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CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

 

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME
OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT
FUND GIVEN IN 1891 BY

HENRY WILLIAMS SAGE

 

 

 

 
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TWELVE SOLDIERS
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From Cromwell to
Wellington:

TWELVE SOLDIERS

Epirep sy SPENSER WILKINSON

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR

V.C., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.8.L, G.C.LE.

WITH PORTRAITS AND PLANS

 

LONDON
LAWRENCE AND BULLEN, Ltp.
PHILADELPHIA: J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY

1899

Au rightlUeserved
THE ideal which has presided over the writing of this volume is that
of a picture of the British army at work during the century and a half
in which the army helped the navy to make Great and Greater
Britain what they have been since men now living can remember. In
the choice of the lives and of their writers the Editor was assisted by
the mature judgment of Colonel Cooper King, who also undertook to
prepare plans of the more important battlefields, and, upon condition
of the Editor’s collaboration; to write the life of Cromwell. The plans
were prepared and for the most part approved by the authors of the
several lives, and the text of Cromwell was settled when Colonel
Cooper King’s lamented death deprived the British army of an inde-
fatigable teacher and the Editor of a good friend and fellow worker.
The Editor has since modified Colonel Cooper King’s account of the
battle of Marston Moor in consequence of the important discoveries
of Mr. Firth, to whom he is much indebted. The plans have been
copied from Colonel Cooper King’s drawings, and a few sketches of
the theatres of war have been added. The portraits have been
selected by Mr. H. W. Lawrence. The very careful and minute
account of Clive prepared by Colonel Adam has been so much modi-
fied that the Editor cannot but recognize his own responsibility for
the form in which it appears. The attempt has been made to attain
a rough uniformity in the spelling of Indian names, and to avoid for
the most part the modern scientific forms. The Editor wishes to
thank his contributors for much patience and courtesy, and Sir
Bindon Blood, Count Gleichen, and Mr. York Powell, the Regius
Professor of History, for help and advice. The author of the life of
Wolfe wishes to express his obligations to Mr. A. G. Bradley’s account
of the career of that general as well as to the works of Wright and

Parkman.
core 5. W.
INTRODUCTION

Tuts volume, which contains the memoirs of twelve
famous British soldiers, embraces a period in the
history of the Empire extending from 1642 to 1852,
and should strongly appeal to a nation which owes
its possessions abroad and its security at home not
only to the gallantry and endurance of its naval and
military forces, but to the ability of their Com-
manders. And I feel sure that it will appeal to an
Army such as ours, which is justly proud of its
achievements and traditions.

The first of the soldiers whose careers are briefly
narrated in the following pages was a great admin-
istrator as well as a Master of the art of war.
Cromwell recognized that the most efficient army
is one composed of self-respecting men of exemplary
character, who are well paid and well treated. He
was determined that his officers, from the highest to
the lowest, should be thoroughly acquainted with
their profession; and though himself holding very
strong religious and political views, he was guided in
the selection and advancement of his subordinates
by the broad-minded principle that ‘“‘the State, in
choosing men to serve it, takes no notice of their
opinions.” The success of Cromwell's Ironsides
Vili Introduction

was due in a great measure to the strict discipline
which he enforced, to his clear perception of the
objective to be aimed at, and to his skilful strategy
and tactics. But it was in a still greater degree due
to the religious fervour which pervaded all ranks.
History proves that there is no more potent factor
in war than a belief in the justice of one’s cause,
and in its being favoured by the Almighty.

The second name in the book is that of the Duke
of Marlborough, to whom I should be inclined to
assign the foremost place in the roll of British
Commanders. His splendid military genius was
united with an almost unparalleled evenness of
temper, and a regard for, and sympathy with, his
troops, which earned for him a devotion scarcely
less than that which the Tenth Legion felt for
Czesar, or the Old Guard for Napoleon.

From a moralist’s point of view, Marlborough’s
character was not faultless, but as a General he had
few equals and no superior. He never fought a
battle which he did not win, never besieged a city
which he did not take, and, in spite of obstructive
allies and jealous continental rivals, he curbed the
aggression of France, and restored the balance of
power in Europe.

I agree with Marlborough’s biographer in ascrib-
ing his success in a great measure to his striking
out a line for himself and not adhering too closely
to professional rules, but I think he is somewhat
severe in his criticism on the predilection of the
French, at that time, for fortified lines and fortified
Introduction ix

towns. They may have carried their dependance
on fortifications to too great an extent, but in the
face of a more numerous enemy, or in a country the
inhabitants of which cannot be thoroughly relied on,
the fortune of a campaign may sometimes depend on
the retention of an important fortress. The gallant
and protracted defence of Gibraltar under General
Eliott (afterwards Lord Heathfield) had a far-reach-
ing effect on the naval power of England, not alto-
gether realized by the statesmen of that day. The
lines of Torres Vedras gave Wellington time and
opportunity for reorganizing his forces, and enabled
him to undertake the operations which led eventually
to the expulsion of the French from the Peninsula.

The obstinate stand made by the Russians at
Sebastopol taxed the resources of the Allies to an
extent which resulted in the conclusion of a peace
not unfavourable to the Northern Power.

During the Indian Mutiny, the forts of Agra and
Allahabad afforded us valuable centres for field-opera-
tions against the rebels. And had the walled
Magazine at Cawnpore with its bomb-proof build-
ings been resorted to instead of the two thatched
barracks on the open plain, it is quite possible that
there would have been no Cawnpore massacre.

On the other hand, however, in continental
Europe, the present system of conscription, and the
facilities which railways afford for moving and
supplying vast armies, have rendered fortresses and
fortified lines of less importance than formerly. The
fact is, that the existence of railways has profoundly
x Introduction

modified the conditions of modern warfare. The
recent campaign in the Soudan furnishes a striking
illustration of the advantage of railway communication
between the base and advanced depéts of a force
operating in an uncivilized country. Again, it is not
too much to say that the existence of railways on the
north-west frontier of India, from Nowshera to
Malakand, from Kohat to the Kuram Valley, and
from Peshawar round or through the Khyber Pass,
would, in all probability, have prevented the late
serious rising of the tribesmen, and their construction
now would tend more than anything else to ensure
their permanent pacification.

Turning once more to the life of Marlborough, it
will be noticed that he paid the utmost attention to
the armament, equipment, and fire discipline of his
troops, and developed their marching powers to
an extent which enabled him invariably to out-man-
ceuvre his opponents. In his masterly handling of
the cavalry arm he followed in Cromwell’s footsteps,
while, though his discipline was as stern as Welling-
ton’s, “Corporal John” managed to make himself

beloved as well as obeyed.

Of the remaining lives in this book, those of
Wolfe, Clive, Lake, and Wellington will perhaps
be found the most interesting. To the first England
owes the dominion of Canada—to the others her
Indian Empire. But Wellington, much as he
accomplished in India, rendered far greater services
to his country during the struggle with Napoleon.

Lake’s fame has been thrown into the shade by
Introduction Xi

the glamour of Wellington’s successes, yet the
former’s military genius was of no mean order, while
his rapidity of movement and promptitude of
decision are deserving of the highest praise.

The histories of Abercromby and Baird remind
us that the importance of Egypt in connexion with
our interests in the Mediterranean, and as an
essential link in the line of communication between
England and the East, had been recognized by
British statesmen at an early date. Abercromby’s
landing in Aboukir Bay, in the face of a determined
enemy, was an operation of extreme difficulty, ad-
mirably planned and carried out. While Baird's
march across an unknown desert, from Kosseir to
Keneh on the Nile, shows how obstacles which seem
almost insurmountable can be overcome by proper
organization and well-thought-out arrangements.

Taking this work as a whole, three points are
brought into prominent relief.

The first is the influence of sea-power on the
military history of the Empire. Unless England
had been predominant at sea, Wolfe could not have
defeated Montcalm at Quebec; we could never
have seized or retained Gibraltar and established
ourselves in the Mediterranean; however capable
our administrators and soldiers, the extension of
our rule over India would have been impossible ;
and the Peninsular War, which drained Napoleon’s
resources and used up some of his best troops, could
not have been carried to a successful issue.

The second point is the necessity for a thoroughly
xii Introduction

efficient army in readiness to take advantage of our
naval superiority. The sister services are rightly
so named, for one is the indispensable comple-
ment of the other. In Africa and India and even
further East we are gradually coming into closer
contact with continental powers, and, unless our
land forces are strong enough to meet the increasing
demands on them, we shall find it difficult to uphold
British rights and British interests.

The third point is that the qualities which dis-
tinguish a successful General are practically identical
with those which lead to advancement in any other
branch of life. In addition to military knowledge
and experience, there must be good judgment, sound
common-sense, tenacity of purpose, quickness of per-
ception, promptitude of decision, and above all an
infinite capacity for taking pains. No detail, however
trivial, which can add to the comfort and welfare of
the troops or increase their fighting efficiency can
be neglected without risk of failure. The officer
who is fortunate enough to be entrusted with a com-
mand in the field should be prepared at all points,
and ready to face all contingencies. He should
follow Czesar’s example of whom Lucan wrote: V2
actum veputans, dum quid superesset agendum.

Roserts, F.M.

Dublin,
December 2, 1898.
CONTENTS

PAGE
CROMWELL ‘ 5 ‘ : a Fi . ‘ I
By LizuTENANT-CoLoNnEL Cooper Kine, R.M.A., and the eae
MARLBOROUGH . . : ‘ 7 : 5 - 7 50
By Tue Hon. J. W. Fortescue.
PETERBOROUGH ‘ . i . a ‘ . é : 92
By Mayor F. E. Cooper, R.A.
WOLFE 5 $ i é 7 ‘ ‘ ‘ 7 « 127
By GENERAL SiR ARCHIBALD ALIsSoNn, Bart., G.C.B.
SLIVE : - ‘ A ‘ 173
By Cotonet F. ro Indian Staff ceans: and the Epiror.
COOTE 2 : : : : : : : . 213
By LiEvTENANT-CoLoneL S. C. Pratt, R.A.
HEATHFIELD 5, A . é < 5 7 ‘ 7 ‘ 251
By LizuTENANT-COLONEL Agus R.A.
ABERCROMBY . 3 : . 3 ‘5 5 7 288
By Brever LizvTENANT-CoLoneL A Court, Military Attaché at : Beheacts
and the Hague.
LAKE rs . ‘ : é é : : ‘1 : 326
By Major E. S. May, R.H.A.
BAIRD ; . “ é é < 2 x 364
By CaPTain eae geneay Grenadier Guards.
MOORE : : . é : : : 5 404
By Major C. B. em R. z
WELLINGTON... Ck 443

By Mayjor-GENERAL F. es, = B., ae A.
PLANS OF BATTLES AND SIEGES

PAGE

Dunbar : . e239
Ramillies  . i ‘ - 75
Barcelona . ‘ . 103
Quebec ‘ ‘ - 153
Plassey : » 203
Porto Novo. ; . 241

Gibraltar, the works
Gibraltar, the bay
Alexandria .

Delhi .

Laswaree
Seringapatam

PAGE
258
282
319
336
342
377

SKETCHES TO ILLUSTRATE CAMPAIGNS

PAGE
Cromwell’s Irish Campaigns 31
Campaigns of Preston and

Worcester : . » 45
Marlborough’s campaigns . 66
North-Eastern Spain . . 107
The Carnatic : s . 184
Bengal ; . 201

North Holland . : . 305

Lake’s Campaigns
Lower Egypt
North-Western Spain .
India . 5 ;
The Empire of Dupleix
Spain and Portugal

PAGE
332
382
426
455
455
465

The Campaign of Waterloo 481
Twelve Soldiers

CROMWELL

1599—1658
5h

AT the beginning of the year ici the breach between
King and Parliament had become irreparable. Thoughtful
men on both sides had come to see that the only arbitra-
ment possible was that of the sword. None saw this
quicker than Oliver Cromwell, member of Parliament for
Cambridge. Hc expended time and money in promoting
the preparation for defence of the city which he repre-
sented and of the adjacent counties. He raised in those
counties, and became captain of, a troop of “horse,” which
was so carefully recruited as to leaven in time all the
Parliamentary forces. From this nucleus grew up the most
remarkable army the world has ever seen. Ten years
later, at the beginning of 1652, Cromwell was Commander-
in-chief of the armies of England. On the battlefield he
had crushed absolutely and entirely the armed strength
opposed to him. In religion he was the recognized leader
of the most earnest among the conflicting sects. As a
statesman, in the judgment of his associates he stood pre-
eminent, so that when, after the exhaustion of the long

conflict, the reconstitution of the State had become in-
B
2 Twelve Soldiers

evitable, it had become not less inevitable that Oliver
Cromwell should be its head. The purpose of this essay
is to follow through those ten years, not the statesman,
not the religious leader, but the soldier.

Oliver Cromwell was born at Huntingdon, on April 25,
1599. He was of good family, far better born than many
a Royalist who reviled him as the “Brewer’s son” which
he was not. Both his grandfather and great-uncle were
knights, and lived “in rather sumptuous fashion at the
mansion of Hichinbrook.” Asa youth he is reported to
have been a not very diligent pupil, erratic in his learning,
and irregular both at the Huntingdon Grammar School
and at Sydney Sussex College, Cambridge. It was not until
1638 that it was given him “to see light,” but from that
time his religious fervour increased and became more severe.

In 1628 he appears in the Roll of the House of Commons
as member for Huntingdon, and twelve years later as
member for Cambridge. He is described by Sir Philip
Warwick as being “very ordinarily apparelled, for it was
a plain cloth suit, which seemed to have been made by an
ill country tailor; his linen was plain and not very clean,
and I remember a speck or two of blood upon his little
band which was not much longer than his collar. His hat
was without a hatband. His stature was of a good size,
his sword stuck close to his side, his countenance swoln
and reddish, his voice sharp and untuneable, and _ his
eloquence full of fervour.” Such was Cromwell in appear-
ance, a man of no great presence, but the soul that was
in him was courageous and of strong temper.

When men’s thoughts turn to preparation for war their
attention is directed to the most recent warfare that has
Cromwell 3

been prominently before the world, and to the systems
that have been developed during its course. In 1642 peace
had not yet been made between the contending sides on
the Continent of Europe; the last great campaigns had
been those of Gustavus Adolphus, who fell at the Battle
of Liitzen in 1632. These campaigns were well-known in
England, where in 1633-4 was published in English
The Swedish Intelligencer, to this day one of the best
records of the exploits of the Swedish king. The general
framework of both armies in the Civil War, as regards
organization and tactics, resembles that of the continental
armies of the period; both contained the three arms of
battle—infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The infantry was
divided into battalions or ¢ertias, composed of pikemen
and musketeers (the latter on the flanks of the pikes), clad
in half-armour and arranged ten ranks deep. There were
no bayonets, and the musket, a match-lock, was fired from
arest. The artillery was very cumbrous, and had so little
mobility, that though it began the battle it rarely moved
from its first position during the progress of the fight. The
cavalry was divided into cuirassiers, arquebusiers, and
dragoons, of which the first two might be classed as heavy
and medium cavalry, and were in those days called “horse,”
while the dragoons were mounted infantry, and were not
included in the term “horse.” The cuirassiers carried
swords and 26-inch barrelled pistols; the others swords
and longer fire-arms. The “order of battle” was usually
in three lines—the “main battle,” the “battle of succour,”
and the “rear battle.” Each was in line of columns at
close intervals, with the cavalry on the flanks. The guns
were dispersed along the front, which was preceded by
4 Twelve Soldiers

small bodies of musketeers and pikemen, called “forlorn
hopes” and serving to some extent to cover the deploymen
of the army.

Though there was a general resemblance between the
outward form of the two armies there was a difference
between them, reflecting the contrast between the medieval
and the Puritan spirit. The Royalist army naturally rested
upon the traditions of feudalism, and made the most of the
relation between the landowners and those who, a few
gencrations earlier, had been attached to the soil. Its
levies, composed of brave men and bold riders, more or
less trained to arms, and serving under their immediate
local superiors, had little organization and less discipline.
The Parliamentary leaders, by their Puritan sympathies,
were more amenable to the influence of the traditions of
the Protestant army of Sweden; some of them had served
in the Swedish army. For example, Alexander Leslie,
afterwards Earl of Leven, was a Swedish field-marshal, and
as colonel-had commanded against Wallenstein the Swedish
garrison of Stralsund; David Leslie too had been a Swedish
colonel. Others had served in the armies of those Dutch
princes who had been the teachers of Gustavus Adults
Accordingly, from the outset drill and discipline, regular
pay and supplies, and military system were at home rather,
in the Puritan than in the Royalist camp.

When the year 1642 began Cromwell never hesitated as
to the course he would take in the great conflict. Upon
the King’s flight to Yorkshire, whence he set out to raise
his standard at Nottingham, Cromwell moved in the Hous
of Commons “that Lord Essex be entrusted with th
trained bands south of the Trent, and that Cambridge b
Cromwell 5

allowed to raise volunteers.” He had himself sent arms
and money to that town, and had seized the magazine in
the castle there. This was the beginning of that ‘ Associa-
tion of the Eastern Counties” which, raised and fostered
by Cromwell and Lord Gray of Wark, furnished the most
trustworthy cavalry on the Parliamentary side during the
war. In this same year, 1642, “ Captain” Cromwell’s name
appears as the officer commanding No. 67 Troop of “ Horse,”
some sixty troopers strong; next year, 1643, his troop
had grown into a regiment of ten troops, and he was then
appointed to command as Colonel the whole of the cavalry
of the Association. His men were picked out as being
“honest and steadfast,” and were from the outset more in
earnest and better disciplined than “the tapsters and
servingmen” whom the Parliament were raising else-
where.

“T beseech you,” he writes in September 1643, “to be
careful what captains of horse you choose, what men be
mounted ; a few honest men are better than numbers... .
I had rather have a plain russet-coated captain that knows
what he fights for, and loves what he knows, than that which
you call ‘a gentleman ’ and is nothing else. I honour a
gentleman that is so indeed.” Such were to be the officers.
Of the men, it is said that “ Not a man swears, but he pays
his twelve pence; no plundering, no drinking, disorder, or
impiety allowed.” Men such as these, men so selected,
formed the famous regiment of Ironsides. “They were
most of them freeholders or freeholders’ sons, who upon
matters of conscience engaged in this quarrel with Crom-
well, and being thus well-armed within by the satisfac-
tion of their own conscience, and without in good iron
6 Twelve Soldiers

armour, they would as one man stand firmly and figh
desperately.” !

This peculiar principle of recruiting is the basis an
foundation of the Cromwellian forces. “That whic
chiefly distinguished the army of Cromwell from othe
armies,” says Macaulay, “was the austere morality an
the fear of God which pervaded all ranks. It is acknow
ledged, even by the most zealous Royalists, that in tha
singular camp no oath was heard, no drunkenness o
gambling seen, and that during the long dominion of th
soldiery, the property of the peaceable citizen and the honou
of women were held sacred.” ?

The war may be said to have begun on September 9,
1642, when Essex, the Lord-General, took the comman
of the Parliamentary Army at St. Albans. The first
important skirmish was on September 22, at Powick, whe
Prince Rupert’s name is first heard. On October 23 was
fought the indecisive battle of Edgehill, in which Captai
Cromwell with his troop of horse “did his duty.” Crom-
well fought his first successful action at Grantham, in May
1643, with twelve troops against twenty-four, and wrote
afterwards: “God hath given us a glorious victory over
our enemies,” for “by God’s providence they were routed
and ran all away.” These words are from the first of his
letters, published in the newspapers at the time.

In July 1643 Cromwell marched to the relief of Wil-
loughby, besieged in Gainsborough; took Stamford and

1 Whitelock.

2 Macaulay perhaps was hardly just to the discipline and religious
temper of the army of Gustavus Adolphus, at any rate in the early
part of the war in Germany, while as yet it was chiefly composed ,
his own subjects.

\
I
Cromwell 7

Burleigh House on the way; forced a convoy into the
beleaguered town; and finally, in an effort to dislodge the
besiegers, found himself in presence of Newcastle’s entire
army. He skilfully withdrew his command by alternate
troops, and fell back safely on his native town of Hunting-
don. The successful conduct of this most difficult operation
shows his rising genius. Later on in the same year, when
acting with Manchester in Lincolnshire, he was present at
a brilliant skirmish near Winceby against a detachment
of horse and dragoons of Newcastle’s army, when his
men “ were very full of joy and resolution, ... . and went
on in several bodies singing psalms.” Their leader led
gallantly, for “Colonel Cromwell charged at some distance
before his regiment, when his horse was killed under
him.”

During the summer of 1643 the scope of the conflict was
extended. Parliament, disheartened by its want of success
in the field, concluded an alliance with the Scots, for which
they paid a price that was to prove heavy. The Presby-
terians stipulated that the English should “join ina Solemn
League and Coyenant to forward the reformation of religion,
to extirpate popery, to preserve the King’s person, and to
punish malignants.” The nation that had resented the
uniformity of ritual which Laud sought to enforce, was
little likely to accept without demur the equally rigid and
more ascetic formula of the orthodox Church of Scotland ;
many thought with Milton, that Presbyter was merely
Priest writ large. The signing of the Solemn . League
and Covenant occasioned that bitter feeling of which there
was evidence later, when Cromwell had to remonstrate
with a Presbyterian colonel, who refused to employ a
LWEI1LVE OVIUICIS

aptist as officer, and to tell him that “the State in
loosing men to serve it takes no notice of their opinions.”
o Cromwell Presbyterianism, like Episcopalianism, was
elastic and cramped. The Independents alone were
lerant. The man in whom the desire for religious free-
om was a mainspring of action, was by that impulse
ought into the position of leader of the Independents in
ie army, of which, partly in consequence of that position,
id partly because he was its best General, he ultimately
2came the head.

King Charles replied to the alliance between Parliament
id the Scots by making peace with the Irish rebels, so as
» withdraw what troops he had in that country for the
urpose of strengthening his hands in England. No act
f his was more fiercely resented by his opponents, for it
iflamed both racial antipathy and religious hatred. By
‘ay of reply, therefore, in October 1644, the Parliament
assed an ordinance to “hang every Irish Papist taken
1 arms in this country.”

This move and counter-move formed the turning-point
1 the Civil War. Each led to retaliation. The one was
Itimately the cause of the Scottish campaigns and of the
ictories of Dunbar and Worcester, the other of the Irish
ampaign, with its bitter memories of Drogheda and Wex-
ord. From this time forward disaster was to follow the
anners of King Charles.

The first important battle in which Cromwell took part
ras that of Marston Moor (July 2, 1644). The allied Scots
nd English were besieging York. Prince Rupert and the
farquis of Newcastle marched to raise the siege. The
ivesting Anglo-Scottish army turned aside to meet the

 

 
Cromwell 9

relieving force, and for this purpose was marshalled on
Marston Moor, seven miles from York.

The battle-field lies on the south bank of the Nidd and
north of the village of Bilton. Crossing it, in a more or less
easterly direction, is a high road, on which are situated to
the westward the hamlet of Tockwith, to the east that of ~
Long Marston. Along the front of the two villages a deep
ditch, with a hedge on its southern side, formed a serious
obstacle, but it terminated opposite to and north of Tock-
with. Behind, or to the south of the road referred to,
the land was arable; on the other side of the ditch it was
open moor with much gorse, and at the top of the moor
was a considerable copse, marked as Wilstrop Wood. South
of the ditch was the Allied army under Fairfax and Leven.
On the left were forty-three or forty-four troops of Man-
chester’s Horse, under Cromwell, and twenty-one troops of
Scot’s Horse, with five or six troops of Scot’s Dragoons.
Leslie, though the senior officer, not only willingly resigned
the command of the left wing, but insisted that Cromwell
should take it. Facing them stood the Royalist Horse of
the right wing, which Prince Rupert himself led in the
battle, and which was ranged with four regiments under
Byron in first line, one echeloned on the flank in second
line, and four in third line. Rupert had his reserve, two
regiments, behind the infantry. In the centre were the
infantry ; on the Parliamentary side Crawford’s Brigade,
the Scottish Foot under Baillie, and Lord Fairfax’s York-
shiremen ; on the Royalist side eight tertias in first line,
seven in second line behind the intervals of the first; in
third line a brigade of cavalry, and behind that to the right
fourtertias of Newcastle’s white-coats, of which the other
10 Twelve Soldiers

three tertias formed the right portion of the second line.
On the Parliamentary right wing were the cavalry under
Lambert and Sir T. Fairfax, numbering fifty-three troops
of English and twenty-two of Scot’s Horse; facing them
were Goring’s Brigades under Lucas and Goring himself.

The artillery of Fairfax appears to have been on the hill
behind the Tockwith-Marston road; that of the King
(twenty-five pieces) lined the ditch, protected by a “ forlorn
hope” of musketeers. The Earl of Leven had the ordering
of the Parliamentary battle. While there was incipient
mutiny in the Royalist ranks for want of pay, on the
Puritan side, “in Marston corn-fields they fell to singing
hymns.”

It was five in the afternoon before the armies were fully
deployed, and a desultory artillery duel was kept up until
half-past six. It was the first time Rupert and Cromwell
had ever met in battle, and great was the curiosity of the
Prince to see his new antagonist. “Is Cromwell there, and
will he fight? for if he does he will find his master,” is
said to have been his eager question of a prisoner taken
early in the day.

It was quite seven o’clock before Leven ordered the
attack, and the whole line of battle advanced towards the
ditch. The cavalry still, as in bygone medieval fights, the
most important arm, pushed forward and crossed the ditch
where it was least an obstacle. The dragoons seemed to
have moved away to protect the left flank of the “ Horse,”
which was apparently formed in three lines, the third being
composed of the twenty-one weak troops of Scots. The
first line, led by Cromwell, defeated Byron, though Cromwell
was slightly wounded; but as Byron’s troops wheeled out-
Cromwell II

wards and fled, they exposed to view Rupert’s second line,
which was therefore engaged by Leslie with the second line
while the first line rallied. There is much obscurity as to
the details of the action after this time. The total result on
the Parliamentary left being the defeat of Byron and Rupert,
whose beaten squadrons dragged with them the small re-
serves in headlong flight, leaving the passage behind the
mass of Royalist infantry free. Rupert himself was nearly
taken prisoner.

Meanwhile, the success on this wing was balanced by
disaster on the other. Charging in two lines, Goring broke
up the cavalry of Sir T. Fairfax and Lambert, and with the
first line drove them far to the south, and also attacked and
routed the infantry of Lord Fairfax, who were already
heavily engaged. Goring then turned upon the Scots, who,
with Crawford’s tertia, were of all the Parliamentary infantry
alone unbroken.

Cromwell's cavalry had pursued the beaten Royalists to
the northward as far at least as Wilstrop Wood, if we may
judge from the number of bullets found in the trees when
they were cut down in 1797, and it is even stated that the
pursuit was continued for three miles on the York road.
Rallying after the pursuit Cromwell continued along the
enemy’s rear—a route which Sir T. Fairfax had taken after
cutting his way through Goring’s victorious squadrons to
join Cromwell’s command ; and while Leslie attacked the
rear of the Royalist infantry in the centre, Cromwell pushed
on to the ground formerly held by Goring, and from that
ground charged in flank and dispersed Goring’s squadrons,
exhausted and reforming after their “reckless raid.” By
ten o'clock the Royalist army was in full flight to York.
12 Twelve Soldiers

In a private letter to Colonel Walton, Cromwell says :
“The left wing, which I commanded, being our own Horse,
saving a few Scots in our rear, beat all the ‘Prince’s Horse,’”
and again, “We charged their regiments of foot with our
Horse and routed all we charged.” Scout-Master Watson
says: “Lieutenant-General Cromwell’s division of three
hundred Horse, in which himself was in person, charged
the first division of Prince Rupert’s, in which himself was
in person. Cromwell’s own division had a hard pull of it,
for they were charged by Rupert’s bravest men in front and
flank. They stood at the sword point a pretty while hack-
ing at one another, but at last he brake through them,
scattering them like a little dust.” .

Cromwell’s letter to Colonel Walton was written to con-
sole that officer for the loss of his son, who was killed in the
battle. It was in no sense an official despatch, though
many of his later letters serve that purpose. “ Before his
death,” he wrote of the Jad, “ he was so full of comfort, that
to Frank Russel and myself he could not express it, it was
so great above his pain. This he said to us. Indeed, it
was admirable. A little after he said one thing lay upon
his spirit; I asked him what that was. He told me that it
was that God had not suffered him to be any more the
executioner of His enemies.”

There seems to have been at this time a very general
impression that to Cromwell mainly the victory was due;
and as if to emphasize this, one of the Parliamentary news-
papers refers to Cromwell as the “ Jronszde, for that name
was given him by Rupert after his defeat near York.” This
term, applied first to the Lieutenant-General, was afterwards
transferred to the soldiery he raised and led.
Cromwell 1

Throughout this earlier period of the war, Cromwell had
had a great though unobtrusive influence upon the army.
Manchester, under whom he had served for a long time,
“permitted him to guide all the army at his pleasure; the
man is a very wise and active head, universally well-beloved,
as religious and strict. Being a known Independent, the
most of the soldiers, who loved new ways, put themselves
under his command.”

The second battle of Newbury, in 1644, was the direct
cause of a re-organization of the Parliamentary army.
There was no pursuit after the fight, though a powerful
body of cavalry was available for the purpose. Cromwell
blamed his chief, Manchester, for the want of energy thus
displayed, and the relations between the two men became
strained. The quarrel led to the weeding out of incom-
petent, half-hearted Generals, and to the creation of the
*“New Model Army.”

This was politically a remarkable new departure, for the
exclusion of the political Generals was destined in time to
make the army supreme in the State. The Independent
party honestly meant to win victory to the cause for which
they had taken up arms—that of the independence of the
people, of their army, and of their Parliament from royal
control. The army was to be newly modelled, so as to
embody the daily growing feeling in the minds of the more
sincere and earnest soldiers and politicians, that the war
would linger on for ever unless sterner courses were taken.
It was to become more thoroughly Puritanical, more severely
in earnest under the discipline of men of Cromwell’s way of
thinking. Purged of all elements of internal weakness, it
was destined to become a powerful weapon in powerful
14 Twelve Soldiers

hands. Cromwell in Parliament vigorously supported the
new creation, and hoped in proposing the removal from the
army of members of the House, that “no members of either
House will scruple to deny themselves and their own
private interests for the public good.”

By April 1645, the “New Model Army” had been
organized by Skippon at Windsor, and had been picked
and weeded.

Its establishment was fixed at ten regiments of cavalry of
600 men each, twelve regiments of infantry of 1200 men
each, and ten companies of dragoons of 100 meneach. The
commanding officers were carefully chosen, and of thirty-
seven Generals and Colonels, only seven were not gentlemen
by birth. This disposes of Holles’ statement, that the new
levies were officered over by “tradesmen, brewers, tailors,
goldsmiths, shoemakers, and the like.”?

Fairfax, its new chief, was slow in council, “furious in
battle.” Ele was brave among all the brave men of either
side. Never a genius in the trade of war he seems to
have loved well, he was slow to act until his mind was
made up, and then, with irrevocable decision, his arm was
quick to strike. On April 1, 1645, he assumed command
of the army, in which his Lieutenant-General was to be
greater than he.

At this time the Royalist forces were in the west under
Goring, at Oxford under Rupert, and in sundry scattered
garrisons. Those of the Parliament were with Fairfax
about Windsor, and with Massey at Gloucester, besides
isolated detachments here and there.

In the first months of 1645 Cromwell acted independ-

1 Holles’ Memoirs, p. 149.
Cromwell 15

ently with a force of cavalry, keeping in touch with the
enemy until the New Model Army should be ready to
move, and so doing, fought victorious skirmishes at Islip
Bridge, Bletchingdon House, Witney, and Bampton-in-the-
Bush. In all this desultory fighting he handled his troops
well, and added to the ever-growing confidence of his men
in their leader. At the same time Waller, a General under
whom Cromwell had for some time served, and who was
not unfriendly to him, did not think he had up to this
“shown extraordinary parts; .... but as an officer he
was obedient, and did never dispute my orders or argue
upon them.”

With the rise of the Independents, revealed in the
formation of the new Model, the note of discord between
England and Scotland grew more pronounced. The Scots
regarded Cromwell as an “incendiary,” who might be
expected to affect the good understanding between the
two countries. They proposed to ‘clip his wings from
soaring to the prejudice of our (the Scottish) cause.”
These vicws only induced the Independents the more
earnestly to support Cromwell, who knew no party and no
section except that which would save the nation. From
now forward a more marked determination and an in-
creasing vigour seem to characterize the actions of the
Lieutenant-General.

In the spring of 1645, Charles and Rupert left Oxford
and marched north. Fairfax invested Oxford, but speedily
abandoned the siege, and officially applied through the
House of Commons for Cromwell, who had been sent
again to the eastern counties, to join him as second in
command, in spite of the self-denying ordinance. Fairfax
16 Twelve Soldiers

had meanwhile followed the King northwards, and on June
13 was joined by the Lieutenant-General at Guilsborough.
On his arrival Cromwell, already a favourite with the
soldiery, “was received with shouts by the whole army.”
An incident of this time illustrates the improvement of
discipline. On one occasion, when Fairfax himself, having
pushed out in the dark to reconnoitre, rode back to camp,
he was detained by a sentry until the officer on duty
came round, and was threatened with death if he moved,
as he had forgotten the countersign.

When Cromwell joined Fairfax at Guilsborough, the
opposing armies were almost in contact. On June 12, the
King’s force had been at Daventry, where it was found by
the cavalry of Fairfax under Harrison. On the 13th it
retreated from Daventry to Market Harborough, and lay
with the head-quarters at that place and the rear-guard at
Naseby. That same day, the 13th, Fairfax from Guils-
borough pushed out another cavalry force under Ireton to

_ hang on the flank of the retiring Royalist column, which,
ignorant of the Parliamentary dispositions and strength,
could take no step unseen by his vigilant scouts. Some
of these on the night of the 13th entered Naseby, and
surprised and dispersed a rear-guard carousing carelessly
in a house there.

On Sunday, June 14, Fairfax, having marched from
Guilsborough, reached Naseby with his whole force by
five in the morning. The same day the King at Market
Harborough determined to turn and face Fairfax, and
took up a position south of that village to await attack.
But the defensive plan was opposed by the impetuosity of
Rupert, whose reconnaissance had been so carelessly con-
Cromwell 17

ducted as to lead him to conclude that the falling back of
Ireton’s advanced scouts on their supports meant that the
enemy was in full retreat! Rupert urged the King to
advance and attack,and the Royalist army, by that time
in battle array, advanced hurriedly in that formation
“before the cannon was turned or the ground made choice
of upon which they were to fight.” 1

Fairfax meanwhile, aware of the King’s advance, awaited
his approach on Mill Hill just north of Naseby, where he
drew up his troops about a hundred yards behind the crest,
so as to conceal his numbers and formation from the
enemy, and still further entice him to fight.?

The ground between this village of Naseby and Market
Harborough is about the centre of the watershed of
England. The streamlets that rise near the battlefield
flow on the one side into the Severn, on the other into the
German Ocean. The ground itself is a low, rolling plateau,
forming a series of positions lying east and west, and
marked by these streams.

The flanks of the position selected by Fairfax rested,
the left on a narrow lane called “Sulby Hedges,” with a
thorn copse and marshy ground; the right on a swampy
hollow, where the ground was also broken by rabbit
burrows, blackthorns, and gorse.

On the morning of the battle the day was fine, with a
fresh north-westerly wind, which early died away. The
Parliamentary army was formed with the cavalry on both
flanks. That of the left wing, commanded by Ireton, had
three regiments in first line, and two in second, while the
dragoons lined Sulby Hedges. That of the right wing,

\ Walford. 2 Tbid., and Markham.
Cc
18 Twelve Soldiers

under Cromwell, was disposed in three lines, five double
squadrons (apparently) in first line (the right drawn back
in echelon), four in second line, and three in third line!
The Parliamentary left wing slightly outflanked the
Royalist line, and the Parliamentary right flank was
“refused.” On neither flank was the ground good for
cavalry. The centre was occupied by Skippon’s com-
mand, in two lines. As usual the infantry were formed
in solid squares, flanked by musketeers, but apparently
five instead of ten file deep, and with wider than the usual
intervals between the regiments. This gave greater
mobility for manceuvring.

In front of the Parliamentary line was the “forlorn
hope” of musketeers, acting as a species of advanced post,
and the guns were dispersed betwcen the battalions of the
first line. Their “word” was “God our strength.”

On the other side, the Royalist march from Market
Harborough had caused much confusion. The cavalry of
the right wing, commanded by Rupert, was in two lines—
the first, five regiments strong, under Rupert; the second,
of similar strength, under the Earl of Northampton; and
there were also some “horse” with the general reserve,
making the King on the whole slightly stronger in cavalry
than Fairfax. The Royalist left wing was commanded by
Sir Marmaduke Langdale, who had three regiments dis-
posed in two lines, and was about equal in strength to the
other wing. Astley was in command of the centre, which
had four regiments in first line, three in second, and two in
third line, or reserve. The twelve guns were probably
dispersed along the front line. The Royalist “word” was

1 Walford.
Cromwell 19

“Queen Mary,” and the men were distinguished by bean-
stalks in their hats.

Both armies advanced simultaneously about eleven
o'clock. Ireton and Rupert met in full charge, and while
Ireton’s dragoons fired on the latter, the Royalist infantry
on the right equally galled the former. Ireton thereupon
turned a portion of his force against the infantry, but was
himself made prisoner, though he afterwards escaped. The
rest of his two lines were defeated by Rupert, who, cutting
his way through them as far as the baggage-park, stayed
to plunder, was beaten off by the musketeers of the
baggage guard, and gave Ireton time to rally.

On the Parliamentary right flank, Whalley led a suc-
cessful charge against Langdale, and the second line with
Rossiter (delayed a little by the ground) completed the
discomfiture of the Royalist cavalry on this flank and
drove it all back, partly to take refuge with the reserve,
partly to a flight “harder and faster than became them.”?!
Only one regiment (Rossiter’s) was left to continue the
rout of the cavalry, and with the remainder Cromwell
turned on the infantry regiments of the left wing. At-
tacked in flank by the Lieutenant-General, and in front by
Fairfax, who led his own regiment of foot, the Royalist
tertias gave way, and the battle was virtually won.
Before this the infantry fight had surged backwards and
forwards, at first with some success on the part of Astley,
but now the whole Parliamentary line was winning, and
the last unbroken tertia on the right of the Royalist front
line, also assailed now by Okey’s dragoons, broke and fled.

The return of Rupert at this juncture effected little.

1 Clarendon.
20 Twelve Soldiers

He was pressed in rear, as he passed, by Ireton’s rallied
squadrons; was too exhausted to offer much resistance,
and when Rossiter’s regiment charged him in flank, his
force also was dispersed in rout.

Fairfax, advancing his line of battle, kept his cavalry
in hand until his infantry had re-formed some distance in
front of the previous fight.

Here was the King’s last reserve. But it was too small
to be of value now, and when the Earl of Carnwath turned
the King’s horse from the field, panic spread. Charles
himself did not halt until he had reached Ashby-de-la-
Zouch. Cromwell and his men continued the pursuit to
Leicester, fourteen miles, and Fairfax ordered that none
of the horsemen were to dismount to plunder, but were to
prevent any of the enemy from rallying. “The order was
discontentedly and therefore savagely obeyed by men who
were loath to leave all the plunder of the field to the
foot.” }

Since the formation of the new model army, there had
been a steady display of what may be termed “war,” as
compared with the mere “ fighting” which obtained before
its rise, and it is to Cromwell and Fairfax between them
that this development is due. There is apparent now, as
before and afterwards, the curious semi-independence in
the position of the former towards the House of Commons,
His letter from Harborough, on June 14, after the battle,
to Lenthall, the Speaker, began: “Being commanded by
you to this service, I think myself bound to acquaint you
with the good hand of God towards you and us;” and he
goes cn to say, that “the General served you with all faith-

? Markham.
Cromwell 21

fulness and honour, and the best commendation I can give
him is that I dare say he attributes all to God, and would
rather perish than assume himself.” It is impossible to
believe that he would have written such despatches unless
there was some understanding as to his occupying a special
and abnormal position towards his immediate military
chief.

With Naseby ended the first Civil War. The King
would “never recover by the sword that kingdom which
he regarded as given him by God.” All the armed strength
left to him, when he fled to Wales, were a few isolated
garrisons and the forces in the west under Hopton and
Goring. These had to be dealt with, and there was much
desultory fighting still, in which Cromwell shared. His
appointment as Lieutenant-General was prolonged for some
months, so he fought with his customary stern resolution
at Langport, Sherborne, Bristol, and elsewhere ; at Devizes,
where to his summons to surrender was sent the answer
that he might “win it and wear it,’ an answer with which
he complied three days later ; and, finally, he was sent to
put a stop once and for all to the troubling of Basing
House, which blocked the way south of the valley of the
Kennet to the west, as Donnington was, for a brief time
further, to block the one to the north of that river.

My Lord of Winchester’s great house of Basing had
been a thorn in the side of London trained bands and
others moving east and west by the southern road, and
had for three years laughed at all attempts to capture it.
But its time was come. At 6 a.m.on October 14 it was
taken. Of all official documents despatched during this
or any war, Cromwell’s letter to Speaker Lenthall is the
22 Twelve Soldiers

oddest and most conclusive. It begins: “Sir, I thank
God I can give you a good account of Basing.” He had
stormed it, sacked it, and destroyed it.

“This is now the ‘twentieth garrison,” says Mr. Peters,
“that hath been taken in this summer by this army, and I
believe most of them the answers of the prayers and the
trophies of the faith of some of God’s servants. The
commander of this brigade, Lieutenant-General Cromwell,
had spent much time with God in prayer the night before
the storm, and seldom fights without some text of Scrip-
ture to support him. This time he rested upon that blessed
word of God, written in the CX Vth Psalm, eighth verse:
‘They that make them are like unto them; so is every one
that trusteth in them,’ which, with some verses going before,
was now accomplished.” }

Fairfax, leaving the Scots to watch Waller and the line
of the Severn, had meanwhile been driving the last Royalist
army into the depths of Cornwall, where it surrendered.
He displayed good strategy in turning instead of forcing
the line of the river Yeo, and the men had behaved well
with forced marches under a burning sun. The army,
though Cromwell was not with it, was being still further
hardened and inured to field operations.

Cromwell had done little in the closing months of 1646.
When victory crowned Fairfax’s western campaign, and he
had turned eastward again to besiege Oxford (the last
important hostile garrison), Cromwell had resigned his
command, and had returned to London to report to the
House of Commons upon the conduct of the war which
was now practically at an end.

1 Carlyle, vol. i. p. 249.
Cromwell 23

With temporary peace came political strife. In 1647
the Parliament wanted to disband the army. Those of
the soldiers who were not at once to be despatched to
Irish wars, were determined not to submit to this process
without receiving arrears of pay, and an “indemnity.” It
might go hard with Independents without the latter.
Accordingly “agitators” were chosen to express the
views of the soldiery to those in authority. It was the
beginning of a possible anarchy. The army seized the
King at Holmby House, sent in a long list of demands,
which Cromwell and Ireton helped to draw up, and,
receiving no satisfactory answer, marched upon London.

So long as he could do so conscientiously, Cromwell had
supported the Parliament against the army. When he was
satisfied of the justice of the soldiers’ claims, he not only
at once threw in his lot with them, but also did his utmost
to restrain them to the extent even of endangering the
good understanding that existed between him and his men.
At one time even, he was all but arrested by the soldiery,
when he was doing his best to effect a reasonable compro-
mise. He was in this, as in all else, so Lilburne says, “the
most absolutely single-hearted, great man in England, un-
tainted and unbiassed.” But his efforts at making terms
with the King were received with mistrust by the army,
and were therefore necessarily futile, and his influence with
the soldiery for a while perceptibly declined. He said
nothing, and kept steadily on in the path of duty. Thus
with anxiety rather than with fighting the year 1647
ended.

In 1648 began the second Civil War. Fairfax, still
nominally in command, put down the rising in Essex,
24 Twelve Soldiers

which culminated in the siege of Colchester. In South
Wales certain erstwhile Parliamentary officers — Lang-
horne, Powell, and Poyer — had revolted against their
former masters, and declared for the King. Cromwell,
with three regiments of foot and one of horse, was sent
to suppress them. He started from London on May 3,
and on July 11 he left Wales at peace. He had taken
Pembroke Castle without artillery, and had moved to
Gloucester to await instructions. These were necessitated
by the invasion of England by the Scottish army, osten-
sibly to rescue the King and assist the Presbyterians
against the “Sectaries,” according to the conditions of
the “Covenant.” The appearance of the Scots stirred
up the embers of the Civil War in various parts. Lam-
bert’s small army at Ripon, too weak to resist, was to be
reinforced by Cromwell from Gloucester.

The plan of operations which guided the advance from
Gloucester reveals the genius of Cromwell. There were
two plans open to the Scots: they might move through
Lancashire to unite with the Royalists in Wales, or they
might advance through Yorkshire, crush Lambert, and
march on London. They chose the former. A weak
general in Cromwell’s place would have tried to meet
them in Lancashire and bar their advance. Cromwell left
the route through Lancashire open to them, and marched
his army into Yorkshire behind Lambert, whose small
force was used to observe them, and to seal the roads
through the Pennine Hills, so that they could gain no
intelligence of the English army.

Cromwell’s army moved by Gloucester, Warwick, Leices-
ter, Nottingham, Pontefract, and Leeds to Wetherby. Here,
Cromwell a6

between Leeds and York, he kept it concentrated, with
Lambert’s force spread out towards Appleby and Kendal,
and along the Pennine range to watch the enemy and to
conceal his own movements. Lambert was strictly enjoined
not to appear in force anywhere, never to fight, but give
way at once to pressure, and to expose as few men as
possible along his front. Hamilton, who commanded the
Scottish army, was absolutely ignorant of everything,
except that there was a small force of cavalry on his flank,
which seemed to melt away before his touch.

The Scots had taken thirty-nine days to traverse eighty
miles, and their force on August 17 stretched from Wigan
to Lancaster, the main body being at Preston, while at
Longridge, four miles from Preston, on the left flank of
their line of march, were some 4000 cavaliers under
Langdale.

Now was seen the effect of Cromwell’s judgment in
placing his army on the Yorkshire side of the hills. He
pushed rapidly through the pass from Wetherby by
Skipton and Clitheroe, where he crossed the Ribble and
brought his army almost entire to Stonyhurst, a few miles
north-east of Preston, where lay the largest fraction of the
Scots force. If he attacked from here and was successful
the Scots defeated must be ruined, for he would be between
them and their northern base. Moreover, their straggling
order of march left him free to attack their isolated centre
fraction with his whole force. On August 17 Cromwell
struck home. He attacked Langdale and drove him back
upon Preston, where the Scots were divided, for half of
them were already south of the Ribble. Cromwell attacked

1 See sketch on p. 45.
26 Twelve Soldiers

so vigorously as to capture the bridge and cut off a portion
of the Scots on the north side. Next day began a pursuit
through Wigan, which left. the Scots no rest, broke up the
Wigan fraction of their army, and dispersed all their forces
south of the Ribble, so that the main body of the invading
army was to all intents and purposes blotted out of exist-
ence. The tail of the Scots column (7000 strong) crawled
home by way of Carlisle, closely followed by Lambert,
while Cromwell marched towards Berwick. .

Cromwell was not like Essex or Manchester, unwilling
to reap the full results of victory. He was thorough.
Military success in the field is of no use unless it leads to
political success, so he moved rapidly into Scotland to
finish his work. The Scottish nation, cowed by defeat, at
once made terms: peace followed, and Cromwell returned
to London.

There trouble was again brewing between the Parliament
and the Independent leaders. The army was beginning
to know its power, and objected to the philandering of
Parliament with the King. The officers sternly demanded
that he should “be brought to justice,” and by way of
emphasizing their demands, occupied Westminster, where
Colonel Pride “purged” the House of its recalcitrant
members.

Events followed rapidly after this, for in January 1649
the King was tried and executed, and Fairfax ceased prac-
tically to exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief of
the now dominant army. There had been incipient mutiny
in Whalley’s regiment, and the shooting of a_ trooper,
Lockyer, created disturbances at Salisbury and elsewhere.
To stamp this out, Cromwell, with three regiments of horse,
Cromwell 27

set out from London on May 9g, and marched wé Alton
and Salisbury to Burford, where he attacked the mutineers
on the night of May 14, and restored order and discipline.

In the spring of 1649 the Government in London deter-
mined to attempt the reduction of Ireland, where the fall
of Strafford had been followed by a dreadful outburst of
barbarity. The Catholics had combined to massacre the
Protestant English, and many thousands of Protestants,
men, women, and children, had been ruthlessly murdered.
The accounts current in England at the time gave’ the
number of victims at all figures between 30,000 and 140,000,
and the temper of the English at home towards the Irish
was like that which was cherished for a time two centuries
later towards the Indian mutineers. But for eight years
the divisions of England, or of England and Scotland,
preserved Ireland from intervention. There was a long
conflict between the Irish Catholics of the Papal and of the
Royalist parties. In 1647, the Duke of Ormonde, the
trusted lieutenant of Charles I., handed over Dublin to the
Parliamentary party, apparently in order to prevent the
whole country from falling into the hands of the political
adherents of the Pope. Charles, however, ordered Or-
monde back to Ireland, and in 1649 that nobleman was at
the head of the combined Catholic and Royalist parties,
with 44,000 men in arms, of whom 19,000, under his own
command, were besieging Dublin; while besides Dublin
only Londonderry in all Ireland held out for the Parlia-
ment, and Londonderry too was besieged.

In 1649, then, Parliament decided to send to Ireland a
strong force, the command of which was eventually en-
trusted to Cromwell, with full civil and military powers.
28 Twelve Soldiers

The Irish were supported at sea by Prince Rupert with a
fleet. Cromwell therefore had also a fleet under Admiral
Ayscough, whose chief subordinates were Colonels Blake
and Dean. Cromwell left London on July 10, and reached
Milford Haven, which was to be his base, on August 2.
From Bristol he had ordered two regiments of foot and
one of horse to be sent at once from Cheshire to Dublin,
which was hard pressed. With this reinforcement, Jones,
the Commander of Dublin, on August 2, made a sortie, in
which he not merely destroyed the batteries which Ormonde
was building to command the entrance to Dublin Bay, but
also surprised Ormonde’s camp, and thereby raised the
siege. Cromwell sailed from Milford with the first convoy
on August 13, reached Dublin on the 15th, and by the 19th
had landed his whole force. He had taken over 16,000
foot and 2100 horse and dragoons, and had found in
Dublin 5000 men under Jones. His first act was to re-
clothe and re-equip Jones’s men, and to fuse them with the
rest of his army, getting rid of a number of Jones’s officers,
in whom he had not full confidence. He told off 5000
men to garrison Dublin, and 15,000 as the field army. Next
he issued a Manifesto (August 24), enjoining the strictest
discipline, and absolute non-interference with non-com-.
batants, and announcing to the population that they
would not be molested, and that all supplies would be
paid for.

The task before him was of enormous difficulty. He
had to fight an army of superior numbers, enjoying the
sympathy of the whole population. Eight years of anarchy
had produced a famine, and he could expect to find in the
country neither provisions nor firewood. He must there-
Cromwell 29

fore bring from England, and convey to his troops, wherever
they might be, food, firewood, clothes, and munitions of
war. There were no roads. Such as had existed were
ruined, and where he required a road he would have to
make it. Almost every town was a fortress, and the
country was studded with castles garrisoned by the enemy.
By a strong place of one sort or the other, every passage
of every river was guarded. Two marches from Dublin on
the north the Irish held the line of the Boyne with the
strong places, Trim—near which was Ormonde’s army—
Navan, Slane,and Drogheda by the sea. In the north, too,
lay beleaguered Londonderry, and there was a possibility
that the Scots, in their detestation of the Independents,
might send help to the Irish of Ulster. To the south,
further away, the Irish forces lay in the triangle between
the fortresses of Wexford, Waterford, and Kilkenny. To
move far inland was impracticable, for in the interior the
army must starve, while by keeping near to the coast it
could draw supplies from the fleet, which could co-operate
in reducing the coast fortresses. These were the material
elements of the situation, which had, however, also its
spiritual aspect. Ormonde had on his side a number of
Protestant Royalists, and in order to keep them with him,
his policy was to put forward the Royalist cause, and its
antagonism to the Parliamentary Republic. Cromwell, by
making himself the champion of Protestantism, at once
confirmed the enthusiasm of his own men, and divided the
followers of Ormonde. The wisdom of this policy is proved
by the fact, that after the first two fights the Protestants
found themselves necessarily leaving the Irish for the

Parliamentary camp.
30 Twelve Soldiers

On the last day of August Cromwell assembled his
forces outside Dublin, and marched north along the coast,
his left flank screened by the cavalry, and further protected
by a flank detachment thrown out in the direction of Trim,
Ayscough, with part of the fleet, sailed north in company
with the army. On September 3 the artillery and infantry
were assembled on the south side of Drogheda, which was
shut in on the north bank of the Boyne by a girdle of
cavalry. A week was spent in building the batteries which
were to breach the wall by St. Mary’s Church, in which
Cromwell intended, after passing the breach, to re-form his
storming column. On the roth all was ready, and the
garrison was summoned to capitulate. The reply being
unsatisfactory, Cromwell hoisted the red flag, the con-
ventional signal of those days to announce that, in case of
storm, the garrison had no mercy to expect. Immediately
afterwards the batteries and ships opened fire. Next
morning the breach had been made, and the storm
took place. The first rush failed to reach the church.
Cromwell re-formed the column and led it himself. The
town was taken, and no quarter was given. Two of the
towers held out; they were summoned the next day.
Their defenders, refusing to surrender, were again attacked,
and when they were compelled to yield, the officers were
killed, the troops decimated, and the survivors transported
to Barbados. This treatment of the garrison accorded
with the spirit of the times, which condoned the refusal of
quarter after a storm. Moreover, Cromwell held it his duty
“to ask an account of the innocent blood that had been
shed” in the massacres of the Protestants. Four days
after the event he wrote: “Truly, I believe this bitterness
Cromwell 31

will.save much effusion of blood.” This belief was justified,
for while on the 13th, the day after the fall of Drogheda,

     
 
 
 
 
   

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the other fortresses on the Boyne were abandoned by the
Irish, and occupied by Cromwell's troops, Dundalk,
Carlingford, and Newry also soon afterwards surrendered
32 Twelve Soldiers

without a storm to parties of cavalry. A force under
Venables was left to complete the conquest of Ulster, and
Cromwell, after putting garrisons into the places taken,
returned with the main body to Dublin.

He then set out to subdue the south. Ayscough with
the fleet sailed to the entrance of Wexford Haven, sending
forward a squadron to watch Rupert off Kinsale. The
army, under the temporary command of Jones, left Dublin
on September 23, and marched down the coast by Arklow,
Ferns, and Enniscorthy to Wexford, where it was joined by
Cromwell on October 1. The advance guard took the
fort commanding the entrance to Wexford Haven, and
the ships’ boats took two frigates lying in the harbour.
Cromwell resolved to breach the castle which commanded
the town, and against the castle prepared his batteries and
storming column. The place was summoned when the
batteries were commenced. Fire was opened on October
11, the castle was stormed, and again, though it seems not
by Cromwell’s orders, no quarter was given. Wexford was
the principal seaport in the south, and the Irish arsenal.
He made it his base for the supplies brought from Milford,
and immediately continued his advance. On the 17th he
was before New Ross, the garrison of which surrendered on
the 19th. He laid a bridge of boats across the Barrow,
and made a magazine at Ross, the supplies being brought
up the river by Blake, who with his ships ran the gauntlet
of the Irish forts commanding Wexford Harbour. All this
was done while Ormonde, with 12,000 men, lay at Kilkenny,
and Owen O’Neill with 10,000 to the east of that town,
neither daring to face the English army in the field. About
this time Venables in the north took Carrickfergus ; the
Cromwell a4

siege of Londonderry was raised, and its commander
marched out and took Coleraine. At the same time, the
commandants of Cork and Youghal offered their submission
to Cromwell, who sent officers by sea to take over those
places. In the middle of November Cromwell ordered
Blake and Dean to establish the magazine for the army at
Cork, and a few days later himself marched from Ross to
Carrick on Suir, which had been seized by his brilliant
cavalry commander Reynolds. Then leaving Reynolds
with one company and seven squadrons to hold Carrick,
he marched down the right bank of the Suir upon Water-
ford. While Cromwell was before Waterford, Reynolds
was attacked by 10,000 men, but beat them off with heavy
loss. Jones was pushed forward with a few squadrons, and
took Fort Passage commanding Waterford Harbour. The
long marches and the constant exposure had broken down
Cromwell’s men, and his camp was ravaged by dysentery.
Waterford refused to surrender, and judging his troops in
no condition for storming, Cromwell marched away to Cork,
and December and January were spent in winter quarters.
When he landed the English held only Dublin and London-
derry in all Ireland; in three months he had taken for the
Parliament every point except Waterford on the north, east,
and south coasts between Londonderry and Cork.

The head-quarters of the Irish were at Kilkenny, the seat
of the Irish Catholic Government, and Irish forces held the
passages of the Suir except Carrick, and of the Nore and
the Barrow above New Ross. At the end of January 1650
Cromwell, from his base at Cork and Youghal, set out on a
new campaign of which the objective was Kilkenny. A

detachment was told off to hold Mallow. A reserve from
D
34 Twelve Soldiers

Youghal directed upon Carrick, the main column (only two
regiments and sixteen squadrons) under Reynolds was
given the direction from Carrick towards Kilkenny, while
Cromwell himself, with 300 foot, twelve squadrons of horse,
and two of dragoons, setting out from Youghal crossed the
Blackwater at Mallow, and then moved by Clogheen,
Ardfinnan, and Fethard to Callan, where he united with
Reynolds on February 7, and took the castle. There was
then a pause in the advance for the purpose of reducing the
places which interrupted the lines of communication. The
capture of Cahir, Goldenbridge, and Cashel secured the
communications with Youghal and Cork, and that of
Knocktopher and Thomastown opened the road to New
Ross and Wexford. A garrison was thrown into Bal-
linakyll, blocking the way from Kilkenny to the north.
Meanwhile a column from Dublin moved down through
Carlow to Leighlin Bridge, and the capture of Leighlin and
Gowran enabled Cromwell to effect his junction with the
force from Dublin, and to have a clear route to that place
also. On March 22 Cromwell’s forces were concentrated
before Kilkenny, and the place was summoned. The
batteries opened fire on the 25th, and on the 26th the
assault was delivered. The suburb of Irishtown on the
right bank of the Nore was taken, but Kilkenny on the
left bank repulsed the attack. On the 28th, however,
Kilkenny surrendered upon terms. Four days later Crom-
well was back again at Carrick on Suir, on the way to the
strong fortress of Clonmel, which was invested at the close
of the month. On May 9 the storm began. There was
hard fighting, and it was not till next day that Cromwell
was master of the town. This was his last fight in Ireland.
Cromwell ae

He marched from Clonmel to Waterford, but before he
could open the attack received the order for his prompt
return to England. He handed over the Irish command
to Ireton, who took Waterford, and the conquest of Ireland
was carried on after Ireton’s death by Ludlow and com-
pleted by Fleetwood.

The energy, the rapidity, and the persistence of Crom-
well’s action in Ireland lie on the face of the story. The
grasp and depth of the commander’s judgment may per-
haps hardly be appreciated without comment. Cromwell
knows always exactly where to strike his blow and correctly
estimates its effect. An infinity of strong places must be
taken; it was impossible to besiege them all, and in each
case to lose time by negotiation or sacrifice lives in a storm.
Cromwell therefore storms the two strongest places, after
notice that he will give no quarter. The threat is carried
out, and produces its effect in the saving of time and of life
during the subsequent operations. The practice of the age
on the Continent condoned this form of bloodshed, which to
many seemed a righteous vengeance for the massacres of
1641-2. Cromwell’s army appears to have had the full
confidence of the Irish in its discipline and fair treatment
of non-combatants. No general and no admiral since
Cromwell’s day has so perfectly illustrated in practice the
combined working of an army and a fleet. When in the
Kilkenny campaign he has to move inland, where he can-
not rely upon the fleet, he spends a month in securing his
communications with Cork, Wexford, and Dublin before
he strikes his blow. In the operations of regular forces
against guerilla levies, supported by a whole population,
and relying upon a network of strong places, Cromwell’s
36 Twelve Soldiers

Irish campaigns form a masterpiece unrivalled in modern
times.

He was recalled to England to meet a still greater danger
from the north. The King’s execution had roused the
Scottish national spirit, and led directly to the proclamation
of his son as King. Cromwell was averse to waiting for
Charles II. to invade England, and Parliament was of the
same opinion. Fairfax had scruples which prevented his
taking part in an invasion of Scotland; these were shared
by his wife, and both seemed to have been weary of a
position which their sympathies rendered impossible. He
resigned the command; and on June 26, 1650, Cromwell
was made Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of the
armies.

He marched north, ‘and crossed the frontier at Berwick
on July 22, choosing the east coast route because it
enabled him to draw supplies from the ships which he pro-
vided forthe purpose. As he had foreseen, the country was
deserted, and no provisions were to be found on the line of
march. Armed parties of Scots prevented the transport of
supplies by road from England. After Newcastle and
Berwick, the ports of Dunbar and Musselburgh were the
points at which the transport ships were to assemble. Of
these Dunbar was the better, for it had a safe roadstead,
while Musselburgh in easterly winds was exposed to all
the fury of the gales.

The strategy of the campaign was simply to seek the
enemy out, and then entice him to fight. But for long no
effort on Cromwell’s part could draw the Scots into the
open. They lay entrenched between Leith and Edinburgh,
a position too strong to be assailed. Possibly their com- —
Cromwell 37

mander, Leslie, was awaiting reinforcements; more prob-
ably, as Cromwell himself said, the Scots were expecting
“rather to tempt us to attack them in their fastness, within
which they are entrenched, or else hoping we shall famish
for want of provisions ;—which is very likely to be if we
be not timely and fully supplied.” After a month of vain
attempts to draw Leslie from his position into a battle in
the open, Cromwell found himself in somewhat desperate
plight. The weather was wet and tempestuous; there was
much sickness ; the supply of provisions from Musselburgh,
owing to rough weather, was precarious, and of local sup-
plies there were none. For mere subsistence, therefore, he
had to fall back from watching Leslie’s army and make for
Dunbar, the nearest trustworthy anchorage. On August
31 he marched from Musselburgh to Haddington. Then
Leslie left his post of advantage, followed close on Crom-
well’s heels, and “indeed had like to have engaged our rear
brigade of horse with their whole army, had not the Lord
by His providence put a cloud over the moon, thereby giving
us opportunity to draw off those horse to the rest of our
army.”

On September 1 the English army continued its retreat
to the neighbourhood of Dunbar, halting on the north side
of the Brockburn. Leslie followed, and turning aside from
the coast road at Haddington, halted on the south side of
the burn, where, from a position on Doon Hill, he com-
manded the road from Dunbar to Berwick. On the one side
were 12,000 men, wearied with marching and exposure ; on
the other, 23,000 soldiers comparatively fresh from the
cover of the Edinburgh-Leith cantonments. The Brockburn
runs through a “ deep ditch, forty feet in depth, and about
38 Twelve Soldiers

as many in width ;” over it were only two points of passage,
one at the foot of the hill held by Leslie, the other convey-
ing the Berwick-Dunbar road. Further down stream, just
before it enters the sea, is Brocksmouth House.

Leslie’s position was, to an army enfeebled in health and
numbers as that of Cromwell, as unassailable as his en-
trenched line at Leith. For the moment Leslie was master
of the situation. If Cromwell tried to march off by the
Berwick road, Leslie would attack his flank at great advan-
tage; if he tried to embark, Leslie would attack his rear-
guard ; if he attempted fortification—no easy matter in
bad weather, and with troops suffering from dysentery—
Leslie would also attack. Leslie had won in the series of
moves that brought Cromwell to Dunbar. It was now
Leslie’s turn to wait, and thereby compel Cromwell to make
the next move, which would increase Leslie’s advantage.
But Leslie committed the fatal blunder of making the first
move himself. Not content with commanding the Berwick
road, he resolved to bar it, and sent his right wing, the
cavalry, to take a position across it. In this way he divided
his force, and exposed a part of it to be attacked in isola-
tion. Cromwell’s quick eye at once saw the opportunity.
Leslie’s horse moved on the evening of September 2.
Cromwell watched the change in his enemy’s arrange-
ments, and immediately issued orders to Lambert and
Monk for an attack at four next morning upon the right
wing of horse which Leslie had thus exposed without
support.

It was six o'clock, two hours later than Cromwell had
planned, before the troops were in motion, the delay being
caused by carrying out Lambert’s suggestion of transferring
Cromwell 39

the artillery to the right, so as to threaten and “contain the
enemy’s left.” Six regiments of horse under Lambert,
with three and a half regiments of foot under Monk, led
the van, and behind that the rest of the army followed.
Before the faint streaks of dawn had risen over St, Abb’s
Head, Lambert’s horse, with the exultant battle cry of
“The Lord of {Hosts! the Lord of Hosts!” was heavily

    

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engaged, and was gallantly and efficiently supported by
the infantry. The resistance was stubborn. “Before our
foot could come up, the enemy made a gallant resistance,
and there was a very hot dispute at sword’s point between
our horse and theirs. Our first foot, after they had dis-
charged their duty (being overpowered with the enemy),
received some repulses, which they soon recovered. For
my own regiments, under the command of Lieutenant-
Colonel Goffe and my Major White, did come seasonably
40 Twelve Soldiers

in, and at the prick of pike did repel the stoutest regiments
the enemy had there, merely with the courage the Lord was
pleased to give; which proved a great amazement to the
residue of their foot, this being the first action between
the foot. The horse in the meantime did with a great deal
of courage and spirit beat back all opposition, charging
through the bodies of the enemy’s horse and of their foot,
who ‘were, after the first repulse given, made by the Lord
of Hosts as stubble to their swords.”

About an hour after the beginning of the fight the sun
rose bright over the German Ocean, and dispelled the
morning mist. Hodgson writes: “I heard Nol say in the
words of the Psalmist, ‘Let God arise, and let his enemies
be scattered” ” And scattered they were. When the
assailants had reached the foot of the hill of Doon, where
Leslie had the night before been posted, the triumphant
General halted the troopers to re-form, and “ gather for the
chase,” according to his wont, and once more raised his

voice, “ strong and great against the sky,” with the words of
the CXVIIth Psalm :
“O give ye praise unto the Lord
All nations that be ;

Likewise ye people all, accord
His name to magnify !

“For great to us-ward ever are
His loving-kindnesses ;
His truth endures for evermore,
The Lord O do ye bless !”

Then the pursuit began, hot, relentless, irresistible. Three
thousand Scots fell that day, and when night came there

were 16,000 prisoners, and if there was any remnant of the
Scottish army, it had disappeared. The army had been
Cromwell - 4I

destroyed. Cromwell was one of those master-spirits who
never lose sight of the end in the means. He fought not
to win battles and gain glory, but to destroy the forces of
the enemy. He had learned by hard experience that “he
that fights and runs away, will live to fight another day,”
and that a victory without an effective pursuit is a victory
wasted. All great generals have known that effective pur-
suit is the necessary complement of a battle won ; but few
have pursued with the vigour and amazing results shown
by Cromwell after Dunbar.

The city of Edinburgh soon surrendered ; the castle alone
refused, and the autumn was given up to its siege and the
dispersion of insurgent bodies, until the army went into
winter quarters about Edinburgh and Leith.

There was still a Royal army in the field, nominally
commanded by the King. Cromwell’s task was not com-
plete until this army too had been dealt with. It lay for
the most part in a strong fortified position at Stirling. As
before, much time was wasted in skirmishes, which did not
bring about the desired result of getting the Scots into the
open: when Cromwell advanced his adversary retired, and
so the dreary campaign went on. While Lambert defeated
the Covenanters in the west, Cromwell was for a long time
ill with fever. When he recovered, he resolved to end the
whole matter. Ifthe Scots would not come out of Stirling
they must be driven out. So he took his army across the
Firth of Forth, and marched through Fife into Perthshire,
where he seized the roads by which the Scots received their
supplies from the north. This move left open the roads
leading southwards into England, and by these roads the
Scots departed. Cromwell undoubtedly intended that they
42 Twelve Soldiers

should so depart, for he saw how that course, when adopted by
them, would lead to the end of the war. It was hopeless to
bring them to battle in the trackless highlands unless they
chose themselves to accept it. But in the more open and
relatively better roaded England, the choice might not be
left to them at all.

A letter from Cromwell to Lenthall, dated “Leith, August
4, 1651,” throws much light on the matter. He begins by
explaining that to force the enemy to quit the pass at
Stirling “we, by general advice, thought fit to attempt St.
Johnston,” by which route apparently the Scottish army
was provisioned. This seems to have forced the King to
the decision of attempting the invasion of England. But
Cromwell goes on to say: “I do apprehend that if he goes
for England, being some days’ march before us, it will
trouble some men’s thoughts, and may occasion some in-
conveniences ; which I hope we are as deeply sensible of,
and have been, and shall be, I trust, as diligent to prevent
as any. And indeed this is our comfort, that in simplicity
of heart as towards God, we have done to the best of our
judgment, knowing that if some issue were not put to this
business, it would occasion another winter’s war; to the ruin
of your soldiery, for whom the Scots are too hard in respect
of enduring the winter difficulties of this country, and to
the endless expense of the treasure of England in prosecut-
ing this war. It may be supposed we might have kept the
enemy from this, by interposing between him and England,
which truly I believe we might; du¢ hozw to remove him out
of this place without doing what we have done, unless we had
had a commanding army on both sides of the River of Forth,
zs not clear to us ; or how to answer the inconvenience afore-
Cromwell A3

mentioned we understand not.” It seems perfectly clear,
therefore, that Cromwell had foreseen and played for his
adversary’s move. And later on, in the same letter: “when-
ever the Lord shall bring us up to them, we believe the
Lord will make the desperateness of this counsel of theirs
to appear and the folly of it also.... This present move-
ment is not out of choice on our part, but by some kind of
necessity ; and it ts to be hoped will have the like issue.’ In
the last few words he refers to his having interposed between
the Scots and Scotland at Preston. All this implies a pre-
conceived plan, which offered the only way of avoiding the
prolongation of the war.

It seems like the irony of fate that the Scots, when they
marched into England to escape old Ironsides, fancied
themselves to be invaders, and thought of conquest. The
timid public, as Cromwell had foreseen, shared this delusion.
He himself weil knew that they were marching into his net.
For while he left Monk with “a commanding force” in
Scotland, and despatched Harrison at once to “attend the
motions of the enemy” and head him off, Lambert marched
“with a very considerable body of horse” towards the
enemy’s rear to press him and keep touch, but to give way
if attacked; and Cromwell himself, with the rest of the
horse, nine regiments of foot and the artillery, in all 10,000
men, set out, “by the Lord’s help,” upon his last great
march, of which the first object was to interpose his army
between the Scots and London. He moved south in two
parallel columns, his troops covering twenty miles a day
“in their shirt sleeves,” their arms and coats being carried
by the country people. At Pontefract he left behind those
men who were sick or footsore, in order to be able still
44 Twelve Soldiers

further to quicken the pace. In Yorkshire, Fairfax was
gathering troops to reinforce him, and the trained bands of
London were collected and sent north under the command
of Fleetwood to meet him.

Charles, who had followed the west coast route, and the
border of loyal Wales, reached Worcester on August 23,
1651. At Warrington his march was delayed by Harrison,
who had been reinforced by a party of Yorkshiremen sent
by Fairfax, and was joined there by Lambert also, who
had overtaken and passed the Scots’ army. Once with
their united forces in front of the Scots, Lambert and
Harrison did not risk a pitched battle, but fell back
through Uttoxeter towards the route of Cromwell’s
advance. Cromwell, marching through Pontefract, Mans-
field, and Nottingham, had by the 25th reached Coventry,
where Lambert and Harrison joined him. Moving thence
by Warwick, Stratford, and Evesham, where Fleetwood
brought the reinforcements from London, he reached the
neighbourhood of Worcester by the 28th.

Cromwell, now with a force much superior to theirs, was
facing the Scots from a position between them and the
capital. On their line of retreat north lay a force under
Whalley, which had followed them down from Lancashire,
and now held Bewdley Bridge on the Severn above
Worcester.

On the 28th, as he was approaching Worcester, Cromwell
sent Lambert to seize the bridge at Upton-on-Severn,
eigkt miles below the town. The bridge was broken, but
Lambert got cavalry across the stream and set to work to
repair it. On September 2, Fleetwood with 10,000 men
marched through Upton to Powick on the Teme, where,
Cromwell 45

however, the bridge had been broken and the north bank
was held by the enemy.

On September 3 the battle of Worcester was fought.
During the morning Fleetwood bridged the Teme, and in
the afternoon crossed it and attacked the enemy, who held
their ground until Cromwell, who had that morning bridged

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the Severn above its junction with the Teme, led across to
the right bank a portion of his own force, and thus struck
the flank of the Scots holding the line of the Teme. The
result was that the Scots were driven into St. John’s—the
suburb of Worcester on the right bank—closely followed
by Fleetwood and Cromwell. Then the Scots from Wor-
cester made a strong sortie on the left bank. Cromwell
thereupon re-crossed the Severn, and after a very stiff
46 Twelve Soldiers

contest drove them back into Worcester. Fighting was
fierce as the iron ring closed in, “and my Lord-General did
exceedingly hazard himself, riding up and down in the
midst of the fire.”

When night fell, with it fell all hope for Charles. No
formed body escaped from Worcester to repass the Scottish
border. It was indeed to the victors “a crowning mercy.”

Into the conflicts of peace which followed his last victory
in the field we cannot here accompany Cromwell. We
must be content to review his work as a soldier.

The man who in mature years began to raise and lead
troops in fulfilment of what he believed to be his duty to
God and to his country, regarded the cause which he
espoused as that of right against wrong. It was natural,
therefore, that in the choice of means he should consider
first the personal character of his officers and men. He
could not expect men to lay down their lives for a cause
in which they had no faith. His first troop, therefore, was
recruited on the basis of character and devotion to the
cause. This principle of recruiting stood the test of war,
and prevailed over all the rival theories. First the Iron-
sides, and then the new model army, proved themselves
equal to every shock. An army thus raised was bound to
be perfect in discipline, and that Cromwell’s army had this
perfection is proved by the rapidity, and, when necessary,
the silence of its marches, and by its absolute restraint
from disorder and plunder.

Cromwell began as a cavalry officer. At the end of.
three years he shows himself master of the trade, and at
Naseby are seen all the points of good cavalry leading in
battle: the bold charge that trusts not to lead but to steel,
Cromwell 4y

the use of a second line and ofa reserve, the timely rally
after the charge, and again before the pursuit, which is
then pushed to the ruin of the enemy. The campaign of
Preston shows the perfect use of cavalry in operations:
reconnaissance by which the enemy is found, and all his
movements watched ; the screen which the enemy fails to
penetrate. In the campaign of Worcester cavalry is used
to delay the enemy’s advance-guard, and to harass his rear-
guard.

In his handling of the three arms together, Cromwell
reveals that grip of purpose in the use of each of them
and in securing co-operation between them, which marks
the tactician. When he attacked a fortress he concentrated
his artillery, holding his infantry ready to storm the breach
as soon as the guns should make it practicable ; his infantry
were instructed when the breach was carried to rally and
re-form to meet the certain counter-attack of cavalry, and
he had in hand the mounted arm to follow up his infantry
and counter the counter-attack.

When the general officer becomes Commander-in-Chief,
he must fulfil other and harder requirements. In the first
place he must choose the objective, the point against which
to deliver his blow. Where the enemy relies on his army,
Cromwell strikes down that army: at Preston, at Dunbar,
at Worcester. When, as in Ireland, the enemy’s army is
nothing, and can evade every blow, while his strength is in
obstacles and strong places, Cromwell neglects the army
and beats down the strongholds.

Having chosen his point, a Commander-in-Chief must
collect his forces to strike hard. Cromwell always brings
his whole available force to the striking point, and every
48 Twelve Soldiers

blow is crushing. At Preston, at Dunbar, at Worcester,
the beaten army is destroyed. When he assaults a fortress
—Pembroke, Drogheda, Wexford, Clonmel—it falls. When
he invests one, it surrenders. It is true he marched away
from Waterford. Only a strong man could have thus
promptly resolved to postpone an attack for which he saw
that his army was unfit, and it was the accident of his
recall that gave the credit of the taking of Waterford to
his successor. Cromwell has no fruitless victories. Pursuit
completes the work of the battlefield, except at Worcester,
where Cromwell, having force enough and to spare, attacks
on all sides, making escape impracticable and pursuit
unnecessary.

The art which is perhaps most admired ina strategist
is that by which his blow is so directed as to drive the
enemy away from his base while the striking army covers
its own communications. A fine example of this is
Cromwell’s march from Wetherby through the hills,
bringing him down upon the rear of the Scots main body
at Preston. The operations against Kilkenny offer a still
more brilliant instance of the same art, for here Cromwell
used his sea power to base himself at Cork, and thus to
strike the Irish army, already cut off from the coast, by
advancing against it from the west, the direction from
which its own leaders expected reinforcement and supply.

With the Lord Protector’s death came reaction; con-
fusion and disaffection were rapidly disintegrating the
battalions of the “Saints.” All Monk’s influence was
barely sufficient to prevent the recrudescence of a Civil
War, that, at this juncture, would have been doubly em-
bittered. But the crisis passed, and the bulk of the army
Cromwell 49

melted away. “Fifty thousand men accustomed to the
profession of arms were at once thrown on the world, and
experience seemed to warrant the belief that this change
would produce much misery and crime; that the discharged
veterans would be seen begging in every street, or that
they would be driven by hunger to pillage. But no such
result followed. In a few months there remained not a
trace indicating that the most formidable army in the
world had just been absorbed into the mass of the com-
munity. The Royalists themselves confessed, that in every
department of honest industry the discarded warriors
prospered beyond other men, that none was charged with
theft or robbery, that none was heard to ask an alms, and
that if a baker, a mason, or a waggoner attracted notice by
his diligence and sobriety, he was in all probability one of
Oliver’s old soldiers.”

This was mainly Cromwell’s work. Take him out of
the history of the Civil War, and you remove its strongest
mainspring. Of all the fighting men, not merely in
England but in Europe, of the seventeenth century, he
stands the foremost. “A larger soul, I think, hath seldom

dwelt in a house of clay than his was.”?

1 Thurloe.
MARLBOROUGH
1650—1722

ON June 24, 1650, there was born to Mr. Winston
Churchill, of Wootton Glanville in Dorset, and to Elizabeth
his wife, a son, who four days later was baptized by the
name of John. The birth took place at Ashe in Devon,
for Winston Churchill had taken the King’s side in the
Civil War, and had suffered so severely for it that his
wife had been compelled to take refuge with her father.
In those very days, strangely enough, the man whose genius
for military organization had wrecked the Royalist cause,
had obtained supreme command of the army, and there-
with, though perhaps he knew it not, supreme power in
England. On June 26, while women were still rejoicing
over the new baby at Ashe, Oliver Cromwell received
his commission as Captain-General and Commander-in-
Chief of the army which was designed to meet the in-
vasion of the Scots. Two months and a half later, when
the dawn of September 3 was stealing over little John
Churchill’s cradle, Oliver was standing erect in his stirrups,
watching the crushing effect of his turning movement on
Leslie’s right flank at Dunbar, till the sun rose broad on
the most brilliant victory of the most remarkable army
in history. What Cromwell left undone for the British

army, that baby in the cradle was appointed to do,
50
 
Marlborough 51

The years crept on, and Cromwell and_his soldiers,
fulfilling their destiny, took upon them the government
of the British Isles. Since the Wars of the Roses, English
soldiers had been the scum of the nation: Cromwell rose
up and declared that they should be the cream; and this
was the result. Nor was the influence of this army
bounded by the shores of Britain and Ireland. It is true
that but one small body of six thousand men ever took
the field on the continent of Europe, and these as allies
of the French under the orders of Turenne, but they sufficed
to show the quality of the rest. In 1444 France, by accept-
ing the principle of a standing army, had made one gigantic
bound which had placed her for two centuries far ahead of
England in the race for military efficiency ; but the work
of ten years, from 1645 to 1655, had brought England
level with her and beyond her. English officers said with
patronizing contempt that the discipline of Turenne’s
troops was good—for France. The strength of Cromwell’s
diplomacy lay in the fame of his armed forces.

But with Cromwell’s death the whole structure fell
to pieces. The famous army was disbanded, and only
the Coldstream Guards were saved intact from the wreck,
together with troopers sufficient to make up the regiment
of horse which we now know as the Blues. Another
regiment, now known as the Grenadier Guards, was made
up from the ranks of the cavaliers, together with two troops
of Life Guards, and these, with two regiments of foot and
one of horse for the service of Tangier, composed the
British army of King Charles I]. The reduction would
in itself have been a small matter could only Cromwell’s
traditions have been preserved; but they were cast
52 Twelve Soldiers

to the four winds. The flood-gates of corruption, jobbery,
embezzlement, and general rascality which had been so
carefully closed by the Puritans, were re-opened, and all
the old abuses, satirized by Shakespeare in the characters
of Falstaff, Nym, Pistol, Bardolph, and Parolles, flowed
back once more into their old channel. By 1666, as a
contemporary letter tells us, it was a scandal to be a

Life-Guardsman.
It was just at this time that John Churchill entered the

army. Whence arose his passion for the military pro-
fession is uncertain. At the Restoration, family interest
had procured for him the post of page to the Duke of
York, and the story goes that the Duke, himself a keen
soldier who had seen many campaigns, noticed the lad’s
enthusiasm when reviewing the Foot Guards, and granted
his request for a pair of colours. However that may be,
a commission, dated September 14, 1667, was issued to
John Churchill as ensign in the King’s own company
of Russell’s (the Grenadier) Guards; and so began his
military career. A year or two later found him, as became
an English officer, engaged with the Tangier regiment
in savage warfare against the Moors, from which service
he presently returned for more serious employment in
Europe. In 1672 Francé and England declared war
against the United Provinces, and one hundred and fifty
thousand men under Condé, Turenne, and Luxemburg
swept down upon the devoted Netherlands. Within two
months they had captured every fortress on the Rhine,
crossed the river itself, and advanced almost to within
striking distance of Amsterdam. Six thousand English
under the Duke of Monmouth took part in the operations,
Marlborough 53

and John Churchill, having first served as a marine officer
at the naval fight of Solebay, joined this force with the
rank of captain in the Admiral’s regiment. Very soon
his distinguished gallantry and extraordinary coolness in
action brought him to the notice of Turenne, who gladly
extended his patronage to the handsome and daring young
Englishman.

Thus the spring of 1674 found him promoted by King
Louis XIV. to be Colonel of his regiment, which had
now passed into the French service, and it was as
the commander of a battalion that he took part under
Turenne in two general actions at Sinzheim and Entzheim
in the country between the Rhine and the Neckar. One
more campaign, or a part of one, was all that he was fated
to serve under the ablest strategist of his age, for on July
27, 1675, Turenne was killed at the action of Salzbach ;
but Churchill seems none the less to have continued his
service on the continent until 1677. These were his
’prentice years, begun, as it chanced, at a time which
Napoleon himself pronounced to be a new era in the
history of war. He had seen the conduct of operations
ona grand scale at the invasion of Holland in 1672, and
had learned by heart the fortresses of the Rhine and
Meuse. He had also followed one of the smaller armies
which Turenne always preferred to command; he had seen
the great master make one of his greatest mistakes, and
strive to set it right by one of his most arduous marches
and most adventurous attacks; he had watched him
manceuvre successfully against so redoubtable an antago-
nist as Montecuculi, and had seen and felt the dismay

1 Afterwards disbanded.
54 : Twelve Soldiers

when the famous Marshal was struck down at Salzbach.
Lastly, he had learned the strong and weak points of
French military administration, and intimately studied the
character of the French soldier.

On his final return to England he was promoted Colonel
of Foot,! and together with his new rank took upon himself
new responsibilities by a secret marriage with Sarah
Jennings, the beautiful but penniless maid-of-honour of
the Duchess of York. The following years were therefore
years of poverty for both of them. Churchill was in con-
stant attendance on the Duke of York, through whom
he obtained for his services a peerage as Baron Churchill
of Aymouth and the Colonelcy of the Royal Dragoons.
But no employment was found for him in the army.

As to the condition of the army itself, it went steadily
from bad to worse during the last ten years of King
Charles II. So long as George Monk lived, there
was still some chance of maintaining the traditions of
Cromwell, and some certainty that the administration
would remain in competent military hands. But when
Charles abridged the powers of Monk’s successor, appar-
ently with some idea of exerting them himself, but in
reality to relegate them to an obscure civilian secretary,
increase of corruption and concurrently of demoralization
could be the only result. At last Charles died, and there
was some hope that matters would be improved, for James,
whatever his faults, was an extremely capable administrator
of a department, and had wrought lasting good both at the
Admiralty and the office of Ordnance. The outbreak of
Monmouth’s rebellion gave James an excuse for increasing
1 Feb. 17,1677-8. He had been made Lieutenant-Colonel, Jan. 5, 1675.
Marlborough 55

the army and of employing his old dependent Churchill,
who was now promoted Major-General (July 1, 1688), but
was presently superseded in the chief command by the
appointment of an incapable foreigner over his head.
There is no need to relate the story of Sedgemoor: it
must suffice that the only good work done either in the
campaign or in the action that closed it, was done by
Churchill. He was rewarded with the Colonelcy of the
Third troop of Life Guards.

All James’s efforts were now directed towards the
creation of an efficient standing army. In default of
legal powers to govern it he took refuge in illegality,
though, like all weak men, he strove to clothe it in legal
forms, and endeavoured by making pets of his troops to
gain the obedience which can only be truly enforced by
discipline. The King wandered from tent to tent of the
senior officers in the summer camp at Hounslow, seeking
to ingratiate himself with all ranks, and writing with ill-
concealed satisfaction of the efficiency of his regiments.
Yet he did not trust them, and more foolish still, showed
that he did not trust them. His idea of an efficient army
was an army strongly leavened with Roman Catholics, or
better still, composed entirely of Roman Catholics. Gross
injustice done in furtherance of this idea alienated almost
the whole of the Protestant officers from their allegiance ;
and when William of Orange landed at Torbay, the army
of James was paralyzed by the desertion of those officers,
and among them of Major-General Lord Churchill.

The rank and file of the army were furious over the
ignoble part that they had played in giving way before
William’s invasion, and the discontent presently found vent
56 Twelve Soldiers

in a serious mutiny of the famous regiment still known as
the Royal Scots. This rising was by William’s promptitude
instantly quelled; but examination soon showed that a
mutinous spirit was not the only evil that required to be
combated in the army. There were significant symptoms
that the whole administrative system was rotten to the
core; and yet even with an army in this state William
had to face the reconquest of Ireland, an insurrection in
Scotland, and a war with France in Flanders.

On the news of William’s invasion, Louis XIV. had
declared war against the States General; and England,
pursuant to obligations of treaty, was called upon to furnish
a contingent of troops for their assistance. Accordingly,
in March 1689 Churchill, now Earl of Marlborough, was
ordered to Holland with nine battalions of British infantry
and two regiments of horse, to serve under the orders of
the Prince of Waldeck. One battalion mutinied, as has
been said, on the march to the port of embarkation, and
on landing in the Low Countries was weakened to extremity
by desertion. The remaining regiments proved to be far
below the strength assigned to them on paper. The
officers were ill-paid, and most of them, even the colonels,
ill-conducted. The men were sickly, listless,! undisciplined,
and disorderly. Their shoes were bad, their clothing miser-
able, their very arms defective. Marlborough found him-
self taxed to the utmost to reduce these unruly elements
to order ; and yet when these same troops a few months
later were engaged in a serious action against the French,
they won the highest praise from Waldeck for their own

! Nonchalants is the word used by the Prince of Waldeck in his
extremely uncomplimentary report.
Marlborough 57

gallantry and the capacity of their commander. This, the
combat of Walcourt, won against Marshal d’Humiéres on
August 27, 1689, was Marlborough’s first brush with a
Marshal of France.

Very differently fared Schomberg, by repute the first
soldier in Europe, in his Irish campaign of the same year.
The story indeed is well-nigh incredible. If the organizers
of the expedition had modelled their arrangements on the
precedent of Edward III.’s invasion of France in 1346, they
would have avoided a hundred blunders. The operations
simply collapsed under the burden of corruption, rascality,
and mismanagement; and Schomberg, an excellent work-
man when good instruments were furnished ready to his
hand, was absolutely helpless. Yet Marlborough, with no
better material at his command, could make his men into
good instruments for himself.

Great preparations were made for more decided action in
Ireland in the following year. William decided to take the
field in person, and Marlborough was detained from Holland
to assume the chief command of the forces in England
during the King’s absence. It occurred also to the Chief
Secretary of Ireland to ransack the records for the history
of Cromwell’s Irish campaign, and to propose it as the
model for the operations then pending. So long as the
ports of Munster were open, he said, France could always
pour reinforcements and supplies into Ireland ; while there-
fore Schomberg advanced from the North, a descent should
be made in the South, and Cork should be the objective.
Marlborough, without consulting records, had seen into the
true heart of the matter as clearly as Cromwell. In August
he prepared a design for the capture of Cork and Kinsale,
58 Twelve Soldiers

undertaking, if the work were entrusted to him, to execute
it in three weeks. The task was accordingly made over
to him and finished, in spite of obstacles raised by William’s
foreign officers, in three-and-twenty days, quietly, deftly,
and unostentatiously. One point only need be noticed in
this brief service in Ireland, that Marlborough begged for
money so that his troops might pay their way, without
wrong to the inhabitants and without injury to their own
discipline. So Cromwell had done before him in Ireland,
so he himself was to do again on the Continent, so was
Wellington to do a century later in the Peninsula.

