Cornell Mniversity Library BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF Henry W. Sage 1891 PEI LE he ain ct tin decent TMM le 6896-1 Seo. University Library TL 924 030 590 9 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION BY M. V. O'SHEA Professor of Education, The University of Wisconsin Author of “‘ Education as Adjustment,” ““ Dynamic Factors in Education,” “ Linguistic Development and Education,” ete. BOSTON, NEW YORK AND CHICAGO HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY Che Viivergide Press, Cambridge + COPYRIGHT, 1909, BY M. v. O’SHEA ALL RIGHTS RESERVED AST Ue. TO MY FATHER AND MOTHER PREFACE In Part I of this volume, I have attempted first to describe the typical attitudes which the child tends to assume to- ward the persons with whom he comes into ¢ontact in the ordinary situations of daily life, and to explain these atti- tudes in view of certain fundamental principles of mental development. To this end I have presented the results of observations of children’s reactions under a variety of so- cial conditions, the aim being to detect if possible the “natural” or impulsive tendencies in their responses. Then, in the second place, it has been my purpose to trace the changes in the child’s adjustments to people which seem normally to occur in the process of development. This has required a mode of procedure in which the individual is followed from infancy to maturity along the several routes which lead to efficiency in social adaptation ; and the ever- present question has been whether the child would on his own initiative follow these routes, or whether if left to him- self he would stop on the way, or turn off in other directions. It has been my constant effort to note the actual tendencies of the child at different stages in his evolution, without regard to prevailing popular or theoretical conceptions of what he is or what he ought to be or to do. I have undertaken in Part II certain phases of the dif- ficult and interminable task of outlining a plan and method of education designed to make the individual socially effi- cient. My point of view might properly, I think, be said to be that of the naturalist rather than that of the logician or philosopher, or even the moralist or idealist. The problem before me constantly has been, — what can we do in social training, considering the nature of the individual and his social needs, rather than what ought we to do viewing the vi PREFACE matter from an ideal standpoint. What I have written is founded mainly upon data gained from experiments and methods which I have been able to study at first hand, or which have been furnished me by persons who have made observations for me, or who have given me an account of their experiences in the training of their own children. But while the purpose of this volume is for the most part to pre- sent the conclusions reached by one observer and adventurer in the training of children, still I have at most points com- pared the principles herein set forth with those advocated by the representative students of child-life and education from Plato down to our own times. In some cases I have ealled attention to the opinions of these writers without foot-note citations of book and page of their works, think- ing it not necessary or desirable so to do. I have hoped that this volume might prove more or less tolerable to par- ents and teachers, as well as to students of mental develop- ment; and with this in mind I have avoided methods of treatment which would give it the appearance of being un- duly technical or “learned.” However, at the close of the book I have suggested a list of references for reading, which includes, I think, those books and articles which best pre- sent typical views since Plato’s day of the social nature of the individual, and the most effective method of training him for social adjustment. In its original form the volume contained a number of chapters treating of the relation between the social develop- ment of the individual and the evolution of social attitudes and institutions in the race. But these portions have finally been entirely eliminated ; partly because with their inclusion the volume seemed to be too bulky, but mainly because upon reflection it has seemed best to omit from these pages all purely speculative and theoretical discussion. The author is very much interested in the general problem of recapitu- Jation in human development, but he is bound to confess that at present it seems impossible to discuss the question in any PREFACE vii definite and positive manner, on account of the limitations of our knowledge in this field. It has seemed advisable, therefore, to confine the treatment to principles, the data for which could be observed at first hand and investigated experimentally. With a view to clarifying the discussion throughout, and to economizing the time and energy of the general reader as well as the student, a marginal analysis and a detailed analytical index of the entire material have been made. Also the more important principles developed in the text have been summarized at the end of each chapter. Special attention is called to the Exercises and Problems given in the last two chapters. These relate to the various subjects considered in the book; and they are designed to stimulate the student to test the principles developed, and to extend their application in every direction. They are intended further to suggest many phases of social develop- ment and education which have hardly been even touched upon in this volume. The lists given on each chapter have been chosen from a large number which have arisen in dis- cussing the different topics with organizations of parents and teachers, and classes of university students. Only those exercises and problems have been selected which upon trial have proven to incite observation and effective reflection on the part of students, as well as those interested in the prac- tical care and culture of childhood and youth. The author has found them to be of considerable service in arousing the interest of the reader, and in making real and vital the con- clusions reached in the text. M. V. O’SHEa. Untversiry or WISCONSIN, Mapison, WISconsIN. CONTENTS PART I THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENTAL COURSE OF TyricaL SocraL ATTITUDES I. Soctasmity .. . aus eS Instinctive sin Testation: The passion ae peveadal “dnten course. The feeling of dependence as one source of sociable expression. The appearance of the highest form of sociable feeling. Favorites and aliens among children. The influence upon the child of adult social stratification. Sociability on the basis of dress distinction. On the basis of intellectual attain- ments. The influence of adolescent development upon socia- bility. Social stratification on the basis of economic status. Charitable tendencies in sociability. Résumé. II. CommunicaTIon . 3 : The need of communication. The epinaings ie fostsaini in the communizing activity. Developmental changes in the character of the communications. The tendencies at adoles- cence. The reticent type. Social value of the communizing activity. Influence of the individual in establishing com- munity sentiment. The influence of the community on the individual’s expressions. Social opposition. Consciousness is a stage ; who are the players? The development of respon- siveness to community sentiment. Résumé. I. Dury . Absence of the sendinsotit ‘of obligation i in iofaney. Origin of the idea of persons as distinguished from things. The genesis of the alter sense. Essential experiences in acquiring the alter sense. Development and enrichment of the conception of the alter. Interpretation of the alter’s expressions. Popular no- tions respecting the relation of the self and the alter. Are the interests of the ego and the alter identical? Neutral attitudes in childhood. Genesis of the sense of duty. The role of religion in the development of conscience. The real- istic character of the child’s religious conceptions. Résumé. x IV. V. Respect... oa 8 ae VI. CONTENTS PUBTICE: Ps) Wah ao se Beh a pe ae Che we Se ak ote Basal experience in the development of the sentiment of justice. Equality of rights and responsibilities limited to members of a class. The réle of conflict in the child’s early social adjustment. The method of the first lessons in justice. Appearance of the sense of property rights. Development of appreciation of the right of possession. Developmental changes in respect to principles of ownership. The réle of positive instruction in developing the sentiment of justice. Purposeful educative training by the group. Instinctive ele- ments in the sentiment of justice. The reflex character of the sentiment of justice in the beginning. Development of an ap- preciation of extenuating circumstances. Development of an appreciation of motive in the alter’s actions. Appearance of the sense of responsibility. The effect of adolescent develop- ment upon the feeling of responsibility. Résumé. Characteristics of feapaai as a ‘postal sslaionasinn Respect is a restrained, appreciative attitude. Respect for institutions and superiors. Respect vs. observance of conventional pro- prieties. Respect vs. admiration, The meaning of “self-re- spect.” Origin of the attitude of self-respect. Appearance of the attitudes of shame, humiliation, remorse, self-esteem, etc. The child’s reaction to reproof. The child’s indifference to his “reputation.” The attitude of respect is taken in view primarily of the motives of action. The influence of adoles- cent development upon the attitude of self-respect. The ef- fect upon the individual of loss of self-respect. The effect upon the attitude of self-respect of the development of sex appreciation. Résumé. DOGUEIRY 5 os ee A ee a es The child as a learner. His attitude toward most of the cul- ture and conventions of society. Convention as a load on feel- ing, inoperative in childhood. The change at adolescence. The process of assimilating social conventions. The child’s reactions upon conventions forced on him. The learner turned teacher. Is the child docile toward the wise ? The child’s attitude is predominantly dynamic rather than assimilative. Indocility with respect to ethical instruction. The inevitable conflict between the child and the adult. Docility in the school. Docility as affected by broadening experience. Im- itation as a method of learning. The dramatic tendency. Résumé. . 115 - 185 CONTENTS xi VII. ResentMenT . . . eo se . 157 The infant’s attitude is a non- pesiatant« one. . The parked: ex- pression of anger. The typical year-old child is angry much of the time. The development of resentment as a personal emotion. Methods of expressing rage. Situations which stimu- late the attitude of anger. The function of anger in social relations. Conditions which favor the development of irri- tability among the members of a group. Appearanceof the attitude of hatred. Appearance of the attitude of indigna- tion. Appearance of the attitude of jealousy. Situations which incite the attitude of jealousy. Conditions favoring the de-, velopment of jealousy. Schoolroom jealousies. Jealousy dur- ing the adolescent period. Résumé. VIII. Accression . . . . 184 The combative impulse. “Methods au fests of étallation: Retaliation on the basis of injury done to one’s “reputation.” Early methods of preserving group stability. Genesis of the judicial attitude. Illustrations of the judicial attitude in typ- ical self-governing groups. The sanguinary tendencies of boys. These tendencies are revealed in verbal as well as in fistic encounters. Girls are less sanguinary. The attitudes of the sexes toward each other. The influence of adolescent de- velopment upon these attitudes. Teasing. Teasing by inciting fear. By “calling names.” By arousing shame. Teasing among primitive children, Résumé. IX. Socran Types. . . . 209 The principle of social ‘ypeei ‘Individual variability 1 recog- nized in popular philosophy. Are there types in childhood and youth? The adaptable type. The “weak” type. The tactful type. The unadaptable type. The impertinent and impudent types. The attitude of scorn. The frank, “open” type. The deceitful type. The communicative type. The self- conscious type. The dramatic type. The hectoring type. The meek type. Developmental transformation in types. Résumé, PART I SoctaL EpucaTIon X. From a NatIonaL STANDPOINT. . . . 229 Our American problem viewed in the light of ihe ecierenne of older civilizations. The point of view. The crucial period xii CONTENTS in the life of a nation. The chief problem in education. De- velopment of esthetic interests. Development of intellectual interests. Tendencies in our own country. Development of sound altruistic interests. Development of industrial inter- ests. Development of individual initiative and efficiency. Conformity to established law. Résumé. XI. Epucatrve SoctaL EXPERIENCE ........ . 248 Education for social efficiency. Educative social experience the first requisite. The social training of the “only child.”’ Hard knocks are essential to effective learning. Present-day tendencies. The situation in the public schools. The typical school is modeled on the static plan. The principle partially realized in the kindergarten. The question of moral instruc- tion. The method of teaching moral principles. The pupil must be led to see the social necessity for every moral atti- tude urged upon him. Moral instruction during adolescence. Résumé. XII. Toe Crrrican Periop .......... . .3874 The infant’s reactions upon his social environment. The child as an expert in coercing his care-takers. Misinterpretation of childish expression. How the child is encouraged in his coer- cive tendencies. Individual differences in the non-conforming disposition. The child’s winsomeness often a disadvantage. Conformity essential to individual as well as social well- being. New times bring new problems in social training. Dis- persed authority renders good social training impossible. The home and the school. True sympathy for childhood. Leader- ship is what is needed in home and school. Résumé. XIII. Codperation 1n Group EpucaTion .. . . 295 Children’s self-discipline in the group. The adult as an out- sider. The teacher as a member of the group. Conflict be- tween fathers and sons. The first forms of group activity in childhood. The development of group consciousness. How the sense of group unity is acquired. Opportunity for play the chief requirement. A lesson from European civilization. The chief count against the city. The need of playgrounds. A sound mind in a sound body. Playgrounds lessen crime. The testimony of playground experts. The playground and school discipline. Rivalry in group activity. The value of competitive activity in the schoolroom and on the play- ground. The survival of the fittest in competitive activity. Résumé. CONTENTS xiii XIV. Proprems or TRAINING. .. . . 321 A typical instance of conflict in the bssiheu of ‘liliven, Differing points of view. Personal traits that incite resist- ance. The futility of much verbal correction. How com- mands are made effective. Commands that do not reach the child’s focus of attention. How indifference to commands is developed in children. Qualities essential in a successful trainer. Mother love. Hamlet as a type of trainer. Relation between the child and his trainer. Can leadership and com- panionship be combined in the same individual? A danger in American life. The evil of early sophistication. Concern- ing dancing. Folk dances in the schools. Résumé. XV. MerHops or CORRECTION ........ -. . 346 The rod as a means of correction. The tendency in our own country. The tendency in older countries. The results of ex- periments in European countries. Is the pendulum swinging too far in our country ? Methods must be varied to meet in- dividual peculiarities. Control by “natural” consequences. Some defects in the plan. The responses to the child’s ad- vances of the representatives of law and order are properly “natural consequences.” Résumé. XVI. SuGGesTION . . . . 370 The general character of deeecito “The atical hintiey of an act of suggestion. The principle of suggestion stated. The influence for good or ill of the personality of the trainer. The suggestion of evil. The view of modern psychology. The. treatment of timidity as a typical undesirable attitude. Ne- gation as a method of training. Positive suggestion as a method of training. Present-day tendencies. Special prob- lems of village life. Home influence in the village. Boy life in the villages of a Western state. The opportunity of the school in the village. Practical methods of improvement. Résumé. XVII. Imrratrion . 1 ww we ee ee ee ew ew B9G Group homogeneity. Familiar illustrations of imitative ac- tivity. Conditions governing the child’s imitations. Persona- tion in childhood. Plato on the moral effects of dramatiza- tion. The value of personating activity. Dramatizing work in the school. Theatrical “properties”? are not essential. Personation.is a sort of vicarious adjustment. Dominant per- sonalities in any community. Are masculine or feminine per- sonalities dominant with the young? Imitation of abnormal xiv CONTENTS traits. The quarantine of nervous and moral disorders. The situation in our country. Shallow sentimentalism in dealing with sub-normal children in the schools. Does « copy pre- sented to the young for imitation sometimes arouse antithetic action? Résumé. REFERENCES FOR READING EXxERcIses AND Prosiems, Part I . EXERcIsES AND ProsteMs, Parr II... INDEX. G0. @ Aloe Glee BOR ES . 424 . 434 . 486 . 551 PART I THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENTAL COURSE OF TYPICAL SOCIAL ATTITUDES CHAPTER I SOCIABILITY STUDENTS of infancy have observed that during the first two months of life the child responds in only a vague, gen- eral, indefinite way to most of what exists and yspstinctive happens about him. He seems at this period manifestations hardly to have become awakened from the unconsciousness of the pre-natal epoch, when there was no stimulating en- vironment impinging upon him and exciting him to adjust- ment of some sort. For several weeks in the beginning of his career, he shows little if any appreciation of the mean- ing and values of things surrounding him, except such as are brought into direct contact with his skin or his tongue. The expression of his features during this early period indicates that he does not discriminate objects on the basis of their power for good or ill in his life; he manifests no inclination to possess himself of certain ones, and to rid himself of others. The world plays on him incessantly, but he does not react upon it except in a very few instinctive ways. The infant is in reality static with reference to much that in due course will incite him to constant activity, in the effort to use it in some way to advance his interests. It will, perhaps, seem to the reader simple enough that the child should not be dynamic in situations with which he has not had vital experience; for why should he be active when he has not learned that his activity will yield pleasure of some kind, or save him from discomfort? But it is worth while to make the point stand out clearly, that there is a period in the life of the individual when the environing world is. practically undifferentiated in respect to values. Now, if we could describe in detail the course of the child in evaluating his environments, social and physical; and if 4 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION we could discover his method of determining values, noting the grounds upon which he estimates them, and the atti- tudes he assumes toward objects when their worth is re- vealed, we should have a complete account of his mental development. Our present task is, however, much simpler than this; it is merely to attempt to state the more im- portant of the child’s processes and attitudes in his efforts to evaluate his social environments, and to become most effectively adjusted thereto. It is probable that the infant’s earliest appreciation of values concerns persons as contrasted with inanimate ob- jects. One who observes a three-months-old child smiling in response to the greetings of its caretaker can hardly fail to conclude that it is pleased, in its naive and largely instinct- ive way, with personal association. The mother is over- joyed when she detects the first smile, faint and fleeting though it may be, for she feels that this is a token of her child’s recognition of people as distinct from things, and his pleasure in social relations. As the poet and idealist see it, —“ With the first dawning smile upon the infant’s face, the instinct of love awakes.” ? By the beginning of the third month, the babe seems to realize, in a very general and obscure manner, of course, that the mother is an object with which it may hold com- munion, which is not the case with the nursing bottle or 1 “To laugh, if but for an instant only, has never been granted to man before the fortieth day from his birth, and then it is looked upon as a mira- cle of precocity.”— Pliny the Elder, Natural History, Book vii, chap. i, Hol- land’s translation. An observer reports the following, in illustration of the point in question : “A little girl three months old watches her father whenever he comes within her range of vision. If he speaks to her or pays any attention to her she smiles and manifests her pleasure by various contortions and wiggles. Her father has always played with her every day,so she ought to know him well, but until he speaks she does not smile. In fact, she has a wondering, curious look in her eyes, which has sometimes made us question if she were trying to locate him in her experience, and was unable to accomplish it until his voice or action helped her to do so.” 2 Harrison, The Study of Child-Nature from the Kindergarten Standpoint, p. 75. INSTINCTIVE SOCIABILITY 5 the rattle; these latter are to be used merely, not com- muned with. The child of four months, making efforts at “cooing” in response to its mother’s salutations, taken to- gether with its accompanying demonstrations of a really remarkable character, such as holding and forcibly expell- ing the breath, the heightened activity of all the bodily members, the significant expressiveness of the features, — these suggest strongly its awareness of personal presence, which cannot be detected when it is reacting upon other situations. Thus early does the child, in just a dim, glim- mering way it must be, distinguish between things to be tested, experimented with, put to some service, and persons to be enjoyed, to be depended upon for protection, to be appealed to in moments of distress. To a certain extent, doubtless, persons are differentiated from objects by the child as his days increase, because they can be used to so much greater advantage: they can aid him in attaining goods which he lacks strength and skill to secure ; they can serve as colleagues or competitors in his games; they can guard him against harm and the like, of which much will be said presently. But when one sees an infant reciprocat- ing the loving expressions of his mother, and later pleading with her to remain near by merely that he may enjoy her presence, it seems beyond question that he has brought with him the rudiments of genuine sociable feeling, which causes him to ascribe a special value to persons, and to de- sire to have friendly intercourse with them. Whether this feeling remains pure and unadulterated, or becomes organ- ized with other feelings of an egotistic character, is not in question ; we will turn to this later. Nor does it matter in 1 Cooley (Human Nature and the Social Order, p. 47) holds that the early manifestations of sociability indicate less fellow-feeling than the adult im- agines. They are, according to this author, largely expressions of a pleasure which persons excite, chiefly because they offer such a variety of stimuli to sight, hearing, and touch. He says (p. 50), “ I take it that the child has by heredity a generous capacity and need for social feeling. . . . It is not so much any particular personal emotion or sentiment as the undifferentiated material of many: perhaps sociability is as good a word for it as any.” 6 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION this connection to say that the young child will appraise his dog and his kitten in the same way as he does his father and mother and nurse; to him they probably belong for a time to this class of objects which may be communed with, and which we have called persons. In due course, we shall see through what experiences they become differentiated so that they cannot be communed with in the same way as can persons, or to the same extent, or with reference to the same interests. It is not too much to say that there is a kind of hunger for personal intercourse which the child experiences before he has completed even six months among us. As early as the fifth month, the mere proximity of mother or Passion ° ; . . : for personal father will often give him peace, when otherwise intercours? he may be restless, discontented, unhappy. Sully, touching upon this point, says that “children are instinct- ively attachable and sociable in so far as they show in the first weeks that they get used to and dependent on the human presence, and are miserable when this is taken from them. . . . In this instinct of companionship there is in- volved a vague inarticulate sympathy. Just as the attached dog may be said to have in a dim fashion a feeling of one- ness with its master, so the child.” Some children from the sixth month on cannot endure to be “left to themselves” at all during their waking hours. It is not merely fanciful to say that the child brings with him a kind of generali- zation of long ages of ancestral experience, to the effect that it is well for a person to be with people because of the advantages to be derived from social unity and codperation. Kirkpatrick,’ speaking from the evolutionary standpoint, declares that “desire for companionship is the natural in- heritance of an ancestry that must have sought it in order to survive. . . . Most children manifest a desire for the presence of adults before they can walk.” It is maintained 1 Studies of Childhood, pp. 242, 243. 2 Fundamentals of Child-Study, p. 119. THE FEELING OF DEPENDENCE 7 by evolutionists generally that the passion for social inter- course, and even the institution of society itself, had their origin in service of a physical sort which men could render to one another. But however this may be, service of the sort indicated is not the only nor the chief source of pleasure which the young child derives from personal relations. It is true that at the outset the parents, and most if not all the other per- sons about the child, minister to his physical needs in some way; but itis significant that his display of pure sociability does not occur principally when his physical wants are being attended to, but rather when the mother’s beaming face is bending over his, and she is calling to him in gentle love- tones. After the first year, the child will show marked pleasure in responding to the father’s salutations, even though the latter has not been of service to him physically. If we may infer anything respecting a child’s conscious processes from his intonations, featural expressions, and the like, we are entitled ‘to hold that he is pleasurably affected in the presence of his mother, say, because in his dawning consciousness he feels her to be a friend, in all that this implies of service and good-will and protection and confi- dence, — a feeling which has slowly developed through long periods of social experience. Possibly the evolution in phylo- genesis of the attitude denoted by “ friend” was dependent at every step upon codperation and protection in the struggle for existence; but the child seems to come into possession of the attitude without having first to experience consciously the factors out of which it has developed. It is not intended here to imply that the child’s eagerness to be in the presence of persons, and to enter wie nnhia into active relations with them, is due wholly of depend- to the feeling of pure sociability, into which no Source ot “ selfish ” factor enters. As he develops and the s»vlalex- . pression range of his contact with the world increases, he often, no doubt, wishes to be with people so that he can 8 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION make use of them to accomplish feats of skill and daring which unaided he cannot himself achieve. It is probable that after the second year, at any rate, the feeling of socia- bility is always bound up with other feelings arising out of the child’s tendency to experiment with his personal en- vironment, in the effort to learn people, and to master and use them in the realization of his needs. In “ mastering his environments” the individual must, of course, become skillful in those activities which will be required of him for later adjustments; and since a large proportion of these activities are directly social in intent and outcome, it is imperative that he should have associates to practice upon. So that his eagerness to be with companions in his play is based in part, though he is not aware of it, upon this great need in learning to handle himself effectively in social situ- ations. From the third year on, the child strives unceas- ingly to perform his feats, and thus to display all his powers and commendable qualities, in the presence of people, and in cooperation with them. In any undertaking he will always do his best according to prevailing ideals, as he appreciates them, if there are spectators at hand, or if he has a competi- tor or an antagonist; and what at first glance may appear to be sociability, without admixture of anything else, may often be an outgrowth to some extent of these other in- terests. The principle is that when the child begins to move about in the world, thus establishing needs beyond his own ability to gratify, he manifests strong sociable attachment, partly, doubtless, so that he may have the aid of competent persons to accomplish his desires. Even when he pleads to be allowed to accompany his father and mother in their trips from home, he has it in the depths of his mind to make use of them to protect him, and to show him sights which otherwise he could not see.1 But these experiences 1 Cooley (op. cit. p. 48) maintains that “ the delight in companionship so evident in children may be ascribed partly to specific social emotion or sen- THE FEELING OF DEPENDENCE 9 seem often to enrich sociable expression. When the child leaves bis home with his parents, he usually becomes more expressive of social feeling than when he is in his nursery. He “takes hold of hands,” his voice becomes soft and ap- pealing, he grows confidential in his communications, and he assumes a deferential attitude toward his elders, who are now in a very real way felt to be his guides and his protectors. He shows this same tendency, in effect, when he goes into strange regions with his brother or sister. Within the walls of his own house, where nothing is unfa- miliar to him, and he has no sense of danger, he may be quarrelsome and spiteful, refusing to cooperate with any one or to share his possessions; but on the street he is likely to have a quite different attitude, being docile, gen- tle, and dependent. This transformation is less marked with older children, though it may usually be observed until the advent of youth at any rate. Later we shall see that the child is on occasion combative, aggressive, resent- ful, as well as sociable, in a positive sense ; and that his anti- social impulses tend to be expressed when he is competing with others under such conditions that he does not feel the need of keeping their good-will and securing their protec- tion, as in the average home where he is shielded from the aggression of strange people. Unquestionably the child’s inherited suspicion of danger in an unfamiliar environment plays a leading role in his manifestations of sociability. It holds in leash the aggressive impulses, and calls to the front those that have for their timent, and partly to a need of stimulating suggestions to enable them to gratify their instinct for various sorts of mental and physical activity. The influence of the latter appears in their marked preference for active per- aons, for grown-up people who will play with them— provided they do so with tact — and especially for other children.” Again, on p. 122, he says, “A healthy mind, at least, does not spend much energy on things that do not in some way contribute to its development; ideas and persons that lie wholly aside from the direction of its growth, or from which it has absorbed all they have to give, necessarily lack interest for it, and so fail to awaken sympathy.” ~ 10 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION object to win the friendship and so the assistance of others. As he develops and has experience in ever-enlarging regions of his environment, the sense of danger will gradually be- come dissipated, and other feelings will take its place; but these will exert a somewhat similar influence upon his social attitudes. As his experiences increase and his sphere of ad- justment expands, he will discover that his prosperity in every respect depends upon the good-will of his fellows, and he will therefore be stimulated all the more strongly to secure this good-will. It is probable that people who do not feel any dependence upon their associates (if there really are such) are in fact less sociable than those who feel such a relation. The very rich, for instance, are as a rule, though there are many exceptions, much less social in their outward expressions than those who earn their daily bread, and who on that account are constantly aware of their dependence upon others. This gives rise to a very complex emotional attitude which, in its expression, appears to be genuine sociability. The individual does not manifest the highest form of sociable feeling until the adolescent reformation is well ; under way. At about the age of fifteen with girls, Tho appear- . ancectthe and a year or two later with boys, there appears highest an interest in people for their own sake, because ae of their worth as personalities with feelings like "their own. This is in some part at least often a religious attitude; and the more active and demonstrative the general religious feelings, the more pronounced are the sociable tendencies. Church-going people are probably more expressive, at any rate, of their sociable feeling than are those who are wholly uninfluenced by any of the activities centring in the church. Of course, it is understood that reference is here made to the Christian religion primarily, which puts emphasis upon the relation of man to man, teaching that one should love his neighbor as himself. As the child grows into boyhood or girlhood, the passion ATTITUDES TOWARD PLAYMATES 11 for mere personal presence declines, at least in most cases, and in its general manifestations; though, as we Favorites shall see presently, this may be due to the increas- 204 allen ing powers of imagery, which makes it possible for children the child to enjoy personal presence, even though persons are not present in the flesh. The five-year-old seeks associa- ’ tion with those, mainly, who can help him to carry forward his enterprises, whatever they may be, or in general to make life interesting to him. Above all things else, he seeks the society of those who can play with him; and this means much, which will be developed at length in another place. Children from three on through the adolescent period gen- erally choose as companions those of about their own ex- perience and tendencies. They are more sociable with such companions than with most adults, or with others of their own age who cannot play as they do. Of course if an adult can become as a child and thus adapt himself to the child’s spontaneity, he will be chosen above all other companions, because he can be of so much greater service to the child. As Cooley! puts it, “ Persons, especially those that share his (the child’s) interests, maintain and increase their as- cendency, and other children, preferably a little older and of more varied resources than himself, are particularly wel- come. Among grown-ups he admires most those who do something that he can understand, whom he can appreciate as actors and producers — such as the carpenter, the gar- dener, the maid in the kitchen. R. invented the happy word ‘thinger’ to describe this sort of people, and while per- forming similar feats would proudly proclaim himself a ‘thinger.’” One can detect almost instantly the sociable attitude in a boy or girl of nine, say, when brought into the presence of a playmate who is genuine and capable, which implies the possession of courage, versatility, ingenuity, and other qualities; while they are more reserved and ill at ease when 1 Op. cit. p. 289. 