CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARYCornell University Library
31924027842081THE GREEK QUESTION
By AUGUSTE GAUVAIN
V %
Formerly Minister Plenipotentiary of France, and now Political
Director of the Journal des Debate
TRANSLATED BY
CARROLL N. BROWN, Ph.D.
The College of the City of New York
PUBLISHED FOR THE
AMERICAN-HELLENIC SOCIETY
105 WEST 40th STREET (Tildin Bcildino), NEW YORK, N. Y.
BY
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AMERICAN BRANCH
35 WEST 32nd STREET, NEW YORK
1918PREFACE
It is not altogether easy, when the whole world is
making such sacrifice and enduring such suffering in
the cause of liberty, to dwell upon some of the happier
accomplishments of the war for a new world. It is
beyond question, however, that the pressure of military
necessity has brought the people of the Allied nations
into much closer and more intimate relationship than
ever before and has forged new bonds of mutual confi-
dence and understanding between them. Such a bond
is the American Hellenic Society, recently founded,
which aims to do for the people of the United States
and those of Greece what similar societies, earlier estab-
lished, have done for the people of Great Britain, of
France and of Japan.
Greece is a name to conjure with. No man or woman
who knows the history of Western civilization can fail
to respond with a thrill of interest and appreciation when
the name of Greece is heard. The place of Ancient
Greece is secure. Her achievements in art, in letters and
in science will never be seriously challenged. Modern
Greece, however, is not alone the descendant of the
Greece of ancient days, but also in no small part the
product of forces and conditions which have influenced
it, and before which it has sometimes been almost help-
less. It appears that a happier day for Greece is
about to dawn. Under the inspiring leadership of M.
Venizelos, whose statesmanlike qualities are one of the
ornaments of our generation, Greece has taken its
natural place with the friends and defenders of liberty
and in opposition to the forces of autocratic power and
the rule of military might. The stimulus of this con-
flict and the satisfaction of these associations bid fair to
iiiIV
PREFACE
unite the whole Greek people through a new spirit of
patriotic fervor and devotion. Modern Greece will then
come to occupy the place in the world of to-day which
is due to a people of its traditions and its characteristics.
The American Hellenic Society will constantly aim to
make known the position, the interests and the ambitions
of Greece, and to promote sympathy with them. It will
aim to make the people of Greece and those of the
United States more intimately acquainted one with the
other by promoting in America the study of the ancient
and modern language and literature of Greece and by
promoting in Greece the study of the English language
and of American history, literature and institutions.
Surely this aim is a noble one and one that will call
forth and receive widespread sympathy and support.
To this cause the series of publications, of which the
present volume is the first, is dedicated.
Nicholas Murray Butler.
Columbia University,
December 1, 1917.INTRODUCTION
The series of articles on the Greek question by M.
Auguste Gauvain well deserves to be made accessible
to all thoughtful Americans who are interested in the
problems connected with the great European war. Its
author, because of his extensive political and journalistic
experience, is splendidly qualified to treat of this ex-
tremely complex question. With a clearness and frank-
ness which does M. Gauvain the greatest credit he casts
light upon the responsibility which rests on the different
nations, and upon the errors committed by them.
The essay reveals facts as yet unknown to the general
public, facts that are incontestably true in that they are
authenticated by documents the publication of which has
been rendered possible only by the recent solution of the
Greek crisis. It permits the reader, as he follows the
startling events that succeeded one another in this crisis
from which Greece has happily emerged, to understand
the attitude taken by the Greek people. Because of
their inactivity and their nonresistant attitude the
Greeks were credited, in the judgment of many for-
eigners, with approving the pro-German policy of their
king and with condoning all those abuses of power by
which Constantine sought to impose his will upon the
people.
M. Gauvain at the very beginning shows the funda-
mental error which characterized the policy of the
Entente toward the Balkan powers. The sentiments
of the Greek people and of the Greek government
were at the beginning of the war decidedly friendly
toward the Allied powers, while the attitude of Bulgaria
on the other hand was, to say the least, doubtful. In
the vain hope of drawing Bulgaria to their side theVI
INTRODUCTION
Allies conceived the idea of the cession of Greek and
Serbian territories to Bulgaria. Such a ceding of
national domain is repugnant to any people, but it
was even tragical in this case, for it was a question
of surrendering territories which were inhabited by more
than a million Greeks and Serbs, who had just gained
their freedom as a result of the victorious wars of
1912-13.
The attitude of Bulgaria did not disabuse the Allies
of their false point of view. Even the loan negotiated
by her in Germany did not serve to dissipate their
illusions. They obstinately insisted on demanding sac-
rifices on the part of Greece.
The masses in a country never make any effort to
understand the psychological basis of actions; they prefer
to pin their attention to the brute facts. Greek public
opinion was therefore deeply stirred upon learning that
the friends and protectors of Greece wished to lessen her
territories and her influence, and at once the feeling was
aroused in the national consciousness that Greece was
being cruelly wronged. This bitter feeling was all the
more increased and intensified by the fact that these
sacrifices were demanded for the benefit and advantage
of a people who were obsessed, as the Greeks had come
to know by centuries of fighting with them for their
own freedom, by the wild desire to dominate the near
East.
It is easy to understand how Constantine and the
agents of the German propaganda could profit by this
error so as to present Germany as the defender of the
territorial integrity of Greece. An attempt was thus
made to create an anti-Ally sentiment in the minds of
the Greeks.
M. Gauvain next examines the attitude of these same
powers toward Constantine after he had dismissed Mr.
Venizelos in October, 1915, and had begun, through the
agency of ministers subservient to the royal will, hisINTRODUCTION
Yll
provocations of the Allies and his machinations against
their military forces at Saloniki, as well as those acts of
espionage practiced against these same troops by his
personal agents.
The Entente powers continued to preserve the same
friendly attitude toward Constantine as in the past.
Conference succeeded conference; the representatives of
the Allies came forth from these interviews completely
charmed, and their impressions were purposely spread
abroad so as to hoodwink the people and hinder them
from seeing whither they were being led.
Constantine was, moreover, at that time extremely
popular in Greece. As a result of the victories of
1912-13, which had been cleverly exploited so as to give
him the whole credit for the success of the Greek
arms, the people had come to regard the king as that
Constantine XII of Greek legend who was destined to
liberate Constantinople, the city of the Byzantine
emperors, thus restoring to Christendom the national
Greek sanctuary, Saint Sophia, and to unite under his
scepter all the Greeks, whether subject to Bulgar or
Turk. It was, then, not to be wondered at that the
people should have implicit confidence in their king.
This confidence of theirs was naturally strengthened
by the attitude of the Allies toward him, for their
friendliness was set before the people as a convincing
proof of the sincerity of the king’s declarations.
Some of his acts, however, which were not fully in
accord with his words, finally began to provoke a certain
restlessness in the minds of the people and to arouse in
them a feeling of distrust. Constantine became aware
of this, and foresaw the possibility of resistance. He
instigated a reign of terror in order to prevent criticism
of his acts. By virtue of a law passed by the Venizelist
government, which prescribed the surrender of all arms
in the possession of private citizens, the government, as
the servile tool of the king, disarmed all citizens of whosevm
INTRODUCTION
abject submission it was not sure. The last step in this
policy of intimidation was the organizing of the League
of Reservists, who were immediately equipped with
regular army rifles.
The result was that nobody dared to utter a word of
criticism. Enlightenment finally came, however, through
the fight begun by the liberal party, for, as soon as the
liberals felt themselves protected by the Allied fleet which
anchored off Salamis in June, 1916, they hastened to
make their will known. The people of Athens in a huge
mass-meeting with one accord declared that Greece pro-
posed to fulfill her duty as an ally toward Serbia and
demanded that the king respect the oath that he had
taken to support the Constitution.
The people of Athens presented their resolutions in
a respectful form, for they hoped that Constantine would
be induced to think and act as a Greek and would follow
the decision of the people. But the Entente powers, far
from supporting the stand taken by the people, continued
through their official and obliging representatives in
Athens to overwhelm Constantine with civilities and
to treat him as a sincere friend who was anxious for
one thing alone—the strict preservation of Greece’s
neutrality.
We are now in a position to understand fully how
this whole attitude of the Allies was exploited, and thus
to appreciate what anxiety and perplexity it must have
produced in the minds of the Greek people, who were
utterly misled by these strange contradictions.
The time finally came when Mr. Venizelos, despairing
of his ability to bring Constantine to a full realization
of his duties toward Greece and the Constitution, deter-
mined to have recourse to a revolutionary movement in
order to save his country. The effect on the people of
Mr. Venizelos’ departure for Saloniki was enormous.
If the Allied powers had at that time recognized the
government of Saloniki as the only legal governmentINTRODUCTION
xx
in Greece, Constantine would long since have yielded
or abdicated.
Indecision, however, still characterized the policy of
the Allies. Recognition of the government of Saloniki,
even as a separate government, was long delayed, while
friendliness continued to govern the relations between
Constantine and the Allies. They carried this solicitude
to such a point as to guarantee the king against any
liberal propaganda in the territories which had not been
able to free themselves from his jurisdiction, and Mr.
Venizelos was even obliged to make reassuring declara-
tions as to the non-antidynastic nature of the liberal
movement.
Even after the criminal outrages of the king against
the Allied troops disembarked at Athens, the attitude of
the Allies continued to show the same contradictions.
Furthermore, although some of the Allied governments
were to all appearances fighting the Venizelist move-
ment, yet it was the people alone that were made to
suffer by the coercive measures employed against Greece.
It was in a chaos of this sort that the Greek people
lived for a long time, and it was in the midst of all these
contradictions that the liberal movement arose. It ought
logically to have failed, but it did succeed. Do you ask
why? Because it was in fundamental agreement with
the deepest convictions of the Greek people, whose true
sentiments and whose real aspirations it reflected. The
most striking proof of this lies in the attitude of the
Greek people toward the liberal movement.
Mr. Venizelos, applying to the letter his political
motto, “ The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth,” impressed upon the people that, in spite of
their bereavements in the Balkan wars, in spite of their
financial bankruptcy and the war-weariness of the nation,
the march of circumstances imposed on Greece far
greater efforts and more costly sacrifices. Mr. Veni-
zelos knew as well as anyone that when men are calledX
INTRODUCTION
upon to make personal sacrifices their ardor is likely
to cool, for selfishness is a dominant element in human
nature. He dared to make this appeal to the Greeks
because he understood their way of thinking, their funda-
mental good sense and their love of country. He did it
although he knew that Constantine, in opposing his
policy, was appealing to the lower and more selfish
instincts of men, declaring that there was no need of
the Greeks subjecting themselves to sacrifices of their
blood and treasure, but that it was rather their duty to
enrich themselves and enjoy their acquired wealth.
The Greek people may well be proud of the proofs
they have given the world of self-denial and sacrifice for
the sake of an ideal. Rejecting the doctrine of a king
whom they loved, they chose the via dolorosa. More
than 30,000 volunteers replied to Mr. Venizelos’ call to
arms and hastened to Saloniki to offer their most
precious possession, their lives, for no other object than
to save the nation’s honor, compromised by the arbitrary
acts of Constantine and a handful of bullies that had
terrorized the people. When one beholds a spectacle like
this, when one sees so many men rushing into a frightful
struggle for the sake of an ideal, the only possible
explanation is that the surroundings in which these men
lived, the very atmosphere which they breathed, was
surcharged with these same ideas. Only thus are senti-
ments like these aroused and exalted to such a pitch that
the individual is led to make the supreme sacrifice. The
French Revolution is the most striking example of this
truth. This is the proof positive of the actual feelings
which dominated the Greek soul in spite of the king’s
teachings, in spite of the privations and humiliations
which were imposed upon Greece as a result of a long-
continued failure to understand her aims.
These sentiments were and are to-day an ardent love
for the ideals of justice and liberty, a craving for national
honesty and political uprightness, an attachment to theINTRODUCTION
XI
democratic principles which form the groundwork of
Greece’s Constitution, and along with these a feeling of
intense gratitude and affection for the nations that have
contributed to the Greek renaissance in the nineteenth
century.
After a blockade which lasted for ten months and
which resulted in untold suffering on the part of the
people, the soldiers of France and England on dis-
embarking at Pireus in June, 1917, were received as
brothers. Constantine did not fail to grasp the situation.
He abdicated, without attempting the slightest resistance.
He knew that he would find few Greeks disposed to
attack the Allied troops, and he understood that the
people as a whole did not share those sentiments which
he had never dared to reveal and which have only
recently come to the knowledge of the Greek people
through the publication of documents of state.
Upon the departure of King Constantine and his
courtiers, all apostles of the Pan-German idea, the Greek
people once again breathed an atmosphere purely Greek.
They began work at once in preparation for the fulfill-
ment of their whole duty.
The day is at hand when all Hellas will take the part
that by right belongs to it in that struggle for grand
ideals pursued by the noble nations of the world. It
cannot be otherwise. It is incredible, nay impossible,
that the people who gave the world ideals of supernal
beauty and of sublime thought that have never been
surpassed should fail to share the great fight against
base materialism and brutal might.
American Hellenic Society.THE GREEK QUESTION
PART I
The deplorable turn which Greek affairs took toward
the close of last year is the consequence of the weak
policy which has been pursued by the Triple Entente
in the Balkans ever since the beginning of the European
war. The errors committed during this period by the
Cabinets of Paris, London and Petrograd have been
numerous and grave. They may, in the last analysis,
be traced back to two fundamentally wrong conceptions.
In the first place, the governments of the three Allied
countries misunderstood the nature of the great struggle
that had just broken out and failed to make use of
the appropriate means to end it according to their real
interests. Secondly, they, at the start, interpreted the
intentions of Turkey in a sense diametrically opposed to
the facts of the case and at a later period committed the
same blunder with regard to Bulgaria.
The ministers who directed foreign affairs in France,
England and Russia during the second half of 1914 were
all men of extended experience. In the course of their
careers, they had had many matters of the greatest im-
portance to arrange. They were personally acquainted,
were in confidential relations with one another and could
easily unite in a course of action. They were repre-
sented, each in the others’ countries by ambassadors who
loyally supported their policies. All conditions seemed
united to permit them to conduct the diplomacy of the
Entente with a firm and steady hand. They gave at the
very beginning an evidence of clear-sightedness by sign-
ing the agreement of September 5, 1914, which bound
l2
THE GREEK QUESTION
the three states together under reciprocal obligations for
the duration of the war, and for the conclusion of peace.
Unhappily in all that concerns the Balkans, they thought
and acted as a Metternich would have acted. Attached
as they were to a policy to be pursued simply for the
good of the state, preoccupied rather with the end of
the war than with the logical means of bringing it to an
end, taking into account the maps of countries rather
than the wishes of their peoples, they set themselves to
pursue solutions which were based on the arbitrary
re-distributing of territories. They imagined that by
cutting the Macedonian provinces into shreds and by
thoroughly recasting from top to bottom the Treaty of
Bucharest of the 10th of August, 1913, they could
succeed in satisfying all the Balkan States and in unit-
ing them for a common purpose against our common
enemies. In trying to nullify the Treaty of Bucharest,
M. Delcasse, Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof acted
against the most elementary political morality. More-
over, they undertook a role that did not belong to them.
The Treaty of Bucharest was the just penalty for the
sudden attack of Bulgaria on Serbia and Greece at
the end of June, 1913. It certainly contained no clause
that was harsher for Bulgaria than were the penalties
contemplated by the three ministers against Austro-
Germany for her sudden attack of August, 1914. It
gave to Bulgaria more than it took from her.
Except for the portion of Dobrudja ceded to
Rumania, it deprived her only of hopes. These
hopes were, it is true, great hopes, but they actually
aimed at the establishment of the Bulgarian hege-
mony in the peninsula.
Certainly it was not for the interest of France,
England or Russia to encourage or rouse these hopes.
It was to the common interest of these three powers
to interpose, in the Balkans, Serbia and Greece on the
one side and Rumania on the other between GermanyTHE GREEK QUESTION
3
and the Aegean Sea so that Germany might not control
the routes to the Orient. The creation of a Greater
Bulgaria, the declared rival of Rumania, Greece and
Serbia, imperiled our influence from the Danube to the
Persian Gulf. The historical and linguistic arguments
invoked by the Bulgarians in support of their contention
were not enough to make us approve designs contrary
to our interest.
Besides, these arguments were specious arguments.
They closely resembled the arguments advanced by
Germany to justify its claims to the right to expand.
The regions arrogated by the Bulgarian agents as having
belonged to the Bulgarian Empire had belonged also to
the Serbian and the Byzantine Empire. The historical
rights, a never-failing source of conflict, balanced each
other. The use of a language in a country gives to a
neighboring country which speaks the same language no
rights over it. Furthermore, the dialect used by the
inhabitants of the greater part of the disputed Mace-
donian territory was closer to the Serbian language than
to the Bulgarian. The Greek language confessedly pre-
ponderated in many villages claimed by the Bulgarians.
There remained to be considered the desires of the in-
habitants. In the eyes of liberal and constitutional states
like France and England, this ought to have been taken
into serious consideration. There is no evidence that the
Cabinets of Paris and London troubled themselves about
it at all during the first year of the war. In offering
to Bulgaria certain territories, they forgot that their
inhabitants had been living and acting as faithful sub-
jects of Greece and Serbia since August, 1913. In
common with the Cabinet of Petrograd, they left the
moral aspect of the question entirely out of account. In
the summer of 1913, with the complicity of Austro-
Germany, Bulgaria treacherously attacked her two allies
with the avowed purpose of despoiling them and, after
subduing them, turning upon Rumania. Her calcula-4	THE GREEK QUESTION
tions and her course of procedure were analogous to
those of Germany and Austria-Hungary against Bel-
gium, France, Russia, Serbia and England and were
just as inexcusable. Politically and morally the sudden
attacks of 1913 and of 1914 are closely allied. How,
then, could the states that were the victims of the second
have dealings with the authors of the first? How did
they dare to exercise in Bulgaria’s favor a pressure on
the lawful victors of 1913? In virtue of what principle
did they wish to suppress the just terms of the Treaty
of Bucharest. Their conduct is to be explained only
by the fact that at this moment they were guided by no
fixed principle. They had in view only expedients. We
must acknowledge that from the declaration of war by
Germany to the intervention of the United States, the
diplomacy of the Triple and then Quadruple Entente
was one of expediency only. It drew its inspiration from
unmoral diplomatic combinations. It busied itself with
the allotment of Europe on the basis of plans decided
on in the secrecy of the Cabinets. Apportionments were
made in accord with desires rather than in accord with
right. As a theoretical principle, there was much talk
of the rights of nationalities, but these are susceptible of
quite different interpretations, and it was perhaps just
on this account that they were put so much in the fore-
ground. There was less talk of the right of civilized
peoples to dispose of themselves, for the application of
this principle would have cramped these architects of
the new Europe. They carried on their negotiations in
the dark because they feared that broad daylight would
disclose ugly facts. They thought themselves clever, but
this very cleverness came near compromising the triumph
of the cause of the civilized world. In short, at the most
critical moment of modern history they gave themselves
up in the diplomatic arena to such intrigues as are
customary in parliamentary lobbies. Instead of taking
their place fairly and squarely at the side of our friendsTHE GREEK QUESTION	5
and against our enemies, the attempt was made to seduce
an accomplice of our enemies by making a place for him
at the cost of our friends. It is in some such way as
this that a Prime Minister, when compelled to reform
his Cabinet, sometimes tries to find a place for an
adversary in the hope of rendering him harmless, instead
of strengthening his ministerial majority by the addition
of a reliable friend. He sometimes succeeds in prolong-
ing in this way a poor existence as minister, but at other
times he simply hastens his fall. In any case, he cuts no
great figure in the world.
There would have been no great glory in obtaining a
provisional success by winning over for the time being a
Bulgaria which would without doubt a little later have
seized the opportunity to put all in question by a course
of blackmail. But to every attentive observer of the
affairs of the Orient who lived in the sphere of realities
and not in that of imagination, Bulgaria was riveted to
the Central Powers by iron bonds. I shall have occasion
to say later and at greater length in what these bonds
consisted. I shall show also how no reasonable states-
man of the Triple Entente ought to have given credence
to the Turkish government’s protestations of friendship.
But contenting myself at present with the examination
of the relations of the Entente with Greece, I shall try
to prove that it was impossible in 1915 to satisfy Bul-
garia without delivering continental Greece a mortal
blow. From the entrance into line of Turkey in the
autumn of 1914 up to the Bulgarian mobilization in
September, 1915,—that is to say, during all the period
of negotiation between the Entente and the Cabinet in
Sofia,—not once did the latter formulate any precise
conditions, the acceptance of which would have been
followed by the signing of a lasting treaty. It veiled
its replies in vague phrases and awaited proposals. Not
only did this general attitude show clearly that it had
no intention of treating and that it sought only to gain6
THE GREEK QUESTION
time, but numerous indications in detail revealed clearly
the purposes which it was very anxious to conceal.
At the very beginning it affected to consider as of no
importance any enlargement of the country’s territories
at the expense of Turkey. Now the plan of the Entente
was actually based on the possibility of compensating
Bulgaria at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, which
had just attacked Russia. The idea was a good one. If
Bulgaria, in order to ally herself with us, had been
contented with the annexation of Ottoman territory and
rectification of her frontiers in Macedonia, no exception
could have been taken to the affair. It was our business
to try to sound her by negotiations in order to know
where she stood. The mistake lay in following the
negotiations up after we had discovered that the Bul-
garian government demanded the hegemony in the
Balkans. As a matter of fact, Bulgaria, without de-
fining limits, let it be clearly understood that she must
have the whole of Macedonia, and that she wanted to
enter into possession of the Serbian and Greek terri-
tories, claimed by her immediately after the signing of
the treaty, before Serbia and Greece should have received
any compensation. It is what M. Ghenadief, former
Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a time when the Cabinets
of the Entente flattered themselves with having won him
over to their cause, expressed as follows: “We must be
paid. We want Macedonia to become once more Bul-
garian, for it is inhabited by our sons. France had to
recover Alsace-Lorraine, just as Italy had to recover
Trieste. We have, you may as well understand, four
Alsaces to recover—Turkish Thrace, Serbian Macedonia,
Greek Macedonia and the Dobrudja. We wish to
occupy at once the part of Macedonia held by Greece
and Serbia.” This declaration emanated from a man
whom the governing parties in Sofia accused of luke-
warmness in the national cause. It dates, it is true, from
June, 1915, but it reproduces faithfully the aspirations ofTHE GREEK QUESTION
7
the Bulgarian people, and the purposes of its government
since the autumn of 1914 and even since the year 1913.
The language of the press and of statesmen in Sofia
leaves no doubt as to this point.
Hardly had the Treaty of Bucharest been signed,
when at the instigation of Baron von Wangenheim,
Ambassador of Germany at Constantinople, the Cabinet
of Sofia entered into an arrangement with the Turks,
and this too in spite of the fact that the latter had a
few months before taken advantage of the embarrass-
ment of Bulgaria to reoccupy and hold Adrianople.
From this moment, the Bulgarians were dominated by
the passion for Macedonia. They reconciled themselves
with the Turks, sharing their hatred of Greece. In the
hope of conquering Saloniki and Cavalla, they promised
the Sultan all Thrace and the islands of the Cyclades.
On their part, the Turks were roused by the desire to
regain Mitylene and Chios. The Austro-Germans knew
how to inflame these desires and the arrangement was
actually consummated in October, 1913. It was agreed
that comitadjis would on every occasion foment trouble
in Macedonia and Albania and that they would always
hold in readiness some cause for an intervention either
by Turkey or by the Central Powers. In fact, comi-
tadjis, armed with Bulgarian weapons, did not cease to
terrorize now Albania and now Macedonia. It needed
all the patience of the Serbian government to prevent
the outbreak of a third Balkan war. The drama of
Serajevo at the end of June, 1914, furnished Austro-
Germany an unexpected pretext for the European con-
flict. The struggle in the east was for the time relegated
to the background, but all its elements continued to
subsist.
