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FROM

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Lowa... Library fee.

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iii
History and Analysis.
of the /
_ Commission and City- Manager Plan
+ of
Municipal Government in the United States

. by,
Tso-SHUEN CHANG

SUBMITTED 70 THE FACULTY OF. THE “GRADUATE couuEcr ‘or ‘7HE STATE
: Dyn Wensrry “OF IOWA IN’ ‘PARTIAL: FULFILLMENT OF THE eee
23 _vOR THE DEGREE. or DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY :

PUBLISHED ar IOWA CITY * TOWA |
“1918
AUTHOR’S PREFACE

The purpose of this monograph is three-fold. In the first
place, the writer aims to trace the origin and development of
the commission plan and the city manager plan—the two latest
forms of municipal government in America—with a view to
ascertaining the defects of the older forms of city government
and the conditions which have led to a nation-wide movement for
the re-organization of city government.

In the second place, the writer attempts to explain, through a
detailed analysis of statutes and charters, the structure of
municipal government under the new régime, and to show
wherein the new plans have departed from the older forms of
city government in the United States.

Finally, the writer endeavors to discover the extent to which
the alleged advantages of the new plans have been sustained in
actual experience. His studies reveal the fact that the published
claims of achievement under the new plans have almost without
exception emanated from officials in charge of the government.
An accurate estimate of the actual success of the commission
plan and the city manager plan is rendered difficult by the fact
that it is well-nigh impossible to disentangle the improvements
which are due to the organization and administration of the new
forms from those which are due to that awakening of civic con-

sciousness which inevitably accompanies changes in government.
4 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

The writer avails himself of this opportunity to express his
thanks to many friends for their readiness in giving information
and furnishing materials for this monograph. It is to Profes-
sor Benjamin F. Shambaugh and Professor Frank E. Horack
that he feels the deepest obligation. From the beginning to the
end both Professor Shambaugh and Professor Horack took active
interest in the work and were never sparing in giving encourage-
ment. To Dr. Dan EK. Clark the writer is indebted for criticisms
and suggestions after the work had reached the manuscript

stage. Furthermore, he desires to express his appreciation of the
many courtesies extended to him by: the library staff of The

State Historical Society of Iowa and of the State University of

Towa.
Tso-SHUEN CHANG

Prexina GovERNMENT UNIVERSITY
PEKinG, CHINA
IT.
II.

IV.

VI.
VII.

VIII.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

7

DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 20

ORIGIN OF THE COMMISSION PLAN OF CITY
GovERNMENT

THE Drs MoINnES PLAN: ITS ORIGIN AND ITS
PROVISIONS

SPREAD OF THE COMMISSION PLAN oF CrTY
GOVERNMENT

THE Crry-MaNnaGER PLAN

QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE PosiTION or City-
MANAGER

SuMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
NoTES AND REFERENCES

INDEX

(5)

49

75

97
158

221
225
243
273
I
INTRODUCTION

It is only within recent years that the people of the United
States have shown any great interest in the problems of
municipal government. From the establishment of the national
government until about the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury the people were busy with the problems of expansion,
élavery, eivil war, reconstruction, and other pressing national
questions. These were solved one by one; but as a rule the cities
were left to develop under obsolete and outgrown charters, and
few people ever took much notice of them. The consequence of
this neglect i is well known to every student of American politics
and institutions.

‘American city government has had a multitude of grievous
charges laid at its door. Numbers of these accusations were
unjust, but far too many counts of the indictment have been
sustained. Instituted to serve the citizen, too often has the city
organization been the harbinger of those who robbed the people
by their corruption and inefficiency. These are stinging charges
to substantiate against our institutions of administration, but
even the most callow enthusiast must admit the fallacies in our
systems of municipal management. Such is the situation. 7d

Such were the conditions when students and writers began to
take notice of the problems connected with the various phases
of city government in the United States. They were greatly
startled, and the American electorate has at last awakened to a
realization of the need of improving the machinery of city. gov-
ernment. Municipal government in America has thus assumed,
during the last few decades, the position of an overshadowing
issue among the grave problems confronting the American
citizens.

‘unieipal government, especially American municipal govern-
ment, is certainly the most important and the most difficult
phase of government. It is most important because munici-

(7)
§ COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

pal government is ‘‘the foundation upon which is built the entire
governmental structure of the nation.’’® It touches the life of
the citizen at more points and is of more vital importance to his
interests than any other branch of government with which he
comes in contact. In the words of ex-Governor Hughes of New
York, ‘‘The source of political power is more and more to be
found in our cities. And there also, in an awakened feeling
of responsibility with regard to matters which directly concern
the lives of the citizens, may be found the needed purifying
force.’’> Indeed, city government in modern times is one of
the great factors in human life, and it gives promise of becoming
of even greater significance during the coming generation.

Municipal government is the most difficult to administer
because of the multitudinous and constantly increasing functions
which it has to perform, and also because of the exceedingly,
complex conditions of modern municipal life under which these
functions must be exercised. The great concentration of popu-
lation, the rapid growth of industrial centers, and the diversity
of interests in the modern city have brought into the foreground
a mass of new and complicated problems which the city is com-
pelled to face and solve. Indeed, the cities are ‘‘the nerve-
centres of the social, industrial, and political world.’ At the
same time, the mechanism of city government, which in this
country was modelled on the pattern in vogue for the nation and
the States and which fitted the wants of the public at the time
when municipal problems and municipal evils were unknown,
has proved to be very defective under the complex conditions of
modern times. Hence, there arises the problem of reorganiza-
tion, that is, the problem of adjusting the mechanism of gov-
ernment to the conditions and problems which municipal govern-
ment has to face.

Such a problem of readjustment and re-organization is by no
means peculiar to municipal government: it is equally present
in the Federal and Commonwealth governments. It has been
well said that in this country ‘‘there is never a year in which the
people of one State or another are not assembled in convention to
reconstruct its organic law from its very. foundations. There
is never an autumnal election at which the people of several
INTRODUCTION 9

States do not vote for or against important changes in their
Constitutions.’’> To the same effect are the words of James
Bryce: ‘‘America changes so fast that every few years a new
crop of books is needed to describe the new face which things
have put on, the new problems that have appeared, the new
ideas germinating among her people, the new and unexpected
developments for evil as well as for good of which her established
institutions have been found capable.’’¢

This spirit of restlessness and constant agitation for improv-
ing existing conditions is more manifested in the movement for
new city charters than anywhere else. Since the beginning of
this century the movement for good city government has spread
over the whole United States. The progress of municipal re-
form, however, has been slow, although not unattended by
encouraging features. But the movement, even at the very out-
set, had produced a ferment in a thousand active minds. Or-
ganizations for municipal reform have become numerous and
widespread, and publicists and statesmen have searched dili-
gently for the model system of government which would rescue
the cities from inefficiency and misrule.

The recent reform movements in municipal government,
having proceeded upon the theory that failures in administra-
tion and leakages in the public treasury are due more often to
inefficient organization and antiquated methods than to official
dishonesty, are directed along two distinct lines—home rule and
commission government.’ ‘‘Home rule seeks an enlargement of
the powers of the municipality ; commission, government, a more
efficient organization to exercise these powers. The city’s powers
are inadequate, according to the first movement; its organization
is inadequate, according to the second.’’8

Of all the plans yet tried, that of government by a commission,
having as its goal the re-organization of the machinery and
methods of government, is the most promising.’ In connection
with this form there has been recently developed a modified
plan, known as the city-manager, or commission-manager, plan.
The commission form and the commission-manager plan are the
most conspicuous developments of recent years in the realm of
American municipal affairs: they deserve serious and careful
consideration from students of government.
10 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

The commission form of city government is not a definite ard
fixed type of municipal organization. With the increase in the
umber of cities operating under this so-called commission form
of zovernment, and with the increase in the number of devia-
tidns and departures from the original Galveston plan found in
various cities and communities which are claiming to have a
commission plan of government, it is rather important to have
clearly in mind at the very outset, what is and what is hot com-
mission government.

The term ‘‘commission government’’ as applied to American
cities is somewhat misleading and confusing. It is misleading
in that the word ‘‘commission’’ has usually implied an appoint-
ivé body. But ever since the Galveston commission ceased to be
appointive by the Governor and became elective, there has been
no ¢ity in the country ‘“‘governed by commission,’’ except Wash-
ington, D. C., the government of which is entirely different from
what we now understand as commission government.” It is con-
fusing, because in those States where ‘‘commissions’’ have been
important branches of State administration, the term is used in
connection with two entirely different things—according as it is
applied to State or to city.

When applied to State and national administration, the term
‘‘eommission’’ is used in connection with the practice of dele-
gating the administration of certain specified functions to
appointed administrative boards or commissions, such as the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Board in
the national government, and the railroad commissions and tax
commissions in the Commonwealth governments. These com-
missions are appointed by the President or the Governor for
definite terms with fixed purposes, and are often granted almost
complete power in their particular spheres. Consequently,
‘““eommission government,’’ as applied to States and viewed
from the standpoint of State administration, connotes ‘‘de-
centralization, the delegation and division of authority and
responsibility, and the disintegration of popular control.’’#
The same idea is more effectively and more strongly expressed
by Francis H. White in an article entitled State Boards and
Commissions in the Political Science Quarterly, as follows: ‘In
INTRODUCTION ti

efféct; the coiimlission system establishes a fourth department
of government directly responsible neither to the people, for
thé members aré seldom elected; nor to the legislatire; for it
does not appoint of remove; nor to the Governor, for thotigh he
appoints, it is seldom he has the power of removat:’’!3 For this
reason théfe has beéh developed, with the spread of the move-
ment, considerable prejudice against the number and scope of
such commissions which, as has been assérted, take away the teal
power from the representatives of the people.

But the térm ‘‘commission governmént’’ has dn entirely
different meaning when applied to municipal administration. In
contrast with its use in connection with State administration;
the term when applied to municipal administration is used to
designate ‘‘the most concentrated and centralized type of or-
ganization which has yét appedted in the annals of représenta-
tive municipal history.’’+ Commisyion' government, as applied
to the city, has been defined as ‘‘that form of city government
in which a small board (less than ten) elected at large, exercises
substantially the entire municipal authority; each member being
assigned 4s a head of a rather defihite division of the adminis-
trative work; the commission being subject to one or more means
of direct popular control such as publicity of proceedings, recall,
referendum, initidtive and a non-partisan ballot.’ ’

Under the above-quoted definition, some notice may be taken
of the differént elements which are included in this type of
municipal government. These elements are not all of equal
importancé: some of them are very essential, without which a
chatter can riot properly be placed in the commission govern-
mient class; while others, though more frequently incorporatéd
in commission charters than im charters of other types, have in
reality nothing more to do With commission government than
with any other type of municipal government.

The leading features or characteristics of the commission form
of government may, thérefore, be éonveniently divided into two
classes: thé essential, did the non-essential. The essential
féeatires are those which are absolutely necessary to identify a
Glidfter a8 a Commission govefnment charter; and the non-edséen-
tél features are thosé which tidy or may not be incorporated
12 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

into a commission charter without in any way affecting the status
of the charter as respects the commission plan. Opinion may
differ as to what are essential and what are non-essential features
of commission government. But among all writers there is
agreement that the most essential element which distinguishes
the commission charter from all the other types of charters
and which accounts for the popularity and widespread adoption
of the plan is this: ‘‘conspicuous responsibility—and hence ac-
countability—of all elected officials to the people.’’#6

This ‘‘conspicuous responsibility’’ is secured, in the first place,
through a complete centralization and concentration of all
powers and responsibility in a small council or commission,
which is never to exceed ten members and usually. consists of not
more than five. This council or commission must not only
exercise all administrative authority, but. must legislate as well.
Indeed, the abandonment of the doctrine of the separation of .
powers as applied to municipal government and the concentra-
tion of the legislative and administrative authority in a single
small body is the predominating feature of the new system.
Furthermore, the members of the commission must be the only
elective officer of the city, with the possible exception of the au-
ditor, and must have the power of appointing and removing all
the subordinate administrative officials of the city. Finally,
each member of the commission is placed in charge of a par-
ticular department so that the work of administration is ‘con-
veniently sub-divided and close oversight of each branch of
municipal work is insured. The individual commissioner is re-
sponsible to the commission as a whole for the work of the par-
ticular department of which he is the head; and the commission,
in turn, is responsible to the citizens and voters for the entire
administration of city affairs. Consequently, official responsibil-
ity is not only definitely fixed, but fixed on the officials elected
by the people.

Writers on the commission plan seem to agree with regard
to the features just discussed, but upon other points it appears
that opinions differ. Other features which have come to be re-
garded in the popular mind as the earmarks of the commission
plan have been considered by some writers as essential features
INTRODUCTION 13

and by others as non-essentials. Among these debatable features
may be mentioned election-at-large, the non-partisan ballot, the
merit system in the appointment of subordinate administrative
officials, and the placing of officials under direct popular control
through the initiative, referendum, and recall.?7

Election-at-large is no doubt desirable in small cities, as it
tends to eliminate petty log-rolling and to emphasize the unity.
of the city. But the importance of this feature has been over-
emphasized: almost all the writers regard it as one of the chief
essential features of the new plan, and almost all commission
statutes and charters contain provision for it. But it must not
be forgotten that commission government is a type of municipal
government, and that election-at-large and representation by
wards are simply methods of representation. Hither of these
two methods may be included in any type of municipal organiza-
tion without modifying in any way the essential features of that
particular type of government. Indeed, many city governments
of the old orthodox type elect their councilmen on a general
ticket. Boston and San Francisco are examples.4® But the
election of the councilmen on a general ticket does not in any way
affect the municipal organization of these two cities.

The elimination of the ward as a characteristic feature of the
commission plan is perhaps due to the fact that for a long time
ward elections have had a bad name in this country. ‘‘Ameri-
can ward representation, ward politics, and ward organization
have come to be associated in the public mind with bossism,
trickery, and almost everything else that is politically demoral-
izing. A feeling so deeply lodged can scarcely be without some
substantial foundation.’’4® But in England, where councillors
are chosen from wards,”’ the method works in a highly successful
manner. The difference, as pointed out by Professor Beard,*!
lies in the fact that ‘‘ward offices in this country have been
characteristically unimportant and obscure.’’ In the commis-
sion plan or the commission-manager plan, however, a councillor
or commissioner is an exceedingly important officer: his position
is entirely different from that of his prototype, the councilman
under the old type of city government. Thus, there is no ground
for believing that the commissioners must be elected at large lest
the commission principle be violated, as one writer has said.**
14 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Furthermore, when cities of fifty thousand population or up-
wards—like Oakland, St. Paul, Jersey City, Buffalo, and others
—have adopted the new plan of government, there have been
good reasons for advocating the election of commissioners by
wards, instead of at large. In such cities ‘‘the mere size of the
electoral unit acts as a discouragement to independent candi-
dates of moderate means and gives advantage to organized stand-
ing political organizations, inasmuch as the task of improvising
an equally effective impromptu vote-getting organization is
too much for the resources of the individual candidate. In
larger cities, therefore, ward election or proportional representa-
tion is advised, as a genuinely free and open competition for
office is more likely to ensue.’’? To the same effect are the words
of Professor Herman G. James.*# ‘‘The practice of election on
general ticket,’’ he says, ‘‘presents increasing difficulties the
larger the area of election, since the labor and expense of con-
ducting a campaign are greatly augmented. But aside from
that, it seems unquestionable that some of our largest cities are
made up of several geographic divisions which really have rather
distinct needs and whose interests would perhaps better be con-
served by a representative body in which these geographical
divisions as such have representation.”’

Indeed, a ward election under the commission form of city
government will be a different matter from that witnessed in the
past, for the commissioner under the new plan is a very im-
portant officer—one of the supreme directors of the city. Thus,
it seems that it is possible, and in some cases even advisable, to
have a ward system of representation under the commission
form, and that there is no ground for speaking of the general-
ticket system as the essential feature of the commission form of
government. Election-at-large is not an essential feature, but
simply one of the ‘‘other features’’ of the commission form of
city government.”

Other features which are frequently connected with the com-
mission form of government are non-partisan election; the
initiative, the referendum, and the recall; and provision for a:
civil service commission. Ever since the Des Moines plan in-
corporated these features they have been found in almost all
INTRODUCTION 15

commission charters, as well as in nearly all recent charters of
other types. But they are by no means essential features of
commission government. The non-partisan ballot is certainly:
very desirable, but not indispensable; for ‘‘the short ballot by
making the party label a superfluous convenience, thereby de-
stroys much of the label’s influence anyway.’’** The initiative,
referendum, and recall are methods of direct legislation and
devices for enforcing popular control over officials. These de-
vices may be applied to any branch of government, national,
State, or local. Indeed, the initiative and referendum were to be
found in the New England town meeting long before the appear-
ance of commission government. There is, therefore, ng more
reason to connect these features with commission government
than with any other type of city organization. The same is also
true of the civil service provision, which is but one of the methods
of selecting public officials and fundamentally has nothing to do
with the commission form of city government as such.

Thus, all these new devices for enforcing popular control,
which are almost always attached to recent commission statutes
and charters, do not enter vitally into the theory or practice of
the plan as such. When all these non-essential features are
eliminated, “conspicuous responsibility” is the only essential
element which characterizes the commission plan of government.
In other words, ‘ ‘a true Commission Plan is one which conforms
to the Short Ballot principle which is defined by the Short Ballot

Organization as follows;
* First: That only those offices should be elective which are important
= enough to attract (and “deserve) public examination.
Second: That very few offices should be filled by election at one time,
so as to permit adequate and unconfused public examinations
of the candidates.”

Thus the true test of a commission charter simply depends
upon whether or not it embodies the element of ‘‘conspicuous
responsibility’’, and if this fact is borne in mind there will be no
difficulty in deciding what is, and what is not, a commission form
of city government. This distinction is important because there
are many cities in the United States which, while desiring the
advertisement that has usually accompanied the adoption of
this type of government, and being at the same time unwilling
16 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

to abandon the old eighteenth century political superstitions,
have adopted one or more non-essential features of the commis-
sion plan and have then advertised themselves as commission-
governed cities.

In spite of the spread of the commission form of government
during the last decade, and in spite of the numerous beneficial
results which have been actually attained in cities operating
under this type of government, the commission plan of city
government has not proved to be the ‘‘cure-all’’ its enthusiastic
advocatés expected. Commission government is no panacea for
all municipal evils. The merit of the plan consists in pointing
out the way to some simplifications in the machinery of city
government. But it is far from being perfect. There are defects
in this system, just as in any other plan of government, the most
serious of which arise in connection with the actual administra-
tion of the plan.*8

Theoretically there are in the commission plan, as has already
been pointed out, both the collective responsibility of the com-
mission as a whole for the entire administration of the city and
also the individual responsibility of each commissioner for the
administration of the department which has been put into his
charge. But as a matter of fact the collective responsibility
of the entire commission is of secondary importance, while the
individual responsibility of the members is by far the most im-
portant consideration. It usually happens that the individual
member in charge of a particular department may not be in
sympathy with the policy imposed upon him by the commission
as awhole. In such a case—especially in cities where each com-
missioner is elected to a specific office—he may choose to regard
himself as responsible to the people rather than to the commis-
sion; and instead of carrying out the policy formulated by the
commission as a whole, he may. choose to carry out a policy of
his own, which may not be in harmony with the policy of the
other departments. In the experiences of some commission-
governed cities there are not lacking instances which point to
such an effect.2? Indeed, the system of independent elective de-
partment heads is not consistent with the theory of undivided
responsibility. Administration has been defined as ‘‘that func-
INTRODUCTION 17

tion of government which demands for its proper exercise cen-
tralization of power and responsibility.’’2? But such an ad-
ministrative centralization of power and responsibility can not
be secured under the five-headed administrative system, even
though real experts can be secured through popular election, and
even though the salaries provided for are large enough to attract
the services of efficient administrative officers. The various
phases of municipal administration, although divided among
different departments, are so intersecting and so overlapping in
their spheres of operation that they can never be independent
of each other. Administrative efficiency is impossible unless
there is centralization of power and responsibility—which, in
turn, can not be secured unless there is a central single-headed
executive authority.

Another serious question which arises in connection with
commission government is the question of how real experts can be
secured to take charge of the administrative work in each de-
partment. ‘‘A man cannot be taken from the merchant’s store
or from the workman’s bench and be turned into an efficient
administrator by the simple magic of popular election by free
citizens of a great republic.’’! When the voters are asked to
elect commissioners to take charge of specific offices, they are
burdened with the difficult task of gauging the executive and
administrative ability of the candidates. Such a task, as exper-
ience has proved, is beyond the power of the voters, in view of
the natural inability of the ordinary citizens to judge the
technical qualifications of the different candidates for the office.
Furthermore, the imposing of requirements of technical or ad-
ministrative ability in elective officers not only narrows the field
of popular choice, but also restricts the freedom of the people
to follow their instincts and choose candidates primarily. with
reference to their representative character.

On the other hand, if the commissioners should be chosen in a
body, with power to apportion the offices among themselves after
the election, then there is the possibility of the choice of popular
candidates, each of whom might be well qualified for a certain
one of the offices, while none of them might be fitted for any
of the other positions. Undoubtedly, there are arguments for
18 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

and against election to specific office and election at random,5*
but as both of these plans are unsatisfactory, they will not be
discussed further in this connection. The results of the elective
systems, whether providing for election to specific office or for
election at random,*? as provided in the ordinary commission
plan are just the same: amateurs are called upon to execute
what only those with professional experience are competent to
perform. This is a very serious defect of the new plan. It is
so serious that some students predict the failure of the plan be-
cause of the provision for the popular election of the city’s ad-
ministrative department heads.

In the hope of remedying such defects in the commission plan,
there has been evolved the city-manager plan, which would pro-
vide for the possibility of expert administration together with a
unification and centralization of administration. ‘‘It creates a
single-headed administrative establishment instead of the five
separate administrative establishments seen in the Des Moines
plan. This administrative unity makes for harmony between
municipal departments since all are subject to a common
head.’’*? The city-manager plan, is therefore, the inevitable and
logical outcome of the commission plan. It carries forward still
further the ideas of centralization and responsibility which find
expression in the commission plan.

The essential characteristics of the commission-manager plan
are, therefore, the centralization of administrative and legisla-
tive powers. Under this plan there is, in the first place, ‘‘a sin-
gle board (commission) representative, supervisory and legisla-
tive in function, the members giving only part time to municipal
work and receiving nominal salaries or none;’’ and secondly,
‘‘an appointive chief executive (city manager) hired by the
board from anywhere in the country and holding office at the
pleasure of the board.’’*+ The city-manager is, then, ‘‘a compe-
tent, experienced, trained and capable person selected on account
of his peculiar fitness and ability to manage the affairs of the
city.’ 785

Thus, under the new plan, the attempt has been made to dif-
ferentiate the legislative from the administrative power. But
this is not the same kind of differentiation that existed under the
INTRODUCTION 19

old council-mayor plan. In former times it was the fear of po-
litical tyranny that raised advocates of the doctrine of the
separation of powers, and therefore administrative and legis-
lative authority are lodged in different bodies which are in a
large measure independent of one another. To-day the theory
of the separation of powers has been abandoned under the com-
mission plan because of the political inefficiency that would re-
sult from the adoption of such a doctrine. But the question still
remains whether legislative and administrative powers can safely
be intrusted to an elective body, without militating against the
highest administrative efficiency. Finally, the question has been
solved by making the functions of the commission supervisory
and legislative, and by vesting the administrative authority in a
city manager, who is hired by the commission, is under its su-
pervisory control, and holds office at its pleasure. The city man-
ager is, as Childs has aptly put it, a ‘‘controlled chief exec-
utive.’’86 It is the aim of the latest plan in American city gov-
ernment to dispose of the conflict of authority and responsibility,
and to overcome the difficulty in securing expert administrative
department heads as found under the commission form. At
the same time it is an attempt to avoid the evils arising in con-
nection with the independent executive plan of city government.

Such, in brief, are the fundamental principles underlying the
commission form of city government and the commission-man-
ager plan. It is the purpose of the writer in this study to trace
the origin and development of these two plans of city govern-
ment in America, and to analyze the statutes and charters
relating thereto.
IT

DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MUNICIPAL
ORGANIZATION

It is difficult to understand why there has been of late so
strong a sentiment in favor of the adoption of the commission
form and the commission-manager plan of city government, un-
less one first has clearly in mind the general trend of American
municipal development. The movement towards city govern-
ment by commission or by commission-manager is not an isolated
municipal experiment, but a phase of a general tendency; and
in order to appreciate the real significance of this particular
form of municipal government, to grasp the causes which called
it into being, some knowledge of the history of American
municipal organization is indispensable. A brief survey of the
institutional history of American municipal government from
the colonial period down to the end of the nineteenth century is,
therefore, necessary.

‘‘American municipal government has its historical origin in
the chartered boroughs or municipal corporations established in
several of the English colonies during the seventeenth and first
half of the eighteenth centuries.’’®? Again, colonial municipal
corporations had their origin in the English borough. Thus,
there is a continuous development of the institutional history
from the English borough, through the colonial municipal cor-
porations, to the American cities of to-day. The influence of
English conditions on the American charters, both colonial and
modern, is clearly visible. In the first English charter granted
in 1665 to the city of New York, it was expressly stated that the
officials of the city should be ‘‘Knowne and called by the Name
and Style of the Mayor Aldermen and Sheriffe, according to
the Custome of England in other his Majesties Corporations. ’’%8
In commenting on the first Boston Charter of 1822, Nathan
Matthews says that ‘‘in substance, the organization provided by
the charter was simply an adaptation of a form of municipal

(20)
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 21

government which has existed for centuries in the commercial
towns of England.’’*? A few words on the system existing in
England in the seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth
centuries are therefore necessary for a proper understanding of
the beginnings of American city government.

The typical English borough about that time has been de-
scribed by Bishop Stubbs as ‘‘a close corporation of a mayor,
aldermen, and council with precisely defined organization and
numbers—not indeed uniform, but of the same general con-
formation—possessing a new character denoted in the name of
‘corporation’ in its legal sense.’’4? Uniformity in English bor-
ough government at that time was impossible, because each
borough was incorporated through a separate grant by the
Crown of its own special charter. As a consequence the powers
and functions of these corporations varied widely. As a rule
the sphere of action of the English borough about that time was
a very limited one. ‘‘The management of local police, the ju-
dicial administration, the direction of markets, and the charge
of the ancient town property sum up the local interests under
the control of the borough governments even in the larger
towns. ’’#1

Such was the model on which the original American system
of municipal government was framed. During the colonial
period twenty corporations were created by the Governors as
representatives of the Crown.” All these charters were accepted
by the inhabitants of the incorporated area: they were not im-
posed on the people since it was a principle of the English law
that the King could not create a corporation without the consent
of the people affected thereby.#*

In all cases the grant of a borough charter provided for the
creation of a governing body, which followed very closely the
pattern of English municipal organization during the latter
part of the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth
centuries. The principal authority in these boroughs or cities
was the Common Council, which was composed of the mayor, a
recorder, and a number of aldermen or assistants, all sitting to-
gether as one body. After the English pattern, the mayor, the
recorder, and the aldermen were vested with certain judicial
22 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

functions in addition to their duties as members of the Common
Council. But contrary to the prevailing English system, the
councilmen and aldermen were elected ‘‘by a popular vote under
a franchise which everywhere included all of the well-to-do
classes, and generally a large proportion of the residents, though
in no case was manhood suffrage established.’’44 With few ex-
ceptions, aldermen and councilmen were elected for a term of
one year. In Philadelphia, Annapolis, and Norfolk the English
system of the close corporation was followed. Here the govern-
ing body was a close corporation, that is, ‘‘the aldermen and
councilmen held their positions for life, and vacancies among
the aldermen were filled by the corporations (7. e. by the Com-
mon Council), and for councilmen by the mayor, recorder, and
aldermen.’’!5

Following the English precedent, the mayor was in no case
chosen by popular vote. In the close corporations he was elected
from the existing aldermen by the corporation, and in other
cases he was appointed by the Governor of the Province.
Whether elected or appointed, the mayor held office for a term
of one year; but re-appointment was not uncommon. The mayor
was the presiding officer at all the meetings of the aldermen and
of the Common Council, and his presence was necessary to con-
stitute a quorum. He had no power of appointment unless
delegated by the council, and in no case had he a veto power.
In Philadelphia he did not even have the right to vote in council;
but elsewhere he had such a power. He was also charged with
the execution of the laws and ordinances and therefore had
rather a wider police power than had any other member of the
Common Council. ‘‘These conditions tended to center the ad-
ministration to a considerable degree in his hands; while his
influence in municipal affairs was further increased by the fact
that he was usually a man of much experience in the affairs of
the corporation, and that in practice he held office for a number
of years. Thus, even during the colonial period, the mayor be-
came something more than a dignified figure-head, and was a
real force in the municipal government.’’!é

The functions of the colonial borough included judicial,
legislative, and administrative duties. The judicial functions,
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 23

which were vested in the mayor, the recorder, and the aldermen,
were relatively more important than the other functions. The
mayor, the recorder, and the aldermen were each justices of the
peace, and while sitting together they. formed a local court of
record. In some instances they were members of the county
court.”

As to the legislative powers, the municipal corporations were
authorized to ‘‘make, ordain, and establish such laws and
ordinances as should ‘seem to be good, useful, or necessary for
the good rule and government of the body corporate’ and to
alter and repeal the same.’’48

The administrative jurisdiction of the colonial corporations
were ‘‘almost exclusively over matters of special interest to the
small urban communities, and seldom included any of those mat-
ters for which there was a general system over the entire prov-
ince.’’49 But as local needs increased with the increase of the
population in certain places during the eighteenth century, and
as the corporations had no authority under the charter to supply
these needs, frequent additional grants were conferred on the
corporations, not by the Governor, but by the colonial assembly.

Thus, American municipalities during the colonial period,
though modelled on the then existing English boroughs, differed
from the latter in several distinctive features. ‘‘Close corpora-
tions were the exception ; the mayor was already an active official
in the city government; central control over the municipalities
existed from the first in the Governors’ power of appointing
mayors; while the way was paved for a more active control
through the special legislation of the assemblies in response to
the demand of the municipalities for larger powers than those
conferred in their charters.’’5?

Such, in brief, are the chief characteristics of the American
colonial municipal system. The most striking feature of it is
the fusion of the legislative, administrative, and judicial duties
in one and the same body of persons. This fusion of duties has
led President Goodnow to conelude that the present commission
system of government ‘‘returns to the original form of city
government in the United States in that it concentrates all pow-
ers, administrative and legislative, in one authority.’’** Para-
24 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

doxical as this statement may seem the commission system of city
government has evolved logically from the colonial framework
of local government. During the colonial period when the
functions of the municipalities were few and when the local
needs to be provided for were not pressing, the machinery of
government which had to carry out these functions and to satisfy
the necessary local needs was not required to be highly organized.
Indeed, government under such conditions was very simple: a
single board of a few members could administer the entire
government, and in the colonial municipalities this proved to be
the case.

But as conditions have gradually changed and when public
health and safety, education, poor relief, the improvement of
highways, and scores of other new problems have come within
the horizon of the activities of the municipality, new organs
have been added, from time to time, to the existing machinery
of government, and consequently the mechanism as a whole has
become more and more complex. This tendency was illustrated
by American experience in municipal government during the
first and second quarters of the nineteenth century, when various
offices were created and different boards or commissions were
either elected or appointed to take charge of the various fune-
tions and to solve the numerous problems which burdened the
municipalities because of the rapid changes in the industrial
and social conditions of the city.

Such developments continued for some time without criticism ;
but finally the people discovered that the complex and compli-
cated machinery was not satisfactory and that the principle
underlying the existing structure was fundamentally wrong and
unsound. The result has been a reaction against the cumbrous-
ness of municipal machinery—a reaction which came during the
latter part of the nineteenth century and manifested itself in
the movement for the simplification of the machinery of govern-
ment. The logical outcome of this reactionary movement has
been the return to the original principle of municipal organi-
zation through the creation of the commission form of govern-
ment, in so far as the vesting of all the municipal authority in a
single body is concerned. Indeed, the commission form has been

 

 
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 25

regarded by an eminent authority on the subject as ‘‘the climax
of a well-defined movement, from the influence of which hardly
a single large city in the country has been entirely exempt’’5*—
a fact that is evidenced by. the history of American municipal
development.

Differentiation of American municipal government from the
British borough type had already proceeded to a considerable de-
gree even during the colonial period. But the Revolution and
the establishment of the State Constitutions brought about still
greater changes in municipal government in this country—par-
ticularly with respect to the position which the city henceforth
occupied in its relation to the State government.

The substitution of elected for appointed Governors changed
the entire relationship between the city and the State. In the
first place, the Governor ceased to appoint the mayor—this
function being transferred to the State executive council. Sec-
ondly, the charter-granting power was transferred from the
executive to the legislative department of the State government.
To be sure, a number of charters appeared after the Revolu-
tion; but they were issued by the State legislatures in the same
manner as other statutes were enacted. ‘‘By this change these
charters could not claim the privileges of special grant which
could not be violated: they. were simply legislative statutes, and
as such liable to be altered, changed, or revoked by subsequent
statutes.’’5$

Although the first legislative charters did create municipal
government practically in conformity to the then existing or-
ganization, there were still marked differences between the new
municipal constitutions and the old ones. Not one of the new
charters was based upon the close corporation idea; and the
popular election of the councilmen was firmly established as the
fundamental principle of American municipal government.*

Such changes can be well illustrated by the history of the city
of Philadelphia during this period. With the Revolution the
first charter of Philadelphia, known as Penn’s Charter granted
in 1701, came to an end. But ‘‘when the war cloud had passed
by, the evils arising from the lack of systematic government be-
came so imminent that the memories of past grievances van-
26 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

ished before present necessities, and in 1783, a petition largely
signed was presented to the legislature and referred to the city
members.’’*> As a result the second charter of Philadelphia
was passed by the legislature on March 11, 1789. By this
charter the government was made essentially representative, and
the administration of local affairs was vested in the mayor, alder-
men, councilmen, and the recorder. The aldermen and coun-
cilmen were elected by the people, the mayor by the aldermen,
and the recorder by the mayor and aldermen.

This charter and others enacted during this decade are impor-
tant as ‘‘marking the complete legal supremacy of the legislatures
over the municipalities, since not even the existing charters are
recognized as barring any measure the legislature might feel
disposed to enact.’ Indeed, this decade has been well termed
as ‘‘a time of special crisis [in municipal development], an epoch
of transition from the old English to the new American type of
urban government.’’®’

It may be noted in this connection that several salient features
stood out prominently in the political philosophy of the states-
men of this period. Chief among these was Montesquieu’s
theory of the separation of powers: that is to say, the powers
of government should be distributed among three distinct de-
partments—legislative, executive, and judicial. Another char-
acteristic of the political philosophy of the time was a preference
for the bicameral legislature composed of members representing
different interests or geographical units. The theory of the
separation of powers and the idea of a bicameral legisature con-
stituted the most important features of the system of the
eighteenth century political philosophy. Indeed, the principle
of divided power or of checks and balances had become an axiom
in political science and a maxim of constitutional government.
The fundamental idea underlying the whole system was that un-
limited power should not be vested in any department.*® These
principles, which were formulated in connection with the re-or-
ganization of national and State governments, and which were
sanctioned in the organic laws of the States and the nation, were
gradually transferred to municipal government. Thus the
dominant factor in municipal development during the last
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 27

decade of the eighteenth century and the first quarter of the
nineteenth century was the influence of the so-called ‘‘federal
analogy”’’.

In the closing years of the eighteenth century a series of
new charters had been passed and several old ones amended.
Among them, the charter of Baltimore enacted in 1797 and the
act passed in 1796 to amend the Philadelphia charter were
particularly important because they marked the beginning of
the application of the ‘‘federal analogy’’ to municipal govern-
ment. In Philadelphia the amendment to the charter introduced
the bicameral system. The aldermen, recorder, and mayor were
deprived of all legislative powers, which were now exclusively
vested in a select council of twelve members and a common coun-
cil of twenty members who were popularly elected and who acted
in separate bodies.*® A third house or division of the council,
consisting of fifteen aldermen, was to be appointed by the Gov-
ernor. They were to hold office during good behavior and had all
the powers formerly vested in the board of aldermen, ‘‘legislative
powers only excepted.’’ The mayor was elected annually from
the fifteen aldermen by the select and common councils in joint
session. According to the charter, the duties of the mayor ‘‘be-
sides that of an alderman of the said city, shall be to preside in
the mayor’s court when present, to promulgate the by-laws,
rules and ordinances of the corporation and to pay special atten-
tion to the due execution and fulfillment of the same’’.©° He
had no power of appointment, no control over city officers, and
no veto power.

The Baltimore charter of 1797 vested the government of the
city in a mayor and a bicameral city council. ‘‘The lower house
or First Branch was composed of two members elected annually
by popular vote from each of the eight wards into which the
city was divided. The upper house or Second Branch was com-
posed of one member from each ward, elected by a miniature
electoral college made up of one elector from each ward chosen
by popular vote at the time of electing the members of the First
Branch. The mayor was elected at the same time and in the
same manner as the members of the Second Branch of the coun-
cil.’’62 By subsequent legislation the electoral college system
28 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

for the choice of the members of the Second Branch was abol-
ished, but it was retained for the election of the mayor who
was given the same veto power over the acts of the council as the
President of the United States has over the acts of Congress. But
in the distribution of powers the national model was not exactly
followed, for in the matter of appointment the mayor was re-
stricted to two candidates for each office nominated by the coun-
cil.62

The beginning of the nineteenth century marked no distinctive
changes in municipal organization. There were few charters
enacted in the first two decades, the more important being the
charter of New Orleans issued by the Territorial legislature in
1806, and the first city charter of Detroit enacted in the same
year. The New Orleans charter followed practically the lines
already laid down in the earlier charters. The officers were a
mayor, a recorder, a treasurer, and a number of subordinate
officers ; and the council was composed of fourteen aldermen, two
from each of the seven wards into which the city was divided.
The mayor was appointed by the Governor of the Territory, but
provision was afterwards made for his election.®

The charter of Detroit vested the government in a mayor ap-
pointed by the Governor, and a city council composed of two
chambers of three members each—all elected by the people. The
mayor was given an absolute veto power in reference to all the
acts of the council and he had the power to appoint all city offi-
cers except the register. The council was given extensive powers,
the exercise of which was subject to the mayor’s veto.*

The consequence of this incorporation of the chief features of
the national and State governments in municipal charters was
very unfortunate. The system of checks and balances in mu-
nicipal government, instead of safeguarding the interests of the
people against the arbitrary and ill-advised acts of public offi-
cers, became an obstacle to the prompt and efficient performance
of municipal functions which were constantly. growing with the
growth of cities. These changes, the autonomous mayoralty, the
bicameral council, and the executive veto, which made their ap-
pearance in municipal charters before the close of the second
decade of the nineteenth century and which distinguished the
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 29

municipal organization of this period from that provided in the
colonial charters, were made ‘‘not because those who were re-
sponsible for them had any experience applicable to municipal
conditions—for at the time these changes were made no one
can be said to have had this experience, as the modern city is a
very new thing,—but because these changes were in accordance
with principles which it was universally believed had been
successfully applied in the national and state governments.’’&
With the exception of the changes just mentioned, the operations
of municipal government during the first two decades of the
nineteenth century had not undergone any marked transforma-
tion from those of the colonial period.

The period from 1820 to 1850 was characterized by the further
development of the features already noticed in the previous
period. At the time, the appearance of new tendencies was
not lacking. In the new Constitution of New York, adopted in
1822, important changes in municipal government were intro-
duced. The appointment of the mayor was henceforth taken
from the Governor and vested in the city council.“ Three new
charters enacted about the same time went a step further and
provided for the popular election of the mayor. These were the
charters of Boston and St. Louis (1822) and Detroit (1824).
But the mayor was still in almost all instances not a very im-
portant officer in the administrative system of city government.
The charter of Boston illustrates this point. The financial,
executive, and administrative powers of the government were
vested partly in the mayor and the aldermen, to whom the
powers of the selectmen of the town were transferred, and partly
in the city council to be exercised by concurrent vote of both
branches. ‘‘Beyond the power to appoint committees which
this position gave him, the mayor was little more than a
figure-head ; and although he was enjoined by the charter ‘to be
vigilant and active at all times in causing the laws for the gov-
ernment of said city to be duly executed and put in force’, and
‘to cause all negligence, carelessness and positive violation of
duty to be duly prosecuted and punished’, the Legislature
omitted to clothe him with powers necessary for the performance
of these duties.’’s”
30 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

The charter of St. Louis vested the administration of the af-
fairs of the corporation in a mayor and a board of aldermen, all
of whom were to be elected annually by the qualified voters.
Both the mayor and the aldermen were required to possess a free-
hold estate within the city limits, and were vested with powers
not differing from those conferred upon like officers in other
cities.68

The Detroit charter of 1824 provided a considerable number
of elective officers. Among them were a mayor, five aldermen,
a marshal, a supervisor, an assessor, a collector, and three con-
stables, all chosen annually. The other officers, including a re-
corder, a treasurer, and a clerk, were to be appointed by the
mayor and the aldermen. The mayor, the recorder, and the alder-
men. were to constitute the common council, and the recorder
was to be the vice mayor of the city.*9

The New York charter of 1830 was another typical charter
of the period which indicated fairly well the general trend of the
time towards the elaboration of the administrative principles
already introduced during the previous decades. The charter
of 1830 ‘‘proposed nothing short of an entire remodelling of the
city government after the pattern of the federal and state con-
stitutions, but the spirit of their too general enactments was
little carried out in practice.’’”® By this charter the city council
was divided into two chambers ‘‘for the same reason which has
dictated a similar division of power into two branches, each
checking and controlling the other, in our general govern-
ment.’’’?! The mayor was given the right to veto any order or
resolution of the council, although his veto could be overridden
by a two-thirds vote of both chambers. The charter also pro-
vided that the executive business of the municipality should be
performed by separate departments organized and appointed by
the council. From the mere fact that the mayor could veto the
ordinances of the council, however, it should not be inferred that
the mayor was made the chief executive of the city. For, as has
already been noticed, there were several commissions appointed
by the council to perform the executive business of the city.7?

During the two decades from 1830 to 1850 numerous new
municipalities were established and new charters enacted. Pro-
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 31

fessor Fairlie mentions forty cities with a population of 30,000
or more that received their first charters during these two
decades.”* The chief feature in all these charters were the ex-
tension of manhood suffrage and the tendency towards popular
administration. A few examples of these charters may be taken
to illustrate this general trend in charter-making at the close of
the second quarter of the nineteenth century and subsequent
years. The charters of Cleveland (1836), Chicago (1837), and
Milwaukee (1846) are typical of this period.

The Cleveland charter of 1836 vested the government in a
mayor and a council. The mayor, the members of the council,
the treasurer, and the marshal were all to be elected annually.
The council was composed of three members from each ward
and as many aldermen as there were wards, elected on a general
ticket, but no two of them were to be residents of the same ward.
The number of wards was fixed at three, but the council had the
power to increase or change the number. ‘‘This is certainly an
extraordinary system, establishing a city council composed so
curiously of local and general elements, with power to increase
or decrease its own members at pleasure.’’?4

In the Chicago charter of 1837” two tendencies appeared:
first, the extended use of the suffrage in the increase of elective
officers, and the tendency of the mayor and council to divide
functions. The principle of popular suffrage, though recognized
in the new charter, was by no means unrestricted in its applica-
tion. Indeed, property qualifications for the suffrage generally
prevailed throughout the country during this period and Chi-
cago was no exception to the general practice. But the restric-
tion in the new charter was not excessive: a normal tax of three
dollars paid within one year before the election entitled the
resident to the privilege of the suffrage, and the members of the
governing body were required to be free-holders. The sig-
nificance of the Chicago charter in this regard was that by im-
posing such low property qualifications it opened the way for the
introduction of universal manhood suffrage at the earliest pos-
sible date. It was only four years later that all property quali-
fications were removed.
382 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

The governing body, as provided by the charter, was a coun-
cil composed of the mayor and twelve aldermen. The mayor was
popularly elected for a term of one year. As far as administra-
tion was concerned he was still unimportant: he was simply a
presiding officer of the council. He had-no appointing power
and could not veto any ordinances passed by the council. In
reality the charter ‘‘prepared the way for a separation of admin-
istrative and legislative functions by removing the mayor from
the control of the council in his tenure, but in the development
of his power it did not radically follow out the division of powers
at the time.’’’6

The council was by far the most important body. Indeed, the
government provided by the charter of 1837 was an administra-
tion by the council, which was supreme in all essential matters.
“‘The supreme position of the council in the charter of 1837
naturally gave it complete control of the municipal patronage.
It elected annually a numerous array of administrative officers,
who possessed more or less discretionary authority, subject final-
ly to the will of the council.’’”? But the supremacy of the
council was only of short duration and its powers were greatly
curtailed by the charter of 1847, which, in accordance with the
prevailing tendency to increase the functions of the electorate,
made the city attorney, the city collector, the treasurer, and one
policeman for each ward elective and directly responsible to the
electorate.” Thus, ‘‘popular administration has been preserved
and fostered in the American municipality to the exclusion of a
trained service, by extension of the suffrage to many offices,
which, in their nature, require previous preparation.’’?9

The Milwaukee charter of 1846 showed exactly the same tend-
ency towards popular administration. The governing body of the
city consisted of a mayor, a common council of three aldermen
from each ward, and also a justice of the peace and a constable
from each ward. All of these officers were popularly elected,
with a tenure of office for one year, except the justices of the
peace whose term was two years. The mayor was given the im-
portant duty of presiding over the common council, in addition
to the usual executive functions. He had no power to vote, ex-
cept in cases of a tie. All other officers—such as clerk, treasurer,
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 33

attorney, assessor, and the like—were appointed by the common
council. But the appointing power of the council was removed
in the next year and the treasurer, the attorney, the marshal,
and assessors were made elective by an amendment to the char-
ter. But the powers of the aldermen in other respects were
increased during the next few years by a series of special acts
and further charter amendments. ‘‘These authorized the coun-
cilmen of various wards to levy special taxes for grading and
graveling streets, building wharves, and dredging the rivers;
to levy a general harbor tax; to borrow money and issue ward
bonds for street work, and for building market houses; and to
provide in various ways for building sidewalks, sewers and the
like. All such work was supervised by the aldermen (who also,
in a few years, were empowered to make contracts for the same),
we can imagine what vast opportunities developed for the grafters
and the ward politicians. ’’8?

It was during this stage of municipal development, when the
council was practically supreme in administration and when the
appointing power was almost entirely in the hands of the alder-
men, that the spoils system made its first appearance in the
selection of city officials.

The American municipal council, as has already been pointed
out, was practically the only municipal authority known to law
in the early days. During the colonial period and a few decades
following the council discharged practically all the municipal
administrative functions, while the mayor was relatively unim-
portant, though signs were not lacking to indicate the opposite
tendency about the beginning of the nineteenth century. But
with a few exceptions like Baltimore and New York City, where
the mayor was given the power to veto ordinances, the council,
up to the second quarter of the nineteenth century or even later,
was the all-important, central body of the city government. All
the governmental activities of the city were put into the hands
of this organization. Its functions included both the making of
the ordinances and the carrying on of the administration. Ad-
ministrative functions were discharged through the committees
of the council, as has been indicated by the charters which have
just been analyzed. The council committees appointed to take
34 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

charge of specific phases of city administration had the power
of appointing all of the subordinate administrative officers, sub-
ject to the approval of the council.

Gradually separate city executive departments were formed
to take charge of the administrative work. In the very begin-
ning the heads of these departments, like the council committees,
were appointed by the council. Under both systems the respon-
sibility for the executive business of the government was divided
among a large number of officers, and could never exactly be
located. The consequence was lack of efficiency and cohesion in
the city administration. Worse still was the intrusion of the
political parties in the city elections and city affairs.

“Tt was natural and inevitable, under such conditions, that
political parties should grasp for the control of cities and villages
and extend their party tests and spoils system methods over
them. Nowhere else could parties so effectively organize, find
so many subservient voters, grasp so much patronage, or so easily
extort large sums of money and other spoils—in a space so small
and easily dominated—as in cities. City party government
which enforced party tests of opinion for all offices and places
in the city service, was, therefore, quickly extended to every city
and village, equally without consideration of its fitness and with-
out resistance.’’8? The influence of the political parties in mu-
nicipal affairs increased with the expansion of municipal activi-
ties which made possible the increase in the number of positions
in the city government available as rewards to the party
workers. The increase of municipal activities and functions was
mainly due to the growth of cities.

A marked tendency towards a rapid development of cities was
seen everywhere during the first part of the nineteenth century.
Indeed, the growth of large cities has been said to constitute the
“‘oreatest of all the problems of modern civilization.’’8?
“‘America forms no exception to the rule that population in
civilized lands gravitates towards great centers. Though her
immense agricultural development might have been expected to
arrest this movement and divert population to the rural districts,
such has not been the case.’
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 35

City life was practically unknown to the forefathers of this
Republic. In the year when Washington was inaugurated the
city of New York was an overgrown village of 33,000 popula-
tion, about as large as the city of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in 1910.
Philadelphia had a population of 42,000; Boston, 18,000; and
Baltimore, 13,000.84 In fact, New York, Philadelphia, Boston,
Baltimore, and Charleston were the only cities in 1790 having
& population in excess of 8,000.8

The opening of the nineteenth century marked the begin-
ning of a new era in the growth of urban population. In the
first few decades, ‘‘there opened the era of canals, followed
closely by the era of railways, which not only built up great
commercial centers, but stimulated the industrial cities by im-
mensely extending their markets. The rate of increase goes up
from thirty-three [percentage rate of increase of the urban pop-
ulation as compared with the general rate], the country’s aver-
age in 1810-20, to eighty-two, two and one-half times the coun-
try’s average in 1820-30.’’86 The opening of the Erie Canal in
1821 was responsible for the rapid expansion of the commercial
centers in New York State. About the same time the expansion
of manufacturers in the New England States caused a consider-
able concentration of population there. The work begun by the
canals was immediately followed in the decade from 1830 to 1840
by the activities in the construction of railways, and the cities
grew apace, attaining their maximum rate in the decade from
1840 to 1850.8”

The growth of cities was sure to be attended by the growth of
the functions and activities of municipal government. The cities
were now required to perform more functions and to render
more services to their respective communities than ever before.
In 1845 New York City organized the first disciplined police
force in the country, and in the same year a paid fire brigade
was established in the same city. In the next year Boston began
the construction of the Cochituate water works; Chicago pro-
vided a municipal water supply in 1851; and Baltimore followed
in 1854. In New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore large public
park systems were established. The rapid expansion of mu-
nicipal activities was manifested in almost all the cities.%
36 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

With the rapid growth of the cities and the development of
municipal functions on the one hand, and with the entrance into
municipal government of political parties which aimed at the
control of the entire governmental machinery so as to increase
their power in the State and nation on the other hand, import-
ant changes were introduced into the system of municipal gov-
ernment as it existed in 1850. The result was the advent of a
new period in the development of American municipal organiza-
tion which was mainly characterized by the growth of special
legislation, the decline of the power of the council, and the es-
tablishment of the board system.

The cities in this country were, up to that time, mostly cre-
ated by special charters.8® The special charter is in its nature a
special grant to a particular local area for the purpose of con-
ferring certain powers and imposing certain duties. The de-
mands of each community are, as a rule, carefully considered by
the charter-granting authority and the scope of the powers
granted is usually in accordance with the needs of the particular
locality at that particular time. These grants of powers are
usually enumerated in great detail and, though suited to the
needs of the city at the time when the charter was granted, could
not be satisfactory for all time. The industrial and economic
conditions of the city are such that the enlargement and increase
of municipal activities and functions are necessary and inevit-
able. Thus, even in colonial times cities often found their grant
of powers to be insufficient, especially in the matter of finances,
and there was frequently application to colonial legislatures for
the extension of charter powers.”

The rapid growth of the urban population in the nineteenth
century and the corresponding increase in municipal activities
were invariably forcing the city to apply continually to the
legislature for new powers to perform the new functions. As a
consequence, ‘‘the special statutes providing for the extension
of municipal action entered into greater and still greater detail
of means and method, thus depriving the municipal councils of
their main functions of a legislative character, and making the
State legislatures the real policy-determining power for the
cities.’’** The constitutional provisions protecting the city
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 37

against the interference of the legislature were especially few in
the earlier State constitutions; and the State was in most cases
prone to take advantage of the unprotected position of the
municipalities, and to interfere in matters which were purely
local in character and might be better regulated by the mu-
nicipalities themselves.%

The State legislature, beginning about the middle of the nine-
teenth century, not only made the charters of the cities and
amended them from time to time, but frequently interfered with
minor details in the administration of the cities by creating new
boards wholly or partially independent of the councils. Thus,
the so-called board system was inaugurated.

‘Although the transfer of power over the city. administration
from the city council to independent boards under the control,
directly or indirectly, of the State authorities was to a consider-
able degree partisan, the council itself was also responsible to a
certain extent for such a change. Before the close of the middle
of the nineteenth century, the inefficiency of the American munici-
pal council became very marked. The council had discredited
itself before the people. As Matthews said in 1895, ‘‘A distrust
of municipal legislatures and of the incapacity of their com-
mittees to conduct the executive business of a city government
has been the chief feature of municipal development in this
country during the past thirty years.’’*? Thus, the State legis-
lature, partly for partisan purposes and partly voicing a
popular distrust of the city council, finally determined to take
away from the council the power to organize the executive
departments and to appoint the heads of these departments and
other municipal officers. The legislature itself assumed the
power to determine what executive departments should exist
and how the heads of these departments should be appointed.
The beginnings of such a tendency are to be found in the New
York charter of 1849.

The fundamental feature of the New York charter of 1849,
which was enacted by the legislature and accepted by the people
on a referendum vote, was the establishment of independent ad-
ministrative departments and the almost complete removal of
executive power from the council. The charter expressly for-
38 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

bade the common council, or any committee or member thereof,
to ‘‘perform any executive business whatever,’’ and such busi-
ness was vested in the newly created departments, the heads
of which were chosen by popular vote for a three year term.%
The purpose of applying the theory of the separation of powers
to municipal government, which had been attempted in various
previous charters, was thus completely carried out. The di-
vorcing of the administrative arm of city. government from the
legislative was complete in this New York charter of 1849.

But the New York charter of 1849 in creating the independ-
ent administrative departments was not the only exponent of
such an idea. Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, and
many other cities furnished like examples in the decade which
followed. In Cleveland the general act of 1852 provided for
the popular election for terms of two years of the mayor, city
marshal, civil engineer, fire engineer, treasurer, auditor, solici-
tor, police judge, and superintendent of markets. The board
of waterworks trustees and three city commissioners were elected
for three years.”

The Chicago charter of 1851 extended the list of elective
officers to include the mayor, city marshal, treasurer, collector,
surveyor, attorney, chief and two assistant engineers, two alder-
men from each ward, a police constable, and a street commis-
sioner, and other officers from each division. The tendency to
enlarge the executive power in this charter was another instance
indicating the movement away from administration by the coun-
cil. The mayor was now made responsible for the proper enforce-
ment of the laws of the State and the ordinances of the council.
He was ‘‘required to give information, from time to time, to the
council and recommend such measures for its consideration as
the demand of the administration might require. He was no
longer a perfunctory signing officer, but the important weapon
of the veto made him a factor to be reckoned with in municipal
administration.’’ Furthermore, under this charter the appoint-
ment of the committees was transferred from the council to ‘the
mayor. With this change the mayor became at once a controlling
factor in shaping the policy of legislation.”
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 39

The Detroit charter of 1857, though not curtailing to a great
extent the powers of the council, did provide eight charter
officers to be elected by the city at large and several more by each
ward.9”

The charter of Philadelphia enacted in 1854,% and the revised
charter of Boston obtained in the same year,?? though not taking
any aggressive step in curtailing the powers of the council, did
grant to the mayor the veto power over the acts or ordinances of
the council.

An examination of the charters of this period will show that
the general tendency of municipal development, beginning about
the middle of the nineteenth century, was away from the council
type of city government, and that almost in every charter pro-
vision was made either to increase the powers of the mayor or
to create independent boards to take charge of the administra-
tion of the city. The heads of these newly created departments
were usually elected by the people during the time when the
dictates of democracy were everywhere coming to prevail.

But the system of popular election of administrative heads
was soon found to be unsatisfactory because efficient heads for
the various administrative branches of the city service could not
be secured in that way. Thus, a change in the method of select-
ing the departmental heads was demanded. But wherever such
a change was made, the old method of appointment by the coun-
cil was nowhere restored. The power to select these officials was
taken from the voters and given to the mayor in the most im-
portant cities, with the restriction that his appointment should
be subject to the confirmation of the council. New York made
the change in 1857 when the general charter law passed in that
year made all the department heads, except the comptroller and
city counsel, appointive by the mayor with the confirmation of
the aldermen.22? Chicago and Baltimore followed suit within a
year or two. These changes were intended to strengthen the per-
sonal relation between the mayor and those who had charge of
the work of administration. ‘‘The idea of making the mayor
responsible for the appointment of a municipal cabinet com-
prising the heads of the various departments soon gained pop-
ularity, partly because it seemed in consonance with the general
40 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

plan of American government as exemplified in the larger areas
of state and nation, and partly because the people of the cities
were beginning to look upon the mayor as the pivotal figure in
local administration. Indeed, the decline of popular confidence
in city councils and the increasing confidence in the chief magis-
trate form the outstanding features of this period.’’/?

But the transition from the irresponsible and independent
board system to the responsible mayor system was not so easy of
accomplishment as seemed at first sight. The State legislature
would not willingly relinquish its control. No sooner had the
board system been adopted and the attack on the custom of
choosing all the chief executive officers directly by the people
commenced, than the State legislature perceived an opportunity
of tightening the reins of State control over city administration
by providing for the State appointment of the members of these
boards. Such interventions, marking the highest degree of
legislative control over municipalities, occurred in several
States during the late fifties.

The first State which took such action was New York. In 1857
the Republicans inaugurated the policy of placing some of the
most important local departments of New York City under the
control of legislative commissions. A State park commission
for New York City and a State metropolitan police board for
New York, Brooklyn, and adjoining counties were established.
The State park commission consisted of seven members, named
by the legislature and given exclusive power over the adminis-
tration of the parks. They were given power to ‘‘require the
city even to issue bonds in such amounts as they saw fit, subject
only to limitations set by the act.’’9? ‘‘State control of the
police departments was deemed specially desirable because of the
real danger from disloyal disturbances, as well as of the im-
portant influence exerted by the police in elections.’’29% In
order to accomplish such a purpose within constitutional bounds,
a metropolitan police district, comprising the counties of New
York, Kings, Westchester, and Richmond, was created; and the
management of this district was put in the hands of a board con-
sisting of the mayors of New York and Brooklyn and five ecom-
missioners appointed by the Governor. By a subsequent act
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 41

the ‘local influence on the board was entirely removed and the
commission was reduced to three members to be appointed by
the Governor. Then, the ‘‘metropolitan fire department’? and
the ‘‘metropolitan board of health’’ were established in 1865
and 1866 respectively.124

The attitude taken by the New York legislature towards the
city of New York was not the exception but rather the rule.
In 1860 the legislature of Maryland, under the excuse of the
disorder brought about by the political excesses of the Know-
Nothing rule in Baltimore, transferred the control of the local
police from the city to a State board of police commissioners.1%
By the police act of 1861 the legislature of Illinois re-organized
the police force of Chicago and placed it under a board, the first
members of which were appointed by the Governor.’ In 1865
the board of metropolitan police, consisting of four commis-
sioners to be appointed by the Governor with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, was established by. the city of Detroit.7”7 In
the following year the Cleveland police was, in like manner,
placed under a State commission to be composed of the mayor
ex officio and four members appointed by the Governor.1® In
Pennsylvania the act of 1870 created a public buildings commis-
sion to have charge of the erection of municipal buildings for
Philadelphia.”? Instances of this kind could be multiplied,
but the illustrations already given will be sufficient in this
connection.

In all the cases cited above the boards or commissions enjoyed
almost complete control over their departments. They not only
directed their administration, but determined the policy with-
out reference to the wishes of the city. In some extreme in-
stances the commissions, like the Philadelphia public buildings
commission and others, could even call upon the council to levy.
an annual tax sufficient to meet their annual expenses.

“This system of government of municipalities by legislative
commissions was enacted on the score of mismanagement and
mal-administration on the part of the local authorities; and in
many cases such charges had no small foundation in fact, so that
the situation justified some form of state control. It is by no
means clear, however, that the method of control provided did
42 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

secure an impartial and effective check of wrong-doing; while
it is certain that the prevailing motives for the measures taken
were too often partisan in character, and that the administration
of the state commissions was in consequence directed as much
toward securing party advantage as efficient government.’’!”?

The effect of the board system on the municipal administration
was thus very unfortunate, carrying irresponsibility to the
extreme. Conflicts between the authorities were frequent be-
cause there was no clear demarcation of functions between the
different boards. Responsibility was scattered and difficult if
not impossible of location; and even if located, it was still more
difficult to correct evils which might arise, for the members of
the boards were not elected, but appointed by the leaders of the
political party which was then in power in the State legislature.
In short, the introduction of this system meant the disorganiza-
tion of municipal administration.

Municipal conditions during the Civil War period seem to
have been very discouraging. Indeed, toward the close of the
war, conditions in the important cities were almost incurably
bad. Antiquated organization, special legislation, and constant
interference of political parties all worked together to cause
municipal affairs to go from bad to worse. This was the period
when the notorious Tweed Ring, described as ‘‘a troop of
plundering banditti who used their civic authority to turn public
funds into private fortunes,’’7 was in ascendancy in the met-
ropolitan city; and the situation in other cities was scarcely
better. To be sure, changes in city government had been made
at times, even before the war period, but they had been the work
of politicians or of some spasmodic effort for reform by the
people.

The problems of municipal government in this country seem
not to have been adequately studied before 1870; nor had the
significance of the new conditions produced by the large aggre-
gation of urban population been grasped by the people up to
that time.1’”? Everywhere such problems were met in a hap-
hazard way. No State or national policy in relation to cities
had yet been developed. One could often find in a single State
as many forms of city government as there were cities; and
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 43

these forms were simply ‘‘a sort of volunteer crop from the
state and national systems’’, which were accepted simply be-
cause they were the most available and easily understood.148

But about 1870 the people of the United States seemed to have
awakened to the dangers of the situation. The evils of special
legislation and the unsatisfactory workings of the board system
had become so clear that organized efforts in the interest of
municipal reform appeared. At first the movement against
legislative control in the form of constitutional prohibition gained
ground. The legislatures had so abused their power over
municipalities that popular sentiment began to protest against
their action even as early as 1851, when Ohio and Virginia
established constitutional prohibitions against special legislation.
Iowa and Kansas included such provisions in their constitutions
before 1860.444 But after the war, either due to the calmer tone
of national polities after the heated strife over slavery and the
war or to the inevitable revulsion from the extreme measures
of the previous decades, the movement against partisan and
special legislation for cities gained much headway.

Thus, immediately following the war a number of States
inserted into their constitutions prohibitions against special
legislation in the matter of municipalities?” This disposition
to insert checks upon legislative interference with local adminis-
tration became so marked from this period on that whenever
State constitutions were revised, some such provisions were
invariably inserted. As Professor Munro says: ‘‘During the
last fifty or sixty years this tendency has grown even stronger,
until it has nowadays come to be taken for granted that, when-
ever a state adopts a new constitution or revises an old one, it
will almost certainly use the opportunity to insert various re-
strictive clauses relating to legislative freedom in matters of
local government.’’17¢

Side by side with the movement for constitutional limitation
upon special legislation concerning municipalities, there was a
movement on foot, beginning in the decade from 1870 to 1880,
to re-organize the machinery of city government. The changes
brought about by the new charters enacted in this and the
following decades ushered in a new period in the development
44 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

of American municipal organization, and this period may be
characterized as the period of the ‘‘Mayor System.”’

The trend of thought during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century was towards the concentration of power and the cen-
tralization of responsibility. The great evil of the board system
of the previous period was the well-nigh absolute independence
and irresponsibility of the executive departments. Under this
system the mayor had practically no control over the adminis-
tration, while the council had practically no power as regards
appointments and appropriations. The absence of responsibility
regarding city administration was especially fatal during the
period of the rapid growth of cities which followed the war.
About 1880 the people of the United States seemed to have been
aroused to the fact that ‘‘the board system did not work satis-
factorily; that it diffused responsibility for municipal action;
that it made it impossible for the people, at any given municipal
election, to exercise any appreciable control over the municipal
government, and that it offered a continual temptation to the
legislature to interfere in the affairs of the city.’’!!7 Conse-
quently, changes in municipal organization were made in the
direction of decreasing the number of the irresponsible and inde-
pendent boards of the previous period and of placing in the
hands of the mayor a large part of the authority and responsi-
bility by granting to him the power to select the administrative
heads. Thus, the board system was superseded by the mayor
system.

Brooklyn was the first city of any importance to concentrate
authority and responsibility in the mayor. In 1882 the revised
charter of Brooklyn vested in the mayor the right, within twenty
days after assuming office, to appoint the new heads of the de-
partments.778 A year previous to that time the New York Senate
investigating committee recommended that the mayor of the city
of New York be granted the sole power of appointment and
removal, without action of the council or Governor. But it was
only in 1896 that the city of New York followed the example
furnished by Brooklyn, and vested in the mayor the power to
remove summarily any department head within six months after
taking office.179
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 45

The new charter of Boston, granted in 1885, vested in the
mayor the power to appoint, subject to confirmation by the
board of aldermen, all officers and boards previously elected by
the city council or the aldermen. The power of removing any
such officer was also given ‘‘for such cause as he [the mayor]
shall deem sufficient and shall assign in his order of removal’’.
Furthermore, the charter provided that ‘‘the executive power
of said city, and all the executive powers now vested in. the board
of aldermen as such, as surveyors of highways, county commis-
sioners or otherwise, shall be and hereby are vested in the mayor
to be exercised through the several officers and boards of the
city in their respective departments under his general super-
vision and control.’’!2¢

The Cleveland charter of 1891 unified completely the admin-
istration of the city under the mayor. He was now given the
power to appoint the heads of the six newly established depart-
ments. He was also given the absolute power to remove the
department heads and his other appointees.1*1

Illustrations may be multiplied to indicate the changed posi-
tion of the mayor in a number of cities—particularly the large
cities—the governments of which have often been characterized
as presenting the ‘‘Mayor System’’ or the ‘‘Federal Plan’’.
The essential features of this system may be briefly summarized.
In the first place, the power to appoint most of the important
municipal officers is vested in the mayor, instead of in the
council as previously was the case. Secondly, the mayor becomes
an executive officer in fact as well as in name and is now held
responsible for the conduct of the subordinate officers. Thirdly,
the mayor is given the power to carry out his policy through the
right to remove any incompetent officer. Finally, the council
is deprived of all executive power and is now made a purely
legislative body.

Thus, in the history of American municipal organization from
the petty colonial boroughs in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries to the metropolitan cities at the end of the nineteenth
century may be observed the general tendency to evolve from
the simple and unorganized colonial council government, through
the practically supreme council government during the early
46 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

part of the last century and the complicated irresponsible board
system of the sixties and seventies, to the ‘‘one-man-rule’’ of the
mayor in some cities at the end of the nineteenth century.

Under the first charters of most of the cities the mayor was
no more than the presiding officer of the council, in which was
vested practically all the powers the municipality could exercise.
The idea of giving any single individual considerable power
received no favor at the hands of men whose memory was still
filled with the tyrannical acts of the colonial Governors, and at
the time when the distrust of the executive was the prevailing
sentiment. The powers of the early councils were not very
minutely enumerated. Liberal privileges were frequently granted
and exercised. The mayor was in most cases subservient to the
council, which performed the executive business through ex-
ecutive officers, boards, or committees of its own creation. The
predominance of the council was then the chief characteristic
of the first period which ended about the middle of the nine-
teenth century.

Gradually, through the inability and incompetency of the
council to satisfactorily provide for the growing activities and
functions of the municipalities, the people began to distrust
the bodies to which they had formerly granted liberal powers.
Complaints of incompetency and even of corruption of the
municipal councils gradually increased both in number and
vehemence, and relief from these evils was eagerly sought from
various quarters. At first, appeal was made to the State legis-
latures for protection against the councils. The consequence was
legislative interference in local affairs and the establishment of
the independent administrative boards which characterized
municipal organization in this country during the period of the
Civil War and the Reconstruction. But the irresponsibility and
confusion resulting from this ill-devised board system was very
disastrous—even more so than the council system. Re-organiza-
tion was again demanded during the seventies and eighties; and
this time the strong executive of the national government was
suggested as the pattern of a new system of municipal govern-
ment. This suggestion was followed to some extent, and the
mayor system or federal plan was accordingly evolved in some
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION 47

cities before the close of the century. Centralization of power
was thus obtained; but it resulted from necessity, not from
choice.

