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AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY

OUR WAR WITH SPAIN

ITS CAUSES, INCIDENTS, AND RESULTS

EMBRACING

A Complete Record

MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS

FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE CLOSE OF THE CONFLICT
WITH DESCRIPTIONS OF

BATTLES, SIEGES, EXPLOITS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS

OF OUR ARMY AND NAVY

BY

HENRY B. RUSSELL

Author of “Life of William McKinley,” “International Monetary Conferences,” etc.

WITH INTRODUCTIONS

BY

HON. REDFIELD PROCTOR ann HON. JOHN M. THURSTON

United States Senator Srom Vermont United States Senator from Nebraska

Superbly Elustrated

WITH STEEL-PLATE PORTRAITS, MANY FULL-PAGE ENGRAVINGS FROM
ORIGINAL DRAWINGS AND PHOTOGRAPHS, AND NEW
AND ACCURATE MAPS

HARTFORD, CONN.
A. D. WORTHINGTON & CO., PUBLISHERS
1898
 

 

Copyright, 1898
By A. D. Wortuineton & Co.

All rights reserved

 

 

I 2 eiseio sk
x
 

ERIODICALLY, in the history of every nation there
Pp comes a crisis; questions having their small beginnings
far back in the past develop to a fruition, the natural
result of antecedent events, the legitimate offspring of all that
has gone to make up a nation’s character and relative position
in the world. These questions must be settled sooner or later,
in accordance with the demands of progress; they may be
softened for a time by diplomacy or obscured by indifference
and attention to other affairs, but the inevitable settlement is
only postponed, the eventual crisis but gathers new force, and,
in time, it must result in bloodshed or a backward step.
Placed as Cuba was, belonging to a nation whose star has been
for three centuries setting, close to the shores of a free people,
whose course has'for more than a century been ever upward,
the issue could not be avoided. The war came.

This event, like all in history, being inseparably linked
with the past, it has seemed to the author that the developing
causes were too important to a proper understanding of the
conflict to remain unnoticed; and this must be the apology,
if any is needed, for the opening pages of this history, dealing
not simply with the Spaniard and the Cuban and the reasons
for the bitter hatred which grew up between them, but with
the part that both Spain and Cuba have played in the con-
stitutional history of the United States. This long story is
replete with many dramatic and romantic incidents, which
take on a new color in the light of the war that has closed

(iii)
iv PREFACE

so gloriously for American arms, and which give the conflict
its true setting in the history of the world’s progress.

But, while briefly placing the causes before the reader, no
space required for a full narration of the incidents of the war
has been sacrificed. Though brief, the conflict has abounded
in deeds of heroism, some of them without a parallel in mili-
tary or naval history, and the character of the American
people has been revealed in stronger colors not simply to other
nations of the world, but to the Americans themselves. The
last vestige of old sectional feeling disappeared in the inspiring
unity with which all, North and South, fell in behind the flag;
and, as the war closed, our eyes were open to a wider vision,
the promise of a grander destiny than we have been wont to
consider in store for us. For the war has brought new ques-
tions and new responsibilities; in the future are suggestions
of new experiences, possibly requiring a new policy. The
Stars and Stripes now float in the Antilles and over rich
islands of the Pacific. Whatever comes, it has been shown
that the people of the United States do not shrink in the face
of duty to themselves and to humanity.

In relating the incidents of the war it has been the con-
stant aim in these pages to make use only of the most reliable
authorities and the available official reports and records.
Many of the illustrations of battles and naval and army life
are from photographs made by photographers at the imminent
risk of their lives, and they have been reproduced for this
volume with the utmost fidelity to the originals. Others are
from drawings and sketches made by eminent artists on the
spot. Acknowledgments are due to Leslie’s Weekly and
Harper’s Weekly for permission to use some of the copyrighted
illustrations that have appeared in those papers.

 

 
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SOOO RE OR SU IRS. (00). £9.

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18.

14.

15.

16.

From Photographs and Original Designs bp Eminent Artists, made
erpressin for this book.

PORTRAIT OF WILLIAM McKINLEY, PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

 

OF THE ARMY AND NAVY (Steel: Plate) . Frontispiece

Engraved from a special photograph approved by the President.
EnGravep AvutTocrapH or Hon. Henry B. Russetu
ORNAMENTAL Heapine To List or ILLUSTRATIONS
ORNAMENTAL Heapine To TaBiy or CoNnTENTS
ORNAMENTAL HEADING To SENATOR Proctor’s INTRODUCTION
ENGRAVED AUTOGRAPH OF SENATOR REDFIELD PRocTOR
ORNAMENTAL HEADING TO SENATOR THURSTON’s INTRODUCTION
ENGRAVED AUTOGRAPH oF SENATOR JoHN M. THURSTON
ORNAMENTAL HEADING To Cuaprer I
EnGRAvVED Init1Au LETTER TO CHAPTER I

EMINENT AMERICAN CrviL LEADERS. : ; . Facing
Hon. Wi11am R. Dar, Secretary of State.
Hon. Russert A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
Hon. Joun D. Lone, Secretary of the Navy.
Hon. Stewart L. Wooprorp, Minister to Spain.

Furious CHARGE or CuBAN INsuRGENTS AGAINST SPANISH

INFANTRY 3 : cl 2 F . Facing
Famous CuBan LEADERS é . Facing
Gen. Maximo GomEz. Gen. CaLIxTa GARCIA.

Gen. Don JULIO SANGUILLY. Gen. ANTONIO Maceo.
Eminent Spanish LEADERS . 5 ‘ 3 : . Facing
Admiral CERVERA. Prime Minister Sagasra.

Gen. WEYLER. Gen. BLANco.
A Frrst-chass MopERN WaRsHIP.— UNITED StaTEs BATTLE-
°sHip ‘‘INDIANA” aT FULL SPEED : 3 Facing
On THE Deck OF A MODERN WaRSsHIP . : . Facing

After-deck of United States Battleship Massachusetts, showing monster 13-
inch guns and revolving turret.

(v)

33
46
47

61

61
102

154
220

286

826
388
17.

18.

19.

20.

ai.

23.

24,
25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Divine SERVICE oN THE BartTiesnip ‘‘TExas” WHILE IN
Port. : - é 5 3 ‘ ‘ . Facing
Driniing MARINES ON THE BATTLESHIP ‘“‘ MEW YORK” Facing

Unitgp States BarriesHie ‘‘ MAINE” ; é . Facing
Blown up in Havana Harbor, February 15, 1898.

DEstRucTION oF THE UNITED STATES BaTrLEsHre ‘‘ MAINE”
IN THE Harpor oF Havana, FeBRuary 15, 1898 . Pacing

APPEARANCE OF THE Barriesaip ‘‘MAInE” a Frew Days
AFTER THE EXPLOSION is r . Facing
A wrecking boat hoisting one of the seh guns te the wreck.

In Hammocks ‘“‘’T wren Decks” — WHERE ‘“‘ JACK” SLEEPS

on A BATTLESHIP . . ‘ - 5 . Facing
In rue Hospritan or A BATTLESHIP 2 . Facing
Called the ‘‘ Sick Bay’ by sailors.
Sworp Dritu or SatLors ON A BATTLESHIP. . Facing
Prominent AMERICAN NAVAL OFFICERS. - . Facing
Admiral F. M. Buncs. Commodore Joun C. Watson.
Lieut. Ricumonp P. Hozson. ee CHARLES D. SIGSBEE.
THE CALL TO WAR P dos fe i r r . Facing

A Grand Army Veteran of the Civil War bringing his son intoa -reenttliie

office in a country town to answer to the call for volunteers in the war with Spain.

PORTRAIT OF MAJOR-GENERAL NELSON A. MILES
(Steel Plate) Facing

Gun Crew Workine A Monster 13-1ncH Gun In ACTION
Facing
AN OLD CoLorED CouPLE, CuBAN REFUGEES, DRIVEN FROM

THEIR Home By SPANISH CRUELTY . ‘ : . Facing

The wife was 80 years old and blind. They are making their way into the
American lines.

PORTRAIT OF ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY
(Steel Plate) Facing

PROMINENT AMERICAN GENERALS . is : ‘ . Facing
Maj -Gen. Jonn R. Brooxe. Maj.-Gen. FitzHucH LEE.
Maj.-Gen. ApNA R. CHAFFEE. Maj.-Gen. JoserpH E. WHEELER.

PORTRAIT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM T. SAMPSON
(Steel Plate) Facing

START OF THE AMERICAN ARMY OF INVASION FOR CUBA,

FROM CHICKAMAUGA. F é ‘ ; 2 . Facing
In THE FoRWARD TURRET OF THE BaTTLEsHIP “Towa” IN
- ACTION . ‘ : : : 3 i 5 - . Facing

Tue Biowine Ur or THE ‘‘Merriac” Across THE EN
TRANCE OF SANTIAGO HARBOR, AND EscaPp or LIEUTENANT
Hopson AnD His Crew. ; . ; . Facing

Tue INVASION oF CUBA . 3 ‘ ‘ . Facing
United States soldiers embarking on fenanants at Tampa, Fla.

358
394
394

412

422

482
452

462
506

516

522

528

584

548
564

582

588

602

654
660
37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

43.

46.

47.

49,

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Tue Frest BLoopy ENGAGEMENT OF UNITED STATES TROOPS

on CusBaN SoIL . ; . é 7 . Facing

United States Marines at inaianame repelling a midnight attack of Spanish
soldiers with the aid of the searchlights of the Marblehead Sunday morning,
June 12, 1898.

Invasion oF Cusa. First Unitep States Troors To Lanp

on ForeIGN SOIL . : : . Facing

Landing of the first American Army of Tgusion: at the pier at Baiquiri, near
Santiago.

Biock Hovsz at StponEY WHERE THE AMERICAN TROOPS
Frest Hoistep THE UNITED States Fiac ; AFTERWARDS
Mave A Bask oF SUPPLIES : : 7 : . Facing

An AxLaRM Near THE SpanisH Line at SIBONEY. CUBAN
Scouts RALLYING AROUND A UNITED States DeEspatcH
BEARER F 3 : . ss , : , . Facing

INFANTRY ON THE WAY TO THE BaTTLE or San Juan Facing
From a photograph taken just twenty minutes before the battle opened.

ARRIVAL OF THE WOUNDED FROM THE BATTLEFIELDS OF SAN
JUAN AND CANEY AT THE FieLD HospiTaL. . Facing

ComMopoRE ScHLEY oN Boarp His Fiace SHIP DURING THE
BoMBARDMENT OF SANTIAGO. : s ‘ . Facing

PORTRAIT OF ADMIRAL WINFIELD 8. SCHLEY

(Steel Plate) Facing

ANNIHILATION OF ADMIRAL CERVERA’S SPANISH FLEET BY

THE AMERICAN SQUADRON UNDER THE COMMAND OF Com:

MODORE SCHLEY, OFF SANTIAGO, JULY 38, 1898. . Facing
A Hanp-To-HAND FIGHT IN THE INTRENCHMENTS.OF SANTIAGO
Planting the Stars and Stripes within the enemy’s lines. Facing

CREEPING UP TO A LINE OF SPANISH SHARPSHOOTERS Facing

A United States trooper accompanied by Cuban scouts nearing the Spanish
Intrenchments at Santiago.

PORTRAIT OF MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM R. SHAFTER

(Steel Plate) Mucing

PORTRAIT OF MAJOR-GENERAL WESLEY MERRITT
(Steel Plate) Facing

676

682

694
706

756

T72
1.

StS SUR 99 pO

lew

:

10.
11.
12.

18.

14.

15,

16.

17.

18.

19,

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LIST OF STEEL-PLATE PORTRAITS

Wiuuiam McKinury, PRESIDENT oF THE UNITED STATES AND

CoMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY AND Navy . Frontispiece

Engraved from a special photograph approved by the President.
Portrait oF Mag.-Gen. Newson A. Mines . . Facing 522
Porrrarr or ApMriraL GrorGe Dewey . 3 . Facing 548
PortRAIT OF ADMIRAL WiLiiaAm T. SAMPSON Facing 582
Portrait oF ADMIRAL WINFIELD S. SCHLEY . . Facing 32
Portrait of Mas.-Gen. Winuiam R. SHAFTER Facing 156
Portrait oF Mas.-Gen. WESLEY MERRITT. . Facing 772

LIST OF MAPS

New Mar or Cusa, mv Corors (14x21 inches) Facing copyright page
Map oF THE City or Havana, AND Havana Harsor SHoOW-

ING THE Spor WHERE THE ‘‘ Marine” was DESTROYED ‘
Map oF THE West InpiEs, mv Cotors (14x21 inches), SHow-

ina Cuspa, Puerto Rico, JAmMarica, Haytr, LeEwarp Is-

LANDS, WINDWARD IsLANDs, Etc. .. = ‘ Facing Preface.
Mar oF THE PHILIPPINE IsLANDS IN CoLors (14x21 inches),
Mauaysia, Curna, Sram, Japan, Etc. . : Facing last page

Map or THE WORLD ON MERCATOR’S PROJECTION, IN COLORS
(14x21 inches) . ‘ , y :
Map oF Cuna SHowmne Its PRovaNGRS, Portnoy OF Rieu,

Princieat Ports, Erc. . a . 188
Mar SHowine Routes anp Disranens BETWEEN Srkcn, THE

Unrrep Srates, West Inpies, Etc. c ; é . §15
Map or Havana, Its HARBorR AND DEFENSES . 527
Map or THE PHILIPPINE IsLANDS 2 ‘ : . 539
Mar or Manina AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY . < 555
Mar or THE Bay anp Harpor or MANnInA. ‘ 2 . 562
Map or ENTRANCE TO HARBOR OF GUANTANAMO . é . 668

Showing Camps of the Marines.
Map or PosiTion oF ouR TROOPS AFTER THE BATTLES OF
CanrEY AND San JuaN—SwHowine Line or Spanish RETREAT 714
Map SHowrina APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING
VESSELS SOON AFTER THE SPANISH CRUISERS HAD EMERGED

FROM THE HARBOR OF SANTIAGO. . 726
Map oF THE APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF THE Orposne Fis

SELS AT THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE . . 736
Map or Eastern Cuna, SHOWING Pension Giannwnmney

TO THE UNITED STATES AT THE Fat oF SANTIAGO. . 9
Map oF THE IsLAND oF PuERTO Rico, SHowine RouTES AND

DIsTaNcEs TO OTHER Pormnts . 3 . 59
Mar or THE Hawattan IsLANDs, growed Bowne AND ie

TANCES TO IMPORTANT POINTS f 766

Map SHowiIne Routes AND DISTANCES BETWEEN THE Ges
States, HawalrAn IsLANDs, THE PHILIPPINE IsLANDS, Etc. . 769
 

CHAPTER I

SPANISH CHARACTER AND HISTORY—DISCOVERY OF CUBA
— ATTEMPTS AT COLONIZATION — EXTERMINATION OF
THE NATIVES —COMING OF THE BLACK MAN.

Spain’s Domain in the Eighteenth Century — The Decadence of a Hundred
Years — Spanish Character — Heroism and Fanaticism —The Hand of
the Inquisitor —The Jews and the Moors— Warriors Unfit for War,
and Colonists Unfit to Colonize — Columbus Hears of Cuba — Taking
Possession for Spain — Characteristics of the Natives — Ideal Condi-
tions of Living — Extirpating the Natives —‘‘ A Ton of Gold ”— Span-
ish Outrages and a Ruined Colony—Indians Bound in Slavery —
Killed out of Pure Wantonness— Native Suicides — A Long Story of
Rapine, Brutality, Waste, and Insult—A Bishop’s Testimony — Be-
ginning of the Slave Trade—Coming of the Black Man, « 61

CHAPTER II

SETTLEMENTS OF CUBA—DAYS OF THE ENGLISH AND
FRENCH CORSAIRS— RISE OF THE ROVING BUCCANEERS
— STIRRING ADVENTURES AND ROMANTIC INCIDENTS.

Diego Velasquez Establishes the First Cuban Settlement — The Resistance
of Chief Hatuey — Efforts to Christianize Him before Burning Him
at the Stake —The Spirit of the Indians Broken —Cuba Begins to
Flourish — Maritime Adventurers — A Remarkable Fight at Santiago
between French Corsairs and Spanish Crew — Three Days of Hand-to-
Hand Combat — Fortifying Havana — Destroyed by the French and
Plundered by Pirates — Building of Morro Castle and the Bateria de
la Punta— Orders to Gibbet and Behead all Protestants — Spain Beset
by Enemies on the Sea — The Rise of the Buccaneers — Futile Efforts
to Exterminate the Freebooters — Romantic Incidents — How Olonois
Captured a Spanish Fleet — Beheading His Intended Executioners —
Flinging Spanish Crews into the Sea, 71

(ix)
x CONTENTS

CHAPTER IIT

SPAIN AT THE FEET OF NAPOLEON—EXPLOITS OF SIMON
BOLIVAR AND SAN MARTIN—SPAIN’S DISASTROUS AND
DISGRACEFUL FAILURES.

Napoleon’s Ambition to Make Spain a Subject Kingdom — Ferdinand’s
Intrigues— Joseph Bonaparte on the Throne — Fall of Napoleon
and Restoration of Ferdinand — Revolt against Spain — Conditions
in Mexico— Raising the Standard of Rebellion — Ignominious
Death of Hidalgo and Morelos— First Struggles in Venezuela—
Simon Bolivar and His Vicissitudes — Napoleon’s Feat Surpassed —
Defeats the Spainards — O’Higgins Becomes Dictator— The War in
Peru— Defeat of the Spanish Fleet at Callao—San Martin Enters
Lima — His Interview with Bolivar— Farewell to the Peruvians —
Buenos Ayres the Storm Center—Paraguay’s Dramatic Chapter —
Spain’s Weakness and Cruelty — A Policy Calming in Disaster
and Disgrace, ‘ : a ‘ : ‘ ‘ . 82

CHAPTER IV

EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES —THE PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA — DISPUTES
AND CONFLICTS OVER THE FLORIDAS.

Spain’s Possessions in Washington’s Time — Owning Over Two-Thirds of
What Now Constitutes the United States—Napoleon’s Ambition to
Establish « Latin Empire West of the Mississippi — An Old Song of
Defiance to the Spaniard — Pickering’s Savage Retort — English Sup-
port — Spain Secretly Cedes Louisiana to Napoleon — Jefferson’s Di-
plomacy — Napoleon Offers to Sell Louisiana —The Treaty Signed —
Spain’s Angry Protest— Dispute over Florida Boundaries — Spain’s
Perfidious and Exasperating Conduct — Stirs the Indians to Massacre
-—Lawless Expeditions —Spain Threatens the United States with
War— Andrew Jackson’s Radical Ideas —Spain Advised by Europe
to Sell— The Treaty — End of a Long Struggle, . és . 90

CHAPTER V

“THE EVER-FAITHFUL ISLE”—PROGRESS OF CUBA DURING
FERDINAND’S DISASTROUS REIGN —THE HOLY ALLIANCE
AND THE FAMOUS MONROE DOCTRINE.

Cuba’s Peculiar Position —Importance of Havana— An Early Cause of
Ill-feeling — Excitement during Toussaint L’ Ouverture’s Struggle —
Cubans Remain Faithful to Ferdinand — Aponto’s Uprising — Agita-
tion for the Suppression of the Slave Trade — Favorable Influence of
CONTENTS xi

English Intervention in Cuba — First Struggle with the Spanish
Authorities — The People Divide — Origin and Purposes of the Holy
Alliance — ‘‘A Softer Word for Despodtism” — Help for the Bigoted
Ferdinand — Discord in Cuba — Smouldering Fires — Adams’s Advice
to President Monroe —The Famous Monroe Doctrine — Retreat of
the Holy Alliance — United States Attitude towards Cuba Influenced
by Slavery —The Panama Congress and its Failure— Attitude of
Southern States— Words of Henry Clay, yi x - 102

CHAPTER VI

SPAIN’S SECRET ATTEMPTS TO SELL THE ISLAND OF CUBA
TO FRANCE—NEGRO OUTBREAKS AND THE TRAGIC
DEATH OF THE MULATTO POET, VALDEZ.

The Captain-General Endowed with Extraordinary Authority — Powers
Misused and Unrest Fostered — The ‘‘ Black Eagle” —Discord among
the Planters — Inauguration of Spanish Venality in Cuba — The
Irrepressible Conflict in the United States— Death of Ferdinand —
No Reforms for Poor Cuba — Spanish Treasury Depleted — The
Queen’s Plan to Secretly Sell Cuba to France — A Monstrous Propo-
sition — Meeting in the King’s Cabinet — Louis Phillippe Demands a
Reduction in the Price of the Philippines —Throwing an Important
Contract into the Fire — Class Hatred Grows in Cuba — Cuba Granted
Representation in the Cortes — The Slave Trade — Outbreaks among
the Negroes — Execution of a Mulatto Poet — His Prayer Recited on
the way to Execution — His Heroic Death, 2 ‘ , . 113

CHAPTER VII

FILIBUSTERING EXPEDITIONS AND THE DEATH OF LOPEZ
—THE BLACK WARRIOR—THE FAMOUS OSTEND CON-
FERENCE — A CUBAN WARNING.

Buchanan’s Efforts to Buy Cuba— Spain Refuses to Sell— Lopez and
His Uprising — His Filibustering Attempts— Capture of Colonel
Crittenden and His Men— Lopez Killed by a Spanish Garrote —
Private Filibustering — A Change in Party Government— A Sym-
pathizer with Filibusters— Duels of the Soulés— An Affair of
Honor with the French Minister ~The Black Warrior Case — Feel.
ing against Spain Intensified —Soulé Threatens Spain — Conference
of American Ministers at Ostend — Fixing a Price on Cuba— The
Manifesto —Soulé Throws up His Commission in Disgust — Effort
to Secure Cuba — Increasing Burdens of Cuba — Arrogance of Span-
ish Authority —A Cuban Warning, ‘ : ‘ . 125
xii CONTENTS

CHAPTER VIII

REVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND INSURRECTION IN CUBA —
BEGINNING OF THE TEN-YEARS WAR— CONDITION OF
CUBA AT THE TIME.

The Revolution at Cadiz— Wretched Condition of Spain — Flight of
Isabella — Her Vain Appeal to Napoleon — Fires of Discontent
Break out in Cuba— Promoters of the Insurrection — High Stand-
ing of the Leaders— The Proclamation at Yara— Beginning of the
Ten-Years War—Condition of Cuba at the Time—Spanish Policy
of Exploiting the Island— A System of Robbery by Spanish Ott-
cials— Revenues of the Island— Principal Industries — Cities Hope-
lessly Bankrupt — Immense Salaries of the Oflicials — Perquisites
and how they were Collected —Iniquitous and Unjust Trade Regu-
lations — Taxing Everything the Cuban Produced or Consumed —
The Wrongs Admitted by the Spaniards Themselves — Vital Ener-
gies of the Island Destroyed—Cuban Hatred of the Spaniard —The
People Ready to Rise, : : ‘ ; : : . 188

CHAPTER IX

COURSE OF THE STRUGGLE— FORMATION OF THE REPUB-
LIC—OUTRAGES BY SPANISH VOLUNTEERS — HEROISM
OF CUBAN WOMEN— MYSTERIES OF MORRO CASTLE.

Rapid Growth of the Insurrection — Forced to Adopt Guerrilla Methods —
Cuban Leaders Refuse to Consider More Spanish Promises — They
Declare the Abolition of Slavery — Meet to Form a Government —
Successful Landing of Arms and Ammunition —Spain Increases Her
Forces — Obtains Her Supplies in the United States—Treats the
United States Insolently—-The Spanish Volunteers —Excesses of
Cruelty — Cuban Successes — Arrest of University Boys — Their
Sentence and the Execution—Guerrilla Tactics— Diminution of
Spanish Forces— Heroism of Cuban Women — Mysteries of Morro
Castle — Further Efforts to Secure Peace — Disagreement among the
Insurgents —A Typical Engagement — Campos Sent to the Island —
The Treaty of Zanjon, . : . . . 147

CHAPTER X

SPAIN’S STRAINED RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE TEN-YEARS WAR—THE VIRGINIUS AFFAIR
—A RACE FOR LIFE— EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN FRY AND
HIS COMPANIONS.

Situation Changed after the American Civil War—Spanish Fears —
President Grant’s Pacific Tenders — Significant Reply of Spain —
CONTENTS Xili

Remarkable Decree of the Captain-General of Cuba — To be Shot Like
Pirates — Methods of Spanish Warfare—The Vérgin’us— Circum-
stances of Her Departure — Sighted by the Spanish Cruiser Tornado
—A Lively Chase — Burning Hams to Keep up Steam — Horses and
Arms Thrown Overboard— A Race on the Moonlit Caribbean — Cap-
tured and Taken to Santiago— The First Execution of Prisoners —
The American Consul’s Messages Delayed — He Asks for an Explana-
tion — An Impudent Note in Reply — Further Executions — Captain
Fry’s Death — His Pathetic Letter to His Wife the Night before His
Death — Arrival of a British Gunboat, é : ‘ r . 158

CHAPTER XI

EFFORTS TO INDUCE SPAIN TO SETTLE— GENERAL SICKLES
ASKS FOR HIS PASSPORTS AND SPAIN YIELDS —UNITED
STATES INSISTS ON PACIFICATION OF THE ISLAND.

Minister Sickles Visits Castelar upon Hearing of the Virginius Affair —
Curious Break-down of the Cables at a Critical Moment — Some Im-
polite Replies — General Sickles Demands his Passports — The Span-
ish Government Quickly Comes to Terms— The People Impatient to
Recognize the Cubans — Remarkable Attitude of Senator Sumner —
Fall of the Spanish Republic— America Insists that the Cuban War
Must Cease — Intervention Threatened — Spain Makes Another Prom-
ise — Forbearance at Washington—Campos Ends the War by the
Agreement at Zanjon— Canovas Refuses to be Responsible for the
Cuban Settlement— Resignation of Canovas— Campos Forms a Min-
istry — Disagreements— A Reform Act Passed — Great Cost of the
War to Spain—Exactions of the Government Increased, « Ta

CHAPTER XIT

CUBA AFTER THE TEN-YEARS WAR—CONDITION OF THE
PEOPLE —THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL AND HIS EXTRAOR-
DINARY POWERS—SPAIN’S CRAFTY POLICY.

Area of Cuba and Its Population— Percentage of Blacks and Whites —
The Government Liberal Only on Paper— The Captain-General and
His Extraordinary Authority — The Council of Administration — The
Officials All Spanish — Provincial Government —Representatives Who
Did Not Represent—The Judicial System—The State Religion
—A Charge against the Revenues of the Island — Backward School
System— Remarkable System of Censorship — No Meetings or Social
Gatherings without a Permit —Object of the Electoral System —
Cubans Have Little Chance to Vote and Less to Elect — Cuban Repre-
sentation in the Spanish Parliament — Hardly a Dozen Cubans Eligi-
ble to the Senate — Discriminations in Provincial and Municipal
Government — Spain’s Deceitful and Crafty Policy, . : - 182
xiv CONTENTS

CHAPTER XIII

SPAIN A PARASITE UPON CUBA—METHODS OF TAXATION
AND EXPENDITURES — ENORMOUS FRAUDS—A SWARM
OF SPANISH VAMPIRES — ‘CUBA IS UNDONE.”

Replenishing the Treasury at Home and Enriching the Functionaries —
Enormous Increase of Taxation — Remarkable Growth of Cuba’s
Debt — Pledging Cuban Revenues for Spanish Interest Payments —
Not a Cent of It Spent to Improve Cuba— Taxes on Everything
— Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg — Enormous Import
Duties — Methods of Spanish Trade Monopoly — Treating Tobacco
as an Enemy and Loading Sugar with Imposts — Regulations of the
“ Coasting Trade” — Frauds Committed upon the Cuban Treasury —
Embezzlements Larger Than the Revenues of the Island —No One
Ever Punished — Officials Protected by Influential Patrons at Home
— The Trey of a Swarm of Vampires, ‘ . ‘ ‘ . 192

CHAPTER XIV

CUBAN EXILES, SECESSIONISTS, AND LEADERS — PREPARA-
TIONS FOR AN INSURRECTION —THE BANNER RAISED
AT LAST — FIRST RESULTS UNPROMISING.

Exile of Many of Cuba’s Best Citizens — José Marti and His Karly Life —
Imprisoned When a Boy — Deported to Spain— He Vows to Free
Cuba — Becomes the Leader of the Secession Party — His Impassioned
Address and Eloquence — Many Rebuffs and Disappointments — His
Trusted Friends in Cuba—General Lacret— A Fierce Hater of
Spain and a Strong Secessionist — Constantly Watched by the Spanish
Militia —His Visit to Santiago —Surrounded by Spanish Troops —
An Abortive Movement — Relaxation of the Vigilance of the Captain-
General — Sagasta’s Plan of Reform— Radical Cubans Received it
with Antagonism —An Empty Reform — Marti Starts for Cuba—
Stopped by United States Authorities —The Outbreak in Matanzas—
Manuel Garcia, ‘‘the King of the Cuban Country,” . ‘ . 200

CHAPTER XV

SPREAD OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE PROVINCE OF
SANTIAGO DE CUBA-—-SOME OF THE LEADERS AND
THEIR METHODS — EXPERIENCE OF A PLANTER.

Nature of the Province of Santiago de Cuba — Striking Personalities —
The Problem of Securing Arms — Horses More Plenty Than Guns —
Code of Honor among the Insurgents— A Visit to Gilard — A Camp
CONTENTS xv

in the Mountains— The Machete— The Government Becomes Anx-
ious — First Efforts to Find the Insurgents — Real Effective Force of
the Spanish Army—lIts Strength as It Appeared on the Official
Records— An Army Scattered All Over the Island — The Captain-
General Acts —Seeking Goulet’s Band— Goulet, Draws the Enemy
into the Hills—The Spaniards Surprised and Routed — Goulet
Captures a Garrison — Effects on the Rural Population, . . 208

CHAPTER XVI

POLITICAL TROUBLES IN SPAIN— GENERAL CAMPOS SENT
TO CUBA—LANDING OF MACEO AND CROMBET — DEATH
OF CROMBET AND NARROW ESCAPE OF MACEO.

Spain Beset Within and Without — Officers Refuse to Volunteer — Sagasta
Ministry Resigns— Canovas’s Ministry —Campos Sent to Cuba—
Maceo and His Record in the Ten-Years War — The Terror of the
Spanish— How He Learned to Read—His Exile and Travels —
A Hostler at West Point — An Ideal Guerrilla Chief — Crombet and
His Record — An Obstinate Captain —Crombet Blows Out the Cap-
tain’s Brains— They Land on a Lonely Shore — Their Sufferings —
Feasting on a Banana Plantation — Surprised — Crombet Surrounded
and Killed — Maceo Escapes— Wanders Alone in the Woods—
Betrayed by an Indian Guide — A Friendly Negro — In an Insurgent
Camp at Last— His Presence Works a Marvelous Change — Drilling
His Men While Carried in a Hammock, 2 ; . 217

CHAPTER XVII

GOMEZ AND MACEO PERFECT THEIR PLANS — TRAGIC
DEATH OF MARTI—MACEO’S BRILLIANT CAMPAIGN—
NARROW ESCAPE OF CAMPOS.

Arrival of Marti, President of the Cuban Republic, and Gomez, Comman.
der-in-Chief — Influence of Gomez in the Central Provinces — Arrival
of Campos — His Plan to Confine the Revolution to Santiago de Cuba
—Plan of Campaign Arranged by Gomez and Maceo— Gomez with
Seven Hundred Cavalrymen Near the Enemy—A Wild Charge —
The Spaniards Driven Back on their Reserves— Marti’s Horse Be-
comes Unmanageable — Carried into the Ranks of the Enemy — They
Fall upon Him— His Death— Campos Orders a Military Funeral —
Maceo’s Attack at Jobito— Barbers as Surgeons— Maceo Plans an
Attack — Death of Goulet Maceo Turns the Retreat into a Charge
— Did Not Know He Was Attacking Campos — Features of a Cuban
Camp — Uniform and Equipment of a Mambis, . ‘ ; . 284
xvi CONTENTS

CHAPTER XVIII .

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA—STRENGTH
OF SPANISH ARMY AND PECULIARITIES OF CUBAN WAR-
FARE—ON TO HAVANA!

Campos Sends for Reinforcements — Landing of Other Cuban Leaders —
Gomez Enters Puerto Principe—His Order for the Destruction of
Sugar Plantations — The Reasons for It — A War on Spain’s Finances
—Campos Leaves Santiago for Santa Clara to Intercept Gomez—
Plan for Concentrating Cuban Forces—Cuban Delegates Meet to
Found the Republic— Picturesque Surroundings— Discussing the
Constitution — Election of Officers— A Government Largely on Paper
— Gomez’s Great Plan for a Westward March — Strength of the Span-
ish Forces— Divisions of the Cuban Army — Gomez’s Instructions —
‘“To Havana” — To Push the Revolt into the West— Tactics of the
Insurgents — Their Advantages in Such a Climate and Country —
Spanish Difficulties— The Nature of Alleged Spanish Victories — Cu-
bans Constantly Pushing Further Westward, . . ; 252

CHAPTER XIX

THE FAMOUS JUCARO TROCHA—RUSE BY WHICH GOMEZ
AND MACEO BROKE THE SPANISH DEFENSE —FEARFUL
EXPERIENCES OF CARILLO AND HIS EXPEDITION.

Campos Reinforces the Jucaro Trocha— Character of This Notable De
fense—Fifty Miles of Forts and Barbed Wire —Gomez’s Plan to
March 12,000 Men Over It— Maceo’s Pretended Attack — Again De-
ceives the Spaniards — Burning Sugar Plantations in Santa Clara —
Insurgents Divide into Small Bands— The Battle of Coliseo — Cam-
pos Foiled Again — Campos Falls Back Finally to Havana — All Cuba
Under Martial Law — Landing of Carillo and Aguirre — Their Con-
tract with a Steamer Captain — Leaving the Ship at Night in a Storm
— Thirty Miles from Land in Small Boats— Blankets for Sails — Land
at Last — The Forts of Santiago— Horror of the Expeditionists — Fac-
ing Death— The Guide Becomes Hopelessly Insane — Prepared for an
Attack — Mistaken for Fishing Boats —TIn an Insurgent’s Hut, . 265

CHAPTER XX

THE ADVENT OF WEYLER, KNOWN AS “THE SPANISH
BUTCHER” — HIS CRUELTY AND BARBARITY—THE FA-
MOUS $5,000,000 TROCHA —DARING EXPLOITS OF MACEO.

Campos Badly Received at Havana — Spaniards Clamor for Sterner Meth-
ods — Campos Consults the Leaders — His Resignation and Self-Sac-
rifice — Weyler’s Arrival — His Infamous Reputation — Commissioned
Because of It— Progress of Gomez and Maceo— Weyler’s Immense
CONTENTS XVii

Forces— Largest Military Expedition Ever Transported by Sea—
Strength of the Insurgents— Object of Their Campaign — Weyler’s
Boastful Proclamations — Civilized War Abandoned — Heroism of
Young Adolfo Rodriguez — His Execution — Waiting for the Death
Shot — A Cruel Pause — Wonderful Example of Self-Control — Wey-
ler’s Ineffective Military Operations — His Big Fence — Maceo Crosses
and Recrosses It Easily — Cuba ‘‘ Pacified’””— Maceo Appears Where
Least Expected — An Example of His Daring and oS — Raid on
Candelaria — Death of Maceo’s Brother José, , : . 288

CHAPTER XXI

DIPLOMATIC TROUBLES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND SPAIN— THE SANGUILY CASE— THE MORA CLAIM
—CAPTURE OF THE COMPETITOR.

The Troubles Begin — The Alvianca Affair — Rights of American Citizens
Ignored —Sanguily and Aguirre— Arrested for Insurrection While
Taking a Bath—A Sharp Interview — Threatening to Shoot Ameri-
can Citizens-—The Consul’s Strong Reply — Release of Aguirre —
Sanguily Sentenced to Imprisonment for Life — His Lawyer Arrested
and Placed in the Same Jail— History of the Mora Claim — A Court-
Martial of the Dead — Extraordinary Diplomacy — A Wait of Ten
Years — Mora Grows Old and Poor — Spain Offers to Compromise for
$1,500,000 — Ten Years More of Waiting— A Demand Not to Be
Mistaken — A Spanish Comment — The Belligerency Question — Op-
posed by the Administration —The Capture of the Competitor — Cap-
tain Laborde’s Story — ‘‘ This Must Stop,” . : s ; . 297

CHAPTER XXII

WEYLER’S FUTILE EFFORTS—TRAGIC DEATH OF THE LAST
OF THE MACEOS—THE MURDERS OF FONDEVIELA AND
REMARKABLE EXPLOITS OF ARANGUREN.

Maceo the Terror of the Spanish Nation — Weyler’s Futile Efforts to Cap-
ture Him— Rebel Hospitals and Spanish Victories — Maceo as Un-
daunted as Ever — A Picture of the Man and of His Camp — Was It
a Spanish Trap?— Attack at Punta Brava—How Maceo Fell— Go-
mez’s Son Kills Himself at His Side— Cubans Rescue Maceo’s Body
— Stories of His Death— Their Effect in the United States — Saved
by a Lucky Bullet — Rejoicing of the Spanish People— Hopes of
Cuban Surrender Disappointed — Maceo’s Successor, Rivera — Insur-
gent Successes in Havana and Matanzas — Reign of Terror at Guan-
abacoa — Weyler Criticised at Madrid — Remarkable Exploits of Nes-
tor Aranguren — Magnanimously Frees Spanish Prisoners of War —
Nearly Captures Weyler eee ae of Destruc-
tion — His Trip to Santa Clara, . ‘ 5 e . 3812

2
XVili CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXTIT

THE MURDER OF DR. RUIZ AND THE THREATENED RESIG-
NATION OF CONSUL-GENERAL LEE— RELEASE OF SAN-
GUILY —ON THE VERGE OF WAR—SPAIN ALARMED.

Congress Stirred by Stories of the Death of Maceo — Opposition to Bellig-
erency — Spanish People Aroused — Trying to Soothe Us — Secretary
Olney’s Claims — Congress Amazed — Spain Seeks European Support
— ‘Independence or Death” —Spain’s Plan of Reform— Her Hand
Still Heavy on Cuba—The Murderous Fondeviela— Killing of Dr.
Ruiz — No Notice Given to Consul-General Lee — Lee Not Supported
at Washington in His Defense of American Citizens — Arrest of Scott
— Lee’s Forceful Despatch — He Threatens to Depart — A Dramatic
Climax —Cuban Sympathizers Classed as Jingoes—Senator Sher-
man’s Defense—Its Significance— Demand for a Ship of-War for
Havana — Sudden Release of Sanguily —Spain Alarmed — Weyler’s
Failures in the East — Capture of General Rivera, . , - 826

CHAPTER XXIV

THE CONDITION OF CUBA IN 1897— HELPLESS WOMEN AND
CHILDREN — AWFUL SCENES OF SUFFERING AND WOE—
MISERY OF THE RECONCENTRADOS—FACING STARVA-
TION AND DEATH.

Attitude of the McKinley Administration — Another Decree of Autonomy
— On the Verge of Starvation— Unparalleled Scenes of Suffering —
Weyler’s Reasons for Concentrating— A Death Warrant to Thou-
sands of the Innocent and Helpless— Driven from Burning Homes
—Huddled in Swamps—A Plague Spot on Earth—A Spanish Ac-
count of Misery — Horrors at Gitines — Coffins Used Again and Again
— Testimony of a Catholic Mother Superior—The Living and the
Dead Together— Dying Little Orphans— Scenes at the Very Gates
of Havana — Heaped Pell-mell Like Animals — The Dead in the
Embrace of the Dying — Terrible Conditions in Pinar Del Rio—
15,000 Dying Children — Extermination the Real Object——The Massa-
cres of Pacificos— The Dead Carts on Their Rounds — Shoveling the
Victims into the Sand — Incredulity in the United States, . . 3844

CHAPTER XXV

RELIEF OF STARVING AMERICAN CITIZENS IN CUBA—FAIL-
URE OF WEYLER’S CAMPAIGN—INCREASING MISERY ON
THE ISLAND—THE ASSASSINATION OF CANOVAS.

Suffering among American Residents in Cuba— The President Asks for
» $50,000 for Their Relief —Spain Watches Us Anxiously —The Mor-
CONTENTS Xix

gan Resolution —Exciting Debate in the Senate —Its Effect in Spain
—Sagasta Rebels — Canovas Resigns — Given a New Lease of Life —
Reasons for His Continuance and for Weyler’s Longer Stay in Cuba
— Political Conditions —Don Carlos— Canovas between Two Fires
— Madrid Opinion —Weyler’s Trip to Santiago — Gomez’s New West-
ward Movement — Insurgent Successes — Weyler Meets Gomez for
the First Time in Battle— Weyler’s Defeat — Superior Tactics of
Gomez — Return of Commissioner Calhoun — Gen. Stewart L. Wood-
ford Appointed Minister to Madrid — His Instructions— Nothing to
Humiliate Spain— A Season of Waiting — Death of Canovas — Party

Quarrels Cease — Weyler Driven into Havana, . ‘ ‘ . 858°

CHAPTER XXVI

THE STORY OF MISS CISNEROS AND HER REMARKABLE ES8-
CAPE— RECALL OF WEYLER— PENALTY OF DEATH TO
ALL INSURGENTS TREATING WITH SPANIARDS.

Weyler Retained by the New Premier— The Escape of Evangelina Cisne-
ros — Her Romantic Story — Following Her Father to Jail—On the
Isla de Pinos— Attracted by Evangelina’s Beauty —A Scream for
Help — Berriz in Close Quarters— Guerrillas Appear— Her Escape
to a Cave— Found by the Guerrillas—Sent to Havana— Thrown
into a Vile Prison — Sympathy Aroused in this Country — An Appeal
to the Queen — Her Escape through a Barred Window — Smuggled
on a Steamer in Boy’s Clothes — Her Enthusiastic Reception in New
York — The Queen Tired of Cuban Troubles— Her Farewell to Min-
ister Taylor — Sagasta’s Ministry — Arrival in Havana of Blanco, and
Return of Weyler— Weyler’s Grotesque Failure — Blanco Announces
a More Liberal Policy — Release of the Competitor Prisoners — Their
Wretched Lot — Masé Elected President of Cuban Republic, . 871

CHAPTER XXVII

THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE—THE TRAGIC DEATH OF
COLONEL RUIZ—RIOTS IN HAVANA, AND THE
“FRIENDLY VISIT” OF THE MAINE.

The Administration’s Cuban Policy Outlined — Possibilities of Interven-
tion — Opposition to Autonomy — Colonel Ruiz Hopes to Convert the
Young Cuban Leader, Nestor Aranguren—The Latter’s Reply to
Ruiz’s Letter—Aranguren Warns Him—The Meeting — Arangu-
ren’s Own Story of What Happened — Ruiz Shot— Organized Re-
lief for the Reconcentrados— Military Operations in the East — Dis-
quieting Reports-— Lee Advises Having Warships in Readiness — A
Delicate Situation — Winter Drill of North American Squadron —
The Storm Breaks in Havana — ‘‘ Death to Autonomy !” — Lee’s Mes-
sage — Blanco’s Prompt Action — Death-Blow to Autonomy — Protec-
tion of American Citizens —The Maine Ordered to Havana — Strange
Action of the Havana Authorities— The Maine Arrives Quietly, 385
xx CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE MAINE AND HER COMMANDER— THREATS AND WARN-
INGS— MINISTER Dre LOME’S ABUSIVE LETTER—START-
LING NEWS—THE MAINE BLOWN UP.

The History of the Maine— Captain Sigsbee, Her Commander — His High
Standing in the Navy Department — His Coolness and Self-possession —
A Second in Which to Act — Many Lives Saved by a Prompt Decision
—The Maine in Havana Harbor—An Unused Buoy — Captain Sigs-
bee’s Precautions — Extraordinary Vigilance—The Hostility of the
Spanish Rabble— Warnings Handed to Captain Sigsbee — His Official
Relations — No Cordiality from Spanish Military Officers— Reporters at
Hotel Ingleterra— Story of a Letter from Weyler— Weyler’s Myste-
tious Hints at Mines—General Aranguren Betrayed by a Negro
Captive — Surrounded and Killed — Conditions Worse and Worse —
Publication of the De Lome Letter— Characteristic Spanish Diplo-
macy — De Lome Admits His Authorship and Resigns —Spain’s Dis-
avowal— A Better Feeling—A Midnight Dispatch — Startling News
— Maine Blown Up” — An Awful Catastrophe, . 3 : . 400

CHAPTER XXIX

THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 15, 1898—A FEARFUL EXPLOSION
AND SCENES OF HORROR — REMARKABLE ESCAPES — THE
WORK OF RESCUE—THE NEWS AT WASHINGTON.

A Quiet night in Havana Harbor—The Maine Swinging at her Chain —
A Sudden Roar, a Crashing Explosion, and a Mass of Flying Flames
and Débris— The Shrieks of Dying Men— The Silence of Death —
Captain Sigsbee’s Escape — Standing on the Sinking Ship — Lowering
the Boats — The Officers in the Mess Room — Frightful Experiences —
Lieut. Jenkins Groping in the Water —‘‘ Which Way ”— Lieutenant
Hood’s Graphic Story —The Work of Rescue—A Last Call but no
Answer from the Burning Ruins — Spanish Delight — Captain Sigsbee
Leaves the Ship — Visits from Spanish Officers — Sigsbee’s Despatches
to the Department — “‘ Don’t Send War Vessels” — Excitement at Wash-
ington — Scenes at the White House—Sympathy of Spanish Officials
at Havana— Public Funeral of the Victims— Appointment of the
Court of Inquiry, . ; ; , ; ‘ . 411

CHAPTER XXX

PREPARING FOR WAR—EVIDENCE OF SPANISH TREACHERY
— MILLIONS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE—A HISTORICAL
MOMENT—THE DRIFT INTO WAR.

Effects of the Maine Incident upon Our Cuban Policy — A Plain, Concrete
Case —The People Remain Patient The President’s Policy Inter-
CONTENTS Xxi

rupted — Reasons for the Accidental Theory —Not Really Believed in
Official Circles — General Lee Informs the State Department that It
Looked Like an Outside Explosion— Sudden Activity in Official
Circles — Preparations for War— Oregon Ordered Home — Dewey
Ordered to Concentrate His Flect— Arrival and Departure of the
Vizcaya — Our Precautions for Her Safety — Spain’s Responsibility for
the Safety of the Maine — Deeper and Deeper Misery in Cuba— Red
Cross Work —Spain’s Request for the Recall of General Lee— Her
Reasons — Probing for the Weyler Letter—Lainé’s Arrest and Ex-
pulsion — Lee Finds a Weyler Telegram — Corroborative Evidence —
A Critical Moment in Our National Life, s . - ; . 47

CHAPTER XXXI

ATTITUDE OF EUROPEAN POWERS — INCREASING GRAVITY
OF THE SITUATION —FINAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WITH
SPAIN—REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY.

Sounding European Governments — Friendly Attitude of England — Rea-
sons for Cherishing an Alliance—The Spanish Court of Inquiry —
Marked Impression Made by Senator Proctor’s Speech — Differing
Policies — General Pando Seeks to Convert Cubans — Renewed Activity
in War Preparations —Spain’s Torpedo Flotilla Departs from the
Canary Islands — Hastening Diplomacy —A Critical Situation —
Our Demands upon Spain — Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry
Submitted — Its Conclusions — Significance of the Keel Plates in the
Wreck — Evidence Entirely Conclusive of Outside Explosion — Efforts
to Fix the Responsibility — Captain Sigsbee’s Testimony — Maine
Anchored Just Where a Mine Would be Placed— An Anonymous
Letter — $6,000 for Blowing up the Ship, . J : . 448

CHAPTER XXXII

NEARING A CRISIS—‘‘REMEMBER THE MAINE” —SPAIN’S
FINANCIAL STRAITS—HASTENING OUR NAVAL PREPA-
RATIONS —SPAIN’S UNSATISFACTORY TACTICS.

Public Impatience Restrained with Difficulty —The President’s Trying
Position — Radical Resolutions in the Senate—The President’s Firm
Hand — Liberal Victory in Spain — The Cuban Deputies — Arrival of
the Vezcaya and Alintrante Oquendo in Havana — Spaniards in Hostile
Mood — Spanish Torpedo Flotilla and Its Movements — Spain’s Appeal
to Europe — Suicide of the Dynasty —Desperate Financial Conditions
— The Church as a Holder of Spanish Bonds— Putting the United
States Navy in Readiness —The Key West Fleet and the Flying Squad-
ron— Apparent Concession but Only for Effect — The Proposed Armis-
tice — Congress Becomes More and More Impatient — The President’s
Reasons for Delay —Time Needed to Prepare — His Influence upon
Congressional Leaders — Learning a Lesson, ; . : . 457
Xxil CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE COALING PROBLEM—SPAIN’S PRETENDED ASSIST-
ANCE OF THE STARVING RECONCENTRADOS — SCENES IN
CONGRESS WHILE AWAITING THE PRESIDENT’S MES-
SAGE.

The Army Ready to Move —The Importance of the Coaling Problem —
Spain’s Small Supply — Coaling at Neutral Ports — Blanco’s Orders to
Help the Reconcentrados—No Charity Except through Fear of War
— Spain Playing to the Galleries of Europe — No Chance for Money to
Get by the Spanish Officials — Appeal of the Autonomist Government
— Position of the Self-Professed Friends of Peace — The Influence of
the Commercial Spirit — ‘‘ Reading the Riot Act to the President” —
The President’s Tact — April 6th, an Exciting Day — Waiting for the
Message — It Fails to Arrive — General Lee’s Request for Time to Get
Out of Cuba— The President’s Courageous Act — Bitter Attacks upon
Him in Congress — Bravely Defended — Other Important Reasons for
Delay — The President’s Expectation of War, é ‘ 7 . 4B

CHAPTER XXXIV
THE JOINT NOTE OF THE SIX POWERS — QUEEN CHRISTINA
ACTS TOO LATE— THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE AT LAST
—“THE WAR IN CUBA MUST STOP.”

A Little Play behind the Scenes— Attempts of European Powers to Act —
Austria’s Interest in the Spanish Dynasty —The French Investment in
Spanish Bonds — Plans for a Joint Appeal — An Impressive Moment in
the White House—The European Note— The President’s Reply —
Humanitarian Considerations — Novel Proceeding in Our Diplomacy —
Condition on Which England and Russia Acted — A Good Opportunity
for the President — A Similar Request Made at Madrid — Spain Replies
that She has Gone as Far as She Can—The Queen Takes Matters in
Her Own Hand and Would Go Further — Too Late — Blanco Ordered
to Suspend Hostilities — Riots in Madrid — General Lee and Many
Americans Leave Havana— No Further Postponement of Message
Possible —Useless to Listen to Spain’s Insincere Diplomacy — The
Message Submitted — History of the Troubles Reviewed — Spain’s
Proposal as to the Maine—The Time for Action at Hand, . 484

CHAPTER XXXV
RECEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE— ARRIVAL OF
GENERAL LEE—EXCITING DEBATES IN THE HOUSE
AND SENATE—OUR ULTIMATUM TO SPAIN— BREAKING
OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

How the President’s Message was Received—A Plain Unimpassioned
Statement — Congress Expected Something More Fiery — General Lee’s
Arrival at Washington — Ovations on the Route — A Warm Welcome
CONTENTS Xxili

—His Testimony before the Senate Committee — Resolutions for
Intervention — The Question of Recognizing the Independence of Cuba
—The Tension of Feeling — Coming Together on the Final Vote —
Report of the Senate Committee — Defending the President — An
Impressive Speech — An Amendment to Recognize the Cuban Republic
Passed — Disagreeing Action and a Conference — The Final Draft —
Wisdom of Going to War without Recognizing Cuba— The Presi-
dent Prepares His Ultimatum — Signing the Resolutions — Minister
Polo Demands His Passports — A High-handed Performance — Wood-
ford Given His Passports, é ‘ ‘ . . 497

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE SPANISH AND AMERICAN NAVIES — PROCLAMATION
OF CUBAN BLOCKADE— DEPARTURE OF AN AMERICAN
SQUADRON FOR CUBAN WATERS — THE FIRST SHOT OF
THE WAR—THE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS.

Beginning Operations — Plans for Offensive and Defensive Action — Com-
parison of the Spanish and United States Navies —Spain’s Armored
Cruisers — Superiority of Our Guns and Gunners—The Spirit of the
Navy — Lieutenant Commander Wainwright’s Plea for a Chance
to Fight— Peculiar Positions of Antagonists—Spain’s Best Ships
neither in Cuban nor Philippine Waters — The Cape Verde Squadron —
Speculations as to Naval Results— Spaniards Suspected of Dark De-
signs — Commodore Howell’s Auxiliary Fleet—Blockading Cuban
Ports— Departure of Admiral Sampson’s Imposing Fleet — Commo-
dore Dewey Ordered to Sail for Manila — Caution of the Naval Strategy
Board— A Spanish Ship Sighted — The First Shot of the War— The
Spanish Flag Comes Down— Other Prizes Captured —The Call for
Volunteers— Prompt Response—A Conflict between Amateurs and
Professionals — Reorganizing the Army— A Cause of Delay, . 505

CHAPTER XXXVII

WAR FORMALLY PROCLAIMED—THE BOMBARDMENT OF
MATANZAS— EXPERIENCES ON A MODERN WARSHIP—
COMMODORE DEWEY SAILS TOWARDS MANILA.

Enthusiasm and Generosity among the People of the United States — Col-
lege Patriotism — Prompt Action by the Women of the Country — Red
Cross Nurses—The Dangers of Yellow Fever —Surgeon-General’s
Warning — Rejoicing in Havana— Blanco’s Grandiloquent Manifesto
— Congress Formally Declares War— Spain Talks of Scandalous Ag
gression — Troubles in the Cortes— Importance of Securing a Base on
Cuban Coast — Havana Ignored— Advancing to Matanzas— The Na-
ture of the Bay — Waiting for the Word to Fire— A Shot from the
Batteries — Engagement Becomes General— A Thrilling Sight — Fol-
lowing the Powerful Projectiles to the Target — Clouds of Smoke —
XXiV CONTENTS 5

Three Hundred Shots in Eighteen Minutes — General Blanco’s Report
of Casualties—‘‘A Mule Killed” —The Cape Verde Spanish Flee}
Sails — Commodore Dewey Points his Fleet towards Manila — Sig-
nificance of his Orders, 5 2.7% 2 be ue cee cao Bal

CHAPTER XXXVIIT

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS—THEIR EXTENT, CHARACTER,
AND NATIVE LIFE —REBELLION OF THE FILIPINOS AND
ITS THRILLING INCIDENTS— THE TRAGIC DEATH OF DR.
RIZAL—GENERAL AGUINALDO AND COMMODORE DEWEY.

Magellan the Navigator Hears of the Wonderful Spice Islands — Persuades
the Spanish King that they Might Belong to Spain — Sailing Westward
Instead of Eastward — Wonderful Voyage — Discovery of the Philip-
pines — The Natives — Early Importance of Manila — The Slaughter of
the Prosperous Chinese — Depressing Results— A Long and Ugly His-
tory — Character of the Islands— Peculiarities of Spanish Government
— The Uprising of 1896 — The Catapunan Society — Appealing to the
Filipinos — A Bloody Conflict — Outrages on Both Sides— A Hundred
Prisoners Suffocated in a Single Night — Public Executions —Dramatic
Incidents — The Romantic Story of Dr. Rizal — His Love Affair — Sen-
tenced to Death — Married in his Cell Just Before his Execution — His
Death — Patriotic Verses— Insurgent Leaders Leave the Country —
Insurrection Breaks Out Again— General Aguinaldo’s Exile, . 534

CHAPTER XXXIX

COMMODORE DEWEY AND HIS S8QUADRON—INCIDENTS OF
THE CRUISE TO MANILA —SEARCHING FOR THE ENEMY
—THRILLING SAIL PAST THE BATTERIES AND OVER
THE MINES—ADVANCING TO THE BATTLE.

Commodore Dewey’s Squadron —Its Guns and Armor — Dewey’s Service
in the Navy — Admiral Porter’s Tribute — Proclamation of the Gov-
ernor-General of the Philippines—Bombastic Encouragement —
Dewey’s Cruise to Manila— Rolling in the China Sea — ‘“‘ Prepare for
Action” — Practice on the Way — Stripping the Ships— All Unneces-
sary Articles Thrown Overboard— A Look into Subig Bay — Move-
ments of the Spanish Admiral— Why he Retired to Manila— The
United States Squadron Holds a Council of War— Dewey Announces
His Purpose to Enter Manila Harbor that Night— Engines Started
Again — Men Quietly Sent to Their Guns—In Sight of the Forts —
Increasing the Speed — Silent and Alert — Discovered at Last —A
Flash of Light, a Rocket, and then the Boom of a Gun — Dewey’s
Orders — Silencing a Battery —Silently Onward — Breakfast at the
Guns— The Enemy Sighted at Cavité— Heading for Battle— The
Spanish Squadron —Its Advantage, . ji ‘ ‘ : . 548
CONTENTS xxXV

CHAPTER XL

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY—A TERRIBLE STORM
OF SHOT AND SHELL— SCENES OF BLOOD AND CARNAGE
—ANNIHILATION OF THE SPANISH FLEET—COMMO-
DORE DEWEY’S GREAT VICTORY.

Commodore Dewey’s Squadron in Battle Array— Advancing Silently
towards the Enemy— Mines Exploded in Front of the Olympia —
“Remember the Maine!”—The Time for Action Comes— Torpedo
Launches Venture an Attack — Rapid Guns — The Reina Christina At-
tacks the Olympia — Meets with a Terrible Fire — Destructive Shot of
the Boston — Retiring for Breakfast — Taking Account of Damages—
The Fury of the Second Attack — Spaniards Fighting Desperately —
Defiant Gunners Swallowed up in the Bloody Water— Escape of the
Spanish Admiral— A Gruesome Sight— Ships Burnt, Suuk, and De-
serted — Surrender of the Fort— Care of the Wounded — Experiences
on the American Ships—Cutting the Cable— Commodore Dewey’s
Modest Despatches, ‘ 7 : , i : ‘ 4 . 561

CHAPTER XLII

AWAITING ADMIRAL CERVERA AND HIS FLEET— ANXIETY
FOR THE OREGON—CERVERA’S UNEXPECTED ARRIVAL
AT MARTINIQUE.

A Period of Uncomfortable Uncertainty —Where would Cervera Appear ?—
Relative Distances of the Hostile Squadrons — Three Theories as to
Cervera’s Probable Course — Plausibility of the Theory that He Might
Intercept the Oregon — The Oregon at Rio Janeiro — Captain Clark has
no Fear of Spanish Fleet — Possibility of a Spanish Attack on Coast
Cities — General Opinion that Cervera would Steer for Puerto Rico —
Admiral Sampson Starts Out to Meet Him — His Formidable Fleet —
The Anticipated Battle — Days of Anxious Waiting — Strategists all at
Sea— Retiewed Concern for the Oregon—Strength of the Spanish
Cruisers — Unknown Possibilities of Torpedo Warfare — Astonishing
Announcement that Cervera had Returned to Cadiz — Assurances from
London — Spanish Denials Disbelieved — Sudden Preparations for In-
vading Cuba — Cervera is Sighted off Martinique—He Learns that
Sampson Had Called for Him at Puerto’ Rico, . é : . 579
XXvi CONTENTS

CHAPTER XLIT

ADMIRAL SAMPSON’S BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN-
THRILLING SCENES DURING THE ACTION —SKILLFUL
AMERICAN GUNNERY—SAMPSON’S WITHDRAWAL.

Admiral Sampson’s Cruise to Puerto Rico — The Gallant Sailors Expect a
Great Fight — Approaching San Juan — Preparations for the Combat
—San Juan Learns of Sampson’s Approach — The Jowa Becomes the
Flagship — Peculiarities of San Juan Harbor — Admiral Sampson’s
Plan of Attack — Running up the Stars and Stripes — Speeding into
the Bay — The Duty of the Wompatuck—Sampson, Finding Cervera
Absent, Decides to Shell the Forts—The First Shot— The Music of
the Projectiles— Spaniards Return the Fire Vigorously — Bravery of a
Spaniard at an Old Gun—Some Dangerous Guns on the Forts—
Marksmanship as Worthless as Spanish Promises— ‘‘ Threaten, Puff,
Splash !” — Cruising by the Forts Three Times — Shells Land on the
New York and Jowa— One Man Killed — The Withdrawal — Admiral
Sampson’s Official Report— Not Even a Spanish Gunboat in the
Harbor — Criticism of Admiral Sampson’s Attack, . 5 » 8993

CHAPTER XLII

INCIDENTS ON THE BLOCKADE LINE — FIRST AMERICAN
BLOODSHED AT CIENFUEGOS — THE BRAVE AND BLOODY
FIGHT OF THE WINSLOW AT CARDENAS —SWEPT BY
SHOT AND SHELL.

The Blockade in Early May — The Capture of the Lafayette — Recklessness
of Some of the American Vessels — Work of Cutting the Cables — Eager
Volunteers for a Dangerous Task — Advancing Close to Shore in
Launches and Cutters — Fire from the Spanish Masked Batteries — Men
Drop at their Oars—Ship’s Guns Drive the Spaniards to Shelter —
Dead Men in the Cutters — Shelling the Lighthouse — First Adventure
of the Torpedo Boat Winslow — Laying a Trap for the Spaniards — In
a Nest of Red Buoys—A Spanish Trap— Deadly Fire Pours in on
the Winslow —The Hudson to the Rescue—A Fatal Shell— Death of
Ensign Bagley and his Men—Terrific Fighting — Brave Act of the
Hudson — Getting the Winslow Out — ee Gunboats Disabled —
Scattering a Spanish Garrison, . a a ; ‘: . 608
CONTENTS XXVii
CHAPTER XLIV :

CHASING CERVERA’S FLEET—DAYS OF EXCITEMENT AND
UNCERTAINTY —SAMPSON AND SCHLEY AT KEY WEST
AND CERVERA AT SANTIAGO.

Cervera Raises another Question for the Strategists —Schley Receives Or-
ders to Leave Hampton Roads— Cervera Reported at Curagoa — He
Seeks Coal and Supplies — Sampson a Day’s Sail from Santiago — More
Days of Uncertainty — Cervera and Sampson Both Sailing in the Same
Direction — Sampson and Schley Arrive at: Key West and Cervera at
Santiago — Cervera’s Luck as a Dodger — How He Entered Santiazo
while our Scouts Were Away — Schley Hurries to the South Coast of
Cuba — Unaware of Cervera’s Arrival at Santiago —Schley Prepares to
Attack Cervera at Cienfuegos — Finds Cervera is not There and Pushes
on to Santiago— Doubt as to Whether Cervera is Really There —
Sampson Turns Back — Schley Steams up before Santiago, . . 618

CHAPTER XLV

THE HARBOR OF SANTIAGO — ADMIRAL CERVERA’S ALLEGED
STRATEGY — COMMODORE SCHLEY MAKES SURE HE HAS
THE ENEMY —CERVERA ‘“ BOTTLED UP.”

A Beautiful Harbor — Morro Castle — Background for Many Bloody
Scenes—The Winding Channel and the Bay — Doubt as to Whether
Cervera was Actually There — Irrational Movements of the Spanish
Admiral — Guided Largely by Necessities— Opportunities which He
Refused to Embrace — Evidence of Cervera’s Presence in the Harbor —
All Doubts Removed — Schley’s Attack on the Forts — Cervera’s Ships
Fire at Random over the Hills — Remarkable Reports from Madrid —
Too Late for Falsehoods — Cervera ‘‘ Bottled Up ”— The Government
at Once Takes Steps to Send Forces to Santiago — Admiral Sampson
Arrives Back at Key West and Prepares to Join Schley — The Monitors
Left Behind — Remarkable Trip of the Oreyon— Admiral Sampson
Takes Command — Organizing the Army — Found Unprepared at the
Last Moment — The Departure at Last, ‘ ‘ é 5 . 682
XXViii CONTENTS

CHAPTER XLVI

THE BRAVE DEED OF LIEUTENANT HOBSON AND HIS CREW
— GOING INTO THE JAWS OF DEATH — FEARFUL EX-
PERIENCES AND A WONDERFUL ESCAPE.

Plans for Destroying or Capturing Cervera’s Fleet — Hobson Presents a
Plan to Prevent His Escape — Admiral Sampson Gives His Consent —
Preparing the Merrimac for a Dangerous Trip — Asking for Volun-
teers — Drawing Lots — Details of Hobson’s Plans — Preparations
Made at Last — The Crew as Selected — Hobson Speaks of His Chances
of Success — Battleships Take up Position at Sunset — Hobson Appears
on the Bridge — Everything Ready — The Merrimac Moves in—
Watching in Breathless Interest — Disappearing in the Mist of the
Shore — A Blaze of Fire — The Search of the Little Launch — Hobson
Given up for Lost — How He Steams into the Sheet of Flame— A Mine
Explodes under the Merrimac—On the Deck in a Hail of Shot and
Shell — Slipping Overboard and Clinging to the Catamaran — A Span-
ish Launch Appears — Prisoners in Morro— Fate Made Known, 645

CHAPTER XLVII

LANDING OF MARINES IN GUANTANAMO BAY — SUR-
ROUNDED BY HIDDEN ENEMIES — SPANIARDS CAUGHT
AT LAST —SHARP NAVAL FIGHT AT SAN JUAN.

Spaniards Strengthen Their Position — Bombarding the Forts at the
Harbor Mouth — The Reina Mercedes Wrecked — Looking for a
Possible Place for the Army to Land — Pluck of the Naval Re-
serves — Landing the Marines — Preparing Camp McCalla — Its
Peculiar Position — Fatal Search for the Enemy — No Sleep for the
Marines — Mauser Bullets Continually Whistling through the
Camp — Bravely Facing the Foe — Untenable Position of the Camp
— Spaniards Fire upon a Funeral Cortége — Driving Them Back
and Resuming the Services —Attacked from a New Quarter — A
Critical Situation — The Enemy Caught in a Trap — Slaughtered
without Mercy — The Camp Moved to a Less Exposed Position —
The Blockade of San Juan — Arrival of the S¢. Paul — The Terror
Makes an Attack — A Broadside from the St. Paul, . i . 659
CONTENTS xxix

CHAPTER XLYVIIT

LANDING OF THE TROOPS AT BAIQUIRI AND SIBONEY —
THE ADVANCE THROUGH CUBAN THICKETS—A MAG-
NIFICENT CHARGE AND A _ DECISIVE VICTORY —
CAMARA’S PHANTOM FLEET.

Arrival of the Transports with General Shafter’s Army — Admiral Samp-
son and General Shafter Consult— Meeting the Cuban Leaders —
Enthusiastic Cubans — Baiquiri Selected as a Landing Place— Plans
and Preparations — Anticipating an Attempted Escape by Cervera —
Incidents of a Difficult Landing — Unfurling the Stars and Stripes —
On the Road to Santiago — Yankee Ingenuity — The Enemy’s Retreat
to Guasimas— General Wheeler Decides to Attack — Moving Ahead
on Difficult Trails and under a Burning Sun— The Music of a Mauser
Bullet — Rough Riders Attacked— A Fierce Battle is On— Deploying
through the Thickets — Death in the Ranks— A Relentless Advance
— Victory and a Well-Earned Rest—The Dead and Wounded —
Camara Leaves Cadiz — His Trip to the Suez Canal, . 7 « 675

CHAPTER XLIX

CONTINUED ADVANCE OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS—GEN-
ERAL SHAFTER ARRIVES AT THE FRONT—PREPARA-
TIONS FOR A GENERAL ATTACK —INGENIOUS SPANISH
DEFENSES.

Advancing the American Lines —The Spanish Retreat — Trials of the Trail
— Soldiers Pushing Ahead Faster Than Supplies Could be Brought
Up—Impossible to Land Heavy Guns—Cutting a Way through
Tropical Jungles— General Shafter Leaves the Ship—The Cuban
Soldiers— A Remarkable Collection of Warriors — Famished and
Naked Patriots — No Understanding of Organized War — Their
Value as Scouts and Guides— Their Aversion to Spades and Picks —
Good Reasons for an Immediate Attack— Dangers of the Climate —
Stretching the Line Northward — Position of the Different Divisions
— Within Rifle Range of the Enemy — Traps Laid by the Spaniards —
Disguised Sharpshooters in the Treetops— Rifle Pits Trained on the
Openings through Which our Troops Must Advance — Expecting
to Take Santiago in a Day—Inadequate Hospital Arrangements —
The Greatest Land Battle of the War, : . F 5 . 691
xxx CONTENTS

CHAPTER L

THE FIERCE BATTLE OF JULY FIRST AT SAN JUAN, CANEY,
AND AGUADORES — GALLANT CONDUCT AND HEAVY
LOSSES OF SHAFTER’S ARMY — INADEQUATE PROVISION
FOR THE SUFFERING WOUNDED — A DARK OUTLOOK.

The Morning of July First — Grimes’s Battery Opens Fire — The Spanish
Reply —The Advance in the Center towards San Juan— A Tell-tale
Balloon — Critical Position of the Seventy-first New York — Storming
the Hill — General Hawkins’ Brave Charge— Capturing the Spanish
Position — Roosevelt Leads the Charge up San Juan Hill— Lawton’s
Attack upon Caney — Desperate Defense of the Spaniards — The Dash
of the Colored Troops — Storming the Fort — Caney Falls — General
Duffield’s Attack at Aguadores— Inadequacy of Hospital Arrange-
ments — Terrible Suffering but Brave Endurance of the Wounded —
Provisions Run Short— General Shafter Sick and Disheartened — A
Dark Outlook — Looking to the Fleet for Help —The Spaniards also
in Despair— Cervera Receives Orders to Escape, j: ‘ . 708

CHAPTER II

ADMIRAL CERVERA’S ATTEMPTED ESCAPE— THRILLING
INCIDENTS OF COMMODORE SCHLEY’S PURSUIT AND
VICTORY — THE RESCUE AND SURRENDER OF CERVERA
AND THE REMNANTS OF HIS CREWS.

The Waiting American Squadron— Admiral Sampson Departs to Consult
with General Shafter — Watching Suspicious Smoke beyond the Ridge
— The Enemy Appears — Commodore Schley’s Prompt Action — The
Spanish Cruisers Emerge from the Harbor — Pictures of Smoke and
Fire — Network of Bursting Shells — Cervera’s Tactics — Pouring
Shells upon the Spanish Cruisers — The Chase Begins — Appearance of
the Pluton and Furor— Wainwright's Handling of the Gloucester —
His Quick and Fearless Advance — Destruction of the Destroyers —
Admiral Sampson Turns Back from Siboney ~The Maria Teresa and
the Almirante Oquendo Run Ashore — The Brooklyn and Oregon Have
a Running Fight with the Vézcaya— Another Spanish Cruiser Beached
— Gallant Rescue of the Spanish Crews — Working the Spaniard into a
Trap — The Surrender— Schley’s Splendid Command, 2 . Pi
CONTENTS Xxxi

CHAPTER LII

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO—TRYING POSITION OF
THE ARMY—RELEASE OF HOBSON AND HIS CREW—
OCCUPATION OF THE CITY—THE PUERTO RICO CAM-
PAIGN.

General Shafter Calls upon Gen. Toral to Surrender — Refusal of the Span-
ish Commander — Refugees from the City — Fruitless Negotiations —
The Exchange of Hobson and His Crew—Their Warm Welcome —
American Lines Advanced — Strengthening the American Position —
The Truce Ends — Bombardment of the City — Another Demand for
Surrender — A Council of Officers— Arrival of General Miles — Alarm-
ing Condition of Our Army — Insufficient Provisions — Suffering of
the Sick and Wounded — Toral Asks for More Time — An Agreement
Reached — Conditions of the Capitulation — The President’s Message to
General Shafter — Occupation of the City — Looking over the Spanish
Defenses — ‘‘ Yellow Jack” Appears— Obstacles Which Our Army
Overcame — Shafter and Garcia—The Campaign in Puerto Rico —
General Miles’s Easy and Triumphal Advance — Ponce Welcomes
American Troops— Last of the Fighting, . . . . 742

CHAPTER LIT

THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES —CONDUCT OF AGUI-
NALDO — PHILIPPINE EXPEDITIONS—ANNEXATION OF
* THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS—FALL OF MANILA.

Hostilities Begin and End in the Philippines — The Philippine Question at
Home —Policy of Expansion—A Complicated Situation — General
Merritt Designated to Lead the Expeditions — Apprehension of Trouble
with the Germans— Dewey’s Tactful Management — The Insurgents
Threaten Trouble— Aguinaldo’s Conduct — Insurgents Invest Manila
— The First Expedition under Way — Manila’s Desperate Condition —
Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands — Arrival of the First Expedition
under General Anderson and the Departure of General Merritt — Tak-
ing Possession of the Ladrone Islands— The Irene Incident — Organ-
izing for Attack —A Spanish Assault — A Demand for Surrender —
Preparing for Bombardment — The Battle of Malate — Fall of the City
— Merritt’s Proclamation, 3 ‘i 3 5 i * , . 761
XXxXii CONTENTS

CHAPTER LIV

SPAIN SUES FOR PEACE— THE AMERICAN TERMS —SIGN-
ING OF THE PROTOCOL — LESSONS OF WAR AND PROB-
LEMS OF PEACE.

Spain’s Reluctance to Yield — Her Embarrassed Condition — Symptoms of
Revolution — Don Carlos and Weyler — Cortes Dissolved in Disorder —
Waiting for Spanish Public Opinion — Overtures at Last through the
French Minister -— Reply of the United States— Terms of the Protocol
—The Philippine Problem — Condition of Our Army in Cuba —
Examples of Genuine Heroism in the War—Credit to the Private
and to the Sailor — The Patriotic and Prudent Policy of the President
—A Rich Legacy for the Future — After War, the Responsibilities of
Peace — The Problems of Better Government in the Conquered Terri-
tory —The Beginning of a New Historical Period in Our National
Life, ‘ : : : ‘ : ho lty go <5 ‘ . 776
 

Hon. REDFIELD PROCTOR

United States Senator from Vermont

CUBA

ITS CONDITION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1898

Isaw during my visit to Cuba and how the situation there

impressed me. This I do on account of the public in-
terest in all that concerns Cuba, and to correct some inac-
curacies that have, not unnaturally, appeared in reported inter-
views with me.

My trip was entirely unofficial and of my own motion:
uot suggested by anyone. The only mention I made of it
to the President was to say to him that I contemplated
such a trip and to ask him if there was any objection to
it; to which he replied that he could see none. No one but
iuyself, therefore, is responsible for anything in this statement.
Judge Day gave me a brief note of introduction to General
Lee, and I had letters of introduction from business friends at
the North to bankers and other business men at Havana, and
they in turn gave me letters to their correspondents in other
cities. These letters to business men were very useful, as one

3 (38)

| T has been suggested that I make a public statement of what
34 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR

of the principal purposes of my visit was to ascertain the views
of practical men of affairs upon the situation.

Of General Lee I need say but little. His valuable services
to his country in his trying position are too well known to all
his countrymen to require mention. Besides his ability, high
character, and courage, he possesses the important requisites
of unfailing tact and courtesy, and, withal, his military educa-
tion and training and his soldierly qualities are invaluable ad-
juncts in the equipment of our representative in a country so
completely under military rule as was Cuba. General Lee
kindly invited us to sit at his table at the hotel during our stay
in Havana, and this opportunity for frequent informal talks
with him was of great help to me.

In addition to the information he voluntarily gave me, it
furnished a convenient opportunity to ask him the many ques-
tions that suggested themselves in explanation of things seen
and heard on our trips through the country. I also met and
spent considerable time with Consul Brice at Matanzas, and
with Captain Barker, a staunch ex-Confederate soldier, the con-
sul at Sagua la Grande. None of our representatives whom I
met in Cuba are of my political faith, but there is a broader
faith, not bounded by party lines. They are all three true
Americans, and have done excellent service.

There are six provinces in Cuba, each, with the exception
of Matanzas, extending the whole width of the island, and
having about an equal sea front on the north and south borders.
Matanzas touches the Caribbean Sea only at its southwest cor-
ner, being separated from it elsewhere by a narrow peninsula
of Santa Clara Province. The provinces are named, begin-
ning at the west, Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, Santa
Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba. My observa-
tions were confined to the four western provinces, which con-
stitute about one-half of the island. The two eastern ones
were practically in the hands of the insurgents, except the two
fortified towns. These two large provinces were spoken of as
“Cuba Libre.”

eG
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 35

Havana, the great city and capital of the island, is, in the
eyes of the Spaniards and many Cubans, all Cuba, as much as
Paris is France. But having visited it in more peaceful times
and seen its sights, the tomb of Columbus, the forts — Cabafia
and Morro Castle, ete—TI did not care to repeat this, pre-
ferring trips in the country. Everything seemed to go on
much as usual in Havana. Quiet prevailed, and except for
the frequent squads of soldiers marching to guard and police
duty, and their abounding presence in all public places, one
saw few signs of war.

Outside Havana all had changed. It was not peace nor
was it war. It was desolation and distress, misery and starva-
tion. Every town and village was surrounded by a “ trocha ”
(trench), a sort of rifle pit, but constructed on a plan new to
me, the dirt being thrown up on the inside and a barbed-wire
fence on the outer side of the trench. These trochas had at
every corner and at frequent intervals along the sides what are
there called “ forts,” but which are really small blockhouses,
many of them more like large sentry boxes, loopholed for
musketry, and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in
each.

The purpose of these trochas was to keep the reconcen-
trados in as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the
surrounding country the people had been driven into these
fortified towns and held.there to subsist as they could. They
were virtually prison yards, and not unlike one in general ap-
pearance, except that the walls were not so high and strong;
but they sufficed, where every point was in range of a soldier’s
rifle, to keep in the poor reconcentrado women and children.

Every railroad station was within one of these trochas and
had an armed guard. Every train had an armored freight car,
loopholed for musketry and filled with soldiers, and with, as I
observed usually, and was informed was always the case, a
pilot engine a mile or so in advance. There were frequent
blockhouses inclosed by a trocha and with a guard along the
railroad track. With this exception there was no human life
36 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR

or habitation between these fortified towns and villages, and
throughout the whole of the four western provinces, except
to a very limited extent among the hills where the Spaniards
had not been able to go and drive the people to the towns and
burn their dwellings. I saw no house or hut in the 400
miles of railroad rides from Pinar del Rio Province in the
west across the full width of Havana and Matanzas provinces,
and to Sagua la Grande on the north shore, and to Cienfuegos
on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish
trochas.

There were no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields
and pastures except such as were under.guard in the immediate
vicinity of the towns. In other words, the Spaniards held in
these four western provinces just what their army sat on.
Every man, woman, and child, and every domestic animal,
wherever their columns had reached, was under guard and
within their so-called fortifications. To describe one place is
to describe all. To repeat, it was neither peace nor war. It
was concentration and desolation. This was the “ pacified”
condition of the four western provinces.

West of Havana is mainly the rich tobacco country; east,
as far as I went, a sugar region. Nearly all the sugar mills
were destroyed between Havana and Sagua. Two or three
were standing in the vicinity of Sagua, and in part running,
surrounded, as were the villages, by trochas and forts or
palisades of the royal palm, and fully guarded. Toward and
near Cienfuegos there were more mills running, but all with
the same protection. It is said that the owners of these mills
near Cienfuegos were able to obtain special favors of the Span-
ish government in the way of a large force of soldiers, but that
they also, as well as all the railroads, paid taxes to the Cubans
for immunity. I had no means of verifying this. It was the
common talk among those who had better means of knowl-
edge.

All the country people in the four western provinces, about
400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified towns
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 37

when Weyler’s order was made, were driven into these
towns, and these were the reconcentrados. They were the
peasantry, many of them farmers, some landowners, others
renting lands and owning more or less stock, others working on
estates and cultivating small patches; and even a small patch
in that fruitful clime will support a family.

It is but fair to say that the normal condition of these
people was very different from what prevails in this country.
Their standard of comfort and prosperity, measured by ours,
was not high. But according to their standards and require-
ments their conditions of life were satisfactory.

They lived mostly in cabins made of palms or in wooden
houses. Some of them had houses of stone, the blackened
walls of which are all that remain to show the country was
ever inhabited.

The first clause of Weyler’s order read as follows:

I OrpER aND CommanpD. First, all the inhabitants of the country or
outside of the line of fortifications of the towns shall, within the period of
eight days, concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops.
Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the
uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as such.

The other three sections forbade the transportation of pro-
visions from one town to another without permission of the
military authority, directed the owners of cattle to bring them
into the towns, prescribed that the eight days should be counted
from the publication of the proclamation in the head town of
the municipal district, and stated that if news were furnished
of the enemy which could be made use of, it would serve as a
“recommendation.”

Many, doubtless, did not learn of this order. Others
failed to grasp its terrible meaning. Its execution was left
largely to the guerrillas to drive in all that had not obeyed, and
I was informed that in many eases the torch was applied to
their homes with no notice, and the inmates fled with such
clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belong-
ings being appropriated by the guerrillas. When they 4
reached the towns they were allowed to build huts of palm —
33 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR

leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the trochas, and
left to live, if they could.

Their huts were about ten by fifteen feet in size, and for
want of space were usually crowded together very closely.
They had no floor but the ground, no furniture, and, after a
year’s wear, but little clothing except such stray substitutes as
they could extemporize; and with large families, or more than
one, in this little space, the commonest sanitary provisions were
impossible. Conditions were unmentionable in this respect.
Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water,
and foul food or none, what wonder that one-half had died and
that one-quarter of the living were so diseased that they could
not be saved? A form of dropsy was a common disorder re-
sulting from these conditions. Little children were still walk-
ing about with arms and chests terribly emaciated, eyes
swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size.
The physicians said these cases were hopeless.

Deaths in the streets were not uncommon. I was told by
one of our consuls that many had been found dead about the
markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping to
get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that
there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the
market surrounded by food. Before Weyler’s order these
people were independent and self-supporting. They were not
beggars even then. There were plenty of professional beg-
gars in every town among the regular residents, but these
country people, the reconcentrados, had not learned the art.
Rarely was a hand held out to you for alms when going among
their huts, but the sight of them made an appeal stronger than
‘words.

Of the hospitals I need not speak. Others have described
their condition far better than Ican. It is not within the nar-
row limits of my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba
with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn;
that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and
stimulated the press correspondents, and that they had given
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 39

tree play to a strong, natural, and highly cultivated imagina-
tion.

Before starting I received through the mail a leaflet, with
cuts of some of the sick and starving reconcentrados, and took
it with me, thinking these must be rare specimens, got up to
make the worst possible showing. I saw plenty as bad and
worse; many that should not be photographed and shown.

I could not believe that out of a population of 1,600,000,
200,000 had died within these Spanish forts, practically
prison walls, within a few months past, from actual starva-
tion and diseases caused by insufficient and improper food.
My inquiries were entirely outside of sensational sources.
They were made of medical officers, of our consuls, of
city alealdes (mayors), of relief committees, of leading mer-
chants and bankers, physicians, and lawyers. Several of
my informants were Spanish born, but every time the answer
was that the case had not been overstated. What I saw I can-
not tell so that others can see it. It had to be seen with one’s
own eyes to be realized.

The Los Pasos Hospital, in Havana, has been recently de-
scribed by one of my colleagues, Senator Gallinger, and I can-
not say that his picture was overdrawn, for even his fertile
pen could not do that. But he visited it after Dr. Lesser, one
of Miss Barton’s very able and efficient assistants, had reno-
vated it and put in cots. I saw it when 400 women and chil-

‘dren were lying on the floors in an indescribable state of
emaciation and disease, many with the scantiest covering of
rags — and such rags!— sick children, naked as they came
into the world; and the conditions in the other cities are even
worse.

Miss Barton needs no indorsement from me. I had known
and esteemed her for many years, but had not half appreciated
her capability and devotion to her work. I specially looked
into her business methods, fearing that there would be the
greatest danger of mistake, that there might be want of system
and waste and extravagance, but found she could teach me on
40 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR

these points. I visited the warehouse where the supplies were
received and distributed; saw the methods of checking; visited
the hospitals established or organized and supplied by her; saw
the food distribution in several cities and towns, and every-
thing seemed to me to be conducted in the best manner pos-
sible. The ample, fine warehouse in Havana, owned by a
Cuban firm, was given, with a gang of laborers, free of charge
to unload and reship supplies.

The Children’s Hospital, in Havana, a very large, fine
private residence, was hired at a cost of less than $100 per
month. It was under the admirable management of Mrs.
Dr. Lesser of New York, a German lady and trained nurse.
I saw the rapid improvement of the first children taken there.
All Miss Barton’s assistants seemed excellently fitted for their
duties. In short, I saw nothing to criticise, but everything
tocommend. The American people may be assured that their
bounty reached the sufferers with the least possible cost and
in the best manner in every respect. If our people could have
seen the small fraction of the need they would have poured
more “freely from their liberal stores” than ever before for
any cause.

General Blanco’s order of November 13th somewhat modi-
fied the Weyler order, but was of little or no practical benefit.
Its application was limited to farms“ properly defended,” and
the owners were obliged to build “centers of defense.” Its
execution was completely in the discretion of the local mili- .
tary authorities, and they knew the terrible military efficiency
of Weyler’s order in stripping the country of all possible shel-
ter, food, or source of information for an insurgent, and were
slow to surrender this advantage. In fact, though the order
was issued four months before, I saw no beneficent results from
it worth mentioning.

I wish I might speak of the country — of its surpassing
richness. I have never seen one to compare with it. On this
point I agree with Columbus, that this is the “ most rich and
beautiful that ever human eye beheld,” and believe every
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 41

one between his time and mine must be of the same opinion.
It is indeed a land—
‘Where every prospect pleases
And only man is vile.”

T had little time to study the race question, and have read
nothing on it, so can only give hasty impressions. It is said
that there were nearly 200,000 Spaniards in Cuba out of a
total population of 1,600,000. They lived principally in the
towns and cities. The small shopkeepers in the towns and
their clerks were mostly Spaniards. Much of the larger busi-
ness, too, and of the property in the cities, and in a less degree
in the country, was in their hands. They had an eve to thrift,
and as everything possible in the way of trade and legalized
monopolies, in which the country abounds, was given to them
by the government, many of them acquired property. I did
not learn that the Spanish residents of the island had con-
tributed largely in blood or treasure to suppress the insur-
rection.

There were, before the war, about 1,000,000 Cubans on
the island, 200,000 Spaniards (which means those born in
Spain), and less than half a million of negroes and mixed
bloods. The Cuban whites are of pure Spanish blood, and,
like the Spaniards, dark in complexion, but oftener light or
blonde,so far as I noticed. The percentage of colored to white
has been steadily diminishing for more than fifty years, and is
not now over twenty-five per cent. of the total. In fact, the
number of colored people has been actually diminishing for
nearly that time. The Cuban farmer and laborer is by nature
peaceable, kindly, gay, hospitable, light-hearted, and improvi-
dent.

There is a proverb among the Cubans that “ Spanish bulls
cannot be bred in Cuba ”’—that is, the Cubans, though they
are of Spanish blood, are less excitable and of a quieter tem-
perament. Many Cubans whom I met spoke in strong terms
against the bull fight; that it was a brutal institution, intro-
duced and mainly patronized by the Spaniards. One thing
42 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR

that was new to me was to learn the superiority of the well-to-
do Cuban over the Spaniard in the matter of education.
Among those in good circumstances there can be no doubt that
the Cuban is far superior in this respect. And the reason of
it is easy to see. They have been educated in England,
France, or this country, while the Spaniard has such education
as his own country furnishes.

The colored people seem to me by nature quite the equal
mentally and physically of the race in this country. Cer-
tainly physically they are by far the larger and stronger race
on the island. There is little or no race prejudice, and this
has doubtless been greatly to their advantage. Eighty-five
years ago there were one-half as many free negroes as slaves,
and this proportion slowly increased until emancipation.

It was said that there were about 60,000 Spanish soldiers in
Cuba fit for duty out of the more than 200,000 that had been
sent there. The rest had died, had been sent home sick, or were
in hospitals, and some had been killed, notwithstanding the
official reports. They were conscripts, many of them very
young, and generally small men. One hundred and thirty
pounds is a fair estimate of their average weight. They were
quiet and obedient, and, if well drilled and led, I believe would
have fought fairly well, but not at all equal to our men.
Much more would depend on the leadership than with us.
The officer must lead well and be one in whom they have con-
fidence, and this applies to both sides alike. As I saw no drills
or regular formation, I inquired about them of many persons,
and was informed that they had never seen a drill. I saw per-
haps 10,000 Spanish troops, but not a piece of artillery or a
tent. They lived in barracks in the towns, and were seldom
out for more than the day, returning to town at night.

They had little or no equipment for supply trains or for
a field campaign such as we have. Their cavalry horses were
scrubby little native ponies, weighing not over 800 pounds,
tough and hardy, but for the most part in wretched condition,
reminding one of the mount of Don Quixote. Some of the
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 43

officers, however, had good horses, mostly American, I think.
On both sides cavalry was considered the favorite and the dan-
gerous fighting arm. ‘The tactics of the Spanish, as described
to me by eyewitnesses and participants in some of their battles,
was for the infantry, when threatened by insurgent cavalry, to
form a hollow square and fire away ad libitum, and without
ceasing until time to march back to town.

It did not seem to have entered the minds of either side
that a good infantry force can take care of itself and repulse
anywhere an equal or greater number of cavalry, and there
were everywhere positions where cavalry would be at a disad-
vantage.

Having called on Governor and Captain-General Blanco
and received his courteous call in return, I could not with pro-
priety seek communication with insurgents. I had plenty of
offers of safe conduct to Gomez’s camp, and was told that if I
would write him, an answer would be returned safely within
ten days at most.

I saw several who had visited the insurgent camps, and
was sought out by an insurgent field officer, who gave me the
best information received as to the insurgent force. His state-
ments were moderate, and I was credibly informed that he
was entirely reliable. He claimed that the Cubans had about
30,000 men then in the field, some in every province, but
mostly in the two eastern provinces and eastern Santa Clara,
and this statement was corroborated from other good sources.
They have a force all the time in Havana province itself, or-
ganized in four small brigades and operating in small bands.
Ruiz was taken, tried, and shot within about a mile and a half
of the railroad and about fifteen miles out of Havana, on the
road to Matanzas, a road more traveled than any other, and
which I went over four times.

Arranguren was killed about three miles the other side of
the road and about the same distance, fifteen or twenty miles
from Havana. The Cubans were well armed, but very poorly
supplied with ammunition. They were not allowed to carry
44. INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR

many cartridges; sometimes not more than one or two. The
infantry, especially, were poorly clad. Two small squads of
prisoners which I saw, however, one of half a dozen in the
streets of Havana, and one of three on the cars, wore better
clothes than the average Spanish soldier.

Each of these prisoners, though surrounded by guards,
was bound by the arm and wrists by cords, and they were all
tied together by a cord running along the line, a specimen of
the amenities of their warfare. About one-third of the Cuban
army were colored, mostly in the infantry, as the cavalry fur-
nished their own horses.

Their field officer, an American from a Southern State,
spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of these colored sol-
diers; that they were as good fighters and had more endurance
than the whites; could keep up with the cavalry on a long
march and come in fresh at night.

The dividing lines between parties were the straightest and
clearest cut that have ever come to my knowledge. The
division in our war was by no means so clearly defined. It
was Cuban against Spaniard. It was practically the entire
Cuban population on one side and the Spanish army and Span-
ish citizens on the other.

Ido not count the autonomists in this division, as they were
so far too inconsiderable in numbers to be worth counting.
General Blanco filled the civil offices with men who had been
autonomists and were still classed as such. But the march of
events had satisfied most of them that the chance for autonomy
came too late. :

It fell as talk of compromise would have fallen the last
year or two of our war. If it succeeded it could only be by
armed force, by the triumph of the Spanish army; and the suc-
cess of Spanish arms would have been easier by Weyler’s policy
and method, for in that the Spanish army and people believe.

There is no doubt that General Blanco acted in entire good
faith; that he desired to give the Cubans a fair measure of
autonomy, as Campos did at the close of the Ten-Years War.
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 45

He had, of course, a few personal followers, but the army and
the Spanish citizens did not want genuine autonomy, for that
meant government by the Cuban people. And it was not
strange that the Cubans said it came too late.

I have never had any communication, direct or indirect,
with the Cuban Junta in this country or any of its members,
nor did I have with any of the juntas which exist in every city
and large town of Cuba. None of the calls I made were upon
parties of whose sympathies I had the least knowledge, except
that I knew some of them were classed as autonomists.

Most of my informants were business men, who had taken
no sides and rarely expressed themselves. I had no means of
guessing in advance what their answers would be, and was in
most cases greatly surprised at their frankness.

I inquired in regard to autonomy of men of wealth and
men as prominent in business as any in the cities of Havana,
Matanzas, and Sagua, bankers, merchants, lawyers, and
autonomist officials, some of them Spanish born but Cuban
bred, one prominent Englishman, several of them known as
autonomists, and several of them telling me they were still
believers in autonomy if practicable, but without exception
they replied that it was “ too late ” for that.

Some favored a United States protectorate, some annexa-
tion, some free Cuba; not one has been counted favoring the
insurrection at first. They were business men and wanted
peace, but said it was too late for peace under Spanish sov-
ereignty. They characterized Weyler’s order in far stronger
terms than I can. I could not but conclude that you did not
have to scratch an autonomist very deep to find a Cuban.

I have endeavored to state in not intemperate mood what
I saw and heard, and to make no argument thereon, but leave
everyone to draw his own conclusions. To me the strongest
appeal was not the barbarity practiced by Weyler nor the loss
of the Maine, terrible as were both of these incidents, but the
spectacle of a million and a half of people, the entire native
population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance
46 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR

from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had knowl-
edge.

T am not in favor of annexation; not because I would ap-
prehend any particular trouble from it, but because it is not
wise policy to take in any people of foreign tongue and train-
ing, and without any strong guiding American element. The
fear that if free the people of Cuba would be revolutionary is
not so well founded as has been supposed, and the conditions
for good self-government are far more favorable. The large
number of educated and patriotic men, the great sacrifices they
have endured, the peaceable temperament of the people,
whites and blacks, the wonderful prosperity that would surely
come with peace and good home rule, the large influx of
American and English immigration and money, would all be
strong factors for stable institutions.

(ia Sritar eee)

 
 

Hon. JOHN M. THURSTON

Senator from Nebraska

INTERVENTION IN CUBA

REASONS WHICH APPEALED TO THE HEARTS OF
AMERICAN PEOPLE

SHORT time ago, in company with several Senators
A and Representatives in Congress, I accepted an invita-
tion to make a trip to Cuba and personally investigate
and report upon the situation there. No conditions or restric-
tions were imposed upon us; we were left free to conduct the
investigation in our own way, make our own plans, pursue our
own methods, take our own time, and decide for ourselves
upon the best manner of laying the result of our labors before
the American people. J went to Cuba firmly believing that
the condition of affairs there had been greatly exaggerated by
the press, and my own efforts were directed in the first instance
to the attempted exposure of these supposed exaggerations.
There had, undoubtedly, been much sensationalism in the
journalism of the time, but as to the condition of affairs in
Cuba there had been no exaggeration, because exaggeration
was impossible.

¥ After three years of warfare and the use of 225,000
(47)
48 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON

Spanish troops, Spain had lost control of every foot of Cuba
not surrounded by an actual intrenchment and protected by
a fortified picket line.

She held possession, with her armies, of the fortified sea-
board towns, not because the insurgents could not capture
many of them, but because they were under the virtual protec-
tion of Spanish war ships, with which the revolutionists could
not ‘cope.

The revolutionists were in absolute and almost peaceful
possession of nearly one-half of the island, including the eastern
provinces of Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Principe. In those
provinces they had an established form of government, levied
and collected taxes, maintained armies, and generally levied a
tax or tribute upon the principal plantations in the other
provinces, and, as was commonly believed, upon the entire
railway system of the island.

In the four so-called Spanish provinces there was neither
cultivation nor railway operation, except under strong Spanish
military protection or by consent of the revolutionists in con-
sideration of tribute paid.

Under the inhuman policy of Weyler not less than
400,000 self-supporting, simple, peaceable, defenseless coun-
try people were driven from their homes in the agricul-
tural portions of the Spanish provinces to the cities and im-
prisoned upon the barren waste outside the residence portions
of these cities and within the lines of intrenchment established
a little way beyond. Their humble homes were burned, their
fields laid waste, their implements of husbandry destroyed,
their live stock and food supplies for the most part confiscated.
Most of these people were old men, women, and children.
They were thus placed in hopeless imprisonment, without
shelter or food. There was no work for them in the cities to
which they were driven. They were left there with nothing
to depend upon except the scanty charity of the inhabitants of
the cities and with slow starvation their inevitable fate.

Jt was conceded upon the best ascertainable authority, and
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON 49

those who have had access to the public records do not hesitate
to state, that upward of 210,000 of these people had already
perished, all from starvation or from diseases incident to
starvation.

The Government of Spain had never contributed one dol-
lar to house, shelter, feed, or provide medical attention for
these, its own citizens. Such a spectacle exceeded the scenes
of the Inferno as painted by Dante.

There had been no amelioration of the situation, except
through the charity of the people of the United States. There
had been no diminution in the death rate among these recon-
centrados except as the death supply was constantly dimin-
ished. There could be no relief and no hope except through
the continued charity of the American people until peace
should be fully restored in the island, and until a humane
government should return these people to their homes and
provide for them anew the means with which to begin again
the cultivation of the soil.

© Spain could not put an end to the existing condition. She
could not conquer the insurgents. She could not re-establish
her sovereignty over any considerable portion of the interior
of the island. The revolutionists, while able to maintain
themselves, could not drive the Spanish army from the fortified
seacoast towns.

The situation, then, was not war as we understand it, but a
chaos of devastation and depopulation of undefined duration,
whose end no man could see.

I will cite but a few facts that came under my personal
observation, all tending to fully substantiate the absolute truth
of the foregoing propositions. I could detail incidents by the
hour and by the day, but I have no desire to deal in horrors.
If I had my way, I would shield the American public even
from the photographic reproductions of the awful scenes that
I viewed in all their original ghastliness.

Spain had sent to Cuba more than 225,000 soldiers to

subdue the island, whose entire male population capable of
4
50 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON

bearing arms did not, at the beginning, exceed that number.
These soldiers were mostly boys, conscripts from the Spanish
hills. They were well armed, but otherwise seemed to be |
absolutely unprovided for. They had been without tents
and practically without any of the necessary supplies and
equipment for service in the field. They had been put in
barracks, in warehouses, and old buildings in the cities where
all sanitary surroundings had been of the worst possible char-
acter. They had seen but little discipline, and I could not
ascertain that such a thing as a drill had taken place in the
island.

There were less than 60,000 then available for duty. The
balance were dead or sick in hospitals, or had been sent back
to Spain as incapacitated for further service. It was currently
stated that there were then 37,000 sick in hospitals. I reached
the conclusion that the entire Spanish army in Cuba could not
stand an engagement in the open field against 20,000 well-
disciplined American soldiers.

As an instance of the discipline among them I cite the fact
that I bought the machete of a Spanish soldier on duty at the
wharf in Matanzas, on his offer, for three dollars in Spanish
silver. He also seemed desirous of selling me his only remain-
ing arm, a revolver.

The Spanish soldiers had not been paid for some months,
and, in my judgment, they, of all the people on the earth,
would most gladly welcome any result which would permit
them to return to their homes in Spain.

The pictures in the American newspapers of the starving
reconcentrados were true. ‘They could all be duplicated by
the thousands. I never saw, and please God may I never
again see, so deplorable a sight as the reconcentrados in the
suburbs of Matanzas. I can never forget to my dying day the
hopeless anguish in their despairing eyes. |Huddled about
their little bark huts, they raised no voice of appeal to us for
alms as we went among them.

There was almost no begging by the reconcentrados them-
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON 51

selves. The streets of the cities were full of beggars of all
ages and all conditions, but they were almost wholly of the
residents of the cities and largely of the professional-beggar
class. The reconcentrados — men, women, and children —
stood silent, famishing with hunger. Their only appeal came
from their sad eyes, through which one looked as through an
open window into their agonized souls.

The autonomist governor of Matanzas (who spoke excellent
English) had been inaugurated in November, 1897. His
records disclosed that at the city of Matanzas there were 1,200
deaths in November, 1,200 in December, 700 in January, and
500 in February — 3,600 in four months, and these four
months under the administration of a governor whom I believe
to be a truly humane man. He stated to me that on the day
of his inauguration, which, I think, was the 12th of November,
to his personal knowledge fifteen persons died in the public
square in front of the executive mansion. Think of it, oh, my
countrymen! Fifteen human beings dying from starvation
in the public square, in the shade of the palm trees, and amid
the beautiful flowers, in sight of the open windows of the
executive mansion!

The governor of Matanzas told us that for the most part the
people of the city of Matanzas had done all they could for the
reconcentrados; and, after studying the situation over, I be-
lieved his statement to be true. He said the condition of
affairs in the island had destroyed the trade, the commerce,
and the business of the city; that most of the people who had
the means assisted the reconcentrados with food just as long
as they could, but he said to us that there were thousands of
the people living in fine houses on marble floors who were in
deep need themselves, and who did not know from one day to
the other where their food supply was coming from.

The ability of the people of Matanzas to aid was practically
exhausted. The governor told us that he had expended all of
his salary and all that he could possibly afford of his private
means in relief work. He was willing that the reconcentrados
52 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON

shall repass the picket line and go back to seek work in the in-
terior of the island. He expressed his willingness to give them
passes for that purpose, but they were no longer physically
able to take advantage of that offer. They had no homes to
return to; their fields had grown up to weeds; they had no
oxen, no implements of husbandry with which to begin anew
the cultivation of the soil. Their only hope was to remain
where they were, to live as long as they could on an insufficient
charity, and then die. What was true at Matanzas was true
at all the other cities where these reconcentrados were gathered.

The Government of Spain had not appropriated and would
not appropriate one dollar to save these people. They were
being attended and nursed and administered to by the charity
of the United States. Think of the spectacle! We were
feeding these citizens of Spain; we were nursing their sick; we
were saving such as could be saved, and yet there were those
who still said it was right for us to send food, but we must
keep our hands off. I said that the time had come when
muskets ought to go with the food.

We asked the governor if he knew of any relief for these
people except through the charity of the United States. He
did not. We then asked him, “ Can you see any end to this
condition of affairs?” He could not. We asked him,
“When do you think the time will come that these people can
be placed in a position of self-support?’” He replied to us,
with deep feeling, “ Only the good God or the great Govern-
ment of the United States can answer that question.” I hoped
and believed that the good God by the great Government of
the United States would answer that question.

T shall refer to these horrible things no further. They
were there. God pity me; I have seen them; they will re-
main in my mind forever — and this is almost the twentieth
century. Christ died nineteen hundred years ago, and Spain
is a Christian nation. She has set up more crosses in more
lands, beneath more skies, and under them has butchered more
people than all the other nations of the earth combined.
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON 53

Europe may tolerate her existence as long as the people of
the Old World wish. “ God grant,” said I, “that before an-
other Christmas morning the last vestige of Spanish tyranny
and oppression will have vanished from the Western Hemis-
phere.”