12 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION in contact with one who may be “ good” but who cannot “do things.” Mere static goodness is not rated high among children of any age. Autobiographical sketches, such as Warner’s Being a Boy, White’s The Court of Boyville, Burnett’s The One I Knew Best of All, and sympathetic glimpses of child-life, such as one finds in Graham’s The Golden Age, Nesbit’s The Would-be- Goods and The Plea- sure Seekers, Ruth McEnery Stuart’s Sonny, and many others, are all full of illustrations of the principle in ques- tion. S. and V. are what might be called typical boys of seven and nine respectively. They have had many boy ac- quaintances and numerous companions; but gradually they are eliminating all but a few who are especially ready and fertile in all sorts of play and adventure. Some of the boys they “like ” are inclined to be rough in speech and act, but they are chosen above “better” boys because they know how to carry through many games, and perform all manner of difficult tricks. Ask S. or V. why he likes these rough boys, and why he does not cultivate the gentler ones, and it will at once become apparent that the source of interest is in the leadership of the more favored boys. In the same way, H. at eleven chooses her companions mainly for their skill and perseverance in play. Girls who - are timid and self-conscious, or who do not “ know what to do,” or who tire quickly, or who easily take offense and refuse to play, or who are quarrelsome and break up the group, — all such types are gradually left out of account.! Several of such girls have already passed entirely out of the circle of H.’s acquaintanceship, and she apparently never 1 Sometimes 2 child who cannot himself play effectively, or suggest new activities to the group, will nevertheless be a favorite because of some of his qualities which the group can use to advantage. The following case illus- trates the principle : — Five little girls, all about ten or eleven years of age, formed “ A Doll Club.” Four were daughters of well-to-do professional parents ; their mothers were club women. These four came from families socially superior to the family of the fifth girl. The fifth girl was really not very bright, nor was she well dressed or well cared for, but, while she could not suggest new games, ATTITUDES TOWARD PLAYMATES 13 thinks of them. She is not much affected by children who are commonly described as being “ refined ” or “religious,” or even “nice” or “ quiet” or “loving.” There is a different type of child from any of those re- ferred to who does not inspire sociable expression in his associates. This is the boastful or dominantly egotistic type, the one who makes those around him feel that he regards himself as superior to them for one reason or another, on account of his personal appearance, it may be, or the wealth of his family, or his excellence in studies, or what not. Ac- cording to my observations, this trait is not manifested in the early years, not before the period of adolescence; but it does frequently show itself after the twelfth or thirteenth year. In later adolescence, it is often seen in an accentuated form. Freshmen in college sometimes make themselves quite offensive to their fellows because of their “ putting on airs.” It is of special significance that the group always attempts to “take the starch out of” one of their number who by word or manner conveys the impression that he esteems himself as above his associates, which should lead him to hold himself aloof from them, or patronize them in any way. Sociability can manifest itself only among those who are on an equality, in most respects, at any rate. There must be community of ability, merit, rank, so to speak, as well as community of interest, in order that persons should maintain sociable relations with one another ; and as children develop group unity and solidarity, they tend to become dynamic in reducing to the general level or rusticating those who make a show of their feeling of preéminence. In the public schools, boys, and to a less degree girls, will harass one of their number who “feels his clothes,” or who for any reason at- tempts to establish himself on a plane above that occupied she was gentle and was a good follower. Some rich relative had given her a beautiful doll, which, together with her gentleness, gained her an admission into a socially superior class. The four rich girls refused to receive other poor girls whose dolls were shabby, both because they were poor and their dolls were poor. (Reported by A. M. J.) 14 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION by the group. Of course, if a boy is superior in combative ability his associates are likely, for reasons of self-preserva- tion, to acknowledge his superiority if he insists upon it ; but if he goes to the extent of playing the bully, the group will sooner or later bring him to heel. If he be a leader in sports aud games, he will, of course, be encouraged and followed without protest from any one ; but under such circumstances his associates do not feel that he is “ proud” or “ haughty” or “conceited,” as they are certain to feel respecting the boy who is vain over mere static possessions, as wealth or rank, and the like. There is a profound significance in the tendency of chil- dren to exalt dynamic accomplishments and subordinate everything of a static character. It is as though the child wished to utilize every moment in learning how to live the simple, concrete, elemental life, not only in play but in other ways; and so he is interested in those persons only who can be of assistance to him by setting him a copy to imitate, or furnishing him material to practice on. Toward such persons, be they young or old, he will manifest sociability; but toward others he will be indif- ferent, or even hostile. The parent and the governess who can “do things” will be admired by children and their good-willcultivated ; but others will be neglected or opposed. It is worthy of remark that what are often regarded as the highest social and moral qualities do not appeal to the indi- vidual strongly, at least until the adolescent period is near- ing completion. They are apparently not dynamic enough for him, not elementary and fundamental enough. Before the adolescent epoch, children rarely, if ever, become enthu- siastic over a companion or an adult who is quiet and re- served, even one who speaks to the child and acts toward him in a tender and affectionate manner. Boys at any rate spontaneously choose those who are not over-careful of the results of their actions, if only they bring things to pass within the sphere of understanding and interest of the child. CASTE STRATIFICATION 15 Children will endure without a word of complaint, and really with apparent enjoyment, quite harsh, rude handling from an older playmate or a parent, if it is administered in the spirit of play. Until he has reached the adolescent age, the child seems to pay little heed to caste stratifications in any com- munity. The son of the millionaire will, if he tne innu- gets the chance, play freely, without any feeling the cia of of condescension, with the son of the day laborer ; adult soctal stratifica- and this not infrequently happens in consequence tion of the democratic character of our public school system. The writer has been studying carefully, and for quite a long period, the social groupings of the children in the public schools of a Western city, where the conditions are un- usually favorable for determining when the young begin to feel and to be governed by the social distinctions of the adults in the community. The schools are so situated that each draws children from most of the typical social groups, —from the homes of the rich, the poor, the idle, the indus- trious, the intelligent, and the illiterate ; from the homes of governors, law-makers, and judges, as well as from those in which no one dwells who has ever held public office. So far as one can tell, the pupils in the elementary schools, with the possible exception of the seventh and eighth grades, are quite unconscious of the social status of their respective families, though in some cases the parents make a constant effort to impress this upon their children. On the play- ground, as well as in the classroom, the young are con- 1 Even when parents are hostile to one another, and endeavor to keep their children apart, the latter will often come together in spite of oppo- sition. The following instance given by a correspondent illustrates the prin- ciple: “G. and B. lived across the street from each other. Their fathers were rival doctors, and hated each other to the extreme limit. Every action and word manifested it. The mothers never spoke to one another. Conver- sation between the parents of one family regarding the other was not at all guarded, so both girls must have known of the animosity; yet they were always together, and one never cared to go to school or to a party without the other. B.’s mother made objection to the friendship, but it did no good. The mothers often laughed with their friends about it.” 16 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION cerned with individual members of groups on the basis alone of their personal qualities, and not their social stand- ing or connections. The children who are competent in the activities of the playground, and so who can lead, are al- ways the favorites, for the time being at any rate, while the incompetent or uninteresting or ugly are as a rule left to themselves. It is true that a number of more or less exclu- sive groups have been formed, but not on the basis of the social status of the families represented, though it some- times appears to be so, since children who are brought together by their parents outside of school, as in parties or dancing classes, tend to group together on the playground simply because they are acquainted with each other. If one will study these groups, he will see that they are generally not conscious of differences in social status; they cling together on the basis solely of familiarity. Parents are, of course, responsible for determining to some extent the associates of their children outside of school, and they attempt to preserve the alignment of the social strata ; so that in effect the groupings on a general playground are often along social lines viewed from without, but not lines drawn or even appreciated by the young themselves. For the reason indicated, there isa tendency among the children who live in a given section of a community, and who see much of one another out of school, to “keep company” in the school. But after all, this is really important only in respect to the groupings of girls, for boys usually ignore sectional limitations in their choice of companions. They do not even respect color limitations, at least in the city to which allusion has been made, though it is different, as the writer has observed, in the southern part of our country. Dress plays no part in the groupings among the boys; Soclability and its rdle among the girls, up to the sixth or onthe basis seventh grade, is of slight consequence, except distinctions in rare instances where parents insist upon the importance of clothes in determining the companionship EXCELLENCE IN STUDIES 17 of their children. As one listens to the spontaneous conversa- tion of girls under eleven years of age, he does not hear refer- ence made often to the dress of any playmate or schoolmate. Associates or acquaintances are not praised or criticised on account of their clothes. Normally the mind of the girl of this age is full of dynamic things, and she talks generally of what a companion or schoolmate can do, whether she is good at girl’s games, whether she has skill in doll play, whether she can draw and paint well, and so on. In short, contrary to much popular philosophy, girls before adoles- ence, are not clothes-minded to any impressive extent. One hears it frequently said that children naturally choose as companions those who are “ bright” and “ intel- ligent.” As commonly interpreted, to be “ bright” onthe means that the child is a leader in the school. (enema We have noted above that a person who is merely ®ttainments static is never a social favorite, no matter how “ good” he may be; and the principle applies to his intellectual abili- ties. If he can see through a game quickly; or if he knows the habits of animals, and how to ensnare them; or if he understands machinery and can make things “go,” he will be acceptable. But mere excellence in studies is not regarded by children as of worth for sociability ; they are not more inclined to choose the boy at the top of the class than the one at the foot. Indeed, the latter is often a social favorite. S. and V. like, above all their companions, two boys who are a grade behind in school. These latter boys belong to the motor type, and they can do many things which interest their associates, while some of their more bookishly brilliant companions seem to them rather unin- teresting because they do not know how to “do things.” Superiority in books is for the normal boy up to adolescence no guarantee of real merit; books are as yet too remote from the dynamic life which alone has value for the child. 1 Any one who has had much experience with boys will recognize the fol- lowing type :— One of the most popular boys in a high school of seventy students, if not 18 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION However, girls of nine or ten often admire one of their schoolmates who is superior in the work of the school. Earlier than the boys, the girls begin to feel the worth of intellectual superiority as displayed in schoolroom situations, and they tend to regard as a model one who can easily accom- plish what they are striving to attain. Of course, it some- times operates in just the reverse way; when a number are striving for a prize, say, the one who wins it may receive the envy and even the hatred of some of those who fail. If one were writing of sociability among children in Eng- land, say, or France, or Italy, he would need to qualify somewhat the statements made above, since in these coun- tries the young are led from the cradle on to observe the social distinctions so prominent in adult society. One sees in Paris or Rome, for instance, the children of the different classes educated in separate schools ; and they are constantly impressed with the notion that they must not be friendly with any but the members of their class. At the public schools in England, especially at Eton, the boys who come from aristocratic homes are inclined in the beginning to shun all but the boys of their respective social groups ; but before they are in the school many weeks, the distinctions established with such trouble by parents, governesses, and tutors are largely if not entirely obliterated. All the evi- dence indicates that before adolescence, speaking generally, young boys particularly will, if left to themselves, ignore the conventional groupings of adult society, and establish their own groupings on the basis alone of efficiency in ac- tivities of interest in childhood.1 Then they will manifest the most popular one, was the son of an exceedingly poor and lazy farmer. He was not even up to the average in his scholarship; but his companions sought him out because, apparently, he was as they put it “a good fellow.” He was a leading member of the football team, catcher on the baseball team, and a thoroughly good story-teller. In short, he did the things that interested boys. (Reported by J. N.) 1 A teacher who has had an excellent opportunity to study the social de- velopment of children, writes the author in respect to the age when she has observed that groupings on economic or similar bases begin to occur. It is ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT "19 sociability toward those, no matter to what class they be- long, who can codperate with them in the enterprises in which they are interested. They will not feel active op- position toward others as a rule; they will simply pass them by. All students of adolescence have noticed that the changes that occur at this time exert a marked influence upon the sociable tendencies of individuals, making them 5 nonce of exceedingly active in some directions and weaken- sanlbszent : j evelop- ing them in others. Expressions in response to ment upon the opposite sex become so accentuated, and as- lability sume such a peculiar character, that they must be treated in a separate place. At the advent of this epoch the indi- vidual, especially the girl, begins to take account of the stratifications existing in adult society, and she gradually comes to choose her associates in accordance therewith. In the early years, wealth, with its varied social manifestations, is largely ignored by the child, but at adolescence it begins to intrude itself upon her attention, and so to determine her social attitudes. If she does not herself belong to the my impression that the cases cited below are very rare, but I give them as they have been described to me: — “Ina town of about twelve hundred inhabitants with which I am familiar, a group of girls considering themselves socially superior to the other mem- bers of the school was formed as early as the fourth grade. It was rare for them to take any one into the group, or to mingle in any way with other children. They even showed a marked hostility toward some children who were much superior to them in scholarship, but were in very ordinary cir- cumstances financially. “Tn a city of some eight or nine thousand, a similar grouping is a trouble- some problem in the fourth grade. “In a school situated in a college region of ——, I knew a group of girls that existed in the fifth grade (I don’t know when it was formed), the chief basis for which grouping appeared to be a like scholarliness of the parents, —a similarity of tastes. In that school there is organized play during inter- missions. These girls apparently considered themselves superior to games in the sixth grade, and it was with great reluctance that they were persuaded to participate therein. They enjoyed better their own quiet conversation. They played games at home, however. “Tn none of these instances did a similar grouping occur among the boys.” 1 A principal of a public school contributes the following testimony : — “T have noticed that the boy who early leaves school to go to work soon 20 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION wealthy class, she commences to feel restrained in the pre- sence of those, once her playmates, who possess more of this world’s goods than she does. Where formerly she made no distinctions in persons except on a dynamic basis, she now gives the right of way to those who display their wealth, though they may not be real leaders. But she defers to them; wealth to her means, in a subtle way, power and social precedence. At the same time, the wealthy members in the group begin to clique together because of community of opportunity and interest, and gradually to terminate sociable relations with those who in their younger years they may have admired for their skill and leadership. In the high school, and even in the seventh and eighth grades, fraternities and sororities flourish easily, and the members of any particular group grow intense in their sociability with one another, but indifferent, or even hostile, to those outside the charmed circle. Early friendships are often broken, and new connections formed. This is true more generally of the girls than of the boys, possibly because of the special influence of mothers over their daughters ; the social distinctions of adult society, conventional and otherwise, are enforced upon girls more rigorously than upon boys.’ The latter, more effectually drops the companions he had at school and finds his delight in associating with the boys who are working as he does. He assumes an air of importance when he meets his old companions. He seems to think that he is somehow on a higher plane than the others. He thinks the boy in school is “ green ’”’ and unfortunate in that he is obliged to attend school. He adapts himself to the habits and customs of those associated with him. This continues until he has entirely drifted away from his old associates. By this time he begins to see that his old associates have gained something which he lacks. He sees that they are superior to him now, and that he cannot compete with them. His mind now tends to become embittered. He is jealous and envi- ous. His disposition becomes soured. He clings closer to those of his own class. He joins their unions and societies, and is a fit subject for strikes and riots. This is, of course, a rather extreme case.” 1 The following is contributed by A. H.;— “Tn a town of seven hundred people, I had a girl in high school who was the richest girl in the school. Her society was eagerly sought by all the so-called ‘swell dressers’ in school. They were respectful in their attitude ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 21 than the former, resist the forces from without that urge on to a re-alignment among the social groupings. To some extent, boys continue even during adolescence to be sociable with those who are efficient in games, or in any forms of masculinity, even in fighting. In the high school, the all- round athletes are usually favorites, and they are shown marked attention by their fellows, who will serve them in every way and strive to interest and please them. This is very noticeable in such boy groups as are found at Eton or Rugby or similar schools, where intellectual and athletic superiority will keep a boy at the head of a group, though his parents may occupy an inferior social position. This principle may be observed operating also in military schools in our own country, where an opportunity is given the boys to express their sociable tendencies; and in institutions like Boy City, the George Junior Republic, and similar communities of boys practicing self-government largely. It should be impressed here that there are operating on children from without certain natural agencies which tend to segregate them into groups on the adult social basis when toward her, and seemed perfectly happy if they could gain her good-will. However, there was another class of so-called ‘ poor’ girls who drew away from her, not because she repelled them, perhaps, but because they felt out of place in her presence. They seemed to be much affected by the evident contrast between their own circumstances and those of this girl as shown in matters of dress, jewelry, the home, ete. When I first saw this girl in the grades she was meek, demure, and humble in her manner, but after two years in the high school she had become haughty, overbearing in many ways, and tended to avoid girls younger than herself. She and her circle were in the habit of making fun of girls who were poorly dressed, but in many cases more brilliant intellectually than they. In fact, one of this group was the biggest dunce in school, while one of the girls outside of this group was the brightest girl in school. “From my observation in the high school, I should say that girls group on the basis of ability to dress in the latest styles and in finest patterns. ‘Why, Florence wears a silk waist to school every day,’ was a remark I once overheard. I heard a girl of twelve years relate to her mother how many of the girls wore new hats and how many had hats which were made over from old ones. “Tf a girl can say witty things and entertain with jokes and stories she may be popular, but this is always a secondary matter, according to my ob- servation.” 22 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION they enter the high school. Even in our country, the majority of the pupils in the elementary school do not for economic rea- sons go beyond the grammar grades. As a rule only those who are at least fairly well-to-do can afford to spend in study four years following the eighth grade. On the whole, the children of the laboring class must become wage-earners by the time they are fifteen, and this removes them from those who are so situated that they can continue in school. Inevitably, then, companionship will be broken up at this point, and class distinctions will begin to be manifested. But these dis- tinctions are not made by the children, but are inherent in our social organization. Further, children who are well-to-do are naturally drawn together to the exclusion of those in humble circumstances, because they are able to participate in activities and indulge themselves in ways which are impossible for the indigent; so the latter simply drop out by themselves without any active opposition on the part of the others. It is of importance for our present purpose to note that often adolescent boys and girls preserve their childhood grouping for games and plays, but have new groupings for their “ party ” activities, — their sociables, dances, card and sleighing parties, and the like. It is probable that boys would be much slower than they are in making the new groupings if it were not for the girls, who tend earlier to insist upon the exclusion of certain boys and the inclusion of others in all social functions. The principle here in question might be much extended, so that we could say that men, if not influenced to the contrary by women, would fail to adopt the social distinctions which exist in modern society. In companies of men who are somewhat separated from complex social groups, as in lumbering and mining camps, thoroughgoing democracy prevails. Under such conditions, individuals are rated on a dynamic basis, and all forms of caste distinctions are ignored. But the im- portation of women into such a community leads rapidly to stratification along lines indicated above. NEW BASES OF SOCIABILITY 23 The principle sought to be developed here is that new bases for the expression of sociability gradually become established during adolescence. For one thing, g)is31 strat- economic independence seems to narrow the range itication on of sociable feeling, speaking generally. This is se aor doubtless due, in its origin, to the development of 48 a feeling on the part of the individual of wealth that the person in humble circumstances can contribute nothing to his pleasure, unless he be a specialist in some sort of ser- vice, when he will be paid for what he does. So far as the adolescent is concerned, the recognition of such distinctions is often due to the constant allusion by his elders to the divi- sions in society between those who have and those who have not. M. at fifteen is made to feel by the group in which her companions are found that if she walks or visits with a cer- tain girl in another group she will displease the members of the first group, and may forfeit their friendship. They make her realize in many ways that she must confine her sociable expressions closely within the special group ; or, at least, she must not be friendly, except in a charitable way, with per- sons “lower” in the social scale. And “lower” means usually, though not in every case, of less evident wealth, which is revealed in a variety of social manifestations, as superior dress, houses, furniture, horses and carriages, splen- dor of receptions, and the like. In the newer parts of our country, lineage is not an important basis for social distinc- tion, though if it be coupled with wealth it is taken advan- tage of, by the girl especially, before she has completed her teens. But ancestry is not a sufficiently tangible thing strongly to impress the adolescent, though it may loom larger and larger as he approaches adulthood. The individ- ual just entering youth cannot appreciate very subtle bases for social distinction ; he must be impressed by a marked display of one sort or another in order that he may really feel that he is either superior or inferior to his fellows in the social order, or their equal. 24 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION So the adolescent, as he draws toward maturity, is ex- ceedingly active in trying to find his level in the social seale. As a boy, full of dynamic interests, he did not appreciate that there were levels which separated people who lived within visiting distance of each other; but the moment he began to give up efficiency in play as the great dominating aim in his life, that moment he entered upon a new order of social distinctions, which he had first to recog- nize and afterwards adapt himself to. Then he commenced the struggle to reach the highest level possible, and he found most of those about him doing the same. Why people desired to attain this “ highest level,” he probably did not in a serious way attempt to determine; he simply felt the tension, and gave way in the direction to release it. Without question, then, the primary basis for social re- grouping during adolescence is of a monetary character, but it is not the only one. A “clever” boy or girl, if not too evidently lacking in this world’s goods, may be made a favorite by those of larger means. So the leading scholar of the school, though indigent, may sometimes be sought after by the sororities and fraternities; but it is rare that his scholarship alone attracts friends to him, although this is sometimes observed in simple communities, as in rural regions, where class distinctions have developed but slightly, the community remaining quite homogeneous. But in complex social groups, besides being a shining mark for his scholar- ship, and so adding some measure of dignity to the group to which he belongs, a youth must at the same time be unusually interesting in some way in order that the upper class may be friendly with him. Often the wealthy youths of both sexes are sought after without regard to their moral or intellectual qualities, or substantial accomplishments in any line; but it is otherwise with the boy or girl of slender means. The personal qualities of the latter must be of the highest order, that they may be noticed and made the bases for social expression by the economically independent. CHARITABLE TENDENCIES 25 This fact is plainly apparent in any educational institu- tion of secondary school or college grade, where there is a considerable body of indigent students who must “work their own way.” Seldom, indeed, do the more favored groups manifest friendly interest in their poorer classmates. An exception is found in the case of a distinguished athlete, or musician, perhaps, or literary genius. The unusual man or woman intellectually, if poor, may be largely ignored by his fellows, so far as sociable expression is concerned, though instances of a contrary sort might be cited. The Phi Beta Kappa students are not as a rule favorites in the groups that really give character to college social life, at least in many institutions. Happily, though, in our great state universities at any rate, the groupings are so varied that a student may find a place in some one of them, no matter what may be his economic status. The Young Men’s Christian Association, for instance, is always open to the student of upright intentions, whether he be rich or poor. It cuts through all social strata, and is friendly toward a man regardless of his economic gharitatie condition, or even his intellectual or other attain. jenceucies ments. But this institution is an illustration of an bility entirely different social grouping from anything noticed heretofore. It is formed for the explicit purpose of promot- ing good-will and friendliness among men regardless of their social relations; it seeks opportunities for friendly ex- pression; while these other groups that have been mentioned have in view solely the interests of the members thereof. The fraternity invites a man to enter into friendly relations with its members because it is thought that he will add to the pleasures of the group; he perhaps is Clever, or is gen- erous in the use of his money, or his family enjoys social distinction, and connection with it will add dignity to the fraternity, and so on. But the Young Men’s Christian Asso- ciation reaches out for a man when it is apparent that it can help him by bringing him into contact with men who will 26 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION fraternize with him, and so save him from social isolation. This new attitude in sociability, which is not prominent until the individual gets well along in adolescent develop- ment, is of the utmost importance in contemporary advanced societies. Asa result of it, practically every person in larger communities, no matter what may be his condition, — eco- nomic, intellectual, or even moral, — has opportunities for friendly intercourse with his kind. Perhaps the majority of people among us are predominantly “ selfish” in their socia- bility, but there are enough of those of a different temper to make the lot of the social misfits less unfortunate than it otherwise would be. While this charitable tendency in sociability is most marked in maturity, still it begins to be strongly manifested before adolescence is completed, at least among those who continue under educational influences. It often happens that men and women who were intensely selfish in their friendliness as high-school students decide, as college seniors, to devote their lives to social settlement or missionary work. Before the adolescent period, children rarely show a disposition to commune with other children for the good they may do them; in their sociable expressions they appar- ently do not have at all in view the feelings of some needy classmate, say. They do not show an inclination to sacrifice their own pleasure for that of others who may be made happy by their friendly advances. Parents have to suggest, and even urge, that their children pay a visit to other children “who are lonely.” During the pre-adoles- cent epoch, the young are but little affected by the repre- sentations of an uninteresting playmate as being “lone- some.” They do hot respond pleasantly when they are asked to invite him to play or dine with them; they suggest some one in his place. They are not moved, either, when they are told that they ought to stay at home to keep a lonely brother or sister company. In short, children are not nor- mally charitable in their sociability. They choose their RESUME 27 companions for the same reason in principle that they choose apples or sugar, — because they get from them plea- sure, though of a peculiar sort. It should be noted, how- ever, that children often show a friendly interest in some schoolmate who is sick. They will suggest taking food or flowers to him, though I have not observed very marked tendencies of this sort in young children. Their interest in the unfortunate is at best but momentary; and usually a sick companion will speedily be forgotten for one who can partake in the plays and games of the group. During the first two months the child exhibits practically no ap- preciation of values as presented in his environment. It is probable that his first differentiation of values occurs in respect to persons as contrasted with things. From the beginning of his third month, the child manifests an inclination to commune with persons. In his intonations and featural expression in response to persons, he shows he is more or less instinctively social. With devel- opment, at least from the second year on, sociability becomes bound up with other feelings, arising out of the child’s efforts to adjust him- self to his environment, social and otherwise. Prominent among these feelings are the inherited feeling of danger, and the feeling of depend- ence upon others. The highest form of sociable feeling, the interest in people for their own personal worth, does not manifest itself until the advent of the adolescent period —at about the fifteenth year with girls, and a year or two later with boys. As the child grows into boyhood or girlhood, the desire for mere personal presence subsides, and interest in people becomes dynamic in character. The basis for choice of companions now is leadership. Toward persons, young or old, who can “do things,” sociability is manifested. The group disciplines any one of its number, unless he be a leader, who assumes superiority in any way. The highest moral and intellectual qualities do not appeal to the child strongly as bases for sociable expression. Adult social stratification does not appeal to the child. Groupings on the basis of social or economic status are not normally made or ap- preciated by children, but are due to proximity of residence and the influence of adults. Girls observe sectional limitations to some extent, but boys ignore even the color line in their choice of companions. Dress plays no part in the groupings among young boys, and has but little effect on girls before the tenth or eleventh year, except when continu- ally dwelt upon by parents. What her companions can do in a dynamic way is of chief interest to the young girl. Mere excellence in studies Résumé 28 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION does not make one a favorite among children ; for the boy, especially, dynamic traits alone have value. However, girls of nine or ten some- times admire schoolmates who are superior in school work. All evidence indicates that before adolescence children will ignore the conventional groupings of adult society, even in communities where class distinctions are much emphasized, as in certain European countries. During adolescence, a re-grouping takes place, largely on the basis of wealth in one or another of its manifestations. In general, economic independence narrows the range and subdues the liveliness of sociable expression. Superior scholarship among the young may serve as a basis for social prestige, provided the possessor is unusually interesting in some other way, and has personal qualities of the highest order. There are social groups, however, such as the Young Men’s Christian Asso- ciation, which are not established on the basis of wealth or scholarship or any interest of a selfish nature ; such groups seek only to promote sociability among people. This charitable tendency in sociability is most marked in maturity ; itis rarely manifested until the adolescent period is reached. Before this time, children choose their companions for more or less selfish reasons, although they may show a kindly interest in a sick schoolmate, which, however, is apt to be monetary. Children are not normally charitable in their sociable expressions. CHAPTER II COMMUNICATION Berore the child is a year old, he shows in most of his atti- tudes that he wishes to have those with whom he has friendly relations share with him in the appreciation of = 5 2 . eo need of whatever he does or discovers of interest to him- communt- self; and he wishes, further, to have all his acquaint- "™" ances participate with him in his misfortunes of whatever sort. As he develops, this general tendency becomes ever more prominent in his thought and action, though revealed in ever more subtle ways. If one will observe the babe in the nursery, it will be seen that whenever he comes upon a toy or object of any kind that attracts his attention, or gives him pleasure, he will make an effort, feeble though it may appear, to call the attention of onlookers to it, and to have them express themselves toward it as he does. Later, when he begins to talk and to walk, he rarely discovers a new thing, to which he attaches any value, that he does not run with it, if possible, to his parents or other hospitable persons to communicate the good news to them. Most observers have found, with Kirkpatrick, that children seem especially de- sirous that others shall hear, see, and feel what they do, as well as that they themselves shall have the same experiences, if agreeable, that others in their presence are having. Tf the child constructs an object with his blocks or in his sand pile which pleases himself; if he performs an unusual deed with hands or voice or body; if he sees or hears any- thing which impresses him, — in every case his experience must, whenever possible, be shared with father, mother, brothers, sisters, and with any person who will listen, even if this person does not show marked appreciation.! Indeed, 1 A careful observer of children gives me the following incidents illustrat- ing certain phases of the principle in question : — 30 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION the child will on occasion endeavor to share his experiences of every kind with indifferent and even hostile persons, if he can find no one else with whom he may communicate. The busy parent and teacher may receive the expressions of the child very coldly, and they may even go so far as to chastise him, in the hope that they may repress him; and yet, in the face of stern opposition, he not infrequently seems unable to restrain this passion to communize, whatever hap- pens to him, or whatever he brings to pass as a result of his own initiative. He is much of the time at high social poten- tial, and he must discharge in order to restore equilibrium ; and no sooner is he discharged than he begins to be charged again. He appears not to be satisfied with any experience, or really to adjust himself to it, unless he can find others to take cognizance of it with him. In the same way he seems to be able to bear his adversities much better if he can re- late them to those who will respond sympathetically to him, or who will attempt to redress his wrongs. It is as though when others understand his troubles, they will bear them with him or prevent their recurrence. Watch the child communicating some ill-luck to his mother. As soon as he has aroused her sympathetic re- sponses, so that she appears to feel with him, or so that she shows that beyond doubt she will soothe him, and provide especially for his pleasure so as to offset his pain, — as soon as he has won her compassion and insured her assistance, he becomes more subdued in his expressions. Often the recital of a mishap, with accompanying demonstrations of suffering, seems to occur for the purpose mainly of arousing compas- ‘* A family in very meagre circumstances, having invited guests to luncheon, had made more than usual preparations for their entertainment. The small girl, bubbling with enthusiasm, mortified her mother by telling the guests that there were oranges in the kitchen, and chocolate cake, etc. “A little girl of three living across the street from a school building used to run over to see the teachers after school hours. The principal was not to return the following year. One day, having just learned of this, the child ran into his room and said: ‘Oh, I’m so glad you aren’t coming back next year.’” THE BEGINNINGS OF RESTRAINT 31 sionate attitudes in those addressed, or to cause rivals or tor- mentors to be disciplined. This tendency is very marked in some children up to the ninth or tenth year, while in others it begins to decline earlier than this. Normally the adolescent keeps his minor troubles to himself; or, if he communicates them at all, he does so in an indirect manner, by way of suggestion largely. At fifteen, he does not crave the demon- strative expressions of sympathy from his elders that he de- manded at the age of five, say; though he is often not averse to having his associates know that he is enduring hardship. But by this time he is beginning to experience something of the attitude of the hero or the martyr. He will bear his mis- fortunes alone and without verbal complaint, though deep down in his feeling he desires that people should recognize him as a hero or a martyr. It should be noted that the boy of sixteen is much less expressive of his experiences, whether painful or otherwise, than the girl of this age, though she is now more reserved than she was as a child. But she seems to need the support and comfort to be derived from the generous participation in most of her experiences of every one about her who is in sympathetic accord with her. She does not “keep things to herself,” as the boy begins to do at this time; and the differentiation of the sexes in this respect becomes more marked as they approach maturity. In the earliest years, everything exceptional or in any way interesting that occurs, and of which the child becomes aware, whether he be the cause thereof or merely the popin- an observer, must be communized ; but as his sphere ™es of : ; restraint of adjustment enlarges, he gradually discovers 1 the com- that people are not at all interested in certain aang kinds of experiences, and they may even be annoyed by their recital, while they are much interested in other kinds. And so he learns, slowly of course, to confine his commu- nizing activity to matters that his hearers take some interest in. When he begins sharing his experiences he does not take account carefully of the attitudes of the alter in rela- 32 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION tion to his communications ; he derives pleasure seemingly from the mere portrayal of whatever has affected him. It is as though he felt strain and tension until he had given his experience publicity ; nature seems to urge him to pub- lish it, no matter what the outcome may be. But as he comes into possession of reflective attitudes, he takes account, more or less, of the social outcome of his expressions, and then he starts on the process of selecting for publication those experiences which will please the persons who learn of them, or which will add to his own good reputation, or which will operate to the disadvantage of his rivals or those who have for any reason aroused his enmity. What the child desires above everything else, especially when he enters the reflective epoch,! is the approval of persons, expressed in their bodily attitudes, their rewards, material and social, and the like; and his deepest concern is to communicate all those experiences — but only those — which will win him the good-will of the persons of whose presence he is in any way conscious. But he also desires to humiliate his competitors, and to subjugate those who will not submit to his domination or who attempt to exercise authority over him, and in his communications he will seek to arouse the anger of his auditors against his enemies. From the third year on to adolescence, at any rate, chil- dren are ready “ tattlers ”; they easily run to the teacher or parent with everything they see, even in their friendly asso- ciates, which they know has been forbidden, and which they fancy may bring chastisement upon the offender, or credit to themselves. To an adult, not familiar with the impulsive character of children’s actions, it seems impossible that they should endeavor to get their playmates into trouble, as they so readily do. There is, of course, a deeper meaning in this phenom- enon. Children insist upon any prohibition of their own activities being made universal, so that no one may do what 1 See the author’s Dynamic Factors in Education, chap. i. DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGES 33 they have been reproved for doing. Then when they see an act performed, which in respect to themselves has been the occasion for discipline, they demand that the performer shall be treated as they have been. It may be added that they are not, in the early years, quite so ready in publishing news of ghe actions of an associate which may bring to him the rewards which have been given to themselves under similar circumstances. Those students of mental develop- ment who maintain that the ego and the alter are but phases of a unity ; that what the ego demands for and of self he also demands for and of the alter under all circum- stances, may be suspected of not having observed children carefully, or they would have noticed that the individual is more urgent in insisting that the alter should bear the pains and penalties of his misdeeds, than that he should bear them himself under similar circumstances. It may be worth while to note further how, in accordance with the principle mentioned above, the character of the individual’s communications changes with devel- Devetop- opment. It has already been intimated that if we Gara observe any child at the dawn of social conscious- {he charac ness, and follow him on for a number of years, we munications may see that his tendency is to communicate all experience that has value for him, no matter what it may be. His ex- periences, however, do not at the outset extend over a wide range; they relate almost wholly to nursery undertakings and discoveries, as well as to the good and ill fortunes arising from contact with people or things. The child views himself as in the centre of the world environing him, and the pronoun “I,” actually used or at least implied, appears in every communication. At the same time the pronouns “you” and “he” are in evidence; which indicates that in the child’s thought there is an alter to be pleased, or at least to be made interested.