The movement for good city government which began in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century had produced a ferment
in a thousand active minds and stirred a thousand progressive
men and women to courageous action. During the last decade
of the century there came the dawn of a brighter day and the
indications of a more rapid and substantial improvement in
municipal government. In January, 1894, the first national con-
ference for good city government was held in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. In May of the same year the National Municipal
League was organized in New York City. Since then there
have been annual national conferences and annual meet-
ings of the league held in different places. The mere fact
of being able to hold a number of large, well-attended and rep-
resentative meetings from time to time, all discussing the same
subject, is of itself a convincing proof of the deep and wide-
spread interest in the question of municipal government. But
such evidences become of secondary importance when there is
taken into consideration the great and unprecedented progress
of the organized municipal reform efforts and the constantly in-
creasing discussion of reform movements in all the leading
newspapers of the country.’*?

The efforts of the reformers, as has already been pointed out,
were directed along two clearly defined lines—re-organization
and home rule. Home rule for cities attempts to define and dis-
tinguish clearly State and local functions and to secure
municipal freedom in so far as the carrying out of the local
functions by the local authority is concerned; while the move-
ment for re-organization has as its goal the improvement of the
mechanism of the government so that economy and efficiency
can be secured in various phases of municipal administration,
and authority and responsibility can be clearly located. Both
phases of the reform movement had already gained considerable
favor in different parts of the country before the close of the
last century.
48 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

In the matter of home rule there were four States’? which,
prior to 1900, incorporated into their respective constitutions
provisions granting to certain classes of cities the right to frame
their own charters. In the matter of re-organization there were
incorporated into the charters of some cities features like the
merit system in appointment, the abolition of the two-chambered
council, and the abolition of the aldermen’s check upon the
mayor’s appointing power. All these changes were aimed at
the simplification of the machinery of government and the defin-
ite location of responsibility and authority. Thus, before the
close of the nineteenth century considerable improvement had
already been achieved in the field of municipal government, both
in its relation to the State legislature and in its internal organi-
zation; and the way had been well paved for further develop-
ments.

But the ‘‘real renaissance in American city government’’ did
not come until the beginning of the twentieth century, when
Galveston made the first experiment in 1901, by applying to its
city government what has since been known as the ‘‘Commission
Plan’’. The commission plan is but a phase of the general
tendency towards the centralization of powers in a certain
definite person or persons. The advent of this new system
marks the climax of the well-defined movement against the cum-
brous~ess of municipal government—a movement which was first
manifested in the last quarter of the nineteenth century when
attempts were made in various cities to concentrate power and
responsibility in the mayor and to simplify the organization of
municipal government in one way or another.
III

ORIGIN OF THE COMMISSION PLAN OF
CITY GOVERNMENT

EARLY PRECEDENTS

The commission plan of city government, though popularly
regarded as being created by the city of Galveston to meet a
special emergency, is by no means in its essential principles an
innovation of this century. As a matter of fact it turns out
that its creators, unconsciously perhaps,!*4 followed precedents
that had long been established. The old colonial system of
borough government, the New England town government, the
government of the national capital since 1878, the system of
county government, and the plan of appointing commissioners
to manage their municipal affairs in time of emergency adopted
by various cities are all in some very important respect similar
to the plan initiated sixteen years ago by the Texas city on the
gulf and since then copied throughout the whole United States.
Indeed, the commission form of city government is a return, as
President Goodnow has rightly poimted out, to ‘‘the original
plan of city government in the United States in that it con-
centrates all powers administrative and legislative in one
authority.’ ’?#5

The analogies between the commission plan and the system of
New England town government are especially striking in cer-
tain respects. The board of townsmen or selectmen closely re-
semble the board of commissioners in cities operating under the
commission plan. Like the commissioners, the selectmen con-
stituted ‘‘a committee, from three to thirteen in number, an-
nually chosen by the inhabitants to order their prudential
affairs.’ The selectmen were a ‘‘responsible board, acting
under the ‘instructions’ of the town-meeting, and accountable
to that body for their acts,’’’?* just as the commissioners are
responsible to the electorate for the administration of the city
government. Under the system of town government there was

(49)
50 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

no differentiation of legislative functions from those of adminis-
trative, since ‘‘as the town representative a vast number of
functions devolved upon the selectmen. Nearly every kind of
business that could be transacted by the town-meeting itself....
was constantly performed by them.’’!??

The government of the city of Washington, D. C., has been
permanently vested in a board of three commissioners since 1878.
Two of them are appointed from civil life by the President, act-
ing by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the
third commissioner is similarly chosen from the corps of en-
gineers of the United States army. This board of commissioners
is ‘‘at the head of the administrative organization of the Dis-
trict of Columbia and exercises general supervision over all
departments of the District government’’, and at the same
time has been vested by Congress with the exercise of extensive
powers of legislation with reference to matters of local in-
terest.1#6

In the same way the county governments in the country have
for a long time been vested in boards of commissioners or of
supervisors, which exercise legislative as well as administrative
powers and in some cases judicial powers.1#9

Nor are there lacking instances of scattered experiments of
the commission form as applied to city government before 1901,
when Galveston began to put this form into a definite shape. In
1863 Sacramento received a charter which placed the govern-
ment in the hands of a governing board called the ‘‘Board of
Trustees’’, composed of three elected members entitled the first,
second, and third trustee, respectively. Each trustee was placed
in charge of a particular department, just as is the case with
the commissioners of the present time. The first trustee was
president of the board of trustees and the general executive
officer of the city. The second trustee was made commissioner of
streets; and the third trustee was superintendent of water-
works. This plan worked very satisfactorily, but was not fav-
ored by the politicians who tried to modify the system by creat-
ing from time to time, through the legislature, new boards and
officers to take charge of various phases of the administration.
As a consequence, the board of trustees was practically deprived
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 51

of all administrative power and became a legislative body.
Finally, the common council system with the mayor and council-
men was restored to its former position in 1893.19

In 1870 New Orleans had received a charter of practically the
same nature as that of Galveston in 1901. Indeed, one writer
has even gone so far as to say that the Galveston charter was a
duplication of the charter adopted by the city of New Orleans.1%#
The act passed in 1870 by the legislature of Louisiana for the
city of New Orleans adopted what was generally known as the
‘‘Administrative System’’, which differs from the commission
form only in name. By its provisions the government of the
municipality was vested in a mayor and seven administrators.
They possessed, in the first place, administrative and executive
functions; and each of them, with the exception of the mayor,
was charged with the administration of a particular branch,
just as are the commissioners in the present commission gov-
erned cities. Secondly, the mayor and the administrators in a
collective capacity formed the council which should exercise
legislative power for local purposes. ‘‘A small and compact
body, its meetings were as business-like as those of a bank di-
rectory.’ ’182

But the administrative system was short-lived, because it was
claimed by the opponents of the system that the council under
the charter was too small and could be too easily controlled in
the interests of private or corporate gain. The pressure for the
abolition. of this system was not easy to be resisted; and the
legislature yielded in June, 1882, by enacting a new charter for
New Orleans, which restored the orthodox type of government
by a mayor and council.7%§

Mobile was the next city which resorted to the system of gov-
ernment by commission. Following the panic of 1873 Mobile
was practically on the point of bankruptcy: the condition of the
city government was deplorable. By an act of February 11,
1879, the State legislature annulled the charter of Mobile and
put an end to the corporate life of the city. Three commission-
ers were appointed to take charge of the assets of the city and
to liquidate its debts. They were ‘‘authorized to discharge their
duties under the direction of the Court of Chancery: to adjust,
52 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

compound, and compromise all debts and demands, including
taxes past due; to report the results of their work to the govern-
nor, and to draft a legislative bill to effect the settlement they
deemed advisable.’’ By a second act there was incorporated
the ‘‘Port of Mobile’, the government of which was vested in a
body styled the ‘‘Mobile Police Board’’, consisting of eight
commissioners, all chosen by wards. The functions of this board
were to preserve the peace, protect the health of the people,
take care of the streets, and provide against fire. In exercising
these functions the commissioners were empowered to pass
laws and ordinances and to levy taxes. Thus, there was a system
of government by two commissions, one appointive and the
other elective. This system continued until 1887 when the usual
American type of city government was restored.1*#

Another early instance of city government by commission is
found in the city of Memphis, Tennessee, during the period be-
tween 1879 and 1891. Memphis, following the severe epidemie
of yellow fever in 1878, was in a condition no better than that
of Galveston following the storm of 1900. The city had incurred
debts to the extent of its authority to borrow money, and its
financial condition was deplorable. In order to improve such
conditions the legislature of Tennessee in 1879 abolished the
municipal corporation of Memphis as such, and created in its
stead the ‘‘taxing district of Shelby County’’, whose affairs were
conducted by the board of public works of five members and a
governing council of three. Under this form of government,
the conditions of the city, sanitary and otherwise, were greatly
improved. After normal conditions and prosperity returned,
this new system was abolished and the old plan restored in
1891.185

In all of these early instances of experiments with the com-
mission form of city government during the latter part of the
nineteenth century the system was regarded merely as a tem-
porary expedient, and as soon as the emergency calling it forth
had been passed the old system was immediately restored.
Thus, no noticeable effect was produced by these scattered in-
stances on the trend of American municipal government. The
task of definitely and permanently incorporating and erystalliz-
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 53

ing the commission form into a popular system of American
municipal government was left to the city of Galveston.

Like the early instances of experiments with the commission
government, the new plan adopted by Galveston was also called
forth by an emergency and was also regarded merely as a tem-
porary measure at the time of its installation. But unlike the
early experiments, which were usually unnoticed by people
outside of their own cities, the system inaugurated by Galveston
attracted a great deal of attention in all parts of the country
and ushered in a new era in the history of American municipal
government.

Galveston drafted its new charter and put the new system into
operation just at the time when civic interest was at its highest
point. Popular dissatisfaction with the complicated and irre-
sponsible system of city government was being manifested
everywhere, and the tendency to concentrate power and re-
sponsibility in the office of mayor was clearly seen in the large
cities during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The
distrust of the council was further reflected in various attempts
to deprive that body of powers that it still possessed, especially
on the financial side, and to vest the same in administrative
officers.1°6

Experiments of various kinds of administration had been tried
in some cities and for some time; but on the whole the people
had not yet developed a definite policy. They clearly under-
stood that simplification was the task that awaited them without
knowing the way to secure that simplification. They had up
to the beginning of the twentieth century tried to simplify
the machinery of the city government by abolishing the
independent administrative boards and by concentrating the
powers in the hands of the mayor; but up to that time
no one had ever dared to bring forth a proposal to
abolish the cherished idea of the separation of powers in
city government. Consequently no attempt had ever been
made to urge a complete re-organization of the whole
municipal structure on the basis of simplification. The tradi-
tional separation of legislative and administrative powers was
too deep-rooted in the minds of people in this country, and any
54 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

proposal to abolish it had been deemed an ‘‘unsafe exposure to
too great temptation, to permit the same body of men who are
to disburse the public funds also to have a free hand in deter-
mining how large that sum shall be.’’/37 Indeed, even in Gal-
veston the new system, when it was first installed, was regarded
merely as a temporary measure to tide over the crisis. Even
the lawyers who drew up the Galveston charter could scarcely
have been aware of the fact that they had devised a system of
government which would within a short time revolutionize the
whole municipal structure of hundreds of American cities.

Gradually the people: outside of Galveston realized the fact
that in Galveston was to be found the system of city government
for which they had long been looking. But no city dared to put
it on trial under normal conditions; nor had it been tried suc-
cessfully in other places. At first, this system was watched very
carefully by people outside of Galveston. Up to 1906, five years
after its adoption by Galveston, only one other city, Houston, had
taken up the plan. But when once the superiority of the system
had been proved, or was supposed to have been proved in actual
operation, it spread very rapidly. With the inauguration of the
so-called ‘‘Des Moines Plan’’, the commission form of govern-
ment began to play an important réle in the evolution of city
government in this country. The widespread use of this system
following the passage of the Iowa law has become ‘‘the most
conspicuous single development of recent years in the realm
of American municipal affairs’’.1°8 The cities now adopted the
eommission. system, not for the purpose of meeting an emer-
gency, but to establish an entirely different principle of mu-
nicipal organization.

For these reasons the honor of inaugurating the commission
form of city government has been rightly attributed to the city
of Galveston, despite the fact that this system is by no means
a new one and that the early precedents may have played a
considerable part in shaping the Galveston charter drafted in
1901. The conditions in Galveston leading up to the adoption
of this system and the fundamental features thereof may now be
examined.
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 55

THE GALVESTON PLAN

Before 1901 Galveston, which was governed by a mayor and
twelve aldermen elected by the people, had been characterized
as ‘‘one of the worst-governed urban communities in the whole
country’’, and its municipal history has been said to ‘‘afford
illustrations of almost every vice in local government.’’*? The
finances of the city had been badly managed and the city
authorities ‘‘had fallen into the disastrous practice of bonding
the city to provide for annual deficits. In less than twenty
years nearly three millions of debt had been accumulated in this
way alone.’’449 The administration other than financial was
equally bad, if not worse. ‘‘City departments were managed
wastefully ; spoilsmen were put into places of honor and profit
in the city’s service.’’141

Such was the character of the city government when on Sep-
tember 8, 1900, a fierce storm forced a tidal wave from the gulf
over the city, destroying a large portion of it and killing be-
tween five and six thousand people. The whole organization of
the city was demoralized and chaos reigned everywhere. But
the existing city government, incompetent and even dishonest,
was utterly helpless in a great catastrophe like this. ‘‘Not
only did this city government demonstrate its total incom-
petency to handle the city in its ruined condition, but it really
seemed as if disaster had added to the usual incompetency,
corruption, grafting, wastefulness of the city’s resources, sine-
eurism and conditions of general scandal.’’!”

It was under such conditions that the Deepwater Committee,
an organization of business men previously formed for the im-
provement of the harbor, took up the matter and determined to
put an end to the scandalous state of affairs and to restore the
city’s financial stability, as well as peace and order. A sub-
committee consisting of three members—Messrs. R. Waverly
Smith, Walter Gresham, and F. D. Minor—was appointed to
draw up a new charter for the stricken city.4* For two months
these three members met every evening and discussed the prob-
able features of a new form of city government. They were
aware of the fact that ‘‘it would be impossible to redeem Gal-
veston under the old form of government and that it was
56 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

indispensable to get a much simpler form, and one that would
offer to the votes of the people only a small number of elective
officers.’’44 Finally, a new charter was drawn, and after ob-
taining the codperation of a large number of people both in and
out of the State legislature, the finished work was introduced in
the form of a bill. At the same time an address to the people
was issued justifying the radical change in the government
which the committee proposed to introduce. Part of the address
may be quoted here to show the exact attitude of the committee

towards the whole situation.

We believe that municipal government, as it has been administered
in this community for the past twenty years, is a failure. It did not
require the storm to bring a realization of this fact, but it brought it home
with greater force upon us. We are seeking relief from the municipal
destruction and despair staring us in the face. It is a question with us of
civic life or death. This committee has labored diligently and earnestly
to prepare and present to the people of this city, and to the legislature,
remedial legislation adequate for the grave emergency confronting us.
Months have been given to its preparation. It is hoped that the central
idea of this new charter—that of a commission—embodies the practical
solution of that hitherto unsolved problem: how to govern, cheaply and
well, a municipal corporation. We are asking for a charter, placing the
entire control of the local government in the hands of five commissioners,
designed to benefit the people rather than to provide sinecures for
politicians.“

Favorable action from the legislature was secured and the
bill entitled ‘‘An Act to incorporate the city of Galveston and
to grant it a new charter and repeal all pre-existing charters’’,
was duly passed. On April 19, 1901, the Governor’s signature
was secured and the proposed bill became a law.146

The act of 1901, as its title indicates, abolished the old mu-
nicipal framework, root and branch, and established an entirely
new system. Originally the framers of the new charter favored
turning over the entire administration of the city to a com-
mission appointed by the Governor, on the theory that skilled
and responsible administrators could only be chosen by some
intelligent authority and not by the blind chances of a popular
election. But the suggestion of disfranchisement was not fav-
ored by the majority of the legislators and citizens, even under
such serious conditions as those confronting Galveston in 1900-
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 57

1901. Some members of the legislature openly declared that
they would under no circumstances support the bill which pro-
posed to deprive the people of their rights, as a matter of public
policy.47 The result was the compromise embodied in the act,
which placed the government of the city in the hands of five
commissioners, three of whom were to be appointed by the Gov-
ernor, while the other two were to be elected by the people. In
so doing the framers still hoped that politics might be eliminated
from the city government, as it was believed that the Governor
would choose none but honest and efficient persons to be commis-
sioners, and that the majority could be relied upon regardless of
the other two, should the elected commissioners fall into the
hands of corrupt politicians.1/8

On September 18, 1901, the new government was duly in-
stalled. ‘‘On taking charge, the commission government found
an empty treasury, city without credit, employees paid in script
which was subject to a large discount for cash, and floating
indebtedness running back for several years. The personnel of
the commission, together with the heads of the departments, in-
spired confidence, and the city was soon put on a cash basis, her
eredit restored so that it could go into the open market, buy
supplies on the same terms and prices as our best merchants or
wealthiest citizens, and the outstanding script was being taken up
with our surplus cash as it accumulated in our treasury.’’1/9
These are the words which appeared in a letter prepared by the
first mayor-president and indicate the immediate results of the
new system. Whether the words of the man who was at the head
of the new system were conclusive or not, the fact remains that
the results of the commission form of government met the ex-
pectation. of its friends.

For a time the new system worked without friction, until a
drayman by the name of Charles Lewis was convicted and fined
twenty-five dollars in the recorder’s court for violating a sani-
tary ordinance which prohibited the removal of the contents of
any privy or water closet, except between certain hours, with
permission of the health physician and in accordance with cer-
tain prescribed rules. The case was appealed to the criminal
district court on the ground that the ordinance in question was
58 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

null and void because the Governor had no authority under the
Constitution of the State to appoint the commissioners. The
charter provision authorizing him to make these appointments,
it was claimed, was null and void, and the ordinance in question
with all its proceedings was, therefore, without authority of
law. The verdict of the recorder was affirmed by the criminal
district court; but the case was again appealed to the supreme
criminal court of the State, which handed down its decision on
March 25, 1903, holding a vote of two to one that the special
charter granted to Galveston violated the principle of self-gov-
ernment embodied in the Constitution and hence an ordinance
passed by the board of commissioners was void.’

But when the constitutionality of the new charter was taken
into the supreme civil court for consideration a decision was
handed down on June 26, 1903, three months after the decision
of the supreme criminal court, to the effect that ‘‘the charter of
the city of Galveston in conferring upon a president and board
of commissioners, a majority appointed by the governor, the
power of governing the city usually committed to a mayor and
city council, was not void as violating article 6, section 3 of
the constitution giving all qualified electors the right to vote
for a mayor and all other elective officers; nor was it beyond
the power of the legislature to enact such an act as being in
derogation of an inherent right of local self-government by
municipalities, arising, by implication, from history and tra-
dition in this state.’ ’#*1

Thus, the commission charter was held to be constitutional
in civil matters, but it did not confer police jurisdiction.
Accordingly, an appeal was made to the legislature for an
amendment to the charter eliminating the appointive feature.
On March 30, 1903, an amendment was duly passed, making all
the commissioners elective. An election for five commissioners
under the new charter was immediately ordered and the result
was the reélection of all the commissioners, including the three
appointed by the Governor.!**

The charter has been slightly modified by subsequent legisla-
tures and by the recently adopted constitutional home rule
amendment,?** but the main features still remain. As at present
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 59

organized the government of the city of Galveston consists of a
mayor and four commissioners, all elected by the qualified
voters of the city for a term of two years. No direct primary,
nomination by petition, or non-partisan election, is found in
Galveston’s charter, which simply provided that ‘‘the manner
of holding the same [election] shall be governed by the laws
of the State of Texas governing general elections.’? The mayor
and the commissioners when elected, constitute the board of com-
missioners, which is the municipal government of the city.1*4

This board of commissioners is vested with the following
powers, to be exercised by a majority vote of all members:

1. To ‘‘exercise all the rights, powers and duties of the
Mayor and Board of Aldermen of cities as may be conferred
by the Constitution and laws of this State.’’255

2. To ‘‘appoint all officers and subordinates in all depart-
ments of the said city.’’%6

8. To ‘‘make and enforce such rules and regulations as they
may see fit and proper for and concerning the organization,
management and operation of all the departments of said city
and whatever agencies may be created for the administration of
its affairs.’’157

4. To make ‘‘all laws or ordinances not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of this State, touching every object,
matter and subject within the local government instituted by
this Act.’’’ Thus in this board of commissioners are vested
all the powers which the city has the authority to exercise. In-
deed, the charter expressly provides that ‘‘said Board of Com-
missioners shall constitute the municipal government of Gal-
veston.’?159

The mayor is the president of the board and his official title
is ‘‘Mayor-President of the Board of Commissioners for the city
of Galveston’’.1° He presides at all the meetings of the board
and has the ‘‘right to vote as a member thereof on all questions
which may rise’’.464 But he has no veto power. He is the chief
executive officer of the city, and as such, his chief function is to
see that all the laws thereof are duly enforced.?*® The charter
requires him to devote at least six hours a day to the duties of
his office and to the affairs of the city.*° He receives as com-
60 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

pensation for his service a salary of $2000 per annum, while the
salary for each of the commissioners is $1200 per annum.

The administration of the city is divided into four depart-
ments: (1) police and fire; (2) streets and public property;
(3) waterworks and sewerage; and (4) finance and revenue.
The electors of Galveston do not choose candidates for the board
of commissioners with reference to the particular department
each of them is to direct, and theoretically at least the positions
to be filled by the candidates for commissionerships are not
known until after election when the board by a majority vote de-
termines the department of which each member shall have
charge. When assigned, the four commissioners are respectively
known as the ‘‘Police and Fire Commissioner’’, the ‘‘Commis-
sioner of Streets and Public Property’’, the ‘‘Waterworks and
Sewerage Commissioner’’, and the ‘‘Commissioner of Finance
and Revenue’’.76+ The ‘‘Mayor-President’’ is not assigned to
any particular department of administration, but he is supposed
to exercise a general supervisory power over all of them.

The commissioners are not required to devote their entire time
to the service of the city, nor is there any definite amount of
time prescribed as in the case of the mayor. As a rule only
about two hours are devoted daily to the service of the city by
each of the commissioners. Their duty is to supervise and to
direct, but not to take over the actual management of the
routine work of their respective departments. The actual
routine work is performed by the superintendents, who are
expert managers appointed by and responsible to the commis-
sioners. By this plan the framers of the charter expected to
secure for the city the services of the successful business men,
who could devote a part of their time to the city without giving
up their business pursuits.7®

The board of commissioners also appoints the following officers
enumerated in the charter: ‘‘a secretary, a treasurer, an attor-
ney, a recorder or judge of the Corporation Court, an assessor
and collector of taxes, a chief of police, a chief of the fire depart-
ment, an engineer who shall also be superintendent of streets,
an auditor, a secretary of waterworks and sewerage departments,
a harbor master, a sexton, a superintendent of waterworks and
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 61

sewerage, an engineer of the waterworks, an assistant engineer
of the waterworks; and, if deemed necessary by the Board, an
inspector of waterworks and sewerage plumbing, an assistant
chief of police, and assistant chief of the fire department and
an assistant city engineer.’’/°* All of these officers, with the
exception of those in the police and fire departments, are named
by the board on its own initiative. For the employees in the fire
and police departments, the commissioner in charge prepares
and presents to the board in writing his recommendations of
persons for appointment, ‘‘based on the integrity of character
and physical and intellectual capacities of the applicants for
such positions’’. In preparing his list of recommendations, the
police and fire commissioner is required to give preference to
‘‘those men who have proved themselves capable, good, and
efficient in the performance of their duties’’. In case of a failure
or refusal of the police and fire commissioner to make the neces-
sary recommendations at the second regular meeting of the
board after its induction into office, the board may proceed to
select proper persons to fill such positions without his recommen-
dations.167

Every appointee must ‘‘be at the time of his appointment a
qualified voter in the city of Galveston’’. Appointees shall hold
their offices for two years.16® But the board of commissioners is
empowered to ‘‘remove any officer for incompetency, inefficiency,
corruption, mal-conduct, malfeasance, or non-feasance in office,
or such other causes as may be prescribed by ordinance after
due notice in writing [to the employee] and opportunity to be
heard in his defence’’.469 Any person can file with the president
of the board charges against an officer for any or all the offences
provided for, and it is the duty of the board to determine the
truth of such charges. At the hearing the board constitutes a
court and is vested with exclusive jurisdiction. Counsel may be
employed both by the accused and by the board. ‘‘Upon the
conclusion of the investigation and argument of the case, a vote
shall be taken on such charge and specification’’, and in accord-
ance with the vote of the majority the board shall give its judg-
ment.” In this connection it may be noted that the members
of the board of commissioners ‘‘may be removed for the same
reasons and in the same manner as county officers’’.17/
62 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

The duties of the different appointed officers are minutely
prescribed in the charter; but the board is empowered ‘‘from
time to time to require further and other duties of all officers
whose duties are herein prescribed, and to define and prescribe
the powers and duties of all officers elected to any office under
this Act whose duties are not herein specially mentioned and to
fix their compensation when not herein fixed.’?!7? The board
has also the power to require bonds to be given by all officers
for the faithful performance of their duties, and to fill all
vacancies when no other method is provided in the charter.

In order to give elasticity to the administration of municipal
affairs, the framers of the charter gave the board the additional
“‘authority from time to time to create and fill and discontinue
offices and employments other than herein prescribed according
to their judgment of the needs and requirements of the city,
and in their discretion, by a majority vote of all the members
of the Board; to remove, for or without cause, the incumbent of
any such office or employment, and may, by order or otherwise,
prescribe, limit or change the compensation of such officers or
employees.’’!”? The only limitation on such discretionary power
of the board is that ‘‘no salary shall exceed nine hundred
($900.00) dollars per annum for any office or employment’’ thus
created.174

In view of the fact that it was the deliberate intention of the
framers of the Galveston charter to surrender local autonomy
and to devise a strong centralized city government unhampered
by the influences of the political boss, nothing except a few pro-
visions relating to the publicity of the actions of the board
is inserted into the charter to safeguard the concentration of
too much power in so small a body. All the legislative sessions
of the board, whether regular or special, are required to be open.
to the public. A public newspaper of the city must be desig-
nated as the official paper in which are to be published all
ordinances, notices, and other matters of public interest. In
this official paper the board must publish quarterly a
statement ‘‘showing a full, clear and complete statement of all
taxes and other revenues collected and expended during the
preceding quarter, indicating the respective sources from which
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 63

the moneys are derived, and also indicating the disposition
made thereof.’’!75

Such, in brief, is the machinery of city government as set
forth in the Galveston plan. The old system of mayor and
aldermen has been entirely done away with and a new system
of a mayor and four commissioners has been installed. The
ward system of representation with its numerous evils and short-
comings has been discarded, and the unit for governmental pur-
poses is now the city as a whole. The time-honored theory of
the separation of powers which, when applied to city gov-
ernment, results in producing an irresponsible and unbusiness-
like organization, and the fallacious idea of popular election of
all the administrative officers, which results in the long ballot
and blind-voting, are abolished root and branch. In place of
these antiquated theories, there are now substituted sound prin-
ciples, based on efficiency and simplicity, which have been
proved successful in large private business corporations. The
system as adopted by Galveston in 1901 confers power and re-
sponsibility on a few elected men who are conspicuously sig-
nificant and important in the city government. All the other
officers and superintendents of the departments are appointed
by and responsible to them. Thus, harmony in administration
is secured. The whole theory underlying the new system is that
the city is to be regarded as a great business enterprise, the
object of which is to secure the welfare of the community. It
was this conception of the city as a business proposition which
gave the Galveston experiment its first great vogue.

Of the success of the Galveston plan most writers have given
emphatic and unqualified assurances. Mr. George Kibbe
Turner, in an article published in the October number of
McClure’s Magazine in 1906, describes in great detail the gov-
ernment of Galveston and makes the following striking compari-

sons between the new and the old system of government:

The commission found the city bankrupt, it has raised its credit above
par. It has saved Galveston one full third of her gross running expenses.
The annual cost of the government of Galveston has averaged about
$650,000. In the four and a half years of commission government ending
February 28, 1906, a saving of at least $1,000,000—over $220,000 a year—
64 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

had been made in comparison, not with the vicious period of the ward
aldermen, but with the years of the general aldermen following 1895.

The government in the four and a half years preceding the Commission
had incurred $250,000 of debt for current running expenses; the new
government incurred absolutely no debt for this purpose. The former
government had had to its credit $425,000 more in assessed taxes than
the new one. After making allowance for the inefficiency of tax collection
under the old régime, the Commission during its first four ana a half years,
had saved the city at least $500,000, which it must have raised by taxes
or added debt if the old administration had been in charge. In addition,
the commission had saved $500,000 more. Of this, $200,000 was laid away
by reducing the net debt by that amount, and $300,000 was put into per-
manent improvements, which, if made at all, must certainly have been
paid for by bonds if the former administration had been in charge. It
might be objected that the slightly smaller population in the second period,
under the commission, would call for smaller expenditures. But this is not
true. The second period has called for larger outlays—for all kinds of
repairs after the storm, and for the extension of the city’s functions in
every line, except possibly one—the fire department. And all this has
been done under a slight average decrease in the tax rate.

These results have been secured by straight, careful business methods,
such as any man would apply to his own affairs. Great pressure and in-
genuity has been used to add to the sources of revenue. An additional
$30,000 has been secured in the four and a half years from a vehicle tax,
not collected in the period before. Nearly $60,000 has been secured from
interest on city deposits, which, by an extraordinary piece of carelessness,
was given over previously to the city treasurer. Some $7,500 has been
realized from taking over the costs which had formerly gone to the chief
of police and the prosecuting attorney in the city court. The waterworks,
at practically no increase in operating expenses, have yielded $115,000
more. And when the streets were rebuilt, the street railway paid its
share of them—a matter of $40,000. Added to this is a comparative
saving in the four years and a half of $60,000 and $40,000 in the police
and fire departments, from a reduction in salaries and force, and nearly
$50,000 from the cheaper operation of the electric light department.”

THE HOUSTON PLAN

The success of Galveston under the commission plan of gov-
ernment attracted the attention of the city of Houston. But the
conditions leading to the adoption of the new system in Houston
were neither dramatic nor calamitous. In Houston there was no
great catastrophe as there had been in Galveston; but, like many
other cities in this country, the people had long suffered from
the evils of the council-mayor system of government. Indeed,
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 65

the story of Houston up to 1905 was the story of all other
American cities. It was a story of incompetency, of political
graft, of corruption, and petty ward polities.

Houston was governed before 1905 by a mayor and a city
council. The city was divided into six wards, from each of
which two aldermen were chosen to sit in the council. Conse-
quently, ward politicians dominated the municipal legislative
body. Each alderman looked out for the interests of his par-
ticular ward even at the expense of the whole city, and the
eatchword for looting the city treasury was ‘‘local patriotism’’.
Graft reigned supreme, and anybody who took a part in the
city government, no matter what his position—policeman, fire-
man, judge, clerk, constable, or what not—was ‘‘out for graft’’.
The city was in an extremely poor financial condition. It was
burdened with a tremendous bonded indebtedness, as well as
with a floating indebtedness of over $400,000.177 Taxes were
collected and revenue was spent, but there were no tangible re-
sults. The better class of the citizens were convinced that a
change in the form of government was necessary to improve the
existing conditions, and they were ready for any kind of a
change.””® The situation was emphatically expressed by Mayor
Rice when he said: ‘‘Debt after debt was being created and
nothing to show for the moneys paid into the treasury. The
people of Houston were in that frame of mind to accept any
form or kind of change in their government, knowing full well
that they could do nothing worse than to continue what they
had.’’279

It was during such a state of affairs that some of the citizens
of Houston observed the improved conditions in Galveston under
the commission system. They felt that the Galveston plan might
be adopted in the hope of redeeming their own city government
from political rascality. A committee of investigation was ap-
pointed to study the actual working of the Galveston plan; and
in its report the committee heartily endorsed the new idea and
recommended that the Houston charter be amended. The com-
mission plan was submitted to the voters on December 10, 1904,
and though the number of people who expressed their opinion
on that occasion was small, a great majority endorsed the
66 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

project.48° Accordingly, a new charter embodying the general
prineples of the Galveston plan was submitted to the Twenty-
ninth Legislative Assembly which met in 1905.

Despite the bitter and determined opposition of the old
political ring, the legislature on March 18, 1905, granted the new
charter in an act, the full title of which reads: ‘‘An Act to
grant a new charter to the city of Houston, Harris County,
Texas, repealing all laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith,
and declaring an emergency’’. But it was found necessary at
the same session of the legislature to amend certain sections of
the charter so as to make provision for an election. On June
27, 1905, the first election under the new charter took place, and
the officials elected began their duties on July 5, 1905.

The charter was again amended by the Thirty-second Legis-
lative Assembly in 1911, and a separate article entitled ‘‘Street
Improvements’? was added. This amendment, however, was
ratified by the voters of the city. By virtue of the constitutional
home rule amendment adopted in 1912 and the enabling act
passed in pursuance thereof by the Thirty-third Legislative
Assembly in 1913, the voters of Houston amended the charter
on October 15, 19138, in thirty-seven of its sections.1#?

Though the main features of the commission plan as ex-
emplified in the Galveston charter were followed, the Houston
charter was by no means a literal reproduction of the original
plan: there were important features in the new charter which
greatly modified the original plan and which put the Houston
charter in a class by itself.

The administration of the city was vested by the charter in
a mayor and four aldermen, who together constituted the city
council. Both the mayor and the aldermen were elected by the
qualified voters of the city at large and held office for two years.
The 1913 amendment authorized the city council to pass ‘‘all
necessary ordinances providing for and requiring the nomina-
tion of all candidates of any political party for elective officers

. . by preferential ballot’’.#* Unlike the Galveston plan,
the characteristic feature of the original Houston charter was
the concentration of almost all the powers of administration in
the hands of the mayor, upon whom was also placed direct re-
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 67

sponsibility co-extensive with his power. In fact, the four com-
missioners or aldermen according to the original plan acted
simply as his assistants, although when acting together they
exercised a check on the mayor’s actions in a few specified mat-
ters, such as those relating to expenditure.158

Under the original charter the mayor of Houston occupied
a predominant position and was the responsible head of the city
government. The aldermen were not his colleagues as in the
case of Galveston, but rather his subordinates in the sense that
he alone was held primarily responsible for the success or failure
of the government. The charter did not provide any adminis-
trative departments; but left them to be created by ordinance,
authorizing, however, the mayor to appoint the heads thereof.
For administrative purposes there were nominally four com-
mittees: on finance and revenue; on police and fire; on water,
light and health; and on streets, bridges, and public grounds.
Each of these committees consisted of one chairman and three
other members. The mayor, subject to the confirmation of the
four aldermen, assigned each of them to be chairman of a par-
ticular committee; and each chairman was nominally one of the
members of all the other committees. The mayor himself was
the ex-officio head of all the committees.184

But all these features were changed by one of the amend-
ments adopted in 1913. The mayor now has no power to make
assignments of the chairmen. of committees, since each of the
four commissioners to be elected at the regular city election
must ‘‘designate the position for which he is a candidate and
shall have his name placed on the official ballot as a candidate
for the particular position which he seeks’’. The positions pro-
vided in the charter are as follows: Tax and Land Commission-
er, Fire Commissioner, Street and Bridge Commissioner, and
Water Commissioner.

The mayor’s powers in other respects, which were very ex-
tensive in the original charter, remain intact. In the first place,
he has and exercises ‘‘such powers, prerogatives and authority,
acting independently of or in concert with the city council, as
are conferred by the provisions of this act, or as may be con-
ferred upon him by the City Council, not inconsistent with the
68 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

general purposes and provisions of this charter’’.%° He is a
member of the city council, and as such he has a right to vote
just as do the other aldermen; but in addition, he has a veto on
‘“‘every ordinance, resolution or motion of the city council’, and
also on any or every item in ordinances or resolutions making
appropriations. The council may pass measures over the may-
or’s veto by a majority vote, but the mayor has also a vote on
questions of passing measures over his own veto.%8? It is his
duty ‘‘from time to time to make such recommendations to the
Council as he may deem to be for the welfare of the city, and on
the second Monday of March of each year to submit to the Coun-
cil the annual budget of the current expenses of the city for that
fiscal year’’. Though the council may increase, reduce or omit
each or any item of the budget, its action is always subject to the
veto power of the mayor.488 The mayor appoints and removes
‘all officers or employees in the service of the city for cause, when-
ever in his judgment the public interests demand’’,#89 and ‘‘any
imeumbent of any office, except the controller, may be removed
at any time by the mayor, with or without the concurrence of
the council.’’! By acting in concert with the other aldermen
in the city council, he has the right to remove any one of the
aldermen or the controller.1%

The city council, which includes the mayor, has very extensive
powers. In it the charter vests the full power and authority to
exercise all powers conferred upon the city, subject to the may-
or’s veto.1% The city council has the power ‘‘to establish any
office that may in its opinion be necessary or expedient for the
conduct of the city’s business or government, and may fix its
salary and define its duties’’.19° It may also increase or dimin-
ish the compensation of all officers, except their own, and may
‘abolish entirely any office at any time, except as to the officers
above mentioned.’’!%* By a majority vote of all the aldermen
the city council may remove the mayor from office ‘‘in case
of misconduct, inability or wilful neglect in the performance of
the duties of his office’’.79° In the same way, any one of the
four aldermen may be removed.19%6

‘‘For the purpose of conducting and transacting the ordinary
business and administrative affairs of the city, the city council
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 69

shall be continuously in executive session, or open and ready to
be convened therefor at any time, and at such hours as the
Mayor may designate’’.19” In this provision of the charter there
is to be noticed a very marked departure of the Houston plan
from that of Galveston. In Galveston, as has already been in-
dicated, the commissioners are not required to devote their full
time to the service of the city, and are not expected to be experts
in the actual charge of the departmental work, but merely ad-
visers or directors of the department whose function is only to
determine the general policies. The distinction between policy-
determining officials and administrative experts is clearly recog-
nized in the Galveston plan, and in so doing the framers of the
charter expect to secure the advices and services of successful
business men in directing the general policies of the city admin-
istration.

Houston, on the other hand, by requiring the full time of its
aldermen and requiring the election of commissioners to spe-
cifie departments, makes no distinction between the policy-
_ determining officials and administrative experts—which pre-
supposes the election of experts to offices. The aldermen elected
are not merely directors or supervisors of the departments as in
the case of Galveston, but are actual superintendents of the
detailed work of the departments. The question as to which
form is the superior is one of the most interesting questions
arising out of the operation of the commission plan of city
government: there is much to be said on both sides. Recent
tendencies seem to be away from the popular election of the
administrative experts, as this would impose on the people a
task of the utmost delicacy—a task which ‘‘demanded intensive
and intimate investigation, such as could be conducted only by
a very few men’’.*9° Such a tendency is clearly seen in the
recent development and spread of the commission-manager plan.
In consideration of the full time devoted to the service of the
city, the mayor and the aldermen receive much larger salaries
than in Galveston: $7500 per annum for the mayor and $2400
for the aldermen.2”° Public council meetings are held each Mon-
day at 4 p. m., but they are little more than a public ratification
of those matters previously agreed upon by the council in ex-
70 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

ecutive session. The sessions are often short and entirely
devoid of the features of the old council meeting.

Like the Galveston plan, there are specific provisions in the
Houston charter intended to insure publicity. The council
‘‘shall sit with open doors; shall keep a journal of its own pro-
ceedings, which shall be public and constitute one of the archives
of the city’’. On the passage of all ordinances or resolutions,
the ayes and nays of the members shall be taken and entered
upon the journal of its proceedings, and no ordinance or resolu-
tion can be passed on the same day on which it is introduced.®!

As originally adopted the Houston charter contained no pro-
visions for the initiative and recall; but provision was made in
the original charter for a referendum on the granting of
franchises and on bond issues. The charter requires any issue
of bonds exceeding $100,000 in any one year to be submitted to
the voters, and to secure a majority vote before such debt can be
created.*°? Any grant of franchises or special privileges must
be submitted to the voters for approval upon petition of at
least five hundred legally qualified voters.29? Under the original
charter the city was granted the right to ‘‘acquire its public
utilities, such as gas, water and electric light works, and under-
ground, surface and elevated street railways, subways, or under-
ground conduit systems for electric light, power, telephone,
telegraph and other wires used for the purpose of transmitting
and electric service.’’*°! This power of the city to purchase and
operate public utilities was greatly broadened by the home rule
amendment of 1913.25

Moreover, the home rule amendment of 1913 not only modified
the election provisions of the charter, reduced the powers of the
mayor, and broadened the scope of municipal ownership of
public utilities, but changed radically the original Houston plan
by the introduction of features of the Des Moines plan, including
the initiative, the referendum, the recall, and civil service pro-
visions.

The amended charter explicitly provides that ‘‘the people of
Houston, in addition to the method of legislation hereinbefore
provided, shall have the power of direct legislation by the in-
itiative and referendum’’.2?6 Any proposed ordinance or reso-
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 71

lution may at any time be submitted to the council by petition
from ‘‘qualified electors equal to fifteen per cent of the total
vote cast at the democratic primary for the nomination of mayor
and commissioners’; and the electors may also request at the
same time that ‘‘such ordinance or resolution be submitted to a
vote of the people, if not passed by the council’’. Upon receiv-
ing such petition and request, the council ‘‘shall either pass
such ordinance or resolution without alteration, or submit it
to the popular vote at a special election; which must be held
within thirty days after the date of the ordering thereof’’. If
the proposed ordinance or resolution. is approved by a majority
of the qualified electors voting thereon, it becomes thereupon or
at any time fixed therein ‘‘effective as a law or as a mandatory
order to the council.’’ It is further provided that ordinances
or resolutions of this kind can not ‘‘be repealed or amended
except by the Council in response to a referendum petition or
by popular vote thereon.”’

Hand in hand with the institution of popular initiative, is the
institution of protest, or referendum. Reference has already
been made to the provision in the Houston charter which enables
the people to veto, through compulsory referendum, the grant-
ing of franchises. But aside from that the people may also,
through the instrumentality of protest, check the enactment by
the council of any ordinance. It is arranged in the Houston
charter that ‘‘prior to the date when an ordinance or resolution
shall take effect, or within thirty days after the publication of
the same’’, upon a petition signed by ten percent?’” of the
voters protesting against the enactment or enforcement of the
same, ‘‘it shall be suspended from taking effect and no action
theretofore taken under such ordinance or resolution shall be
legal and valid.’’ In the meantime, the council must ‘‘recon-
sider such ordinance or resolution and, if it does not entirely
repeal the same, shall submit it to popular vote at the next
municipal election, or the Council may, in its discretion, call a
special election for that purpose; and such ordinance or resolu-
tion shall not take effect unless a majority of the qualified elect-
ors voting thereon at such election shall vote in favor thereof.”’
The only limitation on the exercise of this power of direct legis-
72 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

lation by the people is a provision in the charter limiting the
number of special elections for this purpose to one in any period
of six months.

Closely connected with the method of direct legislation by the
initiative and referendum is the administrative weapon known
as the recall. In Houston this method of removal from office is
applicable to the ‘‘holder of any public office . . . . whether
elected thereto by the people or appointed by the city coun-
cil’’.2°8 The movement to recall an officer begins by the prep-
aration of a petition, the exact form of which is prescribed in
the charter. ‘‘Incompetency or unfitness for or misconduct or
malfeasance in the office’ are specified as grounds for removal.
The petition, when signed by the qualified electors, in number
not less than twenty-five percent of the total vote cast at the
democratic primary for the nomination of mayor and commis-
sioners, is to be filed with the city secretary. The signatures on
the petition thus filed must be verified by one or more petition-
ers: and after such verification, the secretary must immediately
notify in writing the officer sought to be removed. To prevent
the abuses which might possibly arise from the recall procedure,
and to safeguard the officials sought to be removed, the Houston
charter contains a provision which enables the incumbent, whose
removal is sought, to file with the city secretary his objection
in writing to the sufficiency of such petition; and the sufficiency
of the objection is then heard and determined by the city
council. If the sufficiency of the objection is sustained, the
petitioners may amend the petition to meet the requirements
of the ruling of the council.

The grounds for removal set forth in the petition not being
declared insufficient upon objection thereto, and all other re-
quirements being found to have been fully complied with, a
recall election is to be ordered within ten days after the final
certification of the secretary, unless the incumbent sought to
be removed resigns within five days thereafter. The recall elec-
tion is conducted just like any other regular election, in so far
as polling places, ballots, and general arrangements are con-
cerned. If, as a result of the election, the person sought to be
removed is recalled, his tenure of office terminates at once. In
ORIGIN OF COMMISSION PLAN 73

ease he is an appointive officer, his successor may be appointed
immediately by the city council; and if an elective officer, elec-
tion of his successor is to be ordered. But the exercise of this
so-called ‘‘guaranteed right of the people to discharge their
public servants’’?’9 ig not unlimited, as it is provided in the
charter that ‘‘no petition for the recall of any officer shall be
filed until eight months after the election or appointment and
the qualification of such officer, nor shall there be more than
one recall election in any one calendar year’’.

Another improvement of the Houston plan by the home rule
amendment of 1913 was the introduction of the civil service
system in the appointment of subordinate officers.*#? The
amended charter provides a civil service commission of three
persons, one of whom must be a member of the city council.
They are to be appointed by the mayor, with the confirmation of
the city council, and to serve for a two-year term with compensa-
tion. The civil service commission, thus appointed, has the
following functions to perform: (1) to make, with the approval
of the city council, ‘‘such rules and regulations for the proper
conduct of its business as it shall find necessary and expedient’’;
(2) to ‘‘provide for the classification of all employees [with
exceptions indicated below] eligible to civil service’’; (8) to
‘‘make provision for open, competitive and free examination as
to the fitness in regard to classified services for an eligibility
list’’; (4) to hear complaints of the dismissed employees and to
decide whether a particular employee shall be permanently dis-
missed or reinstated in his employment; (5) with the approval
of the city council, to ‘‘make proper rules and regulations for
the government of the employees under civil service’’; and (6)
finally to have such rights and duties as may be granted by the
city council. But the civil service system as provided in the
amended charter of Houston is not thorough-going and perfect:
in the first place, the commission has little power independent
of the city council; and, secondly, many positions are exempted
from the scope of competition. The exempted positions include
all day laborers, ‘‘the heads of departments now existing or
which may be hereinafter named; the City Attorney, and his
assistants; City Tax Attorney, if there shall be one; City En-
74 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

gineer; Tax Assessor and Collector; Chief of Police; Chief of
Fire Department; Fire Marshal; Purchasing Agent; City Health
Officer; City Pathologist; City Scavenger; and all of the chief
clerks of any and all departments of the city government, and
the members of all boards created and appointed by the City
Council’’.

Such, in brief, are the essential features of the Houston char-
ter, which, though not following the Galveston plan in every
particular, still contains all the essential features of the com-
mission plan. The number of men who have actual control, who
direct the policies of the city, and who are held responsible for
their actual working out and enforcement is small. The number
of officers elected is reduced and the number of appointed officers
correspondingly increased.

As to the results of the system in Houston, the same emphatic
and unqualified assurances are given by various writers, as in
the case of Galveston. Mr. Jerome H. Farbar, Director of Pub-
licity, Chamber of Commerce, Houston, Texas, has declared that
the benefits accruing from the commission form of government
in Houston are as follows:

The floating indebtedness of $400,000 was wiped out in less than a year.
The plan has enabled the present administration, [1911] without a bond
issue, to erect three excellent brick school buildings at a cost of $125,000;
to build six miles of paving; to expend $60,000 for public parks and
to appropriate $50,000 for the Houston Ship Channel, exclusive of the re-
cent $1,250,000 voted therefor by the people of Houston. It has made
possible the erection of a $400,000 municipal auditorium out of the gen-
eral revenues of the city without one cent of graft. The auditorium seats
7,000 persons and is the finest convention hall in the South. It has cleaned
out the gambling houses; abolished variety theatres; discontinued the
racing pool rooms; and closed the saloons after 12 o’clock midnight and
all day Sunday. There has been adopted a system of block books for
tax department, which enables the board of appraisers to locate the owner
of every tract of land in the city and collect the assessment. It has
made possible the appropriation annually of a sum exceeding $500,000 out
of the general revenues for improvements. The commissioners have pur-
chased the city water plant, increased the cost of operation and within

one year, showed earnings of $10,575.35 without increasing the cost
of consumption to the consumer.™
IV

THE DES MOINES PLAN: ITS ORIGIN AND
ITS PROVISIONS

The plan of government as adopted in Galveston and in Hous-
ton before 1913 has sometimes been characterized by certain
publicists as an ‘‘unguarded commission government’’, and
criticized as ‘‘an honest attempt to secure better rule which
unhappily ignores the fundamental demand of democratic gov-
ernment—an attempt more reactionary and autocratic in. char-
acter than democratic in spirit.’ They rightly asserted that
the securing of men of high calibre to administer municipal
affairs is of far more importance than is the superior framework
of the government. So long as Galveston, Houston, or any city
operating under this system, possesses commissions composed
only of honorable, upright, competent, and conscientious officials,
they will, to be sure, have good government. But there is no
reason to believe that any of these cities will not occasionally
have an inefficient and corrupt commission which, with wide
and centralized power, would be much more capable of injuring
the city than an equally corrupt and inefficient set of adminis-
trative officers with decentralized powers.

It is argued that officials will become responsible only when
they feel themselves under the immediate control of the people
who are able to make and unmake them. But neither in Galves-
ton, nor in Houston before 1913, was there any provision for the
possible exercise of popular control over the officials. It re-.
mained for the State of Iowa, primarily through the energetic
efforts of certain public-spirited citizens of Des Moines, to
embody in statutory form a new plan of city government by
commission in which all the newer forms of institutional democ-
racy are incorporated, and in which, through democratic checks
and popular protective measures, the government is supposed to
be responsible and responsive to the people at all times. The

(75)
76 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

system of city government as provided in the act of the Thirty-
second General Assembly, passed in 1907, has come to be known
as ‘‘The Des Moines Plan of City Government’’, because it was
proposed and urged by the people of the city of Des Moines.?#8

To appreciate the real significance of the Des Moines plan, a
brief sketch of the situation leading to the development of such
a plan is necessary, since here, as elsewhere, the movement is
simply a phase of a general tendency. The Des Moines plan is
not an isolated experiment, but rather the outgrowth of what
preceded.

Up to the inauguration of the Des Moines plan, municipal
government in the State of Iowa, both with regard to its activ-
ities and its organization, had been little altered from its early
character. ‘‘There have been complaints at times of local
shortcomings, but they were seldom long sustained, and the in-
stances in which there has been any very significant change from
the early system, in which rule of the city was by a council,
with the mayor little more than the presiding officer, have been
very infrequent. Such changes as have been made have tended
toward the increase of the mayor’s power.’’?14

In the Constitution of 1857 there was inserted a clause pro-
hibiting the legislature from incorporating cities and towns by
special charters.*25 In accordance with this provision a general
incorporation law, which classified cities and towns on the basis
of population, was passed by the Seventh General Assembly.
Thus, the municipalities of Iowa were, for the purposes of State
legislation, grouped into (1) cities of the first class, having a
population of 15,000 or over, (2) cities of the second class, hav-
ing a population between 2,000 and 15,000, and (3) towns hav-
ing a population under 2,000.%4° According to the census of
Iowa?2’ for the year 1915, the total population of the State was
2,358,066, and the urban population*!® was 1,277,950, living in
893 incorporated towns and cities. In 1915 there were fifteen
cities of the first class, ninety in the second class, and 788 in-
corporated towns. The largest city is Des Moines, having a
population *!9 of 105,652 in 1915.

Though the history of municipal government and administra-
tion in Iowa has shown nothing unusual and striking, and
THE DES MOINES PLAN 77

though no city in this State has been exceptionally badly gov-
erned, the situation in the larger cities like Des Moines has
seemed rather serious.?#? Des Moines was governed by a mayor
and nine aldermen. The board of public works was the chief
executive board of the city; but the mayor had nothing to do
with its final selection, save that he had first to name the candi-
dates. The duties of the mayor were indeed few and compar-
atively unimportant. He had certain appointive powers, but in
every case his appointment had to be confirmed by the city
council, and it was to that body that the appointees were obliged
to show political worth. On the other hand, the board of public
works was clothed with authority of the greatest moment in a
financial way.?*4

Of the history of municipal government in Des Moines under
the old régime Iowans have no cause to be proud. Like most of
the cities of its size in this country, Des Moines had its own
story of shame, and its own record of corruption and inefficiency.
‘‘Bribery of voters was shamelessly practiced. Ballot boxes had
been stolen and unlawfully exposed to manipulation before the
count of votes. The machinery of elections and nominations
was often kept in the hands of reckless and unscrupulous men
and in some cases of actual criminals.’’*?? Members of the
council were not infrequently in ‘‘profitable contract relations
with the public service corporations’’,**? and worse than that,
there was a cordial entente or rather alliance between the cor-
rupt politicians and privilege-seeking public service corporations.
The immensely rich public service companies were always stand-
ing behind the corrupt political ring, the dominant party and
its machine.**+

In Des Moines the task of the reformers was rendered more
difficult than elsewhere because of the fact that the public ser-
vice corporations, with few exceptions, were controlled by home
capital. ‘‘The master spirits in the companies were the master
financial powers in the cities as well as the bulwark of protection
and the magazine of defence for the political machine. Their
families were social leaders. Their influence in business, so-
ciety, church, educational and political circles was estimably
great.’’#26 Thus, any attack on the corrupt and inefficient
78 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

political ring was liable to come to nothing, for multitudinous
subtle influences were at once set to work on the side of the
corruptionists.

The Des Moines plan of city government, however, was not the
outcome of a crisis nor the issue of a sporadic reform movement,
but was rather the direct result of strong convictions on the
part of the public-spirited citizens that along with the attacks
on corruption and graft attention should be directed to the
reform of governmental machinery. They realized that
‘‘changes in organization and the adoption of up-to-date busi-
ness methods in the conduct of public affairs will accomplish
better results than the denunciation of individual evil-
doers.’’*86 Thus, as early as 1903 when the Iowa State Bar
Association held its ninth annual meeting in Des Moines on
July 16, and 17, Mr. L. G. Kinne, the chairman of the committee
on law reform submitted, among others, the following recom-
mendation :

That the municipal government of cities of Iowa should be vested in a
council of three aldermen, whose term of office should be three years, after
the first council the members of which should serve respectively one, two
and three years, to be determined by lot; thereafter one alderman to be
elected annually; such alderman in all cases to be elected by a vote of the
whole city, and vacancies to be filled by special elections; such councils to
be vested with all the present powers of city councils, and to elect one
of their members as mayor to exercise all the duties of mayor, as defined
by law; such aldermen to be paid from two thousand to five thousand
dollars per year depending upon the class of the city, with additional com-
pensation to the mayor; all to be fixed by law; the said aldermen and
mayor to be required to devote their entire time to the discharge of their
duties.””

This recommendation was supported by Charles A. Clark of
Cedar Rapids in a long paper read at the tenth annual meeting
of the Iowa State Bar Association.**8. In this paper, Mr. Clark
“anticipated in a striking way and to a remarkably complete
extent the objections to the old charters and the grounds for
expecting better results from the new.’’**® The recommendation
was adopted by the association at the conclusion of the reading
of the paper.

Since the fight conducted in Des Moines by the former mayor,
John MacVicar, for the public ownership of public utilities, the
THE DES MOINES PLAN 79

civic conscience had been greatly aroused and the people
educated. The way was prepared for the inauguration of a
movement to rescue Des Moines from the spoilers. The adoption
of the above-mentioned recommendation by the Iowa State Bar
Association was simply one of the many signs of the growing
demand for the reforming and re-organizing of municipal
government in harmony with the business principles of efficiency
and economy, and for a more effective popular control of the
organs of government.

For a number of years Mr. James G. Berryhill while visiting
in the city of Galveston on private business had been greatly
impressed with the plan and the remarkable accomplishments of
the commission form of government. In the early fall of 1905,
when another trip to Galveston was contemplated, he was re-
quested by Mr. Harvey Ingham, editor of The Register and
Leader, to gather as much data as could be secured on the Gal-
veston plan and to present the same to the citizens of Des
Moines on his return. Accordingly, Mr. Berryhill was invited
on November 17, 1905, to make a public report on the Galveston
plan of government at a meeting called by the Commercial Club
of Des Moines and held in the Y. M. C. A. auditorium.” The
meeting developed a very marked interest on the part of the
leading business men of the city, and ‘‘his earnest appeal for ear-
ly but deliberate action aroused an interest and enthusiasm among
his auditors auguring well for the movement then and there form-
ally inaugurated and, in a preliminary way, organized.’’?%? Com-
mittees were appointed and a bill, containing many of the
provisions of the Galveston charter and also some new features,
was prepared for submission to the General Assembly of Iowa
then (1906) in session. But when the bill was presented by the
Des Moines committee to a joint meeting of the committees on
cities and towns of the Senate and House of the Thirty-first
General Assembly it failed to secure the support of the com-
mittees,?5?

‘‘But the reform movement did not die with the bill. Indeed,
it now became a part of the ‘boosting’ program of the Greater
Des Moines Committee.’’?* During the summer of 1906 the
movement developed new force. The agitation was greatly
80 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

furthered by Mr. Harvey Ingham, Mr. Lafayette Young, and
Mr. Wm. G. Hale through the columns of matter which appeared
on the editorial pages of their respective papers, The Register
and Leader, The Des Moines Capital, and The Des Moines
News.?%4

At the same time, it is said that Governor Cummins, though
leading the progressive forces of the State along reform lines,
seemed disposed to side in with the old machine rather than to
jeopardize his political future. He favored a plan of govern-
ment known as the Indianapolis plan.**5

The Indianapolis charter, adopted only a short time previous,
had the characteristic features of the concentration of large
powers in the hands of the mayor, the election of the councilmen
at large, and the abolition of the old council committee system.
This plan, which was freely discussed in the press, had a num-
ber of advocates. A committee was sent to Indianapolis to make
a careful investigation of the plan, and the report made by that
committee was very favorable.?%6 In order to ascertain the state
of public sentiment a newspaper ballot was taken by both The
Register and Leader and The Des Moines Capital. The refer-
enda taken by these papers showed a majority favoring the Gal-
veston plan.?%7

In the meantime, a suggestion was made that a joint discussion
be held in some public place between the advocates of the two
plans: Mr. Berryhill for the Galveston plan and Mr. W. H.
Baily for the Indianapolis plan; that a vote on the question be
taken after its conclusion; and that those participating in the
affair bind themselves to support the decision of the judges.?58
This suggestion having met with favor, a joint discussion was
arranged by the Commercial Club of Des Moines to be held at
the Shrine Temple on January 31, 1907. A committee of three
hundred was named by the president of the Commercial Club to
act as a jury on the debate.?89 The meeting was an enthusiastic
one. While not all the members of the committee of three
hundred were present, the Shrine Temple was well filled with
citizens interested in the adoption of some form of reform gov-
ernment.
THE DES MOINES PLAN 81

The Galveston plan, with modifications discussed at the
meeting, won the decision by a decisive majority ;*4” and the
minority, in entire good faith, accepted the decision and joined
the majority in working out what was henceforth known as the
“Des Moines Plan’’ of city government. The result of the
meeting was significant. The disinterested spectator was in-
formed not only that there was a great demand in Des Moines
for a change in the form of administration, but was also con-
vineed as to the popularity of the Galveston plan.

At the public meeting a charter committee, consisting of
James G. Berryhill, W. H. Baily, I. M. Earle, John Read, and
8. B. Allen, was appointed by the chairman to frame a new
charter to be submitted to the Polk County representatives in
the Thirty-second General Assembly with instructions to urge
its passage.241_ The bill which had been killed in the committees
of the Thirty-first General Assembly was taken as a basis for
the new bill. But several important features—such as the refer-
endum, the initiative, and provisions aimed to prevent the
formation of a machine—were added. The bill thus prepared
was submitted to the Thirty-second General Assembly, beeame
a law on March 29th, and went into effeet on April 1, 1907.

“‘Thus after nearly two years of active agitation and inten-
sive discussion commission government was established in Iowa.
The successful outcome of the agitation was due partly to the
reform spirit of the times, partly to the cumulative efforts of a
group of Des Moines citizens who had for years worked
courageously for better city government, and partly to the en-
thusiasm of men like Mr. Berryhill and Mr. Ingham, who
espoused the cause of commission government as a business
proposition and a means of municipal salvation.’’?#?

The act of the Thirty-second General Assembly establishing
the commission form of government appears as chapter forty-
eight of the Laws of Iowa, 1907, under the title of ‘‘Act to pro-
vide for the government of certain cities, and the adoption
thereof by special election’’. It is also found in the Supple-
ment to the Code of Iowa, 1907, under Title V, Chapter 14-e.
The Des Moines plan, however, contains nothing but ‘‘appro-
priations and adaptations from the charters and experiences
82 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

of other cities and jurisdictions.’’?4? It is a combination of old
and new ideas, some taken from Washington, Galveston, and
Los Angeles, and some from Switzerland and New Zealand, but
all made subsidiary to direct government by the people. It grew
out of the celebrated Galveston scheme by commission, but it
grafted on the bureaucratic plan the new institutional forms of
democracy like the initiative, the protest, the referendum, the
recall, and the merit system. It is this ‘‘combination of prin-
ciples and institutions and their adaptation to exigencies of
modern urban conditions’’ that justifies the claim that the
plan was ‘‘a new and distinct species of city government.’’?44

The commission law of Iowa is a general law, and any city of
the State having the requisite population may avail itself of the
advantages of commission government. As originally enacted in
1907, the law applied only to ‘‘any city of the first class, or with
special charter, now or hereafter having a population of twenty-
five thousand or over, as shown by the last preceding State cen-
sus’’.#45 But it was amended*/* to apply to cities of seven
thousand population or over in 1909, and to cities of two thou-
sand population®/’ or over in 1913. Thus, at the present time,
all cities of the first and second classes are authorized to take ad-
vantage of the commission law at their option.

The question of whether a given city shall adopt the new form
of government may be put to a vote in any city having the
requisite two thousand population or over when electors equal in
number to twenty-five percent of the votes cast for all candidates
for mayor at the last preceding election petition to that effect.
When the petition has the required number of signers, it is the
duty of the mayor, by proclamation, to call a special election
within two months after the filing of the petition. At the
election a majority of the votes cast is all that is necessary to
change the form of government.

The next step in the introduction of the system is the election
of the mayor and councilmen, which may take place at the next
regular municipal election. But the mayor may within ten
days after the special election call, by proclamation, another
special election for the choice of officers of the new government,
if no regular city election occurs within one year. If the plan
THE DES MOINES PLAN 83

is not approved by the people at the special election, the question
may not be submitted again within two years thereafter.?/8

Cities adopting the plan are governed primarily by a council,
which is to take over and distribute among the departments all:
the powers and duties formerly held and performed by the
mayor, city council, board of public works, park commissioners,
board of police and fire commissioners, board of waterworks
trustees, board of library trustees, solicitor, assessor, treasurer,
auditor, city engineer, and other boards and officers.242 The
council consists of a mayor and four councilmen in cities of
25,000 population or over, and a mayor and two councilmen in
cities having a population between 2000 and 25,000. The mayor
and councilmen are elected for a term of two years, and va-
cancies are filled by appointment by the remaining members.
Candidates for offices are nominated and elected at large,
through the process of a non-partisan double election. The
primary election. for the nomination of the mayor and council-
men is held on the second Monday preceding the general elec-
tion; and only those who are selected at the primary may be
candidates at the general election. The method and procedure
in the primary are the same as in the general election.*#

At the primary any person may become a candidate for mayor
or councilman by filing with the clerk, at least ten days before
the date of the election, a statement of such candidacy accom-
panied by a petition of at least twenty-five qualified voters.
Upon the expiration of the time of filing the statements and peti-
tions for candidates, it is the duty of the city clerk to publish
in the daily newspapers of the city ‘‘the names of the persons
as they are to appear upon the primary ballot’’. On the ballot
the names of candidates for mayor and councilmen are arranged
alphabetically, and the qualified voters may vote for only one
of the candidates for mayor and for four or two of the candidates
for councilmen, as the case may be. The ballot is printed upon
plain and substantial white paper, and contains ‘‘no party
designation or mark whatever’’. At the second election only the
two candidates receiving the highest number of votes for mayor,
and only the eight or four (as the case may be) receiving the
highest number of votes for councilmen at the primary may be
84 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

candidates for mayor and councilmen. The candidates receiving
the greatest number of votes in the second election are declared to
be elected as mayor and councilmen.?5!

In connection with elections under the commission plan, pro-
vision is made in the statute for the protection of the purity
of the ballot and for the prevention of the various illegal and
corrupt practices which are unusually common in this country.
Persons agreeing to render services to the candidates in con-
sideration of money or other reward are to be punished by a
fine not exceeding three hundred dollars or by imprisonment
in the county jail not exceeding thirty days; and persons giving
or receiving bribes at the elections, or attempting illegal voting
are deemed ‘‘guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
shall be fined a sum not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00),
nor more than five hundred dollars ($500.00), and be imprisoned
in the county jail not less than ten (10), nor more than ninety
(90) days.’’?5* Moreover, ‘‘every elective officer in any such
city shall, within thirty days after qualifying, file with the city
clerk, and publish at least once in a daily newspaper of general
circulation, his sworn statement of all his election and cam-
paign expenses, and by whom such funds were contributed.’’#5$

When the question of adopting the commission form of gov-
ernment has been decided at the special election and when the
mayor and councilmen have been duly elected, the government
of the city under the new plan is ‘‘really a very simple affair. It
is not only simple but direct. It organized the city as a unit,
making it possible for the people at all times to act ‘together
along simple and direct lines’.’’254

The mayor and the councilmen are the only elective officers
under the Des Moines plan. They constitute the council which
possesses and exercises ‘‘all executive, legislative and judicial
powers and duties now had, possessed and exercised by the
mayor, city council, solicitor, assessor, treasurer, auditor, city
engineer and other executive and administrative officers in
cities of the first and second class, and in cities under special
charter, and shall also possess and exercise all executive, legis-
lative and judicial powers and duties now had and exercised by
the board of public works, park commissioners, the board of po-
lice and fire commissioners, board of waterworks trustees, and
THE DES MOINES PLAN 85

board of library trustees in all cities wherein a board of public
works, park commissioners, board of police and fire commis-
sioners, board of waterworks trustees, and board of library
trustees in all cities wherein . . . . [such boards and trustees]
now exist or may be hereafter created.’’?*5

The council, by a majority vote, elects the more important
officers and employees of the city, including a city clerk, solici-
tor, assessor, treasurer, auditor, civil engineer, city physician,
marshal, market master, street commissioner, three library
trustees, and ‘‘such other officers and assistants as shall be pro
vided for by ordinance and necessary to the proper and efficient
conduct of the affairs of the city’’.*86 The council may also at
any time by a majority vote remove officers and assistants so
appointed,**’? and from time to time ‘‘create, fill and discontinue
offices and employments other than herein prescribed, according
to their judgment of the needs of the city; and may by majority
vote of all the members remove any such officer or employe,
except as otherwise provided for in this act; and may by reso-
Intion of otherwise prescribe, limit or change the compensa
tion of such officers or employes.’’**8

The executive and administrative powers and duties of the
city are distributed among five departments designated as the
“Department of Public Affairs’’, the ‘‘Department of Accounts
and Finances’, the ‘‘Department of Public Safety’’, the ‘‘De-
partment of Streets and Public Improvements’’, and the ‘‘De-
partment of Parks and Public Property’’. Moreover, ‘‘the
Gotiticil shall determine the powers and duties to be performed
by, atid assign them to the appropriate department; shall pre-
sétibe the powers and duties of officers and employees; may
assign particular officers and employees to one or more of the
departments; may require an officer or employe to perform
duties in one or more departments, and may make such other
fules and regulations as may be necessary or proper for the
efficient and economical conduct of the business of the city.’’*5?

The Des Moines plan ‘‘follows the Galveston plan in making
thé comtnision #8 a whole and not the mayor responsible for the
tity government, and the Houston plan in making the commis-
sioners acttial superintendents instead of mere directors of their
86 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

departments.’’®6? The commissioners under the Des Moines
plan, except the mayor, are not elected directly to the depart-
ments of which they take charge. They are simply elected as
members of the council, and it is the duty of the council to
assign by a majority vote at its first regular meeting, each of its
members to be the head of a department, except the mayor, who
by virtue of his office, is always superintendent of the depart-
ment of public affairs. In cities of less than 25,000 population,
where there are two instead of four councilmen, each is assigned
to two of the four departments. Such designation, however,
need not be permanent, but may ‘‘be changed whenever it
appears that public service would be benefitted thereby.’’264
Thus, each member of the council is put in charge of some
definite activity. He exercises administrative control over his
particular department or departments, for the success or failure
of which he is held responsible directly to the council and to a
certain extent to the electorate. In the place of numerous
council committees, as under the old plan, there are now under
the Des Moines plan five committees, each consisting of one
person who is the definite, responsible head of the department
or departments allotted to him.

The council meets in regular session at least once in every
month, and special meetings may be called from time to time by
the mayor or two councilmen.**? ‘‘In cities having four council-
men three members of the council shall constitute a quorum, and
in cities having two councilmen, two members of the council
shall constitute a quorum, and in cities having four councilmen
the affirmative vote of three members, and in cities having two
councilmen the affirmative vote of two members shall be neces-
sary to adopt any motion, resolution or ordinance, or pass any
measure unless a greater number is provided for in this act.’’268
Every motion, resolution, or ordinance, must be reduced to
writing before being voted upon, and upon every vote the yeas
and nays must be called and recorded.?