In more general ways, too, the Bulgarians have never
made any secret of their intentions. They signed the
Treaty of Bucharest under protest, because they were
constrained and compelled to do so. Even in the treaty8
THE GREEK QUESTION
itself, a paragraph records their mental reservations.
Serbia had left them free to choose either the district
of Kotchana or that of Strumitsa, and they preferred
the latter, though less populous and more remote, because
it projected out toward the railroad line of the Vardar.
This became the base of operations for the comitadjis,
who sallied forth again and again from this bastion to
cut the railroad line in the valley of the Vardar, a line
which formed a vital artery of communication for Serbia.
According to the statesmen of Bulgaria then, who passed
as friends of the Entente, Greek Macedonia was thus
one of the four Alsaces of Bulgaria, a country whose
official independence went back to 1908, and whose real
independence began with 1878. It comprised all the
territories situated between the Kara Sou on the east
and the mountains of Albania on the west. In speaking
of the cession of Cavalla, they were not serious. If it
had been a question of this district alone, Greece would
finally have yielded, for even Venizelos himself at one
time (January-February, 1915) had been disposed to
yield on this point. But Cavalla formed a little piece of
Greek Macedonia. If the Bulgarians were particularly
desirous to get it, this was due to its exceptional richness
and in particular to .its strategical importance in any
move against Saloniki. The Greek government had
acted very wisely at Bucharest in 1913 in insisting on
keeping this in spite of the Russian protests, for it knew
that Bulgaria, intent on getting its revenge, would
make use of this as a base for the conquest of Saloniki.
Furthermore, Cavalla is a city almost exclusively in-
habited by Greeks. The Cabinet of Sofia in their brief
occupation of the city in 1912-13, could not, according
to the avowal of King Ferdinand’s agents, find in the
place a Bulgarian capable of discharging the duties of
mayor. The Cabinets of London and Paris obstinately
persisted, none the less, in their unpractical plans. They
refused to listen to the Greek and Serbian statesmen inTHE GREEK QUESTION
9
spite of the fact that they knew their Bulgarian neigh-
bors far better than M. Delcasse and Sir Edward Grey.
As for Russia, she was a perfect M. Perrichon in her
policy toward Bulgaria. Having contributed to create
Bulgaria, she constituted herself her protector against
all and sundry, although her protege had passed over
to Austria ever since the time of Stamboulof. She was
possessed by the idea of bringing back the prodigal to
the Slav fold, while he, freed from his leading-strings,
lavished fair words on his old guardian, but in secret
sought means to break away more completely from her
guardianship.
Not to go into the details of the negotiations that
were carried on in secret, and that are still imperfectly
known, the account that I have given serves to show the
underlying cause of that uneasiness of mind on the part
of the Greeks which permitted our enemies to mock at
our intentions and to turn against us a part of the popu-
lation of the country. The desire to be truthful obliges
us to confess our errors, and these errors that we have
made will help us to understand, though we cannot
excuse, those errors of a far more serious nature of
which King Constantine has been guilty toward us.
The Greek question would not have arisen if the
assassination of King George I at Saloniki in March,
1913, had not prematurely brought the Crown Prince
Constantine to the throne. This prince, the husband
of Princess Sophie, the sister of William II, had ideas
as to the royal power that were diametrically opposed to
those of his father. The former had respected the
constitutional regime and had adapted himself to par-
liamentary customs, leaving the direction of affairs now
to the leaders of one party and now to those of the other.
But his son despised the democratic form of government.
Educated at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, he admired
William II’s way of keeping things under his personal10
THE GREEK QUESTION
control, and regarded as a family fief the kingdom over
which George I had been called to reign under fixed
conditions by the protecting powers and the will of the
people, and he acted as the Lord’s Anointed, although
it must be said that his mind had no religious bent. He
and his brother had adopted the principles of the old
dynasties. During the life of George I they had en-
joyed little prestige. They had even been excluded from
the army after the revolution of 1909. It was Venizelos
who brought the sons of George I again to power. At
the time that he assumed control in 1910 he was con-
vinced that Greece was not ripe for a democratic form
of government, that she needed a dynasty, and that the
thing to do was to strengthen the one that existed. He
recalled the princes, restored to them their rank and set
himself to increase as much as he could the prestige of
the Crown Prince so as to facilitate later his royal task.
He brought into prominence his military successes during
the first Balkan war and followed the same course after
the change of reign. Quite unlike ministers who try to
eclipse their sovereign, Venizelos neglected no oppor-
tunity to enhance the glory of Constantine. This was
not the flattery of a courtier, for at this time he was
the uncontested master of Greece. It was done in the
interest of a dynasty the strength of which seemed to
him necessary to the maintenance of order in the country.
During the early part of the new reign the differences
in temperament and tendency between minister and
sovereign called forth no serious clash. Venizelos pos-
sessed within and without the country an authority which
impressed itself even on his enemies. In less than four
years he had transformed Greece from a disorganized
and discredited country into a well-ordered state, glorious
and prosperous, and with an area twice as large as
before. Wherever he had gone in other countries he
had been regarded as a statesman. His judgment was
admired and his character respected. He inspired feel-THE GREEK QUESTION
II
ings of confidence. Within Greece, the old leaders,
jealous though they were, had to bow before the restorer
of their country. The liberal party, created by Mr.
Venizelos after the revolution, rallied to itself the ma-
jority of the people. It became a real force in the
state and was a decided novelty. Before that time the
kingdom had been divided into fiefs dependent upon
families that had taken a prominent part in the war for
Greek independence in 1821. Although the state was
essentially democratic, a sort of feudalism had established
itself. An oligarchy governed the country, but an
oligarchy without a program or fixed principles. Each
clan had its chief and each chief wished to get into
power in order to satisfy his followers and his own
ambition. There had become established among the
different chiefs of clan a way of “ taking turns ” at
being leader. Spoils were divided in alternation with
one another. Laws were passed to suit the circum-
stances of the hour, and the administration was entrusted
to a personnel chosen because it resembled in its point
of view the chief then in power. Charilaos Trikoupis
was perhaps the only exception in this staff of pre-
bendaries. Venizelos upset this rotten system and built
up a real party founded on the deeper sentiments of the
people and the permanent interests of the country.
Up to that time the people had submitted to the
oligarchic regime, trying to profit by it. But they were
not attached to it. Those who could go away to pursue
fame and fortune did not fail to do so. Thus in both
hemispheres, but notably in Egypt, France and England,
there were established vigorous colonies of Greeks, dis-
gusted with this succession of parties, and desirous to
adorn Hellas with a new order and a new glory. Keep-
ing up a regular contact with the land of their birth, they
continued to exert an influence there. They recognized
at once in Eleutherios Venizelos the man who could
accomplish the work of regeneration. They encouraged12
THE GREEK QUESTION
and supported him. Immediately after he had taken the
reins of government into his hands, the former Cretan
leader revealed what he really was. Though he was the
product of a military revolution, he sent the officers back
to their barracks and forced them to submit to discipline.
He re-established the constitutional regime, which had
been warped by misuse. He guaranteed an honest ad-
ministration of local affairs, stimulated the productive
power of the country, lightened the burden of taxes, had
laws passed that protected labor and restored the inde-
pendence of the courts. In the Chamber of Deputies he
rallied a devoted majority. The old parties disappeared.
None of the old leaders could gather solid supporters
about him. Only an impalpable residuum of objectors
was left. To the regret even of the Prime Minister,
who would have liked to find before him a constituted
party to discuss measures, there was no longer any
opposition in the parliamentary sense of the word. The
government had not suppressed it by the means in use
in other countries—Rumania, for example. It had
simply disappeared like the mist before the sun. Veni-
zelism represented not a dictatorship, not the pre-
ponderating influence of one man, but a regime with
methods and ideas shaped according to the reasoned will
of the upper classes of the citizens and the instinctive
desires of the masses.
At the moment when the European war broke out the
liberal party was all-powerful and the king could not
dream of imposing his personal political views. It was
due to external events that the design to substitute
personal for constitutional government took shape.
Mr. Venizelos was at Munich, en route for Brussels,
where he was to meet the Grand-Vizir in order to settle
the question of the islands, when he learned of the
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. He at once took his
stand. On the 25th of July, right from Munich, heTHE GREEK QUESTION
13
telegraphed instructions to Athens, to the following
effect: “ It is of supreme importance not to allow any
doubt to exist as to the intentions of Greece. Greece
cannot stand with arms folded in the presence of a
possible attack on Serbia by Bulgaria. She could
not tolerate such an attack, for it would lead to an
aggrandizement of Bulgaria and would put in question
the Treaty of Bucharest. This attitude is imposed upon
her alike by her duties as the ally of Serbia and by the
instinct of self-preservation.” At the same time, he sent
a dispatch of like import to Mr. Theotokis (junior),
minister of Greece in Berlin, begging him to inform the
German government that if Bulgaria attacked Serbia
it would be impossible for Greece to remain neutral.
While still in Munich, he received a dispatch from Mr.
Pachitch, Prime Minister of Serbia, begging to know
what attitude Greece was to take. He replied at once
that being, as he was, at a distance from Athens, he
could give no official pronouncement, but that on re-
turning to the capital he would support the following
opinion: Greece must hold her forces ready to oppose
Bulgaria in case she attacks Serbia; she must protect
the latter against the danger of an attack in the rear
and guarantee respect for the Treaty of Bucharest.
On August 2, after a meeting of the Cabinet, Mr.
Venizelos addressed to Mr. Pachitch an official dispatch
of which the tenor was about as follows:
The fact that the independence and territorial integrity of
Serbia constitute a capital factor of the Balkan equilibrium,
created by the Treaty of Bucharest, to which Greece is resolutely
attached, is enough to dictate to the Greek government the
measures that it must take for the present in order to come to
the aid of Serbia, a friendly and allied country, in the most
effective way. The Greek government thinks that it can best
fulfill its duty as friend and ally by holding itself ready to
repulse every attack against Serbia on the part of Bulgaria.
An immediate armed intervention by Greece would be fatal to
Serbia. In fact, Greece could send only weak forces to succor14
THE GREEK QUESTION
Serbia against Austria-Hungary, and besides, her situation as
a belligerent state would expose Saloniki—the only route open
for supplying Serbia with food and munitions—to a decisive
attack. The duty of Greece is to hold her forces intact in view
of a possible Bulgarian offensive that might endanger the safety
of the two countries.
The same day Mr. Venizelos caused dispatches of the
same purport to be sent to London, Paris, Petrograd and
also (mutatis mutandis) to Sofia. With the clear view
of a man who took in the whole political horizon, he
decided without losing an instant, and made known his
decision. At this moment William II, having deter-
mined to array the maximum of strength against the
enemy, urged Constantine to give him his active support.
He sent him several telegrams in German, attempting
to dissuade him from joining in with the Meuchel-
morder of Serbia, and warning him that if the policy
of Greece was opposed to that of Germany the family
relations of the king would suffer for it. Constantine I
at that time resisted this pressure because his Prime
Minister wished him to do so, and because he knew, from
personal experience, that his imperial brother-in-law cared
little for Greece. In the spring of the preceding year he
had secretly sounded William II, without the knowledge
of the Greek government, through the agency of Mr.
Theotokis, former Prime Minister, who had been sent
to Berlin to announce the accession of Constantine I.
At the bidding of the king, Mr. Theotokis had asked
William II if Greece could, come what might, count on
the permanent friendship of Germany. At the time the
emperor was unwilling to answer, but he later caused
the following reply to be sent to the king through Count
Quadt, his minister at Athens:
The imperial government finds itself unable to adopt the Greek
point of view. The alliance which unites her to Austria-
Hungary and Italy prevents her from entering into negotiationsTHE GREEK QUESTION
15
on subjects that touch the interests of her allies. Germany
regards it as her duty to second these interests without any
evasion, and this duty hinders her from taking any initiative
in a question that lies within the sphere of influence of her
allies. Unfortunately, Germany can do nothing for Greece. All
the interests of the empire push her toward states whose views
do not accord with those of Hellenism.
This billet-doux was sent before the sudden attack of
Bulgaria on Serbia and Greece. No matter how much
of a Germano-maniac he was, Constantine must have
experienced a shudder in connecting the last words of
his brother-in-law’s rebuff with the Bulgarian treachery
of the 29th of June.
After the Treaty of Bucharest the German ill-will
toward Greece persisted. In the month of January,
1914, in London, Mr. Venizelos sounded the British
government as to the pressure that the great powers
would have to exert upon Turkey, in order to impose
upon her the decision of Europe in the matter of the
islands. Sir Edward Grey replied that England would
go so far as to make a naval demonstration in order to
enforce respect for the decision of the Conference of
London, with the distinct understanding, however, that
Germany’s consent should first be obtained. Germany,
when sounded in her turn, “ refused to co-operate or even
to consent to any action against Turkey that had an
avowedly unfriendly character.” Nay more, she refused
later to take part in what was a merely formal warning
sent by the great powers to the Sublime Porte. She
persisted in the same attitude throughout the whole of
the Eastern crisis. In the month of April, 1914, Von
Bethmann-Hollweg and Baron von Wangenheim, who
accompanied William II to Corfu, declared peremptorily
to Mr. Venizelos and his Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Streit, that Greece could not count on the help of
Germany in her relations with Turkey and that if the
islands were to pass under the control of Greece in con-16
THE GREEK QUESTION
sequence of the weakness of Turkey, this state of things
could not be regarded as permanent or definitive. Ac-
cording to Von Wangenheim the islands, following the
natural law, would pass under the control of the master
of the Asiatic coast at the time of the settlement of the
Eastern Question. No political influence and certainly
no Greek political influence could be admitted in the
neighborhood.
Thus in what concerns Greece, Germany declared that
she was inspired not only by her formal alliance with
Austria-Hungary and Italy, but also by a secret alliance
with Turkey. At bottom she sustained the Cabinet of
Enver Talaat, whose bloody accession she had helped to
bring about in January, 1913. She urged him on in his
policy of forcing the subject populations to embrace
Mohammedanism, and to become Turks. She approved
the war against the privileges of the Greek patriarchate.
Far from thinking of facilitating or tolerating the dis-
memberment of Turkey, she tried her best to galvanize
the sick man of Europe. From a military point of view
she needed his aid against Russia and England; from the
point of view of economical advantage she wished to keep
for herself the commercial and industrial exploitation of
vast regions destined to a great future. In short, she was
fundamentally anti-Greek. If she had in August, 1913,
voiced her opinion that the Treaty of Bucharest be
not submitted to the revision of the great powers, it was
not for the sake of showing herself friendly to Greece;
it was in order not to offend the king of Rumania, who
meant to keep what he had gained by his intervention
and who had declared to his two Germanic allies that he
would not stand for a Greater Bulgaria. William II
had at that time soothed Austria-Hungary by promising
her a fine revenge at no distant time for her last dis-
appointments in the Balkans. Meanwhile, he had not
ceased to sustain her claims in Albania and Epirus as
against the interests of Greece. In all these questions,THE GREEK QUESTION
17
as in that of the islands, the Cabinet at Athens found
support only in the Triple Entente. In spite of certain
failures the Entente had as its guiding principle that the
Christian peoples under the Ottoman domination had a
right to certain liberties and that if the Ottoman Empire
was to be broken up in whole or in part, these peoples
ought to be called upon to form independent states. On
the contrary Germany was for denying these peoples any
autonomous existence. The only reason she excepted
Albania was because the autonomy demanded for this
lawless country effectively concealed an Austrian pro-
tectorate. Prince William of Wied, appointed bret of
Albania by the Conference of London, was simply a
lackey of Vienna and Berlin. He was charged with the
duty of thwarting with all his power Serbian and Greek
influences.
Under these circumstances, Venizelos must have had
little difficulty in the first days of August, 1914, in
getting Constantine to support his views. With his
habitual frankness he explained his position plainly to
Count Quadt. He set forth to him that in the war
which was beginning, it was inconceivable that Greece
should take part against the three protecting powers
whose interests were in accord with her own. Conse-
quently, she would remain neutral as long as the Balkan
equilibrium created by the Treaty of Bucharest was not
compromised. In an official dispatch of the month of
August, the German government recognized the sound-
ness of the position taken by the Cabinet of Athens, and
Bulgaria, since she was willing not to intervene as long
as Greece guaranteed to remain neutral, kept out of the
war for the time being. William II did not insist on
her acting because the staff in Berlin, fully engaged with
more important operations elsewhere, did not yet wish
to commit itself deeply to any Balkan movement. It
put into play other means.
In the second fortnight of August Mr. Venizelos in-18
THE GREEK QUESTION
sisted on defining before the Entente the attitude of the
government which he directed. At the very height of
the German onset against France, he thought it proper
to inform the Cabinets of Paris, London and Petrograd
that he was in sympathy with them, and that Greece
could put her forces at their disposal for future opera-
tions in the Balkans. France and England acknowl-
edged the receipt of this offer and replied that they
would take advantage of it as circumstances required.
Further George V sent a telegram to King Constantine
to thank him and to inform him that he had ordered
the British Admiralty to come to an understanding with
the Greek staff on the method of co-operation of the
forces of the two countries. Constantine I replied with
a friendly telegram, stating that the Greek naval staff
was prepared to confer with England’s representatives.
This exchange of dispatches took place through Admiral
Kerr as the intermediary.
At this time a significant incident took place. The
Greco-Turkish conference which was to have occurred at
Brussels in order to settle the differences between the two
countries was transferred to Bucharest. There, Talaat
Bey was not content with formulating unacceptable
claims as to the islands; he strove to form a coalition
of the Turks, Bulgarians, Greeks and Rumanians against
Serbia. In spite of his finessing, he betrayed the game
of Germany, whose cards he held. Mr. Venizelos refused
downright to have anything to do with the plan, and
recalled his two delegates, Messrs. Zaimis and Politis.
William II was not discouraged. Realizing that as long
as Mr. Venizelos was in power, he constituted an insur-
mountable obstacle to the realization of his Balkan plan,
he undertook with the aid of the old parties to overthrow
him. Mr. Streit, Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose
competence in international affairs Mr. Venizelos had
thought he could utilize, never thinking of the possi-
bility of treason on his part, became the tool of this plotTHE GREEK QUESTION
19
and recommended war against Serbia. Mr. Venizelos
at once foiled the scheme. He requested Mr. Streit’s
resignation and rejected the German proposition in these
words: “ Greece is too small a country to commit so
infamous an act.” He maintained 120,000 men under
arms and furnished Serbia every facility that she desired
for renewing her supplies of munitions and war materials
by way of Saloniki and the Vardar railroad.
Even as late as the end of autumn, 1914, the Berlin
staff did not seem to have decided on action in the
Balkans. There is every reason to believe that it was
not in favor of the second Austro-Hungarian offensive
against Serbia. But General Potiorek, who was in
command of the forces of the Dual Monarchy on this
front, was impatient to win his laurels. Full of con-
tempt for the Serbians, he thought that he could easily
gain the victory over them. He entered upon the cam-
paign before the Berlin Cabinet had arranged for the
co-operation of Bulgaria. Czar Ferdinand, always a
deceiver, did not put his armies in movement. He pre-
tended that he was observing an official neutrality so as
not to provoke a counter-intervention on the part of
Greece. But he mobilized his comitadjis, furnished them
with arms and even with cannon, and permitted them
to make an inroad right into Serbian territory. In
December, when the Serbs were in a nearly desperate
condition, the Bulgarian comitadjis invaded Serbia and
blew up the bridges on the Vardar and near Zaitchar,
which formed the only routes of communication by which
Serbia was connected with friendly countries. The
Cabinet at Sofia washed its hands of the matter, pre-
tending that these raiders were Macedonians. Mace-
donians or not, these men were armed and paid by the
famous Interior Organization of Bulgaria, which was
in close relations with the government and could only
operate with its connivance. If Serbia, contrary to20
THE GREEK QUESTION
expectation, had not by a superhuman effort recovered
herself, Bulgaria would have rushed upon her so as to
be in at the death. But the armies of Potiorek were
finally completely defeated. They were forced back over
the frontier after having been subjected to enormous
losses in men and material. The Interior Organization
recalled its comitadjis and Bulgaria awaited a more
opportune occasion.
For fear that she might be discouraged and be tempted
under the pressure of Russophiles to go over to the
Entente, Germany concluded with her, in the early days
of 1915 a financial arrangement complementary to the
loan-contract which had been signed shortly before the
war but which owing to circumstances had not been
executed. The syndicate of German and Austro-
Hungarian banks which had undertaken to lend five
hundred million francs to Bulgaria agreed to advance to
her, in exchange for treasury notes accepted at par, one
hundred and fifty million francs at seven and one-half
per cent., of which seventy-five millions were payable at
once, and the rest at the rate of ten millions every
fortnight beginning with the 14th of April. By means
of these fortnightly payments Austro-Germany held in
leash the Radoslavof Cabinet.
About the same time, after long delays, the Triple
Entente decided to undertake against the Dardanelles a
movement designed to reopen its communications with the
Black Sea and to checkmate Turkey. Desirous also of
protecting Serbia against a new offensive she was eager
to secure Greece’s material aid, which was valuable to
her for the sake of the intimidation of Bulgaria, the use
of her fleet for purposes of transport and patrol and the
occupation of bases of operation in the vicinity of the
Dardanelles. On January 24 Sir Francis Elliot,
Minister of England at Athens, communicated to Mr.
Venizelos a telegram from Sir Edward Grey suggesting
to Greece a concerted action in the Balkans, “ in returnTHE GREEK QUESTION
21
for very important territorial concessions on the coast of
Asia Minor.” At this time the Cabinet in London still
cherished illusions as to Bulgaria. In spite of all that
had happened, it hoped that she would yield to its solici-
tation and would consent to align herself on the side of
the Allies. Mr. Venizelos was so captivated by the pros-
pect of re-establishing Greece as she had once existed in
Asia Minor, that he showed himself disposed to cede
to Bulgaria the districts of Cavalla, Sari-Chaban and
Drama (c.2000 square kilometers) and also not to oppose
the cession to her of a part of Serbian Macedonia. He
laid down conditions for this which appear to have been
finally agreed upon by the council of ministers and the
king. But the hostile attitude of Bulgaria and the de-
cision of Rumania to hold off hindered the execution of
this first project.* It was taken up a little later in
connection with the Dardanelles expedition alone. It
was on this occasion that the first clash between Mr.
Venizelos and Constantine I occurred.
The Cabinets of Paris and London at that time re-
newed their offers as to Asia Minor, demanding in
return only the co-operation of Greece against the
Dardanelles. After some rather hurried negotiations,
Mr. Venizelos was in a position to present a definite
proposition, which was discussed March 3 and 5, in two
Crown Councils in which the ex-Prime Ministers took
part. According to the terms proposed and agreed to
by Paris and London, the whole Greek fleet was to
co-operate with the Anglo-French fleet, but the partici-
pation of the land forces was to be limited to a single
division (15,000 men), the rest of the army being re-
quired to overawe Bulgaria. Many objections were
made. Attention was called to the fact that the pro-
posals came from France and England alone, and that
Russia was opposed to the entrance of Greek troops into
* The detailed account of these negotiations will be found in M. Leon
Maccas’ book, Ainsi parla Venizelos, pp. 34 ff.22
THE GREEK QUESTION
Constantinople. Mr. Venizelos was able to reply that
Russia had given her consent, and that the Cabinets of
London and Paris undertook to reconcile in matters of
detail the Greek and Russian points of view. As another
argument a great deal was made of the adverse opinion
of the Greek staff. According to this the Dardanelles
could not be forced by an isolated naval action. As a
result of profound study of the question, the staff had
reached the conclusion that it was necessary to land at
least three divisions on the shores of the Gulf of Saros.