‘ This alter may be his dog or kitten or doll ; but at any rate there is an alter,—a some one, 1 See the author’s Linguistic Development and Education, chaps. ii-iv. 34 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION more or less like himself, who can appreciate his experience and respond to him. At five, he is chiefly concerned with securing social recognition of, and reaction upon, the feats he performs in running, climbing, throwing, talking, and so on ad libitum. He is constantly calling attention to what he has done, or is able to do, in more or lgss exact imitation of most of the simpler activities that he witnesses in his environment. By the age of ten, the individual’s communications relate largely to his experiences in games and plays, and in competition with his fellows, more es- pecially the former with the girl and the latter with the boy. In the talk of the girl at this time, there is normally not so constant allusion to competitive activity as in the case of the boy, but she tells what a good time she has with her playmates in the making of dolls, or the like, and what success she has in her work,— Jin school, perhaps. But while the boy talks of these matters to some extent, they are not predominant in his expressions. He is becom- ing aware of the qualities, abilities, and powers (princi- pally athletic, combative, and “tricky ’’) of his associates, and he wishes the world to know how he stands in com- parison with his competitors. Of course, he still commu- nicates meaningful experiences of every sort, whether pleasurable or otherwise; but the concerns he regarded as of prime importance at five have ceased to play the princi- pal role in his expressions at this period. At the same time it should be noted that his talk does not yet relate at all prominently to the intellectual or ethical activities of his associates. Following the boy on into adolescence, we find that at eighteen what was just beginning to be manifested at ten whetenten- 228 become a passion now. The struggle for the cles at more marked or direct material and social favors adolessenc? seems now very keen, and the boy’s communica- tions relate prominently to his intellectual, social, and physical triumphs. By this time he has established himself TENDENCIES AT ADOLESCENCE 35 in one or more groups, or it may be “gangs,” and he is beginning to think of the group as a unit in competition with other groups, or perhaps with the policeman or the shopkeeper. The girl is conscious mainly of social, esthetic, and intellectual demands for success, while the boy is more conscious of competition in athletics of every sort, and debate. Much of the talk of boys and girls of this age concerns the relations between the sexes, which interest began to manifest itself at the advent of the adolescent pe- riod. Neither boys nor girls at the age of ten normally pay any attention to sex distinctions ; in their expressions they do not differentiate boys from girls. But at fifteen they give publicity to any sort of “ attachment” which may be brought to their attention. They seem to be on the lookout for signs of developing feeling between a boy anda girl; and if they cannot detect a real case of affection, they easily concoct one, and give it as wide publicity, and comment upon it as vigorously, as though it were genuine. This tendency con- tinues without abatement until the adolescent fever begins to be subdued somewhat, though it is never wholly aban- doned, even in maturity. Needless to add, perhaps, some persons lose interest early in this phase of social life, be- cause of the dominance of other interests, which they devote all their energies to promulgating ; but as a rule the detec- tion of evidences of amor between two persons of any age in the community sets all the tongues a-wagging. Long before the church publishes the banns, Dame Rumor spreads the news throughout the community. 1 In the author’s home city, boys begin to form football groups as early as nine. There are a number in the city now that hold together quite well, and “train” as their models, the university men, do. In this city football has been the means of synthesizing these social atoms into molecules. But it is significant that when the “season” is past, the molecules break up into the atoms again. Some of the boys who are together constantly during the autumn do not see anything of each other during the winter, and they appear to have no interest in one another. When the game is on, their com- radeship is based on capacity in this particular activity, and not on other and less dynamic characteristics. 36 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION Children of fifteen are still eager to communicate “ news ” in which the people to whom it is told show an interest; but this news relates to increasingly complex phases of social and ethical life. At this age the individual has aban- doned almost completely the communication of the simple personal interests which wholly occupied his attention at five. During the epoch extending through the college period . at least, the typical boy is not concerned primarily with eth- ical and moral conduct in the more complex relations of society, but only with the simpler phases thereof. As a student, his talk is predominantly of athletic and debating contests, relations of students and faculty, and the like; but in his expressions the notion of playing the game fair is becoming predominant. The notion is not absent entirely from the talk of the boy of ten, but it}is much more pro- minent at twenty. At this latter age, the individual is less eager to publish his own achievements of a simple physical, or even intellectual or social character, than he was at five or ten or fifteen, though he has not completely outgrown this tendency, and it may be that he never will. By the time maturity is reached, the individual’s commu- nications normally relate largely to the social effects of the conduct of his associates, and to the measure of their success in their business, social, political, academic, pro- fessional, or religious activities; and also to the progress which is being made by individuals, by the community, and by mankind in general along one or another of these lines. Thus he has progressed from the point where his own indi- vidual activities engrossed his attention, to the point where he is concerned to a considerable extent with the measure to which his fellows observe the fundamental rules of the social game, so far as he participates in it, either as a player or as an interested observer. Important instances coming to his attention of fair or foul play, as he conceives it, are given publicity, and his attitude toward them is revealed in a positive manner. It is probable that the majority of indi- THE RETICENT TYPE 37 viduals never grow out of this last epoch; if they continue to develop, they simply perfect the tendency dominant during the epoch. But certain persons continue specializing, until their interests in communication relate wholly to the impart- ing of discoveries in the special field of knowledge which they are cultivating. The writer is associated with men who talk of little but the results of research in their own or related fields. Their consuming ambition is to make contri- butions to knowledge, which implies discovery and effective publication. When they establish a new principle, or uncover a new fact, they are as eager to apprise the world of it as the child is to publish his discoveries in his nursery. These men are, in some cases, ill at’ ease in a drawing-room, for they have little interest in the matters that are there being given publicity, and they have lost their sense of social values as represented in this situation. They are, in short, specialists, whose function it is to communize only certain groups of facts; these facts have taken such complete possession of them that unrelated facts can find no lodg- ment in their consciousness. Consequently they cannot be. made publishing media for news and gossip of any sort. To some extent, they interfere with the dissemination of gossip, since they are incapable of taking it up and passing it along. In groups of savants, local happenings of the moment never gain currency. 2 Before leaving this topic a word should be said regard- _ ing the reserved, the reticent, the non-communicative per- son. From the very beginning of expressive ac- no roy tivity, children differ markedly in their eagerness ont type for and freedom in communication. The reserved type of child is inclined to listen while others talk, though this depends in a measure upon the occasion. G., seven years of age, is very shy in the presence of strangers, and will not communicate readily on any subject.' She does not 1 Timidity is, without question, the cause of much apparent reticence in children, as in older persons. A correspondent gives me the following illustration : — 38 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION even enjoy being addressed by persons with whom she is not acquainted. She does not “ make friends” easily ; and when she goes out into the world she clings to her mother, and refuses to make advances to any one.! But in her own “The other morning when I was coming up from the station on the car, a little boy of kindergarten age was seated immediately in front of me, well toward the front of the car. Soon a little girl came in, and after scanning the passengers came eagerly forward, and with a friendly greeting seated herself at the lad’s side. Without a response, blushing and evidently em- barrassed, he retired to the far side of the seat, and occupied himself with the view afforded from the window. Not to be thus put off, the wee maiden slid over toward him, and with her hand on his shoulder said: ‘ Donald, Donald; why, don’t you hear me, Donald ?’ The lad became more engrossed with the view outside. ‘I thought for a minute,’ she continued, ‘that I was n’t going to find you, and then I saw a little boy here, and it was Don- ald.” When I left the car, after some minutes, Donald was just beginning to appear natural. I dare say his embarrassment was due to the conversa- tion of older people.” ‘1M. I. M. sends the following description of a reticent child: — ‘* A little boy, five or six years of age, was very quiet, both in action and in speech. He would sit quietly in a chair for an hour or two at a time, without saying a word. He was left motherless, and was taken by a woman who was very fond of children. She tried to play with the little boy, but he did n’t know how, and would usually sit back and watch her. He was so uneanny that he ‘ got on her nerves.’ He liked best to sit still and listen to her sing. Often when she was trying to teach him to play, he would inter- rupt her and ask her to sing. “T could not believe he was well, but the doctor said he was. His father said he was always that way. “When a baby came to his new home, nearly two years after he went there, he seemed to find his first interest. He was devoted to the baby, and would talk and play with her by the hour, but not in a healthy childish way; he was like a little, old grandfather. “His mother had been an invalid, and he had been obliged to ‘keep quiet’ during the last year of her life, but his father insists that ‘he was always like that.’ ” M. W. cites the following, in illustration of differences in the tendency of children to communicate experiences : — “W. and G. are two brothers, who always were very different. Even when first in school, G. did not tell school happenings, either to his parents, his sister, or his friends. Usually when a child is hurt, the first thought is to run to mother. One day George was accidentally struck in the face with a sledge hammer, breaking his nose and covering his face with blood. Instead of going home or to his father’s place of business, he hid in a fence corner. Some relatives discovered him and took him home. They would never have found out from George how it happened, but the man who was using the hammer told of it. G. never changed ; his studies at school, whether easy or ‘ THE RETICENT TYPE 39 home, among those she knows well, she goes to the other ex- treme, so that she must be repressed, though she resists any interference with her freedom of speech in the home. Con- trasted with this type is another, illustrated by S., who will communicate with people under any and all circumstances. V., at ten, has passed through a non-communicative period, and now he will tell his experiences freely to any one, whether stranger or familiar friend. X. in his earlier years was a very “open,” communicative boy ; but now at nine- teen he is reticent toward all but a narrow circle of inti- mate friends. His former associates say he has become ex- tremely egotistic, and considers himself superior to most of difficult, were never discussed ; his love affairs were jealously guarded ; his business is his own; even his wife shares not in those things. He is like his father, who is contented to live alone in a small cottage at an Indian agency, doing his own work, hunting and fishing, while his wife keeps house for the children that they may attend school in a city in another state. It is not, perhaps, just as he would wish it, but he is contented. “W. has always been anxious to tell where he has been and what he has done. G. liked to go to visit an old aunt in the most lonesome part of the country, but W. would never stay; he might go for a day, but night found him at home. W. always chooses to have his work bring him into contact with as many people as possible. He has always told his mother and sister of the good times when on a trip or camping party; he is even willing to share with his bachelor sister his love affairs.” 1 A. S. sends me the following interesting observation, showing the change in respect to communicativeness which often occurs with development : — “ A young woman more than ordinarily reticent, has interested me. When a small child she was somewhat bashful, but developed into what might be termed a harum-scarum youngster, fond of boys and their games, talkative and light-hearted. Her mother having died before she was six, she had early to assume responsibilities which most children do not know. These influenced her little until the adolescent period, when she seemed to assume a very different attitude toward everything and every one about her. She shunned boys’ society, was diffident in their presence, grew quiet and re- served, in fact she appeared to take a defensive attitude towards those about her. This characteristic she has never been able to overcome, though-she has made an extreme effort to do so since she has grown to womanhood. She dislikes meeting strangers, must know a person well before he knows her at all, is everything but a success socially, prefers not to talk if she may listen, and is considered cold and unfriendly. Her reticence, it would appear, is a result of her having been forced to take the responsibility of looking out for herself too early, of perhaps distrusting the kindliness of individuals about her, and of having thought too much about herself.” 40 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION those he meets in daily life, so that he feels he can do no better than keep his own company much of the time. Again, G. at thirty is a good illustration of the reticent type. He is a scholar, and is apparently more fond of his books than of persons.! He seems timid and ill at ease with most peo- ple. He is seemingly well disposed toward his fellows, but he prefers to commune with them and to serve them through the medium of the written rather than the spoken word. His literary expressions are all distinctly ethical and social in character; and his friends say he “means well.” But he lacks the energy, perhaps, to adapt himself to people in the flesh, or his thought does not move rapidly enough to keep abreast of ordinary conversation, and he feels himself dominated by his associates. With the pen all is different; his “retiring” nature can now express itself without re- straint according to its desires. In the same way, this reticent person can receive communications, through his books, from all the people of merit who have lived and recorded their observations and experiences, and he can appropriate these communications without making any re- sponse on his own part. So he is much easier and happier in his library than among people; and for this reason he shuns the reception-room and most places where men do congregate, and where response is expected from him. Whatever may be the fundamental motive of the indi- vidual’s passion to communize experience, it must be noted, 1 The following cases are typical of persons one meets frequently :— ““ A lady (Miss D.) was formerly very sociable, and sought society for the ‘good time’ it gave her. Now she is so thoroughly engrossed with her special work that she dislikes callers, because she ‘begrudges the time it takes.’ She says that comparatively few have anything to say worth listening to. She has not lost interest in communication, for she writes and lectures.” “In my own case,” writes M. I. M., “I was reticent toward all people except the members of my own family until about eighteen years of age. Now I am reticent toward certain groups, and too talkative towards others. In a crowd I like to listen and observe. I am nervous and uncomfortable in the presence of those I consider my superiors, but do not enjoy anything better than to give a public reading, and the larger the crowd the better I can control myself.” THE COMMUNIZING ACTIVITY 41 at any rate, that it is on the whole socially advantageous in the outcome. The result of this activity is, speak- ye soctat ing generally, that one’s fellows profit by one’s falue of own inventions, accomplishments, beliefs, ethical munizing conceptions, and so on. And what is of chief im- “YY portance, the individual discovers through his expressive ac- tivity that which is regarded by his fellows as of real worth, and this is a guide to him in determining what he should continue to practice, as well as what he ought prudently to abandon. That which, on the whole, people approve, will acquire value for the individual, while that which they con- demn he will sooner or later castaside. Of course, when the reactions of the social environment run counter to the na- tive tendencies of the child, he will struggle long and hard to bring people around to his view; but if he cannot accom- plish this, he will in due course, as a rule, yield to social pressure. Take this for illustration: A boy rushes in from the street, and with great enthusiasm tells his parents some new words he has heard. They frown upon him, and strive to make him realize that ‘ good” people dislike these words. He tries them again perhaps upon his older brothers and sisters ; and they react as the parents did. Now, unless he is upon the street a great deal, these words will not find lodg- ment in his vocabulary, except he practices them for the sake of annoying certain persons whom he likes to tease. On the other hand, if the parents are pleased to hear these new words he will be stimulated to continue in their use, and they will be likely to become a permanent part of his linguistic posses- sions. So he discovers a new trick, it may be turning a somer- sault, and he calls upon every one to witness him do it. The observers declare against it, saying it does not look nice, or he will soil his clothes, or break his neck, or what not, and they may decline to look at him when he does it. If he cannot 1 It should be noted that a boy will not ordinarily be dissuaded from per- forming any activity, simply because people say he will injure himself. On the contrary, he usually regards this as a challenge, which he will readily accept. 42 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION find any one to commend it, he will normally soon leave it for something else that receives social approval and applause. These instances are typical of what is going on constantly among children when they are given any measure of freedom in their activities, and the principle is applicable at every stage of development. When the adolescent exhibits himself, or describes the conduct of another, in some concrete situation, he does not fail to get his cue from the expressions of the people who hear him as to the desirability of continuing the action in question. Under certain conditions he may be incited to con- tinue in a line of conduct which is criticised by his teacher or others, because he is himself hostile to them and he seeks opportunities to torment them, or to show his independence. But, on the whole, he abandons what is generally condemned by those with whom he associates. H. returns from a visit to the home of E., and in narrating her experiences she men- tions, rather incidentally, how impertinently E. responded to her mother’s requests. All who listen to H. express in the strongest terms their disapproval of E.’s conduct, and H., without realizing it perhaps, does not fail to learn a use- ful lesson. So she mentions performances at the homes of other companions that draw forth the disapproval of her auditors, and at the same time she describes situations that meet; their approval ; and in this way she gains an impression of what is permissible, and what is not, with respect to these particular specimens of conduct. The principle applies to all her learning at this period. As the individual approaches adolescence, he not only con- tinues to get educative reactions upon his expressions from Theinflu- his social environment, but he plays a constantly ialviiney TOOYe important part in determining these reac- Miniepup- tions. By the time he is twelve, often consider- Uc opinion ably earlier than this, as with V., for example, he expresses decided opinions respecting the rightfulness and wrongfulness of much that occurs in his environment, and THE INFLUENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 43 that he is incessantly giving publicity to as he has expe- rience with it. Already his individual opinions are begin- ning to have some weight in determining the general opinions of the group, at least among the members of his own “set,” particularly if he is a leader. In this way he has influence, slight as it may be, in shaping public sentiment relating to the matters in which he is interested, — as to whether boys should be prohibited from playing on the school grounds, for instance. As a rule, of course, the adult portion of the community, regarded as a unit rather than as individuals, is not affected to any extent by the views of “mere boys” on any subject, and yet occasionally the latter do make some- thing of an impression, even before they reach the adoles- cent period. But as they move on through adolescence their opinions are given increasingly greater consideration by adults, until in the university epoch they not uncommonly secure reforms in politics, even in violation of long-contin- ued. custom. In the beginning of his communizing activity, the indi- vidual is mainly a learner, though he is himself not at all aware of it; but in the end he expresses himself, for the sake largely of becoming teacher or guide or law-maker. In other words, as a child he expresses himself, sub-con- sciously as a rule, for the purpose mainly of finding out what sort of behavior will result most advantageously for himself ; but as he matures, he expresses himself for the pre- dominant purpose of enforcing his own conceptions upon others, and so making them universal. When the average person reaches maturity, his principal, if not his sole, mo- tive in the matter of communizing experience is to set up his opinions and practices as the standards for the commu- nity at large. The child will, without resistance often, take criticism of his conduct and follow it; the high-school boy normally does so much less easily ; while the college man will ordinarily fight long and strenuously in defense of his mode of conduct and his views of men and things. This is 44 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION as we might expect it to be. The child, being plastic, can adjust himself readily to new standards of conduct ; but as he develops, he normally loses his plasticity; and self-preser- vation, social rather than physical, urges him to make uni- versal his ideals and habits when he gets set, or else he will in time be left out of account in social calculations. In a way every individual, as he settles into permanent form, takes up arms in support of the principles of action which he embodies in his own conduct, not so much because he thinks them right in general, as because he wants to be counted in the majority, in order that what he believes and can do will be most highly esteemed, and in consequence well rewarded by the community. Throughout this discussion, provision has been made for individual variation from normal tendencies ; but nowhere is this more marked than at this point. While most people in maturity tend to defend their practices and give them social approval and prominence, still in every community one may see adults who are genuine “searchers after truth.” The writer knows well one man who is rather more favor- able toward the beliefs and practices of others than toward his own. He often doubts the worth or efficiency of the no- tions and modes of conduct with which he has come to ma- turity, and he is inclined to find fault with his edueation. His associates say he lacks self-confidence. He is not a good fighter for his own interests or beliefs. But the fact that he is a marked exception among his colleagues tends to estab- lish the rule. It was suggested above that the reactions of the social environment upon the individual’s expressions result, on the The influ- Whole, in confirming what is acceptable, and sup- ontton ’ pressing what is evil; but there are exceptions mont on the which should be noted. In stating the principle it expressions was assumed that the social environment acting on the individual strongly indorses the right and condemns the wrong; but this is not always the case. A. has some- THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP 45 times played with a group of boys who exhibit the atti- tudes of the slum toward many of the activities of society. They will ridicule him when he says it is wrong to use vulgar language, and they hold up as their model the boy who is the most ready in the use of what they regard as dynamic speech. So they ridicule him for other expressions which his parents would praise him for, and they urge him on to actions which in his home and school environment are con- demned. Now, he quickly shows the influence of this, let us say, unwholesome social environment, and he would not need to be long in it before he would get a quite different esti- mate of social values from what he now has. It is not so much that he would have different copies set him to imitate, as that his expressions would turn out very differently from what they now do. After all, it is the outcome of actions that determines what will survive in conduct. This is one reason why, when a boy allies himself with any particular social group, as the “ gang” in our cities, or a gambling group, or an athletic group, he rapidly adopts the general traits of the group, because he learns readily to practice those expres- sions that win the applause of the crowd, and avoid those that incite ridicule. While the principle just stated holds as a general thing, still a further qualification is necessary. Normally the child takes due account of the outcome of his actions, gradually selecting for repetition those that people reward him for, and abandoning those that bring upon him punishment or criticism of any sort. But, as already intimated, this does not imply that every boy of five, say, is observant of the attitudes of people toward all his actions, except in respect to those activities that have very serious consequences, as in the case of thievery, for example. So far as the majority of his acts are concerned, he is more or less: indifferent at the outset to the reactions of the people about him, and the ordinary admonitions and warnings of parents have to be repeated over and over again, and often they have no effect 46 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION whatever. The child follows his own inclinations, except when these lead him into very definite trouble of consider- able importance. This is probably more of a masculine than a feminine trait ; or at least, the girl earlier becomes keenly appreciative of the attitudes of the social environment, even when these are not forcibly expressed. The boy must be coerced into conformity by his parents and his teacher,and often by his fellows ; though he sometimes comes into groups, usually older than himself, when he is a willing slave, and he offers no resistance whatever to their suggestions, nor does he try to carry through his own enterprises in the face of the opposition of the group, as he consciously does in the home. Inthe first situation heis a follower and learner, while in the latter he is a bully. A peculiar trait of social opposition already referred to incidently merits a further word in this connection. Prob- ‘Social ably every child is placed im situations at times opposition when he deliberately attempts to run counter to the expressed wishes of his associates. For one thing, he may desire to hector those with whom he is m competition, and so he does what he thinks will annoy them. But more often he craves the distinction to be derived from being in opposi- tion to his fellows. If they find fault with him he shows he is pleased; and the more violent they become, only so that they do not inflict bodily injury upon him, the more he en- joys it. His pleasure increases according to the measure of their displeasure. Later on, when he begins to establish his group relations, he not infrequently courts the disapproval of antagonistic groups. Usually children of any age cannot ignore ridicule; they either wilt before it or attack their persecutors. But when adolescence is reached, one may occasionally find persons who purposely draw upon them- selves ridicule because of their manners, their dress, or their views. It seems at bottom to be due to a love of dis- tinction, however secured, and also to the love of combat. In social opposition the individual is incessantly in the CONSCIOUSNESS A SPECIAL PHASE 47 combative attitude. Sometimes he opposes himself to practi- cally everything that goes on about him; he fights against all forms of social practice. He must always be “on the other side,” because he is essentially a combatant, and is not happy in times of peace. We must now look at a special phase of this communiz- ing activity. It was indicated above that the child early comes to feel the need of being constantly in the gosoons. presence of persons, to whom he may communi- ness isa cate all his experiences, and in whose activities he eae may share. It is rare, if ever, that one sees chil- payee dren who can be really content to carry on their enterprises in solitude. A normal child will not remain by himself if he can have with him people who are in sympathy with him, —that is, who will comfort him when he is in distress; who will receive kindly his invitations to observe what things he can make and what deeds he can perform ; who will show him new tricks, explain new situations to him, and so on. However, if he cannot find actual companions, or if he be suppressed in his spontaneous desires by those around him,— father, teacher, and others, — he may not indulge his socia- ble tendencies as freely as other children. But even in this latter case he will, during waking moments, rarely be alone in the extreme sense of this term, for at least in his fancy there will be people who will seem real to him, and who will participate in all his experiences. He will talk incessantly to these people who dwell in his imagination, describing what he is doing, and conducting himself as though they responded to him. When he has accomplished anything of note in his own estimation, he will express himself to these imaginary observers, much as he does when there are before him persons whose approval he is soliciting. The content of his consciousness is predominantly personal ; people are alto- gether absent from it only infrequently. As the individual’s experiences increase and he gains in the power of inhibition, he normally comes to restrain the 48 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION tendency to communicate aloud with the people in his imagi- nation ; but nevertheless, it is evident to any observer that people are there and guiding him in his conduct. It is appar- ent, also, that the principle in question becomes ever more important and comprehensive with development. In adult life we are always working and playing, reflecting and per- forming, with people looking on, or at least with the feeling of a personal presence to be taken account of. A man in his study, for instance, writes with his readers in view; and really all he does is determined more or less consciously by their approval or criticism. So the teacher prepares his les- son with a class before him in fancy; the orator rehearses his speech with an audience in the focus of attention, and so on. One cannot perform such an apparently simple thing as to buy a tie without being determined in his choice by the attitudes of the persons who stand out most clearly in his imagination. This is not to say that he is explicitly aware of what considerations are involved in his choosing. He certainly does not summon by name each individual in this imaginary group, and ask his opinion. It is probable that in most of the adult’s actions of the character indicated no single personality stands forth as a particular individual, and his special advice sought and followed, though this is doubtless the case sometimes. One’s model, as a special per- son, will be his adviser in some critical situation. At times we all say to ourselves (some of us say it more frequently than others), “ How would X. (our model) conduct himself under these circumstances? What would he say? How would he say it?” and so on ad libitum. But in most of our adjustments in mature life, distinct personalities prob- ably do not function focally in consciousness. Individuals become merged into types, and these gradually become con- densed into attitudes of approval, indifference, or condem- nation. It is a general law of mental development, which has been sketched elsewhere,! that images, whether of persons 1 In the author’s Education as Adjustment, Part III. RECOGNITION OF PUBLIC OPINION 49 or of things, tend upon repetition of adjustments in which they are involved to coalesce into larger unities, and ulti- mately to disappear altogether from the focus of conscious- ness, according as there becomes established a disposition to act in definite appropriate ways governed originally by these images. Thus, in the end explicit imagery is not essen- tial to determine action in effective adaptation to the objects which initiated the images. In the early stages of development, then, the child’s social consciousness is occupied with distinct, concrete personal- ities ; father, mother, teacher, and special play- the devel- mates stand out as individuals, and play their ance: part in all important actions. Children from three aie on into early adolescence, when corrected for any sentiment act, are very apt to cite the example of father or teacher or some other individual in justification of the act. While often, no doubt, children seek to escape censure and the in- fliction of penalties by citing the action of some one who stands well with the authorities in indorsement of their own action where they are aware of differences, nevertheless they are commonly, if not usually, sincere in the matter ; they really conceive that they are doing what would meet the approval of the persons who have in some way become their arbiters of right and wrong. One reason why their action so often seems insincere to the adult is because the latter cannot imagine how the arbiter cited could indorse the