EEE DEPRES ERE TUE Td EAL
SHLAA HUTT HEE THTH ARLE PERRET AT PEPLEHA EAC REA iW

 

i

 

at
|

Led ROA?)
THE PANAMA CANAL

DESHI U UNS ECD

   

mS

ee | 4 Saal hit
bt pi Be ei : A

%
 

Gurnell University Gibrary
Ithaca, New York

CHARLES WILLIAM WASON

COLLECTION
CHINA AND THE CHINESE

THE GIFT OF
CHARLES WILLIAM WASON
CLASS OF 1876
1918
ell University Library

hii
THE STORY OF

THE PANAMA CANAL
Chay TI CAtr

42 {
fre, >
f
PUoSaS JIT JOOP o1qNo QOO'S| JO OVA OWT VU oyLT] uNIeL) WOdy 24YoStIp BUloq Si Jaye POOL

 

“AVMTUdS NOALVO

 
The Story of
The Panama Canal

BY

LOGAN MARSHALL

Author of ‘‘ The Story of Polar Conquest; ’’
‘“‘The Universal Handbook,” Etc., Etc.

WWlustrated

THE JOHN C. WINSTON COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA CHiIcaGco
CoprricHut, 1913
By L. T. MYERS
 

 

 

 

 

 

COLUMBUS AND THE INDIAN MAIDEN.

This beautiful bronze statue of the Great Discoverer overlooks the Atlantic entrance to the
Canal, beholding at last the ‘' New Route to India.”
Io the
MEN ON THE ISTHMUS

WHO AMIDST DIFFICULTIES AND DISCOMFORTS HAVE DEVOTED
THE BEST THAT’S IN THEM TO THEIR COUNTRY’S WORK
PREFACE

No material work of man since the creation of the world
has had so deep and widespread an influence upon the
affairs of mankind in general as that which may cal-
culably be expected to ensue from the achievement of
the Panama Canal. The results will be seen in commer-
cial, political, social, and even religious, effects. It will
make and mar the fortunes of nations. Cousin, the French
philosopher, has said: ‘‘Tell me the geography of a country
and I will tell you its destiny.” By creating important
modifications in the geographical relations of certain com-
munities the Canal will be the means of bringing about
great and lasting changes which are beyond the range
of accurate forethought. We can, however, predict an
enormous gain to this country from the stupendous enter-
prise which has been brought to a brilliant and success-
ful conclusion.

No task has ever been undertaken before which can
compare with it either in magnitude or difficulty, and the
great waterway will stand forever a monument to the
dauntless courage, infinite resourcefulness, ingenuity and
administrative ability of the American people. Ten years
have passed since the United States undertook the work,

years of struggling against all the forces of nature, hard-
(7)
8 PREFACE

ships and disease which would have tried the patience and
resources of any other nation to the breaking point. In
that time a huge cut has been dug and blasted across the
Isthmus of Panama, a mountain range has been pierced
and a smaller range made thirty miles away in the form
of Gatun Dam. Huge locks, the largest in the world,
have been built of enduring concrete, great rivers have
been dammed and an inland sea created in what was a
tropic jungle. In short, the American people have accom-
plished the greatest and most important engineering enter-
prise in the history of the world.

All the available data at the command of the Isthmian
Canal Commission have been placed at the disposal of the
author, together with official photographs, maps, plans,
etc., and this volume is now presented as a complete his-
tory and practical exposition in simple language of the great
enterprise, covering every noteworthy aspect and feature
of the work from its inception in the days of Columbus to

its completion.
Locan MarsHALu.
CONTENTS

CHAPTER I PAGB

Tue AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN. ...... 13
CHAPTER II

CANAL EXPLORATION. . 6 6 0 5 ee ee ee es 28
CHAPTER III

THe PanaMa RaItROAD ........2.2.2.204 44
CHAPTER IV

Tue Istomtan Country ...........2.2. 59
CHAPTER V

CoLON AND PANAMA .............084 76
CHAPTER VI

Tue Frenco PanaMA CaNAL COMPANY ...... 91

CHAPTER VII
Tur New PanaMa CaNsaL COMPANY ....... 110

CHAPTER VIII

Tur AMERICAN ENTERPRISE .......2.2... 124
CHAPTER Ix

Tue HeattH PROBLEM. ..........2.2.. 137
CHAPTER X

Tur LaBoR PROBLEM. .............. 148
10 CONTENTS

CHAPTER XI PAGE
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL ....... 157

CHAPTER XII
MILitary AND PouiticAL ASPECTS ........ 198

CHAPTER XIII

THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL ...... 208
APPENDICES

I

GREAT CANALS OF THE WoRLD .......... 239
II

Economic Errects oF SHip CANALS ....... 254
III

History or TRAFFIC ON GREAT CANALS. ..... 265
IV

Tue CanaL SysTeM oF INDIA .......... 273
V

CANALS IN} OHINAS 3 4s 4. shots Ro Ee Soe. a 283
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Gatun SPILLWAY ........... . .Frontispiece

PAGH
COLUMBUS AND THE INDIAN MampEN ....... 14
Ruins or St. Anastasius, OLD PANAMA ..... 20
Tue Istamus witH CoMPLETED CANAL (Map) ... 60
PanaMA, PasT AND PRESENT ........... 85
CuuRCH OF SAN Francisco, PANAMA ... . . 86
Tue Paciric ENTRANCE TO THE CANAL AT Low Tie . 92

Outp FrenNcH MacHINERY RUSTING IN THE JUNGLE . 99
Tuer INTERSECTION OF THE AMERICAN CANAL WITH THE

OLp FRENCH CANAL AT MINDI .... . . 110
CoLONEL GEORGE WASHINGTON GOETHALS, U. , A. 134
GENERAL VIEW OF THE CiTy oF Panama .... . 189
A Room IN BacHELOR QUARTERS AT CULEBRA. . . 149
Din1nG Room IN THE MARRIED QUARTERS AT CULEBRA 151
View IN THE TOWN oF CULEBRA, CANAL ZONE . . 154
MANDINGO STOCKADE FOR ZONE Convicts ENGAGED IN

Roan “BuUInEDING 2.5. 2-5. 3 2-8 ee ee de 8
Pepro Miauet Locks ............. . 158
Map or THE CANAL ZONE ........... . 158
PROFILE OF CULEBRA CuT ........... . 160
Gatun Dam, Sprptway AND Locks ....... . 162
Gatun Upper Locks, East CHAMBER. ..... . 168
Tur HypROELECTRIC STATION AT GaTUN.... . 164
Pepro Mieuet Locks... . . 165

Tue Great Lock Gates AT Ganon DURING Ganarane:
TO Nigel eae te Lane eae oa anh a ee ee OO
(11)
12 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Gatun Dam SPILLWay . ad

DIAGRAM SHOWING LAKE REneerion

Lock GaTE OPERATING MACHINERY . eat

A CYLINDRICAL VALVE Macuine, Motor snp Baie
SWITCH ae

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE —— Wo OF A eee AND
A Srix-story BuILDING

Gate Moving MacHINERY

BERM CRANES AT MIRAFLORES 3

CuLEBRA Cur LOOKING SOUTH FROM Ben IN Bigg
BANK NEAR GAMBOA . care

CuLEBRA Cut Looxinc NorTH FROM Cansire

THe Front TowER ON APPROACH WALL OF GATUN
Locks.

STEAM SHOVEL Bape nie Race OF Bane

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ON A GIANT STEAM SHOVEL .

Gatun Locks

Gatun Locks

CuLEBRA Cut LOOKING Naas FROM its Giscunes

STEAM SHOVEL LoapiInc Rock ee

VESSEL BEING TOWED THROUGH LOCKS BY Brnerre
LocoMOTIVES

Tue Great CULEBRA Gur

STEAM SHOVELS MEETING AT CULEBRA

EXMPIRE-CHORRERA MacapamM Roap

Map or Routes To THE IsTHMUs . ara

Tur WATERS OF THE Paciric ENTERING THE pes
CANAL bo A ae.

Tue West ees en uns FROM
Toro Pornt .

166
167
168

169

169
171
172

172
177

178
181
182
184
185
187
188

191
192
198
202
209

211

222
CHAPTER I
THE AMERICAN Istamus UNDER SPAIN

On the early morning of the twenty-fifth of September,
in 1513, a small party of men made their laborious way up
the densely covered face of a steep ridge. One, keen of
eye and with determined countenance, pressed forward
eagerly ahead of his companions. When, at length, he
reached the summit, a vast expanse of water stretched
before him on either hand. Balboa had discovered the
Pacific Ocean. Vasco Nufiez de Balboa was a man of extraor-
dinary intellect, and it is not improbable that something
of the true significance of this new knowledge dawned upon
his mind even in these first moments of discovery. Per-
haps he, first of all contemporary explorers, realized that
the Tierra Firma of Columbus was not the Ultima Thule
of sixteenth century endeavor, and that the land of mystic
legend lay away toward the setting sun, beyond the spark-
ling sea whose placid waters washed the shores of the bay
below the height upon which he stood. It was an age of
splendid achievements in geographical science. Bold and
ardent adventurers were fast dispersing the haze that had
obscured more than half the earth, and disclosing new lands
almost as rapidly as geographers could map them. In the
last year of the fifteenth century, Vasco da Gama, return-
ing home from his eventful voyage to India, re-rounded the
cape which Bartholomew Diaz had discovered and which
King John had named Good Hope. A waterway to the
East was thus opened up, and this circuitous route remained
the main means of direct ocean communication between
Europe and Asia until the opening of the Suez Canal,
nearly four hundred years later. Columbus, with the

(13)
14 THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN

vaguest ideas of the extent of the globe, and with none
but the most faulty charts for guide, thought to find Cipango,
where he ran across Cuba and died without knowing that
he had added an enormous continent to the map. First
in the West Indies and later on the mainland of America
he hoped to reach the capital of the Grand Khan, to whom
he bore letters from Ferdinand of Spain. When, upon his
last disastrous voyage, Columbus beat down the coast from
Honduras to Darien seeking a strait through the massive
barrier that stayed his farther progress to the west, he
little dreamed that at a point which he passed in his dis-
heartening search a caudal cut would one day separate two
great continents and unite two vast oceans. ‘Though
Columbus was not actually the discoverer of the Isthmus,
yet his matchless courage in sailing into uncharted seas in
1492 was chiefly responsible for its subsequent discovery.
It is altogether fitting that the great bronze statue of
Columbus and the Indian maiden should stand at Cristobal

\ overlooking the Atlantic entrance to the canal which is to

\materialize his vision of a direct route to Asia. The statue

is life size and stands upon a marble pedestal ten feet
high, an imposing tribute to the great discoverer. It was
the gift of the Empress Eugenie to the Republic of Colom-
bia in 1868 and stood for a time in the railroad yards at
Colon. Count de Lesseps, however, had it removed and
placed it in front of his palace, where it now stands, behold-
ing at last the New Route to India! That to his dying day
Columbus persisted in his belief that there was a strait
through to the Western waters and the lands he sought
is shown in the map inspired by him which was published
soon after his death. Balboa, who followed Columbus,
also believed this legend of the Indians. Explorers who
followed them failed to find the strait, but out of this idea
grew the project of cutting a canal across the Isthmus
first proposed by Hernando Cortez, Spanish conqueror of
Mexico to King Charles V of Spain in 1523, about two
hundred and fifty years before the birth of the United
THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN 15

States of America, the nation destined to complete the
project.

EARLY SETTLEMENTS OF THE SPANISH MAIN

Amongst the horde of adventurers who followed in the
wake of the Great Discoverer was Rodrigo Bastidas. He
was in command of an expedition that, in 1500, coasted
the Spanish Main from some point on the Venezuelan lit-
toral to almost as far south as Porto Bello. Balboa, a lad of
twenty-five, received his first taste of adventure upon this
occasion. On the return voyage the weather-worn and
worm-eaten ships of Bastidas were barely able to make
Hispanola before they sank. Balboa, who possessed little or
no means, turned his attention to agriculture on the island.
The spirit of the rover was strong in him, however, and, in
order to indulge his desire as well as to escape his creditors,
he concealed himself in a cask and caused it to be carried
on board a ship bound for Tierra Firma. At this time
Spain had two sparsely settled provinces on the Isthmus of
Darien and an important stronghold at Cartagena.

Balboa was successful in his scheme of escaping his cred-
itors and seeking once more the new lands which had
aroused his curiosity and love of adventure. The ship
upon which his cask happened to be carried was that of
Encisco, which was bound on a relief expedition to the
Gulf of Darien. As soon as the ship reached the open sea
Balboa was discovered and had difficulty in persuading
Encisco not to throw him overboard, thus ending a very
promising career. The fact that he had previously visited
the Isthmus and would probably be of value to Encisco
through his knowledge of the country, turned the tide in
his favor, however, and he was made a member of the
expedition. During the year before, 1509, an unlucky
expedition had been undertaken by Ojeda and Niqueza,
who had been appointed governors of all the mainland
from Cape de la Vela on the Venezuelan coast to Cape
Gracias 4 Dios on the coast of Honduras. The Gulf of

v
16 THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN

Darien was the line of division between them and they
held dominion over the entire region. Ojeda had preceded
Niqueza on this expedition with four ships and three hun-
dred soldiers. When Niqueza arrived with seven ships and
eight hundred soldiers he found Ojeda suffering greatly
from attacks by Indians. Joining forces they routed the
natives and then proceeded to occupy the region, founding
several towns, among them Nombre de Dios. This town,
though unhealthful and having but a poor harbor, remained
the chief port on the Atlantic side of the Isthmus for nearly
a hundred years. Ojeda and Niqueza both died during
this enterprise and were succeeded by Pizarro, who later on
was destined for an important role in Isthmian affairs.

At the time of the arrival of Balboa and Encisco, Pizarro
was in desperate straits and the town of San Sebastian
almost destroyed. Encisco was proclaimed as governor to
succeed Niqueza and established the town of Santa Maria
de la Antigua del Darien. It had the distinction of being
the first Episcopal see upon the mainland and of containing
the oldest church on the American continent. Balboa was
made alcalde of the new town. Soon afterward he quar-
reled with Encisco and managing to gain the upper hand,
deported the former governor to Spain.

Balboa soon rose to a position of importance among the
colonists of Tierra Firma. He learned from the Indians
that a great sea lay beyond the range of mountains that
traversed the Isthmus, and lost no time in investigating
the statement. With a small force of Spaniards and Indian
guides Balboa succeeded, not without great difficulty, for
the whole way was through dense jungle and over swamps,
in reaching the ocean, of which he formally took possession
in the name of the King of Spain. During this journey
across the isthmus the Spaniards heard of a rich land to the
south abounding in precious metals. Balboa planned the
conquest of this country, and it is more than probable that
Pizarro, who was his companion on this occasion, shared
his designs. Had the former lived to pursue his energetic
THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN 17

and ambitious career Pizarro might never have found the
heroic place which he occupies in history.

In 1515, Balboa received the reward of his enterprise in
the form of the appointment of Adelantado of the Southern
Sea, as the Pacific had been named. The same ship which
brought this news, unfortunately for Balboa, carried also
the new governor, Pedro Arias de Avila, better known as
Pedrarias. Of this monster and his atrocities so much has
been written that it need not be dwelt upon here. As soon
as he arrived Pedrarias had arrested Balboa, but had failed
to convict him. So a truce was arranged between them,
giving Pedrarias the governorship of the Atlantic side and
Balboa the Pacific or “South Sea” with freedom to con-
tinue his explorations.

PREPARATIONS FOR EXPLORING THE PACIFIC COAST

In the following year he prepared to organize an expedi-
tion to the south by way of the newly discovered ocean.
The problem involved in the undertaking was one to daunt
a less bold spirit. Trees suitable to the construction of
ships were to be found only upon the Atlantic side of the
divide, which necessitated the tremendous task of trans-
porting timbers over a route that presented great difficul-
ties to the passage of an unencumbered man. The terribly
onerous labor of collecting the material and carrying it on
their backs to its destination was imposed upon the Indians,
of whom thousands were gathered together for the purpose,
and impelled to the unaccustomed work by the merciless
severity of their taskmasters. Many months were consumed
in this grim struggle for a passage of the Isthmus, which,
in many respects, foreshadowed the endeavors of the mod-
ern successors of these hardy pioneers. Hundreds of the
wretched aborigines, Las Casas says their number fell little
short of two thousand, lost their lives in the undertaking,
but it succeeded, and four brigantines were carried piece-
meal from sea to sea and put together on the Pacific coast.

2
18 THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN

The work of fitting out the ships proceeded rapidly and
Balboa was upon the eve of departure when his arrest was
effected by order of the Governor.

Pedrarias had entertained a jealous hatred of Balboa
for years and could not endure the thought of his achiev-
ing the further successes that promised to follow his expedi-
tion to the south. The Governor pretended to have received
information that Balboa purposed the creation of an inde-
pendent kingdom in the countries that he might discover.
Balboa was tried, condemned on evidence of an ex parte
character, and executed. Thus fell, in the prime of life,
the first of that trio of Spanish explorers whose brave deeds
excite our admiration whilst we deplore the cruelties with
which they were accompanied. Balboa, more than any of
the early explorers except Columbus, deserves recognition
in this day. It is altogether fitting that the name of the
Pacific entrance to the canal should have been changed
from La Boca to Balboa in tardy appreciation of his great
achievements.

THE SEARCH FOR A STRAIT THROUGH THE ISTHMUS

Three years after the death of Balboa, Magellan passed
through the Straits of Tierra del Fuego and opened up a
western waterway to the Orient. The attempts to find a
strait through the continent were not abandoned, however,
Charles the Fifth taking a keen interest in the prosecution of
these efforts. He instructed the governors of all his Ameri-
can provinces to have the coast lines of their respective
territories thoroughly examined and every river and inlet
explored. The orders addressed to Cortes were especially
explicit and urgent, for at this time the hope began to pre-
vail that a solution to the problem would be found in the
territory of Mexico. It was in accordance with this idea
that Gil Gonzales was despatched from Spain to the New
World. Gonzales had authority to use the vessels which
had been built by Balboa, but Pedrarias refused to deliver
THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN 19

them to him. Gonzales was not to be balked by this denial,
however. He immediately took to pieces the two caravels
with which he had arrived and transported them to the
Pacific coast by the route which Balboa had when out.
The reconstructed ships were soon lost and the party built
others, in which they proceeded north in January, 1522, to
Fonseca Bay. At this point the leader, with one hundred
men, continued the exploration by land. Lake Nicaragua
was discovered and a settlement was shortly afterwards
made upon its shore, the Indians having been subjected.
The new discovery awakened fresh ideas and projects
relating to the much desired interocean route. It was at
first reported that an opening existed from the lake to the
South Sea, but an immediate examination failed to reveal
any water connection. In 1529, Diego Machuca, in com-
mand of a considerable force, carefully explored Lake
Nicaragua and its eastern outlet. He found the naviga-
tion of the San Juan River, at that time called the Desa-
guadero, extremely difficult, but eventually emerged from
its mouth with his ships and continued down the coast to
Nombre de Dios. Ata later period an important commerce
was conducted over this route by vessels making ports in
Spain, the West Indies and South America. Thomas Gage,
the English priest who visited Nicaragua in 1637, mentions
this traffic as in existence at that time.

The early exploration of the Isthmus was quickly fol-
lowed by settlements and then the establishment of towns
inhabited by traders and connected by trade routes, for
this was the beginning of Spain’s golden age in her colonies,
and for more than a hundred years a constant stream of
gold, pearls, and other products of Spain’s island posses-
sions flowed across the Isthmus. The towns became
cities with royal storehouses guarded by slaves, merchants’
warehouses, great stone stables for the mules of the treas-
ure trains, beautiful convents and monasteries and resi-
dences built in the Moorish style either of stone or carved
native cedar. Soon the necessity for a permanent highway
to take the place of the Indian trails which were poorly
20 THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN

adapted to the traffic which had now begun to move over
them became apparent.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERLAND COMMUNICATION

Pending the discovery of a maritime channel between
the two oceans, the Spanish authorities had decided to
establish permanent land communication across the Isth-
mus of Darien. Under Charles the Fifth a line of posts
was maintained from coast to coast. Nombre de Dios was
made the Atlantic port and the Pacific terminus was located
at Old Panama, which was created a city in 1521. A road
was at once constructed between these two points, which
crossed the Chagres at Las Cruces. Great difficulties were
surmounted in building this highway. Much of the route
lay over swamps that had to be filled in. Several streams
were spanned by bridges and vast masses of rock were
removed to facilitate the passage over the mountains. The
way was paved and, according to Peter Martyr, was wide
enough to accommodate two carts abreast. There is little
left of this road, once the richest highway in the world, but
it is still possible to catch a glimpse of it at Old Panama,
though it is quickly lost in the deep jungle before the visitor
has followed it more than a few yards. The city of Old
Panama, which is now marked solely by ruins, was erected
about five miles from the modern city of Panama.
Founded in 1519 by Pedrarias, it quickly attained the
position of the most important Spanish city in the New
World, and at the time of its destruction by Morgan had a
population of about thirty thousand.

About ten years after the establishment of this route a
modification of it came into use. Light draft vessels began
to sail from Nombre de Dios along the coast and up the
Chagres as far as Cruses, where the road met the stream,
and thence the journey was completed by land. In the
closing years of the sixteenth century, Nombre de Dios,
which had been repeatedly condemned in memorials to the
Crown, as “‘the sepulcher of Spaniards,’’ was abandoned in
favor of Porto Bello, with a location and other natural
sade auo3sdq & Jo A10]3 9Y} Jo Japuluta1
JUSTIS U SE UlEUIaL SUINI ay} AUG ‘eUteUeg PIO Jo ssuIpjing yusoyIuseU 9y4} JO AYIIOAS}OU 94} JO 9UO SEA SNISeyseUY "4S Jo [eIpayyeD IY

“‘VIANYNVd C10 ‘SNISVLSVNV ‘LS dO SNINU

 

 

 

 

 
THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN 21

advantages decidedly superior to those of the former
terminus.
EARLY TRADE OF PANAMA

This interoceanic communication was of the utmost
value to the Spanish Crown after the conquest of Peru, and
the isthmian territory grew in importance year by year.
The vast treasure that was extracted from the mines of the
south came to Panama in the first stage of transit to the
Royal Treasury. From the Pacific port it was carried to
Porto Bello on pack-animals, and thence was shipped to
Spain. Upon the arrival of vessels from the mother coun-
try, fairs were held at Cartagena and Porto Bello. Thither
came merchants from far and near and caravans from
Panama. An extensive trade was conducted at these
periodical marts and the goods brought from Spain found
their way through Panama to South and Central America
and even to the mainland and islands of Asia. Thus was
demonstrated at an early stage the logical trend of trade
and the great advantages of a trans-isthmian route.

A CHECK TO CANAL PROJECTS

The policy of Philip the Second with regard to the
American possessions was very different from that of his
father. The former was averse to the expansion of his
empire in the New World and distinctly antagonistic to
the plans for an isthmian canal. He reasoned with astute-
ness that the existence of a water route through the con-
tinent of America would give easy access to his new pos-
sessions on the part of other nations and in time of war
might be of greater advantage to his enemies than to him-
self. This policy of Philip was maintained for two centuries
after his death by succeeding rulers.

During this period of quiescent policy on the part of
Spain the most notable event in the history of the Isthmus
was furnished by the disastrous attempt of William Pater-
son to establish a colony in the province of Darien. In
22 THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN

1695 the Scotch Parliament, with the approval of William
the Third, authorized the formation of a company to plant
colonies in Asia, Africa and America and to carry on trade.

THE ILL-FATED DARIEN EXPEDITION

Paterson cherished a scheme of stupendous colonial
commerce, the Darien Expedition being but the initial step
in the enterprise. Toward the close of the year 1698, five
vessels, having on board twelve hundred Scottish settlers,
anchored in a bight which they called Caledonia Bay, a
name it retains at this day. The colonists were received in
friendliness by the Indians and purchased from them the
land upon which the settlement of New Edinburgh was
made. It was Paterson’s design, based upon sound enough
reasoning and knowledge previously acquired from the
buccaneers of the West Indies, to extend his posts to the
Pacific Ocean and open up a trade with the countries of the
South Sea and Asia, in the manner which had been so profit-
able to Spain. He had not, however, anticipated the effect
of the climate upon his northern-bred emigrants. Before
any steps could be taken towards the contemplated exten-
sion of the operations, the colony was decimated by disease.
The misery of the settlers was increased by the loss of the
supply-ship on which they had depended for fresh provi-
sions, and, eight months after the landing, a pitiful remnant
of the original expedition abandoned the settlement and
returned to Scotland. But before this disaster had become
known at home other vessels with additional emigrants were
despatched to the new colony. These made an effort to
revive and maintain the settlement, but with no better
results than those which had befallen their predecessors.
The numbers of the later comers had become sadly reduced
when they were attacked by the Spaniards. After a feeble
resistance they capitulated. So weak were the survivors
that they could not reach their ships without the aid of
their enemies,
THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN 23

Thus ended the Darien Expedition with the loss of more
than two thousand lives and the expenditure of vast sums
of money.

In this section of the country the Spaniards completely
failed to secure the friendship of the Indians or to effect
their subjection. Their amicable reception of the Scotch
immigrants and their invariable readiness to assist the
buccaneers in their incursions against the Spanish settle-
ments indicated the persistent hatred with which they
regarded the first invaders of their land. The Darien
region was wild in the extreme and abounded in secret
passes and safe retreats. From their fastnesses the Indians
made frequent raids upon the Spanish posts and retired by
trails which were known only to themselves.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century, during the
governorship of Andres de Ariza, a determined effort was
made to establish permanent communication between the
coasts at this part of the Isthmus. Plans were laid for a
line of military posts to be connected by a road which should
run from a point on Caledonia Bay to a terminus on the
Pacific Ocean. The project was put into operation, but met
with such formidable resistance on the part of the inhabi-
tants that the Spanish authorities became convinced of the
futility of their endeavors. In 1790 they entered into a
treaty with the Indians, agreeing to disband the garrisons
and withdraw from the country.

CORTES ESTABLISHES A TRANSCONTINENTAL ROUTE

It will be remembered that in the first quarter of the
sixteenth century Cortes received implicit instructions from
the Crown to use every resource at his command in a search
for the longed-for strait. In pursuit of this object the coast
of Mexico was carefully examined and the Coatzacoalcos
River explored. Montezuma afforded valuable assistance
in this investigation by furnishing descriptions and maps
of certain portions of the country. Whilst these efforts
24 THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN

failed of their principal object, they had important results.
Cortes established a transcontinental route along the course
of the Coatzacoalcos, over the divide, and down the Pacific
slope to Tehuantepec. This line of communication soon
gave birth to an extensive trade between Spain and her
provinces on both coasts of America as well as some parts
of Asia. The Ead’s ship-railway of modern days was
planned to follow practically the same line as this early
route of Cortes.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century there were
discovered at Vera Cruz some cannon of ancient date which
bore the mark of the old Manila foundry. This discovery
aroused speculation as to how the pieces of artillery had
been brought to the Atlantic coast of Mexico. It seemed
improbable that they had been transported around the con-
tinent, especially when it was remembered that the only
commercial intercourse with the Philippines had been
through the Pacific port of Tehuantepec and over the route
established by Cortes. This trade-way had long since been
abandoned, but interest in it was at once revived by the
incident which has been recited, and a remembrance of its
former importance prompted the viceroy of Mexico to insti-
tute an investigation.

By this time it had become an accepted idea that mari-
time communication between the oceans could only be
secured by the creation of artificial waterways. Two engi-
neers were directed to explore the country from the mouth
of the Coatzacoalcos to Tehuantepec with a view to ascer-
taining the practicability of a waterway from ocean to
ocean. This was the first canal project entertained for this
region.

INVESTIGATION OF THE NICARAGUA ROUTE

The report on this exploration, which included a cursory
survey, was not such as to encourage the institution of
operations. It had the effect, however, of stimulating the
interest in the subject and in 1779 the feasibility of connect-
THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN 25

ing the Nicaragua lakes with the sea was investigated by
royal command. Manuel Galisteo, to whom the task had
been intrusted, passed an opinion unfavorable to the proj-
ect. Nevertheless, a company was formed in Spain, with
the patronage of the Crown, to carry out the undertaking,
but nothing effective ever came of it.

Galisteo’s expedition had been accompanied by the
British agents at Belize in a private capacity. Upon their
return they made highly favorable representations to their
Government, stating that the project was entirely feasible
and not accompanied by any difficulties that the engineer-
ing capabilities of the day need fear to encounter. This
report made a deep impression in England and when, in
the following year, war broke out between that country
and Spain an effort was made to gain possession of the
Nicaragua country. In 1780, an invading force was organ-
ized at Jamaica. Captain Horatio Nelson was in command
of the naval contingent, and in his despatches stated the
general purpose of the expedition as follows: ‘‘In order to
give facility to the great object of the government I intend
to possess the Lake of Nicaragua, which, for the present, may
be looked upon as the inland Gibraltar of Spanish America.
As it commands the only water pass between the oceans, its
situation must ever render it a principal post to insure
passage to the Southern Ocean, and by our possession of it
Spanish America is divided in two.” The English were
successful in their encounters with the Spaniards, but in
the climate they found an irresistible enemy that forced
them to abandon the enterprise. Of the crew of Nelson’s
ship, the Hinchinbrook, numbering two hundred, more than
eighty fell sick in one night, and only ten survived the return
of the expedition to Jamaica. The hero of Trafalgar barely
escaped with his life after a long illness.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Spain
retained possession of the entire territory embraced in the
question of interocean communication, but she had made
no practical progress towards its settlement. Neither had
26 THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN

she added materially to the available knowledge of the
world on the subject, for the results of Spanish exploration
and survey in this direction have never been made public.
With the exception of the re-opened communication by way
of Tehuantepec, the old Spanish overland routes had all
fallen into disuse, and traffic between the mother country
and the possessions on the west coast of America and in
the Pacific Ocean was maintained by vessels sailing round
Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope. Humboldt vis-
ited Mexico at about this time and recorded the ignorance
that prevailed amongst the local authorities regarding the
interior of the country. He stated that there was not a
single mountain, plain, or city from Granada to Mexico of
which the elevation above the sea was known.

DISINTEGRATION OF SPAIN’S AMERICAN COLONIES

Ere this the entire civilized world had become keenly
interested in the question of an interoceanic canal, and the
investigations of Humboldt commanded wide attention.
Amongst other effects, they aroused the Spanish Government
to action in the matter. In 1814 the Cortes passed an act
authorizing the construction of a canal through the Isthmus
and providing for the organization of a company to carry
out the enterprise. Before anything of importance had
been accomplished under this legislation the revolutions
occurred which wrested from Spain her provinces in South
and Central America. With the loss of territory went the
opportunity for profit and glory by connecting the oceans.

In 1819, the states of New Granada, Ecuador, and
Venezuela united in forming the Republic of Colombia,
under Simon Bolivar; in 1831 they separated into three
independent republics. In 1823 the Federal Republic of
the United Provinces of Central America was formed by
the union of Guatemala, San Salvador, Honduras, Nica-
ragua, and Costa Rica. These political changes, in what
may be termed the canal region, opened up new possibili-
THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN 27

ties in connection with the much-mooted question of a
waterway and claimed the attention of capitalists and
statesmen of all the commercial nations. From this time
the matter is taken up with definiteness of purpose and
never allowed to rest. Plans and negotiations of various
kinds involving all the possible routes follow fast upon
each other until we arrive at the inception of the work by
the United States Government and the assurance of its
accomplishment,
CHAPTER II

CanaL EXPLORATION

Early in 1825, the Republic of Central America, through
its representative at Washington, conveyed to Henry Clay,
then Secretary of State, a desire for “the co-operation of
the American people in the construction of a canal of com-
munication through Nicaragua, so that they might share,
not only in the merit of the enterprise, but also in the great
advantages which it would produce.” Clay was fully alive
to the importance of the project, the execution of which,
he said, ‘‘will form a great epoch in the commercial affairs
of the whole world.’ He returned a favorable answer to
the proposition and promised an investigation on the part
of the United States of the claims advanced in favor of the
Nicaragua route.

CONCESSION TO AN AMERICAN FROM NICARAGUA

In 1826, the Republic of Central America, having grown
impatient of the delay on the part of the United States,
entered into a contract with Aaron H. Palmer of New York
for the construction of a canal capable of accommodating
the largest vessels afloat. The work was to be started
within a year from the date of the agreement. The contract
was to remain in force as long as might be necessary for the
reimbursement of the capitalists engaged, in the amount
of the money invested, together with ten per cent per annum,
and for seven years after such reimbursement the company
was to receive one-half of the net proceeds of the canal.
At the expiration of the seven years in question the prop-
erty was to be transferred to the Republic. It was expressly

(28)
 
*yuaWIUIIAOS ay} Aq pajons}suo0s Buloq sAvmysty jo adA} JUaT[9oxXO JY} SMOYS PUL JOqL] JLAUOD 9UOZ YALA 4]ING Bulaq SI peol siyy

‘avou WVAVOVW LOOd-91 VadaddNOHO-AaId Na

 

 

 
CANAL EXPLORATION 29

stipulated in this contract that the passage should at all
times be open to. the ships of friendly and neutral nations
without favor or distinction.

Having secured his concession, Palmer endeavored to
organize a construction company with a capital of five
million dollars. The utter inadequacy of this amount is
illustrative of the lack of explicit information which charac-
terized all similar enterprises until quite recent’ times. Pal-
mer failed both in America and in England to enlist the
necessary financial aid and the contract was never acted
upon.*

After an abortive attempt to complete arrangements
with a Dutch company, the Central American Republic
again addressed the Government of the United States with
an offer to grant to it the right to construct a canal. In
response to a recommendation of the Senate growing out
of these overtures, President Jackson commissioned Charles
Biddle to visit Nicaragua and Panama, with instructions
to examine the different routes that had been contemplated
and to gather all the information and documents procura-
ble bearing upon the matters in interest. No satisfactory
results followed this mission. A message was sent to the
Senate to the effect that it was not expedient at that time
to enter into negotiations with foreign governments with
reference to a trans-isthmian connection. The truth is that
the Government and its agents were not sufficiently assured
as to the stability of the new republics and feared to create
relations that might lead to political embroilment.

BAILY’S EXPLORATION OF THE NICARAGUA REGION

Meanwhile the active interest in the canal question was
not confined to the United States. In 1826 an English
corporation sent John Baily to Nicaragua for the purpose
of securing a concession. In this object Baily was fore-
stalled by the American, Palmer, but he remained in the

* House Report No. 145, 30th Cong., 2d session.
30 CANAL EXPLORATION

country, and about ten years later was employed by Presi-
dent Morazin to determine the most favorable location for
a cutting.

Baily threw valuable light upon the Nicaragua route
and made a very able report. He recommended a route
from Greytown to Lake Nicaragua, across the lake to the
Lajas, and thence to San Juan del Sur on the Pacific coast.
With the termini he expressed himself as well satisfied.
He proposed to utilize the entire length of the San Juan,
which would necessitate blasting the rocks at the rapids,
diverting the Colorado into the San Juan and deepening the
latter river. He found the four principal rapids within a
stretch of twelve miles, formed by transverse rocks, with a
passage on either side affording a depth of from three to
six fathoms. The river was navigated at the time by
piraguas, large flat-bottomed boats of as much as eight
tons burden, which passed the rapids without serious hazard.

Baily’s line from the mouth of the Lajas, which he pro-
posed to use for three miles of its length, was seventeen
miles. This he thought might be reduced to about fifteen
and a half miles. His summit level was 487 feet above the
lake and the canal was to accommodate ships of twelve
hundred tons with a depth of eighteen feet. He offered an
alternative plan which would reduce the summit level to
122 feet above the lake but would necessitate the connec-
tion of two of his stations by a tunnel over two miles in
length. The report frankly estimated the difficulties
involved in the undertaking, and closed with the statement
that although he could not speak confidently as to the feasi-
bility of the route, which had never been surveyed, he
believed that a continuation through the Tipitapa into
Lake Managua and thence to the port of Realejo was wor-
thy of serious consideration. Whilst these investigations
were proceeding in the north, examination of other proba-
ble routes was being made. In 1827 President Bolivar
commissioned J. A. Lloyd to survey the Isthmus of Panama
with special regard to the possibilities of rail and water
CANAL EXPLORATION 31

communication. Despite the fact that this was the first
transcontinental route, the scientific knowledge of the terri-
tory was most significant. The geography of the strip was
imperfectly known and the relative heights of the oceans
or the altitude of the mountains separating them had never
been ascertained.

THE FIRST SURVEYS OF THE PANAMA LINE

Lloyd made a careful survey from Panama to a point
within a few miles of the mouth of the Chagres. He seems
to have considered plans for a canal premature, but said
that should the time arrive when such a mode of communi-
cation might be favorably entertained the route of the Trin-
idad River would probably prove the most desirable. He
recommended for immediate purposes a combination rail
and water route to take the place of the roads then in use
from Chagres and Porto Bello to Panama. His plan con-
templated a short canal from a point on the Bay of Limon
to the Chagres, the use of that river along its tributary, the
Trinidad, to a favorable spot for a junction, and thence a
railroad to the coast. As to the terminus he was divided
in opinion on the relative advantages of Cherrera and
Panama. The former had the merit of shortening the dis-
tance, whilst the latter was the capital and an already
well-established port.

The Republic of Colombia was disrupted in the year
1831 and the Panama region became a part of New Granada.
In 1838, that Republic granted a concession to a French
company authorizing the construction of highways, rail-
roads, or canals from Panama to any desired point on the
Atlantic coast. This company spent several years in mak-
ing surveys and forming plans. The results were submitted
to the French Government with a view to enlisting its aid
in carrying out the undertaking. The project was presented
in an extremely optimistic light and as one comparatively
easy of accomplishment. The concessionnaires claimed to
have discovered a depression in the mountain range which
32 CANAL EXPLORATION

would permit of a passage at no greater height above the
average level of the Pacific than thirty-seven feet. The
company’s statements excited extraordinary interest, and
in 1843 Guizot, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, instructed
Napolean Garella to proceed to Panama, to investigate the
company’s statements, and to make an independent exami-
nation of the entire situation.

Garella’s report,* which was an able treatment of the
subject, heavily discounted the claims of the Salomon com-
pany and led to its failure. An interoceanic canal was
recommended as the only means of communication that
could adequately meet the future demands of commerce.
Garella agreed with Lloyd that the Atlantic terminus should
be in the Bay of Limon rather than at the mouth of the
Chagres. That river would be met by his canal near its
junction with the Gatun. The reported low depression
which had raised hopes of the practicability of a sea-level
canal at a reasonable cost, could not be found. Garella
suggested the passage of the divide by means of a tunnel
more than three miles in length. The floor of this tunnel
was to be 325 feet below the summit, 134 feet above the
ocean, and the water level 158 feet above extreme high tide
at Panama. The canal was to have a guard lock at each
entrance and the summit level was to be reached by eighteen
locks on the Atlantic slope and sixteen on the Pacific. The
water supply was to be derived from the Chagres through
two feed-canals. The Pacific terminus was placed at Vaca
de Monte, about twelve miles south of Panama. Garella
estimated the cost of a canal on these lines at about twenty-
five million dollars. For an additional three millions he
calculated that a cut might be made in place of the tunnel.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AS A FACTOR IN THE
CANAL QUESTION

“About the middle of the century a succession of great
events vastly increased the importance of a maritime con-

* Reprinted in House Report No. 322, 25th Cong., 3d session.
CANAL EXPLORATION oo

nection between the two oceans to the United States.
The dispute with Great Britain as to the boundary line
west of the Rocky Mountains was settled by the Buchanan-
Packenham Treaty in 1846, and in August, 1848, an act of
Congress was passed under which Oregon became an organ-
ized territory. The war with Mexico was commenced early
in 1846, and by the terms of the Guadalupe-Hidalgo Treaty,
which closed it in 1848, California was ceded to the United
States. Before the treaty had been ratified gold was dis-
covered there, and in a few months many thousands from
the eastern part of the country were seeking a way to the
mining regions. ‘To avoid the hardships and delays of the
journey across the plains or the voyage around the conti-
nent, lines of steamers and packets were established from
New York to Chagres and San Juan del Norte and from
Panama to San Francisco, some of the latter touching at
the Pacific ports in Nicaragua. For a while those traveling
by these routes had to make arrangements for crossing the
isthmus after their arrival there, and were often subjected
to serious personal inconveniences and suffering as well as
to exorbitant charges.

THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTES NEGOTIATIONS FOR A RIGHT
OF WAY

“The requirements of travel and commerce demanded
better methods of transportation between the Hastern
States and the Pacific coast, but there were other reasons
of a more public character for bringing these sections into
closer communication. The establishment and mainte-
nance of army posts and naval stations in the newly acquired
and settled regions in the Far West, the extension of mail
facilities to the inhabitants, and the discharge of other gov-
ernmental functions, all required a connection in the short-
est time and at the least distance that was possible and prac-
ticable. The importance of this connection was so mani-
fest that the Government was aroused to action before all

3
34 CANAL EXPLORATION

the enumerated causes had come into operation, and nego-
tiations were entered into with the Republic of New Granada
to secure a right of transit across the Isthmus of Panama.’’*
This object was effected by a treaty that was ratified in
June, 1848.

In the following year, Elijah Hise, the representative of
the United States in Nicaragua, negotiated a treaty with
that republic. By its terms Nicaragua undertook to confer
upon the Government of the United States, or a corpora-
tion composed of its citizens, the exclusive right to construct
and operate roads, railways, or canals, or any other medium
of communication by means of ships or vehicles, between
the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean and through the
territory of the former state. The concessions made by
this treaty were extremely liberal, but in consideration of
them it was required that the United States should pledge
itself to the protection of Nicaragua and should hold its
army and navy and any other effective resources it might
be able to command available for the defense of the Latin-
American republic against foreign aggression. Nicaragua
was prompted in this negotiation by the desire for aid in
withstanding the policy of Great Britain, which at that
time appeared to be directed toward extending her control
of the Mosquito coast to the lower waters of the San Juan.

The United States Government was not prepared to
assume the responsibility involved in this treaty, in making
which Hise had exceeded his authority, and it was not rat-
ified. Another convention was formulated with the object
of furthering the plans of The American, Atlantic and
Pacific Ship Canal Company, composed of Cornelius Van-
derbilt and others. Although this fell through, its purpose
was effected by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850.

THE VANDERBILT COMPANY IN NICARAGUA

This agreement required the contracting parties to sup-
port such individuals or corporation as should first commence

* Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission. Washington, 1899-1901.
CANAL EXPLORATION 385

a canal through Nicaragua. It practically insured the inter-
ests of the company in whose behalf the negotiations of
the year before had been conducted. The Republic granted
to the Vanderbilt company the exclusive right, for a period
of eighty-five years, to make a ship canal from any point
of the Atlantic coast to any point on the Pacific coast of
Nicaragua, and by any route. The contract also gave to
the company the exclusive right to construct rail or carriage
roads and bridges and to establish steamboats and other
vessels on the rivers and lakes of the territory as accessories
to its enterprise. It was also provided that in case the canal
or any part of it should be found to be impracticable, then
the company should be privileged to substitute a railroad
or other means of communication subject to the same con-
ditions. In order to facilitate the operations, the company
was incorporated by the Republic of Nicaragua in March,
1850. In the following year the arrangement was modified
for the convenience of the company, by the granting of a
new charter to enable the subsidiary operations on the inland
waters to be separated from those connected with the
canal proper. Under this charter the Accessory Transit
Company immediately established a transportation line
from Greytown up the San Juan and across Lake Nicaragua,
by steamboats, to Virgin Bay on the western shore of the
lake, and thence by stage coaches, over thirteen miles of
good road, to San Juan del Sur. In connection with this
route regular steamship communication was maintained
with New York on one side and San Francisco on the other.
This line proved a boon to the gold-seekers and was traveled
by thousands on their way to and from California. It was
obliged to close, owing to the disturbed condition created
by the Walker expeditions, but at a later date was reopened
under a new charter by another company.

The American, Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Com-
pany did not deem any of the surveys or reports that had
previously been made of the Nicaragua country sufficiently
reliable to determine their route upon, and Colonel Orville
36 CANAL EXPLORATION

Childs of Philadelphia was engaged to direct a thorough
instrumental survey of the entire region.

AN ABLE SURVEY OF THE NICARAGUA ROUTE

Colonel Childs’ report was submitted to President Fil-
more in March, 1852, and by him to two United States
army engineers, by whom the plan was pronounced as
entirely practicable, although they recommended some
modification of its details. In view of the fact that the
British Government was jointly pledged with the United
States to protect the enterprise, the plans were subjected
to examination by English experts. These concurred in
the opinion of the American engineers.

Nothing further was done by the Vanderbilt company
towards the construction of a canal, but the Childs’ report
has always been of great value to later investigators in an
examination of the subject. In 1856, Nicaragua declaring
that the company had failed in the performance of certain
clauses of the contract, revoked the concession, annulled
the charter, and abolished the corporation. The company
disputed the right of the Republic to take this action and
made several futile attempts to re-establish its status.

In 1858, despite the continued protest of the former
concessionaries, the Government of Nicaragua considered
itself free to enter into a new contract. This it did jointly
with Costa Rica. The grantee in this case was Felix Belly,
a citizen of France. The rights and privileges accorded to
him under this agreement were very similar to those which
had been enjoyed by the Vanderbilt company, and the
organization which he proposed to create for the purpose
of accomplishing the work was to be similarly protected
by the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. But the con-
tract with Belly contained a clause insuring to the French
Government the right to keep two ships of war in Lake
Nicaragua as long as the canal remained in operation. This
novel feature in the agreement no sooner came to the
CANAL EXPLORATION 37

knowledge of the United States than that country lodged
an emphatic protest with the Governments of Nicaragua
and Costa Rica. The proposed arrangement was charac-
terized as obnoxious. It was pointed out that ‘‘the neu-
trality and security of these interoceanic routes constitute
a great portion of their value to the world, and that the
exclusive right to any one nation to exercise armed inter-
vention would be just ground for dissatisfaction on the part
of all others.”” No attempt was made to enforce the offen-
sive clause and, as the company failed to put its project
into execution, the grant was cancelled. More than once
negotiations have been blocked by political obstructions
and for many years American statesmen have been averse
to the idea of a waterway across the American Isthmus
under foreign control.

In the meantime the demand for transcontinental trans-
portation created by the discovery of the gold-fields of Cali-
fornia led to the building of the railroad across the Isthmus
of Panama. A concession was obtained for the road by three
Americans. This concession contained the important pro-
viso that no canal might be constructed there unless the
consent of the company be obtained. This line was opened
early in 1855 and, whilst it afforded very valuable service,
it stimulated rather than satisfied the desire for a ship
canal. Exploration and survey were actively prosecuted in
the Darien region by the governments and private citizens
of the United States, Great Britain and France. By this
time precise information was available as to the conditions
obtaining along the Nicaragua and Panama routes, but the
interior of the eastern section of the Isthmus was still
unknown except to the Indians, although it had often been
traversed by Spaniards.

EXPLORATIONS IN THE DARIEN REGION
This region had the obvious advantage of short dis-
tances between the oceans and there were good harbors avail-
able on either coast. So, when the difficulties of the tested
38 CANAL EXPLORATION

routes had been proved, attention turned to the southern
extreme of, what may be called, the canal area, in the hope
that the physical features of that region might present diffi-
culties of less magnitude than those existing in the sections
already surveyed. This hope found justification in the com-
mon report that the mountains of the interior offered a low
depression which had long been used by the Indians as a
portage for their canoes when traveling from one ocean to
the other. Indeed, there was a tradition of a long-existing
uninterrupted waterway from coast to coast which was said
to have been effected by cutting a short canal from the
upper reaches of the Atrato to a small stream, the San Juan,
emptying into the Pacific.

In the examination of this region three general lines
were followed—those of San Blas, Caledonia Bay, and the
Atrato River. Each of these names indicates the Atlantic
terminus of the route, but there were many variations in
the courses followed and the contemplated points of termi-
nation at the Pacific ranged over three hundred miles of
coast. These investigations, in which the United States
freely lent its assistance to private endeavors, had good
results in the extension of topographic and geographic
knowledge of the country and seemed to warrant further
efforts in the same direction.*

AN IMPORTANT SENATE INVESTIGATION

In the year 1866, the Senate, with a view to determining
the scope and direction of further investigation of the inter-
oceanic canal question, requested the Secretary of the Navy
to furnish all the available information pertaining to the
subject and to ascertain whether the Isthmus of Darien had
been sufficiently explored.

Secretary Welles responded, in the following year, with
a voluminous report} by Admiral Charles H. Davis. This

 

 

* Details of these expeditions in the Darien district may be found in Senate Ex, Doc. No.
1, 33d Cong., 2d session, and House Nix. Doe, No. 107, 47th Cong., 2d session.
fT Senate 0 x. Doc. No. 62, 89th Cong., Ist session,
CANAL EXPLORATION 39

document enumerates nineteen canal and seven railroad
projects in the isthmian country extending from Tehuan-
tepec to the Atrato. It excludes from consideration the
plans relating to Tehuantepec and Honduras as being
infeasible and meritless.

With reference to the eight proposed routes through
Nicaragua, Admiral Davis says: ‘‘It may safely be asserted
that no enterprise, presenting such formidable difficulties,
will ever be undertaken with even our present knowledge
of the American isthmuses. Still less is it likely to be entered
upon while such strong and well-founded hopes are enter-
tained by the promoters of the union of the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans of finding elsewhere a very much easier,
cheaper, and more practicable route for a canal in every
way suited to the present demands of commerce.”

He condemns a project that had strong advocates at the
time, with these words: ‘‘The examination of the head-
waters of the Atrato, of the intervening watershed, and of
the headwaters of the San Juan, satisfactorily proved that
nature forbids us altogether to entertain an idea cof a union
of the two oceans in this direction.”” The Admiral gives a
general description of the other lines in Panama, Darien,
and the Atrato valley. He states that ‘‘the Isthmus of
Darien* has not been satisfactorily explored,’’ and that ‘‘it
is to the Isthmus of Darien that we are first to look for the
solution of the great problem of an interoceanic canal.
For these reasons and because ‘‘there does not exist in the
libraries of the world the means of determining, even approx-
imately, the most practicable route for a ship canal across
the isthmus,’’ he recommends the further investigation of
the subject in this region.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL COMMISSION

President Grant, in his first message to Congress, rec-
ommended an American canal. That body promptly

* Until quite recently the words Darien and Panama were used interchangeably with refer-
ence to the strip of land now more generally designated_as the Isthmus of Panama. It is
in this broader sense that Admiral Davis uses the term ‘Isthmus of Darien.”
40 CANAL EXPLORATION

adopted a joint resolution providing for more extensive
exploration by officers of the Navy, and the chief of the
Bureau of Navigation was authorized to organize and send
out expeditions for this purpose. In 1872 the Interoceanic
Canal Commission was established. Its members were
General A. A. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers, United
States Army; C. P. Patterson, Superintendent of the Coast
Survey; and Commodore Daniel Ammen, Chief of the
Bureau of Navigation of the Navy. Under the directions
of this commission explorations were conducted in various
parts of the isthmian territory.

The Tehuantepec route was surveyed by a party of
which Captain Shufeldt had charge. It was found that
under the most favorable conditions a canal along the
Tehuantepec line would be more than one hundred miles
in length, with a summit level at least 732 feet above the
sea and requiring one hundred and forty locks. This report,
confirming as it did the conclusions of Admiral Davis and
other experts, put the Tehuantepec route out of the question
for all future time.

At about the same time (1872), an expedition under
Commander Edward P. Lull, assisted by A. G. Menocal, as
chief civil engineer, surveyed the entire Nicaragua route,
following the line taken by Childs, except for a slight devia-
tion in the passage of the divide beyond the lake. Com-
mander Lull’s report was favorable. It included a detailed
plan for a canal at an estimated cost of $65,722,137.

Whilst this work was progressing in the north, Com-
mander Selfridge and other officers of the United States
Navy were engaged in surveying the most promising lines
in the Darien region. In 1875 the Panama route was
minutely surveyed by Lull and Menocal. They reported
in favor of a course 41.7 miles from the Bay of Limon to
the Chagres, ascending its valley and that of the Obispo
to the divide, and descending the Pacific slope by the valley
of the Rio Grande to the Bay of Panama. The line as
marked out in this report has been followed in general in
CANAL EXPLORATION 41

subsequent plans without deviation except in minor
details.

REPORT OF THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL COMMISSION

The Interoceanie Commission now had before it the
reports of the expeditions which have been mentioned and,
in addition, plans and surveys relating to every route in
any degree practicable from one end to the other of the
canal country. Its report,* which was unanimous, was
returned in February, 1876, and embodied the following
conclusion: ‘“‘That the route known as the Nicaragua
route, beginning on the Atlantic side at or near Greytown;
running by canal to the San Juan River, thence . . . to

. . Lake Nicaragua; from thence across the lake and
through the valleys of the Rio del Medio and the Rio
Grande to . . . Brito, on the Pacific coast, possesses,
both for the construction and maintenance of a canal,
greater advantages and fewer difficulties from engineering,
commercial, and economic points of view than any one of
the other routes shown to be practicable by surveys suf-
ficient in detail to enable a judgment to be formed of their
respective merits.”

Meanwhile Lieutenant L. N. B. Wyse, as the representa-
tive of a French syndicate, was negotiating with the Colom-
bian Government for a concession, which he secured in 1878.
An account of this important contract and of the Panama
Canal Company, which operated under it, will be given in
a later chapter.

VARIOUS SHIP RAILWAY PROJECTS

Whilst the report of the Interoceanic Commission was
generally accepted with regard to the infeasibility of the
Tehuantepec route for a ship canal, it appeared to James
B. Eads to offer special advantages for a ship railway, and
in 1881 he secured a charter from the Mexican Govern-

* Senate Ex. Doc. No. 15, 46th Cong., Ist session.
42 CANAL EXPLORATION

ment conveying to him authority to utilize it for that pur-
pose. Eads’ plan was entirely feasible and no doubt would
have been carried to a successful conclusion had he lived,
but with his death in 1887 the project was abandoned.

In 1860 Sir James Brunless and E. C. Webb proposed
to Napoleon the Third a ship railway across the Suez
Isthmus instead of the projected canal, but the proposition
was rejected by de Lesseps. The same engineers prepared
plans for the Government of Honduras, in 1872, for a similar
transportation line from Puerto Caballos to Fonseca Bay,
to carry ships of twelve hundred tons. The Republic
failed to obtain the money necessary to carry out the
plans.

The year after Eads’ death the celebrated Chignecto
Ship-railway was commenced, after years of preparation.
It is now in successful operation over seventeen miles
between the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
The projected Hurontario Railway, of a similar character,
will be sixty-six miles in length. Mere distance, however,
whilst it enhances the cost of such an undertaking, does not
necessarily increase the difficulty of it.