The further pacification of Ireland was made over to
Dutch officers, and William took the command in Flanders
during the campaign of 1691. Marlborough accompanied
him, but the only detail of the year worth recalling is the
profound impression which Marlborough’s ability produced
on the foreign commander, the Prince of Vaudemont. In
the following year, however, Marlborough was dismissed
from all public employment, and even committed for a time
to the Tower, for complicity in Jacobite intrigues. So
William went out to fight against Luxemburg without his
only able officer, and cut a remarkably poor figure as a
General. Ardent soldier though he was, and keenly though
he had studied his profession, he was a General by book
rather than by instinct. His conduct of operations was
singularly uneven, and he seems to have been incapable of
sustained effort in the direction of a series of movements.
He would conceive a brilliant design, such as the attack on
Steenkirk, and mar it by inattention to detail. He lacked
patience thoroughly to think out or execute his conceptions,
and readiness to correct or make good his errors. He had
Marlborough 59

the profoundest confidence in the British soldier, entrusting
him always with the hardest of the work, and looking to
him to redeem his mistakes, The men on their side admired
his personal gallantry and fought for him magnificently.
Never have British troops showed their fighting qualities
more superbly than at Steenkirk and Landen; yet they
were beaten in both actions, and at Landen actually routed,
entirely through William’s fault. But this was not the
worst. The army was neither well-disciplined! nor well-
conducted ; it “swore terribly in Flanders,” and in fact had
reverted in tone to that which it had been before the days
of Cromwell. The force was the largest of British troops
that had appeared in a continental war since the days
of King Henry VI., and it had been beaten by the
French.

The war was closed by the Peace of Ryswick in 1697,
and the army returned home to be delivered over to the
tender mercies of the House of Commons. That assembly,
by an act of criminal imbecility, disbanded the whole of it
except seven thousand men in England and twelve thousand
in Ireland, and this without making provision for the pay-
ment of the wages due to them. The House was stormed
by petitions for arrears, for redress of grievances, and for
reform of abuses. Every man who had a complaint against
his officer—and there were many who had but too just
ground for complaint—laid it by petition before the
Commons, some not omitting to curry favour with them
by pointing out that their officers had spoken disdainfully

1 Thus at Steenkirk certain English battalions broke their ranks in
their eagerness to come into action, and required to be halted and re-
formed at a crisis when every moment was precious.
60 Twelve Soldiers

of the House. The merchants and the rabble took their
cue from the Parliament, called soldiers the plagues of the
nation, and insulted the officers, many of whom after years
of honest service and wounds and hardship were turned
adrift, penniless, to starve. William as Commander-in-
Chief seems to have been powerless; nor does he appear
to have made the slightest effort to check abuses even
where he might. On the contrary, he added to existing
difficulties by flagrant jobbery in granting to favourites,
chiefly foreigners, the Irish land which should have paid
the expenses of the Irish War. The War Office was ina
state of chaos, the Pay Office was a sink of corruption. The
name and profession of the soldier were degraded to the
lowest point, and but for the outbreak of the War of the
Spanish Succession it is difficult to see how the confusion
could have found other issue than in a great military riot.
Such was the state of the army when Marlborough,
having been received back into favour in 1698, was
appointed first Commander-in-Chief of the forces in
Flanders in 1701, and shortly after Captain-General and
Master-General of the Ordnance. The French army, on
the other hand, was still, as it had long been, the first in
Europe. Condé, Turenne, Luxemburg, and Louvois were
dead, it is true, but their traditions still remained to some
extent unimpaired, and above all, the long career of French
victory was still unbroken. Still the army had its weak
points. The object of a campaign in those days was not
necessarily to seek out an enemy and beat him. The two
alternatives prescribed by the best authorities were to
fight at an advantage, or to “subsist comfortably.” Thus
to enter an enemy’s borders, and keep him marching back-
Marlborough 61

wards and forwards for weeks without giving him a chance
of striking a blow, was esteemed no small success, for he
was thereby forced to consume his own supplies, and to
impoverish and harass his troops to death without accom-
plishing anything. The tendency to these negative
campaigns was increased by the interference of the French
Ministry of War with the generals in the field ; the Com-
mander-in-Chief’s orders to the field army being always
forwarded by an inferior officer to the King, without whose
sanction they could not be executed. Great commanders
occasionally had strength to kick themselves free from
such bondage, but the majority preferred to live as long as
possible in an enemy’s country without risking a general
action.

But what the French Court loved above all was a
siege. The cock-pit of Flanders may be defined roughly
as a quadrilateral, bounded to north by the Demer, to
east by the Meuse, to south by the Sambre and Haine,
and to west by the sea, with the angles defined by the
fortresses of Maestricht, Namur, Ostend, and Antwerp.
The country within this quadrilateral is cut by a succession
of rivers flowing from south to north, the Geete, the Dyle,
the Senne, the Dender, and the Lys. A glance at any old
map shows that every one of these rivers was studded with
strongly fortified towns. Each of these towns of course
contained its garrison, and the manceuvres of contending
armies were governed to a great extent by the effort on
one side to release these garrisons for service in the field,
and on the other to keep them locked up for as long as
possible. War in such a country was thus almost inevit-
ably a war of sieges, and the Court of Versailles delighted
62 Twelve Soldiers

in sieges, for it could attend the ceremony in state and
take nominal charge of the operations, with much glory
and with little discomfort or danger. To such lengths
was carried this passion for a siege, that the French
King sought by grant of extra pay and rations to make it
‘popular with the men. Finally, as though sieges provided
insufficient work within trenches for the troops, the French
had a system of covering their frontiers with long chains
of fortified lines, doubtless excellent defensive works, but
subject to the disadvantage of keeping large numbers of
men from service in the field. With all their brilliant
military instincts the French are a pedantic nation, and in
1700 uninterrupted victory and native conceit had brought
this pedantry to a very dangerous height. Even now they
have not wholly abandoned their love for the principle of
fortified lines.

When Marlborough took the field in 1702, a French
prince of the blood, the Duke of Burgundy, with old
Marshal Boufflers to instruct him, lay on the Lower Meuse
with sixty thousand men, threatening Nimeguen and
Grave, the two eastern gates of the Waal and Rhine into
Holland. Boufflers had made a dash at Nimeguen before
Marlborough’s arrival, and Ginkel, who commanded the
British troops, had only saved it by a precipitate retreat
and the sacrifice of his baggage. He had then crossed to
the north bank of the Waal and lay there helpless, while
all Holland trembled over the narrow escape of Nimeguen.
Marlborough on taking command at once crossed to the
south bank of the Waal. “Now, gentlemen,” he said
to the two Dutch civilians who, with the title of
Deputies, attended him to see that he did nothing rash,
Marlborough 63

“now I shall soon rid you of your troublesome neigh-
bours.”

Five swift marches southward took him across the line
of the French communications with the Demer, and
brought Boufflers hurrying back in hot haste across the
Meuse. July 22 found the two armies within striking
distance, Marlborough’s fresh, ready, confident; Boufflers’
encamped in a bad position, and worn out with the
fatigue of a week of desperate marching. The French
lay at Marlborough’s mercy, but the Dutch Deputies for-
bade an attack, and as the Dutch troops which composed
more than half the army were under their control, Marl-
borough was obliged to yield. So Boufflers was allowed
to escape across the Demer, and a first great opportunity
was lost.

Marlborough was now obliged to move northward again
to pick up a convoy, and Boufflers had the temerity to
follow him in the hope of cutting it off. A second time
Marlborough played him the same trick, and by extreme
rapidity of movement threw himself across the line of the
French retreat to the Demer. On this occasion the
French blundered on to the Allies in such hopeless con-
fusion that a great victory for Marlborough was certain.
But when he ordered the: Dutch generals to attack they
refused to move, and when he sought to fight a general
action on the morrow the Deputies stepped in to forbid it.
Thus a second and a third great opportunity were lost.

With the patience and forbearance which were almost
godlike in him, Marlborough excused the Dutch generals
in his despatches, and perforce undertook the reduction of
the French fortresses on the Meuse from Venloo to
64 Twelve Soldiers

Roermond, a pedantic operation thoroughly to the Dutch
taste. Boufflers, powerless to check him, lay at Tongres,
anxious as to the fate of Liége, but anxious also as to the
defensive lines of the frontier on the Mehaigne. Marl-
borough, perfectly aware that he held him on the horns of
a dilemma, drew nearer to him; and Boufflers, finally
making up his mind, selected his camping-ground under
the walls of Li¢ge and marched up with his whole army to
occupy it. Quite unconscious of any danger, he arrived
within cannon-shot of his chosen position, and there stood
Marlborough, calmly awaiting him with a superior force.
For the fourth time victory was certain, and for the fourth
time the Dutch Deputies interposed to save Boufflers, who
hurried behind his fortified lines, leaving Liége to its
inevitable fate. So ended Marlborough’s first effort to
seek out his enemy and beat him, foiled by Dutch pedantry,
treachery, and stupidity.

Deeply chagrined, but never disheartened, Marlborough,
now elevated to a dukedom for his services in the field,
strove hard in the next campaign to convert the Allies to
his new principle of bringing their enemy to action ; but
Dutch obstinacy was too strong for him, and he was
compelled to open operations by the meaningless siege of
Bonn. This done, he hastened back to Flanders, and
prepared with consummate skill a scheme for a combined
attack of all the allied forces on Antwerp. His own part,
which was the most difficult, was fulfilled with perfect
success, but Dutch cupidity and incapacity upset the
whole plan, and the campaign closed rather to the credit
of the French than of the Allies,

Meanwhile continued success on the Upper Rhine and
Marlborough 65

the Danube had given the French and their German ally,
the Elector of Bavaria, command of the line of the
Danube and virtual assurance of an easy march to Vienna
in the campaign of 1704. The affairs of the Empire indeed
were well-nigh hopeless ; a Hungarian revolt was preying
on its vitals from within, and its armies were defeated
and demoralized without. Marlborough saw that so
desperate a situation required a desperate remedy, and
taking Prince Eugene of Savoy, the greatest of the
Imperial generals, into his confidence, he concerted a new
plan of operations. This was nothing less than to commit
the Low Countries to the protection of the Dutch, and
leaving the old seat of war with all its armies and fortresses
in his rear, to carry the campaign into the heart of
Germany. A scheme so daring, so perilous, so utterly at
variance with all the old stilted conceptions of war could
not be broached to the Allies, so the design was carefully
kept secret, being masked under the vague term, operations
on the Moselle. When the British troops streamed out of
their winter quarters to cross the Meuse at Roermond, not
a man had the slightest idea whither the march would
ultimately lead him.

The dispositions of the Bourbon troops showed that no
novelty was looked for in the coming campaign. Villeroy
with an army lay within the French lines on the Mehaigne,
with orders to follow Marlborough wherever he went.
Tallard with another army was in the vicinity of Strasburg,
his passage of the Rhine secured to him by the bridge of
Kehl. The Count of Coignies was stationed on the Moselle
with ten thousand men, ready to act in Flanders or in
Germany as required. Finally, at Ulm lay the Elector of

F
66 Twelve Soldiers

Bavaria and his French allies, forty-five thousand men in
all. On May 18 Marlborough began his famous march,
making his way first up the Rhine towards Bonn. King
Louis at once ordered Villeroy to follow the English
General to the Moselle. Marlborough carefully stepped
out of his way to inspect Bonn, and the French were more

 

confident than ever that he must be bound for the Moselle.
Then leaving the infantry and artillery to follow as quickly
as they might, Marlborough pushed on in all haste with
the cavalry only to Coblentz. Again everything pointed
to operations on the Moselle, unless indeed (for the French
never knew what Marlborough might do) he designed to
Marlborough 67

double back down the Rhine for operations near the sea.
But the Duke hastened on with his cavalry to Cassel, and
requested the Landgrave of Hesse to send the artillery
which he had duly prepared for operations on the Moselle
to Mannheim. Again the French were puzzled. Was
Alsace and not the Moselle to be the scene of action? and
if not, why was the English General bridging the river at
Philipsburg? and why was the artillery moving up the
river? Tallard shifted uneasily to the Lauter, and Villeroy
sent for reinforcements ; but before they could guess what
was going forward, Marlborough had crossed the Main
and Neckar, and had advanced beyond all possibility of
being overtaken on the road to Ulm.

The difficulties and hardships of the march were such as
would have deterred many men from carrying it through
to the end. The roads were execrable, and the rain for
many days was incessant. The artillery was only got
forward by incredible exertion on the part of the officers,
and the foot suffered much, and would have suffered more
but for the Duke’s constant care and forethought for them.
At Heidelberg a large supply of shoes was ready for them,
while victuals had been collected and stores of specie
amassed at different points on the march, that the men
might pay honestly for everything that they took, and
have no excuse for plunder or marauding. Such a thing
had never been known before in all the innumerable
campaigns of Germany.

When finally Marlborough had gathered together the
whole force of the Allies before Ulm, he was still obliged
for the sake of peace to share his command on alternate
days with Prince Louis of Baden, a commander of a
68 Twelve Soldiers

thoroughly wooden type. The Elector of Bavaria had
withdrawn from Ulm at his approach, and Marlborough’s
objective was now Donauwiérth, which would give him at
once a place of arms and a bridge over the Danube. A
move of the Allies northward revealed his intention, and
the Elector at once detached thirteen thousand men to
occupy the Schellenberg, a commanding height which
covers Donauwérth on the north bank of the Danube.
With much difficulty the Duke persuaded Prince Louis to
advance to within fifteen miles of the position, and next
morning, taking his turn of command, he started off at
three o'clock to capture it before his twenty-four hours
should expire. The roads were so bad that the march
was very slow, and the main body of the army was still
some distance in rear when, at six o’clock in the evening,
Marlborough, hearing that reinforcements from the Elector
were on their way to Donauworth, caught up sixteen bat-
talions which he had pushed on in advance, and sent them
straight at one corner of the enemy’s entrenchments,

The defences of the Schellenberg were formidable, and
the attacking troops at first inferior in number to the de-
fending force. The British led the assault with great
gallantry and dash, but despite all their endeavours they
could not carry the entrenchments. The Bavarian troops
were withdrawn from all the defences round the hill to
meet them, and the fight for an hour and a half was des-
perately fierce and bloody, till the main body of the Allies
under Baden came up, found the entrenchments almost
unmanned except at the actual point of attack, and speedily
ended the affair. That hour and a half cost the Allies
five thousand men, and the British alone fifteen hundred,
Marlborough 69

or more than a third of their number that were engaged.
But it cost the Elector Donauwérth and practically the
whole of the thirteen thousand men that held the Schellen-
berg, and laid Bavaria helplessly at the mercy of the Allies,

Marlborough lost no time in following the unhappy
Elector across the Danube, cutting off his supplies, and
trying even by desolation of his territory, a work which
he abominated, to force him to renounce the French
alliance. But now Tallard and his army came streaming
through the Black Forest to his assistance, and joined the
Elector at Augsburg; while Eugene, who had marched
parallel to him on the north bank of the Danube, arrived with
his army on the same day at Hochstddt to the assistance
of Marlborough. The situation of the Allies was now not
of the pleasantest, for they were divided on the two banks
of the Danube, whereas the Bourbons were concentrated
on the south bank. If Marlborough fell back to join
Eugene, the enemy could pass the Lech and enter Bavaria ;
if Eugene crossed the river to Marlborough, the enemy
could pass to the north bank and cut them off from their
only source of supplies in Franconia. The difficulty was
finally solved by the march of the whole French army to
the north of the Danube, with the intention of taking up
a strong position, and forcing the Allied army to retire from
want of supplies.

No sooner were their movements certain than Marl-
borough ! set his army in motion, and in twenty-four hours
had moved the whole of his thirty-five thousand men to

Eugene’s position at Hochstadt, a march of twenty miles,

1 Baden had been got rid of by giving him 15,000 men to besiege
Ingoldstadt.
70 Twelve Soldiers

which included for the whole army the passage of the
Danube and the Wernitz, and for half of it the passage
of the Ach and the Lechin addition. The artillery was
by great exertions brought up a few hours later, and at
dawn of August 12 the junction of the two forces was
complete.

Tallard and the Elector had meanwhile taken up a
position some nine miles away at the top of an almost
imperceptible slope, their right resting on Blenheim on the
Danube, their left at Liitzingen, and their front covered
at about a mile’s distance by a deep boggy rivulet called
the Nebel. YTallard had not the slightest intention of
fighting ; his force was superior to that of the Allies, and
he meant to subsist comfortably. So careless were he
and the Elector that they encamped their forces not as
one but as two distinct armies, each, according to the
orthodox fashion, with cavalry on the wings and infantry
in the centre; so that their front presented a central mass
of cavalry, with a body of infantry on each flank, and
again two more masses of cavalry on the flanks of the
infantry. In any case this was a fault, and with a Marl-
borough within striking distance it was madness.

Thus it was that when the Allies moved forward to the
attack on August 13, Tallard was writing to the Court of
Versailles that the enemy was moving towards Nordlingen,
while his cavalry was scattered in all directions foraging.
No sooner did he realize the truth than all was hurry and
confusion. On his extreme right Tallard could descry
the red coats of the British, and knowing that where they
were, there the hottest of the fighting must be expected,
he lost no time in sending twenty-six battalions to hold
Marlborough 71

Blenheim. But instead of disputing the passage of the
Nebel he decided to allow the Allies to cross it, and to
annihilate them with the stream in their rear. So confident
was this Marshal of France that he seemed to think him- |
self above all rules.

Marlborough, throwing with better reason all text-books
to the winds, formed his line of battle with cavalry in the
centre and infantry on the flanks. Further, to cover the
passage of the cavalry over the river, he formed his horse
in two lines, covered by a line of infantry both in front
and in rear. It seemed a dzzarre! formation to the F rench,
but they understood its purport before the day was over.
The main features of the battle are well known. The
British battalions dashed themselves in vain against Blen-
heim, and Eugene on the right strove in vain to produce
a serious impression on the Elector; but in the centre
Marlborough passed squadron after squadron, though not
without great difficulty and heavy loss, over the Nebel,
and at last was ready for a decisive charge against the
French centre. The attack was delivered at a “grand
trot,” and the French cavalry, not yet broken of the
pernicious habit of using missile instead of shock action,
fired a feeble volley from the saddle and turned tail. Then,
as was to be expected, the flanks of the two armies which
Tallard had failed to make one, swerved back to right and
left instead of rallying on a common centre, leaving a wide
gap between them. Through this gap Marlborough’s horse
poured irresistibly, and the left division bringing up their
right shoulders swept the French cavalry into the Danube.
The twenty-six battalions in Blenheim were surrounded

1 Feuquiéres,
72 Twelve Soldiers

and taken prisoners ; the Elector’s army made its way in
flight rather than retreat to the Rhine, and the action cost
the Bourbons not less than forty thousand men and a
hundred guns. So crushing was the defeat, that it was
long before Louis XIV. found a man who had courage
to tell him the whole truth about the battle. It
shattered French prestige and upset French military theory
so utterly that France never recovered her true position
as the first military nation in Europe until the advent of
Napoleon. “Welcome to England, sir,” said a butcher of
Nottingham to Tallard as the Marshal was escorted with
every mark of respect into the town. “I hope to see your
master here next year.” The remark was typical of the
English feeling at the time. The nation felt that the old
days of Poitiers and Agincourt were come again.
Marlborough on his return from the Danube secured
his winter quarters on the Moselle, with the design of
carrying the war into Lorraine in the following year; but
when the following year came, not a man nor a horse of
his Imperial Allies fulfilled their engagement to join him,
so that he was forced to return to Flanders. Villeroi, who
had been very bold during Marlborough’s absence, instantly
retired within his fortified lines on the Geete and Mehaigne
on his arrival; and it became necessary that these lines,
which, as has been said, were a favourite resource of French
generals, should be forced. The task was the more difficult,
inasmuch as the Dutch conceived the operation to be too
perilous. Marlborough solved the difficulty in a fashion
peculiarly his own. Sending the Dutch to make a demon-
stration near Namur, which led Villeroi to move the mass
of his force in that direction, he threw his own army by a
Marlborough 73

single well-executed night march across the lines at Landen,
unobserved and practically unopposed ; so that when the
Dutch returned from their demonstration they found that,
in spite of themselves, they formed the rear of an army
which was passing the much-dreaded lines in all possible
comfort and safety.

It may have been pique at finding themselves thus
victorious against their will that led the Dutch officers
to thwart the whole of the Duke’s subsequent operations.
Twice if not thrice they saved the French army from over-
whelming defeat by declining to move. Their misconduct
was, however, so flagrant that public indignation was too
strong for them, and they were thenceforth compelled to
be more docile. But for these miserable men, who would
gladly have squandered untold blood and treasure on useless
sieges and paltry meaningless operations, Marlborough
would have finished the War of the Spanish Succession in
three campaigns.

Such was the disgust cf the Duke at the misconduct
of his allies that he proposed to join Eugene and carry
on operations with him in Italy; but the Dutch were so
much alarmed at the prospect of losing him that they
consented to withdraw their obnoxious Deputies and to
substitute others more subservient in their place. The
French, however, were so far heartened by their escapes
of the previous year that the Court actually ordered
Villeroi to move out of his lines on the Dyle to fight a
battle. Where one army moved from the Dyle and the
other from the Meuse the battlefield could lie in but one
place, namely, in the narrow pass between the head-waters
of the Geete and the Mehaigne, where a position had been
74 Twelve Soldiers

duly approved by the Council of War at Versailles. Marl-
borough heard with delight of Villeroi’s advance, and at
once moved forward to meet him.

At one o’clock on the morning of May 23 Quarter-
master-General Cadogan rode forward with an escort of
horse to mark out a camp at the village of Ramillies;
at eight o’clock he reported that troops were in motion
before him; and at ten, when a mist that had hitherto
obscured all objects on that morning finally rolled away,
the whole of Villeroi’s army was plainly visible. The
Marshal was somewhat taken aback, for he had not ex-
pected Marlborough until the following day, but Marl-
borough generally arrived before he was expected. So
Villeroi took up the position of his choice, his right resting
on the Mehaigne, his centre and left sheltered behind the
marshes of the Geete. Between the Mehaigne and the
village of Ramillies, at the edge of these marshes, extended
something over a mile of sound ground, whereon he
massed one hundred and twenty squadrons of cavalry, for
on this narrow expanse of plain before the French right
wing it was likely that the main stress of the action must
fall.

So thought Marlborough as he surveyed the ground, and
he accordingly ordered the whole of the British to march
down with all possible pomp and circumstance as if to
attack Villeroi’s left. That quarter of the French position
was so strong as to be practically unassailable, but Villeroi
knew the share that the red-coats generally took in a
pitched battle, and at once weakened his right and centre
to reinforce his left. Marlborough waited till the move-
ment was complete, and then ordered his British to retire.
Marlborough 75

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76 Twelve Soldiers

The whole retreated accordingly to some rising ground,
where one brigade faced about and halted, while the re-
mainder under cover of the ground marched away to the
centre and left. Thus the whole of the French left, which
was so strongly posted behind the marshes as to be in-
capable of counter-attack, was held in check by five British
battalions, not one of which fired a shot during the day.
Then about 1.30 p.m. the attack was opened on two villages
which covered the French right, and presently the cavalry
on both sides met in full shock. The first charge of the
French bore back the Allies, and was only checked by
the advance of fresh squadrons under Marlborough himself.
Plunging into the thickest of the méée to rally the broken
horse, the Duke was borne down, and only escaped capture
by taking his azde-de-camp’s charger. But more and more
of the allied cavalry quickly came up, while Villeroi was
unable to bring up the squadrons which were posted useless
and inactive on his left to meet them. A final furious
charge in front and flank swept the French cavalry in dis-
order from the field, the allied infantry advanced against
the centre and left, and presently the whole French army
was in headlong flight to the Dyle.

Then the English horse, which had been but little
engaged, took up the pursuit. They had marched at
three o’clock that morning; but at two on the following
morning Lord Orkney could still find a few squadrons
to ride into Louvain, twenty miles from the battle-field,
and rekindle the panic among the French. The main
body of the army was little behind them. Bivouacking for
two or three hours, they marched again at 3 a.m., nor was
it until they had passed the Senne, and after they had
Marlborough a

been engaged for six days in incessant marching before
and since the action, that Marlborough at last granted
them a halt. Villeroi and the wreck of his army had
by this time reached Ghent, but Marlborough had no
intention of allowing him to rest, and an advance to
Oudenarde forced the Marshal to retire up the Lys
to Courtrai lest his retreat should be cut off. The whole
line of the Dyle, the Senne, and the Dender fell into
Marlborough’s hands within a week; the surrender of
Antwerp and Ghent gave him the keys of the Scheldt
and Lys; Menin and Ypres were taken shortly after, and
the capture of Ostend finally completed the triumphant
march from the Meuse to the sea. Bad weather alone
prevented Marlborough from moving on the fortresses of the
Sambre, but even without these there were fruits sufficient
to show for the great campaign of Ramillies. He had
been blamed after Blenheim for not following up his
victory, but he now put an end to that reproach for ever.
The operations of the following year were, for reasons
which cannot be given here, of little or no importance, but
in 1708 the French not only brought a superior army into
the field, but by employing gold instead of steel gained
possession of Bruges and Ghent, and thus recovered the
control of the mouths of the Scheldt and Lys. Posting
himself between Ghent and Brussels, like a king between
two pieces at draughts, Marshal Vendéme held Marl-
borough perforce inactive till he had captured the citadel
of Ghent. Then sending detachments forward to invest
Oudenarde, he himself moved up the Dender to Lessines,
from which point he intended to cover the siege. Great
was his astonishment in approaching the town on the
78 Twelve Soldiers

following day to find that Marlborough was there before
him, and not only within reach of Oudenarde but inter-
posed between him and the French frontier. The Duke
had set his eighty thousand men in motion at 2 a.m. on
July 9, and in twenty-eight hours had marched them
twenty-eight miles.

Foiled in their design, the French turned north-westward
to bar the advance of the Allies on Bruges. Most generals
of his time would have been content with the brilliant
strategic movement alone: not so Marlborough. At
dawn on July 11, the unwearied Cadogan started with
eleven thousand men to throw bridges across the Scheldt
a little below Oudenarde, and at eight o’clock the whole
army followed. The cavalry of the French advanced guard,
riding carelessly on with foragers out, was surprised by
Cadogan’s troopers, and Vendéme found that his enemy
was again close on his heels. The Marshal was for
disputing the passage of the Scheldt, but the Duke of
Burgundy, who was joined with him in command, and,
as Marlborough well knew, was on bad terms with him,
decided to take up a position behind a small stream
parallel to the Scheldt and some two miles in rear of it.
Instant confusion was the result. Seven battalions which
in obedience to Vendéme’s orders had marched down to
the Scheldt were at once cut off and overpowered by
Cadogan, and Marlborough lost no time in hurrying the
passage of the troops over his bridges. At four o'clock
the Duke of Burgundy decided to advance with his centre
and right to overwhelm the troops of the Allies that had
crossed the river, but by that time there were enough of
them to hold their own. Fresh regiments kept pouring
Marlborough 79

over the Scheldt, and the line of battle was gradually pro-
longed as battalion after battalion came forward and en-
gaged in fierce duel with the battalions of the enemy. Both
sides fought well, and matters had come to a dead-lock,
when Marlborough, perceiving that Burgundy’s right flank
rested in the air, sent a large body of cavalry under cover
of a height to move round it and fall upon its rear. The
attack was brilliantly successful, and in a short time the
whole of the French right was fairly surrounded on all sides.

Vendéme made desperate efforts to save the day by
bringing forward the French left, which for some inscrut-
able reason had been left in its original position; but the
infantry would not move, and the cavalry was so effectually
' protected by the marshes and stream in its front that it
could not take the offensive. The light began to wane,
and all that could be seen of the fight was the ever-
narrowing girdle of fire that marked the closing of the
Allies round the doomed French right. At length at nine
o'clock, Marlborough, dreading lest the allied troops should
engage each other in the darkness, called a halt, and the
French were left to escape in a retreat so disorderly
that it might have been called a flight. Another hour
of daylight, so Marlborough said, would have finished the
war. The action was undoubtedly the most hazardous that
the Duke ever fought, but he knew the commanders with
whom he had to deal, and could trust to his own superiority
and to Eugene’s for making the best of that rarest of
occurrences in those days, a general action without an
order of battle.

Most marvellous of all was the spirit of the troops. They
had started at 2 a.m. on Monday and had marched fifty
80 Twelve Soldiers

miles, including the passage of two large rivers, before they
came into action at 2 p.m.on Wednesday afternoon. There
they fought as has been told, but though the infantry was
obliged to halt, forty squadrons pushed on at dawn next
day, and captured without resistance the French lines on
the frontier between Ypres and the Lys. Then Marlborough
was for the bold project of masking Lille and pushing
straight into France. Overruled by Eugene, however, he
consented to undertake the siege of Lille. It is impossible
to go into the details of this famous siege. Suffice it that,
owing to the loss of the Scheldt and Lys through the cap-
ture of Ghent, the whole of the siege train was brought by
road seventy-five miles from Brussels ; that this was accom-
plished without loss of a wagon; that the French com-
manders, albeit they had a superior force, dared not risk a
battle to raise the siege, though they would have had one
forced upon them by Marlborough but for the Dutch
Deputies; that when they tried to bar Marlborough’s
supplies from the East by entrenching and occupying
the line of the Scheldt, the Duke opened a new base at
Ostend; and that when the Elector of Bavaria ventured
to threaten Brussels, Marlborough by a swift, sudden
movement broke through the line of the Scheldt, and
advancing on Brussels with no more than two battalions
of the English Guards, drove him to abandon his siege-
guns and retire by the mere terror of his name. Lille
fell late, having been magnificently defended by Boufflers,
but Marlborough, even in December, recovered Ghent
and Bruges, and with them the navigation of the Scheldt
and Lys. Of all the operations of Marlborough and
Eugene, the capture of Lille in face of a superior force
Marlborough 81

was deemed by contemporary French writers the most
extraordinary.

For the next campaign, a new and far abler opponent
was pitted against Marlborough in Marshal Villars. Like
all of his kind, however, he trusted to fortified lines, and
had thrown up new ones of unusual strength, famous as the
lines of La Bassée, from the Scarpe at Douay to the Lys.
Marlborough as usual turned these lines into one horn of
a dilemma, for he knew that Villars could not hold them
in force without denuding the garrisons. Feinting as if to
attack the lines he beguiled Villars into withdrawing the
bulk of the garrison from Tournay, and then by a single
night’s march, before Villars or indeed his own army had
the least suspicion of his intentions, invested that city
beyond hope of relief. After the fall of Tournay (for all
fortresses fell before Marlborough) the Duke moved back
before the lines at Douay, but only to make one of his extra-
ordinary swift marches fifty miles to eastward, and pass
another chain of lines on the Trouille, near Mons, without
the loss of a man. Villars hurried after him, but too late
to prevent the investment of Mons. His approach to the
town was shut off by a natural barrier of forest, with two
passages through it, one to north, famous by the name of
Jemappes, and one to south, yet more famous under the
name of Malplaquet. Across the latter passage he en-
trenched himself, and here he was attacked and driven
back by the Allies after a very stubborn and bloody
action. The battle was not fought, as Marlborough had
wished, two days before it actually took place, and the
great slaughter of the Allies and the consequent incom-

pleteness of the victory was due to direct disobedience
G
82 Twelve Soldiers

of his orders. Whether Dutch Deputies or Eugene were
to blame for the postponement of the action is unknown,
but it is certain that Malplaquet was least of all Marl-
borough’s actions the actual work of Marlborough.

But now the Duke’s enemies at home, after eight years
of incessant intriguing, were within measurable distance of
accomplishing the overthrow of his political power ; and
the great Captain, knowing that the slightest failure would
destroy all the work of the past six years, was bound to act
with extreme caution. Villars had withdrawn from La
Bassée to another series of defensive lines, and the Duke
therefore contented himself with the siege and capture of
Bethune, and of Aire and St. Venant on the upper Lys for
the campaign of 1710, with the object of increasing facilities
for joint action with an expedition by sea, which should
land at Calais or Abbeville, in the following year.

By 1711, however, his political power was gone, and he
went with a heavy heart to face certain new and quite ex-
ceptionally formidable lines which Villars had drawn from
the coast of Picardy, along the Canche, Scarpe and Sensée,
to Bouchain, thence onward by the Scheldt to Valenciennes,
and ultimately to the Meuse at Namur. Marlborough was
sent into the field weaker by five of his best British bat-
talions; and very early in the campaign the withdrawal of
Eugene’s army left him actually inferior in strength to
Villars He was therefore driven to stratagem to gain
his passage over the lines.

The inundation which formed one of the chief defences
of the lines on the Sensée between Arras and Bouchain
could be traversed only by two causeways, one of them at

1 7.e. with about 70,000 men against 80,000 French.
Marlborough 83

Arleux and one half-a-mile below it at Aubigny, each
defended by a strong fort. Knowing that though he could
take the fort at Arleux and demolish it at any time, yet
Villars would certainly retake and rebuild it as soon as his
back was turned, Marlborough resolved that Villars should
demolish it himself. He therefore first captured the fort,
and then proceeded to increase and strengthen it consider-
ably, leaving a large detachment at Douay to cover the
work. This detachment was, by accident or design, sur-
prised by Villars and suffered some loss; whereupon
Marlborough for once manifested considerable temper, and
reinforced it, as if to show how great was the importance
that he attached to the work at Arleux. The new fortifi-
cations there being at last completed, he threw a weak
garrison into them and moved the rest of the army away
two marches westward. Villars likewise moved westward
parallel to him, but first detached a force to recover
Arleux. Marlborough sent Cadogan with reinforcements
for the garrison. Cadogan, who had his cue, moved with
singular deliberation, arrived too late to save it, and returned
with the news that Arleux had surrendered.

Villars, who, though a gallant soldier, was a great
coxcomb and an insufferable braggart, was elated beyond
measure, and Marlborough seemed to be unusually cast
down. Throwing off his wonted serenity, he declared that
he would be even with Villars yet, and would attack him
at any cost where he lay. Then came the news that
Villars had rased the whole fortifications of Arleux to
the ground ; and therewith the Duke’s ill-temper increased.
Villars next sent a detachment to make a diversion in
Brabant, and this seemed to drive Marlborough distracted.
84 Twelve Soldiers

Vowing that he would stop the detachment at all costs
he sent ten thousand men to Bethune, and the whole of his
baggage and heavy artillery to Douay; and having thus
weakened his already inferior force he repaired the roads
that led to the enemy’s lines and advanced one march nearer
to them. Villars was in a transport of delight, withdrew
every man to the threatened point of the entrenchments,
and boasted that he had brought Marlborough to his ne
plus ultra. Then the Duke drew still closer to the lines,
set the whole of his cavalry to cut fascines, and rode forward
with his generals to reconnoitre the French defences. He
was now quite cool and collected, and gave his directions
loudly, so that all the spies kept about him by Villars
might hear. “Your brigade, General, will attack at this
point, with such a brigade in support,” and so forth. The
generals listened with dismay; the instructions were per-
fectly clear, but they were those of a madman. They retired
gloomily enough, except Cadogan, who galloped off by him-
self unnoticed ; and the men, knowing as well as the officers
that the enterprise was desperate and hopeless, gave them-
selves up for lost and filled the camp with lamentations that
Corporal John had lost his wits.

So passed the afternoon in camp, no one knowing that
Cadogan was even then galloping at the top of his speed
to Douay to warn the garrison to be ready to march that
evening. Just before sundown a column of the allied
cavalry trotted round the French left, attracting every
French eye to the westward. Then as the drums rolled
out tattoo, the order ran down the line of the allied army
to strike tents and march in an hour. At nine o’clock the
whole army faced to the left and strode away eastward in
Marlborough 85

dead silence under the broad light of the full moon. At
dawn fifteen miles were passed and the Scarpe was reached.
Just beyond the river news to this purport ran down the
marching columns—* General Cadogan crossed the cause-
way at Arleux at 3 o'clock and is in possession of the
enemy’s lines. The Duke desires that the infantry will
step out.” Then Marlborough trotted on with fifty squad-
rons, and the infantry settled down to march with a will.
Villars, finding how he had been tricked, galloped furiously
with a handful of horse to save the lines. He found Marl-
borough before him, and paid for his mad behaviour by the
capture of his escort, himself only narrowly escaping the
same fate. The allied infantry meanwhile on one side of
the Scarpe raced against the French horse on the other,
and by five o’clock the whole of Marlborough’s force was
safe within the lines, having covered between thirty and
forty miles in eighteen hours. Fully one-third of them
dropped on the march, many never to rise again, but the
bulk of them struggled in during the next three days to
take part in the siege of Bouchain, which Marlborough with
an inferior force captured actually under Villars’ eyes, thus
crowning the masterpiece of his last campaign.

I shall not speak of the triumph of Marlborough’s
enemies at home in the winter of 1711, of his disgrace and
banishment, and of the shameful sacrifice of the fruit of his
labours by the peace of Utrecht. It is a foul and unclean
story, unfit for any but the baser sort of party-politician.
Nor shall I refer to his restoration to the office of Captain-
General on the accession of George I., for though he
held the title he did not wield the power. To summarize
his achievements in the field and his qualities as a general in
86 Twelve Soldiers

so small a space would be impossible, even if a civilian were
qualified for the task. Enough has been said to show his
unerring divination of an enemy’s plans, the skill, the
secrecy, and the marvellous rapidity of his movements,
and the unfailing accuracy of his combinations. When it
is remembered that many of his most important marches
were executed by night, and always without a hitch, some
faint idea may be gained of the perfection of his forethought
and of the discipline of his troops.

Other points being less well-known may be more fitly
dwelt on here. First may be noticed the great Duke’s
mastery of every detail of his profession. He no sooner
became Commander-in-Chief and Master of the Ordnance
than he issued a new musket to the troops, the bore being
of sixteen bullets to the pound, whereas the French musket
carried twenty-eight bullets to the pound. Next he finally
established the system of dividing the battalion into small
divisions, called platoons,! which was proved to be the most
effective method of maintaining a continuous fire. The
French fired by ranks, one rank firing while the rest reloaded.
Above all he was most particular as to fire-discipline, and
would make the whole army go through the platoon-exer-
cise before him by signal. The result of this superiority in
armament, system, and discipline was signally seen at
Malplaquet,“where the Royal Irish of England met the
Royal Irish of France, and crushed them out of action after
exchanging three volleys, and at Wynendale, where eight
thousand of the Allies defeated twenty thousand French,

1 Platoons were of course first instituted by Gustavus Adolphus, who,
however, made the blunder of interlining them among his cavalry, a
practice severely condemned by Napoleon.
Marlborough 387

pouring in their volleys by platoons as coolly as if on
parade.

But Marlborough was even more fond of his cavalry ;
and here again he did signal service by insisting on shock-
action instead of missile action. Rupert and Cromwell had
set him the example, but missile action, or firing from the
saddle, was not banished from the drill-books of Charles
and James II., and was still practised -by the French.
It has been seen how he smashed the French cavalry at
Blenheim and Ramillies, and it is worth noting that at
the passage of the lines of the Geete in 1705, he caught
up a few English regiments of horse at a critical moment,
and dashing straight at a superior force of French, not only
defeated them but captured eight guns. At Malplaquet
again the sight of Marlborough leading a column of horse
in support of an attack of infantry was sufficient to deter
Villars from a counter-attack. As regards artillery it must
be noted that he himself posted every battery of his army
at Blenheim.

Next must be observed the surprising hold that he had
of all ranks of his army. He had the highest opinion of
the British soldier, and carried his prejudices for things
English so far that he looked upon English horses as well
as English men as superior to any other. He understood
the Englishman too, recognizing that he must be well fed,
and could not “live on nothing like the Germans ;” and
he worked him very hard, notably in the campaign of
Blenheim, when the red-coats had to teach the world,
as they did later in the time of Napoleon, that the French
are not invincible. His British were for the most part the
scum of the nation, obtained by very strange methods, as
88 Twelve Soldiers

the Recruiting Acts of Queen Anne can testify, and very
difficult to keep from desertion when so obtained. Yet
these men not only marched and fought beyond all praise,
but actually became reformed characters, and left the army
better men than they had entered it. There is no stain like
that of Badajoz on the character of Marlborough’s troops,
nor, though they looked joyfully forward to the plunder of
France, is it likely that there would have been had they
marched, as they hoped to march, to Paris itself.

This is the most striking point in the comparison between
Wellington and Marlborough. Both of the great dukes
were the sternest and severest of disciplinarians, but Marl-
borough, though in some points his character falls far below
Wellington’s, exerted a far greater and higher influence on
his men. He had the keenest distaste for licentiousness
either in language or in action, and he contrived to instil a
like distaste into his troops. His army did not swear ter-
ribly in Flanders, as King William’s had sworn before it, but
hada singularly high moral tone. Marlborough for all his in-
vincible calmness and serenity was the gentlest, most sensi-
tive, most humane of men. Though no man ever possessed
a diviner measure of patience or a more superb control of
temper and of language, yet his face, as his chaplain has
told us, was of all faces the most tell-tale of trouble, anxiety,
and worry. Wellington was known in the army by his
title of Douro, but Marlborough was Corporal John, or still
more affectionately the Old Corporal. What feats of march-
ing and fighting he extracted from his army have already
been recounted, but the full measure of his ascendency is
not realized unless it be remembered that the drivers of the
artillery, which surpassed itself in the march to the Danube
Marlborough 89

and to Blenheim, were not regular troops, but provided,
together with the horses, by contract. But no man could
resist the fascination of Marlborough. The whole popula-
tion of the Hague, high and low, turned out to greet him
when he returned safe after a report of his capture in 1702,
weeping for joy and struggling to kiss his hand, his skirts,
even his boots.

The officers again were devoted to him, for they knew
that he would never leave them in the lurch. A captain
in the Royal Irish has described his anxiety when his
company was left for a time in a dangerous position, and
how the Duke, “always watchful, always right,” came up at
the right moment and withdrew it. Yet Marlborough never
spared his officers. Under the system of those days, the
burden of providing recruits and still more remounts ! fell
very heavily on the officers, but the Duke would never let
the State take the whole of it from their shoulders. He knew
that unless expenses were kept down the country would
abandon the war, and that then there would be no crushing
of France and no pedce in Europe. He knew that unless
the British army paid more or less for itself the insane
jealousy of the House of Commons would strike it out of
existence, Thus when his political opponents, not in any
spirit of purity but from sheer faction, proposed in 1712 the
abolition of purchase, he pointed out that it would be most
unfair to forbid officers disabled by work and wounds to
keep themselves from starvation by sale of their commis-
sions; and he prevailed. He knew that little was to be
expected from British civilians for British soldiers, and he

1 In 1704-5 there was a severe epidemic of horse sickness in both
armies.
90 Twelve Soldiers

preferred, with his usual insight as a statesman, that the
army should be maintained, even by the system of purchase
than destroyed through the impatience of the Commons
with a “ non-effective vote.”

In truth it is but half of Marlborough that we see in the
General, When we remember that from 1702 to 1711 he
was not only fighting some of the most masterly cam-
paigns in history, but governing England and directing
the diplomacy of Europe, that the only remedy in all
troubles among the German princelets and the members
of the Grand Alliance was to send for Marlborough, and
that the remedy was never known to fail, then we approach
nearer to some measurement of this great man’s stature.
Even if it were certain that the charge of political double-
dealing and peculation brought against him could be
maintained, we might still remember that if, as is constantly
enjoined on us, it is wrong to turn from the poetry to the
drunkenness of Burns, it is right to dwell rather on the
virtues and services than the demerits of Marlborough.
The attribute which Wellington judged to be most note-
worthy in him was his strong, cool, common-sense, and
this may well have struck a man whose own transcendent
common-sense rose to the level of genius. It includes, too,
all that was wanting in Napoleon, the perfect calmness and
equanimity alike in triumph and in failure, the recognition
without the temptation of the fortune of war, the total absence
of the spirit of gambling, and the unfailing generosity
to a vanquished opponent. So perfect was the balance of
Marlborough’s mind that nothing could turn his head. And
yet, after all, the quality of all qualities that shines in him
is patience—patience which, as he wrote to Godolphin,
Marlborough 91

“conquers all things.” Such gifts, together with his extra-
ordinary insight into the true heart of every matter, would
have carried him to the top in any field of action, and would
have kept him there had he served any sovereign but the
stupidest woman in Europe. But his work was not wholly
undone by the Peace of Utrecht, for he re-made the prestige
which won for the British army the victories of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, and for the British nation the
empire of the world.
PETERBOROUGH

1658—1735

PETERBOROUGH'’S claim to distinction as one of Great
Britain’s military commanders, rests on his campaign in
Spain on behalf of the Austrian claimant to the throne of
that kingdom. The result of that campaign was small, it
was of little profit to Great Britain, and it was carried on
at the same time as Marlborough was winning his glorious
victories in the Low Countries; and yet the most casual
student of English history places Peterborough in the
category of successful British generals.

The reason that fame has thus granted to one general
what she has withheld from others not less deserving, is to
be found in the attractive personality of the man. Born
to great honours, it was only necessary for Mordaunt to
conduct himself discreetly and show moderate intelligence,
to ensure regular and honourable employment in the service
of the State; various, however, as were his gifts, dis-
cretion was one which, on the testimony of friend and foe
alike, was entirely lacking. Born probably in 1658, he
was thirty years of age when the conduct of James II. had
so alienated the Tories of England, that they were as
anxious as the Whigs to substitute for him a system of
government that would at any rate ensure the safety of

the Protestant religion. He, having succeeded his father
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Peterborough 93

as Lord Mordaunt in 1680, was a prominent Whig speaker
in the House of Lords, and one of the most pressing of
those who desired to see William of Orange succeed his
father-in-law. He spent a considerable time at the Hague,
and is believed to have influenced the drafting of William’s
proclamation ; undoubtedly his opinion was asked and his
advice in many cases taken. With the landing of William
at Torbay on November 5, 1688, commences Mordaunt’s
military career in a responsible position. One of the in-
vader’s first acts was to sign a commission authorizing
Mordaunt to levy a regiment of horse, and he was given
the command of the advance-guard. This command was
of the highest importance, as on its conduct depended the
success of the expedition. As is well known, the choice of
the west of England as a landing-place was unintentional.
The grass was hardly green on the graves of the victims of
Monmouth’s abortive attempt three years previously, and
Exeter and Bristol were believed to be strongly held for
the King. It was of great importance to avert if possible
the spilling of blood, and the wider the area that could be
included in the sphere of William’s operations, the greater
the hope of success.

Mordaunt carried out his task with promptitude and
judgment; three days after the landing, Exeter sulkily
opened its gates to hissummons. On the occupation of the
town by the main body he pushed on, gained over the
counties of Wilts and Dorset, and the road to London
being now open, he pressed northwards, where he made
himself very busy inspecting levies and organizing the
country. In January 1689 we find him travelling along
the Scottish border from east to west, and west to east, no
94. Twelve Soldiers

light task when the state of the roads and doubtful char-
acter of the inhabitants is taken into consideration.

William did not show himself ungrateful to his adviser
and vanguard leader, he created Mordaunt Earl of Mon-
mouth, a Privy Councillor, First Commissioner of the
Treasury, and gave him a regiment of horse,

Mordaunt’s life during the next ten or twelve years was
eventful enough, but except for a short campaign in
Holland, and the organization of the defences of the
Channel Islands, his adventures were confined to Parlia-
ment. During the King’s Irish campaign, he was a member
of the advisory council to Queen Mary. In this capacity
he was most unsparing in his criticisms of the command of
the navy, and his remarks were more than justified by the
disastrous result of the battle of Beachy Head.

His application for the command of the navy was, how-
ever, refused, and he shortly afterwards fell into disgrace
with William, and was deprived of all his honours. No
useful purpose would be served by going into the question
of his behaviour in the celebrated Fenwick trial, it is
enough to say that he was censured by the House, im-
prisoned in the Tower, and only released at the close of
the session. An ordinary man would have been cast down
by such misfortunes, but Mordaunt, now Earl of Peter-
borough, was still satisfied with himself and the world as
he found it. He recognized the fact that so long as
William lived all public employment was closed to him,
but he stands almost alone among his contemporaries in
never stooping to intrigue with the exiled royal family.
The age was one of rampant political dishonesty and
venality. Whole cabinet councils were in correspondence
Peterborough 95

with the Stuarts, and the holder of a dukedom would
condescend for a comparatively trifling sum to assist in
the intrigues of a fraudulent financier. Peterborough
might be an uncertain friend, and was most certainly a
dangerous enemy, but at any rate he pinned his faith on
the results of the revolution, and never tried to be safe
whichever side won.

The death of William and the accession of Anne caused
a change in Peterborough’s fortunes. Within a year of
the Queen’s accession, the dignity of Lord-Lieutenant of
Northamptonshire was restored to him, and in 1703 he
was appointed Governor-General of Jamaica, and Com-
mander-in-Chief of a joint naval and military expedition
organized by the English and Dutch for the purpose of
capturing some of the rich Spanish colonies in the West
Indies. This expedition came to nothing, as the Dutch
failed to provide their quota of troops, and Peterborough
very sensibly declined to undertake with 3000 men a task
for which 6000 were required.

The political state of Europe at this time soon gave
Peterborough a new chance of active employment.

King Charles II. of Spain left no heir to his throne, and
those nearest in blood to him were the descendants of his
sister Maria Theresa by her marriage with Louis XIV., and
after them those of his aunt by Leopold, Emperor of
Austria.

There were grave objections to the eldest son of either
of these families succeeding to the throne of Spain, as
France or Austria combined with Spain, would have
formed such a powerful state as to place the whole of
Europe at the mercy of its ruler. Neither Louis XIV.
96 Twelve Soldiers

nor Leopold of Austria was, however, inclined to give up
the prize, and each designated a younger son as heir,
hoping thereby to set at rest the suspicions of the other
European powers. Thus France’s candidate was the Duc
d’Anjou, and Austria’s the Archduke Charles. By skilful
diplomacy, Louis XIV. succeeded in gaining a complete
ascendency over the mind of Charles IL, and also in
securing, in the interests of the Duc d’Anjou, all the most
powerful men in Madrid, so when Charles II. died on
November 1, 1700, it was found that he had made a will
in which Philip, Duc d’Anjou, was named as heir. The
inheritance was eagerly accepted, and within four months
the new King entered Madrid where, on the whole, he made
a good impression.

Events at this moment were not favourable to a sudden
declaration of war by Austria, England, and Holland,
who were bound by treaty to oppose a French candida-
ture, and though William had lost no time in setting the
machinery in motion that was to check the power of
France, yet it was not until after his death that active
hostilities could be assumed. The most important theatre
of war was in the Low Countries, but William’s plans
also comprised an attack on Cadiz. A somewhat futile
attempt was made in 1702 to carry out this portion of
the plan of campaign, the only result being the capture
of the treasure fleet off Vigo, after which the expedition
returned to England.

The following year witnessed the reception of the Arch-
duke Charles with royal honours by Queen Anne, and the
celebrated Methuen Treaty with Portugal, by which that
country became connected with England by the closest of
Peterborough 97

ties, mutual commercial interests. In 1704 10,000 British
troops under Lord Galway were sent to assist the Portu-
guese, who had taken up arms on behalf of the Arch-
duke, but the French, under Marshal Berwick, were every-
where successful, and Lisbon only escaped owing to the
inefficiency of one of their divisional commanders. The
one bright spot in the campaign, was the capture of
Gibraltar, which, important as it has since been to this
country, was then chiefly useful in drawing away the
attention of the French from our Portuguese allies.

Thus the early years of the war of the Spanish Succes-
sion, showed little success for the Austrian cause in Spain,
and in 1705, a fresh expedition was organized with Peter-
borough at its head. In the early part of the eighteenth
century, previous military experience in subordinate situa-
tions, was not held indispensable for appointment to high
command, but even at that time it was rare to select a
man with so little military knowledge as that possessed
by Peterborough. Beyond his command in the bloodless
invasion of 1688, some fighting when a lad in Tangier, and
a spectator’s 7é/e in the Low Countries in 1691, he was as
ignorant of war as any civilian in England, but he was
at that moment on friendly terms with Marlborough, and
Marlborough nominated him for the post. In truth, what
it required was an energetic man with a talent for organiza-
tion, gifted with tact and patience, in short, one who would
endure fools gladly. Peterborough was energetic, he
proved himself to be a good organizer, but he had no
patience, and took a malignant pleasure in exposing the
mental deficiencies of his associates,

The expeditionary force consisted of some 7000 men,
H
98 Twelve Soldiers

of whom two-thirds were British and one-third Dutch.
The majority of the troops were raw levies, and Peter-
borough certainly showed discernment in exchanging some
of them at the earliest possible date for seasoned troops.
Thus at Lisbon he exchanged two battalions of foot for
two regiments of dragoons who had seen service under
Lord Galway, and at Gibraltar he made a further exchange
of raw levies for troops that had been through the siege
and were therefore seasoned and disciplined.

The expedition reached Lisbon July 1, 1705, and the
Archduke Charles was persuaded to join in the new enter-
prise and exchange Portuguese for Spanish soil.

The next port touched at was Gibraltar, and here the
plan of campaign was drafted. The situation in the
Peninsula at this time, middle of July, was as follows,
The Portuguese under General das Minas, and the British
under Lord Galway, were on the Spanish frontier of Portugal
— Gibraltar was held by the British, and it was reported that
the inhabitants of Catalonia had raised a force of 10,000
well-armed men for the Archduke.

The Hispano-French forces were separated into two
bodies, one of 5000 men under Velasco occupying Barcelona,
the other under Marshal Berwick opposing Galway and
das Minas on the Portuguese frontier. The Archduke
Charles was joined at Gibraltar by the Prince of Hesse-
Darmstadt, who had been governor of Catalonia, where he
was popular, and the result of the consultations held by
the various commanders was that Barcelona should be
attacked. The instructions given to Peterborough be-
fore sailing had been very general. He was enjoined
to assist the Duke of Savoy to attack Barcelona and
Peterborough 99

Cadiz, with a rider to the effect that “the principal
design of the expedition was to make a vigorous push in
Spain.”

The fleet sailed from Gibraltar on August 16, and
anchored six days later in Altea Bay. Prompt measures
were taken to encourage the country people to declare for
Charles and with success; General Basset-y-Ramos, a
Valencian, was made Governor of Denia, a small semi-forti-
fied town, and given a garrison of 400 men. The Arch-
duke was greeted with enthusiasm as Charles III., and the
prospects of the Allies seemed favourable. A move was
now made towards Barcelona, and on August 27 the fleet
anchored off that town. The plan of attack settled at
Gibraltar was continued in spite of some resistance on the
part of Peterborough ; the landing at Altea and the favour-
able reception of Charles III. in the province of Valentia
had given him the idea of a more effective stroke. This
was nothing less than to march straight from Denia to
Madrid, and proclaim Charles III. king in the capital.
The scheme was sound in its general conception. The
distance was only 150 miles, and, thanks to the sea and
the possession of Gibraltar, the Allies had two lines of
retreat in case of failure. The hostile garrison of Barcelona
was shut in by the armed Catalans, who, if of small value
in the open field, were very effective in blocking roads and
closing communications. The force under Berwick was
in face of a strong allied force which would follow ‘it up
if it marched towards Madrid. Success depended on
transport and supplies; if both were available in sufficient
quantities there is no reason to doubt that the plan was
practicable and worth some risk. Peterborough, however,
100 Twelve Soldiers

was unable to persuade the Archduke and his Council,
and alone he could do nothing.

When Barcelona was reconnoitred, the difficulties of
the undertaking became apparent; the 10,000 well-armed
Catalans were non-existent ; in their place were only 1500
ill-armed peasants, called Miquelets, and the town appeared
to be strongly fortified and defended by a garrison of 5000
men, quite adequate for its defence and the maintenance
of order among the inhabitants.

The exact date on which the troops disembarked is un-
certain ; probably on September 2, as a council of war was
held “in the camp before Barcelona” on that date. Peter-
borough’s instructions enjoined him to convene councils
of war, and at this period of the campaign they were
numerous ; minutes of those held on August 16, 22, 25, 26,
28,1 are in existence. From these, it appears that the
professional soldiers were unanimous in objecting to the
undertaking, the Dutch General Schratenbach’s views on the
question being particularly strong, in fact, he declined to
hazard the troops of the States-General in the enterprise.

The following extract from the minutes of the first
council of war, held on board her Majesty’s ship the
Britannia, off Barcelona, August 27, 1705,? gives a fair
idea of the difficulties of the siege :—

“That the engineers, whose business it would be to
manage this siege, are so sensible of this inconvenience
(the boggy nature of the ground over which the ap-
proaches must be made), and the insuperable difficulties
which would attend the regular approach, that they gave

1 All old style. 2 Cf. plan on p. 103.
Peterborough IOI

up all thoughts of proceeding according to the usual
methods, and forms of war; and if the town is to be
attacked, propose it may be by erecting a battery of
cannon at between six or seven hundred paces distant
from the curtain in which they propose to make a breach,
and when such a breach is made, to have it stormed.

“This project, which alone they think our little number
of men can enable us to attempt, they confess will be liable
to the following difficulties.

“That the men who are to give the assault must march to
it uncovered about seven hundred paces, under the fire of
three bastions, and of the covered way, which they confess
cannot by such a battery be destroyed, no more than the two
flanks through which this assault must be given: that the
enemy will probably plant pallisadoes in the ditch, which we
shall never come to see with our cannon; so that our men,
to carry the town by storm, will be under a necessity of
gaining the covered way, cutting down the pallisadoes, and
mounting the breach at one time, under the fire already
mentioned.

“For the working at this battery, carrying fascines for
it, bringing up the cannon and ammunition, so great a
number of workmen are necessary as cannot be spared by
our little army, though no guard were to be mounted to
support this battery.”

Nothing, however, could shake the determination of the
King, advised by the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, to
attack Barcelona, and in order to humour his wishes it
was decided, with Peterborough’s consent, to attempt the
siege for eighteen days. Fifty-two guns were landed from
the fleet, and assistance by seamen and marines was also
102 Twelve Soldiers

forthcoming. A battery was built and armed, and the
siege dragged on in a languid manner for the period
agreed upon. It may seem strange that the garrison,
being almost equal in numbers to the besiegers, should
have made no attempt to raise the siege by a sally in
force, but the Miquelets, contemptible in the field, were
useful as blockaders, and the Bourbon troops. within the
works were probably ill-informed as to events outside;
however, on September 24, to the great indignation of the
King and his advisers, it was decided to abandon the
attack, and the heavy guns were sent on board the ships
again,

On the same afternoon a force of 1400 men was paraded
for the purpose of moving on Tarragona, and indeed were
marched off in that direction about 6 p.m.

On reference to the map of Barcelona, it will be noticed
that, in addition to the regular enceznte on the Vauban
system, the town was provided .on the south-west with an
advanced work. This work crowned the hill of Monjuich,
some 700 feet high, and a little over a mile distant from
the walls of the town. The natural strength of this posi-
tion was great, and it had been supplemented by art so
that it might reasonably be considered as impregnable
to the armies of that day. If it was to be taken it must
be by artifice, and such was Peterborough’s object when
he initiated the march on Tarragona. The Prince of
Hesse-Darmstadt must have been astonished when the
English Earl called at his quarters after dark on the 13th,
and informed him that “he had at last resolved upon an
attempt against the enemy, and that now, if he pleased, he
might judge of their behaviour, and judge whether his
Peterborough 103

officers and soldiers had deserved that character which he
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for his horse, and the two generals caught up the column
at 10 o'clock some ten miles on their road. The direction
104 Twelve Soldiers

of the march was now changed, and two hours before
dawn the little column of 1200 foot and 200 horse found
itself at the foot of the hill of Monjuich. This was the
first intimation any one had of their destination, and while
the men rested the officers were allotted their respective
tasks.

The main attack, some 300 strong, was to be delivered
against the east bastion, while a similar force was to assault
an unfinished bastion on the west, the main reserve of 500
men, under a Dutch colonel, being between the two columns,
When the assailants approached, the defenders advanced
to meet them, and attackers and defenders entered the
works together. As soon as the columns had been re-
organized, Peterborough threw up a breastwork to hold
what he had already won; he also sent to bring up 1000
men under General Stanhope, whom he had posted in the
neighbourhood as a reserve, and generally busied himself
in preparations for a continuance of the struggle. At this
moment, however, a panic occurred, and Peterborough re-
turned from a reconnaissance to find his men in full retreat
from the works, 200 of his men captured by the enemy,
and the Prince of Darmstadt killed. He at once rallied
the retreating soldiers, personally led them back into the
entrenchments, and recovered the ground temporarily lost.
Part of the original plan contemplated, in addition to
Stanhope’s reserve, a post of 200 men between Monjuich
and the town; these men were, however, withdrawn and
their place supplied by Miquelets, who fled at the first
shot, so that the enemy was able to send a small reinforce-
ment into the threatened fort. The loss of the 200 men
taken prisoners during the panic was a blessing in disguise,
Peterborough 105

for they were sent to Barcelona, and cross-questioned, when
on the road, by the commander of reinforcements to the
number of 3000; he, hearing that Lord Peterborough and
the Prince were both with the attack, concluded that the
whole allied army must be before him, and ordered a
retreat, the Miquelets closed on his rear, captured five
guns, and effectually severed communications between
Monjuich and the town.

The success gained so far was not thrown away by
subsequent apathy, the fleet co-operated heartily with the
army, and guns were brought up to Monjuich for the
purpose of breaching the citadel, which still held out, and
on the fourth day, September 28, a well-directed mortar-
shell blew up the magazine, and with it the commandant
and the greater part of one of the bastions; the fort was
then rushed, and the garrison made prisoners of war. The
approaches were now pushed on against the west side
of the town, batteries were mounted, on October 14
a practicable breach was made, and, on October 20, a
capitulation was signed, by which the Governor agreed
that if no relief came in four days, he would surrender the
town, retaining his men, arms, and certain munitions of
war, which were to be transported to Rosas. The con-
ditions of this capitulation could not be carried out, as the
inhabitants declared against the Governor, and on October
21, Peterborough was obliged to occupy the town in order
to prevent a massacre of the supporters of the French
King. The capture of Barcelona justified the expedition
to Catalonia. No sooner was the city taken than the
Allies enlisted some 3000 of Velasco’s troops, and formed
them into three battalions, while the number of Miquelets
106 Twelve Soldiers

was greatly increased. The King also set about gaining
the affections of his new people, especially by great devotion
to the rites of the Catholic Church.

Unfortunately, however, he was not happy in his choice
of advisers ; he was surrounded by Germans, and there is
a consensus of opinion that they were of moderate capacity,
and doubtful probity. No efforts were made to clothe, arm,
and feed the numerous deserters from the French side, and
in a few months the addition to the forces gained from this
source had disappeared, and either rejoined their former
colours or dispersed over the country.

Meanwhile, the fall of Barcelona had much encouraged
the Catalans and their neighbours in Valencia. General
Basset-y-Ramos, who had been left in Denia, raised the
whole country against the French, and by December
marched against Valencia, which he occupied without
opposition. In Catalonia, Lerida, Tortosa, San Matteo
and other strongholds either declared for Charles, or
opened their gates without resistance. The last-named
town was of considerable importance, as it commanded
the main pass on the line of communication between the
towns of Valencia and Barcelona; it was held by a
small detachment of dragoons under Colonel Jones, de-
tached from the garrison of Tortosa. Peterborough had,
ever since the fall of Barcelona, been anxious to push on
and hold Valencia, and when the news of the advance of
a Hispano-French force under General las Torres, so much
alarmed Charles that he authorized an advance across the
Ebro, Peterborough made the most of this permission.
Charles’s authorization was dated December Io, 1705, and
was written under the impression that the force with las
Peterborough 107

Torres was insignificant in numbers, and closely beset by
the country people. Peterborough reached Tortosa on
December 27, and found the 1000 men of the enemy to

 

  

   

 

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be in reality 6000, that this force was strong in cavalry
and well equipped, and that the inhabitants were apathetic.
On the allied side there were only 1100 British infantry, and
108 Twelve Soldiers

200 badly-mounted cavalry; moreover, the San Matteo gar-
rison was weak and unable to make a protracted defence.
The problem before Peterborough was one that could be
solved only by stratagem, and he set himself to work in
his characteristic manner. He wrote a letter in duplicate
to Colonel Jones, announcing his arrival with 6000 men,
and he so contrived that both letters fell into the hands
of las Torres, under circumstances that left no doubt of
their genuineness. A judicious distribution of troops com-
pleted the illusion, and nearly 7000 men fled before 1500,
leaving baggage and stores behind them. The pursuit
had to be carried out with great judgment, just sufficient
ardour to keep up the pretence of superior forces, and not
such close contact as to betray the real weakness. The
date of the relief of San Matteo was December 30; next
day a despatch was received from the King, announcing
that vigorous efforts were about to be made by the French
to recapture Barcelona. It must be admitted that the
situation was serious. The allied army on the Spanish-
Portuguese frontier had fallen back, thus releasing an ex-
cellent army under Marshal Tessé, which was marching
on Barcelona wzé Tortosa. Another army, some 4000
strong, was threatening Lerida, and a third force was
entering Catalonia from Roussillon.

Peterborough took the following steps: first he wrote
a bitterly sarcastic letter to the King, next he sent his
infantry, somewhat foot-sore, to Vinaroz, whence they
might if requiréd be moved on Barcelona, and lastly con-
tinued with such cavalry as he had, some 150 in number,
to pursue las Torres into Valencia. He was too late to
prevent the capture of a small town named Villa Real, the
Peterborough 109

inhabitants of which were treated with great brutality, but
he dispersed the rear-guard of the enemy, and with his
worn-out escort took Nules, and obtained there 200 horses.
This frightened poor las Torres so thoroughly that further
pursuit was unnecessary to ensure his rapid retirement.
The great need in a campaign of this nature was mounted
men, and as the country possessed a good supply of horses,
Peterborough remounted all his English and Spanish
dragoons, and turned Lord Barrymore’s regiment of foot
into cavalry. This regiment, some 400 strong, had been
sent to Vinaroz with the other troops after the relief of
San Matteo; it was now ordered to Oropesa, and the
officers provided with cavalry commissions, and the whole
400 mounted on horses procured from the neighbourhood.
He now made Castillon his head-quarters, and by
February had some 3000 men under his orders, of which
about one-third were cavalry. Las Torres had been
relieved of command, and the Duke of los Arcos was sent
in his place at the head of 10,000 men to recover Valencia.
Peterborough’s first objective was the town of Murviedo,
which was held by a cavalry force under the command of
an Irishman of good family named Mahoney, while the
main body under los Arcos were further south, in the
direction of Valencia. Mahoney was persuaded not to
deliver Murviedo over to the horrors of an attack, and
agreed to retire from it and rejoin his command. The
whole transaction was a most mysterious one, and has
not been made easier to unravel by the explanations of
those writers who are supposed to have been in Peter-
borough’s confidence. This much, however, is certain, that
Mahoney’s arrangement was considered suspicious, both
110 Twelve Soldiers

by his superiors and subordinates ; that this suspicion of
treachery caused the retreat to degenerate into a rout,
and that the Irishman was sent to Madrid to answer for
his conduct. Mahoney cleared himself, but the Allies
entered the town of Valencia without a blow being struck,
and los Arcos was in turn disgraced. How far Peter-
borough was implicated in a dishonourable attempt to
ruin a gallant soldier, whose only possession was_ his
honour, is doubtful; he certainly did not deny it himself,
but, on the other hand, his whimsical character was by no
means averse from receiving credit for discreditable actions
that he had not performed. Though Valencia was thus
occupied without resistance, the campaign in this part of
the theatre of war was by no means finished, as los Arcos’
7000 men, now again under las Torres, were in close
proximity to the town; a battering train from Alicante
was expected, besides 4000 more men from Castile. An
allied detachment captured the battering train, another
eluded las Torres’ force, surprised the Castilians, and
brought 600 prisoners into Valencia. An endeavour to
cut off the supplies of the town by seizing the passages
over the Xucar was anticipated, and when the enemy
arrived at the river the important points were already
held. The only expedition that was a failure was one in
which Spanish levies were included, these fell into a panic
and gravely compromised the safety of the commander
and his whole force.

The French, however, had not been idle, and as the fall
of Barcelona had first enabled Charles to get a footing in
Spain, so the recovery of that town was considered of most
importance in the interest of the Bourbon king. Accord-
Peterborough LT7

ingly, an army of 20,000 men under Marshal Tessé ad-
vanced from Saragossa against the capital of Catalonia,
while a smaller force from Roussillon, under the Duke de
Noailles, prepared to join them under its walls; these
forces arrived before Barcelona early in April, and at the
same time a fleet under the Count of Toulouse anchored
off the port. Thus the city was invested by sea and land.

While these French movements were impending, Peter-
borough devised a plan, daring indeed, but possessing the
elements of success. This was submitted to Charles in a
letter dated March 13, 1796, in which it was proposed that
his Majesty should embark in a small fleet prepared for
the purpose, land in Portugal, place himself at the head
of the 25,000 troops on the frontier of that kingdom
and move straight on Madrid, there being no more than
5000 men in arms on that side of Spain. The Earl
undertook on his part to maintain himself in Catalonia
and Valencia, and perhaps open a way to Madrid.
Charles, however, who had refused the chance of march-
ing on Madrid the previous year, preferred to remain
on the east coast, and trusted for safety in the inter-
cession of the Saints. Peterborough, finding his advice
was not to be taken, and that the investment of Barce-
lona was imminent, hurried north with his whole force,
now under 3000 strong. He was able to throw 200
British troops into Monjuich, and proceeded to carry ona
guerilla warfare against the French. In this he was ably
assisted by the Catalans, and besides causing diversions by
his constant attacks, he passed small reinforcements, both
of men and material, through the investing lines. The
city was but ill-prepared to stand a siege, the King and
112 Twelve Soldiers

his German advisers had not even repaired the breach
made in the previous October, and nothing but the en-
thusiasm of the inhabitants, and the prospect of relief by
the British fleet, made any defence possible. This fleet
carried reinforcements, and what was required quite as
much, stores and money, but though it sailed from
England early in March, it did not, in spite of most
urgent appeals from the Allies, leave Gibraltar till April 2.
More appeals were received at Altea on the 7th, but it was
not until April 27, that it arrived at Barcelona. Mean-
while the siege had been vigorously pushed; Monjuich,
bravely defended by a detachment of guards, was only
carried after an obstinate defence, in which the Com-
mander, Lord Donegal, lost his life; but by the beginning
of May the breaches of the excente were practicable, and
an assault could hardly have failed. Fortune here favoured
the Allies, as Tessé put off the attack, until the arrival of
the British fleet relieved the place on the side of the sea,
and added considerably to the number of the defenders.
The Count of Toulouse received news of the approach of
Sir John Leakein time to escape an engagement. This
was a bitter blow to Peterborough, who was most anxious
to keep a portion of the fleet in reserve, and so tempt the
Count into an engagement. The means taken to bring off
this coup were original, and form one of the best-known
incidents of our hero’s career. His commission gave him
supreme command of the fleet when on board, so to carry
out his plan he cruised for two successive nights in a
felucca, hoping to intercept a ship. The second attempt
was successful, and when day broke on the 8th, Peter-
borough’s flag flew from the Leopard, and the fleet was
Peterborough 113

under his orders, but it was too late to ruin the French
fleet. The reinforcements thrown into the town left the
balance of power still considerably on the side of Marshal
de Tessé, but the utmost use had been made of the
2000 regulars brought from Valencia, together with the
Miquelets under Cifuentes, and the French commander
found himself entirely cut off from Madrid and Saragossa,
as the passes were all closed, and indeed his only base was
France. The later conduct of the siege had been cautious,
and now a retreat appeared the only prudent course; so
that May 1 found the besiegers in full retreat, and with
them the young King. The heavy baggage was left be-
hind, as also the sick and wounded. The latter were
especially confided by the French marshal to the care of
the Earl of Peterborough.

The situation was now most favourable for the Allies, a
moderate force could bar the passes of the Pyrenees,
while the presence and co-operation of the fleet rendered
easy a transfer of the forces to Valencia.

On May 18 a council of war assembled at Barcelona,
and decided unanimously “that, considering the present
circumstances of affairs, it would be best to carry on the
operations in the Kingdom of Valencia, where we should
not only enjoy the advantage of the assistance of the fleet,
which would save great expenses, and troubles, which the
army would be liable to in a march to Arragon; there
being no other body in Spain that could embarrass the
speedy conquest of that Kingdom, but that small one of
the Count de las Torres; routing this, the Kingdom of
Valencia would be free. Murcia would submit, and the

most convenient way would be open to proceed with the
I
114 Twelve Soldiers

army towards the capital of Madrid, besides the advantages
gotten by inclining towards the Portuguese army being
able to resist any force the French can make, in order to
hinder the entire conquest of the Continent of Spain.”

In pursuance of this plan Peterborough sailed for Valencia
and arrived there early in June. His first care was to
utilize the resources of the country, more especially as
regards horses; he again raised a dragoon regiment from
the infantry, and in three weeks’ time had accumulated train
and supplies sufficient to equip a movable column under
General Windham. This column was sent against Requena
and Cuenca, two towns on the road to Madrid. While the
country was being cleared in this direction Madrid itself
was occupied by the Portuguese and English under das
Minas and Galway. Berwick, whose force had been re-
duced to 5000 men, could not oppose the advance of an
army out-numbering him, as it did, in the proportion of four
to one, but the slowness of the advance had enabled all
official records and the machinery of government to be
removed. Still, the prospects of the Austrian Archduke
were certainly in a flourishing condition at the end of June
1706 ; as, in addition to the seizure of the capital, Saragossa
and the whole of Arragon declared for him, and Cartha-
gena was taken by the English fleet.

The date of the entry of the English and Portuguese
into Madrid was June 26; on July 6, a courier passed
through Valencia with letters from das Minas and Gal-
way for King Charles. As two couriers had previously
passed without any intelligence for Lord Peterborough, a
certificate was obtained from this messenger to the effect
that he had left Madrid on June 29, and had no letters for
Peterborough 115

the Earl of Peterborough from either das Minas or Galway.
This was the commencement of a series of misunderstand-
ings. Peterborough wrote on June 30, July 1, 5, 6, and 10
to King Charles, urging upon him the necessity of entering
Valencia and pushing on to Madrid. In reply to four
of these letters Charles wrote as follows:—‘.... You
tell me the dispositions you have made to accompany
my person, and moreover offer me to come in person to
concert the rest, which might contribute to our good
success ; for all of which Iam very much obliged to you,
but, being upon the road to Arragon, and engaged to
pursue my march that way, I consider that the journey
you must make to Saragossa to meet me would be too long
and difficult ; and since the fleet is expected each moment,
I conceive your presence very necessary where you are, to
direct that important affair of the Duke of Savoy, upon
which I have so fully expressed myself in some of my
former letters.”

The causes that led to the alterations in Charles’s plans
are somewhat obscure, but Cifuentes, the Guerilla leader,
seems to have taken a leading part in the negotiations at
Saragossa, and there is no doubt Charles hoped to obtain
there a subsidy which would render him independent of
Peterborough. So pleased was he with his prospects in
Arragon, that he allowed a most injudicious letter to be
written to “the peasants of Saragossa,” in which it was
stated “that his Majesty the more readily decided on travel-
ling by the way of Arragon, being satisfied that the services
offered were free and voluntary, not like those of the
Catalans and Valencians, out of any fear or compulsion.”
This change of plans came as a great blow to the English
116 Twelve Soldiers

commander in Valencia, who was fully alive to the whole
danger of the plan, and concealed but badly the indiffer-
ence he felt regarding the future conduct of the campaign.
The allusion in Charles’s letter to the important affair of the
Duke of Savoy requires some explanation. The Duke of
Savoy was opposing the French in Northern Italy, and it
had always been an open question whether our fleet and
the troops under Peterborough in Catalonia would not
have been better employed in assisting him to enter France
from the South-East than in supporting the’ Austrians in
North-Western Spain. This project had always been
before Peterborough’s mind, and during his stay in Spain
he corresponded regularly with the Duke. The relief of
Barcelona, and subsequent retreat of the French from Spain,
caused the British Government and Peterborough himself
to consider that the situation in that country was suffi-
ciently favourable to permit of a reduction in the forces
engaged there.

The Duke of Savoy personally asked for Peterborough’s
services, and the moment was opportune, as the French
were pressing him hard in Turin. Events, however, in Spain
marched so rapidly and so unfavourably, that for the
moment even Charles, little as he cared for Peterborough’s
company, was not willing to lose his assistance.

The circumstances under which the Allies occupied
Madrid were unfortunate, as the force was largely composed
of Portuguese, who were most unpopular in Spain. The
result was that the whole of Southern Spain rose, men and
money were at once forthcoming, Berwick found himself at
the head of 25,000 men, and on August 4, in place of a
triumphal entry by King Charles into Madrid, the town
Peterborough 117

was occupied by Berwick’s cavalry. The condition of the
country was such that das Minas and Galway found their
retreat on Portugal cut off, and resolved to advance towards
Valencia and effect a junction with Peterborough. Charles’s
journey through Arragon was gravely affected by these
events, and he was obliged to ask for help from Valencia.
Peterborough, acting with' great energy and promptitude,
marched with 400 dragoons to meet him, and on August 6
the King and his extourage arrived at the head-quarters
of the allied British and Portuguese forces at Guadalajara.
The garrisons in Valencia and on the borders of Castile
were maintained by Peterborough, who has been blamed
for not bringing substantial reinforcements with him to
Guadalajara, but considering the ease with which Berwick
had already turned Galway and das Minas out of Madrid,
and cut them off from their base in Portugal, ordinary
prudence surely counselled holding the country between
Castile and the sea. Whether this might have been done
with fewer troops is a question that, at this distance of
time, is not easy to answer.

There wascertainly no great inducement for Peterborough
to weaken his hold on a country where he was well known
and popular, in order to strengthen the heterogeneous
collection of troops at Guadalajara, especially as there was
no prospect of the question of command being settled
satisfactorily. The situation was extraordinary ; das Minas
had command of his own Portuguese troops, and had been
allowed by Lord Galway to command the united army
both in Portugal and after it had crossed the frontier.
Lord Galway had a British commission drawn up in wide
terms, and sufficient to justify him in taking command of
118 Twelve Soldiers

any operations carried out in Spain. The Dutch Field-
Marshal, de Noyelles, had command of his Dutch troops,
and also, by Charles’s orders, of the Spanish troops. Lastly,
Peterborough was commander-in-chief by land and sea of
the Catalonian expedition. Two days after Charles’s arrival
at the allied head-quarters, Peterborough proposed that
de Noyelles should keep his Dutch troops and Galway take
all the English troops, das Minas retain his Portuguese
army, and that he should command the Spanish troops.
Thus Charles would have under his orders four bodies of
troops, each commanded bya general of equal rank, and
receiving orders from the King alone.

This scheme was not accepted, and the project of an
Italian expedition was brought forward next day in a
council of war, of which the members, das Minas, Galway,
de Noyelles, Stanhope, the Portuguese Ambassador, and
Charles’s confidant, Lichtenstein, unanimously agreed that
Queen Anne’s wishes regarding the expedition to the Duke
of Savoy should be obeyed. On August 10 Charles
authorized the raising of £100,000 in Genoa.

Peterborough left head-quarters with an escort of eighty
of the Royal Dragoons, which was certainly none too
strong, as the country was now in a very dangerous state ;
indeed, a party of convalescents had been murdered on the
road to Valencia, and Peterborough’s own baggage under
escort had been plundered as it was proceeding to meet
him. He was fortunate, however, in recovering his papers,
as Marshal Berwick returned them to him unopened.

Nearly a month elapsed before Peterborough embarked
for Italy, which he did on September 4, having missed a
chance of taking the Balearic Isles. This enterprise had
Peterborough 119

been suggested by Charles, after the relief of Barcelona,
but events in Spain had prevented it; orders had been sent
from home to Admiral Leake directing him to despatch
nine vessels to the West Indies, and Peterborough, con-
sidering that the force available, after they had been
detached, was too small to encourage any hopes of success,
declined the command, which was undertaken by Leake,
and brought to a happy conclusion. Meanwhile Peter-
borough, on his way to Catalonia to collect troops for
Turin, heard that the Duke of Savoy had gained a com-
plete victory over the French, and that there was no need
for him to bring any reinforcements. He accordingly
reached Genoa alone, raised the £100,000 he had been
commissioned to obtain, and had an interview with the
Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene at Pavia. There
he discussed a plan of campaign against the French,
according to which the South-East of France was to be
invaded from Spain and Italy, with the support of a cover-
ing English fleet. The authorship of this plan was claimed
by Peterborough, who admitted that Prince Eugene had
assisted in framing it, but others ascribe it to Marlborough,
who certainly approved of it. Be this as it may, Prince
Eugene at this time formed a favourable opinion of
Peterborough’s military judgment.

Peterborough returned to the court at Valencia on
January 10, 1707, and was received with the welcome due
to one who brought with him 100,000 badly-needed pistoles ;
and it is some justification for his quarrel with his col-
leagues and the advisers of the King, that they squabbled
just as much among themselves when he was away. His
active military career was now at an end, his commissions
120 Twelve Soldiers

had been revoked, and he was ordered to return home and
account for the sums of money thatthe had received. He,
however, continued to take part in the councils of war, and
Lord Galway was most anxious to resign the command in
his favour, but ministers at home were much out of conceit
with him, and the visit to the Duke and Prince Eugene at
Pavia, together with the bills of £100,000 on the British
Treasury, were two actions which they could not forgive,
and he was again summoned to return.

Although not in a position of any responsibility, yet his
advice at the council held on January 15 was so sound, and
was so soon justified by events, that it is worth noting. It
was to avoid general engagements, and to act as far as
possible on the defensive in Arragon and Valencia, trusting
to fresh errors on the part of the French which would
alienate the sympathies of the Castilians, and to the effect
of diversions from the Italians on the provinces of Rous-
sillon and Provence. This was vehemently opposed by
General Stanhope, and Peterborough finally left Spain on
March 14,! and proceeded to travel leisurely home to meet
such attacks as might be made on his conduct.

The route chosen was somewhat circuitous. He first
proceeded to visit the Duke of Genoa in Italy, and again
endeavoured to interest him in a combined attack on
Toulon, but as it was known that he was without
credentials from home, and indeed under a cloud, the
Duke paid but little attention to his plans. The next
visit was to Vienna, where he appears to have made a
very favourable impression on the Emperor; at Leipsic
he saw his brilliant namesake, Charles of Sweden, and

1 Probably new style.
Peterborough. 121

overcoming all difficulties thrown in his way, played with
him one of his favourite ré/es, that of an amateur envoy.
Moving now westward towards England, he spent ten
days in camp with Marlborough, gave that General a
very full account of his grievances, and endeavoured to
enlist his sympathies. The relations between these two
men had been subject to many vicissitudes, sometimes
hostile, sometimes friendly, they were for the future to
be entirely antagonistic ; but at this moment Marlborough
appears to have treated Peterborough with courtesy, while
writing home to complain bitterly of his loquacity and the
length of his stay. At last Peterborough landed in
England on August 20, 1707. His leisurely journey home
was politic, as it gave time for the public to judge of
his conduct of the operations and the quality of his
advice. It will be remembered that his last act in Spain
had been to record his opinion in favour of acting on
the defensive, and against taking the offensive in Castile.
Events amply justified his judgment, as on April 14, the
decisive battle of Almanza was fought, in which the
English General, Berwick, commanding the French, routed
the English under the French Huguenot, Lord Galway,
capturing all their cannon and 120 standards. The first
intimation of the points on which Peterborough was de-
sired to explain his conduct, was when he asked for an
audience of the Queen. The audience was refused until
he gave an explanation of the three following points:
“First, why he did not in the preceding campaign march
to Madrid with the army under his command; secondly,
why he did not fulfil his instructions, in advancing to the
King of Spain the supplies entrusted to his disposition ;
122 Twelve Soldiers

and thirdly, why he retired to Italy without arms and
borrowed large sums of money on disadvantageous terms ?”
As it seemed as though no formal inquiry into his con-
duct would be made for some time, Peterborough handed
over his papers, which had been carefully kept, to his
physician, Dr. Freind,a man of high character, who pub-
lished in 1707 “ An account of the Earl of Peterborough’s
conduct in Spain, etc.” The official papers published in
this work are valuable, as Dr. Freind swore before the
House of Lords that the extracts from official documents
therein quoted were true. The inquiry into the conduct of
the war in Spain was not seriously taken up until January
1711, or four years after Peterborough had ceased to hold
any command in that country, and when it commenced,
the issue was purely political.

Marlborough and the Whigs having sided with Galway,
Harley and the Tories supported Peterborough, and at
this date the Tories were in power, and the Duke of
Marlborough was not only in disgrace with the Queen,
but also with the British public. The result was that
the conduct of the war by the late ministers was con-
demned, and that a resolution was carried by sixty-eight
to forty-eight votes, to the effect “that the Earl of
Peterborough performed many great and eminent services,
and had his opinion in the Council of War at Valencia
been followed, it might very probably have prevented
the subsequent misfortunes.” A vote of thanks to Peter-
borough was carried unanimously. These votes were
purely political, and were prompted quite as much by
dislike of Marlborough as by approval of Peterborough.

The remainder of Peterborough’s long life was un-
Peterborough 123

eventful; he remained in favour during Anne’s reign, and
was entrusted with diplomatic missions to foreign courts,
but with very restricted powers. On Anne’s death he
fell into disgrace, and though always before the public,
held no further office of state. The place and manner of
his death were characteristic of the man. At seventy-
seven years of age he was operated on for stone, and
shortly afterwards undertook, before the wound was
healed, a journey to Lisbon, where he died on October 25,
1735.

Of late years some trouble has been taken to prove that
all Peterborough’s military success was due to the designs
of others. But Peterborough’s contemporaries generally
accepted him as the hero of the taking of Barcelona, of its
relief, and of the occupation of ‘Valencia. In every action
mentioned in these pages he, and he alone, was responsible,
and upon him failure would have been visited, if failure
there had been ; it is therefore only just to grant him the
credit of victory.

The troops under his command were never numerous
enough to enable one to judge how far Peterborough was
able to handle masses in the field, but quite enough is
known to prove that he had great intuition, and a perfect
knowledge of the working of his opponent’s mind.

The taking of Monjuich was a model of calculated rash-
ness, the dismantling of the siege battery, and the orders
for withdrawal were admirably devised to lull the suspicions
of troops holding a strong post, and the disposition of the
troops was excellent, especially of the reserve under Stan-
hope, who was entirely ignorant of the purpose for which
it was destined. The campaign in Valencia, against las
124 Twelve Soldiers

Torres and los Arcos, showed extraordinary knowledge
of the country, and of the enemy. Although maps were
probably rare, and those faulty, yet Peterborough’s little
flying columns invariably found their way to the right
point, and at the right time. His “Intelligence” was
wonderful. It is said that he depended for it greatly on
priests and ladies, but information thus acquired requires
very careful sifting, and no man knew this better than
he. It is much more probable that “The few Euglish
Dragoons well chosen, and some sober subalterns well
instructed, together with the people of the country,” were
the agents on which he relied. His method of dealing
with his spies was based on thoroughly sound principles.
He paid them well, but never employed any one without
getting the whole family into his possession as hostages
for good faith. His conduct during the siege of Barcelona
by the French was blamed by many, but he contributed
far more to the relief of the town by intercepting de Tessé’s
communications, than if he had increased the garrison by
his force of 2000 men. Where he appears to have failed
was in the operations after Tessé’s withdrawal, and when
the British and Portuguese entered Madrid. His delay in
Valencia was injudicious, and can only be accounted for
by the strained relations between himself and Charles, and
the anomalous position he and his command would have
occupied in the allied camp. It was in such situations as
this that the weakness of his character appeared. Had
Marlborough been in his place, Charles would have carried
out his least wish, and at the same time imagined that he
and his German advisers were the initiators. Marlborough
again would have had no difficulty in reconciling the conflict-
Peterborough 125

ing interests of the various generals. But it should be noted,
that the difficulty of Peterborough’s task was immensely
increased by the inadequate resources placed at his disposal,
The main cause of dispute between the Austrian court
and the English General was the disposal of the money
sent from England. Had Peterborough been able to keep
the court well supplied with funds, he would have been far
more acceptable, and his advice more readily received.
But as matters stood, Peterborough was obliged to take
the lion’s share of the remittances for the payment of his
men, and the doles he gave to Lichtenstein and his col-
leagues were a constant cause of complaint. Indeed,
relations between the Austrians and himself were so
strained as to leave ministers at home no option but to
recall him.

A British general operating on the Continent must,
from the nature of the case, have to deal with allies, and
this fact necessitates great patience and diplomatic skill,
together with perfect command of temper.

