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THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT IN INDONESIA
AS DEFINED IN THE THREE CONSTITUTIONS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. K. PRINGGODIGDO
(translated by Alexander Brotherton)
TRANSLATION SERIES
MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
Price—$1.50
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THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT IN INDONESIA
AS DEFINED IN THE THREE CONSTITUTIONS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. K. Pringgodigdo
(translated by Alexander Brotherton)
TRANSLATION SERIES
Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1957P
@ 1957 by Cornell Modern Indonesia ProjectIll
PREFACE
In few countries, Asian or Western, has the presidency become
so important an institution as in Indonesia. Because Indonesia's
first president has been at the same time the most prominent leader
of its revolution and successful struggle for independence, it is
understandable that in a functional sense the office has consider-
ably transcended its none too precise legal bounds. Soekarno,
regarding himself still as leader of the Indonesian revolution as
well as constitutional president, has not been content to limit
his political role to any narrow interpretation of the area of
presidential authority described in the current Indonesian Consti-
tution. While during the period of Indonesia's first constitution
(1945-1949) his governmental role was in general considerably less
substantial than the major part assigned the president by this
document (with governmental practice in general diverging rather
considerably from the pattern laid down in that constitution),
under the present 1950 Constitution it has in practice considerably
surpassed the much more modest assignment there given to the pres-
ident. Certainly on many important occasions during the last
seven years President Soekarno has played a much fuller and more
decisive political role than the Constitution of 1950 would seem
to countenance. (This has, of course, been particularly true dur-
ing the last two years, the period subsequent to the writing of
Mr. Pringgodigdo's book.)
It is to an analysis of these confusing but critically import-
ant developments in this situation from 1945 until early 1956 and
the problems thereby created, that Mr. Pringgodigdo's monograph
is devoted. With a long and distinguished career in a series of
important governmental posts, for several years (up until early
1957) serving as chief of the President's secretariat (Cabinet of
the President), Mr. Pringgodigdo is uniquely well qualified to
write this study.
The Cornell Modern Indonesia Project is grateful to Mr.
Pringgodigdo and to his Indonesian publisher, Pembangunan, for
granting permission to have his study translated into English and
re-published for the benefit of those interested readers unable
to read Indonesian. Thanks are also due to Mr. Alexander Brotherton
for his excellent translation of Mr. Pringgodigdo's study.
Ithaca, New York
November 15, 1957
George McT. Kahin
DirectorV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER	page
I. THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION AND
THE APPLICATION OF THESE PROVISIONS. ............. 1
Division of State Powers As Provided For By
the 1945 Constitution................................ 1
The Consultative Assembly............................ 1
The President........................................ 1
The Vice-President................................... 2
The Ministers. . .................................... 2
The Chamber of Representatives....................... 3
The Supreme Advisory Council......................... 3
Remarks on the Juridical Concepts of
Presidential Powers as Expressed in the
1945 Constitution............................. 3
Operation of the 1945 Constitution in Practice....	6
The Working Committee of the Indonesian
Central National Committee (KNIP) Invested
with Legislative Powers and Authorized to
Participate in the Formulation of the General
Orientation of State Policy........................ 6
The Ministers Made Answerable to the Working
Committee.......................................... 8
The Trend Toward Democratization.................... 13
Full Powers Again Accorded the President on
Three Occasions................................... 15
Relations Between the Government and the
Working Committee................................. 16
Presidential Cabinets.............................   16
Conclusions Regarding the Exercise of
Presidential Powers..
17VI
CHAPTER	page
II. THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1949 CONSTITUTION AND THE
1950 CONSTITUTION AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE
PROVISIONS................................ 19
Implementation of the Sovereignty of the
People........................................... 19
Definition of the Term '’Government”............... 19
The Appointment of the President................... 21
The Inviolability of the President................. 22
Function of the President in the Formation
of a New Cabinet................................. 22
President and Vice-President Informed on All
Important Issues by the Cabinet.................. 26
Only One Presidential Prerogative.................. 26
The Position of the President as Supreme
Commander........................................ 27
The Vice-President................................... 29
The Status and Functions of the Ministers............ 31
The Cabinet and the Premier........................ 31
The Inner Cabinet.................................. 31
The Position of the Ministers...................... 32
Parliament........................................... 33
The Senate and the Chamber of Representatives.. 33
The Exercise of Legislative Power.................. 35
Emergency Laws..................................... 38
Decrees and Ordinances............................. 39
Other Rights Accorded to the Chamber of
Representatives............................... 41
Conclusions Regarding the Status and Functions
of the President................................ 42Vll
Page
APPENDICES.................................................... 49
I. EXTRACTS FROM REPORTS OF CHAMBER OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON EXPENDITURES
ALLOCATED TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
VICE-PRESIDENT FOR 1951. . ...................... 49
From the	Report	of	Committee	I. . .................. 49
From the	Report	of	Committee	II...................   50
From the	Report	of	Committee	III.................... 51
From the Report of Committee IV.................. 52
From the	Report	of	Committee	V..................... 53
From the	Report	of	Committee	VI.................... 53
From the Report of Committee VII................. 5?
From the Report of Committee VIII................ 54
II. EXTRACTS FROM THE GOVERNMENT STATEMENT IN REPLY TO
REPORTS OF CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES
ON EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO THE PRESIDENT AND
THE VICE-PRESIDENT FOR 1951...................... 55
Regarding Public Speeches by the President and
the Vice-President and Other Matters Relating
to the Status and Functions of the President
and the Vice-President. ......................... 55
Intervention of the President in the Formation
of a New Cabinet. ............................. 57
Entitlement to Intervene in Diplomatic
Appointments and Transfers of Diplomatic
Representatives (Article 123 of the
Constitution) and Similar Matters.............. 57
Status of the Vice-President. . ................. 53
Rank of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Accorded to the President; Wearing of Military
Uniform by the President; Flying of the
Presidential Standard....................... 58
Tours by the President and the Vice-President....
58-ΜIX
FOREWORD
It is appropriate at this moment, when a Constituent
Assembly is shortly to be formed to draw up a new Constitu-
tion, that the constitutional status of the President and
the r6le of the President in state affairs should be exam-
ined .
Certainly the conclusions reached from a study of
developments that have taken place can provide a basis for
the standpoint to be taken in the future.
Since the position of the President is closely related
to the functions of other state institutions it has, of
course, been found necessary to comment also on these insti-
tutions .
The author gratefully acknowledges the many valuable
suggestions given by his brother, Professor Mr. A. G.
Pringgodigdo, Rector of the Airlangga University.
Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo
Djakarta, 22 March, 1956
/1
CHAPTER I
THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION
AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE PROVISIONS
Division of State Powers As Provided For by the 1945 Constitution
By the terms of the 1945 Constitution the State institutions
and holders of State appointments associated with the Office of
President were the Consultative Assembly (Madjelis Permusja-
waratan Rakjat), the Vice-President, the Ministers, the Chamber
of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat), and the Supreme
Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung).
The Consultative Assembly
In paragraph 2 Article 1 of the 1945 Constitution it was
stipulated that the sovereignty of the people would be fully
exercised by the Consultative Assembly.
In paragraph 1 Article 2 of the 1945 Constitution it was
laid down that the membership of the Consultative Assembly
would comprise the members of the Chamber of Representatives
(of which the composition would be determined by law, as
stipulated in paragraph 1 Article 19), and, in addition,
representatives of the provinces and representatives of
the ethnic minority groups on the basis provided for by law.
The Consultative Assembly, incarnating the will of the
Indonesian people, was invested with authority to:
a.	formulate the Constitution of the State (Article 3)
b.	determine the general orientation of State policy
(Article 3)
c.	elect the President and the Vice-President (paragraph 2
Article 6)
d.	amend the Constitution (Article 37)
It was stipulated in paragraph 2 Article 2 of the 1945
Constitution that the Consultative Assembly would meet at least
once in five years.
The President
In Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution it was laid down2
that the President would be appointed for a period of five years
by the Consultative Assembly, and in paragraph 1 Article 4
it was stipulated that the President was "vested with executive
state powers," these powers being restricted only by those
clauses in the Constitution requiring that certain matters
were to be provided for by legislation.
It is to be noted that the President's powers were restrict-
ed since, by the terms of paragraph 1 Article 5 and paragraph 1
Article 20 of the 1945 Constitution, the President could enact
legislation only with the concurrence of the Chamber of Represen-
tatives, whilst it is moreover specified in Article 11 of the
1945 Constitution that it is also with the concurrence of the
Chamber of Representatives that the President declares war,
terminates hostilities, and signs treaties with foreign powers.
By the terms of Article 22 of the 1945 Constitution the
President was authorized, in circumstances of emergency, to
replace the Constitution with a Government Decree for which,
however, the subsequent approval of the Chamber of Representatives
was required.
In paragraph 2 Article 5 of the 1945 Constitution it was
laid down that the President enacted Government Ordinances for
ensuring the effective application of legislation.
As stipulated in Article 10 of the 1945 Constitution, the
President exercised supreme authority over the Army, the Navy,
and the Air Force.
The Vice-President
As in the case of the President, the Vice-President was
elected by the Consultative Assembly, as specified in paragraph 2
Article 6 of the 1945 Constitution, the appointment also being
for a period of five years, this being laid down in Article 7 of
the 1945 Constitution. Article 4 provided that the Vice-President
would assist the President in the exercise of his duties. It was
laid down in Article 9 of the 1945 Constitution that the Vice-
President would be sworn in at a session of the Consultative
Assembly or the Chamber or Representatives in the same manner
as the President. In Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution it was
stipulated that, in the event of the death of the President and
in the event of the President's resigning or being unable to
exercise his duties, the appointment of President would be assumed
by the Vice-President for the remainder of the term of office of
the President.
The Ministers
By the terms of Article 17 of the 1945 Constitution:
a. the President was assisted in the exercise of his functions3
by Ministers of State;
b.	the said Ministers were appointed and could be discharg-
ed from office by the President;
c.	the said Ministers were in charge of the various
Government Departments„
The Chamber of Representatives
In Article 19 of the 1945 Constitution it was stipulated
that the Chamber of Representatives, of which the composition
was to be difined by law, would meet at least once per year.
As was mentioned above, the approval of the Chamber of
Representatives was required for all legislation. Moreover,
by virtue of the provisions of Article 20 of the 1945 Constitu-
tion, the rejection of a draft bill by the Chamber of Representatives
precluded the re-introduction of the same draft during that
current session of the Chamber. In Article 21 of the 1945
Constitution it was laid down that not only the President, but
also the members of the Chamber of Representatives could put for-
ward draft legislative proposals. It was also stipulated in the
same article that draft legislation for which presidential
approval was not forthcoming might not be re-introduced in the
course of that current session of the Chamber of Representatives.
Under the provisions of Article 22 of the 1945 Constitution
a Government Decree, issued by the President in circumstances
of emergency and having the force of law, which did not receive
the approval of the Chamber of Representatives, must, in that case,
be revoked.
The members of the Chamber of Representatives were, by
virtue of the provisions of paragraph 1 Article 2 of the 1945
Constitution, also members of the Consultative Assembly.
The Supreme Advisory Council
It was stipulated in Article 16 of the 1945 Constitution
that the Supreme Advisory Council, of which the composition
was to be defined by law, would provide information requested
by the President. The same article authorized the Supreme
Advisory Council to submit proposals to the Government.
Remarks on the Juridical Concepts of Presidential Powers as
Expressed in the 1945 Constitution.
From a careful perusal of the observations made above, it
can be seen that supreme state power was vested in the Consulta-
tive Assembly, the voice of the Indonesian people, the expression
of Indonesian sovereignty. It was the Consultative Assembly which4
formulated and modified the Constitution of the State, which de-
termined the general orientation of state policy, which elected the
President and the Vice-President. At the same time, it was the
President who gave effect to state policy as determined by the Con-
sultative Assembly, but in exercising this function the President
remained subordinate to the Assembly, to which he was also answer-
able for the fulfillment of the duties of his office.
Thus, in degree of state power, the Office of President, with
the function of implementing state policy, was secondary only to
the Consultative Assembly, and, given that the Assembly was merely
required "to meet at least once in five years," the President was
evidently able to exercise a very considerable authority.
The Vice-President was appointed to assist and to deputize
for the President. The Ministers were merely assistants to the
President and were appointed and could be discharged from office
by the President. The Supreme Advisory Council was no more than a
body charged with providing information to the President. Consti-
tutional guarantees were operative only with regard to the Supreme
Court, in accordance with the stipulations of Article 24 of the
1945 Constitution, and with regard to the Finance Control Commiss-
ion, in accordance with the stipulations of Article 23 of the 1945
Constitution, but the President would obviously exert a large mea-
sure of influence on the appointments to both these bodies.
The President was not answerable to the Chamber of Represent-
atives; the functions of presidential office were exercised inde-
pendently of the Chamber of Representatives. The wide scope of
the powers wielded by the President was limited only by the stipu-
lation in the Constitution that the assent of the Chamber of
Representatives was required for all legislation, and by the fur-
ther stipulation that it was only with the prior approval of the
Chamber of Representatives that the President could declare war,
terminate hostilities, and conclude treaties with foreign states.
To a certain extent the powers accorded the President by the
1945 Constitution were similar to the powers held by the President
of the United States, who is vested with executive powers by the
terms of the United States Constitution. The Ministers of the
United States Government are, in fact, no more than assistants to
the President. The Ministers are appointed and may be dismissed
by the President and are answerable only to the President. More-
over, the President is not answerable to the United States Congress
As if to remove the impression that the President of
Indonesia was accorded excessive powers, it was specifically
emphasized in the Explanatory Notes to the 1945 Constitution that
supreme state authority was vested in the Consultative Assembly.
The Consultative Assembly exercises supreme state
power, whereas the President has the function of
giving effect to state policy determined, as regards
general orientation, by the Consultative Assembly.5
The President is appointed by the Consultative Assembly
and is subordinate to and answerable to the Consultative
Assembly. The President is in the position of being
given a mandate by the Consultative Assembly, and is
obliged to implement the decisions of the Consultative
Assembly. The President does not in any sense occupy
a status equal to that of the Consultative Assembly.