I counseled silence and moderation in the Senate when the
passion of the nation seemed at white heat over the destruction
of the Maine, but it seemed to me the time for action had
finally come. No action in the Maine case! I hoped and
trusted that this Government would take action on the Cuban
situation entirely outside the Mazne case.

What should the United States do?

I believed that recognition of belligerency on our part
would have enabled the Cuban patriots to have achieved in-
dependence for themselves; that it would have given them
such a standing in the money markets of the world, such rights
on the sea, such flag on the land, that the independence of Cuba
would have been speedily secured, and that without cost or loss
of blood or treasure to the people of the United States. But
that time had passed; it was too late to talk about resolutions
according belligerent rights; and mere resolutions recognizing
the independence of the Cuban republic would have availed
but little. The platform of my party demanded that the
United States should actively use its influence for the inde-
pendence of the island. 2

x I yield to no man living in my respect, my admiration
for, and my confidence in the judgment, the wisdom, the
patriotism, the Americanism of William McKinley. When
he entered upon his administration he faced a difficult situa-
tion. It was his duty to proceed with care and caution. At
the first available opportunity he addressed a note to Spain,
in which he gave that Government notice, as set forth in his
message to the Congress of the United States, that the United
States “could be required to wait only a reasonable time for
the mother country to establish its authority and restore peace
and order within the borders of the island; that we could not
54 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON

contemplate an indefinite period for the accomplishment of this
result.”

The President further advised us: “ This government has
never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserv-
ing to itself the determination of its policy and course accord-
ing to its own high sense of right and in consonance with the
dearest interests and convictions of our own people should the
prolongation of the strife demand.”

,\/ This was the proper, the statesmanlike beginning of the

performance of the promise of the Republican platform. It
was in accordance with the diplomatic usages and customs of
civilized nations. In the meantime the whole situation ap-
parently changed. In Spain the liberal ministry of Sagasta
succeeded that of Canovas; the cruel and inhuman Weyler
was recalled, and succeeded by the humane Blanco, who, under
the Sagasta ministry, had unquestionably made every effort
to bring about peace in the island of Cuba under the promise
of autonomy — a decided advance beyond any proposition ever
before made for the participation of the Cukans in their own
domestic affairs.

It was the plain duty of the President of the United States
to give to the liberal ministry of Spain a reasonable time in
which to test its proposed autonomy. That time was given.
Autonomy was conceded the wide world over to be a con-
spicuous failure. ‘The situation in Cuba had only changed
for the worse. Sagasta was powerless; Blanco was powerless
to put an end to the conflict, to rehabilitate the island, or to
relieve the suffering, starvation, and distress.

The time for action had come. Every hour’s delay only
added another chapter to the awful story of misery and death.
Only one power could intervene — The United States of
America. Qurs was the one great nation of the New World,
the mother of American republics. She holds a position of
trust and responsibility toward the peoples and the affairs of
the whole Western Hemisphere.

It was her glorious example which inspired the patriots of
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON 55

Cuba to raise the flag of liberty on her eternal hills. We could
not refuse to accept this responsibility which the God of the
universe has placed upon us as the one great power in the New
World. We must act! What should our action be? Some
said the acknowledgment of the belligerency of the revolu-
tionists. As I have already shown, the hour and the oppor-
tunity for that had passed away.

Others said, “ Let us by resolution or official proclamation
recognize the independence of the Cubans.” It was too late
even for such recognition to be of great avail. Others said,
“ Annexation to the United States.” God forbid! I would
oppose annexation with my latest breath. The people of Cuba
are not our people; they cannot assimilate with us; and beyond
all that I am utterly and unalterably opposed to any depart-
ure from the declared policy of the fathers which would start
this republic for the first time upon a career of conquest and
dominion utterly at variance with the avowed purposes and
the manifest destiny of popular government.

Let the world understand that the United States did not
propose to annex Cuba, that it was not seeking a foot of Cuban
soil or a dollar of Spanish treasure. Others said, “ Let us in-
tervene for the pacification of the island, giving to its people
the greatest measure of autonomy consistent with the con-
tinued sovereignty of Spain.” Such a result was no longer
possible. It is enough to say that it would have been resisted
by all classes of the Cuban population, and its attempt would
simply have transferred the putting down of the revolution
and the subjugation of the Cuban patriots to the armies of the
United States. “

There was also said to be a syndicate organization in this
country, representing the holders of Spanish bonds, who were
urging that the intervention of the United States should be
for the purchase of the island or for the guaranteeing of the
Spanish debt incurred in the attempted subjugation of the
Cuban revolutionists. It was idle to think for a single mo-
ment of sucha plan. The American people would never con-
56 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON

sent to the payment of one dollar, to the guaranteeing of one
bond, as the price paid to Spain for her relinquishment of the
island she had so wantonly outraged and devastated.

There was only one action possible: that is, intervention
for the independence of the island; intervention that would
mean the landing of an American army on Cuban soil, the de-
ploying of an American fleet off Havana; intervention which
would say to Spain, “ Leave the island, withdraw your soldiers,
leave the Cubans, these brothers of ours in the new world, to
form and carry on government for themselves.” Such in-
tervention on our part would not of itself be war. It would
undoubtedly lead to war. But if war came it would come by
act of Spain in resistance of the liberty and the independence
of the Cuban people.

There had been a time when
the land; when sensationalism prevailed, and when there was
a distinct effort to inflame the passions and prejudices of the
American people and precipitate a war with Spain. That
time had passed away. “Jingoism” was long since dead.
The American people had waited and waited and waited in
patience; yea, in patience and confidence — confidence in the
belief that decisive action would be taken in due season and in
a proper way. All over this land the appeal came up to us; it
reached us from every section and from every class. That
appeal was for action.

The administration had been doing its whole duty. With
rare foresight and statesmanship it had hastened to make every
possible preparation for any emergency. If it were true that
the report in the Maine case was delayed, it had been delayed
in order that we might be prepared at all points for defensive
and offensive action. There were some who said, but they
are mostly those who had procrastinated from the beginning,
“ Let Congress hold its peace, adjourn, go home, and leave the
President to act.”

I for one believe that the Congress of the United States
is an equal and co-ordinate branch of the Federal govern-

“jingoism ” was abroad in
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON 57

ment, representing the combined judgment and wisdom of the
many. It could more safely be depended on than the in-
dividual judgment and wisdom of any one man. [, a sena-
tor of the United States, would not consent to abdicate my
right to participate in the determination as to what is the
solemn duty of this great Republic in such a momentous and
fateful hour. We were not in session to hamper or cripple
the President; we were there to advise and assist him. Con-
gress alone could declare war; Congress alone could levy
taxes; and to this Congress the united people of this broad
land, from sea to sea, from lake to gulf, looked to voice their
wishes and execute their will.

Against the intervention of the United States in this holy
cause there was but one voice of dissent; that voice was the
voice of the money-changers. They feared war! Not be-
cause of any Christian or ennobling sentiment against war and
in favor of peace, but because they feared that a declaration of
war, or the intervention which might result in war, would
have a depressing effect upon the stock market.

T did not read my duty from the ticker; I did not accept
my lessons in patriotism from Wall street. I deprecated war.
I hoped and prayed for the speedy coming of the time when
the sword of the soldier would no longer leap from its scab-
bard to settle disputes between civilized nations. But it was
evident, looking at the cold facts, that a war with Spain would
not permanently depreciate the value of a single American
stock or bond.

“ War with Spain would increase the business and the earn-
ings of every American railroad, it would increase the output
of every American factory, it would stimulate every branch
of industry and domestic commerce, it would greatly increase
the demand for American labor, and in the end every cer-
tificate that represented a share in an American business en-
terprise would be worth more money. But in the mean-
time the specter of war would stride through the stock
exchanges, and many of the gamblers around the board would
58 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON

find their ill-gotten gains passing to the other side of the
table.

I said, “ Let them go; what one man loses at the gambling
table his fellow-gambler wins.” It was no concern of yours, it
was no concern of mine whether the “ bulls” or the “ bears ”
had the best of these stock deals. They did not represent
American sentiment; they did not represent American
patriotism. Let them take their chances as they could.
Their weal or woe was of but little importance to the liberty-
loving people of the United States. They would not do
the fighting; their blood would not flow; they would keep on
dealing in options on human life. The time had come when
the men whose loyalty was to the dollar should stand aside
while those whose loyalty was to the flag went to the front.

There were some who lifted their voices in the land and in
the open- light of day insisted that the republican party
would not act, for they said it had sold out to the capitalists
and the money-changers at the last national election. It
was not so. God forbid! The 7,000,000 freemen who voted
for the republican party and for William McKinley did not
mortgage the honor of this nation for a campaign fund, and if
the time ever comes when the republican party hesitates in its
course of duty because of any undue anxiety for the welfare
of the accumulated wealth of the nation, then let the republi-
can party be swept from the face of the earth and be suc-
ceeded by some other party, by whatever name it may be
called, which will represent the patriotism, the honesty, the
loyalty, and the devotion that the republican party exhibited
under Abraham Lincoln in 1861.

There were those who said that the affairs of Cuba were not
the affairs of the United States, who insisted that we could
stand idly by and see that island devastated and depopulated,
its business interests destroyed, its commercial intercourse with
us cut off, its people starved, degraded, and enslaved. It
might be the naked legal right of the United States to stand
thus idly by.
INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON 59

I have the legal right to pass along the street and see a
helpless dog stamped into the earth under the heels of a ruffian.
Tcan pass by and say thatis not my dog. I can sit in my com-
fortable parlor with my loved ones gathered about me, and
through my plate-glass window see a fiend outraging a help-
less woman near by, and I can legally say this is no affair of
mine — it is not happening on my premises; and I can turn
away and take my little ones in my arms, and, with the
memory of their sainted mother in my heart,* look up to the
motto on the wall and read, “ God bless our home.”

But if I do I am a coward and a cur unfit to live, and, God
knows, unfit to die. And yet I cannot protect the dog nor
save the woman without the exercise of force.

We could not intervene and save Cuba without the exer-
cise of force, and force meant war; war meant blood. The
lowly Nazarene on the shores of Galilee preached the divine
doctrine of love, “Peace on earth, good will toward men.”
Not peace on earth at the expense of liberty and humanity.
Not good will toward men who despoil, enslave, degrade, and
starve to death their fellow men. I believe in the doctrine
of Christ. I believe in the doctrine of peace; but men must
have liberty before there can come abiding peace.

Intervention meant force. Force meant war. War
meant blood. But it would be God’s force. When has a

_battle for humanity and liberty ever been won except by force?
What barricade of wrong, injustice, and oppression has ever
been carried except by force?

Force compelled the signature of unwilling royalty to the
great Magna Charta; force put life into the Declaration of In-
dependence, and made effective the Emancipation Proclama-
tion; force beat with naked hands upon the iron gateway of
the Bastile and made reprisal in one awful hour for centuries
of kingly crime; force waved the flag of revolution over
Bunker Hill, and marked the snows of Valley Forge with

* AuTHOR’s Note.—Mrs. Thurston, who accompanied her husband on his journey, was
taken ill and died in Cuba,
60 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR JOHN M. THURSTON

blood-stained feet; force held the broken line at Shiloh,
climbed the flame-swept hill at Chattanooga, and stormed the
clouds on Lookout heights; force marched with Sherman to
the sea, rode with Sheridan in the valley of the Shenandoah,
and gave Grant victory at Appomattox; force saved the Union,
kept the stars in the flag, made “niggers” men. The time
for God’s force had come again. The impassioned lips of
American patriots once more took up the song:

‘*In the beauty of the lilies Christ was born across the sea,
With a glory in His bosom that transfigures you and me;
As He died to make men holy, let us die to make men free,

For God is marching on.”

Others might hesitate, others might procrastinate, others
might plead for further diplomatic negotiation, which meant
delay, but for me, I was ready to act then, and for my action
I was ready to answer to my conscience, my country, and my
God.

In the cable that moored me to life and hope the strongest
strands were broken. I had bunt little left to offer at the
altar of Freedom’s sacrifice, but all I had I was glad to give.
Iwas ready to serve my country as best I could in the Senate
or in the field. My dearest wish, my most earnest prayer to
God was, that when death came to end all I might meet it
calmly and fearlessly as did my beloved, in the cause of
humanity, under the American flag.

i
 

SPANISH CHARACTER AND HISTORY—DISCOVERY OF CUBA
—ATTEMPTS AT COLONIZATION — EXTERMINATION OF
THE NATIVES— COMING OF THE BLACK MAN.

Spain’s Domain in the Eighteenth Century — The Decadence of a Hundred
Years — Spanish Character — Heroism and Fanaticism —The Hand of
the Inquisitor — The Jews and the Moors— Warriors Unfit for War,
and Colonists Unfit to Colonize — Columbus Hears of Cuba — Taking
Possession for Spain — Characteristics of the Natives — Ideal Condi-
tions of Living — Extirpating the Natives —‘‘ A Ton of Gold ”— Span-
ish Outrages and a Ruined Colony—Indians Bound in Slavery —
Killed out of Pure Wantonness— Native Suicides — A Long Story of
Rapine, Brutality, Waste, and Insult— A Bishop’s Testimony — Be-
ginning of African Slave Trade— Coming of the Black Man.

 

HE latter part of the eighteenth
century beheld Spain the proud
mistress of a domain upon which
she could boast that the sun never
set. At the close of the nine
teenth hardly a vestige of that
great empire remains. She found
a new world and, little by little,
in a hundred years has lost it all.
Into the Europe of the sixteenth
century she poured such a stream
of-golden treasure as had never
before been seen, the rich stores
of the Incas and the Monte-

zumas, but it all slipped from her hands, and she is now practi-
cally bankrupt, loaded with a debt she can never pay.
Through her was possible the renaissance of the sixteenth

(61)
62 SPAIN’S VANISHED GREATNESS

century, the great reawakening of medizval Europe; but
Spain remained medieval. Those very human forces which
she set in action by the great discoveries of her intrepid mar-
iners and by the distribution of her newly-found treasures,—
forces which gave birth to modern history, she strenuously re-
sisted. Upon that expansion of thought and action, follow-
ing naturally the accomplishments of her daring explorers,
she set her iron heel. Upon the unfolding possibilities laid at
her feet by Columbus, Cortez, Pizarro, Ponce de Leon, Bal-
boa, and others on the sea, she placed the blight of her Tor-
quemadas and a line of bigoted rulers at home. She strangled
her own magnificent creations, and set about destroying her
own colonies by as heedless and as cruel a policy as was ever
conceived by barbarian of old.

They who discovered the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi,
the Amazon, and the Pacific — those who first went around
the world, were Spaniards. Three-fourths of North and South
America were Spanish before England had acquired a little
spot of land on the nearest shores of America, and to-day Spain
withdraws from the last foot of land which once constituted
her gigantic Western domain.

It would be absurd to say that this has been brought about
without a reason. Sufficient reason exists, and it must to a
great extent be found in the character of the nation. The
foundation for the Spanish character, as in the case of other
peoples, must be largely found in the history of the nation,
which forms no part of the purpose of this book. For a full
understanding, however, of Spain’s relation to Cuba and to
the United States, a brief glance at the general features of
Spanish history up to the nineteenth century will be useful.

Under Roman sway Spain became, more than any part
of the empire of the Caesars, a Roman province, and its traces
remain to this day in language, laws, and customs. The
Italian language preserves less of the qualities of the old Latin
than the Spanish, and certainly no more striking trace of
lingering Roman habit need be sought than in the Spanish
THE KEY TO SPANISH CHARACTER 63

bull-fight. In the great amphitheaters erected by the masters
of the Roman world, money was lavished and victims were
slain to gratify the appetite of the masses. The proud Roman
maids and matrons watched with delight the fierce gladiators
hewing each other to pieces, and in later and more degenerate
days looked on with equal interest while helpless Christians
were torn by savage beasts. But cruelty had still the glamor
of heroism.

In Spain the gladiator has become the picador and the
matador. In place of the Roman maids and matrons are found
the Spanish sefioras and sefioritas of Madrid, Seville, and
Ifavana, watching with keen delight the slow irritation and
laceration of the bulls, and the disemboweling of gallant horses
by the enraged beasts. But in this Roman inheritance a modi-
fication has taken place too indicative of Spanish character
to pass unmentioned. There is the same passion of cruelty
in the bull-ring as in the old amphitheater, but the real heroism
has gone. From the moment the bull steps into the ring he
is doomed; it is no longer a contest of strength, but of persecu-
tion. The banderilleros are supplied with weapons to tease
the animal and means to escape his onslaughts. Whichever
way the tortured animal turns he is met by a fresh enemy,
and he rushes at him only to see him spring aside. The pur-
pose is not to give the animal a fatal wound, but a hundred
bleeding, torturing ones. It is cruelty from which all heroism
is stripped; cruelty only for the love of cruelty — the key to
a great deal in the Spanish character.

But there are other traces than thé Roman in this Spanish
character. Asa part of the political débris resulting from the
fall of the Roman empire, Spain fell to the Visigoths, whose
history there embraces three centuries of debauchery, intrigue,
and murder, tainting the blood of the people. In time, guided
by the spirit of the age, Spain became a hierarchy, in which the
influence of the church became all-powerful, the best of the
Gothic kings, Wambha, who resisted this tendency, falling a
prey to ecclesiastical treachery. The absorption of the state
64 A NATION OF FANATICS

by the church became more and more complete under the
centuries of Moorish warfare, and left its indelible stamp upon
the nation. Jor, in fighting for his faith, the Spaniard, un-
like the Crusader, was fighting for his home. He became a
fierce fanatic, naturally-enough, no doubt, and, when Grenada
fell, Spain at last became a nation, but a nation of fanatics.
It was an age of Spanish heroism, but a heroism which went
hand in hand with extravagant religious zeal. In the latter ~
were the seeds of the ruin of the greatness of her heroism, and
as soon as the vast Spanish empire was created it began to dis-
integrate. If it was Ferdinand and Isabella who sent Colum-
bus forth, it was they also who expelled the Jews, and sent two
hundred thousand Spaniards to death in exile. So blind was
Spanish fanaticism that it was not enough to light the fires
under the Jews; heresy must be stamped out. The Spaniard
who thought and was so brave as to tell what he thought be-
came a victim. The hand of the Inquisitor fell upon the
philosopher and inventor who came forth with the reawaken-
ing of the renaissance, and while other nations advanced slowly
towards modern ideas, Spain proudly clung to medizevalism.

The economic effects of this bigotry were unmistakable.
The persecuted Jews were the financiers, and, because of the
improvidence of rulers and the simplicity of the people in
financial matters, they possessed all the ready money. The
hated Moors were traders who brought rich merchandise from
the east. In her religious zeal, therefore, Spain exterminated
her mercantile classes and left none but warriors, priests, and
peasants. The main wheel was taken out of her economic
structure. The new wealth from America slipped into the
hands of those she persecuted, and thus her wars of persecution
impoverished her at the very time when she might have be-
come the richest nation in Europe, while her further oppres-
sion of her thinkers increased her bigotry and sapped her enter-
prise. When there was no war on hand for the warriors, and
no more hereties for the priests to burn, there was nothing left
for this class but intrigue. Under the various rulers of the
DISCOVERY OF THE BEAUTIFUL ISLAND 65

houses of Hapsburg and Bourbon, this policy continued, until,
after nearly two centuries, Spain was wellnigh exhausted.
She had planted her colonies all over the new world, but had
neither the ability nor the resources to develop them. The
rest of Europe had finally begun to profit from the reawaken-
ing, and the downfall of Spain in America at once began, in
the closing years of the eighteenth century. The peculiar exi-
gencies of their history had made the Spanish people warriors
unfitted for war, and colonists unfitted to govern colonies.

With this brief generalization of Spanish history and
character, we may enter understandingly upon the story of
Spain in America, and particularly in the Antilles. In his
conversations with the friendly natives whom Columbus found
on the island of San Salvador, where he first set foot in the
new world, he sought with eagerness to learn whence came the
gold ornaments they wore. They pointed to the south, and
he made out that in that direction lay a land of great extent
called Cuba, and, self-deceived as he constantly was by his
maps and previously-formed ideas, he immediately concluded
that. this Cuba must be the country of the Grand Khan of Asia.
Accordingly, he set sail, and in three days, or on October 28,
1492, he touched the Cuban shore not far from the present site
of Nuevitas. He was dazzled by the beauty of the landscape
before him and declared it to be “ the goodliest land he ever
saw.” “As he approached this noble island,” wrote Irving,
“he was struck with its magnitude and the grandeur of its
features; its high and airy mountains, which reminded him of
those in Sicily; its fertile valleys, and long, sweeping plains
watered by noble rivers; its stately forests; its bold promon-
tories and stretching headlands which melted away into the
remotest distance. He anchored in a beautiful river of trans-
parent clearness, free from rocks and shoals, its banks over-
hung with trees.” Here landing and taking possession of the
island, he gave it the name of Juana, in honor of Prince Juan,
the son of his sovereigns.

At the time of their discovery the islands of the Caribbean
5
66 A LOVING AND TRACTABLE PEOPLE

Sea were inhabited by two distinct Indian peoples, the
Arawaks and the Caribs. The greater Antilles, Cuba, Haiti,
Jamaica, and Puerto Rico, were inhabited almost exclusively
by the former, and the lesser islands by the latter, who were,
however, the more warlike and venturesome. The Arawaks,
by all accounts, were a simple, kindly people, given to useful
employments and leading a happy life. ‘‘ So loving, so tract-
able, so peaceable are these people,” wrote Columbus to his
sovereigns, “that I swear to your majesties there is not in the
world a better nation nor a better land. They love their
neighbors as themselves; and their discourse is ever sweet and
gentle and accompanied with a smile; and though it is true
they are naked, yet their manners are decorous and praise-
worthy.” Peter Martyr also wrote of them, “It is certain
that the land among these people is as common as the sun and
water; and that ‘mine and thine,’ the seeds of all mischief,
have no place with them. They are content with so little that
in so large a country they have rather superfluity than scarce-
ness; so that they seem to live in the golden world, without
toil, living in open gardens, not intrenched with dykes, divided
with hedges, or defended with walls. They deal truly one
with another, without laws, without books, and without judges.
They take him for an evil and mischievous man who taketh
pleasure in doing hurt to another; and albeit they delight not in
superfluities, yet they make provision for the increase of such
roots whereof they make their bread, contented with such
simple diet, whereby health is preserved and disease avoided.”
To these artless people, living a life so plainly consistent with
the Christian gospel in many essential respects, the Spaniards
resolved, in all sincerity and with the most labored devotion,
to carry the true faith. The natives naturally looked upon
Columbus and his followers as superior beings, and, when their
timidity had been removed, they rendered their visitors every
service in their power and placed before them the best they
had; the cotton which they had learned to rudely spin, their
fruits, and everything they considered of value. Columbus
A GENTLE WARNING 67

carried his faith conspicuously before him, planting the cross
wherever he landed, and, of course, he regarded the natives,
kindly as they were, as heathen. Once after he had set up a
cross and celebrated mass, a ceremony watched by the natives
with the closest attention, one of the group, an old man, came
forward and made a speech in the Indian tongue, which was
then translated to Columbus by an interpreter. The Arawak
said that the ceremony he had witnessed seemed to be a method
of giving thanks to the Great Spirit, and, after stating that he
had heard how the white people had come in large numbers
and conquered many islands, he warned him in the following
words: “If, then, thou art mortal and dost expect to die,
and dost believe that each man shall be rewarded according
to his deeds, beware that thou wrongfully hurt no man nor do
harm to those who have done no harm to thee.” Colunibus
replied that they night have confidence in the white men who
had come to teach them the true faith.

Yet, in a few years, the Spaniards, with bloody hands, had
swept these simple, kindly people from the face of the An-
tilles! Columbus himself did not hesitate to slaughter Caribs
or to send them to Spain to be sold into slavery, when he found
that they had no gold; for he must do something to replenish
the empty treasure chests of his sovereigns. If these daring
Spaniards carried the cross ever in front of them, what they
most sought was treasure. It should be said for Ferdinand
and Isabella, however, that they deprecated these acts and
actually prohibited the deportation of the Caribs for servi-
tude. They desired gold. Columbus urged, in justification
of Carib slavery, that they were enemies of the Spaniards and
also of the gentle Arawaks, and the deportation continued.

It was not Cuba, but Haiti, which was chosen for the first
Spanish settlements in the Antilles. There Columbus left
a small colony under Diego de Arana, and under the protec-
tion of a friendly cacique, or native chief. He prayed that on
his return he should find a ton of gold and spices, with the pro-
ceeds of which his sovereigns might drive the infidels out of
68 INHUMAN TREATMENT OF THE NATIVES

Jerusalem. But the colonists quarreled among themselves
and with the natives. While they hunted the country for
gold, they expected that the Indians would supply them with
provisions. This the natives did freely at first, but the
Spaniards demanded more and more, and when supplies were
not forthcoming, they deliberately seized them. The Indians
saw their fields wasted by those whom they had befriended,
and, observing that it did no good to cultivate them when the
product was all taken from their hands, they fled to the in-
terior and left the settlers face to face with the necessity of
starving or cultivating the fields themselves, work which they
scorned. This led them to wreak new outrages upon the
Indians, who combined to resist them, and, when Columbus
returned he found, not a ton of gold, but a ruined colony.
Then the home government adopted the policy of giving indi-
vidual grants of Jand and allotting a certain number of Indians
as slaves, and so arose the system which ultimately depopulated
the islands. The natives, accustomed for generations to a
measure of independence and freedom which is seldom en-
joyed except by peaceable savages, could not endure the harsh
slavery to which they were subjected. Hundreds committed
suicide rather than work under the lash, and finally the settlers
began to kill them out of pure wantonness. But slaves being
more and more in demand as the native population decreased,
the practice of kidnapping them from the smaller islands came
into use.

We need not dwell upon the story of the cruelty of the
early Spanish settlers, or tell of the thousands of defenceless
people murdered and thousands carried away as slaves, of the
stealing of gold ornaments, and the sacking of provisions. It
is a long story of rapine, brutality, waste, and insult. The
natives were exterminated. We may judge from the words
of a prelate of those days, Bishop of Chiapas, who was brave
enough to protest against the abuses practiced by the Spanish
colonizers. It throws light upon the real Spanish character.
“To these quiet lambs,” he wrote, “ endued with such blessed
BEGINNING OF THE SLAVE TRADE 69

qualities, came the Spaniards like most cruel tygres, wolves,
and lions, enraged with a sharp and tedious hunger; for these
forty years past, minding nothing else but the slaughter of
these unfortunate wretches, whom with divers kinds of tor-
ments, neither seen nor heard of before, they have so cruelly
and inhumanely butchered, that of three million people which
Hispaniola [Haiti] itself did contain, there are left remaining
alive scarce three hundred persons. And for the island of
Cuba, which contains as much ground in length as from Valla-
dolid to Rome, it lies wholly desert, untill’d and ruin’d.”

Such, then, was the condition of Cuba fifty years after that
bright day when it burst upon the vision of Columbus, “ the
goodliest land” he ever saw.

In this situation the idea of importing slaves from Africa
was naturally suggested. It had been noticed that the Afri-
eans who had been brought to the new colonies continued ro-
bust under the blazing sun and in the hard labor of the mines,
and thus, from a small beginning, an extensive slave trade
grew up, much more lucrative than the working of the mines.
But it was not the Spaniard who prospered most in this enter-
prise, for soon after the discovery of America the danger that
the Spanish discoveries might conflict with those of that other
Catholic people, the Portuguese, Pope Alexander VI., while
confirming the right of the Spanish crown to all the lands dis-
covered, designated a line to be drawn due north and south a
hundred leagues west of the Azores from one pole to the other.
All pagan lands to the east of the line were confirmed to Por-
tugal and all to the west of the line was to be the exclusive
property of Spain. Ferdinand and Isabella were commanded:
to appoint upright, God-fearing, skillful, and learned men to
instruct the inhabitants in the Catholic faith, and all unau-
thorized persons were forbidden to traffic on or even approach
the territories, under penalty of incurring “the indignation of
Almighty God and of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul.”
According to this offhand arrangement no other power could
have anything. This simple division of the world, therefore,
70 A NEST OF ADVENTURERS

gave Africa to the Portuguese, and, so far as a Papal bull could,
carried with it the slave trade. But in view of its lucrative
character, it soon attracted adventurous spirits of other nations,

. who, increasing in number and boldness, found after a few
years a vast field of enterprise in all sorts of piratical under-
takings. In time the Spanish islands and Main became a
swarming nest of adventurers of several nations, and as the
native Indians disappeared from the Antilles, the black man
took his place, a fact which accounts for the character of the

_ population of the islands, and the black republics of Haiti and
San Domingo.
CHAPTER II

SETTLEMENTS OF CUBA—DAYS OF THE ENGLISH AND
FRENCH CORSAIRS— RISE OF THE ROVING BUCCANEERS
— STIRRING ADVENTURES AND ROMANTIC INCIDENTS.

Diego Velasquez Establishes the First Cuban Settlement — The Resistance
of Chief Hatuey — Efforts to Christianize Him before Burning Him
at the Stake —The Spirit of the Indians Broken — Cuba Begins to
Flourish — Maritime Adventurers — A Remarkable Fight at Santiago
between French Corsairs and Spanish Crew — Three Days of Hand-to-
Hand Combat — Fortifying Havana — Destroyed by the French and
Plundered by Pirates — Building of Morro Castle and the Bateria de
la Punta— Orders to Gibbet and Behead all Protestants — Spain Beset
by Enemies on the Sea — The Rise of the Buccaneers — Futile Efforts
to Exterminate the Freebooters — Romantic Incidents — How Olonois
Captured a Spanish Fleet — Beheading His Intended Executioners —
Flinging Spanish Crews into the Sea — Havana Taken by the English —
Brighter Times for Cuba.

hausted before the settlement of Cuba was attempted,

and it was because of the unsatisfactory condition of
the former island that Don Diego Columbus, son of the great
discoverer, determined, in 1511, to secure a footing in the
“Pearl of the Antilles.” He chose for the enterprise Diego
Velasquez, one of his father’s companions, who with about
three hundred men landed near the eastern end of the island
and founded Baracoa. The harmless Indians offered little re-
sistance, though one chief, named Hatuey, who had been in
Haiti and knew something of the Spanish practices there, at-
tempted some opposition. He was quickly captured and his
followers were dispersed. As a high chief among his people
he deserved to be treated as an honorable captive, but his death
may be cited as the first instance of Spanish methods upon the
island. As the story goes, when Hatuey was tied to the stake

and the fagots were piled around him, a Franciscan friar stood
(71)

T°: native population of Haiti had become nearly ex-
’

92 VELASQUEZ’S SETTLEMENTS IN CUBA

by and besought him to abjure the heathen gods of his ances-
tors and accept the true faith so that, as the flames consumed
his body, his soul might be wafted to that heaven of rest and
happiness prepared for the faithful. He saw that his accept-
ance of the new faith would not save him from the flames, and
so he asked if there were any Spaniards in that place of eternal
bliss. Of course the friar promptly answered in the affirma-
tive.

“T will not go,” he said, “to a place where I may meet
one of that accursed race.”

Parties from the new colony pushed out and explored the
island thoroughly, and in 1514 the towns of Santiago and
Trinidad on the south coast were formed, largely for the pur-
pose of facilitating communication with the Spanish on the
island of Jamaica. The next year another settlement was
made at the spot now known as Batabano, and it was named,
after the great discoverer, San Christobal de la Habana. Four
years later the settlers removed both the town and its name
to a more attractive place just across the island on the north
shore, and here, in time, grew up the present capital. Within
ten years also Velasquez had founded the towns of Bayamo,
Puerto Principe, and St. Spiritus.

But the Spaniards had profited little, if any, by the experi-
ences following the cruel policy of extermination on adjacent
islands. Diego Velasquez, who was the first governor, ap-
pears to have endeavored to administer affairs with intelli-
gence, and he was certainly energetic, but his treatment of the
aborigines was cruel and short-sighted in the extreme. Al-
though the Indians were mild and inoffensive, the story of the
Haitian settlement was repeated. The native population
dwindled away under the slavery by which they were sub-
jugated; the abuses to which the women were subjected by the
lascivious Spaniards broke the spirit of a people who seemed
to have a marked development of domestic honor. In a short
time only a few remnants of the more barbarous mountain
tribes remained. The soil of the isle was further enriched by
INDUSTRIES OF THE ISLAND 73

the blood of a million aborigines who, up to the coming of the
Spaniards, had livec lives of peace and contentment, prac-
ticing the golden rule more consistently than those who so
faithfully set up the cross in these virgin regions.

It is true that the Anglo-Saxon can say very little when it
comes to the point of discussing mercy to the natives of Amer-
ica, for the spirit of the age was intolerant and relentless. The
fanaticism of men was so intense that it made them ruthless,
particularly when woven into the texture of the character of
the Spaniards, who certainly surpassed all others in cruelty,
though in the milder climates of the-tropics they had a timid
and yielding race to deal with.

Notwithstanding this, Cuba flourished. The soil was rich
and yielded plentifully. The energy of the early governors
rendered the mines profitable, instituted agricultural pursuits,
and created a large trade with the neighboring islands and the
home ports. The island was, moreover, used as a sort of depot
by the Spanish in their operation against the mainlands.
Here it was that Cortez embarked for the conquest of Mexico,
where “ the star of the Aztec dynasty set in blood.”

But the waters of the West Indies soon became the ren-
dezvous of all the maritime adventurers of that ruffianly age.
The other nations had never accepted the Pope’s straight-cut
division of the world whereby Spain was generously given the
whole Western Hemisphere, and England openly disputed it.
Little was done by the governments themselves, however, so
long as they were at peace with Spain, but the continued stories
of treasure shipped from the new lands stirred up a host of in-
dividual corsairs who cared nothing for papal boundaries nor
for the rights of discovery.

In 1516 the capital of Cuba had been moved from Baracoa
to Santiago, and Spain began to take precautions against the
new marauders of the sea, who, however, became more bold
and numerous, at times actually forcing their goods upon the
Spanish settlers under threats of pillage. In 1536 the people
at Havana paid a large sum to a French corsair to save the
74 COURTEOUS COMBATANTS

city, and a battle which took place at Santiago in 1538 well
illustrates the spirit of those times.

A French corsair came into that port and a Spanish vessel
gave fight. They fought the first day till sunset, when they
declared a truce for rest and refreshments while the captains
exchanged civilities. Over their wine and fruit they
mutually agreed to fight each other only by day and only by
swords and lances; for artillery, they agreed, was for cowards,
and they preferred to show their mettle in a square contest,
whichever conquered taking the other’s vessel. In this way
they fought the whole of the second day, neither conquering,
and again the captains exchanged civilities. The Spanish
captain, Diego Perez, asked the inhabitants of Santiago that
night if they would compensate him for the loss of his ship in
case the Frenchman got the better of him, for he said he was
a poor man and could not afford to lose his ship. If he could
be sure of compensation, he would keep up the fight to the
end, and, if victorious, it would be of advantage to the city as
well as to him. The people declined to pledge themselves,
doubtless thinking that the Spaniard would not mar his repu-
tation by withdrawing, and they were right. The battle con-
tinued the next day with renewed ferocity, many falling in the
fierce hand-to-hand conflict; and so again on the fourth day,
on the evening of which the Frenchman promised to continue
it the next morning. But he evidently thought better of it
during the night, for he slipped his cable and retired.

But in spite of such instances of bold resistance the Eng-
lish and French corsairs inflicted great damage upon Spanish
trade, and a French privateer captured Havana and burned it
to the ground. One raid followed another till the Spaniards
were at their wits’ end. They began to build forts and forti-
fications. De Soto, who had returned with plunder from
Peru, was commissioned as governor of Cuba and Florida with
the title of Captain-General, and with instructions to build a
fortress at Havana. He began the erection of the Castillo de
la Fuerza, though it was finished by his lieutenants while he
PLUNDERED BY CORSAIRS AND PIRATES 15

was away searching for gold in Florida, and tracing the course’
of the Mississippi, in which he found his grave.

But English, French, and Dutch raiders continued to
swarm about the islands, and by this time the Spaniards saw,
ov should have seen, one of the disastrous results of their cruel
treatment of the Indians, for the hostility of such natives as
were left was intense, and they freely welcomed to the small
islands and even to Cuba any piratical comer who threatened
the Spanish settlers, and they offered to assist the corsairs in
every way possible. In 1551 the capital of Cuba was trans-
ferred to Havana, which had been growing in importance be-
cause of its conmmanding situation, good harbor, and fertile
surroundings. But it was the object of continued attack, and
in 1554 was partly destroyed by the French, and in the follow-
ing year was plundered by pirates. In the wars of Charles
I. of Spain and his son Philip IT., the English under Drake
again seriously threatened the port, and the Spaniards deter-
mined to increase the fortifications. This gave rise to the
famous Morro Castle and the Bateria de la Punta, which for a
long time made Havana one of the best fortified ports in the
world. They were begun the year after the destruction of the
famous Armada and completed in 1597, and from that time
Havana was the commercial center of the Spanish dominions,
being the stopping place for the treasure ships bearing gold and
silver from Mexico and other colonies.

But the destruction of the Armada had seriously crippled
the maritime power of Spain. That great expedition, chiefly
undertaken to bring England back to the Catholic faith, was
but an incident in that determined purpose of Spain to estab-
lish the power of the Pope while maintaining her exclusive
right to the commerce of the new Western world as granted by
the bill of partition. The fanatical religious fervor of the
Spaniards is illustrated by an incident which took place on the
coast of Florida, where a party of French Hueguerots settled
in 1567. Soon there came a Spaniard sailing under orders to
“ gibbet and behead all Protestants in those regions.” The
76 THE TWO EYES OF SPAIN

settlement was surprised and massacred, and another party
from the same settlement, which the Spaniards afterwards
found, were hanged, over the dangling bodies being placed the
superscription: “ Not as Frenchmen, but as heretics.” But
that same year the Spanish who were trying to settle St.
Augustine were surprised and hanged by an expedition of
Frenchmen, “ Not as Spaniards, but as murderers.”

While religious wars exhausted Spanish resources and ren-
dered the mother country unable to sufficiently protect her
colonies, her commercial policy of exclusiveness only brought
new troubles upon them and a greater horde of piratical
enemies at the very time her naval strength was at a low ebb.
More liberal commercial views were beginning to prevail in
other parts of Europe, but when Cromwell asked that Spain
should abolish the Inquisition and admit the free navigation of
the western seas, the Spanish ambassador replied that for his
king to relinquish those prerogatives would be to “ give up his
two eyes.” Spain not only continued the Inquisition but mas-
sacred with a ruthless hand the men, women, and children of
such English and Dutch settlements as she could find and over-
power in the West Indies, and she strenuously endeavored to
maintain an exclusive trade with her colonies by restricting all
their commerce to the port of Seville and selling the monopoly
of that. This naturally hampered the growth of the colonies
and drew into the waters fresh hordes of smugglers, with whom
the Spanish colonists gladly traded. These smugglers made
their headquarters near Haiti, which, on account of the greater
attraction of Cuba, had been practically deserted by the Span-
ish. The few people who remained there lived mainly from
the herds of cattle which, having greatly multiplied, roamed
wild over the island. They prepared the meat for preserva-
tion in smokehouses, which were called bucans, and the smug-
glers, adopting this method of preserving their meat, became
known as buccaneers. Little by little they multiplied and
erew in importance till they were in constant conflict with the
Spanish on Jand and water and preyed upon Spanish commerce
DEPREDATIONS OF THE BUCCANEERS 77

everywhere. During this period Cuba, as the headquarters
of the Spaniards, suffered severely. The buccaneers were the
real masters of the situation. They feared no enemy and
spared none, and regarded the Spaniards with a bitter hatred
while they emulated their acts of cruelty. As a matter of
tact Spain had drawn upon herself the hatred of all Europe
by her arrogant religious and commercial pretensions, and had
aroused the cupidity of every ruler by the treasures she had
brought to Europe.

The Spaniards found the buccaneers made out of entirely
different stuff from the gentle natives they had so ruthlessly
massacred, for, banding together, they maintained themselves
against every Spanish assault and generally won the victory.
After many Spaniards had bitten the dust, fresh troops were
sent, but the buccaneers were also constantly recruited from
the adventurers and roving criminals of all nations. So mat-
ters continued till 1663, when Spain undertook to overcome
all opposition by sending a superior force of trained men under
Van Delmof, a veteran officer. He attacked the buccaneers’
headquarters on the island of Haiti, but, although they num-
bered only a fifth of the Spaniards, they drove the latter into
the sea with great loss. The Spaniards kept up the struggle by
lying in wait for small parties and butchering them to a man,
but they were always worsted when encountering a consider-
able body. Then the Spaniards foolishly thought to extermi-
nate the buccaneer by exterminating his cattle, upon the
abundance of which he was supposed to depend, but this only
made him the fiercer plunderer of Spanish commerce. He be-
came a freebooter — the freebooter of the Spanish Main. He
attacked Spanish ports, plundered Spanish vessels and put the
crews to death. Havana was threatened, and with this danger
and that of an invasion of the English and Dutch, the Captain-
General began the erection of a new defensive wall across the
projecting neck on which the city is laid out. But the depre-
dations of the adventurers continued in spite of the treaty of
peace between Spain and England in 1670, and declined only
78 THE FREEBOOTERS VICTORY

for a time when towards the end of the seventeenth century
the war between France and England led to dissensions among
the freebooters themselves.

Volumes would be required to tell of the remarkable in-
cidents of this warfare in the West Indian seas. History has
few more romantic pages. A single incident may be given as
an example. A native of Sable d’Olonne, Olonois by name,
having in a Spanish attack lost his ship and narrowly escaped
with his life, managed to arm two small vessels with twenty-
one men; then he started off to pillage the city of Los Cayos
in Cuba. Hearing of the expedition, the Governor-General
at Havana despatched a six-gun frigate manned by ninety men
to the assistance of the inhabitants. Four other smaller ships
were also sent to join the frigate, and it looked like a formidable
expedition against two small vessels with but about a score of
men. The Spanish governor of Havana was so certain of cap-
turing the freebooters that he exacted a promise from the com-
mander of the expedition that he would cut off the head of
every man of them, and he sent along a negro to act as exe-
eutioner. Olonois somehow learned of the plan and at once
started to meet the frigate before she was joined by the smaller
vessels. He had the good fortune to come upon the Spaniard
in the night, and bringing his vessels one on each side, at day-
break his twenty-one men boarded her, and, after a desperate
engagement, overcame the ninety of the Spaniard. He be-
headed all the prisoners but one, not sparing the negro who
had been sent as his executioner. The remaining one he sent
back to Havana with the threat that a similar fate awaited the
governor. Olonois then set out in pursuit of the four in-
tended consorts, captured them and flung the crews into the
sea. “Yet, depraved as they were,” says one writer, “the
freebooters made a great profession of religion, which in some
of their number was doubtless real. They praved fervently
on all oceasions and never commenced a meal without a long
grace. Before going into action they humbly sought God
to grant them the victory, after which the Catholics sung
SPAIN'S INJURIOUS RESTRICTIVE POLICY 79

the Magnificat and the Protestants repeated a hymn.” It
was well into the eighteenth century and after the English,
French, and Dutch had firmly established themselves ip the
West Indies that the freebooters were driven from the seas.

Notwithstanding the complicated relations of the Euro-
pean powers during the war of the Spanish Succession with
which the eighteenth century opened, Cuba was left compara-
tively free from strife, but it was not long before there came
the first serious trowble between the Cuban colonists and the
mother country. By the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, by
which the Hapsburg rule in Spain was ended, the island had
become well settled and the agricultural products of the in-
terior made a large showing beside the gold and silver of the
other Spanish-American colonies. Up to 1717 the main rev-
enue from Cuba came through the commercial monopolies of
Seville and Cadiz, but that year a new policy was inaugurated
by which the growing tobacco trade was made a government
monopoly. Its enforcement was violently resisted and re-
sulted in many collisions between the government forces and
the people. It was but another incident in the restrictive
policy of Spain which finally entirely undermined her power
over her colonies. The magnificent harbors of Cuba could
be entered only by stealth or force except by the monopoly
vessels. As Spain was in no condition to be a large purchaser,
the production of the island was strangled and the farmers
barely more than lived on what they produced. But Spain
would not and did not learn the lesson. - Owing to unwise
measures at home Spain’s own industries declined, and thoze
of her people who could purchase bought foreign products
which were smuggled in, and paid for them with gold from
America. The result was the collapse of her own industrial
system and the loss of the precious metals which she had made
so many bloody sacrifices to secure. .

The monopoly restrictions imposed upon the Cuban trade
gave rise to systematic smuggling by British traders in
Jamaica, and the constant friction finally resulted in the
80 MORRO CASTLE SURRENDERS TO THE ENGLISH

Anglo-Spanish war of 1739, which ended with a general
European war in 1748. In the decade that followed,
the smuggling trade in Cuba grew out of all control of the
tobacco monopoly, and a system of farming out the revenues
to private monopolists was substituted. But this only led to
further trouble. The expansion of British trade in the Indies
led to the Bourbon compact to put a check to it and war began
in 1762. An English fleet consisting of forty-four men-of-
war and 150 other vessels under Admiral Pocock took Havana
in June of that year, and an army of about 15,000 men under
Lord Albemarle began the siege of the Spanish garrison num-
bering 27,000 under Governor Porto Carrero. The resist-
ance was stubborn, but Morro Castle surrendered on July 30th
and the city on August 13th. The treasure which fell to the
English was enormous. Over three.and a half million dollars
was divided among them. The English continued to hold the
city till early the following year, when, under the terms of the
treaty of Paris, the island was restored to Spain in return for
the cession of Florida to England.

On the whole, the eighteenth century was a much Lrighter
one for Cuba, although the blight of Spain’s colonial policy
was not wanting. During their occupation of Havana the
English had opened the port to free commerce, and when the
Spanish again took hold of the island they found it impossible
to safely reimpose the old restrictions in all their rigor. Many
of the former limitations of the commerce of the island with
the home country were removed, and the island made a rapid
material advance. In 1777 Cuba was given a more inde-
pendent colonial government under the control of the Captain-
General, whose power was, however, practically absolute and
fraught with the seeds of the woes of the Cubans in after
years. So long as these officers were intelligent and humane
the island prospered greatly and its wonderful resources be-
eame apparent.

At the time this change was made England was engaged
in a struggle with its American colonies, and the Bourbon
SPAIN REGAINS SOME LOST POSSESSIONS 81

monarchies of France and Spain availed themselves of the op-
portunity to get even with their old enemy. France joined
the American colonists and Spain took up a campaign in her
own behalf, regaining the island of Minorea and_ several
smaller West Indian isles which had been wrested from her.
Other European powers maintained an attitude favorable to
Spain,- though looking out for themselves, and by-the treaty
of Versailles in 1783 Spain regained Florida. England had
lost her American colonies, with the exception of Canada and
some of her West Indian possessions.
CHAPTER IIT

SPAIN AT THE FEET OF NAPOLEON—EXPLOITS OF SIMON
BOLIVAR AND SAN MARTIN—SPAIN’S DISASTROUS AND
DISGRACEFUL FAILURES.

Napoleon’s Ambition to Make Spain a Subject Kingdom — Ferdinand’s
Intrigues— Joseph Bonaparte on the Throne —Fall of Napoleon
and Restoration of Ferdinand — Revolt against Spain — Conditions
in Mexico— Raising the Standard of Rebellion — Ignominious
Death of Hidalgo and Morelos— First Struggles in Venezuela—
Simon Bolivar and His Vicissitudes— Napoleon’s Feat Surpassed —
Defeats the Spainards — O’Higgins Becomes Dictator—The War in
Peru — Defeat of the Spanish Fleet at Callao—San Martin Enters
Lima — His Interview with Bolivar— Farewell to the Peruvians —
Buenos Ayres the Storm Center — Paraguay’s Dramatic Chapter—
Spain’s Weakness and Cruelty — Always Failed to Restore Her Flag
When Once Torn Down— A Policy Culminating in Disaster and
Disgrace.

France, under Bourbon rulers, had ‘regarded them-

selves as natural allies, but this alliance in the end
had much to do with the ruin of Spain. The revival which
promised so much for Spanish industry and commerce under
the wise and enlightened rule of Charles III. was quickly sup-
pressed in the inglorious reign of Charles TV. In 1796 a war
broke out with Great Britain which was productive of nothing
but disaster to the Spaniards. By pressure of France another
arose in 1804 which was attended with similar ill-success, and
in the battle of Trafalgar Spain lost a great part of that fleet
which she needed for the maintenance of her American
colonies. Napoleon had already conceived the idea of mak-
ing Spain a subject kingdom with one of his own family on the
throne, and he had nothing but contempt for its Bourbon ruler,
although he pretended to be a faithful ally. Meanwhile,
Ferdinand, the presumptive heir to the Spanish throne, was

182)

T  iinee, inca the eighteenth century Spain and
NAPOLEON'S DESIGNS UPON THE SPANISH THRONE 83

weakly intriguing to displace his father. He became sub-
servient to Napoleon, who cultivated his intrigues without hav-
ing the least idea of making him King. Finally, Ferdinand,
who was liked by the people, compelled his father to abdicate,
but, lured over the border at this critical moment by Napo-
leon’s agents, he found himself a prisoner and compelled by
Napoleon to renounce all claims to the Spanish throne before
he had had an opportunity to occupy it. The same year
Joseph Bonaparte was prevailed upon by his brother to take
the erown, and he was declared King of Spain and the Indies.
But before he had reached Madrid the country had arisen, the
various provinces electing juntas or councils to administer
affairs and resist Napoleon’s purposes.

That mighty struggle during which Napoleon overran
Spain, and which he acknowledged to have been one of the
main causes of his ultimate downfall, is a thrilling page of his-
tory, but it concerns this story only as it affected Spain’s re-
lations to her American colonies. In 1812 a constitution had
been devised by the Cortes, or legislative body, of Cadiz, appa-
rently liberal, though Wellington considered it good only to be
looked at. “TI have not met,” he said, writing of the Cortes,
“ one of its members or any person of any description who con-
siders it the embodiment of a system by which Spain is or can
be governed. The Cortes have in form divested themselves of
executive power and appointed a regency for that purpose, but
the regency are, in fact, the slaves of the Cortes, and neither
regency nor Cortes have any constitutional communication
with each other, nor have they any authority beyond the walls
of Cadiz.”

Napoleon’s fortunes declined, and, pressed by his enemies,
he again negotiated with Ferdinand, who still seemed sub-
servient, though the French Emperor had so recently and so
cruelly deceived him. Napoleon believed that Ferdinand,
as King, might be a pliant tool, for Joseph had left Spain in
disgust. But the imperial prestige was broken, and early in
1814 Napoleon was compelled to abdicate. Ferdinand had
84 SPANISH-AMERICAN POSSESSIONS

already returned to Spain, where he was welcomed by the
people, who hoped that he would resume the throne and take
up the reins of power under the constitution of 1812. But
Ferdinand quickly abrogated that apparent guarantee of lib-
eral government, together with all the acts of the Cortes, and
proceeded to set up an absolute monarchy on the old lines,
recalling the Papal nuncio and re-establishing the Inquisition,
With astonishing ingratitude he broke his most solemn pledges
and fell under the direction of priests and nobles and of a set
of vulgar flatterers and favorites.

These domestic affairs of Spain had an tapotant effect
upon the American colonies. There were two Spanish vice-
royalties in South America — that of Lima, which comprised
the countries now known as Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Costa
Rica, and the Guianas, and that of Buenos Ayres, which in-
cluded, besides the present Argentine Republic, Uruguay,
Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, and the untraversed wastes of Pata-
gonia. Mexico, which was known as New Spain, and com-
prised a large territory extending to what is now the southern
limit of Oregon, was also a vice-royalty. The revolts and
revolutions in each of these provinces had many features in
common. It has been said that the history of one is the his-
tory of all; and it is true that from 1808 to 1821 all were in
revolt against Spain, their revolutions set each other in
rapid succession.

It is not strange that their history had so much in common,
for all had been the victims of a long oppression of the mother
country, and the political aspirations of their people were
simultaneously stirred when Spain lay at the feet of Napoleon,
and liberal ideas were everywhere noticeable as a result of
the revolutions in America and France. Ferdinand’s restora-
tion of absolutism and oppression, therefore, naturally led to
their revolt.

Mexico ranked first among all the Spanish colonies in re-
spect to population, material riches, and natural products,
though the intolerant spirit of the clergy and military rulers
HIDALGO'S INEFFECTUAL OPPOSITION 85

nad led to the obliteration of almost every trace of the Aztec
nationality and civilization, while the strict system of seques-
tration of commerce crippled the resources of the country.
But the people endured the system till 1810, when discontent
broke into open rebellion under the leadership of a country
priest named Hidalgo.

In Mexico, as in all the colonies, the Spaniards who were
born in Spain held all the offices under the government. The
Creoles, though of Spanish extraction, were treated as an in-
ferior race, while the Indians and half breeds were trampled
under foot. In defiance of the expanding liberalism, the
plain tendency of the times, Ferdinand continued to fill Mexi-
can offices with Spanish favorites, to garrison Mexican forts
with Spanish soldiers, and to exclude from Mexican markets
all wares not made in Spain. This stubborn resistance of all
civilizing tendencies was a feature of Spain’s dealings with all
her colonies and the sufficient cause of discontent.

Priest-ridden at home, her policy of throttling her colonists
in Mexico eventually raised opposition among the Mexican
clergy. Hidalgo and a fellow priest named Morelos kept the
banner of revolt afloat for ten years, and although it was an
article of faith among Spaniards that the priests were not to be
punished for their actions, Hidalgo, when caught in arms, was
shackled hand and foot, carried on a mule to Chihuahua,
thrown into irons, and taken out in the gray dawn to be shot by
clumsy bunglers who could not hit the old man’s heart at ten
paces. Morelos was stripped of his robe, set on his knees with
his back to the soldiers, and shot ignominiously from behind.
Such acts of cruelty but added fuel to the fire of revolt, and
new heroes took the place of the murdered. |

Indeed, the cause of the Spanish monarch in Mexico was
really lost before Iturbide took command of the patriots. He
was a frivolous trifler, maintaining almost an imperial rule
over Mexico for a time, and when he fell the independence of
Mexico was assured and was recognized in 1824 by every
foreign power except Spain.
86 THE POLICY OF EXASPERATION

The same foolish policy which alienated Mexico compelled
the Central American states to follow her example. The his-
tory of Venezuela reveals the same general reason for her in-
dependence. When Napoleon sent Joseph to Madrid to play
King, Venezuela refused to recognize him and stood out
stoutly for the old dynasty, but when the old dynasty was re-
stored and idiotic measures of absolutism were enforced, the
Venezuelans were loyal Spaniards no more. Simon Bolivar
went to England, bought arms, and when he returned made
the Spanish soldiers prisoners and locked them in the strong
fortress of Puerto Cabello.

Spain had but one policy for colonists — oppression, and
for those who protested, torture and death. From 1813, when
the struggle of the Venezuelans for liberty began, till 1820,
when it ended, the Spanish adhered to this policy, which al-
ways led to the further exasperation of the people and
eventually made reconciliation impossible. After the re-
union of New Grenada and Venezuela in 1819 the Spanish
cause was hopeless, but General La Torre insisted on fighting
a battle with Bolivar, in which he lost everything, six thou-
sand men, artillery, honor, reputation, and hope.

But the epidemic of freedom could not be confined to anv
one locality in South America. Everywhere the people were
rising against Spanish wrongs. While Bolivar was fusing
the northern colonies into the republic of Colombia, José de
San Martin, at Buenos Ayres, was maturing plans for the
liberation of Chile. He had been well educated at the Col-
lege of Nobles in Spain, and had fought with distinction at
Baylen, where Napoleon met his first serious reverse at arms.
With 180 recruits which he picked up in the streets of Buenos
Ayres he formed the nucleus of an army, to which were added
the forces under Bernado O’Higgins, son of the viceroy of
Chile.

With this army he crossed the Andes at Uspallata pass,
which is 12,500 feet above the sea, over 4,000 feet higher
than the pass of the great St. Bernard, thus surpassing the feat
VICTORIES OF SAN MARTIN AND BOLIVAR 87

which contributed so much to the glory of Napoleon. At the
foot of the mountains a considerable body of Spaniards was
met, but O’ Higgins fell upon them with his cavalry and routed
them. Pushing rapidly on, San Martin, on February 15,
1817, with hardly a coin in his pocket, no military chest, and
no stores, entered Santiago with his wild gauchos at his back,
and was well received. A junta of the leading citizens of the
capital was summoned and the post of supreme dictator of
Chile was offered him. He declined it, nominating Bernado
O’ Higgins in his place. It cannot be said that San Martin ac-
complished the liberation of Chile by the capture of Santiago,
for the Spaniards held Valdivia, a much stronger place, for
three years longer, but the possession of the capital city by the .
insurgents was a vast moral advantage.

At the time of San Martin’s victory Guiana had been con-
verted to the side of independence by a man of color named
Piar, and on the very day of San Martin’s entrance into San-
tiago, Bolivar defeated the Spaniards at Barcelona.

At this time Peru was a more important division of South
America than Chile, and San Martin felt that his task was only
half accomplished so long as Peru remained in Spanish hands.
THe saw that the possession of Lima and of its seaport Callao
would depend upon control of the sea, and he, therefore, be-
stirred himself to create a navy for the Chileans. He induced
them to buy two old East Indiamen, which were converted into
fighting ships, an old English corvette, and three brigs. Of
this fleet he induced Lord Cochrane to take command as chief
admiral, and the squadron sailed for Callao in January, 1819.
Admiral Cochrane approached the Spanish fleet of twelve ves-
sels and a few gunboats, which lay under the guns of Callao
castle, and, after several ineffectual attacks, he captured the
Esmeralda, a forty-four gun frigate, and added her to their
squadron. In the meantime San Martin landed a body of in-
fantry and horse seventy miles north of Lima and threatened
the city from that side.

The Spanish general, Vezuela, had under his order an army
88 RISE OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS

of 23,000 men, but his officers were disaffected, and, after
much quarreling, they forced him to resign. His successor had
no disposition to continue the struggle, and without firing a
shot, San Martin entered Lima on July 28, 1821, hastened to
proclaim the independence of Peru, and accepted the title of
Protector.

Bolivar had just arrived at Guayaquil after a decisive vic-
tory at Quito and San Martin hastened to meet him there.
What passed between them has never been fully known. But
Bolivar remained at the head of his army, while San Martin,
the pure patriot, returned to Lima and issued a farewell ad-
dress, in which he said: “ The presence of a fortunate soldier
is dangerous to newly-constituted states. Peruvians, I leave
your national representation established. If you repose con-
fidence in it you will triumph. If not, anarchy will overthrow
you. May success preside over your destinies.”

On San Martin’s departure, Bolivar was chosen dictator of
Peru, and a new state was created under the name of Bolivia,
of which he was made perpetual protector. He was also
chosen president of Colombia, and the congress of that state
refused to accept his resignation. The administration of
Venezuela was in the hands of Vice-President Paez, but he
took his orders from Bolivar. Thus all the northern portion
of South America was at this trying time under the control of
one man, who practically had absolute power.

Buenos Ayres had constituted herself a republic in 1810.
The city was a storm center for several years, indeed, from
1810 to 1817 it underwent fourteen. revolutions, suppressed
two rebellions, was twice blockaded and once bombarded, but
peace came when General Rosas trampled all constitutions
under foot and declared himself a military dictator. The
dramatic chapter which Paraguay bore in the long struggle
has been described by Thomas Carlyle in his most vivid
manner.

In all these struggles Spain showed her weakness, her
eruelty, and her stupidity. From the time of Philip IT. to the
AN UNBROKEN CHRONICLE OF DISGRACE 89

present day Spanish fleets have taken the sea only to be beaten,
and Spanish ships have seldom opened fire.except to be sunk.
The overwhelming disaster which overtook the Armada was
but the beginning; Trafalgar was but an incident in the long
history of Spain’s downfall. When the colonists rose in in-
surrection, she threw her fleets upon all the seaports in turn
— Vera Cruz, Caracas, Buenos Ayres, Valparaiso, Valdivia,
Callao. In not a single instance did her squadrons accom-
plish anything, nor did they retard the progress of the insur-
gents for a single day. By spiteful bombardments she occa-
sionally destroyed some lives and property, but never could she
restore the Spanish flag to the forts from which it had once
been torn, nor could she inspire among the rebels any terror
of the Spanish name. The whole record of her colonial man-
agement is an unbroken chronicle of imbecility, cruelty, injus-
tice, and truculence, culminating in disaster and disgrace.

With this brief review of the Spanish loss of Mexico and
the South and Central Americas, we will now trace the move-
ments by which the young republie of the United States be-
came possessed of the richest portion of that great domain
which in the sixteenth century Spain’s daring discoverers had
laid at her feet. It marks the beginning of those relations
between the United States and Spain which have culminated
in the recent war.
CHAPTER IV

EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES—THE PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA — DISPUTES
AND CONFLICTS OVER THE FLORIDAS.

Spain's Possessions in Washington’s Time — Owning Over Two-Thirds of
What Now Constitutes the United States— Napoleon’s Ambition to
Establish a Latin Empire West of the Mississippi — An Old Song of
Defiance to the Spaniard — Pickering’s Savage Retort — English Sup-
port — Spain Secretly Cedes Louisiana to Napoleon — Jefferson’s Di-
plomacy — Napoleon Offers to Sell Louisiana — The Treaty Signed —
Spain’s Angry Protest — Dispute over Florida Boundaries — Spain's
Perfidious and Exasperating Conduct — Stirs the Indians to Massacre
—Lawless Expeditions —Spain Threatens the United States with
War— Andrew Jackson’s Radical Ideas —Spain Advised by Europe
to Sell— The Treaty — End of a Long Struggle.

are not aware that when George Washington was

President more than two-thirds of that great domain
which now constitute our Union belonged to Spain. Be-
cause the government of the United States acquired the
larger part of this vast territory in a peaceful manner the fact
does not occupy a conspicuous place in our histories. But ina
study of the previous relations of this country with Spain, and
of the gradual decline of Spain’s power on this side of the At-
lantic, the fact becomes interesting and important.

During the administration of Washington, and also of
John Adams, the great territory west of the Mississippi from
its mouth to its headwaters was Spain’s. Originally settled
by France, it fell to Spain through the treaty of 1763, fol-
lowing the Seven-Years War. England laid some claim to
that part of it which now comprises the States of Washington

and Oregon, but it was not deemed valid, and the whole region
(90)

D OUBTLESS many of the people of the United States
NAPOLEON'S MAGNIFICENT SCHEME 91

was an unknown wilderness waiting for the nineteenth cen-
tury to unfold its wonderful resources. In addition to this
Florida belonged to Spain, together with a strip of land ex-
tending along the gulf coast to the mouth of the Mississippi,
and known as West Florida.

The eareer of Napoleon played a part not usually appre-
ciated in shaping the destinies of the new American republic.
His ambition to bring Europe under his sway was but a por-
tion of a magnificent scheme which also comprehended the
establishment of a great Latin empire on the Western con-
tinent. In the later exigencies of his career, the necessities
imposed upon him by antagonistic European alliances enabled
the young but sturdy government of the United States by a
master stroke to extend its domain to the Pacific. A brief sur-
vey of the relations of the United States to Spain at the period
following the Revolution is essential to the proper understand-
ing of the dénowement which took place at the century’s close.

During the struggle of the American colonies for their in-
dependence, Spain held aloof for some time, though largely
out of revenge’ upon the English she rendered us some ma-
terial assistance on the Mississippi, allowing us in the first
stress of the war to obtain powder from her stores at New Or-
leans. But soon after the war was over Spain became so arro-
gant over the Florida boundaries and caused so much inter-
ference with our navigation of the Mississippi that the
people of the United States clamored for redress in war. The
following verses from a song, found in a very old book, clearly
shows the feeling in the States at that time, while they were in
a condition of loose federation under the Continental Con-

gress:
“AMOR PATRIA INCITAT.”
1785.
COLUMBIA TO HER GENUINE SONS ON THE PROSPECT OF A SPANISH WAR.
Awake, O my sons! and to glory repair,
The prospect is noble, the object is fair;
The Spaniards have dared to infringe on our right ;
Are ye freemen and not bring the matter to light ?
92 AN IMPORTANT TREATY

These Dons will grow proud by insulting our flag ;

O suffer them not of such meanness to brag,

In peace let your stripes round the globe be display’d,
From nation to nation establish your trade ;

In the language of freemen enforce your decrees,

Make the ocean your empire, and sail where you please ;
On the basis of freedom establish your fame,

And the slaves of each despot will crouch at your name,

Ye had courage to face the bold Briton in war,

And the Spaniard, ye know, is inferior by far.

Demand satisfaction ; if that be denied,

The aggressor the consequence then must abide :

’T would be worthy, by heaven ! and your annals adorn
The standard of freedom to bear to Cape Horn.
Unshackle the slaves that to royalty bow,

And o’er plains quite neglected establish the.plow !

In October, 1795, or during the second administration of
Washington, Thomas Pinckney arranged a treaty with the
“Madrid government establishing as boundaries of the United
States, East and West Florida on the south at 31° North
latitude, and on the west the middle of the Mississippi River
above that latitude. What was ‘regarded as the most impor-
tant and advantageous part of the instrument was a recognition
by Spain of the right of the United States to navigate the
Mississippi, with a privilege of deposit at the port of New Or-
leans, free of duty. About two years later, President Adams,
in a message to the Senate, complained that the Spanish officers
in Louisiana were constantly interfering with the work of run-
ning the southern boundary line under the above treaty. The

“Spanish minister, D’Yrujo, sought to justify the action of the
Spanish authorities on the theory that there were designs
against the Spanish territory, the evidence for which was a let-
ter addressed to one Carey, a Cherokee interpreter, by Senator
Blount of Tennessee, urging him to stir up the Cherokees and
Creeks for the purpose of abetting a scheme, in which the Eng-
lish were also said to be concerned, for invading Spanish ter-
‘itory. This letter seemed to give some validity to the Span-
ish minister’s statement, and the House took steps to impeach
ALLIANCE OF FRANCE AND SPAIN 93

its author, an effort which eventually failed. The British
minister, when called upon to explain, said that while such a
scheme had been proposed to him he had not countenanced it,
and Pickering, then Secretary of State, retorted savagely upon
the Spanish minister. Fisher Ames congratulated Pickering
upon his reply to “ the Spanish Don,” adding, “ You have not
left a whole bone in his skin.” Pickering constantly imputed
dishonorable motives to the Spanish minister, and many of his
letters express his contempt for “the Spanish puppy.” The
statesmen of those times did not hesitate to use plain and even
harsh English.

The conviction that the Mississippi River and 31° North
latitude were not the natural boundaries of the new repub-
lic began to manifest itself soon after peace was restored with
Great Britain, and this feeling was expressed in occasional
propositions for invading Spanish territory. The decadence
of Spain was already well under way. The colonists in her
territories everywhere were misgoverned and oppressed, and
dissatisfaction prevailed. By a treaty in 1796, France and
Spain had allied themselves to guarantee each other’s
dominions in both the Old and New World. This alliance led
the English government to look with favor upon propositions
for enabling the Spanish colonists to throw off the Spanish
yoke at the very time that the feeling in this country was
tending in the same direction. Moreover, the relations be-
tween France and the United States had become greatly
strained through the disingenuous and sometimes rather in-
solent diplomacy of Talleyrand.

In this situation Francisco Miranda, a South American
revolutionist, secretly worked upon the British ministry to
promote a joint expedition for a movement upon Louisiana,
Great Britain to furnish the navy, and the United States
thearmy. Our relations with France went from bad to worse,
and war seemed at hand, and, after the failure of our special
mission to Paris, Hamilton became committed to the scheme
of liberating Spanish America if the United States could
94 LOUISIANA CEDED TO FRANCE

be the principal agency and furnish the whole land force.
Miranda wrote to Hamilton that England would co-operate
as soon as the United States was prepared. “ All is ready,”
he said, “for your President to give the word.” But Presi-
dent Adams was not inclined to favor the project, as, like
Washington, he disliked forcible conquests or foreign al-
lances. “ At present,” he wrote, “there is no more prospect
of seeing a French army here than there is in heaven,” and
‘gradually the danger of a war with France and the possibility
of a conquest of Spanish America faded away.

When Thomas Jefferson- became President, Napoleon,
who had just been proclaimed First Consul, had begun to trail
his sword over Europe and had defeated the Austrians at
Marengo. Spain was still a faithful ally of France. It was
a part of Napoleon’s design to re-establish French influence in
American territory, and thus make a Latin counterpoise to
Anglo-Saxon influence here, partly for the greater security of
the French possessions in the West Indies. In October, 1800,
in a secret treaty by which he promised to secure for Spain
the recognition of the King of Tuscany by all the powers of
Europe, he obtained from her the cession of Louisiana, and
soon took steps to send an expedition to take possession of the
colony.

Meanwhile, the United States, being outraged by Spain’s
repeated violations of her treaty as to free navigation of the
Mississippi, made preparations to attack New Orleans, but
soon after Jefferson’s inauguration information concerning
Napoleon’s secret treaty reached cur government through our
minister at London, and the project was abandoned. The new
treaty was anything but agreeable to the people of the United
States. The administration felt that under the control of
Spain, which was on the road to decay, the United States might
confidently await the time when the territory could be easily
secured. But with the French, under a ruler who contem-
plated universal empire, in control of Louisiana, the case was
different. The possessor of the mouth of the Mississippi, Jef-
PRESIDENT JEFFERSON’S OPINION 95

ferson wrote to Livingston, our minister at Paris, would of
necessity become the natural and habitual enemy of the United
States. “ We-must turn all our attention to a maritime force,
for which our resources place us on very high ground; and
having formed and connected together a power which may
render reinforcement of her settlements here impossible to
France, make the first cannon which is fired in Europe the sig-
nal for the tearing up any settlement she may have made and
for holding the two continents of America in sequestration for
the common purposes of the United British and American
nations.”

Livingston’s instructions in taking the French mission
were to dissuade France from acquiring Louisiana if possible,
and, if not, to procure a cession to the United States of the
Floridas and New Orleans. Meanwhile, the King of Spain
informed the Intendant of Louisiana of its cession to France,
and he was instructed to make arrangements for its delivery
to the French government. In pursuance of this order, or,
perhaps, upon some misconception of his duties, he ordered the
port of New Orleans closed as a place of deposit for merchan-
dise, a privilege which our treaty with Spain had guaranteed.
As a result the product of a large part of the United States
could find no outlet. The people in the western section of the
country were greatly stirred by this act, and Hamilton was in
favor of seizing New Orleans and the Floridas at once and
negotiating afterwards. But Jefferson was disposed to con-
tinue his diplomatic efforts, though they were not succeeding
well. Livingston strove in vain to gain the favor of Napoleon,
who was rapidly fitting out a large expedition to take possession
of the new territory. Jefferson appointed Monroe a special
minister to act with Livingston, but by the time he had reached
France a great change suddenly came over Napoleon. The
order for the sailing of the expedition was countermanded, and
Livingston was surprised to find himself in high favor in the
court.

The cause of this was a sudden threatening of a renewal of
96 LOUISIANA SOLD TO THE UNITED STATES

hostilities of France with Great Britain. Napoleon had
charged the British with perfidy, and George III. had retorted
in kind. The English ambassador was openly affronted at
the Tuileries, and both governments prepared for war.
Napoleon saw that if he continued in his scheme for Louisiana,
the United States would become an ally of Great Britain, and,
moreover, he needed money. The result was that he at once
authorized the sale not only of New Orleans'but of Louisiana.
In this situation the sale was quickly arranged, and the famous
treaty was signed May 2, 1803, the United States ministers
dining amicably with the Consul who but a short time before
would hardly recognize them. By this treaty the United
States became a vast empire with immunity from dangerous
neighbors, securing for about three cents an acre a domain
which has yielded almost incalculable wealth. Thus Spain
lost her hold on the richest part of the American hemisphere.

But it was not without a protest from Ferdinand, who
thought Napoleon had again played him false. Spain’s flag
still floated at New Orleans. The French had not yet taken
possession under the cession of 1800, and while preparations
were being made for the formal transfer of the territory to the
United States, the Spanish minister, at the direction of his
King, protested that France could not cede it because she had
promised not to alienate the territory to another nation, and
because she had not fulfilled the conditions of the treaty, the
King of Tuscany being still unrecognized by the courts at
London and St. Petersburg. To this the United States re-
sponded that any such question must be settled by France and
Spain alone.

The Spaniards were so loath to believe that the United
States could secure the territory that they continued to re-
main in New Orleans after the formal transfer, though the
treaty required them to leave in three months. While the
soldiers of the United States slept in tents and fell sick of
fever, the Spanish soldiers continued to occupy the barracks
and storehouses, and regularly every day mounted guard.
WARS AND COMPLICATIONS 97

Furthermore, in the arrangements for the government of the
new territory we became embroiled in a boundary dispute
with Spain, and her arrogant claim to West Florida was now
secretly encouraged by France. Jefferson seriously thought
of accepting war with Spain, for West Florida appeared es-
sential to the United States on account of Mobile and its bay,
and our ministers had undoubtedly understood when making
the purchase that this territory was included. As the Euro-
pean war was still protracted, and France could not afford to
have this country throw its influence on the side of Great
Britain, Jefferson thought he would try again for a peaceful
settlement, for Spanish affairs seemed to be under the com-
plete control of Napoleon.

Congress appropriated $2,000,000 for another diplomatic
effort to acquire the Floridas, and commissioners were sent
to Madrid for the purpose, stopping at Paris in an unsuccessful
endeavor to secure French support. The conduct of Spain
meanwhile was perfidious and exasperating, and the adminis-
tration would have borne less had it not been for the fear that
France would sustain the declining Spanish kingdom in case
of an open rupture; moreover, by this time we were drifting
into difficulties with Great Britain.

After the breaking out of the war of 1812, Spain, which
had been a pliant ally of France in the confliet with England,
now united with England in-secretly stimulating the Indians
on the southern border to make war against the United States,
which feared that unless East and West Florida were seized
they would become a base for offensive operations by the Eng-
lish. One result of the Spanish and British efforts to stir up
the Indians was the massacre of Fort Mims, where out of the
550 Americans surprised in this slaughter pen, 400 were slain
or roasted to death, an act which was quickly punished by Gen-
eral Jackson, and West Florida practically became ours
through the surrender of the Spanish fortress at Mobile.

After our war with England, Spain alone of all the Euro-

pean powers remained in vexatious relations with this govern-
7
98 FERDINAND’S DOUBLE DEALING

ment. Our troubles with her related to two topics — the
negotiations to secure a cession of East Florida to the United
States, and the revolutions in the Spanish-American colonies
of South America. Our negotiations for Florida made no
progress in spite of our moderation and forbearance. Spain
was either disingenuous or perfidious, or both. After his
restoration, the bigoted and despotic Ferdinand did not con-
ceal his hatred of free institutions. He would have liked to
defy the United States, but the resources of his country were
at low ebb and he failed to secure the support of England,
Tiussia, and France in his plans. He was forced, therefore, to
adopt that common feature of Spanish policy, a profession of
conciliation and friendship while instructing his agents to use
underharided means against us. In this way his agents
fomented disturbances on the Florida fronticr and endeavored
to poison the minds of the people at New Orleans. The in-
structions to the Spanish minister at Washington appeared to
be to keep the negotiations in a state of suspension. The ar-
rangement which the government of the United States de-
sired was the full cession of East and West Floridas with a
fixing of the disputed boundary lines of Louisiana. On our
part it was proposed to relinquish the accumulated spoliation
claims against Spain.

Over this territory which we were trying to peacefully
secure by purchase, Spain exercised hardly the shadow of
authority, a fact which was sufficiently manifest from the ease
with which little troops of irresponsible invaders defied Span-
ish authorities. The only pretence of Spanish occupation of
the Floridas consisted in the retention of small garrisons at
Pensacola and St. Augustine. In 1817 a few lawless recruits
from Savannah and Charleston passed over to Amelia Island,
near the present site of Fernandina, and took possession of it,
at the same time proclaiming a blockade of St. Augustine.
The Spanish governor made a futile effort to dislodge
this band of not more than 150 buccaneers, and they held
their ground for months. Spain then filed various pro-
ANDREW JACKSON CAPTURES PENSACOLA 99

tests at Washington, and even threatened war with the
United States if the occupation were allowed to continue.
It was no wonder that many people in the South were dis-
gusted with the consideration the government showed to the
complaining Spaniards, who were so utterly incapable of de-
fending themselves from any little roving band that located
itself right in the face of the Spanish garrison. And when
the United States sent a force to Amelia Island to disperse
their own filibustering subjects, and, to preserve order, re-
mained temporarily in possession, the Spanish also protested
against this occupation, protested both against the filibusters
and the presence of the soldiers sent to drive them out.

The Seminole war again brought Andrew Jackson to the
front, and he fully believed in seizing the Floridas and holding
them as indemnity for the outrages Spain had committed on
the property of citizens of the United States. His eager spirit
resented the mild diplomacy used with the Spaniards, and he
thought that a government which could not maintain its
authority over territory it professed to own had no right to
continue the pretence. He was strengthened in this belief
by the fact that the Spanish authorities had countenanced
rather than restrained the uprising of the Seminoles in our
territory. His theory was that self-defense compelled the
United States to take control of points which the Spanish
authorities could not keep in order, and when once in the field
he made quick work in capturing the Spanish garrison of Pen-
sacola, much to the perplexity of the administration, which had
cautioned him against going too far into Spanish territory.

When the fall of Pensacola became known in Madrid, the
perfidious King sent orders to suspend treaty negotiations,
which he himself had kept in suspension, and made explicit
demands for satisfaction. In Monroe’s cabinet, John Quincy
Adams, the Secretary of State, was the only one to defend
Jackson’s conduct in acting contrary to orders, and it is quite
possible that his course was directed by a fuller understanding
of the Spanish character and diplomacy.
100 SALE OF THE FLORIDAS

But Jackson’s unauthorized action was disavowed, and that
which a few American troops had seized with so little effort
was formally restored. It was another case of honest for-
bearance on the part of the United States. In presenting the
case of this government in reply to the demands of Spain,
John Quincy Adams put the blame for the invasion directly
upon that country, and the Cortes of Madrid was silenced.
Europe thereupon suggested to Spain the speedy sale of the
Floridas to the young republic, which had shown that it could
take possession of the Spanish territory at any time, without
any trouble, and upon any provocation which the treacherous
character of Spanish diplomacy might easily afford.

The chapter of Spanish intrigue and American diplomacy
concerning the Floridas was soon thereafter closed. In Feb-
ruary, 1819, a treaty was signed by Adams and the Spanish
minister in behalf of their respective governments, whereby
Spain ceded to the United States all territory east of the Missis-
sippi known as East and West Florida, with adjacent islands,
for five million dollars. West of the Mississippi the new
boundary began at the mouth of the Sabine River, now the
eastern boundary line of Texas, running north by that river
to 82° North latitude, thence north to the Red River, thence
west along that river to 100° West longitude, thence north to
the Arkansas River, thence westerly along this river through
what is now Kansas and Colorado to 106° West longitude,
thence north to 42° North latitude, and thence westerly on the
line which is now the northern boundary of Utah, Nevada,
and California, to the Pacific. It was well known that this
government would have pressed further in the effort to secure
the ceding of Texas but for the feeling then beginning to mani-
fest itself that the balance of slave and free states would be dis-
turbed. All the territory left to Spain, including what are
now Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and Cali-
fornia, with parts of Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming, were
in open revolt against a country whose tyranny was rapidly
despoiling her of all the gains of the sixteenth century.
SPAIN RATIFIES THE TREATY AT LAST 101

The treaty was at once ratified by the United States gov-
ernment in anticipation of its speedy ratification by the Cortes,
but the unreliability of Spanish character again manifested
itself. In view of the natural sympathy of the people of the
United States for the rebellious colonists of South and Central
America, it became difficult for the government of the United
States to preserve a strict neutrality in these revolutions.
Ferdinand feared that if he ratified the Florida treaty the
United States would recognize the belligerents, and so he held
off, though France, England, and Russia urged him to ap-
prove. Pressed for a decisive answer, Ferdinand only offered
various mysterious excuses. Congress was disposed to re-
quire the executive to take possession of the Floridas at once,
but the administration still treated Spain with undeserved for-
bearance. Finally, in February, 1821, when Ferdinand’s
throne was threatened by his own people, and South America
had thrown off the yoke, the treaty was ratified and the long
series of negotiations as to Spanish America was brought to a
close. It had been almost the exclusive feature of American
diplomacy during Monroe’s administration. At any time a
handful of United States volunteers could have taken and
held the great territory for which the future held so rich a
destiny, but we dallied with Spain, put up with her shuffling
and treachery, and treated her with a consideration which no
power in Europe would have granted her under the circum-
stances.

From this time forward our relations with Spain chiefly
concern the history of Cuba.
CHAPTER V

“THE EVER-FAITHFUL ISLE”— PROGRESS OF CUBA DURING
FERDINAND’S DISASTROUS REIGN —THE HOLY ALLIANCE
AND THE FAMOUS MONROE DOCTRINE. ;

Cuba’s Peculiar Position — Importance of Havana—An Early Cause of
Ill-feeling — Excitement during Toussaint L’ Ouverture’s Struggle —
Cubans Remain Faithful to Ferdinand — Aponto’s Uprising — Agita-
tion for the Suppression of the Slave Trade — Favorable Influence of
English Intervention in Cuba — First Struggle with the Spanish
Authorities — The People Divide — Origin and Purposes of the Holy
Alliance — ‘‘A Softer Word for Despotism’” — Help for the Bigoted
Ferdinand — Discord in Cuba —Smouldering Fires — Adams’s Advice
to President Monroe — The Famous Monroe Doctrine— Retreat of
the Holy Alliance — United States Attitude towards Cuba Influenced
by Slavery — The Panama Congress and its Failure— Attitude of
Southern States—The United States Uses Its Influence to Insure
Spain’s Domination of Cuba — Words of Henry Clay.

URING the troublous years of the disastrous reign of

LD Ferdinand, the island of Cuba maintained a position
peculiarly her own, and it will be necessary to re-

turn to the time when the people of the United States won
their independence and trace upward the history and condition
of that province which, because of the failure of all efforts
to plant the seed of liberal government in her soil, obtained
the title of “ The Ever-faithful Isle.” During the last years
of the eighteenth century Cuba, under the rule of a few wise
governors, advanced rapidly in material resources, and the
ports of Havana and Santiago were opened to free commerce,
excepting the slave trade, and a few minor productions. At
the close of the century Havana was the most important city
in America. Of the governors, none were more wise and
progressive than Luis de las Casas, who imparted a new impulse
to commerce and agriculture, and inaugurated a series of im-
portant public works. He took an active interest not only in
(102)
 

EMINENT AMERICAN CIVIL LEADERS.

Hon. WILvIAM R. Davy, Secretary of State. ; Hon. RussE-i A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
Hon. Stewart L. Wooprorp, Ex-Minister toSpain. Hon. JoHN D. Lona, Secretary of the Navy.

   
DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA 105

relieving the remnant of the native Indians from slavery, but
in developing the military defenses of the island. A great
navy yard grew up at Havana, though in accordance with
Spain’s short-sighted policy, it was closed in 1776 on the de
mand of the’shipbuilders of Spain that such work should be
done only in the mother country. By this time Spain had
become the servant of France; reforms in church and state,
which stubborn Spain would not have dreamed of had she
had her own way, were introduced, and in Cuba the develop-
ment was marked. In 1776 Spain was forced into a further
alliance with France, and when the Spanish naval power was
broken the following year at Cape St. Vincent, her communi-
cation with her colonies was so interrupted and feeble that
Cuba was left practically to her own devices. When Spain
lay at the feet of Napoleon she had no recourse but to leave the
colonies to defend themselves, and it was only the increased
defenses which saved Cuba from attack.

It was with some difficulty, even under the prudent meas-
ures inaugurated by Las Casas, that serious disturbances could
be avoided when the excitement of the negroes was intensified
by the remarkable campaign of Toussaint L’Ouverture in
Haiti, and there were several bloody uprisings; still, as a
whole, the island greatly benefited by the Haitian revolution,
for it led to a large immigration of white settlers driven out of
San Domingo, the number taking refuge in Cuba in the decade
ending in 1808 having been estimated at fully 30,000. En-
couraged by Governor Las Casas, they contributed largely to
the development of the eastern section of the island, where
they mainly settled, and where they introduced the cultivation
of the coffee plant, the product soon becoming a large element
in the commerce of the island. The cession of Louisiana also
resulted in a large immigration of Spaniards, who found that
they must quit New Orleans or live under the flag of the
United States.

When Napoleon placed his brother on the throne of Spain,
and the Spanish, seeing themselves cheated and humiliated,
106 CUBA’S LOYALTY TO SPAIN

rose in a sort of helpless frenzy, the condition of affairs in Cuba
was greatly changed. England, which had long been an
enemy of Spain, now became her ally. English fleets, instead
of threatening Cuban waters, now aided in extending its com-
merce. When the news of the captivity of Ferdinand
reached Cuba, the colonists, irrespective of any party divisions,
refused, to recognize Joseph Bonaparte. The divisions be-
tween the Cubans and the Spaniards were for the moment
lost sight of, and the people contributed men, money, and
material to assist the Junta of Seville, which proclaimed equal
rights for all Spaniards, both at home and in the colonies.
The hopes of the Cubans rose high, but the Junta proved itself
too closely bound to the colonial monopolies to allow of a
liberal consideration of colonial rights, and the Cubans were
greatly disappointed. The authorities in the island, however,
met the crisis by boldly modifying the orders of the home
government and thus maintaining the freedom of commerce
under other than Spanish flags. During the years when Spain
was losing her colonies in South America, many loyal Span-
iards took refuge in Cuba, and, while the population was
increased and the island became the most important of Spain’s
colonies, the presence of so many Spaniards naturally con-
tributed to strengthen the reaction which followed the restora-
tion of the despotic Ferdinand.

When, after the capture of Seville, the Spanish con-
stituent Assembly was called to frame a constitution for the
Spanish monarchy, the colonies were invited, and Cuba
was represented by three deputies, the small proportion being
the cause of considerable discontent. The Constitution of
1812 became only-another factor in the discontent, for though
the pleas of the Cuban planters prevented the adoption of the
clause for the abolition of slavery in Cuba after ten years, the
rumors of the failure led to serious uprisings among the slaves,
led by José Aponto, a free negro. But the insurrection was
quickly put down and the leaders executed as usual.

However, during that brief period of constitutional gov-
FERDINAND RESTORES DESPOTISM 107

ernment Cuba enjoyed many new advantages. As one Cuban
writer expresses it, “ A division of civil and military powers
was effected; provincial deputations and constitutional muni-
cipal councils were established; liberty of the press was ac-
corded; educated judges were appointed, and the fetters of cen-
tralization were materially relaxed.” There was at this time a
population of about 600,000 on the island, an increase of about
330,000 in twenty years. Of the total, 274,000 were whites,
114,000 free blacks, and 212,000 slaves. The proportion of
increase in twenty years had been 454 per cent. of whites; 19
per cent. of free blacks; and 354 per cent. of slaves.

The revolt in South American provinces undoubtedly in-
clined the home authorities for a time to a more favorable
policy towards the faithful isle, and it was partly for this
reason that when Ferdinand restored despotism in 1814, and
trampled the constitution under his feet, Cuba at first suf-
fered less than Spain herself, though Cuban deputies were not
admitted to the Cortes. But Ferdinand then dissolved the
Cortes and undertook to restore absolutism in all its ancient
rigor. In July, 1814, the Captain-General of Cuba, Apodica,
was ordered to restore the old system, and he made the formal
attempt to do so, but liberal ideas had obtained so much head-
way that is was impossible at once to restore the old order of
things with safety.

In 1817 arose the agitation for the suppression of the slave
trade in Cuba. The importation of negroes into slavery had
been interdicted by Denmark in 1792, by England and the
United States in 1807, by Sweden in 1813, and by Holland
and Irance in 1814, and as England had performed for Spain
the service of saving her from Napoleon, that government
used its influence to bring about the suppression of the slave
trade in the Spanish colonies. The result was the conelusion
of the treaty at Madrid in 1817, by which the deportation of
negroes to Spanish colonies was made illegal after 1820, and
Ferdinand, who was ercatly in need of money, received for
this concession $2,000,000, Portugal being paid a million and

,
108 A REVOLT IN SPAIN.

a half for a like concession. The change was violently op-
posed, not so much by the Cuban planters as by the slave-
trading interests, and for years after the interdiction ship-
loads of slaves were either smuggled in or their entrance con-
nived at by the Spanish authorities.

To compensate Cuba for the supposed loss of commerce
from the interdiction, and in the hopes that it might have a
beneficial effect upon the revolting South American provinces,
which Spain expected then to recover, she consented to have
Cuban ports opened to unrestricted commerce, and encouraged
immigration to the islands. In short, owing to the favorable
influence of English intervention, Cuba made a distinct gain
at this time. But it was the forerunner of that long and
troubled period in which the Cubans and the Spaniards stood
face to face in an attitude of bitter hatred and hostility. For
a proper understanding of recent Cuban history, it is necessary
to mark closely the distinction to which this period gave rise.

It was in 1820 that the standard of revolt was raised in
Spain by Riego and Quiroga against the cruel absolutism of
Ferdinand. The movement quickly spread, and in a short
time the constitution of 1812 was again proclaimed and Ferdi-
nand was compelled to accept it. But the Captain-General
who had been sent out to Cuba two years before attempted to
delay its re-establishment in the island. He was overborne
by the garrison of the city, a part of which at once pronounced
for the liberal order of things, and they were joined by the
Cubans. <A conflict was for the time avoided by the yielding
of the Captain-General. Political prisoners were liberated
from the fortresses and the work of again establishing a con-
stitutional regiume proceeded. The succeeding governors of
the island endeavored to restrain the new tendency, and to
unite the civil and military power in the hands of the Captain-
General in opposition to the constitution, and thus a bitter
feeling was gradually aroused between the Spanish troops
under his immediate command, and the local militia who sup-
ported the Cubans. Secret societies began to take root in the
FORMATION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 109

island, and thus the two elements of the population, those sup-
porting the constitution and mostly native Cubans on the one
hand, and the adherents of absolutism on the other, gradually
took sides in opposing organizations. But while these forces
were arraying themselves in Cuba the constitution was again
broken down in Spain, this time by France under the behest
of the Holy Alliance.

The great ruling houses of Continental Europe, strong up-
holders of absolute monarchial institutions and the divine
right of kings, had naturally become alarmed over the sudden
unfolding of free institutions in the Americas and the develop-
ing weakness of the Bourbon throne of Spain. In 1815, or
shortly after Waterloo, the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and
Prussia had formed the Holy Alliance, its avowed purpose
being to maintain as a Christian doctrine that sovereign right
of legitimacy which Henry Clay in one of his speeches ex-
pressed as “a softer word for despotism.” In 1821, when
Napoleon had breathed his last at St. Helena, and after Ferdi-
nand had been temporarily set aside and carried off to Cadiz
by his subjects a prisoner, this Alliance issued a joint mani-
festo declaring that “useful or necessary changes in legisla-
tion and in the administration of states, ought only to emanate
from the free will and well-weighed conviction of those whom
God had rendered responsible for power.” The Alliance then
proceeded to put its foot upon liberal ideas in government
wherever they were found. Naturally, it turned to help the
bigoted Ferdinand, and the country was handed over to ten
years more of tyranny from the worthless Bourbon, released
from Cadiz. This was Spain’s last great effort to escape the
thraldom of superstition.

The weight of renewed despotism soon fell upon Cuba.
Marshal Vives was sent to Havana with instructions to save
it from the possible dangers of a liberal government. He
began his work in May, 18238, and the island was soon in dis-
cord. An attempt at open revolt was made by an association
known as the “ Soles de Bolivar,” the plan of which was to
110 THE GIST OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

establish a Cuban republic, but it was frustrated by the vigor-
ous Spanish officials, and the leaders who did not escape were
severely punished,

In October of that year Ferdinand, now more arrogant
than ever, set about to carry out the plan of the Holy Alliance,
which was to use Cuba as an arsenal and vantage point for the
subjugation of the newly-established South American repub-
lics. But at this point our ministers in Europe became aware
that the Holy Alliance had a much more ambitious and sweep-
ing project in mind than the assistance of Ferdinand. It was,
in fact, a plan for the combination of monarchial Europe to
throttle independence of spirit in South America. In this
situation England and the United States drew closer together
for the time, though the former had not yet recognized the
new South American republics. John Quincy Adams, then
Secretary of State, strongly advised President Monroe not to
join with England in a protest against the projects of the
-\lhance in South America, but to make his annual message to
Congress a declaration of what would be the position of the
United States if the Alliance undertook to carry out its plans.
Monroe acted on the advice, though with some reluctance, it
is said, and inserted those passages which were destined to be-
come famous as “the Monroe doctrine.” After referring in
the first part of his message to certain negotiations then in
progress between Russia and this government concerning
rights in the far northwest, he said:

“The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in
which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the
American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have

assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for
future colonization by any European power.”

That is the gist of the Monroe doctrine. Monroe continued
with some forcible words in explanation of this position and
plainly intimated that any attempt on the part of the Euro-
pean governments to interfere with the independence of the
new republics would be considered as an unfriendly act,
PURPOSE OF THE PANAMA CONGRESS 111

dangerous to our peace and safety. In England, where the
purpose of the Holy Alliance was understood, the Monroe
declaration was applauded as a bold assertion of American
spirit. Spanish-American securities at once rose on the
market. The Alliance drew back and its interference with
the new republics was thus prevented.

The natural result of all this was to increase the bitter
feeling between the Cuban people and the military govern-
ment of the Spanish-born, and as a result of several small and
unsuccessful attempts at revolt the military despotism was
strengthened, many of the soldiers originally intended for the
renewal of hostilities in South America remaining in Cuba, no
doubt because of an intended Congress of Representatives of
the American republics, the general motive for which was
concerted action in opposition to the apparent purposes of the
Holy Alliance.

It was from this point that our attitude towards Cuba was
largely influenced by her connection with slavery. It was
proposed to have this Congress meet at Panama in 1826, and
the United States was naturally invited to send a representa-
tive. In his first message President John Quincy Adams en-
dorsed the plan and announced that representatives would be
sent, but the plan was strongly opposed in the Senate upon
various pretexts, though the real reason evidently was the fear
of the slaveholding states that this Congress threatened the
institution of slavery. The republics of South America had
abolished slavery, in this being much more consistent with the
demands of liberty than the United States, and it was clear
that the representatives of the slaveholding states would pre-
fer a Spanish Cuba with slavery and an illegitimate slave-
trade, to an independent Cuba without them. There is little
doubt that the relations of our government to Cuba and Puerto
Rico would have formed a feature of the discussion in the
Congress, for the President announced that one of the pur-
poses of the Congress was to consider the “ indirect influence
which might be exercised upon any projects or purposes origi-
112 BOLIVAR’S PROJECT ABANDONED

nating in the war in which the southern republics are still
engaged and which might seriously affect the interest of this
Union.”

The Panama Congress having failed, largely because of
the inadequate support given by the United States, the move-
ment against Cuba which had been planned by Cuban refu-
gees in Mexico and Colombia and was to be led by the great lib-
erator, Simon Bolivar, was abandoned. That it was the policy
of the United States government at this time to ensure the
continued Spanish control of Cuba is clear from the statements
of Henry Clay and others, though the slave states began to
look with favor upon its annexation to strengthen the slave-
holding side of the country.
CHAPTER VI

SPAIN’S SECRET ATTEMPTS TO SELL THE ISLAND OF CUBA
TO FRANCE—NEGRO OUTBREAKS AND THE TRAGIC
DEATH OF THE MULATTO POET, VALDEZ.

The Captain-General Endowed with Extraordinary Authority — Powers
Misused and Unrest Fostered — The ‘‘ Black Eagle ” —Discord among
the Planters — Inauguration of Spanish Venality in Cuba — The
Irrepressible Conflict in the United States— Death of Ferdinand —
No Reforms for Poor Cuba — Spanish Treasury Depleted — The
Queen’s Plan to Secretly Sell Cuba to France — A Monstrous Propo-
sition — Meeting in the King’s Cabinet — Louis Phillippe Demands a
Reduction in the Price of the Philippines —Throwing an Important
Contract into the Fire — Class Hatred Grows in Cuba — Cuba Granted
Representation in the Cortes — The Slave Trade — Outbreaks among
the Negroes — Execution of a Mulatto Poet — His Prayer Recited on
the way to Execution — His Heroic Death.

with those extraordinary powers which for years re-

mained the supreme law of Cuba. Threatened by a
revolution of the natives, and by attacks from Mexico and Co-
lombia, and fearing the designs of the United States, he re-
solved, “ for the important end of preserving in that precious
island his legitimate sovereign authority,” to give to the Cap-
tain-General all the powers which by the royal ordinances were
granted to the governors of besieged cities. He, therefore,
granted “ the most ample and unbounded power, to send away
from the island any persons in office, whatever their occupa-
tion, rank, class, or condition, whose continuance therein ”
the Captain-General might deem injurious, replacing them
with persons faithful to his majesty. He was also granted the
power to suspend the execution of any order whatsoever.
From that day the Captain-General was, in effect, the absolute

ruler of the island, the one essential being that he please his
(118)

le May, 1825, Ferdinand endowed Captain-General Vives
114 THE ‘‘ BLACK EAGLE”

king. He became a military dictator, and the degree of his
despotism depended only upon his character and disposition.
Naturally, the sovereign appointed none but those whom he
belicved to be thorough Spaniards, and thus it happened that
many of the governors misused their enormous powers, widen-
ing the breach between the islanders and the peninsulars, and
causing that very unrest which the grant of authority was in-
tended to repress.

As under strict military supervision, with a large army
constantly on hand, uprisings had little chance of success un-
less operated from outside, Cuban exiles everywhere became
constant conspirators. In Mexico and Colombia they or-
ganized, in 1827, a secret society called the “ Black Eagle,”
and in a short time its ramifications extended into many Cuban
cities and towns. The watchful military forces had no dif-
ficulty in finding the main conspirators on the island, and a
large number of them were condemned to death, the rest to
exile, though the Captain-General was wise enough, in view of
the growing discontent, to mitigate these sentences in many
cases. Vives used his powers with much discretion, but under
his successor, Mariano Ricafort, venality and corruption be-
came more and more manifest, large sums of money wrung
from the Cubans by taxation finding their way into the pockets
of minor officials instead of into public works or into the Span-
ish treasury.

While the opposition of the slaveholding class in Cuba
was one cause of the failure of attempts to shake off the Span-
ish yoke, the slave interests in the United States led the South
to take a position decidedly unfriendly to Cuban independ-
ence, but distinctly favorable to our acquisition of the island.
Early in the constitutional history of the United States, the
acquisition of Cuba had been regarded as desirable if only as a
strategic point. ;

“ T candidly confess,” wrote Jefferson to President Monroe
in 1823, “ that I have ever looked at Cuba as the most interest-
ing addition that could be made to our system of States. The
OPINIONS OF JEFFERSON AND EVERETT 115

control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us
over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries and the isthmus
bordering it, would fill up the measure of our political well
being.” This theory grew naturally out of the consideration
of the geographical position of the island. “ Our safety from
this danger,” that is, the control of the Gulf by a hostile power,
wrote Alexander Hill Everett, our Minister to Spain from
1825 to 1829, in a letter to President Adams, “ has, I believe,
long been considered as resulting. wholly from the feebleness
and insufficiency of Spain; and it has been viewed by all as a
settled point that the American government would not consent
to any change in the political situation of Cuba other than
one which would place it under the jurisdiction of the United
States.” He proceeded to argue that in consequence of the
internal state of the island, the obstinate adherence of Spain
to the colonial system, and the growing strength of the new
South American states, the island could not long remain in its
existing condition, and as the whites were too few to make an
independent government possible, it must eventually fall into
the hands of some other power or become a republic of blacks,
like Haiti. For these reasons he considered it highly impor-
tant that the United States should at once endeavor to obtain
possession of the island in a peaceable way. “If they do not
succeed in this,” he said, “ it is morally certain that they will be
forced, at no very distant period, to effect the same object in a
more invidious manner and at the risk of embroiling them-
selves with some of the great powers of Europe.”

He then asked that he might be favored with instructions
with a view to negotiations on the basis he proposed, which was,
in effect, to offer Spain, then in desperate straits financially, a
considerable loan on condition of a temporary cession of the
island as security. If the loan was not repaid within a
specified time, the United States should assume entire and un-
disputed ownership of Cuba. He closed by saying: “Should
this government (Spain), however, attempt to proceed upon

its usual plan of delay, after all that has already passed, I can-
8
116 ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTHERN STATES

not but hope that Congress will resort to vigorous measures.
The mere demonstration would in this case be effectual and
would be unattended by any danger or inconvenience what-
ever. Nevertheless, violence is always unpleasant, even when
necessary, politic, and safe, so that I should prefer an early
termination of these vexatious disputes in an amicable way.”

But as Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, said in a letter
to Everett that same year, the United States were satisfied with
the existing condition of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the hands of
Spain and with their ports open to free commerce, but he in-
timated that if war should continue between Spain and the
new South American republics, or there should be danger of
Cuba falling into other hands, the United States would not be
disinterested spectators.

While this was the position of the administration, it was
not the position of the inhabitants of the Southern States.
How completely slavery dominated the sentiments of the
South can be judged from the fact that, much as it would
have liked to have the United States acquire Cuba as new
slave territory, nothing would have been more hateful to it
than Cuban independence. In writing to Van Ness, minister
to Spain in 1829, President Van Buren said that “ other con-
siderations connected with a certain class of our population
make it the interest of the Southern section of the Union that
no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke
of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the
sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, the re-
sult of which could not but be very sensibly felt upon the ad-
jacent shores of the United States.”

The State Department also warmly protested in communi-
cations to the government of Mexico against any attempt to
disturb Cuba by putting arms in the hands of one portion of
its population to destroy another, “which in its influence
would endanger the peace of a portion of the United States.”
Thus it was that because of the growing predominance of pro-
slavery control, even then threatening disunion, the govern-
BEGINNING OF THE CARLIST WARS 117

ment of the United States threw its influence in favor of the
Spaniards. While boasting of our freedom, our interests in
slavery made us partisans of Spanish oppression.

When the ignoble Ferdinand died in 1833 and his infant
daughter Isabella was proclaimed Queen under the regency of
her mother Christina, the latter was forced to turn to the Span-
ish Liberals for help against Ferdinand’s brother Carlos, who,
claiming the throne by Salic law, took up arms against the
regency, thus beginning the Carlist wars, which have ever
since disturbed the Spanish nation. The Liberals demanded
reforms, and the revival of the Cortes, which Christina, from
necessity, granteg, but this had no effect upon poor Cuba.
The following year General Tacon was appointed Captain-
General, and instead of adopting a policy of conciliation and
fair treatment to bridge the ever-widening gap between the
Cubans and the Spanish-born, he used his unlimited powers
arbitrarily, and enforced a rigid proscription of all who op-
posed his will.

