CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY THE GIFT or NEWTON C. FARR CLASS OF 1909 Cornell University Library E591 .W17 Cc an TT 3 1924 032 779 427 olin NAVAL SCENES AND REMINISCENCKS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES, ON THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN WATERS DURING THE YEARS 1861, 1862 AND 1863. WITH THE HISTORY OF THAT PERIOD. COMPARED AND CORRECTED FROM AUTHENTIC SOURCES. BY Rear-ApmrraL H. WALKE, U. 5S. N. “United we stand, divided we fall.” ‘Our country, right or wrong.” WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND DIAGRAMS. NEW-YORK : F. R. REED & COMPANY. 1877. Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1877, By Henry WALEE, In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. PREFACE. THE main object of this work is to narrate, minutely and correctly, some of those interesting scenes of the late war, in the very valuable services rendered by the gun- boats on our Western waters, and to adjust, or correct, important perversions and mistakes which occur in the official and other reports. Also to commemorate the conduct of some of those officers and men of the flotilla, who richly deserve the thanks of their country, among whom were those patriotic Western men who fought and labored with our flotilla to drive the enemy from the Mississippi. Sailors, though reckless and improvident, are generous and uncomplaining, but they are not insensible to the neglect and wrong which they so often suffer, and they rely upon the honor of those under whom they have faithfully served, for a fair acknowledgment of their services in the annals of their country. The official reports of the battles of BELMont, Forr Henry, Fort Donetson, Istanp No. 10, Fort Prttow, Mempuis, on the Yazoo, and at GrRanp GULF, are too brief or defective to give the public an adequate idea of those important naval engagements, especially as to the part taken by the various gunboats engaged, and it is, therefore, but an act of justice to the officers and men that A TRUE AND IMPARTIAL statement should be placed iv PREFACE, before the country, that future writers and historians may not continue to give currency to the many errors and perversions of history that have already appeared. This work will notice also, briefly but carefully, the valuable services of some of our eminent non-combatants who built and equipped our Mississippi flotilla. The authority upon which this work is based, are the reports and letters of eye-witnesses, the log-books of the boats, and official statements; the most important of which are compared with each other, and with statements from trustworthy sources other than those mentioned. We are taught by experience that truth and imparti- ality do not always characterize a history because it has the sanction and direct countenance of a government, and our Waval History of the Rebellion, issued under the auspices of the Government and Navy Department, does not seem to be free from the charge implied in the preceding lines, or those expressed by the Secretary him- self in those below. That history is elegantly written and has been highly eulogized, yet, with due deference to our Navy Department, we are obliged to state that it fails to bring out ‘‘the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,” to the extent, at least, that was duly expected and seriously promised by its author. It is now more than fifteen years since the war commenced, and therefore it is time, we think, to commence a reform- atory work in defense of the truth. We will not only correct mistakes, but also state many important facts which have been omitted, concealed or denied, in our his- tories relating to the affairs herein treated. The Navy Department was, no doubt, burdened with an immense number of conflicting statements, both official and private, yet making allowance for that, it is still passing strange that official reports of our Navy should deny, omit or suppress, so many interesting and import- ant facts in regard to the honorable services of some of our officers, while they bestowed special praise on others. This injustice may be explained in some degree, and without imputing unworthy motives to anybody, by the fact that commanders-in-chief are often too hasty and PREFAOE. v confident in accepting the brief reports of battles and movements, made by their subordinates, and in forward- ing the same to the Department without proper scrutiny, if they are satisfactory to themselves. These young subordinates, therefore, can often make or mar the repu- tation (for a time at least) of those officers who rely on the faithful discharge of their duty for its reward, but who, unfortunately, stand in the way of their ju- niors. This may seem a severe criticism upon the moral of our Naval aristocracy, but we most humbly submit that our Navy, like most human institutions, is full of selfish- ness and envy. The Springfield Republican, referring to General Sherman's Memoirs, says: ‘‘The heroism and self sacrifice that illumine every page of the history of the war, were alloyed by jealousies, bickerings and intrigues, of which the people at home had, and have, but a very vague conception, The pure gold was there, but the dross was there also. ‘“Upon one point there will be a general agreement ; since these controversies over the facts of the war were inevitable, it is every way better that they should come now than the next century, and that they should be con- ducted by the actors, rather than their great-grandsons. “In precipitating them General Sherman has done history a service, the value of which cannot be easily exaggerated.” Professor Swinton, who was well known as one of the best correspondents during the war of a New York paper, says: ‘‘ Most of the histories of that war, and the official reports written by some of its generals, were largely overdrawn, and written rather with a view to manufacture fame with some military men, who were to the history, what the hero or heroine is to the romance.”’ He intimates that ‘‘newspaper correspondents did not view the battles and movements of the late war in pre- cisely the same light as did their more interested actors.”’ The following are the sentiments of the Honorable Secretary Welles, on the merits of its history, published Vi. PREFAOR. in the Army and Navy Journal, of September 18,’ 1875 : “Tt would be a difficult and probably an impossible task to correct the misrepresentations, errors and per- versions in relation to the transactions and events of the late civil war. Many of the mistakes are doubtless inad- vertent—false impressions—which may be imputed to careless or superficial examination or inquiry, but not a few were, and are, designed and deliberate misstatements. The result of thése misstatements has been, as was in- tended, the creation of false history, particularly as regards the Navy and the Navy Department. Durinc the Rebellion, these errors usually passed uncorrecti ; but the seeds, sown by jealous rivalry and malevolent partisanship, are bearing vicious fruit. The fictions then planted and spread abroad are made the basis of history. Official documents of the highest character indorse, prop- agate and perpetuate them, so that twelve years after these events occurred, the highest judicial tribunal in the land declares these errors to be ‘ undisputed facts.’ ”’ While giving full credit to the higher officers, we have not failed to remember those humble actors who fought and suffered, but whose deeds are unknown to fame, and whose reward is generally in their own conscience of duty done. The ILLUSTRATIONS and DIAGRAMS are true to nature and to fact, and will, no doubt, be found interesting, as well as instructive. A complete INDEX OF NAMES will be found in the back of the book for easy reference, which contains the names of not only the officers but also of the men mentioned in this work. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. PENSACOLA. Bien Capture of the Navy Yard at Pensacola, the Navy Hospital, Fort Bar- rancas and Fort McCrea by the Confederates. . . . . .... CHAPTER II. ORGANIZATION OF THE WESTERN FLOTILLA. Building the first Gunboats.—Difficulties to be overcome.—Acknow- ledgments of special service.—Admiral Foote at St. Louis.—The Mis- sissippi Pilots.—Statement of Mr. Hines.—The Loyalty of the West- ern Pilots.—The Slaughter Pen.—Pilots not recognized as Officers. —Mr. Tennyson’s Statement.—A Flood at Cairo.—The Cairo Naval Depot commanded by A. M. Pennock.—Early History of the Missis- sippi Flotilla.—Letter from Commander Rodgers.—Gunboats ‘‘ Tay- lor,” ‘ Lexington,” and ‘‘Conestoga.”—Searching for Confederate Batteries. —Reconnoissances at Columbus.—The Gunboat “‘ Taylor.” — Historians reticent. 2. 2. 2 1 1 1 ee ee eee ew we CHAPTER III. BATTLE OF BELMONT. The ‘‘ Taylor” and the ‘‘Lexington.”—General Grant’s Order to the Gunboats.—An Historian’s Blunder corrected.—Descriptions of the Battles by Newspaper Correspondents.—The Gunboats protecting Grant’s Army.—The Naval and Military forces successfully co- operating. —Enemy’s testimony.—No official Report made to the Navy Department.—General Grant’s Official Report.—Commander Walke’s Report.—Admiral Foote’s treatment of Insubordinate Officers.—Cap- tain Walke’s share in the Battle of Belmont.—The Losses on both sides inthe Conflict. . © 2 1 6 ee we we ew we ww we ww BD CHAPTER IV. BATTLE OF FORT HENRY. The Plated Gunboats of 1862.—The ‘‘Carondelet.”—Attack on Fort Henry.—The Torpedoes first discovered.—Plan of the Attack.— The ‘Essex ” disabled.—Flag-Officer Foote’s Official Report to [vii] vill CONTENTS. Secretary Welles.—The ‘‘Carondelet” ashore, and the Flag-Officer greatly excited.—Confederate Account of the Engagement.—The Fort formally surrendered.—Interesting Statement of the Second Mas- ter of the ‘‘ Kssex.”—After the Battle. Sa eee aera CHAPTER V. BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. Letters of Commander Walke to Flag-Officer Foote.—Newspaper De- scriptions of the Action.—A Startling Incident.—Casualties in the Fleet.—How different Results might have been attained.—Captain Walke and the‘ Carondelet.”—Two Interesting Letters from a Partici- pantin the Battle.—Bursting of a Gutt.—The “ Conestoga,” ‘‘ Lexing- ton,” and ‘‘ Tyler.”—The damage sustained by the ‘‘ Carondelet.”— Confederate General Pillow’s Account.—Inaccuracy in the Naval Rec- ords.—Why Mistakes should be corrected-‘now. . . . . . . «> CHAPTER VI. AFTER THE BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. Congratulatory Order of Flag-Officer Foote.—Precautionary Move- ments.—An important Reconnoissance.—The Facts relating thereto.— A Foolish Misrepresentation.—Failure of an Experiment.—The special Danger of Service on the Western Gunboats.—Letters of Commander Walke and Flag-Officer Foote.—Our Flotilla nearing Columbus.—The Rebel Gunboat ‘‘Grampus.” . . . . . 0.0.06. ee ee CHAPTER VII. BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. The Movements of the Confederates for a More Defensive Position.—The Attack on Fort No. 1, about Three Miles above Island No. 10, by our Fleet, with the Mortars, on the 17th, 18th, and 19th of March, 1862.—Defects of the Enemy’s Position.—General Pope Cutting off the Retreat.—A Request Denied.—The Bombardment of the Forts.— “Well done, old ‘ Carondelet.’ —A Critical Situation.—Effect of Erro- neous Reports in our Histories.—Flag-Officer Foote’s Report Cor- rected.—A Brilliant Exploit.—Commodore Hollins’ Jron-clads.—Gen- eral Pope’s Plan for Capturing Island No. 10.—Council of War on Board the “ Benton.”—Captain Walke’s Voluntary Offer to run the Blockade.—Strange Omissions in the Naval History.—First Example of Running Blockades on the Mississippi.Letters of Flag-Officer HOOLES os. 14s seer ae owt el ms 8 a ie ap a ee oe, SE le CHAPTER VIII. RUNNING THE GAUNTLET AT ISLAND NO. 10. Preliminary Correspondence of the Commander-in-chief.— What was rte- quired of the ‘ Carondelet.”—Running the Blockade.—Flag-Officer Foote to General Pope.—A description by a Correspondent.—Captain Walke congratulated on his Achievement.—Importance of the Service rendered.—Letter of Flag-Officer Foote to General Pope.—Captain Walke’s report.—A contemplated Attack by the Fleet which was never made.—Unequal praise.—A description by the Correspondent of The New York Times, and also by the only Correspondent on board the PAGE 50 71 91 99 “Carondelet,” from Zhe Missouri Democrat.—Faitbful word-painting. 120 CONTENTS. 1x CHAPTER IX. CAPTURE OF THE CONFEDERATE BATTERIES AND THEIR ARMY BELOW ISLAND NO. 10, APRIL 6 AND 7, 1862. PAGE Visit of Secretary of War and Colonel Scott.---General Pope’s letter of Instructions to Captain Walke.—Divine Service and a Reconnois- sance.—General Pope’s Forces and the Gunboats Capture the Rebel Batteries below No. 10, and the Confederate Army on the Retreat.— The ‘‘ Carondelet’s” Island Tour of Observation on the Enemy’s Line of Forts.—Capture of one of his Batteries.—Captain Walke’s Official Report.—General Pope’s Letter of Instructions.—The “ Pittsburg’s” Arrival.—Extent of the Victory at Island No. 10.—Misapprehensions Reviewed and Corrected.—Extract from the Log-Book of the ‘‘Ca- rondelet.”—The Letter of Thanks from Secretary Welles.—Comments of Southern Journals. . 2. 2. 1. 1. 1 1 1 we ee ew we «148 CHAPTER X. ISLAND No. 10. Confederate Accounts of the Capture of Island No. 10.—Letter from an Officer on board the ‘‘ Carondelet.”—Brief Review. . .. . 175 CHAPTER XI. BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS. Official Report of Flag-Officer Farragut to the Secretary of the Navy.— Commencement and Progress of the Bombardment of Fort Jackson.— Attack on Forts Jackson and St. Philip.—Announcement of the cap- ture of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and Surrender of New Orleans. —Flag-Officer Farragut’s Detailed Report of the Battle of the Missis- sippii—His General Order.—Correspondence relating to the Surren- der of New Orleans.—Report of Flag-Officer Farragut Commending the Conduct of those under his Command.—Congratulations of the Secretary of the Navy.—Operations of the Mortar Flotilla.—Com- mander Porter’s Announcement of the Passage of the Forts by the Fleet, and the Progress of the Bombardment of the Forts by the Mor- tar Flotilla. —Commander Porter's Detailed Report.—The Battle and Capture of New Orleans not recorded by the War Department.—His- tory set right by the Correspondence of Admiral Farragut and Rear- Admiral Bailey.—Desperate Fighting of the ‘‘ Hartford,” and the lead- ing Gunboats, “Cayuga,” ‘‘ Pensacola,” ‘‘ Oneida,” and ‘‘ Varuna.” — The Gallant Conduct of our Marines . . . . «se + + « © 200 CHAPTER XII NAVAL OPERATIONS ABOVE FORT PILLOW. Preparations to attack Fort Pillow.—Flag-Officer Foote incapacitated. —The first Fleet Fight of the War.—Serious Inaccuracies in the Offi- cial Reports.—The Gunboats not correctly Placed.—Recapitulation of the Actual Facts.—General Remarks. . . . . 2. 2. 2 « we se CHAPTER XIII. EVACUATION OF FORT PILLOW. Devices for Strengthening the Gunboats.—The “ Carondelet’s” Plan Approved of by Admiral Davis.—Attempt to Dislodge our Gunboats. x CONTENTS. PAGE —Demoralizing Effect of our Bombs.—The Evacuation Reported.— The Rebel Steamer ‘‘Sovereign.”—Tennyson’s Narrative of the Evac- uation.—History Set Right.—Important Correspondence. . . . . 269- CHAPTER XIV. BATTLE OF MEMPHIS. The Federal Fleet Engaged.—The Battle Opened by the Enemy.—Re- sults of the Fight.—Grandeur of the Scene Portrayed.—Explosion of the ‘‘ Jeff. Thompson’s ” Magazine.—Flag-Officer’s Report of the Sur- render of Memphis.—Colonel Ellett’s Report.—Extracts from Press Correspondence.—Confederate Acknowledgment of our Victory.—An Enormous Amount of Rebel Property destroyed.—An Atrocious Act that cannot be denied._A Well-Earned Eulogy of the Mississippi Sailors.—Expedition up the White River.—Explosion of the ‘‘ Mound City.”—Scenes on the Mississippi. . , . . . . . . . © « . QUT CHAPTER XV. ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE ‘‘CARONDELET” AND THE , RAM ‘‘ ARKANSAS.” Description of the ‘‘ Arkansas.”—Fortunate Preparations for Action made by Captain Walke.—An Unequal Contest.—Captain Walke’s Report of the Fight.—Pilot Denning Complimented.—The Armament of the ‘ Carondelet.”—Extract from Admiral Farragut’s Report.— A Slander Answered.—A Special Correspondent’s Description of the Fight with the ‘‘ Arkansas.”—An Extract from De Soto’s Letter.— Letters from Varied Sources.—Frank Leslie’s Illustrated News Ac- count.—No Detailed Official Record of this Battle published.—Com- mander Brown’s Account.—The Epidemic of the Season. . . . . 803 CHAPTER XVI. RECONNOISSANCES AND GUARD DUTY. i Burning of the ‘Sallie Wood.”—Rescue of Lieutenant Wing.—The “Carondelet” at Helena.—Letter of Admiral Davis.—Sad Times for the Navy in the West.—The Injustice of the Press.—The Loyal South- erners.—Naval Orders. . 2 2 2 1 1 we we eww ww BG CHAPTER XVII. HELENA, VICKSBURG AND YAZOO. An Instance of Insubordination,—Report of Captain Walke to Admiral Porter.—General Order.—Blockading the Yazoo.—The Cairo Sunk by a Torpedo.—Attack upon the Enemy’s Batteries at Drumgold’s Bluff.—A severe Battle.—An ill-advised but gallant Undertaking.— Comprehensive Orders by Admiral Polen coan Effective Blockade. ---The ‘‘Carondelet ” ordered to Protect Island No. 10.—Reports from General McClernand and Admiral Porter. . . . . . . 2. « « 883 CHAPTER XVII. THE “LAFAYETTE.” Ram Gunboat ‘‘ Lafayette.” —Her Debut upon the “ Father of Waters.” —Breaking the Rebel Blockade at Vicksburg and Grand Gulf.—The “Lancaster,” ‘“‘Switzerland” and “Dummy.” ...... . . 847 CONTENTS. x1 CHAPTER XIX. A REVIEW OF THE FLEET PASSING VICKSBURG. PiGh Letter from an Officer of the “Lafayette” to The New York Times.— Visit from Ladies of the Sanitary Commission.—Running the Block- ade at Vicksburg.—Correspondence of The Cincinnati Commercial. . 353 CHAPTER XX. ADMIRAL PORTER'S FLEET BELOW VICKSBURG. Correspondence of The New York Times.—After the Battle.—Confeder- ate Testimony to the actions of the ‘‘ Lafayette,” and their ae tions on the Imaginary Destruction of that Vessel. . . . . 363 CHAPTER XXI. BATTLE OF GRAND GULF. Admiral Porter’s Plan of Action.—Captain Hoel chosen as ‘‘ Leader.” —The Fleet Advances.—Battle of the Fort.—An Incident on Board the ‘‘ Lafayette.”—A trick of the Enemy.—Admiral Porter’s Official Account.—Captain Walke’s Report.—A misleading Diagram.—Oficial Documents.—Letters to The New Albany Ledger.—Congratulatory Let- ter to Admiral Porter on the Fall of Vicksburg, by the Bonne Secretary of the Navy.—List of Boats and Officers. . . . . 872 . CHAPTER XXII. FIRST EXPEDITION TO ALEXANDRIA, LA. Blockading the Mouth of the Red River.—Destruction of Simmsport. —Expression of Confidence in the Gunboats.—Report of Captain Walke.—Statement of an Officer of the ‘‘Lafayette.”—The Rebel Version.—Unfair Distribution of Medals of Honor. orders to oEne: ceed to Vicksburg.—A Brutal Act. . . . 2... . 394 CHAPTER XXIII SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VICKSBURG. Reports of Admiral Porter.—Report of Adeuben ye George M. Bache, —Death of Foote.—Order of Convoy. : CHAPTER XXIV. CONTRABANDS AND GUERRILLAS. Contrabands and Guerrillas.—Protecting the Negroes.—Incidents on the Mississippi.—Guerrillas.—“‘ Lafayette ” and “ ake ” at the Red River.—Contraband Trade.—Remarks. . . 414 CHAPTER XXV. HELENA AND TUNICA BEND. Report of Commander Phelps.—Report of General Prentiss. ee Welles’ Letter.—Report of cung, Master Hubbell. . . . 422 CONTENTS. xii ! CHAPTER XXVI. BATTLE OF MOBILE. PAGE Passing the Forts.—Loss of the ‘‘ Tecumseh.”—The Ram ‘‘ Tennessee.” —Serious Mistake.—Surrender of the ‘'Tennessee.”—Confederate es Account of the Battle . . . . 1... APPENDIX. List of Vessels and their Stations.—Letters of Distinguished Officers.— Official Orders relating to the Mississippi Flotilla.—Admiral Porter’s Farewell Address.—List of Vessels and Officers at Battle of New Orleans.—List of Vessels and Officers at Battle of Mobile . . . . 441 ‘VIOOVSNdd LY CUVA AAVN GHL JO YAAINEWUNS e “paex AaByy ‘ao warsem ‘Teydsoy ‘Aiddug geo ‘yeomesieg 1 “BAIDOW WoT ‘BULA WOW SCENES AND INCIDENTS. CHAPTER I. PENSACOLA. Capture of the Navy Yard at Pensacola, the Navy Hospital, Fort Barrancas and Fort McCrea by the Confederates. Tux “ History of the Navy during the Rebdellion” should com- mence with the above events, and the actual service then rendered by the Navy in protecting and securing Fort Pickens from falling into the hands of the enemy, as that was one of the first and most important acts of that period. It has not been fairly stated how or by whose agency that fort- ress was saved, and those of the Navy who bore the burden and responsibility of that achievement, are denied the credit due them. One of the most distinguished and intelligent generals of our army is mistaken when he states that the first serious step in the drama of the war was taken on February 16th, 1861, when General Twiggs surrendered his entire command. It is again said that the protection of the St. Louis Arsenal in the winter of 1860-1, was the first event in that war. Now we assert that the surrender of the forts and the Navy Yard, with all the government property at Pensacola, on January 12th, 1861, was one of the first serious blows of the war. The Hon. Gideon Welles, in his excellent narratives referring to this period, and to the forts of New Orleans, &c., says: “General statements, official, semi-official, and otherwise, have been made in relation to the relief of these forts, especially in regard to Fort Pickens, in the spring of 1861. None of the published accounts, 1 [1] 2 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. however, present a full and correct narrative of all the facts and circumstances connected with the relief and reinforcement, on two several occasions, of that fortress. The different statements may be accounted for, in part at least, by the fact that there were sev- eral movements at different dates.” This seems to be an apology for the defects in this particular part of our naval history, but it does not fairly touch the point in question. Our “Naval History” promises facts, and it was well known where the facts could be found at the Navy Department. The true story of this event was as follows: The storeship “Supply,” Commander Walke, arrived at the Pensacola Navy Yard on December 7th, 1860, for stores for the U. 8. squadron at Vera Cruz. On January 9th, 1861, thirty-three days after his arrival, Com- mander Walke was summoned by Commodore Armstrong (then in command of that Navy Yard), to report to him at his office; where also Lieutenant O. H. Berryman, commander of the “ Wyan- dotte,” Commander Farrand, and Lieutenant Renshaw were present. Armstrong communicated to them orders from the Navy Depart- ment, requiring the naval. forces to co-operate with the Army i in the pending emergencies, and Walke was ordered to proceed im- mediately-with the “Supply,” in. company with the “ Wyandotte,” to assist Lieutenant Slemmer of the Army, in transporting his command, ammunitions, and stores from Fort Barrancas to Fort Pickens. On the afternoon of that day, the “Supply” was towed from the yard by the “ Wyandotte,” to an anchorage about three- quarters of a mile distant, where, on account of a dense fog, she remained during the night. At daylight next morning (January 10th), she proceeded to Fort Pickens, where the officers and crew of both vessels were assidu- ously engaged, during that and the next day and intervening night, in performing the duties which had been assigned to them. While at Fort Pickens, on January 10th, Commander Walke received written orders from Commodore Armstrong, of which the following is a copy : ““COMMANDANT’S OFFICE, U. 5. Navy Yarp, PEnsacoua, WARRINGTON, Jan’y 10th, 1861. “Sir: “You will be pleased to proceed with the U. 8. Storeship ‘Supply’ to Fort Pickens, and to furnish to the Commanding Officer of that Fort, such quantities of the provisions on board the ship as he may require for the sub- PENSACOLA. 