It was in this respect that Peterborough failed. He was
quick in the field, and his two plans for entering Madrid
were bold and yet sound. Rashness, indeed, was not one
of his faults ; he declined the first command he was offered
because he considered 3000 men too few for an expedition
against the West Indies. He refused, again, to proceed
against the Balearic Isles, when the fleet had been reduced.
Anxious as he was in 1705 and 1706 to push on to Madrid,
he was equally strenuous in his resistance to the scheme of
doing so in 1707. He was by no means wanting in ad-
ministrative power ; his rule was welcome both in Valencia
and Catalonia, and his employment of mounted infantry—
126 Twelve Soldiers

dragoons as they were then called—showed a ready ap-
preciation of the necessities of the situation, and prompt
utilization of the resources of the country.

Finally, for eighteen months he waged a successful war
in the Peninsula, and after he left it defeat after defeat was

the portion of his successors.
 
WOLFE

1727—1759

JamMES WOLFE was born on January 2, 1727, at the
Vicarage of Westerham, a quiet little country town of
Kent near the border of Surrey.

In the previous year his father, Colonel Wolfe, who
had served under Marlborough, had settled at Westerham,
He was then about forty years of age, and had just married
the beautiful Miss Thompson, of Marsden, in Yorkshire.
She was a very charming person, and a very high- ,
principled one, and to her careful training both her sons
owed much of that noble character which they bore in
after life. It was only for a short time that they lived
at the Vicarage, for they soon changed to another house
within a stone’s throw, remarkable for its quaint gables,
in sight of the church in which the boy was baptized.
Here they lived for twelve years, and here James Wolfe
grew from infancy to boyhood. On the other side of
the village is Squerries Court, which belonged to the
Warde family, with whom Mrs. Wolfe was very intimate.

At Westerham young Wolfe and his brother went
regularly to a school kept by a Mr. Lawrence. In the
year 1738, Colonel Wolfe gave up the house at Westerham
and removed to Greenwich, and there his two sons attended

the school of the Rev. J. T. Swinden, an excellent teacher,
127
128 Twelve Soldiers

who secured the life-long affection of both his pupils.
There was at this school at the same time John Jervis,
the future Lord St. Vincent.

In October 1739, war was declared by England against
Spain. During the progress of the contest, Portobello
was captured by Admiral Vernon, and the news was
received in Great Britain with a burst of exultation.
Wolfe’s father had been appointed Colonel of a new
regiment of marines, one of six which had just been
raised, and which was quartered in a large camp recently
formed at Blackheath. Ten thousand troops were at this
time gathered in the Isle of Wight for an expedition
against Cartagena, on the Spanish main, and Colonel
Wolfe was appointed Adjutant-General to this force.
This appointment of his father stirred up the martial
spirit of young Wolfe to such a point, that he importuned
him earnestly to take him with him on the expedition,
and at last, in spite of his anxious mother’s protest, he
succeeded, and joined his father as a volunteer at the
camp of Newport in the Isle of Wight.

Mrs. Wolfe upbraided the young fellow with want of
love for her in leaving her in this way, but he replied
to her letter from the camp in the Isle of Wight—“I
am very sorry, dear mamma, that you doubt my love,
which I am sure is as sincere as ever any son’s was to
his mother. I will certainly write to you by every ship
I meet, because I know it is my duty. Besides, I would
do it out of love, with pleasure. But pray, dear mamma,
if you love me, do not give yourself up to fears for us.
I hope, if it please God, we shall soon see one another,
which will be the happiest day I shall ever see.” But
Wolfe 129

the brave boy was taken so ill in camp that he had
to be sent home to his mother—and to school!

For two years he remained there, and during this period
much of his time was spent in visits to his friends at
Squerries Court. It was during the Christmas holidays
of 1741-42 that his ardent wishes were gratified, and that
he received, as he was playing in the garden there, with
two of his companions (John and George Warde), his
commission as a second lieutenant in his father’s
regiment of marines. But it would appear that he
never actually joined that corps, and in the course of
a few months he became an ensign in the 12th (now
the Suffolk Regiment), and carried the regimental colour
in a march-past before George II., on Blackheath, of the
British force destined for active service against France.

At this time Wolfe was about fifteen years of age,
and therefore not yet full grown. His shoulders were
narrow, his limbs long and awkward. He was tall for his
age (he ultimately grew to over six feet), his forehead
and chin were receding, his nose pointed and slightly
turned up, and he had then very decidedly red hair.

From Blackheath his regiment marched straight” to
Deptford, where after a week’s detention it embarked with
the rest of the force destined for active service on the
Continent. But his hope of seeing immediate field service
was not gratified. War was carried on in a very leisurely
fashion in those days. His corps landed at Ostend, and
proceeded at once to Bruges, from whence it moved to
Ghent, the point upon which the English regiments were
to concentrate. Ghent was at that time a dull town, and its

lower classes were not well disposed towards their English
K
130 Twelve Soldiers

visitors; but with the upper classes this was far from being the
case, and they were, to use Wolfe’s own words, “immensely
civil” to him, in spite of his then limited knowledge
of French, the language of society. Here he was joined
by his younger brother Edward, who had just obtained
a commission through the influence of his father, who
had now become Inspector-General of Marines.

In February 1743, young Wolfe’s regiment quitted
Ghent to march into Germany, and underwent considerable
hardships on the road. Hardy as James Wolfe was, even
he was terribly worn out during the march, and more
for his brother’s health than his own, he purchased a
horse, on which they used to ride alternately. By the
end of June they were in camp at Aschaffenburg, and
close to the enemy. They had suffered much on the
last forty miles of the march, and from the wasted state
of the country had great difficulty in obtaining food,
indeed, had to live on bread and water only. The two
armies were now face to face with one another, and
separated only by the river Main.

At this time King George II. joined the army, and
assumed the command, this being the last occasion that
an English sovereign appeared in the field. The King was
accompanied by his son, the Duke of Cumberland, and
his Minister, Lord Carteret.

The position was critical The French had thrown
30,000 men across the river, and this force was placed
with one flank resting on the river, the other on a wood.
They had a strong position here, holding the village of
Dettingen, which intervened between the wood and the

river, and were drawn up in five lines, two of foot and
Wolfe 131

three of horse. But instead of awaiting the attack of
the British force, Grammont, who commanded the French,
advanced from his position to meet his opponents.

The French horse were in front, and charged the
English infantry, pistol in hand. Firing their pistols
they drew their swords, and went straight in on the
infantry, but half their number went down before the cool
and deadly fire of the English. Twice this was repeated,
with the same result. “The third and last attack,’ writes
Wolfe, “was made by the foot on both sides. We advanced
towards one another, our men in high spirits, and very
impatient for fighting, being elated with beating the French
horse. The major and I, for we had neither colonel nor
lieutenant-colonel, before they came near were employed
in begging and ordering the men not to fire at too great
a distance, but to keep it till the enemy should come
near us; but to little purpose. The whole fired when
they thought they could reach them, which had like to
have ruined us. We did very little execution with it.
So soon as the French saw we presented they all fell
down, and when we had fired they got up and marched
to us in tolerable good order, and gave us a brisk fire
which put us into some disorder, and made us give way
a little, particularly ours and two or three more regiments
who were in the hottest of it. However we soon rallied
again, and attacked them with great fury, which gained
us a complete victory, and forced the enemy to retire
in great haste.”

‘This is an excellent account to have been written by
young Wolfe. At this time he was acting adjutant to
his regiment, but for his conduct in the fight was made
132 Twelve Soldiers

the permanent adjutant, and promoted to a lieutenancy,
and he was only then a lad of sixteen !

Next morning, the victorious army advanced to Hanau,
where it was joined by reinforcements, and the French
immediately after evacuated Germany. The English
army crossed the Rhine a little below Mayence on a
bridge of boats, and moved to Worms, where it lay until
the autumn, when it dispersed into winter quarters. The
5th Division, in which Wolfe’s regiment was, went to
Ostend, which it reached at the end of November, and
where it spent a dreary winter looking out upon the cold
grey sea.

Wolfe, as adjutant, could obtain no leave, but his brother
was able to join the home circle for a time. Campaigning
had taught Wolfe what its requirements really were, and
during the winter he prepared for the next campaign by
procuring a good cart and tent for his brother and himself.

That he was very far from insensible to the charms of
the fair sex, the following extract from a letter to his
brother shows very clearly—*“ Doubtless you love the
company of the fair sex. If you should happen to go
where Miss Seabourg is, pray don’t fall in love with her.
I can’t give her up. Remember I am your rival. I am
also in some pain about Miss W. Admire anywhere
else and welcome (except the widow Bright). Miss
Patterson is yours if you like her, and so is the little
staring girl in the Chapel with £20,000!” Not bad this
for a youth of his age.

This year, 1744, the English army lay inactive in the
Low Countries. The French force under Saxe had
returned in great strength. Louis XV. was with them,
Wolfe 133

and town after town in Flanders fell into their hands.
Meanwhile Wolfe was fortunate enough to get promoted
to a company in Barrel’s (now the 4th, the King’s Own)
regiment. He was now but seventeen. A contrast to
the system of promotion now-a-days!

In the winter of 1744-45 Wolfe’s brother Edward, who
was of a frail constitution, was at Ghent in a different
regiment, and was there taken ill, and died before James
could reach him. This was a very heavy blow to James,
who was much attached to him. He was obliged to
spend the winter in Ghent with his (Barrel’s) regiment.

After the battle of Fontenoy the regiment was ordered
to relieve one of those that had -been roughly handled
in that engagement, and on May 21 joined the army
on the plains of Lessines. The tide of war had now
set in favour of the French, who took Tournay, surprised
Ghent, and then took Ostend.

In 1745 the Jacobite rebellion broke out in Scotland,
and the whole British force in Flanders was at once with-
drawn to meet it. Prince Charles Edward landed on the
coast of Inverness-shire on July 25, with only some half-
dozen followers. Loyalty to the old race was still strong
amongst the Highland clans; they rallied swiftly to
his standard, and at the battle of Prestonpans utterly
defeated the Government forces under Cope. General
Wade was at Newcastle at the head of the regular troops
which the Government had assembled to arrest the Prince’s
progress, and with him was Barrel’s regiment and James
Wolfe, who had been appointed Brigade-Major. Here,
too, was the regiment of Wolfe’s father, who was now

employed in command of a division.
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For the next two months Wolfe lay with his regiment
at Newcastle, whilst Prince Charles made his celebrated
advance into England in which he reached Derby, but
unable to do more in face of the forces about to close
upon him, had to return to Scotland. On January 16,
1746, the English pursuing force, now commanded by
Hawley, had reached Falkirk, and Prince Charles’s force
was at Stirling, making vain attempts to reduce the castle
without effective artillery.

At ten o’clock on the morning of the 17th, Prince
Charles, by a forced march, was able to review his army
on the field of Bannockburn. He had now about 8000
men with him, The English amounted to about the same
number, and were nearly taken by surprise at his unex-
pected appearance. Both forces rapidly formed in order
of battle. The English were in two lines, with the cavalry
on the left and three regiments of infantry in reserve. They
were all veteran regiments just returned from Flanders. It
was a miserable day, and the cold half-frozen rain beat
pitilessly in the faces of the shivering men.

The action began by Hawley launching his whole force
of Dragoons against the Highland army. They were about
a thousand strong, but it was observed at the time that
there was not much dash in their advance. The High-
landers reserved their fire until the Dragoons were within
twenty paces of them, and then delivered it with such
terrific effect that it threw them into unutterable confusion
and back upon the right of their own infantry, whose ranks
they much disturbed. A regiment of the Dragoons, that
of Cobham, better in hand, rode down between the armies
and drew upon itself the fire of the Highland line, and a
Wolfe 135

portion of them, closing up their ranks, rode knee to knee
over the front line of the Highlanders. These fought with
desperation, using their claymores with deadly effect, and
often trying to dismount the Dragoons by pulling them
off their horses. The cavalry gave way before this, and the
Highlanders, now out of hand, rushed down right upon
the closed ranks of the English infantry. These, partly
blinded by a storm of wind and rain coming right on their
faces, received them with a feeble volley, and then the
whole of the front line and part of the second broke. The
battle had lasted but twenty minutes, and the still un-
broken part of the second line, where Wolfe himself was,
standing firm, prevented any rout and covered the retreat.
During the night Hawley abandoned his camp and cannon
and fell back upon Edinburgh, Prince Charles following
him to Falkirk, and resuming the siege of Stirling Castle.

The Duke of Cumberland was now appointed com-
mander of the royal forces in Scotland, and arrived in
-Edinburgh on January 30, 1746. He at once set to work,
transacted all his business with the civic authorities and
the Generals and Staff, and the very next morning was in
full pursuit of Prince Charles’s army. The weather was
frightful, the roads were ankle-deep, and all the bridges
had been destroyed, so that he was only able to enter
Perth four days after Prince Charles had left. Here he
halted for a fortnight, until he was joined by 5000 Hessians,
who had landed at Edinburgh. He left the Hessians to
garrison Perth, and resumed his march northwards, ships
with supplies moving up the coast parallel with his troops.
Prince Charles meanwhile was moving northwards in two
divisions on Inverness. The Duke, encumbered with his
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artillery and heavy baggage, was unable to follow, and
halted at Aberdeen, where he decided to remain until the
spring. Wolfe, who during these stirring operations had
been acting as a brigade-major, was now fully employed
at Aberdeen in superintending the drill and training ot
the troops there, and preparing them for the decisive cam-
paign about to ensue.

At this time Prince Charles’s force was getting short of
provisions, as the supplies sent to him from France were
almost all seized by the English cruisers, and the country
in which he found himself was amidst the hills and barren,
The days were lengthening and the country drying up, so
the royal army took the field, and leaving Aberdeen
marched upon Inverness. It crossed the Spey unopposed,
and on April 14 came into touch with the Prince’s out-
posts. These fell back at once on Inverness, and the
Duke of Cumberland’s army halted at Nairn.

On the morning of April 15 Prince Charles marched out
from Inverness and took post on Drummossie Moor, near
Culloden House, where he prepared to give battle to the
English army.

The English force was about 10,000 strong, that otf
Prince Charles considerably less. Wolfe’s regiment formed
the left of the English line. There were considerable
intervals between the battalions of the first line. The
battalions of the second line were placed in rear of these
intervals, in each of which there were two guns. The right
of the English rested on Culloden House, its left upon a
long stone wall. The ground was heavy with the rain
which had fallen during the early morning.

The Highland army, commanded by Lord George
Wolfe 139

Murray, was also formed in two lines. The front line
was composed entirely of the Highland clans. In the
second line were the Ogilvies and Gordons and all the
French and Irish who were in the Prince’s service.

As the battle of Falkirk had shown that, when at close
quarters, the Highland soldier could turn with his target
the bayonet of the Englishman and so expose him to the
stroke of the claymore, the Duke of Cumberland had
ordered that each soldier, instead of striking with his
bayonet at the man opposite him, was to strike at the
man on his right so as to pierce him on his unprotected
side. But it is doubtful if many instances of fighting at
such close quarters really took place.

The Highlanders opened the fight with their artillery.
Their guns were badly served, and the English replied
with much accuracy and caused them heavy loss. After
standing there for about half-an-hour the Highlanders
could endure it no longer, and the MacIntoshes burst
from their ranks and rushed down upon the English
infantry, and were followed in this by all the clans. The
grape shot tore through them, and the English infantry,
reserving their fire till they were close upon them, delivered
it with a fatal effect. Still they swept on, and in the centre
broke through the first line of the English. On the High-
land right, opposite which Wolfe was, the attack was most
severe, but Wolfe’s men stood firm and beat it back, On
the left the Macdonalds charged close up to the English
bayonets, but then turned and fled, indignant at having
been placed on the left, instead of on the right, of their
line. The English Dragoons rode out and threatened the
flank of the clansmen, who were seized by panic and fled
138 Twelve Soldiers

in wild disorder. To show how severe the struggle had
been, it is sufficient to mention that Wolfe’s regiment lost,
out of a total of about three hundred, one hundred and
twenty officers and men.

Prince Charles was forced from the field by his staff and
never met his troops again. In avery touching farewell
message he told them, now that his cause was lost, to save
themselves as best they could.

The pursuit by the English was not undertaken at once,
so that the Prince’s men got a considerable start. About
half of the fugitives fled over the moor towards Inverness,
the other half crossed the river Nairn and gained the hills,
where they got shelter. But those making for Inverness
were soon overtaken by the Dragoons, and then followed
a cold-blooded butchery of wounded prisoners and most
disgraceful treatment of women, who were turned out naked
into the snow to die. Wolfe, to his credit, refused to take
part in these barbarities.

The English army at once occupied Inverness. It was
then a very poor town, and there was only one house in it
where any important personage could be entertained. Prince
Charles had been in it quite recently, and the Duke of
Cumberland also put up in it. The old Jacobite lady who
occupied it remarked in her broad Scotch speech, “I have
had twa kings’ bairns living wi’ me in my time, and to tell
the truth, I wish I may never hae anither.”

In 1747 Wolfe was present at the battle of Lauffeld in
the Netherlands, but he has left no account himself of his
experiences then, though we know that he was slightly
wounded. His regiment (the 12th) returned home in the
winter, and getting leave, he spent nearly all his time with
Wolfe 139

his parents in London. He was just twenty-one, and he
now met Miss Lawson, the daughter of Sir William Lawson
of Issell,a Maid-of-Honour to the Princess of Wales. This
young lady, to whom he became deeply attached, did not
return his affection, and his unrequited passion long left
its sad impression.

In 1748 the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle ended the long
contest of seven years in Europe, leaving matters just as
they were at the beginning of it. Wolfe, who was devoted
to his profession, now hoped to see as much as he could of
the great cities of Europe, and so to enlarge his mind, and
he felt much irritation when leave for this purpose was
refused him. Meanwhile his mother was very anxious
that he should “marry money,” and one lady with
£30,000 was pointed out to him. But the fair Maid-of-
Honour to the Princess of Wales was still dominant in his
heart.

Early in 1749 he was appointed Major in the 2oth Regi-
ment (now Lancashire Fusiliers), and ordered to join it at
Stirling. His lieutenant-colonel being almost immedi-
ately after made Governor of Nova Scotia, he came at
once into the command of it. His work in Scotland was
of a most monotonous kind, mainly road-making and guard-
ing the Highland frontier. His regiment was soon ordered
to Inverness, the capital of the Highlands. He found there
a professor of mathematics with whom he worked hard,
and he made many friends in the town. Having obtained
leave of absence he went to Ireland. He says of Dublin
that “it was a prodigious city crowded with large-limbed
people and handsome women.”

He remained, however, but a short time there, and, after
140 Twelve Soldiers

a brief stay in London crossed the Channel and went to
Paris. For five years, from 1752 till 1757, he spent his
time in garrison duty in England and Scotland, except
for the six months in Paris, which he seems to have
enjoyed very much.

In 1757 he was appointed Quartermaster-General in
Ireland, but resigned that appointment after a short time.
In the same year he went with the expedition which was
sent against Rochfort, and though the enterprise proved
a failure, it came soon to be known that had his advice
been listened to the result would in all probability have
been very different.

But we must now turn our attention and change the
scene to the Northern Continent of America. There,
thirteen small and nearly independent British colonies
were scattered along what is now the coast of the United
States. In Canada the French were firmly established,
and held the two strong fortresses of Louisburg and
Quebec. The former is on the south-east coast of Cape
Breton Island, Nova Scotia, the latter on the magnificent
river St. Lawrence, of which it was the key, as it entirely
commanded the navigation.

The design of the great statesman Pitt for the campaign
of 1758 in North America, was to capture Fort Duquesne
and Ticonderoga beyond the Alleghanies; to seize the
forts held by the French on Lakes George and Champlain,
and thus obtain the command of the best inland route
from the British colonies; and lastly, most important
of all, to obtain possession of Louisburg, with its noble
harbour and strong fortifications commanding the entrance

to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The town was situated upon
Wolfe 141

one of the promontories which guard the entrance of the
harbour.

Wolfe was appointed one of the brigadier-generals, and
with the troops destined for this great operation (about
11,000 in number), embarked at Portsmouth on February
19, but in its progress down the Channel the fleet was
driven to take refuge in Plymouth harbour. General
Amherst, who was to command in chief, was to follow.
For nearly three months the unfortunate soldiers were
detained on board ship waiting for fine weather. During
this period two French fleets were detained by the English
fleets, one in Toulon with troops for America, the other
at Rochfort with troops to reinforce Canada.

It was not until May 10 that Wolfe and the British
fleet of forty sail reached Halifax. Here it had to wait
until May 28, when Amherst arrived. Then it put out
to sea and bore away for Louisburg. On June 2, aftera
very stormy passage, it reached its destination, but not
until the 8th did the weather moderate sufficiently for a
landing to be possible. Wolfe was a bad sailor and
suffered terribly from sea-sickness. Admiral Boscawen, in
opposition to the opinion of all but one old captain, deter-
mined to attack. The point for landing was finally fixed
at Freshwater Cove, four miles west of the town. Wolfe’s
brigade was to attempt the landing, and if successful to
cover the landing of the rest of the force.

At dawn the guns of the fleet opened upon the shore,
and the boats pulled in rapidly for the breakers. The
force consisted of twelve companies of Grenadiers taken
from the different regiments, a picked battalion of light
infantry, a company of New England Rangers, and
142 Twelve Soldiers

Fraser’s battalion of Highlanders (now Seaforth High-
landers).

As the boats approached the cove, the shore batteries
opened upon them with so deadly a fire that Wolfe gave
the signal to sheer off. But the signal flag was cut in two
by a round shot, and was not seen, or was disregarded by
three of the boats which were under the shelter of a pro-
jecting cliff. These pulled in at once to the shore on the
left of the cove, and the men rushing through the surf
landed. Wolfe seeing they were there sheltered by the
cliff at once determined to support them, and brought the
Grenadiers and Highlanders over the slippery rocks to
their aid. Here, having got them together, he rushed at
and took the nearest French battery. This left the beach
open for Amherst and the rest of the troops to land, and
as soon as they were ready they moved against the en-
trenched heights on which the French were formed. These
were at once carried, and the pursuit of the French
through the forest continued as far as the open ground
commanded by the guns of Louisburg, where the halt
was sounded.

Some days were now consumed by the English in land-
ing their stores and cannon. Just out of cannon shot
from the town there ran a small stream between low
wooded hills to the sea. In this valley, out of sight from
the French, the English camp was established. The
harbour of Louisburg lay on the farther side of the town,
and its entrance was divided by an island on which was
a powerful battery. Wolfe was now sent with 1200 men
to occupy the point at the mouth of the harbour next to
the English, and to destroy the battery on the island.
Wolfe 143

Within the harbour lay eleven French line-of-battle
ships, mounting 514 guns. On June 26 the island battery
was silenced. So alarmed was the French admiral at this,
that he sank half his ships in the narrowest part of the
entrance, so as to block it. Wolfe now turned his attention
to pushing on his batteries from the land side against the
town, a movement which was met by the French concen-
trating their heaviest fire upon them. One of the English
works was now so far advanced on the side next to the
sea ‘that the French determined at all hazards to destroy
it, and sallied out on July 9 in the dead of night with
1000 picked troops against it. Wolfe at the head of
his Grenadiers was well on the alert, and though the work
was at first carried by the French it was soon retaken at
the point of the bayonet. This was the hardest bit of
fighting during the whole siege. A short time after,
Wolfe made a dash forward, and driving in the French out-
posts, opened a new parallel within two hundred yards of
the walls. On July 21 a shell set fire to the French battle-
ship Céébre which drifted, when in full blaze, into the
Entreprenant and the Capricieux,and set them both on
fire. They all three drifted ashore and were consumed.
A large wooden barrack in the citadel was at this time set
on fire by a shell and burnt down.

Only two French line-of-battle ships now remained
afloat in the harbour. Six hundred English sailors rowed
in in their boats under the fire of the town batteries, and
boarded and carried them both. One stuck fast in mud and
was burnt, the other was brought out safely by its captors.

The last hour of Louisburg had now come. The whole
town was knocked to pieces by the English cannon and
144 Twelve Soldiers

the throwing in of 1200 shells. Only four French guns
were able to return the fire of the besiegers. On July 26
the last of these was silenced, and there were breaches in
the ramparts which lay open to assault.

Sadly the French General Dracour realized that no
further defence was possible, and with bitter regret he had
to send an officer with a flag of truce to ask for terms.
The only answer given by Amherst was that the garrison
must surrender unconditionally, and this was at last, with
a sore heart, agreed to by Dracour.

At eight o’clock on the following morning the English
army marched into Louisburg, the French garrison laid
down their arms, and the British flag was hoisted over
the half-ruined town.

There was joy in England over the capture of Louisburg,
which was the first great victory which our troops had
won in America, and the news was opportune, for it
followed a few days after the accounts of a serious check
to our arms between Lakes George and Champlain, inflicted
at Ticonderoga by the brave and accomplished French
General Montcalm upon General Abercromby. At Ticon-
deroga had fallen that most gallant and rising officer
Lord Howe, of whom Wolfe wrote that he was “the
noblest Englishman that has appeared in my time, and
the best soldier in the British army.”

Wolfe was now anxious to return to England to recruit
his shattered health, but he was ordered, with three
regiments and a fleet of ships under Sir C. Hardy, to
waste with fire and sword the French settlements on the
Lower St. Lawrence. This was speedily done, but it
was painful and uncongenial work to him.
Wolfe 145

Frontenac (now Kingston), on the north shore of Lake
Ontario, was one of the most important French posts. It
had just fallen to Bradstreet with a force of 3000 colonials,
and thus New France was cut intwo. Wolfe was delighted
at this, and he now learned that Fort Duquesne, a very
important post, had also been carried by a provincial force
of Highlanders under Forbes. Fort Duquesne stands on
the point of land where the Alleghany and the Monon-
gahela rivers join to form the Ohio, and where the
flourishing manufacturing city of Pittsburg is now situated.
This closed the campaign, and Wolfe, who was most
anxious to return to England and recruit his shattered
health, and believed that Pitt had been aware of and
approved his intention, left Louisburg early in October,
and landed at Portsmouth November 1. He had lately
been appointed Colonel of the 67th (now 2nd Battalion
Hampshire Regiment), and proceeded at once to take up
his new command at Salisbury, but getting leave went to
visit his parents at Blackheath. Here he learned for the
first time that Pitt had intended that he should have re-
mained in America. He at once wrote to that minister,
and said that he was quite ready to go back, particularly
if there was any chance of operations on the St. Lawrence.

It seems he had been desirous of going to Germany,
but he assured Pitt that he was quite at liberty to dispose
of his “slight carcase” as he pleased, and that, though he
was suffering much from a painful complaint, he would
“much rather die than decline any service that offered.”
There spoke the noble spirit of the man.

He was taking the waters at Bath when he was sent

for to London to receive the command of the great expedi-
L
146 Twelve Soldiers

tion which it had been decided was to be sent against
Quebec in the spring.

Before Christmas Day he returned to Bath, and there
took place the most romantic episode in the great soldier’s
life. He had met Miss Lowther, the sister of Sir James
Lowther, the first Lord Lonsdale, before he embarked for
Louisburg, but at that time it seemed to have been only a
passing acquaintance. Now, however, when he again met
her at Bath, he seems to have at once fallen a victim to
her charms, and though we have no details in regard to
this attachment, there seems no doubt that an engage-
ment took place, and it is certain that Wolfe, until the
day of his death, wore her miniature round his neck.

He was given little time to enjoy his happiness, for in
six weeks he was to embark for Quebec, and during that
short interval, was necessarily almost entirely occupied in
the organization of the force he was to command. He
was particularly anxious to take out with him, as his
Quartermaster-general, Carleton (afterwards Sir Guy),
but the King was much opposed to this, owing to some
remarks that Carleton had made not flattering to the
Hanoverian troops ; but at last, owing to the intervention
of the Prime Minister, Wolfe got his man. There is an
amusing story related of him at this time. One of the
King’s ministers, could not understand him at all, and
told the King that Wolfe was mad. “Mad is he?”
replied the monarch, “then I hope he will bite some others
of my generals.”

Pitt was satisfied, from the result of the last campaign,
that the French dominions in North America were now
within the grasp of a vigorous attack from our forces
Wolfe 147

upon the strongholds of Ticonderoga, Montreal, and
Niagara. These points gained, and a union of the
forces employed against them effected, and strong rein-
forcements from England received, the capital operation
against the siege of Quebec could be undertaken. With
its fall the dominion of France in Canada would be de-
stroyed and the complete supremacy of England insured.

Wolfe was in communication with Mr. Pitt in regard to
his position in command of the active force which was to
be under his orders in Canada. It was decided that he
was to hold the temporary rank of Major-General, and his
three brigadiers, Monckton, Murray and Townshend, were
to hold theirs in the same way. Wolfe was a poor man,
and was a good deal embarrassed as to his expenses in
his new command. He was only entitled to £2 a day,
an amount wholly inadequate. The Secretary at War,
Lord Barrington, to whom he stated his position, and dis-
closed his want of means frankly, took up his case warmly,
and procured for him a special grant of £500.

It is interesting to know what Wolfe’s own view of
his position now was, and it is well explained in a letter
of his to his uncle. He says, “I am to act a greater part
in this business than I wished or desired. The back-
wardness of some of the older officers has in some measure
forced the Government to come down so low. I shall do
my best and leave the rest to fortune, as perforce we
must when there are not the most commanding abilities.
If I have health and constitution enough for the campaign,
I shall think myself a lucky man. What happens
afterwards is of no great consequence.” These words
are very characteristic of Wolfe’s character, his great
148 Twelve Soldiers

modesty, his thorough devotion to duty, and his entire
unselfishness.

The plan of campaign as finally arranged by Wolfe with
Pitt is well explained by Wright in his excellent life of
Wolfe.

“ The fort at Niagara being, since the reduction of Fort
Duquesne, the chief western defence of the French
territory, Brigadier Prideaux, with a few regiments of
regulars, supported by a large body of provincials and
a number of friendly Indians under Sir William Johnston,
were to reduce it. The force was then to embark on Lake
Ontario, descend the St. Lawrence, take Montreal, and
join the main army under General Amherst. In the
meantime the Commander-in-Chief, at the head of 12,000
men, was to invest and destroy the central forts of
Ticonderoga and Crown Point, cross Lake Champlain, and
proceed by way of the Richelieu river to its confluence
with the St. Lawrence, where, being joined by Prideaux’s
detachment, the combined army was to reinforce the
naval and military armaments under Saunders and Wolfe.
Upon the junction of all these forces, and not until then,
was it hoped that Quebec might be subdued.”

It was thus intended to attack the French simul-
taneously on three sides. Amherst, who commanded the
army which had done so little under Abercromby, was to
wait in the province of New York until the coming on of
the mild weather would permit him to advance on
Ticonderoga, and, on capturing it and Crown Point, he
was to move on northwards. Johnston was to seize
Niagara, and then descend by Ontario and the St.
Lawrence on Montreal, where he was to be joined by
Wolfe 149

Prideaux, and reinforce the troops coming out from
England for the final attack on the great object of the
campaign, Quebec.

In Quebec the French General Montcalm, the worthy
rival of Wolfe, had concentrated the bulk of his forces,
amounting to nearly 15,000 men, but of these not more
than 5000 were regulars.

The force now gathering at Louisburg, which was to be
commanded by Wolfe, was intended to have been 12,000
strong, but owing to the counter-ordering of two battalions
at the last moment, it was actually only about 9000. The
fleet destined to carry the troops from England to the
St. Lawrence was divided into two squadrons. The one
with which Wolfe embarked was commanded by Admiral
Saunders and was to make for Louisburg, but when it
reached that place the harbour was found to be still frozen,
and it had to proceed to Halifax, where it was joined by
all the ships carrying the troops from the American
continent who were to take part in the expedition. A
fortnight later the harbour of Louisburg was open, and both
fleet and army were concentrated there. Wolfe was in the
highest spirits. He felt that he had got a force under his
orders upon which he could thoroughly rely.

Admiral Saunders was to convey to the decisive point
on the St. Lawrence the troops destined for the attack
upon Quebec. By June 1 the troops for this great
enterprise sailed out of the harbour of Louisburg. On
the 7th they were off the coast of Newfoundland, still
white with snow; on the 11th they passed the gloomy
heights of Gaspe ; on the 18th they anchored off the Isles
of Bic and Barnaby, where they met the Azchmond frigate.
150 Twelve Soldiers

which had Wolfe on board. On the 20th they doubled
the point of Tadousac, where the deep and strong currents
of the Saguenay drove back several of the transports, but
on the next day the first Canadian settlement on the great
stream of the St. Lawrence was sighted. By the 26th the
whole fleet was anchored on the southern shore of the
Isle of Orleans, within sight of Quebec, and early on the
morning of the 27th the army disembarked there in a
cove under the church of St. Laurent.

Hardly had it disembarked when a terrific storm of
wind and rain broke over the river, driving the transports
from their moorings and casting many of them ashore.
But though very severe it was fortunately of short duration.

The sight which now met Wolfe was not an encourag-
ing one. On the summit of Cape Diamond, crowned by
the citadel of Quebec, waved the flag of France, and on the
north bank of the St. Lawrence, stretching from the river
St. Charles to the deep chasm of the Montmorenci ravine,
a distance of eight miles, covered by a succession of strong
earthworks, lay the French army under Montcalm.

Above the city of Quebec, in the angle between the
rivers St. Charles and St. Lawrence, lay the only approach
by land to the strong fortress along the high narrow ridge
called the Plains of Abraham, which separated these two
rivers. In order to enable the fortress to communicate at
all times with ease with Montcalm’s troops in the lines of
Beauport, a bridge protected by Zétes-de-pont at each end
was thrown across the St. Charles. The position thus
seemed one of almost unapproachable strength.

Beneath the guns of the fortress a fleet of fire-ships had,
without the knowledge of the English, been prepared by
Wolfe 151

the French, and on the night after Wolfe’s landing, they
were launched against the English. It was from the
Point of Orleans that they were first seen by the English
sentries. Almost as soon as they were discovered sheets
of flame burst from them, followed by shot and shell from
their broadside guns. They were bearing down straight
upon the English fleet, but fortunately they had been fired
too soon, and the English sailors dashing out in their boats,
as soon as the guns had been discharged, took them with
admirable gallantry in tow on to the shore, where they
burned out harmlessly.

Wolfe now issued his first address to the Canadian
people. “ We have,” he said, “a powerful armament. We
are sent by the English King to conquer this province, but
not to make war upon women and children, the ministers
of religion or industrious peasants. We lament the suffer-
ings which our invasion may inflict upon you, but if you
remain neutral we proffer you safety in person and property
and freedom in religion. We are masters of the river; no
succour can reach you from France. General Amherst
with a large army assails your southern frontier. Your
cause is hopeless, your valour useless. Your nation has
been guilty of great cruelties to our unprotected settlers,
but we seek no revenge. We offer you the sweets of peace
amidst the horrors of war. England in her strength will
befriend you ; France in her weakness leaves you to your
fate.”

This address, however, had little effect, and Wolfe at this
time was much dispirited, though he never allowed others
to see it. He had carefully reconnoitred the French de-
fences, and with half the force to attack which they had to
158 Twelve Soldiers

defend, his task seemed impossible. He had little hope of
any external aid, as Amherst, who had captured Ticon-
deroga, was so far distant that assistance could not be
looked for from him.

It was now near the end of June, so that, in the
climate of Canada, he had but three months in which
to take Quebec. But short as this time was, he set
himself resolutely (although almost hopelessly) at work
to do it.

His troops were all encamped in the Isle of Orleans in
the mid stream of the St. Lawrence. Opposite Quebec,
on the southern bank of the river, where it is less than a
mile in breadth, rose the heights of Point Levy, which
were occupied in strength by the French. Wolfe saw at a
glance that, could he gain possession of these, he would be
able to open fire with effect from his guns upon the lower
part of Quebec. This had not escaped the vigilant eye of
Montcalm, and he wished to plant on Point Levy a good
force of men and guns, and thus gain the command of the
entrance to the river above Quebec and prevent the
English from shelling the town. But this was opposed by
Vaudreuil, the Governor-General of Canada, who held that
guns could not, at the distance, do any real damage. The
result showed that Montcalm was right.

On the afternoon of June 29 Wolfe determined to seize
Point Levy. Monckton’s brigade was entrusted with this
duty. Towards nightfall part of Monckton’s men were
landed at the village of Beaumont, and the remainder
followed in the morning. The night was bitterly cold. The
whole force advanced along the river road upon the village ot
Point Levy. There they were met by the Canadian rifle-
Wolfe 153

men, who fought well from the shelter of the houses.
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front, and the 78th, Frazer’s Highlanders, rushed with wild

cheers and drawn broadswords upon its rear. It was soon
154 Twelve Soldiers

carried, and its defenders all driven to take refuge in their
boats, in which they escaped to Quebec.

The following day Wolfe made a close examination
through his glass of Montcalm’s position on the other side
of the river. Quebec lay just opposite him, within easy
reach of the position on which he had determined to plant
his batteries. He began at once to throw up approaches,
The French from their floating batteries fired heavily at his
working parties, though with little effect, and the fire from
Quebec itself did little more execution. He soon managed
to get forty cannon and mortars into position and nearly
ready to open fire on Quebec, which lay within effective
range, and he had Monckton’s brigade encamped close in to
support them. It was evident to the French that unless
they could capture and spike these guns the end was near
at hand. <A force of about 1500 men, partly soldiers
partly citizens, came forward as volunteers to attempt the
capture and dismantling of these guns, Their offer was
accepted by Montcalm. During the night they crossed the
St. Lawrence high up, out of reach of the English ships,
and in the darkness pushed their way silently down the
right bank of the river towards Point Levy. The English,
exhausted with their trench work, were unprepared for such
anattack. But the French were not equal to the disciplined
silence necessary for the enterprise. Their own advance
guard hearing some noise rushed back on their main body,
who received them with a volley. A panic now seized their
whole force, and they retreated in utter confusion to their
boats, having sustained a loss of some seventy men killed
and wounded. It requires high discipline to make a

successful night attack.
Wolfe 155

On July 12 Wolfe’s batteries on Point Levy opened fire
upon Quebec, and for weeks continued to pour upon the
town a hail of shot and shell, which did much damage and
set fire to many of the houses. This was regarded by the
English colonists as only a fair return for the unfeeling
and cruel way in which the war had been carried on by the
French Canadians against the soldiers and settlers of the
British. But it soon became clear to Wolfe that this alone
would never reduce the place.

As already explained, the French lines on the left bank
of the St. Lawrence extended down the river from where
the St. Charles falls into it,'close to the town, to the point
where the deep and impassable ravine of the Montmorenci
joins it atright angles. This space was called the Beauport
shore. Wolfe determined to complete his semi-blockade of
the fortress by throwing a force across the St. Lawrence to
occupy a position on the left bank of the Montmorenci
ravine where it joins the St. Lawrence, and he hoped by
pushing up the left bank to find a point where he could
cross over, and so take the French defensive works in
rear.

To distract the attention of his opponent he formed a
brigade at Point Levy on heights in view of Quebec, and
marched it up the right bank of the river to a point some
miles above the town, whilst the light vessels of the fleet,
approaching as close as they could, opened fire on the
French lines between the St. Charles river and the Mont-
morenci ravine. Under cover of this false attack Wolfe,
with a large portion of his army, crossed from the Island of
Orleans the two miles of water which lay between it and
the Falls of Montmorenci, and landed his men just below
156 Twelve Soldiers

the mouth of the torrent on its left bank, where he at once
set to work to entrench himself.

The Montmorenci is a continuous torrent from its distant
source in the Lac des Neiges until it throws itself into the
St. Lawrence. Wolfe got his men up the steep side of the
plateau until he reached the summit, some two hundred and
fifty feet above the sea. From here the river throws itself
at one plunge into the St. Lawrence. Montcalm’s left and
Wolfe’s right were now within musket-shot of each other,
but between them lay the huge gulf into which the torrent
rushes.

On July 18 some English ships, under cover of a heavy
cannonade from Point Levy, faced the fire of the batteries of
Quebec and pushed past them into the upper river. There
they found that the left bank rose almost perpendicularly
from the stream, and seemed to leave no point from which
an ascent could be made. Wolfe ordered them to push on
for sixteen miles to Point aux Trembles, where many of
the leading French families from Quebec had taken refuge.
These were taken prisoners, very well treated, and then sent
back to Quebec. It is related of Wolfe that he entertained
them at dinner, where they had a most merry party to-
gether, and chaffed them much at their General not coming
out from the shelter of his fortifications to meet him as he
had hoped and expected he would have done.

On July 27 the French sent down a large fire-raft,
composed of several schooners linked together, in hopes of
burning or driving ashore the English fleet and transports.
But the sailors were on the look-out for it, and with the
utmost coolness took the raft in tow, and left it on the
beach to burn itself out.
Wolfe 157

The short Canadian summer was nearly over, and no
news in regard to Amherst (the titular Commander-in-
Chief in Canada) had reached Wolfe, who thus came to
see that if Quebec was to be taken he must take it with his
own force.

It was evident that nothing would move Montcalm from
his magnificent position in the lines of Beauport. Wolfe
therefore determined to try if he could not by a great effort
force his way through them. It seemed a hopeless task,
but there was nothing else to be done.

About a mile west of the Montmorenci the Beauport
ridge recedes from the shore and leaves a short space about
a couple of hundred yards in width. On this strip, and
close to high-water mark, lay a redoubt, the only outwork
the French had established below the heights. Here Wolfe
determined to make his attempt. On July 31 the attack
was made. It was divided into two columns. General
Townshend with 2000 men from Wolfe’s camp at Mont-
morenci was to ford the river below the Falls and to advance
along the strand. Wolfe himself with a similar force,
gathered from Point Levy and the Isle of Orleans, was to
cross the river and land upon the mud flats which were
laid bare at low tide. Admiral Saunders with a frigate
was to cover the landing.

At ten o'clock in the morning Wolfe embarked from
Point Levy with the 15th, 78th, and part of the 6oth or
Royal Americans (now King’s Royal Rifle Corps), and all
the Grenadier companies of Monckton’s brigade. Crossing
to the Point of Orleans they took on board all that re-
mained of the Grenadiers. A great battery of forty guns
had been established on the English side of the Mont-
158 Twelve Soldiers

morenci, and the Centurion of sixty-four guns had
floated up with the tide to within range of the eastern
batteries on the Beauport shore. These all opened fire
with the utmost vigour, and under cover of it Wolfe with
his small fleet floated out along the Beauport shore, while
Townshend’s brigade was ready on the left bank of the
Montmorenci to support it when the decisive moment came.

Meanwhile on the French side, from Montmorenci to the
St. Charles river and from that to the ramparts of Quebec,
all was in readiness in the French lines. Two of the
English armed transports, one of which had Wolfe on board,
moved on towards the shore and grounded under the fire
of the French batteries. Wolfe now saw that the advanced
redoubt on the French shore which he had been bent on
occupying was completely commanded by the ridge behind,
and would be under the fire of the enemy’s artillery and
musketry. He therefore did not attempt to land, but kept
moving in his ships up and down to keep the French in
uncertainty as to where his blow would fall. During this
time the road on the heights above the shore from Mont-
morenci to Quebec was crowded with French troops march-
ing to and fro. About two o’clock Montcalm began to
move one of his divisions round the back of the Mont-
morenci Falls, intending to cross the river and fall upon the
English rear. Wolfe detected this at once and immediately
ordered the 48th (now ist Northampton Regiment), which
had been left at Point Levy, to march up the river and
get above Quebec. This was checkmate to Montcalm’s
plan, and as soon as it was detected he ordered the column
intended for Montmorenci to counter-march and hurry back
to Quebec.
Wolfe 159

It seemed now as if all movements for the day were at
an end. On both sides the guns were silent and the forces
stood inactive. Heavy clouds gathered on the hills, and
the rumbling of distant thunder was heard. Wolfe at this
moment thought he saw confusion in the French lines,
and he gave the signal for the English batteries and ships
to open fire. When this had gone on for some time, a red
ensign (the signal to advance) was run up on Wolfe’s
transport. Immediately the boats, crowded with troops,
pulled hard for the shore.

The French batteries instantly opened on them, and
many of the boats got upon ledges of rock. The boat
with Wolfe on board dashed forward, and having found a
clear channel led the way. The attack was to be directed
upon the outwork already mentioned, near the Mont-
morenci end of the French lines. As the first party of
troops, about 1000 in number, got on shore they formed in
columns on the beach, and instantly, without waiting for
the word, rushed forward in great disorder towards 14,000
French, lying behind strong entrenchments. They were
swept down by a terrific fire, and the remnant fell back to
the beach, where the rest of the troops had been spectators
of this premature attack, after which a second attempt was
out of the question, for only the troops not yet engaged
would have been available. A heavy storm of wind and
rain accompanied the repulse, and was followed by a
burst of sunshine, during which hundreds of Indians swept
down to scalp the dead and wounded. The 78th High-
landers now advanced to carry them off, and the French,
with a true soldier-like generosity, stopped the fire of their

batteries until this was effected.
160 Twelve Soldiers

Wolfe was deeply hurt at this disaster, and at the proof
it gave of the indiscipline of his men. He expressed this
in a manifesto in these terms—“ The check which the
Grenadiers met with yesterday will, it is hoped, be a lesson
to them for all time to come. Such impetuous, irregular
and unsoldierlike proceedings destroy all order, make it
impossible for their comrades to form any disposition for
an attack, and put it out of the General’s power to execute
* his plan. The Grenadiers could not suppose that they
alone could beat the French army, and therefore it was
necessary that the corps under Brigadiers Monckton and
Townshend should have time to join, that the attack might
be general. The very first fire of the enemy would be
sufficient to repulse men who had lost all sense of order
and discipline.” He privately said that “despair had
taken possession of his soul,’ and that he looked upon
himself as a ruined man. But he never allowed this to be
seen, nor did it impair his bodily energy, for he now, by
moving constantly from one point to another up and down
the river, kept the French ceaselessly alarmed and their
troops in motion.

At this time Admiral Holmes, with two-and-twenty
British ships, had passed up the river to above Quebec, and
Wolfe had ordered him to take on board at Point Levy
1200 men under the command of Brigadier Murray. To
meet this danger Montcalm directed 1500 men under
Bougainville, to follow the English fleet up the left bank of
the river. Murray twice attempted to land, but was on
each occasion repulsed by the French. A third attempt at
the village of Dechambault succeeded. Some stores of
provisions and cloth were taken, and also a few prisoners
Wolfe 161

and letters, which last disclosed to Wolfe that Amherst
had taken Crown Point on Lake Champlain, and that
Niagara had fallen to Johnston.

Meanwhile, a heavy bombardment of shot and shell was
being poured upon Quebec, so that nearly the whole of the
lower town was, during the early part of August, reduced
to ruins. Wolfe had issued a proclamation calling upon
the peasantry to submit, and where this was not complied
with, the torch was rather ruthlessly applied to their barns
and farmhouses, so that, as far as the eye could reach from
the battlements of Quebec and the heights of Point Levy
to Cape Tourmente and the Isle aux Coudres, columns of
smoke were seen ascending. Numbers of captives now
brought in were treated with great kindness, and the
English soldiers frequently shared their rations and tobacco
with them.

Sickness and disease had now broken out in the British
camp to such an extent that by the middle of August nearly
1000 men out of the small force were in hospital. At this
very time Montcalm had been obliged to detach Levis
with 1500 men to Montreal, as Amherst was, at last, slowly
moving northwards, and Lake Ontario was already in
English hands.

On August 20 Wolfe was down with fever and lying,
racked with pain and worn out with anxiety, in the farm
house at Montmorenci where his head-quarters were.
Time was slipping by, the days were rapidly drawing in,
and the bitter northern winter, when all military move-
ments would become impossible, was close at hand. There
was one day when he was dangerously ill, and intense

was then the anxiety throughout the English lines. For
M
162 Twelve Soldiers

five days he was perfectly helpless and unfit,for any
work, but great indeed was the joy of the army when on
August 25 the medical bulletin announced that he had
got the turn and was decidedly better. By September 1
the attack he was suffering from was over, and though very
weak and pulled down, he was able again to move out
amongst the troops.

To understand the plan which he now adopted we must
consider the position of Quebec and the ground on which
it stands. Quebec is perched upon the extremity of a high
and rocky ridge which is bounded on the south and east by
the St. Lawrence and partly on the north by the river St.
Charles. This high ridge runs westward along the north
bank of the river for about eight miles towards Cape
Rouge, and falls from the tableland on its summit in a
practically sheer precipice of two or three hundred feet in
height. There was only one narrow break, or ravine, in
this cliff at which it was possible for troops to gain the.
summit from the side of the St. Lawrence. This was at
the place called the Anse du Foulon. Wolfe had already
seen this, and he finally fixed upon it for his point of attack.

It seemed a desperate enterprise to embark upon, for
independently of what appeared the almost insuperable
difficulty of gaining the summit of the ridge, Wolfe knew
that Montcalm could meet him there with double the
numbers that he could bring against him. But it was
really his only chance. Once established on the top of the
ridge, he would interpose between Montcalm in Quebec
and the ground up the river from which he drew his supply
of provisions and also cut him off from the French army

acting against General Amherst in Canada.
Wolfe 163

Wolfe.had lost since he arrived before Quebec over
1000 men, and had still about 500 sick in hospital
and on detachment at the Point of Orleans and the
Point of Levy, so that he had little more than 4000 left
for the decisive blow he was about to strike.

On September 3 the camp at Montmorenci was aban-
doned and its garrison withdrawn. This had become
known at Quebec, and Montcalm sent 2000 men to march
round behind the cataract and fall upon the retiring troops.
The British under Monckton, at Point Levy, caught sight of
the movement and checkmated it by a counter demonstra-
tion against the Beauport lines, so that the English were
able to embark with all their sick and wounded and to land
them unmolested at Point Levy.

Wolfe determined to embark the whole of his attacking
force on board the ships which he already had above the
city and to keep them there until the exact point on which
he was to land them was determined on. He assembled
the whole force disposable for his great undertaking at
Point Levy on September 4, and by the 6th had them all
ready for the advance which was then to begin. Leaving
the 48th Regiment to remain behind until sent for, Wolfe
marched the whole remainder of his force up the right
bank of the St. Lawrence till it crossed the shallow stream
of the Etchemin at the point where it falls into the St.
Lawrence. Here he found all the boats of the fleet lying
in readiness for his force to embark. This they did im-
mediately, and Admiral Holmes, who was in command, as
soon as they were all on board, sailed up the river with
them as far as Cape Rouge, eight miles above Quebec.

On the night of the 5th Wolfe had again been taken very
164 Twelve Soldiers

ill. He told the doctor plainly that he knew that to cure
him was impossible, but he begged him to patch him up
enough to get through the enterprise he was now carrying
out. After that he said nothing was of consequence. The
doctor did this, and Wolfe was able to embark on the
evening of the 6th.

At Cape Rouge the French General Bougainville was
stationed in a position strongly entrenched. From there to
Quebec the apparently inaccessible cliff seemed to consti-
tute a perfect defence. Wolfe in a boat with an armed
escort went up and down the river between Cape Rouge
and Quebec and selected his point of attack. This was at
the Anse du Foulon, where there is a break in the cliff and
a zig-zag path winds its difficult way up the steep face of
the rock. Some tents at the top of the path showed that
there was an outpost of the enemy there. Meanwhile
Admiral Saunders and the troops below Quebec, at Point
Levy, were making constant feigned attacks, supported by
artillery, to induce the French to believe that the real
attack was to be made on the Beauport lines below the
city. On the 11th, the whole of these troops were put on
board the British ships in the river, and Wolfe issued the
following, his last orders, to his men. “A vigorous blow
struck at this juncture may determine the fate of Canada.
The first body which gets on shore shall at once attack any
post in front of them and hold it till the main army come
up. The battalions are to form as rapidly as possible and to
charge whatever presents itself. Officers and men will
remember what their country expects of them.”

On the 12th two deserters came in from Bougainville’s
camp at Cape Rouge. They brought the intelligence that
Wolfe 165

a convoy of provisions was to be sent down the river that
night to Quebec. This was a great point in Wolfe’s
favour, for by getting quietly ahead of the convoy, of which
the sentries on top of the cliff were sure to be warned, he
might pass his own boats off as part of it. He was
fortunate in the weather, for it was a moonlight night, a
point of vital consequence to the execution of his plan.
At sundown Admiral Saunders, with his fleet and floating
batteries, crossed the St. Lawrence and closed in upon
the Beauport lines whilst the heavy guns on Point Levy
opened upon the lower town, now much ruined. Wolfe’s
troops were lying on board their boats at Cape Rouge,
eight miles above Quebec.

Wolfe himself was on board the Sutherland and his
old school-fellow John Jervis, the future admiral, was
there with him. We now come to a touching anecdote
of the great soldier. He sent for Jervis and told him
that he did not expect to survive the next day’s fight, and
taking from his neck a miniature of Miss Lowther, gave
it to him, saying that in the event of his death, he wished
that he would deliver it himself to her. Orders had been
sent to Colonel Burton at Point Levy to march his men
up the right bank of the St. Lawrence till he came opposite
the Anse du Foulon, and there take up his position.
Counting the first and second divisions and Burton’s
reserve on the right bank Wolfe had at his disposal for
the expected fight a total force of 4500 men.

On the night of the 12th, the tide having begun to ebb,
Wolfe joined the troops at Cape Rouge, of whom some
1600 men were embarked in boats, about an equal number
being left in the frigates and smaller vessels of the fleet.
166 Twelve Soldiers

Colonel Burton with the 48th Regiment was on the right
bank as a reserve ready to come across when wanted.
About two o’clock the whole flotilla began stealthily to
drift down beneath the shadow of the cliffs.

At this supreme moment Wolfe repeated aloud to his
officers these beautiful lines of Gray—

“The boast of heraldry, the pomp of power,
And all that beauty, all that wealth e’er gave,
Await alike th’ inevitable hour ;
The paths of glory lead but to the grave.”

As the leading boats were drifting down close to the
Anse du Foulon a sentry from the top of the cliff chal-
lenged them in French, Quz vive? Fortunately there
was a Highland officer on board who was a good French
scholar and replied, La France. The suspicious French-
man then asked, A guel régiment? The Highlander
readily answered, De Ja Reine, and as the convoy of pro-
visions was at this time expected by the French to pass,
this reply was accepted as satisfactory. But soon another
sentry close to the water's edge challenged them again.
The Highland officer again was equal to the occasion and
replied readily, “Provision boats, don’t make a noise, the
English will hear us.” This reply was accepted and the
boats passed on, and soon came abreast of the Anse du
Foulon. No sentry challenged them there.

To Colonel Howe, an old companion of Wolfe’s, had
been committed the dangerous and important post of
leading the van with a detachment of Highlanders and
light infantry. The leading boats had been carried by
the current past the proper landing-place. But this
proved to be of little consequence, as the narrow track
Wolfe 167

which led up the cliff was found to be blocked by obstruc-
tions carefully placed. Howe and his volunteers on leap-
ing ashore just as the day began to break threw themselves
on the face of the cliff and soon scrambled up to the top,
whilst those who followed under Wolfe in person, set to
work to remove the obstructions which had been placed
upon the path. On the summit was encamped only a
small detachment of French which was speedily over-
powered, and Wolfe with his 1600 men established them-
selves there. Meanwhile the ships and transports from
the opposite side of the river were coming over rapidly
with the second brigade, some of whom were already
beginning to form on the beach, while Burton, who was
still on the right bank, was prepared to follow at a
moment’s notice with 1200 men.

It was now daylight with a light rain and a murky sky,
and as no French troops were in sight Wolfe had time
to look over the ground and to make his dispositions
quietly. His position was critical, In front were the
ramparts of Quebec with its strong garrison commanded
by Montcalm. It was certain to be largely reinforced for
the coming fight from the French troops in the Beauport
lines and by the banks of the St. Charles, which must have
amounted to between gooo and 10,000 men, while Bougain-
ville with 2000 more was strongly entrenched some eight
miles in his rear at Mont Rouge. Wolfe grasped the
situation at once. A few light infantry were dispatched
to seize two small batteries on the edge of the cliff at
Samos and Sillery. This was quickly and easily done.
Two companies of the 58th Regiment (now 2nd North-
ampton) were left to hold the landing-place. Before six
168 Twelve Soldiers

o’clock in the morning the British were well up on the
Plains of Abraham and deploying rapidly upon them
facing Quebec, at about a mile distant from its ramparts.
Montcalm had passed the night at his own head-quarters
on the Beauport side, and was much perplexed by the
threatening attitude of the British fleet below Quebec,
which was doing its best to make him believe that the
danger lay there. He had never doubted that Bougain-
ville with his 2000 men at Mont Rouge was perfectly able
to maintain the position on the top of the cliffs which ran
from Quebec to Mont Rouge, and which seemed practically
inassailable by any force from below when intelligently
held by those above. He had been utterly taken aback
when about six o'clock in the morning he heard from some
Canadians, who came in with news, that the British were
actually established on the Plains of Abraham in front of
the city. He could not at first believe it, but to make
sure got on his horse and rode out to see for himself.
Then to his utter amazement he descried through the
mist a thin red line coming swiftly over the plain, while
a distant rattle of musketry seemed to accompany its
advance. There was no room for doubt, and he sent at
once a staff-officer to bring up with all speed as many
men as could be spared from.the Beauport lines. But
Vaudreuil, who commanded there, had already got wind
of the landing, and acting upon his own responsibility,
had set the right wing in motion, so that it was now
hastening up to the plateau over the bridge of boats which
spanned the St. Charles. All was hurry and excitement
within the French lines, both in the city and amongst the
troops outside of it. Montcalm, in the face of some
Wolfe 169

opposition of the Council of War, determined to bring on
the battle at once. Orders had been immediately sent to
Bougainville at Cape Rouge, eight miles distant, to bring
up his troops to Quebec so as to threaten the English rear,
and it seems difficult to understand why Montcalm did
not wait until he knew that they were on their way.
Bougainville had in fact already sent forward from Mont
Rouge a body of infantry with about three hundred horse,
to threaten the rear of Wolfe’s army and check his
advance on Quebec. But Townshend with the 6oth, who
was detached to meet them, extended and quickly drove
them back. Wolfe’s right wing rested on the edge of the
cliffs overhanging the St. Lawrence. It consisted of the
35th (now Ist Royal Sussex Regiment), and the Louisburg
Grenadiers composed of the Grenadier companies of various
regiments then in Canada, and the 28th (now Ist Gloucester-
shire Regiment). The centre was composed of the 43rd
(now Ist Oxfordshire Light Infantry) and 47th (now Ist
Loyal North Lancashire), the left of the 78th and 58th.
These formed the first division. But as they did not
extend far enough to reach to the woody slopes which fell
down into the river St. Charles, Wolfe filled up the gap
with the 15th (now Ist East Yorkshire Regiment), and two
battalions of the 6oth from the second division. The 48th
Regiment formed the reserve. Two field-guns had been
with much difficulty dragged up the Anse du Foulon.
This was the only artillery Wolfe had. On both sides
of the field of battle were thick woods which were held
by riflemen, and in these woods sharp skirmishing with the
French immediately began.

By nine o’clock the French under Montcalm’s command
170 Twelve Soldiers

had formed their line of battle. In it were many of the
most famous regiments of old France, Béarn, Guienne,
and Rousillon, La Sarre and Languedoc, while on the
flanks were placed the colonial troops and the militia. All
the troops that could be spared from the lines of Beauport
had been brought up, and the total French force on the
ground must have been about 7500 men.

The strictest orders had been given by Wolfe to his
men that they were to reserve their fire,and with a magnifi-
cent discipline, they stood with arms at the shoulder under
the hostile fire.

While the French were advancing Wolfe was shot
through the wrist, but hastily binding up the wound with
his handkerchief he passed down the ranks, calling to his
men to be steady and reserve their fire.

On came the French right gallantly, but it was not until
the English had received the rolling fire of the whole front
rank of the hostile infantry, and until they were so close
that in the glare of battle they could distinguish even the
whites of their opponents’ eyes, that the command to fire
rang out. In those days the battle formation was three
deep, and terrible indeed was that discharge. Before it
the French were pressing on in perfect order; when it
was over nothing remained in the English front but huge
gaps in the French ranks, interspersed by groups of strug-
gling, shrieking, dying men.

In vain Montcalm endeavoured to rally his broken
ranks. The panic amongst his troops was too great. The
English soldiers stood calm and reloaded. Then Wolfe,
springing to the front, sword in hand, ordered the whole
Wolfe ryt

line to advance. Delivering a withering volley the British
rushed on with the bayonet, Wolfe himself leading. The
French could not await the shock. They broke and fled,
and soon the whole plain was covered with a mass of
fugitives making for the outworks of Quebec.

The only resistance still going on came from some
regiments of militia, who, having got into the brushwood
coverts on either side of the combatants, maintained a
galling fire. Wolfe was now again struck, the bullet
passing through his groin, but he paid no heed to it and
still pressed on sword in hand. But another ball hit him
in the side and passed through his lungs. He staggered
forward, struggling to keep on his feet, and said to Lieu-
tenant Browne of the Grenadiers, who was close at hand,
“Support me that my gallant fellows may not see me fall.”
But it was all in vain, before Browne could reach him he
sank down upon the earth. <A volunteer, Mr. Henderson,
and a private soldier saw him fall and were almost immedi-
ately assisted by an officer of artillery, and these three
at once began to carry him tothe rear. Before they had
gone many paces he asked to be laid upon the ground.
As soon as this was done they rushed to send for a
surgeon, but he whispered with his failing voice, “It is
needless, it is all over with me,” and sank into a stupor.
Shortly after one of those about him said, “They run, see
how they run.” This seemed to arouse him, for he suddenly
murmured, “Who run?” An attendant who heard him
said, “ The enemy, sir.” “Go, one of you,” he said, “with
all speed to Colonel Burton, and tell him to march Webb’s
Regiment down to the St. Charles river and cut off the
72 Twelve Soldiers

retreat of the fugitives to the bridge.” Then turning on
his side in a faint voice he whispered, “God be praised.
I now die in peace.”

In a few minutes, without any apparent suffering, his
spirit passed away, and the toil-worn frame of the gallant
soldier sank to its rest.
 

CLIVE.
CLIVE

1725—1774

AT the beginning of the eighteenth century the greater
part of India acknowledged the Mogul Emperor as Padishah,
or Lord Paramount. The military force and the administra-
tive intelligence which have distinguished the founders of
more than one great line of Moslem chiefs, had enabled
Akbar and his successors to acquire a pre-eminence which
was, during one or two brief periods, beneficial to the mass
of their subjects. But with Aurangzeb was exhausted the
energy of the ruling house, and the spell of their prestige.
He died in 1707, and left his empire a prey to all the
symptoms of decline. The descendants of the Mahratta
robber chief Sivaji, the toleration of whose raids had
marked the waning energies of the supreme power, had
become so strong that the Peishwa at the head of the
Mahratta confederacy controlled the most formidable mili-
tary force in the Peninsula. The Viceroys whom the
Moguls had appointed Governors-General of great pro-.
vinces, were establishing themselves as independent rulers,
among them the Subahdar or Viceroy of the Deccan, who
took the title of Nizam, and the Nawab or Governor of
Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. .
> The degeneracy of government showed itself not merely
in the paralysis of the suzerain power. Administration

had become synonymous with corruption, authority was
173
174 Twelve Soldiers

sought as the road to wealth, luxury, and debauchery, and
the means of its acquisition were intrigue, bribery, and
murder, The duties of government had been forgotten,
and this oblivion was accompanied, as it must ever be, by
a decay of the nerve and fibre of the ruling class. Where
government no longer does its work, and the upper class has
lost its character, there is always room for conquest, which
destroys and clears away the fetid growths of corruption
and establishes a fresh government able to fulfil its functions.

The revival of order and of character in India was to
come, not from Islam, which by the close of the seventeenth
century had everywhere exhausted its power for good, but
from Europe, which by that time had passed out of the
religious into the political stage of development. The new
energy was to enter India, not from the sterile plateau of
Central Asia, but from the great high road of civilization,
the ocean. The same zeal which had impelled the faithful
servants of the prophet to subdue the idolaters of India,
had planted the Ottoman Turks upon the ancient routes
to the East, and compelled the traders of the West to leave
the narrow waters of the Mediterranean, and to explore with
sail and compass the paths of the endless sea. The great
Portuguese explorers led the way. During the sixteenth
century they had set up establishments on the Indian coasts
and claimed a monopoly of the trade of the Eastern ocean.
But before the close of that century the power of Portugal
had been absorbed in that of Spain, where the descendants
of Charles V. had degenerated as fast as those of Akbar.
After the Portuguese came the Dutch, but the eighteenth
century was the period of their decline, and that of the
struggle for the mastery at sea between the English and
Clive 175

the French, These, like their predecessors, and side by
side with them, had their trading stations on the Indian
coasts, the English at Surat (1612) and at Bombay
(1668) on the west coast, at Fort St. David (Cuddalore)
and at Fort St. George (Madras, 1639) on the east coast,
and at Calcutta (1686) in the delta of the Ganges, the
French at Mahé on the west coast, at Pondicherry (1674)
on the east coast, and at Chandernagore on the Hooghly
(1688). All these places were trading factories, held under
grants from the Mogul overlords or their deputies. There
was usually at each station a fort armed with cannon, con-
taining the warehouses and the residences of the Europeans,
and defended by a few European soldiers and a few half-
caste or native mercenaries. Outside the fort would be the
native town. The English had the best of the trade, while
the French appear to have been more successful in culti-
vating sympathy with the natives and their rulers. The
war of the Austrian Succession involved the English and
French settlements in hostilities, in which from the nature
of the case it was inevitable that in the long run success
must come to whichever nation should establish its superi-
orityat sea. The maritime struggle of the eighteenth century
brought with it the constantly growing ascendency of the
British navy, of which the necessary consequence was the
prosperity of the British factories in India and the decline
of their French rivals. That the advantage thus gained
by the English over the French led, in the course of time,
to the substitution of a British for a Mogul overlord of all
India, was due to the degeneracy already described, which
accompanied at once as cause and as effect the collapse of
the Mogul Empire. The first conflict between English and
176 Twelve Soldiers

French involved the French in a quarrel with a local Indian
magnate, leading to a battle in which the French forces were
victorious. This victoryrevealed the superiority of European
against native armies and foreshadowed the future of India,
which was bound to fall to the first European nation that
should have the opportunity to strike for it. The French
statesman, Dupleix, saw the opportunity and tried to avail
himself of it, but he was not a soldier, his officers were
unequal to the tasks which his plans involved, and his
government, engaged in the naval struggle against England,
afforded him a fitful and inadequate support. The rival
English cause found its champion in Clive, who in the first

" conflict at the beginning of his career, had the opportunity

of an independent command. His judgment, coolness, and
courage, in a short campaign, completely turned in favour
of the English the balance of military success and of the
influence that depends upon it. The result was that
Dupleix, discredited by failure, was recalled by his govern-
ment in disgrace, while Clive, recognized as a national hero,
was sent out again to India with increased authority.
Events took him to Bengal, where by applying Dupleix’s
system of intrigue, and supporting it with a boldness in
action all his own, he secured for his countrymen the
authority of government over Bengal, Behar, and Orissa,
and where in a third period of service he established a
military and administrative system that rendered possible
the future further development of the British power. His
work as a statesman and an administrator is part of the
general history of India and of England. The subject
of this essay is his work as a commander in the field,
which laid the foundations of his political greatness.
Clive 177

The English factory of Madras had no official connec-
tion with the English factories on the west coast and in
Bengal, except that all alike were managed hy. seents of
the same company, and that the Governor of each received
his instructions from the same Board of Directors at home.
Writers, factors, and-merchants were paid ten, twenty, and
forty pounds a year each besides board and lodging; the
Governor had £300 or £400 a year, and all alike were per-
mitted to eke out these wretched salaries by trading on their
own account, and apparently also by accepting the presents
or douceurs which formed an essential part of all trans-
actions between Orientals. The Company’s business was
trade; its servants were not expected to meddle in politics,
and it was no part of their tradition to interfere in the affairs
of the Mogul Empire. Madras lay within the province of
the Carnatic, of which the Governor or Nawab was in theory
appointed by and subordinate to the Subahdar of the
Deccan, himself the deputy of the Padishah. The Governor
of Madras paid his dues to the Nawab, and had as little
thought of interfering in native politics as an English
merchant living at Hamburg in 1866 would have thought
of taking part in the quarrel between Prussia and Han-
over. The French were less successful as traders, and the
Governor of Pondicherry, having authority over the distant
stations at Chandernagore and at Mahé, felt himself a
political personage, and was disposed to look rather to
diplomatic intrigue for the extension of his influence, than
to the prosy operations of commerce for the increase of the
profits of his Company.

In 1741 Dupleix, who had been Intendant at Chander-

nagore, was-appointed President of the Council of Pondi-
N
178 Twelve Soldiers

cherry, and Commandant of the French possessions in India.
A good administrator, he set in order the finances of his
settlement, and spent a large sum out of his private fortune
upon the restoration and completion of the fort. He adopted
the manners and style of an Eastern potentate, and entered
into all the intrigues of the native princes of the various
neighbouring courts. In 1744 he was informed by his
directors that France was about to go to war with England,
but that, as the English fleet in Indian waters might arrive
sooner or prove stronger than the French, he was to nego-
tiate with the Governor of Madras that the war should not
extend to the two settlements. But Morse, the Governor
of Madras, having been instructed to expect a strong
squadron, which was to destroy the French commerce,
could not agree to this proposal. Dupleix then appealed
to the Nawab, and induced him to issue a declaration that
he would not permit any breach of the peace between the
English and French in the Carnatic. The English fleet
arrived first, but confined its operations to the sea, so that
nothing was attempted against Pondicherry. Inthe summer
of 1746 a French squadron from the Mauritius, under La
Bourdonnais, arrived off the coast. There was a naval
engagement (July 6 and 7), after which the English Com-
modore Peyton retired to Trincomalee, leaving La Bour-
donnais in temporary command of the sea. After a delay
of two months, caused by disagreement between Dupleix
and La Bourdonnais, the French fleet appeared off Madras,
a battalion of European troops was landed, and Morse
summoned to surrender. He had no means of resisting a
bombardment, and apparently not enough soldiers for
defence. The Nawab declined to interfere. On September
Clive 179

21, 1746, Madras surrendered, upon condition that the town
should be ransomed, and the Company’s servants until
ransomed should be prisoners of war. Dupleix refused to
ratify these terms, being determined to destroy Madras.
La Bourdonnais indignant, then left the coast. The Nawab
ordered Dupleix to give up the town to his agents. Dupleix
politely declined, whereupon the Nawab sent his son with
10,000 men to eject the French. But the French held their
ground, and a small force sent by Dupleix from Pondicherry,
under the command of a Swiss officer named Paradis, to
raise the siege, attacked and dispersed the Nawab’s army
at St. Thomé (November 4, 1746). This was the battle
which created the French prestige in India.

Dupleix’s next effort was to reduce the English settle-
ment at Fort St. David, but in the absence of a naval force
able to co-operate he was unable to achieve success Three
attempts were made against Fort St. David. Early in
1748 a first-rate British officer, Major Stringer Lawrence,
arrived to take command and beat off Dupleix’s third
attack, made in June that year. In August, Admiral
Boscawen, with a fleet of thirty ships and from 2000 to
3000 troops, reached the coast. Boscawen attacked Pondi-
cherry by sea and land, but after a two months’ siege
abandoned the attempt and left the coast. Soon after-
wards (1749) news reached India of the Peace of Aix la
Chapelle, by which the two nations had agreed upon a
mutual restitution of the conquests made during the war.
Madras was accordingly restored to the English,

1 In February 1747 a small French squadron was on the coast, but

retired before the arrival in March of an English squadron from the
Hooghly, which in turn was drawn off by another French squadron.
180 Twelve Soldiers

In June 1748 the Subahdar of the Deccan Nizam-ul-
mulk died, having nominated as his successor his grandson
Muzaffar Jang, but Muzaffar was away while his disin-
herited uncle Nazir Jang was on the spot. Nazir seized
the treasury and proclaimed himself Subahdar. Muzaffar
turned for help to the Mahratta court, where he made the
acquaintance of a political prisoner, Chanda Sahib, a prince
who had a distant claim to the office of Nawab of the
Carnatic. The two princes entered into correspondence
with Dupleix, to whom their proposals gave a brilliant
opening for the extension of his influence. If he could
assist the one to establish himself as Subahdar and the
other to become Nawab, he would through them control the
greater part of Southern India. Dupleix therefore entered
into the plot, paid seven lakhs of rupees to the Mahrattas
as ransom for Chanda Sahib and sent him a force of 400
Europeans and 2000 Sepoys. Chanda Sahib brought into
the field 6000 men and Muzaffar Jang 30,000. With these
forces combined, the two pretenders advanced through the
Eastern Ghauts towards Arcot the capital of the Carnatic.
They were met by the reigning Nawab, who was regarded
by the English as the legitimate ruler in virtue of his
appointment by the late Nizam. In the battle of Ambur
(August 3, 1749) the pretenders were victorious. The
legitimate Nawab was killed,and his younger son Moham-
med Ali, who escaped, took refuge in Trichinopoly. The
pretenders instead of pursuing him lay down to besiege
Tanjore, but withdrew on the appearance of Nazir Jang
with a large army. Soon afterwards Nazir Jang was
assassinated. The two pretenders were recognized, and
Dupleix was everywhere triumphant. Muzaffar Jang
Clive 181

returned towards Aurangabad, the capital of the Deccan
accompanied by a guard of French troops and Frenck
Sepoys commanded by Bussy, one of Dupleix’s officers, and
when soon afterwards the Subahdar Muzaffar was killed,
Bussy without difficulty set up in his place as Subahdar
another prince of the same family. Thus the French in-
fluence became supreme in the Deccan. Dupleix had
installed his own man Chanda Sahib as Nawab of the
Carnatic, and nothing remained except to capture Trichi
nopoly and Mohammed Ali, whom the English still recog-
nized as the legitimate Nawab.

In March 1751 Chanda Sahib with his own army and a
French contingent set out to besiege Trichinopoly. By
this time, however, there was a strong English Governor,
Saunders, at Fort St. David. He sent a small English
contingent to assist in the defence of Trichinopoly, and
prepared a further force to watch the progress of the
enemy advancing for its capture. The observing detach-
ment allowed itself to be badly beaten at Volconda (July
19, 1751), after which it retreated to Trichinopoly. A young
English officer, who had been acting as commissary to this
column, and was indignant at what he thought the incom-
petence with which it was handled, had occasion after the
defeat at Volconda to return to Fort St. David and make
his report to Mr. Saunders the Governor. The name of
this officer was Robert Clive.

Robert Clive was born at Styche, near Market Drayton, \
September 29, 1725, the eldest of twelve children of a
country lawyer. When three years old he was sent to
live at Hope Hall, near Manchester, with his mother’s sister,
Mrs. Bayley. His first school was at Lostocke, in Cheshire,
182 Twelve Soldiers

his next at Market Drayton, and then, after a short time at
Merchant Taylors, he went to a private school in Hertford-
shire. The record of his boyhood is one of insubordination,
fights, and escapades. In 1743 he received a nomination
as writer in the East India Company’s service and set sail
for Madras. The ship stayed nine months at Rio de
Janeiro, where Clive picked up a little Portuguese, and
reached its destination towards the close of 1744. The
young writer was poor, and without friends in the settle-
ment, and being of a proud and independent disposition
led for some time a retired and solitary life. He resented
with great spirit, but without putting himself in the wrong,
more than one attempt tosnub him. The Board in report-
ing home one of these quarrels completely exculpated
Clive, and added, “he is generally esteemed a very quiet
person and in no way guilty of disturbances.” But his high
spirits were accompanied by fits of extreme depression, and
it is said that he escaped suicide only because the pistol:
which he twice pointed at his head both times missed fire.
Governor Morse gave him access to his library and he was
for some time a constant reader. On the capture of
Madras (1746), Clive was one of those who escaped to Fort
St. David, and in 1747 he received permission to exchange
his writership for an ensign’s commission in the Company’s
military service. The commander at this time was Major
Stringer Lawrence, under whose eye Clive first, faced the
enemy. Clive also served during the abortive siege of
Pondicherry, where he distinguished himself in the repulse
of a sortie, and in 1749, during an expedition against Devi-
cota, Lawrence gave him command of the storming party,
“where,” says Lawrence, “he behaved in courage and judg-
Clive 183

ment much beyond what could have been expected from
his years.” On his return to Fort St. David he was ap-
pointed commissary of the forces, but fell ill and was sent
for a sea-trip in the Bay of Bengal. Early in 1751 he had
to equip the force sent to aid the garrison of Trichinopoly,
and then to accompany the second force sent there, which
was defeated at Volconda. Upon its defeat and retreat to
Trichinopoly Clive left it and returned to Fort St. David.
He was then sent to accompany for three days’ march a
third detachment convoying provisions to the besieged fort.
After this, in July 1751, he received a captain’s commission.
Lawrence had gone home to Europe, and the new captain’s
first duty was to march a small reinforcement from Devicota
to Trichinopoly and then to return and report to Governor
Saunders upon the state and prospects of that place.

Clive had little confidence in the officer entrusted with
the defence, and proposed to Saunders to draw off the
besiegers by a diversion. Chanda Sahib and ‘the French
had concentrated their forces before Trichinopoly. The
northern part of the Carnatic and its capital Arcot were
denuded of troops. Clive’s plan was to seize Arcot and
thereby to compel the besiegers of Trichinopoly, if not to

~ raise the siege, at least to detach from it a large part of their

force. The project had the approval of Saunders and the’ .
Board and its execution was-entrustéd to- Clive, who set off
at once to Madras, and started from there (September 6)
with 200° English soldiers, 30a, Sepoys, and three guns.
Of his eight officers four, were civilians and only two had
been under fire. Hereached Arcot, sixty-nine miles distant,
on the fiftheday, having marched the day before through a
violent storm. The place was surprised and the garrison
184 Twelve Soldiers

bolted, so that Clive found himself in possession of the fort
without having lost a man, while the population of Arcot,
100,000 souls, looked on in amazed inaction. Arcot is 180
miles from Trichinopoly, and Clive could expect a breathing
space before Chanda Sahib and the French could be upon
him. He made the most of the time, repairing and supple-
menting the fortifications and dealing offensive counter-
strokes against the enemy in his neighbourhood. During
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escaped garrison in their camp. He had sent for two 18-
pounders from Madras, and while he again marched out
twenty-seven miles to meet them and bring them in safe,
the handful of men left in the fort of Arcot repulsed an
attack. Chanda Sahib sent 3000 Sepoys and 150 French-
men to reinforce the army which his son Rezza Sahib was
collecting near Arcot. By these forces, after Clive had had
three weeks’ respite, the fort was invested. Clive promptly
Clive 185

made a sortie, in which the French gunners were driven
from their guns, so that the respect of the natives of both
sides for Clive and the English was increased. After that
for seven weeks the fort was steadily battered by the enemy.
A breach had by that time been made, and on November
25 the assault was delivered. It lasted for an hour, was
beaten off, and next day the besiegers had disappeared.
The cause of this disappearance lay outside Arcot. The
conflict between Chanda Sahib aided by Dupleix, and
Mohammed Ali supported by the English, was watched by
most of the potentates of Southern India, in particular by
the Raja of Mysore and by the Mahratta general, Morari
Rao, both of whom were waiting to see which way the wind
would blow. The seizure of Arcot revealed an unsuspected
energy in the English, and its determined defence confirmed
the favourable impression. The Mahratta chief decided to
be on Clive’s side, and the approach of his force had induced
Rezza Sahib, first to attempt the storm in order to settle the
question before the Mahratta could interfere, and when that
failed, to abandon the siege.

Rezza Sahib halted his army at Arni. After an interval
Clive, having received reinforcements from Madras and
having been joined by 1000 Mahratta horsemen, marched
out to attack Rezza Sahib in the field. When close to the
enemy, whose numbers were more than double his own,
Clive, seeing a favourable position, halted, his front covered
by a rice-swamp, his right in a village and his left in a
small wood. Rezza Sahib moved forward to attack. His
cavalry threatened both of Clive’s wings, while his infantry
tried to storm the front of the position along a causeway
leading across the swamp. Clive swept the causeway with
186 Twelve Soldiers

his guns, and when the advancing column, led by the French,
had been driven back with heavy loss, pushed a column of
British troops along the causeway to attack the enemy’s
centre where their guns were posted. This charge suc-
ceeded, and the enemy finding his centre broken retreated
in disorder. Clive pursued and the enemy’s army dispersed.
Clive then marched to Conjeveram, captured a fortified
pagoda at that place, and returned by Madras to Fort St.
David.

Meanwhile Dupleix pressed the siege of Trichinopoly,
and raised the French contingent with Chanda Sahib’s.
besieging army to a force of goo Frenchmen and 2000
French-trained Sepoys. Saunders and Clive were intent
upon the relief of the place, and Dupleix to prevent it
arranged in turn his own diversion in the north. He in-
duced Rezza Sahib to raise a fresh army, as the nucleus of
which he sent him 400 Frenchmen. With this force in the
middle of January Rezza Sahib set out to raid the districts
near Madras. Clive was charged with the counter-stroke.
He withdrew the greater part of the garrison of Arcot, and
uniting this party with a small party just landed at Madras
from Bengal, formed a force of 380 Englishmen, 1300
Sepoys, and six guns, with which he moved out to attack
the marauders. Rezza Sahibimmediately set out for Arcot
which, now that the garrison had been reduced, he hoped to
take by assault. Clive lost a couple of days pursuing on
the wrong track, but then set out by forced marches for
Arcot. The same evening (February 23-24, 1752) he
marched his force right into an ambuscade which had been
judiciously prepared for him at Coveripauk by the French
officers. Their guns were posted in a grove forming a
Clive 187

natural redoubt on the right, their infantry in a dry water-
course on the left of the road by which he was moving.
The first sign of their presence was the fire opened upon
the head of his marching column. He was fairly caught
and ought to have been beaten, but he promptly disposed
his little force for defence, communicating to his men some-
thing of his own astounding coolness, and held his ground
for several hours. By degrees he discovered that the
French battery in the grove was the key to the position.
Accordingly he sent a reconnaissance to examine the way
round it, and when he learned that it was unguarded in rear,
told off more than half of his British contingent to turn it.
He set out himself with the turning party, but finding that
his departure unsteadied his force which was holding the
road, he returned to that point and entrusted the detached
party to Lieutenant Keene. That officer judiciously recon-
noitred before striking his blow and came upon the French
rear completely unobserved, so that his first volley startled
them ; they ran from the guns and in a few minutes were
all prisoners. Thereupon the enemy's native troops ran.
Clive halted until dawn, which revealed that he had won a
decisive battle. There had been more Frenchmen than
Englishmen on the ground, more native infantry with the
French than with the English, and the enemy had 2500
cavalry while Clive had had none. The result of the
victory coming after Clive’s previous actions was to take
from the French the prestige they had reaped from the
success of Paradis at St. Thomé, and to transfer it greatly
enhanced to the English. On his return march to the
coast, Clive razed to the ground the monument erected by
Dupleix on the site of a projected town, which was to have
188 Twelve Soldiers

been called Dupleix-Futtehabad, “ The City of the Victories
of Dupleix.” ot

In his brief exercise of independent command Clive had
revealed the qualities of a great commander. The numbers
of troops engaged and the losses inflicted hardly raise
these actions above the rank of skirmishes, yet Clive’s
conduct recalls the words of Napoleon, that “the divine
part of the genius of war comprises all that flows from
moral considerations, from the character, the ability, and
the interests of the adversary, from opinion, and from the
temper of the private soldier, who is strong and victorious,
weak and defeated, according as he believes himself to be
the one or the other.”

When the young conqueror returned to Fort St. David
(March 1752) his career as a general was for the time at
an end, for his friend and superior officer, Lawrence, came
back from England and resumed the command. Clive
once more took his place as a subordinate, and proved
by the brilliant assistance which he rendered to his chiet
that his recent exploits had not shaken his sense of duty.
Towards the close of March Lawrence, accompanied by
Clive, set out for the relief of Trichinopoly. Law, the
French officer who was directing the investment, offered
a feeble resistance to the relieving column, which effected
its junction with the garrison without much difficulty.
After the junction Lawrence had the superior force of
Europeans and Sepoys, while the native army of Chanda
Sahib was fairly balanced by the Mahratta and Mysore
allies of Mohammed Ali.

Trichinopoly lies on the south bank of the Cauvery, a
large river which some distance above the town forks
Clive 189

into two branches, eventually becoming the northern and
southern streams of an extensive delta. The tongue of
land which separates them is pierced a few miles lower
down by a cross channel, so that the portion opposite
the town forms a long narrow island called Seringham.
Into this island Law withdrew his forces. Clive thereupon
at his own suggestion was sent round, with 4oo English,
700 Sepoys, and a contingent of allied cavalry, to the north
bank to drive back any French reinforcements, and eventu-
ally shut up the enemy in the island. Before Clive had
secured all the posts on the north bank which he thought
it essential to hold, he learned that a small French force was
approaching from the north as a relief or reinforcement
to Law. He marched off to intercept this party, which
retreated to Utatur, and Clive then returned to the village
of Semiaveram near to the main route from the island.
His European troops were quartered in two pagodas a
few hundred yards apart; his Sepoys in the intervening
space ; he and his officers were in a caravanserai behind
the smaller pagoda. The same night Law sent across
a party of 80 Europeans and 700 Sepoys to seize Semi-
averam, to which place he did not know that Clive
had returned. Half the Europeans were British deserters,
chosen because in the dark they would not when challenged
reveal, by replying with a foreign accent, the side to which
they belonged. The party crossed by an unguarded
passage. Clive’s sentries were deceived by the statement
of the deserters that they were bringing reinforcements
from Lawrence. Clive himself was awakened by a volley
fired into the caravanserai which killed the sentry standing
beside him. To quell what he thought a disturbance
190 Twelve Soldiers

in his camp, he immediately went to turn out his men
quartered in the pagoda close by, and then came back
to the Sepoys who were firing and whom he supposed to be
his own troops, and ordered them to cease fire. His order
was not obeyed and he received a sword-cut. Next
moment he found himself in presence of a group of French-
men who called upon him to surrender. He instantly
replied that it was for them to surrender, for they were
surrounded by his troops drawn up toattack them. Three
of the Frenchmen surrendered on the spot, the rest ran
off to find an officer and ask for orders. Clive went to the
other pagoda and turned out his men. When he came
back the French Sepoys had made off, and the French troops
and deserters had thrown themselves into the first pagoda.
Clive sent the Mahratta cavalry to chase the French
Sepoys, and waited where he was with his infantry till
daylight. The French party then began to move out of
the pagoda, but were driven back into it by a volley.
Clive went forward to offer the French commander terms.
He was weak from his wound but was held up by two of
his sergeants. One of the deserters fired a shot whith
missed Clive but killed both the sergeants. The French
then surrendered. This night adventure is a picture in
miniature of the warfare of the time in the Carnatic, All
the features are characteristic—the crowd of native troops
easily scared and ready to run like sheep; the handful of
rough, undisciplined, but brave Europeans; and in the
foreground the commanding figure of Clive, always bold,
always cool, never at a loss.

A few weeks later Clive was able to close the last
exit from the island, thus completing its investment, and -
Clive IgI

then to march off and defeat the small French relieving
force, which surrendered to him at Volconda. Soon after-
wards Law with the whole force, French and native, in the
island of Seringham surrendered to Lawrence. Chanda
Sahib, who attempted to escape before the capitulation,
fell into the hands of Lawrence’s native allies, who
quarrelled over the possession of thcir prisoner and settled
the dispute by murdering him.

Clive was in bad health and had been wounded. He
went back to Madras intending to return to Europe, but it
was thought necessary to reduce the forts at Covelong and
Chingliput, and as Lawrence remained in the south, Clive
took charge of the operation. He had but a handful
of raw recruits, who in the first brushes with the enemy ran
away as soon as they came under fire, but he made men of
them and took the forts. Soon afterwards Clive married
Margaret Maskelyne, the sister of the companion of his
escape to Fort St. David in 1746, and in March 1753

he sailed with his bride for England. hoe?

The brilliant services of Lawrence and of Clive had
saved the English cause in the Carnatic, but they were
not decisive. The French were far from crushed. The
disaster before Trichinopoly by no means exhausted the
resources of Dupleix. Though beaten in the field he
was still a power in the land. The Nizam of the Deccan
was his nominee, the creature of his Lieutenant Bussy. In
the winter of 1751-52 the Nizam had ceded to the French
a great tract of country lying to the north of Madras,
now known as the Northern Sirkars, stretching along 600
miles of sea-board and including the fort of Masulipatam.
Chanda Sahib had been appointed Nawab of the Carnatic

y

ey
192 Twelve Soldiers

on the understanding that the real ruler was to be Dupleix,
and after his death Dupleix himself was formally
appointed, though the absence of confirmation from the
court at Delhi, and the maintenance by the English of
Mohammed Ali, reduced the title to no more than a claim.
At any rate there is some basis for the view of modern
French historical geographers who hold that in the time of
Dupleix there was a French empire in India,! consisting of
the direct possession of the Carnatic, except Madras, and
of the Northern Sirkars, as well as of a sphere of influence
co-extensive with the Deccan, that is, with the greater part
of India south of the Nerbudda.