In 1836, when the Spanish treasury was sadly depleted,
there occurred a bit of history not known at the time except
to the three or four parties engaged in it. The Queen con-
ceived the idea of selling to France the turbulent island which
had ceased to be “ ever faithful,” and even the Philippines,
so pressing were her financial needs, and she commissioned a
Spanish banker at Paris to sound Prince Talleyrand upon the
subject. The banker in his note to the Prince spoke mys-
teriously of a plan which might bring fortunes to those en-
gaged in the transaction, but which, if unsuccessful, must for-
ever remain a secret to the rest of the world. The Queen then
despatched Campuzano to Paris to represent the crown in the
business, but he was heartily ashamed of his mission; an at-
tempt to deprive Spain of what he considered her brightest
jewel, nearly all that remained of her once great American
empire. He undertook the office, he said afterwards, because
he feared that if he declined it, it might fall to some of the
Queen’s favorites, who would seek nothing but the personal
118 BARGAINING FOR CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES

pecuniary advantage to be derived from it. Campuzano had a
meeting with Talleyrand. When the secret agreement to be
signed by the King of France and the Queen Regent of Spain
was being read, Campuzano is described by Talleyrand’s secre-
tary as being deeply affected. The proposition from the Span-
ish ruler was so monstrous and base that he struck the table a
heavy blow with his fist and muttered a curse. Cristina pro-
posed for a consideration of 30,000,000 reals (about $3,-
500,000) to hand Cuba over to France, and for 10,000,000
reals more to give up Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

The Queen’s plan would make it necessary for France to
raise a loan, and this was to be floated on the Bourse. Out of
the loan the banker would receive large commissions, while
1,000,000 franes was to be offered to Prince Talleyrand, and
300,000 franes was to be distributed as bribes and commis-
sions to other people whose support might be essential.
When, a few days later, the parties met in the King’s cabinet
to sign the contract, Campuzano could hardly contro] himself,
so disgusted was he with the business which seemed to be
working to a successful conclusion. The article on Cuba
hardly provoked any discussion, but when it came to the
Philippines, Louis Philippe thought he saw an opportunity
for driving a bargain. He remarked that the cession of the
Philippines to France would be so obnoxious to England that
serious complications, if not war, might result. He there-
fore demanded a lower price on the Philippines, and pushing
the contract across the table to Campuzano, exclaimed im-
periously:

“ The reduction of price mast be secepted. The terms are
too onerous. Seven million reals is my offer, or else the con-
tract must be thrown into the fire.”

Talleyrand, who knew how disgusted Campuzano was
with the whole business, and who feared that the King’s move
might spoil the lucrative job, stretched out his hand to pick up
the paper and was about to speak, when Campuzano, starting
up so quickly that his chair fell backward, leaned over the
THE CONTRACT BURNED TO ASHES 119

table, seized the contract, crumpled it in his hand, and look-
ing at the astonished King, said:

“Your majesty is right. The contract is worthless, only
fit to be thrown into the fire.”

He flung the paper on the blazing logs of the fireplace,
and with the tongs beat it down until nothing remained but
the blackened fragments. And thus ended Spain’s only pro-
position for the sale of Cuba.

Meantime the condition of the Cubans upon the unhappy
island became worse and worse under the despotism of Tacon.
The Captain-General was surrounded by corrupt and greedy
office-holders from Spain, while the Creoles were under ban,
though they were the children of peninsulars, many of them
well educated and wealthy. Their misfortune consisted
solely in having been born outside the peninsular, and the
period was at hand when class hatred was to manifest itself in
an antagonism never to end till Cuba should be free. In con-
sidering this period we should not lose sight of events in Spain.

Pressed almost to the point of defeat by the armies of Don
Carlos, Christina, upon her failure to secure money by the sale
of Cuba and the Philippines to France, resolved upon desperate
measures, and a new levy of 100,000 men was made without
a real to pay them. But her minister adopted the policy of
confiscating nearly the entire mass of church property.
While this seemed to open up boundless resources to a nation
so devoured with forced loans, heavy taxes, and administrative
robbery, it was found to be entirely inadequate. In an effort
to realize something from indemnities, the independence of
the South American republics was at last acknowledged (De-
cember, 1836), and that chapter of Spanish decadence was
closed, but the Spanish coffers remained empty and the general
misery culminated in an outbreak, on account of which Chris-
tina was forced to sign a decree recognizing the Constitution
of 1812 till the will of the nation should be made known in
the Cortes. This was eventually done in the revised Constitu-
tion of 1887.
120 PROFESSED CONCLSSIONS AND NEW OPPRESSIONS

It would have been natural to suppose that in such an
ascendency of liberal ideas in the peninsula, Cuba would at
last be enabled to secure some small share of her rights as an
“ever-faithful isle.” Soon after the death of Ferdinand, and
in an evident effort to increase Cuba’s contributions to the
treasury of the home government faced with a Carlist war,
the Queen had issued a decree again allowing Cuba a small
representation in the Cortes, though the unlimited powers of
the Captain-General remained in all their rigorous force, and
the concession really amounted to no more than the paper it
was written on. When, two years later, the Queen, under
compulsion, again promulgated the Constitution of 1812, the
despotic Tacon ignored the decree, and suppressed its procla-
mation in Santiago de Cuba, where General Lorenzo had at-
tempted to promulgate it in spite of the Captain-General.
Tacon sent a large military expedition to Santiago and im-
prisoned or exiled all who had joined in the effort. Under
the Constitution Spain was allowed one representative for each
50,000 inhabitants, but Cuba was put off with four, although
on the basis of the white population alone the island would
have been entitled to nine.

But even this alleged concession was but the forerunner
of a new display of despotism. Speaking in open parliament,
a representative of the Cortes said: “The government has
never held the opinion that deputies should be sent from
America; it has been considered as an evil which it was neccs-
sary to cut short.’ Their advent was a calamity.” <A select
commission at this time drew up a report which was accepted
by the Cortes, and by which it was resolved no longer to admit
deputies from Cuba. The Cuban deputies protested in vain,
and from that date the political constitution of Cuba became
established in accordance with the Queen’s decree of April 25,
1837, a decree which stripped the “ ever-faithful isle ” of all
voice in its own affairs.

This decree announced that the provinces should no longer
be represented in the Cortes, and that,
DARK PAGES IN CUBA’S HISTORY 121

First, as this decision might be “ distasteful to the wicked,”
active malcontents should be “ subject to the judgment of com-
petent tribunals.”

Second, that the provinces should continue to be governed
by the laws of the Indies, and by ordinances and royal orders
issued for their observance; that the Captain-General should
see that these laws were rigidly enforced, and that no measures
adopted in the peninsula be promulgated in the colonies unless
communicated to the Captain-General by the proper minister.

Third, that the higher authorities should assist Her
Majesty by adopting such measures as are necessary to enforce
the special laws.

Fourth, that the liberty of the press should not be per-
mitted, and that vigilant censorship should be exercised upon
pamphlets, newspapers, and writings printed in other coun-
tries.

The years which followed this order made bloody pages in
the history of Cuba. Spain was deaf to the complaints of a
people devoid of a free press, of the right of assembly, and of
the security of the law. The military system gave rise to
many excesses, and the infamous contraband slave trade was
carried on and openly tolerated in violation of treaties by
which, for a money consideration from England, Spain had
formally forbidden it. The government of Spain had de-
clared that all negroes brought from Africa subsequent to the
treaty should be at once set free, and that the ships on which
they had been transported should at once be confiscated, while
the captains and crews and others concerned should be pun-
' ished with ten years servitude. Yet the statistics show that
for the twenty-five years following this treaty an average of
fifteen thousand slaves annually arrived in Cuba from Africa.
It is asserted that in the four years that Tacon was Captain-
General he made no secret of receiving a doubloon, or seven-
teen dollars, per head on every slave landed, and the home
government secretly fostered the trade for the sake of the rev-
enue which went into the pockets of its members.
122 THE POET-MARTYR, VALDEZ

Naturally, the inhabitants of African descent were con-
tinually restive, and many of the mulattoes showed a genius
for leadership, which was often to characterize later Cuban
history. Small insurrections were frequent and conspiracies
were constant. In dealing with them the government was
ruthless, and it was simply necessary for someone to whisper
to an official that a conspiracy was being hatched to lead to
the execution of those who might under any circumstances
be connected with it. Plans for an insurrection were laid in
1844 among the slaves of the sugar plantations about Matan-
zas. Ag the officials discovered the plot early and acted at
once, the real guilt of the arrested parties was largely a matter
of suspicion. The difficulty of obtaining satisfactory evi-
dence was such that the Spaniards resorted to the method of
examining witnesses under torture. How many testified to
suit the government, simply to escape further torture, could
not be known, but the result was the conviction of 1,346 per-
sons, of whom forty-eight were shot and the others subjected
to lesser forms of punishment. Of the guilty ones only fifty-
nine were slaves; 1,242 were free blacks of all shades, and
fourteen were white.

One of those condemned to death, largely because of hav-
ing sung in his poems of the liberty of his country and his race,
was the mulatto poet, Gabriel Concepcion de la Valdez. This
martyr, of whom the world knows but little, possessed in a
marked degree the true poetic spirit. He began his career as
a foundling — the poverty-stricken descendant of a race of
slaves. His childhood was that of a poor laborer with no
means of securing an education except such as he himself could
gather with difficulty. Had he received the stimulus of a
government encouraging letters he might have made himself
better known in the history of literature, but his works would
have been no more immortal than they became, condemned
as he was to spend upon his native soil a life of misery and in-
sult, ending in death by Spanish bullets.

While waiting for his execution he wrote a prayer,
HIS LAST POEM 123

“ Plegaria a Dios,” beautiful in its rhyme and meter, pathetic,
yet brave, in sentiment, and worthy ofa place beside the
classics of the Spanish language. The following excellent
translation has been made by Louis Edward Levy in his notes
to Cabrera’s “ Cuba and the Cubans ”’:

‘Being of boundless good! Almighty God!
To Thee I turn in my most poignant grief ;
Extend Thy hand omnipotent to hold
This odious veil of calumny from me,
And tear away the ignominious seal
With which the world would harshly brand my brow.

“Kings of Kings! Thou God of my forefathers |
Thou art my sole defender, Oh, my God !
All may He do who to the somber sea
Its waves and fishes gave, to heaven its light,
Fire to the sun, and to the North its ice,
Life to the plant, and movement to the rills.

“All things canst Thou accomplish ; all things die
And live again but through Thy holy word.
Apart from Thee, O Lord, all things are naught
And lost in fathomless eternity;

Yet doth obey Thee this same nothingness,
For thereof didst Thou humankind create.

“‘T cannot Thee deceive, Thou God of Truth,
And since it is that Thy omniscient eye
Doth through my body see this soul of mine
As through the clear transparency of air,
Do Thou prevent that innocence be crushed
And wicked slander triumph undisturbed.

“But if in Thy omnipotence Thou wouldst
That I shall perish like a Godless wretch,
And that men may my cold and lifeless corse
Abase and outrage with malignant joy,
Then let Thy voice be heard and end ny life,
And let Thy will, O Lord, be done in me!”

These lines he repeated as he was led forth to his execu-
tion on the Plaza de Armas in Matanzas. The first volley
fired at him by the soldiers failed to hit a vital part, and the
heroic victim, bleeding from many wounds, turned to his exe-
cutioners.
124 THE END OF A SORROWFUL LIFE

“ Aim here!” he shouted in a clear, calm voice, pointing to
his heart.

The order for another volley came, and the brave mulatto
dropped dead upon the ground, his blood mingling with that
soil into which has run so much of the life current of those who
have died for “ Cuba Libre.”

When we consider the deliberate efforts of Spain to with-
hold educational advantages from the natives of Cuba, and
especially the poorer classes, we cannot but be surprised at the
wealth of good Cuban literature and art during the nineteenth
century. To some extent, doubtless, this is due to the prac-
tice of the richer Cubans of sending their sons to the United
States or to Europe to be educated, but some of the finest ex-
amples of genius must be traced to the humblest conditions
of Cuban life. Many of these men have been exiles from
their native land — like the mulatto musician, José White,
at the head of the Conservatory of Music of Brazil.
CHAPTER VII

FILIBUSTERING EXPEDITIONS AND THE DEATH OF LOPEZ
—THE BLACK WARRIOR—THE FAMOUS OSTEND CON-
FERENCE — A CUBAN WARNING.

Buchanan’s Efforts to Buy Cuba— Spain Refuses to Sell — Lopez and
His Uprising — His Filibustering Attempts— Capture of Colonel
Crittenden and His Men— Lopez Killed by a Spanish Garrote —
Private Filibustering — A Change in Party Government— A Sym-
pathizer with Filibusters— Duels of the Soulés—An Affair of
Honor with the French Minister —The Black Warrior Case — Feel-
ing against Spain Intensified —Soulé Threatens Spain — Conference
of American Ministers at Ostend — Fixing a Price on Cuba— The
Manifesto—Soulé Throws up His Commission in Disgust — Effort
to Secure Cuba — Increasing Burdens of Cuba — Arrogance of Span- .
ish Authority —Burdens Only Increased — A Cuban Warning.

1845, the proposition to acquire Cuba by purchase or

otherwise was widely discussed in the United States, and
during the Mexican war which fixed the boundary of Texas
and brought California into the Union as a free state, the
strength of the Cuban idea increased rapidly. The slave-
holders had become greatly concerned over the anti-slavery
agitation, and they looked to Cuba as a means of establishing
the equilibrium of sectional strength. In 1848, therefore,
Buchanan, Secretary of State under President Polk, proposed
negotiations for the purchase of the island to the Spanish gov-
ernment through the American Minister at Madrid, who was
instructed to point out to Spain that she was in danger of losing
Cuba by revolution, and that it might be wrested from her by
Great Britain if a rupture came in their relations. The min-
ister was authorized to pay as much as $100,000,000, and the
treaty should be modeled upon that of the Louisiana purchase.

(125)

| N the agitation which led to the annexation of Texas in
126 LOPEZ’S EXPEDITIONS FRUSTRATED

But the refusal of Spain to entertain the proposition put an
end to the project, and the growth of the anti-slavery sentiment
led many of the slaveholders to lend support to violence in the
shape of filibustering expeditions.

The Cuban liberals, unable to carry on their revolutionary ~
movements at home because of the military vigilance of the
Spanish authorities, turned to the United States as a place to
organize their movements. In May,1847, Narciso Lopez, who
had formed a conspiracy for a rising in central Cuba, was de-
tected and fled to the United States. During the following
year he formed an association of Cuban fugitives in New York,
and in 1849, after the failure of Buchanan’s negotiations, Lo-
pez organized a military expedition and induced many promi-
nent southern citizens to become interested init. The attempt
was frustrated by the vigilance of President Taylor, who had
succeeded Polk, and who issued a warning proclamation. The
second and third attempts were more serious. In April, 1850,
Lopez sailed from New Orleans with about three hundred
Southerners under his command, and, after baffling one of
our naval vessels which was sent to intercept the expedition,
he landed at Cardenas, overcame the Spanish guards, and took
possession. But the spirit of revolution was not at that mo-
ment ripe in the cities of Cuba, and+so Lopez, finding himself
unsupported and unable to reach the rural districts, was soon
driven from the island by the government troops. He took
refuge in Savannah, where he was arrested for violating our
neutrality laws, but he was quickly discharged.

Lopez was not in the least daunted and he saw that he had
the sympathy of a large portion of the southern people. En-
couraged by some revolutionary manifestations in Cuba in
1851 he hastened to New Orleans and organized a new force
of about 450 men, draining as before upon the purses of zealous
politicians in the cause of slavery and disunion. He sailed
away on the steamer Pampero intending to land on the south-
ern coast. But learning at Key West of a revolt at a favor-
able point on the north.coast he made for that place, but missed
FATE OF LOPEZ AND CRITTENDEN 127

it and disembarked on a lonely portion of the coast about thirty
miles from Havana. Colonel Crittenden of Kentucky, sec-
ond in command, with a hundred men, was left in charge
of the stores and baggage, while Lopez, with the remainder
of his command, advanced inland to the town of Poazas,
whose inhabitants,.instead of lending their enthusiastic aid,
fled at once. The separated forces never reunited. Crit-
tenden’s band finally put out to sea in small boats to escape the
Spanish soldiers, and were soon captured by a Spanish war
vessel, which took them to Havana, where, after a summary
trial, they were shot on the 17th of August. Lopez had ad-
vanced but a short distance into the interior, suffering greatly
and finding the simple inhabitants of that section indifferent
to the cause, when he was attacked by government forces, and
after a severe loss he fled to the mountains. But here he was
surprised on the 24th of August by an overwhelming force,
and his scattered men, after wandering about, were gradually
caught and taken to Havana. Lopez was executed at dawn,
September Ist, by the Spanish garrote, an instrument by which
the victim is clasped fast in an iron chair while an iron screw
is pierced through a brass collar to the spinal marrow. The
newspapers of the day record that this execution was publicly
performed in the midst of an approving crowd.

President Fillmore had by proclamation stigmatized all
such hostile adventures from our shores as violations of both
national and international law, and had warned citizens of the
United States who aided such projects that they would forfeit
all claims to the protection of the government. The French
and English governments had also issued orders to their West
Indian fleets to prevent, by force if need be, such invasions of
Cuba. But as a result the Spanish authorities in Cuba be-
came very suspicious of American designs, especially when the
South showed such unmistakable signs of irritation at the
failure of the filibustering schemes, for a mob at New Orleans
attacked the Spanish residents and tore in pieces a flag on the
building of the Spanish consulate. But a little diplomacy
128 PROPOSITION OF FRANCE AND ENGLAND

soon secured a better feeling between Spain and this govern-
ment, and the Southern spirits who still dreamed of securing
Cuba were for the time occupied with the more serious aspects
of the slavery question at home. Henceforth the designs of
the slave party were mainly confined to attempts to purchase
the island. Still, there were some attempts at. filibustering
of a private character. In 1853, General Quitman of Missis-
sippi headed a movement in which extensive enlistments were
made and considerable money was collected, but the govern-
ment interfered, and the leaders in Cuba who promised to work
with Quitman were captured, and eventually several of them
were shot.

Early in 1852 the French and English governments, in-
fluenced by the efforts of the South to acquire Cuba, made a
joint proposition to the government of the United States for a
tripartite convention for disclaiming severally and collectively
all intention of obtaining possession of the island, and binding
themselves to disecountenance all attempts to that effect on
the part of any power or individuals whatever. In December,
1852, Edward Everett, Secretary of State, replied to the
pr oposition in a letter which is an important landmark in our
relations with Spain as to Cuba. The French minister had
stated that France could never see with indifference the pos-
session of Cuba by any other power than Spain, and explicitly
declared that she had no wish or intention of appropriating the
island to herself. Lord Malmesbury made a similar avowal
on behalf of the English government, but Mr. Everett stated
that this government could not, for various reasons which he
proceeded to enumerate, enter into an agreement to pledge
itself for all time, no matter what the circumstances, not to
consider the possibility of the acquisition of Cuba. One of the
reasons was that such a convention would be an entangling
alliance contrary to the oldest traditions of the government;
another, that such an agreement, though equal in terms, would
be very unequal in suhstanee. Cnba lay close to our shores,
commanded the approach to the Gulf and to the entrance of
r

WISE WORDS OF EDWARD EVERETT 129

the Mississippi. “If,” he said, * an island like Cuba, belong-
ing to the Spanish crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames
and the Seine, and the United States should propose a con-
vention like this to France and England, those powers would
assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far
less serious than that which we asked them to assume.”

Mr. Everett said further that while opinions differed as to
the desirability of the United States acquiring Cuba, there
might come a time when it would be essential to our safety.
“Still,” he added, “the President thinks that the incorpora-
tion of the island into the Union at the present time, although
effected with the consent of Spain, would be a hazardous
measure; and he would consider its acquisition by force, except
in a just war with Spain (should an event so greatly to be
deprecated take place), as a disgrace to the civilization of the
age.” He pointed out how, in spite of annoyances to which
the United States had been subjected by acts of the Captain-
General in Cuba, the President had thrown the whole force of
his constitutional power against all illegal attacks upon the
island. “<A respectful sympathy,” he added, “with the
fortunes of an ancient ally and a gallant people, with whom
the United States has ever maintained the most friendly rela-
tions, would, if no other reason existed, make it our duty to
leave her in the undisturbed possession of this little remnant
of her mighty trans-Atlantic empire. The President desires
to do so; no word or deed of his will ever question her title or
shake her possession. But can it be expected to last very
‘long? Can it resist this mighty current in the fortunes of the
world? Is it desirable that it should do so? Can it be for the
interest of Spain to cling to a possession that can only be main-
tained by a garrison of 25,000 or 30,000 troops, a powerful
naval force, and an annual expenditure for both arms and
service of at least $12,000,000% Cuba at this moment costs
more to Spain than the entire naval and military establish-
ments of the United States costs the Federal government. So
far from being really injured by the loss of the island, there is
130 CUBA AND THE CAUSE OF SLAVERY

no doubt that were it peacefully transferred to the United
States a prosperous commerce between Cuba and Spain, re-
susting from ancient associations and common language, would
be far more productive than the best contrived system of
colonial taxation. . . . I will but allude to an evil of the first
magnitude: I mean the African slave trade, in the sup-
pression of which France and England take a lively interest —
an evil which still forms a great reproach upon the civilization
of Christendom, and perpetuates the barbarism of Africa, but
for which, it is to Le feared, there is no hope of a complete
remedy while Cuba remains a Spanish colony.”

Thus were France and England a half century ago given
to understand that, while we could not consent to any other
European power than Spain occupying Cuba, we might under
certain contingencies feel compelled to take it to ourselves;
but not for the aggrandizement of slave power.

But in the following year the Whig administration, whosc
sentiments Everett had expressed, ended, and the party whose
politics were largely dominated by the defenders of slavery
came into power. An ciao cae expansionist, Pierre
Soulé, a Frenchman by birth, was sentto the Madrid mission.
Marcy, the new Secretary of State, sent hint instructions which
went much further than the judicial argument of Everett, and
which indicated how closely bound up in Cuba and its illegiti-
mate slave trade was the cause of slavery in this country.
This fact is more forcibly and less diplomatically expressed in
the private letters of General Quitman of Mississippi, who
could boast for his filibustering schemes many sympathizers*
in Congress and even in the administration. ‘“ Our destiny is
intertwined,” he said, “with that of Cuba. If slave institu-
tions perish there, they will perish here. Thus interested, we
must act.” Marey wrote to Soulé that, under certain cireum-
stances, the United States would be willing to purchase, but
he did not believe that Spain would entertain negotiations,
and he felt convinced that Spain was under obligations to
Great Britain and France not to transfer the island to the
A UNITED STATES MINISTER IN DIFFICULTIES 131

United States. “Independent of any embarrassment of this
vature,” he added significantly, “ there are many other reasons
for believing that Spain will pertinaciously hold on to Cuba,
and that the separation, whenever it takes place, will be the
work of violence.”

The selection of Soulé for a mission which had been
graced by such distinguished Americans as Washington
Irving, showed to what straits the slave party were reduced to
carry out their plans. Soulé was an exile from France for
being a conspirator against the French Bourbons, and Napo-
leon ITI. heartily disliked him. He was a sympathizer with
the filibusters, and not long before his departure for Spain
had made a speech in public praising Lopez and his deeds, but
he was formally received at Madrid, though he quickly in-
volved himself in difficulties. Not long after his arrival, with
his wife and son he attended a ball at the house of Admiral
Turgot, the French ambassador, in honor of the Empress
Eugénie, whose sister had married the Duke of Alva. Dur-
ing the evening the Duke innocently enough remarked that
Mrs. Soulé, who was dressed in green velvet, looked like Mary
of Burgundy. Young Soulé heard it, and at once challenged
the Duke of Alva, and although the latter disclaimed any in-
tention of being rude to Mrs. Soulé, the duel took place and no
one was hurt. But the elder Soulé, having heard that the
remarked had first proceeded from the mouth of Turgot, at
whose house the ball was given, immediately challenged the
French ambassador, and they fought the next morning with
pistols, Turgot receiving a ball in his knee, which for a long
time impaired his health. These affairs made Soulé’s person-
ality anything but pleasant to Spain and France.

—~Shortly after this duel the sentiment against Spain in the
United States was greatly intensified by the case of the Black
Warrior, a steamer owned in New York and plying regularly
between that port and Mobile. She was the largest steamer
‘in the coasting trade, and possessed accommodations for 200

cabin passengers. In going and returning, she touched at
9
1382 SEIZURE OF THE ‘‘ BLACK WARRIOR”

Havana to deliver and receive mail and passengers, but not
for the purpose of discharging or taking on any freight. The
custom laws at Havana were very strict, and under them she
should have exhibited each time a manifest of her cargo.
This, of course, would have been to no purpose as no cargo
was to be moved, so she usually entered Havana and cleared as
“in ballast” to save time and trouble. She had so entered
and cleared thirty-six times in succession, with the full knowl-
edge and consent of the Spanish custom officers, and in accord-
ance with a written general order given by the authorities
seven years before. Stopping at Havana as usual in Feb-
ruary, 1854, the steamer was held in the harbor for having an
undeclared cargo. The cargo was confiscated and taken on
shore, and a fine of more than twice its value was imposed on
the captain and his vessel. The captain refused to pay, pro-
testing against the whole proceeding as wrongful. He de-
clared it a forcible seizure, and, hauling down his colors, left
his vessel as a Spanish capture and made his way back to the
United States,where the owners preferred a claim for
$300,000 indemnity.

Soulé meanwhile had applied every art of menace and
cajolery to induce Spain to cede Cuba to the United States,
and in accordance with his instructions from Marcy protested
against any interference from other European powers in the
negotiations. Spain proudly spurned all negotiations on the
subject. The minister declared in the Cortes that such a sale
would be “the sale of Spanish honor itself.” Then came
from Washington a demand for redress for the Black Warrior
seizure.

In order to impress the governments of Europe as well as
their own, the ministers to England, France, and Spain,
Buchanan, Mason, and Soulé, respectively, all eager to add
Cuba to our slave territory, at the suggestion of Secretary
Marcy called a conference of themselves at Ostend in October,
1854. They conferred three days, and then transferred their
deliberations to Aix-la-Chapelle, where they drew up the re-
THE OSTEND MANIFESTO 133

port which became known as the Ostend Manifesto. It was
proposed that our government should make a bold strike for
Cuba, and that an immediate and earnest effort should be
made to purchase it from Spain at a price not exceeding a cer-
tain maximum, which was between themselves and the admin-
istration fixed at $120,000,000. They declared that our pro-
posal to Spain should be open and frank, so as to challenge the
approbation of the world, and such a transfer, they urged,
would be beneficial to Spain and to all the commercial nations
of Europe. What with her own oppression and the danger of
insurrectionary troubles, they said, Spain, unless she sold,
might lose Cuba and the price as well. Finally, supposing a
price should be refused, the question would remain, they de-
clared, whether Cuba in the hands of Spain did not endanger
our internal peace and the existence of our Union; and if so,
we should be justified by every law, human and divine, in
wresting it from her.

But this remarkable manifesto did not produce the desired
effect. President Pierce was too prudent to at once follow
such reckless advice, and the Kansas-Nebraska trouble soon
furnished him with enough to attend to, especially as it made
the North determined to allow of no more territorial acquisi-
tions till the slavery question was settled. The impetuous
Soulé, observing the hesitation of the government, threw up
his commission and returned home in disgust. Thereupon,
Spain made compensation for the Black Warrior, and both
nations exhibited a more peaceful and amiable disposition.

When Buchanan became President, however, the slave-
holders thought that the policy of “ territorial expansion ”
would be vigorously prosecuted. His message certainly gave
promise of such a policy, and Cuba played a conspicuous part
init. But by this time the anti-slavery sentiment had become
strong enough to hold the South in check. Still, Buchanan
did his best to keep the Cuban project to the front, even after
the elections of 1858 showed that the verdict of the people
was against him. When Congress met in December, he spoke
134 A PROPOSAL FOR THE PURCHASE OF CUBA

much of Cuba, Mexico, and Central America. He held that
if Spain would not sell, self-defense would compel us to annex
it by force. Slidell, one of the President’s most intimate
friends, presented in the Senate a bill proposing to place in
the hands of the Executive $30,000,000 for negotiating the
purchase of Cuba, and he made a long report describing in
glowing language the advantages to be derived, and strongly
reiterating the threat that if Spain would not listen to negotia-
tions, the government of the United States would, by them-
selves or in assisting the Cubans, drive Spain from the island.
But Congress would do nothing in times of such domestic ex-
citement, and Buchanan’s advice went unheeded. The posi-
tion of the parties would have been quite different had Cuba
been wanted for the sake of freedom, but the island was an
open market for slaves, and was desired for just this reason.

In writing to Tocqueville in 1858, Charles Sumner said:
“Why will not Spain follow the example of other European
powers — and now of Russia — and declare emancipation in
her colonies? This would do more to settle the slavery ques-
tion than any blow ever before struck. It would at once take
Cuba from the field of Mr. Buchanan’s lawless desires and
destroy the ailment of the filibusters; besides, it would be an
act of noble justice as well as of wise statesmanship.” He
considered that the neck of slavery was in Cuba, and if it
could be severed there it could not last longer in the United
States. But the question was to be settled in another way,
and when the war broke out this unpleasant chapter in the re-
lations of the United States to Cuba was closed.

During this decade Cubans bore the ever-increasing weight
-of oppression in a spirit of hopefulness, and every attempt to
throw it off was impotent, so extensive and thorough was the
military espionage. It is not strange that their valor was un-
equal to the situation when, living in an island smaller than
the State of New York, they were under the constant watch of
an army larger than was necessary in the whole of the United
States. The Spanish government constantly added to the
PROTECTED ONLY BY BRIBERY 135

burden of taxation, and thus the discontent of the people con-
tinued to increase. Commerce with the United States was
almost destroyed by prohibitory restrictions, and that with the
mother country was subjected to a heavy tax.

An American observer in Cuba in the fifties wrote:
“Every kind of judicial enormity prevails and every descrip-
tion of imposition is practiced upon the helpless Creole. If
he commits a wrong, he is punished without an opportunity of
being heard in his own defense; or, what is the same thing, he
is tried before a prejudiced tribunal. If he has suffered an
injury he finds the means of redress so tedious that endurance
is preferable to the formidable task of obtaining justice.
There is but one means of avoiding persecution, but one way
to escape when persecuted, but one method to obtain justice
when seeking ordinary redress — it is bribery. Gold will
open prison doors; procure dispensation for falsely imputed
crimes; obtain a tardy degree of long-sought justice. Thus
personal security istonly to be enjoyed at the expense of the
right of property.”

The effect of these regulations were sometimes minimized
by the good fortune to secure as Governor-General a man of
more than ordinary honesty and discretion. This was the
case under the moderate sway of Serrano and Dulce during our
Civil War. The tact of the former did much to allay the
irritation caused in the Northern States when Spain recog-
nized the belligerency of the Southern forces over a month
before the first battle of the war. This fact kept in mind will
offer an interesting comparison to the forbearance shown upon
several occasions later by the United States government when
Cuban insurgents sought -belligerent rights. Though it was
-the South which really tried to force Spain to give up Cuba,
by force of arms if necessary, the moment the South took up
arms against the Union, Spain recognized it. It was a feature
of Castilian policy which has not been forgotten, even if we
have had the wisdom to show no signs of revenge in our own
diplomacy towards Spain. ,
136 MORE DECEPTIVE ‘‘ REFORMS”

Unquestionably, the abolition of slavery in the United
States as a result of the Civil War and the re-establishment of
the power of the republic on firm grounds strengthened the
liberal sentiment in Cuba and gave rise to renewed movements
for its expression. The pleas of the Cubans had so much effect
even upon the Spanish government that a liberal ministry
which happened to be in power in 1865 accepted a project for
a Commission of Inquiry to consider and devise reforms for
the Cuban administration. The project was duly set forth in
a royal decree and the Cubans formed extravagant hopes upon
the results. But the whole scheme was emasculated by the
opponents of reform, the devotees of the old system. Accord-
ing to the royal decree the election of the commissioners was
to take place in the manner provided for municipal council-
men, that is, by the higher taxpayers composed in three
classes, landed property, commerce and industry, and profes-
sions. But the Captain-General modified this classification for
the occasion by organizing four groups, commerce and indus-
try being divided. It had the effect and doubtless the object of
diminishing the number of native voters and doubling the
number of Spaniards in whose hands the commerce and city in-
dustries were. The commission was further backed by the gov-
ernment which appointed one-half of the commission itself.
The result was what might have been expected, and it is need-
less to dwell upon the efforts of the Cuban reformers who en-
deavored to impress the Spanish government with the necessi-
ties for reform. Instead of a general plan for colonial reform
being considered, the commission, whose deliberations were
guided by a president appointed by the government, restricted
itself to the proposal of certain regulations for slave-labor about
which the Cubans cared but little. Their own propositions the -
commission declined to entertain. They demanded a constitu-
tional system in place of the autocracy of the Captain-General,
freedom of the press, the right of petition, cessation of the ex-
elusion of Cubans from public office, unrestricted industrial
liberty, abolition of restrictions on the transfer of landed prop-
A PLEA FOR JUSTICE 137

erty, the right of assembly and association, representation in
the Cortes, and local self-government. But none of these pro-
posals would the home government consider. Even the mod-
erate demands of the Cubans for the abolition of slavery were
temporized with and nothing was done. The result was that
the new Captain-General, Lersundi, tightened the screws on
the reformists so that they were worse off than before. To cap
it all, a little later an additional 10 per cent. on the direct
taxes of the island was imposed.

One of the Cuban deputies to the Cortes, in a speech de-
livered in 1866, said: “I foresee a catastrophe near at hand,
in case Spain persists in remaining deaf to the just reclamations
of the Cubans. Look at the old colonies of the American con-
tinent. All have ended in conquering their independence.
Let Spain not forget the lesson; let the government be just to
the colonies that remain. Thus she will consolidate her do-
minion over people who only desire to be good sons of a
worthy mother, but who are not willing to live as slaves under
the scepter of a tyrant.”
CHAPTER VIII

REVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND INSURRECTION IN CUBA —
BEGINNING OF THE TEN-YEARS WAR— CONDITION OF
CUBA AT THE TIME.

The Revolution at Cadiz — Wretched Condition of Spain — Flight of
Isabella — Her Vain Appeal to Napoleon — Fires of Discontent
Break out in Cuba— Promoters of the Insurrection — High Stand-
ing of the Leaders— The Proclamation at Yara— Beginning of the
Ten-Years War—Condition of Cuba at the Time —-Spanish Policy
of Exploiting the Island— A System of Robbery by Spanish Offi-
cials — Revenues of the Island— Principal Industries — Cities Hope-
lessly Bankrupt — Immense Salaries of the Officials — Perquisites
and how they were Collected—Iniquitous and Unjust Trade Regu-
lations — Taxing Everything the Cuban Produced or Consumed —
The Wrongs Admitted by the Spaniards Themselves — Vital Ener-
gies of the Island Destroyed—Cuban Hatred of the Spaniard—The
Burden no Longer to be Endured—The People Ready to Rise.

to worse. The treasury was well-nigh empty. The
air was full of intrigue and conspiracy. At last, on
September 19th, the revolution broke out at Cadiz, and a pro-
nunciamento was issued setting forth the causes of disaffection
in the mother country. It was a long array of charges, all
justified. The truth was that the Spanish rulers, still priest-
ridden, were clinging to the customs of the middle ages, and
the people were at last awakening, but without any adequate
training for governing themselves. A provisional govern-
ment was established, and Isabella fled to France, where she
pleaded in vain for Napoleon’s help. Napoleon was begin-
ning to have troubles of his own, and it was the Spanish throne
which was eventually to form the issue of war leading to the
French collapse at Sedan.
While these events were being shaped at home, the Cubans

were planning another outbreak of their own, for, disappointed
(188)

M EAN WHILE, affairs in Spain had been going from bad
SOME NOTABLE REVOLUTIONISTS 139

over the failure of the Commission of Inquiry, and goaded al-
most to a frenzy by the high-handed methods of Captain-Gen-
eral Lersundi, nothing was left them but another break for
liberty. The movement was fast ripening when the news of
the Queen’s overthrow reached the island, but the change in
Spain made no difference with Lersundi’s policy. He became
even more watchful and oppressive. The plans for insur-
rection were quietly matured in the eastern provinces of the
island by Francisco Aguilera, Manuel Aguilera, and Fran-
cisco Osorio at Bayamo, Carlos Céspedes in Manzanillo, Beli-
sario Alvarez in Holguin, Vincente Garcia at Las Tunas, Do-
nato Marmol in Jiguani, and Manuel Fernandez in Santiago.
These men were not low-born conspirators. Francisco Agui-
lera, for example, though born in Cuba, had been highly edu-
cated both in the United States and Europe, and was a mil-
lionaire when he liberated his slaves and threw himself into
the cause of the rebellion against Spanish tyranny. Céspedes
had graduated in law at Madrid, and was a man of literary at-
tainments. He had been imprisoned during the conspiracy
of Lopez, but since his release had been practicing his pro-
fession in Bayamo. It was at his plantation at Yara that the
revolution was proclaimed. The leaders had planned to have
a simultaneous outbreak on October 10th, but the movement
having been discovered by the authorities, Céspedes at once
placed himself at the head of 100 poorly-armed men and 200
slaves whom he had liberated. Two days later he was joined
by about 4,000 men, and the entire province rose in sympathy
with the movement. By the middle of November he had an
organized army of 12,000 men, who, though poorly equipped,
were united in purpose and of determined will. Thus, in
brief, began the Ten-Years War.

Tt will be well before following the events of this struggle
to make an examination of the social and economic condition
of Cuba at that time, and of the results of Spanish govern-
ment, for it will not simply throw light upon the causes
of the rebellion but make clearer the later course of events.
140 THE SPANISH OCTOPUS

In a general way we have seen that the Creoles or white people
born on the island were allowed no voice in affairs, and the
reason why the Spanish government persistently kept the con-
trol in peninsular hands will appear from the method by which
revenue was extracted from the island. Spain’s improvident
monarchs had not merely run the home government heavily
into debt, but had by an unwise, short-sighted policy destroyed
the industries of the peninsula. Spain’s debt being out of all
proportion to her diminished resources, it became necessary
for her Bourbon majesties to find money to pay the interest
and keep up appearances. Cuba was the richest portion of
the domains and had no power to protect herself. The prob-
lem was, therefore, to squeeze all possible out of the island by
Spanish agents.

But if Cuba had been compelled to furnish only so much
as would satisfy the home government, her yearly contribution
for this purpose being $7,000,000 or $8,000,000, her burden
would have been very much easier. Unfortunately, to this
was added the support of the municipal and provincial gov-
ernment, and the still greater burden of enriching the venal
Spanish officials. The office of Captain-General was a bril-
liant prize for which many aspirants were eagerly struggling,
and under the prevailing conditions it followed that the very
means calculated to insure success presupposed dishonorable
motives. To win influential supporters the candidate was
obliged to promise a subsidy to them, and this he expected to
obtain by peculation when he reached Cuba. There were no
inducements for him, even had he the ability, to study the
needs or gain the good-will of those over whom he presided.
The princely salary which he received was but a part of his in-
come, and generally coming to the island a poor man, he nearly
always returned a rich one, no matter how brief his term of
office.

The annual revenue raised in the island in 1868 was ap-
proximately $26.000,000, and preparations had been made to
increase it. The revenue in the island in 1857 had been
CUBA MORTGAGED FOR SPAIN’S DEBTS 141

$17,790,000, but during Spain’s wars with Morocco, Santo
Domingo, Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Cochin China, the ex-
actions upon Cuba had been so great that the revenue had
nearly doubled, the increase being all out of proportion to the
increase in the value of the productions. Early in the sixties
Spain adopted the practice of issuing Cuban bonds, pledging
the revenues of the island to pay the interest. This plan in-
creased the interest account, and caused a deficit, therefore
new methods of taxation were devised. It was estimated that
while the people of Spain were paying $3.23 per capita of in-
terest on the national debt, the Cubans, who had had no part
nor interest in the contracting of that debt, were paying $6.39
per capita.

It is difficult to obtain satisfactory statistics of Cuba for
that period or for any period, for the Spanish officials have
little fondness for them, but Cuban writers say that shortly
before the war broke out there were in a state of production
the following estates:

Stock farms, . ‘ y : . ‘ . i 2,712
Sugar plantations, . : : 5 . 2 5 1,521
Coffee plantations, . A ‘ 4 i & 3 782
Cattle ranches, , ‘ ‘ r $ : 6,175
Cocoa plantations, . s é é ‘ 2 5 18
Cotton plantations, . : : : ‘ : ‘ 35
Produce farms, A ‘ ‘ - 3 < 22,748
Truck farms, . ‘ ‘ is ‘ - ‘ 5 11,738
Tobacco plantations, é i r ‘ 7 : 11,541
Apiaries, . , - és : 3 F A ‘ 1,741
Country resorts, r ° Fs é . ‘ P 153
Distilleries, : 5 : - 3 6 ‘ P 243
Tile works, - , - . . F iM ‘ 468
Lime-kilns, ‘ i j ‘ ‘ - : 504
Charcoal furnaces, . 5 3 5 ‘ . ‘ 63
Cassava-bread factories, . , : : , : 54
Tanneries, 61

The value of this property, together with its appurten-
ances, was estimated at about $380,000,000, with a net in-
come of about $38,000,000.

The cities were hopelessly in debt and were unable to pro-
142 SALARIES AND PERQUISITES

vide for such necessary improvements as drainage and street
cleaning, and it was even said that in Santiago, a city where
custom revenues were largely absorbed by official peculation,
the municipal gas bills were months in arrears. Education
was neglected and the schools were closed. Little was done
for the maintenance of hospitals, and there was but one asylum
for the insane on the island, and that was at Havana. Else-
where such unfortunates were kept in the common cells of the
jails. Nor should it be supposed that the greater part of the
revenue found its way to Spain. The general expenses of the
Spanish method of governing an island of 1,500,000 people,
less than half of them white, must be considered.

The following were a few of the salaries paid the Spanish
officials of Cuba at a time when the President of the United
States was receiving $25,000:

Captain-General, . : ‘ % ‘ . $50,000
General Manager of the Treasury, : : : $ 18,500
The Archbishop of Cuba, j ‘ é A ‘ 18,000
The Bishop of Havana, . 7 : 18,000
The Chief of the Arsenals and Taek Vande, 5 : 18,000
President of the Court, . é : : é . 15,000
Lieutenant-General, ; : ; ‘ F : 15,000
Governor of Havana, : 3 , 8,000
First Secretary of the Gucciuer: Geneon. 3 , 8,000
A Field Marshal, . 5 é ; ‘ ‘i . 7,500
A Brigadier, . P ‘ . ‘ : ‘ ‘ 4,500
A Colonel, , 2 . . 3 2 i ‘ 3,450
A Collector of Customs, . A ‘ A - , 4,000

There was a whole retinue of other officials, chiefs of
bureaus, and subordinates with large emoluments for their
services. But beyond this were what we call “ perquisites,”
incident to all offices, civil and ecclesiastical, from the highest
to the lowest. These were not fixed by ordinance, but by cus-
tom, and they varied according to the character of the men.
They might be obtained in various ways. Just a little to 4
customs official would make the greatest difference in his be-
havior as to baggage or cargoes. How nicely it might be ar-
ranged can be seen from the usual way of collecting the in-
OPEN AND SYSTEMATIC ROBBERY 143

come tax. A planter, for instance, would hand in a return
putting his income at $10,000. The collector let the planter
know that he was greatly dissatisfied, and that the figure
should be at least $15,000. The planter, of course, knew what
the collector meant, and that it might be worse for him if he
did not take the hint, so he would offer to split the difference
and make it $12,500. The collector, with much politeness
and many assurances of his desire to be obliging, would accept
the compromise. But the tax on the extra $2,500 went into
the collector’s pocket and the original assessment of $10,000
remained on the books. It has been estimated that the pecu-
lations in various ways at the custom house at Havana
amounted to 40 per cent., and at Santiago 70 per cent. of the
entire receipts.

All this, of course, amounted to a tax on industry and com-
merce which could thrive only in spite of such obstacles.
Even if the customs laws had not been subject to these abuses
they would have operated heavily against the industry and
commerce of the people. The Spanish officials were not blind
to the injustice of the laws, but as they profited by them and
gathered all they could in anticipation of returning shortly to
Spain and maintaining that splendid appearance so dear to the
Spanish heart, they usually remained quiet. Only occasionally
was there an officer who had the conscience or the courage to
complain to the home government. Captain-General Dulce,
whose sway was so moderate and whose efforts to remedy
abuses so energetic that the other officials forced his recall, said
in a letter to the Minister for the Colonies in 1867: “The
cause of the trouble and inquietude which appears in the island
of Cuba should be sought to a great extent in the tariff laws,
which, under the pretext of protection, make impossible a
commerce carried on in good faith. . . . The custom house
system is very expensive, overloaded with formalities which do
not prevent fraud but which embarrass and annoy honest
trade.”

Spain managed to retain almost a monopoly of the trade of
144 SPAIN’S MONOPOLY OF TRADE

Cuba through differential duties, while making the Cubans
pay extremely high for articles received from the mother coun-
try. The duty on flour was so heavy that only a small portion
of the people indulged in wheat bread. In Spain the annual
consumption of bread was 400 pounds per capita, while in
Cuba it was fifty-three pounds nine ounces. A barrel of flour
could be bought in New York and carried to some port in
Spain, whereby it became Spanish flour; then it could be re-
shipped across the ocean and sold in Havana for $8.25, while:
if the barrel had been shipped direct from New York to
Havana it would have cost the dealer $10.46. A similar state
of things pertained to the postal regulations. A letter from
Europe, although prepaid, could not be taken from the post-
office till twenty-five cents had been paid. If it were de
livered, the charge was thirty-seven and a half cents. All
sorts of mail matter was treated in the same way.

If anyone carried firearms for his personal safety or kept
them for defense, he had to pay a heavy license, and a strict
search was regularly made for unlicensed firearms. The Civil
Guards cost nearly $3,000,000, and the maintenance of the
troops, without counting the chief officials who received large
salaries and allowances, or the commissions, buildings, and sup-
plies, cost about $4,000,000 more.

With such a climate and such a soil Cuba should have
been one of the richest portions of the earth. Nature had been
bountiful with her, and it was no wonder that the Abbé Raynal
had pronounced her the boulevard of the new world, and
that the Spanish historian had called her the fairest emerald
in the crown of Ferdinand and Isabella. Could she have
fallen to almost any other government in Christendom, the
island could have been a vast, smiling garden, but from the
first to last it had been the unvarying policy of the govern-
ment to oppress and rob the people, to extort the last possible
peseta. Finally, it became impossible for legitimate business
to sustain itself in the face of the increased exactions. Coffee
and cotton planting were practically driven from the island,
THE INTENSITY OF RESENTMENT 145

where they might have proved an enormous source of revenue.
In every way Spain had carried her system to the utmost of
audacity and severity.

One who made some observations in Cuba before the in-
surrection wrote: “It has been my lot in life to mix a good
deal with discontented people — rebels, revolutionists, re-
formers, and, in fact, all categories of men who look upon
themselves as oppressed. . . . But until I listened to Cubans
giving vent to their hatred of Spain, I never had any concep-
tion with what diabolical hatred one nation can look upon an-
other. There is no use in attempting to paint the feelings of
the Cubans still under the power of Spain for the race from
which they have sprung, because all painting would be a weak
and ineffectual representation of the reality. In all prob-
ability, if the present disturbed state of affairs continues in
Spain, the pent-up rage of this much-oppressed people will
find vent in a new Sicilian vespers; and, if it were not for
the fear of exposing their families to a renewal of the insults
and outrages to which they were subjected after the first re-
verses of the revolution, the attempt would have long since
been made.”

The underlying principle of Spanish law as applied to the
Cubans was that every accused Cuban is guilty until he proves
himself innocent. The result was an endless number of ar-
rests and few trials. Arrested persons were led to Morro
Castle, and, when the doors closed, hope was left behind. Few
ever came out, and still there seemed always to be room for
more. Executions thinned out some, starvation some. It
was not considered safe to inquire after details. Persons ar-
rested for complicity in some supposed conspiracy simply dis-
appeared; no one knew whether they had a trial or not, and
their friends feared to press their defense lest they, too, might
be incarcerated.

Cuba had not failed to ask for justice and redress. The
people, before shouldering the rifle, pleaded for their rights.
Far-sighted men had denounced the cancer of slavery, the
146 PLANS OF REFORMERS DESPISED

horrors of the traffic in slaves, the corruption of the office-
holders, the abuses of the government, the discontent of the
people with their forced state of political tutelage. No atten-
tion was given to them, and this brought on the first armed
conflicts.

Before the insurrection of 1868 the reform party, which
included the most enlightened, wealthy, and influential
Cubans, exhausted all the resources within their reach to in-
duce Spain to initiate a healthy change in her Cuban policy.
Having succeeded in leading the Spanish government to make
an inquiry into the economical, political, and social condition
of Cuba, they presented a complete plan of government which
satisfied public requirements as well as the aspirations of the
people. The Spanish government disdainfully cast aside the
proposition, increased taxation, and proceeded to its exaction
with extreme severity.

If any further justification were needed for the uprising,
it could certainly be had from the lips of the Spaniards them-
selves. A few months after the war broke out the minister of
transmarine affairs at Madrid said in an official paper: “A
change of system, political as well as administrative, is im-
peratively demanded.” When a Spanish official was willing
to concede so much respecting the state of affairs in Cuba, no
further evidence is required concerning the outrageous
tyranny to which the Cubans were subjected.
CHAPTER IX

COURSE OF THE STRUGGLE— FORMATION OF THE REPUB-—
LIC—OUTRAGES BY SPANISH VOLUNTEERS —HEROISM
OF CUBAN WOMEN—MYSTERIES OF MORRO CASTLE.

Rapid Growth of the Insurrection — Forced to Adopt Guerrilla Methods —
Cuban Leaders Refuse to Consider More Spanish Promises — They
Declare the Abolition of Slavery — Meet to Form a Government —
Successful Landing of Arms and Ammunition —Spain Increases Her
Forces — Obtains Her Supplies in the United States—Treats the
United States Insolently —The Spanish Volunteers —Excesses of
Cruelty — Cuban Successes — Arrest of University Boys — Their
Sentence and the Execution — Guerrilla Tactics— Diminution of
Spanish Forces— Heroism of Cuban Women — Mysteries of Morro
Castle — Further Efforts to Secure Peace — Disagreement among the
Insurgents —The Rebellion Nearly at a Standstill —A Typical Engage-
ment— Terrible Destruction of Property—-Campos Sent to the
Island — An Armistice —The Treaty of Zanjon.

W ITHIN a few weeks Céspedes had gathered about

him nearly fifteen thousand men, all resolute and

eager, but, unfortunately, poorly armed and
equipped. ‘The plans of the revolutionists having been dis-
covered while still immature, war began before arms could be
smuggled into the island, and, as the Spanish held all the sea-
ports, the insurgents were forced to rely almost entirely upon
guerrilla methods. Still, for the first twe years they were
victorious in many engagements, and were generally succes-
ful, hostilities being mainly confined to the two eastern prov-
inces. During the winter of 1868-69 the struggle centered
along the railway from Nuevitas to Puerto Principe, and the
Cubans became the masters of the country. One after an-
other of the important towns of the interior were captured in
the guerrilla campaign under the leadership of Mannel
Quesada, and the Spanish forces, which included 40,000
regulars and 70,000 volunteers, were repeatedly beaten off

10 (147)
148 CUBAN LEADERS REFUSE TO BE TRICKED

by a Cuban force which could not have consisted of more
than 30,000. Hundreds were ready to flock to the rebel
standard, but it was useless to increase the army faster than
it could be armed. To do this, the leaders were compelled
to depend mainly upon what arms and ammunition they could
capture from the Spanish. The coast was continually pa-
troled by a Spanish squadron of light-draught gunboats, so
that little help from outside could be gained. Nothing but
these ships, however, prevented the Cubans from capturing
some of the seaports. :

At this stage the Spanish ministry recalled Lersundi, and
returned the former Captain-General, Domingo Dulce, who
had stood well with the Cuban people because of his moderate
policy. Dulce at once issued a proclamation appealing for
peace, offering a general amnesty and promising a considera-
tion of grievances when order was restored, but the Cuban
leaders were bent upon absolute freedom and refused to listen
to proposals to lay down their arms. They had been tricked by
such Spanish promises before.

One of the two great questions at issue between the Cubans
and Spain was understood to be the future condition of the
negroes. A Cuban assembly meeting on February 26, 1869,
in the district of Las Villas, declared for the immediate aboli-
tion of slavery “in the name of liberty and the people,” but
the act met with no response from Spain, though many of her
wisest statesmen wére in favor of such abolition. This declara-
tion was the cause of an uprising in the Las Villas district, led
by a Polander named Roloff, who succeeded in driving out the
Spanish soldiers and holding them in check.

On April 10th, while the Cubans were gaining ground, a
Constituent Assembly of Cuban representatives met at Guai-
maro, framed a constitution for the Republic of Cuba, and
elected Céspedes as President, Francisco Aguilero as Vice-
President, and Manuel Quesada as military commander. In
a short time rights of helligerency were accorded them by
Chile, Bolivia, Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, and Pern.
THE UNITED STATES ASSISTS SPAIN 149

In May two expeditions were successfully landed under
the command of Rafael Quesada and Colonel Thomas Jordan,
but the supplies of arms and ammunition thus introduced were
insufficient for the hundreds of fighting men who were eager
to flock to the insurgent standard. Meanwhile, the Spanish
navy had been reinforced by about thirty vessels purchased
in the United States and converted into gunboats, and these,
in addition to the large fleet already patroling the coast, made
the landing of filibustering expeditions a very difficult mat-
ter. Thus it was that the United States afforded more help to
Spain than to the Cubans, with whom most of our people were
in sympathy. This had been the case in all revolutionary
movements in Cuba, the requirements of international law
being upheld by our government. Spain, whose supremacy
was thereby recognized, was enabled to carry in stores of all
kinds from the United States, and by this means to keep her
army in the field, XSpain’s industries were in an impoverished
condition, and but for what the Spaniards in Cuba were en-
abled to purchase in the United States, the Cubans would
probably have pushed on to victory in spite of their small sup-
ples of ammunition and arms. Yet Spain treated us this
time in an insolent and haughty manner, simply because, not-
withstanding the vigilance of the United States officials and
of the Spanish consuls and spies, attempts were made by private
parties to fit out expeditions in aid of the Cubans.

As the war progressed, the people of the United States
could not restrain their indignation at the Spanish operations
on the island. In the first place the Cubans continued to win
victories in the face of obstacles. The yellow fever made
havoe with the conscripted Spanish soldiers, and they were ut-
terly untrained for the guerrilla tactics by which, at the end of
1870, the Cubans had gradually strengthened their hold on
the eastern half of the island. In the second place, the con-
duct of the Spanish soldiers in the western part of the island,
where, according to Spanish reports, peace reigned, was suf-
ficient to rouse the anger even of those friendly to Spain.
150 EXCESSES OF THE VOLUNTEERS

One of the measures adopted by Spain while in a state of
civil disturbance was the formation of volunteer battalions
or home guards. ‘Their officers found it almost impossible to
enforce discipline among them, and they were responsible for
many outrages and excesses of malicious cruelty. They were
placed on duty in the cities, which they were supposed to de-
fend, but which they terrorized much after the manner of
brigands. So uncontrollable were they that they practically
made and unmade their own officers, and, in June, 1870, they
actually arrested and deported Captain-General Dulce be-
cause they considered him too lenient against the insurgents.
The Spanish government tamely submitted to the excesses of
the Volunteers, and this outrage was followed by a similar
deposition of General Lopez-Pinto, cominander of Matanzas.

The new Captain-General, Rodas, proved to be a man after
their own heart, shooting prisoners of war without restraint.
He made a great show of putting down the rebellion, called for
reinforcements, and received them on his assurance that he
would quickly bring the rebellion to an end; but, as a matter
of fact, his forces were invariably worsted in the field by the
Cubans, who would lay in wait for the Spanish detachments
and slaughter them by a murderous fire from ambush. The
result was that in six months Rodas was recalled, and in De-
cember, 1870, Balmaceda took his place. He could do little
against the insurgents, whose guerrilla warfare continued to
baffle the regular troops, but the outrages of the home guards
in the cities of the west became more and more fiendish.
Some 20,000 of these forces were concentrated in Havana, and
about twice as many more in other parts of the island.

In November, 1871, a glass plate at the public tomb of
Havana, where the body of one of the home guards had been
placed, was found to have been defaced by some obnoxious
writing. Suspicion pointed to some of the students of the
University of Havana, and forty-three of these boys were ar-
rested and put on trial. So arbitrary was the act that an
officer of the regular army voluntarily defended them before
EXECUTION OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 151

the military tribunal, and they were acquitted for lack of evi-
dence. But the Volunteers were not satisfied, and they de-
manded of the cowardly Governor-General a second court-
martial composed of their own officers. The Captain-General
partly acceded to their request, and appointed to the court
nine Volunteers, five regular army captains, and a major, with
a colonel as judge advocate. The Volunteers thus had the ma-
jority of the court, and were at once the accusers and the judge.
The result was that eight were sentenced to be shot, thirty-one
were sentenced to imprisonment, and four were acquitted.
The next morning, November 27th, 15,000 of the Vol-
unteers paraded to the scene of the execution; the occasion
was a sort of féte for the bloodthirsty guards, and the boys
were cruelly and unjustly shot. Naturally, the affair sent a
thrill of horror through the civilized world. The Spanish
Cortes, to keep up appearances, passed a vote of censure, but
nothing was done to punish the movers in the outrage.
During the campaign of 1871 the insurgents were enabled
to secure considerable stores of ammunition and arms, largely
from the Spanish, and the campaign of 1872 was practically
a repetition of its predecessor. The insurgents, compelled to
be very saving of their ammunition, confined their open at-
tacks to such small bodies of Spaniards as they could overcome,
eluding the larger ones, which were nevertheless continually
harrassed by sharp attacks and retreats, while exposure and
disease killed nore of the unacclimated than artillery in the
hands of the rebels could have done. Some of the Cuban
forces under General Agramonte in the district of Camagiiey,
in Central Cuba, were so short of supplies and weapons that
they offered.to lay down their arms if their lives would be
spared. The Captain-General accepted the proposition, offer-
ing it as evidence to the outside world that the rebellion was
near its end. But General Agramonte, who refused to yield
and was left with only thirty-five men, organized a body of
cavalry and maintained the war with considerable success.
The authorities were determined to prevent supplies
152 SACRIFICE AND HEROISM

from falling into the hands of the insurgents, and they
not only maintained the strictest watch of the coasts to inter-
cept expeditions but instituted a most severe espionage over
the Cuban families, who naturally sympathized with the pa-
triot forces, and whose patriotism was far from being crushed
by danger. The Cuban women even found ways to give their
most valuable jewels as a contribution to the cause of liberty.

Very heroic were some of their efforts. In 1872, some
ladies in Havana put their diamonds and other valuable jewels
together to realize money with which to assist the Cuban
leaders. The jewels were given to a young brother of one of
the ladies to sell, a very difficult proceeding without raising
the suspicion of the authorities. But he finally sueceeded in
realizing something over $4,000 for the jewels and in forward-
ing the money to Céspedes through a safe channel.

Hardly had he accomplished this before he was denounced
as a suspicious person, and was at once arrested and thrown
into Morro Castle, where he was subjected to the closest ex-
amination in the effort to discover his accomplices. It was
never discovered how his complicity was divulged, though it
was supposed that one of the Jewish pawnbrokers had in-
formed the authorities in order to make himself safe. In
spite of tortures, the young man refused to disclose anything
as to his accomplices, though he was finally offered his free-
dom and permission to leave the island if he would confess all,
the idea being that he was a mere tool, and that a dangerous
combination of conspirators remained to be discovered.

One of the sisters of the accused determined to assume the
whole guilt of the transaction in order to free her brother, but
her friends convinced her that such an act would simply lead
to the death of both. The young Cuban maintained his
silence and suffered all the indignities of imprisonment. He
was, in time, it is said, brought before a military tribunal.
What the sentence was no one knew. His fate remains a
mystery, like that of hundreds of others who entered the gates
of the castle prison.
DEATH OF CuiSPEDES 153

In the fall of 1872 Balmaceda was compelled to relinquish
his command provisionally to Ceballos, and, in the following
year, definitely to General Pieltan, who thought to bring the
war to a close by negotiations. He made repeated efforts to
induce the Cuban leaders to accept peace without independ-
ence, but always without success.

The skirmishing of the insurgents was carried on vigor-
ously in 1873, and the war really reached its climax. But in
the fall of that year disagreements arose among the Cubans
themselves. The Cuban Congress met at Bijagual in Decem-
ber, and a majority being hostile to the policy of President
Céspedes, he was deposed. He retired to San Lorenzo, where
he was surprised by a detachment of Spanish troops, and
though he escaped, he was mortally wounded, and died on
March 22, 1874. He had given up everything for the cause
of Cuba’s freedom, and at the time of his death was practically
homeless and deserted.

Much difficulty was found in selecting his successor, but
Cisneros, a scion of the old Spanish nobility, and a man of high
social rank and abilities, was provisionally elected. In join-
ing the revolution he had renounced his title, and his estates
had been confiscated. But the disagreements among the
Cuban leaders caused widespread disaffection, and for a time
the rebellion was nearly at a standstill. It might have ended
but for the fact that the Spaniards themselves were in discord.
As the campaign in the field had given the Spaniards no ad-
vantage, Jovellar, who had succeeded Pieltan as Captain-
General, determined to take vigorous measures. He declared
the whole island in a state of siege, conscripted every able-
bodied man into the military service, and drafted ten per cent.
of them into the field. This raised a storm of protests from
the citizens and brought down upon him the hatred of the
Volunteers. The outcome so utterly disgusted him that he
asked to be relieved, and he was succeeded in the summer of
1874 by General Concha. With him came more reinforce-
ments and he entered upon an energetic field campaign, de-
154 DESOLATION AND RUIN

feating in September a large body of insurgents at Yarayaba.
His own forces were, however, so crippled and demoralized
by the engagement that the victory was practically fruitless.

After six years of this desultory fighting the end seemed
as far off as ever. Without a navy there seemed to be no
possibility of the Cubans ejecting the Spaniards from the
island, while the Spaniards were able to do no more than drive
the insurgents from one place to another. Meanwhile, it was
costing Spain an immense amount of money and was well-nigh
ruining Cuba. “ The marvel is,” wrote one who was in Cuba
in 1873, “ that such skirmishing should go on from day to day
for four years without more decisive results. There can be
little doubt about the ruthless character of these Cuban hos-
tilities. Printed reports of massacre and torture may be
wildly exaggerated; but there can be no doubt that there is a
vast deal of shooting in cold blood; and property fares no bet-
ter than life in the belligerent’s hands. I know from the very
best authority that in the district of Trinidad de Cuba, one of
the oldest settlements in the center of the island, about two-
thirds of the sugar and coffee estates and of the grazing farms
-were either destroyed or abandonéd before the end of 1871.
That magnificent valley was turned into a state of desolation
from which it will need years of peace to recover. The same
has been the fate of many settlements in the central districts.”

Up to this time Spain had been regularly sending fresh
levies of Spanish youths to the island, only to fall by disease,
or in skirmishes with an enemy which came upon them sud-
denly and as suddenly disappeared to await another oppor-
tunity. The Volunteers were never brought into the field to
any extent, being allowed to play the bandit in the cities. But
when the Carlist wars came on it became impossible for Spain
to spare recruits, and the constantly diminishing forces gradu-
ally fell back before the insurgents.

In 1876, the Carlist uprising in Spain having been sub-
dued and Alfonzo XII. placed upon the throne, General Mar-
tinez de Campos, who had won distinction in putting an end
 

 

 

 

 

FURIOUS CHARGE OF CUBAN INSURGENTS AGAINST SPANISH INFANTRY.
THE PEACE OF ZANJON 157

to the republic and restoring the Bourbon dynasty, was sent
to Cuba with 25,000 veterans of the Carlist wars to end the in-
surrection. He had had experience in Cuban warfare, yet
notwithstanding his experience and energy, and that of his
veterans and recruits, and in spite of the dissensions among
the insurgents, he made little headway. The latter easily
eluded the larger forces sent against them, and overpowered
smaller detachments. The hot season was again coming on,
and the Spanish troops were weakening under the effects of
the climate, when Campos determined to undertake negotia-
tions for a peace. arly in 1878, both sides being well-nigh
exhausted, he succeeded in obtaining an armistice.

The headquarters of the insurgents were then in Cama-
giiey, and there the insurgent leaders met to consider the over-
tures. A commission of nine generals, with Garcia, who had
succeeded Cisneros as president, were appointed to meet Gen-
eral Campos and a number of his officers at the camp of St.
Augustin near Zanjon. This they did on February 10th, and
there they signed the compact known as the peace of Zanjon,
by which the Cubans gave up their struggle for independence,
and the Spaniards promised the reforms which it had refused
to grant in 1867 after the Commission of Inquiry. By the
articles of this agreement Spain conceded to the island of Cuba
the same political privileges, organic and administrative, en-
joyed by the island of Puerto Rico, and granted complete
amnesty as regards political offences. Those remaining under
trial or sentence would be given their liberty, and a general
pardon was given to deserters from the Spanish army.

Freedom to slaves in the insurgent ranks was granted, and
no insurgent should be compelled to render military service to
the Spanish government till peace should have been estab-
lished, while the government would lend aid and protection to
all desiring to leave the island. Insurgents were publicly to
lay down. their arms, railroad and steamship facilities heing
afforded to all sections of the insurgent army repairing to the
place appointed for the surrender of their arms.
CHAPTER X

SPAIN’S STRAINED RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE TEN-YEARS WAR—THE VIRGINIUS AFFAIR
—A RACE FOR LIFE— EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN FRY AND
HIS COMPANIONS.

Situation Changed after the American Civil War—Spanish Fears —
President Grant’s Pacific Tenders— Significant Reply of Spain —
Remarkable Decree of the Captain-Generdl of Cuba— To be Shot Like
Pirates — Methods of Spanish Warfare —The Vérginius— Circum-
stances of Her Departure — Sighted by the Spanish Cruiser Tornado
—A Lively Chase — Burning Hams to Keep up Steam — Horses and
Arms Thrown Overboard — A Race on the Moonlit Caribbean — Cap-
tured and Taken to Santiago— The First Execution of Prisoners —
The American Consul’s Messages Delayed — He Asks for an Explana-
tion — An Impudent Note in Reply —Further Executions — Captain
Fry’s Death — His Pathetic Letter to His Wife the Night before His
Death — Arrival of a British Gunboat.

were to receive at last some measure of that for which

they had been so long pleading and fighting, were
about to lay down their arms, it will be necessary to return
to the beginning of the war of 1868 and observe the manner
in which it affected the United States and its relations with
both the island and Spain. The importance of this struggle
consists not so much in what the Cubans gained, for they really
gained nothing, as we shall see, nor in what the Spaniards
learned, for they learned nothing, as will also be apparent, but
it consists in the position which the United States felt obliged
to assume in the struggle, and which, when understood, will
make clearer the reasons for intervention in 1898, twenty
years after the close of the war. Public and political interest
in the United States during the struggle was largely confined
to the question of the recognition of the Cubans and to what is
known as “ the Virginius affair.”

| EAVING now the Cubans who, supposing that they

(158)
FRIENDLY INTERVENTION REJECTED 159

The Civil War had well-nigh swept out of the public mind
the frantic efforts of Buchanan, Marcy, and others to secure
Cuba, and the situation was greatly altered. Slavery had
been destroyed in this country and retained its foothold in this
hemisphere in Cuba alone. Castellar and others had said in
the Cortes that they wished slavery abolished in Cuba. When
the standard of insurrection was raised at Yara a Spanish minis-
ter had spoken to our representative at Madrid of “ the common
interests shared by the United States and Spain in Cuba,” and
had added, “that whatever retarded the prosperity of the
island was injurious alike to both countries; the welfare of
Cuba was of more commercial importance to the United States
than to the mother country.” Doubtless, the Spanish minister
was haunted by a fear that the United States might, in a
spirit of revenge which would have been so natural to a
Spaniard, recognize the belligerency of the Cubans before
hostilities were well begun, as Spain had recognized the con-
federacy eight years before; and it required uncommon assur-
ance for him to speak of the commercial interests of the United
States and Spain in Cuba when Spain did everything it could
by discriminating duties to injure Cuban commerce with the
United States. The Spanish minister might have added that.
the interest of the United States in Cuba was heightened by a
desire that the struggle just beginning might end in its ac-
quisition of self government and in the abolition of slavery.

General Grant, who became President in March, 1869,
tendered the good offices of the United States for the purpose
of restoring peace in the island, and General Prim, as the
representative of the Spanish government, had replied: “ We
can better proceed in the present situation of things without
even this friendly intervention. A time will come when the
good offices of the United States will not only be useful, but
indispensable in the final arrangements between Cuba and
Spain.” But that time did not come, and the struggle had
not proceeded far before it was apparent that the United States
must become very seriously interested in the way the Spanish
160 OPPOSITE VIEWS OF GRANT AND SUMNER

authorities were conducting the war, and in the manner in
which the rights of American citizens and of American com-
merce were being violated.

President Grant, with some members of his cabinet, was
decidedly in favor of recognizing the belligerency of the
Cubans. Senator Sumner, chairman of the committee on
foreign relations, was strongly opposed to it. The one was a
man of war, the other a student of international relations.
Grant looked at it as a practical problem in warfare; he, doubt-
less, reasoned that we were under no moral obligations to Spain
which, with such undue haste, had recognized the belligerency
of the confederates and still defended that slave power against
which he had worked out his great campaigns and won such
magnificent victories. Sumner hoped that Spain would her-
self abolish slavery and grant self-government to the Cubans,
and he had the further reason, which was certainly a good
one, that he did not wish our standing in the case of the
Alabama claims against England to be weakened by a hasty
recognition of insurgents in Cuba. In one of their interviews
Grant asked Sumner how it would do to issue a proclamation
with regard to Cuba identical with that issue’ by Spain with
regard to us?

“T advised against it,” wrote Sumner to Motley. “ He is
very confident that the Cubans will succeed. On the same
day [ had a call from two Cubans — one of whom was Aldama,
the richest man of the island and an old friend of mine — who °
had come to solicit the concession of belligerency, saying that
with it success was certain, and that without it the island would
become a desert. TI gave them no encouragement.”

Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, was very close to Sum-
ner, and Sumner’s will dominated. But for him, doubtless,
Grant would have done his utmost to concede the right of bel-
ligerency and the Cubans might have been successful. Spain,
with her own wars and that in the island on hand, could hardly
have gone to war with us at the time, and belligerent rights
would have enabled the Cubans to better secure arms, and,
AN INSOLENT AND UNJUST DECREE 161

whereas, we were bound to intercept, if possible, all expeditions
with supplies and arms fitted out in our ports for Cuba, Spain
was freely buying both ships and supplies from us.

The manner in which Spain repaid us for this considera-
tion of her interests may be seen from the decree of the Cap-
tain-General of Cuba, a copy of which arrived at the state
department in April, 1869. One portion of this decree was
as follows:

‘Vessels which may be captured in Spanish waters or on the high
seas near to the island, having on board men, arms, and munitions or
effects that can in any manner contribute, promote, or foment the insur-
rection in this province, whatsoever their derivation or destination, after
examination of their papers and register shall be de facto considered as
enemies of the integrity of our territory and treated as pirates, in accord-
ance with the ordinances of the navy.

“All persons captured in such vessels, without regard to their num-
ber, will be immediately executed.”

In other words, if an American citizen were caught by
Spain near the island with anything calculated to contribute
to the insurrection, he would be shot like a pirate !

Our government at once protested that this was not only
a violation’of its treaty with Spain of 1795, but a violation of
the laws of nations. Secretary Fish added:

“Under that law and treaty, the United States expect for their citi-
zens and vessels the privilege of carrying to the enemies of Spain, whether
those enemies be claimed as Spanish subjects or citizens of other countries,
subject only to the requirements of a legal blockade, all merchandise not
contraband of war. Articles contraband of war when destined for the
enemies of Spain are liable to seizure on the high seas, but the right of
seizure is limited to such articles only, and no claim for its extension to
other merchandise or to persons not in the civil, military, or naval service
of the enemies of Spain will be acquiesced in by the United States.

“This government certainly cannot assent to the punishment by
Spanish authorities of any citizen of the United States for the exercise of
a privilege to which he may be entitled under public law and treaty.”

Almost simultaneously with the receipt of the knowledge
of this order of the Captain-General, the Spanish minister at
Washington made a complaint “ that piratical expeditions are
in preparation against the legitimate government of Spain in
162 FIGHTING UNDER COVER OF THE UNITED STATES

Cuba,” and requested the President to issue a proclamation to
restrain the same. The minister furnished no evidence of any
such expeditions and none really existed at that time. No
proclamation was then issued, but the regular officers of the
United States were instructed to keep a close watch for such
expeditions, and, later, several were stopped. But the ob-
jectionable decree of the Captain-General was quickly fol-
lowed by one which concerned the United: States quite as
much. The course of trade and social intercourse had car-
ried many citizens of the United States into Cuba. They and
their property were subject to protection by the United States.
But the commander at Bayamo issued a proclamation to the
effect that: “ Every man, from the age of fifteen years up-
ward, found away from his habitation, who dees not prove a
justified motive therefor, will be shot; every habitation un-
oceupied will be burned by the troops; every habitation which
does not float a white flag, as a signal that its occupants desire
peace, will be reduced to ashes; women that are not living at
their own homes or at the house of their relatives will collect
in the town of Jiguani or Bayamo, where maintenance will
be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be
conducted forcibly.”

Here was Spain, who would not admit that a state of war
existed in Cuba, for that would have given us ample justifica-
tion for recognition of the Cubans as belligerents, making de-
crees in Cuba just as if war existed and ordering the confisca-
tion of goods, the shooting of seamen and the destruction of
private property, whether the persons involved were citizens
of the United States or not. Meanwhile, she was obtaining
ships and other supplies from us. She was really attempting
to fight the poor Cubans under cover of the United States,
and at the same time decreeing an indiscriminate slaughter,
which might extend to our citizens and to the destruction of
their property.

Under the circumstances, it required a great amount
of self-control on the part of our administration to keep
INDEFINITE BUT CONTINUOUS COMPLAINTS 163

its hands off Spain’s neck. When Sceretary Fish vigor-
ously protested, the Spanish minister endeavored to justify
the outrageous decrees by the code of instruction to our
armies in the Civil War, but the Secretary promptly re-
iterated that these instructions were issued when the country
was in a state of war, which Spain would not admit as to
Cuba; but even so, throughout the whole Civil War not
a prisoner had been shot in cold blood and not a political
crime, however grave, had been visited by capital punishment.
There were many instances in which the property and rights
of American citizens who had no connection with the insur-
rection in Cuba were interfered with, and although Spain
made many promises, restitution was being continually post-
poned on various pretexts, which our government did not con-
sider as evidences of good faith.

The Spanish minister kept complaining to the State De-
partment of alleged expeditions which were being fitted out
for the insurgents, but when the United States officers caught
the suspected parties, Spain could bring forth no evidence.
“The characteristics of vagueness, indefiniteness, and absolute
uncertainty,” wrote Secretary Fish, “ have marked all the in-
formation furnished or proposed to be furnished by Spanish
agents, attorneys, or counsel, since the outbreak of the insur-
rection, as a foundation for proceedings at law against the
parties complained of.” In the case of most of the expeditions
which were intercepted, the United States gathered the in-
formation through the vigilance of its own officers, the Span-
ish agents furnishing none till after the expeditions had been
captured and broken up. Yet Spain was continually com-
plaining of our lack of diligence! and she harshly blamed our
government for prolonging a war which her best generals were
unable to put down.

On the 4th of October, 1870, there sailed from the port of
New York the steamer Virginius, which had been built in
England for use as a blockade runner during the civil war, and
which, having been captured, had been brought to the navy
164 THE CRUISE OF THE ‘‘ VIRGINIUS”

yard at Washington. There she had been purchased at
auction by one John F. Patterson, who had taken her to New
York and made oath that he was a citizen of the United States,
and the sole owner of the vessel. Her custom house bond was
in the regular form, there was nothing in her manifest or
papers or in the circumstances connected with her departure
from New York to attract attention or excite suspicion, and
she left, like any of the other hundred vessels leaving the same
week, without attracting the attention of the Spanish consul or
of the officers of the United States. Her ostensible -destina-
tion was Curacoa, in the Dutch West Indies, and it appears
that she went there. For three years, indeed, she cruised
about the Caribbean Sea, recognized as a vessel of the United
States at different ports. The watchful Spanish minister, in
a communication to our government several months after the
Virgintus had sailed, enumerated several vessels of which he
thought he had cause to complain, but he made no mention of
the Virginius.

But, while it was not known then, it afterwards appeared
that the vessel was in the service of the insurgents. Captain
Try was strongly advised by some of his friends not to take the
risk of the venture of landing arms on the island, but he re-
plied that it was easy enough to run around the Spaniards,
and he considered it a righteous thing to work for the patriots.
“ At any rate,” he said, “ the whole question is one of bread for
my family.”

On the 28d of October, 1873, or more than three years
after she left New York, she regularly cleared from the port of
Kingston, Jamaica, for Puerto Limén, Costa Rica. It was
the intention of the expeditionists on board to sail direct for
the coast of Cuba, but a slight damage to the machinery
obliged the vessel to put in at a port of Haiti. This she shortly
left, and, after touching at other ports on the same island, the
captain concluded on the 30th to attempt a landing on Cuba.

On this day the Spanish consul at Kingston, having heard
of suspicions against the Virginius, advised the governor at
PURSUED AND CAPTURED BY THE ‘‘TORNADO” 165

Santiago that the vessel had recently been seen between
Jamaica and Cuba. The Spanish cruiser Tornado had that
very morning arrived at Santiago, and Governor Burriel at
once communicated his information to the commander, who
set out to find the alleged filibuster. On the following day
the Zvrnado, which was proceeding under sail while work was
being done on her engines, came in sight of the Virginius cruis-
ing close to the Cuban coast. All possible steam was at once
put on the Zornado, and she was soon running for the Vir-
ginius with fourteen-knot speed, while Captain Fry, discover-
ing his peril, headed at once for Jamaica. Unfortunately for
him, the supply of coal was short and he was soon obliged to
burn petroleum, then grease, and fat of any kind; even hams
-had to be thrown in to keep up steam for speed.

When night closed in both vessels were running at their
best, and were in the same relative position, though the Zor-
nado seemed to be gaining. It was one of those clear nights
when the full moon falling on the Caribbean makes objects
visible for long distances, and the Virginius was easily kept in
sight, especially as the greasy combustibles which she was
using caused a thick black smoke to pour continuously from
her funnel. Captain Fry saw that he was falling behind in
the race and that he might not be able to reach neutral waters
in time, and so, to lighten his vessel, horses, cannon, and cases
of arms were thrown overboard. It was said afterwards that
fully two thousand Remington rifles, a mitrailleuse, and much
powder was thrown into the sea to facilitate the flight. But
it did not avail.

Although the coast of Jamaica was but a few leagues away,
the Tornado had come within range, and three shots flew over
the Virginius, then a shell burst near by, bringing the fugitive
to. She was boarded by the Spanish officers and crew, who
hauled down her American flag and run up the Spanish en-
sign. The captain showed his papers and the Spaniards ap-
propriated them. At midnight they turned about for San-

tiago.
. 11
166 EXECUTION OF FOUR PRISONERS

The Zornado and her prize were welcomed at the port
November ist by a great crowd of people. The authorities,
both civil and military, immediately visited Governor Burriel
to felicitate him upon the news, and that evening the governor
gave a brilliant reception; the palace was illuminated, the
vessels were surrounded by boats filled with bands of music
and cheering Volunteers, who made coarse jeers at “the
Yankees.” The festivities were continued late into the night.
The next day a court-martial was held on the Zornado, and all
but four of the prisoners were sent to jail with an escort fol-
lowed by a great rabble of the people cheering and jeering.

The Virginius had in all 155 persons on board, most of
them of Spanish extraction, but the names of at least forty-five
indicated that they were either citizens of the United States.
or of Great Britain. The four upon whom sentence was im-
mediately passed were three Cubans, including General
Verona and a brother of the insurgent leader Céspedes, and
one American named Ryan. Their execution was fixed for
the 4th, and on that day they were marched to a place made
famous by the number of executions there. The whole Span-
ish population of Santiago followed and witnessed the act with
great rejoicing. The men were shot in the usual manner,
kneeling close to the slaughter-house wall. Two of them
were killed at the first shot, but the other two had not been
mercifully hit, and a Spanish officer walked up and ran his
sword through their hearts. Then the crowd ran in and
picked up the bodies, still warm with life, severed the heads,
placed them upon pikes, and marched about the city.

Just before the execution an interesting incident took
place. There were in Santiago fifteen Spanish officers who
at one time had been captured by General Verona, and gen-
erously released. They pleaded with the authorities that this
act should entitle him to mercy, but no heed was given the ap-
peal. ‘The Spaniards demanded blood, they had had a taste
and they demanded more.

As the Virginius had cleared as an American vessel and dis-
SPANISH PIETY AND INSOLENCE 167

played the American colors she at least had an apparent claim
to protection until it should be proven otherwise, and at least
the American and British citizens on board were entitled to the
opportunity of acting with the consuls of their countries in the
defense of any rights which they might have. Our vice-
consul at Santiago, Mr. E. G. Schmitt, therefore, had promptly
demanded access to the prisoners, but the provincial governor
replied discourteously and to the effect that it was none of the
American consul’s business, as the prisoners were all pirates
and would be treated as such. Mr. Schmitt was even refused
the use of the marine cable to communicate with the United
States consul at Kingston, where the Virginius had cleared.
Our consul protested, and meanwhile the form of a court-
martial was gone through with, and the three Cubans and one
American were shot. On the same day the consul received
areply from the governor, from which the following extract,
indicating the character of the Spanish disposition and
methods, is made:

“T have received your communications, one dated the 2d inst , and
the remaining two the 3d inst. ; the first inquiring if it was true that a
telegram had been detained by my orders which you had addressed to the
United States consul in Kingston, Jamaica, asking information as to the
nationality of the steamer Virginius seized on the high seas as a pirate by
the Spanish cruiser Zornado. In my desire to correspond duly to the
exquisite zeal which you show in this matter, I would have replied at once
to your communication, but, as I received it precisely at the moment of
important and peremptory affairs, to which I had to devote myself ex-
clusively ; and further, as the past two days were holidays, upon which
the officials do not come to the offices, being engaged as well as everyone
else in meditation of the divine mysteries of All Saints and the com-
memoration of All Souls’ day, as prescribed by our holy religion ; it was
impossible for me until early this morning to comply to your wishes. .

‘* Neither could I foresee your desire to repair with such haste to the
jail where the prisoners were incarcerated ; much less that you desired to
do so, showing an officiousness so marked, when you had received from
none of them any remonstrance whatever, which they would have made
at once through my conduct if their conscience had permitted them to even
suppose that they were innocent and worthy of the protection of your
vice-consulate, undoubtedly impelled thereto on this occasion for unknown
and suspicious purposes. . . .
168 REPLY OF THE UNITED STATES CONSUL

‘Such conduct, especially after you were advised by the fiscal that
Mr. O’Ryan was an Englishman, obliges me to apply to the government
and propose that your exequatur to perform the duties of your vice-
consulate be withdrawn, as an officer who addresses protests so slightly
founded, and who after that attempts to surprise the intention of the
Spanish authorities, accustomed to act with the rectitude and loyalty
known to all, cannot help compromising the honor of the country he
represents.”

Having written this reply, the governor seems to have pro-
ceeded to the execution of a few prisoners, and the pretended
trial of others. Our consul bore himself with dignity and
honor. In his reply he said:

“‘T should have been the last person to disturb the important duties
of your Excellency, and the religious meditations which your Excellency’s
subordinates were indulging in, had it not been that I consider the case a
pressing one and imagined that, where there was sufficient time to censure
and detain my telegram, there might have been also time for a few lines
of explanation, with the additional motive of my second dispatch, that I
observed that the circumstances which your Excellency enumerates were
no hindrance to the despatch of other business connected with the
steamer. 3

“‘T shall therefore abstain from saying anything further on this point,
than that it seems to me, considering that the Virginius was flying the
United States flag at the time of her capture, that she claimed to be a
United States merchant steamer, and her papers as such were surrendered
by her captain to the boarding officer of the steamer Tornado, it would
have been a delicate attention on the part of your Excellency to have in-
formed me thereof, and that the use of such flag and papers was an abuse
of the goodness of the country which I represent, in order that I might
have brought the same to the notice of my government. ‘

“Finally, I note your Excellency’s intention to apply for the revoca-
tion of my exequatur, and while ignorant of any cause given therefor, I
can only assure your Excellency that my conscience being perfectly clear
in the question, and having acted honorably, and as I consider for the
best, the result of your Excellency’s application is to me a matter of
profound indifference.”

On the 6th there were further court-martial proceedings
and thirty-seven more were sentenced to be shot the next
morning, including Captain Joseph Fry, the commander of
the vessel. Of this man’s indomitable courage in the face of
death, and his intense affection for those for whose sakes chiefly
he had undertaken this hazardous adventure, the pathetic let-
CAPTAIN FRY’S LETTER OF FAREWELL 169

ter written to his wife the night before his execution bears
sufficient testimony.
On Boarp THE Spanish Man-or-WarR ‘‘ TORNADO.”

Santiago DE Cusa, November 6, 773.

“Dear, dear Dita— When I left you I had no idea that we should
never meet again in this world; but it seems strange to me that I should
to-night, and on Anne’s birthday, be calmly seated on a beautiful moon-
light night in a most beautiful bay in Cuba, to take my last leave of you,
my own dear sweet wife! And with the thought of your own bitter
anguish — my only regret at leaving.

‘I have been tried to-day, and the President of the Court Martial
asked the favor of embracing me at parting, and clasped me to his heart,
I have shaken hands with each of my judges, and the secretary of the
court and the interpreter have promised me as a special favor to attend
my execution, which will, I am told, be within a few hours after my
sentence is pronounced.

“Tam told my death will be painless. In short, Ihave had a very
cheerful and pleasant chat about my funeral, to which I shall go a few
hours from now ; how soon I cannot say yet. It is curious to see how I
made friends. Poor Bambetta* pronounced me a gentleman, and he was
the brightest and bravest creature I ever saw.

“The priest who gave me communion on board this morning put a
double scapular around my neck, and a medal which he intends to wear
himself. A young Spanish officer brought me a bright new silk badge
with the Blessed Virgin stamped upon it, to wear to my execution for him,
and a handsome cross in-some fair lady’s handiwork. They are to be kept
as relics of me. He embraced me affectionately in his room with fears in
his eyes. 7

‘Dear Sweetheart, you will be able to bear it for my sake, for I will
be with you if God permits. Although I know my hours are short and
few, lam not sad. I shall be with you right soon, dear Dita, and you
will not be afraid of me. Pray for me, and I will pray with you. There
is to be a fearful sacrifice of life, as I think, from the Virginius, and, as I
think a needless one, as the poor people are unconcious of crime, and even
of their fate up to now. I hope God will forgive me if Iam to blame
for it.

“Tf you write to President Grant, he will probably order my pay,
due when I resigned, to be paid to you after my death. People will be
kinder to you now, dear Dita; at least, I hope so. Do not dread death
when it comes to you. It will be God’s angel of rest,— remember this.
I hope my children will forget their father’s harshness and remember his
love and anxiety for them. May they practice regularly their religion and
pray for him always. Tell ——-—— the last act of my life will be a pub-
lic profession of my faith and hope in Him of whom we need not be

 

*A Cuban rebel general, passenger on the Virginius.
170 A GALLANT ENGLISHMAN INTERFERES

ashamed; and it is not honest to withhold that public acknowledgment from
any false modesty or timidity. May God bless-and save us all! Sweet,
dear, dear Dita, we will soon meet again. Till then, adieu for the last
time.” Your devoted husband,

JOSEPH Fry.

The next morning, with thirty-six others, he was executed.
The next day twelve more shared his fate, and probably all the
remaining 102 would have been shot but for a sudden interrup-
tion. The interest of the British and French consuls and of
the authorities in Jamaica had been aroused, for some of the
prisoners were British subjects. The British sloop of war
Viobe, commanded by Sir Lambton Lorraine, left Kingston on
the 6th, and on the 8th came flying into Santiago harbor.
The commander hastened to land, and at once demanded that
the massacre be stopped.

“ But Sefior,” protested the commanding Spanish officer,
“what affair isit of yours? There are no countrymen of yours
among them. They are all dogs of Americans.”

“Tt makes no difference,” replied the gallant captain. “I
forbid you to put another one of these men to death.”

“ But, Sefior,” returned the Spaniard, haughtily, “ permit
me to remark that I take my orders from the Captain-General,
and not from you.”

“ Permit me also to remark,” replied the captain, “ that
the Niobe is lying in this harbor, with her guns double-shotted,

,and Iam her commander. And, so help me God! if you so
much as harm a hair on the head of another one of those
prisoners, I will lay your town in ruins.” And he went back
to his ship.

The Spaniard looked at the Niobe, saw the big black
muzzles of her guns trained squarely upon the city, and —
there were no more Virginius prisoners massacred in Santiago.

A few days later a United States man-of-war reached the
port and then began the negotiations during which the United
States government was brought to the point of ceasing all
further temporizing and declaring war.
CHAPTER XI

EFFORTS TO INDUCE SPAIN TO SETTLE— GENERAL SICKLES
ASKS FOR HIS PASSPORTS AND SPAIN YIELDS —UNITED
STATES INSISTS ON PACIFICATION OF THE ISLAND.

Minister Sickles Visits Castelar upon Hearing of the Virginius Affair —
Curious Break-down of the Cables at a Critical Moment — Some Im-
polite Replies — General Sickles Demands his Passports — The Span-
ish Government Quickly Comes to Terms— The People Impatient to
Recognize the Cubans — Remarkable Attitude of Senator Sumner —
Fall of the Spanish Republic— America Insists that the Cuban War
Must Cease — Intervention Threatened — Spain Makes Another Prom-
ise — Forbearance at Washington—Campos Ends the War by the
Agreement at Zanjon— Canovas Refuses to be Responsible for the
Cuban Settlement— Resignation of Canovas— Campos Forms a Min-
istry — Disagreements— A Reform Act Passed —Great Cost of the
War to Spain—The Emancipation Act—Cuba Still in a State of
Insurrection — Exactions of the Government Increased.

General Daniel E. Sickles, our minister at Madrid, on

the 6th, or the day before Captain Fry’s execution,
and he hastened to call at the Ministry of State. Spain had
meanwhile become a republic, under President Castelar,
whom Sickles saw in the evening. Concerning the interview
he wrote: “ President Castelar received these observations
with his usual kindness and told me confidentially that, at
seven o’clock in the morning, as soon as-he read the telegram
from Cuba, and without reference to any international ques-
tion, for that, indeed, had not occurred to him, he at once sent
a message to the Captain-General admonishing him that the
death penalty must not be imposed upon any non-combatant

T first intimation of what was taking place reached

without the previous approval of the Cortes, nor upon any per-
son taken in arms against the government without the sanction
of the executive.”
As not infrequently happens in Spanish diplomacy, this
(171)
172 PUBLIC FEELING IN SPAIN

order failed to get further than Havana, at least, in time to do
any good. There were two telegraphic lines between Havana
and Santiago, one by the coast and one overland. One of them
had been out of repair for some time. Significantly enough,
the other failed to work the day that the Virginius was brought
into port, though it suddenly resumed operations in perfect
working order as soon as the Mobe came into port. Public
feeling was running high in Spain. The press, violent and
abusive, advised the government to order General Sickles out
of Spain. One night a mob collected to attack and sack the
legation, but the authorities interfered. Meanwhile the
Spanish in Cuba were threatening all Americans, and in
Havana they gave a great féte and bullfight in honor of Gov-
ernor Burriel, who had ordered the outrage.

General Sickles pressed his remonstrances insistently, and
Carvajal, the Spanish Minister of State, thereupon began to
couch his replies in the rather insolent language adopted by
the governor of Santiago, while Sickles retorted with some
very sharp but thoroughly dignified communications. He
had been instructed by the Secretary of State to protest most
solemnly against the barbarities perpetrated at Santiago, and
in communicating with the Spanish government adopted as
near as could be the words of the instructions from Washing-
ton. To this Carvajal made an exceedingly ill-tempered reply
in which he used the expression: “The protest being thus re-
jected with serene energy.” General Sickles, after restating
the case firmly and correcting some misconceptions, concluded
his reply by saying: “ And if at last under the good auspices
of Mr. Carvajal, with the aid of that serenity which is un-
moved by slaughter and that energy that rejects the voice of
humanity, which even the humblest may utter and the most
powerful cannot hush, this government is successful in re-
storing order and peace and liberty where hitherto, and now,
all is tumult and conflict and despotism, the fame of this
achievement, not confined to Spain, will reach the continents
beyond the seas and gladden the hearts of millions who believe
SPANISH BRAVADO WITHERS 173

that the New World discovered by Columbus is the home of
freemen and not of slaves.” Secretary Fish used strong ex-
pressions in his instructions to Sickles. Mere condemnation,
disavowal, and depreciation of the act would not, he said, be
accepted by the world as sufficient to relieve Spain from par-
ticipation in a just responsibility for the outrage. There
must be punishment of those concerned.

Unable to make any headway in bringing the Spanish
government to some agreement as to the settlement of the
question, Secretary Fish cabled Sickles to make formal de-
mands. If these were not complied with within twelve days
he should leave Madrid. General Sickles did so, and, obtain-
ing no satisfactory response, on the 26th of November he
asked for his passports. Spanish bravado at once withered.
Carvajal within a few hours sent a note, conceding upon some
conditions the demands of the United States that the Virginius
and the survivors should be given up, the perpetrators of the
massacre tried and punished, and the flag of the United States
saluted. One condition was that a salute of the flag should
not be deemed essential if the Spanish government could bring
forward sufficient proofs that the Virginius had no right to
fly the American flag. A conference was held at Washing-
ton between the Secretary of State and the Spanish minister,
Don José Polo, and the arrangements were completed.
Meanwhile the antecedents of the Virginius were inquired
into and it was proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that she
had no right to carry the American flag. Patterson was not
the legal owner of the vessel, the money for her purchase hav-
ing been furnished by a junta of Cuban sympathizers; her
registry, therefore, had been obtained by perjury. This did

. away with the necessity of Spain’s saluting our flag and made
it incumbent upon the United States to prosecute the proper
persons for violation of navigation laws. The Virginius and
her survivors were surrendered to the authorities of the United
States on Decembcr 15th, and while being conveyed to the ap-
pointed port she was lost in a storm off Cape Fear.
174 A RESUME OF SPAIN’S OFFENSES

Then followed a long correspondence over conflicting
claims, Spain setting up many counter claims for alleged in-
jury done to Spain by filibustering expeditions. An extract
from a long letter by Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, to
Admiral Polo, dated April 18, 1874, will show the feelings of
the administration. After reviewing the whole case, Mr.
Fish concluded in these words:

‘“‘For five years the policy of repression, of confiscation, of summary
execution of political prisoners, of refusal of reforms, of denial of self-
government, of maintenance of slavery, in short, the policy of violence and
force, has held sway in Cuba. It is understood that the insurrection calls
to-day for as many troops to keep it in restraint as were necessary in 1869.

“During these five years this government has watched events in
Cuba, perhaps, not always patiently, but certainly always impartially. It
has seen vessels sailing under its flag intercepted on the high seas and car-
ried into Spanish ports. It has seen the property of its citizens embargoed
and their revenues sequestrated, and when it has complained it has been
met by promises of restoration; but the official assurances of Spain in that
respect have in most cases not been complied with. It has seen its citizens
condemned to death under the form of military law and executed in viola-
tion of the treaty obligations of Spain. It has seen other citizens of the
United States mobbed in the streets of Havana for no other reason than
that they were citizens of the United States, or the accidental circum-
stance of the color of the dress. It has stretched its powers and inter-
ferred with the liberties of its citizens in order to fulfill all its duties as a
sovereign nation toward the power which in Cuba was tolerating the evil
influences of reaction and of slavery and of the ‘deplorable and pertinacious
tradition of despotism’ referred to by the minister of transmarine affairs, all
of which made the things complained of possible. It has refrained from
the assertion of its rights under the hope, derived from the constant assur-
ances from the government of Spain, that liberty and self-government would
be accorded to Cuba, that African slavery would be driven out from its
last resting place in Christendom, and that the instruments of the Casino
Espafiol would be restrained in their violence and made to obey law and
to respect the treaty obligations of Spain.

‘But while so doing it expected and still confidently expects the
time not to be far distant when Spain will make reparation for the wrongs
which have thus been inflicted upon their citizens.”

While those who considered it wise to refrain from a
recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans were thus
strongly impressed by the conduct of the Spanish government,
it may be imagined that among the mass of the people, sym-
BITTER FEELING IN THE UNITED STATES 175

pathizing as they did with the Cubans in their hard struggle
for freedom, the bitterness towards the Spaniards was great
and the excitement caused by the Virginius affair intense.
Soon after the outrage there was a great public meeting at
Steinway Hall. William M. Evarts, the leader of the New
York bar, and soon to be Secretary of State, was in the chair
and made a strong speech in behalf of free Cuba. Senator
Sumner had been invited to be one of the speakers, but he de-
clined, and instead sent a letter in a spirit directly opposed
to that of the meeting, insisting on a considerate treatment
of the Spanish republic and discountenancing the belligerent
preparations then underway in the navy yard. President
Grant fully anticipated war, and with his thorough knowledge
of military affairs perfected plans for attacking Spain. But
Sumner’s policy prevailed with the administration, and it con-
tinued to tolerate the repeated promises and shifting tactics
of the Spanish government. Meanwhile, the claims of Ameri-
ean citizens for spoliation in Cuba continued to accumulate.
General Sickles was so impatient under the temporizing policy
of his government that he resigned, and he was succeeded
early in 1874 by Caleb Cushing.

A number of British subjects had been among those exe-
cuted from the Virginius, and Great Britain, also wearied
with delay, early in 1874 insisted upon a decisive answer as
to indemnity, and with her Spain hastened to settle. As the
claims for executed citizens of the United States rested prac-
tically upon the same basis, late the same year our govern-
ment, after much difficulty, reached a settlement. Consider-
able sums were eventually paid by Spain to the families of the
American and British citizens, but the governor who ordered
the executions was never punished. Secretary Fish de-
manded that that part of the treaty should be carried out, but
Spain calmly replied that it considered Governor Burriel’s
conduct justified, and he was even promoted from the rank of
brigadier to major-general. The United States swallowed the
insult out of love for peace.
176 PATIENCE CEASES TO BE A VIRTUE

While England and the United States were urging to a
speedy conclusion the Virginius claims, the weak Spanish re-
public, from which Sumner and others in this country had
looked for great results, fell, and the Bourbons returned to the
throne in Alfonso XII. But it seemed to make no difference
with Cuban ‘polities. The war dragged on, as related in a
previous chapter, and late in 1875, when the end seemed as
far off as ever and property of American citizens in Cuba was
going up in smoke, the administration began to feel that
patience had at last ceased to be a virtue.

On the 5th of November, 1875, Secretary Fish addressed
a note to our minister at Madrid, in which he reviewed the
question and practically stated that the United States had
come to the conclusion that the state of things in Cuba must
cease. “Our relations with Spain,” he said, “are in that
critical position that another seizure similar to that of the
Virginius, other executions of citizens of the United States in
Cuba, other wrongs of a less objectionable character even than
many which have been already suffered by our citizens with
simple remonstrance, or possibly some new act of exceptional
severity in Cuba, may suddenly produce a feeling and excite-
ment which might force events which this government
anxiously desires to avoid. The President hopes that Spain
may spontaneously adopt measures looking to a reconciliation
and to the speedy restoration of peace, and the organization of
a stable and satisfactory system of government in the island of
Cuba. In the absence of any prospect of a termination of the
war, or of any change in the manner in which it has been con-
ducted on either side, he feels that the time is at hand when
it may be the duty of other governments to intervene.”

The secretary restated, with clearness and force, the reasons
which had led the administration to this conclusion, and in-
structed the minister to lay them before the Spanish govern-
ment. The statement was also to be read in confidence to the
proper members of the cabinets at Paris, London, Berlin, St.
Petersburg, Vienna, and Rome, in the hope that some, if not
CAPTURE OF THREE AMERICAN VESSELS 177

all, of those governments might use their friendly powers for
pacification. Spain made another promise, a favorite method
in meeting such emergencies, and just before our Congress
met submitted to Minister Cushing. certain proposals which
it was hoped might be used as a basis for a settlement of dif-
ferences. ‘These proposals had not reached this government
by the time President Grant submitted his annual message,
but he reviewed the whole question, stated the reasons why
he had not deemed it wise to accord the Cubans belligerent
rights, and explained why he believed that the time for inter-
vention had come. As Spain was then, however, disturbed
by the Carlist wars at home, and as proposals had been sub-
mitted, he deferred any positive recommendation till the situa-
tion could be more perfectly understood. Shortly before
leaving office General Grant proposed to European powers
a joint intervention, but soon other matters began to absorb
public attention. Asa result of the conference between Min-
ister Cushing and Calderon, the Spanish Minister of State, a
protocol, often insisted upon during the recent Cuban war and
as often violated by Spain, was signed. Jt was intended to
guard against any repetition of the Virginius affair and
secure to American citizens a civil trial on the charge of sedi-
tion or conspiracy, except when taken in arms, and even in
that case they were to be allowed attorneys and make their
defense in public trial. Spain agreed to command the
strictest observance of the terms of this protocol in all her
dominions, especially in Cuba. It was dated January 12,
1877. During 1877 the three sailing vessels, Hllen Rizpah,
Rising Sun, and Edward Lee, while pursuing their legiti-
mate business under the American flag ontside of Cuban
waters, were fired upon, captured, and detained for days
under circumstances of peculiar hardship and brutality. The
United States government, under President Hayes, carefully
investigated the cases and asked an aggregate indemnity of
$19,500, but again giving Spain all the consideration possible,
the sum was finally compromised for ten thousand dollars.
178 CAMPUS’S PLAN OF REFORM REJECTED

After the Carlist war the Spanish government sent out General
Campos with the results already related. Thus was our inter-
vention at that time avoided by the promises made by Spain,
promises, the fulfillment of which the treaty of Zanjon seemed
to speedily assure.