3 sistence of the men in the Fort, taking his receipt 7m duplicate for the articles so furnished. After having performed this duty, you will return with the ship to the anchorage off this Navy Yard, and complete the loading of her cargo with all possible dispatch. j “‘T am very respectfully, Your ob’nt Servant, James ARMSTRONG, “ Commander Commandant. HENRY WALEE, Commanding U. 8. Storeship < Supply” ‘Bay of Pensacola.” Strict obedience to the latter part of this order would have in- volved the surrender of Fort Pickens, and the capture of the “Supply ” at the surrender of the Navy Yard on the 12th. REPLY. «no doubt, jealous and insubordinate, had increased the elevation of his gun, and just as I was in the act of repeating the captain’s order, pulled his lock string, and blazed away. ee fee ee rane aoe the boom of the can- non’s roar was almost deafening. The wind was blowing across our bows, carrying the smoke away so rapidly as to prevent any obstruction to the view. Our fleet-kept_slowly approaching the fort, and gradually shortening the distance. Our shells, which were fused at fifteen seconds, were reduced to ten, and then to _ : ete ten), five seconds. The elevation of the guns was depressed from seven en degrees-to six, f six, five, ey ee rend then tr deere eee every shot went_straight-home, none from the ‘ Essex’ falling short. “Twenty or thirty minutes after the action had began, some one of the officers ventured to call the attention of Captain Por- ter to the fact that the officers on the other vessels were leaving the spar-decks and going below. ‘Oh, yes,’ says Porter, ‘I see ; we will go too, directly.’ Just then a shot struck the pilot- house, making the splinters fly terribly, as no plating had as yet been put on the pilot-house. At this the order was given for all to go below, and soon all joined us on the gun-deck. Captain Porter, on coming below, addressed the officers and crew, and complimented the first division for their splendid execution, ask- ing us if we did not want to rest, and give three cheers, and they were given with a will. “By orders I turned over the command of the battery to the third master, and ordered the first division to give way to the second. BATTLE OF FORT HENRY. 63 Captain Porter then ordered the first division to the stern battery. This was a precautionary measure the importance of which could scarcely be estimated at that time, but became dreadfully apparent afew moments after. A few of my men, however, reluctant to quit the scene of action, lingered by their guns on the forward gun- deck ; amongst the number was Jack Matthews. In the twinkling of an eye the scene was changed from a blaze of glory to a carni- val of death and destruction. A shot from the enemy pierced the casemate just above the port-hole on the port side, then through the middle boiler, killing Acting Master’s Mate S. B. Brittan, Jr., in its flight, and opening a chasm for the escape of the scalding steam and water. The scene which followed was almost indescrib- able. The writer, who had gone aft in obedience to orders only a few moments before (thus providentially saved) was met by Fourth Master Walker, followed by a crowd of men rushing aft. Walker called to me to go back ; that a shot from the enemy had carried away the steam pipe. I at once ran to the stern of the vessel, and looking out of the stern port, saw a number of our brave fellows struggling in the water. The steam and hot water in the forward gun-deck had driven all who were able to get out of the ports overboard, except a few who were fortunate enough to cling to the casemate outside. On seeing the men in the water, I ordered Mr. Walker to man the boats and pick them up ; Captain Porter, who was badly scalded, being assisted through the port from out- side the casemate by the surgeon, Dr. Thomas Rice, and one of the men. ““When the explosion took place Captain Porter was standing directly in front of the boilers, with his aid, Mr. Brittan, at his side. He at once rushed for the port-hole on the starboard side, and threw himself out, expecting to go into theriver. A seaman (John Walker) seeing his danger, caught him around the waist, and supporting him with one hand, clung to the vessel with the other, until, with the assistance of another seaman, who came to the rescue, they succeeded in getting the captain on to a narrow guard or projection, which ran around the vessel, and thus en- abled him to make his way outside, to the after port, where I met him. Upon speaking to him, he told me that he was badly hurt ; and that I must hunt for Mr. Riley, and if he was disabled I must take command of the vessel, and man the battery again. Mr. Riley was unharmed, and already in the discharge of his duties as Captain Porter’s successor. He had been saved by a sailor (John W. Eagle) from going overboard in much the same 64 SCENES AND INCIDENTS.’ manner that Captain Porter had been. This man Eagle was cap-_ tain of the No. 1 gun, and like Jack Matthews, would not leave his gun, and although badly wounded, with his right hand in a sling, he begged me, with tears in his eyes, not to remove him, but to let him fight his gun. I reported the case to Captain Porter, who decided to let him remain; and this brave fellow fought his gun most admirably through the action, and then ‘capped the climax’ of his bravery and heroism by grasping the casemate with his wounded hand, and clasping Executive Officer Riley with the other one as he was falling overboard, sustaining him until both regained a footing on the projection before men- tioned. “Tn a very few minutes after the explosion our gallant ship (which had, in the language of Flag-Officer Foote, fought most effectually through two-thirds of the engagement), was drifting slowly away from the field of glory; her commander badly wounded, a number of her officers and crew dead at their post, whilst many others were writhing in their last agony. As soon as the scalding steam would admit, the forward gun-deck was ex- plored. The pilots, who were both in the pilot-house, were scalded to death. Marshall Ford, who was steering when the_ explosion took place, was found at his post at t heel, standin aS a ing the signal bell-rope. Pilot James McBride had fallen through the open hatchway to the deck below ; he was still living, but died soon after. The captain’s aid, Mr. S. B. Brittan, Jr., had fallen by the shot as it passed through the gun-deck before enter- ing the boiler. A seaman named James Coffey, who was shot-man to the No. 2 gun, was on his knees in the act of taking a shell from the box to be passed to the loader. The escaping steam and hot water had struck him square in the face, and he met death in that position. Jack Matthews had gone overboad badly scalded. He was picked up by the boats. Third Master Theo. P. Terry was severely scalded, and died in a few days. He was a brave officer. “ Our loss in killed, wounded and missing amounted to 32. Of these.3-were killed instantly, 4 died that night, several were drowned (the number not definitely known), and about one-half the wounded recovered. “The flag-officer continued approaching nearer and nearer to the fort, pouring shot and shell from the boats at still shorter range, . . . until they showed the white flag to surrender BATTLE OF FORT HENRY. 65 When I told Captain Porter that we were victorious, he immediately rallied, and raising himself on his elbow, called for three cheers, and gave two himself, falling exhausted on the mattress in his effort to make the third. A seaman named Jasper P. Breas, who was badly scalded, sprang to his feet, naked to the waist, his jacket and skirt having been removed to dress his wounds, ex- claiming : ‘Surrendered! I must see that with my own eyes be- fore I die.” Before any one could interfere, he clambered up two short flights of stairs to the spar-deck, where he was gladdened with the sight of his own flag proudly and victoriously floating in the breeze. He shouted, ‘Glory to God!’ and sank exhausted on the deck. Poor Jasper died that night, that his country might live. pu —*The Essex’ fired seventy-two shots from two 9-inch guns during the battle. In bedieuGe to baile pede Thales te the powder boys to keep count of the number of charges served to each gun. Job Phillips, a boy fourteen years old, was powder boy. of Naw gus, After the action, Tsifed Job how many shots his gun had fired. He referred me to a memorandum on the whitewashed casemate ; where with a rusty nail he had care- fully and accurately marked every shot his gun had fired ; and his account was corroborated by the gunner in the magazine. This may be considered as a striking example of coolness and bravery in a boy of fourteen, who had never before been under fire.” OTHER ACCOUNTS, The correspondent who was on board the “Cincinnati” and other gunboats, gave the following incidents of this battle : «“ The first. shell_was fired at-hallpast twelve clock, Feb. Ot, 1862. The gunboats approache e fort four abreast, mn the following order. The ‘ Essex’ on the right, then the ‘ Cincinnati,’ ‘ Carondelet,’ and ‘St. Louis.’ The fire was opened at one mile distant from the fort, and continued while the boats steadily advanced, until the fort surrendered, when they were but 450 yards from the fort.” This correspondent also says that “the rebel fire was directed principally at the flag ship, the ‘Cincinnati.”” Another corres- spondent, says, “The enemy’s fire was principally directed to the ‘ Essex,’ &c.” THE “ CINCINNATL” received thirty-one shots, chiefly damaging her where she was not 66 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. iron-plated. Her chimneys, pilot-house, after-cabin, and boats were completely riddled. ‘Two of her guns were disabled. One was struck by a 68-pounder on muzzle. A 32-pounder shot struck on her side, and dented the iron. The only fatal shot from the fort passed through just at the larboard front, killing one man instantly, carrying his head away, and wounding several others. The killed and wounded on board the “Cincinnati” were as follows : Killed, Patrick Casady, head shot away. Wounded, William Fokeman, badly. Oscar H. Pratt, second master, leg badly shattered by a spent ball. Martin Hussey, Geo. Mas- sey, Wm. Curtis, Michael Dalton, and Wm. Avila, slightly wounded. Killed, wounded, and missing on board the gunboat “ Essex ” : Killed, M. P. Ford, Jas. McBride, pilots, scalded to death. S. B. Brittan, master’s mate, head shot away. David Wilson, cap- tain of a gun, James Coffey, and Joshua T. Brice, seamen. Offi- cers wounded, Commodore Porter, and Theodore F. Torey, third master. Seamen wounded, John Matthews, N. McCarty, Peter White, Geo. Nichols, and Samuel Boyer, all badly scalded. John Rodgers, Frances Wilson, Henry H. Agen, B. H. Harring- ton, Wm. O’Brien, Thomas Mullen, W. H. Maxey, F. Sullivan, John O’Hara, John Castillo, J. J. Phillips, B. Louden, and B. Soulin, all slightly scalded. Missing, A. D. Waterman, John Lany, Henry Gramper, Henry Renolds, and James Bedard, all seamen. Some of the seamen jumped overboard. 5S. B. Brittan, Jr. (son of Dr. Brittan, of New York), master’s mate on the “Essex,” was standing so near, and between the captain and paymaster, when the top of his head was shot off, scattering the brains over their clothes. Commodore Foote remained in the pilot-house of the “ Cincin- nati” during the whole of the action. The “St. Louis” was struck by seven shots. She fired one hundred and six rounds, and came out of the fight unhurt, and losing no lives. The “ Carondelet ” also escaped unhurt. The rebels first thought the “ Essex ” was the flag-ship, and fired at her until she was disabled, then fired more constantly at the “Cincinnati.” One of the prisoners had the specifications of the construction of the gun- boats, and they knew where to strike them in the most vital parts. The rebel loss was stated by prisoners taken at six killed, and nine or ten wounded. They struck their flag at 1.40 P.M. BATTLE OF FORT HENRY. 67 OUR GUNBOATS did splendid fighting. We can make no distinction. The “ Cin- cinnati,” however, was in the lead, and flying the flag officer’s pen- dant, the chief mark. In surrendering to our flag-officer, the rebel general remarked : “I am glad to surrender to so-gaHant an officer.” Foote replied, “You do perfectly right, sir, in sur- e ‘racts from the most reliable correspondence from the scene of action, and the interesting letters written on board the gunboats, are of course partial, more or less, according to the nature or circumstances of the writers ; but if suppressed, much of the accurate, minute, and important detail would be lost. Immediately after the surrender of Fort Henry, Admiral Foote returned to Cairo, with the “Cincinnati,” “Essex ” and “St. Louis,” leaving Captain Walke in command afloat at Fort Henry, with the “ Carondelet,” the “Taylor,” “Lexington” and “ Cones- toga,” the last three being up the river in pursuit of the enemy’s boats, which escaped from the fort when it surrendered. The position of the commander of the “Carondelet” during this battle was near the center of her forward fighting battery, directing and encouraging her officers and crew to fight cour- ageously. OFFICIAL THANKS TO THE ARMY AND NAVY. The State of Ohio deemed this battle sufficiently important to merit a vote of thanks, as appears from the following : “Relative to a vote of thanks to General Grant, Flag-Officer Foote and others, for their courage and gallantry exhibited in the bombardment of Fort Henry. Resolved by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, That the thanks of the people of Ohio be, and through their representatives are, hereby tendered to General Grant and Flag-Officer Foote, and the brave men under their command, for the courage, gallantry and enterprise exhibited in the bombardment and capture of Fort Henry, a victory no less brilliant in itself than glorious in its results, giving our army a foot-hold in Tennessee, and opening the way for early advance to the capital of the State. “Resolved, That the Governor transmit copies of these resolu- 68 SCENES AND INCIDENTS.| tions to said officers, with the request that the same be read to the men under their command, “James L. Huspett, “ Speaker of the House of Representatives. “B. Sranron, “ President of the Senate. “ Passed, February 14th, 1862.” AFTER THE BATTLE. Under General Grant’s instructions Captain Walke proceeded with Colonels Webster, Rawlins and McPherson up the Tennessee river in the “Carondelet,” and completed the destruction of the railroad bridge connecting Fort Donelson with Fort Columbus. On the return of this expedition Captain Walke, after a consulta- tion, was requested by General Grant to aid him in the invest- ment of Fort Donelson with the “Carondelet,” “Taylor,” “Lex- ington” and “Conestoga,” which were then returning from the expedition further up the Tennessee river. But the officers in command of these vessels, having failed to comply with Captain Walke’s instructions to follow him to Fort Donelson, he proceeded to that place with the “Carondelet” alone. Professional men may understand this conduct on the part of naval officers, to be an act of insubordination. These gunboats were originally built and equipped under the Army auspices, and at the expense of the War Department, and discipline should have been more strictly enforced. The “Carondelet ” was visited by General Grant and staff on the morning of February 10th, to confer with Captain Walke. At 6.10, p. m., Lieutenant-Commander W. Gwinn, of the gun- boat “Taylor,” came on board with Paymaster Coleman, and received the order from Captain Walke to follow him with the “Lexington ” and “ Conestoga.” The “Carondelet ” then steamed down the Tennessee river to its mouth at Paducah, Ky., from whence a communication was sent to Flag-Officer Foote, relating the chain of events preceding the battle of Fort Donelson—a fact which will convince the reader that the “Carondelet ” arrived in good time at the fort, and announced her readiness for service by firing into it on the morning of the 12th ; before General Grant or_ the_Confederate_General Floyd had arrived with their_entire force. It may also be conceded that there is some ground for taking exception to the charge in Draper's History of the . War, BATTLE OF FORT HENRY. 69 that General Grant was “obliged to submit to this delay to give time for preparing the gunboats, though every hour of it was strengthening the enemy,” as there is no doubt that Foote brought his gunboats to Fort Donelson with all practicable dispatch. The gunboats “Taylor,” “ Lexington” and “Conestoga,” having preceded the “‘ Carondelet ” on the reconnoissance up the Tennes- see river, every particular concerning them is very handsomely re- recorded in the official reports and history. But the services of the “Carondelet ” are not referred to, and the following copy of a report sent to Flag-Officer Foote, will therefore serve as an ap- propriate remedy for this odd deficiency. COMMANDER WALKE TO FLAG-OFFICER FOOTE. “U. 8. Gunboat ‘ CARONDELET,’ “Fort Henry, TENNESSEE RIVER, “Say “ Feb. 8th, 1862. “Sim: “JT have just returned from destroying the bridge of the Memphis and Bowling Green railroad, where I was instructed to proceed by General Grant on the 7th inst. Colonel Webster, with other officers, and two com- panies of sharp-shooters, accompanied me to do the work. We found the place deserted by the enemy, leaving tents and wagons, some of which we brought here. I am nearly out of coal and provisions. The magazine and shell-room of this vessel leak badly, and it is doubtful whether or no our car- penter can stop it, unless she is lightened so that he can get at it. I suspect that some of our rifle shell have not been filled with powder, as there is a great difference in the weight of them, and I picked up one in Fort Henry with the fuse out, but there was no evidence of it having been filled with powder. They require gauging. All are well on board. We expended 101 shell, and one round shot the day before yesterday. The ‘ Conestoga,’ « Lexington,’ and ‘Taylor’ have not returned. “Most Respectfully, “Your Ob’t Servant, “HENRY WALKE. 46 To “ Flag-Officer A. H. Foote, “Commanding Naval Forces, Western Waters, «<< Commander U. 8. Navy.” A LETTER OF THANKS. Flag-Officer Foote received the following letter, which was read to all our squadron ; and a copy furnished to the command- ers of the gunboats. 70) SCENES AND INCIDENTS. SECRETARY WELLES TO FLAG-OFFICER FOOTE. “Navy DEPARTMENT, Feb. 13th, 1862. “Sm: ‘Your letter of the 7th inst., communicating the details of your great success in the capture of Fort Henry, is just received. I had previously in- formed you of the reception of your telegraphic dispatch, announcing the event, which gave the highest satisfaction to the country. «“We have to-day the report of Lieutenant Commanding Phelps, with the gratifying results of his successful pursuit and capture and destruction of the rebel steamers, and the disposition of the hostile camps as far up the Tennessee as Florence. I most cordially and sincerely congratulate you, and the officers and men under your command, on these heroic achievements, accomplished under extraordinary circumstances, and after surmounting great and almost insuperable difficulties. The labor you have performed, and the services you have rendered in creating the armed flotilla of gunboats on the western waters, and in bringing together for effective operation the force which has earned such renown, can never be over-estimated. The de- partment has ohserved with no ordinary solicitude, the armament that has so suddenly been called into existence, and which under your well-directed management has been so gloriously effective. “T am, respectfully, “Your Ob’t Servant, [Signed] ‘“GIDEON WELLES. ‘Flag-Officer A. H. Foorr, U. 8. WV. “Commanding Gunboat Flotilla, &e., Cairo, Il.” ‘NOSTHNOG LYOd AO ATLLVA ‘£aoyeg seddq syeoqung ‘8'O aousyerp eqy ut ‘Aqieue ogy Suy_o" We Audie 6 yawp ‘deg £10478 1078 CHAPTER V. BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. Letters of Commander Walke to Flag-Officer Foote.—Newspaper Descrip- tions of the Action.—A Startling Incident.—Casualties in the Fleet.— How different Results might have been attained.—Captain Walke and the “Carondelet.” —T wo Interesting Letters from a Participant in the Battle. —Bursting of a Gun.—The “ Conestoga,” ‘‘ Lexington,” and ‘‘ Tyler.”— The Damage sustained’ by the ‘‘ Carondelet.”—Confederate General Pil- low’s Account.—Inaccuracy in the Naval Records.—Why Mistakes should be corrected now. Ir is now stated by one of our most brilliant writers of history and biography that Foote sent the “ Carondelet” to Fort Donelson upon a reconnoissance, and other friends of the admiral are evi- dently led into the same error ; but on the contrary, tc our know- ledge he never approved or disapproved of Commander Walke’s co-operation with General Grant, nor did he reply, or allude to the following letters upon that subject. And it is evident that no other officer would have taken the responsibility of revoking the orders for the “Taylor,” “Lexington ” and “Conestoga” to join the “Ca- rondelet” upon the reconnoissance at Fort Donelson, but the flag- officer himself. And as he was previously informed of all the circumstances, by the letters of Commander Walke, there was no explanation asked for, or made, when they met on the night of the 13th. The flag-officer, however, seemed to be satisfied when Com- mander Walke informed him that the “Carondelet” would be ready for battle again as soon as she had replenished her ammunition, early on the following morning. We may, however, be assured by the remarks in Pollard’s Southern History of the War, that if four or five steamers instead of one, had menaced Fort Donelson on the 11th of February, a day or two before the enemy’s re-enforcements had arrived, the effect would have been much more discouraging to the enemy. General Grant, being under the impression at least that Foote’s flotilla could not assist him immediately, instructed Commander Walke to proceed without delay to commence the at- : [71] 72 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. tack on Fort Donelson in connection with our army before the enemy could receive re-enforcements or strengthen his position. The following is the letter referred to, preceding the BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. FROM COMMANDER WALKE TO TO FLAG-OFFICER FOOTE. “JU. §. Gungeoat ‘ CARONDELET,’ “ Paducah, Feb. 10th, 1862. “Sim: “T received instructions from General Grant this evening, to proceed with this vessel to Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland river, to co-operate with our army in that vicinity. I expect to meet you before I reach there. The ‘Alps’ will take me in tow. I will call at this place. General Grant will send the ‘Taylor,’ ‘Lexington,’ and ‘ Conestoga’ after me. “We heard that you were on your way to Fort Donelson, but I hear no tidings of you here to-night. ‘‘The ‘ Taylor’ has just returned from up the Tennessee River, as far as navigable. She, with the ‘Lexington’ and ‘Conestoga,’ destroyed or cap- tured all the enemy’s boats, broke up their camps, and made a prize of their fine new gunboat. “T write this in anticipation of not seeing you before I leave here, as I am (or the ‘Carondelet’ is) very slow, and General Grant desires that I should be at Fort Donelson as soon as I can get there. But I hope you will overtake me, or send me your orders upon this occasion, as I am now acting upon your general instructions repeated at Fort Henry. I expected to send this letter from here to-night, but am disappointed in this also. ““Most Respectfully and Truly, “Your Ob’t Servant, “HH. WALKE, “Commander U. 8. N. ‘To Flag-Officer A. H. Foorr, U. 8. N., “Commanding U. 8. Naval Forces, Western Waters.” This letter explains the part taken by the “ Carondelet ” in the battle of Fort Donelson. After the capture of Fort Henry, Flag- Officer Foote was requested by Generals Halleck and Grant to co-operate with the latter in an attack on Fort Donelson, situated on the west bank of the Cumberland river, near the town of Dover. This fort was stronger, both in natural position and arti- ficial defenses, than Fort Henry, and a land attack was more difii- cult, as there were heights above, below, and all around the works. THE ‘“ CARONDELET ” had the honor of commencing the attack on Fort Donelson ; hav- ing arrived before the fort two days in advance of the other gun- FULL LIST OF CASUALTIES AT THE BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. “§$r. Louis.”—Killed: Charles Baker, ship’s cook ; F. A. Riley, pilot. Wounded: Flag Officer A. H. Foote; R. G. Baldwin, pilot ; Charles Smith, boatswain’s mate; R. H. Madaill, carpenter; Antonio Calders, Thomas Kirkham, M. 5. Coon, John Thompson, seamen. ‘* LovIsvILug.’’— Killed : Joseph 8. Cortis, E. W. Avilla, Charles Billips, John Williams, seamen. Wounded : Michael Kelley, E. 8. Collins, William Higgins, John Paul, Charles Wright. “ PrrtspuRG.’”— Wounded: Charles Merwin, George Smith, seamen. “‘CarnonDELET.”