The mayor is the president of the council and presides at all
its meetings, and he ‘‘shall supervise all departments and report
to the council for its action all matters requiring attention in
either.’’ He signs every resolution and ordinance passed by the
THE DES MOINES PLAN 87

council, but has no veto power. The superintendent of the de-
partment of accounts and finances is the vice-president of the
council, and ‘‘in case of vacancy in the office of mayor, or the
absence or inability of the mayor, shall perform the duties of
mayor.’265

The mayor and councilmen receive salaries in accordance with
the population of the city. In cities having a population of less
than 25,000, the mayor’s salary is ‘‘not to exceed the sum of one
hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) per annum for each one
thousand (1,000) of population, or major portion thereof, in
such city, and for each councilman in said city, not to exceed the
sum of one hundred and twenty dollars ($120.00) per annum
for each one thousand population, or major portion thereof’’;
but in no such city shall the mayor receive more than the sum
of $2,500 per annum, nor shall the councilmen’s annual salary
be greater than $2,000. In cities having a population between
25,000 and 40,000, the mayor’s annual salary shall be $2,500, and
each councilman’s salary $1,800. In cities having a population
between 40,000 and 60,000 the mayor’s salary shall be $3,000,
and each councilman’s salary $2,500. Finally, in cities having
a population of 60,000 or more the mayor’s annual salary shall
be $3,500 and each councilman’s salary $3,000.%%

Such, in brief, is the form of government as provided in the
Des Moines plan. In this plan ‘‘authority and responsibility are
drawn together, unified, and consolidated in the hands of a
very few officers—the members of the council.’’?6? The old
theory of the separation of powers, so familiar to every student
of American politics, is completely ignored, and in its place the
business principle is substituted. Nor is any provision for
checks and balances to be found within the organization itself.
All these political devices which have been so long associated
with democracy are abandoned. To insure the responsibility of
the commissioners and to provide for the popular control of the
officers, the newer forms of institutional democracy are utilized
in the Des Moines plan. ‘‘Indeed, the thorough-going democ-
racy of the Des Moines Plan is clearly seen in the institutional
forms of popular government which determine the relation
between the members of the council and the electorate.’’#68
88 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Under the old régime, the city of Des Moines suffered greatly
from the evil consequences arising from the profitable relations
existing between the city officials and the public service corpor-
ations and the alliance between the machine politicians and the
privilege-seeking interests. The people are well aware of the
secrecy that has surrounded the granting of franchises in the
past, and of the enormous amounts of money that have been
made by some corrupt councilmen or other city officials through
this power of franchise-granting. One of the aims of the Des
Moines plan is to get rid of these evils.

Thus, in the Iowa law numerous provisions are made regard-
ing the relations of the city officials and corporations and the
granting of franchises. Officers and employees are prohibited
from being interested ‘‘directly or indirectly, in any contract or
job for work or materials, or the profits thereof, or services to
be furnished or performed for the city’’, nor are they permitted
to have any interest ‘‘directly or indirectly, in any contract or
job for work or materials, or the profits thereof, or services to
be furnished or performed for any person, firm or corporation
operating interurban railway, street railway, gas works, water~
works, electric light or power plant, heating plant, telegraph
line, telephone exchange, or other public utility within the
territorial limits of the said ecity.’’ Furthermore, no officer or
employee is permitted to accept or receive from such corpora-
tions ‘‘any other sefvice upon terms more favorable than is
granted to the publie generally.’’ But free transportation of
policemen and firemen in uniform is excepted.?6?

‘‘Every ordinanee or resolution appropriating money or or-
dering any street improvement or sewer, or making or authoriz-
ing the making of any contract, or granting any franchise or
Tight to occupy or use the streets, highways, bridges or publie
places’’ must remain on file with the city clerk for public inspec-
tion at least one week before its final passage or adoption. All
franchises or grants for public utilities must be authorized or
approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon at a
general or special election. The question of granting, renewing
or extending such franchises may be submitted by the council
to a vote at a general or special election, or by the mayor if
THE DES MOINES PLAN 89

petitioned so to do by twenty-five property owners of each ward
in a city, or fifty property owners in any incorporated town.
Notice of the election must be published in two newspapers of
the city once each week for at least four consecutive weeks.
All the expenses incurred in holding such elections are to be
paid by the party applying for the franchise or for a renewal or
extension thereof.?7?

Not only on the granting of franchises do the people have a
veto, but they also have a voice through the institution of the
protest on every ordinance passed by the council. No ordinance
passed by the council (except when otherwise required by gen-
eral law or in case of urgency) ‘‘shall go into effect before ten
days from the time of its final passage’’, and if a petition signed
by ‘‘electors of the city equal in number to at least twenty-five
per centum of the entire vote cast for all candidates for mayor at
the last preceding general municipal election’’, protesting
against the passage of such ordinance is presented to the council,
the council must reconsider the measure. If the reconsideration
of the measure by the council does not result in the complete
repeal of the same, the council must submit the ordinance to a
vote of the electors of the city, either at the general election or
at a special municipal election called for that purpose. The
ordinance can become operative only in ease ‘‘a majority of the
qualified electors voting on the same shall vote in favor
thereof’’.?77

The referendum and the protest are means by which the
people are enabled to reject undesirable legislation. ‘‘They are
after all only the negative instruments of democracy: they can
prevent unwise or unpopular measures, but they can not
absolutely compel the adoption of desired acts.’’*”? In order
to accomplish the latter purpose, that is, to enable the voters to
propose the enactment of desirable legislation, provisions are
made in the commission law of Iowa for the institution of the
popular initiative. Thus, in the commission-governed eities of
Towa, if the council refuses to pass the needed legislation, the
people may take the initiative and compel the consideration
and passage of the desired measures. Any proposed ordinance
may be submitted to the council by petition signed by the elec-
90 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

tors of the city ‘‘equal in number to twenty-five per centum
of the votes cast for all candidates for mayor at the last preced-
ing general election’’, and requesting that ‘‘the said ordinance
be submitted to a vote of the people if not passed by the
eouncil’’. Under such circumstances, the council must either
pass the ordinance without alteration within twenty days or
put the question to a vote at a special election, unless a general
municipal election is fixed within ninety days thereafter. If
more than ten but less than twenty-five percent of the electors
petition for the enactment of an ordinance, it must be either
passed or submitted to a vote of the people at the next general
city election. ‘‘If a majority of the qualified electors voting on
the proposed ordinance shall vote in favor thereof, such
ordinance shall thereupon become a valid and binding ordinance
of the city; and any ordinance proposed by petition, or which
shall be adopted by a vote of the people, cannot be repealed or
amended except by a vote of the people.’’?78

In the Des Moines plan ways and means have been provided
for the possible removal of the elective officers before the ex-
piration of the terms for which they are elected. Here, the Los
Angeles recall system is incorporated. It is specifically pro-
vided in the statute that ‘‘the holder of any elective office may
be removed at any time by the electors qualified to vote for a
successor of such incumbent.’’ The recall petition must be
signed by electors ‘‘equal in number to at least twenty-five per
centum of the entire vote for all candidates for the office of
mayor cast at the last preceding general municipal election”’,
must demand ‘‘an election of a successor of the person sought
to be removed’’, and must also contain ‘‘a general statement of
the grounds for which the removal is sought’’. The petition is
to be filed with the city clerk, who is required to examine it
carefully, and to ascertain from the voters’ register whether or
not it is signed by the requisite number of qualified voters.

In case the petition is deemed to be sufficient, it is the duty
of the city clerk to transmit it to the council, which shall order
and fix a date for holding the election, ‘‘not less than thirty days
or more than forty days from the date of the clerk’s certificate’’.
The recall election is conducted ‘‘in all respects as are other city
THE DES MOINES PLAN 91
elections.’’ At the election, ‘‘any person sought to be removed
may be a candidate to succeed himself, and unless he
requests otherwise in writing, the clerk shall place his
name on the official ballot without nomination.’’*?4 Nomin-
ation of other candidates may be made without the in-
tervention of a primary election, by filing with the clerk
‘fa statement of candidacy accompanied by a petition
signed by electors entitled to vote at said special election equal
in number to at least ten per centum of the entire vote for all
candidates for the office of mayor at the last preceding general
municipal election’’.*75 The candidate receiving the highest
number of votes in the election is declared to be elected and to
hold the unexpired term of office. If he happens to be the in-
cumbent, he continues in office; and if not, the incumbent ‘‘shall
thereupon be deemed removed from the office upon qualification
of his successor.’’ This method of removal is declared to be
‘‘eumulative and additional to the methods heretofore provided
by law.’’276

Like the charters of Galveston and Houston, specific pro-
visions guaranteeing publicity are also found in the Iowa law.
All meetings of the council ‘‘at which any person not a city
officer is admitted, shall be open to the public.’’??”

Each month the council is required to print ‘‘in pamphlet
form a detailed itemized statement of all receipts and expenses
of the city and a summary of its proceedings during the preced-
ing month’’. Copies must be furnished to the libraries and
daily newspapers of the city, as well as to any person who makes
application. Provision is also made for the annual ‘‘examina-
tion of all the books and accounts of the city to be made by
competent accountants’’, and the publication of such results.?78

A civil service commission of three men is provided for in the
Des Moines plan of government. A thorough-going merit
system is indeed indispensable to good government, and by its
adoption it is hoped to assure the best possible service for the
city and to substitute personal merit and ability for ‘‘political
pull’’ in the appointment of officials. The appointment of such
a commission is compulsory in cities having a population of
15,000 or over, and optional in cities with a population between
92 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

2,000 and 15,000. But, ‘‘in all cases in which no civil service
commissioners are appointed by the council, the council shall
have the same powers and shall exercise and perform all the
duties devolving upon such commissiohers’’.*79

The civil service commissioners are appointed for six years
and are removable for cause at any time by a four-fifths vote of
the council. Civil service rules, however, do not apply to all
city officials. The law exempts commissioners of any kind
(laborers whose occupation requires no special skill or fitness),
election officials, the mayor’s secretary, the assistant solicitor,
and all officers specifically named in section eight of the law.2%
With these exemptions, the only important officers of the city
subject to the civil service rules are the members of the police
and fire departments, and the chief of the fire department. In-
deed, ¢ivil service regulation in tlie Des Moines plan is confined to
purely clerical assistants and employees, who constitute a small
proportion of the persons in municipal employment.

All appointive officers and employees who are subject to the
civil service rules are elected by the council from a list of per-
sons who have successfully passed the civil service examination
which is held semi-annually for ‘‘the purpose of determining
the qualifications of the applicants for positions’’. These ex-
aminations are practical in their character and relate ‘‘to such
matters as will fairly test the fitness of the person examined to
discharge the duties of the position to which he seeks to be
appointed.’’ Persons holding civil service positions may bé
removed by a majority vote of the civil service commissioners
for ‘‘misconduct or failtire to properly perform their duties
under such rules or regulations as may be adopted by the coun-
cil.’’ Moreover, the chief of the police and of the fire depart-
ment, and any superintendent or foreman in charge of municipal
work may ‘‘peremptorily suspend or discharge any subordinate
then under his direction for neglect of duty, disobedience of
orders or misconduct’’. But in the case of removal or sus-
pension from office, ample provisions are made in the law for
appeals and hearings.*®!

Finally, provision is made for the steps necessary to return to
the former plan of government if in the opinion of the voters
the commission form proves a failure. ‘‘ Any city which shall
THE DES MOINES PLAN 93

have operated for more than six years under the provisions of
this act may abandon such organization hereunder, and accept
the provisions of the general law of the state then applicable
to cities of its population, or if now organized under special
charter may resume said charter’’ by a majority vote cast at a
special election called for that purpose. Such a special election
may be called upon the petition of not less than twenty-five per-
cent of the electors of the city. When the question of abandon-
ing the commission form has been decided in the affirmative, and
the officers prescribed by the general laws of the State for cities
of like population have been elected at the biennial municipal
election, the city then becomes again a city under the general
law. But such a change is simply a change in its form of govern-
ment, and is not in any way intended to affect ‘‘the property,
rights or liabilities of any nature of such city’’.*8? Thus, the
eycle of the law is completed: it begins by introducing a new
form of government, provided for its workings, and ends in
provisions by which it may be abandoned for the former plan
if it proves unsatisfactory.

The city of Des Moines, for the specific needs of which the
law was primarily framed, could not of course take advantage of
the act without passing through the ordeal of a special election.
At this special election the politicians and other interests were
not unrepresented. It was a serious matter for them. As the
first thing needed in the campaign was publicity and as every
paper of the city was on the side of the reformers, a new paper,
known as the Tribune was launched, and a vigorous campaign
against the reformers begun. This paper was sent to every
home in the city during the fight. The saloon interests, the
politicians, and the gamblers were nearly a unit in urging the
electorate to vote no. ‘‘The union labor voters were assured
that the scheme was a device of their natural enemies, the em-
ployers. The foreign voters were simply told that the new
scheme was a return to the monarchy they had just escaped from
in Europe. The negroes were reminded of the origin of the
new form of government.’’?6*

Before election, the startling discovery was made that the
registration books under the management of the ‘‘City Hall
94 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Gang’’ had been padded with- thousands of names having no
right to vote. ‘‘The grave yards had been searched for names
which repeaters could give in precincts where the ring was all-
powerful.’’®s But all these tactics were of no avail, for a peti-
tion for a restrictive and mandatory injunction was filed, asking
the court to direct the registrars of elections to correct their
books and to cut out the bogus names. Accordingly, a revision
of the registration list was ordered by the court, and in this
revision it was reported that about seven thousand names were
stricken from the list.28 On June 20, 1907, the voters of Des
Moines adopted the new plan by a vote of 6376 to 4087.28

Having failed in their attempts to corrupt and deceive the
electorate and to carry the election by recourse to the grave
yards, the reactionaries made a last attempt to defy the will of
the people of the State and the city by resorting to the court in
the hope that the latter would nullify the law passed by the
legislature and ratified by the city. On October 10, 1907,
injunction proceedings to test the constitutionality of the Des
Moines plan were begun in the District Court of Polk County.
It was the intention of the taxpayers bringing the suit to raise
every objection to the law and plan that had been suggested
by its opponents. Every provision of the law which its oppon-
ents had declared vulnerable was attacked: six points were urged
in the support of their contention. In the first place, it was
claimed that the law violated Article IV, Section 4, of the Fed-
eral Constitution which provides that the United States shall
guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of
government. Secondly, it was contended that section one of the
new law violated Article III, Section 30, of the Iowa Constitution,
which prohibits the legislature from passing local or special laws
of any character, it being alleged that this law, applicable only
to a few cities of the State, was special and class legislation. In
four particulars it was claimed that Article III, Section 1, of
the Iowa Constitution providing for the separation of the gov-
ernmental powers was violated by the provisions in the law
vesting all powers in the council and establishing the initiative,
the referendum, and the recall.?8”
THE DES MOINES PLAN 95

The suit to test the constitutionality of the law, however, was
very timely. It was believed that at some stage of the proceed-
ings the new form of government would get into the courts. It
was therefore much better to have the test made at that time
than to have it come just as the city might be engaging in an
expensive improvement, or following the assessment of prop-
erty, or even after the new officials had been chosen, to be met
with a refusal of the officers to vacate.

On November 23rd the Des Moines plan scored its second
triumph when Judge James A. Howe, of the District Court,
handed down a decision holding the law to be constitutional in
every important feature.*88 After declaring that the provision
of the Federal Constitution invoked in this case was a guarantee
to the State and did not apply to a city; that there was no
ground for the claim that the law was special or class legislation ;
that Article ITI, Section 1, of the State Constitution of Iowa
related only to the government of the State and did not affect
the government of cities; and after sustaining the new forms of
democratic institutions like the primary election, the initiative,
the referendum, and the recall, the court concluded its decision

in the following words:

It is elementary that state legislative power is plenary, and that he who
would challenge a legislative enactment must be able to specify a partic-
ular provision of the Constitution which deprives the legislature of the
power to pass the act; also that it is the duty of the court to reconcile the
statutes with the Constitution when it can be dene without doing violence
to the language of either, and in all cases of doubt the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statutes. Considering and
analyzing this act section by section the court is unable to say that it is in
conflict with the letter of the Constitution and therefore sustains the law.

The decision of the District Court, when an appeal was made,
was affirmed by the State Supreme Court on February 18, 1908,
and the constitutionality of the Des Moines plan was definitely

settled.#29

In Des Moines a primary election was held in February to
select candidates for the five offices; and an election, at which
the voters made a choice between the candidates selected at the
primary, was held in March. On April 6, 1908, the plan went,
into operation in Des Moines. Since then, eight other cities in
96 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

the State have also adopted the plan. These cities are Burling-
ton, Cedar Rapids, Fort Dodge, Keokuk, Marshalltown, Mason
City, Sioux City, and Ottumwa.
v

SPREAD OF THE COMMISSION PLAN OF
CITY GOVERNMENT

Probably there never has been a period of greater activity in
the re-organization of city government and in the re-making of
city charters than the period following the passage of the Iowa
law known as the Des Moines plan. The simplified organization
of city government exemplified in the commission plan very
soon spread from the medium-sized cities in the Middle West to
the cities of the metropolitan class in the East. The movement
went from city to city, and from State to State; and in a com-
paratively short time the commission plan was in operation in
over four hundred cities in forty-three States, thus becoming
nation-wide in its scope. Such a wide interest in the commission
form of city government during the past few years has been the
most conspicuous development of recent times in the realm of
American municipal affairs.

Prior to 1907, however, the history of commission government
was short and simple: only two cities in one of the southern
States were operating under this novel plan. But the results in
these two cities soon attracted the attention of municipal reform-
ers and citizens in other States, who, as sufferers from municipal
ills, naturally turned to the remedy which had apparently cured
or benefited other cities similarly affected.2% Visits to Galveston
and Houston, the only two cities up to that time where the plan
was in operation, were often made by individuals or committees
of citizens in order to investigate the actual operation of the
new plan; and practically without exception the visitors were
greatly impressed with the system.?%

Accordingly, reformers and citizens of many graft-burdened
and. boss-ridden cities throughout the country hastened to
espouse the ‘‘Texas Idea’’ because they saw in it a means of
elevating the character and efficiency of their city government.

(97)
98 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

At the same time, it can not be denied that among the factors
responsible for the popularity of the new plan was the erroneous
‘idea always lurking in the popular mind that there is some time
to be discovered a piece of political mechanism which when set
in motion will give perfect city government without further at-
tention from the voter than the occasional casting of a bal-
lot.’’292, The commission plan, which appeared aust at the time
when the people were beginning to realize the ‘‘conspicuous
failure’’ of municipal government in this country, was immedi-
ately heralded as the long- looked-for ideal piece of political
mechanism. ‘Indeed, ‘““the commission movement is essentially
one of imitation. City after city has adopted the commission
plan because it had been reported successful in Galveston, Hous-
‘ton or Des Moines.’’®9 But the fact that many of the American
cities are following with interest the experiments and results
of other municipalities is not discouraging. On the contrary,
it has been pronounced as ‘‘one of the most hopeful signs in re-
gard to the improvement of municipal conditions.’’#%

By 1907 the commission form of city government had proved
its worth as a measure of municipal reform. In that year not
only was a new stimulus given to the plan throughout the coun-
try, but the commission form itself underwent a great change as
the result of the inauguration of the famous ‘‘Des Moines Plan”’.
As soon as the new forms of institutional democracy had been
incorporated into the original plan the commission system gained
a strong hold upon public confidence. It is for this reason that
the Des Moines plan is superior to the original Galveston plan;
and from the time that the newer and improved system was
written into the statute books of Iowa it has been Des Moines,
instead of Galveston, which has led the way in the commission
movement and has exerted the greatest influence in its spread
throughout the whole country.

Moreover, commission government has made headway ‘‘not
alone under its own steam but through the momentum given it
by the vigorous propaganda for nomination reform, the short
ballot and direct legislation.’’?%

Among the forty-eight States of the Union there are at the
present writing only six? that have failed to appreciate and
‘SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 99

adopt the new plan of aunicipal government. In all the other
States this plan has been embodied i in constitutional or statutory
‘laws. To be more ‘specific, there are twenty-seven States?” which
“have. already enacted general laws, optional or obligatory, on the
subject of ‘commission government. In six? of these twenty-
‘seven States, and also in six other States,’ cities of a certain
size are permitted by constitutional provisions to draw up their
own charters with certain restrictions; and thus, any of these
cities may adopt a commission charter if it sees fit. One®? of the
home rule States and three other Commonwealths®*! have enacted
‘optional charter laws; and among the plans provided in these
laws there is invariably the commission plan. There is still an-
other class of States, six in number,?”? in which there is no gen-
eral law providing for the commission form nor any optional
charter law, but in which the legislatures have in many cases
seen fit to grant commission charters to some of the municipali-
ties by special enactment. Thus, in considering the adoption
and operation of the commission form of government in Ameri-
can cities, the States can be conveniently divided into the
following classes:

States with permissive or optional general commission laws.

States with obligatory self-executing commission laws.

States with optional model charter laws.

States with a constitutional home rule charter system.

States with special commission charters.

States in which there are no commission laws or commission
charter cities.

STATES WITH PERMISSIVE OR OPTIONAL GENERAL COMMISSION LAWS

Iowa has the honor of being the first State to pass a permissive
or optional general commission law applicable to cities of a cer-
tain size. Following the passage of the Iowa law, there were gen-
eral laws of the same nature passed in the same year by the
legislatures of Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
Attention will now be turned to these laws and subsequent acts
of other States.

Kansas.—In the early part of the year 1907, when the Des
Moines plan was still in the making, the Kansas legislature
passed two acts enabling cities of the first and second classes
100 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

to adopt the commission form of government at their option.
But both statutes ‘‘bore evidences of haste in drafting and
serious defects were apparent.’’?5 Accordingly, the law for the
first class cities was amended in 1909 ;3* and the law applying
to cities of the second class was repealed in the same year, and
in its place a new law was enacted.*”5 In 1913 another general
law was passed to enable cities of the third class to adopt the
commission form of government.*6

The amended law for cities of the first class contained some of
the features of the Des Moines plan. It provided a commission
of five members to exercise the powers formerly vested in the
mayor and council, and to take charge of the -adminis-
tration of five specified departments: police and fire; finance
and revenue; streets and public improvements; parks and public
property; and streets, waterworks and lighting. For cities of
the first class having less than 18,000 inhabitants®”’ the number
of commissioners was reduced to three, and their duties were
made the same as those of commissioners in the second class
cities. As provided in 1909 the commission, after being elected,
assigned by a majority vote each of its members to some par-
ticular department—except the mayor, who is elected as such
and is ex-officio commissioner of the fire and police de-
partments. But in 1913 an amendment was made to require
candidates for commissioner to indicate the specific departments
for which they were running. Thus, there is now no assignment
of duties to each officer after the commission has been elected.398
Commissioners are nominated and elected at large by the pro-
cess of double election, for a term of two years. Provisions are
also made for a civil service commission, and for the initiative,
referendum, and recall. The commissioners must appoint a
civil service board of three members. The initiative can be in-
voked on petition of twenty-five percent of the voters at special
elections and ten percent at the general election. The refer-
endum is made compulsory on franchises, but not otherwise.
Recall elections can be held on petition of twenty-five percent of
the voters voting at the last municipal election.*9? Any city of
the first class can submit to the electorate at a special election
the question of adopting the plan above outlined, on a ten
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 101

percent petition of the voters; and any city may abandon the ex-
periment after a trial of four years, through the same process, on
petition of twenty-five percent of the electors.

The new law for cities of the second class was modelled on
the Iowa law. The governing body is a board of three com-
missioners, including the mayor. Their tenure of office is three
years, with partial renewal annually. The commissioner-depart-
ments are: fire, police, and health; streets and public utilities;
education, finance, and revenue. The mayor is ex-officio com-
missioner of police, fire, and health. By an amendment passed
in 1911*2° candidates are required to announce upon the primary
ballot which particular commissionership they are seeking. Any
name can be placed on the primary ballot on petition of
twenty-five voters. The number of candidates voted for at the
second election is double the number of offices to be filled. The
initiative is made available at general elections on a petition of
ten percent of the voters, and a forty percent petition may
justify the calling of a special election. The referendum is
made operative on a twenty-five percent petition. This plan
can be adopted at a special election called on a petition signed by
forty percent of the voters; and may be abandoned after four
years trial in the same way, through a forty percent petition.

The general law of 1913, applicable to third class cities, is
very similar to the law for second class cities, except that there
is no provision made for the initiative and referendum.

The response to these laws on the part of the cities of Kansas
were enthusiastic and prompt. From the time of the passage of
these laws to the present over forty cities‘‘’ have installed ‘the
commission plan. This record places Kansas among the leading
States in this movement.

North Dakota.—North Dakota is one of the four States which
enacted commission laws in 1907. The North Dakota law was
passed on March 20th, and applied to cities of not less than two
thousand inhabitants. But in 1911 the law was amended to
extend the system to include towns and villages having a popu-
lation of not less than five hundred.*”. The petition requesting
that the question of adoption be submitted to the voters is
required to contain the names of ten percent of the electors; but
102° COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

should the proposition be voted down, it may not be again sub-
mitted for a period of one year. The board of commissioners
consists of five members, elected for two years and having the’
usual powers possessed by commissions in other cities. Candi-
dates are nominated by petition and elected on a non- -partisan
ballot. But the noteworthy feature of this law i is the cumulative
voting system: ‘‘Hach voter shall be allowed as many votes for
the candidates of City. Commissioners as there are Commission.
ers to be elected, such votes being distributed among the can-
didates as the voter shall see fit; no voter shall be allowed to
cast, more votes than candidates to. be elected. ass

‘The initiative, referendum, and recall were not found in the
original law, but were provided by an amendment passed in
1911. Under this amendment the initiative is made available at
a general election on fifteen percent petition of the total vote
cast at the last preceding municipal election ; while twenty-five
percent petition is required to call a special election. All ordi-
nances except those declared by a two-thirds majority to be
emergency measures are subject to a referendum vote on a
petition of ten percent of the voters. Recall elections ean be
held upon petition by thirty percent of the voters. The plan
may be abandoned after four years trial at a special election
called in response to a petition signed by not less than forty ,
percent of the electors. Ten cities in North Dakota have elected
to come under this plan. 814

South Dakota.—The South Dakota commission law was passed
in 1907, amended in 1909, and altered again in 1911, 1913, and’
1915. It created, in addition to the classes of cities then exist:
ing, a new class of cities known as ‘‘cities under commission’’,
and was a general optional law enabling cities of the first,
second, and third classes to adopt this new form, of govern-
ment.345 On petition signed by a number of voters equal , to
fifteen percent of the number of votes cast for mayor at the last
previous municipal election, the question of adopting the plan
may be submitted to the voters at a special election.

. The law provides for a board. of five commissioners, elected
for five years, with partial renewal each, year ; but, the city has,
the option of determining ‘at the time of adoption whether there
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 103

should be five or three members ‘of the board. If five members
are elected, there are four departments : police and fire, streets
and public property, waterworks and sewerage, and finance and
revenue. But if the city chooses to have three members on the
board, there are only two departments: public property, police,
and fire; and waterworks and sewerage. Any voter may. become
a candidate at the annual election upon the petition of not less
than twenty-five nor more than one hundred and fifty voters.
Candidates can only be selected by a majority of all the votes.
cast. Should it appear that no one has received the necessary
votes, a second election shall be held on the Thursday following
the first election. But in such a case the balloting is confined to
the two candidates receiving the highest vote in the first election.

The initiative and referendum may be invoked by a five per-
cent petition at a special election; and in the case of a refer-
endum election the proposition voted on may refer to the whole
or toa ‘portion of an ordinance. The referendum on franchises
is ‘compulsory. Recall elections can be held on petitions of
fifteen percent of the voters. Thus far, fourteen cities in South
Dakota have elected to come under the new plan as above out-
lined.#26

Mississippt.—Mississippi was the second State in the South to
provide for the commission plan of city government. Prior to
1908 government by commission in the South was confined to
the State of Texas, but in that year the so-called ‘‘Home Rule
Law’’ of Mississippi was passed.*?” It is an enabling act under
which all the cities of the State are granted the option of adopt-
ing the commission form of government at a special election
called upon a petition signed by at least ten percent of the
voters. It provides an aldermanic body consisting of three or
five commissioners, elected at large and possessing all the powers
and duties of the mayor and aldermanic bodies and all other
elective municipal officers. The electors of the city, in their
petition requesting a vote on the commission form of govern-
ment, are allowed to determine the number of commissioners,
their salary, the time required of each, the bond to be given by
each, and such other officers as it might be desired to elect in
their cities. Thus, the characteristic feature of this law is that
104 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

it leaves more liberty and permits more discretion on the part
of the locality with regard to the officers and the exact form of
government than any of the other laws which had been passed
up to that time.

In 1912 another law on the same subject was passed by the
legislature.*/8 It is applicable to all cities upon adoption at a
special election. called upon petition of ten percent of the quali-
fied electors. Under the new law, the number of commissioners
is definitely fixed at three, including the mayor, all elected for
a term of four years. But the salaries to be paid to the commis-
sioners, and the number of commissioner-departments are still
left to be fixed by ordinance. The commission is vested with the
usual legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the city, but
when any city operating under the act desires to extend, dimin-
ish, or limit the powers and duties of the council, ‘‘the Council
may adopt an ordinance so extending, diminishing, or limiting
the powers or duties to be exercised by such Council or the
members thereof, as desired, and shall . . . . submit the same
for the approval of the qualified electors of such city at a general
or special election’’. If a two-thirds majority of the qualified
electors of the city voting thereon shall be in favor of such an
ordinance, then a certified copy of the same must be submitted
to the Governor. It is then the duty of the Governor to con-
sult the Attorney-General about the constitutionality of the
ordinance; and if it is found to be consistent with the Constitu-
tion and laws of the State the ordinance must be approved by
the Governor.

Both the laws of 1908 and 1912 required the submission of
all franchise or bond issue ordinances to a referendum vote, and
provided for the initiative, referendum, and recall; but the
conditions of their operation have been entirely superseded by
an. act of the legislature approved on March 27, 1914.819 Under
this law the initiative is available to any municipality on peti-
tion of ten percent of the qualified electors; and the referendum
may be secured on petition of twenty percent on all measures
excepting those which are declared to be emergency measures.
The recall is made available on a twenty-five percent petition,
but the petition may not be circulated until after it has been
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 105

published in some newspaper for three weeks, together with the
signatures of twenty-five qualified electors. Thus far nine cities
of the State have taken advantage of the commission laws. The
plan has been in operation longest in Clarksdale and Haties-
burg, both of which cities adopted it subsequent to 1910.32

Texas—Up to 1909 Texas had twelve commission-governed
cities. Galveston received its first commission charter in 1901,
and Houston in 1905. These two pioneer cities were soon
followed by Dallas, Fort Worth, El Paso, Denison, and Green-
ville in 1907; and five other cities, including Austin, the State
capital, Waco, Palestine, Corpus Christi, and Marshall. But
all these cities secured the commission form of government
through special charters, and thus there were features peculiar
to each of them. Instead of a uniform system, these charters
allowed conflicting and perplexing provisions to arise in. several
cities.

In view of the difficulties inherent in the special charter sys-
tem, the legislature passed on April 1, 1909, a general law
enabling cities of less than 10,000 population to adopt this form
of government by a referendum vote.3’*? This law was amended
in, 1913 and again in 1914. The amendatory act of 1913 permits
any municipality having a population of 500 to 5000 to adopt
the commission form of government; and the act of 1914 enables
cities of 1000 or over to have the commission plan submitted to
a referendum vote on petition of ten percent of the voters or on
an affirmative vote of the council by a two-thirds majority.%2*
The government provided by the acts is vested in a mayor and
two commissioners elected for terms of two years. But there
are no provisions made for the initiative, referendum, and re-
eall, except that ordinances granting franchises may be referred
to the electorate on petition of five hundred voters. Since the
passage of these laws over twenty Texas cities have elected to
come under the new form of government.3*8

Wisconsin.—The Wisconsin statute was passed in June, 1909,
amended in 1911, and altered again in 1915.5*4 It is an enabling
act applicable to cities of the second, third, and fourth classes.
Thus, Milwaukee, the only city of the first class in the State,
is excluded from the operation of the law.5#° The question of
106 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

adoption can be submitted ‘‘upon petition of electors equal in
number to twenty-five per centum of the votes cast for all can-
didates for mayor at the last preceding city election’’.s2 The
commission council i is composed of a mayor and two other mem-
bers. A unique provision of the Wisconsin. law is that ‘‘Any
Person possessing all the qualifications of an elector in such
city other than the qualification of residence therein shall be
eligible to election as mayor or other member of the council, but
no person who holds a license for the sale of intoxicating liquors
shall be eligible to any such office.’’8??, The mayor is elected for.
six years; while the terms of the two councilmen are two and
four years respectively.. Unlike most of the other commission
laws or charters, the Wisconsin statute does not divide the ad-
ministration of the city into departments, but leaves the whole
arrangement to the council.

Primary nomination by petition, non-partisan elections, the
initiative, the referendum, and the recall were all provided for
in the original law. But in view of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Meade v. Dane County,3*8 declaring uncon-
stitutional the referendum provision when applied to a county,
the legislature in 1915 abolished the referendum provisions for
cities as well as for counties. In the same year the sections of
the original law relating to the initiative and recall were also
revised. The initiative is now made available on a fifteen percent
petition, and the recall is operative on, a thirty-three and one-
third percent petition in cities of the third and fourth classes,
and on a twenty-five percent petition in cities of the first and
second classes.5*°, Thirteen Wisconsin cities are now organized
under the State law as above analyzed.*%°

Illinois —In 1909 a special committee was appointed by the
legislature to investigate and report on the commission form of
government for cities. After visiting Galveston, Houston, and
Dallas the committee was greatly impressed with the system and
strongly recommended its adoption for Illinois cities. But not
until the next year, after the recommendation of the Governor
in his special message, did the legislature pass any act to this
effect.°4!
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 107

The “Illinois statute of, 1910, as subsequently amended i in ‘1911,
and 1 1915, is an ‘optional general 1; law applicable to all cities ‘and
villages ¢ of the ‘State « containing a population not exceeding two
hundred thousand, and may be adopted at a popular election,
called on petition ‘of electors ‘ ‘equal in number to one-tenth of
the votes, cast for all candidates for mayor or president of the
board of trustees at the last, preceding. city or village elec-
tion. 07998 Tt provides, for a council of five members, including
the mayor, elected at large ‘through the process ‘of a non-partisan,
double election, for terms of four years, and exercising all
executive and’ legislative powers possessed by the former city or
village officers; except those vested in the board of local improve-
ments and park officers.

The executive and administrative powers ae distributed’
among the following five departments: the department of public
affairs, the department of accounts and financés, the department
of public health and safety, the department of streets and
public improvements, and the department of public property.
The law requires the mayor to be commissioner of public affairs’
anid superintendent of that department, arid provides that ‘‘the
council shall, at the first regular meeting’ after election of its’
members designate by a majority vote’’ each of its members to be
commissioner and’ superintendent of a particular department.%%3

There are provisions for the initiative, referendum, and recall.’
But as originally provided in'the law of 1910, the recall petition
was required to be signed by seventy-five percent of the electors
voting’ for mayor at the preceding municipal election. This
number, however, was reduced in 1911 to fifty-five percent,
which is still too high to be effective and indicates a cautious
spirit in the General Assembly of Illinois. This high percentage
requiremént ‘(makes the use of recall so much more difficult
than in other places that it’ is doubtful if it will be called into’
operation.’’8%4 The initiative is made available at a general
election on petition signed by ten percent of the voters‘at the
preceding election,’ and a twenty- five percent petition may re-
sult i in the calling of a special election. The referendum may be
invoked on a ten percent petition against all’ measures except
those declared’ by a two-thirds vote to be emergency measures;
108 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

and it is compulsory on franchises. The law itself contains no
provision for the merit system, but recognizes the former civil
service law of 1895.°%° Any town or village, after three years
trial of this form of government, may abandon it at a special
municipal election called upon petition of twenty-five percent of
the electors of the city.**6

Following the passage of the law about twenty cities and
villages adopted the commission form of government in the first
year; and about twenty additional municipalities have elected
to come under the provisions of this act in subsequent years.**?

South Carolina.—In 1910 three States in the South—South
Carolina, Kentucky, and Louisiana—passed general commission
laws applicable to their respective cities of certain sizes. The
South Carolina act’*8 was approved on February 21st. Under
this act any city having a population between 20,000 and 50,000
may adopt the commission form of city government at a special
election called upon a petition representing twenty-five percent
of the vote cast for mayor at the preceding election. But in 1912
another law*? was enacted to extend the same privilege to cities
of over 10,000 and less than 20,000 inhabitants, and also to cities
of over 50,000 and less than 100,000 inhabitants. Under section
twenty-nine of this act, municipalities having a population from
7000 to 10,000 may also adopt the commission form; but this
section was inserted for the special benefit of Florence—as this
is the only city in the State having a population between 7000
and 10,000.

The governing body under the South Carolina commission
laws is the usual council of five members, elected for four years
with partial renewal. The powers of the council are distributed
among these five officers by appointment of the mayor, and may
be redistributed by vote of the council. An unusual feature in
the law is the broad power given to the city attorney, who is
required to see that laws in every particular are enforced; to
take necessary steps to enforce the provisions of the same;
and in case of violation or oversight, is authorized to have
indictments brought and prosecutions made.

Absolute publicity in the matter of appropriations is provided
for; and no franchise can be granted without a referendum
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 109

vote. All public officials and employees are placed under the
control of a civil service commission, and may not be removed
except for cause and upon the joint vote of the civil service com-
mission and the city council after a public hearing. Provisions
are also made for the initiative, referendum, and recall, any of
which can be invoked upon the presentation of a petition repre-
senting twenty percent of the vote cast for mayor at the preced-
ing primary election, but the unusual feature is that the recall
petition is to be addressed to the Governor. Operation under
this act can be discontinued after six months trial by a popular
vote. Columbia, the capital of the State, was the first to take
advantage of the act, by inaugurating the new plan on May 12th
of the year of its enactment.*/¢

Kentucky—Kentucky fell in line on March 21, 1910, with an
act enabling cities of the second class*#1 to adopt the commission
plan at a popular election called upon petition of twenty-five
percent of the electors voting at the preceding general elec-
tion.*4# By two optional acts passed in 1914 the same privilege
was extended to cities of the third’? and fourth*#4
classes.*# The governing body provided by the Kentucky laws
is a board of five commissioners for cities of the second, third,
and fourth classes. Nomination is made by a petition signed by
one hundred voters. Both the election and the nomination are
strictly non-partisan. The mayor is elected for four years, while
the terms of the commissioners are two years. There is no civil
service or recall provision, but the initiative and referendum
can be invoked at any regular election on petition representing
twenty-five percent of the vote cast for mayor at the preceding
election. The plan may be abandoned after four years trial at
a popular election based on petition of one-third of the voters.
Thus far only six cities in Kentucky have elected to come under
the provisions of the commission legislation.346

Louisiana.—The first commission law of Louisiana went into
effect on April 7, 1910. It was applicable to cities of 7500
inhabitants or over; but the cities of New Orleans, Monroe, Lake
Charles, and Baton Rouge were expressly excluded from the
operation of the law, either in the title or in the text of the
bill.247 But this statute was superseded by a general law
110 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

enacted in 1912, which was amended in 1916.%% The new law
is applicable to any town having a population of 2500 or over,
‘and also to any city, New Orleans excepted, having a population
of 5000 or over. The question of adoption may be submitted on
‘‘petition of electors equal in number to twenty-five per centum
of the qualified electors’’ of the city. Provision is made for a
council consisting of a mayor and four councilmen for cities
having a population of twenty-five thousand or over, and a
council consisting of a mayor and two councilmen for cities
having a population between 5000 and 25,000 and for towns of
twenty-five hundred or over.

The administration is divided into five departments in cities
of the first class, and into three departments in cities of the
second class. The mayor is given the administration of the
department of public affairs and public education in cities of the
first class, and of public health and safety in cities of the second
class. The law specifically requires that ‘‘each candidate shall
announce his candidacy for mayor or for councilman and com-
missioner of a designated department or of two departments’’.%49
Provisions are made for the initiative, referendum, and recall,
but not for the primary election and civil service. In all cases
petitions signed by a number of citizens equalling thirty-three
percent of the vote cast for mayor at the preceding municipal
election can bring these devices into operation. Any cities oper-
ating under this plan for more than six years may abandon such
organization by a majority vote at a special election called
on petition signed by thirty-three percent of the electorate.
Thus far, eight cities? in Louisiana have elected to
come under this general law; and three cities**! have adopted
the commission plan under special acts.

During the year 1911 legislation affecting the interests of the
city had a front place in almost all the States in which the law-
making body was assembled in that year. Among the important
matters under consideration was the commission form of city
government. Seven States, widely scattered throughout the
country, passed in that year general optional commission laws,
and many others either amended the already existing commission
laws or passed commission laws other than the general permis-
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 111

Bive, optional type. The seven optional plans adopted in that
year will first be discussed i in the order of their adoption.

Wosnmgcite Wyoming law,%5* approved on February 21,
1911, was the first commission law enacted in that year. It is
applicable to all cities theretofore incorporated under special
charters and having a population of ten thousand or more;
to cities of the first class; and to cities and towns having a popu-
lation of not less than seven thousand. The mayor of the city is
required to submit, by proclamation, the question of adopting
the plan to a vote at a special election, on ‘‘petition of electors
equal in number to fifteen per centum of the number of regis-
tered electors’’. Should the proposition be rejected at the
election, the question can not be again submitted within two
years thereafter ; and even then twenty-five percent of the voters
are required to sign the petition. If the question has been favor-
ably acted upon, the mayor is again required to call a special
election for the election of mayor and commissioners. The
law provides a governing body consisting of a mayor and two
commissioners, to be nominated by petition and elected by a
non-partisan ballot. They are the only elective officers and serve
for a term of two years. The usual features of commission
government, such as the division of departments, the appoint-
ment and removal of subordinate officers, and the publicity pro-
visions are found in the Wyoming law.

The initiative, referendum, and recall are also provided in
this law. By the law as amended in 1913 the initiative is made
available on a petition of thirty percent of the registered voters ;
the referendum, on a thirty-five percent petition; and the recall,
on a twenty-five percent petition. The council is prohibited from
granting any public service franchise, if requested not to do so
by petition signed by ten percent of the qualified voters of the
city. In such a case the council, however, may submit the
franchise ordinance to the voters at the next general or special
municipal election. Sheridan and Cheyenne are the only cities
in the State that have adopted the plan.**?

Montana.—By a general law'*4 approved on February 28,
1911, Montana cities of the first, second, and third classes are
granted the optional right of adopting the commisssion form of
112 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

government. This law was slightly amended in 1913.5 As
usual, any cities can adopt the plan at a special election called
upon petition of a certain percent of the voters. In Montana
this is twenty-five percent; but this percentage is required to
be based on registration, not upon the vote cast at the last pre-
ceding municipal election, as is usually the case. The governing
body consists of a mayor and four councilmen in cities of the
first class having a population of more than 25,000, and of a
mayor and two councilmen in all smaller cities. Candidates for
the primary election are nominated by petition of twenty-five
voters; and the two candidates for mayor, and the four or eight
for councilmen, receiving the highest votes are the candidates
at the regular election. Both the mayor and the councilmen are
elected for two year terms, with partial renewal. The provi-
sions for a division of departments and for a civil service com-
mission, as well as for the initiative, referendum, and recall, are
practically the same as are found in the Iowa law—except that
the percentage of voters required to sign the petitions for the
initiative, referendum, and recall is based on the total number
of registered voters. Only three cities in the State have thus
far elected to come under this law.**6

Idaho.—The Idaho commission law, approved on March 13,
1911, is applicable to any city within the State ‘‘organized under
the general laws of the State, or under special charter, or under
a general incorporation Act, now or hereafter having, as shown
by the last preceding state or national census, a population of
two thousand five hundred persons, or over that number.’’557
Upon a petition of the electors, equal in number to twenty-five
percent of the votes cast for all candidates for mayor at the last
preceding general city election, the question of adopting the
plan may be submitted to the voters at a popular election; but,
should the plan fail to be adopted at the election, the question
may not be resubmitted within a period of two years. The law
provides a council of five members, ‘‘one of whom shall be
known, designated and elected as mayor, chosen and elected from
the city at large.’’ Candidates are nominated by petition of at
least twenty-five electors. It is specifically required that candi-
dates, in order to be elected, must receive more than one-half of
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 118

the ballots cast. If no one receives the required number of
votes, then the ‘‘first election shall be construed to have been
a primary election for the nomination of candidates, and the
second election shall be held to fill such office or offices.’’s*8
‘When elected, the mayor is to hold the office for two years; while
the tenure of office of the councilmen is four years, with partial
renewal every two years.

The mayor ‘‘shall be considered as one of the council for all
purposes and shall vote on all questions the same as any other
member of Council.’’ He presides at all meetings of the council,
but has ‘‘no power to veto any measure, resolution, or ordi-
nance’’.359 Hxecutive and administrative powers and duties
are distributed among five departments: public affairs, accounts
and finances, public safety, streets and public improvements, and
parks and public property. The mayor is the superintendent of
the department of public affairs, and the council at its first reg-
ular meeting after election designates by majority vote each of
the other members to be superintendent of one of the depart-
ments.

The Idaho law specifically provides that ‘‘the people of such
[commission] city, in addition to the method of legislation here-
inbefore provided, shall have power of direct legislation by the
initiative and referendum. 860 Both the initiative and the
referendum are made available on petitions signed by a number
of electors equal to twenty-five percent of the entire vote cast
for mayor at the last preceding election. Initiative ordinances
signed by ten percent of the voters may be submitted to a vote
at the next general election. A unique feature of this provision
is the affidavit attached to the petition whereby the signer
declares that he has ‘‘read, or heard read at length, section by
section, the proposed ordinance or measure attacked.’’84 An-
other unique feature of the law is the provision that the ‘‘fran-
chise will be awarded to the bidder offering to pay to the city
during the life of the franchise the highest percentage of the
gross annual receipts received from the use, operation or posses-
sion of the franchise.’’%6? The recall is made available on a
thirty-five percent petition, but officials are immune from such
proceedings for the first three months. Any city operating
114 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

under this plan may abandon it after six years trial at a special
election called on petition of not less than twenty-five percent of
the electors of the city. Lewiston has been operating under the
commission plan since 1907 under a special charter. Boise
adopted the commission form in 1912, and its charter con-
forms to the general law above outlined in all respects.**

Washington.—Washington is one of the so-called home rule
States. By a constitutional amendment adopted in 1899 cities
of 20,000 inhabitants or over are granted the privilege of fram-
ing and adopting their own charters.**4 Under this provision
Tacoma and Spokane have adopted the commission form of
government. But the application of the home rule charter
system in Washington is very narrow: in fact, only five cities*®
of the State are entitled to the privilege. Accordingly, on March
17, 1911, the so-called Allen Act was approved,*®* which is a
general commission law applicable to cities not included in the
home rule provisions of the State. Any city having a population
of from 2500 to 20,000 may adopt the provisions of this act by
popular election called upon petition of twenty-five percent of
the voters. It provides for a mayor and two commissioners,
elected through the process of a non-partisan double election for
terms of three years. The city clerk is the only officer in addi-
tion to the commissioners designated specifically in the act.
The city commission is granted full legislative and adminis-
trative powers. The mayor is entrusted with special supervi-
sory functions. He presides at all meetings of the council, but
has no veto power.

This general law makes specific provision for the operation of
the initiative and the referendum at special or general elections
on twenty-five percent petitions. All ordinances, except those
declared by unanimous vote of the commission to be emergency
measures, are subject to a referendum. There was also a recall
provision in the general law of 1911, but this part of the act
was superseded’*’ by a constitutional amendment in 1912 which
incorporated the recall feature into the organic law of the State.
By this constitutional amendment*® the recall in Washington is
extended to all local elective officers except judges of the courts
of record. A recall election must be held upon the presentation
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 115

of a twenty-five percent petition in cities of the first class, and
a thirty-five percent petition in other cities and towns.

Finally, the law provides that any city operating under this
act for over six years can abandon the plan by popular election
on petition of twenty-five percent of the electors. From the
passage of the act to the present time only five cities®®® have
elected to come under the provisions of the act. Tacoma,
Spokane, and Everett have adopted the commission form under
the home rule provision of the Constitution.

New Jersey—In May, 1910, Governor Wilson sent a special
message to the legislature of New Jersey urging the passage of
a bill which would give the cities of that State the commission
form of government, with the initiative, referendum, and recall.
In this message he said that ‘‘the changes proposed are not
experimental; they have been tested by abundant experience
elsewhere, and I am sure that it would afford all thoughtful
persons cause for serious disappointment if the legislature should
not avail itself of the opportunity.’’872 As a result of this
message, the commission law of New Jersey, known as the Walsh
law,°71 was passed and approved on April 25,1911. The act as
amended in 1912, 1918, and 1914 is applicable to cities, towns,
boroughs, and other municipalities, and contains such features
as are now commonly found in laws of this kind. It provides a
commission of five members for cities of ten thousand population
or over, and of three members for cities of smaller size. They
are chosen simultaneously for terms of four years. The original
law required the selection of candidates through primaries; but
this feature was repealed by an amendment passed in 1914,
which requires candidates to be nominated directly by petition,
and also makes preferential voting compulsory in all cities oper-
ating under the provisions of the Walsh law.’7? At the first
meeting after election, the commissioners elect from their own
members a mayor, who shall be the presiding officer at the
meetings of the commission but has no veto power.

‘<The board of commissioners shall have and possess all admin-
istrative, judicial and legislative powers and duties now had
and possessed and exercised by the mayor and city council
and all other executive or legislative bodies in said city, and
116 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

have complete control over the affairs of the city’’; and such
powers, duties, and authority are distributed among the five or
three departments as the case may be.*?? The mayor is ex-officio
the director of the department of public affairs; and the other
directors of departments are designated by a majority vote of
the commissioners at their first meeting.

The initiative can be invoked at the general election on peti-
tion signed by ten percent of the voters who cast a ballot at the
preceding general election; and a fifteen percent petition may
secure a special election. Any ordinance, except emergency
measures passed by a two-thirds majority vote of the commis-
sion, is subject to a referendum vote within ten days of its pass-
age on petition signed by ‘‘electors of the city equal in number
to at least fifteen per centum of the entire vote cast at the last
preceding general municipal election’’.*?4 The recall is made
available on petition of fifteen percent of the voters, but officials
are immune from such proceedings for at least a year.

The act above analyzed may be adopted by any city at a
popular election called on petition signed by twenty percent of
the legal voters; and when adopted any city may abandon the
experiment through the same process, but the petition must
be signed by twenty-five percent of the electors. The people of
New Jersey have been very enthusiastic in adopting the pro-
visions of this act. Thirty-two cities*”> have already put them-
selves on record as commission-governed cities.

Alabama.—aAt the session of 1911 the legislature of Alabama
passed a series of acts providing for the commission form of
government in cities of various classes. Two of these laws,
though general in form, are applicable only to the cities of
Birmingham and Montgomery. They took effect without sub-
mission to a popular vote. But two other acts are optional and
permissive in nature. The first of these was the act approved on
April 8th, authorizing the adoption of the commission form in
any city not within the sphere of any of the other commission
laws of the States’ The question of adoption may be submitted
to a popular vote on petition of a number of electors equal to
one percent of the population, on the basis of the last preceding
Federal census.
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 117

Under this act the governing body is a board of three mem-
bers, to be elected one at a time each year for terms of three
years. Candidates are nominated by petition of three percent
of the voters, but party nomination is not forbidden. The
system of preferential voting is incorporated into this law.
The board determines the distribution of functions among its
members, and assigns one of them to be the head of each par-
ticular department. The mayor is not elected as such, but is
chosen by the board from among its own members; and his
powers and duties are also determined and conferred by the
board. A unique feature of this act is the provision that
authorizes the Governor of the State to have the books of the
city examined by the State examiner of public accounts,
the expenses of the examination being paid by the city.

There is no provision for the initiative, nor is there any gen-
eral provision for the referendum. But on petition of ‘‘a num-
ber of voters determined by the ratio of one to every three
hundred inhabitants of the city upon payment by the grantee
of a deposit to cover the estimated cost of a special election’’,
franchise grants must be submitted to a popular vote. The re-
call is made available on petition of twenty-five percent of the
voters. On petition of twenty percent of the voters, and after
six years years of operation under this act, any city may aban-
don the plan and return to the old form of government by a
favorable vote at a special election. Mobile is the only city that
has taken advantage of this law since 1911. In fact, Mobile
is the only city that comes under the provisions of this act,??? but
there is a series of acts providing the commission form of govern-
ment for cities of different sizes.

Only fourteen days after the above mentioned law went into
effect, another act providing commission government for cities
having a population of more than one thousand and less than
twenty-five thousand was approved on April 21st.’78 The
question of adoption may be submitted in cities of the prescribed
size on a petition signed by voters to the number of three to
every one hundred of the population. The law provides for the
appointment of the first commission by the Governor; but sub-
sequent commissions are to be elected by popular vote. The
118 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

governing body is a board of three commissioners, including the
mayor, elected for terms of three years with partial renewal an-
nually. Candidates are nominated by a petition of voters equal in
number to one to every hundred of the population. To be elected
the candidate must receive a majority of votes cast; but if the
first election fails to give any candidate such prescribed ma-
jority, a second election is to be held. No provision is made in
the act for the initiative and referendum, but the recall may be
invoked on a twenty-five percent petition. Since the passage of
this act eight cities have elected to take advantage of its pro-
visions.°79

California —California is one of the home rule States. The
Constitution grants cities of 3500 inhabitants or over the right
to frame and adopt charters of any nature drawn up by boards
of freeholders, subject only to the ratification of the legislature.
But cities of less than 3500 inhabitants are excluded from
enjoying such privileges. In order to permit these small munic-
ipalities to adopt the commission form of government if they so
desire, the legislature in 1911 passed an act granting them such
authority.38¢
- The law authorizes the boards of trustees of cities of the fifth
and sixth classes to submit to the voters of their cities at any
municipal or special election the question of dividing the admin-
istration of the city into five departments, of providing for the
assignment of their several members as heads of such depart-
ments, and of defining the duties, powers, and responsibilities
of each of the heads of departments. A majority of the votes
cast at the election will carry the proposition.

Provision is also made that the trustees may submit the
question of whether or not the officers who are at present
elective, or any of them other than the trustees themselves, shall
be appointed by the board. The names of the officers to be
included must be specified on the ballot. If the proposition is
carried at the election the specified officers shall be appointed on
the expiration of the terms of the existing incumbents.

The adoption of both of the above propositions, in the lan-
guage of the title of the act, ‘‘provides the so-called commission
form of government’’. But thus far no city has seen fit to
adopt the provisions of the act.
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 119

Nebraska.—By an act**! approved on April 27, 1911, Nebras-
ka entered the list of States in which commission government
may be adopted by certain cities through the simple expedient
of a referendum vote. The Nebraska act, known as the
“Banning Law’’, is applicable to any city having a population
of 5000 or over, and may be taken advantage of at a special
election called within twenty days after the filing of a
petition signed by twenty-five percent of the electors voting for
mayor at the preceding city election. When adopted, the com-
mission consists of three councilmen for cities of from five to
twenty-five thousand; of five councilmen for cities of from
twenty-five to one hundred thousand; and of seven councilmen
for cities of more than one hundred thousand. Another unique
feature of the law is that the term of the councilmen is not
definitely fixed, but follows that prescribed in the old charter.
As under the New Jersey law, the mayor in Nebraska commis-
sion-governed cities is not elected as such, but is chosen by the
council from its own members.

The law provides for non-partisan primary nominations on
petitions signed by twenty-five electors in cities of from 5000
to 25,000, and by one hundred electors, in cities of over 25,000.
A filing fee paid to the city treasurer is required of every
eandidate to meet the expenses of holding the primary. Both
at the primary and the regular election the names of the candi-
dates are printed on the ballot according to the rotation system,
so that each name appears in a different position on the ballot in
each election district.

Administrative powers and duties are divided among the de-
partments, the number of which corresponds to the number of
commissioners. To each of these departments the council as-
signs, by majority vote, one of its members to be the head.

The initiative is made available on the basis of fifteen percent
petitions for special elections and ten percent petitions for
regular elections. The referendum is applicable to any ordi-
nance except emergency measures which contain a statement of
their urgency, on petition signed by fifteen percent of the voters.
A recall election may be called on a thirty percent petition;
but the percentage in this case is based on the highest vote cast
120 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

for any candidate for councilman at the last preceding municipal
election.

Operation under the law may be abandoned after a four years
trial, and the city may then return to the plan provided by the
general laws of the State by vote of the people at a special
election called upon petition signed by twenty-five percent of
the voters. In Nebraska only four cities have adopted the com-
mission plan.*%*

New Mexico—As early as 1909, when New Mexico was still a
Territory, a law was enacted allowing any city having 3000 in-
habitants or over ‘‘to be governed by a mayor and not less than
two commissioners nor more than four commissioners, all elected
at large’’, who, ‘‘when elected, shall organize and divide the
government of the city into departments . . . . and each de-
partment shall be presided over by either the mayor or a member
of the commission.’’’85 The commission was empowered to em-
ploy a superintendent of city affairs, who should have entire
charge of the administrative functions of the city. This super-
visor system was identical in all essential respects with the
present commission-manager plan. By the Territorial law of
1909 the cities of New Mexico were granted the option of either
adopting the supervisor system or the commission plan which
was provided in the last section of the act.

The Territorial act of 1909 was repealed in 1913, when a gen-
eral commission law was enacted by the legislature of the State
of New Mexico. This is an optional permissive law, applicable
to any city on adoption at a special election, conditioned on a
twenty-five percent petition. The governing body provided for
is the usual commission of three members, including the mayor.
Their terms of office are three years. Each member takes up the
administration and supervision of a particular department
assigned to him by the commission as a whole. After four years
trial in any city the plan may be abandoned by a vote at a
special election conditioned on a twenty-five percent petition.
The law makes no provision for the initiative, referendum, and
recall.*8+ Las Vegas, a city of about 4000 population, is the
only city where the plan has been in operation since 1913.38
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 121

Missouri—In 1913 the Forty-seventh General Assembly of
Missouri passed two general laws providing for the commission
plan of city government: one law was for cities of the second
class, and the other was for cities of the third class. The com-
mission law for cities of the second class is obligatory in nature
and will be considered in another part of this chapter. The
other act, entitled an act to provide ‘‘an alternative form of
government’’, is applicable to ‘‘any city of the third class in-
cluding any such city acting under special charter or any city
now having or which may hereafter have a population entitling
them to become cities of the third class.’ The question of
organizing as a city under this act may be submitted at a special
election on petition of electors equal in number to twenty-five
percent of the vote cast for all candidates for mayor at the
last preceding city election.

The governing body provided by this act consists of a mayor
and two councilmen for cities having a population of three
thousand and less than twelve thousand; a mayor and three
councilmen for cities having a population of twelve thousand
and less than twenty thousand; and a mayor and four council-
men for cities having a population of twenty thousand and
not more than thirty thousand. Candidates for mayor and
councilman are nominated by a primary election at which any
person can become a candidate by filing with the city clerk at
least ten days before the election a statement of such candidacy ;
but in cities having a population of seven thousand or over,
such statement must at the same time be accompanied by a
petition of at least twenty-five qualified voters.°§”

The executive and administrative powers, authority, and duties
are divided among the following departments: public affairs,
accounts and finance, public safety, streets and public improve-
ments, and parks and public property. The mayor is the super-
intendent of the department of public affairs, and the council
designates by a majority vote one councilman to be superin-
tendent of each of the other departments; but in cities having a
population of less than twenty thousand, one councilman may
be assigned to take charge of the affairs of two depart-
ments.*8
122 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

The initiative is made available at a special election on
petition of twenty-five percent of the voters, and at a general
election on a ten percent petition. Both the referendum and
the recall may be invoked on petition of twenty-five percent of
the voters. The appointment of a civil service commission of
two members is obligatory in cities having a population of between
twenty and thirty thousand, and optional in cities having a
population of between ten and twenty thousand. But ‘‘in all
eases in which no civil service commissioners are appointed by
the council, the council shall have the same powers and duties
devolving upon such commissioners.’’s#9

The plan may be abandoned by cities which have adopted it at
a special election called in response to a twenty-five percent
petition. Following the enactment of this law only four cities*”
in Missouri have elected to come under its provisions.

Tennessee-—On January 28, 1918, a meeting of mayors of
Tennessee was held at Nashville to draft a bill permitting all
the cities and towns of the State to adopt the commission form
of government. A bill of this character was subsequently intro-
‘duced into the legislature and written into the statute books of
Tennessee in September of the same year.5% The law is
applicable to any municipality not yet incorporated under a
special charter providing for the commission form, and may
be adopted at a special election called on a petition of twenty
percent of the voters. Operation under this act may be discon-
tinued after six years trial by vote of the people at an election
called in response to a twenty-five percent petition of the voters.

The governing body under this act is a commission of five
members, elected for terms of four years, for cities having a
population of 10,000 or over, and of three members for cities
having less than 10,000 inhabitants. The mayor is chosen by
the commissioners from among their own number; and by a
majority vote the commission assigns the different departments
to its members. There are provisions for the initiative and
referendum, but none for the recall. The initiative and refer-
endum may be invoked on petition of fifteen percent of the
electors voting at the preceding election; but within a period of
six months only one special election can be called. The refer-
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 123

endum is not applicable to measures declared by a two-thirds
vote of the commissioners to be emergency measures.

In Tennessee there are at present about thirteen cities oper-
ating under the commission form of government, but most of
them have adopted the new plan under provisions of special acts.
Only one city, Lawrenceburg, has elected to come under the
provisions of the general law above outlined.

Arkansas—In 1913 a general optional commission law was
enacted in Arkansas.°% It is applicable to cities having a
population of between 18,000 and 40,000. The question of
adoption may be submitted on petition of twenty-five percent of
the number of votes for Governor at the last preceding election.
The government of the city under this plan is vested in a mayor
and four commissioners, elected by the city at large for terms
of four years. Candidates are required to designate on the
ballot the departments which they respectively prefer.

The city commission is required by the law to appoint a
civil service commission of three members. By a two-thirds
vote of the civil service commissioners, any of the city commission-
ers may be removed. The city commissioners may also be re-
moved by the recall election, which may be invoked on petition
of thirty-five percent of the number of voters at the preceding
general municipal election. The initiative is made available at
a special election on petition of twenty-five percent of the
voters, and at a general election by fifteen percent petition. The
original law provides for a referendum only on franchises,
which may be invoked on a twenty-five percent petition. But
by another law a municipality may submit its ordinances to a
referendum vote on petition of twenty percent of the voters.
Certain ordinances, like those providing for the support of the
city government, for deficiencies in former appropriations, for
the granting of police powers, and for other emergencies are
exempt from such proceedings. It is further provided that
before the submission of an ordinance to a referendum vote, the
Secretary of State must be requested to give his opinion as to
whether the ordinance in question is in conflict with the Con-
stitution or laws of the State. Fort Smith is the only city m
the State which has taken advantage of the law since 1913.59 In
124 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

fact, the commission law in Arkansas was framed primarily for
the benefit of Fort Smith.

Nevada.—In 1915 the State of Nevada was added to the long
list of States which have already enacted commission govern-
ment laws. But the Nevada law‘® differs from all the laws here-
tofore considered in that it enables the city or town not only to
adopt the commission form of government but also to frame its
own charter. At the same time, it differs from the so-called
‘“‘home rule’’ States in that the home rule charter system in
Nevada is provided not by constitutional amendment but by
legislative enactment, and further, that the charter framed in
Nevada must be a commission charter. Thus, the situation in
Nevada in this regard is rather unique. There is a law enabling
any city or town to adopt the commission form of government,
but this is nothing more than an enabling act. All the details
of the charter are left to be worked out by the city itself. The
procedure in charter-making, however, is minutely prescribed in
the law.

On petition of one-fourth of the qualified voters of the city
declaring their desire to adopt a commission form of govern-
ment, an election may be called to select fifteen qualified electors
for the purpose of framing a charter for such city or town,
having for its object the establishment of the commission form
of government. Candidates are nominated by petition of one-
fifth of the qualified voters, and elected by the city at large.
When elected they must convene within ten days after the
election and frame the charter, which must be submitted within
thirty days thereafter to the legislative authority of the city.

The proposed charter must then be published in the news-
papers of the city, or posted for thirty days in three of the most
public places in the city if there is no newspaper. When the
affidavit of the publisher or of the person posting the notice
has been filed with the city clerk, showing compliance with the
above provision, the legislative authority must within five days
thereafter provide for the submission of the charter to the quali-
fied voters of the city at a special election, which is to be con-
ducted in accordance with the general election laws of the State.
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 125

If after the election it is found that a majority of the votes
are in favor of the ratification of the charter, it shall become
the organic law of the city and shall supersede any existing
charter when properly authenticated, recorded, and attested.

Finally, the law provides that any city or town having
adopted such a charter shall have ‘‘all of the powers enumer-
ated in the general laws of the state for the incorporation of
cities, and towns, and such other power necessary and not in
conflict with the constitution and laws of the State of Nevada
to carry out the commission form of government; and such
charter, when submitted, shall fix the number of commissioners,
their terms of office, and their duties and compensation, and shall
provide for all necessary appointive and elective officers, for the
form of government therein provided, and fix their salaries and
emoluments, their duties and powers, and shall fix the time for
the first and subsequent elections for all elective officers, and
after such first election and qualifications of the officers thereat
elected, the old officers, and all houses, boards, or officers shall
be abolished, together with the emoluments thereof, and shall
cease to exist.’’5%5

Amendments to the charter may be proposed and submitted
to the qualified voters by a majority of the commissioners at any
time. But the commissioners must submit amendments when
petitioned so to do by ten percent of the qualified electors voting
at the last regular city election, setting forth the proposed
amendment. But thus far, this law has not been taken ad-
vantage of by any city or town of the State.

STATES WITH OBLIGATORY SELF-EXECUTING COMMISSION LAWS

Utah.—As early as 1907 the State of Utah made its first
attempt to secure a commission government law from the legis-
lature. But the opposition of the dominant political party to a
change from the old form of government was so strong that the
bills introduced were smothered in the committee. Again, in
the fall of 1909 a committee was sent by the Civic Improvement
League of Salt Lake City to Des Moines to investigate and report
on the results of the commission government there. Favorable
reports of this investigation were soon published, and bills
126 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

modelled on the Des Moines plan were introduced into the legis-
lature in 1909. This time the bills passed the legislature, only
to be vetoed by the Governor. In 1911 a third attempt was
made in which the friends of the commission plan were success-
ful. The bills were passed and received the Governor’s signa-
ture. But in order to gain this end the initiative, referendum,
and recall were all eliminated.*”

The peculiar feature of the Utah law*® is that it places all
incorporated cities of every class under a commission form of
government, and that the cities are given no option in the
matter, as the law is self-executing and requires no vote to put
it into effect. The law specifically provides that ‘‘the municipal
government of all cities of the first class is hereby vested in a
board of five commissioners, consisting of a mayor and four
commissioners, and in cities of the second class in a board of
commissioners, consisting of a mayor and two commissioners to
be known as the board of commissioners of their respective cities.
The municipal government of all cities of the third class is here-
by vested in a mayor and city council. The city council shall be
composed of five councilmen, chosen at large by the qualified
voters of the city.’’599

Provision is made for the election of a city auditor, instead
of providing for his appointment by the commissioners. Parti-
san nominations may be made by a convention, but all candi-
dates must file a petition of nomination signed by one hundred
voters. At the primary election candidates equal to twice the
number of offices to be filled are chosen, and they are the only
candidates at the general election. When elected the mayor and
commissioners of cities of the first class, the commissioners of
cities of the second class, and one councilman of cities of the
third class are to hold office for four years; and the mayor of
cities of the second class, four councilmen of cities of the third
class, and the auditor are to hold office for two years.

The board of commissioners possesses and exercises all legis-
lative, executive, administrative, and judicial powers, which
are distributed among the usual five commissioner-departments:
public affairs and finance, water supply and waterworks, public
safety, streets and public improvements, and parks and public
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 127

property. At its first regular meeting the board designates
by a majority vote one of its members to be the superintendent
of each department, but ‘‘such designation shall be changed
whenever it appears that the public service shall be benefited
thereby’’.

By this law, which became effective at the beginning of the
year 1912, all the incorporated cities of every class in the State
of Utah were placed under the commission form of government.

Alabama.—In Alabama there is a series of commission laws,
all passed during the legislative session of 1911. Two of these
laws, which have already been analyzed, are permissive in na-
ture; while the others took effect without any submission to a
popular vote. The first of these mandatory acts!” is one relating
to cities of 100,000 inhabitants or over. This act, though gen-
eral in form, is applicable only to the city of Birmingham as
this is the only city in the State that has the requisite number
of people. Under this act the first board of commissioners was
to consist of the mayor of the city at the time when this act was
approved, who was to hold office for two years, and two other
commissioners appointed by the Governor for terms of three and
four years, respectively. At the expiration of the terms of the
first commissioners, their successors are to be nominated by
petition and elected by the people. A second election is to be
held within one week, if the first election fails to give any can-
didate a majority of the votes cast. The terms of these elective
commissioners are three years, with partial renewal annually.
No provision is made for the initiative and referendum, except
on franchises; but recall elections on petition of three thousand
qualified voters are made applicable to the commissioners.