But the promise proved hollow and, indeed, in the first
instance was not kept. Uport the pacification of the island,
the rebels having laid down their arms according to agreement,
General Campos, evidently intending that the promise should
be kept in good faith, returned to Madrid and submitted the
plans for reforms in Cuba before the cabinet of Canovas, who
at once declared his unwillingness to lay them before the Cortes
with his recommendation, saying that that body would feel and
always feel that Spanish honor required the complete sub-
jection of Cuba. General Campos insisted that he had made
this agreement with the rebels in good faith, that, trusting in
it they had laid down their arms, and that it must be sub-
mitted to the Cortes. Canovas replied that in that case Cam-
pos must do it on his own responsibility. This and other
causes led to the resignation of the Canovas ministry, and
Campos, as the leader of the Liberals, formed a cabinet, but
his ministers could not be made to agree to the Cuban agree-
ment, and so Cainpos quickly resigned. An act was passed,
however, in January, 1879, whereby Cuba was to have repre-
sentation in the Cortes. Under this the province of Havana
should send three senators to Madrid and each of the other
provinces two. The archbishopric of Santiago should send
one, the University of Havana one, and the Society of the
Friends in the Country one. Thirty depnties, allotted accord-
ing to population, were to he sent to the House of Deputies.
They were to be elected by ballot in the ratio of one deputy to
each 50,000 inhabitants. But the peninsulars practically
controlled the elections and more than three-fourths of the
deputies proved to be natives of Spain, so that the Cubans
really gained no voice even in the small representation tem-
porarily allowed them.
LOSS OF LIFE AND TREASURE 179

The Campos ministry fell in December, 1879, Canovas
resumed the reins of government, and the promises made con-
cerning reform in Cuban government were practically ignored.
Spanish methods in Cuba continued very much as they had for
years. The bitter hatred between the insulars and peninsu-
lars was only intensified. The island of Cuba had been laid
waste, thousands of the sons of Spain had found their graves,
millions of money had been spent, and still Spain had not
learned the lesson. The Cuban was still oppressed and waited
only for the next opportunity to take up arms.

The loss of life and treasure in this war was enormous.
Two years before its close, in a debate on Cuban affairs in the
Cortes, it was said that Spain had up to that time sent 145,000
men and her best commanders to Cuba. The number in the
field in the last year of the war was given as 81,700, while
the records of the Madrid War Office show that over 73,000
of the land forces had been lost. The minimum total of
Spanish soldiers who fell in Cuba must have been, therefore,
nearly 160,000, for of those who had gone out not enough ever
came back to make a full regiment. Adding to this total of
Spanish forces the Volunteers, about 80,000 in number, the
Captain-General must have had at his disposal, from the be-
ginning to the end of the war, over 230,000 men. Thousands
fell victims to the guerrilla tactics of the Cubans, but more «lied
of fever and other diseases incident to the climate and changed
conditions of diet. The young men who were conscripted and
sent to Cuba were thoroughly unfitted for campaigning in
such a country, and discipline was so strict in the army that
many of them deserted to the rebels rather than suffer hard-
ships in camp only to be killed in some Cuban ambuscade.
The loss of the Cubans has never been known, for no account
was kept. It was small compared with that of the Spaniards,
for the army was small and scattered in little bands. The loss
has been estimated at 50,000 for the tew vears, but this is
probably an exaggeration.

The cost of the war to Spain was about $300,000,000, and
180 GRADUAL ABOLITION OF SLAVERY

certainly not less than that was lost in Cuba from the destruc-
tion of property and the loss of commerce and trade.

In the years succeeding the war some reforms were made,
though the nature of the government did not improve; in-
deed, as will appear later, tyranny was increased under the
cloak of concessions. The one step in advance was the aboli-
tion of slavery. Back in 1870, at the beginning of the pro-
visional Spanish republic, the Cortes had passed what was
known as the Moret Bill, by which freedom was decreed to
every child born of a slave mother after July 4th of that year;
also to such slaves as had helped or would help the Spanish
against the insurgents. But the Spanish forces derived little
help from this source, for the Volunteers were so opposed to it
that they prevented its publication in Cuba for two years, and
it practically remained a dead letter till after the war, when
it was enforced by the Liberal Ministry. Under the same law
freedom was to be given to every slave when becoming sixty
years of age. In January, 1880; as a partial concession of the
Zanjon treaty, a further measure was passed, providing for
the gradual extinction of slaves, so that in 1887 the institution
practically ceased to exist. The slaveholders, realizing that
it must come, made little objection, but gradually adapted
themselves to the new conditions.

During the sixteen years from the close of the ten-years
war to 1895, Cuba, if not in a state of insurrection, was sel-
dom quiet. When the people saw that they had been again
deceived, it was difficult for them to restrain their disposition
to revolt. Buta general rising was out of the question so soon
after the long struggle, for they had laid down their arms and
the Spaniards had taken them. There were several local and
spasmodic uprisings in the eastern province, however, gener-
ally because of some fresh outrage. In some cases Cubans
who had shortly before laid down their arms would mysteri-
ously disappear. ‘This was the cause of an uprising in 1879 in
Tunas de Bayamo. One of the outrages following the war
was the strangling of General Arcadio Vidal in September,
TYRANNY AND LEGALIZED MURDER 181

1879. He resided at Mayari, in the province of Santiago de
Cuba, under a solemn assurance of the commander-in-chief of
that region that he would not be molested. During one of
the local uprisings, or shortly after, he went to Nipe, and was
invited by the commander of the gunboat Alarma to take
dinner on board. Vidal went, but never returned. It was
said that he was strangled in a boat by three sailors and his
body thrown into the sea. It was asserted also that the deed
was committed in compliance of orders of the Spanish General]
Polavieja.

The exactions of the government were continually in-
creased as the industries of the island began to regain strength
after its long interruption. In 1882 came a Captain-General,
Prendergast, who was another Balmeceda. That year a form
of legalized murder was instituted. Political arrests were fre-
quent and prisoners were shot in transit under the pretence
that they intended to escape. The Cubans saw everything
going from bad to worse, and again conspiracies began to
thrive. As long as they held their peace the outside world
knew little of what they were suffering, but when the next
great outbreak came, the world settled down to the conviction
that something would have to be done.

12
CHAPTER XII

CUBA AFTER THE TEN-YEARS WAR—CONDITION OF THE
PEOPLE —THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL AND HIS EXTRAOR-
DINARY POWERS—SPAIN’S CRAFTY POLICY.

Area of Cuba and Its Population— Percentage of Blacks and Whites —
The Government Liberal Only on Paper— The Captain-General and
His Extraordinary Authority — The Council of Administration — The
Officials All Spanish — Provincial Government — Representatives Who
Did Not Represent—The Judicial System—The State Religion
—A Charge against the Revenues of the Island — Backward School
System — Remarkable System ‘of Censorship — No Meetings or Social
Gatherings without a Permit —Object of the Electoral System —
Cubans Have Little Chance to Vote and Less to Elect — Cuban Repre-
sentation in the Spanish Parliament — Hardly a Dozen Cubans Eligi-
ble to the Senate — Discriminations in Provincial and Municipal
Government — Spain’s Deceitful and Crafty Policy.

BRIEF account of the political, social, and economic
A condition of the island of Cuba, just between the Ten-
Years War and the late struggle for freedom ending in
hostilities between Spain and the United States, will enable
the reader to better appreciate the reasons for the outbreak
and the real character of the patriots.

Cuba has an area a little larger than that of the State of
Virginia, but fully one-fifth of the land is either unreclaimed,
covered with forests, or unexplored. Its population in 1894
was also about that of Virginia, from which it is apparent that
the habitable portions of the island were fairly well settled.
The population at that time consisted of about 1,200,000 white
people and 500,000 blacks, among the latter being com-
monly reckoned those having one-half and even three-fourths
white blood in their veins. After 1868 the black population
decreased both relatively and absolutely, and it is now prob-

ably not more than 25 per cent. of the total population. It
(182)
183

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MAP OF CUBA
Showing its Provinces, population of each, principal points, etc.
184 POWERS OF THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL

has been estimated that of the white people of the island
about one-fifth were Spanish-born: that is, peninsulars, as
distinguished from the insulars, or those born on Cuban soil.
The peninsulars were found principally in the western prov-
inces, and especially in and about Havana, where the popula-
tion is densest. According to the official census of 1887 the
population of each of the provinces and number of people per
square kilometer, or 250 acres, was as follows:

Provinces. Inhabitants. Density.
Havana, . ‘ F ‘ 481,928 52.49
Matanzas, . , ‘ . 5 359,578 30.59
Santa Clara, : ’ : ‘ 374,122 15.34
Pinar del Rio, . 4 ‘ e 225,891 15.09
Santiago de Cuba, . ‘ A 278,379 7.76
Puerto Principe, : : é 67,789 2.10

The government of Cuba after 1879 showed evidences on
paper of some liberality, but the evidences were misleading.
The head was still the Captain-General, appointed by the
crown usually for a term of from three to five years, and who
was ipso facto the Governor-General. In his military
capacity, which was not easily distinguished from his civil
capacity, he had an army during peace of from 13,000 to
20,000 men sent from Spain and maintained out of the Cuban
budget. He was assisted by a sub-Inspector-General, who was
also governor of Havana, but in time of disturbances the mili-
tary divisions were rearranged to suit the emergency. Not-
withstanding all the alleged reforms granted after the treaty of
Zanjon, the Governor-General practically retained all the
powers granted him in 1825 by Ferdinand, powers which pos-
sessed all the absolute qualities of the Turkish Sultan without
the restrictions imposed by the exigencies of European politics.

The Governor-General was assisted by a Council of Ad-
ministration, which was charged with the duty of preparing
the budget and estimating expenditures for submission to the
Cortes. It was the Captain-General’s duty to enforce these
acts, but he had the power to suspend them and adopt his own
course, merely notifying the home government if he thus acted
PROVINCIAL OFFICERS 185

contrary to the administrative council. There was also a body
known as the “ Council of Authorities,” which consisted of the
Archbishop of Santiago, the Bishop of Havana, the command-
ing officers of the army and navy, the chief justice of the
Supreme Court, the attorney-general, the head of the finance
department, and the director of the local administration.
They were called together only when the Captain-General,
usually as a matter of form, wished to consult them, and their
advice had no binding effect. These officials were all Spanish.

Each province was in charge of a governor appointed by
the Crown, who was an officer of the army, and directly re-
sponsible to the Governor-General. There was supposed to be
in each province a representative assembly of not less than
twelve and not more than twenty members, according to the
population. They were elected for four years, and sessions
were held twice a year. Upon meeting, the assembly balloted
for three candidates for speaker, and from this list the Captain-
General appointed one, but he could disregard the names pre-
sented and appoint any other member. The provincial gov-
ernor, if he desired, might preside and vote, and if he thought
best he might prorogue the assembly and report to the Captain-
General. The governor also nominated five members of the
assembly to act as a sort of cabinet, but the Captain-General
appointed them, and the powers of this cabinet were so re-
stricted that the Cuban was never given a voice in affairs.

The Captain or Governor-General had a string tied to
everything, even the municipal government. A board of
aldermen might consist of any number from five to thirty, in-
elusive, according to population, and they elected one of their
number as mayor, but the Captain-General might substitute
any other member. The concentration of ultimate authority
was equally noticeable in the judicial system, which included
two superior courts, one sitting at Puerto Principe for the two
eastern provinces, and the other at Havana for the four western
provinces. Under these were many district and local mag-
istrates, but the Governor-General could overrule any decision
186 RELIGION AND EDUCATION

of any court and even suspend, at discretion, any order or law
from the government at Madrid. It is unnecessary to ex-
amine this system of government further to determine its char-
acter. The Governor-General was absolute, except in two re-
spects. He could be recalled, and he had little to say about
the management of religious affairs.

As in Spain, no other religion was tolerated but Roman
Catholicism. There were no Protestant or Jewish places of
worship, though a person could hold to either of those faiths
provided he did not promulgate views contrary to those of the
established church. The ecclesiastical government was under
the Archbishop of Santiago and the Bishop of Havana, and its
maintenance, amounting to about $400,000, was a charge
against the general revenues of the island.

Until well into the eighteenth century, or after the death
of Ferdinand, there was practically no place on the island
where a Cuban could have his children taught to read and
write, though Pope Innocent XIIL., with the consent of Spain,
had established the Royal University of Havana, and the
Franciscan friars had given some instruction in their monas-
teries upon theology and philosophy. This led some of the
wealthier people of Cuba, early in the century, to send their
children to the United States to be educated, but this was op-
posed by the government and finally prohibited, though no
attempt was at oncé made to provide for such education in
Cuba. Thus many private schools were established. It was
not until 1841 that the right of the poorer classes to a primary
education was recognized by the government. Even then it
was brought about largely by individual efforts, country school-
houses being erected by individuals or by popular subscription
. and donated to the district authorities on condition that free
schools should be maintained. The Spanish element on the
island were inclined to oppose all steps for the education of the
lower classes on the ground that it might endanger Spanish
supremacy. But in 1889 there were 720 public and 537
private schools with an average attendance of about 40,000.
CENSORSHIP AND SUPERVISION 187

The children attending the common schools were at the ratio
of about one to forty-five of the population, or, if the students
in the universities and higher institutions are included,
those receiving instructions outside of the private schools were
one to every forty. In Spain, at the same time, the ratio was
one to nine; in the northern States of the United States, one
to four and two-tenths. By a law in 1880 education was
made compulsory in Cuba, but law had little to do with fact
when the schools did not exist.

An examination of the conditions on the island would not
be complete without a glance at the system of censorship.
Anonymous publications, however innocent, were not per-
mitted. Everything must bear the author’s name and the
place of publication, and the publication of anything offensive
toward the sovereign or his government, or having a tendency
towards a change in government, was an offense punishable
by fine and imprisonment. Very strict obligations were im-
posed upon all editors and publishers, and neglect to comply
with them was a penal offense. No publication could be started
without due notice to the proper authority. Three copies of
every issue must be presented to the governor or the mayor,
who stamped and returned one, retained one, and sent the third
to the district attorney to examine for seditious or otherwise
objectionable matter.

All mutual benefit associations, also, were under strict
supervision. Notice must he given of any meeting, and the
governor could break it up if he wished to. The supervision
of the authorities extended into all the relations of life, and it
was necessary even for a private reception to have a permit.
Otherwise it might fall under suspicion and be the cause of
much trouble to the entertainers and their guests.

Bad as the system of government and of commercial policy
was upon paper, it was in its practical application that the
Cuban was oppressed. He had little understanding of the
laws of government and of trade, but he saw concrete
results. To him the one trouble was Spanish misrule, and his
188 NEW NAMES, NEW OPPRESSIONS

one ambition became “Cuba Libre.” He saw that the
changes in law were not changes in fact. Concessions had
really taken the form of new oppressions. Names, not the
things themselves, were changed. The Captain-General was
called the “ Governor-General.”” The royal decrees took the
name of “authorizations.” The commercial monopoly of
Spain had been named the “ coasting trade.” The right of
banishment had been transformed into the “ law of vagrancy.”
Brutal attacks upon defenseless citizens went under the term
“compote.” The abolition of constitutional guarantees had
become the “law of public order.” Taxation without the
knowledge or consent of the taxed had been changed into the
“law of estimates,” the budget being voted by the representa-
tives of peninsular Spain. Instead of inaugurating a redeem-
ing policy which would have allayed public anxiety, and
quenched the thirst for justice felt by the people, Spain, while
lavish in promises of reform, continued its old and crafty sys-
tem, which was to exclude the Cuban from every office that
could give him any effective influence and intervention in pub-
lic affairs.

In order to render the Cuban powerless, Spain had, when
smilingly offering reforms, but to give him an electoral law so
artfully framed as to accomplish two objects — to reduce the
number of voters, and to provide a purely Spanish majority,
although the Spaniards were less than 10 per cent. of the
total population. For this purpose the electoral right was
made dependent upon the payment of a very high poll tax,
which proved the more burdensome as the war had practically
ruined many of the Cuban proprietors. In this way the right
of suffrage was restricted to only 53,000 inhabitants; that is,
to 3 per cent. of the total number.

The electoral law was also shaped so as to afford to indus-
try, commerce, and public officials facilities to acquire the
electoral privilege to the detriment of territorial property or
the owners of real estate. It also sanctioned fraud by pro-
viding that the simple declaration of the head of a commercial
ELECTORAL FRAUDS 189

house was sufficient to consider all its employes as partners,
having therefore the right to vote. Under this provision there
were firms with as many as thirty partners. By this scheme
alone almost all the Spanish residents in Cuba were turned
into electors. In the municipal district of Giiines, with a popu-
lation of 18,000 people, only 500 of whom were Spaniards or
Canary Islanders, the electoral list contained the names of
only thirty-two Cubans to 400 Spaniards — only a quarter of
1 per cent. of the Cubans to 80 per cent. of the Spanish popu-
lation.

But lest this should not be enough, a so-called Permanent
Commission of Provincial Deputations, appointed by the Gov-
crnor-General, was provided to decide every controversy as to
who was to be included in the registry lists. It is unnecessary
to say its majority was always devoted to the government. In
case any elector considered himself wronged by the decision of
the commission, he could appeal to the “ Audiencia,” or higher
court of the district, but these were almost entirely made up of
Spanish magistrates, were always subject to the authority of
the Governor-General, and mere tools in his hands.

Thus it may be easily understood why on some occasions
the Cuban representation in the Spanish Parliament was made
up of only three deputies out of the thirty allotted to the
island. In the most favorable times the number of Cuban
representatives did not exceed six in a body of 450 members.
The genuine representation of Cuba was sometimes less than
one per cent. of the members of the Spanish Congress. The
overwhelming majority of the Cuban deputation always con-
sisted of Spanish peninsulars. In this manner the ministers of
colonies, whenever they desired to give a decent appearance to
their legislative acts by an alleged majority of Cuban voters,
could always command it, for they were peninsulars, as Span-
ish as the Spanish at home.

As regards representation in the Senate, the qualifications
were practically prohibitive to the Cubans. To take a seat
in the higher house under, the law it was necessary for one to
190 THE FARCE OF CUBAN REPRESENTATION

have been president of that body, or of Congress, or a minister
of the Crown, or a bishop, or a grandee of Spain, a lieutenant-
general, a vice-admiral, an ambassador, a minister plenipo-
tentiary, a counselor of state, a judge or an attorney-general of
the Supreme Court or of the Court of Accounts, andsoon. No
Cuban had ever been permitted to fill any of these positions,
and there were not more than two or three grandees who were
natives of Cuba. The only natives who could become senators
were those who had been deputies in three different Con-
gresses, or who had held for four years a university professor-
ship, provided that they had an income of $1,500; or those who
had a title of nobility, or had been provincial deputies or
mayors in towns of over 20,000 inhabitants, if they had in
addition an income of $4,000 or paid a direct contribution of
$800 to the treasury. There were few native Cubans who
could have met these conditions, but, even so, they could
hardly have been elected under the electoral laws. Such was
the farce of representation which Spain gave to Cuba in her
boasted reforms. The various governments in Spain legis-
lated for the island as they pleased, and often the representa-
tives of the peninsular provinces did not take the trouble to at-
.tend when Cuban affairs were being discussed. There was
one instance in 1880, when the Cuban budget was considered
in the presence of less than thirty deputies and the minister of
the colonies. In 1887 there was created a council under the
minister of the colonies, but not a single Cuban was ever found
among its members.

Through similar contrivances in the law and irregularities
committed in its application, Cubans were also deprived of
representation in the provincial corporations; in many cases
they were entirely excluded from them. When, despite the
legalized obstacles and the arbitrary acts of those in power, the
Cubans succeeded in obtaining some temporary majority, the
government always succeeded in making their triumph null
and void. Only once did the home rule party obtain a ma-
jority of the provincial deputation of Havana, and then the
ALL’S FISH TO THE SPANIARD’S NET 191

Governor-General appointed from among the Spaniards a
majority of the members of the permanent commission. Until
that time the commission had always been of the same
political complexion as the majority of the deputation. By
similar methods the Cubans were gradually expelled from
even the municipal bodies. The majority, consisting of
Spaniards, always took good care to make the burden of taxa-
tion fall heaviest upon the Cuban proprietor, so that he really
bore a heavier taxation while enjoying less representation.
One year not a single Cuban had a seat in the “ Ayunta-
miento,” or board of aldermen of Havana, and in 1891 the
Spaniards predominated in thirty-one out of thirty-seven of
the “ Ayuntamientos” in the province of Havana. In that
of Giiines, with a population of 12,500 Cubans, not one of
them was found among its councillors; at the same time there
were only three Cuban deputies in the provincial deputation
of Havana, two in that of Matanzas, and three in that of Santa
Clara, the most populous regions in the island of Cuba.

From 1878 to 1895 there was but one native Cuban acting
as governor in the province of Havana, Rodriguez Batista,
who had spent nearly all his life in Spain, where he had made
his administrative career. The predominance of Spain ex-
tended down to all the local corporations. The powers of the
deputations in the provinces were not simply restricted and
their resources scanty, but the Governor-General appointed
their presidents and members of their permanent commissions.
He appointed mayors who might not belong to the corpora-
tion, and the governor of the province appointed the secre-
taries. The government reserved, moreover, the right to re-
move the mayors, of replacing them, and of suspending the
councillors and the “ Ayuntamientos,” partly or ina hody. It
frequently made use of this right for electoral purposes, to the
detriment always of the Cubans.
CHAPTER XIII

SPAIN A PARASITE UPON CUBA —METHODS OF TAXATION
AND EXPENDITURES —ENORMOUS FRAUDS— A SWARM
OF SPANISH VAMPIRES — ‘CUBA IS UNDONE.”

Replenishing the Treasury at Home and Enriching the Functionaries —
Enormous Increase of Taxation — Remarkable Growth of Cuba’s
Debt — Pledging Cuban Revenues for Spanish Interest Payments —
Not a Cent of It Spent to Improve Cuba—Taxes on Everything
— Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg — Enormous Import
Duties — Methods of Spanish Trade Monopoly — Treating Tobacco
ag an Enemy and Loading Sugar with Imposts — Regulations of the
“ Coasting Trade” — Frauds Committed upon the Cuban Treasury —
Embezzlements Larger Than the Revenues of the Island —No One

* Ever Punished — Officials Protected by Influential Patrons at Home
-—The Prey of a Swarm of Vampires.

E may now turn to observe what use Spain made of
\) \ / her power over Cuba, and we are at once met with
the fact that Spain had had no colonial policy ex-
cept that from what she had subdued by force she sought im-
mediate riches, and these she had remorsely wrung from the
labor of the natives, even of Spanish blood. For years she had
been simply a parasite upon Cuba, and had exploited the island
through a fiscal regime, a commercial regime, an a bureau-
cratic regime. Her thought from the beginning had been to
draw from the island all that could be squeezed out of it.
Nothing was consecrated to the development of the island.
Whatever was done was solely to replenish the exhausted
treasury of Spain and to enrich Spanish functionaries. Hav-
ing saddled Cuba with debt, and reached that point where in-
ereased taxation reduces rather than increases revenue, the
island was of little further value except to the Spanish bond-
holder and the official who came to Cuba with but one aim —
(192)
OVERWHELMED WITH NEW BURDENS 193

to draw a fortune from resources which should have been de-
voted to the native population. When he had amassed all
the money he could hope to draw from his position, he invested
it, not in Cuba but in Europe, returning home to enjoy the
income he had gained at the expense of the Cuban.

When the Ten-Years War came to an end, two-thirds of
the island was completely ruined. The other third, the in-
habitants of which had remained peaceful, was abundantly
productive, but it had to face the great economic change in-
volved in the impending abolition of slavery. Evidently it
would have been a wholesome and provident policy on the part
of Spain to have lightened as much as possible the fiscal bur-
dens of a country in such a condition. But instead, Spain was
bent upon making Cuba pay the entire cost of the war. She
at once overwhelmed the colony with enormous budgets reach-
ing as high a figure as $46,000,000! And this only to cover
the obligations of the State, to fill the gulf left by the
wastefulness and plunder of the civil and military administra-
tion during the years of war, and to meet the expenses of the
military occupation of the country. For the first two years
after the war the budget was over $46,000,000; in 1882 it fell
to $35,000,000, and from then till 1886 it remained at about
$34,000,000. Then it dropped to $26,000,000, where it re-
mained until the outbreak of the recent insurrection.

This reduction was not occasioned by Spain’s desire to
diminish the burden resting upon the country, but the limit
had been exceeded. The taxes simply killed the source of rev-
enue. Before the expenditures were reduced a new burden
was added in the shape of an accumulating deficit. At first
the revenue was $8,000,000 short of the budget; in 1880 it
was $20,000,000 short; in 1883, $10,000,000, and although
the expenditures were reduced, the accumulated deficit had
by 1895 reached $100,000,000, which amount was, of course,
added to the already heavy debt.

The debt of Cuba was created in 1864 by the simple issue
of $3,000,000; in 1868 it had risen to $25,000,000; in 1891,
194 NOT ONE CENT FOR CUBA

according to a statement made by Perez Castaneda in the Span-
ish Senate, it had increased to the extraordinary sum of $175,-
000,000, and by the middle of 1895 it stood at $300,000,000!
Thus, by the time of the recent outbreak the debt of the little
island, considering its population, exceeded that of all the
other American countries, including the United States.

This enormous debt, that ground the country down and
did not permit its people to capitalize their income, or foster
its improvements, or even to advance its industries, constituted
one of the most iniquitous forms of the Spanish spoliation. In
it were included a debt of Spain to the United States; the ex-
penses incurred by Spain when she occupied San Domingo;
those for the invasion of Mexico, and for her hostilities against
Peru; the money advanced to the Spanish treasury during the
later Carlist wars; and to cover the lavish expenditures of its
administration following 1868. Not a cent of this enormous
sum had been spent in Cuba in the advancement of civiliza-
tion. It had not contributed to build a single mile of high-
way or of railroads, to erect a single lighthouse nor deepen a
single port; it had not built one asylum nor opened one public
school. This heavy burden was left to future generations
without a single compensation or benefit.

“Why must Cuba pay the debt?” asked a senator in the
Spanish Senate in 1891. “ Are not these matters for the pen-
insula? Certainly they are matters for the whole of Spain.”

But the debt was left on Cuba. A Madrid paper said
that same year that from 1878 to the 30th of June, 1891, the
sum of $115,336,304 had been paid for interest and redemp-
tion on the Cuban debt, and yet it had gone on increasing.
The estimates for expenditures for the fiscal year 1893-94 were
given as follows:

Interest on the public debt, =. . fi . $10,435,188
Salaries and expenses of the colonial ana z 155,125
Regular army, . , : : . : i - 4,128,616
Navy, ‘ . 3 1,055,136
Military and siawal endiens wa retired pay, s 5 1,746,829

Civil pensions and retired pay, i. oi . . 442,223
THE ALL-DEVOURING SPANIARD 195

Judiciary, . - i 3 F - ‘ ‘ $317,595
Religious establishment, . : . es ° : 385,583
Volunteers, ‘ & i ; . : 1,768,125
Treasury depantiant, : r ~ - 3 3 708,125
Police force, . ‘ ‘ . 2,664,923
Executive soruinneuk endkiine poles, : 7 ‘ 1,371,165
Department of the interior, . ¢ : ‘ e 771,125
Other expenditures, . i . ‘ : ‘ ‘ 87,636

Total, . é ‘ : ‘ z $ ‘ . $26,037,389

Turning now to the other side of the account to discover
where the money was to come from, the estimates for the same
year furnish the following:

Tax on realestate, . 5 ‘ Z : Ps . $1,711,000
Import duties, . : ‘ é ‘ 2 ‘ : 9,620,000
Export duties, . 2 ‘ d : 5 j : 1,220,000
Port dues, . : ; rs Fi 3 535,000
Ten per cent. tax on paceenber fans, : 2 5 240,000
Excise on liquors, sugar, tobacco, petroleum, . 5 2,580,000
Tax on trades and professions, . fi 2 1,680,000
Stamp tax, including postage and telegraph, ‘ 2 2,174,660
Lotteries, . 3 ‘ . 3,104,000
Rents and sales of pubiie property, - 5 e : 399,000
All other sources, ‘ 5 ’ ; . 4 1,377,000

Total, . : ‘ ° ; : : : . $24,640,660

If the people of the United States were taxed at the same
rate per capita for their federal expenses, it would mean
squeezing out a revenue of $1,425,000,000 a year; or, to put it
the other way, if the Cubans raised a revenue for general ex-
penses at the same rate per capita that we do for the main-
tenance of the general government, she would have been taxed
only about $9,000,000 instead of $26,000,000.

The Spanish system of taxation in Cuba had always been
analogous to the killing of the goose which laid the golden egg.
Tor example, there were the once famous Cobre copper mines
situated among the mountains about three leagues from the
city of Santiago. They are of such superior richness that as
much as $4,000,000 worth of ore was exported in 1841. As
late as 1867, 6,000 tons were shipped in ten months. But
196 ONE GOOD REASON FOR INTERVENTION

the government was not content with raising a very large sum
by the taxation of the product; it increased the excise charge
till it no longer paid to work the mines, and so they remained
practically undisturbed, yielding little or no revenue.

The budget showed that nearly 40 per cent. of the rev-
enues were expected from duties upon imports. Everything
that was imported was taxed as heavily as possible, unless it
came from Spain. Nearly every class of articles paid a much
heavier duty than was paid by the sister isle of Puerto Rico.
In very "many cases the duty on imports was placed at twice
what they were for Puerto Rico. The effects of such a tax
were not only injurious to Cuba but to the United States, and
this latter fact should be considered when coming to the ques-
tion of the reasons for United States intervention. In the
year 1890 the exports from Cuba to Spain were about
$8,000,000, to the United States over $58,000,000. The ex-
ports of Spain to Cuba were about $25,000,000, and from the
United States only about $17,000,000. Though Cuba was
close to our doors and sent us over seven times as much of her
products as she did to Spain, we could not sent to Cuba of our
products but about 70 per cent. of what Spain could send 3,000
miles across the ocean.

The Cuban budget burdened the people in the proportion
of about sixteen dollars per capita, or about eighty-five
pesetas, while the Spaniards in Spain were taxed by the home
budget only at the rate of forty-two pesetas. The defense of
the country against its own people, the cost of the army, the
navy, the civil guard, and the guardians of public order, con-
sumed 36.59 per cent. of it. The debt consumed 40.89 per
cent. more, and this left but 22.52 per cent. for all other ex-
penditures required for civilized life and advancement. But
of this remnant but 2.75 per cent. was set aside for the future
and to develop the resourees of the country. And as there was
a deficit none of this could be used.

Bent upon exploiting the island, Spain strangled that vital-
ity by which alone exploitation could continue profitable.
THE CUBAN PLANTER’S DISCOURAGEMENTS 197

The economical situation in Cuba was such that she produced
for export and imported largely of what she consumed. Wis-
dom would, therefore, have naturally suggested to Spain that
Cuba could be most prosperous when her commercial relations
were least hampered, but she adopted a contrary policy. To-
bacco and sugar were loaded with excessive imposts; the cattle-
raising industry was shackled with heavy excise duties, and the
mining industry practically ruined.

The district which produced the best tobacco in the world,
the famous Vuelta Abajo, lacked every means of communica-
tion by which the value of the product could have been greatly
increased. No roads, bridges, or ports were to be found there.
And while other governments were taking steps to foster their
tobacco industry the Spanish government loaded the exporta-
tion of Cuban tobacco with an export duty of $1.80 on every
1,000 cigars. The same was true of the sugar industry. While
Spain was paying bounties for sugar produced in the penin-
sula, she exacted a heavy import duty upon all Cuban sugar,
so that a hundredweight of Cuban sugar was overburdened,
when reaching the Barcelona market, with 143 per cent. of its
value. The Cuban producer was oppressed with every kind of
exaction; the introduction of indispensable machinery was
heavily taxed, transportation was obstructed by taxes on the
railroads, a direct tax or industrial duty was exacted, and still
another, equivalent to an export duty, for loading and ship-
ping, while always and everywhere were the illegal exactions
of corrupt and thieving officials.

Besieged by complaints of such destructive discrimination,
Spain made great promises of reform. Cuban products were
to be admitted to the peninsula free of duty, excepting, how-
ever, tobacco, rum, sugar, cocoa, and coffee, which remained
“temporarily ” burdened. Duties on the importations from
Spain to Cuba were to be gradually reduced through a period
of ten years, till, in 1892, they were to be entirely extin-
guished. But, like other Spanish reforms, this was a new
eppresion, a a fresh disguise. The temporary duties, which
198 SPANISH CRAFT AND INJUSTICE

were upon the principal and almost the only products of the
island, were left undisturbed. Spanish products paid no
duties in Cuba, but Cuban products paid heavy duties in Spain.

In order to present an idea of how far the monopoly of
Spain went, it will suffice to point out the fact that the duties
on many foreign articles exceeded 2,000 per cent. as compared
with those borne by Spanish products. One hundred kilo-
grams (220 pounds) of knitted goods paid, if from Spain,
$10.95; if from a foreign country, $195. One hundred kilo-
grams of cassimere, if a Spanish product, paid $15.47; if
foreign, $300. The evil, however great, would have been
less had Spain been a flourishing industrial country, and had
produced the principal articles required by Cuba for the con-
sumption of its people and the development of its resources.
But Spanish industries were backward, and Cubans were thus
compelled to use inferior goods or pay exorbitant prices for
foreign articles, while Spanish merchants gained further profit
by importing foreign wares into Spain, there to be naturalized
for exportation to Cuba. This device had been in force a long
time and was one cause of the uprising of 1868.

The salaries of the various Spanish officials in Cuba were
in no way curtailed, while the perquisites and peculations con-
tinued to grow, and it was one of the most exasperating of all
the oppressions to which the Cuban was subjected. The min-
ister of colonies at Madrid was regularly assigned $96,800 for
use from the Cuban treasury. One minister took in 1892
$1,000,000 belonging to the treasury of Cuba from the vaults
of the Bank of Spain, and lent it to the Transatlantic Com-
pany, of which he was a stockholder, without any authorization
whatever. When he was threatened with prosecution he
haughtily replied that in that cae all his predecessors from
every political party would have to accompany him to court.
Nothing was done. In June, 1890, the subject of Cuban de-
faleations came up in the Chamber of Deputies, and it was
openly stated that under false vouchers and fictitious bills dur-
ing the Ten-Years War, there were defalcations amounting to
PECULATION AND CORRUPTION 199

over $22,000,000. The same year General Pando affirmed
that the robberies committed through the issue of warrants by
the board of public debt exceeded the sum of $12,000,000,
and he furnished a series of other embezzlements which
footed up more than $40,000,000. An article in the Ateneo
de Madrid, early in 1895, stated that the custom house frauds
in Cuba from 1878 to that date amounted to $100,000;000.
These peculations represented but a part of the hidden venality
of the administration. Falsification of documents, bargains
with delinquent debtors, exactions of higher dues from simple
peasants, delays in judicial or other business in order to obtain
a gratuity, all combined to divert the money of the Cubans into
the pockets of the functionaries. And while these evils were
brought to light from time to time, no one was ever punished.
In 1887, General Marin entered the custom house of Havana
with a military force, occupied it, and after investigating the
operations which had been carried on there, discharged every
official, but they were never punished, nor did they expect to
be. It has been stated that every official who went to Cuba
regularly paid some influential patron at the Court for protec-
tion. Indeed, the officials were really protected by the royal
decree of 1882, which provided that.the ordinary courts could
not take cognizance of such offenses as defalcations, abstrac-
tion, and maladversion of public funds, forgery, ete., com-
mitted by the officials of the administration, unless their guilt
were first established by an administrative investigation. The
administration, therefore, became the judge of its own of-
fenses. Naturally, corruption grew apace. Said Rafael de
Fslava in his Judicio Critico de Cuba en 1887: “ Granted
the correctness of the points I have just presented, it seems to
be self-evident that a curse is pressing upon Cuba, condemning
her to witness her own disintegration and converting her into
a prey for the operation of those swarms of vampires that are
so cruelly devouring us, deaf to the voice of conscience, if they
have any; it will not be rash to venture the assertion that Cuba
is undone ; there is no salvation possible.”
CHAPTER XIV

CUBAN EXILES, SECESSIONISTS, AND LEADERS —PREPARA-
TIONS FOR AN INSURRECTION—THE BANNER RAISED
AT LAST — FIRST RESULTS UNPROMISING.

Exile of Many of Cuba’s Best Citizens — José Marti and His Early Life —
Imprisoned When a Boy — Deported to Spain— He Vows to Free
Cuba — Becomes the Leader of the Secession Party — His Impassioned
Address aud Eloquence — Many Rebuffs and Disappointments — His
Trusted Friends in Cuba—General Lacret—A Fierce Hater of
Spain and a Strong Secessionist — Constantly Watched by the Spanish
Militia —His Visit to Santiago — Surrounded by Spanish Troops —
An Abortive Movement — Relaxation of the Vigilance of the Captain-
General — Sagasta’s Plan of Reform— Radical Cubans Received it
with Antagoniss —An Empty Reform — Marti Starts for Cuba—
Stopped by United States Authorities —The Outbreak in Matanzas —
Manuel Garcia, ‘‘the King of the Cuban Country ””— An Apparent
Failure.

suspected of entertaining plans against the Spanish
government, and the cold-blooded manner in which
political prisoners were treated, naturally led to the exile of
many of the better educated Cubans. They were scattered
through the other West Indian islands, through Europe, and
especially the United States. While as peaceful citizens they
had many opportunities to prosper in the United States, they
did not and could not forget Cuba where others of their
nationality were still suffering, and thus there were active
juntas of Cuban sympathizers everywhere. Spain was con-
tinually complaining that they menaced the peace of the
island, but their exile she alone was responsible for.
One of these exiles was José Marti, who was living at New
York. He was the son of a Spanish colonel, who had learned
to sympathize with the Cubans, and who, upon José’s birth,

threw up his commission, saying that no son of his should be
(200)

T HE vigilance with which the officials followed persons
YOUTH OF JOSE MARTI 201

brought up a servant of Spain. It is not surprising that with
such a father José, at the age of fourteen, should be attacking
the Spanish government in an amateur newspaper he had
established. The little paper was suppressed and the young
editor sentenced to ten years imprisonment in Havana.
Afterwards he was condemned to the chain for life, and
obliged to work with gangs of convicts under conditions which
killed strong men. The powerful influence of his family
finally secured a mitigation of his sentence to deportation to
Spain, where he was confined to the limits of the country. He
there received a university education and began to show his
remarkable talents. But while the amnesty gave him his
freedom, it did not appease his indignant resentment for
Spain’s broken promises and continued oppressions in the
island of Cuba. He resolved to act. At first he went to Cen-
tral America, thence to the United States, where he was in
constant communication with the promoters of the insur-
rection of 1868, and it was not long before he became the
leader of the revolutionary party.

At this time there were four distinct parties in Cuba — the
Conservatives, the Progressive Reformers, the Autonomists,
and the Secessionists. The Conservatives were, in general,
uncompromising Spaniards, the enemies of all reforms, bit-
terly hostile to the idea of secession, and with an indignant dis-
belief in the possibility of Cuban emancipation. They re-
garded the Cubans as a conquered people, and maintained that
there was but one way to hold them in subjection — to treat
them with extreme harshness and to refuse pitilessly all the
ameliorations which leniency, if not foresight, might have sug-
gested. The aim of the Progressive Reformers was ultimately
to attain autonomy by successive reforms, obtained legally and
with moderation. Those Cubans who adopted this idea were
mostly those who had been allowed to take subordinate posi-
tions under the government. The more numerous Autono-
mists were reformers of a more radical type, and they were
backed by some of the more enlightened classes in Spain, who
202 HIS CRUSADE 1N CUBA’S BEHALF

had come to the opinion that the superannuated regime under
which Cuba had so long suffered must be in some way changed
or improved. The Secessionists were the great body of the
Cubans who had sickened of Spanish promises and were de-
termined upon independence or death. There could be no
active propaganda of such ideas as this, and its supporters could
have little shape as a party.

It was of this class of radical Cubans that José Marti be-
came, in 1892, the uncontested chief. He gave himself to the
interests of this party, and there was not a moment when he
was not devoted to the effort to realize his dream of inde-
pendence for his country. Through the United States, San
Domingo, everywhere, he traveled, preaching his holy war.
Te was a man of charming and captivating personality, yet
with audacity and perseverance. His impassioned address;
his eloquence, at the same time exalted and simple; his hatred
of Spain, from which each day he drew some new grievance,
and his energetic and magnetic oratory gave him the aspect
of a modern Peter the Hermit, preaching a new crusade.

Marti gathered here and there a few contributions which
he sent to trusty agents in Cuba for the purchase of arms
and ammunition. But his work was often painful for one of
his nature; he met many rebuffs and disappointments, yet
when all the world ridiculed and doubted his mission, he re-
mained confident. He attracted the attention of the late
Charles A. Dana, who was an admirer of sincerity and energy,
and was quick to appreciate talent. Dana believed with Marti
that Spanish despotism in Cuba was a wrong that cried to
heaven, and therefore could not endure; he became a strong
advocate of Cuban independence, and his influence gradually
brought the cause to notice and helped to shape events.

The dreams of Marti in those days seemed so far beyond
the possibility of reality that even among the people who had
been won over to his cause by his convincing and impassioned
words, there were those who looked upon him as the victim
of hallucinations. He had friends in Cuba who thought with
FOSTERING THE SPIRIT OF REVOLT 203

him that the hour was fast ripening, but they were few.
There were not then more than 500 who were ready for the
word to take up arms, and nearly all of them were young men.
The old generals had not forgotten the failure of 1878, and
looked upon another effort then as rash, if not foolish. But
Marti faithfully corresponded with his few trusted friends,
and in secret nourished the spirit of revolution, while in
his hands he held the threads of the developing conspiracy.
He knew that if too many Cubans were at once concerned,
the Spanish would become alarmed and balk his efforts;
and he believed that when the standard of revolt was raised
thousands would flock to it, while those in exile would soon
find their way into the insurgent ranks. This being the pur-
pose in view, February 24, 1895, was fixed as the date for rais-
ing the cry of “ Cuba Libre! ” all over the island.

But in the latter part of 1894 there were indications that
the Spanish government proposed to make another attempt at
reform, and the secessionists feared that the Cubans might be
quieted by this pretense of progress. They thought that the
true policy for a reform would be to deal a blow impelled by
a strength rendered desperate by repeated abuse, and that the
blow should be struck while the whole country was irritated
and watchful. Encouraged by some deceptive improvement
in their condition, the mass of the people would relapse into
supineness, and in a so-called “ reformed” Cuba there would
be no spot in which the seed of rebellion might thrive, till the
people were again undeceived. Marti, therefore, determined
to fire his mine at once, imperfect as were the preparations.

There had been for some time in Havana an ex-rebel gen-
eral, the son of French parents from San Domingo, whose
name was Lacret. He was a picturesque, gray-haired gentle-
man, who looked much like an old French general of the
second empire. He had many pieces of property on the island,
and many invested interests, but he was a secessionist, a fierce
hater of Spain, and a veteran of the Ten-Years War, in which
he had given the Spaniards no end of trouble. He had not
204 LACRET’S FUTILE OUTBREAK

been exiled, but the government kept its eyes on him, and
when he moved on to Santiago in 1894 the police shadowed
him by instructions of the governor of the province. The
ostensible reason for Lacret’s journey was to visit a tract of
property called Santana, a few miles from Santiago. In
charge of this property, either as administrator or as tenant,
Lacret kept a mulatto named Alfonzo Goulet, who was also
an ex-rebel, and had fought side by side with Lacret in the
Ten-Years War.

One day Lacret left Santiago surreptitiously and went to
Santana, where he met a handful of men who had for a long
time been under the tutelage of Goulet; in all, about fifteen
persons, armed with rifles and Remington guns. They pro-
claimed the freedom of Cuba and retired into the woods of
Santana to await developments. But almost immediately a
company of Spanish troops, about 200 strong, came filing
through the country. At about the same time Lacret re-
ceived from the revolutionary committee of New York, of
which Marti was the head, an order to postpone his attack.
Lacret had another good reason for deferring his enterprise —
an old wound in his foot reopened — and he could not walk.
It was with great difficulty that Goulet succeeded in carrying
him to the coast and getting him on board a ship. All this
passed quietly without a shot being fired. Thé conspirators
returned to their homes unmolested, though they were under
the vigilant eyes of the police.

Apparently, from the time of this outbreak until the revo-
lution really broke out four months later, no one believed in
the possibility of an insurrection. Many who, a few months
later, were leaders in the insurgent party, at that time spoke
in unqualified disapproval of the outbreak, and with apparent
sincerity. The disfavor with which the public reccived the
project of Lacret’s little band of insurrectionists contributed
much towards the relaxation of the vigilance of the govern-
ment. The Captain-General, Calleja, became less watchful,
and this favored the designs of the secessionists.
MORE FALLACIOUS REFORMS 205

In the last days of 1894 Sagasta laid before the Cortes his
project for reforms in Cuba. It was adopted, but the autono-
mists and secessionists received it with outspoken antagonism,
claiming that the adoption of such deceptive measures would
suppress none of the abuses under which the island groaned.

The project to which the Spaniards later endeavored to
give much importance in order to condemn the revolution as
the work of anarchy really left intact the political régime of
Cuba. It did not alter the electoral laws nor curtail the power
of the bureaucracy; it increased the power of the general gov-
ernment, and left the same burdens upon the Cuban taxpayer.
The reform was mainly confined to the changing of the coun-
cil of administration into a partially elective body. One-half
of its members was to be appointed by the government, but the
other half were to be elected by the qualified electors. The
Governor-General had still the right to veto all its resolutions,
and to suspend at will the elective members. This council
was to make up a kind of special budget, while the general
budget would, as before, be made up in Spain; the tariff laws
would be enacted by Spain, the debt, militarism, distribution
of revenues, and bureaucracy would continue to devour Cuba.
Such was the self-government which Spain promised at the
very moment when the island was over a voleano of revolu-
tion.

The immediate effect of the passage of these alleged re-
forms by the Cortes was to hurry the revolutionary party into
revolt before their organization had been completed, before
they had a fair supply of arms, and while the leaders were still
scattered in various parts of the hemisphere.

Marti chartered three vessels, the Lagonda, the Amadis,
and the Baracoa, and sailed from New York with men and
war materials in January, 1895. Arrangements had been
made for landing the recruits and arms in Santiago, Puerto
Principe, and Santa Clara, but the expedition was stopped at
Fernandina, Fla., by the United States authorities, and Marti
Icft for San Domingo to join Maximo Gomez, who had been
206 “THE KING OF CUBA”

a military leader in the former war. Meanwhile, the Cuban
secessionists clamoring for the revolution to proceed im-
mediately, the banner was raised on February 24th as had
been arranged.

The authorities were aware of the project, and martial
law was proclaimed throughout the island the day before, and
in the province of Puerto Principe a rigorous search was made
for arms and ammunition, which were confiscated. For a
similar reason the revolutionists in Pinar del Rio did not at
once respond. The rising was confined to Santiago, Santa
Clara, and Matanzas, and in the two latter provinces the
leaders and many suspected persons were quickly imprisoned.
The attempt in Matanzas was of peculiar interest because of
the person who directed it. He was known by the title
of Ll Rey di los Campos de Cuba — “ the king of the country
of Cuba,”

This king was none other than the celebrated bandit,
Manuel Garcia. His modus operandi was perfectly simple.
Placing himself at the head of a few followers, he would
present himself at the home of some rich landed proprietor,
usually a Spaniard, and make him an offer something like this:
“You will give me before the expiration of...... the sum of
anes on In order to assure myself that you will comply with
my request, I shall take your wife or your son or daughter as a
hostage.” Protestations were useless; it was prudent to obey.

But justice should be done to the memory of this remark-
able bandit. He did nothing worse than many Spanish
officials were doing every day. Doubtless, Manuel Garcia
thought that if Spanish extortion from the Cubans was jus-
tifiable, so also would be a little Cuban extortion from the
Spaniards. His demands were calculated with great accuracy,
and the taxes which he levied never exceeded the actual re-
sources of the taxpayer. In this respect he was rather more
lenient than the Spanish collectors. Then, too, he always re-
turned the hostage in good condition. This line of conduct in-
dicated that he possessed a certain amount of relative honesty.
DEATH OF MANUEL GARCIA 207

Moreover, this king of the country was kind and charitable to
the poor. At times a price was set upon his head. Spain
mobilized against him legions of gendarmes, but he laughed at
such a display of forces, passed across their lines, and went to
and from Havana whenever his interests there demanded his
presence. It has been said that the contributions he extorted
were devoted to the use of the revolutionary committee. On
the 24th of February, with a few companions, twenty-four in
all, he raised the standard of revolt in Matanzas. For ten
years he had lived under a shower of bullets, frustrating at
every turn the strategic movements made against him; but he
fell mortally wounded in the first engagement of his troops
with the Spaniards. Immediately after his death his men dis-
persed, and order was restored for the time in that part of the
island.

The Governor-General on the 27th issued a proclamation
declaring the provinces of Matanzas and Santiago in a state of
siege, and fixed a period of eight days within which all who
surrendered would be pardoned. Under these conditions, one
man surrendered on the 3d of March, was brought to Havana,
and set at liberty. He was very soon after arrested on the
ground that he had bought arms for the movement, and was
subsequently court-martialed and sent in chains to the Spanish
penal colony in Ceuta, Africa. Other Cubans were too wise
to surrender themselves into such hands. The apparent
failure of the uprising and the small number of the insurgents
seemed to have deceived the Spanish officials, and there was
little alarm as Spain had at that time an army of over 19,000
regulars in addition to so many of the 50,000 volunteers as
might be called out. But the appearances of a Cuban revolu-
tion are deceitful.
CHAPTER XV

SPREAD OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE PROVINCE OF
SANTIAGO DE CUBA—SOME OF THE LEADERS AND
THEIR METHODS — EXPERIENCE OF A PLANTER.

Nature of the Province of Santiago de Cuba — Striking Personalities —
The Problem of Securing Arms — Horses More Plenty Than Guns —
Code of Honor among the Insurgents — A Visit to Gilard — A Camp
in the Mountains— The Machete—The Government Becomes Anx-
ious — First Efforts to Find the Insurgents — Real Effective Force of
the Spanish Army —Its Strength as It Appeared on the Official
Records— An Army Scattered All Over the Island — The Captain-
General Acts —Seeking Goulet’s Band— Goulet Draws the Enemy
into the Hills—The Spaniards Surprised and Routed — Goulet
Captures a Garrison — Effects on the Rural Population — Taking up
Arms.

T was in the province of Santiago de Cuba that from the

| beginning the insurrectionary movement assumed a dan-
gerous importance. It was there that the revolution of
1868 had been strongest, and it was there always that the
Cuban hatred of the Spanish was most marked. By reason
of the mountainous configuration of the country it is ad-
mirably adapted for resistance, and much of its coast is dif-
ficult to protect from secret landings. The shore for mile
after mile is characterized by long reaches of lonely snow-
white beach or rugged brown rocks, and is apparently devoid
of all human habitations, while a little distance back rise
twisted hills showing evidence of former voleanic upheavals.
But beyond these hills, and within the watershed of the Rio
Cauto, are delightful valleys where nature can be enjoyed
in unstinted measure, though the comforts of civilized life
are rare. The fruits and vegetables render subsistence an
easy matter to small guerrilla bands, and the temperature is

(208 )
THE GARDEN OF CUBA 209

uniformly genial. Roving bands can camp almost anywhere
among the hills or valleys in security; the water bubbles forth
from springs of crystal purity, and camp life is burdened with
the least amount of encumbrances. It had been called the
“ Garden of Cuba,” and some of the earlier colonists were so
delighted with the region that they imagined it to be the
original garden of Eden. In the mountains along the shores
is much mineral wealth, which generally remains untouched,
while in the valleys are great plantations which, in times of
peace, are very valuable and flourishing. The principal city
is Santiago de Cuba on the south shore, situated at the head
of a landlocked bay, and from it proceeds one of the two short
railways in the great province, a distance of about twenty
miles to the town of Euramada. About forty miles to the
east of Santiago is Guantanamo, connected by a dozen miles of
railway to a small port on the Bay of Guantanamo.

Tn the neighborhood of Santiago two revolutionary leaders
at once sprung to eminence — Antonio Goulet, already men-
tioned in connection with the Lacret uprising, and Pedro
Perez. In the northwestern portion of the province the move-
ment was directed by Bartholome Masé, Jesus Rabi, Miro,
and a negro general, Moncada. Masé had been the last to
lay down his arms in 1878. He had been imprisoned for
months without trial, but had finally been allowed to return to
his estates. Having been a man of wealth and position before
the first war, he had toiled against the obstacles of Spanish
taxation until he had again brought his plantations to the point
of returning a good revenue, and it might have been supposed
that he would have hesitated to drop all he had gained for an-
other assault upon Spanish authority. But when the call to
arms swept over the island in 1895 he at once burned his
plantation as an example to other patriots, and took the field
with all his men.

In many ways General Jesus Rabi was one of the most in-
teresting of the leaders. He was one of the very few descend-
ants of the Carib aborigines. But he was a man of strong per-
210 EMINENT REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS

sonality and well educated, and in the Ten-Years War had been
considered one of the bravest as well as gentlest of the Cuban
soldiers. He gave up a comfortable living to serve his country.
It has been commonly supposed that the Cuban revolutionists
were almost entirely from the poorer and the criminal classes;
that they fought because they had nothing to lose and every-
thing to gain. While in the rank and file there were many of
this class, for the leaders were glad of any men who were able-
bodied and brave, the leaders themselves were to a great extent
of the island’s aristocracy, living luxuriously upon large es-
tates. They were proud. and impatient of restraint, and sel-
dom have the ablest and best-born citizens of a country strug-
gled for independence more freely, or more unanimously sac-
rificed so much for their cause. In the revolution of 1895
these men came to the front again.

But while the Cuban Jeaders and their men abounded in
warlike spirit, they had few of the means of warfare. The
main problem was to secure arms and ammunition. An in-
cident will show how the rebels went to work. Near Goulet
lived a French planter, Jean Antomarchi, of the family of
Dr. Antomarchi, the last physician of Napoleon I. at St.
Helena, who afterwards settled upon a plantation in Santiago
province. Jean Antomarchi maintained a somewhat neutral
position in the insurrection, and yet was on friendly terms with
the insurgent leaders. One morning soon after the uprising,
one of Goulet’s lieutenants came to Antomarchi’s house, and,
in the name of his chief, requested his repeating rifle, remark-
ing that he would consent to allow him to retain his other
weapons, a shotgun and a revolver. Antomarchi thanked
him warmly for the generosity, but sent the remaining weapons
to Santiago for safe-keeping. Whoever had a good rifle in
those regions was compelled to give it up for Cuba Libre, unless
he took the field with it.

A Cuban insurgent seldom neglected the opportunity to
obtain a better horse than he had. If he met a man better
mounted than himself, he would politely request the stranger
A COURTEOUS INSURGENT 211

to exchange, and he always complied, no questions being asked.
The rebels recognized a certain regularity in such a proceed-
ing, but their distinctions were sometimes surprising. As an
example, Antomarchi tells the experience of a friend of his,
who owned important property in Cuba. “ About the time
the war opened,” said-Antomarchi in telling the story, “ I met
the count one evening as I strolled about the city.

“*« Listen to what has happened to me,’ said he. ‘Toward
noon to-day, when I crossed the Plaza de Armas, I saw a horse
that looked very much like my own, but it was mounted by a
negro whom I did not recognize. The tail of the horse had
been docked, as are only those of horses that are used in the
army. I had just noticed this when the negro, coming up to
me, asked me if I were the Count X. I answered in the af-
firmative, and he handed me this note.’

“ The count held out a slip of paper and I read the follow-
ing words:

““Senor Count: I return your horse because it has been
brought into the ranks illegally.

(Signed) GiLarp.’

“ Gilard was one of the insurgent leaders in that neighbor-
hood. This is what had happened: The servant of the
Count had, without warning, left his service and joined the in-
surgent ranks, and he thought that his master’s horse, which
was a superb animal, might serve with profit in the war of the
rebellion. On his arrival in camp he had offered it to Colonel
Gilard, under whose orders he was to serve. The colonel ques-
tioned him as to the owner of the horse, and the negro con-
fessed everything, and Gilard, who was an accomplished cava-
lier despite the fact that he was a mulatto, sent back the horse
to its owner with the above note. The count entreated me to
convey his warm thanks to the chief in acknowledgment of his
amiability. A few days:later, when I returned to my planta-
tion, I made haste to do the count’s errand. I knew that
Gilard was in the neighborhood of a coffee plantation called La
Felicite, which I had to pass on my route. When I reached
212 IN THE REBEL CAMP

La Felicite, I stopped before the dwelling house, and inquired
where I could find him. ‘There were several armed men on
the veranda, and they looked at me without uttering a word.
I repeated my question, and then one of them asked, ‘ Are you
French?’ ‘Yes,’ I answered. ‘Very good. Follow this
road. It will lead you to a wood of mango trees and beyond
that to a‘bdnana plantation. Follow the same path until you
are stopped by a sentinel.’ I thanked him and turned my
horse into a path hardly a quarter of a yard wide, faintly
traced along the side of a very steep mountain. Suddenly a
challenge rang out from the crest of the mountain:

“<« Alto quien va?’ (Who goes there?)

“T answered ‘ Cuba,’ which is the countersign of the insur-
gents. I was ordered to halt, and I obeyed. Then-I saw a
man carrying a Remington rifle coming toward me, spring-
ing from rock to rock. He saluted me, and asked what I
wanted. I told him my name and errand, and he went to in-
form his chief, who came to meet me through the shade of the
great banana leaves and the feathery shadows thrown by the
towering cocoa trees. When he came up with me he affably
invited me to go with him further on. JI dismounted and
went along with him, and after a time we reached his hut, or,
rather, we went under a roof made of palm leaves which cov-
ered at the utmost no more than four square yards. This shel-
ter was without walls; there was nothing of it but the roof of
palm leaves. For furniture it had a hammock, three guns,
and two empty tin cases which served as chairs. The colonel
made some very polite excuses because he had no chair to offer
me. When we were seated upon the tin boxes I delivered my
message, and then I felicitated him on the judicious choice he
had made in staking his camp and the superiority of the mili-
tary position which he occupied. I saw almost immediately
that this man was fully convinced of the right of the cause for
which he hazarded his life, but I saw, also, that he lacked the
energy which ought to be the predominating quality of a par-
tisan. To be always in motion, to harass the enemy unceas-
SCATTERED AND UNARMED BANDS 213

ingly, to keep him constantly on the watch, to fatigue him, to
attack isolated soldiers, to surprise sentinels; in a word, to be
forever in the breach, without rest day or night, and that in all
kinds of weather, these are the principal duties of guerrilla
warfare, and these duties the kind and loyal Gilard often for-
got in the quiet serenity of his green retreat. Dreamy and
generous by nature, he let one day follow the other without
any visible sign of war while he enjoyed the calm and the
security of his mountain fastness. But there were found later
in the ranks of the army of independence men of action who
profited by every advantage and developed a superhuman
energy and activity.”

No man unaccustomed to the peculiarities of Cuban war-
fare would have given much serious attention to the little
groups which located among the hills of Santiago; certainly,
few would have dreamed that in a short time the ery of “ Cuba
Libre! ” would be carried in the face of Spanish soldiers to
Havana and beyond into Pinar del Rio. Goulet’s band was
typical of many others. His grade was that of lieutenant-
colonel, and with his aide-de-camp, Palacios, and about fifteen
men, he began marching over the country, procuring some re-
cruits anda few arms. They had not more than twenty guns
of all descriptions, and, what was worse, only a few hundred
cartridges, but they had set out to wrest from the proud
Spaniard the Pearl of the Antilles.

They began by an indiscriminate appropriation of all kinds
of firearms. They accepted everything, from the repeating
rifle to the old shotgun with aramrod. Many of the men had
only revolvers, while a still greater number carried only a
knife about twenty inches long and known as the machete —
an implement which should have a place upon the coat-of-arms
of Cuba Libre, for it is one of the institutions of the island.
Jn times of peace it is used in the cane fields, and in times of
war, in the hands of mounted insurgents, it struck terror to the
hearts of Spanish youth.

Notwithstanding the apparent insignificance of the revolu-
14
214 THE SITUATION BECOMES ALARMING

tionary movement, the government became anxious. Several
decrees had been issued fixing the time in which the rebels
might lay down their arms, and promising a pardon to those
who should return to their homes, but the insurgents paid little
attention to them, being too wise to put faith in a Spanish par-
don. General Lachambre was appointed by Captain-General
Calleja commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces in the prov-
ince of Santiago de Cuba, and charged with the work of re-
pressing the insurgents. With some difficulty Lachambre
gathered together about two hundred men and set out for
Guantanamo, where he showed himself in brilliant uniform,
surrounded by staff officers, but a short time afterwards he de-
parted, not even having had a glimpse of the insurgents.

A characteristic proof of the improvidence and the disorder
of the Spanish government is that when the effective forces of
the island should, for the safety of Spanish rule, have been
20,000 men, it was impossible to get together much more than
2,000 capable of efficient service. The Spanish Army List
(Anuario Militar de Espaiia) for 1896 showed what would
have been a formidable army for a territory about the size of
Virginia; formidable as it might have been if massed to mect
the enemy in open battle, the exigencies of warfare with the
Cubans required the Spanish forces to be scattered over the
island. Every little town had to be garrisoned, for the enemy
might spring up anywhere at any moment. Moreover, there
was always a large proportion of the regulars, or those who had
come from Spain, who were unacclimated and were unfit to go
into the field.

At this time Spain was characterizing the insurrection as
a species of brigandage of trifling import, but gradually it
began to be realized that it was a serious movement, rapidly
gaining strength and breadth. While affairs seemed quiet
for the time in the western provinces, it was not easy to realize
the gravity of the conditions in Santiago, where even conserva-
tive people began to clamor loudly for autonomy — a sort of
compromise with the new spirit of independence.
THE SPANIARDS ROUTED , 215

Finally, the Spanish government resolved to act, and its
first effort illustrates so well the conditions of warfare in Cuba
and the conditions which prevailed to a great extent through-
out the whole contest that it is worth studying. One day a
column of about 250 Spanish soldiers left Santiago and began
operations from the little town of Cobre, about twenty miles
away. The object was to disperse Goulet’s little band, which
was master of the country about Botijo, where the people gen-
erally sympathized with the insurrection. It was hardly more
than a month since the insurgents had taken the field, and all
who were interested in them were somewhat alarmed when
they saw the prospect of an encounter between Goulet’s fol-
lowers and the royal troops. Warned of the approach of the
Spanish, Goulet quietly retreated into the mountains, and
then for some time he contented himself with secretly follow-
ing the enemy, waiting till he should find a propitious place
where he could give his followers the first baptism of fire.
He realized fully how important it might be not to discourage
them at the start. It was with joy, therefore, that he saw the
Spanish advancing into the interior within a labyrinth of hills
which few knew so well as he, and covered with forests and
underbrush which were well adapted for his tactics. He
pushed around and ahead to await them on the ground of an
ancient sugar-mill near Botijo. At this place the highway led
near the foot of a wooded hill of some height, the loose lime-
stone making the hill inaccessible. As soon as the Spaniards
had entered well into the ravine, the insurgents opened fire
on them. ‘The troops, which had marched without recon-
noitering, were completely surprised by the bold attack and
answered it only with a feeble fire. The Cuban fire was also
badly aimed, though Goulet and a few of his followers aimed
with calmness and skill. Several of the Spaniards were
wounded, and the column retreated precipitately, leaving two
of their wounded on the field. They returned to Cobre,
routed, and in a condition approximating that of stragglers.

On the day following this event Goulet caused a note to
216 . HUMANITY OF CUBAN LEADERS

be written to the military commandant of Santiago de Cuba,
informing him that he had picked up two wounded men
and that he would agree to return them should he, the com-
mandant, send for them. The only condition asked was that
the soldiers sent to convey their wounded comrades must come
unarmed. Goulet pledged his honor that they should come
and go unmolested. The commandant sent for his men ac-
cording to instructions, and Goulet kept his word.

From that hour the character of the war was transformed.
On the side of the Cubans reason and pity held natural pas-
sions in check. During the previous insurrection bloody re-
prisals were the rule with both of the contending forces, and
acts of unexampled cruelty and barbarity were freely com-
mitted. From the beginning of this insurrection the insur-
gents, as a rule, practiced moderation and profound respect
for the rights of humanity. The watchword of merey and
humanity came from the revolutionary committee in New
York. The instructions of the committee were formal and
they were carried out to the letter by the leaders.

The echo of the insignificant skirmish ending in the defeat
of the Spanish troops from Cobre reverberated throughout the
rural districts, and from that hour the negroes believed that
defeat for them would be impossible. Goulet passed on to the
little village of Hongolosongo, which was defended by a feeble
troop of Volunteers. He surprised the fort, and, without
striking a blow, took possession of the ten or twelve guns of the
garrison and of a case of cartridges. He gave full liberty to
the Volunteers who had manned the fort, and a few of them
enlisted at once under his orders. Farther on in the interior
of the country, General Rabi met with a success similar to that
of Goulet, though it was less brilliant. He fought at Los
Negros with a Spanish column, the struggle ending without
an accident to his men and with some loss to the Spaniards.
Meanwhile, the insurrection was organizing in the rural dis-
tricts. Some leaders of the former war recruited a few men,
but as yet the movement was without a directing head.
CHAPTER XVI

POLITICAL TROUBLES IN SPAIN— GENERAL CAMPOS SENT
TO CUBA—LANDING OF MACEO AND CROMBET — DEATH
OF CROMBET AND NARROW ESCAPE OF MACEO.

Spain Beset Within and Without — Officers Refuse to Volunteer — Sagasta
Ministry Resigns —Canovas’s Ministry —Campos Sent to Cuba—
Maceo and His Record in the Ten-Years War — The Terror of the
Spanish— How He Learned to Read—His Exile and Travels —
A Hostler at West Point — An Ideal Guerrilla Chief — Crombet and
His Reeord — An Obstinate Captain — Crombet Blows Out the Cap-
tain’s Brains— They Land on a Lonely Shore — Their Sufferings —
Feasting on a Banana Plantation — Surprised — Crombet Surrounded
and Killed —Maceo Escapes— Wanders Alone in the Woods —
Betrayed by an Indian Guide — A Friendly Negro —In an Insurgent
Camp at Last — His Presence Works a Marvelous Change — Recruit
ing His Army — Drilling His Men While Carried in a Hammock.

of the insurrection Spain was beset with troubles

within as well as without. The arrest and summary
treatment of an American citizen in Havana and the seizure
of an American vessel had placed the State Department at
‘Washington in a position of diplomatic hostility, and it was
becoming very evident that the authorities in Cuba were not
suppressing the rebellion with that thoroughness required to
uphold Spain’s supremacy. The home government had
treated the agitation as a recrudescence of the former so-called
“brigandage,”’ and, having fostered this impression, the sud-
den call for volunteers to go to Cuba not only opened the eyes
of the incredulous but brought the government into a sharp
contest with the militia. While it was apparently easy to re-
eruit men from the ranks of the army, the officers, according
to some of the Spanish papers, refused to volunteer to go to
Cuba, and this forced the government to the unpleasant ex-

(217)

LD URING the weeks immediately following the outbreak
218 EXCITEMENT IN SPAIN

pedient of drawing lots. The fact was the subject of much
comment in the press, and, in many cases, harsh criticisms of
the army officials with imputations of cowardice and venality.
The officers, furious under this criticism, on March 16th went
in a body to the office of one of the newspapers, invaded the
composing-rooms, and broke the printing-presses. The police
contented themselves with a very feeble interference. De-
mands made by army officers upon the Liberal ministry that
they suppress the newspapers daring to assail the army met
with a refusal which, on the following day, caused the resig-
‘nation of the ministry. Great excitement followed this step,
and it was not till General Campos was made Captain-General
of Madrid and given full authority that even a semblance of
order was restored.

It seemed probable that Sagasta, the Liberal leader, had
been rather glad of the opportunity to place upon the Con-
servatives the responsibility of regulating matters which were
daily becoming more complicated. The quarrel between the
journalists and the army officers served as a convenient pretext,
and on the 23d of March the Conservatives, under Canovas del
Castillo, took possession of the reins of the government. Im-
mediately after his installation the president of the council
made a very clear statement regarding the conditions prevail-
ing in Cuba, and the people became aware of the seriousness of
the insurrection. Public opinion changed, the danger was
realized, and there arose a clamor for a strong hand to stay the
insurrection. With one voice the people called for General
Campos, and soon his appointment as Governor-General of
Cuba and Commander-in-Chief was made known. Mean-
while, the first expedition, consisting of over 8,500 soldiers,
had already landed in Havana.

The news of Campos’s appointment was gencrally wel-
comed in Cuba. The insurgents knew that Spain’s most
famous general was a fair fighter, though severe, while those
who still hoped for peace, even though they sympathized with
the Cubans, had great confidence in the sagacity and skill of
CAMPOS RETURNS TO CUBA 219

the man who had happily brought to a close the Ten-Years
War. Everyone agreed that Campos was the most honest
man in Spain, the Spaniard of all Spaniards who knew Cuba,
her needs and her aspirations best. Besides, there was a con-
viction that as soon as Campos had informed himself of the
state of the country he would ask his government to make sucl:
concessions as would deprive the war of a rational basis.

The autonomist party were persuaded that Campos would
bring with him the much-desired civic policy. Many of them
think to this day that if he had at once offered the insurgent
leaders a broad autonomy, the insurrection could have been
quelled in a short time. But it is probable that the power
vested in him did not enable him to settle the contention in this
manner. Those who were well acquainted with the Cuban
junta and its purposes believed that the secessionists would
never have listened to further Spanish offers of plans of au-
tonomy. They had been duped once, and they did not pro-
pose to experience another disappointment.

But, unquestionably, there was at that moment a good
opportunity for Spain to make the proposition, for while the
radical secessionists might have continued to struggle, there is
no doubt that a fair proposition of self-government would have
alienated from the insurgent cause many who were in a doubt-
ful attitude at the time. It would also have made it extremely
difficult for the insurgent leaders to have carried their cam-
paign into the western part of the island. But while Campos
was on his way to Cuba with reinforcements events were hap-
pening on the insurgent side which had the greatest influence
upon the future of the war.

What the insurgent bands lacked at that time was a chief
vested with the authority that comes of an unquestioned
record, or that authority which by reason of a strong person-
ality and magnetic power over men would stand for experience
anda name. It was the common opinion that if some of the
exiled generals of the former war could succeed in landing in
Cuba, they could infuse the necessary strength into the cause.
220 YOUTH OF MACEO

In the province of Santiago the partisans of the insurrection
prayed for the coming of Maceo and Flor Crombet.

They did not know that the old leaders were about to enter
upon the scene and change in a short time the whole course of
events. At that moment Maceo and Flor Crombet were in
San Domingo, and they had but one arm of the sea to cross.

Antonio Maceo was born on July 14, 1848. His father
had a little plantation near Barajagua, and there were eleven
sons, of whom Antonio was the eldest. His skin was very
dark, something between the negro and the mulatto, although
he seemed much nearer the lattér type. At the beginning of
the Ten-Years War he did not know how to read or write.
His father kept mules for hire and they were driven along the
lonely mountain roads by Antonio. In this way the boy made
trips to Baracoa, to Guantanamo, to Santiago, and even to
Holguin.

He saw the slaves toiling their lives away in the fields, fet-
tered and lashed by overseers. He saw the red and yellow
Spanish flag floating above the fortified towns, and came to
understand it as an emblem of rapacity, cruelty, and greed.
One autumn day in 1868 Antonio returned to his father’s
plantation from Baracoa with the information that the Cubans
had rebelled. The father, being a careful man, at once ad-
vised his family to remain strictly neutral. But they secretly
exulted over the successes of their countrymen, and it may
have been that the Spaniards obtained an inkling of their sen-
timents. At any rate, Spanish spies began to annoy them,
and more than once they were threatened. The revolution
had been in progress for some months, and the Spaniards were
wild over a series of disasters, when there appeared at the
Maceo plantation a band of Spanish guerrillas. Maceo and

his older sons were away with a mule train.
They returned at nightfall. As the plantation came into
view, a horrifying sight met the gaze of Maceo and his sons.
Where his home had been there was nothing but a smoulder-
ing heap of ashes and embers. His barns were burned, his
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FAMOUS CUBAN LEADERS.
Gen. Maximo GoMEz. Gen. CALIXTA GARCIA.
Gen. Don JuL1Io SANGUILLY. Gen. ANTONIO MAcEo.
THE OATH OF THE MACEOS 223

crops destroyed, his mules, sheep, horses, and cattle driven off.
But where were the members of his family? Out in the jungle
a woman screamed. Father and sons rushed in the direction
of the voice. Six young boys lay on the ground, bound, bleed-
ing, and senseless. The gray-haired mother stood tied to a
tree, moaning, with a broken arm.

On the following day the father called his sons about him,
and exacted from each a promise that they would never lay
down their arms until the invader was driven out and Cuba
was free. A few days later Maximo Gomez, lying out in the
mountains of Santiago with his little following, was con-
fronted by a gaunt, haggard man, behind whom were half a
dozen awkward boys. Little did Gomez know that in this
gathering of raw recruits there stood his future lieutenant-
general. He asked them if they could fight. They smiled
and said “ Perhaps.” Soon afterward some Spanish troops
were riding leisurely along with an ammunition train.
Around the bend of the road, in front, swept a flying body of
horsemen, with their machetes glittering. They were guer-
rillas of Gomez, and at their head rode the “ awkward squad ”
of the Maceos.

Right into the heart of the Spanish troops they drove, pell
mell, cutting, slashing, and striking right and left. When
the fight was ended the elder Maceo lay dead on the ground.
Before the expiration of two months, Manuel, Fermin, and
Justice Maceo had been killed in battle.

Raphael was so cut up by wounds that he left the island to
die as an exile in Costa Rica. For six months after this the
survivors of the Maceo family seemed to bear charmed lives,
and they became the foremost fighters under Gomez.

Next, Miguel was killed by a bayonet thrust at the cap-
ture of Une Vitas. Soon after Julio was shot dead at Nuevo
Mundo. Felipe and Tomas were so badly wounded that they
became helpless cripples in San Domingo.

Then, almost at the end of the war, Marcus was killed in a
gallant machete charge, leaving Antonio, of all the “ awkward
224 A BRILLIANT AND DARING LEADER

squad”’ of fighters, still in the field. His brother José was
still too young to join his relatives. During the first twelve
months of Maceo’s service he received sixteen of the twenty-
one severe wounds that marked his body at the close of the war.
With great taciturnity and apparent gruffness, he combined
a magnetism that drew men to him. Within a year he had
been promoted through the various grades of sergeant, lieuten-
ant, and captain to that of major. Soon after receiving this
honor, Maceo was ordered to capture the upland town of Ti
Ariba. With only 300 men he made a headlong attack on the
forts, and after a desperate engagement succeeded in driving
the Spaniards into Santiago. For this brilliant engagement
he received the shoulder straps of a colonel. The more power
accorded by Gomez to Maceo the more effective became the
fighting of the Cubans. Maceo’s following was a blindly de-
voted one, and his men would follow wherever he might lead.
In 1870 Maceo with 400 men fiercely attacked the Spanish
general at Ramos. Campos held his ground, and the fighting
raged at intervals for thirty days. Near Monte Oscuro he
was fiercely attacked by General Valera, at the head of 1,000
Spaniards. With only 400 men he made a stand in a strong
position against the combined forces of Valera and Campos.
Maceo quickly saw that he would have to retreat. Before
doing so he lured the Spaniards into a dangerous position, and
then raised his favorite cry of “ Al machete!” The slaughter
was terrible. ;

After Maceo’s retreat Campos returned to Santiago with
only a remnant of his former forces. He was met by Bal-
maceda, the Captain-General, who said, derisively:

“Oh, you pretend that all the glory was on our side. That
may be so, but the losses were on our side also.”

“Does your excelleney suppose,” retorted Campos, “ that
Cubans use cotton bullets? ”

Maceo’s next notable achievement was in the battle of
Zarzai, where 2,500 Spaniards were utterly routed. Later,
at the battle of Santa Maria de Holguin, he charged the Span-
THE TERROR OF THE SPANIARDS 225

ish line at the head of his followers, and many were cut down
before they could fire a shot. It was at this time that Maceo
first met General Weyler. The latter had been made a briga-
dier, and at the battle of Guaimaro was sent against Maceo.

Maceo had placed his men across a steep ravine in some
heavy brush. The Spaniards came tumbling and running up
to the edge of the ravine, and there they were slaughtered like
sheep. Weyler fled, leaving five hundred dead on the field.
He never stopped to look back until he was safe within the
Spanish lines at Puerto Principe. Soon afterward, with 500
men, Maceo attacked the San Quentin battalion, 1,000 strong,
under the command of Colonel Yoyer. The Spaniards lost
200 men, and would have been annihilated had it not been for
the timely arrival of Lieutenant Tirso with reinforcements.

For these brilliant acts Maceo was made major-general.
Tt seemed as if this new honor put additional spurs on his heels.
He lost no opportunity to harrass the enemy, was in ambush
and on guard everywhere, and he became the bugbear and
terror of the Spaniards. He expected them at all points, even
when he was far away, and his life seemed set upon a height
beyond the reach of Spanish bullets. How to take Maceo be-
came the one idea of the Spanish soldiers, and as he became
the terror of the Spaniards he became equally the hero of the
Cubans. In rapid succession he engaged the Spaniards in a
series of brilliant and bloody fights.

In the battle of Cayo Rey, Antonio Maceo had a narrow
escape from death. In the midst of the fight he saw the Span-
ish colonel in command cheering on his troops. In an instant
Maceo had drawn his machete and rushed forward to engage
the Spanish commander in a sword combat. The latter saw
the Cuban leader coming, and flourished his sword in defiance.
At that moment Maceo received a rifle bullet through his
lungs. He reeled in the saddle and would have fallen had it
not been for Lieutenant-Colonel Pacheco, who caught him as
he fell and carried him to a place of safety. At the same time
Colonel Rodriquez, perceiving Maceo’s perilous plight, made
226 SUBDUED ONLY BY WANT

a gallant charge, and, under a sweeping fire, the Spaniards
were checked.

For three months Maceo fought a battle for his life, with
but meager attendance and but slim chances for recovery. At
last his naturally rugged. constitution triumphed, but his roar-
ing and trumpet-like voice had vanished. Again in the saddle,
Maceo began to adopt new methods of crippling Spain. He
began to destroy Spanish property and to burn Spanish planta-
tions. In company with his brother José, now grown to man-
hood, and 500 guerrillas, he invaded the Guantanamo district,
spreading desolation with fire and sword.

While he was in the midst of his fiery crusade the Cuban
and Spanish leaders met at Zanjon and signed a treaty of peace.
The news was brought to Maceo by a messenger who was
authorized to procure his signature to the treaty.

“Tell them,” was Maceo’s reply, “ that I will never sign
any compact with Spain other than a compact for the freedom
of Cuba. J will not submit.”

So Antonio Maceo kept on fighting. It soon became evi-
dent, however, that the backbone of the war had been broken.
Ten years of starvation and exposure in all sorts of weather
had broken the spirit of all but Maceo. Unable to obtain sup-
plies, he was reduced to complete want. Then the capitula-
tion came. He wrote Campos a haughty letter, agreeing to
lay down his arms, disband his forces, and submit to exile on
the condition that a Spanish man-of-war be placed at his dis-
posal to convey him and his officers to Jamaica. This offer
was readily accepted by Campos, who realized the impossibility
of catching Maceo in a country where he knew every tree and
bypath.

Maceo disbanded his men in the early dawn under a big
tree near Guantanamo. There were men among that 500 who
had fought under Maceo for almost ten years. They were
ragged and half starved, but they had stood together in the
brunt of many a hard-fought battle, and it was no wonder that
tears were in their cyes as they bade their leader goodby.
THE WEST POINT HOSTLER 227

For them it was a return to the blackened sites of their
burned homes and their ruined plantations. For him it was
exile forever to a foreign country — and Cuba still in chains.
No wonder the thought maddened him. Yet he counselled
patience, industry, and obedience to the laws. “ As for me,”
he said, “J will follow the will of fate that leads me blindly
onward. Will I come again? Quien sabe?” Then there
were handclasps and goodbys, and Antonio Maceo sailed away
to Jamaica.

In the few moments of his leisure he had learned to read
and write. At night, when the fighting was over, by such light
as his straightened means could compass, he pored over his
books as industrious and submissive as a child. General Lacret
was his preceptor, and he suddenly acquired an amazing fond-
ness for books relating to wars and military tactics, which he
read early and late.

Early in 1879 Maceo arrived in New York. For a month
or more he lived alone, without other companionship than that
of books. In a few months he made his way to West Point,
where he obtained employment as a hostler. Nobody in the
academy dreamed that the broad-shouldered, dark-browed
man who handled the horses so easily had ever smelled the
smoke of battle, or heard the song of rifle bullets. Day after
day, on the parade ground, he watched the evolutions of the
cadets, listened to the commands of the officers, studied the
discipline of the place, pored over volumes of military tactics
that he had managed to borrow, and added to his natural genius
the knowledge of other great generals.

At last the hostler, who was regarded as book-mad, gave up
his position and returned to New York. From New York he
went to Costa Rica, taking a hundred or more weighty volumes
with him. Some wealthy Cubans had settled in Cost Rica
during the war, and they now offered Maceo a tract of land on
which to colonize his brave followers. Here for ten years the
exile worked and studied and dreamed, instructed his veterans
in the modern theories of war, and gave them practical lessons
228 WORKING AND WAITING

in drilling and in cavalry evolutions. Never for a moment did
he forget his purpose.

In 1888, ten years after the close of the war, he began to
scheme for another uprising in Cuba. He took his former
officers into his confidence, and the little band of revolutionists
spent almost a year in making plans for the overthrow of
Spain.

Finally, Maceo sailed for Jamaica, and from Jamaica to
Santiago de Cuba, disguised as a laborer. Not fora moment,
however, during the ten years that had elapsed since the war
had the Spanish government lost sight of Maceo. Conse-
quently, when he disappeared from Costa Rica there was a hue
and cry. “ Maceo has gone,” was telegraphed to Madrid and
Havana. Search was made throughout the island. Finally,
the government got word of him. Under torture a Cuban
confessed that he had seen Maceo in FE] Christo, disguised as a
muleteer. In the meantime Maceo had become aware that his
whereabouts had been discovered. A fisherman who had
fought under him during the war sailed for Kingston one dark
night with Maceo in his boat. Jor many weeks thereafter
the Spaniards searched in vain for the Cuban leader.

Maceo returned to Costa Rica disappointed, but not dis-
couraged. He entered into correspondence with prominent
Cuban sympathizers in American cities, and with General
Gomez in San Domingo. This was kept up until local juntas
were formed in almost every prominent city in the United
States. Then Maceo and his little band of patriots in Costa
Rica had nothing to do but wait for events. The years be-
tween 1890 and 1895 were passed in hard work and in study-
ing the possibilities of Cuba from a military standpoint.

One day in February, 1895, word came that the Cubans
had risen. A week later Maceo, his brother José, Flor
Crombet, Cabreco, and sixteen other veterans, sailed from
Costa Rica for San Domingo. At this time Maceo was forty-
seven years old. His hair and his beard were beginning to
show threads of silver, but his strength and agility were sur-
TREACHEROUSiACEO AND CROMBET 229

prising. He wd I {h'axtpshooter and a horseman of incom-
parable finish and skill. Calm, imperious, and inflexible as
he stood under the rain of bullets, he was the ideal of a guer-
rilla chief. In the march of events he was to display qualities
which proved that he was as true a man and as masterful a
general as he was keen and skillful in strategy. Springing
from obscurity, he hewed out of the rugged history of Cuba
a name that will be remembered while liberty endures. Un-
known as he was and of a race of slaves, backed only by a
small band of rebels, he met the soldiers of a European power
and the head of an imposing army on the ground of man’s
equality, and for a moment the rebel held the safety of the
royal army in his hands.

Flor Crombet was also a guerrilla of unquestioned valor.
He fought side by side with Maceo during the greater part of
the Ten-Years War; wounded many times, he seemed to bear
acharmed life. He wasa lion in battle, but he lacked Maceo’s
greatness of soul, and he had neither the noble instinct nor the
generosity of Maceo. But he was whiter than his compatriot,
his mother having been a mulatto, while the untainted blood
of the Caucasian race ran in the veins of his father.

At San Domingo they chartered a little American boat in
which to cross to the coast near Baracoa, the nearest port,
taking with them a few arms and such equipments as they
considered necessary. They crossed without attracting atten-
tion. The Spanish cruiser which patrolled the coast did not
appear. On the morning of April Ist they sighted Baracoa,
and the leaders then asked the captain, who was steering his
boat towards the port, to land them farther along the coast at
some distance from the city. The captain refused, urging
that it had been agreed that they should land at Baracoa; he
declared that he should land just as he had contracted to, and
added that he had no wish to run upon the rocks which line
the coast for the purpose of pleasing his passengers.

Maceo and Crombet insisted that he should not land in the
port, and when the captain would not listen to their entreaties
a

230 WANDERINGS A. ™ WAITING

they told him that to do so would Never’ them into the
jaws of death. They told him that they could not approach
the port without being recognized, and that they would be ar-
rested and shot. But nothing that they urged had any in-
fluence upon the captain. He steered steadily towards the
city, and Crombet, beside himself, seized a rifle and blew out
the captain’s brains.

They then took the ship, put about, and steered for the
coast, and shortly afterwards landed in a little bay situated
some distance from Baracoa. It was a part of the country of
which they knew very little, and they wandered for some time
at random, and the few inhabitants whom they met, Indian
guerrillas in the service of Spain, were hostile to them.
Maceo and his band kept in hiding in the woods, where they
were soon called upon to undergo serious privations. After
a few days of trial and discomfort, however, they arrived at a
plantation of banana trees laden with fruit. They were
thankful for such a feast after their prolonged fast, but while
they were busy with this harvest they were surprised by a troop
of Indians commanded by Spanish officers. Maceo, realizing
their position, in an instant cried out to his companions:

“ Sauve qui peut!” (Let him escape who can.)

All ran, with the exception of Crombet, who was at once
surrounded. He fired and killed several of his adversaries,
then fell dead with a bullet in his forehead. The Spaniards
turned to pursue the rest of the band, but they had disap-
peared.

Dispersed and wandering separately, their sufferings were
intense. Maceo lived for days on bitter oranges, the only
fruit which grows in those Cuban woods. His boots had given
out, he was barefooted, for in his precipitate flight he had been
forced to abandon all his supplies. After a time he met an In-
dian and asked him to show him the way out of the woods.
The Indian, who had recognized him, agreed, and they went
on together for several hours. Evening came on.

“General,” said the Indian, “ beyond this point I do not
A TREACHEROUS SCHEME DEFEATED 231

know the way, and I think it would be better for you to re-
main in this grotto to-night. To-morrow I will return with
one of my friends who knows the country, and he will lead
you wherever you think best.”

Maceo thanked him and rewarded him by giving him the
only money he had left, an American twenty-dollar gold-piece.
In the shelter pointed out by the guide the wind had heaped up
a bed of leaves, upon which the tired fugitive stretched him-
self. But he was too tired and too anxious to sleep, and the
thought came to him that it would not be prudent for him to
rest there.

“No,” he said to himself. “It is not well that anyone
should know where I pass the night.”

Then he arose and looked about him. The dew lay heavy
upon the great leaves of the rich undergrowth, and a white,
malarious veil, hanging above the earth and embracing it,
trembled in the dim light of the night. Maceo’s heart
swelled with memories of his sorrowful youth, the remem-
brance of the natural and inevitable wrongs of his birth, and
the desperate fight for freedom of his tortured country. He
thought of Crombet who had fought by his side and had been
like a brother to him, and of all the brave, determined men
who had given their lives into his keeping and followed him
without a question or a doubt. They too were fugitives, grop-
ing about in the forest.

“No, there must be no careless relaxation now,” he
thought.

Despite his longing for rest, he left his cave and crept out
into the woods, where he hid himself among the leafage of the
great plants at the foot of a tall tree. In that position he could
watch the cave and signal should his guide return according to
his promise.

He had just settled himself comfortably in his shelter
when he heard voices in the direction of the grotto, and im-
mediately afterwards saw a troop of armed Indians advancing.

They were led by his guide, who had no sooner received his
15
232 WITH FRIENDS AT LAST

money than he had gone to betray him to his enemies, and the
Indians had come to capture him while he slept.

Maceo crept further away through the underbrush, that
luxuriant growth which returns no sound of the cautious
human footfall. It was not long before he heard the Indians
clamoring loudly because the perfidious guide had brought
them to an empty cave. It is evident that the Spanish authori-
ties, knowing of Maceo’s departure from San Domingo, and
anticipating that he would attempt to land on the island, had
laid their traps to capture him. The obstinacy of the captain
whom Crombet had shot was suspicious, and the quickness
with which armed bands turned up in the thick woods where
he had been almost lost could hardly have been without de-
sign.

Maceo wandered about all that night, expecting at any
moment to meet an enemy. Reaching at last a small hut
among the rocks, he entered, revolver in hand, and an old
negro sprang up from the floor.

“Do you recognize me?” asked Maceo.

“Yes, General,” was the reply. “You are Don Antonio
Maceo.”

“Very good,” said Mac20. “You will guide me to the
nearest insurgent station. If you lead me into an ambush I
will blow your brains out.”

The old negro did not reply. Silently he led Maceo along
a faintly-marked trail, and after several hours of marching
they met a little group of Cubans, who welcomed Maceo with
joy and gratitude. As for Maceo he was utterly exhausted,
unable to take another step. The dangers which he faced
after landing near Baracoa afford another proof of the daring
qualities of the man, and also of the lack of real sympathy
which the uprising encountered at the beginning. But as
soon as it was known that Maceo had landed, and, in spite of
the attempts to capture him, was at the head of an army, the
whole aspect of things was changed. One by one, or in little
groups, the Creoles who were serving in the Spanish ranks
AGAIN IN THE FIELD 233
joined the insurgents; those who had held back doubtfully
shouldered their guns and came into camp, while the Indians
who had failed to capture and assassinate Maceo, awed by his
bravery, soon became some of his best soldiers.

All those who had landed with Maceo and had escaped
from the attack at the banana plantation had to pass through
trying ordeals before they arrived at insurgent camps, but they
all came out safe. Maceo, who had not been a witness of the
killing of Crombet, believed that he was still alive, and as soon
as it was possible he ordered the woods searched in every direc-
tion. Fora long time he looked for him at every turn, and in
his dreams of Cuba Libre he saw his old friend living and_
triumphant. The Spaniards boasted that they had carried
away his body, but this is doubtful, as those who saw the body
which they exhibited as that of Crombet did not recognize it.

Maceo exerted himself at once to gather about him an
army, and when he had a few hundred armed men he felt that
lis success was assured. When it is considered what he accom-
plished with these men, one can imagine what he might have
done, with his military talents, could he have commanded a
large army of trained soldiers. His organization of the rough
material at his disposal was masterful, though for a long time
he was hardly able to do much work with his troops. In his
terrible ordeal he had become crippled; his feet were so
swollen that for some time he had to be carried about in a
hammock. But nothing escaped his keen eye and vigilance.
CHAPTER XVII

GOMEZ AND MACEO PERFECT THEIR PLANS — TRAGIC
DEATH OF MARTI—MACEO’S BRILLIANT CAMPAIGN—
NARROW ESCAPE OF CAMPOS.

Arrival of Marti, President of the Cuban Republic, and Gomez, Comman-
der-in-Chief — Influence of Gomez in the Central Provinces — Arrival
of Campos — His Plan to Confine the Revolution to Santiago de Cuba
—Plan of Campaign Arranged by Gomez and Maceo— Gomez with
Seven Hundred Cavalrymen Near the Enemy— A Wild Charge —
The Spaniards Driven Back on their Reserves— Marti’s Horse Be.
comes Unmanageable — Carried into the Ranks of the Enemy — They
Fall upon Him— His Death —Campos Orders a Military Funeral —
Maceo’s Attack at Jobito— Barbers as Surgeons— Maceo Plans an
Attack — Death of Goulet -—— Maceo Turns the Retreat into a Charge
— Did Not Know He Was Attacking Campos — Features of a Cuban
Camp — Uniform and Equipment of a Mambis.

when a detachment was sent to receive Generals

Maximo Gomez, Francisco Borrerro, Angel Guerra,
and José Marti, under whose energetic management the insur-
rection had been organized. They arrived in Cuba on the
11th of April, five days before General Campos succeeded
General Calleja as Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish forces
in the island. Pending the formal action of the Cuban
leaders when they should become more firmly established, the
revolutionary committee appointed Marti President of the
Republic of Cuba and Gomez as Commander-in-Chief of the
army. In two months, therefore, a revolution which had, to
all appearances, begun so insignificantly was fairly launched,
and the greatest general in Spain was on his way to measure
arms with the strongest leaders among the Cubans. If Gomez
was less than Maceo an idol of the Cuban people in the east,

he was better known in the central divisions of the island, and
(284)

(5 ve: Maceo had hardly begun his preparations
ON THE POINT OF ENCOUNTER 235

the plan was to take steps at once to extend the insurrection
into that quarter. Gomez had been one of the leading spirits
of the previous war, and later had been an officer of high re-
pute in the Honduras army. The knowledge of his presence
in the island was an inspiring impulse upon the Cubans in the
provinces of Puerto Principe and Santa Clara, who immedi-
ately prepared to join the insurgents, and, as in that section of
the island the white race predominated, their sympathy af-
forded the insurrection a more favorable standing.

Campos’s first plan of campaign was to confine the revolu-
tion to the province of Santiago de Cuba, and he was reported
to have made the statement that he would crush the insur-
gents, establish peace, and return to Spain the following No-
vember. He issued a proclamation promising pardon and
freedom to such rebellious Cubans as would surrender them-
selves and their arms, but it was too late for such an expedient
to have the desired effect. Campos asserted that the province
of Puerto Principe would never rise in revolt, and, in order to
prevent it, he projected a line of railway from Santa Cruz on
the south coast to the city of Puerto Principe, and another
from Manzanillo to Bayamo, hoping thereby to engage the un-
employed and quiet the fever of revolt. It became equally
important for the Cuban generals to cross the country into
Puerto Principe so that Gomez could bring into the field those
who were waiting for a leader, hence both the Cubans and the
Spaniards awaited the results of this first movement with great
interest. Campos hastened a cordon of troops, estimated to
number 10,000 men, near the border of Puerto Principe and
Santiago to prevent Gomez from entering. Meanwhile,
Maceo, who could more readily than Gomez recruit in the
east, organized the troops as best he could. Several chiefs
brought in little bands which they had gathered together, and
Goulet with his force, which by this time numbered near
1,000 men, hastened to join his old commander. To the in-
domitable courage and fierce endurance of the Cubans was
now added the buoyancy and confidence which came from the
236 FACE TO FACE WITH THE SPANIARDS

knowledge that they were to follow the lead of generals of
tried capacity, as daring fighters as the world has ever seen,
and recruits came in much faster than the equipments could
be supplied.

Gomez, Marti, and Maceo arranged their plan of cam-
paign and then separated. It was decided that in order to
facilitate the entrance of Gomez and Marti into the province
of Puerto Principe, Maceo should attempt a diversion of the
royal forces in the direction of Guantanamo. Gomez and
Marti with about 700 cavalrymen turned their course west-
ward. As their main purpose was to work their way into
Puerto Principe, where Marti counted on the presence of
Gomez and his own personality and eloquence to influence the
undecided, it was policy for them to avoid, if possible, the
Spanish troops, leaving them to be drawn away by Maceo with
his superior forces. But, unfortunately, when they found
themselves in the neighborhood of the enemy, the prudence
of Gomez was overborne by the zeal of Marti.

On the 18th of May, when camped on the plains of Dos
Rios, they learned that the first line of the enemy was in the
neighborhood, safely protected by a fort. Starting out before
daybreak the next morning, they soon came upon the Spanish
outpost. Marti was all excitement. He desired to fight, but
the prudent Gomez reminded Marti that skirmishing was not
to be the object of the expedition, that they should pass around
the enemy if possible, and he thought it would be wiser to
profit by the heavy fog which enshrouded the plain by firing
a few shots at the outposts, while they continued on their
march unnoticed along the flank of the royal army. But the
firing of the muskets excited Marti more and more. They
were face to face with the hated Spaniards against whose op-
pression he had struggled and suffered. The hope of his
youth and his manhood at last seemed to be realized. He
had planned the great struggle now at hand; step by step, in
the face of discouragements and obstacles, had infused it with
life and made it a working force. Here at last was a chance
FALL OF THE “PATRIOT MARTI 237

to strike. Why should they avoid this enemy with whom for
twenty years he had longed to measure strength? He could
not bear to think of drawing back, of slinking away.

“That would be dishonor,” he said.

Before the wild exaltation of Marti, Gomez had not the
heart to insist upon his own prudent tactics. And if, indeed,
they had had a large army, instead of a force insignificant
in comparison with the royal troops; had been properly
armed and equipped, a decisive blow might have been struck
then and there. The enthusiasm of the young recruits, led
by an old warrior of mark and such a spirited champion as
Marti, would have been hard to withstand, for no such frenzy
of patriotic fervor prevailed among the Spanish youths, drawn
into the struggle against their will. As it was, they quailed
before the charge of those seven hundred cavalrymen, and no
serious harm might have been done but for the recklessness of
Marti, who was mounted upon a very beautiful and vigorous
horse. He was told that the animal might be unmanageable
in a skirmish, even if ridden by an experienced horseman, but
Marti would not listen.

“Viva Cuba Libre!” he cried, waving his sword, and, fol-
lowed by his soldiers, he rushed upon the Spanish lines. Be-
fore the avalanche the Spanish army retreated, but in good
order upon its reserves. That was the trap. Gomez sounded
a rally to the troops, and they stopped, but Marti, carried on
by the vigor of his horse, which he could not control, was taken
straight into the ranks of the enemy. He received a bullet in
his left eyebrow, another in his throat, and several sword
thrusts in his body. Then the Spaniards fell upon their vic-
tim. The insurgents charged again, but in the face of such
superior numbers the movement was of no avail. There was
danger of losing all, and Marti was dead.

Marti wore upon his hat a scarf in the colors of Cuba Libre
on which were embroidered the words “ A. Marti.” The com-
mander of the Spanish forces hastened to transmit to Santiago
the news of this important capture, and the rejoicing was great
238 MARTI EULOGIZED BY HIS FOES

among the Spaniards. General Campos at once gave orders
to despatch two persons who knew Marti to identify him and
bring back official proof of his death. After its identification
the corpse was to be brought to Santiago, let it cost what it
might. He did not propose to neglect the opportunity of pro-
ducing upon public opinion an impression unfavorable to the
Cuban cause, and, naturally, the news of Marti’s death was at
first received with incredulity by some. But the evidence was
conclusive. The body of the dead president was carried to
the cemetery, where it was exposed to the public view and
photographed. By the order of General Campos, a Spanish
general presided at the funeral of the illustrious insurgent,
and pronounced a discourse over the grave, eulogizing the bril-
lant qualities of the fallen enemy, and mourning because his
courage and his talents had not been exerted in a better cause.
Those who had been present at the summary executions of the
previous war thought that times had changed and military
manners with them. At that time Marti’s corpse would have
been dragged through the streets of the city. But Campos
knew that such brutal treatment would only arouse thousands
of Cubans who were then in a doubtful attitude. The example
of leniency had already been set by the Cubans at the order
of the revolutionary committee, and to have offset this with
outrages would have called down upon the Spanish the con-
demnation of other nations. And this was at a time when
Spain was eagerly seeking moral support from outside for use
in her relations with the United States, which were continually
becoming more serious and complicated.

Marti’s death appeared at first sight to be an irreparable
loss, but the movement had received such an impulse that noth-
ing could then have stopped its onward march. It was quickly
arranged that T. Estrada Palima should act as president until
such time as the Cuban Assembly could meet to definitely
organize the republic. Marti had already issued the call for
this meeting and it only awaited the favorable opportunity.

The new president at the outbreak of the Ten-Years War
THE NEW PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 239

was one of the wealthiest landowners in eastern Cuba. He
took up arms, and served nine years in the field. During this
time his mother was starved to death by the Spaniards. He
was finally elected president of the Republic, and while in
that capacity was captured and taken to Spain. In a census
which was taken of the prisoners in the fortress in which he
was confined he wrote upon the blank which was given him:
“T. Estrada Palma; of foreign birth — Cuban; occupation,
President of the Republic of Cuba.” Upon the cessation of
hostilities in 1878, the Spanish government offered him a high
political position and the restitution of his vast estates, which
had been confiscated, if he would take the oath of allegiance.
This he refused to do, and, almost destitute, he departed for
IJonduras. In a small college there he found employment
as a professor, and thus supported himself until he became
postmaster-general of Honduras. The daughter of President
Guardiolo became his wife. Later, he set out for the United
States and founded a school in the town of Central Valley,
N. Y., for the education of Spanish-American children.

But he always retained his sympathy and enthusiasm for
the cause of Cuba and offered everything he possessed to
further the insurrection, becoming one of the leaders of the
revolutionary committee, and thus, on Marti’s death, the head
of its operations.

Experience had taught Marti that Céspedes had failed in
1578 largely because of lack of arms. Before attempting to
begin the war, therefore, Marti had organized a system of col-
lecting money from exiled Cubans everywhere. He had but
asmall sum at the beginning, for his system had only begun
its operations. The Spaniards generally believed that Marti
controlled millions and jumped at the conclusion that he was
hacked solely by the people of the United States. But it is
stated as a fact that Marti was compelled to start the war with
no more than $75,000, which would be hardly enough for a
single expedition. But his system was in working order and
it represented imiillions. ‘
240 A PREMONITION OF FATE

This is why the death of Marti did not check the march of
the revolution. Marti knew well it would be so, and a short
time before he set out with Gomez he had written to a friend
in Havana a letter in which he used these significant words:

“T can die now, because my work is done. I feel that I shall
soon be in the hands of that destiny which makes some men
disappear after finishing their mission for the good of their
country.”

Did his highly wrought and sensitive mind receive one of
those flashes of intuition of which history affords so many
notable examples

 

a premonition of the fate that awaited
him? If this be so, perhaps there is less reason to wonder at
the recklessness with which he rushed upon the swords of the
Spanish at Boca de Dos Rios.

The Cuban revolutionary organization was composed
largely of the Cuban political clubs throughout the United
States, about 300 in number, and all working under the gen-
eral regulations laid down by Marti. Contributions of money
from the members were regulated according to their resources.
The clubs, in a general election which was held every two
years, elected the treasurer of the party, but the real head of
the whole organization was the president, or, as the Cubans
called him, the delegate, who, after the outbreak of the insur-
rection, was appointed by the government in Cuba. Such was
the office which Marti held and which fell to Palma.

He was the plenipotentiary with full power to dispose of
funds, having the full confidence of the clubs. The Cubans
knew that their contributions were used for the purposes to
which they devoted them. They did not need to safeguard
the men who held the funds when they knew that they had un-
reservedly relinquished all they had ever possessed to the
cause, and many of them. had sacrificed great wealth rather
than swear allegiance to Spain. Thus it was that every Cuban
cigarmaker left ten per cent. of his wages at the delegation,
and the whole pay of one day’s work every week. They went
without home coniforts and often deprived themselves and
GENEROSITY OF EXILED CUBANS 241

their families of all but the bare necessaries of life in order
that they might help to set Cuba free. If there was a reverse
in the field, or some discouraging circumstance like the death
of one of the great leaders, the Cubans gave all the more.
While the people of the United States and the rest of the world
were reading in the newspapers of Cuban skirmishes, they
little realized what a story of self-sacrifice, of devoted patriot-
ism, lay under the surface of the life of the Cubans in this
country and in Europe. It was a drama which had to be en-
acted in secret.