—Jtilled: Alfred Richardson, coxswain ; Albert Mark- ham, William Duff, Joseph G. Leacock, seamen. Wounded: William Minton, pilot, mortally; John Doherty, second master; H. A. Walke, fourth master; Samucl Brooks, second engineer ; John Hall, volunteer gunner of the ‘‘St. Louis”; Richard Mahone, quartermaster ; Thomas Brown, captain of gun; Joseph McBride, ship’s cook; James Plant, James Burns, Patrick Laughlin, Edward Green, Owen Connolly, Henry Smith, Patrick Sullivan, John Owen, Amos Dutch, Patrick Brine, William Johnson, Benjamin Edger, Henry Anderson, Daniel F, Charles, J. Doughty, John Murphy, William B. Roney, Thomas Burns, James McFadden, John Dimond, Matthew Arthur, Owen Canty, James McConnell, seamen. BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. 73 boats, she fired upon the enemy’s works on the morning of February 12th; and also, at the request of General Grant, made a diversion in his favor on February 13th, as narrated in the following report of Commander Walke to Admiral Foote. “U. 8. Gunpoat ‘ CARONDELET,’ ‘Near Fort DoNELSON, CUMBERLAND RIVER, «¢ Feb. 15th, 1862. “SIR: “T arrived here (towed by the ‘ Alps’) on the 12th instant, about 11.20 A.M., and seeing or hearing nothing of our army, I threw a few shell into Fort Donelson, to announce by arrival to General Grant, as he had previ- ously requested. I then dropped, down the river a few miles, and anchored for the night, awaiting General Grant’s arrival. “On the morning of the thirteenth, I weighed anchor, and came again to this place, where I received a dispatch from General Grant, informing me that he had arrived the day before. and had succeeded in getting in position, almost entirely investing the enemy’s works. “«*Most of our batteries ’ (he writes) ‘are established, and the remainder soon will be. If you will advance with your gunboat at ten o’clock in the morning, we will be ready to take advantage of any diversion in our favor.’ “Timmediately complied with these instructions by throwing some 139 15-second and'10-second shell into the fort ; receiving in return the enemy’s fire from all their batteries ; most of their shot passing over us, and but two striking us, one of which was a 128-pounder solid shot. It passed through our port casemate forward, and glancing over our barricade at the boilers, and again over the steam-drum, struck, and burst the steam-heater ; and fell into the engine-room without striking any person, although the splinters wounded slightly some half-dozen of our crew. I then dropped down to this anchorage, but the sound of distant firing being heard, we again attacked the fort ; throwing in some forty-five shell, and receiving little damage. “LT returned to this place, to await further orders, when I received a second dispatch from General Grant, stating that you were expected on the following morning. “Tam, Sir, Most Respectfully, ? “Your Ob't Servant, “A. WALEE, “ Commander U. 8. Navy. “Flag-Officer A. H. Foote, “Commanding U. 8. N. Forces in Western Waters.” In this engagement the “Carondelet” commenced firing on the fort, at a distance of a mile and a quarter, the enemy replying immediately as the vessel advanced, the attack lasting from ten o’clock in the morning to meridian, and being renewed in the afternoon. Three of the enemy’s guns were reported to be dis- abled. 74. SCENES AND INCIDENTS. OUR NAVAL HISTORY is silent on some important facts in its version of this event ; viz. that four gunboats were to have participated therein to make it more effective, and that three of them failed to obey the orders of General Grant and Commander Walke to accompany the “Caron- delet” on this reconnoissance ; but it gives an unfavorable view of the “Carondelet” alone on this occasion, especially in comparison with the brilliant action or “what was expected to be the decisive battle, the next day ;” which is represented as having resulted in the surrender of Fort Donelson, by our highest possible naval authorities. .A few particulars are called for from those who were present on that occasion to dispel the idea that Fort Donelson was captured by our fleet under Admiral Foote, for in reality it was taken by General Grant, with the army. The following are a few quotations from reliable correspondence on the reconnoissance. A reliable correspondent of the army on this occasion writes: “According to the admission of the rebel officers the casualties from the attacks by the ‘Carondelet’ were greater than those which resulted from the combined attack of the whole fleet the next day. The attack of the next day on the water batteries was neither the most brilliant nor the most successful effort of the siege. About the only result was, that a single gun of the enemy was dismounted and the unequalled fighting qualities of the fleet demonstrated. The gunnery was generally of a differ- ent character.” Query: Is it at all improbable that the deliberate firing of one gunboat by experienced gunners, with heavy rifled guns of long ranges, should do as much execution in six hours, upon a battery of twelve or fifteen guns of much less range, than the firing of four such gunboats with less experienced crews, upon these batteries at close quarters for one hour and a half, at various distances, and much less deliberation ? In reference to the reconnoissance and the bombardment on the following day Captain Morgan made the same statement to the officers on board the “Carondelet” on Sunday, the morning of the surrender. NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS ON THE ACTION. * The Missouri Republican of February 28th, 1862, has this report in its correspondence of the day before the battle: “During the day BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. 15 much uneasiness was felt as to the gunboat fleet. It was there- fore with no little gratification that information was at last received about noon on Thursday, that the avant courier of the fleet, the ‘Carondelet,’ Commander Walke, had arrived below the fort. In the afternoon the report of her guns was received with cheer up- on cheer by the troops encircling the beleaguered fort. “Commander Walke’s operations this afternoon, although par- taking more of the nature of a reconnoissance, were considered by the rebel officers, as I have since ascertained, as one of the most formidable attacks they had to encounter. Hidden behind a jutting promontory of the river bank, the ‘Carondelet,’ herself secure from all heavy shot of the Columbiads of the fort, hurled shell upon shell into the water batteries of the fortifications. The commander of these batteries has recently informed me that the fire of the ‘Carondelet’ did more actual damage to his guns than the heavy bombardment of the following day.” Another reliable army correspondent writes: “The rebel offi- cers commanding the river batteries also assure me that the prac- tice of our gunners, in the excitement of the bombardment, was much inferior to that displayed in the reconnoissance, when matters were conducted with more deliberation.” And this is corrobor- ated by the official reports in the Southern press. The Chicago Times’ correspondent reports: “The ‘Caronde- let’s ’ movements led to several skirmishes, though of no serious nature. They were covered by a gallant cannonade of the gun- boat ‘Carondelet,’ the only one that arrived. Thus single-handed one hundred and thirty-eight rounds were thrown into the enemy’s works, and she was finally compelled to withdraw, having received a shot from the enemy’s 128-pounder gun in her bow, crippling her severely, and wounding seven men. She fell back but a short time, to repair damages and put her wounded on board the trans- port ‘Alps. At 1.15, p. m., she commenced firing again upon the fort, and kept up a brisk fire until she had expended all or nearly all of her long-range shell, when at dusk she retired from the contest, having annoyed the enemy and encouraged our army.” In this fight (February 13th), after Captain Walke had placed his gunboat in a fighting position, he took his stand as before very near the center of the fighting battery, where he remained during the firing, giving all necessary orders, and encouraging his people to fight courageously. They fired one hundred and eighty- four shell. : 16 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. The “Carondelet” anchored about three miles below the fort, at about four in the afternoon. Admiral Foote arrived at 11.30, Pp. M., with the partially iron-clad “St. Louis” (flag steamer, Lieu- tenant Paulding), “Louisville” (Commander Dove), and “ Pitts- burg” (Lieutenant Egbt. Thompson) ; also the wooden gunboats “Conestoga” (Lieutenant Phelps), and “Taylor” (Lieutenant Gwinn), and several transports with re-enforcements for General Grant of 8,000 men. About midnight Captain Walke reported in person to the flag-officer. Next morning the “Carondelet ” replenished her stock of am- munition and partly repaired her damages, and again “shifted berth” by orders from the flag-officer, when a startling instance of inebriety occurred. At this critical period, the gunner at the magazine, in a fit of intoxication, threatened to blow up the “ Carondelet,” and send her with all her hands to Ile was immediately ironed and con- fined in his room, under a guard in charge of the third master, but, during the battle, he succeeded in » eluding his guard, and reached the magazine hatch, where he was stopped by the surgeon, Dr. Mc- Neily, and others, and again se- cured. The third master, who was also intemperate and disaffected, was discharged a few days after the battle. On the 14th of February, Flag- Officer Foote, having instructed his officers, and prepared for battle, at ; one o’clock, p. m., hailed the “Car- 3% ondelet,” and ordered her with the ~ other gunboats to follow the motions of the commanding officer. At 1.20, p. o., the flag-officer made general signal 958. At 2.10, p. m., he pro- ceeded slowly up the river with the “St. Louis ” (flag steamer), “Louis- ville” and “Pittsburg,” and formed in the first order of steam- ing,—“St. Louis” on the extreme right, “Louisville” next, “Pittsburg ” next, and “Carondelet” on the extreme left. At 3, P. M., Fort Donelson. BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. 77 THE ENEMY OPENED FIRE upon us with two guns; their shot falling short, we did not reply until we were within one mile of the fort, when we opened a de- liberate and well directed fire upon the enemy’s batteries. The flag-officer ordered his squadron to steam up faster, but not to fire so fast. The “Louisville” and “Pittsburg,” not keeping up to their proper positions, were hailed by the flag-officer and ordered ‘to steam up, and with the “ Carondelet ” was ordered not to fire so fast. About 4, p. m., the battle raged with all its horrors. When our squadron was within six hundred yards of the enemy’s bat- teries, their heavy shot and shell penetrated the gunboats with deadly effect, shattering the “ Carondelet’s” pilot-house and wheel and mortally wounding her first pilot. Her port rifle gun burst, prostrating and disabling another gun’s crew at the same port.* She received, also, two shot in her bow between wind and water, but still continued in line, or a little in advance, firing with her remaining two guns without intermission. The other gunboats, although suffering in like manner, maintain- ed an unbroken front, and moved steadily up to within four hun- dred yards of the batteries, receiving and delivering a fire which soon terminated the struggle by forcing the gunboats to retire. The enemy relaxed his fire about 4.30, p. m., and began to desert his lower guns. The “Carondelet” was then nearly out of the range, being almost on the flank of the enemy’s batteries, or on the eastern shore of the river, opposite. CASUALTIES IN THE FLEET. At this point of the action, when the “Louisville” backed down, Flag-Officer Foote had been slightly wounded ; the pilots of the “St. Louis,” “Louisville” and “Carondelet,” were wounded mor- tally ; and the port bow-gun of the latter had just exploded, pros- trating and blinding the captain, officers and crew. Pilot-housesalso, were battered in, and wheels broken, each vessel having been struck about fifty times with 128-pound and 32-pound shot; and forty- * This accident was caused by reckless disregard of the standing order, never to fire a gun until the cartridge and shell were well rammed down to the bot- tom of its chamber. And the reason that none were killed, and so few men were mortally wounded by this explosion is, that they knew the danger they had incurred, and stood farther from the gun than usual, without informing their officers. And the gun was broken in only four large pieces, the largest of which fell outside of the port. 78 SCENES AND INCIDENTS.: five of our men and officers were killed or wounded. We were at this time within three hundred and fifty yards of the enemy’s lower battery, which mounted nine guns and several heavy Columbiads and 32-pounders above them, all with the modern improved sights, and manned and officered by the best men of the Southern army. DROPPING OUT OF BATTLE. Our gunboats were now struck by every shot in the most vital parts, but they did not falter, and were still steaming up to the batteries fighting with desperate earnestness, when the look-outs informed the captain of the “ Carondelet” that our fleet was drop- ping astern out of battle. He ordered her engines to be stopped and reversed. Captain Walke having so recently received the ad- monition not to precede the flag steamer, and as he had not re- ceived instructions to pass Fort Donelson, but to follow the motions of the flag-officer, he was obliged to back out of battle with the squadron. The “Louisville,” being disabled and unmanageable, was the first gunboat which commenced to back or drift out of battle, which was not discovered by Commander Walke until he was about to bring his broadside battery to bear on the enemy. The “Louisville” was followed next by the flag steamer (“St. Louis”) and then by the “Pittsburg.” The latter, in attempting to turn, struck the “Carondelet’s” starboard quarter and rudder, breaking off its hinges, thus compelling the “Carondelet” to re- tire after having nearly flanked the enemy’s batteries. She was terribly cut up, not a mast or spar was standing. All our barges, boats, stanchions and hammock nettings, had been cut to pieces, with the pilot house and smoke pipes riddled; port side cut open fifteen feet, and decks ripped up, in many places plowed up ; rifled gun and anchors in fragments ; with four men killed and fifteen wounded, two mortally, and two solid shots in her bow between windand water. In this condition the “ Carondelet” drifted slowly out of battle without turning ; and her bow guns were playing on the enemy as long as our shell could reach him. Our decks were so slippery with the blood of the brave men who had fallen, that we could hardly stand until we covered them with sand. While thus drifting we received a 32-pounder from the enemy on a ricochet in the starboard bow port, which beheaded two seamen and cut another in two, sending blood and brains over the captain, officers and men who were standing near them. The “ Carondelet,” with broken rudder, wheel and wheel ropes, was BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. 79 drifting on a point of the shore just below the fort, and thus receiving its concentrated fire, was obliged to steam up away from it, in the rapid current ; for certain destruction must have followed if she had struck and lodged on the point, which the day before the captain so eagerly sought as her protecting breastwork. The “St. Louis,” “Pittsburg ” and “Louisville” were all terri- bly cut up by the enemy’s shot, the latter having her wheel-ropes shot away. Her pilot, Samuel McBride, states that as soon as he discovered this damage, he ran out on the stern to repair it and to hook the relieving tackles, so as to be able to steer the boat with them, and to keep her in proper position in the line of battle. But the shells from the gunboats “Taylor” and “Conestoga” exploded so fearfully and constantly over the “Louisville” that the pilot and his party were driven away from the tillers, and they took shelter under the casemate. Thus Captain Dove was compelled to let her drift out of battle, as she was crippled and unmanage- able. When the flag steamer was compelled to follow the same course, a termination of the engagement was inevitable. : The “ Taylor” and “Conestoga” were so far astern that their shell fell shért or exploded over our own gunboats, doing less damage, evidently, to their enemies than to ne friends. One of the “Taylor’s” 64-pound shell exploded over the “Carondelet” and the fragments penetrated her stern casemate. The “ Louis- ville,” Captain Dove, informed Captain Walke that she was also struck by them in the same manner. A FOOLISH MISREPRESENTATION ALLOWED TO PASS UNNOTICED. Take, for instance, a statement which originated with and was promulgated by, some of those who were the actors in the scene described, which appeared in the Chicago Tribune under date of April 2nd, 1870, as follows : “ Captain laid the ‘ Pittsburg’ along side of the batteries at Fort Donelson, and poured into them grape and canister, until every water-tight compartment was riddled with rebel shot, and his vessel went down on the bar just as victory shouted her tri- umph, and Grant marched over the walls of the conquered fortress. Raising and re-fitting his vessel, which was the first to run the batteries at Island No. 10, transferred to the seaboard to assist in finishing the war, this gallant captain was sent here, with his scars and his nenrolas to rust away in [Mound City, IL] dreamy activity.” This statement was site repeated by the Mound City (IIL) 80 SCENES AND INCIDENTS.. Journal, and published under the eye of the officer in command, who of all other men must have known by his participation in all of these occurrences, that the assertions therein contained were palpably untrue. When a contradiction was given at Mound City, after its first appearance, the perpetrators were so completely con- victed, and possibly ashamed, that they did not attempt any reply. The “St. Louis” and the “ Louisville” were the first out of gun- shot range from the fort, and were at least half a mile further off than the “Carondelet.” The next vessel to them was the “ Pitts- burg,” and last of all was the “Carondelet,” over a quarter of a mile; from that vessel were fired several effective parting shots (while she was within range), from her bow guns, and receiving the concentrated fire of the enemy in return. HOW DIFFERENT RESULTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN ATTAINED. It may be noticed that the “Carondelet” had an encouraging prospect of passing above the enemy’s batteries, and no doubt she would have done so, had the orders of the flag-officer permitted. Had his orders contemplated that course of action by our fleet, or an attempt to pass the enemy’s batteries, for an attack upon his army in the flank or rear, there was a probability that two at least of our gunboats could have succeeded. And if our fleet had received orders to pass these batteries with full speed, or at night, to prevent the enemy from getting the exact range of his guns on the gunboats, it is more than probable that several of them, if not all, would have succeeded in passing, and on arriving at the enemy’s rear would have cut off his retreat, co-operating with our army in attacking his unprotected flank. Great service might thus have been rendered with our heavy guns, which would most certainly have decided the battle that night very satisfactorily, and with less bloodshed. This idea was not suggested until the day after the battle, when Foote asked Walke if he (Walke) could have passed above the batteries. An after-thought expressed in one of his letters. On the following day the “St. Louis,” Commander Paulding, made a reconnoissance near the fort and fired several shot, but being out of range, no reply came from the enemy, who were des- perately fighting our army under General Grant. BURYING OUR DEAD. On board the “ Louisville,” “ Carondelet,” and “St. Louis,” the burial service on the following day (15th) was duly performed by BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. ’ 81 the officers and crews of the gunboats, over the remains of their brave companions. The scene was mournful and imposing. Na- ture was clothed in her white wintry robes, while the distant boom of Grant’s heavy artillery over the hills, rolling along and dying away in the valley of the Cumberland, seemed our funeral guns ; and on each boat a silent, uncovered party, bended over their friends who died in the battle, The flag for which they fought and died, hung quiet and drooping at half-mast, the last sad token of respect to the departed, The subdued and tremu- lous voice of their captain affected his faithful sailors with un- usual sorrow, as the touching and solemn words fell upon their ears: “I know that my Redeemeth liveth, and that He shall stand at the latter day upon the earth; and though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God; whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold and not another.” In the pause which followed might be faintly heard the service which was being read on the other vessels: “I am the resurrection and the life, saith the Lord ; he that believeth in Me though he were dead, yet shall he live.” CAPTAIN WALKE AND THE “ CARONDELET.” The services of the “‘ Carondelet” in the reconnoissance prece- ding the battle of Fort Donelson are not mentioned in the offi- cial reports, except by the insertion of a letter from her comman- der. In the History of the Navy the reference to the reconnois- sance includes the statement that “the ‘ Carondelet * (iron-clad) had been sent forward ahead of the rest of the flotilla, and on the 13th was ordered to attack the water-batteries single-handed,” and by an omission of the fact, makes it understood that it was Foote’s instead of Grant’s order. To give the reader an idea of the magnitude of the task the “ Carondelet” had to perform, the History then gives a descrip- tion of the fort, and makes a statement as to its great strength, _adding pointedly: “It is very easily seen that it would be utterly vain for a single steamer.” If this reconnoissance was in’ vain, it should be attributed to the fact that the Navy officers did not obey promptly the orders of their superior in command, and in consequence failed to be present, and to join in the battle accord- ing to General Grant’s instructions. And it can also be as easily imagined, that if the flag-ofilcer had made the reconnoissance, it would have been officially recorded as a glorious, if not a success- ful affair in our naval history. 6 82 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. The Confederate historian, in reference to the reconnoissance on the morning of the thirteenth of February, says: “ Just as the sun rose, the cannonade from one of the enemy’s gunboats com~- menced the conflict, which was destined to continue for several days and nights. The fire soon became general along our whole lines.” AN INTERESTING LETTER. The following letter, written on board the “Carondelet” by one of the crew, at the time, a participant, while all the facts and incidents were fresh in memory, is here inserted for its individu- ality in narrating the capture of Fort Donelson. “Fort Henry was manned by men who fought with a despera- tion worthy of a better cause. We were scarcely mentioned in the Fort Henry affair, although we occupied the second position, and in our services were second to none, while those western band- boxes, the ‘ Conestoga,’ ‘Lexington,’ and ‘Tyler,’ were puffed up by the papers, when they were astern during the whole of the fight, and took no active part in it. We had one man injured by the recoil of the gun. “The next day we proceeded to Danville to destroy the bridge of the Clarksville and Memphis railroad. We burned part of the railroad, and then returned to Fort Henry, remaining at this fort until ordered to proceed against Fort Donelson, on the Cumber- land. “On February 12th, we arrived within sight of the fort, and gave them nine shells (to which they did not reply) and then re- tired, thinking the fort had been evacuated. Thus far we had seen nothing of the land forces, or the gunboats which were to assist us. “The next morning (February 13th), an aid-de-camp of Gen- eral Grant came with orders for us to proceed to the fort, while the land forces would engage it in the rear. We went up and fought about two hours, when the rebels put a 120-pounder through our port bow, SCATTERING SPLINTERS ON EVERY SIDE, and finally lodging in our heater, which damage compelled our retirement. It knocked down every man at the gun, killing none but wounding seven, including the captain of the gun. It passed within a foot of me, and the force of the air knocked me over. In the afternoon we engaged them again, firing about fifty shells into them, and then Captain Walke said he would wait for the BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. 