Eads’ proposed line adhered in general to the course
mapped for a canal. The length of the railway was to have
been 134 miles. The summit of 736 feet is reached by easy
grades, the heaviest being less than fifty-three feet in the
mile. The railway was designed to carry vessels up to
seven thousand tons, and the total cost of the line, lifting-
docks, harbors, stations, shops, machinery and all other
equipment was estimated at less than fifty millions.

In 1884 a treaty had been negotiated between the United
States and Nicaragua for the construction of a canal by the
former, to be owned by the two states jointly. Whilst it
was under consideration in the Senate the treaty was with-
drawn by the President for the reason that it proposed a
perpetual alliance with Nicaragua and, like the Hise treaty,
imposed obligations on the United States for the protection
of the former country which it was inadvisable to assume.
CANAL EXPLORATION 43

In April, 1887, Nicaragua granted a concession to A. G.
Menocal for the construction of a ship canal from Grey-
town to Brito. Thus far the story has been a recital of
plans, projects, and theories. When we take up the thread
of it in a later chapter it will be to recount active operations.
CHAPTER III
Tue Panama RAILROAD

The great migration to the Pacific coast following the
discovery of gold in ‘‘ Forty-nine” acted as a strong incen-
tive to the immediate establishment of an isthmian route
by which the long and hazardous journey across the western
territories of the United States might be avoided. In the
last chapter a brief account was given of the enterprise
conducted by the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship
Canal Company, which, although it never effected its
original purpose of opening a waterway, afforded valuable
service to the gold-seekers in the early fifties by maintain-
ing a transportation line across Nicaragua.

At the outset of the gold movement thousands made
their way to California by way of the Isthmus of Panama.
Steamships carried them from New York to the mouth of
the Chagres. The journey thence to the Pacific coast,
although no more than fifty miles by the trail, occupied
from five to ten days and was accompanied by almost as
much hardship and danger as in the days of Balboa. The
emigrants were rowed or towed up the river by natives to
a point near Cruces. The rest of the way to Panama was
covered on foot or on mules. Women, when means would
permit, were carried by selleros. These were native Indian
porters, with a kind of chair strapped to their backs. There
was, at that time, no regular steamship line between Cali-
fornia and Panama. The travelers were often subjected
to long and wearisome waits in the city. The old battery
and the adjacent ramparts were favorite resorts of impa-
tient watchers for a vessel from San Francisco, and their
names and initials are cut in the stones by hundreds. On

(44)
THE PANAMA RAILROAD 45

more than one occasion epidemics made serious inroads
among them. General Grant, in his memoirs, tells us that
he was with the Seventh United States Infantry at Panama
in 1852, en route to California, when cholera broke out.
Fifteen per cent of the regiment succumbed to the disease
and more than five hundred emigrants died of it. Cholera
is not one of the prevalent diseases of the Isthmus. An
influx of foreigners to Panama has always been accompanied
by an outbreak of yellow fever, to which the natives are
immune.

This transflux of travelers determined certain American
capitalists to undertake the construction of a railroad across
the Isthmus. A grant for the purpose had been made by
the Government of New Granada to Mateo Kline on behalf
of a French syndicate, in 1847, but it had expired by default
in 1848. In the following year, William Henry Aspinwall,
John Lloyd Stephens, Henry Chauncy, of New York, and
their associates incorporated under the name of the Panama
Railroad Company.

THE TERMS OF THE CONCESSION

Having declared all former similar concessions null and
void, the Government of New Granada extended to this
company the exclusive privilege of building a road and of
operating it for a period of forty-nine years from the date of
completion, which was to be not later than six years after
the signing of the contract.

Subsequently this agreement was modified in important
particulars, and in its present form entitles the company
to ‘‘the use and possession of the railroad, the telegraph
between Colon and Panama, the buildings, warehouses, and
wharves belonging to the road, and in general all the depen-
dencies and other works now in its possession necessary to
the service and development of the enterprise for a period
of ninety-nine years from the 16th day of August, 1867.
At the expiration of this term the Government is to be sub-
46 THE PANAMA RAILROAD

stituted in all the rights of the company and is entitled to
the immediate possession of the entire property. The
Republic is bound to grant no privilege during this term to
any other company or person to open any other railroad
on the isthmus, nor without the consent of the company to
open or work any maritime canal there to the west of a line
drawn from Cape Tiburon, on the Atlantic, to Point Gara-
chine, on the Pacific; nor to establish any such communi-
cation itself. But the company can not oppose the con-
struction of a canal except directly along the route of its
road, and the consent required is only to enable it to exact
an equitable price for the privilege and as indemnification
for the damages it may suffer by the competition of the
canal. It is also stipulated that the company shall forfeit
its privilege should it cede or transfer its rights to any
foreign government.”

THE GREAT DIFFICULTIES OF THE UNDERTAKING

When the Republic of Colombia superseded the Govern-
ment of New Granada (1867), new requirements were
imposed upon the railroad company. It was compelled
to pay to Colombia a quarter of a million dollars annually
and to “transport free of charge the troops, chiefs, and
officers, and their equipage, ammunition, armament, cloth-
ing, and all similar effects that may belong to, are or may
be destined for the immediate service of the Government
of the Republic or the State of Panama, as also their officials
in service or in commission, and those individuals who,
with their families and baggage, may come to the country
in the character of emigrants, and of new settlers with the
permanent character of such, for account of the Government
up to the number of 2,000 annually.”’ This agreement was
worked by the Colombian Government to the utmost, and
the tremendous amount of ‘deadheading”’ with which the
company was forced to put up cut into its profits seriously.
Some idea of the extent to which this abuse was carried
THE PANAMA RAILROAD 47

may be inferred from the fact that during the year 1903
the company carried 4,663 first-class passengers who paid
their fares and 11,098 passengers and 6,601 troops free.
In addition a considerable amount of freight was trans-
ported gratis under the agreement.

The Panama Railroad Company, with characteristic
American energy, attacked the difficult undertaking with-
out delay. The engineering staff was on the ground in the
autumn of 1849. ‘Their quarters were on board a sailing
ship. They worked by day, waist deep in mud and slime,
making surveys and cutting a trail, and slept at night on
their floating home. Nothing but the indomitable will and
push for which Americans are justly praised could have
overcome the terrible difficulties that met them at every
step. The country was a howling wilderness, pestilential
and death-dealing; the forests teemed with poisonous
snakes and other equally unpleasant inhabitants; night
was made hideous by the large, broad-chested, active
mosquitoes of that part of the coast, who bite through
clothing most successfully; the country produced absolutely
nothing, and every mouthful of food had to come from New
York. Despite these obstacles, that brave little band
worked ahead, and kept on with their surveys. At the very
outset they encountered the difficulty of finding a suitable
location for the line traversing the quicksands and swamps
between Colon of to-day and Gatun. It is reported that in
some of the swamps the engineers under the late Colonel
George M. Totten, and Mr. Trautwine, failed to find bottom
at 180 feet. An embankment was created for the road by
throwing in hundreds of cords of wood, rock, and more
wood. This causeway, as it may be called, cost a fabulous
sum of money; but at last it was completed and they floated
their tracks, so to speak, over the swamps.’’*

Despite its ample resources and the unflagging application
of its representatives in the field, the company at the end
of two years had completed only about one-half of the

* Five Yearsin Panama. Wolfred Nelson, M.D., New York, 1889.
48 THE PANAMA RAILROAD

permanent way, or, to be more exact, the twenty-three
miles between Colon and Barbacoas. The transportation
of passengers and baggage across the Isthmus was, however,
in operation. The railway line was used as far as it was
completed; canoes were employed upon the Chagres to
Gorgona or Cruces; and the remainder of the journey was
performed by road.

SOME FEATURES OF THE CONSTRUCTION

At Paraiso, thirty-eight miles from the Atlantic, the
line attained its greatest elevation, being 263 feet above the
mean level of the ocean. Upon the western side of the
divide the maximum grade was one in ninety; upon the
Pacific slope it was a little more. Twenty-three miles of
the road were level and twenty-five straight, but there were
sharp curves in places. There were no fewer than one hun-
dred and thirty-four culverts, drains, and bridges of ten feet
and less, and as many as one hundred and seventy bridges
from a twelve-foot span to the length of the Barbacoas.
The line was still a single one with sidings when it was taken
over by the Canal Commission in connection with the con-
struction work on the canal. The railroad was paralleled by
atelegraph line. Of this, Pim, in his ‘‘Gateway to the Paci-
fic,” says: ‘‘There are twenty-six posts to the mile, con-
structed in the following manner: A scantling four inches
square, of pitch-pine, is encased in cement, molded in a
cylindrical form, tapering toward the top, and sunk four
feet in the ground. I was assured that when once dry these
posts would last for ages. The cost of each was five dollars.
They have the appearance of hewn stone and are quite an
ornament along the line.”’

At the close of the year 1854 the construction had
arrived at the divide. The Culebra pass afforded the great-
est depression but it was practically two hundred and forty
feet above sea level. The rails were carried over at this
point and down the Pacific slope to Panama. On the 27th
THE PANAMA RAILROAD 49

day of January, 1855, Colonel Totten went over the line
upon the first locomotive to cross the American continent
from ocean to ocean.

The utmost credit is due to the promoters of this great
enterprise and to those who executed it. Aside from the
important services the road has rendered to commerce
during the past fifty years, its efficacy as a pioneer move-
ment has been inestimable. The railroad opened the way
over the Isthmus, stimulated the desire for a canal, and
afforded indispensable facilities for its consummation.

The cost of the road was considerably in excess of the
original estimate. After its opening to through traffic,
many improvements were carried out, including the expen-
sive bridge at Barbacoas, and it is probable that the outlay
in establishing the route exceeded eight million dollars.

From Colon the road ran almost due south by west for
more than seven miles until it met the Chagres at Gatun.
Its general direction thereafter was south-easterly, along
the valley of the river as far as San Pablo, the half-way point
between the oceans.

THE FINE BRIDGE ACROSS THE CHAGRES

Here the Chagres was spanned by the splendid Barbacoas,
which word itself, in the native language, signifies a bridge.
It was built of iron over six hundred feet long, resting upon
stone piers. It cost upwards of half a million dollars. Dur-
ing the dry season the river dwindles to a shallow, almost
sluggish, stream, perhaps less than two hundred feet in
width, but in the rains it becomes a torrent, sometimes far
exceeding its normal bounds. Thus in 1878 the Chagres
flooded its valley and rose to a height of fifteen feet over the
railway. The earthquake of 1882 threw the bridge slightly
out of alignment but apparently without seriously damaging
it.

From San Pablo the road hugged the left bank of the
river to Obispo, where it turned off suddenly at right angles

4
50 THE PANAMA RAILROAD

to the stream. In the vicinity of Obispo is Cerro Gigante,
the hill from whose summit Balboa is said to have gained
his first view of the Pacific. There is no historic evidence
on this point, and it seems more probable that if the exact
spot could be ascertained it would be on one or the other
of the heights that flank the Culebra pass. At Paraiso, on
the Pacific slope, the company’s engineers had an experience
that is inseparable from excavation works in this part of
the world. A cut had been made forty feet in depth and
the rails laid along its bottom, when the torrential rain
swept the earth back and covered the track at a depth of
twenty feet. A similar occurrence befell the Panama Canal
Company more than once, affording a warning to the
American engineers which they have carefully heeded.

EXTRAORDINARY LABOR DIFFICULTIES

Reference has been made to some of the difficulties
which were encountered in what Tomes (‘‘ Panama in 1885’’)
characterizes as the ‘‘almost superhuman” task of building
the railroad across the Isthmus of Panama. Not the least
of these were involved in the efforts to secure an adequate
supply of labor. It was soon found that the natives could
not be counted upon to any extent. The company con-
cluded to import Chinamen and a ship landed eight hun-
dred of them at Panama. They immediately began to fall
sick and in a week’s time upward of a hundred were pros-
trated. The interpreters attributed this to the deprivation
of their accustomed opium. A quantity of the drug was
distributed to them and had a marked effect for the better,
but, to quote Tomes, ‘‘a Maine opium law was soon promul-
gated on the score of the immorality of administering to so
pernicious a habit, and without regard, it is hoped, to the
expense, which, however, was no inconsiderable item, since
the daily quota of each Chinese amounted to fifteen grains,
at a cost of at least fifteen cents.”’ Deprived of what from
long habit had become a necessary stimulant and subjected
THE PANAMA RAILROAD 51

to the depressing effect of the unaccustomed climate, the
coolies lost all vigor and courage. In less than two months
after their arrival there was hardly one of the original num-
ber fit to wield a pick or shovel. They gave themselves up
to despair and sought death by whatever means came
nearest to hand. Some sat on the shore and stoically
awaited the rising tide, nor did they stir until the sea swal-
lowed them. Some hanged themselves by their queues or
used those appendages to strangle themselves. By various
methods hundreds put an end to the misery of their exist-
ence. The remnant, fewer than two hundred, sick and use-
less, were shipped to Jamaica.

The next experiment of the railroad company was
hardly less disastrous. A number of Irish laborers were
imported at considerable expense, but, although the mor-
tality amongst them was not so great as that experienced
from the Chinese, it is said that the company failed to secure
a single good day’s labor from one cf them. <A great number
were buried on the Isthmus and the remainder were sent to
New York, where most of them died from the effects of the
fever contracted in the south.*

The road was finally completed with the labor of some
three thousand men of mixed races, but chiefly negroes
from Jamaica and East Indian coolies.

THE CANAL COMPANY SECURES THE RAILROAD

The Panama Canal Company learned at an early stage
in its operations that control of the railroad was essential to
the success of its project. In the fall of 1879 the stock was
offered to de Lesseps for $14,000,000, being at the rate of
$200 each for 70,000 shares. This would appear to have
been a very fair price when the worth of the line to the canal

*It should be stated that the late Colonel George M. Totten, chief engineer of the road,
threw discredit upon these statements of excessive mortality which, however, have emanated
from several apparently reliable authorities. Colonel Totten repeatedly stated that the num-
ber of men employed in the construction of the railroad at no time exceeded 7,000 and that
the total deaths among the laborers during the five years of the operation were not in excess
of 1,200. If we assume an average of 5,000 laborers per annum, probably an underestimate,
we have a mortality of 48 per thousand, an incredibly low figure, when the conditions under
which the road was built and the later experiences of the French are considered.
52 THE PANAMA RAILROAD

company is considered and the fact that its extremely profit-
able business, which had returned profits ranging from
twelve to twenty-two per cent per annum, was in prospect
of practical annihilation on the completion of the waterway.
De Lesseps, however, perhaps hoping to secure better terms,
declined the proposition. The construction of the canal was
commenced early in the following year but the operations
were obstructed at every step by the railroad company,
which instituted a systematic scheme of delay in the delivery
of goods to the canal company. At length it was forced
upon de Lesseps that the American corporation commanded
the situation, and he decided to buy the company’s shares.
But in the meanwhile they had been steadily advancing,
and when the transfer was effected the price had risen to
$250 a share. Six-sevenths of the entire stock was sold to
the Panama Canal Company,* the remainder being retained
in American hands for the purpose of keeping the charter
alive.

With the opening of the railroad a large traffic across
the Isthmus sprang into existence and grew rapidly with the
advance of time. The products of Asia and the countries
upon the Pacific coast of America were carried from Panama
to Colon, there to be distributed amongst steamships making
the ports of Europe, Canada, the United States and the
West Indies. Moving in the reverse direction, goods from
these countries reached, by the same transisthmian route,
South and Central America and San Francisco. From
the last named port reshipment was made to the Pacific
islands and points on the Asian mainland. A number of
steamship lines made regular calls at the terminal ports of
the railroad. The line occupied a commanding position as
the essential link in this chain of traffic, and took full advan-
tage of the fact. Its charges were exorbitant and its profits
enormous for many years. Its rates were based on, in gen-
eral, fifty per cent of the through tariff. For instance, of

* The company has been generally known in America by this name, but its corporate title
was ‘‘La Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interoceanique de Panama.”’
THE PANAMA RAILROAD 53

the total cost of shipping goods from New York to Val-
paraiso, one half represented the charge of the railroad
company for its share of the carriage. In some instances
this policy of mulcting the shipper excessively resulted in
loss of business. For many years the road carried enormous
quantities of coffee to Europe. The through rate was about
thirty dollars per ton. The railroad company received
fifteen dollars and the two steamship companies that handled
the goods divided a similar sum. In the early eighties a
German line commenced to run to South and Central
American ports by way of the Straits of Magellan. In a
very short while this line had secured all the coffee ship-
ments and much other freight that had previously been
sent across the Isthmus.

However, the railroad company was not seriously
affected by these diversions, and in the course of time it
entered into an agreement with the Pacific Steamship Com-
pany which created a condition in the nature of a mono-
poly, to which reference will be had again.

THE LONG CALMS ON THE PACIFIC COAST

Tramp steamers often make the ports on either side of the
Isthmus, and many sailing vessels put in at Colon. The
latter are less frequent visitors at Panama on account of
the calm that prevails on that coast. Such craft have been
known to leave the latter port and return for fresh supplies
after lying in the doldrums for weeks without being able to
get away. There was the case of the British bark Straun,
which cleared from Panama in May of the year 1884. After
getting out of the Gulf she beat about between latitudes
four and six for months and finally put back to port after
being out one hundred and five days,

THE ASSETS OF THE RAILROAD AND THEIR VALUE

When the United States Government purchased the
property of the Panama Canal Company it acquired 68,887
54 THE PANAMA RAILROAD

of the 70,000 shares of the railroad company and afterward
bought up the remainder.

The property of the railroad company transfer ed to
the United States Government consisted of about forty
eight miles of single track with twenty-six miles of sidings;
thirty-five locomotives, thirty passenger cars, more than
nine hundred freight cars and a quantity of miscellaneous
rolling stock. The equipment, like everything else that
came from the hands of the French company, was in a
condition of unnecessary deterioration. The railroad com-
pany owned repair shops, wharves and buildings at both
Panama and Colon, and almost the entire island of Manz-
anillo, upon which the latter city stands, was its property.
It held large parcels of real estate along the line, aside from
the land actually occupied by the road, and had with the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company, an undivided half interest
in the islands of Naos, Culebra, Perico, and Flamenco, all
in Panama Bay. It was also the proprietor of three steam-
ships having an average tonnage of about twenty-seven
thousand. The entire property, ‘‘cost of road, real estate,
and equipment,” including the steamships, tugs, lighters,
etc., was carried on the books at what would seem to be the
conservative valuation of a little over twelve millions and a
half.

As soon as the Government assumed charge of the rail-
road, complaints of the traffic monopoly were made by ship-
pers who had been without means of redress under the old
conditions. The justice of these complaints was fully
recognized by the authorities. General Davis, the first
governor of the Canal Zone, severely criticised the manage-
ment of the road, and Secretary Taft, in the report to which
reference has already been made, says: “ . . . What-
ever may have justified the rates charged by the railroad
company, the salaries paid by it, and the character of its
corporate organization, and the expenses of the office in
New York, certainly for the purposes and under the control
of the United States, radical changes must be made,”
THE PANAMA RAILROAD 55

A contract existed between the railroad company and
the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, which secured to the
latter concern the exclusive privilege of issuing through
bills of lading on freight from San Francisco to New York.
Mr. Taft expressed the opinion that this contract was
“invalid under the laws of Colombia and the laws of Pan-
ama.’ The Panama Railroad Company ran three cargo
steamers on the Atlantic side, between New York and Colon,
and would recognize no through bills of lading except those
issued from its office in New York. Goods shipped across
the Isthmus by any other line were charged the heavy local
freight rates in force between Panama and Colon. This
arrangement, together with its control of the docking facil-
ities at Colon, most effectually enabled the company to
shut out any competition in the Atlantic carrying trade.

SUGGESTED RAILROAD AND STEAMSHIP TRAFFIC REFORMS

Early in 1905, Joseph W. Bristow was commissioned to
investigate the situation under consideration. After an
examination extending over several months he substantiated
the foregoing facts and made the following recommendations:
That the road should be continued as a commercial line,
that it should be double-tracked, equipped with modern
rolling stock, and supplied with additional wharves and other
improvements; that the rates for through freight should
be made as low as the cost of the service and provision for
a fair dividend will permit; that the steamship line main-
tained by the road between Colon and New York should
be continued by the Government; that the exclusive con-
tracts with the Pacific Mail Steamship Company and the
two South American west coast lines should be cancelled,
‘“‘and the ports of Colon and Panama be opened to the
use of all steamship lines on equal terms;” that in case a
new steamship line be not established within reasonable
time by private capital between Colon and the Gulf ports,
the railroad company should establish and maintain such
56 THE PANAMA RAILROAD

a line (it is cheaper and more convenient to move the prod-
ucts of the Mississippi Valley by way of these ports than
through New York); that in the event of the Pacific Mail
Steamship Company discontinuing its service between San
Francisco and Panama some other private corporation
should be encouraged to take its place, but failing this, the
Panama Railroad Company should run a line of steamers
over the route.

It will be seen that the report contemplated a consider-
able extension of the Government’s commercial operations,
but only as alternative measures to be resorted to in case
the desired objects could not be attained through private
enterprise. Mr. Bristow recommended favoring American
ships in traffic relations as far as might be consistent with
treaty obligations, but, upon the theory that the railroad
was performing the functions of a canal, he did not deem
it practicable to discriminate to the advantage of American
bottoms at the ports of Panama and Colon.

The report met with the approval of the Government,
and steps were taken to carry out its general reeommenda-
tions.

THE RELOCATED PANAMA RAILROAD

A first necessity was to relay the line so that its tracks
would at all times be above the level of Gatun Lake after
the opening of the canal; a task nearly as costly as building
the entire road anew.

The new, or relocated line of the Panama Railroad, is
47.11 miles long, or 739 feet longer than the old line. From
Colon to Mindi, 4.17 miles, and from Corozal to Panama,
2.83 miles, the old line is used but the remaining 40 miles
are new road. From Mindi to Gatun the railroad runs, in
general, parallel to the Canal, and ascends from a few feet
above tide water elevation to 95 feet above. At Gatun
the road leaves the vicinity of the Canal and turns east
along Gatun Ridge to a point about 43 miles from the cen-
ter line of the Canal, where it turns southward again and
THE PANAMA RAILROAD Oo”

crosses the low Gatun Valley to Monte Lirio, from which
point it skirts the east shore of Gatun Lake to the beginning
of the Culebra Cut at Bas Obispo. In the Gatun Valley
section there are several immense embankments, necessary
to place the line above the lake level, which in the 3-mile
section, aggregate about 5,000,000 cubic yards. Likewise,
near the north end of Culebra Cut, where the line is located
so as to furnish waste dumps for spoil from the Canal, there
are several very heavy embankments. Originally it was
intended to carry the railroad through Culebra Cut on a
40-foot berm along the east side, 10 feet above the water
level, but the numerous slides have made this plan impracti-
cable, and a line is now constructed, on a high level around
the Cut, known locally as the Gold Hill Line. Leaving the
berm of the Canal at Bas Obispo, the Gold Hill Line cuts
through a ridge of solid rock, and gradually works into the
foot hills, reaching a distance from the center line of the
Canal of 2 miles opposite Culebra; thence it runs down the
Pedro Miguel Valley to Paraiso, where it is only 800 feet
from the center line of the Canal. This section of the
line is located on a maximum grade of 1} per cent, com-
pensated, and has a total length of 93 miles. The sharpest
curve on the whole line is 7°. From the south end of
Culebra Cut at Paraiso, the railroad runs practically
parallel with the Canal to Panama, with maximum grade
of 0.45 per cent. Where the railroad crosses the Gatun
River, near Monte Lirio, a steel girder bridge has been
erected, the center span of which will be made into a lift
span where the Gatun Lake is formed, to permit access to
the upper arm of the lake. The Chagres River at Gamboa
is crossed on a steel girder bridge, 7-mile long, with one 200-
foot through truss channel span. Numerous other rivers
and small streams are crossed on reinforced concrete cul-
verts. Near Miraflores, a tunnel 736 feet long has been
built through a hill. The total cost of the new line has been
$8, 866,392.02.

At present the Panama Railroad is relatively the busiest
58 THE PANAMA RAILROAD

line in the world. During 1910 the freight movement over
its fifty miles of roadbed approximated 300,000,000 tons.
Whilst the commercial traffic is considerable, it accounts
for but a fractional part of the whole. The great bulk of
the material carried consists of spoil from the works, and
supplies for the Commission. The engineering department
of the Canal operates about 300 miles of construction track-
age and the Panama Railroad acts as a clearing house for
its traffic. It receives the dirt trains loaded and returns
them empty. From 700 to 800 dirt trains a day are handled,
each composed of a locomotive and 18 flat cars, the full
load being 500 tons.

The passenger traffic on this little railroad is also extra-
ordinarily great. All day long employees are journeying
between the many towns that are strung along the line.
During the year about 1,500,000 passengers are carried.
In the mornings and evenings closely packed laborers’
trains of a special type are run.

It is hardly necessary to state that as an adjunct to the
canal construction the railroad is of the highest importance
—indeed, it is a sine qua non. With the completion of the
waterway, the road will lapse into the condition of a mere
local line between Colon and Panama. It should, never-
theless, continue to be a valuable property in the hands of
either the Government or a private corporation. As ameans
of transporting men and material employed in the opera-
tion of the completed canal it will always be of service.
It is probable that a considerable amount of freight will be
reshipped even after the canal is opened. Many voyagers
will leave vessels at the point of entering the canal in order
to avoid what will generally be an unpleasant passage and
secure the opportunity of spending a few hours in Panama
by making the transit by rail. Both the terminal ports,
but especially Panama, must grow rapidly under the influ-
ences of future traffic and the local business of the railroad
will be proportionately increased.
CHAPTER IV
Tue IstHmMiaAN CouNTRY

During recent years the ribbon of land that joins the
continents of North and South America has loomed large
in the public eye.

Since the days of Greece’s glory no such small strip of
soil as the Isthmus of Panama has gained equal distinction.
It has been the scene of stirring adventure and the site of
the wealthiest city in the world. It has been the subject
of epoch-making diplomacy and a sphere for political dis-
turbances. It is the seat of the greatest engineering enter-
prise in history; an enterprise which is destined to largely
revolutionize the commerce of the earth and, more than
any other modern factor, to influence the fortunes of
nations.

In the second decade of the sixteenth century Angel
Saavedra mooted the idea of a canal through this narrow
neck of inter-ocean territory. Since that time the thought
could not be banished from the minds of men though a
King of Spain decreed death to any who should voice it.
For two hundred years and more plans and projects for the
great waterway have been advanced. The first attempt
to construct it ended in a cataclysmal failure. In these
early years of the twentieth century the opening of a passage
is at length assured, and it will be available to the traffic of
the world almost, perhaps exactly, four hundred years from
the discovery of the Pacific.

THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA

The neck of land separating the two great oceans of the
globe, which is called the Isthmus of Panama, forms the

(59)
60 THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY

southern termination of the great American isthmus extend-
ing north to Mexico. This strip of land curving about four
hundred and seventy miles from west to east has commonly
been styled the Isthmus of Darien, but that name is more
properly applied to the section of country between the Gulfs
of Uraba and San Miguel. The Isthmus of Panama is
traversed along its entire length by the Cordillera de Baudo,
separated from the Andes by the Valley of the Atrato which
marks the northern limit of South America. Erroneous
impressions are apt to be created by the usual practice of
studying geography with the aid of the ordinary flat maps,
which have the effect of exaggerating the size of countries
in high latitudes and diminishing the equatorial areas. One
thousand miles in latitude 60 degrees occupies upon the ordi-
nary map twice as much space as does one thousand miles
along the equator. It is a revelation to many a well-
informed person to learn that South America is very nearly
as large as North America. For the study of the Panama
Canal in its relations to the rest of the world the use of a
globe, or a map on the polyconic projection is recommended.
Another point worth noticing in this connection is that the
most pronounced diversion from the general north and south
trend of the Americas is found in the Isthmus of Panama,
which takes a lateral direction east and west and throws
the southern continent, so to speak, to the east of the north-
ern, so that a line dropped due south from New York would
pass through the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Chile.

In looking at a map of the western hemisphere we are
accustomed to finding the Atlantic Ocean to the east or
on the right hand. For this reason a sectional map of the
Canal region is likely to be a little confusing at first glance.
It will show the Pacific on the right and the Atlantic on the
opposite side of the page. This is due to the fact that the
Isthmus makes a northerly loop in the portion containing
the Canal Zone, and Panama is actually east of Colon, from
which port the Canal will take a south-easterly direction to
its Pacific terminus. A line from Buffalo continued south
 

° pe Is

S] SEIS 9 awouvdeay ~

           

——= 49
TSE = a) \
Ve ee ene fF é a

| HWOWIKegG TG ¢ Lg

4 e " S|RaMUaneuangues
Jd

sf
NN é e009 '4d
i ksseny797 pe
You
soy

  

LOY DATGUBATIUNG y

    

         

Fn) /noson SES

bz:
O10) oso ep se2bg
1p NTE GY Dee

ee

    

01/38
07.105

LoeS99) = SURO EMON,

op Pe IULON ; PY |
ve OE BL _ | ne | 08.

  

 

 

 
Fold out
 
THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY 61

would bisect the Canal and leave Panama on the right and
Colon on the left.

The writer finds an excuse for these explanations in the
knowledge that many intelligent persons have been puzzled
by the unfamiliar geographical conditions involved.

POLITICAL CHANGES IN PANAMA AND COLOMBIA

Having secured their independence from Spain, the
provinces of Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, and Panama
formed a republican federation. Subsequently, the two
first-named seceded, and Panama with Colombia estab-
lished the United Sovereign States of New Granada.
Although each of the states combined in this political union
exercised sovereign powers, the paramount authority in
the territory became gradually centralized at Bogota. In
1861, against the wishes of the leading citizens of Panama,
the United States of Colombia were organized with a new
constitution conferring greater powers on the government
at Bogota. Twenty-five years later, after a civil war in
which many lives were lost, Colombia succeeded in estab-
lishing the republic which took her name. By this measure
Panama lapsed to the condition of a mere department with
a governor appointed by the Colombian president and vested
with little independent authority. The Panamans, whilst
forced to submit to this degradation, have always protested
against it and have consistently declared their right to the
position of a constitutional state. The government of
Panama by the corrupt Colombian politicians had always
been bad, and the people of the Isthmus had entertained
the design of independence for years before America opened
negotiations for the Canal and, indeed, had enjoyed it for
three years following 1857.

THE REVOLUTION OF PANAMA

Panama threw off the yoke of Colombia at an extremely
opportune time as regards the plans of the United States
62 THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY

for the construction of the Isthmian Canal. The coinci-
dence of the event was the only basis for the utter nonsense
written in this country upon the subject at the time. While
the opportunity was seized most promptly by our executive
officials, doubtless saving the delays of lengthy and expensive
negotiations, there is absolutely no ground for the accusa-
tion that the American authorities instigated the coup
which gave independence to the Isthmus, but, on the con-
trary, sufficient evidence that, although they may have had
some inkling of the attempt before its occurrence, they were
entirely free from participation in it. The suspected repre-
sentatives of our Government have denied that any Amer-
ican official instigated or assisted in the revolt. In this they
are borne out by the statements of the leading Panaman
revolutionists and by Doctor Herran, the Colombian Min-
ister to Washington at the time.

The Hay-Herran Treaty was negotiated at Washington
in 1903 between the representatives of the Governments of
the United States and the Republic of Colombia. Its pur-
pose was to secure to the former state the privilege of mak-
ing a canal through the Isthmus of Panama. Colombia was
to authorize the French company to sell out to the United
States and to give a strip of land thirty miles wide for a
Canal Zone over which Colombia should retain sovereignty
but the United States have police control. The United
States was to pay ten millions of dollars at once and one
hundred thousand yearly after the ninth year. The
national legislature of the latter country, moved it is be-
lieved by the hope of inducing us to pay a higher price,
failed to ratify the treaty.

A COMIC OPERA COUP D’fTAT

The Panamans are much more astute than is generally
supposed. They had realized fully the enormous advan-
tages that would accrue to their country from the opera-
tion of the Canal by America, and when the opportunity
seemed to be in danger of destruction by the action of the
THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY 63

Colombian politicians, the leading men in Panama who, as
has been said, have harbored thoughts of independence for
years, determined to take matters into their own hands.
No doubt they calculated, as they reasonably might, upon
the United States acknowledging them as soon as they had
knocked off their shackles. The revolution was bloodless
and savored of opera bouffe in the absurdity of its details.
The Government of Bogota learned of the plot before it was
put into execution and despatched several hundreds of the
ragamufins that composed its ‘‘army”’ to Panama under
Generals Tobal and Amaya, with orders to arrest the con-
spirators and carry them to the capital. When the detach-
ment arrived at Colon the generals hurried forward over
the railroad with their warrants and were promptly placed
in confinement by the revolutionary leaders.

Meanwhile, Colonel Shaler, the Superintendent of the
Panama Railroad, unquestionably placed impediments in
the way of the further progress of the troops. It must be
remembered, however, that Colonel Shaler, although an
American, was not an official and acted as the representa-
tive of the corporation which was interested in the sale of
the canal property to the United States, for the Panama
Canal Company owned the railway.

The sympathy of the American Government and peo-
ple was unquestionably with the Panamans, but they
received no official aid from this country.

Marines were landed from an American gunboat and
two days later the Colombian troops took ship for Carta-
gena. Panama immediately declared itself an independent
republic and was recognized by the United States without
delay.

THE AMERICAN PART IN THE AFFAIR

There is reason to believe that the Colombian soldiers
were bribed—at the rate of about five dollars apiece—by
friends of Panama, but the statement that the money was
distributed or handled by an officer of the American Navy
64 THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY

is a gross and stupid libel. The presence of the marines was
without a doubt a decisive factor in the accomplishment
of the revolution, but that it was not premeditated and had
no other purpose than the protection of American lives is
proved by the following official report of the officer com-
manding the Nashville:

“U.S. 8. Nashville, Third Rate.
“Colon, U. S. Colombia, November 5, 1903.

‘“‘Sir: Pending a complete report of the occurrences of
the last three days in Colon, Colombia, I most respectfully
invite the Department’s attention to those of the date of
Wednesday, November 4, which amounted to practically
the making of war against the United States by the officer
in command of the Colombian troops in Colon. At 1 0’clock
p. m. on that date I was summoned on shore by a precon-
certed signal, and on landing met the United States consul,
vice-consul, and Colonel Shaler, the general superintendent
of the Panama Railroad.

“The consul informed me that he had received notice
from the officer commanding the Colombian troops, Colonel
Torres, through the prefect of Colon, to the effect that if
the Colombian officers, Generals Tobal and Amaya, who
had been seized in Panama on the evening of November 8,
by the independents, and held as prisoners, were not released
by 2 o’clock p. m., he, Torres, would open fire on the town
of Colon and kill every United States citizen in the place,
and my advice and action were requested. I advised that
all the United States citizens should take refuge in the shed
of the Panama Railroad Company, a stone building sus-
ceptible of being put into good state of defense, and that I
would immediately land such body of men, with extra arms
for arming the citizens, as the complement of the ship would
permit.

UNITED STATES MARINES ARE LANDED

“This was agreed to, and I immediately returned on
board, arriving at 1.15 p. mM. The order for landing was
THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY 65

immediately given, and at 1.30 p. m. the boats left the ship
with a party of forty-two men under the command of Lieu-
tenant-Commander H. M. Witzel, with Midshipman J. P.
Jackson as second in command. Time being pressing, I
gave verbal orders to Mr. Witzel to take the building
referred to above, to put it into the best state of defense
possible, and protect the lives of the citizens assembled
there—not firing unless fired upon. The women and chil-
dren took refuge on the German steamer Marcomania and
the Panama Railroad steamer City of Washington, both
ready to haul out from dock if necessary.

“The Nashville got under way and patrolled along the
water-front close in and ready to use either small arm or
shrapnel fire. The Colombians surrounded the building
of the railroad company almost immediately after we had
taken possession, and for about one and a half hours their
attitude was most threatening, it being seemingly their
purpose to provoke an attack. Happily our men were cool
and steady, and while the tension was very great no shot
was fired.

“At about 3.15 p. m. Colonel Torres came into the build-
ing for an interview and expressed himself as most friendly
to the Americans, claiming that the whole affair was a mis-
apprehension, and that he would like to send the alcalde of
Colon to Panama to see General Tobal and have him direct
the discontinuance of the show of force. A special train
was furnished and safe conduct guaranteed. At about 5.30
p. M. Colonel Torres made the proposition of withdrawing
his troops to Monkey Hill if I would withdraw the Nash-
ville’s force and leave the town in possession of the police
until the return of the alcalde on the morning of the 5th.

THE NERVE OF AMERICAN MARINES PREVENTS A CONFLICT
WITH COLOMBIA

“After an interview with the United States consul and
Colonel Shaler as to the probability of good faith in the

5
66 THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY

matter, I decided to accept the proposition and brought
my men on board, the disparity in numbers between my
force and that of the Colombians—nearly ten to one—
making me desirous of avoiding a conflict so long as the
object in view—the protection of American citizens—was
not imperiled.

‘“‘T am positive that the determined attitude of our men,
their coolness and evident intention of standing their
ground, had a most salutary and decisive effect on the
immediate situation, and was the initial step in the ulti-
mate abandoning of Colon by these troops and their return
to Cartagena the following day. Lieutenant-Commander
Witzel is entitled to much praise for his admirable work in
command on the spot.

“T feel that I can not sufficiently represent to the
Department the grossness of this outrage and the insult
to our dignity, even apart from the savagery of the threat.

“Very respectfully,
“‘JoHN HUBBARD,
“Commander, United States Navy, Commanding.
“The Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.”’

In his more detailed report Commander Hubbard stated:
“‘T beg to assure the Department that I had no part what-
ever in the negotiations that were carried on between
Colonel Torres and the representatives of the provisional
government; that I landed an armed force only when the
lives of American citizens were threatened, and withdrew
this force as soon as there seemed to be no grounds for
further apprehension of injury to American lives or prop-
erty; that I relanded an armed force because of the failure
of Colonel Torres to carry out his agreement to withdraw
and announced intention of returning; and that my atti-
tude throughout was strictly neutral as between the two
parties, my only purpose being to protect the lives and
property of American citizens and to preserve the free and
uninterrupted transit of the isthmus.’’
THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY 67

THE PRESIDENT’S DENIAL OF OFFICIAL COMPLICITY

President Roosevelt, referring to the foregoing reports,
says: ‘‘This plain official account of the occurrences of
November 4 shows that instead of there having been too
much prevision by the American Government for the main-
tenance of order and the protection of life and property on
the isthmus, the orders for the movement of the American
warships had been too long delayed: so long, in fact, that
there were but forty-two marines and sailors available to
land and protect the lives of American men and women.

At Panama, when the revolution broke out, there
was no American man-of-war and no American troops or
sailors. At Colon Commander Hubbard acted with entire
impartiality toward both sides, preventing any movement,
whether by the Colombians or the Panamanians, which
would tend to produce bloodshed. On November 9 he pre-
vented a body of the revolutionists from landing at Colon.”

In his message to Congress the President made the fol-
lowing reference to the treaty and the complications which
grew out of it: ‘‘ During all the years of negotiation and dis-
cussion that preceded the conclusion of the Hay-Herran
treaty, Colombia never intimated that the requirement by
the United States of control over the canal strip would ren-
der unattainable the construction of a canal by way of the
Isthmus of Panama; nor were we advised, during the months
when legislation of 1902 was pending before the Congress,
that the terms which it embodied would render negotiations
with Colombia impracticable. It is plain that no nation
could construct and guarantee the neutrality of the canal
with a less degree of control than was stipulated for in the
Hay-Herran treaty. A refusal to grant such degree of con-
trol was necessarily a refusal to make any practicable treaty
at all. Such refusal therefore squarely raised the ques-
tion whether Colombia was entitled to bar the transit of
the world’s traffic across the isthmus. . . . Colom-
bia, after having rejected the treaty in spite of our protests
and warnings when it was in her power to accept it, has
68 THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY

since shown the utmost eagerness to accept the same treaty
if only the status quo could be restored. One of the men
standing highest in the official circles of Colombia on
November 6 addressed the American minister at Bogota,
saying that if the Government of the United States would
land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty and the
transit, the Colombian Government would ‘declare martial
law, and, by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when
public order is disturbed, (would) approve by decree the
ratification of the canal treaty as signed; or, if the Govern-
ment of the United States prefers, (would) call an extra
session of the Congress—with new and friendly members—
next May to approve the treaty.’

“Having these facts in view, there is no shadow of a
question that the Government of the United States proposed
a treaty that was not only just, but generous to Colombia,
which our people regarded as erring, if at all, on the side
of overgenerosity, which was hailed with delight by the
people of the immediate locality through which the canal
was to pass, who were most concerned as to the new order
of things, and which the Colombian authorities now recog-
nize as being so good that they are willing to promise its
unconditional ratification if only we will desert those who
have shown themselves our friends and restore to those who
have shown themselves unfriendly the power to undo what
they did. I pass by the question as to what assurance we
have that they would now keep their pledge and not again
refuse to ratify the treaty if they had the power; for, of
course, I will not for one moment discuss the possibility of
the United States committing an act of such baseness as to
abandon the new Republic of Panama.”

DESCRIPTION OF THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA

The recognition of the independence of Panama by the
United States was followed by a treaty between the two
countries which will be referred to in a succeeding chapter.
THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY 69

The physical features of the Isthmus of Panama are
very diversified. The center of the country is occupied by
mountains and hills. In some parts these elevations extend
to the coast, but usually they are flanked by alluvial plains
or gently rolling country. This again is fringed by a strip of
costal swamp covered with mangroves. Heavy forest and
dense jungle clothe the mountain districts. The growth is
so strong and rapid that the railroad company has to main-
tain a constant fight against its inroads. If not checked it
would in six months bury the line. The Chagres is the
principal river in every respect, but there are a number of
smaller streams.

The territory of the Republic of Panama is divided into
provinces and these into municipal districts. The canal
route traverses two of these provinces—those of Colon and
Panama. Their prosperity is assured by the American
enterprise now in process of development.

THE INHOSPITABLE SAN BLAS COUNTRY

The province of Darien is not a promising region. It
is largely made up of mountainous wilderness and impassa-
ble swamps. Rumor has persistently credited the San Blas
district with rich gold deposits, but verification is rendered
difficult by the unfriendly attitude of the Indians there,
who have always displayed an unconquerable objection to
the presence of white men. The San Blas Indians occasion-
ally visit Panama on trading or marketing excursions, but
they are reticent about their country and their affairs and
decidedly averse to any but the most tempcvary relations
with foreigners. The provinces of Chiriqui and Veragua
support industries of considerable importance and appear
to be capable of much greater development under favorable
conditions. David, the capital of Chiriqui, occupies an
extremely picturesque site upon a _ well-wooded coast.
Behind the town stretches a fertile savanna backed by a
range of mountains from two to three thousand feet in
70 THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY

height. It is one of those quaint old settlements with which
the traveler in Spanish-America becomes familiar, but he
never tires of the air of restful simplicity that pervades
them. The houses, generally one story in height, are square
whitewashed structures with roofs of red tile and front
verandas. The inhabitants are hospitable, contented and
inclined to take life easily. Several of them are well-to-do
and not a few highly cultured.

THE ANCIENT GRAVES OF CHIRIQUI

Chiriqui became suddenly famous several years ago on
account of the interesting relics that were unearthed there
from the guacas, or graves, of the ancient inhabitants. <A
great number of these treasures were found in the district
of David. ‘History is silent about the people who are
buried in thousands there. The discovery of these old
cemeteries came about in this wise: Many, many years ago
in cutting a trench through a peaceful forest to drain off
water, the Indian diggers came across an image of gold.
Great was their surprise and the execrable sedd’ore, or ‘the
cursed thirst of gold,’ settled upon that primitive people
like a nightmare. They kept on digging, and unearthed
quantities of golden ornaments and images of various kinds.
Soon hundreds were digging in the forest, and it has been
estimated that gold ornaments were uncovered to a value
exceeding $400,000 in a space of five or six years. They were
sold for weight, or value in coin, and went into the melting
pot. Later, some archzologists took an interest in the
matter, and some systematic work was done, they directing
and the natives doing the digging. It would seem that in
the majority of cases the graves first were dug, their sides
lined with pieces of stone, and then cross pieces were laid
over these. Inside, the pottery was placed, together with
ornaments of gold, cooking utensils, ete. The graves of the
poorer class contained nothing but cooking utensils and no
gold ornaments were found in them.
THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY 71

“A native locates a grave by tapping the earth as he
walks along. As soon as he gets a hollow sound familiar
to his expert ear he commences digging and digs down.
The contents are stone implements, pottery implements,
ornaments and pure gold, and ornaments of gold gilt, a
species of pinchbeck, called by the natives here twmbago.
There are also ornaments in copper, and a few bone instru-
ments.

“There are a number of small idols in stone, varying
from nine to eighteen inches high. There is also a species
of grinding stone, on which they evidently ground their
corn, or its equivalent. The better class of these grinding
stones were from eighteen to twenty-four inches in length,
and from twelve to fifteen inches in width. I am now
speaking of some of the largest. They were concave on
top, and in the graves were found stone rollers fitting the
upper surface. Generally they were made to represent
some animal.

CURIOUS IMPLEMENTS OF A BY-GONE RACE

“There were some with tiger-shaped heads and four legs.
The tail generally folded around and rested on the left hind
leg. A commoner type of grinding stone resembled a low
stool of stone without any ornamentation. In the graves
were found an endless variety of stone chisels and stone
hatchets. Some of these chisels and hatchets were beau-
tifully proportioned, presenting various planes and surfaces
for examination, and their edges in many instances were
sharp even after having been exposed for long centuries to
the effects of that humid soil. These were the implements
with which the people did all their carving.

“Tn the pottery implements the variety was almost end-
less, not only suggesting considerable ingenuity, but also
some knowledge of the anatomy of the human body.
Between many of these pieces of pottery and the male
angels on the doors of La Merced, at Panama, there was a
72 THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY

striking analogy. . . . Roughly classifying the pot-
tery utensils, they were of two kinds, glazed and unglazed,
and many of the markings on them had been made in black
and red pigments. Many of the borders, while crude, were
very suggestive. There was a series of gods, little squat
figures with triangular faces; nearly all of which had been
glazed and were ornamental. Their pectoral development
was remarkable. It is supposed that they were a kind of
idol. . . . Then there were rattles of ingenious con-
struction, with which they soothed the gentle baby in early
days. There was a series of whistles (it is supposed that
they were bird calls) producing all sorts of notes, from a full
rich sound to a gentle twitter.

THE MYSTIC FROG OF THE EARLY INDIANS

‘“‘ Among the gold ornaments found in the guacas at Chiri-
qui were many frogs. The frog seems to have been a favor-
ite type of ornament with those early races. The largest frog
of pure gold uncovered there weighed eighteen ounces.
: Another thing that seemed very strange to me
was a kind of bell. It was of gold, and an exact counter-
part of the oldtime sleigh-bells, or those with a slot. It had
a handle and within were little pieces of metal, and these
little bells, when shaken, emitted quite a musical sound.
eo Among the tumbago ornaments the majority rep-
resented birds or frogs. From a careful examination of a
number of them the body seemed to be made of copper
covered with a film of gold. How it was put on I am unable
to say, but certainly gold it was. . . . JI saw another
specimen which caused me a deal of speculation. It evi-
dently was intended for the figure of a king. It was in
bronze, and that surprised me greatly, because the art of
casting in bronze is deemed an art to this day.’’*

By classifying these discoveries it is shown that the
Isthmian Indians were about on the same level of civilization

* Wolfred Nolson.
THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY 73

as the Indians of Mexico and Peru. They were in a later
stage than the stone and bronze age.

THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF PANAMA

It is very probable that with the exploitation that is
likely to follow the opening of the Canal, the Isthmus will
prove to have rich and extensive mineral resources. Gold,
copper, manganese, and coal are known to exist in different
parts, but the greater portion of the country is yet to be
subjected to geological surveys. When the waterway
comes into use a great market for coal will be established at
Panama and the demand will doubtless lead to the operation
of local mines. The island of Muerto, near David, is said
to be almost a solid mass of coal covered with a stratum of
clay. As early as 1851 the geologists, Whiting and Schu-
man, made a report on this deposit which was published in
London. Here would seem to be a favorable opportunity
for American capital and enterprise.

There are large areas of good grazing ground in the
western provinces, and the industry has been pursued to
some extent. When the Canal is in use there will be a ready
and profitable market for meat at Panama and cattle rais-
ing should become one of the chief industries of this section.

The country about the Chiriqui Bay already has a large
and flourishing fruit trade. The entire region in the neigh-
borhood of the Costa Rica border is exceeding rich—as rich
as any in the tropics, perhaps. It might be developed with
comparative ease. It has a pleasant and salubrious cli-
mate. The people are genial and hospitable; well disposed
towards Americans and eager for improvement.

THE FAMOUS PEARL ISLANDS OF PANAMA BAY

The famous Pearl Islands lie in the Gulf about forty
miles off the city of Panama. By the Spaniards they were
called the King’s Archipelago. The pearl fisheries are of
very ancient origin. Balboa secured a number of the gems
74 THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY

from the Indians, and was told by them that the pearl oys-
ter had been sought in these waters during uncountable
ages. At one time these fisheries were probably as rich as
any in the world, but reckless methods injured them, and
whilst they are still worked in a desultory fashion, it may be
said that the old beds are practically exhausted.

The pearls of Panama have always been noted for their
size. It is said that specimens as large as filberts have been
found. They are very lustrous and have a silvery sheen,
differing from the creamy shade of the pearl of Ceylon.

The native Panamans are a more attractive people than
one would be led to suppose from the accounts of travelers
who have only come in contact with the lower classes in
the city of Panama who are a mixed and far from represen-
tative lot.

It has long been a practice with the well-to-do creole
families to send their children of both sexes to the best
colleges of Europe and America. Consequently the upper
class is distinguished by refinement and culture as well
as many natural qualities of an admirable character. They
entertain the strongest feelings of admiration and respect
for the American people, and, if we may judge from recent
experiences, our relations to the Panamans will continue
without difficulty or friction.

The disbandment of the army by President Amador
was effected with little trouble because of the ‘indly inter-
vention of the American minister, whose advice was accepted
by both sides in a friendly spirit. It is doubtful if any
other South American Republic could attempt the retire-
ment of the entire military force, no matter how weak,
without precipitating a revolution.

The rancheros of the country districts are peacefully
inclined and contented with their simple pastoral life.
They live in huts of the simplest construction and till a
few acres of ground. Their wants are very few and easily
supplied. The condition of the peon will be improved
with the general prosperity that is in store for the Isthmus.
THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY 75

Except upon the coasts the climate of the Isthmus is
not worse than that of the average tropical region and in
some parts of the territory it is quite healthful and pleasant.
Hundreds of Americans have been employed by the rail-
road and many of them have enjoyed excellent health dur-
ing residences extending from ten to twenty years. The
average temperature is about eighty degrees and there is
generally a refreshing breeze from the north. The humid-
ity in the rainy season is great and its effect very enervating
to natives of higher latitudes. There are two seasons.
The wet season commences about the middle of April and
lasts for eight months. The dry season from the middle
of December is generally considered healthy even in the
canal region. During this period the sky is a cloudless
blue by day and at night the moon and stars are sublime.
CHAPTER V
CoLoN AND PANAMA

In the days when Spain maintained a great trade route
across the Isthmus, the Atlantic terminus was Porto Bello,
about twenty miles east of the mouth of the Canal. A
cluster of Indian shacks upon a low beach now marks the
place where the Spanish galleons were wont to land their
cargoes of merchandise and take on board the pearls and
precious metals consigned to the king’s treasury. The
ruins of the old city are shut in by heavy woods and lost
in a tangle of dense undergrowth.

The construction of the railway gave birth to the
modern port. The Americans called it Aspinwall, after
one of the chief promoters. By the French it was named
Colon. The city is built upon the Island of Manzanillo,
a sand-covered coraline formation, three-quarters of a mile
in length and not more than six hundred yards broad. It
stands a very few feet above the ocean at high tide and
is connected with the mainland by the railway embank-
ment. The original town was anything but a pleasant or
healthy place of residence. The railroad buildings, dwell-
ings, laborers’ quarters, and shops, mostly of wood, were
scattered about without any particular system or order.
The center of the island was occupied by an almost stag-
nant lagoon, creating a most undesirable condition from a
sanitary point of view.

During the disturbances incident to the revolution of
1885, Colon was completely destroyed by fire. It was
reconstructed with somewhat more regard for convenience
and sanitation, but still leaving much to be desired in both
respects.

(76)
COLON AND PANAMA 77

COLON AN UNATTRACTIVE CITY

The Colon of to-day is a straggling, unattractive city
with some redeeming features, however, and a promise
of more in the near future. The railroad company occupies
the greater part of the water-front with its various build-
ings, including wharves and docks. Parallel with these
is the main street, composed almost entirely of frame
buildings. There are some good shops and a number of
conscienceless dealers in spurious curios who, together with
the enterprising money changers, reap a royal harvest from
unsophisticated travelers. From the moment of landing
the stranger is beset by a howling crowd of nondescripts
who contend with one another for the privilege of fleecing
him. His baggage is distributed amongst as many different
individuals as possible, and upon his arrival at the hotel
he is called upon to pay each one an exorbitant fee for his
service, although it may have consisted in carrying a news-
paper only. Before the American advent there was no
escape from this imposition. If a victim refused to be
mulcted he was haled before a magistrate who invariably
supported the extortioners. In those days a man dared
not ask a native the name of a street unless he was pre-
pared to pay for the information. This system of bleeding
the helpless foreigner is now confined within the bounds of
semi-decency and an American, at least, is treated with a
show of honesty.

COLON WAS AN UNSANITARY TOWN

Along the beach to the east of the town is the foreign
quarter, containing some comfortable residences, an Epis-
copal church built of stone, and a tolerable hotel. On
the west side, fronting the ocean, stand the handsome houses
of the old French officials. ‘They are grouped in a park
beautifully laid out and convey the impression that our
predecessors of the Canal did not neglect their personal
comfort. The residence of de Lesseps is a particularly
78 COLON AND PANAMA

attractive structure of two stories surrounded by a double
pier of verandas. Back of the city upon the mainland
is Mount Hope, or Monkey Hill, whose cemetery has a
population greatly in excess of that of Colon.

A COMPARATIVELY HEALTHY TOWN

Despite its known disadvantages and extremely for-
bidding aspect Colon has a record in the matters of health
and mortality that compares favorably with that of Panama
and belies the apparent conditions. Yellow fever has
rarely appeared at Colon and malaria is seldom contracted
there. Perhaps the city owes its comparative healthful-
ness to its situation on an island and the fact that a con-
siderable portion of its surface is washed by sea water in
which, it is said, mosquitoes will not breed.