Men naturally wondered how it was that while Spain was
sending over more men and arms, and spending money which
the nation could ill-afford to lose, the poor Cubans kept up a
contest on their side. But it was not maintained without
money, and plenty of it. It is said that once a Wall street
banker inquired into the income of the Cuban treasury in New
York, and was surprised when he was shown that it was re-
ceiving an income averaging $200,000 a month. The Cubans
in Paris alone sent over $120,000 at one time.

Bearing in mind these facts, it will be more readily under-
stood why, with such a complete organization working in this
country, the government of the United States was placed in an
extremely difficult position in its endeavors to maintain the
requirements of international law, especially when compelled
to assume an attitude favorable to Spain while the people sym-
pathized cordially with the struggling Cubans. And neither
the vigilance of the government, nor the spies of Spain, nor
Spanish diplomacy with strong influence to back it, could
check the results of the patriotic self-sacrifice of the Cuban
colony.

While Gomez, mourning the fate of the dashing but reck-
less Marti, was adroitly working his way along the flank of the
enemy towards the province of Puerto Principe, Maceo was
vigorously diverting the Spanish forces in the eastern part of
the island. Other bands of insurgents were having frequent
skirmishes amid the hills of Santiago de Cuba, and occasion-
242 VICTORIES OF RABI AND MACEO

ally a quite serious engagement. General Rabi defeated the
Spanish colonels Santoscildes and Zubikoski at Los Negros.
At Ramon de las Yaguas, Colonel Garzon surprised and cap-
tured Lieutenant Gallengo and a few Spanish soldiers. These
the disarmed and permitted to go unmolested, for it should
always be remembered that in these early engagements the
Cubans.were less concerned about killing Spaniards than they
were in capturing their arms. At El Cacao, General Rabi
cut to pieces the Spanish forces under Colonel Sanchez and
obtained a good supply of arms and ammunition, and in several
other small engagements the insurgents were successful, for
while the Spaniards were almost always at an advantage as to
numbers, and had the further advantage of good arms, they
were at a disadvantage in almost every other respect. Their
officers were utterly unequal to the kind of strategy which was
required in fighting the insurgents in such a country. The
fire of the insurgent musketry was likely to burst upon them
at any moment unless they were in the open plains. Taken
‘unawares, they would return the fire at random and seldom
hitarebel. On the other hand, the insurgents would use their
poor firearms to the greatest advantage, and when the oppor-
tunity came make a wild dash at the enemy with their
machetes, capturing all the arms and ammunition they could.
Moreover, the adroit Cuban leaders made the most marvelous
and unexpected movements with their little bands, all the time
drawing the Spanish further and further from the points
where success seemed the most promising.

Tn the pursuit of his plan Maceo attacked General Salcedo,
who had 3,000 men, at Jarahuca, and defeated him. and in
later operations succeeded in capturing 200 rifles and 40,000
rounds of ammunition by surprising a Spanish garrison at the
little town of Cristo. On the 25th of May, at the head of 2,000
men, Maceo encamped at the town of Jobito, a little north
of Santiago and not far from Guantanamo. He was close in
the neighborhood of a large force of the Spanish, but his posi-
tion was well chosen. At daybreak the next morning his
AN IMPORTANT ENGAGEMENT 243

troops were vigorously attacked by the royal army under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bach. The Spaniards were
ranged upon a narrow road which runs along a river, and which
for some distance is in full view of a plateau upon which Maceo
and his army had bivouacked. On their left they practically
commanded the enemy’s column; it may be said that they over-
hung them. The two contending forces remained at their
posts all the morning, exchanging a well-sustained fire of
musketry. Suddenly towards 11 o’clock the insurgents
heard a significant trumpeting in the enemy’s camp; an officer
of importance, one of the Spanish leaders, had been killed, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Bach had been mortally wounded.

As the Cubans were in a superior position, the Spanish
officer dared not risk an attack. He, therefore, sent to Guan-
tanamo for reinforcements, and, abandoning his position, drew
back to await them. They arrived in the evening and covered
the Spanish commander’s retreat. This was the first serious
engagement of the campaign, and the insurgents had held the
royal forces in check, fighting like demons. But the priva-
tions and suffering in the Cuban camps in these days required
stout hearts. There were no doctors and no medicine, and
the wounded insurgent had to rely upon nature for his cure,
though there were a few barbers in the ranks who acted as
surgeons. -

For a few weeks after this little of importance occurred.
Maceo effected a union with Rabi, and together they marched
westward toward Manzanillo, meeting with little opposition.
Meanwhile, General Campos had become impatient because
his generals displayed so little energy; he determined to show
them that he, the Captain-General, would meet the insurgents
without the support of the entire army. Since his arrival in
Cuba he had seldom left the ship upon which he had estab-
lished his headquarters. He sailed from Havana to Santiago,
and, wherever he thought he was needed, urging on first one
and then the other, negotiating in one place and ordering a
fight in another. Early in July he went to Manzanillo and
244 CAMPOS GOES TO THE RELIEF OF BAYAMO

landed. Numerous complaints had appeared in the press that
the Spanish forces at Bayamo, an inland city about twenty-five
miles from Manzanillo, were in a deplorable condition, without
food or hospitals, and cut off from Manzanillo by the insur-
gents. Campos, apparently, conceived the plan of relieving
Bayamo and of crushing the collected forces of Maceo and
Rabi at one blow, and of afterwards pushing westward to drive
Gomez into the Spanish military line between the province of
Santa Clara and Puerto Principe, thus catching the Cubans
between two fires. He ordered three Spanish columns to
march against Maceo’s force from different directions, while he
started from Manzanillo on the 12th with a convoy under
General Santocildes, which was to re-victual Bayamo.

Everything went well until they reached the neighborhood
of Peralejos, where the road divides. The new highway
stretches out towards the north while the old road ‘deflects
slightly towards the south. The guide turned into the new
road, which is better known and more worn by travel, but
General Campos ordered him to take the old road.

Maceo had been warned that a Spanish column was to leave
Manzanillo with commissary stores for Bayamo, and he de-
cided to attack it with as strong a force as he could muster.
With this end in view he had picked up Goulet’s force en-
camped at St. Georges, and also sent messengers to Rabi and
the others who were near by to join him. It was not long be-
fore his army, swelled by these reinforcements, numbered
3,000 men, of whom at least 500 were practically without
arms. They had proceeded toward Bayamo, and halted near
the parting of the roads.

Thinking that the Spanish column would follow the new,
well-beaten road, Maceo distributed his troops among the
underbrush and placed his equipage and the men who had no
guns along the side of the old abandoned road. Goulet and
his band was placed between the largest body of the insur-
gents and the military impedimenta. General Campos was
moving forward with great caution, when his advance guard
A PANIC TURNED TO AN ONSLAUGHT 245

came full upon the band of unarmed Cubans and fired a volley
of musketry into their ranks. The result was a wild re-
treat. The panic of the unarmed soldiers was so great that
Goulet’s troops were swept backward. For a moment he
seemed utterly abandoned, but his two aids-de-camp, Palacios
and Colas, were near him, and the three undaunted soldiers
united in a desperate effort to stem the flood of retreat. The
Spaniards advanced firing volley after volley at the flying
fugitives. Goulet mounted a rise of ground, to watch the
movements of the enemy and to give orders to his lieutenants,
and as he crouched at the foot of a tree half stripped by the
Spanish bullets, which fell like rain, a bullet entered his knee,
traversing the groin, and he fell dead. _ His two aids hastened
to carry his body from the field.

Maceo, who had expected to face the Spaniards on the
other road, heard the noise of the battle, and, notwithstanding
the disadvantages of his position, he rallied his troops and faced
the enemy by a change of front. When it is remembered that
the undisciplined and panic-stricken unarmed band was in full
retreat, it must be acknowledged that Maceo’s change of front
was remarkable, and that it did honor to his generalship. The
aspect of the combat at once changed; the Spaniards fell back
under the unexpected attack and felt that they were defeated.

At that moment General Campos ordered his officers to dis-
mount. General Santocildes did not hear the order and re-
mained upon his horse. Maceo was in front of his line sur-
rounded by his staff, all young men of excellent family, used
to the management of firearms and better marksmen than the
average soldier. He ordered them to fire full upon the per-
son who had remained upon his horse, supposing him to be the
general in command. Santocildes received in his body the
contents of twenty rifles and fell mortally wounded. As he
fell the Spanish soldiers rushed forward with a stretcher to
bear away his body. Maceo ordered his staff to fire upon the
compact group which the enemy formed at that point. Three
times the Spaniards were forced to drop the stretcher upon
246 A SPIRITED FIGHT

which lay the body of their general, and each time they left
upon the spot a number of dead and dying. They returned
after the third repulse and this time they succeeded in carry-
ing the body away with them.

Campos, seeing the turn the battle had tale ordered his
men to shoot all the horses and mules, and the dead bodies of
the animals were piled up as a barricade. Maceo, on foot,
urged the soldiers on with all his accustomed energy and cour-
age. It was a warm and spirited fight. The dead increased
on the side of the royal army, but they continued to pour upon
the insurgents a well-sustained fire. The rebels, on the other
hand, held their ground firmly. Campos received a ball in
his boot and another broke his staff.

As it drew on towards night the rain began to fall in tor-
rents and the ardor of the insurgents, whose ammunition was
running low, was somewhat cooled. At this favorable mo-
ment Campos gave the order to his men to resume their march
toward Bayamo, and the insurgents followed, harrassing the
royal army all the way to the gates of the city. The engage-
ment lasted eleven hours and cost the Spaniards, according to
their own account, a general and seventy men killed, and 100
soldiers wounded more or less seriously. The Cubans de-
clared that the Spaniards lost 400 killed and a large number
wounded, while the Cuban loss was Goulet and about 130
men. Altogether the day had been a hard one, and Campos
acknowledged in his report that his column had twice been in
danger. On reaching Bayamo he sent for reinforcements,
withdrawing a considerable number from Santa Clara prov-
ince, thus tending, as Maceo purposed, to make Gomez’s con-
temporaneous efforts in that direction easier.

Maceo did not learn till the following day that he had been
fighting with the Captain-General.

“ Had I known that,” he said, “ I would have sacrified 500
of my men and taken him dead or alive! Thus with one blow
I would have ended the war.”

It is true that had such been the result of the battle the
MACEO’S MAGNANIMITY 247

consequences would have been incalculable, and even had
Maceo attacked the Spanish as he expected to, the result might
have been very different. As it was, Maceo was compelled to
rescue his army from a rout. With what skill he faced his
armed men about, and brought them up past the unarmed
stragglers who were running for their lives, the results showed.
That one battle proved that Maceo was a great general.

But it was not simply upon the field that he showed his
great qualities. After the battle Maceo had the wounded
picked up and cared for, and then, sitting down in his humble
camp, he wrote the Captain-General the following letter:

To Marshal Martinez CAMPos:

Desiring that the wounded abandoned by your troops upon the battle-
field shall not perish for want of help, I have ordered my men to carry
them to the houses of the Cuban families living near the place of the com-
bat, where they are to be kept until you send for them. It is understood
that the soldiers who are sent by you for this purpose shall not be attacked

by those whom I command.
(Signed) Awntontio Maceo.

We may imagine the feelings with which the greatest gen-
eral of the proud Spanish nation received this note from the
mulatto general. But Campos was a wise and generous foe
and knew how to appreciate Maceo. If the Spaniards had
always been as magnanimous in the treatment of the wounded
Cubans who fell into their hands there would have been less
cause for a war which was destined to devastate the fair island
of Cuba.

The next morning Maceo filed off with his troops. They
were within sight of the city, and the Spaniards fired after
them a harmless volley of artillery.

“That is the way to salute a general,” said Maceo with a
laugh,

When once his brilliant exploit was accomplished the in-
surgent leader retired. He had just learned that important
forces were on their way to Bayamo to reinforce Campos, and

he feared to be taken between two fires. He sent each band
16
248 A SPANISH GARRISON SURRENDERS TO VASGUEZ

to its respective encampment to await such a time as he might
think best fitted for a new sortie.

Goulet was replaced by Colonel Higinio Vasquez, an old
mulatto who had not the prestige of his predecessor but who
proved a good commander. Diego Palacios was also made a
commander. On returning to the country near Santiago, the
troops commanded by Vasquez passed the little city of Baire,
which was defended by a small garrison. The vigilance of
the sentinels was inadequate to the occasion and the insurgents
penetrated easily into the city. The Spaniards retired into the
church, which they barricaded and from which they directed
a weak fire upon the insurgents. Vasquez ordered the com-
mander of the garrison to surrender, but he refused. The
Cubans continued to operate against the church, and then
the commander entered into negotiations with Vasquez. In
order to have time to receive instructions from Campos, he
asked Vasquez to wait two days before exacting his surrender.
Campos had fixed a certain lapse of time before the expiration
of which no officer was permitted to surrender a fortified posi-
tion. The Cuban commander, probably thinking that Cam-
pos could not help the garrison at that distance, agreed to wait
until the two days should have elapsed. When that time had
passed the Spaniard had surrendered, and Vasquez had saved
hisammunition. He allowed the Spanish commander to keep
his sword and gave him permission to return to a city occupied
by Spaniards, but the Cubans disarmed the Spanish soldiers.
They took possession of the guns and cartridges in the gar-
rison, but were surprised to find that there was but a small
supply of ammunition. Searching the corners of the church,
however, they found in one place the ground had been dis-
turbed. On digging they found the bodies of two soldiers,
buried during the siege, and near by four boxes filled with
cartridges. Owing to this discovery they were enabled to re-
new their ammunition, and they armed themselves with the
guns taken from the enemy. ‘Thus it was that the insurgents
kept themselves supplied with ammunition, and as time went
A LOST LEADER 249

on more and more of the weapons which Spain had sent to the
island to be trained upon the Cubans were turned on the
Spaniards. It made little-difference to the former whether a
Spaniard was dead or alive; but they wanted his rifle and his
cartridge box. After the battle of Peralejos, the Cuban forces
had picked up considerable quantities of ammunition which
the men under Campos had abandoned, and Maceo even
directed the cartridge shells to be gathered up so that they
might be refilled. So precious to them were bullets in those
days.

Had Goulet been spared a little longer to the cause of the
insurgents, he might have made a name for himself in the
world, for, while he had not the brilliancy nor the dash of
Maceo, he was a brave man. When it is remembered from
what despised material these mulatto generals were made, the
qualities they showed must challenge our admiration. They
could draw some of the best blood on the island into their
service. The aids-de-camp who had stood by Goulet when he
had been left almost alone at Peralejos were instances of this.

The life of a Cuban soldier could hardly be appreciated ex-
cept after visiting their camps and observing their peculiari-
ties. The usual tents were simply roofs of leaves fastened
upon pickets about six feet in height and capable of sheltering
five or six men, so that when the Spaniards made the pompous
announcement that they had destroyed a rebel encampment
it meant very little. As a matter of fact, the insurgents re-
garded an encampment as a thing of absolute insignificance,
because in two hours they could set up as large a collection of
the so-called tents as might be required. With so many woods
and palm trees at hand, the Cubans had little cause to regret the
loss of their improvised shelters. In one corner of an encamp-
ment would usually be an enclosure for cattle brought in for
the troops. Cattle were raised in great abundance in sections
of the province of Santiago de Cuba, and from the beginning

‘of the war the insurgent authorities had declared them to be
the property of the nation. This decree at least insured sus-
250 EQUIPMENT OF AN INSURGENT

tenance to the Cuban army in that section. When it is also
remembered that yams, bananas, cassava, sweet potatoes, man-
goes, and sugar cane form the basis of a nourishment very de-
sirable in the eyes of the natives, it can be understood how
easy it was for the insurgents to live in a country where the
rural people generally sympathized with them.

Nothing would seem to the-American more curious than
the equipment of an insurgent, or mambis, as he was called.
The climate demands very little in the way of clothes. The
soldier usually wore a pair of linen trousers and a knitted
woolen shirt, and some of them wore a short blouse called
mambisa, invented during the Ten-Years War. Its origin
was significant. After many months of rough campaigning,
clothes became rare, many of the mambis had no vests. This
was an inconvenience because it deprived- them of pockets
into which they could put cartridges intended for instant use.
But necessity, that fruitful mother of invention, came to the
rescue. They adopted the plan of wearing their shirts out-
side of their trousers, turning up the flaps in front and behind,
and sewing them up as far as the waistline, leaving openings
in which to slip their hands. This arrangement gave them
one large pocket at the front and another at the back, in which
they could stow away a large quantity of ammunition or other
supplies, which served also in some measure to protect the
body. This form of dress was found to be so practicable that
after the war jackets after the pattern were manufactured, and
that is why the mambisa with pockets at the belt became so
common among the later insurgents.

‘When the mambis was so fortunate as to be able to make a
choice as to his footgear, he usually wore the espadrille.*
Otherwise he went barefoot, and that was among the least of
his troubles. The chiefs of the army usually wore leather
shoes, and these might be called the principal insignia of their
rank. The insurgents wore Panama hats with a ecockade in
the shape of a Cuban flag or a star attached to the brim, which
was turned up in front and fastened to the crown.

 

“A kind of shoe having a sole of woven straw.
A PRIMITIVE KNAPSACK 251

The most peculiar feature of the mambis’ accoutrement
was his “sack.” It was an ordinary bag of burlaps or other
coarse texture, such as might be found in any barn. To each
end of these bags would be fastened ropes of straw which
would be passed over the shoulders and under the arms. It
was, of course, less practicable than the ordinary knapsack of
our soldiers, but the soldier of Cuba Libre put up readily with
such inconveniences, and the mambis was content when his
sack was well filled with his traps, utensils, reserves of ammuni-
tion, and provisions. Besides this sack they usually-had a
small bag attached to a cross strap in which were choicer
articles, their papers, or the commissions of their grade, if they
had such. For arms they carried a machete, and, when they
could obtain it, a rifleoragun. Some of the clever ones made
cartridge-holders out of old saddle girths. The nature of the
equipment was optional and varied with the resources of the in-
dividual. The majority of the soldiers had a grade. They
were ambitious, and there was no more satisfactory way of re-
warding their valor than by advancing them in rank, but when
the call to arms came, each one, from the commander-in-chief
to the common soldier, would rush into the fight on his own ac-
count, and none of the insignia of official rank were worn in
the army.
CHAPTER XVIII

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA—STRENGTH
OF SPANISH ARMY AND PECULIARITIES OF CUBAN WAR-
FARE—ON TO HAVANA!

Campos Sends for Reinforcements— Landing of Other Cuban Leaders —
Gomez Enters Puerto Principe—His Order for the Destruction of
Sugar Plantations — The Reasons for It — A War on Spain’s Finances
—Campos Leayes Santiago for Santa Clara to Intercept Gomez —
Plan for Concentrating Cuban Forces—Cuban Delegates Meet to
Found the Republic— Picturesque Surroundings— Discussing the
Constitution — Election of Officers— A Government Largely on Paper
— Gomez’s Great Plan for a Westward March — Strength of the Span-
ish Forces— Divisions of the Cuban Army — Gomez’s Instructions —
“To Havana” — To Push the Revolt into the West— Tactics of the
Insurgents— Their Advantages in Such a Climate and Country —
Spanish Difficulties — The Nature of Alleged Spanish Victories — Cu
bans Constantly Pushing Further Westward—Lunching as They
Filed.

ORTUNE certainly favored the insurgents in leading
k the Captain-General into the province of Santiago de
Cuba, for while Campos was unsuccessfully exerting
himself to crush the rebellion there, he was leaving the way
open for Gomez to carry the banner of Cuba Libre to the west-
ward. After reaching Bayamo and examining the garrison
there, Campos immediately sent for reinforcements and a con-
siderable number of troops came from Santa Clara. That
province he regarded as thoroughly loyal, and he did not be-
lieve for a moment that Gomez would be able to push beyond
the old Jucaro trocha.

But it happened at about this time that three able Cuban
leaders, Generals Roloff, Sanchez, and Rodriguez, landed in
Santa Clara province with a large amount of war material,
and before the Spaniards had extricated Campos from his posi-
tion at Bayamo the army in Santa Clara had been organized

into the Fourth Army Corps, and operations were at once
(252)
GOMEZ STRIKES AT THE REVENUES OF SPAIN 253

begun. It was not long before the insurrection had taken a
vigorous stride there. Skirmishes weré of almost daily oecur-
rence and there were some important encounters caused by the
action of the insurgents who undertook to destroy the rail-
road and telegraph communication of the province. Many
of the Spanish Volunteers in this district showed that their
loyalty to Spain could not be relied upon. One proof of this
was that 400 under Major Casallas deserted and joined the
Cuban ranks in a body at the first opportunity, taking with
them all their arms, ammunition, and supplies.

General Gomez, after the engagement in which Marti lost
his life, sueceeded in eluding the forces sent to intercept him
and entered the southern part of the province of Puerto Prin-
cipe early in June, or before the events just related took place.
Here he was joined by Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, the most
influential Cuban in that district, and soon his forces were
increased by young men from all over the province, thus form-
ing the nucleus of what was later the Third Army Corps.

When Gomez reached Najasa, about thirty miles from the
city of Puerto Principe, he issued one of the first of those gen-
eral orders which had so much effect in the later conduct of the
island. It was as follows:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF LIBERATION,
Najasa, Camagiiey, July 1, 1895.
To the Planters and Owners of Cattle Ranches :

In accord with the great interests of the revolution for the independ-
ence of the country and for which we are in arms:

Whereas all exploitations of any product whatsoever are aids and re-
sources to the Government that we are fighting, it is resolved by the Gen-
eral-in-Chief ta issue this general order throughout the island, that the in-
troduction of articles of commerce, as well as beef and cattle, into the
towns occupied by the enemy, is absolutely prohibited. The sugar plan-
tations will stop their labors, and whosoever shall attempt to grind the
crop, notwithstanding this order, will have their cane burned and their
buildings demolished. The person who,.disobeying this order, will try
to profit from the present situation of affairs, will show by his conduct lit-
tle respect for the rights of the revolution of redemption, and therefore
shall be considered as an enemy, treated as a traitor, and tried as such in

case of his capture. Maximo Gomez,
The General-in- Chief.
254 A POVERTY-STRICKEN NATION

The reasons for this order were the same as those which
led to the destruction of cotton in the South during the Ameri-
can-civil conflict. The sugar crop was a large source of rev-
enue to the Spanish government, both directly and indirectly.
He who follows the developments of this rebellion must al-
ways remember that while the Cubans were in no position to
drive from their strongholds the Spaniards who held the ports
and garrisoned the large towns, they could practically hold and
control the rural districts. It was equally true that the
Spaniards could not subjugate, except by vastly superior num-
bers, the numerous battalions of Cubans who were scattered
about in the country, where the people generally sympathized
with the insurrection. But while the Cubans could subsist
easily upon the country itself, the Spaniards required always
money, money, money. Ships must patrol the coast, rein-
forcements must be hurried from Spain, and they must be paid
and fed. But Spain was poverty-stricken and she had for
years depended upon Cuba to provide funds, and had even
pawned the revenues of the island in the European Bourses.

The insurgent leaders were well aware of Spain’s weakest
point. A war against Spain’s financial credit would be slow,
but it would be sure, and the Cubans were not pressed for time.
Every fall in the market price of Spanish securities, every
deficit in the revenues, every month’s pay of the army in ar-
rears, every unpaid bill for transportation and supplies, would
be to the Cubans an indirect victory, much more important to
them than the mere slaying of a few Spanish youths whom the
fever would kill sooner or later. The burning of sugar cane
was therefore a deliberate and rational policy of war, for the
planter could not then pay his income tax, nor buy from abroad
so as to enable the Spanish to fleece him at the custom house.
The Spaniards recognized that if the sugar crop could be
gathered it would greatly weaken the insurrection, if it did not
break it up, and they naturally did all they could to make out
that the insurgents were carrying on a war of vandalism and
barbarism. But the mere burning of the cane did not destroy
PUSHING THE CAMPAIGN WESTWARD 255

the plantation. It has even been affirmed that the burning
of one crop of cane will result in so much greater a yield the
following season that the loss is small, for the roots of the cane
remain in good condition. Ilow successful the insurgents
were in this method of striking at the power of Spain may be
observed from the fact that while the sugar crop of Cuba
amounted to 1,040,000 tons in 1894, it fell to 300,000 tons the
first year of the insurrection.

Having issued this order and another to the insurgent
troops to destroy all railroad and telegraph lines possible,
Gomez proceeded to ride over the country surrounding the
city of Puerto Principe. He burned the railroad station of
Alta Garcia, a few miles from the city, captured the fort of El
Mulatto to the northwest of the city, and cut to pieces a small
Spanish band near Las Yeguas. The town and the fort of San
Jeronimo surrendered to him, and he attacked and raided the
town of Cascorro in the eastern section of the province. This
was one of his most profitable engagements, as he found a large
quantity of arms and ammunition. All the wounded were
picked up and cared for by the Cubans to the extent of their
means, and prisoners were released to the Spanish, who were,
unfortunately, seldom ready to be as magnanimous. When-
ever Gomez found his position inferior or met a force too great
for him to attack with safety, he contented himself with an am-
bush and a rapid retreat, which the Spanish news headquarters
at once construed into a rebel rout, although the unmistakable
fact was that the insurgents were constantly growing in num-
bers and were pushing their campaign further and further
westward. By summer the insurrection had taken shape in
the three great provinces of the east, and the time had come for
the supreme effort to be made by the insurgent leaders.

Campos had meantime left Santiago de Cuba, where the
uprising had become general, and was being vigorously pushed
hy Maceo and other insurgent leaders, and hurried back to
Santa Clara province to prevent Gomez from passing beyond
the Jucaro trocha, which stretches for fifty miles across the
256 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC

western portion of Puerto Principe. The forces he had relied
upon to prevent the westward march of Gomez had proved en-
tirely inadequate for the sharp tactics of the veteran Cuban,
and, besides, daring bands of insurgents were by this time rov-
ing over the districts of Santa Clara.

It was at this point that Gomez announced his intention of
marching through Santa Clara into Matanzas and on to
Havana. The Spaniards explained the progress of the insur-
rection by the fact that it was impossible for their soldiers to
operate during the wet season, and they boasted that as soon
as the winter or dry season set in the Cubans would be driven
back into the province of Santiago de Cuba, where by the con-
centration of their entire fleet at the eastern shores of the island
they could cut off the base of supplies and starve the rebels
into submission. But it was in just this dry season that Gomez
proposed to march towards Havana, and this movement must
be regarded as the most remarkable of any during the war.

By the beginning of the dry season Gomez had practically
perfected “all his plans and had ordered Maceo, with about
4,000 men, mostly infantry, to follow up and join him near the
trocha. Further westward, Generals Roloff, Sanchez, Perez,
and Lacret were waiting under orders for the advance of the
Commander-in-Chief. Gomez established his headquarters at
Jimaguaya, in the province of Puerto Principe. Near the
town is an immense prairie or savanna, difficult of approach,
and it was upon this plain that it was decided to accomplish the
formal organization of the republic and the concentration of
its military forces. The call for a meeting of representatives
of the Cuban people to form a permanent civil government
had been issued by Marti as soon as he reached the island, but
his death and the exigencies of the campaign had rendered it
inadvisable to comply with the call till this time.

The formation of a republic by people who have rendered
allegiance to monarchial institutions is always a dramatic mo-
ment in the history of nations, but seldom has a republic been
set up under more picturesque circumstances than attended
FORMING A CONSTITUTION 257

the establishment of the Republic of Cuba on the 13th of Sep-
tember, 1895. On that broad savanna gathered the men who
were to stand in the same relation to the young republic as the
fathers of the Constitution of the United States stood to our
people. These men were engaged in serious business, and
they felt their responsibility. The Cuban revolution was or-
ganized on a basis which insured its continuance till Cuba was
free. It might take years, but they knew the time would
come when Spain could hold out no longer, when her last cent
had gone and she could raise no more. They knew also that
thousands of exiled Cubans and other sympathizers were drop-
ping a large share of their wages into the revolutionary fund
and would continue to do so. There was a grim determina-
tion, with confidence in ultimate success, in the acts of. these
men. Of course, one of their immediate hopes was that the
new republic would be recognized by the United States.

At a preliminary session, the character of each representa-
tive was accredited by the respective credentials of his appoint-
ment, the representatives having been elected by the insur-
gents in each of the five army corps. There were twenty in
all, representing all the provinces except Pinar del Rio. The
assembly organized with Salvador Cisneros Betancourt presi-
dent, and proceeded at once to form the constitution which was
to rule the destinies of the republic. This discussion occupied
days. Every article was debated, amendments were proposed
and discussed, and finally on the 16th it was voted to refer the
various propositions to a committee for a complete revision of
the text. When they had completed the draft it was read,
and each of the representatives affixed his signature to the
paper. “ Then,” in the language of the secretary of the coun-
cil, José Vivanco, “the president and other members of the
assembly, with due solemnity, swore upon their honor to
loyally and strictly observe the fundamental code of the Re-
public of Cuba, which was greeted by spontaneous and enthu-
siastic acclamations of all present; in testimony of which are
the minutes in the general archives of the government.”
258 THE COUNCIL OF THE YOUNG REPUBLIC

On the 18th the assembly proceeded to the election of the
officers of the government council, each representative deposit-
ing his ballot in an urn placed on the chairman’s table. The
voting resulted in the election of the following:

President.— Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, who had held the same
position in the former revolutionary government.

Vice-President.— Bartolome Mas6, a prominent citizen of Manzanillo.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs — Raphael Portuondo y Tam-
ayo, a member of a wealthy and distinguished family of the province of
Santiago de Cuba.

Secretary of War.— Carlos Roloff of Santa Clara, a native of Poland
who had borne a conspicuous part in the former revolution.

Secretary of the Treasury.— Severo Pina, of an old and wealthy family
of St. Spiritus.

Secretary of the Interior.—Dr. Santiago Garcia Canizares.

‘

Sub-secretaries were chosen for each of the departments.
The vice-president of the assembly immediately installed the
President, and the latter in turn installed the other officers
elected. The assembly then chose General Gomez, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the army; General Maceo, Lieutenant-
General, and Tomas Estrada Palma, the head of the revolu-
tionary committee which operated from New York. The as-
sembly also passed laws dividing the island into states, districts,
and prefectures, regulating marriages, establishing post-
offices, and providing for the collection of taxes. The whole
arrangement was tolerably complete, but, unfortunately, for
the time, existed mainly on paper.

The governmental council went to Gomez’s camp, where
he with his troops took the oath of allegiance to the constitu-
tion of the republic. They then proceeded to Maceo, who
was still in the province of Santiago de Cuba working west-
ward, and his forces took the oath. After visiting Santa
Clara to administer the oath to the different forces there, the
council returned to Santiago de Cuba for the purpose of estab-
lishing headquarters. During the month these officers pro-
mulgated their various regulations, which were published in
two newspapers soon established. Provisions were made for
A MASTER OF STRATEGY 259

collecting revenue, and the army was authorized to destroy
those plantations which would not pay taxes to the republic.
The problem of the army’s equipment was not so much a
financial one, but arose from the caution necessary to run the
Spanish blockade and evade the vigilance of the officers of the
United States.

Civil formalities having been completed and the govern-
ment having concluded a grand review of the forces which
were to march to Havana, Gomez proceeded with his plans for
marching to Havana. Maceo was bringing his forces up from
the east with little difficulty, though he was compelled to fight
some of the way. In point of strategy there have been few
events in recent warfare to equal the remarkable character of
the undertaking Gomez had in mind. For it is to Gomez
alone, it has been said, that the honor of devising the move-
ment isdue. In carrying it out he accomplished feats worthy
of the most conspicuous of the world’s renowned generals, and
he exhibited qualities placing him among the first of Ameri-
can commanders. This opinion has been expressed by men
of thorough and critical knowledge of military affairs who fol-
lowed the movements.

To thoroughly appreciate the nature of the stratagem it is
necessary to observe something of the forces which Gomez and
Maceo might be expected to encounter. The royal army was
commanded by one of the most celebrated generals of the army
of Spain. There could be no question, it might be supposed,
that such an army under such a leader must oppose a desperate
and powerful resistance. Neither could there be a doubt that
every resource of brilliant strategical art would be brought to
bear on the attempt to circumvent the plans of the army of
free Cuba. According to the newspapers of Havana, on No-
vember 15, 1895, the total number of the royal army on duty
in Cuba was as follows:

+

Infantry, . : r ‘ : . é 4 59,900
Cavalry, . : i 5; : 5 : : i 13,886
Artillery, . ‘ % ¥ , ‘ 5 i i 1,858

Engineers, ‘ j : ‘ 3 ¢ 4 1,415
260 MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CUBA

Infantry of the ei : 2 : * 7 3 2,700
Policemen, 4 - ‘ : ‘ és s 976
Gendarnies, i : z ‘ ‘ ‘ Z ‘ 4,400
Guerrillas, - : : i ‘ 7 ‘ “ 1,832

Total, é : : ‘ é ; : $ 86,967

Of this total 81,591 were for active service in the field and
5,876 were for garrison and police duty. Adding to these
figures about 40,000 Volunteers, who were in general em-
ployed in guarding the cities, we have a total of 125,000 men,
or thereabouts. At this period of the war the Spaniards
garrisoned over forty cities or villages, and if these garrisons
were not in the actual conditions of a siege they were at least
employed in defending the cities or villages and the people
who were in them, for the insurgents were the absolute mas-
ters of the rural districts in the east, and they fired on any
troops that ventured beyond the city limits. The garrisons of
each city may be estimated as averaging about 1,000 men, or,
in all, 40,000 men, of whom at least one-third were recruited
among the Volunteers. It would appear from these figures
that 26,000 men available for war and destined for that object
were immobilized. Consequently, there remained about
55,000 Spaniards capable of taking the field. From this num-
ber must be deducted the troops which were in operation in the
extreme eastern portion of the island, or east of the point of the
concentration under Gomez, which numbered at least 6,000.
It may be asserted, therefore, that that part of the Spanish
army which was between Havana and Gomez must have num-
bered at least 50,000 well-armed men. It was against this de-
fending force, vastly superior in numbers and equipment,
that the insurgents were about to measure their strength.

From the outset, Gomez divided his troops into three
columns, one commanded by Antonio Maceo, about 3,000
strong; another under the command of Suarez and Lacret,
numbering 2,000 men, and the principal corps, numbering
about 6,000 men, under his own personal direction. A column
of 1,000 men under the command of Francisco Perez formed
the advance guard. In all, therefore, there were 12,000 men.
ON TO HAVANA ! 261

This was the effective army with which Gomez began his
march upon Havana, but it should be borne in mind that it
was only the nucleus, for as the insurgents marched along they
were joined by all the Cubans who daily embraced the cause
of liberty. Two months later, when Gomez parted from
Maceo near Havana, he had under his orders from 18,000 to
20,000 well-armed soldiers.

After Gomez had unfolded his plan and explained to his
lieutenants all that he hoped, he told them that all their efforts
were to be directed towards one object, to reach Havana. Ie
insisted that it was not a question of killing Spanish soldiers,
but of arriving before Havana. He expected them by a
march — strategic if need be — and as rapid as possible, to
succeed in reaching the goal, and they were to foil the enemy
as often as possible, and in any way, whether by a false attack
or by an absolute avoidance of a meeting. His final instruc-
tions were: “In the event of a forced battle, overthrow
them; pass over them — and on! To Havana!”

Gomez well knew what an effect would be produced by the
invasion of the western provinces of Cuba by the army of the
liberators. Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio had never
been stirred by the movement of the insurrection during the
Ten-Years War. The insurgents had never been able to enter
them. Assured by this precedent of immunity from attack,
General Campos had felt it safe to promise to preserve them
from any incursions of the rebels. His object in giving such
a promise was to reassure public opinion, alarmed by the pes-
simistic rumors regarding the advance of the insurgents.
However inferior the Spaniards of the royal army may have
been in point of enthusiasm, there could have been no doubt
that they were capable of defeating in open battle the undis-
ciplined army of insurgents who were homogeneous in noth-
ing but their love for Cuba and their hatred of Spain. But
there was no reason to fear that the army of Gomez would be
forced into battle, for in order to bring about such a result it
would have been necessary to surround the insurgent army to
262 POINTS IN FAVOR OF THE CUBANS

bring it to a halt and then attempt to destroy it in close con-
flict.

Jt would seem that Campos had such a plan as this in con-
sideration for a time, but he found that it was a plan that could
not be carried out by such an army against such an enemy.
While the Spaniards marched in columns relatively large from
1,000 to 1,500 men, who could move but slowly, burdened as
they were with a certain amount of luggage and the usual
military impedimenta, the Cubans had divided their army
corps into detachments of from 200 to 300 soldiers, well-
equipped and carrying an adequate supply of ammunition,
soldiers familiar with the country, with no useless baggage to
transport, and habituated to such nourishment as they could
gather from the trees, the plants, and other products of the
ground over which they marched. These small detachments
of natives, habituated to a climate which is barely supportable
to others, slipped between the meshes of the net which Campos
essayed in vain to stretch out, and as they marched with a very
small convoy they cared very little if they left-behind them
an enemy who with his best efforts could not have hindered
them from returning to their point of departure should such a
movement become necessary.

It may be thought that it would have been a rational way
of circumventing the Cubans for the Spaniards to have fol-
lowed the tactics of Gomez and divided their columns into
small bodies calculated to compete with the rebel troops in
rapidity of mobilization, but the Spanish officers had a distinct
disinclination to attack the Cubans except with a very superior
force. Moreover, the Spanish soldiers were much embar-
rassed by the natural difficulties of the country, and their lack
of familiarity with these difficulties, and with the country
itself. They dared not leave their positions without the guid-
ance of some one born in the country, and the recruiting of
these guides became a serious problem. Each day it became
more difficult, for the natives feared the insurgents and were
haunted by visions of the reprisals which they feared might
CUBAN WILL-0’-THE-WISPS 263

follow any great victory obtained by Gomez, as the insurgents
had declared that any Cuban found by them serving in the
ranks of the Spanish army should be hanged.

There existed another reason why the movement of the
Cuban army was easier and less influenced by nervous dread.
Every movement of the Cubans was calculated, and they
began their march with a distinct end in view, while the ob-
ject of the Spanish movement was much more vague. To
chase after the fleet-footed Cubans was far from easy. On
the rare occasions when an insurgent column was engaged in a
skirmish with the Spaniards, the insurgents sent forth a few
flying volleys and disappeared as if the earth had swallowed
them. It seemed to be of no importance to them which direc-
tion they took; they faced about in the very midst of a combat
and fled in any direction, apparently without a plan. The
Spaniard stood alone upon his ground and eried “ Victory!”
This is the explanation of the Spanish despatches to the jour-
nals of that day. It was always the same story, reading some-
thing like this: “ After an insignificant discharge of mus-
ketry, the Cubans ran away.”

And yet the Cubans were every day marching nearer and
nearer to Havana. While the Spaniards were winning their
alleged victories, the Cubans were bringing the whole island
into insurrection and making it well-nigh impossible for loyal
planters to harvest a sugar crop. Some of the war correspond-
ents, who had never seen a war before, complained that there
was only a handful of insurgents here and there and that
Gomez would not fight. They missed entirely the strategem
which he was carrying out with the most consummate skill.

Whether these tactics are called Cuban retreats or Spanish
victories, it cannot be denied that they gave to the insurgents
an advantage far exceeding victories which fall on more im-
portant combats. At times the royal troops endeavored to
equal their adversaries in rapidity of movement, but it was like
a race between day and night. As one observer expressed it:

“ The passage of the rebels resembled the trail of Hop o’ my
i7
264 ALONG THE INSURGENTS’ TRAIL

Thumb, except that in the place of crumbs and pebbles the
Cuban Hop o’ my Thumbs left along their trail the bodies of
their foundered horses, the chewed remains of sugar cane and
bananas, and the empty cans of preserves which had been de-
voured as soon as pilfered, for the insurgents lunched as they
fled. There were whole days together when their only food
was sugar cane; and this simple nourishment sufficed to sus-
tain the strength of these robust men who were inured to all
suffering, who went into a skirmish as children go to play, and
whose chief advantage was that there was no climatic danger
for them in an atmosphere that is fatal to their enemies.”
Under such circumstances the march from Gomez’s point of
concentration was made. The Spaniards were incapable of
parallel efforts and such a mode of living, and they lost more
than an hour each day in making the rancho, or the soup for
their meals. .
CHAPTER XIX

THE FAMOUS JUCARO TROCHA—RUSE BY WHICH GOMEZ
AND MACEO BROKE THE SPANISH DEFENSE —FEARFUL
EXPERIENCES OF CARILLO AND HIS EXPEDITION.

Campos Reinforces the Jucaro Trocha— Character of This Notable De-
fense — Fifty Miles of Forts and Barbed Wire -—Gomez’s Plan to
March 12,000 Men Over It— Maceo’s Pretended Attack — Again De
ceives the Spaniards— Burning Sugar Plantations in Santa Clara —
Insurgents Divide into Small Bands—The Battle of Coliseo —Cam-
pos Foiled Again — Campos Falls Back Finally to Havana — All Cuba
Under Martial Law — Landing of Carillo and Aguirre — Their Con-
tract with a Steamer Captain — Leaving the Ship at Night in a Storm
— Thirty Miles from Land in Small Boats— Blankets for Sails — Land
at Last — The Forts of Santiago— Horror of the Expeditionists — Fac-
ing Death — The Guide Becomes Hopelessly Insane — Prepared for an
Attack — Mistaken for Fishing Boats —In an Insurgent’s Hut.

the Jucaro trocha on which Campos was relying to

keep the enemy within the eastern provinces. This
military defense, which had been constructed during the
former war, he had, in anticipation of the movement, strength-
ened and reinforced along its entire length., Those who have
not seen these lines of defense have an inadequate idea of what
they consist, and as similar lines were built later in the western
section of the island, a description of the Jucaro trocha will
serve for all. It stretched from Jucaro on the south coast of
the province of Puerto Principe to Moron on the north. The
country on each side of it was covered by a thick jungle of
woods. The trocha consisted primarily of a cleared space
through this jungle from 100 to 200 yards wide, and the trees,
cut down to clear a way, were piled up on each side, thus form-
ing a sort of barrier of tree trunks and their branches, averag-
ing perhaps six feet high and fifty feet wide. These alone

(265)

T WO weeks after-Gomez began his march he was before
266 THE FIFTY-MILE TROCHA

would seem to an observer sufficient to prevent the passage
of any army, especially if the barricades were guarded, but the
Spanish found that such a device would not even prevent the
passing of Cuban cavalry. The space between the lines of
fallen trees was given up to a military road and forts and a
maze of barbed wire. At intervals of every half mile along
this roadway were the larger forts made of stone and adobe
and painted white. Midway between the larger forts were
placed blockhouses of two stories, the upper being of wood.
Between each of the larger forts and the blockhouses, or within
the short distance of a quarter of a mile, were placed three
small forts of mud and planks surrounded by a ditch. They
were capable of holding five men and were within hailing dis-
tance of each other, or about 150 yards.

The construction of the larger forts was such as apparently
to render them invincible. Above the cellar was a vault en-
closed by the stone and mud walls which rose about five feet
higher, making a second-story defense, the roof of the vault
being a sort of platform on which the men in the second story
could stand and deliver their fire either over the top of the
walls or through holes cut lower down near the platform, so
that a shot could be sent directly on the heads of those who
might approach close to the fort. The cellar could be used
for reserves of ammunition. Covering the second story was
a roof of sheet-iron supported by iron standards, and on the
roof was a watch tower. The only approach to one of these
forts was a movable ladder used something like the gangway
of a man-of-war and which could be pulled out of reach.

Along one side of these fortifications was a maze of barbed
wire, strung back and forth from three rows of poles, about five
feet high. It is said that when this part of the trocha had been
completed 450 yards of wire had been used to every twelve
yards of posts. To all appearances, it would have been a dif-
ficult matter for a man on foot to pick or cut his way through
the maze, to say nothing of the cavalrymen and impedimenta.
Such, in general, was the wall of defense which ran for fifty
CLEVER RUSE OF MACEO AND GOMEZ 267

miles from Jucaro to the town of Moron near the north shore.
It was not in the complete state which has been described when
Gomez and his army approached it from the east in the latter
part of 1895, but Campos, to make assurance doubly sure, had
reinforced the trocha with a large body of men. Gomez’s
plan involved marching 12,000 men over it.

Maceo had not yet brought up his division, and while wait-
ing for him Gomez apparently thought he would ascertain
what he could do with the trocha, and, if possible, discover the
condition of things on the other side. So, leaving his army
back some distance, with a few hundred men he began to
manceuvre before the trocha and finally sueceeded in working
a small force through on the southern end. He immediately
fell upon the little town of Pelayo, and captured the forts
which guarded it, together with the entire garrison and a large
amount of arms and ammunition. He then moved cautiously
northward through the woods into the district of Remedios,
then suddenly westward toward the trocha. The Spaniards
appear to have been closely watching the southern end, be-
lieving that Gomez’s remaining force would try to effect a
passage there. In consequence, Gomez found the northern
part weakly defended, or at least he succeeded in re-crossing
it, and was soon joined by Maceo, who by this time had brought
up his army, having marched across the whole of Puerto Prin-
cipe province, eluding four Spanish columns which had been
sent against him. Maceo’s forces were therefore in front of
the trocha some little distance to the north of where Gomez’s
main division was waiting to cross. It might seem that when
they were in this position it would have been easy for the
Spaniards whom Maceo had left in the rear to have closed in
and hemmed in the Cubans between the trocha and themselves,
but the country is a difficult one for the moving of disciplined
troops, and, moreover, the Spanish officers were never quite
sure where the enemy was and seemed to content themselves
with trusting in luck to come upon him in a favorable location.
Gomez understood the position of the Spaniards perfectly.
268 PLAYING HIDE AND SEEK WITH CAMPOS

He ordered Maceo to make a feint of attack upon the
northern portion of the trocha before which he was. Maceo
accordingly sent a few soldiers to the front of the entrench-
ment of the royal army, and the Spaniards, thinking that the
advance guard of the Cubans had opened an attack and pro-
posed to cross the trocha to the north, passed the word down the
trocha, and immediately the Spanish rushed en masse toward
the north, leaving the southern portion, before which Gomez
was concealed, unprotected. This was exactly what Gomez
had counted upon, and he forthwith crossed the barricade
without striking a blow, except to clear away trees and other
obstacles. His passage seems to have been unsuspected by
the Spanish engaged in holding back Maceo, who had no in-
tention of crossing there or then. Finally, when he had heard
that Gomez was safely over, Maceo beat a retreat, the Span-
iards thinking they had won a victory the report of which
would read well at Havana and Madrid. “The main body of
the rebels under Gomez and Maceo endeavored to force a
passage in the trocha to the north, but were repulsed and re-
treated in disorder,” and so on.

Maceo had apparently disappeared towards the north, and
the enemy naturally kept their attention turned in that direc-
tion; but as soon as the shrewd Cuban leader was out of sight
he faced southward and hurried his men to the point where
Gomez had just taken his men through, followed in his tracks
without difficulty, and before the Spaniards realized what had
happened the entire Cuban army were marching into Santa
Clara province and the rear guard had defeated Colonel
Segura, who was taking supplies to the trocha. The Cubans
were so fortunate by a brilliant dash as to capture about 200
mules laden with arms, ammunition, and supplies.

On the arrival of the combined Cuban forces in Santa
Clara, Gomez divided them, sending flying squadrons in ad-
vance under Generals Suarez, Perez, and Lacret, dispatching
others to Sagua in the north and towards Trinidad in the south.
Maceo’s forces made a demonstration near the city of Santa
ANOTHER EVASIVE MOVEMENT 269

Clara, where Campos had made his headquarters, and Gomez
threatened Cienfuegos. It was not, of course, Gomez’s inten-
tion to seriously attack any of the large fortified towns, and he
had good reasons for dividing his forces into several detach-
ments. Had the army remained together it could have moved
but slowly and the country would have afforded scant supplies
for so large a force, while by division supplies could be drawn
from the whole country round, a larger district would be
brought into the insurrection, which was, after all, the main
purpose of the expedition, the enemy would be more puzzled
with the purposes and location of the foree, and the march
toward Havana would be more rapid. Gomez in all these
operations kept an ample force in the rear so that retreat, if
made necessary, would not be cut off.

Campos at Santa Clara saw that he had been outflanked by
the clever ruse of the Cubans before the trocha and that he
was now in a measure surrounded. So when he heard that
Gomez was threatening Cienfuegos he made a precipitate
march to that place, intrenching himself and assuming direct
command of. his troops. He also dispatched a large number
of troops to form a line between Cienfuegos and Las Cruces to
impede the westward march of the Cubans. Meanwhile,
Gomez had not forgotten one of the main purposes of his cam-
paign, which was to prevent the grinding of sugar cane so that
Spain would lose her revenue and the Cuban workmen, left
with nothing better to do, would take up arms. Shortly after
crossing the trocha, therefore, he issued a peremptory order for
the destruction of sugar plantations and railroad communica-
tion. Realizing that such destructive methods might so arouse
the planters as to make them too active allies and supporters
of the Spanish army, he supplemented this order with the fol-
lowing proclamation, which reveals something of the spirit of
the old general:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF LIBERATION,

Sanett Spiritus, November 11, 1895.
To honest men, victims of the torch :

The painful measure made necessary by the revolution of redemption
270 REASONS FOR SEVERE MEASURES

drenched in innocent blood from Hatuey to our own times by cruel and
merciless Spain will plunge you in misery. As General-in-Chief of the
army of liberation, it is my duty to lead it to victory, without permitting
myself to be restrained or terrified, by any means necessary to place Cuba, |
in the shortest time, in possession of her dearest ideal. 1 therefore place
the responsibility for so great a ruin on those who look on impassively
and force us to those extreme measures which they then condemn, like
dolts and hypocrites that they are. After so many years of supplication,
humiliation, contumely, banishment, and death, when this people, of its
own will, has arisen in arms, there remains no other solution but to tri-
umph, it matters not what means are employed to accomplish it.

This people cannot hesitate between the wealth of Spain and the lib-
erty of Cuba. Its greatest crime would be to stain the land with blood
without effecting its purposes because of puerile scruples and fears which
do not concur with the character of the men in the field, challenging the
fury of an army which is one of the bravest in the world, but which, in
this war, is without enthusiasm or faith, ill-fed, and unpaid. The war
did not begin February 24th ; it is about to begin now.

The war had to be organized ; it was necessary to calm and lead into
the proper channels the revolutionary spirit always exaggerated in the
beginning by wild enthusiasm. The struggle ought to begin in obedience
to a plan and method more or less studied, as the result of the peculiarities
of this war. This has already been done. Let Spain now send her soldiers
to rivet the chains of her slaves; the children of this land are in the field,
armed with the weapons of liberty. The struggle will be terrible, but
success will crown the revolution and efforts of the oppressed.

Maximo Gomez, General-in- Chief.

Naturally, the destruction of sugar plantations caused
some bitterness among alien owners, many of whom were citi-
zens of the United States, and for a time it militated against
the efforts of Palma, the plenipotentiary of the republic, who
was seeking to secure a recognition of the belligerency of the
Cubans from the government of the United States. Gomez
maintained his purpose and endeavored to reassure Palma, as
the following letter will show.

District oF REMEDIOS,
Province of Santa Clara, December 8, 1895.
To Tomas EstrapA PatMa,

My Dear anp EstremMep Frienp: It is not long since I wrote you,
but an opportunity offers by which I may send you a few words of en-
couragement and good cheer. Rest assured I write you whenever I can,
which is not often, owing to the great amount of work which at present
falls upon my shoulders. J know the pen is mightier than the sword, but
my mission at present is with the latter ; others must wield the pen.
THE ONE GLORIOUS OBJECT a71

Eight days ago Gen. Antonio Maceo and myself met and fought the
enemy with our forces in conjunction. The Spanish column, including
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were our superiors in number, but the
arms of the Cuban Republic were again victorious, J have not time at
present to go into details of the battle; they will follow later. Suffice it
to say, Spanish reports to the contrary notwithstanding, we won the day.

Our advance may be slow, but it will be sure and firm. If you hear
of our retreat, remember that it will be temporary and for a purpose. Our
faces are turned toward the west and nothing will stop us. The result of
my observations as we proceed is that the Spaniards are in need of almost
everything — money, sympathy, soldiers, and even leaders who have faith
and courage in the righteousness of their cause.

If Cuban valor and resolution do not fail us, and if the hearts of Cuba’s
children do not weaken, I have every reason to believe that the close of
the six-months campaign now initiated will find everything satisfactorily
settled, and Cuba free.

I know that unfavorable comment has been made on some of the
methods we have been forced to employ in this revolution, but it will not
do to listen to the complaints of the superficial and irresponsible. No
sugar crop must be made this winter under any circumstances, or for any
amount of money. It is the source from which the enemy still hopes and
dreams of obtaining itsrevenue. To prevent that end, for the good of our
country, has been and shall be our program.

We are Cubans and have one great aim in view, one glorious object
to obtain — the freedom of our country and liberty. It is of more impor-
tance to us than glory, public applause, or anything else. Everything
else will follow in time. I have never believed in or advised a sanguinary
revolution, but it must be a radical one. First of all, we must triumph ;
toward that end the most effective means, although they may appear
harsh, must be employed.

There is nothing so bad, so dishonorable, so inexcusable, in the eyes
of the world, as failure. Victory is within our reach. To hesitate, to
delay it, to endanger it now, would be stupid, would be cowardly, would
be criminal. We will succeed first ; the applause of the world will follow.
To do otherwise would be not to love one’s country. I have never felt
more confident than at the present moment. You can rest assured that
Cuba will soon achieve her absolute independence.

Ever your true friend, Maxmo Gomez.

The insurgents continued their evasive movements with
great skill. They advanced through Santa Clara, San Juan
de Lasquaras, and Ranchuelas, till in their devious ways they
reached the boundary of Matanzas. Campos was again out-
flanked; he drew back and established his headquarters at
Colon, twenty miles over the border of Matanzas. Here, just
272 CAMPOS ENDEAVORS TO CONCENTRATE

as Campos was planning to concentrate his forces, surround
Gomez and force him into open battle with a vastly superior
Spanish force, Gomez was planning to again radiate his troops.
This he did by sending General Bandera to the north, General
Maceo remaining in the center, while he took his own forces
southward, and Generals Suarez, Perez, Lacret, and other
officers with small divisions were despatched to attract the at-
tention of the enemy by rapid marches and raids. By the
time Campos was ready to concentrate his forces, therefore,
there was nothing except one of these various “ will-o’-the-
wisp” divisions to concentrate upon, though of this, appa-
rently, he was not fully aware.

He had hopes that the Spanish forces in Gomez’s rear would
be able to co-operate with him, but every means of communica-
tion by railroad, telegraph, or telephone had been completely
destroyed by the insurgents in their progress. Under other
circumstances it is doubtful if the complicated strategy he con-
templated would have been practicable owing to the natural
conditions of the country, for such a move, even in European
countries, would have required the co-operation of officers
who were familiar with the ground over which they were to
deploy, and the officers upon whom Campos depended were
unaccustomed to Cuba. Campos, however, agreed with his
generals — Garciq, Navarro, and Valdes — on the point of
concentration where they were to meet on a day appointed
and were to drive the enemy before them. At that place and
at that appointed time the great battle should be fought. But
Gomez continued his crafty march with his division, entering
the province of Matanzas through Palma Sola to the south of
Campos’s headquarters which Maceo was ardered to attack by
two columns advancing in the center. To draw the insurgents
into his proposed trap, Campos ordered his pickets to return the
fire of the insurgents in a feeble manner, while Maceo, who,
like Campos, was hoping to deceive the enemy so as to leave
the divisions to the north and south unobstructed, had given a
like order to hismen. This engagement, therefore, amounted
APPLYING THE TORCH 273

to but little. But during its progress the insurgents were busy
with one of their flank movements. Suddenly the cane-brake
which surrounded the Spanish camp burst into flames and
towards the west there appeared a great blazing plain. Gomez
had found the orders against the grinding of the sugar crop
disobeyed in Matanzas, for the planters had been relying upon
Campos’s work and were not expecting an invasion, and his
torch was being relentlessly applied. Campos understood at
once that he had been foiled. It was not long before the
flames threatened to lick the feet of his frenzied horses. Tle
gave the orders to break the camp at once and looked about for
his lieutenants. They were not to be found; they had been
unable to concentrate. Campos alone had come to the ren-
dezvous!

Such, in brief, was the battle of Coliseo in December,
1895, which was so construed by the press censors as to occa-
sion much rejoicing at Havana, for they thought the rebels
had been met and checked. In reality, however, a few insur-
gents had played their games with General Campos; a detach-
ment of Cuban cavalry, commanded by Maceo, had made a
whimsical charge on the Spanish pickets, a fire had broken out
in the cane-brakes, and the Cubans had marched into Matan-
zas province.

Campos drew back to Jovellanos, towards which Gomez
advanced, burning the sugar plantations on the way. With
calls for the protection of the sugar plantations in both Santa
Clara and Matanzas to attend to, the cities of Santa Clara,
Cienfuegos, Colon, and Cardenas threatened, Campos drew
back to Limonar, and Gomez advanced to Jovellanos, which
commanded the railroad lines of Cardenas, Matanzas, and
Havana. ‘These lines he destroyed, while the smoke of the
sugar plantations never ceased to darken the sky. With all
communication with the east, except by water, cut off, Campos
moved back to Matanzas and hurriedly sent orders for the con-
centration of as many troops as possible, sending even to the
province of Santiago de Cuba for as many troops as could be
274 ALL CUBA IN A STATE OF SIEGE

spared from there. Then he fell back to Havana and the in-
surgents, without serious obstacle, continued their destructive
march towards the west, while Campos waited for rein-
forcements and set about actively to fortify the land ap-
proaches of the capital city. He also hurried as many troops
as he could spare to the neighborhood of Batabano, directly
across the island from Havana, withdrawing even a large num-
ber of marines from the fleets for shore duty, for by this time
the insurgents were threatening to break the line and penetrate
into Pinar del Rio. So grave was the situation that martial law
was declared in both the provinces of Havana and Pinar del
Rio. Thus by the end of 1895 the whole island from Point
Maysi to Cape Antonio was declared to be in a state of siege.
The censorship of the press became more rigid than ever, and
an order was issued for the delivery of all horses in the island
to the Spanish government at prices ranging from $18 to $35,
doubtless more for the sake of crippling the insurgents than
for any use which the Spanish forces could make of them.
The horses were not paid for in cash, but in certificates that
they had been delivered to the government at a certain value.
As the Spanish forces had lost control of much of the rural ter-
ritory of the island, the order naturally did not inconvenience
the insurgents, and a large majority of the people outside of
the cities were more ready to surrender their horses to the
Cubans than to the government for nothing except a certificate
which was of no pecuniary value.

As already explained, it was not the intention of General
Gomez in carrying out. this winter campaign to lay siege to
Havana. That would have done little good, even supposing
his troops could have held their place before the gates, for,
while the bay was open, supplies or reinforcements could have
been easily brought in. Gomez’s two great objects were to
prevent the grinding and export of sugar and the consequent
flow of treasure into the Spanish coffers, and to infuse the
Cubans everywhere with courage to take the field, with the
belief that he could control the provinces and enforce his
EXPEDITION OF CARILLO AND AGUIRRE 275

orders. While the westward march of the main body of the
troops was being carried on, the forces of the other Cuban
army corps succeeded in carrying out the orders concerning
sugar cane and the destruction of Spanish lines of communica-
tion. Some artillery had been introduced into the Cuban
army, and with this small garrisons were more easily attacked.
Moreover, the insurgents, in spite of the Spanish patrol of the
coast, managed to preserve communication between the in-
terior and certain points on the‘coast where, from time to time,
supplies were received and carried inland.

It was also during the march westward that Generals
Francisco Carillo and José M. Aguirre, two talented guerrilla
chiefs, landed an important expedition on the eastern end of the
island. They had chartered a steamer at New York to trans-
port them to the eastern coast of Cuba with thirty-two men,
besides a guide who was to direct them as soon as they landed
upon Cuban soil, and who had been sent to the revolutionary
committee from Santiago. It was arranged with the captain
of the boat that on arriving in the waters of Aserraderos, a
small seaport about ten leagues to the west of the city of San-
tiago, and when they should be but three miles from the shore,
he should transfer them with their arms and baggage to small
boats, after which he would be free to sail in any direction.

One night at about 11 o’clock, after a voyage of five days,
while a very stiff breeze was blowing, the captain directed the
passengers to make ready to leave the ship, as they had arrived
in sight of land and were but about three miles from the shore.
His contract, he said, was fulfilled, and he was ready to trans-
fer them into small boats, in which they were to land. The
passengers at once clambered down the side of the vessel into
the tossing boats, but in the confusion of the night, and, hur-
ried by the captain, who feared lest he should fall into the
hands of a Spanish cruiser, the Cubans lost a large portion of
their equipments before they could stow them safely in their
small craft. Enough remained to somewhat overload them,
however, and, as the sea was very rough, they were in con-
276 LEFT THIRTY MILES FROM LAND

stant danger of being capsized. In one of the boats was Ca-
rillo with ten men; in the second was Aguirre with eight men
and a dynamite gun; and the third, commanded by Colaso,
contained the remainder of the company. As soon as every-
thing which had not been lost in the transfer was in the boats,
the steamer with all speed disappeared in the darkness. The
insurgents had no idea as to the course they should take, as
they could see but a few feet in any direction, so there was
nothing for them to do but to toss about, awaiting the coming
of the dawn.

At daybreak the wind fell and they gazed about them to
discover some place where they might land, but all before
them was tossing water. They realized that the captain of
the steamer had deceived them. They were not three miles
from shore; as a matter of fact, they were thirty, and liable
to be picked up by any Spanish cruiser which happened along.
Taking what they thought must be the right direction to reach
land, they rowed for hours, each one taking his turn at the
oars. Towards 10 o’clock the wind rose again, and to increase
their speed they tried to make sails of their woolen blankets,
using an oar for a mast and rigging rifles fastened end to end
for yards. By this arrangement they were enabled to make
much better headway.

After much difficulty and anxiety they drew near to land,
but upon closer examination they were horrified to find that
they were just opposite the port of Santiago, only twelve
miles from Morro Castle perched high above the roadstead.
At sight of this the guide began to tremble. He said that the
first war or merchant vessel which came along must see them
and give the alarm, and the recognition of them meant death.
He became paralyzed with fear; his mind began to wander and
in a short time he had become entirely insane.

Carillo was not the man to weaken under such an ex-
tremity. He had faith in the star of his destiny and used all
his charms of persuasion to revive the spirits of his companions.
It is a fact almost without precedent that no ship either en-
IN DESPAIRING SUSPENSE 277

tered or left the port of Santiago on that long day, though this
port is very much frequented. The star on which Carillo re-
lied had not forsaken him. They kept on their way, heading
as much as possible to the west of the frowning castle, and at
6 o’clock the boats were but three miles from the shore and
about the same distance to the westward of the passage. But
their position was more than critical. They were aware that
each evening at nightfall a small gunboat made the rounds
on the outside of the bay, and that if once they were caught
they would be shot before they were many hours older. An-
ticipating a meeting with the gunboat, Carillo ordered his
men to hide their arms, keeping them, however, so as to be
within easy reach when the war vessel should be sighted, but
only in ease of an attack were they to fire. They fully ex-
pected to be attacked and that they were about to play a des-
perate game. At half-past six, night had completely settled
in, and suddenly they saw the red light of the gunboat coming
directly towards them, and as it crept on they watched it de-
spairingly. Nearer and nearer it came, though a little to one
side, and it passed within gunshot, but it did not hail them.

It seemed impossible that the Spanish should avoid seeing
them, and it is probable that the officers thought that these
three small boats belonged to some inoffensive Santiago fisher-
men. They were looking for larger game, and it would not
have been reasonable for them to suppose that insurgents
would attempt to land under the guns of Morro Castle. They
finally landed toward 10 o’clock that night, and immediately
began unshipping their ammunition and cannon, an operation
which consumed a good part of the night, and at daybreak
they set out to find their way. The danger was by no means
past; they were entirely unfamiliar with the immediate sur-
roundings; the guide had become a hopeless lunatic. Carillo
with his aid-de-camp climbed to the top of the mountain be-
fore them and saw a hut on the other side close to the valley.
They descended and entered it, and found a woman preparing
breakfast. She offered him some coffee, which he accepted
278 THEY REACH THE INSURGENT CAMP

gratefully and in his pleasantest manner. He was apparently
unarmed, but he did not have the appearance of a Cuban, and
when he asked the mistress of the house where her husband
was and when he would return, she looked at him mistrustfully
and said she did not know. Carillo knew from this action that
he must be at the house of a Cuban and of an insurgent, and
in a short time a man armed with a musket and leading two
horses appeared. General Carillo made himself known at
once, and the man, acting as a guide, soon had the expedition
in the nearest insurgent camp. This expedition may be re-
garded as typical of many others.

At that time the insurgents in the east were under the high
command of General José Maceo, Antonio’s brother, and they
were passing their lives in comparative quiet in their various
camps. Nearly all martial efforts were confined to the sur-
roundings of Havana, where Gomez was in charge, and the in-
surgents of Santiago de Cuba were rarely troubled with the un-
important sorties of the Spaniards. They pitched their camps
wherever they could find a comfortable place, the officers
usually taking possession of some old building or shed, while
the men brought in palm leaves and constructed primitive
shelters. They usually posted pickets on all the roads, and
made themselves comfortable. Frequently, camps were
placed near some planter, who deemed it wise to show his sym-
pathy for the insurgents whether he really wished to or not,
and he usually had the officers and staff at his meals.

Occasionally, however, a Spanish promenade would inter-
rupt this calm. One day Colonel Sandoval left the city of
Cobre, about ten miles from Santiago, with an army of 1,500
strong. They passed through Botija and camped upon the
banks of the Cauto at a point called Dos Palmas, and one
day passed over the road which meandered into the valley
below a planter’s house and then into his plantations. They
marched along and fired a volley into the cocoa trees to in-
timidate the enemy. None were there, but the Cubans
opened fire from an ambush further on. They were placed as
A TYPICAL SKIRMISH 279

sharpshooters and fired at will while the Spanish fired great
salvos. This noise lasted about a quarter of an hour, during
which the 1,500 men of His Majesty the King repeatedly dis-
charged all of their guns. One would have thought that two
important armies were facing each other, though there were
not at the utmost more than twenty-five of the insurgents.
The noise of the musketry was like the pattering of ‘rainfall
upon a tin roof. Then everything ceased. The Spaniards
had one wounded, and the Cubans had come without an acci-
dent out of the hailstorm of Spanish bullets. This is an ex-
ample of many of the engagements.

Of course, the laborers on the plantation were all terrified,
especially the women. Two days later, while the planter was
resting after his breakfast, his domestics hurried to him and told
him that armed men were advancing up the hill towards the
house. He arose and distinctly saw them coming in his direc-
tion, while to the left, hidden behind some trees on his prop-
erty, and not more than 400 yards from where he stood, he saw
a group of insurgents. As soon as the Spaniards were halt
way up the hill, they fired upon the house, but the bullets
passed overhead and did no harm. The insurgents immedi-
ately began to fire upon the advancing column. The Span-
iards came up at a quick step and single file, following an old
abandoned route, and the firing became more formidable. Six
or seven rebels stood well in evidence upon the crest and fired
upon their adversaries. Notwithstanding the successive dis-
charges of the advancing column, which was hardly over 600
yards from them, only one Cuban was wounded, and he but
slightly in the leg, while one of the Spanish officers fell from
his saddle, and immediately every officer dismounted and
walked beside his horse.

The column was still advancing when the planter saw
crawling on the ground, in the yard which surrounded his
house, three Cubans armed with rifles and very much excited
by the skirmishing. , He asked them what they were doing at
that hour on his property. They replied that they were going

18
280 BETWEEN TWO FIRES

to fire upon the enemy, as they were in a good position for the
purpose. The planter tried to dissuade them by telling them
that they ran the risk of compromising him, and moreover,
they could do no serious harm to the enemy. But they would
not take his advice, and the one who commanded the two others,
a Spanish deserter, gave his companions orders to begin firing.
This made the planter’s position extremely critical, for, on see-
ing shots come from the parapet surrounding the yard, the
Spanish fired a volley on the house, while the women who had
sought refuge near the planter began to ery terribly, and hold-
ing out their children to him besought him to save them. But
none of the bullets seemed to reach them. He made all his
people lie down in the mill for pounding coffee, a kind of cir-
cular trough in masonry, and bullet proof, and awaited events.

The planter foresaw that the Spaniards would accuse him
of being an accomplice of the insurgents, and that he might
have hard work to defend himself. He went out again to par-
ley with the three Cubans, and finally persuaded them to go
away. Meanwhile, the column reached the yard, and the
planter came out of the house where the women had taken
refuge, and as he did so the Spanish aimed their guns at him.

“Tt is useless to shoot,” he cried, “there are on this place
only inoffensive and peaceable people.”

They then approached quietly, but with bayonets pointed.
As soon as the commander came up where the master of the
house was, the planter stepped forward and was placed be-
tween two soldiers with fixed bayonets.

“Did you shoot?” asked the commander.

“No, captain, if I had fired I should have run away with
the insurgents.” :

“How many mambis were they?”

“ Only three.”

“Tell me the truth,” said the commander, doubtfully.

“There were only three.”

“ How many times did they fire? ”

“Three times, I believe.” .
APPEASED WITH CHICKENS 281

The commander made a gesture of disbelief. Fortu-
nately, at this moment they brought to him nine brass ends
of empty cartridges. The Spanish soldiers searched every-
where except in the house, and they were just beginning
to break in the doors when the commander called out to them:
“The first man who touches anything here shall be hung.”
This was a characteristic remark, and reassured the planter
somewhat as to the issue of the commander’s questioning.

“ Are you French?” he resumed.

“ I am.”’

“ Show me your papers.”

The planter held out a certificate from the consul, and an
authorization to live in the country given him by the Spanish
government.

“Do you know that I had orders to shoot you?” said the
Spanish commander. The planter lkept silent.

“ And also an order to burn your house?” Continued
silence on the part of the planter.

“You had an insurgent camp:upon your property,” con-
tinued the captain.

“No, captain, it was on the highway outside of my land
and my property,” and he pointed out the place in the midst
of the woods, but the Spanish officer manifested no desire to
explore it.

“ And all these miserable negroes and negresses whom you
have here, what have youtosayforthem? They are all rebels
and I shall put them to the sword.”

Great lamentations and cries from the women.

“ And those chickens in your yard, are they yours?”

“Yes, captain.”

“Will you let me have four of them?”

“Ten if you wish,” answered the planter, delighted to see
the turn the conversation was taking.

“Have them caught immediately,” ordered the captain.

Two negresses caught the chickens, and when the captain
was in possession of them he asked the planter if he had any

”
282 ON THE MARCH WESTWARD

rum. Unfortunately, he had exhausted his stock upon the
insurgents. But he offered them some sugar and water, which
they accepted, and jugs of it was distributed about among the
soldiers, who seemed to be satisfied with it, as there was noth-
ing better. When each one had quenched his thirst the cap-
tain gave the orders to depart, and he said on leaving: “ Ad-
vise your friends, the insurgents, not to fire on my troops from
ambuscades on your property. If they do, I shall retrace my
steps and burn your hacienda.”

“T shall tell them so,” replied the planter, “but I doubt
whether they will listen to my words.”

In fact, the column had not gone 200 yards from the house
when it received a volley from the insurgents, who were hid-
den in the underbrush. But the captain did not retrace his
steps. And thus it was that by means of a trifling tribute the
planter saved his life and property.

Such was a characteristic incident of the war in Santiago
while Gomez was driving Spain’s great general into Havana.
When Generals Carillo and Aguirre had arrived the insur-
gents sent Brigadier Cebreco to the shore to assist them in
bringing their arms and cannon in, and on their return they
made their camp near a planter and enjoyed his hospitality
in the manner which has been described. Carillo expected
General Rabi, who was to lead him into Santa Clara province,
where he was better acquainted. Finally, Rabi arrived at the
head of about 200 men, many of whom were Spaniards who
had deserted and joined the insurgents, carrying their arms and
baggage with them. The leaders at once set. out for their
westward march with their precious dynamite gun, which was
used with good effect on the way, several forts being captured.
Carillo took command in the Remedios district, where, owing
to his popularity there, his army rapidly increased under con-
stant recruits. Aguirre reported to Gomez and was soon en-
gaged about Matanzas.
CHAPTER XxX

THE ADVENT OF WEYLER, KNOWN AS “THE SPANISH
BUTCHER”— HIS CRUELTY AND BARBARITY—THE FA-
MOUS $5,000,000 TROCHA— DARING EXPLOITS OF MACEO,

Campos Badly Received at Havana — Spaniards Clamor for Sterner Meth-
ods — Campos Consults the Leaders — His Resignation and Self-Sac-
rifice — Weyler’s Arrival — His Infamous Reputation — Commissioned
Because of It — Progress of Gomez and Maceo — Weyler’s Immense
Forces— Largest Military Expedition Ever Transported by Sea —
Strength of the Insurgents — Object of Their Campaign — Weyler’s
Boastful Proclamations — Civilized War Abandoned — Heroism of
Young Adolfo Rodriguez — His Execution — Waiting for the Death
Shot — A Cruel Pause — Wonderful Example of Self-Control — Wey-
Jer’s Ineffective Military Operations — His Big Fence — Maceo Crosses
and Recrosses It Easily —Cuba ‘ Pacified””— Maceo Appears Where
Least Expected — Maceo Surprised —Turning Defeat into Victory —
An Example of His Daring and Strategy —-Raid on Candelaria — Bat-
tles and Skirmishes — Death of Maceo’s Brother José.

HEN General Campos, having fallen back from one
\) \/ stronghold to another, finally made his stand in
Havana, he was very badly received by the people,
who considered him guilty of culpable negligence and care-
lessness. It was one of the absurdities of the situation that
Spain was continually characterizing the rebellion as only the
outbreak of a lot of ignorant negroes, and insisting that a state
of war did not actually exist upon the island. Spanish pride
bled at the thought that at any moment the bands of these
rebels might pour triumphantly into the streets of Havana.
Public emotion ran high. Since the battle of Coliseo hun-
dreds of families had taken refuge within the walls of the capi-
tal, deserting the rural districts and even the villages. The
highways and byways were cumbered with people distracted
with fear and bringing in whatever they could bear or trans-
port of their useful and precious possessions. Household
goods and objects of value were piled together in confusion.
( 283 )
284 A PANIC IN HAVANA

If from the beginning of the insurrection the population of
Santiago de Cuba —which had known all the trials of the Ten-
Years War — had dreaded to be involved in the vicissitudes
which follow the march of armies, to what could be compared
the fear of the panic-stricken people of Havana when they
heard the ery, “ The mambis are coming?”

The Spaniards of Havana were of the haughty and unre-
lenting type, from the beginning of the insurrection clamoring
for revenge without mercy. Their aim was to restore the sys-
tem of reprisals which had piled up hecatombs of helpless
Cubans during the former war; such a system of revenge as
had distinguished with an uneviable celebrity some of the
Captain-Generals of the preceding insurrection, like Balma-
ceda and such subordinate officers as Weyler. These fanatics,
furious and trembling with fear, demanded of the marshal
some cogent reason for his repeated defeats. They made
serious threats, but the well-known energy of Campos held
them in check; they dared not make any open attack on his
person.

Confronted by the disfavor of the populace, Campos met
the leaders of the three parties in an interview having for its
object the adjustment of the existing conditions. He asked
what measures they could propose and what they would advise.
The Conservatives clamored for vigorous reprisals; the Re-
formists dared not express an opinion. The Autonomists
timidly assured their leader of their support. In the face of
such divergence of opinion, practically deprived of the assist-
ance of the governmental parties, Campos thought it but right
that he should resign his command.

In accepting his perilous office of commandant of Cuba,
Campos had given proof of his self-sacrifice. He had attained .
the height of honor and glory in his own country; he had
pacified Cuba after her Ten-Years War; he had pacified the
people who were in revolt in Spain; he had restored and sup-
ported the Spanish monarchy, and when he was advanced in
years, and should have been enjoying the rest earned by un-
ARRIVAL OF THE BLOOD-THIRSTY WEYLER 285

faltering effort, he was sent to Cuba to fight a difficult and
doubtful war, and to risk his reputation as a soldier with all the
renown attendant upon a long life crowded with the distinction
and the advantages which are the rewards of success. It is
certainly to his honor that he did not waver from the line of
conduct traced by him for his rule of life, a line inseparable
from an exalted conception of honor and magnanimity. By
his rectitude he had forced even the most implacable of his
enemies to render homage to the greatness of his soul. When
Spain was threatened with the penalty of her own bloody
despotism, she turned over to one who had not sympathized
with her system the subjection of this island after subjection
had become impossible, and the Spaniards, terrified by the
vengeance of events which threatened them, could simply
clamor for more blood, more reprisals, in short, for a line of
eonduct which Campos could but regard as base and disastrous.

Campos sailed for Spain on the 17th of January, 1896, his
office being temporarily left in the hands of General Sabas
Marin, who, on the 10th of February, was succeeded by Gen-
eral Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, Marquis of Teneriffe, bet-
ter known and hated by the world at large simply as “ Weyler.”
This general arrived preceded by a reputation for excessive
severity and cruelty. THe was accused of having committed
the most atrocious crimes during the former war. The insur-
gent leaders were inclined to weleome his appointment, for
they knew his disposition and counted upon the probability
that his acts would quickly arouse sympathy for the struggling
Cubans in the United States and elsewhere, and eventually
secure for them that recognition which they so much desired,
and which their representatives in the United States were ‘so
industriously seeking. Moreover, they said that his militarv
talents were not brilliant, in ability not to be compared with
Campos, and his appointment to the office at such a crisis in
Cuba could be but for one purpose, of returning to a system of
severe reprisals. Undoubtedly, the Spanish government had
been moved by a certain stress of public opinion to appoint
286 INSURGENT LEADERS ENCOURAGED

him, for the impression then was that the failures of General
Campos were due to a too lenient treatment, not simply of
Cubans in the field but of Cubans apparently peaceful.
Chiefly because of his reputation for severity in the former
war, the Conservatives in Havana demanded him. He secured
the important mission, indeed, mainly because as a man he
lacked the high qualities possessed by Campos. It was pre-
tended, however, that he had been especially instructed to
moderate his ardor, a pretence doubtless suggested by the fear
of possible complications with the United States.

The Cuban question had already been taken up by the
United States Senate, and considerable excitement prevailed
in New York as well as elsewhere in the country when the
news of Weyler’s appointment was received. The fear that
the United States might recognize the belligerency of the
Cubans hung like the sword of Damocles over the head of the
Spanish Ministry, and while it was compelled to heed the
clamors of the Conservatives in Havana and Madrid, it osten-
tatiously used every means calculated to avoid a declaration by
this country which might double the force of the revolution.
Naturally, all this agitation in Spain and Madrid filled the in-
surgent leaders with joy. They predicted that as soon as
Weyler should begin his work all the Cubans who were still
doubtful and wavering would be forced to leave the cities with
their arms and baggage, preferring to take the chances of war
to being captured in their houses and imprisoned, tortured,
transported or shot — a prediction which came true.

Meanwhile, Gomez and Maceo had pushed through Mad-
ruga, Neuva-Paz, and Giiines. When they reached the im-
portant railway line which unites Batabano to Ilavana, they
destroyed it at several points, as also the telegraph lines. Hav-
ing done this, the two chiefs separated; Gomez to go towards
Havana, and Maceo to continue his march westward to bring
the province of Pinar del Rio into the insurrection.

‘General Weyler brought over with him large reinforce-
ments, and he must have begun his work for the pacification
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EMINENT SPANISH LEADERS.
Admiral CERVERA. Prime Minister SAGAsTa.
Gen. WEYLER. Gen. BLANCO.
WEYLER’S IMMENSE MILITARY FORCE 289

of the island with a force of about 140,000 men. According
to the official figures given out at Madrid, there had been at
the outbreak of the insurrection 20,000 men for field work in
the island. From that time to the 10th of March, 1896, there
were sent over nine successive bodies of reinforcements aggre-
gating a little more than 120,000 men. They were divided in
the following proportions:

General officers, . : é ° . 40
Field officers, a a 562
Company officers, . : : F % 4,768
Sergeants, . ‘ 3 cae, ‘ 3,396
Corporals and privates, , ‘5 112,560

Total, . : ‘ , j . 121,826

It has been said that this made the largest military force
ever transported by sea, and if it is added to the original per-
manent force, not counting the Volunteers in city garrisons,
it makes an army of over 140,000, of which Weyler took com-
mand in an island no larger than Pennsylvania. Yet the
Spanish government maintained that this was not a war! It
was simply brigandage! And the refinements of international
Jaw could not seem to furnish a warrant for the recognition as
belligerents of the patriots against whom Spain had armed
such an immense force!

The armament which Spain had sent over during the year,
according to official returns, consisted of the following, omit-
ting field pieces and heavy ordnance:

64,125 Spanish Mauser magazine rifles, caliber 7 mm., model 1893.
1,176 Spanish Mauser magazine rifles, caliber 7.65 mm.

69,639 Remington repeating rifles, caliber .48 in., model 1871-89.

10,000 Remington repeating rifles, caliber .48 in., model 1871.
5,027 Mauser carbines, caliber 7 mm., model 1893.

The ammunition sent over for use in these guns was given
as follows:
33,660,000 cartridges for Mauser 7 mm. rifle and carbine.
7,441,273 e ee # 7.65 rifle.

Bea " “ Remington rifle, model 1871-89.
9,051,575 * i“ = a a 1871.
290 INSURRECTION ALL OVER CUBA

Tf every two thousandth bullet had killed a Cuban there
would have been none left on the island. But it is probable
that these bullets killed more Spaniards than Cubans, for the
latter depended largely upon the supplies of ammunition which
were captured from the Spanish, and the Cuban loss was al-
ways extremely small compared with that of the Spanish. A
Spanish column would fire repeated discharges at half a dozen
Cubans in ambush and possibly wound a man or two, while
the half dozen Cubans might kill a dozen Spaniards and wound
a score.

The insurgents startin? in February as only a handful of
men in the province of Santiago de Cuba, in December con-
sisted of about 50,000 men, not over half of whom were fully
armed and equipped; the rest carried miscellaneous weapons.
This army was divided into five corps, two in Santiago, one in
Puerto Principe, and two in Matanzas and Santa Clara.
These corps were subdivided into brigades and divisions, scat-
tered here and there all over the island.

This was the force that General Weyler with about four
times as many armed men at his command was to crush. So
far as the insurgents were concerned, their great object had
been nearly accomplished; they had spread the insurrection all
over Cuba, and all that remained for them was to hold the
island till Spain went into bankruptcy or some one should in-
terfere. There was no more thought of taking Havana than
there was of taking Madrid. Their work was simply to
harass the Spanish, at every opportunity, and at every point, to
capture their arms and to cut off all supplies and all revenue
from the island.

Upon his arrival at Havana, General Weyler, much to the
delight of the uncompromising Spaniards, issued several boast-
ful proclamations announcing that the war should be con-
ducted in the sharpest manner. One of his proclamations
commanded the different municipal governments to send him
lists of all persons in any way identified with the insurrection,
and announcing that all who did not surrender would be
THE BUTCHER BEGINS HIS AWFUL WORK 291

severely punished. It was generally understood that no quar-
ter would be given. The first results of his efforts to find those
likely to be identified with the insurgents was to bring under
suspicion many people who had taken no part in the uprising,
many mothers who perhaps had sons in the insurgent ranks, or
peaceful Cubans who were known to have taken part in the
Ten-Years War. No leniency was to be shown to Cuban
prisoners of war. Cuban hospitals were to be ruthlessly de-
stroyed and all found in them put to death. It was no longer
to be civilized war. The brutality of the fierce Spanish gueril-
leros was not to be restrained by any humanitarian considera-
tions so foreign to their nature. The shooting in cold blood of
luckless young Cubans became a regular early morning scene
about the Spanish garrisons, and many were the examples of
Cuban heroism all unknown to the world except to the soldiers
who delighted in this wanton cruelty.

A case which may serve as an example of many was that of
young Adolfo Rodriguez. It was one of the few cases wit-
nessed by American eyes, and has been graphically described
by a correspondent. Rodriguez was but twenty years old, the
only son of a Cuban farmer living nine miles out of the city of
‘Santa Clara. He had joined the revolution when it broke out
in that province, leaving his father and mother and two sisters
atthe farm. Shortly afterwards he was captured by a Spanish
detachment, though he defended himself so well that he
severely wounded three of his assailants with his machete.
Like others who were brought into the military prisons of the
towns, he was sentenced to be shot on the plain outside
the city.. None of his friends could be present; it would not
do for them to manifest any sympathy for a Cuban captive.
Three hundred soldiers were marched out in the gray light of
the morning to the music of a jaunty quickstep. Then, fol-
lowed by a crowd of the curious, and between two priests, came
Rodriguez, erect, soldierly, taking two steps to the priests’
one. He had a handsome, gentle face framed in a mass of
curly black hair. “It seems a petty thing to have been
292 MURDER OF A BOY PATRIOT

pleased with at such a time,” says the correspondent, “ but I
confess to have felt a thrill of satisfaction when I saw, as the
Cuban passed me, that he held a cigarette between his lips, not
arrogantly nor with bravado, but with the nonchalance of a
man who meets his punishment fearlessly, and who will let
his enemies see that they can kill him but cannot frighten
him.” The Cuban walked to where the officer directed him
to stand and turned his back to the square of soldiers, facing
the hills and the road across them to the farm where were his
sorrowing father and mother and sisters. Straightening him-
self as far as the cords which bound him would allow, he fixed
his eyes on the hills over which the morning light was break-
ing. The officer gave the order, the men raised their rifles,
the Cuban heard the click of the triggers without a motion of
his beaming face. Then came a pause, a dreadful, a cruel
pause. As the officer had raised his sword to give the signal,
another officer rode up and called his attention to the fact that
the firing squad was so placed that they were in danger of hit-
ting some of the soldiers at the extreme end of the square.
The men were ordered to lower their rifles, and the officer
walked across the grass and tapped Rodriguez on the shoulder.
Tt must have been a terrible shock to one fully nerved for the *
ordeal, but this boy turned his head steadily, followed with his
eyes the direction of the officer’s sword, nodded his head
gravely, and, with his shoulders squared, took up a new posi-
tion, straightened his back again and once more waited for
the fatal volley. Nothing could execed such an exhibition
of self-control. Again the sword rose, the triggers clicked,
the sword dropped, and the men fired. The young Cuban
sank on the grass without a strugele.

Another Cuban’s blood for the freedom of Cubans’ soil!
And day after day, in garrisons all over the island, others such
as Rodriguez were falling, without a murmur, without. a fear,
alone with their enemies; and the mothers and the sistcrs who
wept for them were soon to mect a fate more horrible, huddled
amid the sick and starving pacificos at Weyler’s stations of
WEYLER BUILDS AN EXPENSIVE FENCE 293

concentration, the climax of inhuman warfare, the extermina-
tion of the innocent and helpless.

Weyler’s military achievements were chiefly conspicuous
for their ineffectiveness. With Gomez and Maceo both in
the regions of Havana when he boastfully took command, in-
stead of throwing his vastly superior forces upon the insur-
gents, he adopted the expedient, always popular with Spanish
commanders in Cuba, of building a fence. His idea was to
prevent Maceo from getting into Pinar del Rio, or, if he should
get in, to keep him there while he sent his columns against
him. The boundary line between the provinces of Havana
and Pinar del Rio lies close to the narrowest part of the island.
At this narrowest part, between Artemisa and the Bay of
Majara, Weyler, therefore, constructed another trocha about
twenty-five miles long, and lying about forty miles west of
Havana. This pretentious device was constructed in a coun-
try quite thickly settled, and therefore quite dissimilar from
the jungle through which the Jucaro trocha was built. It dif-
fered also in character. A road wide enough to permit the
cavalry to pass comfortably was bordered on each side by a
ditch, three yards wide and three yards deep, in the lower
places filled with water. Along these trenches was stretched
barbed wire — imported from the United States, of course.
As the island was not admitted to be in a state of war, nothing
was contraband so far as the Spanish were concerned, but
everything was so far as the Cubans were concerned. Beyond
the ditches and the wire fence, which it was supposed would
offer some obstacles to cavalry, were dug rifle pits twenty feet
apart, and at intervals of about 100 yards were built “ forts,” so
called, whose walls were formed by partitions of thick planks,
a yard apart, the intervening space being filled with sand.
At night this fortified line was lighted by electricity and the
forts were connected by telephone wires. Twelve thousand
men were concentrated on this elaborate highway, making it
a permanent post, and 6,000 were placed toward Pinar del Rio
and 6,000 more towards Havana to hold themselves in readi-
294 IT DOES NOT KEEP THE BANDITS OUT

ness to reinforce the troops on guard in case of an attack.
This great military work is supposed to have cost nearly $5,-
000,000. It was to aid in pacifying “a few bandits.”

But in spite of General Weyler’s precautions, in the latter
part of February Maceo led his forces across the incompleted
trocha, and then recrossed to assist Gomez to carry the wounded
out of reach of danger. Then he went on an expedition
towards Matanzas, and Weyler announced in one of his glib
proclamations that the provinces of Havana and Pinar del
Rio were pacified and free from any large body of insur-
gents, whom he classed as outlaws to be dealt with by the
mounted police. Both Maceo and Gomez were represented
as fleeing towards the east before the victorious Spaniards.
But Maceo escaped easily from the combination which had
been planned by Weyler, and at the head of a large force,
by quick marches through the swamps skirting the southern
coast, once more appeared where he was least expected, de-
termined to humble Weyler and return again to Pinar del
Rio. On the 11th of March he suddenly attacked the city
of Batabano, pillaged it, and burned a part of it. On the
14th he crossed the trocha again, and two days later fought
a fierce battle with the Spaniards in which he captured arms
and ammunition, but the resistance was so spirited that
Maceo’s foree was divided. Tired out by their fighting
Maceo’s division halted near a cane farm and gave the horses
a chance to eat and the men an opportunity to rest, station-
ing guards near the highway to Candelaria, which it was
supposed the enemy would take if disposed to advance. A
ficree tropical rain storm came on and the guards relaxed their
vigilance, thinking the enemy would not march in such a
storm, but as a matter of fact a large Spanish force under
Colonels Inclan and Linares was coming up the road, and
before the Cuban guards could gallop to where Maceo was
reading the papers the enemy were less than half a mile away.
Maceo had hardly mounted when the Spaniards opened a ter-
rible fire and the Cuban infantry retreated in wild confusion,
RETREAT AND PURSUIT 295

Meanwhile, Maceo took in everything at a glance, and taking
a circuitous route with a small guard he gained a position on
the other side of the enemy, who were so occupied in storming
the position of the retreating Cubans that he fell upon them
entirely unexpected. Then the Spanish pack train and im-
pedimenta turned and fled, and the wild rout of the Cubans
came near being duplicated by the Spaniards. Had Maceo
been reinforced by his other commands, as he had reason to
expect, he would have won a great victory. But the Spanish
saw how few men he really had and held their position till
Maceo’s ammunition ran out, when he retired. He had suc-
ceeded in capturing several mules laden with provisions, and
the Spanish loss was heavy. Maceo was so displeased with
the officers who had failed to rally their men that he deprived
them of,command. After that the insurgents fought bravely
in many engagements during the greater part of the year when
Maceo’s army was roaming over the hills of the province and
maintaining itself against all the forces sent by Weyler to
overcome him.

Nothing could better show Maceo’s daring and gift for
strategy than his attack in June on the government stores at
Candelaria, a town on the railroad line in Pinar del Rio about
fifteen miles from the trocha. General Weyler had meditated
making it a base of supplies during a campaign against the in-
surgent chief whom he considered the backbone’ of the insur-
rection, for he had sent thither a large amount of bread and |
meats under a strong convoy, which, with the ordinary gar-
rison, made Candelaria a very strong place. Maceo heard of
the supplies, and for weeks kept his spies prowling about the
place in the guise of priests and poor workmen. Indeed, a
lady of very good family and a strong sympathizer with the
revolution was one of the most successful emissaries. It was
decided that the stroke should be made on the feast of San
Juan, when high mass was to be celebrated, for Maceo knew
full well that the garrison usually attended such ceremonies in
a body, leaving only a very few sentries on duty when the
296 DARING CAPTURE OF SUPPLIES

enemy was not supposed to be anywhere near. About 200
insurgents straggled off into the town with their machetes hid
under their jackets or in their trousers, and by design ar-
ranged themselves in the church porch and just inside the
door, whereas the garrison, as had been surmised, were ranged
in the best places near the high altar. During the sermon,
which was delivered after the Gospels, a signal was given by a
friendly accomplice from the church tower, and twenty min-
utes later there was a clatter of hoofs and a band of insurgents
were driving a whole line of wagons out of the city, while
every man had some plunder thrown across his saddle. When
the bugle sounded the Spanish garrison came rushing out of
the church, obstructed by the insurgents near the door, who
pretended to be frightened peasants and planters, and a ter-
rific crush with considerable loss of life resulted. When the
Spaniards had made their way out they started in pursuit of
the plunderers, who shot down the sentries and made good
their escape into the woods. While the pursuit was in prog-
ress the insurgents who obstructed the Spaniards in the church
joined their comrades. In this engagement the Spaniards
lost a captain and several men, while the insurgents lost two.

Typical skirmishes and battles were taking place all over
Cuba during the whole of the year 1896. Their description
would be tedious and unnecessary, for they were much alike.
They were nearly always reported as Spanish victories, though
the insurgents roamed at will over every part of the island.
Gomez had but one purpose — to wear out the Spanish. In
July, General José Maceo was killed in a hard engagement in
which his small army beat off the Spanish. Of the Maceo
family none were left but Antonio. All had been sacrificed
to Cuba Libre.
CHAPTER XXI

DIPLOMATIC TROUBLES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND SPAIN—THE SANGUILY CASE—THE MORA CLAIM
—CAPTURE OF THE COMPETITOR.

The Troubles Begin — The Allianca Affair — Rights of American Citizens
Ignored —Sanguily and Aguirre— Arrested for Insurrection While
Taking a Bath— A Sharp Interview— Threatening to Shoot Ameri-
can Citizens-—The Consul’s Strong Reply —Release of Aguirre —
Sanguily Sentenced to Imprisonment for Life— His Lawyer Arrested
and Placed in the Same Jail— History of the Mora Claim — A Court-
Martial of the Dead — Extraordinary Diplomacy— A Wait of Ten
Years — Mora Grows Old and Poor — Spain Offers to Compromise for
$1,500,000 — Ten Years More of Waiting— A Demand Not to Be
Mistaken — A Spanish Comment — The Belligerency Question — Op-
posed by the Administration —The Capture of the Competitor — Cap-
tain Laborde’s Story — Penalty of Death — ‘‘ This Must Stop ”

of interfering in Cuban affairs during the Ten-Years

War, the lovers of peace had abundant reasons for mis-
givings when the Cubans proclaimed a new insurrection in
February, 1895. Cuba had become more closely identified
with this country commercially; Americans controlled large
property interests there and thousands of Cubans had mean-
while become citizens of the United States. While the far-
sighted deemed it inevitable that this government would in
time be brought into the conflict, there were few manifesta-
tions of concern at first, and conservative opinion all over the
country was strongly set against any steps which should give
Spain offense. But with a diplomacy such as Spain prac-
ticed, and methods of warfare such as she adhered to, it was
absolutely impossible for a self-respecting nation to remain
thoroughly cordial, and the diplomatic friction began almost

immediately after the standard of revolt was raised.
19 (297)

| F the people of the United States had felt upon the point
298 THE ‘‘ ALLIANCA” AFFAIR

The revolution was hardly two weeks old when a Spanish
gunboat off Cape Maysi fired upon and chased an American
steamer, the Allianca, which was engaged in regular traffic
between New York and Colon. This act at once raised a
flurry in the United States, whose people knew how prone
Spain had been in the former war to interfere with American
vessels, and it was feared that something like a Virginius af-
fair might result. The government of the United States at
once demanded an explanation of the conduct of the captain
of the gunboat and an apology. It should be remembered
that no state of war existed affording any excuse for firing on
American vessels. Spain at that time, engaged in putting
down the outbreak of army officers in Madrid, knew well
enough that if an outrage were committed on American com-
merce the United States might step in and grant belligerent
rights to the Cubans, and her ministers very quickly disavowed
the act with full expressions of regret and assurance of a non-
recurrence of such an event, while the offending officer was re-
lieved of his command.

But the State Department of the United States soon found

_that it had much more serious business on hand in protecting
the rights of American citizens in Cuba. As already related,
one of the first acts of the Captain-General at the outbreak of
the rebellion was to place the western provinces under martial
law, and on the day of the outbreak many arrests were made
in the provinces of Havana and Matanzas, the revolution in
that quarter being for the time suppressed. Two of the per-
sons arrested in Havana were Julio Sanguily and José
Aguirre, both American citizens.. The former had been a
brave and efficient officer in the Ten-Years War, had been
wounded seven times, and, whether the Spanish authorities had
any evidence against him or not, they naturally assumed that
his sympathies were with the insurgents, though since the war
he had become an American citizen. On the morning of the
24th of February, Sanguily was arrested at his house while
taking a bath, a circumstance, which furnished no very pre-
ARREST OF SANGUILY AND AGUIRRE 299

sumptive proof of his connection with the uprising of that day.
He was thrown with others into Cabafias fortress, and sub-
jected at once to trial by court-martial in direct violation of the
treaty between the United States and Spain of January 12,
1877, which provided that American citizens arrested without
arms in hand should not be tried by any exceptional tribunal
but by those of ordinary or civil jurisdiction.

Our consul-general at Havana, Ramon O. Williams, went
on the morning of the 25th to Captain-General Calleja and
informed him that both Sanguily and Aguirre were natural-
ized citizens of the United States, and as such were duly in-
scribed in the register of foreigners kept in the office of the
Governor-General. He remonstrated against the commit-
ment to court-martial and asked for their immediate transfer
to the civil jurisdiction. The Captain-General pretended to
be surprised that they were American citizens and instantly
answered the consul in an outburst of most violent language
and gesture, saying that it was a disgrace to the American flag
for the government of the United States to protect these men,
who, it was notoriously known, were conspirators against the
government of Spain; and, growing more violent, he ex-
claimed that many citizens of the United States were conspir-
ing in Cuba against Spain, and that he would shoot every one
of them caught.in arms regardless of the consequences.

“But, General,” interposed the consul calmly, “in carry-
ing out such measures you will surely observe in all its parts
the agreement between the two governments?”

“Yes, in observance of the agreement,” he said, somewhat
more moderately.

“Well, General, that is all I have come to ask for, but
these American citizens, instead of having been committed be-
fore a civil court in observance of the agreement have been
subjected to a trial by court-martial contrary to the agreement;
for neither of them has been captured with arms in hand
against the government, but both were arrested by the munici-
pal police while peacefully deporting themselves in the city.”
300 TREATY OBLIGATIONS EVADED

Calleja merely observed that the law governing the resi-
dence of foreigners in the island was paramount to the treaty
between the United States and Spain. The consul firmly re-
plied that his government would not admit such a construction
of it. Calleja said the prisoners might apply to his judge-
advocate, who would see whether they were entitled to rights
under the treaty. As the judge-advocate was a creature of
the Captain-General, he doubtless would have decided that
the prisoners had no rights. Our consul firmly maintained
that in deciding such a question no Spanish judge-advocate
should supersede the diplomatic representative of the United
States, and that he should at once take steps to formally re-
monstrate. Calleja again became excited.

“Your defense of these men is a disgrace to the American
flag! ” he exclaimed.

“General,” replied the consul, “I am acting entirely
within the confines of my official duty and in accordance with
the instructions of the Secretary of State of the United States,
and in strict conformity with the agreement of the 12th of
January, 1877”; and he then bade Calleja good morning and
withdrew. The incident, which is thus related in the diplo-
matic correspondence, serves to illustrate how lightly Spanish
officials regarded treaty obligations, and shows also their feel-
ing towards the United States. About a month later Sanguily
was transferred to the civil jurisdiction, but he was almost im-
mediately arrested upon another and a ridiculous charge, and
submitted to a court-martial on that without any information
being officially conveyed to the consul, who learned of it only
through Sanguily’s attorney in the other case. Another pro-
test was made, and the Captain-General pretended to comply
with the demand, but Sanguily was kept in military prison,
and apparently it was to keep him there that the second charge
was trumped up.

Four months later the consul wrote to the State Depart-
ment that the cases of both Sanguily and Aguirre presented

the anomaly that, while arrested at the very outbreak of the re-
‘
LANGUISHING IN PRISON 301

bellion, they had not been brought to trial, though others ar-
rested subsequently and for overt acts in connection with the
rebellion had been released. Only the American citizens ar-
rested solely on suspicion were subjected to the extreme arbi-
trary measures. “ They are discriminated against on account
of their quality of being American citizens,” wrote the consul
to the Secretary of State. In September, in view of the delay,
the State Department demanded the instant release of San-
guily and Aguirre, and the later was released, a promise being
given that Sanguily would be tried soon. As a matter of fact,
the authorities had no case against him. The courts in Decem-
ber took up his case, and, although the evidence adduced
against him was of the flimsiest character, he was sentenced to
imprisonment for life. An appeal was taken to the Supreme
Court of Justice at Madrid, which ordered a new trial. In the
last days of December, 1896, nearly two years after his arrest,
he was again tried and sentenced to perpetual imprisonment.
Meanwhile, his health had become broken in prison and he
hegged to be allowed to leave the island with his family. An-
other appeal was taken and still he languished in prison.
Meanwhile, the lawyer who defended him in the first trial, and
who made a magnificent defense, was arrested and looked froin
the bars of a cell adjoining Sanguily’s in Cabafia fort, and the
lawyer who managed his first appeal before the Madrid court
was made to suffer so much in consequence that it was difficult
to find any one who would undertake his second appeal there.

A fair idea of the dilatory tactics of Spain when dealing
with the claims of American citizens can hardly be obtained
from the consideration of cases which arose so late as the insur-
rection of 1895. The records of the State Department at this
time had a long list of claims against Spain which, though
strongly pressed from time to time, had never been adjusted.
They extended back for fifty years. But there was one of
only about twenty years’ standing which became of consider-
able interest and importance, as it was in 1895, when Spain was
endeavoring in every way to raise money to send troops to
302 THE MORA CLAIM

Cuba, that the State Department demanded that it should be
settled, not because Spain was in difficulties, but because Con-
gress some months before the revolution had taken action
which left the State Department no option except to press for
asettlement. Spain had admitted the claim to be just many
years before, and nine years before had promised to pay. It
was known as the Mora claim, the early history of which
properly belongs to the Ten-Years War.