After the departure of Clive, the military contest was
continued to the close of 1753, when Lawrence crowned a
brilliant campaign by a final victory at Trichinopoly. The
French Company at home failed to understand the diplo-
matic successes of their representative, and saw only his
military failures and the financial deficit. The English East
India Company, too, was tired of hostilities carried on during
peace under the veil of assistance to native princes, and it
was agreed between London and Paris that there should
be a settlement. Dupleix was ordered to negotiate. He
insisted however on being recognized by the English at
Madras as Nawab of the Carnatic, a condition which was
impossible for them to accept, whereupon his directors,
impatient, superseded him, and in January 1755 a treaty
was signed at Pondicherry by which both sides agreed
to renounce all native dignities and to abandon all inter-
ference with native powers, while the French were to
relinquish all possessions they had acquired in excess

See map, p. 455.
Clive 193

of those belonging to the English. The treaty, however,
though it prolonged the suspension of the conflict, was
hardly carried out. Bussy remained in the Deccan, and the
French continued in possession of the Northern Sirkars.

When Clive reached home, he found himself at the age
of twenty-seven a famous man. The Directors of the East
India Company banquetted him and presented him with a
diamond-hilted sword, which, however, he accepted only on
condition that a similar gift should be bestowed upon
Lawrence. He had brought home a small fortune, and
was in a position to clear of encumbrances his father’s
estate. It was now his ambition to make a political career
at home, and in the election of 1754 he was returned in the
Sandwich interest for the Cornish borough of St. Michaels.
There was a petition against the return, and though the
committee decided in favour of Clive, the question was
settled by a vote of the House, and as the Government
used its majority against him, he was unseated. He had
spent money freely,and was livingasa richman. The end
of his fortune was beginning to be visible, and he deter-
mined to return to the East.

At this time, the dispute between the French and the
English, arising out of the French claims to the Ohio
valley, was passing out of the stage in which a diplomatic
settlement was possible. The year 1754 is that of Wash-
ington’s abortive expedition against Fort Duquesne. In
view of the prospect of war, Clive’s application for employ-
ment was welcome to the East India Company, whose
Directors obtained for him a commission as lieutenant-
colonel in the King’s army, and appointed him Governor of

Fort St. David. He was instructed to proceed in the first
0
194 Twelve Soldiers

instance to Bombay, and there to organize an attack upon
the French in the Deccan.

Upon his arrival at Bombay in November 1755, he found
that an expedition into the Deccan was precluded by the
terms of the treaty of Pondicherry. The Government of
Bombay took advantage of his presence, especially as he
had brought with him troops from England, and of that of
a squadron under Admiral Watson, to arrange for an
attack upon the pirate chief Angria, the head of a clan of
rovers, who had established a formidable power in the coast
district to the north of Goa. Angria’s great stronghold
was at a fort called Gheria, commanding the harbour of
Viziadrug. The place was blockaded on the land side by
the Mahratta allies of the English. Clive and Watson
appeared before it in February 1756, landed troops,
bombarded the fort from the ships, and divided the plunder,
about £120,000, among the officers and men of the two
services. There was a dispute about the shares, in which
Clive and Watson were equally determined in maintaining
the rights of the army and navy respectively, and equally
generous as regards their personal interests. The fleet
then proceeded to the east coast, reaching Fort St. David
in the middle of May.

( In the Carnatic the treaty of Pondicherry had failed to
allay the disputes between the French and the English.
Bussy still exercised a controlling influence in the Deccan,
and the English were intent upon supplanting him, and
upon the expulsion of the French from the Northern
Sirkars. Their plans were upset by the news of a disaster
in Bengal. :

The richest district which had owned allegiance to the
, Clive 195

Mogul emperors was the Subah or Vice-Royalty, compris-
ing the three provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa.
Early in the century a strong Viceroy had made himself
Practically independent, by acquiring for himself, not
merely the executive authority with the title of Nawab,
but also the office of Diwan, or finance minister, a post
which in the Mogul system was usually distinct from that
of the Executive Governor. The extensive powers of
this Nawab became hereditary, and passed after some
time into the hands of a clever usurper, Ali Verdi Khan,
whose chief difficulty had been to resist or prevent the
inroads of the Mahrattas from Nagpore, which had caused
the English to surround their settlement at Calcutta with
a bank and a trench known as the Mahratta ditch. About
1750 the Nawab bought off the Mahrattas, by ceding to
them the greater part of Orissa, and in 1756 he died, and
left as his successor his grand-nephew, Suraj-ud-Dowla, a
profligate and vindictive youth of nineteen. Some trifling
dispute embittered Suraj-ud-Dowla against the English,
and in the summer of 1756 he seized the English residents
at Cossim Bazar, and marched with a large army from his
capital Murshedabad to Calcutta, which was poorly de-
fended and eventually taken. One hundred and forty-
six English prisoners were crushed for the night into a
small room called the Black Hole, from which next
morning only twenty-three came out alive. The news
that Suraj-ud-Dowla was marching against Calcutta
reached Madras on July 15, and three days later Major
Kilpatrick, with 250 European troops, sailed for Bengal,
where they landed at Fulta at the beginning of August,
and were joined by the refugees from Calcutta, among
196 Twelve Soldiers

them Mr. Drake the Governor, whose retreat to the ships
during the Nawab’s attack on the town and fort had been
by no means creditable. On August 5 the English at
Madras heard of the fall of Calcutta and of the outrage of
the Black Hole. The authorities with great spirit resolved,
at the risk of weakening themselves in their impending
conflict with the French, to send the strongest possible
force to the relief of their countrymen in Bengal. Admiral
Watson agreed to take his squadron, and a military
force of 900 Europeans and 1500 Sepoys was put
under the command of Clive, who was instructed, while
acknowledging Mr. Drake’s authority in civil and com-
mercial business, to retain complete military and political
control of the expedition and to take charge of the
funds for its supply. There was no supreme authority
in Madras, so that the plan and the preparations alike
involved negotiations.

It was October 10 before the fleet sailed. The weather
was bad and the entrance to the Hooghly difficult.
Not until the middle of December did the expedition
reach Fulta, where the emaciated survivors of Kilpatrick’s
force and of the refugees were picked up. A day or two
later operations began by an attack on the Fort of Budge-
Budge. At Watson’s suggestion, though against his own
judgment, Clive landed the bulk of his force a few miles
below the fort, and marched by a circuitous route to a
point on the road from Budge-Budge to Calcutta. Here he
was surprised by a superior force of the enemy. His never-
failing coolness enabled him to keep his men in hand, to
show a firm front, and to make a counter attack, where-
upon the enemy retired. Meanwhile the fleet bombarded
Clive 197

the fort, which, as the enemy was evacuating it, was
entered by a drunken sailor, followed first by some of his
comrades, and then by the party told off for the storm.
The fleet pushed on to Calcutta, followed by the troops.
No serious resistance was made, but the arrangements for
the occupation led to a dispute between Clive and Watson
over the right to appoint a commandant of the fort. It
, was compromised by the keys being entrusted to Drake,
the restored Governor. A week later, a small naval and
military force was sent up the river to the town of Hooghly,
which was taken.

The Nawab set out from Murshedabad witha large army
to recover Calcutta. Clive entrenched his force close to
the river, about a mile above the town. On February 3
the Nawab’s army passed this position, and occupied
the outskirts of Calcutta. During the night, Clive
persuaded the Admiral to lend him 600 sailors, and
in the early morning set out with about.1300 Europeans
and 600 Sepoys, intending to seize first the enemy’s guns,
and then the Nawab himself. The plan was frustrated
by a dense Bengal fog in which the. column lost its
way. The Nawab’s army occupied the north-east corner
of Calcutta, within and without the Mahratta ditch. In
the fog Clive forced his way through that portion of
the enemy’s force which lay outside the ditch, and con-
tinued his march parallel with the ditch, until he reached
a road leading through the town to the fort, where he
arrived about noon, having lost 174 men killed and
wounded. His column had repulsed two cavalry charges
and silenced a battery which had tried to put a stop to
its march, but the troops reached the fort with a sense of
198 Twelve Soldiers

confusion and failure. Clive, however, rightly divined that
the enemy’s loss had been greater than his own, and
opened negotiations with the Nawab in the high tone of
a victor. The Nawab was very much frightened, retreated,
and a few days later signed a treaty, by which, while he
renewed and increased the privileges of the English, he
promised to restore his share of the plunder of Calcutta.
v- More dangerous perhaps than the Nawab were the
French at Chandernagore, for it was known in Calcutta
that war between France and England had begun, and
M. Law, who had fought against Clive at Trichinopoly,
was now in Bengal, with a party of French troops, for the
assistance of the Nawab against the English. For some
weeks the English authorities were paralyzed by divided
councils. Drake and his committee of three had the
authority of their appointment by the Company. Clive
had the powers given him by the Madras authorities,
together with the military command. Watson having the
highest rank, and that in the King’s service, considered
himself the representative of the King’s government, and
of rights and interests greater than the Company’s. Early
in March an official notification of the war with France,
and the arrival of three men-of-war in the Hooghly, decided
Watson in favour of an attack upon the French settlement.
This put an end to the difficulties, and the Nawab’s pro-
hibition. of any such attack was ignored. Clive and
‘Watson with their joint forces invested Chandernagore,
which after a gallant defence surrendered on March 24.
There had been no stand-up fight with Suraj-ud-Dowla,
and in spite of the treaty, it was clear that his animosity
to the English was undiminished, and that there was no
Clive 199

limit to his duplicity. The successor of an usurper, he
was an incapable debauchee, and beyond measure cruel
and oppressive to his subjects. His own chief officers
plotted for his deposition, and made overtures to the
English authorities for the support of their plans. Clive
and the Council were not slow to perceive the advantage
which they would gain from helping a revolution, which
would probably take place whether they interfered or not.
Their support, if the plot succeeded, would make the new
Nawab their ally if not their dependent. After protracted
negotiations, in which Clive took a leading part, it was
decided that the new Nawab should be Mir Jafar Khan,
the commander-in-chief of Suraj-ud-Dowla’s army. He
was to be supported in the overthrow of his master by the
two officials next in importance to himself, and by the
great native banking-houses of Murshedabad, and in
return for the support of the English was to pay
10,000,000 rupees to the Company, and to distribute
further millions among the English officials and officers
who were privy to the plot. Until all was ready, the
Nawab’s suspicions were to be allayed by unlimited assur-
ances of good-will and fidelity. Among the native agents
in the negotiations was a banker named Omichund, who,
at the critical moment, threatened to betray everything to
Suraj-ud-Dowla unless he were promised an enormous sum
of money, according to some accounts as much as
2,000,000 sterling, the promise to be guaranteed by its
insertion in the contract or treaty between the English
officials and Mir Jafar. The Council at Calcutta proceeded
to consider “how to deceive Omichund, and prevent the
disclosure of the whole project,’ and adopted a method
200 Twelve Soldiers

suggested by Clive. Two copies of the treaty were
written out, one of which contained, and the other omitted,
the stipulation upon which Omichund insisted, it being
understood that the original and only valid treaty was
the one without this clause. Both were duly signed, and
when Watson refused to put his name to the bogus paper,
the Admiral’s signature was forged by Clive’s orders.
Omichund, when his agent had seen the treaty, was satisfied,
but of course it was only the bogus that had been shown.
The Nawab’s commanders now urged him to destroy the
pestilent English, the English adopted a more hostile tone
towards him, and while he marched south from Mursheda-
bad, Clive marched north from Chandernagore to meet
him.

Clive’s road ran for eighty or ninety miles along the
right bank of the river Hooghly, which is called in its upper
course the Bagirathi. Near Cutwa it was necessary to
cross the river and follow a road up the left bank. On
June 17 Clive was near the crossing and sent Major Coote
to seize Cutwa. During the next day or two, reports were
received which threw a doubt upon the intentions of Mir
Jafar and his colleagues in the Nawab’s camp. These
men were traitors to their master; they might be playing
a double game and be simply luring the English to de-
struction. Clive’s force consisted of about 1000 European
and 2000 native troops and ten field-guns. He was
several marches distant from his base and from all possi-
bility of support. If he should once cross the river, defeat
must be disastrous, for there would be no road by which
he could retreat. The Nawab’s force was estimated at
35,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry, and forty guns. If its
Clive 201

commanders did their duty, there was every probability
that Clive’s small army would be destroyed, after which
the English would certainly be expelled from Bengal.
These were the issues which Clive was weighing in his

 

      
   
 

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mind, when on June 21 he called a Council of War, where
he put the question, “Whether under existing circum-
stances, and without other assistance, it would be prudent
to cross the river and come to action with the Nawab,
202 Twelve Soldiers

or whether they should fortify themselves at Cutwa, and
wait till the monsoon was over, when the Mahrattas or
some other country power might be induced to join them.”

Clive first gave his own opinion in favour of waiting.
Twelve officers expressed the same view. Major Eyre
Coote expressed a very decided opinion in favour of
prompt action. He urged that hesitation would annihilate
the moral advantage of the previous English successes,
and that considerations of supply would prevent the force
remaining where it was and compel a retreat. Six officers
voted with Coote. When the Council was over, Clive
spent some time alone deliberating with himself. <A letter
from Mir Jafar reassured him. He went back to camp,
told Coote he was going to attack, and issued orders for
the crossing of the river in the morning. Next afternoon
the whole force was on the other bank, and an hour after
midnight, after a fifteen miles’ march through flooded
country, halted for the night in the mango grove of Plassey,
where they could hear the drums in the Nawab’s camp
a mile further on.

Close to the grove, and on the river’s bank, was a hunting-
box belonging to the Nawab. It was occupied by some
of Clive’s men, and from here in the morning Clive sur-
veyed the field. The mango grove, half-a-mile long and
three hundred yards wide, had a good bank round it and
formed a ready-made redoubt. A mile to the front was
the Nawab’s entrenchment, starting at right angles to the
river, then bending back a little and stretching away for
two or three miles inland. By the river, about half-way
between the two camps, was a mound formed by the banks
of a small tank or reservoir, and between that and the
Clive 203

Nawab’s entrenchment was a smaller mound. Early in
the morning the Nawab’s army moved out. A handful
of Frenchmen under St. Frais took position at the tank,
with a picked force of 5000 horse and 7000 foot behind
them by the river. The rest of the army, in three great
divisions, came out of the entrenchment and made a great
wheel to its right, its line being curved like a sickle and

| Battle of Plassey 23" Sune 1757,
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threatening to enclose in its forward sweep Clive’s small
army. Each division had its share of heavy guns mounted
on platforms, which were dragged by oxen in front and
pushed by elephants behind. These three divisions were
commanded by the three traitors, the one on the left
nearest to Clive being Mir Jafar, but this until after the
battle Clive could only guess. He drew up his force in
204 Twelve Soldiers

front of the grove at right angles to the river, with the left
near the hunting-box. About six o'clock the enemy
began a cannonade from all their artillery, to which Clive’s
artillery replied. After a couple of hours Clive, finding
that some thirty of his men had been knocked over, moved
back the bulk of his force into the shelter given by the
natural redoubt of the grove. His own guns had probably
done more execution than those of the enemy, but he
seems to have been in doubt as to the part which the three
traitor generals were playing. The backward movement
was followed by a short advance of the enemy, and an
increase of their fire, which however did little harm as the
English were now protected. Shortly before noon Clive
assembled his chief officers, and explained his decision to
wait where he was till midnight, and then to move forward
and attack the Nawab’s camp. About noon there was
a heavy shower of rain, after which the enemy’s fire
slackened because their powder was wet, and the English
ceased fire because their plan was to wait. When the
rain stopped, the enemy’s horse near the river moved for-
ward to charge, but they were received with an effective
fire, and their leader, Mir Mudin, the only true man among
the Nawab’s generals, was killed: The charge came to
nothing and the cavalry retired.

About this time Clive, satisfied with his plan and con-
vinced that no dangerous attack was likely, lay down for a
sleep in the hunting-box. About the same time Suraj-
ud-Dowla, very much frightened by the news of Mir Mudin’s
death, sent for two of his other commanders in turn, and in
the most abject fashion implored them to stand by him in
his hour of need. The first, Mir Jafar promised to be true
Clive 205

and staunch, and immediately after the audience wrote a
note to Clive telling him to push on at once, for now was
his time! The second told the Nawab that his army was
giving way, that the English were pushing on, and that the
battle-field was not a safe place. This completed Suraj-
ud-Dowla’s panic. He sent for his best dromedary, and
with his body-guard of 2000 horse rode off as fast as he
could to Murshedabad, leaving orders for his army to come
back inside the entrenched line. The consequence was,
that while Mir Jafar’s division moved south to be nearer
to the English, the bulk of the Nawab’s army moved north-
wards away from them, leaving St. Frais with his French-
men alone on the mound. Thereupon Major Kilpatrick
moved forward with two companies to attack St. Frais,
and sent a messenger to awaken Clive. Clive came out
very angry with Kilpatrick, but quickly took in the situa-
tion, and led on the two companies himself, sending back
Kilpatrick for more. Meanwhile the English officers on
the right, not understanding Mir Jafar’s advance, threw
out a party to check it, with the result that Mir Jafar
moved slowly inland away from the English and away
from the Nawab’s army. On Clive’s advance, St. Frais,
seeing the retreat in his rear, fell back from his mound to
the entrenchment. Clive pushed on, and opened fire with
his guns against the Nawab’s camp behind the entrench-
ment, and so soon as Mir Jafar’s retreat convinced him
that there was nothing to fear from that quarter, prepared
to storm the point held by the French. But as the Nawab’s
army had continued its retreat, the French found themselves
deserted, and had no reason to sacrifice themselves for

1 This note did not reach Clive until the whole action was over.
206 Twelve Soldiers

nothing. They followed the fugitive army. It was about
five o'clock, and the Nawab’s army was in full flight when
Clive received a message from Mir Jafar. He at once sent
word that he would meet him next day at Daudpore, some
miles further in the direction of Murshedabad, and im-
mediately afterwards sent on Coote with a small force to
pursue the retreating army. That night Clive’s little army
bivouacked at Daudpore. Major Coote was sent in pursuit
of Law and his Frenchmen, and eventually drove them into
Oudh.

In his diary of the campaign of 1792, written twenty

years after the event, Goethe represents himself as having
said to his comrades round the camp-fire on the evening
of the cannonade of Valmy, “ From here and from to-day
begins a new epoch of history.” Twenty years after Plassey,
a man might well have imagined that he had said some-
‘thing of the same kind in the camp at Daudpore, on the
night of June 23,1757. Neither event is properly called
a decisive battle. The fate of Europe was determined in
1792 by the Duke of Brunswick’s refusal to attack the
French. The fate of India was determined in 1757 by
the treachery of the Nawab’s generals, which made it
impossible for his army to fight.

The day after the battle Mir Jafar was recognized by
Clive as Subahdar of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, and a few
days later was installed at Murshedabad. The fugitive
Suraj-ud-Dowla was arrested, imprisoned, and opportunely
murdered by his native enemies. Clive and the other
British members of the conspiracy received from Mir Jafar
the large payments agreed upon together with very large
money presents; the Company had all its privileges con-
Clive’ 207

firmed, and was presented with all the lands south of
Calcutta subject to an annual rent. It soon became evident
to both sides, that Mir Jafar not only owed his position to
the English and in particular to Clive, but that without the
help of the English and of Clive he could not retain it. It
became evident, too, to the Company’s officials at Calcutta,
that to Clive they owed their restoration and exaltation.
In June 1758 a new constitution, framed by the Company
in London for the administration of their affairs in Bengal,
reached Calcutta. The men on the spot had the good
sense to set it aside, and to appoint Clive president of the |
settlement.

At this time the presence of Lally in Southern India
renewed the difficulties of the English at Madras, Lally
had landed at Pondicherry with large reinforcements in
April 1758. He took Fort St. David, and during the
winter of 1758-59 besieged Madras. To strengthen himself
he had recalled Bussy from the Northern Sirkars, and Clive
now played on a larger scale his old game of counter-stroke.
He sent Colonel Forde, with 500 Europeans and 2000
Sepoys, to expel froin the Northern Sirkars the French,
who, after Bussy’s recall, were commanded by Conflans.
Forde made a good campaign, beat and drove out the
French, and when the Nizam appeared on the scene, in-
duced him to cede the Sirkars to the English.

Meanwhile, Mir Jafar was threatened on his northern
frontier with an invasion undertaken by the Nawab of
Oudh in support of a son of the Mogul emperor, who,
against the authority of his father, laid claim to the throne
of Suraj-ud-Dowla. Mir Jafar appealed to Clive, and Clive,
in the spring of 1759, marched up with a small force, 450
208 Twelve Soldiers

Europeans and 2500 Sepoys, to Murshedabad and Patna.
His appearance was enough. The Nawab of Oudh
retired, and the Mogul pretender disappeared. Mir Jafar
showed his gratitude by presenting to Clive, in perpetuity,
the rent due from the Company for its lands south of
Calcutta. This rent was the jaghir which the Directors
afterwards tried to appropriate to the Company.

On his return to Calcutta in the autumn, Clive had to
face a new danger in the shape of a Dutch invasion. The
Dutch settlers at Chinsurah, north of Chandernagore, re-
sented the special privileges which the English had extorted
from Mir Jafar. A strong Dutch fleet entered the Hooghly,
and the Dutch authorities intrigued with Mir Jafar, who
chafed against the tight rein kept on him by the English.
The Dutch sent in a formal demand for the redress of their
grievances, of which the most important was that the
English claimed a right to search every vessel passing up
the Hooghly. Clive replied that in these matters the
English were the agents of the Nawab, who was the agent

of the Mogul Emperor. The Dutch Commander’s retort
was to seize such British vessels as he found at Fulta. This
action relieved Clive of the responsibility of commencing
hostilities against a nation with which Great Britain was
at peace. Forde had just brought back his troops from
the Northern Sirkars, and Clive resolved to settle with the
Dutch before Mir Jafar could take their side. The Dutch,
with seven men-of-war, sailed up the river and landed 1500
men (700 Europeans) near Calcutta, on the opposite bank
of the river. Clive had already sent Forde across the river
to deal with the Dutch troops, and now ordered Commodore
Wilson, who had three East Indiamen, to fight the Dutch
Clive 209

fleet. Wilson in a two hours’ fight completely defeated
the seven Dutch ships, of which only one escaped, to be
taken a few days after by British men-of-war at the mouth
of the Hooghly. Forde marched north, and found himself
between the Dutch column landed from the ships and the
garrison of Chinsurah, which moved out to meet him. He
easily defeated the garrison, and next day sent a note to
Clive, asking whether with his 1200 men he should risk a
battle with the Dutch 1500. Clive received the note at
the whist-table, and wrote across it in pencil, “ Dear Forde,
Fight them immediately. I will send you the order in
Council to-morrow.” Next day, November 25, Forde at
Biderra completely defeated the Dutch, of whom 320 were
killed, 300 wounded, and about 600 taken prisoners.

After this it might well seem to Clive that the position
of his countrymen in Bengal was secure. He had become
immensely rich, and being only thirty-five years old, might
think that his brilliant Indian career was but a beginning
to be followed by greater achievements in a wider field.
In 1760 he returned home, leaving Calcutta in February
and reaching London about October. His wealth had not
impaired his generosity, for he not only made a handsome
provision for his parents, but settled on his old commander
and comrade, Stringer Lawrence, an income of £500 a year.
Pitt had called Clive a “heaven-born general,” and the
King had said of a young officer, who proposed to go to
Germany to learn the art of war, “If he wants to learn the
art of war let him go to Clive.” But Clive was to find, as
many a great man after him has found, that to the British
public, India is a long way off ; and that the importance of

services rendered to this country, diminishes in the public
P
210 Twelve Soldiers

eye with the square of the distance. His reward for found-
ing an Empire was an Irish peerage. He entered Parlia-
ment only to find himself a supporter of Pitt when Pitt
was intrigued out of power. To the East India Company
he had given grave offence by a despatch to Pitt (dated
January 7, 1759), in which he had advocated the extension
and consolidation of the English power in India, and had
suggested for that purpose the transfer of authority from
the East India Company to the Crown. Accordingly, he
found on the Board of Directors a strong feeling against
him, which was inflamed by the friends of-all the incapables
whom his strong hand at Calcutta had disturbed. He was
for a time deprived of his jaghir. But the incapables whom
he had left behind unconsciously worked in his favour.
Having squeezed the last rupee out of Mir Jafar, the
Council at Calcutta allowed themselves to be bribed into
deposing that prince, and set up in his place his son-in-
law, Mir Cassim, who soon afterwards raised a new army,
and attempted to renew the exploit of Suraj-ud-Dowla
and expel the English, Though he was defeated and
crushed at Buxar by Hector Munro, the news of his
advance sufficed to induce the East India Company to
send out Clive again, this time as Governor-General and
Commander-in-Chief of Bengal. The appointment was
made in March 1764.

In April 1765 Clive landed at Calcutta. By that time
the fighting was over, and Clive’s work as Governor-General
was destined to be administrative and political rather than
military. He found the Company’s services disorganized
and corrupt. With a firm hand he suppressed a mutiny
among the officers of the Company’s army, and restored
Clive 211

authority and discipline. He went as far as the Company
would allow him in putting a stop to corrupt practices in
the Civil Service. The Directors and the public at home
were strongly prejudiced against the extension of the
Company’s territory and political authority. Clive there-
fore set his face against interference between the native
powers outside the limits within which the Company had
established its influence, comprising the provinces of Bengal,
Behar, Orissa and the Northern Sirkars, together with Oudh,
which had been conquered by Munro during his absence.
His plan was to hold these provinces under grants from the
Mogul Padishah, maintaining a puppet Nawab at Murshe-
dabad, and another at Lucknow. But while he thus veiled
the real authority of the Company from the eyes of the
public at home, he increased it in regard to Bengal, Behar
and Orissa, by compelling the Nawab, who was put ona
fixed allowance, to cede to the Company the function of
Diwan, or financial administrator.

In January 1767 Clive once more embarked for England.
On his return, instead of honour and repose, he found cen-
sure and calumny awaiting him. His energetic purification
of the Company’s service had multiplied the number of his
enemies, and for the next five years his energies were over-
taxed, and his broken health shattered by an unflinching
resistance to the attacks of his enemies. At length, in
May 1773, a long parliamentary inquiry and debate upon
his conduct ended in a vote which recorded that “he has
rendered great and meritorious services to his country.” He
had won his last fight. But the effort had been too much for
him, the fitsof depression to which he had always been subject
recurred, and in November 1774 he committed suicide.
212 Twelve Soldiers

It is the mark of a great man that he discovers in a
world, which to his fellows seems confused and common-
place, a series of tasks to the performance of which his life
is given. When afterwards the series is summed up, it
seems to form a consecutive process marking the central
or guiding line of some department of human action. For
each of Clive’s acts a counterpart may be found in similar
exploits by one or other of his contemporaries, but the
whole series has a unity and a continuity that reveal an
idea and a purpose. The full scope of this idea and of
this purpose was first made plain to the world when a later
generation of his countrymen perceived that there had
grown up a British Empire in India, and that he was its
founder.
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Q

 
COOTE?
1726—1783

ONE of the most distinguished soldiers of his time, Sir
Eyre Coote, is conspicuous among the makers of British
India. The victor of Wandewash and Porto Novo, the
capable lieutenant of Clive and the trusted friend of Hast-
ings, has had scant justice done to him in the pages of
history. A wide interval of time divides the epochs of his
most notable exploits. His great physical and mental
powers were at their prime when he overcame the un-
fortunate Lally ; enfeebled by age and wearied by disease,
he relieved the devastated Carnatic from the greatest
leader of native levies the British had ever encountered,

Little is known of his early life. The youngest son of
a clergyman, he was born in the county of Limerick in
1726. His father, the Reverend Chidley Coote, was a
direct descendant of Sir Charles Coote, who was made
Provost-Marshal of Connaught by James I., and created
the premier Irish baronet. Obtaining his commission at
an early age, Eyre Coote served as an-ensign in the 27th
Regiment in the rebellion of 1745, and was present at the
Battle of Falkirk.

Some years later he was gazetted to a captaincy in the
39th, a regiment which sailed for Madras in 1754, and
thereby acquired the proud motto, “ Primus in Indis.”

1 Coote’s operations may be followed on the sketches of the Carnatic

and of Bengal given in the life of Clive.
213
214 Twelve Soldiers

The news of the capture of Calcutta by Suraj-ud-Dowla,
and of the barbarous treatment of the European captives,
reached Fort St. George in August 1756. A deep feeling
of anger and resentment rose in every mind ; the deaths of
their countrymen had to be revenged, and the treacherous
ruler of Bengal punished.

The English and French military forces in the Carnatic
were at this time nearly equal in numbers, and a renewal
of hostilities might at any moment be expected. It was
known, moreover, that a formidable expedition, avowedly
destined for Pondicherry, was being prepared at Brest.
Fortunately the English fleet held command of the sea,
and it seemed possible that troops despatched to Bengal
might fulfil their task and return to the Madras Presidency
before the French reinforcements arrived. After a lengthy
debate, the Madras Council decided that a well-equipped
force of 900 Europeans and 1500 Sepoys, under the com-
mand of Colonel Clive, should be embarked forthwith, and
be convoyed to the Ganges by the squadron of Admiral
Watson. Three companies of the 39th Regiment formed
part of the force, and of one of these Captain Coote was
in command. Delayed by adverse winds, the expedition
did not reach the mouth of the Hooghly till the close of
the year.

The first object of attack was the fort of Budge-Budge. It
was arranged that the men-of-war should cannonade it from
the river, while the troops, making a detour by land, would
cut off the retreat of the garrison. The Admiral’s ship,
out-sailing the others, anchored abreast of the fort, and by
a heavy fire silenced its guns and effected a breach in the
rampart. Clive, after a trying night march, was surprised
Coote 215

by a force from Calcutta, but, beating it off, encamped the
following evening on the river-bank above the fort.

The troops were buried in slumber, when the stillness of
the night was broken by loud shouts and musketry-fire.
Some sailors in high spirits had strolled out in the moon-
light to look at the fort. One of them, named Straghan,
seeing the breach made by the ship’s guns, could not resist
the inclination to ascend it. On reaching the top, he found
a party of the garrison sitting together smoking. Firing
his pistol amongst them, he rushed forward, waving his
cutlass and shouting, “ The place is mine.” The astounded
guard endeavoured to seize him, but the sailor defended
himself gallantly till his comrades came to his assistance.
The nearest troops now rushed to join in the fray, and the
surprised garrison fled in disorder. Taxed next morning
by the Admiral with his drunken conduct, Straghan could
only reply, “ Why, to be sure, sir, it was J that took the
fort, but I hope there was no harm in it.” On being re-
buked, and threatened with punishment, the unabashed
sailor was heard to mutter, “ Well, if I am flogged for this
‘ere action, I will never take another fort for them by
myself so long as I live.”

The further advance up the river met with no resistance,
and Calcutta once more fell into English hands. In the
daring surprise of the Nawab’s camp, and the consequent
capture of the French settlement at Chandernagore, the
King’s troops especially distinguished themselves, and
Coote, for his services, was promoted to the local rank of
major. The British army of 3000 men, which had now
to contend for the sovereignty of Bengal with a force of
twenty times its strength, started northward in the middle
216 Twelve Soldiers

of June 1757. After a few short marches, Coote, detached
in advance, captured the town and fort of Cutwa, which
formed a serviceable depdt for supplies.

In front of the British lines was a broad river swollen by
recent rains. On the further bank, a day’s march up-
stream, stood the entrenched camp of the enemy, defended
by over 50,000 men, and fifty-three guns. The chief
generals of the Subahdar had been bought over by
Clive, but it was difficult to forecast the effect of their
treachery on the day of battle. To cross the river and
risk defeat was extremely hazardous; to retreat on
Calcutta meant the loss of Bengal. Shrinking from the
responsibility of making a decision, Clive called the only
council of war he ever held. The majority of the officers,
including himself, voted for delay and against immediate
action, Coote, with the rare foresight and capacity for
command that afterwards signalized his career, protested
strongly against the decision. In curt and vigorous
language he pointed out that the army had hitherto been
uniformly successful, that delay meant not only loss of spirit
and prestige, but would give time for the French leader
Law to join the enemy. In any case, half-measures were
a mistake. If the army was not going to fight, it should
retreat on Calcutta, and the disgrace and disaster conse-
quent on such a movement were obvious. The soundness
of the views so forcibly urged caused Clive, after deep
reflection, to disregard the opinion of the council. On
meeting Coote some hour after the officers had separated,
he informed him of his change of mind, and that he
intended to fight. Clive and Coote were the master-spirits
of the army, and on their shoulders must rest the credit of
Coote B17

the decision which had such far-reaching consequences.
The river was crossed on June 22, and on the following
day the victory of Plassey laid the foundation of the British
Empire in India.

The fall of Suraj-ud-Dowla, and the installation of Mir
Jafar as the new Subahdar, led to an era of great pros-
perity in the Bengal settlement. Trade revived, and
Calcutta was once more the centre of power and wealth.
One danger alone remained. M. Law, with the refugees
from the French factories, having lost their ally, retired up
country, and would always be a source of disquietude to
the ruling power. A strong detachment, under the com-
mand of Coote, was sent in pursuit, but the French moved
too quickly to be caught up, and eventually found shelter
in Oudh. Although the expedition was not successful, the
management of it reflects the greatest credit on its leader.
With boats wretchedly manned and equipped, and a
mutinous soldiery, he traversed some 400 miles of an
almost unknown country in the most unhealthy and trying
season of the year. Enfeebled by fever after his great
exertions, Coote returned to England at the close of 1757,
and a year later he was gazetted Colonel of the 84th
Regiment, which was newly raised for service in India.

While Coote was recruiting his health in England, the
struggle for supremacy in Southern India between the
English and French East India Companies was carried on
with varying success. The arrival from Europe in April
1758 of M. Lally with 1100 men and a powerful armament,
turned the balance of power in the French favour. The
troops landed at Pondicherry captured Cuddalore without
difficulty, and proceeded to lay siege to Fort St. David,
218 Twelve Soldiers

the strongest place of arms in the British possessions. The
garrison, insufficiently supplied with ammunition, and
weakly commanded, held out for some time in expectation
of relief by the fleet, but, as not a sail appeared, were
obliged to surrender. Further disasters and the loss of the
Carnatic seemed imminent. The English, in the greatest
alarm, abandoned all the forts in the interior with the
exception of Trichinopoly, and withdrew their garrisons
to Madras. An appeal was sent to Bengal for help, and
the greatest energy displayed in strengthening the defences
of the Presidency town, To crush the English power by
the reduction of Madras was a measure of prime import-
ance, The French, however, had neither the money, the
supplies, nor the transport necessary for such an operation.
In the hope of relieving their immediate wants, an expedi-
tion was undertaken to Tanjore, one of the richest provinces
of Southern India. The intemperate treatment of the
natives by Lally, and his ignorance of the customs of the
country, reduced the troops to the direst extremities. The
plundering of the towns and temples enraged the populace,
and scarcity and distress prevailed in every camp. The
guns for the siege of Tanjore had finally to be abandoned,
and the hungry and indignant soldiery had to retreat to
the coast, dependent on the meagre sustenance of the
cocoa-nuts and wild fruits that grew by the road-side.
Meanwhile an indecisive battle took place between the
English and French fleets, and a few days after the return
of the army to Pondicherry, Admiral d’Aché set sail with
his ships for the Mauritius.

Matters were little improved in September by the capture
of Arcot and the minor forts abandoned by the English,
Coote 219

and Lally with his troops again returned to his head-quarters,
a prey to chagrin and disappointment.

M. Bussy, who had been recalled from his mission in
the Deccan, now joined the forces, and was made second in
command.

The resources of Pondicherry were unequal to the further
support of the army. It was better to take the field than
to perish with hunger. A sum of money was raised by
voluntary loans, and Lally marched northwards on Madras,
to pillage the Black Town and devastate the adjoining
country. At the close of the year the English were
invested in their last stronghold. The advent of a French
frigate with money and supplies encouraged Lally to
commence regular siege operations, which were carried on
with great skill and vigour. An effective breach was
made in the fortifications of Fort St. George, and orders
given for the assault, when the English fleet with rein-
forcements arrived in the Madras Roads. “Words,” says
Lally, “are inadequate to express the effect which the
appearance of the ships produced. The officers who com-
manded in the trenches deemed it even inexpedient to wait
for the landing of the enemy, and two hours before re-
ceiving orders retired from their posts.” The siege was
raised, and the French army hurriedly retired on Conjeve-
ram, where it took up a strongly-entrenched position.

Eager to recover their lost province, the English with
a well-equipped force followed the enemy. But Lally, in
spite of his recent discomfiture, was a formidable foe, and
presented a bold front. By a feint against Wandewash
Major Brereton induced the French to leave their lines,
and captured Conjeveram in their absence. No other
220 Twelve Soldiers

operations of importance took place, and the armies re-
mained facing each other on the Palaur till the rainy
season put an end to hostilities. The opposing forces
were so equally matched that neither cared to risk the
disastrous consequences of a defeat. The French, terribly
distressed through lack of money and supplies, were con-
strained to await attack. The Company’s troops, in con-
stant expectation of reinforcement, could not afford to risk
a premature movement.

With a mutinous soldiery and an empty treasure-chest,
Lally was helpless. From the sea alone could come relief.
The long-expected squadron of M. D’Aché arrived on the
coast in September 1759, but was at once attacked by the
British fleet. The battle was indecisive, and though greatly
crippled, the French ships were able to anchor in the Pondi-
cherry Roads. After supplying Lally with money and
landing some marines, the Admiral made the startling
announcement that he was obliged to leave the coast.
In spite of the urgent remonstrances of the Government,
the fleet again started for the Mauritius, and left the English
undisputed masters of the sea.

The rains having ceased, Major Brereton, who had
received a welcome reinforcement of Europeans, decided
to make a dash for Wandewash. The French garrison
was, however, on its guard, and the attack was beaten off
with heavy loss. The English retired to their cantonments
at Conjeveram. The fortunes of the French in India were
now at alow ebb. More than a year’s pay was due to the
troops, and scanty fare with rigorous discipline led to an
open mutiny, that was with difficulty quelled.

Lally, unable any longer to subsist his large force, sent
Coote 221

a portion of it to Seringham near Trichinopoly, while the
remainder were scattered in detachments near Arcot and
Wandewash.

Such was the position of affairs in October 1759, when
Colonel Coote, with his regiment, arrived in Madras and
took command of the British forces. There was some
little delay in equipping the newly-arrived reinforcements,
but in November the whole army was assembled at
Conjeveram.

Coote was now in the prime of manhood. Tall and
erect, with stalwart, sinewy frame, he looked every inch
a soldier, A quick, vigorous intellect was combined with
a cool, calculating spirit. Under the most trying difficulties
he preserved an equable calmness that inspired confidence.
Fertile in expedient, he was never rash, or overrated the
powers he wielded. A rigid disciplinarian, he added tact
to firmness, and his innate kindness and consideration for
others gained him a real affection from those he led. A
soldier more than a statesman, he had little patience with
the subtle intrigues of diplomacy, but in the angry discus-
sions of the Cabinet he never made an enemy. Masterful,
like Clive, he made his decisions quickly and seldom altered
them. The regard felt for him by the troops he so often
led to victory was ardent and constant. For years after
his death no Sepoy who had served under him would pass
the portrait that hung in the Madras Exchange without
saluting the revered Coote Bahadur. Under such a leader
the morale of the troops was doubled, and the singular power
of discipline made more than usually conspicuous.

The struggle between the rival nations for supremacy
in the Carnatic was now drawing to a close. The
222 Twelve Soldiers

English, assembled in strong force, were determined
to bring matters to a decisive issue. Lally, recalling
his detachment from Seringham, concentrated _ his
troops at Arcot, where some 2000 Mahratta horse were
enlisted.

Defeat to the English would be serious, but might be
retrieved with the assistance of the fleet. A repulse to the
French, who had lost command of the sea, would probably
entail a great disaster. The difficulties as to supply were
on both sides great, and neither army could keep the field
without the support of fortified granaries. It was thus
of the greatest importance to secure possession of the
‘numerous small forts that studded the district. It was
impossible for the British army, hampered by its slowly
moving train, to prevent the concentration of the numerous
small French detachments. Both on account of its im-
portance, and of the prestige to be thereby gained, the
first movement was directed against Wandewash. Start-
ing first in the direction of Arcot, so as to deceive the
enemy, Coote suddenly turned southward, and captured
the weakly-held fort with little loss. A march eastward
led to the important post of Carangoly, which after a short
bombardment surrendered. Retracing his steps, the British
commander pushed after the main French army at Arcot.
Before any measure of importance took place the rainy
season obliged the force to go into cantonments at Coveri-
pauk, on the north bank of the Palaur.

The English army was miserably deficient in cavalry.
There was only one troop of Europeans, while the undis-
ciplined and cowardly horse of the Nawab of Arcot were
worse than useless. The French mounted troops and their
Coote a2

Mahratta allies covered their army with a veil that Coote
could not penetrate.

Bussy was anxious to ravage the country in rear of the
English, and by cutting off their supplies force them to
fight at a disadvantage. Lally, however, was bent on
stronger measures. His men were dispirited from in-
action, and supplies were nearly exhausted. At Conje-
veram there was a large depot of English stores, and once
in possession of them, Wandewash might be recovered.

The French army was ready to take the field early in
January 1760, and covered by its numerous cavalry, slipped
away unnoticed from Coote’s front by the Wandewash
road. Pushing rapidly on Conjeveram, the French plun-
dered the town, and captured 2000 bullocks and large
supplies of grain. Elated with success, Lally with the
siege train at once marched southwards on Wandewash,
leaving Bussy with the main body somewhat in rear to
cover the movement. As soon as the absence of the
French army was detected, Coote moved rapidly in pur-
suit, and crossing the Palaur, marched to the relief of his
beleaguered fort. The probability that an attempt would
be made to capture Wandewash had not escaped notice,
and the garrison had been warned to be on their guard.
By taking an easterly route Coote covered the forts of
Carangoly and Chingliput, and thus not only obtained
supplies and protection for his train, but secured a safe
retreat in case of disaster. Confident in the ability of the
fort to hold out for some days, the English commander
decided not to offer battle until Lally had exhausted a
portion of his strength in siege operations. On the news
that a breach had been made, the army on the 2ist of
224 Twelve Soldiers

January (1760) was pushed forward to a village seven miles
from the French camp, and orders issued for an advance
the next morning.

Wandewash lay on a plain some two miles from a range
of low hills; around it were numerous rice-fields and large
rain-water tanks. The ground where it was not cultivated
was open, and well adapted for the movement of troops.
The fort itself was strong though small, but the town which
lay outside it was protected merely by a wall and ditch.
Lally captured the town with little difficulty, and under
cover of the houses erected his breaching batteries. The
French engineers then proceeded in orthodox fashion, ‘as
if they were about to attack Luxemburg.” Several days
had been thus wasted in siege operations when the appear-
ance of the English relieving force was signalled. Lally,
after some hesitation, decided not to raise the siege, but to
recall his main body and accept battle. Leaving a cover-
ing detachment with the batteries, he drew up the re-
mainder of his force on open ground with a large empty
tank in front of each flank. The regiment of Lorraine
with a squadron of hussars was on the right, the regiment
of Lally on the left, and the French Company’s Europeans
in the centre. In the second line were the Sepoys, with
an entrenched gun manned by Europeans on each flank.
The mound encircling the brim of the tank on the left
front was turned into an entrenchment for four guns and
defended by sailors. The remaining sixteen field-pieces
were disposed in intervals in the front line. The total
French force consisted of 1350 Europeans, including cavalry
and sailors, and 1800 Sepoys. The Mahratta horse could
not be depended on as a fighting body.
Coote 225

Coote, in the early morning of January 22, rode with
his vanguard, and dispersing the cavalry sent against him,
reconnoitred the ground. In the distance was seen the
entire French army, with the camp of the Mahratta horse
on the hillside beyond. Returning to his main body, he
ordered the advance to be made in fighting formation. On
nearing the French lines the dispositions for defence could
be clearly seen. The entrenchment on the left looked
formidable, and its guns swept the ground of approach.
The army was ordered to take ground to the right, so
that the line of battle should in its advance overlap the
strengthened left flank of the French. The movement
was the more judicious, as by it the English right was
secured from cavalry attack by reason of the stony hillside,
while the new front covered directly the village to
which the baggage-train had been sent. The British force
consisted of about 1900 Europeans, of whom 80 only
were cavalry, 1100 Sepoys, and several squadrons of the
Nawab’s mounted troops. The first line was formed of
Draper’s and Coote’s regiments, with the Company’s
Europeans in the centre. In the second line were
the European Grenadier companies flanked by Sepoys,
while the cavalry formed a reserve in rear. The guns
were on the flanks, and in the intervals between the
regiments.

In this order the army advanced well within gunshot of
the enemy, when a brisk artillery contest took place. The
round shot from the entrenchment threw the left of the
English line into some confusion, and Lally, placing him-
self at the head of his cavalry, gave the order to charge.

His officers would not at first follow him, and the delay
Q
226 Twelve Soldiers

enabled Coote to order up cavalry and Sepoys in support
of the threatened flank, and to secure its safety.

The enemy’s troops appearing somewhat unsteady under
the cannonade, a general advance of the Europeans was
ordered by Coote, while the guns continued firing as long
as their front was clear.

It was now about one o’clock. The French troops were
eager for the fray, and Lally led the Lorraine regiment,
formed in column, towards the advancing English line.
Coote ordered his men to reserve their fire till the enemy
was within fifty paces, and delivered at such short range
its effect was great. The column of attack, though shaken,
was not stopped, and breaking through the English forma-
tion, had to be driven back with the bayonet. Some hot-
blooded Irishmen of the 84th followed in pursuit, but were
at once recalled to their former line. While this fierce
contest was taking place on the English left, a lucky shot
blew up a powder-wagon in the French entrenchment and
killed eighty of its defenders. So great was the panic, that
the sailors fled in dismay and abandoned their post.
Draper’s regiment on the English right was at once
ordered to the assault, while their Grenadier company
replaced them in the front line. In spite of the vigorous
resistance of some of Lally’s regiment, who replaced the
French sailors, the redoubt was carried, but with heavy
loss. Bussy with the nearest troops made strenuous
attempts to recover the post, but was beaten, off and him-
self taken prisoner.

The successful issue of the fighting on both flanks
enabled Coote to advance his whole line to musketry range.
The European battalions of the rival Companies were now
Coote 20%

face to face at close quarters. After a short fire fight, the
English Commander ordered the charge, and the French,
who had been for some time unsteady, fled in disorder.
The French cavalry, showing a bold front, covered the
retreat, and the defeated infantry rallied in good order
near the fort, where they were joined by the siege de-
tachment.

The French lost 600 men, and all their guns, stores, and
equipment, while several officers of note and a large
number of men were taken prisoners. Lally fell back to
the vicinity of Pondicherry, where he was in a favourable
position to obtain supplies from a comparatively fertile
area.

Coote has been blamed for not following up his success
by attacking Pondicherry. According to Lally, the city
was in the greatest straits for provisions, and would have
been obliged to surrender if invested. On the other hand,
the English had no accurate knowledge of the destitute
condition of the French Presidency town, and the French
army was still a formidable foe. To proceed with the
reduction of the minor forts in the interior was a policy
of less risk. When all the sources of supply were cut off,
Pondicherry must fall unless relieved by the French fleet.
Each day’s delay would probably strengthen the British
power, and diminish that of the enemy.

The day after the battle the English army jaarckad on
Arcot, and its capture in February was followed by that
of most of the forts held by the French in the interior.
On approaching Pondicherry, Lally fell back on the red
hills overlooking the town. Major Monson in the mean-
time had been detached to the southward, and with the
228 Twelve Soldiers

aid of the fleet and troops from Tiichinopoly, captured
Carical, Chellambrum, and Cuddalore. On May 1, 1760,
the sole possessions that remained to the French in the
Carnatic were Pondicherry on the coast, and Gingee and
Thiagar in the interior, while the entire British army was
assembled for the investment of the French Presidency
town.

“From this time,” says Lally, “Pondicherry without
money, without ships, and without even provisions, might
be given up for lost.” Dissension and intrigue embittered
the French Civil Government, and patriotism no longer
existed ; self-interest and greed overwhelmed all sense of
duty, and the names of De Leyrit and his Council must
ever be covered with disgrace.

Lally, in his person, combined the greatest daring with
fertility of resource; but, hated by his countrymen, and
unpopular with the natives, his position seemed hopeless.

In this emergency he opened negotiations with Hyder
Ali, the famous Mahommedan general, who was practically
the sovereign of Mysore. The French offered the im-
mediate possession of Thiagar, a subsidy in money, and
a large accession of territory in case of a favourable issue
to the war. Hyder was to furnish a reinforcement of 8000
men, and to supply cattle and grain for the use of the
French troops. The alliance thus formed relieved the
immediate wants of the French camp, but after some four
weeks’ service the Mysore levies were abruptly recalled to
repel the invasion of their own country by Smith’s levies
from Trichinopoly.

Pondicherry on the sea-shore was fortified in the usual
way, by a bastioned front and a central citadel. To repel
Coote 229

the attack of irregular troops, a boundary hedge of prickly
shrubs formed an outer line of defence connecting redoubts
some mile apart. Outside the hedge again were two
strong entrenchments, protecting the approaches along the
shore from the north and south.

The position of Lally and his allies was so strong that
the approaches of the English were made with the greatest
caution, The summer months were passed in observation,
and in endeavouring to prevent supplies passing into the
town. The defection of Hyder’s troops in July forced
Lally to retire to an entrenched camp outside the boundary
hedge, while Coote took post at Villanore, and covered
his position with small redoubts.

Lally made one more desperate effort to hold back the
tide of misfortune that threatened him. Early in September
he planned with the greatest secrecy a night attack on the
English redoubts. The entrenchments covering the left
and centre of Coote’s position were to be simultaneously
assaulted, while a third column, crossing the river, was to
attack the camp in rear. The surprise was complete.
The redoubt on the English left was captured, while Coote
had the greatest difficulty in withstanding a fierce attack
on his centre. The column intended to act on the camp
in rear, however, lost its way, and its failure to co-operate
led to the French troops being beaten back with heavy
loss,

An event now took place which shows the folly of
attempting to govern a country from a distance. Orders
arrived from England that Monson should take command
of the army of Madras, and that Coote with his regiment
should be sent to Bengal. The supersession, if it may
230 Twelve Soldiers

be so called, was most inopportune. Coote had conducted
the campaign with unvarying success, and at the moment
of triumph was deprived of his command. The Council
of Madras was filled with consternation, and the troops
with sorrow. A man less wise and magnanimous might,
in just resentment, have raised difficulties. Coote, however,
at once consented to allow his regiment to remain to crown
the victory of another with the success due to his own
plans.

Colonel Monson, now in chief command, at once pro-
ceeded to close the lines of investment. By means of a
night march, a simultaneous attack was delivered on the
French camp and two of the redoubts in the boundary’
hedge. The obstinate resistance of the enemy cost many
lives, and in carrying the redoubts Monson was severely
wounded. Coote was at the Presidency preparing to
embark, but at the earnest request of the Council and
Monson, returned to the army and resumed the command.
The blockading force actively proceeded with the reduction
of the outlying defences, and completed the investment
on all sides. Delay was caused by the rainy season, but
early in December regular siege operations were com-
menced, and bombarding batteries erected. The sea-front
was vigilantly guarded by Admiral Stephens, and the
boats of his fleet cut out two French frigates that lay under
the guns of the fort.

On the last day of the year, the coast was visited by
a hurricane, which caused great havoc both on sea and
land. Three of the English ships foundered, three others
were driven ashore, and 11,000 lives lost. On land the
tents were blown down, the siege works swamped, and
Coote 22%

the ammunition destroyed. So great was the confusion,
that it is doubtful whether a sortie made at this juncture
could have been resisted. With infinite labour the
siege batteries were again manned, and approaches
and parallels opened, when on January 15, 1761, a
deputation came from the town to propose terms of
capitulation. The French troops had been for some time
on half rations, and Lally had exhausted every source
of sustenance. Deserted by their fleet, and in a state of
starvation, nought remained for the garrison but to
‘ surrender unconditionally. Even the entrance into the
town of the victorious army did not put an end to the
dissensions that disgraced the Franco-Indian officials,
Lally was openly insulted, and had to be protected by
English troops; while Dubois, the chief Intendant, who held
proofs of the disloyalty and corruption of the Council, was
killed,

The fall of Pondicherry was quickly followed by that of
Thiagar, Gingee, and Mahé, and the French Empire in
India ceased to exist. The struggle between the English
and French, which had been carried on with varying
success for fifteen years, was now brought to a close, and
the supremacy of the East India Company insured.

The restoration of their settlements by the treaty of
Paris again gave the French a foothold in the country, but
the mighty fabric erected by Dupleix was irrevocably
shattered. Never were the British better served than in
this short and eventful campaign, Soldiers and civilians
alike vied in patriotic devotion to duty. The almost
universal greed for wealth was subordinated to the great
aim of the moment, Rivalries and jealousies were put
232 Twelve Soldiers

aside to help the British arms, and dissensions in the
Council slumbered until all danger was passed.

In the spring of 1761, Coote sailed with his regiment for
Bengal, where he assumed command of the forces, and took
his seat on the Council. The new Commander-in-Chief,
however, “determined to avoid political discussions, and to
endeavour to reconcile his colleagues, with all of whom he
was on terms of friendship.” On arriving at Calcutta he
found an empty treasury, the troops mutinous for want of
pay, and the allowance made by the Nawab several months
in arrear. The misgovernment of Mir Jaffar was
notorious, and it was decided that his son-in-law, Mir
Cassim, should assume the active administration of the
province. A political revolution of this kind naturally
upset the relations of Bengal to the minor provinces. A
violent dispute arose between the new Nawab and Ram
Narrain, the Deputy Governor of Behar. Coote was sent
in command of the field force to Patna with instructions
if possible to adjust the difference. Though tempted with
a bribe of seven and a half lacs of rupees, he strenuously
opposed the Nawab, and espoused the cause of his
opponent. Events prove him to have been in the right, as
the opposite course of handing over Ram Narrain to the
mercies of the Bengal ruler proved an unmistakable error,
and gave a violent shock to the confidence of the native
rulers in English good faith.

A trifling incident now occurred, which not only shows
the masterful conduct of Coote, but exemplifies the
imperious methods adopted by the Company’s servants.
Mir Cassim was encamped outside Patna, and for
ceremonial purposes wished to take up residence in his fort.
Coote 233

Distrustful of his real object, Coote declined to accede to
the not unreasonable request that he should withdraw the
British guards and sentries. Finding that the Nawab did
not come in as expected, the Colonel went in the early
morning with a strong escort to his camp, and forced his
way into the public tent. This unfortunate intrusion and
display of suspicion was deeply felt, and Mir Cassim,
in reporting the outrage, declared that the Colonel entered
in a great passion, “With a cocked pistol in each hand,
uttering G—d d—ns!”

After the settlement of the disputes at Patna Coote went
back to Calcutta, and early in 1762 returned to England.

In recognition of his valuable services, the Directors of
the East India Company presented him with a diamond-
hilted sword, and he purchased an estate in Hampshire with
the large fortune he had amassed in the East. In 1771 the
dignity of a Knight of the Bath was conferred upon him,
and subsequently he was promoted to the rank of Lieuten-
ant-General, and appointed to the command of the forces
in India.

In the spring of 1779 Sir Eyre Coote once more arrived
in Calcutta, and succeeded General Clavering as Com-
mander-in-Chief. His conduct in the Supreme Council was
essentially that of a peacemaker. In the quarrels between
Hastings and Francis, and the dissensions that weakened
the Government, he took little part. Though following
generally the policy of the Governor-General, he made a
firm stand on all matters affecting military operations.
His position was that of a soldier and not of a politician.

While the Northern Presidency was shaken by internal
dissension, a war cloud was gathering in the West. In
234 Twelve Soldiers

spite of Coote’s remonstrances, a force which he thought
inadequate was sent to the Jumna to ward off a Mahratta
invasion. The exploits of Captain Popham in expelling
the invaders from Gohud, and in capturing the rock-bound
fortress of Gwalior, are the more remarkable in view of the
General’s opinion, that such operations were “totally
repugnant to his military ideas.”

Meantime a new danger arose in the Southern Presidency.
Hyder Ali, the most formidable enemy the British power
had ever encountered, was again in the field. In 1769 he
had dictated peace to the English under the walls of
Madras. The evasion of their treaty obligations by the
Madras Government, and the insulting defiance of the
Mysore standard at Mahé, were about to be punished.
At a time when the English were embroiled alike with the
French and the Mahrattas, a vast army descended from the
table-land of Mysore to the plains of the Carnatic. Ac-
companied by French officers, the Mysore levies overran
the country, capturing the forts, plundering the open towns,
and spreading havoc up to the outskirts of Madras. Never
was a country less prepared for such an_ invasion.
Supplies and equipment were wanting, and the only
troops available were scattered in detachments throughout
the province. By dint of great exertions, the bulk of the
forces were massed in two bodies, under the commands
of Sir Hector Munro and Colonel Baillie. Before,
however, a junction could be effected, Hyder Ali fell
upon Baillie’s detachment, and completely destroyed it,
while Munro, with loss of guns and baggage, managed
with difficulty to reach Madras.

1 See map, p. 455.
Coote 235

Intelligence of the invasion of the Carnatic, and of the
disasters that had befallen the British forces, reached
Calcutta in September 1780. To the dangers incident on
a Mahratta war was now added a general confederation of
native states against the British power. Warren Hastings,
“the saviour of India,” saw clearly that a situation had
arisen which would tax all the resources of the Government.
In his opinion any measures would be ineffectual, “unless
Sir Eyre Coote would at this crisis stand forth and vindi-
cate in his own person the rights and honour of the British
arms.” He further moved in Council, that an offer of
peace should without delay be preferred to the Mahrattas,
and that Coote with a large sum of money, and the
available European troops and Lascars, should be
despatched by sea to Madras. Preparations were at the
same time made to send by land a large force of Sepoys,
who were averse to a sea transit. The strong measure was
taken of suspending the Governor of Madras, and giving the
Commander of the Forces unrestricted power in dealing
with the money and troops of that Presidency.

After an expeditious voyage, Coote with his reinforce-
ments arrived at Madras in November 1780, and was
received with joyful acclamations. Age and ill-health had
somewhat impaired the powers of the veteran, but the
utmost confidence was reposed in him, both by the
governing authorities and the troops he led. The period
of the monsoon was occupied in collecting supplies and
transport, but the negligence of the Madras Government
had been so great, and the venality and corruption of its
officials so excessive, that it was with the greatest
difficulty that a very insufficient equipment was provided.
236 Twelve Soldiers

In his despatches to the directors, Coote depicted in the
darkest colours the disastrous condition into which the
country had drifted, and a Council of War decided that
“the utmost to be expected from taking the field was the
relief of some of the garrisons invested by the enemy ; and
this effected, the army ought to return for the security of
Madras, the grand national object.”

It was not till January 17, 1781, that the General was
able to take the field with his army of 7000 men, of whom
1700 were Europeans. The principal strongholds of the
Carnatic were invested by Hyder’s troops, and the first
objective of the army was the relief of the forts in the
interior. After the siege of Chingliput had been raised,
the fort of Carangoly was taken by assault, and an advance
made on Wandewash. At the time of Hyder’s invasion,
this important fort was, like many others, held by the
troops of the Nawab of Arcot, and its surrender had been
agreed upon. On the day that the formalities were to be
completed, Lieutenant Flint with one hundred Sepoys was
seen to approach. Repeated messages were sent to stop
him, but Flint, with great address and plausibility sent the
successive messengers back for references, and steadily ad-
vanced. On nearing the gates he announced that he had a
letter from the Nawab, and demanded admission to deliver it.
After repeated refusals, Flint and four Sepoys obtained an
audience between the gate and the outer barrier. The
commandant was attended by an escort of thirty swords-
men and one hundred Sepoys. It was soon apparent that
Flint had no letter, and his arguments for taking over the
place were treated with derision. Contemptuously dis-
missing him, the native chieftain rose, but at a signal, the
Coote one

bayonets of the four Sepoys were at his breast, and Flint
threatened his instant death if any one moved. The con-
sternation of the moment gave time for the rest of a small
detachment to run in and secure their prisoner. Flint now
with conciliatory language gained over the half-hearted
escort and obtained possession of the fort, which he sub-
sequently commanded with a rare ability and fertility of
resource. Hyder was furious, his best troops were sent
to invest the place, and every stratagem and artifice
was employed to get possession of it.

Some four days before Coote arrived, a strong force
dressed as British Sepoys advanced towards the fort with
colours flying. Presently their guns came into action
against large bodies of Mysore cavalry who were threaten-
ing them on the flanks, The investing troops in the
trenches at once fled precipitately towards Arcot. It was
with the utmost difficulty that Flint prevented his garrison
throwing open the gates and going out to welcome the
relieving force. He luckily noticed that the round shot
fired always fell clear of the Mysore horse—a most un-
English proceeding. Flint seized the opportunity to set
fire to the wooden material in the trenches and galleries,
and on the approach of the English army a few days later,
the investment was raised. After encamping a few days
on the scene of his former exploits, Coote put his forces in
movement towards Permacoil.

News was now received that a French fleet had arrived
off the coast, and that the inhabitants of Pondicherry were
laying in supplies and raising troops. Coote at once
pushed forward to the coast, and taking position on the
red hills above the town, deprived the French of their
238 Twelve Soldiers

weapons and destroyed the boats on the shore. The
boldness of the English General’s advance led to the
raising of the investment of the inland forts. Hyder, con-
centrating his forces, at once marched towards Cuddalore.

On learning of the approach of the Mysore army, Coote
without delay struck his tents, and marching in a line
parallel to that of the enemy, gained Cuddalore, and the
provisions it contained.

The rapidity and judgment with which the march was
conducted saved the town, but the position of the English
army had become hazardous.

The scanty stock of provisions that the General had
brought from Madras was now nearly consumed. In his
own words, “I cannot command rice enough to move
either to the northward or the southward. I offered battle
to Hyder yesterday, but I no sooner showed myself than
he moved off. Everything must be risked to assist me,
my difficulties are great indeed.” With the sea-front
guarded by the French Admiral, and the resources of the
country cut off by Hyder, the army was ina desperate
strait, when, to the astonishment of all, Admiral D’Orves
set sail and left the coast. Never had France such an
opportunity. There was no risk to be run or battle to be
fought. By simply riding at anchor for a few days, the
surrender of the English army would be secured, and
Southern India be wrested from the British power.

The departure of the French fleet enabled supplies to
be landed once again for the subsistence of the troops.
Transport animals: were, however, very deficient, and the
immobility of the army led to constant recriminations
between the General and the Madras Government. In
Coote 239

one of his despatches he sums up the situation. “I promise
you that the army I now command shall not remain a
moment unemployed, if you will only supply me with
provisions and the means of carrying them.” From
February to June but little was done except sending
out detachments for foraging purposes. The Mysore army
was in the meanwhile ravaging the Tanjore province and
threatening Trichinopoly, while Wandewash was again
invested.

On the arrival of the English fleet with reinforcements
from Bombay, Coote determined to push southward along
the coast in the direction of Trichinopoly. Understanding
that the fort at Chillambrum was weakly held by Hyder’s
troops, he decided to attack it on June 18, with a portion
of his native force. The fortified pagoda was, however,
strongly held by some 3000 men, and the assaulting party
was beaten back with heavy loss. The whole army retired
on Porto Novo, to obtain from the fleet a siege equipment
necessary for the renewal of the attack.

The repulse at Chillambrum and the retirement of the
British troops inspired Hyder with unwonted confidence.
Relinquishing his march on Trichinopoly, and calling in all
his detachments, he determined to risk his fortunes in a
battle with the English army.

At daylight on June 28, the whole plain to the north-
ward of Porto Novo was seen covered by the tents of the
Mysore army. By forced marches Hyder had taken up
his position within three miles of the British forces, and
rendered it impracticable for them to move in any direction,
or obtain supplies except from the fleet. The numerous
and enterprising Mysore horsemen ranged the country up
240 Twelve Soldiers

to the outpost line, and the Sepoy sentries were adjured to
save their lives by deserting their posts.

The position was full of peril. A defeat of the sole
British army in the field would entail the loss of Southern
India, and a reign of anarchy in the Carnatic. To await
attack in an unfavourable position would be disastrous.
The supplies were limited, and reinforcements were not
expected. The only remaining course was to attack and
defeat the enemy. All siege equipment and superfluous
baggage was at once embarked, and the troops supplied
with four days’ provisions for an immediate advance.

Early on the morning of July 1 the army, some
8500 strong, of whom 2000 were Europeans, marched out
of camp, and formed up in battle array in two lines on the
wide plain traversed by the only available route to Cudda-
lore. The first line of infantry, commanded by Sir Hector
Munro, was composed of three European and six Sepoy
battalions, while the second line, under General Stuart,
consisted of four battalions of native troops. The cavalry
force was weak, a European troop and two regiments of
native dragoons, while fifty-five pieces of artillery were
drawn by bullocks, with difficulty, through the heavy sand.
A strong guard was detached to protect the baggage, which
was to await the issue of the engagement on the sea-shore,
Menaced in front and flank by the enemy’s horse, the army
moved forward along the road in fighting formation. On
arriving near the high wooded ground and sand-hills which
rose from the plain, the enemy’s position was seen, and a
halt ordered to examine it.

In the form of a curve, it apparently extended from
commanding ground on the right, across the Cuddalore
Coote 241

road, to a range of sand-hills on the left. The right and

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centre of the line was marked out by entrenched batteries,

the fire of which completely dominated the plain and route
R
242 Twelve Soldiers

of advance. The sand-hills on the left were weakly held
and the extension of the defensive line to the sea had not
been completed as intended. It was difficult to estimate
the number of Hyder’s troops, or attribute a true value to
the numerous irregulars that accompanied him, but it was
evident that an army of at least 40,000 men, very strong in
cavalry, and well provided with artillery, barred the road.

To attack in front a position so strongly held was too
dangerous, while to turn it on the right flank was from the
nature of the ground very difficult. To turn the left was
a more feasible operation, to which the character of the
ground lent itself.

From the left of Hyder’s position a range of sand-hills
ran parallel to the coast-line for some 1100 yards. Through
this, at some distance to the northward, had been cut a
passage for the guns intended for an unfinished redoubt
close to the sea. Coote at once realized that these sand-
hills would afford him cover till he reached the gap, and
that by pushing through it, he could render useless the
whole of the strongly entrenched position. At the same
time, an occupation of the sand-hills which formed the left
of Hyder’s line would not only give him a good artillery
position, but form a pivot to secure his weakest flank and
protect his baggage.

Moving his whole force rapidly to the right, the English
General pushed his first line under cover of the ridge to the
gap, and without encountering much resistance, deployed
in the plain beyond. The Sepoysand Lascars assisted the
enfeebled gun cattle in dragging the field-pieces through
the heavy sand. The second line was directed, as soon as
its front was cleared, to advance in column to the assault
Coote 243

of the sand-hills on the left of the enemy’s line. The
attack of General Stuart was crowned with success, and he
was enabled to drag his guns to the crest of the hill, and
by their fire assist the advance of the main body. Hyder,
at once realizing that the value of his entrenchments was
lost by Coote’s able manceuvre, moved off his infantry and
guns in a direction parallel to that of the British army,
and again formed up in front of them to cover the
Cuddalore road.

A long cannonade now took place. The numerous
Mysore cavalry made repeated attacks on both flanks of
Coote’s line, while the most determined assaults, headed by
French officers, were made to dislodge Stuart from his
position. The steadfast gallantry and discipline of the
British troops enabled them to withstand all Hyder’s efforts.
Dispirited by the loss of their chief cavalry leader, and
shaken by the superiority of the fire of the English guns,
the Mysore army began to waver, and Coote ordered an
advance. Hyder,seated ona stool inthe centre of his line,
could not believe that the day was lost, and it was only
by force that he was induced to mount his horse. As the
deployed line slowly advanced, the Mysore guns began to
limber up, and on the approach of the English to close
quarters the Mysore infantry, after a parting volley, fled in
precipitate confusion. When the English reached the high
ground of the enemy’s position, the whole country to the
westward appeared covered with a flying mass of horse,
foot, artillery, and baggage.

{t is difficult to understand why the available cavalry
were not sent in pursuit, but the horses had had a hard
day’s work, and Coote, with his natural caution, probably
244 Twelve Soldiers

did not trust much to either the fighting capacity or
loyalty of his black horsemen. The actual British loss was
little over 400 men, but the discomfiture of the enemy was
complete, and it is estimated that they left over 3000 dead
on the field. The battle affords one of the many instances
of the triumph of discipline over numbers, and illustrates
the formidable fighting power of a native race under British
leaders. With a combination of daring and caution seldom
surpassed, Coote, under most unfavourable conditions, had
‘riumphed over overwhelming numbers. The English
army was suffering great difficulties with regard to the lack
of money, provisions, and transport. In the words of
Coote’s despatch announcing the victory, “If Hyder Ali,
ouoyed up with his former success, had not come down to
neet us, I could not have moved the army to follow him.”

Porto Novo was probably the most important battle that
vas ever fought in Southern India. It gave the first
sffectual check to the ambitious schemes of the Indian
Napoleon, and was a blow from which his dynasty never
ecovered. Hyder, it is true, fought afterwards some des-
»erate battles, and even gained a measure of success, But
he spell of victory was broken, and none of his later tri-
imphs compensated for the defeat that terminated his
areer of aggression. Astounded and dispirited by his re-
wulse, he recalled the troops investing Wandewash, and
vith his whole army retired to Arcot. Coote marched
eisurely northwards on Madras, and at the beginning of
\ugust effected a junction with the detachment of Sepoys
hat had been sent by land from Bengal. With a force of
2,000 troops, flushed with success, the General lost no
ime in again taking the field,
Coote 245

The first objects to be attained were the capture of
Arcot and the relief of Vellore. The commissariat system
was, however, still lamentably defective, the supply of rice
was small, and the number of baggage oxen insufficient.
Under circumstances which Coote described as “ heart-
breaking,” he resolved to attack Tripassore, some thirty-
three miles to the westward, and secure the stores in it.
After a nominal resistance, the fort surrendered in sight of
the Mysore army, which had marched to its relief. Hyder,
falling back a few miles, drew up his army at Pollalore, on
the scene of his former triumph over Colonel Baillie. The
front of the main position was intersected by ravines and
water-courses, and in parts covered by thick jungle, while
the country on both flanks was generally open and
suitable for cavalry. On August 27, the English army
pushed forward to the attack, and after eight hours’ hard
fighting remained masters of the field. The ground was
so diversified and intricate that the larger units were
thrown into confusion, and the fighting was mainly that of
individual battalions. Though Hyder withdrew his forces
at nightfall, the victory was indecisive, and Coote, with a
crippled transport, fell back the following day on Tripassore.

The position of affairs during the next month was criti-
cal. Vellore was in the greatest straits from want of pro-
visions, Madras itself was threatened with famine, and the
possibility of disbanding a portion of the army was seriously
entertained. Vellore commanded one of the main passes
to the Mysore plateau, and its relief had to be attempted at
all hazards. Coote, with the able assistance of Macartney
the new Governor of Madras, collected a small amount of
supplies, and once more started westward. By taking a
246 Twelve Soldiers

northerly route, the long baggage-train was protected on
the right flank by a mountainous country. Hyder, undis-
mayed by his defeats, once more prepared to dispute the
advance, and was again severely defeated at the Sholangur
Pass on September 27. The Mysorean accounts uni-
formly describe the battle as a surprise, and Hyder only
saved his guns by desperate charges of cavalry. Coote was
unable to take immediate advantage of his victory. The
army was living from hand to mouth, and it was only by
scouring the adjacent country, and making bold forays at
great risk, that supplies were obtained. In one of these
expeditions Coote, though suffering from an illness, was
thirty-two hours in the saddle, and succeeded in dispersing
a large force of Hyder’s cavalry, and capturing their stores
and equipments. By dint of great exertions, the lucky dis-
covery of hidden stores of grain, and the capture of some ~
Mysore convoys, a store of six weeks’ supplies was thrown
into Vellore by the end of October. The rainy season was
now approaching, and Coote, after taking the small fort of.
Chittore, hastened back to Madras, relieving Tripassore,
which had again been invested by Hyder, on his route.
During the campaign with Hyder, events were occurring
elsewhere which demand a brief notice. By the declara-
tion of war between England and Holland, the British
possessions were threatened by a coalition of naval powers.
Lord Macartney justly conceived that it was of importance
to close to hostile fleets all the harbours on the coast. He
urged on Coote the necessity of equipping an expedition
for the reduction of Negapatam and the other Dutch
trading stations. The General objected to this plan. In
his opinion the small resources of the Presidency should
Coote 247

be devoted to overcoming Hyder, for to disperse effectually
the Mysore army was of main importance. The seizure
of the ports with the aid of the fleet was a matter that
could be undertaken at any time. Coote’s remonstrances
were unheeded, and Negapatam was captured with great
gallantry by Sir Hector Munro, without the withdrawal of
a single man from the main army. The subsequent
seizure of Trincomalee by the fleet closed to the Dutch
every harbour in the Indian seas,

The health of Sir Eyre Coote was now much impaired
by the fatigues and anxieties of the campaign. He
complained bitterly of the absence of zeal on the part of
the authorities in providing the sinews of war, and of the
constant interference of the Government in military
matters. His naturally quick temper was not improved
by age and ill-health, and he publicly expressed his
intention of resigning his command, and returning to
Bengal. Macartney, aware of the great value of his name
and influence, made every concession to his views, but the
news of the desperate situation of the Vellore garrison put
an end to disputes.

Carried in his palanquin, the aged General once more
led his troops to relieve the invested fortress. Though
harassed throughout his march by Hyder’s cavalry, and
seriously attacked on one occasion by his whole force,
Coote succeeded in carrying in three months’ supplies,
and brought back his army to Madras with little loss.
The year (1782) which opened thus favourably in the
Carnatic, was also marked by the successes of the Bombay
troops on the Malabar coast. These, however, were more
than counterbalanced by the total destruction of Colonel
248 Twelve Soldiers

Braithwaite’s detachment in Tanjore by Tippoo, and the
landing of a French force of 3000 men at Porto Novo,

The French were speedily joined by Hyder’s son, and
the combined forces, after capturing Cuddalore and
Permacoil, moved on Wandewash. Partly from want of
supplies, and partly through dissensions in the Council,
Coote did not move to meet the enemy until May 12.
The French, however, declined a general action, and fell
back on a strong position nearer Pondicherry. To attack
a superior force formidably posted, and in hopes of rein-
forcement, was a task too hazardous for a prudent
commander. Coote determined to march on Arni, the
main depot of the Mysore army, and thus tempt the allies
to leave their favourable position. The stratagem was
successful. Hyder pushed forward his son by forced
marches to reinforce the place, while, leaving his allies, he
followed with his main army. The attack of the Mysore
General on the English rear-guard was unsuccessful, but
Arni was too strongly held to be taken, and the usual
want of provisions led to a retirement of the army on
Madras.

The signing of peace with the Mahrattas was followed
by prolonged but abortive negotiations with Hyder, during
which active operations were suspended. Vellore was,
however, again re-victualled, and a half-hearted attempt
made to recapture Cuddalore. The troops on both sides
were, in fact, awaiting the issue of the constant engage-
ments taking place between the English and French fleets.
On the arrival of the rainy season in October the fruitless
and harassing warfare by sea and land came to an end,
The English went into cantonments at Madras, and the
Coote 249

French at Cuddalore, while Hyder with his main body
encamped near Arcot. Sir Eyre Coote, whose health had
been long failing, now gave up the command in the
Carnatic to General Stuart, and returned to Bengal.

The mismanagement of affairs by the civil and military
authorities after Coote’s departure forms an unconscious
tribute to his skill and experience. There was no one to
replace him. On Hyder’s death the Mysore army might
have been crushed, but there was no strong hand to grasp
the opportunity. The French forces were again becoming
formidable, and the situation critical. Coote was once
more sent for, and set sail for Madras in the armed
ship Revolution. The vessel, chased by French cruisers,
eventually got to port, but the General had a relapse of
his complaint, and died shortly after landing, on April 28,
1783.

In studying the campaigns in the Carnatic, the modern
critic will be struck by the slowness of movement of the
contending forces. An army on the march was apparently
a convoy guarding a long line of stores, camp-equipage,
and provisions. With the native troops marched their
wives and families, while the Europeans had a numerous
retinue of attendants; a great bazaar detachment of pro-
vision-merchants and suttlers followed in rear, and the
fighting men were outnumbered four or five times by the
non-combatants. Nearly all the stores were carried on
bullocks, which slowly plodded over sandy plains destitute
of food, while on all sides irregular horse hovered in chance
of pillage. Before a fight the huge train had to be massed
under a special escort, while the infantry in deployed lines
advanced slowly abreast of the guns dragged by oxen.
250 Twelve Soldiers

Any rapid movement or quick change of formation was
impossible. After a preliminary cannonade the rigidly
drilled lines advanced to close quarters, and the firing of
musketry by volleys at short range decided the issue.

It was perhaps unfortunate that Coote did not retire
earlier from the field. The pressure of years and ill-health
affected in latter days his composure and mental powers.
But his unvaried success must not be overlooked. A man
after all is judged by his works. The discomfited Hyder
and the unfortunate Lally are witnesses to the character
and ability of the gallant soldier, who has earned a niche
in the Temple of Fame."
 
HEATHFIELD

I717—1790

THE career of George Augustus Eliott, Baron Heath-
field, is in some respects unique. Entering the army at
a time when frequent opportunities of military distinction
presented themselves, he made such good use of those
that came in his way as to rise to the rank of Lieutenant-
General at the early age of forty-five, an instance of rapid
promotion that can hardly be surpassed, even in these
days. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that, in spite of.
the distinction of his early career, his name would now
be almost forgotten had he not had the satisfaction, as
a veteran of sixty-five, to hold the greatest of British
fortresses through one of the longest sieges on record,
and his reputation may therefore be said to rest wholly
upon one exceptional achievement—the defence of Gib-
raltar.

It is rare in several years of active warfare to find the
chief event a siege, and therefore a stationary and con-
tinuous action as distinguished from a chapter of move-
ment across a theatre of war, where operations, as a rule,
are carried out by varying methods and in changing
scenes. And when this siege continues for upwards of

three and a half years—a sufficient time for the inception,
251
25D Twelve Soldiers

course and conclusion of a campaign, for the overthrow of
a dynasty or the destruction of a nation—it becomes an
historical event of such importance that we are apt to
forget that all its events, as in this case, took place in
one small bay, on one narrow strip of sand, along the
shores of a restricted rock which for all this long period
never ceased to echo with the sounds of war, and witnessed
a continuous engagement that knew no truce, no moments
of relaxation, and throughout which the opposing forces
-were ever within hand-grip of each other.

When we add to this the fact that attack and defence
were alike conducted by land and sea, and that the one
failed and the other succeeded solely because England—
holding this important fortress—was then, as now, mistress
of the seas, and therefore able on three separate occasions
to relieve a garrison brought to the direst straits by close
investment—we have a combination of circumstances
which renders this chief event in Eliott’s career a remark-
able one, and causes his life to stand out distinct from
those of perhaps greater and better known men, whose
deeds may occupy a larger page, but scarce one of whom
has, by a single achievement, rendered more signal service
to his country than did the great Governor of Britain’s
greatest fortress.

George Augustus Eliott, born at his father’s seat of
Stobs in Roxburghshire on Christmas Day 1717, was the
seventh son of Sir Gilbert Eliott, third baronet. The
family was an ancient and honourable one, although we
have no authority for the statement made by one of the
historians of the siege, that it sprang from one “Mr.

1 Ancell.
Heathfield 253

Aliott,” who held a distinguished post in the army of
William the Conqueror.

The future Governor of Gibraltar commenced his educa-
tion in Edinburgh, and, like many other Scotch youths of
that period, continued it at Leyden, whence he passed to
the French college of La Feére—once presided over by
Vauban—thus receiving his first lessons in the defence of
a fortress from the nation that, half a century later, was
unsuccessfully to besiege him.

After serving in Edinburgh for a short time with the
23rd Welsh Fusiliers, Eliott went to Prussia, with whose
army he served as a volunteer in 1735—1736, after-
wards returning to Woolwich to be instructed in artillery
and engineering. He then was granted a commission
as a field engineer, and he also figures in Kane’s
list of officers of the Royal Artillery as a cadet-gunner
of October 1739, and as a second lieutenant a year
later.

Having thus received a very varied military education
he entered the cavalry, in which his whole regimental
service was passed, his adoption of this branch being
probably due to the circumstances that an uncle, Colonel
Eliott, was at this time in command of the 2nd troop of
Horse Grenadiers, now the Life Guards, in which regiment
the nephew was gazetted. a cornet in 1739, and with which
he proceeded on active service as adjutant, taking part in
the War of the Austrian Succession, being present at
Fontenoy and many other engagements, and receiving
a wound at Dettingen.

He purchased his captaincy in 1745, his majority in
1749, and his lieytenant-colonelcy in 1754, and a con-
254 Twelve Soldiers

temporary writer asserts that it was mainly owing to his
“exemplary attention that the two troops of Horse
Grenadiers became the finest corps of heavy cavalry in
Europe.” ?

In 1748 he married Anne Pollexfen, daughter and
heiress of Sir Francis Henry Drake, last baronet, of
Buckland Abbey, Devonshire.

Having been made atde-de-camp to George II. in
1755, he raised and commanded the First Light Horse,
now the 15th (King’s) Hussars, and long known as
“Eliott’s Light Horse,” being the first British regiment of
light dragoons raised for permanent service. Within a
year of its creation Eliott took the young regiment to
Germany, where from 1759 to 1761 it greatly distinguished
itself, while its leader largely added to his reputation,
especially at Warburg, at the head of the Scots Greys
and the r1th Dragoons, repeatedly earning the acknow-
ledgments of Prince Ferdinand.?

In 1761 he was appointed a Brigadier-General to com-
mand the cavalry in a descent upon the French coast,
and the following year sailed for Cuba as second in
command of an expedition under George, Duke of Albe-
marle. Eliott’s humanity and forbearance are mentioned
as being prominent in this campaign, and with his share
of the prize-money obtained in it he purchased the estate
of Heathfield in Sussex, from which he afterwards took
his title.

On returning from Havana in 1763 he was promoted
a Lieutenant-General, but remained unemployed until

1 Brydges.
2 Historical Record of the 15th (King’s) Hussars.
Heathfield 255

appointed Commander-in-Chief in Ireland in 1774. He
resigned this post very shortly; it is said on account of
his authority being too much interfered with in matters
of detail.t

However, a fresh sphere was shortly to open for him, in
which, fortunately for his country, his undoubted military
genius was to have full liberty of action both in large and
small matters, and in 1777 he sailed for Gibraltar, of
which important fortress he had been appointed governor
the previous year.

Although the Rock had no record until Tarik the Moor
(from whom it derives its name?) made it—A.D, 711—
the base for those operations on the mainland that were to
add so romantic a chapter to history, the events that have
since taken place along its rocky shore have more than
atoned for its want of earlier distinction.

Comparatively untroubled for the first few centuries of
Moorish rule, Gibraltar underwent no less than eight
sieges in the hundred and fifty years that preceded the
Moorish downfall, and its troubles did not immediately
end when it passed into Spanish hands, for it formed a
subject of dispute between the powerful Duke of Medina,
who claimed and for some time held it, and the Crown of
Spain, until 1502, when it became part of the Spanish
kingdom and was granted as arms a castle and a key,
happily emblematic of its importance as the portal alike of
Spain and the Mediterranean.

Two centuries later it fell to Rooke (1704), and has ever
since been one of the proudest possessions of the British
Empire.

1 Ancell. 2 Gibel Tarik, or Tarik’s Mountain.
256 Twelve Soldiers

Its gradual evolution as a fortress during the nearly
twelve centuries in which it has been in these three owner-
ships is somewhat remarkable. When the Moors first
possessed it they could not hope, nor did they attempt,
to hold the entire rock against an attacker, but contented
themselves with retaining a castle at its northern extremity
from which they defied the invader, to whom was sur-
rendered the rest of the place.

This castle, completed A.D. 742, stretched from the
waterside—where it contained a dockyard and arsenal—in
three successive wards up the western slope of the rock to
where what we now call “the Moorish Castle” still stands,
a weather-beaten, shot-torn tower overhanging the town,
and originally but part of the fortification of the upper
ward. Here until recently was an Arabic inscription—
“To the God that pacifies and of Peace, and to the God
that lasts for ever,” a curious dedication of a place that in
470 consecutive years was to experience no less than
fourteen sieges. As the town, which originally lay within
the castle, extended beyond its walls, the Moors, anxious
to preserve it from an invader, commenced a wall down
the western slope, from the summit near the signal-station
to the water’s edge, so as to deny about one-half the rock,
and that the inhabited northern portion, to an attacker,
and along the sea-line they built works of defence, thus
considerably extending their original fortress.

The Spaniards greatly added to the artificial strength of
the place, working mainly on Moorish lines, erecting the
existing larger and stronger wall alongside the original
Moorish one, whose remains are still visible, and con-
structing works along the sea on sites now occupied by
Heathfield 257

King’s, South, and Jumper’s Bastions, being content for
the most part to leave the southern portion of the Rock
with no more defence than that afforded by nature. Thus,
for both Moors and Spaniards, the fortress consisted of
the northern end, but in British hands all this has
changed.

While the command of the sea by the possessors of
Gibraltar prevents the permanent establishment of an
enemy upon its southern half, thence to deliver an attack
upon the fortified northern portion, the development of
modern artillery has also now rendered it possible, by
means of central and generally elevated batteries, to pro-
tect its entire coast-line and oppose a landing at every
point.

The outworks of Gibraltar are therefore no longer on
shore, but at sea; they lie at the extreme range of its
heaviest guns; its glacis is not now the immediate slopes
of individual works, but the entire sea area commanded
by high-site batteries which permit of an accurate and
destructive fire being brought to bear upon the deck, that
most vulnerable part of an attacker’s vessel.

But when Eliott took up his command he found a very
different state of things from that now existing.

Gibraltar is a narrow rocky promontory—whose greatest
length lies north and south—joined to the mainland by a
flat sandy isthmus from which its northern face rises
perpendicularly to an extreme height of over 1300 feet.
Its shore and higher slopes are for the most part in-
accessible from the east, and access to its western side
across the knife-like edge at the summit running from the
Rock Gun to O’Hara’s (see Map), is therefore practically

s
258 Twelve Soldiers

impossible. This western side has less steep slopes and
an easier coast-line, and at its northern end lies the town,

The Spanish Lines

Eastern Guard
House

  
        
      
    

 

= =

      

 

— |
a Town

2

above and below which in Eliott’s time were situated most
of the defensive works.
Above the Moorish castle and about half-way up the Rock
Heathfield 259

was a group of batteries, of which Willis’s was the centre,
commanding the northern and north-western land and sea
approaches, and constituting almost the only high-site
works at that period. The immediate approach from the
isthmus was guarded by Grand Battery, from which a
continuous line of works ran along the shore as far as
South Bastion, King’s Bastion, about the centre, being
then in course of construction, in accordance with the
recommendations of General Boyd, the Lieutenant-Go-
vernor. Further south were a few isolated works, such as
Jumper’s, the Six-Gun Battery (now Little Jumper’s), and
the defences of the New Mole. The armament of these
works consisted of guns, ranging from 3- and 4-pounders
to 32-pounders; mortars from 13-inch downwards; and a
few 8- and 10-inch howitzers.

When Eliott arrived, and with characteristic energy and
thoroughness proceeded to take stock of his command, he
found the place in a state of almost ruin and decay, few
guns remained mounted, the parapets had crumbled, the
ditches were choked with rubbish, and stores and
magazines were alike defective’ Frequent reports to this
effect had been sent home; a commission, presided over by
the Master-General of the Ordnance, had sat at West-
minster in 1769 to consider the state of the defences, and
as early as 1752 a Mr. Sub-Director Montresor had re-
ported on the works, and among other things had recom-
mended the construction of “a wharf and bason”? close
to Jumper’s Bastion, where ships could be repaired and
supplied, thus showing that the dual nature of the fortress
and its dependence on the sea were clearly recognized.

1 Sayer. 2 King’s Library, British Museum.
260 Twelve Soldiers

In 1770 Lord Chatham spoke of the necessity of main-
taining a naval force in the bay “sufficient to cover that
garrison, to watch the motions of the Spaniards, and to
keep open the communications with Minorca,” and, he
added, “the indispensable service of the lines requires
about 4000 men,”! pointing out the fact that even with a
relief then going out the garrison would be 800 short of
that by no means excessive number.

The political horizon was very clouded when Eliott
arrived in Gibraltar, and he presently received a cypher
despatch warning him of the assembly of a large fleet
at Cadiz, and the transport thither of a quantity of
material of war from Dunkirk—“ circumstances,’ added
the Secretary of State, “that require the greatest vigilance
on your part.”? In his reply the Governor, while assuring
the Government of his vigilance, stated that it would be
impossible to withstand a siege with his insufficient re-
sources, and added, “not less than 8000 men, artillery
included, will be sufficient,” * as garrison.

But the most pressing of his deficiencies was perhaps
that of the food supply. In March 1778 he reported that
his “present store of beef, pork, pease, and butter is
scarcely the complement of five months. Flour, including
biscuits, three months; oatmeal the same. Pardon me,
my lord,” he concludes, “for once more repeating that
no time must be lost in forwarding the supply from
England.” 4

His representations appear to have fallen on deaf ears,

1 Correspondence of Earl Chatham.

? Townshend to Eliott, September 1777.
3 Eliott to Townshend, October 1777.