Time was when the word Panama suggested untold
wealth and voluptuous luxury. That was in the halcyon
days when the old city, designated the Key to the Pacific
and the Gate of the Universe, was the receiving point for
the gold of Darien, the pearls of the Gulf islands, and the
silver from the mines of South America. Fabulous treasure
was often stored in ‘‘Panama, the Golden,” awaiting a
favorable opportunity for carriage by the king’s horses
over that splendid engineering achievement, the paved
way that crossed the Isthmus to Porto Bello.

THE DEPARTED GLORY OF PANAMA VIEJO

Panama Viejo was a beautiful city. On either side
stretched a picturesque tree-lined coast. In the back-
ground the mountains reared their rugged heads and
between them and the city rolled a noble savanna laid out
in fertile fields and lovely drives. The city contained
twelve thousand or more buildings. Many of the grand
mansions were built of stone and others of aromatic cedar.
There were palatial public buildings; a handsome stable
for the king’s horses, and a castellated depository for the
COLON AND PANAMA 79

king’s treasure. The churches were gorgeous and their
plate and fittings world-famous. There were no fewer
than eight monasteries and a magnificent hospital. The
viceroy maintained a regal splendor; his suite and the
many other wealthy inhabitants lived in the greatest
luxury. The natives were their slaves. Money poured
into their coffers without any exertion on their part. They
merely took their ease and collected toll of the minerals
going to the east and of the merchandise passing through
Panama on its way to Asia and the Pacific islands.

THE PIRATES OF THE SPANISH MAIN

No account of the early days of the Isthmus can be
complete without mentioning the English pirates or buc-
caneers who menaced the rich trade of Spain with her
western possessions. Though England was not technically
at war with Spain yet a practical state of war existed between
the two nations for many years. Spain resented the visits
of traders of other nations who came on peaceful visits.
This resentment soon grew into open hostility, for the
English were particularly quick to take up the challenge.
The result was the rise of a horde of brilliant adventurers
who preyed on the Spanish commerce for nearly a hundred
years. England winked at their depredations in spite of
the insistent protests of Spain. Among the most notable
of these buccaneers may be mentioned Sir Francis Drake,
Morgan, Parker, Ringrose, Sharp, Dampier and Wafer.
Though their ethical standards may be questioned in these
days the conditions largely justified their methods. The
cruelty and rapacity of the Spaniards in their acquisition
of treasure, their monopolistic attitude toward trade and
the methods adopted by them to insure this monopoly
to a great extent offset the tactics of the rovers. That the
English achieved special distinction in this semi-warfare
was probably due to the long strife between England and
Spain and to the fact that English traders came in greater
80 COLON AND PANAMA

numbers to the Spanish main. It is related that Sir Francis
Drake while on a peaceful trading expedition with Sir John
Hawkins was treacherously set upon by a Spanish fleet and
barely escaped with his life. From that day he vowed
vengeance on the Spaniards and for a quarter of a century
he harried the Spanish main and was a terror to every
Spanish town from Trinidad to Campéche. In 1572 Drake
set out with two ships and seventy-three men upon one
of the boldest enterprises in history, namely, the sack of
Nombre de Dios and the capture of the rich treasure convoy
which he knew through spies was due to go across the Isthmus.
In these objects Drake was entirely successful, securing
considerable loot from the city and a great amount of gold,
silver and jewels from the treasure caravan, probably
amounting to not less than a hundred thousand dollars’
worth. He again sacked and burned the town of Nombre
de Dios in 1595 and sacked Porto Bello just afterward but
here contracted the disease of which he afterward died.
The success of Drake’s raids and the enormous profit secured
opened the eyes of other adventurous Englishmen to the
rich field for their enterprises and for a century afterward
preying upon Spanish commerce was a recognized occupation.
The transportation of treasure across the Isthmus became
so dangerous that the route around the Horn was adopted
until Drake by his adventurous voyage through the Straits
of Magellan captured so much booty and created such
havoc among the Spanish treasure ships that trade once
more returned to the Isthmus.

After Drake, perhaps the most noted of the freebooters
was Henry Morgan, because of the greatness of the devas-
tation he wrought in the Spanish trade and of the very
interesting and minute account of his adventures written
by Esquemeling. Morgan was a Welshman who gained
considerable note on the Spanish main by his association
with a Dutch pirate named Mansvelt in a project to create
a buccaneer stronghold on the island of Santa Catalina.
Mansvelt died and the island fell into the hands of the
COLON AND PANAMA 81

Spanish. Morgan however was in Jamaica when the island
was taken and consequently was safe, as Jamaica had been
seized by the English in 1655, some ten years before. Soon
afterward Morgan, having gathered a fleet of nine ships
and nearly five hundred men, set out to capture and sack
Porto Bello. In this daring enterprise Morgan was entirely
successful. Anchoring his ships some nine leagues from
the city the pirates entered small boats and landed shortly
after midnight and attacked a castle near the city. After
considerable difficulty they captured this and blew up the
garrison. This attack alarmed the city however and for
the rest of the day a desperate fight raged about one of the
defending castles. The buccaneers were repeatedly repulsed
until they hit upon the scheme of placing ladders against
the battlements and driving nuns and priests ahead of
them up these ladders. The garrison fired upon these
religious people, but though they died painful deaths the
plan worked and with the ladders so placed the capture
of the castle and fall of the city soon followed. For two
weeks the rioting and sack of the city continued, then
having extorted a ransom of $125,000 from the citizens
Morgan departed, returning to the West Indies. The
money did not last long however and Morgan was scon
planning a new raid. With the reputation gained on his
Porto Bello expedition he had no trouble in gathering a
force and having decided to attack Old Panama he set
sail with thirty-seven ships and two thousand men. Stop-
ping at Santa Catalina he captured the island after a
faint resistance and holding the main body of the expedition
there he sent one of his captains named Brodley ahead to
take the fortress at the mouth of the Chagres river, called
Fort San Lorenzo. It was a tremendous undertaking with
so small a force (four ships and four hundred men) but
Brodley succeeded in his endeavor after an heroic attack
in the face of desperate resistance. In a few days the
main force under Morgan appeared and leaving a garrison
at Fort San Lorenzo began his famous march across the

6
82 COLON AND PANAMA

Isthmus with twelve hundred men. The crossing occupied
ten days of hunger, thirst and terrible hardships, but at last
they arrived before the city of Panama, garrisoned by
four hundred cavalry, twenty-four hundred infantry and
heavy artillery. Fortunately for the tired buccaneers, the
Spanish instead of awaiting their attack elected to charge
them. On they came across a swampy field in the face
of a tremendous fire from the pirates. It was too much
and soon the charge broke and turned to a rout, the Span-
iards taking refuge in the jungle. This left the way to the
city opened and Morgan was not slow to pursue his advan-
tage. After a brief resistance he found the city at his mercy
and marching in ordered a round-up of the citizens in a
systematic scheme for extracting all the wealth the city
contained. For three weeks the pirates robbed and pillaged,
though without many of the excesses which had marked the
capture of Porto Bello. During this time a large portion
of the city was burned though the origin of the fire is not
known. Satisfied that they had obtained all possible
loot from the city Morgan’s men began the march back
across the Isthmus to Fort San Lorenzo. Here the spoil was
divided and great dissatisfaction ensued when it was found
that each man’s share amounted to only about one hundred
dollars. It seemed a poor return for the hardships and pri-
vations endured. Morgan was blamed for an unfair division
of the spoils and so bitter were the denunciations that he
thought it wise to depart without the formality of a leave-
taking, followed by a few only of his ships. The balance
of the pirates were left to get away as best they could.
Morgan sailed to Jamaica, made his peace with the governor
by dividing his share of the loot. It is somewhat remarkable
to relate that he abandoned buccaneering and soon suc-
ceeded to the governorship. In that office he was notably
diligent in the suppression of piracy!

After Morgan’s great raid on Panama  buccaneering
began to die out on the Spanish main. The ports were
not entirely neglected however and Hawkins, Sharp and
COLON AND PANAMA 83

others continued operations for some years. The greatest
exploit of these later pirates was the attack upon the rebuilt
city of Panama. With a force of about three hundred and
fifty men they sailed for Panama and fought a great naval
battle in the Bay of Panama with five Spanish men-of-war.
Though victorious in this they did not attempt a landing,
but after a ten day stay in the harbor sailed for the coast
of South America where the expedition split into two
sections. One party under the pirate leaders Dampier
and Wafer, referred to earlier in this chapter, made the
perilous journey across the Isthmus. Surrounded by hostile
Indians, at the mercy of the swollen streams and tropical
jungle they at last managed to reach the Atlantic and Dam-
pier’s ship.

Today one must look for the ruins of Panama Viejo
amidst a rank growth of tropical vegetation, above which
rears the sturdy tower of St. Anastasius, at whose altar Piz-
arro made votive supplication before setting out upon his
momentous voyage to the south. The sudden and tragic
fall of the old city, in the pride of its beauty and strength,
had a depressing effect upon the Spaniards and left them
with no heart to resurrect it. They transferred the capital
to a site about six miles to the west, but the glory of ‘‘Pan-
ama the Golden” was never revived in its adumbrant suc-
cessor.

NEW PANAMA BUILT WITH REGARD TO DEFENSE

In building the new Pacific port the Spaniards were not
unmindful of the lesson taught by the buccaneer raid. The
city was laid out upon a rocky peninsula, the whole of which
is occupied by it. A wall, thirty to forty feet in height and
of solid masonry, in places sixty feet broad, skirted the entire
shore. Along the bay-front the outer wall was reinforced
by another, and the intervening space formed a moat.
This wall and its accessories cost more than eleven millions
of dollars, despite the fact that the natives were forced to
84 COLON AND PANAMA

render almost gratuitous service in its construction. Much
of the wall still remains in a good condition of preservation.
It is used as a promenade by the citizens and as a play-
ground by their children. The moat has long been dry and
some of the poorer dwellings have been raised within it.
There is a story of a king of Spain who was noticed one day
to be looking out toward the west from a high window of
his palace. A minister, who remarked the strained expres-
sion of the monarch’s eyes, ventured to enquire what might
be the object of his anxiety. ‘‘I am looking,” said the king,
“for those costly walls of Panama. They ought to be dis-
cernible even at this distance.”

THE HOUSES AND CHURCHES CONVERTIBLE INTO FORTS

All the old buildings of Panama were designed for use
as forts in case of need. The houses have walls of stone,
three feet thick, with heavy doors, often iron-clad, and
windows only in the second story. Similar precautions were
observed in the construction of the churches. Their sides
were made to resist the heaviest artillery of the day, and
their windows stand sixteen or twenty feet above the ground.
These defensive measures were justified by after events, for,
although the later Panama never fell into the hands of an
enemy during the Spanish dominion, its strength alone saved
it from attack on more than one occasion. Shortly after
its foundation an unsuccessful attempt to take it was made
by a force of buccaneers. That extraordinary man, Captain
Dampier, took part in this enterprise.

The substantial houses of Panama are much like those
of the old Spanish colonies in other parts of the world—
solid, heavy, forbidding structures, the upper story of which
alone is occupied by the owners. In Panama, as in San
Juan and Manila, the best families are to be found living
over a herd of natives, or negroes, unless the ground floor is
given up to a store, or workshop. The lower portions of
the houses seldom have any windows in front, and if any
 

as

) UOlJONpas yw9I3 v UT Dulypnsos
| POYylyA YPM Syo0148 mnu plo S,euTeue_ jo UO jo sulaedal 343 BULMOYS 9UI0G

  

A}lo 9y} JNoysnoiy} pre] useq aAvy sadidiajea pu sio.

 

S
‘INASdUd ANV LSVd ‘VINVNVd

 

 
COLON AND PANAMA 85

exist, they are strongly barred. A veranda, overhanging
the sidewalk, is the evening resort of the occupants of the
upper half of the dwelling.

The streets, formerly paved with cobble-stones, are tor-
tuous and often very narrow. There is too much congestion
for health, or convenience, and the improvements in this
direction will be a boon to the inhabitants. It is gratifying
that, unlike the people of other Spanish-American cities
which have been treated to a clean-up by us, the Panamans
are immediately appreciative of our efforts in their behalf.

THE INTERESTING CHURCHES OF MODERN PANAMA

The churches and ecclesiastical ruins of Panama present
a rich field for the research of the antiquarian and the archi-
tect, and a capable writer might find material for a highly
interesting volume in them. ‘‘The oldest church is that of
San Felipe Neri, in the long past the parish church of the
city within the walls. Its side is on a narrow street, and
over the sole entrance one reads, ‘San Felipe Neri, 1688,’
cut in a shield.” The early Spaniards were famous for
making cements, both colored and uncolored. So hard
were they that they have stood the effects of the heat and
moisture of that destructive climate without damage. This
old-time cement to-day is as hard as stone. Over the
entrance to public buildings and churches they made their
inscriptions in these cements, in many instances filling in
odd spaces with ornamental work made of the large pearl
shells from the famous Islas de Perlas, or Pearl Islands, in
the Gulf of Panama. Such designs when new must have
been chaste and beautiful, as the smooth mother-of-pearl
surfaces of the large shells on a background of reddish cement
must have made a beautiful contrast, the shells reflecting
the sun rays in a thousand directions. ‘‘This quaint and
most substantial old edifice faces on a small street. At
one time it made the corner of the Plaza San Francisco.
The large door is reached by a few stone steps on either side
86 COLON AND PANAMA

of which are plain columns, while there are a few lancet
shaped windows above. Its front is very plain. The whole
is surmounted by a quaint old tower of the true Moorish
type. It is built wholly of stone with a rounded cupola of
the same material. Lashed to cross-pieces are the old-time
bells. The door is a huge affair of most substantial make,
studded with huge brazen heads or knobs. When closed
from within, persons in the church could stand a siege very
successfully. The side windows of the church are fully
twenty-five feet above the street, and they were purposely
so made in case of attack. The walls of San Felipe Neri
are nearly five feet thick, and the windows are so deeply
recessed as to remind one of an ancient fortress or prison.”
A larger, and not less interesting church is that of San
Francisco, facing upon the square of the same name. It
was built early in the eighteenth century. The interior is
very imposing with its gracefully arched roof and fine
supporting columns, dividing the entire length of the edifice.
The altar is an exceedingly large and beautiful structure of
carved hardwood.

THE FAMOUS FLAT ARCH OF ST. DOMINIC

A strange story attaches to the ruins of St. Dominic.
When intact it must have been an extremely handsome
edifice, but its noble towers and grand facade are things of
the past, and the massive remains of the old church are
now overrun by vegetation. The most striking portion of
the building has survived the attacks of fire and the shocks
of earthquake. It is one of the most peculiar arches in the
world. It stands complete near what was the main
entrance. It is a single span of about sixty feet, its chord
so flattened as to be almost horizontal. Architects are
puzzled to account for this arch standing without further
support than the terminal columns. Legend has it that this
curious structure was erected three times and each time fell.
A fourth time it was set up, and the monk who designed it
 

 

 

 

 

 

THE CHURCH OF SAN FRANCISCO, PANAMA.

An excellent example of Spanish architecture. _
 

 
COLON AND PANAMA 87

stood beneath the arch and declared that if it should not fall
upon his head the work was good and would endure.

The churches of La Merced, San Juan de Dios, St. Ana,
and the Cathedral, deserve description if space permitted.
Nelson makes an interesting statement with regard to the
origin of the last-named building: ‘‘The cathedral of
Panama was built at the sole expense of one of the bishops
of Panama, and was completed about 128 years ago. The
bishop’s father was a Panamanian by birth—a colored man.
He made charcoal near La Boca de la Rio Grande, or the
mouth of the Grand River, a stream entering the Bay of
Panama some two miles from the Panama City of today.
This colored man made his charcoal and brought it on his
back from house to house to sell— a custom that obtains to
this day. He gave his son, the future bishop, as good an
education as was possible. In due time he became a deacon,
priest, and finally bishop of Panama—a bishop of proud
Panama, for in those days it was a wealthy city. He was
the first colored bishop of Panama. This son of a charcoal
burner developed into a grand man, and in time crowned a
life of usefulness by building the cathedral from his private
means.’’ Much of the stone used in its construction is from
the highlands of the interior, and was brought many leagues
on the backs of men. After long years the building was
completed in 1760.

The churches of Panama are both numerous and noisy,
facts that are impressed upon the stranger by the almost
incessant clanging of their bells. Panama has been the
scene of three or four great fires, in which several ecclesiasti-
cal buildings were damaged or destroyed.

THE DEAD ARE TEMPORARY TENANTS OF THEIR GRAVES

The city has several cemeteries, but the system of
temporary tenancy forbids any calculation of the number of
past occupants. When a graveyard becomes crowded the
coffins are taken up, the bones shaken out in a heap, and
88 COLON AND PANAMA

the empty receptacles offered for sale, or hire. The same
system of leasing space is in force in the boveda enclosures.
A boveda is a niche just large enough to accommodate the
coffin of an adult. The cemetery is formed of a quadrangle
surrounded by three tiers of bovedas. These are rented for a
term of eighteen months, and after a coffin is deposited in
one, the opening is closed with a slab, or bricked up.
Where the space has been permanently secured, a memorial
tablet often seals the aperture. When the rent of one of
these sepulchers is overdue its contents are thrown out in
just as business-like a manner as that in which a harsh
landlord might evict a delinquent tenant. Perhaps the
foregoing statements ought to have been made in the past
tense, for the Canal Commission, in the exercise of its
right of control in sanitary matters, has vigorously mod-
erated all similar practices There has been an abatement
of the evil in recent years as a result of the protests of
foreigners. This disgraceful custom of disturbing the dead
was confined to the natives. In the Chinese cemetery and
in that of the Jews, corpses have been permitted to rest in
peace, and it goes without saying that such has been the
case in the burial grounds controlled by the railroad and
canal companies.

IN SPANISH-AMERICA GRAFT EXTENDS TO THE GRAVE

One would naturally infer from the conditions, that
the Panamans entertained no respect for the memory, or
bones, of their deceased relatives, but such is not the case.
The truth is that the system of renting graves is an exhibi-
tion of the “graft” that has for ages pervaded every rood
of territory under Spanish rule. The right to conduct a
cemetery, like the privilege of running a gambling establish-
ment, was farmed out to the highest bidder, and the con-
cesionero might regulate his business in almost any manner
he pleased. The price of a permanent grave was placed
so high that the poorer classes could afford no more than
COLON AND PANAMA 89

a temporary lease, and when that had expired often found
themselves unable to renew it. The fact that they did
not dispense with consecrated ground, as they might have
been excused for doing under the circumstances, is suf-
ficient evidence of their regard for the welfare of their dead.

Panama was once a most disorderly city, filled with
low grog-shops, and reminding one of Port Said in the
seventies. Robberies, murders and hold-ups were every
day affairs, but to-day it is a quiet and orderly place, with
a well-equipped and efficient police force.

AMERICAN AUTHORITY IN THE PANAMAN REPUBLIC

The treaty with the Republic of Panama gave to the
United States jurisdiction in the matter of sanitation and
order, beyond the limits of the Canal Zone, into the cities
of Colon and Panama and over the adjacent waters. The
Commission determined to make Panama a clean and, at
least, moderately healthy city. The task was a stupendous
one, and the difficulties involved by it were fully appre-
ciated, but it has been successfully attacked and plans
for a thorough transformation of the capital realized.
Panama existed without a water supply, or a sewerage
system, for more than three centuries, and a magazine
writer once remarked that it would not seem to matter
greatly if it were left in the same condition for another
decade or so. That, however, was not the way in which
the Commission viewed the matter. These defects have
been considerably remedied and a great deal toward their
complete removal has been accomplished.

PANAMA ENJOYS THE BOON OF GOOD WATER

By the enlargement of a dam, which the Panama Canal
Company had constructed at the headwaters of the Rio
Grande, an extensive reservoir has been formed. The
water has been piped from this to another reservoir, on the
summit of a small hill at Ancon, having a capacity of one
90 COLON AND PANAMA

million gallons. Thence it flows by gravity to the city.
The system is designed to furnish sixty gallons a day per
head to a population of thirty thousand. At points on the
streets, or other public places, where portions of the popu-
lation may not have sufficient means to make house con-
nections, hydrants have been placed, so that an unlimited
supply of good water may be obtained without cost or
difficulty. Before deciding upon the source of the supply,
the Commission submitted samples of the water from the
upper, or Rio Grande, reservoir to expert bacteriologists
and chemical analyzers. After thorough tests the water
was pronounced satisfactory before even the banks and
bed of the reservoir had been cleaned of vegetation.

A system of sewerage has been installed which cares
for sixty gallons per head of the population per day and,
in addition, one inch of rainfall per hour. This does not
provide for the disposal of the maximum precipitation in
the rainy season, but any excess over the capacity of the
sewers will be carried through surface channels. The
sewerage system, with a total length of nearly eighteen
miles, serves every portion of the city, and may be readily
extended to outlying districts.
CHAPTER VI
THE FrReNcH Panama CANAL COMPANY

Whilst the American Interoceanic Canal Commission
was investigating the comparative merits of the various
isthmian routes, a project for a waterway through the
Isthmus of Panama was set on foot in France at the sug-
gestion of Count Ferdinand de Lesseps.

In 1875 the subject was discussed at length by the
Congrés des Sciences Géographiques at Paris, which strongly
recommended the immediate prosecution of surveys with
a view to decisive action. Following the session of the
Congress a provisional company was formed by General
Turr and other individuals for the purpose of securing
a concession from the Republic of Colombia. This syn-
dicate was composed of speculators whose sole motives
were of a commercial nature. They despatched to the
Isthmus Lieutenant L. N. B. Wyse, an officer of the French
Navy and a brother-in-law of General Turr, with instruc-
tions to select a route and negotiate with the Colombian
Government for a concession. In making his selection the
Lieutenant was to be guided by a consideration for the
prime object of the syndicate, which was to make as large
a profit as possible from the sale of whatever interests it
might acquire. Wyse and his employers were not actuated
by any utilitarian sentiments, but merely by a desire to
make money out of the scheme regardless of ultimate con-
sequences. The spirit that moved them in the promotion
was exhibited by their successors in the conduct of the
enterprise, the management of which was ‘‘characterized
by a degree of extravagance and corruption that have
had few, if any, equals in the history of the world.”

(91)
92 THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

COLOMBIA’S CONCESSION TO THE FRENCH PROMOTERS

Lieutenant Wyse made a perfunctory survey, com-
mencing at Panama and extending only about two-thirds
of the way to the Atlantic coast. Nevertheless, he cal-
culated the cost in detail and claimed that his estimate
might be depended upon to come within ten per cent of
the actual figures. The Colombian Government entered
into a contract with the Lieutenant which in its final form
was signed two years later. It gave to the promoters the
exclusive privilege of constructing and operating a canal
through the territory of the Republic without any restrictive
conditions, excepting that, if the route adopted traversed
any portion of the land embraced in the concession to the
Panama Railroad, the promoters should arrive at an amic-
able arrangement with that corporation before proceeding
with their operations. On the part of the concessionaires
it was agreed that the course of the canal should be deter-
mined by an international congress of engineers.

The concession was transferred to La Compagnie Uni-
verselle du Canal Interoceanique de Panama, generally
known as the ‘Panama Canal Company,” and on the
fifteenth day of May, 1879, the International Conference
met to determine the route. It was composed of one hun-
dred and sixty-four members, of whom more than half
were French and the remainder of various nationalities.
Forty-two of the members only were engineers. The pro-
ceedings were pre-arranged and those who knew most
about the subject in hand found that their opinions were
least in demand. The following conclusion was put to
the vote and carried by a small margin, the engineers who
voted affirmatively being in a minority:

CONCLUSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

“The conference deems that the construction of an in-
teroceanic canal, so desirable in the interests of commerce
and navigation, is possible and, in order to have the indis-
 

 

 

 

 

THE PACIFIC ENTRANCE TO THE CANAL AT LOW TIDE.

On the extreme left of the picture will be seen the rear tower range light and on the extreme right the front tower. On this tower the high water mark point is marked.
THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 93

pensable facilities and ease of access and of use, which a
work of this kind should offer above all others, it should
be built from the Gulf of Limon (Colon) to the Bay of
Panama; and it particularly recommends the construction
of a ship canal on a level in that direction.”

It was at this meeting that Ferdinand de Lesseps made
his first public appearance in connection with the enter-
prise. He took the chair and dominated the sessions of
the Conference, and there is no doubt that his will was
the most potent influence in bringing about its decision.
Several members, who were radically opposed to the con-
clusions, rather than declare their difference from the
opinions of a man of the great distinction and high repu-
tation that de Lesseps enjoyed at the time, absented them-
selves when the final vote was taken.

FERDINAND DE LESSEPS, DIPLOMATIST AND PROMOTER

Ferdinand de Lesseps was born in France in 1805.
At an early age he entered the consular service of his
country and on more than one occasion distinguished him-
self in critical emergencies. In 1854, he visited Egypt
and conceived the idea of the Suez Canal. For several
years the opposition of the British Government obstructed
his efforts to carry out the great undertaking which was
eventually brought to a successful conclusion by him.
He also promoted the construction of the Corinth Canal.

De Lesseps was at the height of his reputation when
he assumed the direction of the ill-fated Panama venture.
His great intellect may have been on the wane, but it is
certain that his self-confidence and boundless belief in his
own abilities were never greater than when he made the
declaration, that ‘“‘the Panama Canal will be more easily
begun, finished and maintained than the Suez Canal.”
The disgraceful failure that resulted must be attributed
largely to de Lesseps himself. He publicly assumed the
responsibility for the enterprise and its management from
94 THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

the outset Although he was not an engineer and had
but a very limited knowledge of the science of engineering,
he considered himself better informed than men who had
the advantage of technical training and experience. He
laid out the work, acting upon data which a professional
engineer would have deemed insufficient or unreliable.
With fatuous disregard for the opinions of experts, he
altered plans and estimates to conform with his own unsup-
ported ideas and, in short, exercised an arbitrary and unwise
control over every feature of the undertaking. Almost to
the last he cherished the belief that he enjoyed the un-
bounded confidence of the French people and that their
purses would never be closed to his demands. Although
his plans were fatally faulty and largely impracticable,
there is no reason to doubt de Lesseps’s good faith in the
earlier stages of the enterprise. As it advanced and the
errors of his basic calculations were forced upon him, he
resorted to deception and, with the constantly increasing
difficulties of the situation, his words and actions took an
ever increasing divergence from the direction of truth and
honesty.

Notwithstanding that the project was essentially a
French one, and the money absorbed in it was subscribed
in France, the interest in it was universal, and the collapse
of the Company caused widespread excitement. Not the
least serious of the results was the discredit cast upon the
whole question of interoceanic communication and especially
upon the Panaman phase of it. Exaggerated pessimism
succeeded to the optimistic hopes which attended the launch-
ing of the venture, and even after this lapse of time doubts
of its practicability are extensively entertained. Such
doubts, however, can not find a logical basis in the fiasco
produced by the Panama Canal Company. Its entire enter-
prise was built upon an unstable foundation. The plans
were conceived in error and in ignorance of some of the
most potent factors in the problem to be solved. Impor-
tant circumstances were overlooked or inadequately pro-
THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 95

vided for. Available knowledge was neglected and past
experience disregarded. One man’s preconceived ideas were
applied to the situation in substitution of a scientific study
of the conditions. The original miscalculations were fol-
lowed by a series of avoidable mistakes, the inevitable con-
sequence of which was the final disaster.

The mismanagement of the undertaking amply sufficed
to insure its failure, but the catastrophe that ensued was
rendered greater by the insane extravagance and the un-
bounded corruption which characterized the conduct of the
Company. Froude, in his book on the West Indies, says:

FROUDE’S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE FRENCH
MISMANAGEMENT

“Tn all the world there is not, perhaps, now concen-
trated in any single spot so much swindling and villainy,
so much foul disease, such a hideous dung heap of moral
and physical abomination, as in the scene of this far-famed
undertaking of nineteenth century engineering. By the
scheme, as it was first propounded,* six and twenty millions
of English money were to unite the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans, to form a highway for the commerce of the globe and
enrich, with untold wealth, the happy owners of original
shares. The thrifty French peasantry were tempted by
the golden bait and poured their savings into M. de Lesseps’s
money box.”

Commenting upon the causes that contributed to the
failure, a writer in the Forum stated that ‘following his
acknowledged principles of being sole arbiter of the com-
panies which he founded, M. de Lesseps has directed every
step without counsel, control or, it may be added, knowl-
edge of what was required. His eye has been bent steadily
upon the Bourse. He has never put forward a single esti-
mate that has not been falsified by the event. For the

* The noted author meant to say, the equivalent of ‘‘six and twenty millions, etc.” Very
little English money was invested in the scheme.
96 THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

work of a responsible engineer he has substituted the action
of what he called consultative committees, superior councils,
and the like, which have been, for the most part, little more
than picnic parties at public cost, and with the recommenda-
tions of which he has dealt as he thought fit.”

RUINOUS FINANCING FROM THE OUTSET

The first and a continuous drain upon the financial
resources of the Company was in the form of ‘founders’
profits.” At the initial meeting of the shareholders, when
they all fondly imagined that the venture was a bonanza,
they were informed that they had to pay the following
claims, and accepted the statement without a murmur:

ESTABLISHMENT EXPENSES OF THE PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

 

Forthe: Concessionicd24 sas cece eb ae ees tees Pee AONE Tee Sew $2,000,000
Preliminary: EXpenses soy 2.2 2) sin eeside telat aah, ache sean aoaieieepraeavece 2,160,000
Profit on Preliminary Expenses..............0 2.00: c eee eee eee 2,360,000
American Financial Group.......... 0.00 2,400,000

ED Obed ois oe tabs moa tee ates A tess ras a ya Ln nena a ee Rote Retna atlas $8,920,000

The greater part of this sum was taken by the founders
out of the first $20,000,000 paid in. It is doubtful if any of
the outside shareholders knew precisely, or even approx-
imately, what these figures represented. They were too
absorbed in visions of vast prospective profits to concern
themselves overmuch with present expenditures.

In addition to the immediate cash benefits the founders
were to receive fifteen per cent of the net profits of the
Company. These prospective payments were capitalized
under the name of parts de fondateur in ‘‘parts” of $1000
each. There were originally five hundred and later nine
hundred of these ‘‘parts,”’ which attained a price of $16,000
each. De Lesseps is authority for the statement that in
November, 1880, they sold at $76,000, ‘each.

In 1883 the promoters netted $716,900 and the directors
THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 97

and staff, $186,900, out of the “profits” of the undertaking.
The directors were allowed a further three per cent of the
profits, which contingent benefit they commuted into a
present payment of $48,000.

RECKLESS EXTRAVAGANCE ON THE ISTHMUS

Dr. Nelson, who was upon the ground whilst the
Panama Company’s operations were in progress, makes the
following statement: ‘The famous Bureau System is
what has obtained in the Isthmus up to the present time,
with changes and amplifications without number. ‘There is
enough bureaucratic work, and there are enough officers
on the Isthmus to furnish at least one dozen first-class
republics with officials for all their departments. The
expenditure has been something simply colossal. _One
Director General lived in a mansion that cost over $100,000;
his pay was $50,000 a year; and every time he went out
on the line he had his deplacement, which gave him the
liberal sum of fifty dollars a day additional. He traveled
in a handsome Pullman ear, especially constructed, which
was reported to have cost some $42,000. Later, wishing
a summer residence, a most expensive building was put
up near La Boca. The preparation of the grounds, the
building, and the roads thereto, cost upwards of $150,000.

: Another man had built a large bath-house on
the most approved principles. This cost $40,000. Thou-
sands and tens of thousands have been frittered away in
ornamental grounds, for all had to be beau, utility being a
secondary consideration.”

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

We will now resume the history of the Panama Canal
Company. It was capitalized at $80,000,000, in shares of
$100 each, which were opened to public subscription in
Europe and America in August, 1879. Less than one-tenth
of the amount was taken up and the organization of the

7
98 THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

corporation was indefinitely postponed. In the criminal]
trial that followed the failure of the Company, Charles de
Lesseps stated that after the abortive effort to float the
Company his father placed the financial arrangements con-
nected with the disposal of the shares in the hands of an
influential group of financiers and journalists, who under-
took to mould public opinion to a favorable form Here
we find the explanation of three of the enormous items of
preliminary expense which are given above. Early in 1880
M. de Lesseps arrived at Colon, accompanied by an inter-
national technical commission which was charged with the
work of making the final surveys and marking the precise
line to be followed by the Canal. This highly important
task, like all the other preliminary steps of the undertaking,
was performed in haste and the party left the Isthmus
before the close of February.

RECKLESS ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF CONSTRUCTION

The Paris Congress had estimated the cost of construct-
ing the Canal at $214,000,000, and the time necessary for
its completion at twelve years. The technical commission
expressed the opinion that the entire operation might be
finished in eight years at a cost of $168,600,000. In view
of the fact that several of the engineer-members of the
congress considered the former estimate too low, it is difficult
to understand how the commission arrived at its figures.
The reduction was not, however, sufficiently great to satisfy
the purpose of de Lesseps, which was to present to the pub-
lic a proposition so attractive as to be irresistible. In order
to promote this object, he took upon himself to alter the
sum fixed by the commission to $131,600,000, which he
declared would be sufficient to provide for the entire
expenses of the operation. The first year’s traffic was esti-
mated at 6,000,000 tons, assuring arevenue of $18,000,000,
and this was claimed to be a very conservative assumption,
whereas, it was in reality almost beyond the possibility of
*jeuvy dy} 0} oouvsqUY IUL]TY 9Yy UL Buyywsodo soApasp 9y7 sMoys OsTR oangord sty,

‘IGNIW LY TVNVO HONTYA GIO AHL HLIM TVNVO NVOIMANV AHL dO NOILOASUAINI AHL
“AON ‘poonnpuy yp poonsspuy ‘ydos60j04yI

: %TA ge
ey ssesia STAG 7

«8

 

 

 
THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 99

realization. The limit of fanciful prediction had not, how-
ever, been reached. In May, 1880, Mr. A. Couvreux,
Jr., a member of a large contracting firm, publicly stated
that his house was prepared to undertake the entire work
at a cost of only $102,400,000. In the light of our present
knowledge the absurdity of these statements is patent, but
we must remember that at the time the whole proposition
rested upon a basis of theory. The fact should have been
an incentive to conservatism, and, although there may not
be sufficient ground at this stage of the enterprise to impugn
the honesty of the promoters, the recklessness with which
M. de Lesseps submitted his inexpert calculations to the
public was little short of criminal.

THE STOCK IS OVERSUBSCRIBED BY THE PUBLIC

Having prepared his new financial prospectus on the
alluring lines indicated, M. de Lesseps made a tour of the
United States, England, Belgium, Holland, and France,
delivering speeches in which the enormous profits to accrue
to the fortunate investors in the Panama Canal project
were depicted in the seductive rhetoric that was always
at his command. Following this campaign of words,
$60,000,000 in shares of $100 denomination were offered
to the public and doubly subscribed for.

It was agreed that the first two years should be a period
of organization to be devoted largely to surveying and
ascertaining from actual experience something of the cost
of excavation and other features of the operation. In other
words, the public having invested its money upon the
strength of certain wild guesses advanced with all the assur-
ance of conviction, it was now proposed to investigate the
facts. Later developments proved that even the surveys
of the line were unreliable. Three years after the engineer-
ing force had been at work upon the ground it was discovered
that what they supposed to be an almost fathomless swamp
was composed of solid rock a few feet below the surface, and
100 THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

this was only one of a number of similar misapprehensions.
The second period, of six years, was to be occupied with
the actual work of construction under contract.

THE COMPANY COMMENCES THE WORK OF CONSTRUCTION

In February, 1883, the latter stage was entered upon with
Mr. Dingler as engineer in chief. His plan for a sea level
canal made the following provisions: The canal, which had
its origin at Colon, in Limon Bay, was to follow the bottom
of the Chagres Valley for a distance of about 28 miles, to
Obispo; it was then to cross the Cordilleras, the passage
accounting for about 7 further miles of its length; contin-
uing thence, the line traversed the Valley of the Rio Grande
and terminated in deep water near the Island of Naos, in
the Bay of Panama. The full length of the proposed cut
was 46 miles. The depth of the canal was to be 30 feet
and its width at bottom 72 feet.

For the regulation of the waters of the Chagres, which
vary from 26 cubic yards at low water to 2,620 cubic yards
in flood, it was proposed to construct a large storage reser-
voir at Gamboa by damming the river and deflecting its
affluents to the sea on either side of the Isthmus.

The cube of the excavations provided for by this plan
was a minimum of 157,200,000 yards, being 59,000 more
than had been estimated by the commission and 98,250,000
more than the congress had indicated.

This plan was accepted and, despite the enormous
increase of work entailed by it, de Lesseps adhered for a
year longer to his original estimate of cost and time of con-
struction. It was not until a meeting of the shareholders
in 1885, that he increased the former to $120,000,000, and
extended the latter to July, 1889.

A SIMPLE UNDERTAKING ACCORDING TO DE LESSEPS

At the inception of the enterprise M. de Lesseps estab-
lished a Bulletin which became the medium for the dissem-
ination among the shareholders and the general public of
THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 101

the most exaggerated reports and the most reckless mis-
statements. In March, 1881, de Lesseps stated in this
publication: ‘But two things need be done: to remove a
mass of earth and stones, and to control the river Chagres.

The canal is, therefore, an exact mathematical
operation.” This statement alone betrays the promoter’s
ignorance of the great engineering problems inseparably con-
nected with the undertaking; for the control of the Chagres
involves the most intricate and difficult calculations and
engineering works imaginable. In addition were the
thousand and one obstacles: disease, labor problems,
inadequate machinery, public distrust of the project and
financial difficulties to be encountered and which de Les-
seps entirely ignored or made light of.

By the middle of 1885, hardly one-tenth of the estimated
minimum excavation had been done, and it became evident,
even to the non-professional observer, that the program
could not be carried out in accordance with the assurances
repeatedly given by de Lesseps. The enterprise began to
be severely criticised and passionately discussed in the press
of France. The credit of the Company was seriously
affected by these assaults and it became necessary to adopt
drastic measures for the restoration of public confidence in
order to secure the additional funds that were already
needed. At this critical juncture, the promoter, for M. de
Lesseps had long since taken the whole affair into his own
hands, sought the aid of the Government, which had been
extended to him during the Suez Canal operation. He
applied for permission to issue lottery bonds, but the desired
authority was not granted at that time.

By this time it was widely recognized that, de Lesseps’s
declaration to the contrary notwithstanding, the Panama
project involved immeasurably greater difficulties than those
encountered in the Suez undertaking. In fact, the two
operations were so dissimilar in every essential respect that
the latter afforded no criteria by which to judge the former.
At Suez, the entire line lay along low ground and most of
102 THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

the way traversed lakes, marshes, and swamps. One of the
chief difficulties rose from the softness and instability of the
material to be dealt with. In Panama the main problems
are the passage of a chain of mountains and the disposition
of a number of streams. At Suez, the tides are the same at
each end of the Canal; at Panama there is a difference of
twenty feet between the Atlantic and Pacific extreme
oscillations. In the earlier enterprise neither climate nor
labor entailed unfavorable conditions, whereas in all the
operations upon the American Isthmus they have been
among the most vexatious factors entering into the situation.
The constructors of the Suez Canal had the support of the
French Government and of the Khedive of Egypt, and the
encouragement of the whole world. In his later venture
de Lesseps started with well-founded opposition against his
plans and which steadily increased as the attempted execu-
tion of them betrayed their futility. The comparison
admits of extension were that necessary.

In his letter of August the first, 1885, to the Minister
of the Interior, praying for authority to raise a loan of
$120,000,000 on lottery bonds, Ferdinand de Lesseps stated:

“The organization of the working camps, the installation
along the whole line of twenty-seven contractors piercing
the isthmus at their own risk and peril, an immense stock
on working footing, is such as to allow the canal to be com-
pleted and inaugurated in 1888.”

THE SEA-LEVEL PROJECT INVESTIGATED BY THREE PROMINENT
ENGINEERS

The Chamber of Deputies recommended that the desired
permission should be granted to the Company without
delay, but the Government decided before complying to
send a competent engineer to the Isthmus with instructions
to investigate and report upon the situation. At the time
that this official was conducting his examination, two other
engineers were similarly engaged. Each proceeded inde-
THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 103

pendently of the others, but all arrived at one conclusion,
which is the more remarkable since two of them were in
the employ of the Company. In the forepart of 1886 the
reports were submitted to the respective principals.

Armand Rousseau, the Government commissioner, found
that the completion of the Canal with the resources avail-
able and in prospect was practically impossible unless the
plan was changed to one involving the use of locks.

M. Jacquet declared that, after a thorough investigation
of the work in all its details, he was convinced of the neces-
sity of abandoning the original design, and he recommended
the construction of a lock canal along the precise line
adopted for the sea level project. Leon Boyer, who held
the position of Director of Works upon the Isthmus, stated
that the completion of a canal on a level was impossible
with the money at command and in the time stipulated.
He suggested a temporary waterway, to be operated by
locks and to be replaced by a sea level canal as soon as
possible.

This weight of expert opinion, which it must be remem-
bered was in corroboration of similar expressions voiced
by eminent engineers on previous occasions, de Lesseps dis-
carded in his usual high-handed manner. He would not
listen to a word against the sea level project, but declared
in the most emphatic terms his intention to pursue it to
the end. He had ‘“‘promised the world a canal at the level
of the oceans,’ and he proposed to keep his word despite
all opposition. At this stage of the proceedings the ‘‘Great
Undertaker,” as he began to be dubbed, assumed the role
of the persecuted philanthropist.

The shareholders of the Company were frequently
informed henceforth that all kinds of powerful interests
were in league against their enterprise, but at the same time
they were assured that he, de Lesseps, might be depended
upon to circumvent the machinations of these wicked
plotters.

Lest the reader should fall into misapprehension as to
104 THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

the true significance of the recommendations of the engineers
which have been cited, it may be well to remind him that
the undertaking of the Panama Canal Company was a
purely commercial enterprise, and that the reports and
suggestions of the experts in question were made with that
fact constantly in mind. None of them expresses the
opinion that a sea level canal is impracticable, nor is the
question taken into consideration by either of them directly.
The point of their decision was whether a sea level canal
could be constructed at a cost and in such time as to make
its after operation a profitable business for the shareholders.
Time, of course, is a great factor in the cost of an operation
involving hundreds of millions. Interest increases at an
enormous rate during the later years. Therefore, con-
siderations which would preclude the pursuit of a project
solely contemplating commercial results might not be of
sufficient weight to deter a government from following the
same lines. The United States, observing business prin-
ciples to the utmost reasonable extent, might justiftably con-
struct a sea level canal at an expense that would entail the
ruin of a private corporation. Even though the operation
of the canal should fail to return any interest upon the
money invested, the Government might well consider itself
fully compensated for the outlay by the political advantages
secured, the great savings in the movements of warships,
and other desiderata which will be noticed in detail in later
chapters.

FURTHER EFFORTS TO RESTORE THE WANTING CONFIDENCE
OF THE PUBLIC

Whilst the engineer reports to which reference has been
made above were in course of preparation, de Lesseps
visited the Isthmus with a large party of individuals, many
of whom were influential in the commercial and financial
circles of France. Few of them had any technical knowl-
edge, but the majority seem to have been susceptible to the
THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 105

persuasive eloquence of the great promoter, for upon their
return the enterprise received the endorsements of various
chambers of commerce and general boards. In July, 1886,
the Government declared its intention of postponing for
several months the decision in the matter of the lottery
bonds. De Lesseps took umbrage at this action and, rely-
ing upon the effect of the moral support of the powerful
commercial bodies, withdrew his request. He received from
the stockholders permission to issue a new series of bonds,
and did so with success, but the enterprise had passed
beyond the stage of possible salvation.

AN AMERICAN OFFICER INSPECTS THE OPERATION

In March, 1887, Lieutenant C. C. Rogers, U. 8. N., was
ordered by the Navy Department to inspect the canal work.
He took three weeks to the task and went thoroughly over
the line. He found the hospitals and quarters for officers
and laborers clean, well-ventilated frame buildings, admir-
ably suited to the climate. The canteens were kept by
Chinamen, who boarded laborers at reasonable rates. There
were upwards of 10,000 workmen, employed by contractors,
who, with the number of the Company’s employees, made
up a total of 11,566. The laborers were chiefly impor-
tations from the’ West Indies, with a few negroes from the
Southern States of America. The standard wage was $1.50
in silver a day. The laborers were paid every Saturday.
Sunday was spent in drinking; Monday in recuperation;
and on Tuesday they returned to work; ‘‘hence,” says the
lieutenant, ‘‘the number of working days in a month seldom
exceed twenty or twenty-two.”’ The Company endeavored
to put 20,000 laborers upon the ground and, as they could
not be had from the West Indies, tried to get them from
Western Africa and Southern China, but without success.

The hospital records of the Company showed a death
rate of seven per cent of those employed on the work from
its inception to July, 1887, but this did not include the
106 THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

great number who contracted disease on the Isthmus and
died elsewhere.

SIGNS OF COLLAPSE BEGIN TO BE EVIDENT

By this time the work had become seriously disorganized.
There had been changes of contractors. Some had thrown
up their contracts, others had brought suits against the
Company. There had been frequent alterations in the
working plans and there was a general feeling of uncer-
tainty as to the character of the future operations.

In the meanwhile de Lesseps had found his attitude on
the sea level question untenable and, after a considerable
amount of beating about the bush, he consented to what he
called ‘‘a provisional lock canal.”

The new plans were hurriedly prepared and adopted.
The estimates of the expenditure of money and time that
would be necessary to carry them out were made low
enough to create some hope that the public would advance
further financial assistance to the scheme. The new route
was to follow the existing line of the Company’s work. The
surface of the canal at its summit was to be forty-nine
meters above the level of the oceans. For the sake of
economy the depth of the cut was so far reduced that, had
the work been carried to a conclusion, it must have pro-
hibited the passage of a large proportion of ocean-going
vessels. The summit was to be reached by the use of
hydraulic elevating machinery.

THE FRENCH PUBLIC REFUSES TO SUBSCRIBE FURTHER FUNDS

The next step was to procure the necessary funds.
Application was again made to the Government for authority
to issue lottery bonds and the Company was granted per-
mission to raise $160,000,000 in this manner. The bonds
of $80 denomination were offered at $72 each. They were to
bear four per cent interest and to be redeemed by a civil
amortization association and to share in semimonthly
THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 107

drawings. The proposition, backed by better security,
would have been an extremely attractive one, but to so low
an ebb had the Company’s credit fallen that only 800,000
bonds were subscribed for. A second attempt to float the
bonds, with extra inducements to subscribers, only proved
the futility of the effort.

The Company had already issued shares and obligations
approximating the immense sum of $350,000,000 for an
undertaking which it had promised to complete at a cost
of $120,000,000. It now asked for an additional amount
of upwards of $133,000,000 for the purpose of constructing a
“temporary”? waterway with a very limited capacity. Of
the vast sums which the Company had expended, $105,-
000,000 went for interest, administration expenses, bankers’
commissions, etc., and less than half was made available
for the actual work. The annual interest charge was
running in excess of $16,000,000 and at this time the Com-
pany had in hand barely sufficient cash to cover one month’s
current expenses.

Before the close of 1887 a general belief prevailed in
England and America, and, perhaps everywhere but in
France, that de Lesseps would never complete the Panama
Canal. The failure to place the lottery bonds in the follow-
ing year showed plainly that at length the French public
had lost all confidence in the scheme and its chief promoter,
whose statements and estimates had been so greatly, and
so often, changed. Bankers could not be induced to handle
the loan issues on any terms. The Government was not
disposed to advance money to the Company and was itself
so involved financially as to put the question of its finish-
ing the canal beyond consideration. It was universally
doubted whether the Company could complete the water-
way, even though it received the money asked for, and it
was shown that, in the event that it did succeed, its fixed
charges would be in the neighborhood of $30,000,000, a
sum far in excess of the maximum traffic returns of a sea
level canal according to de Lesseps’s largest estimate. So
108 THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

that upon his own showing the project under the most
favorable circumstances would be a financial failure.

A RECEIVER TAKES OVER THE PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

On the fourth day of February, 1889, the civil court of
the Seine appointed Joseph Brunet judicial receiver of La
Universelle Compagnie du Canal Interoceanique de Panama.

We will give a brief statement of the receipts and expen-
ditures of the Panama Canal Company from the date of
its organization until the end of the year 1889.*

RECEIPTS.

Proceeds from the Capital Stock, various loans and bond

IBSWOR wi Sites Sy eur eslats Sauna, da eae ar eeanle vas Ain slau apelin Aa 1$254,336,547
Other receipts from sundry sources ..........000 000 cece eee 7,933,317
Expenses incurred but not paid.............. 000. c ee eee eee 3,668,770

Total amount collected and due by the Company........ $265,938,634
EXPENDITURES.

(Outlay on the Isthmus.)

Salaries and expenses of management...................00.. $16,540,883
Rents and maintenance of leased property.................. 3,301,070
Purchase of articles and material for consumption............ 5,847,920
Purchase and transportation of machinery, etc............... 23,874,935
Surveys and preparatory work............ 0.000: cece eee nee 270,946
Central workshops and management.................000000- 5,989,577
Various constructions, buildings, and general installation. .... 9,407,705
Work of excavation and works of construction............... 89,434,224
Purchase sof lands? svcd rv: ose ks eek eee Ee ees 950,655
Sanitary and religious service........... 0.00. eee eee eee eee 1,836,768

Total expenditures on the Isthmus....................- $156,654,687

(Outlay at Paris.)

Paid: forthe Con¢ession .aik cece sok oa os 9 a se SRR SEES 2,000,000
Paid to the Colombian Government...............0.000000% 150,000
Various expenses incurred before organization............... 4,612,244

* A few comparatively small sums should strictly como within the account of 1890, but,
for the present pee may without impropricty be included in the above statement.
} Fractions have been discarded throughout.
THE FRENCH PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 109

Paid to American Financial Group................0000.0005 $2,400,000
Interest on various obligations.............0... 0000s eee eens 43,124,272
Amortization transactions........0.0.0.0.000 00 cc cece eee eee 4,505,617
Expenses of floating bonds, loans, etc., commission, advertising,

PEINtING, |e Cen rataraa mercenary renee 4 eee ee wees 16,616,840
Paid to agents of the Colombian Government............... 42,760
Boards of management and direction.................00005 1,242,458
Salaries: Of CM PlOV COS hos varia asus due qnnernoeie eieceecleiaeses mogul eed Aaeen 1,023,444
UN AIIES s siaputic iors aecdaecdeve vaienea sepa pena abv emele cenetee 742,238
Home Office and furniture........... 0.0. eee eee 417,479
Compensation to contractors on cancellation of contracts..... 240,000

Total expenditures at Paris..................2..22+-+-. $78,140,329
SUMMARY
Receipts from all sources. ........... 006. c cece cee eee eee $265,938,600
Expenditures—

At PAM aIi 8 5c eccrine kaat-aw gp htiven used eed $156,654,687

Att Rariss 22577 vinaua 5 Saeed qeaue-aide Ske ae Aaa ee 78,140,329

Paid for Railroad shares.................... 18,653,637

In connection with Lottery bonds........... 6,452,936

Advance to the Colombian Government. .... 491,015

Various debtor accounts.................. 2,291,160

Cash and negotiable paper in hand........... 3,254,847

Total equal tO TeCelIPts. ..crccsc creer eeeerveeeecareneees $265,938,600

 
CHAPTER VII
Tue New Panama CanaL CoMPANy

The task entrusted to the receiver of the Panama Canal
Company was an extremely difficult one. If the affairs of
the Company should be wound up it would be impossible
to save the shareholders from total, or almost total, loss of
their investments, for the property and work which was
estimated as worth $90,000,000 depended for its value upon
a continuation of the operation.

The gravity of the situation, in which two hundred
thousand persons, the majority of them in moderate cir-
cumstances, were involved, was fully appreciated by the
Government, and special legislation was effected for the
purpose of affording the Company temporary relief from
the pressure of its liabilities.

Several circumstances militated against the endeavors of
the receiver to reorganize the enterprise. The most serious
of these was the public scepticism which had followed the
failure of de Lesseps to make even a respectable approach
towards the achievement of his undertaking. The share-
holders had learned at last that systematic deception had
been practised upon them for years, and they felt that they
had no reliable knowledge as to the state of affairs at the
Isthmus.

AN EFFORT TO RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

The first step in the process of restoring public con-
fidence was the investigation of the commission to which
reference was made in the preceding chapter. In addition
to the statement of the amount of work done and the value

(110)
‘sdassa] ag JO ainjlej o1juesid ayy jo Jopurmas onayyed Y

‘ATONOL AHL NI ONILSNY AYANIHOVN HONAAA ATO

 

 

 

 

 
 
THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 1li

of the plant, the commission gave an opinion that a lock
canal might be completed in eight years at a further cost of
$100,000,000.

Any hope that might have been derived from this report
was, however, dependent upon the success of the receiver
in negotiating new concessions with the Colombian Govern-
ment, for the time limit, under the contract, for the com-
pletion of the canal, neared its termination. Lieutenant
Wyse, who had secured the original grant, was sent to
Bogota immediately following the submission of the commis-
sion’s report. After pourparlers that extended over four
months, a new agreement was signed December the tenth,
1890, providing for an extension of ten years.

In the meanwhile Joseph Brunet had died and was
succeeded by Achille Monchicourt. The new receiver
applied himself with remarkable energy and acumen to the
organization of an active company. He had contrived to
keep the work going upon the Isthmus, although the scale
of operations was greatly reduced. During the years
1891-93, he settled, by a series of compromises, most of
the lawsuits existing with the old company and successfully
resisted certain creditors and bondholders who would other-
wise have ruined the interests of all concerned.

STEPS TOWARDS THE REORGANIZATION OF THE COMPANY

In April, 1893, Colombia made a further concession to
the receiver, by granting an extension until October 31,
1894, for the organization of a new company and ten years
from that date for the completion of a canal. A few months
later ‘‘a special law for the liquidation of the Interoceanic
Canal Company”’ was passed and had the effect of suspend-
ing the most obstructive actions before the courts. Early
in the following year, death relieved Achille Monchicourt
and his place was filled by M. Gautron. There remained
but a few months in which to effect the organization of the
new company and, with the co-operation of the attorney
112 THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

for the bondholders, the receiver bent his energies to the
task. They secured the co-operation of the managers of
the old company, the contractors, and certain other
interested persons, in the new enterprise, in the form of
abatements of their claims, and subscriptions to the capital
of the reorganization. ‘The amount necessary to complete
the full sum was to be asked of the old bondholders and
shareholders.