Another act! of a similar nature was passed about the same
time. This act related to cities having a population of more than
twenty-five and less than fifty thousand. Like the other act,
this law is applicable only to the city of Montgomery. The
mayor at the time of the passage of this act was to be the ex-officio
mayor for four years; and he, together with four commissioners
appointed by the Governor, constituted the first board of com-
missioners. All the other provisions relating to the commission:
are practically the same as the provisions in the act discussed
128 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

above. There is no initiative provision, but the referendum is
made available on a twenty-five percent petition, and the recall
on petition of a thousand voters. Unlike the act for Birming-
- ham, which can only be repealed by legislative enactment, the
commission government under the act for Montgomery can be
abandoned, after four years of operation, by popular vote at an
election called upon petition of one thousand voters.

Pennsylvania—lIn Pennsylvania”? the commission form of
city government was first considered in 1908, when there were
but twelve cities in the country operating under this plan. In
1909 the subject was favorably considered by the Chamber of
Commerce of Pittsburg. A convention was held in October,
1910, at Williamsport for the purpose of discussing commission
government, and a permanent organization under the name of
“Municipal Government by Commission Committee of Allied
Civie Bodies of Pennsylvania’’ was immediately formed. In
the next year bills were presented to the legislature providing
for the commission plan of government for cities of the second
and third classes, but the legislature declined to pass the
measures. The reform movement, however, did not die with
these bills. Great pressure was brought to bear upon the legis-
lature by cities of the second class; and as a result Pittsburg
and Scranton received the benefits of some features of the new
plan. The cities of the third class continued the effort to secure
the commission form, largely through their respective civic or-
ganizations, acting under the direction of the Allied Civie
Bodies Committee. In 1913 another bill was presented to the
legislature; and this measure passed both houses and was ap-
proved on June 27th.4%3

The law!* provides for the commission form of government
for all cities of the third class without a local referendum for
its adoption, and therefore affects every city in Pennsylvania
except Philadelphia, Pittsburg, and Seranton. By another act
approved on July 8th, this law is also made applicable to the
forty-two boroughs of the State having a population of over
10,000 by being submitted to a vote at a special election on
petition of one hundred qualified electors or by resolution of
the council or the corporate authority of such borough.
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 129

The governing body provided by the law is the council, com-
posed. of the mayor and four councilmen. On petition signed by
twenty-five qualified registered voters of the city, the name of
any person may be proposed for any elective municipal office,
and may be placed on the primary ballot in the order to be
determined by drawing lots. The persons receiving the highest
number of votes, up to double the number of persons to be
elected, are the only candidates at the regular election. Both
primary and regular elections are conducted on a non-partisan
plan. When elected the mayor holds his office for four years
and the councilmen for two years. The controller is the only
other elective officer besides the mayor and the councilmen, and
he is elected in the same way and holds office for four years.
All other officers, including the city solicitor, city engineer, city
treasurer, city assessor, and city clerk are appointed by the
council for terms of two years. There is no civil service
provision in the law.

The legislative power of every city of the third class is vested
by the act in the council; while the executive and administrative
powers, authority, and duties are distributed and divided among
five departments: public affairs, accounts and finance, public
safety, streets and public improvements, and parks and public
property. The mayor is ex-officio superintendent of the de-
partment of public affairs, and the council designates by a
majority vote each of the members to be superintendent of a
particular department.

A rather peculiar provision for the salaries of the mayor and
councilmen is to be found in the Pennsylvania law. It provides
that the council shall, by ordinance, fix the amount of the salary
to be paid to the mayor and the councilmen for their services,
but the salary paid to the mayor shall not be less than five
hundred dollars nor more than three thousand five hundred
dollars per year; and that for any councilman not less than two
hundred and fifty nor more than three thousand dollars per
year.?5 This provision, as Mr. Fuller and some of the other
originators of the law have frequently pointed out, has this
advantage, ‘‘that the flexibility of the plan will enable the cities
of the third class to adopt the City-Manager or Business-Man-
130 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

ager plan of city-government, if they so desire, and add but
little to the cost of administration’’; because, by fixing the
salaries of the mayor and councilmen at the low figure, it is
feasible to devote the amount thus saved to the salary of the
manager./6

The law makes no provision for the recall; but the initiative
and referendum are made available either at special or general
elections, on a petition signed by voters equal in number to
twenty percent of all votes cast for all candidates for mayor at.
the last preceding municipal election. In order that an initia-
tive petition may be circulated, a written request for it must
be filed with the city clerk, signed by one hundred qualified
electors and asking that a petition be prepared. All ordinances,
except those for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health, or safety, containing a statement of urgency, are subject
to a referendum vote within ten days after their final passage.

Missourt—The Missouri commission law for cities of the
second class is obligatory in nature./?? It specifically provides
that every city of the second class ‘‘shall be governed by a coun.
cil, consisting of the mayor and four commissioners.’’ The coun-
cil ‘‘shall exercise the corporate powers of such city, and shall
be vested with all powers of legislation in municipal affairs,
touching every object, matter and subject within the purview
of the local self-government conferred upon every city of the
second class, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the State of Missouri, and of this article.’’ Again, the council
‘‘shall have control and supervision over all the departments of
the city . . . . and to that end, shall have power to make and
enforce such rules and regulations as they may see fit and proper
for the organization, management and operation of all the
departments of the city, and whatever agencies may be created
for the administration of its affairs.’’498

The executive and administrative powers and duties are
distributed among five departments: safety and public affairs,
revenues, public health and sanitation, streets and public im-
provements, and public property and public utilities. The
mayor is required by law to be the commissioner of the depart-
ment of safety and public affairs; and the commissioners of
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 131

other departments are elected as such. The mayor, the commis-
sioners, together with a municipal judge, are the only elective
officers. Candidates are to be nominated at a primary at which
any person can become a candidate by paying, at least ten days
before, ‘‘a filing fee of ten dollars to the city clerk’’, and filing
‘‘with said clerk a statement of such candidacy’’. All the elect-
ive officers are to hold office for four years, but may be removed
at any time through the process of recall election, which is made
available on a petition representing twenty percent of the en-
tire vote cast for mayor at the last preceding general election
of the city. The initiative is included on the basis of a five per-
cent petition, but a fifteen percent petition may call for a
special election. All ordinances except those passed by a four-
fifths vote of the council as emergency measures are subject to
a referendum vote upon petition of ten percent of the voters,
but referenda on franchises and on the sale of municipal utili-
ties owned by the city are compulsory.

The mayor is required to appoint, with the advice and con-
sent of the council, a civil service commission of four members
for terms of four years. It is the duty of this commission to
provide ‘‘for the classification of all employments in the various
city departments of administration . . . . for open, competitive,
and free examinations as to fitness; for an eligible list from
which the vacancies shall be filled; for a period of probation
before employment is made permanent; and for the promotion
on the basis of merit, experience and record.’’499

STATES WITH OPTIONAL MODEL CHARTER LAWS

Ohio.—In 1912 Ohio, by a constitutional amendment, granted
to all cities the privilege of framing their own charters. In
fact two methods for securing city charters are provided in the
Constitution of Ohio as amended in 1912. The first method calls
for a commission to draft a charter to be adopted or rejected by
the electorate of the municipality ; while the second one provides
for the passage by the State legislature of general laws for the
incorporation of cities and villages which shall become operative
when they are submitted to and ratified by the people of the
municipality.47° Under the second plan the legislature in 1913
182 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

passed ‘‘An Act to provide optional plans of government for
municipalities and permitting the adoption thereof by popular
vote.’’

This model law of Ohio carries out the so-called ‘‘triple-
option’’ method, embodying three different forms of city gov-
ernment—the commission plan, the city manager plan, and the
federal plan. Any one of these plans may be adopted by any
city at an election called in response to a petition signed by
electors of the city ‘‘equal in number to ten per centum of those
who voted at the last regular municipal election’’.//4_ The peti-
tion must specify the form of government to be voted upon; and
if the proposition of adopting one of the three plans of govern-
ment is approved by a majority of those voting thereon, that
plan ‘‘shall go into effect upon the first day of January follow.
ing the next regular municipal election’’.44? Should the prop-
osition of adopting one of these plans fail to be approved by the
electors of the municipality, the same proposition can not be
again submitted within the next year. ‘‘Any municipality
which shall have operated for five years under any plan provided
in this act may abandon such organization’’ in favor of another
plan by popular election demanded by a ten percent petition.#
Under the commission plan of this model charter law there is to
be a commission of three members for cities having less than
10,000 inhabitants, and of five members for other cities. All the
commissioners are elected on a non-partisan basis and from the
municipality at large. They are to hold office for four years.
The commission is vested with all ‘‘powers conferred upon
municipalities by the constitution of Ohio, and any additional
powers which have been or may be conferred upon municipalities
by the General Assembly’’. The commission is required to meet
in legislative session at least twice each month and in adminis-
trative session at least once each week, but ‘‘no legislative
business shall be considered or acted upon at administrative
sessions’, Administrative officers, including a clerk, a treasurer,
an auditor, and a solicitor, are enumerated in the law, and
provision is made for the appointment of these officers by the
commission. But the commission also has authority to ‘‘create
and discontinue departments, offices, and employments; to ap-
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 133

point or provide for the appointment of all officers or employees
of the municipality; to remove any such officers or eraployees
by a majority vote of all members’’. There is no provision made
in the law for the division of administrative work into depart-
ments, but the commission ‘‘may, at its discretion, assign the
direction or supervision of particular departments or branches
of the government to individual commissioners; but such action
shall in no manner release the commission as a whole from
responsibility or the condition of any department or branch
of government so assigned. ’’#14

Provision is made for a civil service commission of three mem-
bers to be appointed by the commissioners. The initiative and
referendum, as provided in the general law, are provided for in
the commission plan as well as in the other plans. Both are
available on a ten percent petition. But the recall is left
optional, the voters are required to vote for or against it at the
time when they vote on the question of adopting the new plan.

Thus far, Middletown is the only city adopting the straight
commission plan as provided for in this optional charter law.#45

Virginia.—By an optional law approved on March 13, 1914,
certain cities of Virginia were granted the same privileges and
put in the same position as cities under the model charter law
of Ohio. The Virginia law empowers any city of the State
having a population of less than 100,000 (thus excluding Rich-
mond) to adopt one of the three specified forms of government
as provided in the act at a special election called upon petition
of twenty-five percent of the electors qualified to vote at the
last preceding municipal election. These three plans are the
general councilmanic plan, the modified commission plan, and
the city-manager plan.‘76

The so-called modified commission plan is not, after all, very
much modified. Under it all the legislative, administrative, and
executive powers of the city are conferred on a council of three
or five members—the number to be determined by the voters of
the city at the time when that particular plan of government is
adopted. They are elected at large and on a partisan ballot,
and hold the office for four years. With the exception of those
134 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

officers whose election by popular vote is required by the Consti-
tution of the State, these councilmen are the only elective officers
of the city. The mayor is elected by the council from among
its own members. His chief function is to preside over the
meetings of the council. He has no veto power, but possesses
all the rights and duties of a councilman. The law requires
him to ‘‘acquaint himself with the conduct of each of the city
departments (in addition to those under his immediate super-
vision) and from time to time report to the council thereon,
with such recommendations as he shall deem desirable’’./1”

Administrative duties are distributed among departments.
The council designates the administrative duties of its members
and assigns each member to the headship of a particular de-
partment or departments, over which he has special oversight
and direction, subject to the provisions of the act and the ordi-
nances of the council.

The original law did not provide for popular control through
the initiative, referendum, and recall. But in an amendment
to the law, enacted by the legislature in March, 1916, these
powers of popular control were made available. The following .
significant statement is found in Section 16 of this act of 1916:

Provisions authorizing the use by the electorate of the powers of the
Initiative, the Referendum and the Recall, being essential features of many
forms of city government in which all powers of government are concen-
trated in the hands of a small body of men, the electors of any city of the
Commonwealth which has already adopted, or which may hereafter adopt,
any form of government authorized under this act may incorporate as
part. of such form of government provision for the exercise by them of any
one or more of the powers above mentioned by proceeding in the manner
hereafter prescribed.*®

Thus, upon petition of ten percent of the voters in any city
where the commission form of government is in operation, or
in which it is proposed to adopt such a plan of government, the
question of incorporating into the new form provisions for the
initiative, referendum, and recall must be submitted to the
voters at an election. If the question is decided in the affirm-
ative at such election, the initiative, referendum, and recall
must be included in the charter and made available, each upon
petition of ten percent of the qualified voters.
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 135

Thus far the commission plan of Virginia’s optional charter
law has not been adopted by any city of that Commonwealth.

New York.—tUargely through the efforts of the Municipal
Government Association, an optional city charter law was passed
by the legislature of New York in 1914. As indicated by its
title, the law was enacted ‘‘to authorize a city of the second or
third class to adopt a simplified form of government.’’#/9 It
provides seven types of charters, including the commission, city-
manager, and the federal plans, each of which may be adopted
by any city of the second or third class if a majority of its voting
citizens so desire. On presentation of a petition signed by ten
percent of the voters who voted at the preceding general election,
requesting the submission to vote the question of adopting a
specified form of government as provided in the act, the common
council of the city must designate a day not less than one
month nor more than two months thereafter, ‘‘for the
holding of a special election to ascertain the will of the
electors regarding the question’’, or submit the question to
the general city election, if there is such an election not more
than three months nor less than one month after the filing of the
petition. Through an election, if a majority of the voters voting
thereon favor the adoption of the specified plan submitted to
them, such plan shall become operative when the officers provided
in the act are duly elected.

Among the plans provided in the act, Plan A and Plan B are
of special interest in this connection. These two plans are
entitled, respectively, government by a limited council or com-
mission with division of administrative duties, and government
by a limited council or commission with collective supervision
of administration. Under both plans, the governing body is a
council of five members, elected at large and holding office for
four years, with partial renewal biennially. But in cities of less
than 25,000 inhabitants, the voters are allowed to choose between
a council of five members and a council of three members. In
both cases there is a mayor elected as such, who acts as the head
of the city merely on ceremonial occasions. He presides at the
meetings of the council and exercises a general supervision over
all the departments, but has power only to make recommenda-
136 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

tions. He votes just as do the other members of the coun-
cil, but has no veto power. Under both plans the council is
vested with and exercises ‘‘all the legislative, executive and
administrative powers of the city howsoever conferred upon or
possessed by it’’.

Thus far these plans are exactly the same. The chief differ-
ence between them is simply the difference in the amount of
actual work required of the members of the council. Plan A
requires the council to divide the administration of the city
into departments and to assign each of its members to the
headship of a particular department or departments. Under
Plan B the council acts merely as a board of directors and
chooses other officials to direct the work of the administrative
departments. Although there is the same departmental division
under both plans, the individual members of the council under
the second plan do not serve as heads of departments as under
the first plan, these positions being filled by appointments by
the council.

Watertown is the only city in the State that has adopted
(in 1915) the commission plan under this optional charter law.
But even here the law did not take effect until January 1,
1918. #20

Massachusetts—The desire of the Massachusetts cities to
break their legislative shackles and of the legislature to escape
the burden of passing upon numerous special local bills led to
the enactment of an optional city government law/#! which was
approved on May 29, 1915. This optional charter law had its
origin in a recess legislative committee known as the ‘‘Doyle
Committee’’, appointed in 1914 to ‘‘investigate the subject of
charters and laws for governing cities, and providing a standard
form of charter for the government of cities both by commission
and otherwise, and any other matters which the committee may
deem pertinent in regard to the subject of city laws and char-
ters.’’#? In the following January a report offering four types
of government—including government by a mayor and council
elected at large, government by a mayor and council elected at
large and by districts, the commission form, and the city-
manager plan—for adoption by Massachusetts cities, Boston
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 1387

excepted, was issued ; and a general law conforming to this report
Was soon passed.

Under the commission plan of this law there is provided a
city council of five members, including the mayor, elected for
a term of two years and partially renewed each year. The
administrative functions of the city are divided among five
departments: administration, finance, public works, public prop-
erty, and health. Each commissioner is elected for a specific
department, that of the mayor being administration. The
council as a whole has general jurisdiction over the policies and
work of each department; but each commissioner has full power
concerning matters affecting his own department, and appoints
and removes the subordinate officers in his department, sub-
ject to confirmation by the council. Thus, at the present time
any city in Massachusetts, with the single exception of Boston,
can adopt the commission form at its option. But thus far the
plan has not been utilized by any city.

STATES WITH A CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE CHARTER SYSTEM

At the present time there are twelve States which have in-
corporated into their fundamental laws the so-called home rule
charter system. There are considerable variations, both in the
methods and in the machinery of home rule charter-making,
which have perhaps little bearing on the subject under consider-
ation. It will be sufficient here to indicate that this system
permits cities having the requisite population, through con-
ventions or boards of freeholders, to frame their own charters.
These charters are then adopted, either without reference to the
Commonwealth government or after a submission of the scheme
of government to the legislative or executive branch for its
approval. After their adoption the charters are not subject to
amendment by the legislature of the State through the passage
of either general or special legislation. The only limitation on
the governments of the various cities which are entitled to draw
up their own charters is that the charters must be consistent with
and subject to the laws and Constitution of the State of which
they form a part. Thus, in so far as there is no specific pro-
hibition in the Constitution or general laws of the State against
138 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

providing any form of government except the old mayor and
council type, these so-called home rule cities may draw up
commission charters if they so desire. It is the purpose of the
following pages to examine and analyze some of the typical
home-rule commission charters. Each of the home rule States
will be taken up in the chronological order of its adoption of the
system.

Missouri.—Missouri was the first State to incorporate the
home rule charter principle into the American legal and con-
stitutional system. Indeed, the home rule charter system is
often spoken of as the ‘‘Missouri Idea’’. By the Constitution
of 1875, cities having a population of 100,000 or over are per-
mitted to frame and adopt their own charters. But inas-
much as there are only at the present time two cities in the
State having the requisite population, the possibility of home-
made commission charters in Missouri is very small. Thus far,
no city in Missouri has ever adopted a commission charter under
the home rule provision of the Constitution.

California.—By a constitutional amendment in 1879 the State
of California granted the right to frame the city charter to any
municipal corporation containing a population of more than
one hundred thousand—which meant San Francisco alone. But
the privilege of drafting the city charter has been extended by
constitutional amendment in 1887 to cities having a population
of ten thousand, and in 1890 to any city in the State containing
more than three thousand five hundred inhabitants. But in all
cases the right has been reserved to the legislature to approve or
reject the charter as adopted, but without the power of amend-
ing it in any way. With the exception of this limitation
practically any city in California can adopt a charter of its
own drafting.’*4 Indeed, the extensions of the application of
the home rule charter system, made by the successive constitu-
tional amendments, resulted in a larger increase in the number
of municipal-made charters in California than in any other
Commonwealth in which such a system is now in vogue.

‘“‘The commission form of government was taken up in 1909
by Berkeley and San Diego, [and by] the former the most
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 139

advanced features, the non-partisan nomination and majority
election, of the Des Moines plan were copied with progressive
modifications. The Berkeley election plan permits a majority
on the first ballot to elect without further contest. At the
regular session of 1911 the legislature ratified eight charters of
which six, including that of Oakland, the largest city in the
country to adopt the commission plan so far [1912], provided
for that form of government... . At the special session of
1911 two more charters, both of the commission variety, were
presented to the legislature from Stockton and Sacramento. The
latter provides for the shortest of ballots, one only of the five
commissioners being chosen each year.’’#25 The examples set
by these cities were soon followed by San Mateo in 1912; Pasa-
dena in 1913; Napa and Alhambra in 1915; and Santa Monica
in 1916.4%6

Washington—In Washington cities of twenty thousand in-
habitants or over have the privilege of drawing up their own
charters./?7. In the edse of Walker v. Spokane#?® it was held
that ‘‘the only limitation on the part of the powers of the city
government to enact laws through the medium of a charter is
that they shall be in accordance with general law’’, and that a
charter establishing the commission form of government, with
the initiative, referendum, and recall, does not violate any statu-
tory law. But due to the narrow application of the home rule
charter system, there has been no considerable growth of city-
made charters in Washington. Thus far, only five cities—Seat-
tle, Tacoma, Spokane, Bellingham, and Everett—are entitled
to enjoy the privilege of framing their own charters, and all
except Bellingham have already adopted home rule charters.
With the single exception of Seattle, all the home rule charters
in Washington provide the commission form of government. In
Seattle, a city-manager charter was drawn up, but was defeated
at a special election held on June 30, 1914.4#9

Tacoma/*? was the first city in Washington to draw up a
home rule commission charter, which was adopted on October 16,
1909; and was followed by Spokane on December 28, 1910, and
Everett on April 16, 1912.48! All these charters provide for a
commission of five members—except in the case of Everett
140 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

where there are only three commissioners—elected as candidates
for the executive departments prescribed in the charter. In the
Spokane charter/*? there is a provision for the preferential
system of voting. By this plan there is a complete unification
of primaries and elections, the commissioners being chosen by
a single process of voting and in proportion to the number of
their respective supporters. Nomination is made by petition
signed by not less than twenty-five electors. Both the nom-
ination and the election are non-partisan, and at the election
the voter may indicate his first and second choices, although he
is not compelled to do so. In all of these three charters provision
is made for the initiative, referendum, and recall.

Minnesota.—Minnesota was the fourth State in the Union to
permit cities to frame charters for their own government. The
‘‘Missouri Idea’’ was introduced into the State by the constitu-
tional amendment of 1896./33 The contents of the amendment
of 1896 were copied from the Missouri Constitution of 1875 with
only a few changes. But instead of limiting the privilege of
home rule to cities having a certain population, the Minnesota
plan is applicable to any city or village in the State. The Con-
stitution, however, also provides that ‘‘it shall be a feature of
all such charters that there shall be provided, among other
things, a mayor, or chief magistrate, and a legislative body of
either one or two houses’’. Thus, there was doubt at one time
as to whether or not a commission charter could be drafted under
these provisions of the Constitution.

To clear up this uncertainty the legislature in 1909 passed a
law specifically conferring on the charter board the power to
draw up a commission charter./*4 The board of freeholders is
also authorized to make provision for the election of the com-
missioners at large, for the apportionment of the administrative
duties among the commissioners, for non-partisan primary
nomination and election ballots, and for the initiative, referen-
dum, and recall.4%5

This freedom enjoyed by the board of freeholders in drafting
the city charter is the chief characteristic of the home rule
charter system. The commission plan may be incorporated in
its most progressive or least progressive form: the decision rests
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 141

with the board of freeholders in the first instance and with the
voters of the city in the final instance. As one writer says:
‘‘The Minnesota law is a model or a failure depending largely
upon whether or not the critic or judge is a believer in home
rule for cities or a believer in centralization with state super-
vision, regulation and control.’’48¢

The first cities in Minnesota which took advantage of the pro-
visions of the Constitution and statute were Mankato, Faribault,
and St. Cloud. All except St. Cloud adopted, in 1911, plans
providing for a commission of five members, one of whom should
be the mayor; while the commission is given all the governmental
authority of the city, both executive and legislative.43? St. Cloud
provided for a commission of three members. On December 3,
1912, Duluth voted to adopt a new charter embodying the com-
mission form of government, with the initiative, referendum,
and recall, and providing for election according to the prefer-
ential system of voting. The governing body is known as the
city council, composed of a mayor and four councilmen and
vested with all the legislative and executive authority of the
city.488 The examples of Duluth and other cities were soon.
followed by St. Paul and Tower in the same year; by Eiveleth
and Pipestone in 1918; and by Two Harbors in 1915.43 Minne-
apolis failed to adopt a charter providing for the commission
form of government in September, 1913.44?

Colorado.—The next State to incorporate the home rule char-
ter system into its Constitution was Colorado. In. 1902 the
most radical home rule constitutional provision to be foun”d any-
where in the United States was adopted. Section six of the
twentieth article of the Constitution, as amended in 1912, has
granted municipalities of 2000 inhabitants large powers over
their own affairs, especially the authority ‘‘to propose for sub-
mission to a vote of the qualified electors proposals for charter
conventions and to hold the same, and to amend any charter’’.

Under this provision Colorado Springs and Grand Junction
in 1909 drafted and adopted home rule charters embodying the
commission form. The charter of Colorado Springs/#? was
drafted by a charter convention and adopted at an election
held on May 11, 1909. It provides a council of five members
142 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

including the mayor, which has all the legislative powers of the
city when acting as a deliberate body and exercises all the
executive and administrative powers, authority, and duties;
while each member of the council acts as head of a specified
department assigned to him by the council. The members of the
council are elected for terms of four years. The election pro-
vision is very interesting. There is no primary election, but
the first election is final in case the candidate or candidates
receive a majority of the votes cast for the office or offices. If
no one receives the requisite vote a second election is held at
which only the names of the two candidates receiving the highest
number of votes at the first election are placed on the ballot.
Provision is also made in this charter for the initiative, refer-
endum, and recall. The initiative and referendum are made
available at special elections on a fifteen percent petition, and the
recall on a thirty percent petition.

The Grand Junction plan** is of special interest to stu-
dents of political science, because it incorporates into the com-
mission plan of government the system of preferential voting.
It provides for non-partisan nominations by twenty-five indi-
vidual petitioners. The ballots used at the election must be of
such a nature that the voters can express several preferences or
choices for officials. The ballot contains three columns opposite
the names of each candidate, headed ‘‘First Choice’’, ‘‘Second
Choice’’, and ‘‘Other Choices’’. The voters are enabled to vote
against candidates as well as for the candidates of their choice.
“‘To vote against a candidate, omit any cross opposite his name,
and you thereby place him one vote behind all candidates voted
for. To vote for a candidate, make a cross in the appropriate
column opposite his name, voting for the first choice in the
first column, for the second choice in the second column, and
for as many other choices as the voter may have for any office
in the third column. Only one choice can be voted for one
person, and only one first and one second choice.’’444

The government provided by the charter is administered by a
commission of five members, elected through the system of
preferential voting above indicated for a term of four years,
with two or three members retiring every two years. Each
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 143

commissioner is nominated and elected to the headship of a
specific department. The departments are: public affairs,
finance and supplies, highways, health and civic beauty, and
water and sewers. The initiative may be invoked at a general
election on a petition representing five percent of the vote cast
at the preceding election in the city for all candidates for Gov-
ernor, and at a special election on a ten percent petition. The
referendum and the recall are made available on twenty percent
petitions.

In 1913 the charter of the ‘‘City and County of Denver’’,
adopted in 1904, was amended so as to provide the commission
form of government for that political area; but this plan was
discarded by the voters on May 9, 1916, when the mayor and
council plan was restored.4#® Other cities in Colorado which
have adopted home rule commission charters are Pueblo, Colo-
rado City, and Fort Collins.+#4¢

Oregon.—Oregon has also fallen into line, taking up the home
rule movement in 1901 when a constitutional amendment was
proposed by a legislature authorizing the law-making body of
the State to grant to all cities the right to frame charters for
their own government by means of a board of freeholders and
popular ratification. Although this proposal was passed and
ratified by the legislature in 1901 and 1903, it was not submitted
to the people for ratification. In 1906 a constitutional amend-
ment proposed by an initiative petition was adopted authorizing
the State legislature to provide for a system of home rule char-
ters for all the cities of the State. Legislative action to carry out
the provisions of this amendment was taken in the next year.'4”
It is under this authority that a number of municipalities in
Oregon have adopted the commission form and the commission-
manager plan.

The first city in Oregon to take advantage of the provisions of
the Constitution and law by adopting a commission form of
government was Baker, which began its career under the new
plan in October, 1910. The Baker charter44* provides for the
election of three commissioners, including the mayor, to partic-
ular departments and for a term of two years. Other provisions
of the charter are non-partisan primary nominations, the safe-
144 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

guarding of majority elections, and the incorporation of the
State law regarding the initiative, referendum, and recall. The
second charter of Portland, which went into effect on July 1,
1913, embodies the commission form of government. Under this
charter the government is vested in a mayor and four com-
missioners elected through the system of preferential voting, and
for terms of four years. The mayor is vested with power to
assign the departments to particular commissioners. The
initiative, referendum, and recall are all provided in accordance
with the State law.

Oklahoma.—iIn 1907 Oklahoma was admitted into the Union.
In the Constitution/’ there is a clause providing for the home
rule charter system, according to which ‘‘any city containing a
population of more than two thousand inhabitants may frame a
charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to
the constitution and laws of this state.’’ Under this constitu-
tional provision, over twenty cities have framed and adopted
commission charters. It has been said that ‘‘there is no city
of 4000 or over inhabitants in the state which has not that form
of government. This change has all come with the past five
years; Tulsa being the first, the larger cities following, and the
smaller ones changing from the aldermanic to the commission
form.’’51_ But these individual commission charters differ from
each other in many respects. ‘‘Nearly every type of commission
organization to be found anywhere can be found in some of the
commission governed cities of Oklahoma, and some variations
that cannot be found elsewhere. Some of these cities provide
for primary elections and some do not. In some, elections are
partisan and in some non-partisan. The number of commission-
ers varies in the different cities from three to five.’’45?

Michigan —The new Constitution of Michigan, which went
into effect in 1909, stipulates that ‘‘the legislature shall provide
by general law for the incorporation of cities, and by general
law for the incorporation of the villages,’’ and that ‘‘under such
general laws, the electors of each city and village shall have
power and authority to frame, adopt and amend its charters,
and through its regularly constituted authority, to pass all
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 145

laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, subject
to the constitution and general laws of the state.’’5% Although
the foundation and principle of municipal home rule was
established by the revised Constitution, legislation was required
to prescribe the method by which cities should act and to estab-
lish limitations with regard to tax rates and indebtedness. Ac-
cordingly, an enabling act was passed by the legislature in 1909
to put the home rule provision of the Constitution into actual
operation.

The law of 1909, as subsequently amended in 1911 and
1913,54 authorizes the voters of the city to frame and adopt,
as well as to amend, its charter, and to pass all laws relating
to municipal affairs not contrary to the Constitution and general
laws of the State. But charters adopted according to the
provisions of this law must contain certain compulsory pro-
visions, as well as features that are permissive and optional.
Among these permissive features may be mentioned the initia-
tive, referendum, and recall, the civil service system, and non-
partisan primaries and elections. .The compulsory provisions
prescribed by the charter, however, do not by any means handi-
cap or prevent the municipalities from adopting the commission,
commission-manager, or any other new and improved form of
government. Thus far thirteen cities in Michigan have taken
advantage of the law and adopted home rule commission char-
ters; but as a consequence of this home rule system, there is no
uniformity in these charters./**

Texas.—Texas was the next State to incorporate the home rule
charter system into the Constitution. The constitutional amend-
ment adopted in 1911 established the home rule charter system
by definitely allowing all cities having a population of five
thousand or over to frame and adopt charters for their own
government. In 1913 an enabling act/>* was passed by the legis-
lature to put the constitutional provision into operation. The
extent to which Texas cities have taken advantage of the oppor-
tunities afforded to them by this home rule legislation to regulate
their local affairs is shown by the fact that thus far thirty-nine
cities have either adopted new charters or amended their old
ones.
146 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Among the new charters a large majority provide for the
commission form of government; while Galveston, Houston, and
Dallas are among the cities which have made certain changes in
their commission charters./5’7 Thus, in Texas cities may adopt
the commission form of government by any one of the following
three methods: first, by the special charter system ; second, under
the general commission laws of 1909, 1913, and 1914; and third,
under the home rule charter system. The combination of these
three systems has placed Texas in the foremost position in this
movement.

Arizona.—The home rule charter system was established in
1912 when Arizona was admitted as a State into the Union. In
accordance with the Constitution,/*® all cities of thirty-five thou-
sand inhabitants or over may enjoy the privilege of framing
their own charters. But thus far only Phoenix has a home rule
city-manager charter; while in Douglas there is found a home
rule commission charter./°9

Ohio.—By a constitutional amendment! adopted in 1912
Ohio entered the list of home rule States. Under the provisions
of this amendment, which went into effect on January 1, 1913,
a number of cities adopted the commission-manager plan, but
only Lakewood chose to have a commission charter.

Nebraska.—The last State to adopt the constitutional home
rule charter system was Nebraska. Municipal home rule in
Nebraska was provided for by an amendment to the Constitution
in 1912.46 Any city having a population of more than five
thousand may frame its own charter through a charter conven-
tion. Thus far, however, no city in Nebraska has succeeded in
adopting a home rule commission charter.

STATES WITH SPECIAL COMMISSION CHARTERS

North Carolina.—North Carolina accepted the ‘‘government
by commission’’ idea in 1909, when a special charter providing
that form was granted to High Point.46? The number of com-
missioners provided in this statute, however, was unusually
large—there being nine. But in 1915 this special charter plan
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 147

was amended and the number of commissioners reduced to five,
elected annually. Neither in the original nor in the amended
charter is there any provision made for the initiative, refer-
endum, or reeall.

Greensboro!*! and Wilmington!® received special commis-
sion charters in 1911; Raleigh in 1913; and Asheville in 1915.
All of these charters, except that of Wilmington, provide for a
commission of three members, including the mayor. Wilmington
has a council of six members. In all provision is made for the
initiative, referendum, and recall, but the percentages required
on the petitions to put these instruments into operation vary
greatly from place to place.

West Virginia—West Virginia in granting special commis-
sion charters to Huntington** and Bluefield’*? in 1909 added
some new features to the commission form of government. In
addition to the general commission of four members, the Hunt-
ington charter provides a citizens’ board, which is composed of
eight persons chosen by the voters from each of the four wards.
This board has the ‘‘right to veto on any franchise or ordinance
passed by the Board of Commissioners, and the right to hear
charges against any commissioner. A majority vote of the
Citizens’ Board may veto an ordinance or franchise; a two-
thirds vote removes a commissioner. The Citizens’ Board has
its president, its rules and keeps the usual records, the city clerk
acting as secretary. This, it should be noted, is only a veto-and-
recall board, not a second chamber with coordinate power.’’468

Bluefield secured a similar charter from the legislature in the
same year. But in place of the citizens’ board Bluefield has a
council composed of four persons elected from each ward. This
council has the power to veto any ordinance, franchise, or license
by a majority vote of all the members elected; and also the
right to make recommendations concerning any matter relating
to the city government. The legislative and administrative func-
tions of the city are vested in a body of four persons known as
the ‘‘Board of Affairs’’, but the members of this board can be
removed by a two-thirds vote of the council.

West Virginia increased its list of commission-governed cities
in 1911 by granting to Parkersburg’®? a new charter modelled
148 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

more or less on that of Des Moines, and by granting charters to
Fairmount and Grafton in 1913 and 1914, respectively. All
these three charters contain features of the advanced type of
commission charters, including nomination by petition, the non-
partisan direct primary and election, a civil service provision,
and the initiative, referendum, and recall.

Maryland.—As is the case in most of the southern States,
cities in Maryland are chartered by special acts. In 1910 the
city of Cumberland received a special charter establishing the
commission form of government. The governing body is a
council of five members, including the mayor, elected for terms
of two years. Candidates are nominated at a primary election
by petition of at least one hundred qualified voters, and are
elected on a non-partisan ballot. The powers granted to the
mayor and city council are very broad, as the charter expressly
provides that they ‘‘shall have control and supervision over all
the departments of the said city, and to that end shall have
power to make and enforce such rules and regulations as they
may see fit and proper for and concerning the organization,
management and operation of all the departments of said city,
and whatever agencies may be created for the administration of
its affairs.’’479

The mayor and council, by a majority vote, assign each of its
members to take charge of one of the following departments:
police and fire, streets and public property, water and electric
light works, and finance and revenue. The mayor is not assigned
to any particular department, but is given ‘‘general supervision
over all the departments of the city government and may require
at any time full and particular information from any commis-
sioner as to the affairs of his department.’’47!_ There is no pro-
vision in the charter for the initiative, referendum, and recall;
but the initiative has been available since November, 1915, when
a constitutional amendment providing for municipal and
county initiative on petition of twenty percent of the voters was
ratified. The example of Cumberland was followed by Ellicott
City in 1914, when a special charter creating a government by
three commissioners was enacted.+7*
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 149

Maine—In 1908 a new charter, following somewhat the
features of the Des Moines Plan, was prepared for the city of
Portland by a convention composed of committees representing
the city government, the board of trade, and four other local
organizations. The proposed charter was then sent to the
legislature for an enabling act to place it before the voters of
Portland, but was killed in committee. In 1911 a similar charter
was framed by a similar convention. Because of the failure of
the previous charter to obtain favorable action as a special
charter it was proposed that the legislature should enact it as
an enabling act for cities throughout the State. But in spite
of this arrangement it met with no better fate than its predeces-
sor.

In the same session, however, the legislature of Maine did pass
two special enabling acts. In accordance with one of these acts:
Waterville voted in the fall of 1911 upon the commission form of
government, but failed to adopt it. Under the provisions of
another act, Gardiner voted upon the same proposition and ac-
cepted it.

The new government of Gardiner is in the hands of a mayor
and two aldermen, one to be elected each year for a three-year
term after the initial election; and the administration of city
affairs is divided and classified under three department heads.
The initiative is made available at a general election on petition
representing ten percent (not less than 100 voters) of the vote
cast for mayor at the preceding election, but a twenty percent
petition (not less than 250 voters) may call a special election.
Both the referendum and the recall may be invoked by the pre-
sentation of a twenty-five percent petition. Thus far Gardiner
is the only city in the State operating under the commission
form of government.*7$

Florida.—At the legislative session of 1911 a number of
special acts were passed granting new charters to cities or towns.
Two of them provide for the commission form of government for
the towns of Pass-a-Grille/?# and Green Cove Springs!?® In
both cases provision is made for a commission of three members
elected at large. The Pass-a-Grille charter authorizes the com-
missioners to choose a mayor from among their own number, and
150 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

to confer upon him a veto power over ordinances adopted by the
board. There is no initiative or referendum, but recall elections
can be invoked on petition of a number of qualified electors equal
to fifty percent of the total vote cast at the last preceding
municipal election.

The Green Cove Springs charter provides for both the initia:
tive and the referendum on petition of fifty percent of the
qualified voters, and a recall election must be held in response
to a forty percent petition. Referenda on bond issues and
franchises are compulsory.

During the same session a new charter was passed granting
to the city of Lakeland!’* the authority to adopt the commission
form of government, providing the question was approved by a
two-thirds vote of the council and ratified by a majority of the
voters. Lakeland adopted a commission-manager charter in
1913.47?

In 1913 special commission charters were granted to Orlando,
Pensacola, St. Petersburg, West Palm Beach, and Orange Park;
and Apalachicola received a charter in 1915.478

Georgia.—In 1911 new charters providing for the commission
form of government were passed by the legislature for the cities
of Cartesville and Marietta and referred to the voters of these
cities at special elections. The former‘?? is modelled on the Des
Moines Plan, and provides for a mayor and two commissioners,
the mayor being the head of one department, while the board
assigns the members to the remaining departments. The board
has power to appoint all the city officials, to create or alter city
offices, and to determine their powers and duties. There is
also provision for the initiative, referendum, and recall. The
referendum is made available on petition of ten percent of the
registered voters, and the initiative and recall on twenty-five
percent petitions.

The Marietta charter!’ also makes provision for three com-
missioners, one to be elected every two years for a six-year
term. There is no provision for the initiative and referendum.
Rome obtained a commission charter in 1914. The initiative,
referendum, and recall are made available on petitions of twenty-
five percent of the registered voters.
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 151

Nevada.—One city in Nevada, namely Las Vegas, received in
1911 a special charter providing the commission form of govern-
ment. This charter is still in force. It creates, as the governing
body, the usual commission of five members, including the mayor.
The commissioners are elected for four years, and each of them
is assigned to a particular department of the city administration
by the mayor. The recall is provided for in the charter and can
be invoked on petition of twenty percent of the qualified elec-
tors. The initiative and referendum are provided for in the
State Constitution since 1912 by an amendment made in that
year.481

Aside from the above mentioned States where commission
charters can not be secured in any other way than through the
special enactments of the legislature, there are States where
means other than the special charter system are provided to
enable municipalities to adopt the commission plan, but where
special commission charters are also to be found. ‘As a rule,
these special commission charters were granted before there was
any general commission law or home rule charter system. Spe-
cial commission charters in this group of States will therefore be
discussed in their chronological order.

Texas.—After Galveston and Houston had obtained satisfac-
tory results from the commission form of government there was
a great impetus in favor of the adoption of this plan in other
towns and cities of the State. In 1907 five Texas cities—Dallas,
Fort Worth, El Paso, Denison, and Greenville—adopted the
plan. These charters were significant because three of them,
those of Fort Worth, Dallas, and Denison, added new features to
the original Galveston or Houston plan. The Fort Worth char-
ter,#8* granted on February 26th, contains provisions for the
referendum and recall. In the charter of Dallas, secured on
April 13th, there are separate articles dealing with the initiative
and referendum on ordinances,/®? the recall of elective offi-
cers,/#4 and very elaborate provisions regarding the granting
and control of franchises.!8 This Dallas charter is especially
important because it ‘‘most directly suggested the referendum
and initiative’’,/8° which were in the same year incorporated into
the famous Des Moines plan.
152 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Denison#8? secured in the same month a commission charter
containing provisions for the recall as well as a limited referen-
dum on franchises. Greenville,/#* with a population of a little
over 8000, was the first small city trying the new experiment.
In 1909 the legislature of Texas granted commission charters to
five other cities—namely, Austin, the State capital, Waco, Pales-
tine, Corpus Christi, and Marshall. But as all the charters
granted up to the end of the first decade of this century are
special charters, there are features peculiar to each of them.
Instead of a uniform system, these charters allow the existence
of conflicting and perplexing provisions in several cities. In
view of the difficulties inherent in the special charter system the
legislature, as has already been noticed, passed a general law on
April 1, 1909, enabling cities of certain size to adopt this form of
government by a referendum vote.

Idaho—Lewiston,!*? Idaho, has been operating under the com-
mission plan since 1907, its special charter having been secured
on March 18th. It provides for a council of seven. members, in-
cluding the mayor, elected through the process of double election
for terms of seven years. Provisions are made for primary
nomination by petition; for the initiative, referendum, recall;
and for a civil service commission. The unique provision of this
special charter is that officers who are heads of departments
have the privilege of the floor at meetings of the council when
matters concerning their department are under discussion.

Massachusetts —Since 1908 the commission form of city gov-
ernment ceased to be a southern or western fad. The system of
government by commission is no longer a new experiment con-
fined to a few cities scattered throughout the southern and
western States, but has become a well-defined movement from
the influence of which even the conservative New England cities
are not immune. The first eastern State affected by this move-
ment was Massachusetts in 1908, when Haverhill/% and Glou-
cester/*! received from the legislature charters containing feat-
ures of the commission form. Both charters provide for a
council of five members, including the mayor, and vest in this
council all powers formerly exercised by the city council, mayor,
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 153

and various boards. In Haverhill members of the council are
nominated at a non-partisan primary based on petitions signed
by twenty-five voters and are to hold office for two years, with
partial renewal annually. Each member of the council, except
the mayor, is the head of a particular department to be desig-
nated by the council. The mayor exercises a general super-
visory power, and is required to assume the duties of the heads
of departments during their disability. The initiative is made
available at general elections on petition of ten percent of the
voters voting for mayor at the preceding election. Both the
referendum and the recall are available on a twenty-five per-
cent petition.

In Gloucester the mayor and councilmen are elected annually.
Nominally they are chairmen of the committees, but actually
they are heads of departments which are not designated in the
charter, but are to be provided for by ordinance. The initiative
and referendum may be invoked on petition of twenty-five per-
cent of the votes cast for mayor at the preceding election. The
referendum on franchises is compulsory. But there is no pro-
vision for the recall or for a civil service commission.

The results in these two cities which had discarded the
old form of government were very convincing; and the ex-
ample was soon followed by Taunton in 1909 and by Lynn in
1910. At the general election held on November 7, 1911, the
commission plan was submitted in Cambridge, Chelsea, Lowell,
Lawrence, and Pittsfield in accordance with special acts of the
legislature; but it was only in Lowell and Lawrence that the
new plan was adopted, while in all the other cities it was re-
jected.492 Salem was added to the list of commission-governed
cities on November 5, 1912, but Salem had the honor of being
the first city to discard the new plan by adopting the council
plan as provided in the optional charter law.

Tennessee—Memphis secured in 1907 a special charter or
charter amendment providing for the commission form of
government, but the measure was declared unconstitutional on
technical grounds. As a result of an appeal to the legislature
another act of the same nature was passed in 1909. But in
order to avoid the possibility of the law getting into the courts
154 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

and again being declared unconstitutional, the four members
of the legislative council whose terms did not expire until
November, 1911, were made members of the board of commis-
sioners. Consequently the mayor was the only officer elected in
the first year of the commission government.

This charter? vested in the board of commissioners all the
powers formerly exercised by the legislative council, the fire
and police commissioners, and the board of public works, with
certain additional powers conferred upon the municipal cor-
poration. The mayor is made the head of the department of
public affairs and health; and the other commissioners are
each designated to be the head of one of the following depart-
ments: fire and police; streets, bridges, and sewers; accounts,
finance, and revenue; and public utilities, grounds, and build-
ings. The civil service provision is similar to that found in the
Iowa law. There is, however, no provision made for the initia-
tive, referendum, or recall. The example of Memphis was
followed by Etowah in the same year, and by Chattanooga,
Knoxville, St. Elmo, and Lebanon in 1911. The Chattanooga
charter grants the mayor a veto power and a vote on the
question of sustaining his own veto. Bristol received a special
commission charter in 1913, and La Follette in the following
year. Murfreesboro and Jackson adopted the commission plan
in 1915 under special acts. All these acts, being special in
nature, vary greatly from one another./%

New York—New York began to feel the impetus of the
movement for commission government in 1908 when the people
of Buffalo, under the authority of what is known as the public
opinion ordinance, voted for a new and simplified charter. But
the experience of the cities of New York in general and of
Buffalo in particular show how difficult it is sometimes to se-
eure efficient government by resorting to small governing
bodies. In November, 1909, the Referendum League of Buffalo
caused to be drafted a proposed charter which was submitted
to the people, and favorably voted upon.49

In 1910 three special bills providing commission charters for
Buffalo, Mt. Vernon, and Melzinga were introduced in the
legislature. The first two received scanty courtesy, neither
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 155

being reported out of the committee. The Melzinga charter,
though it passed the legislature, was vetoed by Governor
Hughes because it was carelessly drawn.

Early in February, 1911, representatives of twenty-two cities
met in Rochester and formed the Commission Government As-
sociation of New York State, the object of which was ‘‘to
establish in the Municipalities of New York State a business
form of government on the commission plan’’.%* In the same
year seven commission bills were introduced into the legisla-
ture; but in spite of the strenuous pleadings of citizens from
all over the State, either individually or as delegates from clubs
or associations, on behalf of these bills none of them succeeded
im pasying both houses.9?

In the meantime, more and more interest was being mani-
fested in the various cities which were attempting to secure
the simplified form of government; and in the period from 1910
to 1912 the proposed charter bills were endorsed by the various
civic and commercial organizations of different cities. It was
due to this manifestation of popular interest in city govern-
ment that Beacon succeeded in securing, in 1913, the first spe-
cial commission charter ever enacted in the State.

At the legislative session of 1914 the charter bill for Buffalo
was again introduced, and this time, thanks to the authorities
of the various civic and commercial organizations, it passed
the Senate unanimously and reeeived only three dissenting
votes in the Asseinbly. But this action was not final. The
Constitution of New York requires the submission of local bills
to the mayor of the city concerned as the representative of the
city. Mayor Fuhrmann vetoed the bill on the grounds that it
ought not to be submitted along with other matters at the reg-
ular election and that it contained certain flaws in its phras-
ing. Wheu the bill was resubmitted to the legislature, however,
it was passed by a large majority in both houses.4® In the
fall of 1914 it was adopted by the voters of the city.

Thus, after six years of unremitting effort Buffalo finally
secured a commission charter and so became the largest city in
the country to commit its legislative and administrative affairs
to a single group of men, thus emphasizing the tendency toward
concentration of power and responsibility which has been the
156 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

characteristic feature of all recent developments in American
politics.
STATES WITH NO COMMISSION LAW OR COMMISSION CHARTER CITIES

From the above brief review of the commission government
movement in this country it will be noted that in the short
period of ore decade (from 1907 to 1916, inclusive) with only
six exceptions, all the States of the Union have been affected
in one way or another. In all these States there are commis-
sion laws, either general or special, which have been taken
advantage of in varying degrees by the cities. The six States
which have up to the present writing kept out of this nation-
wide movement are the following: Connecticut, Delaware, In-,
diana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. This
number is certainly insignificant in comparison with the large
number of States influenced by the movement—the numerical
ratio is only one to six. Professor Munro’s prediction made
in 1907 that the system of ‘‘government by Commission’’ must
be regarded as ‘‘the climax of a well-defined movement, from
the influence of which hardly a single large city in the country
is entirely exempt’’ was certainly fulfilled during the period
under consideration.

But since the popularization of the city-manager plan by
Dayton, the progress of commission government has practically
come to a standstill. Indeed, the recent tendency has been for
the city-manager plan to arrest the march of commission gov-
ernment in cities. At the same time, it should be noted in
passing that there are many States in which the commission
government is, for the time being at least, the only form of
simplified government easily available to their respective cities;
and for some time to come additional cities will, no doubt,
still adopt that form. But wherever the citizens of a com-
munity are given the right to frame their own charters, as in
the case of the twelve so-called home rule States, or are given
the option between several forms of simplified government, as
in the case of States with optional model charter laws, the
city-manager plan has the place of undisputed leadership in
popular favor.
SPREAD OF COMMISSION PLAN 157

Commission government as operated in Des Moines, in GCal-
veston, and in over four hundred other cities has cleared away
the confusion of power and responsibility that existed in the
old council-and-mayor plan; and through the application of the
short ballot principle and the newer forms of institutional
democracy, has given to the cities a workable form of muncipal
democracy. It is only on the administrative side that commis-
sion government is weak and defective, and the city-manager
plan seeks to supply the remedy. Indeed, the new plan has
been defined as ‘‘an endeavor to retain the strength of the
commission plan—the concentration of policy determining au-
thority in a small non-partisan legislative body—and to add
to it a permanent administrative force of trained exec-
utives.’’499 The origin and development of the city-manager
plan will be discussed in the next chapter.
VI
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN

Just as the commission form of government made headway
through the momentum given to it by the newer forms of in-
stitutional democracy, so the city-manager plan made its way
into the arena of municipal reform as the result of the tendency
towards an appreciation of the need of experts in the manage-
ment of complicated city affairs. This system follows not only
many of the principles of responsible parliamentary govern-
ment, but also most of the methods of large business corpora-
tions. The latest plan in American city government,°”? as one
writer has called it, provides in the first place ‘‘a single elective
board (commission) representative, supervisory and _ legisla-
tive in function, the members giving only part time to munici-
pal work and receiving nominal salaries or none.’’541

In the same way as the directors of a business corporation
employ a president, and just as the members of the majority
party in Parliament choose a party leader to be the prospective
prime minister, the board or commission employs a manager,
known as the city-manager, who holds his office at the pleasure
of the board. The city-manager is the sole agent of the council
through whom that body acts; and he is responsible to it for the
entire administration of the city. Thus, administrative respon-
sibility is secured, in the first place, through the responsibility
imposed upon the manager, appointed and removable by the
council. Members of the council, in turn, are responsible to
the electorate and may be removed by the process of the recall.

The city-manager may not be a specialist in any particular
department of the city administration, but he must be an ex-
pert in city management. Not every city has expert managers
among its own residents. Indeed, some of the smaller towns
have no men qualified to perform the tasks assigned to the
city-manager. In such a case, if the choice is limited to local
residents, the manager will generally be appointed for rea-

(158)
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 159

sons other than skill in administration. To avoid such a situ-
ation it is now the practice of most of the city-manager gov-
erned cities to adopt the German method of advertising for a
manager, who may come from any part of the country.5?

The majority report of the National Municipal League’s
committee on the commission form of government declared that
“‘the city manager feature is a valuable addition to the com-
mission plan’’; and the advantages of the new plan as enumer-
ated in the same report are so comprehensive and so well
worked out that an extensive quotation from the report is
here inserted :5%8

1. It creates a single-headed administrative establishment instead of
the five separate administrative establishments seen in the Des Moines
plan. The administrative unity makes for harmony between municipal
departments since all are subject to a common head.

2. The city manager plan permits expertness in administration at the
point where it is most valuable, namely, at the head.

3. It permits comparative permanence in the office of the chief ex-
ecutive, whereas in all plans involving elective executives, long tenures are
rare.

a. This permanence tends to rid us of amateur and transient executives
and to substitute experienced experts.

b. This permanence gives to the administrative establishment the superior
stability and continuity of personnel and policies which is a necessary
precedent to solid and enduring administrative reforms.

c. This permanence makes more feasible the consideration and carry-
ing out of far-sighted projects extending over long terms of years.

d. This permanence makes it worth while for the executives to educate
themselves seriously in municipal affairs, in the assurance that such educa-
tion will be useful over a long period and in more than one city.

4, The city manager plan permits the chief executive to migrate from
city to city, inasmuch as the city manager is not to be necessarily a resi-
dent of the city at the time of his appointment, and thus an experienced
man can be summoned at advanced salary from a similar post in another
city.

a. This exchangeability opens up a splendid new profession, that of
“Ceity managership.’’

b. This exchangeability provides an ideal vehicle for the interchange
of experience among the cities.

5. The city manager plan, while giving a single-headed administration,
abolished the one-man power seen in the old mayor-and-council plan. The
manager has no independence and the city need not suffer from his personal
whims or prejudices since he is subject to instant correction, or even dis-
charge, by the commission... .
160 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

a. This abolition of one-man power makes safer the free-handed exten-
sion of municipal powers and operations unhampered by- checks and
balances and red tape.

b. More discretion can be left to administrative officers to establish
rulings as they go along, since they are subject to continuous control and
the ultimate appeal of dissatisfied citizens is to the fairness and intelli-
gence of a group (the commission) rather than to a single and possibly
opinionated man (an elective mayor). Inversely, laws and ordinances can
be simpler, thus reducing the field of legal interpretation and bringing
municipal business nearer to the simplicity, flexibility and straightforward-
ness of private business.

6. The city manager plan abandons all attempts to choose administra-
tors by popular election. This is desirable because: :

a. It is as difficult for the people to gauge executive and administrative
ability in candidates as to estimate the professional worth of engineers or
attorneys . .

b. By removing all requirements of technical or administrative ability
in elective officers, it broadens the field of popular choice and leaves the
people free to follow their instinct which is to choose candidates primar-
ily with reference to their representative character only. Laboring men, for
instance, can then freely elect their own men to the commission, and there
is no requirement (as in the Des Moines charter) that these representatives
shall, despite their inexperience in managing large affairs be given the
active personal management of a more or less technical municipal de-
partment.

7. The city manager plan leaves the line of responsibility unmistakably
clear, avoiding the confusion in the Des Moines plan between the responsi-
bility of the individual commissioners and that of the commission as a

whole.
8. It provides basis for better discipline and harmony, inasmuch as the

city manager cannot safely be at odds with the commission, as can the
Des Moines commissioners, in their capacity as department heads, or the
mayor with the council in the mayor-and-council plan.

9. It is better adapted for large cities, than the Des Moines plan.
Large cities should have more than five members in their commission to
avoid overloading the members with work and responsibility, and to avoid
conferring too much legislative power per individual member. Unlike the
Des Moines plan, the city manager plan permits such enlarged commissions,
and so opens the way to the broader and more diversified representation
which large cities need.

10. In very small cities, by providing the services of one well-paid man-
ager instead of five or three paid commissioners, it makes possible economy
in salaries and overhead expenses,

11. It permits ward elections or proportional representation as the
Des Moines plan does not. One or the other of these is likely to prove
desirabie in very large cities to preserve a district size that will not be so
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 161

big that the cost and difficulty of effective canvassing will balk independ-
ent candidates, thereby giving a monopoly of hopeful nominations to per-
manent political machines,

12. It creates position (membership in the commission) which should
be attractive to first class citizens, since the service offers opportunities for
high usefulness without interruption of their private careers.

The report of the committee of the National Municipal
League gave Sumter, South Carolina, the credit for originating
the city-manager plan, because it was Sumter which made the
first attempt to combine the commission form and the city-
manager. But like many other chance creations of politics, it
turns out that the originators of the Sumter plan have built
upon a solid basis of experiences which had been thoroughly
worked out in other jurisdictions, both foreign and domestic.
The city-manager plan has its progenitors which can hardly
be excluded from a consideration of the history of the move-
ment.

It has been claimed by writers on municipal government that
the German Burgomeister and the English Town Clerk are the
forerunners of the American city-manager. But according to
Mr. Toulmin, ‘‘the idea abroad was only partially formulated
before it was fully developed in this country, and, in fact still
remains but partially formulated there. All credit for so
radical an achievement belongs to the American people who
actually created it.’’4 The solution of the difficult problem
of the extent to which the German Burgomeister or the Eng-
lish Town Clerk has influenced the development of the Ameri-
can city-manager need not be discussed in this connection.
But it is necessary for the purpose of the examination here
undertaken to set forth and discuss the preliminary plans that
have led to the fully developed commission-manager plan as
the term is now understood.

THE NEW MEXICO PLAN

The first attempt to create a municipal officer resembling
the present city-manager was made by the Territorial legisla-
ture of New Mexico in 1909, when the so-called ‘‘supervisor
plan’’ was written into the statute books. The New Mexico law
of 1909, which was in force until the passage of the present
162 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

commission law in 1913, provided a council of three members
as the governing body of the city. This city council was
authorized to employ a ‘‘superintendent of city affairs’, whose
duty it was ‘‘to take charge of all public matters of the city,
under the direction of the mayor and the city council; to direct
all street improvement, care for and repair all streets and all
public improvements, and to direct the use, extension, repair,
maintenance of all public utilities; to see that the city is kept
in proper sanitary condition and safe for life and property.’’
The law provided further that ‘‘it shall be his duty to submit
to the mayor and the city council at the regular meeting of
the city council, held in the month of March of each year, a
detailed estimate as near as is practicable, of the expenses of
maintaining streets, alleys, public grounds, of keeping a proper
sanitary condition, and the estimate and expense of any im-
provement which may be necessary and contemplated by said
superintendent, and mayor and city council, and he shall make
such recommendations to said mayor and city council, as may
seem to the best interest of the city, and he shall at all times,
when necessary, consult the mayor and city council upon all
matters pertaining to the city’s welfare and the comfort and
convenience of the people thereof.’’5°

The superintendent was required to devote his entire atten-
tion and time to the affairs of the city and was prohibited by
the law from being engaged in any other work or occupation.
His compensation was determined by the mayor and the city
council and fixed by resolution, but it might not be increased
or diminished after two years or during the period of his em-
ployment without his consent.

The city of Roswell was organized under this supervisor plan
and its affairs were so conducted until the repeal of the act in
1913. By the terms of this repeal Roswell, however, was permit-
ted to continue the plan until the next regular election in 1914,
when the city had the option of adopting the commission law
of 1913.5 In 1914 Roswell, instead of coming under the com-
mission law of 1913, created the position of city-manager under
an ordinance of the city council. The city-manager, appointed
by the mayor with the consent of the city council, is the ad-
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 163

ministrative head of the city government. His powers and
duties are subject to the approval, supervision, and control of
the mayor and city council, and his salary is fixed by ordinance
or resolution. of the city council.°97

THE STAUNTON PLAN

Inspired by the success of commission government in Gal-
veston and Houston, the city of Staunton, Virginia, appointed,
in 1907, a special committee to investigate and report upon ‘‘the
expediency of creating a more efficient and economical adminis-
tration of the city’s affairs.’’°§ But the investigation had not
proceeded very far when it was discovered that a barrier stood
in the way. The State of Virginia prescribes the form of city
government for all its municipalities by rigid and mandatory
provisions in the Constitution, which provide, among other
things, that ‘‘in every city there shall be elected by the qualified

voters thereof . . . . a mayor, for a term of four years, who
shall be the chief executive officer of the city’’, and that in every
city of the first class ‘‘there shall be . . . . a council, composed

of two branches having a different number of members.’’509
According to statutory provision, any city having a population
of ten thousand or more is a city of the first class. Staunton
having more than 12,000 inhabitants is therefore a city
of the first class. Such being the case, Staunton could
not legally abolish the office of mayor and council and
substitute therefor a board of commissioners. There was no way
to overcome this legal limitation, except by amending the Con-
stitution; but such procedure was not considered feasible—at
least for the time being. The difficulty, though an obstacle for
Staunton, served as a means of creating an innovation in Ameri-
can municipal government.51¢

In section 1038 of the Virginia Code there is a provision which
permits the city council to establish such officers as may be
necessary to properly conduct the city’s affairs. Taking advan-
tage of this provision, the idea of a general manager was con-
eeived, and an ordinance creating such an office was accordingly
passed on January 13, 1908.4 Thus Staunton created the posi-
164 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

tion of general manager without changing its form of govern-
ment in other respects.

The ordinance of January 13th authorized the two branches
of the council to meet in joint session for the first time and there-
after annually at the regular election of city officers in July
of each year to appoint an officer known as the ‘‘General Mana-
ger’’, who is required to devote his entire time to the duties of his
office, and to ‘‘have entire charge and control of all the executive
work of the city in its various departments, and have entire
charge and control of the heads of departments and employees of
the city.’’ Other duties of the general manager are to ‘‘make
all contracts for labor and supplies and in general perform all
the administrative and executive work now performed by the
several standing committees of the Council, except the Finance,
Ordinance, School and Auditing Committees.’’ Furthermore,
he is required to ‘‘discharge other duties as may from time to
time be required of him by the Council.’’ These additional
duties, so far as required by the council, consist of being a
‘financial adviser of the council, a court to hear complaints of
citizens, and supervisor of the superintendents of highways,
parks, lights, water and corrections.’’522

The general manager, before entering upon the duties of his
office, is required to ‘‘execute a bond before the Clerk of the
Council in the penalty of $5,000.00 with good and sufficient sure-
ty, conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of his
office.’ He is paid an annual salary which is fixed by the
council at $2500.

The general manager is required to report to the city council
at the beginning of each fiscal year the needs of all the city
departments, together with his recommendations and detailed
estimates. Thus, an intelligent budget system is made possible
and misappropriations and discrepancies between the estimated
revenues and expenditures so frequent under the old system may
be avoided. Again, he is required to report at the close of each
year to the council all the work done and every cent spent during
the year. Monthly balances must be rendered to the council
both by the manager and the treasurer; and these two must
agree, the one operating as a check on the other. In the office
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 165

of the general manager there is kept a systematic account of
every transaction, and also a regular set of double entry books
serving as a check on the office of city treasurer. All these
books are open to public inspection at any time. It has been
well said that the office of general manager is ‘‘really a bureau
of information for the City Council, and departments and the
public. ’’513

In the words of John Crosby, president of the common coun-
cil of Staunton, Virginia, the Staunton plan is ‘‘a democratic
government ‘for the people and by the people’. Neither the
people nor the council have surrendered any of their sovereign
rights; they have simply created an office known as that of a
general manager, a paid employee, who devotes his whole time
and attention to the business of the city and who is responsible
to the council and the people, instead of intrusting the affairs of
the city to the Committees of the Council.’’>14

THE LOCKPORT PROPOSAL

After Staunton made the first move toward introducing the
managership into city government, an attempt to combine the
features of commission government with the city-manager idea
was first made in 1911, when the board of trade of Lockport
presented to the New York legislature a plan of city govern-
ment subsequently known as the ‘‘Lockport Plan’’.

In the fall of 1910 the city of Lockport, being conscious of
the unsatisfactory manner in which its municipal affairs had
been run under the old and complicated mayor and council plan
of government, appointed a charter revision committee in the
hope that a better framework of government might be devised.
But when it was known that this committee was ‘‘to do nothing
but trim the edges of the old charter, the local board of trade
began to agitate for commission government, and produced a
bill applicable to any third class city in the State, Lockport in-
eluded, for an improved government plan.’’55

The form of government set forth in this measure is built upon
the fundamental features of the best existing commission gov-
ernment statutes and charters, that is, the unification of all local
powers of government in the hands of a single elective body,
166 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

and the short ballot. It also aims to correct the inherent defects
in the ordinary commission form of government from an ad-
ministrative point of view.

Under this proposal*!* the legislative and general regula-
tive powers of the city are vested in a city council, composed
of five aldermen elected at large for four years, and subject to
recall after six months on a twenty-five percent petition. The
candidate receiving the highest number of votes is ipso facto the
mayor of the city, who possesses certain special powers and
duties conferred upon him by the charter or the city council.
Just as in ordinary commission-governed cities, the mayor in the
Lockport proposal is to be the president and presiding officer of
the city council, and like the mayor of most of the commission-
governed cities, he has no veto power. Thus far, the proposed
measure is similar to the commission plan; but here the similar-
ity ends.

The radical departure of this proposal from the orthodox
commission form is on the administrative and executive side,
and this departure is made by the creation of the office of city-
manager. This officer is chosen by the city council to be the
administrative head of the city government for an indefinite
term. The city-manager is required (1) ‘‘to see that within
the city the laws of this state and the ordinances, resolutions and
by-laws of the city council shall be faithfully executed’’; (2)
‘‘to attend all meetings of, and to recommend to, the city council,
from time to time, such measures as he shall deem necessary or
expedient for it to adopt’’; (3) to present, ‘‘at such times as the
city council shall so require’’, reports from the several depart-
ments, and to ‘‘draw up an annual report which shall consolidate
the special reports of several departments’’; (4) to be a member
of the board of estimate and apportionment and to ‘‘present, to
that body, annually, an itemized estimate of the financial needs of
the several departments for the ensuing year’’; (5) to ‘‘appoint
persons to fill offices for which no other mode of appointment is
provided’’; (6) to ‘‘transmit to the heads of the several depart-
ments written notice of all acts of the city council relating to
the duties of their departments’’, and to ‘‘make designations of
officers to perform duties ordered to be performed by the city
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 167

council’’; and finally (7) to ‘‘exercise all other powers and per-
form all other duties conferred and imposed upon mayors of
cities, unless other designation shall be made by this act or by
act of the city council.’’5?’

According to this proposal, therefore, the commission or
eouncil is but a policy-determining body, while the policy-
executing functions are entrusted to the city-manager. In other
words, the plan provides that ‘‘the commission, shall execute its
policies through a hired administrator, leaves to the commis-
sioners simply the function of telling their city manager what
the people want, and seeing to it that he carries out their orders
in the spirit in which they are issued.’’58

Aside from the main feature of the proposal noted above,
several interesting minor features may be mentioned in passing.
These are the usual minor features of commission government
charters or statutes, including the non-partisan election, the
abolition of the ward, and the initiative, referendum, and recall.
An interesting feature of the election provision is the incorpor-
ation of the Canadian system of nomination by deposit. Nom-
ination may be made by petition, but in lieu of this, ‘‘a deposit
of fifty dollars in. legal tender may be made by any candidate for
the office of alderman and his name shall be entered upon the
official ballot in all respects as if a petition had been filed and
accepted.’’ This deposit, however, may be refunded if the
candidate receives fifteen percent or more of the total votes cast.

The ‘‘Lockport Bill’’, introduced in the New York legislature
of 1911, never became a law. It was due to the unfortunate
politieal conditions in New York State that the city of Lockport,
much to the disappointment of the friends of good government,
never came under the operation of such a charter.*’9 But at
the same time it should not be overlooked that the Lockport pro-
posal, though it failed to be written into the statute books of
New York State, has aroused much comment and _ interest
throughout the country; and the cities which have since adopted
the city-manager plan have practically without exception copied
the Lockport proposal verbatim.
168 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

THE SUMTER PLAN

The Lockport proposal, though it excited much discussion,
never came to fruition; and so it was left for the southern city
of Sumter, South Carolina, to be the first city in this country
to combine the features of commission government with the
city-manager idea. The new form of government thus evolved
is commonly known as the commission-manager plan, suggesting
the idea of a continual development from the commission form
of government.