This objection was only too well founded. But it could
be countered by directly recommending to the Allies the
action on land in the indicated region, a region which
was, as a matter of fact, very well chosen. Difficulties
as to the delimitation and administration of the terri-
tories promised in Asia Minor were also raised. Mr.
Venizelos met all these arguments, and devoted himself
to showing how immensely important it was for Greece
to appear in the Orient at the side of the Western
powers, and incidentally to assure herself a magnificent
domain of 120,000 square kilometers inhabited by
flourishing Greek colonies. This would in a marvelous
degree supplement the present possessions of the realm
and would strengthen Greece’s hold on the islands. The
king broke off the second session without reaching any
decision, but on the following day he made known his
refusal. Mr. Venizelos submitted his resignation, which
was accepted. Mr. Gounaris was charged with the duty
of forming a new Cabinet with power to dissolve the
Chamber. He associated with himself as Minister of
Foreign Affairs Mr. Zographos, former High Com-
missioner in Epirus.
Mr. Venizelos did not think it proper at this time to
provoke a struggle as to the constitutionality of the
king’s action. In an interview granted to the corre-
spondent of the Havas Agency (March 13, 1917) he
thus justifies his course: “ In February, 1915, the actionTHE GREEK QUESTION
23
of the king might have been regarded as constitutional,
at any rate, formally, for a disagreement as to policy
having arisen between the king and myself, it was
possible to hold the opinion that, inasmuch as the last
elections dated back to three years earlier and New
Greece had as yet no parliamentary representatives it
was possible, I say, to hold the opinion, that it was the
duty of the country to decide the point at issue. I
might well regret this procedure and might even find
it injurious, but I could not rebel.” He did not rebel,
but he immediately exposed the critical situation created
by his fall. Calling to his house the deputies of the
liberal party, he showed them the consequences of the
decision of Constantine I. “ We have let a unique op-
portunity escape us. The harm done is irreparable.
Nothing can make things right again even supposing
that our government should be recalled to power and
invited to enforce the decision taken by it.” When
attacked later by his successor and the court, he pub-
lished two communications which he had addressed to
the king in the last days of the crisis. These two letters
have an historical interest. With prophetic lucidity the
minister explained to his sovereign that the fate of
Hellenism was deeply involved in the success of the
Triple Entente, and that if Austro-Germany should
triumph, Bulgaria would seize all Macedonia with
Saloniki included, Turkey would again take possession
of the islands, Hellenism in Asia Minor would be rooted
out and Greece would fall back into the stagnant con-
dition in which she had been prior to the first Balkan
war. The consequences to Greece could not possibly
be more disastrous if, in alliance with the Triple Entente,
she were to be defeated along with her. Her vital in-
terests bade her take advantage of the state of war which
existed between Turkey and the Entente in order to
deliver the hundreds of thousands of Greeks living on
the shores of Asia, to permit the 200,000 refugees of24
THE GREEK QUESTION
Asia Minor to recover their homes and to double again
the extent of the kingdom which had already been
doubled once since 1912.	“ Your Majesty,” said Mr.
Venizelos at the end, “ is in the very prime of life for
creating by your sword a Greater Greece, and for firmly
establishing this military exploit by a complete political
reorganization of the new state. You can pass on to
your heir and successor, when the hour comes, an
achieved task of superhuman grandeur, such as is given
few princes to consummate.”
The question had been precisely put, and had been
decided against the convictions of Mr. Venizelos and
the general sentiment of the people. The former Prime
Ministers who had been invited to attend the Crown
Councils had recognized that the government was in
accord with public sentiment, and Mr. Theotokis, though
he was in the opposition, had declared to the king that
he could not undertake to follow out his policy. We
do not know to what extent Constantine I was then
committed to William II. He could hardly at this early
date appeal as an excuse to the danger of Greece’s being
crushed. The Russians were still in the Carpathians and
Przemysl, completely invested, was to surrender a few
weeks later. Negotiations were being carried on to bring
about the intervention of Italy. At all events, during
the Gounaris ministry negotiations between Athens and
the Entente were again taken up and Mr. Zographos
did not cease to affirm his friendly feelings toward the
protecting powers. On April 14, in reply to a request
of April 10 that Greece should participate in the war
against Turkey, he proposed that Greece should give
military aid on condition that the Entente would guar-
antee the continental and insular integrity of Greece
during the war and for a certain time afterward, that
a naval and military agreement between the staffs should
govern the conditions under which they should operate
and that a treaty should fix the extent of the territorialTHE GREEK QUESTION
25
concessions promised in Asia Minor. It would have to
be understood that the definitive object of the war was
to be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
Were these proposals made in good faith? It would
be bold to affirm it. In any case, they deserved to be
taken into serious consideration. They contained no
unacceptable demand. The clause about the dissolution
of the Ottoman Empire raised, it seems, some anxiety.
It was, however, very natural that the Greek govern-
ment should wish to protect itself against a spurious
solution which would have left her, at the peace con-
vention, face to face with a Turkey eager for revenge.
If the diplomats of western Europe took fright at the
vista thus opened before them, it was because they had
a less clear comprehension than the Orientals of the
elements of this distinctly Oriental question. The
guarantee of territorial integrity was clearly due. It
was this, however, that seems to have hindered the nego-
tiations from coming to a head. Still possessed with
the idea of winning over Bulgaria, the diplomats of
the Entente wanted to keep it in their power to offer
to her eastern Macedonia and Serbian Macedonia. They
permitted the proposals of the 14th of April to fall
through, and this decided Mr. Gounaris’ career. This
politician, ambitious to become a party leader, would
have been flattered to direct an intervention policy and
to substitute himself for Mr. Venizelos. Repulsed by
the Entente, he turned toward the pro-Germans and
created an anti-Venizelist party. He proceeded to dis-
solve the Chamber of Deputies, headed a furious
campaign against the Venizelist candidates, bound his
ministers to the king in a real solidarity, and proclaimed
to the electors that they would have to choose between
the policy of Mr. Venizelos and that of the king. Con-
stantine, being seriously ill, interfered neither with his
words nor his deeds. His protracted illness gave him,
free as he was, by virtue of the Constitution, from any26
THE GREEK QUESTION
personal responsibility, a convenient excuse for not
breaking away from a shameful campaign.
The general elections of the 13th of June gave the
Venizelists 184 seats as against 130 for the Gounarists.
This was not a crushing majority, but the districts of
the Greece of the time before 1912 had supported him
almost in their totality. The Gounarist successes, on
the other hand, had been won in New Greece, especially
by Mohammedan and Jewish candidates. This was due
to an intense pressure which was easily exerted by the
government on heterogeneous populations which had been
freed from the Turkish domination only three years
before. The liberal party thus issued victorious from a
very difficult test. Parliamentary custom required that
Mr. Gounaris should retire and that Mr. Venizelos
should be recalled to power. Nothing of the sort took
place. Mr. Gounaris did not budge, and the king did
not ask him to resign his place to the victor. The minis-
terial press continued with impunity to calumniate Mr.
Venizelos. The calling together of the new Chamber
was postponed under the pretext of the king’s illness.
If any doubt existed in the month of March as to the
sentiments of Constantine I, such doubt could no
^longer exist in the month of July. His attitude can
be explained only by his desire to resist the wishes of
the people and by his faith in the victory of Germany.
It was probably in the month of July that the pact
was made between the brothers-in-law. At this time,
the Russians had been thrown back from the Carpathians
and the Italian offensive had been stopped. The staff
in Berlin had resolved to destroy Serbia. William II
informed Constantine I that he was about to attack the
Serbians with 400,000 men, that Bulgaria was in accord
with him, and that he counted on Greece’s remaining
neutral. This notification was accompanied by a threat
in case he was disobeyed and by a promise guaranteeingTHE GREEK QUESTION
27
the territorial integrity of Greece if Constantine followed
his advice. The king yielded. His staff, which, up to
that time, had shown itself hostile to Bulgaria, was
willing to be convinced that, after all, they might just
as well come to terms with her at the expense of Serbia;
the main thing was to protect themselves against the Slav
peril, springing from the union of two Slav neighbors;
it made very little difference which of the two was
crushed, provided one of them was put out of the way.
This reasoning was fundamentally wrong, in view of
the fact that Serbia desired no Greek territory, while
Bulgaria wished to annex eastern Macedonia. Unfor-
tunately, at this very time, in a note dated August 3,
the Triple Entente demanded of the Cabinet in Athens
that Greece should consent under certain conditions to
cede eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria in order to permit
the reconstruction of the Balkan confederation. This
false step at such a critical time had deadly results.
It cast into the shade the distant Bulgarian peril and
brought into high relief the immediate sacrifices that
were demanded. There was, it is true, no comparison
between the extent of the districts that Bulgaria coveted
and that of the districts which the Entente wanted
Greece and Serbia to cede. But William II assumed
responsibility towards Greece for the behavior of Bul-
garia, which was moreover to be so generously com-
pensated by her gains in Serbia that she would not claim
anything elsewhere. This was without doubt an idle
guarantee, but in the eyes of courtiers and intriguers it
was quite enough to protect a sovereign and ministers
who were disposed to permit themselves to be convinced.*
* Germany’s bad faith in the matter seems established by the publication
(October 9, 1915) in the Venizelist newspapers Patris and Hestia of a Ger-
mano-Bulgarian treaty dating from the previous July 17. This treaty, con-
cluded at Sofia, gave Bulgaria all Albania, all New Serbia, Monastir, Guev-
gheli, Doiran, Cavalla, Seres, Fiorina and Castoria. The tenor of this
document was said to have been communicated by the English Legation in
Athens. The German Legation denied its authenticity. But, on the other
hand, it was maintained that the information was exact. If this is the case,
we may well ask how England, knowing of this treaty, could have kept up
her negotiations with Bulgaria until the beginning of October, 1915.28
THE GREEK QUESTION
In the interview mentioned above, Mr. Venizelos
estimates the importance of the incident as follows:
Between the elections and my return to the leadership of the
government an important event had happened. The protecting
powers had proposed to Greece to cede eastern Macedonia to
Bulgaria. This proposition, apart from the fact that it did
not satisfy Bulgarian ambitions, as was seen by what followed,
was treacherously exploited by the pro-German propaganda and
helped the cause of the royalists, who at once took the stand
that Greece’s territorial integrity must at all costs be main-
tained. I do not exaggerate when I say that if it had not been
for this step the king would never have dared to repudiate the
obligations imposed upon us by our treaty with Serbia. You
ask me whether all this is simply an impression of mine. It is
more than this; it is an absolute certainty based on facts and
documents of which I had cognizance at that time. Further,
it was only three or four weeks later that Mr. Gounaris let
Rumania know that in case of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria,
Greece would not go to the assistance of her ally.
One thing brought on another. The failure of the
Greek government carried with it that of the Rumanian
government. Although it was even more to Rumania’s
interest than to Greece’s not to let Serbia be crushed,
because this put her vital communications and conse-
quently her very existence at the mercy of Germany, she
committed the same sin, the same crime against herself.
It was under these circumstances that the king recalled
Mr. Venizelos to power without making him aware of
his personal dealings with his brother-in-law. Some days
later Bulgaria signed a treaty with Turkey by which the
latter allowed her a very appreciable improvement of
her frontiers, in particular at the very gates of Adri-
anople. This agreement was the counterpart of the
one that followed the Treaty of Bucharest. It indicated
that the time to act had come. The Turks had no
notion of dispossessing themselves of valuable territories,
without the certainty of material aid against the holders
of Chios and Mitylene. Instead of determining theTHE GREEK QUESTION
29
Allies to take energetic precautions against Bulgaria,
this arrangement moved them to show themselves more
generous toward her. On the 14th of September, after
long and painful pressure upon Serbia, they offered
Bulgaria the spoils of Macedonia. Those were gloomy
days for Mr. Pachitch and Mr. Venizelos. Yielding to
the insistence of the Entente the latter resigned himself
to Serbia’s cession of Monastir to Bulgaria on condition
that Albania should be divided between Greece and
Serbia in such a way that these two countries should
have a common frontier. Bulgaria answered by decree-
ing a general mobilization. Some Western Europeans
suggested that this mobilization might perhaps be di-
rected against Turkey; their blindness bordered on
insanity. A man like Mr. Venizelos could not be
deceived even for an instant. He submitted to the king
and made him sign a decree ordering the mobilization
of the Greek army (September 23).
Was harmony between minister and sovereign to be
once more established? Mere spectators might have
supposed this to be the case, for the evidence of the
nation’s peril was before all eyes. People who had been
initiated into the ways of the Greek court were not so
sanguine. They suspected that the pro-Germans had
advocated the general mobilization so that the men under
arms might be prevented from making any manifesta-
tions in Venizelos’ favor and from supporting him by
force in case a new disagreement with the monarch
should cause his removal. This explanation seems too
complicated to be right. At any rate, it was not to
the taste of Bulgaria. When he learned the news of
the Greek mobilization, Mr. Radoslavof made a scene
before William II’s minister: “You have cheated us,”
he cried, and launched into reproaches. William II was
deeply interested in safeguarding his reputation and his
interests. With furious intensity he put into operation
every means that he had of influencing Constantine I.30
THE GREEK QUESTION
The Gounarists who had lost their positions, the former
ministers who were in retirement, such as Mr. Streit,
the staff officers imbued with the spirit of the Kriegs-
akademie, the snobs of the court and the people who
were paid salaries by the German propaganda, joined
with Queen Sophie and the king’s brothers against Mr.
Venizelos. This statesman who sought only the good
of his country was a thorn in the flesh of all these people.
The pressure of the Entente in the opposite direction
was insignificant, formal and uncoordinated.
On the 29th of September the new Chamber met.
Mr. Venizelos set forth the situation in the most gloomy
light. However, since Bulgaria still pretended at this
time that her mobilization had as its only object an
armed neutrality, he contented himself with declaring
that he returned to his earlier program as thus formu-
lated. “ The government is held by the obligations im-
posed upon it by its alliance with one of the belligerents,
Serbia, and is determined to fulfill these obligations if
the casus foederis arises.” Mr. Gounaris maintained
that the mobilization ought to serve only to protect the
vital interests of the country, to the exclusion of any
obligation imposed upon the country by the treaty of
alliance with Serbia. On the 3d of October Russia, at
last undeceived, called upon the Bulgarian government
“ openly to break inside of twenty-four hours with the
enemies of the Slav cause and Russia ” and to proceed
at once to the discharge of officers belonging to the
armies of states which were at war with the powers
forming the Entente.
On October 4 the Greek Chamber held an exciting
session, which was prolonged far into the night. The
former leaders, Messrs. Dragoumis, Rhallis, Theotokis
and Gounaris, made violent attacks on the Cabinet in
connection with the dealings with Bulgaria. Taking
advantage of a speech of the 28th of September, in
which Sir Edward Grey, while threatening the Bui-31
THE GREEK QUESTION
garians, again made proposals to them, they claimed
that the Entente was manipulating things so as to renew
negotiations at the cost of Greece. Mr. Venizelos replied
that formal and official assurances had been given him
that the promises concerning concessions to Bulgaria,
even those on the part of Serbia, could be considered
from now on as having lapsed. He added, “ I am really
convinced that if latterly there had not existed in Bul-
garia a misunderstanding as to our policy, a misunder-
standing due perhaps to the fact that in the last days
of the government of the Hon. Mr. Gounaris, the ideas
of the government underwent a certain alteration or a
certain unsettling, if, I say, Bulgaria had not found
herself misled as to the declarations of Greece touching
this question, I have reason to believe that she would
not have decided to mobilize, thus running the risk of
lighting a conflagration in the Balkans.” This was a
thrust delivered straight at Mr. Gounaris. The former
Prime Minister recoiled and dodged. When pressed by
his successor, he did not dare to deny that a change of
the nature indicated had taken place in the last days of
his ministry. His connivance with Germany was thus
clearly established. As it was only in accord with the
king that he had acted, the conflict between the crown
and the government became inevitable.
This came about a propos of the casus foederis. Mr.
Venizelos declared categorically that Greece was bound
to succor Serbia in virtue of the treaty of June 3, 1913,
which had been concluded for a period of ten years.
As to this point, I quote here the extract from the official
record of the session:
At this time I no longer regard myself as justified in conceal-
ing from the representatives of the country and the country
itself the fact that our treaty of alliance with Serbia is a
general defensive treaty, on the basis of which each of the states
binds itself to aid the other if one of them, without provocation
on its part, is attacked by a third.32
THE GREEK QUESTION
Mr. Popp.—By any third whatsoever?
Mr. Venizelos.—There is no “ whatsoever ”; the word is
“ third ”! It was on the basis of this treaty, gentlemen, that
when in May, 1914, our relations with the Ottoman Empire
reached an acute stage, we addressed ourselves to Serbia, ex-
plaining to her the motives on account of which we were about
to face a new war against Turkey, a war which we regarded
as defensive, even though we were the first to attack, because the
provocations on the other side had become intolerable. It was
on this basis, I say, that we turned to Serbia to invoke her aid
in case, during the war, we should be attacked by another state.
The Prime Minister might have stopped at that point.
But consistently with his character and perhaps also to
anticipate by a formal vote of the deputies the resistance
that he foresaw on the part of the king, he tackled at
once the eventuality of hostilities with the Central
Powers. His words were these:
I certainly do not propose to you that we should declare war
on Germany and Austria; but, gentlemen, if, in putting into
execution our national program, if, while discharging what is
for us a debt of honor, while fulfilling our duties as Allies, while
defending the vital interests of the state, we find ourselves
brought face to face with powerful nations, I am certain that,
while expressing our regrets, we shall do our duty. [Applause!]
Before the manifest danger that comes on us from the north,
threatening to rob us of what we have gained in the course of
the last two wars, I should have proved myself irresolute and
cowardly in not hastening to take such decisions as duty, honor
and the highest interest impose on the nation. [Prolonged
applause!]
After a passionate debate, these declarations were ap-
proved by the Chamber by 147 votes out of 257. If
we add the nine ministers who abstained from voting,
the effective majority was forty-six votes. This was not
enormous, but if we take into account the conditions
under which the dissolution of the Chamber and the new
elections had taken place, and the vehemence of the
debates, the majority was large. It would certainlyTHE GREEK QUESTION
33
have approached being unanimous, if there had not been
a feeling that the king was behind Mr. Gounaris. So
the king’s intrigue against Mr. Venizelos had failed.
Constantine I ought to have recognized this. He could
have cleared himself in the sight of his accomplices in
Berlin by saying that he had done for them all that
he could, but that being a constitutional sovereign he
was absolutely prevented from going any farther. Now,
Constantine, in lack of other qualities, is obstinate. He
decided to override the vote of the Chamber. Making a
pretext of the allusion to hostilities against the Central
Powers, of which apparently there had been no mention
in the Council of the Ministers held before the session,
he informed Mr. Venizelos that he had gone beyond his
rights and demanded his resignation. It was the plainest
possible avowal of secret agreements with Germany.
The king would never have dared to decide on such a
stroke if his personal obligations had not run counter to
the fulfillment of his duty as a constitutional sovereign.
He gave the preference to the former. The minister
thus affronted might have resisted, but he preferred to
yield.
These two decisions of the 5th of October, 1915, were
responsible for tremendous consequences. That of the
king is not to be justified or excused from any point of
view. It was a violation of his oath of accession, and
it constituted an act of treason to the country. The
soundness of the minister’s decision is open to question.
The Greeks of future ages will perhaps excite them-
selves about this as those of past ages have turned over
again and again the question as to what would have
happened if Alexander the Great had not died pre-
maturely. What would have happened if Mr. Veni-
zelos had kept the power in spite of Constantine I?
Naturally this will never be known. Mr. Venizelos has
developed at length the reasons for his docility in his34
THE GREEK QUESTION
interview of the 13th of last May. He affirms that,
left as he was to his own resources, he could not have
resisted the king effectively; not being able to count on
the support of the army, whose officers were for the most
part devoted to the sovereign, he would have provoked
the annihilation of the liberal party if civil war had
broken out. These attempts at self-justification show
as much as anything can that the old Cretan revolu-
tionary had developed, that he had become more inclined
to counsels of reflection than to the daring of inspiration,
and that he counted more on time than on force. They
show also that if Mr. Venizelos had not been left to his
own resources, he could have triumphed over the king.
Since his second dismissal, Mr. Venizelos has not in-
dulged in any recriminations against the three protecting
powers. He has climbed his Calvary without a word
of complaint. He is sustained by an invincible patriotic
faith. His hope is in the reparations of the future.
But the responsibilities of France, England and Russia
are none the less great. During an entire year the three
Allied Cabinets had meddled in Balkan affairs only to
muddle them. They had permitted Turkey to give
refuge to the German warships, to close the Dardanelles
to commerce and to organize the defense of the straits
through the agency of German officers who replaced
those of the British naval mission. Then when their
friends in Constantinople tricked them, they had been
hard put to it to stir up enemies against them. Instead
of forming once more against Turkey the league that
had in 1913 been so successful against Bulgaria, who
was now Turkey’s ally, they had persistently offered
to Bulgaria the territories of members of this league,
especially of Serbia, their ally in fact, and of Greece,
their prospective ally. They had compromised the
warmest and surest friend that they had in Greece and
when this friend, whose support was indispensable to
them in the realization of their plans, was attacked byTHE GREEK QUESTION
35
his sovereign, they deserted him. At the moment when
the Anglo-French troops were landing at Saloniki to
hasten to the defense of Serbia, France and England
suffered the minister who had invited them there to be
driven out, and left the fate of the expeditionary force
in the hands of a sovereign who had perjured himself.
What a strange aberration, and how imprudent!
It was during these early days of October that the fate
of Greece and of the Saloniki expedition hung in the
balance. The two questions were bound up together.
From the 23d of September, the date of the publication
of the decree authorizing the Greek mobilization, Mr.
Venizelos had requested from the ministers of England
and France the dispatch of 150,000 troops intended to
replace the same number of troops which Serbia, accord-
ing to the terms of the treaty of June 3, 1913, had been
expected to put in line on her southern frontier in order
to benefit by the casus foederis. The Cabinets of London
and Paris had agreed. Desirous of making amends for
their previous errors, they had actively taken the neces-
sary executive measures. Constantine I had sought to
avoid responsibility, and Mr. Venizelos on October 2 had
had to address a purely formal protest * to M. Guillemin,
who had just notified him of the prospective arrival at
Saloniki of a first contingent of French troops. The
debarkation began October 5, at 3 p.M.f Mr. Venizelos
had handed in his resignation at one o’clock. Is it con-
ceivable that at such a critical moment the Cabinets of
London and Paris and their representatives at Athens,
forewarned of the hostile intentions of the king, should
not have made every effort to minimize their effect? It
was of no use to organize a military expedition, if
measures were not taken to assure it a friendly reception
and free play in the country which was to serve as its
* “ To preserve neutrality up to the time when the casus foederis should
present itself.”
t On October 5 at Karaboroun, and on October 13 at Saloniki.36
THE GREEK QUESTION
base of operations. The whole arrangement presup-
posed, if not the active co-operation of the Greek army,
at least the political support of Greece. That being so,
how could the originators of the enterprise sit quietly by
with their arms folded when Mr. Venizelos was dis-
missed? If the Cabinets of Paris and of London had
acted as energetically as that of Berlin, Mr. Venizelos
would have found in their support the strength necessary
to checkmate the king. They alleged that they had no
right to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign
state. This excuse, which the official organs repeated
ad nauseam, is a wretchedly poor one.