The by-laws of the New Panama Canal Company were
filed towards the close of June, 1894. The capital of the
company consisted of 650,000 shares of $20 each, 600,000
of which were to be subscribed for, whilst 50,000, absolutely
unencumbered, were to be given to the Colombian Govern-
ment in consideration of the contracts granting extensions.
Thus, five years after the appointment of a receiver for the
Interoceanic Canal Company, what was generally known as
the ‘‘New Panama Canal Company” was definitely estab-
lished.

The new company,like its predecessor, was a commercial
concern, pure and simple. Although the French Govern-
ment, by the exercise of extraordinary legislation, had been
largely instrumental in the creation of the company, neither
governmental patronage nor responsibility was extended
to it.

The directors of the new company appointed a Comité
Technique to thoroughly examine the whole problem of the
canal. This was a wise determination, for the surveys
made under the direction of the old company had been of
such a cursory character that little reliance could be placed
upon them.

WELL-CALCULATED ACTION BY THE NEW COMPANY

The Comité Technique was composed of seven French
engineers and an equal number of foreign experts, including
several who had the special advantage of experience in canal
work. Whilst making careful surveys and maturing plans
THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 113

for the ultimate operations, the committee directed the
continuance of excavations in places where they were cer-
tain to come within the specifications of any plan that
might eventually be adopted. In addition to its original
investigations, the Comité Technique verified and rectified
the surveys and measurements of the old company. In
short the technical committee performed the most valuable
scientific work that had yet been done in connection with
the Isthmus and handed over to the Isthmian Canal Com-
mission maps and documents which Admiral Walker
declared to be worth at least a million dollars.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERS

The final report of the Comité Technique was submitted
at the close of the year 1898. It estimated the cost of a
canal, which could be completed in ten years, and would be
equal to all the demands of commerce, at one hundred
million dollars. Aside from the question of health, the
Comité recognized two principal difficulties to be overcome
—the cut through the divide and the control of the Chagres.
The former, whilst a stupendous task, was merely a matter
of excavation and involved no serious engineering problem;
the latter, on the contrary, presented features sufficiently
intricate and perplexing to tax to the utmost the available
technical ingenuity of the world. The solution appeared to
be susceptible of achievement by several different methods,
and numerous plans emanated from sources that com-
manded respecitul attention.

“The studies of the New Company were based on three
fundamental principles: (1) To reject any plan that did
not, independently of considerations of time and expense,
offer every guarantee of a serviceable canal. (2) To reject
any fanciful scheme depending on the application of new
and untried devices not justified by experience; and (3) to
give due weight to the peculiar tropical conditions under
which the work must be executed. These must compel

8
114 THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

the employment of a class of laborers inferior to those avail-
able in better climates, and the work will be exhausting to
those supervising the constructions. No technical details
should therefore be admitted involving operations of excep-
tional difficulty.’’*

THE PLAN OF THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

The report of the Comité included two plans contemplat-
ing two summit levels, of which the bottom of the canal was
respectively sixty-eight and thirty-two feet above mean tide.
The relative costs of construction were nearly the same, but
the fact that a canal at the higher level could be completed
in much less time decided the Comité to recommend that
plan.

General Abbott intimated that but for this considera-
tion it is certain that the conclusion of the Comité would
have been different. He declared that in the hands of the
American Government, with expense a minor condition,
“there can be no question that the low level variant should
be preferred.” Since the controversy has already been
settled for all time and the canal completed at an eighty-
five foot level, it is useless to consider the details of the
Comité’s projet, to which the plan recommended by the first
Isthmian Canal Commission closely conformed. ‘The line
follows closely that adopted by the old company, which,
with slight variations has been accepted by all subsequent
technical surveys. More than half the distance follows
straight lines, and in the remainder of the route the highly
important feature of curvature leaves nothing to be desired
This is a detail of the utmost consequence as affecting safety
of transit and speed of passage. ‘‘Experience on the Suez
Canal has compelled, since the route was opened to traffic,
a costly increase from the original minimum radius of 700
metres (2,300 feet) to 1,800 metres (5,905 feet). On the
Panama projet the ruling radius is 3,000 metres (9,842 feet),

* Problems of the Panama Canal. Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Abbott, U. S. Army (retired).
Late Member of the Comité Technique. Now York, 1905.
THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 115

falling occasionally to 2,500 metres (8,202 feet), the mini-
mum being 1,700 metres (5,577 feet), and this latter only
for about half a mile in approaching Obispo, where the
width is sufficiently increased to justify the reduction.”

The scientific information accumulated by the Comité
Technique is amongst the most valuable data relating to
the Panama Canal extant and is valued at $1,000,000.

CRYSTALLIZATION OF AMERICAN INTERESTS

By the time the Comité Technique had made its report,
public sentiment in this country had become strongly
impressed with the desirability of a trans-isthmian canal
under American control, and a majority in Congress favored
immediate action to that end. The Nicaragua route
appeared to be the best available at the time and general
opinion favored it. The situation thus created caused
extreme anxiety to those interested in the welfare of the
New Panama Canal Company. It had reached precisely
the stage where the directors proposed to appeal to the
financiers of the world, when its prospects were thus sud-
denly overshadowed. Although firmly convinced that the
Nicaragua route was greatly inferior to their own, the com-
pany realized that should the United States construct a
waterway there, or elsewhere, commercial competition
would be impossible. This and other considerations would
surely deter investors from backing the private enterprise.
Furthermore, with the American Government in the field,
the completion of the Panama Canal would be retarded, if
not prevented, by the difficulty in securing labor under com-
petitive conditions.

In this dilemma the directors decided upon a course
calculated to bring the comparative merits of the Nicaragua
and Panama routes squarely before the American Govern-
ment. Since the report of the Comité had not been made
public, the directors were satisfied that the United States
authorities could not possibly have anything like adequate
116 THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

knowledge or appreciation of the superior advantages of
their proposition.

The full report of the Comité Technique, including details
of the projet recommended by it, was accordingly placed in
the hands of President McKinley during the first week of
December, 1898. On the twenty-first day of that month
the Senate, by a large majority, passed a bill providing for
government support of the Maritime Canal Company in its
Nicaraguan enterprise, but the House adjourned without
taking action upon the measure. On the reassembling of
Congress the French Company secured a hearing before
the Rivers and Harbors Committee of the lower house, to
whom the Senate bill had been referred on an amendment.
The Company’s representatives frankly explained their pro-
ject and expressed the willingness of the Company to re-in-
corporate under American laws in case the Panama route
should be decided upon. The Senate amendment was
defeated and, in March, 1899, Congress authorized the
President to make an exhaustive investigation as to the
most practicable and feasible Isthmian route for a canal
that should be under the complete control of the United
States and the absolute property of the nation.

APPOINTMENT OF THE FIRST ISTHMIAN CANAL COMMISSION

In accordance with these instructions President McKin-
ley placed the work of investigation in the hands of a body
which was officially styled ‘“‘The Isthmian Canal Commis-
sion,” and which was composed of the following members:
Rear-Admiral John C. Walker, U. 8. N. (retired); Hon.
Samuel Pasco; George S. Morison; Lieutenant-Colonel
Oswald H. Ernst, Corps of Engineers, U. 8. A.; Lewis M.
Haupt, C. E.; Alfred Noble, C. E.; Colonel P. C. Hains,
Corps of Engineers, U. 8. A.; Wm. H. Burr, C. E.; Prof.
Emory R. Johnson. The Commission made an examina-
tion of the New Panama Canal Company’s project, both in
Paris and on the Isthmus, and then proceeded to ascertain
THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 117

upon what terms and conditions the property and rights of
the Company might be transferred to the United States,
for the law under which the Commission was acting for-
bade the consideration of government support to a private
enterprise. The Republic of Colombia having signified its
willingness to consent to the alienation of the concession,
it only remained for the Commission to learn the purchase
price in order to make its report to the President. There
was considerable delay and some misunderstanding about
this last detail. The Company was naturally reluctant to
submit a definite figure to a body which ‘‘had no authority
to accept or reject any terms,’’ but proposed instead to
make a tentative offer subject to an itemized valuation and
arbitration where necessary. To this the Commission would
not listen, but insisted upon a statement of the Company’s
price in a lump sum without reservation.

THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FAVORS THE
NICARAGUA ROUTE

The report of the Isthmian Canal Commission was
presented to the President in November, 1901. It dis-
carded altogether the detailed memorandum of valuations
submitted by the Company and briefly declared that the
“total amount for which the Company offers to sell and
transfer its canal property to the United States” is $109,-
141,500. The value set upon it by the Commission was
$40,000,000. It needs no extensive calculation to deter-
mine that this was an underestimate, even when due allow-
ance is made for the usual depreciation of second-hand prop-
erty. It will be remembered that the receiver of the old
company valued the assets that passed into his hands at
about $90,000,000, and several millions had been expended
in a judicious manner by the new company.

The report closed with the following recommendation:
“‘ After considering all the facts developed by the investiga-
tions made by the Commission and the actual situation as
118 THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

it now stands, and having in view the terms offered by the
New Panama Canal Company, this Commission is of the
opinion that ‘the most practicable and feasible route’ for
an Isthmian canal, to be ‘under the control, management,
and ownership of the United States’ is that known as the
Nicaragua route.”

THE FRENCH COMPANY MEETS OUR BID

When this finding became known at Paris the directors
of the New Panama Canal Company immediately resigned,
and at a general meeting of stockholders held in the last days
of the year it was decided to meet the terms of the Com-
mission’s estimate. Accordingly an offer to sell out all
assets, rights, and interests for the sum of $40,000,000
was telegraphed, the owners realizing that with only one
possible purchaser and the certainty of the property be-
coming practically valueless unless taken by that purchaser,
no alternative existed. The Company’s change of base
impelled the Commission to make a supplementary report,
in which it stated that ‘‘the unreasonable sum asked for
the property and rights of the New Panama Canal Com-
pany when the Commission reached its former conclusion
overbalanced that route, and now that the estimates by
the two routes had been nearly equalized, the Commission
can form its judgment by weighing the advantages of each
and determining which is the more practicable and feasi-
ble. . . . After considering the changed conditions
that now exist, the Commission is of the opinion that ‘the
most practicable and feasible route’ for an Isthmian canal
to be ‘under the control, management, and ownership of
the United States’ is that known as the Panama route.”

THE SENATE INVESTIGATES THE QUESTION OF ROUTE

In the meanwhile, and before the Isthmian Canal Com-
mission had filed its report, an ill-considered bill had been
passed by the House, authorizing the President to secure
THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 119

a concession from Nicaragua and to proceed at once to the
construction of a waterway by that route. Fortunately
the Hepburn Bill was not hastily disposed of in the Senate.
The matter was thoroughly investigated in committee and
extensively debated in the chamber. The weight of engin-
eering opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of the Panama
route, but, perhaps, the most effective statement in its favor
was delivered by Senator Hanna, who had made a close
personal investigation of the question. A series of practical
inquiries submitted by him to eighty shipowners, ship-
masters, officers and pilots engaged in operating the most
important intercontinental steamship lines and _ sailing
vessels elicited replies which were without exception strongly
in favor of the Panama route. More than ten per cent of
these emanated from persons interested in sailing ships
and familiar with the navigation of them, a result especially
significant in view of the fact that one of the very strongest
objections advanced against the more southerly location is
its assumed disadvantage to sailing craft.* The debate
in the Senate was followed by the passage in both branches
of Congress of the Spooner Bill. This measure authorized
the President to acquire the rights and property of the New
Panama Canal Company for a sum not to exceed $40,000,-
000 and to secure by treaty with the Republic of Colombia
the perpetual control of the territory needful for operating
the canal; it also provided for the prosecution of the work
by an Isthmian Canal Commission consisting of seven
members to be appointed by the President.

We have already recited briefly the incidents of the
imbroglio that followed the failure of the Colombian Legis-
lature to ratify the Hay-Herran Treaty and culminated in
the independence of Panama. Sufficient has been said
to show how nearly the American people came to being
committed to the Nicaragua route. What, in such an
event, would have been the actual outcome it is impossible

* Full details of this interesting information will be found in the Congressional Record,
June 9, 1902.
120 THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

to conjecture, but there is ample ground for the belief that
the undertaking would have proved more hazardous, more
difficult, and less satisfactory when completed, than the
Panama project.

It will be convenient at this point to consider briefly
the most important features of difference between the two
routes. In the first place, the verified data upon which
to work was very much greater in the case of Panama, not
to mention the fact that a considerable proportion of the
task had already been accomplished at that point. In
fact the Nicaragua project is still a mass of theory which
application might prove to be infinitely erroneous, whilst
at Panama the stage of uncertainty had been virtually
passed and the operation presented definite and calculable
tasks.

THE NICARAGUAN ROUTE COMPARED WITH THAT OF
PANAMA

The American Isthmus does not contain a single natural
harbor on the Nicaraguan coast A satisfactory approach
to a canal might be excavated upon the Pacific side, but the
Atlantic littoral offers no such facility. The harbor of
Greytown, which was once a good one, has long since been
closed by the formation of banks whose material is con-
stantly carried down by the San Carlos and Serapiqui
Rivers. These obstructions could be cleared, but only at
great expense and the maintenance of the necessary chan-
nel would involve incessant dredging. At Panama, an ex-
cellent entrance was available at either end of the Canal.

Whilst both routes lie within the zone of seismic disturb-
ances, there was no recorded convulsion, nor any physical
evidence of one, in the Isthmus of sufficient force to have
seriously damaged a lock level canal, much less one upon
the sea level. Nicaragua, on the other hand, presents
volcanic features, including Lake Nicaragua itself, which
betoken tremendous upheavals in the past. The earth-
THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 121

quake that occurred in that region in 1844 must have
caused great destruction to a canal had one been in exis-
tence at the time, as well as to the shipping on it. The
proposed line passes close to the active volcano Ometepe,
which was in violent eruption as late as 1883. The great
volcano, Momotombo, on the edge of Lake Managua,
after fifty years of inactivity, burst out with great violence
in the month of February, 1905. This eruption was pre-
ceded by earthquakes.

NICARAGUAN ROUTE PRESENTS MANY EXTRAORDINARY
DIFFICULTIES

The region traversed by the Nicaraguan route is subject
to strong winds and heavy rainfall, which would militate
against the safe navigation of a canal. The latter prevent-
ing clear observation would tend to delay or prevent passage
at night. It is true that Panama is also subject to heavy
rainfall, but it is neither so continuous nor so great as upon
the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, which has no definite dry
season. Moreover, any delays occasioned from this cause
would be of shorter duration and of less consequence in
Panama owing to the difference in length of passage.

Serious difficulties in the case of the Nicaragua con-
struction would be created by the San Juan River, which
may be considered as at least equal to those involved in
the regulation of the Chagres. The course of the former
stream is extremely tortuous, and expert opinion holds that
it would be impossible to reduce it to a safe curvature.
General Abbott says: ‘‘This long river route, exceeding
in length the entire distance from ocean to ocean by the
Panama line, must remain subject to the combined effects
of strong winds, sharp curvature, and longitudinal and
cross currents, to say nothing of the obscuration due to
heavy rainfall. It may well be doubted whether any system
of artificial lighting could render night transit safe for large
ships, and without it delays and possible congestion could
122 THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

hardly be avoided.”’ A popular idea prevails that the
Nicaragua route offers a great advantage in the seventy
miles of lake section, but this is fallacy. Something like
one half of the distance is over bottom that presents a
similar problem to that encountered at Lake Menzeleh in
the construction of the Suez Canal, to wit, the opening and
maintenance of a channel through soft mud. The Isthmian
Canal Commission estimated the cost of this portion of the
operation at $8,000,000. Even when made, this expen-
sive and difficult channel would be a source of frequent
danger, for Lake Nicaragua is subject to violent storms,
during which there would be serious liability of vessels
grounding. To quote General Abbott: ‘‘It remains to
refer to what from an engineering point of view would be
perhaps the most serious objection to the Nicaragua route
if completed and opened to traffic. This would be the risk
of longer or shorter interruptions liable to result from the
complicated systems of water supply in seasons of drought
of long duration; and the lake lies in a district where they
are far from uncommon. It has been claimed that a vast
lake about 3,000 square miles in extent must furnish an
ideal source of supply, but the matter will bear a little
examination.

CONTROL OF LAKE NICARAGUA A SERIOUS PROBLEM

“By the dam on the lower San Juan river the channel
of the present stream would be transformed into an arm
of the lake, maintained sensibly at the same level, and
through this arm all shipping must pass, the depth of water
depending wholly on the stand of the lake. This stand
is now subject to a natural oscillation of about 13 feet.
Under the projected conditions the entire outflow must
pass over the dam at a distance of 50 miles from the main
lake, and if the level is allowed to rise above the present
high water stand, valuable lands under cultivation on the
west shore of the lake would be flooded and claims for
THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY 123

damages would result. On the other hand, the bed of the
river is crossed by many ledges of rock, and the cost of
excavation fixes a limit to the depth economically practi-
cable. . . . The level of the lake must be held approxi-
mately between 111 feet and 104 feet above tide and the
bed of the present river must be excavated sufficiently to
afford a sailing depth of 35 feet at all times. But the
records establish that years of high lake and years of low
lake follow in no regular succession. As it is impossible
to provide a reserve sufficient to control the level of an im-
mense body of water 3,000 square miles in extent, the
regulation of this vital element must be left to the foresight
and good judgment of the operator controlling the outflow
of the dam. . . . Carelessness or bad judgment on
the part of the operator at the dam, or an abnormal season,
might therefore involve the stoppage of traffic for an in-
definite period. A really desirable canal should be subject
to no such contingency.”

The Nicaragua route shows some savings in distances
between important shipping points as measured upon the
map, but these would almost certainly be made up for by
the much shorter time of passage through the Panama
Canal.

It must be borne in mind that the decision of the Isth-
mian Canal Commission in favor of Nicaragua was prompted
by the price asked by the Company for its interests in the
Panama enterprise and that decision was promptly reversed
as soon as the Commission’s estimate was accepted. As
the cost of constructing and maintaining the respective
waterways was practically equal in the Commission’s opin-
ion, it is evident that the alacrity with which they turned
to the Panama proposition when the terms were favor-
able was due to a conviction of the superior merits of that
project.
CHAPTER VIII

Tor AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

 

The Hay Bunau-Varilla Treaty was negotiated be-
tween the respective representatives of the United States
and Panama in the autumn of 1903 and fully ratified Feb-
ruary, 1904. The most important features of this conven-
tion are as follows:

Article 1. ‘The United States guarantees and will
maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama.”

Article 2. ‘“‘The Republic of Panama grants to the
United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control
of a zone of land, and land under water for the construction,
maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said
Canal, of the width of ten miles, extending to the distance of
five miles on each side of the center line of the Canal to be
constructed; the said zone beginning in the Caribbean Sea
three marine miles from mean low-water mark and extend-
ing to and across the Isthmus of Panama into the Pacific
Ocean to a distance of three marine miles from mean low-
water mark, with the proviso that the cities of Panama
and Colon and the harbors adjacent to said cities, which are
included within the boundaries of the zone above described,
shall not be included within this grant. . . . The
Republic of Panama further grants in like manner to the
United States in perpetuity all islands within the limits
of the Zone above described and, in addition thereto, the
group of small islands in the Bay of Panama, named Perico,
Naos, Culebra and Flamenco.”

Article 3. ‘The Republic of Panama grants to the
United States all the rights, power, and authority within
the Zone mentioned and described in Article 2 of this agree-

(124)
THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 125

ment . . . which the United States would possess and
exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory within which
said lands and waters are located, to the entire exclusion
of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such
sovereign rights, power or authority.”

Article 6 provides for compensation to private property
owners, by the United States, for any damage to private
property occasioned by the canal operations and for the
assessment of such compensation by arbitration.

UNITED STATES AUTHORITY IN COLON AND PANAMA

Article 7. ‘. . . The Republic of Panama agrees
that the cities of Panama and Colon shall comply in per-
petuity with the sanitary ordinances, whether of a preven-
tive or curative character, prescribed by the United States
and, in case the Government of Panama is unable, or fails
in its duty, to enforce this compliance by the cities of
Panama and Colon with the sanitary ordinances of the
United States, the Republic of Panama grants to the United
States the right and authority to enforce the same.

“The same right and authority are granted to the
United States for the maintenance of public order in the
cities of Panama and Colon and the territories and harbors
adjacent thereto in case the Republic of Panama should not
be, in the judgment of the United States, able to maintain
such order.”

Provision is made in this article for the reimbursement
of the United States for any outlay it may make, under
the discretionary authority referred to above, in ‘‘works of
sanitation, collection and disposition of sewage, and dis-
tribution of water, in the cities of Panama and Colon.”

Article 9. ‘‘The United States agrees that the ports at
either entrance of the canal and the waters thereof, and the
Republic of Panama agrees that the towns of Panama and
Colon shall be free for all time, so that there shall not be
imposed, or collected, custom-house tolls, tonnage, anchor-
126 THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

age, light-house, wharf, pilot, or quarantine dues, or any
other charges, or taxes of any kind upon any vessel using,
or passing through the Canal, or belonging to, or employed
by, the United States, directly or indirectly, in connection
with the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation
and protection of the main Canal, or auxiliary works, or
upon the cargo, officers, crew, or passengers, of any such
vessels, except such tolls and charges as may be imposed by
the United States for the use of the Canal and other works,
and except tolls and charges imposed by the Republic of
Panama upon merchandise destined to be introduced for the
consumption of the rest of the Republic of Panama, and
upon vessels touching at the ports of Panama and Colon
and which do not cross the Canal.”

THE PRICE OF THE CONCESSION

Article 14. “As the price of compensation for the
rights, powers, and privileges granted in this convention by
the Republic of Panama to the United States, the Govern-
ment of the United States agrees to pay to the Republic of
Panama the sum of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) in gold
coin of the United States on the exchange of the ratifica-
tion of this convention and also an annual payment, during
the life of this convention, of two hundred and fifty thou-
sand dollars ($250,000) in like gold coin, beginning nine
years after the date aforesaid. ;

THE CANAL TO BE NEUTRAL FOREVER

Article 18. ‘‘The Canal, when constructed, and the
entrances thereto, shall be neutral in perpetuity, and shall
be open upon the terms provided for by section 1 of article
three of, and in conformity with all the stipulations of, the
treaty entered into by the Governments of the United
States and Great Britain on November 18, 1901.’’*

 

 

* Tho reference is to the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, which was designed to facilitate the
construction of the Panama Canal.
THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 127

In accordance with the provisions of the Spooner Bill,
the President appointed a commission of seven members to
prosecute the canal operations. They were: Rear-Admiral
John G. Walker, U. 8S. N. (retired), Chairman; Major-
General George W. Davis, U. 8. A. (retired), Governor of
the Canal Zone; William Barclay Parsons, C. E.; William
H. Burr, C. E.; Benjamin M. Harrod, C. E.; Carl E.
Grunsky, C. E.; Frank J. Hecker. John F. Wallace, an
engineer of experience and ability, was appointed Engineer-
in-Chief, and Surgeon-Colonel W. C. Gorgas, of the United
States Army, whose splendid record in Cuba marked him
as pre-eminently fitted for the task, was placed in charge
of the Sanitary Department.

In a letter dated May the ninth, 1904, the President
directed the Honorable William H. Tait, Secretary of War,
to assume supervision of the work of the Isthmian Canal
Commission. The same document defines the duties of the
Commission, which are, in general, to make all needful
regulations for the government of the Zone; and ‘‘to make
or cause to be made, all needful surveys, borings, designs,
plans, and specifications of the engineering, hydraulic, and
sanitary works required and to supervise and execute the
same.”

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE INHABITANTS OF THE ZONE

This letter goes on to instruct the Secretary that ‘the
inhabitants of the Isthmian Canal Zone are entitled to
security in their persons, property, and religion, and in all
their private rights and relations. They should be so
informed by public proclamation. The people should be
disturbed as little as possible in their customs and avoca-
tions that are in harmony with principles of well-ordered and
decent living.

“The municipal laws of the Zone are to be admin-
istered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were
before the change. Police magistrates and justices of the
128 THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

peace and other officers discharging duties usually devolving
upon these officers of the law, will be continued in office
if they are suitable persons. . . . The laws of the land,
with which the inhabitants are familiar, and which were in
force on February 26, 1904, will continue in force in the
Canal Zone and in other places on the Isthmus over which
the United States has jurisdiction until altered or annulled
by the said Commission,” but the principles of government
set forth in the Constitution of the United States are to be
observed in the administration of the Zone.

In a later letter to the Secretary, the President makes
an important declaration of the broader policy of the United
States towards the Republic of Panama as follows:

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS PANAMA

“The United States is about to confer on the people of
the State of Panama a great benefit by the expenditure of
millions of dollars in the construction of the canal: but this
fact must not blind us to the importance of so exercising
the authority given us under the treaty with Panama as to
avoid creating any suspicion, however unfounded, of our
intentions as to the future. We have not the slightest
intention of establishing an independent colony in the mid-
dle of the State of Panama, or of exercising any greater
governmental functions than are necessary to enable us
conveniently and safely to construct, maintain, and operate
the canal under the rights given us by the treaty. Least of
all do we wish to interfere with the business and prosperity
of the people of Panama. However far a just construction
of the treaty might enable us to go, did the exigencies of
the case require it, in asserting the equivalent of sovereignty
over the Canal Strip,* it is our full intention that the rights
which we exercise shall be exercised with all proper care for
the honor and interests of the people of Panama. The
exercise of such powers as are given us by the treaty within

 

 

*See Article 3, of the treaty quoted above.
THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 129

the geographical boundaries of the Republic of Panama
may easily, if a real sympathy for both the present and
future welfare of the people of Panama, is not shown,
create distrust of the American government.”

It is not our purpose to enter into a discussion of the
political aspects of the treaty, but a careful reading of the
portions which have been reproduced will give an idea of
the great scope of this convention. To draw attention to
but one direction in which its potency extends, the provision
for the maintenance of order by the United States in the
cities of Colon and Panama is a practical preventive of
future revolution in the Republic.

At the close of the year Secretary Taft visited the
Isthmus and entered into an agreement with President
Amador, covering several supplementary matters of impor-
tance. A tariff adjustment, satisfactory to the Panamans,
was effected. It was arranged that only supplies for the
canal, and goods in transit, were in future to be entered at
the Zone ports, thus assuring the Government of Panama
of all customs receipts and port dues. The Republic agreed
to reduce its tariff from fifteen to ten per cent, except upon
wines and alcohol, and to place its postal rates upon the
two-cent basis. Panama also agreed to adopt the gold
standard, a very necessary measure for the welfare of that
republic, as well as for the facility of transactions between
the two nations. At the time this understanding was
arrived at, the Colombian currency had become so debased
that a five-dollar bill was exchangeable for an American
nickel, and there was one cent change due at that.

A FUTILE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

Just before the arrival of Secretary Taft, General
Huertas had planned one of the puny revolutions which
have furnished librettists with inexhaustible material. He
had mobilized the army of 182 half-clad men and boys, with
the design of subverting the Amador government. The

9
130 THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

threat of calling upon half a dozen American marines who
happened to be in the city with their side-arms on, induced
him to give up the idea. He was placed upon the retired
list and the army of the Republic was disbanded.

At a banquet given in his honor by the Panaman Presi-
dent the Secretary delivered a timely homily on the subject
of revolutions and urged upon his auditors the necessity of
the government preserving the rights of the minority. The
speech, which was in the nature of a friendly warning and
an intimation that the United States expected the Republic
to refrain from any revolutionary disturbances in the future,
was well received by the representatives of both political
parties, and doubtless had a salutary effect.

THE COMMISSION VISITS THE ISTHMUS

The Canal Commission arrived at the Isthmus in April,
1904. The only work in progress at the time was the
excavation of the Culebra Cut, where a few French
machines were employed with a force of about seven hun-
dred men. Owing to the long lapse of time since the New
Panama Canal Company ceased operations, a chaotic con-
dition prevailed along the entire line of the canal and the
plant and equipment transferred by that Company was in
such a deteriorated and scattered state as to require months
for its collection and repair. Whilst the task of straighten-
ing up was being carried out Engineer Wallace tested some
American steam excavators and established important data
as to units of cost and expenditure of time. Meanwhile
the Commission proceeded, by means of new surveys and
examinations, to gain such information as might afford a
satisfactory basis for the ultimate plans. As has been
stated, the French companies performed a great deal of
accurate scientific work along the same lines, but much of
the data secured from them needed to be modified in order
to bring it into harmony with the more extensive scheme of
the American project. The Commission was not restricted
THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 131

by the limitations which governed the plans of the purely
commercial enterprises, and whilst its work was entirely of
a tentative nature, a waterway much larger than any con-
templated by the French companies was a foregone con-
clusion.

THE PLAN OF THE WALKER COMMISSION

The Commission formulated a plan for a lock canal at
an 85-foot level with a dam at Bohio and a lake 38.5 square
miles extending from that point to Obispo. The Commis-
sion rejected the sea-level plan, prefacing its conclusion with
the following statement: ‘‘If a sea-level canal be con-
structed, either the canal itself must be made of such
dimensions that maximum floods, modified to some extent
by a reservoir in the Upper Chagres, could pass down its
channel without injury, or independent channels must be
provided to carry off these floods. As the canal lies in the
lowest part of the valley, the construction of such channels
would be a matter of serious difficulty, and the simplest
solution would be to make the canal prism large enough to
take the full discharge. This would have the advantage,
also, of furnishing a very large canal, in which navigation
under ordinary circumstances would be exceptionally easy.
It would involve a cross section from Obispo to the Atlantic,
having an area of a least 15,000 square feet below the water
line, which would give a bottom width of at least 400 feet.
The quantity of excavation required for such a canal has
been roughly computed, and is found to be about 266,228-
000 cubic yards. The cost of such a canal, including a
dam at Alhajuela and a tide lock at Miraflores, near the
Pacific end, is estimated at not less than $240,000,000.
Its construction would probably take at least twenty
years.”

The investigations of the Commission were necessarily
directed chiefly to the various suggestions for the control
of the Chagres. The question had to be considered from
132 THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

the point of view of a sea level canal as well as that of a
waterway with locks. In the former case the flood waters
of the river, if admitted into the canal, would create dan-
gerous currents and carry in heavy deposits, necessitating
extensive dredging. The various dam projects were
examined by the Commission as well as the plans of the
French companies for diverting the river through a tunnel
to the Pacific Ocean.

Before the Commission closed the first year of its exis-
tence the question of its efficiency and adaptability to the
work in hand was widely raised. Secretary Taft, upon his
return from the Isthmus in December, 1904, had expressed
to the President an opinion that the Commission, whilst it
had ‘‘made as much progress in the necessary preparations
for the buildings of the canal as could be expected in the
short time since its appointment,’ was unwieldy and so
constituted as to render difficult the apportionment of
specific work and responsibility among its members. Chief
Engineer Wallace complained that his plans were repeatedly
changed and that he was hampered in the effort to carry
them out.

THE OBJECTIONS TO THE COMMISSION

In a message sent to Congress on the 13th of January,
1905, President Roosevelt plainly expressed his objections
to the existing arrangement. He asked for ‘‘greater dis-
cretion in the organization of the personnel”’ to be employed
in the management of the enterprise.

‘Actual experience has convinced me,” he said ‘‘that it
will be impossible to obtain the best and most effective ser-
vice under the limitations prescribed by law. The general
plans for the work must be agreed upon with the aid of the
best engineers of the country, who should act as an advisory
or consulting body. The consulting engineers should not
be put upon the Commission, which should be used only as
an executive instrument for the executive and adminis-
THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 133

trative work. The actual work of executing the general
plans agreed upon by the Commission, after receiving the
conclusions of the advising engineers, must be done by an
engineer in charge; and we now have an excellent engineer.”
The President went on to state that the Commission should
consist at most of five members and preferably of three.

In response to this message, the House passed a bill to
abolish the Commission and place the government of the
Zone and the construction of the Canal entirely in the hands
of the President, but the measure was defeated in the
Senate. Failing Congressional relief the President deter-
mined, in his characteristic way, to deal with the situation
himself. He secured the resignation of the entire Isthmian
Canal Commission and reformed that body, placing the con-
trol of affairs definitely in the hands of an Executive Com-
mittee composed of three of the seven members required by
law to constitute the whole. Each of the executive mem-
bers had distinct duties assigned to him. Chairman Shonts
was placed in charge of the entire enterprise, with powers
resembling those of a railroad president. Engineer Wallace
was made field manager, with full control of the construc-
tion. Judge Magoon was created Governor of the Canal
Zone and United States Minister to Panama. The other
four members of the Commission were: Mordecai T. Endi-
cott, Peter C. Hains, Oswald H. Ernst and Benjamin
M. Harrod.

WALLACE RESIGNS AND STEVENS STEPS IN

The new arrangement had been in force less than sixty
days when the Chief Engineer, for some cause which has
never been fully explained, resigned his position. The
resignation, coming as it did without warning or adequate
explanation, naturally aroused resentment on the part of
Secretary Taft, and Mr. Wallace retired from the service
under a cloud. The place thus made vacant was promptly
and satisfactorily filled by the selection of John F. Stevens,
134 THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

who had been engaged by the War Department to supervise
the construction of the new railroads in the Philippines.
Mr. Stevens assumed charge of the canal operations in
August, 1905.

On the first day of the following month the International
Board of Consulting Engineers met in Washington. This
body had been formed with the co-operation of several
foreign governments for the purpose mainly of examining
the principal problems involved in the construction of the
Canal.

THE PRESIDENT’S ADDRESS TO THE CONSULTING ENGINEERS

The President addressed the assembled Board at length,
explaining that his remarks were to be taken as suggestions
rather than as instructions. ‘‘I hope,” he said, ‘‘that
ultimately it will prove possible to build a sea-level canal.
Such a canal would undoubtedly be best in the end, if feasible,
and I feel that one of the chief advantages of the Panama
Route is that ultimately a sea-level canal will be a possibility.
But, while paying due heed to the ideal perfectibility of the
scheme from an engineer’s standpoint, remember the need
of having a plan which shall provide for the immediate
building of the canal on the safest terms and in the shortest
possible time.

“Tf to build a sea-level canal will but slightly increase
the risk, then, of course, it is preferable. But if to adopt a
plan of a sea-level canal means to incur hazard, and to insure
indefinite delay, then it is not preferable. If the advantages
and disadvantages are closely balanced I expect you to say
so.

“T desire also to know whether, if you recommend a
high-level multi-lock canal, it will be possible after it is
completed to turn it into, or substitute for it, in time, a
sea-level canal, without interrupting the traffic upon it.
Two of the prime considerations to be kept steadily in mind
are: 1. The utmost practicable speed of construction.
 

 

 

 

 

Copyright by Harris & Ewing.
COLONEL GEORGE WASHINGTON GOETHALS, U. S. A.

The genius of the Canal. After the successive resignations of John F. Wallace and

John F. Stevens as Chief Engineer, President Roosevelt decided that the time had come to
turn the work over to the U.S. Army Engineers.

His decision has been abundantly justified
by the remarkable results achieved.
THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 135

2. Practical certainty that the plan proposed will be
feasible; that it can be carried out with the minimum risk.”

After a thorough study of the maps and documents
in the possession of the Isthmian Canal Commission, the
Board of Consulting Engineers spent three weeks on the
Isthmus, and on February 19, 1906, presented their report
to Congress through the President, advocating a sea-level
canal. A dissentient minority of five members, all Amer-
icans, made however a detailed report advocating a lock
canal eighty-five feet above mean sea-level.

THE MILITARY BOARD

In April, 1907, Mr. John F. Stevens resigned from
the position of Chief Engineer. President Roosevelt, with
the hearty approval of Mr. Taft, who was then Secretary
of War, immediately installed a military organization, in
accordance with an idea that had been entertained for some
time previous. A new Commission was created, with
Colonel George W. Goethals, Corps of Engineers, U. 8. A.,
as Chairman and Chief Engineer. The other members
were Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Hodges, U. 8. A.; Lieuten-
ant-Colonel William L. Sibert, U. 8. A.; Lieutenant-Colonel
D. D. Gaillard, U. 8. A.; Civil Engineer H. H. Rousseau,
U. S. N.; Colonel W. C. Gorgas, U. 5. A.; and Honorable
J.C. 8. Blackburn. Mr. J. B. Bishop was retained in the
position of Secretary to the Commission and Editor of the
weekly ‘“‘Canal Record.’”’ The only change in the compo-
sition of the membership was occasioned by the retirement
of Senator Blackburn at the close of his third year’s service.
The vacancy was filled by the appointment of Mr. M. H.
Thatcher, on April 12, 1910, to the head of the Depart-
ment of Administration.

When Colonel Goethals and his aides came into control
of the Canal, the lock plan, as advocated by the minority
of the Board of Consulting Engineers, had been authorized
by Congress and accepted by the people of the United States
136 THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

as representing the form which the waterway would ulti-
mately take.

The opportunity of still further strengthening the posi-
tion of the Chairman of the Commission was not neglected
by the President. Colonel Goethals was also made the
chief executive of the Canal Zone, exercising the power
formerly vested in the Governor, and President of the
Panama Railroad Company, thus centering in him the
absolute authority upon the work and making him superior
to all save the President and the Secretary of War.

THE INVESTIGATING BOARD

In February, 1909, the President ordered Secretary
Taft and a board of experts, especially appointed for the
purpose, to make an inspection of the work upon the Canal,
with particular reference to the Gatun Dam. In the
resultant report the Commissioners expressed the opinion
that the site of the structure met all the requirements of
safety and that excess of precaution characterized the
design and measures for its execution. They recommended
a reduction in the height of the dam and also suggested
some modifications of other parts of the Canal plan.

The changes which were adopted in 1909, and a few that
had been previously determined upon, were the last of any
consequence to be effected.

The chief departures from the plan as previously de-
scribed were the removal of the terminal locks at the Pacific
end from Sosa to Miraflores, and the consequent elimination
of the proposed lake between the divide and the Pacific
Oceai, certain increases in the dimensions of the channel;
enlargement of the lock capacities; decrease in the height of
the Gatun Dam, and the construction of breakwaters at
Colon and Panama,
CHAPTER Ix
Tue Heattu PRoBLEM

The question of sanitation, closely allied as it is to that
of labor, has always been an important factor in operations
conducted upon the Isthmus of Panama, but fortunately,
with the advance of time, the difficulties presented by it
have become ever more susceptible to scientific treatment.
The Panama railroad was built at an appalling sacrifice
of life. At that time a blind contest was waged with dis-
ease, but no serious effort was made to mitigate the con-
ditions that produced it. The French companies adopted
some preventive measures and their provision for the care
of the sick was admirable, but it remained for American
administration to attack the problem in the determined
and radical manner that minimized effects by reducing
causes.

It was recognized at the outset that the Panama Canal
could not be built by Americans unless the Canal Zone was
first made healthy in order that Americans could live here
with reasonable safety. So long as health conditions were
bad it would be impossible to recruit a stable labor force,
not only on account of actual conditions, but also because
the Isthmus of Panama had been given a world-wide rep-
utation for unhealthfulness during the construction of
the Panama railroad and the work of the French on the
Canal.

A knowledge of conditions as they existed on the
Isthmus at the time of the American occupation is neces-
sary to a realization of the truly marvelous results which
have been accomplished.

The Isthmus itself was truly a valley of death, in which

(137)
138 THE HEALTH PROBLEM

malaria, yellow fever and smallpox ran riot. The terminal
cities of Colon and Panama were the chief breeding places
for these diseases, and their reputation as the worst pest-
holes in the world was more than justified. Imagine cities
whose sidewalks and streets were entirely unpaved, and
which during the rainy season (which lasts during nine
months of the year) became practically impassable, without
any sewage system or system of plumbing, lacking all
facilities for the collection of garbage and refuse, so that
the only method used by the natives to get rid of such
matter was to dump it into the streets, resulting in a condi-
tion of almost inconceivable filth and an ideal breeding
place for disease!

SANITATION IN PANAMA AND COLON

The American authorities realized that any movement
to make the Isthmus healthy must begin with the cleaning
up of Colon and Panama. With this idea in mind we were
wise enough to specify in our treaty with the Republic of
Panama that our Government should have sanitary jurisdic-
tion over these two cities. Thus was the foundation laid
for the wonderful transformation which has converted this
land of pestilence and death into an abode for Americans
which is as healthy as the average city in the United States.

Marvelous as the results have been it must be admitted
that they are chiefly due to the brilliant discovery made
by the United States army surgeons in Cuba in 1900 that
yellow fever, the scourge of the tropics, was transmitted
from one person to another solely by a mosquito of a partic-
ular type, known as the stegomyia. It should be said here
in all justice to the surgeons and soldiers of the United
States army who risked their lives in the making of this
discovery, and particularly to that brave man who sacrificed
his life in its pursuit, that it is doubtful if the Canal enter-
prise could have been brought to a successful termination
without their sacrifice and the knowledge which was
 
“Taye ueapD yi Apo ay} A[ddns 0} yuosuIUIDAOD s8940}g popu dy} Aq 3I[INq SilOAtISO1 JY} JO QUO SI pUNOIBII0} yy UT

“VINVNVd dO ALIO AHL AO MAGIA TVYANAD
‘ACN ‘poonsspuQ P poonsapuyQ ‘ydvL60j04q

 

Se ae Ab

aro

 

 

 

 
THE HEALTH PROBLEM 139

obtained through it. The four years which had elapsed
between the original demonstration of this theory and the
arrival of the Americans in Panama gave ample time in
which to prove its accuracy. With this information, and
the supplementary knowledge supplied by the discovery
in 1898 that malaria, which ranks second only in importance
to yellow fever as one of the scourges of the tropics, was
transmitted in similar fashion from one person to another
by a type of mosquito known as the anopheles, the work of
making the Isthmus a safe habitation for Americans became
practically a matter of administration. The dangers were
understood; likewise the precautions. Smallpox could be
controlled by vaccination, and the plague guarded against
by proper quarantine regulations such as are in effect in
every American port, so that the sanitary officers of the
commission had their work laid out for them clearly and
accurately before beginning their task.

MOSQUITOES CARRY DISEASE

The history of the epoch-making discovery of the
mosquito transmission of yellow fever is so interesting and
remarkable that some mention must be made of it. The
theory that yellow fever was transmissible in this way dates
back as early as 1847, and was again stated in a paper on
the subject by Dr. Carlos J. Finlay of Havana in 1881.

It was not until 1900, however, during the occupation of
Cuba by the United States army, that an opportunity arose
to make a thorough test of the mosquito theory. In that
year yellow fever was epidemic in Havana, and there were
an appalling number of cases in the United States army in
spite of the use of all known methods of fighting the dis-
ease. It did not seem possible to check its spread in the
light of knowledge then extant. Many theories were
advanced, and at last a board of army surgeons was
appointed to investigate the matter of the disease, its causes
and method of treatment, consisting of the four army
140 THE HEALTH PROBLEM

surgeons, Jesse W. Lazear, Walter Reed, James Carroll
and Aristides Agramonte. After various experiments they
decided to test the theory of transmission by mosquitoes.
To do this it was necessary to secure human subjects for
experiment, and they decided to make the first experiments
on themselves. The mosquitoes were to be secured, allowed
to infect themselves with the disease by biting a yellow
fever patient, and then in turn to bite them.

One of these officers, Dr. Agramonte, was immune to
the disease through previous attacks; another, Dr. Reed,
was recalled from the island before undergoing the experi-
ment. Doctors Carroll and Lazear were bitten by infected
mosquitoes, with the result that Dr. Carroll suffered a very
severe attack of yellow fever from which he barely escaped
with his life. Dr. Lazear was not so fortunate. He con-
tracted the disease in its most severe form and died of it.
It must be understood that these surgeons fully realized
the great danger which they ran in making these experi-
ments, in order to realize their extreme bravery and high
devotion to duty. No appreciation of the marvelous
achievement of the Canal itself can be complete without a
full measure of praise being given to the high courage of
these men who made the discovery through which the
execution of the work was made possible.

To further demonstrate the truth of this theory a call for
volunteers to undergo mosquito infection was made, and it
is a high tribute to the bravery of the American soldier to
note that there were instant and abundant responses.

It had been demonstrated by the tests of Doctors Lazear
and Carroll that considerable time must elapse between the
infection of the mosquito and the time at which it could
infect another person. One of the soldiers chosen for the
test was submitted to the ordeal of being bitten by infected
mosquitoes, and it was discovered that the dangerous period
began about twelve days after the infection of the mosquito.
Experiments made by soldiers to determine whether or
not yellow fever was a contagious disease, by wearing
THE HEALTH PROBLEM 141

clothes of a yellow fever patient, and sleeping in a bed
previously occupied by a patient who had died of yellow
fever, amply proved that it was not possible to transmit
the disease in this way. Thus it was fully demonstrated
that the stegomyia mosquito was the sole means of trans-
mitting this dread disease.

MALARIA TRANSMISSION

The discovery that malaria was transmitted not by poi-
sonous air or water, but by the anopheles mosquito solely,
was made by a British army surgeon, Major Ronald Ross,
who, after studying the problem of transmission of malaria,
was successful in infecting birds with this disease by means
of mosquito bites. This principle was afterwards applied
to human beings successfully, and the theory proven that
this was at least one of the methods of transmitting malaria.
Later on, by means of further experiments, it was demon-
strated that it was not possible to infect beings with malaria
by means of either air or water from places in which the
disease was epidemic.

Armed with this knowledge the surgeons drew up a new
set of regulations for the government of Havana during the
American occupation. These regulations were put into effect
immediately, and consisted mainly of the segregation of
all those attacked by the yellow fever in wire-screened houses
so that the mosquitoes could not bite them and make them-
selves the means of carrying the disease. The infected
houses were carefully fumigated, swamps, stagnant water
and all likely places for the breeding of mosquitoes drained,
with the result that within ninety days the disease was
entirely stamped out; and with very few exceptions there
has not been a recurrence of it in Havana since 1901.

Similar tactics were carried out in the case of the malaria-
carrying mosquito, and with signal success, bringing the
death rate from malaria down to about forty-five per year
or about one-sixth of the previous rate.
142 THE HEALTH PROBLEM

The work in Havana was under the direction of Surgeon
Major W. C. Gorgas, and the marvelous success achieved
there was largely due to his painstaking work and adminis-
trative ability. The work accomplished there, of course,
pointed the way directly to the sanitation of the Isthmus.
President Roosevelt, realizing the value of the work which
had been done, and the necessity for a similar but much
greater task on the Isthmus, instructed the first commission
to pay particular attention to the problem of sanitation.
Colonel Gorgas, as the organizer and director of the cam-
paign in Havana, was unanimously chosen as the best man
for the leadership in the work on the Isthmus.

The first Isthmian Canal Commission to take charge
of the work of constructing the Canal was appointed by the
President on February 29, 1904, and confirmed by the
Senate on March 3. The Commission arrived on the
Isthmus on April 5 on a visit of inspection, accompanied by
Col. W. C. Gorgas, Medical Corps, U. 8. A., John W. Ross,
Medical Director, U. 8. N., Capt. C. E. Gillette, Corps of
Engineers, U. 8. A., and Maj. Louis A. LaGarde, Medical
Corps, U. 8. A., as experts on sanitation. After a thorough
examination of conditions on the Isthmus these experts
returned to Washington and reported a plan for the sanita-
tion of the Canal Zone and the cities of Panama and Colon,
and on May 8, 1904, Col. Gorgas, as Chief Sanitary Officer,
was authorized to proceed with the work. He returned to
the Isthmus, arriving on June 28. Between May 19, 1904,
and June 30, 1904, Dr. L. W. Spratling, U. 8. N., was act-
ing health officer. As the representative of the Commis-
sion on the Isthmus, Gen. George W. Davis, Governor of
the Canal Zone, issued an order on June 30, 1904, announc-
ing the organization of the Sanitary Department, with
Colonel Gorgas as its head.

IDEAL CONDITIONS FOR SPREADING DISEASE

At the beginning of the American occupation the Isthmus
of Panama was afflicted with a plague of mosquitoes. The
THE HEALTH PROBLEM 143

high temperature, which varies little during the year,
allowed constant breeding and the pools of water left by the
almost continuous rains during the rainy season, which
lasts for nine months out of the year, open tanks and water
barrels, which formed the water supply system, were ideal
breeding places. The interior of the Isthmus was a tropical
jungle, another condition likewise ideal for mosquito propa-
gation. Practically all of the inhabitants were subject to
malaria, and the mosquitoes had a constant source of infec-
tion from which to draw. Somewhat similar conditions
prevailed with regard to yellow fever.

The methods to be adopted in the war on the disease were
clearly defined, and were resolved into a war on mosquitoes,
a campaign for cleanliness, and the education of the natives
looking to the suppression of the dangerous practices which
had before been in operation. The cities of Panama and
Colon must have a sewage and water system which would
be strictly sanitary. All houses would be carefully screened
and their inhabitants protected from mosquito bites in order
to limit the spread of the disease. The extermination of
the mosquitoes must be accomplished by the draining of all
stagnant pools and the elimination of all standing water in
every case possible, and where this could not be accomplished
spraying with crude oil must be resorted to in order to kill
the mosquito larvae. The brushwood of jungle growth had
to be cut and burned, and a general cleaning up process
adopted along the whole of the route of the Canal wherever
occupied by Canal forces. These portions were cleared of
undergrowth of all kinds for a distance of two hundred yards
around all habitations.

No deaths from yellow fever had occurred among the
employees of the French Company since 1897, although a few
cases had been treated on the Isthmus in the year preceding
the arrival of the Americans. A large part of the popula-
tion of Panama was immune, and it was among the new
arrivals that the disease first showed itself. In July, 1904,
Charles Cunningham, a white employee of the Police Depart-
144 THE HEALTH PROBLEM

ment, was taken ill with it and died. No other cases were
reported for about a month. On November 21, a case
developed in Santo Tomas Hospital in the city of Panama,
and in December, 1904, seven cases developed in that city.

In the month of January, 1905, the disease broke out
in Colon, and in the two cities 19 cases were recorded that
month. In February, 14 cases developed; March, 11;
April, 8; May, 33. The maximum was reached in .June,
when 62 cases were reported, and from that month there
was a steady decrease, the number of cases that developed
in July being 42; August, 27; September, 7, and October,
3. The last case in the city of Panama developed on No-
vember 11, and, the last in Colon, on December 11, 1905.
In all there were 246 cases in 1904 and 1905, and 84 deaths.
Of this number 134 of the cases and 34 of the deaths were
among Commission employees.

The disease had been confined to the cities of Panama
and Colon. It was fought by preventing the introduction
of more cases from the fever ports of nearby countries,
keeping patients in screened rooms where mosquitoes
could not gain access to them, and by an energetic campaign
for the extermination of mosquitoes. The work was
carried on at first without the cooperation of the people,
but within a year they had been taught to assist in the
destruction of the mosquito.

The first work against malaria was undertaken in Empire,
Culebra, and Ancon in July, 1904, and by September it had
been extended to Gorgona, Paraiso, and Balboa. The
situation with regard to malaria in July, 1904, is accurately
illustrated by the conditions at Ancon Hospital, and in the
various villages. Anopheles and stegomytia mosquitoes
were found in large numbers in the buildings and wards.
Mosquito breeding took place within a few yards of the
wards and none of the buildings were screened. The dec-
orative plants and shrubs in the grounds were surrounded
with clay vessels containing water and vegetation in which
mosquitoes were breeding, and all ditches in the grounds
THE HEALTH PROBLEM 145

were producing mosquito life. There is no doubt that
many cases of malaria and yellow fever had been con-
tracted in the hospital itself previous to this time. Exami-
nations of blood taken from the inhabitants of one town in
the Canal Zone showed that 80 per cent of the people were
infected with the malaria organism, and that Ancon was
not an isolated instance was proved by the large percentage
of cases from all the villages. In Colon one-sixth of the
entire population was suffering from malarial attacks
during each week, this deduction being based on the num-
ber of cases treated in the hospitals.

The permanent work for the prevention of malaria has
been practically accomplished, although certain measures
such as grass and brush cutting, oiling pools, and similar
routine work must necessarily be continued indefinitely.

Only two cases of bubonic plague have developed on
the Isthmus since American occupation. On June 15,
1905, a negro longshoreman, at Balboa (formerly La Boca),
was taken ill, and a microscopic examination showed that
he was suffering with bubonic. He died eight days later.
The village was cleaned and disinfected, and a crusade
against rats, the common carriers of bubonic, was begun.
On July 9, a “rat brigade” was set at work in Panama, and
a systematic effort to exterminate the rats around the docks
and throughout the city was made. Rat traps were issued
free to all persons who wished them. Later a bounty was
placed on each rat delivered to the health department,
and this bounty is still in effect.

In January, 1904, Dr. C. C. Pierce, of the Public Health
and Marine Hospital Service, took up the work on the
Isthmus of despatching ships bound to San Francisco and
also of making a sanitary survey of the Canal region. In
May, by an arrangement between the State Department in
Washington and the Government of Panama, he took
charge of the quarantine work for the port of Panama, and
since that time the quarantine on the Isthmus has been
under American control. In spite of the fact that ports

10
146 THE HEALTH PROBLEM

on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the Isthmus, north
and south, have been infected with bubonic, smallpox,
cholera, and yellow fever, the quarantine has been suc-
cessfully maintained. In both of the stations, Panama and
Colon, screened rooms are set aside for yellow fever sus-
pects, and every precaution is taken to guard them from
the bite of mosquitoes.

PRESENT HEALTH CONDITIONS

The Canal Zone is at the present day more healthful
to the white man than many parts of the United States.
There has been an absence of yellow fever during the past
nine years and it is safe to say that no epidemic of that
disease will ever again occur upon the Isthmus. Malaria
is being rapidly reduced and its source eradicated by the
persistent labors of the Sanitary Department. The gen-
eral health of Canal employees, both white and colored, is
better than that of the several communities from which
they were drawn, but, with regard to the former, it must
be considered that they are picked men in the prime of life,
and that those among them who succumb to climate or
disease are quickly weeded out and sent home.

A total of about $20,000,000 has been spent upon the
Canal Zone for sanitation, but in spite of this fact the Isthmus
cannot be regarded as a health resort. It is a reasonably
healthy place to live, but it must be remembered that this
condition can only be maintained so long as the stringent
methods of health precaution are enforced.

The fact that medical services are entirely free, and that
removal to a hospital is compulsory on the part of the attend-
ing physician, has much to do with the excellent conditions
of health maintained there. It must be confessed, however,
that in spite of all these precautions malaria still exists upon
the Isthmus and must be regarded as a serious problem,
the only solution of which is the entire extermination of the
anopheles mosquito. The Canal operating forces must
THE HEALTH PROBLEM 147

continue to live in screened houses, take quinine in large
quantities, remain indoors at night and continue the various
precautions which have been adopted.