83 rest of the gunboats. In this. day’s fight: we fired one hundred and eighty-three shelis, without losing a man ; although, as we learned on the 16th from a rebel colonel by the name of Morgan, their killed and wounded were over seven hundred. “ At night the rest of the gunboats arrived, together with the re-enforcements of troops from Cairo and Paducah, and in the afternoon of the 14th, about 2 Pp. m., we advanced in our shattered condition against the fort. The line of battle was as follows: ‘St. Louis’ (flag ship) on the right, ‘Carondelet’ on the left, ‘Louisville’ and ‘Pittsburg’ in the center, and three western bandboxes in the rear. We fought desperately for about two hours and a half, within less than half a mile from the fort, when the rifled gun I was serving with shell exploded, knocking us all down, killing none, but wounding over a dozen men, and spread- ing dismay and confusion among us for a short time. For about two minutes I was stunned, and at least five minutes elapsed be- fore I could tell what was the matter. When I found out that I was more scared than hurt (although suffering from the gun- powder which I had inhaled), I looked forward and found that our gun had burst, and was lying on the deck split in three pieces. Then the cry ran through the boat that we were on fire, and my duty of pump-man called me to the pumps. While there, two shot entered our bow-ports, and killed four men, and wounded about a dozen. They were borne past me, three with their heads off, and a fourth with his entrails hanging out, and partly dragging along the deck. The sight almost sickened me, and I turned my head away. “Then came our master’s mate, Brennan, revolver in hand, threatening to shoot us if we did not go to our quarters immedi- ately. I told him that OUR GUN HAD BURST, and that we had caught fire from the enemy’s shell on the upper deck. He then said, ‘ Never mind the fire; go to your quarters.’ There were six of us at the pumps at the time, and we accord- ingly obeyed his order. “Then I took a station at the starboard tackle of another rifled bow gun, and remained there until the close of the fight. While running the gun out, we trampled in the blood and brains of an esteemed shipmate; but such are the horrors of war. The commodore and the rest of the gunboats, retired at least twenty minutes before we even thought of it, and when victory 84 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. was almost within our grasp ; but it was not until we had four killed and over thirty wounded (including one of our pilots, who was mortally wounded), two of our boats shot away, our flag- staffs gone, together with our colors, and our starboard rudder disabled, and the boat ‘all cut up,’ as the saying is. As we left, we fired the last eleven shots at the fort, and expended our last cartridge in the retreat. “About five in the afternoon the action ended, and the ‘ Car- ondelet ’ was engaged three hours that afternoon. This is true, notwithstanding newspaper reports were to the contrary. They will tell you that such and such a boat went up into the teeth of the batteries, and smashed things generally. Of course the ‘Pittsburg’ was disabled, we know, but was not the ‘ Carondelet ’ in like condition? I would not have mentioned our boat, had it not been that we have been slighted in the western papers. The rebels tell us a different story from what you read in the news- papers. They said that the boat with the red stripe around her smoke-stacks DID MORE EXECUTION than the other three combined, both at Forts Henry and Donel- son. According to our officers’ watches we fought two hours, while the reports say one hour and fifteen minutes. But it makes very little difference now that the fort is taken. “Our boat has three bow-guns, two rifles, and one smooth-bore sixty-eight. The rifles are about 84-pounders. Our bow being iron-plated, we have always fought ‘head on.’ Several of our rifled shell were a little too large, and would stick in the gun about half way down. Gunnery requires they should be with- drawn, but when you are close to the enemy’s batteries, you can- not lose time by drawing them out, so we blazed away at them, home or no home. The gun was ran out when it bursted, or the damage would have been greater than it was; but I sincerely trust that the like may not happen again. THE ‘CONESTOGA,’ ‘ LEXINGTON,” AND ‘ TYLER,’ were on hand on the 14th of February. But what were they doing? One of them gave us three shots in our stern, which fact is suppressed in the newspapers. I suppose they could not see the fort. ‘ Vive la bandboxes !’ “On the 15th, we were on shore burying the dead, and I had the last solemn duty to perform for them on earth, namely, mark- BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. 85 ing their rough head-boards with the initials of their names. I was present at their burial. A Catholic priest was passing by at the time, and thought that he would say a few words over them. Our officer checked him, and told him to wait a little longer, as another body would soon arrive from the gunboat ‘St. Louis.’ After its arrival, he asked the attention of those gathered around him. He made a few remarks about the deceased seamen, in which he said that ‘although they did not die like Christians, they died like heroes in the defense of their country and their flag.’ He then read the prayers for the dead, and ordered us to cover them over. They were all buried in a row, with their faces to the West. Their names were Albert Richardson, of Baltimore, Albert Markham, of Mississippi, William Duff, Joseph G. Leacock, and Charles W. Baker, all of Philadelphia. The first four mentioned belonged to the ‘Carondelet,’ and Baker to the ‘St. Louis.’ “On the 16th (Sunday) we went up again to the fort, and found that the white flag was flying. The fort had surrendered. The stars and stripes borne by our troops were seen in the rear of the fort, and we knew it was all right then. But while on the way up to the fort I was fearful lest they might haul down the white flag and blaze away again. I was more frightened that Sunday morn- ing than I was during all our fighting, but I do not think that I showed any outward signs of it. In conversation afterwards with my shipmates, I found that they all felt about the same as your uncle. In the fight at Fort Henry, I had a very narrow escape, but at no time was I badly frightened, but on the 16th. Don’t mention. John Owens and William B. Rooney were wounded on the 14th. McFadden, of Philadelphia, also lost an arm. All belonged to the *Carondelet.’” These are the impressions of one of the crew of the “Carondelet,” a young man who had been in service but a few months, written to his parents in Philadelphia. We lost in this battle eleven killed in the fleet, and about forty wounded. THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE CARONDELET, The following brief report of the damages received by the “Carondelet” from her carpenter, Ober. Donalson, on February 14th, 1862: “One piece of shell in after casemate, in the captain’s cabin (which was fired from U.S. gunboat “Taylor” by an acting master, against the remonstrances of her gunners) all boat davits shot away on the starboard side, damaging all the small boats, two 86 SCENES AND INCIDENTS, shot on starboard casemate on iron. One shot on starboard case- mate, cutting clean through. One shot on starboard side between water-line and planking, three cutting through planking. Two iron stanchions shot away. Hammock nettings on both sides of the boat cut to pieces. One shot went through wheel, disabling it. One shot struck the cap of the starboard bow port, glancing on the breech of the rifle gun, and landing against the trunnion of the after gun (killing three men and wounding others); one shot in planking; one shot in planking of starboard bow ; one shot cut- ting away chocks, cast-iron, breaking shank of the 800-pounder an- chor; one shot struck on the iron casemate of port bow; four shots on port casemate forward of rifled gun, one shot in port casemate, lodging over the rifle gun; one shot cut away two stanchions on port side; six shots in the pilot-house, cutting through iron casing, completely shattering one section of pilot-house; six shotsin through the smoke stacks, cutting them nearly to pieces, besides being struck by several picces of shell and grapeshot. One shot through the mainmast ; one shot cut away our ensign staff and ensign ; one shot through the top of the wheel-house, one on the the side of wheel- house. Several shot struck the chain cables, coal bags which cover- ed the deck, ripping it up badly in several places; two shot in the lower part of wheel-house, and one in the bag room, and many other marks of shot and shell, doing more or less damage to the vessel.” The distressing attempt to help the “iron-clads” in this battle by these “wooden gunboats,” which had been so highly praised for distinguished services in the battle of Fort Henry, was prompted in like manner by the hope to share largely in a glorious victory at Fort Donelson. But when it proved to be a disastrous defeat, they soon disappeared and were otherwise engaged on some im- portant business, beyond the sound of battle. See official report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1862. GENERAL PILLOW’S ACCOUNT of the gunboat attack upon Fort Donelson reads thus : “ My orders to the officers, Captains Shuster and Stankoitch, who commanded the lower battery of eight guns, and Captain Ross the upper battery of four, were to hold their fire until the enemy’s gunboats should come within point-blank range of their guns. This they did, though the ordeal of holding their fire while the enemy’s shot and shell were thick around their positions was a severe restraint upon their patriotic impulses. But, nevertheless, our batteries made no response till the gunboats were within BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. 87 range of their guns. Our entire line of batteries then opened fire. The guns of both parties were well served. The enemy constantly advancing delivered direct fire against our batteries from his line of five gunboats, while the sixth moved up in the rear, kept the air filled with shell, which fell thick and close all around the posi- tion of our batteries. The fight continued, the enemy steadily advancing slowly up the river, and the shot and shell from fifteen heavy rifled guns tearing our parapets, and plunging deep into the earth around and over our batteries, for nearly two hours, and until his boats had reached within the distance of 150 yards of our batteries. “Having come in such close conflict, I could distinctly see the effects of our shot upon his iron-cased boats. We had given two or three well-directed shots from our heavy guns on one of his boats, when she instantly shrunk back, and drifted helpless below the line. Several shot struck another boat, tearing her iron case and splintering them, as by a stroke of lightning, when the two fell back. Then a third received several shots, making her metal ring, and her timbers crack, when the whole line gave way and fell back from our fire until they passed out of range. “Thus ended the severe and close conflict of our Western heavy guns and the enemy’s gunboats, testing their strength and the power of heavy guns to resist them. The shot from our 32- pounder guns produced but little effect. They struck and re- bounded, apparently doing but little damage ; but I am satisfied, from close observation, that the timbers of the frames did not, and could not withstand the shock from the 10-inch Columbiads or 32-pounder rifled guns.” INACCURACY IN THE NAVAL RECORDS. There is a mistake in our naval writings when the statement is made that the enemy were so greatly demoralized by our gun- boats that they could not be brought into effective use on the following day, in the action which resulted in their defeat and the surrender of Fort Donelson to Brigadier-General Grant, com- mander of our military forces. Such an assertion gives credit to the Navy, which, strictly speaking, belongs to the Army. The fleet did its best, but could not boast of the victory, and no friend of the Navy should maintain such unworthy pretensions. On the 16th the white flag was flying over Fort Donelson early in the ‘morning, when our gunboats steamed up to the fort, and Captain Dove, who had preceded them in a tug, had the honor of receiving 88 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. the tender of the first rebel sword in the fort. But the terms of surrender were concluded on the previous night between General Grant and General Buckner. The batteries were found to be nine 32-pounder cannonades, two rifled, and one 10-inch Columbiad (128-pounder). In accounting for the impunity with which the “Carondelet ” fired upon this fortification, while on the reconnoissance of the 13th of February, it was stated by an officer of Fort Donelson that the fire of the principal part of their battery upon the “ Caronde- let ” was obstructed by the timber on the point of rock, behind which she had prudently taken shelter. WHY MISTAKES SHOULD BE CORRECTED. It may at first appear to the reader that the frequent repetition in this work, of details relating to the same occurrences, is unne- cessarily wearisome ; but it will be noticed that our narrative frequently is at variance as to important facts and incidents with other published works, and therefore it is necessary that the ver- sion we hold to be correct should be substantiated from varied and independent sources. The absence of many material facts from the official records, as deposited at the Navy Department, and the limbo of mistakes (as they are now called), which have necessarily followed, would, indeed, seem to offer sufficient justifi- cation for a critical examination of our entire naval history. It would, no doubt, be a great satisfaction to the American people if a full and accurate history could be compiled, which should con- form to the only safe standard of history, namely, absolute im- partiality, and show a readiness to award equal and exact justice to both Army and Navy, in the numerous instances where the nature of the services rendered co-operation of the land and naval forces necessary. Our endeavors must, however, be limited to the correction of the various mistakes and misapprehensions which have arisen in relation to the events which it is our special province to describe. Private letters may easily lead a historian very far from the truth by a small mistake ; and there is an instance reported in reference to this battle, that the flag-officer writes a private letter to the Secretary of the Navy, in which he states that the rebel officers said that our fire had so demoralized their troops that they could not afterwards be brought up to their work ; and the commander of the fort actually went down to Captain Dove, of the “ Louis- ville,” and offered to surrender to him as the representative of the BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. 89 flag-officer, who was at Cairo. Our historian takes this as the basis of historical proof that Fort Donelson was virtually captured by the flag-officer, although Foote was not aware of anything of the kind until after the work was accomplished by General Grant. FORT DONELSON. A very incorrect account of the action of our fleet is found in a statement from the surgeon of the gunboat “ Pittsburg,” published as early as February 20th, 1862, in one of the Western papers, in regard to the respective positions of all the gunboats, as they dropped out of the battle of Fort Donelson. “The engagement of February 14 lasted one hour and thirty- six minutes. The ‘St. Louis’ was crippled and fell back soon after ; the ‘Louisville, then the ‘Carondelet,’ firing as they re- treated, and lastly the ‘Pittsburg.’ We received two shots in the starboard bow, which made her exceedingly thirsty, and she soon drank in several feet of water. We were sinking. The pumps were soon ‘manned, and our boat is still afloat, and making herself useful as well as ornamental.” The enemy’s guns being furnished with the most perfect sights then in use, were fired with surprising accuracy, and almost all their shot struck the pilot-houses, or “between wind and water,” or entered one of the bow ports. : The Record of Living Officers of the U. S. Navy also says that after this bombardment “the rebels were so greatly demoralized that they could not be brought into effective action on the follow- ing day, which resulted in the defeat of and the surrender of Fort Donelson to Brigadier-General Grant, commanding the military forces.” Some of our historical writers also assume Flag-Officer Foote to have been present at the surrender of Fort Donelson, when the fact is that he was then at Cairo. This matter is of the greater importance because on the 20th of February, soon after the battle, a proclamation was published at Clarksville, and sent all over the country, couched in the following terms (without date) which could not do otherwise than lead to a mistaken inference. A PROCLAMATION To the Inhabitants of Clarksville. ' At the suggestion of Hon. Cave Johnson, Judge Wisdom, and the mayor of the city, who called upon me yesterday, after our hoisting the Union flag on the forts, to ascertain my views and in- 90 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. tentions towards the citizens and private property, I hereby announce to all peaceably disposed persons, that neither in their persons nor property shall they suffer molestation by me, or by the naval forces under my command, and they may safely resume their business avocations with assurances of my protection. At the same time, I require all military stores and army equipments shall be surrendered, no part of them being withheld or de- stroyed ; and further, that no secession flag or manifestation of secession feeling shall be exhibited. And for the faithful obser- vances of these conditions I shall hold the authorities of the city responsible. Anprew H. Foore. CHAPTER VI. AFTER THE BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. Congratulatory order of Flag-Officer Foote.—Precautionary Movements.— An Important Reconnoissance.—The Facts Relating thereto.—A Foolish Misrepresentation.—Failure of an Experiment.—The special Danger of Service on the Western Gunboats.—Letters of Commander Walke and Flag-Officer Foote.—Our Flotilla nearing Columbus.—The Rebel Gunboat “ Grampus.” On the morning of the 15th of February, Flag-Officer Foote followed the same course in regard to Commander Walke as at the close of the battle of Fort Henry. Notwithstanding the crippled condition of the “Carondelet,” he ordered Commander Walke, with that vessel and the “St. Louis,” to remain in com- mand at Fort Donelson, while the flag-officer himself returned to Cairo in the “Conestoga.” After he had sailed, however, Com- mander Dove, with the “ Louisville,” was also detained, at the request of General Grant. Before the flag-officer left for Cairo, Commander Walke called on him in the cabin of the “ St. Louis,” where he was sitting with one shoe off, and the foot upon his knee, complaining of a slight wound, which was not then visible through the stocking, nor considered serious; although there were several extraordinary reports circulated since, one of which ‘was that it was struck by a solid shot of a 128-pounder. Three gunboats remained until after the surrender of Fort ‘ Donelson, which took place on Sunday, February 16th, when they steamed up the river above the fort to Dover. There our officers and men met in good cheer. Our usual “ divine service” was then performed on board the“ Carondelet,” as the most ap- propriate way of giving thanks to God, “the only Giver of vic- tory,” and under such circumstances, it makes a very happy impression on all sincere hearts. The “Carondelet” had had two 32 or 42-pounder shot in her bow, “between wind and water,” and leaked badly ; her hull and [91] 92 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. her crew being more cut up and disabled than any other gunboat of the squadron. As General Grant could then dispense with her services, she returned to Cairo for repairs. Arriving there on the morning of the 17th, Commander Walke reported to the flag- officer the success of our arms, and the surrender of Fort Donel- son to General Grant. Flag-Officer Foote immediately issued the following CONGRATULATORY ORDER. “« February 17th, 1862. “‘Plag-Officer Foote, the commander-in-chief of the Naval Forces on the ‘Western waters, while he congratulates the survivors of the distinguished gunboat ‘Carondelet’ in the several actions so bravely fought, sympathizes with the wounded who have gloriously periled their lives in honor of the Union and the dear old flag. He also sympathizes with the friends of those gallant dead, who could not have died in a more glorious cause. Let us thank God from the heart, and say, ‘Not unto us alone, but unto Thy Name, O Lord, belongs the glory of the triumph of our arms.’ [Signed] “A. H. Foots, “Flag Officer.” The above order was read to the officers and crew assembled on board the “ Carondelet,” and then returned to the flag-officer by the bearer, in compliance with the verbal order of the flag- officer. PRECAUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. Being apprehensive of an attack upon Cairo, where our garrison was greatly reduced, on that morning Flag-Officer Foote dis- patched the “ Carondelet” down the river to Fort Holt, to watch the enemy’s approach ; and then proceeded himself without delay to Fort Donelson, in the “ Conestoga.” On the following day the “Carondelet” with the “Pittsburg,” two transports, and a few troops under Colonel Buford, were or dered on a reconnoissance down the Mississippi as far as Colum- bus, Ky., and about 5, p. m., beat to quarters within five miles of Columbus, and rounded to half an hour later: the “Pittsburg” following her, without firing upon the enemy’s works, which ap- peared intact. On the gunboats returning at 5.45, p. m., the trans- port “D. Y. Wilson” came within hail, and was sent by Captain Walke to the “Pittsburg” to help her up stream. The “Rob Roy” came alongside the “Carondelet” and-assisted her: Colonel Buford and staff came on board ; and at a quarter past ten o’clock, p. M., the gunboats anchored at Fort Holt. The urgency of this service, although entrusted to two crippled gunboats, was deemed of great importance, on account of appre- AFTER THE BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. 93 hensions awakened by the report of Captain Porter, who described several formidable rebel gunboats seen on a reconnoissance a few weeks previous, one of which was thought from his description to be the “ Manassas.” AN IMPORTANT RECONNOISSANCE, The exigencies of the service did not permit the “Carondelet” to retire from the field of action for her much needed repairs, for on the 28rd, while she was under repairs, with mechanics on board, her commander received orders to accompany our fleet down the river on a reconnoissance near Columbus, the particulars of which must be given to correct certain mistakes on the part of some of our navy records, which have represented its effect in the light of a victory over the enemy, and which attributes the evacuation of that most formidable position to the approach of our fleet and its terrible appearance. One description magnified the effect produced by the threatening approach of our fleet by saying: « Alarmed by the reconnoissance two days previous, the garrison had aban- doned the place, and when the national forces arrived, the forts, though of unusual strength, were unoccupied.” The truth is that the enemy was compelled to change his base of operations, by the action of our military and naval forces under General Grant and Flag-Officer Foote, without any reference to this reconnoissance. The capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donel- sonn, in the rear of Columbus, broke the enemy’s line of defenses, and forced him to fall back on a base further south ; which move- ment the enemy had nearly accomplished on the 23rd, the day re- ferred to. The last boat-load of Confederate stores was then on its way down the river to Island No. 10 in charge of Mr. Yocum (now of St. Louis, Mo.), and could have been easily captured, had we known what the enemy were then doing. A TRUE DESCRIPTION of this reconnoissance is as follows : On the 23rd of February, the ‘Cincinnati,’ having on board the flag-officer, the ‘Mound City,’ ‘Carondelet’ and ‘St. Louis,’ steamed down the river within sight of Columbus on a reconnois- sance, accompanied by the ‘Conestoga,’ convoying five transports, the ‘Lake Erie’ and ‘ Wilson,’ with two mortar-boats in tow. At 10 4. m., just as the ‘Iron Banks’ were in sight (according to the laws of the Navy, from ‘time immemorial’), the ‘ Caron- delet? mustered her crew for divine service. 