Antonio Maximo Mora was born in Cuba, where he had
large estates. In 1853 he came to New York and fixed his
residence there, and in May, 1869, he took out his papers of
naturalization and became a citizen of the United States. In
November of the following year, in one of those peculiar
freaks of barbarism with which Spain conducted the Ten-
Years War, a court-martial was convened in Havana which
passed sentence of death and confiscation of property against
fifty-one persons, all of them absent from the island, and one
of them dead, for alleged complicity in the Cuban rebellion.
It is probable that the government simply wished the estates.
Mr. Mora, who was then in New York, and had in no wav
given the rebellion aid and comfort, was among those sen-
tenced. Secretary Fish at once protested against the sentence
of confiscation, and our minister at Madrid pressed the matter
there. Im the last days of 1872, the Spanish government hav-
ing shown no disposition to act, Secretary Fish cabled to our
minister: “Urge the immediate release and restoration of
the embargoed property.” Early in 1873 a decree of restora-
tion was issued in Madrid, for the United States were seriously
talking of recognizing the belligerency of Cubans, but the
decree was absolutely disregarded in Cuba. It was first sup-
posed that this was an act of insubordination on the part of the
Cuban authorities, but it turned out that with the decree of re-
storation which was sent to Cuba were also sent secret instruc-
tions not to comply with it. This mode of procedure was also
Spanish.

Late in 1873, in fact, during the excitement over the Vir-
DELAYS AND EXCUSES 303

ginvus affair, the Madrid government sent to the Captain-
General an order reading: “The restitution must be made.”
But this also was evidently intended for consumption only in
the United States. The restitution was not made. In 1875
our State Department informed the Madrid government that
it should be obliged to take steps to hasten the restitution if
something were not done. Three months later the Spanish
Ministry sent our minister a note solemnly binding itself to
place the property at the disposal of its owner, but it con-
tinued, nevertheless, to remain in the hands of the Spanish
authorities of Cuba. Thus the matter ran along for over ten
years, Mora meantime growing old, enfeebled, and poor, al-
though his estates had been worth over $2,000,000. Finally,
in 1886, after many excuses, the Spanish government offered
to settle the whole claim, interest and all, for $1,500,000.
The interest alone during the interval would have amounted
to that. But Mora, considering his circumstances, agreed to
this settlement, which could only be viewed in the nature of a
compromise in which he sacrificed half his rightful fortune.
Our government and Mora thought that they had at least se-
cured a settlement. But Spain did not pay and would not
make the provisions for its payment. Our demands were al-
ways met by excuses. Every succeeding Secretary of State did
his best to make Spain settle, but could not, though the claim
was freely admitted. Thus nearly ten years more passed.
Finally, in 1894, Congress took action.and left the State De-
partment little option except to compel a settlement, and this
was the state of the case when the revolution broke out and the
Cubans demanded the recognition of their belligerency. Spain
had never needed money more than at that minute, but she
faced the fact that if she did not settle and settle quickly she
might have to face the prospect of the United States forcibly
demanding a settlement. Secretary Olney made a demand in
a tone which could not be mistaken. Premier Sagasta was re-
ported as saying that the only course open to his much-embar-
rassed government was to pay over the money, and it was paid.
304 TRYING TO RESPECT THE AGREEMENT

Though a claim of such long standing could not fairly be
regarded as having anything to do with the existing questions
concerning Cuba, it was a significant fact that certain papers
favorable to the administration and also opposed to interven-
tion in Cuba considered this as in the nature of a bargain. In
June, 1895, the New York Times said: “It will be difficult
to avoid the conclusion that the payment of the award is also
the purchase of our abstentation from practical intervention in
behalf of the Cuban insurgents.”

As in the Ten-Years War, Spain was constantly making
strong protests and bitter complaints against the alleged aid
that the Cubans were receiving from sympathizers in the
United States. Our government did all it could. Proclama-
tions were issued warning citizens, and instructing officials to
renew their vigilance, and a large expense, over $2,000,000,
was incurred in keeping a fleet of cutters in southern waters to
intercept expeditions, many times to the annoyance of those en-
gaged in legitimate business. The Cuban expeditionists were
so sharp that they frequently escaped without being suspected
by the Spanish spies or caught by the authoritics. No gov-
ernment could have done more to live up to its obligations.
Meantime, it was inevitable that the successes of a people strug-
gling for their freedom from oppression should be welcome
to the people of this country. When Campos was driven into
Bayamo, the adherents of the policy of recognition gained evi-
dent strength and Congress manifested a decided disposition to
act. Public meetings were held in many cities and towns ex-
pressing sympathy with the Cubans. These expressions were
not dictated out of any hatred to Spain as a nation, but out of a
natural dislike of her methods in Cuba. But the Spaniard
could not bring himself to comprehend how the people of the
United States could be actuated by a desire to see an op-
pressed people free. To the Spanish character such a senti-
ment would be entirely inexplicable. They could find no
other motive for our interest in Cuba except in a desire to pos-
sess her by fair means or foul. They had not learned that the
e

SPAIN’S CONTEMPT FOR THE UNITED STATES 305

Civil War had greatly changed the sentiment of this country
towards Cuba. Nothing could furnish a better idea of how
this country was regarded in Spain than a few expressions
from a leading Spanish journal, #1 Mercantil Valenciano, in
October, 1895.

‘* When would it have been possible for any nation with a history, for
any European nation, degraded though it might be, to take advantage of
a war in order to demand an indemnity of a million and a half of dollars? *
The dignity and chivalry of every nation in old Europe would have re-
coiled at this, but no one is astonished at this in New America, in a race of
people without morality and without justice.

‘A blockade strictly carried out against the vessels of the starry flag
would render extremely difficult, if not impossible, the carrying on of the
enormous business done by the Yankees with Cuba. If, besides the strict
blockade, we add occasionally the capture at sea, and the prompt execu-
tion by shooting, of those who attempt to run it, it will then be for the
United States, and not Spain, to ask that the recognition of the rebels, as
belligerents, be annulled.

“With regard to the possibility that the Yankees, fond of boasting
and threats as they are, will make war on Spain on account of the block-
ade, or of the breaking off of commercial or even diplomatic relations, we
need not worry ourselves. The North American republic is absolutely
powerless for carrying out an offensive war with a nation even moderately
military, as ours is. Let us defend ourselves in Cuba by sinking the
American vessels that carry contraband of war, and by showing the world
that we know how to make effective a blockade as extensive as that of
Cuba, and let us laugh at the United States and at the belligerency of the
insurgents.”

In the latter part of 1895 the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations took wp the question of our attitude towards the new
Cuban Republic. Palma, the Cuban representative at Wash-
ington, had made a strong appeal for recognition, and the
claims of the Cubans were set forth in detail. By that time
Gomez and Maceo had made their remarkable march of in-
vasion and were the masters of the rural districts and were
overrunning Havana province. Campos was about to be suc-
ceeded by Weyler, whose unpleasant reputation gave addi-
tional strength to the Cuban cause in this country. Even
under Campos the people had been shocked by authentic ac-
counts of the treatment of insurgent prisoners by the Span-

* The Mora claim already described.
306 CUBAN BELLIGERENCY RECOGNIZED

iards, while the insurgents themselves treated the Spanish
prisoners in a manner approved by civilized warfare. Early
in February the Senate committee reported a concurrent reso-
lution to the effect that the war had reached a magnitude which
concerned all civilized nations, and if it were to continue it
should be conducted on both sides on principles acknowledged
to be obligatory upon civilized nations, and that the President,
if he concurred in this opinion, should in a friendly spirit use
the good offices of the government in requesting Spain to ac-
cord to the armies with which she was engaged the rights of
belligerents. But President Cleveland was evidently opposed
to interfering in Cuban affairs, and it was said to be at the ad-
ministration’s instance that the resolution was made coneur-
rent instead of joint, the custom being not to send resolutions
of the former character to the President.

It would apparently have been wise for Spain to admit the
belligerency of the Cubans, for otherwise she incurred respon-
sibility for all the damage done to the property of foreign resi-
dents in Cuba, and her liabilities in this respect were already
enormous. But toa nation which seldom paid her obligations,
even those which she admitted, this might not appear a serious
matter. It was evident that some of the wisest and strongest
men in the Senate were on the point of favoring an inter-
ference to save the island from further massacre and Spain
from contracting a debt she could never pay, for fate was in-
exorably working for Cuban independence.

After a long debate the Senate passed by a vote of 64 to 6
a resolution favoring the recognition of Cuban belligerency,
and interposing our friendly offices in behalf of Cuban in-
dependence. The house passed resolutions essentially the
same by a vote of 263 to 16. This undoubtedly was a fair
expression of the sentiment of the people of the United States.
From this time forth, therefore, only the delicate requirements
of international law could prevent interference by this nation,
and it hecame a question of time when diplomacy should give
way to sentiment and action.
GENERAL LEE SENT TO HAVANA 307

The Spanish populace was much wrought up over this ex-
pression of opinion; our legation at Madrid had to be placed
under guard, and at Barcelona our consular headquarters were
attacked and the Stars and Stripes contemptuously treated.
Spain hastened, however, to apologize and to offer reparation
for those acts. She was frightened. But as these resolutions
had no effect in shaping our active policy towards Spain, we
continued to live up to the requirements of international law
and to seize vessels and cargoes suspected to be intended for
Cubans.

Notwithstanding the violent feelings which the Spanish
in Spain and Havana were manifesting towards the United
States, the Spanish government showed its desire to conciliate
this country. General Weyler received our new consul-gen-
eral, Lee, at Havana with marked cordiality. General Lee’s
military experience and professional training made him un-
usually competent to ascertain the exact state of affairs in
Cuba, and he was not a man to be hoodwinked or cajoled when
the interests of the United States were in danger. Meanwhile,
in the summer of 1896, the presidential campaign diverted
public interest in a great degree from the struggle going on in
the oppressed island. It had become evident that it would re-
main for the next administration to determine what should be
our policy towards the Cubans, against whose armies General
Weyler was making poor headway, though he was beginning
to treat the innocent and the helpless with a disregard for
human instincts which excited the horror of the civilized
world.

On the last day of April, 1896, the American schooner
Competitor from Key West, with part of her crew, was cap-
tured near San Cayetano while engaged, as the Spanish al-
leged, in landing arms for the insurgents. She was towed to
Havana, and our consul at once demanded that the protocol of
1877 be adhered to in the trial of any Americans who might be
among the crew. The minister to Spain was urged also to re-
quest that the Captain-General be instructed to a strict ob-
305 THE CASE OF THE ‘‘COMPETITOR”

servance of that treaty. The Spanish admiral claimed, how-
ever, that these men did not come within the treaty inasmuch
as they were not “citizens of the United States residing in
Spanish dominions,” one clause of the treaty. We claimed
that in the part of the treaty covering such cases there was
nothing making residence of American citizens within Spanish
dominions a condition necessary to entitle them to all its guar-
antees. The Spanish government promptly sent orders to
Cuba for the suspension of all executive action till an examina-
tion had been made as to the standing of the Americans cap-
tured. But three days later the Spanish admiral officially in-
formed our consul that the treaty did not apply to the Ameri-
can prisoners and that they would be tried by court-martial.
Captain Laborde of the vessel was born in New Orleans and
had once been deputy sheriff at Tampa. According to his
statement, the vessel of which he was master belonged to a
man in Key West, and she had a wrecking license. She had
cleared the Key West custom house with a crew of four besides
himself, taking on board twenty-four men as passengers for
Lemon City, Fla., at two dollars each, and she had sailed at 2
o’clock in the morning. When in the neighborhood of Cape
Sable on the 22d of April, the passengers forcibly took charge
of the ship, and six of them went into the captain’s cabin and
with pistols compelled him to give up the command. The
men then took the vessel to Cape Sable, where they took on
twenty-three more men with arms and ammunition. They
then sailed for the Cuban coast, landing near San Cayetano on
the 25th. The captain was forced to go ashore in the first
boat with one of the crew and nineteen men, who, on landing,
at once escaped. He returned to the ship and another lot was
landed. Then the vessel was sighted by a Spanish cutter.
The captain displayed the American flag and made no attempt
to escape with the passengers. The Spanish came aboard and
seized them. They were put in what was called a Spanish
windlass, the wrists being tied toecther.and the rope then
drawn tight by a stick so as to cause much torture. They were
CONDEMNED TO DEATH 309

taken without arms; indeed, there were none on board. Be-
sides the captain there were two men, Melton, a correspondent
of the Jacksonville Times-Union, and Gildea, the mate, an
Englishman. <A few days later two American citizens named
Leavit and Barnet, who were supposed to have belonged to the
crew, were captured while asleep and taken to Havana, where
they were also subjected to court-martial.

The Spanish prosecuting officer asked for penalty of death
for all on the ground that the local law for foreigners took pre-
cedence in such a case over any treaty, and the obedient court
quickly pronounced a death sentence. Secretary Olney at
once urged upon the Spanish minister at Washington that exe-
cutions should not take place till this government had been
permitted to examine the proceedings of the court, and as a re-
sult the Spanish government, much to Weyler’s indignation,
ordered the cases transferred to the Madrid court. This meant
indefinite delay.

The summer months passed by, the prisoners complained
of insufficient food, were afflicted with prison fever, and some
of them were transferred to the military hospital. On Sep-
tember 3d Secretary Olney cabled the minister at Madrid
that the delay in deciding the Competitor and other cases
which had meanwhile arisen was “absolutely unreasonable.
Call for prompt action and reasons justifying past delay or
additional delay, if such is asked for.” Thereupon the min-
ister was informed that the authorities of the Madrid court
had ordered a new trial before an ordinary tribunal, and
that the decision would be made public “soon.” But the time
passed on, and late in November the consul at Havana acci-
dentally heard that the marine court-martial was again trying
the prisoners. He asked for an authorization to protest, but
the State Department upon investigation was informed that it
was only a preliminary proceeding, and while in such cases the
validity of any military jurisdiction whatever was not in ac-
cord with the treaty, the department decided to simply watch
the proceedings. Something of the character of these pro-
310 ARMENIAN HORRORS DUPLICATED IN CUBA

ceedings is indicated by the following letter, which Captain
Laborde managed to get to the consul:

Fort Capaftas, December 11, 1896.
Sm: I beg to inform you that yesterday afternoon I was ordered by
the actual military judge of the prosecution of the Competitor’s crew to
dress in a military suit, with the purpose of being recognized by someone.
Of course I formally protested of such act and refused to be disguised in
that way. He answered immediately that he was going to compel me by
force, and fearing to become the victim of his brutality, I obeyed. As he
did not allow my protest to be considered, I hurry to let you know this
- and afford a proof of the way justice is being done me.
Iam, sir, your humble servant,
ALFRED LABORDE, Master.

‘When the cases were at this point, Congress called for the
correspondence and took the matter in hand, but Spain con-
tinued to hold the men in prison, and it was long before their
fate was determined.

It was one of the anomalies of the situation that while the
island of Cuba was being devastated by war, and its people,
even the peaceful ones, were victims of the destruction, a class
of people who usually urged peace with Spain and forbearance
with her diplomacy were ‘very much disturbed by Turkish
atrocities in Armenia. It was considered a wrong for Chris-
tian nations to allow those atrocities to continue, and the
failure of the Christian nations of Europe to promptly inter-
vene was vehemently denounced. It was even urged that the
United States should step in. But a devastation quite as hor-
rifying was going on right at our shores, and our interests were
affected not simply by moral but financial considerations.
The loss of a sugar crop in Cuba meant a great deal financially
to the people of the United States as well as to Cubans. Sixty-
seven million spoons went into sugar bowls every morning, and
in a year at a spoonful a time this meant two million tons con-
sumed by our people.

Fully one-half of it was expected to come from Cuba. The
question which the people of the United States naturally
asked themselves was this: “ Shall we allow this war to go on
SERIOUS QUESTIONS 511

indefinitely? Shall we allow a war of extermination to be
maintained at our very doors? Shall we allow Spanish troops
in vast numbers to be sent to exterminate the Cuban popula-
tion? Shall we allow a war of devastation to be carried on
until the island of Cuba is ruined for all purposes of civiliza-
tion, or shall we interpose and say to Spain, ‘ You have refused
all reasonable overtures; you have turned deaf ears for years
to the reasonable appeals of the Cubans for a just share in their
own government, now we must say to you, this must stop!”
CHAPTER XXII

WEYLER’S FUTILE EFFORTS—TRAGIC DEATH OF THE LAST
OF THE MACEOS— THE MURDERS OF FONDEVIELA AND
REMARKABLE EXPLOITS OF ARANGUREN.

Maceo the Terror of the Spanish Nation — Weyler’s Futile Efforts to Cap-
ture Him— Rebel Hospitals and Spanish Victories— Maceo as Un-
daunted as Ever — A Picture of the Man and of His Camp — Was It
a Spanish Trap?— Attack at Punta Brava — How Maceo Fell— Go-
mez’s Son Kills Himself at His Side— Cubans Rescue Maceo’s Body
— Stories of His Death— Their Effect in the United States — Saved
by a Lucky Bullet — Rejoicing of the Spanish People— Hopes of
Cuban Surrender Disappointed — Maceo’s Successor, Rivera — Insur-
gent Successes in Havana and Matanzas — Reign of Terror at Guan-
abacoa — Weyler Criticised at Madrid — Remarkable Exploits of Nes-
tor Aranguren — Magnanimously Frees Spanish Prisoners of War —
Nearly Captures Weyler Himself — Weyler’s Campaign of Destruc-
tion — His Trip to Santa Clara.

Maceo. Having constructed a five-million-dollar

trocha and garrisoned it with about twenty thousand
of her “brave sons” to prevent Maceo from escaping from
Pinar del Rio, it soon appeared that the dashing Cuban had no
particular desire to escape. With a force at his command of
less than 4,000 armed men, he moved about the province of
the west at will, capturing and destroying the garrison towns
and so terrorizing the Spanish soldiers that they dared not
move except in large columns, and these, moving slowly about
in a hilly country, were at the constant mercy of the cleverly-
handled insurgents. It was evident that unless Maceo could
be subdued, Weyler’s boasted trocha would be set down as a
failure. Hence, Weyler’s chief object became the capture of
Maceo. Little attention was paid to Gomez or to other Cuban
generals who were moving about in the provinces of Havana
and Matanzas, but the greater part of the effective force of the

(312)

T HE terror of the proud Spanish nation was the dusky
WEYLER’S WILY FALSEHOODS 313

Spaniards was thrown against Maceo. Ten engagements were
fought against him within fifteen days with no appreciable
advantage to the Spaniards, though Weyler constantly regaled
Madrid with accounts of his crushing blows, and the proud
peninsulars daily scanned their papers in the expectation that
an account of Maceo’s capture would surely appear. But it
did not, and soon the rainy season practically put an end to
the Spanish operations and Maceo entrenched himself with
greater strength in the province. In the meantime more rein-
forecments came from Spain, and at the end of the wet season
Weyler took the field in person and with much éclat. He es-
tablished headquarters on the line of the railroad between
Havana and Pinar del Rio and several skirmishes ensued.
Despite his reports of successful engagements with Maceo’s
army a continuous stream of wounded Spanish soldiers found
their way back to Havana.

Soon Weyler returned, and, with that bravado which might
be described as a species of grandiloquent falsehood, calmly ad-
hered to in the face of its absurdity, he announced that the
province was “ pacified.” But shortly came reports, which
the censor was unable wholly to smother, that Maceo was
capturing garrisons, and driving into fatal ambush the Spanish
detachments sent against him. Again Weyler took the field.
Three times he did this with the same results. In November
he went forth with the largest body-guard ever known in the
history of war, a cordon of 6,000 men, whose duty it was to
care for his personal safety in a little province about the size
of Connecticut, and a province which a few weeks before he
had again pronounced pacified. At his command were over
60,000 troops to capture an army but one-fifteenth as large.
On leaving Havana he declared himself entirely satisfied with
what he had done during the campaign and insisted that all
that remained for him in Pinar del Rio was to “ reconnoitre the
hills in the eastern part,” whereupon the complete pacifica-
tion of the province would soon follow. But the people against

whom he gained his chief successes were civilian captives and
20
314 WITH A PRICE UPON HIS HEAD

unarmed farmers. Occasionally, a small rebel hospital would
be discovered in the woods and every wounded man would be
slaughtered — * the insurgents leaving a large number of dead
upon the field.” Weyler returned to Havana. The province
was again “ pacified.”

Yet, as undaunted as ever in the gloomy gorges of the hills
of Pinar del Rio, within sight of the trocha, was the man
against whom Weyler had made his showy marches. Sitting
under the rain-scaled roof of his improvised hut, his brown
face standing out clearly in the firelight, his clothes ragged
and torn by the jungle thorns, and the four gilt stars on his
faded coat rusted by sun and storm, there was apparently
little about him to induce a Spaniard to give a peso for either
his life or death. All about him in the flickering lights of
the camp were the champing horses, and close by the edge of
the trees, in long quiet lines like windrows, lay the Cubans,
half of them barefooted and barebreasted. The gleam of
white bandages could be seen all along the line, but even the
sickest and most desperately wounded, in their fevered dreams,
still clung to their machetes; no hospitals for them while they
had an arm to wield or a leg to stand on. Out under the tall
palms, silent and alert, stood the sentries, dark silhouettes
against a starlit sky.

The dusky general at the fire rose to his feet, turned up
the brim of his old faded hat, and peered earnestly down the
dark wooded ridges of the mountains to the east where other
camp fires were gleaming. Then you could imagine why it
was that the Spanish government would pay a million pesos
for the death of this man, with broad shoulders and heavy
brow, whose gentle eyes could gleam with a terrible fierceness.
The camp fires to the east were those of the Spanish along the
trocha, and, as Maceo watched them, his lips curled with con-
tempt. Here stood the last. of the Maceos — there were his
hereditary enemies. The blood of his family stained the
island from end to end. He had fought them from his boy-
hood and would fight them till he died — or Cuba was free.
THE LAST OF THE MACEOS FALLS 315

At this moment Maceo was as strong in that province as
ever, in spite of the columns which Weyler had sent against
him. There he might have remained and possibly might have
lived till Cuba was free. But he had other plans. Just why
Maceo at this time left his army to another gifted guerrilla
chief, Ruis Rivera, has never been satisfactorily explained.
That he left it because it was in sore distress, as the Spanish
averred, and because he wished to learn why he was not rein-
forced, is absurd. His army was not in distress and Maceo
had no fear of death. For years, time after time, he had
rushed into the thickest of the battle langhing at the Spanish
bullets in the belief that they would not hit him unless fate
willed it so. The most plausible explanation of his move
is that he proposed to leave the Pinar del Rio forces to
Rivera to carry on the war there while he joined the forces
operating in Havana province, thereby accomplishing the
double purpose of making an aggressive movement under the
nose of the boasting Weyler, and diverting his attention from
the western province, which Rivera could then easily hold.
At the same time that Maceo started eastward, Gomez started
westward. With a guard of about a dozen of his staff Maceo
suddenly crossed the trocha at the north and appeared in the
province of Havana where he was apparently expected by the
Cubans, and where he was least expected by the Spaniards,
unless it is true that he was enticed over the trocha by a plot
and drawn into a Spanish trap. He quickly gathered about
him a small force of Cubans operating in the western part of
[Havana province, and on December 7th was suddenly attacked
by a superior Spanish force under Colonel Cirujeda at Punta
Brava. While Maceo was in the center of his staff, a heavy
volley was fired directly at them and Maceo was shot in the
neck and fell from his horse mortally wounded. Several of his
staff also fell, while one of them galloped back to secure aid
to carry away Maceo’s body. Gomez’s son, also on Maceo’s
staff, remained by the body and, when he could no longer
defend it, seems to have killed himself and fallen at Maceo’s
316 WAS THERE FOUL PLAY?

side. The Spaniards rifled Maceo’s body of his jewels, but
probably without knowing whose they were, for the body was
left on the field and afterwards buried by the Cubans in a spot
which remained a secret to all except a few.

The stories which reached this country concerning the mys-
terious death of Maceo greatly aroused the people and in-
flamed Congress, impatient under President Cleveland’s mild
diplomacy. The friends of the Cuban cause spread abroad a
detailed and circumstantial story to the effect that Maceo had
been treacherously persuaded to meet certain of the Spanish
leaders under a flag of truce and that, with the members of his
staff, he was murdered by men in ambush, the whole plot hav-
ing been conceived by Spanish high officials. This version

- was readily believed in this country though vigorously denied
at Madrid and Havana. It was very natural that it should
be believed. Spanish reports of movements in Cuba had time
and again been shown to be absurdly colored. It was well
known that for months the whole military ability of general
Weyler had been directed against Maceo; to take Maceo some-
how, dead or alive, was the Spaniard’s ambition. That they
should have lured him into an ambush was plausible enough,
except for one fact — Maceo was too shrewd to be tricked.
He knew Spanish ways. On the other hand, was it probable
that one who had lived day after day under the fire of the Span-
jards, had boldly entered their fortified towns, and cireum-
vented them time after time, should suddenly fall with nearly
his whole staff in one of those skirmishes, the science of which
he was a master? The theory of foul play, which was not in
the least false to the spirit of the Spanish methods in Cuba
and the Philippines, was further strengthened by the fact that
Dr. Zertucha, Maceo’s physician, who was with him at the
time, very soon afterwards deliberately gave himself up to the
Spaniards, was immediately released and given perfect liberty
and protection. Fle was at once branded as a traitor by the
Cubans and accused of having been the Spanish instrument
to lead Maceo into the Spanish trap. But Zertucha promptly
ZERTUCHA’S PATHETIC DEFENSE 317

defended himself with a story of the affair which showed that
he was either a great rascal or a much-maligned patriot. Ma-
ceo, he said, was out of ammunition, had no supplies, had even
followed the enemy's trail in search of cartridges. “I have
wept and will continue to weep over the death of him who was
my friend — my brother rather than my chief. It is impos-
sible to believe that he should thus have exposed himself to
certain death by placing himself in a position so dangerous
as the one he took, especially as it was not strategical. No,
Maceo, rather than struggle against certain elements, chose
to die at his post, facing the enemy.” Asa reason for surrend-
ering to the Spanish he said: “Upon the body of General
Maceo and in the presence of General Diaz I swore that I
would not serve under any other leader in the revolution. I
am carrying out my oath.”

His statement was not one calculated to entirely relieve
him of suspicion. Several who had been near Maceo stated
that soon after he had entered the province of Pinar del Rio
he received advices from the Cuban agent in Tavana that the
Spaniards were secretly corresponding with some officer in
his army, and the fact caused Maceo so much uneasiness that
he issued an order for summarily dealing with anyone who was
found to be in conferences with the enemy. It is also alleged
that Maceo’s suspicions of Zertucha were so great that he took
good care to keep him near himself.

How important an element in Spanish affairs was this mu-
latto general may be judged from the statements made at the
time in a Spanish journal, Hl Pais. “The indications are,”
it said, “that if it had not been for Maceo’s death, not only
would General Weyler have been recalled but a ministerial
crisis would have occurred on December 9th. It is said on the
best authority that on December 7th, when the government
learned that General Maceo had passed the trocha, a cabinet
council was summoned for the next day. The Duke of Tetuan
and other ministers who are personal friends of General Mar-
tinez Campos were going to require the deposition of Weyler
318 THE JOY BELLS RING IN OLD MADRID

on the ground that his failure was evident, and no time should
be lost in having him replaced by some other general before the
dry season was more advanced. Cieneral Weyler’s lucky star
saved the situation. On December 8th, Premier Canovas sent
word that he was ill, and the meeting of the ministers was ad-
journed till the afternoon of the 9th. On the morning of that
day the news of Maceo’s death came, and both Weyler and the
ministry could breathe more freely.”

But a few days before the news of Maceo’s death, the E/
Liberal of Madrid said: “ Maceo isthe war. To conquer him,
to annihilate his followers, is to finish the war, to gladden the
nation’s heart, and to present us before the world as capable
of accomplishing that which we purpose. Victory’s first re-
quirement is, that people know in advance who is to be con-
quered,” Later, the same paper said: “After many a
gloomy day, that of yesterday was a day of happiness and as re-
generating as any in our glorious past. Maceo’s death implies
that the greatest part of his adherents will surrender, and that
the remainder will be dispersed.”

Great was the Spanish rejoicing. Royal flags were hoisted
everywhere in Madrid, and bells were rung, while the Queen
sent a gift to the wife of the Spanish officer whose men killed
Maceo. -As soon as the news reached [avana, a grand torch-
light procession was organized, and after a long march through
the illuminated streets, it proceeded to the palace where a great
crowd was assembled. General Weyler was received amid
cries of “ Long live Spain!” “ Long live the King! ” and in
response he said that he would now speedily pacify the island.
A. few days later, there was a great excwrsion from Havana to
Punta Brava, and a féte on the spot where Maceo fell, in honor
of Major Cirujeda’s column. On the arrival of the excur-
sionists, they were received by the officers, and there were
speeches and much jubilation.

But General Weyler’s expectations of a speedy breaking
up of the rebellion were disappointed. Te fully believed that
the Cubans in Pinar del Rio would rush in and lay down their
CAMPAIGNS OF EXTERMINATION 319

arms. But no one surrendered except Zertucha, while every
night the volleys of the insurgent skirmishers could be heard
in the suburbs of Havana.

General Rivera, Maceo’s successor in Pinar del Rio, took
up a position in one of Maceo’s old strongholds. In a few days
General Weyler went again, in person, and with a strong force,
to the province which he had declared pacified. But the cam-
paign proved to be one of extermination. It was supposed
that the insurgents were short of supplies, and so farms were
ruined, everything that could not be carried away was burned,
and animals were seized or killed. The Cuban soldiers in
their depredations had only burned cane fields so as to prevent
the Spaniards from deriving revenue, but the Spaniards spared
nothing, from the potato field to the house of the planter
who was suspected of sympathizing with the insurgents.

Rivera evaded the traps set for him with skill, though men-
aced by a greatly superior and a well-equipped force. Weyler
was obliged to keep arrayed against him the same powerful
army he had used against Maceo, and, as a result, he began to
be the subject of severe criticism in Madrid, though his harsh
methods made him a hero among the Conservatives of Havana,
who received him with a great demonstration, when late in De-
cember he again returned from the field. Madrid papers said
they should have received much more satisfaction from the
demonstration had General Weyler shown that he had accom-
plished anything in Pinar del Rio. As a matter of fact, the
insurgents seemed to be more active than ever, and the provi-
dential bullet which had gladdened Spanish hearts by killing
Maceo had not been followed up. After Weyler had made
another visit to the front, boasting that he would speedily pa-
cify the province, had marched his men about the hills till they
were tired out, and had won no signal advantage over the in-
surgents, he made his way back again towards Havana, and the
Madrid papers were so vehement that the government seized
them and began action against their proprietors.

While Weyler was using his troops to no effect in the
320 A REIGN OF TERROR

east, the insurgents, less liable to strong opposition, were over-
running Matanzas, and indeed were capturing the very sub-
urbs of Havana itself. The divisions under command of Bet-
ancourt planned an attack on the Spanish force under Col.
Aldea, and it was carried out so successfully that the Spaniards
were demoralized, and they admitted a loss of seventy-five men.
It was nearer twice that. The Spaniards fled in disorder into
the town of Ceiba Mocha. A little later the insurgents seized
and pillaged the town of Guanabacoa, which is practically a
suburb of Havana, and then.returned to their camps. The
Spanish commander was replaced by Colonel Fondeviela who
had the reputation of being a ruthless assassin. A reign of
terror, apparently sanctioned by Weyler, began; men accused
of giving information to the insurgents were arrested and
never seen again in the city. Their bodies were lying beyond
the outskirts. Fourteen such persons were killed on a single
day, Sunday, January 3d. Many of them were well-known
young men of the best Cuban families of the city, who, the
day before, were living peacefully at their homes. arly in
January the insurgents captured the town of Arroyo Naraujo,
near Havana, took all the clothing and food, and reduced it
to ashes, the Spaniards fleeing to the capital.

As Weyler’s position became more insecure at Madrid,
he became more reckless in fixing the character of reports.
Without a word of truth Gomez was represented as desirous
to treat with him for peace, though Gomez at the very mo-
ment was aggressively attacking Spanish forces in Santa Clara.
Pinar del Rio was again declared as pacified, and within a few
hours reports came to Havana that the Spanish division under
Colonel Segura had been completely routed by Rivera, who
had drawn the Spanish colonel into a tight place in the hills,
and then charged with terrible effect; nearly three hundred
Spaniards were killed, and as many more wounded, while the
Cuban loss was small. This report, which turned out to be
true, was suppressed by the censors, and the government circu-
lated a report that Rivera had been killed. It was a desperate
SLAUGHTER OF THE SICK AND WOUNDED B21

game, and could not be expected to last long, unless circum-
stances altered for the better, but the Conservatives in Havana
ostentatiously combined to express their confidence in the
Captain-General, and this had an effect of softening the criti-
cisms for a time.

It was a noticeable fact that in all the highly-colored re-
ports of Spanish victories no account was ever given of the
prisoners taken. The only mention was of insurgents killed.
It was notorious that the Spanish executed the insurgents who
fell into their hands, in sharp contrast to the policy which the
Cubans had endeavored to carry out from the beginning of the
war. The same fate overtook the sick and wounded when
taken in Cuban hospitals. The Spanish newspapers would say
that such an insurgent hospital was destroyed after an en-
gagement with the forces which defended it, and so many
were killed; nothing was said about the sick and wounded. In
fact, they made up the list of the killed. An attack on these
defenseless unfortunates was construed into a Spanish victory.
As might be imagined, these crimes only intensified the Cuban
hatred of the Spaniards, and confirmed them in the determina-
tion to fight it out to the bitter end — independence or death.
Yet Weyler was pretending to expect that these people would
soon lay down their arms.

At last he retired to his palace and remained inactive for
a time, reiterating on every opportunity that the island would
soon be pacified, and contenting himself with reviling the in-
surgents as bandits, though they swarmed all about Havana,
and it was impossible to communicate with any place more than
five miles from the city without first overcoming an insurgent
force. To meet this unexpected activity, men and guns were
drawn from the famous trocha, and that defense was again
open. Some rebels poured through to reinforce Rivera in
Pinar del Rio, where the insurgents maintained themselves
easily.

While Fondeviela was continuing his butcherics in Guana-
bacoa, unrebuked by Weyler, though several Spanish dele-
322 AN IDEAL SOLDIER

gations had warned him, a very striking instance occurred,
illustrative of much that characterized the war between the
proud Spaniard and the Cuban “bandit.” Operating in the
vicinity of Havana was a young insurgent commander of
good family, named Nestor Aranguren. He had taken the
field for Cuba Libre at the head of a hundred other young men
of equally high antecedents; indeed, they were said to be all
university men, mostly graduates of the University of Havana.
They were well equipped and of the bravest character, and
Aranguren had not only the spirit of a true soldier but a natural
genius for military affairs which had been at once recognized
by his superiors and his promotion had been rapid. He had
been kept in the province of Havana, where his influence and
that of his men was considerable. One night, within sight
of a Spanish fort, and almost at the gates of Havana, by a dar-
ing stroke, he derailed a train and captured several Spanish
officers under Fondeviela’s command. When the news reached
Havana there was much mourning, for it was taken for granted
that the officers would be killed, and they were greatly sur-
prised when they came to Havana safe andsound. Aranguren
had treated them with courtesy and given them a safe return
to their camps. Such was the example of self-restraint under
strong temptations which the alleged bandits furnished to the
proud Spaniard who went about the island slaying in cold blood
not simply the insurgents captured in battle, but sick and
wounded men in hospitals and defenseless men and women
leading peaceful lives. Yet these Cubans were the people
whose belligerency the government of the United States could
not recognize, their expeditions were chased by our war cutters,
and the leaders of the expeditions arrested and tried, while the
Spanish were buying in our ports whatever they could pay for,
and our government was even dickering diplomatically with
the Spanish government, which hoped thereby to preserve
something of its supremacy over those brave and oppressed
people.

It was not long after Aranguren’s exploit that he nearly
GOMEZ’S SCATHING MESSAGE 323

captured the Captain-General himself. Weyler had left Ha-
vana with his strong body-guard and a force of troops for Ma-
tanzas. On his return march in the last week in January he en-
tered a village in the south of Havana province, ordered the
inhabitants to leave for a fortified place, and then burned the
town. He then proceeded to the town of Gopaste, which was
reached about nightfall, and guides were sent forward to recon-
noitre. Aranguren had his forces concealed in the houses of
the town, and but for an accident he might have accomplished
one of the greatest feats of war. An accidental discharge of
a gun by one of the insurgents gave the Spaniards the alarm,
and, seeing that their plan had failed, the insurgents rushed
from their concealment and drove the Spanish forces back to
Weyler’s position, and several of his guard were wounded.

In January the command of the insurgents in Pinar del
Rio was assumed by Mayta Rodrigues, and Rivera crossed the
trocha into Havana province, where the Cuban operations be-
came more active than ever. At this time the Spanish gov-
ernment announced that it was meditating reforms and was
placing before the autonomists a scheme which it was hoped
might take the vitality out of the insurrection. Weyler en-
deavored to secure an interview with Gomez for the alleged
purpose of offering peace on the basis of home rule. But Go-
mez had no faith in him and returned this message:

“Tell General Weyler that I do not consider him a man
of honor. He is too deep in the mud to raise himself to my
level and confer with me.”

While the reforms were stated to be acceptable to the auto-
nomists’ party, that organization had dwindled to an inconse-
quential body, owing to the successes of the revolution and to
the atrocities of the Spaniards in the island.

Unable to drive the Cubans out of Havana province with
his greatly superior army, Weyler resorted to the device which
he had tried in Pinar del Rio. Late in January he ordered the
destruction of all plantations and buildings in the province
which could be likely in any way to prove useful to the insur-
324° WEYLER PROPOSES TO STRIKE A DECISIVE BLOW

gents. The Madrid Chamber of Commerce protested, but to
no avail. Weyler did not seem to recognize the fact that he
was doing exactly what the insurgents had beén doing for two
years in order to deprive the Spaniards of revenue. Je was
helping the insurgents carry on their campaign. Thus the
whole island, except in the east, where the insurgents were in
full control, where they collected taxes and where some indus-
tries were proceeding under their protection, was made a desert.
About Havana and Matanzas the Spaniards destroyed every-
thing within their reach, and the insurgents did the same.
If the Cubans came to a patch of potatoes they took what they
wanted and destroyed the rest so that the Spaniards could not
have them. If the Spaniards arrived at the patch first, they
did the same thing. Weyler, as usual, regaled Madrid and
Tavana with claims that the island was being speedily pacified.
So matters went on week after week.

Early in February Weyler determined to push a large force
through to Santa Clara, in which locality Gomez was supposed
to be. He went through a country in which not a green thing
had been left growing. As Sheridan said of the valley of
Virginia, “a crow flying over the country would have to take
rations.” The huts of the pacificos were pitched in the swamps
about the forts and starvation was beginning to stare them in
the face. When Weyler reached Santa Clara he was received
with great ceremony. All the forces possible had been con-
centrated there and the city and the outskirts fairly swarmed
with soldiers. To all appearances he was to strike a decisive
blow. But his enemies, who had greatly increased in Spain,
said that he had gone into the field to prevent his being re-
ealled, as it would be a public scandal to recall a gencral when
at the front.

Gomez, who had started westward at about the same time
Maceo began his fatal journey eastward, soon after crossing the
trocha had an engagement with Spanish forces under General
Tuque. The result of the encounter was a defeat of the
Spaniards and their retreat.
GOMEZ RECROSSES THE TROCHA 825

Finding that the Spanish troops about him were greatly
superior in numbers to his own, Gomez deemed it wise to escort
the civil government, which he had proposed to move nearer to
Havana, back into Puerto Principe, and having accomplished
this he recrossed the trocha without the loss of a man and again
took his place in the hills to the east of Santa Clara. The plan
of his campaign was to move westward slowly, augmenting his
force with the various brigades scattered along the route, and
also by the army of General Garcia from the east. Meanwhile
he detached two divisions, which made their way westward, and
were soon operating in Weyler’s rear.

General Calixto Garcia, who arrived in the island some-
what later than the other Cuban leaders, was one of the best-
known fighters for Cuban freedom. He had fought with
great ardor during the Ten-Years War, and shortly afterwards,
when he found that Spain did not intend to keep her promises
made at Zanjon, he took up arms again. But his small force
was surrounded by the vigilant Spaniards, and, rather than be
captured, he deliberately shot himself. The bullet passed
from his chin through his tongue and came out between his
eyebrows, and to this day the opening remains from the roof of
his mouth to his forehead. He always keeps a bit of cotton in
the hole in his forehead, a peculiarity which can be distin-
guished in his photographs.

Having been captured when thus wounded, he finally es-
caped from prison and wandered about the world till the new
war began. Then he remained in the United States for a time,
fitting out expeditions for Cuba. At last he arrived there and
took command of the army of the East.
CHAPTER XXIII

THE MURDER OF DR. RUIZ AND THE THREATENED RESIG-
NATION OF CONSUL-GENERAL LEE— RELEASE OF SAN-
GUILY —ON THE VERGE OF WAR—SPAIN ALARMED.

Congress Stirred by Stories of the Death of Maceo — Opposition to Bellig-
erency — Spanish People Aroused — Trying to Soothe Us — Secretary
Olney’s Claims — Congress Amazed — Spain Seeks European Support
— ‘Independence or Death’”—Spain’s Plan of Reform — Her Hand
Still Heavy on Cuba—The Murderous Fondeviela — Killing of Dr.
Ruiz — No Notice Given to Consul-General Lee — Lee Not Supported
at Washington in His Defense of American Citizens — Arrest of Scott
— Lee’s Forceful Despatch — He Threatens to Depart — A Dramatic
Climax — Cuban Sympathizers Classed as Jingoes—Senator Sher-
man’s Defense —Its Significance — Demand for a Ship of-War for
Havana— Sudden Release of Sanguily —Spain Alarmed — Weyler’s
Failures in the East— Capture of General Rivera— Activity of In-
surgents

OR some weeks prior to the reassembling of Congress in
F December, 1896, it was apparent that the people of the

_ United States would not permit the Cuban situation to
drag along indefinitely. In behalf of the Cubans, both parties
had inserted a strong plank in their platform, and the hopes of
the Cuban sympathizers, which had been dashed by President
Cleveland’s gentle diplomacy, eagerly awaited the coming ad-
ministration of William McKinley. That our interference
would be tolerated, if, indeed, it were not welcomed by British
interests, was evident from editorials in leading English papers.
The chaotic condition of industry and commerce in Cuba could
not be longer endured with complacency, when there was no
evidence that the Spaniards could pacify the island, and when
Spanish atrocities seemed to warrant interference on the
grounds of humanity alone. Indignation meetings were held
all over the United States, and were often addressed by leading
and influential men. There was little interest in President

(326)
 

 

 

A FIRST-CLASS MODERN WARSHIP,—UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP “INDIANA” AT FULL SPEED
ACTION OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 329

Cleveland’s message — his last annual state paper — except
in his references to Cuba. He reviewed the struggle and saw
no prospects of its early termination, and he suggested that if
Spain should offer to Cuba a full measure of home rule, Cuba
remaining subject to the Spanish sovereignty, such a solution
might be satisfactory on both sides, and the United States
might well consent to give guarantees for the carrying out of
the arrangement. For the present he recommended our gov-
ernment to pursue our usual course. But hardly had the mes-
sage been printed when the people were aroused by the stories
of the fate of Maceo.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations proceeded to
action at once, and, notwithstanding the fact that Secretary
Olney departed from custom and appeared before the com-
mittee and advised against any action by Congress, it unani-
mously passed a joint resolution, introduced and championed
by Senator Cameron of Pennsylvania, acknowledging the in-
dependence of the Republic of Cuba, and offering friendly
offices with government of Spain to bring the war to a close.

But it was evident that there were still too many forces
against such a policy to admit of its adoption. The conserva-
tive men in the Senate considered it precipitate action. The
friends of the incoming administration were not. disposed to
have the issue created until the new administration could act
in the premises in its own way, and besides, it is difficult for our
government to accomplish anything during that period be-
tween the election of a new President and his inauguration. It
was evident, however, that the time was drawing near when
something would be done, and but for the fact that a new ad-
ministration was about to take up the responsibilities of office,
Congress would have done its best to force the Executive to
take action, poorly as we were prepared for war.

The Spanish people were again greatly aroused by the ac-
tion of the committee. Popular feeling was evidently in favor
of boldly defying the United States and of notifying this gov-
ernment that Cuba would be retained if it took Spain’s last dol-
330 RESOLUTION OPPOSED BY SECRETARY OLNEY

lar and her last man to uphold her sovereignty. The resola-
tion, by the way, was more moderate than that which Spain had
hastened to put into execution in favor of the South before
actual hostilities had been begun in 1860. But the govern-
ment of Spain, in spite of the clamors of the people, maintained
a dignified attitude, relying on the influence of President
Cleveland to oppose interference for the time, and again made
it known that it would soon, or as soon as the condition of the
island permitted, institute a system of autonomy similar to that
in Puerto Rico and would liberalize the commercial regula-
tions. Spanish statesmen considered always that the mere an-
nouncement of reform purposes would effectually soothe the
feelings of American people. But so high ran the feeling
in the United States that Secretary Olney deemed it expedi-
ent to make a public statement of his reasons for opposing the
Senate resolution, and he further aroused Congress by the
claim that the resolution amounted to nothing but a statement
of opinion by the eminent gentlemen of the committee and that
“the power to recognize the so-called Republic of Cuba as an
independent state rests exclusively with the executive. A res-
olution on the subject by the Senate or by the House, by both
bodies or by one, whether concurrent. or joint, is inoperative
as legislation and is important only as advice of great weight
voluntarily tendered to the executive regarding the manner in
which he shall exercise his constitutional functions.” Con-
egress was amazed. Good constitutional lawyers held that if
such a resolution should be passed over the President’s veto
and he refused to execute it he would be liable to impeachment.
It was recalled that just sixty years before President Jackson
had in a message to Congress referred to it the question of the
recognition of the Republic of Texas.

On December 21st the Senate Committee on Forcign Re-
lations made a long report citing for the right of intervention
a long line of European precedents, and showing that Europe
has invariably asserted and practiced the right to interfere,
separately and collectively, amicably and forcibly, when ques-
SPAIN SEEKS SUPPORT FROM EUROPEAN POWERS 331

tions of independence were involved. The situation in Cuba
and the duty of the United States as the committee saw it
were stated, and it was claimed that there could be no rational
interference except on the basis of independence. Congress
then adjourned over for the holidays.

Meanwhile, Spanish policy was directed towards securing
support from other European powers. She labored desper-
ately to show the powers that her troubles with this country
were also theirs, and it was evident she expected aid in defy-
ing “the Yankee.” The attitude of France and Austria ap-
peared to be favorable; they sympathized with Spain but were
non-committal. The Vatican was of course distinctly favor-
able to Spain’s cause. England offered little encouragement.
President Cisneros of the Cuban Republic allowed it to be dis-
tinetly understood that it would treat with Spain only on the
basis of the absolute independence of Cuba, and the Spanish
journals announced that, while the death of Maceo implied the
stupefaction of the insurgents, only the destruction of a large
insurgent force or the complete pacification of a province could
be sufficient for the establishment of the contemplated reforms.
They looked to see General Weyler follow up the advantage
which accident had thrown in his hands, but as the days
elapsed, and the fruitlessness of Weyler’s campaigns became
apparent, they gave way to a spirit of criticism of the man who
was so continually boasting of what he would do but never
did it.

Some support was given those opposing the passage of the
Cameron resolution by the intimations from Madrid that
Spain was preparing to accept the offer of the administration,
tendered sometime before, for friendly mediation in guarantee-
ing to the insurgents the efficiency of the proposed reforms,
but these intimations evidently had no other purpose than
to prevent, if possible, the passage of the resolution. To off-
set this, the delegate of the Cuban Republic at Washington,
Gonzalo de Quesada, issued a long statement on January 3d,

1897, reiterating the position of the insurgents. There were
21
332 QUESADA’S STATEMENT OF THE SITUATION

three parties to be eonsidered, he said, Spain, the United States,
and the Cubans. As to Spain, neither the genius of her insti-
tutions nor the character of her people would allow her to de-
part from her ancient system of colonization; indeed, Canovas
had recently stated that while Spain would grant more liberal
measures than had before been contemplated she would not
under any circumstances grant autonomy after the fashion of
Canada. The reason for this was plain, for under such a sys-
tem there could be no more exploitation for Spanish monopo-
lies nor use of the island to pay Spanish debts. As to the
United States, it could not be expected that that government
would accept the eternal role of a policeman to see that His
Spanish Majesty fulfilled his contract. He justly declared
that the idea that a free and happy people should become the
sponsers for the continued monarchial domination of Cuba
could find no sympathy. “As for Cubans,” said Quesada,
“they know well enough that when Spain is willing to give
them genuine autonomy, it is because Cuba is lost and she de-
sires by some trick or pressure to make the Cubans pay the
enormows Spanish debt. To all projects the Cubans will re-
spond, now and always, with their motto: ‘ Independence or
Death.’ ”

As soon as Congress reassembled after the holidays it ap-
peared that there was little chance of the passage of the Cam-
eron resolutions, which were successfully side-tracked. The
Cuban sympathizers contented themselves with debate on the
case of Sanguily, favoring a request from the President for
his instant release. As the Cortes was not in session it was
evident that no reform, even if one were actually intended,
could be legitimately carried out in Cuba for the present, but
it was announced from Madrid in January that the cabinet,
after consultation with the Queen, and manifestly with the
purpose of preventing serious action by the United States by
the coming administration, would probably pardon Sanguily
and at once decree liberal reforms, trusting that the Cortes
upon assembling would grant a bill of indemnity. But as the
WAITING FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION 333
last days of the administration approached it was apparent that
Spain had only contempt for President Cleveland’s policy of
friendly mediation, had never seriously considered it, was pro-
posing reforms only for effect upon the coming administra-
tion, that the Cubans would take no notice of it, and that the
people of the United States rejected such a policy with scorn
and were simply waiting for McKinley. This attitude was
reflected in Congress and nothing was attempted with the reso-
lutions of recognition. Fearing that the coming administra-
tion might not be so easily trifled with, the Spanish journals,
which, in treating of the United States, had long been insolent,
pretentious, and bombastic, became for the time very con-
ciliatory.

The plan of reform which Spain proposed left her hand
still heavy upon Cuba. It pretended to make the council
of administratién a more representative body, but as the
electoral system was not materially changed, this meant noth-
ing, and, of course, the Cubans knew it. Spain hoped that
the Cuban sympathizers in the United States would not know
it, and would, therefore, become less active in the cause of
belligerency. The Cortes was still to have a veto power, and
while it was provided that the Cuban council might have the
right to make up a budget, it could be decreed from Madrid if
not satisfactory. The tariff laws were only partially modified
and Spanish products were to be favored by a large discriminat-
ing duty.

While Weyler was upon his earlier mission, news came
of the landing of a large expedition of guns and men under
Roloff, the minister of the war, in the eastern part of the
island, the reinforcements at once joining Garcia’s command.
On the other hand, General Rivera, who succeeded Maceo in
the west, was severely wounded in an engagement with a
superior Spanish force under General Velasco, captured and
taken to San Cristobal. Like Maceo, Rivera had left his forces,
and, for some reason, was proceeding eastward with a euard of
only about a hundred men. As the Spaniards seldom moved
304 RULE OF THE BARBAROUS FONDEVIELA

at night, and as Rivera was surrounded at night, it was gener-
ally believed that he was captured through treachery, and that
he would be shot. That was General Weyler’s purpose, but
Madrid interfered. The government at Spain had been
brought to see that she could not demand the sympathy of
civilized Europe by using the methods which had so long made
her warfare in Cuba a disgrace. Another proof of Spain’s con-
ciliatory attitude was the removal of the prohibition on the ex-
portation of leaf tobacco contracted for by American firms
prior to the issue of an edict forbidding its shipment. Spain
even considered the issue of an amnesty clecree similar to that
which had resulted in the surrender of many revolutionists in
the Philippines. The authorities in Cuba sent to Madrid a
fresh installment of reports of the pacification of the island, and
the government suggested that if the proposed amnesty was
favorably received a large portion of the troops would be with-
drawn.

But the evidences of a more peaceful condition of things
was only apparent. From a diplomatic point of view, Spain
was simply endeavoring to draw the attention of the new ad-
ministration away from the island.

While Weyler was in the field in Santa Clara, and at that
moment when it was expected that he would engage Gomez
and either fall or conquer, the murderous Fondeviela in his
bloody operations at Guanabacoa became so reckless as to make
American citizens his victims. Several Americans were
already under arrest and lodged in various prisons at points
held by the Spaniards, and the State Department had been
diplomatically busy in looking out for their interests. It was
difficult for General Lee to obtain any satisfactory reasons why
these persons were arrested and thrown into vile prison holes,
and all protests and demands were met by that cvasive shifting
policy which had always characterized Spain’s dealings with
American interests.

Among those arrested about the middle of February at
Fondeviela’s orders was Dr. Richard Ruiz, a naturalized
MURDER OF DR. RUIZ 335

American citizen who had studied and practiced dentistry in
Philadelphia for many years before going to Cuba. He was
charged with having assisted General Aranguren’s band to
derail the train, when Spanish officers were captured and mag-
nanimously released, as already related. The charge was of
the flimsiest character, as the doctor had the reputation among
all of attending strictly to business and of not meddling in any
way with revolutionary movements. He was thrown into
the Guanabacoa jail, no communication with him being al-
lowed, and on the afternoon of ["ebruary 17th he was found
dead in a cell, there being little doubt that he had been beaten
to death by the jailers at Fondeviela’s orders. The Spanish
authorities, as usual, had failed to give our consul any. official
notice of the arrest, and Consul-General Lee heard of it only
unofficially. Ie was fully aroused.

It would appear that General Lee had experienced some
difficulty in having his efforts in behalf of arrested American
citizens satisfactorily supported at Washington, where the ad-
ministration was apparently clinging to a hope that something
might result from Spain’s abundant promises, which Mr.
Olncy was slow to learn how to discount. Spain had given a
semi-official assurance that Sanguily would be released, but the
release did not come and, meanwhile, other American citizens
were pining away in jail, and others were being arrested and
disposed of in utter disregard of their rights as American citi-
zens. It was stated in the papers that General Lee had kept
the wires busy informing the State Department as to the death
of Ruiz, and the arrest of other Americans, but had received no
reply. ‘Ten days before he had sent a despatch, saying that
Charles Scott, an American citizen, had been arrested at Regla,
charges unknown, as usual. Scott had been eleven days in-
communicado, and it was reported to the consul that he had
been several times under severe torture.

It was reported in the newspapers that Lee had made a
demand for warships for a protection, had been refused, and
had sent in his resignation. The feelings of the people were
336 STARTLING TELEGRAMS FROM GEN. LEE

greatly aroused; Congress became more bitter against the ad-

-ministration, and immediately called for the correspondence
and reports of the consul-general at Havana relating to all
American citizens in prison, whose cases had not been before
reported on. It was not submitted till three days before the
Cleveland administration went out of office. From this report
it appears that General Lee sent the following telegram to the
State Department on February 20th:

“Charles Scott, a citizen of the United States, arrested Regla; no
charge given. Been without communication, jail, Havana, two hundred
and sixty-four hours. Cannot stand another Ruiz murder and have de-
manded his release. How many war vessels Key West or within reach
and will they be ordered here at once if necessary to sustain demand ?”

Whatever the reply to this telegram, the State Department
did not submit it to the Senate committee, not being compatible
with public interests. Its nature may be judged from Gen.
Lee’s next despatch to Olney, which appears in the document:

“Havana, February 23, 1897.

“Situation simple; experience at Guanabacoa made it my duty to
demand, before too late, that another American who had been incommu-
nicado two hundred and sixty-four hours, be released from said incommu-
nicado, and did so in courteous terms. If you support it, and Scott is so
released, the trouble will terminate. If you do not, I must depart. All
others arrested with Scott have been put in communication. Why should
only American in lot not be? He had been incommunicado now three
hundred and thirty-eight hours. Ler.”

That day the Spanish authorities complied with Lee’s de-
mand, as is seen from the following dispatch:

“Havana, February 23, 1897.
“Scott released from incommunicado to-day, on demand, after four-
teen days’ solitary confinement in cell five feet by eleven; damp; water
on bottom cell, Not allowed anything to sleep on, or chair; discharges
of the body removed once in five days. Was charged with having Cuban
postage stamps in house. Scott says went always twelve hours without
water, once two days. He is employe American Gas Company.
LrEr.”

Rather graphic, if concise, were these two dispatches of
a single day, but they serve to illustrate the treatment re-
METHODS OF THE INQUISITION REVIVED 337

ceived by Americans in Spanish hands on more than one oc-
casion, indeed, almost continually during the war. In
Santiago those alleging American citizenship were arrested
early in the war, and their fate remained a mystery. There
were known to be at this time about forty Americans in Span-
ish prisons in Cuba, against whom charges had long been pend-
ing and never tried, or against whom no charges whatever had
been preferred.

From the day of the arrest of Dr. Ruiz to the day of his
death the Spanish authorities, though having his papers in their
possession, never took the trouble to inform General Lee that
he had been arrested, and he was only kept informed of the
course of events from unofficial sources. This alone consti-
tuted a grave breach of international law. Yet, the case of
Ruiz was one of daily occurrence in Cuba then, with this dif-
ference that the victim was usually a Cuban. It was the cus-
tom of Spanish officials to torture and, perhaps, murder their
defenseless prisoners in their attempts to wring from them a
desired confession incriminating them, as well as others, in
some imaginary offense.

In investigating the case of Ruiz, Consul-General Lee de-
manded that the body be turned over to him, and that an au-
topsy be performed by two physicians, one an American, to be
designated by himself. The acting Captain-General in Wey-
ler’s absence, Ahumada, saw that Lee was aroused and com-
plied. The consul and physician proceeded to Guanabacoa,
where Fondeviela tried to delay them, but they insisted and
went to the jail to find that the body had been placed in a cart
and was about to be taken away. A little delay would have
prevented an investigation, which showed that Ruiz had met a
horrible death, in a cell which would in a short time have
proved the death of any man; that he had been arrested on a
trumped-up charge, and that he had been kept incommunicado,
like so many others, though, under our treaty with Spain, no
American citizen could be held in close confinement for more
than seventy-two hours.
338 TORLURED FOR HAVING A POSTAGE STAMP

For months General Lee had placed overwhelming proofs
before the State Department that not a single provision of the
treaty rights secured to us by Cushing and Pinckney was being
observed by the Spanish authorities in Cuba, but Lee’s friends
claimed that his representations had not only been kept from
the public, but had drawn no reply from the executive depart-
ment. Lee had submitted in silence to a position so little to
his liking and probably would have done so till the end of the
administration, which was so near, but for the murder of Ruiz,
of whose imprisonment he had notified the State Department
and of whose fate he had warned it. He had taken the same
course in the case of Scott, whose wife went to Lee in tears and
said that he was being tortured, and, she feared, killed, though
arrested only because he had a Cuban stamp in his large stamp
collection.

The threatened resignation of Lee, unless upheld in his ef-
‘forts to protect American citizens, precipitated a dramatic
climax to the administration’s conciliatory Cuban policy, and
stirred Congress, with but a few hours longer to exist, into one
of its most heated debates of Cuban affairs. The circumstances
under which the Cameron resolution for the recognition of
the Cubans was set aside have been already explained, and
everyone had accepted as a fact that the delicate problems in-
volved would be left to the new administration with our
Spanish relations still cordial, when Lee’s practical request for
war ships came like a bombshell in a quiet camp. Secretary
Olney, after the failure of the Spaniards to put into execution
a scheme of autonomy in which the President had put his faith,
had evidently endeavored to ward off an open rupture with
Spain at any cost, while the Spaniards of Cuba, thinking, ap-
parently, that Americans could be attacked with impunity,
began to vent their natural hatred. Congress had nourished
a feeling of contempt for our diplomatic forbearance with
Spain, but, like others, had given up attempts at action. The
conservative element which feared war and the burdens it
might involve even with a power so weak as Spain, had found
 

 

ON THE DECK OF A MODERN WARSHIP.
After-deck of United States Battleship Massachusetts, showing monster 13-inch guns and revolving turret
FORCEFUL WORDS OF JOHN SHERMAN 341

it easy to avoid sympathy for a few American citizens, most of
whom were of Cuban birth, and the conservative press im-
mediately branded any one who demanded that the government
should compel Spain to live up to its treaty obligations as a
a“ jingo.”

But when the Ruiz incident and Lee’s position became
known, strong resolutions for insisting upon the protection of
American citizens were introduced in the Senate and passed
without division, and a resolution demanding the immediate re-
lease of Sanguily was also passed after a strong argument by
Senator Sherman, who, in four days, was to take Olney’s place
at the head of the State department. “TI trust the time will
never come,” he said, “when an American citizen can be
wronged or persecuted by any power, great or small. That is
the way I feel now. Jam in favor of protecting this American
citizen, though he is a naturalized citizen. JI am opposed to
wrong and tyranny and violence wherever it is exercised, and
when it is exercised against an American I will stand up for
him even if I am alone.” Conservative senators endeavored
to check the course of debate by stating that Spain was simply
waiting for Sanguily’s counsel to withdraw his appeal so as to
pardon him. But it was held on the other side that Spanish
history gave no assurance that such a promise would be ful-
filled, if Sanguily forfeited his legal rights by such a with-
drawal. “If I had my way,” exclaimed Senator Frye of
Maine, “a ship of war would start forthwith for Havana.”

Spain was alarmed. At noon the next day a telegram
reached Havana from Madrid for the immediate release of
Sanguily. In two hours he walked feebly out of a prison
where he had been kept,. without a shadow of evidence to
justify it, for over two years. Spain saw that it was no time to
“fool ” with the United States. If she had not acted speedily
the MeKinley administration would have begun with a war.
It is probably also true that had not the strained relations be-
tween Lee and the State Department leaked out through
Havana, Sanguily would have remained in jail. Secretary
342 WEYLER’S CAMPAIGN A FAILURE

Olney had made public nothing concerning the condition of
affairs, and the attention of Congress would not then have been
called to them but for the newspaper reports. By Sanguily’s
release the tension at Washington relaxed, and the public mind
was absorbed by the inauguration of a new administration.

The Captain-General was still at Santa Clara province en-
deavoring to entrap Gomez, and it was reported that he was
highly indignant at the release of Sanguily, holding that treaty
rights ceased when martial law was proclaimed. On March
4th he was back again at Havana, and it was generally under-
stood that his campaign had been a complete failure. He had
led a vast army into Santa Clara, burning the cane fields on the
way, and Gomez had sent his forces around him to unite with
the insurgents in his rear. In this situation, Weyler returned
to Havana by boat from Caibarien. Spain, however, main-
tained her conciliatory policy, releasing in a few days a few
more prisoners, one of them a war correspondent for a New
York paper who had been held for several weeks. The crisis
seemed to be over, and the new administration was largely oc-
cupied with domestic affairs, having given to General Lee the
assurance that his efforts to protect the rights of American
citizens would be thoroughly supported. Spain even went so
far as to remove Fondeviela from command at Guanabacoa.
His record for cruelty was worse than that of any Spanish
officer in Cuba, but he was quickly made chief of police in
Havana. In the latter part of March Weyler again went to
the front in Santa Clara, and it was evident that he must stand
or fall upon his accomplishments there, for the rainy season
was approaching, when the pacification of the island would be
impossible.

But, meanwhile, there was renewed activity all over the
island among the insurgents. Their lack of arms and ammuni-
tion was partly supplied by several new expeditions which
escaped the authorities, and General Weyler’s campaign in the
east again proved a complete failure from a military point of
view. Asamatter of fact, he did not at any time go anywhere
FIGHTING ALL ALONG THE LINE 343

near Gomez or Garcia, but skirted along the coast in a small
steamer, touching at various fortified towns, making some
changes in the civil administration. Not, the slightest ground
existed for the persistent reports that the Cubans were ready to
negotiate; there was not a single day upon which fights were
not taking place in all of the six provinces. Correspondents
of the London papers who visited Gomez’s camp said that
the insurgents were never in better shape to fight than at this
time.
CHAPTER XXIV

THE CONDITION OF CUBA IN 1897— HELPLESS WOMEN AND
CHILDREN— AWFUL SCENES OF SUFFERING AND WOE—
MISERY OF THE RECONCENTRADOS—FACING STARVA-
TION AND DEATH.

Attitude of the McKinley Administration — Another Decree of Autonomy
—On the Verge of Starvation — Unparalleled Scenes of Suffering —
Weyler’s Reasons for Concentrating —A Death Warrant to Thou-
sands of the Innocent and Helpless— Driven from Burning Homes
— Huddled in Swamps—A Plague Spot on Earth— A Spanish Ac-
count of Misery — Horrors at Giiines— Coffins Used Again and Again
— Testimony of a Catholic Mother Superior—The Living and the
Dead Together — Dying Little Orphans—Scenes at the Very Gates
of Havana — Heaped Pell-mell Like Animals — The Dead in the
Embrace of the Dying —Terrible Conditions in Pinar Del Rio —
15,000 Dying Children — Extermination the Real Object —The Massa-
cres of Pacificos— The Dead Carts on Their Rounds — Shoveling the
Victims into the Sand—A Guerrilla Triumph—A Mangled body
Strapped to a Mule —Incredulity in the United States.

and diplomatic language gave Spain to understand that

neither the people nor the government of the United
States could regard with complacency an indefinite continua-
tion of the existing condition of things in Cuba, and, as before,
the friendly services of the United States were placed at the
disposal of Spain in any way that might conduce to peace in
the island and the institution of genuine reforms. But the
two nations regarded Cuba from utterly irreconcilable stand-
points. To Spain the only imaginable condition conducive to
peace was a continuation of Spanish sovereignty, which, how-
ever much veneered with reforms, would nevertheless in
reality be a sufficient sovereignty to permit the continued ex-
ploitation of the island. To the United States there appeared
no possible condition conducive to peace but a grant of the
broadest type of home rule or complete independence to the
Cubans. From the Cuban standpoint, absolute independence

(344)

F ROM the first, the McKinley administration in courteous
TRYING TO HOODWINK THE UNITED STATES 345

was the only solution, but there was a lingering belief in our
government that if a genuine autonomy were granted the
Cubans would feel it to their advantage to drop their arms.

Spain’s ministry recognized in the attitude of the new ad-
ministration a determination not to be so easily trifled with as
before, and it therefore proceeded to release more American
prisoners, and to make in its diplomacy as well as in the public
prints great pretentions concerning a new scheme of autonomy
which it was proposed to introduce, but in which lurked the in-
sincerity characterizing all the plans of reform which Spain
had from time to time been “meditating” for forty years.
The Queen Regent signed the decree for these reforms on
April 29th, and one of the humors of the act was that it was
done upon the assurance of (reneral Weyler that the four
western provinces were at last completely pacified. That the
reforms were intended to hoodwink the United States was
evident from many circumstances, and the Havana papers
quietly smiled at the cry of “ Weyler and Reform.”

The adininistration was not deceived by Weyler’s assur-
ances, and while hoping for the best from the alleged reforms,
it proposed to examine into Cuba itself. President McKinley
had at first intended to send Judge Day of Canton, Ohio, a
man with whom he was thoroughly acquainted and in whose
ability and integrity he had complete confidence, as a special
commissioner, but he was made assistant Secretary of State,
and William J. Calhoun of Illinois was appointed instead.
Spain manifested some dislike to such a step on the ground
that it appeared to be an interference with Cuban affairs which
was not warranted, but the mission was consented to on the
diplomatic understanding that Mr. Calhoun was to go for the
purpose of acting with General Lee in an investigation of the
Ruiz case.

Meanwhile, the enormous expenses of Weyler’s manage-
ment of affairs had produced something like a financial crisis
at Havana. The debt had risen to $425,000,000, and the rev-
enue the Spanish could collect in the first two years of the war
346 AMERICAN CITIZENS STARVING IN CUBA

amounted to only $25,000,000. In the fall of 1896 Weyler
had caused to be issued notes payable at the face value in silver
to the extent of $24,000,000, replacing the gold notes which
had to be withdrawn because they would not circulate. These
silver notes steadily depreciated. Weyler decreed that they
were legal tender at their face value in all transactions, but
the government which paid all its obligations in them seemed
unwilling to itself accept them in payment. In May a crisis
was reached; a run on the bank occurred and Weyler, who had
gone to Santa Clara for a third. time, was hastily summoned to
Havana. A Spanish five-dollar gold piece was worth $11.70
in the paper currency, and not only the business interests but
the people were becoming restless. Famine was. rapidly
spreading in the capital itself. The Spanish officials, who
were the only gainers under this regime, industriously circu-
lated among the masses of the people a report that the United
States were responsible for the situation by allowing arms and
ammunition to be sent to the insurgents, and the condition of
the finances caused a new class in the United States to beg Con-
gress to intervene; over 700 of the bankers and merchants
of New York and other commercial centers, whose trade was
severely affected, representing, as their petition said, over
$100,000,000 worth of capital invested in the island, urged
that Congress should take steps at once, outside of senti-
mental grounds, to make this investment safe. But the ad-
ministration wisely showed its immediate concern over help-
less Americans in Cuba who were on the verge of starvation.

It will now be necessary to examine briefly a feature of
General Weyler’s methods in Cuba to which full justice could
hardly be done in a whole volume — his war on the pacificos.
There is no parallel for it in history. Ifa true and adequate
history of it is ever written, it will be the largest and darkest
picture of man’s inhumanity ever drawn. Nothing in real
life has quite so closely approached the tortures of the damned
in the poetic dreams of Dante as the punishment deliberately
imposed upon the innocent and the helpless, old men and old
THE FIENDISH PLAN OF CONCENTRATION 347

women, mothers with babes in their arms, Cuban maidens and
Cuban boys. And the remarkable thing about it is that it
was taking place at the end of the nineteenth century within a
hundred miles of the shores of the United States while many
of its citizens were crying “Peace!” “Be still!” “It is
none of our business!” “ Do not interfere!” “That would
lead to war and it would cost lots of money! ”

In October, 1896, while Weyler, who had shown no mili-
tary talents in the field, was vainly throwing his forces into
Pinar del Rio, he conceived the idea that the quickest way to
pacify the insurgents was to make war against the peaceful
Cubans. Seeing that the movements of his columns were al-
ways made known to the Cuban leaders, thus giving them
the opportunity of making ambushes, disastrous to Spanish
columns, he thought that if the pacificos were driven from
the country to the fortified towns, their houses and crops
destroyed and their property confiscated, they could no longer
aid the insurgents with information, shelter, or food. Hay-
ing obtained permission from Madrid, therefore, he issued
a decree on October 21st that all the inhabitants of the coun-
try districts or those who resided outside the lines of fortifica-
tions of the towns should within eight days enter the towns,
and any individual found outside the lines in the country
at the expiration of that period should be considered a
rebel and should be “ dealt with as such ” — which in guer-
rilla Spanish meant that they should be shot or hacked to
death with machetes. The decree further stated that the
transport of food from one place to another without the per-
mission of the military authorities at the place of departure
was absolutely forbidden. “Those who infringe upon this
order will be tried and punished as aiders and abettors of the
rebellion,” that is, shot. The owners of cattle were ordered
to drive their herds to the towns. The last section of the de-
eree related to those combatants who should surrender them-
selves, and was of little importance because none surrendered.

Most of these men and women were of the guajiro class,
348 DRIVING IN THE PACIFICOS

respectable, hard-working farmers on a small scale. On three
or four acres of land they raised all the necessities of their
simple lives, and even the luxuries, including coffee and to-
bacco. But they were naturally improvident in a land which
was ever productive, and thus they had few resources to fall
back upon in such unfortunate circumstances as Weyler’s order
suddenly forced upon them.

This death warrant of hundreds of thousands of innocent
people, particularly women and children, was sent to the gov-
crnors of the western provinces — it could not, of course, be
carried out in the two eastern provinces which the Cubans con-
trolled — and the governors made it known to the leaders of
the Spanish guerrillas, who were intrusted with the task of in-
forming the country people that they must leave their home-
steads and belongings and remove to the appointed places of
concentration. As these guerrillas, composed exclusively of
Spanish jail-birds, were notorious for their inhumanity and
outrages upon defenseless Cubans, brutality being a part of
their trade, it may be imagined how the order was carried out.
The people were not allowed to take away with them any prop-
erty but what they could carry on their backs, and, as they
filed away to the stations where they were destined to die of
starvation and epidemic diseases, they saw their homes go up
in smoke, their crops burned down, and their cattle and oxen
confiscated to feed the hated Spanish troops who could not con-
quer Cuba. Wherever the peasants resisted they were driven
in at the point of guns and often shot down to avoid further
trouble.

This order showed the absolute incompetency of Weyler
as a general as well as his inhumanity, for the able-bodied men
of each family who had remained neutral, if not loyal, so long
as they were permitted to live on their few acres, at once joined
the insurgent ranks when ordered to concentrate, and thus it
was almost entirely the old, the infirm, the women and the
children who were driven into the towns. The order failed
also to embarrass the insurgents by the destruction of the
A PLAGUE-SPOT ON THE EARTH 349

plantations, for they were accustomed to finding their living
in the woods, and they always regarded such destruction as an
injury mainly to the Spanish. As a war measure, therefore,
it was successful only as a boomerang.

The helpless people were allotted ground near the towns,
almost invariably in low-lying, swampy, and malarious places.
The Spanish residents would not be burdened with them and
generally cared not how soon they died. They were concen-
trated in greatest numbers where the accommodations were
least adequate, as if extermination were the main object.
There was nothing for them to do and there was less and less
for them to eat, and finally they stretched out upon the damp
ground, gazing vacantly before them as the weary days
dragged by. Mothers lay listless with dead babes in their
arms. The quick and the dead lay side by side till the latter
were taken and thrown into the dead carts, and carried off
into the country where lay the half-buried bodies of hun-
dreds of victims of this system of warfare. The huts of
these people were jammed together in rows with but a few
inches of space between, and the ground was covered with
filth. Diseases of malignant types claimed their victims every-
where and every day. There was no medical attendance; it
was fortunate if there were half rations. In the different
stations of concentration there were estimated to be over
400,000 of these helpless people, and by the summer of 1897
the death rate had become terrible. The beautiful island was
a plague spot upon earth.

By the first of May, or when the rainy season was nearly
due, the full horrors of this policy began to manifest them-
selves. The Spaniards themselves no longer overlooked the
fact, and even the censor allowed statements as to the con-
dition of things to appear in some of the Havana papers. It
may be taken for granted that the following from the La
Lucha of Havana is considerably underdrawn:

“At a meeting held by the Health Junta in Giiines, April 3d, it was
decided to appoint a special committee to investigate the real sanitary con-
22
350 RELIABLE TESTIMONY

ditions of the population in that town. The report made by that commit-
tee shows conditions which are simply’awful. The first house they en-
tered in Luisa Delca street, they found twelve persons ill with small-pox,
lacking not only medical assistance, but also food. There were a father
and his two sons who were actually starving. They were three living
skeletons.

‘* Almost everywhere else they went they met with similar sights.
At the reservoir for the water supply, they were shocked to see it full of
filth more than a foot deep. From the reservoir they went to the hos-
pital, where there were only forty-three beds and forty-eight patients.
There were two in each of three beds, and three in another bed. One of
them in this bed had been dead for four and a half hours and was lying
with the other two who were still living. There was only a single man in
charge of all the sick, and one woman to do the washing. When they in-
quired about the kitchen, they were surprised to find that there was none.

“At the Plaza de la Villa, where there are two hundred huts of reton-
centrados, in every hut there was one, two, or even five or six persons ill
with small-pox, and all of them in the most wretched condition. LEvery-
where hunger, starvation, and illness reigned. In one house there was a
coffin against the wall, and the woman of the house said that she had
already used it to bury three members of her family, victims of small-pox.
She had brought the coffin back home to use for the next one, and just
then there was on the bare floor another man who had died of small-pox,
awaiting his turn. She bought the coffin for fifty cents, knowing that it
had been used several times before.”

While it is doubtful if any of the stories of suffering sent
to this country were exaggerations, we will give place in these
pages to such accounts only as have an assured basis of re-
hability, and generally such as were transmitted to the
State Department by our authorized consuls and which were
not published in the newspapers of the day. These reports
covered only certain points and so can give but a partial idea
of the situation — they are but types of the whole.

From the abundance of such testimony the following ex-
tract from a letter from the Mother Superior of the Convent
of the Sacred Heart in Havana to an old pupil in this country
may be selected:

“The war is continuing its work of destruction. Captain-General
Weyler’s plan was to starve as many as he could and thus do away en-
tirely with the Cuban race. He has succeeded in killing thus hundreds

of thousands, without exaggeration, by the compulsory law of concen-
tration.
A TERRIBLE PICTURE 351

“Lately, some of our older pupils discovered a place called ‘Los
Fosos,’ which means ‘the ditches,’ because it isa low and marshy place.
There over a thousand women, and children of both sexes, are living aban-
doned, unknown, and starving. Many are perfectly naked; all are heaped
up pell mell! They have been there nearly two months. Of their num.
ber, fifteen to twenty or thirty die daily.

“At night there is no light, and in the morning the corpses and living
are found together.

‘Our children of Mary are perfect heroines, but only the older ones
can enter into this den where the Government has concentrated the coun-
try people for the purpose of making them die from inanition. Their in-
iquitous plan is a great success. After having passed weeks without food,
they are brought salt codfish or rice, and, in eating ravenously, they die.

‘Now, we could fill books with the horrors of this place. Its history
will yet be written. Our children of Mary, their husbands and friends,
and our good bishop with many of the clergy are hard at work trying to
alleviate this unheard-of misery. But it is almost impossible to aid so
many. The Cubans are very charitable and generous, notwithstanding
the poverty of every one. They are wonderful. They have stripped
themselves of everything to cover the naked, for naked they are, and liv-
ing together packed as are the animals in transportation cars, Just so!
Just so! Do you understand ? Can you imagine worse? And the filth!
It cannot be told!

“There are in this place over one hundred little children without
fathers or mothers. Nobody takes care of them, and some die daily. A
woman who had eleven children has lost seven of them in three months,
and she is now dying of inanition.”

These reconcentrados, it should be understood, were at the
very gates of the city of Havana. As General Lee said in
one of his communications, there were fewer here than in most
other places, and in general their condition was better than
elsewhere. Yet their condition could hardly be exaggerated
by the use of any words which the English language can com-
mand. Ina report which was submitted to General Lee by
one who visited these reconcentrados, and whom Lee vouches
for as “a man of integrity and character,” one of the sights was
“460 women and children thrown on the ground, heaped pell-
mell as animals, some in a dying condition, others sick and
others dead, without the slightest cleanliness, nor the least help,
not even to give water to the thirsty, with neither religious or
social help, dying wherever chance laid them, and for this
limited number of reconcentrados the deaths averaged be-
352 INIQUITIOUS CRUELTY — INDESCRIBABLE SUFFERING

tween forty and fifty daily, giving relatively ten days of life
for each person. Among the deaths we witnessed there was
one impossible to forget,’ continued Lee’s informant. “We
found a young girl of eighteen seemingly lifeless on the
ground; on her right side was the body of a young mother,
cold and rigid, but with her young child still alive clinging to
her dead breast; on her left hand side was also the corpse of a
dead woman holding her son in a dead embrace; a little farther
on a poor dying woman having in her arms a daughter of four-
teen, crazy with pain, who after five or six days also died in
spite of the care she received. In one corner a poor woman
was dying, surrounded by her children, who contemplated her
in silence, without a lament or shedding a tear, they themselves
being real specters of hunger, emaciated in a horrible manner.”
As the dead were taken away new victims were driven in, and,
says this informant for whom Lee vouches: “If any young
girl came in any way nice looking, she was infallibly con-
demned to the most abominable of traffics.” In time some-
thing was done through the energy of private persons for the
help of these people, but it was estimated that the usual death
rate among them was about 77 per cent.

Writing late in the year of 1897 to the State Department,
the vice-consul at Sagua la Grande said: “It is difficult, it
may be said almost impossible, to be able to describe the ex-
tension and intensity of such suffering, of such iniquitous, un-
just, and sinful imposition, to annihilate thousands of women
and children. If this Godless combination should be ac-
curately represented it would seem an exaggeration induced
by stirred fellow feeling. No history in the world, ancient or
modern, can be compared an instant to this frightful, dreadful
suffering. Perhaps civilization has not seen the like of it.”

Shocked by the desperate distress he saw about him, the
consul offered to contribute through the mayor 3,000 loaves
of bread to feed the hungry, but the offer was refused, though
the mavor had said in public that a thousand persons were
dying of hunger in the city. The refusal, it was said, was due
SUCCESS OF WEYLER’S MERCILESS METHODS 353

to a fear to recognize officially a state of affairs which would
cause criticisms of Weyler’s style of warfare.

Nowhere was the condition more terrible than in Pinar del
Rio province, but that section was visited so little by anyone
except the Spanish that few adequate reports of the real state
exist. The Spanish papers were always inclined to minimize
the suffering, sometimes to avoid the subject altogether. But
La Lucha declared that there were 40,000 reconcentrados in
the province, absolutely destitute, and “15,000 of them were
children, mostly orphans.” It would seem as if extermina-
tion were the real purpose, for at the capital of the province
where support might have been most easily obtained there were
comparatively few reconcentrados, while huddled about the
little places were as many as 4,000 destitute women and chil-
dren. The taxpayers of these little centers having been ruined
by the war, the authorities could incur no expense, so tle Span-
ish papers said, for help. General Lee estimated that during
the year 200,000 of the rural population in the four western
provinces died from starvation and resultant causes, “and the
deaths of whole families almost simultaneously or within a few
days of each other, and of mothers praying for their children
to be relieved of their horrible sufferings by death, are not the
least of the many pitiable scenes which were ever present. In
the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba, where
the order of concentration could not be enforced, the great
mass of the people are self-sustaining.”

Reports of the massacre of pacificos were of daily oceur-
rence and many of them were shown to be authentic. ‘Late
in July, one was reported from Santi Spiritus peculiarly ap-
palling in its details. The pacificos, who had been starving for
several days, crowded around the forts and asked in vain of
the commander to be allowed to seek food. .A woman whose
four children were dying of hunger resolved to brave the anger
of the soldiers to gave her boys from misery. In the night she
slipped unnoticed between two sentinels and reached the
woods. On returning in the morning with vegetables, she was
3854 ONE OF THE BUTCHER'S ‘“‘ VICTORIES”

caught and recognized. At once the rumor was spread among
the soldiers that the pacificos had an understanding with the
insurgents and that the woman had gone out to inform them
of the Spanish defenses. With a shout of “treason” the
troops began the slaughter, the helpless pacificos were mowed
down like sheep, and the commander reported the occurrence
to General Weyler as a victory of his troops over the insur-
gents, who had many killed. Such news was, of course, re-
ceived at Madrid with demonstrations of delight.

The morning light broke with little good cheer to any one
in western Cuba, unless to the Spanish guerrillas and butchers.
The first rays of the sun fell upon a land, once glowing in all
the emerald brightness of exuberant tropical vegetation, now
resembling nothing so much as a great ash heap. Where
once stood the humble dwellings of the pacificos, surrounded
by their rich garden patches and waving fields, were now heaps
of ruins, the marks of fire, of death, and of desolation, and
hovering always in the sultry air were the greedy vultures.
Here and there were half-made graves from which protruded
the festering flesh, sometimes the ghastly countenances of the
victims of Spanish “ military regulations.”

Each town awoke each morning to face a fresh installment
of the dead. Out to the esplanada, in full sight of the town,
filed the usual morning procession, the band, playing a jaunty
air, the priests, the soldiers and their officers, and there were
shot in the back young boys who had been captured in various
ways and charged with the stereotyped crime of rebellion, and
found guilty after a court-martial in which the victims had
nothing to say. Asa matter of fact, very few of these victims
were ever in the insurgent ranks; the great majority were sim-
ply peasants who had not heeded the proclamation of recon-
centration, or who, starving, had attempted to eseape through
the Spanish lines to find a few roots, but had fallen in with the
Spanish bushwhackers lying in wait day and night about the
roads and hyways leading from the town to the country dis-
tricts. Asa rule, those who were caught were shot down in
GATHERING IN THE HARVEST OF MARTYRS 355

cold blood in their tracks, and, possibly, covered with a sprink-
ling of earth, while the case was reported as another Spanish
victory in a skirmish. Some, however, were brought to town
when captured and fiendishly tortured for a time in the hope
of securing from them useful information; then in the gray
dawn they were led out and shot.

As the sun rose higher over the desolate and bloody scene,
it shone upon the dead carts filing away. In the camp of the
starving pacificos the dead had been assorted from the living,
the harvest of another night, while those in whom the breath
of life feebly lingered lay listless, speechless, dazed by the very
enormity of their own suffering and of the suffering about
them.

From morning to night these dead carts were busy, jolting
out to the trenches and back. “ The dead cart,” says a reliable
correspondent who witnessed these scenes about Matanzas, “ is
a great box on wheels, inside of which is another rough box
which slides in and out like a coffin from a hearse. And in-
deed it is a coffin —the communal coffin, as it were — in
which those who are shot down in San Severino as well as those
who die of smallpox in the pacifico settlements, in which those
who die of yellow fever in the hospitals as well as those who
are found starved to death in the streets, are all laid and jostled
during the mad gallop to the cemetery, or rather to the trenches
adjoining the cemetery, where the dead are shoveled away out
of sight under a few inches of sand. The great communal
coffin holds four corpses ‘ comfortably,’ as the driver told me;
but very often he has to pack five or six bodies into it — the
bodies of blacks and whites, children and men and women, all
together. When the trench is reached they are pulled out by
the legs and thrown without a coffin, and often without clothes,
into the trenches. From morning to night this cart is always
on its rounds and with two or three changes of horses; from
morning to night you can see it, always moving swiftly through
the streets of Matanzas, and always going in one direction;
from morning to night, through the cracks in the rough-hewn
356 A GHASTLY TROPHY

boards, there drips to the ground the blood of the martyrs who
were murdered in the morning on the yellow sand of the
esplanade by the blue waters of the bay. . . . The dead cart
is next driven up Cascoro Hill, and from here it never returns
empty, but always filled. On this hill there are living, or
rather dying, about 3,000 people. The number of corpses
carried away is about twenty-five or thirty daily. The
guajiros hate to give up their dead, although the deaths occur
principally from smallpox, and many are buried secretly at
night outside the cabin doors. And so the dead cart goes upon
its rounds where I have no longer the heart to follow. On
my way back to the hotel I fell in with the local guerrillas
marching in triumph through the principal streets of the city.
There were about eighty men, with brutal jail-bird coun-
tenances, and indeed they were, as I afterwards learned, lib-
erated convicts to a man. In the midst of them and the oc-
casion of their triumphal bearing I saw the naked body of a
white man tied on the back of a mule, with stomach slit open
and nose cut off, and horribly mangled in the face and in other
unspeakable ways. As they lounged through the streets they
shouted to their friends that they had just had a sharp engage-
ment with Betancourt’s partida, which they say numbered
about 500 men, and that they had killed a score or more whom
the insurgents had carried off to rob them of their triumph, all
but this one. They marched on with their reeking trophy to
the headquarters of the civil guard. Here they untied the
body and threw it on the ground. Hundreds of soldiers and
Spanish civilians, too, now filed past, gloating over the sicken-
ing spectacle, turning over with their feet the dead body and
closely scrutinizing it, as perhaps one might do on seeing a
great tarpon or a moose. The cabo, or corporal, of the guer-
rillag held forth the while in a loud voice how the battle had
been fought and what a charge he had made al machete, and
how he had brought down two more men with his revolver.
One of the civil guards came out of the building while the tall
talk was going on, and, after examining the body, said: ‘ Hola,
A STORY THAT COULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED 357

amigo, I imagine this sin verguenza (shameless fellow) must
have died of hunger before you cut him up with the cold steel.
Just look at him a moment, will you?’ And with this the
guard lifted up the corpse and disclosed the emaciated condi-
tion of what was really nothing but a skeleton, and none of the
Spanish soldiers there doubted but that the occasion of this
triumph was simply some poor fellow, crazed by the pangs of
hunger, who had attempted to slip out of the town during the
night, had been shot down, and then carved up with the
machete so as to make as gory an exhibit as possible.”

These are but glimpses of the panorama of death which
it is distressing and revolting to follow. Of such was the
whole. It has never been exaggerated; it never will be.
Here fiction fell before reality. It was one of the unfortunate
facts of the situation that the people of the United States did
not really believe the stories of misery, of suffering, of outrage
upon the island, partly doubtless because it seemed too ter-
rible for the nineteenth century, and on American shores, and
partly because of the poor character for truth which had been
given some stories of military operations there. These stories
of the reconcentrados were considered by many as examples
of rather graphic writing by newspaper men, whereas these
plucky and gifted writers had actually encountered a subject
for which their capacity for exaggeration proved entirely in-
adequate to the demands of reality. Many of us were more
ready to believe every harrowing tale of the slaughter of
people in far off Armenia by the murderous Turks. But
gradually the truth was brought home to those who would
listen by the reports of Americans of unquestioned veracity
who had gone to Cuba to satisfy themselves as to the real con-
ditions. What they saw is graphically told by Senators Proc-
tor and Thurston in the introductory pages of this book, and
we may leave the picture with the little glimpse of it we have
given. The details of cold-blooded murder and enforced
starvation, executed as a part of the governmental business,
by a professed Christian people, are not pleasant.
CHAPTER XXV

RELIEF OF STARVING AMERICAN CITIZENS IN CUBA—FAIL-
URE OF WEYLER’S CAMPAIGN—INCREASING MISERY ON
THE ISLAND— THE ASSASSINATION OF CANOVAS.

Suffering among American Residents in Cuba—The President Asks for
_ $50, 000 for Their Relief —Spain Watches Us Anxiously —The Mor-
* gan Resolution —Exciting Debate in the Senate —Its Effect in Spain
—Sagasta Rebels — Canovas Resigns — Given a New Lease of Life —
Reasons for His Continuance and for Weyler’s Longer Stay in Cuba
— Political Conditions —Don Carlos—Canovas between Two Fires
— Madrid Opinion —Weyler’s Trip to Santiago — Gomez’s New West-
ward Movement — Insurgent Successes— Weyler Meets Gomez for
the First Time in Battle—Weyler’s Defeat — Superior Tactics of
Gomez — Return of Commissioner Calhoun — Gen. Stewart L. Wood-
ford Appointed Minister to Madrid — His Instructions — Nothing to
Humiliate Spain — A Season of Waiting — Death of Canovas — Party
Quarrels Cease — Weyler Driven into Havana.

lished the fact in the spring of 1897 that a large

number of American citizens in Cuba were in a state
of destitution, suffering for want of food and medicine as a re-
sult of Weyler’s order for concentrating the country people in
the towns. Early in May, Consul-General Lee reported that
from six to eight hundred Americans were without means of
support. The local authorities, even if kindly disposed, were
unable to relieve the needs of their own people. President
McKinley assured General Lee that provision would be made
to relieve the American citizens, and to that end on the 17th of
May he sent a message to Congress recommending an appro-
priation of $50,000 to be immediately available for use under
the direction of the Secretary of State; and it was desirable
that a part of the sum might be left for providing transporta-
tion for such American citizens as desired to return to the
United States but had no means to do so.

(wees information from our consuls in Cuba estab-

(358 )
 

 

DIVINE SERVICE ON THE BATTLESHIP “TEXAS” WHILE IN PORT.
DEBATE UPON THE MORGAN RESOLUTION 361

Public opinion in the United States was again strongly
aroused. Ata large mass meeting held at Washington, pre-
sided over by Senator Gallinger, strong pleas for intervention
and sharp criticisms of the mild policy of the previous admin-
istration were made.

Spain watched these developments in the United States
very anxiously, and the conservative Spanish journals advised
the government to make no more concessions, and especially
to forbid us to interfere in Cuban affairs. But the govern-
ment was aware that such a policy would at once strengthen
the warlike feeling in this country, and so it was officially an-
cording belligerent rights to the Cubans, which passed by a
doned on the King’s birthday and that Spain would place no
obstacle in the way of relieving the American reconcentrados.

The message was followed by three days of long and ex-
citing debate in the Senate over the Morgan resolution for ac-
cording belligerent rights to the Cubans, which passed hy a
vote of 41 to 14, most of the latter being Republicans who did
not wish to interfere with the policy of the administration,
which at that time was summed up in the words, “a peaceful
intervention to secure the independence of Cuba.” This was
substantially the demand in the platform on which the Presi-
dent had been elected, but he evidently did not propose to be
swerved from a judicious course, though he recognized that
the people were becoming impatient. Independence through
purchase was regarded as one of the possibilities, but in any
event it was seen that it must be independence. Spanish rule
over the island was recognized as no longer possible or desir-
able. It was not unreasonable to suppose that some of the
support of the belligerency resolution had come from political
enemies who wished to force the administration into precipi-
tate action, and the President did not propose to be forced.
In his position he was upheld by the House.

The effect of this new excitement in the United States
upon the Spanish government was pronounced. Sagasta, the
Liberal leader, had allowed Canovas to pursue his policy for a
362 SPAIN’S GLOOMY OUTLOOK

long time without criticism, though believing that the attempt
to uphold the Weyler regime was driving the United States
into warlike expressions. When the action of the United
States Senate became known, Sagasta announced that the
truce whereby he had supported Canovas in his Cuban policy
was at an end. In a debate in the Cortes he said: “We
have 200,000 troops in Cuba, but we are not masters of the
territory trodden by our soldiers. Carlism is organizing itself
in the peninsula and menaces us with a new war, thanks to the
immunity it enjoys. The picture could not be gloomier. We
have a war in Cuba and a war in the Philippines. We wish to
know what has become of the sixteen millions of the former
loan, as eight millions are still due the army. In Cuba no im-
portant problem has been solved, and there has only been an
exaggeration of long-existing evils.”

The feeling between the Liberals and Conservatives be-
came very bitter. In a dispute in the lobby of the Cortes over
the Morgan resolution between Comas, a Liberal senator,
professor in the Madrid University, and the Duke of Tetuan,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the latter boxed the senator’s
ears, and the excitement became so great that the sitting was
suspended. The Duke resigned his office, but the bitter feel-
ing continued, though a duel was averted. The Liberals
declared their intention of absenting themselves from the
Cortes till reparation was made. Canovas appealed to the
absentees, saying that love of country in the presence of
grave international troubles should lead them to resume their
duties, but they obstinately remained absent, and on the 2d
of June Canovas tendered his resignation to the Queen. She
summoned General Campos to Madrid, and after a consulta-
tion with the party leaders the Canovas ministry was given a
new lease of life. Faith still lingered in the reports of Weyler
as to the speedy pacification of Cuba; in fact he had held and
continued to hold this position of the greatest pecuniary profit
to himself largely by continually repeating what was not true
as to the condition of the island. But there were other reasons
DISTRUST AND DISSENSION 863

of state more weighty. If the recall of Weyler had had no
other danger than the fall of the Canovas ministry the injury
might have been repaired, though Canovas was a strong man
— perhaps the only man in Spain in whom the throne had com-
plete confidence. But such a crisis might also have entailed an
admission of the condition of the finances and of the hopeless-
ness of the war in Cuba, and the serious men in both parties
feared that with a popular knowledge of so many accumu-
lated troubles the monarchy would disappear and the country
be devastated by another civil war. For this reason Canovas
was given another lease of life, and Weyler remained to run
his bloody career a little longer.

An understanding of the political condition of Spain re-
quires a study of Don Carlos. His shadow darkened the path
of the infant King. His sympathizers were continually de-
nouncing the ministry for its Cuban policy and for its meek-
ness towards the United States, and they were taking advan-
tage of every fresh trouble to breed discord among the people.
Canovas was, therefore, between two fires. He feared to pro-
voke the intervention of the United States lest it lead to a war
which would complete the ruin of Spanish resources and over-
throw the monarchy; on the other hand, he feared that the re-
call of Weyler and a mild policy towards the United States
would bring about a revolution at home and a general ruin
through which Don Carlos would rise the master of the people.
Much as the Liberals hated Canovas and his ministry, they
saw that his fall might lead to their own destruction.

The Republican party in the kingdom was also active, if
not altogether united. Early in 1897 the organ of the Prog-
ressist Republican party, Zl Pais, said of Cuba: “ Do these
people revolt without a cause and sacrifice everything for the
mere sake of fighting? What have we done in favor of Cuba?
How have we governed the Philippine Islands? Let us con-
fess it frankly. There is a feeling of protest at the bottom of
the terrible tragedy which now covers with blood the soil of
our colonies. There is also in it a great responsibility for the
364 WAR AND BANKRUPTCY THREATEN SPAIN

men who have ruled Spain these twenty years and for the
monarchy which has not known how to promote the happiness
of the people. There is no longer any monarchical party fit
for governing. . . . Deprived of resources and weakened,
Spain cannot sustain a second Ten-Years War in Cuba.
Bankruptcy must soon come.”

It was to reach this end that the Cuban revolutionary party
was campaigning. This was the purpose in the beginning,
to weaken Spain, to wear her out so that in despair and to save
herself she would drop Cuba and leave it to the Cubans. And
when Spain was really brought to the point of seeing that
Cuba could be of no further use to her, her pride and domestic
politics left her no other course but war with the United States.
“War,” said the same journal, “is the only solution that will
prolong the days of the doomed monarchy. Woe to the
throne if it avert it. To fall in Cuba is to fall with all the
ignominy of Sedan; to fall in the United States is to fall with
all the glory of Waterloo.”

At this juncture General Weyler made an ostentatious trip
to Santiago by water and there spoke grandiloquently, assuring
the Spaniards that he had come to finish the pacification of
the island. Moving the Spanish troops out of the city a short
distance, he captured a few Cubans, not insurgents, indeed, too
young to fight; sailed around to Manzanillo and then departed
for Havana, saying that the rainy season would prevent his
carrying the campaign further then. He had done nothing,
and tried to do nothing except to create the impression at
Madrid that he was covering the whole island with his pacifica-
tion process. At the very time he was making this trip the in-
surgent forces were camping within sight of Havana, and
Gomez was issuing orders for another westward movement.
The rumor of this step was offset at Havana by suspiciously
circumstantial stories to the effect that Weyler had at last
hemmed Gomez in, that he must either fight or surrender, and
that Gomez had been severely wounded. Within twenty-four
hours the people of Havana were astounded to hear that a
MORE BRAGGADOCIO FROM WEYLER 365

force of over 5,000 insurgents, having worked their way from
the Jucaro trocha, was invading Matanzas. Weyler tele-
graphed orders to hurry into Matanzas troops from Pinar del
Rio and Havana, thus leaving the former province, so recently
reported as pacified, at the mercy of the insurgents. It was
for this very purpose that Gomez made the movement. While
. Havana was waiting to hear of the capture of Gomez, Weyler
suddenly reappeared, having captured nothing, and with con-
siderable flourish informed Spain that he was about to take
the field in person. The Spanish forces were concentrated on
the borders of Havana province and assumed an entirely de-
fensive attitude. As usual, the invading force of the insur-
gents was divided. To the north was Colonel Rojas with 800
men; to the south Colonel Edward Garcia with 680; in the cen-
tral division were 1,700 men divided into bands of about 200
.each. Further to the east Colonel Verona had 1,000 men.
The time had come when Havana could not be deceived by
Weyler’s reports, for by the first of August the rebel bands
had moved up and were making nightly raids upon the suburbs
of the city. Small garrisons were captured on all sides, and
trains were stopped. It was impossible for trains to proceed
out of Havana in any direction without being strongly guarded
by a detachment of troops in armored cars, which were freight
cars sheathed over with iron plates, slits being left through
which fire might be directed upon the attacking insurgents.
An engine was always sent on some distance ahead of each
train to guard against dynamite explosions, for in several, cases
trains had been blown up with great loss to the Spaniards.
When Weyler wished to go to Matanzas he was compelled to
take the boat. The inhabitants of the suburbs fled to the city,
where the people were undeceived and began to place the
blame upon Weyler, who up to this time had been upheld be-
cause of his inhuman methods. But the news was not allowed
to go to Spain. “ Nothing is happening except the raids of a
few bandits,” were the usual advices from Havana, and Weyler
was so much chagrined at the letters sent to some of the New
366 THE SITUATION COMPREHENDED AT MADRID

York and London papers that their correspondents were ex-
pelled from the island.

It was quite evident that Madrid could not be deceived by
the claims of pacification. “ We have for some time purposely
refrained,” said £1 Imparcial, “from all comment and criti-
cism concerning the Cuban question in order not to be prose-
cuted and not to give rise to press scandals. If we now break
silence it is to express our astonishment upon learning that
provinces have been declared pacified where fighting is an
every-day occurrence and where the rebellion’s most famous
leaders continue at the head of their followers.”

General Garcia, operating in the province of Santiago de
Cuba with a well-equipped army, had driven the Spaniards
into the more important towns after several victorious engage-
ments. In their effort to hold Bayamo the Spaniards had
several times undertaken to transport supplies from Man-
zanillo, but each time the rebels had fallen upon them and cap-
tured a large portion of the arms and provisions. Once they
had blown up a boat laden with men and supplies on the Cauto
River. It cost the Spaniards a large amount of money and
blood to keep a garrison at Bayamo, and it was of no impor-
tance to them from a military standpoint, for the country was
filled with insurgents and the Spaniards did not venture to at-
tack. But Weyler knew that the fall of Bayamo would result
in the fall of the ministry and possibly in a Spanish uprising.

After passing around Weyler’s troops and entering Matan-
zas, Gomez returned to Santa Clara, where Weyler again en-
deavored or pretended to surround him. The result was that
General Weyler met General Gomez for the first time in a
pitched battle. There is a cattle ranch at La Reforma, in
the eastern part of Santa Clara province, consisting of about
10,000 acres, and it was always a favorite camping-ground for
Gomez, as his son, who fell by Maceo’s side, was born there.
At this time he camped on this ranch as usual.

It seems incredible that 1,500 men should stand and fight
20,000, but the Spaniards always march in columns of 1,000
A TYPICAL SPANISH VICTORY 367 |

men and one piece of artillery — one cannon. They came
into Reforma in twenty different directions. Weyler’s trap
was apparently well laid, but Gomez, who was cognizant of it
for two weeks, simply waited. His tactics here were typical
of his tactics elsewhere. He sent a hundred men to fight one
column and fifty to fight another column; a hundred against
another, and seventy-five to meet still another, and so on. Ten
Cubans have often been known to hold a Spanish column of
1,000 men until General Gomez could get together his im-
pedimenta and get away — hold them at a complete standstill.
The Spaniards were always in deadly fear of an ambuscade,
and they would not run into it.