The excuse would not have amounted to anything,
even if England, France and Russia had not been bound
to Greece by a treaty. As it was, the Greek ministry
had just come through general elections which had given
it an imposing majority, after a campaign in which its
opponents, at that time in power, had taken neutrality
as their program and the name of the king for their
party-emblem. The country, solemnly consulted by
means of a dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, had
declared itself in favor of political accord with the Triple
Entente as against the policy of Mr. Gounaris and the
king. According to the Constitution, the government
ought to be freely administered by the leader of the
victorious party. In once more dismissing this leader
from power for the identical reason that had determined
his first discharge, the king became guilty of an un-
friendly act toward the Entente. He at one and the
same time deliberately rebelled against the Constitution
and antagonized the three powers who possessed the
declared sympathy of the country. These powers found
themselves, therefore, quite legitimately on the defensive
against the king.
But they possessed another right. In virtue of the
treaties of July 6, 1827, February 3, 1830, May 7, 1832,
July 13, 1863, and March 29, 1864, they had been made1 *
THE GREEK QUESTION
37
“ protecting powers of Greece,” sureties for her inde-
pendence and her constitution. The treaty of 1863 was
especially in point. It had been concluded after the
decree of forfeiture had been pronounced against King
Otho on account of his misgovernment and anti-constitu-
tional attitude, and had stipulated that the three powers
were calling to the Greek throne Prince William of
Denmark (George I) in order to realize the wishes of
the Greek nation. Article III was thus conceived:
“ Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of
Denmark and the guarantee of the three courts,
forms a monarchical, independent, constitutional state.”
Article X established for the new king a personal en-
dowment consisting of the sum-total of the credits on
the Greek treasury which each one of the three courts
therewith resigned. In accordance with Article XI the
three courts were to see to it that Prince William was
recognized as king of the Greeks by all the sovereigns
and states with which they were in relations. Never
was the right of intervention better established.
In the first days of October, 1915, Constantine I had
not yet committed that series of acts outraging the
independence and Constitution of Greece which char-
acterized the following eighteen months, but all these
acts were latent in the decision of the 5th of October.
It was evident that if the king discharged the minister
whose policy the electors and the Chamber of Deputies,
acting in full cognizance of the case, had just approved,
it was done to inaugurate with all its consequences the
absolutist regime, which had been repudiated by the
treaty of 1863. On ascending the throne Constantine I
had pronounced the following oath before the represen-
tatives of the people: “ I swear in the name of the Holy
Trinity, consubstantial and indivisible, to protect the
dominant religion of the Greeks, to observe the Con-
stitution and the laws of the Greek nation and to pre-
serve and defend the national independence and integrity33
THE GREEK QUESTION
of the Greek state.” On the 5th of October he had
broken this oath. He had abused the country and its
legal representatives. He had compromised the national
independence and integrity of the state. Were the pro-
tecting powers to delay protesting till the country was
crushed under foot, till its independence was suppressed
and its integrity violated? It was not only their right
but their duty to intervene immediately between the
people and the king. Their inertia was in great part
the cause of the catastrophies that followed.
Some authorities have claimed that Constantine’s coup-
d’etat ought to have determined France and England to
abandon the Saloniki expedition rather than to attempt
to break down the resistance of the king. This is strange
reasoning. These two powers, in accord with Russia,
had thought it necessary to go to the rescue of Serbia,
their common ally, making use of the territory and the
help of Greece, which was also in alliance with Serbia.
The treachery of Constantine I rendered this help even
more necessary and more urgent. Instead of changing
their plan the guaranteeing powers ought to have fol-
lowed out its execution with redoubled energy. By
lowering their flag before the king, by withdrawing from
Saloniki the troops that had just arrived, by abandoning
Serbia, they would have covered themselves with shame.
Furthermore, they would have abandoned all the Orient
with its resources and its coasts to Austro-Germany.
Right soon they would have been unable to maintain
their commerce in the eastern Mediterranean and
through the Suez Canal. They knew it. Unfortunately
they lacked reasoning power and conscience. They
abandoned the Greek people to a despot and trusted
to luck.PART II
No sooner had Mr. Venizelos been dismissed by the
king than the three protecting powers became aware of
the consequences of their inaction at the time of the coup-
d’etat of Constantine I. It was no longer a question of
the participation of Greece in the hostilities against the
Central Powers, but of the execution of the treaty of
alliance between Serbia and Greece. The king had de-
manded the resignation of Mr. Venizelos on the pretext
that as president of the Council of Ministers he had
brought Germany and Austria into the case, without
being authorized to do so. But the Greco-Serbian treaty
subsisted as an indivisible whole, the Chamber had called
for its fulfillment and the new government ought to have
conformed to the obligations assumed toward Greece’s
ally and to the express commands of the Chamber. This
was so clear that Mr. Zaimis, the new Prime Minister,
did not dare at first to take his stand against it. In
appearing before the Chamber on October 11, he did not
repudiate Greece’s obligations toward Serbia. He
simply reserved for himself the power to adapt the policy
of Greece to events, “ in order better to assure the vital
interests of the nation.” He even declared that his
policy “ rested on the same basis as the policy followed
by Greece since the beginning of the European war.”
He said not a word of what he would do if Serbia was
attacked by Bulgaria. In fact, he permitted the allies
of Serbia to transport their troops over Greek territory
in order to help the armies of King Peter. Mr. Veni-
zelos, therefore, did not regard it as his duty to break
at once with his successor. He maintained that he did
not want to cast the country into internal difficulties and
promised to give his support to the government “just40
THE GREEK QUESTION
so long as it did not overturn the fundamental principles
of the Venizelist policy.”
Thus this oecumenical ministry * could take its place
without any opposition and get possession of all the
instruments of power without difficulty. On his part
the king had a free field for carrying on his negotiations.
Thanks to the extreme scrupulousness of Mr. Venizelos
and the inertia of the Triple Entente, he cleared without
accident the dangerous part of the road which led him
toward a dictatorship. From that time he had no need
to worry. Master of the staff and the army, freed from
all control, he felt himself in a position to resist all
parliamentary or constitutional pressure. Furthermore,
his prestige was increased by the very success of his
authority as exerted. His praises were sung in a tone
almost of adoration by a chorus of journalists richly paid
by the propaganda of Baron Schenk. Mr. Zaimis could
then, without provoking a new crisis, reject outright the
obligation to help Serbia. On the day but one after the
session in which Mr. Venizelos had accorded him a pro-
visional parliamentary support, that is, on the 13th of
October, he notified Mr. Pachitch that the Greco-Serbian
treaty had in view exclusively the hypothesis of an attack
by Bulgaria alone, and that owing to the lining up of
Germany and Austria-Hungary against Serbia, the
treaty no longer applied.
This interpretation, contrary to the actual provisions
of the treaty, which established no such distinction, was
insulting not only to the Chamber which had expressed
the opposite opinion but also to Serbia and to the pro-
tecting powers, her allies. The Cabinet of Pachitch
drank the bitter cup to the dregs without any recrimi-
nations. Probably in the hope that friendly relations
with Greece would be resumed later, and in the desire
* The ministry was thus christened by public opinion because it comprised
five former Prime Ministers—Messrs. Zai'mis, Theotokis, Dragoumis, Rhallis
and Gounaris.THE GREEK QUESTION
41
not to offend a state whose position on her southern
border was of great value to her, Serbia did not break
off diplomatic relations with the perjured government.
It did not even publish the text of the treaty, the divul-
gation of which would have exposed the bad faith of
the Cabinet of Athens. As for the protecting powers,
they flattered themselves that they could win back
Constantine I by offering new advantages to him.
England offered him as the price of aiding Serbia the
cession of the island of Cyprus, which she had held since
1878 in virtue of the treaty concluded June 4 of that
year with Turkey. At other times the prospect of
acquiring Cyprus, that large island with 285,000 inhabi-
tants of whom 235,000 are Greeks, would have roused
the enthusiastic approbation of Greece. Sir Edward
Grey in all probability imagined that this would either
suffice to bring the king back to their side, or would at
least permit public opinion to exert upon him a decisive
pressure. He had not correctly estimated the full extent
of the damage done by the Entente’s weak policy and the
success of the German propaganda. Mr. Zaimis refused
in a disdainful way this unexpected gift, which was sub-
ject only to the condition that Greece should give
military aid to Serbia regardless of what the issue of
the war might be. In a note of October 22 to the
Cabinet in London he declared that the Austro-German
attack released Greece from the obligation to interfere
by force of arms, since the treaty of 1913 had had
exclusively in view a Balkan war. This refusal is vir-
tually a proof in black and white of the connivance of
Constantine I with Germany. That the Greek govern-
ment did not eagerly jump at the chance to incorporate
in its realm such a valuable island as Cyprus must be
due to the fact that it had other more alluring promises.
According to men in the confidence of Mr. Venizelos *
* Interview with Mr. Diomedis, former minister, in the Gazette de Lausanne,
June 6, 1917.42
THE GREEK QUESTION
these promises consisted of an extension of Greek terri-
tory in Albania, of the annexation of the Cyclades and
of the island of Cyprus. Now, although the fate of
Albania depended in some measure on Austria-Germany,
that of the Cyclades and of Cyprus depended on the
great maritime powers. These would require to have
been destroyed, therefore, before the promise of William
II could have been fulfilled. But Constantine’s faith in
the victory of Germany was so strong that he preferred
the emperor’s two birds in the bush to England’s bird
in the hand. Without troubling themselves further about
the consequences of this situation, France and England
pursued in Macedonia the task imposed on them by
circumstances.
The Greek Chamber of Deputies, however, took
offense almost immediately. The new Minister of War,
General Yannakitsas, acted in a way so lacking in
respect toward the Chamber that Mr. Venizelos pro-
voked a political debate in the course of which he
delivered two great speeches (sitting of the 3d of
November, prolonged till 4 a.m. of the 4th). General
Yannakitsas having refused to express his regrets, and
the Cabinet having rallied to his support in spite of
the adverse vote of three of its members, Mr. Venizelos
raised the question of a vote of confidence in the gov-
ernment. Unmasking the ministry, he denounced the
unconstitutional nature of its power. He maintained
that the Greek constitutional monarchy was a republic
with a king at its head. As the name of the king had
thus been mentioned he explained his position as to the
sovereign’s intervention in the following words:
I admit as justifiable a disagreement between the Crown and
the responsible government when the Crown believes that the
latter is not in harmony with the opinion of the people. It was
under such conditions that in February, 1915, the change in
our policy was made. It was in this spirit that the Crown
and the government disagreed in February. But this disagree-THE GREEK QUESTION
43
ment was decisively ended by the vote of the people. If you
think that the Crown is excusable, according to the spirit of our
parliamentary regime, for disregarding this will as expressed by
the people in their free elections, free at any rate as far as the
manner in which the opposition carried on the contest is con-
cerned, though not free in view of the means employed by the
government; if you believe, I say, that the Crown has the right,
after appeal has been made to the people and the people has
expressed its will, not to follow this expressed will of the people
but to proceed to a new dissolution in order to demand the so-
called verdict of the people again and again, then this means
that you admit that the liberal regime in Greece, under which
we have lived for a half-century, has become worse than a scrap
of paper, the term which has been used by some people to
describe international treaties.
Messrs. Gounaris and Theotokis undertook then to
show that the schemes of Mr. Venizelos were leading
Greece to her ruin and that the casus foederis with Serbia
was not applicable. As this was the last sitting of the
Chamber and therefore gave Mr. Venizelos his last
chance to defend his policy before the legally constituted
representatives of the country, it is interesting to repro-
duce several extracts from his speech which have a
historical importance and of which the dispatches from
Athens gave at that time an incomplete and obscure
analysis. In reply to the charge of having been willing
to concede to Bulgaria at the beginning of 1915 the
districts of Drama, Cavalla and Seres, he gives the
following explanation:
It was a question only of the three districts of Cavalla, Drama
and Sari-Chaban, that is to say, of an area of about 2,000 square
kilometers. I proposed the cession of these three districts on the
following conditions and presuppositions:	First: that we should
receive the districts of Doi'ran and of Guevgheli, with an area of
1,000-1,200 square kilometers,—that is, of an extent equaling
about half of the territory to be ceded in eastern Macedonia.
From the point of view of richness, they were certainly inferior
in value, but from a strategical point of view they are of far
greater value. Further, our concessions to Bulgaria were made44
THE GREEK QUESTION
not in order to purchase Bulgaria’s neutrality but to enlist her
active help against Turkey, so that she might attack Turkey
from Thrace while we would make our attack from the Asia
Minor side, thus making the destruction of the Ottoman Empire
more rapid.
Further, we were ceding the 2,000 square kilometers on con-
dition that the powers of the Entente should recognize that the
vast territorial concessions which they had promised us should
have the extent that I outlined in my second communication to
the king. ... If you wish to know the probable area which
the cession of Smyrna and the principal part of its hinterland
would carry with it, you must take into account that the Hermos
and Meander rivers naturally belong to this hinterland and that
their valleys reach 275 kilometers into the interior of Asia
Minor.
Further, I demanded the appointment of an international com-
mission which would have proceeded to an exchange of popu-
lations as soon as the boundaries of Greece and Bulgaria had
been definitely traced. Bulgaria, moreover, would have bought
the property of such inhabitants of the ceded regions as might
have preferred to emigrate to the New Greece, the Greater
Greece, which my policy would have created, this policy that you
have not followed.
Mr. Theotokis cannot rightfully say, because we were at that
time disposed to cede Cavalla and Sari-Chaban, that “ a man
must be blind not to understand that Bulgaria, if she had re-
ceived these regions as well as all the Serbian possessions in
Macedonia, would have become colossally powerful and dangerous
to our existence.” For Bulgaria would have received from
Serbia only the non-contested zone which was to have reverted
to her by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty concluded before the war.
This non-contested zone had an extent of about 10,000 square
kilometers. This, added to the 2,000 square kilometers that we
would have ceded in eastern Macedonia and the 14,000 square
kilometers that she would have received in Thrace by the recti-
fication of the Enos-Midia line, would have made an increase of
about 25,000 square kilometers; she would have had then a total
area of 140,000 square kilometers. How can you then maintain
that this Bulgaria could have been dangerous as ever against
a Greece which by her increases of territory in Asia Minor would
have had an area of 250,000 square kilometers?
As to the Greco-Serbian treaty, Mr. Venizelos de-
clared that far from having been unwilling to apply itTHE GREEK QUESTION	45
at the beginning of the war, as his opponents contended,
he had come to an agreement with the Cabinet in Bel-
grade on this point in the month of August, 1914. He
affirmed that it was equally inexact to say that Serbia
in similar circumstances (in May, 1914) had refused her
aid to Greece.* Passing on, then, to the question of the
contingent of 150,000 men that Serbia was bound, by the
terms of the treaty, to put in array against Bulgaria in
order that the casus foederis should come into play, Mr.
Venizelos made these two points: 1—France and Eng-
land had promised to send 150,000 men to take the place
of the Serbian contingent; 2—Serbia had herself put in
line 120,000 men against Bulgaria, so that taking into
account what Serbia alone had done, she lacked only
30,000 men of having fulfilled the stipulation of the
treaty. Finally, leaving out of account the interpreta-
tion of the treaty, Mr. Venizelos undertook to prove that,
treaty or no treaty, Greece ought to hasten to the aid of
Serbia.
Mr. Theotokis thinks that the salvation of Greece is to come
from the Central Powers. I say to him, with the deepest con-
viction, that Greece not only cannot grow, but that she cannot
even continue to exist within her present confines, if she finds
herself opposed to the powers that control the sea. ... I am
justified in telling you to-day that you do not see clearly if you
maintain that in case Serbia should be destroyed and Bulgaria
should occupy a large part of her territories, it will be easy,
regardless of the final result of the war, to dislodge her from
the territories that she will have seized. Do you believe that at
the close of the European war the peoples that have taken part
in this exhausting struggle will for an instant permit their gov-
ernments to mark the signing of the peace by beginning a new
war, a war against Bulgaria to compel her to withdraw her
armies from the regions that she claims? I repeat once more
that in pursuing your policy you are making sure of only one
thing: the creation of a greater Bulgaria which before we shall
* Later, in his weekly journal, the Keryx, Mr. Venizelos told how Mr.
Pachiteh in May, 1914, had informed the Porte that if war broke out between
her and Greece, Serbia would not remain indifferent.46
THE GREEK QUESTION
have celebrated the centennial of our independence will rush upon
us, weakened militarily and without friends and allies.
Next, Mr. Venizelos compared the two Greeces that
were thus in conflict:
We have the former world of Greece represented by the new
Cabinet and the new world of Greece, the world of the time
following the revolution of 1909, represented by the liberal
party. The old conception, which the present Cabinet represents,
is that which believed that Greece could not produce an army of
more than 60,000 men; it is that which believed that Greece
could never contract an alliance that would help her to realize her
national aspirations; it is the Greece whose views about our
national aspirations were nebulous, and as undecided as they
were indefinite; it is the Greece whose preparations were as
insignificant as its aspirations were magnificent. We did not
then realize how far our just and legitimate aspirations might
extend. We let them reach so far oftentimes that statesmen who
were content with extending them only as far as Kroussovo were
accused by us of betraying the rights of Hellenism.
It is, then, natural that to-day too, when once more circum-
stances analogous to those of 1912 present themselves, it is
natural, I say, that our political conceptions should be as far
removed from each other as are the poles. Now as then, you
do not wish a war which necessitates the help of allies, and when
I tell you that the cup has not been finally taken from you,
that it will be brought again to your lips that you may drink
it to the dregs, you say, “ Well, it is your fault, for having
brought us as far as the Nestos.” * [Applause.]
Do you not think, then, gentlemen, that the New Greece is
justified in saying to the Old Greece: “ In the presence of the
great difficulties which are before us, you ought once more to
step aside and to give place to the New Greece which has the
courage necessary to meet the new situation.” [Shouts of
“ Bravo!” and prolonged applause.]
By 147 votes against 114, with three blank ballots, the
Chamber adopted the program of the liberal party,
judging the declarations of the government unsatisfac-
tory and censuring the conduct of the Minister of War.
* The river Mesta, which empties into the sea in the district of Cavalla.THE GREEK QUESTION
47
The first move of the king was to appoint General
Yannakitsas his aide-de-camp. Then he accepted the
resignation of Mr. Zaimis and charged with the for-
mation of the new Cabinet a Mr. Scouloudis, an octo-
genarian who had served in the ministry only once, and
then for but five months, when in 1897 he had been
minister with the portfolio of foreign affairs in Mr.
Rallis’ Cabinet. Mr. Scouloudis took this portfolio once
more into his own hands and retained most of the
members of Mr. Zaimis’ Cabinet, including Mr.
Gounaris and General Yannakitsas. The only new col-
league whose co-operation he secured was Mr. Micheli-
dakis, a Cretan, and an obstinate rival of Mr. Venizelos.
This series of acts constituted a declaration of war on
the Chamber, the liberal party and Mr. Venizelos. It
was followed by a decree of dissolution of the Chamber.
In one month Greece had reached the last stage on the
road toward absolutism.
The royalists concealed the sinister aspects of this
evolution as well as they could. According to their
views the Constitution conferred on the king, without any
limitation, the power to dismiss his ministers and to
dissolve the Chamber. Consequently Constantine I kept
within the limits of the Constitution in changing his
ministers and dissolving the Chamber as often as he
thought necessary. In fact, the Greek Constitution
contained no reservations as to the exercise of the power
to dismiss ministers or to dissolve the Chamber. But
this is the case generally in all parliamentary govern-
ments. Custom corrects textual omissions. No text can
settle in advance all the clashes that may possibly arise
between the different branches of the government. If
the power to change the Cabinet and to dissolve Parlia-
ment were actually unlimited, a constitutional regime
would be equivalent to a government at the king’s good
pleasure. In the last resort, it is the people who decide;
that is to say, when the sovereign makes use of his pre-48
THE GREEK QUESTION
rogatives in a way that is obviously contrary to the spirit
of the government the people makes known its will
by effective measures. This had been done in Greece in
1863, as in France in 1830. Nothing of the sort took
place at Athens in November, 1915, because the leader
of the majority did not wish it and the protecting powers
did not encourage it. In November the difficulty of
triumphing over the king was greater than in October.
The leader of the last legitimate government no longer
controlled any of the elements of public power; they
were all in the hands of his opponents. It was then only
logical that, having yielded in October, he should yield
again in November. In politics events are irresistibly
linked up one with another.
The same logic compelled the three protecting powers
to trust the formal protestations of friendship made by
the king and his ministers. Mr. Scouloudis certainly did
his duty along this line. In a note of November 9,
addressed to the Entente Powers, he gave them “ the
most formal assurances of his firm resolve to continue a
most sincerely benevolent neutrality ” toward them.
“ The new Cabinet,” he added, “ adopts as its own the
declarations of Mr. Zaimis as to the attitude of the
royal government in its relation to the Allied troops in
Saloniki. It is too fully conscious of the true interests
of the country and of what it owes to the protecting
powers to depart in the slightest degree from this line
of conduct.” At the same time the confidential repre-
sentatives of Constantine I in the capitals of the Entente
were telling all who were willing to listen to them that
the king had been misjudged, and that from now on all
that was needed to establish the most perfect harmony
between the court of Athens and the Entente was to rid
him of Mr. Venizelos. It was on the basis of these
fair words that the Anglo-French force that had
landed at Saloniki a month earlier began operations
in Macedonia.THE GREEK QUESTION
49
Gloomy months followed. While our expeditionary
force spent itself in vain efforts to help the Serbians,
driven back by superior forces, the royal dictatorship
extended its hold over all Greece. The protecting
powers raised no protest. Their excuse was that they
desired to avoid interfering with the internal affairs of
Greece. Constantine I heaped compliments and marks
of favor on such members of the French and English
governments as visited Athens. M. Denys Cochin and
Lord Kitchener were successively the recipients of signs
of friendship. And yet, notwithstanding all this, less
than fifteen days after his appointment Mr. Scouloudis
announced his intention to disarm and intern Allied
troops, whether Serbian or Anglo-French, who might
be driven back on to Greek territory. Emboldened by
unexpected complacency or even by encouraging con-
fidential statements on the part of personages of the
Entente who were opposed to the Macedonian enter-
prise, he pretended to apply strictly in the matter the
ordinary rules of neutrality. It required “ commercial
restrictions ” and a threatening note in order to recall
him to a sense of respect for Greece’s obligations and
his own promises of November 9. On the 24th of
November, after a painful discussion, he consented to
permit the Allied troops liberty of movement and the
use of the necessary ways and means of transport. One
of the members of the Cabinet, however, characterized
this agreement very exactly in the following words:
“ The matter has been happily arranged, thanks to the
broad views of Germany, who has kindly consented not
to place any obstacles in the way of our benevolent
neutrality toward the Entente.” In Greece, then, the
Allies benefited no longer by the benevolence of Greece
but by that of Germany! William II advised Con-
stantine to be patient till such time as the armies of
these two brothers-in-law could together fall upon ours.
There was no election campaign. Mr. Venizelos50
THE GREEK QUESTION
requested his friends not to run for office and advised
the electors not to vote. According to his idea, abstain-
ing from voting was the only way for the liberal party
to show its strength. As a matter of fact, half of the
voters were under arms, including fifty-three Venizelist
deputies. The government was ready to give furloughs
to its supporters while withholding them from its
opponents. This consulting of the electorate was, then,
a downright farce, and those elected were not even sure
of being allowed to take their seats, because this de-
pended on authorization by the military powers. If the
liberals participated in the balloting the government
would not hesitate to maintain that the people had rati-
fied its policy. It was better to leave to the old parties,
illegally returned to power, the responsibility for events.