In 1912 the South Carolina legislature passed the so-called
‘‘Columbia Bill’’, embodying the general features of the Des
Moines plan, to which reference has already been made in an
early chapter. In this law there is a special provision for the

government of Sumter which reads as follows:

If a majority of the ballots cast at the election provided for herein
shall be in favor of having a manager (city manager), then, in that event,
the mayor and councilmen when elected shall not distribute the powers of
said council among the members of the same; but shall employ a male
person of sound discretion and of good moral character not of their number
of such salary and upon such terms as they may decide, who shall be sub-
ject to such rules and regulations as may be provided by said council-
men.°”

As indicated in the above quotation, the new form of govern-
ment was not forced by the legislature on the city of Sumter.
On the contrary, it was entirely optional with the people of the
city to adopt either the straight commission form, as provided in
the State law, or the city-manager plan. On June 12, 1912, a
special election was held, and the new city-manager plan which
carried out the essentials of the Lockport proposal was adopted
by a vote of two to one.*?4

In August of the same year the first election took place. In-
asmuch as the new plan removes the burden of administrative -
details from the members of the elective board, it provides more
chances for business men of ability to assume the responsibility
of municipal management without at the same time giving up
their private interests. The commission of three members which
was elected was said to be ‘‘composed of the strongest and ablest
of men that could be brought together’’; one of them was a
former mayor and the chief advocate of the new system; another
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 169

was a banker; and the third was a prominent merchant.*** The
three men who make up the commission, one of them bearing
the title of mayor, are not attracted by the salary of the office,
which is only $300 for the mayor and $200 for the councilmen;
nor are they expected to give any considerable time to their
public duties. Indeed, they are frankly not experts. Their only
function is to represent the interests of the city as a board of
directors and to delegate the responsibility for detail work to a
competent executive known as the city-manager, who is their
servant and holds his office at their pleasure. To this officer the
councilmen entrust the appointment, subject to civil service
rules, of all the other city officers and employees; and to him
they look for reports of the city’s needs and the formulation of
the city’s budget.®?8

The first task of this newly-elected council was the selection of
a competent and trained man as the first city-manager of Sum-
ter; and in performing its duty, the council advertised through-
out the country for a general business manager, just as a private
business concern usually does under the same circumstances.
Such a practice, though not uncommon in Germany, was cer-
tainly a unique spectacle in this country. Indeed, the council
had caught the spirit of the new plan.5#4

As the proclamation of the Sumter Council issued on October
14, 1912, was the first advertisement of this kind ever published

in this country, it may be quoted in full:
October 14, 1912.

The city of Sumter hereby announces that applications will be received
from now till December the first for the office of City Manager of Sumter.

This is 4 rapidly growing manufacturing city of 10,000 population, and
the applicant should be competent to oversee public works, such as paving,
lighting, water supply, etc.

An engineer of standing and ability would be preferred.

State salary desired and previous experience in municipal work.

The City Manager will hold office as long as he gives satisfaction to the
commission. He will have complete administrative control of the city,
subject to the approval of the board of three elected commissioners.

There will be no politics in the job; the work will be purely that of an
expert.

Local citizenship is not necessary, although a knowledge of local condi-
tions and traditions will of course be taken into consideration.
170 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

A splendid opportunity for the right man to make a record in a new and
coming profession, as this is the first time that a permanent charter
position of this sort has been created in the United States,

At the request of the City Commissioners these applications will be
filed with the Chamber of Commerce of Sumter, A. V. Snell, Secretary.”

This proclamation attracted nation-wide attention. Almost
all the leading newspapers of the country and municipal and
engineering journals of any importance published the news and
the advertisement. In response, nearly one hundred and fifty ap-
plications appeared—a majority of them being from civil engi-
neers with experience in municipal work. After an investigation
of the records of various applicants, the council chose Mr. M. M.
Worthington, a non-resident civil engineer, and duly appointed
him to the position of the first city-manager of Sumter in Jan-
uary, 1913. His salary was fixed at $2400 per annum. Mr.
Worthington held his position for nine months and was succeeded
by Major Robertson at $3300 a year. But the second manager
resigned after only a few months’ service (November 1,
1914) .56 Since then the position of city-manager in Sumter has
not been filled.

The causes of the unsatisfactory results in Sumter have been
well stated and set forth in the June, 1915, number of The Ameri-
can City, under the heading ‘‘How the City Manager plan was
handicapped: Three comments on the unsatisfactory experience
of Sumter, S. C., with the commission manager plan under a
defective charter.’’5?? These three comments, though written
from different viewpoints and by different persons—a local ob-
server, a charter expert, and Sumter’s last city manager—came
to the same conclusion that the unsatisfactory experience was
not the result of the defects of the plan itself, but was due to
the peculiar local conditions existing in Sumter. Mr. Robert-
son, Sumter’s last city-manager, formulated in this connection
two principles essential to the success of the city-manager plan,
which were absent in the Sumter plan. ‘‘First, the responsibili-
ties and duties and authority of the city manager should be
clearly set forth; Second, it should be a misdemeanor (or pos-
sibly a felony would be more effective) for a commissioner or
councilman, except in official session, to interfere in any way
with or assume in any way the authority of the City Manager.”’
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 171

These two principles are certainly very fundamental to the suc-
cess of the city-manager plan, and cities failing to observe them
will inevitably be disappointed in the working of the plan.

THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN IN HICKORY AND MORGANTON,
NORTH CAROLINA

Not long before Sumter came under the new plan of govern-
ment the citizens of a little town of 3716 inhabitants in the
neighboring State, namely, Hickory, North Carolina, became in-
terested in a new charter. They took up the Lockport proposal,
and utilized it. The new charter5*® adopted on March 17, 1913,
followed very closely the model charter except that the members
of the council, instead of being elected at large, were chosen by
wards, and that the city-manager is charged with certain specific
engineering duties, including ‘‘authority and charge over all
public works, the erection of buildings for the city, the making
and construction of all improvements, paving, curbing, side-
walks, streets, bridges, viaducts, and the repair thereof”’.

Furthermore, the city-manager in Hickory is authorized to
‘“‘approve all estimates of the cost of public works, and recom-
mend to the city council the acceptance or rejection of the work
done or improvements made; he shall have control, management
and direction of all public grounds, bridges, viaducts and public
buildings; he shall have control of the location of the street car
tracks, telephone, telegraph poles and wire; he shall have charge
of the water sheds from which the city takes it supply of water,
pumping stations, pipe lines, filtering apparatus, and all other
things connected or incident to the proper supply of water for
the city; and shall secure all rights of way and easements con-
nected with the water works or sewerage systems, or the exten-

sion of the streets’. The first appointee to the position of
city-manager was Mr. Marvin Sherrill of Louisville, Ken-
tucky.5?9

The neighboring city of Morganton observed with great inter-
est the formulation and adoption of the city-manager charter
at Hickory. In fact, the people of Morganton liked the Hickory
charter so well that they, after making a few changes in it, took
it to the State capital and secured its enactment as their own
172 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

charter. But instead of being called ‘‘city manager’’, the new
officer in Morganton was created with the title of ‘‘Town Man-
ager’’. This title is probably more suitable to Morganton, which
has only 2712 inhabitants. The government of the city is vested
in a mayor and two aldermen, comprising the city council, by
whom the town manager is appointed. His term of office is at
the pleasure of the council. The plan became operative in May,
1913; and the new position created was immediately filled on
May 10th.5%

THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN IN DAYTON, OHIO

Reference has already been made to the home rule amendment
made to the Constitution of Ohio in 1912 by which Ohio cities
were emancipated from legislative domination and given the
right to frame and adopt their own charters. Immediately after
this amendment went into effect on January 1, 1913, scores of
Ohio cities began to avail themselves of the privileges thus
granted; and among them was Dayton. At the very beginning
of the charter campaign in Dayton public-spirited citizens and
numerous civic organizations, including the Chamber of Com-
merce, the Bureau of Municipal Research, and a variety of
others, insisted on the introduction of the city-manager plan.
When the campaign was under way there came the disastrous
flood of March 25th.5%1

It is a curious fact that twice has a flood disaster brought
about an important departure in American municipal govern-
ment. Just as the flood of 1900 resulted in giving Galveston the
famous commission government, so Dayton received a new type
of government as a result of the flood of 1913. This coincidence
arouses historical curiosity in the fact that at the time of a great
disaster, like the flood, when the governmental mechanism has
completely broken down, the only thing that can save the situa-
tion is to put the management of the city’s affairs in the hands
of a small committee which is able to act quickly and effectively.
This was what was actually done both in Galveston and in Day-
ton. The practical demonstration of the operation of a simpli-
fied governmental form given to the people at such a critical time
served not only as a powerful incentive to discard time-honored
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 173

and unworkable political concepts and theories, but also as a
means of bringing out and of introducing new methods and new
ideas of government which conform to modern conditions.

It is true that had there been no flood, Dayton might still have
adopted the city-manager plan; but it is also true that the
great flood emphasized the faults of the old system and taught
the need of an effective and efficient government, and that the
enthusiasm and interest of the citizens of Dayton might never
have been stirred up to such a degree as was shown in the cam-
paign, if the old government had not completely broken down.
As it was, the result on May 20th, when Dayton decided by a
vote of 11,542 to 2020 to have a charter convention, was the
election of every one of the fifteen candidates on the commission-
manager ticket.**?

After the election the charter board worked diligently on the
charter, and submitted their finished work to the people in July.
On August 12th an election was-held, and the result was the
adoption of the new charter by a vote of 13,217 to 6042.538

The adoption of the new plan by so important a city as Day-
ton, having a population of over 115,000, gave the greatest
publicity to the city-manager plan. Hitherto, this innovation
in American municipal government had made only a slight im-
pression upon the public mind; and it is to the Ohio cities,
especially to Dayton, that must be attributed the credit of
bringing the plan into the realm of practical possibility and of
popularizing it throughout the country. Dayton is to the city-
manager plan what Des Moines has been to the commission plan.

In analyzing the Dayton charter it should be constantly kept
in mind that it was the deliberate intention of the framers of
the Dayton plan to retain the strength of the commission plan
and at the same time add to it a permanent administrative force
of trained executives. Such an endeavor is well indicated in
the statement of the charter commission issued to the voters
when the proposed charter was submitted. Part of the state-
ment is as follows:

We have taken a step in advance of the Commission governed cities and
provided a remedy for the generally acknowledged defect of such forms.

We have provided a chief administrative officer named ‘The City Manager’,
whose duty it shall be to supervise and control the conduct and operations
174 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

of all officers and employes of the city and to manage the affairs of the
city in an efficient and economical manner. We are convinced this cen-
tralization of administrative authority will produce business-like methods
in city government and fix responsibility for official action that will result
in great benefit.

In these words of the charter commission may be found the

keynote of the new charter, which is an attempt to secure
democracy and efficiency at the same time—the most difficult
problem of present-day politics. This combination was effected
in Dayton by a complete separation of the legislative from the
administrative functions of government and by the subordi-
nation of the administrative officers to the legislative authority.
In other words, the functions of the representatives of the people
are strictly limited to the determination of what shall be the
general policies of the government, while the execution of the
policies thus determined is delegated to the so-called ‘‘controlled
executive’, an appointed officer held definitely responsible.

The policy-determining functions of the city’s government are
entrusted to a commission of five members, elected at large on a
non-partisan ticket for a term of four years. Nomination is
made by a primary election, and the name of any elector of the
city may be put on the primary ballot on petition of ‘‘at least
two percent of the total number of registered voters in the
municipality.’’>*+ This board of commissioners is to be a con-
tinuous body, since the terms of three and two of them expire
alternately every two years.

The mayor is not separately elected as such, but the commis-
sioner who receives the highest vote at the election at which
three commissioners are chosen is ipso facto the mayor of the
city. His duties are to preside over the meetings of the com-
mission and to represent the city as one of the members of the
county budget commission for the fixing of the tax rate. He is
“‘recognized as the official head of the city by the courts for the
purpose of serving civil processes, by the Governor for the pur-
poses of the military law, and for all ceremonial purposes. ’’535

Each commissioner receives an annual salary of $1200 and the
mayor has an additional sum of $600. A deduction of one per-
cent of the annual salary is to be made for each absence of a
commissioner from a regular meeting, and five consecutive
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 175

absences may operate to vacate the seat. The commission is
required to meet not less than once a week. But the duties of
the commissioners are by no means burdensome: They may be
briefly summarized under two headings: (1) the appointment
of a city-manager, a city clerk, several members of a county
board, and a civil service board; and (2) the enactment of
various kinds of ordinances, like appropriation ordinances, po-
lice ordinances, and ordinances determining upon public works
to be paid for by special assessments.*3¢

The officer taking charge of the entire detailed administrative
work is the city-manager, who is defined in the charter as ‘‘the
administrative head of the municipal government’’, and is held
‘responsible for the efficient administration of all departments’’.
The appoinnment of the city-manager made ‘‘without regard to
his political beliefs’, and he himself ‘‘may or may not be a
resident of the city of Dayton when appointed.’’5’? The city-
manager holds his office at the will of the commission and is also
subject to popular recall. Charter experts do not agree on the
advisability of the last mentioned provision. It was said that
‘the very first step in the direction of expert city administration
was to take the choice of the experts out of the hands of the elec-
torate and to put it into the hands of some other organ, the council
or the mayor, as the case may be. . . . If it is characteristic of
the city manager plan to make the commission or council re-
sponsible for choosing the best man for the place, what possible
justification can there be for making that same man subject to
recall by the electorate ?’’5#

The duties and powers of the city-manager are very extensive,

and as enumerated in the charter, they are as follows:

To see that the laws and ordinances are enforced;

To appoint and, except as herein provided, remove all directors of de-
partments and all subordinate officers and employes in the departments in
both the classified and unclassified services; all appointments to be upon
merit and fitness alone, and in the classified service all appointments and
removals to be subject to the civil service provisions of this charter;

To exercise control over all departments and divisions created herein or
that may be hereafter created by the Commission ;

To attend all meetings of the Commission with the right to take part in
the discussion but having no vote;
176 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

To recommend to the Commission for adoption such measures as he
may deem necessary or expedient; ;

To keep the Commission fully advised as to the financial condition and
needs of the city; and

To perform such other duties as may be prescribed by this charter or be
required of him by ordinance or resolution of the Commission.”

Thus, the city-manager exercises all the functions of municipal
government except those which are political or policy-determin-
ing in nature. Under him there are, for administrative pur-
poses, five operating departments. At the head of each depart-
ment there is a director, chosen by the city-manager for an in-
definite term and responsible to him and the commission ‘‘for
the conduct of the officers and employes of his department, for
the performance of its business, and for the custody and preser-
vation of the books, records, papers, and property under its
control.’’54@ These directors are:

1. The ‘‘Director of Law’’, who is the city attorney.

2. The ‘‘Director of Public Service’’, who has ‘‘charge of
the construction, improvement, repair, and maintenance of
streets, sidewalks, alleys, lanes, bridges, viaducts, and other pub-
lie highways; of sewers, drains, ditches, culverts, canals, streams,
and water courses’’; of the collection of garbage and ashes;
and the general supervision of all public utilities.

8. The ‘‘Director of Public Safety’’, who is the executive
head of the divisions of police and fire, and also the chief ad-
ministrative authority in all matters affecting building in-
spection and regulation, and the enforcement of ordinances re-
lating to weights and measures.

4. The ‘‘Director of Finance’’, who has under him the city
accountant, the city treasurer, and the city purchasing agent.

5. The ‘‘Director of Public Welfare’’, who has charge of ‘‘all
charitable, correctionable, and reformatory institutions and
agencies belonging to the city; the use of all recreational facili-
ties of the city including parks and playgrounds’’; and who has
also under him the health officer of the city.

This division of government for administrative purposes into
five departments, so common in the commission-governed cities,
is, however, by no means to be considered as final in Dayton. In
fact, a reservation is specifically made in the charter by which
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 177

the commission ‘‘may by ordinance discontinue any department
and determine, combine, and distribute the functions and duties
of departments and subdivisions thereof.’ 41

An interesting provision in the Dayton charter, not ordinarily
found in American charters, is the section which provides for
the appointment of a ‘‘City Plan Board’’ by the commission, and,
upon the request of the city-manager, for the appointment of
citizen boards to act in an advisory capacity with various de-
partment heads.

Oftentimes claims have been made that the commission form
of city government is modelled upon the organization of large
business corporations. But even a superficial examination of
the Des Moines charter and other charters modelled after it
will reveal the obvious fact that both Des Moines and other
commission-governed cities have failed to install modern scien-
tific methods of managing business, which are indispensable in
the operation of commercial organizations. The framers of the
Des Moines plan, in their endeavor to model the city govern-
ment on the plan of private business organization, unfortunate-
ly overlooked or minimized the importance of the characteristic
features of modern business management.

As a matter of fact, provisions like scientific budget-making,
accounting procedure, the purchasing of supplies, service and
operating cost, the standardization of duties and compensation,
are of far more importance to the successful operation of various
phases of municipal administration than is the bare framework
of a simplified government machinery. The almost universal
failure of the commission-governed cities to install scientific
methods of business management may partly account for the
mediocre administrative accomplishments under this form of
government, and for the recent decline of enthusiasm for that
plan. On the other hand, a few cities operating under the may-
or-and-council plan of government have by the adoption of
these improved methods of business management succeeded in
increasing the efficiency and economy of their administration,
and have been recognized as being more efficiently governed than
are some cities with commission government charters.
178 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Realizing the failure of the Des Moines plan to carry out
consistently the application of modern scientific business meth-
ods to city government and its failure to recognize the impor-
tance of business methods in municipal administration, the
framers of the Dayton charter introduced in that instrument
numerous detailed provisions for the operation of the adminis-
trative departments and for the guidance of the administrative
officers. These features, which are usually absent in the ordi-
nary commission charters, include provisions governing the
budget-making, accounting procedure, the purchasing agent,
public improvements, and the like. Space forbids a detailed
analysis and discussion. of these important features, but a brief
summary of the financial system may illustrate the up-to-date
method installed in Dayton.

The fiscal year of the city is coincident with the calendar year.
The procedure provided in the charter for the appropriation of
funds may be briefly summarized as follows: the city-manager
is required to submit to the commission not later than November
1st of each year ‘‘an estimate of the expenditures and revenues
of the city departments for the ensuing year’’, to be compiled
from detailed information obtained from the several depart-
ments. The classification of the estimates of expenditures must
as nearly as possible correspond to the main functional divisions
of all departments; and the following information must be pre-

sented in parallel columns:

A detailed estimate of the expense of conducting each department as
submitted by the department.

Expenditures for corresponding items for the last two fiscal years.

Expenditures for corresponding items for the current fiscal year, including
adjustments due to transfers between appropriations plus an estimate of
expenditure necessary to complete the current fiscal year.

Amount of supplies and materials on hand at the date of the preparation
of the invoice.

Increase or decrease of requests compared with the corresponding appro-
priations for the current year.

Such other information as is required by the Commission or that the City
Manager may deem advisable to submit.

The recommendation of the City Manager as to the amounts to be appro-
priated with reasons thereof in such detail as the Commission may direct.“

Copies of the estimates, when prepared and submitted, must
be on file in the office of the commission for public inspection and
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 179

examination; and provision is made for public hearings and for
the publication of the tentative appropriation ordinance before
its final passage.

In order to provide adequate regulation of accounting pro-
cedure, the framers of the Dayton charter borrowed two sec-
tions from the Cleveland charter. One of these sections reads
as follows: ‘‘ Accounting procedure shall be devised and main-
tained for the city adequate to record in detail all transactions
affecting the acquisition, custodianship, and disposition of value,
including cash receipts and disbursements’’.54? The other bor-
rowed section, which is simply a corollary of the above clause,
requires the commission to make a continuous audit of ‘‘the
books of accounts, records, and transactions of the administra-
tive departments of the city. Such audit . . . . shall be
made by one or more certified public accountants F
[whose duties] shall include the certification of all atatoments

. [including] a general balance sheet, exhibiting the
eset and liabilities of the city, supported by departmental
schedules, and schedules for each utility publicly owned and
operated; summaries of income and expenditure, supported by
detailed schedules; and also comparisons, in proper classifica-
tions, with the last previous year.’’544

Supplementing these charter provisions for financial control,
ordinances have been passed making further detailed provisions
for departmental procedure, such as the installation of ledgers
and records, the method of central control of operating reports,
unit cost records, and the like.5#* In short, a detailed and most
up-to date municipal accounting system has been installed in
Dayton. Closely connected with the financial accounting system
are the provisions by which the ‘‘heads of each department or
office shall require proper time reports from all service rendered
to be certified by those having cognizance thereof, to serve as a
basis for the preparation of pay-roll vouchers.’’646 Thus Dayton
has established a financial system which compares favorably with
that found in large business organizations and which is equaled
by only a few other cities in this country.

There are also complete and lengthy provisions with reference
to the city purchasing agent, the financing of public improve-
180 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

ments, the control of franchises, civil service, and the initiative,
referendum, and recall.

On the whole, the Dayton charter is a great improvement on
those in common use, but it is still far from being perfect. There
are weaknesses in this as well as in other charters—a number of
which have already been pointed out by charter experts. But it
must be admitted that the lines laid down in the Dayton charter
are in the right direction, and it only requires time and exper-
ience to improve and perfect the plan step by step.*#’

THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN IN OTHER CITIES OF OHIO

Among the charters drafted following the adoption of the
home rule amendment to the Ohio Constitution, those of Dayton,
Springfield, Youngstown, and Hlyria were of city-manager va-
riety. The proposed Youngstown charter deserves special men-
tion since it added to the city-manager plan, among other features,
the preferential system of voting. It provided for a council of
nine members, nominated from wards but elected at large for a
term of four years. The mayor was elected by the council
from among its own members. His chief functions were to
appoint all standing and special committees of the council and
to cast two votes in case of a tie. For the exercise of adminis-
trative functions a general director was provided whose duties
and powers were, in general, similar to those conferred upon the
city managers of other cities. But the only deviation from the
standard city-manager charter was the five-year residence re-
quirement at the time of his appointment. Provision was also
made for an administrative council which should consist of the
general director, the director of law, the director of finance, and
the heads of departments and divisions, and which should meet
at least once a month.*/8

The Elyria charter was not materially different from the Day-
ton charter, except that the title ‘‘director of public affairs’’
was used instead of the familiar term ‘‘city manager’’. Another
and more serious deviation from the Dayton charter was the pro-
vision making the solicitor, city clerk, auditor, and treasurer
direct employees of the commission rather than of the city-man-
ager. In taking this step the charter framers justified them-
THE CITYMANAGER PLAN 181

selves on the ground that the auditor and treasurer should act as
checks on the city-manager, and that the solicitor and the
clerk had more intimate and direct relationship to the city coun-
cil in the shaping of its policies and the keeping of its records
than to the city-manager.549

The charters of Youngstown and Elyria above outlined were
both defeated. The vigorous opposition of the politicians and
the insufficient publicity given to the charter provisions were
said to be the main causes for the defeat of the new plan in both
cases.

Springfield was the second Ohio city to take up with the city-
manager plan, which was adopted by a vote of 5957 to 2652 on
August 26, 1913.559 In essentials the Springfield charter follows
closely the Dayton charter. There is a commission of five mem-
bers, elected at large and for a four-year term. The commission
has a president who is to be the official and ceremonial head of the
city, corresponding to the mayor of the English borough cor-
poration. The city-manager, chosen by the commission without
regard to his political affiliation or residence, is to be the real
head of the municipal administration. The city-manager in
Springfield is charged with the same duties and given the same
powers as is the city-manager in Dayton, with certain devi-
ations. In Springfield the city-manager is charged with the
additional duty of seeing that ‘‘all terms and conditions imposed
in favor of the city or its inhabitants in any public utility
franchise are faithfully kept and performed; and upon knowl-
edge of any violation thereof to call the same to the attention of
the city solicitor, who is hereby required to take such steps as
are necessary to enforce the same.’’**! As in the case of the
proposed Elyria charter, the Springfield plan takes certain of
the general officials—including the city solicitor, city auditor,
city treasurer, and purchasing agent—out of the control of the
city-manager and puts them under the commission. With these
two exceptions the provisions in the Springfield charter relat-
ing to the city-manager are taken verbatim from the correspond-
ing provisions in the Dayton charter.

The city budget system, the accounting methods, and other
features of the Dayton charter also appear almost verbatim in
182 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

the Springfield document. A civil service commission and the
maintenance of a board of sinking fund trustees are also pro-
vided for; and the members of these bodies are under the direct
control of the commission. The referendum and recall are
available on a fifteen percent petition; but the referendum at a
special election requires a petition of twenty-five percent, which is
also the number of voters required to submit a proposed ordi-
nance to the electorate.**?

The next city in Ohio to provide for the commission-manager
plan was Sandusky, which adopted a new home rule charter
providing for that form of government on July 28, 1914, by a
vote of 1396 to 1289.5? In the main, this charter also follows
the Dayton or Springfield model; but some deviations are found
in the election sections, which contain no provision for primaries.
All candidates are. nominated by petition, and a plurality vote
is sufficient to determine the choice. With this exception all the
other important provisions of the charter are copied verbatim
from one or the other of two charters mentioned.

The commission-manager plan, as developed in Dayton and
other cities in Ohio or elsewhere, though proved to be superior
to any other form of city government previously adopted, has
still one serious defect. It has been claimed that the council or
commission under this new plan, being a legislative and repre-
sentative body only, ought to consist of the representatives of
various elements of the city population. The system of election
provided in the orthodox commission-manager system usually
results in the election of the councilmen belonging to one party
or one faction of the electorate, and a legislative body represent-
ing one party or one faction of the electorate is more or less
objectionable under any form of government. It is especially
so under the manager plan when the small council, having as its
chief function the determination of policy, may also elect the
chief executive to carry out the policies so determined. On
more than one occasion, the Dayton charter has been subjected
to serious criticism not because of any defects in the adminis-
trative methods, but because of the fact that the only voters
represented in the commission of five, the city’s only representa-
tive body, are those making up the one group in the city which
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 183

framed the charter.**> But ‘‘fairness demands that if the council
is to have this elective function it should be a small copy of the
entire voting population.’ ’556

To overcome this defect, which may be real or merely assumed,
it has been proposed and advocated by charter experts and
writers that the city-manager plan could be made truly demo-
cratic and perfect by the introduction of the proportional system
for the election of the commission. The proportional system of
representation as defined by Mr. C. G. Hoag, Secretary of the
United States American Proportional Representation League, is
“nothing but a form of ballot, and a set of rules for counting
ballots, that make it easy for the voters to build up at a single
election—without any primaries whatever—approximately equal
constituencies each of which is unanimous, under the actual
circumstances existing, in the desire to support a certain candi-
date.’’55?_ The first important attempt to strengthen and perfect
the city-manager plan by -the introduction of the proportional
system of election was made in Ashtabula, Ohio.

Under the home rule provision of the Ohio Constitution, Ash-
tabula chose a charter commission to frame a new city charter
in the early part of 1914. In view of the examples afforded by
Dayton, Springfield, and Sandusky, the charter commissioners
naturally turned their attention to the commission-manager plan.
But the objections to the possible one-party representation under
this new plan were soon raised; and at the suggestion of Mr.
Hoag the proportional system for the election of the council was
seriously considered by the charter commission. Although Mr.
Hoag had convinced some members of the charter commission,
especially Mr. W. E. Boynton, of the advantages of the propor-
tional system under the manager plan, the commission rejected
the proposal for fear that the introduction of this novel plan
might result in the defeat of the charter as a whole at the polls.
Such being the case, the proposed charter, which was voted on
and adopted in November, 1914, vested the government in a
council of seven, nominated by a five percent petition and elected
at large on a non-partisan ballot.%

The campaign for the adoption of the proportional represen-
tation system, however, was not ended with the adoption of the
184 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

new charter. The advocates were persistent, and before the
election of the new commission, they initiated proportional
representation as an amendment, which was voted on and
adopted in August, 1915.

The manner of election covered by the amendment is the so-
called Hare system. Candidates for the seven commissioner-
ships are nominated by petition signed by two percent of the
registered voters. But only one petition can be signed by one
voter. The names of the candidates are printed on the ballot
in a single list without party names or emblems. At the election
the voter marks his choices for as many candidates as he prefers,
indicating the order of his preference by the figures 1, 2, 3, 4,
and so on. Only one ballot can be counted for one candidate.
The count of the first choices is made at the precincts, but the
count of the other choices is made by the electoral authorities
of the city, in the presence of representatives of the candidates,
newspaper men, and other interested parties. In order to be
elected the candidate must receive the number of votes equal to
the ‘‘quota’’ or constituency which is the whole number next
higher than the quotient secured by dividing the total valid bal-
lots by eight, a number greater by one than the number of
seats to be filled. Candidates receiving, on the first count, the
number of votes equal or greater than the ‘‘quota’’ are de
clared elected; but all votes received by such candidates in ex-
cess of the ‘‘quota’’ are surplus of that candidate, which, when
taken at random but equally from the ballots of each precinct,
must be transferred to second-choice candidates, each one in ac.
cordance with the instruction given by the voters’ figures on
the ballot. After the transfer of all surplus, the votes standing
te the credit of each candidate are again counted; and any can-
didate, when his votes in the process of transfer, reach the
‘“quota’’, is immediately declared elected. The next step is the
elimination of the candidate having the lowest vote, and the dis-
tribution of his votes to the other candidates as in the above
case. This same process of the elimination of candidates and the
transfer of votes is repeated until candidates to the number of
seats to be filled have been declared elected.*59
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 185

The principle at the bottom of this system of voting and count-
ing ballots is that the voters are to be divided, in accordance
with their will as set forth on their ballots, into seven groups,
each comprising one-seventh of the voters—as nearly as possible
—and each unanimous in the desire to send into the council a
particular candidate. In other words, the system provides in
place of the seven territorial constituencies which would elect
the councilmen under the ward system, seven unanimous con-
stituencies.5

The members of the council thus elected shall hold office for
four years; but provision is also made for partial renewal bien-
nially. The council has all the powers of the city government,
except as otherwise provided in the charter or constitution. In
brief, these powers may be classified into ordinance power and
power of appointment. By ordinance or resolution the council
may ‘‘prescribe the manner in which any power of the city shall
be exercised.’’56 The appointees of the council include a city-
manager, a city-solicitor, a city treasurer, a health officer, a city
auditor, and three civil service commissioners.

Other provisions of the charter, including those dealing with
the powers of the city-manager, appropriations, payments and
reports, improvements and contracts, and the control of fran-
chises, follow closely the lines laid down in the charters of Day-
ton, Springfield, and Sandusky. A great number of sections are
simply copied verbatim from these charters. The initiative and
referendum may be invoked on a ten percent petition and the
recall on a twenty-five percent petition.

The next city in Ohio to adopt the city-manager plan was
Westerville**? which elected to operate under the city-manager
plan on July 31, 1915, in accordance with the optional city gov-
ernment law, reference to which is made elsewhere in this study.

On June 6, 1916, the voters of Hast Cleveland approved a
home rule city-manager charter by a vote of four to one.56
The charter, being modelled after that of Dayton and Spring-
field, provides a commission of five members, elected at large for
terms of four years and partially renewed every two years. A
municipal judge is also elected at the same time. The com-
mission appoints the city-manager and the director of finance.
186 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

The city manager is given full control and supervision of the
administration and appointment of all other officers and em-
ployees not enumerated in the charter. Even the civil service
commission is appointed by the city-manager, but in this case the
approval of the city commission must be first secured. The city
commission also frames and adopts the rules and regulations for
the civil service.

In order to prevent the encroachment of the commission on
the duties and powers of the city-manager, the charter contains
an express provision prohibiting the commissioners, individually,
from interfering in any manner with the administration of
affairs or with the appointment and removal of officers and
employees.

The initiative, referendum, and recall are provided; but pri-
maries are eliminated. Candidates are nominated on petition
and elected on a non-partisan ballot.

The unique feature of this charter is the provision for woman
suffrage. In the State of Ohio the right to vote was, until very
recently, limited only to ‘‘male white’’ citizens. But the framers
of the charter were of the opinion that the home rule amend-
ment, granting authority to exercise all the powers of local
self-government, carried with it the power, by charter provision,
to extend the right to vote to the female sex. This provision,
however, was submitted separately, and after approval by the
voters became a part of the charter. Before this provision went
into effect, however, Ohio had extended the right to vote to
women.

The first commission was elected in November, 1916, but the
remainder of the charter did not take effect until January 1,
1918.

THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN IN ARIZONA, COLORADO, CALIFORNIA, AND
OREGON

The city-manager plan, although originating in the East,
seems to appeal very strongly to the urban centers in the West
and South. In the year 1913 there were numerous cities in Ari-
zona, Colorado, California, and Oregon which were considering
the adoption of this new plan. In Arizona three cities, Douglas,
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 187

Phoenix, and Bisbee, became interested in this form of city gov-
ernment. Douglas drew up, under the home rule provision of
the Constitution, a city-manager charter of the orthodox type;
but owing to the vigorous opposition of the politicians and ill-
informed citizens, and to certain incidental features of the
charter, the people failed to adopt the charter at the polls. The
same fate fell to a similar charter in Bisbee for reasons not
unlike those operating in Douglas.**+

Success, however, met the city-manager plan in Phoenix, the
capital of Arizona, which is thus far the only city in the State
to adopt a home rule charter. Phoenix drew up in the latter
part of 1913 a charter drafted on the same lines as was the de-
feated charter of Douglas, and adopted this instrument on
October 11, 1913, by a three to one majority.°° This charter,
which went into effect in April, 1914, provides for a commission
of five members and a city-manager. The duties of the city-
manager are similar to those provided in charters of the same
kind, including the general supervision and direction of the
administration of the city government, supervision of the official
conduct of all appointive city officials, except the auditor and
city magistrate; supervision of the performance of all contracts
for work done for the city; the purchasing of all materials and
supplies of the city; the appointment and removal of all em-
ployees and officials of the city, unless otherwise provided in
the charter; and the submission of monthly reports of the condi-
tion in the city to the commission.**

The unusual features of the Phoenix charter with reference to
the city-manager are that his salary is definitely fixed in this in-
strument at $5000 per year, and that he is required to be a
resident of the city at the time of his appointment. The resi-
dence provision was inserted in the charter in order to meet the
requirements of the State Constitution.

Another Arizona city having an officer bearing the title of
‘‘eity manager’’ is Tucson. At the November election of 1914
the Republican ticket, which was carried at the polls, was
pledged to employ a city-manager and to follow the general plan
concerning the office in so far as the State law permitted. This
pledge was fulfilled when Mr. C. K. Clark, a non-resident of the
188 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

city and the State, was appointed in the spring of 1915 to the
new position, which was created by an ordinance of the city
council. But in Tucson, though there is a city-manager, there
is no commission-manager plan. The city-manager of Tucson is
not a charter officer and exists only at the pleasure of the city
council. Furthermore, the mayor and council possess the legal
rights to make all appointments and to exercise all the corporate
powers of the city. The city-manager possesses only such pow-
ers as the city council may deem fit to grant to him.*®

Montrose, Colorado, adopted a home rule city-manager charter
in January, 1914. This charter provides for a commission of
five members, elected at large for a two-year term. These mem-
bers constitute the city council and the legislative body of the
city, which appoints the city-manager, city attorney, police
magistrate, board of library commissioners, and board of ceme-
tery commissioners. The city-manager is the executive head of
the government. His duties and powers as enumerated in the
charter are very general and are grouped under four headings:
the appointment and removal of all officers not enumerated in
the charter; attendance at all meetings of the council, with the
right to take part in the discussion but not to vote; the furnish-
ing of information to the council with reference to the financial
condition and needs of the city; and the performance of other
necessary duties as prescribed in the charter or required of him
by the council. Furthermore, he is the purchasing and sales
agent for all personal property and supplies for the city, and the
manager of all public works and improvements. The city-man-
ager is not required to be a resident of the city. He may be re-
moved by a unanimous vote of the commission or by popular re-
call as any other city official.56

In California the city-manager plan first appealed to Whittier,
a small city of a little more than 4500 inhabitants. Like the
cities of Ohio, this little California town enjoys the privilege of
drawing up its own charter. In the process of adopting a new
charter in the early part of 1913 the board of freeholders took
up the ‘‘Lockport Proposal’’ as the basis and produced a charter
similar to that model. But opposition to this novel plan, both
from the politicians and ill-informed citizens, was so strong that
the charter was defeated at the polls.5*9
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 189

But the result in Whittier did not discourage the charter
board in Bakersfield, the first city in California which succeeded
in adopting a home rule city-manager charter. On November 7,
1914, the voters of the city voted in favor of the new charter
at a special municipal election. Subsequently, the legislature of
California, by a concurrent resolution, ratified the proposed
charter, which went into operation in April, 1915.57

The charter of Bakersfield provides a council of seven mem-
bers, one to be chosen from each of the seven wards of the city
by the electors thereof for a two-year term. The council appoints
a city-manager, a treasurer, an assessor, an attorney, and a
clerk for indeterminate terms; and also an auditor, a police
judge, and public welfare commissioners for two-year terms.
The city-manager, who may or may not be a resident of the city
at the time of his appointment, is given the general supervision
and direction of the administrative affairs of the city government.
He receives a salary to be fixed by the council, and his special
duties, as enumerated in the charter, are exactly the same as
those provided in the charters of the Ohio cities mentioned above.
The officers to be appointed by the city-manager are also enumer-
ated in the charter, and the list includes the chief of police, the
chief of the fire department, the city engineer, the superin-
tendent of streets, the health officer, and the building and
plumbing inspectors. Detailed provisions are also made with
reference to finances and taxation, including a budget system
and a system of assessment, the administrative departments,
municipal ownership and operation of public utilities, publie
improvements, and public education. The initiative, refer-
endum, and recall are all available on petition of twenty-five
percent of the voters.

Santa Barbara was the next city in California to draft a home
rule city-manager charter, which was adopted in September,
1915, and went into operation on January 1, 1916, after being
ratified by the legislature. The charter provides for a council of
five members each elected for a four-year term. As usual, this
council is a policy-determining body, and the execution of the
policies so determined is entrusted to a city-manager, who is
appointed by the council and who may or may not be a resident
of the city at the time of his appointment.*”
190 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

San Jose soon followed, and a city-manager charter patterned
after the Dayton plan has been in effect since July 1, 1916. For
the performance of legislative functions there is a council of
seven members elected through the double process of a non-
partisan election and for terms of six years. This council
appoints the city-manager, city clerk, members of a civil service
commission, and of a city planning commission. The city-
manager is the administrative head of the city, and he in turn
appoints the city treasurer, city engineer, city attorney, chief of
the police department, chief of the fire department, board of
health, health officer, superintendent of parks, and board of
library trustees. All officers appointed by the council, with the
single exception of the city-manager, may be removed by an
affirmative vote of four members after a public hearing, but
the city-manager may be removed without any hearing. The
city-manager in making his removals is required to file a state-
ment of the reasons for removal with the civil service commis-
sion, and the person whose removal is sought must have an
opportunity to be heard in his own defense.57?

The San Jose charter was drafted by Thomas H. Reed,
professor of Political Science at the University of California,
who was subsequently appointed to be the first city-manager of
the city at a salary of $6000 per annum.’

As early as October 1, 1913, the city-manager plan was adopted
in La Grande, a small city in Oregon. The original charter went
into effect in January, 1914, but it was later amended in
December, 1915. As amended the charter provides for a com-
mission of three members whose compensations are fixed at five
dollars per meeting. Candidates for the commissionerships are
nominated by petition and elected at large by the qualified elect-
ors of the city, but provision is made that ‘‘when the number
of candidates is more than three times the number of offices
to be filled, each voter shall have the right to vote for as many
first choice candidates as there are offices to be filled, and may
have second or third choice candidates when it becomes neces-
sary by reason of the number of candidates, to obtain a majority
election.’’574
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 191

The commission appoints a city-manager and a municipal
judge whose tenures of office are subject to the discretion of the
commission ; and both of them may be removed at any time with
or without cause. Other duties of the commission are to enact
and repeal ‘‘such ordinances as shall be required by the public
good, take care that the business character and ability of the
General Manager is sufficient to enforce the municipal law, per-
form his duties and services for the best interest and welfare of
the municipal government, and in a careful, prudent and busi-
nesslike manner.’’575

The city-manager, whose maximum salary is $3600, is vested
with ‘‘absolute control and supervision over all officers and em-
ployes of the city except the commissioners and the municipal
judge’’. With the exception of the commissioners and the
municipal judge the city-manager appoints all officers provided
for in the charter, including a city recorder, treasurer, city
attorney, chief of police, chief of the fire department, city engi-
neer, superintendent of water system, city health officer, and
street superintendent. He is also authorized to ‘‘employ such
additional help as may be necessary to carry on and perform
the business affairs and departmental work of the city.’’576 All
the officers and employees appointed and employed by the city-
manager are subject to removal by him, with or without cause.
But the city-manager himself, being accountable to the commis-
sion for his actions, conduct, and management of the business,
may also be discharged at the will of the commission with or
without cause. The conception of the city as a business enter-
prise is further emphasized by a provision of the charter which
says that the city-manager ‘‘shall see that the business affairs of
the municipal corporation are transacted in a modern, scientific
and business-like manner and the services performed and the
records kept shall be as nearly as may be like those of an. efficient
and successful private corporation’’.*7”

THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN IN MICHIGAN AND MINNESOTA

Another very active field for the city-manager is to be found
in one of the middlewestern States, namely, Michigan. The
first city in Michigan to avail itself of the city-manager plan
192 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

through the home rule provision in the constitution was Cadillac,
which adopted a new charter providing for that form of govern-
ment in 1913. The charter, which was adopted on December
9, 1913, and has been in operation since January, 1914, provides
a commission of five members including the mayor. Candidates
for the four commissionerships are nominated from voting pre-
cincts and elected at large by a preferential ballot affording
three choices. They serve without compensation and hold office
for four-year terms; but the term of office of the mayor is two
years.

The general manager appointed by the commission is ‘‘the ad-
ministrative head of the municipal government under the di-
rection and supervision of the Commission.’’ He has all the
duties and powers given to similar officers in other cities; but
besides these customary duties and powers he is given ‘‘active
control of the fire, police, and engineering departments of the
city’’. To make this provision effective he is given exclusive
control of the stationing and transfer of all patrolmen and other
officers and employees constituting the police force, and also of
all firemen and other officers constituting the fire department.
Furthermore, he is required to manage and control all the
charitable, correctional, and reformatory institutions and
agencies belonging to the city; and to manage and supervise
all public improvements, works, and undertakings of the city
for which no other provision is made.°78

The city of Manistee adopted a new charter establishing the
city-manager plan on December 15, 1913. There is a council of
five members which exercises the legislative powers of the city.
Candidates for councilman are nominated by petition and
elected on a preferential ballot with two choices. When elected,
they are to hold office for a term of five years. Elected at the
same time with the councilmen are four justices of peace and
one constable, each of whom is elected at large by the qualified
electors of the city. By a majority vote the council appoints a
city clerk, city treasurer, city-manager, city attorney, three
assessors, and other officers and employees from time to time
as it may deem necessary to carry the charter into effect. The
city-manager is the administrative head of the city government
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 193

and has all the powers and duties provided in the orthodox
type of city-manager charter. Detailed provisions are also made
with reference to the finances of the city, the assessment and
collection of taxes, public and special improvements, city bonds,
the control of franchises, public education, and direct legisla-
tion by the people.*79

Big Rapids followed in February, 1914, when the commission-
manager charter was voted on and adopted. The government
of the city is vested in a commission of three members, including
the mayor. Candidates are nominated by petition and elected on
preferential ballots which afford three choices. When elected,
they hold office for two years. The mayor is the executive head
of the city, but is deprived of the veto power. The commission
is empowered and required to appoint a general manager and
other administrative officials. The general manager, who holds
his office for one year or until his successor is appointed, is
given charge of all public works, the supervision of improve-
ments, and the employment of subordinate officials.58?

Toward the end of the year 1914 an elective charter commis-
sion in Jackson was busy in drafting a home rule charter for the
city. After diligent study of many other charters and visits
to a number of cities then operating under the commission-
manager plan, the charter commissioners were convinced of the
superiority of the new plan; accordingly, they incorporated
into the proposed charter a number of features of the advanced
type of charter, chief among them being the city-manager plan.
The proposed charter was submitted at the general election held
on November 3, 1914, and adopted by a popular vote. A charter
election was held on December 8th, and the new government has
been in operation since January 1, 1915.%%

The government of the city is vested in the usual commission
of five members, including the mayor. The commissioners are
elected through the process of non-partisan double election and
hold the offices for four years, with partial renewal biennially.
The mayor is elected for a two-year term and is authorized to
exercise the powers conferred upon sheriffs to suppress dis-
orders.
194 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

For administrative purposes, the city commission appoints a
city-manager, city clerk, city treasurer, city attorney, city physi-
cian, health officer, sanitary inspector, one supervisor for each
ward, and one or more building inspectors. Other officers of the
city, including the chief of police and chief of the fire depart-
ment, are appointed by the city-manager with the approval of
the city commission.

The city-manager is given ‘‘charge of the administration of
municipal affairs under the direction and supervision of the
city commission.’’ After enumerating the various powers and
duties of the city-manager, including the supervision of public
works, the active control of the fire and police departments of
the city, and numerous other functions similar to those found in
charters of the same type in other cities, the charter proceeds to
specify the qualifications of the chief administrative officer of
the city. This specification is rather unusual and reads as

follows:

The City Manager shall be a man of good business and executive ability,
and, if practicable, a civil or mechanical engineer. He may or may not be
a resident or elector of the City at the time of his appointment, but other
things being equal, preference shall be given to a citizen of Jackson.™

The charter also contains provision for the appointment of
advisory committees and of a purchasing agent as found in the
Dayton charter; for budgetary practice and bonding; for the
assessment and collection of taxes; for the control of franchises;
and for direct legislation by the people.

Albion and Petosky, two small cities of five thousand inhabi-
tants each, joined the movement in the same year. Both adopted
city-manager charters of the orthodox type in the fall of 1915,
and both charters went into effect on January 1, 1916.58

The next important city to adopt the city-manager plan in
Michigan was Grand Rapids. According to the Federal census
of 1910 there were 112,571 inhabitants living in the city of
Grand Rapids—only about 400 less than in Dayton. Being the
second largest city in the country operating under the city-
manager plan of city government, the charter of Grand Rapids
deserves more than a bare mention in this study.

On May 4, 1916, the charter commission of Grand Rapids
adopted a proposed revised charter which, according to the Con-
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 195

stitution of Michigan, was to be first submitted to the Governor
of the State for approval. Such an approval was secured on
May 17th. On August 29, 1916, by a vote of 7693 to 6021 the
charter was adopted. But it did not go into effect until May 1,
1917584

The new charter provides for a commission of seven members.
One of the commissioners is to be nominated and elected by the
city at large, and two commissioners are to be nominated from
each of the three wards but elected at large. There is a process
of double non-partisan election, and candidates for the primary
are nominated by petition signed by fifty to one hundred quali-
fied electors of the electoral district from which the particular
candidate seeks nomination. A mayor and a president are
chosen by the commission from its own members. They are to
hold office for two years and receive a salary of $1200 per
annum. The mayor receives an additional three hundred dollars.

Besides the commissioners there are elected at the same time a
comptroller, four county supervisors, one constable in each ward,
and five library commissioners and two justices of the peace in
the city at large. But these officers, with the exception of the
comptroller, are inconspicuous officers who do not form an in-
tegral part of the city government.

Subject to the Constitution and general laws of the State and
the charter, the commission is authorized to pass all laws and
ordinances relating to municipal concerns, and to appoint a
city-manager, a city attorney, a city clerk, a city treasurer, and
three assessors to be chosen one from each ward. Other funce-
tions of the commission are to act as a civil service board; to pass
upon all appeals from the assessments on the tax rolls as a board
of review; and together with the city treasurer, comptroller,
three assessors, and twelve supervisors (four to be elected from
each ward), to represent the city on the county board of
supervisors.

One of the unique features of the Grand Rapids charter is

that providing for municipal codperation which reads as follows:

The City Commission and City Manager shall seek to bring about co-oper-
ation among and between the cities of Michigan in whatever way may seem
best for the purposes:
196 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

(a) Of securing a uniform system of accounting among said cities so
that intelligent comparison may be made, and so that each city may profit

by the experience of all.
_(b) Of enabling said cities to work out plans for co-operative buying

at wholesale rates.
(c) Of promoting the prosperity, welfare and happiness of the citizens

and taxpayers.

This provision indicates that cities in this country are begin-
ning to realize the importance of codperation with other cities
for the solution of difficult problems. Concerted action is every-
where an important factor in any phase of activity—a rule from
which municipal affairs are not excepted. But it is only in the
Grand Rapids charter than any indication of this movement on
the part of cities is to be discovered.

The city-manager has charge of the administration of munici-
pal affairs under the direction and supervision of the city com-
mission. He is responsible for the enforcement of all laws and
ordinances, and is vested, among other powers, with the appoint-
ment and removal of the administrative and other subordinate
officers and employees. The following officers are specifically
mentioned in the charter: director of public service, who shall
have charge of the department of public service; director of
public safety, who shall have charge of the department of public
safety ; director of public welfare, who shall have charge of the
department of public welfare; and purchasing agent, who shall
have charge of the purchasing department.58¢

Besides these administrative departments which are under
direct control of the city-manager, the following departments
are also established by the charter: an auditing department, of
which the city comptroller is the head; a taxation department, of
which the city assessors are the heads; a finance department, of
which the city treasurer is the head; and a department of law,
of which the city attorney is the head.

Before the raising of any money by the city or the levy and
collection of any tax each year, the city-manager must submit to
the city commission an estimate of the expenditures of the city
for the fiscal year. On the basis of this estimate the city com-
mission provides by ordinance for a budget and a tax sufficient,
with other resources, to pay the estimated expenditures, the
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 197

maintenance of all sinking funds, and the interest on all munici-
pal debts. In the budget there must be specified the several
items for which appropriations are to be made, including the
sinking fund, departmental appropriations, and the contingent
fund. As a measure to provide and insure full publicity and
popular scrutiny of the budget, the charter requires the city
commission to mail to ‘‘every registered voter annually, and at
least twenty days before the budget ordinance is brought up for
final adoption, a summary of the proposed budget.’’58?

Another significant departure of the Grand Rapids charter
from the charters of the conventional type is to be found in the
provision for the appointment by the city commission of a board
of art and museum commissioners for the control and manage-
ment of the museum and all property of the city intended for
the promotion of the arts or the building up of an art collection;

and for the establishment of a house of correction and work
farm.

Turning to Minnesota, it appears that at the legislative session
of 1913 Representative Kerry Conley of Rochester introduced a
bill to permit cities to adopt the city-manager plan, which was
little more than a reproduction of the original ‘‘Lockport Pro-
posal’. But the bill, although it passed the lower house, failed
to be reported out of the Senate.588

At the same time, several cities of the State undertook to adopt
the city-manager plan. Attempts were made in the fall of 1913
both in Little Falls and in Brainard. But in both cases the
voters failed to adopt the new plan.

But these failures did not discourage the citizens of Morris,
a little town of about two thousand inhabitants, from attempting
the same thing. The Morris charter, which was adopted in the
fall of 1913, prescribes that the legislative and administrative
powers of the city shall be vested in a commission of three
members, subject to popular control through the process of direct
legislation and the recall. The commissioners serve without
compensation for a four-year term. The actual administrative
work of the city government is vested in a city-manager, whom
the commission is authorized to appoint and to invest with such
administrative duties and powers as are necessary. Candidates
198 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

for the commissionership are nominated by petition and elected
on a preferential ballot with first and second choices. The city-
manager is given general control of administrative affairs. He
holds his office for one year and receives a salary of $1600 and
also an allowance for horse and conveyance.*®9

THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN IN TEXAS AND THE SOUTH

Texas, the home of the commission form of city government,
is also a very active field of operation for the city-manager. The
movement in Texas began with Amarillo, which was also the
first city to abandon the regular commission form for the new
type. The commissioner-manager plan was adopted in 1913, and
the charter establishing that form of government went into effect
in January, 1914. By this new home rule charter the administra-
tion of the city’s affairs is vested in a commission of three mem-
bers, including the mayor, all of whom are elected at large. This
commission is required to meet as often as once a week in regular
sessions, and as often as necessary in called sessions. Among
the duties of the commission the most important is the appoint-
ment of a city-manager, who shall be the actual head of the
municipal administration and shall hold the office at the pleas-
ure of the commission. The city-manager is paid a salary of
$2400 per annum.”

Taylor and Denton in the same State were added to the list of
cities having the city-manager a few months later. Both cities
adopted the plan in April, 1914.

The Denton charter provides for a commission of five members
elected at large and serving without remuneration. The city-
manager, or mayor, which title is used in Denton, is appointed
by the commission and serves during the pleasure of the com-
mission for a term of not exceeding two years; but he may be
removed at any time, with or without notice. The city-manager,
in turn, appoints the heads of all departments of the city sub-
ject to the approval of the commission.

In Taylor the government is vested in a commission of five
members elected for two-year terms. Nomination by petition
and election by preferential ballot are features of the election
provisions of the charter. After the election the commission
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 199

appoints a number of enumerated administrative officers, among
whom is the city-manager.°% :

With the commission-manager plan there is no advantage in
making the commission very small. When the commission con-
sists of three or five members in a fairly large city there is a
certain inadequacy on the representative side of the government.
Charter experts and city-managers—like Upson, Waite, Hoag,
and others—are impressed with the problem and suggest pro-
portional representation to insure a proper diversity in the com-
mission. On March 6, 1915, Sherman, Texas, adopted a home
rule city-manager charter which deviates from the preceding
charters of the same type by providing a commission of sixteen
members and a city-manager. Indeed, Sherman is the first city
which varied the orthodox type of the plan in a way that is
worthy of copying when large commissions begin to come into
vogue. In order not to violate the short ballot principle, the
Sherman charter provides that these sixteen commissioners shall
hold their offices with rotating tenures; and in order to provide
a more expedient way of handling the business, there is an ex-
ecutive committee of three within the commission, chosen by it
and holding office at its pleasure, to handle details and to work
in special intimacy with the manager.®9? Yoakum, Tyler, San
Angelo, and Brownsville are other cities in Texas that were
added to the list of commission-manager governed cities in
1915.594 All these charters are of the usual orthodox type.

Oklahoma.—Oklahoma fell into line in the fall of 1914 when
Collinsville adopted, on November 24th, a new charter which
provides for a governing body consisting of three commissioners,
and creates the office of ‘‘Business Manager’’. The incumbent
of the last named position holds the office at the pleasure of the
commission. The ‘‘Business Manager’’ is ‘‘vested with the ex-
ecutive and judicial power and authority of the city, subject to
supervision and control by the Board of Commissioners.’’
He is required to make nominations for appointment to all offices,
which are to be confirmed by the board, and to make a monthly
financial statement.°*
200 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Florida.—Another accession to the commission-manager roll
is the State of Florida, where two cities succeeded in securing
this new type of charter in 1914 and 1915. These two cities are
Lakeland and St. Augustine. In the spring of 1914 Lakeland
created, by ordinance, the city managership under the general
power over administration organization conferred upon that
town by its charter.*% 7

St. Augustine adopted the plan on June 7, 1915, by a vote of
415 to 397.597 The charter provides the usual commission of
three members, including the mayor. They are elected at large
and serve for three years, with partial renewal annually. They
receive no compensation. The city-manager, appointed by the
commission, has the usual powers and duties conferred upon
such an officer. In addition he is also required to act as purchas-
ing agent for the city. The St. Augustine charter, however, con-
tains the following unique statement of the official relations
between the city commission and the city-manager, the like of

which is to be found in few other charters.

Neither the Commission nor any of its members shall dictate the ap-
pointment of any person to office or employment by the city manager or
in any manner prevent the City Manager from exercising his own judgment
in selecting the personnel of his administration. The Commission and its
members shall deal with the administrative service solely through the City
Manager and neither the Commission nor any member thereof shall give
orders to, nor make requests of, any of the subordinates of the City Man-
ager, either publicly or privately. Any such dictation, orders, requests, “or
other interference upon the part of a member of the City Commission with
the administration of the city shall constitute a misdemeanor and upon
conviction thereof before a court of competent jurisdiction, any member of
the City Commission so convicted shall be fined not exceeding two hundred
dollars or be imprisoned not exceeding six months, or both, at the disere-
tion of the court, and shall be removed from office.™

South Carolina and North Carolina.—Another significant ad-
dition to the list of commission-manager governed cities was
“Tittle Old Beaufort’’ in South Carolina. In February, 1915,
Beaufort adopted a city-manager charter of the conventional
type by a small margin of votes.59 The unique feature of the
Beaufort charter is the provision that the city-manager is also
to be the secretary of the chamber of commerce under the new
régime. Like other small towns of the country, Beaufort had
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 201

been operating under an unpaid town government and a chamber
of commerce. But the activities of both the government and the
chamber of commerce were hampered because of the lack of
funds. As a way out of this fiscal difficulty it was finally de-
cided to unify the functions of the two organizations in charge
of one person, hoping that an abler man could be secured by the
combined resources of the city and the chamber of commerce
than either could afford alone.°”

By a special act of the legislature approved on March 8,
1915,59! the city of Elizabeth, North Carolina, also secured a
city-manager charter of the orthodox type. As the governing
body of the city, it provides for a board of eight aldermen, two
from each of the four wards into which the city is divided.
Their term of office is two years. The mayor presides at the
meetings of the Board and is the official head of the city for
civil process. Contrary to the usual practice in cities having
the same type of charter, the mayor in Elizabeth City has the
veto power upon ordinances, contracts, and franchises.

The board of aldermen appoints the city-manager, health
officer, and city attorney. Other officers of the city, including
the city auditor, city tax collector, street commissioner, chief
of fire department, harbor master, chief of police, and building
inspector, are appointed by the board upon the recommendation
of the city-manager. The city-manager, being the chief adminis-
trative officer of the city, has ‘the usual powers and duties of
similar officers in other cities. He is also the purchasing agent
of the city and is generally responsible for the conduct of all the
departments under his control. His salary is to be determined
by the board, but the maximum limit is fixed by the charter at
$2400 per year.

West Virgima. —On May 27, 1915, the city-manager plan
made its entry into the State of West Virginia, when Wheeling
adopted by a substantial majority a special charter providing
that form of government. 602 The charter, which did not go into
effect until January, 1917, provides a city council of nine mem-
bers to be nominated one from each ward and nine at large, and
elected at ‘large through the process of a double non- -partisan
election. The mayor, chosen by the city council from among
202 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

its own members, is the official head of the city for the purpose
of serving civil process and for all ceremonial purposes. The
council appoints a city-manager, city clerk, city solicitor, judge
of the police court, chief of police, and commissioners of loans
and bond issues. All other officials are appointed by the city-
manager.

The city-manager, who is defined in the charter as ‘‘the ad-
ministrative head of the municipal government’’, and is ‘‘re.
sponsible for the efficient administration of all departments’’,
has the usual powers and duties of similar officers in other cities.
But his authority over the subordinate officers and departments
of the city is more clearly defined in this charter than elsewhere.

The charter provision reads as follows:

The city manager shall have authority to provide for the appointment of
such officers, the appointment of whom are not vested in the Council, as
shall be necessary or proper to carry into full effect any authority, power,
eapacity or jurisdiction which is or shall be vested in the city of Wheeling,
or in the council thereof, or in such city manager; to grant, in writing,
to the officers so appointed the powers necessary or proper for the purposes
above mentioned; to define their duties in writing; to allow them reason-
able compensation (said compensation to be approved by council), and to
require and take of all or any of them such bonds, obligations or other
writings as he shall deem necessary or proper to insure the proper per-
formance of their several duties.°*

THE ORIGIN OF THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN IN IOWA

In Iowa there were cities which had the office of city-manager
before there were any provisions on the statute books sanction-
ing the creation of such an office. Clarinda was the first city in
this State to create, by ordinance, the office of ‘‘Business Mana-
ger’’, and was said to be the third city in the country to have
such an officer. In April, 1913, the mayor and council were
elected with the understanding that they would appoint a city-
manager to take up the administrative work of the city govern-
ment; and this understanding was carried out immediately after
the election.*°4 The incumbent is appointed by the mayor and
holds office for a one-year term. But he may be reappointed
indefinitely. The city-manager is also required to perform the
duties of street commissioner.®*
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 203

The example of Clarinda was followed by Iowa Falls in April,
1914, when a similar office was created by an ordinance of the
city council. In Iowa Falls the city-manager is required to per-
form all the duties that were formerly performed by the city
elerk and the street and road commissioner ; and he is also vested
with the power of supervision over all the municipal depart-
ments except the police department.®¢

But the office of city-manager in Clarinda and Iowa Falls
before 1915 was an extra legal institution which existed without
legislative authority. The situation, however, was changed in
1915 when the Twenty-sixth General Assembly passed an act to
authorize ‘‘all cities and towns, except cities under the commis-
sion form of government and cities having a population of more
than twenty-five thousand’’ to ‘‘provide by ordinance for the cre-
ation of the office of city manager and to fix likewise the duties
and powers and compensation of such officer.’’67

As provided in this act, the city-manager is to be appointed by
“a majority vote of the city or town council at a regular meeting
of such body’’, and to hold office at the pleasure of the council.
By a majority vote of the council he can be removed at any time.

After the selection and appointment of the city-manager, the
city or town may by ordinance require him to ‘‘perform any or
all of the duties incumbent upon the street commissioner, or
manager of public utilities, cemetery sexton, city clerk and
superintendent of markets’, and to ‘‘superintend and inspect
all improvements and work upon the streets, alleys, sewers, and
public grounds of the city or town’’, and to ‘‘perform such other
and further duties as may be imposed upon him, and to possess
such other and further power as may, from time to time, be by
ordinance conferred upon him.”’

The act further provides that ‘‘ whenever by ordinance or reso-
lution of the council the powers and duties heretofore vested in
any other appointive municipal officer are to be wholly per-
formed by said city manager, then no appointment of such ap-
pointive officer shall be made, and any appointment of such
officer, made prior to the adoption of such ordinance or resolu-
tion shall be hereby cancelled.’’ It is hoped that through such
a provision in the act the administration of the city or town
204 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

where the city-manager is appointed, may be gradually cen-
tralized and responsibility fixed.

Aside from the act which was passed to legalize an existing
institution, the legislature of Iowa passed, at the same session,
another act incorporating the city-manager plan of government
into the legal system of the Commonwealth. The plan was
originally introduced in the House by Representative McFarlane
in ‘‘a bill for an act providing for the government of cities and
incorporated towns by a council and manager; for the adoption
of such plan of government by special election, and for penalties
for violation of the provisions hereof.’’6°8 The bill was passed
by the House by a vote of ninety-eight to eight; and the Senate
later passed it by a unanimous vote. It became a law in May,
1915, when it was approved by the Governor.

Like the commission government law, the city-manager law
of Iowa is a permissive, optional, general law, applicable to
any city having a population of over two thousand.®!” In order
to organize under the provisions of this act, the first step in the
procedure of adopting the plan is the drawing of a petition by
a certain number of electors asking for the submission of the
question to a vote of the people. The number of electors signing
such a petition must be equal to twenty-five percent of the votes
east for all candidates for mayor at the last preceding election.
The petition is then to be filed with the city clerk, and within
two months a special election is to be held in accordance with a
proclamation of the mayor. A majority of the votes cast at such
election is all that is necessary to bring about the adoption of the
plan. If the plan is rejected at the polls the question may not
again be submitted within two years.

After the plan has been adopted, the next important step is
the organization of the city government. In cities having twenty-
five thousand inhabitants or over there are to be elected five
councilmen to exercise all the executive, legislative, and judicial
powers of the municipal corporation; and in cities having less
than twenty-five thousand inhabitants, there is provision for a
council of three members. The law, however, further specifies
that ‘‘in any city having a population of twenty-five thousand
or more, and less than seventy-five thousand, of which the terri-
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 205

tory embraced with the boundaries of such city lies in two town-
ships, which are divided by a watercourse, four councilmen shall
be elected, two of whom shall be residents of, and elected from
that part of the city lying within each of such townships.’’
There is probably no better illustration than this provision to
indicate the means by which a State legislature is able to evade
the constitutional prohibition against local or special legislation.
The city-manager law of Iowa was primarily enacted for the
city of Waterloo, and incidentally for other cities; and in order
to make the organization of the city government under the new
plan meet the special local conditions in that city, such an absurd
provision as the above was inserted into the law.

The councilmen may be elected at the next regular city or
town election, or at a special election called by proclamation of
the mayor, if there is no regular election within the following
year. The councilmen elected begin their tenure of office on
the first Monday after the election, and are to serve ‘‘until the
next regular biennial municipal election, and until their succes.
sors are elected and qualified.’’ But provision is made to term.
inate the terms of different councilmen in such a way that not all
of them will go out of office in the same year. |

Candidates for councilmen to be voted on at the election are
nominated by petition signed by at least ten electors for every
one thousand inhabitants of the city or town. The petition must
be filed with the city clerk ten days before the election day; and
only the names of the persons so nominated are to be put on the
official ballot. At the election the judges and clerks are to be
appointed by the city authority just as in any regular election.
‘‘The election shall be conducted, the vote canvassed, and the
certified return thereof made by the judges of such election as
provided by law.’’

The council when elected and organized, selects one of its
members as ‘‘chairman and presiding officer who shall be desig-
nated as mayor of the city or town in which he is elected’’;
and ‘‘shall be recognized as the official head of the city or town,
by the courts and officers of the State, upon whom service of
civil process may be made.’’ He is also authorized to ‘‘take
command of the police, and govern the city by proclamation at
206 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

times of public danger, or during an emergency’’, concerning the
existence of which he himself is to be the judge.

The councilmen serve and perform all the required duties
without compensation, and are to meet in regular session at least
once every month and in special sessions from time to time when
called by two councilmen. All the meetings of the council,
whether regular or special, are open to the public. In cities
having five or four councilmen, three members constitute a
quorum; and in cities having three councilmen, two members
constitute a quorum. A majority vote is necessary to pass every
resolution and ordinance, which must be recorded before going
into force. Every motion, resolution, and ordinance must be
reduced to writing before being voted upon, and upon every vote
in. the council the yeas and nays must be called and recorded.

It has already been pointed out that the council or commission
under the city-manager plan is primarily a legislative body. In
this capacity the councilmen ‘‘can promulgate in tangible form
the policies they may, in the light of their experience, determine
upon.’’¢!4, But aside from this chief function the council under
this plan is unavoidably accorded a limited appointive power.
This power is vested in the council because it is thought that the
members of this body are better qualified than the electorate to
select the chief administrative head; but it is limited so as to let
the chief executive select those for whose work and efficiency
he is responsible. Accordingly, the Iowa law imposes upon the
city council the duty of selecting the city-manager. It is also
mandatory on the council to appoint a city clerk, a police judge
or magistrate, a solicitor, an assessor, the members of the library
board, and three persons constituting a local board of review;
but the appointment of a corporation counsel and assistant
solicitors is left optional with the council. The compensation
and tenure of office of the officers so appointed are determined
by the council. All the other city officers and employees are to
be appointed by the city-manager.

The city-manager is defined in the law as ‘‘the administrative
head of the municipal government of city or town in which he is
appointed.’’ But it by no means follows that the Iowa law makes
it possible for the exercise of a great amount of power by a single
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 207

man. On the contrary the city-manager is under the constant
direction and supervision of the council, and holds his offiee at the
pleasure of the council.

Before entering upon the duties of his office, the city manager
is required to take an official oath to support the Constitution
of the United States and of the State of Iowa, and to perform
to the best of his ability, faithfully, and honestly, the duties of
his office. A bond in favor of the city is also required so as to
insure the faithful performance of his duties.

In making the appointment of the city-manager, the council
‘‘shall consider only the qualifications and fitness of the person
appointed’’, neither his political affiliation nor his residence
being taken into account. To guard against any corrupt alliance
between the city-manager and councilmen, provisions are made
forbidding the appointment by the manager of any councilman
to any office, and his taking part in any election for the purpose
of electing the councilmen. Violation of these provisions is a
misdemeanor, and is punishable according to law.

The city-manager under the Iowa law exercises all the usual
powers of similar officers in other cities; but in addition, he is
specifically charged with certain duties which in other cities are
usually the functions of other administrative officers. In the
first place, he is the purchasing agent of the city, as the law re-
quires him to ‘‘make all purchases of material and supplies, and
see that such material and supplies are received, and are of the
quality and character called for by the contract.’’ Again, he is
charged with the management of numerous public works in-
cluding streets, sewers, markets, sewage disposal, municipal
lighting works, transportation, and recreation facilities. He is
also given ‘‘the active control of the police, fire and engineering
departments of the city or town’’; and finally, he is authorized
to issue licenses at his discretion, and to revoke the same at his
pleasure.

In conformance with the recent tendency to emphasize the
importance of improving the financial condition of the city, the
Towa law contains a reference to the manner of making the bud-
get. It requires the manager to ‘‘prepare and submit to the
eouncil, an annual budget on the basis of estimates of the ex-
208 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

penses of the various departments of the city or town.’’ In these
estimates the expenses of each department for the preceding
yeur must be shown; and indication must also be made as to

‘‘wherein an increase or diminution is recommended for the
ensuing year.’’ These estimates are required to be made public
through the columns of the official newspapers of the city for
the information of citizens two weeks before they are submitted
by the manager to the council; and printed copies of the same
are to be furnished to any citizen upon request. Publicity and
safeguards with respect to the financial interests of the city are
further guaranteed by giving the citizens full opportunity to
make any objections or protests ‘‘to any item or items in such
budget, or to any omissions therefrom. ’’

But the budgetary system as a whole can not be considered as
perfect. ‘‘The budget should not only be a statement of appro-
priations, but also of the revenues from which these appropria-
tions are to be disbursed.’’67? In so far as the Iowa law fails to
make provision for the estimates of the revenues, it fails to pro-
vide a satisfactory budgetary system, although this law shows
in this regard an improvement over the commission law, which
does not even contain the word ‘‘budget’’, but uses the term
“‘appropriations’’ instead.