act in question ; but the child is not ready in detecting the differentiz of special acts. He applies to special cases, in a crude sort of way, general tendencies to action without noting particular modifications; so he often goes astray when he feels he is acting in conformity to principles ap- proved by his models. It should be appreciated that the young child, four or five years of age, does not refer to general, but only to individual practice or sentiment or opinion, in indorsement of his con- duct when it is under examination. One never hears him 50 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION say, “ People do it,” or “ Every one thinks it is right.” Instead he says, “Mother (or, it may be Miss H., his teacher, or Albert, his playmate) thinks it is right for me to do it.” But as development proceeds, as the range of social contact broadens, and as action in all typical situations be- comes facile and more or less habitual, individual arbiters for the child become consolidated, so to speak, and there is gradually established a sense of what the majority of the individuals would advise,—the general, and in time the public, opinion of the community. This sense of a general trend of opinion in reference to the ordinary activities of daily life arises from contact with the group with which the child has most intimate relations. For instance, V. has already, at nine, a sense of the atti- tudes of a group of playmates toward a few of the situations presented in his adjustments, and he is influenced to some extent thereby. He also has a more or less clear conscious- ness of the general opinion of the people in the immediate neighborhood regarding certain concrete matters, as out- door games, especially those played on Sunday. Further, he has a quite definite feeling respecting the teacher attitude toward various kinds of conduct; he sometimes says to his brothers and sisters, “‘ The teachers will not like it”’; or “I know there is no use to ask the teachers, for they will not let us do” this or that. Beyond these typical examples, V.’s appreciation of public opinion in reference to modes of thought and action is very slight, if indeed it exists at all. It is true that he has heard parents, teachers, and others speak of certain ethical and moral principles in a general way, as if all people conformed to them, and undoubtedly he is influenced more or less in his own thought and conduct by some of these expressions; but, after all, he connects them mostly with the particular individuals who have spoken of them to him. He does not really feel that the majority of the people in the community indorse them, as he will come to feel when he has had vital contact with many per- RECOGNITION OF PUBLIC OPINION 51 sons in such relations that he will see the principles are generally observed. A further word should be said regarding the method of gaining a feeling for general or public opinion. The majority of the people H. (as a type) knows, at least those with whom she has vital experiences, have quite similar attitudes respecting the rightness or wrongness of specific kinds of behavior in which she is interested; that is, they will sev- erally respond in substantially the same way when certain acts are performed in their presence. Inevitably, then, H. acquires the feeling that persons in general assume the atti- tudes which this particular group does. So far as her present experience is concerned there are few if any exceptions to give rise to doubt,.or to restrain action in the direction ad- vised by this group; though, of course, as she comes into give-and-take relations with persons who have different ex- periences from her own, she will need constantly to revise her views in respect to much that she believes implicitly now. It is apparent that an appreciation of community opinion, in the generally accepted sense, is developed only very grad- ually, following upon extensive and intimate experience with persons. For the young child, who has had close rela- tions with those only in his own home, there can be no response to public sentiment; and it is without doubt true that an adult whose range of personal contact has been very limited may have no feeling for public opinion in any large way. When an individual has significant relations with only a few associates, and these differ to some extent in their views and practices, the individuality of each remains more or less distinct in his social consciousness. There can be no adequate recognition of a general or public opinion in such a case, only the opinions of John, Henry, and the others as separate personalities. The principle is that as one becomes more and more cosmopolitan, individuals as such normally tend to lose their influence as arbiters of his conduct; 52 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION they slowly but surely merge into a feeling of the attitudes of the community as a whole; and ultimately, if one’s range of experience continues to increase, he gains a sense of the fundamental attitudes of the times in which he lives. In due course, and upon multiplication of social experiences, this feeling comes to constitute one’s criterion of what is per- missible in social relationships. It is obvious, though, that the opinions of unusually impressive personalities, whatever may be the reason for their impressiveness, tend to retain an independent place in the social consciousness ; they are kept from merging with the crowd because of their exceptional importance. This is precisely the case, as these pages are being written, with the personality of Theodore Roosevelt. He is probably the most potent force to-day in the lives of many young men, though he only exhibits in an impressive way the general trend of contemporary public opinion in respect to political conduct, sport, and the like. In passing, it may be said that, in the training of the young, we often strive to make the views and teachings of great men stand out clearly from the general sentiment of their age, or perhaps in illustration of this sentiment, be- cause we wish our youth to take these men as models. When a boy is tempted to tell a lie, for instance, we wish him to be forcibly reminded of the action of George Wash- ington, and to be restrained from doing what his hero would condemn. In like manner, we exalt other personalities ex- hibiting in a marked way the virtues of honor, patriotism, industry, frugality, kindness, charity, bravery, etc., in the hope that they will live in the consciousness of our pupils, and act as counselors in times of need. The child very early shows a marked tendency to commune with people. Probably the majority of his communications — though not all of them — have for.their object to gain the sympathy and approval of those about him, or to cause his rivals or tor- mentors to be held in check or chastised. At first everything of inter- est to him is communicated; but with the development of reflection only such matters are communized as will produce reactions favorable Résumé RESUME 53 to himself or unfavorable to his rivals or enemies. With adolescence the boy —and the girl to a less degree — grows less demonstrative in his expression; he begins to experience something of the feelings of the hero or the martyr. Children are insistent in having prohibitions, and to some extent privileges, affecting them made universal, particularly in respect to their associates. The five-year-old is chiefly concerned with securing social recognition of, and reaction upon, his exhibitions in running, climbing, throwing, constructing, and the like. At ten the girl com- municates mainly her experiences in codéperation with her associates in games and plays, while the boy dwells more largely on his accomplish- ments in muscular competition with his companions. At adolescence the boy communizes everything pertaining to his own or his associates’ triumphs, — intellectual, social, physical, but principally the last; while the girl is concerned mainly with the social, esthetic, and intellectual demands for success in her relations with people. With the advent of the adolescent period, much of the talk of both boys and girls concerns the social relation of the sexes, and they give wide publicity to all evidence of attachment between a boy and a girl. As maturity is approached, personal achievements play a decreasing role in the individual’s expressions; his communications relate largely to the social bearing’of the conduct of associates, and to their successes socially, politically, and professionally. Marked instances coming within his attention of foul or fair play, according to his view, to- gether with his comments thereupon, are published on every favorable occasion. The majority of persons remain in this stage of social evolution, but some continue developing until their communications relate wholly to their special fields of activity. These latter persons are, however, as eager to give to the world any new fact or principle they may discern as is the child in the nursery to publish his discoveries. These special- ists are in some cases ill at ease in a drawing-room, say; the concerns of their chosen fields take such complete possession of them that they become indifferent to gossip about the common interests of daily life which occupy the attention of a promiscuous group of persons. Timidity is doubtless the cause of most apparent reticence in child- hood. This reticent attitude may not be manifested toward all people, or on all oceasions. It is probably very seldom that one finds a really non-communicative individual in respect to all persons and matters whatsoever. Through this communizing activity of the individual, society profits by his experiences, while he in turn, through the reactions of the people in his environment, learns to adjust himself to his social surroundings. The child expresses himself largely for the purpose of learning what behavior, in any given situation, will result most advantageously in 54 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION respect to his welfare. The adult expresses himself more for the pur- pose of enforcing his own conceptions and making them universal in effect. The child can more readily adjust himself to new standards, while the adult ceases in large part to be plastic. However, there are in every community “ searchers after truth,” who, though mature, are “open to conviction,” and who easily adapt themselves to the beliefs and practices of others. Sometimes social groups fail to enforce upon a member prevailing standards of conduct. “Gangs” often encourage in one of their num- ber what is condemned in home and school. The young child is not markedly studious of the attitudes of the people about him toward all his actions; but he tends to follow his own inclinations, except when they very plainly lead him into trouble. At times every child deliber- ately runs counter to the express wishes of his associates, in order that he may hector them, or gain distinction by being marked as a non- conformist. Sometimes the adolescent, craving distinction and not being able to attain it in any other way, purposefully draws upon him- self ridicule; though this is decidedly exceptional. The child, and the adult to an even greater extent, are always acting in the presence of persons, real or imaginary. As maturity is approached, distinct personalities, arbiters of conduct and focal in consciousness in childhood, become condensed into general or public feeling of approval, indifference, or condemnation of conduct. The recognition of, and response to, public sentiment increases with devel- opment. Children at the outset act in accord with the felt desire of particular individuals, such as father, mother, or teacher. With enlarging social experience the child gains a more or less clear idea of the attitudes of people in general toward social questions of interest to him. Through the similar reaction of different persons as arbiters of conduct, individuals merge into a feeling of the sentiment of the community or the times. Unusually impressive personalities may, however, retain an independent place in the social consciousness of the individual, and play a more prominent part than public opinion in his reactions, CHAPTER III DUTY : Tr is a matter of common observation that the infant reveals no awareness of an alter, whose interests should be consid- ered in determining his behavior. Attitudes and 4.18 activities which will secure him food and relief from of the gene distress may be freely performed ; and for a num- anitgatient ber of weeks, eight or ten at the least, he takes ‘mney into account no other considerations in controlling his ac- tions. When he is inclined to squall, either in protest or in supplication, he does so without self-restraint ; one can discover no evidence that he has any realization of the neces- sity or the desirability of checking himself because of the feelings or wishes of others.? From his standpoint there is nothing, either personal or material, in his environment the well- or ill-being of which should be duly considered in determining his behavior.’ Of course, most of the acts he 1 “For some time after birth the child is little more than an incarnation of appetite, which knows no restraint, and only yields to the undermining force of satiety.” (Sully, op. cit. p. 231.) Perez writes to the same effect (op. cit. p. 290) : ‘‘ If then we wish to under- stand the meaning of the actions of little children, and to direct their wills in a useful and progressive manner, we must bear in mind that all their tendencies, whatever they may be, begin and end with egoism.” 2 A.J. H. sends the following observation, which he thinks illustrates a well-nigh universal tendency in childhood : — ‘«My little son is very fond of picture books, and enjoys having me show them to him. Often I have n’t time to attend to him, and I try by all manner of means to show him that I cannot possibly comply with his wishes; but he shows no regard for anything or anybody except to have others attend to his pleasures. He will try to pull me out of my chair down upon the rug by main force, and he insists that his pleasure be attended to, and at once. He eannot tolerate delay, but teases, pulls, cries, yells until he gets what he desires.” 8 If the reader has not made observations relating to this matter he ‘ should listen to an infant’s vocal demonstrations, and note the expressions of his features and his bodily attitudes, and it will be seen that he has not the 56 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. AND EDUCATION performs suggest an instinctive appreciation, at any rate, of personal environment to be dealt with in some way and for some end; but the principle is that at the outset this end is concerned solely with self-gratification, without any concern for the effect of his actions upon the alter, except as the latter can serve him in his need. The alter’s interests and needs and evaluations of things are completely ignored. As we follow the individual in his development, we can observe, by the twelfth week possibly, the beginning of what Originotthe May be regarded as a conscious realization of cer- {dea otper- tain differences between people and mere things, oahted. such as his bottle, his cradle, and the like.1 This from things yealization is indicated by the peculiar pleasure which is manifested in personal association, as portrayed especially in his smile and in his characteristic vocal ex- pressions. But here at the dawning of the sense of an alter there is no evidence that the child has even a suspicion that the former experiences discomforts or pleasures resembling his own. He does nothing whatever, either positively or negatively, to heighten the one or lessen the other. The ad- vent of the alter into his consciousness has not yet modified his conduct in the least, except to make him more demon- strative in the effort to gratify his own wants. Indeed, there is yet no alter in the true sense. There are simply special sorts of objects that afford a peculiar kind of pleasure. These objects do not experience pains and pleasures, as the self does, nor hunger, fear, or fatigue, nor suffer from cold or uncomfortable clothing and the like. They are simply to be used and enjoyed, not to be ministered unto, or to be sacrificed for, or to be made either glad or sad. In short, there are no other selves like the ego-self ; the latter is the sole thing in the universe that has needs, for the gratifica- tion of which the whole world exists. Not until the indi- slightest regard for anything but his own discomforts, and the means of relieving them. 1 This point is discussed in some detail in the author’s Linguistic Develop- ment and Education, chap. i. i PERSONS DISTINGUISHED FROM THINGS 57 vidual begins to interpret others on the basis of his own ex- perience will he acquire a genuine alter sense. In the first stage of development the alter is simply a thing of a peculiar character, not a person as this term should be understood. Thus ill-equipped does the child come into a world of social objects and values. But passing over, for the moment, several months of lesson-taking in social appreciation, we find that by the end of the first year the child seems on certain occasions to re- strain his teasing or crying, to mention a typical form of early inhibition. These occasions always have direct social connections of some sort. Usually the mother, governess, or father reacts in a particular manner upon the child’s ex- pressions, and this incites inhibitory effort. So, too, at this time the child will go a little way at least in sharing his candy and playthings with the members of the family ;1 while at the sixth month he did not show the slightest dis- position to do this. Jumping forward to his second birth- day, we see that, even when he is alone, he will under certain 1 A correspondent gives a number of illustrations of his child’s first “ al- truistic ” or “ ethical ” actions, of which the following are typical : — “ My little son is a little more than two years old. A playmate frequently comes in to play with him. When his mother or father is in the room and shows approval of his unselfishness, he is willing to share his playthings, but as soon as no older person is in the room, he snatches his things away again. When alone he pushes his little playmate off the chairs, saying, ‘ baby chair’ or‘ papa chair.’ Whenever any older person is about, he always looks for an approving word or smile, when he condescends to share any of his posses- sions. . “ At other times I have observed him to become suddenly lavish in his generosity, and allow the little girl to have nearly all of his playthings, and especially his favorite ones. Each time I have observed him suddenly to change his mind, it seemed, and grab his things away again. He seems to be ethical by fits and starts. “When my little boy was about a year old, I would thank him for any- thing he would do on my request. I might ask him for some of his grapes, and after he had given me one and saw me smile and nod approval, he would give me another and pause for the usual reaction. This he might continue to do until all of his candy or grapes were gone. Then he might ery for them again. The above and other observations have convinced me that children are only apparently ethical, i. e., they consider the alter only because the reward is greater than the sacrifice that is necessary in order to do so.” 58 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION conditions refrain from touching objects, say, that he has been instructed (we shall presently see what is implied in this term) not to disturb; whereas, during his first year, such instruction would exert no influence upon his conduct a few moments after it was given. He will now apparently make an effort to control his impulse to interrupt his mother when she is talking; he will strive to keep his food from falling on the floor, because of his having been urged to do so by some person; and these are but typical examples of many simple social actions which may be observed at this stage of development. These are mentioned in this place merely as illustrations of the awakening in the child of an awareness that he should control his conduct with reference to the commands, or needs, or wishes of the people about him. We catch him here at the very birth, perhaps, of his sense, in its crudest, most elemental form, of oughtness, of duty, and it may be of ethical feeling. How, then, does the child come to differentiate in his consciousness persons from things, and endow the former a with the true characters of personality? Possibly e genesis 2 ae . of thealter What might be called reflex imitation plays a part, tienes as when the child smiles and “coos” in response to his mother’s salutations ; but imitation of this kind does not play the principal rdle. The reactions of the alter upon the child’s expressions furnish him his most important data for gaining the notion that the alter is like his own self. It is, of course, relatively late in the child’s development before he reaches any generalization regarding the alter’s feelings. In the early stages of learning the child simply notes how the alter reacts upon the situations in which he is placed, and the former begins to construct his idea of the latter on the bases of these reactions. Thus the alter is a thing that acts in particular ways in response to his own expressions ; and the young child is quite indifferent to all the activities of the alter except those that directly affect him for good or ill. The alter is not a thing that feels so and so, as he does himself. GENESIS OF THE ALTER SENSE 59 Watch the infant as he develops both positive and negative social attitudes, following precisely the lines marked out by the reactions of the people about him. Here is a child whose parents, nurse, brothers, and sisters never react positively to his disadvantage when he grabs sugar lumps at the table, say, though they may look pained. But the infant takes no cognizance of looks. However, when these people react in a dynamic way to his discomfort, then he takes notice. This shows him what he can expect from these people, and later he may assign appropriate feelings to them on an occasion of this sort. But the point is, that he must first experience their positive reactions before he can get started in assigning to them personal qualities. A study of the child does not yield evidence to the effect that, through imitation alone, he would make progress in differ- entiating persons from things. Take, for instance, his imitation of his mother’s look of disapproval in certain situations. One may see children who mimic the mother in this, and they have apparently no appreciation of what it signifies, because it has not acquired meaning through having been directly associated with more dynamic and therefore more effective attitudes on her part. The individual who knows what the disapproving countenance really imports is the one who has himself had painful experiences when he has seen the countenance in the past; or he may have seen his fellows who have been the cause of it suffer on account of it. And this instance is typical of many others that might be mentioned. Speaking generally, then, expression in the alter serves to remind the child of what the former has done in the past, and so it is understood. But without doubt there are cer- tain expressions, as crying and laughter, that are understood as a matter of instinctive appreciation by the child. Many observers have noticed that children will respond sympathet- ically to laughter, and be overcome when they see another crying, even though they have not progressed very far in 60 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION their imitative activities. It is probable that this aids the child in gaining a “ consciousness of kind,” though it does not serve in the beginning to differentiate very clearly per- sons from animals, as the pet dog or kitten. Indeed, it seems evident that for many months the child’s pets are regarded as of his kind. He conducts himself toward them much as he does toward the people about him. He talks to them, laughs at, and, as he seems to think, with them; he plays with them, and sobs if they are hurt and ery out with pain. As he develops he gradually grows away from the animals, in the sense that, as his range of action and ex- pression widens, he notices that his pets cannot respond to him in kind. At the same time he finds himself responding ever more completely to the people about him; and in con- sequence they are selected, out of all the objects environing him, as of his kind. They are the only objects that can reciprocate his increasing complexity of expression, not only through language, but also through facial expression, laugh- ter, and the like. And, parallel with this development, there goes on a constantly increasing complexity in both the posi- tive and the negative reaction of persons upon the individ- ual’s actions, so that by the fifth year, say, people must be considered in his activities more than any or all the other objects in his environment combined. At every turn he finds a person forbidding, or encouraging and rewarding; and all this experience serves to differentiate people completely from objects. The point will bear repetition, that the experiences which at the outset enable the child to differentiate the alter Essentiaa {50M things in general, and endow him with the experiences qualities of selfhood, are those in which the former in acquiring . . : thealter | 18 by the latter rewarded in some manner for actions ry that please him, or punished for actions that dis- please him. When the child shares his goods with his fellows he is repaid richly in his mother’s approval, manifested in various concrete ways, alike in deed and in word; and he GENESIS OF THE ALTER SENSE 61 also receives gifts and pleasing expressions from those with whom he has shared. People uniformly exert themselves to make the child feel happy when he shows “ thoughtful” tendencies, even though any specific act may be, as it usu- ally is, of no consequence to those affected by it. For the child from ‘six months on there are always words of com- mendation and often marked demonstrations when he is generous, and return gifts or kindly expressions, with ac- companying reasons therefor, impressing a principle, —“ You were so good to me,” etc., or “ Whenever my little boy is kind and thoughtful,” and so on at any length. The prin- ciple involved holds fully, in its negative application, for the child’s “ egoistic”’ action. Normally, the social environment expresses its disapproval in ways the child can appreciate, when he is “ thoughtless” or “selfish.” To illustrate this last point: when he is “mean,” the persons affected make him suffer for it; his brothers and sisters tell him they will not share with him; father, mother, and teacher make him feel unhappy through “ scolding ” him, or shaming, or avoid- ing him; or in some way they cause him to feel that un- happy results have followed his action. Again, when he cries his mother may refuse him his food, or she may show disapproval in her face or voice or manner, or, in the last resort, she may whip him. In some way she makes him realize that crying is not acceptable; and this, as a typical experience, gives him data for determining the propriety of such action. While the individual is taking his first lessons in social conduct, the parents and teachers freely point him to people who are “altruistic,” and they praise these, and try in every way to make their lot seem a most desirable one. Thus in time it is normally made obvious to the novice in social behavior— and without doubt his natural endowment aids him to some extent in attaining this realization — that he can as a rule get more pleasure from what turns out to be (though he does not yet know the difference) a generous 62 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION rather than a selfish act. While he is learning this lesson, one can observe the struggle taking place between an origi- nal, self-gratifying tendency and a not-yet-very-clearly-felt or definitely-established social one. At this moment one sort of action, the purely selfish, may gain the right of way; and at the next another sort, the generous, may become supreme. The principle is that, taken as a whole, the child’s experi- ences with the people about him tend to make what is denoted by the term “altruistic action” seem to him best suited to promote his interests ; although, it must be re- peated, from his standpoint there is not yet either egoistic or altruistic conduct as we understand the terms. There are simply actions, some of which he is beginning dimly to dis- cern turn out well, and are performed by people generally, while others turn out poorly, and are as generally avoided.* For a number of months the child’s experience with people consists mainly in discovering that they will reward him for Develop- certain of his actions and punish him (in some ment an‘ t manner) for others. But as he develops, it hap- a denet. pens that he and his mother, father, and others the alter come to react upon the same typical situations, and in the same general manner, with substantially the same outcome in all cases. For example, the pet dog pre- 1 Kirkpatrick (op. cit. p. 181) summarizes the matter in this way: “The individual in society learns that certain actions are undesirable, because they result in other persons performing acts that are unpleasant to him. Out of such experiences grow the laws governing society. The child finds that some instinctive acts are more pleasurable than others, or that one kind of act interferes with another, and thus learns to regulate his conduct. He is also impressed less directly with their undesirability by the attitude of other people. The child is at first neither moral nor immoral, but unmoral. He is acting according to his natural instincts when biting and striking his mother, as much as when he is hugging and kissing her, and no more. In both cases he acts as his instincts and feelings prompt, and to him one act is just as good as the other. Experience, however, soon teaches him that one kind of act brings pleasant results in the way of approbation and favor, while the other brings him disapprobation and perhaps punishment. He thus learns that some acts are better than others. ‘ Better,’ however, means to him merely moore pleasurable in results to himself, not morally better, for of that he has no conception.” THE CONCEPTION OF THE ALTER 63 sents many situations upon which the child reacts, sometimes happily, at other times unhappily ; sometimes approvingly, and at other times disapprovingly; and the father, mother, and others usually react in a similar manner in any given instance. They laugh when the child does, they appear to cry when he does, they show anger with the child at the dog’s behavior, and so on ad libitum. This process is nor- mally going on all the time in the development of the child, from the eighth or ninth month forward. In this the parent generally simulates the attitudes and expressions of the child, and the latter inevitably comes to expect that the alter will usually react as he does. One will be impressed with this if he will follow the ordinary child during his third year, say, and note how he must unlearn much that he learned in his first year regarding the parents’ attitudes toward his pets, his brothers and sisters, and so on. Of course, if the parent never simulates an attitude ‘in sympathy” with the child, the latter will not suffer disillusionment later; but at the same time he will not so readily come to feel that the parent is of his kind. It is for this reason that the child normally grows more rapidly with his mother than with his father in acquiring the consciousness of kind; the former is more “ sympathetic ” than the latter, and the child learns readily to expect from her reactions like his own. If the child were placed only with persons who never reacted as he did in any situation, he would continue for a much longer period than he usually does in regarding persons as things without traits like himself. It is community of action that leads him to feel similarity in characteristics; or, in other words, that enables him to view the alter as he views the self, and assign to him the feelings and attitudes which he himself experiences. We have been using the expressions “like himself,” “like his own,” and so on; but the child does not, by the end of the first year, have any content for “own” in a true sense. It seems rather superfluous to say that “self” as it 64 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION appears to the reflective person does not exist for the child. The latter acts as a self long before he has an idea of self. His learning (which is a conscious process) in the early months does not relate to self, as some philosophers have urged, but it concerns the alter solely. The child evidently ds his own attitudes and states as objective in the same sense that he regards the attitudes of others as objective. Not until he enters the reflective epoch does he form a notion of self as differentiated from all else.1 For example, K. at the age of one, S. at four, and V. at seven, show no evidence of possessing any idea of a self, of a self-conscious self, though the last two at any rate can and do use the term “self,” and they show in their actions that they have a knowledge of the relations of the self to the alter in many of the situa- tions of life. Without question, much of what an onlooker might think denoted an explicit knowledge of self in the child’s action, might be wholly instinctive ; consciousness at the moment might really be objective in content, as op- posed to what is implied in the popular signification of the term “subjective.” Self for the child is a body of predomi- nantly instinctive attitudes and tendencies; it is not at all a matter of focal awareness. At this point we must inquire how it is that the indi- 1 The following observations may be cited at this pomt. Mr. B. says: ‘* Last spring at the closing exercises given by the pupils of the model school, I had an opportunity of observing the behavior of children, from the kinder- garten to the eighth grade, before a group of people. The children of the lower grades up till about the fifth invariably showed not the slightest trace of embarrassment. This was by no means so true of the sixth, seventh, and eighth grade pupils, or those old enough ordinarily to be in those grades. I noticed that the children who gave a Christmas entertainment last year in my home town behaved in a similar manner. H. J. W. gives this testimony: ‘‘ My mother used to have me as a child say before visitors my prayers that she had taught me, to show how many I knew. I delighted in this at first, and said my lines very loudly and boldly; but after the seventh or eighth year I would shrink and cringe, and mother would have to urge me very firmly before I would consent. I fre- quently forgot my well-learned lines, which I could repeat glibly at other times, when alone or in the presence of nobody outside the family. This change seemed to come over me rather suddenly.” INTERPRETATION OF EXPRESSIONS 65 vidual learns the meaning of the attitudes of the alter. The argument thus far has proceeded from the concep- tnterpreta- tion that the child’s ethical development depends ton st the mainly upon the character of the reactions of the pressions alter upon his expressions. What arouses hostile reactions in the alter must as a rule be abandoned, while what pleases him may be freely performed. But how can the individual tell when the alter is pleased, or otherwise? Baldwin has indicated one answer to this question. The child, he says, early “ ejects” his feelings, and ascribes them to the alter ; or, in other words, he interprets what he finds in the alter in terms of his own experience under similar circumstances. When he sees the mother laughing he concludes, in his naive manner of course, that she feels as he does when he laughs. So he is constantly acting on the assumption that he can determine the alter’s feelings from his expressions, on the basis of the relation between any particular feeling of his own and its characteristic expression. But this answer can be at best only partially true. For one thing, it should be recognized that there is an instinctive factor operating in the child’s “ reading” the expressions of the alter. The infant can “read” the mother’s face and voice before he has entered the “ ejective” period. He reacts appropriately to the expressions of good-will and of anger before he has himself expressed these states. So, too, he seems instinct- ively to feel more or less completely the meaning of sob- bing, as indeed the pet dog does, for it will show evidence of distress, or at least of disturbance, when it is in the pre- sence of one weeping. It is probable that the individual comes among us equipped to respond with some measure of appropriateness to the fundamental types of emotional ex- pression, even before he feels the emotions himself; and often this inherited responsiveness extends to rather com- plicated and subtle expressions. X. at the age of one and one half years evidently feels the meaning, in a general way only of course, of even slight modifications in the featural 66 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION expression of her mother. S. at seven is much keener in noting changes in expression ; he is certain to detect in those near to him any display of sombreness or gloom or disap- proval. It is not probable that in this responsiveness he is interpreting in the light of his own experience solely, for he has not had experience of just the sort he reacts to in the alter. In a sense the more fundamental types of expression have meaning, and produce responses in the child, on the same principle as the burning candle does; a definite ten- dency to appraisement and reaction in both cases is provided for at birth, and it functions when the appropriate occasion is presented. It is not apparent why the child should not learn the meaning of expression as he does anything else, by relating it to its accompaniments as well as to its antecedents and consequents. When he sees a smiling face, say, and his mother at the same moment gives him pleasure in one way or another, he easily comes to expect pleasure when he de- tects this expression; and in all his reactions, and in his imagery, so far as he has any, he associates smiling faces with certain consequents that we designate as generous, kindly treatment. In due course he will acquire the terms that denote the meaning of this particular attitude, — kindly, good-natured, happy, friendly, and the like, — but they all go back to his early experience in associating a certain ex- pression with a characteristic outcome in terms of his own pleasure and pain. It is really not necessary, in order that the child should react appropriately to the alter, that he should be able to image the feelings that lie back of the alter’s expressions; and while the terms used by the adult in denoting expression do refer apparently to emotional states, still for the child they indicate solely positive atti- tudes in the alter. When V. hears me speak of a certain woman as a “sour” person, he interprets the word in terms of the way she treats him, and also, though not so prominently, in INTERPRETATION OF EXPRESSIONS 67 terms of the expression on her face. He does not now, as a matter of fact, conceive of certain emotional states as the basis of his own feeling and expression. He interprets all the terms he hears descriptive of disposition or character, or, in general, of emotion, in terms of his experience with the persons involved, just as he would interpret the term “ugly,” say, if it were used to describe a dog which had bitten him. We can easily believe that an individual equipped with the child’s intellectual outfit, but lacking ex- pression altogether, could still learn in the manner indicated the meaning of the grosser forms at least of expression in the alter, as well as in animals. At the same time it is obvious that, given a creature which feels and expresses and “ejects” his experience into things like himself, he will all the more readily discover the meaning of expressions similar to his own in the creatures with which he has experience. Unquestionably, then, as the child develops, he tends to interpret the meaning of attitudes in others on the basis of similar attitudes in himself, and to the alter he normally ascribes, ever more largely with development, the feelings which he himself