The President is wholly subject to the authority of
the Consultative Assembly.
As regardsthe position of the President in relation to the
Chamber of Representatives it was stated that:
Although not answerable to the Chamber of Represen-
tatives the President does not dispose of dictatorial
powers.
Besides being answerable to the Consultative Assembly,
the President must also give full consideration to the
views of the Chamber of Representatives.
Moreover, the position of the Chamber of Representatives
is firmly established. The Chamber cannot be dissolved
by the President as is the case in those countries
where the parliamentary system operates.
In addition, the members of the Chamber of Representa-
tives are also members of the Consultative Assembly, and
consequently the Chamber of Representatives is able to
exercise a constant supervision over the actions of the
President; in the event that the Chamber of Representa-
tives considers that the President has deviated from
the orientation of policy as laid down in the Constitu-
tion or defined by the Consultative Assembly a request
can be made for the convening of a special session of
the Consultative Assembly in order to demand from the
President an account of his actions.
Certainly, the 1945 Constitution, in specifying the authority
of the Consultative Assembly and the Chamber of Representatives,
provided that the President was not invested with dictatorial
powers, but there is still the question of the powers accorded
the President during the interval prior to the formation of these
two bodies which could exercise restraint on action by the Head
of State.
In Article IV of the Transitional Provisions of the 1945
Constitution it was laid down that, until the formation of the
Consultative Assembly, the Chamber of Representatives, and the
Supreme Advisory Council in accordance with the terms of the
Constitution, all state powers would be exercised by the President
assisted by a National Committee.
By virtue of this stipulation the President was legally
empowered to act with dictatorial authority since there was6
absolutely no basis for interpreting what was described as the
assistance of a National Committee as a factor of restraint. The
President could thus determine the general orientation of state
policy and could issue all legislation. The sovereignty of the
people was thus vested entirely in the President„
The presidential dictatorship was to continue until the form-
ation of the Consultative Assembly and the Chamber of Representa-
tives, and in this connection it was stipulated in the Additional
Provisions of the 1945 Constitution that:
Within six months from the date of the termination of the
war in Asia the President of Indonesia will give effect
to all requirements specified in this Constitution.
The course of events, however, was to show that the pattern
of state administration would evolve in a manner other than that
envisaged in the Additional Provisions of the 1945 Constitution.
Operation of the 1945 Constitution in Practice
As has been mentioned above, it was laid down in the
Transitional Provisions of the 1945 Constitution that, pending
the formation of the Consultative Assembly, the Chamber of
Representatives, and the Supreme Advisory Council in conformity
with the provisions of the Constitution, all state powers would
be exercised by the President "assisted by a National Committee."
The decision to set up a National Committee was taken by the
Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (Panitya Persiapan
Kemerdekaan Indonesia) on 22 August, 1945, and the duly established
Tndonesidn Central National Committee (KNIP) was installed in off-
ice by the President on 29 August, 1945.(1)
The Working Committee of the Indonesian Central National
Committee (KNIP) Invested with Legislative Powers and
Authorized to Participate in the Formulation of the Genera1
Qrientation of State Policy	‘
Acting on the proposal decided by the KNIP at a meeting on
16 October, 1945, the Vice-President issued, the same day, Vice-
Presidential Announcement No.X, of which the provisions were
described by the chairman of the KNIP Working Committee in a
statement on 20 October, as follows; (2)
(T) Kusnodiprodjo, Himpunan Undang2, peraturan2, penetapan2
Pemerintah Indonesia, (Laws, Decrees, and Directives of the
Indonesian Government) 1945, p.117, 121, reprinted 1951,
(2) Ibid., pp. 58, 59.7
In Vice-Presidential Announcement No. X of 16 October,
1945, it is stipulated that, pending the formation of
the Consultative Assembly and the Chamber of Represen-
tatives, the KNIP will be vested with legislative
powers and will participate in the deciding of the gen-
eral orientation of state policy, and, given the gravity
of the situation at present, the general functions
of the KNIP will be assumed by the Working Committee of
the KNIP.
By virtue of this decision the Working Committee will:
a.	participate in the deciding of the general orienta-
tion of state policy, this signifying that the
general orientation of state policy will be defined
jointly by the Working Committee and the President;
at the same time, the Working Committee will not be
concerned with the incidental aspects of government
policy which remain entirely under the control of
the President;
b.	formulate, jointly with the President, all legis-
lation relating to matters that are the concern of
the Government, which term designates -
the President assisted by the Ministers and the
officials under the authority of the Ministers.
In view of the modification of the status and the func-
tions of the KNIP, this body (and the Working Committee
acting in the name of this body), will, as from 17
October, 1945, no longer be concerned with matters relat-
ing to the implementation of Government measures." (3)
The powers of the President, hitherto of a dictatorial charac
ter, were appreciably diminished by the provisions of the Vice-
Presidential Announcement No. X. It was now required that the
President _§Jiaxe_ with the KNIP, or the Working Committee of the
KNIP, those powers accorded him by virtue of the terms of
Transitional Provision IV of the 1945 Constitution, notably,
the authority, which would subsequently be assumed by the Consul-
tative Assembly, to determine the general orientation of state
policy, and the further authority, which would subsequently be
vested in the Chamber of Representatives, to issue legislation.
This departure from the stipulations of the Constitution had,
it was explained in the Vice-Presidential Announcement No. X, in
(3) The last phrase recalls the situation hitherto applying where-
by the KNIP, as an organ assisting, and at the orders of,
the President, participated in the implementation of ad-
ministrative measures, for example, in visiting the
various provinces to provide information to the population,
and in issuing letters of identification to those wishing
to proceed beyond the limits of Djakarta.8
a seemingly conciliatory tone, become necessary because:
the present serious situation is such as to require
that there exist in addition to the Government a
representative body which will share responsibility
for actions of vital concern to the Indonesian people?
and it was further specified that:
the Working Committee will retain the authority with
which it is now vested only until the formation of the
Consultative Assembly and the Chamber of Representatives
as provided for by the terms of the Constitution. (4)
The Ministers Mla.de Answerable to the Working Committee
Another change was brought about a month later following the
publication of a communiqu4 on 11 November, 1945 by the Working
Committee stating:
The Indonesian Constitution does not incorporate any
clause by virtue of which the Ministers are made an-
swerable to or exempted from the control of a represen-
tative body. On the other hand, it is to be recognized
that a governmental structure whereby the Ministers are
answerable to a representative body provides a means of
giving expression to the sovereignty of the people. The
Working Committee has accordingly proposed to the Presi-
dent that appropriate modifications to the existing
pattern of Government be devised so as to establish a
governmental structure on this basis. The President has
accepted the proposal of the Working Committee. (5)
In the Government Announcement of 14 November, 1945> (6), giv-
ing the composition of the new Cabinet formed by Sjahrir, it was
stated:
The Indonesian Government, having successfully overcome
initial difficulties in the course of consolidating its
position, now deems it opportune to introduce various
emergency measures which will ensure that the administra-
(4)	The formation of these two bodies was never carried out, so
that it was the KNIP which, at a plenary session in Djogja
from 6 December to 15 December, 1950,approved the legislation
ratifying the Round Table Conference Agreement and the
Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia
whereby the status of the Republic of Indonesia was that of a
component in a federation of states. (Mr. Sartono, 10 Tahun
Kemerdekaan Indonesia/Ten Years of Indonesian Independence/
P. 12).
(5)	Kusnodiprodjo, 1945? p . 139,
(6)	Ibid., p. 78.9
tion of the state will be effected on a democratic basis.
Of the changes relating to the formation of the new
Cabinet the most important is that whereby the Ministers
are now vested with executive authority and made answer-
able to a representative body for the exercise of that
authority.
The change in the status of the Ministers meant the practical
elimination of any grounds for the exercise of the presidential
powers as defined in the Constitution.
Previously, the Ministers had acted solely as assistants to
the President and were answerable only to the President. Now the
Ministers became members of a Cabinet headed by a Premier, and
each Minister was answerable to the Working Committee of the KNIP.
Thus, the Ministers were no longer under the authority of the
President, and, in consequence, the President became merely a
symbolic figure. The texts of all legislation, decrees, and
ordinances had now to be counter-signed by a Minister.
Hitherto, the President had been, in the fullest sense, the
Government. Now, however, the function of the government of the
State was exercised jointly by the President and the Cabinet.
This radical change, which modified the entire significance of
the Constitution, took place only three months after the promul-
gation of the Constitution, and came into effect without any
amendment to the text of the Constitution. The new form of
Government was announced merely as a measure of democratization
of the state administration. There was no indication to suggest
that it was intended as a provisional arrangement to apply for the
time being only.
In an analysis of the nature of this far-reaching change the
Minister of Information stated on 24 November, 1945;
It is stipulated in Article 17 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia that the President will be assist-
ed in the carrying out of his duties by Ministers of State
who are appointed by and may be dismissed by the Presi-
dent .
The Ministers are thus answerable to the President, and
it is furthermore obvious that, under the terms of the
Constitution, the status of a Minister is, in effect,
that of an executive official directing a Government
Department, although a Minister is not to be classified
in the normal category of high-ranking civil servants.
By virtue of their being answerable only to the President
the Ministers are then not directly answerable to the
people who are represented by the Consultative Assembly.
With this pattern of government all authority for the
conduct of state affairs rests with the President. How-10
ever, since the Consultative Assembly, which appoints
the President, is the supreme state body of the Republic
of Indonesia, the President is, at the same time, answer-
able to the Consultative Assembly.
The Constitution also provides that the Chamber of
Representatives will, jointly with the President, exer-
cise legislative power and decide the State Budget; but
the President is not answerable to the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives although required to secure the prior approval
of this body for the promulgation of legislation.
While it can be said that there is a separation of the
Ministers from the Chamber of Representatives and the
Consultative Assembly, it must be remembered that it
would not be possible for the President to attend to all
details of legislation jointly with the Chamber of
Representatives unless assisted by the various Ministers.
Thus the procedure as regards legislation is such that,
in each case, the Minister concerned is in direct contact
with the Chamber of Representatives.
The Ministers are, however, merely acting on behalf of
and in the name of the President, and the situation is
on that account unsatisfactory since, under this arrange-
ment, the President is unduly exposed to adverse
criticism. For example, if any Minister commits an
error in the course of carrying out his duties it is
not the Minister who is answerable to the people—that
is, to the Consultative Assembly--but the President.
Certainly the President is able to dismiss the Minister
involved, but the dismissal of the Minister will
hardly silence unfavorable comment directed against
the President who will be held guilty of the fault
committed by the Minister.
Consequently, the question then arises of whether it
could be possible to evolve a more satisfactory formula
for the organization of executive state functions so
that the Ministers would be answerable to the people.
In the present critical situation this question is of
particular urgency.
In various western countries it is customary that the
Ministers of State are invested with authority and made
answerable for the exercise of this authority. Notably
in countries where a system of parliamentary democracy
applies, this principle operates coordinately with the
existence of diverse political parties. It is usually
the practice in democratic countries for the Ministers
to be appointed by the Head of State from the leaders
of the political parties commanding the greatest meas-
ure of popular support, the Ministers so appointed
comprising a Cabinet.11
Generally the Head of State designates a leader of the
most influential political party to carry out the form-
ation of the Cabinet.
While the Head of State acts in conjunction with the
Cabinet, each Minister of the Cabinet is vested with
authority and is answerable for the exercise of this
authority to an assembly representing the people. In
this way the sovereignty of the people is given clear
expression.
Where such a system operates the opportunity is provided
for open and effective criticism of the Government with
the right accorded the members of the representative
assembly to call to account any Minister considered to
have carried out his duties unsatisfactorily. In the
event that the representative assembly finds that the
policy followed by a Minister is at variance with the
policy the assembly desires, the Minister concerned is
obliged to resign from office.
The resignation of any one Minister under such circum-
stances may, of course, result in the resignation of the
Cabinet as a whole, should it happen that the other
Minister support the policy of the Minister who had been
criticized. This denotes that all members of the
Cabinet accept collective responsibility for the actions
of any one member of the Cabinet.
With this system of government the Cabinet is headed by
one of its members given the title of Premier. Usually
this post is assumed by the political leader designated
by the Head of State as Cabinet formateur.
The possibility of establishing this system of government
in Indonesia is, however, excluded by the provisions of
our present Constitution*
As was pointed out above the provisions of the present
Constitution are such that a revision of the Constitution
would be necessary before the Ministers of State could be
invested with authority and held answerable for the
exercise of his authority. At the moment it is the
President who is charged with the direction of state
affairs.
It is, of course, stipulated in Article 37 of the
Constitution that amendments to the Constitution may be
decided on by a meeting of the Consultative Assembly
provided that two-thirds of the total membership of the
Assembly is present and that the proposed amendment is
supported by at least two-thirds of the members present
at the session. But, viewing the question from a consti-
tutional standpoint it can be seen that a revision12
designed to provide for a pattern of government as re-
ferred to above is not possible.
However, a pattern of government whereby Ministers of
State are accorded authority and held answerable for
the exercise of this authority may be brought into
effect as a result of conventional usage, in which case,
of course, the character of ministerial functions and
repsonsibilities would be essentially provisional in the
same way as various existing regulations—and even our
present Constitution--are only provisional. It should
also be recalled that the Working Committee of the KNIP
is also only a provisional institution.
In the Additional Provisions of the present Constitution
it is stipulated that the Consultative Assembly will,
within six months of its being formed, assemble to form-
ulate a Constitution, and it is also required that the
Consultative Assembly will be formed within six months
from the termination of war in Asia. With the formation
of the Chamber of Representatives and the Consultative
Assembly by the holding of general elections participated
in by the entire Indonesian people our state institutions
will no longer be of a provisional character.
Thus there need be no reason for concern at the changes
now being brought into effect, for these changes, al-
though seemingly at variance with the terms of the
present Constitution, are designed to ensure a democratic
structure of the Indonesian State. (7)
In this statement of the Minister of Information, which re-
ferred not only to the Government Announcement of 14 November,
1945, but also to Vice-Presidential Announcement No. X of 16
October, 1945, two contentions were put forward:
firstly: that a revision of the structure of government,
as discussed in the statement, could not be introduced
on the basis of the then existing Constitution;
and
secondly: that such a revision could be brought about
on the basis of conventional usage.