At a meeting of the liberal party held at his house
November 21 Mr. Venizelos had this policy adopted,
and on the same day published an explanatory manifesto
of which these were the closing words:
The government wishes to play a political comedy unworthy of
a free people. It is in a spirit of mockery that it has called this
an expression of the national will. This political comedy is
really intended to prevent the expression of the national will by
means of a dishonest election, and to cause it to be believed that
the Greek people could not only countenance the disgrace of
the non-fulfillment of a treaty of alliance, which has made it
possible for Greece to extend its frontiers as far as the Nestos,
but also could approve of the degradation of our political
regime and the estrangement of the natural friends of Greece.
In a comedy like this, I say, the liberal party is in duty bound
to take no part, in order not to lend an appearance of legality
to this action which ought, in conformity with the facts of the
case, to be denounced as a violation of constitutional law and
morality.
The liberal party, in thus refusing to participate in the elec-
tions, does not abandon politics nor withdraw from the struggle.
On the contrary, by this abstention, it continues to participate
in political affairs. It leaves to the government, which has
brought us into this situation, full and entire responsibility forTHE GREEK QUESTION
51
the deterioration of our political regime and for the disasters
which this policy is bringing upon the nation. At the same time,
our party is also trying to avoid other dangers likely to result
from an internal struggle, which might quickly become acute,
now that we are in the midst of an external crisis as well.
When this external crisis shall have passed, if the disasters
that the policy of the government is preparing for us do not
assume such proportions as to shatter our faith in the future of
Hellenism, the liberal party will be ready to undertake the
struggle into which the country is forced in order to defend its
constitutional liberty.
No matter how acute this future struggle may be, it will be
continued then under conditions less dangerous than those under
which it would be carried on to-day when we are in the midst of the
most dangerous national crisis that we have ever experienced.
The restoration of their liberties to the Greek people will be
the one indispensable condition of the safety of the state. This
alone can preserve her from wasting away and dying an in-
glorious death, the end toward which the definitive establishment
of despotism in our country would surely lead.
On the 19th of December, the day of the election, only
200,000 citizens voted although the voters of the 13th
of June had numbered 750,000. This was a little less
than one-fifth of the registered voters. And yet the
government had used a veritable wealth of means of
compulsion: suspension of the rule that certain employees
could not be removed, the discharge of men in office, the
distribution of lands to the Mohammedans of Macedonia,
threats to the directors and editors of the newspapers of
the opposition, espionage, infringements on the right
to assemble and so forth. It was this Chamber, thus
elected, which served as a shield to Constantine’s despotic
government.
Indeed, the king delegated all his powers to his mili-
tary council, presided over by General Dousmanis, to
whom the Cabinet ministers served simply as tools.
With the co-operation of the military attache of Ger-
many the staff prepared the eventual co-operation of
the Greek army with the German-Bulgarians coming52
THE GREEK QUESTION
from the north. German pamphlets were gratuitously
and profusely distributed in the barracks, where, on the
contrary, the reading of liberal journals was forbidden
under heaviest penalties. Volunteers recruited in the
1st regiment of the army corps of Athens, of which
the Crown Prince was colonel, formed a sort of royal
body guard and served as an agency of propaganda.
The army was withdrawn from its military duty in
order to be employed for political purposes. In 1909
Mr. Venizelos had adopted precisely the opposite
method. Though called to Greece by the Military
League, he had shortly afterwards proceeded to dissolve
it and had sent the army back to its professional duties.
He had put an end to anarchy and had prevented civil
war by sending each man back to his place and by
substituting an ordered democracy for a oligarchy gov-
erned by demagogues. Constantine I brought back
disorder, prepared the way for civil war, cut the country
in two internally and delivered its frontiers to an enemy
beyond its gates. The Cretan revolutionary acted as a
statesman, while the king behaved like a revolutionary.*
* The Keryx, in the month of June, after the crisis was past, described
the situation as it had existed, as follows:
“ The attempt was made to strangle the national soul and to inspire abject
terror by any means whatsoever, in order that the people might bow before the
deadly results of the policy employed. Whole armies of spies and intriguers
were formed, with all their elements eager to sell their very souls. Citizens who
had no interest in politics were followed both openly and secretly by detectives
without being able to imagine what political calumny was being hatched
against them. Those who met in the public centers of the two cities did not
dare to ask each other for the news of the day, in the certainty that among
the strangers about them were base spies whose business it was to weave slan-
derous plots. Those who took places at tables in caf£s and confectioners’
shops looked around in a frightened way and beheld the respectable person,
who was about to sit down beside them, listening to their conversation and
addressing them with insolent frankness with the intention of provoking a dis-
cussion, and of crying out to these innocent citizens that they were insulting
the king.
“ The most respectable citizens were dragged before the courts on slanderous
charges, those who dared to blame the conduct of the government received
menacing letters in which they were warned to look out for their lives. Auto-
mobiles and carriages were stopped and their occupants asked who they were,
where they came from and whither they were going. In front of many
houses detectives were placed keeping count of those who entered or passed
out, following like ‘ faithful ’ dogs every movement of the occupants. Men53
THE GREEK QUESTION
The real nature of that “most sincerely benevolent”
neutrality, promised by the Scouloudis Cabinet, was
shown at once by the ill-treatment of the conquered
Serbians, who had succeeded in escaping from the
Germano-Bulgarian grip. In order to anticipate the
effects of this ill-will, warships of the Allied fleet on
January 10, 1916, landed some detachments at Corfu
and prepared to receive there the wreck of the Serbian
army which had taken refuge on the Albanian coast.
By a note of that same day the representatives of the
Allied powers informed Mr. Scouloudis of this measure
dictated by “ a feeling of pure humanity.” Reluctantly,
Mr. Scouloudis yielded to the inevitable, but he took his
revenge by concluding with Bulgaria an arrangement,
the existence of which was later revealed by the
Hungarian newspaper Az Est, which published the
following Bulgarian note:
Since the capture of Bitolia (Monastir) and of Resna the
Bulgarian army has approached close to the Greek frontier. In
consequence of this movement the general staff of Bulgaria is
afraid that on the frontier collisions may easily arise between
the outposts of the Bulgarian army and those of the Greeks.
Desirous of avoiding the possibility of such accidents the
Bulgarian government invites the Greek government to consent
to the creation of a neutral zone on the Greco-Serbian frontier
as has been already done on the Greco-Bulgarian frontier and
to be willing that along the Greek frontier the troops be with-
drawn on both sides for the distance of a gun-shot.
Some weeks later, in April, the government of Athens
flatly refused to let the Serbian troops who had been
kindly received at Corfu, and who had now recovered
of all sorts and of the most peaceful character were searched for hidden
weapons, while right before them passed quite openly the minions of the gov-
ernment. Every hangman was armed, every individual that would sell him-
self was bought, every man devoid of conscience was recruited for this work
of espionage, calumny and perfidy. The times of Turkish despotism knew no
more dangerous organizations. Janissarism lived once more in a different54
THE GREEK QUESTION
from their trials and had been equipped afresh, to
rejoin the Anglo-French expeditionary force in Mace-
donia by passing over Greek territory	or through	the
Corinthian Canal. It alleged that	the	passage	of	the
Serbian soldiers would endanger public health, would
interfere with the passenger and freight traffic, would
violate the neutrality of Greece and menace its inde-
pendence. The first two objections were in fact un-
founded. The third had only an apparent value. As
a matter of fact, even if Greece	was	neutral	in	the
European conflict, she was Serbia’s	ally	in virtue	of	the
treaty of 1913. The alliance was not destroyed by
the refusal to give the help provided for by the treaty.
The Cabinet of Belgrade had carefully avoided regard-
ing this refusal as a rupture. It did not despair of being
able to bring Greece back to the feeling that it was its
duty to defend the common interests of the two countries.
Now, over and above the auxiliary force of 150,000 men,
the treaty of June, 1913, provided for facilitating the
transportation of troops of each of the signatory states
through the territories of the other. If the ministers of
Constantine I had really been animated toward the
Allies by the sentiments expressed in their note of the
9th of November, they would have hastened to give them
this permission which would have cost Greece nothing
and would have formed a poor compensation for their
failure to fulfill the clause as to giving aid. As for the
menace to her national independence, this was chimerical.
It was evident that the Serbian troops would hasten
away to Macedonia without delaying in Old Greece.
Besides, the route through the Corinthian Canal obviated
this pretended danger.
Mr. Scouloudis’ ill-will was equaled by his bad faith.
This first showed itself in the month of May. On the
23d of this month a column of Germano-Bulgarian
troops appeared before Fort Rupel at the entrance of
the Demir-Hissar Pass and summoned the Greek gar-THE GREEK QUESTION
55
rison to surrender, declaring that they had been ordered
to penetrate into Greek territory “ in order to occupy
certain advantageous positions.” The occupants of the
fort at first refused. They even fired twenty-four
cannon shots against the invaders, but during the night
they received the order to withdraw. In the Chamber,
on June 5, Mr. Scouloudis thus explained this order:
“ Being aware on the one hand of the resolve of the
invaders to seize the fort and seeing on the other hand
that a continued armed resistance might at any moment
lead to a general engagement which would result in
breaking a neutrality that it had no intention of aban-
doning, the government issued the following order
through the Minister of War: ‘First to cease all re-
sistance, and then to declare to the German commander
that in view of the general invasion of the German army
in the pass of Demir-Hissar, where the fort is, the
garrison of the fort is obliged to retire, taking with it
the war material in the fort.’ ”
The explanation was very pretty. In order not to
depart from neutrality—always the same old excuse—
the Greek government let the Bulgarians, its irrecon-
cilable enemies, seize its territories and occupy a group
of newly built fortifications, the construction of which
had cost relatively large amounts of money. Mr.
Scouloudis declared before the Chamber that he had
protested most energetically to Germany and her allies,
and he also launched out into pompous denials of the
suspected understanding with the Germano-Bulgarians.
And yet, this understanding actually did exist. This
was proven by documents found later in the military
offices of the IVth army corps and published in fac-
simile. Although at that time this was only a suspicion,
several deputies of this shadowy chamber murmured.
As a sort of relief for their irritation, Mr. Scouloudis
announced that on the Saturday before, June 3, the
king’s fete-day, General Sarrail had proclaimed martial56
THE GREEK QUESTION
law in Saloniki and that the Greek government had at
once protested. Thereupon, Mr. Stratos expressed his
opinion that all the stir about the occupation of the
Rupel Pass was unjustified and that the proclamation
of martial law at Saloniki was of far greater importance.
He ended by saying that Mr. Venizelos had had in view
only the aggrandizement of Bulgaria. A deputy named
Mitropoulos shouted “ Cannot the man guilty of such
crimes be prosecuted?” Mr. Stratos demanded that a
prosecuting attorney should be called on to act.
That was the way this Rump Parliament made Mr.
Venizelos responsible for the capture of the Rupel
forts.
Public opinion did not take the thing so calmly. The
Macedonians were disturbed. Patriots who were not
blinded by hatred for Venizelos and abject devotion to
the king were startled at the spectacle of their enemies
of 1912-13 firmly established in the lands won by the
victories of these two glorious years. They recalled to
Constantine I that he had then won the title of Bulgar
Slayer and repeated his dispatch to his Minister of
Foreign Affairs, sent on the 25th of June, 1913:
Urgent dispatch of His Majesty, the King, to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs.
June 25.
The sixth division reports that Bulgarian soldiers, at the
command of a police officer, led into the courtyard of the local
Bulgarian school the Metropolitan of Demir-Hissar, two priests
and more than two hundred prominent citizens and massacred
them there. The division staff ordered the bodies exhumed and
established the fact of the crime. The Bulgarians, furthermore,
violated girls and killed one girl who resisted.
Protest, by my order, before the representatives of the civi-
lized powers against these monsters with human faces. Protest
before the civilized world and declare that I shall find myself
forced, to my regret, to proceed to reprisals in order to inspire
some fear or' some reflection as to consequences before crimes
like these are perpetrated.THE GREEK QUESTION
57
The acts of the Bulgarians have made all the atrocities of past
barbarian invasions fade into insignificance. They prove that
the Bulgarians no longer have the right to be included among
civilized peoples.
Constantine R.
If Constantine I showed himself perfectly reassured
as to these people whom he had three years before
banished from the civilized world, the Allies did not
share these sentiments. The right wing of their expedi-
tionary force was menaced. The bulk of the army could
be attacked on the flank at a moment when it might
be engaged in a serious operation in the northwest.
Furthermore, the Bulgarians were not the only ones to
inspire apprehensions. The connivance of the Scou-
loudis Cabinet with them furnished ground for appre-
hension. Toward the end of May, General Yannakitsas
warned his troops that they might soon be called on to
fight. But against whom, pray, since Greece was main-
taining a strict neutrality? Some days later at the close
of a review of troops who had taken part in the grand
manoeuvers, the king made an address in which he said:
“ Soldiers ought to be obedient to orders, not to senti-
ments.” Further, Constantine I on the pretext of going
hunting went on an excursion of six days in upper
Thessaly in the vicinity of that Albano-Epirote region
where the Austrian troops were operating. The tone of
his speeches, his manner, and his actions themselves
should have warned us to be on our guard. On the
12th of June “popular” manifestations against France
and England took place in the capital. Since these
powers had neglected to act at the moment when a
decisive result might easily have been obtained, they were
now forced by necessity to take effective precautions
against an imminent danger. They at once organized
a landing force under the orders of Admiral Moreau and
transported it to the Bay of Salamis. Though the in-
structions given to the admiral and the representatives58
THE GREEK QUESTION
of the Entente in Athens have never been divulged, there
is reason to believe that the intention of the protecting
powers was to settle the Greek affair with one stroke and
to re-establish in its integrity the constitutional regime
with appropriate material guarantees. Unfortunately,
at the last moment, these intentions were modified.
Either owing to some diplomatic intervention or because
Constantine I, warned of the blow that was threatening
him, took the first steps toward submission, the ministers
of the three protecting powers contented themselves with
sending Mr. Scouloudis on the 21st of June an ulti-
matum. This document was in truth unusually curt.
After having called attention to the “ many legitimate
grounds for suspecting the Greek government,” to the
activities of foreigners who were trying to create on
Greek territory hostile organizations contrary to the
neutrality of the country and tending to compromise the
security of the military and naval forces of the Allies,
to the connivance of the Greek Cabinet with the
Germano-Bulgarians in the Rupel affair, to the violation
of the Greek constitution and the evident “ collusion of
the present Cabinet with their enemies,” the protecting
powers demanded the immediate execution, without dis-
cussion or delay, of the following measures:
1.	The actual and total demobilization of the Greek army,
which must be put, with the briefest delay, on a peace footing.
2.	That the present ministry should be at once replaced by
a business Cabinet without political color which should offer all
necessary guarantees for the loyal fulfillment of that benevolent
neutrality toward the Allied powers that Greece had promised to
observe, and should vouch for the honesty of new elections.
3.	An immediate dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, fol-
lowed by new elections, after the expiration of the time-limit
provided by the Constitution and after the general demobilization
should have restored the electoral body to its normal state.
4.	The replacing, after consultation with the Allies, of cer-
tain police functionaries whose attitude, inspired by foreign in-
fluences, had facilitated outrages committed against peaceable59
THE GREEK QUESTION
citizens, as well as insults directed at the Allied legations and
people under their jurisdiction.
The king submitted. Many of those who were privy
to these negotiations supposed, nay hoped, that he would
prefer to abdicate rather than to submit to such mor-
tifying conditions. If he had been guided by motives
originating in a feeling of wounded self-respect, he would
probably have given up the struggle from this moment.
But without any doubt he was advised by William II to
bend the neck and to keep his throne while waiting for
better times. So he dismissed the docile Mr. Scouloudis
and charged Mr. Za'imis with the duty of forming a new
Cabinet. It was Mr. Za'imis who, on June 23, signed
the promise to execute in their entirety the demands
formulated in the ultimatum of the 21st. On the 29th
of June the general demobilization was decreed, and on
the 31st of July the army was once more put on a
peace footing. Many functionaries were replaced or dis-
charged, but the Chamber was not discharged, under the
pretext that it was impossible, because of circumstances,
to decide at that time, as the Constitution demanded, the
date of the coming elections. The Chamber was, there-
fore, simply adjourned. General Dousmanis and Mr.
Streit, the two secret advisers of the king, continued to
hold their positions. The pro-Entente newspapers were
prosecuted for having “ defamed and insulted the govern-
ment and the army,” when as a matter of fact they had
at that time been indulging in the gentlest sort of criti-
cism. The very life of Mr. Venizelos was threatened,
so that he was obliged to protect himself with a body-
guard of his faithful Cretans. This did not, however,
hinder him from energetically conducting his electoral
campaign in view of the great national election that was
approaching. The magnificent resistance at Verdun, the
Franco-British success on the Somme, the victorious
offensive of General Broussilof in Galicia and Bukovina60
THE GREEK QUESTION
gave to his electioneering a turn that was very disquieting
to the royalists.
Constantine I resolved at that time on an act that will
eternally weigh heavily on his reputation. Fearing, in
spite of an unbridled anti-Venizelist propaganda, and the
formation of leagues of reservists who put force at the
disposal of the election agents of the government, fear-
ing, I say, that the Venizelists would be returned in large
majority to the new Chamber, the king wished at any
price to postpone the elections indefinitely. To achieve
this end he contrived the invasion of eastern and western
Macedonia by the Germano-Bulgarians. Descending the
valley of the Strouma, the Bulgarians seized all the ports
of the valley and the cities of Drama, Seres and Cavalla.
They carried away the garrisons and had them trans-
ported to Germany. They got possession of war ma-
terial consisting of 200 cannon of the latest model, 50,000
rifles, great stores of ammunition and different kinds of
equipment, etc. The Greek troops had received definite
orders not to resist the Bulgarians and to enter into no
common action with the French. Those who did not
wish to submit to the humiliation of internment were
obliged to take refuge as best they could within the
radius of action of the expeditionary force of the Allies.
Out of 4,500 men and 200 officers of the garrison of
Cavalla, 2,200 soldiers and about 120 officers with
Colonels Christodoulou and Lelakis crossed over to the
island of Thasos; 700 men with 40 officers set sail for
the Pireus; the rest with Colonel Hadjopoulos who
commanded the 6th division were directed by the Bul-
garians toward Drama. In the localities that they seized
the Bulgarians gave themselves up to the most savage
acts of violence against the inhabitants, who, since their
precipitate departure in 1913, had been described to them
as hostile.*
* These events took place in the interval between the 20th of August and
the beginning of September.THE GREEK QUESTION
61
This time the measure had been heaped full to over-
flowing. It was no longer a matter of a difference of
opinion about the Constitution; it was a clear case of
treason. Constantine I accepted as a satisfactory guar-
antee on the part of the invaders the assurance from the
ministers of Germany and Bulgaria in Athens that
Greek sovereignty would be respected, that the German
and Bulgarian troops would evacuate the Greek territory
thus occupied as soon as military conditions would
permit, and that the inhabitants would be indemnified
for all the damage caused. A vigorous movement of
protestation took place at once. On Monday, the 27th
of August, an immense crowd gathered before Mr. Veni-
zelos’ house to cheer for the leader of the liberal party.
Mr. Venizelos addressed these 60,000 citizens and pro-
posed to them to elect a delegation which should submit
to the king a stirring appeal of which he then and there
read the text. He did not break with the monarch; he
only entreated him to return to a sense of his obligations
as king. On this point, the peroration of his address
was particularly significant: “You will see, O King, by
the meeting of to-day that the liberal party is not the
enemy of the Crown any more than it is of the royal
family; nor is it your personal enemy. It is only the
respectful guardian of free government and admits no
deviation on this point. But just here, too, lies the real
interest of the Crown. Only those who exploit the latter
can seek to persuade you of the contrary and they are
then really your worst enemies.” But Constantine I
had no intention of receiving a delegation of liberals or
of replying to their appeal. He announced that he was
ill, and that the publication of the decree of dissolution
of the Chamber and of convocation of the electors would
have to be delayed for some time longer. During this
illness, real or pretended, events came on thick and fast.
The intrigues of the German agents assumed such pro-
portions and the acts of the governmental functionaries62	THE GREEK QUESTION
were so hostile to the Entente that on September 1 a
strong Franco-British squadron, under the orders of
Admiral Dartige du Fournet, commander-in-chief of
the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, came to anchor
in the harbor of Salamis. On the 2d the ministers of
France and England demanded control of the postal,
telegraph and wireless communications, the expulsion of
hostile agents of corruption and espionage, and penalties
for the Greek subjects who had participated in the acts
of corruption and espionage above described. Mr.
Zaimis could do nothing else but yield. The disorders,
nevertheless, kept on increasing. The leagues of reser-
vists organized meetings of protest against the demands
of the Entente. On the 10th of September a band of
about twenty-five persons made their way into the garden
of the French Legation, and discharged their pistols in
the air, shouting, “ Long live the king! Down with
France! ” Mr. Zaimis had to present his regrets to M.
Guillemin, and have them presented at the Quai d’Orsay
in Paris by Mr. Romanos. He was obliged to guarantee
the infliction of penalties upon the guilty men and to
promise to close at once the various sections of the
League of Reservists both in Athens and in the
provinces.
However, the Bulgarian invasion cut the Greek army
in two materially and morally. The soldiers who had
escaped from eastern Macedonia and almost the entire
garrison of Saloniki formed themselves into an army for
national defense and put themselves at General Sarrail’s
disposal to resist the Bulgarians. A committee for
national defense, at the head of which was Colonel
Zymbracakis, addressed a proclamation to the people in
order to incite them “ to cease to obey the authorities
who had betrayed the national honor,” and another
proclamation to the army to urge it to place itself under
the orders of the committee with a view to the liberation
of the fatherland. These appeals found numerous echoes.THE GREEK QUESTION
63
Furious at what he called a defection, the king received
in solemn audience the officers of the 5th division
(Saloniki) who had refused to make common cause with
their comrades of the national defense and he congratu-
lated them emphatically: “You have inscribed your
names in the annals of history with a pen of iron. You
have shown an example of an iron discipline, of a faith
and devotion toward your king and your leader that is
proof against every test. By your attitude you have
stigmatized as traitors those who have betrayed their
oath and among whom, unfortunately, your commanding
officer is counted. . . . With such an army and at the
head of men like you, possessing your morale, your sen-
timents and your faith, I am ready to face no matter
what enemy.” As the officers thus congratulated had
been unwilling to fight the Germano-Bulgarians, this
“ no matter what enemy ” that the king had in mind
could only be the expeditionary force of the Entente.
In spite of so many disturbing indications, Mr. Veni-
zelos still clung to the hope of winning the king back to
the national cause. Rumania had declared war on
Austria-Hungary on the 28th of August, an event of
great importance to Europe, but of especial importance
to Greece. For more than a year General Dousmanis
himself had said that the moment Rumania entered the
war Greece would be obliged to do the same. Without
doubt, he did not believe that King Ferdinand, a Hohen-
zollem, would turn against Germany, but the opinion
that he expressed was a political necessity so evident that
Mr. Venizelos thought that he ought to make a supreme
effort. He describes the steps he took in the following
terms: *
I informed Mr. Zai'mis that if the king, contrary to what his
courtiers had declared, was still unwilling to side with the
Entente, he would prove by this very act, before the whole world,
* Interview given March 13, 1917, to the special envoy of the Havas Agency.64
THE GREEK QUESTION
that he was following a pro-German and not a Greek policy, and
I	added that I should in that case consider it my duty to revolt.
Mr. Zaimis, on the basis of this declaration and appealing to
the signs of impatience and even of disorder that began to show
themselves in the army, obtained from the king his promise to
enter upon negotiations with the nations of the Entente looking
to an emergence from her neutrality. The king even authorized
him to put himself in touch with me so as to keep me informed
of all the negotiations as they occurred.
But meanwhile the German Emperor telegraphed to the king
to assure him that within a month he would certainly have con-
quered all Rumania and have thrown Sarrail’s army into the sea.