experiences. As a result of this tendency, by the time he reaches maturity he becomes in a manner the measure of all things. This does not seem to involve any peculiar psychological process, nor does it introduce any new psychological principle. When the child becomes acquainted with the traits of his own dog, he tends to ascribe its characteristics to every dog at all resembling his own; and this law is universal in its application. Now, is it not reasonable to say that as the child matures his consciousness, so far as it is personal, becomes filled ever more largely with his own experience and attitudes, which he has learned as he learns everything else; and that he then ascribes to objects like himself the qualities and feelings which he finds in this object he knows most about? In this law-abiding way he must come gradually to give the alter some such an outfit of feelings, needs, and desires as he finds in him- 68 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION self; it is inevitable that he should do this. Yet it should be recognized that the individual usually, if not always, favors himself in his attitudes toward the alter; that is, the needs of the alter are not usually seen to be quite as pressing as his own in similar situations, — his pains are not as severe, his bravery is not as marked, his selfishness is greater, and so on ad libitum. It is a rare child who can evaluate the experience of a comrade, especially when the two are brought into competitive relations, exactly as he evaluates his own experience under approximately identical conditions. Such a thing is never seen in infancy, when the alter is a thing to be adjusted to and used for the advantage of self; the in- terests of the ego give a special importance to the experiences of self as compared with the alter. This will, perhaps, be the best place in which to take a glance at some popular notions regarding the relations of Popular the self and the alter in the typical situations of motitisg me Social intercourse. In current psychological theory specting the relation of the two are, or tend to become, inseparably asso- theater ciated in all thought and action. However, this is more evidently true of the mature individual than of the child, as our previous discussion has indicated. It is prob- able that when the child is pounding his nursery floor with a hammer he is in only a very remote sort of way conscious of an alter; possibly his consciousness at the time may con- tain only things. It is true that in time even this act will be likely to acquire some personal connections, which will govern the individual in its performance; but just now one would need to depend on faith in order to say that the alter entered into the process at all. If there are people looking on, the child may endeavor to attract their attention, but even so, his chief interest may have no personal reference. Surely we can take him early enough, when he is just be- ginning to grab at the bright objects in his cradle, or when he is making every effort to get food, and we can then see that the alter plays no role in determining his action. The grati- RELATION OF THE SELF AND THE ALTER 69 fication of appetite at the outset does not, so far as the child’s consciousness is concerned, involve the alter in any way. In time, though, every act of taking food will doubt- less gain some sort of personal associations, so that the alter will be in consciousness, focally or marginally, when food is eaten; but this will be the result solely of associational experience. In the beginning of life the child’s conscious- ness is concerned only with things to be used in some way; but with development all the relations with these things come to be loaded with personal values. At every step upward, then, the alter comes normally to play a constantly increasing part in the thoughts, feelings, and attitudes of the self. The seers of every age have taught that we are members of one body, and if one prospers all will be prospered, while if one suffers all will be afflicted. The likeness between the social and the biological organism in this respect was sug- gested long ago. In the human body there are various mem- bers related to one another in such a way that each attends to some special need, and the entire organism profits thereby. The more effectively any special organ performs its particu- lar task, the better it will be for the community as a whole. Its work is at once individualistic and socialistic, egoistic and altruistic. The eye must be eager to get from the environment everything that will gratify its own desires ; but the greater its success in this regard, the more completely will the needs of the entire organism be provided for. So, according to this view, egoism and altruism in the human body are complementary, and not antagonistic, in the out- come; an organ cannot work for self without working for others at the same time. If it should deliberately set about to work for the alter, it would have to proceed in its own way. which would result in ministering to its own special needs. So, extending the argument to society, the interests of the individual and of the group are regarded as identical ; what is best for the one is best for the other; there can be 70 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION no genuine antagonism. It has remained for modern stu- dents of society and social development greatly to extend and perfect this notion of social solidarity, and to show how the interests of the self, and all its thoughts, feelings, and volitions, are bound up with those of the alter, which seems to obliterate the old opposition between egoism and altru- ism. As Cooley states it, the ego is always acting for the approval of some alter, so that there can never be such a thing as “selfishness” in the popular understanding of the term. This conception, which appears so attractive at first sight, is nevertheless only a partial truth. Keeping to the biologi- Arothein- C2. illustration, it is a simple fact that, in the terestsof nutrition of the body, a group of special organs the ego an . : oe thealter or a single organ may under certain conditions \dentical? secure an undue share of nutriment at the expense of other organs. When the bodily community is prosperous ; when there is nutrition enough for all organs ; when there is ‘no crisis to be met, there appears to be perfect codperation and mutual sharingamong all the organs. But when the crisis does come, there is apt to be struggle for survival among the organs. For example, when the energy is running low —in the organism, the brain may make such demands upon the available supply that the muscles and the digestive sys- tem will suffer; and the reverse may also be true. In dis- ease it is generally the case that some member of the bodily organism is not receiving adequate nourishment, because there is not enough for the entire community of organs, and some are greedy in appropriating more than of right belongs to them if the principle of identity of interests is regarded as the ruling one. Of course, in the end the greedy ones will be penalized for their sefishness, since the weak organs will lower the vitality of the body as a whole; and ultimately total destruction will ensue. But temporarily an egoistic organ may act in hostility to the warfare of the alter, and be prospered on account of its cupidity; and in the general Sw RELATION OF THE SELF AND THE ALTER 71 break-up at the end, certain organs live considerably longer than others, because they have an advantage in utilizing the energies of the organism. Happily, though, nature has so constituted things that, on the whole, there is such a rela- tion between the members of the bodily community that they can work together in prosperity for a long time as a unity. How is it now in the social body? If one secures what he wishes for self, must it always be through ministering to the needs of the group of which he is a member? If it is justifiable to use the terms egoism and altruism at all, should it be simply to describe the relative breadth of the individual’s social interests? Is the egoistic person merely one who works for the alter in a narrow and relatively non- vital way,— as when he spends his life in pursuit of gold he must serve others, but both his aim and his service are relatively low and of only temporary worth? On the other hand, is the altruistic individual one who works for self, but in doing this he must serve others in some really im- portant and enduring manner? It is claimed by some writers that the man who is generous, who cares for the sick and needy, who supports all meritorious enterprises, will receive the respect and gratitude of his fellows in return, and these are for him the most substantial and important of all possible rewards for his efforts, Looking at this matter from the developmental stand- point, it is impossible to see how any one could think there was no such quality as egoism in childhood, supposing egoism to denote undue or exclusive concern for self to the neglect or detriment of the alter.t What does a three months’ old babe know or care about the alter ? How does he serve the 1 The following from Cooley (gp. cit. p. 92) may be noted in this connec- tion: — “Self and other do not exist as mutually exclusive facts, and phraseology which implies that they do, like the antithesis egoism versus altruism, is open to the objection of vagueness, if not of falsity.” Again, p. 190: “ The satisfaction, or whatever you choose to call it, that 72 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION alter in obtaining what he wishes ? The service all goes one way; it is all take and no give. And this continues for many months, and without educative influences of the kind described on preceding pages it would probably extend, in a subdued form at least, into maturity. For one who studies a child in his reactions upon the social environment, there can be no doubting the fact that in his own consciousness he is an egoist in the popular sense of the term; and even viewed from without, it does not appear that he concerns himself with the needs or desires of the alter, except as his own ends are thereby very obviously ministered to. He is constantly demanding service, not proposing equitable ex- change of services, as men must do in maturity, which com- pels the individual to give consideration to the desires of the alter. Moreover, young children do not utilize what they secure from one group of persons for the advantage of another group, in order to gain the good-will and esteem of this group, as the adult does. If now it be asked whether, in the child’s activities, he ever seeks to do another good without reference to the ad- Neutraa V2tage to self, the answer will not be in accord attitudes in with current theory touching this matter, as ex- Peeper pounded by certain psychologists. KE. in her daily life at twelve performs good offices for her younger sister and brothers, which could not be regarded as egoistic, in the popular sense of the term, by any unprejudiced ob- server. For example, she gives up her reading to repair her sister’s doll, even though she has not been asked to do so; and she gains absolutely nothing from her altruistic act, except the happy expressions of the recipient of her favor. one gets when he prefers his duty to some other course is just as much his own as any pleasure he renounces.” Still again, he says (p. 348): ‘‘ As a matter of fact, ego and alter, self and sympathy, are correlative, and always mingled in ethical judgments, which are not distinguished by having less self and more other in them, but by being a completer synthesis of all pertinent impulses. The characteristic of asense of right is not ego or alter, individual or social, but mental unifica- tion, and the peculiar feelings that accompany it.” NEUTRAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN 73 She probably does not experience the pleasure of a “ satis- fied conscience,” such as the adult does; she is simply moved by an impulse to serve, and she goes with the im- pulse. She expects no return, and there is no evidence that she is compensated in the way certain theorists maintain. She would serve any child as readily as her sister ; and she serves them in other ways than the one indicated. To be sure, such activities do not constitute a large part of her daily life ; nor, on the other hand, do the purely egoistic actions occupy a prominent place. She moves through the day, doing the tasks assigned her in school and at home without a definitely marked attitude, either egoistic or al- truistic. So far as her own consciousness is concerned, a large part of her attitudes are without doubt neutral, though viewed ad extra they apparently tend in one direc- tion or another. She does not deliberately plan to serve others, except when the spirit of giving is general about her, as at Christmas time, when she applies herself for weeks to making gifts for her companions. Neither does she plan in any purposeful way to add to her own pleasures ; she simply adjusts herself from moment to moment in any situation in which she may be placed so as to get the most out of it, according to the desires of the instant. If there be competition for pleasures, as in the use of books, or ap- paratus in the gymnasium, she ordinarily keeps what things she can get as long as she enjoys them, and if there be not too great protest; but if her competitors make a disturb- ance, she may surrender to them as the best way to adjust matters. She is, however, always more ready to yield to the en- treaties, and even the bullying, of her sister, who is still a babe, than to her brothers, who are about her equals in most forms of competition. She appears to feel that the latter can care for themselves, and are ordinarily to be resisted in their aggressions; though she will not resist the aggressions of the former, which are more marked than in 74 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION the case of the brothers. But the apparently helpless and needy, if they are at the same time not repulsive, seem to arouse the altruistic impulses far more readily than those who seem strong and capable,! though it is a matter of feeling, not of reflection, certainly in the early years. As the individual develops through adolescence, it can be noted that a constantly larger proportion of his actions are re- moved from the neutral class.? As he grows in reflectiveness he becomes ever more conscious of the effect of his conduct 1 The following instance given by A. S. (an adult) illustrates quite the opposite of this statement : — “Thave been much interested recently in the observation of a child of five. He is in matters of conduct rather poorly disciplined. In degree of un- selfishness I have seen few children his equal. However, this doesn’t appear to be a matter of training at all. Having few attractive characteristics, he is made little of by myself and a friend, and yet he almost never sees us but he insists on giving us something, if he has anything to give. I have rarely done him a favor, and only occasionally do I more than greet him. “ The other day he came through the dining-room where I was seated. In his hand he held a few small confections, given him by a friend. He offered me one, which I declined. He insisted, and I declined. Being seated at the opposite side of the table, he could n’t reach me, so he called out, ‘ Here, you catch it,’ which, however, I did not offer to do. Being called away by his mother, he laid the candy on the table beside some one, and said, ‘ You give it to her!’ and departed. This all occurred very quietly in a moment of time, and I’m sure his motive was not just to have his way in spite of my opposition. i “On another occasion he entered the sitting-room chewing gum. ‘How many pieces of gum did you get for five cents?’ asked some one. ‘Two packages,’ was the reply. ‘Give me a piece, please!’ I remarked, not know- ing whether he had any left. Taking several pieces out of his pocket, he proceeded to distribute them indiscriminately about the room till the last piece was gone. “ Again, seeing my friend across the street, he called out, ‘ Wait, Miss G., I'll give you some candy!’ and he trudged over to give it to her.” ? Kirkpatrick (op. cit. p. 124) says selfishness does not appear until youth is reached. Note the following : — “Youths are then for the first time genuinely selfish, since if a selfish act is done now it may be in opposition to an altruistic impulse, while before this it involved only a choice between immediate and remote pleasures to self. True selfishness emerges only when both the lower individualistic and the higher altruistic impulses are felt. The adolescent may therefore be the most selfish or the most self-sacrificing of beings, and is often each in turn.” It will be apparent to the reader that Kirkpatrick uses the term selfish- ness in a very different sense from what it has been used thus far in our dis- cussion. NEUTRAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDHOOD 75 upon his fortunes and destiny, and he is governed accord- ingly. At times he unquestionably brings self to the front, and deliberately works for its interests in ways in which he thinks these will be most effectively advanced. At other times he consciously strives for the good of his associ- ates; though it is probable that in this striving he is more conscious than the child of twelve of the reward he will have in the good-will of the beneficiary and the esteem of the social group. Rewards of this sort do not make a deep im- pression upon the young child anyway. As the individual’s foresight increases, as he is able to look ahead and note the consequences of his conduct, his actions, viewed from with- out, take on an increasingly altruistic character; but re- garded from within they would probably be found to be dictated in the interests of the self as well as the alter. The girl of twelve is to some extent spontaneously, or per- haps instinctively, altruistic at times; whereas the girl of twenty may be much more altruistic in the extent and effect of her actions, but not any more so in her feeling. But even the latter is spontaneous in her altruism in some situations, mainly those of a maternal character, — sacrificing for the young, her own offspring predominantly, but not exclu- sively. What prompts the mother to serve when service in- volves suffering? Her view probably does not extend much beyond the circumstances of the moment. Service is needed, and it will be given without price. Here the alter is the focus of all feeling and effort. There is probably an in- stinctive tendency which abides with the individual during life, and which causes him often to minister to the needs of others without asking whether he shall be duly compensated therefor ; though if we should search his being to its very depths, we might find at its bottom, far from the seat of conscious reasons and motives, an impulse to the effect that if he gives aid in times of distress, he may be cared for himself in his own hour of need. Without stopping for further analysis here, it may now 76 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION be said that the child’s sense of duty,so far as it is ac- arene quired, grows right out of his social experiences, the sens Wherein he is made aware that it is of advantage ofduty. = to respect the rights of others, and to share his possessions with them, and help them when they are in need. In the begining, the mother’s disapproval, revealed in a variety of concrete ways, was the principal spur to in- hibition ; and the child had actually to see her face in order that it should control him. However, in the course of ma- turing, as the imaging power develops, the mother can con- tinue to exert an influence over her child’s conduct, even when she is far removed from him. She really lives in her boy’s springs of conduct when he is tempted to perform the actions she has forbidden, or when he fails to perform those she has urged upon him. She isthere in greater or less vivid- ness of detail, looking on, and approving or disapproving as she did in the flesh, and thus she directs him much as if she were really present to his senses. As development proceeds, the mother, in her concrete, distinct personality, gradually subsides, so to speak, and there is left only the appreciation of her general attitudes in the special sorts of situations in which she has determined the child’s actions in the past. And what is true of the influence of the mother is equally true of every person who instructs the child regard- ing his social relationships, whether of set purpose or only incidentally, in the give-and-take of social intercourse or in books. If one should work out the natural history of any act subject to the control of conscience, or which incites the activity of conscience, he would find it conforming to this general type. There must first be very definite, concrete experience, — approving or disapproving persons, rewards or penalties, and so on. Then in time these may operate through imagination, as we say, with the result that the concrete factors are gradually eliminated, but their import is still felt. And, reinforced by impressions gained from GENESIS OF THE SENSE OF DUTY 17 history, literature, art, religion, etc., this feeling or tendency is sufficient to keep conduct in harmony with the forces which influenced it originally. Until ethical action in any situation becomes quite definitely established, the concrete personalities who initiated it tend to remain as foci of atten- tion, as it were, and so as counselors of behavior. It should be impressed that when these concrete personalities have receded to the margin of consciousness, the individual re- mains responsive to their influence. He feels he must act in the present as they encouraged him to act in similar situ- ations in the past. He feels disturbed, ill at ease, on the wrong track, if on any occasion he runs counter to his habit- ual action, or that enjoined upon him by those who have had a prominent place in his consciousness ; and ordinarily he will be restless until he comes back into line. Con- science, then, is active only when there is a felt lack of har- mony between the individual’s present action and that which has been urged upon him in the manner which has been sketched above. As he develops and acquires a sense of the attitudes of people in general, rather than the individuals nearest him, he will gradually gain a feeling for certain kinds of ideal conduct, or that which is generally indorsed and taught by the people with whom he comes in contact, or by literature or biography or religion, but with which he is not in accord in his own conduct, in some respects at least. So long as he knowingly falls short of this ideal as he has come to conceive it, just so long will he experience some measure of strain and tension. But as soon as his action is brought into correspondence with his ideal, con- science will approve; there will be a feeling of ease, of con- gruity, of satisfaction. And if his ideal can be realized with- out struggle, conscience will gradually cease to manifest itself at all; there will be no further need for it to be active. Thus, as was suggested in a previous chapter, conscious- ness on the social side is a sort of theatre in which one’s 78 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION friends and acquaintances and the public in general, so far as it has become a matter of experience, whether in the con- crete or in literature or art, constitute the audience whose function it is to pass judgment upon the actor’s perform- ances. Every deed is scrutinized by them, and one cannot escape praise or blame, except in respect to those activities that have often been appraised in the same way, and per- formed readily, so that they have become automatic. This it is that causes the child distress when he performs a “mean” act, even when he knows it will not be actually detected. These ideal spectators know of it, and they are condemning or shaming him, and he is not fit to be seen by his fellows. If a person should be so constructed (as idiots probably are) that consciousness could entertain no ideal personages who would commend or blame him for his con- duct, it is impossible to conceive that in such a case there would be any way for him to determine whether deeds were right or wrong, except by their concrete, immediately ex- perienced results. The right is, then, in the early years, at any rate, what one’s models indorse; the wrong is what they condemn. I use the term models in a broad sense. Some of Shake- speare’s characters may be my models in a very real and vital way. Plato and Aristotle, through their written expressions, may be living personages for me, and they may determine my conduct in some respects; they may live in my con- sciousness in a real manner, and act as counselors in mo- ments of doubt. Sothe eminent men of all times, whose lives I am familiar with, and some of the great characters de- picted in fiction, as well as the persons now living whom I have met in vital relations, all dwell within reach of my springs of action, and play a part in approving or disap- proving my conduct. Some stay close to the focus of con- sciousness, while others take up a position more remote; but none of them are wholly lost. When I am perplexed, I try to discover how these persons would act under similar THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIENCE 79 circumstances, and when I see what they, or the majority of them, or the more important of them, would do, I see what I may do. Reference has already been made, though in an incidental way, to the part religion plays in presenting ideals of con- duct, and in enforcing upon the individual the ay, cote of necessity of conforming to these ideals in all his eg ton actions. It would not be proper to attempt here ment ofcon- to discuss in detail the psychology and social value **!2¢° of religious belief; but there can be no objection to pointing out the effect of religious training upon the ethical, or, more broadly, the social attitudes of the child. The principle has been developed that the child early discovers, from his give- and-take experiences with people, that certain of his ex- pressions must be repressed, while others may be performed at will. In due course he generalizes his experience, to the effect that anti-social conduct, as determined by the reactions of the alter, is “wrong,” while that which advances the in- terests of the alter as well as those of self is “ right.”” When the child begins to differentiate his actions on the basis of their social outcome, people must be actually present to "his senses, and reprove him for non-permissible actions, and commend him, or at least not condemn him, for his good or right conduct. In the course of development, when the imaging activity, and especially the reflective tendency, begin to develop, the individual may feel the force of commenda- tion or censure for his behavior when no persons are present in the concrete. In due course, in normal development, the parent, the teacher, the playmate, and others come to function in the individual’s conduct through the force of habit, in which there is an ideal factor, as of the parent forbidding or praising a given action, and a motor factor arising from the individual's action in the past. Further, through history, literature, art, and the like, the child constructs ideal con- ceptions of conduct, and these ideals play down more or less constantly upon all his actions. * 80 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION In religion the idealizing process acquires a prominence which it does not attain in any other phase of the child’s experience. Definite ideal personages are presented, and impressed vividly upon the child’s consciousness. Speaking generally, these religious personages are made to embody in their own conduct, and to require of all persons, the highest form of social action conceived by the people of any given time or place. These personages are made extraordinarily effective in influencing the individual’s action by ascribing to them the qualities of omnipotence, omniscience, omnipre- sence, and the like, so that they are always aware of one’s transgressions as well as one’s faithfulness in the perform- ance of duty. Moreover, these religious personages are, in Christianity at any rate, perfectly just and righteous, so that just and righteous conduct in the individual will be fully appreciated and rewarded. Thus the child who has had religious instruction of the character indicated has an ever-present and very real stimulus to the performance of what he comes gradually to understand as ethical, moral, social conduct. Otherwise he is dependent solely upon the momentum he has gained from the reactions of his early trainers and associates upon his expressions. The young child is very realistic in his religious concep- tions. He readily accepts whatever is taught him regarding Thereal- the attitudes of religious personages toward him istic o#at- in his behavior; though it should not be inferred acter of the child’s that: catechetical instruction is always effective in co aeteion this way. Of course, theological teaching cannot be grasped by the child, unless it is presented through the concrete deeds of definite personalities within his compre- hension. But that instruction which portrays religious per- sonages as perfect in conduct, their office being to reward good and punish wrong action in human beings, becomes potent in the child’s life in dissuading him from certain forbidden acts, and coercing him in the performance of acts which he would neglect except for stimulus applied a pos- RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS 81 teriori. The religious instruction given children commonly emphasizes the conception that God is an omniscient and omnipotent lawgiver and judge, who will mete out justice to every individual, inflicting pain when he disobeys, and providing for his happiness when he acts in accord with the instructions which have been given him. Now, these instructions generally have in view the establishment of fundamental social attitudes in the individual. The Ten Commandments are rules which the individual must observe if he would adjust himself harmoniously to the group to which he belongs; the group would be destroyed in time if these rules, most of them, were not followed by its members. So the Sermon on the Mount is a social code suited to the needs of a complex, peaceable society. In the same way most of the religious principles sought to be impressed upon children have the control of their relations toward their fellows solely in view. The instruction which aims to develop reverence for sacred personages and things, and the observ- ance of religious rites and ceremonies, has for its end to secure such an attitude of the individual toward religious things that they can continue to control him. If he is deeply impressed with the infinite wisdom and power of divine persons, they can exercise a commanding influence over him in restraining what he has been taught is wrong action, and enforcing what he has been taught is right conduct. Thus religious teachers often make a supreme effort to fill the child’s consciousness with the idea of divinity as immea- surably intelligent and powerful, and they surround all religious objects and ceremonies with mystery, which in the early years, at any rate, is favorable to the development of attitudes of humility and obedience. But the instructors of the young commonly go far beyond the effort to develop in the child a consciousness of God as the ruler of the universe, and arbiter of right and wrong. They try to teach a vast number of specific facts regarding the nature of God, the characteristics of His place of abode, 82 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION His associates in heaven, His method of administering jus- tice to the faithful and the sinners, the place of abode of those who offend the Divine Being, etc., etc. This instruc- tion becomes, then, an intellectual exercise, and as such it takes its place in the child’s consciousness with other intel- lectual subjects, as history, science, and the like. The child regards his catechism as a thing to be learned the same as his arithmetic, and the one does not exert greater influence upon his conduct than the other. It is the common thing to see children driven to Sunday School to recite verbatim their lessons, which never touch the springs of conduct in any way. It will not be appropriate here to enter into detailed exami- nation of catechetical instruction ; but any reader can verify for himself the statement that nine tenths of all that is con- tained in the catechisms of any of the religious bodies among us that employ this method of instruction appeals solely to the intellect, and is for the child up until adolescence at least purely verbal. In the same way a large part of the work of the Sunday School as it exists among us is strictly intellect- ual, and it does not impress upon the learner the supreme conception of the glory and greatness and justice of God, and the certainty with which he administers social and moral laws. As a consequence, children instructed in this way do not gain from religion what it is really designed to afford them, so far as their social nature and needs are concerned. One may see children reciting every day in the catechism, or in lessons worked out on the plan of the Sunday School, who are not influenced in the slightest degree by what they learn. This is seen most strikingly in the public schools of Germany or England, where religious instruction constitutes a regular part of the work, or in the parochial schools of the countries like Italy, Spain, or Holland. The one needful thing in religious instruction, so far as it is intended to be of value in restraining and constraining the individual in his social relations, is that it should suffuse the child’s consciousness with a feeling of the reality of God, RESUME 83 and of his infinite justice and wisdom and power, so that He can read the human heart, and reward or chastise the indi- vidual according as he has done right or wrong, as revealed in his own conscience. Any philosophic speculation about the personality of God, or His relation to the universe, tends to lessen His influence upon the child’s conduct. In the same way, undue familiarity with religious objects or ceremonies tends to destroy that simple, elementary feeling which is alone potent in shaping conduct. Children brought up in the homes of ministers often come to look upon religious rites in a purely mechanical way. The sense of mystery is lost, and a feeling of commonplaceness supersedes it. In this way the influence for good of religious feeling is nullified. For the first eight or ten weeks the child is concerned solely with the interests of self. At about the twelfth week he begins to manifest plea- sure in personal association, as shown mainly in his smile and characteristic vocal demonstrations. But for the infant the alter does not have interests and needs like the self; there is nothing in his environment, either personal or material, the well or ill-being of which should be considered in determining his behavior. By the end of the first year the child may on occasion inhibit his teasing or erying, or share his candy or playthings in the presence and under the influence of parent or governess; but very little of this sort of thing can be ob- served during the early months. However, by the close of the second year the child manifests some sense of social obligation, as revealed in his effort to control his ‘‘ evil” impulses and perform acts of positive social value. Through the dynamic reactions of the alter upon his expressions, the child learns slowly to differentiate persons from things, and to regard the former somewhat as he regards himself. Imitation alone does not suffice to secure this differentiation. Vital experience is necessary in Résumé 1 Rey. J. H. K., a distinguished minister of the gospel, sends me the following testimony: “I am distressed over the attitude of my four children toward the religious offices of the house and the church. When they return from a prayer-meeting they may make fun of the prayers offered by mem- bers of the church, or they may complain at the length of the service or the tiresome character of the remarks they heard. When I officiate at a funeral, they almost always show interest only in the amount I received for my ser- vices. I have long felt that my children go through their prayers at home in a purely niechanical way, and they have the same attitude toward the church service. I do not know what to do with them.” 84 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION order that expression may acquire meaning. There are doubtless cer- tain expressions of the alter which are understood more or less instinet- ively by the child, and these aid him in gaining a “consciousness of kind.” For a time the child regards his pets as of his kind, but he gradually grows away from animals because of their limited reactions upon his expressions. : By the fifth year, through the positive and negative reactions of people, the child has learned to regard them in all his activities as different from things. Approval and disapproval, rewards and punish- ments very concretely given, enable the child gradually to differentiate his attitudes into two great classes, which later he will designate as egoistic and altruistic. Speaking generally, his experiences with people teach him that conduct altruistic in nature will promote his interests, while egoistic action will turn out badly for him. Community of interest and action leads the child in the course of time to view the alter much as he does himself, in respect to needs and deserts. The child acts as aself long before he has an idea of self in a reflect- ive sense. Self for the child is a body of instinctive attitudes and ten- dencies. With development he learns to interpret the meaning of atti- tudes in others on the basis of similar attitudes he has himself assumed. However, in his ‘‘ ejective tendencies ” the individual usually favors the self as contrasted with the alter. Of the popular notions regarding the relation of the ego and the alter, the common-sense view considers egoism and altruism as diamet- rically opposed to one another, so that a person could not be egoistic and altruistic at one and the same time; while according to another view they are simply phases of every social attitude the individual takes. Both these views are partial and so erroneous, at least so far as they relate to the developmental period of human life. A considerable pro- portion of a child’s actions are neither egoistic nor altruistic. They do not have for their purpose the advancement of the interests of the ego as against those of the alter, or vice versa. As the individual develops through adolescence a constantly larger proportion of his actions is removed from the neutral class; and viewed from without they appear to become more and more altruistic, but regarded from within they may be seen to be dictated in the interests of the self as well as or even at the expense of those of the alter. There may be observed at every period in development genuinely altruistic actions in outcome, spring- ing probably from an instinctive tendency to help those in need. People differ in respect to the degree to which they strive to pro- mote the interests of self as opposed to those of the alter; and various types in this regard have always been recognized in popular philosophy. Action in the early years is usually unreflective, and is executed on the basis of expediency. In due course, however, the individual dis- cerns more or less clearly that certain kinds of conduct, positive as RESUME 85 well as negative, must be required of all for the welfare of all. When he makes this discovery he is prepared to assimilate ethical instruction, which, combined with the influence of the hard knocks received in the give-and-take experiences of daily social adjustments, gradually estab- lishes the sense of right as opposed to wrong action. In the evolution of the sense of duty the child first realizes that the rights of others must be respected, and later he feels they ought to be respected. A child’s conscience grows out of his social experience, wherein he has been made to realize through the reactions of people upon his ex- pressions that certain actions may be freely performed, while others must be restrained. As he matures, the concrete factors are gradually eliminated and the remaining feeling, reénforced by lessons from his- tory, literature, art, and religion, suffices to guide conduct; and con- science is active only when conduct is not in accord with the lessons impressed in the manner indicated. As the individual acquires a sense of the attitudes of people in general, whether of those about him or in books, he gains a feeling for certain kinds of ideal conduct, and con- science is felt only when he is conscious of disharmony between his ideal and his real action. Consciousness on the social side is thus a kind of theatre in which our friends and acquaintances, the public in general, and characters derived from literature, history, and art, constitute the audience and pass judgment upon our performances. In religion the idealizing process attains a prominence which it does not attain in any other phase of the child’s experience. The young child is very realistic in his religious conceptions. That instruction which portrays religious personages as perfect in conduct, and also omniscient, omnipotent, and the like, and whose office it is to reward good and punish wrong action in human beings, becomes potent in the child’s life in dissuading him from certain forbidden acts, and coercing him in the performance of acts which he would neglect except for stimulus applied @ posteriori. But religious teachers often fail to make a deep impress upon children, because their teaching is theological, technical, and is merely verbal so far as the learner is concerned. CHAPTER IV JUSTICE Our discussion thus far has prepared the way for a consid- eration of the development of certain special attitudes aris- Basalexpe- ing in the social adjustments of the individual; faa and first, the attitudes involving the sentiment sraent ot of justice. We have traced the method by which ment the child acquires the conception that the alter has feelings of pleasure and pain like himself. We have also noted that in the process of development his sense of the alter’s attitudes and needs becomes ever keener, and exerts an increasingly determining influence upon his conduct, leading him to regard and to treat the alter much, though not precisely, as he regards and treats the self. As a result of this developmental process, the child comes in due course to realize that the alter has rights which first must be and later ought to be, respected in all the relations which the self assumes toward him. The goal toward which the indi- vidual normally tends in his social development is undoubt- edly the point at which he will readily grant to the alter the privileges enjoyed by the self, and impose upon him the same obligations; and he will insist in all the ways he can upon every person receiving pleasures or pains accord- ing to his deserts ; though the sentiments of mercy and pity may sometimes urge him to shield the alter from the suftfer- ing which his acts would entitle him to, in accordance with the general view of justice current in the community at the time. It is a commonplace, of course, that this sentiment becomes embodied in time in laws or rules or customs, and the individual who is strictly just will insist upon all the members of the community being dealt with in conformity thereto. But in every advancing society the sentiments of RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 87 sympathy, pity, and mercy go beyond the established laws or customs, and they may, as they often do, protect individ- uals from the consequences of their deeds as viewed in the light of the regulations on the statute books. Thus mercy has the effect of tempering justice, a phenomenon which will receive the attention it deserves in another chapter. When we say that the development of the sentiment of justice tends toward the point at which the individual will treat the alter as he does the self, it must be gquanty understood that the term alter as here used can- %! "ents ° and respon- not be interpreted to apply to all persons whom- aibilittes soever beside the self, but, speaking generally, ener only to those in the same “class” or group or **lass circle with the self. One “gentleman” may resist any suggestion to take advantage of another “ gentleman” ; but he may act very differently toward his servant or his slave. A Greek might think it unjust to cheat one of his own nationality, but at the same time he might not hesi- tate to take advantage of a foreigner. A student may feel the justice of playing fair with his fellow students, but he may experience no resistance to the impulse to take advan- tage of the members of another college with which his alma mater may be in competition, or even to deceive to his own gain the instructors under whom he works. Evi- dently the individual tends to recognize equality of privi- leges, rewards, responsibilities, and penalties only among those of a kind with himself, as he sees the matter. We have already noticed how the consciousness of differences among people is developed in the individual ; and once this process of differentiation gets started, it gives rise to the idea that all people are not equal, and so are not entitled to the same rewards and penalties for any given deed or catalogue of deeds. What would be excused in a king, say, might cost a peasant his life. But kings, like peasants, have their own codes, which operate on the whole to insure’ equality among the members of the respective groups. 