Neither of these contentions is correct. It is obviously
wrong to describe a deliberately introduced procedure as a con-
ventional usage because this term is applicable only to those
customary practices which arise as a natural consequence over a
period of time.
Moreover, the new arrangement could be considered as being
based on the provisions of the then existing Constitution, since
(ϊ)-TbidT“p"~T8.13
it was specified in Article IV of the Transitional Provisions that
the President would temporarily exercise the powers to be exercised
subsequently by the Consultative Assembly on its being formed.
These powers encompassed the authority to amend the Constitution
referred to in Article 37.
Similarly the Government Announcement of 14 November, 1945,
by virtue of which the President was required to share his powers
with the Working Committee of the KNIP, was issued in conformity
with the terms of the Constitution since the proposal for the
introduction of this measure came from the Working Committee it-
self and the Announcement was of the same validity as the
provisions of the Constitution.
Owing to the redistribution of state power, so that the
Ministers became answerable to the KNIP and were no longer
answerable to the President, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic
of Indonesia was implemented, almost during the entire period
of its being operative, in a manner that did not conform to its
provisions. In theory the pattern of government corresponded
to that of American democracy, in practice it was the pattern of
western European democracy that was followed
Within the Working Committee also there was an awareness of
this discrepancy and of the need to modify the terms of the
Constitution to correspond to the procedure that had come into
operation. This is evident from the statement issued by the Work-
ing Committee on 5 December, 1945 (Statement No. 10) (8) of which
the concluding section read as follows:
The means for effecting these modifications should, in
the opinion of the Working Committee, be defined by a
commission of which the members are appointed by the
Government. This commission should make arrangements
for the fullest possible expression of public opinion
on this issue, and in this way the function of the
commission will be carried out with the thoroughness
desired and, at the same time, the people as a whole
will have been able to participate in determining the
scope of the changes that have now become necessary.
However, as far as the writer is aware, the suggested com-
mission was never set up.
The Trend Toward Democratization
The existence of general support for democratic ideals and of
efforts to establish a democratic state structure immediately after
the Proclamation of Independence is confirmed by the suggestion
given in the Government Announcement of 3 November, 1945, (9) urging
the creation of political parties. The Government considered it
desirable that there should be a diversity of political parties
(8) Ibid., p. 15314
since with the setting up of different political parties
all trends of opinion amongst the people can be given
organized expression.
The same suggestion was repeated in the Government announce-
ment of 14 November, 1945 (LO) in.which it was stated that:
With the object of ensuring the development of means of
expression of political opinions the Government of the
Republic of Indonesia urges the people to set up politi-
cal parties so that the various political trends in the
country will be effectively represented. The initial
steps toward the formation of various political parties
had been taken prior to the Japanese occupation but all
such activities were prohibited by the Japanese author-
ities. Whereas both the Japanese authorities and the
Dutch authorities rigorously suppressed the communists
and other political parties which put forward the demand
for full national independence, the Government of the
Republic of Indonesia will not forbid the existence of
any political organization of which the aims and prin-
ciples do not conflict with democratic ideals.
This suggestion is particularly significant since it is at
variance with the previously announced intention of the Indonesian
Independence Preparatory Committee which had, on 22 August, 1945,
besides establishing the KNIP, decided on the formation of the
Partai Nasional Indonesia, (11) this party being envisaged as the
sole Indonesian political organization. (12) From the statement
issued by the Working Committee on 30 October, 1945, which led
to the promulgation of the already mentioned Government Announce-
ment of 3 November, it is quite evident that this divergence was
recognized. In this statement it was noted that:
The Working Committee considers that the moment is now
opportune for steps to be taken to develop the popular
movement in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution relating to freedom of Assembly.
(9) Ibid., p. 76.				
(10)	Ibid.,	P·	79.	
(11)	Ibid.,	P ·	118.	
(12)	Moves poned	for on	the formation of this the instructions given	party were, however, post- in Government Announcement
31 August, 1945, "in connection with the importance of the
role of the KNIP in coordinating all measures relating to the
consolidation of the unity of the people."
Ibid., p. 46.15
The question then arises of whether only one party should
be organized or whether the formation of diverse politi-
cal parties, reflecting various different trends of
opinion should be authorized.
If democratic principle are to be observed it is not
permissible that only one party should be allowed to
function. (13)
Full Powers Again Accorded the President on Three Occasions
The pattern of government similar to that applying in the
western European democracies, as introduced by the changes
described above, did not, however, operate uninterruptedly. On
three occasions the President was again vested with full powers—
on the first occasion from 29 June, 1946, to 2 October, 1946,(14)
in connection with the kidnapping of the Premier, Sjahrir; on
the second occasion from 27 June, 1947 to 3 July, 1947, (15) as a
consequence of the critical situation due to the deadlock in the
discussions with the Dutch; and on the third occasion from 15
September, 1948, to 15 December, 1948. (16) owing to the "Madiun
Affair."
It is to be noted that in the first two instances full powers,
were assumed by the President by virtue of a Presidential Decree
in which it was announced that the President
assumes full powers of government for the time being,
whilst in the third instance an Act was passed with the con-
currence of the Working Committee, the text of the Act being
counter-signed by the Minister of Defense, the Minister of
Internal Affairs, and the Minister of Justice. In this Act it
was stipulated that
the President is accorded full authority to take all
necessary measures and to institute whatever regulations
may be required without regard to the provisions of
existing legislation and regulations.
No definite reason can be given for the difference in pro-
cedure. It is possible that on the first two occasions legisla-
tive formalities were dispensed with because of the weak position
(13)	Ibid., p. 137
(14)	Kusnodiprodjo (second impression^ p. 251, (Presidential
Decrees 1 and 2, 1946)»
(15)	Kusnodiprodjo (first impression?), p. 395 and p. 396, (Pres-
idential Decree 6, 1947).
(16)	Kusnodiprodjo (second impression), p. 135, (Act No. 30, 1948),16
of the Cabinet, or perhaps because of a lack of time, whilst on
the third occasion there was a stable Cabinet in office and there
was adequate time to arrange the passage of legislation; or perhaps
the explanation lies in the gradual strengthening of the position
of the Working Committee so that the transfer of full powers to the
President could not be effected without the assent of the Working
Committee.
Significantly, during the third period in which full powers
were again vested in the President, the customary procedure for the
promulgation of legislation—with the approval of the Working
Committee and the counter-signing of the texts by the Minister
concerned—was maintained, but during this period also the full
powers accorded the President by the Working Committee were exer-
cised in the issuing of a considerable number of Government Decrees
on matters which should have been dealt with by laws passed in
accordance with the normal procedure. These Government Decrees
were not counter-signed by Ministers although all decisions re-
lating to such Decrees were taken at meetings of the Cabinet.
Relations Between the Government and the Working Commi11ee
In general the relations between the Working Committee and the
Government were entirely satisfactory, and there was never any
instance of the resignation of a Minister or of a Cabinet because
measures of policy did not meet with the approval of the Working
Committee.
As far as the writer is able to recollect, there was only one
instance of definite conflict between the President and the Work-
ing Committee, this being in connection with Presidential Decree
No. 6 of 29 December, 1946,	(17) which provided for an increase
in the membership of the KNIP. This decree was submitted for
consideration to a meeting of the Working Committee on 17 Jan-
uary, 1947 (18) and was rejected by the Working Committee. Never-
theless, the decree was not withdrawn by the Government but was
submitted to a plenary meeting of the KNIP held in Malang from 25
February, 1947 to 6 March, 1947. After a heated debate the terms
of the decree were approved.
Presidential Cabinets
In discussing the relationship between the President, the
Cabinet, and the Working Committee mention should also be made
of the three Presidential Cabinets, the first of which was in
office from 2 September, 1945 to 14 November, 1945, the second from
29 January, 1948 to 4 August, 1949, and the third from 4 August,
(17)	Kusnodiprodjo, 1946, p. 249
(18)	Lembaran Sedjarah /Pages of History7 issued by the Ministry of
Information, Djogja, 1950, p.52, and 10 Tahun Kemerdekaan
Indonesia/* Ten Years of Indonesian Independence? by Mr.
Sartono, p. 1017
1949 to 20 December, 1949.
The first of these three Presidential Cabinets differed from
the other two in that it was functioning prior to the introduction
of the modified application of the Constitution, the Ministers
then being answerable solely to the President, whilst the iffice
of Premier had not yet been instituted.
The second and third Presidential Cabinets were in office
after the revision of the structure of government, and were not
formally different from a Cabinet in which there is no president-
ial participation; in both these instances the post of Premier (19)
was maintained, and the Ministers were answerable to the Working
Committee, whilst the texts of all legislation had to be counter-
signed by the Minister concerned.
These two Presidential Cabinets are described as such merely
by reason of the fact that the post of Premier in both instances
was held by the Vice-President, who could, irrespective of his
status as deputy Head of State, exercise a moral authority by
virtue of his personal qualities and the prominent r8le he had
played in the struggle for independence. Furthermore, the com-
position of these two Cabinets did not become a question of
bargaining between the various political parties, and it was
generally considered that a Cabinet so established could not
be forced to resign by the Working Committee.
It was, in any case, apparent that both these Presidential
Cabinets were formed because, firstly, considerable difficulty
had been encountered in attempts to arrive at agreement between
the political parties on the composition of a Cabinet, and
secondly, there was an evident need for a Cabinet with unquestion-
ed authority.
Conclusions Regarding the Exercise of Presidential Powers
In the preceding pages it has been pointed out that the
structure of government as defined in the 1945 Constitution, where-
by the President was accorded virtually unrestricted powers, was
radically changed when provision was made for the Working Committee
to function as a legislative body participating in the deciding of
(19) It was not specifically stated in Presidential Decree No. 3,
1948, announcing the formation of the second Presidential
Cabinet, that the post of Premier was assumed by the Vice-Pres
ident, it being merely indicated that "the routine direction
/of the Cabinet/ will be effected by His Excellency Vice-
President Mohammad Hatta." However, Vice-President Hatta
signed the texts of all legislation as Premier. (Government
Decree No. 22 of 1948 is an example.) In Presidential Decree
No. 6, 1949, of 6 August, 1949, announcing the formation of
the third Presidential Cabinet, the Vice-President was
referred to as Premier.18
the general orientation of state policy and with the introduction
of the system by which the Ministers became answerable to the
Working Committee. As a result of these changes, authority for the
conduct of state affairs was transferred to the Working Committee
and the Cabinet, and the course of events showed that this system
operated satisfactorily.
At the same time, however, it could be seen that a situation
might arise requiring the installation of a Presidential Cabinet
able to exert a greater measure of control than a Cabinet formed by the
normal procedure; and similarly it could also be seen that, on
occasions, it might be found necessary again to accord full powers
to the President.
In the course of drawing up the new Constitution the Constitu-
ent Assembly will be able to weigh carefully the desirability of
making provision for these two possibilities.
If it should be felt that such provision might possibly be
misused for the imposition of a dictatorship, then appropriate
clauses could be included in the Constitution excluding this
eventuality, and ensuring the preservation of a democratic state
structure.19
CHAPTER II
THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1949 CONSTITUTION
AND THE 1950 CONSTITUTION AND THE APPLICATION
OF THESE PROVISIONS
Whilst the 1949 Constitution and the 1950 Constitution were
distinctly different in character—the 1949 Constitution providing
for a federal state and a bicameral parliament, the office of Vice-
President being dispensed with, the 1950 Constitution providing for
a unitary state and a unicameral parliament and reintroducing the
office of Vice-President--the clauses in both Constitutions relat-
ing to the functions and the powers of the President are more or
less identical. Consequently, it has been decided to cover in one
chapter the analysis of the status and the authority of the Pres-
ident as laid down in each of these Constitutions.
Implementation of the Sovereignty of the People
In the 1945 Constitution it was stipulated in Article 1 that
the sovereignty of the people would be exercised entirely by the
Consultative Assembly. In the 1949 Constitution and in the 1950
Constitution, however, it was stipulated that the sovereignty of
the people would be exercised by two bodies, notably the Govern-
ment and Parliament, jointly, that is, the Government together
with the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate under the terms
of the 1949 Constitution, and the Government together with the
Chamber of Representatives under the terms of the 1950 Constitution
This provision is laid down in the first Article of both Constitu-
tions .
Thus, the organs of the State, listed in the 1949 Constitu-
tion as the President, the Ministers, the Senate, the Chamber
of Representatives, the Supreme Court, and the Finance Control
Commission, and listed in the 1950 Constitution as the President
and the Vice-President, the Ministers, the Chamber of Representa-
tives, the Supreme Court, and the Finance Control Commission were
not made jointly subordinate to a single superior authority.
Definition of the Term "Government"
In Article 68 of the 1949 Constitution it was stated that
the Government comprises the President and the Ministers and it
is further specified that:
Any reference made to the Government in this Consti-
tution is understood to mean the President with one,20
several, or all the Ministers according to their
respective specific or general responsibilities.
This definition was omitted from the 1950 Constitution, per-
haps on the grounds that there would be some confusion if the term
Government was taken to refer only to the Cabinet.
However, since it was stipulated in the first article of both
the 1949 Constitution and the 1950 Constitution that the sovereign-
ty of the people will be exercised by the Government and Parliament
jointly, it is hardly possible to consider that the scope of the
term Government did not comprise the office of President. More-
ever, given the nature of the functions of the President in the
conduct of state affairs, particularly in connection with the
coordination between the Cabinet and Parliament and as regards
the promulgation of important decisions of the Cabinet, it is
patently clear that the President must be recognized as being an
integral component of the Government. For example, it is obvious
from the terms of Article 95 of the 1950 Constitution, in which
it is stated:
All legislation passed by the Chamber of Representatives
acquires the force of law after being ratified by the
Government,
that the office of President is necessarily included within the
meaning of the term Government.
Thus, it is virtually certain that the definition given in
Article 68 of the 1949 Constitution was omitted from the 1950
Constitution only because there seemed no purpose in clarifying
further a point that was already clear. It is to be noted too
that those clauses in the 1950 Constitution referring to the off-
ice of President were included in the section dealing with
Government.