94 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. As our floating castles steamed over the turbid waters of the Mississippi, threatening its hostile shores, the service of that day was most inspiriting, as we endeavored to ‘Remember to keep holy the Sabbath day and hallow it.’ The voice of the command- ing officer was heard over the silent deck, repeating the words : ‘From the rising of the sun even unto the going down of the same, my Name shall be great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense shall be offered unto my Name, and a pure offering ; for my name shall be great among the heathen, saith the Lord of Hosts.’ The psalm for that morning seemed to us very appro- priate, also.” . WHEN APPROACHING COLUMBUS the enemy fired two guns as a signal, and then sent up their flag of truce on the rebel transport “ Red Rover.” Our fleet, which was three or four miles distant, rounded to, and the “‘ Cincinnati” (in advance) hoisted the white flag, and at 10.45, A. M., sent a tug with a flag of truce to communicate with the enemy’s boat in Lucas Bend. At 1.45, p.m. the Confederate flag of truce returned to Columbus. At 2.30, Pp. m. the flag-officer ordered the “Caron- delet ” to remain and bring up the rear. The fleet then returned to Cairo, except the ‘‘ Carondelet,” which took her post on guard at Fort Holt at 7.10, P. m. We may add to the foregoing particulars the remark that it is a very poor compliment to our sailors and soldiers to have it re- corded in the naval history that the enemy fled at the appearance or sound of our great guns. THE “ CARONDELET” UNDER REPAIRS. We now return to the history of the movements of the gunboats after the reconnoissance, to which allusion has been made. The “ Carondelet,” being unfit for active service, and leaking badly, was granted permission to return to Mound City, where she could be docked, and the shot-holes (received in the various battles in which she had been engaged), be promptly repaired. She accordingly pro- ceeded thither on the 24th, reaching Mound City at 1, p. a.—was at once placed on the ways, and the work of repairing was carried on so vigorously that she came off the ways again at 11, a. m., the following day. Having gotten up steam she returned to Cairo, where the carpenters again went to work upon her. She was the last boat to be repaired (her presence in the reconnoissance on the 23rd having been considered indispensable), although the damages to the “ Carondelet ” in every respect exceeded those of any other AFTER THE BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. 95 vessel in the squadron, according to the statement of William L. Hamilton, the boat builder, who repaired all the gunboats of the Mississippi fleet at Mound City, Il. AN EXPERIMENT THAT PROVED A FAILURE. A day or two after, we were ordered out on the Ohio river to experiment backing up stream ; and as the “Carondelet” mean- dered over the wide-spread Ohio at Cairo, she looked like a lame duck, seeking a retreat from her unnatural task. The first attempt to back steadily up against the current was proof enough of her inability in that respect ; she immediately made a shear over first to one side of the river, and then to the other; and when once prevailed upon to turn, she required the whole breadth of the river to get her head down stream again. She was then anchored by the stern, and she yawed in the same manner in a much smaller compass, but dragged her anchor at every swing. Fi- nally, two anchors being tried, she dragged them both alternately, until they came together. So the experiment failed: like Ba- laam’s ass, the vessel refused to keep her head in the right direc- tion, but turned aside “ out of the way,” being under no control of the helm in such a strong current. Every trial proved alike unsuccessful ; but when at last an attempt was made to heave up the anchor, the mystery was increased, as it was discovered that the anchor refused to show itself, in spite of all the force which was applied to bring it home again. To be brief: after a long trial, various devices revealed the fact that the wire rope of the telegraph had caught the anchor, and held it for two hours with the utmost tenacity. SPECIAL DANGERS INCIDENT TO THE SERVICE. The construction of those western gunboats was so defective, that they were liable not only to be blown up in the ordinary wholesale casualties of war, by a shot through their exposed boilers and magazines, or by the torpedoes of the enemy, but owing to their furnaces being so near the bottom of the vessel, tne occupants were actually placed “between two fires,” as the vessels very frequently took fire. It required unceasing vigilance and exertion, including the passing and throwing of water day and night, to escape the always impending danger of burning, or of being blown up. Another source of annoyance and distress to the crews of these vessels at this time, was the delay (sometimes for several 96° SCENES AND INCIDENTS. months) in the payment of their wages. This occurred often by the pay, destined for the men, being diverted to defray other expenses. It was a great hardship to those men, especially, who had families to provide for. We insert a letter from Commander Walke to Flag-Officer Foote on this subject, and the reply there- to. Asa proof of the faithfulness of the “Carondelet’s” crew, under greater hardships in this respect than any other gunboat of our fleet, being almost constantly engaged on active service, not one of her crew deserted, or, so far as we are informed, at- tempted to desert, which was a frequent occurrence on other ves- sels of our fleet, by men who had received their pay. But not so with the crew of the “Carondelet.” During the first three or four months, some of the families of these men were, in conse- quence, turned out of their temporary homes into the street, by relentless landlords, without money, and, as reported, often with- out friends or credit. Every application to the captain or flag- officer, whether in the shape of written or verbal appeals, was in- effectual to obtain relief ; but the. efforts of the crew in this di- rection called forth the following correspondence : COMMANDER WALKE TO FLAG-OFFICER FOOTE. “U. 8. Gunboat ‘CARONDELET,’ “ February 28th, 1862. “Sir : : “There are so many distressing cases of want represented to me in the families of our crew who have not received any of their pay, which is con- trary to your promises and arrangements in that respect. I most respect- fully request that their distress may be rclieved as soon as the means can be procured. Iam unable to discover the cause or the remedy, as the crews of all the other vessels have been paid, I belicve. “Very Respectfully, «Your Ob’t Servant, “To Flag-Officer “HH. Wake. A. H. Foors, ‘ “Commanding U. 8. Naval Forces, “Commander U. S. Navy, Western States.” In reply to the above letter, the following answer, in Flag- Officer Foote’s handwriting, was received : FLAG-OFFICER FOOTE TO COMMANDER WALKE. “Tell the men, with whom I sympathize, that I mean to have them paid regularly, that for want of treasury notes they will have to wait two or three days longer. I will arrange it satisfactorily as soon as I can do so. [Signed] “A. H. Footer, “FlagOfficer.” AFTER THE BATTLE OF FORT DONELSON. 97 In the mean time every exertion had been made to complete the repairs, and on the 4th of March, at 4.30, a.a., the “Carondelet” was again on her way down the Mississippi, in company with our flotilla, composed of the following vessels: Flag steamer “ Ben- ton,” Flag-Ofticer Foote, commander-in-chief ; “Mound City,” Commander A. H. Kilty ; ‘“ Louisville,” Commander Dove, U. S. N. ; “ Carondelet,” Commander Walke, U. 8. N.; “ Cincinnati,” Lieut. Commander Stembel, U. S. N.; “St. Louis,” Lieut. Com- mander Paulding, U. 8. N. ; “Pittsburg,” Lieut. Commander E. Thompson, U. 8. N.; and “Lexington,” Lieut. Commander Shirk. The transports in the rear consisted of the large steam- boats, “J. T. Wilson,” “Ike Hammit,” “Pike,” and ‘ Wiscon- sin,” each having five mortar-boats in tow; also the “Judge Florence,” magazine-boat, and the “ Great Western,” provision- boat ; and the flotilla was accompanied by our troops, under Gen- eral Buford, in the “Silver Wave,” the “ Rob Roy,” the “ Alps,” the “Hero,” and half a dozen tugs, with a large number of barges and laden lighters in tow ; thus making a very formidable display. THE FLOTILLA NEARING COLUMBUS. About 8, a.m., our fleet rounded to in the lower end of Lucas Bend, about three miles above Columbus, and drifted slowly down under the fortifications until satisfied that a flag which floated over them was, notwithstanding its odd appearance, in- tended to represent our stars and stripes. After having been detained two hours in ascertaining this fact, our fleet descended the river to Columbus. The forts had been evacuated two days previously, and were now occupied by twenty-five of our cavalry scouts from Paducah, Ky., under the command of Colonel Haas. Flag-Officer Foote, after holding a consultation with his offi- cers, and the army officers present, proceeded with his fleet, and several transports, to Hickman, twenty miles below Columbus, and there anchored in a line across the river for the night. At daylight on the following morning he continued ON HIS WAY TO ISLAND NO. 10, leaving the “Louisville,” Commander Dove, on guard at Hick- man. The morning was dark and foggy, the pilots only knowing the course and position of the fleet. The dim outline of high bluffs and tall trees, with strange echoes along the shores rather confused the “ old salt of the mountain billow,” who involuntarily looked around for “breakers.” 7 98 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. About 7.30, a.m, the fog arose suddenly ahead, and behold! just emerging from the forest of a deep bayou, the saucy “ Gram- pus,” the most notorious gunboat in those waters, appeared lying across our track almost motionless, and “close aboard.” Her colors were struck and engines stopped (a token of submission), and our people, taking a long breath, thought she was certainly their prize at last. SURPRISE OF “‘DARE-DEVIL JACK.” The flag steamer “Benton,” being at the time in advance, our excited officers and men looked and listened for her guns ; but she was dumb, and so slow in her movements, that, perceiving her tardiness, the little “ Dare-Devil Jack” (as she was called by those who trusted more to her speed than her prowess) started down the river with such astonishing celerity, like a scared rab- bit, that she was beyond the reach of the “ Benton’s” 9-inch Dahlgreen guns, before one of them could be fired. The “ Ben- ton’s” decks and guns were then in the midst of a refreshing ablution; they were not comme il faut or presentable so early. And when she did fire, the shell fell short of the ‘ Grampus ” about one-third the distance, and the game (like Cuffy’s rabbit) proved to be “dry eating,” and unworthy of further notice offici- ally ; and our admirable reporters had such a tender regard for the fleet and the flag steamer, that they could not mention the matter at all Ol ON GNVISI ZAOPV ‘1 ON LYOd HLIM ATLLVE CHAPTER VII. BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. The Movements of the Confederates for a More Defensive Position.—The Attack on Fort No. 1, About Three Miles Above Island No. 10, by our Fleet, with the Mortars, on the 17th, 18th and 19th of March, 1862.— Defects of the Enemy’s Position.—General Pope Cutting off the Retreat. —A Request Denied.—The Bombardment of the Forts.—‘‘ Well done, old * Carondelet.’ ”—A Critical Situation.—Effect of Erroneous Reports in our Histories. —Flag-Officer Foote’s Reports Corrected.—A Brilliant Exploit.— Commodore Hollins’ Iron-clads.—General Pope’s Plan for Capturing Island No. 10.—Council of War on Board the ‘‘ Benton.”—Captain Walke’s Voluntary Offer to run the Blockade.—Strange Omissions in the Naval History.—First Example of Running Blockades on the Mississippi.—Let- ters of Flag-Officer Foote. AFTER the evacuation of Columbus, the Confederates, with the view of arresting the further progress southward of the Federal arms, proceeded to re-enforce and fortify the positions held by them on Island No. 10, and on the eastern bank of the Mississippi, in its vicinity. These positions were remarkably well-chosen for defense, but just as remarkably ill-chosen for retreat, an alterna- tive which does not appear to have presented itself to the officers by whom they were selected. THE ENEMY’S POSITION. On both sides of the river, nearly surrounding the points occu- pied by the enemy, were impassable swamps and bayous, and their only chance for obtaining supplies or effecting a retreat was by the Mississippi, south of Island No. 10. General Pope, with an army of ten thousand men, having occu- pied New Madrid, on the western bank of the river, below Island No. 10, at once perceived the defect in the enemy’s position, and with great promptness and energy proceeded to take advantage of it. With the cannon he had captured at New Madrid, he established a line of batteries extending from that place to a point nearly opposite to Tiptonville, fifteen miles below Island 10, over land, and twenty miles by the river. A short distance below [99] 100 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. this begins the great swamps, near the banks on both sides of the river, containing but few spots of dry land, extending southward to a distance of sixty miles. By intercepting the navigation below Tiptonville, General Pope shut off the enemy from his only source of obtaining sup- plies, and of the only route by which he could retreat, as all inland communication was cut off by the swamps and bayous. Having established his batteries and blockaded the river, it was the design of the Federal commander to cross with his army and at- tack the enemy’s position in the rear from below. This movement, however, could not be executed without the aid of the gunboats. The enemy, anticipating it, had UAND NO. 10. constructed batteries at ev- ery point on the bank of the river, from Island 10to Tiptonville, where troops could be landed. Under these circumstances, General Pope requested Flag-Officer Foote to send one of the gunboats past the enemy’s batteries at Island No. 10 to New Madrid; a request which that officer declincd to comply with, on the ground of its impracticability. On the 17th of March the flag-officer reported that he had attacked the enemy’s forts with the iron-clads at a distance of two thousand yards or more. On account of the rapid current the boats would have been unmanageable had they come within shorter range; they would also have been in danger of being carried under the enemy’s guns, as a nearer approach would ex- pose the sterns and quarters of the vesseis, their most vulnerable points, to five or six other batteries mounting forty-three guns. While our gunboats were taking their positions in line of battle according to rank without special orders, the “Cincinnati” and ““St. Louis,” with the flag steamer “Benton” between them, in the center, lashed together ; the “Mound City ” on the extreme right, moored to the lowest point on the Missouri shore, opposite BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. 101 the “upper fort,” the “Carondelet” took her position on the extreme left, near the eastern or Kentucky shore. Just as the “ Carondelet ” had prepared for battle, however, she was ordered away by the flag-officer, who took her place, and she then steamed over to the opposite side of the river and moored (without further instructions), alongside of the “Mound City,” heading down stream ; the bombardment then commenced at very long range. While it was progressing the “ Pittsburg” steamed over to the western bank, astern of the “Mound City” and “Carondelet,” and her commander came on board the latter, and, having no orders, inquired of Captain Walke what he should do or where should be the position of his vessel in the battle, and was politely referred to the flag-officer as the proper source of ail such inform- ation, in the absence of any special or general orders upon the subject. The “Pittsburg” then started to join the flag-officer on the other side of the river. The bombardment commenced on the 17th March, at about 1, pe. M., and continued until night; it was resumed on the following morning and proceeded until 11 o’clock, the enemy having in the mean time ceased firing. The flag steamer and her immediate consorts, being the most prominent, had the honor of receiving several shots from the enemy’s upper battery, none of them, however, inflicting very much damage. The “St. Louis,” it is said, lost fifteen killed and wounded by the bursting of her rifle gun. On the first day a deliberate and a well-directed fire, once every minute, was kept up by order of the flag-officer; and, so far as could be observed from the “Carondelet,” eight out of every ten of her rifle shell struck in or very near the batteries; the crews were now well skilled in handling the guns, and we finally silenced the upper battery except one gun. At 4.50, the flag steamer sig- nalled to the “Mound City” and “Carondelet” to “cease firing” and those vessels answered the signal ; when the latter, being inse- curely moored, steamed up the river a short distance and there anchored. The “Benton,” “Cincinnati” and “St. Louis” contin- ued the action until sundown, but they did not succeed in silencing the solitary gun, which fired a parting shot just as our vessels were about leaving to anchor for the night. Our distance from the fort while firing continued, was at least a mile and three-quarters or two miles, and our rifle guns only reached it by an elevation of eight or nine degrees. The “Carondelet” fired during this day’s bombardment, seventy-five 15-second rifle shell, 102 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. eighteen 8-inch shells, twenty-five solid 8-inch shot and two 10- second rifle shells. The “Mound City” and the other three gunboats expended about the same amount, according to the allowance of time when engaged. The casualties were none, except those in- flicted upon our officers and crew on board the “St. Louis” by the bursting of one of her rifle guns, which killed two and wounded eleven severely, and two slightly. In our naval records and history only three gunboats enjoy the honor of being mentioned particlarly in connection with this affair, —the “Benton,” “Cincinnati” and the “St. Louis.” The position of the two latter vessels to the flag ship reminds one forcibly of the Scriptural account of Aaron and Hur holding up the hands of Moses while the battle was progressing, “ until the going dewn of the sun” ; for the “ Benton” (flag ship) was in like manner supported by the two gunboats named with her, throughout the whole of this bombardment. The “ Mound City” and the “ Carondelet ” were present, how- ever, on the western side of the river. About three miles above Island No. 10, was situated the enemy’s upper fort, on the Tennessee shore, which was about equi-distant between the flag steamer and these two gunboats ; they being within the range of all the enemy’s guns, on or above Island No. 10, while the “Benton” was beyond the range of all the batteries, except this one, with a gunboat on each side of her. The special correspondent of the Chicago Fimes, writing from on board the flag steamer “ Benton,” four miles above the head of Island No. 10, Mississippi river, on March 17, 1862, narrates this bombardment, and reports that the enemy were in large force, with Commodore Hollins and his ram “‘ Manassas” ; also that two Confederate gunboats were sunk in attempting to pass the Fed- eral batteries at Point Pleasant, and that four other gunboats, which ran by General Pope’s batteries, were stopped at our New Madrid batteries. The tout ensemble of this narrative is devoted to the praising of the flag steamer and her consorts ; aml vice versa, to the disparagement of the “ Mound City” and the “ Car- ondelet,” which were, of course, “too far away to attract his at- tention.” On the night following, at 11.30, p.a1., on the 17th, the “ Caron- delet ” hove up her anchor and got under way, by order of the flag-officer, and went to the mortar-boats to protect them. On the morning of the 18th, the flag-officer ordered her to drop down BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. 108 again to the extreme point opposite the enemy’s upper battery, and with the “Mound City,” to fire a shot once in every five minutes. This order was immediately obeyed, and with her rifled guns made good shots. Nearly every time they were fired, their shell struck the fort ; but all her 8-inch shell fell short, even when the guns were fired with the highest elevation which her ports would allow. The cautious firing enjoined upon the “Carondelet” by the flag-officer’s commendable care, was doubtless owing to the fact that her large rifle guns, although the most effectual while they lasted, were not constructed or modeled for such service. The reinforce of the rifle gun especially, should be much stronger than that of a smooth-bore, to be equally serviceable ; and as the guns of the “Carondelet ” endured much more firing at long or short range, than any other guns of the squadron, it was reasonable to suppose that they also would soon do far more damage amongst their friends than to their enemies if used much longer ; and the bursting of one of these guns about that time, on the “St. Louis,” was a warning. In this connection it should be remembered that the bursting of this description of gun, as well as that of the “Lady Polk” and “Lady Jeff Davis,” and also those of our own fleet, when engaged in battle at Fort Donelson, killed and wounded more of their gunners than those of the enemy. The “Benton, ” with her consorts on the east side of the river, and the “ Mound City” and “ Carondelet ” on the west side, were engaged in bombarding the upper fort, firing every five minutes from 9.30, A.M. The account of this bombardment, according to the History of the Great Rebellion, shows how greatly our historians have been misled. The following is a specimen of the misunderstandings, and of course misrepresentations, which are very frequent : “ At 8, A.M, all the gunboats dropped down, st remost, to a point within one mile of the head of Island No. 10, were formed in line across the river, all headed up stream, the flag steamer several hundred yards in advance ; they opened fire,” &c.; this “con- tinued with great vigor for several days.” : Here is another curious account: “ All the gunboats heading up stream, and the flag steamer several hundred yards in advance of all of them; and they formed in a line across the river.” Such left-handed compliments need correction. The flag steamer “Benton” must, of course, be honored as usual, but it is a well-known fact that these gunboats fought with their main batteries (the bow guns), and the “ Benton,” “ Cincin- 104 SCENES AND. INCIDENTS. nati,” and “St. Louis,” were lashed together, and over three miles from Island No. 10, and about two miles from the nearest of the enemy’s forts, which their smooth-bore guns could not reach. It was, therefore, impossible that the flag steamer could be “several hundred yards in advance” of the above-mentioned gunboats. The “Benton” was never “within one mile” of the island before its surrender, and in this action was nearly a mile further from it than the two gunboats which were not mentioned. ‘““WELL DONE, OLD ‘CARONDELET.’” At 10.20, a. m., the flag steamer made signal to the “Mound City ” and “ Carondelet ” to “cease firing,” when the latter withdrew, giving the cuemy one of her unerring shots as a parting salute, that cut down a large tree which overhung their battery, which' falling with a tremendous splash into the water, had the appear- ance of a great explosion, and called forth the cheers of her com- rades on the “ Mound City,” and on the western side of the river, with the exclamation, “ Well done, old ‘ Carondelet !”