4 Eliott to Townshend, March 1778.
Heathfield 261

as did his entreaty for a good understanding with Morocco,
Gibraltar’s natural source of supply in a war with Spain,
for in this important matter the Spanish Government
had forestalled us, and it was Eliott who first informed
ministers of the treaty concluded between Spain and
Morocco, which was brought to his notice by a Jew in the
service of the Emperor.

It will be as well here briefly to review the circum-
stances preceding the outbreak of war with Spain, which
led to the presence of French and Spanish troops before
Gibraltar. It can well be imagined that the Rock—
situated at the southern extremity of their beautiful
peninsula, forming a natural portal to the Mediterranean,
in whose bay and beneath whose guns a fleet could ride
securely—had long been a thorn in the side of every
patriotic Spaniard, who could not unmoved see this re-
nowned fortress, the scene of so many fierce struggles in
the years of Moorish dominion, in the hands of a distant
nation with whom Spain had nothing in common. Al-
ready unsuccessfully besieged in 1705 and 1727, no one
can read the history of these times without perceiving that
the re-capture of the Rock was the leading motive of
Spanish policy, the object for which Florida Blanca, the
Spanish Minister, declared the readiness of the king his
master to break every engagement, even that known as
the Family Compact between the two houses of Bourbon.!

In England’s embarrassments with her American
colonies and with France, Spain saw, and was prompt to
seize, her opportunity, and after some negotiation she
concluded a treaty with her northern neighbour in April

1 Coxe’s History of the Kings of Spain.
262 Twelve Soldiers

1779, by which “the two Courts bound themselves to grant
neither peace nor truce nor suspension of hostilities until
Gibraltar should be restored.”1 Her efforts did not end
here. She approached Hyder Ali, England’s enemy in
the East; made advances to Russia and Prussia; and
came to an agreement with Morocco, whose ports were
to be open to Spain but closed to England. At the same
time she pushed forward her naval and military prepara-
tions, hoping by the addition of forty sail to the French
fleet, if not to compass the actual defeat of the British
Navy upon the high seas, at least to prevent the relief of
Gibraltar from English ports.

Meanwhile she had not abandoned the hope of obtaining
the place by direct treaty, and to this end carried on secret
negotiations, both before and after the declaration of war,
whose progress forms one of the most remarkable chapters
in the history of diplomatic intrigue. While the British
Cabinet was able to deny any collective knowledge of
these remarkable negotiations, there is no doubt that
more than one of its members was fully cognisant of
them, notably Lord Germaine, Secretary of State for
War, whose private secretary, a Mr. Cumberland, with
Commodore Johnstone, commanding on the Lisbon
Station, and an Irish priest named Hussey, chaplain to
the King of Spain, was intimately concerned in the affair.

It was on June 16, 1779, that war between Spain
and England was formally declared, but it was not till the
autumn of 1780, when the siege had been successfully
endured for over a year, that the negotiations finally fell
through; and thus while the defenders of Gibraltar were

1 Mahan’s Jnfluence of Sea Power.
Heathfield » 263

putting forth their best efforts and daily sacrificing life it-
self to preserve the fortress for England, ministers at home
were carrying on secret negotiations by tortuous and
obscure channels for its surrender to Spain. Happily these
efforts failed, and history is spared the humiliating record
their success would have entailed.

Eliott, meanwhile, did all that lay in his power to put
his command in a proper state of defence, inspecting his
regiments—which he reported thoroughly efficient but
weak in numbers—strengthening his parapets, and mount-
ing his guns.

On June 18, 1779, he rode out with his staff to pay a
ceremonial visit to the Spanish General, Mendoza, at the
neighbouring village of San Roque. Mendoza’s manner
was observed to be very embarrassed, and it is supposed
that he had already received news of the declaration of
war, intelligence of which only reached Eliott on his return
to Gibraltar, being brought by Mr. Logie, British Consul at
Tangier, who had arrived in the Governor’s absence.

At this time the garrison of Gibraltar numbered 5382 of
all ranks, including 3003 British infantry—the 12th, 30th,
56th, 58th and 72nd regiments; the three Hanoverian
regiments of Hardenberg, Reden and De la Motte, 1095
rank and file; 428 artillery; and 106 engineers and arti-
ficers. The naval force, under Admiral Duff, consisted of
the Panther, three frigates, and a sloop.

The great siege that now commenced may be divided
into three main phases—that of investment only, lasting
from June 1779 to April 1781; that of investment combined
with bombardment, commencing on April 12, 1781; and
the final stage of close attack by land and sea, prepared
264 Twelve Soldiers

for throughout the summer of 1782, when blockade and
bombardment had both proved unsuccessful. The grand
attack delivered and defeated on September 13, 1782,
virtually finished the siege, which was not, however, form-
ally raised until the following February.

To do justice to its many events within the limits at my
disposal is impossible, and it must suffice to fill in the
general outline only with such details as are necessary for
a comprehension of its course and as relate more particu-
larly to the subject of this memoir. Even here great
difficulty is experienced, for Eliott was no mere figure-
head, nor even an average commander, but in every way
the life and soul of the defence, the man to whom all
looked for the guidance his bold character could give, and
the judgment his great experience afford. He was the
pivot on whom all turned ; remove him and you lose the
most.commanding personality on either side, a man more-
over for whom no detail was too small, no particular too
insignificant, yet who did not lose himself in minor matters
but looked with calm, far-seeing eye upon surrounding
circumstances, and, not content to play a mere defensive
part, strove not only to meet, but to anticipate every fresh
move of the enemy. Thus the defence as conducted by
him is one of carefully planned anticipatory effort and
well-devised counter-stroke. This prominence of Eliott
and his personal interest in every detail are apparent in all
the records of the siege, chief among which is, of course,
Drinkwater’s history, universally recognized as the standard
work. In addition to other less known, but scarcely less
interesting personal narratives, I have had the good fortune
to come across a hitherto unpublished MS. diary recently
Heathfield 265

presented to the Gibraltar Garrison Library, kept by a
Captain Spilsbury of the 12th Regiment, whose record
is remarkable for a frankness of criticism and freshness of
statement not found in the carefully edited works of
Drinkwater and other published writers. I commence the
history of the siege by an extract from this source :—

“June 21,1779. This day communication is shut with
Spain, the Guards are re-inforced, and Grand Battery made
a Captain’s night guard, the Picquets are ordered to lie
accoutred with their arms loaded. No one to pass at
Landport but workmen, engineers, etc, and in case of
an alarm the Town Regiments to line the wall of the
town, and those of the southward to form on their
Parades.”

Thus runs the first entry in the diary of Captain Spils-
bury, whose peculiarities of writing I reproduce.

A council of war, held at the Governor’s residence a few
days later, decided on the immediate steps to be taken,
which included the clearance of a camping ground for
600 men near Devil’s Gap, and the formation there of a
mortar battery; the construction of three new batteries
near Willis’s, also of a post of observation at the Moorish
Castle and of bomb-proofs further south; the erection of
traverses, and the general strengthening of exposed
parapets.

As regards provisions, nothing could be hoped for from
Morocco beyond chance cargoes that might succeed in
evading the blockade established on July 16, 1779, by a
Spanish squadron of “two seventy-fours, two frigates, five
xebecques, and a number of gallies and half-gallies ”
(Drinkwater). Occasional vessels might, and did, arrive
266 Twelve Soldiers

from England, Minorca, and other friendly ports, but such
chance comers would be exceedingly rare, and a careful
administration of supplies and development of existing
resources was most necessary.

The garrison was at this time supplied with vegetables
from gardens on the north front, outside the fortress gates,
which remained available until November 1780, when, the
close approach of the besiegers’ works preventing access
to them, by Eliott’s directions other gardens were success-
fully cultivated towards Europa. So short of supplies was
the place when the siege commenced, that within a month
it became necessary to reduce the rations by one-half,
and orders were issued at this period that no horse should
be kept whose owner could not show at least 1000 lbs. of
fodder for it, Eliott ordering one of his own horses to be shot.
In other ways he was an example to his garrison, being a
vegetarian and teetotaller, “perhaps the most abstemious
man of his age” (Ancell), seldom taking anything, says
Drinkwater, but “vegetables, simple puddings and water;
and yet is very hale and uses constant exercise.” Ancell
adds, that he was often content with but short spells of sleep
of only four hours’ duration, and in every way he appears to
have been a man whose habits and manner of life singularly
fitted him for the command of a garrison soon to be
reduced to the greatest extremities. He early “made
trial of what quantity of rice would suffice a single person
for twenty-four hours, and actually lived himself eight
days on four ounces of rice per day,” says Drinkwater, a
fact corroborated by Spilsbury, one of whose earliest
entries runs, “The Guards to mount without powder in
their hair ;” while another a little later adds, “ It seems the
Heathfield 267

Governor has bought up all the hair powder, and eats
puddings made of it.”

On July 26, 1779, the first arrival of Spanish reinforce-
ments took place, and troops and ordnance were landed
at Punta Mala, where a landing stage had previously been
constructed, and a camp was formed close by.

These regiments consisted of two battalions of Spanish
Guards, two regiments of Walloons and other corps
selected from the regiments of Soria, Quadalaxara,
America and Catalonia, and of volunteers from Aragon
and Savoy, numbering 13,700 in all, inclusive of 1000
artillery and twelve squadrons of cavalry (Sayer). The
command was assumed by Don Martin Alvarez de Soto-
mayor, a general who had seen service in Italy, and who
presently completed and armed Fort San Felipe in the
old: lines facing the Rock, constructed a mortar battery,
and commenced more formidable works.

It was decided at a council of war, held on September
II, 1779, to oppose these active works as far as possible,
and at daybreak on the following morning fire was opened
from Green’s Lodge (recently completed), Willis’s, and
Queen Charlotte’s batteries, the first gun being discharged
by the wife of an officer to General Eliott’s signal of
“Britons, strike home!”

For three and a half years from this time a perpetual
fire was kept up from the Rock, whose batteries were
incessantly manned by night and day. The immediate
effect upon the enemy’s works was not very great, and
Spilsbury, always outspoken, declares the practice to have
been “very bad”; although a panic was caused among the
enemy’s working parties, and also in the town of Gibraltar,
268 Twelve Soldiers

whose inhabitants imagined that the attackers would at
once reply. This they do not seem to have done until
December 27, when they opened an experimental fire
upon the nearest works, and it was not till January 12,
1780, that their first shot fell in the town, where it
wounded a woman in the foot.

The following entry in Captain Spilsbury’s diary may
be quoted as typical of many of his very original notes,
and illustrative of General Eliott’s disciplinary methods:
“October 3, 1779. One 58th man was overheard saying
that if the Spaniards came damn him that would not
join them. The Governor said he must be mad, and
ordered his head to be shaved, to be blistered, bled, sent
to the Provost on bread and water, wear a tight waistcoat,
and to be prayed for in church,” a treatment that must
surely have ended in kill or cure.

The great height of the Rock at its northern extremity
afforded such an opportunity for commanding fire that
an effort was made to mount a gun there, and by October
12 a twenty-four pounder was dragged to the summit,
some 1300 feet high. Later on a mortar was mounted
here, and the emplacement was named “the Rock Gun,”
a name it still bears.

A week later General Eliott was present at night at
Willis’s Battery to witness an experiment with a light ball,
the invention of Lieutenant Witham of the Artillery.
The siege is indeed remarkable for inventions contrived,
and expedients used by the defence, such as a special
gun and mortar carriage designed by Lieutenant Koehler
of the Artillery for firing at extreme angles of depression,
experiments with varying charges at different angles of
Heathfield 269

elevation, attempts to obtain a satisfactory fuse and to
improve existing shell, and many other smaller artillery
matters.

Later on General Boyd advocated the use of red-hot
shot, for which furnaces were constructed, some of which
still exist, and these projectiles played a very prominent
part in the repulse of the final attack; while the naval
defenders were not idle, witness their extemporized gun-
boats; finally, the rock-cut galleries commenced by
Sergeant-Major Ince of the Engineers stand to this day,
a monument of what man’s ingenuity and perseverance
may effect under stress of circumstances.

To all such matters great and small Eliott gave his best
encouragement, and indeed the defence could not possibly
have succeeded had not every rank and every arm joined
in hearty co-operation, support, and mutual emulation
throughout these trying years. Such brotherly effort and
true spirit of camaraderce are happily not rare in British
sailors and soldiers, but no one can read the history of the
siege of Gibraltar, in which so many instances of this
spirit abound, without grasping the fact that such efforts
were both largely called forth and judiciously applied by
one energetic, untiring, far-seeing man, and that man—
Eliott.

By the end of 1779 the garrison was in sore straits for
want of food, the rations had been again reduced, the
supply of flour and fresh meat was exhausted, and Drink-
water says that “thistles, dandelions, wild leeks, etc.”
formed the daily nourishment of numbers. A turkey
fetched £4,a goose 42, and ducks a guinea and fowls
eighteen shillings a couple. But help was fortunately at
270 Twelve Soldiers

hand. On January 17, 1780, a fleet and convoy under
Admiral Sir George Rodney appeared in the Straits, and
were welcomed with a salute from the guns of the fortress,
thus relieved of its most pressing necessities.

Not only had Rodney with him the convoy he had sailed
with from Spithead—he had captured on January 8 a
rich Spanish fleet laden with wheat, flour and provisions,
the greater part of which he had brought along for the
use of Gibraltar; and he had achieved a still greater success
on the 16th by his defeat off St. Vincent of a Spanish
squadron under Admiral Don Juan de Langara, capturing
six ships and blowing up another, and taking prisoner the
Admiral, badly wounded.

The arrival at such a moment of a British Admiral with
a captured convoy, a captured fleet, a captured admiral, a
fresh British regiment—the 73rd Foot, 1000 strong—and a
well-supplied convoy from England affords as striking an
instance of the value of sea power as we can wish to find.
Without this and two subsequent ‘reliefs Gibraltar could
not possibly have held out against so close an investment
for so extended a period. On board the flagship, serving
as a midshipman, was the future king, William IV., and
Langara rightly interpreted his presence there when he
exclaimed, “Well does Great Britain merit the Empire
of the sea, when the humblest stations in her navy are
supported by princes of the blood!” (Drinkwater).

For some time after Rodney’s departure on February 13
no event of importance occurred, but in June an attempt
was made by means of fire-ships to set fire to our shipping,
which at this time consisted of the Panther, the Enterprise,
two smaller armed vessels, several armed transports, and
Heathfield 271

some merchant ships. The attempt failed, owing to the
promptitude and gallantry of the sailors, and the nine
ships were all towed or drifted to the south, where they
fell upon the rocks, and, having burnt to the water’s edge,
their hulls were afterwards useful as firewood for the
garrison. On the 27th of this month several gunboats,
propelled by oars and carrying a gun at the bow, made an
attack upon the Panther, and for the remainder of the
siege this method of annoyance was repeated at intervals,
causing serious inconvenience to the defenders both in the
harbour and on shore.

Presently provisions again began to run short, and in
September turkey-cocks fetched three and a half guineas,
ducks a guinea a couple, geese twenty-six shillings each,
and smaller stores sold in proportion. In October biscuit
was issued to the troops in lieu of bread, and a garrison
order fixed a man’s weekly ration at 2 lb. of salt fish, 1 lb.
of pork, and } lb. of beef. Scurvy made its appearance,
but the fortunate arrival of a Danish ship from Malaga
laden with oranges and lemons, which by Eliott’s order
were purchased and distributed as an anti-scorbutic, par-
tially allayed this disease. We can, however, sympathize
with Spilsbury’s entry of October 22, 1780, “ The salt fish
all served out, to the no small satisfaction of the garrison,
who are heartily tired of it.”

The Emperor of Morocco now proceeded to more open
and active measures against us, allowing hostilities to be
carried on in his ports, and ill-treating and finally expelling
Mr. Logie, the British Consul, and other British subjects.
His action is in some degree attributable to the refusal of
the British Government to supply him with naval stores
292 Twelve Soldiers

for three vessels he had recently built in order to protect
his coasts from the Spaniards, who wished to oblige him to
let them farm his ports of Tangier, Tetuan, and Larache.
Eliott supported his application, and its refusal threw
Morocco finally into the arms of Spain.

It was on April 12, 1781, that two events of the greatest
importance occurred. The besiegers had for some time
been extremely active on the isthmus and, among other
works, had constructed and armed an advanced battery
named the Mill Battery, about 1100 yards from the garrison,
and it appeared as if to starvation by blockade was soon
to be added destruction by bombardment.

On the morning of April 12 a thick fog obscured the
Straits, but when it cleared away it disclosed a very large
convoy and fleet under Admiral Darby, intelligence of the
departure of which from Torbay had recently reached the
garrison, whose joy at this welcome sight was speedily
dashed by the opening of the long-dreaded bombardment.
As the leading vessels dropped anchor under the guns of
the fortress, as if by pre-concerted signal, those of the
besiegers opened fire and commenced a bombardment of
the town and fortifications, which continued with the
greatest fury for many weeks, and knew no intermission of
twenty-four consecutive hours until May of the following
year, a period of no less than thirteen months.

Drinkwater estimates the guns in action against the
fortress at this time as 149,114 of which—including 50
mortars—bore upon the garrison. Sayer places these
figures at 170, with 80 mortars, but whichever number is
correct they considerably outnumbered the guns of the
defence. The town was speedily in ruins, the inhabitants
Heathfield 29

sheltering at the south end of the Rock, where some time
previously Eliott had permitted them to erect wooden huts,
but the activity of the enemy’s gunboats on the departure
of Darby’s fleet rendered even the southern portion unsafe,
and the distress of soldiers and civilians alike was extreme,
The wife of an officer gives a graphic account of the miseries
she and her children endured in endeavouring to escape
the enemy’s fire near Europa, where one night the rock
behind which they sheltered was struck by a shot that
covered them with dust and splinters. She writes—

“Tt would have melted the hardest heart to see the
women and children run from the camp without a rag
to cover them whenever the gunboats approached.” !

I give one extract from Spilsbury, which may serve as
a typical twenty-four hours’ experience—

“May 24,1781. About midnight a shell fell into a house
(at) South Shed and buried about 16 people for 2 or 3
Hours, but they were got out by the Assistance of the
Picquet, except a Child belonging to the poor woman (of
the) 58th that was killed some time ago, which perished
by it. Three Jews, one that had lost all he had in Town,
near 10,000 Pounds, his Clerk, and a Relation, a woman,
were killed by a shell in their House in Black Town, and
2 Butchers, inhabitants, were killed and one wounded, and
one 73rd was killed in his Bed in S. Barracks. Two shells
fell in the Hospital Yard, and a shot went through the
Roof of the pavilion at the Hospital where Lt. Lowe was.”

It is said that in six weeks’ time 56,000 shot and 20,000
shell were thrown into the place, and night and day were
alike rendered hideous by the continual roar of the enemy’s

1 Sayer.
T
274 Twelve Soldiers

guns and of those of the garrison in reply. Yet the loss of
life to the troops was comparatively small, although the
works were much damaged and the town practically de-
stroyed. The flight of the inhabitants to the south and
the destruction of their houses brought to light large
quantities of wine and food, carefully preserved by some
merchants in view of starvation prices. It is perhaps
scarcely to be wondered at that the soldiers, already
wearied with the monotony and hardships of nearly two
years’ investment and driven to desperation by the horrors
of the bombardment, should have broken into open riot,
and, encouraged by the discovery of so much wine and
provisions, pillaged the smoking ruins while the -very
air above them was thick with shells and the Rock re-
echoed to the cannons’ roar. This is the only disgraceful
as it was the most trying part of the siege, and called for
stern measures on the part of the authorities. More merciful
methods being unavailing, death itself was the punishment
for men caught in the act of pillage, and the record is
darkened by such entries as these—

“May 29, 1781. Two of the Artificer Company hanged
at the White Convent for robing (szc) that store”; and the
next day: “One of the 58th punished and another hung
for stealing Rum which is buried all over the Garrison and
in the Hospital Garden” (Spilsbury).

Order was gradually re-established, the recently arrived
provisions were stored, and the place, becoming accustomed
to the enemy’s discharges, settled down into its normal
condition of defence. And that Eliott was not content
with a merely defensive attitude is evident. The an-
noyance caused by the gunboats resolved him to attempt
Heathfield 275

reprisals on the Spanish camp, and, with this object, a
battery was constructed at the end of the Old Mole, con-
sisting of a 13-inch mortar, five 32-pounders, and one 18-
pounder, which, sunk in the sand at different angles of
elevation and secured by baulks of timber, so annoyed the
enemy as to earn at their hands the name of “the Devil’s
Tongue.” It opened fire on June 28,1781. In order to
guard the harbour against the gunboats two brigs were
cut down and converted into prames or boats, mounting
some four or five guns each, which, being moored within
range of our batteries, acted as guard-ships. Later on the
frames of twelve gunboats were sent out from England
and completed at Gibraltar. Each carried a 24-pounder
or 18-pounder gun, and was manned by a crew of twenty-
one sailors.

On October 1 and 2 the enemy’s expenditure of ammuni-
tion amounted to 1948 and 1263 rounds respectively. It
was now that the daring project of a sortie for the destruc-
tion of the enemy’s works—which could not be kept under
by fire from the fortress—entered the Governor’s head.
Sayer says that in a Hzstordcal Sketch of Gibraltar, 1792,
in the British Museum, are to be found some pencilled
marginal notes signed “W. Booth,” in one of which the
writer asserts that he suggested the practicability of a
sortie to General Boyd, who went as far as the Devil’s
Tower to satisfy himself as to the likelihood of its success
before mentioning the matter to Eliott. Whether this is
so or not, it is certain that the information brought by a
deserter who arrived in the garrison at the beginning of
November was of considerable value in determining the
mode of attack. This man was taken to Willis’s Battery,
276 Twelve Soldiers

where he explained the works below him to the Governor
giving details of their armament and night-guards, etc.

At midnight, on November 26, some 2178 of all ranks,
out of a total strength of 5952, assembled to the south of
the town, and, having been formed into three columns,
issued by the Landport Gate to the attack of the enemy’s
advanced works. These were seized with scarcely any
opposition, and, the infantry having formed beyond them
as a covering party, with the reserves nearer the Rock, the
artillery and engineers, to the number of about 300, pro-
ceeded to destroy the enemy’s carefully constructed works,
and succeeded so well that in an hour’s time their object was
accomplished and an orderly retirement to Gibraltar was
effected. The whole force was under command of General
Ross, but Eliott’s anxiety was so great that—unknown to
Ross—he could not abstain from accompanying the troops,
an action which has been much criticized. The troops
behaved splendidly, and fully acted up to their countersign
—“ Steady.” Their loss was insignificant, and they
captured two officers and sixteen privates of the enemy’s
guard of the trenches, which consisted of one captain, three
subalterns, and seventy-four privates. The senior officer’s
report, which was found, stated, rather prematurely, that
“nothing extraordinary” had occurred during the night
(Drinkwater). The Spaniards, who seem to have been
entirely unprepared for,this bold move, contented themselves
with an ineffectual fire against the Rock batteries, and
made no effort to disturb the working party.

This brilliant achievement put fresh heart into the
defenders, as such an assumption of initiative might have
been expected to do, but the besiegers quickly recovered
Heathfield 277

themselves, and in the following month had sometimes as
many as 1000 men at work reconstructing their batteries.

Early in 1782 Minorca fell, and it was presently
rumoured that its conqueror, De Crillon, with French re-
inforcements, was hastening to the assistance of the
Spaniards. On April 11 Eliott learned by a vessel from
Faro of great preparations in progress at Cadiz, and
greater activity was now visible upon the shores of the
bay, in which a fleet of over 100 transports appeared on
May 26, followed next month by 60 French sail, bringing
about 5000 French soldiers. The fire from the Spanish
lines now almost entirely ceased, and on May 4 twenty-
four hours elapsed—the first for over a year—without any
discharge from besieged or besiegers. It was evident that
a final effort was being prepared, and, had the garrison
been possessed of a sufficiently powerful telescope, they
might one day have witnessed a curious scene upon the
shores of the bay. <A group of officers, one of whom was
a well-known French engineer named D’Argon, and
another the chief engineer of the Spanish fleet, was
collected round a piece of oak timber about a foot square
in section, which, having been immersed in the sea for six
hours, was brought to land, and a hole bored in it in which
a 24-pounder shot—brought to red-heat in a neighbouring
kiln—was inserted. It was a battle between the two
elements, fire and water, and when the latter was success-
ful and the wet wood gradually extinguished the hissing
projectile, D’Arcon felt assured that his elaborate design
for the subjugation of the grim fortress across the bay
would prove successful.

1 Mémotre pour servir & Uhistoive du Sidge de Gibraltar. D’Argon,
Paris, 1783.
278 Twelve Soldiers

This plan is sketched ina memorandum drawn up by
De Crillon, and now in the British Museum, and its main
feature was the employment of ten Jdatteries flottantes,
which should anchor in front of the fortress, and effect a
breach for the entrance of a landing party. Great
ingenuity, time, and labour were expended upon these
floating batteries, which D’Arcon claimed to be zusud-
mersibles et indestructibles, and were formed by cutting
down the masts and rigging of several vessels of from
600 to 1400 tons burden, providing them on the side to be
exposed to the fire of the Rock with a sloping roof and
armour composed of three layers of squared timber three
feet thick, separated by wet sand and backed by a layer
of damp cork. The roof was covered with wet hides, and
the whole provided with a network of pipes conveying
water from central reservoirs to every exposed part of the
ship’s side. It is said that 200,000 cubic feet of timber
were expended on these unwieldy vessels, whose armament
consisted of from 10 to 26 guns, with crews of from 250 to
760 men. They were to be supported by the fire of the
allied French and Spanish fleet and of the land works,
which now assumed great proportions, one work alone,
according to Spanish accounts, requiring 1,600,000 sand-
bags, and being raised in one night to a height of 12
feet, with a parapet 18 feet thick, by an immense work-
ing party of 10,000 men. The landing party was to be in
boats provided with hinged planks to assist them to
land.

This remarkable project was only less extraordinary
than some of the many other designs submitted to the

Spanish Government, one of which was to erect a mountain
Heathfield 279

on the neutral ground of the same height and bulk as the
Rock, while another proposed the destruction of the latter
by blowing it up.

D’Argon’s plan having been accepted, no time was lost
in preparing for it, and ten ships were speedily cut down
and armed under the anxious eyes of the garrison, who
were well informed of the design. One man of the 73rd
regiment having announced that he had dreamed that the
place would fall on a given date, the Governor ordered
him to be taken to the provost-ship until the day arrived,
and then flogged; and Spilsbury says, “The men have a
number of stories among themselves, but their allowance
of grog is drank before night, and they are obliged to go
to bed sober, so no wonder they have disagreeable
dreams.”

To assist at the allied triumph persons came from all
parts of Europe, amongst others the Comte d’Artois and
the Duc de Bourbon, who, arriving in August, brought
letters for the beleaguered garrison, and sent them in
under a flag of truce accompanied by a present of vege-
tables, game and fruit for the Governor. Eliott in his
reply accepted the food, but added that in so doing he
had broken a resolution he had previously kept—not to
receive any gift for his own private use—“ So that, with-
out any preference everything is sold publicly here; and
the private soldier, if he has money, can become a
purchaser as well as the Governor.” He asked that no
more might be sent him, and added that although
vegetables were scarce at this season, every man had a
quantity proportional to the labour he expended in
raising them. The English, he continued, were foud of
280 Twelve Soldiers

gardening, “and here we find our amusement in it during
the intervals of rest from public duty.”

On his side Eliott had not been idle. The arrival of
the 97th Regiment, 700 strong, in March 1782, and of
about 70 Corsican volunteers in July, had brought the
garrison, sailors included, up to a strength of some 7500
men, of whom at the beginning of September about 400
were in hospital. The guards daily absorbed nearly 1100,
the picquets took over 600 more, and daily working
parties of nearly 2000 men were now employed by the
engineers in strengthening the works likely to bear the
brunt of the attack, erecting caissons and traverses, and
constructing improved communications. Iron grates for
heating red-hot shot were distributed throughout the
batteries, and every preparation made for a determined
resistance.

A further work of great interest was going forward in
the construction of those rock-cut galleries now so widely
celebrated. These were suggested by a Sergeant-Major
Ince of the Engineers, who—in response to a desire of
Eliott’s to bring a flanking fire upon the enemy’s entrench-
ments—proposed boring a tunnel through the solid rock
from near Faringdon’s Battery to a projecting mass of
rock now hollowed out and known as St. George’s Hall.
His idea was adopted, and on May 25, 1782, he com-
menced driving a passage six feet by six feet. On August
19 Spilsbury notes, “Sergt. Ince has got 165 feet into the
Rock and made two embrasures,” and, ten days later,
“TInce’s gallery 200 feet long, and has two 24-pounders
mounted in it.” These embrasures were originally in-
tended as air holes, and by September four or five guns
Heathfield 281

were mounted in them. A deserter who reached the
garrison on August 28 announced the grand attack for
September 15, and it was on the 6th of this month that
General Boyd, in a letter to the Governor, suggested
anticipating the enemy to some extent, and destroying his
now formidable land batteries by opening on them with
red-hot shot. His proposal was approved, and under his
direction the artillery commenced firing with these pro-
jectiles at 7 o'clock on the morning of September 8, with
such good effect that the works were speedily alight and
a considerable portion destroyed. A heavy fire was
maintained by both sides for the next four days, and on
the 12th about noon the allied French and Spanish fleet
sailed into the bay to assist in the morrow’s attack.

As the garrison lined the sea-wall to witness this
imposing arrival—numbering 39 ships of the line, and
raising the enemy’s naval force to over 50 vessels, nine
bearing admirals’ pennants—a signal, which was taken for
that denoting a British fleet, was observed at the yard-
arm at the signal-station on the summit of the Rock, and
a shout arose from the defenders, who imagined a friendly
fleet to be in pursuit. Then, to every one’s surprise, the
supposed signal detached itself from the yard and, floating
in the air, was seen to be a large eagle which had
momentarily settled on the signal-post, and was accepted
by the superstitious as an omen of victory for the British
arms.

It was about 9.30 a.m. on September 13 that the ten
floating batteries loosed from their moorings and took up
position in line about 1000 yards west of King’s Bastion,
upon which Eliott had taken his stand, and which work
282 Twelve Soldiers

bore the main brunt of the coming action. The flag of
Admiral Don Buena Ventura Morena in chief command
flew from the Pastora, while D’Argon was on board the

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Talla Piedra, these being two of the largest vessels, and
it was precisely these two that first caught fire and led to
the demoralization of the others. They lost no time in
Heathfield 283

opening the action, but Spilsbury in his sarcastic manner,
observes that at first “they fired a great deal into the
‘water, that being a new way of making breaches.” The
garrison was not slow to reply, and Eliott in his despatch
says that the guns were served “ with a deliberate coolness
and precision of school practice, but the exertions of the
men were infinitely superior.”

Speaking of Eliott’s situation at this trying moment,
Sayer says, “On the land he was threatened by 246 pieces
of cannon, mortars, and howitzers, and an army of near
40,000 men; while by sea 50 sail of the line, 10 floating
batteries of a construction supposed to be indestructible,
with countless gun and mortar boats, and 300 smaller
craft, were waiting only the signal for the attack. To this
enormous armament but 7000 men and 96 guns could be
opposed.”

The difficulties inseparable from an allied attack soon,
however, made themselves apparent. The allied fleet for
some reason failed to bear its part; the land batteries had
not received full instructions; the fire-ships, which at first
answered expectation, presently began to smoke from the
red-hot shot, and by seven o'clock in the evening the
defenders’ fire had assumed an undoubted superiority.
The garrison in these hours had suffered much; the works
were riddled with shot, the houses reduced to an even
greater ruin than before, and the town choked with débris.
So exhausted were the gunners that they drank the water
in the buckets in which their sponge-heads were washed,
and, as the day wore on, had in some cases to be relieved
by infantry detachments. What must have been the
feelings of the stern-visaged Eliott as he paced the rampart
284 ' Twelve Soldiers

of King’s Bastion, himself exposed to the greatest fury of
the enemy’s fire, and marked that fire gradually slacken as
his own subdued it; watched the wreathing smoke ascend-
ing from Morena’s flagship, and, as night fell, saw one
after the other of the dreaded floating batteries break into
flames, until their blazing hulls illumined the now silent
bay, and disclosed their panic-stricken crews escaping in
confusion, leaving the wounded to a horrible death upon
the burning vessels.

It was now that the British sailors, led by the gallant
Captain Curtis, played their part and proved themselves
worthy of the great traditions of the navy. At 2 a.m.on
the 14th the whole of the defenders’ gunboats sallied forth,
and, forming line outside the battering ships, completed
the confusion of their crews. Not only were large numbers
captured as they endeavoured to escape, but many
wounded Spaniards were saved at great risk of life from
the burning and exploding ships, whose losses in men
amounted to 1473, according to a Spanish official account.
The garrison’s loss did not exceed 16 killed and 68
wounded, and their expenditure of ammunition was
estimated at 8000 shot and 716 barrels of powder.

With the failure of this grand attack the Siege of Gib-
raltar may be said to have virtually concluded. It is true
that it was not until February 5, 1783, that the last
shot was “ wantonly fired” over the enemy’s works; true
also that in the interval the allies pushed their approaches
still closer to the foot of the Rock, and that their fleet in
the bay sailed in pursuit of Lord Howe’s relieving squad-
ron, which, through adverse winds, was carried past the
place in October 1782; but all the operations subsequent
Heathfield 285

to September 13 were but languidly carried on. The
distinguished persons who had come to witness the down-
fall of the garrison departed, convinced that its hour had
not yet arrived; negotiations for peace were initiated,
and at last, three years seven months and twelve days
since the closing of the fortress gates, Gibraltar again had
free communication with the outer world.

The losses of the garrison in this protracted siege were
333 killed or died of wounds, 536 died of sickness, 138 dis-
abled by wounds and discharged, 773 wounded but re-
covered, and 43 deserted.

The ammunition expended between September 12,
1779, and February 3, 1783, is calculated at 200,600
rounds from the batteries and 4728 from the gunboats,
while the estimate of the Spanish expenditure between
April 12, 1781, and February 2, 1783, is 244,104 rounds
from the land batteries and 14,283 from gunboats
(Drinkwater).

De Crillon visited the place on March 31, 1783, and
paid the defenders many compliments, pronouncing the
rock-cut galleries to be worthy of the Romans, and being
specially polite to the officers of the artillery, whom, he
said, he was glad to meet away from their batteries, where
they never spared him. The garrison cheered him on his
entrance, and he and Eliott embraced with many expres-
sions of regard. It was, in fact, a time_of mutual compli-
ments, and the British officers were equally politely
received when they visited the attackers’ works.

On April 19 two interesting ceremonies took place, the
first on the Red Sands, beyond the Southport Ditch, the
second in King’s Bastion. The first was the scene of a
286 Twelve Soldiers

general parade, when Eliott read to the troops a letter of
thanks from the Home Government, adding the following
characteristic words on his own behalf:—

“Forgive me, faithful companions, if I humbly crave
your acceptance of my grateful acknowledgments. I only
presume to ask this favour, as having been a constant wit-
ness of your cheerful submission to the greatest hardships,
your matchless spirit and exertions, and on all occasions
your heroic contempt of every danger.”

Proceeding later to the King’s Bastion, he was invested
with the Order of the Bath by General Boyd, acting as
King’s Commissioner.

Spilsbury gives a carefully executed drawing of the Bas-
tion, which was decorated for the occasion, and as the
ribbon was placed round Eliott’s neck the infantry fired a
volley, and the guns of the Bastion a salute from right to left.

It was indeed appropriate that a work thus named, con-
structed by one veteran, and on which the other stood on
the great day that preserved Gibraltar to the Empire,
should have been the scene of this interesting ceremony ;
and equally appropriate is it that Boyd, to whose foresight
we owe this bastion, and who had in every way been second
only to Eliott himself throughout the siege, should now by
his own desire lie buried beneath its gun floor.

It was not until June 1787 that Eliott was, somewhat
tardily, raised to the peerage with the title of Baron Heath-
field, a title that became extinct in 1813 by the death of
his only son. Eliott himself died of palsy at Aix la
Chapelle on July 6, 1790, only two days before his in-
tended departure on a visit to his old command. He is
buried in Heathfield Church, Sussex.
Heathfield 287

The character of this sturdy soldier is a remarkable one.
Of a curiously strict and abstemious life at a period when
temperate living was rare, he united the sternness of a
strict disciplinarian with a tender and modest nature. Ex-
acting in the calls he made upon others, he was always
ready to set an example of self-denial, nor ever expected
his men to face a danger he would hesitate to experience
himself. Gifted with a wide judgment, combined with a
singular mastery of detail, always alert and far-seeing,
his varied experience and extended military training ren-
dered him the very man for the command of Gibraltar
in its most anxious years; and he was a worthy successor
to those bold and hardy Moors and chivalrous and
accomplished Spaniards who had preceded him in the
defence of the rock fortress with which his name will ever
be associated.

His stern lineaments, commanding presence, eagle fea-
tures, and penetrating eye are worthily portrayed by the
greatest English painter of the age, whose picture affords
us as admirable a presentment of the outward man as
Eliott’s great deeds do of the inner qualities and consum-
mate military genius of Gibraltar’s greatest Governor.
ABERCROMBY
1734—1801

WHEN England took up arms against’ the French
Revolution in 1793 her military power had fallen to the
lowest ebb, and her army was utterly inadequate, in every
sense of the term, for the vigorous prosecution of war
against a great and powerful nation.

For all practical purposes the British army had almost
ceased to exist; the idealogues of Parliament worshipped
the maxim that an armed disciplined body was in its
‘essence dangerous to liberty; and, rating as they did the
precedents of constitutional history higher than the
evidence of their own senses, they overlooked the fact
that liberty could be as readily threatened from without
as from within, and against this danger, which they had
not the wisdom to foresee, they had not only made no
adequate preparation, but had rendered it impossible that
such preparation should be made, while for offenszve wars,
that is to say for empowering the burden of a campaign to
be transferred to the territory of an enemy, the laws of
England had made no provision at all.

In spite of the many severe lessons afforded by the
military history of the eighteenth century, it had become
the established custom of England to raise an army only

in time of war, and to disband it on the ratification of
288
 
\
Abercromby 289

peace, retaining only such meagre cadres as were then
indispensable for the preservation of internal order, owing
to the absence of any formed body of civil police. The
standing army, as an institution, was looked upon with
deep mistrust, and was invariably reduced to a mere
skeleton the moment its aid was no longer required. This
constant fluctuation in numbers, which exercised a most
pernicious influence upon the continuity of military life
and the traditions of war, were neither due to the penury
of the Treasury nor the parsimony of Parliament, but to
the distrust of the influence of the army upon internal
affairs, a feeling now happily dissipated by a series of wise
measures inspired by broader views of the relation between
the army and the State.

This mistrust extended to all the machinery of the
military system, which was deliberately allowed to rust
and rot for want of employment. In 1792 there was
barrack accommodation for only 20,000 men in Great
Britain; the buildings themselves were dilapidated and
insanitary, and it was as much as any minister's place was
worth to bring in a vote for reform, or to attempt to create
satisfactory billeting laws, without which the maintenance
of a thoroughly trained and mobile army at home is im-
practicable. Moreover, in 1793, the spirit of the army had
been gravely impaired by the repeated failures and the
discreditable direction of the war in America; there were
no leaders of the first rank in whom the army had con-
fidence, and the professional instruction of officers and
men was beneath contempt. In such condition, ill-armed,
ill-disciplined, without leaders, and wanting in nearly

everything that makes an army formidable, save and
U
290 Twelve Soldiers

except its native gallantry which never forsook it, the
army was thrown headlong into one of the bitterest and
most stoutly contested conflicts of modern times.

If the great war was ultimately successful, owing to
the boundless ambition of Napoleon, who overstepped all
limits imposed by nature, reason, and self-interest, and
thanks to the staying power and spirit of England, pro-
tected while at the lowest ebb of her military power by
a formidable navy, this result should not blind us to the
fact that neither statesmen nor Parliament had foreseen
the gathering storm, or had taken any precautions to
weather it, and that no less than eight years passed before
England was able to strike firm blows with her army, and
fifteen years before the weapon was so tempered that it
could seriously influence the course of military events.
During this period how many hundred thousand lives
were lost, and how many millions poured out in that
gigantic struggle!

It is not too much to say that had England, at the
outset of the war, been able to place in the field an army
equal in numbers to that with which, two hundred years
before, Elizabeth had confronted Philip of Spain, the great
war would have been strangled at its birth, and the world
spared the frightful losses and huge weight of debt which
still hamper the physical development and embarrass the
finances of the nations of Europe.

The epic period of the war in the peninsula, and the
fascination which ‘clings to a great name, have unduly
obscured the events which led up to Wellington’s cam-
paigns, and supply the key-note to his early successes.

Through these dark years—years of doubt and despond-
Abercromby 291

ency, of gropings in the dark for the first truths of organ-
ization and direction, of trials and storms, of uphill fighting
and barren successes, and finally of brilliant victory—the
subject of this memoir occupies essentially the first position,
and is identified, more than any other of his contemporaries,
not even excepting his brilliant lieutenant, Moore, with
the revival of the military spirit and splendid fighting
traditions of the British army. ‘

Ralph Abercromby was born in October 1734, at
Menstry, near Tullibody, in the county of Clackmannan.
His father, George Abercromby, had been called to the
bar, but had never practised his profession. He was a dis-
tinguished scholar and a man of industry. He had married
the clever and beautiful daughter of Mr. Dundas of Manor,
and the influence of her family was not without importance
in shaping the career of her son.

Ralph Abercromby’s education, begun by a private
tutor, was continued at the school of Mr. Moir at Alloa,
then considered one of the best in Scotland. After passing
some time here, Ralph was sent to Rugby, where he re-
mained till he was eighteen, then becoming a student at
the Edinburgh University, during the years 1752 and
1753. In these early days he failed to distinguish himself
in his studies, but the records of his contemporaries show
that his character was held in high esteem, that he was
manly and sensible, sound rather than brilliant, with a pre-
possessing appearance and polished manners. Destined by
his father for the law, he was sent to Leipsig in 1754, but
he here conceived a violent distaste to the profession, and
expressed an ardent desire to become a soldier. This
decision came as a disappointment to his father; but like
292 Twelve Soldiers

a man of sense, he gave way to his son’s wish, and
purchased a cornetcy for him in the 3rd Dragoon Guards.
He remained in country quarters with his regiment till
1758, when he accompanied it to Germany, and was
appointed A.D.C. to General Sir W. Pitt. During part of
the Seven Years’ War, although serving in a subordinate
position, Abercromby had time and opportunity for study-
ing to the best advantage in the still unrivalled school of
the great Frederick ; and one may trace in many acts of
his subsequent career, the influence of this early training
upon the formation of his military character. At the
conclusion of the war he accompanied his regiment to
Ireland, and working his way rapidly up the ladder,
became lieutenant-colonel in 1773, brevet colonel in 1780,
and colonel of the 103rd, or King’s Irish Infantry, in 1781.
This regiment was disbanded in 1783, when Abercromby
retired on half-pay, his military career apparently at an end.

On quitting his command he was induced to take up
politics, and was returned for the county of Clackmannan
in the Whig interest, after a bitter contest and a harmless
duel with his opponent, Colonel Erskine. Politics, however,
proved as uncongenial to his nature as the law, and after a
very brief parliamentary career, he retired in favour of his
brother, and returned to Edinburgh, to devote himself to
the education of the children born from his marriage with
Miss Menzies in 1767.

When war broke out in 1793, Abercromby immediately
applied for a command, and his reputation and family
interest procured him promotion to the rank of Major-
General, and the command of a brigade of the line destined
for Flanders.
Abercromby 293

The moment was not unfavourable for a vigorous effort
against the common enemy. The Austrian victories of
Aix-la-Chapelle and Neerwinden had rolled back the tide
of the republican invasion; Dumouriez, despite his brilliant
defence of the Argonnes in the previous year, and his well-
earned victory at Jemappes, had retired within the frontiers
of France, his lieutenants despondent and his army dis-
organized by defeat.

On March 1, 1793, the Duke of York, with a weak
brigade of Guards, 1920 all ranks, anchored off Helvoet
Sluys, and on April 23 reached Tournay, where he was
joined by Abercromby’s brigade of three line regiments,
the Duke’s command being subsequently made up to
12,000 men, by the addition of bodies of Hanoverian and
Hessian troops in British pay. Nothing could be worse
than the appearance of Abercromby’s command. “We
remarked with concern,” writes Sir Harry Calvert, “that
the recruits these regiments had lately received were in
general totally unfit for service, and inadequate to the
fatigues of a campaign, being mostly either old men, or
quite boys, extremely weak and short.”

By the third week in May, the Allies had collected
80,000 men, and driving the French from their position
at Famars, failed to follow up their success, and sat down
to besiege Condé and Valenciennes, which fell into their
hands indeed by the end of July, but saved France, by
giving her two months’ respite, in which to re-organize her
shattered forces.

In June, the Allies could have placed in line 130,000 men
within fifteen marches of Paris, and there existed at that
time no adequate army to arrest their march upon the
294 Twelve Soldiers

capital. But the war of sieges still exercised a fatal attrac-
tion upon military councils ; the real scope of the contest
upon which the nations had entered was not understood,
and the demon of jealousy was already eating into the
heart of the Alliance, and deflecting the energy of each
member upon secondary and selfish objects.

No one can read the history of that period without
becoming profoundly impressed by the dangers and dis-
advantages of allied operations. Prussia, inflamed with
jealousy by the aggrandisement of Austria, was only
seeking for an excuse to desert the cause; her eyes, like
those of Austria, were fixed on the spoils of Poland, while
England, not to be outdone, had set her desires upon the
capture of Dunkirk, whose destruction had been for so long
dangled before her eyes asa primary objective for her
strategy.

So, when immediate danger was removed, the Duke
of York, with 35,000 men, marched on Dunkirk, and 45,000
Imperialists began the siege of Quesnoy. France was
given time to collect and train the masses which were soon
to spread over Europe in a conquering flood.

The Dunkirk expedition proved a hopeless failure. A
series of unsuccessful combats were fought before the
town, but the strange absence of naval co-operation
doomed all the efforts of the besiegers to failure; the
French gun-boats in the shallows off the coast continually
harassed the batteries and columns of the assailants ; and
threatened at length by a relieving army, the Duke was
forced to abandon the attempt, leaving thirty-two guns
in his deserted batteries as trophies for the enemy. The
effect of this failure was immense, and out of all proportion
Abercromby 295

to the magnitude of the disaster. A new heart was put in
the French, and in October, Jourdan, who had replaced
Dumouriez, after the latter’s unsuccessful attempt to play
the part of Monk, advanced, captured Wattignies, raised
the siege of Maubeuge, and forced the Allies across the
Sambre.

In the spring of 1794, the Emperor of Austria joined
the army, and reviewed the Allies on the plain of Cateau
on April 16. On April 26 and May 10, two attacks of the
French were beaten off, and on May 17 general attack
upon the French position was planned by the Emperor’s
head-quarters. The attack was ordered to take place in five
separate columns, the Duke of York with the third column
having to advance by Lannoy and Roubaix upon Mouvaux.
On the morning of the 17th, Roubaix was captured with
slight loss, and Abercromby, with the Guards, took up a
position in front of it. The day was now well advanced,
it was known that the other columns had either failed
or were so far in rear that no co-operation was to be
expected, and the Duke resolved to advance no further.
Returning to Lannoy, he received positive and reiterated
orders to take Mouvaux, and although it was felt that
such orders, in view of the failure of the other columns,
were simple madness, and only to be accounted for by
a desire to sacrifice the Duke’s column in order to relieve
the Austrians, the order was obeyed. Abercromby, with
the Guards and the 7th and 15th Light Dragoons, stormed
the intrenchments with the greatest gallantry, and here
the column halted for the night, a brigade of the British
line, under Major-General Fox, and five Austrian

battalions, taking up a position in support.
296 Twelve Soldiers

Thrust forward like a wedge into the French position,
the Duke’s troops were now greatly exposed, and their
critical situation was fully represented to the Austrian
head-quarters, who took no adequate measures to support
them. Early on the 18th, an enveloping attack began
upon the British position. The blow first fell upon the
Austrian battalions in support, who gave way. Almost
simultaneously a second French column from Lille
threatened to form a junction with the first, and to cut
off the Duke from his line of retreat. The position was
extremely critical. The Duke himself was almost taken,
and escaped with difficulty. The British infantry, attacked
on all sides “like a mobbed fox,” as Calvert has described
it, fought their way out with cool and conspicuous gal-
lantry, under the able leading of Abercromby and Fox,
and eventually effected their retreat, but not without
severe loss,

On the 22nd, the camp of the Allies was attacked at
daybreak, but after a somewhat severe struggle the enemy
retired.

The failure of the 17th had the effect of all failures upon
half-hearted alliances. The Emperor of Austria left for
Vienna, and his army, deserting their Dutch and British
allies, was soon in full retreat tothe Rhine; Prussia proved
equally faithless to the cause, and in the ranks of the
Duke’s force fury at the duplicity of their pseudo-allies
was the dominating note.

In July, the Duke’s force of twenty-three battalions of
British infantry and forty squadrons gradually retreated
before the French, fighting a number of partial combats,
and as autumn came on, fell back to the positions on the
Abercromby 207

Meuse and the Waal, where it was hoped that the army,
flanked by the Dutch fortresses and inundations, would
be able to arrest the enemy’s march. Undeterred by the
obstacles in their front, and the inclemency of an unusually
severe winter, the French under Pichegru continued to
press forward, and the British force, at no time very homo-
geneous, firmly knit by discipline or accustomed to severe
marches and hardships, suffered greatly during the retreat
from the Waal to the Weser. The Duke left for England
in December, and in the spring of 1795 the shattered
remnants of his command returned home.

Throughout this severe and disastrous campaign, Aber-
cromby found many occasions to distinguish himself. At
Furnes, and again at Valenciennes, his gallantry was con-
spicuous. For his services at Roubaix he was publicly
thanked by the Duke of York, and throughout the retreat,
where he was constantly at the post of danger, it was
greatly thanks to his skill and caution that the army was
spared a serious disaster. On his return to England he
was made a K.B., and found that his valour and ability
had won him the highest place in the esteem of both the
Government and the army.

Under such fortunate circumstances, he had not long to
wait for further employment, and in 1795 he was offered
and accepted the command of a force to be despatched to
the West Indies to reduce the French sugar islands.

At the peace of 1763 the respective claims of Great
Britain and France in these waters had been settled by a
division of the spoils; in 1783, the French captures had
been restored to England, France retiring from the contest
with a loss of honour and position, while the enormous
298 Twelve Soldiers

debt contracted paved the way for the ruin of her ancient
government.

In the first two years of the Great War, a rapid and well-
conducted campaign led to the capture by England of
Tobago, Santa Lucia, Martinique, Guadeloupe and Les
Saintes; but, in June 1794, a French expedition under
Victor Hugues was permitted to reach the West Indies.
Guadeloupe and Santa Lucia were recaptured, the negroes
stirred up to revolt, and the spirit of disaffection quickly
spread far and wide through the British possessions.

In the summer of 1795 the British Government deter-
mined to restore the balance and to root out the nests of
the privateers, who from their secure refuges were doing
severe damage to the West Indian trade. It was at first
intended to send out 27,000 men, but these numbers could
not be made up, and fell to 15,000. The convoy left Spit-
head on November 15, but was scattered by a severe storm ;
many ships were driven ashore, and the remainder returned
to Spithead. Early in December the expedition set sail
again, but after battling with adverse winds for fifty days,
most of the ships put back. Abercromby, with his staff,
sailed at last on February 14, 1796, and landed at Barbados
on March 17, the convoy arriving a month later.

The force sent out from England consisted mainly of
recruits under inexperienced officers; it was very soft,
owing to along confinement on board ship, and wanting
in experience of war and the elements of sound adminis-
tration. The country was difficult, the climate deadly.
Although the white element in Hugues’ command was not
large, the negro forces were agile, brave and numerous,
well-accustomed to the country and the climate, and
Abercromby 299

no mean antagonists. After a full review of the position,
Abercromby decided that his force was not sufficient for
the reduction of Guadeloupe; Santa Lucia was fixed upon as
next in importance, and preparations made for its reduction.
The central pivot of the Republican defence was at Morne
Fortune, on the west side of the island, where the position
was a strong one, and held by an adequate garrison.
Sailing from Martinique on April 26, Abercromby suc-
ceeded in effecting a landing, and after some severe
skirmishes, drew his investing line close round the place,
and by the help of the navy brought up eighteen guns, and
opened fire on the town on May 16. In spite of a brave
resistance and a spirited sortie, the garrison was forced to
surrender on the 25th, some two thousand men marching
out as prisoners of war, while one hundred guns and many
vessels and stores fell into the hands of the victors. St.
Vincent and Granada were next cleared of the enemy,
while the navy, in a series of single-ship actions, greatly
distinguished itself. Abercromby returned home in the
summer of 1796, but came out again later in the year,
and, Spain having thrown in her lot against England,
orders were sent him to take Trinidad and Porto Rico.

In the bay of Shagarennes in Trinidad lay a Spanish
squadron, consisting of one 8o0-gun ship, three 74’s and
a frigate, moored in line close to the shore,and protected by
batteries on an island covering the entrance to the bay.
On the evening of February 16, 1797, Admiral Hervey’s
squadron took position to prevent the enemy’s escape, and
the next morning a combined attack by sea and land was
made onthe Spaniards. The enemy quickly beat a retreat,
setting fire to their ships; only one 74 was saved, but
300 Twelve Soldiers

next day the Governor capitulated, with 2200 soldiers and
seamen, while one hundred guns and a large supply
of stores and ammunition fell into the hands of the
British.

These various successes had greatly reduced the field
force available for action, since the wasting effect of the
climate and the need of garrisons for the captured islands
were not made good by any reinforcements from England.
Thus Abercromby could only collect 3000 men for the
capture of Porto Rico, and it is clear from his report that
he was without proper intelligence of the strength of
the resistance he could expect to encounter. The capital,
San Juan, was not only very strong, but there were 16,000
men in arms on the island. A landing was nevertheless
effected, and several Spanish attacks beaten off with loss,
but finding that nothing serious could be accomplished
with the limited means at his disposal, Abercromby wisely
determined to abandon the attempt, and effected his
withdrawal without loss.

At the end of February he asked permission to throw
up his command, complaining that the complex nature of
the civil and military duties, and the time spent in the
control of the army accounts, rendered his task very
disagreeable, and one that he could not discharge to his
entire satisfaction.

The campaign had not been a barren one. Two import-
ant islands had been captured, a hostile squadron de-
stroyed, 5000 prisoners of war taken, with two hundred
guns and many stores, while Hugues’ career of conquest
had been cut short, and British predominance in the West
Indies restored. If a clean sweep had not been made, the
Abercromby 301

result was solely due to the inadequate means provided for
the prosecution of a very considerable enterprise.

Shortly after his return home, Abercromby was appointed
to the command in Ireland, then on the eve of rebellion.
Here his liberal views and his sympathy with many Irish
grievances placed him at variance with the Castle rule, and
eventually led to a disagreement with Lord Camden, then
Lord-Lieutenant, which ended in Abercromby’s resignation.

His conduct throughout this trying period was marked
by the high sense of duty which characterized all his
actions. He attempted in vain to stem the tide of indis-
cipline which disgraced many of the acts of those under
his command, but he came too late, and found himself the
victim of discreditable intrigue, or, in the words of Lord
Charlemont, “achieved the happiness of being cordially
disliked and abused.”

From Ireland he was moved to the more congenial sphere
of the command in Scotland, where he was very popular
with all classes, and here he remained until called on to
assume the command of the Ist Division, destined for the
expedition to Holland.

It is important to realize how the way had been cleared
for the action of the army by the naval successes of six
years of war. In 1793 England had 304 vessels of war,
including 115 sail of the line, 45,000 seamen and marines,
and a naval vote of £4,000,000. In 1799 these numbers had
risen to 507 vessels, including 125 of the line, with 120,000
seamen and marines, and a vote of 413,500,000. In six
years the British navy had lost, from all causes, twelve sail
of the line and eighty-nine frigates, but during the same
period the French, Dutch and Spanish navies had lost
302 Twelve Soldiers

sixty-eight sail of the line and ninety-four frigates, of which
thirty-nine of the line and sixty-three frigates had been
added to the British navy.

The army had not grown in like proportion, and had
been subjected to a constant drain, while no adequate
measures had been taken to fill up its depleted ranks.

The campaigns in Flanders and the West Indies had
caused fearful ravages in the thin ranks of our weak
battalions. The protracted struggle in the West Indies
alone cost England 30,000 lives and thirty millions of
money. In 1794, 18,596 men were killed or died in the
service, while in the two succeeding years 40,639 men were
discharged on account of wounds and infirmities. Such a
ghastly record will not stand alone so long as Governments
are incapable of providing an army sufficient for the needs
of a great and growing Empire.

In 1799 the Government fell back upon the old constitu-
tional force for the men required to carry on the war. In
July the militia in England and Wales numbered 76,000
men, and a law having been passed to enable a proportion
of these to enlist with bounty into the regular army, 15,712
were so enlisted, and military activity of a kind again
became possible.

Abercromby’s command, formed of regiments drawn
from Ireland and the Channel Islands, was encamped
during the summer of 1799 at Shirley Common, near
Southampton, and then at Barham Downs, near Canter-
bury, and here the influx of the militiamen caused
regiments 300 strong to expand to 1700 and 1800 men,
and to form two or three battalions. It was a miserable
makeshift, and the appearance of the nondescript force
Abercromby 303

beggars description, while generals, officers and men, were
all unknown to one another, and all equally untrained in
the business of war.

The ostensible object of the impending expedition was
to re-establish the former constitution in Holland, and to
restore the Stadtholderate to the House of Orange.

In June an agreement was signed with Russia, by which
the latter power agreed to supply 18,000 men, to be main-
tained by British subsidies. Each nation had, as usual, a
selfish object in view, England desiring to seize the
remains of the Dutch fleet beaten at Camperdown, while
Russia sought to aid the march of Souvarov by a formid-
able diversion.

In a sense, the moment was not unfavourable. Bona-
parte was still in Egypt, Jourdan had been compelled to
re-cross the Rhine, Massena was hard-pressed in Switzer-
land, and all Italy, excepting Genoa, had been overrun by
the Austrians.

Without waiting for the Russians, Abercromby, with
12,000 men, embarked at Margate, Dover and Deal, in the
second week of August, the convoy numbering 200 sail,
with 50 flat boats for landing troops. The expedition
reached the Dutch coast on the 21st, but the troops could
not be landed till the 27th, owing to the weather.

‘Brune, who commanded in Holland, had ample time to
complete his preparations, and sending right and left for
troops, he stationed Daendels, with 7000 men, to oppose the
landing, and made ready for a stout resistance. Although
the two services worked heartily together in the landing
operation, only 3000 men could be put on shore simultane-
ously, and the movement itself was wanting in rapidity and
304 Twelve Soldiers

order. Daendels however failed to seize his opportunity
and attack with energy, and after a severe contest, lasting
till night-fall, was overpowered by the growing numbers of
his enemy.

A force was now sent to seize the battery at Helder
point, to enable the fleet to enter the Zuyder Zee. The
2000 Germans, in Dutch pay, who garrisoned the battery,
evacuated this important post hastily, leaving behind
them a number of field and position guns in good
order, and on August 30, Vice-Admiral Mitchell stood in
and peremptorily summoned the Dutch fleet to surrender.
After a short parley, the standard of the Prince of Orange
was hoisted, and an important object achieved.

Abercromby now advanced, and took up a good position
between Petten and Oude Sluys, his front covered by the
canals, whose high embankments gave a good command
over all avenues of approach.

Here he was attacked by Brune, with 21,000 men, at day-
break on September Io, but the position was so strong, and
the dispositions for defence so good, that the fiercest
attacks of Dutch and French columns, double the strength
of the British force, were beaten back with heavy loss. In
these two engagements the enemy had 2087 casualties,
those of the British amounting to 614.

During the following week the Duke of York arrived and
assumed command, and by the 18th the British and
Russian reinforcements brought up the strength of the
Allies to 33,000 men. On the 19th a combined attack was
made on Brune’s position, stretching from Alkmaar to the
Camperdown heights. In this action Abercromby’s
division was detached for a wide enveloping movement by
Abercromby 305

Hoorn round the enemy’s right, the distance being so
great that it was a physical impossibility for his column to

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carry out its orders in the time allotted. In all, 15,000 of

the Allies never fired a shot ; of the remainder, the Russians
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306 Twelve Soldiers

threw themselves on the enemy with the greatest gallantry
penetrated to Bergen, where they became a mere mob, and
being impetuously attacked were driven back with heavy
loss. On this disastrous day the Russians lost 3000 men,
and nearly all their artillery, and the British 1500.

Although this defeat greatly embittered the relations
between the Allies, a fresh attack was ordered for
October 2, the arrival of another Russian division having
brought up the strength of the army to 40,000 men. In’
this action the brunt of the fighting fell on Abercromby’s
division, which advanced .along the beach, and after a
severe contest, lasting for several hours, gained the barren
honours of a hard-fought day, and at night-fall the
French retreated.

On the 6th was fought the battle of Egmont, as hotly
contested as the battle of the 2nd, and equally indecisive,
though the Allies remained masters of the field.

In these two battles the Allies had lost 5000 men killed
and wounded, and although the French had suffered
equally, the allied council of war decided on a retreat.
Brune had been strongly reinforced ; the Russians were
sullen and unfriendly, and had not properly supported the
attack on the 2nd; the army was suffering greatly from
the severity of the weather and the scarcity of supplies ;
while events in other theatres of war had also taken an
unfavourable turn for the allied arms. The retreat was
not pressed, and negotiations resulted in the withdrawal of
the Allies by November 20.

For his services in this campaign Abercromby received
the thanks of Parliament, and a sword of honour from the
City of London. Hehad fought two actions with complete
Abercromby ; 307

success while in chief command, and his victories had paved
the way for the seizure of the Dutch fleet. For the master
error of the campaign, the ill-planned battle of September
19, he was not responsible. On October 2 he had two
horses shot under him, and of his action this day the
Duke, always generous in acknowledging the acts of his
subordinates, wrote that “in no instance were the abilities
of a commander, or the heroic perseverance of troops, in
so difficult and trying a situation, more highly conspicuous.”

Although now of an age when most men would be
thinking of honourable retirement, Abercromby could not
be spared while work remained to be done, and shortly
after his return to Scotland he was appointed to succeed
Sir Charles Stuart in the Mediterranean command, whcre
great events were impending.

It was the intention of the British Government to employ
15,000 men sent out from England, joined with 5000 drawn
from the Mediterranean garrisons, in coalition with the
Austrian army in the Maritime Alps. Had this force been
in a position to relieve the Austrians besieging Massena in
Genoa, it is possible that the Marengo campaign might have
terminated differently, but the rapidity of Napoleon’s
action checkmated the British plans, and the aid intended
arrived too late.

Abercromby reached Minorca in June 1800, and busied
himself with the training, discipline, and outfit of the picked
body of men whom he found under his command. When
the result of the Marengo campaign was known, he received
orders to take 10,000 men, to sail for Gibraltar and pick up
10,000 more under Sir James Pulteney, and under escort of
Lord Keith’s squadron to land and destroy the arsenal of

Z
308 Twelve Soldiers

Cadiz, “if he was certain of bringing off the army.” Before
sailing from Gibraltar, Abercromby consulted Lord Keith,
who informed him that if the troops took the points of
Rota and Santa Carolina, the shipping could anchor. On
October 2.Lord Keith sailed from Gibraltar, with twenty-
two sail of the line, thirty-seven frigates and sloops and
eighty transports. When off Cadiz, two days later, the
naval officers who knew the coast assured Lord Keith
that there was no safe anchorage in a south-west wind,
and that such wind might be expected at such a late season
of the year, in which case the ships of war would be obliged
to put to sea, and the transports and storeships might be
blown on shore. This opinion entirely altered the aspect
of the undertaking, in view of the wording of Abercromby’s
orders, but Lord Keith would give no immediate decision.

On the 4th the town was summoned, and in reply the
Spanish Governor sent a touching appeal, conveying the
information that the town was suffering severely from the
ravages of the plague. A reply was sent expressing regret
at the sufferings of the inhabitants, but requesting that all
ships armed and arming should be at once surrendered.
The Governor, Don Thomas de Morla, sent back a spirited
reply, and a half-hearted determination to attack was
arrived at.

On the morning of the 6th the signal was made to prepare
to land, the fleet then being under way and about ten miles
from the shore. The arrangements for this undertaking
proved quite inadequate, and the confusion was augmented
by the ships being under sail. By one p.m. only 3900 men
were in the boats, and more could not be accommodated ;
the boats were seven miles from the shore, and it would
Abercromby 309

be dark before a second contingent could be landed to
aid them. Abercromby therefore decided to postpone
the operation till the following day, and at his request the
fleet anchored, and the boats returned to the ships.
During the night Keith wrote to Abercromby pointing
out the danger of anchoring, and the latter, finding the
navy unable to give him the assurance which his orders
demanded, decided to abandon the undertaking. The
force now returned to the garrisons of Gibraltar, Minorca
and Malta, but the Government had no intention of
allowing this fine force, maintained at such considerable
expense, to lie idle, and on October 25 orders were received
for the expedition to Egypt. On December 14 Keith
reached Malta, with the fleet and the Minorca troops, and
regiments were disembarked while their ships were being
cleaned ; good food and exercise reviving their efficiency
which had been somewhat impaired by their long con-
finement on board ship.

After each of his inspections at this period, we find
Abercromby’s general orders bearing testimony to the zeal
and unremitting attention with which he watched over the
well-being of his troops.

In one instance, the packs are ordered to be carried higher
on the shoulders, “so that the weight on the chest may be
as light as possible, and the men have free use of their
arms.” On another occasion, he “observed that in many
regiments the band exceeds the number prescribed by the
rules of the service, that non-commissioned officers are
employed as musicians, and that children unfit for any
service are borne on the strength as privates.” And again,
“Sir Ralph Abercromby desires that those regiments
310 Twelve Soldiers

which are at present only provided with Russia check-
trousers, may, as soon as possible, be furnished with
woollen breeches or trousers. He does not restrict
commanding officers in the choice of colour, but he
expects that each regiment, in that respect, will preserve
an exact uniformity.”

The information upon which the Home Government had
decided to send 15,000 men to attack the French in Egypt
was meagre and inaccurate. It was believed that the
French were only 14,000 strong, whereas they were more
than double that number, and the intercepted letters of
French officers gave a false notion of the spirit and effici-
ency of the renowned Army of Italy. The expeditionary
force was strong in infantry, very weak in artillery, and
without horses for cavalry or guns. The Turks had
promised to assist in the expedition, and to provide re-
mounts if the force would rendezvous on the coast of Asia
Minor ; so in order to secure Turkish co-operation the Ist
Division sailed for Marmorice Bay on December 20, arriv-
ing on the 28th, the remainder of the force joining them
by January 1, 1801.

The reports of Colonels Murray and Moore upon the
state of the Turkish army now showed that no reliance
could be placed upon aid from this quarter, nor could more
than 200 horses be provided for the cavalry, and fifty for
the guns. But the time spent at Marmorice Bay was not
wasted. Taught by his experiences in Holland and off
Cadiz, Abercromby came to an agrecment with the navy
upon the arrangements for landing; the troops were con-
stantly practised at the work, and both army and navy
exercised continually in boat-drill.
Abercromby 310

There was nothing to gain by further delay, and on
February 20 the whole force was embarked, and on the
23rd set sail with a fresh breeze.

The expedition was a bold one. The local pilots declared
it madness to make the attempt at such a season ; inform-
ation as to the country was entirely wanting, and the only
map which existed proved ludicrously inaccurate. In view
of the necessity for keeping touch with the store-ships, it
was indispensable to select a point for landing where the
fleet of 175 vessels could anchor in safety, and Aboukir
Bay was chosen, although it was known that resistance
might be expected here on landing.

The numbers embarked were 15,330 men, including roco
sick and 500 Maltese; the force being divided into one
brigade of Guards, four of the line, a foreign brigade, the
reserve, and a brigade of two regiments of cavalry.

On February 26, a convoy from England, with provisions,
fell in with the fleet, but one vessel foundered, and several
others, with horses and stores, parted company, being unfit
to sail with a fleet. On March 2, the fleet cast anchor in
Aboukir Bay, the battleships riding where the French line
of battle had been moored at the battle of the Nile, and
the cables of the flagship Foudroyant chafing against the
Orient’s wreck.

On February 27, two officers sent to reconnoitre the
landing-place had been captured by the French; four
frigates with troops and stores from France had also
slipped into Alexandria, and on March 2 another French
frigate found herself in the middle of the British fleet, but
by putting a bold face on the matter, and answering signals,
managed to escape detection, and reached Alexandria,
aie Twelve Soldiers

where the brig Zod from France also arrived the same
night.

The warning given was thus ample, and French troops
were in movement from all sides to give the invaders a
warm reception.

On the shores of Aboukir Bay, General Friant, with 2500
men, occupied a dominating position, a mile in length,
looking down upon the beach, the central hill rising to
a height of 180 feet above the sea. Aboukir castle was also
strongly held, and from all points of the position, which
was well and intelligently occupied, so severe a fire could
be brought to bear upon a force attempting to land, that
the French could not believe that such an apparently rash
undertaking would be tried.

Abercromby, Keith and Moore, after thoroughly recon-
noitring the position, were of a different opinion. It was
hoped that the enemy’s fire would be kept down by
stationing light-draught vessels, bomb-ketches and armed
cutters, near the shore, and on the flanks of the boat-
flotilla, while it was judged that the steep ascent to the
main position was practicable, and therefore on the whole
favoured the attack.

The arrangements made for the landing were admirable,
and deserve the most careful study.

The JZondovi brig was anchored just out of gunshot, to
mark the centre of the line of attack, and here the flotilla
of boats were ordered to rendezvous and form line, their
flanks protected by the gunboats and armed launches. A
naval officer, Captain Cochrane, was placed in charge of
the whole operation, and other naval officers in charge of
the several boat-divisions into which the flotilla was divided.
Abercromby 313

The troops carried sixty rounds and two spare flints, three
days’ rations and canteens full of water, camp-kettles, and
either blankets or great-coats; four or five small casks of
water were placed in each boat, while a carpenter with
materials for plugging shot-holes, and the provision of
spare oars, guarded against contingencies of accidents.
The men were ordered to sit close together, and keep still,
and not to load until they were ashore. The first line con-
sisted of flat boats with troops and of certain launches with
artillery, towed by cutters; the second line of cutters to
attend on the flat boats and help them in case of accident,
while in the third line came more cutters towing launches
and the ships’ boats, each set keeping in rear of their re-
spective flat boats.

The camp colours of each battalion were carried by the
Grenadier company on the right of the line of boats of
each regiment, and the orders for companies were to form
up on the left of the Grenadier company on landing ; fifty
feet interval was ordered to be preserved between flat boats,
to prevent crowding and to enable the cutters to succour
any boat sunk ; all turnings were to be by signal, or, if no
signal could be observed, always to starboard. Each boat
was ordered to row straight to its front from the rendez-
vous, and on no account to close to the right or left. On
reaching the shore the flat boats were ordered to drop their
grapnels from the stern, so that they could haul off when
the troops were landed; they were then to proceed to ships
flying certain signals, and afterwards to those flying certain
other signals, till the whole of the troops were landed,
the captain of each boat-division taking his boats to a par-

ticular ship, so that regiments might be landed collectively.
314 Twelve Soldiers

At 2 a.m. on March 8, the 1st Division, consisting of the
Reserve under Moore, the Guards, and part of the Ist
Brigade, in all 5500 men, under Major-General Coote, were
placed in the boats, the remainder of the 1st and 2nd Bri-
gades being placed in ships close in-shore, so that they
might quickly reinforce the troops first landed.

At 3 a.m. the signal was given to rendezvous at the
Mondovi brig, but the extent of the anchorage was so
great that the movement was not completed and the line
accurately formed till nine.

At this hour the signal was given to advance, and few
grander or more inspiriting sights can ever have been
witnessed than when the whole line sprang forward with
a cheer and dashed towards the shore.

Immediately a heavy fire was opened by the French guns
in Aboukir castle and the field-guns in position, sweeping the
line of boats from end to end. Undeterred, the boats only
increased their pace, preserving magnificent order and regu-
larity, until three hundred yards from the shore, when a tre-
mendous fire of musketry swept down upon them, and the air
seemed alive with bullets, to which no reply could be made.

Abercromby had taken up his position with Lord Keith
in a bomb-vessel close in-shore, and, with that forethought
for his men and readiness to assume entire responsibility
which characterized him, he had sent word that he would
make the signal for recall in case he saw that the fire was
too great for the men to bear.

Looking at the spectacle before his eyes, he saw with
intense anxiety the storm of lead descending on his
gallant regiments, and with difficulty refrained from
hoisting the signal. But there was no need for it.
Abercromby 315

Cochrane’s boat reached the shore first, and the officers
stepped out. In grand order, and almost simultaneously,
the first line of boats reached the shore, and in a twinkling
2000 men were formed up in line. With fixed bayonets,
in many cases without waiting to load, the regiments were
led straight to their front against the enemy, without a
moment’s delay or hesitation, some with charged bayonets
in perfect order, others scrambling up the ascent as best
they could, but all pining to take their revenge for the
losses they had been forced to endure in silence. The
French resisted stoutly in their position, and their cavalry
charged gallantly right down to the beach, striking the
point where the Guards had not completed their formation.
They were repulsed at all points, and were swept away by
the impetuous rush of their assailants, losing 400 men and
eight guns in the struggle.

The seamen under Sir Sidney Smith, who had shared
in the dangers of the day, now afforded material aid in
dragging guns up to the heights, and after great exertions
the whole force was landed before night, Abercromby
himself coming on shore and showing to all his strong
feelings of gratitude and admiration for their gallantry.
The losses amounted to 700 killed and wounded, by no
means excessive in view of the nature of the undertaking,
while, thanks to the precautions taken, only three boats
were sunk by gun fire, and but few men drowned. On
the 9th and 12th the army advanced without serious
opposition, encamping in three lines on the latter date at
Mandora Tower.

On the 13th a fresh advance was ordered, with a view
to attack the French position on the ridge in front of
316 Twelve Soldiers

Alexandria. As the force moved out in two lines, the
French, reinforced to about 6000 men, came down to attack,
their cavalry again distinguishing themselves by impetuous
charges. Repulsed at all points, the enemy withdrew to
their position on the ridge, whence their artillery fire
played with effect upon the British force in the plain
beneath them.

By Abercromby’s orders a movement was begun upon
the right of the French position, but after some progress
had been made it was found that the position was too
strong, and after Generals Hutchinson and Hope had
given him their opinions in this sense, Abercromby decided
to abandon the attack for the day.

The real strength of the enemy was only now gradually
becoming known, and the commander, still ignorant of the
real numbers in his front, exercised sound discretion in
breaking off the engagement. He determined, before pro-
ceeding further, to bring up his heavy guns, in order to
meet the French artillery on equal terms, and to distribute
the entrenching tools in order to secure the position when
won.

Meanwhile he encamped his force in two lines, in a good
position, four miles from Alexandria, on a front of a mile
and a half, the right resting on the sea, and the left on
Lake Maadieh.

His right, slightly advanced, rested on a raised plateau
three hundred yards broad. A redoubt was built in front of
some ruins of an old palace, which afforded a good point
of support, and here Abercromby posted his trusty Moore
with the Reserve, the 28th Regiment in the redoubt, the
58th in the ruins, and the 23rd, 42nd, and flank companies
Abercromby 317

of the goth in support. A valley, three hundred yards
broad, divided this post from the rest of the position,
.which extended along gently undulating sand-hills, and
was occupied in front line by the Guards and two line
brigades.

In second line the foreign brigade was posted in rear
of the Reserve, with the remainder of the force to their
left. Slight works were thrown up at a few points, and
two 24-pounders and thirty-four field-guns placed in
position. Tents were now brought up, and large fatigue
parties employed in bringing up stores from a depét formed
a mile and a half in rear of the position. The fleet at
this time was off Alexandria, having left armed cutters
and some other light-draught vessels to protect the flanks
of the advance.

On the 2oth, Sir Sidney Smith received a letter from an
Arab sheik giving the important information that General
Menou, the French commander in Egypt, had reached
Alexandria with a large force, and intended to surprise
the British camp in the course of the night. Although the
head-quarters did not place implicit confidence in the
news, every precaution was taken. Abercromby’s orders
of the 2oth state that, “as it is possible that the enemy
may be desperate enough to make a night attack, the
General is under the necessity of requesting that the troops
may remain with their accoutrements on, and lie in their
blankets in the position which they are to occupy in case
of attack.” They were further recommended to use the
bayonet as much as possible, and not to throw away their
fire in the dark, to preserve strict silence, order, and regu-
larity, and not to follow the enemy or quit their positions
318 Twelve Soldiers

in case of attack. The men’s muskets were ordered to be
well flinted, and sixty rounds a man issued; patrols were
to be sent out in every direction, the troops to be ready
to turn out at a moment’s notice, and all to be under arms
at four in the morning.

Moore, who was in command of the outposts this night,
remained with the left picquet of the Reserve till 3.30 a.m.
on the 21st. Nothing had been seen of the enemy, so,
leaving orders that the picquets were to retire at daybreak,
he rode towards the left of the position, and presently a
few dropping shots from this quarter showed that the
enemy was on the move, but did not seem to threaten
anything very serious. Suddenly, from the extreme right,
a heavy fire burst out, followed by loud cheers. The attack
had begun in earnest, and Moore dashed back to his com-
mand, meeting all the picquets falling back, and finding
his troops engaged in a desperate contest.

General Menou, on reaching Alexandria, had reproached
his generals for their lack of energy, and had determined
to make a false attack on the British left, followed by an
assault on the post held by Moore, his plan being to force
this point and then to roll up the British line towards the
lake. He had 21,000 of the finest troops in the world
under his command, veterans of twenty battles, and ignorant
of defeat, and all looked on victory as assured.

The attacking columns advanced with all the order and
silence of perfectly trained troops, and the instant they
were seen and fired at by the British sentries, they
dashed in with their usual impetuosity at the heels of the
retiring picquets. The weight of the attack fell on the
28th and 58th Regiments, who stood firm as rocks against
Abercromby 319

overwhelming numbers, waiting until the glazed hats were
plainly visible before they opened a furious fire, which
made the attack recoil.

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Quickly reinforced, the French came on again, and now

swarmed round the position on all sides. At this moment
the 23rd and 2nd came up to support their comrades,
320 Twelve Soldiers

The 42nd in their advance captured the colours of the
‘Invincibles,’ with the names of Bonaparte’s Italian
victories emblazoned on it, while the remains of the
French column, which had penetrated into the ruins,
surrendered. At this moment the leading regiments of
the French cavalry, floundering through the camp of the
28th, fell on the 42nd and overwhelmed them. Although
broken in formation, the Highlanders stood up to their new
antagonists, and fought on as they stood, until the flank
companies of the goth cleared the ground with a few
volleys, which littered the ground with dead and dying
French troopers and horses. ‘Finally, the foreign brigade
came up in good order and completed the rout, sharing
gallantly in the fortunes of their British comrades. At
the first alarm Abercromby had mounted his horse and
moved towards his right; when near the ruins he had
despatched his A.D.C.’s in all directions with orders, and
as the French cavalry burst in he was almost alone. The
horsemen penetrated to the spot where he stood, and the
veteran was thrown from his horse, but a dragoon who
attempted to cut him down was shot by a man of the
42nd ; the sword of the dragoon remained in Abercromby’s
possession, and was given by him to Moore before the day
ended.

Although at this time mortally wounded by a bullet in
the thigh, he appeared to take no notice of it, and went
forward to the redoubt, where the 28th were still carrying
on the fight. As day dawned, a column of Grenadiers had
attacked the Guards, supported by a heavy fire of
skirmishers, but they were repulsed, and the advance of
General Coote’s brigade completed the enemy’s discomfiture.
Abercromby 331

Abercromby remained at the post of danger till the last
shot was fired, and until he was assured of the complete
defeat of the enemy, giving orders with perfect calmness,
and allowing no one to know that he was severely wounded.
Then, at last, overcome by loss of blood and the fatigues
of his last battle, the gallant old veteran sank down
exhausted, and was borne away from the front, cheered to
the echo as he passed by his victorious troops, as proud of
their chief as he was of the gallant men who had so
brilliantly illustrated his last field by their conspicuous
valour and devotion. The French left 1700 killed and
wounded in the British position, of whom 1040 were
buried on the field. The French prisoners gave out that
‘they had never been fought till now, and that their
actions in Italy were nothing compared to those they had
fought since we landed.”

The British loss was 239 killed and 1250 wounded ; but,
above all, the army had soon to mourn the loss of their
splendid old chief, who was carried to the Foudroyant and,.
after lingering a few days, expired on March 28, amid the
keen and lasting regrets of his comrades in arms.

The most eloquent tribute that can be paid to the
memory of the gallant Abercromby is a plain narration
of his splendid services. In estimating these services, it
is however important to bear in mind the very indifferent
material often placed at his disposal, the arduous character
of the campaigns in which he was engaged, the many
difficulties of country and climate he had to contend with,
and the sometimes ungrateful tasks that he was called upon

to perform.
322 Twelve Soldiers

From first to last he was never in command of an army
adequate in numbers for the mission to which it was
destined; he was always engaged in an uphill struggle,
and labouring under every difficulty that can beset a
commander ; he was never carried along on the crest of a
wave of success, and every victory was stubbornly contested
and dearly won.

Yet, throughout the storms and dangers of his arduous
but honourable career, he found the means not only to
distinguish himself, but to give added lustre to the British
arms on many a hard-fought field.

Valiant and honourable, firm and just in all his dealings,
sagacious, clear-sighted and of sound judgment, no other
chief of his time was so eminently suited to lead the
attenuated ranks of his country’s fighting men through
the darkness of despondency into the light of victory.
Essentially prudent and wary, he was mainly instrumental
at Roubaix, at Porto Rico, at Egmont, and at Cadiz, in
keeping clear of undertakings or in withdrawing from
dangerous enterprises, where a hotter spirit and a less
cautious commander might have been easily tempted to
incur disaster ; and he possessed, in a marked degree, that
rare blending of soldierly qualities which has so often
distinguished his fellow-countrymen, and when the
opportunity offered he could strike—strike quickly, and
strike hard.

Modern Europe had not seen an instance of a successful
landing on a foreign shore, in face of an enemy, before
Abercromby accomplished the feat, first in the West
Indies, then against Daendel’s 7000 men, and finally
against Bonaparte’s veterans, succeeding on each occasion
Abercromby a28

in one of the most delicate operations that can fall to the
lot of a commander. In his last landing at Aboukir Bay
he gave an indelible personal impress to the operation,
which marks it for all time as a model of cool calculation
and brilliant daring.

No other general in modern times has been so closely,
so intimately, and so often engaged in combined opera-
tions with the navy of his own country ; no one has shown
such tact and sound common-sense in distributing to the
sister services, to each their due part and proper functions,
and no one has more clearly expressed by his victories the
vast reach and the mighty strength of the arm that Britain
wields in her amphibious power.

All Abercromby’s campaigns were fought when he was
well advanced in years, but despite the fatigues and ex-
posure of the exhausting struggles in Holland and the West
Indies, the vigorous old chief retained to the last a remark-
able vital energy and bodily activity, while his unimpaired
mental powers enabled him to place at his country’s dis-
posal his exceptional experience and knowledge of men
and things until well on into the autumn of life.

As a man, his fame equals if it does not surpass that as
a soldier. Straightforward and honourable in his daily life,
he was a model husband and father, and the records of
his contemporaries abound in instances of his kindliness
and forethought for those serving under his command. In
an age when professional ignorance and want of experi-
ence caused much unnecessary suffering to the troops,
Abercromby distinguished himself by his wise measures
and practical foresight, and never had the British soldier
a truer comrade or more generous friend.
324 Twelve Soldiers

As a leader on the field of battle, Abercromby had one
serious defect: he was extremely near-sighted, and although
able, through glasses, to observe ground and the enemy’s
dispositions both quickly and well, it was necessary for him
to be able to rely upon the aid of good executive generals,
quick to grasp his intentions, to act on their own respon-
sibility, and to carry out his intentions with singleness of
purpose during the moving phases of a fight. In this
respect he was singularly fortunate, and left behind him
many able lieutenants, who not only carried the campaign
in Egypt to a successful issue, but distinguished themselves
in many another field, while two of them, Moore and
Picton, were destined like their veteran chief to fall in
the arms of victory. In Moore’s journal there is an
eloquent tribute to Abercromby’s memory, and in the
memoirs of many other of his contemporaries can be found
the clear and ringing notes of genuine admiration and
universal respect.

Sir Henry Bunbury, who was intimately associated with
him in 1799, has left on record the following brief but
characteristic sketch.

“Of all our generals .. . Abercromby stood foremost.
Mild in manner, resolute in mind, frank, unassuming, just,
inflexible in what he deemed to be right, valiant as the
Cid, liberal and loyal as the prowest of black Edward’s
knights: an honest, fearless, straightforward man, and
withal sagacious and well skilled in his business as a
soldier. As he looked out from under his thick, shaggy
eyebrows he gave one the idea of a very good-natured
lion, and he was respected and beloved by all who served

under his command.”
Abercromby 325

One cannot close this record more fitly than by giving
the words of the general order to the army, issued by his
old friend and comrade the Duke of York, on the occasion
of Abercromby’s last victory and death.

“The illustrious example of their commander cannot
fail to have made an indelible impression on the gallant
troops, at whose head, crowned with victory and glory, he
terminated his honourable career ; and His Majesty trusts
that a due contemplation of the talents and virtues which
he uniformly displayed in the course of his valuable life
will for ever endear the memory of Sir Ralph Abercromby
to the British army.

“His steady observance of discipline, his ever-watchful
attention to the health and wants of his troops, the per-
severing and unconquerable spirit which marked his
military career, the splendour of his actions in the field,
and the heroism of his death, are worthy of the imitation
of all who desire, like him, a life of honour and a death

of glory.”
LAKE

1744—1808

GERARD LAKE, who was afterwards to win fame and
remembrance as Lord Lake of Laswaree, was born on
July 27, 1744, of a race so ancient that popular tradition
derives it from Sir Launcelot du lac of the Arthurian
legend, What is less disputable, is that he was the elder
son of Lancelot Charles Lake, and grandson of Warwick
Lake, who married the heiress of Sir Thomas Gerard of
Flamberds, Harrow-on-the-Hill. One of his mother’s
sisters married William Pulteney, first Earl of Bath, and
George Colman, the elder, was the son of another of his
maternal aunts. He was appointed an ensign in the Ist
(Grenadier) Guards on May 9, 1758, being then therefore
but fourteen years of age, and he belonged to the same
corps throughout his service as a regimental officer. Thus
it was that Lake had the rare good fortune to join the
service at a time when Europe was ringing with the
victories of Prague and Kolin, and when the genius of
the great Frederick was astonishing the world and teaching
soldiers their profession.

The Guards went to Germany in 1760, and with them
the young ensign served during the subsequent campaigns
under a brigadier who bore the redoubtable name of Julius
Cesar.

At the close of the campaign of 1762 he returned to
326
 

 

LAKE.
Lake 224

England, having just been promoted Captain and Lieu-
tenant-Colonel in accordance with the system which pre-
vailed in the Guards up to our own times. Some few
years later he was in Ireland as azde-de-camp to Sir Richard
Pearson, K.B., but what is of more interest to us is his
sojourn in America, whither he went in 1781 with drafts
for his regiment there on active service under that Lord
Cornwallis with whom he was subsequently to be so much
thrown in contact, and under whom it was his fate to serve
up to the.very end of his career.

Lake’s regiment was part of the force which was in-
vested at York Town, and on October 16 he distinguished
himself by his handling of a detachment from the Guards
and the Grenadiers of the old 80th Regiment in a brilliant
sortie which cost the enemy a large number of killed
and wounded and eleven guns. The subsequent sur-
render left him a prisoner of war till May 1783, and then
for ten years his life was with the court rather than the
camp. In February 1793 war with the French Republic
broke out, and a brigade of Guards under Lake’s com-
mand sailed for the Low Countries, to take part in the
expedition under the Duke of York. The war in America
had been one of surprises and ambushes, and probably
it was there that Lake first learnt the value of light infantry
troops ; at any rate he now utilized the opportunity, while
his regiment was quartered at Dordrecht, to form a com-
pany of light infantry amongst his Guardsmen. On
August 18 the Prince of Orange, with his Dutchmen,
had attacked the enemy in an entrenched position at
Lincelles, and at first had gained some advantage. At
one o'clock, however, a counter-stroke caught them un-
328 Twelve Soldiers

prepared, and they not only abandoned the ground that
had been gained, but left their ammunition and guns
behind them. The Prince called to the Duke of York for
aid, and Lake was ordered to lead his three battalions with
some guns to the rescue. Though the weary Guardsmen
were just settling down after a long march, their energetic
leader had placed them in front of Lincelles by six o'clock,
The unenterprising Dutchmen would, however, neither
rally nor even believe in the possibility of the day being
retrieved, and now Lake had to face twelve hostile
battalions with his three. The enemy held two strong
redoubts on either flank of the village; the road along its
front was strongly palisaded, and natural obstacles made
the rear of the flanks safe. A rapid glance showed that a
quick, audacious blow could alone be successful, and with-
out a moment’s hesitation Lake launched three battalions
on the stronghold of the confident foe. Then he sent word
back to the Duke of York to tell him how matters stood.
He knew that his men were well disciplined, and reckoned
that their onset would be a vastly different thing to face
from the half-hearted advance of the Dutch, So it proved.
The comparatively raw troops of the French quailed before
the impetuosity of the Englishmen, and fled from the
redoubts precipitately. Nor when they tried to rally
behind the village would Lake allow them breathing time,
but sweeping round their right flank, finally shattered the
shaking ranks. Eleven pieces of cannon, a stand of
colours, and seventy prisoners were the trophies of the
victor’s resolution and promptitude. There is no more
brilliant little victory in English history, and the mis-
conduct of their allies enhanced the Guardsmen’s triumph.
Lake 329

But when on the following day they met their friends, who
somewhat sullenly welcomed the victory they might have
shared, the Prince of Waldeck grasped the hand of their
commanding officer with the words—“Your glory is our
shame.”