He asked him, therefore, to resist the Venizelist policy for four
weeks more. With all docility the king obeyed, yielding to the
injunctions of his brother-in-law, and ten days after he had
seemed to be about to side with the powers of the Entente he
threw aside the mask and returned to his self-willed policy.
Mr. Zaimis, realizing that he was being mocked, refused to
play the king’s game and resigned. The moment to act had
come; the country had seen light; the king never would move.
Admiral Coundouriotis, disheartened by such criminality,
joined me along with General Danglis, and we decided at once
to raise the standard of revolt.
Mr. Zaimis handed in his resignation as Prime
Minister on the 11th of September. In spite of the
solicitations of Messrs. Gounaris and Rhallis, he per-
sisted in his refusal to serve, and it was very difficult
for the king to find a successor. He did not dare to
recall Mr. Gounaris, his confidential adviser, whose
nomination would have constituted a violation of Article
II	of the ultimatum of June 21. And yet he had to
have someone who, under the cloak of neutrality, should
ruin the Venizelist policy within and without the country.
By the mediation of Mr. Streit, his unofficial Minister
of Foreign Affairs, he at once offered the position with
this understanding to Mr. Dimitracopoulos. But the
latter, upon ascertaining that it would be impossible for
him to maintain his position owing to the refusal of the
ministers of the Entente to withdraw their insistence on
the execution of the conditions of the ultimatum of65
THE GREEK QUESTION
June 21, resigned the office. Several days were spent
in new efforts. Finally, on the 16th of September, Mr.
Nicolas Calogeropoulos, former associate of Mr. George
Theotokis and conspicuous member of the aristocratic
Germanophile coterie, formed a ministry composed of
second-rate men who were notorious anti-Venizelists.
His personal sentiments were well known. In June,
1915, he had been heard to say publicly, while speaking
of the leader of the liberal party: “We must have this
traitor’s blood.”
The formation of this Cabinet was a challenge to the
Entente. The ministers of the protecting powers refused
to have anything to do with it. When questioned about
this, Mr. Calogeropoulos replied: “According to diplo-
matic custom, immediately after the formation of the
Cabinet, the foreign representatives visit the Prime
Minister. If this takes place, in common courtesy, we
shall immediately return the visit.” The expected visit
did not take place. Then Mr. Calogeropoulos published
the following communication: “ The declarations which
have been made by the Prime Minister and in accordance
with which the present government is not a Cabinet in
the ordinary sense of the word, hut has a political char-
acter, must be understood as follows: the ministry, com-
posed of persons belonging to the Parliament, assumes
before the country all responsibility for its acts, accept-
ing, be it understood, the note of the powers of June 21
in the same spirit as did the Zaimis Cabinet.” In spite
of this express acceptance of the ultimatum of June 21,
the ministers of the Entente persisted in holding aloof.
The tension reached its height. From all the larger
islands of the Cyclades came manifestos, approved by
large assemblies, urging Constantine I to recall Mr.
Venizelos without delay and threatening in case of re-
fusal to establish a revolutionary government. These
demonstrations did not shake the king’s resolve. Their
only effect was to render him more insolent.66
THE GREEK QUESTION
On the 20th of September, before the infantry bar-
racks of Athens and in the presence of 5,000 soldiers
gathered for the ceremony of administering the oath to
the new recruits, the king delivered a speech breathing
the purest absolutism. He declared to the young sol-
diers that they were from now on “ soldiers of the king,”
that they owed a blind devotion “ to the will of the king,”
and he warned them not to yield to suggestions intended
to mislead them: “Do not listen,” he cried, “to the
advice of the profiteers of patriotism, since for them
patriotism is only a screen behind which they hide
in order to commit crimes.” These were the very
words of William II. “ Voluntas regis suprema lex
esto.”
On the next day, Patris, the organ of Mr. Venizelos,
characterized this speech as contrary to the fundamental
principles of the Constitution, surpassing the very worst
conceptions of absolutism. Mr. Venizelos himself de-
clared publicly that the nation ought at once to take the
defense of its interests into its own hands.
On the 22d, Colonel Zymbracakis reviewed on the
parade ground of Saloniki the contingents of Mace-
donian volunteers who were ready to join the army of
Sarrail. The same day, Mr. Calogeropoulos decided to
institute lawsuits against all the officers, non-commis-
sioned officers and private soldiers “ who had adhered to
the revolutionary movement.” On the 24th, the Congress
of Hellenic Colonies assembled in Paris pronounced the
deposition of King Constantine. On the 25th, at half-
past four in the morning, Mr. Venizelos, accompanied by
Admiral Coundouriotis, commander-in-chief of the Greek
navy and a group of friends, set sail from Phalerum for
Crete. Received with enthusiasm at Canea by the people
and by the troops he issued a proclamation to the Greek
people. After describing the disorders resulting from
the fatal policy of the king during the last year and a
half, he concluded:THE GREEK QUESTION
67
It is not the time now to try to find those who are responsible
for our accumulated misfortunes. The duty imposed on us is to
try, while there is still time, to save what can be saved. The
surest way to find safety would certainly be to re-establish our
broken national unity, in order that this work may be undertaken
with the co-operation of all the nation’s forces.
But there is only one possible means of re-forming this broken
national unity. It is to return without delay to the policy which
the national conscience dictates; it is to attempt at the side of
our Serbian allies and of the great powers who are battling with
them, three of whom are guarantors of our independence, to free
our territory from the invasion of this detested enemy; it is to
co-operate with these powers so that not only shall Europe be
finally and forever freed from the danger of the German hege-
mony, but that the Balkans too may be freed from Bulgarian
pretensions to supremacy.
We shall count ourselves happy if the king decides, at this
supreme moment, to put himself at the head of the national
forces, so that, in an indissoluble union, we may attempt the
realization of this national policy. But if this cannot be ob-
tained, there remains but one means of safety, that is, the
isolated action of that part of the nation which believes that if
we do not co-operate with our natural allies in the re-creation
of the Orient which is bound to result from the great European
war, the Greek government and the Greek nation will go down
to ruin.
For this reason taking on ourselves, with a feeling of duty but
also with enthusiasm, the mission entrusted to us by the people,
we appeal to all Hellenism and demand its help in the work that
we are undertaking. Since the government has betrayed its
obligations, it is incumbent upon the nation to attempt the
realization of the task imposed upon it. We invoke the support
of every Greek citizen who feels that a longer tolerance of the
disasters and humiliations which the policy which we have fol-
lowed has caused, would be equivalent to the death of the
nation.
We undertake this struggle in the full conviction that the
nation, summoned, in the defection of the State, to a rising in
mass, will realize once more the miracle which is necessary to
bring the nation back to the way from which it has wandered for
a year and a half.
Immediately, adherents flocked to the cause. In all
the larger islands of the Cyclades, the royalist authori-68
THE GREEK QUESTION
ties were deposed and replaced by Venizelists. From
Athens itself many officers, followed by non-commis-
sioned officers and private soldiers, set sail for Saloniki.
The committee for national defense put itself entirely
at the disposal of the government that was forming.
The permanent bureau (in Paris) of the Congress of
Greek Colonies sent a telegram of adherence to Mr.
Venizelos, promising to follow him “ on the path of honor
and glory ” to which he had committed the Greek race.
From Canea, Messrs. Venizelos and Coundouriotis sent
to M. Briand, President of the Council and Minister of
Foreign Affairs of France, a dispatch congratulating
him on the recent success of the French troops on the
Somme and containing warm wishes for the final success
of the Allies. It was the first contact of the provisional
government with a foreign government. M. Briand
thanked the signers of the telegram through the consul
of France at Canea.
The miracle, the vision of which guided Mr. Venizelos
over the waters of the Archipelago, was accomplished at
this moment. New Greece, becoming the guardian of
the sacred fire of the fatherland, peacefully conquered
the Old, and Hellas began to believe once more in her
destiny.PART III
The departure of Mr. Venizelos for Canea gave rise
to curious and diverse comments. While it was generally-
interpreted in France, in England and especially in New
Greece and the islands as the beginning of a patriotic
campaign destined to produce great results, the circles
devoted to the king affected to regard it as a confession
of weakness, if not as a flight. We may even question
whether the government in Athens did not actually look
on this move with favor, in the hope that the prestige of
the leader of the liberal party would vanish with his
departure from the capital. The friends of the Royal
Family in Greece as well as elsewhere were inclined to
compare his departure to that of General Boulanger for
Brussels in 1889. . . . Did Mr. Calogeropoulos wish to
pose as the Greek Constant? Certain it is that he per-
mitted the news to spread that co-operation of Greece
with the Entente was again possible. He demanded
only, so it was said, a definite period of delay, so as
to permit the reorganization of the military forces of the
country before involving it in the war. Even the atti-
tude of the protecting powers toward this move on the
part of Mr. Venizelos was not very clearly defined. It
soon appeared that their support of him, a support that
was absolutely necessary if he was to succeed in his enter-
prise, had been subordinated to the condition that this
should not take the form of an antidynastic movement.*
JNow, in order to produce its full effect the movement
ought to have started upon the arrival of the liberal
leaders at Canea, with a proclamation deposing the king,
or at least with the convocation, in a city removed from
* Mr. Venizelos declared later, in 1917, that this condition had actually been
imposed upon him.
6970
THE GREEK QUESTION
royalist control, either of the Chamber that had been
illegally dissolved or of an assembly of delegates from
all parts of free Greece. Embarrassed by the engage-
ment that he had been forced to make, Mr. Venizelos was
obliged to restrain the demonstrations of his followers
instead of encouraging them. The friends of the Royal
Family profited by this false position to insinuate that
the grand national movement was a failure. At the
same time any allusion in the French press to the possi-
bility of a change of reign was suppressed by the censor.
French publicists were forbidden to advocate the for-
mation of a Greek government bent on breaking down
the resistance of Constantine I.
Mr. Calogeropoulos decided that the proper time had
come for him to withdraw, and on the 4th of October
he made known his resignation in the following remark-
able communication: “ The government having been
unable up to the present moment to get in touch with
the representatives of the Entente Powers here in
Athens, and considering its existence an obstacle to the
progress of national affairs, has asked the king to accept
the resignation of the Cabinet.” The king accepted this
resignation all the more readily because he thought that
by sacrificing his minister he could renew official relations
with the Entente. On the 10th of October, then, Mr.
Spiridon Lambros, professor and archaeologist, who had
been made Prime Minister with Mr. Zalocostas as
Minister of Foreign Affairs, succeeded in re-establish-
ing normal relations between the government and the
Entente. This success was all the more inexplicable
since the majority of the Calogeropoulos Cabinet had
been pro-Entente in spite of their being anti-Venizelist,
while the Lambros Cabinet was composed entirely of
court favorites. It was just at this time that Mr. Veni-
zelos and Admiral Coundouriotis, after a triumphal tom-
in the islands, landed at Saloniki. They at once formed
there, with General Danglis who had joined them, aTHE GREEK QUESTION
71
provisional government in the form of a triumvirate,
assisted by a ministry of which Mr. Politis was the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was on the 10th of
October, also, that Admiral Dartige du Fournet sent
Mr. Lambros a note demanding, as a sequel to his note of
September 2, certain concessions, including disarmament,
sequestration or surrender of vessels of the Greek fleet,
disarmament of certain land-batteries and also the control
of the police and of the railroads. On the 11th the Lam-
bros Cabinet yielded, and on the following day the trans-
fer of the Greek light cruisers to Keratsini was effected
and their disembarked crews were quartered in different
public buildings in Athens. But the pro-German in-
trigues were at that time so far developed, so many
armed men thronged the streets, and Mr. Lambros
seemed so prone to evasions, that on the 13th the admiral
was forced to emphasize and make more definite his note
of the 10th. He demanded in particular that all citizens
should be forbidden to carry arms of any sort whatsoever
and that the embargo on the exportation of wheat from
Thessaly should be raised.
Anxious weeks followed. Encouraged by the success
of the Germano-Bulgarians in Rumania, the royalists
became more and more insolent. The director of the
newspaper Patris was prosecuted for having published
in his paper official documents relative to the surrender
of the Rupel forts. The fulfillment of the conditions
prescribed in the notes of the 10th and 13th was avoided
by subterfuges. The king surreptitiously concentrated
troops and war material in Epirus and Thessaly; at one
time he was even credited with the intention of taking
refuge there. On the 18th he reviewed on the parade
ground the sailors who had been disembarked from the
vessels sequestered by Admiral Dartige and addressed
them in a passionate speech that was full of threatening
allusions. During this period the triumvirate was being
organized at Saloniki, intent above all on gathering72
THE GREEK QUESTION
together the contingents that were not only to battle
against the Bulgarians at the side of the troops of the
expeditionary force but also to forward the liberating
movement in Greece. As to the question of the form
of government, Mr. Venizelos refused to commit him-
self. In a speech delivered at a great banquet given in
honor of the provisional government, he only fore-
shadowed the convocation of a national assembly charged
with the duty “ of erecting an insurmountable rampart
against the assault of the king on the sovereignty of the
people.” On the 20th of October, in a conference held
at Boulogne, the leaders of the French and English
governments decided not to recognize officially the pro-
visional government, though lending to it their material
aid. France and England guaranteed to share equally
the expenses of the Venizelist army and consented to an
advance of ten million francs in addition.
At this moment negotiations in Athens took a new
turn in consequence of the arrival of M. Benazet, deputy
of the French Chamber, charged by the French staff with
a mission in the Orient. Through an Italian friend, a
Signor Serpieri, a director of the French Mining Com-
pany in Laurium and on intimate terms with the court,
M. Benazet obtained an audience with the king. There
followed a sudden change in policy, the details of which
still elude the historical critic. The only thing that we
can make out with certainty is that the king was clever
enough to persuade his interlocutor of the sincerity of
his friendly intentions toward the Allies and of his readi-
ness to favor an arrangement calculated to reassure
them completely. He suggested the idea of a surrender
of batteries and munitions to Admiral Dartige and a
transfer of troops. M. Benazet left the palace with the
idea that an amicable arrangement could easily be made
and that it would be the height of cleverness to reconcile
Mr. Venizelos and the king. He was confirmed in this
idea by the friendliness shown him by the queen. SomeTHE GREEK QUESTION
73
days later, Admiral Dartige was himself presented to
the king, and seemed to carry away from this interview
a similar impression. The king and his brothers went to
dine with Prince Demidof, Minister of Russia. Then
Admiral Dartige ordered one of the two landing com-
panies which had been installed at the Zappeion since
the incident at the French Legation to return to its
vessel again. In an account of the Benazet mission that
appeared in the Petit Parisien of January 10, 1917, the
result of this mission is thus set forth: “ The king hoped
to reconcile the desire which he felt to remain neutral
with his desire to restore peace and harmony to his
country. He did not demand any compensation (?)
but only requested that consideration for his feelings be
shown by the avoidance of any exultation—especially in
the press—over his concessions to the Entente. Our
diplomatic and military representatives were charged
with the execution of this agreement, as approved by
the government.” On the part of the Entente it was
carried out to the letter. The press was rigorously cen-
sored and could not communicate its apprehensions to
the public. In the House of Commons on the 31st of
October, Lord Robert Cecil declared that whatever
tended to unite all the Greeks would be desirable
indeed.
A further diplomatic arrangement was made a little
later. In consequence of a slight collision at Ecaterini
between the troops of the king and those of the trium-
virate (November 4-5) the protecting powers consented
to establish a neutral zone between the territories of the
provisional government and those of Old Greece, in such
a way that the extension of the Venizelist movement was
blocked. Thessaly and Epirus, which were devoted to
Venizelos and were only awaiting the appearance of
Saloniki contingents in order to drive out the royalist
authorities, were thus prevented from rising. The crea-
tion of this neutral zone coincided with a visit of General74
THE GREEK QUESTION
Roques, Minister of War of France, first to Macedonia
and then to Athens. The establishment of this neutral
zone was hailed as a fine solution. With negotiations
at the point where they then stood, the Cabinets of the
Entente believed that an acceptable arrangement was
about to be consummated with the government in
Athens. They permitted, without any protest, the con-
voking and assembling on the 13th of November of that
Rump Parliament on the dissolution of which they had
insisted on June 21. The Cabinet in Athens pretended
that by virtue of the Constitution the Chamber ought to
resume its duties on that day. The reply might have
been made that the sole Chamber that legally existed and
was qualified to meet was that elected June 13, 1915.
To raise no objection seemed preferable, and, besides,
the Chamber was dismissed almost immediately without
having transacted any business. It had, however, served
to break the injunction in force against it. Did Admiral
Dartige think that he could then and there demand the
reward for our complaisance? On the 17th of November
he sent Mr. Lambros a new note demanding the sur-
render of eighteen field batteries, sixteen mountain bat-
teries with a thousand rounds of projectiles per battery,
as well as of 4,000 Mannlicher rifles with 200 cartridges
per rifle, of 140 machine-guns and of fifty automobile
trucks. On the 20th, without awaiting a reply, he noti-
fied the embassies of the hostile states in Athens of the
decision of the Entente to expel their personnel from
Greek territory within forty-eight hours. On the 22d
he proceeded to enforce this expulsion, and this was ef-
fected without any notable incident. On the 22d Mr.
Lambros replied to the note of the 17th, offering to
hand over a larger number of cannon than the Germano-
Bulgarians had seized in Macedonia, 191 as against 124.
He refused to meet the rest of the Entente’s demands.
On the 24th the admiral ordered the government in
Athens to give over to the Allies ten mountain batteriesTHE GREEK QUESTION	75
on or before the 1st of December and the rest on or
before the 15th. He justified this demand by the re-
mark : “ The place of the material that I demand is not
in your magazines, but on the Macedonian front at
Monastir, where the destinies of the Balkan States are
to be decided.” It was on the 24th, too, that the govern-
ment at Saloniki declared war on Bulgaria and Ger-
many. Not being able to send a direct notification to
these powers, it begged the Allied governments to be so
good as to take this duty upon themselves. It is as yet
uncertain whether they did this.
During the last days of the month there was extreme
confusion. The Military League was reconstituted.
The officers stirred up the soldiers in their barracks, the
reservists were armed, the disorderly elements were en-
rolled by the agents of General Dousmanis. Fights
broke out in the streets; many Venizelists were roughly
handled. On the 26th a detachment of 200 French
marines came to reinforce the little contingent encamped
at the Zappeion. In the capital an artificial excitement
increased hour by hour. In the provinces, where none
existed, the government counterfeited it. It pictured
an uprising of the peasants in Thessaly, a massacre of
the soldiers at Ecaterini. Now, nowhere had the Thes-
salian peasants stirred, and the very prefect of Larissa
himself acknowledged that not a word had been heard
about rebellion iri his province. As for the evzones
(light-armed troops in native costume), not one had been
harmed. That did not, however, hinder the Gounarists
from ordering a solemn requiem—forbidden at the last
minute—to “ celebrate the entrance into immortality of
the heroes who had fallen gloriously in a battle against
the traitors.” By dint of these tragi-comedies an agita-
tion was produced which threatened at any instant to
be transformed into riots and massacres. During the
night of the 27th very many houses in which Venizelists
lived were marked with red circles. The leaders of the76
THE GREEK QUESTION
reservists proclaimed that they would hinder by force
the surrender of weapons even if the government per-
mitted it. Trenches were dug in the immediate neigh-
borhood of Athens, and emplacements for machine-guns
and artillery were prepared.
On the 27th Mr. Zalocostas addressed a protest to the
representatives of the neutral powers at Athens against
the blockade of the straits of Salamis by the Allies,
against the control exerted by them over public utilities,
against the expulsion of the personnel of the legations
of the Quadruple Alliance, and, finally, against the de-
mand for the surrender of war material. He closed his
note of protest with this phrase: “ I have no doubt, Mr.
Minister, that you will offer me, in these painful circum-
stances the support that I request.” On the 28th a
Crown Council was held, the conclusions of which were
not published; but the correspondents of news agencies
and of foreign newspapers telegraphed that the govern-
ment persisted in its refusal.
In spite of all these unfavorable signs, the confidence
of Admiral Dartige and of General Bousquier, the
French military attache, in an amicable solution appeared
unshaken. On the 29th the admiral had a somewhat long
interview with the king. On the 30th the general too
was given an audience by Constantine I. In the course
of these conversations both were convinced that the king
desired only that they should force his hand and that a
simple outward manifestation of force would make it
possible to gain all that they had demanded. The king,
it was said, had formally declared that the Greek troops
would offer no resistance; he had even had this assurance
given in writing by the marshal of the court. During
the 30th vessels carrying French troops cast anchor in
the harbor of Pireus. They had orders to disembark the
next morning and, without cannon or convoy of muni-
tions and supplies, to go and occupy certain positions and
take charge of a prescribed amount of war material thatTHE GREEK QUESTION
77
was to be handed over to them. The expedition was
organized like an ordinary field manoeuver in time of
peace, with the conviction that it would encounter no
resistance. Admiral Dartige, in fact, expressed to some
newspaper correspondents “ his full conviction ” that the
cannons would be delivered without any disturbance of the
peace. He added that he “ had not the slightest intention
of resorting to force.”
This optimism was not shared by the Athenians. Since
the night of the 29th the troops of the garrison of Athens
had left their barracks to take up positions in the environs
of the city, especially at Goudi and Chalandri. By
authority of a decree published on the 29th, authorizing
voluntary engagements, an indirect mobilization was
effected. More than 10,000 men “ volunteered ” the
first day and were at once incorporated in the force.
The instructions given to the military authorities pre-
scribed that they should not hinder the disembarking
of the Allied troops, but should follow them in equal
numbers and oppose the execution of the orders of
Admiral Dartige. The principal buildings of Athens
were occupied by Greek marines. The inhabitants of
the city who were witnesses of these preparations and
of a multitude of little characteristic incidents, got the
impression that a conflict was inevitable. The news-
papers informed their readers to this effect. The
Messager dfAthenes bearing the date of the 1st of
December, but printed on the 30th of November, wrote:
Not to mince matters, the government of Athens proceeded
yesterday to the first act of hostility against the Entente. It
began its mobilization by the system of voluntary engagements,
just as Germany had put her army on a war footing at the end
of July, 1914, by the system of individual orders. A particu-
larly well informed man in Entente circles said very truly: “ We
have driven out the ministers of the Central Alliance, we have
driven out the Germans, but we are treating with respect the
German organization in Greece.”78
THE GREEK QUESTION
And Athens is not calling the reserves alone to the colors. It
is clothing with the regulars’ uniform the raw recruits, that is to
say, those factors of disorder by which it has terrorized the
people, that “ people ” in whose name the German oligarchy has
committed all its crimes against Greece. It seasons with “ Attic
salt ” its declaration of war against the protecting powers.
The idea dominant in most Athenian circles, the idea pro-
claimed by the pretorian guard of the kingdom of Athens, which
has lately been christened “ the national army,” is that the
Entente will not wish to aggravate the difficult situation in which
she finds herself here in the Orient in consequence of the defeat
of Rumania, by creating a new front on Greek territory. It is
an idea which has been kept alive by the policy which the Entente
has followed in Greece and which has become deeply rooted
through newspaper campaigns in which men came to forget, as
C16menceau did, that party quarrels in time of war reverberate
far beyond the frontiers of a country.
If the Entente, by some appropriate act, had taught the heroic
camarilla that its anger was as much to be feared as Germany’s,
Greece would not to-day be hurried at full speed toward the
abyss. She would find herself to-day in her place near her pro-
tectors, and thousands of human lives would have been spared,
thousands of lives whose loss is due solely to the regard of the
Entente powers for the sacred persons of their worst enemies in
Greece.
For two years they have been shrieking their hostility in the
very faces of the Entente. But in spite of this, the commander-
in-chief of the Allied naval force continues to talk to us of
good intentions and of faithful promises.