* She then returned to her former anchorage. At 12.05 the “ Mound City ” opened fire again at two or three minutes’ interval. At 3.55, Pp. M., a tug from the flag steamer boarded the “ Caron- delet” with orders from the flag-officer to go up for coal and ammunition. Afterwards she returned to the former post to which she had been assigned, for the protection of the mortar- boats, and there, from the mortars and gunboats, an occasional ~ shos was fired at the forts. March 19, early in the morning, the mortar-boats and the “Mound City ” commenced firing at an early hour, shots being fired at the forts every minute or two. The shots fired by the enemy in reply generally fell short or passed over our boats with- out striking them. At 9.45, a.m, the flag-officer signalled the “Mound City” to cease firing. The enemy then opened fire, a few shot, from two of the lower batteries, on the mortar-boats, * This shot was, of course, claimed for the insatiable flag steamer (by some of her correspondents), who claimed everything, although her smooth- bore 9-inch shell did not reach the enemy, but struck the water far short of the upper fort, which was the nearest to the ‘‘ Benton.” Nor did she or any other gunboat fire at the precise time when the ‘‘ Carondelet ” fired her last shot on that occasion, with her heavy rifled gun fully charged, and pointed with an elevation of about eight or nine degrees, and these facts were espe- cially noticed. But it was not, however, more surprising that the staff officers should have claimed the credit of this shot for the ‘‘ Benton ” than that they and a few of their misguided friends should claim, or attempt to claim, ex- clusively, the credit of the capture of Island No. 10. BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. 105 making some very good shots for the distance, about two and three-quarters or three miles, but did not strike them. The mortar- boats returned the enemy’s fire, which soon ceased. The “Mound City ” fired every fifteen minutes until 10, rp. u., when the “Ben- ton” fired one gun and the firing ceased. March 20th the “ Mound City ” fired a gun at the batteries with long intervals until 10.50, A. M., when the “Benton” signalled her to cease, though the * Benton ” and mortar-boats continued firing at the forts leisurely, with long intervals ; but the “ Benton’s ” 9-inch shells appeared to fall short invariably. At 2, Pp. m., the enemy fired on us again. Some of their shot struck very near to the “Carondelet” and the mortar-boats, but did not hit any of them. As we gave them an immediate answer with our mortars the enemy ceased, no change having been made in the position of the mortars or gunboats. March 21st, at 12.20, a. m., a light was observed at the upper battery, and the “Mound City ” fired two shots at it; the “Ben- ton” also, between 4 and 8, a. m., fired five or six shots in the same direction. The reason why the shot and shell from our smooth- bore guns did not reach the batteries, was that the charge of powder furnished for these 9-inch guns, particularly, was insufficient to enable them to throw their shell as far as other heavy guns. The tortar-boats continued firing at long intervals. March 22nd, the mortar-boats fired two shells per hour, and with the rest of our squadron remained in stat guo on the Missouri shore ; the gunboats fired at longer intervals. All night General Pope’s guns, which were about twenty miles down the river’s course from our fleet, and about six miles distant in a direct line; were plainly heard. Our transports, the “ Alps,” “ Wilson” and “ Wis- consin” came down and took all but four of the mortar-boats in tow up the river. At 6, p. m., the “Carondelet,” by order of Flag- Officer Foote, dropped down about three hundred yards nearer the upper batteries, opposite, and took up position at the end of the point, under a clump of very large overhanging trees, prepared to bombard Fort No. 1. ACCIDENT TO THE “CARONDELET.” March 23. The mortar-boats fired a bomb-shell every half-hour. The river was rising, fast overflowing its banks; the current being very strong, and the gunboats constantly steaming against it. At about eight o’clock two immense cotton-trees fell upon the “Caron- delet’s” decks, on the port quarter and wheel house, breaking up her boats and davits; and the hammock nettings, and sky-lights 106 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. were also stove in. These trees had been undermined by the strong current, and their fall was no doubt caused by the tremendous shocks of the bombardment, near the river bank. Every effort was made on the part of the officers and crew of the “Carondelet,” to extri- cate her from the unfortunate position in which she was placed ; and while so engaged another large tree fell with its full force across her deck, destroying everything that had escaped on the first occa- sion, and wounding Hugh Maguire (seaman) dangerously, and John McBride (ship’s cook) mortally, several others being slightly injured. The “Carondelet” was now hors de combat, and in a very CRITICAL SITUATION, unable to move or make signals. At 10, a.m, the flag-officer sent the tow-boat “Alps” from alongside the “Benton,” to assist in ex- tricating the “Carondelet,” by towing her out from the trees which held her fast. She was subsequently towed up the river, and a gang of carpenters from Cairo were occupied more than a week in partially completing the necessary repairs, the officers and crew also working night and day to clear away the wreck, and put their vessel again in good fighting trim. In the mean time, very heavy firing was heard distinctly below Island No. 10 and New Madrid, which proved to be an attack of the enemy’s gunboats, under Commodore Hollins, on General Pope’s batteries below that place in the enemy’s rear, which our historian describes in the particulars of the occupation of New Madrid by General Pope, with his army of twenty thousand men. “The peril of this enterprise was greatly increased by the pres- ence below the island of the rebel gunboats,” “ which commanded it to the extreme range of their cannon, some of which were rifles.” ‘‘ Nine of these boats at some times engaged his batter- ies, but with little effect, because their shot and shell went mostly over the trenches, while they, lying high out of water, and above the banks, were conspicuous marks, and therefore suffered se- verely.” , A BRILLIANT EXPLOIT.. At the Confederate Battery No. 1, about three miles or more above Island No. 10 (not on Island No. 10), a very brilliant affair took place, and deserves our highest commendation. The service was performed on April 1st, 1862, by an expedition under com- mand of Colonel Roberts (who proposed and voluntarily executed the plan), which consisted of fifty men, in five armed barges from the squadron, fully manned and officered. It was the next day BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. 107 very graphically described in the columns of the Cincinnati Gazette, as follows: “ A most daring exploit was performed last night by Colonel Roberts, and fifty picked men from his regiment, the 42nd Illinois. It was intensely dark, and a severe gale of wind and thunder-storm prevailed. During the height of the storm, Colonel Roberts and his men in five yawls, managed by crews from the gunboats, left the “Benton,” and with muffled oars, and under cover of the darkness, rowed down the stream in the direction of the upper battery. When within a few rods of it, a blinding flash of lightning glared upon the water, revealing the boats to the sentries. They fired five or six shots, the balls whistling over- head, doing no damage, and incontinently fled back to the camp, which is located some distance to the rear of the battery. Our men made no reply, but pulled up to the fortification, sprang up over the parapet, and in three minutes’ time spiked all the guns, six in number ; Colonel Roberts himself spiking a huge 80-pound pivot-gun. The boats returned without a man receiving a scratch. “The guns, which had all been duly mounted within the past two or three days, some having been previously dismounted by our cannonading, were sixty-fours and eighties. The ‘Grampus’ was lying near the battery, but made no demonstration, fearing to come out in a storm.” The fact of the “ Benton” firing about the time of the starting of the expedition, gave rise to much criticism ; and a similar de- monstration on the part of the same vessel near the time when the “ Carondelet” started to run the blockade was also commented upon, as such a startling movement would only put the enemy more on the alert, than otherwise. It will be readily imagined that the immediate actors in these expeditions had good reason for preferring silence to the diversion which the “ Benton” thought fit to. make, which would surely attract the attention of the enemy to the movements of our gunboats on those occa- sions. CONTINUING THE BOMBARDMENT. Our mortars kept up a very heavy bombardment on the morn- ing of April 1st, and the enemy replied with spirit from their floating battery for a short time. Their shots were well aimed, but occasioned no damage. Very heavy and rapid firing was heard last night and this morn- 108 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. ing at Point Pleasant, or in that vicinity. Our mortars ceased firing at sunset. Flag-Officer Foote says in one of his reports that “in this en- gagement one of the enemy’s guns was dismounted, and their men at times ran from the batteries.” In all subsequent reports respecting the naval operations at Island No. 10, he describes the attack as being made at long range ; and hence it is evident that, although some injury might have been inflicted on the enemy’s fort, the great object of reducing these works, and of capturing the enemy’s forces, could not be effected or materially advanced, by the gunboats alone, owing to the position which they occupied, and the manner in which the attack was conducted. This was the opinion of our naval officers, and that expressed by General Pope, judging from his official detailed report, in which, after de- scribing the military operations below New Madrid, on the west bank of the river (already referred to), he says: “ Meantime the flotilla had been firing at long range, both from the gun and mortar-boats, at the batteries of the enemy, in and opposite Island No, 10, for seven consecutive days, without any apparent effect, and without any advance whatever towards their reduc- tion. This result was doubtless due to the defective construction of the boats.” According to the official report of Flag-Officer Foote on the 26th of March, there were nineteen Confederate gunboats and rams in the river, among them several powerful iron-clad vessels (as then reported and believed) ; and some of which were then below New Madrid, under command of the indomitable Comman- der Hollins, who with these made several attempts to capture our fort at Point Pleasant. Hollins ran his vessels up right under the muzzles of Pope’s guns, the shot and shell from which went through the gunboats at nearly cvery fire; one shell, according to the report of those who were on board, cutting its way through two of them, resulting in terrible destruction, and the death of many of their officers and crew. Finding his western gunboats so vul- nerable, Hollins took a final leave for New Orleans, and a junior officer became his successor in the command. The names of the Confederate vessels at Island No. 10, as re- ported by prisoners and refugees, were the “ Livingston,” mount- ing five guns, “ Pontchartrain,” seven guns,” “Ivy, four guns, and “M’Rae,” eight guns. There was also a floating battery of sixteen heavy guns, and the “ Grampus” of two guns. Below Island No. 10, after the capture of the island, Foote’s BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. 109 flotilla, while on its way to Fort Pillow, met with five of these Confederate gunboats, under the command of John W. Dunning- ton, of Kentucky, formerly a lieutenant in the United States Navy. They exchanged shots with our leading gunboats, the “Benton” and “Carondelet,” and the shell from the enemy’s vessels exploded over our boats, but our own rifle shells did not reach them ; showing clearly that some of their heavy guns were of superior range. The second ineffectual bombardment already referred to occurred on the 4th of April—the day on which the “Carondelet” ran the gauntlet. The “Benton,” “Cincinnati” and “ Pittsburg” came over to the western bank of the river, and moored close to the place where our gunboats and mortar-boats had been tied up for weeks, secure from all harm from the batteries above and on Island. No. 10, which were two, three and four miles distant. From this remote position the above-mentioned gunboats commenced a bombardment of “ Zsdand No. 10,” over the point of land above it. The wreck of the steamer “‘L. B. Winchester,” which had been sunk by the enemy, lay just above the island, and about midway between it and the Missouri shores, where the mortar-boats laid, in a chute, across the point above the island ; and the object of the enemy in sinking her there, was to prevent our gunboats from running past them, through this chute, unnoticed, by which it would have been possible for a gunboat to elude the fire of the batteries on Island No. 10, and those on the Tennessee shore, and then attack them in the rear. It was stated by our commodore that in the course of the bom- bardment on the 4th, this wreck was struck by our shell and burned ; but the enemy said they burned the wreck themselves. The fire from our gunboats was not replied to at all promptly, and it seemed to have no other effect than to cause the enemy to move their floating battery of heavy guns-from Island No. 10; as they said, merely to place it in a more secure position, a short distance lower down; but, as our own reports allege, because it was cut adrift by our shot. Whatever was the cause which led to the removal of the floating battery, the position to which it was subsequently assigned was maintained until after the island had surrendered, when it was scuttled and turned adrift.* Such is the importance with which this bombardment is invested by some of our naval reports and histories, that we find repeatedly * See Official Reports. 110 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. the statement that (combined with the spiking of a few guns, about three miles above Island No. 10) it resulted in a great measure in securing victory for our fleet. In one account it is represented that there was a bombardment by these three gunboats both be- fore and after the “ Carondelet” ran the gauntlet ; another history makes the bombardment to have been continuous. Thus it is intended to convey the impression that this action occurred before instead of after Captain Walke’s determination to run the gauntlet, and that a safe passage was made for the blockade-runners to pass the enemy’s batteries beforehand, by the spiking of No. 1 battery on the island, and those three miles above, and the displacing of a floating battery of the largest guns. For this service claim is laid to the honor of anticipating the victory, and the capture of Island No. 10, by our fleet, before the “Carondelet” passed down the river below the island, and “attacked and silenced the land batteries on the Tennessee shore,” and before General Pope crossed over the river with his army to attack the enemy in the rear, both of which the historian is led to believe was unnecessary, as the enemy had already surrendered to the threatening appear- ance of our fleet, without a struggle. In fact, the variations of the history and reports published of this event, have so befogged the facts and circumstances, in regard to the actions of our gun- boats, that very few writers have attempted to give us a full, clear and satisfactory account of it. A PERVERSION OF FACTS. All who have any knowledge of the subject, will readily perceive that such stories throughout are but a plausible and transparent delusion, for which the honor of our Navy must suffer until it is corrected. The actual facts were quite easily misunderstood, how- ever, by the ambiguity of the official despatches, by which Fort No. 1 was mistaken for the first or upper fort at the head of Island No. 10. All the enemy’s batteries, on shore and afloat, opened fire for the first time with all their vigor, upon the gunboats when they ran the blockade, excepting the upper battery or Fort No. 1, which the “Carondelet” passed unobserved at a distance of over a mile, and then she passed within one hundred, instead of “three hun- dred yards” of those on Island No. 10. Fort No. 1, on the Ten- nessee shore, was then nearly overflowed. The floating battery before mentioned was never moored at the head of the island, so far as could be seen; but about half the length of the island down the river, on the middle of the northern side of the island, and it BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. 111 was so far from our gunboats and mortar-boats, when they bom- barded the island on the 4th of April, that it was scarcely visible with good marine glasses. It afterwards fired upon the gunboat “Carondelet” when she ran the gauntlet. Flag-Officer Foote’s official report of spiking Battery No. 1, above Island No. 10, on the Tennessee shore, reads as follows: “JU. §. Flag Steamer ‘ Benron,’ “Orr Isuanp No. 10, ** April 2nd, 1862. “Hon. GIDEON WELLEs, “ Secretary of the Navy. «Sr: “Last night an armed boat expedition was fitted out from the squadron and the land forces at this point, under command of Colonel Roberts, of the 42nd Illinois Regiment. The five boats comprising the expedition were in charge of First Master G. V. Johnson, of the ‘St. Louis,’ assisted by Fourth Master Geo. P. Lord, of the ‘Benton,’ and Master’s Mate Scoville, of the ‘Mound City,’ each with a boat’s crew of ten men from their respective vessels, and carried in all one hundred men, exclusive of officers, under com- mand of Colonel Roberts. «At midnight the boats reached the upper or No. 1 Fort, and pulling di- rectly in its face, carried it, receiving only the harmless fire of two sentries, who ran after discharging their guns, while the rebel troops in the vicinity rapidly retreated. Whereupon Colonel Roberts spiked the six guns mounted in the fort, and retreated with his boats uninjured. The commanding offi- cer compliments all under his command for coolness and deliberation, and as being ready to perform more hazardous service had it been required to fulfill the object of the expedition. “Very Respectfully, ““A, H. Foote, “«Flag-Officer.” THE SITUATION FROM ANOTHER STAND-POINT. It may be judicious to take a more comprehensive view of the situation at this time, somewhat different to that which is taken by the writers of our history. For instance, Fort Donelson repulsed a squadron of four gunboats, giving them a terrible battering. Columbus was considered the most formidable of all the Confed- erate fortifications in the west—‘“the Gibraltar of the west.” But Flag-Officer Foote informed the honorable Secretary of the Navy, that Island No. 10 was still more impregnable and “harder to conquer” than Columbus. Yet, soon after, we are gravely in- formed by the Secretary of the Navy, and subsequently by our naval historian, that a few rowboats, officered and manned from five of our gunboats, succeeded in effecting a landing on Island No. 10. The historian’s statement is as follows: 112 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. “Tt appears that the battery at the head of the island, whose guns were spiked in the night expedition of boats under Colonel Roberts, was the one mainly relied upon by the rebels. It mounted eleven guns, and a boat would have to pass within three hundred yards of this strong work.” Nevertheless the crews of these rowboats accomplish their landing quite easily, and without loss. So, then, if all this be true, we have suggested to us a simple calculation in the “ double rule of three,” viz.: if Colonel Roberts, with five rowboats, cap- tured and spiked the guns of the main battery on Island No. 10 (as stated) in three minutes, how many minutes should it take six iron-clad gunboats to capture the island after its main battery of “eleven guns had been spiked,” and the floating battery of “sixteen heavy guns,” as then reported, had been driven away down the river, scuttled and wrecked, on the 4th of April? If all this had been as stated, Foote certainly ought to have taken Island No. 10 immediately thereafter ; and if that distinguished officer had done s0, his entire fleet and General Buford’s little army could have joined with the forces under command of Gen- eral Pope, and thus have followed up the advantage so quickly, as to have met Farragut near New Orleans, instead of above Vicksburg. — Notwithstanding the abundant proof as to the actual facts, such blunders occur in our naval records and history. The battery in which the six guns were spiked by Colonel Roberts, of our Army, was not on or near to Island No. 10, but about three miles east of it,in the bend or turn of the Mississippi, on the Tennessee shore. The achievement was the voluntary action of Colonel Roberts, and was originated and carried out independent of, and unconnected with, any other scheme then known ; certainly not because this battery was ever likely to pre- vent a gunboat from passing down the river at that stage of high water, when it could be very easily avoided, so far, at least, as to be harmless. But there are many other mistakes which are quite as bad, and worse, in other histories than those of our naval histories, but more excusable. One historical account, especially, in a “ Sketch of General Pope,” to be found in “ The History of the Civil War in the United States, by 8. M. Schmucker ; revised and completed by Dr. L. P. Brocket,” wherein, at pages 206 to 209 inclusive, Island No. 10 is represented as havirg surrendered to Flag- Officer Foote in consequence of his “tremendous bombardment,” BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. 