The Cubans on this occasion not only held the Spanish
columns in check but several times small divisions charged,
and on the last time Weylev’s left flank was routed. His horse
was wounded three times, although he did not come to the
front. The battle wound up by Weyler’s withdrawing his
troops and Gomez came in and camped on the field. It was
reported in Havana as a Spanish victory. The Cuban loss
was twenty-six and the Spanish loss 185 and about 300
wounded. The Cuban wounded were always difficult to esti-
mate because so many were wounded who paid no attention to
it. There is an authentic instance of a case where a Mauser
bullet passed through a man and he was not aware of it for two
days. This bullet, which is of small caliber and covered with
nickel, has wonderful penetrating power, but all accounts
agree that it is not deadly unless it strikes a vital organ. In
this one respect, apparently, the use of the Mauser rifle, the
Spaniards were humane to the Cubans; but in no other.

The net result of Weyler’s Santa Clara campaigns, from
which such great results were expected, was the complete de-
vastation of another province and a consequent reduction of
the food supply upon which the Spanish troops were more de-
pendent than the Cubans. In the country which the insur-
gents commanded, which was at least four-fifths of the island,

and into which the Spanish troops did not venture except in a
23
°

368 MILITARY SKILL AND JUDGMENT OF GOMEZ

large force, the Cubans found food on every bush and in every
root. They held hill-locked valleys where their cattle grazed
in safety and where they even planted quick crops like sweet
potatoes, which ripen five or six times a year in Cuba. Gomez
and his leaders availed themselves to the fullest extent of the
advantages afforded by the nature of the country, fought only
when they wanted to, aud chose favorable moments for attack
with rare discernment and judgment. Gomez showed himself
to be not only a man born to command, but one skilled to a
high degree in military science so far as it could be applied to
the peculiar warfare in which the Cubans were engaged. THis
masterly circular movements by which he brought his forces
to Weyler’s rear when that general fancied he had the wily
Cuban hemmed in was but a single example of the many cases
in which he never failed to puzzle the Spanish, who, worn out
by the chase, could never succeed in cornering him, and who
lived in constant dread that he would fall upon them suddenly
from some favorable ambush. ,

On his return from Cuba, Mr. Calhoun made a confidential
report to the President upon the Ruiz case and as to the situa-
tion on the island as he saw it, and a few days later Stewart L.
Woodford of New York was appointed to the Madrid ministry,
with instructions to secure an‘indemnity of $75,000 in the
Ruiz case, and to impress upon the Spanish government the
sincere wish of the United States to lend its aid towards the
ending of the war in Cuba by the reaching of peaceful and
lasting results, just and honorable alike to Spain and to the
Cuban people. These instructions recited the character and
duration of the contest, the widespread losses it entailed,
the burdens and restraints it imposed upon us, with constant
disturbance of national interests and the injury resulting from
an indefinite continuance of this state of things.

It was stated that at this juncture our government was con-
strained to seriously inquire if the time was not ripe when
Spain of her own volition, moved by her own interests and
every sentiment of humanity, should put a stop to this destrue-
ASSASSINATION OF CANOVAS 369

tive war and make proposals of settlement honorable to herself
and just to her Cuban colonies. It was urged that as a neigh-
boring nation with large interests in Cuba we could be re-
quired to wait only a reasonable time for the mother country
to establish its authority and restore peace and order within the
borders of the island; that we could not contemplate an in-
definite period for the accomplishment of this result.

No solution was proposed to which the slightest idea of
humiliation to Spain could attach, and indeed the precise pro-
posals were withheld to avoid embarrassment to that govern-
ment. All that was asked or expected was that some safe way
might be speedily provided and permanent peace restored.

During the interval of time required for the newly-ap-
pointed American minister to present his credentials to the
Spanish court, both the governments of the United States and
of Spain maintained a waiting attitude as to Cuban affairs,
though in the latter country domestic politics were much dis-
turbed. It was held as an assured fact that the Canovas min-
istry would in a short time be required to resign, and it was
expected that the event would take place very soon after the
American minister presented his credentials and made his de-
mands, an event which could hardly occur till October, when
the Queen returned to Madrid from San Sebastian. Mean-
while, the Cortes had been dissolved, and Canovas, whose
health had become somewhat impaired, had gone to Santa
Agueda, a watering place not far from San Sebastian, where he
was taking a course of baths and attending to affairs of state.

On the 8th of August, while Canovas was standing in the
gallery of the bathing establishment waiting for his wife, a
young Italian anarchist named Golli fired three shots at the
minister, all taking effect, and he died ina few minutes. For
years Canovas had been one of Spain’s leading statesmen, a
strong upholder of the monarchy and a defender of the intee-
rity of the kingdom, and, though Spain’s relations were in
a very trying state, he was still hopeful of a settlement which
would preserve to the kingdom peace at home and continued
370 MISERY AND DEATH

dominion over Cuba with little surrender of royal preroga-
tive. This assassination had the effect of stopping the politi-
cal quarrel of the great parties; Sagasta and other Liberals at
once placed themselves at the orders of the government, but
General Azcarraga, the minister of war, was made premier
provisionally.

It was the general opinion in this country that the death of
Canovas would greatly change the Cuban situation, for by his
ability and strength as a statesman he had braved as no other
man could the publie opinion of those who more and more
called for the removal of Weyler. That general was at this
time engaged in an effort to beat back the advancing insur-
gents in Matanzas, but he was gradually forced back towards
Havana. The day after the tragedy in Spain his forces suf-
fered a severe defeat at Aguacate in Havana province, and,
leaving many Spanish dead on the field, he hurried back into
the city with rebels firing on his rear guard. He had been
utterly unable to check the invasion which Gomez had planned.
Death had been on all sides, in the open ground of battle, in
the hidden ambush, the burning building, the fever-infected
swamp, the disease-breeding hospitals — yet the rebellion re-
mained a living, active, aggressive force. The Spanish
soldiers were in a bad way, they had not received their pay for
months, they were weak from illness and poor rations, they
were badly clothed and sometimes shoeless, their credit was
exhausted, and they were in no condition to take the offensive.
The only feature of Weyler’s campaign which was working
successfully was his war on the pacificos. They were dying
by the hundreds in the centers of concentration every day.
In Pinar del Rio whole towns were starving. There were no
vegetables; people were feeding on emaciated dogs. Pacificos
were driven into the city of Matanzas from some of the outside
fortifications which the Spanish could not hold, and as the poor
famished wretches came straggling along, vainly beaten by the
soldiers to make them go on, many dropped down and died.
Everywhere was misery and death.
CHAPTER XXVI

THE STORY OF MISS CISNEROS AND HER REMARKABLE KS-
CAPE— RECALL OF WEYLER—PENALTY OF DEATH TO
ALL INSURGENTS TREATING WITH SPANIARDS.

Weyler Retained by the New Premier— The Escape of Evangelina Cisne-
ros — Her Romantic Story — Following Her Father to Jail—On the
Isla de Pinos— Attracted by Evangelina’s Beauty —A Scream for
Help — Berriz in Close Quarters— Guerrillas Appear — Her Escape
to a Cave—Found by the Guerrillas—Sent to Havana— Thrown
into a Vile Prison— Sympathy Aroused in this Country — An Appeal
to the Queen — Her Escape through a Barred Window — Smuggled
on a Steamer in Boy’s Clothes— Her Enthusiastic Reception in New
York —The Queen Tired of Cuban Troubles—Her Farewell to Min-
ister Taylor — Sagasta’s Ministry — Arrival in Havana of Blanco, and
Return of Weyler— Weyler’s Grotesque Failure — Blanco Announces
a More Liberal Policy — Release of the Competitor Prisoners — Their
Wretched Lot — Mas6 Elected President of Cuban Republic.

that General Weyler would be retained in Cuba and

be supported by the government, which would strictly
adhere to the late minister’s policy. In writing to one of his
political supporters he said: “ General Woodford will be re-
ceived and even welcomed as our mourned Don Antonio
(Canovas) wished to weleome him. If he brings only claims
of American citizens harmed in Cuba, attention will be paid
to these claims so far as they are just. In a friendly manner
he will be notified also of Spain’s right to claim other damages,
and instructions will be given for the purpose to our minister
at Washington. But it will be a great mistake if he intends to
suggest any other kind of American interference in Cuba.”
He said that America would be told very plainly to keep her
hands off or take the consequences. But the Conservative
forces were badly divided, and as the success of the ministry
depended upon the carrying on of that policy which had nearly

(371)

r ! ~ IIE provisional premier, General Azcarraga, announced
372 SURRENDER OF LAS TUNAS

been disastrous even under the strong hand of Canovas, it was
evident that it could not long endure. Nothing but a con-
spicuous success by Weyler in Cuba could give it strength, and,
as it happened, his forces met at this critical time their worst
reverse of the year, a defeat peculiarly humiliating to the
proud Spaniards.

As already stated, General Garcia’s force in the province
of Santiago de Cuba had through additions from successful ex-
peditions one of the best-equipped forces on the island. Early
in September he brought his army before Las Tunas, one of
the five important places in the province, strongly defended
by six forts. Before opening fire he wrote to the Spanish com-
mander: “T have 5,000 men and artillery enough to shatter
the whole town of Las Tunas. I give you three hours to sur-
render, and I will respect your life and that of your men.”

No answer came, and the fire was opened on Friday, the
3d, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The Spanish replied vigor-
ously with their twelve-pounders, but the dynamite gun of the
insurgents made great havoe in the forts. On Sunday at
noon a white flag was raised on the principal fort and the com-
mander announced his desire to surrender on honorable terms,
having, he said, asked for reinforcements but received no
reply. Garcia well knew why; no troops could be spared from
any part of the provinee. The Spanish had been driven away
from the Cauto River and hemmed in at Manzanillo, and
every garrison in the province except that at the city of San-
tiago was helpless and isolated. In the two days’ bombard-
ment over 300 Spanish soldiers were killed. Garcia held
seventy-five prisoners to be exchanged for an equal number of
Cubans, and the others were disarmed and paroled. Te se-
cured several large guns and a quantity of arms, ammunition,
and provisions.

General Lugue, the commander of the province, attempted
a few days later to retake the garrison with 5,000 men, but was
defeated and driven westward. On the way he captured a
small Cuban settlement and slaughtered the women and chil-
WEYLER ASKS FOR REINFORCEMENTS 373

dren in suggestive contrast to Garcia’s act in paroling the cap-
tivcs of Las Tunas. General Weyler was obliged to follow his
glowing despatches of pacification with one asking the Madrid
government for heavy reinforcements for the eastern prov-
inces, as none could be spared from the west, where the rebels
were moving about to suit themselves. This placed the Span-
ish ministry in a very delicate position. Weyler was told that
he must retake the town, as the public criticism of the minis-
try was becoming very severe. But of Las Tunas little but
ruins remained to be retaken.

Though the Spanish continued to report victories daily it
was, nevertheless, a notable fact that the rebels were still as
active as ever in all the provinces. All the rural districts were
in the hands of the insurgents, who reigned as absolute imas-
ters, and in the eastern end of the island had reorganized the
provinces. The royal troops were cantoned in the cities, from
which they sallied forth now and then, but with small results.
They would start out in the morning to crush a rebel force, fire
afew volleys at them and return in time for their evening meal.
In these engagements the Spanish loss was generally greater
than the Cuban, though the Spanish reports were always to the
contrary.

The peaceful peasants were the worst sufferers. It was
estimated by good authorities that in the provinces of Havana
and Pinar del Rio-the Spaniards killed about five of them to
one bona fide insurgent. This did not include the pacificos
dying of starvation and disease.

In the fall of 1897 public interest in the United States was
greatly aroused in the remarkable escape of Evangelina Cis-
neros, a young Cuban girl of good family, whose story reads
like a romance. At the outbreak of the revolution she lived
with her father and three sisters at a pleasant little place in
Puerto Principe. Her father decided to enter the Cuban
army, but before he could go he was arrested, and in time was
sent to Isla de Pinos with other prisoners. Evangelina faith-
fully and dutifully followed his footsteps to share his punish-

~
374 THE STORY OF EVANGELINA CISNEROS

ment and comfort him in his sorrow. She was eighteen years
of age, cultured, talented, and beautiful. Through her ef-
forts and the mediation of some friends, the governor of the
penal settlement gave Cisneros permission to withdraw from
the common criminals, and to live with his daughter, and there
everything went well till a new governor came to the island,
Colonel Berriz, a nephew of the Spanish minister of war and
a favorite adjutant of Weyler. Struck by the girl’s beauty,
he endeavored to attract her to him, but failing, adopted
harsher measures. Her father was arrested and taken to an
unknown place. Late that night, when the girl was alone and
wondering where her father was, Colonel Berriz came to her
house, forced himself into her presence, sought to force her to
submit to him by making her father’s liberty contingent upon
her compliance, and when this failed he would have over-
powered her had she not slipped away from him, opened the
door, and screamed for help, which came at once. Berriz
was in close quarters for a moment, but succeeded in calling a
few guerrillas who were near. As her friends were unarmed
they could make no resistance; they tried to escape as best
they could, and several were shot in cold blood. She man-
aged to escape and hid in a cave till the next morning, when
she was discovered by guerrillas, locked up, and later, with
others, was sent to Havana, where she was placed in the Casa
de Recojidas, the prison for disreputable women. In order to
save the reputation of the villain, Colonel Berriz, the Spanish
had invented an accusation against her character. Her ex-
periences in that prison were horrible.

At intervals the story of this innocent girl’s wrongs tan
through the Cuban news in this country, and many people be-
came interested. Her trial came on in August, and she was
sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment in an African penal
settlement upon the testimony of the perjurers who were try-
ing to save the reputation of the nephew of the man who had
become the Premier of Spain. Mrs. Jefferson Davis, Julia
Ward Howe, Mrs. John A. Logan, and others petitioned the
HER RESCUE AND ESCAPE 375

Queen for her release. The Pope, who had been appealed to,
urged clemency, while Weyler, incensed at the efforts in the
girl’s behalf, publicly reiterated the falsehood as to her charac-
ter. The Queen did not act.

The Spanish authorities did not fail to show their resent-
ment of the interest displayed by the wives of Americans in the
case of Miss Cisneros, for they not only shut her off from all
communication with her friends but threw into the prison for
lewd women in Santa Clara five women who dared to prepare
a most courteous appeal to General Weyler for the release of
Miss Cisneros. All these women belonged to the best families
in Santa Clara. Sefiora Plana was sixty-seven years old and
the widow of a former mayor of the city. Sefiorita Gutierres
was the principal of the oldest and best private college for
young women in the island. These women were kept in
prison without any definite charge being made against them,
and instead of being put in the city jail they were thrust into
pens the surroundings of which were of the filthiest character.
That the prisoners were refined and elegant women made not
the slightest difference, and their case was not an isolated one.

Meanwhile, a New York newspaper commissioned one of
its ablest reporters to go to Havana and see if he could bring
about her escape. The story of how the escape was planned
and executed is a thrilling page of the romance of her life. It
was a desperate game, but it sueceeded, and one night, hav-
ing succeeded in drugging the wretched women in the prison
pen with her, lest they should betray her, she was helped
through a window, one of the bars of which had been filed
and bent by her accomplices. She was at first taken to a
house of a friend in Havana and carefully concealed. In a
few days, dressed in boy’s clothes, she was smuggled on a
steamer bound for New York, while the Spanish guards were
searching Havana high and low for her. She became the
heroine of the hour in New York, where a reception was ar-
ranged for her, and where her beauty and cultured ways won
admiration and the story of her trials thrilled every heart.
376 THE QUEEN IN A DILEMMA

While it is possible that few cases possessed so many dra-
matic features as that of Miss Cisneros, it was well known that
there were hundreds of other victims, innocent of any charge
except sympathy for the Cubans, victims of a punishment
which could, as Mrs. Logan said in her strong appeal to the
Queen in behalf of Miss Cisneros, “ only to be compared to the
atrocities inflicted upon the Christians by order of Nero, whose
butchery of the innocents is cven to this day considered the
most fiendish the world ever saw; the thought of them must be
sickening to your gentle soul.” Had it not been for the dar-
ing rescue made by a newspaper man, she, like others, might.
have gone to wear away her life in an African penal settle-
ment. For could the Queen pardon a mere girl when her
punishment was necessary to save the reputation of the nephew
of her Prime Minister? That she was moved by the appeals
and the story of Miss Cisneros’s sufferings there can be little
doubt. She was tired and sick of the condition of things in
Cuba. To pardon this girl might mean a cabinet crisis, and
how much: the case had to do with the fall of General Azcar-
raga can only be surmised. It was on September 28th that
the Queen talked so plainly to Azearraga that he resigned, but
before the new ministry was fairly at work Miss Cisneros had
slipped through her barred window and was on her way to
New York.

On September 13th, when taking leave of Mr. Taylor, the
departing minister of the United States, the Queen said:

“Do, pray, be a friend to Spain when you return to Amer-
ica.”

“Madam, I will, so far as my conscience will permit,” he
replied, with a courtly bow.

The Queen received Minister Woodford graciously and
conversed with him in an informal manner without any refer-
ence to the subject upon which both countries were intensely
interested. His instructions were such as to give Spain no
intimation of just what the United States would do as a last
resort to end the trouble in Cuba, and his first duty was to

2
THE RECALL OF WEYLER 377

sound Spain as to our friendly intervention to bring about a
settlement between the Cubans and the Spaniards. If Spain
rejected this plan, the minister was to inform this government
and receive new instruction.

Meanwhile, General Azcarraga was engaged in a desperate
attempt to bring into a cabinet all the dissenting Conserva-
tive forces, but the larger wing of these under the leadership
of Silvela refused to become a party to the government unless
Weyler was recalled. To this Azcarraga would not consent,
believing it would result in the downfall of the Conservatives.
Fis situation was further complicated by the excommunica-
tion of the Minister of Finance, who had appropriated certain
property of the church. This in Catholic Spain was a serious
matter, but Azcarraga held on till the Queen, who had become
disgusted with Conservative quarrels and horrors in Cuba, re-
turned to Madrid September 28th, when she stated her senti-
ments so forcibly that the ministry tendered their resignations.
This crisis naturally postponed any reply to Minister Wood-
ford’s note. When Sagasta was summoned to form a cabinet,
hope of peace in Cuba was stimulated by the announcement
that Weyler would be recalled if he did not resign, and General
Blanco, considered as the most humane general in Spain, would
take his place to carry out a comprehensive scheme of au-
tonomy. But Weyler was not disposed to resign his lucrative
position, and the hopeful feeling in the United States was offset
by the rage with which the bloodthirsty element in Tlavana re-
ceived the news of Weyler’s fall. The Volunteers, at the in-
stigation of one of Weyler’s factotums, paraded the streets
shouting “ Death to the United States! ’* “ Long live General
Weyler! ” and the whole city was for a short time in a state of
terror. Even some of the so-called Autonomists declared that
it was a shame for Spain to adopt home rule at the dictation of
the United States.

General Blanco arrived at Havana on October 30th, and
General Weyler departed, having bought a bill of exchange,
it is reported, for $600,000. Tis salary during his occupancy
3738 A CARNIVAL OF BLOODSHED AND FRAUD

of the island would have amounted to about $80,000. Thus
his methods of administration had been successful from a per-
sonal point of view; in fact, this was nearly always the case
with Spanish officials in Cuba, but a carnival of theft prevailed
under the Weyler regime. The expenses of the war had
nearly doubled; millions had been spent for supplies, and yet
the Spanish troops were poorly fed and poorly clothed. Medi-
cine had been purchased in large quantities, but was always
scarce, and the names of legions of dead Spaniards were kept
on the pay-roll. Never had been more strikingly illustrated
the saying that though a Spaniard will fight for his country,
he also does not hesitate to rob it. The frauds of the com-
missariat were enormous, and Weyler was only one of the
principal benefiters.

To sustain Weyler in pacifying a country which he was
continually reporting to be troubled with a few bands of scat-
tering bandits, Spain had poured out her young blood with a
lavish hand — 130,000 men and officers in addition to the
120,000 which had been previously. sent. Thus from the out-
break of the war she had sent to the island over 250,000 men,
fully armed, and the mystery of the military world was what
Weyler could do with them in an island so small that an army
of 30,000 insurgents could practically hold the whole coun-
try and even raid the suburbs of Havana. History affords no
parallel in the way of grotesque failures, With such an
army and over 50,000 Volunteers at his back, Weyler had
done nothing but complete the devastation of the fertile island
and starve and kill thousands of pacificos, driven like sheep
from their burning homes. His guerrillas, like the Duke of
Alva’s murderers in the Netherlands, had swept the country
for hiding innocents, and butchered in cold blood wounded
Cubans in their hospitals, not sparing the nurses. JIundreds
had been ‘thrown into filthy jails upon the flimsiest charges or
none at all, their fate often remaining a mystery. Te had
met the generosity of the Cubans, who regularly sct at liberty
the Spaniards they captured, by killing Cuban prisoners upon
BLANCO’S POLICY UNACCEPTABLE 379

nearly every occasion, and all this cruelty and wantonness had
but added fuel to the flame of Cuba’s hatred toward the mother
country, which now, in the hope of saving her devastated
island, grudgingly proposed to offer an autonomy which, if
more liberal than heretofore, was still restricted.

Many people of the United States had hopes in the new
policy. Selfishly clinging to the hope of peace, we hesitated
to set the stamp of intervention upon this wretched page of
the history of barbarism, while scores of our own citizens were
languishing in the dirty jails of Cuba with no hope of a trial,
for there was no evidence of their guilt.

But the far-sighted could easily see that intervention must
come. The administration, while disposed to exhaust every
resource of diplomacy, saw that independence alone would
avail. Every Cuban general in the field and every Cuban
officer in the civil government asserted again and again that
there could be no solution but independence. The fact that
General Blanco, upon taking office, proclaimed at once that
he proposed to follow “a broad policy of expansion, of gen-
erosity and forgiveness, tending to re-establish through lib-
erality fraternity among all the inhabitants of the country,
and to cement their adhesion to the mother country,” made no
difference. There could be no adhesion of the Cuban to such
a mother as Spain had proved, and General Blanco found that
at the very moment when Spain would permit autonomy the
Cuban party of autonomy had dwindled away to nothing, and
the army of independence was never stronger, more aggressive,
more successful, or more confident. Cubans were quite well
aware that Spain was equal to pigeon-holing the whole scheme
after they had surrendered their arms.

Sagasta, whether believing that autonomy would be ac-
cepted or not, knew that it would gain time and tend to
diminish the aggressive spirit in the United States. He had
been given to understand that if something were not done it
would be impossible to silence the demands of Congress when
it met in December. Moreover, the time had come when the
380 SPAIN INTENDS: TO HUMBLE THE UNITED STATES

island was of no further financial use to Spain. She had
mortgaged Cuba’s revenues for more than they were worth by
the issue of bonds. To hold her longer would mean only an
exhausting expense to Spain, and it was only that ungovernable
pride which had been her ruin that prevented her from with-
drawing from the devastated island. In this situation a war
with the United States seemed to afford an avenue of escape
with the possibility -—the probability —as the Spanish
statesman thought, that the other powers of Europe would step
in and not only help her humble the United States but even
give her back C'uba and preserve the dynasty. This attitude
was plainly discernible in the Spanish journals and it should
have been evident to us that war must come. From this time
forth Spain used what resources she could command, not to
push the war in Cuba but to strengthen herself for a contest
with the United States, while doing everything to postpone the
break by an ostentatious reversal of Weyler’s policy as to the
reconcentrados, and an attempt to infuse the forlorn hope of
autonomy with enough life to keep the United States in a wait-
ing’ attitude.

A reply to Minister Woodford’s note was received by our
government on October 23d. It appeared to be in the direc-
tion of a better understanding. It-expressed in the suavest
manner an appreciation of the friendly purposes of the United
States, admitted that our country was deeply affected by the
war in Cuba, and that its desire for peace was just. It de-
clared that the Spanish government was bound by every con-
sideration to a change of policy that should satisfy the United
States and pacify Cuba within a reasonable time, and to this
end Spain had decided to put into effect the political reforms
long advocated by Sagasta, without halting for any considera-
tion in the path which in his judgment would lead to peace.
It was said that the military operations would be continued,
but would be conducted with regard for private rights, and that
Spanish sovereignty would be strictly guarded. It asked that
Spain be left free to carry on its military and political opera-
MR, TAYLOR’S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 881

tions as she saw fit, -while the United States on its part better
enforced the regulations against the filibustering expeditions.
Stripped of its diplomatic phraseology, what Spain told the
United States was substantially this:

“ All the armed expeditions intended to benefit the Cuban
rebels are organized in the United States and sail from United
States ports. Some of these expeditions have been prevented
from going to Cuba, but most of them have succeeded in leav-
ing America. If there were no aid from United States citi-
zens there would be no insurrection. The United States can
best extend its friendly offices by suppressing these expedi-
tions.”

Shortly after the reply to Minister Woodford’s note, and
after General Blanco had begun his work in Cuba, Hannis
Taylor, whom Woodford had succeeded, in an article pub-
lished in the North American Review explaining the condition
of affairs in Spain and his efforts to induce the late Canovas
ministry to try and save Cuba by a generous grant of au-
tonomy, said that Spain had no understanding of the word
autonomy, and that she was trifling with us as if we were chil-
dren. He also stated as his belief that Congress should assert
our duty on the broadest possible lines to put an end to the
hopeless war in Cuba, because it involved constant disturbance
of our own peace and the destruction of our own commerce
and property interests; that our government had offered in
vain our services as a peacemaker, and that, in view of Spain’s
refusal to accept such services in the form of mediation, this
country must now devise some means of bringing the war in
Cuba to a speedy close in case Spain fails to do so within a
specified time. While Taylor’s statement had the advantage
of being true, it called forth bitter criticisms from Spain and
was considered imprudent at home. But it no doubt better
informed the people as to the insincerity of Spanish pretensions
of reforms, and when Spain replied to Minister Woodford’s
acknowledgment of Spain’s previous response, it was with the
intimation that in granting autonomy to Cuba she would be
882 BLANCO IN A DIFFICULT POSITION

governed by circumstances. Her purpose was perhaps best
expressed by General Pando, Blanco’s chief of staff, when he
said that autonomy would be one thing in the palace and an-
other in the field, where it would be “ autonomy at the point
of the bayonet.” Asa result, the administration wisely began
the work of putting the defenses and the armament of the
nation, so long neglected, into better shape. The wisest men
saw that war was inevitable unless Spain surrendered her
sovereignty in Cuba on some terms. From this time on diplo-
macy was used largely in an effort to arrange the terms, and in
Spain it was used to provoke the European powers into an at-
titude of hostility towards us. In Cuba the Spanish continued
to burn Cuban hospitals, kill the inmates and helpless women
and children, while the insurgents continued their successes.
According to the reports of the Spanish health bureaus, a thou-
sand reconcentrados were dying every day. It was too laté to
amend matters by annulling the decree of concentration, for
the hapless people were now destitute, they had no homes to re-
turn to, and their fields had been destroyed. Even had there
been anything for these pacificos to return to, and even had
they strength enough remaining to return, they could have no
confidence in the Spanish. The cruel guerrillas were still
roaming about and their butcheries could hardly be restrained
by any central authority. Blanco, apparently, endeavored to
do what he could by establishing zones of cultivation for the
employment of pacificos. The step proved a farce, an arrange-
ment only on paper. His desire to have the grinding of sugar
begin again could not avail, as the planters had not the means
to restore their machinery. Moreover, Blanco soon found
that Weyler had left the army in a terrible condition, and the
officers endeavored to throw obstacles in the way of autonomy
and milder methods, the uncompromising Spaniards being
particularly bitter at the thought that the proposed reforms
had been undertaken, as they supposed, at the instance of the
United States. The horrors of the war were regarded with the
utmost indifference by the more bigoted Spaniards at Havana.
RELEASE OF THE ‘ COMPETITOR” PRISONERS 383

The unfortunate were dying from hunger in the very streets of
the city without arousing the slightest feeling of charity among
the Spaniards. Some of the newspapers went so far as to con-
sider the awful mortality a good thing for the country, the in-
terests of Spain, and even of humanity. They declared that
the result of Weyler’s warfare was a natural selection, and
that the classes which were dying out were useless and ought
to be replaced by stronger and more industrious people from
Spain. General Blanco felt the difficulties of his position so
keenly that he was inclined to ask relief from office.

By order from Madrid the Competitor prisoners were re-
leased on the 17th of November, and the act was naturally re-
garded not so much as a concession as an effort on the part
of Spain to deprive the friends of intervention in the Congress
of a rational basis for action. It was in exact keeping with
previous Spanish diplomacy to appease sentiment in this coun-
try at certain intervals by the release of American citizens
kept a long time in prison without evidence of their guilt.

Broken in health by their long confinement and the treat-
ment accorded them, and clad only in the rags which they had
worn since their capture a year and a half before, they pre-
sented a pitiful spectacle as they landed in New York and fell
into the arms of their friends. Melton, the newspaper man,
who had started for Cuba under contract to write a series of
articles for a Florida journal, robust, strong, and weighing
165 pounds, came back emaciated and so weak that he could
hardly speak. Laborde had become paralyzed, and Leavitt
had nearly lost his mind. The story they told of their suf-
ferings was heartrending. Sentenced to death without any
chance to defend themselves, and saved only because the exe-
cution was postponed from Madrid, for eighteen months they
had Jain in jail and been frequently subjected to torture by
their cruel jailers. Yet some of the newspapers of the coun-
try hailed the tardy release of these men as a triumph of
American citizenship and a disarmament of “ jingoism.”
They pretended to regard it just as Spain in her crafty insin-

a
384 CUBAN LEADERS REPUDIATE AUTOMONY

cerity trusted they would, and of course they reflected the
opinion of many people desirous of peace at any price. But
as their arrest, like that of other Americans, had taken place
under a previous Spanish administration our government
could do no more than give a fair trial to the new administra-
tion, which seemed so much more humanely disposed.

Tn constructing a scheme of autonomy more generous than
those which had preceded, Sagasta found himself opposed by
the commercial interests of the country, who said it would
never do to allow the Cubans to regulate their own tariff; but
he maintained his position so firmly as to devise and secure the
signature of the Queen to a plan which granted the Cubans
the electoral privileges of the peninsulars, allowed them an in-
sular representative government, but left the tariff to a mixed
commission, partly appointed by the Crown, the Captain-
General reserving the right to decide disputes. But the plan
was coldly welcomed at Havana, and was at once met by
proclamations from Gomez and Garcia making it an offense
punishable with death for any insurgent leader to accept pro-
posals of autonomy from the Spaniards, and further decreeing
that anyone sent from the Spanish to confer as to autonomy
should be regarded as a spy and treated as such. In any
event, the plan could have little operation outside of Havana
and a few large centers, for the insurgents at this time were
stronger than ever, and General Pando, who had set out to
drive Gomez from the point where he had a short time before
defeated Weyler, was repulsed and obliged to retreat.

Late in 1897 the Cuban General Assembly met and elected
new government, officials, Bartolome Masé becoming Presi-
dent of the Republic. By this act alone the determination of
the Cubans was revealed, for Masé was the author of the motto
“Tndependence or Death.” Among his countrymen he was
the soul of political honor and devotion to the cause of free-
dom, and Gomez had called him the Father of His Country.
A cabinet was formed and the Cuban government continued
to transact what business the conditions permitted,
CHAPTER XXVII

THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE—THE TRAGIC DEATH OF
COLONEL RUIZ—RIOTS IN HAVANA, AND THE
“FRIENDLY VISIT” OF THE MAINE.

The Administration’s Cuban Policy Outlined — Possibilities of Interven-
tion — Opposition to Autonomy — Colonel Ruiz Hopes to Convert the
Young Cuban Leader, Nestor Aranguren—The Latter’s Reply to
Ruiz’s Letter—Aranguren Warns Him—The Meeting — Arangu-
ren’s Own Story of What Happened — Ruiz Shot— Organized Re-
lief for the Reconcentrados — Military Operations in the East — Dis-
quieting Reports — Lee Advises Having Warships in Readiness — A
Delicate Situation— Winter Drill of North American Squadron —
The Storm Breaks in Havana — ‘‘ Death to Autonomy !” — Lee’s Mes-
sage — Blanco's Prompt Action — Death-Blow to Autonomy — Protec-
tion of American Citizens — The Maine Ordered to Havana — Strange
Action of the Havana Authorities—Gen. Lee’s Misgivings— The
Maine Arrives Quietly — Demonstrations of Eternal Friendship.

sage of President McKinley were awaited with the

keenest interest in the United States, in Spain, and in
Cuba. Could the crisis in Cuban affairs be longer postponed?
The President recognized the problem as the most important
with which the government had to deal. His message told
the story of the previous rebellions, and the relation of our
government to them and to the existing rebellion in which de-
struction had been carried to every part of the island. He de-
nounced the “ cruel policy of reconcentration,” which had ut-
terly failed and which “ was not civilized warfare, but extermi-
nation.” Against this abuse he had repeatedly protested.
After reviewing the more recent diplomatic negotiations, he
said that three untried measures remained — the recognition
of belligerency, the recognition of independence, and neutral
intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compro-
mise. He declared that he would not speak of forcible an-

(385 )

T HE assembling of Congress in December and the mes-
386 “IN THE LINE OF RIGHT AND DUTY”

nexation as that could not be thought of. “That, by our code
ot honor, would be criminal aggression.” He gave his reasons
for considering the question of recognition premature, though
should such a step be deemed wise in the future he should not
hesitate to take it. Intervention on humanitarian grounds
would have been seriously considered but for the favorable
change in Spain’s policy. In conclusion, he said:

“T shall not impugn its sincerity, nor should impatience be suffered
to embarrass it in the task it has undertaken. It is honestly due to Spain
and to our friendly relations with Spain that she should be given a reason-
able chance to realize her expectations, and to prove the asserted efficacy
of the new order of things to which she stands irrevocably committed.

The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable con-
dition of righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain as well as
equitable to all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba,
is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of other and further action
by the United States will remain to be taken. When that time comes,
that action will be determined in the line of indisputable right and duty.
It will be faced without misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obliga-
tion this Government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to it
the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity.

‘Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated
only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion
nor selfishness, the Government will continue its watchful care over the
rights and property of American citizens, and will abate none of its effort
to bring about, by peaceful agencies, a peace. which shall be honorable
and enduring.

“Tf it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations
to ourselves, to civilization and to humanity, to intervene with force, it
shall be without fault on our part, and only because the necessity for such
action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civ-
ilized world.”

Although the apparent hopefulness of the message was
not shared by the majority of the members of Congress, they
could not but be impressed with the strength of the reasons
for waiting and watching results. But it soon became evident
that, however good the disposition of Captain-General Blanco,
it could have little effect upon an island so conditioned as
Cuba. A large proportion of the Spanish subjects having
commercial and business interests there would not accept
autonomy, and the openly hostile attitude of the always
AN ATTEMPT TO PERVERT ARANGUREN 387

troublesome Volunteers caused the government much anxiety.
Blanco did all he could to bring the insurgents around to a
more favorable attitude, going so far as to liberate General
Rivera, Maceo’s successor, who had been captured in March
and had been in Cabafia fortress ever since. The Captain-
General endeavored to have him use his influence with the
insurgents to accept autonomy, but he refused. A decree was
published, offering amnesty to all exiles ordered from the
island by Weyler, except common criminals, but how deter-
mined the insurgents were in the position they had taken is
shown by one of the tragic incidents of this period.

The fearless young insurgent leader, Nestor Aranguren,
whose daring raids upon the Spanish forces about Havana had
given him the sobriquet of “the Cuban Sheridan,” was a per-
sonal friend of Colonel Ruiz, Blanco’s aide-de-camp. Ruiz
had informed Blanco that he believed he could convince Aran-
guren of the advantage of surrendering and accepting au-
tonomy. “I know his good heart,” said Ruiz, “and I can in-
duce him to abandon his folly and come back to Havana with
me.” Nothing could have been more pleasing to Blanco than
to make a convert of this dashing young Cuban. Ruiz opened
correspondence with him to this end, and Aranguren answered
in amiable terms, but energetically refused to betray the Cuban
cause. “ We are suffering all the hardships of the life we are
leading,” said Aranguren, “only to make our country free.
We do not hate the Spaniards personally, but we do not like
their government in any form. Asa gentleman I appreciate
you and admire your talents, but in our intercourse let us drop
political questions.”

This letter encouraged Ruiz to answer that he was sure
that “ personally ” Aranguren would not refuse to see him,
and he asked for a meeting on December 9th two miles from
Campo Florida. Aranguren sent the letter to General Rod-
riguez, commander of the insurgent forces in the province of
Havana, and awaited orders. Receiving no reply on the day
Ruiz had appointed, he did not go, so Ruiz returned to Campo
388 RUIZ MEETS THE FATE OF A SPY

Florida and wrote again to Aranguren. On the 11th the lat-
ter received from General Rodriguez the message, “ Do as you
please, but if he offers autonomy do your duty.” Aranguren
sent a copy of this order to Ruiz with these words:

“Tf you desire to talk about the independence of Cuba or
as a friend I will see you to-morrow. If not, for God’s sake
do not come.”

Ruiz well understood the nature of the order which Gomez
had given to his army. Anyone appearing to offer autonomy
would be treated as a spy, but Ruiz still had faith in his powers
to persuade Aranguren, so when he received the reply on the
13th he at once started for the rendezvous. What followed
was thus related afterwards by Aranguren himself:

“The following day (it was 10 o'clock in the morning) Ruiz, in the
full uniform of a Spanish colonel, and accompanied by two practicos, pre-
sented himself at one of the outposts. From the very start I felt nervous
and would gladly have avoided the encounter, but it was not in my power
todo so. I met Ruiz at the entrance tomy camp. He was very pale and
acted in a nervous, hesitating manner. He rode forward and attempted
to grasp my hand. which I refused to let him have.

“* How fine you are looking,’ he said, not appearing to notice my
action. ‘This life evidently agrees with you. You are a fortunate boy ;
no man among you all has the future that you have. Autonomy has been
granted, aad you, my dear friend, have been selected as the first one to be
pardoned.’

“In vain did I hold up my hand and motion him to stop talking.

“*T have come,’ he continued, ‘to offer the pardon of a generous
Government and such a position as you may desire. Ask what you will
and you will have it. It all lies with you. Ask.’

“Ruiz had condemned himself, and I ordered my men to arrest him.
He was at once tried, found guilty, and shot. He met his death like a
brave man, fearless to the end. This is a true account of how all this sad
affair occurred, and when my friends in the North read this, I hope they
will rcason as I did, that a soldier’s duty to his country comes first of all.”

It was said that the insurgents found upon Ruiz’s body an
authorization from General Blanco offering to give Aranguren
$100,000 and to extend official favors in the autonomous gov-
ernment. This act was industriously heralded as an evidence
of the barbarity of the Cubans by the Spanish ministry and by
“the peace at any price ” men in the United States, and more
THE RED CROSS IN CUBA 389

ado was made over it than over the hundreds of cases in which
Cuban officers had been ruthlessly slain in cold blood, a fate
that was still reserved for Aranguren himself. Ruiz did not
go under a flag of truce; he went in the face of a warning.
Aranguren was soldier enough to carry out the orders of his
commander-in-chief. The injustice of classing this with the
outrages daily practiced by the Spaniards was so flagrant that
it only stirred the deeper the spirit of Cuban sympathizers in
this country.

In view of the continued and indeed increasing suffering
of the reconcentrados, and the widely-expressed desire through-
out the United States to assist the helpless and starving, the
government, after some difficulties, arranged in December
with the Spanish minister so that charitable contributions in
money or kind could be sent to the island by, the benevolently
disposed people of the country. Articles so intended could
be consigned to the consul-general, who had arranged to co-
operate with the local authorities in certain places. At first
the relief was confined to Havana, but in a short time proper
organizations were formed in the surrounding sections. The
work was systematized under the supervision of Miss Clara
Barton, president of the Red Cross Society of the United
‘States, and her active and experienced assistants. Thus much
suffering was prevented, though when the number of poor and
destitute was so large it was almost impossible to relieve more
than a few of the worst cases in each locality.

Spanish military operations on the island were at first
boldly directed against the insurgent leaders in the east.
Gomez still remained at his favorite camping-ground, and
General Pando, the chief of staff of the Captain-General,
undertook to dislodge him, but, failing to do so, he proceeded
to Manzanillo, where the Spanish forces were in a desperate
condition. ,

General Pando’s object was to disperse General Garcia’s
army, which was in full control of the Cauto River and had
the interior towns practically in a state of siege. He found
390 AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH AUTONOMY

the Spanish troops in that section in a terrible condition, a
small portion only fit to take part in an active campaign. He
was able to get together a force superior in numbers to those
which Garcia had in that region, and undertook to make his
way inland from Manzanillo. The result was a Spanish de-
feat. Pando was obliged to return to the coast and to ask for
reinforcements, which, however, Blanco could not spare con-
sidering the activity of the insurgents in the west. In Havana
province the Spanish forces were centering their efforts upon
Avranguren, who had been raised to the rank of brigadier-
general, but thus far with poor results.

All these circumstances were particularly discouraging to
General Blanco at a time when he was making the effort to es-
tablish the scheme of autonomous government, and was finding
his acts frustrated by the quarrels of the Conservatives and.
the Autonomists. The decree of General Blanco announcing
the establishment of autonomy on January Ist had a bombas-
tic introduction about the blessing to be expected from the new
regime. The plain truth was that outside the army of office-
seekers, who were the natural result of the general poverty of
the country, and a few Spaniards whose private interests led
them to support Sagasta’s government, there were no honest
believers in autonomy. The Cubans were well aware that the
decree was a sham, promulgated merely to endeavor to de-
ceive the patriots. The uncompromising Spaniards laughed
in the very faces of the new ministers. “An opera bouffe
cabinet,” was what El Comercio called the new ministry which
took.the oath of office on January Ist.

The determination not to give offices in the government
to the uncompromising Spaniards had greatly enraged some
of them. The advantage given to them by General Blanco
of ten votes out of sixteen in the electoral junta, which prac-
tically enabled them to gain a majority in the Assembly, did
not mollify them. Among the Volunteers, and even in the
regular army, there was continual muttering of discontent,
threatening to break out into violence upon any provocation,
BLANCO PROMISES TO PROTECT AMERICANS 391

and hardly had President McKinley’s message been read in
Congress before the State Department was receiving disquiet-
ing information from our consuls.

There were rumors, as General Lee telegraphed, of an ex-
tensive conspiracy in Matanzas directed against Americans.
General Blanco promised to deal at once with the alleged con-
spirators, and in his note of December 3d General Lee said
that he had the assurances that American life and property
would be protected by the government at a moment’s notice.
“T have declined to make an application for the presence of
one or more war ships in this harbor, and have advised those of
our people who have wives and children here not to send them
away, at least for the present, because such proceedings would
not in my opinion be justifiable at this time from the stand-
point of personal security. I still think that two war ships at
least should be at Key West, prepared to move here at short no-
tice, and that more of them should be sent to Dry Tortugas, and
a coal station be established there.” On the 13th General Lee
wrote concerning the proposed autonomy on the efficacy of
which both Spain and the United States were basing their
hopes of peace: “The contest is most unequal. For it there
are five or six of the head officers at the palace and twenty or
thirty persons here in the city. Against it are, first, the in-
surgents, with or without arms, and the Cuban non-combat-
ants; second, the great mass of the Spaniards. Indeed, there
is the greatest apathy concerning autonomy in any form. No
one asks what it will be or when, or how it will come. I do
not see how it could even be put into operation by force.”

In a letter on the 28th he said: “On the night of the
24th instant there seems to have been a concerted plan over the
island to testify to the disapprobation of the people to the pro-
posed autonomistic plans of the Spanish government. It cul-
minated in this city about 2 o’clock on the morning of the
25th in the principal square of Havana, where a mob as-
sembled with cries of ‘Death to Autonomy!’ and to General
Blanco, and shouting ‘Viva Wevler!’ They made demon-
392 NEED OF A WAR SHIP AT HAVANA

strations, too, against the office of the Diario de la Marina, a
paper established in this town favoring autonomy, but were
dispersed by the military police and soldiers.”

The situation was one of extreme delicacy. The adminis-
tration did not fail to perceive that the lives of American citi-
zens were in some danger and that they should really have the
moral support to be derived from the presence of a man-of-
war; on the other hand, there was the danger that the appear-
ance of a United States war ship in Cuban ports would cause a
demonstration by the already inflamed enemies of autonomy
and of the United States. There was the suggestion in Gen-
eral Lee’s correspondence that a large and influential portion
of the Spanish people in the Cuban cities were really desirous
of a war with the United States, and that this feeling lay to
some extent underneath the manifestations of disorder. Gen-
eral Lee was inclined to think that the arrival of a United
States war ship would so excite the people as to precipitate a
crisis at once, and so, from time to time, he advised delay.
He had, however, come to the conclusion that it was essential
to have a naval force in readiness to act, and the administra-
tion strongly seconded him in this belief. But it saw the
necessity of proceeding cautiously, for Spain was regarding
our naval plans with expressions of disapprobation.

The North Atlantic squadron had orders to rendezvous
about Key West, not, it was stated, because of conditions at
Havana, though the plan for winter drill in those waters un-
doubtedly had in it a measure of precaution. The Maine was
coaled and ready for sea at short notice and was undoubtedly
held in readiness in case of emergency. ‘

On the 12th of January the anti-reform storm broke forth
in serious riots in Havana, taking the shape of attacks upon the
autonomistic papers. A mob headed by several army officers
and made up of hundreds of the conservative Spaniards
wrecked four newspaper offices, the immediate cause being
General Blanco’s refusal to suppress these journals, which were
supporting him. The next day General Lee telegraphed to
ANTI-REFORM RIOTS 893

Washington: “Soldiers sent to protect them fraternized with
the mob. ‘Two attacks were attempted to-day. I am told
that troops massed inside of palace to protect Governor-Gen-
eral shout, ‘ Death to Autonomy!’ ‘Death to Blanco!’ Un-
certainty exists whether Blanco can control situation. If
demonstrated he cannot maintain order, preserve life, and
keep the peace, or if Americans and their interests are in dan-
ger, ships must be sent, and to that end should be prepared to
move promptly. Excitement and uncertainty predominates
everywhere.” Blanco acted promptly and courageously.
Artillery forces and cavalry detachments were placed at all
strategic points in the city. He issued orders also to the au-
tonomie papers to publish nothing more which would inflame
the rioters. This was really a confession of weakness. The
rioters thus gained their point. A death blow had been given
to autonomy! Though the rioting ceased, it was not because
the rioters had been forced to stop. The cause of the -whole
trouble was that the Spaniards were determined that no con-
cession or authority should be given to the Cubans out of re-
spect to the wishes of the United, States or other power, and
they had formed a conspiracy to compel Blanco either to give
up autonomy or leave the island. It was hatched among the
Volunteers and supported even by conservative spirits in
Madrid.

Thousands of troops were brought in from the field and
massed in the city under officers whom Blanco thought he
could depend upon, and gradually quiet was restored, though
there was much suppressed excitement. The Cuban question
was again introduced into Congress and the popular feeling
for intervention strongly asserted itself.

The administration was fully aware of the dangers of the
situation, and quietly began to make preparations to act if
necessary, though maintaining the most friendly attitude
toward Spain. It was evident that autonomy was dead. The
insurgents were driving the Spanish troops from their gar-
risons, the reconcentrados were starving notwithstanding
804 RESUMPTION OF FRIENDLY NAVAL RELATIONS

measures of relief; there could be but one outcome, but one
policy. Spain must yield her sovereignty in the island or face
war. The President, aware that any accident might precipi-
tate trouble and endanger every American on the island, de-
termined to use his diplomacy to induce Spain to peacefully
yield her sovereignty in Cuba, and at the same time prepare to
protect American rights.

In taking the necessary steps the administration desired to
avoid any affront to Spain, and also the dangers of arousing
the excitable Spaniards in Cuba and Spain. To have sent a
battleship into Havana harbor while Blanco was offering as-
surances that the rights of all foreigners would be protected
would in all probability have added new fuel to the riots. In
two or three days quiet had been restored and a few days later
the Spanish minister at Washington was informed that the
United States desired to “resume” friendly naval calls in
Cuban ports. The minister was inclined to demur, but con-
sidering the spirit in which the proposal was made there could
hardly be reason for any diplomatic objection, and any Span-
ish alarm might be prevented if a Spanish war ship made a
similar call at some American port.

On January 24th, Assistant Secretary Day sent the follow-
ing despatch to General Lee:

‘*It is the purpose of this Government to resume friendly naval visits
at Cuban ports. In that view, the Mazne will call at the port of Havana
ina day or two. Please arrange for a friendly interchange of calls with
authorities.”

Secretary Day made a statement to the public in which he
said: “Sending the Maine to Havana means simply the re-
sumption of friendly naval relations with Spain. It is cus-
tomary for naval vessels of friendly nations to pass in and out
of the harbors of other countries with which they are at peace,
and British and German war ships have recently visited
Havana. Thisisno new move. The President has intended
to do it for some time, but heretofore something has happened
 

 

 

 

 

ibvdeanild Aha ath

 

 

1. DRILLING MARINES ON THE BATTLESHIP “NEW YORK.”
2. UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP ‘“ MAINE.”
Blown up in Havana Harbor, February 15, 1898.
SPANIARDS SUSPICIOUS OF THE ‘‘ MAINE” 397

to postpone it. The orders for the Maine mean nothing more
than I have said, and there is nothing alarming or unfriendly
inthem. The Spanish minister here is fully informed of what
is going on, and so far as I know has not made the slightest ob-
jection to it.” Ina public statement the Spanish minister at
Washington said: “It is perfectly in accord with usage for
war ships of two friendly powers to enter and leave each other’s
ports; the war ships of Spain have visited American ports on
complimentary missions three times in as many years, and if
there has not been an American warship in Havana in the
same length of time it is merely because the United States
government has not seen fit to order one there.” Unques-
tionably, it was a purely friendly act from a diplomatic point
of view, and it was so published by the Spanish government,
but the Spanish people were inclined to think otherwise. Ex-
citable Spaniards in Madrid professed to think the United
States had ulterior motives, and General Lee reported that the
Havana authorities were fearful lest it should excite the people
of the city and cause a demonstration. But the Spanish gov-
ernment, to show the appreciation of the courtesy of the United
States — so smooth are the words of diplomacy — announced
that the cruiser Vizcaya would soon pay a visit to an American
port.

As soon as General Lee received Secretary Day’s despatch
he cabled back, advising a postponement of the visit of the
Maine for six or seven days until the recent excitement was
allayed, but he said he would consult the authorities. Cap-
tain-General Blanco had just gone on a trip to the eastern part
of the island in the hopes of converting the insurgent leaders.
Lee received a reply at once that the Maine had been ordered
and would be at Havana the next day. “ Keep us advised by
frequent telegrams.” The next day Lee telegraphed: “ At
an interview authorities profess to think United States has
ulterior purpose in sending ship. Say it will obstruct au-
tonomy, produce excitement, and most probably a demonstra-
tion, Ask that it is not done until they can get instructions
398 THE ‘‘MAINE” ARRIVES AT HAVANA

from Madrid, and say that if for friendly motives, as claimed,
delay is unimportant.”

As the Spanish minister at Washington had been fully in-
formed of the purpose of this government, the ignorance of the
Havana authorities must have been assumed or the authorities
at Madrid had not advised Havana. The former was probably
true, and the objections at Havana were doubtless made to pro-
vide an excuse for the inevitable failure of autonomy. They
saw a chance to cast the responsibility upon the United States
and use it as an argument with the European powers. Madrid
had doubtless advised Havana how to receive the suggestion.

That General Lee had misgivings, not for the Maine, but
of a hostile demonstration on the part of the Volunteers is evi-
dent from the despatch which he sent on the 25th: “ Ship
quietly arrived at 11 a. m. to-day. No demonstration so far.”
The Maine steamed into the harbor with no more disturbance
than attends the arrival of the Key West mail steamer. When
she came alongside Morro Castle she saluted the Spanish flag
with twenty-one guns, the response being given by the guns of
Cabafias. The Maine ran up the Spanish royal ensign and
saluted the Spanish flagship with thirteen guns. The Alfonso
ATI. ran up the Stars and Stripes and returned the salute gun
for gun. The Maine dropped her anchor where the harbor
master directed, and the official calls and other demonstrations
of eternal friendship followed. But in spite of them it was
impossible to overlook the strong undercurrent of feeling ig
the city, the excited talking of groups about the cafés, and the
expressed opinion of radical Spaniards that the cause of Spain
had been betrayed by the government, and that the nation had
been humiliated by the first step in Yankee intervention.
The arrival of the battleship was considered a joyful event
among the Americans, for they had been in suspense and now
felt that they were safe. This alone was enough to anger
some of the Spaniards of the city.

In reality, the appearance of the Maine in Havana harbor
was a necessary and justifiable move for the proper protection
A CRISIS NEAR AT HAND 399

of American citizens. In view of recent outbreaks in the city
our citizens could not feel secure without such protection, and
another outbreak might occur at any time and be less easily
putdown. The State Department had waited until it thought
a reasonable time had elapsed after the outbreak to permit of
the visit of the J/aine being classed as a friendly act, a “ re-
sumption ” of naval cordiality, and a free use of diplomatic
fictions was doubtless wise for its effects not simply upon Spain
but upon the inflammable Spaniards in Havana and the im-
patient people of this country.

It was plain that Congress was watching with impatience
and ill-concealed excitement the next step in the President’s
policy. The belief was strong that when it was made per-
fectly clear to the world that autonomy had failed, the Presi-
dent would feel called upon to act in accordance with the
declarations in his message. It did not seem possible that a
crisis could long be delayed, for if it did not come through the
vigorous action of the President there would evidently be an
uprising in the Congress which would force the issue upon the
country. The Congressional situation was strained to the last
degree, for it was known that the half had not been told re-
garding the horrors of starvation and there was no appreciable
amelioration of the dreadful situation. Only because of the
profound respect for the President’s judgment, the thorough
confidence in his devotion to the national honor, the entire
helief that he would act when the moment was ripe, restrained
the impetuous of his own party, while some of ‘his opponents
were striving to force the question for political effect.
CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE MAINE AND HER COMMANDER— THREATS AND WARN-
INGS— MINISTER Dz LOME’S ABUSIVE LETTER— START-
LING NEWS—THE MAINE BLOWN UP.

The History of the Maine — Captain Sigsbee, Her Commander — His High
Standing in the Navy Department — His Coolness and Self-possession —
A Second in Which to Act — Many Lives Saved by a Prompt Decision
—The Maine in Havana Harbor—An Unused Buoy — Captain Sigs-
bee’s Precautions — Extraordinary Vigilance—The Hostility of the
Spanish Rabble — Warnings Handed to Captain Sigsbee — His Official
Relations — No Cordiality from Spanish Military Officers — Reporters at
Hotel Ingleterra — Story of a Letter from Weyler— Weyler’s Myste-
rious Hints at Mines—General Aranguren Betrayed by a Negro
Captive — Surrounded and Killed — Conditions Worse and Worse —
Publication of the De Lome Letter— Characteristic Spanish Diplo-
macy — De Lome Admits His Authorship and Resigns— Spain’s Dis-
avowal— A Better Feeling—A Midnight Dispatch — Startling News
—‘‘ Maine Blown Up” — An Awful Catastrophe.

battleship, was launched at the Brooklyn Navy Yard

November 18, 1890, and was christened by Miss
Alice Tracy Wilmerding, a niece of General Benjamin F.
Tracy, then Secretary of the Navy. An act of Congress in
1886 authorized her construction at a cost not to exceed $2,-
500,000, and it is said that her exact cost was $2,484,503.
The delay in.completing her was due to difficulty in securing
the heavy armor. Jler dimensions were: Length at load
water line 318 feet, beam 57 feet, draught, 214 feet; her dis-
placement was 6,648 tons. She could carry enough coal to
steam 7,000 miles at ten knots an hour; she had twin screws
and the indicated horse power of her vertical triple-expansion
engines was 9,000. Her armor in the water line belt and the
barbettes was twelve inches thick, and on the turrets ten inches
thick. A protective steel deck, two inches in thickness on
the crown and four inches on the slopes, protected the boilers

(400)

T HE Maine, which was officially rated as a second-class
THE COMMANDER OF THE ‘‘MAINE” 401

and engines. Her armament consisted of a main battery of
four 10-inch guns, mounted in pairs in two turrets, and six
6-inch guns, two each in the bow and stern, and two on the
main deck superstructure, amidships. The other armament
consisted of eight 7-pounders and four machine guns; there
were also seven torpedo tubes and two 30-foot torpedo boats,
each weighing seven tons. She could hurl a broadside of
1,822 pounds, not including her small-arms fire, and she could
fire 1,224 pounds ahead from her two turrets and forward
guns, besides the smaller fire. Her crew consisted of 378
sailors, besides officers and forty marines.

Captain Sigsbee, her commander, is one of the most
popular officers in the Navy Department. For four years he
was chief of the Hydrographic Office, and by his energy it had
been brought up to a high state of efficiency. He was born in
the State of New York in 1845, and entered the service during
the Civil War, having been graduated from the Naval Acad-
emy in 1863 in time to take part as an ensign in the attack on
Mobile Bay under Farragut. In all the various commands
afterwards entrusted to him he showed his skill, energy, and
intelligence, and secured the confidence of the Department
which led to his selection for the important command of the
Maine, a position coveted by many of his rank. He had
earned the reputation of being cool in emergencies, and he dis-
played this quality not long after taking command of the
battleship. In the summer of 1897, while steaming up North
River in New York Harbor, following his prescribed course,
he saw just ahead a big excursion steamer crowded with people,
steering out of course and bearing down upon him. He
quickly signaled for the excursion boat to get out of the way,
but, apparently, no attention was paid to the signals. A min-
ute more and the Maine would run her down, with a certain
loss of scores of lives. Captain Sigsbee had only a second in
which to act; he turned the prow of the Maine inshore and she
went crashing into the wharf. The wharf was wrecked and

the Maine was somewhat damaged, but no lives were lost.
25
402 THE ‘‘ MAINE” ANCHORS IN HAVANA HARBOR

The captain was commended by the Department. After all
was over, a friend asked him what passed through his mind as
he headed towards the wharf.

“T thought,” he said, “ that my naval career was ended.”

It was largely because of his carefulness, unflinching self-
possession, and readiness for emergency that he was selected
for the delicate mission of taking the Maine to the harbor of
Havana, at a time when the presence of an American war ship
was greatly needed there, and much good tact and cool judg-
ment were also required.

The berth given the Maine was in the man-of-war anchor-
age off the Machina, or “ the Shears,” and was, to all appear-
ances, one of the regular mooring buoys of the harbor. The
Havana pilot who conducted her in said it was Buoy No. 4,
but the bearing taken on the Maine soon after anchoring did
not place the ship exactly according to the charted position of
that buoy. No notice was taken of this because it was as-
sumed that the charted position might represent former posi-
tions, and that the buoys might have been changed somewhat

.in the examination of the moorings. It appears to have been
an unusual place for anchorage. Ship captains of several
years’ experience in running into the port of Havana asserted
that they had never known a man-of-war to be anchored at that
buoy, and that merchant vessels were very rarely anchored
there. Unquestionably, it was the least used buoy in the har-
bor. It was stated that the vessel last anchored there before
the arrival of the Maine was the Ligaspi, a Spanish dispatch
boat which had been used by General Weyler in his tours
about the waters of the island. She had run out and anchored
there two days before the Maine arrived, and afterwards had
taken a different position. It was noticed that in the series of
social formalities following the arrival of the Maine the cap-
tain of the Ligaspi never called upon Captain Sigsbce, who re-
garded the fact with some suspicion, but did not consider it of
serious moment.

Fully aware of the state of feeling among the radical Span-
°

SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS FOR THE SHIP'S SAFETY 403

iards and Volunteers in Havana, Captain Sigsbee took extraor-
dinary precautions. He had sentries on the forecastle and
poop, quartermaster and signal boy on the bridge, signal boy
on the poop; the corporal of the guard especially instructed to
look out for the port gangway, the officer of the deck and the
quartermaster particularly directed to look out for the star-
board gangway; a quarter watch was kept on deck all night;
sentries’ cartridge boxes were filled, and their arms kept loaded;
a number of rounds of rapid-firing ammunition were kept in the
pilot house and in the captain’s spare pantry, under the after
superstructure; additional charges of shell were close at hand
for the secondary battery; steam was kept up in two boilers in-
stead of one; special instructions were given to watch care-
fully all the hydraulic gear and report defects, and the officer
of the deck was charged to make detailed reports to Captain
Sigsbee, even of minor matters.

. He also instructed the master-at-arms and the orderly ser-
geant to keep a watchful eye on everybody that came on board.
When visitors went below they were to go with them, and
afterwards were to carefully inspect the routes that these per-
sons had taken lest packages of high explosives should have.
been left somewhere. The whole purport of the various orders
was that the vessel was in a position requiring extreme vigi-
lance.

The reasons for this were not founded upon any distrust
of the high authorities of Havana, but upon the possibilities of
danger from attempts of irresponsible parties. It was hardly
conccived as possible that the Maine stood in any danger of
mines or torpedoes, for they would have required some kind of
official connivance. But the hostility of the Spanish rabble
was very apparent. On the first Sunday after the arrival,
when a ferryboat crowded with people, both civil and military,
returning from a bull fight in Regla, passed the Maine she
was greeted with yells, whistles, and derisive calls from a num-
ber of the passengers. When Captain Sigsbee and other
officers were in the city they would occasionally be handed
»

404 THE ‘‘ MAINE” AN UNWELCOME VISITOR

slips of paper warning them to look out for their ship, but the
captain thought little of these. General Lee was constantly re-
eciving warnings and threats of assassination. One day Cap-
tain Sigsbee received in his mail a card upon which was writ-
ten a lot of stuff — “ Viva Weyler! ” “ Down with the United
States!” “ Are we going to submit to this vessel coming here
from their rotten old fleet?” ete.

Yet his relations with the officials were outwardly cordial.
Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, second in command, was
very particular concerning the occasional visitors, though very
few except those of the highest social standing in the city came
to the ship. They were always accompanied about by officers.
There were but two visits of Spanish military officers. Once a
party of five or six came aboard during Captain Sigsbee’s ab-
sence and they were reported to him as appearing constrained
and not desirous of accepting much courtesy. Captain Sigs-
bee said he invited Spanish officers to the ship, in fact, made
considerable effort to get them on board socially, in order to
show good will according to the spirit of the Maine’s visit, but
they did not come. :

The correspondents of the United States papers and the re-

_ porters of the Havana journals were in the habit of meeting at
the Hotel Ingleterra at night to talk and exchange news. One
of these was Honoré Francois Lainé, the correspondent of the
New York Sun, who was on rather friendly terms with Fran-
cisco Diaz, a reporter for the Union Constitutionel, a Wey-
lerite paper. One night in January, according to Lainé’s
story, they met at the hotel, and Diaz said that he had reliable
information that General Weyler intended to become a can-
didate for the Cortes from the district of Havana. Asked how
he knew, he said that he had a copy of a letter which Weyler
had written to Santos Guzman, a lawver and the head of the
conservative party in Havana, as Spanish as garlic. Guzman
had turned the letter over to the editor of the ultra-Spaniard
Union Constitutionel, in order that at the proper time Wey-
ler’s candidacy might be announced and commented on. Diaz
SUGGESTIVE PARAGRAPHS 405

had succeeded in getting a copy of it, and Lainé made a copy of
which the following is a translation:

Maprip, January 8, 1898.
His Excellency Don Francisco DE Los SANTOS GUZMAN,
HAVANA.

My Distinguished Personal and Political Friend : — Since the last events,
I have changed my views about the attitude which our political party in
Cuba ought to assume. J have thought before that it was more dignified for
us to abstain from the electoral contest: I believe now that it is a patriotic
duty for us to go to the polls. Our success can not be doubted ; neither
can be our majority of voters, nor that, with a program of defense of
national honor, we will have side by side with us all those lukewarm politi-
cians who, though Spaniards by heart are deceived by the inside combina-
tions of Moret and Sagasta and take as scientific solutions of our colonial
problems what are really dishonorable humiliations of our country before
the United States.

Write on your flag, thé flag of Spain: ‘‘ Defense of National Honor,”
and I offer you my name as your candidate. After having commanded
during*two years 200,000 Spanish heroes in Cuba, the title I shall be more
proud of is that of Deputy from Havana at the Cortes of Spain,

By the way, I have read these days that the Americans are thinking about
sending one of their warships to that ety. During my command in Cuba they
did not even dare to dream about tt. They knew the terrible punishment thut
awaited them. Ihave Havana harbor well prepared for such an emergency.
LT rapidly finished the work thut Martinez Campos carelessly abandoned.

“If the insult ts nade, I hope that there will be a Spanish hand to punish tt
as terribly as tt deserves.

Romero is in better health than his friends could have expected, and
notwithstanding how morally sick I feel breathing this humiliating atmos-
phere, is well, also, your affectionate friend and servant, :

‘VVALERIANO WEYLER.

By the time this letter reached Havana the riots had taken
place, autonomy had revealed its weakness, and it had become
a question whether any elections would be held. The Con-
servatives had announced that they would not by voting be-
come parties to such a plan, and the information that Weyler
had changed his mind and counselled participation in the elec-
tions and electing him as deputy in the face of the autonomous
plan was naturally regarded as an important piece of news.
But as the Maine had not then reached Havana, and little or
nothing was known outside of official circles of her intended
visit, the reporters took no notice of the latter part of Weyler’s
406 ARANGUREN BETRAYED AND SHOT

note, regarding it as a species of that braggadocio to which they
had become accustomed when he was Captain-General. Lainé
threw the copy of the letter into his desk, and two days later
the Mazne anchored in the harbor.

Fortunately, the attention of Havana people was somewhat
diverted at just this time by events in the field. General
Blanco had gone on a trip to the eastern end of the island, where
the Spanish forces had suffered several defeats at the hands of
Garcia and Rabi, and on January 27th there was great joy
among the Spaniards when the dead body of the young Cuban
general, Aranguren, who for months had terrorized Havana by
his daring raids, was brought to the city and exhibited. He
had been one of the picturesque figures of the rebellion, second
only to Maceo in the dread he inspired in the Spaniards, and
after he executed Colonel Ruiz, who tried to induce him. to ac-
cept autonomy, the great object of the Spanish officers was to
capture Aranguren dead or alive. But he was not captured in
battle. Through a Cuban prisoner, the Spaniards learned
that the daring insurgent was in the habit of quietly paying
visits to a family in the suburbs of Havana. Offered a bribe
of $500 if he would lead them to the place, the negro accepted,
and one morning the Spanish cavalry burst upon it from all
directions. Aranguren and his orderly were shot at the first
volley, and the younger members of the family fell wounded
into the arms of the father and mother, who were made pris-
oners.

General Blanco’s mission to the east was a complete fail-
ure. He had gone with the expectation of winning the in-
surgent leaders over to autonomy, but their only response had
been to press harder upon the Spanish forces in the east, which
were in a sad condition of neglect, poorly fed, and not paid at
all. The pretence of autonomy was sinking lower and lower
into contempt; the new cabinet was like a hornets’ nest; deeper
and deeper into misery were falling the starving reconcentra-
dos. From an American point of view the situation had be-
come well-nigh intolerable. American citizens were held as
THE DE LOME LETTER 407

virtual prisoners away from their plantations; the American
consuls required constant military and police protection, yet
in response to the appeal for contributions they were doing
everything possible to relieve the condition of the starving
people, while the Spanish guerrillas were doing everything
possible to exterminate them.

In a diplomatic note Spain pleaded for a longer trial of
autonomy and said that the United States could not expect the
war to close within an indefinite period unless filibustering ex-
peditions were prevented. The whole responsibility for the
success of these expeditions she placed upon us, though her
naval vessels were supposed to command the whole coast of
Cuba. This intimation was resented by the United States in
a strong note, detailing our efforts to prevent filibustering.

When affairs were in this delicate situation, the Cuban
Junta in New York made public the following astounding let-
ter purporting to have been written by the Spanish minister
at Washington, Senor De Lome, to the editor of Hl Heraldo at
Madrid, who had recently been on a visit to Cuba:

LEGATION DE EspaNa, WASHINGTON.

Exrmo Sefor Don Josz CaNALEJAS:

My Distinguished and Dear Friend :— You need not apologize for not
having written tome; I also ought to have written to you, but have not
done so on account of being weighed down with work, and nous sommes
quittes.

The situation here continues unchanged. Everything depends upon the
political and military success in Cuba. The prologue of this second method
of warfare will end the day that the Colortial Cabinct shall be appointed,
and it relieves us in the eyes of this country of a part of the responsibility of
what may happen there, and they must cast the responsibility upon the
Cubans whom they believe to be so immaculate.

Until then we will not be able to see clearly and I consider it to be a
loss of time and an advance by the wrong road — the sending of emissaries
to the rebel field, the negotiating with the autonomists not yet declared
to be legally constituted and the discovery of the intentions and purpose of
this government. The exiles will return one by one, and, when they return,
will come walking into the sheepfold, and the chiefs will gradually return.
Neither of these had the courage to leave en masse, and they will not have
the courage thus to return.

The message has undeceived the insurgents who expected something
else, and has paralyzed the action of Congress, but I consider it bad.
408 DE LOME’S ABUSE OF THE PRESIDENT

Besides the natural and inevitable coarseness (groserta) with which he
repeats all that the press and public opinion of Spain has said of Weyler, it
shows once more what McKinley is— weak and catering to the rabble, and,
besides, a low politician, who desires to leave a door open to me and to
stand well with the jingoes of his party.

Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, it will only depend on ourselves
whether he will prove bad and adverse to us. I agree entirely with you;
without a military success nothing will be accomplished there, and without
military and political success there is here always danger that the insurgents
will be encouraged, if not by the government, at least by part of the public
opinion.

I do not believe you pay enough attention to the rdle of England.
Nearly all that newspaper canaitle which swarm in your hotel are English,
and at the same time that they are correspondents of the Journal they are
also correspondents of the best newspapers and reviews in London. Thus
it has been since the beginning. To my mind the only object of England is
that the Americans should occupy themselves with us and leave her in
peace, and if there is a war so much the better; that would further remove
what is threatening her — although that will never happen.

It would be most important that you should agitate the question of
commercial relations even though it would be only for effect, and that you
should send here a man of importance in order that I may use him to make
a propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the Junta and
to win over exiles.

There goes Amblard. I believe he comes too deeply taken up with
little political matters and there must be something very great or we shall
lose.

Adela returns your salutation and we wish you in the new year to be a
messenger of peace and take this New Year’s present to poor Spain.

Always your attentive friend and servant who kisses your hands.

'Enriqur Dupuy DE Log.

How this letter found its way into the hands of the Cuban
Junta was a mystery, and, indeed, has practically remained so,
but it made little difference, as the Spanish minister at once
declined to deny its authenticity, and afterwards admitted it.
Following its publication events moved rapidly. Antici-
pating the inevitable, De Lome cabled his resignation to Sa-
gasta. However much the President might be inclined to
overlook the attack upon himself, he was aware of the serious
aspect of the letter as affecting our relations with Spain. The
State Department, which on the following day came into pos-
session of the original letter, secured from De Lome a frank
affirmation that he had written it, and Minister Woodford was
A BEGUILING SIDE ISSUE 409

requested to demand De Lome’s immediate recall. The Sa-
gasta ministry accepted the resignation in time to prevent this
government from handing De Lome his passports, but the inci-
dent was not regarded as closed unless Spain made some dis-
avowal of the intimations that her agitation of the question
of commercial relations was for nothing more than effect, and
that she proposed to institute a lobby in the United States
Senate.

The negotiations for reciprocal commercial relations formed
one of the diplomatic side issues which Spain was apparently.
using to beguile the United States away from the point of in-
tervention. Of course, our government was obliged to accept
Spanish representations in this line as genuine, whether it
really thought so or not. So long as Spain retained her sov-
ereignty of the island it would be of the greatest advantage to
obtain less discriminating tariffs in Cuba as related to American
goods. In October, 1897, Minister De Lome had notified this
government that as soon as Spain had leisure to take up the
subject he would probably be authorized to enter into negotia-
tions for reciprocal trade arrangements, but the Spanish gov-
ernment never seemed to have lcisure to refer to the subject ex-
cept when the United States showed a fresh disposition to do
something with the Cuban question. On the 6th of February,
or two days before De Lome’s abusive letter was made public,
he called upon John A. Kasson, who had been appointed a
special commissioner plenipotentiary by this government for
these commercial negotiations with Spain, and said that he
had been authorized to act for Spain in the matter and that a
special commissioner would soon arrive from Cuba to repre-
sent the autonomous government. Such was the situation
when De Lome’s letter practically announced that this dicker-
ing over commercial relations was only for effect.

It was apparent enough to all who were watching develop-
ments that all of Spain’s diplomacy was for effect — pro-
fessions of reform, freer commercial relations, the pardoning
of American citizens who had been long imprisoned — all for
410 A STARTLING MESSAGE

the sake of throwing obstacles in the way of active intervention
by this country in Cuban affairs, and of creating sympathy in
Europe: But until this diplomatic veneer had been frankly
exposed in the De Lome letter no notice was taken of it.

On the 14th of February, Spain sent a disavowal of the
sentiments of the letter, and named Don Luis Polo y Barnabe
‘to take De Lome’s place, and the President authorized the
statement that the incident was closed. The tension in the
relations between the two nations appeared to be relaxed; a
resolution for the belligerency of the Cubans was the same day
reported adversely; De Lome had gone to New York, where he
was waiting for the departure of a steamer, and the Spanish
cruiser Vizcaya was on her way to the port of New York to re-
ciprocate the friendly visit of the Maine, which was floating
quietly in the harbor of Havana. Such was the situation
when the following message flashed over the cables to the State

Department:
Havana, February 16, 1898.— 12.80 a. m.
Maine blown up and destroyed to-night at 9.40 p. m. Explosion
occurred well forward under quarters of crew ; consequence many were lost.
It is believed all officers saved, but Jenkins and Merrit not yet accounted
for. Cause of explosion yet to be investigated. Captain-General and Span-
ish army and navy officers have rendered every assistance. Sigsbee and
most of his officers on Ward steamer City of Washington. Others on
Spanish man-of-war and in city. Am with Sigsbee now, who has tele-
graphed Navy Department.
LEE.
CHAPTER XXIX

THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 15, 1898— A FEARFUL EXPLOSION
AND SCENES OF HORROR— REMARKABLE ESCAPES — THE
WORK OF RESCUE— THE NEWS AT WASHINGTON.

A Quiet night in Havana Harbor— The Maine Swinging at her Chain —
A Sudden Roar, a Crashing Explosion, and a Mass of Flying Flames
and Débris— The Shrieks of Dying Men—The Silence of Death —
Captain Sigsbee’s Escape — Standing on the Sinking Ship — Lowering
the Boats — The Officers in the Mess Room — Frightful Experiences —
Lieut. Jenkins Groping in the Water —‘: Which Way ”— Lieutenant
Hood's Graphic Story —The Work of Rescue— A Last Call but no
Answer from the Burning Ruins — Spanish Delight — Captain Sigsbee
Leaves the Ship — Visits from Spanish Officers — Sigsbee’s Despatches
to the Department — ‘‘ Don’ Send War Vessels ’’ — Excitement at Wash-
ington— Scenes at the White House—In the Cabinet Room — The
Official Impression — The General Impression — Sympathy of Spanish
Officials at Havana— Public Funeral of the Victims— Appointment
of the Court of Inquiry.

night of February 15, 1898. The great United States

battleship lay quietly at her anchorage pointing nearly
northwest. About 250 yards ahead of her and midway be-
tween her anchorage and the Machina wharf was moored the
Spanish man-of-war, the Alfonso XII. The Spanish despatch
boat, Ligaspi, which had come out two days before, lay at a
berth a little further to the north. The steamer City of
Washington of the Ward line, which had just arrived, was
lying about two hundred yards to the southward and eastward
of the Maine’s stern, slightly on the port quarter, and other
vessels were quietly at anchor at distances somewhat more
remote.

The stars shone dimly through the still and heavy atmos-
phere, while across the gently undulating waters of the harbor
from every direction vibrated the lights of the city. So quiet
was the night and the surroundings that the echoes of the

(411)

| was a calm, warm night in the harbor of Havana — the
412 THE CALM BEFORE THE AWFUL SHOCK

bugle sounding from the deck of the Maine at tattoo were
singularly distinct, and they fell pleasantly upon the ear.

The usual inspection of, magazines had been completed;
every part of the ship, every room, every passageway had
been entered and examined; the keys had been given to Cap-
tain Sigsbee, who was seated at his port cabin table, writing a
letter to his family. Other officers were in their rooms aft,
reading or writing, or conversing in little groups im other parts
of the ship. Swinging in their hammocks and lying about
the ship forward, some asleep and some spinning yarns, were
the gallant young sailors and marines off duty. Others were
on their watch on deck, and the sentries were at their posts.
The reports had been made to the officer of the watch. Half-
past nine — All was well.

Passengers from the United States on the City of Wash-
ington had come up to the stern of the ship to watch the J/aine.

“We are under the guns of the United States,” said one.
“We are well protected, and we can sit here.”

As they looked there came a roar of immense volume, a
little interval, just enough to be distinguishable, and then a
sharp crashing report, a burst of flame high in the air, and a
great rising mass of smoke, streaked with burning or black fly-
ing objects. The bow of the J/aine rose out of the water, and
then, before the light of the explosion faded, the ship settled
back and down — deeper and deeper — while round the bow
surged a foaming semicircle of water, of débris, and groaning
men, the cries for help falling to a low murmur as the bow
settled below the foam.

Such was the frightful spectacle from a little distance in
that awful moment — at 9.40 on the night of February 15th.

Death sealed the lips of 260 of her gallant men. All that
was known of their experience was told in that appealing cry
for help as it mingled with the hissing and the roaring of the
fearful maelstrom of fire and water in which they were strug-
eling —a ery which died away into a moan and then into
the silence of death.
 

 

 

 

 

DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP “ MAINE” IN THE HARBOR OF HAVANA
FEBRUARY 15, 1898.
A NIGHT OF HORROR 415

Captain Sigsbee was just finishing his letter when he felt
the first crash of the explosion, the trembling and lurching
motion of the vessel and the subsidence. The electric lights
went out. He thought at once that the Maine had been blown
up and was sinking. Thinking it might be necessary for him
to make an exit by the cabin port holes on the starboard he
rushed in that direction, but found that he could get out by the
passage leading to the superstructure. He, therefore, took
the latter route, feeling his way along and steadying himself
by the bulkheads. At the quarter deck he found some of his
officers who had escaped, asked a few questions hurriedly, and
then climbed up on, the side-rail, holding to the main rigging
in order to see over the poop awning, which was covered with
débris, but he could make little out of the black mass ahead of
him. He ordered Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright to post
sentries all around the ship, but in a moment they saw that
there were no marines to post and no place forward to post
them. By this time the surviving officers had all worked
their way out and were standing by his side on the poop. He
commanded silence everywhere, and directed that the forward
magazines be flooded, but soon saw that they were already
under water, and those who were coming up from the ward
room told him that the water was rushing in over everything.
About this time fire broke out in the mass forward and he
could see the white floating bodies in the water and hear their
faint cries. That gave him a better knowledge of the situa-
tion than anything else, and he immediately ordered the boats
to be lowered, but it was found that only two boats were avail-
able. These were lowered and manned and left the ship to
save the wounded, jointly with other boats, which by this time
had arrived on the scene from the Spanish man-of-war and
the City of Washington.

While Captain Sigsbee, with a few of his officers, was
standing there the boats returned and reported that they had
gathered in from the wreck all the wounded that could be
found. ‘The J/aine was settling very fast, and by this time
416 STRUGGLING OUT OF THE RUINS

the deck where the officers stood was level with the gig’s gun-
wale afloat in the water alongside. The fire amidships was
burning more fiercely and the spare ammunition in the pilot-
house was exploding. 7

All the officers were accounted for except Lieutenant Jen-
kins and Engineer Merritt. At the time of the explosion Lieu-
tenants Jungen, Holman, and Jenkins, and Chief Engineer
Howell were at a small table in the after part of the wardroom
messroom talking. Jungen has just finished his cigar and was
rising, when there came the dull, deafening roar, followed by
the frightful crash, and it seemed to them as if the whole ship
was falling to pieces.

“We have been torpedoed!” shouted Holman, jumping
up. “Follow me.”

They had hardly reached the opposite door when the lights
went out and left them in total darkness. Jungen supposed
that both Holman and Jenkins were ahead of him, but he
could hear neither, and stretching out his hands he followed
along till he reached the ladder, which he ascended to the pas-
sageway of the after superstructure, turning to the left, intend-
ing to go forward. But he at once encountered a mass of
débris. He tried to reach the ladder leading to the poop, but
could not. His only escape was to raise himself by a door
on the superstructure. At his first effort he failed and fell
back; straining every muscle for the second effort, he swung
himself up, caught a chain and raised himself to the poop,
where he found the Captain and Lieutenant-Commander
Wainwright. Holman and Howell worked themselves out in
much the same manner, but Jenkins, who had probably tried
to save some papers, missed his way.

The mess attendant, John H. Turpin, had been in the ward-
room pantry when the explosion occurred, and the officers in
the messroom had started to find their way out. Before he
reached the messroom the lights were all extinguished. He
heard Jenkins shout to him, “ Which way?”

“T don’t know which way,” cried Turpin.
TURPIN’S ESCAPE 417

The water was rushing in rapidly, and as they groped about
came nearly to their waists.

“Which way?” shouted Jenkins again.

“T don’t know, sir, which way,” replied Turpin again, as
he felt his way along a wall. The water rose to his breast and
Jenkins shouted again, and again Turpin replied that he could
not make out his direction. Suddenly the whole compart-
ment lit up by the light of an explosion — one of the after-
explosions in the magazines — and Jenkins started forward,
threw up both his hands, and fell by the steerage pantry. Tur-
pin got his direction, and groped his way aft to the captain’s
ladder, which he found carried away. The water was up to his
chin, and rushing in with frightful rapidity. He was just
giving up when he felt a rope, and climbing on this hand over
hand, he reached the deck, from which he soon jumped over-
board. As he swam out a Spanish gig passed him, but he dove
under water, thinking that the ship had been attacked and
that he would be captured. When he came up he swam
towards the Maine’s barge and was pulled in. By this time
many small boats were about the wreck, picking up the drown-
ing men, and many were the thrilling, the fearful experiences
of those who succeeded in extricating themselves from the
awful wreck.

Lieutenant Hood’s graphic story, as told to the Naval
Board of Inquiry, gives a graphic picture of the horrors fol-
lowing the explosion. He said: “I was sitting on the port
side of the deck, with my feet on the rail, and I both heard
and felt — felt more than I heard —a big explosion that
sounded and felt like an under-water explosion. I was under
the impression that it came from forward starboard at the
time. I instantly turned my head and that instant there was
asecond explosion. I saw the whole starboard side of the deck
and everything above it as far aft as the after end of the super-
structure spring up in the air with all kinds of objects in it —
a regular crater-like performance with flames and everything
else coming up. J immediately sprang behind the edge of the
418 EXPERIENCE OF HOOD AND THOMPSON

superstructure for shelter, as there were a number of objects
flying in my direction. J ran very quickly aft, as fast as I
could, along the after end of the superstructure, and climbed
up on a kind of step. I went under the barge, and by this
time the explosion had passed. The objects had stopped fly-
ing around. Then I saw on the starboard side an immense
amount of foaming water and wreckage and groaning men
out there. It was scattered around in a circle, I should say
about a hundred yards in diameter, off on the starboard side. I
immediately proceeded to lower the gig with the help of an-
other man. After I got that in the water, several officers
jumped in it and one or two men, to rescue the wounded. In
the meantime somebody else was lowering the other boat on
the port side. I heard some groans forward and ran forward
on the quarter deck down the poop ladder, and I immediately
brought up on an immense pile of wreckage. I saw one man
there who had been thrown from somewhere, pinned down by
aventilator. We got him up just in time, just before the water
rose over him.”

Corporal Thompson was lying in his hammock on the port
gangway about twenty feet from the turret, when he was sud-
denly thrown through the port awning as high as the super-
structure. He fell hack on the deck stunned. As soon as he
realized his position, he regained his feet and hung to the ridge
rope till the water came nearly up to his neck. Just then a
rope was thrown him from one of the boats; he let go of the
ridge rope, sank, came up and managed to catch the line and
was pulled into the boat.

Every few minutes, as the Maine burned fiercely, a shell
would burst, scattering the flaming débris all about, but still
the men in the boats worked bravely to find the injured. No
more cries could be heard, though they knew that over 200
sailors must be on board. Then an officer of one of the
Maines \oats approached the ship, and, with a voice that
could be heard far away in the stillness of the night called out:
“Tf any one is alive on board, for God’s sake say so!” AI
DELIGHT OF THE RABBLE AND OFFICIAL REGRET 419

waited for an answer, but none came, save the echo from the
shore.

Nearly all Havana was on the wharves watching the spec-
tacle, and among the rabble could be heard the ery of “ Viva
Lispana!” and “ Mueran los Americanos!” Expressions of
delight were unmistakable.

While Captain Sigsbee and Lieutenant-Commander Wain-
wright were watching the details of the awful,scene from the
poop, it became evident that they must take to the boats, as
there was danger that the forward magazine might explode,
for parts of it were constantly going off. Everything had been
done that could be done. So they left the ship and went to
the City of Washington, where they found the wounded and
dying lying upon mattresses in the dining saloon. Many had
been taken aboard the Spanish war ship, where they were being
cared for. Having observed that the wounded were being at-
tended to, and having directed a muster to be taken of those
on board the rescuing vessels, the Captain went on deck and
took a last look of the burning wreck of his vessel. At mid-
night he went below and dictated a telegram to the Navy De-
partment. While there several Spanish officers — civil, mili-
tary, and naval — came on board, in their own behalf and in
representative capacity, expressing sympathy and sorrow for
“the accident.” There were the representatives of General
Blanco and of the admiral of the station, and the civil governor
of the province was on board in person. Having finished his
telegrams, Captain Sigsbee met the group of Spanish gentle-
men and thanked them for their visit and sympathy. In-
variably, their expressions of sympathy were followed by
eager inquiries as to Captain Sigsbee’s idea of the cause of the
accident, for accident it must have been, they said. Inva-
riably, the Captain replied that he must await further investi-
gation. Doubtless, this curiosity was natural. Even if entirely
innocent, they knew that Spanish designs would be suspected
because of the bitter feeling in Havana toward the United

States, and because of the desperate character of the officers
26
420 VISITORS INSIST UPON THE ACCIDENT THEORY

of the Volunteers, as well as some of those of the regular army.
But Captain’s Sigsbee’s visitors insisted that it must have been
an accident.

“Tam convinced it was the dynamo boiler,” said a Spanish
naval officer.

“ But we had no dynamo,” said Captain Sigsbee.

“Then it must have been the boilers,” said the Spanish
officer.

“But the forward boilers had not been lighted for three
months,” replied Sigsbee. “ Only the after boilers were used,
and the explosion oceurred well forward.”

But the torpedoes, someone suggested. The torpedoes had
not been fitted with war-heads, and without them the torpe-
does were harmless. Besides, they were kept aft. As for the
forward magazines, the ammunition was exploding in detail
while the officers were talking, and kept on exploding much
of the night. Fifty feet aft from the bow was the first store-
room for ammunition. It was twenty feet wide across the
ship, twelve feet fore and aft, and seven feet high. On one
side was kept the shells and on another the powder for the 6-
inch guns. Aft of this room was another of the same dimen-
sions, the storeroom for ammunition for the six-pounder, and
one-pounder Hotchkiss guns. Back of this was the first of the
ship’s large magazines, twenty-cight feet wide and twenty-four
feet fore and aft. It was divided into three compartments by
partitions, so that one-half of the magazine was used for
powder for the 10-inch guns, and the other compartments
contained powder for the 6-inch guns and shells for the 10-
inch guns. Running along either side of the magazine were
narrow coal bunkers. Everything had been thoroughly in-
spected shortly before the explosion. Had the explosion
originated in those magazines, thought the survivors of the
Maine, there would have been nothing left to explode. But
they kept their thoughts to themselves. It was a critical time.

The despatch Captain Sigsbee sent to the Navy Depart-
ment was as follows:
CAPTAIN SIGSBEE’S DISPATCHES 421

“* Maine blown up in Havana harbor at 9.40 last night and destroyed.
Many wounded and doubtless more killed or drowned. Wounded and
others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamers. Send light-
house tender from Key West for crew and the few pieces of equipment
above water. None has clothing other than that upon him. Public
opinion should be suspended until further report. All officers believed to
be saved; Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish
officers, including representatives of General Blanco, now with me to
express sympathy.”

He also sent the following to Key West:

“Tell admiral Maine blown up and destroyed. Send lighthouse
tenders. Many killed and wounded. Don't send war vessels if others
available.” ;

When asked afterwards at Washington why he had ad-
vised against sending war ships he said: “In the first place
there was a great deal of excitement, and I wanted to work
along without men-of-war, and to allay the excitement in the
city; and, in the next place, if there were any more mines, I
did not want any more war vessels blown up. Up to that
time I had ‘strongly recommended that the Indiana be sent
there, just to show them that the Maine was not the only vessel
in the navy or the most powerful. After that time I had no
more confidence in the people. Treachery had been shown us,
and there was no special care for us. They had not attempted
to protect us.”

General Lee was sitting in his room in his hotel when the
explosion occurred, and as soon as he learned that it was the
Maine, he hastened to the palace and asked for General Blanco.
He came immediately and Lee said that tears were in his eyes.
He seemed to regret it as much as anyone in Havana. But he
soon heard that many Spanish officers were drinking cham-
pagne at different cafés in honor of the event.

Three hours after the Maine had been blown up representa-
tives of the press were rushing about Washington in cabs at
midnight, ringing doorbells, and informing the Secretary of
the Navy and every one connected with the department, of
“a bad accident to the Maine.” There was no doubt in the
422 EXCITEMENT IN WASHINGTON

minds of the Secretary of the Navy and his assistants that
something unfriendly had happened to the battleship sent on
her “ friendly mission ” a little more than a fortnight before.
Suppressed excitement continued everywhere. Early the
next morning crowds were gathered about the models of battle-
ships and cruisers in the halls of the Navy Department. Men
of the press and others were keeping a well-worn path between
the Department and the White House, and here and there
were little groups, all quiet, talking in low tones, some faces
white, with strained expressions. At the White House were
more faces white and strained, and the few words one heard
were in strangely quiet undertones. The men on duty at
the door and about the halls replied mechanically to questions
of visitors.

Preparations for the last of the series of official recep-
tions to be given the next evening had been nearly completed
— the box arrangements for wraps all up in the outer corridor,
and floral decorations in the east room and state parlors. A
woman came in, and, as her first glance fell upon the impro-
vised cloak-room, she exclaimed:

“Oh, you are not going on with the reception, are you,
while a hundred American sailors lie dead in Flavana?”’

Her voice trembled with feeling, though she did not know
that instead of one hundred dead American sailors, there were
260. That was given out later. There had been no order as
yet to give up the reception, and the attendant to whom she
spoke looked distressed, but could only reply:

“T—I don’t know.”

Up in the Cabinet-room the President was talking it over
with such members of his cabinet as were in town, and during
the day the contents of the dispatches from Havana were
given out from time to time. There was no disposition to
withhold anything, and, indeed, it would have been very un-
wise to have done so, undcr the strain of public excitement and
anxiety. When the Attorney-General came out of the eabinet-
room he was instantly surrounded by men of the press, who
 

 

 

 

 

APPEARANCE OF THE BATTLESHIP “MAINE” A FEW DAYS AFTER THE EXPLOSION.
A wrecking boat hoisting one of the great guns from the wreck.
THE OFFICIAL AND THE GENERAL IMPRESSION 425

looked rather than asked the questions usually “fired” in
quest of information. He stood his ground well, looking
them squarely in the face as he said in cool, deliberate tones:

“Everything known about the disaster will be given out;
the President directs it, and you will learn all from the Seere-
tary of the Navy. Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, that I
should say nothing more.”

Then, after an instant’s pause, he added: “The Spanish
government at Havana tenders its sympathy.” He bowed and
passed down the stairway. There was not a word of comment.
Men of the press had become hardened to the “ friendly rela-
tion ” phase of the Cuban policy.

Ten minutes later the Secretary of the Navy came out of
the cabinet-room. Three men who had been waiting for him
were at his side at once. On their return one was asked: -

“ Well, what is the impression — the official impression? ”’

“Oh, the official impression is that it was an accident.”

“ And the other impression — the general impression? ”

“ Oh, the general impression is that it was not an accident.”

In the meantime at the Navy Department telegrams were
coming by the score from relatives and friends of the dead sail-
ors buried next day at Havana. A Court of Inquiry to in-
vestigate the cause of the disaster was at once appointed, and
it was also promptly decided not to send another warship to
Havana for the present. General Lee, ag well as Captain
Siesbee, advised against sending another ship at once, and,
undoubtedly, they had good reasons for such advice.

The Spanish authorities, however, acted in the most sym-
pathetic and cordial manner. The hospitals were opened for
the wounded and the Spanish physicians and nurses assisted
the surgeon of the ship in alleviating the sufferings of the in-
jured. It being-impossible to embalm the dead and send them
to this country, the bodies that were found were buried in
Havana, Captain-General Blanco offering to give them a public
funeral at the public expense. There was a great funeral
cortége, in which 5,000 people were in line. The Bishop of
426 THE COURT OF INQUIRY BEGINS ITS WORK

Havana, assisted by the chaplain of the ship, conducted the re-
ligious ceremonies. No trouble was spared in Havana to make
the survivors as comfortable as possible and to show sympathy
for the great loss by the “ accident.”

The Court of Inquiry, composed of Captain William T.
Sampson, Captain French E. Chadwick, Lieutenant-Com-
mander William P. Potter, and Lieutenant-Commander
Adolph Marix, proceeded at once to Havana and began a secret
investigation on Monday the 21st. Divers were set to work
under command of Captain Sigsbee. At first some little fric-
tion developed as to cur rights in the wreck. When early on
the morning of the 18th Captain Sigsbee and three of his offi-
cers rowed out to endeavor to find in the hulk the bodies of
Lieutenant Jenkins and Engineer Merritt, they were stopped
by a guard of armed Spanish sailors surrounding the sunken
battleship. Captain Sigsbee declared who he was and his in-
tentions, but they told him that they had strict orders not to
allow any diver employed by Americans to go down unless ac-
companied by a Spanish diver. Captain Sigsbee returned and
together with General Lee held a long discussion with the Ad-
miral and General Blanco. It was urged that the wreck was
American property and under the jurisdiction of American
officers, and the point was finally carried. Had the Havana
authorities insisted on their claim, the impression would natur-
ally have been formed that they had reason to fear that some-
thing incriminating them would be found. They asked for a
joint investigation, but the court preferred to act independ-
ently, with assurances to the Spanish officials that, on their
part, every facility for making a separate investigation would
be extended to them.

The administration had every reason for confidence in the
members of the Court of Inquiry. Captain Sampson had been
chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for several years, and was
a man of positive convictions and judicial disposition. The
other members had special qualifications which entitled them
to confidence.
CHAPTER XXX

PREPARING FOR WAR—EVIDENCE OF SPANISH TREACHERY
—MILLIONS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE— A HISTORICAL
MOMENT — THE DRIFT INTO WAR.

Effects of the Mune Incident upon Our Cuban Policy — A Plain, Concrete
Case —The People Remain Patient — The President’s Policy Inter-
rupted — Reasons for the Accidental Theory — Not Really Believed in
Official Circles — General Lee Informs the State Department that It
Looked Like an Outside Explosion — Sudden Activity in Official
Circles— Preparations for War— Oregon Ordered Home — Dewey
Ordered to Concentrate His Fleet— Arrival and Departure of the
Vizcaya — Our Precautions for Her Safety — Spain’s Responsibility for
the Safety of the Maine — Deeper and Deeper Misery in Cuba— Red
Cross Work — Spain’s Request for the Recall of General Lee — Her
Reasons — Probing for the Weyler Letter—Lainé’s Arrest and Ex-
pulsion — Lee Finds a Weyler Telegram — Corroborative Evidence —
The President Seeks Support in Congress — $50,000,000 for National
Defense — A Critical Moment in Our National Life.

or delayed actual hostilities. Undoubtedly, it erystal-
ized American sentiment; here was something concrete
in its character and appealing directly to the sentiment of the
people as Americans. If they had been balancing doubtfully
as to our grounds for interference because of Spanish excesses
in Cuba and Spanish disregard of our rights, they could doubt
no longer when a fine battleship lay at the bottom of Havana
harbor, with the mangled bodies of 260 sailors and marines
in the wreck. They might fail to appreciate the serious-
ness of affairs when couched in the smooth words of diplo-
macy, but the ruin of the Maine was understood. No matter
whether it suggested motives of revenge or not; it suggested
action. There was something more than a general impression
that it was not an accident. It was a belief.
Nevertheless, the people were not at first impatient. Self-
repression was a dominant characteristic, even in Congress.
(427)

| T is a question whether the J/aine incident really hastened
428 DELAY CAUSED BY THE “‘ MAINE” CALAMITY

Nothing else was talked about in conversation, but little was
said in public utterance to arouse the suppressed excitement,
and though it was attempted it met a silent reproof even from
Cuban sympathizers who fully realized that action must fol-
low. But it introduced a new phase into our relations with
Spain, and one which required a little time for an adjustment,
so that we might not appear to rush into war out of pure re-
venge. It really interrupted the course of the policy which
the administration had laid down. Spain had been given to
understand that we could not contemplate an indefinite con-
tinuance of the existing affairs in Cuba; our war ships had been
sent to the vicinity of Cuba, and as a preparation for a vigorous
policy the President had collected from the consuls on the
island a great mass of reports confirming all the assertions in
the newspapers about the starving reconcentrados. Congress
had called for these reports and the President was just on the
point of giving them to Congress and to the world when the
news of the Maine explosion came. So the reports were held
back in the fear that, when added to the disaster, the excite-
ment might lead Congress to declare war on the instant, and
prudence commanded that we should go to war, if we went at
all, decently and in order.

It was for this reason that the administration fostered the
impression that the sinking of the Maine might have been an
accident, while the “ peace-at-any-price ” men became almost
ridiculous in their efforts to show that it certainly was an acci-
dent. They were willing to gloat over and enlarge upon any
rumor that the discipline on the Mazne was bad, rumors which
usually emanated from similar sources. To all appearances,
they would have been glad to shift the responsibility upon one
of the most competent and gallant of our naval officers, and
their attitude had an exasperating rather than a quieting ef-
fect upon the mass of the people, who were waiting patiently
for the report of the naval board. On the other hand, all
sorts of rumors were circulated by those who seemed desirous
of plunging the country at once into war. The administra-
THE PRESIDENT’S PRUDENCE AND SELF-CONTROL 429

tion, doubtless in the interest of peace and dispassionate judg-
ment, appeared to hold the theory that the country should con-
sider the disaster to the Maine an accident till there had been
ample evidence to the contrary; on the other hand, the people
preferred the theory that it should be considered a piece of
Spanish treachery till there should be ample evidence to the
contrary.

But if the higher officials of the administration and the
leaders of Congress would not admit that they saw evidences
of Spanish treachery in this tragedy following the long chain
of dramatic incidents connected with our controversy with
Spain, in their hearts was even more than a grave fear and a
dark suspicion. And it was not long before this suspicion was
strenethened. The administration does not seem to have sought
information of a conclusive character till the whole could
Le known and given to the public. But if prudence required
its members to avoid exciting Congress and the people, it also
required it to secure some little intimation of what might be
expected. Going to war is not a simple business. It requires,
besides ways and means, men and arms, and a motive which any
European nation favorable to Spain or hostile to the United
States on general principles could not question. To rush into
war might prove disastrous, and yet the President felt that if
anything developed showing conclusively that the J/aine was
blown up from outside war would become inevitable. The
people would hardly allow the government to take any other
course, and no man ever hada greater respect for the sentiment
of the people than President McKinley. They could not ap-
preciate the perils of the situation nor the tremendous respon-
sibilities resting upon the executive, who knew we were living
overavoleano. But he wisely counseled patience and allowed
the people to think that he believed the Maine to have met her
fate through an accident. He had planned a Cuban policy
upon broad lines, and it was a very serious matter to have such
a disaster at such a moment suggesting in the hearts of so many
the thought of revenge or swift retribution. Every considera-
430 PREPARATIONS FOR ACTION

tion of prudence and safety required him to keep this great
moving patriotic sentiment of a nation of nearly 80,000,000
people in check. But could he?

General Lee sent but one dispatch concerning the investi-
gation of the causes of the disaster, and that was the day after
the naval board began its inquiry. In it he said: “ Copper
cylinders’ ammunition found intact in 10-inch forward maga-
zine, starboard side, this morning. Seems to show that maga-
zine not exploded. Evidence beginning to prove explosion
on port side by torpedo.”

This dispatch was not given out then, not till long after; it
would have been unwise; but the keen senses of the newspaper
men knew that something had happened. “Owing to some
inexplicable cause,” wrote one on the 24th, “ the air of Wash-
ington is again surcharged with feverish excitement over the
extremely delicate situation resulting from the destruction of
the battleship Maine.”

The people understood the pacific official expressions and
were not surprised when preparations for action were suddenly
begun. Vessels out of commission were being put in readi-
ness; ammunition was being manufactured at an unusual rate;
coal was being stored at convenient points along the coast;
fortifications were-being repaired and put in readiness for the
defense of the coast; inquiries concerning the mobilization of
the naval and ordinary militia were sent to a few States likely
to be first summoned into action in case of war. On March
9th it was decided to withdraw the battleship Oregon from the
Pacific squadron. Such a step could hardly have been taken
had peace been deemed probable, for it imposed upon the
battleship a very long journey around the Horn. Orders were
sent to Rear Admiral Dewey, commander of the Asiatic naval
squadron, to concentrate his ships at Hong Kong; in fact, no
step was spared for placing us in a position to sternly face a foe
in the immediate future. Spain also began to negotiate for
ships, and, fearing the successful consummation of such nego-
tiations, Secretary Long on March 9th cabled to the naval at-
SPANISH INVESTIGATION A FARCE 431

tachés of the United States abroad to obtain options on armored
cruisers and torpedo boat-destroyers.

At the White House and State Department, where they
were preparing to make representations to Spain in connection
with the Maine disaster and the general Cuban question, they
were talking peace. In the Military and Naval Departments,
where they were preparing for war, they were talking peace.
The average Senator or Representative was talking war.
With them war was inevitable. But, peace or war, the Presi-
dent had a fixed purpose in view. If forcible intervention
came, it would be because Spain declined to consider inter-
mediary propositions looking to the independence of the island
through peaceful means. He determined to keep his existing
Cuban policy intact and to handle the Maine disaster as a sepa-
rate incident.

So far as could be seen, the Spanish authorities made no at-

.tempt to discover whether a plot to blow up the Maine had
existed. They seem to have taken it for granted that it was
an accident, and their investigation was a farce — a most trans-
parent effort to bolster up the accident theory. The whole
forward part of the ship from a point just abaft the forward
turret had been twisted fifteen or twenty degrees to starboard,
and that part of the wreck was a wilderness of débris and curled
and twisted plates.

But was the force of the explosion inward or outward? In
seeking to answer this question the divers soon found con-
clusive testimony.

When it became evident from what little leaked out that
the disaster could not have been caused by an explosion of the
boilers, the “ official impression ” was that it must have been
due to the explosion of the forward magazines where the pow-
der was.