The provisions respecting other administrative details in the
Iowa city-manager law, like most other commission laws, are
very few. The law requires, in the first place, the city-manager
to see at all times ‘‘that the business affairs of the municipal
corporation of which he is manager, are transacted in a modern
and scientific method, in an efficient and businesslike manner,
and that accurate records of all of the business affairs of the
city or town under his management, be fully and accurately
kept.’ Further, he is required to submit to ‘‘the council an
itemized monthly report in writing, showing in detail, the re.
ceipts and disbursements, for the preceding month’’, and such
reports after being passed upon by the council are to be pub-
lished in the newspapers so that the whole community may be
kept informed of current municipal happenings. In these two
provisions may be found all that there is in the law aiming at
efficient business methods in cities.
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 209

Of the newer forms of institutional democracy found in the
Des Moines plan, the city-manager law of Iowa includes only the
referendum on franchises and the protest, the procedure in-
volved being exactly the same as provided for in the commission
law. But no provisions are made for the initiative, the recall,®#*
or a civil service commission.

As in the commission government plan of Iowa, the city
manager law makes provision for the abandonment of the plan
after six or more years of operation, in the same way as the
plan was adopted.

These two different manager acts, respectively known as the
Clarinda plan and the Waterloo plan, constitute the most im-
portant municipal legislation enacted by the Thirty-sixth Gen-
eral Assembly of Iowa. Since the legal establishment of these
plans in Iowa, only Grinnell has availed itself of the Clarinda
plan, and Webster City of the Waterloo plan.

THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN IN THE OPTIONAL CHARTER LAWS

Reference has already been made to the optional charter laws
passed by the legislatures of Ohio, New York, Massachusetts, and
Virginia in the years from 1913 to 1915.64 In form these laws
are general enabling acts, providing a number of optional plans,
each of which is applicable to certain cities upon adoption by a
local referendum. With the exception of the Ohio model charter
law, which is applicable to all the cities and villages of the
State, all other laws are limited in their application to certain
classes of cities. Massachusetts excludes the city of Boston; New
York limits the operation of the law to cities of the second and
third classes; while in Virginia cities of over one hundred thou-
sand population can not avail themselves of the advantages of
the law.

The Ohio and Virginia laws provide three plans: the commis-
sion plan, the city-manager plan, and the federal plan. New York
has seven optional forms of charters, which are as follows :—

1. Government by a limited council or commission, with
division of administrative duties.

2. Government by a limited council or commission, with col-
lective supervision of administration.
210 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

3. Government by a limited council or commission, which
shall choose a city-manager.

4. Government by means of separate executive and legisla-
tive departments, the latter to consist of three or five councilmen.

5. Government by means of separate executive and legisla-
tive departments, the latter to consist of a council of nine
members elected at large.

6. Government consisting of a mayor elected at large and a
legislative council chosen by wards.

7. Adoption of the law of third class cities by cities of the
second class.

The Massachusetts law provides:

1. Government by a mayor and city council of nine members,
elected at large.

2. Government by a mayor and city council of from eleven
to fifteen members, elected partly at large and partly by dis-
tricts.

3. The commission form of government.

4. The city-manager plan of government.

The commission plans, as provided in these four optional char-
ter laws, have been analyzed elsewhere in this study; and for
the present purpose only the essential points in these laws with
reference to the city-manager plan need to be presented.

Being permissive and optional in form, these four charter
laws are not self-executing. In order to be effective in any city,
the people must, through an initiative petition, start proceedings
for the adoption of any one of the forms provided in the laws.
In all the States ten percent of the voters of the city may start
the movement by petition. The basis for this percentage, how-
ever, is not the same in the different States. Ohio requires ten
percent of those who voted at the last regular municipal elec-
tion; New York and Virginia require ten percent of the number
of votes cast at the last preceding general election; and Massa-
chusetts takes as the basis the registered voters at the last
preceding State election. The petition, after having secured
the necessary required number of signatures, is to be filed with
the proper authority, which is also different in the different
States. In Ohio it is ‘‘the board of deputy of state supervisors
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 211

of elections or board of deputy of state supervisors and in-
spectors of election’’ of the county in which the city is situated;
in New York and Massachusetts the city clerk is the proper
authority ; and in Virginia the circuit court having jurisdiction
over the city is specified. In all cases a majority of the votes
cast thereon at the election is all that is necessary for the
adoption (or rejection) of the proposed plan.

The city-manager plans, provided in these laws, are of prac-
tically the same nature, differing only in minor details. In all
the laws there is provision for a council as the legislative body
of the city, and for an appointed and ‘‘controlled’’ city-manager
to be the administrative head of the city government. But the
size of the council varies in the different laws. In all except the
Massachusetts law, which fixes the number of councilmen at
five for all cities, the council varies in size in accordance with
the size of the municipality. In Ohio there are five councilmen
for cities having not more than ten thousand inhabitants; seven
for cities between ten thousand and twenty-five thousand; and
nine for cities of twenty-five thousand and upwards. New York
provides a mayor and four councilmen for cities of the third
class, and a mayor and six councilmen for cities of the second
class. Finally, the Virginia law provides for a council of three or
five members for cities of ten thousand or under; and of from
five to eleven members for cities of ten thousand or over.
Councilmen are in all cases elected at large, and have a four-
year term in all States except Massachusetts, where the term of
office is two years.

It is only in the New York plan that the mayor is elected as
such. The Massachusetts law provides that in the election at
which the places of three members in the council are filled, the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes is declared to
be the mayor of the city under the city-manager plan. Both
in Ohio and Virginia the mayor is chosen by the council from
among its own members at the first regular meeting following the
election. The name ‘‘mayor’’ is not found in the Ohio law, the
term ‘‘chairman’’ being used instead.

The mayor so chosen or elected is in all cases the official head
of the city for the service of civil process and respected as such
212 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

for ceremonial purposes. He presides at the meeting of the
council, and in New York and Massachusetts he has the same
power as other councilmen to vote upon all matters coming be-
fore the council.

The administrative and executive powers under these plans
are, as usual, vested in an officer known as the city-manager,
who is appointed by the council and holds the office during the
pleasure of the latter body. The Virginia law specifies that the
manager shall hold ‘‘office during the pleasure of the council;
or for a term of three years unless sooner removed by the council
upon proven charges preferred for malfeasance or misfeasanee,
neglect of duty or incompetency.’’ If after three years the
manager proves to be satisfactory, he may be reappointed by the
council for a term not exceeding six years, but he is always
subject to removal by the council for the above mentioned causes.

Like other city-manager statutes or charters these optional
charter laws vest in the city manager all the functions of
appointment, of control of employees, and of advice to the com-
missions. The Ohio law enumerates his powers as follows:

(a) to see that the laws and ordinances are faithfully executed;

(b) to attend all meetings of the council at which his attendance may
be required by that body;

(ec) to recommend for adoption to the council such measures as he may
deem necessary or expedient;

(d) to appoint all officers and employees in the classified service of the
municipality, subject to the provisions of this act and the civil service law;

(e) to prepare and submit to the council such reports as may be re-
quired by that body, or as he may deem advisable to submit;

(f) to keep the council fully advised of the financial condition of the
municipality and its future needs;

(g) to prepare and submit to the council a tentative budget for the
next fiscal year;

(h) and to perform such other duties as the council may determine by
ordinance or resolution.

The New York law gives similar powers to the city-manager,
the following being the exact language of the law:

The city manager shall (1) be the administrative head of the city govern-
ment; (2) see that within the city the laws of the state and the ordinances,
resolutions and by-laws of the council are faithfully executed; (3) at-
tend all meetings of the council, and recommend for adoption such measures
as he shall deem expedient; (4) make reports to the council from time
to time upon the affairs of the city, keep the council fully advised of the
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 213

city’s financial condition, and its future financial need; (5) prepare and
submit to the council a tentative budget for the next fiscal year.

The city-manager in Massachusetts ‘‘shall (1) be the adminis-
trative head of the city government; (2) see that within the city
the laws of the state and the ordinances, resolutions and regula-
tions of the council are faithfully executed; (3) attend all
meetings of the council, and recommend for adoption such
measures as he shall deem expedient; (4) make reports to the
council from time to time upon the affairs of the city, keep the
council fully advised of the city’s financial conditions and its
future financial needs; (5) appoint and remove all heads of de-
partments, superintendents and other employees of the city.’’

The Virginia law empowers the city-manager in the following
manner:

The city manager shall (1) see that within the city the laws, ordinances,
resolutions and by-laws of the council are faithfully executed; (2) attend
all meetings of the council, and recommend for adoption such measures
as he shall deem expedient; (3) make reports to the council from time to
time upon the affairs of the city; keep the council fully advised of the
city’s financial condition and its future financial needs; (4) prepare and
submit to the council a tentative budget for the next fiscal year; (5)
perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the council not in con-
flict with the foregoing.

From these provisions in the laws with reference to the powers
of the city-manager it can readily be seen how closely one State
follows another in drawing up statutes of the same kind. Only
two explanations seem possible to account for this similarity:
either these statutes are drawn very hastily and blindly; or the
law of one State is so well worked out that the second State can
not draw up a better one on the same subject.

Since the enactment of these optional charter laws, no city in
Ohio or Massachusetts has seen fit to adopt the manager plan so
provided. But in Ohio, as has already been pointed out, cities
enjoy the constitutional right to frame their own charters, and
so there is no need to adopt any ready-made plan enacted by the
State legislature. It is only in New York that the manager
plan of the optional charter law has been adopted by a consider-
able number of cities. Niagara Falls was the first city to succeed
in adopting the plan, on November 3, 1914, by a vote of 2526
to 1068;°!5 and was followed by Newburgh on May 1, 1915, by
214 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

a vote of 1432 to 1087.6 Another city in New York which has
availed itself of the optional charter law is Watertown, which
adopted the manager plan on November 2, 1915, by a vote of
2488 to 2891.57 But the manager plan in Watertown was not
put into effect until January 1, 1918. In Virginia, Portsmouth
is the only city that has thus far availed itself of the manager
plan as provided in the law of 1915. The plan was adopted in
November, 1915, and went into effect in September, 1916.68

CITY-MANAGERS IN OTHER CITIES

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that there are two
distinct types of city-manager now existing in this country. As
ordinarily understood, the city-manager plan is ‘‘a form of
government which combines the ideas of a small representative
body, elected at large on a non-partisan ballot, possessing all
ultimate legal powers of the city, and subject to certain important
checks in the hands of the electorate, with concentration of ad-
ministrative power in a single individual chosen by the represen-
tative body because of expert professional qualifications.’’¢9
This single individual administrative head is known as the city-
manager. With few exceptions the cities that have already
been discussed in this study have city-managers of this type.

But there are also cities which have created the office of city-
manager by ordinance, but without at the same time introducing
any change in connection with the old mayor and council form
of government. This was what Staunton did in 1908 when for
the first time in this country the term ‘‘manager’’ in connection
with municipal administration was introduced. There the old
mayor and council form of organization was retained and no
change was made in the form of government other than the cre-
ation by ordinance of the position of city-manager. This plan
has since been followed by a number of other cities.

Under the definition of the city-manager plan above cited and
in the consideration of the history of the city-manager movement
by a number of authorities on the subject, the city-manager
under the old mayor-and-council form of government has been
entirely ignored. Whether such an attitude is justifiable is
open to question ; but the fact remains that the general-manager
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 215

features introduced by Staunton and followed by other cities has
at least some of the advantages often claimed for the city-
manager plan—as, for example, the idea of a single administra-
tive head chosen because of professional qualifications. For this
reason the original manifestation of the plan in Staunton has
been fully treated in this study; and for this reason, also, a con-
sideration of the history of the city-manager movement can not
be said to be complete without taking into account those cities,
other than Staunton and those already given above, which have
provided by ordinance for the position of city-manager without
changing their form of government in other respects.

But in taking up this class of cities an obvious difficulty soon
appears. As the term ‘‘city-manager’’ has a certain advertising
value for the city employing it, many cities have been inclined
to confer upon a certain officer the title without at the same time
giving to him the real powers pertaining to such a position. It
is said that in a certain city in Tennessee where there was an
officer known as the city commissioner who had considerable to
do with public works, the council passed a resolution which ran

substantially as follows:

Whereas it is getting to be the fashion for up to date cities to have city
managers, and

Whereas it will make . . City look like an up to date city to
have a city manager,

Therefore, be it resolved, that the title of the present city commissioner
be changed to city manager.”

Thus, there are so-called city-managers who are not really
managers of cities: the mere conferring of the title of city-
manager does not necessarily make such an official a real city-
manager. At the same time there is no hard and fast rule to rely
upon in deciding whether or not a given official is a real city-
manager. There are different degrees of power that are given
to the city-managers in different cities. It is, perhaps, for this
reason that organizations concerned with city government, like
the National Municipal League and the Short Ballot Organiza-
tion, are justified in including in the list of city-manager cities
only those cities having a combination of the commission govern-
ment and general-manager ideas; for, as Childs says, the other
type of city-manager form, ‘‘lacking so many of the basic prin-
216 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

ciples which are essential to good government in the long run, is
very liable to get into trouble from time to time and to give to
the true Commission-manager plan and to City managers, an
undeserved bad name.’’61

But since the City Managers’ Association has defined the city-
manager as one who ‘‘is the administrative head of a munici-
pality appointed by its legislative body’’** and has admitted
into membership city-managers under the mayor-and-council
form of organization as well as those under the true commission-
manager plan of government, it seems necessary to include in
this consideration of the city-manager movement those non-com-
mission governed cities which have an officer who bears the title
of city-manager. Some of the more important cities of this class
may now be discussed in order to illustrate more fully the
powers and duties of that type of city-manager.

Virginia.—By ordinance of the city council, adopted in 1912,
Fredericksburg created the office of city commissioner. But
under the Constitution of Virginia the police and taxing power,
being sovereign powers delegated to the city council, could not
be re-delegated to any other agency. Thus, the ordinance
creating the new office left all matters relating to the police and
taxing power intact in the council; but in other respects the city
council acts only as a board of directors in relation to the policies
of the city commissioner. The city commissioner is vested with
complete authority relating to all administrative affairs other
than those of the police department and the levying of taxes. In

.fact, he is ‘‘the supervising, directing, executing, overseeing,
buying and spending agent of and for the city.’’ He is required
to ‘‘look after the heads of the water, sewer, gas, streets and all
other departments of the city ; to map out plans in all the depart-
ments for codrdinated work, so that each department would
work in conjunction with other departments, and all together
work towards one comprehensive plan for the betterment of the
whole city.’ ’68

In exercising his authority and performing his duties the city
commissioner is only responsible to the city council as a whole, to
which he submits at its regular meetings an itemized statement
of all the expenditures during the preceding thirty days, the
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 217

estimated expenditures for the following thirty days, and a
financial statement with his recommendations in regard to fur-
ther improvements and developments.

Another city in Virginia governed by a business manager
under the mayor-and-council form of municipal organization is
Charlottesville. It was due partly to the inefficient and waste-
ful administration under the unpaid committee system of the old
form of government and partly to the example set by Staunton
that the city council of Charlottesville passed, in the summer of
1913, an ordinance creating a municipal business manager. This
ordinance was to be effective for one year, but in the summer of
1914 it was amended and reénacted.**4 The manager thus
created is to be elected at the meeting of the council for a two-
year term. He is charged with the duties of an executive and
administrative character formerly performed by the several
committees of the council—these committees being now required
to act only in advisory capacities. Any disagreement between
the municipal business manager and the committees is to be
referred to and decided by the council. In the quarterly reports
the manager is required to set forth an estimate of all the sums
of money necessary to carry on the operation of the city in the
various departments for the ensuing quarter. At the end of
each quarter he is again required to ‘‘make a written report to
the council of all transactions and operations during the said
quarter, including a detailed statement of all bills approved by
him showing how and where the various sums were expended
during said quarter in order that all disbursements may be re-
lated to their objects in the several departments.”’

Pennsylwania.—The city of Titusville, Pennsylvania, which
adopted commission government under the Clarke Act, created
the office of city-manager by an ordinance passed in December,
1913. The departments of engineering, streets, sewers, water,
lighting, and purchasing are thus consolidated and put under
the charge of the city-manager. Titusville is one of the first
cities in Pennsylvania to adopt this plan of administering city
affairs. The city-manager there holds his office at the pleasure
of the city council, and draws a salary of $2100 per annum.°**
218 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Grove City was the second Pennsylvania city to have a city-
manager. Early in the year 1913 Grove City had an epidemic
of typhoid fever which was caused by a polluted water supply.
As a result the council, in the spring of 1914, passed an ordi-
nance creating the position of manager; and a committee was
appointed to secure a man for that position. In Grove City
the manager bears the title of ‘‘Managing Engineer’’—which
indicates the fact that much of the engineering work of the city
is either performed or supervised by him. His tenure of office
is fixed by the ordinance as one year; but he may be reappointed ;
and he may be removed at any time by the council.*6

Massachusetts —In Norwood, Massachusetts, there is a town-
manager operating under the old form of town-meeting charter.
This town-meeting system of New England provides for regular
meetings at which the citizens vote upon by-laws and elect the
selectmen and other officials. This scheme is very democratic
and was workable under the simple conditions of former days,
but it is not adapted to the handling of complex problems of
a modern city. For this reason the legislature of Massachusetts
passed an act in 1915 empowering the selectmen of the town to
appoint a town-manager. His tenure of office is not fixed. He
is given full power to appoint and discharge superintendents
of all departments, as well as to fix salaries and create new de-
partments or disband or combine existing departments.®?”

Illinois——In River Forest, Illinois, the government was for-
merly in the hands of a president and six trustees, elected at large
and serving without pay. With the growth of the city, how-
ever, it was found that these officers were unable to give the
necessary personal attention to the affairs of the village and so
they decided in May, 1913, to employ a city-manager, or general
superintendent, whose duty it would be to assume the adminis-
trative functions of the village. No change of charter provision
was necessary to create the position, as the Illinois statutes
provide that at their discretion the president and the board of
trustees ‘‘may from time to time, by ordinance passed by vote
of two-thirds of all the Trustees elected, provide for the appoint-
ment by the President, with the approval of the Board, of such
THE CITY-MANAGER PLAN 219

officers as may by said Board be deemed necessary or expedient
for the proper administration of the affairs of the village.’’s*
Thus, on June 9, 1918, an ordinance creating the office of ‘‘Gen-
eral Superintendent’’ was passed, and an appointment was made
on the same day. The ordinance requires this new officer to
devote all of his time to the service of the village, with general
authority and supervision over all other village officers.

Glencoe is another small town in Illinois which created the
position of village manager by virtue of a resolution of the city
council in January, 1914. After the passage of the resolution
Glencoe advertised in a Chicago newspaper for a village manager,
and finally selected H. H. Sherer to fill the position. The man-
ager receives a salary of $2400 per annum.®?9

California.—In the spring of 1914 the city of Inglewood,
California, passed an ordinance creating the office of city-
manager and defining his duties and powers as follows:

1. To see that laws and ordinances of the city are enforced;

2. To exercise control over all the departments of the city and direct
the work of all appointive officers;

83. To employ and dismiss all city employees;

4. To superintend the construction of all public work within the said
city ;

5. To approve or disapprove the requisition for the purchase of any
article or articles for the said city by any department or officer before the
purchase is made.

6. To attend all the meetings of the Board of Trustees and to recom-
mend to said Board for adoption such measures as he may deem necessary
or expedient ;

7. To keep the Board of Trustees fully advised as to the financial con-
ditions and needs of the city; and

8. To perform such other duties as may be prescribed by ordinance or
resolution_of the Board of Trustees.”

In exercising these powers the city-manager is subject to the
approval and control of the board of trustees, which has full
power to correct and set aside any action taken by him. The
ordinance further provides that the legal department and the
city attorney are expressly excepted from the city-manager’s

control.
The example set by Inglewood was followed by San Diego,
where the office of city-manager was similarly created by an
220 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

ordinance on May 8, 1915.1 Mention may also be made of Al-
hambra, California, Clark, South Dakota, and Grand Haven,
Michigan. In all these cities there are officers called managers.
During the legislative session of 1917 the Arkansas legislature
passed a commission-manager charter applying to Hot Springs;
and the Kansas legislature passed an optional, State-wide com-
mission-manager plan law.
Vil

QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE POSITION OF
CITY-MANAGER

The city-manager plan, like any other form of government, is
no miracle in itself. ‘‘Governments, like clocks, go from the
motion men give them; and as governments are made and moved
by men, so by them they are ruined too.’’6s? There is no such
thing as a perfect form of government—municipal, State or
national. So long as government must be administered by men
the success or failure of a particular form of government, no
matter what its form may be, will be largely decided by the kind
of men who are entrusted with its administration. The form of
government is important only in so far as it facilitates or ob-
structs them in the performance of their functions. Assuming
that the city-manager plan is a good and adequate instrument
with which to carry out the work of governing cities, the ques-
tion still remains, what should be the standard qualifications in
the new profession of city-manager? This question is of the
utmost importance when one considers how many good measures
and how many good laws have fallen into disrepute simply be-
cause of administration by the wrong kind of men, or of the
lack of specially prepared administrative officials.

In answering the question concerning the requirements for
<ity-manager, one should constantly bear in mind the functions
which the city-manager is called upon to perform. It is only
from a thorough understanding of the nature of the city-man-
ager’s work that a conclusion can be reached as to the necessary
and standard qualifications for such a profession. From the
analysis of some of the typical city-manager statutes, charters,
and ordinances mentioned elsewhere in this study, and from the
conclusions of competent authorities, the following are apparent-
ly the general powers usually conferred upon that official :

He is charged with the enforcement of laws and ordinances.

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222 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

He administers the affairs of the departments and is responsible for the
results obtained therefrom.

He appoints and dismisses the employees whose work will produce the
results he is responsible for.

He advises the council and attends the meetings for that purpose, sup-
plementing his advices with formal written reports, but he has no vote.

He estimates the financial needs of the corporation and acts as expert
budget maker and financial advisor of the commission.

He has the general powers of investigation and is the general agent of
the commission. ,

It is evident that the work the city-managers are expected to
perform is almost entirely of a scientifie and technical character.
For instance, the administration of departmental affairs re-
quires high technical and scientific skill similar to that required
for the successful conduct of a commercial and business enter-
prise. Again, the formulation of a tentative budget requires
foresight and initiative. Finally, the construction and oper-
ation of public works, which are put in charge of the city-
manager by many charters, requires the same technical knowl.
edge and skill that is necessary in supervising similar works
conducted by private corporations.

Early charter-makers have regarded this last-named phase of
the city-manager’s work as his most important function; and
therefore, it has been specifically set forth in some of the charters
that the city-manager shall be a civil engineer. For this reason a
la¥ge majority of the city-managers have been recruited from
the ranks of men trained and experienced in engineering work.
But this is a good preparation only in so far as it goes: a
knowledge of engineering is only one qualification for the office.
The city-manager who is an engineer has the same advantage in
this respect as managers with a knowledge of accounting, sani-
tation, or criminology have in other respects. Rightly understood
the city-manager is more than a superintendent of public works.
Being the administrative head of the municipal government, he
is charged with functions far more important than the perform.
ance of special acts of individual application as expressly enum-
erated in the charter or ordinance.

In the first place, the city-manager is invariably gtanted
powers more or less extensive which affect directly and per-
sonally all the officers of the municipal administration. For
QUALIFICATIONS OF CITY-MANAGER 223

instance, he appoints, suspends, or removes any of the officers
or employees in the respective departments which may be under
his management and control; and in almost all cases he has
the power to examine the affairs of any department or the con-
duct of any officer or employee.

In the second place the power of the city-manager to see that
the laws of the State and the charter, ordinances, resolutions,
and by-laws of the council are enforced and faithfully executed
gives him a somewhat undefined power which may have far
reaching consequences in reference to the welfare of the com-
munity. This is true because the city statute books in. this coun-
try contain a large number of ordinances touching matters that
concern every phase of the life, liberty, and property of the
citizen. ‘‘The truth is that no other body of laws interferes
with individual freedom of action so much as city ordinances.
In the country the law-abiding citizen hardly ever feels the
tether of the law. In the city he feels it all the time.’’*3+ Thus
the city-manager, charged with the enforcement and faithful
execution of the laws and ordinances, becomes the officer upon
whose executive ability, common sense, and honesty the welfare
of the whole community depends. Questions of law, of justice,
of the welfare of the population, of civil administration, and
of political management are involved in the actual services
demanded of the city-manager.

Viewed from the standpoint of all his functions an engineer
with mere technical training would not necessarily make a good
city-manager. An engineer may be competent to take care of
the physical side of the city; but this is only half of the task of
city administration. The other half of administration, far more
important and essential than the mere care of the physical plant
of the city, is the social or human side, that is, the welfare of the
people in their social capacity. To take care of this phase of
city administration requires managers possessing more than
technical training in engineering work. Mr. Henry M. Waite,
city-manager of Dayton, offers some suggestions concerning the

necessary qualifications of a city manager when he says:

He [the city manager] should have at least a fair education—sufiicient
theory, but not too much to spoil the practical side of his make-up. He
must be an executive, he must know how to handle men; he must be fair
224 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

and just; he must be firm and polite; he must have the courage of his
convictions. Any man with these qualifications can be a city manager.
Such a man can select the subordinate and advisers to aid him in carrying
out the functions of those departments with which he is not familiar. He,
as an executive, must get the efficiency from all of his departments through
organization.

The qualities indicated by Mr. Waite are of prime importance
in the management of large affairs. But the manager of a city
requires additional qualifications. The requirement for munic-
ipal-managers differs from that for the managers of ordinary
business corporations inasmuch as municipal administration
has problems that transcend those of business, and the manager
should not be held down to commercial standards. While it is
- possible and profitable to apply business organization and
business methods to the municipal corporation, it by no means
follows that the government of a municipality is purely a
business institution, and that any successful business manager
can become a good municipal manager. Private business
managers are primarily trained to make profits; while municipal
managers have the welfare of the people as their prime object.
Municipal administration can never be commercialized without
lasting injury to the community; and consequently a municipal
manager must be one who has something more than cold and
practical business sense. To use the words of Professor Black:
mar, the city-manager must be a social engineer.

The city-manager ‘‘must know thoroughly the physical struc-
ture of the city and how to build it and maintain it, the political
and social organization of the city and their administration, and
a knowledge of the whole population so that he may care for it,
for it is the function of municipal administration to care not
only for the physical plant, but for the whole population. And
the administrator must know how to manage all of this with
efficiency and economy. There must be no waste through prac-
tical administration or through the by-products of social activity

. [In brief], the city manager must be a social engineer as
well as a civil and structural engineer. ’’636
VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

All systems of government are expedients of time and place,
and so that form is the best which ‘‘under the existing conditions
of public intelligence, public experience, civie spirit, and common
honesty prevailing in each particular city, succeeds best in
making the whole body of public authorities, from the chief
magistrate to the humblest elector, individually and collectively
responsible for the good government of the municipality.’’6?
It is, therefore, quite impossible to say a priori what form of
municipal government is the best. It is the results obtained
rather than the form of organization which is of prime im-
portance to the people under any political jurisdiction. The
form is important only in so far as it facilitates or obstructs
the attainment of the results which the people desire. In other
words, that form of government is the best which produces the
best results.

Applying this test to the American system of municipal gov-
ernment up to the end of the nineteenth century, it is very evl-
dent that the form was not such as could produce the best re-
sults. Municipal government was a complicated organization
which, being made up of a conglomerate mass of unrelated
authorities of all degrees of independence, was ‘‘characterized
by hopeless diffusion and confusion of power and responsibility,
legislative as well as executive, among state legislature, council,
mayor and well-nigh independent administrative officers and
boards. ’688

Indeed, American municipal government during the last
quarter of the nineteenth century fell far behind the standard
of efficiency that should prevail. Thus, too often the worst men
were put in charge of the administration and the best citizens
were repelled by the character of the associations prevailing is
the city hall. At intervals, however, when mal-administration
reached an intolerable point, the suffering community lost pa-
tience, and spasmodic movements for reform were aroused.

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226 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

With a show of indignation and enthusiasm a reform administra-
tion was occasionally installed. But time and again those who
started the movement very soon realized the impossibility of
their task, because they were hopelesly handicapped in their
efforts by radical defects in the system of government and
numerous adverse influences. Moreover, the people were too
busy to keep watch on the government for any long period and
too ready to settle back into their ordinary state of apathy. As
a result, defeated bosses, corrupt officials, and spoilsmen too
often worked their way back into power by pointing out a few
of the mistakes and blunders made by the inexperienced reform-
ers. Again, a spirit of sectionalism too often dominated the
council of the city; while the system of ward representation
operated to encourage the councilmen to ‘‘log-roll’’ extravagant
measures and distribute spoils for the gratification of their con-
stituencies and to the injury of the community at large. These
were the conditions responsible for the often quoted utterance of
James Bryce that ‘‘the government of the cities is the one
conspicuous failure of the United States.’’

That American city government at the end of the nineteenth
century was poorly organized, badly administered, and corruptly
used is too well known to need any further comment on what
may be called the extra-municipal stories of different cities,
picturesque and potent as these have often been. This ‘‘con-
spicuous failure’’, however, did not come about by chance. Nor
were the defects in the mechanism of the government the only
cause for this failure. Various other factors have been pointed
out by writers and students of government. For the present
purpose, however, only two of these factors need be mentioned.

On the one hand, there is the so-called personal interpretation
of politics,*°9 which attributes failure in municipal government
to defects in the character of the people and which specifies the
charges as follows: (1) the levity of the national character;
(2) the lack of public spirit; (3) the vileness of local politicians ;
(4) the spirit of commercialism; and (5) the natural outcome of
democracy.5#® One writer even goes so far as to say that ‘‘the
people are not very good, and in many cases they do not want
very good government. At best they want good government
only now and then. The citizens of our cities would be very glad
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 227

to get something for nothing. They would be glad to have a
government that would be good to them as individuals and that
would cost them nothing of time or effort or money.’’#

The other interpretation, which has already been suggested
and which since the beginning of the present century seems
more widely accepted, is the institutional view; it asserts that
the personal interpretation is entirely inadequate as an explana-
tion of the phenomena, and that the chief difficulty lies in the
character of the institutions. Cities are what they are because
of obstacles which would make it difficult for any people to be
well governed.*4? Professor Ford of Princeton, after an ex-
haustive examination into the various hypotheses that have been
put forward to account for the failure of American city govern-

ment, sums up this view in the following language:

The bad operation of American municipal government is not due to de-
fect of popular character, but to defect in organization of government.
The organic defect lies in the fact that the executive and legislative de-
partments, in addition to being separately constituted, are also discon-
nected, and this very disconnection has prevented in practice the degree
of separation in their functions which their integrity requires, a conse-
quence precisely what Madison predicted if separate powers are not duly
connected in their operation. The remedy is therefore to be found in
establishing a proper connection between the executive and legislative
organs of government, so as to make the functions of administration and
control coextensive.

The view thus expressed by Professor Ford has been the
prevailing view of the general public during the last decade; and
the movement for the commission form of government and the
commission-manager plan is a striking manifestation of the
popular conviction that ‘‘failures in administration and leakages
in the public treasury are due more often to inefficient organi-
zation and antiquated methods than to official dishonesty.’’644

But the commission form of city government, or the commis-
sion-manager plan, was not consciously devised to solve the
problem of municipal government: it was a chance creation of
polities. Prior to the twentieth century, city government by
appointed commissions had been of frequent occurrence, but
government by elected commissions was almost unknown. In
1894 when the National Municipal League was formally or-
ganized in New York City municipal reformers did not even
228 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

dream of that form of city government; and in the municipal
program formulated and adopted by that. body in 1899%* if
declared itself in favor of what was then considered as the best
type of city government: the federal plan as exemplified in the
charter of Brooklyn and the charter of Philadelphia. Indeed,
the movement for the concentration of power in the hands of
the mayor at that time was so sweeping that one writer even
voiced his fear of the possibility that it would degenerate into a
“‘fad’’,646

Ever since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the
problem of municipal government has been constantly before
the minds of public-spirited citizens as one which must be solved,
and a great deal of active interest has been taken in the subject.
The importance of the form of government has been recognized,
and modification of the city charter has since become the favored
remedy, the purpose being to center greater responsibility and
power in a few hands. Good government clubs, municipal
leagues, and local improvement societies have been organized
everywhere. City after city has demanded a reform charter,
in the hope that the evils of irresponsible and inefficient gov-
ernment might thereby be reduced in some measure. Every-
where the reform movement of the period has this characteristic
feature: the concentration of power and responsibility in the
hands of the mayor.

In view of the diffused responsibility characterizing the system
of American city government previous to this period the policy
then adopted by the municipal reformers represented a natural!
reaction. The remedy suggested and looked for was logically
the abolition of the old system which ‘‘provided a separate and
independent board or officer for each of the city departments,
and gave the council the means of doing mischief. with very
little opportunity for doing anything good.’’6? By concen-
trating authority and executive power in the hands of the mayor
it was hoped that popular attention could be easily fixed upon
one man instead of being distributed among scores of inde-
pendent departmental heads, and consequently greater amena-
bility to popular control would be possible than otherwise could
be secured.*4® But the idea of radically departing from the
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 229

traditional concepts with reference to city government and of
putting the municipal government entirely in the hands of a
commission of a few men, except in cases of emergency, was
never suggested by municipal reformers of the nineteenth
century. .

It was not until 1901, after the Galveston flood, that elected
commissioners made their appearance in. the municipal history
of the country. But even then this new form was not regarded
as affording a new frame of city government which could be ex-
tended to, and adopted by, cities throughout the country. It was
only after wonderful results were reported to have been ac-
complished in Galveston under the new form and after the in-
ception of the Des Moines plan with all the popular forms of
institutional democracy, that the commission form of city gov-
ernment became widely popular. City after city has followed
the example of Galveston and Des Moines, until at the present
time there are over four hundred cities throughout the country
operating under one type or another of the commission form of
government.

With few exceptions cities operating under this new form of
government are claimed to have accomplished results deemed
impossible under the old plan: politics have been eliminated,
ward lines abolished, authority centralized, responsibility fixed,
and efficient methods employed. These are simply a few of the
many beneficial results claimed for the new plan.*#9 Numerous
articles, pamphlets, and books on the commission form of city
government have been written, and in most of them undue
emphasis has been put on the activities along the line of works
in municipal improvement, the lowering of tax rates, and the
like. By some advocates the relation of cause and effect has been
accepted as conclusively proved, the commission form being the
main cause and municipal improvements or lower tax rates the
effect of the city betterment movement. To others who are not
so enthusiastic about the new form of government as are its
ardent advocates, the adoption of a new form of charter has been
one of the effects and not the cause of an awakened civic spirit.
“«®very new plan works well for a time, because the movement
for reform from which it springs brings good men to the front
230 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

and places power in their hands. The real test comes in later
years when the momentum is exhausted, and the moral enthu-
siasm of the dawn has faded into the light of common day.’’65
Recently the number of cities adopting the commission form
has been very small. With the advent of the city-manager plan
the commission form has been regarded as relatively antiquated.
The early enthusiasm has cooled, and public interest in the
novelty of the plan has been diverted to a still newer form of
government. So far as the commission form is concerned at the
present time, the momentum is apparently exhausted. More-
over, important departures from the orthodox type of the city-
manager plan, such as the increase in the number of commission-
ers, and the incorporation of the systems of preferential voting
and proportional representation, have been adopted and prac-
ticed in some cities. Indeed, American cities show little hesi-
tation in making important changes in their efforts to secure
better adjustments. '
While there may be objection to such apparent vacillation on
the ground that it may subject municipal reformers to the
suspicion of not knowing their own minds,®*! it is believed to be
the most hopeful feature of current American politics. The
people acknowledge their failure in city government, and they
are earnestly seeking remedies. But from the very nature of the
problem it is difficult for municipal reformers to decide for
themselves or make clear to the public in general what these
remedies should be; nor is it possible for them to agree on any
single scheme. It is not improbable that the commission form
and city-manager plan are not the last and permanent form of
American city government. A great many plans and’ forms
must be tried and tested before the final word can be said: the
fittest form will survive after years of experimental selection.
With the number of cities? aggregating about three thou-
sand and with the people always on the lookout for political in-
novations, America offers the best field in the world for municipal
experimentation. Small governmental areas like cities are, by
their very nature, fit places in which to try innovations in the
machinery of government. To experiment with Congress would
be to jeopardize the whole nation; to experiment with the State
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 231

legislature would be to subject the entire Commonwealth to
uncertainty; but experiments in municipal government affect
only a small fraction of the people and the actual situation is
not aggravated. At the same time, successful experiments in
reform may extend from city to city and may even proceed to
State and national adoption. This is a hopeful feature of
American politics. .

Turning now to the actual accomplishments under the com-
mission form and the city-manager plan, it is evident that tem-
porary improvements have been followed by a change to the new
form in most cases; and in certain cities permanent improve-
ments have resulted from doing away with the anomalies and
complexities of earlier charters. But the actual success of the
new plans can not be definitely and easily ascertained. To
attempt a general survey of municipal administration under the
new forms compared with that under the old plan is hardly
possible. because of the inadequate data available for such a
study. Municipal conditions existing prior to the adoption of
the new form can not be compared with those existing after the
adoption, since the standards in accordance with which the rec-
ords are kept are different under the two régimes. The reor-
ganization of departments, and the greatly altered methods of
municipal bookkeeping which have come into being with the new
framework of government make it very difficult to determine to
what extent any city has gained in its passage from the old
régime to the new. And the published claims of the achieve-
ments in different cities made under the new plan of govern-
ment have almost without exception emanated from the officials
in charge; and to attempt a general verification of these claims
would have required prohibitively costly and extensive investi-
gation.

An accurate estimate of the actual, success of the commission
form or the commission-manager plan is rendered still more
difficult by the fact that it is well-nigh impossible to disentangle
the improvements under the new form coming from the mere
change of governmental organization from those resulting from
the awakening of civic consciousness. In pointing out the re-
sults which have come from the commission form or the commis-
sion-manager plan, the advocates usually fail to take any account
232 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

of the growth of public sentiment demanding better government
and compelling the choice of better men. Since government is
carried on not by charters or laws, but by men, upon the govern-
ing body depends the success or the failure of the plan. Any
account of the successful operation of the new plan without
taking into consideration the men, from the magistrate to the
humblest electors, who carry on and direct the machinery of
government, is certainly worth very little.

While officials may be handicapped by an ill-drafted and
unworkable system, an excellent system may also be manipulated
by corrupt officials. Thus, despite the large group of municipal
reformers who maintain that given a proper charter everything
else will take care of itself—methods, men, and results—it is still
the concensus of opinion among the authorities and publicists
that man, if not more important, is at least of as much impor-
tance as the system. Judge Dillon maintained that ‘‘no munici-
pal constitution and no municipal mechanism will necessarily
insure good municipal government. Whether the essential pow-
ers of a municipality, as in England, are in an elective council,
which elects its mayor and appoints its standing committees
which oversee the various administrative departments, or, as in
New York, where the substantial powers are in an autocratic
mayor and in elective commissioners, and where the authority
of the legislative branch is so curtailed as to leave that body
almost a phantom, it depends almost wholly upon something
else than forms of organization whether there will result good
municipal rule. That indispensable something else is what may
be called Civic Patriotism.’’68

‘‘The cultivation and practice of civie patriotism’’, he con-
tinued, ‘‘are therefore among the chiefest duties of American
citizenship. By civic patriotism is meant the feeling and the
taking of a deep, unselfish, earnest, ever-wakeful, active interest
in. the affairs of one’s own city or local community, regarding it
as having an automony, a distinct personality, a name and inter-
ests of its own, and, if one pleases, endowed with a sense:-of
personal honor and with all laudable ambitions for the pro-
motion. of the welfare of its people. Where such civic virtues
exist, the local community will neither suffer from the dry-rot
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 233

of public indifference and neglect nor become tainted with ‘graft’
or corruption. Its life will be beautiful, and like the ocean will
be kept pure by its own ceaseless flow and movement.’’6&54

To the same effect are the words of Professor Taussig of
Harvard, who uses the following significant and forcible lan-
guage:

We in the United States have still to learn how to get common honesty
and faithful routine. Antiquated political institutions, excess of elected
officials, lack of concentrated responsibility,—all these explain a good deal,
and improvement in these matters of political machinery promises a good
deal. But at bottom we have to depend on the stuff of the people. A good
electorate will choose honest and capable officials, a debased or indifferent
one will tolerate demagogues and thieves. The traditional method of com-
mittee administration and scattered responsibility has often been held
accountable for the evils of municipal government in the United States. No
doubt it has had ill effects. But it is striking that a very similar system
in Great Britain has not stood in the way of honest and efficient ad-
ministration. Reform in the machinery of municipal government will avail
little unless the right persons are chosen to run the machinery. From this
elemental requisite there is no escape.

The mere fact that the commission plan and the city-manager
plan have been established in over four hundred cities within the
last decade is a clear indication of the so-called awakened civie
patriotism. The character of government is nothing but a re-
flection of the intelligence of the voters and the amount of in-
terest which is felt by them in public affairs. In case there is
lack of such intelligence and interest on the part of the voters,
the dishonesty and ignorance which will be manifested in the
conduct of public affairs can not be lessened by any means.
Legislation is powerless and ineffective in such a case, and the
defects and abuses in the government can never be reformed
unless the people on the whole have intelligence and an interest
in participating in governmental affairs. It will make but little
difference what may be the laws governing the terms of office, or
the methods of selecting the officials, or the powers vested in this
or that official, so long as the people themselves are satisfied to
be governed by ignorant and dishonest officials. It is only when
there is an ‘‘awakened, vitalized and actively operating public
opinion’’ that the mechanism or system of government has any
bearing on the administrative results. Professor McBain of
Columbia has this idea in mind when he says:
234 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

I am inclined to believe that had the commission or the city-manager
type of government been established a generation or so ago it would have
been a dismal failure. In an atmosphere of public indifference, of in-
activity, of lack of heart or of interest, it would have lent itself admirably
to the machinations of professional politicians and spoilsmen. We should
hesitate to give to the genius of a designer credit that is in fact due to a
new motive force—in this case to an awakened, vitalized, and actively
operating public opinion.

Assuming the reasoning in the above quotation to be correct
and that the spread of the commission plan and the city-man-
ager plan was due to the awakening of civic consciousness, the
next logical inquiry is concerning the extent to which the new
system has facilitated the realization of the best possible govern-
ment. The sponsors of the commission plan declare that the
advantages of that plan are: (1) that it concentrates respon-
sibility; (2) that it makes business methods possible in city ad-
ministration; (3) that it reduces administrative friction and
delay; and (4) that it improves the quality of municipal offi-
cers.°57

Again people were assured when the city-manager plan came
into existence that this scheme would secure, in addition to the
benefits possible under the commission plan, two other important
advantages, that is, administration by experts and separation of
the policy-determining function from that of policy-executing.
It is worth while, then, to determine to what extent these various
claims have been sustained in the actual operation of the new
plans.

The first of these advantages is said to be the concentration of
responsibility. ‘‘What modern municipalities need, especially
in America, is a régime in which, without hesitation, without
study, without lawyers’ or experts’ opinions, the humblest
laborer can tell who is responsible for any defect he may discover
in the police of the streets, in the education of his children, or
in the use and mode of taxation.’’°*8 That such a régime has
been secured under the commission form is beyond doubt. In-
stead of ‘‘that intolerable scattering of powers, duties, and
responsibilities which the old type of city government promoted
to the point of absurdity’’®° there is under the commission plan
“conspicuous responsibility and hence accountability of all
elective officials to the people.’’ This conspicuous responsibility
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 235
is recognized as resting on a single authority—the commission
or council as the case may be; and experience has shown that the
people of a municipality are better able to select and to
hold responsible one ruling authority than several.

As a corollary to this claim it is asserted that there would be
less administrative friction and delay under a commission of
five members than under a larger body. ‘‘The history of large
councils is in general little more than a record of political
maneuvering and frictional intriguery, with a mastery of
nothing but the art of wasting time and money. A council of
some half-dozen men offers at least the possibility of despatch
in the handling of city affairs; for its small size removes an
incentive to fruitless debate, and affords little opportunity for
resort to those subterfuges in procedure which serve mainly to
create needless friction and delay.’’6

But the case is entirely different with the claim that the com-
mission plan means the introduction of business methods into
city administration. On the whole, the commission form of
government has failed in this respect. To be sure, efficient in-
ternal administration is something which ‘‘no charter can as-
sufe, though jt can do much, if its administrative provisions are
properly framed, to make good results possible. To establish
an elective cémmission or a city manager is not in itself enough
to guarantee that the city’s business will be conducted properly,
although many persons seem to have imagined so.’’6! Efficient
eity government depends as much on a simplified organization
as on proper administrative machinery ; but the introduction of
a simplified organization does not necessarily involve the auto-
matic introduction of efficient, business-like administrative meth-
ods. On the contrary, most commission charters and statutes
are especially weak and defective in the sections relating to
administrative matters.°©? In some extreme cases the commission
charter even follows literally the old charter which it super-
seded, with the single exception that it reduces the number of
council members and makes them heads of administrative
departments, elected at large. The charter of New Orleans is a
conspicuous example of this class.***
236 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

As a rule, most commission charters and statutes are con-
cerned more with the political than with the administrative side
of the city government. From the analysis of these charters
and statutes it is evident that the framers bestowed much care up-
on such provisions as the methods of nomination, the primary
election, the forms of ballot, the number of commissioners and
the assignment of functions among them, direct legislation and
the recall; but scanty attention is given to the various detailed
provisions which would be instrumental in bringing the business
methods of the city up to the level of those of the best private
business corporations. Provisions for scientific budget-making,
modern methods of accounting and reporting, of purchasing and
storekeeping, and scores of other matters, which are of im-
perative consequence in creating efficient city administration,
find scanty attention or no place in these new charters—with the
exception of those of Dayton and a few other cities. It seems
rather strange and contradictory that when the sponsors of the
commission. plan declared that the commission form was avow-
edly patterned on the organization of private business concerns,
and that the introduction of this system meant the introduction
of modern business methods, the framers of charters failed to
avail themselves of the established methods which are in opera-
tion in any private business establishment.

To be sure, it is possible to introduce business methods under
the commission form; but they are no more and no less possible
under the commission form than under any other type of organi-
zation. The inadequate provisions dealing with administrative
details in the commission charters and statutes is certainly the
chief defect which accounts for the failure in some cities where
the plan is tried. On the other hand, cities having availed
themselves of efficient business methods, but which are still under
the old council-and-mayor plan or the federal plan of govern-
ment, have achieved far better results than in most of the com.
mission-governed cities. The administration in New York City,
as a result of the establishment of the municipal research bureau
and the introduction of various up-to-date administrative meth-
ods, has improved during the past decade to an extent excelling
the achievements in all the commission-governed cities com-
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 237

bined ;**4 and the results in other cities where efficient business
methods have been introduced are equally significant. Thus, as
Professor Munro says, ‘‘if essentials are looked after, the exact
type of charter does not matter.’

Concentration of authority and responsibility and the intro-
duction of efficient business methods, important as these features
may be, become less significant when the personal equation in
municipal employment is considered. As has already been
pointed out, government is carried on not by charters or laws,
but by men; therefore, the inquiry as to whether the new system
attracts more competent and better men than the old system
becomes very important. At the very outset when the agitation
for the adoption of the commission form took definite shape, the
sponsors of the plan strongly and unequivocally assured the
public that the new plan would attract better men. It was
asserted that ‘‘the distinction which attaches to the commis-
sioner’s office, together with the consciousness that due credit
for individual achievement will not be unnoticed, gives to the
position an attractiveness which is all the more effective because
allegiance to the ward machine is not necessary to obtain it.’’66
This sounds very reasonable in theory, but is not sustained by
the actual experience of the commission-governed cities.

An examination of the make-up of the commissions will reveal
the fact that in many cases a majority of the commissioners are
either of the old type of councillors, or are men who held some
sort of office under the old régime. Professor Munro has ex-
amined the make-up of ten commissions or the record of fifty
commissioners, and has found that thirty-seven of these fifty, or
seventy percent of the new officials, have had connection of one
sort or another with the city administration under the old
plan.**? Again, Professor Shambaugh made the following sig-
nificant statement with reference to the working of the Des

Moines plan in Iowa:

Perhaps the greatest disappointment in the workings of the Des Moines
Plan in Iowa is in the selection of the members of the Council, for it is a
fact that the elections have not resulted in the selection of really capable
and efficient men. To be sure the commission councils have thus far
seemed to average higher and better all around than the councils under the
old organizations; but the new plan by placing greater responsibility upon
238 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

the elective officers requires a correspondingly higher grade of competency.
To the observer it would appear that neither the electorate nor the council
are sufficiently impressed with the great necessity of efficiency in the
selection of men for public positions. Nor has the best talent thus far
been attracted to the elective positions.

These statements indicate that the introduction of the new
plan does not bring about a material change in the personnel of
the government. But at the same time it should not be forgotten
that, thanks to the simplification of governmental machinery
and the concentration of authority and responsibility, the same
type of men can achieve better results under the new plan than
under the old régime, where the officials were hopelessly handi-
capped by various checks and balances.

On the whole, it may be safely said that the commission plan
has achieved something, mainly along the line of securing gov-
ernmental machinery which the people can understand and of
concentrating authority and responsibility in a few persons
whom the people can put their hands on when anything goes
wrong in the government.

Turning now to the city-manager plan it will be observed that
it attempts to interfere with or alter none of the legal or political
characteristics of the commission plan. What this newer innova-
tion attempts is to carry to its logical conclusion the idea of
centralization which the commission system has laid down. The
commission form has given the people a simplified, centralized
form of government, so far as it goes. But it has failed to apply
the idea of centralization to administration, and consequently
administrative friction and delay, though greatly reduced, is
not completely eliminated under this form of five-headed govern-
ment. Furthermore, the commission form has been rightly ob-
jected to in various quarters because of the danger of concen-
trating in the hands of the same body the power of both making
the ordinances and executing them; and of imposing taxes,
appropriating money, and making expenditures.

As a remedy for these shortcomings in. the commission plan,
steps have been taken in a number of cities to adopt the city-
manager plan, which attempts to separate the function of repre-
sentation or policy-determining from the pure administrative or
policy-executing function, not by a return to the old system
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 239

of separation of power, but by retaining the unity of power in the
hands of a small representative body which carries out its orders
through a strong, unified, harmonious administrative organiza-
tion under an appointed and controlled but expert manager.
Thus, it is claimed that the advantages of this new plan, in
addition to those secured under the commission form, are the
separation of policy-determining and policy-executing functions
and the introduction of expert administration.

In any political action there must be first the formulation of
the will, and then the execution of the will thus formulated. As
President Goodnow well states: ‘‘The will of the state or
sovereign must be made up and formulated before political
action can be had. The will of the state or sovereign must be
executed, after it has been formulated, if that will is to result in
governmental action.’’*6® These functions of formulating and
executing the will are respectively known as policy-determining
and policy-executing, or legislation and execution, or more
properly, administration. Now, this principle formulated with
special reference to national or State governments, or rather to
government in general, is equally applicable to the government
of the city. But it often happens that prominent writers, after
an examination of the activities of municipal authorities, come
to the conclusion that the work of governing a city involves but
little true legislation. They claim, on the other hand, that it is
primarily administration. A no less distinguished scholar and
authority than Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Har-
vard University, says: ‘‘Municipal government is pure business
and nothing else—absolutely nothing else.’’®’? This has been the
idea upon which the commission government movement has been
based.

But it does not take long to convince students of government
and municipal reformers that municipal government is some-
thing more than business. The questions that touch the people
oftenest and closest in their personal relations are questions of
municipal government ;*”! and city ordinances interfere more
with individual freedom and action than any other body of laws.
Thus municipal government is government in just the same
sense that State government is government. Such being the
240 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

case, there must be in municipal government as well as in State
government two separate and different functions.

Not only are the two functions of an entirely different nature,
but the performance of these two functions, due to the com-
plexity of political organization, must be entrusted to two sepa-
rate governmental organs. But in actual operation, these two
separately constituted governmental organs carrying two differ-
ent functions, legislation and administration, can not be dis-
connected as under the old system of city government, in which
the disconnection between the legislative and executive depart-
ments prevented the proper separation and coordination of their
functions. ‘‘No political organization, based on the general
theory of a differentiation of governmental functions, has ever
been established which assigns the function of expressing the
will of the state exclusively to any one of the organs for which
it makes provision. ’’6??

Legislation and administration, due to the very nature of
these functions, can hardly be differentiated. If legislation is
defined as ‘‘the laying down of general principles and rules of
conduct’’, and administration as ‘‘their application to specific
eases’’, there is practically no line of demarcation between the
general and specific.67? The legislative body may enact the
ordinances in a general and broad way and leave it to the
executive body to work out the details; or it may choose to lay
down the law in such specific and minute details that the admin-
istrative agency has no discretionary power whatever. Both
experience and theory show that it is impossible to mark off
rigidly the respective sphere of action, and to make the one body
independent of the other. Mr. Durand has well said:

In the decision of most municipal questions sound business judgment
and deliberation and technical training and knowledge are all alike desir-
able. Harmonious codperation between legislative and executive is shown
by the success of the cabinet system to be highly advantageous in promot-
ing efficiency of national government, and it is still more useful in the
city. The German city organization shows us what can be accomplished
by such a union.“

Now, the city-manager plan has for its basic principle this
harmonious cooperation between the legislative and - executive
branch of government. Under it there is a close union rather
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 241

than a separation of these two authorities. The council or com-
mission, that is, the legislative branch of the government is
made supreme; it chooses and controls the executive—the man-
ager—while at the same time seeking his advice and leadership.
The council holds the manager responsible for the details of
administrative work; and the people hold the council responsible
for the results of the entire administration. The policy-de-
termining and policy-executing authorities are separately con-
stituted, but they are connected by subordinating the policy-
executing authority to the policy-determining.

This very subordination of the city-manager to the commission
has led one prominent writer on the subject to declare that the
city-manager plan does not of necessity involve a separation of
policy-determining and policy-executing functions, nor does it
of necessity result in administration by experts. According to
this writer the ‘‘degree of separation and the degree of ex-
pertness that result must be ascribed not to anything that
inheres in the form of government but to the practice under that
form as it has developed under the compelling force of en-
lightened public opinion.’’&’> This line of reasoning is war-
ranted by the experience of some cities, and is especially sig-
nificant when it comes from the pen of such an authority as Pro-
fessor Howard L. McBain.

he same writer further asserts that the commission plan and
the city-manager plan, while differing in the respects already
noted, resemble each other because in the last analysis the com-
mission or council is the government in both cases. In the
city-manager plan the council or commission which has the ul-
timate power of decision is composed not of professional experts,
but of ordinary members of society at large. Business men,
manufacturers, and persons in various walks of life may be
members of the council, provided they are chosen by the elec-
torate. Acting together in the council, they decide the affairs
of the city. They may listen to and follow the advice of the
city-manager who is an expert, but it is they who actually de-
cide; and further, by controlling the tenure of the manager, they
may actually control the administration.
242 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

To be sure, any kind of government, no matter how perfect
it is in form, depends for its success upon the capacity and loy-
alty of those who have a part in the work of governing. Ina
city that elects machine-controlled political puppets to office any
form of government will break down in actual operation, to say
nothing about the experimental commission or city-manager
plans. Again, the character of the governing body depends on
the character of the electorate. A corrupt and ignorant elector-
ate can never elect honest and competent officials. Thus, the
first requisite of any reform movement is the public spirit,
intelligence, and independence of the voters. The very move-
ment for the commission plan and the city-manager plan can
indicate nothing but a change of attitude on the part of the gen-
eral public towards municipal questions, which is a very hopeful
sign. While reforms in the mechanism of government do not
necessarily create public spirit, intelligence, and independence
in the voters, they have given these qualities an advantage
which they have never before possessed. From this point of
view, high commendation of the virtues of the commission plan
and the city-manager plan is justifiable as a ‘‘means for keep-
ing public opinion upon its mettle’’; but in so doing, care must
be taken that such laudation may not result ‘‘in convincing a
busy and not exacting people that here at last, after all the
futile searching of the years, they have come upon their long
sought El Dorado—a super-government, a government so per-
fect in type that they can wind it up at periodical elections and,
with supreme confidence in its ability to run itself, turn their
attention to other things’’.676
NOTES AND REFERENCES

CHAPTER I

1 Toulmin’s The City Manager, p. 6.

2 Sparks’s The Business of Government: Municipal, p. 1. Mr. Edward
A. Fitzpatrick, in a short article entitled What is Ciwic Education?, re-
marked that ‘‘from every standpoint of life and of our education the city
is the fundamental phase of government. It is a phase of government
with which every individual comes in direct contact. It is the only phase
of government in which civic education can be said to deal with the
community life. The state is not a community, nor is the nation in any
genuine sense of these terms. The state or nation are merely more or less
artificial things compared to the city. They are merely the over-head
charges of the city government.’’—National Municipal Review, Vol. V,
p. 278.

3 Cited in Woodruff’s Charter-making in America in the Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. 103, p. 638.

4 Wilcox’s The Study of City Government, p. 236.

5 Shaw’s The American State Legislatures in the Contemporary Review,
Vol. 56, p. 555.

6 Bryce’s American Commonwealth (1915), Vol. I, p. 2.

7 Horack’s Reorganization of State Government in Iowa in the Iowa
Applied History Series, Vol. II, p. 7.

8 Ryan’s Municipal Freedom, pp. 152-153.

9 See President Lowell’s Introduction to Ryan’s Municipal Freedom.

10 Beard’s Loose Leaf Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 10201.

11 MacGregor’s City Government by Commission, p. 10. This mono-
graph was published as Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, No. 423.

12 MacGregor’s City Government by Commission, p. 10.

13 White’s State Boards and Commissions in the Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 18, pp. 645, 646.

14 Woodruff’s City Government by Cotimteslon. p. 12.

15 Bradford’s History and Underlying Principles of Commission Gov-
ernment in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Vol. 38, p. 680. Compare Beard’s American Government and
Politics (1914), pp. 598 ff; Munro’s The Government of American Cities,
pp. 294 ff; Munro’s Commission System of City Government in McLaugh-
lin and Hart’s Cyclopedia of American Government, Vol. I, p. 344;
Deming’s The Government of American Cities, p. 97; Kale’s Unpopular
Government in the United States, pp. 139 ff; Childs’s Short Ballot Prin-
ciples, pp. 63 ff; Pollock and Morgan’s Modern Cities, pp. 183 ff; Good-

(243)
244 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

now’s Municipal Government, pp. 175-178; Report of the National Munici-
pal League’s Committee on the Commission Form of Government published
in the National Municipal Review, Vol. I, pp. 40-44; Matthews’s Municipal
Charters, pp. 17,18; James’s Applied City Government, pp. 45-51; Zueblin’s
American Municipal Progress, pp. 383-385; Eliot’s City Government by
Commission in the World’s Work, Vol. XIV, pp. 9419 ff; Ryan’s Commis-
sion Government Described in Woodruff’s City Government by Commission,
pp. 64-88; Croly’s Progressive Democracy, pp. 286, 287.

16 Beard’s Loose Leaf Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 10201.

17 Considered as non-essential in the report of the National Municipal
League’s Committee in the National Municipal Review, Vol. I, pp. 41, 42;
as non-essential, except with regard to election-at-large, by MacGregor in
his City Government by Commission, pp. 29-31; and as essential in Ryan’s
Municipal Freedom, p. 24, and by almost all other writers. Matthews has
a particular aversion to the initiative, referendum, and recall. He says:
“«These features, found in most commission charters as well as in some
others, are, in the writer’s view, not only inconsistent with democracy
as originated and hitherto practiced in this country, but are inherently
ineapable of application to municipal administration’ ’—Matthews’s Munic-
ipal Charters, p. 18.

18 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 191.

19 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 192.

20 Munro’s The Government of European Cities, p. 235.

21 Beard’s Loose Leaf Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 10203.

22 MacGregor’s City Government by Commission, p. 26.

23 Beard’s Loose Leaf Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 10203.

24 James’s The City Manager Plan, the Latest in American City Gov-
ernment in The American Political Science Review, Vol. VIII, p. 612.

25 National Municipal Review, Vol. I, p. 41.

26 National Municipal Review, Vol. I, p. 41.

27 Beard’s Loose Leaf Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 10201.

28 Goodnow’s Principles of Administrative Law of the United States,
p. 3.

29 For instance, in The Des Moines Capital, January 6, 1917, there is
a headline entited ‘‘ Mayor probes actions of the city police’’. Instances of
this kind, which were of frequent occurrence in other cities and in Des
Moines during the previous period, clearly indicate the fact that under the
commission form administrative centralization is still lacking and that
conflicts among the commissioners are unavoidable.

30 James’s The City Manager Plan, the Latest in American City Gov-
ernment in The American Political Science Review, Vol. VIII, p. 608.

31 Wilcox’s The Study of City Government, p. 230.

82 The arguments for and against election to specific office and. election
at random are well stated in Johnson’s Commission Government for Cities:
Election to Specific Office vs. Election at Random in the National Munie-
ipal Review, Vol. II, pp. 661-664.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 245

33 National Municipal Review, Vol. III, p. 46.

34 National Municipal Review, Vol. III, p. 45. Compare also Definition
of the ‘‘ City Manager Plan’’ in Beard’s Loose Leaf Digest of Short Ballot
Charters, pp. 10203, 10204; Childs’s The Principles Underlying the City-
Manager Plan in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science: Commission Government and the City-Manager Plan, (Re-
vised edition, 1914) pp. 171 ff; James’s Applied City Government, pp. 62
ff; James’s The City Manager Plan, the Latest in American City Gov-
ernment, in The American Political Science Review, Vol. VIII, p. 604;
Matthews’s Municipal Charters, p. 41, note; Zueblin’s American Municipal
Progress, p. 386.

35 Toulmin’s The City Manager, p. 76.

36 Childs’s Controlled Executive Plan in the National Municipal Review,
Vol. II, pp. 76-81. Zueblin gives the following significant definition of the
eity-manager which may be cited in this connection: ‘‘The city manager is
the paradox of an all-powerful executive absolutely subordinate to the
eouncil’’.—Zueblin’s American Municipal Progress, p. 386.

CHAPTER II

37 Fairlie’s Essays in Municipal Administration, p. 48.
38 Documentary History of New York, Vol. I, p. 389.
39 Matthews’s City Government of Boston, p. 166.
40 Stubbs’s Constitutional History of England, Vol. 3, p. 577.
41 Fairlie’s Essays in Municipal Administration, pp. 49, 50.
42 List of colonial boroughs as given by Fairlie in his Essays in Munic-
ipal Administration, p. 50, note.
Agamenticus, Maine, chartered 1641.
Kittery, Maine, chartered 1647.
New York, New York, chartered 1686.
Albany, New York, chartered 1686.
‘Germantown, Pennsylvania, chartered 1687.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, chartered 1691.
Chester, Pennsylvania, chartered 1701.
Westchester, New York, chartered 170(?).
Bath, North Carolina, chartered 1705.
Annapolis, Maryland, chartered 1708.
Perth Amboy, New Jersey, chartered 1718.
Bristol, Pennsylvania, chartered 1720.
Williamsburg, Virginia, chartered 1722.
New Brunswick, New Jersey, chartered 1730.
Burlington, New Jersey, chartered 1733.
Norfolk, Virginia, chartered 1736.
Richmond, Virginia, chartered 1742.
Elizabeth, New Jersey, chartered 1740.
Lancaster, Pennsylvania, chartered 1742.
Trenton, New Jersey, chartered 1746.
246 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

43 Rogers’s Municipal Corporations in Two Centuries’ Growth of
American Law (Yale Bicentennial Publications), p. 218.

44 Fairlie’s Municipal Administration, p. 73. In England, the controll-
ing power over corporations was virtually vested in ‘‘select bodies’’, and
the abuses arising out of this system continued after the revolution in 1688,
and until the passage of the act of Paliament in 1835.—See Dillon’s
Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations, Vol. I, p, 20.

45 Fairlie’s Municipal Administration, p. 73.

46 Fairlie’s Municipal Administration, p. 74.

47 Fairlie’s Essays in Municipal Administration, pp. 76, 77.

48 Fairlie’s Essays in Municipal Administration, p. 77.

49 Fairlie’s Municipal Administration, p. 75.

50 Fairlie’s Municipal Administration, p. 76.

51 Goodnow’s Municipal Government, p. 176.

52 Munro’s The Galveston Plan of City Government in the Proceedings
of the Providence Conference for Good City Government, 1907, p. 144.

53 Fairlie’s Municipal Administration, p. 78.

54 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 5.

55 Allison and Penrose’s The City Government of Philadelphia, in the
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science,
Vol. V, p. 33.

56 Fairlie’s Municipal Administration, pp. 78, 79.

57 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 6.

58 McClain’s Constitutional Law in the United States, p. 63.

59 Allison and Penrose’s The City Government of Philadelphia in the
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol.
V, p. 34,

60 Greenlaw’s Office of Mayor in the United States in Municipal
Affairs, Vol. III, p. 39.

61 Hollander’s The Finances of Baltimore, p. 52.

62 Fairlie’s Municipal Administration, p. 79.

63 Howe’s Municipal History of New Orleans in the Johns Hopkins
University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol. VII, p. 14.

64 Wilcox’s Municipal Government in Michigan and Ohio in the
Columbia Uniwersity Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol.
V, pp. 411, 412.

65 Goodnow’s Municipal Problems, p. 17.

66 Greenlaw’s Office of Mayor in the United States in Municipal
Affairs, Vol. TIT, p. 35.

67 Matthews’s The City Government of Boston, pp. 164, 165.

68 Snow’s The City Government of St. Lowis in the Johns Hopkins
University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol. V, p. 143.

69 Wilcox’s Municipal Government in Michigan and Ohio in the Colwm-
bia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. V, p-
414,

70 Durand’s The Finances of New York City, p. 41.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 247

71 Address of the convention of 1829, cited in Durand’s The Finances
of New York City, p. 42.

72 Greenlaw’s Office of Mayor in the United States in Municipal
Affairs, Vol. III, p. 38.

73 The distribution of these municipalities was as follows: ‘‘Nine of
these were in New England, where the development of manufacturing
‘centres had increased population beyond the capacity of the town-meeting;

‘ five were in New York State; the same number in Ohio, four in Illinois;
and almost every state was represented by one or two cities.’’—Fairlie’s
Municipal Administration, p. 83.

74 Wilcox’s Municipal Government in Michigan and Ohio in the
Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol.
V, p. 443.

75 This charter was enacted by the legislature of Illinois at the session
ending March 6, 1837. The original copy can be found in the Laws of
Illinois, 1837, pp. 50 ff. It is also found in a pamphlet entitled The Charters
of the City of Chicago, compiled by President Edmund J. James of the
University of Illinois.

76 Sparling’s Municipal History of Chicago in Bulletin of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin: Economics, Political Science, and History Series, Vol.
Hy, p. 32.

77 Sparling’s Municipal History of Chicago in Bulletin of the Uniwer-
sity of Wisconsin: Economics, Political Science, and History Series, Vol.
II, p. 31.

78 Sparling’s Municipal History of Chicago in Bulletin of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin: Economics, Political Science, and History Series, Vol.
TI, p. 31.

79 Sparling’s Municipal History of Chicago in Bulletin of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin: Economics, Political Science, and History Series, Vol.
II, p. 29.

80 Larson’s Financial History of Milwaukee in Bulletin of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin: Economics and Political Science Series, Vol. IV, pp.
163, 164.

81 Eaton’s The Government of Municipalities, p. 11.

82 MacKenzie’s Introduction to Social Philosophy, p. 101.

83 Carnegie’s Triwmphant Democracy, pp. 46 ff, cited in Howard’s
Local Constitutional History of the United States, p. 150, note.

84 Beard’s American City Government, p. 1.

85 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 9; James’s The
Growth of Great Cities in Area and Population: A Study in Municipal
Statistics, p. 2. In the census of the United States, only that population
is counted as urban which is to be found in cities of 8,000 inhabitants or
upwards.

86 Weber’s The Growth of Cities in the Columbia University Studies in
History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. VI, pp. 23, 24.
248 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

87 Weber’s The Growth of Cities in the Columbia University Studies in
. History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XI, pp. 24, 25.

88 Fairlie’s Municipal Administration, pp. 86, 87.

89 Godkin says: ‘‘ American cities. . . . are without exception the
creations of a state; they have grown up either under state supervision or
through state instigation; that is, they owe their origin and constitution
to the government. Their charters have usually been devised or influenced
by people who did not expect to live in them, and who had no personal
knowledge of their special needs. In other words, an American municipal
charter has been rather the embodiment of an a priori view of the kind of
a thing a city ought to be, than a legal recognition of preéxisting wants
and customs.’’—Gidkin’s Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy, p. 146.

90 Fairlie’s Essays in Municipal Administration, p. 92.

91 Fairlie’s Municipal Administration, p. 87.

92 Goodnow’s Comparative Administrative Law, Vol. I, p. 205.

93 Matthews’s The City Government of Boston, p. 170.

94 Durand’s The Finances of New York City, p. 69.

95 Wilcox’s Municipal Government in Michigan and Ohio, in the
Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol.
V, pp. 450, 451.

96 Sparling’s Municipal History of Chicago, in Bulletin of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin: Economics, Political Science, and History Series, Vol.
TI, pp. 115-117.