113 that being (according to the writer) the only attack made upon the enemy’s works. General’s Pope’s army is said to have then marched to Tiptonville, but how this march was accomplished, with the Mississippi between them, we are not informed. A MISLEADING PICTURE. Of course, we are quite prepared to admit that a faultless his- tory could not be expected, especially in consideration of the con- flicting nature of the information reported as authentic, and perhaps never more so than in this rebellion. It was impossible to avoid mistakes when there were so few accounts rendered that were not more or less partial and interested. Neither can our Navy Department now remedy the evil. Reporters, politicians, artists and lithographers were sometimes employed with much pains and expense, that they should magnify the actions of our fleet, and the deeds of our warriors, pretty much in proportion to the per- sonal influence or inducements offered. Some of the pictures, in particular, are good specimens of this artifice and humbug ; among them being one purporting to represent this bombardment of Island No. 10, under which it surrendered on the 7th of April, 1862. The picture is intended as a complete bird’s-eye view— twenty-two and a half inches by sixteen inches—in very brilliant colors, in which, however, the artists and artificers have, at great pains, succeeded in misrepresenting the so-called capture of the island ; but no such scene, or anything like it, occurred there. Gunboats and mortars present are portrayed (see photograph herein), as all firing at once; and all the gunboats, except the “Taylor” and “Lexington,” are steaming rapidly down upon the island (which, by the way, has come up to meet them about two miles from its usual position, and is very considerably elongated), and all the Confederate batteries blazing away at a frightful rate. This picture is entitled— “Bombardment and capture of Island No. 10 on the Mississippi river, April 7th, 1862, by the gunboats and mortar fleet under command of Commodore Foote, with his flotilla, which left Cairo March 14th, and arrived at anchorage above Island No. 10 on the afternoon of the following day, and immediately opened fire on the forts, which was continued day and night until April 7th, when at midnight the rebels surrendered, and the whole island, with all its vast munitions of war, fell into our hands, after having withstood the bombardment for twenty-three days.” In the construction of the picture the flag steamer “Benton,” 8 114 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. the most formidable gunboat, has the post of honor, of course. This picture is such a remarkable illustration of the above-men- tioned works, that they all appear to have been designed by the same clique of artists. The true position of our gunboats on this occasion, in relation to each other, was nearly the reverse of this representation ; the “Carondelet ” and “Pittsburg” being then down the river, twenty miles below Island No. 10, and having, with our army, under General Pope, actually gained the victory twelve hours previous to the surrender of the island to Commodore Foote. But here these gunboats are placed prominently in the rear. It will be interesting as well as instructive, to give the reader the facts and impressions of an intelligent “landsman,” @ disin- terested eye-witness,” as reported by the Missouri Democrat. The subjoined letter was written from the ftoti!la under date of, April 4th, 1862. “We were all most gloriously disappointed yesterday in antici- pating a big fight. Early in the morning Captain , of the ‘Benton’ made some very mysterious visits to different boats of the squadron, and at one time was seen very earnestly spying at the rebel battery from the pilot-house of one of the tug-boats, which for this purpose had been taken to a favorable position on the Missouri shore. This was all entirely out of the ordinary routine, and, of course, created among observers expectations that something was to be done. “ At ten o’clock a body of sailors about an inclined derrick on the forecastle of the flag ship could be heard singing, ‘Heave away, my hearty fellows: heave away,’ and seen surging backwards and forwards, as if heaving the ponderous anchor which for more than two wecks, to the great disgust of newspaper reporters, has held the advance of the fleet motionless. The ‘ Cincinnati,’ which for a long time had imitated with offensive consistency the immobil- ity of the flag ship, was also discovered increasing her steam, and getting ready for the change of programme so anxiously awaited. “«What does this mean?’ was the question exchanged between lookers-on who had not been admitted to the profound seerecy of the ‘Benton.’ The upper rebel battery was not again to be stormed, for it had evidently been most effectually silenced by a daring spik- ing party last Tuesday night. The fleet was not about to return to Cairo, for Commodore Foote does not know how to withdraw from an undertaking, and in this respect, is not unlike the little drummer-boy, who, upon being asked to beat the retreat, after giv- ing a number of the other calls, said he never had been taught it. BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. 115 We soon had no occasion for speculating about what was to be done, for the gunboats headed over to the Missouri shore, and were seen leisurely taking a position to serve their broadside guns at the floating battery ; an indistinct view of which was obtained while it lay partly submerged under a steep bank, twenty-five feet high, on the west side of the notorious Island No. 10. A thrifty-looking peach orchard in full bloom, stood upon the bank just over the battery, and enabled our gunners, more than any- thing else, to acquire the range. “The ‘Carondelet’ and ‘Mound City,’ not being so situated as to take part, and at the same time exposed to a return fire, withdrew to a less dangerous position ; the ‘St. Louis’ also was not invited to participate, and remained at anchor in the stream. At 11 o’clock the ‘Cincinnati’ fired the first shot ; she was soon followed by the ‘Pittsburg’ and ‘Benton.’ The decks of the non-combative transports were covered with spectators, who, closely watching the exploding shells, commented upon their effectiveness, and held themselves in readiness to dodge the shrieking shot which were momentarily expected from the rebels. None of these came, however, and their unutterable placitude was most contemptible. “ Our shooting was less frequent, and seemingly less determined, than on the day of the first bombardment ; and for the first two hours, we thought it simple wariness on the part of our officers, resulting from a purpose to enter more gradually upon a more resolute conflict ; but we were deceived when after three hours the fire slackened instead of being increased. The ‘Benton,’ long before darkness set in, and without any special necessity, hauled near to the Kentucky shore apparently reflecting thereby the opinion of the commodore, that more had been undertaken than could be accomplished. This view of the matter, we think, was well taken, for, with the aid of good glasses, no damage was seen to be done by our shooting, the enemy not even appearing annoyed, and at best the policy of reducing a line of batteries by opening upon the one most remotely situated, being exposed in the mean time to the fire of the others, appears to us a little strange. “ Little reverses of this kind, or probably they may more appro- priately be denominated failures, give great comfort to the rebels, and will encourage them to a more desperate defense when the final struggle comes, than they might otherwise make. To-day everything hereabouts has assumed its former attitude. The 116 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. transaction of yesterday has been almost forgotten, and remem- bered, if at all, as one of much noise but of little significance.” True enough, the young and ingenuous reporter could not then see the significance of this sudden and mysterious move- ment of these gunboats, or the incentive which broke up their “masterly inactivity.” But now the pages of our history will show him that a great victory was then expected to be gained by our army; and by this attack (in appearance at least) our fleet could ultimately lay claim to the credit of capturing Island No. 10. GENERAL POPE’S PLAN OF OPERATIONS. Colonel Bissell, of the Engineer Corps, had some time pre- viously been directed by General Pope to examine the swamps on the west bank of the river, above and near Island No. 10, and ascertain whether or not a canal could be constructed from a point above Island No. 10 to New Madrid. From his report it appeared practicable to make a channel through the swamps, of sufficient depth to admit the passage of light-draught boats, and the work of opening the channel was immediately commenced.* It was the design of General Pope to make the canal deep enough for the gunboats; but the difficulty of the undertaking was too great, and the time when the river would fall faster than ‘he could dig being near at hand, it was found impossible to ac- complish the task as at first proposed, within the time required, if at all. There appeared, moreover, but little prospect of Gen- eral Pope obtaining any aid from the flotilla ; and he accordingly ordered the construction of several floating batteries, made from heavy coal barges, with which he hoped to silence at least a part of the enemy’s forts, to enable his army to cross the river. But General Pope did not fully rely upon their ability to cope with the heavily-armed and strongly-built forts of the enemy ; and he continued to urge upon Flag-Officer Foote the necessity of send- ing down one, two, or three of his gunboats, to render the most essential assistance. In one of his letters to that officer, General Pope says: “I am thus urgent, sir, because the lives of thousands of men, and the success of our operations, hangs upon your de- cision.” Notwithstanding the repeated solicitations of General Pope, * We ask the attention of the reader to the above particulars, to contro- vert explicitly the idea that this plan of operations should be accredited to the flag-officer. BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. 117 Flag-Officer Foote was unwilling to assume the responsibility of ordering a movement, the practicability of which he was per- sonally very doubtful, and which was also opposed by nearly all his officers. In his report to the Secretary of the Navy, dated March 20th, 1862, Flag-Officer Foote, in support of his opinion, resting upon the advice of a council of his officers, says : “J send to-night to sound in a narrow and shallow channel, in hopes the present rise of water will enable me to dispatch a small steamer, with light draft, to General Pope, near New Madrid ; * who, as I have already informed the Department, has several times requested that I would send him two or three gunboats, to enable him to cross over to the Tennessee side, with the view of attacking the rebels in the rear at that point, while we make the attack in the front, or river side. I am apprehensive, however, from our ill success thus far, that this project may not prove feasible. To-day, for the first time since I have been in com- mand of the flotilla, I called a council of war with the view of ascertaining the opinion of the officers, with reference to sending, or attempting to send, aid to General Pope. “The officers, with one exception, were decidedly opposed to running the blockade, believing it would result in the almost certain destruction of the boats which should attempt to pass the six forts, with fifty guns bearing upon the vessel.” A coungil of war “ for the first time,” was called by Flag-Officer Foote, as it appears in the above letter, on the 20th of March, 1862. Where it was held, or who were present, does not appear therein : but one nameless officer was not “opposed to running the blockade.” This council appears to have been a secret one, of which we know nothing, except by the above letter. The actual council, at which a decision was made, was held on the 28th or 29th of March, 1862, on board the flag steamer. At this council was read the letter of General Pope, already referred to ; and then the flag- officer invited the commanders to retire, as he said he would take the opinion of each, separately and privately. It happened that in the order of rank, the second officer called was the commander of the “ Carondelet,” who, upon being asked his opinion on the subject of running the blockade, earnestly advised the admiral to send a gunboat down to General Pope (nearly in these words), * This attempt to send a small steamer with light draft through a’ little bayou, to New Madrid, is a very clear indication that no gunboat was then intended to be sent there. 118 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. “if he thought her services below Island No. 10 would justify the risk.” “On being immediately asked whether he would under- take to pass the enemy’s batteries with the “ Carondelet,” Captain Walke replied that he would. The admiral then said he would send Captain Walke his orders, and that he should or would be rewarded.* It was considered advisable and desirable, that none but vol- unteers should take part in this exceedingly hazardous expedition, as it was then considered, and as it was known to Captain Walke, that one of the officers of the “Carondelet” would probably de- cline to go voluntarily, the admiral sent for him afterwards ; and at the suggestion of Captain Stembel, Mr. Hoel, first master of the “Cincinnati,” was sent for, and he consented to accompany Cap- tain Walke on board the “ Carondelet,” and the disaffected ofticer was excused. It was under the circumstances just recounted—when it was known that the whole success of General Pope’s operations de- pended upon one, at least, of our gunboats effectually running the blockade—that Captain Walke, confident of the morale of his command, offered to take the “Carondelet” past the batteries. Various accounts are given in reference to this matter in our histories. In one of them it is said that “the ‘Carondelet ’ under- took” to perform this service; while the important fact that it was the advice of Captain Walke to send a gunboat to General Pope, which was so highly appreciated by the admiral, is over- looked or suppressed entirely. Captain Walke could not have been guilty of such presumption as to have assumed the responsi- bility of rushing into the admiral’s presence, volunteering his advice, and offering to go on that dangerous expedition, without first. being asked, and impressed with the importance of the ser- vice which might be rendered by his gunboat below Island No. 10. It was after hearing General Pope’s letter read, and when Captain Walke’s opinion and advice were asked, that he told the flag-officer that if the services of a gunboat would justify the risk he certainly would send the gunboat desired, and being asked if he would run the gauntlet himself, replied that he would. Certain partics have tried to take from Walke the credit of this enterprise, by their accounts of it, by stating that General Pope’s * We are convinced that this council of war was not consulted to carry out the flag-officer’s plan of operations, but torclieve himself of the responsi- bility of complying with the request of General Pope to co-operate with him in a plan which he, Foote, did not approve of. See his official reports. BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10. 119 plan of sending a gunboat past the batteries was abandoned after the council of war, and then giving a long account of the opera- tions of our fleet above the island (which had previously occurred), to convey the idea that all this work by Flag-Officer Foote, and the length of time to accomplish it, had superseded Pope’s re- quest ; but that the bombardment of the island, and the spiking of the guns on Fort No. 1, had then enabled him to risk one of his gunboats in running the batteries to secure the capture of Island No. 10, without reference to the operations of General Pope. And such are the statements of the most beautiful and confident writers on our naval affairs, during the rebellion, that the latest production has at last accredited Flag-Officer Foote with all the honors, as the projector and executor of all these successful operations, which, according to their accounts, required a hard struggle of twenty-three days to accomplish. A GUNBOAT URGENTLY NEEDED BY GENERAL POPE. The critical appearance of affairs at this time may be imagined from the nature of some of the published letters ‘of the flag- Spicer: In one of them Admiral Foote says : “General Pope has no transports, and, without our reaching him by running the blockade, is unable to cross over to the Ten- nessee side from New Madrid, where he now is in force ; and it is impossible for him, from the inundated state of the country, to send or march his troops to this point.” In another letter also the flag-officer alludes to the naval forces of the enemy below Island No. 10, and advises General Halleck and Commander Pennock, at Cairo, to prepare for the worst, “in case he should be overpowered.” He also alludes to that report in similar letters to the Secretary of the Navy, before and since Walke ran the gauntlet, of the serious apprehension of a formid- able attack upon our fleet by that of the enemy, from New Orleans and Memphis. And the order to be on the alert, was extended to all the other officers in command on the Mississippi, above Island No. 10. But after the apprehended dangers were overcome by the gunboats under command of Captain Walke—the “ Pitts- burg” and some others having followed that officer’s example when the possibility of successfully running the blockade had been demonstrated—many efforts were made to detract from the meritorious services of those who were first to make the venture, and who subsequently, with the army at New Madrid, achieved such glorious results. CHAPTER VIII. : RUNNING THE GAUNTLET AT ISLAND NO. 10. Preliminary correspondence of the Commander-in-chief.—What was re- quired of the ‘‘ Carondelet.”—Running the blockade.—Flag-Officer Foote to General Pope.—A description by a correspondent.—Captain Walke con- atulated on his achievement.—Importance of the service rendered.— etter of Flag-Officer Foote to General Pope.—Captain Walke’s report.— A contemplated attack by the fleet which was never made.—Unequal praise.—A description by the correspondent of The New York Times, and also by the only correspondent on board the ‘‘ Carondelet,” from The Missouri Democrat.—Faithful word-painting. ELAG-OFFICER FOOTE TO GEN. HALLECK. “Flag Steamer ‘Benton,’ orF Isuanp No. 10, March 26, 1862. ‘‘ GENERAL: “Tn view of the rebels having, as is reported, thirteen gunboats at New Orleans, irrespective of four or five below New Madrid, with the ‘Ma- nassas’ ram at Memphis, I respectfully suggest, in the contingency of their passing up the river, that it would be desirable to have a river battery placed at Columbus, which would sweep the river below that point. Cairo, being now overflowed, presents a less defensible position than Columbus. “Tam very Respectfully, “« Major-General “(A. H. Foote, H. W. Haiecs, “ Flag-Officer. Coma’g St. Louis, Missouri,” Copies of two letters referred to on preceding pages. FLAG-OFFICER FOOTE TO COMMANDER PENNOCK. “Flag Steamer ‘Brenton,’ Isuanp No. 10, March 26, 1862. “Sir: “You will inform the commanders of the gunboats ‘Cairo,’ ‘Taylor,’ and ‘Lexington,’ not to be caught up the rivers with too little water to re- turn to Cairo. They, of course, before leaving, will consult the generals with whom they arc co-operating. As it is reported, on the authority of different persons from New Orleans, that the rebels have thirteen gunboats finished and ready to move up the Mississippi, besides four or five below [120] ONDELET RUNNING THE GAUNTLET AT ISLAND No. 10. RUNNING THE GAUNTLET AT ISLAND NO. 10. 121 New Madrid, and the ‘Manassas,’ or ram, at Memphis, the boats now up the river and at Columbus or Hickman should be ready to protect Cairo or Columbus, in case disaster overtakes us in our flotilla. “ Respectfully, ‘A, H. Foote, “« Flag-Officer.”’ DANGERS Of RUNNING THE BLOCKADE. In a letter written by Commodore Foote to General Pope, the risk to which any boat attempting to run the blockade would be exposed, and the galling fire which could be brought to bear upon it from the forts, are thus described. The letter is dated on the 6th of April, two days after the gauntlet was run, and reads thus : “Tf it did not sink the gunboat, we would, in the Navy, consider the gunners totally unfit for employment in the service ; and, therefore, my responsibility for the lives of the officers and men under my charge, induces me to decline a request which would, especially without protection to the boat, were the rebels at all competent to perform their duty, result in the sacrifice of the boat, her officers, and men, which sacrifice I would not be justified in making ; certainly not now, when by your admission it will be easy for the new rebel steamers, reported to be on their way up the river, to pass your batteries in the night; and if they meet my squadron, reduced by loss, so as to be unable to cope with them, can continue up the Mississippi or Ohio, to St. Louis or to Cincinnati.” Attention is invited to the tone and expressions of the flag-officer on these various occasions, before and since his order was written to Captain Walke, dated March 30th, 1862 ; his letters to General Pope, as given above, compared with his reports to the Secretary of the Navy, and to General Freemont, on or about the 5th or 6th of April, containing the anxious views of the commodore concerning his flotilla ; and those also which were written after the surrender of Island No. 10, to be convinced of the effect which Captain Walke’s advice, and the important results as they progressed to secure the victory, which the flag- officer’s friends now claim entirely as the fruit of his labor. The first cheering hope for the success, after the waning for- tunes of our fleet, appears in the following letter of the flag-oflicer to the Honorable Secretary of the Navy : “U. 8, Flag Steamer ‘ Benron,’ orF Isuanp No. 10, April 5, 1862. «Sm: ‘I have the honor to enclose several letters and papers referring to our 1 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. ' action here within the last three or four days. By spiking the rebel guns in one fort, and compelling the floating battery to cut adrift from her moor- ings, on the following day, from our effective firing on her ; these have en- abled the ‘ Carondelet,’ Commander Walke, to run, as I hope, successfully, the blockade, and join General Pope at New Madrid, who has been urging me to send him one or two gunboats, to cover his troops while he lands in force to attack them in front. While the ‘Carondelet’ was running the blockade last night in the midst of a heavy thunder-storm, the batteries opened upon her with forty- seven guns ; still, as the preconcerted signals with that vessel of firing minute guns was made as far as the heavy thunder would enable us to hear, I trust that she is now safely at New Madrid. “T have the honor to be, Your Ob’t Servant, ‘A. H. Foote, “Flag-Officer. “Hon. GIDEON WELLES, “ Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.” In an excellent report of this achievement by a correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial, from the gunboat “Cincinnati,” above Island No. 10, the writer says: “Flash after flash, boom after boom, in concert with the lightning and thunder of nature, made us almost despair of the safe passage of the brave men, on that daring craft ; but the God of Battles was with them, and He who ‘holds the waters in the hollow of his hand’ bore them safely through. Fifty-one guns were fired at her ; but, when we had al- most given her up as lost, the heart-gladdening signal of her safety came hurling through the air, making our souls leap for joy, and our hands clasp with a fervor of feeling that few have felt.” Very few would ever wish to withhold the highest honor from General Pope and his officers, Generals Hamilton and Bissell; or from Flag-Officer Foote, and the officers and men of the Navy who executed their instructions below Island No. 10. The following is a copy of the order issued to Captain Walke, by Commodore Foote, when the “ Carondelet” was about to start to run the blockade : — FLAG-OFFICER FOOTE TO CAPTAIN WALKE, U. S. N. “U. 8. Steamer ‘Benron,’ orr Isutanp No. 10, March 30th, 1862. «$m: ““You will avail yourself of the first fog or rainy night, and drift your steamer down past the rebel batteries, on the Tennessee shore and Island No. 10, until you reach New Madrid. I assign you this service as it is vitally important to the capture of this place that a gunboat should now be at New Madrid, for the purpose of covering General Pope’s army while cross- RUNNING THE GAUNTLET AT ISLAND NO. 10. 