Nevertheless, it would be as well for the Constituent Assembly
to include in the new Constitution the definition of Government
given in the 1949 Constitution so that any possible source of
confusion will be removed.
In both Constitutions, in Article 117 of the 1949 Constitu-
tion, and in Article 82 of the 1950 Constitution, it is laid down
that the primary concern of the Government is to promote the well-
being of the entire country and, in particular, to ensure observa-
tion of the provisions of the Constitution, the laws, and other
regulations.
The Status and the Functions of the President
In the 1945 Constitution the position of the President was not
defined, but in Article 69 of the 1949 Constitution and in Article
45 of the 1950 Constitution the President is specifically referred
to as the Head of State.21
The Appointment of the President
In the 1945 Constitution it was stipulated that only "an Indo-
nesian of purely Indonesian origin" could hold the office of Pres-
ident. In the 1949 Constitution, however, it was laid down in
Article 69 that the position of President could be hold only by
"an Indonesian.” Despite the different formulation the actual
significance of both terms is identical. It should also be noted
that the stipulation was made in Article 82 and Article 101 that
the members of the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives would
be "Indonesian citizens," since membership of these two bodies was
not restricted only to the "Indonesians of purely Indonesian origin.
Probably the omission of the term "of purely Indonesian origin"
was made with the object of discouraging the tendency to make
distinction between Indonesian citizens of purely Indonesian origin
and Indonesian citizens of other than purely Indonesian origin.
The element of race discrimination as regards the office of
President was removed in the 1950 Constitution, it being stated in
Article 45 that the post of President would be held by "an Indones-
ian citizen."
By the terms of Article 6 and Article 7 of the 1945 Constitu-
tion the President was to be elected by the Consultative Assembly
for a period of five years—but it was laid down in Article III of
the Transitional Provisions that, on the first occasion, the Pres-
ident would be named by the Indonesian Independence Preparatory
Committee. The appointment of the President by the Independence
Preparatory Committee took place on 18 August, 1945.
In the 1949 Constitution it was specified that the President
would be elected by delegates of the component states of the Repub-
lic of the United States of Indonesia. No mention was made of the
period for which the President would be appointed. Election of
the President by 16 delegates of the component states, in accord-
ance with the terms of the 1949 Constitution, took place on 16
December, 1949, the President being sworn in on 17 December, 1949.
In Article 45 of the 1950 Constitution it was stated that the
President would be elected in accordance with the procedure fixed
by law, but at the time of the drawing up of the 1950 Constitution
the necessary legislation had not been enacted, so that no elect-
ion could be held. On this account the stipulation was included
in the Charter of Agreement of 19 May, 1950, negotiated between the
Government of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia, to the effect that the post
of President of the unitary state then about to be established
would be President Sukarno.
This stipulation was in conformity with the provision made
in Article 141 of the 1950 Constitution that appointments being
exercised at the time of the lapsing of the 1949 Constitution
would be maintained until it was specified otherwise by the terms
of a new Constitution. For this reason no election of a President
was hold when the unitary state was re-established.
As in the 1949 Constitution, no mention was made in the 1950
Constitution of the period for which the President would be appoint-
ed. Both the Government of the Republic of the United States of
Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia accepted22
the understanding that the President and the Vice-President would
not be replaced before another Constitution had been formulated by
the Constituent Assembly, (see Tambahan Lembaran Negara /Supple-
mentary Official Bulletin/ No. 37, 1950)	—'
Thus it was left to the future Constituent Assembly to deter-
mine the procedure for the election of the President.
The Inviolability of the President
Some measure of restriction on the authority of the President
was imposed by two similarly-worded clauses in the 1949 and 1950
Constitutions—notably Article 118 and Article 119 of the 1949
Constitution and Article 83 and Article 85 of the 1950 Constitu-
tion—in which it was stipulated that:
The President (and the Vice-President) is inviolable»
The Ministers are held jointly responsible for the
policy of the Government, and each Minister individ-
ually for the exercise of his functions.
All presidential decrees, including those issued by
virtue of the authority of the President over the
Armed Forces, will be countersigned by the Minister
or Ministers concerned.
The requirement for the counter-signing of the text of the
relevant documents was dispensed with only with regard to the
appointment of the Vice-President—by the terms of the 1950 Con-
st! tution--and the formation of a new Cabinet--by the terms of
both the 1949 and 1950 Constitutions. In connection with the
formation of a new Cabinet it was stipulated that the Presidential
Decree announcing the ministerial appointments would be counter-
signed by the Cabinet-formateur.
Thus, the President was accorded a prerogative to act with-
out reference to the Cabinet in respect of the appointment of
the Vice-President (the appointment being made in accordance with
the recommendation of the Chamber of Representatives), and in re-
spect of the formation of a new Cabinet.
Furthermore, it became the procedure for the mandate for the
Cabinet formateur or formateurs to be signed only by the President,
as was the decree announcing the formation of a new Cabinet,
neither of these documents being counter-signed by a Minister.
Function of the President in the Formation of a New Cabinet
In paragraph 1 Article 74 of the 1949 Constitution it is laid
down that:
The President will appoint a committee of three mem-
bers for the purpose of forming a Cabinet, in agree-23
ment with the delegates of the participant terri-
tories (of the Republic of the United States of
Indonesia).
Under the terms of the 1950 Constitution the President was
free to designate the Cabinet formateurs and to determine the
number of Cabinet formateurs to be designated, it being stipulated
in paragraph 1 Article 51 that:
The President will appoint one or more Cabinet formateurs.
It should be noted that the above-mentioned clause of the 1949
Constitution was not observed in connection with the formation of
the RUSI (1) Cabinet when four, and not three, cabinet formateurs
were designated--two from the Republic of Indonesia, Drs. Moh.
Hatta and Sultan Hamengkubuwono, and two from the Federal Consulta-
tive Assembly,(BFO) Sultan Hamid and Anak Agung Gde Agung. Given
this precedent of non-observance of the stipulation in the Consti-
tution it was obviously desirable that subsequently no such limit-
ation should be laid down regarding the number of cabinet formateurs
to be designated. Moreover, prior to the introduction of the 1949
Constitution the President had also been free to decide on the
designation of cabinet formateurs and on the number of formateurs
to be designated.
Identical clauses were included in both the 1949 and 1950
Constitutions—Article 74 of the 1949 Constitution and Article 51
of the 1950 Constitution--in which it was stipulated that:
In accordance with the recommendation of the forma-
teur(s), the President appoints one as Premier and
also appoints the other Ministers.
This clause was applied with the interpretation that the
Premier was to be appointed not from the formateurs as is suggest-
ed by the text but from the nominees for ministerial posts proposed
by the formateurs. Consequently it could, and did, happen that a
cabinet formateur need not be included in the cabinet (Sidik was
not included in Sukiman Cabinet), or need not be named Premier
(as in the case of Wongsonegoro, formateur of the Ali Sastroamid-
jojo Cabinet).
In the opinion of the writer this interpretation is incorrect,
for it can be seen from the phrasing of the above-mentioned
article in the 1949 Constitution in the official Dutch language
text of this Constitution:
Overeenkomstig de aanbeveling der drie formateurs
benoemt de President een hunner tot Minister-Pres-
(1) Republic of the United States of Indonesia24
ident en benoemt hij de overige Ministers. (2)
which, apart from the reference to the number of formateurs, would
also be the rendering of the corresponding article in the 1950
Constitution--that the intention was to have the post of Premier
allocated to one of the Cabinet formateurs. Where this procedure
was not observed the terms of the Constitution were obviously dis-
regarded. In order to remedy the anomaly so arising the Constituent
Assembly must include a clause in the new Constitution whereby no
obligation would be imposed for the inclusion of a formateur in the
Cabinet or for the naming of a formateur as Premier.
Some confusion may arise also from the indefiniteness of the
phrase "In accordance with the recommendations of the Cabinet
formateur(s)" which could be interpreted to signify that
the President is obligated to issue a decree of which the
terms correspond to the suggestions put forward by the
Cabinet formateurs,
or that
a measure of restriction applies to action by the Pres-
ident in respect of the formation of the Cabinet.
Of these two possible interpretations it has been the second
that has been adopted, it being accepted that whilst the President
was not obliged to approve all proposals made by a Cabinet form-
ateur any proposal that was approved would be confirmed by presi-
dential decree.
Nevertheless the meaning of the phrase quoted remains uncertain
so that some clarifying qualification is required. For example, a
provision could be introduced that;
If the President considers that the Cabinet as proposed
by the formateurs would be able effectively to exercise
its functions...
In paragraph 3 of both Article 74 of the 1950 Constitution
and Article 51 of the 1949 Constitution it was stipulated that
the President will allocate the portfolios, in accordance with the
proposals of the formateurs, in a Cabinet assuming office, and may
also appoint Ministers without portfolio who have the title of
Ministers of State.
On several occasions it has happened that, following negotia-
tions between the political parties concerned, the formation of a
new Cabinet has been accompanied by changes in the number of Minis-
tries. Obviously the establishment or dissolution of a Ministry
has far-reaching consequences directly affecting the state finances
(2) In accordance with the recommendation of the three Cabinet
formateurs the President names one of them Premier and also
names the other Ministers.25
and state administration, and on that account particularly it is
undesirable that such changes should be made solely for political
reasons. Decisions relating to the establishment or dissolution
of Ministries should be taken only after prior discussion by a
Cabinet. This procedure would be more in accordance with the
terms of Article 50 of the 1950 Constitution where it is laid
down that;
The Ministries are formed by the President,
it being evidently implicit that the President gives effect to the
proposals in this connection put forward by the Cabinet. Consider-
ing the importance of the issue it is desirable that no decision
relating to the creation or the dissolution of a Ministry should
be taken without approval from the Chamber of Representatives. To
this end the text of the relevant article in the Constitution
should read;
The formation of Ministries will be determined by law.
Presidential Decrees announcing the appointment of the Premier
and the Ministers of a new Cabinet are, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 4 Article 74 of the 1949 Constitution and
paragraph 4 Article 51 of the 1950 Constitution, to be counter-
signed by the Cabinet formateurs. This provision is only of any
real purpose if the formateur becomes a member of the Cabinet,
either as Premier or Minister, for then the formateur is, by
reason of having counter-signed the Presidential Decree, answer-
able to Parliament for the measures taken by the President. If,
on the other hand, the formateur does not become a member of the
Cabinet, the counter-signing of the decree merely indicates that
the composition of the Cabinet corresponds to the proposals sub-
mitted to the President by the formateur. As an alternative to
the existing stipulation a clause could be introduced providing
for either
or
or
a.	the counter-signing of the Presidential Decree
announcing the composition of the new Cabinet
by the outgoing Premier;
b.	the counter-signing of the Presidential Decree
announcing the composition of the new Cabinet
by the Premier of the newly-appointed Cabinet;
c.	dispensing with the procedure of counter-signing.
With regard to the first possibility it may be noted that with
the formation of the RUSI Cabinet there was no outgoing Premier to
counter-sign the Presidential Decree, and, furthermore, it is high-
ly improbable in most instances that an outgoing Premier would be
inclined to give approval to the formation of a Cabinet to which
he is to cede office.
It would be a more reasonable procedure to have the President-
ial Decree counter-signed by the Premier of the newly-appointed26
Cabinet since this would confirm the Premier's being prepared to
face the verdict of Parliament on the new Cabinet's program. To
allow for the possibility of there being no Premier yet appointed
at the time of the issuing of the Presidential Decree provision
could be made for the decree to be counter-signed by the member
of the Cabinet who would become Premier.
There remains the third possibility of dispensing with the pro
cedure of counter-signing as in the case of the Presidential Decree
designating the Cabinet formateur. Were the procedure of counter-
signing to be dispensed with the authority of the President in
connection with the formation of a new Cabinet would be more firmly
established.
Apart from the formation of a Cabinet all changes in the
composition of a Cabinet and the resignation of a Cabinet are
given effect to by Presidential Decree as stipulated in paragraph
5 Article 74 of the 1949 Constitution and paragraph 5 Article 51
of the 1950 Constitution this signifying, of course, that the
decree is counter-signed by the Premier.
President and Vice-President Informed on All Important
Issues by the Cabinet.
In paragraph 2 of Article 76 of the 1949 Constitution and in
paragraph 2 of Article 52 of the 1950 Constitution it is laid down
that the Cabinet will at all times inform the President (and the
Vice-President) of matters of importance, and that this obligation
applies also to the Ministers individually in respect of issues
coming within the scope of the authority of each. This provision
is necessary in view of the clause requiring that those regulations
and directives issued by the Cabinet or a member of the Cabinet
for which the signature of a Minister alone is not sufficient
authorization must be signed by the President and counter-signed
by the Minister or Ministers concerned. The President thus acts,
not independently, but as an adjunct of the Cabinet. (3)
Only One Presidential Prerogative
The formation of a new Cabinet is in fact to be regarded as
the prerogative of the President, for in this instance the Presi-
dent exercises a personal authority.
At the same time all clauses in the Constitution referring
to functions of the President exclude any authorization for inde-
pendent action by the President. These clauses merely ensure
that the decision in all cases is taken by the Cabinet or by the
Minister concerned, any decree or regulation than issued being
(3) However, except in the case of correspondence addressed
to the Head of a foreign state, no letters of the President
—official or unofficial--are counter-signed by a Minister.27
signed by the President (and counter-signed by a Minister).
Whereas in the past certain state measures were defined
in the>Constitution as the prerogative of the Crown, the relevant
terms of the present Constitution merely indicate that such
measures are not exclusively within the scope of ministerial author
ity. For example, it is stipulated in the 1949 and 1950 Constitu-
tions that:
The President forms the Ministries. (Article 50, 1950
Constitution)
The President has the right to dissolve the Chamber
of Representatives. (Article 84, 1950 Constitution)
The President awards decorations established by law.
