and ceasesto be a king. That is, in short, not to
multiply cases! In whatsoever he has no authority, there he
is no ‘king, and may be ‘resisted: for wheresoever the
authority ceases, the king ceases too, and becomes like other

é
318 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

men who have no authority. And these two cases he ins
stances in, differ little from those above mentioned, to be
destructive to governments, only that he has omitted the
principle from which his doctrine flows, and that is the
breach of trust in not preserving the form of government
agreed on, and in not intending the end of government
itself, which is the public good and preservation of property.
When a king has dethroned himself, and put himself in a
state of war with his people, what shall hinder them from
prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any other
man, who has put himself into a state of war with them,
Barclay, and those of his opinion, would do well to tell us.
Bilson, a bishop of our Church, and a great stickler for the
power and prerogative of princes, does, if I mistake not, in
his treatise of ‘“ Christian Subjection,” acknowledge that
princes may forfeit their power and their title to the obedi-
ence of their subjects ; and if there needed authority in a
case where reason is so plain, I could send my reader to
Bracton, Fortescue, and the author of the “ Mirror,” and-
others, writers that cannot be suspected to be ignorant of
our government, or enemies to it. But I thought Hooker
alone might be enough to satisfy those men who, relying on
him for their ecclesiastical polity, are by a strange fate
carried to deny those principles upon which he builds it.
Whether they are herein made the tools of cunninger work-
men, to pull down their own fabric, they were best look.
This I am sure, their civil policy is so new, so dangerous, and
so destructive to both rulers and people, that as former
ages never could bear the broaching of it; so it may be
hoped, those to come, redeemed from the impositions of
these Egyptian under-taskmasters will abhor the memory of
such servile flatterers, who, whilst it seemed to serve their
turn, resolved all government into absolute tyranny, and
would have all men born to what their mean souls fitted
them—slavery.

240. Here it is like the common question will be made,
Who shall be judge whether the prince or legislative act
contrary to their trust? This, perhaps, ill-affected_ and
factious men may spread amongst the people, when the
prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I
teply, The people shall be judge; for who shall be judge
whether his trustee or deputy acts well and according to
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. 34

the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him and must,
by having deputed him, have still a power to discard him
when he fails in his trust? If this be reasonable in par-
ticular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in
that of the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions
is concerned and also where the evil, if not prevented, is
greater, and the redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous ?

241. But, farther, this question, Who shall be judge?
cannot mean that there is no judge at all. For where there
is no judicature on earth to decide controversies amongst
men, God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is true, is judge
of the nght. But every man is judge for himself, as in all
other cases so in this, whether another hath put himself
into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal
to the supreme Judge, as Jephtha did.

242. If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of
the people in a matter where the law is silent or doubtful,
and the thing be of great consequence, I should think the
proper umpire in such a case should be the body of the
people. For in cases where the prince hath a trust reposed
in him, and is dispensed from the common, ordinary rules
of the law, there, if any men find themselves aggrieved,
and think the prince acts contrary to, or beyond that trust,
who so proper to judge as the body of the people (who at
first lodged that trust in him) how far they meant it should
extend? But if the prince, or whoever they be in the
administration, decline that way of determination, the appeal
then lies nowhere but to Heaven. Force between either
persons who have no known superior on earth, or which
permits no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a
state of war, wherein the appeal lies only to Heaven; and
in that state the injured party must judge for himself when
he will think fit to make use of that appeal and put himself
upon it.

ae Toconclude. The power that every individual gave
the society when he entered into it can never revert to the
individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always
remain in the community ; because without this there can
be no community—no commonwealth, which is contrary to
the original agreement; so also when the society hath
placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to continue
in them and their successors, with direction and authonity
320 TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

for providing such successors, the legislative can never
revert to the people whilst that government lasts ; because,
having provided a legislative with power to continue for
ever, they have given wp their political power to thé legis-
lative, and cannot resume it. But if they have set limits to
the duration of their legislative, and made this supreme
power in any person or assembly only temporary ; or else,
when, by the miscarriages of those in authority, it is for-
feited ; upon the forfeiture of their rulers, or at the deter-
mination of the time set, it reverts to the society, and the
people have a right to act as_supreme, and contiriue the.
legislative in themselves or place it in a new form, or new
ands, ‘as they think good.

———~

 

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