97 Wilcox’s Municipal Government in Michigan and Ohio in the
Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol.
V, p. 422.

98 Allison and Penrose’s The City Government of Philadelphia, in the
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol,
V, p. 49.

99 Matthews’s The City Government of Boston, p. 167.

100 Durand’s The Finances of New York City, p. 77.

101 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 14.

102 Durand’s The Finances of New York City, p. 78.

103 Durand’s The Finances of New York City, p. 79.

104 Durand’s The Finances of New York City, p. 79.

105 Hollander’s The Finances of Baltimore, p. 204.

106 Sparling’s Municipal History of Chicago in Bulletin of the Univer:
sity of Wisconsin: Economics, Political Science, and History Series, Vol.
II, p. 129.

107 Wileox’s Municipal Government in Michigan and Ohio in the
Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law,
Vol. V, p. 427.

108 ‘‘A law of 1866 established a Board of Metropolitan Police Com-
missioners and removed the police fund, with the tax levy for ‘its support,
from the control of the Council. A board of four commissioners, appointed
by the Governor of the State, assumed full management of the police
NOTES AND REFERENCES 249

fonction. The purpose of this change is not clear, although the Mayor,
who was made ex-officio member of the board was assured that, it would
prove to be worth while.’’—Williamson’s The Finances of Cleveland in
Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law,
Vol. XXV, pp. 465-467.

109 Allison and Penrose’s The City Government of Philadelphia in the
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol.
V, p. 53.

110 Fairlie’s Municipal Administration, pp. 90, 91.

111 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 15.

112 As to the significance of the new conditions produced by the large
aggregation of urban population, and the proper solution of the different
problems involved, Dillon writes as follows:

‘‘Density of population is the foundation of municipal organization, and
each centre of density is the appropriate municipal unit. But the process
has continued so long that now a population which a hundred years ago
would have made a populous nation is to be found gathered in a single
centre. The interests of this aggregation of inhabitants are common in
their entirety, but separate and distinct when applied to topographical
and other charactertistics and peculiarities of the component parts. His-
torically, too, vested interests and peculiar rights may have accrued to
portions of this locality which have given them an existence and charac-
teristics distinguishable from other parts. The territory covered by these
enormous aggregations of individuals is too extensive to permit the suc-
cessful application of the simpler form of municipal government; and the
problem which has to be met is to devise a method which will at once
centralize the general interests of the entire community in a central body,
and distribute the local interests peculiar to the different parts among
bodies qualified to interprét the demands and requirements of the locali-
ties.’’—Dillon’s Commentaries on the Laws of Municipal Corporations,
Vol. I, p. 37.

113 Devlin’s Municipal Reforms in the United States, p. 4.

114 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 55.

115 These States were as follows: Florida, 1865; Nebraska, 1867;
Arkansas, 1868; Illinois and New York, 1870; West Virginia, 1872; Texas
and Pennsylvania, 1873; and some other States adopted somewhat differetit
constitutional provisions, aimed more or less definitely at the evils of
special legislation. —Fairlie ’s Municipal Development in the United States
in A Municipal Program, p. 24.

116 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 54.

117 Goodnow’s City Government in the United States, pp. 65, 66.

118 Goodnow’s City Government in the United States, p. 66.

119 Durand’s The Finances of New York City, p. 165.

120 Cited in Greenlaw’s Office of Mayor tn the United States in
Municipal Affairs, Vol. III, p. 47.
250 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

121 Wileox’s Municipal Government in Michigan and Ohio in the
Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol.
V, pp. 465-467.

122 Eaton’s The Government of Municipalities, p. 4.

123 These pioneer home rule States are Missouri (1875), California
(1879), Washington (1889), and Minnesota (1896).

CHAPTER III

124 Eliot’s Better Municipal Government in Beard’s Loose Leaf Di-
gest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 21101.

125 Goodnow’s Municipal Government, p. 176.

126 Howard’s Local Constitutional History of the United States, p. 75.

127 Howard’s Local Constitutional History of the United States, p. 78.

128 Dodd’s Government of the District of Columbia, pp. 73-80.

129 Fairlie’s Local Government in Counties, Towns, and Villages, p. 75.

130 MacGregor’s City Government by Commission, pp. 21-22.

131 Scroggs’s Commission Government in the South in The Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 38, p. 682.

132 Howe’s Municipal History of New Orleans in the Johns Hopkins
Unwersity Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol. VII, p. 172.

133 Howe’s Municipal History of New Orleans in the Johns Hopkins
University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol. VII, p. 173.

134 Scroggs’s Commission Government in the South in The Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 38, pp. 684, 685.

135 Seroggs’s Commission Government in the South in The Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 38, p. 685;
MacGregor’s City Government by Commission, p. 20.

136 The conception of American city government during this period
has been well expressed by John R. Commons in the following words:

“‘The city is looked upon as a business corporation, instead of a political
corporation, to be managed in a business manner, It must therefore have
a general manager, who shall appoint all heads of departments, and become
clearly responsible for its administration. Power must be taken from the
council and from boards, and be concentrated in the mayor. The mayor
must be elected by popular vote.’’—Commons’s Proportional Representa-
tion, p. 198.

137 Garvin’s Better City Government in The Arena, Vol. 41, p. 39.

138 Woodruff’s City Government by Commission, p. 1.

139 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 295.

140 Munro’s Galveston Plan of City Government in the Proceedings of
the Providence Conference of the National Municipal League, 1907, p. 144.

141 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 295.

142 James’s Two Successful Experiments in Ciwie Government: Gal-
veston and Houston, Texas, in The Arena, Vol. 38, p. 8.

143 Bradford’s Commission Government in American Cities, p. 5;
MacGregor’s City Government by Commission, p. 35.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 251

144 Eliot’s Better Municipal Government in Beard’s Loose Leaf Di-
gest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 21101.

145 Cited in Bradford’s Commission Government in American Cities,
pp. 5, 6.

146 Seroggs’s Commission Government in the South in The Annals of
the Americain Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 38, p. 686.

147 Williams’s Governing Cities by Commission in The World Today,
Vol. 11, p. 945.

148 James’s Two Successful Experiments in Ciwie Government: Gal-
veston and Houston, Texas, in The Arena, Vol. 38, p. 9.

149 Cited in James’s Two Successful Experiments in Ciwie Government:
Galveston and Houston, Texas, in The Arena, Vol. 38, p. 10.

150 Ea parte Lewis, 73 Southwestern Reporter 811; or 45 Texas Crim
inal Report 1.

151 Brown et al vs. City of Galveston, 97 Texas Report 1.

152 MacGregor’s City Government by Commission, p. 195. The word
‘*Commissioner’’, as used in the charter of Galveston and all subsequent
charters, is immaterial. One writer has suggested the title ‘‘ Municipal
Managers’’ as a good descriptive phrase, because that is precisely what
they are——Pollock and Morgan’s Modern Cities, p. 183.

153 Taking advantage of the constitutional home rule amendment
adopted in 1912, Galveston amended its charter on September 30, 1913,
but not in any radical aspects. Commenting on these amendments, the
editor of the National Municipal Review says: ‘‘The subject matter of
some of the amendments, (and this is characteristic of Texas charters gen-
erally) strikingly illustrates the need of a standard test by which a great
mass of detail will be eliminated from the basic law of the city and put
into an administrative code, which will be amendable by the governing
body of the city. Were such a distinction recognized we should not have
a charter amendment ‘adding section 35 granting the city commissioners
power to control and regulate use of streets and prevent heavy traffic on
certain streets, such as Broadway, etc.’, or ‘amending section 20a, fixing
the salaries of firemen, also captain engineers and firemen employed on fire
boats’, or ‘adding section 62aa extending saloon limits so as to authorize
the location of barrooms east of Sixth Street and south of Avenue H.’ ’’—
National Municipal Review, Vol. ITI, p. 114.

154 Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 5.

155 Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 6.

156 Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 8.

157 Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 12.

158 Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 17.

159 Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 5.

160 Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 6.

161 Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 12a.

162 Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 13.

163 Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 7.
252

164
165

COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 12.
Bradford’s Commission Government in American Cities, p. 7;

MacGregor’s City Government by Commission, p. 38.

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 19.
Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 20.
Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 19.
Charter of the City of Galveston, See. 32.
Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 32.
Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 9.
Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 21.
Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 29.
Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 24.
Charter of the City of Galveston, Sec. 13.
Turner’s Galveston: A Business Corporation in McClure’s Maga-

gine, Vol. 27, pp. 618, 614.

177
178
p. 145.
179
Annals
p. 687.
180
181
182
V, See.
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

MacGregor’s City Government by Commission, p. 40.
James’s Houston and its City Commission in The Arena, Vol. 38,

Cited in Seroggs’s Commission Government in the South in The
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 38,

Bradford’s Commission Government in American Cittes, p. 23.
National Municipal Review, Vol. ITI, p. 114.

Charter of the City of Houston (compiled by E. P. Phelps), Art.
4a,

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VII, Sec. 10.

Bradford ’s Commission Government in American Cities, p. 24.
Charter of the City of Houston, Art. V, Sec. 3.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VI, Sec. 7.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VI, See. 6.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VI, Sec. 8.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. V, Sec. 2.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VII, Sec. 8.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VI, Sec. 7.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VII, Sec. 1.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VII, See. 8.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. V, Sec. 1.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VI, Sec. 5.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VII, Sec. 5.

Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VII, See. 11.

One writer has summarized the reasons for election to specific office,

and for election at random as follows:
Reasons for election to specific office:

(1)

‘‘Election to specific office is essential for consistency with the

fundamental principle of commission government that the line of responsi-
bility from members of the council to the people should be clear and sharp.’’
NOTES AND REFERENCES 253

(2) ‘It should conduce to harmony and attention to business in the
council to have each member in a position from which the rest cannot de-
pose him, in which he knows he must stay until the end of his term, and in
which he must make good, if at all.’’

(3) ‘Election to specific office enables a man to know in advance for
what office he is running, and the voter to know to what office he is electing
him.’’

(4) ‘‘Election to specific offices is not open to the objection that the
people should never elect experts, for there is no necessity that these men
should be experts, but there is necessity that they should be elected to a
place in which they have an interest and for-which the voters will con-
sciously support them.’’

(5) ‘‘Experience has already developed serious objections to the prac-
tice of election at random.’*

Reasons for election at random:

(1) ‘‘Election at random makes it unnecessary for candidates to have
to get elected to a certain office, or to be lost from the council.’’

(2) ‘‘An inferior banker might be elected to the headship of the de-
partment of finance over a man with general experience in business, greatly
his inferior in actual fitness for the office.’’

(3) ‘‘It is almost invariable practice of American commission gov-
erned cities to elect their councils at random.’’—Johnson’s Commission
Government for Cities: Election to Specific Office vs. Election at Random
in the National Municipal Review, Vol. II, pp. 661-664.

199 Childs’s Short Ballot Principles, p. 44.

200 Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VI, Sec. 9. Originally the
mayor in Houston received a salary of $4000 per annum, but this was raised
to $7500 by the 1913 home rule amendment. Another amendment increas-
ing the salaries of the. other commissioners from $2400. to $3600, however,
was lost.

201 Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VII, Sec. 6.

202 Charter of the City of Houston, Art. IV, See. 1.

203 Charter of the City of Houston, Art. II, See. 18.

204 Charter of the City of Houston, Art. IX, See. 15.

205 ‘‘The city of Houston may by purchase, lease, condemnation, con-
struction or otherwise, establish, own, equip, maintain, conduct and operate,
in whole or in part, libraries, reading rooms, art galleries, museums,
assembly or convention halls, parks, playgrounds, gymnasiums, baths,
public toilets, and comfort stations, abattoirs, municipal lodging houses
and tenement houses, dispensaries, infirmaries, free employment bureaus,
almshouses, work farms, detention homes, cemeteries, crematories, morgues,
works or plants for the preparation, manufacture, handling ,or transporta-
tion of materials required in the construction, completion, maintenance
or repair of streets, bridges, sidewalks, sewers and any public work, im-
provement, building or utility, whether specifically mentioned herein or not

. .The City of Houston may also by purchase, condemnation, con-
254 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

struction or otherwise establish, own, equip, maintain, conduct and operate
in whole or in part steam laundries, ice factories, bakeries, belt and ter-
minal railways and union depots within or without the City of Houston;
also, any and all buildings, establishments, institutions and places, whether
situated inside or outside of the city limits, which are necessary or conven-
ient for the transaction of public business or for promoting the health,
morals, education or welfare of the inhabitants of the city, or for their
amusement, recreation, entertainment or benefit’’—Charter of the City of
Houston, Art. II, Sec. 7a.

206 Charter of the City of Houston, Art. VIL b, Sec. 1. The following
quotations in the next two paragraphs are all taken from the same article.

207 The basis of percentage is the same as in the case of the initiative.

208 Churter of the City of Houston, Art. VII a, Sec. 1. The expressions
within quotation marks in this paragraph are taken from the same article
unless otherwise indicated.

209 Wilcox’s Government by all the People, p. 167.

210 Charter of the City of Houston, Art. V a. The expressions within
quotation marks in this paragraph are taken from the sections of the same
article.

211 Farbar’s Results of Commission Government in Houston, Texas, in
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vol. 38, p. 904.

CHAPTER IV

212 The Arena, Vol. 38, p. 431.

213 Shambaugh’s The Commission Plan of Government in Proceedings
of Minnesota Academy of Social Science, Vol. III, p. 158.

214 Bowman’s Administration of Iowa in the Columbia University
Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XVIII, p. 13.

215 Constitution of Iowa, 1857, Art. III, See. 30.

216 Laws of Iowa, 1858, p. 363.

217 Census of Iowa, 1915, p. xix.

218 Census of Iowa, 1915, p. xxxi.

219 Census of Iowa, 1915, p. xxxiv.

220 Shambaugh’s Commission Government in Iowa: The Des Moines
Plan, p. 9.

221 The Register and Leader, February 2, 1907; Horack’s The Govern-
ment of Iowa, pp. 128-130; Hamilton’s Government by Commission, pp.
26 ff.

222 Hamilton’s Government by Commission, p. 93.

223 Hamilton’s Government by Commission, p. 92.

224 The Arena, Vol. 38, p. 433. ‘‘Des Moines’ most important de-
parture from the norm of municipal practice has been its policy of securing
all classes of public service through private corporations, whereas many
cities own and operate their own water works.’’—Hamilton’s Government
by Commission, p. 31.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 255

225 The Arena, Vol. 38, p. 434.

226 Horack’s Reorganization of State Government in Iowa in the Iowa
Applied History Series, Vol. II, p. 7.

227 Proceedings of the Iowa State Bar Association, 1903. pp. 60, 61.

228 Proceedings of the Iowa State Bar Association, 1904, pp. 129-134,

229 Hamilton’s Government by Commission, p. 126.

230 Berryhill’s The Des Moines Plan of Municipal Government in
Proceedings of the Iowa State Bar Association, 1908, p. 35.

231 Hamilton’s Government by Commission, p. 105.

232 Berryhill’s The Des Moines Plan of Municipal Government in Pro-
ceedings of the Iowa State Bar Association, 1908, p. 38.

233 Shambaugh’s Commission Government in Iowa: The Des Moines
Plan, p. 11.

234 Hamilton’s Government by Commission, p. 107.

235 The Arena, Vol. 38, p. 435.

236 Berryhill’s The Des Moines Plan of Municipal Government in
Proceedings of the Iowa State Bar Association, 1908, pp. 38, 39.

237 Hamilton’s Government by Commission, p. 109.

238 Hamilton’s Government by Commission, p. 108.

239 Shambaugh’s Commission Government in Iowa: The Des Moines
Plan, p. 12.

240 The vote was 106. to 27 in favor of the Galveston plan with modi-
fications.—The Register and Leader, February 2, 1907.

241 The Register and Leader, February 2, 1907.

242 Shambaugh’s Commission Government in Iowa: The Des Moines
Plan, pp. 12, 13.

243 Shambaugh’s Commission Government in Iowa: The Des Motnes
Plan, p. 14.

244 Shambaugh’s Commission Government in Iowa: The Des Moines
Plan, p. 14.

245 Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 38.

246 Laws of Iowa, 1909, p. 53.

247 Laws of Iowa, 1913, pp. 86, 87.

248 Laws of Iowa, 1909, pp. 53, 54.

249 Laws of Iowa, 1909, p. 57.

250 Laws of Iowa, 1909, pp. 54-56.

251 Laws of Iowa, 1909, pp. 54-56.

252 Laws of Iowa, 1907, pp. 41, 42.

253 Laws of Iowa, 1908, p. 46.

254 Shambaugh’s Commission Government in Iowa: The Des Moines
Plan, p. 15.

255 Laws of Iowa, 1909, p. 57.

256 Supplemental Supplement to the Code of Iowa, 1915, p. 82.

257 Laws of Iowa, 1909, p. 57.

258 Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 48.

259 Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 42.
256

260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267

COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

MacGregor’s City Government by Commission, p. 48.
Supplemental Supplement to the Code of Iowa, 1915, p. 82.

Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 43.

Laws of Iowa, 1909, p. 57.

Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 42.

Laws of Iowa, 1907, pp. 42, 43.

Laws of Iowa, 1913, p. 87.

Shambaugh’s Commission Government in Iowa: The Des Moines

Plan, p. 17.

268

Shambaugh’s Commission Government in Iowa: The Des Moines

Plan, p. 17.

269°
270
271
272

Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 44.
Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 44.
Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 48.
Shambaugh’s Commission Government in Iowa: The Des Moines

Plan, p. 26.

273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280

Laws of Iowa, 1907, pp. 47, 48.

Laws of Iowa, 1907, pp. 46, 47.

Laws of Iowa, 1909, p. 59.

Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 47.

Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 43.

Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 46.

Supplemental Supplement to the Code of Iowa, 1915, p. 83.
Laws of Iowa, 1907, p. 46. These exempted officials are the city

clerk, solicitor, assessor, treasurer, auditor, civil engineer, city physician,
marshal, market master, street commissioner, and three library trustees.
The law was made to apply to the chief of the fire department in 1911.—
Laws of Iowa, 1911, p. 39.

281
282
283
35, p.
284
285
286
287
288

Supplemental Supplement to the Code of Iowa, 1915, pp. 83, 84.
Laws of Iowa, 1907, pp, 48, 49.

Turner’s The New City Government in McClure’s Magazine, Vol.
97.

The Arena, Vol. 38, p. 435.

The Register and Leader, June 19, 1907.

The Register and Leader, June 21, 1907.

The Register and Leader, October 10, 1907.

The text of the decision is found in The Register and Leader,

November 24, 1907; and also in Hamilton’s Government by Commission,
pp. 249-274.

289

290

Eckerson vs. City of Des Moines, 137 Iowa 452.

CHAPTER V
Williams’s Governing Cities by Commission in The World Today,

Vol. XI, p. 943.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 257

291 Bradford’s History and Underlying Principles of Commission Gov-
ernment in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Vol. 38, p. 673.

292 Bates’s Commission Government in Kansas in Proceedings of
American Political Science Association, Vol. VII, p. 114.

293 Bruere’s The New City Government, p. 129.

294 The American Political Science Review, Vol. IV, p. 223.

295 Munro’s Ten Years of Commission Government in the National
Municipal Review, Vol. 1, p. 563.

296 These six States are Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, New Hamp-
shire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.

297 These twenty-seven States are as follows: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Laws in Alabama,
Pennsylvania, and Utah are obligatory and self-executing. Missouri pro-
vides an obligatory commission law for cities of the second class, and a
pertuissive law for cities of the third class. The laws in all the rest of the
States are optional.

298 These States are Arizona, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Washington.

299 These States are California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon,
and Ohio.

300 This State is Ohio.

301 These States are Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia.

302 These six States are Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, North
Carolina, and West Virginia.

303 Bates’s Commission Government in Kansas in The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 18, p. 719.

304 Laws of Kansas, 1909, Ch. 74, pp. 131-140.

305 Laws of Kansas, 1909, Ch. 82, pp. 153-169.

306 Laws of Kansas, 1913, Ch. 128, pp. 204-211.

307 In Kansas the cities of the first class include all cities over fifteen
thousand inhabitants; the second class those over two thousand, but not
over fifteen thousand; and the third, all incorporated places of not over
two thousand populdtion—Bates’s Commission Government in Kansas in
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.
18, p. 719.

308 Laws of Kansas, 1913, Ch. 85, pp. 135-142; National Municipal
Review, Vol. TI, p. 682.

309 By a constitutional amendment in 1914 the recall was made appli-
eable to all cities in the State on a twenty-five percent petition.—Constitu-
tion of Kansas, Art. 4, Secs. 3-5.

310 Laws of Kansas, 1911, Ch. 184, pp. 313, 314.
258 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

811 The cities which have adopted the commission plan are as fol-
lows: Leavenworth and Caldwell in 1908; Anthony, Hutchinson, Inde-
pendence, Junction City, and Wichita in 1909; Abilene, Cherryville, Dodge
City, Emporia, Eureka, Iola, Kansas City, Girard, Marion, Neodesha,
Newton, Parsons, Topeka, Wellington, and Holton in 1910; Chanute, Coun-
cil Grove, Hiawatha, Manhattan, Pittsburg, and Pratt in 1911; Arkansas
City, Great Bend, Kingman, and Olante in 1912; Fredonia, Garden City,
Garnett, Lawrence, Ottawa, Osawatomee, and Sabetha in 1913; Fort Scott
and McPherson in 1914; St. Mary’s and Horton in 1915.—Equity, Vol. 18,
pp. 216-222,

312 Laws of North Dakota, 1911, Ch. 77.

313 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 35401.

314 The cities in North Dakota adopted the commission plan as fol-
lows: Mandan in 1907; Bismarck and Minot in 1909; Devil’s Lake in
1911; Fargo, Hillsboro, and Williston in 1913; Ray in 1914; Marmarth in
1915; and Washburn in 1916.—Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 258, 259.

315 Thirteenth Session, Legislatwe Assembly, State of South Dakota,
Senate Bill, No. 187; Laws of South Dakota, 1913, Ch. 119; 1915, Ch. 113.

816 The names of the cities and the dates of adoption are as follows:
Sioux Falls in 1908; Canton, Chamberlain, Dell Rapids, Huron, Pierre,
Rapid City, and Yankton in 1910; Aberdeen and Lead in 1911; Belle
Fourche, Madison, and Watertown in 1912; and Springfield in 1914.—
Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 276-280.

317 Laws of Mississippi, 1908, Ch. 108, pp. 101-104.

318 Laws of Mississippi, 1912, Ch. 120, pp. 107-119; Beard’s Digest of
Short Ballot Charters, p. 36402.

319 Laws of Mississippi, 1914, Ch. 158, pp. 201-204. The seventh sec-
tion of this law reads as follows: ‘‘The provisions of this act shall
apply to municipalities, whether operating under special charters or under
Chapter 120 of Laws of 1912, providing for commission form of govern-
ment, or under Chapter 99 of the Code of 1906, relative to municipalities,
and all laws amendatory thereof.’’

320 Other cities in Mississippi which adopted the commission form of
government in pursuance of the State laws are Gulfport and Laurel in
1911; Charleston, Jackson, Meridian, Vicksburg, and Greenwood in 1912,
—Equity Vol. 18, pp. 240, 241.

321 Bradford’s Commission Government in American Cities, pp. 73, 74;

322 Equity, Vol. 18, p. 284; Laws of Texas, 1913, Ch. 21, pp. 36-39.

323 A partial list of the Texas cities operating under general commis-
sion laws of the State is as follows: Aransas Pass, Kennedy, Lyford,
Marble Falls, and Port Lavaca in 1910; Abilene, McAllen, Port Arthur,
San Benito, and Spur in 1911; Bishop, Franklin, Frankston, Nixon, and
Hereford in 1912; Jacksboro, McKinnery, Somerville, and Sweetwater in
1913; Coleman, Honey Grove, Orange, and Groesbeck in 1914; and Alice
in 1915.—Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 289-295.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 259

324 Laws of Wisconsin, 1909, Ch. 48; Laws of Wisconsin, 1911, Ch. 67A;
Laws of Wisconsin, 1915, pp. 58, 59. The law is also published in pamphlet
form, entitled Wisconsin Law; Commission Form of City Government.

325 Mr. MacGregor points out the only reason for not including Mil-
waukee was that ‘‘at that session of the Legislature Milwaukee was en-
deavoring to secure home rule, and it was feared that if made applicable
to Milwaukee the commission bill might interfere with this project as well
as endanger its own passage.’’—MacGregor’s Commission Government in
the West in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Vol. 38, p. 730.

326 Wisconsin Law: Commission Form of City Government, p. 2.

327 Wisconsin Law: Commission Form of City Government, p. 3.

328 155 Wisconsin 63,

329 Equity, Vol. 18, p. 306.

330 The names of these Wisconsin cities and the dates of their adop-
tion are as follows: Eau Claire in 1910; Appleton and Oshkosh in 1911;-
Janesville, Menominee, Portage, Rice Lake, and Superior in 1913; Ash-
land and Ladysmith in 1913; Antigo and Fond du Lac in 1914; and Green
Bay in 1916.—Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 306-308.

331 Bradford’s Commission Government in American Cities, pp. 73, 74;
Fairlie’s Commission Government in Illinois Cities in The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 38, p. 750.

332 Laws of Illinois Relating to Commission Form of Municipal Govern-
ment, p. 2. ‘

333 Laws of Illinois Relating to Commission Form of Municipal Gov-
ernment, p. 28.

334 Fairlie’s Commission Government in American Cities in The An-
nals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 38, p.
753.

335 Laws of Illinois Relating to Commission Form of Municipal Gov-
ernment, pp. 34, 54, 55.

336 Laws of Illinois, 1915, pp. 282, 283.

337 In 1911 the following nineteen Illinois cities and villages adopted
the commission plan: Braceville, Carbondale, Clinton, Decatur, Dixon,
Elgin, Forest Park, Hamilton, Hillsboro, Jacksonville, Kewanee, Moline,
Ottawa, Pekin, Rochelle, Rock Island, Springfield, Spring Valley, and
Waukegan. These cities were followed by Geneseo, Harvey, Marseilles,
and Naperville in 1912: Port Byron, Catlin, Harrisburg, Cairo, and Mur-
physboro in 1913; Flora, Bloomington, Highland Park, and Effingham
in 1914; Coal City, Joliet, Lincoln, Sterling, Paris, and Princeton in 1915.
—Equity, Vol. 18, pp, 206-212.

338 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 33401.

339 Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1912, pp. 841-849; Benet’s A
Campaign for a Commission Form of Government in The American City,
Vol. III, pp. 276-278.
260 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

340 Benet’s A Campaign for a Commission Form of Government in the
American City, Vol. IEI, p. 276. Other cities in South Carolina which
have followed the example of Columbia are Florence in 1912; Orangeburg
and Spartanburg in 1913; and Rock Hill in 1916.—Zquity, Vol. 18, pp.
274-276,

341 Cities of the second class in Kentucky are those having a popula-
tion between 20,000 and 100,000.

342 Acts of Kentucky, 1910, Ch. 50; Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot
Charters, p. 33701. ‘

343 Cities of the third class in Kentucky are those cities having a popu-
lation between 8000 and 20,000.

344 Cities of the fourth class in Kentucky are those cities having a
population between 3000 and 8000.

345 Acts of Kentucky, 1914, Ch. 77, pp. 271-287; Acts of Kentucky,
1914, Ch. 92, pp. 477-496.

346 Kentucky cities adopting the commission plan under general laws
are Newport in 1910; Lexington and Covington in 1911; Paducah in 1913;
Cynthiana and Hopkinsville in 1914—Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 223, 224.

347 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 36301.

348 Laws of Louisiana, 1912, Act. No. 207, House Bill No. 115, provid-
ing a form of government for cities of 2500 and over; Laws of Lowisiana,
1916, Act. No. 6.

349 Laws of Louisiana, 1916, Act. No. 6, Sec. 2.

350 These cities are Shreveport in 1910; Hammond, Lake Charles,
and New Iberia in 1911; Baton Rouge and Donaldsonville in 1912; Alexan-
dria and Jennings in 1913.—Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 224-226.

351 New Orleans and Natchitoches received special commission charters
in 1912; and Lafayette adopted the plan in 1914 by special act.—Equity,
Vol. 18, pp. 225, 226.

352 Laws of Wyoming, 1911, Ch. 84. This law, with amendments, is
also found in Election Laws of the State of Wyoming, 1914, pp. 97-105.

353 Sheridan in 1911, and Cheyenne in 1913.—Equity, Vol. 18, p. 309.

354 Laws of Montana, 1911, Ch. 57; Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot
Charters, p. 35301.

355 Laws of Montana, 1913, p. 480.

356 These three cities are Missoula in 1911; Polson in 1912; and Helena
in 1915.—Equity, Vol. 18, p. 245.

357 Laws of Idaho, 1911, p. 281.

858 Laws of Idaho, 1911, p. 292.

359 Laws of Idaho, 1911, p. 295.

360 Laws of Idaho, 1911, p. 301.

361 Laws of Idaho, 1911, pp. 302, 303.

362 Laws of Idaho, 1911, p. 308.

363 Equity, Vol. 18, p. 204.

364 Constitution of Washington, Art. XI, See. 10.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 261

365 These five cities are Seattle, Tacoma, Spokane, Bellingham, and
Everett.—Abstract of the Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910,
Supplement for Iowa, p. 75.

366 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 38301; Laws of Wash-
éngton, 1911, Ch. 116.

867 State ex rel Lynch v. Fairley, 76 Washington 332.

368 Constitution of Washington, Art. I, Sees. 33, 34.

369 Cities in Washington which have elected to come under the pro-
visions of the general commission act are Centralia in 1910; Chehalis,
Hoquiam, North Yakima, and Walla Walla in 1911—Equity, Vol. 18, pp.
301, 302.

370 Cited in Current Literature, Vol. 50, p. 477.

371 State of New Jersey, An act relating to regulating and providing
for the government of cities, towns, boroughs, and other mimicipalities
within the State.

372 Hennessy’s Municipal Progress in New Jersey in the American
City, Vol. X, p. 501.

373 State of New Jersey, Amendment to the Act for the Government
of cities, Special session 1913, Ch. 22, p. 3.

374 State of New Jersey, An Act relating to regulating and providing
for the government of cities, towns, boroughs and other municipalities
within the State, pp, 19-21.

375 These cities are Hawthorne, Margate, Ocean City, Panaic, Ridge-
wood, and Trenton in 1911; Atlantic City, Ridgefield Park, Borough of
Deal, Long Branch, Nutley, Longport, and Wildwood in 1912; Sea Isle
City, Millville, Phillipsburg, Beverly, Bordentown, Jersey City, and Vine:
Jand in 1913; Orange, Asbury Park, Belleville, Irvington, and Haddon-
field in 1914; Bayonne, Bradley Beach, Cape May, New Brunswick, and
Hoboken in 1915; Allenhurst and Lambertville in 1916.—Equity, Vol. 18,
pp. 249-252.

376 Laws of Alabama, 1911, Act No. 330; Beard’s Digest of Short
Ballot Charters, p. 33903.

377 National Municipal Review, Vol. I, p. 98.

378 Laws of Alabama, 1911, Act. No. 504.

379 These cities are as follows: Cordova, Hartselle, Talladega, and
Tuskaloose since 1911; Carbon Hill, Elba, and Sheffield since 1912; and
Plorence since 1913.—Equity, Vol. 18, p. 183.

380 Laws of California, 1911, Ch. 418.

381 Laws of Nebraska, 1911, Ch. 24; Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot
Charters, p. 34601.

382 Nebraska eities under the commission form of government are
Beatrice and Omaha since 1911; and Lincoln and Nebraska City since 1912.
~—Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 246, 247 .

383 Cited in Bradford’s Commission Government in American Cities,
p. 107.

384 Equity, Vol. 18, p. 253.
262 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

385 The Short Ballot Bulletin, June, 1913, p. 7.

386 Laws of Missouri, 1913, p. 517.

387 Laws of Missouri, 1913, pp. 518-521.

388 Laws of Missouri, 1913, pp. 522, 523.

389 Laws of Missouri, 1913, pp. 525, 526,

390 These four cities are Kirksville, Monette, and West Plains since
1914; and Aurora since 1915.—Equity, Vol. 18, p. 243.

391 National Municipal Review, Vol. II, p. 285.

392 Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 280-283.

393 Laws of Arkansas, 1913, Act No. 13.

394 Equity, Vol. 18, p. 184.

395 Statutes of Nevada, 1915, pp. 294-298.

396 Statutes of Nevada, 1915, p. 297.

397 National Municipal Review, Vol. I, p. 119.

398 Laws of Utah, 1911, pp. 224-233; Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot
Charters, p. 37101. The law is also separately published in pamphlet form
with the title, Municipal Government: State Laws providing for the Or-
ganization and Regulation of Municipalities.

399 Municipal Government: State Laws providing for the Organization
and Regulation of Municipalities, p. 1.

400 Laws of Alabama, 1911, Act. No. 163; Beard’s Digest of Short
Ballot Charters, p. 33901.

401 Laws of Alabama, 1911, Act. No. 254; Beard’s Digest of Short
Ballot Charters, p. 33905.

402 In Pennsylvania cities are divided into three classes: Philadelphia,
first class; Pittsburgh and Scranton, second class; and twenty-three cities
of less than 100,000 population constitute the third class.

403 Fuller’s Commission Government for all Third-Class Cities in
Pennsylvania in The American City, Vol. IX, p. 128.

404 Laws of Pennsylvania, 19138, pp. 568-631. The law is also pub-
lished in pamphlet form, with the title, An Act providing for the incor-
poration, regulation, and government of cities of the third class.

405 The law, however, fixes the salaries of the mayor and the council-
men elected under the provisions of the act, until thereafter changed by
ordinance, to be as follows: For mayor, in cities having a population less
than 15,000, $500; in cities having a population between 15,000 and
30,000, $1200; in cities having a population between 30,000 and 50,000,
$2500; in cities having a population between 50,000 and 70,000, $3000; in
cities having a population over 70,000, $3500.

For councilmen, in cities having a population less than 15,000, $300;
in cities having a population between 15,000 and 30,000, $750; in cities
having a population between 30,000 and 50,000, $2000; in cities having a
population between 50,000 and 70,000, $2500; in cities having a population
over 70,000, $3000. An Act providing for the incorporation, regulation,
and government of cities of the third class, ete., pp. 25, 26, 32.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 263

406 Fuller’s Commission Government for All Third-class Cities of
Pennsylvania in The American City, Vol. IX, p. 134.

407 The title of the Missouri commission law for cities of the second
class is ‘‘An Act to repeal Article 3 of Chapter 84 of the Revised Statutes
of Missouri of 1909, with all amendments thereto, said article being en-
titled, Cities of the Second Class, and to enact in lieu thereof a new article
providing for the government of the second class.’’—Laws of Missouri,
1913, pp. 420-462.

408 Laws of Missouri, 1913, pp. 439, 440.

409 Laws of Missouri, 1913, p. 461.

410 Constitution of Ohio, Art. XVIII, Sees. 2, 8, 9.

411 An Act to provide optional plans of government for municipalities,
Ohio, 1918, p. 1.

412 An Act to provide optional plans of government for municipalities,
Ohio, 1918, p. 3.

413 An Act to provide eee plans of government for municipalities,
Ohio, 1918, p. 21.

414 An Act to provide ainloni plans of government for municipalities,
Ohio, 1918, p. 6.

415 National Municipal Review, Vol. V, pp. "659, 660.

416 Virginia Code, Supplement, 1916, p. 914.

417 Virginia Code, Supplement, 1916, p. 918.

418 Cited in Equity, Vol. 18, p. 297.

419 Laws of New York, 1914, Ch. 444.

420 Equity, Vol. 18, p. 255.

421° General Acts of Massachusetts, 1915, Ch. 267. This act is also
published in pamphlet form under the title of ‘‘ An act to Simplify the Re-
vision of City Charters’’

422 Cited in The American Political Science Review, Vol. IX, p. 324.

423 Constitution of Missouri, Art. IX, Secs. 16, 17, 20-23.

424 Constitution of California, Art. XI, Secs. 8, 8a, and 844.

425 Reed’s Municipal Home Rule in California in the National Munic-
ipal Review, Vol. I, p. 572.

426 Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 186-193.

427 Constitution of Washington, Art. XI, Sec. 10.

428 62 Washington 312.

429 University of Washington Extension Journal, Vol. I, pp. 166-168.

430 Enabling Act of the State of Washington and Charter of the City
of Tacoma, Washington,

431 Patton’s Home Rule in Iowa in Iowa Applied History Series, Vol.
II, pp. 60, 61.

432 Charter of the City of Spokane, State of Washington.

433° Constitution of Minnesota, Art. IV, Sec. 36.

434 Laws of Minnesota, 1909, Ch. 170.

435 Codman’s Commission Government for Cities in the Proceedings of
Minnesota Academy of Social Science, 1911, Vol. V, pp. 94, 95.
264 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

436 The American Political Science Review, Vol. V, p. 80.

437 National Municipal Review, Vol. I, p. 287.

438 Charter of the City of Duluth.

439 Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 238, 239.

440 Patton’s Home Rule in Iowa, p. 63.

441 Constitution of Colorado, Art. XX.

442 The Charter of the City of Colorado Springs, Colorado.

443 The Charter of the City of Grand Junction, Colorado.

444 Bucklin’s The Grand Junction Plan of City Government in The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 38,
p. 760.

445 Meredith’s Denver’s New Charter in the National Municipal Ee-
view, Vol. V. pp. 471-475.

446 Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 195-198.

447 Constitution of Oregon, Art. XI, Sec. 2; Lord’s Oregon Laws,
Sees. 3481, 3482.

448 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 38201.

449 The Charter of the City of Portland, Oregon.

450 Constitution of Oklahoma, Art. XVIII, Sec. 3 (a).

451 The American Political Science Review, Vol. VIII, p. 466.

452 MacGregor’s Commission Government in the West in The Annals
of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 38, p. 739.

Oklahoma cities under the commission form are as follows: Ardmore in
1908; Enid and Tulsa in 1909; Bartlesville, Duncan, El Reno, Guthrie,
Miami, Muskogee, McAlester, Purcell, Sapulpa, and Wagoner in 1910;
Holdenville, Layton, Oklahoma City, and Stillwater in 1911; Ada, Okmul-
gee, and Pawhuska in 1912; Wewoka and Weatherford in 1913.—Equity,
Vol. 18, pp. 263-267.

453 Constitution of Michigan, Art. VITI, Sees. 20, 21.

454 Laws relating to the incorporation and general powers of cities in
Michigan (Revision of 1913), Part III, pp. 146-167.

455 Michigan cities adopting commission charters under the home rule
provisions are as follows: Harbor Beach and Port Huron in 1910; Pontiae,
East Jordan, Fremont, and Wyandotte in 1911; ‘Monroe, Marquette, Owosso,
Saginaw, and Traverse City in 1913; Adrian in 1914; and Munising in 1915.
—Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 231-235.

456 Laws of Texas, 1913, pp. 207-317.

457 Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 284 ff.

458 Constitution of Arizona, Art. XIII, Sees, 2, 3.

459 Patton’s Home Rule in Iowa in Iowa Applied History Series,
Vol. TI, p. 66.

460 Constitution of Ohio, Art. XVIII, Secs. 8, 9.

461 Equity, Vol. 18, p. 260.

462 Constitution of Nebraska, Art. XI a.

463 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 33301.
464
465

NOTES AND REFERENCES 265

Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 33305.
An Act of the General Assembly of North Carolina to Amend the

Charter af the City of Wilmington and Amendments thereto establishing
Commission Form of Government.

466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493

Laws of West Virginia, 1909, Ch. 3.

Laws of West Virginia, 1909, p. 1.

Bradford’s Commission Government in American Cities, pp. 90, 91.
Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 33201.

City Cade and Charter, Cumberland, Maryland, p. 56.
City Code and Charter, Cumberland, Maryland, p. 57.
Equity, Vol. 18, p. 227.

National Municipal Review, Vol. I, pp. 107, 108.
Laws of Florida, 1911, Act. No. 266, Ch. 6385.

Laws of Florida, 1911, Act. No. 235, Ch. 6363.

Laws of Florida, 1911, Aet. No. 244, Ch. 6363.
National Municipal Review, Vol, I, pp. 104, 105.
Equity, Vol. 18, pp. 201 ff.

Laws of Georgia, 1911, Act. No. 176.

Laws of Georgia, 1911, Act. No. 293.

Equity, Vol, 18, p. 247.

Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 36009
Charter of the City of Dallas, Art. 8.

Charter of the City of Dallas, Art. 9.

Charter of the City of Dallas, Art. 2, Sec. 8.
Hamilton’s Government by Commission, p. 9.

Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 36018.
Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 36005,
Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 38401.

City of Haverhill, Massachusetts: City Charter, 1914,
An Act to Amend the Charter of the City of Gloucester.
National Municipal Review, Vol. I, p. 108.

Memphis Charter; Amendment to the Charter of the City of

Memphis, Tennessee, being Senate Bill No. 574, Chapter 298, Acts of the
Legislature, Year 1909.

494
495
496
497
498
499

Equity, Vol. 18, p. 282.

Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 25, p. 373.

The American City, Vol. IV, p. 145.

National Municipal Review, Vol. I, p. 148.

The American Political Science Review, Vol. VITI, p. 454.
Upson’s The City Manager Charter of Dayton in The Annals of

the American Academy of Political and Social Science: Commission Gov-
ernment and City Manager Plan, p. 192.
266 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

CHAPTER VI

500 See James’s The City Manager Plan, the Latest in American City
Government in The American Political Science Review, Vol. VIII, pp.
602 ff. :

501 The Coming of City Manager Plan in the National Municipal Re-
view, Vol. III, p. 45.

502 Foulke’s Evolution in City Charter Making in the National Munic-
ipal Review, Vol. IV, pp. 20, 21.

503 The Coming of City Manager Plan in the National Municipal Re-
view, Vol. III, pp. 46-48.

504. Toulmin’s The City Manager, p. 4.

505 Laws of New Mexico, 1909, p. 240.

506 Bradford’s Commission Government in American Cities, p. 107.

507 The position of city-manager in Roswell has since its creation been
filled by W. M. Atkinson, an ex-mayor of Roswell and the chairman of the
board of county commissioners. He is employed at a salary of $1800 per
year; but the peculiar feature is that he has the privilege of continuing his
office as county commissioner and of attending to other public duties.—The
American City, Vol. XII, pp. 502-503.

508 Holsinger’s General Manager Plan of Government of Staunton,
Virginia, p. 1.

509 Constitution of Virginia, Art. VIII, Secs. 120, 121.

510 Bradford’s Commission Government in American Cities, p. 119.

511 The ordinance creating the general manager in Staunton may be
found in Holsinger’s General Manager Plan of Government of Staunton,
Virginia, pp. 7, 8; and also in Woodruff’s City Government by Commission,
pp. 304, 305.

512 Toulmin’s The City Manager, p. 17.

513 Holsinger’s General Manager Plan of Government of Staunton,
Virginia, pp. 9, 10.

514 Crosby’s Staunton Plan of Municipal Government in The Annals
of American Academy of Political and Social Science: Commission Gov-
ernment and the City Manager Plan, Revised Edition, 1914, p. 208.

515 Childs’s The Lockport Proposal in The American City, Vol. IV, p.
285.

516 A digest of the Lockport Proposal is found in Beard’s Digest of
Short Ballot Charters, p. 61001.

517 The Lockport Proposal in Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters,
p. 61003.

518 Childs’s The Lockport Proposal in The American City, Vol. IV, p.
286.

519 Lockport rejected Plan C of the New York optional city government
law on November 3, 1918, by a vote of 2427 to 1962.—National Municipat
Review, Vol. IV, p. 101.

520 Laws of South Carolina, 1912, Ch. 453, Sec. 30.

521 The Short Ballot Bulletin, June, 1913, p. 7.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 267

522 The Short Ballot Bulletin, August, 1912, p. 3.

523 Gilbertson’s Commission Government with a City Manager, p. 5.

524 The Short Ballot Bulletin, October, 1912, p. 3.

525 The Short Ballot Bulletin, October, 1912, p. 2.

526 The American City, Vol. XII, p. 511.

527 The American City, Vol. XII, pp. 511-514.

528 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 33307.

529 The Short Ballot Bulletin, June, 1913, p. 5.

530 National Municipal Review, Vol. II, p. 472.

531 Fanchee’s Two Epoch-Making Campaigns in Dayton, Ohio, in The
American City, Vol. IX, p. 47.

532 Fanchee’s Two Epoch-Making Campaigns in Dayton, Ohio, in The
American City, Vol. IX, p. 49; The Short Ballot Bulletin, June, 1913, p. 6.

533 The Short Ballot Bulletin, August, 1913, p. 2.

534 Charter of the City of Dayton, Secs. 3 and 9.

535 Charter of the City of Dayton, Sec. 36.

536 Toulmin’s The City Manager, p. 62.

537 Charter of the City of Dayton, Sec. 47.

538 James’s Defects in the Dayton Charter in the National Municipat
Review, Vol. ITI, p. 97.

539 Charter of the City of Dayton, Sec. 48.

540 Charter of the City of Dayton, Sec. 53.

541 Charter of the City of Dayton, Sec. 52.

542 Charter of the City of Dayton, Sec. 156.

543 Charter of the City of Dayton, Sec. 78.

544 Charter of the City of Dayton, Sec. 44.

545 Toulmin’s The City Manager, pp. 123 ff; National Municipal Re
wtew, Vol. II, p. 643, Vol. IV, p. 268.

546 Charter of the City of Dayton, Sec. 80.

547 Upson’s Comments on the Dayton Charter in National Municipal
Review, Vol. IV, pp. 266-272.

548 National Short Ballot Organization: The City Manager Plan of
Municipal Government, p. 32; The American Political Science Review,
Vol. VII, p. 654.

549 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 21905.

550 The American City, Vol. IX, p. 362.

551 The Charter of the City of Springfield, Sec. 16 (d).

552 The Charter of the City of Springfield, Secs. 23, 26, 53-73.

553 National Municipal Review, Vol. III, p. 768.

554 Charter of the City of Sandusky.

555 National Municipal Review, Vol. IV, p. 482.

556 Hatton’s The Ashtabula Plan in the National Municipal Review,
Vol. V, pp. 57, 58.

557 Hoag’s The City Manager Plan with Proportional Representation
in Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, pp. 21306 ff.
268 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

558 Hatton’s The First Proportional Representation in America in
The Ashtabula Plan of Municipal Government, published by the Ashtabula
Chamber of Commeree, p. 8.

559 Charter of the City of Ashtabula, Secs. 46-1, 46-2.

560 Hatton’s The Ashtabula Plan—The Latest Step in Municipal Or-
ganization in the National Municipal Eeview, Vol. V, pp. 59 ff.

561 Charter of the City of Ashtabula, See. 3.

562 National Municipal Review, Vol. IV, p. 653.

563 National Municipal Review, Vol. V, pp. 476, 477.

564 Gilbertson’s The City Manager Plan to Date in Beard’s Digest of
Short Ballot Charters, p. 21906.

565 Arizona Republican, September 12, 1913.

566 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 38501.

567 National Municipal Review, Vol. IV, p. 296; The American City,
Vol. XII, p. 501.

568 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 37007.

569 Digest of the Defeated charter may be found in the National Short
Ballot Organization: The City Manager Plan, p. 22; Gilbertson’s The City
Manager Plan to Date in Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 21906.

570 Charter of the City of Bakersfield.

571 Equity, Vol. 18, p. 193.

572 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 38023.

573 National Municipal Review, Vol. V, p. 680.

574 Charter of the City of La Grande, Ch. 3, Sec. 8.

575 Charter of the City of La Grande, Ch. 5, Sec. 10.

576 Charter of the City of La Grande, Ch. 8, Sec. 4.

577 Charter of the City of La Grande, Ch. 8, See. 4.

578 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, pp. 35015, 35016.

579 New Charter of the City of Manistee.

580 Equity, Vol. 18, p. 234.

581 Charter: City of Jackson, Michigan.

582 Charter: City of Jackson, Michigan, Section 55.

583 National Municipal Review, Vol. V, p. 102.

584 National Municipal Review, Vol. V, p. 659.

585 Charter for City of Grand Rapids, Michigan, Title V, Sec. 3.

586 Charter for City of Grand Rapids, Michigan, Title VI, Sec. 1.

587 Charter for City of Grand Rapids, Michigan, Title V, Sec. 19.

588 National Municipal Review, Vol. II, p. 285.

589 The American City, Vol. XII, p. 506.

590 Proceedings of the First Annual Conference of the City Manager
Association, 1914, p. 15.

591 The American City, Vol. XII, p. 503.

592 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 36029; Equity, Vol. 18,
p. 292.

593 National Municipal Beview, Vol. IV, pp. 296, 381.

594 Equity, Vol. 18, pp, 293-295.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 269

595 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 36119; The American
City, Vol. X, p. 193; Vol. 12, p. 507.

596 National Municipal Review, Vol. III, p. 592.

597 The Short Ballot Bulletin, June, 1915.

598 Beard’s Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 33603.

599 The Short Ballot Bulletin, August, 1916, p. 3.

600 The American City, Vol. XII, pp. 505, 506.

601 Laws of North Carolina, 1915, Ch. 341; Beard’s Digest of Short
Batlot Charters, p. 33309.

602 Greater Wheeling Charter, 1915.

603 Greater Wheeling Charter, Sec. 14.

604 Wilson’s The City Manager Form of Government at Clarinda, Iowa.

605 Proceedings of the City Managers’ Association, 1915, p. 68.

606 The American City, Vol. XII, pp. 501, 502.

607 Supplemental Supplement to the Code of Iowa, 1915, p. 46.

608 House File, 1915, No. 408.

609 The Short Ballot Bulletin, April, 1915.

610 Supplemental Supplement to the Code of Iowa, 1915, pp, 86-95.

611 Toulmin’s The City Manager, p. 62.

612 Prendergast’s New Municipal Finance, p. 5.

613 Although no provision is made in the law for the removal of the.
officials through the process of popular recall, the councilmen and manager
are still subject to removal from the office by the district court in accord-
ance with the general methods of removal of public officials in Iowa,
especially by the Cosson Removal Law of 1909. See Patton’s Removal of
Public Officials in Iowa in the Iowa Applied History Series, Vol. II, No. 7.

614 The material for this section was taken from the following sources:
An Act to provide optional plans of government for municipalities, Ohio,
1918; Laws of New York, 1914, Ch. 444; Laws of New York, 1916, Ch. 156;
An Act to Simplify the Revision of City Charters, Massachusetts, 1915;
Virginia Code, Supplement, 1916, pp. 914-919.

615 National Municipal Review, Vol. IV, p. 101.

616 National Municipal Review, Vol. IV, p. 474.

617 National Municipal Review, Vol. V, p. 102.

618 Equity, Vol. 18, p. 298.

619 James’s What is the City Manager Plan? in Bulletin of the Univer-
sity of Texas, 1915, No. 11, p. 19.

620 Cited in Childs’s Professional Standards and Professional Ethics
in the New Profession of City Manager in the National Municipal Review,
Vol. V, p. 195.

621 Childs’s Professional Standards and Professional Ethics in the New
Profession of City Manager in the National Municipal Review, Vol. V,
p- 196,

622 By-Laws of the City Managers’ Association, Art. 1.

623 Embrey’s How a Little City is Progressing under a City Commis-
sioner in The American City, Vol IX, p. 25.
270 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

624 The ordinance of the city council of Charlottesville creating the
office of municipal business manager may be found in Patton’s Municipal:
Business Manager in the National Municipal Review, Vol. IV, p. 52.

625 The American City, Vol. X. p. 87; Vol. XII, p. 502.

626 Proceedings of the City Managers’ Association, 1915, p. 72; The
American City, Vol. XII, pp. 504, 505.

627 Proceedings of the City Managers’ Association, 1915, pp. 81, 82; The
American City, Vol. XII, p. 502.

628 Cited in Mitchell’s A Suburban Village with a ‘‘Man on the
Job’’ in The American City, Vol. IX, p. 327.

629 The American City, Vol. X, p. 193; Vol. XII, p. 506.

630 Cited in Kressly’s How the City Manager plan is Working in a
Small California Municipality in The American City, Vol. XII, p. 102.

631 The American City, Vol. XIII, p. 419.

CHAPTER VII

632 Poore’s Charters and Constitutions, Vol. II, p. 1519.

633 Toulmin’s The City Manager, p. 90.

634 Cooper’s Objections to Commission Government in The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 28, p. 854.

635 Proceedings of the City Managers’ Association, 1914, pp. 4, 5.

636 Blackmar’s City Manager, a New Career in Public Service in the
Proceedings of the National Conference on University and Public Service,
1914, pp. 278, 279.

CHAPTER VIII

637 Wileox’s The Study of City Government, p. 232.

638 Durand’s Council vs. Mayor in the Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. XV, p. 432.

639 Howe’s The Modern City and its Problems, p. 51.

640 Ford’s Principles of Municipal Organization in The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 23, p. 195.

641 Wilcox’s The Study of City Government, p. 229.

642 Howe’s The Modern City and its Problems, p. 51. It has further
been pointed out that ‘‘the system exerts an important influence in deter-
mining the character of the men who are attracted to the public service.’’
—Ryan’s Municipal Freedom, p. 50.

643 Ford’s Principles of Municipal Organization in The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 23, p. 215.

644 Horack’s Reorganization of State Government in Iowa in the Iowa
Applied History Series, Vol. II, p. 13.

645 See A Municipal Program: Report of a Committee of the National
Municipal League, adopted by the League, November 7, 1889, together with
explanatory and other papers.

646 Wilcox’s The Study of City Government, p. 231.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 271

647 Wilcox’s The Study of City Government, p. 228.

648 Goodnow’s City Government im the United States, p. 199.

649 Some of the typical claims of gains resulting from the adoption of
the. commission form may be found in Bruere’s The New City Government,
pp. 72-76.

650 Lowell’s Eapert Administration in Popular Government in The
American Political Science Review, Vol. VII, p. 62.

651 James’s Proportional Representation: A Fundamental or a Fad in
the National Municipal Review, Vol. V, p. 277.

652 The word ‘‘city’’ is here used to indicate a place having 2500 or
over inhabitants.—See Thirteenth Census of the United States, Vol. I,
pp. 97 ff.

653 Dillon’s A Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporation, Vol.
I, p. 55.

654 Dillon’s A Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporation, Vol. I,
pp. 55, 56.

655 Taussig’s Principles of Economics, Vol. II, p. 410.

656 McBain’s Evolution of Types of City Government in the National
Municipal Review, Vol. VI, pp. 29, 30.

657 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, pp. 304-308.

658 Goodwin’s Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy, p. 171.

659 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 304.

660 Munro’s The Government of American Cities, p. 308.

661 Munro’s Principles and Methods of Municipal Administration, p. 18.

662 Matthews’s Municipal Charters, p. 18.

663 Hutson’s New Orleans’ Experience under Commission Government
in the National Municipal Review, Vol. VI, p. 74.

664 Some of the benefits of municipal researches for New York City.
are as follows: ; :

1, Establishment of the principle that the majority has no right to
impose wasteful and incompetent government upon the minority—through
the removal by Governor Hughes of Borough President Ahearn on evi-
dence of incompetence and waste first furnished by the Bureau.

2. Reorganization of the department of finance with notable improve-
ments in its methods of inspection, audit, payment, collection, reports, ete.

3. Accounting revision for all city departments with time sheets and ser-
vice records as the basis for auditing payrolls.

4, Budget reform, budget exhibits, budget publicity, budget confer-
ences of social workers, clergymen, and taxpayers.

5. Conversion of the commissioners of accounts office from a handicap
to civic progress into a potent agent for efficiency and honesty.

6. An increase of $2,000,000 a year in revenues due to the organiza-
tion of water collection methods.

7. System and economy substituted for waste and chaos in the repairs
and stores methods of the water department and in the purchasing and
repair methods of the police department.
272 COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

8. Establishment of a bureau of child hygiene in the department of
health and the extension of its work for school children and infants.

9. Cessation of many slaughter house evils through more efficient inspec-
tion by the department of health.

10. Recovery of $723,000 from street railway companies for paving done
at public expense between the companies’ rails, and suits pending for
$300,000.—Bruere’s The New City Government, p. 101.

665 Munro’s Principles and Methods of Municipal Administration,
p. 17.

666 Ryan’s Municipal Freedom, pp. 53, 54.

667 Munro’s Ten Years of Commission Government in the National
Municipal Review, Vol. I, p. 564.

668 Shambaugh’s Commission Government in Iowa: The Des Moines
Plan, pp. 32, 33.

669 Goodnow’s Politics and Administration, p. 9.

670 In an address before the Boston Economic Club, January 11, 1907,
cited in MacGregor’s City Government by Commission, p. 17.

671 Matthews’s The City Government of Boston, p. 182.

672 Goodnow’s Politics and Administration, p. 15.

673 Durand’s Council vs. Mayor in the Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
XV, p. 681.

674 Durand’s Council vs. Mayor in the Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. XV, p. 685.

675 McBain’s Evolution of Types of City Government in the National
Municipal Review, Vol. VI, pp, 28, 29.

676 McBain’s Evolution of Types of City Government in the National
Municipal Review, Vol. VI, p. 30.
INDEX

Accountant, 176

Accounting, provisions for, 178; meth-
ods of, 181, 236; desirability of uni-
formity in, 196

Accounts and finances, 85

Administration, definition of 16, 17,
240; departments of, 60

Administrative council,
of, 180; meeting of, 180

Administrative departments, designa-
tions of, 85, 100; provision for, 189

ee Si TELYS experts, election of,

composition

Aamintstrstive officials, appointment

or,

Administrative system, abolition of,
51, adoption of, 51

a committees, appointment of,
194

Alabama, scope of commission laws
in, 116; laws in, concerning com-
mission government, 116-118; cities
in, under commission government,
118; commission laws in, 127, 128

Albion (Michigan), adoption of city-
manager charter in, 194; popula-
tion of, 194

Aldermen, reference to, 20, 21, 45, 48;
functions of, 21, 22, 28; vacancies
among, 22; election of, 22, 26, 66,
83; term of office of, 22, 27, 66, 201;
powers of, 27, 29, 30; qualifications
of, 30; local interest of, 65; com-
pensation of 69, 78; duties of, 69;
pumber of, 77; deposit required of,
167; appointive power of, 201; meet-
ings of board of, 201

Alhambra (California),
commission government
city-manager in, 220

Allen, S. B., charter framed by, 81

Allen Act, passage of, 114

Alleys, expenses for, 162; maintenance
of, 176; inspection of, 203

Allied Civic Bodies Committee, effort
directed by, 128

Allison, Edward P., article by, 249

Amarillo (Texas), city-manager plan
in, 198

American politics, feature of, 231

Annapolis (Maryland), 22

Apalachicola (Florida), special com-
mision charter granted to, 150

Appointive officials, conduct of, 187

Appraisers, board of, 74

Appropriations, provisions for, 178,
185; public hearings on, 179

Arizona, admission of, into the Union,
146; provisions of constitution of,
146; establishment of home rule
charter system in, 146; spread of
city-manager plan in, 186-188; agi-
tation for city-manager in cities of,
186,187; capital of, 187

Arkansas, laws in, concerning com-
mision government, 123, 124; city-

adoption of
in, 39;

manager plan in, 220; commission-
manager charter authorized by, 220

Art aud museum commissioners, ap-
pointment of board of, 197

Asheville (North Carolina),
charter granted to, 147

Ashtabula (Ohio), proportional sys-
tem in, 183

Ashtabula Plan, The, 267

Assembly, votes in, 155

Assessment, provisions for, 193

Assessors, election of, 30, 33, 85; ap-
pointment of, 60, 189, 192, 195, 206;
duties of, 88, 84; term of office of,
ae department under control of,

special

appointment of,

Attorney, appointment of, 188, 189,
190, 191, 192, 194, 201; department
under control of, 196

Attorney-General, opinion of, neces-
sary, 104

Auditing committee, 164

Auditors, term of office of, 38; elec-
tion of, 38, 85, 126; appointment of,
60, 132, 185, 189, 201; duties of, 83,
84; provision for, 180, 181; reference -
to, 187

Austin (Texas), commission govern-
meu in, 105; charter granted to,

Assistant solicitors,
206

Baily, W. H., discussion by, 80; char-
ter framed by, 81

Baker (Oregon), provisions of char-
ter of, 143, 144

Bakersfield (California), adoption of
aoe rule city-manager charter by,

Ballots, reference to, 72, 98, 118;
names of candidates on, 83, 119, 129,
142, 205; designations on, 123, 184;
provisions for forms of, 236

Baltimore (Maryland), charter of
(1797), 27; provisions of charter of
(1797), 27, 28; reference to, 33, 39;
population of, 35; water-works of.
35; park systems of, 35

“Banning Law,” application of, 119

Bates, Frank G., article by, 257

Baton Rouge (Louisiana), 109

Beard, Charles A., comment by, 13

Beaufort (South Carolina), feature of
charter of. 200; failure of govern-
ment of, 201

Bellingham (Washington), charter
framed by, 139

Benet, Christie, article by, 259

Berkeley (California) commission
plan considered in, 188; election
plan of, 139

Berryhill, James G., report of, 79;

discussion by, 80; charter framed
by, 81; article by, 255

(273)
274

Bicameral council, 28

Bicameral system, reference to, 26, 27;
abolition of, 48

Big Rapids (Michigan), adoption of
commission-manager plan in, 183

Birmingham (Alabama)), commission
laws applicable to, 116, 127; repeal
of act for, 128

Bisbee (Arizona),
of, 187

Blackmar, Frank Wilson,
by, 224; article by, 270

Blind-voting, 63

Block books, system of, 74

Bluefield (West Virginia), special com-
mission charter granted to, 147

Board, numbers of, 117; powers of,
1

failure of charter

comment

“Board of Affairs,” powers conferred
upon, 147

Board of health, establishment of, 41

Board system, establishment of, 36,
46; inauguration of, 37; effect of, on
municipal administration, 42; rea-
sons for failure of, 44

Boise (Idaho), adoption of commis-
sion government in, 114

Bond issues, referendum vote required
on, 104, 150; commissioners on, 202

Bonds, issuance of, 70; provisions for,

Boroughs, influence of, on American
cities, 20; functions of, in England,
21; reference to, 115

Boston (Massachusetts), election of
councilmen in, 13; charters of, 20,
29, 39, 45; population of, 35; water-
works of, 35; reference to, 136, 187;
exclusion of, in optional charter
law, 209

Bowman, H. M., article by, 254

Boynton, W. E., 183

Bradford, Ernest S8., article by, 257

Brainard (Minnesota), agitation for
city-manager plan in, 197

Bridges, construction of, 171; main-
tenance of, 176

Bristol (Tennessee), special commis-
sion charter granted to, 154

Brooklyn (New York), charters of,
4, 228

Brooklyn County (New York), crea-
tion of, 40

Brownsville (Texas), adoption of com-
mission-manager plan in, 199

Bryce, James, comment by, 9, 226

Bucklin, James W., article by, 264

Budget, formulation of, 222; provision
for, 196

Budget-making, 177,
178, 194, 238 i.

Budget system, reference to, 181, 189

Buffalo (New York), election of com-
missioners in, 14; special bill for,
154; struggle of, for commission
charter, 154, 155; commission char-
ter granted to, 155

Burlington (Iowa),
ernment in, 96

Business-manager, appointive power
of, 199; office of, 199, 202, 217; pow-
ers of, 199; financial report of, 199,
217; term of office of, 199, 217; du-
ties of, 217

Business-manager plan, 129, 130

provisions for,

commission gov-

COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Cadillac (Michigan), adoption of
city-manager plan in, 192

California, laws of, concerning com-
mission government, 118; amend-
ments to the constitution of, 188;
eharters framed by cities of, 188;
agitation for city-manager in cities
of, 186; spread of city-manager
plan in, 188-190, 219, 220 :

California legislature, charter ratified

by, 189
Celitornia, Municipal Home Rule in,

Cambridge (Massachusetts) adop-
pom of commission-manager plan in,

Canadian system of nomination, de-
scription of, 167

Canals, maintenance of, 176

Candidates, nomination of, 91, 182, 184,
190, 191, 192, 193, 197, 205; filing
fee required of, 119, 131; election of,
124; elimination of, 184

Cartesville (Georgia), special commis-
sion charter granted to, 150

Cedar Rapids (Iowa), population of,
in 1910, 35; reference to, 78; com-
mission government in, 96

Cemetery commissioners, appointment
of board of, 188

Cemetery sexton, duties of, 203

Centralization, movement toward, 44,

Chamber of commerce, proclamation
filed with, 170; charter campaign
led by, 172

Charitable institutions, care of, 176;
control of, 192

Charleston (South Carolina), popula-
tion of, 35

Charlottesville (Virginia), government
of, 217 .