(Article 126, 1949 Constitution, Article 87, 1950
Constitution)
The President has the right to grant pardon for punish-
ments imposed by judicial sentence. (Article 160, 1949
Constitution, Article 107, 1950 Constitution)
The President concludes and ratifies treaties and
other agreements with foreign powers. (Article 175,
1949 Constitution, Article 120, 1950 Constitution)
The President appoints representatives of Indonesia
to other powers...(Article 178, 1949 Constitution,
Article 123, 1950 Constitution)
The President receives the representatives of other
powers to the Republic of (..) (4) Indonesia.
(Article 178, 1949 Constitution, Article 123, 1950
Constitution)
The President declares war. (Article 128, 1950
Constitution)
The President proclaims a state of emergency.
(Article 129, 1950 Constitution)
In each instance the word President signifies Government and
the sole purpose of these clauses is to ensure that the relevant
documents bear the signature of the President as with all legisla-
tion, Government Decrees and Presidential Decrees.
The Position of the President as Supreme Commander
It was stipulated in Article 10 of the 1945 Constitution
that:
(4) The 1949 Constitution refers to the Republic of the United
States of Indonesia.28
The President is vested with supreme authority over
the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
At the time this provision was fully in accordance with the posi-
tion of the President as laid down in the 1945 Constitution.
Subsequently, however, with the recognition of the inviolability
of the President and the assumption of full governmental responsi-
bility by the Ministers, the rank of Supreme Commander accorded
to the President became no more than an honorary title, although,
given the extent of the President's influence over the Army the
provisions of Article 10 of the 1945 Constitution were not without
tangible significance. On various occasions the divergence between
juridical concepts and the actual course of events became apparent,
as, for example, in January, 1948, when a conflict of opinion be-
tween the President and the Premier (Amir Sjarifuddin) led to the
fall of the Cabinet later the same month.
Whilst the President is referred to as the Supreme Commander
the general commanding the Armed Forces has the rank of Commander-
in-Chief.
In paragraph 1 Article 182 of the 1949 Constitution it was
laid down that:
The President is the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of the United States of
Indonesia,
but in paragraph 2 of the same article it was stated that:
....if required the Armed Forces will be placed under
the command of a Commander-in-Chief.
The term Supreme Commander was not used in the 1950 Consti-
tution of which Article 127 reads:
The President is vested with supreme authority over
the Armed Forces}
(this formulation corresponding to the wording of Article 10
of the 1945 Constitution). In paragraph 2 of the same article
it is laid down that:
In time of war the Government places the Armed Forces
under the command of a Commander-in-Chief,
Probably the omission of the title Supreme Commander was intend-
ed as a means of confirming the purely nominal status of the
President in relation to the Armed Forces. It is the writer's
opinion, however, that the changed wording, with the use of the
phrase vested with supreme authority instead of the title
Supreme ~Commander , does not fulfill this intention.
The nominal character of the President’s position in relation
to the Armed Forces is adequately indicated in Article 85 of the29
1950 Constitution in which it is stipulated that:
All Presidential Decrees, including those issued by
virtue of the authority of the President over the
Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia will be
counter-signed by the Minister concerned.
Despite the modified wording, it remained the practice in the
Army to refer to the President as the Supreme Commander. Moreover,
it is stated in the 1954 Defense Act (Act No. 29, 1954) that "the
President is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces" and, as
such, is vested with supreme authority over the Armed Forces. At
the same time it was stipulated in Article 12 that the Minister of
Defense is held responsible for measures affecting the Armed Forces
Obviously it would be only logical for the Constituent Assem-
bly to include in the new Constitution a clause referring to the
President as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
The Vice-President
The office of Vice-President was not provided for in the
1949	Constitution but was re-established by the provisions of the
1950	Constitution. It is stated in Article 45 of the 1950 Consti-
tution that:
In the exercise of his duties the President is assist-
ed by a Vice-President,
and it is further provided in Article 48 that:
In the event of the death of the President, or the President's
removal from office, or being unable to fulfill the duties
of office, the presidential functions will be assumed
by the Vice-President until the expiration of the
period for which the President was appointed.
In the 1949 Constitution it had been stipulated in Article 72
that:
Whenever the circumstances may require it, the Pres-
ident delegates the functions of his office to the
Premier,
and:
in the event of the death of the President, or in
the event of the President's being permanently pre-
vented from exercising the duties of office, a new
President will be elected as provided for in the
federal laws.
In the 1950 Constitution the same provisions—as set out in30
Article 45, Article 46, and Article 47—applied to the President
and to the Vice-President as regards election to office, age qual-
ifications, place of residence, etc. It was also sitpulated in
Article 45 of the 1950 Constitution that the first appointment of
a Vice-President in the restored unitary state would be made by
the President, the appointment to be as recommended by the Chamber
of Representatives. By the terms of Article 85 of the 1950 Consti-
tution the counter-signing of the Presidential Decree by a Minister
was not required.
While it was stipulated in paragraph 3 of Article 45 of the
1950 Constitution that:
The President and the Vice-President are elected in
accordance with the provisions laid down by law,
it was stated in the Explanatory Notes No. 7 to the 1950 Constitu-
tion (dealing with the replacement of the 1949 Constitution with
the 1950 Constitution) that, since it was the view of both the
RUSI Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia,
that:
no change would be made in the appointments of the
President and the Vice-President prior to the final
drafting of a new Constitution by a Constituent
Assembly, the formulation of provisions relating to
the election of the President and the Vice-President
was left to the Constituent Assembly.
The establishment of the office of Vice-President is, of
course, essentially related to the emergence of the dual unity of
leadership of Sukarno and Hatta (Dwi Tunggal) in 1945. Thus the
Vice-President was not allotted functions apart from the functions
of the President, for the status of the Vice-President was no
different from that of the President. Then, during the RUSI per-
iod no provision was made for the office of Vice-President since
Mohammad Hatta had taken over the post of Premier. If it is
recalled that a Presidential Cabinet had been installed during
the Djogja period and a similar Cabinet was in office during the
RUSI period, and further, that the Premier represented the Presi-
dent, while Parliament did not have the power to compel the
Cabinet to resign, it can be seen that the establishment of the
office of Vice-President provides an example of the extent to
which the formulation of a Constitution may be influenced by an
element of personal consideration.
Whereas the Vice-President had been named Premier in a Presi-
dential Cabinet in the Djogja period, the 1950 Constitution exclud-
ed the possibility of the formation of a Presidential Cabinet, so
that the Vice-President could not become Premier without first
resigning from his appointment as Vice-President.
The question now arises as to whether, in view of the course
of events during these last few years, it may not be advisable to
make provision in the new Constitution for the formation of a
Presidential Cabinet in exceptional circumstances. There is also
the question of whether it may not also be advisable to make
provision for the transfer of full state power to the President
and the Vice-President in the event of an emergency.31
The Status and Functions of the Ministers
An analysis has already been given in the preceding pages of
the meaning of the term Government, of the procedure followed
in the formation of a new Cabinet, and of the position of the
Ministers.
The Cabinet and the Premier
There was no provision in the 1945 Constitution for any
specific institution comprising the Ministers as a distinct group,
the reference in Article 17 being only to "the Ministers" without
further qualification. In both the 1949 and 1950 Constitutions,
however, the Ministers were referred to either as the Cabinet—
in Article 74 of the 1949 Constitution and Article 51 of the 1950
Constitution—or as the Council of Ministers—in Article 76 of
the 1949 Constitution and Article 52 of the 1950 Constitution.
The term Council of Ministers was used in the sense of a meeting
of the Cabinet, but was generally accepted as signifying the Cab-
inet .
While it is stipulated in both Article 74 of the 1949
Constitution and Article 51 of the 1950 Constitution that each
Cabinet will include a Premier no indication is given of the
functions of this post beyond the provision in Article 76 of the
1949 Constitution and Article 52 of the 1950 Constitution that
the Premier will preside over the meetings of the Cabinet.
However, it is always recognized that the Premier is the
leader of the Cabinet, and a Cabinet is identified with the name
of the Premier. The replacement of individual Ministers is, of
course, always possible, but, in the writer's opinion, the Premier
could hardly be replaced without the formation of a new Cabinet.
As was pointed out above (see page 23) it did not necessarily
follow that a Cabinet formateur would be allocated the post of
Premier.
It is to be noted that in each Cabinet there is at least
one Vice-Premier. A Vice-Premier participates in the leadership
of the Cabinet and does not hold any portfolio. As no provision
has ever been made for the post of Vice-Premier the terms of
Article 51 of the 1950 Constitution should be revised so that this
appointment is recognized.
The Inner Cabinet
At the time of the first Dutch military attack on the Repub-
lic of Indonesia there was set up an Inner Cabinet and this insti-
tution was preserved in the RUSI period. In Article 75 of the
1949 Constitution it was stipulated that the Ministers of Defense,
Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance, and Economic Affairs
were accorded a special status within the Cabinet in that these32
Ministers were authorized, in circumstances of emergency or when-
ever immediate action was required, jointly to take decisions which
had the same validity as decisions taken by a plenary session of
the Cabinet. This provision, designed to ensure complete secrecy
on decisions which may have been disclosed outside the Cabinet
if all the Ministers were informed, was not included in the 1950
Constitution.
The Position of the Ministers
As already noted, it was stipulated in Article 118 and
Article 119 of the 1949 Constitution and again laid down in Article
83 and Article 85 of the 1950 Constitution that:
1.	the President is inviolable;
2.	the Ministers are jointly responsible for the entire
policy of the Government, and each Minister individ-
ually for his share in the Government;
3.	all Presidential Decrees are counter-signed by the
Minister or Ministers concerned.
Since the Ministers may be called to account for any action
taken in the exercise of their office, the Chamber of Representa-
tives consequently has the right to force the resignation of any
Minister whose policy it disapproves of. In Article 122 of the
1949 Constitution, however, it was specifically stated that the
Chamber of Representatives (then not yet an elected body)
can neither compel the Cabinet nor the individual
Ministers to resign.
This provision had been made for the purpose of guaranteeing the
Cabinet the necessary freedom from interference in a difficult
period of transition so that general elections could be arranged
and a new Constitution formulated with a minimum of delay. With
the exclusion of this stipulation from the 1950 Constitution the
departure it made from the western European parliamentary system
was eliminated.
Under the terms of Article 83 of the 1950 Constitution the
President was accorded the right to dissolve the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives, the same article including the proviso that, in the
event of the exercise of this power, new elections would be held
within 30 days. The right to dissolve the Chamber of Representa-
tives was vested in the President as a counter-balance to the
possibility of the Chamber's forcing a Cabinet to resign.
Obviously it is impossible to arrange a general election
within the narrow time-limit of 30 days, so that it would be
preferable, in the opinion of the writer, to stipulate that the
holding of general elections will be commenced within thirty days.
In this way the prompt formation of a new Chamber of Representa-
tives would be ensured and the danger of a dictatorial regime33
would be avoided.
There was no provision in the 1949 Constitution for the dis-
solution of the Chamber of Representatives.
Parliament
The Senate and the Chamber of Representatives
In accordance with the federal state structure of the Repub-
lic of the United States of Indonesia (the RUSI comprising—1 the
Republic of Indonesia, 2 West Kalimantan, 3 East Indonesia,
4 Madura, 5 Bandjar, 6 Bangka, 7 Billiton, 8 Greater Dajak, 9 Cen-
tral Java, 10 East Java, 11 Southeast Kalimantan, 12 East Kaliman-
tan, 13 Pasundan, 14 Riau, 15 South Sumatra, and 16 East Sumatra)
the 1949 Constitution provided for a bicameral Parliament, a
Senate and a Chamber of Representatives.
The membership of the Senate was made up from two representa-
tives from each of the component states. The Senate represented
the component states, and the members were appointed by the Govern-
ments of the component states, as laid down in Article 80 and
Article 81 of the 1949 Constitution.
The RUSI Chamber of Representatives comprised 150 members,
as stipulated in Article 98 of the 1949 Constitution, and, as
stated in the same article, represented the entire Indonesian
people. In Article 99 it was laid down that one-third of the
total number of members of the RUSI Chamber of Representatives
would be from the Republic of Indonesia and two-thirds from the
other component states. It was also provided in Article 100 that
the Chinese minority would be represented by nine members in the
RUSI Chamber of Representatives, the European minority by six mem-
bers, and the Arab minority by three members, and in the event that
these numbers were not arrived at in the formation of the Chamber,
the Government of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia
would appoint additional members representing the said minorities
to the extent required by the Constitution.
In Article 111 of the 1949 Constitution it was stipulated
that elections would be held for a Chamber of Representatives
within one year from the date on which the 1949 Constitution be-
came operative. However, the Republic of the United States of
Indonesia was abolished and replaced with the present unitary
state before the expiration of this time-limit.
In the re-established unitary state the institution of a
Senate was dispensed with, but, as was laid down in Article 77
of the 1950 Constitution, the Chamber of Representatives of the
Republic of Indonesia had a membership comprising the chairmen,
vice-chairmen, and the members of the RUSI Chamber of Representa-
tives and the RUSI Senate, and the chairmen, vice-chairmen, and
the members of the Working Committee of the Central National Com-
mittee (KNIP) and the Supreme Advisory Council.34
The following list shows the initial composition of the new
Chamber of Representatives:
I	Members from the RUSI Chamber of Representatives
a. representing the territory of the
Republic of Indonesia as defined by
the Renville Agreement ....................... 50
b. representing other territories .............. 79
c. not previously member of the RUSI
Chamber of Representatives; additional
members appointed by the Republic of
Indonesia for the Pasundan State ..	..	..	..	. |9
II	Members from the RUSI Senate.........................29
III	Members from the Working Committee of the
KNIP ............... . ....................... .	. .	.46
IV	Members from the Supreme Advisory Council ........... 13
Total . .......... . . 236
From these figures it can be seen that, in comparison with the
composition of the RUSI Chamber of Representatives, the membership
of the Chamber of Representatives of the newly re-established
Republic of Indonesia included a far greater proportion of repre-
sentatives of the Republic of Indonesia in relation to the number
of representatives of the former Federal Consultative Assembly
territories.