On Thursday, the 30th of November, at half-past six
in the afternoon, Admiral Dartige received the official
reply of the Greek government, elaborated in several
successive meetings of the Cabinet. It was a refusal.
The admiral was not surprised, for he believed that
Constantine I wanted to have his hand forced by a
demonstration of military force. Consequently, on the
morning of Friday, December 1st, several French de-
tachments, equipped as though for a dress parade, dis-
embarked and advanced in different directions. They
soon clashed with troops entrenched along the two prin-THE GREEK QUESTION
79
cipal roads that lead from the sea to Athens. The
Greek soldiers blocked their way and opened fire.
Immediately the royalists posted on the emplacements
began to fire volleys with their machine-guns not only
upon the Allied detachments but also on the French
quartered at the Zappeion and on the annex of the
English Legation, which served as the headquarters of
the Anglo-French police. The Anglo-French defended
themselves valiantly. But, caught by treachery, they
endured cruel losses, for which, however, they made the
enemy pay dearly. I shall not go into numbers here,
nor shall I describe the vicissitudes of this deplorable
day.* I shall limit myself to a few statements of fact.
The Greeks, whether reservists or soldiers of the standing
army took the initiative in firing without the slightest
provocation, and even before the Allies had tried to take
away a single cannon. They fired on troops quartered
in a public building and engaged in peaceful occupations.
They fired through the windows at those of the Allies
who had taken refuge in buildings where, on the word
of Greek officers, they had believed themselves safe, they
acted exactly as though they had received definite orders.
They were posted in such positions that it was almost
impossible to reply to their fire without hitting some of
the most celebrated monuments of Athens. They had
taken the ground immediately surrounding the Acropolis
as their base of operations. If the fleet, moored before
Salamis with its vessels broadside toward the Acropolis,
had wished to destroy with its shells the batteries or the
massed troops, it would have run great risk of blowing
up a part of the celebrated temple. Even if the sacred
marbles had received only some slight scratches from
shrapnel, the Allies would none the less have been de-
nounced to the whole world, especially to hesitating
* See a conscientious and circumstantial account of the events of the 1st
and 2nd of December in a letter written from Athens by M. Charles Fr6gier
and published in the Journal des Dibats, January 8, 1917.80
THE GREEK QUESTION
neutrals, as barbarians that had fallen lower than
Vandals or Huns.
In lack of preliminary arrangements or of orders
issued in the course of the drama, the grand Allied fleet
remained almost inert. Only a few shells were fired on
the garden of the Royal Palace. Blockaded in the
Zappeion, to which he had gone at the beginning of the
day, Admiral Dartige was neither able to go out from
the Zappeion so as to go directly to the palace, which
was near at hand, nor to have orders sent down to the
fleet. The ministers of the Entente were no whit wiser
or bolder than he. We should like to be able to blot out
this page of our history. While our soldiers were falling
under the blows of assassins, negotiations began once
more. The king proposed to hand over six batteries.
From eleven o’clock in the morning until two at night
there was an exchange of proposals between the king,
Mr. Lambros and the ministers of the Entente. Finally,
on December 2d, at two in the morning, the following
agreement was signed:
The ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia,
having declared in the name of the admiral, commander-in-chief
of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, that they have ac-
cepted the delivery of six batteries instead of the ten that had
been demanded on or before the 1st of December, and having
furthermore recommended to their governments not to insist on
the other demands as to cession of war material, the Greek
government declares on its part that it will consent to put the
six batteries at the disposal of the Allies.
This was a surrender. Count Bosdari, Minister of
Italy, agreed to it only upon the insistence of his col-
leagues. “ It made me blush for France,” he said a few
hours later to one of our countrymen. Not only were
our decimated detachments forced to beat a sad retreat,
leaving to others the duty of burying their dead and of
caring for their wounded, but our companies, encamped81
THE GREEK QUESTION
at the Zappeion, and all our other posts were re-
embarked. Admiral Dartige left the Zappeion about
seven o’clock in the morning to return on board his vessel.
The survivors of the companies who had stayed with him
the entire day (December 1) endured the depth of
humiliation. As they possessed no means of transport
for their material, military trucks were furnished them by
the Minister of War of Constantine I on the request of
the admiral and the French minister. Along with the
soldiers of the different branches of the Allied control,
these brave men, among whom were to be seen many who
had fought at Verdun or at Dixmude, regained the quay
of embarkation under the escort of Greek soldiers.
The 2d of December beheld even worse horrors.
According to the testimony of a witness, “ the hunting
out of the Venizelists was a truly horrible business to
which nothing can be compared unless it be the Massacre
of Saint Bartholomew’s Eve.” The prominent Veni-
zelists of Athens and Pireus were massacred, tortured
and imprisoned. Their houses were pillaged from
garret to cellar. The offices and presses of the liberal
newspapers were destroyed. No help was given to
the pursued. They were forced to endure outrages
and sufferings of all kinds without having the
consolation of hearing or seeing any help coming from
the powers who ought to have protected their country.
The mayor of Pireus, escaping from torture, said to a
Frenchman: “ In the whole history of France there is
not a single example of a similar abandonment.”
It was true. There certainly is not in the history of
France an example of a like humiliation accepted so
resignedly. After the retreat of all our contingents, the
evacuation of all our posts and the abandonment of the
control of all public utilities, there was an exodus of
our nationals. The French of Attica, the personnel of
the French School of Archaeology, our merchants and
our journalists fled, with the surviving Venizelists, from82
THE GREEK QUESTION
that land where Constantine I ruled in blood. On the
4th of December a cortege of Venizelists in chains
marched past the French School. French citizenship,
which had been respected for a hundred years in all
Greek lands, had become an object of derision.
The negotiations of the 1st and 2d of December had
their origin in a mental blindness that was quite un-
pardonable. They had neither been approved nor rati-
fied by the French government, which at once perceived
the seriousness of the affront and the necessity of aveng-
ing it. It informed Admiral Dartige that it was in-
admissible to settle the aggression of December 1 by the
cession of a few cannon, and that any discussion as to
the amount of material to be surrendered would be
neither more nor less than disgraceful barter. At the
same time it took measures imposing an embargo on
Greek shipping and a provisional blockade of the Greek
coasts until it should come to an agreement as to details
with the other Allied powers. Then, on December 3, it
submitted proposals to the Cabinets of London, Petro-
grad and Rome. These proposals have never been
divulged. It is possible that some of them were just
as radical as those of the preceding months were harm-
less. When one has been cruelly misunderstood there
is a temptation to pass suddenly from one extreme to
another. However this may be, for the sake of appear-
ances or for lack of proper means of execution, the four
Allied powers contented themselves with announcing a
blockade of the coasts and islands of Greece “ which were
subject to or occupied by the royal Greek authorities ”
(December 7) and with presenting a series of demands
to the Cabinet in Athens.
While these new negotiations were hanging fire, Con-
stantine I and his accomplices gloried loudly in their
triumph. The pursuit of the Venizelists, though less
savage, continued and the pillage of their houses wentTHE GREEK QUESTION
83
on. Taking the diplomatic offensive, the Lambros
Cabinet sent to its representatives abroad a dispatch in
which it claimed that it had been compelled to repress
an insurrection. “ The investigation which is being
actively pushed,” said this communication, “ will show
the existence of an antidynastic plot, fomented by the
Venizelist party, which took advantage of the riots re-
sulting from the skirmishes in the streets. It was only
owing to the measures taken by the government that the
conspirators could be arrested and the perfect order that
now reigns could be restored.” A repression so moderate
of a rebellion so criminal certainly deserved congratula-
tion, and the Minister of War actually did congratulate
the troops of the Athens garrison and “the other com-
batants ” in an order of the day, of which these passages
are worth remembering: “ It is with a heart overflowing
with gratitude that, by order of his majesty the king,
your commander-in-chief, I address to you my felicita-
tions and congratulations on your exemplary conduct
during those never-to-be-forgotten days, the 1st and 2d
of December. Your loyalty, your spirit of self-sacrifice
and your courage have saved our fatherland jeopardized
by enemies who hoped to disturb public order and over-
throw the dynasty. Our enemies must now realize that
such valiant troops are invincible, and I can from now
on view the future with confidence.”
On their part the royalist newspapers celebrated in big
headlines, “ the retreat of the Allied forces before the
irresistible attack of the Greek troops,” and enumerated
the prisoners taken on the 1st of December. Others
were glad “ that the heroes of Kilkish had had the honor
of fighting the heroes of the Somme and Verdun.” The
newspaper Nea Hemera wrote: “The 1st and 2d of
December have been, we are proud to say, two of the
greatest, the holiest, the most splendidly glorious days
in all Greek history. They may be regarded as the
dawn of the real independence of Greece, delivering her84
THE GREEK QUESTION
from the most hateful yoke which has ever menaced the
existence of our race.” The association of “ radical
reservists ” addressed to all its members the following
telegram: “Receive the kiss due to heroes. The rocks
of the Acropolis have, thanks to you, regained their old-
time prestige. The Greeks of to-day have won laurels
worthy of the past. And now, keep watchful guard
around the throne of our great king.” Another royalist
association sent out from the “ Central Bureau of the
Reservists ” the following circular to all its adherents:
“ On the occasion of the discharge for a time of the
members of the Pan-Hellenic Association of Reservists,
accept the fraternal kiss of the Central Bureau for the
glorious events that have occurred; announce to all our
friends to whom you communicate these presents that
we shall remain here obedient to the word of command
and that as for them, they have now only to return to
their families, full of pride in the great work accom-
plished. Let them wait, though, with bayonets fixed,
ready to return, when the exigency arises, and place
themselves under the colors in order to fulfill their
supreme and sacred duty toward king and country.”
The Allies, who had been represented to the Greek
people as having confiscated the instruments of national
defense,—in particular, the French and English allies
(for care was taken not to raise disturbances in
the neighborhood of the Italian and Russian embassies),
—were denounced, through the machinations of the king,
as enemies of the Greek people. Constantine I had cun-
ningly persuaded us to formulate claims that were sure
to wound Greek national pride and had urged us to
proceed to the execution of our demands by force. He
had then thrown against our unsuspecting soldiers bands
of highly excited Greeks, and in short, thus killing two
birds with one stone, he had suppressed those Venizelists
whom he had resolved to hinder, even by fire and sword,
from regaining power by legal means.THE GREEK QUESTION
85
He was on the point of succeeding. For a while he
had fooled the Allies by granting them in an official
way concessions which he afterward abrogated in fact
by the issuance of secret orders. Then he had arrayed
against them the Germano-Bulgarians by opening up to
these hereditary enemies of Greece territories which had
been won by conquest in 1912-13. Disappointed in not
seeing that formidable German offensive which was to
pulverize the contemptible Anglo-French expeditionary
force, he found himself forced to try to gain time. He
made use of the Allies to neutralize the activity of the
Venizelists. He had discredited the former by getting
them to enter into agreements with him, and had held
the latter in check by having their best weapons wrenched
out of their hands by the protecting powers themselves.
When finally driven to the wall he had broken away over
the corpses of the Allied soldiers. He believed himself
saved. But the armies of William II still failed to
appear before Saloniki. Constantine I had to try once
more to gain time. He found the governments whom he
had smitten on the one cheek perfectly ready to turn to
him the other.
On the 14th of December the ministers of the Quad-
ruple Entente delivered a new note to the government
in Athens. They demanded reparation and the im-
mediate transfer to the Peloponnesus, under the effective
control of officers belonging to the Allied armies, of the
Greek troops stationed on the mainland of Greece. Mr.
Zalocostas, interspersing a few pleasantries in his reply,
promised to execute the removal of the troops in ques-
tion. He begged the four powers to “ reconsider ” their
decision to continue the blockade and offered as “ the
best guarantee that all misunderstandings would be
avoided, the firm and most sincere desire of the royal
government and of the Greek people to see confirmed
as soon as possible the traditional excellent relations with86
THE GREEK QUESTION
the four powers and the renewal of a close friendship
based on reciprocal confidence.”
Mr. Zalocostas would hardly have dared to use irony
like this if he had not felt that disagreements of one
sort and another were undermining the action of the
Allies. He knew, far better than the public, which was
systematically kept in ignorance of the negotiations be-
tween the chancelleries of the Entente, that the identity
of views among them was by no means perfect. But
one factor in the case was self-evident: the Italian press
of all parties inveighed bitterly against Mr. Venizelos,
while on the other hand it extolled Constantine I. The
Tribuna wrote:
The disorders in Athens prove that Constantine and his
country are in perfect agreement, that no dynasty was ever a
more faithful interpreter of the spirit and will of a nation than
his. Hence the dangerous absurdity of those sentimental and
magnanimous attempts on the part of the Allies to revivify, or,
worse yet, to recognize, as though again existent, another Greece,
purely fantastic and imaginary, a direct heir of ancient Greece.
Let us leave this “ Hellas ” out of account and realize that we
have only Greece with which we must deal. It is greatly to be
deplored, and the events of to-day are the sad results of this
error, that in newspapers of a certain tendency, and even in the
parliaments of the Entente, this truth has not yet come to be
• courageously recognized, and that they continue to speak of a
Hellas that exists wholly in the person of Venizelos.
On the 22d of December the same journal wrote:
There were only two straightforward ways of dealing with
Greece: alliance or war; an alliance, however, with the recognized
chief of the state; with the king, and not with Venizelos, who
is looked upon askance by both army and people; or else war
against the army, the organized force of the state. Instead of
this, what has the Entente done? It has made an alliance with
one individual against the king, and has declared war on the
Greek people, subjecting it to humiliations and threats. The
Entente has put forth all its efforts not to the end that it mayTHE GREEK QUESTION	87
win Greece over to itself, but that it may conquer for the benefit
of Venizelos.
So, according to Rastignac (Signor Vicenzo Morello),
we ought to have run after an alliance with Constantine
as we had solicited that of Cobourg in Sofia, and to have
carried on a campaign against Venizelism similar to the
pressure we had exerted on Serbia. The Corriere della
Sera, the most important and influential newspaper in
Italy, had no hesitation, in order to damn Mr. Venizelos
in the opinion of the protecting powers, to denounce
him as an accomplice of Constantine’s. On the 5th of
December this famous Milan journal said:
And there, in Saloniki, rubbing his hands with satisfaction, is
Venizelos, Constantine’s best subject and his most useful minister
in partibus. If the Central Empires should win the victory, the
king would make capital out of the injuries inflicted on his
country by the Allies, their oppressors. If the Entente gets the
upper hand, Venizelos will come knocking at the door of the
peace congress and will show his declaration of war against
Germany and Bulgaria. The trick is most astoundingly crude.
There is no need even of imagining that the king and the rebel
are in secret accord. It is enough to know that the double game
exists in reality. But, within the last few days, a member of
the English government, in the House of Commons, assured
Venizelos of the protection of England; and the righteous
indignation of the French press will perhaps not be sufficiently
strong‘to cut short the comedy and to determine the Entente
to take measures against those who are committing sabotage on
her war in the east. The phil-hellenism of our allies is proof
even against bullets. While Greece glories in her hostility to
Italy, while she opposes to our rights in the Mediterranean a
Pan-Hellenism that is alike grotesque and frenzied, the diplo-
macy of our allies, so it seems, proposes at all costs to avoid
breaking with her, in order to he able, in the future, to count
upon her friendship. Phil-hellenism seems an essential element
in their program notwithstanding all that has happened in
Greece during the last two years and more.
This language furnished an explanation of the fact
that the Quadruple Entente persisted in not officially88
THE GREEK QUESTION
recognizing the provisional government in Saloniki. It
proved that if the protecting powers wished to take any
serious action, they would have to resign themselves to
acting alone and without the support of the Cabinet in
Rome. They appear to have decided to take this step.
At the end of December the Cabinet in London
appointed Lord Granville, councilor of the British
Embassy in Paris, to represent the government of
his majesty in Mr. Venizelos’ provisional government at
Saloniki, with the title of “ diplomatic agent.” Some
days later the Cabinet in Paris appointed M. de Billy,
councilor of the French Embassy at the Quirinal, to a
like position. On the 31st of December the ministers of
France, Great Britain and Russia in Athens, declaring
that they were acting as representatives of the guar-
anteeing powers of Greece, sent Mr. Zalocostas a note
formulating a series of demands for guarantees and
reparations. The guarantees consisted in the reduction
of the Greek forces in continental Greece “ to the number
of men strictly necessary to the maintenance of order and
to the policing of the country ”; in the transfer to the
Peloponnesus of all superfluous armament and muni-
tions, as well as of all the machine-guns and of all the
artillery of the Greek army with their ammunition; in
the prohibiting of all meeting and assembling of reserv-
ists north of the Isthmus of Corinth; in forbidding
every civilian to carry arms; in the re-establishment of
the different controls by the Allies. As reparations the
three powers exacted the immediate liberation of all
persons detained because of political opinions or political
offenses, and indemnities for the victims of the 1st and
2d of December (paragraph 4); the dismissal of the
commander of the first corps of the army, apologies on
the part of the Greek government to the ministers of the
Allies, a public ceremony of salute rendered to the Allied
colors, and finally, permission to use the Itea-Larissa
route for the transportation of troops. No definite time-THE GREEK QUESTION
89
Emit was fixed, but the blockade was to be maintained
“ until satisfaction had been afforded on all the points
above indicated.”
The Allies persisted, then, in their arrangements for
the handing over of supplies, the transfers of troops and
the system of controls by representatives of the Allies.
They even made their blunder worse by making it more
precise. In this note in which they were supposed to
be exacting punishment for the outrages of the 1st and
2d of December, they offset all that they gained by the
following: “ On their part, the guaranteeing powers give
a formal engagement to the Greek government not to
permit the armed forces of the government for the
national defense, profiting by the withdrawal of the
royal troops from Thessaly and Epirus, to pass over
the neutral zone established in agreement with the Greek
government.” Though it seemed logical, this agreement
was really monstrous. It placed in a clear light the
fundamental viciousness of the whole arrangement.
Under pretext of hindering the Venizelists from profit-
ing by movements of troops made independently of them,
the protecting powers sanctioned a provisional arrange-
ment which cut Greece into two parts and protected the
king against the national movement. This ought to have
been enough to reassure Italy. But in spite of it, she
refused to participate in the concerted measures. She
instructed Count Bosdari to present a separate note to
this purport:
Italy, by this present communication, affirms her joint respon-
sibility with her allies in matters general. She shares in the
demands and declarations contained in the aforementioned note,
touching the military guarantees that the powers of the Entente
deem necessary to exact of Greece in view of the present situa-
tion in the Balkans, as well as the reparations that these same
powers believe to be due them in consequence of the events of the
1st of December.
As to what concerns the claims in paragraph 4 of the note90
THE GREEK QUESTION
of the guaranteeing powers, in view of the fact that these have
to do with questions of internal order, Italy believes that she has
no right to intervene and declares that she takes no interest in
the investigation into said claims.
The three protecting powers did not maintain this dis-
tinct attitude of theirs for any very long time. In the
course of conferences held in Rome during the first days
of January by the Prime Ministers of Italy, France,
Great Britain and the representative of Russia, assisted
by eminent civil and military personages, they were sur-
prised by a dispatch from the Cabinet in Athens, dated
January 6, raising various objections to the note of
December 31. After a discussion, of which the public
knew nothing, the four governments of the Entente on
the 8th of January united in a common declaration.
They established as a principle that they had as their
end and aim the protection of the army in the east from
any and every menace of a flank attack from the Greek
side. Then they fixed a limit of fifteen days for the
execution of the ultimatum of the 31st of December,
specifying that if, after eventual acceptation, any
obstacle whatever was willfully raised to the execution
of this arrangement within the prescribed time, they
would claim against their liberty to act in such a way
as to assure the safety of their nationals by making use
of their own resources on land and sea. Unfortunately,
this desire to be energetic was spoiled by an agreement
with Constantine I that was more far-reaching than that
of the 31st of December. It was thus framed:
The Allied powers promise not to allow the partisans of the
provisional government to take advantage either on land or sea
of the withdrawal of Greek troops into the Peloponnesus, with
the purpose of occupying any portion whatever of Greek terri-
tory that is thus deprived of all means of resistance.
The Allied powers in like manner promise not to let the
authorities of the provisional government establish themselves in
any territories now in the possession of the royal government91
THE GREEK QUESTION
which they [the Allies] may feel themselves called on to occupy
temporarily for military reasons.
When Baron Schenk was expelled from Athens with a
pack of agents of the German propaganda, he replied, it
is said, to an American journalist who asked him about
the future: “ The question as to whether my work in
Greece will last depends entirely on the Allies, who up
to now have been my best assistants.” They continued
to be his best assistants.
They became more and more involved in the tangle
of negotiations. On January 10 Mr. Zalocostas replied
to the ultimatum of the 8th by a note that was at once
ironical and full of traps. He began by availing himself
“ with the liveliest satisfaction ” of the “ exact guar-
antees ” that the powers had been so good as to give to
Greece. Then he expressed his desire “ in this case
also ” to do all that was in his power to avoid all mis-
understanding. With this point once established, the
rest of his letter simply bubbled over with sources of
misunderstanding. He said that in order that the guar-
antees demanded by the powers might be as little annoy-
ing as possible, “ they could be determined, in the accord
that would come about, without permitting any infringe-
ment on the different departments of the administration
or with the means of communication in the interior.”
Mr. Zalocostas deigned afterwards to withdraw an
objection that had been raised to the liberation of the
persons referred to in paragraph 4 of the note of the
31st of December, but he demanded in return the setting
free “ of persons imprisoned for not having acceded to
the revolutionary government, or arrested on the occasion
of the forced conscription carried on by the seditious
committee.” As to the indemnities to the victims of the
1st and 2d of December, he proposed to refer the matter
to the Greek courts and proposed a mixed inquest.
Having thus given “ a supreme evidence of his sincere92
THE GREEK QUESTION
intentions ” he declared that “ the conditions for the
lifting of the blockade might be regarded as already-
fulfilled.” “ Finally,” said the minister in closing,
“ while appreciating fully the guarantees of the Allied
governments on the subject of the revolutionary move-
ment, guarantees which will reassure the minds of the
Greek people, the royal government expresses the hope
that, in the spirit which inspired the promise which the
Allied governments had been good enough to make in
the next to the last paragraph of their note of January
8, 1917, they may be willing to apply analogous measures
to the territories at present occupied by Allied troops and
notably to the islands which they had occupied after the
1st of December.
Evidently, Mr. Zalocostas must have felt encouraged
in his policy of subterfuge. The Idea Nazionale, a
newspaper very much in favor at the Italian Embassy,
wrote: “The Greeks now regard Italy with friendly
feelings, one may almost say, with gratitude. The
government of Athens seems to put all its confidence
in the Italian Minister.” This journal considered all
appeal to the special rights of the guaranteeing powers
as absurd formalism and as outworn partisanship. It
characterized as a serious and unjustifiable mistake the
attempt to base political action in Greece’s case “ on
treaties of protection that were antiquated and utterly
out of date.” After the conference at Rome on January
10, it commented thus on the decisions reached: “This
conference was convened here in order to show a respect
to Italy commensurate with the increasing importance
of her role as well as in order to recognize her
special interests in the Orient.” The journal La
Stampa, Signor Giolitti’s organ, said squarely:
“ Italy is at present the real ‘ protecting power ’
of Greece.”