88 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION Thus the sentiment of justice often serves to make per- manent stratifications in social groupings, however estab- lished, for it tends to keep individuals within the confines of their respective classes in respect to their privileges and responsibilities, their rewards and penalties. On the other hand, in very plastic groups the sentiment of justice plays an important part in changing the boundary lines between classes, and in abolishing these lines altogether under cer. tain conditions. While in American society there is some- times a tendency for members of the “higher” classes to resent the efforts of a member of a “lower” class to push upward beyond his “station,” still it is possible for one in the humblest sphere of life to be elevated to the most ex- alted position, provided he is able to serve society effectively according to its needs at the time. So there is developing among us a feeling, more or less general and well-defined, that in the spirit of justice a man should be rewarded — in honor and opportunity, perhaps, rather than in money — according to the measure of his ability, and his sincerity in serving the community. Capacity to do what society desires to have done, and faithfulness in the doing of it, are prob- ably more important desiderata in the formation of classes in our country than elsewhere, though even among us wealth and ancestral connections play leading parts. But we must return to trace out in greater detail the steps by which the adult’s complex sentiment of justice is The réleot developed. We have noted above how social ex- the child's peTience works upon the original ego-centric ten- tina. dencies of the child, and modifies, restrains, ments diverts them, and even supplants them to some extent by alter-centric tendencies. It has been. said in effect more than once that, in the process of adjustment to his fellows, the individual inevitably acquires a more or less settled habit of taking into account the interests, the point of view, and the tendencies of the alter. Now, this experience lays the basis for the sentiment of justice in its FIRST SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 89 fundamental meaning, — that all individuals should have an equal chance in competition for the goods they seek to obtain, and that they should suffer impartially according to - their responsibility for misdeeds they have performed, or for errors in judgment. It need hardly be insisted upon here, after what has already been said, that the young child is a bully, who strives to get more than his just portion of the things he desires, and endeavors to transfer to others the penalties which rightfully he should bear. The child of two will not normally play fair when he is in competition with his fellows. He will make use of every means at his command to get that which he wishes, whatever it may be, irrespective of the rights of others who are affected by his action. He shows but slight appreciation of the feelings of his parents, even in the varied activities of the home. He is completely dominated by the goal toward which he is striving, and nothing but forceful resistance on the part of the alter can restrain him, when restraint is necessary ; and it is probable that the original, all-powerful egoistic mo- tives get modified or checked only by determined resistance from those more powerful than the child. In time, as the number of such occasions increases, the child comes to an- ticipate them, so that he can with some measure of success check himself. If one will follow a child day by day, he may trace this experience of resistance coming to be anticipated. Take, for example, the case of a young child playing the game of toss- ball with a group of children or adults. Let us say that at the start he demands the ball most or all of the time. When another gets it he cries for it, and gives vent to angry ex- pressions if it is denied him. All in the group say to him, “Tt is not your turn ; you have just had it ; you must let the others take their turn,” and so on; but he is indifferent, at this stage of his development, to their attitudes. He shrieks at the top of his voice if it is not given to him, and if there are older persons around to whom he can appeal, he will run 90 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION to them and endeavor by various means to excite them so that they will come to his aid, and enable him to gain his end. If he can get no help in this way, then he may try to prevent the one who has the ball from playing with it; or as a last resort he may try: to break up the group, or go off sulking, expecting in this way to arouse the feelings of his tormentors so that they will cease their opposition to him. In all this experience there appears to be no consciousness on his part that he is in the wrong; so far as his own atti- tude is concerned, he is justified in getting the ball if he wants it. Justice for him requires that his wishes be always indulged. He is sincere about it, if it be proper to apply the term “ sincerity ” to one whose motives are practically all governed by a selfish aim, as his are. But follow this child along for a little distance, and ob- serve him taking his first lessons in justice, as the group The method understands it. The persons whom he attempts to eee bully will not give in to him. They tell him if he justice will “ play fair ” and “ take his turn ” he may play, but otherwise he must stay out. If the group is constant in this attitude, the child will sooner or later discover that he must check himself if he would stay in the game at all. He will resist the development of this notion, but it will get established in time. One can observe it taking effect in the child’s attitudes. Yesterday, and for several days before that, perhaps, he tried to bully the group, but he finally drew himself sullenly off into the corner, and the game went on without him. To-day he repeats the performance, but one notices that he goes into his corner less readily; and with some encouragement from the group he may literally drag himself back into line, and actually take his turn. For the rest of the game he will “ play fair” without protest ; he has learned that the group will resist him unless he does as the others do. Of course, this change is not wrought suddenly as a rule; but whether it takes a long or a short time to accomplish, it is always brought about according to THE SENSE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 91 this general plan. The instance cited is typical of innumer- able cases occurring normally in the daily life of the child, and all having substantially the same history and the same outcome. It is true that some children are not in their early years resisted in many of their aggressions, but such chil- dren simply defer their elementary lessons in justice until they come in contact with groups that will resist them; and it is only a matter of time before they will meet these groups, unless possibly they be the children of kings. But even these latter children must ultimately come into conflict with those of their own class who will resist them in their unjust demands. This will, perhaps, be the best point at which to consider one of the most important though elementary phases of the development of the sentiment of justice, —— the Aypoarance evolutiop of the sense of property, with the re- a alia cognition of the rights and duties appertaining "ets thereunto. As we have already noted, the infant comes among us with the naive feeling that everything he wants “belongs” to him, in proof of which observe his utter lack of restraint in striving to secure whatever attracts him. His instinctive attitude is, get everything that is in any way desirable. The six-months’-old child shows no apprecia- tion, so far as one can tell, of the principle of property, ex- cept that he should so far as possible obtain and retain all that he can lay his hands on that pleases him or gratifies his curiosity. He cannot, of course, be said to have a feeling of right with respect to it, since he cannot appreciate that the alter has a valid claim upon anything. The sense of right can be felt only when the individual realizes that the alter is competing for goods he himself desires, and that because of previous experience affecting the things in question one or the other should secure them and exercise dominion over them. The infant’s feeling is that he should be master of all he surveys; and the representations to the contrary made by those about him have no effect on him, unless they for- \ 92 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION cibly resist his cupidity, when he usually protests with voice, fists, and body until he becomes exhausted, or until his at- tention is diverted into other channels. But so long as the desired objects are kept in view, the untaught, “ natural” child assumes only one attitude toward them, and that an appropriative or aggressive one. His brother may say to him: « But it is mine, you know”; “You cannot have my things, for I do not take your things,” and so on ad libitum ; but these phrases mean nothing to the individual who has not had some months, at least, of vital experience in meeting with resistance in endeavoring to get control of goods which have already been appropriated by the alter in accordance with the rules of the social game. The principle is that the terms mine and thine require for their proper understand- ing by the child a vast deal of give-and-take contact with others, as a result of which there is slowly develgped the sense that objects belong to people by virtue of their having had certain types of experience with them. Let us glance now at the way in which the individual discovers what sort of experience one must have with an Develop- Object in order to claim it as his own against all ment ot®?- competitors. To begin with, whatever the infant preciation of theright has in his grasp he will strive to retain as long as tin he gets pleasure from it; and he will even endure considerable punishment before he will release it. Take, for example, his resistance to any attempts to remove his bottle before he has satisfied himself with it; and this is a typical instance. As he develops, and begins to grip objects about him, he shows the same tendency to keep all he can lay his hands on that pleases him. Now, suppose he is permitted to retain whatever he gets in his grasp, and he is given every object that he desires ; in such cases the original feeling that all he wants he will secure is deepened in him, and his expressions become ever more violent if accidentally or. otherwise his wishes are thwarted in any way. But sooner. or later he is resisted in his attempt to gain possession of THE RIGHT OF POSSESSION 93 objects which are much desired by others to whom they “belong,” and at that moment he begins to differentiate goods into those that the alter will not permit him to have, no matter what efforts he makes to obtain them ; those that he can secure if he struggles vigorously for them; and those that no one tries to deprive him of, or to resist him in his efforts to secure them. When he is prevented by his brother from taking a certain object, the latter says to him: “Tt is mine because papa (or mamma or some one) gave it tome”; or, “ They said J might have it”; or, “ because I got it first”; or, “because I found it”; or, “because I have had it a long time,” and so on through a number of other reasons. If the father prevents him from getting the object he desires, it is ‘ because it is not good for you,” or “it belongs to Brother,” and so on. But, the child never sees the justice of these positions at the outset; he always responds with, “ Well, Z want it.” This is the only reason he can understand for claiming anything of value. But he is resisted, and he learns, through ceaseless opposition to his aggressions, that when father or mother gives an object to his brother he himself must keep his hands off it. He comes to this point in his evolution very slowly, but the reactions of the social environment keep him moving toward it with greater or less rapidity, depending upon the strength of his original impulses in comparison with the intensity and con- stancy of the educative influences playing on him. So, by the method sketched above, he discovers that when a brother or sister or playmate is in possession of an object, no matter how he or she came by it, it cannot be appropriated by himself without violent reactions from those who have control of it. One can observe this lesson as it is being learned and applied in the child’s daily adjustments. In the beginning, when he is acquiring familiarity with the ele- mental principles of property rights, he at times extends his application of the principles to his dog, his cat, even his rocking-horse ; they must be left in control of the objects 94 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION which they now possess. One can see a child vigorously de- fend the rights of his pets against the depredations of the marauders about them. There is, perhaps, an element of make-believe in this, for it is not long before the individual shows that when his interests so advise, he will pay no heed to the rights of his pets, but he will without any restraint despoil them of their belongings for his own advantage. It is not long in his learning process before he will ascribe genuine property rights only to those living things that really resist his attempts to plunder them. While his freedom of appropriation is thus being narrowed constantly through the reaction of the alter, the principle involved is brought out distinctly in his experience when he is in conflict with his fellows in respect to his own posses- sions. If he is being attacked by invaders, he calls upon his father or mother or any person who can help him to defend his belongings. Then arises the necessity of determining whether he is entitled to the goods he claims, and the novice is made to give a reason, acceptable to those about him, why he should not be deprived of some or all of them. This is an exceedingly illuminating sort of experience for him; it compels him to recognize certain fundamental property rights, and to consciously employ the principles involved in trying to keep his “things” under his control. Every hour of waking life during the first few years, he must appeal to these principles in his inevitable conflicts with his fellows, if he has give-and-take relations with them. Slowly the princi- ples are brought out more or less clearly, depending upon the nature of his experience, because matters of vital con- cern to him are settled by them, and they define for him what he may get and keep, and what he may not appro- priate. As the child develops, and his relations with people be- come ever more complex, he continually learns new and more and more subtle principles of ownership; and he finds as he endeavors to obtain and retain goods that the PRINCIPLES OF OWNERSHIP 95 rules he first learned must be modified in various ways. For instance, it is revealed to him in due course, pevetop- though he resists learning the lessons, that he may ™ental . 7 changes in not always keep possession of an object when he respect to finds it, or when it is given him by a companion, Princes or when he buys it with his penny, and so on. It sup must be impressed by repetition that he abandons any prin- ciple of ownership when it operates to his advantage only after a hard struggle ; he “cannot see” why he should not keep this or that ; “I always have done so,” and the “ other boys keep their things when they are given to them,” and soon. There are conflicts at every step forward, from the time when original impulse begins to get restrained and diverted until the individual comes into complete accord, if he ever does, with social practice so far as it directly affects him. If social practice is constantly changing in some re- spects, — as it is in every plastic or dynamic society, — the individual never reaches the point where all conflict in re- gard to rightful ownership ceases. As his range of social contact enlarges he is brought up against traditions, customs, laws which he cannot understand. Like the boy of six, he “ cannot see” why he may not keep complete control of the goods that in a simpler social organization would of right perhaps belong to him. When he comes into the city from a rural life, he must reconstruct many of his principles of ownership ; he cannot now enjoy the liberties with some of his belongings which he enjoyed when the interests of but relatively few people were involved in his use of them. The greater the number of egos the child comes into vital relations with, the more intricate becomes the question of control and ownership. Also, when scarcity of goods exists, and the desire for possession becomes ever more urgent, the greater the tendency to modify the principles governing ownership, so that those who have in relative abundance may share with those who are in need. It is probable that the individual passes through some such a course in respect 96 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION to recognition of the principles of ownership, as does the society of which he is 2 member, if it is at all plastic. As members increase in any community, the principles of contro] and possession must be constantly revised, to insure that some may not possess the world to the disinheritance of others. Thus there are no eternal and immutable rules of possession in any dynamic society. These rules depend in general upon the conditions which will secure comfortable existence to the greatest number, as the greatest number sees the matter at the time, though no people so far as we know has ever completely realized this ideal, albeit many have striven toward it. Needless to say, perhaps, we are here touching upon a well-nigh infinitely complex matter, when we consider the practices of the different races of men, and the present tendencies among progressive nations, which are seeking deliberately to construct rules of action that will insure the perpetuity of the society, and secure to each individual to the largest possible extent life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Forever, if these ends be attained, there must be reconstruction of the principles of ownership as the conditions of the society itself change. It should be noted in this connection that the lessons taught the child by the group in the negative manner already The réleot IWdicated are usually supplemented by positive positive in- instruction given in different ways. For one thing, struction in , 6 2 7 < developing in his games the child’s companions commend him the sont when he “plays fair,” and the effect of this ap- justice proval is plainly apparent upon the individual at every point in his ethical development. He keenly appre- ciates having all those in his group applaud him for his actions, wherein he takes no advantage but gives every one a fair show under the rules. At times, it is true, the attitude of the group may not be favorable to the development of justice in one of its number who may be inclined to bully ; but it is within bounds to say that, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, children from the sixth or seventh year on uy THE SENTIMENT OF JUSTICE 97 will in their group attitudes encourage at least simple, crude justice as it concerns the activities of individuals in a group. A gang may prey on “ outsiders,” and it may idolize him among their number who has the least regard for the rights of his victims; but at the same time the group will resist any inclination in such an one to give rein to his aggressive temper when he is dealing with the group itself. Even among thieves there is honor ; they must play fair with one another, though they may recognize no obligations toward any one without their circle. This group reaction upon the individual’s concrete acts continues throughout the entire course of his ethical devel- opment; and its most marked general effect is its tendency to make him conform to the rules of the game as played by the group at the time. As the child’s range of activity increases, he comes into touch with groups of ever-widen- ing ethical interests, until if he lives his life normally he will run through the scale from infancy to maturity, and he will get group reaction upon practically every aspect of social conduct, — censure if he does not play fair, and com- mendation if he does unto others (the others of the group) as he would be done by. He cannot escape this. moulding process by the group. Whatever he does at any period of his ethical career, after the age of one or two at the latest, produces a response of some sort from the group or groups in which he holds membership; and looking at the matter in a large way, this response serves to encourage just ac- tion, and discourage that which is unjust, according to the customs of the time and the place. The kind of group response to individual action we have been examining is more or less non-reflective, even reflex or automatic. But the group, through specially purposeful delegated members, often reacts upon the child’s ete aggressions in a deliberate, conscious way, with the group the purpose in view to make him appreciate that unwilling- ness to play fair is “‘ mean,” “ piggish,” “contemptible,” 98 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION unjust, and so he should change his attitude. Even a child who is habitually in the bullying attitude will often de- nounce one of his fellows when the latter tries to take such an advantage as he may frequently take himself. Children are very quick to give publicity, with appropriate comments, to mean actions among all those with whom they are in competition in any way, in order thus to arouse hostile reactions from the group. It is practically impossible for a child, from the time he begins to understand any form of expression in the alter, to escape for any considerable period this sort of ethical education, aimed at making him restrain his egoistic impulses. In the beginning the mother tells him “it is not right” to keep the ball all the time; his brothers and sisters want to play as well as he does. She asks him how he would like it if they should keep it from him so that he could not play; and so on ad libitum. Later his fellows become more dynamic and effective in their instruction ; and while all this has but slight influence upon egoistic tendencies at the outset, still the effect is cumulative, and grows ever more compelling as the group resists the individual in his bullying, and penalizes him for his selfishness. Of course, terms like “right,” “mean,” etc., have little if any significance for the child until he gets well started in his ethical evolution; and they would never signify anything definite probably if he did not meet with resistance in his aggression, or if those near him were not resisted in their depredations upon the rights of others. It is suggestive to note with what feeling a mother may condemn a certain action because it is not right or just, while her five-year-old boy may be entirely unaffected in contemplation either of the unjust act or the mother’s con- demnation of it; which is one evidence that the sentiment of justice is the product primarily, not of natural endow- ment but of social experience, wherein the rights of the alter are literally pounded into the individual. But there are doubtless certain instinctive tendencies INSTINCTIVE TENDENCIES 99 functioning in the child’s reactions in some of the situations in which the sentiment of justice is operative in Thetneise a crude form. Even at a very early age the indi- slements . . . . in the sen- vidual will resent the punishment of his pet dog timont ot by any member of the family ; indeed, he will ‘st resent the harsh treatment of any of his possessions as soon as he begins to get the feeling that they belong to him and not to others. So, too, he will show indignation as early as the twelfth month when a larger brother chastises a smaller one (it is not so often the case the other way ’round), except possibly when the babe himself has de- manded the administering of the penalty. That is to say, the year-old child is a not wholly indifferent spectator of the adjustments of his associates to one another.' In a very elementary, crude way, and while he is still an infant almost, he resents the domination of the weak by the strong espe- cially, though he may show some feeling also if a smaller person makes another, who may be strong, suffer in a very concrete way. Later on he will lend his voice and his fists in support of the weak individual, or the “under dog,” even if the latter seems strong, in the event that he has no personal interest in the conflicts which arouse his feeling. Of course, the child’s own interests are bound up some- how in the contests of his fellows in most of the social dramas occurring in his presence in daily life, so that it is impossible to say definitely to what extent his natural feel- ing for fair play determines his conduct in much that he 14H. J. P., a correspondent, gives the following testimony touching this point : — “My experience varies upon this matter. It appears that it makes a dif- ference who the actors are. ‘M.,’ my infant sister, was visibly displeased whenever I attempted (in playfulness, though to her it was in earnest) to ‘pummel’ father, providing he showed signs of resentment. I might act the same toward another member younger than I, and babe would not resent it. In this instance the baby seemed to sympathize most with those who were doing most for ‘ baby.’ Mother was as liable as myself to be rebuked, providing she should in any apparent manner abuse father, who then held her (baby). My younger brother has always supported me as against my sisters, although they are all younger than I.” 100 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION does. Moreover, his love of combat often leads him to countenance conflicts which an active sentiment of justice would urge him to terminate if he could. Boys not infre- quently stand by for a time and see a bully punish one not of his dimensions or strength; but sooner or later the sense of fair play will be likely to assert itself, and the aggressor will be told to take some one of his size. Young children are not ready and skillful in detecting differences in size and strength, but when these differences are very obvious, their inclination is to side with the weaker ones in the con- tests they witness. Any close observer of children in group relations can notice them from the first year on standing up for what might be regarded as the right, though they do not think of it in this way. In general, the child will sympathize with one who is suffering pain, as against the one who caused it. It happens now and then normally in the child’s life that he is led astray by his feelings, for he may take the side of one who deserves chastisement, and who would be benefited by it. But the child does not look for- ward or backward before he expresses his feelings; he reacts at once, on the basis that pain should be relieved and the person (or even the thing) who occasioned it should himself be made to suffer. It is suggestive that, when the child is in a resentful frame of mind, he can easily endure the sufferings of the one against whom his resentment is directed ; indeed, he often takes keen pleasure in inflicting penalties upon some one who has made him “ mad,” even though the latter may be his best friend. It is worthy of emphasis that the sentiment of justice as expressed by the child is altogether “ blind,” to use the pop- Thereflex ular figure of speech. When the child observes a traacter ft contest he does not take account of circumstances, mont ot iss as the adult normally does, in order that he may beginning determine which of the contestants is in the right, or whether both may be wrong. The child’s impulse leads him, as a rule, to throw his strength to the support of the THE CHILD’S NOTION OF JUSTICE 101 one who in size and strength is clearly at a disadvantage, though he may really need chastisement. He may have presumed upon his weakness, and attempted the réle of an aggressor; but the child cannot go so far in his considera- tion of contributing factors. The feeling for fair play on the part of the child, and to a less extent of the adolescent, is not held in check until motives or “extenuating circum- stances” can be reviewed. This is without doubt the most striking difference between the adult’s and the child’s attitudes toward situations in which equity is involved. The principle in question has an interesting application in another way. Take a family of seven, say, —the father and mother and five children, the latter from three to twelve years of age. Suppose they are engaged in the per- formance of household duties of some sort, which are not on the whole agreeable. The chances are that very frequently questions of fair play must be considered. The parents try to settle them in view of conditions which should make one child do more or less, or a different kind of work, than another. But if the children be given freedom to express themselves, the younger ones at least will often be in con- stant turmoil. Each is apt to suspect that the other is fa- vored above himself, and he cannot easily be made to appreciate the equity in the matter. The only thing that will satisfy him will be to have all the others do just as he does, no matter what it may be, except in the case that he is doing something that he particularly likes to do, when he is most skillful in discovering reasons why he should be left alone in the enjoyment of his pleasure. If a boy of five be sent from table to wash his hands, he is apt to demand, if he feels free to express himself, that his brother be made to go also, even though his brother is not in need of ablu- tion. It may be noted, though, that the arguments the boy now urges for having his brother do the same unpleasant thing as himself he will decry loudly to-morrow night, when his brother uses them against him under exactly the same 102 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION circumstances. The young child is amazingly inconsistent in his evaluation of circumstances which should govern the conduct of himself and of his fellows; he is a long way from acting so that his action might be made universal. The child of twelve is normally far more consistent, and the youth of twenty is still more so. This is revealed in a striking manner in the resistance which is being constantly offered by the parents, teachers, and others to the aggres- sions of the three-year-old, and the comparatively slight re- sistance offered to the activities of the twenty-year-old. The latter has brought his original impulses under control, so that he can and normally does avoid the actions which meet with opposition from those about him, while at the same time he deliberately performs to a greater or less extent those actions that receive the approval, positively expressed, of his associates. The five-year-old must have fifteen years of vital experience before he can lay his course along a route on which he will not meet with continual opposition as he endeavors to proceed, but on which he will rather be given applause. How can one describe all the difficulties which the child experiences in comprehending the principles of equity which are applied in adjudicating the conflicts which arise in his daily adjustments! Doubtless most of the actions of the child of seven, say, which are performed in response to the request or command of those in authority over him, and most of the restrictions imposed upon him, seem to him unfair, in the sense that he resists them, and finds reasons why he should be excused from submitting to them. He is utterly unable to see why others should be favored above himself in any of the concerns in which he is interested. “‘T don’t see why I can’t go to skate if K. does”; «I don’t see why I have to go to school when S. does n’t”; «“ Why can’t I stay up until nine o’clock? the other boys do”; “I don’t see why I can't have as many sugar lumps as H. does,” and so on ad libitum, are instances which illustrate EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES 103 the child’s difficulties in understanding the justice of any rules which do not operate to his liking, though he may be very ready to defend them in their application to a brother or sister or classmate. S. cannot see why he cannot sit up as late as V., who is older than himself, though he will “argue” with K. to show her she should not remain up as long as he because she is younger than he is; and this in- stance is typical of what is going on normally much of the time in the life of a group of children from three to ten years of age, when their spontaneous expressions are not suppressed. Before he acquires a feeling for an equitable adjustment of relations, then, the child demands that rules be made universal irrespective of persons or conditions, ex- pevelop- cept when his own interests are at stake, when he ™totan z ‘ ¥ 3 apprecia- easily sees that justice would not be violated if he tonot “ex- should be favored. The conditions which come rae earliest to be regarded as requiring special consid- ®t” eration in the administration of rules of behavior are sick- ness, smallness, weakness, or age, especially the former. When an individual is obviously ailing, so that he presents to the eye of the child a weakened or strange aspect, then the latter will exempt him from the requirements which he will impose on all others, because they have sometime been im- posed on himself. The possession of superior talents, or hereditary rights, or anything of the sort is given no attention by the young child in his universalizing of the ethical law, though they usually play a prominent part in the judgments of youth. Even productivity is not considered as a basis for discrimination, for the father or mother will often be held by the children for the performance of the duties required of themselves; and they will expect the parents, who have alone produced goods of value, to share and share alike in their distribution, unless the parents have from the begin- ning compelled the children to play a subordinate role in the domestic drama. But in this latter case the children 104 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION defer to the parents in their ethical judgments because they must, and not because they feel the justice of it. However, as the child grows into the adolescent period, he normally comes to recognize the special claims of age, mainly, no doubt, because of the precedence which tradition gives to the older people of the community. By the time he has reached his twelfth year, at any rate, the chances are that the individual has read and heard much about respecting one’s elders, and always yielding to them simply because they are older and so more deserving than others. It is significant, however, that in communities where age is not venerated, the children do not spontaneously come to make distinctions in their judgments in favor of their elders. In street gangs marked disrespect is often shown to older