Charters, number of, enacted and
amended, 27; number of, enacted
from 1830-1850, 30-38; submission of,
124; ratification of, 125; number of
commissioners designated in, 125;
provisions for compensation of offi-
cers in, 125; provision for powers
of officers in, 125; provision for
amendment of, 125; methods of se-
curing, 131; reference to, 184, 223;
types of, 135; framing of, 137, 144;
features of, 145

Charter board, power conferred upon,
140; work of, 173

Charter commission, statement by, 173,
174; members of, 183; work of, 193

Charter committee, composition of, 81

eas conventions, provisions for,

Charter election, holding of, 193

Charter laws, states with optional
model, 131-137; execution of op-
tional, 213

Chatershaking, law providing for,

Chattanooga (Tennessee), adoption of
commission government in, 154

Checks and balances, reference to, 26,
30, 160; results of, in municipal’ gov-
ernment, 28, 29; provision for, 87;
effects of, on officials, 238

Chelsea (Massachusetts), adoption of
commission plan in, 153

Cheyenne (Wyoming), adoption of
commission government in, 111
INDEX 275

Chicago (Illinois), charters of, 31, 32,
38; suffrage in, 31; water supply of,
ri reference to, 39; police force of,

Chief magistrate, provisions for, 140

Chief of fire department, appointment
of, 60, 189, 190, 191, 194, 201; refer-
ence to, 74’: officers suspended by, 92

Chief of police, appointment of, 60,
189, 190, 191, 194; reference to, 74;
officers suspended by, 92

Childs, Richard S., comment by, 215,
216; article by, 245, 266, 269

ia influence of social leaders in,

Circuit court, petition filed with, 211

Cities, neglect of govenment of, 7;
problems arising in, 24; gravitation
of population toward, 34; devel-
opment of, 35, 36; demand for pow-
ers by, 36; population of, 111; ref-
erence to, 115; charters framed by,
124; incorporation of, 125; provis-
‘ions for incorporation of, 144; pow-
ers granted to, 145, 146; aggregate
number of, 230

Cities and towns, authority conferred
upon, 203

Cities of the first class, laws affect-
ing, 100, 101; reference to, 102, 111;
executive departments in, 110; num-
ber of commissioners in, 112; recall
election in, 114, 115; government of,
126; provisions for, 163

Cities of the second class, laws af-
fecting, 101, 121; reference to, 102,
105, 111; executive departments in,
110; government in, 126, 128; pro-
vision for, 135; operation of charter
law in, 209; number of councilmen
in, 211

Cities of the third class, laws affect-
ing, 101, 121; reference to, 102, 105,
106, 109, 111; government of, 126,
128; provision for, 1385; operation of
charter law in, 209; number of coun-
cilmen in, 211

oe of the fourth class, 105, 106,

Cities of the fifth class, board of trus-
tees in, 11

Cities of the sixth class, board of
trustees in, 118

Citizens’ board provisions for, 147,
177

City, topography of, 224; political and
social organization of, ‘994; necessity
of charter reform in,

City So mitnteheatlony lack of cohesion
in, 3

City and County of Denver (Colorado),
commission plan abandoned in, 143

City attorney, election of, 32, 33, 60;
reference to, 73, 176; powers of, 108

City Charter Making, Evolution in,
266

City charters, demand for changes in,

City commissioner, powers of, 216;
functions of, 216, 217; reports of.
216, 217

City ‘Commissioner, How a Little City
is progressing under a, 269

City council, powers conferred by, 67

City engineer, 74

City Government, Evolution of Types
of, 271

City Government, The Grand Junction
Plan of, 264

City government in America, latest
plan of, 158

“City Hall Gang,” registration books
padded by, 93, 94

City health officer, 74

City-manager, appointment 18,
162, 175, 181, 185, 189, 190, 130 194,
195, 198, 200, 201, 202, "206, ‘O12; ‘office
of, 159, 214, compensation of, 163,
170, 187, 189, 190, 191, 198, 201, 217,
219; powers of, 163, 185, 186, 188,
191, 192, 193, 194, 197, 201, 207, 212,
218, 218, 221, 299’. term of office of,
166, 169, 188, 198, 202, 203, 207, 212,
217, 241; duties of, 166, 167, 171, 173,
174, 181, 187, 188, 189, 190, 196, 200,
201; 203, 267, 308, 222; appoint-
ive power of, 166, 169, 175, 176,
186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 196,
197, 202; 206, 213, 213, 218,
219, 222, 223; relation of, to council,
166, 241; qualifications of, 168, 169,
187, 194, ‘oor, 215, 221-225; reports re-
quired of, 169, 187, 213, 219, 222;
budget formulated by, 169; adver-
tisement for, 169, 170, 219; title of,
172, 180, 198, 215; provision for,
173; definition of, 175, 202, 206,
216, 245; enumeration of, powers
of, 175, 176, 212, 213; power
of removal of, 175, 187, 190, 191, 196,
218, 218, 219, 228; power of, to vote,
175, 188, 222; request by, 177; finan-
cial report by, 178, 207, 208; checks
on, 181; removal of, 188, 190, 191, 198,
203, 212; estimates submitted by,
196; relation of, to commission, 200,
241; double function of, 200, 202;
recommendation of, 201;  reap-
pointment of, 202; authority of,
202, 208, relation of, to executive
departments, 202, 218, 219, 223;
election of, 203; bond required of,
207; oath of office of, 207; control
of employees by, 212; responsibil-
ities of, 212, 222; types of, 214-220;
list of cities under, 215; reference
to, 216, 223, 224; departments under
control of, 217; salaries fixed by,
218; relation of, to board of trustees,
219) importance of, 221; education
0

City- manager in America, forerunners
of, 161

City-manager plan, origin of, 9; ad-
vantages of, 18, 159-161, 234, 235,
238, 239; separation of powers un-
der, 18, 19; reference to, 129, 132,
133, 135, 136, 234, 242; progress of,
156; definition of, 157, 214; origin
and development of, 158-220; ten-
dency leading to, 158; administra-
tive efficiency in, 158; centralized
responsibility in, 160; adaptability
of, 160; economy in, 160; ward
elections in, 160; proportional rep-
resentation in, 160; progenitors of,
161; adoption of, 168; events lead-
ing to, 172, 173; place of origin of,
186; provision for abandoning, 209;
proceedings for adoption of, 210,
211; similarity in, 211; votes for,
218, 214; innovation of, 230; sim-
plicity. of, 234; reduction of func-
tions in, 235; improvement of, 238;
276

failure of, 238; basic principle of,
240; supremacy of, 241

City-Manager Plan, The, to Date, 268

City-Manager Plan, The, the Latest in
American City Government, 266

City-Manager Plan, The, with Pro-
portional Representation, 267

City Managers’ Association, defini-
tion by, 216

City pathologist, 74

City physician, election of, 85

City plan board, provision for, 177

City scavenger, 74

City tax attorney, 73

Civic consciousness, awakening of, 231,

234

Civic Education, What is, 243

Civic Improvement League of Salt
Lake City, committee sent by, 125

Civic patriotism, importance of, in
city government, 232; awakening of,
233; definition of, 233

Civil engineer, election of, 38, 85; term
of office of, 88; reference to, 194

Civil service, use of, 15; provision for,
70, 100, 110, 129, 148, 154, 180; ex-
emptions from rules of, 92; examin-
ations for, 92; reference to, 169

Civil service board, appointment of,
175; provision for, 195

Civil service commission, appointment
of, 73, 128, 131, 185, 186, 190; compo-
sition of, 73; functions of, 73; pow-
ers of, 73; provisions for, 91, 92, 100,
112, 122, 183, 153, 182; control of,
over officials, 109; term of office of,
131; duties of, 181; reasons for re-
movals filed with, 190

Civil service commissioners, appoint-
ment of, 92; power of removal of, 92

Civil service law, recognition of, 108

Civil service system, provision for,

145
Civil War, municipal conditions dur-

ing, 42; municipal organization
during, 46
Clarinda (Iowa), creation of city-

manager in, 202

Clarinda plan, description of, 202-204;
reference to, 209

Clark, Charles A., paper read by, 78

Clark, C. K., appointment of, 187, 188

Clark (South Dakota), city-manager
in, 220

Clarke Act, 217

Clarksdale (Mississippi),
government in, 105

Clerk, appointment of, 30, 182, 175,
189, 190, 192, 194, 195, 202 205, 206;
election of, 32, 85; reference to, 65,
91; duty of, 83, 203; campaign ex-
penses published by, 84; resolution
filed with, 88; petition filed with,
90, 130, 211; designation of, 114;
candidacy filed with, 121; affidavit
filed with, 124; term of office of,
129; fees paid to, 131; bond sub-
mitted to, 164; provision for, 180

Cleveland (Ohio), charters of, 31, 45,
179; departments created in, 38;
control of police in, 41;

eons (Mass.), water-works of,
5

Codman, William, article by, 263
cone of taxes, provision for, 193,

commission

Collector, election of, 30, 32; appoint-
ment of, 60

COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Collinsville (Oklahoma), adoption of
ecity-manager plan in, 199

Colonial boroughs, list of, 245

Colorado, home rule charters incor-
porated in, 141; constitutional
amendments in, 141; adoption of
commission laws in, 141-143; cities
in, under commission plan, 143; agi-
tation for city-manager in cities of,
186; spread of city-manager plan
in, 188

Colorado City (Colorado), adoption
oe a rule commission charter in,

Colorado Springs (Colorado), home
rule charter of, 141

Columbia (South Carolina), commis-
sion government in, 109

Columbia Bill, provisions of, 168

Commercial organizations, efforts of,

Commercialism, spirit of, 226
Commission, powers of, 104, 114, 120,
32, 141, 197; composition of,
119, 122, 123, 182, 139, 141, 142, 147,
151, 154, 168, 169, 174, 181, 182, 185,
187, 190, 192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 199,
200; term of office of, 115, 119, 200;
eharter drafted by, 1381; meetings
of, 132, 175, 198; appointive power
of, 132, 185, 188, 191, 193, 194, 195,
197, 198, 206, 210; power of removal
of 133; duties of, 175, 191, 198; de-
partments created by, 175; duties
prescribed by, 176; measures pre-
sented to, 176; power of, over ex-
ecutive departments, 176, 177; report
required by, 178; duty of, to audit,
179; president of, 181; officers under
control of, 181, 192; approval of,
186, 194, 198; regulations for civil
service framed by, 186; powers con-
ferred on, 195; functions of, 195,
206, 212; estimates submitted to,
196; popular control of, 197; execu-
ue committee of, 199; reference to,

a
nN

Commission, Governing Cities by, 256

Commission charter, drafting of, 140;
differences between, 144; methods of
adoption of, 146; states with special,
146-156; weakness in, 235; concern
of, 236

Commission Form of Government, A
Campaign for a, 259

Commission forms of
similarily in, 241

Commission government, demand for,
9; definition of, 9, 10, 11; means of
control of, 11; features of, 11, 12, 13,
14; representation in, 14; defects of,
16; collective responsibility in, 16,
17; individual responsibility of com-
missioners in, 16, 17; need of cen-
tralization in, 17; election of ex-
perts in, 17, 18; history of inaugu-
ration of, 53, 54; act establishing,
81; procedure for adoption of, 82,
88; provision for abandoning, 92, 93,
100, 101, 108, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115,
116, 117, 120, 122, 128, 182; reason
for popularity of, 98; changes un-
dergone by, 98; adoption of, in
small municipalities, 118; provisions
for adopting, 125; weak points in,
157; analogy of, 158; administrative

government,
INDEX

efficiency in, 177; creation of, 227;
history of, 227-230; spread of, in
the United States, 2! study of,
229; relative successes of, 231, 232;
reference to, 234; advantages of, 234
Commission Government Association
of New York State, purpose of, 155
Commission government charters, 167
Commission Government for Cities,
244, 263
Commission Government, History and
Underlying Principles of, 257
Commission Government, Objections
to, 270
Commission Government in Iowa, 254
Commission Government in Kansas,

257
Commission Government in the West,

Commission laws, states with permis-
sive or optional, 99-125; general and
optional, adoption of, by _ states,
110; provisions in, 122; obligatory
and self-executing, 125-131; cities of
the second class governed by, 130;
reference to, 146

Commission-manager plan, origin of,
9; characteristics of, 18; spread of,
69; reference to, 120, 145, 216, 231;
adoption of, 143, 146, 198; creation
of, 227

Commission plan, definition of, 15;
reference to, 48, 132, 133, 135, 136,
145, 166, 173, 242; analogies of, 49,
50; distinguishing features of,
incorporation of, 140, 142; adobtion
of, 143; defect of, 177; results of,
209; failure of, 235; introduction of
business methods in, 236; theories
concerning, 2387; popular control
under, 238; objections to,
remedy for shortcomings of, 238,
239; cities under, 25:

Commission plan of city government,
early precedents of, 49-55; origin
of, 49-75; spread of, 97- 157.

Commission Plan of City Government,
The, 254

Commissioners, election of, 13, 14, 100,
102, 118, 139, 140, 150, 193, 195, 198;
term of office of, 38, 59, 100, 101, 102,
105, 109, 111, 114, 117, 118, 123, 126,
127, 131, 1382, 142, 143, 144, 150, 151,
174, 181, 185, 188, 192, 193, 197, 199,
200; analogy of, 49; county govern-
ment vested in boards of, 50; duties
of, 51, 52; powers of board of, 59,
115, 116, 126; election of board of,
60; time devoted by, 60; compen-
sation of, 60, 104, 7 190, 192, 197;
board of, 61; power ‘of removal of
official ‘titles of, 60, 251; ap-
pointive power of board of,
61; power of removal of board
of, 61; causes for removal of.
61; compensation fixed by board
of, 62; duties prescribed by board
of, 62; sessions of board of, 62; re-
port required of board of, 62, 63;
bonds required of boards of, 62,
103; policy determined by, 69;
reference to, 72; number of, 100,
102, 103, 104, 109, 120, 126, 427,
144) 147, 230, 236; partial re-
newal of, 102, 118, 127, 142, 185, 193,
200; mayor elected by, 122; means
of removal of, 123, 147; amendment

277

proposed by, 125; officers assigned
by board of, 127; composition of
board of, 127; appointment of suc-
cessors to, 127; appointment of, 127;
assignment of, 130, 131; appointive
power of, 133, 187; officers removed
by, 187; powers granted to, 149, 150,
232; request of, 170; renewal of
board of, 174; provision for va-
cancy in office of, 174, 175; candi-
dates for, 184; actions prohibited to,
186; officer under board of, 199;
resolution affecting, 215; first in-
stance of election of, 229; distine-
tion in office of, 2377 ; quality of,
237; conflicts between, bad: appoint.
ment of board of, 248; function of
board of, 248, 249
Commissions, net aces of, in state
and national affairs, 10, 11
Committees, departments assigned to,
67; bills smothered in, 125; reports
of, 125
Cquunion council, composition of, 21,
Commons, John R., comment by, 250
Comptroller, election of, 195; depart-
ment under, 196 (see also controller)
Congress, powers vested by, 50; ex-
periment with, 230
Kerry, bill

Conroy introduced by,

Connecticut, need of municipal re-
form in,

Constables, election of, 30, 82, 192,

195; reference to, 65

Constitution, laws not consistent with,
59, 145; reference to, 95, 104, 125,
130; home rule provision in, 115;
provisions of, 118, 140, 148; powers
granted by, 182; popular vote re-
quired by, 183; charter consistent
with, 137; home rule provision of,

138, 145, 187
Contingent fund, items for, 197
Contracts, public inspection of, 88;

supervision of, 187; veto power up-
on, 201
Controller, removal of, 68; term of
office of, 129 (see also comptroller)
Convention, representation in, 149
Cooper, Walter G., article by, 270
Cooperation, importance of, in city
affairs, 196
Cooperative buying, plans for, 196
Corporation counsel, appointment of,

Corporation court, judge of, 60

Corporations, 21; number of, during
colonial period, 21; influence of, in
city government, 7

Corpus Christi (Texas), commission
government in, 105; charter granted
to, 152

Corruption, attacks on, 78

Council, composition of, 27, 28, 30, 31,
32, 66, 78, 83, 106, 107, 108, 110, 112°
126, 129, 130, 133, 135, 137, 141, 142
147, 148 152 162; 166, 172; 180, 182
188, 189, 190, 192, 201, 210, 211, 241;
appointive power of, 29, 32, 188, 202,
205; supremacy of, curtailed, 32;
powers of, 33, 44, 68, 84, 85, 94°
100, 104, 115, 123, 130, 133, 136, 141, 142,
147, 148, 152, 162, 188, 192, 202. 204;
216, 241; decline of power of, 36; in-
efficiency of, 37; powers of, curtailed,
278

37, 38, 39; reference to, 45, 58,” 113,
214, 225; predominance of, 46; dis-
trust in, 46, 583; government by, 51,
76; sessions of, 68, 69, 86, 152; meet-
ings of, 69, 206; journal proceed-
ings of, 70, 206; resolutions re-
pealed by, 71; popular check on, 71;
hearing of, 72, 109; power of, over
civil service commission, 73; boards
created by, 74; duties of, 83, 84;
officers elected by, 85, 92, 185, 189,
190, 192, 202, 206; power of removal
of, 85, 190; vice-president of, 87;
franchise submitted by, 88, 111;
law concerning, 107; officers as-
signed by, 119; resolution of, 128;
legislative power vested in, 129;
salary of mayor determined by, 129;
salary of councilmen determined by,
129; consent of, 131, 1387, 162; special
election designated by, 135; juris-
diction of, 137; report submitted to,
162; committees of, 165; functions
of, 167, 168; election of, 201, 237;
resolution passed by, 215; advisory
power of, 217
Council-and-mayor
methods in, 236
Council committees,
er of, 33, 34
Councillors, election of, 31
Councilmanic plan, 133
Councilmen, provision for vacancies
among, 22; election of, 22, 26, 82, 84,
135, 136, 142, 148, 152, 153, 166, 180,
189, 190, 205, 211; government by,
51; number of, 86, 110, 121, 141, 204,
126, 136, 142, 171, 211; term of office
of, 22, 83, 106, 108, 113, 126, 129, 133,
205; compensation of, 87, 206, 262;
qualifications of, 106, 205; partial
renewal of, 108, 112, 113, 135, 137, 153,
ear reference to, 168; law affecting,
20'

plan, business

appointive pow-

Council system, abolition of, 63

Council vs. Mayor 2

Counsel, use of, 61

County board, appointment of, 175

County board of supervisors, repre-
sentations in, 195

County budget commission, tax rate
fixed by, 174

County commissioners, 45

County government, system of, 49

County supervisors, election of, 195

Court of Chancery, authorization by,
1, 52

Courts, injunction issued by, 94; duty
of. 95; judges of, 114; head of, 174;
reference to, 205

Criminals. election controlled by, 77

Crosby, John, comment by, 165; ar-
ticle by, 266

Culverts, maintenance of, 176

Cumberland (Maryland), special char-
ter granted to, 148

Cummins, Albert B., city government
plan of, 80

Curbing, construction of, 171

Dallas (Texas), commission’ gov-
ernment in, 105; official visit to, 106;
changes in charter of, 146; adop-
tion of commission plan in, 151

Dayton (Ohio), city-manager plan in,
156, 172-180; flood in, 172; charter

COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

convention in, 173; population of,
173, 194; reference to, 175, 176; fi-
nancial system in, 178, 179; example
of, 183; city-manager of, 223; char-
ter of, 236

Dayton, City Manager Charter of, 265

Dayton, Ohio, Two Epoch-Making
Campaigns in, 267

Dayton charter, adoption of, 173;
provision of, 177; framers of, 178,
179; weaknesses in, 180; features of,
181; criticism of, 182; reference to,
185, 194

Dayton Charter, Comments on the, 267

Dayton Charter, Defects in the, 267

ee plan, separation of powers in,

Deepwater Committee, sub-committee
appointed by, 55

Delaware, need of municipal reform
in, 156

Democracy, Unforseen Tendencies of,

Denison (Texas), commission govern-
ment in, 105; adoption of commission
plan in, 151; commission charter
granted to, 15

Denton (Texas), adoption of city-man-
ager plan in, 198

Denver’s New Charter, 264

Des Moines (Iowa), population of, in
1915, 76; old government of, 77; cor-
ruption in, 77; meeting of the Iowa
State Bar Association in, 78; refer-
ence to, 79, 173; bill presented by
committee from, 79; reform move-
ment in, 79; commercial club of,
joint discussion arranged by, 80;
efforts of citizens of, 81: conditions
in, under old regime, 88; agitation
for reform in, 93; success of the
new plan in, 98; committee sent to,

Des Moines Capital, The, referendum
taken by, 80

Des Moines charter, provision for pub-
licity in, 91; reference to, 160

Des Moines commercial club, 79

Des Moines News, The, 80

Des Moines plan, reference to, 14, 18,
81, 99, 148, 150, 151, 160; adoption
of, 54, 94; introduction of features
of 70; origin and provisions of, 75-
96; act establishing, 76, 97; sources
of ideas in, 81, 82; elective officers
in, 84: commissioners under, 85, 86;
committees under, 86; number of
officers in, 87; popular control un-
der, 87, 209; aim of, 88; provisions
for recall in, 90; civil service in,
91, 92; constitutionality of, 94, 95;
overation of, 95, 96; superiority of,
98; features of, 100, 149, 168; bills
modelled according to, 126; improve-
ments on, 139; executive depart-
ments in, 159; defect of, 177; fail-
ure of, 178; inception of, 229; work-
ing of, 237, 238

Des Moines Plan of Municipal Gov-
ernment, The, 255

Detroit (Michigan), charters of, 28,
29, 39; provisions of charters of, 30;
establishment of police board in, 41

mynen Edmond B., opinion of, 232,

Direct legislation, provisions for, 70,
71, 72, 192, 197, 286; propaganda
INDEX

for, 98; control of, 193
Director of finance, officers under
direction of, 176; provision for, 180;
appointment of, 185
Director of law, 176;

Director of public affairs, title of, 180
oe of public safety, duties of,

provision for,

Director of public service, duties of,

Director of public welfare, duties of,
176, 196; officer under direction of,

176
Director of publicity, 74
Directors, designations of, 176
District Court, decision of, 95
District Court of Polk County (Iowa),
litigation in, 94, 95
merece of Columbia, government of,

Ditches, maintenance of, 176

Douglas (Arizona), home rule commis-
sion charter in, 146; failure of char-
ter of, 186, 187

Doyle Committee, purpose of, 136; re-
port of, 136, 137

Drains, maintenance of, 176

Duluth (Minnesota), adoption of com-
mission plan in, 141 ;

Durand, E. Dana, comment by, 240;
article by, 270 2

Earle, I. M., charter framed by, 81
East Cleveland (Ohio), adoption of
home rule city-manager in, 185
Eckerson vs. City of Des Moines, 256
Education, department of, 101
Election, notice of, 89; reference to,
93; non-partisan, 109; provisions for,
190, 210; regulation concerning, 205
Blection-at-large, desirability of, 13
Election at random, reasons for, 253
Election at Random, 244
Election district, 119
Election to specific office, reasons for,

252, 253

Election to Specific Office, 244

Elections, penalty for bribes in, 84;
expenses in, 89; supervisors of, 210,
211

Blectorate, functions of, 241, 242

Electors, petition by, 82, 106, 107,
110, 121, 122, 1385; privilege of pe-
tition by, 89; votes of, 102; salary
of commissioners determined by,
103; approval of law by, 104, 141;
petition signed by, 109, 111, 112, 113,
115, 116, 117, 119, 126, 180, ‘
140, 195, 205; choice of, 124; number
of councilmen determined by, 133;
reference to, 134; preferences of,
142; powers vested in, 144, 55
functions of, 190, 232; petition sub-
mitted by, 204

Eliot, Charles W., comment by, 239

Elizabeth (North Carolina), adoption
of city-manager plan in, 201

Bllicott City (Maryland), special char-
ter granted to, 148

El Paso (Texas), commission gov-
ernment in, 105, 15

Blyria (Ohio), charter drafted by, 180

Elyria charter, defeat of, 181

Embrey, Alvin T., article by, 269

279

Hing mects, anges of, 83, 84; term of

office o ; appointment of

190, 191” i= ee

Engineering departments, control of,
192, 207; supervision of, 217

England, government of cities in, 13;
boroughs in, 20, 21; law in, regard-
ing corporations, 21; town clerk in,
161; borough corporation in, 181;
powers of city council in, 232; “se-
lect bodies” in, 246

Erie Canal, opening of, 35

Estimate, budget presented to board
of, 166

Etowah (Tennessee), adoption of com-
mission government in, 154

Europe, monarchy in, 93

Eveleth (Minnesota), adoption of
commission plan in, 141

Everett (Washington), adoption of
commission government in, 115;
adoption of home rule charter sys-
tem in, 139

Executive committee, duties of, 199

Executive departments, designations
of, 85, 107, 118, 121, 126, 127, 129,
130, 137, 143, 148, 154, 176, 196; num-
ber of, 103, 119, 149; reference to,
116; officers asigned to, 122; duties
distributed among, 134

Executive officers, election of, 38

Executive Plan, Controlled, 245

Hneetive powers, unification of, 165,

Executive veto, 28

Expenditures, publication of cam-
paign, 84; report of, 196
Fairlie, John A., 31
charter

Fairmount (West Virginia),
granted to, 148
Fancher, Fred W., article by, 267

Farbar, Jerome H., opinion of, 74;
article by, 254
Faribault (Minnesota), adoption of

commission plan in, 141

Federal census, population according
to, 116, 194

Federal Constitution, violation of, 94;
provision of, 95

“Federal Plan,” features of, 45, 46,
132, 185; business methods in, 236

Federal plan of city government, 228

Federal Trade Board, 10

Finance, committee on, 164

Finance, department of, 100

ea and revenue, commissioner

of,

Finances, provisions for control of,
179, 189, 193

Financial interests,
tive to, 208

Fire and police commissioners, pow-
ers of,

Fire and police departments, appoint-
ment of employees in, 61

Fire commissioner, provision for, 67

Fire department, establishment of, 41;
peerees to, 64,101; control of, 192,

publicity rela-

Fire engineer, election of, 38; term of
office of, 38

Fire marshal, 74

oe 65; free transportation of,
280

Ele petrick: Edward A., article by,

Florence (South Carolina), special
legislation for, 108
Florida, spread of city-manager plan

in
Florida legislature, acts passed by,

Ford, Henry Jones, comment by, 227;
article by, 270

Fort Collins (Colorado), adoption of
home rule commission charter in,

143

Fort Dodge (Iowa), commission gov-
ernment in, 9

Fort Smith (Arkansas), adoption of
commission government in, 124

Fort Worth (Texas), commission gov-
ernment in, 105; adoption of com-
mission plan in, 151

Forty-seventh General Assembly
(Missouri), laws passed by, 121

Foulke, William D., article by, 266

Franchises, granting of, 70, 88; pop-
ular consent on, 89; submission of,
to referendum vote, 1038, 104, 107,
108, 111, 117, 123, 127, 150, 152, 153,
209; provisions for, 113; control of,
151, 180, 185, 1938, 194; veto power

upon, 201

Fredericksburg (Virginia), govern-
ment of, 216, 217

Freeholders, charters framed by

board of, 118, 188; powers conferred
upon board of, 140; reference to, 141
Fuhrmann, Mr., bill vetoed by, 155
Fuller, A. M., comment by, 129, 130;
article by, 262

Galveston (Texas), first experiment in
city government by, 48; reference
to, 49, 61, 74, 82, 105; conditions of,
52, 55; commission plan crystallized
in, 53; damages by flood in, 55, 229;
introduction of charter of, 56; ad-
dress to the people of, 56; act to in-
corporate, 56; amendment to char-
ter of, 58; electors of, 60; financial
condition of, 63; annual expenses of,
63; catastrophe in, 64; aldermen in,
67; official visits to, 97, 106; success
of the new plan in, 98

Galveston act, opposition to, 56, 57

Galveston charter, reference to, 51,
146; framing of, 54; influence of
precedents in, 54: framers of, 62;
provision for publicity in, 91

Galveston plan, 10, 55-64, 70, 79; pre-
cedents of, 50-52; influence of, 53,
54; reason for adoption of, 54; im-
mediate results of, 57, 63, 64; ma-
chinery of, 59-63; submission of, 65,
66; commissioners in, 69; argu-
ments against, 75; joint discussion
on, 80; modifications in, 81; com-
mission in, 85; success of, 151; event
leading to, 172; votes for, 255

Gamblers, opposition by, 93

Gambling house, abolition of, 74

Garbage, collection of, 176

Gardiner (Maine), adoption of com-
mission plan in, 149

Gas works, 88; supervision of, 216

General Assembly, powers granted by,
182

General commission law of Texas,
cities operating under, 258

COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

General director, provision for,
residence qualification of, 180

General manager, bond required of,
164; compensation of, 164; check on,
164; report required of, 164; duties
of, 164, 192, 194; character of office
of, 165; business character of, 191;
appointment of, 192, 193; term of of-
fice of, 193

General manager ideas, 215

General superintendent, appointment
of, 218, 219; supervision by, 219

Georgia, charters passed by, 150;
cities in, under special commission
charter, 150

German method of advertising, appli-
eation of, in America, 159

GEE TAn Ky practice of advertising in,

Gilbertson, H. S., article by, 268

180;

Glencoe (Illinois), creation of city-
manager in, 219
Gloucester (Massachusetts), charter

granted to, 152; reference to, 153
Godin, Edwin Lawrence, comment by,

ee Frank J., comment by, 23,

Government, importance of form of,
221, 225; need of cooperation in de-
partments of, 240

Government, Expert Administration
in Popular, 271

Soe ene clubs, organization of,

Governor, corporation created by, 21;
appointive power of, 28, 40, 41, 117,
127, 248; reference to, 44, 148, 174;
tyrannical acts of, 46; commission-
ers appointed by, 56, 57, 127; au-
thority of, questioned, 58; ordinance
submitted to, 104; recommendation

by, 106; special message of, 106;
recall petition addressed to, 109;
authority conferred upon, 117;

votes for, 123; bills vetoed by, 126;
bills signed by, 126; approval of,
195, 204

Grafton (West
granted to, 148

Grand Haven (Michigan),
ager in, 220

Grand Junction (Colorado), home rule
charter of, 1

Grand Junction plan, distinguishing
features of, 142, 143

Grand Rapids (Michigan)), adoption
of city-manager plan in, 194; popu-
lation of, 194; charter commission

Virginia), charter

city-man-

of, 194, 195; revised charter of,
195, 196

Greater Des Moines Committee, pro-
gram of, 79

Green Cove Springs (Florida), special
commission charter granted to, 149

Greensboro (North Carolina)), special
charter granted to, 147

Greenville (Texas), commission gov-
ernment in, 105; adoption of com-
mission plan in, 151

Gresham, Walter, charter drawn by,

Grinnell (Iowa), adoption of city-
manager plan in, 209

Grove City ae cease govern-
ment of, 218; epidemic in, 218
INDEX

Hale, Wm. G., reform movement, fur-
thered by, 80

Harbor master,
201

Hare system, description of, 184

Harris County (Texas), 66

Hatiesburg (Mississippi), commission
government in, 105

Hatton, Augustus R., article by, 267

Haverhill (Massachusetts), charter
granted to, 152; reference to, 153

Health, department of, 101; ordinance
for 180; appointment of board of,

appointment of, 60,

Health officer, appointment of, 185,
189, 190, 191, 194, 201
Health physician, permission granted

y,

Heating plant, 88

Hickory (North Carolina),  city-
manaeer plan in, 171; population of,
17

High Point (North Carolina), spe-

. Cial charter granted to, 146

Highways, superintendent of, 164

Hoag, C. G., definition by, 183; ref-
erence to, 199; article by, 267

Home rule, demand for, 9; goal of,
47, 48; modifications of amendment
to, 70; application of, 140; pioneer
states in, 250

Home rule amendment, adoption of,
66; change made by, 73, 74

Home rule charter system, states with
constitutional, 187-146; description
of, 137, 188; application of, 139;
method of, 146; reference to, 151

Home rule charters, application of.
114; incorporation of, 188; provis-
ions of, 141, 142; uniformity of, 145

Home rule cities, privilege of, 138

Home rule commission charters, adop-
tion of, 145

Home rule for cities, 141

“Home Rule Law,” passage of, 103

Home rule states, 124, 156

Horack, F. E., article by, 270

Hot Springs (Arkansas), commission-
manager charter of, 220

House of correction, provision for,
19

‘7

Houston (Texas), adoption of com-
mission plan in, 54; story of, 65;
old government of, 65; need of re-
form in, 65; act granting charter of,
66; amendment to charter of, 66;
government in, 74; official visits to,
97, 106; success of the new plan in,
98; reference to, 105; changes in
charter of, 146; powers conferred
upon, 253, 25:

Houston, Results_ of
Government in, 254

Houston charter, essential features
of, 66-74; change in features of, 67;
provisions for publicity in, 70, ;
special provisions of, 71, 253, 254;
reference to, 72

Houston plan, 64-75; feature of, 69;
commissioners in, 69; change in, 70;
improvement of, 73, 74; results of,
74, 151; arguments against, 15;
commission in, 85

Houston Ship Channel, appropriation
for, 74

Howe, James A., decision by, 95

Commission

281

Iiughes, Charles E., comme :
charter vetoed by, 154 id Si

Huntington (West Virginia), special
commission charter granted to, 147

Hutson, Ethel, article by, 271.”

Idaho, cities in, under commission
government, 114; laws in, concern-
ing commission government, 112-114

Illinois, police act of, 1861, 41; laws
in, concerning commission govern-
ment, 106-108; General Assembly of,
107; cities in, under commission
government, 108, 259; spread of city-
Manager plan in, 218, 219

Illinois Statutes, scope of, 107; pro-
visions of, 218

Improvements, supervision of, 193

Improvements and contracts, pro-
visions for, 185

Incorporation Act, 112

Indebtedness, provisions for, 145

Indiana, need of municipal reform in,

Indianapolis
sent to, 80
Indianapolis plan, features of, 80
Ingham, Harvey, request by, 79; re-
form movement furthered by, 80;
reference to, 81
Inglewood (California),
city-manager in, 219
Initiative, use of, in city government,
18, 15; reference to, 14, 82; origin
of, in New England, 15; provision
for, 70, 71, 81, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104,
105, 106, 107, 109, 110, F % 5
114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123,
127, 128, 130, 131, 138, 184, 140, 141,
‘ , 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151,
152, 153, 154, 167, 180, 185, 186, 189,
209; institution of, 89, 94;  con-
stitutionality of, 95; elimination of,
126; court decision on, 139; incor-
poration of, 144; aversion to, 244
Injunction, filing of, 94
THAD ectors, appointment of, 189, 194,

(indiana), committee

powers of

ary
=

@
5

Interstate Commerce Commission, 10
Interurban railway,
Invoice, preparation of, 178

Iowa, special legislation prohibited
in, 43; commission plan perfected
in, 75; constitution of, 1857, 76;

municipal government in, 76; pop-
ulation of, in 1915, 76;  classifica-
tion of cities in, 76; government of
cities in, 78; bill submitted in Gen-
eral Assembly of, 79; commission
government established in, 81;
commission law in, 82; census of, 82;
commission-governed cities in, 96:
statute books of, 98; origin of city-
manager plan in, 202-209; incor-
poration of city-manager plan in,
204; nature of city-manager law in,
204, 208; oath to support constitu-
tion of, 207; provisions for finan-
cial matters in, 207, 208; defects of
budget system in, 208; abandonment
of city-manager plan in, 209

Iowa, Home Rule in, 263

Bor Removal of Public Officials in,

Iowa, Reorganization of State Govern-
282

Iowa constitution, violation of, 94;
reference to, 95

Iowa Falls (Iowa), creation of city-
Inanager plan in, 203

Iowa law, passage of, 54, 97, 99; pro-
visions in, 88, 89, 206; provision for
publicity in, 91; reference to, 101,

12, 154
Iowa legislature, act passed by, 204
Iowa State Bar Association, annual
peeling of, 78; recommendation by,

Jackson (Michigan), adoption of city-
manager plan in, 198; provisions of
charter of, 194

Jackson (Tennessee), adoption of com-
mission plan in,

oe Edmund J., compilation by,

James, Herman G., arguments of,
against election at large, 14; article
by, 266, 267, 269, 271

Jersey City | (New J ra election
of commissioners in,

Johnson, Lewis Teneute. article by,
2:

Judge oo police court, appointment
f,

Judges, 65; appointment of, 205
oe of peace, election of, 82, 192,

Kansas, special legislation prohibited
in, 48; laws in, affecting commis-
sion government, 99-101; cities in,
under commission government, 101;
commission-manager plan law of,
220; city-manager plan in, 220

Kentucky, commission laws passed
in, 108; laws in, concerning com-
mission government, 109; cities in,
under commission government, 109,
260; reference to, 171

Keokuk (Iowa), commission govern-
ment in, 96

ee (New York), creation
ol,

Kinne, L. G., recommendation by, 78

Knoxville (Tennessee), adoption of
commission government in, 154

Kressly, Paul E., article by, 270

La Follette (Tennessee), special com-
mission charter granted to, 154

La Grande (Oregon), adoption of
city-manager plan in, 190

aoe charter, amendment of,

Lake Charles (Louisiana), 109

Lakeland (Florida), special commis-
sion charter granted to, 150; adop-
tion of city-manager plan in, 200

Lakewood (Ohio), adoption of com-
mission charter in, 146

Lanes, maintenance of, 176

Las Vegas (Nevada), special commis-
sion charter granted to, 151

Las Vegas (New Mexico), adoption of
commission government in, 120

Lawrence (Massachusetts), commis-
sion plan substituted in, 153

COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Lawrenceburg (Tennessee), adoption
of commission government in, 123

Laws of Iowa, 1907, act in, 81

Lebanon (Tennessee), adoption of
commission government in, 154

Legislation, checks on, 43; definition
of, 240

Legislation and administration, differ-
entiation of,

Legislative council, powers of, 54

Legislatures, petition presented to,
26; supremacy of, over municipall-
ties, 26; powers of, over cities, 36,
37; control of, over city affairs, 40;
illustrations ‘of interventions by,
40-42; abuse of power of, over
municipalities, 43; appeal made to,
46, 58, 153; interference of, 46; ref-
erence to, 48, 225; act annulled by,
51; law passed by, 104; acts passed
by, 105, 106, 131, 145; special com-
mittee appointed by, 106; ratifica-
tion by, 118; bills introduced in, 122,
128; charters ratified by, 139; con-
stitutional amendment proposed by,
aaa special legislation evaded by,

Lewis, Charles, court case of, 57, 58

Lewiston (Idaho), adoption of com-
mission government in, 114; spe-
cial commission charter ‘granted
to, 152

Library commissioners, appointment
of board of, 188, 190; election of, 195

Library trustees, board of, 88, 85;
election of, 85

Licenses, issuance of, 207

Lighting, supervision of, 217

Lighting plant, 88

Lighting works, management of, 207

Lights, superintendent of, 164

Little Falls ee agitation of
city-manager plan in,

“Little Old Beaufort” (South Caro-
as adoption of city-manager in,

Loans, appointment of commissioner
of, 202

Lockport bill, failure of, 167

Lockport plan, history of, 165; fea-
ture of, 166; description of, 166,
167; provision of, 167

Lockport proposal, 165-167, agitation
arising from, 168; utilization of,
re model of, 188; reproduction of,

Lockport Proposal, The 266

Los Angeles (California), 82;
system in, 90

Louisiana, act passed by, 51; commis-
sion laws passed in, 108; laws in,
concerning commission government,
109-111; cities in, under commission
government, 110

Louisville (Kentucky), 171

Lowell, A. Lawrence, article by, 271

Lowell (Massachusetts), commission
plan substituted in, 153

Lynn (Massachusetts), adoption of
commission government in, 153

recall

McBain, Howard L., comment by, 233,
234, 241; article by, 271

McClure’s’ Magazine, article in, 63

McFarlane, Arch W., bill introduced
by, 204
INDEX

MacGregor, Ford H.,
259

MacVicar, John, 78

comment by,

Magistrate, 187, 232

Maine, legislative acts passed by, 149;
eity in, under special commission
charter, 149

“Managing Engineer,” title of, 218;
term of office of, 218; removal of,
218

Manhood suffrage, illustrations of, in
city charters, 31

Manistee (Michigan), adoption of city-
manager plan in, 192

Mankato (Minnesota), adoption. of
eommission plan in, 141

Marietta (Georgia), special commis-
sion charter passed by, 150

Market master, election of, 85

Markets, management of, 207

Marshall, election of, 30, 31, 38, 85;
term of office of, 38

Marshall (Texas), commission govern-
ment in, 105; charter granted to, 152

MarshaHtown (Iowa) commission
government in, 96 .

Maryland, legislature of, 41; cities in,
under special commission charters,
148

Mason City (Iowa), commission gov-
ernment in, 96 7 .

Massachusetts, political situation in
cities of, 136; commission govern-
ment inaugurated in, 152; legisla-
tive laws passed by, 209; application
of charter law of, 209; charter laws
in, 210; reference to, 210, 212; term
of councilmen in, 211; election of
mayor in, 211; provisions for pow-
ers of city-manager in, 213; spread
of city-manager plan in, 213, 218

Matthews, Nathan, comment by, 20,
21, 37; opinion of, 244

Mayor, 20, 21, 41, 44, 48, 58, 72, 90,
91, 101, 104, 110, 118, 141, 147, 160,
165, 168, 172, 181, 193, 198, 210, 214,
225; functions of, 21, 22, 28, 59, 134,
185, 174, 180, 201, 202; influence of,
dnring colonial period, 22; term
of office of, 22, 38, 59, 66, 83, 105,
106, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 123,
126, 127, 129, 131, 137, 143, 144, 148, 149,
152, 163, 193 195; powers of, 22, 27,
29, 46, 66, 67, 70, 84, 100, 103, 117,
144, 148 152 166, 202, 232; appoint-
ment of, 23, 28, 29, 127; election of,
26, 27, 31, 32, 38, 66, 82, 83, 84, 115,
119, 122, 136, 149, 174, 180, 201, 211;
duties of, 27, 32, 77, 78, 83, 84, 86,
87, 110, 111, 121, 180, 134, 205; veto
power of, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33. 38, 39,
59. 68, 87, 113, 114, 115, 134, 136, 150,
154, 166 193 201; appointive power
of, 28, 29, 30, 32, 38, 44, 45, 67, 68,
73, 77, 181, 162; qualifications of,
30, 106; executive power of, 38, 45,
51; relation of, to municipal cab-
inet, 39, 40; power of removal of, 44,
45; tendency to concentrate power
in, 53; title of, 59, 211; privilege of,
to vote, 59, 68, 113, 136, 212; com-
pensation of, 60, 69, 78, 87, 174, 195,
562; check on, 67; responsibility of,
67; budget submitted by, 68; rela-

283

tion of, to the council, 68; removal
of, 68; session designated by, 69;
importance of, 76; powers concen-
trated in, 80, 228; special election
called by, 82, 88, 89, 204; vacancy in
office of, 83, 87; secretary of, 92;
law concerning, 107; powers dis-
tributed by, 108; candidates for,
112; report required of, 134; recom-
mendations by, 134, 185, 186; provis-
jon for, 140, 141, 150, 211; report
submitted to, 162; council of, 175;
election called by, 205; official capa-
city of, 211, 212

Mayor-President, 59;
power of, 60

Mayor system, period of, 44; features
of, 45; reference to, 46

Meade v. Dane County, case of 106

Mechanical engineer, 194

Meas (New York), special bill for,

supervisory

Melzinga charter, veto of, 154
Memphis (Tennessee), government of,
52; special charter granted to, 153

Meredith, Ellis, article by, 264
Merit system, desirability of, 13; ref-
erence to, 48, 82, 91; provision for,

1

Michigan, adoption of new constitu-
tion of, 144; cities in, under com-
mission plan, 145; cities in, under
home rule provisions, 264; consti-
tution of, 195; spread of city-man-
ager plan in, 191-197, 220

Middletown (Ohio), adoption of com-
mission plan in, 13

Middle West, commission government

in,

Milwaukee (Wisconsin), charter of,
31, 32, 33; reference to, 105

Minneapolis (Minnesota), 141

Minnesota, commission laws in, 140,
141; cities in, under commission gov-
ernment, 141; constitutional pro-
visions of, 141

Minnesota law, characterization of, 141

Minor, F. D., charter drawn by, 55

Misdemeanor, penalty for, 200, 207

Mississippi feature of law in, 103, 104;
laws in, affecting commission gov-
ernment, 103-105; cities in, under
commission government, 105, 258

Missouri, laws in, concerning commis-
sion government, 121, 122; cities in,
under commission government, 122;
laws of the state of, 130; commis-
sion laws in, 130, 131; incorporation
of home rule charter system in 138

Missouri constitution, 1875,

Missouri constitutional amendment,
1896, 140

“Missouri! Idea,’’ origin of, 188; in-
troduction of, 140

Mitchell, Karl M., article by, 270

Mobile (Alabama), government of, 51,
52; adoption of commission govern-
ment in, 117

Mobile police board, government en-
trusted to, 52

Monroe (Louisiana), 109

Montana, cities in, 111; laws in, con-
cerning commission government,
111, 112; cities in, under commission
government, 112

Montesquieu, theory of, 26

Montgomery (Alabama), commission
284

laws applicable to, 116; act appli-
cable to, 127; repeal of act for, 128
Montrose (Colorado), home rule city-
manager charter in, 188
Morganton (North Carolina),
manager plan in, 171, 172
Morris (Minnesota), population of,
197; adoption of charter in, 197
Mt. Vernon (New York), special bill
for, 154
Municipal activities, character of, 239
Municipal administration, elements
in, 232
Municipal auditorium, erection of, 74
Municipal Business Manager, 270.
Municipal corporations, origin of, 20;
early development of, 20-24; powers
of, 22, 23; distinctive features of,
23, 24; provision for, 195
Municipal debts, interest on, 197
Municipal departments, supervision of,

city-

Municipal development, crisis in, 26
Municipal government; charges
against, 7; importance of, 7, 8;
development of, in the United
States, 7-19; reasons for difficult
administration of 8; need of re-

organization in 8 9; reform
movements in, 9; develop-
ment of, from 1820-1850, 29-38 ;

three plans of, 183; designation of
plans of, 135; types of, 136, 209, 210;
business phase of, 224; conditions
of, 225, 226; causes for failure of,
226, 227; importance of organiza-
tion of, 227; interest in, 228; exper-
iment in, 231; study of, 231, 239;
reformers of, 239; functions of, 239;
character of, 250

Municipal Government Association, ef-
forts of, 1385

Municipal Government by Commission
Committee of Allied Civic Bodies
ee Pennsylvania, organization of,

Municipal government in America,
origin of, 20; model of, 21; new
era in history of, 53; characteriza-
tion of, 225; history of, 225-242

Municipal home rule, establishment of
principle of,

Municipal improvement, 229

Municipal judge, election of, 185,
191; removal of, 191

Municipal law, enforcement of, 191

Municipal leagues, organization of,
2

Municipal machinery, demand _ for
changes in, 24; federal analogy in,
27; need of simplification in, 53

Municipal organization, development
of, in America, 20-48; changes in,
36; summary of history of, 45-47

Municipal Organization, Principles of,
270

of, 70;
provision for, 18
Municipal problems, awakening on,
in the United States, 43
Municipal reforms, agitation for, 78-
81; movement for, 228; policy of

Municipal ownership, scope

2

Municipal re-organization, beginnings
of, 48; demand for,

Municipal research, agitation led by
poard of, 172

COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Municipal research bureau, establish-
ment of, 236

Municipalities, need of,
234; distribution of,

Munro, William B., comment by, 43,
156, 237; discoveries of, 237
Murfreesboro (Tennessee), adoption
of commission plan in, 154

in America,

Napa (California), adoption of com-
mission government in, 189
Nashville (Tennessee),
mayors held at, 122
National census, 112
National conference, first meeting of,

meeting of

National government, 239

National Municipal League, organi-
zation of, 47, 215, 227; report of,
159-161

National Municipal Review, comment
by editor of, 251

Nebraska, laws in, concerning com-
mission government, 119, 120; cities
in, under commission government,
120, 261; adoption of constitutional
home rule charter system in, 146;
amendment to constitution of, 146

Negroes, political propaganda among,

Nevada, home rule charter system in,
124; charter making in, 124; laws
in, concerning commission govern-
ment, 124, 125; reference to, 125

Nevada law, features of, 124

New England, town government of,
49; town-meeting system in, 218

New England cities, commission gov-
- ernment in, 152

New England states, 35

New Hampshire, need of municipal
reform in, 156

New Jersey, laws in, concerning com-
mission government, 115, 116; cities
in, under commission government,
116, 119

New Mexico, laws in, concerning
commission government, 120; Terri-
torial legislation of, 161

New Mexico plan, 161-163

New Orleans (Louisiana), issuance
of charter of, 28; government of,
51; reference to, 109, 110; charter
of, 235

New Orleans’ Experience under Com-
mission Government, 271

Newspaper, charter published in, 124

New York, adoption of constitution of,
in 1822, 29; reference to, 35, 210, 212;
Republicans in, 40; powers of park
commission in, 40; commission laws
in, 135, 186; reform movement in,
154,155; political conditions in, 167;
legislative laws passed by, 209;
limitation of charter law of, 209;
cities of, number of councilmen in,
211; provisions for powers of city-
manager in, 212, 213

New York City, officials in, 20; char-
ters of 20, 209, 210; provisions of
eharter of, 30; reference to, 33, 39,
41, 44, 47, 227; population of, 35;
police force of, 35; park systems of,
35; feature of charter of, 37, 38;
government of, by legislative com-
INDEX

missions, 40, 41; powers of mayor in,
232; administration in, 236; muni-
cipal researches for, 271

eo York constitution, provisions of,

New York County, creation of, 40

New York legislature, law passed by,
135; plan presented to, 165; bill in-
troduced in, 167

New York Senate investigating com-
mittee, recommendation by, 44

New Zealand, 82

Newburgh (New York), adoption of
city-manager plan in, 213

Niagara Falls (New York), adoption
of city-manager plan in, 213

Nomination, non-partisan, 109; meth-
ods of, 236

Nomination reform, propaganda for,
98

Non-partisan ballot, desirability of,
13, 15; election by, 102, 111, 183, 214;
names of candidates in, 148; nomin-
ation by, 186

Non-partisan election ballots, provis-
ion for, 140

Non-partisan elections. 14, 129, 193;
provision for, 106, 107, 114, 119, 144,
145, 148, 195; process of, 201

Non-partisan nominations, provision
for, 139, 142

Non-partisan primary, provision for,
140, 143, 145, 148; nomination at,

3

15%

Norfolk (Virginia), 22

North Carolina, cities in, under spe-
cial commission charters, 146, 147;
cities in, under city-manager plan,
171, 172, 201

North Dakota, laws in, affecting com-
mission government, 101, 102; cities
in. under commission government,
102. 258

Norwood (Massachusetts),
ment of, 218

govern-

Oakland (California), election of com-
missioners in, 14; ratification of
charter of, 139

Officers, provisions for removal of,
92, 1°; enumeration of, 132; re-
striction on appointment of, 203,
204

Officials, removal of, 61; bonds re-
quired of, 62 ;

Ohio, special legislation prohibited
in, 43; constitutional amendment
in, 131, 146, 180; constitution of,
131, 172; model charter law in, 133;
spread of city-manager plan in,
180-186; constitutional provisions
of, 183; legislative laws passed by,
209; application of charter law of,
209; charter provisions for, 209;
number of councilmen in cities of,
211; election of mayor in, 211;
powers of city-manager in, 212;
spread of city-manager in, 213

Oklahoma, admission of, into the Un-
ion, 144; constitutional provisions
of, 144; types of commission char-
ters in, 144; spread of city-manager
plan in, 199; cities in, under com-
mission plan, 264 ‘i

One-party representation, objection
to, 183

285

Optional charter laws, origin of, 136;
enactment of, 213

Orange Park (Florida), special com-
mission charter granted to, 150

Ordinances, protest to, 89; popular
voice on, 88, 90; reference to, 113;
referendum vote on, 123, 130, 131;
constitutionality of, 123; committee
on, 164; provisions of, 164; enact-
ment of, 175; veto power upon, 201;
execution of, 212, 213, 223, 238

Oregon, home rule movement in, 143;
provisions of state law of, 144;
agitation for city-manager in cities
of, 186; spread of city-manager plan
in, 190, 191

Orlando (Florida), special commission
charter granted to, 150

Ottumwa (Iowa), commission govern-
ment in, 96

Palestine (Texas), commission gov-
oo in, 105; charter granted to,
Park commissioners, duties of, 83, 84
Park officers, 107
Parkersburg (West Virginia),
ter granted to, 147
Parks, superintendent of, 164
Parks and playgrounds, care of, 176
Parliament, analogy of, to city gov-
ernment, 158; act passed by, 246
Partisan ballot, 1383
Partisan nomination,
126
Pasadena (California), adoption of
commission government in, 139
Pass-a-Grille (Florida), special com-
mission charter granted to, 149
Patton, John S., article by, 270
Patton, O. K., article by, 263, 269
Paving, construction of, 171
Payments and reports, provisions for,

Penn’s charter, (1701), 25
Pennsylvania, act of, (1870), 41; re-
form movements in, 128-130; com-
mission laws in, 128; spread of city-
manager plan in, 217, 218; classes
of cities in, 262 ; :
Pennsylvania Commission _Govern-
ment for all Third-Class Cities, in,
Pennsylvania law, peculiar feature of,
129, 130
Penrose, Boise, article by, 249
Pensacola (Florida), special commis-
sion charter granted to, 150
Petition. use of, 82, 182; filing of, 90,
210, 211; affidavit attached to, 113;
candidates nominated by, 115, 117,
124: nomination by. 148. 198; per-
centages necessary for, 210
Petosky (Michigan), population of,
194; adoption of city-manager plan

in, 194

Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), 22, 41;
charters of, 25, 26, 39, 228; amend-
ment of charter of, 27: ponulation
of, 35; park systems of, 35; first na-
tional conference in, 47; law for,

128
piigdelphia, The City-Government of,
24

char-

provision for,

Phoenix (Arizona), adoption of home
rule commission charter in, 146;
286

gcoption of city-manager plan in,

Phoenix charter, feature of, 187
Physician, appointment of, 194

Pipestone (Minnesota), adoption of
commission plan in, 141

Pittsburg (Pennsylvania), benefits
received by, 128

Pittsfield (Massachusetts), adoption
of commission plan in, 153

Police, election of, 32; establishment

of board of, 41; ‘department of, 101;
appointment of chief of, 201, 202;
control of, 207

Police and fire, division of, 176

Police and fire commissioner, 60, 83, 84

Police and fire departments, mem-
bers of, 92

Police commissioners, state board of,
41; establishment of board of metro-
politan, 248

Police constable, election of, 38

Police department, control of, 192;
supervision of, 203

Police district, creation of, 40

Police judge, election of, 38; term of
office of, 38; appointment. of, 189,
206

Police magistrate, appointment of, 188

Police power, delegation of, 216

alam 65; free transportation of,

Political circles, influence of social
leaders in, 77

Political parties, influence of, in city
affairs, 34; intrusion of, in municipal
affairs, 36, 42

Political party, candidates for, 66; op-
position by, 125

Political ring, opposition by, 66

Political science, students of, 142

Politicians, opposition by, 98, 481, 187,
188; vileness of, 226

Politics, personal interpretation of,
226; elimination of, 229

Polk County (Iowa),” charter submit-
ted to representatives of, 81

Polling places, 72

Popular control, extent of, 214

Popular election, desirability of aban-
doning, 160

Port of Mobile,

52
Portland (Maine), history of charter
of, 149

incorporation of,

Portland (Oregon), second charter of,
144

Portsmouth (Virginia), eooption of
city-manager plan in,

Powers, separation of, a 88, 53, 54,
63, 87,

Preferential ballot, provision for, 66;
officers elected by, 192; choices in,
193, 198; election by, 198; incorpora-
tion of, 230

Preferential system, provisions for,
180

Preferential voting, provisions for,

5, 140; incorporation of, 117, 142

Preferential voting system, provision
for, 141

President, compensation of, 195, 218;
term of office of,

President of the United States, com-
missioners appointed by, 50

Primaries, provisions for, 182; elim-
ination of, 186; candidates for, 195

COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Primary elections, 95, 113; provision
for, 110, 144, 236; candidates nom-
inated in, 121, 126, 148

Primary nomination, 106;
for, 152

Property owners, petition by, 89

Proportional representation, cam-
paign for, 183, 184; reference to,
199, 250; incorporation of, 230

Proportional system, definition of, 183

Public affairs, 85

Public and _— special
provisions for, 193

Publte education, provision for, 189,

provision

improvements,

Public estimates, inspection of, 178

Public grounds, expenses for, 162;
inspection of, 203

Public improvements, 85; provision
for, 162, 178, 189; supervision of,
192; financing of, 179

Public parks, expenditures for, 74

Public peace, preservation of, 130

Public places, occupation of, 88

Public property, 85

Public protest, provision for, 208

Public safety, department of, 85

Public service corporations, law re-
garding, 88

Public utilities, power of city to ac-
quire, 70; referendum vote on sale
of, 181; maintenance of, 162; general
supervision of, 176; provision for
operation of, 189; duties of manager
of, 203

Public welfare commissioners, ap-
pointment of, 189

Public works, power of board of, 77,
154; board of, 88, 84; provision for,
193; management of, 207

Publicity, provision for, 108, 197, 208

Pueblo (Colorado), adoption of home
rule commission charter in, re a

Purchasing agent, reference to,
176; provisions for, 178, 179, 18
194; duties of, 196

Raleigh (North Carolina),
charter granted to, 147

Reactionaries, opposition by, 93, 94

Read, John, charter framed by, 81

Recall, use of, in government, 13, 15;
reference to, 14, 82; provision for, 70,
00, 104, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112,
114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 122, ,
130, 133, 134, 140, , 143, 145,
147, 14 8) 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154,
166, 167, 180, 182, 185, 186, 188,
197, 209, 236; steps necessary to, 72,
90, 91; limitations on, 73; institution
of, 94; constitutionality of, 95;
elimination of, 126; court decision
on, 139; incorporation of, 144; city-
manager subject to, 175; aversion
to, 244; extension of, 257

Recall elections, holding of, 72, 73;
petition for, 100; provision for, 102,
128, 127; process of, 131

Reconstruction, 46

Recorder, functions of, 21, 22, 23; elec-
tion of, 26; legislative powers of,
27; reference to, 28; appointment of,
30, 60, 191

Recreation facilities, management of,

special
INDEX

Reed, Thomas H., 190; article by, 263

Referendum, use of, in city govern-
ment, 13, 15, 89; reference to, 14, 81,
82; origin of, 15; provisions for, 70,
71, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106,
107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 118, 114, 115, 116,
117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 127, 128,
180, 133, 134, 140, 141, 142, 1438, 145,

147, 148, 149, 150 152, 153, 154, 167,

180, 182, 185, 186, 189, 209; establish-
ment of, 94; constitutionality of, 95;
elimination of, 126; court decision
on, 139; incorporation of, 144; aver-
sion to, 244

Referendum League of Buffalo (New
York), charter drafted by, 154

Reform movements, manifestations of,
47; opposition to, 93, 94

Reorm period, characterization of,

a

Reformers, 97

Register and Leader, The, editor of,
79; referendum taken by, 80

Re-organization, object of, 47, 48

Representatives, functions of, 174

Republic, 35

Republican ticket, pledge in, 187

Republicans, 40

Resolutions, 113; enforcement of, 223

Revenue, department of, 101

Review, appointment of board of, 206

Revolution,

Rhode Island, need of municipal re-
form in, 156

Rice, H. B., comment by, 65

Richmond (Virginia), 133

Richmond County (New York), crea-
tion of, 40

River Forest (Illinois),
of, 218, 219

Road commissioner, duties of, 203

Robertson, Major W. F., principles
formulated by, 170

Rochester (New York),
representatives in, 155

Roswell (New Mexico), adoption of
city-manager plan in, 162

Rotation system, 119

government

meeting of

Sacramento (California), government
op 50, 51; commission charter of,

Safety, ordinance for, 130

St. Augustine (Florida), adoption of
city-manager plan in, 200

St. Cloud (Minnesota), adoption of
commission plan in, 141

St. Elmo (Tennessee), adoption of
commission government in, 154

St. Louis (Missouri), charter of, 29,

30

St. Paul (Minnesota), election of
commissioners in, 14; adoption of
commission government in, 141

St. Petersburg (Florida), special com-
mission charter granted to, 150

Salem (Massachusetts), adoption of
commission plan in, J

Saloon interests, opposition by, 93

Saloons, regulation of, 74

San Angelo (Texas), adoption of com-
mission-manager plan in, 199

commission

San Diego (California), )
3 city-mana-

plan considered in, 138
ger plan in, 219, 220

287

San Francisco (California), election
of councilmen in, 13; benefit of, 138
San Jose (California), adoption of
me rule city-manager charter in,

San Mateo (California), adoption of
commission government in, 189

Sandusky (Ohio), adoption of com-
mission-manager plan in, 182; ref-
erence to, 183; charter of, 185

ey inspector, appointment of,

Santa Barbara (California), adoption
of home rule city-manager charter
in,

Santa Monica (California), adoption of
commission government in, 139

School, committee on, 164

Scranton (Pennsylvania), benefits re-
ceived by, 128

Seattle (Washington),
home rule charter in,

Secretary, appointment of, 60; peti-
a filed with, 72; certification by,

adoption of

Selectmen, number of, in town gov-
ernment, 49

Senate, 41; consent of, necessary, 50;
bill passed by, 204

Senate and House committees, joint
meeting of, 79

Seventh General Assembly
law passed by, 76

Sewage, disposal of, 207

Sewerage system, provisions for, 171

Sewers, maintenance of, 176; inspec-
tion of, 203, 216, 217; management
of, 207

Sexton, appointment of, 60

Shambaugh, Benj., F., comment by,
237, 288; article by, 254

Shelby County (Tennessee),
of, 52

Sherer, H. H., appointment of, 219

Sheridan (Wyoming), adoption of
commission government in, 111

Sheriff, 20; powers of, 193

Sherman (Texas), adoption of city-
manager plan in, 199

Sherrill, Marvin, appointment of, 171

Short ballot, 15; propaganda for, 98;
provision for, 139

Short Ballot Organization,
by, 15; reference to, 215

pee ballot principle, preservation of,

(Iowa).

creation

definition

Shrine Temple, joint discussion in, 80

Sidewalks, construction of, 171; main-
tenance of, 176

Sinking funds, maintenance of, 197

Sioux City (Iowa), commission gov-
ernment in, 96

Smith, R. Waverly, charter drawn
by, 55

ane A. V., proclamation signed by,

meaty: influence of social leaders in,
7

Solicitor, election of, 38, 85; term of
office of, 38, 129: duties of, 83, 84;
reference to, 92; appointment of, 182,
185, 202, 206; provision for, 180, 181

South Carolina, laws in, concerning
commission government, 108, 109;
spread of city-manager plan in, 200,

2
South Carolina act, approval of, 108
288

South Carolina legislature, bill passed

,

South Dakota, laws in, affecting com-
mission government, 102, 103; city-
manager plan in, 220

Special acts, provisions of, 123; char-
ters granted under, 154

Special assessments, 175

Special charter plan, amendment of,

Special charter system, method of, 146
Special charters, nature of, 36; pro-
hibition of, 76; commission gov-
ernment granted by, 105; cities in-

corporated under, 111, 112, 122;
reference to, 149
Special committees, recommendation

by, 106; appointment of, 180
Special election, holding of, 71, 168;
reference to, 88, 89, 90, 91, 100, 119,
139; purpose of, 98, 111, 118, 133 142,
204; provision for, 101, 102, 103, 104,
107, 108, 112, 114, 116, 119, 120, 121,
124, 128, 131, 135, 148, 149, 182; cost
of, 117; charters ratified in, 139, 189
Special legislation, 42, 84, 187; con-
stitutional prohibition against, 43;
constitutional provisions for, 249
Special local bills, number of, 136
Special statutes, 36
Spoils system, first appearance of, 33
Spokane (Washigton), adoption of
commission government in, 114, 115;
adoption of home rule charter sys-
tem in, 139
Spokane charter, provision for, 140
Springfield (Ohio), charter of, 180,
181, 182, 185; example of, 183
Standing committees, appointment of,
180

State, reference to, 36, 38, 40, 45, 125,
133; interference of, in city affairs,
87; control of, 41; forms of city
government in, 42; special legisla-
tion prohibited in, 43; decision af-
firmed by Supreme Court of, 45;
home rule in 48, 114; progressive
forces in, 80; general laws of, 93,
112, 120; plenary legislative power

of, 95; commission city govern-
ment in, 97; grant by, 103; laws
of, 104, 128, 124, 1387, 145;

cities and villages in, 107, 112, 115;

eapital of, 109; city interests
in, 110; organic law of, 114;
commission laws of, 116: opin-

ion of secretary of, 123; boroughs of,
128; powers granted by, 143; uni-
form laws in, 149; pleadings by citi-
zens of, 155; commission charter
enacted in, 155; need of commission
law in, 156, 157; third class city in,
165; officers of, 205; enforcement of
laws of, 223

State Boards and Commissions, 10

State census, 112

State commission, composition of, 41;
policy determined by, 41; partisan
control by, 42

State constitutions, effects of, on city
charters, 25; reference to, 37; pro-
vision of, 151; requirement of, 187

Siete examiner, accounts examined by,
1

State government, 239; functions of,
240

State law, provision of, 168

COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

State legislature, charter enacted by,
218; experiment with, 230, 231

States, number of, in union, 98; div-
ision of, according to classes, 99

Statutes, constitutionality of, 95;
ee in, 235; chief concern of,

Staunton (Virginia), general manager
in, 168; government of, 214, 215

Staunton plan, 163-165

Stockton (California),
charter of, 1389

Streams, maintenance of, 176

Street and bridge commissioner, pro-
vision for, 67

Street and public property,
missioner of, 60

Street commissioner, election of, 85;
appointment of, 201; duties of, 203

Street improvements, insertion of, 66

Street railway,

Streets, repair of, 162; construction of.
171; maintenance of, 176, 207; ap-
pointment of superintendent of, 60,
189, 191; inspection of, 203, 216, 217

Streets and public utilities, depart-
ment of, 101

Stubbs, Bishop, comment by, 21

Suffrage, extent of, during colonial
period, 22; limit to, 186

Sumter (South Carolina), origination
of city-manager plan in, 161; city-
manager of, 169; population of, 169;
response to proclamation of, 170

Sumter council, proclamation by, 169,

commission

com-

Sumter plan, 168-171

Superintendent of markets, election of,
38; duties of, 203

Superintendent of parks, appointment
of, 190

Superintendent of water-works, ap-
pointment of, 191

Superintendents, appointment of, 60,
213, duties of, 162; compensation of,
162; removal of, 213

Supervisor system, features of, 120

Supervisors, election of, 30; county
government vested in, 50; appoint-
ment of, 194

Supplement to the Code of
(1907), act in, 81

Supreme civil court, decision of, 58

Supreme court, decision of, 106

muprene criminal court, decision of,

Iowa

8
Surveyor, election of, 38; reference to,

Switzerland, 82

Tacoma (Washington), adoption of
commission government in, 114, 115;
adoption of home rule commission
charter in, 139

Taunton (Massachusetts), adoption
of commission government in, 153

Taussig, Frank W., comment by, 233

Tax, 196

Tax and land commissioner, provision
for, 67

Tax assessor and collector, 74

Tax collector, appointment of, 201

Tax payers, welfare of, 196

Tax rates, provisions for, 145, 229

Taxation, provisions for, 189

Taxing power, delegation of, 216
INDEX .

Taylor (Texas), city-manager plan
in, 198

Telegraph, provision for, 171

Telegraph line, 88

Telephone, provision for, 171

Telephone exchange,

Tennessee, abolition of municipal cor-
portion in, 52; cities of, 122; laws
in, concerning commission govern-
ment, 122, 123

Territorial act, provisions in, 120

Territorial legislature, 28

Texas, laws in, regarding elections,
59; reference to, 66, 74, 108; cities in,
under commission government, 105;
incorporation of home rule charter
system in, 145; act passed by, 145;
cities in, under home rule charters,
145; cities in, under special com-
mission charters, 151, 152; charters
granted by, 152; spread of city-
manager plan in, 198, 199; general
commission hw of,

“Texas Idea,” 97

Thirty-first General Assembly (Iowa),
committees in, 79; reference to, 81

Thirty-second General Assembly
(Iowa), act passed by, 76, 81

Thirty-sixth General Assembly (Iowa),
acts passed by, 209

Thirty-second Legislative Assembly

(Texas), amendment by, 66

Thirty-third Legislative
(Texas), amendment by, 66

Titusville (Pennsylvania), government
of, 217, 218

Toulmin, H. A., comment by, 161

Tower (Minnesota), adoption of com-
mission plan in, 141

Town manager, appointment of, 172;
term of office of, 172

Towns, population of, 111; reference
to, 115; incorporation of, 125; plan
presented by, 165

Transportation, management of, 207

Treasurer, 28, 176; appointment of, 30,
60. 132, 185, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194,
195; election of, 31, 32, 38, 85; term
of office of, 38, 129; duties of, 83,
84; fee paid to, 119; monthly balance
rendered by, 164; provision for,

department under con-
trol of, 196

Tribune (Des Moines, Iowa), propa-
ganda by, 93

“Triple Option,’ 132

Trustees, functions of board of, 50,
51; provision for board of, 118;
compensation of, 218; power of
beard ote 218, 219; meeting of board

of,

Tucson (Arizona), city-manager plan
in, 187, 188

Tulsa (Oklahoma), government of, 144

Turner, George Kibbe, article by, 63

Tweed Ring, description of, 42

Twenty-sixth General Assembly
(Iowa), act passed by, 203

Twenty-ninth Legislative Assembly
(Texas), plan submitted to, 66

Two Harbors (Minnesota), adoption
of commission plan in, 141

Tyler (Texas), adoption of commis-
sion-manager plan in,

United States, commission-governed
cities in, 15, 16; reference to, 44;

*

Assembly

289

city government in, 49, 226; commis-
sioners appointed by president of,
50; guarantee to states by, 94; oath
to support constitution of, 207; need
of good electorate in, 233

United States American Proportion-
al Representation League, 183

United States army, 50

Upson, Lent Dayton, 199; article by,

265

Urban population, effects of, on
municipal functions, 35, 36; growth
of, 35, 249; definition of, 247

Utah, 125; agitation for commission
government in, 125, 126; cities in,
under commission government, 127

Utah law, peculiar feature of, 126

bene need of municipal reform in,

Viaducts, construction of, 171; main-
tenance of, 176
Villages, provisions for incorporation.

Virginia, special legislation prohib-
ited in, 43; commission laws in, 133-
1385; optional charter law in, 135;
provisions of the constitution of,
163; legislative laws passed by, 209;
provision of charter law of, 209;
number of councilmen in cities of,
211; election of mayor in, 211; pro-
vision for city-manager in, 212;
powers of city-manager in, 213;
spread of city-manager plan in, 214,
216, 217; constitution of, 216

Virginia Code, provision in, 163

vatera. influence of, on government,

,

Waco (Texas),
ment in, 105;
152

Waite, Henry Matson, 199, 224; sug-
gestion by, 223, 224

Walker v. Spokane, decision in, 139

Walsh law, provisions of, 115

Wards, use of, as election districts,
13; representation of, 63, 189, 201;
nominations in, 195; abolition of,

commission govern-
charter granted to,

Washington, George, 35

Washington, home rule law in, 114;
laws in, concerning commission
government, 114, 115; cities in, un-
der commission government, 115;
commission laws in, 139, 140; cities
ai under general commission act,

Washington, D. C., government of, 10,
50; reference to, 82

Water, superintendent of, 164

Water commissioner, provision for, 67

Water plant, purchase of, 74

Waterloo (Iowa), law enacted for, 205

Waterloo plan, description of, 205-209

Watertown (New York), adoption of
commission plan in, 136; adoption
of city-manager plan in, 214

Waterville (Maine), special election in,
140

Water-works, 35, 88; term of office of
board of, 38; secretary of, 60; su-
perintendent of, 60; engineer of, 61;
290

profit in, 64; board of, 83, 84; pro-
one for, i71; supervision of, 216,

Water-works and sewerage, commis-
sioner of, 60

Webster City (Iowa), adoption of city-
manager plan in, 209

Wels kie and measures, ordinance on,

Westchester County (New York), cre-
ation of,

Westerville (Ohio), adoption of city-
manager plan in, 185

West Palm Beach’ (Florida), special
commission charter of, 150

West Virginia, cities in, under spe-
cial commission charters, 147, 148

Wheeling (West Virginia), adoption
of city-manager plan in, 201

White, Roasts H., article by, 10;
comment by, 11

ae (California), population_ of,

Whittier charter, defeat of, 188

Williams, C. Arthur, article by, 256

nen Charles C., article by,
Williamsport (Pennsylvania), con-
vention held in, 128

COMMISSION AND MANAGER PLANS

Wilmington (North Carolina), special
charter granted to, 147

Wilson,
comment by, 1

Wisconsin, laws in, affecting commis-
sion government, 105, 106; cities in,
under commision government, 106

Wisconsin statute, passage of, 105

Woman suffrage, provision for, 186

Work farm, provision for, 197

Wor Mneeans M. M., appointment of,

Soodzayg, message of, 115;

Wyoming, cities in, under commission
government, 111; laws in, concern-
ing commission ‘government, 111

Yoakum (Texas), adoption of commis-
sion manager plan in, 199

Young, Lafayette, reform movement
furthered by, 80

Young Men’s Christian Association,
tneeting in auditorium of,

Youngstown (Ohio), drafting char-
ter of, 180

Youngstown charter, defeat of, 181

Zueblin, Charles, definition by, 245
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