128 ing that point to the opposite or Tennessee side of the river, that he may move his army up to Island No. 10, and attack the rebels in the rear, while we attack them in front. Should you succeed in reaching General Pope, you will freely confer with him, and adopt his suggestions, so far as your superior knowledge of what your boat will perform will enable you to do, for the purpose of protecting his force while crossing the river. You will also (if you have coal, and the current of the river will permit), steam up the river when the army moves for the purpose of attempting their fortifica- tions. Still, you will act cautiously here, as you nov will be the only boat be- low. You will capture or destroy the rebel steamboat ‘‘Grampus,” and the transports, if possible, between this place and Island No. 10, at such time as will not embarrass you in placing yourself in communication with General Pope, at the earliest possible time after leaving this place. On this delicate and somewhat hazardous service to which I assign you, I must en- join upon you the importance of keeping your lights secreted in the hold or put out, keeping your officers and men from speaking at all, when passing the forts, above a whisper, and then only on duty, and of using every other precaution to prevent the rebels suspecting that you are dropping below their batteries. If you successfully perform this duty assigned to you, which you so willingly undertake, it will reflect the highest credit upon you, and all belonging to your vessel ; and I doubt not, but that the government will appreciate and reward you for a service which, I trust, will enable the army to cross the river, and make a successful attack in the rear, while we storm the batteries in front of this stronghold of the rebels. Commending you, and all who are under your command, to the care and protection of God, who rules the world and directs all things, “T remain, Very Respectfully Your Ob’t Servant, “A. H. Foots, «« Commander «« Flag-Officer Com. Naval Forces Western Waters. H. Watrg, U.S. N., Commanding U. 8. Gunboat ‘ Carondelet.’” «Pp. §. Should you meet with disaster, you will, as a last resort, destroy the steam machinery, and if possible to escape, set fire to your gunboat or sink her and prevent her from falling into the hands of the rebels. “A, HF.” What was required of the “Carondelet” very clearly appears in this extraordinary order of the flag-officer, which has been pub- lished in nearly every book which treats of this subject. But it is evident that none have attempted or pretended to consider the extent of its requirements from the “Carondelet.” For their perfect accomplishment would not fall short of an exclusive vic- tory for that vessel. The order alone will convince the profes- sional reader, acquainted with that locality, that the services de- manded of that gunboat far exceeded anything which the fleet had accomplished or attempted, notwithstanding the empty boasts of its victory. She was not only to run the blockade successfully, ' 124 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. but to capture or destroy the enemy’s gunboat “ Grampus,” and the transports which were moored under their batteries at Island No. 10, and also those between our fleet and Island No. 10; and in addition to all this, to communicate with the least possible de- lay with General Pope. The possibilities shadowed forth in the orders to Captain Walke, and the task which he “so willingly undertook,” appeared to be considered of too hazardous a nature to be undertaken by the whole fleet above Island No. 10; espec- ially when an attack from the enemy’s fleet was daily expected. This order, therefore, meant business, and such as could not be done without a victory. Although these orders were too intricate and ambiguous to be carried out to the letter, Captain Walke appreciated them, as they clearly evinced the confidence which was placed in his wise discretion, which had before undergone tests that had been very thorough and satisfactory. On the 4th April, Acting First Master Hoel joined the “Caron- delet,” all preparations being made to run the blockade of the ene- my’s forts onand about Island No. 10. Captain Walke sent an offi- cer to the flag-ofticer with the information that the “ Carondelet” would run the gauntlet that night, if it would meet his approba- tion; and, upon receiving a favorable answer, at 8, p. M., the “Ca- rondelet” went a short distance up the river, and took a barge laden with coal and hay on her port side. Where there was no iron plating on the sides of the vessel forward and aft, it was pro- tected with bales of hay, lumber, chain-cables, &c. ; the coal barge being lashed to her port quarter, to protect the magazine and shell rooms. Her upper deck was covered, also, with lumber, cord wood, coal bags, chain-cables and hawsers: cables and ropes were coiled round the pilot-house, from twelve to eighteen inches thick, and heavy timber, with all her available iron, was securely placed as a barricade around the boilers and engine-room ; and it was truly said, “The brave old ‘ Carondelet’ looked like a farmer’s team, preparing for market.” Captain Walke, being put on his own resources, was visited by General Buford, who rendered all the assistance in his power, and was with the captain all the preceding day, on the “ Rob Roy,” searching for the suitable barges. The general was accom- panied on board that night by Captain Hottendorff, of the 42nd Mlinois, and twenty-three sharpshooters of his command who vol- unteered to accompany her. He also remained on: board to the last moment, to give the captain and his brave officers and crew a hearty farewell with every encouragement from the Army officers. No officers of the fleet were present, although by some of them it RUNNING THE GAUNTLET AT ISLAND NO. 10. 125 was said, the “Carondelet” was going into “the jaws of death,” and from them cheer was not expected. All the arrangements being completed, the captain briefly ad- dressed the crew, on the character and importance of the enterprise in which they were about to engage ; and concluded by giving the orders required for the occasion ; “all ready, cast off the hawsers ;” all having expressed their readiness for the adventure. The “Ca- rondelet,” being one of the slowest vessels of the fleet, was difficult to manage ; on this occasion, particularly, she was very hard to steer or turn. The weather indicated rain, and a heavy storm was com- ing up the river rapidly. Assoon as the “Carondelet” was cast off, her bow was slowly turned to the westward. Heading for Island No. 10, she drifted silently past our fleet until clear of the first point, when she steamed down the river with all speed, heedless of the enemy’s shot, and a tremendous black storm which came roaring up the river, threatening to sweep destruction over land and water ; with awful blasts of lightning and thunder, the artillery of heaven and earth combined to crush the daring intruder as she passed through the blinding storm ; like that which the inspired psalmist so vividly describes: “The waters saw Thee, O God, the waters saw Thee, and were afraid : the depths also were troubled. The clouds poured out water, the air thundered, and Thine arrows went abroad.” We prefer, however, to give our readers some of the most perfect pictures of this adventure, by the best writers who actually wit- nessed the scene. FLAG-OFFICER FOOTE TO GENERAL POPE. U. 8. Flag Ship ‘‘ Benton,” orF Istanp No. 10, April 4, 1862. ‘GENERAL : “The ‘Carondelet,’ Captain Walke, left her anchorage this evening at 10 o’clock, in a heavy thunder-storm, for the purpose of running the fire of the batteries at Island No. 10, and those lining the Tennessee shore, to join your forces at New Madrid. By a previous concerted signal of three minute guns, twice fired, at intervals of five minutes, which have since been heard as near as the heavy thunder would enable us to ascertain, leads me to hope that the blockade has been run successfully, although the batteries opened upon her with forty-seven guns while passing. J am, therefore, so exceeding- ly anxious to hear the fate of the noble officers and men who so readily were disposed to attempt the hazardous service, that I beg you will immediately inform me by the bearer, if Commander Walke has arrived with his vessel, and the condition in which you find her and her officers and men. “Tam Respectfully, Your Ob’t Servant, “To Major-General “A. H. Foote, JOHN PorE, “« Flag-Officer. Commanding Army at New Madrid, Missouri.” 126 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. The following is an extract from the correspondence of the New York Times, above Island No. 10, April 5th: “ At 10 o’clock she cast loose, and started slowly down the stream. At the same time heavy clouds had overspread the sky, and a genuine tropical thunder-storm came howling upon theriver. It did not rain, in the ordinary meaning of the word, but whole gulfs of water came pouring down in masses. Nor did it thunder and lighten, in the usual meaning given to those words, but it roared at us as if all the electric batteries of north, south, east and west, had concen- trated their forces, and were bellowing at us in unison, while the lightning, in each broad flash, was so vast and so vivid that it seemed as if the gates of some hell, like that of Milton, were opened and shut every instant, suffering the whole fierce reflection of the infernal lake to flash across the sky. At such a time the ‘Carondelet’ lifted her anchors and slowly swung into the stream, watched through the almost blinding flashes by thousands of eager eyes, whose owners, regardless of the driving storm, crowded the decks of the other gunboats and transports to watch the heroic undertaking. Slowly she swung round till headed down stream, and then pushed straight ahead, keeping well over towards the island. We could see her almost every second ; every brace, port, and outline could be seen with startling distinctness, enshrouded by a bluish-white glare of light, and then her form for the next instant would become merged in the intense blackness that lay upon the river like a pall. “With beating hearts we saw her arrive opposite to and pass the first battery, on the Kentucky shore, without a demonstration from the enemy. But just below was another battery whose guns had often pitched their immense balls a distance of four miles; and with hearts whose beatings could almost be heard beneath our jackets, we watched her slowly approaching in checquers of dark- ness and flame, the dreaded works. A crashing peal of thunder, a blinding flash of light, which scarcely had disappeared when a broad blaze of flame burst from the fortifications, followed imme- diately by a second and third; a few moments later, and the reports came up to us, dulled by the power of the storm. No reply from the ‘Carondelet.’ Slowly she steamed ahead, the sky all ablaze about her, the Kentucky shore vomiting fierce flames, the thunders of the storm and the roar of the rebel artillery commingling ; as if heaven and earth had joined to crush the audacious intruder. “Jn about twenty minutes the ‘Carondelet’ had passed below RUNNING THE GAUNTLET AT ISLAND NO. 10. 127 the island, chased all the way by the outbursting flashes along the shore, roared at by the thunders above, beset by the rain and buffeted by the savage winds. Then the flashes along the shore ceased, and then a few moments of terrible suspense. Had she gone down, or was’ she drifting helpless in the swift current? Just then the roar of a gun came up faintly from below, and then another and another. It was the signal that she had passed through safely ; and then there went up such thunders of cheers, and hurrisanes of shouts from the watching crowds, that even the storm itself was outroared, and the voice of our jubilation sent down to the rebels, who were gnashing their teeth in bafled rage behind their fortifications. “To conclude, I will add, that forty-seven shots were fired at the ‘Carondelet,’ not one of which struck her! She lay off last night a short distance above New Madrid, and this morning early steamed up to the landing. “Such another scene of rejoicing at her arrival was probably never witnessed,” &c. (Signed) Gataway. The following graphic account of the “Carondelet’s ” exploit, written “on the spot” by one of the editors of the St. Louis Democrat, is worthy of perusal; as the most correct and faithful report of this event that has yet been published. “PULL PARTICULARS BY THE ONLY CORRESPONDENT ON BOARD THE ‘ CARONDELET.’—A NIGHT OF STORM, DARKNESS AND PERIL ON BOARD THE ‘ CARONDELET.’—SAFE THROUGH, AND GREAT JOY ON BOARD AND ON SHORE. “On board the gunboat ‘ Carondelet,’ off New Madrid, “ April 5th. “On the 30th ulto., Commodore Foote addressed to Captain Walke, commanding the gunboat ‘Carondelet,’ an order from which we make the following extracts. Its complete publication would reveal improper information. [The order referred to is contained in the preceding pages. ] “Last night was appointed by Captain Walke for the perform- ance of the above order. Yesterday morning preparations began on the ‘ Carondelet.” Planks from the wreck of an old barge were brought on board, with which the deck of the boat was covered, to resist plunging shot; all surplus chains were coiled over the most vulnerable parts of the boat; an 11-inch hawser was wound round the pilot-house as high up as the windows; the 128 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. hammock nettings were well packed with hammocks ; gun car- riages were taken apart, and cord wood was brought up from the hold for the purpose of constructing barriers about the boilers, and many other minor preparations made during the day to fit the vessel, so far as possible, for the ordeal through which she was to pass. “The condition of the weather was anxiously looked forward to, and every perceptible change in the atmosphere or wind observed, and the consequences carefully calculated, as they were to bear on the success or defeat of the enterprise. Late in the day there was every prospect of a clear, moonlight night ; something very undesirable, as may be inferred from the foregoing orders, and that which would have given the enemy timely notice of our ap- proach, and enabled him to serve his guns with as much accuracy as in daylight. Under these circumstances, it was concluded to wait until the moon had gone down; and then, be the auspices what they might, attempt the execution of a project, the aban- donment of which would have been a great disappointment, after the preliminaries had attained such a degree of maturity. At sundown the indications grew more favorable ; the atmosphere became suddenly hazy, the wind veered to the north-west, and a set of black clouds, rapidly increasing in width, bordered the horizon from the north-west, strongly evidencing an approaching storm. “The way the batteries were to be passed was as follows : Com- modore Foote’s injunctions concerning quietness and suppression of all lights aboard were to be strictly observed, the guns were run back, and the ports closed; the sailors, cap-a-pie, with pistols, cutlasses, boarding-pikes, and muskets. Hand-grenades had been provided, and the hot-water hoses were connected with the boilers, and held in readiness to drench with scalding water those who might attempt to board the boat, and overcome the crew ; the engineer had orders to cut the cold-water supply, and the injector pipe, if it became likely to fall into the enemy’s hands. This, in case of necessity, would have been resorted to instead of burning the vessel ; for it would not only have given to the crew better means of escape, but averted the terrible loss of life that inevitably would have resulted from the firing of the boat, and the explosion of the magazine. “ At dusk, twenty-four sharpshooters, Company H, 42nd Illinois, commanded by Captain Hollenstelm, who dropped down in cut- ters and transports, and came at dusk on board of the ‘Carondelet,’ RUNNING THE GAUNTLET AT ISLAND NO. 10. 129 were mustered on deck, inspected, received their orders (which were to co-operate with the crew in repelling boarders), and then taken to the gun-deck, there to remain until called upon ; observ- ing the strictest silence in the mean time. “The barges of hay were for protection. At 8 o’clock the boat left her anchorage, and passed up the shore for a mile, where, partly concealed between two transports, was a barge containing coal and baled hay. This was immediately made fast to the port side, it being the part to be chiefly exposed to the enemy’s batteries. ‘The hay had been placed in layers on the wrong side of the barge (the outer one); the crew was soon employed in shifting it where it would afford greater protection, and at the same time enable the gunboat to control it much easier. One course of bales was laid over the casements astern, as they weie to be presented to the enemy for a long time after passing the batteries, and liable to receive all the shots sent after us, without being iron-plated, or able to resist heavy cannon balls. “The barge and the hay came up to the top of the broadside port-holes, and would have been of much service had the batteries to be passed been on a parallel with the gunboat; but such was not the case here, for both on the mainland and head of the island they stand upon a bank twenty or thirty feet high, and in firing into a passing boat it becomes necessary, as subsequently demon- strated, for them to depress their guns, in which event the barges alongside were supposed to be important shields. “Wr. R. Hoel, first master of the ‘ Cincinnati,’ a gentleman of twenty-one years’ experience on the Mississippi (and whom we ‘may parenthetically state is now making his 194th trip to New Orleans), came on board the ‘Carondelet’ at 9, a. u., and relieved Richard N. Wade, the first master of the boat. A consultation was immediately held with the pilots, in which the course of the channel, and the location of the bars, were taken into considera- tion. It had been previously determined to run down on the Missouri side of the island, and to add to the practicability of this, last Tuesday afternoon the fleet shelled the rebel floating bat- tery, for the purpose of driving it from the command it held on that channel. “The hour approaches. At 10 o’clock the moon went down ; the storm, which had been thickening and gathering for several hours, was now about to burst upon us, and, greatly encouraged by so opportune a period for starting, the captain passed the word ‘All ready,’ and the sailors were sent on shore to loosen the lines. 9 130 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. In a few moments we were under way, and after a little difficulty in rounding with the cumbersome barges, fairly stood * out for New Madrid.’ The machinery was so adjusted as to permit the escape of the steam through the wheel-house, and thus avoid the pufting which results from its passing through the steam pipes. So silently did we proceed that it was scarcely known on board that the boat was under way, and we thought some of the officers were almost unbelievers when they asked the engineer, through the speaking pipes, if he was ‘ going ahead on her.’ “Tor the first half mile everything went still and smooth be- yond even the most sanguine anticipations, and the probability of passing the batteries unobserved was being remarked by some, when the soot in the chimneys caught fire, and a blaze five feet high leaped out from their tops, lighting brightly the upper deck of the vessel and everything around. The word was hastily passed to the engineer to open the flue-caps, after which the flames subsided ; but not until the rebels had the fairest oppor- tunity to discover our approach and prepare a reception. This was a serious mishap, because no signal, even by appointment, could so perfectly reveal our intentions ; and what contributed to its misfortune was the time of its happening, which was before any of their batteries had been passed, giving them ample time to communicate from one point to another before we came within range. Notwithstanding all this, strange as it may seem, no alarm among the rebels was discovered to follow, and we were consoling ourselves over the remissness of the rebel sentries, when, to our great astonishment, the chimneys were fired again, as if a treacherous deity was presiding over the fortunes of our boat.* TOE CAUSE OF THE FIRE. “This repetition of what had seemed before an untoward event, was on deck thought to proceed from the mismanagement of the engineer, and it was with no little emphasis that the executive officer demanded ‘ why in h 1 the flue-caps were not kept open.’ A subsequent examination proved, however, that it was a matter over which the engineer had no control further than to suppress the fire when it occurred. The escape into the wheel-house of * Tt was an error to suppose, that the gunboat, or anything at a distance from the batteries, was visible through that black thunder-storm, except by the lightning ; as the ‘ Pittsburg,” which followed the ‘‘Carondelet,” a few duys after, had seventy-three guns fired at her, as reported. She was, therefore, as readily seen without those blazing chimneys to invite the at- tention of her enemies, and frighten our fastidious spectators, or those who have since so glowingly harped upon the awful scene. RUNNING THE GAUNTLET AT ISLAND No. 10. 131 the steam, which, when passing through the smoke stacks moist- ened the soot, left it to be rapidly dried and ignited by the fire in the furnaces. “The rebels took the alarm. The boat now presented a broad- side to the upper fort, and the sentries there had not failed to discover the boat by the last accident, and alarmed the guards at the forts below by discharging their muskets. Immediately afterwards five rockets were sent up from the main land and the island, and were followed by a cannon shot from Fort No. 2. The stillness of the upper fort satisfied all those on board that the guns had been most effectually disabled by the spiking party. Had it not been so the rebels would have first opened upon us with cannon from that point, since it was first alarmed, and afforded an easy range. We concluded to rush by. “But one course remained to be pursued by the officers of the ‘ Carondelet ;’ that was, to let on a full head of steam, and make the greatest possible haste by the rebel batteries, which were now momentarily expected to open fire from all their guns. To this end orders were hurriedly passed below to the engineers, and the speed of the boat was soon much accelerated. Mr. Wil- son, one of the boatswain’s mates, was stationed on the forecastle with lead and line, to give the soundings. Mr. Gilmore, one of the master’s mates, was placed on the forward or upper deck to pass them to Captain Hoel, who also stood upon the deck to direct the pilots how to steer the boat. THE CRISIS. “Just at this juncture, while vivid flashes of lightning lit up the hurried preparations of the rebels as they charged and trained their guns, while peal after peal of thunder reverberated along the river, and the rain poured down in torrents. Now was the time for coolness and heroism. Captain Walke deliberately giv- ing orders ; Captain Hoel stood firm on deck in a perfect shower of cannon balls and musket balls which were launched upon us, and as he discovered the outlines of the banks, or the course of the channel by the aid of the flashing lightning, his clear voice rang out his commands to the pilots, who steadily held the wheel. But once, we believe, during the perilous passage, did the watchful eyes of the captain suffer the boat to gain a precarious position ; and then it was when a lengthened intermission between the flashes of lightning completely obscured our course, and the current, striking the cumbersome barge, sheered the vessel, and carried it towards a neighboring bar. The first glance of light, however, 132 SCENES AND INCIDENTS. ! disclosed our situation, and the rapid command, ‘ Hard-a-port,’ admonished us of our danger. The boat, nevertheless, soon re- gained the channel, and our fears were dispelled by remarks on deck, that ‘all was going well,’ and the anxiously-waited reports, as they came up from the forecastle, ‘No bottom.’ “ Just at this time, the ‘ Benton,’ ‘ Pittsburg,’ and several mor- tars, opened upon the rebels, who were so industriously storming the ‘ Carondelet,’ and it gave us great satisfaction to know that our friends were returning a fire which we could not. When we got well out of the range of the enemy’s land batteries, passed the first shock which greeted us from the head of the island, and were gliding down the north bank, the exultation began, and the most disparaging comments were made upon the enemy’s wild firing. ‘When the circumstances under which it was made are taken into consideration, however, we doubt whether our own gunners could have excelled. it. The furious hurricane then raging, and the impenetrable darkness precluded a knowledge of our position, which every turn of the wheel changed. Our boat was not very fleet, and the barge in tow impeded a speed which might otherwise have been made, with the current in our favor. The consequence was, an exposure of thirty minutes to an uninterrupted fire from four batteries on the Kentucky shore, and one at the head of the island. The judgment which we were enabled to form from the shrieking of their shot, was that they flew from five to thirty yards over our heads; a few were heard to plunge in the water. One cause of the wild shooting was in over-estimating the distance of our boat. It was close along the bank, under their guns; and had this been fully understood, the rebels would have found it difficult to depress their guns to such a degree as to bear upon us, without having them dismounted by an angular recoil. “ After having passed the foot of the island without finding the battery there, which for several days had been reported as mounting a number of long-range guns, a feeling of security came over our officers, and they would have been glad to make it known to the crew, and afford them relief from a long and painful suspense, but it was not over yet. A reconnoissance on the preceding day disclosed the locality of a floating battery, three miles below the island, on the Tennessee shore, and this re- mained to be passed.