In spite of this protection, the three guaranteeing
powers could not let the impertinence of Mr. ZalocostasTHE GREEK QUESTION
93
pass. On the 13th of January their representatives,
with the Italian Minister acting in concert with them,
addressed a new note to the government of Athens,
rejecting all the suggestions of Mr. Zalocostas and
insisting on the immediate and unconditional carrying
out of the guarantees and reparations that had been
demanded. On the 16th of January, after a Crown
Council, which had been specially called, the government
of Athens decided to yield. It declared “ that it had
no idea of procuring any limitations to the acceptance of
the demands formulated by the powers and that it gave
its adherence to the precise terms as announced.” On
the 24th of January the Official Journal of Athens pub-
lished a decree deposing from office General Callaris,
commanding the 1st corps of the army. On the 25th
Mr. Zalocostas addressed the following letter to the
representatives of the Quadruple Entente: “Conform-
ably to the promise given in its reply to the ultimatum
of the Allied governments dated January 8, the royal
government presents formal apologies to their excel-
lencies, the Ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy and
Russia because of the regrettable incidents of the 1st of
December, 1916.” On the 29th, in the presence of the
ministers and before detachments of the land and sea
forces of the four powers, in Zappeion Square, the
Greek troops commanded by a Greek general and
Prince Andrew, the king’s brother, marched solemnly
by and saluted the Allied colors. On the same day,
Mr. Zalocostas informed M. Guillemin that the dis-
solution of the societies of reservists had been declared
and that the judiciary had been charged with the exten-
sion of this measure.
Such was the outcome of this long diplomatic duel.
We obtained a nominal satisfaction, but in reality Con-
stantine I came out of the conflict not only exonerated
but with reputation enhanced. Under the inspiration of
his hidden councilors who were always with him, he94
THE GREEK QUESTION
continued to elude the effective execution of the guar-
antees accepted by his government.
This diplomatic bickering was succeeded by skirmish-
ing between the Allies and the administration. The
time-limit of fifteen days, set by the declaration of the
8th of January, elapsed, but the prescribed transfers of
troops and war material had not been effected, the
controls which had been provided for had not been
established, and the reparation to the victims of the 1st
and 2d of December had not been made. Mr. Lambros
and his civil and military coadjutors employed every
artifice to avoid the execution of the conditions laid
down by the Entente. The soldiers transported to the
Peloponnesus made their way back again in citizen’s
dress or on military leave of absence; or better yet, such
men as were needed north of the Isthmus of Corinth
were dressed up as police, if indeed they were not turned
into comitadjis outright. Lies were told about the con-
tents of cases of weapons, and arms were cached in the
earth. Informed of this by the Allied controllers,
General Caubone, the new military attache of France,
presented claim on claim. Messrs. Lambros and Zalo-
costas dissimulated, denied, protested their good-will,
evaded the issue and were profuse in promises. Mean-
while, the royalist newspapers invented calumny on
calumny against the Allies. Their principal argument
was furnished them in the continuation of the blockade;
they proclaimed that the Entente was starving the
people; they organized indignation meetings, and saw
that repeated entreaties and petitions were sent to the
king. In order not to permit public opinion to be led
astray, the ministers of the Entente, on the 19th of
February, caused to be published in the newspapers a
declaration to the Greek people summing up the situa-
tion as follows:
The representatives of the Allies have already called the atten-
tion of the royal government to the hostile attitude of the GreekTHE GREEK QUESTION
95
press and to the danger that Greece will incur if she persists in
fostering public excitement and in making attacks that are as
often as not founded on calumny and lies. For example, in the
matter of the blockade, certain newspapers are trying to spread
the impression that this is unjustly maintained since Greece has,
as they say, fulfilled all her engagements. This is manifestly
inexact. The military control of the Allies cannot take the
responsibility of declaring that the promised guarantees have
been given, while there remains in continental Greece a great
quantity of arms, the existence of which is recognized by the
Greek government itself since it has prescribed to the authori-
ties the date on which they must be surrendered. The Allied
control is all the less justified in consenting to leave these arms
on this side of the Peloponnesus, since they might be employed
by the hostile organizations which continue to exist in all
parts of Greece and especially in Thessaly, where they constitute
a perpetual menace to the oriental army. Other important facts
have been brought directly to the knowledge of the Greek gov-
ernment by the chief of the Allied control,—for example, the
laying of mines on the banks of the Corinth canal. In these
circumstances the Greek people ought not to be surprised that
the Allies in default of that correct attitude which they have a
right to expect on the part of Greece, cannot regard the guar-
antees stipulated in the note of January 8 as having yet been
yielded. Nevertheless, far from being indifferent to the suffer-
ings of an innocent people, the Allied powers have already looked
into the question of what measures they will take to furnish
Greece with food supplies just as soon as circumstances will
permit. In consequence, the Allied ministers call the attention
of the Greek government once more to the grave responsibility
that it would incur if it tolerated any longer the excesses of the
anti-Venizelist press, which seems to have no other design than to
delude public opinion and thus hinder the re-establishment of
friendly relations between Greece and the Allied powers.
This appeal to common sense provoked in Greece a
redoubling of recriminations and calumnies. New
journals were even created specially charged with vili-
fying the Allies. Ever since the 2d of December the
Venizelist newspapers had ceased to appear. The public
could only look for information to the organs of King
Constantine. It was thus kept in an utterly abnormal96
THE GREEK QUESTION
state of ferment. The Lambros Cabinet took advantage
of this to oppose to the demands of the Allies exceptions
or contestations that were increasingly irritating. Time
went by without the threatening clause of the declaration
of the 8th of January being put into effect. In the
second fortnight of March, Sir Francis Elliot, the
English minister, and M. Guillemin, the French min-
ister, left the warships in which they had lived since the
events of December in order to reopen their embassies.
Emboldened by impunity, Greeks, disguised as comi-
tadjis, gave themselves up to insulting provocations and
even to crimes. A band of these irregulars massacred
a patrol of Senegalese in the vicinity of Serbia. By way
of reprisal General Sarrail gave the order to shoot all
armed individuals belonging to the irregular bands. The
order was executed. A troop of cavalry of the Saloniki
army, sent into the valley of Vistritsa, discovered in the
monastery of Zidani (Zidavrion) concealed weapons and
armed comitadjis; he confiscated the arms and shot the
comitadjis, among whom was a Greek officer. There
arose at once a chorus of maledictions in the royalist
press. This extract from Scrip of the 5th of April
gives an idea of what these were like:
Ajax in his madness butchered sheep, thinking that he was
butchering his enemies. General Sarrail butchers abbots, no-
taries and police, thinking that he is butchering comitadjis.
And for fear that this massacre may give rise to the idea that
there are no longer any comitadjis and that he, Sarrail, is from
now on useless, he announces that his orders will continue to be
executed and that the irregulars will be shot. Is every peasant
who does not abandon his wife and his daughter to the “ needs
of the army,” or who manifests fidelity to his country and
devotion to his king, regarded as an irregular? . . . The Greek
government would commit the worst of errors in making any
reply to the general’s communication. There is only one reply
to make: “ The general lied! ”
The question of indemnities to the Venizelists who had
been injured or had been subjected to damages raisedTHE GREEK QUESTION
97
interminable controversies. After the arrival of the two
French and English representatives in the commission
instituted for this purpose, Mr. Lambros put forth vari-
ous unacceptable claims. The pretense was made that
they could find no appropriate place for the sessions of
the commission. Then they proceeded to stumble around
in the tangles of procedure. Finally, the ministerial
journals suggested the idea of reconventional counter-
claims against the Entente; so, for instance, the Neon
A sty proposed to demand a sum of six million francs
to defray the cost of the transport of troops and war
material into the Peloponnesus. Passing frankly to the
offensive, the royalists called upon Mr. Lambros to
purify the personnel of the university which had been
contaminated by Venizelism. They expressed the regret
that the cleaning up had not been more complete on the
2d of December. Openly banishing from now on the
idea which, with the object of misleading the Entente,
had been for a long time lauded, that idea, namely, of a
possible reconciliation between the king and Mr. Veni-
zelos, they rejected with horror the possibility of such a
rapprochement: “Constantine,” cried the Acropolis,
“ has the innocence of a sacrificial lamb.”
These actions did not, at the end of the winter of
1917, meet in France and England with the same in-
dulgence as previously. In spite of the tender regard
for the susceptibilities of Constantine I which was felt
by the Cabinets of Paris and London, public opinion in
the two countries expressed itself more and more strongly
against the policy of inactivity in Greece. It found a
powerful echo in the two parliaments. At the Palais
Bourbon the Greek situation was the subject of very
lively discussion in secret committee. In the meanwhile,
in the second fortnight of March, the Briand Cabinet
resigned. Although it had not lost its majority, and the
immediate cause of its withdrawal was the difficulty of
replacing the Minister of War, who had been forced out,98
THE GREEK QUESTION
it is certain that its authority had been weakened by its
way of handling the Greek question. The Ribot Cabinet
which succeeded it felt that it ought, in this connection,
to defer to public opinion. It showed very soon that it
intended to settle the question for once and all. At
that very time revolution broke out in Russia. After a
week or two of uncertainty, it became clear that the
forced abdication of Nicolas II was in reality a deposi-
tion and that Czarism itself had been overthrown. Con-
stantine I lost in the Petrograd court a valuable support.
Some days later, at the beginning of April, the United
States intervened in the European conflagration. Presi-
dent Wilson declared war on Germany and proclaimed
the right of peoples to dispose of themselves freely.
He thundered against absolutism and autocracy. This
anathema re-echoed widely throughout all Hellas. The
ground began to fail beneath the feet of the “ slayer of
Venizelists,” the constitutional king who had been trans-
formed by the grace of William II into the Lord’s
Anointed, accountable to God alone.
On the 28th of March two Venizelist newspapers, the
Hestia and the Ethnos, appeared again in Athens. On
the 13th of April came the turn of the Kairi and on the
22d that of the Patris. The others followed after an
interval of a few days. At about the same time those
of the Ionian Islands in which the Allies were not
established gave adherence one after another to the pro-
visional government in Saloniki. On the 7th of April,
the anniversary of Greek independence, the ministers of
the Entente did not appear at the celebration of the
national holiday and the Allied vessels, warships as well
as the vessels of the merchant marine, were not decorated
with flags in honor of the day. To stimulate the
enthusiasm of the crowd, the royalists had spread the
rumor that the Venizelists would seize the opportunity
of the national holiday to make an attempt on the life
of the king and to stir up riots. But all passed off veryTHE GREEK QUESTION
99
calmly. This did not hinder the organs of Constantine
on the next day from assuring the “ idol adored of the
people ” that he would be defended against all attempts.
The journal Scrip in a lyrical outburst put in the mouth
of the people this hymn “ to the martyr king ”:
I am there, Sire, at thy side! Guard in thy powerful hands
the strength of the state and the honor of the fatherland. I,
yes I, will support thy glorious throne. No power in the world
shall tear me away from thy feet. Even in chains, with hands
in irons, and feet in fetters, even under the tyranny of starvation
and the threat of death, I will continue to shout “ Long live the
king!”
This exaltation of spirit, generously rewarded by the
treasury of the German propaganda, succeeded in de-
luding the neutrals and even some of those on the side
of the Entente. It did not deceive observers that were
well advised. One of them, M. Charles Fregier, on the
15th of April (Journal des Debats, April 28) wrote
from Athens:
In the course of the difficult negotiations of these latter times
the Entente has surrounded the throne of Constantine with
guarantees, destined to uphold it even against the will of his
subjects; these guarantees are perhaps, at this moment, his
surest support. On the day when the logical course of events
shall for once and all abolish them, when the Entente shall decide
to support its friends, wherever they may be, in old Greece as
well' as in the new, we shall perhaps be amazed to see this much
vaunted prestige of Constantine sink out of sight in an instant,
crushed under the too heavy burden imposed on it.
At the Quai d’Orsay in Paris and at the Foreign Office
in London the same opinion began to prevail. The
realization dawned on them that, instead of administering
in small doses, drop by drop, as it were, their moral and
material support to the provisional government, heavily
burdened with anxiety, it would have been more profit-100
THE GREEK QUESTION
able as well as more clever freely and frankly to facilitate
its task. What results might the Allied powers not have
obtained, as M. Fregier said in the letter cited above,
“ if they had devoted as earnest efforts to strengthening
New Greece, considered as the eleventh of the Allied
states, as they had spent in order to keep the crown on
Constantine’s head?”
Considerations of this nature found more and more
acceptance among serious thinkers. On the 19th of
April, in a meeting at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, Messrs.
Ribot, Lloyd George, Boselli and Sonnino discussed,
among other subjects, the Greek question. Their de-
cision was not divulged, but a few days later the court
at Athens showed symptoms of uneasiness. The rumor
of Mr. Lambros’ resignation was current. Mr. Lambros,
a mere tool of the king, had no special reason for with-
drawing nor even any desire to do so. If the power left
his hands, it was because the monarch judged it advan-
tageous to sacrifice-this minister to the supposed rancor
of the Entente. There was some talk of Mr. Zaimis,
who had become once more the governor of the National
Bank, as future Prime Minister. These tentative moves
had a somewhat cool reception in the French press. The
change of person, as proposed, would have brought us
no satisfaction. For some time, there was no further
mention of it. But another rumor spread. An inten-
tion to abdicate in favor of the Crown Prince was
attributed to Constantine I. The French press observed
that neither Greece nor the Entente would gain anything
by the change. Since, after the appointment of the
Ribot ministry, the censor had allowed greater freedom
to the press, it demanded the definitive and radical
settlement of the Greek question. It demanded of the
powers that had signed the declaration of the 8th of
January to reclaim their liberty of action in accordance
with the formal clause that had provided for this even-101
THE GREEK QUESTION
tuality, and to act vigorously in Attica, or at least to
permit the provisional government to act by its own
agencies in Thessaly and the rest of the kingdom. These
articles in the French journals were much commented
on in Athens. People believed that they saw in them
signs that were the precursors of grave measures. On
the 1st of May the Congress of Hellenic Colonies,
assembled at Paris, declared Constantine I and all his
dynasty deposed from the throne and from all royal
prerogatives. At the same time it “ appealed to the
benevolence of the Allied powers no longer to hinder
any province from giving its adherence freely to the
national government at Saloniki ” and begged them “ to
recognize the Greek Republic just as soon as the
assembly called to constitute it should have proclaimed
it.” Then the Zaimis clique appeared once more, and
was accepted on the 3d of May. After long parleys
Mr. Zaimis consented to leave his position at the
National Bank to take upon himself once more the
prime ministry with the portfolio of foreign affairs.
Almost all his colleagues were professed anti-Venizelists.
Mr. Zaimis had very little support in the press.
Treated as a suspect by the royalist editors who had
been besought to conceal their sentiments so as not to
bring discredit on the new royal cabinet, he was de-
scribed by most of the Venizelists as a man of straw.
The Makedonia characterized him as “ the Pilate of
crucified Greece.” In France a marked distrust of him
was evinced. Although he declared that his entire pro-
gram consisted in the re-establishment of friendly rela-
tions with the Entente, he was suspected of holding to
these friendly relations only in order to permit the king
to gain more time and to corner the grain-harvest of
Thessaly for the exclusive advantage of the royalists.
Besides, General Dousmanis, Colonel Metaxas, Messrs.
Streit, Mercouris and Co. kept hold of the power both
public and secret, and with it remained in the confidence102
THE GREEK QUESTION
of Constantine I. Mr. Zaimis did, to be sure, imme-
diately put at the disposal of the commission on indem-
nities a meeting place for which they had up to that
time looked in vain. He did, to be sure, announce that
measures had been taken against the armed bands
that were overrunning Thessaly, and he also let it be
known that he was going to send away from Athens
seven colonels who were known to be hostile to the
Entente. Very small guarantees these to the Entente!
As a matter of fact, during the entire month of May,
the agents of control under General Cauboue kept
discovering arms and ammunition concealed in the capi-
tal itself, or in the suburbs or the provinces. The police
continued to dress themselves up as comitadjis, and the
comitadjis to disguise themselves as police. The officers
of Constantine’s staff elaborated as assiduously as ever
the plans for co-operating with the Germano-Bulgarians
against the day so eagerly longed for, the day when the
soldiers of William II would descend on Saloniki.
Though to all appearance dissolved, the League of
Reservists was reconstituted under the direction of a
nephew of Mr. Gounaris by the name of Sayas. In
reply to objections on the part of the Minister of the
Interior, Mr. Sayas threatened the government “ with
an explosion of popular anger.” As a substitute for the
League of Reservists or as a superstructure on it, there
was formed, under the auspices of Mr. Livieratos, a
retired magistrate, a so-called “ Federation ” of the
syndicates of the different trades and professions and
of popular societies. The royalists gave out that this
was a union of labor organizations, but the real labor
organizations entered a protest. Messrs. Sayas and
Livieratos, however, negotiated with Mr. Zaimis none
the less freely, because of this fact, on an absolutely
equal footing. They issued a manifesto against the
dismissal of the seven colonels.
These were not the only indications of a dangerous103
THE GREEK QUESTION
situation. The authorities themselves assumed a pro-
vocative attitude. On the 21st of May a decree of
arrest issued by the grand jury brought before the
assizes the director and manager of the newspaper
Patris on the score of having published in 1916 some
letters that established the part taken by Deputy
Callimassiotis, a friend of Mr. Gounaris, in supplying
the German submarines. On the 29th of May the navy
war-council sent forth an order for the arrest of Admiral
Coundouriotis for the crime of high treason. At the
end of the same month some Venizelists were beaten
and imprisoned on the island of Aegina by the police.
During the night of the 30th-31st an attempt was made
to assassinate two English officers. A few days later
some French officers of the military control, on a tour
of search, were obliged to turn back before a party of
reservists. The newspaper Scrip accused the Senegalese
of the expeditionary force of kidnapping little children,
killing and eating them.
At the same time the Constantine cult became a sort
of idolatry. On the 27th of May the second anniversary
of the miraculous cure of the king by the wonder-working
picture of the Panagia of Tenos, a thanksgiving service
was held at the Metropolitan Church, which the Embros
reported in the following words: “ When the reverend
orator, incomparable in the force of his logic and the
brilliance of his rhetoric, had affirmed in thundering
words that King Constantine was not destined to be
dethroned but to be crowned with the imperial diadem
in Constantinople, when he had finished chanting the
hymn: ‘ Be victor, thou emperor and king,’ the throng
rushed forward to kiss the hands of the prelate, while
on all sides re-echoed these cries: 4 Down with the
tyrants! Long live our adored king!’” On the 3d of
June, the king’s fete, the followers of Constantine were
carried away by another ourburst of devotion to their
sovereign. The Federation of Workingmen presented104
THE GREEK QUESTION
the monarch with an iron cross, begging him to wear it
whenever he appeared before the troops with the baton
of a German field-marshal in his hand. After the
Te Deum at the cathedral Constantine I betook himself
to the University to take part in the dedication of his
own bust. Two other busts of him were to be dedicated
in the course of the month, one at the barracks of the
7th regiment of infantry and the other at the Chamber
of Deputies. Fate, however, was reserving for Con-
stantine a ceremony of quite a different nature.
During the month of May the Cabinets of Paris and
London had come to an agreement. Their chiefs had
held additional conferences in Paris and in London.
Assured of the agreement of Russia and the consent of
Italy, they had resolved on radical measures. Their
decisions, the outcome of secret deliberations, became
known only after they had been put in execution, and
even then not fully. We may quite certainly say that
they had a double object: the sequestration of the harvests
in Thessaly so that they would profit all Greece, and
the re-establishment of the constitutional regime. Sus-
pecting what was to happen as to the first part of the
program, Mr. Zaimis proposed to yield to the Allies a
portion of the Thessalian harvest. As to the second
part, the government in Athens did not know exactly
in what this re-establisment of the constitutional regime
consisted. But it flattered itself that it could bring it
to naught. The time has not come to tell what supreme
efforts were put forth in order to make the Allies’
enterprise miscarry as it had done in the month of
June, 1916. This time these efforts failed.
On Wednesday, June 6, the Athenians suddenly
learned of the arrival in Greek waters of M. Jonnart,
a French senator, invested with the rank of High
Commissioner of the protecting powers. Then they
noticed a great movement of warships in the bay of
Salamis, the Saronic Gulf and the Gulf of Corinth.THE GREEK QUESTION
105
The royalists insinuated that it was going to be just the
same with the Jonnart mission as with the earlier demon-
strations of the Allies. Then they saw the vessel that
carried the High Commissioner, after a short stop at
Salamis, sail off to Saloniki. What passed between
M. Jonnart, Mr. Venizelos and General Sarrail is not
known. On the 10th M. Jonnart returned to Salamis.
On the 11th, in the morning, the lightning struck. In
an interview with Mr. Za'imis, the High Commissioner
of the three protecting powers demanded in their name
the abdication of King Constantine and the designation
of his successor, to the exclusion of the Crown Prince.
What then became of the tens of thousands of heroes
who had sworn to defend the king, their idol, to the very
last drop of their blood. They raised a hue and cry,
turbulent throngs filled the streets, but there was no
breach of the peace. What were the thoughts that
passed through the mind of Constantine I ? After bitter
reflections on the vicissitudes of mundane affairs, he
decided to submit. On Tuesday between 9 and 10 in
the morning Mr. Za'imis informed M. Jonnart that “ His
Majesty the King, solicitous as ever of the interests of
Greece alone, has decided to leave the country along with
the Crown Prince and has designated as his successor
Prince Alexander,” his second son.
Constantine I did not officially abdicate nor did his
eldest son resign his claim to the throne. They hoped
without doubt to be restored to Greece by William II,
the Conqueror. They left the throne in the meantime
to a complacent prince who would keep the crown for
them, and they left the political power to a minister who
would care for their interests. But they went away
without daring to defend themselves or to have any
defense made for them. They fled before the storm,
carrying with them the curse of Hellas. Embarked for
Italy, they had not yet reached the residence of their
choice when their hopes were dashed. While they106
THE GREEK QUESTION
slipped out of Lugano amid manifestations of public
scorn, Mr. Venizelos was starting for Athens. After
a brief consultation, the High Commissioner decided,
with Mr. Venizelos and Mr. Zalmis agreeing, that half-
way measures would do no good and that the best
thing was to restore the power to Mr. Venizelos, who
would reassemble the Chamber elected June 13, 1915.
No sooner said than done. In consequence of the pub-
lication of a proclamation in which he boasted of his
desire to follow in the footsteps of his illustrious father,
Alexander I was required to apologize and to declare
his willingness to respect the Constitution. He is now
only the shadow of a king, obliged to content himself
with signing the papers that his Prime Minister puts
before him. The latter, acclaimed by the crowd, which,
according to the statement of the paid agents of the
German propaganda, hated him and was sure to tear
him in pieces, has taken up with a firmer hand than ever,
and with an increased prestige, the direction of national
affairs. The people of Thessaly are saluting the soldiers
of Sarrail’s army as their liberators. The Morea is
yielding submission. The army in its entirety is rallying
in support of the new regime. General Dousmanis,
Colonel Metaxas, the two Mercouris and their acolytes
meekly embarked for Corsica. All the thunders of war
which for two years had intimidated the Entente with
their rumbling died away entirely.
A few days had sufficed to bring about this great
change. The decision of two governments, the energy
and ability of one man, the mere presence of an armed
force capable of breaking down all resistance got the
better at once of the extravagant showy boasting of a
clique of fanatics. The errors of 1915 and 1916 have
not been repaired, for political mistakes always leave
behind them something irreparable. But the humiliation
of the 1st of December has been avenged and the prestige
of the Entente re-established. Greece has been restoredTHE GREEK QUESTION
107
to her natural destiny and respect for treaties has been
confirmed. It has been proved to the world that the
protecting powers, when they co-operated with the chief
of the liberal party in restoring the constitutional regime
did not, as the Germans and some neutrals claimed,
commit a violation of international law comparable to
the invasion of Belgium in August, 1914, but that they
acted as guardians of the liberties of a people bound to
them by solemn treaties. What could be done in Greece
in the spring of 1917 was done, but there is still much
to do in the East.
THE END