Considering the nature of the work, the living conditions
and the length of time occupied by the enterprise, the death
roll has been comparatively small, and to the date of the
opening of the Canal there have been in the neighborhood of
6,000 deaths, of which less than 300 were Americans. Of
the total number somewhat over 1,000 died from accidents.
This really compares very favorably with that of the French,
who lost in the nine years of their occupation about 16,000,
or nearly three times as many.
CHAPTER X
Tue Laspor PROBLEM

Each of the enterprises that preceded the American
occupation of the canal territory found the difficulty in
securing satisfactory labor one of the greatest deterrents
to success.

The health conditions were so forbidding, the problem
so apparently hopeless that even the most adventurous
spirits of the races of the world looked askance at Panama.
When the Americans took charge, however, all this was
changed. The Canal Zone was made healthy and the
completion of the work assured by the ample credit of the
United States. High pay was offered and many other
inducements which soon brought the adventurous of all
lands flocking to the Isthmus. Hardly a nation is lacking
in representatives on the construction force and the census
of the Canal Zone taken in 1912 showed forty nationalities
from eighty-six different geographical subdivisions, so that
the world at large can justly feel proud in the achievement
so truly international in its scope.

RECRUITING A FORCE

The number of men upon the rolls of the Commission
has varied greatly. When Wallace took charge in 1904
there were 746 men employed upon the Canal. Immediately
recruiting stations were opened in the United States, the
West Indies and Europe, with the result that about 45,000
men were imported under contract up to 1912. The force
has been anything but permanent, especially during the
early days of the enterprise, when many of those employed

(148)
*saaxojduia SH JOJ ‘syudwosnue 3B
‘pooj poos aptaoid 0} sured }vai3 uayHe} sVY JUDWUIIACS oY ‘su

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
THE LABOR PROBLEM 149

departed on the same ship that brought them after one
look at the conditions. These were improved, however,
and the promise of high pay, free lodging, good and cheap
food and all the other inducements offered by the Commis-
sion kept a steady stream of labor flowing to the Isthmus.

The high water mark of employees on the Isthmus was
reached in 1910 when there were 38,676 men upon the rolls.
Of these 5,573 were Americans who usually compose from
one-sixth to one-seventh of the total working force. Since
1910 the gradual reduction in the force has been permitted
by the completion of various parts of the project and at
the time of the opening of the Canal only a small operating
and maintenance force will be kept there in addition to the
military garrison.

The Americans employed on the Isthmus are in positions
of supervision or skilled labor in the various trades, steam
engineers, steam shovel men, railroad brakemen, conductors,
firemen, policemen and in the higher offices.

Few women came to the Canal Zone in the early days,
but according to the census of 1912 there were over four
thousand women and children of American employees on
the Isthmus. Most of the laborers are colored and come
from the islands of the West Indies, Barbadoes, Martinique,
Jamaica, Trinidad, etc., to the number of about 30,000.
Europe has supplied about half as many. Of the Europeans
employed over eight thousand were Spaniards and they
proved the most satisfactory of all the common laborers
employed by the Canal Commission.

The suggested employment of Chinese coolies to dig the
canal met with such opposition in the United States that
no move was made to put it into effect. Furthermore,
little difficulty was experienced after the work was under
way in obtaining all the common labor desired.

THE GOLD AND SILVER ROLLS

Some distinction had to be made between skilled and
unskilled labor and this was accomplished by dividing the
150 THE LABOR PROBLEM

employees into “gold” and “silver” men. The gold roll
included all the Americans and those drawing over $75.00
per month who are paid in gold. The silver roll includes
all the common and unskilled laborers and these men are
paid in the silver money of the Republic of Panama.
This distinction is useful in many ways but chiefly in allow-
ing the Commission to draw the color line as it could not
do directly, because of the United States Constitution and
for other reasons. The distinction, however, is not a hard
and fast one, and, consequently, is not open to criticism
from that standpoint. In uniformity with this there are
separate facilities provided everywhere for the two grades
of employees. There are second-class railway cars, special
commissary clerks and separate eating-houses.

QUARTERS

The types of quarters furnished for the gold and silver
employees of course differ radically, although in both cases
living accommodations, together with food, light and water,
are supplied by the Government without charge. The gold
employees live in two types of quarters, known as bachelor
quarters and married quarters, and assignments to these are
made by district quartermasters according to a code of
rules, which takes in the date of the applicant’s entry into
the service, the rate of salary, etc. The quarters for both
bachelors and married men are provided with modern
plumbing and all necessary furniture. The types of houses
differ somewhat according to the salary of the employee,
but all are constructed from ingenious designs which adapt
them both for convenience and comfort to a tropical climate.

The bachelor employees on the gold roll are housed in
quarters like dormitories, and take their meals at hotels
established and maintained by the Government.

The silver bachelor employees live in barracks, each of
which accommodates seventy-two men. They sleep in a
triple tier of bunks, which are fitted with laced canvas
   

   

‘oyinbsow 4

OY OF paudos08 AI]
*sotdos} 84} Ur OjT] JO SpUTMAIINDoI 94} YoauT OF poudTis

[Auo Sz soy sto NAOId SBY UOISSIWIWIOD [eURD UPIUIYAS] OYL

‘VadaTNO LV SUALAVNO GaIMAVW AHL NI WOOU ONINIG

 

 

 

 
THE LABOR PROBLEM 151

bottoms. These barracks are cleaned daily by janitors and
are kept in good order, no baggage or effects of any kind
being allowed on the floor.

AMUSEMENTS

One of the most difficult problems about the labor situa-
tion on the Isthmus has been the amusement of the
employees after working hours. The cities of Panama and
Colon do not supply many forms of amusement, besides the
fact that they are inaccessible to those employed inland.
To meet this difficulty the Commission has gone to great
pains and expense to provide club houses, which are
operated by the Young Men’s Christian Association, and of
which there are seven, located at Cristobal, Gatun, Gorgona,
Empire, Culebra, Corozal and Porto Bello. These club
houses have facilities for billiards, pool, bowling, gymnasium,
reading rooms, and also facilities for social, church and lodge
functions. Moving pictures are given in the club houses
about once a week. There is also the Isthmian Canal
Commission band, an excellent organization which gives
regular concerts at the towns throughout the Canal Zone.

In spite of the efforts which have been made, however,
it is extremely difficult to maintain a steady force on the
Isthmus. For instance in 1911, the force of employees on
the gold roll changed to the extent of sixty per cent, and
statistics show that the average length of stay of mechanics
on the Isthmus is one year. There are very few of the
original employees who went to the Isthmus in 1904 who
remained to the end of the work. Another reason for this
constant change of workmen is that the men who compose
the force are to a large extent adventurous spirits, who go
to the Canal largely to see the big enterprise and be able
to say afterward that they had a hand in its completion.

AN AMERICAN MANUFACTURING COMMUNITY

Few people realize how many different classes of work
enter into this great enterprise. The great distance between
152 THE LABOR PROBLEM

Panama and this country has necessitated the establish-
ment of an American manufacturing community with all
the facilities of an American community of the same sort,
including houses, schools, churches, club houses, municipal
improvements, such as waterworks, electric light plants, etc.
From a labor standpoint the great machine shops at Gorgona
and Empire are very interesting. These shops are equipped
to build, assemble and repair all of the machinery used in
the construction of the Canal. The raw material is pur-
chased in the United States and made into the finished
product. Locomotives, trains, dredges, etc., are purchased
in the United States, knocked down and shipped to the
Isthmus in sections, to be assembled and put into working
condition after arrival there. In many cases it is cheaper
to manufacture small articles on the Isthmus than to trans-
port them from the United States.

The item of repairs is a serious one, for the reason that
the Canal machinery is driven at a very high speed in the
effort to obtain phenomenal results. This results in fre-
quent breakage, so that the shops are ever busy with this
class of work. One plant alone, that at Gorgona, covers
twenty-two acres of ground, and has a railroad trackage of
seven miles. These shops have had to be entirely removed
before the opening of the Canal, since the rising waters of
Gatun Lake will entirely cover their location before the
eighty-five foot level is reached.

The old adage that “Necessity is the mother of inven-
tion’? has been largely demonstrated during the construc-
tion of the Canal. Gigantic obstacles have arisen, only to
be met and conquered by the ingenuity of the engineers in
charge of the work. Many clever devices have been
invented and put to practical use. Among these may be
mentioned the lock gate operating device, of which a cut and
full description will be found in the chapter on ‘‘The Plan
and Operation of the Canal.” Another extremely clever
device, which has resulted in a tremendous saving of time,
money and labor, is that known as the track shifter,
THE LABOR PROBLEM 153

invented by W. G. Bierd. This consists of a huge crane
with a long boom, which is run out upon the section of track
to be moved. Chains are attached to the rails which are
spiked to the ties, and the boom is lifted and drawn to one
side, shifting the track some three or four feet. The
machine is then moved forward and a new grip is taken on
the track farther on and the operation repeated. In this
way large sections of track may be shifted to one side in a
short space of time. The device has proved of great value,
especially on the dumps and fills where the excavated mate-
rial is deposited.

Another clever device is the unloading plow. A long
train of cars filled with earth is run to the proper unloading
point, and the plow operated by wire ropes is drawn over
the beds of the cars, pushing all the material off to the side
desired, and effecting a great saving in time and labor.

Strikes upon the Isthmus have not had great success,
for the reason that the Government considered that the
main object was to complete the Canal in the least possible
time and with the least possible trouble, holding that the
good of the nation was above any small private grievance.
To this end the Commission was given the authority to expel
anyone from the Canal Zone who was not necessary to the
work, or who became objectionable for any reason. This
was upheld by the Supreme Court, which ruled that the
Canal Zone was not a part of the United States, and there-
fore not subject to the Constitution, but could be treated
as a military reservation. Men who stirred up trouble in
the work by threatening strikes or making themselves
objectionable in any way have been promptly deported and
their places filled. The Canal Commission has directed the
work with a strong hand, as the only method of pushing
it forward to a profitable and successful conclusion.

As a matter of fact, there has been no occasion for a
strike on the Isthmus, as the sole grounds have been a desire
for more money. When it is considered that these men are
working under conditions which have been modified to an
154 THE LABOR PROBLEM

almost unreasonable extent for their ease and well being,
it is hard to see any just grounds for a strike. The men
work on an eight-hour day schedule, with an intermission
of two hours at noon. They get their food cheaper than
they could buy it in the United States, free light, water,
fuel, quarters, medical services, low railroad rates, and
their wages and salaries average from thirty to eighty per
cent more than for similar positions in the United States.
It would be hard to find a better treated body of men
from any standpoint. They are allowed an annual vaca-
tion of forty-two days for gold employees, and should they
desire they may save up this leave from year to year and
take the accumulated vacation in any one year. They are
allowed sick leave also on pay.

The net result of all this is that the work has gone for-
ward practically without any serious interruption from
labor troubles.

COMMISSARY

The problem of supplying quarters, food, clothing and
the necessaries and luxuries of life for the enormous army
of workmen at Panama has been a very considerable one.
It has, however, been worked out by the Quartermaster’s
and Subsistence Departments, which respectively have
charge of the buildings and physical property of the Com-
mission, together with the recruiting of labor, storage of the
material and supplies, and operation of the commissary
store system, which sells merchandise to canal employees at
prices but little higher than those at which the articles are
bought in quantities. In addition the Subsistence Depart-
ment has charge of operating the hotels, kitchens and messes
in which the gold and silver employees are fed. Central
stations have been established for this purpose, with huge
bakeries, refrigerating plants and storehouses.

The commissary system consists of twenty-two general
stores in as many Canal Zone villages and camps along the
relocated line of the Panama Railroad. It is estimated
IEH Plo) pue asnoyqnyo ay} uaaayaq suni
Teue) eqL MH PIOd,, St asnoyqnys ay} jo yoeq [py ysiy ayy ‘sasnoyqnys ,saasojdwa pue siaj1enb 10jayoeq 1JOjJ pasn sBurpyinq jo adAy ay} sMoUs sIyy

‘ENOZ IVNVO ‘VUGHINO AO NMOL AHL NI MIA

 

ASNOHENI1D SHSLYVNO YOWH OVE

 

biz.

 

 
THE LABOR PROBLEM 155

that with employees and their dependents there are about
65,000 people supplied daily with food, clothing and other
necessaries. The main supply station of this system is
located at Cristobal, from which a supply train of twenty-
one cars is dispatched every morning, consisting of refrig-
erator cars containing ice, meats and other perishable
articles, and ten cars containing other supplies. These
are delivered at stations along the line, and distributed to
the houses of employees by the Quartermaster’s Department.
Some idea of the volume of this business may be gained
from the fact that the purchases of this department in the
United States amount to about $12,000,000 worth of
supplies annually, which require a discharge of one
steamer each day.

The hotel branch maintains the well known Hotel
Tivoli at Ancon, together with eighteen hotels along the
line for white and gold employees, at which meals are served
at thirty cents each. At these hotels there are served
monthly about 200,000 meals. There are seventeen messes
for European laborers, who pay forty cents per ration of
three meals. There are also operated for the West Indian
laborers sixteen kitchens in which they are served by ration
of three meals for twenty-seven cents per ration. The
supplies for one month for the line hotels, messes and
kitchens cost about $85,000; labor and other expenses,
$16,500. The monthly receipts, exclusive of the revenue
of the Hotel Tivoli, amout to about $105,000.

The commissary stores have on sale a very large variety
of articles which are purchased in large quantities under
the contract system in the United States, and this business
is managed by the Government on a profit just large enough
to make both ends meet, including the costs of transporta-
tion, handling and delivering.

The commissary stores are run entirely on a charge
basis. Enployees are issued coupon books of varying face
values with which they purchase supplies. At the end of
the month the value of the coupons used is deducted from
156 THE LABOR PROBLEM

the employee’s salary. The net result of this great system
is that the employees and the Canal Commission are not
troubled by the prevailing high prices in the United States,
and are a well satisfied and contented body of men.
*SPBOI JUD UUIIAOS Burpying ut padxoydurs Ayqeyyoid ose S}IIAUOD aUOZ = ‘uOsSTId JeoIdo1, Vy

“ONIGTINd GVOU NI GANVONA SLOIANOD ANOZ UYOA AGVHOOLS OONIGNVIN

 

 
CHAPTER XI
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

During the past twenty years a wondrous transforma-
cion has taken place in the narrow strip across the Isthmus
over which the United States holds dominion, but most of
this change has been wrought since the American occupation
began. The French did a great deal of work, but it was
mainly of the pioneer sort that makes little appeal to the
eye and is fully appreciated only by the technician. Their
surveys were of incalculable value to our engineers. The
buildings and machinery which they left saved us much
trouble and expense. They dug a ditch for a few miles inland
from the Atlantic and took an enormous mass of material
out of Culebra, but the one was as a scratch in the ground,
and the other as a notch in the hill, compared with the full
extent of the necessary excavation.

The earlier period of the American tenancy was wisely
devoted to preliminary measures of the utmost importance,
but unimpressive in their immediate results. Plans were
carefully considered in detail. Organization was effected.
The railroad was reconstructed, machinery and methods
were tested. Civil government was installed. And, most
important of all, the field of action was made sanitary and
the task thereby rendered possible.

When the army engineers assumed charge of the opera-
tion, the period of preparation had just closed. The type
of the waterway and its main features had been finally
decided upon. The labor supply was assured and life on
the Isthmus involved no unusual menace to the health
of the white man. In short, the period of construction had
begun, the plans were drawn, the tools provided, the foun-

(157)
158 PLAN

AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

 

 

Cant BAB’ BEAN %
e

      
  
    

 

 

ek mon O71 e0L0
ae = CRISTOBAL iB
o ye ’
Be I coe 28
* 05]
/ e 7
7 ’
,
‘
‘ x
i Y <
;
t a ‘4
: \5
‘ a u
‘ vo
A
i SQVBOHIO \
A ‘
t
% A
) ‘
: Yh rrisores :
‘ J
i é
s PTAVERNILLA =‘
i » oe
4 \p SAN PABLO \
\ SS \
4 ‘
\ + ‘
\ y \ aw
* GORGONA Chagres
~ MATACHIN dh ‘
‘s OBISPO ;
> !
/ d '
. t
. ‘
: i
i olEMPIRE /
.
if ‘
: 6] CULEBRA :
i Y i
‘ f \
\\ ‘
‘ PPARAISO =|
4 DPEORO MIGUEL \
* ) e
) f \
‘ \ !
é t MAP OF THE
: ff oroza,. f# CANAL ZONE
. J : or > @ 8 Oe PF
e ‘
t ea ee . mee
’
Wie t
‘ WY n
¥ PANAMA +
Pp ie i
14 ocr
Cyrsrec fa nw
MAP OF THE CANAL ZONE
PEDRO MIGUEL LOCKS.

     

In the upper right hand corner are the great berm cranes used t» « urry the concrete from
the mixers to the locks,
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 159

dations laid for the magnificent superstructure which has
been built under Colonel Goethals. For this great canal is
as impressive as Niagara with its wonderful artificial can-
yon at Culebra, its great locks, dams and lakes. The
thing is stupendous in its entirety, so let us examine it in
greater detail.

The total length of the Canal, along the channel extend-
ing into the ocean at either end, is fifty and one-half miles;
the land length is ten miles less.

Approaching from the Atlantic, a vessel enters Limon
Bay by a channel 500 feet wide at bottom, and follows
this for about seven miles to Gatun. Here a flight of three
locks raises it to the summit level at an elevation of 85 feet.
The vessel may traverse the twenty-four mile stretch of
Gatun Lake at high speed in a channel varying from 1,000
to 500 feet in width. Culebra Cut is entered at Bas Obispo
and the passage of nine miles made through a channel hav-
ing a bottom width of 300 feet. At Pedro Miguel, where the
summit level ends, a lock lowers the vessel to a small lake,
with surface at about 55 feet above the level of the sea.
At a distance of about one and one-half miles beyond, the
two-flight locks of Miraflores are encountered. Through
them the vessel descends to tide-water and continues its
way to the Pacific by way of a channel eight and one-half
miles in length and 500 feet in bottom width. The depth
of the Canal throughout is forty-five feet at least, except
for the approach channel on the Atlantic side, where the
bottom will lie forty-one feet under water at mean tide.

GATUN DAM

The approximate measurements of the Gatun Dam
are: one and one-half miles in length along the crest; one-
half mile wide at the base; 400 feet wide at the water sur-
face; 100 feet wide at the top, and its crest at an elevation
of 115 feet, or 30 feet above the normal level of the lake.
The dam is formed by the flanking hills and two rock walls,
160 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

$3007

" wanoiy 040 UWA

 

    
        

SHOOT TANOIW OUdAd OL VOANOD LV ANIC AHL WOUA LOO VAdATN AO ATIIOad
$3. ' Ww

oF Le 9¢ g¢ + re 26
JousD jo Hoyog , eo

  
    

SPAND 2L£ GOL t2 AA 61"! x

aN Rig (HOH FO BPORIS Aad) SN vo
e, SoM 9 tuy dg udrpoawox? § sir :
 eewy Ape : ¢
Mo 4e XZ F904

2¢6aM07 ... 3

 

 

avoxd ¥

        

\
PANN

SPA ND 08 EIR 02

CMM

900, 3

Nee

uN

MTT)
SSKMMTOMTTT NY
SOMO

‘oo

Z|
A
3G

woe
PAM ae

 

 
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 161

enclosing a mixture of sand and clay. The top and upstream
slopes are heavily riprapped.

The spillway is a concrete-lined opening, 1,200 feet long
and 300 feet wide, cut through a hill in the center of the dam,
the bottom of the opening being ten feet above sea level.
During the construction of the dam, all the water discharged
from the Chagres River and its tributaries was carried
through this opening. After construction had sufficiently
advanced to permit the lake to be formed, the spillway was
closed with a concrete dam, fitted with gates and machinery
for regulating the water level of the lake, as described below.

The water level of Gatun Lake, extending through the
Culebra Cut, is maintained at the south end by an earth
dam connecting the locks at Pedro Miguel with the high
ground to the westward, about 1,700 feet long, with its crest
at an elevation 105 feet above mean tide.

The small lake between the locks at Pedro Miguel and
Miraflores is formed by dams connecting the walls of the
locks at the latter point with the high ground on either side.
The dam to the westward is of earth, about 2,700 feet long,
having its crest about 15 feet above the surface of Mira-
flores Lake. The east dam is of concrete, about 500 feet in
length, and forms a spillway for the lake, with crest gates
similar to those of the Gatun Dam.

Lake Gatun covers an area of 164 square miles, with a
depth in the ship channel varying from 85 to 45 feet. The
channel through the lake for the first 16 miles from Gatun
is 1,000 feet in width; for the next four miles it is 800 feet,
and for the remainder of the distance 500 feet wide. The
summit level of the lake extends through the cut and to
the Pedro Miguel Locks.

SPILLWAY, GATUN DAM

The Spillway is a concrete lined channel 1,200 feet
long and 285 feet wide cut through a hill of rock nearly
jn the center of the Dam, the bottom being 10 feet above

11
162 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

 

GATUN DAM, SPILLWAY AND LOCKS.
 

 

 

 

GATUN UPPER LOCKS, EAST CHAMBER.

The view is looking north from the forebay showing the upper guard gates and emergency dam.
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 163

sea level at the upstream end and sloping to sea level at the
toe. Across the upstream or lake opening of this channel.
a concrete dam has been built in the form of an arc of a
circle making its length 808 feet, although it closes a channel
with a width of only 285 feet. The crest of the dam is
69 feet above sea level, or 16 feet below the normal level of
the lake which is 85 feet above sea level. On the top of this
dam have been placed 13 concrete piers with their tops 115.5
feet above sea level, and between these there are mounted
regulating gates of the Stoney type. Each gate is built of
steel sheathing on a framework of girders and moves up and
down on roller trains placed in niches in the piers. They have
been equipped with sealing devices to make them water-tight.
Machines for moving the gates are designed to raise or lower
them in approximately ten minutes. The highest level to
which it is intended to allow the lake to rise is 87 feet above
sea level, and it is probable that this level will be maintained
continuously during wet seasons. With the lake at that
elevation, the regulation gates will permit of a discharge
of water greater than the maximum known discharge of the
Chagres River during a flood.

HYDROELECTRIC STATION AT GATUN

Adjacent to the north wall of the spillway has been
located a hydroelectric station capable of generating through
turbines 6,000 kilowatts for the operation of the lock machin-
ery, machineshops, dry dock, coalhandlingplant, batteries, and
for the lighting of the locks and Zone towns and, if desirable,
operating the Panamarailroad. The building is constructed
of concrete and steel, and is of a design suitable for a
permanent power house in a tropical country. The dimen-
sions are such as to permit the installation of three 2,000-
kilowatt units, and provision is made for a future exten-
sion of three additional similar units. It is rectangular
in shape, and contains one main operating floor, with a
turbine pit and two galleries for electrical equipment. The
i164 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

building, with machinery and electrical equipment has been
laid out upon the unit principle, each unit consisting of

aN
iN
ae

Pp

 

 

32) =

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.250 k w. water turbine

2,000.k. w. generator a

Reactance. ‘ a ae
eneretor instrument trensfor

— Generator switches ee

Bus 4

- Bus2.

~ Circuit switches

- Circuit instrument transformers

— First gallery (eh +4085)

~ Second gailery (el. + 55.35)

- Main floor (el. + 33.25)

~ Low water (el. ¢ 7)

petee ton: crane

Cable t Vault.
Draft Tube.

 

Ow>
ae

see aan

penvOz

oovE

THE HYDROELECTRIC STATION AT GATUN.

an individual head gate, penstock, governor, exciter, oil-
switch and control panel.

Water supply is taken from Gatun Lake, the elevation
of which will vary with the seasons from 80 to 87 feet
above sea level, through a forebay which is constructed
 
*soyes JOMO] pur /

 

‘SHOOT TANOIN OUCAd

 

 

 
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 165

as an integral part of the curved portion of the north spill-
way approach wall. From the forebay the water is
carried to the turbines through three steel plate penstocks,
each having an average length of 350 feet. The entrances
are closed by cast iron headgates and bar iron trash racks.
The headgates are raised and lowered by individual
motors which are geared to rising stems attached to the
gate castings. The driving machinery and the motors
have been housed in a small concrete gatehouse erected upon
the forebay wall directly over the gate recesses and trash
racks. The gate house has been constructed for the present
requirements of three head gates, and provision made for a
future addition of three more units.

WATER SUPPLY OF GATUN LAKE

Gatun Lake impounds the waters of a basin compris-
ing 1,320 square miles. (See Map, p. 162.) When the surface
of the water is at 85 feet above sea level, the lake will have
an area of about 164 square miles, and will contain about
183 billion cubic feet of water. During eight or nine months
of the year, the lake will be kept constantly full by the pre-
vailing rains, and consequently a surplus will need to be
stored for only three or four months of the dry season. The
smallest run-off of water in the basin during the past 22 years,
as measured at Gatun, was that of the fiscal year, 1912,
which was about 132 billion cubic feet. Previous to that
year the smallest run-off of record was 146 billion cubic feet.
In 1910 the run-off was 360 billion cubic feet, or a sufficient
quantity to fill the lake one and a half times. The low
record of 1912 is of interest as showing the effect which a
similar dry season, occurring after the opening of the Canal,
would have upon its capacity for navigation. Assuming
that Gatun Lake was at elevation plus 87 at the beginning
of the dry season on December Ist, and that the hydro-
electric plant at the Gatun Spillway was in continuous opera-
tion, and that 48 lockages a day were being made, the eleva-
166 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

tion of the lake would be reduced to its lowest point, plus
79.5, on May 7th, at the close of the dry season, after which

 

Wee. Hoes wore
ees Seen eeewee we one= =

  
   
 

 

g

$s
SS SM
“e ew My y

l--°
'

prsccrcetece
7s IMO

 

 

Courtesy of “The Panama Guide™

GATUN DAM SPILLWAY.

it would continuously rise. With the water at plus 79 in
Gatun Lake there would be 39 feet of water in Culebra
“se Buty 8Y},UO JYAIOA Oavs OF PLOY TTA Adyy JeYY OS SIOqUIBYO IVE YYLA\ 4]ING ae PUB Yowa suo3 YEL OF YO" Wo] YSi9as soje3 9Sny asoyy

‘NOILONULSNOD ONTYAG NOALVO LV SALVD WOOT LVAAD AHL

 
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 167

Cut, which would be ample for
navigation. The water surface of
the lake will be maintained during
the rainy season at 87 feet above
sea level, making the minimum
channel depth in the Canal 47
feet. As navigation can be carried
on with about 39 feet of water,
there will be stored for the dry
season surplus over 7 feet of water.
Making due allowance for evapora-
tion, seepage, leakage at the gates,
and power consumption, this would
be ample for 41 passages daily
through the locks, using them at
full length, or about 58 lockages a
day when partial length is used,
as would be usually the case, and
when cross filling from one leck to
the other through the central wall
is employed. This would be a
larger number of lockages than
would be possible in a single day.
The average number of lockages
through the Sault Ste. Marie Canal
on the American side was 39 per
day in the season of navigation of
1910, which was about eight months
long. The average number of
ships passed was about 13 per lock-
age. The freight carried was about
26,000,000 tons. The Suez Canal
passed about 12 vessels per day,
with a total tonnage for the same
year of 16,582,000.

The water level of Gatun
Lake, extending through the Cul-

‘NOILVAT1E TAVI ONLMOHS WVAOVIA

aol
a Aire
ys Ni
2 i
sg 6
a Wie
YU 1a >
WEES
fdatans'! 3

    
  

LS

ne
Ss

$e,
LA,

 

 

ey w CCIE

(JPOTEY So paw HF-OF (PUP {0 yj6us7;ery

    

tt

   

Sop BEY
SYP] SANE.

fueuss Of

 
168 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

ebra Cut, is maintained at the southern end by an earth
dam connecting the locks at Pedro Miguel with the high
ground to the westward, about 1,400 feet long, with its
crest at an elevation of 105 feet above mean tide. A concrete
core wall, containing about 700 cubic yards, connects
the locks with the hills to the eastward; this core wall rest-
ing directly on the rock surface and being designed to pre-
vent percolation through the earth, the surface of which is
above the Lake level.

A small lake between the locks at Pedro Miguel and
Miraflores has been formed by dams connecting the walls
of Miraflores locks with the high ground on either side. The
dam to the westward is of earth, about 2,700 feet long,
having its crest about 15 feet above the water in Miraflores
Lake. The east dam is of concrete, containing about
75,000 cubic yards, about 500 feet in length, and forms
a spillway for Miraflores Lake, with crest gates similar to
those at the Spillway of the Gatun Dam.

THE LOCKS

There are twelve locks in the Canal, all in duplicate;
three pairs in flight at Gatun, with a combined lift of 85 feet;
one pair at Pedro Miguel, with a lift of 303 feet; and two
pairs at Miraflores, with a total lift of 543 feet at mean tide.
The dimensions of all are the same—a usable length of 1,000
feet, and a usable breadth of 110 feet. Each lock is a
chamber, with walls and floor of concrete, and water-tight
gates at each end.

The side walls are 45 to 50 feet thick at the surface
of the floor; they are perpendicular on the face, and narrow
from a point 244 feet above the floor, until they are eight
feet wide at the top. The middle wall is 60 feet thick and
81 feet high, with vertical faces. At a point 424 feet above
the surface of the floor, and 15 feet above the top of the
middle culvert, this wall divides into two parts, leaving a
U-shaped space down the center, which is 19 feet broad at
*99e3 OY) Butsoyo Jo BSutusdo ur sjzpnsos suvo
PPOYAs ]]NG OY} BULATOAoL Jey} Os YHIjs V JO SuvouT Aq WY oy} UO ov

   

|,, B SB UMOUy ‘jooym 1e9B yeaId oy]

“AUANIHOVAW ONILVUAMO ALVO ADOT "KON ‘poonsspuyn »Y poonsspuy ‘ydoibojoyg

 

Se MIA

 

 

 
‘nys Io uado AJartjua st aayeA ay} UaYyAi IOJOU 3y} sdoys pue sa

Mod ay} YO sinys ATTeoewWO Ne YyoIAs yu] PYL "SHOOT JO sjas va1yy ayy Jo yoea uo
uo}j}e4s Surjesodo Je1jUId B WoIZ pal]orjuos oie saayea IV

“SYIO] 94} OF} IozyeAr jo AOY 9} ayerndes O} posn 318 Yor AUBUL jo 9u0 St esulyoeul SIU

‘HOLLAS LIWII GNVY YOLOW ‘ANIHOVA AATVA TVOIMQNIIAO V

 

 

 
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 169

the bottom and 44 feet broad at the top. In this space is
a tunnel, divided into three stories or galleries. The low-
est of these divisions is for drainage; the middle for the
wires that will carry the electric current to operate the gate
and valve machinery, which is installed in the central wall,
and the upper division forms a passage-way for the oper-
ators. The lock chambers are filled and emptied through

|

 

 

 

 

I

 

 

F

 

 

HC ea ay

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

L VV:

ey

OLS

 

 

 

 

COMPARISON BETWEEN SIDE WALL OF LOCK AND A
SIX STORY BUILDING.

lateral culverts in the floors, connecting with main culverts,
18 feet in diameter in the walls, the water flowing in and
out by gravity.

The lock gates are steel structures, seven feet thick,
65 feet long, and from 47 to 82 feet high. They weigh
from 300 to 600 tons each. Ninety-two leaves are required
for the several locks, the total weighing 57,000 tons. Inter-
mediate gates are being used, in order to save water and
time, and permit of the division of each lock into two
170 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

chambers, respectively, 600 and 400 feet long. In the
construction of the locks there were used 4,500,000 cubic
yards of concrete, which required about the same number
of barrels of cement.

The time spent in filling and emptying a lock aver-
ages about fifteen minutes, without opening the valves so
suddenly as to create disturbing currents in the locks or
approaches. The time required to pass a vessel through
all the locks is estimated at 3 hours; one hour and a half
in the three locks at Gatun, and about the same time in
the three locks on the Pacific side. The time of passage
of a vessel through the entire Canal is estimated as ranging
from 10 to 12 hours, according to the size of the ship, and
the rate of speed at which it can travel, since the twenty-
four mile passage of Gatun Lake may be made at full
speed.

GATE-MOVING MACHINERY

The machinery for opening and closing the miter gates
was invented in the office of the Assistant Chief Engineer
by Edward Schildhauer. It consists essentially of a crank
gear, to which is fastened one end of a strut or connecting
rod, the other end of which is fastened to a lock gate. The
wheel moves through an arc of 197 degrees, closes or opens
the gate leaf, according to the direction in which it is turned.
One operation takes 2 minutes. The crank gear is a com-
bination of gear and crank, is constructed of cast steel, is
19 feet 2 inches in diameter, and weighs approximately
35,000 pounds. It is mounted in a horizontal position on
the lock wall, turns on a large center pin, and is supported
at the rim in four places by rollers. The center pin is
keyed into a heavy casting anchored securely to the con-
crete. The crank-gear has gear teeth on its rim and is
driven through a train of gears and pinions by an electric
motor in a contiguous room. The motor is remotely con-
trolled by an operator who is stationed at a center control
house near the lower end of the upper locks. <A simple
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 171

Cate

ae qe ew cece eos om — >> | a See eee ew ee

am 0 ro ¢ of Phe Bese

GATE MOVING MACHINERY.

This shows the relation of the bull wheel to strut and gate. A. Strut or connecting rod,

Ta wee ee we we ee ee ee eee

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

B. Bed plate. C. Bearing wheel.
172 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

pull of a small switch is sufficient to either close or open
a 700-ton gate, the operation being perfectly automatic.

No ship is allowed to pass through the locks under its
own power, but is towed through by electric locomotives
operating on tracks on the lock walls. The system of
towing provides for the passing through the locks of a
ship at the rate of 2 miles an hour. The number of loco-
motives varies with the size of the vessel. The usual num-
ber required is 4: 2 ahead, 1 on each wall, imparting motion
to the vessel, and 2 astern, 1 on each wall, to aid in keep-
ing the vessel in a central position and to bring it to rest
when entirely within the lock chamber. They are equipped
with a slip drum, towing windlass and hawser which per-
mits the towing line to be taken in or paid out without
actual motion of the locomotive on the track. The loco-
motives run on a level, except when in passing from one
lock to another they climb heavy grades. There are two
systems of tracks: one for towing, and the other for the
return of the locomotives when not towing. The towing
tracks have center racks or cogs throughout, and the loco-
motives always operate on this rack when towing. At
the incline between locks the return tracks also have rack
rails, but elsewhere the locomotives run by friction. The
only crossovers between the towing and return tracks are
at each end of the locks, and there are no switches in the
rack rail.

PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Several protective devices have been used to safeguard
the gates in the locks.

First. Fender chains, 24 in number, each weighing
24,098 pounds, have been placed on the up-stream side of
the guard gates, intermediate and safety gates of the upper
locks, and in front of the guard gates at the lower end of
each flight of locks. They prevent the lock gates from
being rammed by a ship that might approach the gates
under its own steam or by escaping from the towing loco-
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Photograph, Underwoud & Underwood, N.Y.
BERM CRANES AT MIRAFLORES.
These great cranes, which are movable on the tracks at the bottom of the picture,

carry electric trolleys which transport the concrete from the mixers to the desired
point on the lock walls.
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 178

motives. In operation, the chain is stretched across the
lock chamber from the top of the opposing walls, and when
it is desired to allow a ship to pass, the chain is lowered
into a groove made for the purpose in the lock floor. It
is raised again after the ship passes. The raising and lower-
ing is accomplished from both sides by mechanism mounted
in chambers or pits in the lock walls. This mechanism
consists of a hydraulically operated system of cylinders,
so that 1 foot of movement by the cylinder accomplishes
4 feet by the chain. If a ship exerting a pressure of more
than 750 pounds to the square inch should run into the
fender, the chain is paid out gradually by an automatic
release until the vessel comes to a stop. Thus, a 10,000-
ton ship, running at 4 knots an hour, after striking the
fender can be brought to a stop within 73 feet, which is
less than the distance which separates the chain from the
gate.

Second. Double gates have been provided at the en-
trances to all the locks and at the lower end of the upper
lock in each flight, the guard gate of each pair protecting
the lower gate from ramming by a ship which might pos-
sibly get away from the towing locomotives and break
through the fender chain.

Third. A dam of the movable type called an emer-
gency dam has been placed in the head bay above the
upper locks of each flight for the purpose of checking the
flow of water through the locks in case of damage, or in
case it is necessary to make repairs, or to do any work
in the locks which necessitates the shutting off of all water
from the lake levels. Each dam is constructed on a steel
truss bridge of the cantilever type, pivoted on the side
wall of the lock approach, and when not in use rests on
the side wall parallel to the channel. When the dam is
used, the bridge is swung across the channel with its end
resting on the center wall of the lock. <A series of wicket
girders hinged to this bridge are then lowered into the
channel with their ends resting in iron pockets embedded
174 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

in the lock floor. After the girders have been lowered into
place, they afford runways for gates which can be let
down one at a time, closing the spaces between the wicket
girders. These gates form a horizontal tier spanning the
width of the Canal and damming the water to a height of
10 feet. Another series of panels is then lowered, and so
on until the dam, constructed from the bottom upward,
completely closes the channel. When the dam has checked
the main flow, the remainder, due to the clearance between
the vertical sides of the gates, may be checked by driving
steel pipes between the sides of the adjacent panels. These
dams are operated in three movements, and the machinery
for operating is, therefore, in three classes, gate-moving,
raising and lowering the wicket girders, and hoisting the
gates on the girders, all driven by electric motors.

CAISSON GATES

To permit examining, cleaning, painting, and repairing
the lower guard gates of the locks, and the Stoney gates
of the Spillway dam, and for access in the dry to the sills
of the emergency dams, there have been provided floating
caisson gates of the molded ship type. When their use is
required the caissons are towed into position in the fore-
bay of the upper lock, above the emergency dam, or between
the piers of the Spillway, and sunk. The caissons are
equipped with electric motor driven pumps for use in
pumping out the caissons and for unwatering the locks.

ELECTRIC CONTROL OF LOCK MACHINERY

The gates, valves, and fender chains of the locks are
operated by electricity, and remotely controlled from a
central point; that is, there is a central control station for
each of the series of locks at Gatun, Pedro Miguel, and
Miraflores. In passing a ship through the locks it is neces-
sary to open and close the miter gates weighing from 380
to 730 tons, to fill and empty lock chambers containing
‘o¢-+ UOIzeAsTa
ye IO ‘JeUBD 94} JO WO}}0q 9} MWOJAq aay QI JNO” SI [eUvS aSeUTeIP 9Y} Ul Joye AY *yMd ay} JO TWO}}0q 9Y} UO Bulpurys div [aAoys pue UleI}] OY,

‘VOGNVD UVAN ANVA LSVA NI GNdd WOU HLAOS ONIMOOT LOO vaso

 

 
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 175

from three and one half to five million cubic feet of water,
to raise and lower fender chains weighing 24,098 pounds
each, and to tow the vessel through the locks. All these
operations, except that of towing, are controlled by one
man at a switchboard.

The control system for Gatun Locks is typical. Water
is let into the lock chambers or withdrawn from them by
means of culverts under the lock floors, which connect
with larger culverts in the lock walls, through which water
is carried from the higher to the lower levels. The main
supply culverts are 18 feet in diameter, and the flow of
water through them is controlled by rising-stem gate valves,
which can be completely opened or closed in one minute.
In the center wall the culvert feeds both lock chambers,
and therefore at each outlet into the lateral culverts there
is a valve of the cylindrical type, in order that water may
be let into or withdrawn from either chamber at will. A
complete opening or closing of these cylindrical valves
takes ten seconds. The miter gates are never opened or
closed with a head of water on either side of them, the
chambers being first emptied or filled by means of the
valve and culvert system. The time required either to
open or close the miter gate is two minutes.

A ship to be raised to the lake level comes to a full
stop in the forebay of the lower lock, prepared to be towed
through one of the duplicate locks by electric towing loco-
motives. The water in the lower lock chamber is equalized
with the sea level channel, after which the miter gates are
opened, the fender chain lowered and the vessel passed
into the first chamber, where the water is at sea level.
Then the miter gates are closed. The rising stem gate valves
at the outlet of the main culverts are closed, while those
above are opened, allowing water to flow from an upper
level into the lower chamber, which, when filled, raises the
vessel 284 feet, to the second level. This operation is
repeated in the middle and upper locks until the ship has
been raised to the full height of 85 feet above the level of
176 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

the sea. At Gatun, in the passing of a large ship through
the locks, it is necessary to lower 4 fender chains, operate
6 pairs of miter gates and force them to miter, open and
close 8 pairs of rising stem gate valves for the main supply
culverts, and 30 cylindrical valves. In all, no less than
98 motors are set in motion twice during each lockage of
a single ship, and this number may be increased to 1438,
dependent upon the previous condition of the gates, valves
and other devices.

Each gate leaf, valve, and fender chain is operated by
a separate motor mounted near the machinery in chambers
in the lock wall, the motors acting through suitable gears
(or pump in the fender chain) upon the various machines.
In each machinery chamber is erected a starting panel
containing contactors by which current will be applied
to the motor and these panels are in turn controlled from
a main unit in the central control house. Some of the
machinery chambers at Gatun are 2,700 feet distant from
the point of control; 90 per cent of them are within 2,000
feet, and 50 per cent of the total within 1,200 feet.

The station from which control is exercised over the
movement of all the machines is on the center wall at the
lower end of the upper flight of locks at Gatun, and similarly
placed at Pedro Miguel and Miraflores. It is in a building
raised high enough above the top of the wall to allow a
towing locomotive to pass under, a height of 16 feet, and
to command an uninterrupted view of every part of the
locks. In this house is a double control board duplicated
to conform to the duplication in locks. The control board
is in the nature of a bench or table, 32 inches above the
floor, containing a representation, part model and part
diagrammatic, of the flight of locks controlled by the
respective series of switches. Standing at his switchboard
the operator throws the switches, and sees before him in
model or diagram the progress of the fender chains as they
rise and fall, the movement of the miter gates inch by inch,
the opening and closing of the gate valves in the main cul-
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 177

verts at every stage, the operation of the cylindrical valves,
and, in addition, indication of the gradual rise or fall of the
water in the lock chambers. The switches controlling the
various motors, together with their indicators, are mounted
upon the board in the same relative position as the machines
themselves in the lock walls. Some distortion of scale will
be allowed, to give room for the switches. The board is
not over 4 feet in width, in order that the operator may
be able to reach beyond the middle of it, and the length
of the board is limited to 30 feet at Gatun, and proportion-
ally at the other locks.

The system is interlocking, so that certain motors can
not be started in a certain direction until other motors are
operated in a proper manner to obtain consistent operation
on the whole, and to avoid any undesirable or dangerous
combinations in the positions of valves, gates, or fender
chains. In this way and by the use of limit switches the
factor of the personal equation in operating the machines
is reduced to a minimum, almost mechanical accuracy
being obtained. Before the operating pair of valves in the
main culverts can be opened, at least one pair of valves
at the other ends of the locks, both upstream and down-
stream, must first be closed. This limits an operator to
the act of equalizing water levels between locks, and keeps
him from allowing water to flow from, say the lake level
to the middle lock past the upper lock, thus preventing a
possible flooding of the lock walls and machinery rooms.
Interlocks, devoted to the control of action between the
gate valves in the main culverts and the miter gates, pre-
vent valves being opened a lock length above or below a
miter gate which is being opened or closed, and thus prevent
an operator causing a flow of water while the miter gates
are being moved. Interlocks for the cylindrical valves
guarding the openings from the center wall culvert to the
lateral culverts keep those of one side or the other closed
at all times, except when it is desired to cross-fill the cham-
bers, when they may be opened by special procedure. An
178 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

interlock prevents the operator from starting to open a
miter gate before unlocking the miter-forcing machine.
The miter gates guarded by a fender chain must be opened
before the chain can be lowered, and the chain must be
raised again before the gate can be closed, or more exactly
the switches must be thrown in this order, but the opera-
tions may proceed at the same time. The simple inter-
locks will prevent such a mistake as leaving the chain down
through lapse of memory when it should be up to protect
the gate.

LIGHTING THE CANAL

The general scheme of lighting and buoying the Canal
includes the use of range lights to establish direction on
the longer tangents and of side lights spaced about 1 mile
apart to mark each side of the channel. The range lights
are omitted in Culebra Cut, where their use is hardly
practicable, and on four of the shorter tangents on the
remainder of the Canal. In the Cut have been: placed
three beacons at each angle, and between these inter-
mediate beacons in pairs on each side of the Canal. By
keeping his ship pointed midway between these beacons,
the pilot is able to adhere closely to the center of the Canal.
At each tangent it is necessary to have two ranges of two
lights each to prolong the sailing line in order that the
pilot may hold his course up to the point of turning. These
range lights will be situated on land. There are three
types, all of reinforced concrete. The more elaborate struc-
tures are used on the Gatun locks and dam and in the
Atlantic and Pacific Divisions, where they are closer to the
sailing lines of the vessels, while simpler structures have
been placed in the Gatun Lake, where they are under less
close observation. A light and fog signal on the west break-
water in Limon Bay is also included. The illuminants are
gas and electricity, the latter being used whenever the
light is sufficiently accessible. For the floating buoys, and
for the towers and beacons which are in inaccessible places,
 

4

if.

lamaueiail

 

 

 

 

THE FRONT TOWER ON APPROACH WALL OF GATUN LOCKS.

These range lights are used to guide ships in the channel of Gatun Lake and aid them in
teaching the entrance to the locks at night.
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 179

the system using compressed acetylene dissolved in acetone
has been adopted. The buoys are composed of a cylindrical
floating body or tank, surmounted by a steel frame which
supports the lens at a height of about 15 feet above the
water level. The buoys are moored in position along the
edge of the dredged channel by a heavy chain and a con-
crete sinker, and should remain lighted for six to twelve
months without being recharged. The candlepower of the
range lights varies according to the length of the range,
from about 2,500 to 15,000 candlepower. The most
powerful lights are those marking the sea channels at the
Atlantic and Pacific entrances, they being visible from about
12 to 18 nautical miles. The beacons and gas-buoy lights
will have about 850 candlepower. White lights will be
used throughout, and, in order to eliminate the possibility
of confusing the lights with one another and with the lights
on shore, all range lights, beacons, and buoys will have
individual characteristics formed by flashes and combina-
tions of flashes of light and dark intervals.

EXCAVATION

The total excavation, dry and wet, for the Canal as
originally planned, was estimated at 103,795,000 cubic
yards, in addition to the excavation by the French com-
panies. Changes in the plan of the Canal, made subse-
quently by order of the President, increased the amount
to 174,666,594 cubic yards. Of this amount, 89,794,493
cubic yards were to be taken from the Central Division,
which includes the Culebra Cut. In July, 1910, a further
increase of 7,871,172 cubic yards was made, of which
7,330,525 cubic yards were to allow for slides in Culebra
Cut, for silting in the Chagres section, and for lowering the
bottom of the Canal from 40 to 39 feet above sea level in
the Chagres section. These additions increased the esti-
mated total excavation to 182,537,766 cubic yards. In
1911, a further increase of 12,785,613 cubic yards was made,
180 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

of which 5,257,281 cubic yards was for slides in Culebra
Cut, and the remainder for additional excavation and
silting in the Atlantic and Pacific entrances, raising the
grand total of estimated excavation to 195,323,379 cubic
yards. In 1912 an increase of 17,180,621 cubic yards was
made, of which 3,545,000 cubic yards was for slides in
Culebra Cut and the remainder for dredging excavation
at Gatun locks, silting in the Atlantic entrance, and for the
Balboa terminals, and in 1913 came a still further increase
of 20,126,000 cubic yards, of which 9,067,000 cubic yards
was due to slides and breaks in Culebra Cut, bringing the
grand total of estimated excavation to 232,353,000 cubic
yards. Deducting Balboa terminal excavation, the total
for the Canal proper, according to the estimate of 1913,
is about 223,559,000 cubic yards, or nearly double the
amount of the original estimate made in the minority
report of the International Board of Consulting Engineers
in 1906. The points of deepest excavation are in Culebra
Cut, 495 feet above the bottom of the Canal at Gold Hill,
and 364 feet above at Contractor’s Hill opposite. The
widest part of the Cut is opposite the town of Culebra,
where owing to the action of slides on both banks, the top
width is about half a mile. Active excavation work on a
large scale did not begin until 1907, when 15,765,290 cubic
yards were removed. In 1908, over 37,000,000 cubic yards
were removed, and in 1909, over 35,000,000 making a total
for the two years of over 72,000,000 yards, or a monthly
average for those two years of 3,000,000 cubic yards. In
1910, 31,437,000 cubic yards were removed; in 1911, 31,-
603,000; in 1912, 30,269,000; and to July 1, 1913, 18,324,-
637 cubic yards, including both wet and dry excavation,
and leaving a total of 25,748,051 yet to be taken out.

SLIDES AND BREAKS

There have been in all 26 slides and breaks in Culebra
Cut; 17 covered areas varying from 1 to 75 acres and 9
   

  

*poXosjsap Udy JBUB JO WO }Oq ayy UC
dy} Jo ainssaid ay} }eY} pajoodxa si yr ynq t

 

1 aL ooul 2) AY} JOJ St
TIva YXaNO darand THAOHS WVaALS

 

 

 

 
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 181

covered areas of less than 1 acre each, making in all a total
of 225 acres. One variety of slide is caused by the slipping
of the top layer of clay and earth on a smooth sloping sur-
face of a harder material. The largest slide of this character
is that known as Cucaracha on the east bank of the Canal
just south of Gold Hill. This gave the first French com-
pany trouble during the final years of its operations. It
first gave the Americans trouble in 1905, and between that
date and July 1, 1918, over 12,000,000 cubic yards of
material were removed from the Canal because of it. It
broke nearly 1,900 feet back from the axis of the Canal
and covers an area of 47 acres. Another variety of slide,
properly called break, is due to the steepness of the slopes
and the great pressure of the superincumbent material upon
the underlying layers of softer material. The largest slide
or break of this type is on the west side of the Cut at
Culebra just north of Contractor’s Hill and covers an area
of 75 acres. Over 7,000,000 cubic yards of material have
been removed from this slide. On the east side of the Cut
a similar slide covers an area of about 50 acres, breaking
back about 1,300 feet from the center of the Canal. About
a half million cubic yards have been taken out of this slide
and more remains to be removed. It is estimated that the
total amount of material removed from the Canal because
of the slides will aggregate between 21,000,000 and 22,000,-
000 cubic yards.

DRILLING AND BLASTING

Most of the material excavated in Culebra Cut has
consisted of rock varying from very soft, which readily
disintegrates on exposure to the atmosphere, to very dense
rock of great hardness. It has been necessary before
excavating this material to drill and blast it. Two kinds
of drills have been used—tripod and well—both obtaining
their power from a 10-inch compressed air main on the
west bank of the Cut which is supplied by three batteries of
182 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

air compressors placed at equal distances along the 9 miles
of the Cut. The usual depth of drill holes has been about
27 feet, three feet deeper than the steam shovels have
excavated. The drill holes, placed about 14 feet apart,
are loaded with 45 per cent potassium nitrate dynamite in
quantities depending upon the character of the rock, and
are connected in parallel and fired by means of a current
from an electric light plant. The maximum number of
drills in use at any one time in Culebra Cut was 377, of
which 221 were tripod and 156 well. With these over 90
miles of holes have been drilled in a single month. A
pound of dynamite has been used to about every 23 cubic
yards of material blasted, and the quantity used in Culebra
Cut during several years has averaged about 6,000,000
pounds a year.

CAPACITY OF STEAM SHOVELS AND DIRT TRAINS

There have been several classes of steam shovels engaged
in excavating work, equipped with dippers ranging in
capacity from 13 cubic yards to 5 cubic yards, and a trench-
ing shovel, which has a dipper with a capacity of { of a
cubic yard. In Culebra Cut excavation the 5-yard dippers
have been used almost entirely.

Each cubic yard, place measurement, of average rock
weighs about 3,900 pounds; of earth, about 3,000 pounds;
of ‘‘the run of the Cut,” about 3,600 pounds, and is said to
represent about a two-horse cart load. Consequently, a
five cubic yard dipper, when full, carries 8.7 tons of rock,
6.7 tons of earth, and 8.03 tons of ‘‘the run of the Cut.”

Three classes of cars were used in hauling spoil—flat
cars with one high side, which were unloaded by plows
weighing from 14 to 16 tons, operated by a cable upon a
winding drum, and two kinds of dump cars, one large and
one small. The capacity of the flat cars is 19 cubic yards;
that of the large dump cars 17 cubic yards, and that of the
small dump cars, 10 cubic yards. The flat car train was
 

 

 

 

 

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ON A GIANT STEAM SHOVEL.

During his visit to the Isthmus, while President, Mr. Roosevelt dispensed with ceremony,
went among the men, talking and eating withthem. In this way he obtained a very intimate
knowledge of the great enterprise. His visit marked the first occasion upon which a President
of the United States left the country during his term of office.
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 183

ordinarily composed of 20 cars in hauling from the cut at
Pedro Miguel, and 21 cars in hauling from the cut at
Matachin. The large dump train was composed of 27
cars, and the small dump train of 35 cars.

The average load of a train of flat cars, in hauling the
mixed material known as ‘‘the run of the Cut,” was 610.7
tons (based on a 20-car train); of a train of large dump
cars, 737.68 tons, and of a train of small dumps, 562.5 tons.

The average time consumed in unloading a train of flat
cars was from 7 to 15 minutes; in unloading a train of large
dump cars, 15 to 40 minutes; and in unloading a train of
small dump cars, 6 to 56 minutes. The large dump cars
were operated by compressed air power furnished by the
air pump of the locomotive, while the small dump cars
were operated by hand.

The record day’s work for one steam shovel was that of
March 22, 1910, 4,823 cubic yards of rock (place measure-
ment), or 8,395 tons. The highest daily record in the
Central Division was on March 11, 1911, when 51 steam
shovels and 2 cranes equipped with orange peel baskets
excavated an aggregate of 79,484 cubic yards, or 127,742
tons. During this day, 333 loaded trains and as many
empty trains were run to and from the dumping grounds.

The greatest number of shovels in use at one time in the
Cut was 43, and the greatest monthly excavation in any
single month, in the Cut, was obtained in March, 1911,
when 1,728,748 cubic yards of material, mostly rock, were
excavated.