The distribution of representation in the RUSI senate and
Chamber of Representatives was as follows:
Seats	Seats
provided for taken up
Senate
Representatives of the
Republic of Indonesia ....... 2	2
Representatives of the
Federal Consultative
Assembly..................... 30	27
Chamber of Representatives
Representatives of the
Republic of Indonesia........ 50	50
Representatives of the
Federal Consultative
Assembly . .	. ......... . . . 100	7935
52
Senate and Chamber of Representatives
Representatives of the
Republic of Indonesia ........ 52
Representatives of the
Federal Consultative
Assembly ..	.........
106
. 130
In the Chamber of Representatives of the newly re-established
unitary state the representation of the two groups was:
Representatives of the
Republic of Indonesia ..	..	130
Representatives of the
former Federal Consulta-
tive Assembly ..	..	..	.
........106
Subsequently, as was provided, for in Article 56 and Article
57	of the 1950 Constitution the membership of the Chamber of
Representatives returned by general election would be determined
on the basis of one representative for every 300,000 resident
Indonesian citizens.
As in the 1949 Constitution, it was stipulated in Article
58	of the 1950 Constitution that the Chinese, European, and
Arab minorities would be represented in the Chamber of Representa-
tives by nine, six, and three members respectively. In the same
article it was specified that, should the required number of
representatives of these minorities not be returned by election,
the Government would appoint additional representatives of these
groups to the full number prescribed.
The Exercise of Legislative Power
The stipulations of both Article 127 of the 1949 Constitution
and Article 89 of the 1950 Constitution provided that legislative
power would be exercised by the Government together with the
Chamber of Representatives, it being further specified in the 1949
Constitution also in Article 127 that the Senate would participate
in the exercise of legislative power in respect of matters con-
cerning particularly one, several, or all the component states or
parts of the territories of these states and in respect of matters
relative to relations between the Republic of the United States of
Indonesia and the said component states.
It was laid down in Article 128 of the 1949 Constitution and
in Article 90 of the 1950 Constitution that draft legislation
drawn up by the Government would be presented to the Chamber of
Representatives by Presidential message, the 1949 Constitution
providing also that such draft legislation would at the same time
be brought to the notice of the Senate. The Chamber of Represen-36
tatives was also accorded the right by the terms of Article 129
of the 1949 Constitution and Article 91 of the 1950 Constitution
to introduce amendments to any legislation submitted by the Govern-
ment. Furthermore, the Ministers were, by virtue of the provisions
of Article 105 of the 1949 Constitution and Article 64 of the 1950
Constitution, entitled to speak at any session of the Chamber of
Representatives.
It was required by the terms of Article 134 of the 1949 Con-
stitution and Article 92 of the 1950 Constitution that, in the
event of the rejection by the Chamber of Representatives of draft
legislation proposed by the Government, the President would be
notified by the Chamber of Representatives of its decision.
Similarly, it was stipulated in Article 92 of the 1950 Con-
stitution that the Chamber of Representatives, having accepted,
with or without amendment, draft legislation proposed by the
Government, would notify the President of this decision and sub-
mit the text of the said legislation to the President. In Article
133 of the 1949 Constitution it was laid down that, whilst the
President would be notified of the decision of the Chamber of
Representatives approving draft legislation, such approved draft
legislation dealing with matters coming within the competence
of the Senate would be submitted to the Senate.
In Article 136 of the 1949 Constitution it was further pro-
vided that the Senate, having approved draft legislation already
accepted by the Chamber of Representatives, would notify the Presi-
dent of this decision, and, in the event of its rejecting draft
legislation already approved by the Chamber of Representatives,
the Senate would also notify the President of the decision taken.
A further provision in Article 136 of the 1949 Constitution
authorized the Government to submit again to the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives draft legislation rejected by the Senate, and, if ap-
proved again, and without amendment, by the Chamber of
Representatives with a favorable vote of at least two-thirds
of the members present (as required by the stipulations of Article
132), the text of such legislation would then be forwarded to the
President for ratification. It was also required by the terms of
Article 137 of the 1949 Constitution that the President would be
notified by the Chamber of Representatives of the rejection by
the Chamber of Representatives of draft legislation submitted to
it by the Government for reconsideration.
In an identically-worded provision in Article 138 of the 1949
Constitution and in Article 94 of the 1950 Constitution it was
stipulated that:
The Government is bound to ratify duly passed legis-
lation unless the Government gives notice, within
one month from the date on which the legislation in
question has been submitted for ratification, of
having preponderant objections to the terms of the
legislation in question.37
In the same articles it was further laid down that the
Chamber of Representatives (and under the terms of the 1949 Con-
stitution, also the Senate) would be notified by Presidential
Message of the ratification of an Act by the Government or the
objection of the Government to an Act.
The Government was authorized by the provision of Article 138
of the 1949 Constitution and Article 94 of the 1950 Constitution
to withdraw any draft legislation not yet passed by the Chamber
of Representatives.
In Article 130 of the 1949 Constitution and Article 95 of
the 1950 Constitution it was specified that all legislation passed
by the Chamber of Representatives—the 1949 Constitution referred
also to legislation passed by the Senate on matters coming within
the competence of the Senate—acquired the force of law on being
ratified by the Government, further, that the laws of the state
were inviolable. Thus, the duly ratified laws were wholly
binding on every Court of Law.
It was also provided in Article 128 of the 1949 Constitution
and Article 90 of the 1950 Constitution that the Chamber of
Representatives could submit draft legislation to the Government,
this provision similarly applying, under the terms of the 1949
Constitution, to the RUSI Senate in respect of matters coming
within the competence of the Senate
With regard to draft legislation proposed by the Senate,
it was provided in Article 129 that such draft legislation
would be discussed by the Chamber of Representatives which was
authorized to introduce amendments to the draft.
In Article 133 of the 1949 Constitution it was also laid
down that if the Chamber of Representatives introduced amend-
ments to draft legislation proposed by the Senate the amended
draft would be then submitted to the Senate for further con-
sideration, the subsequent procedure being as that provided for
in respect of draft, legislation proposed by the Government. In
the same article it was provided that draft legislation proposed
by the Senate that was accepted by the Chamber of Representatives
without amendment would be forwarded to the President for ratifi-
cation by the Government.
The proposing of legislation by the Chamber of Represent-
atives was dealt with in Article 135 of the 1949 Constitution
and Article 93 of the 1950 Constitution, the 1950 Constitution
providing that such legislation would be submitted to the
President for ratification by the Government, the 1949 Constitu-
tion providing that such legislation when relating to matters
coming within the competence of the Senate would be submitted
to the Senate for consideration, but in all other cases submitted
to the President for ratification by the Government. Whilst no
provision was made for prior discussion with the Government on
draft; legislation to be proposed by the Chamber of Representatives —
the Government having the function in this connection of merely38
accepting or rejecting such draft legislation—it nevertheless
became the procedure for members of the Government to discuss such
drafts, and, where necessary, suggest modification of the text,
before the proposed legislation was submitted to the President for
ratification by the Government. Consequently the final text sub-
mitted by the Chamber of Representatives was in fact a version
arrived at from consultation between the Chamber of Representatives
and the Government.
There was only one draft bill, which became law submitted
by the RUSI Chamber of Representatives, whilst five draft bills
which have become law have been put forward by the Chamber of
Representatives since the re-establishment of the unitary state.
In all cases these bills related to the Chamber of Representatives
and the members of the Chamber, as can be seen from the following
list:
1	Statute No. 4,1950 regarding reimbursement of members
of the RUSI Chamber of Representatives (subsequently
revoked)
2	Statute No. 6,1951 regarding salaries and allowances
for the chairman of the Chamber of Representatives,
and allowances for traveling and accommodation costs
for members of the Chamber of Representatives (replac-
ing Statute No. 4,1950 but also subsequently revoked)
3	Statute No. 37,1953 regarding reimbursement of
members of the Chamber of Representatives
4	Statute No. 2,1954 regarding payments to the chair-
man, the vice-chairman, and the members of the Chamber
of Representatives (replacing Statute No. 10,1953 which
had replaced Statute No. 6,1951)
5	Statute No. 5,1954 regarding the right of the Chamber
of Representatives to set up Commissions of Inquiry
6	Statute No. 75,1954 regarding penal provisions apply-
ing specifically to members of the Chamber of Represen-
tatives .
Special Committees of the Chamber of Representatives are
still engaged in the drafting of four bills, to be proposed by
the Chamber of Representatives, dealing with the status of an
outgoing Cabinet, state of emergency, rules of procedure of the
Chamber of Representatives, and the scope of authority of
Ministers.
Emergency Laws
Both the 1950 and 1949 Constitutions, as well as the 194539
Constitution, (5) authorized the Government independently to
issue Emergency Laws to regulate matters on which immediate action
was required by reason of exceptional circumstances. This pro-
vision was laid down in Article 139 of the 1949 Constitution and
Article 96 of the 1950 Constitution, in both of which it was also
stated that Emergency Laws had the same force and authority as
laws enacted by normal procedure.
It was further stipulated in identical provisions in Article
140 of the 1949 Constitution and Article 97 of the 1950 Constitu-
tion that Emergency Laws would, within one month of being enacted,
be submitted to the Chamber of Representatives (6) to be dealt
with in accordance with the procedure prescribed for draft legis-
lation submitted by the Government; in the event of the rejection
of an Emergency Law by the Chamber of Representatives such an
Emergency Law would automatically lapse, whilst all consequences
arising from the implementation of such an Emergency Law, which
lapsed on that account, would be provided for by law to the
extent that necessary provisicns therefore were not included in
the terms of the Emergency Law in question. Similarly, it was
required that, when an Emergency Law was adopted as a statute
by normal procedure after having been amended, the consequences
of such amendments would also be provided for by law.
Decrees and Ordinances
It was laid down in Article 141 of the 1949 Constitution
and Article 98 of the 1950 Constitution that;
Regulations for the execution of laws are enacted
by the Government and called Government Ordinances,
and in Article 142 of the 1949 Constitution and Article 99 of
the 1950 Constitution that;
The laws and Government Ordinances may delegate to
other organs (of the State) the task of further
regulating definite subjects specified in the pro-
visions of these laws and ordinances.
Usually further directives as to the application of laws
and Government ordinances were given in Presidential Decrees
(the term Keputusan Presiden—Presidential Decision--being
invariably translated as Presidential Decree). The texts of all
laws, Government Ordinances, and Presidential Decrees were signed
(5)	In Article 22 of the 1945 Constitution the reference was to
"...Ordinances which have the force of law."
(6)	This provision was not always observed, with the result that
a considerable number of Emergency Laws are still operative
as such.40
by the President and counter-signed by the Minister or Ministers
concerned, whilst official directives of lesser consequence were
issued by the Minister concerned in each case.
The designation of Presidential Decree (referred to in Indones-
ian as Keputusan Presiden—Presidential Decision) has been applied
both to those decrees issued by the President in which specific
directives are given and to those decrees issued by the President
announcing appointments or termination of appointments of high
rank in the state administration (as indicated in Article 51 of
the 1950 Constitution). (7)
As can be seen from the following table those Presidential
Decrees announcing such appointments or terminations of appoint-
ment have been far more numerous than those Presidential Decrees
in which specific directives have		been given:	
Year	Presidential Decrees giving specific directives	Presidential Decrees relating to appointments, pardons, etc.	Total
1950	54	727	781
1951	13	1051	1064
1952	27	1565	1592
1953	63	1663	1726
1954	103	1345	1448
1955	71	1605	1676
Evidently there is adequate justification for proposing that the
present practice of designating all decrees issued by the Presi-
dent as Presidential Decisions (Keputusan Presiden) should be
revised and only those Presidential Decrees in which specific
directives are given should be referred to as Presidential De-
cisions, whilst those dealing with other matters should be referr-
ed to by the term Peraturan usually denoting decree.
Provision could be made so that:
Presidential Decrees in the nature of directives
(Peraturan Presiden) would relate to:
Legislation
Government Ordinances
Presidential Decrees (Peraturan
Presiden--this term not yet
being applied)
Ministerial Ordinances, etc.
Regulations formulated by
independent state institutions;
and that
(7) The same term Keputusan Presiden was also mentioned in Article
85 of the 1950 Constitution but in this case with a wider meaning41
Presidential Decrees which could be referred to as
Presidential Decisions (Keputusan Presiden) would
relate to:
decisions by the President
decisions by Ministers, and
such items
decisions by directors of
independent state institutions.
Provision for this differentiation should certainly be made in
the new Constitution in order to remove the existing anomaly.
The following table shows the number of laws and decrees issued from 1950 to 1955:				
Year	Statutes	Emergency Laws*	Government Decrees	Presidential Decrees
1950	8	43	33	781
1951	24	25	73	1064
1952	24	15	51	1592
1953	37	9	42	1726
1954	76	12	64	1448
1955	12	19	27	1676
* A number of Emergency Laws have become statutes enacted
by normal procedure.
Other Rights Accorded to the Chamber of Representatives
In Article 120 of the 1949 Constitution and Article 69 of the
1950 Constitution it was laid down that:
The Chamber of Representatives has the right of in-
terpellation and questioning; the members have the
right of questioning.
The Ministers will furnish all the information re-
quested to the Chamber of Representatives, either
orally or in writing.... subject to the condition that
the providing of the information requested is not
considered contrary to the general interests of the
state,
and, further, in Article 121 of the 1949 Constitution and
Article 70 of the 1950 Constitution that:
The Chamber of Representatives has the right to set
up Commissions of Inquiry.
As has already been noted (see page 30) the provisions of
the 1949 Constitution withheld from the Chamber of Representa-
tives the right to force the Cabinet or individual Ministers
to resign from office, and, at the same time, did not authorize42
the President (that is, the Government) to dissolve the Chamber
of Representatives. The provisions of the 1950 Constitution, on
the other hand, did invest the Chamber of Representatives with
the right to compel the Cabinet or individual Ministers to resign
from office, whilst also according the President (that is, the
Government) the right to dissolve the Chamber of Representatives.