people, especially when they become infirm, and are unable to redress the wrongs done them ; all of which suggests that there is little if any instinctive provision made for the child’s discriminating in favor of those older than he. The favoring of age in administering rules of justice is a matter of social, not physical heredity. It has literally to be driven into many children; it appears as though they natu- rally resisted it. In a primitive society the elders force the young to make obeisance to them, and always to decide in their favor as against younger individuals; and even among highly developed peoples, as the Germans particularly, the educational régime from the cradle to full maturity is cal- culated to teach special regard for age, so that the young come as a rule to grant to older people rights and privileges which they would deny persons of their own age. But this is not in the least “natural”; it is imposed upon the child, and he accepts it as a matter of necessity. In America there is, on the whole, a tendency for children to treat adults on the same basis as they treat their companions; justice de- mands that they all conform to the same rules in respect to privileges, as well as penalties and rewards. Indeed, in some instances the child early acquires the attitude of ex- APPRECIATION OF MOTIVES 105 pecting that his elders will always give way to him and his companions ; they did so during his first few years, and his sense of fair play has been determined accordingly. H. is the only boy in a family of three adults, who have “cherished ” him dearly, and have always “ humored ” him in his demands. He frequently has playmates in the house, and he exacts from the older people the same consideration for these playmates that he himself receives. As a result, he has reached the point where he expects his elders will always serve him and his playmates and sacrifice for them. He cannot quite understand it when he finds an adult who will not indulge him in his every wish. For him, justice requires that he should have the right of way before grown people, which is exactly the reverse of what one finds in a typical German household. We see here another piece of evidence to the effect that the sentiment of justice, as ex- pressed in the early years at any rate, is the product of experience, and it differs with individuals according as their experiences differ. A child who has from the beginning been resisted by older people in authority over him, and required to take a minor part in the affairs of daily life, will come to feel that the parent, the teacher, the minister, the policeman, e¢ al. should always by right have the best end of everything ; their wills, however they may be ex- pressed, should not be ignored or opposed by himself. But children who have “had their own way,” as against grown people, will not know how to take resistance to their wishes from the teacher, the minister, or any one else. One of the most interesting phases of the evolution of the sentiment of justice concerns the development of an appreciation of motive, as determining the sort of Develop- reaction which the individual should make upon Reresletisn the expressions of the alter. In the beginning, jf motive in actions are responded to in view of their external actions character and their outcome, no matter what may have been the alter’s intentions in respect to them. The child really 106 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION assumes his attitudes in view of the results of the alter’s conduct, and he expects the latter to do the same in respect to his own actions. If a child of two has been punished for carelessly breaking his dish, say, he will anticipate similar treatment when he breaks it in a purely accidental and unavoidable way. In a home where children are frequently whipped or chided for acts of negligence, destruction, vio- lence, or interference with the activities of one another or the established order of things, they demand that “ justice be meted out” to any one who has offended in any of these ways, whether or not he is negligently or intentionally guilty, “ An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,” regardless of motive, sums up the child’s code of justice and equity, which terms mean to him the same sort of attitude. It is the visible, tangible effects of action that he goes by in reaching his conclusions as to the treatment deserved by the actor. But it is in one sense not proper to use the term deserved here, for the young child has no mental content which would enable him to make the discrimina- tions implied in the term deserve. To intelligently use this term, one must have reached the plane of development where he can feel that the alter is not to be judged by the outcome of his action so much as by his motive in perform. ing it, and the conditions under which it is performed. All this is beyond the two or three-year-old, though some children show evidence as early as the fourth year of appre- ciating motives and determining conditions of actions. How- ever, such appreciation is quite imperfect at four; but normally it grows ever stronger, more comprehensive, and controlling until maturity is reached. We must now inquire how the child acquires the feeling for motives as determining the essential quality of actions. To begin with, from the first year on he is often placed in situations where the notion of motive is made prominent in dealing with individuals, though he does not seem to catch a glimpse of the idea until he is well past his second birth- APPRECIATION OF MOTIVES 107 day. But in due course he discovers that the parent and the brothers and sisters do not react in the same way upon all his actions which have substantially the same outcome. For instance, §., V., and H. are building a “fort” in their nursery. K., who is not permitted to move around the “ fort” as freely as she wishes, at last breaks down a part of it in a fit of anger. Impulsively the injured children fly at her, and “spank” her. She remonstrates, and goes complainingly to her mother, who comes as a judge to the scene of the disaster. The proprietors of the “ fort” make it clear to the latter that K. performed the evil deed “on purpose,” and the mother tells K. she must bear the penalty she received ; and, moreover, she must be isolated for a time, since she “cannot play nicely and fairly.” She tells K. how “naughty” it is to disturb her brothers and sisters in the way she did, and how she cannot let her go near them atall again unless she can be good. The culprit is, of course, in a more or less impervious and resistant attitude toward this instruction, but nevertheless it has an effect, and with repetition it ulti- mately makes a deep impression. This instance is typical, in essential features, of experi- ences the child is having constantly during his early years and, in more and more subtle ways, even well on toward -adolescence, and possibly through it and beyond it. But here now is a different sort of experience, which makes the learner of ethical lessons see that as a rule it is motive rather than outcome that is chiefly considered in the way the alter responds to his conduct. The “fort” is again knocked down by K., but this time she accidentally stum- bled and fell on it. She herself appreciates a difference between her attitude in this and in the other case. Then, after the first more or less angry expressions of those who suf- fered from her accident, they forgive her, and dismiss her with the warning “that she must be more careful next time.” This, too, is in outline a typical instance of nursery life, and of the life outside as well; and it serves to differentiate 108 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION actions in the individual’s consciousness on the basis of his attitude toward the alter in performing them. So, by the time the child is four, one may frequently hear him excus- ing himself on the plea that he “ did not mean to do” this or that”; he realizes more or less clearly that this is one way to escape penalties for careless and even vicious acts, and he tends to employ the formula whenever there is an open- ing. He comes easily to think he is not responsible to the extent of being penalized for the unhappy outcome of his ac- tions if he does not deliberately harm any one. Of course, he is not very keen in distinguishing between what is de- liberate or purposeful and what is only accidental. He is not at all introspective ; and actions which the adult often regards as malicious, he may himself say are without evil intent. On the other hand, if he has not been punished for his spiteful actions, he will be perfectly free in confessing that he did this or that “on purpose.” H. at four years of age affords an illustration of this principle. He has always “ had his own way” in a home where he has had only adults for companions ; and when he plays with other children, as he sometimes does now, he inflicts divers sorts of pains upon them, merely because they get in his way, or deprive him of some object he covets. When he is asked for an explana- tion of his behavior, he says (speaking now of his relations to a particular child), “‘ Well, she would not let me have it” ; or “ I wanted to be in theswing ”; or “ She was in my way,” and so on. But the child with whom he plays always excuses herself if she injures him, by saying that she “ did not mean to,” or that he struck her first, or that he took her things away from her. She has already begun to appreciate that the treatment of an action usually depends upon the motive behind it; but H. thinks that the gratification of his own desires is a sufficient justification for any act. It has been suggested that the individual in his evolution passes through a stage wherein he fancies that no penalty THE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY 109 should be attached to such of his’ actions as turn out badly if only they happen by chance. But he does not stop here long, for social forces keep working on him, and he is gradually made to realize, in a very obscure way at first, that he must suffer the ill consequences of accidents, espe- cially when they occur as the result of his “carelessness” or “‘thoughtlessness.” Every moment, as he develops, the situation normally grows more complex with him; and while he stoutly resists taking the “thoughtful” attitude, still this is in due course literally forced upon him to a greater or less extent. As his range of social contact increases he is penalized in a variety of ways for actions that result unfortunately, even if he did not intend evil in their execution. It seems hardly necessary to dwell upon the point that some children learn these lessons earlier, and more thoroughly and subtly, than others, largely because they have experiences in which the essential principles are constantly impressed ; but all individuals, except those that are sub-normal, learn them sooner or later. As the individual grows on into adolescence, the idea of responsibility for his actions becomes ever more prominent in consciousness, and at the same time the condi- pevetop- tions determining responsibility become ever more Ment ot the involved. In the beginning his feeling about an sponsinility act was dependent wholly upon its outcome; he did not take into account the circumstances under which the act was performed. Then, through the character of the reactions of the alter, he came gradually to feel that unfortunate results of his actions were not to be recorded against him unless he meant to produce them. Next, he slowly came to a realization of the fact that he must pay the penalty for an accident if he could have avoided it by being cautious, — by being more alert to the possible ill consequences of his acts. Incessantly, as he develops, he is called upon to justify his conduct on the bases of motive, carefulness, responsi- bility. In all these experiences the notion of responsibility 110 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION is impressed upon him, and the conditions under which he becomes responsible are at one and the same time defined ever more clearly, and made more and more subtle. At nine he is made to feel responsible for a deed that results un- fortunately to any one, if he has in the past been warned against it or anything closely resembling it. He is held responsible for getting his lessons in school if the pupils in his class master theirs, and he is penalized if he fails so to do. In short, he is made to feel responsibility for perform- ing tasks and avoiding actions that the majority of the nine-year-old children in the community are, as a matter of tradition largely, assumed to be able to do. In every community there is a general sense of what should be ex- pected of children of different ages; and while this varies, for communities and teachers and parents, still the variation is slight after all. This “general sense” has been passed along from one generation to another since the beginning of human society, being modified to a greater or less extent by each generation, with the result that individual children are held responsible for what this tradition indicates they should be able to do. Then the child is often led to see the reasonableness of holding him responsible for a given act, though he may not acknowledge that he appreciates it, by showing him that his playmates are held responsible for similar acts. He may resist the adult’s view of his respon- sibility, but he cannot long resist the application to him personally of a principle which he sees generally applied to the groups of which he is an active, vital member. The consideration of factors determining responsibility mines does not extend beyond the concrete self until ‘ect . 4 ofadoles- the adolescent revolution is well under way. The Lae child of eleven or twelve never spontaneously ex- foltag et USS himself for a misdeed because of an inherited responsi- tendency to perform it. So he never justifies his = low grades in school, or his failures, on the basis of a lack of inheritance of ability. Naively he regards him- ADOLESCENT CHANGES 111 self, so far as natural gifts are concerned, as on a par with his fellows; and if he does not do as well as they, it is because of some accident, or some physical disadvantage operating against him. In this naive manner he assumes that all people are equal by birth, though as early as the age of five he appreciates that there are differences between his fellows in strength, in temperament, in helpfulness, and so on; and later, by the age of eight at any rate, he sees that there are. differences between his classmates in their abilities, as in reading, singing, drawing, speaking, etc. But still he does not go back to original endowment for his explanation or justification of these differences. He will talk of a stupid classmate as though he could be bright if he would try hard enough; and while he does not ascribe his own failings to lack of effort, still he does not locate the trouble outside of himself. “I can’t do it; I don’t know how; I have n’t had as much of that as the others,” he will say, and more like it. But during the adolescent upheaval, when introspection develops with extraordinary rapidity, the individual often tries to make an inventory of his abilities, native and cul- tivated, and he readily comes to the view that he is what he is largely because of inherited powers and tendencies. In some of the adolescent autobiographies, one may read bitter denunciations of the general scheme of things that cursed the writers with ugly bodily features or mediocre talents, or what not. The child of ten could not take such a point of view, for the reason that he has no sense of a “ general scheme of things” which shaped him physically and determined the measure of his abilities. He regards himself as he is, without questioning the circumstances of his origin. But these circumstances play a leading role in the adolescent’s estimate of himself, and of his responsibility for living the sort of intellectual, esthetic, and moral life that tradition imposes upon the groups to which he belongs. When he falls short of the standard as he sees it, he not 112 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION infrequently avoids self-censure by laying the “ blame” on the existing social order, or he may carry it back to his ancestors, his nationality, or his Maker. This does not mean that he fails to do his best to meet the obligations which rest upon him, thinking to place the responsibility for his deficiencies on others than himself. But when he feels he has made an effort which has not accomplished what the community expected of him, or what tradition standard- ized for him, then, to restore equilibrium among his own emotions, he may pass the problem of justifying his action to those who, as he thinks, conferred upon him his tendencies and capacities. At the same time he may assume responsi- bility for neglect to use to the full the talents or abilities he knows he possesses. He may also shoulder the blame for not acting in the present in the light of previous experi- ence, to the end that he might avoid past errors and seize opportunities for being of service to his fellows. In the daily life of the adolescent there is normally much strain and stress due to the individual’s failure to adjust himself fully to a complex social environment, and his effort properly to locate the responsibility for this failure. It is probable that this tension is greater at twenty, say, than at forty ; since by the time the latter age is reached the individual has, as a rule, largely settled for himself the question of the extent to which his native equipment in physical, intellectual, esthetic, and moral traits equips or disqualifies him for attaining the standards reached by his associates, and. he worries less about his shortcomings than he did at a younger age. In the course of his development, and as a result mainly of give- and-take relations with his fellows, the child comes to realize that the Besa alter has rights, which first must be and later ought to be re- spected in all relations affecting the welfare of the latter. The goal toward which the individual tends in social development is the point at which he will treat the alter as he does himself, in respect alike to rewards and to penalties. This sentiment of fair play or justice becomes embodied in ever RESUME 113 more complex forms in the customs and laws of a community; and in compliance therewith all members of the community are, theoretically, treated impartially according to their deserts, though mercy may fre- quently temper pure justice. This equality of persons before the law is, however, recognized by the individual only as it pertains to the members of any given class. Thus the sentiment of justice in static societies often preserves social stratifications from effacement or modi- fication. In plastic groups, on the other hand, it plays an important part in constantly altering class boundary lines. Capacity to do what society wants done, and faithfulness in the doing of it, are the most important desiderata in the determination of classes in our country; though wealth and ancestral connections play leading parts. The child is a bully by birth, and it is only through conflict, with resistance and retaliation from his social environment, that he makes his first social adjustments. As he comes into vital relations with the group, he sooner or later discovers that his aggressions will on the whole be resisted and even thrust back upon him, and so he learns that he must do as others do if he would get on well. The untaught, “natural ” child assumes toward all objects of his desire an appro- priative or aggressive attitude. Only through a great deal of give-and- take contact with others do “ mine” and “thine ” come to be properly understood. Gradually there is developed the sense that objects ‘ be- long ” to particular people by virtue of their having had certain types of experience with them. As the child is resisted in his attempts to gain possession of certain objects while he is not resisted in other cases, he comes in due course to differentiate goods into those that the alter will not permit him to have, those that he can secure by struggle, and those that no one makes any effort to prevent him from obtaining. Through almost ceaseless opposition to his demands, he discovers that what is given to others, what is bought by them, or earned by them, etc., he must not attempt to appropriate. In his conflicts with his fellows in respect to retaining goods once in his own possession, he is compelled to recog- nize certain fundamental property rights, and consciously to employ them in his appeals to his parents et al. Thus he slowly learns the principles that define for him what he may get and keep. With broadening experience new principles of ownership are gained, and old rules are continually modified. But there is conflict at every step forward; and the individual is brought in time to realize that there are no immutable rules determining ownership. In plastic soci- eties the rights of possession are in due course seen to depend upon the conditions which will secure equality of opportunity to the great- est number. Supplementing the negative instruction which has been sketched, the group reacts in a positive way, with a view to teaching the child 114 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION to be just, commending him when he plays fair, and censuring him when he plays foul; and this serves, on the whole, to encourage just and discourage unjust deeds. This group reaction upon the individ- ual’s acts continues from infancy to maturity, and normally it affects every aspect of his social adjustment. He is denounced by members of the group when he tries to take advantage, and he is praised when he shows fairness in his conduct. There seems to be an instinctive element in the attitude of justice, which is shown by even very young children in their sympathy with the weaker person in the contests they witness. The young child does not as a rule take account of circumstances in his reactions upon situ- ations arousing the sentiment of justice; he usually sides with the one in need of help, whether or not he is deserving of it. The feeling for fair play on the part of the child is not held in check until motives and extenuating circumstances can be reviewed. Before he acquires a sense of the need of equitable adjustment of relations, the child demands that rules be applied universally, irrespec- tive of persons or conditions, except where his own interests are im- periled thereby. The favoring of age in administering rules of justice is a matter of social, not physical, inheritance. In the beginning the child has no appreciation of motive or inten- tion in actions which affect him; he responds to them in view of their external character and their outcome. But with experience he learns to differentiate actions on the basis of his attitude toward the alter in performing them. He discovers that the alter reacts differently to ac- tions according to the intention of the actor in their performance. At the outset the child expects the alter will respond to his actions on the basis of their outcome. Then, as he is let off for accidental mis- haps, he comes in time not to hold himself responsible for deeds not done purposefully. But as his range of social contact widens, he is made to realize that he must suffer the consequences of his own care- less or even unfortunate, though not careless, action. As he grows on into adolescence, the idea of responsibility becomes more and more prominent, and the conditions of responsibility more involved. Before this time the factors determining responsibility are not considered as extending beyond the concrete self; but during the adolescent up- heaval introspection develops greatly, and the individual often takes account of his “natural” abilities and inherited powers and tendencies in estimating the degree to which he is responsible for what he does or fails to do. CHAPTER V RESPECT In popular thought, one will be “respected” only when he observes, outwardly at least, in his public and private life the more important social and moral standards and charaoter- ideals of the group with which he has vital rela- yA'as tions. It is true that under certain conditions we eae may respect persons who do not conform to the non less important (as we think) group standards of conduct ; but in such cases the individuals thus favored possess ex- ceptional qualities of some kind, usually marked strength of personality in certain particulars, which make it difficult for us to condemn or to ignore them. For example, the writer knows a man, a resident in a churchgoing community, who never participates in church services ; but nevertheless he is universally respected because he is absolutely frank, and yet considerate of the feelings of others, in the statement of his belief that he can do more good by spending his time in other ways than in attending church. And as he is an uncommonly forceful man, who serves his community in many directions, there is a general and yet definite convic- tion among those who know him that whatever he does cannot be seriously wrong anyway. Other men in the same commu- nity who do not observe the custom in regard to churchgoing are not highly esteemed by the faithful, since the former are not strong enough in other respects to counteract social disapproval for their lack of conformity in this particular. This is normally the way in a community where standards in reference to any action, even though conventional, are gen- erally observed ; the dissenter usually brings upon himself the censure of the group, though it is otherwise with the individual who can make his associates believe that in his 116 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION nonconformity he is pointing the way to higher things. Of course, the reaction of a community, either in approval or condemnation of a person’s conduct, may not be very dy- namically expressed ; respect is a much less definite, direct, aggressive attitude than others that we shall study presently. In passing, however, it may be remarked that men will as a rule express their attitudes positively and forcefully in reference to certain kinds of action which obviously affect social well-being profoundly. For instance, a cruel murderer will be dealt with in a direct and summary manner, since society realizes that if he or his type is left at large the com- munity itself will be destroyed. So the group will in a very marked manner commend a brave general who has per- formed some heroic service for his fellows, as when he has protected men in their lives and fortunes. In a more or less reflex way they celebrate his virtues in a conspicuous fash- ion, so that he and his kind may be prospered, and that others in the group may emulate him when the occasion presents itself. Rather striking examples of social and anti-social conduct have been mentioned, in order thus to illustrate the way soci- Respectisa ety reacts upon the individual when it can see with ae its own eyes, as it were, that he is either a friend iveattitude or a foe of the community. But social or anti-social conduct in modern complex society is not ordinarily of a sort that appeals directly to the senses, and sd stirs automat- ically the primal instinct of self-preservation. It requires rather obtrusive meanness on the part of an individual for the community to react vigorously upon him in the effort to protect itself, by checking or eliminating him. If an alder- man, for a consideration, gives away a valuable franchise in his city to a corporation, the community may realize ina way that by this act he has injured the social body ; but yet it does not seem to be a life and death matter. The anti-social deed does not occur on the instant; and, moreover, “there are always two sides” to a question of this sort because of RESPECT AN APPRECIATIVE ATTITUDE 117 its subtlety. Then a part of the community often cannot appreciate that a real damage has been done; this form of evil is so new and elusive that its seriousness cannot be generally felt, and consequently it does not arouse deep feeling in all members of the community. When a murderer or felon or traitor or incendiary or horse thief (in some com- munities) is at large, practically every one can react strongly to him, for they can image what may occur if he is not sup- pressed. But it is different with the ward boss, or the boodler, or the employer of child labor, or the walking delegate, or the adulterator of food-stuffs, or the “high financier.” As already intimated, the harm which these latter individuals do is not very concrete or obvious, and so it is not reacted to vigorously by the majority, perhaps, of the people. In the same way the man who is honest in politics and business, faithful in his marital relations, devoted to his filial duties, and true in all moral relations, may not, on account of these virtues alone, appeal to the impulsive emotions of his fellows, as does the hero on the battlefield or the football field or in the pestilence-stricken city. With much public display medals may be awarded to men who have performed service in these latter ways; but rare it is that any demonstration is made in celebration of the achievements of a man who has taught a class of students, say, to be honest, and to practice the virtues essential to the highest welfare of the community in modern times. The latter form of service is too complex, it is too new, it is not picturesque enough to awaken an urgent feeling of approval in society. There may be some expression of feeling from certain of the man’s friends; but it will be quiet, non-demonstrative ; it will indicate approval, a friendly attitude, confidence, trust, good-will ; in short, the individual will be respected. Tt is a common saying, even in America, that the child should be trained to respect his elders and those superior to him in any way, or in authority over him, or representa- tives of the state or the church, or any institution regarded 118 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION as sacred. It is the chief, perhaps the sole aim of the edu- Respect tor cational system of many peoples, as the Chinese, institutions the Meors, the Russians, the Italians, et al., to de- and superi- . iy ors velop in the young respect for the established insti- tutions, and all who are connected with them. It is apparent what the réle in the social drama of such a practice as this is; it tends to conserve the existing order of things, and to insure to those in authority a continuance in the enjoyment of their advantages. Those peoples who are most insistent in demanding respect from the young for the civic and ecclesiastic rulers are, as a matter of fact, most stable, in the sense that the social order endures longest without change. Even among such a progressive people as the Ger- mans there is relatively slow social readjustment. Indeed, the existing institutions and social distinctions are at the present time undergoing but slight if any change, though there is a rising tide of feeling against the monarchical form of government, which tends to keep the favored few in positions of great privilege as compared with the masses. But this unrest is due mainly to the infusion of foreign views into German life. Englishmen, and Americans espe- cially, are responsible for much of the growing disrespect for the established order in Germany. The education of the young still tends to conserve respect for the emperor and everything he favors, and also for the church, though dis- cussion has already begun to spread among the people the conviction that this institution is not supremely worthy of homage, since there are many forms in which it presents itself, and these are themselves antagonistic to one another. In a German school to-day it is no uncommon thing to hear the Protestant church, say, held up for veneration in one classroom, and for derision in another. Children early take sides, each party presenting to the other the errors and shortcomings of his faith. Inevitably this tends to break down allegiance and respect, though outwardly the young may defend the cause they have espoused, and they may CONVENTIONAL PROPRIETIES 119 conform to the conventional methods of showing apprecia- tion. But inwardly doubts and suspicions, aroused by the attitudes of associates, begin to develop, and they often strengthen until they destroy the original attitudes of re- gard and homage. But it is altogether different in reference to the training of the young to respect the state. From the moment they begin to understand any sort of instruction they are duly impressed with the greatness and majesty, and even the holi- ness, of the sovereign, and all who are the direct instruments of his will. In every schoolroom the mention even of the name of the supreme ruler is made an occasion for the dis- play of high regard by the pupils. The emperor’s picture adorns many schoolrooms, and no opportunity is missed to awaken in the young lively feelings of appreciation of and devotion to him. There is no splitting up into antagonistic groups among the pupils, some manifesting regard for the sovereign and others maligning him. If there is any show of disrespect on the part of nonconformists, the offenders are quickly suppressed, so that their vicious influence may not be permitted to poison the minds of those who are well dis- posed. In this way, the young are kept in an attitude of what outwardly resembles respect for everything that per- tains to the state as it is constituted at the moment. In the same way, respect is developed for the rulers of the house- hold, — the father and mother, and all adult members of the family. But is this really respect? or is it simply the observance of conventional proprieties? Are not “respectful” children very often simply those who are “civil” toward pospect ys, those in authority over them, whether kings, the observ- oe ance of con- magistrates, parents, teachers, or ministers? Such ventional children make way before their “superiors,” and ™Pretss respond to their inquiries with “yes, sir,” and “no, sir”; while children lacking “respect” in popular usage do not apparently recognize any social distinction between those in 120 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION authority and playmates. For a child to address his father as “sir,” while he does not so address his brother, is usually taken to denote that he appreciates his father’s excellence, and respects him for it. So, in the view of many people, children who are properly trained in the matter of respect will not interrupt their elders when they are talking; they will give them first choice in every situation where there is an advantage in having the pick. It has been intimated in previous chapters that before adolescence children do not “naturally” take attitudes Respect ys, toward their elders or their rulers in the ways admiration just mentioned. A boy of seven, say, does not normally manifest homage spontaneously in the presence of his father because of the latter’s excellence, except it be in the matter of unusual strength or courage or mechanical skill. So the child really does not in a true sense respect his father, no more than he respects any one else. He may admire a noted athlete or pugilist or an engineer or a fire- man, but he cannot be said to respect him. So the deference he shows to those in authority is generally the result of fear, originally at least, though it may be, at the age of seven, say, largely a matter of habit, thus having no sig- nificance for the attitude of respect so far as the child’s con- sciousness is concerned. What outwardly may seem to the onlooker to be an indication of recognition by the child of moral excellence in the one to whom he makes obeisance, may often be only a recognition of the wisdom of maintain- ing such an attitude for his own welfare. Not excellence but chieftainship in a superior is the real motive for assum- ing the obeisant attitude, if an untaught child can be said to be ever really obeisant. He may be polite outwardly, which will give the appearance of being respectful, but inwardly there will be a profound difference between the two attitudes. A boy of seven, say, is not yet aware, except in a very obscure way at best, of standards of conduct insisted upon by the community, and to which all for the THE MEANING OF SELF-RESPECT 121 common good should conform; and he is not critical in detecting whether those about him take cognizance of such a standard. His concern with people has reference primarily, not to their observance or negligence of ethical standards, but to their ability and willingness to help him achieve his ends, or to entertain him or to keep out of his way. With these introductory words upon the general attitude of respect, we may turn now to a consideration of the atti- tude of self-respect. This latter term implies that sce huey one can, on occasion at least, view the self objec- ing ot seif- tively, and take attitudes toward it in certain "?