To handle this amount of material required the services
of 115 locomotives and 2,000 cars, giving about 160 loaded
trains per day to the dumps, which on the average were
about 12 miles distant, the haul one way varying from
about one mile to 33 miles. To serve properly the trains
and shovels employed in excavation work in the Cut,
although it is less than nine miles in length, about 100
miles of track have been required, or an average of over
nine parallel tracks at all points,
184 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

BREAKWATERS

Breakwaters have been constructed at the Atlantic and
Pacific entrances of the Canal. That in Limon Bay, or
Colon harbor, extends into the bay from Toro Point at an
angle of 42° and 53’ northward from a base line drawn from
Toro Point to Colon light, and is 10,500 feet in length, or
11,700 feet, including the shore connection, with a width
at the top of fifteen feet and a height above mean sea level
of ten feet. The width at the bottom depends largely on
the depth of water. It contains approximately 2,840,000
cubic yards of rock, the core being formed of rock quarried
on the mainland near Toro Point, armored with hard rock
from Porto Bello. The purpose of the breakwaters is to
convert Limon Bay into a safe anchorage, to protect ship-
ping in the harbor of Colon, and vessels making the north
entrance to the Canal, from the violent northers that are
likely to prevail from October to January, and to reduce to
a minimum the amount of silt that may be washed into the
dredged channel.

The breakwater at the Pacific entrance extends from
Balboa to Naos Island, a distance of about 17,000 feet, or
a little more than three miles. It lies from 900 to 2,700 feet
east of and, for the greater part of the distance, nearly
parallel to the axis of the Canal prism; varies from 20 to
40 feet in height above mean sea level, and is from 50 to
3,000 feet wide at the top. It contains about 18,000,000
cubic yards of earth and rock, all of which was brought
from Culebra Cut. It was constructed for a two-fold pur-
pose; first to divert cross currents that would carry soft
material from the shallow harbor of Panama into the Canal
channel; second, to furnish rail connection between the
islands and the mainland.

CHANGE OF LOCATION OF LOCKS

A brief explanatory review of the changes referred to
may facilitate a clear understanding of the final plan.
\ *s]iv1 B09 uo uns s10j0UI BulMo} 9Y} YOIYA UMOP puv dn spaaa] JUaIBYIP Jo SHOT
wo oulpuy ‘YY ‘Aep se ayes se yystu ye uolzesodo 9YVUE [IM SYOO] OY} JO Sapis ]]v uO SYS] jo MOL V *s]YSI] O14z09]9 OJ poyooda aq [ILM sysod ayaiouCD
yorym uo oseg “4) ‘apis oyled wooly BUIWOD SjassaA JOJ YOoT “yo “JoPAL 9Y} Bulyzwpe s0j sO0Y UT SajOY 9ION ‘apis o1jUeTyY WoO1jJ HOO] ys1y jo
JOO “A “UOroMAysuoo apun 93v3 yoo] “= “S|[VAL YOO] oY} Ruoye pivs Boo uo uns AY, —*syx9o] 9yy YN0IYA Ajosijua JasseA Yous MO}Q [IH Yor Jo InoF
‘1OJOUL BUIMO} IQA = ‘paya|dwoo aru syoo7] uNzes) sv @ AVAL padpasp aq OF pur] Jo Bale [LUG “{ “JPAd] vas VAOR JooJ GR aHE] UNZeXD) OF
Pastel 918 's[assaa soo] 9a1Y} JO Satias VAG dIOYAr ‘SYOO'] UNFPA) OF ULVOIQ IVUL]}Y Woy ‘AUG] So[lUL _WOADS ‘jeuvo JO UOIZIeS JaAa] ves PajajdwoD “Wy

‘SHOOT NOLVO “0D smanly “HO ‘1ybyhdog

 

  

 

 

 

 
*s10jOU ay} Aq AO} Ul UdHey
9IB S[aSSaA aTaY AM [TEM OPIN “J ‘woseas Aules SuTWOD BuLIMp ea} L8 0} Pastel aq [[LA, ‘“JeAd] BAS AACE JooJ CP MOU aYeT ‘JouuUeYyO [vUR PUL 9b]
unyey “NY ‘apis og Meg wor Sumuod aye] unyes worj ayes Yoo] yal [| “}Uaplose Jo Yuara ur Sxd0] JO LOTJOa}OId JO} 4B AQU|SIOWA ]20}5 "J

‘SHOOT NOLVD 0) ssaDID HO “ybyndos

 

 

= . id

 

 

 

 
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 185

It has been asserted that the abandonment of the Sosa
site Was in response to a new idea acted upon without due
consideration. The facts in the matter are these: In 1905,
the present chief engineer visited the Isthmus in the capac-
ity of a member of the Board of National Defenses. In
a relevant report, he made the following statement:

“The great objection to the locks at Sosa Hill is the
possibility of their destruction by the fire from an enemy’s
ship. If, as has been suggested to me by officers of this
department entitled to speak with authority on the subject,
these locks can be located against and behind Sosa Hill in
such a way as to use the hill as a protection against such
fire, then economy would lead to the retention of the lake.

If, however, Sosa Hill will not afford a site with
such protection, then it seems to me wiser to place the
locks at Miraflores.”

Mature study of the question led to the conclusion
that locks at Sosa would not be sufficiently secure, and it
was further evident that their transfer to Miraflores would
be accompanied by a saving in cost. The latter point,
it should be remembered, was that decided upon by the
Walker Commission for the site of the tide lock at the Pacific
end. So that it appears that this, like all the other features
of the plan, has been the subject of the most exhaustive
investigation and thought.

CHANGES IN DIMENSIONS

The increase of channel width through one-half the
length of Culebra Cut from 200 feet to 300 feet at the
bottom, which will enable ships to pass each other in any
part of the Cut, was not made on the recommendation of
the Commission, but by executive order.

The usable dimensions of the locks were changed at the
instigation of the President and on the recommendation
of the General Board of the Navy from 900 feet and 95
feet, to 1,000 feet and 110 feet.
186 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

On this point Colonel Goethals has said: ‘‘It is objected
that the size of the locks limits the Canal to vessels which
can use them. This is true. The present lock designs
provide intermediate gates dividing the locks into lengths
of 600 and 400 feet. About 98 per cent of all ships, in-
cluding the largest battleships now building, can be passed
through the 600-foot lengths, and the total lock length will
accommodate the largest commercial vessels now building,
which, I believe, are 1,000 feet long and 88 feet beam. It
is true that ships may increase in size so as to make the
present locks obsolete, but the largest ships now afloat
can not navigate the Suez Canal, nor the proposed sea
level canal at Panama. It must also be remembered that
the commerce of the world is carried by the medium-sized
vessels, the length of only one of the many ships using the
Suez Canal being greater than 600 feet.”

It is undoubtedly fortunate that Colonel Goethals’ judg-
ment in this matter was not accepted, since during the past
two years a great increase in the size of both commercial
and war vessels has come about, chiefly noticeable in width.
Our new battleships have a beam of 97 feet and upwards,
which will leave a clearance in the lock chambers of less
than 13 feet in all, or about 6 feet on either side. Com-
mercial vessels now built, and others whose keels have been
laid, have a beam of 96 feet, so that it is quite possible
that the locks may prove to be too narrow before they are
found too short.

The height of the Gatun Dam was decreased, so that
its crest stands 30 feet, instead of 50 feet, above the normal
level of the lake, which is 85 feet.

This change was made because, with the progress of
time and more thorough knowledge of the foundation
material, it became quite evident that the larger dimen-
sions were unnecessary, and to build in accordance with
them would be a wasteful expenditure of time and money.
The reduced weight is sufficient to meet the utmost demands
of stability, and the reduced height is ample for the com-
‘OF+ UoTZeAaya ‘ynNd Jo wW0}z}0q ay} UO Sulpuyys iv suleI} ITY

‘SVaVOSVO SVI WOU HLAON ONIMOOT LOO vada

 

 
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 187

plete retention of the lake, which can never, under any con-
ceivable circumstances, rise to 100 feet above sea level.

COST OF THE CANAL

The present estimated cost of the Canal, which it is
improbable that any future conditions will materially
affect, is about $375,000,000. No unknown factors, nor
hypothetical calculations entered into the preparation of
these figures. This estimate is largely in excess of that
which formed part of the report of the Board of Consulting
Engineers, but which was based on data much less com-
plete than that since rendered available. During the last
six years of the work there was an increase in the wage
scale and in the cost of material. Wages on the Isthmus
exceeded those in the United States from 40 to 80 per cent
for the same class of labor. The original estimates were
based on a ten-hour day, but Congress afterward imposed
upon the Commission the observance of an eight-hour day.
The various changes already noted, and others of a minor
character, but considerable in the aggregate, increased the
quantity of the work to be done by 50 per cent. Despite all
this, the unit costs increased no more than 20 per cent.
Furthermore, no such system of housing and caring for the
employees as was maintained was anticipated by the Board.

In addition, municipal improvements in Panama and
Colon, together with advances to the Panama Railroad,
approximated $15,000,000, a sum which will eventually
be returned to the Treasury of the United States.

APPROPRIATIONS
Payment to the New Panama Canal Company............. $40,000,000 .00
Payment to Republic of Panama.................0..00000. 10,000,000 ..00
Appropriation, June 28, 1902............... 0... c eee ee eee 10,000,000 .00
Appropriation, December 21, 1905........................ 11,000,000 .00
Deficiency, February 27, 1906..................2....200.. 5,990,786 .00
Appropriation, June 30, 1906........................0004. 25,456,415 .08
Appropriation, March 4, 1907....................... 0000 27,161,367 .50

Deficiency, February 15, 1908............ 0.0.0... cece 12,178,900 .00
188 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

Appropriation, May 27, 1908........... cece cece cece eee $29,187,000.00
Detieiency,, March 4.1909 jx c0525 ces again ele aad s 5,458,000. 00
Appropriation, March 4, 1909............. 0.00.00 e eee 33,638,000. 00
Deficiency, February 25, 1910............. 0.00... eee eee 76,000 .00
Appropriation, June 25, 1910............... 00... 37,855,000 .00
Appropriation, March 4, 1911............... 000.000 00 000 45,560,000 .00
Appropriation, August 24, 1912,...................0..005. 28,980,000 . 00
Private Act. Relief of Elizabeth G. Martin................ 1,200.00
Private Act. Relief of Marcellus Troxell.................. 1,500.00
Private Act. Relief of W. L. Miles....................04. 1,704.18
Private Act. Relief of Chas. A. Caswell................... 1,056.00
Private Act. Relief of Alexandro Comba.................. 500.00
Private Act. Relief of Douglas B. Thompson.............. 1,500.00
Private Act. Relief of Robert S. Gill...................... 2,520.00

Motal sven. tags seared Monee aimeoinneapa i haie ease SOEe DOL 446e10
Appropriation for Fortifications, March 4, 1911.............  3,000,000.00
Appropriation for Fortifications, August 24, 1912........... 2,806,950 .00

CLASSIFIED EXPENDITURES TO NOVEMBER 1, 1912

Department of Construction and Engineering.............. $159,411,558.14
Department of Construction of Engineering Plant...........  2,868,362.47
Department of Sanitation...........0..0 000.0000 0 cee eee ee 15,319,682 .40
Department of Civil Administration ....................... 5,961,599 .68
Department:of Lawes siesta dase on bee) eaneneeaee ses 30,887 .52
Panama Railroad, Second Main Track...................-. 1,123,477 .93
Panama Railroad, Relocated Lime....................00... 8,866,392 .02
Purchase and Repair of Steamers..................002205- 2,680,112.01
Zone Water Works and Sewers................000000e eee 5,140,506. 45
Zone: Roadway siwewscsis cswniane oi Gad ia ewe ae eas owe 1,579,724. 67
Loans to Panama Railroad Company...................... 3,247,332.11
Construction and Repair of Buildings...................... 10,188,813.63
Purchase from New Panama Canal Company............... 40,000,000.00
Payment to Republic of Panama......................0--- 10,000,000 . 00
Miascellaneousiec: eack sen As ay ae nes a RE, Seas IR A OS 4,207,175 .37

UD Otalermre rn rea tetany Rane ee $270,625,624. 40
Expenditures for Fortifications to Nov. 1, 1912............. 1,685,315.75

The balances carried in expenditure accounts, which
are included in the last item above, for water works, sewers,
and pavements in the cities of Panama and Colon amounted
‘apqissod
Teue) ay} surasip ur ssoisoid pides 04} opeu aaey uoljeiado Yyowa ye [el1a}eUI JO SUO} [BIOAaS PLO] pur yr

“M00uU ONIGVOT THAOHS WVdLS

 

Ip 0} a[qe are Yyolys sautyoem years asoyy,

 
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 189

altogether to $2,395,358.79. The unexpended balance in
the appropriation for sanitation in the cities of Panama
and Colon, available for expenditures on water works,
sewers, and pavements, was $97,465.64, including transfer
of appropriations for quarter ended September 30, 1912.

A careful official estimate has been made by the Canal
Commission of the value to the Commission at the present
time of the franchises, equipment, material, work done, and
property of various kinds for which the United States paid
the French Canal Company $40,000,000. It places the
total value at $42,000,000, divided as follows:

Excavation, useful to the Canal, 29,708,000 cubic yards...... $25,389,240 .00
Panariva, Railrodd Stocks. iA o0.4 gsscu. pacaauw tons deans anutete eee Sadar 9,644,320 .90
Plant and material, used, and sold for scrap................. 2,112,063 .00
Buildings; usediavserc avant oicne tn hcate tien enletarnanttra menses e 2,054,203 .00
Surveys, plans, maps, and records................00eeeeeeee 2,000,000. 00
ST ean eo eg a a eae eae nacre Bt sete GAGA Seon aad oe CI 1,000,000 .00
@lesrings: roads: elec si0.camaverot tek Ax anne mmuacn oe adeurenia ee 100,000.00
Ship channel in Panama Bay, four years’ use..............4- 500,000 .00

Rota eke wuss deta hiner Sith be lian sm perenne ganas shade $42,799,826 .00

The Canal Zone contains about 486 square miles, about
95 of which will be under the waters of the Canal and
Gatun and Miraflores Lakes. It begins at a point 3 marine
miles from mean low water mark in each ocean, and extends
for 5 miles on each side of the center line of the route of the
Canal. It includes the group of islands in the Bay of
Panama named Perico, Naos, Culebra, and Flamenco.
The cities of Panama and Colon are excluded from the
Zone, but the United States has the right to enforce san-
itary ordinances in those cities, and to maintain public
order in them in case the Republic of Panama should not
be able, in the judgment of the United States, to do so.

Of the 436 square miles of Zone territory, the United
States owns about 363, and 73 are held in private owner-
ship. Under the treaty with Panama, the United States
has the right to acquire by purchase, or by the exercise of
199 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

the right of eminent domain, any lands, buildings, water
rights, or other properties necessary and convenient for
the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and
protection of the Canal, and it can, therefore, at any time
acquire the lands within the Zone boundaries which are
owned by private persons. The United States will also
control the area to be covered by Gatun Lake which extends
beyond the lines of the Canal Zone.

The population of the Canal Zone, official census, is
62,810; of Panama City, 35,368; of Colon, 17,749.

The permanent administration and Canal headquarters
building will be on a knoll west of Ancon quarry where it
will overlook both the terminal piers and the Canal
entrance. It is to have 75,000 square feet of floor space
and is to cost not more than $375,000, including $25,000 for
that part assigned to permanent records. The quarters
for employees attached to the administration building will
be erected in the general area adjacent to and northeast of
it, and employees connected with the shops, docks, and
other terminal facilities at Balboa will be housed in quarters
erected in the area surrounding the slope of Sosa Hill and
on the fill adjoining the Ancon-Balboa highway. There
will be a permanent settlement at Pedro Miguel for em-
ployees of the Pacific locks, and one at Gatun for employees
of the Atlantic locks. The settlement at Cristobal will be
maintained, and possibly the settlement at Ancon. No
necessity is apparent for any other than the above five
settlements, except for the military forces which will be
stationed on the Isthmus.

The piers for commercial use at Balboa are built at
right angles to the axis of the Canal, with their ends about
2,650 feet from the center line of the Canal channel. They
are about 1,000 feet long, and 200 feet wide, with 300-foot
slips between, and with landings for small boats at the head
of each slip for the full width between piers. The old
French steel wharf, about 1,000 feet long, will be retained
for some time in the future, for commercial purposes.
 

 
“HOO] 9Y} YSNOIY} Jassaa ay} MIP 0} U1d}s JY} OF
‘apis Jay}ie jv syTea opis oy}
9q [[E drys ou ‘wiooi suisue pur oa

 

 

day asn 0} pamoy]ye
ABR OF Japlo uy

 

‘“SHAILOWNOOOT OILWLOAUTA AM SHOOT HONOUHL GCAMOL ONIGDA TASSHA
. SUDYIITY LEyNdod ,, fo fisajinoD

 

 

 

 

 
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 191

Two wharves and one pier have been constructed at
Cristobal, behind a mole and breakwater, built out from
shore toward the Canal channel, and paralleling the bound-
ary line between Canal Zone and Panamanian waters.
Primarily, these docks are to meet the commercial require-
ments of the Panama railroad, but should there be enough
traffic after the Canal is completed to justify it, four other
piers, each about 1,000 feet long, and 209 feet wide, with
300-foot slips between, will be constructed.

The main drydock will be situated at Balboa, and will
be capable of accommodating any vessel that can pass
through the Canal locks. It will have a usable length of
1,000 feet, a depth over the keel blocks of 35 feet at mean
sea level, and an entrance width of 110 feet. The entrance
will be closed by miter gates, similar to those used in the
locks. The drydock will have a rock foundation, and its
sides will be lined with concrete. Its equipment will include
a 40-ton locomotive crane, with a travel on both sides.

For vessels of smaller type, an auxiliary drydock will
be built at Balboa, in lieu of the marine railways originally
contemplated. It will have a usable length of 350 feet, a
width at entrance of 71 feet, and a depth over the keel
blocks of 131% feet at mean sea level. It will be provided
with a floating caisson. The 40-ton locomotive crane on
the main drydock will be utilized for this dock also. The
work of providing space for these drydocks, as well as for
the new shops, is now under way, and requires the excava-
tion of about 300,000 cubic yards of material from the
northwest face of Sosa Hill. The excavated material is
used in filling the site for the shops and terminal yard.

On the Atlantic side it is proposed to retain the old
French drydock at Mount Hope, which has a usable length
of 300 feet, a width at entrance of 50 feet, and a depth over
the sill of 13 feet at mean sea level. It was the opinion of
the board in charge of the dock projects, that the commer-
cial requirements in sight would not warrant the construc-
tion of a drydock at Cristobal capable of accommodating
192 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

large vessels, in view of the building of a drydock at Balboa,
to which any large vessel on the Atlantic side could be taken
and returned, in case it was found necessary to dock it for
repairs.

The plans contemplate furnishing vessels with fuel,
fresh water, and supplies of all kinds. The main coaling
plant will be situated on the north end of the island,
opposite dock No. 11, Cristobal. It will be capable of han-
dling and storing 200,000 tons of coal, with a possible
increase of 50 per cent. One hundred thousand tons of
the total normal storage is subaqueous. ‘The plant will
have railroad connection with the mainland over a bridge
of the bascule type, which will cross the French canal at a
point about half a mile south of the Mount Hope drydock.
The preliminary work on this plant has been begun by the
Panama railroad.

A subsidiary coaling plant will be situated at Balboa,
at the outer end of the southeast approach wall of the dry-
dock, having a frontage of 500 feet thereon, adapted for
discharging vessels. This plant will be capable of handling
and storing 100,000 tons of coal, with a possible increase
of 50 per cent. Fifty thousand tons of the total normal
storage is subaqueous.

In addition to coal, facilities will be provided at Cris-
tobal and Balboa for supplying shipping, and the Canal
works, with fuel oil. In line with this plan, four steel tanks
of 40,000 barrels capacity each, have been contracted for in
the United States.

The main repair shops will be built at Balboa, and are
designed to maintain the following equipment:

1. Lock, spillway, and power plant machinery. 2.
Water and land equipment retained for the maintenance of
the Canal. 3. Rolling stock and equipment of the Panama
railroad. 4. Mechanical apparatus connected with the
coaling plants, fortifications, cold storage plant, wireless
stations, etc. 5. The making of repairs, etc., required by
commercial vessels, and by private individuals and corpora-
“Pet UOTPBAVTS ‘W10}}OQ JY} AMOTAq
Jao] XISMOYe SI [aUULYD aSvUILID Jojno dy} Ul BuIpur}zs Jo}eM ay ‘YF-+ UOlpeAgja ‘WO}}0q ay} UO BuLjzioa\ o1v puNoBaIOJ ay} Ul UMOYS S[eAoYs UBIIS OM} OTL

‘ALLANOO WOU HLYON ONIHOOT LOO VaaaTNo

 

 
 
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 193

tions. 6. The making of such repairs as may be required
by vessels of the United States Navy.

In addition to these, a number of subsidiary buildings
will be erected. All of the structures will be of permanent
construction, with steel frames. The sides and ends will
be left open for ventilation and light, protection from sun
and rain being afforded by overhanging sheds.

The main metal working shops, including machine,
erecting and tool shops, the forge and pipe shop, and the
boiler and shipfitters’ shop, together with the shed for the
storage of steel, will be placed end on between the drydock
and repair wharf. The general storehouse, foundry, wood-
working shops, subsidiary buildings, and office building, will
be erected parallel to the line of the drydock and water
front, northeast of the main shops. Two lines of railroad
tracks will extend past each end of the main metal working
shops, and one track through their center. The main shops
will be provided with overhead traveling cranes, the crane
runways being extended through each end of the buildings
over the railroad tracks. As far as possible, the present
machinery will be utilized in the new shops. All of it will
be electric driven, including both individual and group
drive.

It is proposed to retain the drydock shops, for making
repairs on the Atlantic side, until sufficient experience is
had to determine the extent and character of repair facilities
necessary.

For the handling of the lock gate leaves, as well as for
other Canal requirements, and commercial and general
wrecking purposes, one, or two, powerful floating cranes
will be purchased. For handling vessels of the largest size
at Cristobal and Balboa, two high power harbor tugs will
be provided, and for the transportation of coal, fuel oil, and
fresh water alongside of vessels, a sufficient number of barges
and lighters will be placed in service. The steel barges,
now in use by the Canal Commission, can be used to good
advantage, after the necessary modifications have been

13
194 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

made, in the barge and lighter service. A tender for pas-
sengers and mail will be furnished at each terminus also,
provided the business justifies it.

Some idea of the stupendous nature of the undertaking
may be gained by a glance at the following table of statistics
of the equipment in use during the construction period:

CANAL SERVICE
Steam shovels:

105-ton, 5 cubic yard dippers............0..00 000 cee eee eee ee 15
95-ton, 4 and 5 cubic yard dippers..............0. 0.0.00 cc eeeee 30
70-ton, 23 and 3 cubic yard dippers...................00.20004. 33
66-ton, 24 cubic yard dippers..................0.00........ 0000 10
45-ton,, 14 -Cuble yard Gippers oss. 04 scene tisccinnamacedenlieuaees 11
AO= CON fecnarn sue iironee Mer oud Ud me TEA ce eect apa Oe a tea ag ae 1
Trenching shovel, $ cubic yard dipper.......................... 1
BEG Galli Sacecas enue tee he att seit Ne REE ANU aRy ne Nae 101
Locomotives:
American—
MOGSCONS Sac dciersteacete Damen oa mia ened ete Mee ees ees 100)
AOS GONG sarees ress aie eisetis Saas wea 2 ce bib pee wld nat ee blede, side 41
VEO Ser hte ce earst A ton ssi uie clic etna atnameabace a auihes Mtoe ee 20
Otay se eetela's eo sans Senay teal tse rcitcinawae onto — 161
Bren Chon Hanbaasite tt sia tan econ cine ays eT uate Rta iatmrt taal 104
Narrow gage, American, 16 tons..................00 ee eee ee 33
Bilec tricia ysuicratesncttaran Greapurtl ie Nyat loath ards taend a2 9
BR Ota eek Se cee ee ch nes ie es A nec ae pee BS Rad 307
Drills:
Mechanical churn, or well...........0000..00 000 ccc cece eee ee. 196
lB 000 ear Nica Ser en Rn EA ene Netra tree ee Rear a ane 357
POU alliettesn saa nee teeta ear ane rans DvcsA m. Oe unt haa Ng ae aici ak 553
Cars:
Flat, used with unloading plows..................0. 0000-0 ee eee 1,760
Sbeel Gum ps Wlargee x. Cocke « wh mavasl ree rskeea nae ease ke eae tants 596
Steeldumps;emalli ceases wits wuatilewuarn vee wes oem oe ABO: sae 1,207
Ballast dum psavcrrsracn stecmen een aes te adele coals. wun caver tela sns 24
pp teel fla terssen te neues cvantindal sie sels Sommrea ieee noe cent ak Ne 487
INAITOW PALO shia sisi ontaares ceetenmbcnsee tees eat cements e ea 209
MOOR sacrasneasetrcs acer nannies sebacule wo deeoaav ds Mead ids ee ee ak 6
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 195

Pay Cert cates eleven tis hee. mice ed tend eyes a thems Oa nee ie Rowe 1
AUTOMATIC ClECEIIG: 05:3 cuvntecgiens Belek aha nsadywan encase 45
WSCA VING 5 22s a pcr ieceads win cote aetnebons cette Seana aseicion Ge Ree teoarea ote Ae 224
Special SHOPS A. cattacyee ere svas eierAte esas me ka ee eter Veliond ame ntem 12
SU Ot Hills Os ioae ye vgs Peto vad mah Gu a Ae eae A od teen yee 4,572
PROS ens ok hc cue ae erlang Cen ae ple ete apne rea 26
ME TAC KE SIIRGETS irscecnctar tsk rtd mat ata VAN rel elect et de Payette te ee are eh aor 9
Wnloadersis sn cicisves haus ect pene elle teal dacs tite wc ctnialolaMin oe 30
Pilerdri vers’ acco keene euch oie Seed Gait Ta OnE og RN eR 14
Dredges:
Brenchvladder reise e PA oe cece ame cae sc Ne oe 7
NEVI py 1) CT ass sacs « cibawaresdatbakemee ae alee ese ete oto eo nent eae nents ey aha 3
Pipeline tee yae cies prc ya ois cra arta nl aati diene Daas me Goer 2 ed era tye 7
Sea-going suction................ 00.000 IDO RCE RR Sar eh rosa en Be 2
lami Shell satcrent a auutton atisl etnies pi acsbbactatasiae claret ay mere etn 1
ISG Ga Sisk he Ree ee See dt Soy rns Pah Lela Seal ate ocean 20
CLAM ES gasiens. isa NOU sae eee a tonne tach tere NNO sb Le Aes Derlam nee etn RP HIG 47
Rock breaker cc) 5.85 sa 2 Ftast ate Sev da ed Sear os Ek 1
BIR Gist ee ey Sean ties then 2 AG. Vines Ares ANAS ch Ten cx oie run AMEN EATEN HO 11
BRO Ws Oat a ries ye geen Se es A a sea ict een cet alate unicorn ms ogra th ey 1
HOUSE boats oy aa piece aa cers ads Ayah SN RAS ne OS ned ADA eae 3
Cape ts arserva gine eh ou cudie den a tate) cere cm eon ae eins rau einai arr ipa act ee 12
Piledriver: floating 30s coc ut nd eee ten Ascaris cae ae 8 3
(CAMEO GAG a soe es fee ake do CER NG ee Se een sale Sect c eeu cen 1
Barges, lighters and SCOWS ... 0.6... ec nets 72
ISAUNCHEST © & Sacwsiates aut Hates dtvcuthy utcrs aiarenesteotienah inated Routh eanoneen soe 29
TD Till BOatS! Sco ass 54 epee. waa oe gaan te aie. Tene tae Se ASS Soe eens 2
Bloating“derricks:4 os.icee sy, aikg tae Ghee Bio ae ears as ges wpa De 2
PANAMA RAILROAD
Locomotives:
Road. (12 oil burners). ccna eee ae oe eee es Ce 36
Switches deicdehawestaenc italic hon pneaaverodh damn stelle es aah ura econ alnlehent 26
FESO ball 2.3, sta em eectnap esreratcest oeoas Gore) ca ee iteacads ah eine oem eet ad stew uma 52
Cars:
COaCNES iia Seagate's Roe Maree S ye ee ee A ieee eT 57
Rreightuaeiiy seule Me nah ea en ead cha detecting Baye shore ecneasip se 1,434

LOLA Sie essnecasimeamann ma annnecee inoeaas Maser aesaak waa deans 1,491
196 PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL

Cranes:
TiS COMO CIV 2s g atccia oo is Sees adios eRe Se ene eee eirarlto opera Sie Malin napers 2
WO CKD asec oiias deere <p caceitl od Siete sem ounte Seales Cregeen eek eran beer 2
TRO Ged isssevscsyevh salon ass soseescd tax eat ace Seo Seo Ne Sean a A aapeys ailerons Womasens 4
Piledrivers
STP aC he hac parva sistas oor hci avi altos oriooe aes aaa reed o Porta date D bscre Creerrauses 1
OREN Bis acs Selec ne te eas eatetntar ans Seas a gunn esanievys nose suaustans ase ena 1
USO CAL ye fare seee os soe wee icon ane Seep oa SENG Bae So eRe SMe See ava ea 2
EUS DOA ts acm te tte ck Secs ce tata ecb sulalesd desis aco Rute re cadens medee je A busine 1
Lighters:
Coal\all ated cca s's svat etic he ere ne ajeatard bs eee GR RE 5
Careossteelvand rome aavecnsin ucttcrke ae ae oR SUNER tatetie sana Beni teu 8
PEO tea yo tlie sien: cio ceosh aeons tceovpe as este Sed WERE Eo OE 13
Motor boate® crass ce nena ta ei terete ea ed a eae alee an 2
Steam ditcher.5.co sso eh aches Sava ta aco lgss sidel Parade ai sab ee LEY OS 1

SUCCESS OF THE MILITARY MANAGEMENT

The writer confesses to having been one of the sceptics
who viewed with misgiving the transfer of the Canal opera-
tion to military management, and he acknowledges with
pleasure that in every important respect the results have
been contrary to his predictions. The work could not have
been in better hands. It has been carried on without any
hitch or subsidence, and the progress made has excited the
admiration and astonishment of engineers throughout the
world.

An excellent organization has been established and a
strong esprit de corps maintained. Health conditions
were steadily improved and a gradual increase in the ef-
ficiency of labor effected. All classes of employees have
been imbued with confidence and courage by the knowl-
edge that their chiefs were moving along clearly cut lines,
with well-defined purposes in view. For the first time
PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE CANAL 197

since the enterprise was entered upon, the responsible heads
of it were in complete accord with the controlling authori-
ties at Washington.

The plan of organization of the Engineering Department
divided all construction work into three topographical
districts, each under the charge of an Assistant Engineer
with full control and responsibility. These divisions are:
The Atlantic Division, extending from deep water to Gatun
Lake, and including the Gatun Dam and locks; the Cen-
tral Division, extending from Gatun to Pedro Miguel, and
including the Culebra Cut; the Pacific Division, extending
from Pedro Miguel to deep water in the Pacific, and
including the dams and locks at the former point and at
Miraflores.
CHAPTER XII
Miuirary AND Po.LitTicaL ASPECTS

For more than two hundred and fifty years the various
nations of the world have been wrangling over the project
of building a canal on the Isthmus of Panama. Diplomats
have fought wordy battles and concocted wily schemes to
secure a foothold on the Isthmus which would place their
governments in an advantageous position either for building
a canal or acquiring a strategic position in case one was
built by another nation. Spain, England, France, Colombia
and the United States have figured as the principals in these
diplomatic negotiations. Although there have been other
nations involved none have played a part sufficiently note-
worthy for mention.

Of course Spain, as the first nation on the ground, was
chiefly concerned with the canal project in its early days.
Next England, whose traders and freebooters had obtained
a foothold on the Spanish main, became a factor in Isthmian
politics. The Englishmen had settled in Nicaragua and
Honduras, Jamaica and others of the West Indian islands.
Of these settlements, perhaps the most important, from a
diplomatic point of view, was the English colony in that
part of Nicaragua known as the Mosquito Coast. This
colony was established in 1740, and some time later became
a dependency of Jamaica. This foothold was gradually
strengthened by treaty and otherwise, until England was
enabled to organize a province there called British Honduras.
Diplomatic discussion of this matter between England and
Spain again and again resulted to the advantage of England,
and her hold upon this territory grew stronger and stronger.
In 1860 England was able to obtain an acknowledgment

(198)
4 {ND vigapny jo Yysua] oitjusa aq} Burpuazxe Jadat W10}}0q $} 4e JauUUeYO B BurTjo[duios puv yeueD ay} Jo IoOYy
SY] GO SUYIOM Y}Oq ‘Brqe[N | JO U0} ay} ayisoddo yal UMOYS s[aAoYs Wea}s 9y} Vaya poyIvursea [eue) oy} Jo AIOysTY oy} UT Yooda yueyoduI Uy

‘VadaTOO LV ONILGAW STXHAOHS WVaALS

 
 
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS — 199

from Nicaragua of the validity of her claim to British
Honduras, and became a powerful factor in that part of
the Isthmian country.

THE UNITED STATES TAKES A HAND

The United States, although naturally the logical
builder of a canal on the Isthmus, was very slow to take
advantage of the necessity and opportunity. It was not
until about 1835 that any interest in such a project was
manifested in this country. In that year the question of a
canal was brought up in the Senate, with the result that an
emissary was sent to the Isthmus to make an investigation
of the matter. This move had no definite results until 1846,
when a treaty was negotiated with New Granada by which
the United States was given the sole right of transit across
the Isthmus between the Atrato River and the Chiriqui
Lagoon, either by road, railroad or canal. The limits of
this treaty were sufficiently wide to provide a basis for the
Panama Railroad concession, secured a few years later.

An attempt was made shortly afterward to negotiate
the same privileges with Nicaragua, but complications
were immediately encountered because of the fact that
England was powerfully entrenched there. Various agents
were sent to this country in an effort to conclude a satis-
factory treaty. Finally, the negotiations resulted in the
signing of a treaty with Nicaragua, guaranteeing that
country sovereignty over the territory occupied by the
canal which it was proposed to build. As this rather left
England out in the cold, she immediately took steps to
maintain her strategic position by threatening the seizure
of Tiger Island in the Gulf of Fonseca, at the Pacific terminus
of the proposed canal.

To block this move the United States, through its agent
in Nicaragua, negotiated a treaty with that Republic by
which Tiger Island was ceded to the United States, thus
creating a difficult situation with England. A diplomatic
200 MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

wrangle immediately ensued, which was settled in 1850
by the unfortunate Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, under which
both governments agreed to forego the right to build or
fortify an Isthmian canal, or to ally themselves with any
Isthmian country for that purpose. Both countries offered
protection to any other country which would undertake
to build the canal, and guaranteed the freedom of a port
at either end of the canal.

This treaty did not apply to British Honduras, and
resulted greatly to the disadvantage of the United States.

This state of affairs maintained until after the Civil War
in the United States, since that struggle occupied the atten-
tion of this country to so great an extent that the matter of
building a canal was naturally held in abeyance. In 1866,
however, the project again came up for discussion, and the
people of the United States came to a clearer realization
of the irritating features of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
and to desire a greater latitude of action upon the Isthmus
of Panama. Various propositions were made looking to the
abrogation of the treaty with England, among them being
a project to buy Tiger Island. But these came to no definite
end. President Grant was the first to advocate the clear-
cut policy of an American canal under American control, and
negotiations were entered into with Nicaragua in 1869 and
1870 with a view to building a canal across the Isthmus.

Soon afterward France entered the field of Isthmian
diplomacy, Ferdinand de Lesseps making an attempt to secure
an abrogation of our treaty with New Granada, in order
that France might have the right to build a canal entirely
under French control. The United States applied the
Monroe Doctrine and adopted so firm an attitude on this
subject, however that the attempt was abandoned.

GROWTH OF DEMAND FOR A CANAL

From this time on the American people turned their
eyes more and more strongly to Panama and to the vital
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 201

necessity of this country for a canal under American owner-
ship. The strong desire for this dates back to 1849 with
the rush of the gold miners to California during the great
gold strike in that State. Difficulty was experienced in
crossing the continent because of a lack of transcontinental
railroads and the length and tediousness of the journey by
wagon train. A great many o: the ‘forty-niners” chose
to take ship to the Isthmus and brave the perils of the
jungle and to pay the high rates exacted for crossing there.
From this date our Far West grew rapidly in importance,
and the necessity for some means of quick transportation,
both for the purpose of defense and trade became more
and more apparent, until, in 1898, the famous voyage of
the Oregon around the Horn brought the crying necessity
for a canal before the American people in such a way that
public sentiment was aroused and became insistent that a
canal should be built and owned by the United States as
soon as possible.

THE VOYAGE OF THE ‘“‘OREGON”’

The American people will not soon forget the voyage
of the Oregon. At the opening of the war with Spain, when
the great Spanish fleet under Admiral Cervera was reported
to be speeding across the Atlantic to make an attack upon
the American coast, the Oregon, one of the finest ships in
our none too large navy, was on the Pacific side. Need of
her on the other side of the continent was felt so strongly
that orders were telegraphed to her captain to make the
long voyage around the Horn at the utmost possible speed.
Never before had such a voyage at top speed been made by
a battleship. Day by day the people hastened to open
their newspapers to see where the Oregon was, and to
wonder whether she would be able to make the long voyage
without accident and arrive at the scene of action in time.
The Oregon did make this memorable voyage without
accident and in record-breaking time, and arrived in time to
202 MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

take part in the battle of Santiago. Nevertheless, the lesson
taught by the anxiety and suspense endured throughout
many days was not soon to be forgotten, and the determina-
tion became stronger and stronger that such an emergency
must never again arise and that some rapid means of com-
munication between our coasts must be provided. Within
two years a new treaty with England called the Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty was negotiated, and ratified on December
16, 1901. By the provisions of this treaty the troublesome
and annoying Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was abrogated. The
United States was empowered to build and control a canal,
both in times of peace and war. By this treaty we were
forbidden to blockade the canal, but were not forbidden to
fortify it, and thus all obstacles to the construction and
ownership of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama were
cleared away, and a way opened for the enterprise.

SELECTING A LOCATION

The next three years were occupied in selecting a loca-
tion. Two routes were suggested, one on the location of
the French attempt at Panama, and the other through
Nicaragua. After careful study and investigation, however,
it was decided to adopt the Panama route, as has been set
forth at greater length in another portion of this volume.

The negotiations with Colombia, looking to the right
to build a canal, have also been detailed at length, as have
the dramatic revolution in Panama and the treaty with
that country, which closed the diplomatic wrangling of
centuries and left the United States free to build a canal
under the conditions which we desired.

FORTIFICATIONS

Prominent among the international questions involved
by the consideration of the canal has been the question of
fortifications. By the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty we were
not forbidden to place fortifications on the canal, and in
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS = 203

fact no mention of the matter was made. After the signing
of the treaty, however, there was a great deal of discussion
as to whether or not we had this right. The matter was not
definitely settled until 1911, however, when an appropriation
of $3,000,000 was made by the House of Representatives
for this purpose. Work was begun immediately, and the
huge forts which guard the waterway, armed with the
latest and largest type of mortars and disappearing rifles,
have settled this question for all time.

The questions raised on this subject involved not only
our right to fortify the canal, but also the expediency. As
on many other questions which have arisen concerning
methods of policy connected with the canal, the people of
the United States were divided into rival camps on this
subject. The opponents of fortifications presented many
arguments in support of their position. In the first place
it was claimed that no fortification was necessary, inasmuch
as the canal could be protected by our fleet. This argument
was met by a consideration that in that case our fleet in
time of war would be largely tied down to a defense of this
important avenue of communication, and would lack the
freedom of action which would be most favorable to its
success. Further argument along this line was that this
would be a far more expensive method of defending the
canal than the proposed fortifications, since it would be
necessary to provide a fleet of sufficient size to take care of
the defense of the canal, in addition to the ships necessary
for the defense of our extensive coast line. Many other
arguments were brought up by those opposed to fortifica-
tions, but these were disposed of along the same logical
lines.

The doctrine of non-militarism is the one chiefly
expounded by those opposed to canal fortification. Up to
the present time our theory of national defense was largely
based on the belief that no enemy could successfully attack
us because of the ocean lying between. In these days of
high speed ships, however, the long stretch of South America,
204 MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

reaching far below us, is practically the only remnant of
that isolation. The great length of the voyage around the
Horn, together with the fact that no European nation has
a foothold in any part of the continent which it could use
as a naval base, offers a formidable obstruction to the
passage of a hostile fleet. Should the enemy, however,
obtain control of the Panama Canal the distance would be
shortened by some 8,000 miles, and a powerful fleet would
be able to threaten both coasts of the United States at one
time, a thing which is now impossible.

Of course, we must be protected from such a possibility.
Our army is too small to adequately protect both coasts
at the same time, and our land fortifications are too widely
separated for adequate defense. With the control of the
canal insured to us by powerful fortifications and garrisons,
we can concentrate our land forces on that side of the con-
tinent which is threatened by an enemy. ‘Thus by means
of the Panama Canal we are once more enabled to resume
the attitude that we are naturally defended from foreign
attack, and that the opening of the Canal is a long step
away from militarism instead of in that direction.

Many means of insuring possession to us of the Canal in
time of war have been suggested, such as treaties with
foreign countries which would assure us that the Canal
would not be used against us at such time. These, how-
ever, would not be sufficiently trustworthy to satisfy us.
A strict neutralization of the Canal would make it possible
for the enemy to use the waterway as well as ourselves, an
even more unsatisfactory state of affairs. The only possible
solution of the problem is that the Panama Canal must be
kept open always to our fleet and closed to the fleet of our
enemy, and that it must be entirely under our control,
unhampered by any other nation. To accomplish this,
every possible step must be taken to promptly construct
fortifications and military defenses of all kinds, and to
establish a garrison sufficiently powerful to insure an
adequate defense of this vital point.
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS = 205

The fact that we have fortified the Canal does not in
any way conflict with our treaty obligations to maintain a
neutral commercial waterway, but we must insist on con-
sidering the Canal a part of our coast line, and as such
falling under our rightful control as the great highway
between our Atlantic and Pacific shores. The sentiment
to this end has been growing ever since the Canal project
became a concrete one. If a precedent were needed, we
have it in the precautions taken by England to guard the
approaches to India by means of fortifications at Gibraltar,
Cyprus and at Malta, which guard the entrance to the
Mediterranean. The Red Sea is protected by fortifications
at Aden and on the Island of Perin, and to make matters
doubly sure England owns a controlling interest in the Suez
Canal. Other nations, furthermore, have pursued similar
tactics. Germany has securely fortified the Kiel Canal, and
there are other instances of a similar nature.

The control of the Panama Canal is, however, far more
necessary to our national security than that of the Kiel
Canal to Germany or the Suez Canal to Great Britain, since
it is the key to the protection of our many thousands of
miles of coast line and the seaports which dot it, and it is
only right that we should adopt similar precautions to insure
our safety by its adequate defense. One of the chief difficul-
ties with the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was the clause which
guaranteed to England a free passage through the Canal
in case she was at war with this country, and it was largely
on this account that pressure was brought to bear for a
repeal of this treaty.

There are two branches of defense which must be con-
sidered, namely:—sea and land. The sea defenses will be
provided for in the enormous fortifications with their power-
ful artillery, which are situated at the Atlantic end on both
sides of Limon Bay. At the Pacific end the fortifications
are placed on the islands which guard the entrance to the
Canal. These fortifications serve a double purpose, as they
will be the means of keeping a hostile fleet at a distance
206 MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

too great for any bombardment of the locks and machinery
of the Canal. They will also serve to protect the exit of
our fleet in case it should be necessary to send it through
the Canal in the face of a hostile fleet. The second branch
of defense of the Canal must provide against an attack by
a land force. This will be accomplished by the mobile
land garrison, which will be employed to defend the Canal
against a landing force from an enemy’s fleet, or from an
army which would approach to the attack through one of
the South American republics.

In the first instance, the proposed garrison of six or
seven thousand men would probably be ample to repel any
such attack, and the further consideration that it would be
very difficult to land any force on the Isthmus in the face
of a defending fleet makes this item of little consequence.
In case, however, of the expedient of bringing a large army
to attack the Isthmus by land, we are in a particularly
favorable position to reinforce the garrison by either one
of the two oceans, and we can probably put a sufficient
force there to insure adequate defense before a hostile army
would be able to reach and attack the Canal.

As now planned the land garrison will consist largely of
infantry with full artillery, and a small body of cavalry.
These men will maintain a permanent garrison, and thor-
ough and detailed plans will be worked out for a complete
defense of the Isthmus. With the completion of the Canal
the entire Zone, with the exception of the stretch occupied
by the Canal itself, together with a few military roads, will
be allowed to relapse into the original jungle, and as growth
is very rapid in the tropics it will be but a short time until
this is again in the wild state and will thus form one of the
best defenses against a land force. For this reason the Isth-
mus will not be open to settlement, but will be maintained
strictly as a Government reservation; and no one will be
allowed to land there without the express permission of the
Government.

In addition to the defenses of the Canal itself, the
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 207

enormously strong naval base which we are constructing at
Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands may be counted upon
to assist materially in the defense of the Pacific end of the
Canal.
CHAPTER XIII
Tue ReEsuLts oF OPENING THE CANAL

Ever since the project of cutting an Isthmian canal has
begun to be talked of in the United States, the question of
what the results attained by it would be has been a matter
for serious discussion.

As the enterprise neared completion this discussion
became more general and of deeper interest to the people
at large, especially to those interested in shipping and in
transcontinental and foreign commerce. Congressional
investigations have been made, and special reports prepared
on the subject, until now we are in a position to predict
along fairly definite lines what the net results of the opening
of the canal will be.

The benefits which will accrue to this country fall into
two major classes:—military and commercial. It has long
been said that a Panama canal is a commercial convenience
and a military necessity. But to the people at large the
commercial aspects of the canal are pre-eminent, and they
look to it for great results in the reduction of the risks and
expenses of commerce.

FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW

From a military point of view the canal will prove of the
greatest value. The United States is in a most peculiar
position as a world power, on account of the enormous
extent of our coast line and the fact that it fronts upon both
the Atlantic and the Pacific, upon both of which oceans it
is necessary to maintain a powerful naval force. Without
the Panama Canal the Atlantic and Pacific fleets are nearly

(208)
*]e1Ioyeur Jo spsvA 91qnd Q00‘CO0‘OOT
S,p]zom yy 1 a ysadny ay} jo
yeym yAnoIY} yno st yeueD ay} yulod sty} IW

 

JO UOIJBAVOXA DY} pasnbas pur v
9uo paultojJ pue VOL Jo AposIe]

 

 
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 209
Aaa

 

IS DAKOTA, 7S? ono i,
: WISCONSIN I MICHICAN

   
   
    

 

NEW YORK

 

 

 
    

a Lessnewe-
Ny LOowA oa [ :
\ CSS ese Nios Rate e sees weeny 5 a
EBRASKA, Fd : ; foot
a t : ; PENNSYLVANIA) 9) —
Rae eee ai TILLINOIS INDIANA, z {NEW YORK
" ' ' es
‘ & ae fin
’ » ‘ 3
KANSAS jMissouR! i # pat i 4
t 8, f(Kentucny, b
re ae ‘
Lo 7 TENNESSEE - N 0
Tec fINDIAN: : jee’ CAROLINA
FY $ ERRITORYIARKANSAS Ac ece yer we nage fon n nee 0
; c : es

\.SOUTH Ss,
\CAROLIN
‘

      

:
u . Ly
IALABAMA\ GeoRGIAY

‘ sf
NCARIBBEAN SEA

founTeMALa’
{HONDURAS _/ x Z
Sal A 7
{NICARAGUA ‘ 4
‘ 4
a Sey, Z
v C5) Sop: ( I
o, a) BS \\‘coLon i
a S $ ae
2 ; Se
e PAWAMA ¥ “eg
? bee |
° ) ween
. <
+ COLOMBIA
>
Route To THE ISTHMUS ee

 

ECUADOR,
.

 

 

 

MAP OF ROUTES TO THE ISTHMUS.
This shows the directness of the routes from New York and New Orleans to Colon.

14
210 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

fourteen thousand miles apart, and the seriousness of this
matter was best evinced to the American people by the
spectacular voyage of the “Oregon” during the Spanish-
American war. In other words, it is necessary to maintain
two fleets, each one capable of defending the entire eastern
or western coast line without assistance from the other side
of the continent. This state of affairs is not only expensive,
but to a certain extent dangerous, unless we are able to
keep both fleets up to a standard of efficiency greater than
that of any fleet which could be brought from any eastern
or western nation to attack our ports.

By means of the Panama Canal, however, either fleet
could be reinforced within a short space of time, and thus
the mobility of both fleets will be greatly increased.
Furthermore, the Panama Canal with its enormously strong
fortifications, its dry-docks, coaling and supply stations,
will form a naval base at the sole connecting link between
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. From the standpoint of a
military expert this is a most important matter and it has
been said that the canal will double the efficiency of our
eastern and western fleets. The authorities at Washington
were keenly aware of the advantage of such a naval base,
and wisely omitted any clause in the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty which forbade us the privilege of fortifying the
canal.

COMMERCIAL ASPECTS

So much for the military aspect of the canal. The
results of opening the waterway to commerce are far reach-
ing and complex. Since the opening of the first railway
to the Pacific, in 1869, shippers have had the choice of rail
and water routes for the transportation of their freight
from coast to coast, and, in spite of artificial restraints
upon the competition of the water routes with the trans-
continental railroads, the rates by rail between the two
seaboards have been affected by those charged by the
carriers by water. The Panama Canal will shorten and
“ny PuIBUT 9Y1
JO S19}BM OY} pajesredas YoryA sYoo] SooyRslY 94} JO YJNos ayYAp ay} jo posod

 

ivudp jo spunod Q¢7'z¢E Jo 4se[q 24} smoys YdeiZ0j0yd sty T

“IVNVO VWYNVd GHL ONINALNA O1dIOVd AHL JO SYALVM AHL
IIPLIS SNIN [DUOYoULIIUT aYL ‘TYOLINdOD

 

 

 

 

 
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 211

improve the intercoastal water route and will greatly in-
crease the influence which the coastwise lines will be able
to exert upon the railroad services and rates. The volume
of traffic moving coastwise will be greatly enlarged by the
canal. Some goods now handled all-rail will move by water
or by rail and water lines, and there will necessarily follow
a modification of rail rates and a readjustment of the rela-
tion of the charges of rail and water lines.

What the actual freight rates between the Atlantic and
Pacific seaboards will be, by rail and water lines, after the
opening of the Panama Canal, and what shares of the total
traffic will move coastwise and by rail, can not be predicted
in advance; but inasmuch as the division of intercoastal
traffic between the water and rail carriers and the rates
charged by the competing ocean and rail routes may be
affected by the tolls charged for the use of the Panama
Canal, it is desirable that before fixing the tolls as com-
plete information as it is practicable to secure should be
obtained concerning the existing traffic and rates of both
the water and the rail lines connecting our two seaboards.
Accordingly, it is proposed to explain the nature of the traffic
now carried by water routes between the two seaboards.

It is well known that only partial information regarding
the traffic by rail between the eastern and western sections
of the United States is obtainable, but enough facts are
known as to the total transcontinental rail tonnage and
as to the seaboard and inland origin and destination of
that tonnage to give some indication of the probable effects
of the Panama Canal upon the traffic and upon the rate
policies of the eastern, southern, and transcontinental rail-
roads. It will be possible to present in sufficient detail
the traffic and rates of the coast-to-coast carriers by water
and to compare the present intercoastal rates by water
and rail lines. It will be understood that the conclusions
as to the effects which the Panama Canal will have upon the
transcontinental traffic and rates of the railroads must be
only tentative.
212 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

ROUTES AND TRAFFIC BY WATER BETWEEN THE ATLANTIC
AND PACIFIC SEABOARDS OF THE UNITED STATES

Shipments between the two seaboards of the United
States may move by three water routes that compete with
the rail lines connecting the two coasts, (1) the all-water
route around South America via Cape Horn for sailing
vessels and through the Straits of Magellan for steamers;
(2) the route by way of Panama with the transfer of traffic
by rail across the Isthmus; and (3) the route via the Isthmus
of Tehuantepec, across which, from Puerto Mexico on the
Gulf to Salina Cruz on the Pacific, freight is handled by
a railroad owned by the Mexican Government.

Traffic carried by rail lines between the Atlantic and
Pacific seaboards may move coastwise for a short distance
on each seaboard—as from New York to Norfolk or from
Portland, Ore., to San Francisco at the beginning or end
of the railroad haul across the continent. The only railroad
controlling a through route between the Atlantic and
Pacific seaboards is the Southern Pacific, which operates
the Morgan Line of steamers between New York and New
Orleans and Galveston. The steamers of the Morgan
Line extend the Southern Pacific route from the Gulf termini
of the railroad to New York, and thus enable the Southern
Pacific to compete both with the other transcontinental
railroads and with the intercoastal water routes around
South America and across the Isthmuses of Panama and
Tehuantepec. This combined rail and water line of the
Southern Pacific is called the ‘‘Sunset-Gulf Route.”

1. The oldest route between the two seaboards of the
United States is the one taken by sailing vessels around
Cape Horn. Prior to 1849, however, only an occasional
vessel, which was in most instances a whaler, undertook
the voyage between the Atlantic and Pacific, but with the
discovery of gold at the close of 1848, and for a few years
thereafter, there was a very large use of this route. In
1849, 775 vessels cleared from the Atlantic seaboard for
San Francisco and all but 12 of them were sailing vessels.
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 213

The opening of the Panama Railroad early in 1855 caused
most of the traffic between the seaboards to abandon the
long route around South America, but a considerable num-
ber of sailing vessels were annually dispatched between
the two seaboards by way of Cape Horn, and a small
amount of steam tonnage made use of the Magellan route.

The superiority of steamers over sailing vessels for
handling most classes of freight, even for such a long route
as that between the two seaboards of the United States
around South America, became evident during the 1890’s
and caused the company which was then operating the
principal line of sailing vessels between our two seaboards
by way of Cape Horn to sell its sailing vessels and to inaugu-
rate, in 1899, the American-Hawaiian line of steamers run
by way of the Straits of Magellan. Early in 1907 the
American-Hawaiian line shifted to the route via the Isthmus
of Tehuantepec, and since that date practically all of the
shipping moving between our two seaboards around South
America has consisted of chartered sailing vessels and
steamers that handle such bulky cargoes as can be eco-
nomically shipped by that circuitous route.

2. The Panama route between our two seaboards was
opened for traffic at the close of 1848, at the time of the
rush to the California gold fields. With the completion of
the railroad from Colon to Panama, early in 1855, most.
of the traffic between our two seaboards moved by way of
Panama; and this continued to be the principal highway
for transcontinental traffic until 1869, when the connection
of the Missouri River with the Pacific coast by the Union
and Central Pacific Railroads established the first rail line
across the United States. The traffic by way of Panama
rapidly fell off after 1869; and, though varying from year
to year, remained comparatively small until 1911, when
there was a sudden increase in the volume of traffic by
water between our two seaboards.