Conclusions Regarding the Status and Functions of the President
From a survey of the various provisions relating to the
status and functions of the President in the 1945 Constitution,
the 1949 Constitution, and the 1950 Constitution it can be seen
that:
a.	whilst the President was not accorded unlimited state
power by the provisions of the 1945 Constitution, it
being stipulated in Article 3 and Article 37 that the
Consultative Assembly would formulate and introduce
modifications to the Constitution and would define the
general orientation of state policy, and in Article 5
that the legislative power vested in the President would
be exercised in concurrence with the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives, it was laid down in Article IV of the
Transitional Provisions of the 1945 Constitution that,
pending the formation of the Consultative Assembly and
the Chamber of Representatives, the President, assisted
by a National Committee, would exercise the competences
of both these institutions; the President held these
extensive powers during the period 18 August to 16
October, 1945 (see also page 4);
b.	in Vice-Presidential Announcement No. X, dated 16
October, 1945, it was provided that, pending the
formation of the Consultative Assembly and the
Chamber of Representatives, the Working Committee
of the Indonesian Central National Committee (KNIP),
acting on behalf of the KNIP, was authorized to par-
ticipate (with the President)
in defining the general orientation of state
policy, and in the exercise of legislative
powers;
thus the powers of the President were diminished in
respect of these two functions by reason of the
participation of the KNIP Working Committee (see page 7);
c.	on 11 November, 1945, the President decided that, as
had been proposed by the KNIP Working Committee, the
Ministers, who had hitherto been merely assistants of
the President and responsible only to the President,
would be made responsible to the Working Committee,
the President as Head of State remaining in the posi-
tion of not being answerable to any state organ;43
d. the status of the president as Head of State not
responsible to any state organ was preserved in the
provisions of both the 1949 and 1950 Constitutions
(see page 19 and page 30).
As Head of State the President occupies a position of pre-
eminence. In the name of the state the President receives the
representatives of foreign powers, appoints representatives of
the Republic of Indonesia to foreign powers, concludes treaties
with foreign powers, awards decorations, grants pardons, de-
clares war, holds the rank of Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces, signs the texts of all legislation, Emergency Laws,
Government Decrees, Presidential Decrees; and virtually all
correspondence between the Government and the Chamber of Re-
presentatives is effected through the intermediary of the Pres-
ident .
However, all decrees and other documents signed by the Pres-
ident must also be counter-signed by the Minister concerned in
each case. The President is inviolable; it is the Minister who
is answerable for measures taken.
Thus, whilst the President, as representative of the State,
occupies a position of pre-eminence, the Constitution provides
that, with the exception of the formation of a new Cabinet, the
Minister concerned in each case is answerable for action taken
by the President.
When it is recalled that the Republic of Indonesia had to
wage a constant struggle for survival in the first years of its
existence, and that the President has held the position of Head
of State since the Republic of Indonosha came into being, it is
easily understood that these juridical concepts could not always
be fully implemented. During the Djogja period the President
was again accorded full state powers on three occasions (see page
15) and during this period also a Presidential Cabinet was in-
stalled (see page 16). Moreover, it has happened subsequently
that the President has refused to sign documents submitted by a
Minister for signature. These and other actions of the President
have been criticized as being at variance with the provisions of
the Constitution.
The extracts from the reports of the various Committees of
the Chamber of Representatives, which are attached as Appendix I,
show the measure of dissatisfaction in these Committees regard-
ing actions of the President. In Appendix 2 are given extracts
from the reply of the Sukiman Government to issues raised by the
Chamber of Representatives Committees.
The most important points of this reply are as follows:
The scope of the functions of the President and the
Vice-President at the moment cannot, in the opinion
of the Government, be defined solely on the narrow44
basis of purely constitutional considerations. Var-
ious other factors, notably those deriving from the
actual conditions applying in this current period of
transition, must also be taken into account. It is
the Government's opinion that, by reason of the con-
ditions existing at the moment in various fields, the
President and the Vice-President are frequently obliged
to play a more active and more extensive role than
would be the case if the country had attained a satis-
factory degree of stability.
Moreover, both the President and the Vice-President,
who were acknowledged as trusted leaders of the nat-
ional struggle during the period of colonial rule
and during the Revolution, are still accorded the
same respect and recognition by the entire people
now that Indonesian independence has been achieved.
Thus, the President and the Vice-President are not,
as would be contended on the basis of a strictly
constitutional viewpoint, merely personal symbols
of the state, but are national leaders have the full-
est confidence of the people.
It is for this reason that the people constantly call
for statements by the two personalities who hold the
highest positions in the state, and thus it is inevi-
table that the President and the Vice-President fre-
quently address to the people declarations on the
foundations of the state, on the development of the
state and the factors hindering this development, and
on continuing the national struggle. Such declarations
are, of course, also issued by various government
representatives and officials, but the fact remains that
the people insist on personal visits by the President
and the Vice-President who are more trusted and more
respected than any other official spokesman.
It must be pointed out too, that requests for state-
ments by the President and the Vice-President are
made not only be the people, but also by government
bodies desiring assistance in arriving at important
decisions.
The existing conditions then evidently oblige the
President and the Vice-President to be active be-
yond the limits of strictly formal duties.
The Government is convinced that the activities of
the President and the Vice-President in this con-
nection have been of inestimable benefit to the State
and to the people. The Government furthermore main-
tains that there has been no violation of the funda-
mental principles of parliamentary government as
expressed in the letter and the spirit of the Constitu-
tion since the Cabinet remains answerable to Parliament
for all actions of the President and the Vice-President.45
The question of whether the Cabinet agrees or dis-
agrees with actions of the President and the Vice-
President is an internal matter between the Cabinet
and the President and the Vice-President themselves.
It may well be that the circumstances under discussion,
which arise from the course of historical evolution,
impart to the parliamentary regime in Indonesia at
the moment an individual character, but the basic
condition of the Cabinet's being answerable to Parlia-
ment for all measures is definitely preserved.
It is the hope of the Government that this clarifi-
cation will remove all uncertainty and misunder-
standing regarding the position of the President and
the Vice-President.
The affirmation that:
firstly, the question of whether the Cabinet agrees
or disagrees with actions of the President and the
Vice-President is an internal matter between the
Cabinet and the President and the Vice-President
themselves; and
secondly, the Cabinet is answerable to Parliament
for all such actions
disposes of the issue from a juridical viewpoint. The Head of
State is inviolable; it is the Cabinet that is answerable for
all actions of the Head of State.
Actually, the reply quoted does indicate that the scope of
action in respect of which the President is inviolable is ex-
tended. Whilst the provisions of Article 118 of the 1949 Consti-
tution and Article 83 of the 1950 Constitution referred implicitly
to governmental actions—since the Ministers were made answerable
for government policy--the inviolability accorded the Head of
State is now taken to apply to all activities of the President
and the Vice-President having any bearing on state affairs.
Considered politically, the government statement quoted
above affirms that the Head of State remains unconditionally
in office, whilst the activities of the President and the Vice-
President could possibly bring about the resignation of a Cabinet.
There is the possibility that Parliament, disapproving of actions
of the Head of State, may demand the resignation of the Cabinet,
and it is also possible that a Cabinet, unwilling to accept
responsibility for certain actions of the Head of State, may
decide to resign.
Only if one of the pro-Government groups in Parliament
withdrew its support for the Cabinet (for example, in the event
of a grave difference of opinion between the President and the46
Cabinet) would there be any real likelihood of Parliament's forcing
the Cabinet to resign.
On the other hand, there is far more likelihood of a Cabinet's
deciding to resign by reason of being unwilling to accept respon-
sibility for actions of the Head of State.
On the basis of the foregoing remarks it can be concluded
that, although by the terms of the Constitution the office of
President is an exclusively symbolic appointment, the President
has come to acquire an unassailable status and has been able also
to exercise no small measure of personal authority. Being in an
unassailable position the President can publicly express his
opinions without giving any regard to the policy of the Cabinet.
This can, of course, lead to conflict between the President and
the Cabinet, in which case the resignation of the Cabinet is the
only solution.
It is possible that a Cabinet may remain in office even
though Parliament and the Cabinet both do not approve of the
actions of the President, but the stability of the Government is
then jeopardized.
In the course of events there have developed, as a result of
the particular position of the President and the Vice-President in
the eyes of the people, certain procedures which are now establish-
ed practices. However, there is no general awareness of this devel
opment and in consequence a degree of confusion arises which, in
turn, creates widespread instability.
The matter should be given the fullest consideration by the
Constituent Assembly with a view to having in the new Constitution
appropriate provisions which will clarify the existing situation
as regards the status of the Head of State. The Constituent
Assembly is at liberty to decide for or against the maintenance
of the current practices, but whatever the decision the question
must be dealt with unequivocally for the provisions in the pre-
sent Constitution relative to the status and functions of the
Head of State are insufficiently precise.
Should the Constituent Assembly decide on the maintenance
of the current practices and so make it officially permissible
for the President to express publicly his views on state policy—
the President then in effect participating in the definition of
the general orientation of state policy--a clause should be in-
cluded in the Constitution stipulating that the Cabinet is required
to secure the prior approval of the President on all matters con-
cerning the basic objectives of state policy. In this way it will
be ensured that the President and the Cabinet follow a common
policy, and there would thus be no conflicting public statements.
Providing that it is not decided to adopt the American
system (where the President is vested with executive state
authority and is not answerable to Parliament) but to retain
the western European system (where the Ministers are answerable
to Parliament), a clause of the nature suggested would be suf-47
ficient. The inclusion of such a provision in the Constitution
would mean a departure to some extent from the western European
system without leading to the adoption of the American system.
With the introduction of this provision a new and distinct system
would be established.
Should the Constituent Assembly disapprove of maintaining
the current practices and decide to define the office of President
as an appointment of exclusively symbolic character it will be
necessary to have a clause in the Constitution requiring the
President to secure prior approval from the Cabinet for any action
he may wish to take that would relate to state policy.
Whichever alternative is adopted, there will still be need-
ed some provision such that, in the event of there arrising any
irreconcilable difference of opinion between the President and
the Cabinet, the issue can be resolved by a prescribed means,
for example, by decision of Parliament.49
APPENDIX I
EXTRACTS FROM REPORTS OF CHAMBER
OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON EXPENDITURES
ALLOCATED TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT
FOR 1951
From the Report of Committee I
It was asked by several members of the Committee whether, in
view of the inviolable status of the President and the Vice-
President, the Cabinet could be held answerable for speeches
made in public by the President and the Vice-President. If the
responsibility of the Cabinet in such instances was only nominal,
it was observed, the question arose of which organ of state
authority could be held answerable for the speeches made on such
occasions recently as the reception for National Sports Week
Committee, United Nations Day, the 17 August celebrations, and
Heroes Day. In more than one instance, it was further stated,
the nature of the speeches was not in keeping with the dignity of
the position of a Head of State, and, moreover, certain ill-
judged comments made in these speeches could adversely affect
the development of negotiations with other governments as, for
example, the discussions with Holland recently on West Irian.
Recalling the statement by the Director of the Presidential
Secretariat at a meeting of the Assembly Committee for Internal
Affairs to the effect that President Sukarno was frequently ob-
liged to speak as a popular leader as well as President, a member
of the Committee suggested that the President should, in making
a public speech, indicate first whether he was speaking as a
popular leader or in his capacity as President.
Because public statements by the President or the Vice-
President were invariably made in the presence of members of the
Diplomatic Corps and were consequently regarded as declarations
of government policy, it was suggested that, in order to avoid
any undesirable consequences, the President and Vice-President
should not make frequent public speeches unless the Cabinet was
in all cases to be held responsible for the statements delivered.
In a further question it was asked what limits were imposed
on the President's participation in the formation of a new Cabi-
net and whether the President was to be regarded as having only
the function of ratifying the decisions of the formateur of as
having the function of a co-formateur.
In this connection also it was asked whether the President50
and the Vice-President were constitutionally authorized to exert
influence in the appointment or transfer of diplomatic representa-
tives „ The member of the Committee submitting this question also
asked whether there were any other matters coming within the scope
of the authority of branches of the Government where the President
and Vice-President were entitled to take action.
From the Report of Committee II
One member of the Committee expressed the opinion that no
responsibility could be accepted for the public speeches made by
the President since frequently there were statements in these
speeches which were at variance with the views of the Cabinet, for
example, as regards West Irian. In a parliamentary system of
government, the member added, it was usually incumbent on a Cabi-
net which could not approve the actions or the standpoint of the
Head of State to resign,,
The same speaker requested that there should be a clear in-
dication given as to whether or not the Government could be expect-
ed to follow the same pattern of parliamentary regime as operated
in those countries regarded as examples. It was also asked what
action was envisaged by the Government with regard to those mat-
ters for which no responsibility could be accepted.
Several members of the Committee asked whether, pending the
formation of a Constituent Assembly, Parliament and the Government
were jointly authorized to modify the terms of the Constitution
and specify the number and nature of the Ministries. The hope was
expressed that legislation would be enacted stipulating the number
and the nature of the Ministries. Such action, it was pointed
out, corresponded to the wishes of the Ministries, and would,
furthermore, provide the occasion for defining unequivocally the
functions of the President and the various other executive organs
of the state.
One member asked for a precise clarification of the status
of the Vice-President.
It was requested that an act be drawn up specifying the
functions of the President, the Vice-President, the Supreme Court,
the Attorney-General, the Finance Control Commission, and other
executive state bodies.
With regard to actions taken by the President, the viewpoint
was expressed by a member of the Committee that the Cabinet must
either approve or disapprove all public statements by the Pres-
ident, and if approval could not be given to all such statements
the Cabinet was consequently obliged to resign.
The point was also raised of the President's frequently
appearing in public in army, navy, and air force uniforms and
rarely in civilian clothing. An explanation for this was requested51
There was also a request made for a Government statement
defining the status and scope of authority of the President as
laid down in the Constitution. Clarification on this point,
it was added, would ensure than an effective measure of control,
similarly based on the terms of the Constitution of which every
leading state official pledged observance in taking the oath of
office, could be exercised in respect of presidential actions not
having the approval of Parliament.
The President, it was further stated, had constantly inter-
vened in the affairs of one of the Ministries and this matter
should be given the attention of Parliament and the Government.
Another member of the Committee observed that only the
title of Head of State was mentioned in the text of the Consti-
tution and no reference was made to a rank of Supreme Commander
and other such designations.