It was during the Irish Rebellion that Lake was next to
distinguish himself. As usually occurs in such irregular
warfare, the difficulty was to get an opportunity of striking
a telling blow against large formed bodies of the enemy.
Lake exhibited remarkable energy and quickness in the
minor operations, and considerable patience when, finding
his foes concentrated in Wexford on June 19, he wisely
refrained from a premature attack. On the 21st he at
length held his enemy fairly in his grasp in the position
of Vinegar Hill. A decisive victory was the inevitable
result of such a conflict between discipline and unorganized
frenzy, the entire rebel camp, with their guns, arms, and
plunder was captured, and any combined effort of re-
sistance finally crushed. Lake is no more to be blamed
for the excesses which followed, than is the Great Duke
for the scenes in Badajos. The British soldier of the day
was terrible in his triumph. Lake says in his letter to
Castlereagh after Vinegar Hill—“ The troops behaved
excessively well in action, but their determination to destroy
every one they think a rebel is beyond description, and
wants correction.” Of the executions he was subsequently
obliged to carry out, he says—“I really feel most severely
the being obliged to order so many men out of the world.”
In August the French Directory succeeded in landing a
force under General Humbert, which it trusted would form
the nucleus of another army of insurrection, and prolong the
330 Twelve Soldiers

conflict. A distinct success at Castlebar on August 26 at
first flattered the hopes of the Frenchmen, but their Irish
allies responded very faintly with either men or supplies to
their appeal, and after a short advance into the country
they had to fall back to the sea. Then Lake, with a
compact force eager to retrieve the disaster of Castlebar,
showed himself a most dangerous antagonist.

Day and night he dogged Humbert’s footsteps with the
same unrelenting vigour with which subsequently he pur-
sued Holkar. Nor was he content to use cavalry alone
for this purpose. He caused his light infantrymen to
be mounted behind his dragoons, and thus four days after
the French had evacuated Castlebar, he brought the head
of their column to a standstill at Ballinamuck, and com-
pelled them to surrender.

When the French force had been wiped out, there
remained to be dealt with bands of outlaws and robbers
still at large in the fastnesses of the wilder portions of the
country. These Lake energetically pursued and dispersed,
but such employment was not agreeable to him nor is
it instructive to us, and his longing glances were soon
cast towards a field where there was work to be done
more worthy of an ambitious general. Meanwhile, his
presence in Ireland was turned to political account, and
a vote in favour of the Union helped him towards the
Indian command which he desired. In October 1800 he
was appointed Commander-in-Chief in India and second
member of the Indian Council, and on July 31, 1801, he
actually took over his new responsibilities.

He had come to India at a time when the great Mahratta
Confederacy existed, with the avowed object of expelling
Lake 331

us from Hindostan. French adventurers organized the
native armies, and endeavoured to support the policy of
our opponents in Europe by creating a diversion in the
East. Fortunately at such a moment there was at the
head of the Indian Empire a statesman who was a man of
action too; and the Marquis Wellesley had clearly realized
for some time that the combination against us must be
broken up.

In December 1802 he took advantage of a war between
the rival Mahratta chieftains, and of the defeat of the
Peishwa, their nominal head, to negotiate the treaty of
Bassein, which satisfied neither the Peishwa nor the other
princes, and effectually split up their confederacy. Then
he drew the sword, determined once for all to reduce the
Mahratta chieftains to a status inadequate to aggressive
enterprises against our territory. The circumstances of
the moment placed at his disposal two soldiers of marked
ability and energy, in the persons of his brother, Major-
General Arthur Wellesley, and General Lake. To the
former he assigned the task of dealing with the Mahratta
forces in the south and south-west, while to the latter fell
the even more. difficult duty of crushing the highly-trained
battalions of Scindiah, under Monsieur Perron, in the
north-west provinces. At the end of July 1803 Arthur
Wellesley advanced against Scindiah and the Rajah of
Berar in Central India. On August 7 Lake left Cawnpore,
and on the 12th united his forces in the camp at Kanauj,
where a few days were spent in gaiety and field-sports
such as the neighbourhood abundantly provided. Thorn
tells us a characteristic anecdote, when he says that here
the Commander-in-Chief shot with his pistol a tiger which
332 Twelve Soldiers

had been speared by Major Nairne, and was in the act of
springing upon him when the General went to his as-
sistance. It was at this camp that Lake, during the
preceding winter, had introduced and perfected the system
of “Galloper guns,” of which our Horse Artillery are
the present development, and which were to be of such

 

   
 

    

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service to him subsequently in his rapid cavalry ex-
peditions. Few military improvements ever bore more
opportune fruit than this, as was evidenced by the terror
which this ubiquitous artillery in the space of a few months
produced on the Mahratta horse. Here too, no doubt,
the same keen eye superintended the training of the light
Lake axe

infantry marksmen, who were another new improvement
in the Indian army.

On the 28th Lake was on the frontier with 10,500 men,
within sight of Koel, where Perron was strongly posted,
with the fort of Aligarh a short distance in his rear. The
Frenchman was already preparing to desert Scindiah’s
cause, and made no real effort against the English. A
rapid reconnaissance showed Lake his enemy, with his right
supported by the fort of Aligarh, his front covered by a
swamp impassable in all but a few places, and his left also
considerably strengthened by the features of the ground
and by some villages in that quarter. The Mahratta force
has been very variously estimated, but the cavalry num-
bered 5000 regulars, while with the irregulars the total has
been placed as high as 20,000. To these may be added
2000 well-trained infantry, and a considerable number of
guns. Lake decided to turn the enemy’s left, but to do
so he had to make a difficult movement to his own
right. Perron let slip the chance then offered to his
numerous cavalry. He might have met Lake and crushed
the head of his column, as Frederick met his opponents at
Rossbach, but he only stood in half-hearted indecision till
his foe was near enough to strike with full force. And
once the desired point was gained the blow fell with
stunning completeness. The attack of the cavalry in two
lines was supported by the infantry in three or four, and
but slight resistance was offered to the onset. A large
column of irregulars for a few moments threatened our
advance, but the Galloper guns that had been trained for
the purpose went swiftly into action, and it needed but a
very few rounds from them ere the Mahratta Cavalry broke
334 Twelve Soldiers

and fled. Then the squadrons rushed upon them too, and
the rest of the fight is but the story of panic and despair.
Perron escaped to Agra,and Lake’s success was marred only
by the dispersion of the foe having left him nothing more
to destroy. That night the army encamped at Koel.
Before it lay the fort of Aligarh, formidable in defences,
and commanded by a Frenchman named Pedron. When
Perron had made his own skin safe, he sent a letter to his
countryman, exhorting him “to defend the fort while one
stone remained upon another.”

Lake, confident of success, and anxious to save blood-
shed, did his best to make this hero come to terms, and
with commendable humanity delayed several days in
attacking, so that he might have every facility for doing
so Poor Pedron, “a stout elderly man in a green jacket
with gold lace and epaulets,” was however either of too
heroic a nature to accept the terms, or else, which is
perhaps more likely, his men, who had their own leaders
and notions, would not allow him to do so. Aligarh was
garrisoned by 2000 trained infantry, was defended by a
powerful artillery, and was elaborately fortified. To enter
on a siege might give the enemy time to reinforce Delhi,
on which the eye of Lake was already set, so he determined
to try a coup de main. A narrow causeway led across the
moat, from 100 to 200 feet wide and 32 feet deep, to the
first gateway, and along that narrow path, raked by three
guns and flanked by a bastion, the storming party of the

1 “No one exacts more of a soldier than myself, when I think it
absolutely necessary to call forth their exertions, at the same time I
have ever avoided risking the life of a soldier when it could be spared.”
—From letter to Lord Wellesley, dated September 1, 1803.
Lake 335

76th Regiment was led. Several attempts at escalade
were baffled, and there was much loss of life, but eventu-
ally a 12-pounder was brought up, and the gate forced
open. Four gates were thus passed in succession, and
finally, at the end of an hour’s hard fighting, the British,
by sheer persistence, carried inch by inch a fortress hitherto
regarded as impregnable. The British had lost 223 men,
while 2000 dead Mahrattas bore testimony to the stub-
bornness of the defence. A deed so daring electrified the
whole country ; the Mahrattas realized that even French
officers and European training could not balance such
determination ; the natives generally were panic-stricken,
and they and their rulers conceived horrible imaginings
as to what European soldiers and European courage
might accomplish. The tangible trophies consisted of 109
cannon, with a vast quantity of stores and material of all
kinds. Perron had calculated on the fortress holding out
for two months. It had fallen in a day.

From the scene of this triumph Lake moved towards
Delhi, on September 7, 1803. On the same day a letter
arrived from Perron, who threw himself on his mercy and
asked for a safe conduct to Lucknow. He had received a
bitter blow in the base desertion of Bourguien, his fellow-
countryman, who had placed himself in command at
Delhi. When Lake on the 11th reached the Hindun river,
six miles from that city, after a fatiguing march, the
advanced cavalry of this same Bourguien came suddenly
upon his men while pitching tents and cooking. Calling
three of his cavalry regiments to him, Lake at once set
out to reconnoitre, and found the enemy so strongly posted
that to turn him out of his position seemed hopeless.
336 Twelve Soldiers

Twelve battalions of infantry, trained by Europeans, some
5000 sabres and 70 guns, were there in all. Both flanks
rested on a swamp, and a line of entrenchments secured

     
  
 

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the front. It was an occasion when stratagem must
replace audacity, and Lake could be cunning as well as
bold. The Mahrattas were a race of soldiers flushed with
the conquest of the territories of the Great Mogul. Many
Lake 33 7

of their battalions had been brought by the able de Boigne
to a state of discipline and training that was equal, as they
supposed, to that of the troops whom to-day they were to
meet. They would in all probability snatch impatiently
at a victory which they regarded as their due. Lake,
weighing these things in his quick mind a minute or two,
resolved to try and draw the enemy out of his works, in
order to spring upon him in the open. His infantry were
called forward, and while they were coming up his cavalry,
exposed all the time to a heavy cannonade, covered the
movement. When the moment was ripe the squadrons were
retired towards the advancing battalions. The Mahrattas,
exultant, determined to convert the retreat into a rout, and
rushed forward from their earthworks, accompanied by their
artillery. Meanwhile the British cavalry and infantry had
met; the former opening out from the centre, drew off to the
flanks, and disclosed to the astonished enemy the infantry
columns deploying into line for attack. Some squadrons
too were detached with Gallopers to protect the British
right. Lake, who had already had one horse shot under
him, himself led the bayonets against the cannon. On
they swept till within a hundred yards of their foe, then there
was one volley, a ringing cheer, and his men rushed on
their opponents. That furious charge was too much for
the Mahrattas, and.without waiting to cross bayonets their
infantry went right about and fled precipitately. Now the
British line broke up into columns of companies, and
through the intervals the Galloper guns and cavalry dashed
on in pursuit. Thorn tells us that the former particularly
distinguished themselves, and did great execution amongst

the fugitives. No victory could have been more complete.
Zi
338 Twelve Soldiers

The Mahrattas lost enormously, and many of those who
escaped fire and steel found death in the waters of the
Jumna. The minarets of Delhi saw it all, and ere the
sun set that night Lake had pitched his camp on the east
bank of the Jumna, opposite the Imperial City. The
victors had lost 477 men killed and wounded, of whom
no fewer than 131 belonged to the gallant 76th. Of their
opponents 3000 were left upon the field, while practically
the whole of their guns and ammunition, with two tumbrils
of treasure, became booty. Three days later, Bourguien,
said to have been the very first to leave the field, sur-
rendered to his opponent with four more of Scindiah’s
foreign officers. On the 16th Lake had his first interview
with Shah Alum, “the Great Mogul,” old and blind and
miserable, but overjoyed at his deliverance, and eager with
squalid magnificence to shower high-sounding titles on the
foreigner who had saved him from his friends.

Lake was occupied till September 24 in putting matters
on a satisfactory footing at the capital, but then set out
down the western bank of the Jumna to seize the scarcely
less important city of Agra, containing treasure to the
amount of twenty-five lakhs, held for Scindiah by a
Dutch adventurer, named Hessing, with 4500 men. Out-
side the walls, to which they had been refused admission,
lest they should claim a share of the treasure, three bat-
talions which had escaped from Delhi and four of Perron’s
5th Brigade, which had arrived with twenty-six guns from
the Deccan, were in position. More dangerous even than
these, there hovered on Lake’s right rear fifteen trained
battalions from the Deccan, the flower of Scindiah’s army,
under Monsieur Dudrenec.
Lake 339

A less resolute man might have hesitated when menaced
by three such forces, but Lake’s quick decision enabled
him to catch them each in detail. Before he could besiege
Agra he must clear away the force on the glacis. On
October 10, therefore, he fell upon it with nine battalions,
in so vigorous a fashion that in spite of a determined
resistance, which cost him nine officers and 213 men, he
captured all the guns and completely dispersed the
battalions. Then he set to work at the fortress. The
Mahratta soldiers, disgusted with foreign leaders after their
experiences with Perron and Bourguien, had deposed
Hessing and the European officers from command. The
defence was but half-hearted, and a short bombardment on
the 17th was enough to bring the garrison to its knees on
the following day. The cherished twenty-five lakhs fell
into Lake’s hands, together with many pieces of artillery,
amongst which was “the great gun of Agra,” a monster
firing a projectile of 1500 lbs., which however sank to the
bottom of the Jumna on its way to Calcutta, and has lain
there ever since. It was the turn now of the force from
the Deccan, which two battalions from Delhi had joined,
and which had also been swollen by the fugitives from
Aligarh, Delhi and Agra.!. On them Lake swiftly turned.
“Tf I can get hold,” he said, “of the brigades of the Deccan,
not a Frenchman will be left in the country.” Dudrenec,
however, and the French officers, tempted by the British
terms, deserted the Mahrattas, and Lake himself confessed
that it was well for the British force that they did.

Abaji,a Mahratta of considerable military talent, fore-

1 Despatches of the Marquess Wellesley, edited by Martin, vol.
xi. p. 445. Thorn also gives the same numbers.
340 Twelve Soldiers

stalled by the energy of Lake in his attempt to relieve
Agra, intended to wait for a chance of recovering Delhi,
and accordingly moved to occupy a position in the hilly
Mewat country, to which only one pass, and that easily
defensible, led. His army would form a dangerous nucleus
of resistance, and must be destroyed. Therefore Lake
determined to try and catch him before he could reach
this stronghold, and accordingly on October 27 set out
in pursuit. A rain-storm inundated the camp on the 28th,
and rendered movement that day impossible, but on the
next a forced march of twenty miles made up the lee-way.
The heavy artillery and baggage was left behind at Fut-
tehpore Sikri, under the protection of two native battalions,
because the state of the ground prevented their moving
sufficiently rapidly, while Lake at the head of the cavalry,
light artillery, and infantry pressed on with redoubled
efforts. On the evening of October 31 he was close to
the very ground Abaji had quitted that morning. The
pass, which was the goal of this exciting race, was now
but thirty-three miles distant, and the active Mahrattas
were a day’s march ahead. It was imperative to delay
their progress somehow, and Lake had immense confidence
in the cavalry and the guns he had trained to act with
them. So he determined to press on with these arms
alone, fasten with them on his foe, and hold him till the
infantry could come up. At eleven o'clock that night his
three brigades of cavalry were again on the road, and the
sunrise of November 1 showed him the Mahrattas on the
north of the Bara4ki Nullah, not far from the village of
Laswaree, and somewhat in confusion at his unexpected
appearance. The squadrons had come twenty-five miles
Lake 341

in six hours during the night following a hard day’s march,
and now nine thousand excellent infantry, seventy-two guns,
and between four and five thousand cavalry were before
them.

No wonder if Lake held his breath for a moment as he
looked across at what was against him. They were the
best of the celebrated de Boigne’s famous brigades, had
earned the proud title of “the Deccan Invincibles,’ and
had been taught to act up to their pretensions. With him
were cavalry and Galloper guns alone, and five of his
eight regiments were composed only of native horsemen,
just as were those they faced. But they were flushed with
the deeds of Aligarh, Delhi and Agra, while in the hostile
ranks were many fugitives from those well-won fields.
It was of the first importance to prevent the enemy from
reaching the difficult pass for which he was heading, and
above all other considerations, it was safest when dealing
with an Asiatic to be audacious. Finally, when first
sighted, the enemy were somewhat in confusion at Malpur,
and apparently about to slip away. Lake’s decision was
soon made, and was what might have been anticipated
from the character of the man. Putting himself in the
place he loved, at the head of his leading regiment, he led
it to the attack, trusting that he could at any rate hold
the enemy till the infantry, who had started at three a.m.,
came up.

But the Mahrattas were not intending to fly. They cut
the embankment of a canal, and flooded the path along
which Lake must advance, to delay his progress, and give
them time to take up a defensive position. Their right
now rested on the village of Laswaree, a rivulet and
Twelve Soldiers

front, while Malpur

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cealed from view by high grass.
position, the clouds of dust raised by their numerous

cavalry quite obscured the movement, and it was impossible
Lake 343

for Lake to see exactly how they were placed. This
difficulty might in the case of a less resolute man have
induced delay or hesitation, but Lake was one who never
swerved from the prompt execution of his original con-
ception, and was not to be baffled by embarrassments.
So he held on straight for the point where he had last
seen the enemy. That point had now become the left of
the Mahratta position, and by his reaching it the line of
retreat for all their guns, which Lake had made up his
mind to have, would be cut.

Whatever was the intention of the foe, Malpur was the
objective which promised the most decisive results, and
therefore, through the dust and fire of the Mahratta batteries,
our squadrons swept unswervingly to that goal. The Ist
Brigade (8th Light Dragoons and Ist and 3rd Native
Cavalry) was to pass along the front of the enemy’s
position and attack Malpur, while the 3rd Brigade (29th
Light Dragoons and 4th Native Cavalry) was to assault
the right flank. Lake’s officers entered fully into the
spirit of his instructions, and carried his idea out with a
most whole-hearted chivalry. The advanced guard and
Ist Brigade stormed headlong into the village, forced back
the enemy’s line here, and captured several guns. The
success was dearly purchased, however, with the loss of
its leader, Colonel T. P. Vandeleur, of the 8th Light
Dragoons (now Hussars).

The 3rd Brigade, which came next, wheeled sharply to
its left, and made straight at the enemy’s line close to
its right extremity. Right in the teeth of the powerful
artillery in position waiting to receive them, galloped the
29th Dragoons and the 4th Native Cavalry. Not till
344 Twelve Soldiers

they were within twenty yards from the muzzles was the
storm let loose, but then it crashed upon them with
pitiless fury, and a terrible scene of carnage ensued, re-
minding one of the destruction of the French Cuirassiers
by Mercer’s battery at Waterloo. Chains had been drawn
from axletree to axletree between the guns, while the
batteries were concealed by long grass until they opened
fire. Somehow or other the chains were passed. Back-
wards and forwards, three times through the Mahratta line,
rode the horsemen, and when they left the guns to fall
with impetuous fury on the infantry behind, the dusky
gunners, emerging from beneath their carriages, re-loaded
and poured destruction on their rear. The infantry mean-
while took shelter behind an entrenchment barricaded
with hackeries, carts,and baggage, and from this strong-
hold plied their assailants with musketry. Although all
the guns at this part of the field had been captured, only
two could be carried off. In short, the weakness of
cavalry, after its first rush is expended, was once more
exemplified, and the brigade, although it had achieved a
most pronounced victory, and exhibited almost ideal
bravery and dash, had to be recalled to re-form on the
support in rear. But Lake, though at a dear price, had
gained his object, and the foe did not venture to try and
slip away.

Meanwhile his infantry battalions were listening to the
distant cannon, and were pressing on their way with
steadfast determination to have their share in the glory. At
noon they had come up, having accomplished twenty-five .
miles since morning. Lake rested them for an hour, and let
them eat their breakfasts, before he drew them up to fight.
Lake 345

The Mahrattas had made use of the respite allowed them
after the cavalry had been recalled in changing their
position to one of greater strength round the village of
Malpur. Their hearts may have failed them when they
saw the British infantry appear on the scene, and negotia-
tions for a surrender were commenced. Lake, probably
suspecting treachery, none the less continued his prepara-
tions for attack, and when the time allotted for the per-
formance of the conditions imposed by him had elapsed
without their fulfilment, set his plan in motion.

The enemy was now drawn up almost at right angles to
his former front, with his left resting on Malpur, which had
been prepared for defence, and was well protected with
artillery, while guns were also posted along the new front.
A second line in rear of the village was parallel to the
first. Lake intended to form his battalions in two columns,
to move along the rivulet under cover of the broken
ground and long grass which had just given shelter to the
enemy’s line, again to force his way between the enemy’s
right and the nullah, and to assail him in his right rear.
The flank march before the enemy’s position once more
reminds us of the Seven Years’ War, and was carried out
with a precision which Frederick would have commended.
The 2nd Brigade of Cavalry was sent to threaten the
enemy’s left flank, while the 1st Brigade formed a reserve,
and the 3rd covered the movement of the infantry. All
the guns that could be got together were massed in four
large batteries to support the attack. As soon as the
Mahratta general grasped what the movements in his front
portended, he threw back his right wing, and his numerous
and powerful guns grouped round Malpur began a furious
346 Twelve Soldiers

cannonade on the heads of the advancing columns. The
British artillery deployed in reply, and vigorously returned
the fire. Amid this cannonade, the infantry, although
losing heavily, pressed steadily forward, headed by the
indefatigable 76th. When within one hundred and fifty
yards of their objective, the storm of case from the Mah-
ratta batteries was felt in full force, and at that moment
it was discovered that the second column, which was to
have been in close support of the first, had been delayed
in the broken ground, and was not at hand. To stop
under such a storm, or even to hesitate, might prelude a
defeat. Therefore Lake, accurately gauging the spirit of
his men, himself headed the 76th Regiment, and led it
and the two native regiments with him straight at the
position. As they struggled forward, the enemy received
them with the greatest steadiness, and Abaji, displaying
nice judgment, suddenly threw his cavalry upon them as
they reeled under the fire of his guns. Lake, no less
vigilant and ready, called the 29th Light Dragoons to
make a counter-charge. At this supreme moment his
horse was shot, and his son fell wounded at his side.
Such mishaps, while they in no way shook the fortitude
of the leader, only maddened to enhanced exertions the
men who witnessed them. Their cheers mingled with
the trumpet-call as the 29th Dragoons rode headlong
into the guns. One tremendous salvo emptied many a
saddle, but the squadrons went unfalteringly on, pierced
the batteries, and broke the infantry in rear. Right in
their track Lake led his own infantry ; who soon seized
the guns and made good the ground gained by the cavalry.
The squadrons having destroyed the first line of the enemy,
Lake 347

now wheeled to the left, and dashed at his cavalry, which
was hovering behind, drove it in stampede off the field,
and pursued it remorselessly up to the pass through
the hills which had been Lake’s goal all along. Then
back again they hastened, to fall on the rear of the main
body, whose escape they effectually cut off. The 27th
Light Dragoons and 6th Native Cavalry on Lake’s extreme
right, also joined in the assault on the enemy’s rear, and
sabred many hundreds. But the battle, though won, was
by no means over. De Boigne’s battalions were still to
justify their reputation, and show a steadfastness such as
soldiers will admire, but can scarcely hope to surpass.
If they gave way before the British bayonets, they did
so only inch by inch, and nothing like a panic marked
their overthrow. At length but two thousand heroes were
left to stand at bay, and these, hemmed in on all sides,
finally surrendered as prisoners of war—almost all the
remainder of the nine thousand infantry who had faced
Lake that morning were left lying dead on the field.

There is scarcely a more bloody or stubborn fight
recorded in the annals of war, and the victor, with a
chivalry all his own, did due homage to the courage of
his opponents. In his despatch to Lord Wellesley, he
wrote—* Jf they had been commanded by French officers
the affair would, I fear, have been very doubtful.’ His
troops cheered him as he turned to leave the scene of
carnage; he raised his hat in response, but pointing to the
dead Mahrattas lying round their guns, told them “to
despise death as those brave fellows had done.”

The British side had lost 824 killed and wounded, in-
cluding forty-two officers, amongst whom Major-General
348 Twelve Soldiers

Ware and Colonel Vandeleur were killed. The Commander-
in-Chief had two horses shot under him,and had more than
one very narrow escape. The Mahrattas lost their camp
as it stood, all their baggage, some seventy guns, and
forty-four stands of colours, but such trophies, even when
added. to the ammunition, specie, and bullocks taken, did
not represent the severity of the blow that had struck
them. The power of their race had that day been shattered,
and the dreams of conquest conjured up in the Mahratta
mind were for ever dissipated. Even if his triumph was
tempered with a certain sense of relief that the day had
ended well for him (and in a letter to the Marquess
Wellesley he confesses that it was the most anxious one
he ever spent), Lake might well exult that night. Witha
force at no time exceeding eight thousand men he had in two
months’ time completely wrecked the thirty-one battalions
which de Boigne and Perron, and other French officers,
had disciplined and trained for Scindiah ; he had stormed
Aligarh, captured Agra, and entered Delhi as a conqueror.
He had met and routed the best troops in India, excepting
the British, in four pitched battles, had taken 426 cannon,
and an immense booty of other description, while in this
final fight he dealt such a blow as reverberated from one
end of the peninsula to the other. And in doing all this,
he had vied in the manner in which he exposed himself
with the greatest daredevil in his army; he had accomplished
what he did mainly by his own matchless personal activity
and energy, and so had gained the love as well as the
respect of every man he led. The thanks of Parliament,
a sword of honour from the inhabitants of Calcutta, and
a superb service of plate from the officers who had served
Lake 349

with him, bore tangible testimony to the manner in which
his services were appreciated, while a peerage, somewhat
tardily bestowed on September 1, 1804, called him to the
House of Lords as Baron Lake of Delhi and of Aston
Clinton, Bucks,

Peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar was finally
signed in February 1804, but Scindiah’s sworn enemy and
rival in the Mahratta confederacy, Jeswant Rao Holkar,
who had stood aside and watched Laswaree with com-
placency, now turned a lowering brow towards those who
in destroying his rival had shown him what might be in
store for himself. A treacherous duplicity, ill-concealed
by a haughty bearing, left little doubt as to the course
that would have to be adopted with him; the barbarous
murder of three English officers in his service, who had
refused to fight against their own countrymen, and the
discovery of intrigues against us with the Sikhs and
Rohillas, precipitated a foregone conclusion.

On February 9, 1804, Lord Lake once more drew the
sword, and marched from Biana twenty-one miles into
Jeypore territory which had been invaded by the Mahrattas.
Negotiations still continued, but Lake, foreseeing how
they would end, from time to time moved his force further
forward. On April 18, he detached Colonel Monson with
a small force to protect the capital, Jeypore, the neighbour-
hood of which was reached on the 21st. Holkar, however,
true to the traditional tactics of his race, declined to
face the attack, and slipped away. Moreover, a detach-
ment of two battalions, and a regiment of cavalry, under
Colonel Don, had stormed and taken Tonk Rampura,
and the news of this success was enough to make Holkar
350 Twelve Soldiers

cross the Chambal, and hasten still further southwards.
Lake, feeling that British prestige had now been vindi-
cated, intended to postpone operations until after the rains,
and ordered Don to join Monson, and the latter, who had
now nearly four thousand men, to remain at Kota, and
protect the lands of the Jeypore Rajah, while he himself
with his main body should move on Agra and Cawnpore.

Monson was a gallant man, but his courage shone more
steadfastly during the impetus of an attack than when a
decision in chill difficulties had to be formed and carried
through. He rashly disregarded Lord Lake’s instructions,
and with a scheme of his own in his head, left Kota to
advance further against Holkar. The cunning Mahratta
simulated retreat, and drew him on until with food for only
two days, he was several marches from his base. When
Monson found himself within striking distance, he resolved,
in spite of his perilous position, to attack. Had he stuck
to his determination he might very likely have won. But
his nerve failed at the supreme moment, and when within
only seven miles of the enemy, he decided to fall back.
And then, as he struggled back through the difficult country
towards Agra, his opponent made him feel the full measure
of despair. Had Holkar been the relentless soldier he
was reputed to be, not a man would in all probability
have escaped; as it was, when the demoralized force
slunk crestfallen into Agra, it had lost twelve or fourteen
guns, fifteen officers had been killed or drowned, nine more
were wounded, while three, of whom subsequently one
was murdered and one died, had been taken prisoners.
The actual number of soldiers who perished has never
been known,
Lake 351

The disaster only indirectly interests us here, for Lake
was in no way responsible for it, but the sense of shame
which the news of it produced, quickened every English-
man in India to enhanced efforts towards avenging it, and
gave the Commander-in-Chief another opportunity of dis-
playing his talents in their very brightest phase. An
avenging force was at once called together, and at its
head he rode out of Cawnpore on September 3.

Holkar was far too clever to make a stand-up fight,
To hover on his opponent’s flanks, to harass him in every
way, delay his advance, cut off his supplies, then perhaps
to slip away, gain Delhi, and seize the Emperor, such was
the far abler plan he had in his mind.

On October 7, Lake hoped he at last held him at Aurang,
but Holkar eluded his swoop, slipping off more quickly
than he could be followed. On the roth the same tactics
were pursued. The following day a message from Delhi
announced the impending siege of the capital, and disclosed
the true schemes of the enemy.

Three or four strong places lay between Lake and that city,
but these with judicious courage he ignored, and making for
the decisive point, started at once to succour Ochterlony who
was holding it. On the 18th he reached his destination, to
find that the terror of his advent had been enough to cause
the Mahrattas toraise the siege precipitately four days before.

Holkar, foiled in his attempt, had retreated north-
wards, and having crossed the Jumna near Paniput, was
preparing to ravage the Doab. On the 3oth, our in-
defatigable General again started in pursuit of him, with
three British and three native regiments of cavalry, the
horse artillery, and Don’s reserve brigade of infantry,
352 Twelve Soldiers

Colonel Burn had been detached on the 25th to go to
the relief of Saharanpur. On him the Mahrattas now
turned, and for three days his small force, driven into a
mud-fort at Shamli, had made a desperate defence. On
the 2nd of November, Lake marched thirty miles in
twelve hours to the rescue. The next day he reached
the fort, but the rising dust of his advance had been
enough to drive off the enemy, who vanished to the
northward. On the 5th, after a day’s rest, the quest was
again taken up, and fourteen miles were covered. On
the 6th another march of twenty-four miles to Sird-
hana, where dwelt the celebrated Begum Sumroo, was
accomplished. On the 7th, a fleeting view of the enemy’s
rear-guard rewarded his perseverance, but the sight of
his horse artillery moving out to engage it was enough
to drive it off. Fifteen miles were accomplished ere
his troops drew bridle at Khatauli; and the next day
they were again on the track, and that night reached
Meerut. On the oth the remorseless pursuit still swept
ahead, and at sunset, Lake was at Ha’par, twenty miles
nearer his foe. The next day saw the same extra-
ordinary spectacle. The enemy always twenty or thirty
miles in front, burning, plundering, destroying as he went
along, and like a sleuth-hound at his heels, the untiring
British general. Thus the days went by till on the
16th, when Lake in the evening reached Aligunj, he
found that village still burning, and learnt that Holkar
was but thirty-six miles ahead at Furrukhabad. A forced
march by night might catch him unprepared, and this was
what Lake determined to try. At nine o’clock at night,
therefore, he started with the British cavalry and horse.
Lake 353

artillery alone. The moon was up, and cheered by its
light and the early prospect of an end to their labours,
the men rode gaily on. Just as day was breaking they
saw the enemy’s camp before them wrapt in slumber, the
horses on the picquet lines, their riders in their blankets
on the ground beside them. The grape which the horse
artillery poured in upon them was the first intimation of
Lake’s approach. Panic is but a faint term to express the
scene which ensued. The 8th Hussars were first among
the sleepers, but the other regiments were scarcely behind
them, and a slaughter ensued more nearly akin to butchery
than fighting. Of the Mahrattas! three thousand were
sabred, and more than that number were dispersed, while
but two of our men were killed and only twenty wounded.
And for ten miles further the avenging squadrons raced
along. Holkar was the first to fly, nor did he draw
rein till he reached the Kalini river eighteen miles away.
Lake had left Delhi on the 31st of the previous month,
and he had consequently covered three hundred and fifty
miles in eighteen days, and had been able to snatch Burn
from the jaws of the Mahrattas,on the way. That per-
formance is perhaps unparalleled, but what makes it still
more astonishing is the final effort, for when the distance
to which the pursuit was carried is taken into account, it
will be found that during the last twenty-four hours, more
than seventy miles were left behind. That such strenuous
exertions could be crowned by such a feat speaks volumes
for the discipline, efficiency, and spirit of the troops, and
for the character of their leader.

1 The number of the Mahratta horse has been numbered by

thousands, by some as high as 60,000,
AA
354 Twelve Soldiers

On the zoth Lake was again pressing after the fugitive,
who, he heard, had in his extremity made for Deeg. Before,
however, we continue the tale further, it is necessary
to pause for a moment, and glance backwards at what
had been done by the infantry and artillery left behind
at Delhi, when the cavalry had pushed on after Holkar’s
horsemen. General Fraser, whom Lake had left behind
in command, had quitted Delhi on the 6th, and had
sought out the Mahratta battalions and guns with the same
persistency which we have been admiring in his leader.
These had taken refuge in the territory of the Rajah of
Bhurtpore, and on the 13th Fraser brought them to battle
in front of Deeg. The Mahrattas, supported as they were
by a strong fortress, showed the most determined bravery,
but were eventually decisively beaten, with a loss of
87 cannon and some 2000 men. Thus was the British
prestige restored, and the 14 guns lost by Monson re-
covered, but the gallant and capable Fraser was so
severely wounded that he died on the 24th. The victory
was, however, most opportune, and the news of it, which
reached Lake’s cavalry as it moved off for its dash on
Furrukhabad, must have had no small effect on the spirits
of the troopers.

Lake, after nine days’ marching, crossed the Jumna on
the 28th, near Muttra, and there after a separation, during
which both portions had gained so much glory, the army
was once more united. It was necessary to wait for siege-
guns from Agra, but on December 1 Lake was on the road
again, and on the 13th was in position before Deeg, where
the remnants of Holkar’s army had sought shelter. On
the following day his guns opened fire, and on the 23rd
Lake 355

a breach in an outwork was stormed and carried. The
enemy did not wait for more, but evacuated the citadel
and fled to Bhurtpore. Thus Christmas morning, 1804,
saw the British troops in possession of the place. They
had to mourn for 43 comrades killed, while 184 were
wounded, but with the fortress, Ioo. cannon, a large
quantity of ammunition, stores, and grain, together with
two lacs of specie, had fallen into their hands.

Holkar’s organized army was now annihilated, but the
Rajah of Bhurtpore had openly declared for his cause, and
had to be made to feel the power of the English. Therefore
Lake, having first re-established the defences of Deeg,
marched from thence on the 28th, and on January 2, 1805,
took up his ground in front of the capital of the recalcitrant
Rajah.

The works which defended it were most formidable ;
lofty ramparts, flanked by semi-circular bastions, rose
behind a wide ditch with precipitous sides, and were
commanded by the citadel, which was particularly high
and strong. However much his troops may have recently
justified his confidence, such a stronghold, unless surprise
were possible, was not to be rushed. And on January 2,
Lake had only six 18-pounder guns, four 8-inch, and four
54-inch mortars available for bombardment. He himself
wished to try a coup de main, but was dissuaded from doing
so.

On the morning of the 7th, therefore, the breaching
batteries, such as they were, opened fire. On the oth a
breach was reported practicable, and that night three
columns of assault were launched at it. Of these the
centre and most important one lost its way in the dark-
356 Twelve Soldiers

ness, and missed the breach altogether. The enemy was
not surprised, as it was intended he should have been, and
met the onslaught with a well-directed and continuous fire.
An incredible confusion supervened, and when Maitland
got his men together opposite the breach, they were mown
down by a concentrated fire. Maitland was shot dead
almost on the crest-line of the parapet ; the gallant officers
who stepped into his place fell in turn too, and the ranks
behind them were rent and shaken as by the blast of a
tornado. All that men might dare was attempted, and no
stigma of disgrace attaches to their sullen retreat when
they fell back, leaving one-third of their comrades behind,
All had depended on Maitland’s rush, and it had collapsed.

This disastrous attempt only nerved Lake to renewed
exertions. He had failed by night, next time he would
succeed by day. More guns were brought to bear, and
on the 21st another storming party, provided with light
bridges, essayed the task. But the observations and
measurements which had been made proved deceptive, and
the bridges were found too short. Again confusion reigned.
The stormers were helplessly exposed on the counterscarp,
till 18 officers and 573 men had been sacrificed in vain.

Holkar that day made a counter demonstration on the
British camp, but the fire of the horse artillery kept his
men at a distance, and killed fifty of them.

Even after his second failure Lake did not lose heart.
On February 20 he gathered himself together for another
spring, but this time he fell short of success even further
than before; 28 officers and 894 men were killed and
wounded, and what was worse, the spirit of the troops
showed signs of giving way. Next day a few stirring
Lake a57

words from their indomitable leader awoke their old cn-
thusiasm, and they promised to justify their reputation in
another chance. That afternoon a storming party tried
again to climb the breach. Lieutenant Templeton of the
76th, who had volunteered for the forlorn hope, led a few
heroes to the summit, but there fell dead. Lake’s azde-
de-camp, Major Menzies, took his place, but only to die
too; much gallantry, much patience, much resolution, only
ended in more exposure, more bloodshed, more butchery
of brave men. In this assault 28 officers and 862 mcn
were wounded, six officers and 125 men killed, and the
attack failed.

Four times had the walls of Bhurtpore been assaulted
in vain. Lake was no nearer victory than when he began,
and was weaker by 3100 men killed and wounded. The
guns of his batteries were worn out, and powder was running
short. On February 24 he raised the siege, and retired
his army to the north-east with a view of commencing a
blockade. Undoubtedly he had been fairly worsted, and
the effect of his previous victories was much diminished in
consequence. The natives confessed that they could not
face the British in the open, but behind walls they were
still ready to stand, nor did their confidence disappear till
twenty-one years later, when the rough touch of Lord
Combermere shattered it for ever.

Lake cannot escape censure for the failure. Rendered
over-confident by success, he refused to recognize im-
possibilities, and rushed on the impenetrable walls without
waiting for an adequate artillery. His was the failing
of a strong, impetuous nature; it was the same fault
which Frederick had to expiate at Kunersdorf, when he
358 Twelve Soldiers

too would not wait for his guns, and which has cost many
an over-sanguine leader many a valuable life since then.
Another cause of disaster was Lake’s imperfect knowledge
of the ground in front of the breaches, and of the nature of
the defences. The path must be thoroughly reconnoitred,
and artillery must prepare the way: these are the lessons
of the first siege of Bhurtpore.

Lord Wellesley saw clearly where the shortcoming lay.
On March 9, he wrote to Lake, fearing we had despised
our enemy, and pointed out that “time and regular pro-
ceeding will succeed if an adequate battering-train be
provided.” On the 13th he said again—“It is of more
importance that we should not again fail than that we
should soon succeed.”

When a few days afterwards the battering-train and
reinforcements arrived, they were no longer needed. The
Rajah had indeed won, but his victory had made him feel
faint-hearted as to the future. On March io he opened
negotiations for peace, and on the 12th the war, so far as
he or Bhurtpore were concerned, was at an end. But
Holkar was still to be dealt with, and Lake was soon
at the head of his cavalry and on the track of the
Mahratta.

The fugitive was caught in camp on April 3, a thousand
of his followers were killed, his adherents were dispersed,
and ‘he himself was driven across the Chambal, a deserted
wanderer, his army ruined, his artillery captured, his allies
alienated from his cause.

Then the army sought shelter from the rigour of an
Indian summer, and operations were suspended.

At the end of July the Marquis Cornwallis, charged
Lake 359

with a very different policy, succeeded Wellesley as
Governor-General, and also became Commander-in-Chief,
instead of Lake, to whom then as next in seniority fell
the command of the Bengal Presidency, The situation
thus created was difficult and trying, but the tact and
good taste displayed in it by Lord Cornwallis prevented
any breach between the two generals. Lake could not
but remonstrate at the new order of things, but no answer
ever reached him, for the stout old man succumbed under
his burden before he had been three months in the country,
Then Lake once more filled his old place, and once more
gave a splendid example of energy and pertinacity, such
as recalls the efforts that preceded Furrukhabad.

Holkar, during the few months succeeding his last defeat,
had penetrated as an adventurer with a motley collection
of followers into the country of the Sikhs, and was en-
deavouring to enlist them in his cause. It was necessary
at once to choke any chance of such a coalition, and
therefore Lake put his troops at Agra in motion on
October 10, and marched in pursuit of the freebooter,
whom he drove before him to the banks of the Sutlej.
This display of promptitude and vigour decided the course
of Sikh policy in favour of the English, and at Umritsur on
December 19, negotiations were commenced by which the
Khalsa chiefs agreed to remain neutral. Shortly after-
wards, according to instructions received from the Governor-
General, Holkar was reinstated in those dominions which
had been won from him by the labours and sacrifices of
the troops. The swing of the political pendulum frustrated
the large designs of genius, and, as has since more than
once occurred in the history of the British empire, ad-
360 Twelve Soldiers

vantages which British soldiers had bled to gain were
thrown away when the fighting was over.

On January 19, 1806, Lake began his return march, and
on February 19 was formally re-appointed Commander-in-
Chief by the Court of Directors. But his work in India
was done, and it only remained for him to supervise the
details of the settlement he had brought about. He waited
at Delhi therefore for two months, and saw the wily
Holkar out of British territory. Arrangements also had
to be completed with the old Emperor, but the last paper
was signed and the last claim adjusted in due course, and
in February 1807 Lord Lake finally quitted India, fol-
lowed by the good-will and enthusiastic praise of all with
whom he had come even remotely into contact.

A viscounty, with a pension of £2000 a year for three
lives, marked the King’s sense of his services, and various
honorary positions and distinctions were conferred upon
him. His enjoyment of these dignities was but brief, for
a cold caught in attending Bulstrode Whitlocke’s trial
by court-martial produced a serious illness, and he died
in Lower Brook Street on February 20, 1808. He left
three sons and five daughters, but in 1848 the title became
extinct.

Lake had enjoyed to the full the crowded hour ot
glorious life. He had seen and done much, and had
profited by his experiences, No general has ever more
completely understood the value of promptitude in decision,
resolution in execution, pertinacity in following up a
victory. He thoroughly appreciated what power rapidity
of movement brings with it, and to him the Indian army
owed its light infantry and Galloper guns. The officer
Lake 361

who trained his men to accomplish the marches which led
up to Furrukhabad, who by sheer persistency hunted Holkar
and his ubiquitous horsemen down, and did all this after
a long experience as a Guardsman in London, and a
hanger-on of a sensual and luxurious court, undoubtedly
displayed energy and force of character. Remembering
too that in spite of his training as an infantry soldier, and
of the pedantry and formality prevalent in his time, he
distinguished himself above all in the employment of
cavalry, and that swiftness and surprise were the features
of his tactics, we must acknowledge him no ordinary man.
Of great presence of mind and cool in action, we are told
that his pulse seemed to beat more slowly and his brain
to see more clearly in the hour of danger than at any other
time. To such characteristics were added much physical
strength, a gracious manner, unusual personal bravery, and
a full measure of that indescribable magnetism which
enables a leader to influence and get the most from his
subordinates. To meet our great antagonists in Europe
was denied him, but, if we cannot measure him by the
highest standard, and accord him genius, we may feel
grateful for an example still worthy of our study. He
has been termed impetuous, and accused by some of that
same cut-and-thrust style of generalship that made a
holocaust at Chillianwallah. Scarcely, however, with
justice. The man was brave to a degree that in a leader
now-a-days might be termed wanton and foolhardy, but in
the day in which he lived, when the personal influence of a
commander could assert itself, an example of bravery was
often of supreme importance. Napoleon in his first Italian
campaign exposed himself in just the same way; Wellington
362 Twelve Soldiers

escaped death or a wound only by a miracle at Waterloo;
Ney, in person and even on foot, led the guard in its last
effort; Radetzky as a major-general swam a river at the
head of his division of cavalry, the very year of Furrukha-
bad, and had a horse shot under him at almost every fight.
It was the fashion of the time for leaders thus to beckon
on their men, and it is not for us who live under other
conditions to deride such noble displays of what after all
moves men most to mighty deeds. If Lake had not had
two horses shot under him at Laswaree, would our men
have carried the Mahratta batteries?

Again, in all his fights he seems to have shown a capa-
city for quickly appreciating the vital spot, for swiftly
throwing his force on to that spot, and for carrying through
his plan with unflinching resolution. Force of character
of this kind is the one attribute absolutely indispensable
to success in war, the one essential element, without which
intelligence may see so many sides to a question as to
engender doubt, knowledge may degenerate into pedantry,
and caution tarry until it becomes irresolution. That
Lake failed before Bhurtpore must be counted on the
other side of his account, but again here his first instinct
was the true one, and if he could not realize the diffi-
culties before him, even after one or two reverses, who will
blame the confidence, grown over-great perhaps because
of what he had seen done at Aligarh, and Deeg? We
may finally note the love and respect he inspired in all
who knew him, his warm heart, his generous temper, his
sunny, sympathetic nature, for such characteristics make
men beloved, and soldiers work more readily, and fight
more unselfishly for those they love than for those they fear
Lake 363

or only respect. The Marquis Wellesley, a statesman of
genius and discernment, knew him in the field and council-
chamber, and in a letter to the Prince of Wales he eulo-
gizes “his unexampled alacrity, his judgment, skill and
promptitude of decision, his irresistible spirit of enterprise.”
BAIRD

17571829

Sir DAVID BAIRD, the hero of Seringapatam and of the
British expedition from the Red Sea into Egypt, stands
out in the history of the British army as a fine type of the
cool, hard-headed, hard-hitting, and self-reliant regimental
soldier. Obliged to fight his way up for himself, and
blessed with none of those extraneous and “ back-door”
social advantages which went so far, in the days in which
he lived, towards furnishing commanders for our forces,
he thoroughly deserved the successes which came to him,
for they were the result of his own work.

His best friends could hardly have called him tactful
in his dealings with his superiors—indeed, in this respect
he resembled that brilliant but erratic genius Dundonald—
but throughout his career, by a single-minded devotion to
duty, and by keeping a high standard both of justice and
of ambition before his eyes, he attained to an eminence
in his profession by means which may well serve as an
example for the rest of us to imitate.

David Baird, the fifth son of Mr. William Baird of
Newbyth, East Lothian, was born in December 1757.
He seems to have made up his mind fairly soon in life
as to what career he wished to follow, for he was gazetted

at the early age of fifteen to an ensigncy in the 2nd
364
 

BAIRD.
Baird 365

Regiment of Foot (now Queen’s West Surrey). Before
joining, he was sent for a few months to Mr. Locie’s
‘Military Academy at Chelsea, and here, we may pre-
sume, he learnt the rudiments of military art as taught in
those days. Next year, 1773, he joined his regiment at
Gibraltar, and remained there till 1776, when he returned
home on leave.

In person, Baird was already considerably over middle
height, and by the time he had attained his full growth
was well over six foot three. He was well-made in
addition, and with big bones, broad shoulders, and an
excellent constitution, was, physically, all that could be
desired. He seems to have been popular with all ranks,
and his manners were natural and unaffected ; plucky he
certainly was, but although his biographer describes him
as light-hearted and gay, the few ‘anecdotes and letters
that we have about him point to his taking rather a serious
view of life, and failing to see the point of various practical
jokes which were played on him by his brother subalterns
of the 2nd Foot. In fact, he was a good type of a young
and hot-tempered Scottish soldier, who attends severely
to his duty and lets nothing interfere with his aims.

Whether it was that his spirit yearned for the more
congenial companionship of his northern countrymen, and
that the climate of “Gib” did not agree with him, he did
not rejoin his regiment, but applied for an appointment in
the regiment of Highlanders which was being raised in
Scotland by Lord Macleod. He was given the command
of the Light Company, raised at Elgin, and in the spring
of 1778 joined the remainder of the regiment at Fort

George.
366 Twelve Soldiers

Ten new regiments were at this time being raised chiefly
for service in India, and Lord Macleod’s regiment, the 73rd
(subsequently the 71st), was ordered at once to Portsmouth.
On arrival there, however, the East India Company’s ships
were not ready to receive it, and the regiment was sent for
six months to Guernsey. It was not till March 7, 1779,
that the fleet for India set sail, Baird being in command
of one hundred and fifty men on the Zar! of Oxford. It
is not necessary to follow the details of the voyage ; suffice
it to say, that after touching at Madeira, Goree, and the
Cape, where three months were wasted, Lord Macleod and
his Highlanders landed at Madras in January 1780, just
a year from the time they embarked at Portsmouth.

It was not long before the 73rd were to smell
powder in earnest. Eleven years before this the Madras
Government had been heavily pressed by Hyder Ali
Khan, Regent of Mysore, and had made an offensive
and defensive treaty with him, by which each was bound
to help the other against its enemies. Shortly after the
conclusion of the treaty, Hyder Ali found himself at war
with the Mahrattas, and applied to Madras for help. This
was flatly refused, so the Regent went to the French, and
demanded and obtained not only arms and ammunition,
but white officers as well for the drilling of his troops.
Aided by these he had little difficulty in disposing of
the Mahrattas, and then turned his attention to improving
the efficiency of his army with a view to getting on equal
terms with his faithless ally the Honourable East India
Company.

Soon after this, the Company at Bombay, in pursuance
of their usual policy of land-grabbing at the expense of
Baird 367

their neighbours, extended the light of their countenance
and protection (for a consideration) over one Roganat Rau,
who, having murdered his nephew the Rajah of Poona,
now aspired to the throne of the Mahrattas, and was
prepared to hand over a considerable territory as the
price of British protection. The main body of Mahrattas,
however, did not see the question in the same light, and
formed a coalition with most of the powerful rajahs of
Southern India, including Hyder Ali Khan, to get rid
of the English altogether and drive the Company into
the sea. The Madras Government blunderingly compli-
cated the situation at this critical moment by marching
some troops across Hyder Ali’s territory without his leave,
and by seizing the French settlement of Mahé, a town
which he declared to be under his protection and in his
own dominions.

The next intimation that the Government had of Hyder
Ali’s views was the appearance of his army, over 80,000
strong, and officered by Frenchmen, within measurable
distance of the city. Of the 6000 troops forming the
garrison, only the 73rd was ready to march at a moment’s
notice ; the remainder were not properly equipped. After
a most anxious month of deliberation and divided councils,
Sir Hector Munro, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras
Presidency, started on August 25, 1780, with the 6000 to
effect a junction with Colonel Baillie, who was coming with
3000 men from the Northern Sirkar, at Conjeveram. Baillie
was attacked on the way by greatly superior numbers of
the enemy under Tippoo, Hyder Ali’s son, and although
much weakened, beat them off with serious losses on both
sides. This necessitated aid being sent, and Colonel
368 Twelve Soldiers

Fletcher, with the flank companies of the 73rd under Baird,
two other white and eleven other native companies, was
sent to Baillie’s assistance. The two parties, not 3000 in
all,joined in safety, but on the way back they were attacked
at Perambaukum by overwhelming numbers of the enemy,
assisted by a detachment of French troops. With desperate
gallantry the British force repulsed the enemy time after
time, and might even have come out victorious had not
two of their ammunition tumbrils exploded, leaving
them without artillery or powder. The enemy closed in
round them, and after losing three-fourths of his men,
Colonel Baillie hoisted a white handkerchief, ceased
firing, and grounded arms; whereupon Tippoo’s cavalry
rushed on the unarmed men and began cutting them
down.

Baird, who had particularly distinguished himself by his
coolness and bravery in the action, received a bullet in the
thigh, two sabre cuts on the head, and a pike wound in the
arm, and when he recovered his senses amongst a heap of
dead and dying, was almost put an end to by a prowling
spearman. Eventually he was found by a sergeant and
private (both wounded themselves) of his own company,
and together the three limped in the direction of Sir
Hector Munro’s camp, which they imagined could not be
far off. As they proceeded, however, no signs of the camp
or of any British force were visible, and, faint from fatigue
and loss of blood, they struck out for the French camp,
luckily finding it before they became too exhausted to
reach it. Here they were generously treated by the
French, and their hurts looked to; but their despair was
great on finding that they had, under strict orders, to be
Baird 369

given up to Hyder Ali. This was carried out, and on the
following day Baird found himself a prisoner in the camp
of the enemy, together with many of his unfortunate
brothers-in-arms.

It may here be mentioned that Sir Hector Munro,
although within earshot of the fight at Perambaukum,
accepted implicitly the opinions of several fugitives from
the field of battle, who imagined that all was lost. He not
only sent no assistance to Colonel Baillie, but incontinently
retreated with all his force to Madras, being harried by
Hyder Ali’s cavalry all the way, and creating terrible
consternation in the town by his arrival.

Baird and his six fellow prisoners (including Colonel
Baillie) were kept marching about with Hyder’s army
for some time, and were then sent to Seringapatam, where
they arrived in the beginning of November. Here they
were kept in a sort of cow-stable inside a courtyard enclosed
by eighteen-foot walls, and given about sixpence a day to
find themselves in everything. Gradually the prison
became more and more crowded by the arrival of other
English officers, till the number amounted to nearly thirty.
At first the prisoners were left unchained, and a French
surgeon was allowed to come and dress their wounds.
But after six months even these slight indulgences were
taken away, and all the prisoners were put in irons, each
set weighing nine pounds. Baird, the wound in whose leg
was still open, and who was weak from fever, was fortunate
in being exempted through the great generosity of his
friend Captain Lucas, who refused to allow the irons:
to be put on him, and when the gaolers insisted, offered

to wear Baird’s set in addition to his own. The book
BRB
370 Twelve Soldiers

of fate was thereupon consulted and was propitious; so
for the time being Baird escaped.

Next November, however, he was ironed, and remained
so till the following April. During his confinement he
never lost hope, and his presence of mind was several
times of great value to himself and his companions,
notably in a case where one prisoner, a certain Lieutenant
Stringer, went mad, and threatened to make injurious
revelations to the Kiladar, or Governor. The remaining
prisoners seriously thought of smothering him, as he would
undoubtedly have made charges which would have put
their lives in peril. Baird, however, pointed out the danger
and futility of this course, and when Stringer, in presence
of the gaoler, showed him a piece of bread and assured
him it was poisoned by his brother officers, Baird snatched
the bread out of his hand and ate it, which convinced the
gaoler.

It is quite possible that during this time Baird’s liver
and temper may have suffered by the confinement—
nothing more likely. For when it was reported to his
mother at home—and it is a wise mother that knows her
own child—that he was in prison and chained to another
man, she only remarked, “De’il help the chiel that’s
chained to oor Davie!”

Month after month rolled on, and the only occupations
for the prisoners were tending their own sick, who died
with startling frequency, welcoming new arrivals, and
making little articles of bamboo or dungaree shirting.
Hyder Ali died in December 1782, but their condition was
in no way lightened or improved by his successor, Tippoo
Sultan, rather the reverse.
Baird S71

Three times did the prisoners drink the King’s health on
June 4, and a fourth year was working towards its close
before they were released. In March 1784 peace was
proclaimed, and soon afterwards Baird and his companions
were informed that they were free.

On arrival at Madras Baird found that Lord William
Murray, a junior Captain from half-pay, had been recom-
mended over his head for the majority of the regiment,
and was actually in command. Luckily for the peace
of the regiment and of Baird’s mind, a protest had been
sent in to England before the latter’s release, and eventually
this nomination was cancelled ; which was as well, for it
was subsequently discovered that no majority was vacant
at the time Murray was appointed !

For the next three years Baird did duty with his
regiment at Madras, Arcot, and Bombay, and in 1787 he
obtained his majority and went home on leave. After a time
he heard that the lieutenant-colonelcy of his regiment (now
changed in title to the 71st Highlanders) was vacant
through the ‘death of Lieutenant-Colonel Elphinstone,
and he made desperate efforts to secure it for himself.
In this he was successful, for Colonel Baring, who had
already been appointed, did not wish to go to India; thus
Baird was enabled, by a series of complicated arrange-
ments, to obtain the desire of his heart, and started for
India as Lieutenant-Colonel of the 71st in March 1791.
It is worth mentioning, as a curiosity, that through his
inability to find the necessary money at the right time,
Lord Cavan and Sir John Moore were gazetted to
Lieutenant-Colonelcies three or four days before our hero ;
this, of course, made them senior to him in the army. It
372 Twelve Soldiers

is odd to think how this trifling incident may have altered
the course of history, judged by the light of after events in
Egypt and at Corunna.

On arriving at Madras, Baird found that the 71st had
taken the field under Lord Cornwallis against our old enemy
Tippoo Sultan ; he himself was given the command of a
brigade of Sepoys. The Mahratta forces had now joined
armies with us against Tippoo, and the latter, becoming
alarmed, had endeavoured to open peace negotiations for
the purpose of gaining time. Lord Cornwallis, however,
had refused to be led into a trap, and in a short time
attacked and reduced several of his hill forts. Immediately
after Baird’s arrival the capture of Nundydrug was
decided on, and was carried out on October 17,
Savendrug, a formidable fort on a hill top eighteen miles
west of Bangalore, was then attacked, and stormed on
December 21. Baird’s part in this consisted in taking
his brigade round to the rear, and attracting the enemy’s
attention from the real point of attack. This was most
successfully carried out, and the fortress fell with a loss to
our side, in open day, of only one man wounded!

Having disposed of these obstacles, Lord Cornwallis
turned his attention towards Seringapatam, and arrived
there on February 5, 1792, with a force of nearly gooo
men. On the next evening he attacked with three “divi-
sions,” our hero commanding 500 of the 72nd and 1200
Sepoys on the left wing. Dashing forward with extraordi-
nary keenness, Baird soon cleared the fortified camp of the
enemy on Carrighaut Hill, and rushed ahead of his men
down a narrow rocky path. Somewhat to his surprise,
he found that it ended abruptly in a cul-de-sac, and also
Baird 373

that of his whole force only twelve of the 72nd were with
him. However, he pushed on under fire, and luckily
rejoined the rest of his men, who had come down by an
easier path. Thence he joined forces with a few other
separated detachments, and insisted on fording the deep
Cavery. The result of this was that he found himself
on an island, under fire, in the dark, and all his men’s
ammunition sopping wet. Nothing daunted, he proceeded
to charge the battery in front of him, but luckily for his
party found that the enemy had just been driven out by
part of the centre division. The action ended by Corn-
wallis establishing himself close to the town, and Tippoo
shortly afterwards sued for peace. The terms of the treaty
brought the Sultan to his knees, and for several years he
refrained from hostile operations.

Baird now took his regiment to Secundumali, and thence
to Wallajahbad, and for the next five years devoted himself
to raising the discipline and efficiency of his corps to a
point rarely witnessed in India in those days. Not only
was this often acknowledged in orders by his superiors, but
it became the custom, on new corps arriving at Madras, to
send the commanding officers up to Wallajahbad to see the
71st, and get a few hints as to interior economy and
smartness. Amongst other regimental institutions, he
established an officers’ mess, which appears to have been a
very rare thing at that period.

In 1793 the 71st were witnesses of the peaceful surrender
of Pondicherry by the French, and afterwards were sent to
Tanjore, Baird being appointed commandant of the town.

We have seen Baird as a soldier, and seen too how
well he acquitted himself. Unfortunately he was not so
374 Twelve Soldiers

successful when confronted with the political intrigues and,
we must confess, rather shady conduct of the East India
Company when dealing with native potentates. His keen
sense of justice conflicted with the orders of the Company
delivered through the somewhat jack-in-office Resident at
Tanjore; and by mixing himself up in political business,
with which, it must be allowed, he had no right whatever
to interfere, he received a severe snub from the Madras
Government, and was removed for a time with his regiment
to Pondicherry.

A much heavier blow was, however, in store for him.
Soon after receiving a most flattering public encomium
from the Commander-in-Chief on the excellence of his
regiment, orders were sent him one morning to disband it
at once, and draft the efficient men into the 73rd and 74th.
Baird’s own feelings can be imagined, but his sense of duty
was strong. He had the order read on parade by the
Adjutant, being unable from emotion to do so himself, and
on the men breaking out into perhaps excusable murmurs
at the injustice of the order (which ruined the prospects
of many), he quieted them with “My poor fellows—not a
word—the King must be obeyed.”

The regiment was marched at once to Madras and there
disbanded. Only the officers, non-commissioned officers,
band and drums were embarked for England, leaving all
the privates on shore, with little chance of ever seeing
their beloved Scotland again.

Baird arrived with the skeleton of his regiment at the
Cape of Good Hope in December 1797. Here he found
both the garrison and the fleet in a state of partial mutiny,
and was begged by the Governor, Lord Macartney, to
Baird 375

remain as Brigadier-General. After some hesitation Baird
consented, and took up his duties at once. A difficult
task it was to restore order and a proper spirit in the
garrison, for all, officers and men, were violently opposed
to the Commander of the Forces, General Francis Dundas,
and showed it openly on many occasions. In the end
matters quieted down, and Baird speedily got to work at
his brigade (86th and Scotch Brigade), doing wonders to
raise its tone and efficiency.

After a year in the colony, Baird found himself
promoted Major-General, and received orders from home
to return with his brigade and the 28th Dragoons to India,
where operations were going to be renewed against Tippoo
Sultan. The latter had shown himself again most hostile
and insolent towards us, and had in addition committed
the crime of allying himself with the French. Lord
Mornington, therefore, who had just arrived as Governor-
General, determined on crushing him for good and all
before the French could arrive from Egypt, and with this
view assembled as large a number of troops as he could
collect in the time at various points in the Madras
Presidency. The intelligence of the battle of the Nile, and
a successful disarming of 11,000 French troops at Hyder-
abad, relieved the tension considerably, but it was con-
sidered advisable, as an additional measure of safety, to
secure the alliance of the Nizam of the last-mentioned city.

On arrival at Madras in January 1799, Baird found
himself appointed to the command of a brigade consisting
of the 12th and 74th and the Scotch Brigade. This one
might have thought a sufficient command for a recently

1 Later the 94th Foot.
376 Twelve Soldiers

appointed Major-General, but Baird was not satisfied.
The Nizam of Hyderabad’s troops, amounting to 12,000
men, had, at his Highness’ request, been placed under the
charge of Colonel Arthur Wellesley, as brother of the
Governor-General, and Baird remonstrated with General
Harris, commanding the army, at being superseded in a
big command by a Lieutenant-Colonel. Before, however,
the matter took a serious turn he acknowledged himself in
the wrong, seeing that the appointment was more political
than military; that Colonel Wellesley was not in real com-
mand of the Nizam’s troops, but as his regiment, the 33rd,
was attached to these forces, was only the senior European
officer present with them; and thirdly, that the agreement
with the Nizam himself permitted of no officer of higher
rank than that of colonel being attached to his troops.
The matter therefore dropped.

Hostilities began by an uncalled-for attack by Tippoo on
the Bombay army—war not having yet been declared—in
which he was beaten off with a loss of 1500; then
followed the Battle of Mallavelly (March 27, 1799), in
which the impetuosity of the 74th, of Baird’s Brigade,
nearly caused a serious disaster. This was, however,
staved off by their commander’s presence of mind, and
then the march on Seringapatam was resumed.

On April 2 the army, well found and numerous,
amounting to over 30,000 men, besides 6000 of the Hyder-
abad cavalry, arrived within five miles of their objective.
Tippoo, on seeing this large array, adopted a tone of
injured innocence, and tried to delay operations by
wasting time over negotiation. General Harris, however, cut
him short, and by May 1 the batteries were in position.
Baird 379

On May 3 a sufficient breach was made in the outer
wall, and Baird volunteered to lead the storming party.

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His request was complied with, and it was settled that the
assault should take place on the following day: this was
378 Twelve Soldiers

indeed necessary, as only two days’ supply of rice remained
in the Commissariat for the native allies.

The assaulting force numbered about 4800 men, includ-
ing the 12th, 33rd, 73rd, and 74th regiments, flank
companies of the 75th, 77th, Scotch Brigade, De Meuron
regiment, and Bombay European Regiment, besides
twenty-four companies of Sepoys: these were all formed
up in the trenches before daybreak on the 4th.

During the forenoon Baird received orders to attack at
I p.m., and at 1.10 the troops, formed into right and left
columns under Colonels Sherbrook and Dunlop respect-
ively, left the trenches with Baird at their head. A
tremendous fire was poured on them as they emerged and
crossed the Cavery river, but although losing a good many
men here, they reached the opposite bank, and, led by
Baird, rushed at the breach, which had been surrounded by
about twenty of the enemy’s guns, The result was not
long in doubt. After a short but desperate hand-to-hand
fight, in which Baird was almost the first arrival, the breach
was won, and the British colours hoisted.

The troops quickly divided to the right and left, Baird
being with the right column, and cleared the ramparts.
A broad ditch, the existence of which was previously
unknown, checked the assault for a moment, but scaffolding
poles and planks were soon discovered, and the storming
party poured on. The hour had been carefully selected, so
that the enemy were surprised in their midday siesta: to
this may be attributed the comparatively small loss on
our side of 386 men killed and wounded. Tippoo himself
fought with the courage of despair, but was twice wounded,
and finally killed by a bullet through the head at close
Baird 379

quarters. Within an hour of the commencement of the
assault, Seringapatam was practically ours ; the remainder
of the day was spent in completing the victory, and in put-
ting an end to the universal looting that was going on. It
was not till night fell that Tippoo’s body was discovered
under a heap of dead, and that Baird, exhausted by eight
hours of violent exertion, asked to be temporarily relieved.
To this request General Harris answered by sending
Colonel Wellesley to take over the post of Commandant of
Seringapatam, as he happened to be next for duty.

Baird was furiously angry at being, as he called it,
superseded in the moment of victory by a junior officer,
and wrote a most ill-advised letter to the General on the
subject. As a matter of fact, the incident had occurred in
the ordinary course of things, but Baird again saw the hand
of favouritism and tyranny in this, and his fiery temper
found vent on paper. General Harris wrote him a severe
answer, but by this time Baird had cooled down, and re-
quested leave to withdraw his objectionable letter. Harris
at once complied, and, never even mentioning the matter to
the higher authorities, was loud in praises, official and per-
sonal, of Baird’s gallantry and success. The Prize Com-
mittee presented him with the late Sultan’s state sword, and
the field officers who served under him with another one of
the value of 200 guineas. He received the thanks of the
House of Commons and (indirectly) of the East India
Company, and was recommended by Lord Mornington
(who had now been created Marquis Wellesley) for a
K.B.,! which he did not receive.

1 In those days the Order of the Bath consisted of only twenty-four
military and twenty-four civil knights.
380 Twelve Soldiers

General Baird was now appointed to the command of
Dinapore, but on learning that an expedition was going to
set sail from Madras, and that his old rival Colonel Welles-
ley was probably going to command it, he interviewed
Lord Wellesley on the subject, and obtained the command
for himself, with Colonel Wellesley as second in command.
The object of the expedition was to seize first Batavia (in
Java, then under French dominion) and then Mauritius.
Elaborate instructions were drawn up by the Governor-
General, and Baird had just, on February 5, 1801,
embarked for Trincomalee, where he was to pick up his
main force, when despatches from home completely altered
the objective, and directed the expedition to be sent in-
stead to Egypt, vzd Suez, to assist Sir Ralph Abercrom-
by in driving out the French.

It is unnecessary to give details of the preparations, but
the difficulties of counter-ordering matters and altering the
whole plan were such that General Baird did not leave
Bombay till April 6, and even then he had to leave
Colonel Wellesley behind, as the latter was laid up with a
serious attack of fever.1. Most of his force had preceded
him in small detachments, but on his arrival at Mocha,
April 24, and then at Jedda, May 18, he found that some
had gone to Suez, and some to Kosseir, whilst his troops
and provision ships from the Cape had not arrived, and he
had not yet met his Naval coadjutor, Admiral Blankett.
After many days spent in trying to get his troops and
stores together from literally all four points of the compass,
and in securing the friendship of the authorities along the

1 This fever probably preserved for us the Great Duke, for the
vessel on which he was to have sailed was lost on the way to Egypt.
Baird 381

Arabian coast, including that of the Sherif of Mecca, Baird
arrived at Kosseir on June 8. Owing to the lateness of
the season, and the consequent contrary winds, Suez
could not be attacked; Baird therefore determined to
carry out his part of the programme by marching over-
land to the Nile at Keneh from Kosseir, a distance of 120
miles.

This period of his life perhaps shows up the subject ot
this memoir at his best, for never did his indomitable
tenacity of purpose and his great powers of resource
appear to better advantage. In truth his position was
full of difficulties, for he was working in the dark. In the
first place, not half his troops had yet arrived, nor had
the greater part of his provisions; he did not know what
was going on in Egypt, for he had heard nothing since
the news of the victory at Alexandria and the death of
Abercromby on March 21 ; he had only vague instructions
from home, and none at all from the General (Hutchinson)
commanding in Egypt; he did not know what the diffi-
culties and dangers of the desert route might be, except
that they were likely to be great ; and he had no camels
or water-casks. To add to his perplexities, he did not
know how the people of Upper Egypt or the Mamelukes
would receive him, and there were excellent grounds for
believing that a French force lay between him and the
English army in Lower Egypt. Lastly, the rumours
which had reached him caused him to doubt whether,
after all, his force would be required in Upper Egypt,
and whether they would not be better employed in their
original plan of turning the French out of Batavia and
Mauritius. Yet did he not waver for one moment in his
382 Twelve Soldiers

purpose, but proceeded forthwith to make preparations for
getting his troops across the desert.

Lower E’gypt

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Farshuk sn
Dendera

The only force which he found on arrival at Kosseir was
an advanced detachment under Colonel Murray, con-

1 Quartermaster-General of the Expedition.
Baird 383

sisting of about seven hundred men. These he determined
to make the advance guard, and he devoted his first efforts
to supplying them with adequate transport. Bullocks had
been brought from India with their carts, and large mus-
sucks (water-skins) had also been supplied; but it was
very shortly evident to the General that, even if the track
across were good enough for wheeled transport, the bullocks
would get little to drink on the way, for the wells were
few, small, and far between. It was therefore necessary
to buy camels; but there were not many of these to be
had. A certain number were collected and bought, mostly
in the Arabian ports, and orders were given to go on buy-
ing for the present ; eventually (according to one authority)
five thousand camels were collected, utilized for water trans-
port, and distributed among the different units, but when
the advanced guard started there were very few indeed.

Baird commenced operations by sending on advanced
parties to dig wells at a point eleven miles out from
Kosseir, and at another point forty-three miles further on.
This done, he despatched stores of sheep and biscuits to
various points to act as depéts on the road, and sent off
the first detachment, under Colonel Beresford, on June 21,
himself accompanying it to the first wells eleven miles
out. To every one’s. consternation, the mussucks leaked so
terribly on this short journey that they became practically
useless ; the wells gave but little water, yet it was necessary
to push on: so the only thing to be done was to send
the water camels of the second party after the first, thus
considerably delaying the march of the former, and not
much improving the chances of the latter, for the mussucks
were nearly empty by the time they received them.

This break-down of the mussucks was a serious matter
384 Twelve Soldiers

indeed, for it imperilled the whole of the expedition. How-
ever, Baird’s view was that, since casks (of which he had
none) would probably warp when emptied of their contents,
it was no use sending for any; in his words—* We must
either trust to the puckallies (large mussucks), or find
water on the desert, or re-embark.” The mussucks were
therefore carefully soaked, overhauled, and mended, and
further wells were dug on the road. This delayed the
advance for some days, but these measures were obviously
of vital necessity, and ultimately conduced to the success
of the whole undertaking.

The official programme for the march—the first one ever
undertaken by British troops across an unknown desert—

was as follows :—

DAY. MILES.

ist. New wells siya sis 11 Water.

2nd. Half way to Moila es 17. No water.

3rd. Moila_... sa wise 17 Water and provisions.
4th. Advanced wells ie g Water.

5th. Halfway to Legeta ... 19 No water.

6th. Legeta(El Gaita) i 19 Water and provisions.
zth. Baromba (Abu Amram ?) 18 Water.

8th. Ghennah (Keneh) is io The Nile.

Total 120

Detachments to halt at Moila and Legeta if necessary.

Marching was generally to be done at night and in the
early morning. Each man was to be limited to one gallon
of water per diem, given to him on arrival in the morning ;
no water was on any account to be distributed whilst on
the march.

Subsequently these orders were slightly modified, for
tea or wine was issued on marching days (at the rate of
one pint per man), whilst an additional taste was given
Baird 385

to the saltpetre-impregnated water that was found at
Kosseir and the brackish liquid from the wells, by causing
the ration rice to be boiled in it. The wisdom of this
step can be fully borne out by any desert traveller, for
experience shows that the more taste (especially if it is
nasty) there is in your water the less do you drink of it.

On June 30 General Baird left Kosseir, to superintend
from a central position, Moila, the march of his troops.
The following extract from a letter from Colonel Auchmuty,
his Adjutant-General, dated Moila, July 2, gives an idea
of the position :—

“The roth (Foot) were met on the march, suffering
greatly, and getting on badly. We are certainly in a bad
scrape. We can hardly get forward or go. back, and the
prospect does not brighten; but we must not despair.
Among many causes for uneasiness, is not hearing from
Hutchinson. The General is much alarmed at it, etc. etc.”

Baird arrived on July 6 at Keneh, and matters began
to look more cheerful. The first two or three detachments
had suffered severely from thirst, heat, and even hunger,
for the advanced provision stores had run out, but it was
a case of “Ce n’est que le premier pas qui cote.” For after
the machinery was once set in working order, the troops
poured across quickly. Additional wells were dug and
the existing ones deepened ;! water was found underground
almost throughout the desert, even in unlikely places,
and the camel transport grew in size and efficiency.

Although Baird fretted and chafed at the delay with
which his troops arrived at Kosseir, it is probable that

1 It is worthy of note that the “New Wells,” thirteen miles out
from Kosseir, still beay the name of Bir Ingliz (English wells).
ee
386 Twelve Soldiers

this was of ultimate benefit to him, for he was obliged to
send them across to Keneh as they arrived, in small de-
tachments ; whereas, if they had all arrived together, the
chances are that he would have had much difficulty in
supplying them with water at Kosseir, and would have
lost a large number! at this insalubrious spot. As it was,
very few men of his force were lost on the journey, and
these few mostly by their own fault; for when occasion
offered, men would sometimes in the darkness leave the
ranks and hide themselves among the rocks, so as to get
a few hours’ sleep—with little chance of finding their way
on when they woke. This desire for sleep, we are told,
arose from the impossibility of sleeping in the excessive
heat during the day, the thermometer showing 110° to
115°, even in the tents, which were at every halting-place ;
and also to the slow and lengthy marches undertaken at
night, for although the total distance was correctly given
as one hundred and twenty miles, it appeared to the
wearied troops to be considerably more.

The following is the composition of the force which was
brought across from Kosseir to Keneh :—

A. BRITISH TROOPS.

OFFICERS. N.-C.0.’5 & MEN. TOTAL.

8th Light Dragoons?. —.:. 5 a 80 oa 85
Royal Artillery? ... sin 2 ss 44 s08 46
Royal Engineers. ... aa I nis ° as I
1oth Foot ... bie sin 36 “ts 918 “is 954
OTSt? sy zed eee ees 43 ae 931 wi 974
8oth , ... ae ae 17 aes 343 ae 360
86th ,, ia aise a 16 kate 341 sats 357
88th _,, sic Sex se 21 sia 436 sal 457
3234

 

1 By dysentery and ophthalmia. 2 From the Cape.
Baird 387
B. NATIVE TROOPS.

OFFICERS, N.-C.0.’s & MEN. TOTAL.

Bengal Artillery... sine 8 aa 307 ee 315
Bombay _,, ne sek 6 Sie 314 ote 320
Madras_,, i ‘ia 5 sin 248 ae 253
Engineers of 3 Presidencies 5 oa ° it 5
Madras Pioneers ... eae 2 wes 92 sie 94
Bengal Infantry Volunteers 26 ide 605 vies 631
Ist Bombay Infantry vie 36 ea 786 ae 822
7th = + aes 38 ee 723 ses 761

3201

Grand Total, 6435

The guns numbered about thirty, and were drawn across
the desert by bullocks.

On arriving at Keneh Baird made strenuous efforts to
communicate with General Hutchinson at Cairo, and
obtain decided orders from him. Being in the dark as
to what the position was in Lower Egypt, and hearing
vaguely that the French had been practically driven out
of the country, Baird knew not whether to bring his troops
down stream, or whether, in case they should be no longer
required, to take them back again to Kosseir and re-embark
them there for Batavia and Mauritius. At last, however,
he received the long-expected despatch, dated July 5,
which informed him that, owing to General Menou’s
resistance, and to intelligence received that the French
were despatching a great expedition, probably against
Egypt, General Hutchinson would be extremely glad
to have General Baird’s able assistance and co-operation.

Baird at once issued orders for the movement down
stream, and collected as many boats as possible from
the river above and below him. The Nile was rising
daily and threatening to swamp the banks, so it was
388 Twelve Soldiers

necessary, since part of the force was obliged to go by
road, to move as quickly as possible. The movement
was carried out more easily than Baird expected, for the
country was with him, and brought in large quantities of
supplies and boats. The troops were packed into the
boats as quickly as they arrived from the desert, and on
July 31 the General, having despatched a portion of his
force to march along the banks, and having left Colonel
Murray in charge at Keneh, and some troops there and
in the desert to keep the route open to Kosseir, embarked
in his boat for Cairo.

On August 8 General Baird reached Ghizeh (opposite
Cairo), and proceeded to make arrangements for encamping
his troops here, the last orders from General Hutchinson
having been to this effect.

The state of affairs in Egypt was not at all to Baird’s
liking, for he now found that after all his difficulties had
been successfully surmounted, and his wearisome marches
concluded, there would probably be no fighting in which
to display the mettle of his troops.

It seemed indeed as though there would be little for the
Indian army to do, for although the French in Alexandria,
under General Menou, were still holding out, there was a
sufficient force of British, Turks, and Mamelukes surround-
ing the town to make an ultimate surrender a matter of
only a few weeks. Cairo, with a French garrison of nearly
14,000 men under General Belliard, had capitulated on
June 27, so there was nothing further to be done in this
direction for the present. It was a sad disappointment
to all concerned, and could not but raise a doubt in their
minds as tq whether the force might not, after all, have
Baird 389

been better employed in the cherished project of an attack
on Batavia and Mauritius,

By the middle of August the expedition, coming down
stream in detachments, had concentrated at Ghizeh. Never
had there been seen, by all accounts, a finer body of men,
and their discipline was only equalled by their efficiency.

In accordance with orders received, Baird broke up his
camp towards the end of the month and moved down
stream towards Rosetta, to assist in the reduction of
Alexandria. But here again were the Indians destined
to disappointment, for on the very day on which they
arrived (September 1) the French garrison capitulated.

The events which occurred in Egypt during the next
nine months may be briefly summarized: the difficulties
between ourselves and the Turks with regard to the dis-
posal of the Mamelukes (who subsequently obtained
possession of all Egypt), the uniting of the Indian and
British armies, in spite of Baird’s protest, under Lord
Cavan (who succeeded General Hutchinson as Commander-
in-Chief in Egypt), the arrival of the news on November 15
that the preliminaries of a treaty of peace had been signed
with France, the splitting up of Baird’s army, and the
return of the Indian portion across the desert to Suez
in the late spring of 1802—all can only be touched on.
It may not be out of place here to mention the opinion
expressed at this time by Count de Noé,a French Royalist
officer serving in our 10th Foot, on the character of his
General. “Nous nous en séparames avec regret ; ce digne
chef s’étoit toujours distingué par le vif intérét qu'il prenoit
aux officiers sous ses ordres, et par sa sollicitude envers le
soldat. Sévére, mais juste, dans l’exercise de ses fonctions
390 Twelve Soldiers

il étoit également chéri et respecté de tous ses soubor-
donnés” (szc).

The crossing to Suez was effected during the latter end
of May without difficulty, in consequence of the help
extended by Lord Cavan and the Turkish Pasha of Egypt.
By June 7 all were embarked, and on July 6 Baird arrived
at Madras.

After a brilliant reception had been accorded to the
General and his troops, and a special General Order issued
thanking them for their services—and be it noted, that all
the natives employed on the expedition received “hono-
rary” medals, a rare distinction at that period,—Baird
was appointed Commander of Fort William (near Calcutta),
and transferred in September to Fort St. George (Madras).
As a recompense for his services the Sultan of Turkey
appointed Baird Knight of the Crescent, but the honour
does not appear against his name till 1808.

Shortly after his arrival hostilities again broke out
between ourselves and a combination of native princes,
and Baird was given command of a division. After a
series of harassing marches, during which considerable
difficulty was experienced in feeding his troops, the
General reached the Tumbudra river. His personal
activity had been most noticeable during this time, and
some officers, not blessed with the same energy, even
affected to consider that such constant exertion was
hardly necessary, especially under the burning Indian
sun. After the day’s march Baird would visit each corps
and department in his division, and afterwards reconnoitre
the country to be traversed on the morrow, finishing up
with an evening parade. No detail was too minute to
Baird 391

escape his eye, and although he was aware of the opinions
entertained by the above-mentioned gentlemen, he used
himself to say that he considered his actions absolutely
necessary for the discipline and efficiency of his troops,
and that although they might grumble on the march and
in quarters, they would be only too thankful to him when
they found themselves opposite the enemy. With which.
sentiment few will disagree. Strange to say, after a few
days at the Tumbudra, Baird applied for leave to relinquish
his command and return to England. The reasons must
have been serious which prompted him thus to give up an
important command on the eve of hostilities, but beyond
the fact that he considered himself slighted by having to
send considerable drafts to General Wellesley’s force, and
in other ways, little has transpired as to his ‘motives.
Whatever the reasons may have been he returned to
Madras, and embarked on the True Briton for home;
this was in February 1803.

On her voyage across the Indian Ocean the vessel was
driven to the south by a violent storm, and failing to
make the Cape of Good Hope, she steered her course for
St. Helena. Here Baird was met by the intelligence that
we were again at war with France, and the 7vuwe Briton
being detained for convoy work, he engaged a passage in
a South Sea whaler. His ocean troubles, however, were
not yet over, for in the Bay of Biscay the whaler was
chased and captured by a French privateer. The prize-
master was taking her towards Bordeaux when the fortune
of war again intervened, this time in Baird’s favour, for
H.M.S. Sirzus espied the whaler and quickly recaptured
her. Baird transhipped to H.M.S. Mary, which was pro~
392 Twelve Soldiers

ceeding homewards, and whilst in her nearly terminated
his career for good and all, for a round shot coming from a.
French coast battery near Ushant, which they had happened
upon during a thick fog, passed within a few inches of his
head whilst he was standing at the gangway. Eventually.
‘he reached Falmouth in safety, and a French prisoner of
equal rank having been liberated in exchange in conse-
quence of Baird having given his parole not to try and
escape, he was shortly appointed to the Staff of the
Eastern District, under Sir James Craig. In 1804 he was
knighted.

The next exploit of General Baird was the capture of
the Cape of Good Hope, which, since his sojourn there, had
been handed over to the Dutch in accordance with the
terms of the Peace of Amiens (March 25, 1802). In July
1805 he received secret orders from Lord Castlereagh to
take command of an expedition consisting of half the zoth
Light Dragoons, some Artillery, and the 24th, 38th, 59th,
7Ist, 72nd, 83rd, and 98th regiments, which were embarking
at Cork and Falmouth, ostensibly for the West Indies and
India respectively. Sir Home Popham, already well known
(and well trusted) by Baird in the Red Sea in 1801, was
to have command of the fleet (six ships), and the expedi-
tion was to rendezvous at Madeira and capture Cape
Town as quickly as possible. The total number of bayonets
and sabres (exclusive of seamen and marines) was 6654.

We can imagine Baird’s joy at receiving these orders,
and he was not long in putting them into execution. He
was quickly at work in Cork, superintending the arrange-
ments, and fostering the idea that the destination of the
expedition was the Mediterranean. Funchal was reached
Baird 393

on September 28, and the concentration was effected at
San Salvador (or Bahia in Brazil), a measure rendered
necessary by the bad weather encountered, and by the loss
of two transports! on a reef off the South American coast.
Here the force was carefully inspected by Baird, and the
final touches put to it. On November 28 the fleet left
this port, and made the coast of Africa, a little to the
north of Cape Town, on January 4, 1806.

The garrison of this town was numerically superior to
the troops under Baird’s command, and consisted of a
mongrel force of Dutch infantry and artillery, Boers,
Germans, French sailors, and Hottentots, the numerous
cavalry being “composed of Boers and farmers, well
mounted and armed with long guns, capable of throwing
shot to a much greater distance than ordinary muskets.” ?
The Joubert of those days was one General Janssens, an
officer much esteemed for his kindness of heart (of which
Baird took full advantage later on), his administrative
capacity, and his military talents. This officer was as
cunning as he was worthy, for he had determined to let
the town take care of itself, and capitulate if it liked,
whilst he guarded the land approaches to it, and cut off
the food supplies for our troops and fleet once we were
in possession.

The fleet anchored off Table Bay beyond the range of
the batteries, and Baird and Popham gave anxious thought
to the plan of attack. Eventually they settled to land
at Leopard’s Bay,’ sixteen miles north of Cape Town, but

1 But only three lives.
2 Compare Majuba, seventy-five years later.
3 Close to the present Melkbosch Point.
394 Twelve Soldiers

on the following day the surf was so heavy that it was
found to be impossible ; the 20th and 38th were therefore
sent to disembark as an advanced guard further north, at
Saldanha Bay. However, on the following morning the
surf had so moderated that landing was found to be
possible at Leopard’s Bay after all, and by the morning
of the 8th the whole of the troops, with six small guns,
had been landed, meeting with no opposition to speak of.
After four miles of the sandy Cape Town road had been
traversed, the enemy was found in strength on the
Blauweberg, prepared to dispute our passage. The British
force therefore advanced in two brigades of three battalions
each, and on the enemy’s cavalry threatening to turn our
right flank, the right brigade engaged and contained them,
whilst the left brigade advanced under a hail of bullets
and prepared to charge the Dutch infantry. The latter,
however, did not wait, but broke and fled, leaving a large
number on the field. The remainder of the enemy’s force
followed their example, and retreated in an easterly
direction towards the interior.

With a loss of fifteen killed and one hundred and eighty-
nine wounded our troops pushed on towards the town, but
were much distressed by the want both of condition and
of water. They halted at Riet Wallery for the night, and
Baird here passed several anxious hours, for Janssens was
threatening his line of communications with the fleet—a
precarious base in this case, dependent on the weather ;
he was short of supplies and water, and he expected a
tough resistance on the morrow from the formidable works
round Cape Town if he ventured on an attack with only
3500 men and a few six-pounders.
Baird 395

On the following morning, therefore, he took up a position
on the shore which offered favourable conditions for com-
municating with the fleet, with a view to landing more
guns, men, and supplies. Much to his relief, however, a
flag of truce shortly appeared from the town with offers
of capitulation, and these were carried into effect on the
same day.

General Janssens had now to be dealt with. He had
taken up a position at Hottentot’s Holland Kloof, and
was preparing to cut off the supplies to the town. Baird
therefore sent the 59th and 72nd to threaten his rear, and
another detachment, by sea, to land on his left rear. At
the same time he heard that Janssens was wavering between
‘his previous determination to cut off supplies and thus
ruin many of his fellow-countrymen, and a desire to sur-
render in view of the hopelessness of further resistance.
He therefore despatched a conciliatory letter, which we
can only describe as being a model of “soft sawder”; he
pointed out that Janssens had behaved gallantly, that no
more could possibly be expected of him, that further re-
sistance would only mean the useless spilling of his country-
men’s blood and the destruction of their property ; and he
concluded by suggesting, most politely, a complete sur-
render. After several days’ hesitation (during which the
83rd was despatched to cut off his possible retreat), and
endeavours to obtain better terms, Janssens’ solicitude for
his countrymen’s property gained the day, and he sur-
rendered with all the honours of war.

General Baird thereupon assumed the Governorship of
the colony, in accordance with his instructions. The
results of his administration may be gathered from the
396 Twelve Soldiers

respect with which he was regarded by the inhabitants,
and afterwards by the remarks of his successor, General
Grey, who wrote—“On my arrival at the Cape I found
much to admire and nothing to change.”