Several causes account for the relative unimportance
of the Panama route since 1869. The transcontinental
214 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

railroads, until recently, have maintained a relentless com-
petitive warfare against the Panama route. The through
rail rates between the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards are
lower than the rates for shorter hauls to and from the inter-
mediate points in the Rocky Mountain territory; and, until
the Government regulation of railroads became effective,
the railroad companies quoted shippers such rates as were
necessary to keep traffic from taking the Panama route.
Moreover, the transcontinental railroads were able to restrict
the use of the Panama route through their close relations
with the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, which has, for
most of the time, been the only regular line between the
west-coast ports of the United States and Panama. For
a period of 20 years, ending in 1893, the railroads, through
the Transcontinental Association, paid the Pacific Mail
Steamship Company a fixed monthly sum, or rental, for
the freight space available in its steamers, and thus com-
pletely controlled the Pacific Mail as a competitor. From
1900 to the present, the Southern Pacific Company has
owned a majority of the stock of the Pacific Mail Steam-
ship Company. The history of the relations of the Pacific
Mail to the transcontinental railroads and to the Panama
Railroad need not be presented in this account of the traffic
and rates by the various routes connecting the two sea-
boards of the United States.* It is sufficient to state that

* For the history of the relations of the Panama Railroad to the Pacific Mail Steamship
Company and for an account of the connection of the Pacific Mail with the transcontinental
railroads, the following references may profitably be consulted:

(1) Opinion of the Interstate Commerce Commission in Railroad Commission of Nevada
v. Southern Pacific Company et al. (June 22, 1911), 21 I. C. C. Reports, 329-384.

(2) Statement by Edward A. Drake, vice-president Panama Railroad, to the Committee
on Interoceanic Canals, United States Senate, Feb. 11, 1910.

(3) Report of Joseph L. Bristow, special Panama Railroad commissioner, to the Secre-
tary of War, June 24, 1905, upon the Policy to be Pursued in Management of the Panama
Railroad Company (Government Printing Office, Washington), also report of Jan. 20, 1908,
on the Advisability of the Establishment of a Pacific Steamship Line by the Isthmian Canal
Commission (S. Doc. No. 409, 62d Cong., 2d sess.).

(4) Statement by R. P. Schwerin, vice-president and general manager Pacific Mail Steam-
ship Company, to the Committee on Interoceanic Canals, United States Senate, on Senate
bill 428, Mar. 10, 1910. Also statement by Mr. Schwerin before same committee, on House
bill 21969 Mar. 1, 2, and 3, 1912.

(5) Statement by William R. Wheeler, representative of San Francisco Chamber of
Commerce, to Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals, on House bill 21969, May 27, 1912.

 
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 215

the transcontinental railroads by active competition and
by artificial restraint have, until recently, kept the traffic
via the Panama route comparatively small.

The development of traffic via Panama has been ham-
pered, not only by the competition and restraint of the
transcontinental railroads, but also by two other causes.
While the French company was engaged in construction
work on the Isthmus from 1882 to 1889, the use of the
Panama Railroad by commercial freight was restricted by
employment of the railroad for the transportation of mate-
rials and supplies used in construction work. Likewise,
since 1904, the construction of the canal has limited the
volume of commercial freight that could be handled across
the Isthmus. The other cause that has checked the growth
of traffic via Panama has been the competition of the
Tehuantepec route, which, since the beginning of 1907,
has afforded a shorter and better transportation route than
the one by way of Panama for the traffic between the two
seaboards of the United States. The volume of traffic
handled via Panama between our two seaboards during recent
years has been small and has tended to decline on account
of the absorption of the Panama Railroad in Canal work.

3. The Tehuantepec route was opened for traffic early
in 1907, when the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company
took its steamers off the route via the Straits of Magellan
and established regular line services on the Atlantic between
New York and Puerto Mexico and on the Pacific between
Salina Cruz and Hawaii and the west-coast ports of the
United States. In 1906 it made an agreement with the
Tehuantepec National Railway, which is owned by the
Mexican Government, stipulating that the railway com-
pany should receive one-third of the through rate. This
agreement also included a guaranty on the part of the
Tehuantepec National Railway that the net earnings of
the steamship company, per ship ton, should not be less
than the earnings had been in 1904, when the steamship
company was operating by way of the Straits of Magellan.
216 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

This guaranty, however, did not require the Tehuantepec
National Railway to reduce its share of the gross receipts
of the steamship company to less than 25 per cent. The
American-Hawaiian line has been very successful. The
fleet of the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company in-
creased from 3 steamers in 1899 to 9 steamers in 1904,
and to 17 in 1911. Five new steamers were ordered in
1911. The rapid growth in the traffic of the company
has been made possible by the sugar tonnage from Hawaii
to the eastern ports of the United States. The freight
shipments westbound between our two seaboards are larger
than those eastbound, but the exports of Hawaiian sugar
have enabled the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company
to run its steamers loaded in both directions. Indeed,
the exports of sugar from Hawaii have been much larger
than the American-Hawaiian Company could handle.

The through route between the two seaboards via the
Southern Pacific Railroad from the Pacific coast to Gal-
veston and New Orleans and from those cities to New York
by the Southern Pacific Company’s steamers (the Morgan
Line) was established in 1888. The Sunset-Gulf route
immediately began an active warfare against its com-
petitors by rail and by water lines, and secured a large
share of the traffic from coast to coast. The transconti-
nental railroads, other than the Southern Pacific, ran from
the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers to the Pacific coast
and were primarily interested in the development of traffic
between the Middle West and the Pacific coast. The
rates by the Sunset-Gulf route from New York to San
Francisco were made the same as the rates by the trans-
continental lines from St. Louis and Missouri River crossings
to the Pacific. Gradually the rates by the through all-rail
lines from the Atlantic to the Pacific were made the same
as the rates from Chicago, St. Louis, and Missouri River
crossings to the Pacific seaboard. This system of blanket
rates was worked out by 1896, and has since prevailed on
west bound traffic. The establishment of the same rates
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 217

by the Sunset-Gulf route and by the all-rail lines between
the two seaboards allied the Sunset-Gulf route with the
all-rail lines as common competitors against the water routes
around South America and via the Isthmuses of Panama
and Tehuantepec. The control of the Pacific Mail Steam-
ship Company by the transcontinental railroads since 1874,
and the ownership of the Pacific Mail by the Southern Pacific
from 1890 to the present, enabled the transcontinental
railroads, as has been explained, to keep the traffic by the
water routes within small proportions, until a few years
ago, when the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company,
and later the California-Atlantic, developed a relatively
large tonnage coastwise via the Tehuantepec and Panama
routes. This development of the coastwise business dur-
ing the last few years has not been seriously opposed by
the railroads, doubtless because of the rapid development
of the rail tonnage consequent upon the industrial progress
of the Intermountain and Pacific Coast States.

The volume of traffic handled between the Atlantic
and Pacific ports of the United States by the several water
routes has been constantly on the increase for a number of
years, showing the rapidly growing need for the canal. The
total tons of freight, not including Hawaiian sugar, rose
from less than 500,000 tons in 1906 to over 800,000 tons
in 1911. If the tonnage of Hawaiian sugar be included,
the increase during the six years in total traffic was from
560,000 to 1,104,000 cargo tons. The increase during the
four years ending in 1911 was steady and rapid. The
decline during 1907 and 1908 is to be accounted for mainly
by the San Francisco earthquake and fire.

An important feature is the separation of total traffic
into that handled by regular steamship lines and that
carried by individual vessels owned or chartered by the
shippers. The traffic handled by the regular lines more
than trebled during the six-year period, while that carried
by individual vessels decreased more than 50 per cent.
In 1911, 82.8 per cent of the entire traffic, other than
218 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

Hawaiian sugar, was carried by the regular lines, whereas
in 1906 only 42.1 per cent was shipped by the established
steamship lines.

The volume and variety of the traffic between the two
seaboards of the United States have so expanded as to
render the services of established steamship lines having
regular and frequent sailings more economical than the
services of individual vessels carrying full cargoes-of single
commodities. The traffic manager of the American-
Hawaiian line stated to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, on January 16, 1907, that—

We carry practically everything. In the course of a year I think we
have at least 90 per cent of the articles that may be named in the trans-
continental tariffs and a great many articles not on any tariff that are
continually offered and carried.

The traffic carried by way of the Panama route also
includes a large variety of commodities. The west-bound
freight tariff of the Panama Railroad Steamship Line re-
quires 25 pages to enumerate the several articles upon
which individual rates are quoted. The east-bound tariff
of the California-Atlantic Steamship Company is a type-
written document of 20 pages.

The freight carried between our two seaboards by way
of Panama and Tehuantepec originates and terminates not
only at the Atlantic and Pacific ports, but also at interior
points. Manifests of the shipments by the American-
Hawaiian line enumerate commodities shipped from eastern
New York, eastern Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maine; also
commodities from Syracuse and Buffalo, N. Y., from nu-
merous cities in Ohio, from certain cities in Michigan, and
from Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Louis. These same
manifests show that this freight is destined not only to
Pacific coast ports, but to inland points, such as Sacra-
mento, Stockton, The Dalles, Ore., Spokane and Everett,
Wash., and Reno, Nev.
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 219

Most of the bulk cargoes handled-in vessels owned or
chartered by shippers now move by the disadvantageous
routes around Cape Horn or through the Straits of Magellan.
The opening of the Panama Canal will make it possible
for the individual ship to engage in intercoastal traffic
under much better conditions. It is not probable, how-
ever, that the percentage of the total traffic handled by
individual vessels will increase in the future. It is more
probable that the percentage of the entire business handled
by lines will increase. Most of the traffic from our Pacific
to Atlantic ports carried in individual vessels owned or
chartered by the shipper will necessarily consist of cargoes
of grain, lumber, and sugar. The sugar traffic is already
large and may be expected to become heavier. The ship-
ments of grain from the west coast, especially from Puget
Sound ports, to Europe through the canal will be large,
but it is not probable that the grain from the northwestern
part of the United States will find very much market at
the Atlantic seaboard. That section of the United States
will in all probability be supplied from the grain fields of
the Middle West. Barley from the Pacific Coast States
will be required in the Mississippi Valley and Atlantic
coast sections of the United States, and may be shipped
in vessel cargoes as charter traffic. However, such com-
modities as wheat, barley, wool, canned salmon, and others
of a like character that might advantageously be shipped
as full cargoes in chartered vessels will probably be carried
eastbound mainly by line vessels, because of the fact that
the tonnage of traffic westbound is normally heavier than
the tonnage eastbound. Line vessels will seek these bulk
commodities as supplemental cargoes eastbound and at low
rates. As was stated above, the American-Hawaiian line
has developed a profitable business by securing a heavy
eastbound tonnage of Hawaiian sugar. In 1911 the Ha-
waiian line transported 295,800 tons westbound, but only
162,500 tons, other than sugar, eastbound.

The lumber shipments from the Pacific coast through
220 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

the canal will comprise a large tonnage, but the destina-
tion of most of the traffic will be Europe and not the eastern
part of the United States, which will continue to be supplied
mainly from the forests in the Southern States. The south-
ern pine and hardwood forests constitute the largest lumber-
producing district in the United States at the present time.
Shipments are made economically and expeditiously both
by all-rail routes to northern markets and also by rail to
southern seaports and thence by coastwise vessels.

Upon the opening of the Panama Canal it is probable
that manufacturers and other large shippers will employ
their own or chartered vessels for shipments of some heavy
commodities to Pacific markets. Undoubtedly there will
be a good deal of coal shipped westbound in chartered
vessels. Fertilizers, heavy iron and steel, and some other
commodities may be sent as bulk cargoes in individual
ships from time to time. It is probable, however, that
most commodities, other than coal and fertilizers, will be
shipped by line steamers.

The fact that most of the traffic through the canal
between the two seaboards of the United States will be
handled by regular steamship lines and that only a minor,
and probably a decreasing, percentage of the total will be
transported in individual vessels owned or chartered by
shippers should be given careful attention in considering,
(1) what the policy of the United States should be concern-
ing the prohibition of the use of the canal by vessels con-
trolled by railroads, and (2) concerning the remission or
omission of tolls upon vessels engaged in the coastwise
business.

1. The policy of denying the use of the canal to vessels
owned or controlled by, or affiliated with, railroad com-
panies is advocated by those who favor the policy mainly
for two reasons, (a) that the competition between the
railroad-controlled and the independent steamship lines
will be disastrous to the independent lines, and (6) that
the Government regulation of the rates and services of
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 221

ocean carriers is impracticable and undesirable. If coast-
wise traffic through the canal were to be handled mainly
by individual vessels owned or chartered by shippers,
Government regulation would, indeed, be impracticable;
but the service of steamship lines operating over established
routes is not essentially different from the transportation
service of the railroads. Moreover, when several steam-
ship lines operate over the same route or over competing
routes they have fixed schedules of rates established by
agreement and their rate policy differs in no marked degree
from that of competing railroads.

The rates charged by steamship lines differ fundamentally
from charter rates, which are highly competitive and fluctu-
ate with the supply of and demand for chartered tonnage.
Charter rates fluctuate according to business conditions
and could not be and ought not to be subject to Govern-
ment regulation. The rates of steamship lines, however,
are not only made in conferences of the competing lines,
but also in many cases are fixed with reference to the rates
charged by the railroads with which the steamship lines
must compete for traffic. It is thus at least doubtful
whether it is good public policy not to regulate the rates
and services of coastwise steamship lines. Whether such
regulation is wise or unwise, it is at least not impracticable.

2. The question of exempting coastwise shipping from
the payment of Panama Canal tolls should be decided
with reference to the parties that would be benefited by
that policy. If the tolls charged coastwise ships using
the canal are added to the rate of freight paid by shippers,
the remission of tolls will benefit the shippers and possibly,
to some extent, the general public. On the other hand,
if the freight rates are not any higher because of the tolls,
the exemption of ships from the payment of tolls will not
affect the freight rates, and the exemption of the payment
of tolls will benefit the steamship company and not the
shippers. Charter rates, as has just been stated, are highly
competitive and the rates which a shipper must pay to
222 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

secure the use of a vessel for a trip through the canal will
undoubtedly be increased by the amount of tolls paid.
Shippers using vessels which they own or charter will
receive the benefit of the exemption of canal tolls. On the
other hand, the rates charged by steamship lines, being
regulated by agreements among competing companies and
being fixed with reference to what the traffic will bear,
will presumably be as high as traffic conditions warrant
regardless of canal tolls. If the tolls are charged, the
operating expenses of the steamship companies will be
increased by the amount of the tolls and their net profits
will be lessened by the same amount. In other words,
free tolls will be a gratuity or a subsidy to the coastwise
steamship lines. There are reasons for believing that the
rates of the coastwise steamship lines, which will handle
from four-fifths to nine-tenths of the water traffic between
the two seaboards of the United States, will not be affected
by the policy of the United States Government as regards
free tolls.

Estimates of the comparative costs of shipment by the
methods outlined above as against those via the Panama
Canal all point to a saving of at least one-third in favor of
the canal. The railroads charge about one-third of the
through rate upon all freight carried between the coasts,
and this on an average amounts to between $3.00 and
$3.50 per cargo ton. Against this there will be merely the
charge of $1.20 per net vessel ton exacted for the use of the
canal. Inasmuch as a vessel ton is equivalent to 100 cubic
feet of space, while a cargo ton is only equivalent to 40
cubic feet of space, these terms must not be confused. As
a rule, freight vessels can transport more than two tons of
cargo for each net ton of rating, an average of about two
tons of freight capacity for each vessel ton. On this basis
the tolls as fixed for the canal at present will only amount
to about sixty cents per cargo ton, and the saving should
be from $2.40 to $2.90 on each ton of cargo as against the
railway transfer method.
‘aoueIjua oyToeg 3} poajoid ssiayeMyvaiq epg ‘orURTTy
ay} Wor; PeURD 9Y} Bul1ajua sdrys Joj Ioqiey ajes B UIOJ 0} PAUSISap St YSTYA Ja}eayeaiq sy} JO ade} 9Y} UO HOI Buroejd YIOM je aspaip & SMOYS UOTJEIJSN]]! oY,

‘INIOd OWOL WOW CUVMVAS ONIQOOT ‘AALVMAVANA LSaM AHL

SA AE

 

 

 

 
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 223

There are many commodities which will be shipped via
the canal which would not bear the double handling made
necessary by the old method, either by reason of their
fragile nature or the expense of double handling. Among
the latter are lumber, coal, ore and such materials which
are handled in bulk. This latter consideration will be of
the utmost importance in connection with the great ore and
nitrate deposits of the western coast of South America.

REDUCTIONS IN SHIPPING RATES

The matter of ascertaining the amount of reduction in
costs made possible by the use of the canal is not difficult
to determine. When, however, we attempt to investigate
the matter of a reduction of charges a more difficult situa-
tion confronts us. While the freight rates charged by
transcontinental railroads have been a great factor in creat-
ing a powerful demand for a canal, in the hope that water
competition would result in reducing present rates, it is
extremely doubtful if these reductions will bear a true
proportion to reductions in costs, although the idea is prev-
alent throughout the country that such will be the case.

Our industrial history has shown very clearly that it is
impossible to compel keen competition. Our railroad com-
panies have pools, conferences, mergers, road understand-
ings and agreements to such an extent that competitive
rates do not exist, and the Interstate Commerce Commission
is the only means open to the shipper of compelling a
reasonable relationship between costs of transportation and
rates. The rule of thumb by which railroad rates are fixed
is the phrase, ‘‘all that the traffic will bear,” and it seems
likely that this method will also be followed in fixing the
steamship rates through the canal, and the rates maintained
by the same methods as have been followed in the case of
the railroads. All of the great European transport lines are
bonded together in rate agreements, and it is probable that
the coastwise steamship lines using the Canal will be
224 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

operated under similar conditions, and the rates between
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts will be the same by all rival
lines. Of course there will be outside competition by means
of privately owned or chartered vessels, but inasmuch as
few shippers are able to forward in cargo lots this compe-
tition will amount to but a small percentage of the total
volume of trade, practically all of which will be handled by
the regular transport companies. These rates may be
modified, of course, by extending the power of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, or some similar body to their
regulation, but is is probable that the same conditions
which obtain in connection with the transcontinental rail-
roads will reappear in connection with the Canal.

RAILROAD COMPETITION

From this arises the question of competition between the
transcontinental railroads and the intercoastal steamship
lines. It has been thought that the railroads would be
compelled to reduce their rates to a competitive basis with
the freight rates charged via the Canal, and it was with the
idea of compelling such competition that railway-owned
ships were forbidden the use of the waterway. Two sets of
conditions are to be apprehended: the first, that rate confer-
ences between the steamship and railroad companies will
operate to maintain a non-competitive rate schedule between
them; or, in other words, that both will continue to charge
as much as the traffic will bear. The second condition is
that only about ten per cent of the railroad traffic is billed
through from coast to coast, and if the roads should reduce
the rate on this class of traffic they would be compelled to
adjust the rates to all intermediate points on a similar basis
and thus cut heavily into their revenues. On this account
it is altogether likely that the railroads will prefer to sacrifice
the ten per cent of volume rather than revise all the existing
rates on such a basis. Summing up the situation, we must
not anticipate a heavy reduction in costs of transportation
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 225

between the coasts either by ship or railroad. Certain
reductions, however, are bound to come, for the reasons
that competition cannot be entirely eliminated, and the
insistent demands of the public for rates which bear a rea-
sonable relation to the costs of service must be taken into
consideration in fixing rates; and there are certain commod-
ities upon which the reduction is sure to be material, and a
large number on which some reduction will certainly be
made in order to fill the ships which will naturally enter
into this business.

The most direct way of estimating what the people of
the United States and of the world at large are to gain by
the opening of the Panama Canal is to estimate the tonnage
which will pass through the canal, and to divide this tonnage
among the several classes of trade. It has been estimated
that the traffic between the coasts of the United States
will amount to only about one-tenth of the ships which
pass through the canal, our trade with foreign ports will
amount to about one-third, and that one-half of the traffic
will be ships which do not touch the ports of the United
States at any point, but simply use the canal as a short cut
between the Atlantic and the Pacific.

To understand the relation of the now existing trade
routes, and those which will come into being with the
Panama Canal, a study of a route map is necessary which
shows comparative distances on all of the principal trade
routes. (See page 226.)

RESULTS FAR REACHING

It is difficult to foresee all of the results which will be
obtained by the operation of the Canal, for the reason that
they are so numerous and so far-reaching. It is probable
that in course of time trade, political and banking conditions
will be revolutionized to a degree unforeseen. The first
effect will naturally be the tightening of the commercial ties
between the eastern and western sections of the United

15
226 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

(‘a8ed 941soddo uo 9][qQu}4 99g)
“IVNVO VNVNVd AHL Ad ANV SANIT ONILSIXG AW SAONVISIC ANV SALNOU AGVUL

 

i
a
3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 227

States, due to the greatly increased facilities for transporta-
tion between them. With the increase in commercial
relations will naturally come a greater community of
interests, not only commercial, but political and social, and
a closer welding of East and West.

DISTANCES IN NAUTICAL MILES
SAVED FROM NEW YORK VIA THE PANAMA CANAL ON TRADE ROUTES

San Francisco:

 

 

 

 

 

Miagellaniencta nce utee sae wpa ce aebale seo se Miacaeasnare sis 13,135
Panaaniay: o.oiteic cen ior sd oe Wien a heen a ees ey ae et ee 5,262
DAVed outa selon Metts posta era ha erecaus vans Recalave he gctaictey Seat ouedoee ss ha 7,873
Guayaquil:
Magellanic hires cies ineiata’ tmncthiate a sets encanta see tutes chant meveunieres ees 10,215
Panama cnaiegu cee yok a eee es Re Ge 8 et os tee are ea 2,810
AVEO os.o hath co micu he ictivias ies ohana uiseae: asreitituedans anpe ere tees 7,405
Callao:
Mapellans ii sc ee wa ate oesaottls gguatiel oe wee Sg accra an cela eeu iaateecines 9,613
Pai Arn tics cos es a a eS a roe at re shears Ro a EIR Se acer ee a aber 3,363
Savedivctectieta a caceus ea teennnlecntipnes baka Ree wae 2 Boerne anaes tale 6,250
Iquique:
Magellan’ cnx seins sate Se ares Roun lets ened Kole ateecent athiinieces 9,143
SPB yn na Be os as cers yenistctie Cah ea anes coon May via creeecan ee teareuavels rade 4,004
SAVE ds iciaccule satan acarnlouee eed Oa wate eee ad eee enue ares alah eit 5,139
Valparaiso:
Magellan’. cs5 caasceiiso een dh eh ois ise eat eee 8,380
Panam as. oii s cece eae ea Sia es ME Us A eee I Siecaetelers eek 4,633
Saved tie so vaiave soseeeie o ahceeve ea Seen e moeer ae a ee ces aus Gest 3,747
Honolulu:
Magellan. 2.5. 2ce cece cence bene teed ene een ee nee cee 13,312
Pam Anse acces es ee ee wiedale waeinG eae as oconnaw hehe Geta anaes aa 6,700

 
228 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

 

 

 

 

Manila:
DUCZ a bina arodcnys sti bearer sane Raare eR Pena eames oe 11,589
SAMUI Ghia 2 i schay eG ye te Behe oe ec bm coast me Hack caloveue, casement e Groep 11,548
DAVE Ge Arnevaes aod xictn see dean ston Main Sool Poera ene oto ants 41
Yokohama:
PUES rsicteiepssees shane ailspukeresiie wom Babe ciese acu aud oededacy ah aca crak ove yaatancberes teat 13,079
PBA UIA atte aoa eaeue vans sees Ae uaaey Ore tolelel as Rigsbol cs Guoloueiacs vooanea atzeosye 9,798
Saved: vcvwscavenara soa sieve VeRae ys ald CE RGR at eos ale ea oes 3,281
Hongkong:
UCT ee) ee ies ae atd via ata esau agary oa tenay esr ithete 4d tor Se aiauscae susie eicbebs 11,628
SP TAMA etic shat ose Recah aoa, Ration 8 Rahassees, Lae Ai aE aaa eae 11,383
BVO i ices Biegig dg weiboan di gwen 98 RPS mceTy AA weer aelln roan xorg 245
Melbourne:
Magellan ost saa icne Xe cious neko tes carte Sand Se egusnionean Sc aiat 12,852
MP ATV TUNE an css cain oi ncn tts nan a Ie Soaedak no tuen Sd Gasaded nb aalodaneiy Latuces a eet 10,030
POV. G Chess sbecaccestyt ret taster ome ures dagen aoa es roe ah een cori tO 2,822

THE CANAL AND THE COMMERCE OF AMERICA

The establishment of a waterway between the two
great oceans of the globe will more widely affect the com-
merce of the world than any single work or event in its
history. President Hayes, in 1879, declared that ‘‘an
interoceanic canal across the American Isthmus will es-
sentially change the geographic relations between the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States and be-
tween the United States and the rest of the world.” The
Panama route will effect much greater economies of time
and distance than those that are at present secured by the
use of the Suez Canal.

Colquhoun, in his ‘‘Key to the Pacific,” says: “It will
bind together the remote sections of that immense country,
assimilate its diverse interests, go far towards solving many

* Via San Francisco and the Great Circle.

 
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 229

difficult problems, and make the United States still more
united. . . . No greater impulse to commerce can be
given than this complement to the Suez Canal. It will
benefit America in an infinitely greater degree than Europe.

It will give an immense impetus to United States
manufactures, especially cotton and iron, and will greatly
stimulate the shipbuilding industry and the naval power
of the United States.”

Whilst the Panama Canal must prove an universal boon
it will doubtless work to the detriment of some countries
and certain industries, at least until after adjustment of
the new trade relations. America will always be the great-
est beneficiary of the advantages accruing from the use of
the waterway and we will briefly consider a few of the
changes in conditions that have been brought about by
the completion of the enterprise to which so large an amount
of American energy, intellect and capital has been devoted.

EFFECT OF THE CANAL ON THE COMMERCE OF THE SOUTH _

No region in the United States can feel the immediate
benefit of the new route to the same extent as the Southern
States and the vast Valley of the Mississippi. The latter
territory, the richest in all the world, one and a quarter
million square miles in extent, intersected by five thousand
miles of navigable waterway, with prolific soil and ener-
getic people, finds new markets and a new outlet for its
varied products no longer dependent upon expensive rail-
way transportation,’ Chicago is nearly the same distance
from New Orleans as from New York, but St. Paul, Omaha,
Dubuque, Evansville and Denver are nearer to the former
point than to the latter. It is quite probable that the
present generation will see ocean steamships coming down
from Duluth, through the Great Lakes, an inland canal,
and the Mississippi River, to the Gulf of Mexico, and pass-
ing on to Pacific and Asian ports.

The new gateway to the Pacific will give a tremendous
230 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

iinpetus to the industries of the South. Its raw cotton,
which for a decade has been making small gains, under
difficult competition with the British East Indies and China,
in the Japanese market, is relieved of an onerous handicap.
The product of its mills, a coarse fabric, such as is especially
adapted to the requirements of South American and Ori-
ental consumers, must enjoy an enlarged demand under
stimulating conditions. Heretofore almost all the cotton
goods exported from this country to Asia has gone out
through New York eastward by way of the Suez Canal.

Alabama coal will find a constant and extensive demand
at Panama, which will become the greatest coaling port in
the world. Birmingham, where iron can be produced more
cheaply than at any other place on the earth, will find new
markets in South America and Asian countries for its output.
The steel, machinery, and various hardware of Tennessee
and other Southern States, which have been reaching
Australia and China during the past few years under the
most disadvantageous conditions of shipment, can be sent
through the Canal to these and other destinations at a
cost which may defy competition. The large lumber and
wood manufacturing industries of the South will be ob-
viously benefited to a great extent by the creation of a
short route to the western coasts of Central and South
America.

, GREAT BENEFITS TO OUR PACIFIC STATES
WW
- The immense saving in the journey from our eastern
ports to the Pacific Coast will revolutionize the trade of
the latter region. / Von Schierbrand says:* ‘‘It has been
computed that on a single voyage of a 1,500-ton sailing
vessel between Port Townsend, Seattle or San Francisco
and Boston, New York or Philadelphia, the saving effected
in wages, repairs, insurance, provisions, and freight charges,

by reason of the Panama Canal will aggregate between

*Amerioa, Asia and the Pacific, Wolf von Schierbrand. New York, 1904.
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 231

$8,000 and $9,500.” Many raw products of our Pacific
Coast, which can not bear the cost of long railroad hauls,
are made available to eastern markets at prices profitable
to the producer and the manufacturer. This applies par-
ticularly to building lumber and furnishes a partial solution
to the problem with which the rapidly disappearing forests
of our middle and eastern states are confronting us. The
economies effected in the transportation of the cereal and
fruit products of California and other western regions may
easily be imagined. Millions of pounds of fish were sent
annually in ice across the continent, aside from the enor-
mous quantities that went to Europe in English sailing
vessels round Cape Horn. All this passes through the
Canal.

The Canal is the means of enabling the people of the
Pacific Coast to buy more cheaply and to secure better
prices for their products. By breaking the monopolistic
power of the railroads it will lead to the agricultural de-
velopment of the unoccupied sections of this territory, to a
vast increase in its population and to the creation of world-
wide markets for its products.

A BOON TO THE NORTHEASTERN TERRITORY

«The industries of the northeastern section of the United
States, that is to say the territory lying to the east of Pitts-
burg and to the north of the James River, consist mainly
of the manufactures of iron and steel, machinery, tools,
etc., and textiles, coal mining, and shipbuilding. The
exports of manufactured cotton from this and other parts
of the United States go principally to ports in Asia and
Oceania, where their chief competitor is the product of the
British mills. It is not necessary to expatiate upon the
advantage which the short route will give to us in this
trade. The countries of South America expend about
$80,000,000 annually in the purchase of cotton goods.
At present, however, little more than five per cent of this
232 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

large sum is paid for American cloth, but the facilities for
shipping economically that will be created by the Canal
must have, among other results, that of giving to the manu-
facturers of our Northeastern and Southern States a very
large share of this desirable business.

It is hoped that by the use of a new type of steel river
barge of large capacity and small draft the coal of Penn-
sylvania and the Southern mines may be shipped direct to
Panama at a cost of one dollar per short ton. This would
allow of its being sold at three dollars, a figure sufficiently
low to preclude successful competition. The ability to
supply cheap fuel would not only accrue to the benefit of
our coal mining interests, but would, where other consid-
erations balanced, decide shipmasters in favor of the
Panama route, for the contract price of steam coal at Port
Said is about six dollars and the current price about ten
dollars per ton.

OUR ADVANTAGE OVER FOREIGN COMPETITORS

The principal exporting competitors of the United
States in the markets for the manufactures of iron and steel
are Great Britain, Germany and Belgium. European
producers can reach the west coast of South America, and
the oriental countries in general, more readily than can our
manufacturers, but the Canal will entirely subvert the con-
dition in the favor of the latter. Few of our industries are
likely to receive such an expansive impulse from that event
as those dependent upon iron and steel for their material
and the section which will benefit most in that respect is
the coal and ore region of the South.

One of the most certain consequences of the increased
American trade due to the waterway between the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans will be the great extension of the mer-
chant marine and the expansion of the shipbuilding in-
dustry of the country. The Canal will have the effect of
largely increasing the coasting trade of the United States
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 233

and all the vessels engaged in it must be built in American
yards. Aside from this the increased foreign trade under
conditions that will make the shipping business once more
profitable, must lead to the construction of a large ad-
ditional number of American vessels, and the considerable
benefiting of American shipbuilders, who find great diffi-
culty in competing with those of Europe on account of our
higher wage scales.

A large shipbuilder responded to an inquiry by the
Isthmian Canal Commission with the following statement:
“In my judgment the opening of the Isthmian Canal and the
development of its traffic would stimulate American ship-
building to the extent of an increased demand for vessels
to be used in trade affected by said canal. As a rule in-
creased demand develops increased sources of supply and
the cost of product is invariably reduced in proportion of
increased business to fixed expenses of any manufacturing
establishment, and therefore the canal would in this case
tend to enable shipbuilders to construct ships more econom-
ically and more surely to compete with foreign builders.”

The foregoing are only a few illustrative examples of
the benefits to certain portions of the United States con-
ferred by the Panama Canal. Anything approaching a
comprehensive statement of the matter would fill a large
volume.

THE EFFECT ON OUR FOREIGN COMMERCE

But to gain a full view of all that will be accomplished
it is necessary to go farther afield. Up to within the
last few years the American people have been so largely
occupied with the development of the enormous natural
resources of this country they have had little time or neces-
sity for the development of foreign trade, and the com-
merce of the world at large is carried on by European
nations. This state of affairs cannot exist indefinitely,
however, and our foreign trade is now growing very rap-
idly. In spite of this present great total, however, the
234 THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL

effect of the Panama Canal will be to multiply it enor-
mously. For instance, our percentage of the great trade
with the western coast of South America is extremely small.
The shipments from southern Chile of nitrate, copper and
iron ores, etc., amount to an enormous tonnage each vear.
Of this the United States gets less than one-fifth. Grain
shipments from western South America are also heavy, and
practically all of this goes to Europe. With the Canal open
the United States will be so much nearer than Europe that
a large portion of this trade should eventually be diverted
to the eastern coast of the United States, where our great
manufacturing plants are located. The same conditions
apply to Australia and New Zealand, with which we will be
on a par with Europe so far as distance is concerned by the
use of the canal, and our Atlantic coast will be 4,000 miles
nearer Australia by Panama than by Suez. New York will
be 5,000 miles nearer New Zealand by Panama than around
the Cape of Good Hope.

Our traffic with the Far East, China and Japan, will
likewise be greatly benefited by the new route, although not
to such a great extent, as both China and the Philippines
will be equally distant from New York via both the Panama
Canal and the Suez Canal. From the standpoint of a
reduction of distance the Panama Canal will undoubtedly
benefit us to a very great extent.

The other considerations of costs of fuel, supplies,
facility for repairs, etc., have been taken care of by the
establishment of the great supply stations at Panama.

THE EFFECT ON OUR SHIPPING INTERESTS

The question of American shipping has been a sore
point for many years. In fact, the American flag has
almost disappeared from the world’s merchant marine.
There have been various causes for this, chief among them
the high cost of labor, which has put the cost of building
ships in the United States up to a prohibitive figure and made
THE RESULTS OF OPENING THE CANAL 235

it far cheaper to buy ships abroad and operate them under
a foreign flag than to build here. Recent legislation ad-
mitting foreign built ships to American registry, together
with the admission of necessary parts free of duty, looks
to the remedy of this matter, and we shall probably see an
enormous increase in the American registry within the next
few years. Ships, however, which are engaged purely in
the coastwise trade must still be built in the United States
to obtain the privilege of American registry.

WILL THE CANAL PAY

The question of whether or not the Canal would pay
has been one which has agitated the American people for
some time. The maximum rate which has been authorized
by Congress for canal tolls is $1.25 per ton on freight, and
$1.50 per passenger, although these rates may be reduced
by the President in case they are higher than necessary
to produce the amount required for operation and main-
tenance, which will amount to about $4,000,000 annually.
If we take into account the interest upon the investment
at the rates at which the Canal bonds have been placed,
the tolls must produce another $10,000,000 per year, or a
total of $14,000,000 annually for the Canal to be self-
supporting. It is not likely from the outlook that the
Canal will pay for some years to come.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I*
GREAT CANALS OF THE WoRLD

Ship canals connecting great bodies of water, and of
sufficient dimensions to accommodate the great modern
vessels plying upon such waters, are of comparatively recent
production and few in number. The one great example
of works of this character which has been a sufficient length
of time in existence and operation to supply satisfactory
data as to cost of maintenance and operation and practical
value to the commerce of the world is the Suez Canal, and
for this the available statistics begin with the year 1870,
while its new and enlarged dimensions only date from the
year 1896. For the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, connecting
Lake Superior with Lake Huron, statistics date from 1855.
Statistics of the Welland Canal date from 1867, though
the canal in its enlarged form has been in operation only
since 1900. The other great ship canals of the world are
of much more recent construction, and data regarding
their operation therefore cover a comparatively brief term,
and in some cases are scarcely at present available in
detail.

The artificial waterways which may properly be termed
ship canals are nine in number, viz.:

(1) The Suez Canal, begun in 1859 and completed in
1869.

(2) The Cronstadt and St. Petersburg Canal, begun in
1877 and completed in 1890.

(3) The Corinth Canal, begun in 1884 and completed
in 1893.

* The following matter is largely quoted from the monograph under this title issued by
the Department of Commerce and Labor, Washington, D. C.

(239)
240 GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD

(4) The Manchester Ship Canal, completed in 1894.

(5) The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, connecting the Baltic
and North Seas, completed in 1895.

(6) The Elbe and Trave Canal, connecting the North
Sea and Baltic, opened in 1900.

(7) The Welland Canal, connecting Lake Erie with
Lake Ontario.

(8 and 9) The two canals, United States and Canadian,
respectively, connecting Lake Superior with Lake Huron.

THE SUEZ CANAL

The Suez Canal is usually considered the most im-
portant example of ship canals, though the number of
vessels passing through it annually does not equal that
passing through the canals connecting Lake Superior with
the chain of Great Lakes at the south. In length, how-
ever, it exceeds any of the other great ship canals, its total
length being 90 miles, of which about two-thirds is through
shallow lakes. Work on the canal was begun on April
25, 1859. Political, labor and financial troubles delayed
the completion of the enterprise, however, and the formal
opening of the canal was not until November, 1869.

The material excavated was usually sand, though in
some cases strata of solid rock from 2 to 3 feet in thick-
ness were encountered. The total excavation was about
80,000,000 cubic yards under the original plan, which gave
a depth of 25 feet. In 1895 the canal was so enlarged
as to give a depth of 31 feet, a width at the bottom of
108 feet and at the surface of 420 feet. The original cost
was $95,000,000, and for the canal in its present form
slightly in excess of $120,000,000.

By the concessions of 1854 and 1856 the tolls were to
be the same for all nations, preferential treatment of any
kind being forbidden, and the canal and its ports were to
be open to every merchant ship without distinction of
nationality. The formal neutralization of the canal oc-
GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD 241

curred in 1888 by the Suez Canal Convention, but was not
fully assented to until April 8, 1904.

The canal is without locks, being at sea level the entire
distance. The length of time occupied in passing through
the canal averages about eighteen hours. By the use of
electric lights throughout the entire length of the canal
passages are made with nearly equal facility by night or
day. The use of these lights, the growth in canal dimen-
sions, the increase in the number and size of passing stations
or ‘“‘lay-bys” and the straightening of curves have reduced
the average time required to pass through the canal from
48 hours 58 minutes in 1870 to 17 hours 1 minute in 1911.

The canal has accommodated the following traffic service
since its opening:

Gross

VESSELS. Tonnage.
VTS eatres come vnats ashe c eee ken Bick ee enki 9 Rane Say ema ig ora ne 486 654,915
ESC Dhoni ete be nets bedi taen nena yey h oases 1,494 2,940,708
SSO Meee eho tr eee eat tg anes 2,026 4,344,519
TS OO Pe ehenee dee Rte nie pred cee Sameer eer tine ee 3,389 9,749,129
TO Fite oe ceegeen hota tA ee alia US tan Ae te: an ee 3,434 11,833,637
FL O(N seat ents Se tar oe tego eon anteater anne! 3,541 13,699,237
WG OS aosess aescs di eu antes eet cent bn re Coe ek tee tn 4,116 13,134,105
UO 1 ces hei ic teste RN RR ae, Roce) Secret tas yanz jaan ogre Ae 4,533 16,581,898

The tolls charged are 62 francs per ton for vessels carry-
ing cargo, and 4} francs for vessels in ballast. Steam vessels
passing through the canal are propelled by their own power.

THE CRONSTADT AND ST. PETERSBURG CANAL

The canal connecting the Bay of Cronstadt with St.
Petersburg is described as a work of great strategic and
commercial importance to Russia. The canal and sailing
course in the Bay of Cronstadt are about 16 miles long,
the canal proper being about 6 miles and the bay channel
about 10 miles, and they together extend from Cronstadt,
on the Gulf of Finland, to St. Petersburg. The canal
was opened in 1890 with a navigable depth of 204 feet,
the original depth having been about 9 feet; the width

16
242 GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD

ranges from 220 to 350 feet. The total cost is estimated
at about $10.000,000.

THE CORINTH CANAL

The next of the great ship canals connecting bodies of
salt water in the order of date of construction is the Corinth
Canal, which connects the Gulf of Corinth with the Gulf
of Aigina. The canal reduces the distance from Adriatic
ports about 175 miles and from Mediterranean ports about
100 miles. Its length is about 4 miles, a part of which
was cut through granite soft rock and the remainder through
soil. There are nolocks. The width of the canal is 72 feet
at bottom and the depth 261 feet. The work was begun in
1884 and completed in 1893 at a cost of about $5,000,000.
The average tolls are 18 cents per ton and 20 cents per
passenger.

THE MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL

The Manchester Ship Canal, which connects Man-
chester, England, with the Mersey River, Liverpool, and
the Atlantic Ocean, was opened for traffic January 1, 1894.
The length of the canal is 35% miles, the total rise from
the water level to Manchester being 60 feet, which is divided
between four sets of locks, giving an average to each of 15
feet. The minimum width is 120 feet at the bottom and
average 175 feet at the water level; the minimum depth 26
feet, and the time required for navigating the canal from
five to eight hours. The total amount of excavation in
the canal and docks was about 45,000,000 cubic yards,
of which about one-fourth was sandstone rock. The lock
gates are operated by hydraulic power; railways and
bridges crossing the route of the canal have been raised
to give a height of 75 feet to vessels traversing the canal,
and an ordinary canal whose route it crosses is carried over
it by a springing aqueduct composed of an iron caisson
resting upon a pivot pier. The total cost of the canal is
given at $75,000,000. The revenue in 1911, according to
GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD 243

the Statesman’s Year-Book. was £580,841, and the working
expenses, £305,977.

THE KAISER WILHELM CANAL

Two canals connect the Baltic and North seas through
Germany, the first, known as the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal,
having been completed in 1895 and constructed largely for
military and naval purposes, but proving also of great
value to general mercantile traffic. Work upon the Kaiser
Wilhelm Canal was begun in 1887, and completed, as before
indicated, in 1895. The length of the canal is 61 miles, the
terminus in the Baltic Sea being at the harbor of Kiel.
The depth is 294 feet, the width at the bottom 72 feet,
and the minimum width at the surface 190 feet. The
route lies chiefly through marshes and shallow lakes and
along river valleys. The total excavation amounted to
about 100,000,000 cubic yards, and the cost to about
$40,000,000. The saving is 200 miles in the Kattegat
passage, and the time of transit occupies from eight to ten
hours.

THE ELBE AND TRAVE CANAL

A smaller canal known as the Elbe and Trave Canal,
with a length of about 41 miles and a depth of about 10
feet, was opened by the Emperor of Germany, June 16,
1900.

It was under construction for five years, and cost about
$5,831,000, of which Prussia contributed $1,785,000 and the
old Hanse town of Lubeck $4,046,000. This canal is the
second to join the North Sea and the Baltic, following the
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal (or Kiel Canal), built at a cost of
$37,128,000. The breadth of the Elbe and Trave Canal
is 72 feet; breadth of the locks, 46 feet; length of locks,
261 feet; depth of locks, 8 feet 2 inches. It is crossed by
29 bridges, erected at a cost of $1,000,000. There are
seven locks, five being between Lubeck and the Mollner
244 GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD

See (the summit point of the canal) and two between
Mollner See and Lauenburg-on-the-Elbe. The canal is
able to accommodate vessels up to 800 tons burden; and
the passage from Lubeck to Lauenburg occupies 18 to 21
hours. The first year it was open (June, 1900, to June,
1901) a total of 115,000 tons passed through the canal.

ELECTRIC TOWING

At this point it may be noted that the Germans began
experiments during 1900 with electric towing on the Finow
Canal between Berlin and Stettin. A track of 1-meter
gauge was laid along the bank of the canal, having one
9-pound and one 18-pound rail laid partly on cross-ties
and partly on concrete blocks. The larger rail served
for the return current, and had bolted to it a rack which
geared with a spur wheel on the locomotive. The loco-
motive was 6 feet 10 inches by 4 feet 10 inches, mounted
on four wheels, with a wheel base of 3 feet 6 inches, and
weighing 2 tons. It was fitted with a 12-horsepower
motor, current for which was furnished by a 9-kilowatt
dynamo, driven by a 15-horsepower engine. The current
was 500 volts, transmitted by a wire carried on wooden
poles 23 feet high and about 120 feet apart. The boats
were about 132 feet long and 15 feet 6 inches beam, and
carried from 150 to 175 tons on a draft of 4 feet 9 inches.

SHIP CANALS CONNECTING THE GREAT LAKES OF
NORTH AMERICA

Three ship canals intended to give continuous passage
to vessels from the head of Lake Superior to Lake Ontario
and the St. Lawrence River are the Welland Canal, orig-
inally constructed in 1833 and enlarged in 1871 and 1900;
the St. Mary’s Falls Canal at Sault Ste. Marie, Mich.,
opened in 1855 and enlarged in 1881 and 1896, and the
Canadian Canal at St. Mary’s River, opened in 1895. In
point of importance, measured at least by their present use,
GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD 245

the canals at the St. Mary’s River by far surpass that of
the Welland Canal, the number of vessels passing through
the canals at the St. Mary’s River being eight times as
great as the number passing through the Welland, and the
tonnage of the former nearly forty times as great as that
of the latter. One of the important products of the Lake
Superior region, iron ore, is chiefly used in the section con-
tiguous to Lake Erie, and a large proportion of the grain
coming from Lake Superior passes from Buffalo to the
Atlantic coast by way of the Erie Canal and railroads
centering at Buffalo. The most important article in the
westward shipments through the Sault Ste. Marie canals,
coal, originates in the territory contiguous to Lake Erie.
These conditions largely account for the fact that the
number and tonnage of vessels passing the St. Mary’s
River canals so greatly exceed those of the Welland Canal.

The Welland Canal connects Dalhousie on Lake Ontario
and Port Colburne on Lake Erie on the Canadian side of
the river. It was constructed in 1833 and enlarged in 1871
and again in 1900. The length of the canal is 27 miles,
the number of locks 25, the total rise of lockage 327 feet,
and the total cost about $26,000,000. The canal will
accommodate vessels of 14 feet draught.

THE SAULT STE. MARIE CANALS

The canals at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, and Ontario
are located adjacent to the falls of the St. Mary’s River,
which connects Lake Superior with Lake Huron, and lower
or raise vessels from one level to the other, a height of 17
to 20 feet. The canal belonging to the United States was
begun in 1853 by the State of Michigan and opened in 1855,
the length of the canal being 5,674 feet, and provided with
two tandem locks, each being 350 feet in length and 70 feet
wide, and allowing passage of vessels drawing 12 feet, the
original cost being $1,000,000; the final, $4,000,000. The
United States Government, by consent of the State, began
246 GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD

in 1870 to enlarge the canal, and by 1881 had increased its
length to 1.6 miles, its width to an average of 160 feet, and
its depth to 16 feet; also had built the Weitzel lock, 515
feet long and 80 feet wide, 60 feet at gate openings, with a
depth of 17 feet on the sills, which was located 100 feet
south of the State locks. The State relinquished all control
of the canal in March, 1882. In 1887 the State locks were
torn down and replaced by a single lock known as the Poe,
800 feet long, 100 feet wide, with a depth of 22 feet of
water on the sills. This lock was put in commission in
1896. The canal was also deepened to 25 feet. In 1908
began the widening of the canal above the locks and the
construction of a new lock 1,350 feet long between gates and
having a draught of 244 feet at extreme low water. The
Canadian canal, 14 miles long, 150 feet wide, and 22 feet
deep, with lock 900 feet long, 60 feet wide, with 22 feet on
the miter sills, was built on the north side of the river dur-
ing the years 1888 to 1895 at a cost of $7,900,000. The
commerce passing through the canals is larger than that of
any other canal in the world; the total tonnage of the
American canal in 1910 was 49,856,123, while that of the
Suez Canal was only 23,054,901.

LAKE BORGNE CANAL

The Lake Borgne, Louisiana, Canal was formally opened
in August of 1901. It affords continuous water communica-
tion with lakes Maurepas, Pontchartrain, and Borgne, the
Mississippi Sound, Mobile, and the Alabama and Warrior
rivers, and the entire Mississippi River system, and has an
important bearing as a regulator of freight rates between
these sections. The effects of the canal may be briefly
summed up as: Shortening the distance between New
Orleans and the Gulf points east of the Mississippi; bring-
ing shipments from the Gulf coast direct to the levees at
New Orleans; saving the trans-shipment of through freights,
with a consequent reduction in freight rates; enabling sea-
GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD 247

going vessels, drawing 10 to 12 feet of water, to come within
20 miles of New Orleans, saving all such craft the cost of
tonnage, and shortening, by 60 miles, direct water com-
munication between New Orleans and the deep water of
the Gulf. In addition to these effects may be enumerated
the cheapening of coal for consumption at New Orleans.
Coal had hitherto been floated down the rivers from Pitts-
burgh, a distance of 2,100 miles. The canal opened up the
coal fields in the interior of Alabama for New Orleans
consumption and reduced coal prices considerably, giving
an additional advantage to domestic industries and to
steamers purchasing bunker coal. The canal is 7 miles long
and from 150 to 200 feet in width. Bayou Dupre forms a
portion of the canal. The lock chamber is 200 feet long,
50 feet wide, and 25 feet deep, and connects the canal with
the Mississippi River.

THE CHICAGO SANITARY AND SHIP CANAL

The Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal connects Lake
Michigan at Chicago with the Illinois River at Lockport,
a distance of 34 miles. It was cut for the purpose of giving
to tne city of Chicago proper drainage facilities by revers-
ing the movement of water, which formerly flowed into
Lake Michigan through the Chicago River, and turning
a current from Lake Michigan through the Chicago River
to the Illinois River at Lockport and thence down the
Illinois River to the Mississippi. The canal, which is prac-
tically a sewer, is flushed with water from Lake Michigan,
and its waters are pure within a flow of 150 miles. Its
capacity, not fully utilized at first, is 600,000 cubic feet
per minute, sufficient to renew the water of the Chicago
River daily. Indeed it has been proved that the Illinois
is purer than the Mississippi at their junction.

The minimum depth of the canal is 22 feet, its width
at bottom 160 feet, and the width at the top from 162 to
290 feet, according to the class of material through which
248 GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD

it is cut. The work was begun September 3, 1892, and
completed and the water turned into the channel January
2, 1900. The flow of water from Lake Michigan toward
the Gulf is now at the rate of 360,000 cubic feet per minute,
and the channel is estimated to be capable of carrying
nearly twice that amount. The total excavation in its
construction included 28,500,000 cubic yards of glacial
drift and 12,910,000 cubic yards of solid rock, an aggregate
of 41,410,000 cubic yards. In addition to this the con-
struction of a new channel for the Desplaines River became
necessary in order to permit the canal to follow the bed
of that river, and the material excavated in that work
amounted to 2,068,659 cubic yards, making a grand total
displacement in the work of 48,478,659 cubic yards of
material which, according to a statement issued by the
trustees of the sanitary district of Chicago, would, if
deposited in Lake Michigan in 40 feet of water, form an
island 1 mile square with its surface 12 feet above the
water line.

All bridges along the canal are movable structures.
The total cost of construction, including interest account,
aggregated $34,000,000, of which $21,379,675 was for
excavation and about $3,000,000 for rights of way and
$4,000,000 for building railroad and highway bridges over
the canal.

The Illinois and Michigan Canal, which formerly car-
ried off most of the waste of the city, is used by small craft,
and the new drainage canal also may be used for shipping
in view of the federal government’s improvements of the
rivers connecting it with the Mississippi for the construction
of a ship canal for large vessels. The canal also made
possible the development of enormous hydraulic power for
the use of the city.

THE HENNEPIN CANAL

The Illinois and Michigan Canal has been supplemented
by the Illinois and Mississippi Canal, more commonly
GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD 249

known as the “Hennepin.” It completes a navigable
waterway from the Mississippi River to Lake Michigan.
The first appropriation for the project was made in 1890;
work was begun in 1892 and the canal formally opened,
October 24, 1907.

Starting at the great bend of the Illinois River, 12
miles above Hennepin, this barge canal follows the Bureau
Creek valley to the mouth of Queen River on the Rock
River, and then proceeds by the Rock River and a canal
around its rapids at Milan to its mouth at Rock Island
in the Mississippi River. The canal is 80 feet in width
at the water line, 52 feet in width at the bottom, and seven
feet in depth. The greater part of the water comes from
the Rock River, which is dammed by a dam nearly 1,500
feet long between Sterling and Rock Falls, Illinois.

OTHER CANALS

In addition to the ship canals previously mentioned,
there are a number of other important waterways worthy
of mention. The great North Holland Canal, cut in 1845
from Amsterdam to Helder, a distance of 51 miles, to
avoid the shoals of the Zuyder Zee, has a depth of 20 feet,
a width of 125 feet at the surface, and carries vessels of
1,300 tons burden, and is described as ‘‘the chief cause of
the great prosperity of Amsterdam.”

The Caledonian Canal, which connects the Atlantic
Ocean and North Sea through the north of Scotland, is
17 feet in depth, 50 feet in width at the bottom, and 120
feet at the surface, with a surface elevation at the highest
point of 94 feet above sea level. The canal proper is 250
miles long, and the distance between the terminals over
300 miles. It saves about 400 miles of coasting voyage
round the north of Great Britain through the stormy
Pentland Firth. The cost has been stated at $7,000,000,
including repairs; and the annual income is between
$35,000 and $40,000.
250 GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD

The Canal du Midi, cut through France from Toulouse,
on the Garonne River, to Cette, on the Mediterranean,
a distance of 150 miles, is 60 feet wide, 63 feet deep, has
114 locks, and is, at its highest point, 600 feet above the
level of the sea. Its cost was $3,500,000, and it is navigable
for vessels of 100 tons.

In India the canals, constructed primarily for irrigation
purposes, at a cost of about $15,000,000, are utilized to
a considerable extent for inland navigation. In Germany
the canals, aside from the Kaiser Wilhelm, are 1,511 miles
in length, and the canalized rivers 1,452 miles. In France
the length of the canals in operation is 3,021 miles.

CANADIAN CANALS

The canal systems of European countries and of Canada
differ from those of the United States in that they are
operated in conjunction with, and made complemental to,
the railway systems of those countries. Canada’s six great
systems of government canals afford, with the St. Lawrence
River connections, important inland communications. The
total length of the canals in operation is 262 miles, but
the aggregate length of continuous inland navigation ren-
dered available by them is nearly 3,000 miles. The amount
expended in the construction and maintenance of these
canals, including the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, is over
$100,000,000.

The St. Lawrence River canal system from Lake Superior
to tide water overcomes a difference of about 600 feet and
carries immense quantities of grain from the West to Mon-
treal, the chief port of summer trade on the Atlantic.
These canals have a minimum depth of 14 feet on the
sills and are open to Canadian and American vessels on
equal terms.