From the Report of Committee III
Various members of the Committee expressed the opinion that
the President intervened to an unjustified extent in the conduct
of state affairs. Such action was objected to as obstructing the
Cabinet in the exercise of its functions, and it was also noted
that steps taken by the President may well be contrary to the
policy of the Cabinet which was, however, answerable to Parlia-
ment for all such measures.
There were several members of the Committee who commented
that it was apparently desired that the people should be in awe
of the President so that no dissension would result from the in-
troduction of modern methods and practices which the large major-
ity of the population, still inclined to associate the President
with traditional values, may not understand.
Suggestions were made by a number of members of the Committee
that:
1.	President Sukarno should not make a practice of
intervening in the conduct of state affairs; it
was to be remembered that the functions of the
office of President were quite different from the
activities of Bung Karno as a leader of a popular
movement;
2.	prior approval of the Cabinet should be required
for public speeches by the President and the Vice-
President given that—as in other countries where
the President was considered to be the personal
symbol of the state—the Cabinet was answerable
to Parliament and for public statements by the
President and the Vice-President;52
3. in view of the considerable expenditure involved
and in consideration of the personal safety of the
President, tours by the President should be less
frequent, and whenever such tours are made fewer
persons should accompany the President; moreover,
presidential tours should be subject to the prior
approval of the entire Cabinet.
It was further suggested by several members of the Committee
that the President should exercise discretion in making public
statements. This recommendation, it was explained, did not imply
any restriction on the special rights of the President.
From the Report of Committee IV
There was unanimous agreement on the view that the very
frequent public speeches by the President during the past two years
had in virtually every instance touched on delicate political issues
and often expressed an attitude at variance with Cabinet policy.
It was noted that, with the system of parliamentary govern-
ment as laid down in the Constitution, the Minister concerned
in each case was answerable to Parliament for the statements made
by the President;., In this connection it was asked whether—as
would be in conformity with the terms of the Constitution—prior
approval was given by the Cabinet or by whichever Minister might
be concerned to public speeches by the President.
The present situation, it was stated, had particularly un-
desirable consequences, as was seen recently in the Assembly
Defense Committee when the Minister of Defense was unable to
give any information regarding statements on defense questions
made in a speech by the President.
Prior authorization by the Defense Minister for public
speeches by personnel of the army and other institutions having
the character of instruments of state authority was similarly
called for. Failing some sort of restraint, it was stated,
the impression was given that the state was ending toward
fascism with the instruments of state power having complete con-
trol of the government apparatus. In this connection mention
was made of the President's speech at the Chandradimuka opening
on 6 October in which a large measure of blame was placed on the
political parties for the present situation. Such criticism,
it was pointed out, lowered the prestige of the political parties,
the existence of which was a fundamental element of democracy.
An equally unfavorable impression was given on the occasion
of Armed Forces Day, it was stated, when an Order of the Day was
issued by the Commander-in-Chief and by the Chief of Staff, but
not be the Defense Minister.53
From the Report of Committee V
These members of the Committee were also opposed to the
President's making frequent trips accompanied by a large entourage,
since the expense involved was excessive and not justifiable even
though the purpose of these tours was to consolidate popular sup-
port for the ideals of Pantjasila. Moreover, the speeches by the
President, designed to foster national unity, frequently gave
offense to the adherents of one or another viewpoint, it was noted,
so that the likelihood of division rather than unity was increased.
The hope was expressed that the Government would take positive
measures regarding the President's speechmaking.
The view that no action could be taken because "the Pres-
ident is inviolable," it was considered, reflected a lack
of affection for the President.
From the Report of Committee VI
All members of the Committee were agreed on suggesting to
the Government that special legislation or a regulation should
be drawn up defining the status and functions of the President
and the Vice-President.
Certain members of the Committee proposed that provision
should be made for a distribution of duties of office between the
President and the Vice-President since, up to the present, the
functions of the Vice-President had not been clearly specified
and it seemed that the Vice-President acted merely as an official
in the service of the President.
It was maintained by a number of members of the Committee
that in Indonesia the President occupied a position quite distinct
from that of the Head of State in other countries since, besides
his official appointment, President Sukarno was also still a
leader of the masses. Invariably, it was pointed out, the Pres-
ident was requested by the local population of places visited
during his tours to address gatherings even though the official
programme had not provided for public speeches.
Various members of the Committee voiced the opinion that
either the Premier or another member of the Cabinet should be
held answerable for statements made in public speeches by the
President.
From the Report of Committee VII
Agreement was expressed by various members of the Committee
with the statement made in a meeting of the Internal Affairs
Committee to the effect that the President, acting in contradic-
tion to the terms of the Constitution, intervened in the conduct
of state affairs. This intervention, it was added, was notably
evident in the speeches by the President, such as that delivered54
on the occasion of the 17 August celebrations in 1951. The reply
received by the Internal Affairs Committee—that the President was,
by virtue of his official position, inviolable, and, at the same
time, must be recognized as acting in the capacity of leadership
that dated from the development of the national movement—was
described as unacceptable.
According to the provisions of the Constitution, it was
contended, the Cabinet is answerable for all actions of the Presi-
dent, and if the Cabinet was unwilling to approve the actions of
the President the Cabinet must then resign.
The situation, it was stressed, called for the urgent atten-
tion of Parliament.
From the Report of Committee VIII
Another member of the Committee stated that it was impermiss-
ible that the President, as the personification of the state, should
deliver public speeches of which the texts had not been counter-
signed by the Premier. It was also suggested that prior approval
of the Premier should be required for tours by the President and
any member of the Cabinet.
It was understandable, one of the Committee members commented,
that the President should address public gatherings with the
object of countering the widespread indifference toward the Govern-
ment, but this function would, nevertheless, be better carried
out be the Information Ministry. In other countries, such as India,
it was noted, the President did not assume such responsibilities.
The same member of the Committee further commented that
whilst visits to outlying regions of the country by the President
and members of the Cabinet were indeed necessary, given that the
populations in these regions frequently requested visits of this
nature, there should be first a definite program drawn up for
official tours so as to ensure that positive results were achieved.55
APPENDIX II
EXTRACTS FROM THE GOVERNMENT STATEMENT IN REPLY
TO REPORTS OF CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEES ON EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT FOR 1951
Regarding Public Speeches by the President and the
Vice-President and Other Matters Relating to the Status
and Functions of the President and the Vice-President
Discussions by all Committees of the Chamber of Representa-
tives on the status and functions of the President and Vice-
President touched mainly on the matter of public speeches by the
President and the Vice-President. The majority of members speak-
ing on this question were of the opinion that the limits which
should be observed in accordance with the terms of the Constitu-
tion had been exceeded.
Since a fundamental issue is involved the Government
considers it necessary to give its views on the status of the
President and the Vice-President before dealing specifically with
the question of public speeches.
The scope of the functions of the President and the Vice-
President at the moment cannot, in the opinion of the Government,
be defined solely on the narrow basis of purely constitutional
considerations. Various other factors, notably those deriving
from the actual conditions applying in this current period of
transition, must also be taken into account. It is the Govern-
ment's opinion that, by reason of the conditions existing at the
moment it various fields, the President and the Vice-President
are frequently obliged to play a more active and more extensive
role than would be the case if the country had attained a sat-
isfactory degree of stability.
Moreover, both the President and the Vice-President, who
were acknowledged as trusted leaders of the national struggle
during the period of colonial rule and during the Revolution,
are still accorded the same respect and recognition by the entire
people now that Indonesian independence has been achieved. Thus,
the President and the Vice-President are not, as would be contend-
ed on the basis of a strictly constitutional viewpoint, merely
personal symbols of the state, but are national leaders having
the fullest confidence of the people.
It is for this reason that the people constantly call for
statements by the two personalities who hold the highest positions
in the state, and thus it is inevitable that the President and56
the Vice-President frequently address to the people declarations
on the foundations of the state, on the development of the state
and the factors hindering this development, and on continuing the
national struggle. Such declarations are, of course, also issued
by various government representatives and officials, but the fact
remains that the people insist on personal visits by the President
and the Vice-President who are more trusted and more respected
than any other official spokesman.
It must be pointed out too that requests for statements by
the President and the Vice-President are made not only by the
people but also by government bodies desiring assistance in arriv-
ing at important decisions.
The existing conditions then evidently oblige the President
and the Vice-President to be active beyond the limits of strictly
formal duties.
The Government is convinced that the activities of the Pres-
ident and the Vice-President in this connection have been of in-
estimable benefit to the State and to the people. The Government
furthermore maintains that there has been no violation of the
fundamental principles of parliamentary government as expressed
in the letter and the spirit of the Constitution since the Cabinet
remains answerable to Parliament for all actions of the President
and the Vice-President.
The question of whether the Cabinet agrees or disagrees with
actions of the President and the Vice-President is an internal
matter between the Cabinet and the President and the Vice-President
themselves.
It may well be that the circumstances under discussion,
which arise from the course of historical evolution, impart to
the parliamentary regime in Indonesia, at the moment, an individ-
ual character, but the basic condition of the Cahinet's being
answerable to Parliament for all measures is definitely preserved.
It is the hope of the Government that this clarification will
remove all uncertainty and misunderstanding regarding the position
of the President and the Vice-President.
The various points raised, including the suggestion that
the functions of the President and the Vice-President should be
specifically defined (or, as proposed by Committee IV, that legis-
lation should be drafted stipulating the status and functions of
the President and the Vice-President), and the statements regard-
ing public speeches by the President and the Vice-President are,
it is felt, fully covered by the foregoing clarification.
The Government also wishes to state that the desire expressed
by a number of members of Parliament for measures to be taken
which would ensure a situation conforming to the provisions of the
Constitution is fully understood and appreciated.57
The efforts of the Government are being directed toward this
end, but it must be recognized that the conditions arising in the
course of this present transitional period still make impossible
the fulfillment of all requirements of the Constitution.
Again in connection with public speeches by the President and
the Vice-President, the Government has found that the President
and the Vice-President always endeavour to express views in public
that correspond to the standpoint of the Cabinet. This is to be
seen from the speeches read first to the Premier of to the Minister
of Information and from unprepared speeches by the President and
the Vice-President.
For this reason the Government does not consider it necessary
to adopt the suggestion by Committee I and Committee IV that the
President and the Vice-President be required in all cases to
secure prior official approval from the Cabinet for statements
to be made in public.
Intervention of the President in the Formation
of a New Cabinet
The functions of the President with regard to the formation
of a new Cabinet are dealt with in Article 51 of the Constitution.
In accordance with the terms of this article of the Constitution,
the President, who has held discussions with the various parties
and groups represented in Parliament before designating a Cabinet
formateur, is free to accept or to reject the list of Ministers
proposed by the formateur. However, it is, of course, certain
that the formateur will have discussed the nominations with the
President before drawing up a final list. This procedure, which
is warranted in view of the considerable experience of the Pres-
ident in state affairs and his knowledge of the personal qualities
required for a ministerial post, is not in conflict with the terms
of Article 51 of the Constitution and does not signify that the
President acts as a co-formateur. Once the Cabinet is formed,
the formateur (the Premier) is answerable in every respect for
the composition of the Cabinet.
Entitlement to Intervene in Diplomatic Appointments
and Transfers of Diplomatic Representatives
'(Article 123 of the Constitution) and Similar Matters
It is the Minister concerned in each instance who is entire-
ly answerable for decisions on diplomatic appointments even though
the relevant documents bear the signature of the President.
However, as with other important matters, the Minister
would certainly first discuss the question with the President—
particularly in view of the provisions of paragraph 2 Article 52
of the Constitution—before submitting the relevant documents for
signature by the President.58
Status of the Vice-President
In Article 45 of the Constitution it is stipulated that the
Vice-President assists the President in the carrying out of his
duties, and in Article 48 it is stipulated that, in the event of
the President's being prevented from carrying out his duties, the
Vice-President will deputize for the President.
At no time since the Proclamation of Independence has any
necessity been felt for an official division of duties between
the President and the Vice-President, and the Government is also
of the opinion that there is no need for any such provision. Sim-
ilarly the Government cannot agree with the conclusion of Committee
IV that, in the absence of such a provision, it appeared that the
Vice-President was merely an official under the instructions of
the President.
Rank of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Accorded to the President; Wearing of Military
Uniform by the President; Flying of the
Presidential Standard
Since it is stipulated in Article 127 of the Constitution
that the President is vested with supreme authority over the
Armed Forces it is customary for the President to be referred
to as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Similarly, on
the basis of the provisions of this Article the President wears
military uniform (of the Army) as official dress, whilst the
presidential standard also incorporates the star-shaped emblem
in the banner of the Armed Forces. It is, of course, desirable
that, at naval and air force ceremonies, the Supreme Commander
should wear the uniform of whichever service is concerned. This
is essentially a question of military etiquette. The President-
ial standard is flown to indicate the presence of the Head of
State.
Owing to the pressure of more urgent issues the Government
has not yet had an opportunity of establishing official regulations
regarding presidential dress and insignia.
The Government is in complete agreement with the statement
by several members of Committee III to the effect that the major-
ity of the people favor the retention of marks of distinction for
the Head of State.,
Tours by the President and the Vice-President
It has already been pointed out how important it is that
the President and Vice-President maintain contact with the various
provincial territories and deliver addresses to the inhabitants of
these regions. The Government is in full agreement with the view
put by a member of Committee VIII that it is essential that the
President and the Vice-President visit the outlying territories and59
it was, moreover, to be remembered that such visits were requested
by the inhabitants in these areas.
The Government is of the opinion that, since Indonesia is
a state which has only recently achieved independence, visits to
provincial areas by the President and the Vice-President are par-
ticularly desirable, if only for the purpose of acquiring familiar-
ity with these various regions, for Indonesia comprises a diversity
of islands and peoples. During the last two years the President
and the Vice-President have made a number of tours, which have
taken up a considerable time and which have demanded no small
degree of physical effort, and almost all regions have now been
visited.
Because these tours can only be undertaken on occasions when
it is possible for the President and the Vice-President to be
absent from the seat of Government—and this possibility depends
on the largely unforeseeable trend of domestic and international
developments--the proposal put forward by a member of Committee VIII
for a pre-arranged program is impracticable.
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