In February Baird made elaborate preparations for
giving a warm reception to Admiral Villeaumez’s squadron,
which was reported to be coming to the Cape; but all
in vain. The squadron must have got wind of the British
occupation, for the only French vessel that arrived was the
Volontaire frigate, which, misled by our perfidious hoisting
of Dutch colours, innocently entered the harbour, and was
promptly captured.

We now come to an episode in General Baird’s life in
which his action got him into serious trouble with the
home authorities, and eventually brought about his recall
from the Cape. Though it is not for us to say whether his
conduct was correct or the reverse, it is impossible to avoid
the conclusion that his action was dictated by the highest
motives, and that ninety-nine out of every hundred British
officers would have acted as he did. It came about in this
wise. Commodore Sir Home Popham had for some time
past had his attention directed to the defenceless condition
of the rich Spanish colonies in what is now known as the
Argentine Republic, and had determined to try and secure
them by means of an expedition on his own account. For
this purpose he required men, and asked Baird to lend him
some of the troops under his command. Baird for a long
time felt it his duty to refuse to lend a hand in an under-
taking apparently unauthorized by the home Government,
though Popham assured him that the enterprise was
founded on an understanding with the British Ministry,
Baird 397

whom he had sounded on the subject. Baird, whose
characteristic Scotch caution forbade him to act without
written orders, hesitated for some time; but on Popham
limiting his demands to one regiment of infantry and some
artillery, and assuring him that he would carry out the
expedition in any case, even if he had to do it without
troops, the General gave way, and lent him the 71st Regi-
ment and some field guns, with a small detachment of
gunners, and Colonel (Brigadier-General) Beresford in
command.

On April 13, 1806, this force sailed from the Cape wid
St. Helena for the River Plate, and on June 27 captured
with little bloodshed the town of Buenos Ayres. So far so
good ; but on August 12 an unexpected rising took place,
and the British troops, outnumbered and exposed to a
murderous fire from the tops of the houses, were obliged,
with a loss of 165 out of 1300, to lay down their arms.
The home Government, willing enough to reap advantage
from the first success, had already despatched reinforce-
ments, and issued orders regulating the trade of their new
possession ; but even before the news of the disaster
arrived in England their tone had changed completely.
Sir Home Popham was recalled and tried by court martial,
and Baird received a letter, dated July 26, by which he was
informed that his action was not viewed with favour at
home, and that he was to return home directly his successor
arrived. .

In January 1807 Major-General Grey disembarked, and
took over the government. General Baird therefore pro-
ceeded home nominally in disgrace, but his embarkation
partook rather of a heartfelt farewell to a national hero.
398 Twelve Soldiers

Addresses of sympathy and regret poured in on him,
even from the Dutch burghers, and from the text ot
these addresses it is evident that he had succeeded in
winning the affection and respect of the people under his
rule.

It was not long before the country again required his
services, this time in an entirely novel direction. The
treaty of Tilsit had raised grave suspicions that Napoleon
intended to use the Danish fleet to assist him in reducing
the maritime strength of England, and the strong but
necessary step was taken of sending a powerful expedition
against a neutral capital to Copenhagen. Sir David was
attached as G.O.C. First Division under Lord Cathcart;
and by the beginning of September the town, arsenal,
and fleet were in our hands. This expedition must
be referred to in the briefest terms, for although Baird’s
division took part in the bombardment of Copenhagen,
the circumstances were such as to offer no particular
opportunity for distinction. He was, however, twice
slightly wounded, once in the collar-bone and once in
the left hand.

On his return to England Sir David was ordered to
form a camp of instruction on the Curragh of Kildare, with
a command of 13,000 men, and was busily employed during
the next nine months in organizing that establishment, the
success of which eventually led in after years to the form-
ation of Aldershot.

Baird was not long left in pursuance of this peaceful
occupation, for in August 1808 he was ordered to take
command of a division of 11,000 men, embark them at
Cork and Falmouth, and proceed to Corunna, thence to
Baird 3909

unite with Sir John Moore’s army, and assist the Spaniards
in driving the French out of the Peninsula

By October 13 Baird’s force had anchored at Corunna;
but already here his difficulties began, for the local Junta
refused to allow the disembarkation until leave to do so
had been obtained from the Central Junta at Madrid!
When the leave arrived, the country people were not
more complaisant than their superiors, for they looked
upon their British allies with suspicion, and refused to
provide them with fresh supplies or assistance in procuring
transport, except at most outrageous prices.

Sir John Moore was meanwhile at Lisbon. The plan
of campaign was to advance the two armies from their
then bases, and unite at some point in Leon, the Spanish
armies under Blake, Romana, Palafox, and Castafios mean-
while covering their concentration from the French, who
were pouring troops into Spain in the direction of Madrid.
Baird was instructed to form his advanced depédt at
Astorga, and began his march thither on October 28, only
six days after disembarking.

It is not necessary to follow the details of the march of
the two armies towards each other. Both Baird and
Moore had the greatest difficulty in collecting and forward-
ing supplies, for the Spaniards, instead of, as had been
confidently expected, welcoming them as deliverers, helped
them little or not at all, and the destruction of the Spanish
armies one after the other before the two British forces
had joined, left the latter in a perilous condition, liable to
be defeated in detail by the French armies which were
now advancing on them from several points.

1 These operations may be followed on map at p. 426.
400 Twelve Soldiers

On November 28 Sir John at Salamanca had become
so anxious for the safety of the British forces that he
determined to retreat, and ordered Baird to fall back
on Corunna. On December 5, however, hearing that
Madrid was still holding out, and being pressed on all sides
to consider his determination, General Moore counter-
manded these orders, and the two armies eventually
effected their junction, on the 2oth, at Mayorga. Hardly,
however, had this been accomplished, and orders issued for
the advance on the 23rd, when Sir John received
information that the whole of the French forces,
numbering over 80,000 men, with Napoleon in command,
were advancing to cut him off from Galicia. He therefore
abandoned all forward movement, and, much to the
disgust of his army, ordered a retreat on Vigo, véd Astorga.

The horrors of this march have often been described,
and need no more here than a slight reference. In the
depths of winter, over mountainous and barren country,
with a disorganized Spanish army of fugitives hampering
every movement, and with Soult’s pursuing columns in
their rear, the British troops were obliged, sorely against
their will, to make forced marches, day and night, back to
the sea. After suffering frightful hardships from the
weather and from want of supplies, the army arrived at
Corunna, to which the destination of the retreat had been
changed, on the 14th, but no ships were in sight. Sir
David Baird had during this terrible time shown the most
conspicuous devotion in trying to keep his Division
together, and looking after their wants to the best of human
ability; but his men had suffered severely, chiefly from the
exhaustion following the day and night marches ordered
Baird 401

by Sir John, against which Sir David had protested in
vain as being most harmful and unnecessary. Although it
was obvious that the troops could, and were most anxious,
to make a stand against the pursuing enemy, Moore
appeared to have but one idea—retreat at all costs; and
Baird, his loyalty and discipline strained to the utmost, did
his duty manfully, and carried out to the full these most
distasteful orders.

On the r5th the transports arrived from Vigo, and the
work of embarking the sick and the wounded was soon in
full swing, covered by the army in position on the hills
surrounding the bay. On the 16th the French made
preparations for the attack, and the disheartened British
troops revived as if by magic. Sir David’s division was on
the right of the line, and seeing the French columns
advancing against this point, he asked his General whether
it was not time to move forward, and if so, whether he
would not give the order. “No, Baird, do you give the
word,” said Sir John, and Baird at once ordered his divi-
sion to advance. This was the last word of command he
ever gave in action, for a few minutes later a grape shot
struck him in the left arm, immediately below the shoulder.
Almost stunned by the blow, he dismounted, and then
tried to mount again, but it was impossible. Although
the bone was shattered, and his side was laid open by the
same shot, he walked so quietly into Corunna that several
officers who passed him on the way did not even notice he
was wounded. After a short rest in his quarters, he was
taken on board the Ville de Paris, and there the
surgeons immediately performed the painful operation of

cutting the arm out of the socket. During the progress of
DD
402 Twelve Soldiers

the amputation Baird remained quietly seated at the table,
and only once uttered an exclamation of pain. Even
when urged to lie down, and whilst the surgeons were
dressing the wound, he was much more concerned about
the progress of the action than about himself.

Sir John Moore’s death, which occurred a short time
after Baird received his wound, left the latter in command
of the army, but under the circumstances the command
was assumed by General Hope, who successfully carried
out the brilliant victory which followed, and embarked the
army.

It was long before Sir David recovered from the effects
of his wound, but his sufferings were alleviated by. the
sincere sympathy which he received from all, by the vote
of thanks which Parliament gave him, and by the honour-
able though tardy recognition of his services by the
immediate bestowal on him by the King of the red ribbon
of the Bath, and of a baronetcy in the following April.

* * * * * *

The record of Sir David Baird’s career now draws toa
close. The only subsequent appointment which he was
able to hold was that of Commander of the Forces in
Ireland, from 1820 to 1822, and the command being
reduced in the latter year to that of a Lieutenant-General,
he resigned it in favour of his old Adjutant-General in
Egypt (now Sir Samuel) Auchmuty. Thereafter he
retired into private life, and having married a Miss Preston
in 1810, and been created G.C.B. in 1815, he spent his
remaining years in peace and happiness.

He died on August 18, 1829, from the effects of a bad
fall from his horse six years earlier.
Baird 403

The memory of Baird will long remain in British history
as that of an incarnation of almost all the military virtues.
Cool, resourceful, self-reliant, brave, active, energetic, just,
and, above all, devoted to his duty, he had in addition the
qualities of the born organizer and leader of men, and the
power of making himself respected and beloved by all who
came under his influence. Of his powers as a strategist
and a tactician we have but few examples, and great, in
the ordinary acceptation of the word, he could hardly
be called. But as a thorough soldier he stands in the
front rank of this world’s heroes, and Great Britain may
consider herself lucky in being able to claim him as a son
of hers in the time of the great struggle.
MOORE
1761—1809

AMONG the men who took part in the building up of the
world-wide British Empire, a prominent place belongs to
Sir John Moore, whose character combined in a very re-
markable way firmness and decision with gentleness and
affability, prudence with daring, patriotism with sympathy
for a distressed foe, and a deep sense of duty with a keen
sensitiveness or touchiness as to the manner in which he
was treated by his official superiors. He had strong and
well-cultivated intellectual powers, which enabled him to
make correct judgments, and during all his life he dis-
played much affection for the members of his family. He
was never married, as he considered his means inadequate
to support in a proper manner the lady to whom his
affections were given.

John Moore was born at Glasgow on November 13, 1761,
and died at Corunna, in Spain, from the effects of a wound
received in action, on January 16, 1809. He was the third
son of Dr. Moore, a Glasgow physician of high character
and learning, and as he remained under his father’s care
until he was fifteen years old, there can be no doubt that
his character, at first fiery and intractable, was largely in-
fluenced for good by the judicious and firm influence of
his father. His figure was tall and graceful, and though

his facial expression was cheerful and kindly in character
404
 

 
Moore 405

yet his firmly-set mouth gives some indication of the
fearlessness and strength of mind that characterized his
whole career.

His education began at the High School at Glasgow,
but in 1772, when the boy was eleven years of age, his
father took charge of the young Duke of Hamilton during
a prolonged tour on the Continent of Europe. John
accompanied the party, and though the Duke was five years
his senior, a warm friendship sprang up between them—a
friendship which proved very beneficial to Moore, in an
age when men as a rule could procure advancement only
by patronage or purchase.

Dr. Moore and his two young charges visited Paris,
Geneva, various places in Germany, as well as Vienna,
Venice, Rome, and Naples; during all this time John’s
education was continued with a view to fit him for a
military career, for which he had shown an inclination
before he was twelve years old. His curriculum included
mathematics, engineering, geography, history, general litera-
ture, fencing, and riding; besides which he learnt French
and Italian, a knowledge of which proved of the greatest
use to him in after years. When in Berlin in 1775, the
travellers were received by Frederick the Great, who gave
them permission to be present at his reviews, the effect
of which was to increase young Moore’s desire for a mili-
tary career. While they were at Naples in 1776, the glad
tidings arrived that the Duke of Argyle, at the request of
the Duke of Hamilton, had obtained an ensigncy in the
sist Regiment for Moore. But as he was only fifteen
years old, he obtained leave from his regiment, then at
Minorca, and after remaining some months longer in Italy
406 Twelve Soldiers

he rejoined his mother at Glasgow towards the end of the
year, preparatory to joining his regiment.

After a short stay at Glasgow he hastened, early in 1777,
to Minorca, vid Marseilles, to join his regiment, then
stationed at Port Mahon. His life there was uneventful,
but the bent of his character showed itself plainly. Though
only sixteen years old, he persevered in his studies, showed
strict obedience to orders, paid scrupulous attention to
details, and avoided the somewhat fashionable evils of
excessive drinking, gambling, and quarrelling ; rather un-
usual characteristics for lads of his age at such a period.
But the dull routine of garrison life weighed heavily on a
young soul burning with ardour for active service. In his
letters to his father he expressed his longing to take part
in the American War, which was then at its height. This
desire was soon gratified, for the Duke of Hamilton, also
seized with military ardour, had raised, with the consent
of the Government, a Highland regiment for active service
in America, in which he secured for young Moore botha
lieutenancy and the post of paymaster.

His regiment proceeded to Halifax in Nova Scotia, and
in June 1779 formed a portion of the expeditionary force
to the Bay of Penobscot, under MacLean. In this expedi-
tion young Moore more than once distinguished himself by
coolness and daring, and in this way won for himself the
warm friendship of MacLean, who, on their return to
Halifax, placed at Moore’s disposal his own valuable pro-
fessional library. Needless to say, Moore made full use of
his opportunity. This incident forms rather a happy picture
of a distinguished general, not only equipping himself with
the best military literature of the day, but also personally
Moore 407

undertaking the instruction of a promising young officer.
Unfortunately after some time MacLean’s health gave way,
and he died at Halifax.

The quiet routine of an uneventful garrison life again
began to weigh on Moore, who had been promoted to a
captaincy. So in 1781 he went on leave to New York,
the head-quarters of the British Army in America, in the
hopes of seeing service, but while he was there the news
arrived of Lord Cornwallis’s surrender at York Town.
This surrender virtually ended the land operations of the
American War, and Moore returned to England on leave.

While he was at home the Peace of Versailles was
signed in 1783, and one result of this peace was the dis-
bandment of the Hamilton Regiment. Captain Moore
was now placed on half-pay, but he spent much of his
spare time studying military history and field-fortification.

The failure to bring the American War to a successful
conclusion brought about a change of Ministry at home,
and in the new Parliament Moore was elected, through the
influence of the Duke of Hamilton, as the representative
of four Scottish boroughs. In Parliament he held himself
independent of the recognized political parties of the day.
However, he generally voted for Pitt’s measures, and
though he did this, Burke, then in the Opposition, was so
convinced of the honesty of his convictions, that he spoke
to Dr. Moore in commendatory terms of his son’s political
conduct. Moore’s moderation and straightforward char-
acter won for him many friends on both sides of the
House, and also the permanent friendship of the Duke of
York. Moore’s parliamentary experience proved of great
value to him in subsequent years, for it gave him a
408 Twelve Soldiers

practical insight both into the fabric and spirit of our
national government, and also into the influences that
controlled the conduct of the statesmen of the day.

But Moore’s ruling passion was for a military career.
The reduction of establishments that followed the peace
of 1783 offered no opportunity for the satisfaction of this
desire until 1787, when, owing to a probable renewal of
war, the strength of the army was increased. Amongst
other increases, two new battalions were added to the 6oth
Regiment, to one of which Moore was appointed as major.
He joined this battalion at Chatham, and his strong, firm,
and just character was conspicuously displayed in effecting
the rapid disciplining and training of the officers and men
entrusted to his care. But in the following year, 1788, he
was transferred to his old regiment, the 51st, which was
then stationed at Cork.

When Major Moore joined the sist he found it in a
very disorganized state. His suggestions for improving
it were ill-received by his Lieutenant-Colonel, who con-
sidered them as an uncalled-for interference. Moore
tactfully accepted the situation and bided his time, acting
with loyalty to his commanding officer, and winning the
devotion of those under him, many of whom owed their
promotion to him in after years, among them Ensign
Anderson, subsequently his inseparable companion. Further
than this, during his whole stay in Ireland, up to 1792,
Moore closely studied the condition of affairs in that island
and the character of the people—a knowledge which, later,
proved of the utmost value to him. Moore had one strong
characteristic, and that was the desire to gather informa-
tion of every kind wherever he might be. In after years
Moore 409

we have him, wherever stationed, finding out all that he
could about the country and the people among whom he
was living—information of the greatest value to every
soldier who recognizes the fact that war is a political act
entered into for a political purpose, by which it must be
directly or indirectly controlled from beginning to end.
While Major Moore was stationed in Ireland, a probable
rupture with Spain in 1789, over the ownership of St.
George’s Sound, on the Pacific coast of North America,
led to the preparation of an expeditionary force to attack
the rich Spanish colonies in South America, from which
Spain derived so much revenue in gold. The rumour of
war induced the Lieutenant-Colonel of the 51st Regiment
to apply for leave to retire for family reasons. The leave
being granted, Moore purchased his commission, and thus
succeeded to the command of the regiment. He at once
set about improving its discipline by strictly enforcing
obedience to the existing military regulations, while at
the same time cultivating friendly relations with his officers
and men. The battalion was soon thoroughly practised
in drill and other military duties, and while discipline was
strictly enforced, the welfare of the men was at the same
time carefully considered and provided for. At this period
drunkenness was very rife among the officers of the army,
but Lieutenant-Colonel Moore strictly set his face against
the custom, and made those of his officers who would not
conform to his views either leave the service or exchange
into other regiments. The splendid spirit and discipline
that the 51st Regiment subsequently displayed in the long
Peninsular War were admittedly due to Moore’s training.
1 Then known as Nootka Sound.
410 Twelve Soldiers

Moore’s genius cnabled him to see that training men toa
mere blind obedience to orders was not a healthy or a
high ideal to work for, as it cannot ever draw out of them
the maximum of energy and will. This can only be done
by affection. And so, side by side with a strict disciplinary
system, we find Colonel Moore adopting a friendly and
cordial attitude towards his officers and men, while ex-
ercising careful and considerate forethought for their
personal requirements and future well-being.

On the friction between Spain and England being
smoothed over, the expeditionary force was broken up
again, and the 51st Regiment remained in Ireland until
1792, when it received orders to embark for Gibraltar,
which place was reached by the end of March 1792.
Colonel Moore’s active spirit again found relief from the
monotonous routine of garrison duty in travelling about
Southern Spain and acquiring a knowledge of the Spanish
character and habits.

In December 1793, the Soth and 51st Regiments were
sent from Gibraltar, and joined the expeditionary force to
Corsica under General Dundas; the Corsicans having
applied to England for help and annexation. Colonel
Moore and Major Kochler, an artillery officer, were sent
in advance to report on the practicability of the proposed
enterprise, and to investigate how far the Corsicans were
in earnest in desiring English help and rule. They were
accompanied by Sir Gilbert Elliot, the King’s Com-
missioner in the Mediterranean, who was to communicate
with Paoli on political points. This small party sailed in
January 1794, and were enthusiastically received by the
Corsicans. They learnt that the French still held St.
Moore 411

Fiorenza, Bastia, and Calvi. When the fleet appeared,
Moore made his report in favour of immediate action,
before the French could strengthen their defences, pro-
vided the Corsicans gave them hearty co-operation. But
Moore had unwittingly under-estimated the French strength,
relying on Corsican estimates. He reported the French
forces as only 2000, whereas in reality they were 7000
strong.

Moore’s report was approved, and the fleet sailed to
Porto Ferrara, to assemble the troops and to collect the.
ordnance stores required for the land operations, and it
was not until February 1794 that by the taking of St.
Fiorenza the operations began,! which ended in the freeing
of Corsica from the presence of French troops. Moore took
a prominent part in them all, and led the assaults on the
fortified places with great bravery and determination, after
these assaults had been duly prepared by artillery fire, from
pieces which in some cases had been dragged with great
difficulty to theiremplacements. After St. Fiorenza, Bastia
was next attacked, and finally, in May 1794, the French
garrison of 6000 men capitulated from famine. Soon after
this, General Sir Charles Stuart arrived from England and
took command of the troops, General Dundas having left
for England. Between Moore and Stuart a great friend-
ship sprang up.

After the fall of Bastia, the siege of Calvi was begun on
June 29, when the weather was oppressively hot and fever

1 A Martello tower defended the bay of this place and held out for
a week. It was the model on which the Martello towers were built
along the south coast of England to resist the expected French
invasion at the beginning of this century.
A412 Twelve Soldiers

very prevalent, from the marshy character of the soil
around Calvi. For these reasons Stuart determined to
avoid regular siege operations, which would only cause his
force to waste away with sickness. Consequently he
decided to assault at an early date, after a preliminary
bombardment, and for this purpose he hurried forward the
landing of the necessary guns, ammunition, stores, and
provisions. Lord Hood also sent him fifty men under
Captain Nelson. Batteries were erected during the suc-
ceeding nights, and a fierce cannonade was kept up by
both sides! Stuart slept every night in the trenches, and
very frequently reconnoitred the effects of the artillery
fire. Moore expostulated with him at his exposing him-
self so much, but Stuart replied that he considered it the
special duty of the commander to examine personally the
state of the breach, lest he should expose others to the
greater danger of storming before it was practicable. This
noble answer was never effaced from Moore’s memory.
The assault on the outworks of Calvi was ordered to be
made at the dawn of July 19 by three assaulting columns
—two to make the assault and one to follow in reserve for
use when required. Moore commanded the right column,
and the assault, bravely led and carried out, was successful.
New batteries were raised on the captured works, but the
excessive heat and destructive sickness caused much delay.
However, on August 22, the French garrison capitulated.
Shortly after this, the post falling vacant, Moore was
made Stuart’s adjutant-general ; but on Sir Gilbert Elliot
being appointed Viceroy of Corsica, with full civil and
military authority, Stuart sent in his resignation.

1 It was during this cannonade that Nelson lost his eye.
Moore 413

Moore’s parliamentary experience convinced him that
the Corsicans were totally unfitted for the imitation of the
British constitution which Elliot tried to force on them,
and in common with every other Englishman on the
island, felt deeply for the Corsicans. This was displeasing
to the Viceroy, so on the excuse that Moore was thwarting
him in his policy, he ordered him away in October 1795.
However it is to be noted, that he wrote home expressing
a wish that Colonel Moore should be employed elsewhere,
and acknowledging his great talents. Moore’s departure
was deeply regretted, not only by the troops, but also by
the Corsicans.

On reaching England, Moore had an interview with
Pitt, who was favourably impressed with his display of
character and who was acquainted with Elliot’s disposition.
The Duke of York also took up his cause, and Moore was
soon astonished by being promoted to the command of
a brigade forming part of an expedition that was being
sent under Sir Ralph Abercromby to the West Indies,
which at that time formed the chief centre of England’s
external trade. His brigade was forming in the Isle of
Wight, and consisted of foreign corps, chiefly of French
emigrant Royalists. The post of brigade-major he kept
open for his old friend Anderson of the 51st Regiment,
who, he heard, had already sailed to Barbados.

On February 28, 1796, the expedition sailed from Spit-
head, and reached Barbados on April 15. From here
two strong detachments were sent off, one to St. Domingo
and the other to Demerara and Berbica, and on April 22
the remainder of the force with Moore’s brigade sailed for

St. Lucia.
414 Twelve Soldiers

The first objective was the harbour of Castries, the chief
town of St. Lucia. The landing had to be forced, and was
actually effected during a high wind by Moore at the head
of the 42nd Highlanders. In fact, the operation would
have been delayed but for Moore’s protests and energy.
In the subsequent operations Moore was the moving spirit,
and on several occasions showed complete readiness to
accept responsibility when unexpected events occurred, or
when his orders were not clear and Abercromby was not
present to issue fresh orders. Moore’s personal bravery
and daring were also conspicuously displayed, and his
judgment was so sound that Abercromby invariably
approved of whatever he undertook on his own authority.
In the siege operations that followed, Moore’s previous
experience at the siege of Calvi proved of great value.
He thoroughly recognized the necessity for guns of
powerful calibre pushed forward to as short a range as
possible.

It was at this time that an incident occurred show-
ing Moore’s large-mindedness and disinterestedness of
character. The siege batteries having been erected more
or less within the limits of the ground held by Moore’s
troops, the work of superintendence almost entirely fell on
him, and he found the work too much for his physical
powers. Consequently he asked Abercromby to order
General Knox, Moore’s senior, to take over part of the
work. Sir Ralph replied that he had no intention of
superseding him, and was surprised at Moore’s request.
Moore replied that he had only asked for a good officer,
“for it is of the utmost importance that the service should
be well conducted, but of none which of us commands.”
Moore AIS

Next day General Knox was put in orders for the
duty, and he and Moore subsequently acted in perfect
harmony.

The French capitulated towards the end of May 1796,
but not before several hard-fought sallies had been under-
taken, in the repelling of which Moore took an active
and leading part. In fact, throughout his career, Moore
seems to have delighted in being foremost in all hand-to-
hand fighting, in which he invariably displayed the most
determined coolness and bravery.

Abercromby could not stay longer in St. Lucia, which
was as yet far from being subjugated ; and on June 4 he
sailed with most of his force, to reduce the revolted islands
of Grenada and St. Vincent. But before leaving he
pressed Moore to accept the post of Governor of St. Lucia
on the plea that his military talents were necessary to
complete the subjugation of the island. The work before
Moore was one of very great difficulty. The wooded and
intricate mountains were full of armed negro bands called
“Brigands,” who had been declared free by French
revolutionary agents. The only result obtained by these
political fanatics was to kindle in the emancipated slaves
an unbridled ferocity, which developed into a savagery
sullied by unmentionable horrors, sparing neither women
nor children. Unfortunately the woods were full of
succulent roots, on which the brigands were able to live,
and Victor Hugues, the French Commandant at Guade-
loupe, was able, in the absence of any British ships, to send
frequent supplies of arms, ammunition, and provisions to
the revolted negroes.

The white troops that had been left with Moore were
416 Twelve Soldiers

chiefly recruits with inexperienced officers, for the reasons
already stated, and he more than once complained to
Abercromby both of the shameful ignorance and want of
zeal of the officers under his command, and also of the
want of discipline that existed among the men—a state of
things that proved a great source of trial to him, and
compelled him to be constantly moving up and down the
island to see that his orders were being carried out.
He believed in seeing that the orders he issued were
put into effect. But besides his European troops, he
had a small corps of black troops of which he thought
highly, considering them to be the best kind of troops for
the country, because they were possessed of many
excellent qualities and, with proper training and attention,
could be made fit for anything.

The housing of his troops was Moore’s first great
difficulty, as the destruction effected by the brigands had
been so excessive that there were not sufficient buildings
remaining either to shelter the troops or to form a hospital,
and, the rainy season having set in, much sickness pre-
vailed from the outset.

Moore was overwhelmed with applications for troops to
protect the various plantations, but he wisely saw the
danger and weakness of splitting up his troops into
numerous small detachments. As soon as possible he
made a tour of the island, in order to become acquainted
with the principal people and to address meetings, assuring
the planters of protection, and asking them to treat their
slaves with kindness and justice, so as to tempt back those
who had joined the brigands. He then proceeded to act
as many others have done under similar circumstances, as
Moore 417

Cromwell in the Eastern Counties, Hoche in la Vendée,
Roberts and White in Burmah, and Carrington in
Matabeleland. He established a line of fortified posts at
certain important points covering the plantations, and told
off flying columns to act offensively against the brigands
wherever they could be found, and to give them no rest
until they laid down their arms. He also arrested some
of the few known agitators. The coast was also guarded
as far as possible by detachments, to prevent supplies
coming to the brigands by sea, and all boats were ordered
to be destroyed. Vigilance and strict discipline were
strongly inculcated on all concerned. Orders were also
issued to destroy all the root crops found in the woods, as
well as all the huts built by the brigands. Moore himself
constantly visited the posts in succession, and took part in
some of the offensive operations against the enemy when-
ever he got intelligence of their being assembled. In a
letter to his father at this time, he complains that he had
very few officers that he could depend on, and that his
troops were bad and were so ill-commanded that his
presence was necessary at every quarter. He found that
the troops were healthier when kept actively employed
than when at rest; he asserted that the greater part of
the sickness suffered proceeded from a want of discipline
and interior economy in the regiments, and accordingly he
insisted on great attention being paid to the cleanliness
and neatness of the soldiers’ person and to the regularity
of his diet, to extra food being issued instead of rum, to
sea or river bathing, and to constant activity and move-
ment; for, he adds, ordinary parades leave “ the soldier to

lounge the whole day in a barrack, where the air cannot
EE
418 Twelve Soldiers

be good, and where, from indolence, his body becomes
enervated and liable to disorder.”

Moore’s arrangements proved successful, and would
have succeeded better had he been better able to prevent
the brigands receiving supplies from Guadeloupe, but the
coast-line was too extensive to enable him to watch it
efficiently without war vessels. The brigands were gradu-
ally succumbing to famine, but his troops were also being
diminished and disheartened by sickness, especially as
they were without much zeal for their work. And in the
end he was himself attacked with yellow fever, by which
he would have been carried off but for the care of his
Brigade-Major Anderson. He was then relieved by Colonel
Drummond, who by continuing to carry out his views,
successfully reduced the island to order, and Abercromby,
seeing his feeble state, sent him home to England in July
1797, where he was well received by the Duke of York.

Soon after this, a French invasion being seriously
apprehended, Major Hay of the Engineers was deputed
to make a reconnaissance of the southern coast of England.
Moore accompanied Hay in making this reconnaissance.

Moore’s next employment was in Ireland, where a
rebellion had broken out in 1796 at the instigation of
French emissaries. To quell this rebellion, Abercromby,
who had by this time also returned to England from the
West Indies, was given command of the troops in Ireland.
At his request, Moore was appointed to a brigade
command under him, and they both reached Dublin early
in December 1797.

Moore’s head-quarters were at Bandon, and his force
consisted of over 3000 Irish Militia, who had very little
Moore 419

idea of discipline. But by kindly, though strict and just
treatment, he gradually brought them into tolerably good
order. In April 1798 he received orders to disarm the
population in his vicinity. This he carried out by
keeping his troops collected, and ordering the various
parishes to bring in the food required for his men, which
was paid for. This enabled discipline to be preserved and
prevented any plundering. Notice was then sent out for
all arms to be brought in, on threat of permitting the
troops to live at free quarters. This threat was effective,
and as soon as the order was obeyed the troops were
moved on to the next district. Moore everywhere urged
the landlords to try and gain the good-will of their tenants.
At the same time he kept a vigilant watch for assemblies
or threatened risings, and wherever these were considered
likely to take place, he appeared on the spot with such a
strong force of cavalry and infantry as to overawe the mal-
contents. By such means, though his district was considered
to be the most disaffected of all, no insurrection broke out
in it.

In May the insurrection broke out furiously in Kildare,
and General Lake determined to assemble all his dispos-
able troops. In accordance with this resolution, Brigadier
Moore was ordered to march from Bandon to Dublin, 200
miles. The fear of a rising in Cork kept him there for
three days, but after that, by rapid marching, he reached
New Ross in a week, where he joined General Johnstone,
who had been severely attacked by the rebels. The
enemy was attacked next day, but they did not wait for
the assault. Moore was then ordered to proceed with
1000 men to Taghmon, seven miles from Wexford, after
420 Twelve Soldiers

joining with Lord Dalhousie, who was to meet him on the
way. Moore, on reaching the place of rendezvous, sent
out patrols to find intelligence either of the enemy or of
Lord Dalhousie’s force; but getting no information pro-
ceeded on towards Taghmon. However, before he had
gone far he encountered a strong rebel force of about 6000
men, who charged boldly. Moore’s inexperienced troops
wavered, but he placed himself at the head of his right
wing on foot, and, charging sword in hand with his men,
drove the enemy back. Hearing that his left was
also wavering, he galloped there, again led his men suc-
cessfully forward, and the enemy fled. After resting on
the battle-field that night, and having been joined by
Lord Dalhousie, he advanced next day to Taghmon, but
hearing of the distressed condition of Wexford, he deter-
mined to push on there before the rebels had time to
recover from their defeat. He entered Wexford without
resistance, and released the people who had been shut up
as prisoners and who were on the point of being murdered
in cold blood.

In the meantime Lake had combined with Johnstone,
and defeated the main body of the rebels at Vinegar Hill.
The rebellion was practically crushed, but order had to
be restored. Moore was now promoted to Major-General,
and was given command of a strong flying column to
reduce those refractory rebel bodies that still entertained
hopes of aid from France, and who for this reason per-
severed in hostilities. Large bodies of them lurked in the
mountains of Wicklow. Moore pleaded with the landlords
and tenants for mutual toleration; but to break up the
irreconcilables he divided his force into four columns
Moore 421

with orders to keep up communications with each other
as they advanced, to maintain strict discipline, and to
avoid injuring the unarmed inhabitants. The rebels were
then relentlessly pursued, and given no peace, until in
three weeks they had either dispersed or laid down their
arms.

News now arrived of the landing of a French force
in the South of Ireland, and all the troops were hurried
southwards, but before any serious fighting occurred, the
French commander, Humbert, laid down his arms. General
Moore’s brother, who was present during the advance, gives
a very interesting account of Moore’s great energy and
untiring exertions in gaining intelligence, in placing his
outposts, and in seeing that the comforts and requirements
of his men were supplied. Moore’s sound judgment and
tact won for him the warm respect and confidence of the
Lord-Lieutenant, Earl Cornwallis.

Next year, in 1799, when Bonaparte had been repulsed
before Acre, and Suwarow was overrunning Northern Italy
with a Russian force, the British Government determined
to land a force in Holland to free that country from the
domination of France. A Russian force of about 17,000
men was also subsidized to take part in the expedition.
Sir Ralph Abercromby was accordingly ordered to begin
the invasion with a force of 10,000 men, and Moore was
appointed to the command of a brigade of this force. His
brigade was formed in Hampshire, and the troops being
mostly raw soldiers, he energetically threw himself into
the work of training them in field duties. The troops
were embarked at Ramsgate, and on’ August 27 Moore
was the first to effect a landing, with about 300 men,
422 Twelve Soldiers

with whom he held the beach until the rest of his
brigade had got on shore; after which he advanced, and
covered the landing of the other brigades. The Dutch had
no desire for British help, and so made no effort to rise
against the French. Throughout the whole campaign!
Moore distinguished himself frequently by his bravery and
cool judgment, and in the final fighting was wounded
severely. For his services in Holland he was appointed
Colonel of the 52nd Regiment, and when his health was
restored was given the command of the troops at Chelmsford.

But Moore was not allowed to remain long in peace.
By June 1800 he found himself in Minorca, again employed
under Abercromby. Here he spent his time instructing
and disciplining the raw troops sent out from England
until October, when he joined Abercromby’s expedition
to Egypt. Aboukir Bay was reached at the beginning
of March 1801. On the morning of March Io a landing
was effected by the 1st Division. Moore’s brigade was
the first to reach the shore, and to charge the enemy, he
himself leading the way. The French were driven back.
On the following day the English advanced again, with
equal success. On March 21 the French attacked, when
both Abercromby and Moore were badly wounded, the
former fatally, to the great loss of the English army.
Moore, however, remained in Egypt until after the fall
of Alexandria, and then obtained leave of absence to
England.

After peace with France was signed at Amiens on
March 27, 1802, the reduction of the army for a time
took away Moore’s employment. But early in 1803 the

1 Of which a sketch is given in the life of Abercromby.
Moore 423

52nd Regiment, of which he had been colonel in 1801,
was ordered to be trained in light infantry tactics, and
Moore was entrusted with this duty, as the idea was
suggested by him as preferable to raising special new
corps. On the renewal of the war with France, in May
1803, the army was augmented, the militia called out, and
a new volunteer force of 400,000 men enrolled for local
defence against a projected invasion of England by Bona-
parte. The principal portion of the regular army was
posted between London and the nearest sea-coasts, under
the command of Sir David Dundas, and Moore was
nominated to a brigade, first at Brighton, and afterwards
at Canterbury. But on July 9, 1803, he took command
of a brigade at Shorncliffe, consisting at first of the 4th,
52nd, 59th, 7oth, and 95th Regiments. Some of these
units were subsequently changed, and Moore’s reputation,
as a disciplinarian, was so great that the 43rd Regiment,
which had been in an unsatisfactory state, was also put
under ‘him.

Moore’s brigade was carefully trained to light infantry
duties. There has been some dispute as to who should
have the credit of instituting this system into the English
army. While at Minorca in 1800 Moore’s attention had
been directed by Abercromby to the need in the British
army of a light infantry corps, similar to that of the
French Voltigeurs.2 He had, moreover, noticed with

1 This consisted in breaking up the battalion into skirmishers,
supports and reserves, similar in some respects to the modern system
of tactics now taught to all foot regiments. The ordinary fighting
formation for British infantry at that time was the line.

2 See autograph letter from Abercromby, exhibited in the Edin-
burgh Naval and Military Exhibition of 1889.
424 Twelve Soldiers

approval the system adopted by Major Kenneth Mac-
Kenzie, when this officer was in temporary command of
the goth Regiment at Minorca However, while at Shorn-
cliffe, he not only introduced the system of light infantry
drill and manceuvres into his brigade, but also that admir-
able system of discipline and interior economy (on which
he laid such stress in St. Lucia) that laid the foundation
of the famous Light Division in the subsequent Peninsular
War.

On November 14 Moore was made a Knight of the
Bath. He chose, as the supporter of his arms, “a light
infantry soldier, as being colonel of the first light infantry
regiment, and a g2nd Highlander, in gratitude and
acknowledgment of two soldiers of that regiment who
saved my life in Holland.”?

The eventful year 1805 arrived. Trafalgar had been
fought and won, and France had humbled Austria and
Russia, overrun Italy, and driven the King and Queen of
Naples into Sicily. To preserve Sicily from France 12,000
British troops were placed in that island. They were first
commanded by Sir John Stuart, who was superseded in
June 1806 by General Fox, brother to the English Prime
Minister, and British Minister at the Neapolitan Court at
Palermo. As General Fox was more or less infirm, Sir
John Moore, who had been promoted Lieutenant-General
in November 1805, was nominated as his second in
command.

In 1807, on Fox being recalled, the command in Sicily
was given to Sir John Moore. In September he received
instructions to embark, and proceed with 7000 men to

1 See Stewart’s Scottish Highlanders. 2 bid,
Moore 425

Gibraltar. On his arrival at Gibraltar he was ordered to
leave two of his regiments there, and proceed with the
remainder to England, where he was well received by the
Duke of York, and was praised for his judicious conduct
in regard to Sicilian affairs.

In May 1808 Moore was sent in command of a force of
11,000 men to aid the King of Sweden against Russia, which
had now joined hands with France. He was ordered not
to place himself under the command of the King, whose
sanity was doubted, nor to engage in any enterprise so far
from the coast as would endanger his chance of re-
embarking. The actual line of action he was to take was
left to his own discretion. When Gothenberg was reached,
the King refused to allow the troops to be landed from their
crowded transports, though after a few days the regiments
were allowed to land in rotation on a small island for exer-
cise and bathing and for practising disembarkations. After
some fruitless negotiations through intermediaries, Sir John
went to Stockholm to confer with the King. The King’s
ideas were thoroughly unpractical ; he thought that with
the small forces at his and Moore’s command, he could
drive either the French out of Zealand or the Russians
out of Finland. As Moore would not agree to these
wild projects, he was practically placed under arrest by
the King, but escaped from Stockholm in the guise of
a peasant, and on reaching Gothenberg returned to Eng-
land, in July 1808. But on reaching the Downs the
troops were ordered to proceed to Portsmouth, while
Moore was ordered to report himself in London, where he
was informed that his action in Sweden was approved.

Bonaparte’s attempt to confiscate Spain had by this time
426 Twelve Soldiers

begun, and Spanish appeals for help had reached England.
Arms, ammunition, and money had been given, and Sir

Cape Fa

 

NORTH-WEST SPAIN

Arthur Wellesley was sent on July 12 with g00o men from
Ireland to Portugal, with orders to effect a landing if he
was strong enough, but if not to wait for reinforcements
which would be sent to him under Moore and other
Moore 427

commanders. Moore was informed that he would have to
serve under Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard.
He expressed his indignation at having to serve under two
officers, one of whom had never been before employed as a
general in the field, after his having held the chief
commands in Sicily and Sweden. However, he acted
loyally to his new chief, Sir Harry Burrard, and having
handed to him the troops he had so long commanded, he
sailed with him as his second in command. At the end of
July, off Cape Finisterre, information arrived that Wellesley
had already landed in Mondego Bay. Burrard pushed on
there at once, directing Moore to proceed to Vigo with his
troops and to wait there for orders. But as the wind was
unfavourable for this, he went to Oporto and then to
Mondego Bay, where he received orders to land the troops.
During the disembarkation he was ordered to stop it, and
to proceed further south, so as to be nearer to the ad-
vancing army. Contrary winds prevented him reaching
Marceira for four days, and then the surf on the beach was
so violent that it took five days to land the troops. In
the meanwhile the convention of Cintra had been
signed ; Sir Arthur Wellesley as well as Dalrymple and
Burrard had gone home; this left the. chief command
to Sir John Moore, in which position he was confirmed
by orders from England.

Portugal having been cleared of French troops, the next
thing to do was to assist Spain, which was in a most un-
happy condition. By an official letter, dated September
25, 1808, Moore was informed that an army of not less
than 30,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry was to be em-
ployed under his orders in the north of Spain, in order
428 Twelve Soldiers

to co-operate with the Spanish armies; that to make up
this force, 15,000 men under Sir David Baird would be
sent out to join him by way of Corunna; and that it was
left to his judgment whether he should fix on some point
of rendezvous in Galicia or on the frontier of Leon, or
transport his troops by sea from Lisbon to Corunna.

In Spain everything was in confusion. The local
provincial Juntas were jealous of one another, and refused
to let their provincial levies go far from them. The
Spanish generals were under no recognized head, and
looked only to their respective provincial Juntas for orders.
Apathy, arrogance, and self-satisfaction reigned everywhere.
In this chaos of affairs the Spanish troops were completely
neglected, and were soon in want of food, clothing, shoes,
arms, equipment, means of transport, and every other
necessary for ensuring military efficiency. This destroyed
all discipline, and led to much deserting and brigandage.
The Spaniards were full of self-conceit as to what they
could do, but they never at any time tried to do it. In fact,
there can be but little doubt that among the leading
men in Spain there were many who were traitors to
their country, and who really desired French domination,
hoping to profit thereby. The English Minister Frere was
completely deceived by their promises and assurances, none
of which were fulfilled. And being deceived, he was
constantly giving Moore faulty information and faulty
advice.t

1 But little is here said of Moore’s relations with Mr. Frere, the
British Minister in Spain, but these relations were anything but
pleasant to Moore, and were borne with great patience and forbearance
in the face of a common danger, requiring united and harmonious
action and not hard words and disunion,
Moore 429

The information that Moore received from Madrid con-
cerning the strength of the Spanish and French armies
was most misleading—the Spanish strength was grossly
exaggerated at 160,000 men, and the French strength
grossly minimized at 53,000 men. Nor was this all
Moore’s difficulty. England had been for so long the
enemy of Spain, that there was no enthusiasm among the
people for the presence of the British troops. In fact,
often Moore was unable to purchase, at exorbitant rates,
provisions which a few days after were freely given to the
French, and he found it almost impossible to obtain any
information concerning the French from the country
people. Besides this, Moore was hampered by an inex-
perienced administrative staff, and many of his troops were
only raw levies lately raised and but ill-officered.1 But
before he began his operations, he, like every other English-
man at that day, believed in the reality of the Spanish
patriotism against the French.

His first difficulty was to obtain information concerning
the roads leading into Spain, and the means of subsistence
available while traversing them. The information that he
did receive proved to be erroneous. Three Spanish armies,
he was informed, were posted along the Ebro containing
the French, with a small Spanish force at Burgos, while
the whole country was described as enthusiastic and rising
in arms. Consequently Moore considered himself as free

1 It has been said that our troops in the Peninsula were the sweep-
ings of our gaols. But in those days the gaols were filled by men who
would not be considered as criminals now-a-days, and who, being men
with much superfluous energy, were imprisoned for breaking oppressive

and unjust laws that prevented them exercising their natural energies
in useful ways.
430 Twelve Soldiers

from any danger of attack while concentrating his own
force. Accordingly, he determined to concentrate his and
Baird’s forces at Valladolid. And as the direct road was
said to be impassable for artillery (this turned out to be
false), he sent all his guns under General Hope by Badajos,
Talavera, and Madrid to Valladolid.

Baird arrived at Corunna on October 13, and the Junta
there refused to let him land. Probably they feared an
English ruse to secure the harbour and fortifications of
Corunna, for shortly afterwards the neighbouring harbour
of Ferrol was strongly garrisoned, and not an Englishman
was allowed within its gates. After some delay in getting
permission from Madrid, Baird was allowed to land, but
he found the greatest difficulty in getting transport and
food, even in spite of the arrival of Romana,! and it was
not until October 28 that he was able to move. Moore
had requested him to prepare a large depét at Astorga
and to leave a small garrison at Corunna, which “must
be” the principal base of supplies for the English army
while in the north of Spain. Baird reached Astorga on
November 19, but before this date the whole military
situation had changed.

Bonaparte, having returned from Erfurt, now determined
to settle the Spanish matter in person, and unknown to
Moore, who could not get any information from Madrid or
elsewhere, began to increase his troops in Spain to nearly
200,000 men. Moore, having sent off his troops in different

1 A Spanish general who had brought home several thousand Spanish
troops previously serving with Napoleon’s armies on the southern
shores of the Baltic.
Moore AST

directions, left Lisbon on October 27,! and reached
Salamanca on November 13, where he had only three
brigades. But the French had begun their advance, had
burst upon the Spanish armies, which were so widely
separated that they could not help each other, and on
November 11 had severely defeated Blake in the north
and on November 13 the Spanish force at Burgos. It was
only on November 15 that Moore, to his amazement,
heard that the French were at Valladolid, and that the
Spanish forces, supposed to be covering and protecting
his concentration, had been swept away. He now began
to consider the probability of having to retreat, and
warned Baird of such a probability; he had not been
sent to fight single-handed an overwhelming French force,
but to act in conjunction with the Spanish armies. How-
ever, he still hoped for the best, relying on Spanish assur-
ances that the country was arming and that the other
armies were efficient and numerous, both of which state-
ments were false. Moore doubted but he could not
deny them. Baird wrote in reply that he was making
arrangements to secure his own retreat if necessary.

On November 28 Moore received information of the utter
defeat of the other Spanish armies, and knowing now that
he could not rely on any Spanish help—that he might he

1 On October 9 Moore issued an order calling attention to the
amount of sickness among his troops owing to their intemperate
habits, and on October 10 he issued an appeal to his regiments re-
questing them to leave their women and children behind. This
appeal was not responded to, and in consequence the women and
children suffered terribly during the retreat to Corunna, and great
numbers of them fell into the hands of the pursuing French.
432 Twelve Soldiers

attacked by the French in overwhelming force, with his
own troops unduly separated, and that if he moved
towards either Baird or Hope he left the other still more
exposed to defeat—he sent definite orders to Baird to
retreat, and to Hope to get back, if necessary, into Portugal
by the best way he could, while he would retreat on
Lisbon by the road he had advanced on. Moore did not
in the least fail to recognize the advantage of a retreat on
Corunna, for he fully appreciated the value of sea power.
His orders were for Baird to get back to Corunna, and to
come round by sea to Lisbon, where he and Hope would
meet him, and the whole force would then proceed by sea
to Cadiz, and help the southern provinces, with Gibraltar as
a base. Moore’s officers were very averse from the idea of
retreat, but they did not grasp the gravity of the situation
as Moore did. Moore certainly did not positively know
the French strength and dispositions, but he did know that
Bonaparte, who never did things by halves, was in Spain,
and he also grasped, what the other officers did not, the
utter worthlessness and unveracity of the Spanish assur-
ances and information.

However, Frere, the British Minister, and the Central
Junta at Madrid, were bitterly opposed to any retreat, and
on December 5 Moore, who had not yet moved from
Salamanca, received a letter dated December 2 from the
Central Junta, which was brought to him by two of their
ministers, asserting the disastrous effect that the news of
his retreat would have on the country, and assuring him
that the forces around Madrid were ample to repel the
enemy, and that the patriotic enthusiasm was intense
against the French. On this Moore counter-ordered
Moore 433

Baird’s retreat, who had only fallen back as far as Villa-
franca, and ordered him to form magazines at that town
and at Astorga, in order to facilitate a possible retreat
in case the Madrid news was false; and false it was,
for on December 3, the day after the letter was sent,
the very men who wrote to Moore opened the gates of
Madrid to Bonaparte! Moore also wrote to Romana, now
at Leon collecting the remnants of Blake’s army, asking
for his co-operation. On December 7 Hope joined Moore,
having narrowly escaped contact with the French. Now
for the first time Moore was free to move to his left with-
out fear of deserting Hope, and at once wrote to Baird
saying that he would move towards him to Zamora and
Toro, and asking Baird to move to Benavente. Moore’s
plan now was to threaten the French line of retreat
through Burgos, and thus to cause the French to move
northwards from Madrid, which he still thought was
holding out, and thus to relieve the pressure there on the
Spaniards, and to give southern Spain time to raise fresh
troops and send them forward.

But Moore learnt the truth on December 15. However,
he hoped that the influence of the Spanish resistance in
the south and east would prevent all of the French troops
from being turned against him. On December 14, at
Alaejos, he received an intercepted letter sent from
Bonaparte to Marshal Soult, giving fairly full information
of the French strength and dispositions in Spain. He
learnt that the French thought that he was in retreat ;
that Marshal Soult was at Saldanha in front of Romana
with two divisions, that Junot was at Burgos, that Madrid

had completely submitted, that the French there were
FF
434 Twelve Soldiers

marching on Badajos, and that another French force was
marching on Saragossa. He therefore asked Baird to
march on Benavente, while he himself marched on Toro,
with a view to attacking Soult while that general was in
ignorance of the proximity of the English, and before he
could be reinforced.

Moore reached Toro on December 16, and there received
a report of the condition of Romana’s so-called army,
written by an English officer sent for the purpose. It was
in a hopeless condition, and the mass of it could not be
relied on. However, on December 18, he wrote to
Romana requesting his co-operation, and asking him in
case of his having to retreat to move into Asturias, so as
to leave the road to Corunna open to the British army.
On December 20 he was joined by Baird at Majorga, and
the British army was now for the first time united, with a
total strength of 23,000 infantry and 2200 cavalry, ex-
clusive of the troops protecting the line of communication
to Corunna. That night the French detachment at
Sahagun were surprised and defeated by the English
cavalry.

Moore moved to Sahagun on December 21, and on the
following day wrote to Romana asking him to join in a
movement to attack Soult on December 24. Romana
agreed, but fortune which had so far been favourable to
Moore now turned against him, and it was only Moore’s
deep insight into the real state of affairs—an insight which
reached beyond the surface-appearance of affairs—that
saved him and his force from utter disaster. This insight,
like that of all other men of genius, was due to previous
and frequent meditation of what might happen. “In war
Moore 435

it is the unexpected that happens,” so runs the proverb—
but not so in Moore’s case.

On December 23 Soult had 18,000 men behind the river
Carrion, and Junot’s corps was known to be at Burgos.
Moore fully understood the risks he was running—liability
to be surrounded by superior forces and his communication
with Galicia cut—for he stated them in a letter sent to
Mr. Frere on the 23rd. But during the day various
ominous reports arrived. A strong reinforcement had
reached Soult; large quantities of provisions and forage.
were being collected at various points by the French ; the
French corps marching on Badajos had been turned back,
and were at Talavera when the messenger left ; the French
troops at Madrid were advancing northwards by rapid
marches ; and Romana sent word that he had similar inform-
ation, and that he had moved forward to Mansilla with 7000
infantry and eight guns. Moore at once countermanded
his orders for battle, and issued orders for an immediate
retreat, having, as he wrote to Romana, fulfilled his
purpose in drawing the French from Madrid and so giving
the south breathing time ; to continue the march on Soult
would end in the loss of his army, especially if Soult
retreated to draw him after him; his only chance now
was to defend the mountains of Galicia, with the sea at his
back, and in this he expected the co-operation of Romana,
who should hold Mansilla for a few days to hide the
retreat from the enemy. Asa matter of fact Moore had
divined the intentions of Bonaparte, who was hurrying
forward with 70,000 troops to cut off Moore from his base,
and who had ordered Soult to retire before Moore, if Moore
attacked, but if Moore retreated to delay him as much as
436 Twelve Soldiers

possible. Moore again requested Romana to move, when
forced to retire, towards Asturias, and to leave the road to
Corunna open to the English troops.

Moore’s first object was to get behind the Eslar, and
secure the three routes over it at Mansilla, Valencia, and
Castro Gonsalo. Romana held Mansilla, and was asked
to destroy the bridge and defend Leon, neither of which
did he do; Baird was sent by Valencia, the shortest road,
to cross by the ferry there; and as the Valencia road
would not offer sufficient supplies for the whole army,
Moore took the main part of the force to Benavente by
the bridge at Castro Gonsalo. During the retreat several
cavalry actions took place, in which the French were in-
variably defeated. Baird crossed the Eslar on December
26, and Moore on the 27th. The troops, which had up
till this time shown such good behaviour, now broke down
in discipline under the strain of a rapid retreat, and of
their disappointment at not having been allowed to attack
the enemy. Much of the disorder was caused by the
Spanish authorities disappearing and leaving no one to
provide the requisite lodgings and necessaries for the troops,
who revenged themselves by ransacking the houses, and
inordinately drinking the wine they found. On December
27 Moore issued a strong order on the subject at Benavente,
throwing much of the blame on the regimental officers for
not controlling their men properly. He pointed out that
the situation was “such as to call for the exertions of
qualities the most rare and valuable in a military body.
These are not bravery alone, but patience and constancy
under fatigue and hardship, obedience to command,
sobriety, firmness, and resolution, in every different situa-
Moore 437

tion in which they may be placed. It is by the display
of such qualities alone, that the army can expect to deserve
the name of soldiers; that they can be able to withstand
the forces opposed to them, or fulfil the expectations of
their country.” And he concluded by asking them to
trust to his decision as to the time and place to fight.

Moore heard at this time that, in spite of the movement
of the French troops towards himself, the Spaniards in
the rest of Spain were doing nothing, but were supplying
the French with all they wanted. But he hoped for the
best, and determined to hold the mountains of Galicia
unless compelled to retreat by overwhelming numbers.
In case of further retreat, he was still undecided whether
to move to Vigo or to Corunna for embarkation, and in
order to hold the road to Vigo open, he sent 3000 men
under General Crawford to that place by Orense, to pre-
vent the enemy capturing it, and engineer officers to Vigo
to report on the facilities it offered for embarkation. As
he left Benavente for Astorga, the French Imperial Guard
Cavalry attacked, but were repulsed, and their com-
mander, General Le Febvre, taken prisoner. At Astorga
Baird’s force re-joined Moore, who was dismayed to find
the town already occupied by Romana’s troops, who,
starving, half-naked, and rendered miserable with the
intense cold of winter, had broken into Moore’s magazines.
Romana had given way without making any resistance
before Soult, and was making for Vigo, consuming without
leave the British provisions, and blocking the road with
his mules and carts. From this point the necessary means
of transport failed, causing much loss, and adding greatly
to the confusion and distress of the march. The retreat
438 Twelve Soldiers

continued to Villa Franca, which was reached on January
I, 1809, and at this town the troops again broke out into
terrible drunkenness and disorder. The men had been
sorely tried by intense cold, pouring rains, bad roads deep
in mud, scanty provisions irregularly issued, deficient trans-
port, and insufficient shelter. The conduct of the Spaniards,
who made no effort to aid the British nor to retard
the French, had also roused the animosity of the troops.
The retreat was now daily harassed by the French, who
however were always driven back, but many drunken men,
as well as the sick and wounded, had to be left behind,
besides many of the women and children, for whom no
transport could be secured.

Hearing that Corunna offered better facilities than Vigo
for an embarkation in the face of an enemy, Moore decided
to proceed there, and sent a message for the fleet at Vigo
to proceed to Corunna. He also heard that the country
near Lugo was good for defensive operations, and there he
decided to make a stand. On January 7 an action took
place with the French advance guard, which was severely
repulsed. And on January 8 Moore waited for the attack
of the French main body. The prospect of a battle had
renewed the ardour and discipline of the troops. But
Soult refused to attack. Moore had no longer to do with
Bonaparte, who had quitted his army at Astorga‘for France,
on hearing that Austria was again arming against him.
Moore, fearing that Soult was only waiting for reinforce-
ments to surround him, and knowing that his own supplies
were nearly exhausted, as there was no means for bringing
down the supplies lying at Corunna, was forced to continue
the retreat, and he did so during the night of the 8th with-
Moore 439

out the French being aware of it until morning. But the
weather was fearful, the men worn out with fatigue, and
ever ready to give way to drunkenness, and consequently
the disastrous disorderliness continued until Corunna was
reached on January 11, after a march of 250 miles over
difficult country in mid-winter. The bay was empty of
transport, which had been delayed by adverse winds. On
the 12th the French appeared before Corunna, and on the
13th, 14th, and 15th Moore was busy restoring discipline
and preparing for the coming fight. On the evening of
the 14th the transport arrived, and the embarkation of the
sick, the dismounted cavalry, some of the artillery, and
horses was immediately proceeded with, and the embarka-
tion of the remainder of the force was ordered to be
carried out on the night of January 16. But in the after-
noon of that day the French attacked in force, and after
a severe fight were completely repulsed. It was during
this ight that Sir David Baird lost his arm, and Sir John
Moore received his mortal wound. He only lived a few
hours after this, and was buried at Corunna the same
evening, during the embarkation of the force. The French
had been so severely handled that they did not attempt
to seriously disturb the British any further. The embarka-
tion was continued during the 17th, and was completed on
the morning of January 18, 1809.

Soult, before he left Corunna, showed his respect for
his deceased foe by ordering the French Consul at Corunna
to erect a memorial stone on the spot where Sir John
Moore fell, but he was unable to carry this into effect
before the French were compelled to evacuate the town.
Subsequently the Marquess de la Romana raised a wooden
440 Twelve Soldiers

monument to the memory of Moore on the battle-field of
Corunna. This was replaced in 1811 by the Prince Regent
of Spain with a more permanent monument. His native
city, Glasgow, erected a bronze statue to his memory, and
the Rev. Charles Wolfe wrote the pathetic funeral ode
known as “The Burial of Sir John Moore.”

So lived and died a beau ideal of a British gentleman
and officer. Gentle, just, and brave; filled with loyalty
to his sovereign and country; ever ready to do his duty
in any capacity whatever, fearless of responsibility, seeing
the right and determined to do it; a chivalrous knight
strong in mind, self-sacrificing in spirit, with noble ideals,
and withal studious and observant. “No British com-
mander was ever more popular with his officers, none have
left a more lasting impress on the troops trained under
them. In the Peninsula epoch, and long after, to have
been ‘one of Sir John Moore’s men’ carried with it a
prestige quite suz generis. Napoleon said of him: ‘ His
talents and firmness alone saved the -British army (in
Spain) from destruction. He was a brave soldier, an
excellent officer, and a man of talent. He made a few
mistakes, which were probably inseparable from the
difficulties with which he was surrounded, and caused
perhaps by his information having misled him.”” A true
and generous tribute, for probably Bonaparte never fully
knew how badly Moore was served even by those who
should have possessed the ability to obtain correct inform-
ation and to supply him with it.

The majority of Moore’s officers failed to realize the
purpose of his movements after December 7, to draw the
French northwards, and that his desire to accomplish this
Moore 441

had been pushed to the verge of possible disaster. The
result of this was to cause much imprudent and even in-
subordinate language to be spoken by some of his general
and other officers. The great losses and disorder of the
retreat to Corunna, the only really contested part of
Moore’s career, were due mainly to factors apart from
Moore’s responsibility, such as the action of the Spaniards,
- who hindered and dislocated the movement; the English
Government, who left him without the means of obtaining
adequate land transport ; the supineness of the officers, who
did not loyally support their leader; a total want of ex-
perience among the administrative officers in the execution
of their duties; the drunken habits of the men, and the
want of experience and disciplinary character among many
of the lately levied troops.

This memoir may be fitly concluded with the epitomized
account of Sir John Moore’s life given in the following
extracts from the General Order issued by the Duke of
York, as Commander-in-Chief, on February 1, 1809.

“ The benefits derived to an army from the example of
a distinguished commander do not terminate at his death ;
his virtues live in the recollection of his associates, and
his fame remains the strongest incentive to great and
glorious actions.

“ Sir John Moore from his youth embraced the profession
with the feelings and sentiments of a soldier; he felt that
a perfect knowledge and an exact performance of the
humble, but important duties of a subaltern officer, are
the best foundations for subsequent military fame; and
his ardent mind, while it looked forward to those brilliant
achievements for which it was formed, applied itself with
442 Twelve Soldiers

energy and exemplary assiduity to the duties of that
station.

“In the school of regimental duty he obtained that cor-
rect knowledge of his profession so essential to the proper
direction of the gallant spirit of the soldier; and he was
enabled to establish a characteristic order and regularity
of conduct, because the troops found in their leader a
striking example of the discipline which he enforced on
others. . . . The unremitting attention with which he
devoted himself to the duties of every branch of his
profession obtained him the confidence of Sir Ralph
Abercromby. ... [His military character] exhibits one
feature so particularly characteristic of the man, and so
important to the best interests of the service, that the
Commander-in-Chief is pleased to mark it with his peculiar
approbation. The life of Sir John Moore was spent among
the troops. During the season of repose, his time was
devoted to the care and instruction of the officer and
soldier; in war, he courted service in every quarter of the
globe. Regardless of personal considerations, he esteemed
that to which his country called him the post of honour,
and by his undaunted spirit, and unconquerable persever-

”

ance, he pointed the way to victory... .
 
WELLINGTON
1769—1851

AN author seeking for a novel subject of universal
interest might do worse than choose that of the “decisive
conversations of the world.” Probably they would all have
some common characteristics. Their exact date and their
precise phrasing would, after all research, remain very
uncertain. Between their immediate consequences and the
ultimate effect of these on mankind, there would be, much
as between seed-time and harvest, intervals of uncertain
weather, threatening the crop, showers and sunshine bring-
ing it to maturity. Among such conversations must cer-
tainly be reckoned cne which took place in some lodgings
over a pastry-cook’s shop in Oxford Street, probably in the
autumn of 1785. Two ladies and a lad were present at it.
One of the ladies is only important to us because she heard
the conversation and recorded it afterwards. The other was
a stately widow, whose husband had died four years earlier,
leaving her an embarrassed estate, the title of Lady Morn-
ington, six sons and two daughters. For all of these her
children, of whom the eldest was nearly of age and now at
Oxford, she was anxious by help of family interest to
provide. The third who joined in that decisive conversa-

tion was her fourth son, Arthur, a sickly, rather gawky
443
444 Twelve Soldiers

boy, ‘with a very pronounced nose,” as the lady narrator
reports. He was about sixteen years of age, had just
returned from a short and by no means brilliant career
at Eton, and was standing with his back to the fire-
place. “Don’t you know my son Arthur?” said the
matron, speaking indignantly, after shaking hands with
her guest ; “he has been giving us a good deal of trouble
lately. I have secured for him the promise of a clerkship
in the Irish Excise; he gets £80 a year, and it will rise to
£600. He won't have it! Nothing will satisfy him but
to go into the army, and idle away his time, as if we had
the means of buying his commissions!” “No, mother,”
answered the young man, “I did not say that; I only
asked to be allowed to go to France to study my
profession.” :

Fortunately her ladyship’s “ugly son” carried his point.
To Angers soon afterwards he went. There he remained
for about a year, studying such military science as the
Marquis de Pignerol, a distinguished Engineer officer of
the ancien régime, could impart, acquiring also what in
after life was of no small service to him, a good knowledge
of French. Napoleon, after spending five years in military
schooling at Brienne and in Paris, had just obtained his
commission at the time when Wellington entered Pignerol’s
school at Angers,

Not, therefore, as the “ dunce of the family ” was Welling-
ton sent into the army. He was in the eyes of his family
the fool of the party because he himself chose his pro-
fession, and from the beginning intended to treat it as one
requiring serious study. That was his first great advantage
in the race of life. Of what he did at Angers we know as
Wellington 445

little as we know of what he did at Eton, and it would not
profit us if we did. That a boy figures at the top of class-
lists may or may not be a favourable indication of coming
success in life. The fact that he has thrown himself heart
and soul into a career which suits his special capacities,
yields much more certain hope of future achievement.
There is, however, probably no calling in which promise is
so apt to be blighted by want of adequate scope for the
practical application of the larger knowledge, which can be
acquired only by study, as it is in that of war. The
subaltern who finds that for many years he is doomed to
carry out a dull routine, has a hard task in attempting to
enlarge his view beyond buttons and gaiters, and if, during
his younger days, he delays the study of the wider aspects of
his profession because he sees no prospect of making use
of what he learns, he often discovers too late that habit has
,become his master, and that serious work is for him im-
possible. From that fate Arthur Wellesley was saved by
the early promotion which his family interest, and the
generosity of his brother, Lord Mornington, in paying for
his commissions, were able to procure for him. He obtained
his first commission soon after his return from Angers.
On March 7, 1787, he was gazetted as an ensign in the
73rd Regiment. On December 25 of the same year he
was a Lieutenant in the 76th. After exchanging into the
4Aist, he was appointed on June 25, 1788, to the 21st Light
Dragoons. After three years in the cavalry, he was made
a Captain in the 58th, and after sixteen months in the
58th, obtained, on October 31, 1792, a troop in the 18th
Light Dragoons. Whilst still a Lieutenant, he was returned
to the Irish Parliament in 1790, being falsely voted to be
446 Twelve Soldiers

of age before he was so. After six months in the 18th, he
obtained a majority in the 33rd on April 30, 1793. On
September 30 of the same year, when twenty-four years
of age, he became Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding the
33rd. During his captaincy and majority he had been on
the staff of the Lord-Lieutenant. Beyond the fact that he
was steadily snubbed, we know little of this period of his
life. It is difficult to think that he could, during peace
time, have been more fortunate in his education for his
future career. Having had just enough experience in every
rank of both cavalry and infantry to give to a soldier who
meant business the opportunity of learning the duties of
each in detail, he found himself at four-and-twenty in a
position of large and ample responsibility. His work, both
in the Irish Senate and the Irish Court, had given him
wider views of life than mere regimental duty would have
permitted him to take. Toa man not resolutely determined ,
to fit himself for his work, the early advancement might
have been perilous. To the boy who, resisting the re-
monstrances of his friends, had known his own mind, and
had, as he told one of his favourite officers in later life,
devoted from that time two or three hours a day to the
serious study of his profession, apart from its immediate
peace routine, his rank was a guarantee that if war came
his labours would be fruitful.

In the same month that Wellesley obtained command
of the 33rd, Napoleon, an outcast from Corsica, a recently
promoted captain of French artillery, who had been pre-
viously expelled from the French army for absence without
leave, but had had his position restored to him, was pub-
lishing his Supper of Beaucaire, his first successful literary
Wellington 447

and political effort, and before the end of September was
engaged in the Siege of Toulon. Practically, at the same
moment, the apprenticeship of life was ending for each of
them. Very different had been the storm-tossed passionate
youth of the one, and the smooth-sailing, orderly progress
of the other. Both had been troubled by difficulties as
to ways and means. But for Wellesley, these were chiefly
due to the necessities of expenditure involved in his aristo-
cratic position ; for Napoleon, they were the actual pressure
of penury, the doubt whether it would be possible to keep
soul and body together. In no small measure those
twenty-four years had already fixed the characteristics
which each was to carry with him throughout life. Wel-
lesley had from the first dealt with men from a position
above them, using them with a strong sense of responsi-
bility, but with little personal acquaintance. Napoleon
had been a sans-culotte among sans-culottes always with a
full sense of the advantage of breeches, but essentially a
child of the revolution, one who had lived in contact with
the minds of men to whom existing conditions were in-
tolerable. Even as Emperor, Napoleon was a very much
breeched sans-culotte. Wellington throughout was par ex-
cellence a gentleman and an aristocrat. How could either
be other ?

Wellesley, after a few months’ peace command, during
which he had had time to earn for the 33rd the reputation
of being the best drilled and most efficient regiment in
Ireland, was despatched with it to join the disastrous
expedition of the Duke of York inthe Netherlands. There,
in command of his battalion, Wellesley markedly dis-
tinguished himself. He received in line a charge of pur-
448 Twelve Soldiers

suing French cavalry, drove them back, and thereby saved
the remainder of the retreating column with which he was
working. Subsequently to this he was selected to command
the brigade which formed the rear-guard of the retreating
army. We know, from his own comments, that that which
had impressed him most had been the appalling ignorance
and indifference which had surrounded him. “It has
always been a marvel to me how any of us escaped,” he
said in after years. He was so disgusted with the conduct
of the campaign, that he seriously thought of leaving the
army, and was ready to take almost any position in civil
life ; though if the army were to be decently ruled, he still
preferred it as a career. In the autumn of 1795 he was
ordered to proceed with his regiment to the West Indies,
but contrary winds delayed the expedition, and when it
finally started the Government had modified their plans.

Apri The 33rd remained behind, and was ordered to

179° the East Indies. Wellesley was seriously ill and
unable to start with the battalion. He, however, followed
them in a swift man-of-war, and overtook them at the
Cape. He remained there till March 1797, and then went
to Calcutta. Towards the end of 1797 the 33rd was
detailed to take part in an expedition against the Manila
Islands, which was to have been commanded by General
St. Leger. Wellesley himself seems to have been offered
the chief command of the Bengal part of the expedition,
but to have modestly suggested that an officer of larger
experience should be appointed. In any case, fears of an
invasion of the Carnatic by Tippoo Sultan caused the
scheme to be abandoned.

On May 17, 1798, Lord Mornington arrived in Calcutta,
Wellington 449

having been appointed Governor-General. Throughout all
the year during which Arthur had been in India prior to
his brother’s arrival, he had been writing to Lord Morning-
ton, then in the India House, letters in which he had
thoughtfully and carefully discussed military and political
affairs. Lord Mornington was coming out at a critical
moment. He had formed a definite scheme of policy
during his journey. Arthur became one of the principal
agents in bringing that policy to a successful issue. In
carrying out the work that so fell to his lot, he passed
through the next great stage of his career, that which gave
him,on a continually and rapidly extending scale,experience
both in war and state-craft.

The situation was this. The instructions with which
Lord Mornington had gone to India had directed him to
preserve a balance of power between the three native states
of Tippoo Sultan, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas, of whom
the ostensible ruler was the Peishwa. Lord Mornington
found that Tippoo Sultan had become much the most for-
midable of the three, because of fighting which had taken
place between different Mahratta chiefs, and between the
Mahrattas as a confederacy and the Mahomedan Nizam.
At the court of the Nizam, M. Raymond, a Frenchman,
had organized a corps of 10,000 men, This, officered as it
was by Frenchmen, gave him a dominant position at
Hyderabad. Lord Mornington therefore intended first, to
re-establish the alliance between the Company, the Nizam
and the Mahrattas; secondly, to make the two native
states effective allies. This he proposed to do as to the
Nizam by replacing Raymond’s corps at Hyderabad with

a force officered by Englishmen; as to the Mahrattas, by
GG
450 Twelve Soldiers

restoring the authority of the Peishwa over his rebellious
subjects, Holkar and Scindiah. Very soon after Morning-
ton’s arrival at Calcutta, the necessity of these steps was
made the more certain by the discovery that Tippoo Sultan
was endeavouring to enter into an effective alliance with
the French, and was hoping for help from the Mauritius.
It was essential, in order to replace Raymond at Hydera-
bad, to employ force that must be withdrawn for the time
from the Carnatic. The Madras civil and military authori-
ties, under whom the Carnatic was placed, fearing that
Tippoo Sultan would take advantage of any diminution
of their strength, and fearing also to provoke invasion by
military preparations, were very half-hearted in their sup-
port of the Governor-General’s policy. It was essential
for him to have at Madras an officer thoroughly in sympathy
with his projects and fully understanding them. He
gladly therefore took advantage of the necessity for rein-
forcing the troops there to transfer the 33rd Regiment to
the Madras establishment, and to employ its commanding
officer, his brother, as his confidential agent in communica-
tion both with Lord Clive the Governor, and with General
Harris the Commander-in-Chief, of the Province. Arthur
Wellesley threw himself with such zeal into this work,
that it is hardly too much to say that it was his presence
at Madras that enabled his brother practically to enforce
his will. After a time troops were gathered at Wallajah
Nuggur with a view to possible hostilities. The death, in a
duel, of Colonel Aston, the commanding officer of the camp,
gave Arthur Wellesley the command. In a very short time,
the vigour of his administration of this army of 30,000 men
had made itself conspicuous by the efficiency which he had
Wellington 451

introduced under very difficult circumstances. The re-
moval of the French officers from Hyderabad was in due
time successfully accomplished by a bloodless coup de mazn,
the Nizam having himself become alarmed at the ascendency
they had acquired.

In the early part of 1799 everything was ready for an
advance against Tippoo. General Stuart was to move
from Bombay, landing at Cannanore. General Harris,
on the Madras side, marched with his own army and that
of the Nizam, to which the 33rd was attached, Arthur
Wellesley being in immediate command of this contingent,
which he estimates at 6000 infantry and 10,000 horse. On
March 27, at Mallavelly, Tippoo, who had been previously
repulsed by Stuart, made a vigorous attack upon Harris’s
advancing army. The brunt of the onslaught fell on the
force under Arthur Wellesley’s orders. He led his division
against the enemy’s right flank. A brigade of Tippoo’s
infantry advanced to meet them, but were dispersed by
the 33rd Regiment, and cut to pieces by the cavalry under
Major-General Floyd. The army then closed in for the
siege of Seringapatam. On April 5, two of the enemy’s
outposts were attacked at night ; one on the left by Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Shaw, with his own battalion, the 2nd of
the 12th Regiment, and a native battalion ; one on the right
by Arthur Wellesley, with his battalion of the 33rd Regi-
ment and a battalion of Sepoys. The outpost, which the
33rd attacked, was in a wood. This had, on April 3, been
traversed at night by a brigade under General Baird, and
it had then been found to have been abandoned by Tippoo’s
troops. It had not been reconnoitred by day, and it had
in the interval been re-occupied by the enemy. The attack -
452 Twelve Soldiers

of the 33rd failed, In some way or other Arthur Wellesley,
who seems to have been well to the front in the wood,
became separated from his command and, not being able
in the darkness to find them, made his way back with only
one or two men and reported, “in considerable agitation,”
to General Harris the failure of his attempt. His second
in command, Major Shea, brought Wellesley’s detachment
into camp, having offered his assistance to Lieutenant-
Colonel Shaw, and been by him told that the 12th did
not require his help, and that he had better follow his
leader. Naturally a man, who at thirty years of age had
from his own ability, knowledge, zeal, and good fortune
come so prominently to the front as Arthur Wellesley
had done, had many jealous of him who were not likely
to spare, in their comments, the brother of the Governor-
General. There can be little doubt that all the awkward
features of the case were discussed at the time with undue
severity, but it is equally clear that the Duke’s biographers
sweep away the story in too summary a fashion, on the
assumption that no possible mistake or misfortune could
have attended our hero. His misfortune did not consist,
as they assume, in the failure of the night-attack. That
might have easily happened without blame to him. The
misfortune lay in the fact that he had become separated
from his command when in presence of the enemy, and
that he reported his arrival to General Harris without it.
Captain Mahan has wisely said, when speaking of a certain
failure of Nelson’s, that constant success is probably good
for no man. It was a very gentle blow which fortune thus
administered to one who, more constantly than almost any,
deserved her favours and received them. The following
Wellington 453

day he was employed, with increased forces, in attacking
the same position in good daylight. The enemy gave way
immediately.

On May 4, Seringapatam was taken by assault, the
attacking force being commanded by General Baird.
Arthur Wellesley was in charge of the reserve. The
following day he was appointed to be Commandant in
Seringapatam. I do not think that there can be any
doubt in the ‘minds of those who have read the corre-
spondence and papers of the time, that he had already
proved himself in every way the fittest man for this very
important post, and that, though his connection with the
Governor-General had given him the opportunity of dis-
playing his efficiency, it would have been even then mani-
festly disastrous for the public service that any other ap-
pointment should have been made. Nevertheless, it caused
many to blaspheme. Circumstances further favoured him.
Three general officers, who might have been appointed to
the command of the army in Mysore, cither went home or
were ill. General Harris himself was anxious to return
as soon as possible to the Carnatic and then go home. In
the result, Arthur Wellesley was left both to administer
the government of Mysore and to command the army
there. A series of minor operations against rebellious
chiefs, who had gathered portions of the scattered troops
left unemployed by the fall of Tippoo, gave him practice at
first on a small and then on a gradually increasing scale, in
which he had to make all arrangements and to attend to
every detail. The assembly, under Dhoondiah Waugh,
of a formidable force of rascaldom from every quarter
brought him his first independent work of a larger kind.
454 Twelve Soldiers

July 14 Koondgul, into which Dhoondiah had thrown 600
men, was stormed. Dummul,a very strong fort, was
July 26. similarly captured. Rushing on with the cavalry
July 30. alone, Wellesley surprised Dhoondiah’s camp oppo-
site Manowly, and captured all his baggage and guns,
Sept. 10. Dhoondiah, with 5000 horse, was next attacked
at Conahgull. His army was dispersed and he was killed.
Dees 2, Arthur Wellesley received an order to take com-
mand of troops, which were being collected at Trin-
comalee for an attack upon the isles of France and Bourbon,
of which, after their capture, he was to remain as Governor.
The opposition of Admiral Rainier,and other circumstances,
decided Lord Mornington to change the conditions of this
expedition. A much larger army was to be employed in
the capture of Batavia, and General Baird was therefore
placed in command of it. Arthur Wellesley was to be
second in command in the attack on Batavia, but after its
capture was to carry out the original design, and take
command of the expedition against the two islands. He
was furious with his brother for the change. Whilst at
Trincomalee he received copies of despatches addressed
to Lord Mornington by Dundas, then Secretary of State,
before the Governor-General had himself seen them. In
these despatches instructions were sent for the expedition
to be employed in assisting to turn the French out of
Egypt. On his own responsibility, Baird having not yet
arrived, he moved the army to Bombay. There he was
laid up with fever, so that he was unable to accompany
May 7, Baird to Egypt,and he resumed his government in
ae Mysore. On April 29, 1802, he was gazetted as
a Major-General.
Wellington 455

The disorders, which had for years prevailed in the
Mahratta Confederacy, had resulted in the Peishwa, the

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nominal head of that strange robber state, seeking
refuge in British territory. Whilst there he had signed
456 Twelve Soldiers

Dee. 3 at Bassein a treaty with the Government, ratified
on February 11, 1803. Arthur Wellesley was
employed to restore, in accordance with this treaty, the
authority of the Peishwa at Poonah. Poonah was occu-
pied by the forces of Holkar, one of the rebellious
Mahratta chiefs. Holkar’s lieutenant, Amrut Rao, had
threatened to destroy the town on the approach of the
English. General Wellesley, after a move through Mah-
ratta territory, the chief difficulty of which, the supply of
his troops, had been greatly diminished by the reputation
for fair dealing and strict discipline which he had acquired
in the campaign against Dhoondiah, arrived within forty
‘Apel Yo; miles of Poonah. Thence, marching at night with
1803. the cavalry and one battalion of infantry, he reached
Poonah next day in time to save the city and the family of
the Peishwa. He says that he was detained six hours in
getting his guns through the Bhore-Ghaut, a difficult
mountain-pass, but that, nevertheless, he had marched
sixty miles between the morning of April 19 and 2 p.m.
on the 2oth.

Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, two of the Mahratta
chiefs, despite their nominal acquiescence in the restoration
of the Peishwa, assumed so threatening an attitude that
the Governor-General placed in his brother’s hands the
political as well as military authority for dealing with the
crisis in the Deccan, whilst General Lake, the Commandcr-
in-Chief in India, operated towards Delhi. In the result,
being unable to obtain any definite satisfaction from the
Mahratta chiefs, Major-General Wellesley marched against

June 4, them from Poonah. He captured Ahmednuggar

803. :
ee by assault, and decisively defeated at Assaye the
Wellington 457

combined armies of Scindia, and the Rajah of Berar.
He had actually present only 8000 men, of Sept. 23,
whom 1500 were British, The defeated army ae:
consisted of 30,000 horsemen, 102 guns, and 10,000 in-
fantry. The battle was gained by a sudden decision of his
own, to attack earlier than had been intended, without
waiting for the co-operation of Lieutenant-Colonel Steven-
son, who would have brought him reinforcements almost
equal to his own army. The Mahrattas were drawn up in
a narrow delta, only a mile across, between the River Kaifna
and a deep nullah. Attacking them in this position, he so
moved his army that they were unable effectively to use
their numerous cavalry, and that their infantry was forced
into a change of position, difficult in the very moment
of attack even for good troops, and sure to disconcert
inferior infantry. He captured all the 102 guns, and
thoroughly broke their effective strength. It was neces-
sary, however, to follow up the victory by inflicting a yet
further defeat upon them, two months later, at Ar- . 28,
gaum. Here thirty-eight more guns were captured. 1803.
He carried by storm the fortress of Gawilghur. Dec. 15.
By virtue of the powers conferred on him, he

was, after these successes, the capture by Lieutenant-
Colonel Stevenson of Asirgarh, and a victorious cam-
paign of Lake’s, able to conclude a peace with both the
Mahratta chieftains. He skilfully separated their interests
by an independent agreement with each of them. He
was created a Knight of the Bath. The defeat Sept ts
of Holkar by Lake, in December 1804, promised
general peace in the East, and Sir Arthur Wellesley left
458 Twelve Soldiers

ae India, nominally on leave of absence, really pur-
posing not to return. He wished to go home, first
because he had served in India “as long as any man ought
who can serve anywhere else,” and there appeared a pros-
pect of service in Europe in which—as he puts it—“I
should be more likely to get forward.” Second, because
he was suffering from lumbago and general malaise ; third,
because he thought that he had been badly treated both by
the Directors and the Government. Later, he also thought
it well that he should be at home to defend his brother’s
administration.

When he went to India he was already known to be a
capable soldier, as is proved by the trust that was reposed
in him before his brother’s arrival, and by the masterly
papers on important questions of military and_ political
organization which he penned immediately after his ad-
vent: but the eight years passed in India, whilst they had
left him in the full vigour of manhood at thirty-six years
-of age, had given him experience of independent command,
and of complicated, political, and military questions, which
had developed his capacity for war and state-craft to an
extent that would have been hardly possible under any
other conditions. In a sense, it is true that he owed his
opportunities largely to the fact that his brother was the
Viceroy, under whom he served. The Marquis of Wel-
lesley had, however, jealous and suspicious masters in the
Directors, very unwilling that jobs should be done by any
one but themselves. They were only too critical of his
appointments of his brothers. His one defence, vigorously
sustained in his despatches, was that his choice had been
dictated solely by the public interest, and that no one else
Wellington 459

could have carried out as Arthur had done the high political
and military duties with which he had entrusted him, or
been a more useful political agent than Henry had proved
himself. It is a plea, the full force of which can only be
assumed ina brief notice of this kind. The more com-
pletely the facts are examined, the more fully is the justifi-
cation established by the services which were rendered
by the younger brothers to the elder.

On his return to England, Sir Arthur was sent to Han-
over with an expedition commanded by Lord Cathcart.
Napoleon’s victory at Austerlitz obliged the Ministry to
recall the troops. Soon afterwards Sir Arthur entered the
House of Commons as member for Rye. There he suc-
cessfully defended his brother's splendid Indian career.
He married Lady Catherine Pakenham. His April
marriage is one of the most pathetic and character- 1806.
istic incidents of his life. Hehad proposed before he went
to India. Her family had then opposed the match. She
had been smitten by small-pox, and had therefore written
to release him. He loyally insisted upon holding to his
tryst. But in many respects, those melancholy words of
the poor old scholar—*“Saepe olim amanti nocuit semper
amare,’—‘“It is no new tale that woe comes to the lover
whose love takes no account of time”—fulfilled themselves
in his case. She was a loyal wife, but not one who could
bind him to herself. In 1807 Sir Arthur became Irish
Chief Secretary in the Duke of Portland’s administration.
His greatest distinction in that office consisted in the
establishment of an effective police. He had, however,
bargained that his acceptance of a civil appointment should
not keep him back from active military service. In July
460 Twelve Soldiers

came the news of the treaty of Tilsit, by which Napoleon
and Alexander agreed to divide the world between them.
Among other schemes, the navies of Denmark and Portugal
were to be seized to form a fresh fleet for invading Britain.
The Ministry replied by despatching a combined naval and
military expedition to remove the Danish fleet. Lord
Cathcart was incommand. Sir Arthur Wellesley was em-
ployed with a force of all arms, in dispersing the Danish
troops collected in the open country, whilst the main army
closed in on Copenhagen. On August 19, 1807, he de-
feated the Danes at Kioge. The regiments, which afterwards
formed the Light Division in the Peninsula, the 43rd, 52nd,
and 95th, then first fought under his orders. So also did
the 3rd and the 92nd. He was called in to negotiate the
surrender of the Danish fleet and the conclusion of peace,
Sixteen sail of the line, nine frigates, fourteen sloops, and
many smaller vessels, besides immense stores, were brought
back to England. He took up again his office as Chief
Secretary. The condition of affairs in Spain and Portugal
June 14, determined the Ministry to despatch Sir Arthur

ee Wellesley in command of an expedition, of which
a portion, under General Spencer, was already at sea off
the coast of Spain, and the remainder was to follow him

April. from Cork. He had becomea Lieutenant-General,

1808. and had, when Spencer joined him, a force of
twelve battalions of infantry, a small number of guns, for
which the Government had sent no horses so that he was
obliged when he advanced to leave half of them behind,
and one regiment of cavalry. In all, he had 13,000 troops
available. Six thousand Portuguese were to co-operate
with him, but he obtained from them only 1400 infantry
Wellington 461

and 250 cavalry. The French troops, which had been
passed into Spain to support the usurpation of the ancient
throne by Napoleon, who had seated on it his brother
Joseph, were everywhere struggling with the Spanish
patriots. Bessiéres had gained a decisive victory at Rio
Seco over the Spaniards, but the surrender of 14,000 men
under Dupont had left Junot isolated. Junot had origin-
ally possessed himself of all the strong places in Portugal
with the help of an allied Spanish army which had now
revolted against him, been disarmed, and a large part of
it made prisoners by the French. His available French
army was about 23,000 strong, but part of it was in garri-
son in the several fortresses. It was hampered by universal
insurrection, and had, for the purpose of suppressing local
risings, been broken up into several bodies, of which two,
one under Laborde 6000 strong, one under Loison, also
about 6000, were moving from different directions on
Leyria. Sir Arthur, anticipating their arrival by Aug. 11,
a rapid march, forced them apart, and was thus oe
able to attack and defeat Laborde by himself in the strong
position of Rolica, and to capture his guns. On Aug. 17.
the field of battle Wellesley received news that a
brigade under Major-General Anstruther had arrived at
Maceira Bay, and that another under Acland was close at
hand. The Portuguese, having failed to support him, he
felt bound to obtain these reinforcements before again
engaging the enemy. At Vimiero, whither he had moved
to cover the landing, Junot, who had meantime been able
to gather together his scattered forces, attacked him on
August 21. Sir Arthur completely defeated him, capturing
thirteen guns, Had he been free to pursue at once, and
462 Twelve Soldiers

had Sir John Moore’s corps been marched from Mondego
Bay, as Sir Arthur wished, upon Santarem, so as to fall
on the rear of the retreating army, it is practically certain
that the French would have been forced to surrender toa
man. In the course of the previous day, however, August
20, Sir H. Burrard had arrived to take over the command.
He now forbad all pursuit, and called in Sir John Moore’s
corps to join the army, so that it could not intercept the
French retreat.