** situations as he would toward the alter in similar situations. It has already been said that, in the process of development, it comes about that the self and the alter are, allowing for minor exceptions, judged by the same ethical code ; though it was stated that, in times of crisis, the individual will ordinarily favor self as against the alter. However, there is a more or less prevalent view of the relation of the ego and the alter which may be mentioned best in this connec- tion, for it has a vital bearing on the attitude of self-respect. This view maintains that the genuinely ethical person will allow others larger freedom of action, in contravention of community-standards, than he will allow himself; that he will overlook in others transgressions which he will not condone in himself. People sometimes say they cannot toler- ate in the activities of the self certain kinds of dissembling, as in ordinary society relations, for example, which they may regard as permissible on the part of the alter if he can feel justified in his own conscience. This view undoubtedly reflects the trend of the advance guard in ethical evolution, but it is probably not truthful to the situation as it actually exists among us. It indicates that the race is making a supreme effort to develop in the individual the disposition always to exact of the self what he exacts of the alter ; and in order to put a prize on self-discipline, the latter is some- times in public representations exalted above its true status 122 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION at the present stage of ethical development. There is little need for society to urge the individual constantly to demand that the alter live up to community standards, for it is “natural” for one to make insistence of this sort. But it is necessary for society to urge the individual to deal rigidly with the self, which, as we have seen, is not as easy for most persons as to deal rigidly with the alter. People then stimulate and encourage and sustain themselves and one another in what they know to be ethically ideal by professing that they have more rigorous standards for self than for the alter; but this is a matter of aspiration mainly, if not wholly, for in their daily adjustments they do not seem to show adherence to these higher standards, which seek to keep the self completely under control, restraining it in its ego- istic and driving it onward in its altruistic tendencies. The instinctive and habitual inclination of the individual is de- cidedly in the direction of favoring the self; but his con- scious striving, his ideals, look toward holding the self to strict conformity to the highest social rules he knows, while leaving the alter to the discipline of his own conscience. Perhaps in certain instances this conscious ideal may have become stronger and more compelling than original tendencies, with which it must be in continual conflict; but if so, it is un- doubtedly rare, so rare, indeed, that it may be practically ignored. From what has been said above, it must be apparent now that respect and self-respect develop pari passu; and Origin of the same must be true also of the negative atti- the auitude tudes of disrespect and shame or mortification or Tespect contrition. When achild manifests disrespect for another on account of any act or attitude, he will tend to feel mortification or shame when he perceives himself in the same situation. So when he reaches the stage when he can assume the attitude of respect toward the alter for his social or ethical conduct, then he can assume somewhat the same attitude toward the self under similar conditions. It ORIGIN OF SELF-RESPECT 123 is very probable that an individual cannot feel either pleased or the opposite with the self, in respect to actions and atti- tudes which are of indifferent value as viewed in the alter; and the converse is unquestionably true. For instance, a boy of five is quite unmoved at the sight of soiled hands or face or clothes in the alter, and he feels no shame or humiliation whatever when his parents or nurse call his attention to his own unclean condition. It is the common thing for parents to attempt to shame their children at every meal on account of their soiled hands and face; but their efforts to arouse attitudes of self-condemnation fail utterly. Day after day and year after year the same efforts are made by the parents with the same outcome, until in the process of development the ideal of physical cleanliness commences to be established among the child’s system of values, when he will manifest displeasure at the sight of uncleanness. And as soon as he begins to appreciate this ideal with reference to self, he begins to appreciate it also as desirable in others. In the early years cleanliness in a companion is not a trait which the child counts for or against him at all, unless he be extremely offensive, so that he is a source of physical annoyance, to the sense of smell mainly. The esthetic or hygienic feeling of the child of five, say, is very rarely out- raged by the condition of his companions or any of his associates. It is true he may notice a very dirty face or a badly torn and soiled suit, but he regards them mainly as objects of curiosity. He does not assume a repellent attitude toward them, though he may repeat current conventional condemnatory phrases taught him by his mother or nurse. Not until the adolescent period is reached, and sex appre- _ ciation and feeling is awakened, does the individual become: genuinely responsive to neatness, cleanliness, etc., in appear- ance. Before this he must be urged to attend to his toilet so as to conform to conventional practice; but it is an arbitrary matter wholly with him, and unless constant pressure be applied to him he will relapse into his original 124 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION indifference to personal appearance, and he will not feel humiliated if he is detected with dirty hands or clothes. One rarely sees a child before the adolescent period ashamed or mortified or humiliated or even chagrined. Appearance Lhere is no evidence that remorse or contrition is ot the atti felt before this time. The child may be annoyed shame, and sorry and suppliant, and the like ; but these ae latter attitudes, which are aroused in direct ad- celtesteam, JuStment to objective conditions, are quite different eto. from the former, which show subjective feeling with discipline of the self. A child may be suppliant as a matter of expediency, but not show the least inclination toward self-condemnation ; one can tell by looking at him that he is merely doing the thing which he feels will at the moment save him from trouble. Instantly the indignant parent or nurse or teacher is appeased, the child assumes his wonted attitudes, in which he shows no consciousness of having transgressed any rules. But it is otherwise with the expressions of the mortified individual. His social environ- ment may change, but he may remain unchanged until the subjective difficulty into which his transgression has plunged him can be cleared up. As you watch the adolescent who has been made ashamed, you can see that, unlike the seven- year-old who has had exactly the same experience in out- ward. features, his attention is wholly subjective and his emotions centrifugal in direction. He is not now studying the attitudes of the alter, so that he can return to his ac- customed self-confidence and self-assertiveness as soon as the latter relents in his resentful expressions; on the con- trary, he is endeavoring to adjust his recent action to his ideal of what he should do, which ideal has been established in the manner worked out in preceding paragraphs. In the same way a child may before adolescence be vain of his possessions, or some article of adornment, as a ring; or he may be haughty or overbearing ; but he shows none of the attitudes attendant upon feelings of self-approbation or THE CHILD’S REACTION TO REPROOF 125 honor or esteem or veneration. That is to say, the self as an object to be respected or condemned does not play a part in the individual’s feelings and attitudes before the adolescent epoch. It is suggestive to note how unconcernedly children from the age of two or three to eleven or twelve receive reproof and criticism which might stir an older person |. ; ‘ 5 . e child’s very deeply. Sometimes one is placed in situations reaction to where he is compelled to witness a teacher, parent, ™ or other person attempting to arouse shame or remorse or contrition in a child, by charging him with offenses against fair play or truthfulness or decency or honor. The older person, even as an onlooker, may feel the sting of the rebukes given, but the child is liable to react as he may think best in adaptation to the immediate situation. His attention is likely to be wholly objective, so that the chiding does not strike in as the one who administers it expected it would. The child is apt to rebound the moment the criti- cism ceases, in which respect he is strikingly different from the adult, who would either feel abased or indignant, ac- cording as he thought the charges just or otherwise. Chil- dren before adolescence do not strongly feel resentment toward those who ascribe to them more or less serious deviation from social, ethical, and moral standards, in which regard they are again very different from the adult. This must mean that the child does not realize that the self is seriously injured by such charges of social alienation. It is true that a child as early as the fourth year will usually deny when accused that he has violated any rule of conduct which has been impressed upon him, mainly because of the attitude of the one who blames him. He feels, rather in- stinctively, that he should resist any one when he is in that peculiar attitude toward him which is seen in one who is charging another with some transgression. It does not make much difference to the child what the content of the charge may be; the featural, vocal, and bodily attitudes 126 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION are what give the victim his cue as to the sort of reaction he is to make. I can assume the attitudes of one who is charging another with lying, and then accuse a six-year-old of having studied his lessons in ‘school faithfully, and he will assume the negative or resistant attitude, thinking that I must be censuring him, and if he does not repel the charge he will be penalized. The child before adolescence does not mind seriously what people think of him, except as their estimate is ex- The child’s pressed definitely in very concrete actions affect- indifference ing his immediate welfare. The boy likes to be reputation spoken well of on the playground for his skill, since then he will be permitted to play in prominent positions in the group games. He likes to be talked about as a daring fellow, who cannot be frightened ; and to be made the leader of the group is a coveted honor, for which he will sacrifice much, and undergo ordeals of considerable rigor. At the same time it will annoy him to be called a “ tittle-tattle,” or “ coward,” or “ quitter.” However, his attitude in such a case is a combative or angry one, rather than one of humiliation, whether he be guilty or not. It approaches more nearly to humiliation the older the boy gets; until, in the high-school period, for one to be called by his fellows a prevaricator or talebearer, or to be given any other term of reproach, may cause him keen pain of the humiliative type, unless the victim feels he has been unjustly accused, when his attitude will probably be one of indignation and antagonism. This suggests how much more highly the adolescent values “reputation ””—his ethical, moral, and social rating in the eyes of his fellows—than does the child. One reason doubt- less is because the former has come to see more or less clearly that his well-being along every line depends upon his keep- ing the confidence and good-will of his associates, while the child, being under the care of his parents, does not really need to secure the confidence of those about him, except in INDIFFERENCE TO REPUTATION 127 respect to his playfellows. But it is otherwise with the ado- lescent, who is looking forward eagerly to the time when he will play an independent réle in social life, at which time he will prosper or fail according as he does or does not have the confidence of his associates. It is significant that the typical boy of seven or so has little desire to stand high in his studies or deportment in school, unless there is some concrete and very tangible reward therefor, such as a prize, or excuse from attending all the exercises of the school. He-does not care for the reputation he gets in respect to intellectual abilities or be- havior ; and the efforts of the teacher to appeal to the boy’s desire to be a “ good and intelligent man like his father” prove futile in the great majority of cases. There is nothing within the child’s experience which would enable him to re- spond to such an appeal. It is true that pupils, especially girls, from about the tenth year on are sometimes eager to get good “ marks” in their studies; but it is probable that in doing so they wish, more or less unconsciously, to win the good-will of the teacher and to avoid her scolding, rather than to gain the admiration of their schoolmates. So they do not experience true ethical or moral pride any more than they experience shame. They may assume the general attitudes produced by these emotional states in older indi- viduals; but such attitudes are aroused in view of outward and physical rather than ethical situations. It should be noted, however, that as the individual de- velops he can scarcely avoid having experiences wherein, through repetition, it is made evident to him that certain sorts of conduct are naughty or bad or mean or low or vul- gar and the like. And the individuals who are guilty of such actions are declared not to be “ nice” or “ respectable” or “decent,” and people must let them alone, or not show them favors, or invite them to parties, or share playthings with them, and so on. This expression of disapproval of evil doing, which is going on in the presence of the child 128 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION much of the time, makes him feel that it will be to his dis- advantage if anything of the kind is charged upon him. So he comes to resist vigorously whenever he is accused; and gradually he acquires a hostile attitude toward the one who accuses him, much as he would be angered at one who would strike him or otherwise injure him. The ten-year-old can hardly realize that his good name or his reputation will be blasted when misconduct is charged upon him ; he only feels in a general sort of way that if an accusation against him is left to stand he will suffer for it in some concrete manner. It is not on account of his eagerness to protect the self from moral or ethical injury that he reacts with such vigor against his accusers, but only that he does not want their indictments to rob him of any definite advantage he was enjoying before the charges were made. It is needless to add, possibly, that the transition from this stage in social development to the stage when the individual’s reactions to accusations always occur, in view of strong feeling for the preservation of the self against ethical debasement by the alter, is very gradual indeed; but it should be emphasized that there is such a transition, and when it has been accom- plished the individual reveals in all his expressions the change that has been wrought. It is of importance to note in this connection that we do not often hear the phrase, “a self-respecting child,” which indicates that people have ap- parently not noted in the young the attitudes which are an indication of regard for the ethical self, and of intense feel- ing of the humiliative type when it falls below the ideal of conduct set up for it by the individual. Our discussion thus far has led us to see that the atti- The attituae tude of respect is one mainly of appreciation; ot respectis it ig not essentially dynamic. The child who taken in view prima- loves a friend will normally manifest his affection rily of the . i ss ‘ ita io motives of 10 very definite objective ways; and the principle acne applies in respect to his feeling of hatred, and the like. But when he reaches the point where he begins to re- ATTENTION TO MOTIVES 129 spect or disrespect his father or other person, he is likely to grow subdued in his expression. The situations which call forth the latter attitudes are not so simple and well defined as in the case of the former ones; and they con- cern motives rather than the outcome of action, or the ex- ternal attributes thereof. Then as the individual acquires the tendency to go back of the actions of people to the feel- ings which prompt them, and take his attitudes in view of what he finds in the springs of conduct; as he inclines to take account of intentions rather than results in the con- duct of the alter, he grows naturally into the attitude of respect or the opposite. With broadening experience he comes to see more or less clearly that what is of real conse- quence in the alter is good, true purpose, and faithfulness in the performance of duty under all circumstances; and the man who can be trusted may be respected and honored, while the one who is not sound at heart merits only dis- trust and contempt. So the sentiment of respect concerns mainly the springs of conduct; if they are pure in any par- ticular case we respect the individual in question, even if the outcome of his actions is not always such as we might wish. But if the fountains of conduct are tainted we will put no further trust in the individual, for even though he may for the moment be in harmony with ethical standards of action, still we could not depend upon him if he should see an opportunity to take advantage of us. We can count upon the man whose motives are right, though he may be crude and ill-advised in some of his relations ; but we must always be on our guard against the sly, deceitful person, or he may stab us when our back is turned. Respect for a man gives us confidence in him, while we are suspicious of the one whom we cannot respect. As the child grows into the adolescent period and becomes ever more subjective in his tendencies, inevitably he begins to give attention to the motives behind his own conduct. As he queries whether the alter is faithful, to the end that 130 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION he can be trusted, so he inclines, ever more largely with rheintn. evelopment, to ask the same question of himself. ence ot If he can answer it in the affirmative, he can have fovcan confidence in his own integrity, in which case the ment opens general character of his conduct will reveal his of eet sense of congruity with social and ethical ideals, respect . ° He will resent a suggestion from any one that he is not worthy of the trust and confidence of his fellows. His very bearing will show that he is vitally conscious of the self in its relation to the ethical standards of the community. One cannot detect in the expressions of a ten-year-old any evi- dence that he is affected by a contemplation of the status of the self with respect to these standards. He simply lives his life of adjustment to concrete situations, in a wholly non- subjective or non-reflective way. But it is very different with the twenty-year-old. One can see in his attitudes clear testimony that the self has been made the subject of reflec- tion ; and the results thereof determine how the self reacts upon the alter’s expressions. The aim in this reflection is always to survey the self in view of the felt standards in the community. If such an examination shows that the self is not a transgressor, the individual will assume toward the alter an attitude of assurance or courage. He will feel that he is “as good as others” ; he has ‘nothing to be ashamed. of”; his “conscience is clear.” But if in his introspection he finds that he falls below the standards which he imposes upon others, and which are represented in public as binding upon all, then he will tend to treat the self in some such way as he treats the alter when the latter is found guilty. He will hesitate to go freely among his associates. He will be uncomfortable when he is with them, and he will not exhibit his accustomed courage and freedom until he has ex- piated his sin, or until he has forgotten it, and regains the feeling that he is again in harmony with the moral stand- ‘ards of his community. If the alter be found guilty of a shameful deed, the indi- THE LOSS OF SELF-RESPECT 131 vidual will express his disapproval thereof in some more or less dynamic way. He will not simply have feeling in refer- ence to the offender; he will strive toturn public sen- The timent against him, or he willrefuseto have relations teimar with him, or he may deal directly with him, inflict- Tiana ot ing upon him physical injury, or condeming him “ to respect his face,” thus hoping to humiliate or mortify him. But when the self is detected in thé performance of a shameful act, the only dynamic attitude that can be taken is a penitential one, in which the individual inclines to punish the self in some manner, by stripes, by fasting, by prayers, and the like. Normally this attitude is actually taken, thus showing that the self and the alter are judged by somewhat the same code. In its essential characteristics the attitude is one of moral disintegration, a weakening of the assurance of the self in relation to the alter. Loss of self-respect is then essentially a loss of confidence and courage in social adjustments. As one who has lost his self-respect is in a hostile attitude toward self, so he fancies the alter assumes the same rela- tion toward him, and he succumbs, except when he makes a supreme effort to resist the destructive influence of social condemnation, when he may become brazen and militant, a situation to be considered later. The expressions just noted are rarely if ever seen in chil- dren before adolescence. The ten-year-old boy may wilt under the condemning gaze or speech of one who knows he has com- mitted an offense against decency or fair play; he may be confused and embarrassed while his accuser is present to his senses ; but he will recover the moment there is a change in the one who condemns him. This is not the case though at sixteen and after, for then a feeling of mortification will endure after the one who occasioned it has disappeared. When shame is experienced by the adolescent his whole organism is unhappily affected, even the physiological pro- cesses, and the disturbance is not easily or quickly over- come. 132 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION It is probable that the individual cannot suffer in this manner until the adolescent revolution is well under way, The ettect 204 consciousness of sex has emerged. When sex uponthe appreciation makes its advent, it gives tone and sf tecpect color to most if not all of the individual’s senti- ofthede- ments. To a very important extent, the adoles- velopment : ofsexap- cent thinks of self in terms of the reaction of the Freciation Opposite sex; though if this reaction indicates lack of confidence, or disdain, contempt, and the like, the individual may resist it, and he may seek for reasons to sus- tain the self against its defamers. But sooner or later the attitudes of the other sex will play an important réle in de- termining his estimate of himself, in respect to moral and social qualities particularly. Moreover, the relations of sex greatly enlarge the range of personal attitudes, and give rise to sentiments which have had no existence heretofore, since there has been no function for them to perform. The evolution of these subtle sentiments gives a new direction to the individual’s feelings and renders them far more sub- jective than they were before this epoch. Normally the adolescent is most eager to seem to be of consequence in the world, to have merit in the eyes of those whose good- will and confidence he greatly desires. In brief, as soon as the individual experiences strong at- tachment for one of the opposite sex, he cannot avoid feel- ing deeply that he should be worthy of this one’s affection and trust. This leads him to a searching of heart and to an examination of motives, such as the ten-year-old never undertakes, and the results of this experience determine whether the adolescent will in contemplation of himself have self-respect or the opposite. If he is conscious of not being worthy, but if at the same time he is earnest in his intentions to be better, to live up to the standards which those he admires expect him to do, then he will assume the attitudes of contrition and humility. As he views his past he may be overcome with shame or mortification or remorse ; RESUME 133 but as he looks forward he may see himself a different indi- vidual, one who will realize in his thought, feeling, and action the ideals which he has set for himself, because they are prominent in the estimate of him held by those whose sentiments are of chief concern to him. True humility is, perhaps, the most complex and subtle of all the individual’s attitudes, and so it is never seen until toward the comple- tion of the developmental process. As a general thing a man will be respected by his associates only when he observes, outwardly at least, in his public and private life the more important moral and social standards and ideals of the Résumé group with which he has vital relations. Respect is a less definite and direct attitude than most of those the individual assumes in his social adjustments ; it is a restrained and appreciative rather than a demonstrative and dynamic attitude. Among some peoples a supreme effort is made to develop in the young respect for the established institutions of church and state and their representatives. Such peoples are more stable, but less plastic, than a people like the Americans, Also their children show more respect for parents, teachers, ministers, and the like than do our chil- dren. However, what may outwardly sometimes appear to be respect is nothing but observance of conventional proprieties. Again, a boy’s admiration for an athlete or engineer or other person who “does things” is often regarded as respect for him, but the two attitudes are essentially different. It is sometimes said that a genuinely ethical person will grant to the alter larger freedom of action in contravention of community standards than he will allow himself, and that he will overlook in others transgressions which he will not excuse in himself. But this is a matter of aspiration mainly ; in order to urge the individual to treat the alter as he does the self, the ideal of holding a higher standard for the self than the alter is purposefully overemphasized in public appeal: Respect and self-respect develop pari passu. The individual cannot feel pleased or otherwise with the self in respect to actions which are viewed indifferently in the alter ; and the reverse is equally true. Be- fore adolescence children are rarely ashamed or mortified or chagrined. They may feel annoyed or irritated, but they do not experience re- morse or contrition. Their attention in social adjustment is always objective. They do not view the self in its relation to the social and ethical standards of the community. Young children recover immediately from reproof or censure which might profoundly affect an adult, whose self-respect would be deeply | 134 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION wounded. Children are quite indifferent to their “reputation,” in which particular they are the direct contrast of the adult. However, a child may resist accusations of wrongdoing because he feels that if he lets it go he will suffer some concrete disadvantage. Respect is an attitude taken in view primarily of motives rather than the outcome of actions. Children cannot assume this attitude, then, until they begin to take account of the intentions of the alter in his conduct. Respect for a man gives one confidence in him, while we are suspicious of a person whom we cannot respect. At adolescence the individual begins to regard the self in the light of the motives behind its attitudes, which inclines him toward self-respect or the opposite. Loss of self-respect involves loss of courage and confidence in social adjustments. These expressions are rarely seen in children before ad- olescence. The development of sex appreciation at adolescence gives rise to attitudes of shame and the like, which may profoundly disturb the entire organism. The individual who, viewing his past, sees moral standards broken, but who at the same time earnestly desires to con- form to these standards in the future, will assume the very complex attitudes of contrition and humility. CHAPTER VI DOCILITY In preceding chapters attention has been directed to the individual’s readiness in appropriating the experience of others, when he sees clearly that it can be of mye onna service to him in accomplishing the ends for which #84 learner he is striving at any period in his development. It has been pointed out that the child prefers as companions those who are capable of teaching him how to perform tasks which he is endeavoring to master. In general, the boy who can organize a new game is preferred above one who has no ingenuity in this respect, unless, indeed, he is a noteworthy leader in other ways. If he be superior in any form of ath- letics within the range of the child’s abilities, the latter will ordinarily make a favorite of him. We have noted, further, that in the early years the individual is not strongly attracted by intellectual or moral superiority in his associ- ates, so that he does not normally choose playmates who can instruct him in regard to these matters. That is to say, the young child does not assume a learning or docile attitude toward certain aspects of his social environment, while he is distinctly in such an attitude with reference to other phases thereof, those presenting opportunities for acquiring acts involving competitive or constructive activi- ties within his sphere of appreciation and execution. He is usually eager to follow after any leader who excels in games, or who is skillful in making a kite or a boat, say. So, too, he will learn readily enough from one who can show him how to whistle, as an example, or to perform tricks requiring the dextrous use of any member of his body. Boys who can turn a somersault or handspring or the 136 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION like easily becomes leaders, and readily acquire a following of companions in an assimilative attitude. Again, skill (erude, of course) in playing the simpler musical instru- ments will make a boy prominent among his fellows, though this does not apply as a rule to the more complex instruments, especially the piano, until the adolescent revo- lution is well under way ; and even then the expert musi- cian will attract only a few choice learners. But one may observe in any community that young boys gravitate to- ward an associate who can play the jew’s-harp, or mouth orgar, or drum, or bones, and they neglect no opportunity to practice these instruments for themselves, and to secure the leader’s help in learning the coveted art. Once more, the child is always in a docile attitude toward his elders, and in general his protectors, whenever he ventures into the world among people or things that are strange to him. Often children who persist in “having their own way” in the home will be utterly compliant and tractable when they go into the city with father or mother or any older friend. However, as they grow to feel at ease in any situa- tion, they tend normally to become more independent in it, and less responsive to the suggestions of those whom they once obeyed implicitly. Strangeness, fear, danger appear to awaken the instinct of docility in the young; while in the youth or the adult they might stimulate attitudes of cour- age or defiance. But while the child is by birth a learner in respect to the sorts of activities and situations just indicated, he is in His attitude 2 quite different attitude toward most of the social toward = conventionalities and the culture to which the st of th cuiture and adults of the community attach supreme impor- faa" tance. From Plato down all observers of the society =: young have noticed the reluctance of children to adopt the customs and “ manners” of society; they strenu- ously resist the imposition upon them of the “ polite” atti- tudes generally assumed by the adults about them. As a THE CONVENTIONS OF SOCIETY 137 general thing, pressure must be applied continuously in one way or another until the adolescent period is reached in order to compel a child to observe conventionalities in respect to speech, dress, toilet, and so on, which are uni- versally observed by the grown people in his community. It normally requires great patience to teach a boy to be “civil” to his superiors; he naturally resists instruction of the sort, and follows it only when he realizes that he will be heavily penalized if he fails to do so. As a rule, boys must be trained for a long period to do such a simple thing as to lift their caps to ladies, and often instruction must be reinforced by physical stimuli applied repeatedly before the boy comes habitually to observe this formality. So in respect to most of the customs of an hospitable, esthetic, hygienic, and reverential character as found in the drawing- room, the dining-room, the school, the church, and so on. These conventions are for the most part expressive of a certain amount of courteous deference, and at the same time of reserve in the relations of adults; but the atti- ,_ mae tudes they demand in their observance seem not i fay “= to harmonize with the tendencies of the child. In operative in assuming these attitudes the adult cannot be said ‘Mahood to be really spontaneous ; he is more or less formal, and to a certain degree restrained, and it may be artificial. He observes the major conventions whether or not at the mo- ment he experiences the emotions of which they are natu- rally the expression. He will under ordinary social condi- tions often assume attitudes of respect and friendliness, even though he feels otherwise. At the same time he will hold in check his impulses to come into physical rapport with those who awaken his emotions of affection, except under certain conditions where restraining customs are not operative. That is to say, the adult has, through his conventions, brought himself into outward conformity to the more important practices of society, even though in- wardly he may be greatly at variance therewith. But the 138 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION child’s inner and outer attitudes tend normally to be con- gruent. If he feels anger, it is as a rule immediately put out into correlated motor adjustments. So if he feels friendliness, or doubt, or envy, the subjective state is embodied in appropriate outward expressions. When he bears affection toward an individual he is likely to express it by striving to embrace the object of his emotion, or to fondle or play with him in some way. On the other hand, when he feels. antipathy toward a person he is apt to en- deavor directly either to punish him or to put him out of the way. In any case, feeling tends to lead him into some sort of immediate physical contact with the objects inciting it; whereas in adult life the observance of conventions serves in a way as a barrier to keep individuals physically apart, and to prevent the direct expression of strong emotion. As the individual enters the adolescent period, and his range of personal adjustment is much enlarged, with the os result that new and more and more complex and ie change . atadoles- vital relations come to be established between eee himself and his associates, then he begins to feel the meaning and value of ceremonious conduct, which may as occasion requires express friendly or hostile relations without direct physical contact, or convey to the world at- titudes which are not actually felt. As the current of life broadens, and the slumbering impulses are aroused, there is gradually forced upon the individual the realization that immediate, primitive expression of feeling is inadvisable in a large proportion of social situations, and so he more or less readily adapts himself to customary modes of inter- course. The adolescent sees with some measure of clearness that the stability and peace of the community require that individuals assume conventional attitudes of affection, or respect, or deference, or antagonism, rather than to give way to unrestrained or unmodified passion, which is char- acteristic of the child. The youth cannot fail to appreciate that a society of adults, where emotion should be expressed ADOPTION OF SOCIAL CONVENTIONS 139 as bluntly as it is among children, would be one in which there would be constant conflict and disorder, as there is indeed in groups of children. So the individual must subdue his feelings, and give them vent only in the general ways which all may practice. This serves to preserve individuality to a certain extent; it protects the self in its isolation, and yet it permits of suf- ficiently intimate intercourse so that the advantages of communication and codperation may be secured. The point is that the child will assume a docile attitude toward the conventions of which those mentioned are typical only as his expanding life makes him feel their value, and really their necessity. At seven, say, he appears to have no real- ization of their utility, though there may be dawning upon him the conception that if he observes them he will get on more happily with the people around him, and they will favor him in a variety of ways. The “polite” boy will probably be commended by his parents and his neighbors, though he is not likely to receive the approval of his asso- ciates, who have not reached the point where they esteem “‘ politeness” as a desirable quality in a leader. Normally the child up to adolescence is relatively incapable of noting the advantages to be derived from the observance of social customs ; the tide of his buoyant life runs so strongly toward expression of social feeling that he is more or less indif- ferent to the attitudes of adults in their reaction upon his . conduct in this respect. It is important in this connection to note the behavior of the child who is coerced by those in authority into adopting the social conventions indicated. Here tne process is a boy whose mother is teaching him to remove ae wooded his hat, let us say, to the ladies on the street. At conventions the outset he normally resists ; he says he does not see why he should be made to do it; and when he neglects the thing he excuses himself by saying that he could not remember it, or that it was impossible for him to perform it, when 140 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION his real reason was his unwillingness to conform to the convention. One may hear boys of six or seven discussing among themselves this custom as a typical one, and they often ridicule it, and declare they will resist efforts made to compel them to observe it. An unpracticed boy does not “feel like himself” when he attempts it; it is not in accord with his habitual adjustments in such situations. It is as though he were assuming the personality of another, which, if he did it spontaneously, he could assimilate with his own personality ; but when he is coerced into it there is a conflict with the old habitual self. which does not coalesce readily with this new self as modified by adult convention ; hence the peculiar reaction. There is discord at this point in his evolution between the child’s real attitude toward people, and that which is urged upon him by his trainers. Tf left to himself, he would not adopt this to him peculiar mode of social expression, until he reached the place in his development where it would very clearly have value for him in facilitating his adaptations to the people around him. He would then be in the docile attitude in respect to it, but not before. The child’s efforts to assimilate conventions forced on him are attended by rather extraordinary outward demon- Fhe child's strations, which are doubtless the reflex of the reactions _ incongruous and perturbed inner states. In popu- upon con- Fentins —_ lar phrasing, he does the conventional thing half- him heartedly. He may go through the process, but nevertheless he is in a resistant attitude toward it. Out- wardly it seems that his personality is split in twain, one part contesting with the other. When the individual per- forms an act that is, as we say, “ normal to his nature,” his entire being proceeds in a unified manner in its expression, the aim being to concentrate the whole organism in all its movements upon the task that is to be accomplished. But it is otherwise with an act which he performs as a result of social pressure. This he does not treat respectfully. He REACTIONS UPON CONVENTIONS 141 scoffs at it; “makes fun” of it; does not try to do it just as the adult does, but exaggerates some aspect of it, or in- troduces ridiculous features on his own part. He does not give himself to it. The attitudes are more or less antago- nistic ; now he tends to resist, and now to conform. In a situation of this sort the individual is not dynamic; his energy is not concentrated into any one expressive channel. Throughout the child’s development, when he is being co- erced into the adoption of adult conventions, he manifests this peculiar attitude, showing his lack of docility with reference to them; but still he may choose to conform to many of them rather than to suffer the penalties of non- conformity. On the other hand there are some conventions, as putting on a napkin at the beginning of a meal, for instance, that some children will resist for a considerable period, several years often, even though they are “scolded” three times every day, and perhaps sent away from the table. In the majority of American homes doubtless there is more or less conflict over “table manners,” until the last child gets started on his adolescent reformation. It is, of course, somewhat different in countries where from the beginning the child is kept under, and regularly penalized for any infraction of rules or neglect of conventions. But even at a German, English, or Italian table, where children are given a chance to show their natural inclinations, one may see how slow they are to adopt adult manners, and how they resist them if they feel they have a show of gaining their own way. It is significant to observe the methods of the parent, the teacher, or the minister in dealing with children in their indifference or hostility to such social conventions as have been mentioned. The child may go just far enough in any instance so that he can say he has complied with the com- mand laid upon him, but usually he has only partially conformed, and in spirit he may have been in a resistant 142 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION attitude constantly. The parent then may say, -« Why don’t you do as I wish you to?” “ Why are you not more in earnest 7 “ Why do you take this thing as a joke?” and so on through a long list of fault-finding questions, all directed at the lack of appreciation of the necessity of being serious and faithful in the performance of an act. Even when the child “does what he is told” without much resistance, he may still fail to execute an action as his elders do, and up to the measure of his own abilities, if he is given any freedom to follow his inclinations. He will take advantage of any opportunity to have fun, at the risk of not thoroughly. completely, and accurately performmg his task. His attitude im such cases is not one in which he secks to imitate an adult model as closely as he can; but he tends rather to pursue his own immediate play interests. That is to say, the child is not normally, im respect to most of his activities, in the learning attitude, in the sense that he will strive to emulate the adult im his s