Numerous smaller canals bring Ottawa into connection
with Lake Champlain and the Hudson River via Montreal.
Over this route travel the logs and lumber of Ontario,
GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD 251

Quebec and New Brunswick. One group of canals, the
Trent Valley system, shorten the distance from Lake
Superior to the sea. They connect Lake Ontario with
Georgian Bay (an arm of Lake Huron) via Lake Simcoe.
Surveys have been made with a view to connecting the
Georgian Bay, through the intervening water stretches,
with the Ottawa River system and thus with Montreal.
In 1903 all tolls were removed from Canadian canals.

CANALS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

In the United Kingdom the length of canals belonging
to railways is 1,144 miles, and that of canals not belonging
to railways 3,310 miles. The paid-up capital (from all
sources) of the independent canals in 1905 amounted to
£36,973,503, according to the board of trade returns.
Including railway-owned canals, this amount exceeded
£47,000,000. The annual traffic runs about 43,000,600
tons, comparing unfavorably with the amount carried by
the railways. The improvement and development of these
internal waterways is regarded by the chamber of commerce
as a matter of urgent necessity.

CANALS OF THE UNITED STATES

The canals of the United States still used for com-
mercial purposes are 38 in number, with an aggregate
length of 2,443 miles, the total cost of their construction
being about $200,000,000. The most important of these,
aside from that connecting the Great Lakes, of course,
is the Erie Canal, 387 miles in length, with 72 locks and
a depth of 7 feet. Next in length is the Ohio Canal from
Cleveland, Ohio, to Portsmouth, Ohio, 317 miles in length,
with 150 locks and a depth of 4 feet. Next in length is
the Miami and Erie Canal, from Cincinnati to Toledo,
274 miles in length, with 93 locks and a depth of 54 feet.
The Pennsylvania Canal, from Columbia to Huntingdon,
252 GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD

Pa., is 193 miles in length, with 71 locks and a depth of
6 feet. The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, from Cumber-
land, Md., to Washington, D. C., is 184 miles in length,
with 73 locks and a depth of 6 feet. The Lehigh Coal and
Navigation Company’s Canal, from Coalport to Easton,
Pa., is 108 miles in length, with 57 locks and a depth of
6 feet. The Schuylkill Navigation Company’s Canal,
from Mill Creek, Pa., to Philadelphia, Pa., is 108 miles
in length, with 71 locks and a depth of 6} feet. The
Illinois and Michigan Canal, from Chicago, IIl., to La Salle,
is 102 miles in length, with 15 locks and a depth of 6 feet,
and the Champlain Canal, from Whitehall, N. Y., to West
Troy, is 81 miles in length, with 32 locks and a depth of
6 feet.

COST OF MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CANALS

There are no locks on the Suez Canal, but the channel
is through drifting sand for a great part of its length. The
entrance to the harbor of Port Said on the Mediterranean
intercepts the drift of sand discharged from the Nile and
carried along the coast by the easterly current. The main-
tenance of the Suez Canal therefore requires a large amount
of dredging and consists mainly of this class of work. The
operating expenses are also large, the great traffic involving
heavy costs for pilotage. The general expenses for admin-
istration have necessarily been greater for the Suez Canal
than for the Kiel or Manchester canals, on account of the
distance of the work from the point of central control, a
disadvantage which will also attend the operation of the
Panama Canal. The annual cost of maintenance and
operation of the Suez Canal in 1911 was $6,600,000, or
about $733,000 per mile.

The cost of maintenance and operation of the Kiel
Canal for 1910 was $12,000 per mile; of the Manchester,
$39,000 per mile. These canals have locks and other
mechanical structures, and therefore might be expected
GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD 253

to have a higher cost of maintenance than the Suez Canal,
which has none, but this appears to be more than offset
by reduced cost of maintaining the prism and more eco-
nomical central control. The traffic being light on these
canals, the cost of pilotage and port service is small.
APPENDIX II
Economic Errects oF SHip CANALS

Much has been written concerning the ship canals of
the world as great works of engineering; much, too, on
their political and military importance; but of the part
they have played in the great economic changes, the result
of the marvelous development of transport industries dur-
ing this last half century, it is not so easy to find definite
or satisfactory accounts. At the same time vague and
indefinite statements frequently made indicate that their
economic importance has been significant; and, in fact, it
is only as they are influential in this way that they become
commercially profitable undertakings. The attempt is here
made to trace with some degree of precision these economic
effects, showing how, in consequence of the canals, impor-
tant changes have been made in business machinery, in
business methods, in producing and marketing commodities,
and in general economic development.

The ship canals do not form a connected part of the
world’s transportation system, and in consequence the
economic results of each are, in the main, independent of
all other canals. Furthermore, the economic importance
of the different canals presents the widest variations. Each
opens the way for the creation of many and extensive carry-
ing routes; but, while the influence of some has been merely
local, the consequences of others have been felt through-
out the commercial and industrial world. These conditions
suggest the natural method of treatment to be a considera-
tion of each canal separately, tracing so far as possible the
particular economic effects that have resulted from its
existence.

(254)
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIP CANALS 255

AMSTERDAM CANAL

In a country as well supplied with smaller canals as
Holland is, it was natural that the idea of a ship canal
should present itself to Amsterdam, when the shallowness
of the Zuyder Zee and other difficulties of approach were
causing her to lose trade to her rival, Rotterdam. The
idea soon took practical form, and in 1826 the Helder Canal,
with an 18-foot channel, offered an easier approach to the
Dutch port. With the development of the shipping indus-
try the dimensions of this canal became inadequate after a
few decades, while its length (50 miles) and the difficult
entrance in the passes of the Texel proved additional dis-
advantages. To maintain the commercial position of
Amsterdam the construction of a new and larger canal,
built by the shortest line to the sea, was decided on, and
in 1876 the North Sea Canal, terminating at Ymuiden,
153 miles in length and 23 feet in depth, was opened for
use.

The effect of the new canal on the commerce of Amster-
dam was instantaneous. For twenty years the tonnage
statistics for shipping at that port had shown an almost
complete stagnation, while at Rotterdam the shipping had
trebled. In six years after the new canal was opened the
tonnage entering and clearing at Amsterdam had more than
doubled, rising from 802,000 tons in 1876 to 1,734,000 tons
in 1882.

Extensive enlargements and improvements were early
decided upon, and the Amsterdam Canal can now be used
by all but a few of the largest sea-going passenger vessels.
Ymuiden has become one of the leading fishing ports in
Europe.

THE SUEZ CANAL

In December, 1858, a company was formed to undertake
M. de Lesseps’ audacious scheme of connecting the Mediter-
ranean and Red seas; in the following spring work was
256 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIP CANALS

commenced, and in 1869 the Suez Canal opened a new water
route to the East.

It takes but a glance at the statistics of traffic to notice
the enormous difference between the trade that has devel-
oped through the Suez Canal and that of the canals already
considered. Beginning in 1870, with 486 vessels, having a
tonnage of 436,000 tons, there was a steady increase until
1875, when it had reached nearly 1,500 ships and over
2,000,000 tons. After a few years of quiescence came a
second period of rapid increase, from 1880 to 1883, in the
latter year the figures of 3,300 ships and 5,800,000 tons
being reached. Since then there has been a slowly increas-
ing tonnage, reaching the maximum figure of 8,700,000 tons
in 1891, but falling off somewhat since that year. In 1896
the figures were 3,409 ships with a tonnage of 8,594,307.

EFFECT OF SUEZ CANAL ON SHIPPING

The development of a trade of such an extent and value
by a new route could not but have an important and far-
reaching influence on the economic interests of the world.
Perhaps the most striking results of the opening of the
canal route to the East were those on the machinery of
trade—meaning by this term both the material appliances
and the business organization of trade. One effect might
have been in part anticipated. The new route saved
nearly 3,000 marine leagues on the voyage from the ports
of western Europe to the Hast, or almost half the distance
to Bombay. The obvious result of the use of the new route
would be that half of the vessels engaged in the Eastern
trade would be out of employment. In fact, however, the
change came more indirectly. Sailing vessels did not find
it advantageous to use the canal, and continued on the old
route around the Cape of Good Hope. But the canal, by
making practicable the use of steamships in the oriental
trade, brought about an even greater revolution in the
character of the shipping business to the East. By the
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIP CANALS 257

Cape route coaling places were few, and the facilities for
coaling expensive. The consequence was that the enormous
expense of coaling at these out-of-the-way places, with the
loss of freight room for the extra space needed for coal, made
the use of steamers unprofitable. But by the canal route
a steamer could coal at Gibraltar, Malta, Port Said, and
Aden, where coal could be furnished at moderate rates,
while the space saved from coal could be used to carry a
larger cargo. Accordingly, a large number of new iron
screw steamers were soon constructed for the trade with
the East, and replaced a large percentage of the sailing
vessels. It has been estimated that 2,000,000 tons of ves-
sels were thus thrown out of employment, and the effect
of this can be seen in the immediate reduction in the ton-
nage of sailing vessels. In 1869 the sailing tonnage in the
British foreign trade was 3,600,000 tons; in 1876 it was but
3,230,000 tons.

GREAT ORIENTAL STEAMSHIP COMPANIES

In the construction of the new steamers for the canal
trade two lines already in existence—the Peninsular and
Oriental Steamship Company and the Messageries Com-
pagnie—took prominent parts. But new companies also
were rapidly organized, which built steamers and estab-
lished new lines to the East, among which may be noted the
British India Steam Navigation Company, the Clan Line,
the Austro-Hungarian Lloyds Company, the Italian Steam
Navigation Company, and the Rubbotino Company, of
Genoa. It is not possible to get at the amount of ship-
building made necessary by the change in the kind of ships
used in the Eastern trade, but some idea of the importance
of the change may be seen by noting the fact that the total
steam tonnage in the British foreign trade increased from
650,000 tons in 1869 to 1,500,000 tons in 1876. It would,
of course, be possible to learn the number and tonnage of
ships now engaged in the trade between Europe and the

17
258 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIP CANALS

East, but to account for all of this by the Suez Canal would
be to exaggerate its effects. Improvements in marine
engines and in the construction of steamers make much
longer steamer voyages possible to-day than were possible
in 1870, as is shown by the lines to Australia and across the
Pacific Ocean. It is, therefore, certain that if no Suez
Canal had been built, there would have been by this time
steamers in the Eastern trade; but the change would have
come at a much later period, and sailing vessels would con-
tinue to carry a large, perhaps a dominant, share of the
traffic. The effect of the Suez Canal was to make the
transition from sail to steam sharp and decisive, and to
bring it about in the decade 1870-1880.

AN ANTICIPATED EFFECT NOT REALIZED

One change in the shipping industry that was expected
from the construction of the Suez Canal has not been
realized. It was predicted that the geographical advantage
given to the Mediterranean ports by the new route would
soon enable them to regain the position they had held in
the Middle Ages as the carriers of Eastern produce to the
markets of Europe. In England it was felt that the canal
would seriously threaten British maritime supremacy, but
the results have been otherwise. It was only in England
that the capital was at hand to build the large screw
steamers which alone could profitably use the canal,
and from the start three-fourths of the vessels using the
canal have been British.

But while the carrying trade is still in British vessels a
much larger and a growing share of the traffic is carried
from the East directly to the Continent, and England has
declined in relative importance as a warehousing and dis-
tributing point for Eastern goods. Under the old régime
of sailing vessels around the Cape, when voyages from
India took a good part of a year, and the time of arrival
could not be calculated on within a month or two, it was
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIP CANALS 259

necessary that large stocks of goods should be kept on hand
to enable dealers to meet the varying demand for their
goods. Steamers by way of the Suez Canal make the
voyage in thirty days and the time of their arrival can be
regulated within a day. Shorter voyages and punctuality
of arrivals make it possible for local dealers both in England
and on the Continent to order directly from the East and
the change in the method of this business rendered useless
to a large extent the immense warehouses at London, Liver-
pool, and other English ports.

DIRECT EXPORTS FROM INDIA TO EUROPE

This change in the direction of trade has not been
simply the transfer of the distributing points from Eng-
land to the Mediterranean ports of southern Europe. . The
towns of Italy, Greece, and southern France have been
almost as greatly disappointed in their expectations of
becoming trade centers as in their hopes of controlling
the shipping trade to the East through the operation of
the Suez Canal. To be sure there has been a heavy in-
crease in Indian exports to Italy, Austria, and Russia;
and the Mediterranean ports, notably Genoa, have increased
in importance. But the most striking feature of the change
in the direction of Indian exports lies in the increased
traffic to France, Holland, Belgium, and, above all, to
Germany. The statistics of Indian exports to these coun-
tries show that there is no longer any one country pre-
eminent as a distributing point for Eastern produce, but
that all Europe trades directly with the East. Neverthe-
less, with this great change in the character of the Indian
export trade the imports of European goods to India con-
tinue, as in the days before the canal, to come almost
entirely from England.

The termination of the warehouse distribution system
of England was one of the forces which led to the dis-
appearance of the class of merchant princes who had
260 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIP CANALS

hitherto monopolized the Eastern trade. The system of
bank discounts and commercial loans, by enabling men
of ability to secure capital at low rates of interest, also
played a large part in driving out of trade the old houses
doing business on their own capital, from which they
expected large rates of interest. But as long as large
stocks of goods had to be kept on hand for six months
or more at a time, it was difficult for the new business man
to get the credit that would enable him to supplant the
old-established houses in the Eastern trade. When, how-
ever, the new route by the Suez Canal, by bringing steam-
ers into use, enabled a cargo to be sold and delivered
within a month after the order had been sent, the advantages
on the side of the man working with borrowed capital
were decisive.

As a result of the opening of the Suez Canal, sailing
vessels, warehouses, merchant princes, dealers in six
months’ bills found their old occupations slipping away.
The old modes and channels of business were altered and
new adjustments had to be made. In the meantime the
confusion and disturbances in the business world were
so great that the London Economist has said that they
constituted one great general cause for the universal com-
mercial and industrial depression and disturbance of
1873.

EFFECT ON EASTERN PRODUCE

The effect of the opening of the Suez Canal and the
new route to the East on the production and marketing
of Eastern produce is by no means so easy to trace as the
effects on the machinery of trade. If all the necessary
statistical material were at hand it would be an almost
endless task to disentangle from the complex results of
complicated causes the exact changes that have been due
to the canal. It is possible, however, to see the effects
produced by the canal in the case of a few leading com-
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIP CANALS 261

modities, and in other respects the general tendency of
the new route can be recognized.

EFFECT ON CERTAIN COMMODITIES

A few commodities will serve to show that not every
articie in the Eastern trade has been affected by the new
route and the new methods of business brought about
by it. The exports of Indian cotton have remained at
about the same figure since the opening of the canal, show-
ing that for that article the sailing vessel and the Cape
route provided as cheap a road as the canal route. The
exports of Indian wool and of spices have increased to
some extent, but with nothing to indicate that the increase
is greater than would have taken place in the ordinary
development of trade. The exports of tea from India
show an astonishing increase from 11,000,000 pounds in
1870 to 120,000,000 in 1893-94. But with an article of
such high value the direct effects of the canal through
cheaper freight rates can have had little influence here,
though indirectly the increased Indian production may be
due in part to the easier communication with the West
that was made possible by the canal. In the earlier arrival
of the new season’s teas the influence of the canal in shorten-
ing the time from India to England is clearly evident.
Tea imports to England in July, 1870, were 711,000 pounds;
in July, 1871, 4,000,000 pounds; in July, 1872, 23,000,000
pounds—the enormous increase being the direct result of
the use of steamers via the canal in place of sailing vessels
and the long Cape voyage.

Rice is a commodity the trade in which has been sub-
ject to important changes as a direct result of the use of
the canal route to the Hast. Rice is a staple Italian cereal
and a leading article of Italian export. It had formerly
been imported into European countries by the Cape route,
but by the canal route Eastern rice was enabled to reach
markets in southern Europe formerly inaccessible, and
262 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIP CANALS

even to be sold in Italy itself, much to the displeasure of
the Italian producers. In the six years following the open-
ing of the Suez Canal the export of Indian rice doubled
and has continued to increase since. It constitutes the
largest single item in the export trade of India.

INDIA AS A WHEAT-EXPORTING COUNTRY

The creation of the wheat export trade of India is due
directly to the opening of the Suez Canal route to Europe.
Efforts had been made to carry wheat around the Cape,
but the liability to heat during the long voyage and the
loss from weevil in the cargo made all such attempts unsuc-
cessful. The possibility of carrying wheat by the new
and shorter route was soon demonstrated, and a trade
was established that has grown until India has become
the second wheat-exporting country in the world. In
1870 the wheat exports of India were 130,000 bushels; in
1876, over 4,000,000 bushels; in 1883, 35,000,000 bushels;
in 1891, 50,000,000 bushels.*

Under ordinary conditions the Indian product is an
important item in the wheat market of the world. It will
be observed that the great increase in this Indian export
trade did not begin until after the year 1876. The exten-
sion at that time came about through the reduction in
freight rates made possible by improved steamers. It is
nevertheless true that the establishment of the wheat-export
trade of India and the possibility of any such trade’s exist-
ing at all is to be ascribed to the Suez Canal.

On the imports into India the direct influence of the
Suez Canal seems to be striking in the case of but one
commodity—petroleum from the Russian oil fields at
Batoum. Before the discovery of these fields the imports
of oil into India were insignificant. The value of such
imports in 1869 was about $110,000 and in 1876 had risen

* According to statistics of 1911, India stood third among the wheat-producing countries
of the world. The United States stood firat, with 621,338,000 bushels; Russia in Europe,
second, with 447,016,000 bushels; aud British India, third, with 371,646,000 bushels.
' ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIP CANALS 263

only to $175,000. But when the Batoum oil fields were
discovered, an extensive trade to India, via the Suez Canal,
immediately developed. In 1880 the imports of oil into
India were 6,500,000 gallons, valued at $1,360,000; in
1885 this had risen to 26,300,000 gallons; in 1890, to
51,800,000 gallons, and in 1893, to 86,600,000 gallons.
For a considerable period the Indian demand absorbed
more than half the total product of the Russian oil wells,
and to-day it takes more than a quarter of their output.
As the distance from Batoum to India around Africa is
as great as that from the American oil fields, it does not
seem possible that any of this Russian oil would have
found its way to India by the Cape route. Some trade
might have arisen by the overland route to India, which,
when railroad connections from the Caspian Sea to India
are complete, would have become important, but the oil
imports of India as they stand to-day are made possible
only by the existence of the canal route.

If the question be asked, What is the total significance
of the Suez Canal on the production and marketing of
commodities? the answer can be given only in general
terms. <A superficial observer might base an estimate on
the increase in Indian trade with Europe from $280,000,000
in 1870 to $700,000,000 in 1894.* If, however, it is borne
in mind that this increase has been at a less proportionate
rate than that from 1850 to 1870 without the canal, and
if the large extensions of the foreign trade of Australia,
South Africa, Argentina, and the United States within the
last twenty years are also remembered, it must be evident
that other and more general causes than the opening of
the canal have affected the development of India. On the
other hand, to limit the effects of the canal to those results
which can be directly traced, such as the development of
the trade in rice, wheat, and petroleum, is to err by under-
statement. The greater ease of communication by the

*In the year ending March 31, 1912, the total European trade of India amounted to
$750,000,000.
264 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIP CANALS

canal route has brought much more Western life into per-
sonal contact with the East, and this has had much to do
with the development not only of the foreign trade of the
Eastern countries, but also of their internal resources.

To recapitulate: The construction of the Suez Canal
has led to the immediate and rapid development of the
use of steamers in the Eastern trade, has brought about
the disuse of most sailing vessels in that trade, has caused
the decline of the warehouse distribution system of Eng-
land, and the rise of a direct trade between the East and
the consuming countries of Europe. The shorter and more
direct route has also made possible the wheat export trade
of India, and the trade in oil from Batoum to India, and
has doubled the rice exports of the latter country. The
canal has also been one of the many factors in other import-
ant economic changes, among which may be mentioned the
crisis of 1873 and the general development of trade and
industry in the East.
APPENDIX III*
History or TRAFFIC ON GREAT CANALS

The traffic of the Suez Canal during the first two years
was relatively small, for the reason that the Suez route
is not a practicable one for sailing vessels. At the time
of the opening of the canal, most of the freight between
Europe and the countries on and beyond the Indian Ocean
was carried in sailing vessels. Steamers had to be built
for the Suez route, and, being much less efficient than
freight steamers are to-day, they but gradually took the
traffic with the Far East and Australasia from the sailing
vessels and the Cape of Good Hope route.

The increase in the traffic of the Suez Canal, however,
was relatively large during the first decade, the net tonnage
of the vessels that passed through the canal amounting
to 2,000,000 in 1875 and to 3,000,000 in 1880. During the
following ten years the traffic rose to 6,800,000 net tons,
the gain for the decade being 126 per cent. This was a
decade of rapid expansion of the commerce of Great Britain
and other European countries with India, the Orient, and
Oceania; and the Suez Canal secured, in competition with
the Cape Route, a steadily increasing share of that com-
merce.

The third decade of the operation of the Suez Canal,
1890-1900, was one of only moderate traffic development.
Serious business depressions in different parts of the world
during this decade checked the rate of commercial expan-
sion. From 1890 to 1900 the Suez traffic, net vessel ton-
nage, rose from 6,800,000 to 9,738,000 tons, the absolute

* The following paragraphs on the traffic history of canals are extracted from the report
of Emory R. Johnson, Special Commissioner on Panama Canal Traffic and Tolls.

(265)
266 TRAFFIC ON GREAT CANALS

increase being less than 3,000,000 tons and the rate of
increase 43.2 per cent—only a third of the rate that had
prevailed from 1880 to 1890.

Since 1900, the traffic of the Suez Canal has risen rapidly.
The net tonnage in 1910 was 16,581,000, 70.2 per cent above
the figures for 1900. In 1911, the net tonnage advanced
to 18,324,794 tons, or to 69.3 per cent above the figure
for 1901. Europe and the eastern part of the United States
are building up a large commerce with the countries east
of the Suez Canal. The countries of the Indies, Oceania,

TRAFFIC OF THE Sunz Cana, 1870-1911

 

 

 

 

 

Gross Number of
Years Tonnage Vessels Pancha
LS LO eisecouden cto uname 654,915 486 26,758
VS OMe ets Steines hak ek tie 1,142,230 765 48,422
TS Oveti sees eons a es 2,940,708 1,494 84,446
TS8O nwa caaree sone eras 4,344,519 2,026 101,551
TBS G ics zensca wee wen seek a oe 8,985,411 3,624 205,951
A SOO vacate ches sesh anes 9,749,129 3,389 161,352
US ODS ciaakanuusd inca eahene ae 11,833,637 3,434 216,938
A900 ers stan ee laartuee ante: 13,699,237 3,441 282,511
WOOD nk dharani ga teatera 18,310,442 4,116 252,691
NO OG seis eaceacyan 8 etinoadueniens 18,810,713 3,975 353,881
N9OT shoo eek woes renee 20,551,982 4,267 243,826
TGS crores ietagaae ene: 19,110,831 3,975 218,967
TQ0O Me ork Seto eee 21,500,847 4,239 213,122
WOW O eer tyacemeeeroravaneoweens thu oes 23,054,901 4,533 234,320
MOU eects. seictesecencmn weegesann ace 25,417,853 4,969 275,651

and the Orient are entering upon the development of their
resources and industries with the increasing assistance
of western capital; and the consequent expansion of the
commerce of those countries is indicated by the rapid growth
of the traffic of the Suez Canal.

The frequent enlargements in the dimensions of the
canal have permitted the use of larger ships and have
favored the growth of traffic. The draft allowed vessels in
the canal was increased in 1890 from 24 feet 7 inches to 25
feet 7 inches, in 1902 to 26 feet 3 inches, in 1906 to 27 feet,
and in 1908 to 28 feet. By 1915, when the present improve-
TRAFFIC ON GREAT CANALS 267

ments shall have been completed, vessels drawing between
31 and 32 feet will be permitted to use the canal. The
average size of the vessels that passed through the Suez
Canal in 1911 was more than four times the average in
1870 and more than double the average in 1885, the mean
tonnage per vessel being 898 net tons in 1870, 1,509 tons
in 1880, 2,033 tons in 1890, 2,830 tons in 1900, 3,658 tons
in 1910, and 3,685 tons in 1911. The number as well as
the size of the vessels has increased rapidly each decade,
with the exception of the ten years from 1890 to 1900 when
the growth in the world’s commerce was at a slackened
pace. In 1911, nearly 5,000 vessels—4,969—made use of
the canal, an average of nearly 14 per day for each of the
365 days of the year.

The number of passengers through the Suez Canal
varies from year to year. The total for 1911—275,651—
was somewhat less than the figures for 1900. The maximum
for any one year was reached in 1906, when, at the time of
the war with Japan, Russia took a large number of naval
vessels and troops through the canal.

TRAFFIC ON THE KAISER WILHELM CANAL

Vessels totaling 7,231,458 net tons, not including war
vessels or ships in the service of the canal administration,
passed through the canal. The increase since 1896, the
first full year of the canal’s operation, had been 312 per
cent, and the increase during the last decade 70.7 per cent.
In 1910, 43,328 vessels passed through the canal, 83.4 per
cent of them being vessels flying the German flag. Steamers
contributed 76 per cent of the total tonnage, while sailing
vessels and unrigged craft made up the remainder. The
average tonnage of the steamers was but 278 net tons,
and that of sailing and unrigged vessels only 71.6 tons.
Only 46.1 per cent of the total number of merchant vessels
using the canal were steamers, though they comprised 76
per cent of the net tonnage. The small coasting vessels
268 TRAFFIC ON GREAT CANALS

operated on the North and Baltic seas make large use of
the canal and account for most of its traffic.

TRAFFIC ON THE MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL

Though the traffic of the Manchester Ship Canal has
been less than was estimated, there has been a steady
increase. In 1911, 5,217,812 tons of freight used the canal,
as compared with 925,659 tons in 1894, the first year of
operation. The gain during the decade 1900 to 1910 was
61.3 per cent, although the high figure of 1907, owing to
the subsequent commercial depression, had not yet been
reached in 1910. The increase during the decade ending
in 1911 was 77.3 per cent, more freight being handled in
that year than during any previous year in the history
of the canal.

Of the total traffic in 1911, 4,894,670 tons consisted of
sea-borne traffic, this being an increase of 82.3 per cent
over the year 1901. The barge traffic of the canal in 1911
totaled 323,142 tons, and was less than was carried during
the later nineties. In view of the connection of the Man-
chester Canal with as many as 14 barge canals, the barge
traffic is surprisingly small.

The total number of vessels entering the canal in 1911
was 6,409 with a net register tonnage of 2,869,641. Since
the opening of the canal the annual number of vessels
entering has increased 40.8 per cent, and the net tonnage
298.3 per cent. During the last decade the number of
vessels entering increased 27.9 per cent, and the net ton-
nage 97.2 per cent. The Royal Commission on Canals and
Waterways after reviewing the traffic from 1898 to 1905
concludes that ‘‘these figures show a rapid and satisfactory
progress, and prove what can be done by energy and cour-
age, and with a large expenditure of capital, in favorable
circumstances, to create trade.”’

The officials of the canal company have, however, repeat-
edly expressed dissatisfaction with the growth of traffic
TRAFFIC ON GREAT CANALS 269

which so far as facilities are concerned might have been
more rapid. The chairman of the board of directors at

the general meeting of the company on February 17, 1910,
spoke as follows:

If more patriotism could somehow be infused into the mercantile and
manufacturing community of this district we should soon have a large expan-
sion of traffic. What I mean with regard to imbuing the mercantile and
manufacturing community with local patriotism is this: That they should
be determined in every case to back up their own part. If shipowners were
made to believe that when they take the risk of running lines of steamers
to and from Manchester they would have the whole-hearted sympathy and
support of the whole mercantile community we should go ahead very much
faster. Self-interest is the dominant factor in business, and it is on that
ground that I mainly appeal to the mercantile and manufacturing community.
It is sheer folly to send their goods by rival routes merely because they, for
the time being, in competition with the Ship Canal, come down to the Man-
chester Ship Canal cost. But I appeal also on higher grounds. Surely the
men of Manchester are not going to incur the stigma of being unable to put
the finishing hand to their great work. They have attained celebrity all
over the world for converting their inland town into one of the great seaports
of the Kingdom. Are they going to clinch their effort by showing the whole
world they are determined that their own port, and not rival ports, shall have
every ton of traffic they can influence? Manchester men are generally
believed to be too far-seeing and thorough to do things by halves; and the
serious question for our undertaking is “Are they going to live up to their
reputation?”

The chairman’s words point to the chief traffic diffi-
culty of the canal. From the very beginning it has had
to compete with the railroads which previously carried
nearly all the freight to and from the Manchester district.
During the promotion of the canal their policy was to block
its construction; and, failing in this, their policy has been
to cut their rates to the basis of canal charges in order to
hold as much of the traffic as possible and to compel the
canal company to operate as a losing venture to its stock-
holders. The chief competition centers about the traffic
to and from the points around Manchester not directly on
the canal. Upon such traffic, the canal charges, plus rail-
road rates, plus handling charges, must compete with the
270 TRAFFIC ON GREAT CANALS

through railroad rate to Liverpool and the handling charges
at that terminal. Shipments directly to and from Man-
chester are sometimes handled by rail from and to coast
ports, when the railways are able to provide shippers and
consignees with sidings and to offer them favorable through
rates.

This competition with rail carriers indicates, however,
that the commercial value of the canal is not fully measured
by the extent of its traffic. The favorable railroad rates
to the coast ports are directly due to the ship canal, and
much of the industrial growth of the Manchester district
is directly due to the canal. The Royal Commission on
Canals and Waterways asserts that ‘‘it is true that this
undertaking has not as yet proved sufficiently remuner-
ative to enable dividends to be paid on ordinary share
capital. It has, however, fulfilled the object of greatly
increasing the commercial prosperity of Manchester. The
trade of Manchester was, in the period immediately before
the construction of the canal, in a depressed condition.
Works were being closed, there was no extension, and the
value of property was going down. Since the canal was
opened there has been a large increase in the net annual
ratable value in Manchester, and there are other signs
of increased wealth and prosperity.’ The report also
states “this benefit or indirect return has already been
sufficiently abundant to justify the great outlay on the
canal. Moreover, the net revenue shows a steady increase,
and provides a direct return on a growing proportion of
the capital.”

The inland city, Manchester, has not only maintained
itself as an industrial center, but has become the fourth
port in England. The population of Manchester, not
including the increase due to the extension of its area to
surrounding towns, rose from 644,873 in 1901 to 714,427
in 1910, or 10.79 per cent. The population of Liverpool
meanwhile increased from 704,134 to 746,566, or 6.03 per
cent. The shipping of Manchester (entrances and clear-
TRAFFIC ON GREAT CANALS 271

ances) increased from 3,001,000 tons in 1900 to 4,564,000
in 1910, or 52 per cent; those of Liverpool grew from
18,477,000 to 21,828,000, or 18.1 per cent; those of Hull
from 6,732,000 to 9,885,000, or 46.8 per cent, and those of
London from 30,500,000 to 36,030,000, 18.1 per cent. The
shipping using the port of Manchester consists mainly
of freight vessels, as the large ocean-going passenger ships
dock at coast ports. Nevertheless the increase during the
decade 1900-1910, of 65.8 per cent in the seaborne traffic
of the Manchester Ship Canal and of 55.8 per cent in the
net tonnage of vessels annually entering and clearing the
port of Manchester through the canal, does not compare
unfavorably with the gain in the shipping at the other
great ports of Great Britain. It will be recalled that the
traffic of the Suez Canal during that decade increased
70.2 per cent. It is significant that during the decade end-
ing in 1911 the net tonnage of shipping using the Suez
Canal increased 69.3 per cent, while during the same period
the total freight traffic of the Manchester Canal increased
77.3 per cent, and its seaborne traffic made a gain of 82.3
per cent.

TRAFFIC ON THE AMSTERDAM CANAL

The gross tonnage of the vessels using the Amsterdam
Canal increased from 1,401,128 in 1877 to 8,583,066 in
1911, and the number of vessels during the same period
increased from 3,376 to 28,799. During the decade 1901
to 1911, the gross tonnage increased 50.6 per cent and
the number of vessels 196 per cent. Of the total gross
tonnage in 1911, 7,968,257 tons were of seagoing vessels,
the remainder, or 614,809 gross tons, were of fishing and
other small craft. In that year there were 4,650 seagoing
and 24,149 fishing and other small vessels locked through
the locks at Ymuiden. The gross tonnage of the seagoing
vessels using the canal increased 43.4 per cent during the
decade ending with 1911, although the number of seagoing
vessels annually using the canal increased but 4.5 per cent.
272 TRAFFIC ON GREAT CANALS

Of the total vessels locked at Ymuiden in 1911, 14,548
were locked inward and 14,251 outward.

The gross tonnage entering Amsterdam in 1911 aggre-
gated 3,573,498 gross tons, and was 39.1 per cent in
excess of the entrances in 1901 and 316 per cent greater
than it was in 1877. In 1911 83.2 per cent of the entire
gross tonnage locked inward at the North Sea locks moved
through the canal to Amsterdam; but owing to the large
number of fishing boats and small vessels engaged in local
traffic only 16.2 per cent of the total number of vessels
that passed the locks were entered at Amsterdam.
APPENDIX IV
THe Cana System or INDIA

In a few of the colonies of the world, notably India and
Ceylon, irrigation works of great value have been con-
structed by the colonial governments. While these have
been costly, the expense has been entirely borne from
colonial funds or from loans which are borne by the colonial
government, and the cost has been many times repaid by
the increased production of the irrigated areas. It has been
estimated that the value of a single year’s crop produced
in the irrigated sections of India in excess of that which
would have been produced without irrigation more than
equals the entire cost of the irrigation system.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CANALS IN INDIA

The irrigating system of India is described by Sir John
Strachey as follows:

“In India the very existence of the people depends
upon the regular occurrence of the periodical rains, and
when they fail through a wide tract of country, and, still
worse, when they fail in successive years, the consequences
are terrible. The greater part of India is liable periodically
to this danger, but the country is so vast that it never hap-
pens that all parts of it suffer at the same time. Improve-
ments in the economic condition of the people, especially
more diversity of occupation, can alone bring complete
safeguards and render general famine, in its extremest form,
through a great tract of country impossible. But this
must be a long and gradual process. Meanwhile it had been
found by experience that although the entire prevention of

(2738)
274 THE CANAL SYSTEM OF INDIA

famines, the most destructive of all calamities, is beyond
the power of any government, we can do much to mitigate
them by removing obstacles which hinder commercial inter-
course and which diminish the productiveness of the land.
The instruments by which we can do this are roads, rail-
ways, and canals.

IRRIGATION CONSTANTLY REQUIRED IN PARTS OF INDIA

“In northern India, even in good seasons, artificial
irrigation is a necessity for the successful cultivation of
many of the more valuable crops, and when there is a gen-
eral failure of the periodical rains there is no other means
by which drought and scarcity can be prevented. A large
portion of northern India is now protected by canals of
greater magnitude than exist in any other country of the
world. ;

“Little of the old irrigation works of our predecessors
is retained in the existing canals. Practically all of these
have been made by ourselves, and the often-repeated state-
ment, prompted, I believe, by that strange inclination to
depreciate their own achievements which often besets
Englishmen, that the old canals have been more profitable
than those constructed by ourselves has not the least
foundation of truth.”

A NEW ERA IN IRRIGATION

The year 1878, which saw the close of the most disas-
trous famine, opened a new era in irrigation. It was at
last recognized that such famines would probably continue
to occur at no great intervals of time, and that the cost of
relief operations must be met, not by increasing the per-
manent debt of the country, but by creating a fund of
famine relief and famine insurance. For this purpose it
was fixed that there should be an annual provision of 1,500-
000 rupees to be spent on (1) Relief, (2) Protective Works,
(3) Reduction of Debt. Among protective works the first
THE CANAL SYSTEM OF INDIA 275

place was given to works of irrigation. These in turn were
divided into three classes: (i) Productive Works, (ii) Pro-
tective Works, (iii) Minor Works.

The productive works are those which may reasonably
be expected to be remunerative, and they include all the
larger irrigation systems. The capital cost is provided
from loan funds, and not from the relief funds previously
mentioned. In the seventeen years ending 1896-97 the
capital expenditure on such works was 10,954,000 rupees,
including a sum of 1,742,000 rupees paid to the Madras
Irrigation Company as the price of the Kurnool-Cuddapah,
Canal, a work which will never be financially productive,
but which nevertheless did good service in the famine of
1896-97 by irrigating 87,226 acres. In the famine of 1877—
78 the area irrigated by productive canals was 5,171,000
acres. In the famine year 1896-97 the area was 9,571,000
acres, including an area of 128,087 acres irrigated on the
Swat River Canal in the Punjab. The revenue of the years
1870-80 was nearly 6 per cent on the capital outlay. In
1897-98 it was 7.5 per cent. In the same seventeen years
2,099,000 rupees were spent on the construction of protec-
tive irrigation works, not expected to be directly remunera-
tive, but of great value during famine years. On four works
of this class were spent over 1,500,000 rupees, which, in
1896-97, irrigated over 200,000 acres, a valuable return
then, although in an ordinary year their gross revenue
does not cover their working expenses.

In the seventeen years ending 1896-97, 827,214 rupees
were spent on the minor works for which capital accounts
have been kept, and during the last of that time they
yielded a return of 9.13 per cent. In the same year the
irrigation effected by minor works of all sorts showed the
large area of 7,442,000 acres. Such are the general statistics
of the outlay. The Government may well be congratulated
on having secured in that year of widespread drought so
large an area of irrigated territory. Since that time prog-
ress has been steady.
276 THE CANAL SYSTEM OF INDIA

CANALS OF THE PUNJAB

Beginning with the Punjab province, in which most
progress has been made, the great Sutlej Canal, which
irrigates the country to the left of that river, was opened
in 1882, and the Western Jumna, perhaps the oldest in
India, was extended into the dry Hissar and Sirsa districts,
and generally improved so as to increase by nearly half its
area of irrigation between 1878 and 1897. ‘This is sufficient
to secure the territory forever from famine.

The Bari Doab Canal, which irrigates the Gardaspur,
Amritsar and Lahore districts, has been enlarged and
extended so as to double this irrigation. The Chenab Canal,
the largest in India, and the most profitable, was begun in
1889. It was designed to command an area of two and
one-half million acres, and to irrigate annually somewhat
less than one-half that area. It flows through land which,
in 1889, was practically a desert. Colonization began in
1892, and nine years later the canal was watering nearly
two million acres. The population at that time was 800,000,
consisting chiefly of thrifty, prosperous peasants, with
occupancy rights in holdings of about twenty-eight acres
each.

The Jhelum Canal was opened October 30, 1901. It is
a smaller work than the Chenab, but it is calculated to
command over a million acres, of which at least one half
will be watered annually.

A smaller work, but one of great interest, is the Swat
River Canal in the Peshawar Valley. It was never expected
that this would be a remunerative work, but it was con-
sidered expedient for political reasons in order to induce the
turbulent frontier tribes to settle down into peaceful
agriculture.

A scheme greater than any so far mentioned is that of
the Sind Sagar Canal, projected from the left bank of the
Indus opposite Kalabagh to irrigate 1,750,000 acres at a
cost of 6,000,000 rupees. Another great canal scheme pro-
posed from the right bank of the Sutlej would irrigate about
THE CANAL SYSTEM OF INDIA 277

600,000 acres, commanding Montgomery and Multan dis-
tricts, at a cost of 2,500,000 rupees. These three last pro-
jects would add 2,774,000 acres to the irrigated area of the
province, and as they would flow through tracts almost
uninhabited they would offer a most valuable solution for
the congestion in some districts of Northern India.

In addition to these great perennial canals, much has
been done since 1878 in enlarging and extending the so-
called “inundation canals’ of the Punjab, which utilize the
flood waters in the rivers during the monsoon season and are
dry at other times. By these canals large areas throughout
most of the Punjab are brought under cultivation, and the
area thus watered has increased from about 180,000 to
500,000 acres since 1878.

CANALS IN SIND

Upon inundation canals such as these the whole cultiva-
tion of Sind depends. In 1878 the area was 1,500,000 acres.
In 1896-97 it had increased to 2,484,000 acres. This increase
was not due to famine in Sind, for that rainless province
depends always on the Indus as Egypt does on the Nile,
and where there is no rainfall there can be no drought.
But the famine prices obtained for agricultural produce
doubtless gave an impetus to cultivation. In Sind, too,
there is room for much increase of irrigation. It has been
proposed to construct two new canals, the Canal Jamrao
and the Shikaarpur, and to improve and extend three exist-
ing canals, Nasrat, Naulakhi and Dad. The total cost of
these five projects, some of which are now in progress, was
estimated at 1,586,000 rupees, and the extension of irriga-
tion at 660,563 acres.

THE GANGES CANAL

In the basin of the Ganges, the commissioners appointed
to report on the famine of 1896-97, found that in the terri-
tory between the Ganges and the Jumna little was left to be
278 THE CANAL SYSTEM OF INDIA

done beyond the completion of some distributary channels.
The Ganges Canal, the East India Company’s great work,
constructed between 1840 and 1854, before there was a mile
of railway over India, still holds first place among later
irrigation work both for boldness of design and complete-
ness of execution. It is a lasting monument to the genius of
Sir Proby Cautley, an officer of the Bengal Artillery, and
a born engineer.

Since 1870 consideration has been given to projects for
irrigating the fertile province of Oudh, by means of a great
canal to be drawn from the river Sarda. Water is here in
abundance and the land is well adapted for irrigation, but
as there is considerable rainfall it is doubtful whether this
scheme would prove remunerative, and a large section of
the landowners have hitherto opposed it as likely to waterlog
the country.

PROTECTIVE WORKS

Among the four protective works of irrigation, which,
as previously stated, irrigated over 200,000 acres in 1896-97,
one of the most important is the Betwa Canal in the parched
district of Bundelkhand. ‘This canal has cost over 400,000
rupees, and causes an annual loss to the state in interest
and working expenses of 20,000 rupees. The value of crops
raised on the area, however, has justified its construction.

A similar canal from the river Ken in the same district
has been constructed. Proceeding farther east we find very
satisfactory progress in the irrigation of Southern Behar
effected by the costly system of canals drawn from the river
Sone. In 1877-78 these canals irrigated over 240,000 acres.
Rapid progress was not expected here, and 792,000 acres
was calculated as the maximum that could be covered with
the water supply available. In the five years preceding
1901 and 1902 the average irrigated area was 463,181 acres,
and during the latter year the area was 555,156 acres, the
greatest maximum ever obtained.
THE CANAL SYSTEM OF INDIA 279

CANAL SYSTEM OF ORISSA

The canal system of Orissa was likewise not expected to
be remunerative, since in five years out of six the local rain-
fall is sufficient for the rice crop. In 1878-79 the area
irrigated was 111,250 acres, and the outlay up to date was
1,750,000 rupees. In 1900-01 the area was over 200,000
acres, the highest ever attained, and the capital outlay
amounted to 2,623,000 rupees. It should be stated in favor
of these canals that, although the irrigation is not of annual
value, they supply important water communication through
a province which, from its natural configuration, is not likely
soon to be intersected by railways. If, moreover, such a
famine as that of 1866-67 were again to occur in Orissa,
there would be no question of the value of these splendid
canals.

IRRIGATION IN THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY AND MYSORE

In the Madras Presidency, and in Mysore, irrigation
has long assumed a great importance, and the engineering
works of the three great deltas, Godavari, Kistna and
Cauvery, the outcome of the genius of Sir Arthur Cotton,
have always been quoted as showing what a boon irrigation
is to a country. In 1878 a total area of irrigation in the
Madras Presidency amounted to about 5,000,000 acres.
The irrigation of the eight productive systems was 1,680,000
acres, and the revenue, 789,000 rupees. In 1898 there were
ten of these systems with an irrigation area of 2,685,000
acres, and a revenue of 1,163,000 rupees.

In the three great deltas, and the small southern delta
that depends on the Srivaikuntam weir over the river
Tumbraparni, extension and improvement works have also
been carried on. The Sangam and Pennar systems depend
on two weirs on the river Pennar in the Nellore district,
the former about eighteen miles above the latter just below
the town of Nellore. The former irrigates on the left; the
latter on the right bank of the river. This district suffered
280 THE CANAL SYSTEM OF INDIA

severely in the famine of 1870-78, and the irrigation works
were started in consequence. The Barur tank system in the
Salem district was also constructed after this famine, but
as yet it has not fulfilled expectations.

THE PERIYAR SCHEME

The Periyar scheme has for its object both the addition
of new irrigation, and the safeguarding of that which exists
in the district of Madura, playing water by means of a
large number of shallow tanks drawing their supply from a
very uncertain river, the Vaigai, which takes its rise on the
eastern slopes of the Ghat range of mountains. Just
opposite this river, on the western base of the range, is the
source of the river Periyar. The rainfall on the west is
greater than that on the east, and the surplus waters of the
Periyar used to find their way through a short torrent
course to the sea, rendering no small service by the way.
Its upper waters are now stemmed by a masonry dam, 178
feet high, forming a large lake, at the eastern end of which
is a tunnel 5,700 feet long, piercing the watershed and dis-
charging 1,600 cubic feet per second down the eastern side
of the mountains into the river Vaigai. No bolder work of
irrigation has been carried out in India, and the credit is
due to Colonel J. Pennycuick, C.8.I. The dam and tunnel
works were unusually difficult of construction, as the coun-
try was roadless and uninhabited except by wild beasts,
and a breeding place for fever and cholera.

THE RUSHIKULYA CANAL

The Rushikulya Canal was not expected to be remunera-
tive, but is considered a valuable protection against famine.
It consists of weirs over the river Gulleri, Mahanadi and
Rushikulya in the backward province of Ganjan south of
Orissa. From these weirs flow canals altogether about 127
miles in length, which, in connection with two large reser-
THE CANAL SYSTEM OF INDIA 281

voirs, are capable of irrigating 120,000 acres. In 1901 the
works, though incomplete, already irrigated over 67,000
acres.

OTHER WORKS

In addition to all these vast engineering systems, south-
ern India contains a number of minor works of irrigation,
some utilizing springs in the sandy beds of rivers, others
utilizing the rainfall of a half square mile ponded up in a
valley. In other cases tanks are fed from neighboring
streams, and great ingenuity is displayed in the methods
used to prevent the precious water from being wasted.

The canals of Sind have already been mentioned. Else-
where in the Bombay presidency, in the Deccan and Gujart,
there are fewer facilities for irrigation than in other parts
of India, and the rivers are, for the most part, of uncertain
volume. The cost of storage works is also great. In
ordinary years the black soil can raise fairly good crops of
cotton, millet and maize without artificial watering. The
most important irrigation works in this region are Mutha
and Nira canals in the Poona district.

In Upper Burmah three productive irrigation works
were planned at the opening of the present century—the
Mandalay, the Shivebo and the Mon canals, of which the
first was estimated to cost over 320,000 rupees and to
irrigate 22,000 acres. The area estimated to be watered
by the whole three projects is 262,000 acres, located in the
only part of Burmah that is considered liable to famine.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE IRRIGATION COMMISSION

In 1901 the government of India appointed a commis-
sion to examine throughout all India what could further be
done to alleviate the horrors of famine. It had previously
been the custom of the government not to borrow money
for the execution of irrigation works unless there was a
reasonable expectation that within a few years they would
give a return of 4 or 5 per cent of the capital outlay. But
282 THE CANAL SYSTEM OF INDIA

in 1901 a different attitude was assumed. It was found
that although some irrigation works (especially in the Bom-
bay Deccan) would never yield a direct return of 4 or 5 per
cent, stillin a famine year they might be the means of pro-
ducing a crop which would go a long way toward reducing
the necessity of famine relief. In the Sholapur district of
Bombay, for instance, about three years’ revenue was spent
on relief during the famine of 1901, when an expenditure of
ten years’ revenue on irrigation works might have done away
for all future time with the necessity for this greater outlay.
After further careful study of every part of India the Irriga-
tion Commission published an exhaustive report. While
emphatically asserting that irrigation alone could never
prevent famine, they recommended an outlay of £45,000,-
000 spread over a period of twenty-five years.

PRESENT OUTLOOK

Up to 1913 the net revenue has remained fairly constant
at $3,000,000 a year. During the four years ending 1910-11
the capital outlay increased from $172,500,000 to $197,-
500,000, while the total area irrigated and the net receipts
showed little change and consequently the percentage of
profits fell from 6.74 to 6.33. Punjab is the province where
the existing canals are the most necessary and also the most
remunerative and it is there that the most important work
is now under construction. This is known as the Triple
Canal in the Upper Jhelum, the Upper Chenab and the
Lower Bari Doab, which will be completed in 1915 at a cost
of $40,000,000. In the United Provinces a series of minor
canals have been constructed for the protection of Bundel-
khand against famine, while a large scheme is under consider-
ation to increase the supply of the Ganges and Jumna Canals
from the overflow of the Sarda River at Oudh. These
projects involve the expenditure of nearly $30,000,000,
APPENDIX V*
CANALS IN CHINA

There are several features of the canal system of China,
especially of the Imperial or Grand Canal, which can be
studied with profit by the people of the United States.
One of these is the use of the canal for the production of
food in addition to its uses as a means of transportation.
Allied to this is the use of the muck which gathers at the
bottom of the waterway for fertilization. Another is the
use of every particle of plant life growing in and around
the canal for various purposes.

The Chinese secure a vast quantity of food of one sort
or another from their canals. To appreciate the exact
situation with respect to the waterways, it must be realized
that the canals of China cover the plain country with a net-
work of water. Leading from the Grand Canal in each
direction are smaller canals, and from these lead still smaller
canals, until there is hardly a single tract of 40 acres which
is not reached by some sort of ditch, generally capable of
carrying good-sized boats. The first reason for this great
network is the needs of rice cultivation. During practically
all of the growing season for rice the fields are flooded.
Wherever a natural waterway can be made to irrigate the
rice fields it is used, but, of course, from these to the canals
or larger rivers there must be waterways. Where natural
streams can not thus be adapted the Chinese lead water in
canals or ditches to the edge of their fields and raise it to
the fields of rice by the foot-power carriers which have been
described so often by tourist writers. However the water

* Report of United States Consul Anderson, Hangchau, China.
(283)
284 CANALS IN CHINA

is supplied to the rice, it is evident that there must be a
waterway leading to the field and back to a principal stream,
which is generally a branch canal. These waterways
naturally take up a considerable portion of the land, and
the Chinese make as profitable use of them as of the land
itself.

The first use of the waterways is for fishing. The
quantity of fish taken from the canals of China annually is
immense. The Chinese have no artificial fish hatcheries,
but the supply of fish is maintained at a high point by the
fact that the flooded rice fields act as hatcheries and as
hiding places for the young fish until they are large enough
to look out for themselves. In the United States this fish-
propagation annex to the canals is probably neither possible
nor needful in view of the work done by the State and
National bureaus, but in China it is nothing less than provi-
dential.

CHINESE CANALS SUPPLY FERTILIZER

Along the canals in China at any time may be found
boatmen gathering muck from the bottom of the canal.
This muck is taken in much the same manner that oysters
are taken by hand on the Atlantic coast. In place of tongs
are large bag-like devices on crossed bamboo poles which
take in a large quantity of the ooze at once. ‘This is
emptied into the boat, and the process is repeated until
the boatman has a load, when he will proceed to some
neighboring farm and empty the muck, either directly on
the fields—especially around the mulberry trees, which are
raised for the silkworms—or in a pool, where it is taken
later to the fields. From this muck the Chinese farmer
will generally secure enough shellfish to pay him for his
work, and the fertilizer is clear gain. The fertilizer thus
secured is valuable. It is rich in nitrogen and potash and
has abundant humus elements. This dredging of the canals
for fertilizers is the only way by which the Chinese have
kept their canals in reasonably good condition for centuries.
CANALS IN CHINA 285

The fertilizer has paid for itself both ways. Recently there
were complaints filed at Peking that the ashes from the
steam launches plying on the canal were injuring the muck
for fertilizing purposes, and the problem has been con-
sidered a serious one by the Chinese Government.

In addition to securing fertilizers from the canals, and
thus keeping the canals in condition, the farmers’ help
keep them purified by gathering all floating weeds, grass,
and other vegetable debris that they can find upon them.
Boatmen will secure great loads of water plants and grasses
by skimming along the surface of the canal. The reeds
growing along the canals are used for weaving baskets of
several grades, and for fuel. In short, no plant life about
the canal goes to waste.

UTILIZATION OF SWAMP LAND

Where there are so many canals there is more or less
swamp ground. In China this is utilized for the raising of
lotus roots, from which commercial arrow-root is largely
obtained. There is no reason why much of the waste
swamp land in the southern portion of the United States
should not be used for a similar purpose, and the commer-
cial returns from a venture of this sort in that part of the
country ought to be satisfactory. Where the canals of
China widen, by reason of natural waterways, or for other
reasons, the expanse of water not needed for actual naviga-
tion is made use of in the raising of water nuts of several
varieties, especially what are known as water chestnuts.
These nuts are raised in immense quantities. They are,
strictly speaking, bulbs rather than nuts. They are rich
in arrow-root and are prolific, an acre of shallow water pro-
ducing far more than an acre of well-cultivated soil planted
in ordinary grain or similar crops. These nuts, also, could
be produced to advantage in the United States where there
is land inundated for the growing season to a depth which
will give ordinary water plants a chance to thrive and which

 
286 CANALS IN CHINA

is not capable of being drained for the time being. The
nuts or bulbs are toothsome when roasted, and are whole-
some, but probably would be more valuable in the United
States for the manufactured products which can be secured
from them.

There are duck farms all along the canals in China.
These are profitable. Chinese canals, as a rule, considering
the population upon them and their varied uses, are cleaner
than canals in the United States. There are few if any
factories to contaminate them. The Chinese use of certain
sewage for fertilization also prevents contamination to a
great extent. The canal water is used for laundry, bath,
and culinary purposes indiscriminately. A canal in the
United States could never be what it is in China, but the
Chinese have a number of clever devices and ideas in con-
nection with canals which can be adopted in the United
States with profit.

THE ANCIENT GRAND CANAL OF CHINA

The Grand Canal system in China has existed in almost
its present shape since about the time Columbus discovered
America. The Grand Canal itself, extending from Hang-
chau to Peking, is about a thousand miles long. Much of
it is banked with stone, and all of it is in such condition that
with the expenditure of a little money the system could be
put upon a modern and effective basis. As it is, the canal
handles practically all the internal trade of China, and this
trade is far greater than its foreign trade. The coming of
railroads will affect the canals somewhat, but not so much
as may be imagined, for the railroads will very largely build
up a trade of their own. A little money will make China’s
canal system in the future what it has been in the past, the
greatest on earth.