The fact was that the Government had been obliged
for the moment, in view of the popular excitement
which the resistance offered by the Spanish patriots
to the French had aroused in Great Britain, to concen-
trate all their efforts upon an attempt to assist Portugal
and Spain. Sir John Moore had just returned to Eng-
land from an expedition to Sweden, in which he had
been abominably treated by the king of that country,
already suffering from the insanity which subsequently
forced his deposition. The Ministry could not avoid send-
ing Moore and his troops to Spain; but, as he had bitterly
resented the want of support that he had received from
them and had spoken with a freedom which had offended
them, they were determined that he should not have the
command of the army in Portugal, which must necessarily
have fallen to him had he been sent without other pre-
cautions to join Sir Arthur in Portugal. They therefore
selected Sir Hew Dalrymple to command, and Sir
H. Burrard to be second. The appointment of these
officers had the effect of preventing either of the two best
men, Moore and Wellesley, from commanding. Sir H.
Burrard and Sir H. Dalrymple each had their share in
Wellington 463

seriously injuring Wellesley’s first Peninsula campaign.
Having been deprived of the opportunity of destroy-
ing the enemy, Sir Arthur approved of an arrangement
by which the French army, now concentrated, and in
effective possession of Lisbon and the strong places of
Portugal, should be allowed to abandon these, and should
be moved to France. He strongly disapproved of the
actual provisions of the so-called “ Convention of Cintra.”
A wave of passionate indignation at the disappointing con-
ditions of that treaty swept over England. Sir H. Dal-
rymple and Sir Arthur were called home to answer for it
before a court of inquiry. Sir H. Burrard obtained leave,
and also appeared before the court, which brought in an
uncertain verdict. Sir Arthur returned to his Irish office.
Moore remained in command in Portugal. Meanwhile
Napoleon was preparing a vast army to reconquer
Spain. By the time that his great host of 330,000 men
and 60,000 horses, commanded by himself in person,
and everywhere sweeping the Spaniards before it, was
moving from the Pyrenees upon Madrid, Moore had
gathered his own portion of his little army at Salamanca.
Sir David Baird, with 10,000 men, was at Astorga. In-
cluding Baird’s division, Moore had about 32,000 men
under his orders. Refusing the mad proposals of our
envoy Frere, that he should with his handful of men place
himself directly in the path of Napoleon, he, by one of
the most daring and skilful strokes recorded in
history, struck towards Sahagun against Napoleon’s 1808.
sensitive line of communication with France. He thereby
drew after him the hosts which, but for his diversion, would
havecrushed out resistance in Spain. Having prepared
464 Twelve Soldiers

his magazines with a view to retreat, the necessity of which
sooner or later had been obvious from the moment when
Napoleon began his new invasion, he eluded the great
Emperor, and fell back on Corunna. Napoleon, recalled to
France by the war preparations of Austria, left the pursuit
to Soult. Him Moore fought and drove back at Corunna,
to cover his own embarkation. He was, however, obliged
to destroy most of his horses, and many stores. A great
sacrifice for a great end! No less a one than that of
depriving Napoleon of the one opportunity he ever had
of fairly crushing Spain. Moore was killed in the moment
of victory. The retreat of an army in the middle of winter,
pursued by such a man as Napoleon, with all the resources
at his disposal, through snow-clad mountains, could hardly
leave that army uninjured. A severe storm scattered the
ships which brought back the expedition to England. Ap-
parent failure never so completely concealed a marvellous
achievement.
April 22, © When Sir Arthur once more landed in Portugal
1809. i z 3

to assume the command which for five victorious
years he was not again to abandon, the situation was
as follows. Soult, after the embarkation of Moore’s
army, had invaded the north of Portugal. He had oc-
cupied Oporto, and his troops were extended along both
banks of the Douro. Victor, in the south, had been joined
by Lapisse’s corps, and lay at Merida on the road by
Badajos and Elvas. Cuesta, who had been recently badly
defeated by Victor, lay with his Spaniards to the south of
the army which had beaten him, half-way towards Seville.
The English army under Sir John Craddock, about 20,000
strong, was at Leyria and Alcobaca. The English Govern-
Wellington 465

ment had all but made up its mind to abandon Portugal,
when a memorandum from Sir Arthur, proposing to organ-
ize the Portuguese army, take it into English pay, supply

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it with English officers, and assist it with an army of 30,000

Englishmen, caused a reversal of the policy. He was

sent to carry out his own scheme. He was received with

enthusiasm, and appointed Marshal-General of the Portu-
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466 Twelve Soldiers

guese army, of which Beresford was placed in command.
Soult was surrounded by difficulties. His communications
with Spain were threatened by irregular troops, so that he
was obliged to employ forces on the Tamega to clear the
passage over that river. Conspiracy was rife among his
officers, and they communicated with Sir Arthur. He
encouraged them, but pursued his own plans. Having
May 10. concentrated his force at Coimbra, he attacked
May 11. Soult’s troops on the south of the Douro, captur-
ing their guns. He drove them with heavy loss across
May 12. the river. Early next morning he forced the
passage of the Douro on boats. Soult, cut off from
all roads of retreat, had to abandon guns and baggage,
and effect the escape of his men by mountain paths.
Sir Arthur now turned on Victor, against whose advance
he had provided during his absence, by leaving a defensive
force, chiefly Portuguese, to detain him, and having the
promise of the co-operation of Cuesta, who had been
reinforced. Victor promptly fell back. Sir Arthur had
June 12. his army at Abrantes on the Tagus, but was de-
layed by want of money, boots, shoes, etc., till
the 27th. The army, moving along the right bank of the
July ro. Tagus, reached Plasencia. Sir Arthur arranged
with Cuesta that they should together march upon
Talavera where was the passage of the Alberche, a tribu-
tary of the Tagus, on the direct road to Madrid, while
another Spanish army under Venegas threatened Madrid
from the south and west. Though Venegas was expressly
under Cuesta’s orders, the Central Junta, then the highest
authority in Spain, without any notice to Wellington of
Cuesta, ordered Venegas not to carry out the assigned
Wellington 467

programme. Yet, the one purpose for which Sir Arthur
had agreed to advance so far into Spanish territory, was to
force back the French sufficiently to establish communica-
tion between these two Spanish armies. All the promises
on which he had relied were broken to him alike by
Cuesta, and by the Spanish authorities. His army was
all but left to starve. Cuesta indulged in a series of
movements so fatuous that co-operation with him was
impossible. The French, having collected the two corps of
Sebastiani, and Victor, with all the troops that Joseph could
bring from Madrid, attacked the Spanish and English
armies at Talavera and were bloodily repulsed, Joy a
though a too reckless advance made by the guards

nearly compromised the army, and the co-operation of the
Spaniards was miserable.

Sir Arthur had declared his intention of not engaging
further in the affairs of Spain till he should have better
guarantees for the supply of his men, before news arrived
of the advance south of Soult’s forces, threaten- July 30.
ing the communications of the British army.

Soult had in fact collected at Salamanca 34,000 men,
formed of three corps, his own, Ney’s and Mortier’s, and
was hoping to cut off Sir Arthur from Portugal. Welles-
ley had relied upon the Spanish troops holding the pass
of Banos long enough to make Soult afraid to advance,
seeing that Beresford’s Portuguese corps threatened him on
one flank from Portugal, and, if the pass were held, there
was ample time for the English army, after victory at
Talavera, to return and deal with him. The prompt
abandonment of the Banos pass by the Spaniards dis-
concerted these arrangements. Soult entered unresisted
468 Twelve Soldiers

August 1. into Plasencia, the very town from which Wellesley

had started on July 17 for Talavera. Passing
to the south of the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo,
Sir Arthur withdrew his head-quarters to Badajos.
There he took up a position for the defence of
Portugal, ready, when adequate security for food could be
obtained, to give assistance to Spain. His withdrawal
gave him an influence with the Spaniards which no re-
monstrances had secured. Cuesta was removed. Sir
Arthur was appointed Captain-General of the Spanish
armies, but his own Government declined the offer. More-
over, it was for him an important advantage, that Mr.
Frere was recalled from his position as English representa-
tive at the Spanish seat of Government and replaced for
atime by the Marquis of Wellesley. Subsequently when
for a short time the Marquis became Minister of Foreign
Affairs, he was succeeded by Henry Wellesley. There are
few more suggestive and dramatic incidents in war than
the occupation of Talavera by Victor after Cuesta, breaking
faith with Wellington, had abandoned it. The French and
English wounded trusted to Cuesta’s charge were, when
Victor arrived, dying on the stones of the streets. Victor
had all alike cared for in the townsfolk’s houses. From
those houses he extracted supplies of food and forage
sufficient for three months for the French army, who paid
nothing for them. The owners had concealed these stores
from the English army. But for the folly of the townsfolk
in thus refusing to their protectors the right to purchase

Sept. 3.

the means of living, Talavera would have escaped the
utter wreck which was now its fate. The illustration of
the difficulties with which Sir Arthur had daily and in
Wellington 469

almost every transaction to deal, increased, as up to this
time they had been, by the credulity, the vanity and
ignorance of Mr. Frere, could hardly be more complete.
I mention the incident however for another reason. In
large measure the whole struggle in the Peninsula de-
pended upon the question whether Napoleon’s or Wel-
lington’s methods of supplying troops would in the long
run prove most successful. The French could maintain
for months a large army in a district where a division of
Wellington’s would have starved ina week. The reason
of this was chiefly that it was not the custom in Portugal
orin many parts of Spain for large markets to be estab-
lished, even in towns. The people stored in their own
houses and often buried in concealed spots the supplies
they needed for a year’s consumption, and they would not
sell even to their neighbours. In the art of unearthing
these stores the French were past masters. Each man
carried in his knapsack the tools for house-breaking.
They thus lived in plenty without cost. On the other
hand they gradually gathered round them hosts of
peasantry forced, as much by starvation as by patriotism,
into the ranks of the guerillas. In two countries where
revolutionary propagandism had not been idle, and in both
of which therefore at first there were large numbers who
looked upon the French as deliverers from tyranny, the
effect on the feeling of the population of wholesale robbery
was a military element of the greatest importance to
Wellington, and he developed it by the contrast of his
own methods of a discipline severely enforced, supplies
regularly paid for, and an army fed from established
magazines. Unfortunately the Treasury never realized
470 . Twelve Soldiers

the all-importance of ample cash always in his hands, as
the weapon essential for this method of warfare. He was
habitually left bankrupt. Money was wasted elsewhere.
This is an element of the whole Peninsula campaign,
which has to be remembered at every stage of it. Wel-
lington is often reproached with being inactive in pursuit.
More often than not his pursuit was stayed by the fact
that the French had been living in a district which, from
his point of view, was a desert in which his army must
starve. All his much-abused views of discipline were
coloured by the necessity for enforcing on an army, from
its then composition more disposed than the French to
plunder, the respect for personal property which was
essential, not only to its efficiency, but to its existence. He
calculated that the French method caused them to lose
fifty per cent. of their effective strength in every campaign.

The next great phase of the contest turned more directly
than any other on these considerations, but they were
paramount throughout. In England, despite his successive
victories, “the want of capacity and want of skill” of Sir
Arthur were denounced in Parliament, though he was now
created Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington
of Talavera. Lord Wellesley was at this time able to
return the service formerly done him, and vigorously to
defend his brother’s policy and actions. On October 20,
1809, Lord Wellington had completed a personal survey
of the ground on which he had determined to erect the
great entrenched camp subsequently known as the “ Lines
of Torres Vedras,” and on that day issued orders for
entrenchments, redoubts and other work to be actually

begun. Napoleon, having made peace with Austria and
Wellington 471

being about to marry an Austrian Princess, had his hands
once more free to attend to the Peninsula. During 1809,
and the spring of 1810, he poured over the Pyrenees
troops who raised the total muster-rolls of the French in
Spain to 365,000. Occupied, however, with his marriage,
and absorbed in personally superintending the war of land
blockade against England, the Emperor placed these hosts
in the hands of two principal leaders, of whom Massena
was entrusted with the conquest of Portugal, whilst Soult
swept victoriously over Spain. Massena first set himself
to reduce Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and whilst he
was thus engaged, Wellington remained to watch him on
the frontiers of Portugal. Ciudad Rodrigo fell. July rz,
Craufurd, who was commanding the light division

close to the French, was roughly pushed back by July 24.
Ney and narrowly escaped disaster. Almeida fell. July 27.
Meantime Wellington had swept the country clear

of flocks, herds and provisions, so that when the French
should advance they would find nothing to live on. The
work was not carried through as perfectly as he desired,
solely because of the opposition of one member of the
Portuguese Government, Sousa, who succeeded in delaying
the issue of notices to the inhabitants. The measure
proved for all that a very effective agent in the destruction
of the French. Moreover, partisans and guerillas swarmed
in all the mountainous district through which Massena
had to move, and on which he afterwards depended for
supplies. Every French straggler met with certain death.
No convoy could pass anywhere without a powerful escort,
and the risk of surprise. Under these conditions ‘Sept,
Massena moved forward and Wellington leisurely 1810.
472 Twelve Soldiers

Sept. 26. retreated. At Busaco he fronted the French
both to encourage his own army, especially the
young soldiers of Portugal, and to discourage the French
Marshal. Reynier and Ney were employed in the attack.
It was bloodily repulsed, and Massena, deciding that
Busaco was the strongest place in Portugal, turned the
position by a pass on his right, only to find himself in
ps > presence of the defences on which a year’s labour
had been expended. Behind them the whole
army, which had already inflicted on him a severe check,
was securely disposed. The Portuguese had gained confi-
dence by their easy victory. Massena had learnt that
even that portion of Wellington’s army was not to be
despised by the conquerors of Europe. After for about a
month fronting the lines, Massena skilfully withdrew to
Santarem and Torres Novas, where he was better able to
feed his army. Wellington moved out; but finding
Santarem too strong for attack, placed his troops for
the winter in cantonments and awaited the effect of
famine.
Massena had despatched Foy to Paris for instructions.
Feb, &, When that General returned, he brought orders
1811. from Napoleon that Massena was at all costs to
maintain his position, and that Soult was to march to his
support and attack Badajos. Orders to that effect had
Dec, reached Soult, many previous ones having been
1810. intercepted by guerillas. Soult promptly obeyed,
and with 20,000 men carried out a brilliant campaign
March @@@inst the Spaniards in Estremadura. Badajos
11, 1811. was treacherously surrendered to him. That, how-
ever, brought his movement towards Portugal to an end,
Wellington 473

for in his absence from Andalusia, General Graham had,
despite the feebleness and treachery of the Spanish
General, Lapena, associated with him, defeated the French
at Barosa before Cadiz. Soult was therefore March 5.
compelled to return into Andalusia. Meantime,
despite Napoleon’s orders, Massena found himself forced
by famine on the night of March 5, the very day of
Barosa, to withdraw from Santarem. On March 6, in the
early morning, Wellington’s pursuit began. The retreat
was magnificently conducted as a military operation, and
brilliantly covered by Ney as a rear-guard, but marked by
atrocious cruelty. Wellington followed up the pursuit
till April 8, when the last of Massena’s men crossed the
Portuguese frontier, and the English army halted with
head-quarters at Villa Formoso. Wellington’s next
object was to possess himself of Almeida and Ciudad
Rodrigo, to both of which he laid siege. He had been
stopped from further pursuit by the failure of the Portu-
guese Government to supply their army, so that it was
dying of starvation. In the action at Sabugal, before the
French crossed, they had been severely handled. April 3.
Massena, having been reinforced, attempted early

in May to raise the siege of Almeida. The boldest, the
most dangerous, and one of the most skilful, though not
faultless actions that Wellington ever fought, that of
Fuentes d’Honoro, followed. Massena having May 3,
been baffled, Almeida fell, but Brennier the May 5;
governor, with the larger part of his garrison,

made his escape after destroying most of the guns.
Meantime in the south, Beresford had been’ blockading
Badajos. Soult, moving to relieve it, was met at Albuera
474 Twelve Soldiers

and defeated in the bloodiest, and for the soldiery
May 16. ‘
most glorious field of the war.

Wellington’s success in delivering Portugal had made
one all-important difference in his position. The English
nation was at last behind him. Carping criticism and
distrust which had hitherto, by their influence on the
Government, hampered every movement, were silenced.
Ministers were now much more dependent on him than he
on them. The first attempt on Badajos followed. Two
assaults failed. He had no adequate siege train for it, but
having been promised one from England he suddenly laid

Jen es siege to Ciudad Rodrigo and took it by assault
Jan. 19. before Marmont, who had _ succeeded Massena,

could gather his army for its protection. Welling-
eee ton then similarly invested Badajos and captured

. it. Both operations were costly in lives from the
insufficiency of the means provided by the home Govern-
ment for a regular siege, and from the necessity of obtain-
ing the results rapidly. Their success, gained by the

‘magnificent fighting of his men, and stained by their crimes,
effectually barred the roads into Portugal and opened the
way into Spain. By repairing the Bridge at Alcantara
and employing Hill to destroy the passage at Almaraz, he
now put himself in a position to operate either against
Marmont to the north of the Tagus, or against Soult in the
south, without either being able to help the other. Keep-
ing both of them in alarm he chose the former for attack.
After he had captured the defensive works which Marmont
had elaborated in Salamanca, a series of operations fol-
lowed in which the superior marching powers of the French

army gave their general a decided advantage up to two
Wellington 475

o'clock on July 23. On that day Marmont, seeking to
extend his left in order to turn Wellington’s right, made a
wide movement which exposed him as his divisions became
separated to a sudden attack upon the isolated troops of
his left wing. “That fellow will compel me to give him a
licking after all,” exclaimed the English leader, as he
watched the development. He then lay down to sleep,
ordering that he should be called when the French columns
had reached a definite spot. At the assigned moment a few
rapid orders enabled him to seize the opportunity. The left
wing of the French army was destroyed almost at once.
The remains of the whole force were saved only by the
fact that the Spaniards had abandoned the ford at Alba de
Tormes without informing Wellington. The result was
that while he moved on Huerta and Encinas, the French
remnant escaped by Alba.

Joseph fled from Madrid. Wellington entered it. Un-
fortunately at this moment, as throughout the aug. 12,
war, his deadliest enemy was the costly penurious- uae
ness of the English treasury. “We are absolutely bank-
rupt,” he writes from Madrid. His position, however, was
such that he had the choice of attacking one of three
isolated armies. He might move against Soult, who
had been hitherto watched by Hill, and now, abandoning
the siege of Cadiz, hurried towards Valencia. He might
turn on Joseph who had fallen back on Suchet in Catalonia,
or lastly he might strike at Clausel who, moving from
Burgos down the valley of the Pisuerga, threatened the line
of the Douro. Against him Wellington, drawing Hill
towards Madrid, advanced. He drove the French back
beyond Burgos, to which he laid siege. He failed after a
476 Twelve Soldiers

month to capture it. Souham, having succeeded to the
command of the northern army much reinforced, moved
to the relief of Burgos. Wellington fell back southwards,
effected his junction with Hill, and retired into winter
quarters after a disorderly retreat. The Opposition in
England had taken a new form, and the Ministry, instead
of finding themselves hampered in carrying on the war,
were reproached with not having adequately supported
Wellington. Captain Sterling, his enthusiastic advocate,
writing as “Vetus” in the Zzmes, had become a power in
England. Therefore, when next year the campaign began,
his army was a very different one from any he had previ-
ously commanded. The stringent measures, which he had
taken whilst the troops were in cantonments, had restored
the discipline which had broken down during the retreat
from Burgos. Large reinforcements and stores had arrived.
He had been appointed generalissimo of the Spanish
armies, and had done something towards obtaining useful
co-operation from them. Early in May he advanced upon
Salamanca and thence north-east upon Vittoria, where on
June 21 he inflicted on Joseph’s army a defeat so crushing,
that it virtually, at a blow, terminated the French dominion
in Spain. Suchet still held out in Catalonia, but he was
rigidly confined to his own province. Otherwise the
French armies were engaged from this time in defending
France against invasion, not in attempting to maintain
their authority. | Wellington’s movements threatened
advance into France, though at first he dreaded the experi-
ment. Soult, who had been, previous to the last campaign,
withdrawn from Spain at Joseph’s request, was now hastily
sent back there with all the troops that Napoleon could
Wellington 477

spare from his great struggle in Germany. Indeed, though
after Vittoria it was a mere dream, Napoleon had a hope
that Soult, by combining with Suchet, might make such
terms with Spain as would enlist her against England.

The “ battles of the Pyrenees” followed. Soult displayed
all his usual skill, and had, in a marvellously short time,
collected an army on the whole, apparently superior in
force to Wellington’s, but being finally driven back on
August 3, he could not prevent St. Sebastian from Sept. 8.
falling. Pamplona fell two months later. Wel- Oct. 31.
lington forced the passage of the Bidassoa and Oct. 7.
that of the Nivelle, capturing 51 guns. On Novem- Nov. 10,
ber 1 he had issued his proclamation to the French,
on passing the frontier. In order to maintain his promises
made therein, of strict discipline and kindly treatment
of the peasantry, he was obliged to denude himself for a
time of nearly all his Spanish troops, who could not be
restrained from securing booty and avenging themselves
on the French. His great difficulty now was that the war
with the United States, which had broken out in the
previous year, so occupied the Admiralty that he was ill-
supported in the Bay of Biscay, on which he was dependent
for supplies from home. The passage of the Nive occupied
from December 9 to 13, 1813. As soon as the weather
made movement possible Soult was heavily defeated at
Orthez. Urged forward by Napoleon, Soult, how- Feb. 27,
ever, attempted to take advantage of the fact that ae
Wellington had detached Marshal Beresford with Mar. 12.
two divisions to Bordeaux in order to raise revolt in that
loyalist quarter. Soult advanced across the Mar. 20.
Adour, but was defeated at Tarbes and fell back
478 Twelve Soldiers

April 10. on Toulouse, where was fought the final battle of
the war; Soult abandoned the town and retreated on
Villa Franca. Immediately afterwards news arrived of the
abdication of Napoleon, due to the occupation of Paris by
the Allies and the desertion to them of Marmont carrying
over his corps. Most of Wellington’s victorious army was
hurried off to the wretched war with the United States. A
visit to Paris and another to Madrid followed. In Madrid
his presence was sorely needed to minimize the reckless
folly of Ferdinand, whose restoration had been brought
about chiefly by Wellington’s own victories, but who had
passed so much under French influence during his com-
pulsory sojourn in France that the English Government
were anxious to utilize Wellington’s influence with the
King to prevent him from rewarding the services of
England by a desertion of her alliance, and to save him
from the violent reactionary faction into whose hands he
had thrown himself. When, however, the now Marquis of
Douro and Duke of. Wellington at length set foot in
Britain, after five years of absence, he found that enthu-
siastic as was his reception, the country was absorbed with
only one question. Even peace was hardly welcomed,
because it threatened to restore the slave trade, which had
been abolished by Britain during the period when she so
ruled the seas that she could decree its cessation every-
where. Portugal alone, as an independent ally, had been
' allowed to pursue the traffic. It was because Wellington
was the one man whose influence with the courts of France,
Spain and Portugal was likely to be strong enough to give
hope that the national will would be enforced in this
matter, that he was appointed Ambassador to Paris, when
Wellington 479

on other grounds it might have seemed particularly unwise
to send him to France. It is characteristic of him that he
threw himself into the new question with all the vigour
that had enabled him during five long years to keep the
three kingdoms of England, Spain and Portugal sufficiently
concentrated on the struggle in the Peninsula to secure
the great end which, despite the vacillations of almost all
others in all the three kingdoms, had at length been gained.
He studied a perfect library on the subject. He entered
into the closest relations with Clarkson, Wilberforce and
the other Abolitionists. Through them he succeeded in
stopping what was the greatest difficulty in his way,
the passionate language of the English newspapers against
those, especially in France, who not having passed under
the same influences as Englishmen, were anxious for the
sake of their colonies to restore the trade. He brought
to bear on the three rulers, who all acknowledged their
obligations to him, every argument that was likely to
determine their practical action. From Paris, however,
he was very soon sent to replace Castlereagh at the
Congress of Vienna.

His presence there had become essential because, in the
settlement of the map of Europe, it was soon clear that
military force might become necessary to keep in check the
ambition of Russia supported by Prussia, now acting as her
obedient vassal. France, England and Austria had
concluded an alliance, and it looked as if war was on the
eve of breaking out when news reached the quarrelling
statesmen which quickly brought them for a time into
harmony again. Napoleon, slipping away from Elba,
which had at the peace of 1814 been granted him as an
480 Twelve Soldiers

Mar. 1. independent principality, had landed, as his parti-

1815. sans put it, “ with the violets in the Spring” in the
Gulf of Jouan between Cannes and Antibes, had been
joined in succession by all the troops sent to arrest him,
and had made his triumphal entry into Paris on March 20,
It was a purely military revolution. Though his actual
presence still evoked enthusiasm among the populace, the
country was sick of war. Napoleon’s great object was to
gain time to conciliate the nation. He made eager
attempts to secure peace. The Congress had, however,
already agreed to place him “ors fa lot. Each of the
four Great Powers had bound itself to make no separate
peace, and had pledged itself to vast efforts for his destruc-
tion. Whilst in accordance with this treaty, which had
been due mainly to Wellington’s tact and skill, Russian,
Austrian and other German armies were slowly moving
towards the Rhine, the Duke hurried to Belgium, where a
mixed army of British, Dutch, Belgians, Hanoverians,
Nassauers, Brunswickers and other nationalities was being
gathered to co-operate under his orders with a Prussian
army placed under the great hero of the War of Liberty,
Prince Bliicher, to whom as an inspiring leader who yet
“understood nothing whatever of the conduct of a cam-
paign” there was attached Gneisenau, the most skilful of
Prussian soldiers, as Chief of the Staff. Wellington had
with him very few of his old Peninsula veterans or of his
Peninsula staff. Even the British part of his army was
largely made up of recruits from the Militia. Altogether
it was about as heterogeneous a body as could well have
been drawn together. Lord Hill and the Prince of Orange
acted as Commanders of his two corps. The troops were
Wellington 481

dispérsed in cantonments, which extended from the Scheldt
on the right, to the Quatre Bras Brussels road on the left.
A strong reserve was in Brussels, Wellington’s and the
Prussian armies were waiting for the slow movement of the
huge masses of the Allies to the Rhine before gathering for

 

A
GQarleror

the invasion of France, when Napoleon anticipated

- Fi June 15.
that effort by attacking the Prussian outposts at
Charleroi. The Prussian army was at this time distributed
in four great corps, Ziethen’s having its head-quarters at
Charleroi, Pirch’s at Namur, Thielmann’s at Ciney, Biilow’s
at Liége. Its right connected with Wellington’s left along

the Quatre Bras Brussels road. Napoleon had employed
1
482 Twelve Soldiers

his wonted energy in reforming the army left him by the
Bourbons, and he had over the resources which he pos-
sessed in 1814, the great advantage that his garrisons of
war-tried troops, who had been then in various fortresses
in Spain, Germany and Italy, were now returned. He had
great difficulties. The Royalists everywhere, especially in
La Vendée, gathered force. The Republicans were active in
Paris and in the towns generally. The mothers had joined
the priests in hatred and opposition to the man who had
after years of slaughter allowed the fair fields of France to
be desolated. The army though devoted to him, much as
a band of bandits is devoted to its chief, distrusted its
other leaders whom it had seen settling down under the
Bourbons to enjoy the plunder of long years, whilst the
privates and junior officers were left in beggary. The
disorders of a soldiery accustomed to find food for them-

selves, still more alienated the country. Nevertheless, « -

Napoleon always believed that, if he could have gained
a decisive victory in Belgium, his success would have once
more given him such a hold over France that he would
have been able to sweep aside the vast hosts that. were
from other quarters advancing against him. Bya masterly
series of movements, he succeeded in gathering from
various quarters an army of 128,000 men in the neighbour-
hood of Charleroi, before either the Prussian or English
armies had concentrated, even at the head-quarters of the
different corps. None had moved for a general concentra-
tion. Throughout the fifteenth he had to fight the corps of
Ziethen alone, and by evening he had pushed it aside
towards Fleurus. Ney reached him after he himself had
passed through Charleroi. He despatched Ney along the
Wellington 483

Brussels road to drive in the allied army. He gave Ney
two corps, those of D’Erlon and of Reille, eight divisions,
besides a large force of heavy cavalry, in all about 45,000
men. Ney, who had with him only one staff-officer, and
knew nothing of the organization or positions of his troops,
pushed on with such force as he could lay hands on and
drove in the outposts at Frasnes, but did not venture to
attack Quatre Bras,

Wellington received with incredulity from the Prince
of Orange, just before going to the Duchess of Richmond’s
ball, news of the attack at Frasnes. He had earlier in
the afternoon heard of the movement on Charleroi, but
believing this to be a feint, and fearing attack on his line
of communications with the sea, he had delayed till 10 p.m.
the issue of orders for the eastward movement of the
troops, though about 5 p.m. he had directed orders for
local concentration to be issued. No cannon whatever,
during the ball, sounded “an opening roar,” such as Byron
assumes, unless a few shots fired into vacancy by the
Belgian brigade at Quatre Bras may conceivably have
been discharged by men not attacked. Further orders
were issued during the night.

In the early morning the reserve moved on Waterloo,
the point of the cross-roads to Nivelles and Quatre Bras.
There it awaited orders. None of the other troops which
depended on orders from Brussels moved till the morning
of June 16. Bad staff-work had miscalculated the times
and distances. The one Dutch Belgian division of Per-
poncher had been directed to move on Quatre Bras, and
one brigade assembled there without Wellington’s instruc-
tions, Wellington, riding through the troops halted at
484 Twelve Soldiers

Waterloo and through Perponcher’s division at Quatre
10.30 Bras, reached the heights between Quatre Bras
ine v6. and Frasnes, whence he despatched a letter to

Bliicher, then at Sombreffe, in which, presumably
from erroneous information supplied to him by his staff,
he assumed the positions of the various detachments of
the allied army to be much nearer to Quatre Bras than
they were. He then rode to see Bliicher at Brye. Napo-
leon was gathering around Ligny what was by both

Wellington and the Prussian staff taken to be practically

the French army. Wellington came away with the con-
victiun that Bliicher, from his dispositions, would be badly
beaten. He promised to support Bliicher if not himself
attacked. In the result, late in the day, Napoleon inflicted
on Bliicher a severe but not crushing defeat. Only three of
the Prussian corps had been present. Biilow from Liege,
having misunderstood an order of Gneisenau’s, had not
arrived in time. On the other hand, at Quatre Bras, Ney,
nominally in command of eight divisions of the French
army, besides heavy cavalry specially assigned him, had
been only able in the course of the day to employ three
divisions. One of Reille’s divisions had been diverted.

D’Erlon’s whole corps, part at least of which Napoleon had
originally intended to fall by way of the Quatre Bras road
on the rear of the Prussian army, had been prematurely
called to the Ligny side of the contest, recalled to the left,
and, after useless wanderings, bivouacked late at night
without having fired a shot, in rear of the French troops,
who, after a fierce contest, had by that time been repulsed
by the slowly gathering forces of Wellington’s army. Till
quite lately it has appeared to be certain that the disastrous
Wellington 485

order which thus deprived the French army both at Ligny
and Quatre Bras of the services of this important corps was
due to the mistake of an adde-de-camp of Napoleon. It is
however asserted that the original order has now been dis-
covered, that it was expressly addressed by Napoleon him-
self to D’Erlon, and carried not by an azde-de-camp but by
a sub-officer of the Guard. So severe had been the struggle
at Quatre Bras, that in his great despatch on the Waterloo
campaign Wellington officially reports that he had been
attacked by the combined corps of Reille and D’Erlon
(eight divisions), a misstatement, doubtless due to the
evidence of prisoners as to the corps designed for the
attack, and to the report of the Prince of Orange, who
formed the same opinion; but, considering the hand that
wrote it, a magnificent testimony to the fighting efficiency
of the three French divisions which in fact assailed him.
Late at night the Prussian army fell back, two corps
without artillery northwards, the third, Thielmann’s, with
the artillery and train along the road to Gembloux, where
it established connection with Biilow’s corps from Liége.
Early in the morning all moved northwards towards
Wavre. It was not till two o'clock in the afternoon of
the next day that any serious pursuit of the Prussians
was attempted by Napoleon. Deceived by misleading
reports, and by captures made by Pajol’s cavalry on the
Namur road, he at first believed the Prussians to have
retreated in that direction. He, at twelve o'clock, gave
verbal orders to Grouchy to pursue with the corps of Van-
damme and Gérard. Somewhat better informed later, he
sent him a written order to move towards Gembloux, and
explore the enemy’s march. At two o’clock, when Grouchy
486 Twelve Soldiers

was starting, deluges of rain descended, making the roads
almost impassable, so that it was late in the evening before
Grouchy reached Gembloux, having then little knowledge
of the direction of the Prussian retreat. Meantime Ney,
unaware of Napoleon’s victory at Ligny, and disheartened
by the ill success of the previous day, had remained
inactive. No serious attempt was made to disturb
‘Wellington’s army till Napoleon, having given his orders
to Grouchy, moved to support Ney. Wellington had had
ample time to arrange for the retreat rendered necessary
by the Prussian defeat. When Napoleon and Ney
advanced, they met with nothing but cavalry, which covered
the allied troops, who had from all quarters fallen back
towards Mount St. Jean, a position on the south side of
the forest of Soignie, which had been noted by Wellington
in a reconnaissance of the previous year. The perfection of
the arrangements for the retreat made it one of the finest
lof Wellington’s war movements. At Genappe a smart
check was inflicted on the French pursuing cavalry by the
British. The intolerable weather hampered both armies.
With the exception of 18,000 men left by Wellington at
Hal, the whole of his army was concentrated in good
time, in what was on the following day to become the
field of “that world earth-quake Waterloo.” The French
army was only partly in position on the opposite side of
a narrow valley, partly in rear. Wellington had pledged
himself to fight if Bliicher could support him with one or
two corps. Early in the morning of the 18th arrived a mes-
sage from Bliicher, promising to come with his whole army.
The whole story of the relations between the two armics
at this time has only of late years been made known to us
Wellington 487

from the Prussian archives, Wellington resolutely refused
to discuss it. Miiffling, who was the military attaché from
Bliicher at Wellington’s head-quarters, deliberately dis-
guised the facts, and has been accepted as infallible by all
the earlier historians. The truth is that Gneisenau had
a profound distrust of Wellington, and fearing that he
did not seriously mean to fight at Waterloo, dreaded to
commit the Prussian army to what, in that case, would
have been a fatal move. Bliicher’s loyalty saved the
cause of Europe.

In the main, Wellington must have been aware of this
condition of mind of the men on whom he had to rely.
His whole scheme for the coming battle depended on
Prussian support; yet if we are to accept the story thus
told, he did not know till the actual morning of the
battle that he would receive it. He usually dined about
3p.m. There is a story, supported by much evidence,
but opposed by almost as much, that he, after dinner,
rode alone with an orderly to confer with Bliicher, and
make sure of his support. The whole matter is in doubt,
and any one who possesses evidence on the subject wouid
do a great service to the cause of historical truth if they
would publish it.

On the morning of the 18th the strength of Wellington’s
army at Waterloo was 67,661, including 156 guns and 12,632
cavalry. The French were 71,947, of which 15,765 were
cavalry. They had 246 guns. Napoleon delayed till
near noon, because of the condition of the ground, which
prevented the movement of guns. The battle began
from Napoleon's left, by an attack by Reille against the
fortified farm-house of Hougoumont. It was followed
488 Twelve Soldiers

by a movement against the English centre by D’Erlon’s
corps. Both these were severely repulsed.

D’Erlon’s attack had hardly begun when Napoleon
became aware that a body of troops were at St. Lambert.
They were, in fact, the advance of Biilow’s corps, and before
3 p.m. Napoleon, realizing that he was threatened by a
Prussian force on his right, withdrew Lobau with the 6th
corps from supporting D’Erlon (the ist), and prepared to
meet this new danger. He left Ney to conduct the attack
against Wellington’s army, and directed his personal atten-
tion to fending off the threatened blow. He hoped that
Grouchy, who had over-night reported his having moved
northwards, would march by the bridges of Moustier and
Ottignies and catch the Prussians between two fires. He
had arranged a series of patrols extending to the bridges.
They, however, failed to get into communication with
Grouchy, and an order sent off to him at 1 p.m., directing
him to move against Biilow, did not reach him till between
6 p.m. and 7 p.m., when he was engaged at Wavre.

About 4 p.m. Ney captured La Haye Sainte, a forti-
fied farm-house on the left centre of Wellington’s line.
D’Erlon’s corps being, however, much exhausted, Ney
asked for a cavalry division, in order to give D’Erlon
time to get his men together. As soon as they moved
off the whole of the cavalry, which had seen the allied
troops after the repulse of D’Erlon’s first attempt with-
draw behind the crest of the hill, and had seen the capture
of La Haye Sainte, dashed forward as to a mere pursuit,
For two hours they broke in vain upon the solid squares
formed to receive them. Meantime, about 4.30 p.m., the
Prussian attack had begun. Between five and six, the
Wellington 489

Prussians, having driven back Lobau, approached Planche-
noit. The “young” guard had to be thrown into Planchenoit,
but before the Prussians were driven back some of the
“old” and middle-guard had also to be employed. All
this time Wellington was personally watching every phase
of the fight, restoring the strength of weak points, directing
all the principal movements. At one critical moment his
readiness and presence of mind alone saved the British
line of battle from being broken in two. Of the twenty-
four battalions of the Guard, Napoleon had only eight now
available. These, about 7 p.m., he threw into the attack.
Their advance was met in front by the Guards. The
extreme flank was attacked by Adam’s brigade, of which
the 52nd, under Colborne, began the movement. The
whole mass was hurled back in disorder.

About 7.30 p.m. the van of Ziethen’s corps appeared
at Papelotte, and fell upon the right flank of D’Erlon’s
corps, forcing at the same time Lobau to fall back towards
Planchenoit. The Duke seized the moment to order a
general advance, and the Prussians, moving forward simul-
taneously, the French army soon ceased to exist as a fight-
ing force. At II p.m. in Genappe, Wellington handed
over the further pursuit to the Prussians. The details of
Grouchy’s actions do not concern the Duke’s life, but as a
question of the nature of the decision, which he took when
he faced Napoleon at Waterloo, it is right to say that
on the whole the balance of evidence shows that had
Grouchy moved across the Dyle as Napoleon during
the battle expected, but had not ordered him to do,
the Prussian attack would have been delayed so long
that the whole conditions of the battle would have been
490 Twelve Soldiers

changed. It is impossible to say what would have
happened.

The victorious advance of the Allies upon Paris, though
not unopposed, could not seriously be checked. Napoleon
abdicated again, and was sent as a State prisoner to St.
Helena. The Allies determined to maintain in France an
army about 150,000 strong, made up of various contin-
gents, about 30,000 being British. Of the entire army
Wellington was for three years generalissimo. In the last
year of the occupation, 1818, he was engaged at the Con-
gress of Cambray, which settled the terms of evacuation,
When the army had returned home he was appointed

aes Master-General of the Ordnance, which carried
with it a seat in the Cabinet, of which Lord Liver-
pool was the Premier.

His influence in the House of Lords steadily grew, and
ultimately became, for a time, very nearly supreme. His
authority over the Prince Regent, partly exercised through
Lord Castlereagh, and continued when George IV. became
king, was almost as great. It was, however, rather that of
a calm and wise doctor dealing with a madman than any-
thing which did more honour to the man he guided. The
patient often chafed under the yoke. Wellington’s intense
loyalty to the Crown as such, hardly enabled him to endure
one whom, as a man, he utterly despised. The Duke became,
in his own way, almost as much a leader of fashion as the
“first gentleman of Europe.” Thus, it is said, that we owe
to him the practice of hats being carried into a drawing-
room. When George IV. came to the throne in 1820,
the Duke in private did all he could to restrain the King’s
vindictiveness against the Queen, but there is an amus-
Wellington 491

ing story told of his being. called on by the mob, when
riding in Pall Mall, to cry “God bless Queen Caroline.”
He complied, and then as he passed out shouted back
the addition, “and may all your wives be like her.” When
he first returned to England his popularity with the mob
led to their lifting him on their shoulders, and demand-
ing whither they should take him. As so public an escort
would not have been always convenient he usually answered
“Carry me home,” and, in fact, he soon found it impossible
to leave his house on foot. The iron shutters, which the
breaking of his windows induced him to put up at Apsley
House, and never to take down, his narrow escape with
his life on June 15, 1832, were later illustrations of the
treatment meted out by a mob to a strong servant of the
kingdom, not wont to swerve from what he believed to
be the path of duty, to serve the hour, either of popular
applause, or popular hate.

At the Congress of Verona he protested against the
invasion of Spain by France, yet refused to assist Oct.
by arms the Spanish patriots whom it was the ie
object of the French Royalists to suppress. He stopped
Russia from attacking Turkey, and generally opposed to
the “Holy Alliance” the principle of non-intervention,
not, however, in the least in the modern sense of that term.

When Nicholas ascended the throne of Russia, Wel-
lington, in February, was sent to St. Petersburg re
on a special mission, by which he for a time ‘
averted war with Turkey.

On January 22, 1827, he became Commander-in-Chief
of the army, still holding the Master-Generalship, but on

Canning’s succeeding to the Premiership in the following
492 Twelve Soldiers

May, Wellington refused to hold office under him, and
resigned both the command of the army and the Master-
Generalship.

In January 1828 he very unwillingly became Premier,
and had not been in office a month before he bitterly
regretted it. He thought it his duty to carry Catholic
emancipation, in order to avoid civil war in Ireland. He
fought Lord Winchilsea in a duel in order to stop the
violence of the language of the old Tory party as to his
action in this matter. It is somewhat remarkable, con-
sidering the times, that it was the only duel he ever fought.
Though it scandalized many of his friends, it put an effectual
stop to calumny. On November 16, 1830, having been
beaten by a combination of the party of Parliamentary Re-
form with the Tories, whom he had alienated on the Roman
Catholic question and by the votes of the Catholics, he
resigned office. Any fair statement by which the Duke’s
action can be judged, requires room and verge enough to
trace the character of his successive decisions. As in the
case of Catholic emancipation, so in that of the Reform Bill,
an intense dread of civil war was one of the dominant
factors. In all cases the question, how the Government
of the country was to be carried on, z.e. how the ordinary
administration on which the happiness of millions depended
was to be made effectual, was uppermost in his mind. It
was for making London from the worst into the best
policed city in the: world that he was stoned by the mob
in 1829.

It is an interesting fact that the Duke himself found for
Peel the first seat which gave him his entrance into
Parliament. More and more as that statesman’s carcer
Wellington 493
developed, it became the Duke’s great object to support
him. It was this which led to the curious incident in
1834 when, having been sent for by William IV. on the
fall of Lord Melbourne’s first Administration, he recom-
mended Peel, then in Italy, as Premier, and, in order not
to hamper his cnoice of Ministers, carried on for the time
the routine work of all the offices. In principle the break-
ing up of the party by Peel on the question of the Corn
Laws, was a repliqua of the Duke’s action in the matter
of Catholic emancipation. Both depended on the central
idea that loyalty to the nation is more sacred than loyalty
to party. In private life he was the best of landlords,
spending all his rent-roll on his estate. All those who’
surrounded him in his family circle were devoted to him.
His relations with his very able but eccentric eldest son
were alone in their eyes unhappy, almost entirely by the
father’s fault, for of the devotion of the son to the father
there can be no question.

In his later life there once more opened before him
the prospect of war on a great scale. When in 1840 the
tension between France and Prussia appeared to be strained
to the breaking point, the King of Prussia asked for his
services as Generalissimo of the German Confederation.
He, in obedience to her Majesty’s commands, accepted
the offer. The incident ended there because peace was
maintained.

In old age he had settled down into the position of
universal family adviser to the nation. In 1842 he was
made Commander-in-Chief for life. His powers became
enfeebled at a comparatively early age, and though, by
the authority of his great name, and broadly by the
494 Twelve Soldiers

principles he applied to the case, he for the third time
saved his native land from civil war, by his peaceful
victory over the Chartists on April 10, 1848, practically all
the work was done by others. His familiar daily ride to
the Horse-Guards ended in little more than a daily doze
when there. In 1852, the year after the exhibition, the
great life tranquilly ceased at Walmer.

The general assumption that he was not an ambitious
man seems to me to require a definition of ambition. He
had no trace whatever of the Napoleonic ambition, the
ambition of the sans-culotte or the revolutionist. In am-
bition, as in everything else, he was first of all a gentleman,
an aristocrat, a loyal and, in the highest sense, a con-
servative servant of Qucen and country, loyal most of all
in this, that when he thought either nation, Minister, King,
Queen, or personal friend wrong, he never served his own
interest or betrayed theirs by flattering them with words
that he knew to be false.

Nevertheless no one can really study his letters without
seeing very clearly that, especially in his youth, the am-
bition, if ambition it be, of wishing to be allowed to handle
tools of which he was a master, and some impatience at
seeing them misused in incompetent hands, was typical and
characteristic of him. He was the strongest, loyalest,
greatest flesh and blood Englishman that we, or our
fathers, know of, or are likely to know. Those who scoff
at his statesmanship mean. by a statesman, a politician
skilful in carrying his party to victory. When they can
produce the man of this kind, who three times saved his
country from civil war, showed his power by such an act
as that of Catholic emancipation carried by him alone,
Wellington 495

and made London the most orderly of capitals, it will
be time enough to enter into such comparisons. Till then,
those who prefer national to party services may possibly
think that, despite undoubted mistakes, the statesman was
even greater than the soldier, though neither of them was
so great as the man.
INDEX

ABERCROMBY, Ralph, 288; neglected
state of the British army at the out-
break of the Revolutionary War,
288; disastrous results upon the
Great War of this neglect, 290; re-
generation of the army chiefly due
to Abercromby, 290; his birth,
291; schooling at Edinburgh and
studies at Leipsig, 291 ; Cornet in
3rd Dragoon Guards, 292; serves
during Seven Years’ War, 292; re-
tires on half-pay, 292; M.P. for
Clackmannan, 292; retires from
politics, 292; marries Miss Menzies,
292; war breaks out and he is ap-
pointed Major-General, 292 ; situ-
ation in the Netherlands, 293 ; Aber-
cromby’s brigade under the Duke
of York, 293; mismanagement of
the Allies, 293; due to their selfish-
ness and jealousy, 294; allied army
divided, 294; failure before Dun-
kirk, 294; the attack on Mouvaux,
295 ; its success, 2963; the British
force is left unsupported and com-
pelled to retreat, 296 ; collapse of
the Allies and general retreat, 296 ;
Abercromby’s distinguished services,
297; is made K.B., 297; sent to
the West Indies, 297 ; the situation
there, 297; the force inadequate
and ill prepared for the service, 298 ;
Abercromby takes Santa Lucia, St.
Vincent and Granada, 299; sails
for England and returns to West
Indies the same year, 299 ; success
in Trinidad, 299; and failure at
Porto Rico, 300 ; resigns the com-
mand, 300; takes up and resigns
the command in Ireland, 301; com-
mands in Scotland, 301 ; appointed
to the first division for the campaign
in Holland, 301; growth of the

 

navy during the first six years of the
war, 301; shrinkage of the army
during the same period, 302; the
Government falls back upon the
militia, 302 ; poor quality of Aber-
cromby’s troops, 302; purpose of
the expedition, 303; agreement
with Russia, 303; difficulties of
France, 303 ; Abercromby sets sail,
303; Brune’s preparations for de-
fence, 303 ; Abercromby effects his
landing which leads to the capture
of the Dutch fleet, 304 ; repulses
Brune’s attack, 304; Duke of York
and the Russians arrive, 304; ill-
planned battle of September 19, 304;
Abercromby sent in the wrong di-
rection, 304; his division on 2nd
and 6th October, 306; battle of
Egmont, 306; Allies retreat and
withdraw from Holland, 306 ; hon-
ours for Abercromby, 306; ap-
pointedto Mediterranean command,
307 ; plan to relieve the Austrians
comes too late, 307; is ordered to
attack Cadiz, 307 ; Lord Keith’s in-
competence, 308 ; causes the aban-
donment of the expedition, 309;
Abercromby ordered to Egypt,
309; care for his troops while at
Malta, 309 ; poor information about
the French in Egypt, 310; the ex-
pedition at Marmorice Bay, where
the expected Turkish aid is not
forthcoming and where Abercromby
practises landing, 310; voyage to
Egypt, 311; the fleet in Aboukir
Bay, 311 ; the French receive warn-
ing, 311 ; their preparations for de-
fence, 312 ; Abercromby’s arrange-
ments for landing, 312; the landing,
314; and repulse of the French,
314; Cochrane’s boat reaches the
498 Index

shore first, 315; the advance to
Alexandria, 315 ; the first attack on
the French broken off, 316; Aber-
cromby strengthens his position,
316; its description, 316; he learns
of Menou’s arrival and prepares to
resist a night attack, 317; battle of
Alexandria, 318; Abercromby is
wounded and remains at the post of
danger till the last, 320; his death
on board the Foudroyant, 321 ; re-
view of his career and character, 321

Aboukir Bay, Abercromby’s landing
and action at, 314

Agra, siege of, 338

Ahmednuggar, siege of, 456

Aire, siege of, 82

Albuera, battle of, 473

Alexandria, battle of, 318, 422

Aligarh, storming of, 334

Almeida, siege of, 473

Antwerp, surrender of, 77

Arcot, capture of, 183, 185

Argaum, battle of, 457

Arni, battle of, 185

Assaye, battle of, 456

BapajJos, siege of, 474
Baird, Sir David, 364; his birth, 364;
Ensign i in and, 364; goes with his
regiment to Gibraltar, 365 ; returns
home, 365 ; appearance and char-
acter, 365; transferred to 73rd, 365;
sails for India and lands in Madras,
366; Hyder Ali and the East India
Company, 366; Baird accompanies
Baillie’s detachment, 368 ; wounded,
368; taken prisoner and sent to
Seringapatam, 369; four years of
confinement, 371; he is released,
371; Major and goes home on leave,
371; returns to India as Lieutenant-
Colonel, 371; Moore by an acci-
dent senior to Baird, 371; com-
mands a brigade of Sepoys, 372;
storming of Savendrug, 372; at-
tack on Seringapatam, 372; peace
with Tippoo, 373; Baird’s disci-
pline in the 71st, 373; commandant
of Tanjore, 373 ; disagrees with the
President, 374; his regiment dis-
banded, 374; Baird at the Cape,
374; promoted Major-General and
returns to Madras, where he com-
mands a brigade, 375 ; annoyed at
the advantages given to Colonel
Wellesley, 376; battle of Malla-

 

velly, 376 ; siege of Seringapatam,
376 ; Baird leads the storming party,
378 ; thinks himself superseded by
Wellesley, complains to Harris, but
withdraws his complaint, 379;
thanked by Parliament, 379; re-
ceives command of an expedition

destined for Java, but subsequently

ordered to Egypt, 380; sails from
Bombay, 380; arrives at Kosseir,
381; difficulties of the enterprise,
381; Baird’s arrangements for the
desert march, 382 ; leaves Kosseir,
385; reaches Keneh, 385 ; he hears
from General Hutchinson and moves
down the Nile, 387 ; his disappoint-
ment at finding the fighting over,
388; his force absorbed in Lord
Cavan’s command, 389; the Indian
contingent returns to Suez and
Baird accompanies it to Madras,
390 ; appointed Commander of Fort
William, transferred to Fort St.
George, 390; Knight of the Cres-
cent, 390; commands a division,
his energy and discipline on the
march, 390; throws up his com-
mand and returns to England, 391;
his adventures on the voyage home,
391; appointed to Staff of the
Eastern District, 392; knighted,
392; appointed to the command of
the expedition to the Cape, 392;
arrives off the coast of Africa, 393 ;
lands at Leopard’s Bay, 394 ; battle
of Blauweberg, 394; Cape Town
capitulates, 395 ; surrender of Jans-
sens, 395; Baird Governor of the
Cape, 395; lends troops to Sir
Home Popham for the attack on
Buenos Ayres which ends disas-
trously, 397 ; is therefore censured
and recalled, 397 ; his popularity at
the Cape, 397 ; sent to Copenhagen
under Lord Cathcart, and is
wounded, 398; forms camp of in-
struction on the Curragh, 398 ; sent
to Spain in command of a division,
398 ; arrives at Corunna and marches
to Astorga, 399 ; his junction with
Moore, 399; the retreat to Co-
runna, 400 ; battle of Corunna, 401;
Baird severely wounded, 401 ; order
of the Bath and baronetcy, 402 ;
Commander of the Forces in Ireland,
402; marries Miss Preston, 402;
G.C.B., 402 ; his death, 402
Index

Ballinamuck, surrender of the French
at, 330

Barcelona, siege of, 101 ; capitulation
of, 105

Basing House, siege of, 21

Bastia, siege of, 411

Benavente, action of, 437

Bethune, siege of, 82

Bhurtpore, siege of, 355

Black Hole, the, 195

Blauweberg, battle of, 394

Blenheim, battle of, 70

Bonn, siege of, 64

Bouchain, siege of, 85

Budge-Budge, action of, 196

Buenos Ayres, Popham’s success and
disaster at, 397

Burford, action at, 27

Burleigh House, siege of, 6

Busaco, action of, 472

CALLAN CASTLE, siege of, 34

Calvi, siege of, 411

Carangoly, siege of, 222;
siege of, 236

Chandernagore, siege of, 198

Charleroi, attack at, 482

Chillambrum, Coote defeated at, 239

Chingliput, siege of, 191; second
siege of, 236

Chinsurah, battle of, 209

Chittore, capture of, 246

Clive, Robert, Lord, 173; the con-
ditions which gave him his oppor-
tunity, 176; the career and work of
Dupleix, 177; intrigues in the
Carnatic, 180; the Anglo-French
struggle centres in the siege of
Trichinopoly, 181; which brings
Clive into close relations with
Governor Saunders, 181; Clive’s
birth and education, 181; receives
a nomination as writer in the East
India Company’s service and arrives
in Madras, 182; escape to Fort St.
David, 182; Ensign’s commission
in the East India Company’s service,
182 ; is present during the siege of
Pondicherry, 182 ; commands storm-
ing party at Devicota, 182; returns
to Fort St. David, and is appointed
commissary of the forces, 183 ; falls
ill and is sent for a sea trip, 183 ;
present at defeat at Volconda, 183;
returns to Fort Sf. David, 183 ;
Captain’s commission, 183 ; marches
reinforcement to Trichinopoly and

second

 

499

reports to Governor Saunders, 183 ;
Clive’s plan to seize Arcot approved
by Saunders, 183 ; surprises Arcot,
183; and repulses French attack
on that place, 1853; joined by
Morari Rao, 185; defeats Rezza
Sahib at Arni, 185 ; Conjeveram,
186 ; defeats French at Coveripauk,
187; demolishes Dupleix-Futte-
habad, 187; on the return of Law-
rence takes his place as a subordin-
ate, 188 ; takes part in the relief of
Trichinopoly, 188; holds north
bank of the Cauvery, 189; is sur-
prised at Semiaveram, 189; and
wounded, 190; but obtains the
surrender of his assailants, 1903
engagement at Volconda, 191; takes
Covelong and Chingliput, 191 ;
marries Miss Maskelyne and sails
for England, 191; his reception,
193; returned to Parliament for
Sandwich, but unseated, 193;
approach of the Seven Vears’ War,
193 ; Clive commissioned as Lieu-
tenant-Colonel in the King’s army
and appointed Governor of Fort St.
David, 193; arrival at Bombay,
194; takes Fort Gheria with Wat-
son, 194; reaches Fort St. David,
194; the Black Hole disaster, 195 ;
Clive commands the expedition sent |
to Bengal, 196; sails with Watson,
196; takes Budge-Budge, 196; is
surprised but disperses the enemy,
196; Calcutta re-occupied, 197;
Clive forces his way through the
Nawab’s army, 197; and frightens
the Nawab into retreat, 198 ; invests
and takes Chandernagore, 198;
negotiates with Mir Jafar, 199;
tricks Omichund, 200; sets out to
attack Suraj-ud-Dowla, 200; the
halt at Cutwa, 200; council of war,
201; Clive decides to attack, 202 ;
battle of Plassey, 202; advance to
Daudpore, and Murshedabad, 206 ;
Clive receives large payments from
Mir Jafar, 206 ; is appointed presi-
dent of the settlement of Calcutta,
207; sends Forde to conquer
Northern Sirkars, 207 ; marches to
Murshedabad to help Mir Jafar, 207 ;
quarrel with the Dutch, 208 ; battle
of Chinsurah, 209 ; Clive returns to
England, 209; his generosity, 209 ;
Pitt’s opinion of him, 209 ; receives
500

an Irish peerage and enters Parlia-
ment, 210; offends the East India
Company, 210; but is appointed
Governor-General and Commander-
in-Chief of Bengal, 210; his third
period of Indian service, 210; sup-
presses mutiny, 210; reforms ad-
ministration and adopts the terri-
torial policy of abstention from
annexation, 211 ; his return home,
211; attacks upon him, 211; Par-
liamentary debates, 211; his final
triumph and death, 211; the found-
er of an Empire, 212

Clonmel, siege of, 34

Conahgul, action of, 454

Conjeveram, capture of, 186

Coote, Sir Eyre, 213; his birth, 213 ;
Ensign in 27th, 213; battle of
Falkirk, 213 ; Captain in 39th, and
sails for Madras, 213; expedition
to Bengal, 214; the campaign of
Plassey, 215; Coote promoted to
local rank of Major, 215; captures
Cutwa, 216; council of war, Coote
urges immediate action, 216 ; battle
of Plassey, 217; pursuit of Law,
217; Coote returns to England,
217; Colonel of 84th, 217 ; course
of the war in Madras from 1758-9,
217; Coote returns to Madras and
takes command, 221 ; his character
as a leader, 221; the local military
conditions, 221 ; campaign of 1759,
222; Coote takes Wandewash and
Carangoly, 222; French plans for
1760, 223; Lally endeavours to
recapture Wandewash, 223; Coote
marches to its relief, 223; battle of
Wandewash, 224; Coote does not
pursue, but takes fortsin the interior,
227; siege of Pondicherry, 228; a
French sortie, 229 ; Coote super-
seded by Monson, 229; who is
wounded and Coote resumes the
command, 230 ; fall of Pondicherry
and the other French possessions
afterwards restored by the treaty of
Paris, 231 ; Cootemade Commander-
in-Chief in Bengal, 232; dispute
between Mir Cassim and Ram
Narrain, 232; Coote’s imperious
ways, 232; returns to England,
233; Knight of the Bath, Lieuten-
ant-General and again Commander-
in-Chief in India, 233; returns to
Calcutta, 233; disapproves of

 

Index

Popham’s operations, 234 ; Madras
invaded by Hyder Ali, 234 ; Baillie’s
disaster, 234 (see also) 367 ; Coote
sent to Madras with supreme powers
by Warren Hastings, 235; retakes
Chingliput and Carangoly, 236;
Wandewash secured and defended
by Lieutenant Flint until relieved
by Coote, 236; he marches to
Permacoil and Pondicherry, 237;
and Cuddalore, 238; where he is
detained some months for want of
provisions, 238; attacks Chillam-
brum, is beaten back and retires to
Porto Novo, 239; battle of Porto
Novo, 239; its importance, 244;
Coote marches towards Madras,
244; surrender of Tripassore, 245 ;
defeats Hyder at Pollalore, 245;
and at Sholangur Pass, 246; takes
Chittore, relieves Tripassore, and
returns to Madras, 246; war with
Holland, 246; Coote disagrees
with Macartney about the plan of
campaign, 246; his health fails,
offers to resign, but is persuaded to
remain to relieve Vellore, 247; fresh
campaign against Hyder and the
French, 248; Coote retires on
Madras, 248; negotiations with
Hyder, 248; Coote resigns com-
mand and returns to Bengal, 249 ;
is again sent for and sails for Ma-
dras, 249 ; his death, 249

Copenhagen, battle of, 398

Cork, siege of, 57

Corunna, battle of, 401, 439

Covelong, siege of, 191

Coveripauk, battle of, 187

Cromwell, Oliver, 1; M.P. for Cam-
bridge, which he prepares for
defence, 1; raises a troop of horse,
1; his ten years’ career, 1; birth,
2; family, 2; school, 2; at Cam-
bridge, 2; conversion, 2; M.P. for
Huntingdon, 2; Warwick’s descrip-
tion of him, 2; action in the House
upon the King’s flight in 1642, 4;
puts Cambridge ina state of defence,
5 ; Captain of a troop of horse, 5 ;
character of his soldiers, 5; at
Edgehill, 6 ; fight at Grantham, 6;
relieves Gainsborough, 6; takes
Stamford and Burleigh House, 6;
a skilful retreat, 7; skirmish near
Winceby, 7; at Marston Moor, 8;
commands horse of left wing, 9;
Index

Rupert’s inquiry about him, 10;
defeats Rupert, 10 ; pursues Rupert
and allies, and attacks Royalist in-
fantry and left wing cavalry, 11;
his letters after the battle to Wal-
ton, 12; Watson’s account, 12;
the name Ironside, 12; blames
Manchester for want of energy, 133
in Parliament supports creation of
“New Model Army,” 13 ; acts in-
dependently with force of cavalry,
1645, 14; Waller's opinion of him,
153 Scots regard him as an “ in-
cendiary,” 15; Fairfax applies for
him as second in command, 15;
joins Fairfax at Guilsborough, 16;
commands right wing at Naseby,
17; defeats Loyalist infantry at
Naseby, 19; continues pursuit to
Leicester, 20; independence to-
wards House of Commons, 20;
letter from Harborough to Len-
thall, 20; shares in fighting after
Naseby, 21; appointment as
Lieutenant-General prolonged, 21 ;
letter to Lenthall telling of fall of
Basing House, 21; resigns his
command and returns to London
to report to House of Commons,
22; helps to draw up list of demands
of the army, 23; in danger of being
arrested by the army, 23; sent to
suppress revolt in South Wales, 24;
takes Pembroke Castle, 24; plan
of the Preston campaign, 24;
advances from Gloucester, 24;
marches into Yorkshire, 24 ; pushes
through pass from Wetherby, 25 ;
army arrives at Stonyhurst, 25;
attacks Scottish army near Preston,
253 pursuit through Wigan, 26;
marches towards Berwick, 26;
moves into Scotland, 26; peace
follows, 26; returns to London, 26;
attacks mutineers at Burford and
restores order, 27 ; commands force
sent to Ireland, 27; sails from Mil-
ford and reaches Dublin, 28; re-
clothes and re-equips Jones’ men
and dismisses some officers, 28 ;
issues Manifesto, 28; makes himself
champion of Protestantism, and
divides Ormonde’s followers, 29 ;
assembles forces outside Dublin, 30;
arrives on south side of Drogheda,
30; summons garrison to capitulate,
30; Drogheda taken and no quarter

 

501

given, 30; returns to Dublin, 32;
sets out for the south, 32; joins
Jones at Wexford and storms the
fort, 32; makes Wexford his base,
32; takes New Ross, 32; Cork
and Youghal offer submission, 33 ;
makes new base at Cork, 33;
marches to Waterford, 33; his men
broken down by exposure, 33;
abandons siege and winters at Cork,
333 Sets out on campaign against
Kilkenny, 33; takes Callan Castle,
34; concentrates forces before Kil-
kenny, 34; takes Kilkenny, 34;
invests Clonmel and takes it, 34;
ordered to return to England, 35 ;
strategy of Irish campaign, 35;
combined working of army and
fleet, 35 ; Cromwell made Captain-
General and Commander-in-Chief,
36; crosses frontier at Berwick,
36; manceuvres before Edinburgh,
37; short of provisions, 37; falls
back on Dunbar, 37; battle of
Dunbar, 37; pursuit after Dunbar,
40; ill with fever, 41; crosses
Forth and marches into Perthshire,
41; letter to Lenthall proves that
he meant Charles to invade Eng-
land, 42; pursuit of Charles, 43 ;
reaches Worcester, 44; battle of
Worcester, 45; the character of his
army, 46 ; review of his work as a
general, 46 ; his death, 48
Culloden, battle of, 136
Cutwa, capture of, 216

DEEG, siege of, 354

Delhi, battle of, 335; relief of, 351

Dettingen, battle of, 131, 253

Devicota, siege of, 182

Drogheda, siege of, 30

Dummul, siege of, 454

Dunbar, battle of, 37

Dunkirk, defeat of the Duke of York
before, 294

EDGEHILL, battle of, 6
Egmont, battle of, 306

FALKIRK, battle of, 135, 213
Fontenoy, battle of, 253

Fort Gheria, siege of, 194
Fuentes d’Honoro, action of, 473
Furrukhabad, battle of, 353

GAWILGHUR, siege of, 457
502

Ghent, surrender of, 77
Gibraltar, siege of, 263

Gingee, siege of, 231

Granada, Abercromby takes, 299
Grantham, action at, 6

HEATHFIELD, George Augustus Eliott,
Baron, 251 ; his birth, 252; educa-
tion, 253; serves in 23rd and in
Prussian army, 253; officer of ar-
tillery, 253; transfers to cavalry,
2533 present at Fontenoy and
wounded at Dettingen, 253 ; Cap-
tain, Major and Lieutenant-Colonel,
253; marries Anne Pollexfen Drake,
254; aide-de-camp to George IL.,
254; raises and commands First
Light Horse, 254; goes with his
regiment to Germany, 254; distin-

guishes himself at Warburg, 254; |

appointed Brigadier-General in ex-
pedition to France, 254; second in
command of expedition to Cuba,
254; Lieutenant-General on return
from Havana, 254; Commander-
in-Chief in Ireland, 255 ; Governor
of Gibraltar, 255; history of Gib-
raltar, 255; Eliott takes up his
command, 257; description of the
defences, 257; their neglected con-
dition, 259 ; Eliott’s representations
on the subject, 260; Spanish policy
aims at recovering Gibraltar, and
concludes treaty with France, 261 ;
secret negotiations between Spain
and England, 262; war declared,
262; Eliott’s diligence, 263;
strength of the garrison, 263; the
three periods of the siege, 263;
Eliott the life and soul of the
defence, 264; Spilsbury’s diary,
265; Eliott strengthens the de-
fences, 265 ; shortness of provisions,
266 ; Eliott’s abstemiousness, 266 ;
Spanish reinforcements, 267; the
British open fire, 267; Spaniards
open fire six weeks later, 268;
Eliott’s original discipline, 268 ;
the Rock Mortar, 268; artillery
experiments, 268 ; red-hot shot, and
galleries in the rock, 269 ; spirit of
the defence, 269; arrival of Rod-
ney’s fleet, after defeating the
Spanish squadron, 270; Spanish
fire-ships and gun-boats, 270; re-
newed scarcity, 271 ; Morocco joins
with Spain, 272 ; arrival of Darby’s

 

Index

fleet, 272; effects of the bombard-
ment, 272; disorder which is re-
pressed, 274; batteries on the Old
Mole, 275 ; British gunboats, 275 ;
enemy’s advanced works destroyed,
276; arrival of French fleet, 277;
De Crillon’s experiment with wooden
armour, 277; his floating batteries
and immense preparations, 278;
more original discipline, 279;
Eliott’s views on gardening, 279;
British reinforcements and prepara-
tions, 280; battery ina tunnel, 280;
enemy's advanced works again de-
stroyed, 281; an omen, 281; the
grand attack, 281 ; its failure, 284;
Spanish ships take fire, 284; and
are attacked by British gun-boats,
284; end of the siege, 284;
exchange of compliments, 285 ;
Eliott’s address to the garrison,
286; Order of the Bath, 286 ; raised
to the peerage, 286; his death, 286

KILKENNY, siege of, 34
Kinsale, siege of, 57
Kioge, action of, 460
Koel, battle of, 333
Koondgul, siege of, 454

LAKE OF LASWAREE, GERARD, LorD,
326; his birth, 326; Ensign in the
ist (Grenadier) Guards, 326; goes to
Germany, 326; returns to England,
326; Captain and  Lieutenant-
Colonel, 327; goes to Ireland as
A.D.C. to Sir R. Pearson, 327; goes
to America under Cornwallis, 327 ;
distinguishes himself at York Town,
327; taken prisoner, 327; com-
mands a brigade of Guards in the
Low Countries, 327; forms a
company of light infantry, 327;
action of Lincelles, 327; the Irish
Rebellion, 329 ; Vinegar Hill, 329;
Lake’s letter to Castlereagh, 329 ;
compels the French to surrender at
Balinamuck, 330; Commander-in-
Chief in India, 330; Wellesley’s
policy, 331 ; treaty of Bassein, 331;
Mahratta War, 331; Lake’s camp
at Kanauj, 331; ‘‘Galloper guns”
and light infantry, 332; Lake de-
feats the French and Mahrattas at
Koel, 333; storms Aligarh, 3343
battle of Delhi, 335 ; Lake moves
upon Agra, 338; action before
Index

Agra, ils bombardment and fall,
3393 pursuit of Abaji, 340; Lake
with cavalry and horse artillery
comes up with the enemy, 341;
battle of Laswaree, 341; the first
cavalry charge, 343; the infantry
come up, 344; second phase of the
action, 345; combined attack by
the three arms, 345 ; which is com-
pletely successful, 347; results of
the victory, 347; Lake’s personal
energy and daring, 348; he is raised
to the peerage, 349; peace with
Scindiah, 349; war with Holkar,
349; Holkar retreats, 349; Mon-
son’s rash pursuit and disastrous
retreat, 350; Lake sets out in
pursuit of Holkar, 351; relieves
Delhi, 351; and Shamli, 352;
comes up with Holkar, surprises
and defeats him at Furrukhabad,
3533 Fraser defeats the Mahrattas
at Deeg, 354; Lake storms Deeg,
354; siege of Bhurtpore, 355; the
first assault, 355; second assault,
356; third assault, 356; fourth
assault, 357; the siege raised, 357;
lessons of the failure, 357; peace
with the Rajah of Bhurtpore, 358 ;
Holkar’s army dispersed, 358;
Cornwallis succeeds Wellesley and
supersedes Lake, but his death re-
stores Lake to the command in
chief, 358; Lake drives Holkar
into the Punjab, but the Govern-
ment reverses its policy and rein-
states Holkar, 359; Lake returns
home and is made a viscount, 360 ;
his death, 360; his character as a
general, 360

Laswaree, battle of, 341

Lauffeld, battle of, 138

Lille, siege of, 80

Lincelles, action of, 327

Louisberg, battle of, 141; siege of,
142

Lugo, action at, 438

Maui, siege of, 231

Mallavelly, battle of, 376, 451
Malplaquet, battle of, 81

Manowly, action of, 454
Marlborough, John Churchill, Duke
of, 50; birth, 50; enters the army
as Ensign, 52; page to Duke of
York, 52; engaged against the
Moors, 52 ; serves as marine officer

 

503

at Solebay, and in the Netherlands
under Turenne, 53; Colonel in the
French service during Turenne’s
last campaigns, 53; Colonel of
Foot in the British Service, 54;
marries Sarah Jennings, 54 ; created
Baron Churchill of Aymouth and
Colonel of the Royal Dragoons, 54;
Major-General, 55; battle of Sedge-
moor, 553; Colonel of third troop
of Life Guards, 55; deserts James
for William of Orange, 55; Earl of
Marlborough, 56; ordered to Hol-
land, 56; action of Walcourt against
Marshal d’ Humieres, 57 ; commands
in England during the king’s absence
in Ireland, 57 ; Marlborough’s Irish
campaign, 57; takes Cork and
Kinsale, 57; accompanies William
to Flanders, 58; dismissed and
committed to Tower for complicity
in Jacobite intrigues, 58; received
back into favour, appointed Com-
mander-in-Chief, Captain-General
and Master-General of the Ordnance,
60; campaign of 1702, 62; Gin-
kell’s retreat across the Waal, 62;
Marlborough advances across the
Waal, 62; prepares to attack
Boufflers, 62; is prevented by the
Dutch Deputies, 63 ; out-manceuvres
Boufflers and again proposes attack
which the Dutch Generals and
Deputies in turn prevent, 63; oper-
ations on the Meuse,’ 63; Marl-
borough draws Boufflers into his
trap at Liége, the Dutch Deputies
again interfere, 64; created Duke,
64; campaign of 1703, 643; siege
of Bonn, 64; plans a combined
attack on Antwerp which the Depu-
ties upset, 64; campaign of 1704,
64; concerts plan of operations
with Prince Eugene, 65; May 18
sets out for Bonn, 66; pushes on to
Coblentz, 66; and Cassel, 67;
crosses Main and Neckar, 67;
gathers allies before Ulm, shares
command with Louis of Baden, 67 ;
attacks enemy’s entrenchments on

‘the Schellenberg and takes Donau-

worth, 68; follows Elector across
the Danube, 69; Eugene at Hoch-
stadt, 69; critical position, 69;
Tallard moves to north bank of
Danube, 69; Marlborough joins
Eugene at Hochstadt, 69; battle
504

of Blenheim, 70; moves for winter
quarters to the Moselle, 72; cam-
paign of 1705, 72; Imperialists will
not help in Loraine so Marlborough
returns to Flanders, 723 crosses
French lines at Landen, 73; oppo-
sition of Dutch officers, 73; cam-
paign of 1706, 73 ; proposes to join
Eugene and carry on operations in
Italy, 73; begged by Dutch to
remain, 73; moves forward to meet
Villeroi, 74; battle of Ramillies,
74; surrender of Antwerp and
Ghent, 77; takes Menin, Ypres
and Ostend, 77 ; campaign of 1708,
77; French recover Bruges and
Ghent by bribery, 77; battle of
Oudenarde, 78; captures French
lines of Ypres and Lys, 80 ; Eugene
overrules his project of masking
Lille and pushing into France, 80;
besieges Lille and takes it, 80;
recovers Ghent and Bruges, 80;
campaign of 1709, 81; takes
Tournay, 81; invests Mons, 81;
battle of Malplaquet, 81 ; campaign
of 1710, 82 ; besieges and captures
Bethune, Aire, and St. Venant, 82;
campaign of 1711, 82; Eugene’s
army withdrawn, 82; Marlborough’s
device for inducing Villars to raze
the fort at Arleux, 83; passes the
lines of the Scarpe and takes Bou-
chain, 85 ; disgrace and banishment,
85; restored to office of Captain-
General on the accession of George
I., 85 ; Marlborough as a general,
86 ; comparison between him and
Wellington, 88; influence on his
troops, 88; Wellington’s opinion
of him, 90; his patience, 90

Marston Moor, battle of, 8

Menin, siege of, 77

Monjuich, attack on, 102

Moore, Sir John, 404; his birth, 404 ;
education, 405; the grand tour,
405; Ensign in 51st, 405; joins
his regiment in Minorca, 406 ; goes
to America ina Highland regiment,
406; takes part in the expedition
to the Bay of Penobscot, 406;
Captain, 407; returns to England
on leave, 407; placed on half-pay
and enters Parliament, 407 ; Major
in the 60th, 408; returns to the
5ist, 408; four years in Ireland,
408 ; obtains command of the 51st,

 

Index

409; his discipline, 409; goes to
Gibraltar, 410; the expedition to
Corsica, 410; fall of St. Fiorenza and
of Bastia, 411 ; siege of Calvi, 411 ;
Adjutant-General to General Stuart,
412; disagrees with Elliot and is
sent home, 413; sent in command
of a brigade under Abercromby to
the West Indies, 413; arrives at
Barbados, 413; the landing in St.
Lucia, 414; capitulation of St.
Lucia, 415 ; Moore Governor of St.
Lucia, 415 ; his work in St. Lucia,
416; has yellow fever and returns
home, 418; reconnaissance of the
southern coast of England, 418;
goes to Ireland under Abercromby,
418 ; defeats the rebels at Taghmon,
419 ; relieves Wexford, 420; Major-
General, 420; commands a flying
column, 420; ordered to Holland
in command of a brigade, 421;
Colonel of 52nd, 422; commands
at Chelmsford, 422 ; goes to Minorca
and to Egypt, 422; wounded at
Alexandria and returns to England,
422 ; commands brigade at Shorn-
cliffe, 423; introduces system of
light infantry drill, 424; Knight of
the Bath, 424; sent to Sicily, 424 ;
Lieutenant-General, 424; given
command in Sicily, 424; sails for
Gibraltar and returns to England,
425 ; commands the expedition to
Sweden, 425 ; arrested by the King
of Sweden, escapes and returns to
England, 425; goes to Spain as
second in command to Sir Harry
Burrard, 427; lands at Marceira,
427; the Convention of Cintra,
427; Moore in chief command,
427 ; his instructions for the Spanish
campaign, 427; helplessness of the
Spaniards, 428; false information
given to Moore, 429; his plan of
campaign, 429 ; determines to effect
his junction with Baird at Valladolid,
430; Baird lands at Corunna, 430;
Moore leaves Lisbon, reaches Sala-
manca, and learns that the French
are at Valladolid and have dis-
persed the Spanish armies, 431 ; he
decides upon retreat, Baird to Co-
runna, himself to Lisbon, 432; but
upon Frere’s false representations
countermands the retreat, 432; is
joined by Hope’s column, 4333
Index 505

learns the facts about the French

forces, 4333 reaches Toro, 434;

1s joined by Baird at Majorga,

434; decides upon retreat, 435;
disorder among his troops, 436;
defeats French cavalry at Benavente,
437; the Spaniards plunder his
magazines and transport, 437; he
decides to embark at Corunna, 438 ;
action at Lugo, 438; reaches Co-
runna, is attacked by the French
and completely defeats them, 439;
his death and_ burial, 439; his
character, 440; Napoleon's judg-
ment of him, 440; the Duke of
York’s eulogy, 441. For reference
to Moore, see also pp. 463-464

Mouvaux, attack on, 295

Murviedo, siege of, 109

NasEsy, battle of, 17
New Ross, siege of, 32
Nules, siege of, 109

OrTHEzZ, battle of, 477
Ostend, siege of, 77
Oudenarde, battle of, 78

PAMPLONA, battle of, 477

Pembroke Castle, siege of, 24

Bape Baillie’s defeat at, 234,
36.

Peterborough, Charles Mordaunt,
Earl of, 92; succeeds his father
as Lord Mordaunt, 92; his rela-
tions with William of Orange, 93;
commands the advance guard of
William’s invading army, 93; occu-
pies Exeter and gains over Wilts
and Dorset, 93; created Earl of
Monmouth, a Privy Councillor and
First Commissioner of the Treasury,
94; campaign in Holland, 94; a
member of Queen Mary’s council,
943 criticizes command of navy,
94; application for command of
the navy refused, 94; falls into
disgrace, and is deprived of his
honours, 94; censured by the House
for his part in the Fenwick trial
and imprisoned in the Tower, 94;
Earl of Peterborough, 94; death
of William causes change in his
fortunes, 95; reinstated as Lord-
Lieutenant of Northamptonshire,
95; appointed Governor-General
af Jamaica and Commander-in-

 

Chief of English and Dutch expe-
dition against the Spanish West
Indies, 95; the expedition comes
to nothing, the Dutch failing to
provide troops, 95 ; the expedition
to Spain, 97; Marlborough obtains
the command for Peterborough, 97;
he reaches Lisbon and Gibraltar,
98; the situation in Spain, 98;
arrival at Altea Bay, 99; proposes
a march on Madrid, 99; fails to
convince the Archduke, 100; ar-
rival off Barcelona, 100; councils
of war, 100; the siege begun, Ior;
and abandoned, 102; attack on
Monjuich, 102; Barcelona capitu-
lates, 105; Peterborough moves
towards Valentia, 106; reaches
Tortosa, 107; his trick for scaring
away Las Torres, its success and
Peterborough’s pursuit, 108; he
takes Nules, 109; and Murviedo,
109; enters Valencia, 110; the
French invest Barcelona, Peter-
borough proposes that the Arch-
duke should sail round to Portugal,
his advice is rejected and he returns
to Barcelona, 111}; he joins the
British fleet and takes command of
it, but fails to surprise the Count of
Toulouse, 112; the French raise the
siege of Barcelona, 113; sails back to
Valencia, 114; prepares to operate
against Madrid which is meanwhile
occupied by the Anglo-Portuguese
army, 114; the Archduke abandons
the plan of marching from Valencia,
to the disgust of Peterborough who
becomes indifferent to the future
conduct of the campaign, 115 ; his
services asked for by the Duke
of Savoy, 116; joins Charles at
Guadalajara, 117; project of an ex-
pedition to aid the Duke of Savoy,
118; Peterborough sent to negoti-
ate, 118; embarks for Italy, 118;
declines to command the expedition
against the Balearic Isles, 119;
arrives at Genoa and meets Eugene
at Pavia, 119; returns to Valencia,
119; fresh quarrels with the Arch-
duke’s advisers, 119; is ordered
home, 120; leaves Spain, 120; visits
Genoa and Vienna, 120; stays with
Marlborough, 121; lands in Eng-
land, 121; refused audience of the
Queen, 121; Dr. Freind publishes
506

account of his conduct in Spain,
122; inquiry into his conduct of
the war in Spain ends with a vote
of thanks, 122; missions to foreign
courts, 123; falls into disgrace after
Anne’s death, 123; his death, 123 ;
his work as a general, 123

Plassey, battle of, 202, 217

Point Levy, capture of, 152

Pollalore, battle of, 245 _

Pondicherry, siege of, 182, 228; fall
of, 231

Porto Novo, battle of, 239

Porto Rico, Abercromby fails to take,

300
Preston, battle of, 25
Pyrenees, battle of the, 477

QUATRE BRAS, action of, 484
Quebec, siege of, 155; fall of, 169

RAMILLIES, battle of, 74
Rolica, action of, 461

SABUGAL, ‘action of, 473

Salamanca, battle of, 474
Savendrug, storming of, 372
Schellenberg, attack on the, 68
Sedgemoor, battle of, 55
Semiaveram, action of, 189
Seringapatam, siege of, 372, 376, 451
Sholangur Pass, battle of, 246
Stamford, siege of, 6

St. Fiorenza, siege of, 411

St. Lucia, Abercromby takes, 299,

415
St. Sebastian, battle of, 477
St. Venant, siege of, 82
St. Vincent, Abercromby takes, 299

TAGHMON, action of, 419

Talavera, battle of, 467

Tarbes, battlejof, 477

Thiagar, siege of, 231

Toulouse, battle of, 478

Tournay, siege of, 81

Trichinopoly, siege of, 181, 183; re-
lief of, 188

Trinidad, Abercromby takes, 299

Tripassore, fall of, 245; relief of, 246

VIMIERO, battle of, 461
Vinegar Hill, action of, 329
Vittoria, battle of, 476
Volconda, battles of, 183, 191

WALCOURT, action of, 57

 

Index

Wandewash, siege of, 222; relief of,
223; battle of, 224 ; defence of, 236

Warburg, battle of, 254

Waterford, siege of, 33

Waterloo, battle of, 487

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke
of, 443; his early choice of a pro-
fession, 444; his schooling at An-
gers, 444; the advantages of early
promotion, 444; Ensign in 73rd,
445; Lieutenant in 76th, 445; ex-
changes to 4Ist, 445; transferred to
21st Light Dragoons, 445; Captain
in 58th and 18th Light Dragoons,
445; returned to the Irish Parliament,
445; Major in 33rd and Lieutenant
Colonel, 446; his early career con-
trasted with that of Buonaparte,
446; the campaign of 1794 in the
Netherlands, 447; Wellesley at the
Cape and at Calcutta, 448; Lord
Mornington becomes Governor-
General, 448; his policy, 449;
Wellesley sent with the 33rd to
Madras, 450; the Camp at Wal-
lajah Nuggur, 450; war with Tip-
poo, 451; Wellesley commands the
Nizam’s contingent, 451; battle of
Mallavelly, 451; siege of Serin-
gapatam, 451; Wellesley appointed
Commandant in Seringapatam, 453;

campaign against Dhoondiah
Waugh, 453; Wellesley takes
Koondgul and Dummul, 454;

actions of Manowly and Conahgul,
454; the projected expedition to
Batavia, 454; Wellesley moves the
troops to Bombay, but is taken ill
and returns to Mysore, 454; Major-
General, 454; treaty of Bassein,
456; Wellesley at Poonah, 456;
the Mahratta war, 456; assault of
Ahmednuggar, 456; battles of As-
saye, 456, and Argaum, 457; storm
of Gawilghur, 457; Wellesley a
Knight of the Bath, 457; returns
home, 458; the expedition to Han-
over, 459; member for Rye, 459;
marries Lady Catherine Pakenham,
459; Irish Chief Secretary, 459;
the expedition to Denmark, 460;
action at Kioge, 460; Wellesley
again Chief Secretary, 460; Lieu-
tenant-General, 460 ; commands the
expedition to Portugal, 460; action
of Rolica, 461; battle of Vimiero,
461; the Convention of Cintra, 463;
Index

Wellesley recalled to England, 463;
ence more Chief Secretary, 463;
Moore’s campaign, 463 ; Wellesley
Sent to the Peninsula to carry out
his own plans, 464; campaign of
1809, 464; he forces the Passage of
the Douro, 466; battle of Talavera,
467; difficulties of supply, 468;
Wellington’s method contrasted
with that of the French, 469; Baron
Douro and Viscount Wellington,
470; lines of Torres Vedras pre-
pared, 470; campaign of 1810, 471;
action of Busaco, 472; Massena
checked at Torres Vedras, 472;
campaign of 1811, 472; pursuit
of Massena, 473; actions of Sabu-
gal and Fuentes d@Honoro, 473;
Almeida recovered, 473; Beresford
wins the battle of Albuera, 4733
campaign of 1812, 474; capture of
Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, 474;
battle of Salamanca, 474; Wel-
lington enters Madrid, 475; fails
to take Burgos, 475; the Ministry
at home compelled to support him,
476; campaign of 1813, 476; battle
of Vittoria, 476 ; battles of the Pyre-
nees, of St. Sebastian and of Pam-
plona, 477; passage of the Bidassoa,
of the Nivelle and of the Nive, 477;
campaign of 1814, 477; battles of
Orthez and of Tarbes, 477, and of
Toulouse, 478; abdication of Napo-
leon, 478; Wellington in Madrid,
478 ; Marquis of Douro and Duke
of Wellington, 478; returns home,
478; Ambassador to Paris, 478; the
slave trade, 479; plenipotentiary at
the Congress of Vienna, 479; Na-
poleon’s return from Elba, 479;
Wellington commands the army in
Belgium, 480; his heterogeneous
forces, 480; quality of Napoleon’s
army in 1815, 482; his attack at
Charleroi, 482; Wellington’s orders
of June 15 and 16, 483; his visit to
Ligny, 484; action of Quatre Bras,
484; the retreat to Waterloo, 485;
Wellington’s relations with Bliicher,
486; battle of Waterloo, 487; ad-
vance upon Paris, 490; Wellington
commands the army of occupation,
490; Congress of Cambray, 490;
Master-General of Ordnance, 490;
his influence, popularity and un-
popularity, 490; Congress of

 

Suz

Verona, 491; mission to St. Peters-
burg, 491; Commander-in-Chief,
492; resignation, Premier, Catholic
Emancipation, duel with Lord Win-
chilsea, resignation, the London
police, 492; his support of Peel for
whom he carried on the Govern-
ment, 492; selected for the com-
mand of the German armies, 493;
Commander-in-Chief for life, 4933
death, 494; his character asa states-
man, 494

Wexford, siege of, 32; relief of, 420

Winceby, skirmish near, 6

Wolfe, James, 127; his birth, 1275
education, 127; joins his father asa
volunteer, 128; letter tohis mother,
128; is taken ill and sent home,
129; receives commission in his
father’s regiment of marines, 129;
Ensign in the 12th, 129; his ap-
pearance, 129; leaves for active
service on the Continent and lands
at Ostend, 129; marches into Ger-
many, 130; hardships on the road,
130; his account of the battle of
Dettingen, 131; Adjutant, 131;
and Lieutenant, 132; goes into
winter quarters at Ostend, 132;
letter to his brother, 132; pro-
moted to company in Barrel’s regi-
ment, 133; death of his brother,
1333. Wolfe joins the army at
Lessines, 133; returns to England
on outbreak of the Jacobite Re-
bellion and is appointed Brigade-
Major, 133; his part in the battle of
Falkirk, 135; battle of Culloden,
136 ; refuses to take part in the cruel-
ties after Culloden, 138; present at
the battle of Lauffeld, 138 ; returns
home, 138; falls in love with Miss
Lawson, 139; appointed Major in
the 2oth at Stirling, and obtains
command of the regiment, 139;
studies mathematics, 139; visits
Dublin, 139; and Paris, 140; ap-
pointed Quarter-Master-General in
Ireland, 140; joins expedition
against Rochfort, 140; the expedi-
tion against Louisburg, 140; Wolfe
a Brigadier-General, 141; leaves
Portsmouth for Canada, 141; and
reaches Halifax, 141; the expedi-
tion lands near Louisburg, 141 ;
Wolfe’s part inthe action, 141 ; and
in the siege, 142; fall of Louisburg,
508

144; Wolfe sent to the St. Law-
rence, 144; close of the campaign,
145; leaves Louisburg and lands at
Portsmouth, 145; Colonel of the
67th, 145; selected to command the
expedition against Quebec, 145;
becomes engaged to Miss Lowther,
146; the King’s opinion of his
madness, 146; the plan of the cam-
paign, 148; the expedition arrives
at Louisburg, 149; and sails up the
St. Lawrence, 150; the landing
near Quebec on the Isle of Orleans,
150; the situation at Quebec, 150;
Wolfe’s address to the Canadians,
151; he captures Point Levy, 152;
and repulses the French night attack
at that point, 154; opens fire on
Quebec, 155; lands a party on the
north bank below the Montmorenci,
155; reconnoitres up the St. Law-
rence, 156; entertains French pri-
soners, 156; the attack on the
Beauport lines, 157; and its repulse,
159; Wolfe’s manifesto to his

 

Index

troops, 160; operations up the
river, 160; the bombardment, 161;
sickness in the British camp, 161 ;
Wolfe down with fever, 161; his
plan for landing above the town,
162; withdraws from Montmorenci,
163; embarks his force, 163; again
taken ill, 163; his last orders, 164;
he asks Jervis to take care of Miss
Lowther’s portrait, 165; embarks
in the boats, 165; Gray’s Elegy,
166; passes his ship off as a French
convoy and arrives at the Anse du
Foulon, 166; the landing, 167; and
deployment on the Plains of Abra-
ham, 168 ; Montcalm surprised, 168;
Wolfe’s dispositions, 169 ; the battle,
169; Wolfe wounded, 170; the
victory, 170; flight of the French,
171; Wolfe’s second and third
wounds, 171; his death, 171

Worcester, battle of, 45

York Town, siege of, 327
Ypres, siege of, 77.

THE END

 

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