It was evident by the 26th that the administration had in
reality abandoned the accident theory, and at a cabinet meet-
ing the possibilities of the future were discussed. Even if it
were conclusively shown that the Spanish government either
432 THE ‘‘ VIZCAYA” VISITS NEW YORK

at Madrid or at Havana had nothing to do with the design,
Spain would be no less responsible for not protecting the ship
while in the harbor, particularly if she had been deliberately
anchored over a mine.

The Spanish cruiser Vizcaya, which had arrived at the
port of New York in the midst of the public excitement over
the loss of the Maine, departed on February 26th as safe and
sound asshe came. The precautions of the port authorities to
guard the Spanish vessel from all harm were thorough and ef-
fective, and the extreme to which these precautions were car-
ried was illustrated by the fact that even the Holland sub-
marine boat was constantly watched. The government, in
short, accepted its responsibility for the security of a foreign
vessel of war visiting its waters on a friendly mission.

It is a principle of international law that a ship of war ad-
mitted to a foreign port is accorded the privilege of extra-terri-
toriality. While ordinarily this consists simply of immunity
from local jurisdiction, yet by reason of the principles under-
lying the privilege of extra-territoriality such vessel of war is
entitled to the same immunity and inviolability which sur-
rounds the person of an ambassador and his hotel. It becomes,
therefore, the duty of the authorities responsible for the gov-
ernment of the harbor visited by a foreign public vessel to use
due diligence that such vessel is not injured by any violence of
the inhabitants or by any hidden means of injury known to
such government, such as submarine mines, torpedoes, or other
concealed means of defense. And this duty is intensified to
the highest degree when the fact is taken into consideration
that foreign public vessels of war, being subject to the port.
regulations, must anchor where directed by the local authori-
ties.

It is a well-established fact that a government is liable for
damages done to alien residents of a country by a mob which
by due diligence it could have repressed. Italy not long ago
was indemnified by the United States for the injury done to her
citizens by a mob in New Orleans. In 1853 the Congress of
 

 

 

 

IN HAMMOCKS “’TWEEN DECKS” — WHERE “JACK” SLEEPS ON A BATTLESHIP.
SPANIARDS AND REBEL3 EQUALLY FIRM 455

the United States acceded to the demand of Spain for the in-
demnity for losses sustained by the consul of Spain and other
persons residing at New Orleans or at Key West, in the year
1851, through the violence of individuals excited by the intel-
ligence then recently received at those places of the execution
of certain persons in Havana by the Spanish authorities of
Cuba.

Should it be established that the Maine was blown up
either through design or want of due diligence on the part of
the authorities at Havana, Spain’s responsibility would be com-
plete, and would justify the United States in resorting to dras-
tic measures of redress.

Convinced that the Cubans would not accept the plan of
autonomy proposed, the autonomist party in Cuba began to
discuss additional measures without any assurance from Spain
that she would consent to them. They were suggested with
the evident intention of determining, if possible, to what ex-
tent it would be necessary to go to induce the insurgents to lay
down their arms. But the insurgents continued firm in their
demand for absolute independence, and Spain was in reality
equally firm in her determination to maintain her sovereignty
and reject any active interference by the United States.

Financially, Spain was sinking deeper and deeper into
debt, and knew not how to pay arrears due the army, civil
servants, and other debtors, while an annual interest charge of
“$65,000,000 was due and the Cuban indebtedness had arisen
to nearly $500,000,000. Meanwhile, affairs both financial
and military seemed to be drifting without any clear plan of
action or distinct hopes for the future. Bad as this was, the
starvation and suffering in Cuba were much worse. Official
statistics as reported showed that in the province of Matanzas
alone 50,000 people had perished, and a third of the popula-
tion left were in destitution.

Miss Clara Barton of the Red Cross Society, on her arrival
in Cuba reported that the condition was far worse than she
had believed possible. ‘The planters and business men were
436 HOPELESS AND DISTRESSED CUBA

almost.or quite ruined. It appeared as if years of peace would
be required to restore industry and commerce to a normal
state. In short, the entire condition of the island was des-
perate and apparently almost hopeless. Wholly apart from
the Mazne disaster, the serious issue in the Cuban question was
a continuing one. Our government had reached the belief
that the time had nearly come when humanity and commercial
interests alone required it to intervene.

While the Court of Inquiry was conducting its inquiry, the
public waited patiently and with little knowledge of the nature
of the testimony or of the impression made upon the members
of the board, which observed the greatest secrecy. But some
points, for which the enterprising press were lying in wait,
leaked out, such as, for example, the fact that much of the am-
munition in the forward magazine was found intact. Every-
thing went to confirm the general impression and belief that
the disaster was not an accident. The public had made up its
mjnd with an instinct which is generally unerring.

If the official appeal for help for the starving reconcen-
trados had been made in the hope that the sympathy of the
people of the United States would prove the most humane
factor, and therefore one of the most powerful influences in the
peaceful effort to bring the war to a speedy close, it was a hope
with little promise of fulfillment. Apparently, it had no effect
on Spain. The authorities at Madrid and Havana did nothing,
and did not try todo anything. But the American relief con-
tinued and could not be withdrawn when the need for it was
becoming more and more pressing.

Up to the 10th of March the American committee for the
relief of the reconcentrados had distributed rations to 18,000
starving people in Havana and the neighboring towns of
Guanabacoa, and 85,000 in the whole island. Still the misery
was intense and people were dying by the hundreds every
day.

When, early in March, it was announced that fresh supplies
would be carried to the island on two American war ships —
°

SPAIN ASKS THE RECALL OF GENERAL LEE 437

the Montgomery and the Nashville —the expedition was
awaited with especial interest in view of the fate of the Mazne,
and this was followed by much disturbance of feeling when
Spain, through Minister Woodford, requested that supplies
should not be sent to Cuba on war vessels, and that our govern-
ment should recall Consul-General Lee, through whose active
efforts supplies had been distributed where most needed. The
Madrid papers were charging that General Lee’s sympathies
were more with the insurgent than with the Spanish forces,
and that he was in friendly relations with correspondents of
papers which were considered to be decidedly unfriendly to
Spain. They were so considered because they had endeavored
to give a true and adequate idea of the sufferings on the island
and the inhuman practices of the Spanish soldiers; also because
they offered evidence that the Maine had been destroyed by
design. It would have been strange, indeed, had Mr. Lee
failed to have sympathy for the insurgents after what he had
observed, but he at all times carefully refrained from official
acts that would have compromised him or the people he repre-
sented.

After the destruction of the Maine, the correspondent,
Lainé, whose story was afterwards told to a Senate committee,
bethought himself of the Weyler letter, to the latter part of
which he had paid little heed at the time a copy of it came into
his possession. Lainé asserted that he tried to see Diaz, his
informant, and secure, if possible, the original of the letter,
but could not. He assumed that Diaz, being a Spaniard, must
have notified the authorities that he had a copy of the letter,
for on March 4th he was arrested and kept in Cabajia fortress.
Through a friend who had witnessed the arrest, he had been
able to inform the consul-general. On the 9th he was ex-
pelled from the island. He averred that the Spanish police
officials had informed him that they knew of his secret, but
that it would die with him, and he considered that he had been
expelled rather than killed because he had been enabled to
make his arrest known.
438 THE WEYLER LETTER CONSIDERED GENUINE

The letter was published in a New York paper and drew
forth a denial from Guzman that he had ever received it, and
from Weyler that he had ever sent it. General Lee knew
Lainé well, and had, as he says, always found him “a very up-
right, honest, straight fellow.” When he saw the copy of the
Weyler letter, therefore, he thought the chances were that he
had a copy of a genuine letter, and he set some machinery at
work with the result that he found a cablegram signed “ Wey-
ler,” sent from Barcelona to Eva Canel and Santos Guzman.
The former was quite a noted Spanish woman in Havana who
was a great admirer of General Weyler. During the mob riots
she had shouted “ Viva Weyler!” and “ Muera Blanco!” and
was finally expelled from the island by Blanco and sent to
Mexico. Guzman was the one to whom the letter Lainé
showed had been addressed. This cablegram read:

“Grave circumstances cause me to ask you to destroy the last letter of
February 18.”

General Lee was entirely satisfied that it was a genuine
telegram received at Havana, and considered it corroborative
of the letter shown by Lainé. The cablegram seemed to refer
to a later letter, and to all appearance was sent after receiving
information that his former letter had been made public. It
will be noticed that Lainé’s arrest occurred the 4th, the request
for Lee’s recall the 6th, and Lainé expulsion on the 9th.

Many saw in Spain’s request for the recall of General Lee
the hand of De Lome, who had just arrived at Madrid, as he
was known to have advised his government to take such a
course when he was minister. When the State Department
first considered sending relief supplies to Cuba by war ships,
De Lome had been very prompt to protest, and he also spoke
unofficially to members of the State Department of what he
considered the impropriety of General Lee’s conduct in Ha-
vana.

The request for Lee’s withdrawal was promptly refused hy
the President, who said in a public statement: “The President
THE PRESIDENT ENDORSES GENERAL LEE 439

will not consider the recall of General Lee. He has borne him-
self throughout this crisis with judgment, fidelity, and courage
to the President’s entire satisfaction. As to the supplies for
the relief of the Cuban people, all arrangements have been
made to carry a consignment this week from Key West by one
of the naval vessels, whichever may be the best adapted and
most available for the purpose, to Matanzas and Sagua.”

It was decided to send the supplies in the Pern with the
Montgomery as convoy, so, practically, both requests from
Spain were refused and she was too wise to press them. The
tone of the conservative press in Spain became very hostile to
the United States, though the ministry made frequent ex-
pressions of its desire for friendly relations. Elections for the
Cortes were pending and the Liberals were anxious that a ma-
jority should be chosen in support of the Sagasta ministry.
There had been no election since the Canovas ministry, and
thus the Liberals were in a minority, dangerous in view of the
complications ahead.

The trend of events was unmistakable. The administra-
tion was doing everything possible to place the navy and army
on a war footing and Spain was making efforts to buy war ves-
sels. The President felt that the time had come to add to the
fleet, and that required the support of Congress. His consulta-
tions with the leaders of Congress plainly showed that he would
be gladly supported in any preparations for war, though there
was some hesitancy shown by the naval committee, curiously
enough, from the representatives of the State of Maine. The
result of the President’s consultation was the introduction by
Mr. Cannon, chairman of the House Committee on Appropria-
tions, of a measure setting apart $50,000,000 for the defense
of the nation to be used at the President’s discretion. No
statement was made of the reason why such a sum was de-
manded. But it was warmly approved throughout the coun-
try. The people simply knew that the controversy with Spain
had reached such a point that the President felt it his duty to

prepare for war. The bill was as follows:
a7
440 REVIVAL OF AMERICAN PATRIOTISM

“Be it enacted, etc., that there is hereby appropriated out of any money
in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the national defense and for
each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discre-
tion of the President and to remain available until June 30, 1899,
$50,000,000.”

It was passed in the House of Representatives on the 8th
and in the Senate on the 9th of March, without a dissenting
voice in either body and without debate in the Senate; and it
was at once signed by the President. One of the striking
features in the debate in the House was the apparently gen-
eral agreement that it was essentially a peace rather than a war
measure. The argument was that to be well prepared for any
possible emergency was the best way to insure the calm and
reasonable consideration of fair propositions for the mainten-
ance of honor and justice without resort to war. The same
reason was given for the continued activity of the army and
navy, the reorganization of military departments, the purchase
of war material, the equipping of ships, the enlisting of men,
the increased estimates in the naval bill, the forming of two
new regiments of artillery, which the army officials had long
before unsuccessfully demanded as a necessity for coast de-
fense. All of these steps were being taken, and the two days
in which the resolution for defense was passed formed a dra-
matic climax. They were days when stocks, bonds, and cal-
culating self-interest were lost sight of in the rise of American
patriotism; a cool, strong, determined unit of thought and
action, sweeping everything before it in the Congress of the
United States.

There were many ready and anxious to belittle the step, as
there will always be people who will belittle any great action.
If it was only a peace measure it was a pretty big one. No
step in the three years of our Cuban policy had so won the re-
spect of nations. Its meaning was great and far reaching. It
meant the freedom of Cuba — by peace if possible; if not, by
war. That would depend upon Spain. President McKinley
completely dominated the situation. Congress gave to him
CONGRESS UNITED AS ONE MAN 441

$50,000,000 and a vote of confidence such as no President ever
had, both without his making a promise in return. He had
neither to promise war to the “ jingoes,” nor peace to the stock
brokers. He deeply felt the trust imposed in him, for he con-
sidered it as a trust and not as a vindication.

Iistory will certainly call that a striking moment in our
national life when $50,000,000 were given to the President
without a minute’s hesitation or a dissenting voice. Such a
vote was not recalled in the whole history of Congress — every
man voting, and all on one side, ready and eager to go on
record. The four hours’ debate in the House was not really a
debate — but four hours of speeches all on one side. For the
first time since the Civil War, Congress was united as one man
in a common cause for the honor of a common flag. It was
worth a few millions just to show to the world that silver and
gold, protection and free trade, and all other differences, with
the party names of Republican, Democrat, and Populist had
vanished, leaving no East, West, North, nor South, but instead
one solid American party, with a single plank in its platform,
pledged to stand by the government. The nation with such
confidence in its government is a great nation.

The dispatch of the Senate was somewhat surprising to
those who had anticipated something of interest in connection
with passing a special bill carrying $50,000,000. It was all
over in half an hour. Never before had so many senators
voted solidly, and those who had been ridiculed as jingoes felt
rather proud of the name when every Senator, including those
who had been earnestly seeking to avoid complications with
Spain, voted “aye.” But it was a “ peace measure.”

It certainly seemed to have a calming effect upon Spain,
and a semi-official statement was made in Madrid to the effect
that Spain was no more desirous of war than the United States.
Undoubtedly, this was generally true, in spite of a feeling that
a war with the United States might be necessary to save the
throne. The statement said there was no cause for war, but
this was from Spain’s standpoint. She had no desire for war
442 PREPALING FOR DEFENSE OR OFFENSE

so long as the United States allowed affairs to go on in Cuba,
and she held there was no cause for war so long as the United
States did so. But from the American standpoint the war in
Cuba must stop, and the only chance for peace was in Spain’s
yielding, and she would welcome a war with the United States
rather than do that. If she withdrew from Cuba, it must be
at the point of the guns of the United States, not of those of
Cuban bandits. The far-sighted in this country understood
this perfectly, and therefore considered the $50,000,000 a war
measure, not a peace measure.

The government at once became intensely active in put-
ting the country in a condition of defense. Enormous quan-
tities of war supplies were ordered; negotiations for the pur-
chase of war ships building abroad were begun; recruiting
stations for the navy were opened; the monitors, cruisers, and
rams were put under commission; the great ordnance factory
of the government was kept working night and day, and two
cruisers, receiving finishing touches in English ship yards and
intended for Brazil, were purchased.
CHAPTER XXXI

ATTITUDE OF EUROPEAN POWERS — INCREASING GRAVITY
OF THE SITUATION — FINAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WITH
SPAIN— REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY.

Sounding European Governments — Friendly Attitude of England — Rea-
sons for Cherishing an Alliance —The Spanish Court of Inquiry —
Marked Impression Made by Senator Proctor’s Speech — Differing
Policies — General Pando Seeks to Convert Cubans — Renewed Activity
in War Preparations —Spain’s Torpedo Flotilla Departs from the
Canary Islands — Hastening Diplomacy — A Critical Situation —
Our Demands upon Spain — Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry
Submitted — Its Conclusions — Significance of the Keel Plates in the
Wreck — Evidence Entirely Conclusive of Outside Explosion — Efforts
to Fix the Responsibility — Captain Sigsbee’s Testimony — Maine
Anchored Just Where a Mine Would be Placed— Certain Navy Offi-
cials Suspected — Remarkable Conversation Heard on a Ferry Boat —
An Anonymous Letter — $6,000 for Blowing up the Ship.

HE European governments, while not officially sounded

| as to their attitude in case of war, gave indications of
their official position, and in all cases save one their
responses were satisfactory. Austria’s manner, if not posi-
tively unfriendly, was somewhat chilling. Germany gave us
to understand that its friendship and trade with the United
States were of more importance to her than friendship and
trade with Spain. But the most significant expression, and
by far the most important, came from England. There had
been some discussion as to joint action between the United
States and England in case an attempt was made by conti-
nental powers to close neutral ports in China, but it had been
indecisive. It was made clear, however, that there was a
practically unanimous feeling in England with regard’to the
strength and justice of the American position in the differences
with Spain. Never before in the history of England and the
United States had there been such outspoken approval of

(448)
444 ENGLISH SYMPATHY AND APPROVAL

American policy; never before such warm expression of Anglo-
Saxon fellowship. The sobriety of spirit and quiet determina-
tion, first to be in the right, and next to support the right at any
cost, which had thus far been shown by the President, by Con-
gress, and by the people of the country during these trying
weeks had won the English heart, and it was evident that if war
came with Spain, England would stand as a warning against
any interference from Continental powers. It was not con-
sidered probable that there would be a formal alliance between
the two countries, but their unconscious gravitation towards
each other in time of danger showed again that blood was
thicker than water. The historical and race kinship of the
two pcoples was evidently becoming more distinct in the
national consciousness, and promised to constitute a great fac-
tor in the international problems of the future.

Certainly, the moral advantages of treating international
questions on a high level were strikingly displayed during
these weeks in which the adininistration was addressing itself
with composure and dignity to the solution of the vexatious
issues between it and Spain. Bluster and irritability would
have lost us precisely that commanding moral position which
restraint and moderation gained for us. It was this which
thwarted the attempt made by Spain to secure support from
the Continental powers. Sir Charles Dilke, one of the great-
est authorities on foreign affairs in England, strongly ex-
pressed his sympathy with our attitude towards Cuba.  Pro-
fessor Bryce declared that he had always believed that “ be-
neath the sometimes troubled surface there is a deep and strong
current of sympathy for each other, as well as a sense of
essential unity, in the two great and free English peoples on
the opposite sides of the Atlantic.”

England’s disposition to cherish an alliance with us was
very reasonably influenced by the diplomatic situation in
Europe as to China. Rather than be deprived of the markets
of the far Fast or to suffer the dismemberment of the Chinese
empire, which was seriously threatened by the aggressive
FINDING OF THE SPANISH COURT OF inquiry 445

policy of Russia, France, and Germany, England had inti-
mated that she would go to war. Matters had arrived at a very
critical stage, and had not the trouble between Spain and the
United States brought forth the evidences of an understanding
between the latter and England, the three Continental powers
threatening England’s prestige in the East might have pushed
her to active operations. When the influence, even though
entirely moral, of the United States was thrown in the balance
with England, the powers drew back. This, doubtless, had its
effect in stirring up the severe criticisms of the United States
and the evident sympathy with Spain in the press of Russia,
France, and Germany. It compelled a relinquishment of
designs in the East at a time when they thought England to be
unsupported.

Moreover, the Cuban war had been as disastrous in many
ways to the interest of England as to ours. The railways had
largely been built with capital borrowed in London; over 100
plantations were owned by Englishmen or were controlled by
English capital, and England had been seriously considering
what she should do with all the claims of her citizens for
damages in the Cuban war, — damages for which Spain was
lable.

Little was heard from the Naval Court of Inquiry in the
Maine disaster, though from unofficial sources came occasional
intimations that the explosion was external and not internal.
But, in the pressure of other events, the importance of the
inquiry was lost sight of. The President of the Spanish Court
of Inquiry, Captain Peral, publicly stated that in his opinion
the disaster was an accident, pure and simple. The prevailing
idea was that much depended upon the report of our Court, and
also much upon the reply of Spain to any demand for indem-
nity that might be made. It was semi-officially announced that
Spain would resist the payment of an indemnity. This atti-
tude taken in advance of the report of our Court, and only upon
the publie statement of Captain Peral, gave abundant evidence
that the United States could expect nothing from Spanish
446 EFFECT OF SENATOR PROCTOR’S SPEECH

diplomacy. When it took twenty years to collect a claim
which Spain acknowledged to be just, there was little prospect
of securing an indemnity for the Maine.

Spain remained as firm as ever in its refusal to consider
the freedom of Cuba; Captain-General Blanco, at a dinner
given at Havana, declared that Spain would never give it up
nor would she sell at any price.

Nothing made a more marked impression upon Congress
and the country at this time than the speech of Senator Proctor
in the Senate on March 17th. Owing to the ageressive char-
acter of some of the pro-Cuban newspapers, many people had
formed the habit of discounting the news which came from the
troubled island. Even when these statements were backed by
reports from some correspondents of good repute, there was a
disposition to doubt occurrences which hardly seemed possible
in civilized warfare. This doubt manifested itself in the Sen-
ate among those who dreaded precipitate action, and it was
fortunate, therefore, that some of the senators and congress-
men had determined to see for themselves. Of all those who
chose thus to inform themselves no man was more respected
among his colleagues than Senator Proctor of Vermont, a level-
headed, conservative New Englander, with much acumen,
sobriety of judgment, and due regard for the responsibilities
of his office. When, therefore, he described in cool, dispassion-
ate language the conditions of Cuba as he saw them in Febru-
ary and early in March, and voiced his judgment concerning
the future of Cuba if it continued under Spanish rule, doubtful
people began to realize why it was that so many had long urged
intervention. He assured the Senate that he spoke without
any consultation with the President, and that his words could
only be interpreted as an expression of his personal belief, but
it was well known that he was a close friend of the President,
and that his judgement was prized at the White House.

It had become apparent that, assuming that the Maine
incident was satisfactorily settled, two radically differing
parties existed among those close to the President: those who
A COMPLICATED SITUATION 447

advocated immediate intervention on the ground of humanity
and commercial necessity, and those who preferred to give
Spain a longer time to demonstrate the success or failure of
autonomous government. All agreed that it would be useless
and unwise to attempt to force the insurgents into accepting
even the most generous Spanish terms, and all dreaded an at-
tempt to settle the question by force at any time between May
1st and October 1st, when the mortality from fever might be
greater than that from Spanish bullets. Undoubtedly, many
sincere friends of Cuba, who had made up their minds that
force would be necessary and wise, would have been glad to
continue the relief to the reconcentrados and to impress upon
Spain diplomatically the necessity of her granting freedom to
Cuba on honorable terms, but events could not be so easily
managed. The action of this nation cannot be determined by
the President alone, or by Congress, or by any special interest;
in the last analysis it must be determined by the people.
There are times when the national consciousness rises higher
than anything else and such times are momentous ones in the
life of the nation.

The most important news which came from the theater of ©
war at this time was that General Pando had announced an
armistice in eastern Cuba, with the purpose of securing a con-
ference with General Gomez and other leading insurgent of-
cers to urge upon them the claims of more liberal autonomy.
It was stated that the most generous terms would be offered, a
proposition to willingly surrender Cuba to the Cubans, to dis-
band the Spanish Volunteers, and to leave Cuba entirely free
to govern herself on the payment of an annual sum to Spain of
$2,000,000. But it was too late for such measures as this, and
as soon as the Volunteers heard of it they began to make
trouble.

As the time for the report of the Naval Board approached,
the public impatience increased. By the 24th the gravity of
the situation could no longer be disguised by expressions of
peace; the feeling of restlessness was noticeable everywhere.
448 A THRILLING SCENE IN THE SENATE

A crisis seemed at hand. The activity of preparations in the
Army and Navy Departments constantly increased. Troops
had been ordered eastward; important changes had been made
in the naval commands; telegraphic orders for the purchase of
tugs and torpedo destroyers had gone forth. In Congress the
nervous enthusiasm of the crowd of spectators who daily
wandered about the great marble capitol found vent when
Senator Gallinger of New Hampshire depicted the horrors he
had witnessed in Cuba, and when Senator Thurston of Ne-
braska, who had just returned from a visit to Cuba, where
his wife had died, in a glowing speech described the dreadful
scenes he had witnessed, and declared strongly for action. As
he neared the close of his speech he broke down under excite-
ment, sympathy, and sorrow, and as he sat down he bowed
his head upon his desk and wept, and the galleries broke into
applause that for the first time in the United States Senate
was allowed to go on unchecked.

Mrs. Thurston’s death was a severe blow to Senator Thurs-
ton, and Washington people who knew her as a woman of high
intellectual attainments, ever mindful of the suffering, sym-
pathized with him deeply. She was a member of the Cuban
Relief Association, and the horrors of the war in Cuba im-
pressed her with the strongest desire to help the suffering
people in every way possible. Her appeals sent home in be-
half of the little children, with their starving mothers, could
not be read without a feeling that they were wrung from a
heart filled with anguish and pity, and the scenes of distress
she witnessed had their effect in causing her fatal illness.

The gravity of the situation was increased by the departure
from the Canary Islands of a flotilla of torpedo boats, osten-
sibly for the West Indies, though the opinion was held that the
movement was for the purpose of influencing the elections to
the Cortes to be held on the 27th. The Carlists, Conservatives,
and Republicans were attacking Sagasta for alleged weakness
in dealing with the United States.

The President early decided to treat the Afaine question
A STUBBORN AND RESENTFUL NATION 449

and the general Cuban question separately, the latter having
been inherited from the previous administration, and the
former being au incident not affecting the general question
from a diplomatic point of view, however much it might from
the popular side. Realizing that it would be impossible to re-
strain Congress and the people after the report of the Court
of Inquiry, the inevitable conclusions of which the adminis-
tration well knew, the President hastened on h‘s diplomatic
negotiations in every way possible. He impressed upon Spain
his desire for peace, but declared that the situation in Cuba
must be relieved. We should insist upon making the relief
of the starving effective. It would be impossible for the
United States to allow the contest to go on, and as autonomy
such as Spain had proposed would not be accepted by the
Cubans, it was useless to consider further the possibilities of
that plan as a measure of peace. But if Spain could be in-
duced to suspend hostilities and induce the Cubans to treat,
it was possible that the United States might by some arrange-
ment bring about the compliance of the Cubans.

On March 23d Minister Woodford conveyed to the Spanish
government the attitude of the administration, and two days
later Spain replied to the effect that she could not agree with
* the “inaccurate conclusions” of the American government as
to the conditions in Cuba, and she still insisted that autonomy
was working well. Neither could Spain admit the interference
foreshadowed in the American note and she deprecated the
sending of official relief and war vessels to Cuba.

There was little time left. The President received the re-
port on the Afaine on the 25th, and it would not do to hold it
back from Congress. He saw that the only way to avert war
for the time was to induce Spain to grant an armistice during
which the Cuban question could be deliberately and dispas-
sionately considered and settled. Accordingly, on the 27th,
as a result of much previous correspondence, he submitted
through the minister at Madrid propositions for an armistice
until October 1st for the negotiation of peace on the basis of
450 SPAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OUTRAGE

the independence of Cuba, with the good offices of the Presi-
dent. In addition to this, he asked for the immediate and
effective revocation of the order of reconcentration so as to
permit the people to return to their farms, the needy to be
relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States,
co-operating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full
relief.

On the following day, and while the President was await-
ing the reply to what he considered a final effort to settle
affairs diplomatically, the report of the Court of Inquiry was
made public, but it created no new excitement. It had been
largely discounted. The public mind had already been made
up, and the report came chiefly as a formal finding in a case
that had already been decided upon abundant circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, the Cuban question was developing so
rapidly and upon such a large scale that the report took the
place of an incident merely, another step in the imevitable
course of events. Another reason for delay was removed,
another reason for intervention offered. Among a certain
class some disappointment prevailed because the Court had not
been able to definitely fix the responsibility, the difficulties in
the way of such a board when endeavoring to detect a Spanish
culprit in such a state of affairs as existed at Havana not being
appreciated; but it made little difference whether the responsi-
bility was fixed or not, for, in fact, and in the eyes of the people
of the United States, Spain could not escape the responsibility
of the outrage, even if her officials were ignorant of any plot.
She had failed to protect a vessel at Havana on a friendly mis-
sion, and the fact that the evidence was quite conclusive that
the Maine had been blown up by a mine made the case against
Spain all the stronger, for a mine sufficient to cause such de-
struction could not have existed without the knowledge of
someone in authority about the fortifications of the city. Even
had the Court reported that it had been unable to determine
how the Marne had been blown up, it is doubtful if it would
have made any serious difference with the situation. The fact
CONCLUSIONS OF COURT OF INQUIRY 451

that a state of things existed in Cuba which made it unsafe for
American war ships to go there was sufficient. The great
Cuban question was still over and above incidental considera-
tions; the Mazne had simply determined the people to settle
it, if not quickly by peace, then quickly by war.

President McKinley sent to Congress the full text of the
report, together with the voluminous evidence taken, and a
brief message recapitulating the well-known facts about the
visit of the Maine to Havana, the organization of the Court
and its proceedings, and giving this succinct statement of the
findings:

““The evidence of the divers establishes that the after part of the ship
was practically intact, and sank in that condition a very few moments after
the explosion. The forward part was completely demolished.

“Upon the evidence of a concurrent external cause the finding of the
Court is as follows :

‘** At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point 114 feet from the
middle line of the ship and 6 feet above the keel when in its normal position,
has been forced up so as to be now about 4 feet above the surface of the
water, therefore about 34 feet above where it would be had the ship sunk
uninjured.

“<The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed Y shape (A), the
after wing of which, about 15 fect broad and 32 feet in length (from frame
17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the
same plating, extending forward.

“* At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two and the flat keel bent
into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plates.
This break is now about 6 feet below the surface of the water and about 30
feet above its normal position.

‘‘*In the opinion of the court this effect could have been produced only
by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about
frame 18 and somewhat on the port side of the ship.’

“The conclusions of the Court are :

“That the loss of the Maine was not in any respect due to fault or neg-
ligence on the part of any of the officers or members of her crew ;

‘“That the ship was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine,
which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward maga-
zines ; and

“That no evidence has been obtainable fixing the responsibility for the
destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons.”

In conclusion, he said that he had directed the findings of
the Court and the views of this government to be communi-
cated to the government of Spain, and added: “T do not per-
mit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish na-
452 CONVINCING EVIDENCE

tion will dictate a course of action suggested by honor and the
friendly relations of the two governments.” He refrained
from making an immediate demand for indemnity, desiring
first to see what Spain might see fit to answer to our presenta-
tion of facts.

The evidence that the disaster was caused by an outside
explosion was convincing to all who had a knowledge of the
work of the Court of Inquiry. The center of the explosion
was beneath and a little forward of the conning tower and on
the port side, and not only did the wreck show that no ex-
plosion of the forward magazines could have produced such
effects, but that they were plainly the effect of a force from
underneath the ship. The keel at this center of explosion was
blown up above the surface of the water, and the forward
part of the ship had been thrown over forward so that the
bow was driven into the mud. Indeed, about all of the forward
part of the ship which appeared above water were the keel
plates. More than this, the divers discovered, underneath
this part of the raised keel and exactly where the center of the
explosion was, a large hole in the mud, fully fifteen feet in
diameter and seven feet deep. The Court was inclined to
think that the force of the mine explosion must have exploded
some part of the forward magazines, but, nevertheless, con-
siderable ammunition from these magazines was found intact,
whereas had the initial explosion taken place within them
nothing would have remained. Besides, there was nothing to
cause these ammunition stores to explode except an explosion
from outside. The evidence was entirely conclusive.

Recognizing the obstacles to the work of obtaining any
evidence calculated to fix the responsibility for the outrage,
the Court of Inquiry does not seem to have devoted much at-
tention to that branch of the investigation, although it secured
some evidence that was not made public. As the Maine had
been conducted by direction of the harbor authorities to a
buoy so seldom used, and as such an explosion could not have
been worked except by connivance with some one on shore in
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IN THE HOSPITAL OF A BATTLESHIP,
Called the ‘‘ Sick Bay ” by sailors,
CAPTAIN SIGSBEE’S TESTIMONY 455

charge of or with a knowledge of the mines, an investigation to
fix the responsibility would naturally have taken the Court in
the direction of the authorities who were investigating the case
for Spain, and who had asserted from the beginning that it
was an accident. It was generally thought that General
Blanco was innocent of any knowledge of a plot, but it was well
known that a large proportion of the guards were hostile to
him, were adherents of Weyler, were bitterly hostile to the
United States, were capable of almost anything in the way of
outrage, and were, moreover, in a position to use mines if such
there were in the harbor.

“Tt is a curious fact,” said Captain Sigsbee before tho
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which was pursuing
an investigation of Cuban affairs at this time, * that the officers
of the deck say we never swung in that particular direction
before. The Mazne is lying now in about the position she
would have taken to play upon the Spanish batteries — the
Morro and Cabafias. Now, if a mine had been planted there,
where the Maine could play on the batteries, I assume that it
would have been planted in just that place where the Maine
was blown up. If only one had been planted it would have
been just there.”

“Tf that ship had swung into position to fire on the castle,”
asked Senator Morgan, “and a torpedo had been placed, or
mine placed, under water so as to blow up the ship in case she
did fire, then it would have been placed exactly where you
were blown up?”

“T would have placed it there,” replied Captain Sigsbee.

“That suggests the possibility of its having been placed
there before you were located there?

“Tt does.”

“ Has it occurred to you that very likely it was done so?”

“TJ think if we had owned the port and had suspected a
possible aggressive spirit, I think we would have done the
same thing.”

“You would have put it right there? ”
456 A CONVERSATION ON THE FERRY

“Tf we had only one mine, I should have put it right
there.” :

Captain Sigsbee said further that he had reasons, which it
might be injudicious to disclose, to believe that a certain navy
official was in charge of the electric battery which controlled
the mine. The dangers to residents of Havana testifying be-
fore the Court of Inquiry were so great that none could be
induced to do so unless names were suppressed. One such
person appeared and testified through an interpreter that on
the morning of the day the Maine was blown up he was cross-
ing from Havana to Regla, that ferry passing quite near to
the Maine. He was sitting on the front of the boat and about
four feet from him were three Spanish officers, two of the army
and one of the navy, in conversation with a stout man in
citizen’s dress. He noticed that they were conversing about
the Maine.

“T have heard in the Circulio Militario,” said one of the
army officers, referring to the military club on the Prado,
“that it is nearly arranged. They are going to blow her up
anyhow. It isa shame to Spain that she should be here in the
bay.” ;

The witness was standing close to the wall so that the off-
cer did not notice he was listening, and he heard the citizen ask:

“Would not making explosions in the bay run great risk
to the city of Havana?”

“No,” said the officer, “ it is arranged so that it will simply
explode, open the vessel, and she will sink immediately.”

“T will take plenty of beer on that occasion,” said the
citizen, with an exclamation of joy, and the men moved
further away, so that no more was heard, though they con-
tinued to converse while looking at the Maine.

There appeared to be no clue to the identity of the officers,
and the evidence does not seem to have been followed up;
indeed, it would have been impossible to do so without the aid
of detectives. The interpreter, who was one of General Lee’s
employes, also testified to the receipt at the consular office of
CURIOUS ANONYMOUS LETTER 457

the following anonymous letter, dated the 18th, or three days
after the destruction of the Maine:

‘It should be remembered that at dawn of the day of the terrible
catastrophe an individual was killed in a small boat together with another
who is to be found wounded and a prisoner. They were going about the
crusiers Mutue and Alfonso NIT and as the said individuals are of the worst
antecedents as harbor thieves, I have interested myself in investigating
what connection this occurrence could have with the explosion of the Maine,
and I have discovered tliat those two men, together with another who is
called Pepe Taco, had bought in a hardware store in Mercaderes street,
called La Marina, a hose such as is used by divers, and that the three left
Regla in a small boat which they placed under the wharves of Sta. Catalina
and they were loitering more than an hour and a half while Pepe Taco, who
is a calker and a diver, probably the best in these parts, did the work to
bring about the explosion of the Maine. With this data I went to Regla
and discovered that the family of the dead man who lived in the utmost
misery in a house in Rodriguez Batista street had moved to a well-furnished
one in Galabert street. There I learned that they had agreed with some
merchants of Muralla street for the work of blowing up the ship for the
sum of $6,000 — $2,000 in advance, the other $4,000 after seeing the result.
But as they did not come out of the adventure very well, having been
attacked when they were retiring, the result of which was the death of one,
who left his teeth in the boat, and another one wounded, the third one has
not presented himself to collect the rest of the moncy and it could probably
be secretly done that by paying him the rest, that the others will not now
pay him, he would declare the truth of all this. The one whom I call the
third is the diver Pepe Taco who was not wounded who, no doubt, is afraid
to present himself to collect the rest. In Muralla street, they tell me was
the place where the business was arranged with Messrs. Garcia, Corujedo,
Villasuso, Maribona, and others whom I do not remember. The man
arrested is being administered morphine constantly to sce if he will die and
not give evidence so as not, as they express it, to spoil the affair after it has
come off so much to their taste.” :

It was a fact recorded by the papers that on the night be-
fore the explosion a suspicious boat was seen crossing the bay,
and the Spanish guard of the artillery dock fired on it, killing
one of the men on board, who fell into the water. The other
man landed and was arrested by the guard, but the next day
after the explosion he was released. The authorities made a
great mystery of the affair, but no attention was paid to the
circumstance by the Court till the receipt of this anonymous
letter. An effort was made to follow up the clue, but the re-

sults were kept a state secret.
28
458 SUGGESTIVE PHRASE FROM SPANISH REPORT

The report of the Spanish Court of Inquiry based its
reasons for concluding the explosion an internal one mainly
on the statements that no dead fish were seen about the wreck,
a faet entirely inconclusive, largely because there are few
fish in the dirty waters of the bay. It was admitted that no
effective examination had been made of the conditions of the
wreck, but, it said, * this must not be understood to mean that
the accuracy of these present conclusions requires such proof.”
CHAPTER XXXII

NEARING A CRISIS—‘‘ REMEMBER THE WAIVE” —SPAIN’S
FINANCIAL STRAITS—HASTENING OUR NAVAL PREPA-
RATIONS —SPAIN’S UNSATISFACTORY TACTICS.

Public Impatience Restrained with Difficulty —The President’s Trying
Position — Radical Resolutions in the Senate—The President’s Firm
Hand — Liberal Victory in Spain —The Cuban Deputies — Arrival of
the Vizcaya and Almirante Oquendo in Havana — Spaniards in Hostile
Mood — Spanish Torpedo Flotilla and Its Movements— Spain’s Appeal
to Europe — Suicide of the Dynasty —Desperate Financial Conditions
—The Church’ as a Holder of Spanish Bonds— Putting the United
States Navy in Readiness— The Key West Fleet and the Flying Squad-
ron— Apparent Concession but Only for Effect — The Proposed Armis-
tice — Congress Becomes More and More Impatient — The President’s
Reasons for Delay —Time Needed to Prepare— His Influence upon
Congressional Leaders— Condition of Some of Our Battleships —
Learning a Lesson.

without debate referred to the committees on foreign

affairs, but it at once became evident that the pub-
lie patience, which had endured till this formal act was com-
pleted, could now be restrained only with the greatest dif-
ficulty. The navy was not disposed to rest content under an
indefinite continuance of futile diplomacy while the murder
of their comrades went unpunished, and this feeling was
shared by a large portion of the public. Revenge is doubtless
a questionable motive for war, but under the circumstances it
could not fail to exist. “Remember the Maine” became a
catch-phrase of the day. Congress, moreover, had for weeks
been holding back resolutions for the prompt settlement of the
Cuban questions, and feeling the stress of public opinion as its
members did, the reference of the Maine report was at once fol-
lowed by intimations that the President would not be left. to
control the situation for the purpose of dallying indefinitely,

(459)

T HE report of the Court of Inquiry was formally and
460 WAR SPIRIT IN THE SENATE

or even for any length of time, with the crafty and shifting
authorities at Madrid.

The President fully realized the increased difficulties of
the situation, and, while he desired peace, he was in no mood
to shrink from war if it became necessary; he simply wished to
proceed in a manner which would leave no stain upon our ac-
tion for history to record, and give none of the European powers
a ground for just criticism. This desire was not influenced by
any fear of them, or tacit surrender of the right of the United
States to determine its own course in its own way, but be-
cause he wished war, if it came, to stand upon a sound moral
basis as far as this country was concerned. Having enjoyed
a long career in Congress as one of its leaders, he was fully
able to appreciate its feelings, and he had no intention of defy-
ing a body for which he had the highest respect and in whose
wisdom he had the greatest confidence. Still, he wished to use
his own powers so that there could be no mistake resulting
from the bitter passion of the hour.

On the 29th, the war spirit in the Senate, so long con-
fined, burst forth with renewed energy. Four resolutions on
the subject were offered respectively by Senators Allen, Raw-
lins, Foraker, and Frye, and were referred without debate to
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the two senators last
named being members of that committee. Senator Allen’s
resolution recognized the independence of Cuba and appro-
priated $500,000 for relieving the suffering there; Senator
Rawlins made his a virtual declaration of war against Spain,
authorizing the use of the army and navy to carry it to a suc-
cessful conclusion. Senator Frye’s resolution was more mild,
authorizing the President to take such effective steps as in his
discretion were required to bring about peace in Cuba and the
independence of the Cubans. The Foraker resolution called
on Spain to withdraw from Cuba, and while not formally de-
claring war, authorized the use of the land and naval forces of
the country to enforce the demands.

The same day the President held a conference with some
A FIRM HAND AT THE HELM 461

of the leading members of the two houses to arrange, if pos-
sible, a plan for executive and legislative action with the hope
of heading off the too radical element in Congress, determined
to have war at once and without reference to the existing diplo-
matic situation. Those who were attempting to hold back
Congress till the executive could act were inclined to think
that he would not be able to maintain his control of the situa-
tion and meet the expectations and demands of the people of
the country unless he at once announced a positive policy,
which would include a demand upon Spain for the immediate
cessation of hostilities, not through the military device of an
armistice but by the actual evacuation of Cuba by the Spanish
troops, the granting of full and complete autonomy, and the
assurance of ultimate independence. They considered it too
late to talk of an armistice such as the President had proposed
at Spain’s suggestion. The people were not in a mood to take
Spanish suggestions with patience, and there could be no true
armistice so long as the Cubans refused to suspend hostilities
for anything except independence.

But the President was able to prevail upon the leaders in
Congress to curb their warlike spirit till after he could inform
them whether Spain accepted or rejected the demands he had
made in his last note, a reply to which he momentarily ex-
pected. He was hopeful, though far from sanguine, that at
the last moment Spain would yield to the inevitable and accept
terms on which war could be avoided, at least till the summer
season was over. For he knew full well that those who would
plunge the country into war at once had an inadequate concep-
tion of the difficulties of summer campaigning in Cuba.

The elections to the Spanish Cortes passed off quietly on
Sunday, the 27th, and resulted in an overwhelming victory
for the Liberals. While the other parties endeavored to secure
popular support by declaring that the Sagasta ministry was not
sufficiently firm in dealing with the United States, Sagasta
gave expressions to terms of defiance, declaring that Spain
would not concede our right to intervene, and thus partisan
462 THE ‘‘ VIZCAYA” WELCOMED AT HAVANA

lines gave way before a sentiment uniting all.men in the sup-
port of those who were already in office. The result naturally
strengthcued the hands of Sagasta and gave him greater con-
fidence in a determined policy. In the elections in Cuba,
twenty of the thirty deputies to the Cortes were from the
Autonomists, the rest from the Conservatives. Of the twenty
Autonomists chosen, only eight were natives of Cuba, and of
the ten Conservatives but one was Cuban-born, and he had
lived mainly in Spain and was very pro-Spanish. Five of the
Conservative deputies were notorious for their hatred of the
United States. Feeling against this country ran very high in
Havana, and Americans there were far from being in a com-
fortable or safe position. They were apt to be insulted wher-
ever they went, and it was dangerous to resent it.

The arrival of the Vizcaya at Havana created an enthu-
siasm which threatened to end in an outbreak of the lawless
elements. Crowds gathered to welcome the cruiser, shouting
“Viva Espana!” and “ Viva Weyler!” By taking extraor-
dinary precautions General Blanco was able to preserve the
peace, but there was abundant evidence of the feelings of the
hostile Volunteers. A few days later the Almirante Oquendo
arrived and was similarly welcomed.

In the latter part of March the report that the Spanish tor-
pedo flotilla which had stopped at the Canary Tslands had been
ordered to Puerto Rico added to the gravity of the situation in
this country and caused much alarm. As such a flotilla was
not needed in Cuba for the purposes of suppressing the re-
bellion and was of an aggressive, not defensive, character, it
seemed likely that Spain had determined upon hostile actions,
and even the Army and Navy Journal went so far as to term it
an act of war, justifying our immediate action, as if war had
been declared by Spain. But in view of the preparations we
had already made for action, if necessary, the appearance of
the Spanish flotilla at Puerto Rico could really be regarded as
little more than justifiable precaution.

Although the Queen and the Spanish government made
 

 

 

 

SWORD DRILL OF SAILORS ON A BATTLESHIP.
THE SPANISH THRONE IN PERIL 465

many diplomatic appeals for the help of Europe in preventing
the impending intervention in Cuba, there was little indica-
tion of success. In Europe, as in the United States, the ques- -
tion which statesmen and financiers were asking was, how
could Spain enter upon a great war with a treasury so empty?
—a war in which she would ultimately and inevitably stand to
lose not only Cuba and Puerto Rico but the Philippines, and
which might involve the overthrow of the monarchy. But in
reality the Spanish people had been so persistently deceived by
their government as to Spanish successes in ‘Cuba, and as to the
military weakness and boastfulness of the United States, that
they really believed Spain capable of doing great things, of
actually invading the United States; and to have drawn back
in the face of such an opinion would have so enraged the de-
Inded people as to have at once overthrown the monarchy.
The dynasty was likely to fall in either case. But if it stood
any chance, it was in war.

The wisest in Spain as well as in the United States saw that
the triumph of Spanish arms in Cuba, or even in the retention

_of Spanish sovereignty, would be a fruitless, if not a dangerous,
victory. It certainly could not be final. Supposing that the
armiés of Garcia and Gomez laid down their arms and the in-
surgents were dispersed, what would be the very best condi-
tion the optimist could imagine? Even if it could be accom-
plished without recourse to another loan, the interest on the
Cuban debt would then amount to $30,000,000 per annum,
and the revenues could not be made to reach this amount even
before the island was devastated and by recourse to every pos-
sible means of taxation.

But beyond this, the maintenance of the army which would
be necessary, and of the civil administration, even supposing
honesty in administration, which would be supposing alto-
gether too much, would cost $80,000,000 more. Spain would
hardly be able to make both ends of her own budget meet, to
say nothing of helping Cuba.

Continued Spanish sovereignty in Cuba had, therefore, be-
466 DESPERATE CONDITION OF SPAIN’S FINANCES

come to Spain an absolute impossibility, and yet to yield it was
a political impossibility — the suicide of the dynasty.

The financial condition of the Spanish government could
hardly have been worse. Taxation, which before the war with
Cuba was reckoned to consume one-fifth of the total income of
the people, had been increased by every expedient known to
bankrupting finance. Confessing the corruption or incapacity
of her own officials, the government had carried further the
costly policy of turning over to private monopolies the col-
lection of the various taxes. The old tobacco monopoly had
been renewed at a higher rental and monopolies were created
to deal in petroleum and explosives. The government had
asked permission to turn over to private companies for twenty-
five years the state lottery, and for fifteen years a monopoly in
the sale of salt. The 4 per cent. bonds of the government,
which three years before had sold at 80, had by the end of
March fallen to 51, and the government, in its straits to bor-
row, had pledged its customs revenue, increased the privileges
of the state banks, and offered the railroads subsidies and an
extension of privileges till 1980 for assistance in raising loans.
The debts nominally resting on Spain had not been materially
increased, because the war loans figured as the Cuban debt;
but the home debt alone amounted to $1,300,000,000, or $400
for every family in the poverty-stricken nation. The enor-
mous Cuban debt was relatively a more serious matter, for it
was a question whether all the property remaining in Cuba
after three years of war would have discharged the debt which
the island would have been required to carry if Spain had been
victorious. The crushing weight of this prospective load was
one of the factors which made submission worse than death to
the patriotic Cubans. It was to bring about just this state of
things that Gomez had fought his campaigns, and it was appa-
rent that when Spain reached the point at which she would be
compelled to give up, the Cubans, having established their in-
dependence, would give themselves little concern over a debt
which had been incurred in fighting and oppressing them.
THE ROMISH CHURCH AND SPANISH BONDS 467

The impending conflict, therefore, involved not only the
Cuban debt but the bankruptcy of Spain, and naturally the
holders of all her millions of debts became greatly concerned
over the situation. To understand the developments which led
to the declaration of war in spite of all the influence against it,
it will be necessary to observe where this debt was held.

In the early part of the nineteenth century the property
of the Church of Spain had so accumulated that it might be
said almost without exaggeration that the ecclesiastical estab-
lishment had absorbed the wealth of the country. In 1820
there were no less than 150,000 priests in Spain, and clerical-
ism had played a large part in the struggle of the dynasties,
factions, and parties. The success of Christina after the death
of Ferdinand in 1833 meant a defeat for. the clerical party,
and it was followed by sweeping confiscatory decrees which
led to a protracted quarrel between the Vatican and the Span-
ish government. It was finally compromised in 1859 by a
new Concordat between the Pope and the Spanish govern-
ment, in accordance with which a large amount of church
property was sold off and there was issued to the church several
hundred millions of dollars of interest-bearing Spanish bonds.
It was natural, therefore, that the church as the holder of such
an enormous block of Spanish bonds should become especially
anxious to maintain Spanish credit, and a war with the United
States meant bankruptcy beyond peradventure.

During the last week in March the government of the
United States had further inereased its army and navy and put
it in a condition of readiness for possible war. Admiral Sicard
was given six months’ leave of absence because of ill health,
and Captain William T. Sampson was appointed commander
of the fleet at Key West. He was considered an ideal officer
for the important commission. A flying squadron with head-
quarters at Hampton Roads was organized with Commodore
Winfield Scott Schley as its chief. It consisted of the battle-
ships Teras and Massachusetls, and the cruisers Brooklyn,
DMinneapolis, and Columbia, the fleetest of our navy. Nego-
468 SIGNIFICANT PURCHASES

tiations for the purchase of foreign war ships continued; the
entire fleet of revenue cutters belonging to the Treasury De-
partment, which had for three years been kept busy in the ef-
fort to intercept Cuban filibusters, were by command of the
President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, trans-
ferred to the navy to co-operate with the naval service. Eleven
of the finest yachts and largest tugs in the possession of private
parties were purchased to be fitted out as torpedo, dispatch, and
gunboats. Monitors that served in the Civil War were ordered
into commission, and sent to the harbors of New York and
Boston, there to be manned and handled by the naval militia.
Ammunition was distributed to all the important seacoast
fortifications, and all reserve field and siege guns in the in-
terior were ordered to coast ports, while the infantry and
cavalry forces of the government were placed in such a condi-
tion that within three days the entire army could be mobilized
either at Atlanta or at Washington. Our agents scoured
Europe for available munitions, and we secured an option upon
everything that would be needed if war were declared. Most
significant of all was an order to paint the war vessels in colors
never used except in likelihood of hostile action.

The war tide rose by leaps and bounds during those few
eventful hours in which Spain’s reply was expected. Con-
gress had waited patiently for the report on the Maine, and
now here was another affair to wait for. The newspapers were
full of conflicting statements as to what Spain proposed and
what the President’s policy was to be. Owing to the mystery
which always surrounds diplomatic communications, the situa-
tion appeared much more complex and delicate than it really
was. The President’s note of the 27th had demanded an
armistice till October 1st for the negotiation of peace on the
basis of the independence of the Cubans, the immediate revo-
cation of the order of reconcentration, and the relief of the
needy. Spain saw that some concession was essential to
pacify Congress, but she endeavored to grant only that which
had the appearance but not the substance of concessions.
CHARACTERISTIC SPANISH DIPLOMACY 469

Her reply arrived at Washington on the night of the 31st.
She consented to release the reconcentrados at once (something
which she had ordered months before ‘but without effect), and
she announced that the cabinet had voted $600,000 for the re-
lief of the needy. But when it came to arranging terms of
peace she said that she would confide that to the insular autono-
mist parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of that body
would be necessary to reach the final result, “it being under-
stood, however, that the powers reserved by the Constitution to
the central government are not diminished or lessened.” In
other words, she did not propose to permit the United States
to take part in peace negotiations, and she did not propose to
surrender her sovereignty of the island. She proposed to
leave peace measures exclusively to an autonomous govern-
ment which was a farce and a failure, with which the insur-
gents would not treat and which was really but a blind to con-
ceal Spain’s purpose to handle the island as she always had
handled it. Moreover, this alleged insular parliament would
not meet for over a month. Spain said, however, she would
not object to a suspension of hostilities if it were asked for by
the general-in-chief of the insurgents. It was well known that
Gomez would do nothing of the kind. Spain’s reply gave no
evidence of what powers the insular parliament had for nego-
tiating peace. In fact, the reply, while calculated to give
those prejudiced in favor of peace at any price a chance to say
that Spain had offered all we had asked, had really given noth-
ing. Even the order for the release of the reconcentrados and
the appropriation of money for the needy were valueless, sim-
ply on paper and of no effect, as afterwards appeared. It was
characteristic Spanish diplomacy, and the misfortune was that
a certain international or diplomatic courtesy compelled the
United States to wait on it.

Following this and during the first week in April our re-
lations with Spain came to a crisis and the country was in a
condition of feverish anxiety. Every day news was expected
to show whether the outcome was to be peace or war, and as the
470 THR ‘‘“MAINE” DESTROYED BY DESIGN

days passed it beeame more and more apparent that war would
be inevitable. The feeling in Congress was tense. An in-
creasing number in both the House and Senate showed an
eagerness for action which would bring the differences with
Spain toa head. Undoubtedly, this feeling was strengthened
by the report of the Court of Inquiry and by the further evi-
dence concerning, the disaster which was later given by Gen-
eral Lee and Captain Sigsbee to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. The more the testimony was studied the
more did the feeling gain ground that the blowing up of the
Maine was an act of treachery. Naval experts unhesitatingly
expressed their belief that when the Maine was anchored to
one particular buoy it was known that a mine lay underneath
her, and mines of that kind, they said, were not in the pos-
session of individuals, nor were they to be purchased in the
markets. It was hinted that certain Spanish officials knew of
the location of the mine and had expected to use it in case hos-
tilities were declared.

Nothing but the influence of the President prevented Con-
gress from prompt action, which would have been a virtual
declaration of war. He could not have had any great amount
of faith in the possibility of bringing Spain to terms by diplo-
matic methods after Spain’s reply, but at the same time some
of the European powers and the Vatican began-to use their
persuasive powers upon the proud but weak nation and some-
thing might come of it. At least the delay would enable the
United States to perfect its preparations and take the necessary
steps for the safety of American citizens on Spanish territory.
It would undoubtedly have been his wish to have continued
the negotiations over the rainy season in Cuba, meanwhile
helping the reconcentrados, and in October, if necessary, to
have struck the intervening blow to set Cuba free. It doubt-
less would have been the part of wisdom. Our forces could
have been drilled and acclimated in southern camps, our navy
could have been put in prime condition, the reconcentrados
could have heen helped back to their farms and started again,
DELAY THE PART OF WISDOM AVI

and sober sense might by that time have convinced Spain that
the best policy for her was to declare Cuba free.

But the impatience of Congress, whose members were daily
swamped with letters from the people clamoring for war, could
not be indefinitely curbed, and while the President was aware
of it he did the best he could and much more than a man of less
tact or one possessing in a less degree the confidence of Con-
gress could have done. He had constant interviews with the
leading men of both parties, took them into his confidence, ex-
plained to them the exact situation and succeeded in con-
vincing them that a little delay would be wise from every point
of view. If war was to come, every day’s delay would be help-
ful; if anything was to be hoped from diplomacy, delay was
absolutely necessary. Spain had made some apparent con-
cessions and might make the necessary ones under European
pressure. These representations had their effect upon a ma-
jority of the Senators and Congressmen, and by common con-
sent they agreed to wait a few days longer.

Unfortunately, there were some who, boasting of superior
patriotism, were anxious to make political capital by making
bitter speeches against delay, even attacking the motives of the
President, and unfortunately also the peace-at-any-price men
in the country, professing to believe that the President was in
accord with them, began to raise the ery “ Stand by the Presi-
dent,” thus adding to the impatience of Congress by creating
the impression that he, like the peace men, had no idea of put-
ting an end to the state of things which had become intoler-
able.

The people of the United States had lived so long at peace
and had such an inadequate idea of the requirements of modern
warfare that they could not appreciate the wisdom of delaying
the initiation of hostilities. Out battleships were far from
ready. The foul growth on the bottom of the Massachusetts
had decreased her maximum forced draught speed from six-
teen to ten knots, while the Zowa, the fastest of our battleships,
at Key West was reduced to a like speed, and the dry dock
492 AN UNLEARNED LESSON

capacity was inadequate. Had not the navy yard forces been
kept at work day and night almost from the time of the blow-
ing up of the Maine, and all preparatory work ‘been pushed
with feverish haste, even while peace seemed possible, we
should have been ill-prepared for an aggressive warfare beyond
our shores at the time when the patience of Congress at last
gave out. The poeple of this generation had yet to learn that
two nations cannot proceed to war with the promptness with
which two street gamins square off for a struggle with their
fists.
CHAPTER XXXITIT

THE COALING PROBLEM—SPAIN’S PRETENDED ASSIST-
ANCE OF THE STARVING RECONCENTRADOS — SCENES IN
CONGRESS WHILE AWAITING THE PRESIDENT’S MES-
SAGE.

The Army Ready to Move —The Importance of the Coaling Problem —
Spain’s Small Supply — Coaling at Neutral Ports — Blanco’s Orders to
Help the Reconcentrados—No Charity Except through Fear of War
— Spain Playing to the Galleries of Europe — No Chance for Money to
Get by the Spanish Officials — Appeal of the Autonomist Government
— Position of the Self-Professed Friends of Peace — The Influence of
the Commercial Spirit — ‘‘ Reading the Riot Act to the President” —
The President’s Tact — April 6th, an Exciting Day — Waiting for the
Message — It Fails to Arrive — General Lee’s Request for Time to Get
Out of Cuba— The President’s Courageous Act — Bitter Attacks upon
Him in Congress — Bravely Defended — Other Important Reasons for
Delay — Spain’s Foolish Action — The President’s Expectation of War.

parations for placing the armies and navies in con-
dition for immediate use, if called upon, continued
with vigor in both Spain and the United States. The fleet of
auxiliary naval vessels was further increased by the purchase
of tugs and yachts; a new cruiser, called the Diogenes, which
was built in Germany for a foreign power, was bought in Eng-
land; the ships at Key West and Hampton Roads were stripped
in readiness for actual war, and every preparation was made for
moving the army. The state of New York placed a million
dollars at the disposal of the governor for putting in readiness
the military and naval reserve, and Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Jowa took similar action. An effort was made to purchase
the Danish Island east of Puerto Rico for a coaling station,
but was abandoned because of the price asked.
It was at once recognized that the coaling problem was
one of the most important in modern naval warfare. Only
(473)

L) vent these days of uncertainty and excitement pre-
474 A PROBLEM IN NAVAL WARFARE .«

one power had really solved it in a satisfactory manner, and
it is largely in the adequate establishment of a great number
of coaling stations that Great Britain’s commercial and naval
strength lies. ‘This had been so effectively demonstrated in
the far East that Russia, Germany, and France were eagerly
endeavoring to follow her example. Germany’s plight was
revealed by the cruise of her fleet to Chinese waters. The
London Punch emphasized it by representing Prince Henry
running about with his “ mailed fist” and anxiously inquir-
ing: “ You haven’t got a ton of coal about you, have you?”

Spain was poorly prepared to meet the problem in Ameri-
can waters, in spite of her possessions. ‘One port in Puerto
Rico and a few in Cuba were all that she could count upon, and
in these the supply was not large, not more than enough to
coal her fleet for two months. As to her coaling at neutral
ports — mostly British — the government of Great Britain,
as far back as 1882, had drawn up a series of neutrality regu-
lations by which it was declared that any belligerent ship
should be allowed to buy only enough coal to take her to the
nearest port of her own country, and, furthermore, that no
two supplies of coal should be granted at any British neutral
port within three months of each other. The same restrictions
had been adopted by some of the other powers, and for many
years those in the United States who had advocated the “ for-
ward policy,” had urged upon our government that we not
only needed coaling stations in the West Indies, but in the
Fast, and that our station at the Hawaiian Islands should be
preserved at all hazards. Some of our highest naval authori-
ties had frequently asserted that our national policy ought to
be that no foreign power should hereafter acquire a coaling sta-
tion within three thousand miles of San Francisco.

Spain sought to deprive the United States of a certain
moral advantage in the dispute at this critical time by order-
ing Captain-General Blanco to rescind the infamous concen-
tration order at once. Blanco stated that after the publication
of the order the reconcentrados and their families would be
MONEY FOR REVELS BUT NOT FOR RELIEF 475

allowed to return with safety to their homes, that relief com-
mittes would allow them to secure new houses, and that
assistance would be given to them in obtaining work and in
engaging in agricultural pursuits. Spain, moreover, officially
announced that the ministry had voted an appropriation of
$600,000 for the relief of the reconcentrados, and would
accept whatever assistance in affording relief the United States
might send, if not sent officially or by way of intervention.
Nothing but the certainty of war had up to this time been
sufficient to induce Spain to even make the show of appropriat-
ing one peso for the relief of the starving people, and there
was little in Spanish methods to convince us that she really had
the intention of effectively relieving the suffering at this
critical time. A vote of $600,000 by the ministry was a very
different thing from the actual use of that sum in relief.
During all those months when such steps on the part of
Spain might have amounted to something, it was not known
that the government, nor even the Queen, who was pictured
as a woman much to be admired, had made the mildest sort of
protest against a policy which would have disgraced the worst
of the Sultan’s Kurdish cavalry in Armenia.’ During the
time when the whole world was ringing with the horrors of the
Spanish policy in Cuba, and American charity was endeavor-
ing to find a way to carry relief without offending Spain, all
the Spanish illustrated papers were full of lively accounts and
showy illustrations of the carnival revels throughout Spain.
While nothing was contributed throughout the whole of Spain
for the relief of the Queen’s suffering subjects in the “ Ever
Faithful Isle,” the Spaniards, with all their oft-mentioned
impoverishment and lack of resources, had wealth enough to
lavish upon carnival frivolities. | Meanwhile, the Spanish
government, evidently satisfied with its policy of extermina-
tion in Cuba, was somehow finding money all over Europe
to spend in the purchase of munitions of war and additions to
the navy with the purpose of fighting the United States. The

Spanish element in Havana was able to give brilliant public
29
476 MORE EMPTY FORMS AND PROMISES

balls and theatrical entertainments for the raising of money
for the Spanish navy, while contributing inappreciably for the
relief of the wretched people who were dying daily in the very
streets of Havana.

When, therefore, in the critical early days of April the
Spanish ministry, desperately playing to the galleries of
Europe, went through the form of appropriating money for
the relief of the reconcentrados, there was very little reason to
believe that a penny of it -was-really intended to be used for the
purpose proclaimed, and as the days passed there was no evi-
dence that any attempt was made to so employ it. As General
Lee pithily remarked to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, even if the money actually ever passed out of the
Spanish treasury, none of it would succeed in running the
* gauntlet of the Spanish officials in Cuba, who would certainly
steal every dollar of it before it could reach the poor wretches
for whom it was nominally intended. Officials who would
steal even in handling the money intended for the army and
for national defense, would hardly hesitate to take money
sent for the relief of the Cubans whom, with grim satisfaction,
they had ruthlessly imprisoned and starved in the hope of
exterminating them.

At this time also the autonomist government of Cuba sent
an appeal to President McKinley, urging him to respect the
will of the majority of the people of Cuba, declaring that the
majority believed in home rule under Spanish sovereignty,
that the insurgents were in a minority, and that the majority
had the right to decide the destinies of the island. It declared
that it would be unjust for any foreign government to impose
upon the majority a political régime against its will. But
this appeal had no effect upon those who understood the actual
situation. Reports from all our consuls had shown that au-
tonomy was a failure and that the majority of the Spanish were
as bitterly opposed to it as the insurgents themselves.

The first week in April was one of the most remarkable in
the history of the country. Up to this time the peace people
A MEMORABLE WEEK 47?

had hardly realized that a crisis was approaching; they had
not believed such a thing as war possible. “Surely,” said
they, “ we have no righteous cause for war — no man of sense
ean want war. This talk will pass over.” Indeed, up to the
last moment a few self-possessed friends of peace in the United
States declared their inability to discover any possible reason
why we should give ourselves the slightest degree of concern
about what was going on in Cuba. There are always men,
otherwise intelligent, who are incapable of understanding
events till they have receded some distance into history; they
were born so. The bewilderment of the public as to the be-
havior of these advocates of peace at any price was not lessened
by the fact that, to some extent, they were precisely the same
gentlemen who, but a short time before, had vehemently de-
manded that the United States should make war upon the
Turkish empire because it had not paid over to our government
some thousands of dollars considered by us to be due for certain
educational property destroyed by mobs several years ago in
Asiatic Turkey. Some who had vehemently denounced the
slaughter of seal pups on the Pribilof islands appeared to be
unmoved when the slaughter of Cuban women and children
was mentioned.

There was another and a larger class who, while expressing
no opinion concerning the Cuban question, were actuated by
more worthy motives. They formed the opinion that Con-
gress was driving the country into an unnecessary war, which
would cost an immense amount of money, disorganize business,
which was just beginning to recover from the previous depres-
sion, and cost much in American blood. Assembling as boards
of trade, or chambers of commerce, they petitioned Congress _
to sustain the President in: his effort to procure:a peaceful
settlement. While these men were patriotic citizens, ready
to do their part if war became necessary, their efforts naturally
became associated with those in this country and in Europes
who brought their influence to bear at Washington simply out
of regard for the value of stocks and bonds. “ What is the
478 ALARM OF CAPITALISTS

killing of a few Cubans to a general impairment of values?”
as one eminent financier said! The investment market is
largely an international affair and has its ramifications every-
where. While no appreciable part of the Spanish debt was
held in the United States, the great bankers of Europe, who
had large interests at stake in the maintenance of Spanish
credit, had also intimate connection with great banking houses
in New York, and these, in turn, had intimate connection with
banking houses in other parts of the country. The rich re-
wards which the large banking houses of New York reap from
gigantic financial operations are dependent upon their ability
to enlist the co-operation of European capital. These so-
called “ conservative business interests” undoubtedly had the
right to be heard, but they really paraded before themselves
men whose patriotism was much less questionable, by employ-
ing the ingenious methods of making a show of public opinion
by resolutions adopted by chambers of commerce. These
methods were perfectly understood by members of Congress,
and none of them were deceived into supposing that the circu-
lar letters and’ mimeographed resolutions represented anv
spontaneous movement of public sentiment. The unfortunate
thing about it was that it led to the impression that the Presi-
dent’s message was being held back out of deference to these
representations, and led to many bitter attacks upon him which
were wholly unjustifiable.

Congress and the people were impatiently waiting for the
message and they misconstrued the air of mystery that pre-
vailed over its non-appearance. Angry Congressmen flocked
to the President at all hours, and he heard them, listening with
courteous attention, which he never for a moment relaxed,
and then in a few words he would quiet them down and they
would go away content for the time. Ina few days, roused by
excited companions or constituents, they would reappear as
warlike as ever, and with patience he would calm them down
once more, showing not only his reserve strength, but his
high-minded tact. They went away convinced by the Presi-
INTENSE INTEREST IN THE MESSAGE 479

dent’s sincerity that he proposed to carry out a strong policy
entirely to their liking, but why did not the message come?

One day a Congressman started for the White House with
the intention, as he said, of “reading the riot act to the
President.” But when there his resentment melted. He
could neither threaten nor abuse this cordial gentleman, who
asked his opinions and expressed himself so firmly. So he,
like others, went back and waited while men of the opposing
party were charging that the administration was being held
up by Wall Street, and that its motives were altogether bad.
It was a trying moment for the President’s friends as well as
for the President.

At last it was announced that the message was completed
and would be sent to Congress on Wednesday, April 6th.
On Tuesday it was read at the cabinet meeting. The air of
the capital was full of electricity. On Wednesday morning
the crowds surging to the Capitol reminded people of the ex-
citing days of the Civil War. At six o’clock in the morning
the entrances were besieged though the Houses would not con-
vene till noon. There was not room in the galleries for a
third of the people who wished to be there. Every seat was
occupied, not only in the strangers’ gallery, but also those for
the press, for the diplomatic corps, and the friends of the mem-
bers. An intensity of feeling was apparent in the galleries,
on the floor, everywhere. Several members brought their
little children with them, holding them in their laps, believing
that it would be a day which they would remember when they
had grown to manhood. <A buzz of discussion filled the air.
Visitors in the front rows of the gallery leaned over to see the
photographs of starving Cubans that were being circulated.

The regular business of the House began and the time
wore on toward one o’clock without sign of that for which all
were waiting. Once there was a little flutter of anticipation
at the appearance of a messenger, but it was only a message
from the Senate that he brought. Then a rumor passed from
mouth to mouth that the message was coming at two o’clock.
480 THE SCENE IN THE HOUSE

A few courageous individuals ventured to leave their places
to go in search of food, and after a struggle in a restaurant re-
turned with sandwiches and fruits. The rest sat stolid, giving
scant attention to the debate in the House. It was all very
well to discuss the reorganization of the army, but the crowd
were waiting for another story —the President’s story of
Cuba’s wrongs. Five minutes past two and no message!
Then came a whisper, followed by a vague rustle of impatience,
that three o’clock would be the hour. Still no one moved.
All were too conscicus of the waiting crowds without, ready
to overflow an empty seat. But at last notes were sent up
from members on the floor to their friends above with the
disappointing news that the message was not to be sent over;
and unless the visitors were prepared to stay till Monday they
might as well go home. Reluctantly, the crowd melted,
hoping still that this might be a false report. Even as late as
five o’clock that afternoon there were some persistent seekers
still waiting, tired, cross, disappointed, hungry, but quite sure
that if they waited long enough the document might come.

When the message had been read to the cabinet and was
ready to be transmitted, word came from Consul-General Lee,
suggesting that action be postponed till the following week,
in order that all officials of the United States and all citizens
so desiring might withdraw from Cuba in safety. Excite-
ment was running high at Havana. The President at once
saw the force of the appeal; and, moreover, there was reason
for faith in a lingering hope that Spain would yield at the last
moment. Lee’s message was not only a reason for further
delay, but it was a convenient one, something that might hold
Congress in check a little longer till the last peaceful resouree
had been expended. The President intimated that he would
comply with Lee’s appeal. Immediately some of his ablest
advisers in the cabinet protested that the tempcr of Congress
and the people was such that no postponement would be toler-
ated. It would be dangerous. A fear was expressed lest the
President should suffer greatly from criticism.
CRITICISM AND FALSE CHARGES 481

“Tt is not a question of what will happen to me,” he is
reported to have said, “ but what will happen to those in Cuba.
I shall not send in this message till the last one of them has
left the island.”

And he did not. It was a courageous thing to do when
some congressmen, many editors, and many of the people
were impugning his motives. One afternoon a Democratic
Congressman from Ohio ventured to declare that “ influences
in New York wired over to Boston, wired from: Boston out to
the Western cities, and then back here under the name of the
peace party — which simply means the speculating party in
stocks and bonds, a new name and a disguise — demonstrate
that there will be no war. . . . I say that the center of
this telegram business is not even Wall Street, but Lom-
bard Street. It is a sympathetie fall in stocks that gentlemen
who control the administration fear more than they fear war.
We owe an apology to Judas Iscariot. . . . Ever since
March, 1897, this administration has been doing something
endeavoring to raise the price of stocks. . . . Dictators
to the administration are now with their shoulders under the
market trying to hold it up.”

This called forth a prompt reply from another Ohio Con-
eressman, General Grosvenor, one of the most picturesque
personages in either house, a striking figure, with silver hair
and beard and a ringing voice. He said, in part:

«The gentleman from Ohio makes a charge that ought to condemn the
President of the United States to impeachment and imprisonment. The
gentlenian declares that no message came from General Lee yesterday, that.
it was wu ‘fake’ report; that it was false and that it was given out for a
corrupt purpose by the President— namely, to affect the stock market.
Every part of that statement is, without qualification, absolutely without
foundation in truth. I will ask the gentleman from Ohio, suppose the mes-
sage had gone to Congress yesterday and suppose that last night the blood
of the chivalrous gentleman from Virginia [General Lee] had soaked the
soil of Cuba, what would have been the verdict of the American people
against the administration ? The President withheld his message from Con-
gress upon the representation of General Lee that there was trouble there.
The world will be notified to-night that the President has been assailed by
482 THE POPE ATTEMPTS TO MAKE PEACE

distinguished representatives on this floor, his motive impugned, his integ-
rity censured, his whole action charged as being instigated by criminal
purpose; and this in a body boasting that it is going to stand by the
administration,”

It is a source of gratification that only one member of Con-
gress was found at that time willing to give official publicity
to the absurd and baseless charge that the President was
influenced by stock jobbers in withholding the message. But
other reasons contributed to the President’s wish to hold it
back, diplomatic reasons which could not prudently have been
made public, and which, therefore, only increased the mys-
tery, the impatience, and the criticism. Reference has already
been made to the deep interest the Roman Catholic Church
had in maintaining Spanish credit, besides the interest natur-
ally felt by the Pope in a Catholie nation. Pope Leo, that
venerable figure, the loftiness of whose personal character had
won for him the esteem of good men of all communions, had
for months apparently been bringing his influence to bear at
Madrid, where his influence was greatest, in a desire to ward off
awar. His advisers in this country and in Rome being such in-
telligent Americans as Archbishops Ireland and Keane, must
have confirmed his own intuitions that the American people
would not accept his arbitration or do anything to concede his
authority as a temporal ruler. But the Pope seenis to have
cherished the hope that Spain might be persuaded to withdraw
under such terms as would not sacrifice her pride at every
point, while the essential features of the demands of American
public opinion would be granted, and President McKinley had
intimated to the Vatican authorities that any influence which
the Pope could bring to bear on Spain would be appreciated by
lovers of peace. It was due to the joint pressure of the Pope
and the European powers that Spain made new advances at a
time when diplomatic relations were thought to be closed.

Archbishop Ireland, an American of the highest patriot-
ism, acted for the Pope here, and he had a clear comprehension
of all the factors involved in the complicated situation. Tlis
FALSEHOOD AS A SALVE TU PRIDE . 483

opinion, as expressed to the President, that the Pope, if a little
more time were accorded, might be able to induce Spain to
depart from Cuba without resort to war, in itself furnished
ample and conclusive reasons for granting a few days’ delay.
Secrecy was observed solely for the sake of effectiveness of the
negotiations. But, unfortunately, the Spanish authorities did
a very foolish thing, though one not without precedent. She
allowed the Minister of the Interior, Sefior Capdepon, who had
had nothing to do with the negotiations, and, in view of his
official position would not have, except as an adviser, to
ulake a statement that the Pope had consented to act
as mediator at the suggestion of the United States! This
was so utterly false that it did not need the official denial
of the administration at Washington, which was, however,
made. The Spanish government seems to have made the
statement to satisfy its ungovernable pride. In answer to
Spain’s appeal the Pope had declared that if she would
suspend hostilities for a time he would endeavor to make a
permanent peace. Spain accepted the condition just before
the day approached on which the President intended to send
in his message, and such was the situation on that day when the
message was held back.

It was plain to the President that whatever form he gave
his message, Congress would take its appearance as a signal for
taking action leadin;z to war. Tt he counseled peace, Congrcss
would take the matter into its own hands; if he counseled war,
Congress would cheerfully follow. It was this latter course
which Congress hoped for and expected. Realizing this, he
‘felt it would be unwise to send in a message while the powers
and the Pope were bringing their influence to bear upon Spain.
He was entirely right, but the expectant people could not
understand his motives because of the mystery surrounding
the affair. That the President fully expected war was evi-
dent, for the wrecking company which was at work on the
Maine had been ordered to leave Havana harbor, a step that
would hardly have been taken if any hope of peace remained.
CHAPTER XXXIV

THE JOINT NOTE OF THE SIX POWERS — QUEEN CHRISTINA
ACTS TOO LATE- THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE AT LAST
—‘“THE WAR IN CUBA MUST STOP.”

A Little Play behind the Scenes— Attempts of European Powers to Act —
Austria’s Interest in the Spanish Dynasty —The French Investment in
Spanish Bonds — Plans for a Joint Appeal — An Impressive Moment in
the White House—The European Note— The President’s Reply —
Humanitarian Considerations — Novel Proceeding in Our Diplomacy —
Condition on Which England and Russia Acted — A Good Opportunity
for the President — A Similar Request Made at Madrid — Spain Replies
that She has Gone as Far as She Can —The Queen Takes Matters in
Her Own Hand and Would Go Further — Too Late — Blanco Ordered
to Suspend Hostilities— Riots in Madrid — General Lee and Many
Americans Leave Havana— No Further Postponement of Message
Possible —Useless to Listen to Spain’s Insincere Diplomacy — The
Message Submitted — History of the Troubles Reviewed — Advising
against Recognizing the Independence of the Cuban Government —
Spain’s Proposal as to the Maine—The Time for Action at Hand.

scenes while the exciting events attending the delay

of the message were taking place upon the stage. In-
deed, this little by-play might have had a small part in the post-
poning of the message. The European powers had up to this
time taken no concerted action either to influence Spain or to
plead with the United States for peace. It was understood
that Austria had undertaken to secure joint action to warn this
country against interfering with Spanish rights in Cuba, and
it was also understood that France, Germany, and Russia
would have been disposed to join in deprecating our forcible
intervention, but England stood in the way of such joint
action, and without her the Continental powers might have
found themselves in an embarrassing position had they at-
tempted it. It should be remembered that at the time our re-
lations with Spain approached a crisis after the destruction of
the Maine, the European powers were on the point of a crisis

(484)

N VERY interesting little play was going on behind the
INTERESTS OF THE CONTINENTAL POWERS 485

of their own because of affairs in China. The aggressiveness
of France, Germany, and Russia in securing rights from the
weakened Chinese empire had stirred Great Britain to the de-
fense of her rights, and called forth from her ministers the
declaration that she would go to war rather than suffer a
diminution of her rights in the East by the partition of China.
Germany, France, and Russia were in a position to act with a
degree of concert against England, and were evidently on the
point of doing so when the Spanish-American crisis suddenly
revealed the fact that England not only sympathized with us
but was disposed to favor an English-speaking alliance, whose
influence, of course, would be felt in the East as well as the
West. The Continental powers, which had thought to take
Great Britain unsupported, suddenly drew back when they saw
that their action would force Great Britain into a natural al-
liance with the United States.

Moreover, Austria had a certain further interest, as: the
people of Spain happened to be ruled by a branch of the Aus-
trian Bourbons, and the house of Hapsburg could not in de-
cency neglect its own. Indeed, from the very first, Spain’s
course was guided not so much by considerations of the
national welfare as by the desperate desire to protect the in-
terests of the Queen Regent and her son and ward,
the lad Alfonso. The French government also had the further
interest of protecting her investors who had absorbed a large
portion of Spain’s bonds. The Spanish debt had been scaled
down considerably after the Ten-Years War in Cuba, and the
prospect of a war with the United States was a serious one for
these French investors.

When these powers saw that it would be impossible to take
concerted action in defense of Spanish sovereignty, the propo-
sition was made for a joint appeal for peace to be presented to
both Spain and the United States, and this was done on the
Tth, the day following the excitement over the delay of the
message. The visit had heen arranged in advance, the Presi-
dent knew that an appeal world |e presented the same day to
4356 THE "MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP AND PEACE”

the Madrid government; he knew just what the diplomats
would say before they said it, and, indeed, their joint note had
been inspected and viséd at the State Department before pre-
sentation. Nevertheless, it was an impressive moment when
the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, France, Aus-
tria, Italy, and Russia appeared before the President, the Brit-
ish ambassador, who was spokesman, stating that they had been
commissioned to approach him with a message of “ friendship
and peace.” He then presented the following note:

“The undersigned, representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary,
France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, duly authorized in that behalf,
address in the name of their respective governments a pressing appeal to
the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the
American people in their existing differences with Spain. They earnestly
hope that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while
securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for
the re-establishment of order in Cuba.

“The powers do not doubt that the humanitarian and purely disin-
terested character of this representation will be fully recognized and appre-
ciated by the American nation.”

The powers acted here not with any idea of suggesting
what we ought to do or must do, and whether intentionally or
not they gave to the President an opportunity to declare just
how irrevocable was the intention of the United States that
order must be restored and established in Cuba, thus enabling
the powers to deal more effectively with responsible officials at
Madrid. The President replied thus, at once making it clear
to Europe and to Congress why he could not deal further with
Spain on the basis she proposed:

“The government of the United States recognizes the good will which
has prompted the friendly communication of the representatives of Ger-
many, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set
forth in the address of your excellencies, and shares the hope therein ex-
pressed that the outcome of the situation in Cuba may be the maintenance
of peace between the United States and Spain by affording the necessary
guarantees for the re-establishment of order in the island, so terminating the
chronic condition of disturhance there, which so deeply injures the interests
and menaces the tranquillity of the American nation by the character and
.

GOOD WILL OF THE POWERS RECOGNIZED 487

consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its
sense of humanity.

“The government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian
and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of
the powers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will
be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to
humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which has
become insufferable.”

The fact that the representatives of the powers were re-
ceived in a collective capacity at all aroused some criticism in
this country, for it was a distinctly novel proceeding in our
diplomacy. The American spirit does not consent to have the
concert of Europe, as such, acting diplomatically in any affair
which concerns us, and doubtless the President might have de-
clined with propriety to be addressed by the particular group
of European powers which of late years has assumed to im-
pose its mandates upon the rest of the world. On the other
hand, the attitude of the powers was one to which this govern-
ment could take no just exception, and it might have proved
disadvantageous had the reception of the appeal been declined.
The British minister would not consent to act with the repre-
sentatives of the other powers until he was assured that no de-
sign of menace lay in the proposition, and the Russian minister
declined to act till assured that the note would be welcomed by
the United States. He considered the affair a mere bit of
formality. It also gave the President an opportunity to make
a statement which might remove any misconception in the
minds of Europeans as to our right to deal with our own affairs
unmolested, and of reminding them that, much as they depre-
cated war from a humanitarian point of view, it was chiefly
from this very point of view that we were about to go to war.

The powers proffered the same request to the government
at Madrid, and Sefior Gullon, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
simply replied that Spain had reached the limit of her policy
in conceding the demands and allowing the pretensions
of the United States. She, however, immediately em-
braced the opportunity to bring forward another alleged
488 A PRETENSE OF AN ARMISTICE

concession, carefully stating that it was in obedience to Euro-
pean intervention and not American demands. This implied
that Spain had thus arranged for European support, but the
United States government knew well enough that there was no
ground for the implication. The concession took the form of
an order to General Blanco to suspend hostilities for the pres-
ent. Contrary to previous intimations, this so-called armistice
was entirely without conditions, and its duration was to be de-
termined by Blanco. It was not an armistice in any sense of
the word, nor did it even include a request to the insurgents to
join init. An armistice is, of course, an agreement between
two hostile governments or military commanders for a mutual
cessation of hostilities. In this case, so far from an armistice
having been determined upon, Sefior Quesada, speaking of-
ficially for the Cuban Junta, said positively that the Republic
of Cuba would not consent to any negotiations for armistice or
suspension of hostilities unless the basis.was the absolute inde-
pendence of Cuba.

The Spanish cabinet were reported as at odds over the ques-
tion of the suspension of hostilities, but the Queen, influenced
apparently by the Pope, took the matter into her own hands
and insisted upon it, though the order which came late on Sat-
urday, the 9th, was accompanied by an unofficial intimation
that Spain would gladly see the United States withdraw its
war ships from the neighborhood of Cuba and the Philippine
Islands during the further negotiations. The Queen was evi-
dently in a mood, when it was too late, to concede autonomy on
Canadian lines rather than lose the sovereignty of Cuba. But
these repeated yieldings to what were considered the demands
of the people of the United States made the royal position
even more uncomfortable by angering the Spanish masses.

Riots occurred in Madrid on Sunday afternoon and even-
ing. The Prefect, who was witnessing the Easter Sunday
bull fight, promptly left the ring, and by energetic measures
prevented a serious outbreak. The demonstration was made
by Carlists, Republicans, and Romerists, and a number of the
AMERICANS DEPART FROM CUBA 489

leaders were arrested. Much feeling was aroused among the
people by a report, evidently circulated by design, that the
Spanish minister had been attacked at Washington and his
residence wrecked. There was no truth whatever in the story,
and Minister Polo hastened to assure his government that noth-
ing serious had happened.

Meanwhile, the delay in the message gave the needed op-
portunity for the withdrawal of Americans from Cuba. When
the excitement was running high, General Lee left on the
Fern, reaching Key West Saturday evening, and with him
came most of the other American officials and residents in
Cuba and many Cubans who believed their lives in danger at
Havana. A deplorable but necessary result of the withdrawal
of Americans from Cuba was the immediate cessation of our
efforts to relieve the reconcentrados, for Miss Barton and the
other Red Cross agents took General Lee’s advice and left the
island. No consular officials remained in Cuba to supervise
the distribution of supplies, and the regular freight and pas-
senger service between Cuba and the United States ceased.
Considerable supplies of provisions were left in Cuba, and it
was the belief of the officials of this country that they would be
used for the army, the Spanish taking no interest in relieving
the reconcentrados. Indeed, nothing had occurred to indicate
that Spain had taken the slightest step to use in charity any of
the $600,000 voted by the cabinet several days before. The
move was regarded as insincere and made only to gain time.

Notwithstanding the apparent change in Spain’s attitude,
it was evident that another postponement of the message would
not do. However unjust, the impression had become strong
that in the White House during the development of the crisis
there had been too many statesmen near the President who
looked upon the cause of Cuba without sympathy, either moral
or political, who thought of the Mfazne’s destruction as merely
a regrettable subject for diplomatic negotiation, who habitually
thought of the Monroe doctrine as a pretentions theory, and
whose ambition for the greatness of the United States and
490 THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE

whose conception of its future welfare were bound up within
their existing commercial interests. As a matter of fact, the
delay was caused by the creditable desire of the President not
to weaken the action of his government by even the appearance
of injustice to Spain. But Spain’s diplomacy, as crafty and in-
sincere as ever, by alleged concessions and by other devices,
if not stimulating the hope that she would withdraw from
Cuba, at least compelled the President to listen again and
again or be accused of a diplomatic discourtesy.

The time had come, however, when it was useless and
might be dangerous to listen longer. Such diplomacy might
be kept up till doomsday. Having failed to accomplish any-
thing by it, nothing remained but to calmly pass the issue over
to Congress, which might be more temperate under its respon-
sibility. So not far from noon on Monday, the 11th, the
message was delivered substantially as drafted the week before,
but supplemented with a statement of Spain’s latest action.

The message opened with a long, thorough, and convincing
historical review of the entire subject. The President pointed
out that the existing revolution was only one of several such
disturbances which had caused the United States enormous
loss in trade and had “ by the exercise of cruel, barbarous, and
uncivilized practices of warfare shocked the sensibilities and
offended the humane sympathies of our people.” He then re-
ferred to the efforts of President Cleveland to bring about
peace, and their failure; to the institution in October, 1896, of
“the policy of devastation and concentration,” and to the fact
that by March 18, 1897, the mortality among the reconcen-
‘trados from starvation and disease exceeded 50 per cent. of
their whole number — adding, “it was not civilized warfare;
it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that
of the wilderness and the grave.”

The history of the attempts of his administration to im-
prove the condition of affairs in Cuba were next considered —
the overtures made to the Spanish administration which suc-
ceeded that of the assassinated prime minister Canovas; the
FOUR REASONS FOR INTERVENTION 491

successful demand for the release of American citizens im-
prisoned in Cuba; the appointment of a Cuban relief com-
mittee; the appeal to the American people for contributions,
and the action of the Red Cross Society; finally, Spain’s revo-
cation of the order of concentration and appropriation of money
for the relief of the sufferers. Still, he said, the situation re-
mained unendurable, and on March 27th he had made proposi-
tions through Minister Woodford looking to an armistice until
October 1st. To this Spain replied, offering to entrust the
effort to make peace to the Cuban so-called autonomous parlia-
ment. This was quite unsatisfactory, as the parliament was
not to meet till Mav 4th and its powers were indefinite.

Then the President came to the question of what action the
government should take. Forcible annexation, he said, would
be “eriminal aggression”; recognizing belligerency would
“accomplish nothing towards the end for which we labor —
the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery
that afflicts the island ”; recognizing the independence of Cuba
had no historical precedent clearly applicable to the situa-
tion. Headded: “From the standpoint of experience, I do
not think it would be wise or prudent for this government to
recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called
Cuban republic.” As to intervention, he held that there were
good grounds for such action: first, in the cause of humanity;
second, for the protection of our citizens in Cuba; third, from
the injury to our commerce and the devastation of the island;
fourth, from the constant menace to our peace in many and un-
expected ways, arising out of such a war at our doors. The
last reason was illustrated and enforced by this reference to the
destruction of the battleship Maine:

“The destruction of the noble vessel has filled the national heart with
inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and
marines and two officers of our navy reposing in the fancied security of a
friendly harbor have been hurled to death ; grief and want brought to their
homes and sorrow to the nation. . . The destruction of the Maine by
whatever exterior cause is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things

30
492 A SOLEMN RESPONSIBILITY

in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that
the Spanish government cannot assure safety to a vessel of the American
navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace and rightfully there.”

After referring to his statement in his message of the year
before, that the time might come when it would be necessary
to intervene with force, the President closed with these words:

«The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged
the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may
smolder with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that it can-
not be extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and
repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced
pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization,
in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the
duty to speak und to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

“In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress
to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full
and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the
people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable
government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international
obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens
as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United
States as may be necessary for these purposes.

‘‘And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of
the starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food
and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the
public treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens,

“The issue is now with Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I
have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs
which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon
me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action.

“Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official
information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent
of Spain directs, General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to
proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have
not yet been communicated to me.

““This fact, with every other pertinent consideration will, I am sure,
have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which
you‘are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our
aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails,
it will be only another justification for our contemplated action.”
CHAPTER XXXV

RECEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE— ARRIVAL OF
GENERAL LEE—EXCITING DEBATES IN THE HOUSE
AND SENATE— OUR ULTIMATUM TO SPAIN — BREAKING
OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

How the President’s Message was Received — A Plain Unimpassioned
Statement — Congress Expected Something More Fiery — General Lee’s
Arrival at Washington — Ovations on the Route— A Warm Welcome
—His Testimony before the Senate Committee — Resolutions for
Intervention — The Question of Recognizing the Independence of Cuba
— The Tension of Feeling — Coming Together on the Final Vote —
Report of the Senate Committee — Defending the President — An
Impressive Speech — An Amendment to Recognize the Cuban Republic
Passed — Disagreeing Action and a Conference — The Final Draft —
Wisdom of Going to War without Recognizing Cuba— The Presi-
dent Prepares His Ultimatum — Signing the Resolutions — Minister
Polo Demands His Passports — Spanish Ministry Withhold the Presi-
dent’s Despatch to Woodford — A High-handed Performance — Wood.
ford Given His Passports. ;

which, for weeks, had been so wrought up over the an-

ticipation of it that something of a more fiery charac-
ter was expected. Their appetites sought rhetorical vehe-
mence, and they were disappointed to find only a plain, unim-
passioned statement of facts which had long been familiar.
But once did the message strike the high note suited to the
war party’s ears, and that was when it said, “ This war must
stop.” But Congress expected that the President would
lead the way, and that it could follow on, shouting for war,
but taking no responsibility in the premises. The Presi-
dent, however, cast the responsibility squarely upon it.
“The issue is now with Congress,” he said, and further on
he added, “ Prepared to execute every obligation imposed
upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your
action.” This was a plain assurance that the President

would now stand by Congress, though Congress had only
(493)

T HE message was very coldly received by Congress,
194 LEE’S TRIUMPHAL RETURN

with great difficulty been induced to stand by him, in his
serious efforts to settle the trouble by diplomacy. Congress
had waited for the President, now the President waited for
Congress. In this situation there was but one thing for Con-
gress consistently to do. The message was, without debate,
referred to the committees on foreign affairs. On a second
reading, Congress found the message more to its taste, and it
had the assurance that the President was ready to intervene
just as soon as authority was given him to do so.

On the evening of the day the message was presented Gen-
eral Lee arrived at Washington. His progress northward was
in the nature of a triumph, being lustily cheered along the way
and at Richmond royally received by Governor Tyler. Great
was the enthusiasm at Washington; crowds were at the depot ’
when his train rolled in, and lined the street as he was driven
to his hotel, to which a vast number of people flocked, some
with torches, in procession. A patriotic serenade was arranged,
and in spite of his wearisome trip he had to step out on the
balcony and address the multitude. He was at once in great
demand at the State Department and before the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, to which he made a long state-
ment on the situation in Cuba, and gave his reasons for the
conviction that the Afaine was blown up from outside. He
believed it was done by Spanish officials, but that the Captain-
General had no knowledge of it. He considered the alleged .
letter from Weyler to Santos Guzman, already referred to,
genuine. Captain Sigsbee expressed the same conviction as
to the Maine, and said that the Spanish exercised no vigilance
whatever over any but their own vessels. As to the Spanish
Board of Inquiry, it did nothing for a week after the explosion
and did very little work at all on the wreck. General Lee
further said that the armistice was not of the slightest use or
effect. He said the Cubans had only the skeleton form of a
government, with no permanent capital, but that all Cubans
sympathized with the insurgents and four-fifths of the in-
habitants of the island were Cubans.
AN EXCITING DEBATE 495

While the case was in the hands of committees the world
waited in almost breathless suspense for the outcome, but it did
not wait long. The House was the first to act. On the 138th
a resolution was introduced by the acting chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee following the recommendation of
the President, authorizing and directing him to intervene at
once to stop the war in Cuba, that permanent peace might be
secured, and that a stable and independent government might
be established by the people of Cuba, and empowering him to
use the land and naval forces of the United States for that pur-
pose. There were those who desired more radical action, and
insisted that there should be a recognition of the Cuban repub-
lic, but the administration forces held together admirably, and
the resolutions of the majority of the committee were carried
on a final vote by 322 to 19, on Saturday the 16th.

The debate was extremely exciting at times. Though
there was an agreement between the Democratic and Repub-
lican memhcrs of the committee as to the presentation of the
resolutions and the minority substitute, an unfortunate mis-
understanding arose among the members of both parties, eulmi-
nating in an occurrence which cast a blot on the historic pro-
ceedings of the day. The difference of opinion on which the
parties were lined against each other was simply over the form
of the resolution, the Democrats largely wishing to recognize
the independence of Cuba at the outset, in defiance of the
recommendations of the President and the advice of General
Lee, and the Republicans wishing to postpone such recogni-
tion till a more favorable time. During the excitement a per-
sonal quarrel occurred between two members; a Georgian was
ealled a liar and responded by throwing a book at the head of
the offending Pennsylvanian. Before the end of the day ex-
planations were made and the incident only serves to show the
tension of feeling in Congress.

In the final vote both parties came together and the unity
of North and South and the common feeling at the last were
worth remembering. It was certainly remarkable that out
496 TENSION OF FEELING IN CONGRESS

of that great body of men only nineteen were in opposition.
The long-expected crisis had come and been met in a strong
one-minded way and generally with dignity. The resolution
as passed by the House was understood to meet the desires of
the President, which was another remarkable feature consider-
ing the severe criticisms to which he had been subjected by
members who at last voted for the desired resolution. The
Democratic substitute would have béen a virtual declaration of
war, and, although the other resolution could under existing
circumstances lead to nothing else unless Spain speedily ad-
mitted the independence of Cuba, it was a much wiser ex-
pression and a safer course.

In the Senate on the 14th the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee reported resolutions in harmony with those of the House,
accompanied by a strong and brilliant report prepared and pre-
sented by Senator Davis, the chairman of the committee. It
discussed the J/aine incident and other reasons for the grave
step proposed, and a minority of four led by Senator Turpie
added a statement advocating the recognition of the existing
government of the Cuban republic. It is probable that the
resolutions of the majority would have been passed in short
order but for the introduction of a resolution recognizing the
Cuban republic, and conspicuously advocated by Senators
Foraker on the Republican side and Turpie on the Democrativ
side. A long debate followed, some of the Democratic and so-
called “ silver ” Senators making severe attacks upon the Presi-
dent, declaring that his message was inconclusive, that his
course had been vacillating, and that he had been under the in-
fluence of senators interested in stocks and bonds. It was un-
fortunately apparent that. certain leaders were anxious to make
capital for their party. These criticisms were repelled with
emphasis by both Republican and Democratic senators. Sen-
ator Hoar made a long and very able address upholding the
President and warning the Senate against going beyond the
recommendations of the message. Ile declared that the pro-
posal to recognize the independence of the Cuban republic
STRONG AND ELOQUEANT SPEECHES 497

was an extremely unwise one, of such a nature as to en-
tangle us in case of intervention, which he regarded as almost
inevitable. He thought it would be far wiser to place in the
hands of the President the power he asked for and trust him
to secure the pacification of Cuba without resort to war, if pos-
sible. It might be that with this power in his hands he could
come to a satisfactory agreement with Spain. “If, in the
providence of God,” he said, “ this country is called upon to do
a great act of international justice, let us do it in the spirit of
justice and not of revenge.” He felt that if we went to war it
should be with “sanction of international law, the sympathy
of all humane and liberty-loving nations, with the approval of
our own consciences, and with the certainty of the applauding
judgment of history.” He did not like to think of the Genius
of America “angry, snarling, shouting, screaming, clawing
with her nails,” but rather “to think of her in her honest and
serene beauty, inspired by sentiments— even towards her
enemies —- not of hate but of love; perhaps a little pale about
the eyes and with a smile on her lips, but as sure, determined,
unerring, and invincible as was the Archangel Michael when
he struck down and trampled upon the demon of darkness.”

Mr. Lodge made a brilliant historical argument, urging
strong and immediate action. Mr. Turpie declared that the
recognition of independence must-logically precede interven-
tion and was “the great outlying, overshadowing fact in the
whole transaction.” Mr. Foraker made an elaborate argu-
ment in favor of recognition. Mr. Fairbanks found the so-
called republic of Cuba “ too nebulous, too mythical; at most
a military oligarchy with no habitat.” Mr. Daniel declared
that the resolutions as reported would naturally result in turn-
ing our guns upon the insurgents, and this charge led to a
lively passage at arms between Mr. Daniel and Mr. Gray.
The possibility of the United States becoming liable for Span-
ish bonds issued to pay the expenses of the Cuban war unless
we first recognized Cuban independence was discussed with
some vigor, but was generally repudiated.
498 A TIME TO DROP PARTY DIFFERENCES

There were a few, very few, who still thought we had no
cause for intervention. Mr. Wellington and Mr. White
argued that Spain had already complied with our demands, and
the latter added: “It has been well and thoughtfully said that
no more sublime spectacle has ever been presented than that
of a great nation sacrificing for justice its passion and its
pride.”

Just before the vote was taken, Mr. Gorman, the Demo-
cratic senator from Maryland, made a very impressive speech,
defending the President, declaring that his course had been
wise and patriotic, and that both branches of Congress ought
to uphold him; that it was a time to drop all party differences
and to act, not as Republicans or Democrats, but as American
citizens. He wished that the record of division already made
could be blotted out and only a united people presented to the
world. He added:

“‘T pledge myself to forget that McKinley was elected by the Republi-
can party because I know and believe that as President of a united people he
will bear his country’s flag aloft, and that no nation, Spain or any other,
will receive from him aught else than that fair, manly, and brave treatment
of an American President.”

The vote on the amendment recognizing the Cuban repub-
lic was 51 in favor to 87 against. The affirmative vote was
made up of 29 Democrats, 6 Populists, 5 silver Republicans,
and 11 regular Republicans; the negative vote consisted of 32
Republicans and 5 Democrats, the latter being Gray, Caffrey,
Gorman, Morgan, and Faulkner.

The Senate resolutions came before the House on Monday;
Mr. Dingley moved concurrence with an amendment, striking
out the clause concerning the recognition of the Cuban repub-
lic, and upon this motion called for the previous question,
which was ordered, thus shutting off debate. The Republi-
can leaders had made preparations for the division, using all
the influence they had to bring radical Republicans into line.
The Democrats and Populists, who, with a single exception,
were solidly arrayed in favor of the Senate resolutions un-
amended, hoped for sufficient Republican help to carry their
RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES 499

point; but in this they were disappointed. When the vote was
taken Dingley’s motion was carried by 178 to 156. Fourteen
Republicans broke over party lines and voted in opposition.
Four of them were from Wisconsin, two from Indiana, seven
from Illinois, and one from North Dakota.

The resolutions as amended then went back to the Senate,
and, beforé they were received, ten of the Republican senators
who had voted with the Democrats and Populists on Saturday
had a conference and decided to work against concurrence in
the House amendinent. The Senate by a vote of 46 to 32,
showing no change in the attitude of the two parties, resolved
to adhere to its resolutions and sent them back to the House,
which again voted to non-concur and returned the resolutions
to the Senate with the independence clause again stricken out;
it resolved to insist on its amendment and asked for a con-
ference. The vote was 172 to 148, showing a majority of two
more than on the former vote. At 1:10 a. m. on Tuesday the
conferees of the two Houses reached an agreement. On the
part of the Senate, the clause recognizing the independence of
the Cuban republic was yielded, and on the part of the House
the paragraph declaring that Cuba is and of right ought to be
free was accepted. The two houses then passed the resolu-
tions in the following form:

““Waereas, The abhorrent conditions which have existed for more
than three yearsin the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have
shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a dis-
grace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction
of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty of its officers and
crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be
endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his
message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress
was invited ; therefore be it resolved :

‘« First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought
to be, free and independent.

“« Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government
of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of
Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces’from Cuba and Cuban waters,

“ Third. That the President of the United States be, and he her®y is,
500 REASONS FOR NOT RECOGNIZING CUBA

directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the
United States, and to cull into the actual service of the United States the
militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry
these resolutions into effect. :

“ Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island,
except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is
accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its
people.”

It was not without considerable difficulty that enough
Republicans were held to the defense of the President’s posi-
tion. The feeling in behalf of Cuba and against Spain was
so bitter that it required the greatest parliamentary skill and
the strong hand of the Speaker to prevent concurrence with
the Senate. The great majority felt that the Cuban republic
had won its freedom, and in their excitement they failed to
grasp the legal reasons against such action. Recognition of
the Masé government might follow later, but at the outset of
intervention the recognition of that government would have
undoubtedly hampered our efforts. Had we acknowledged it,
our only logical course would have been to form an offensive
and defensive alliance with this new sovereign power, and then,
in a strictly subordinate way, co-operate simply with General
Gomez. It was much better for us to enter upon the conflict
upon our own responsibility. Under the resolution, as
adopted, our demand that Spain withdraw her troops and relin-
quish sovereignty in the island could mean nothing than that
she should relinquish the sovereignty to the United States.
This left us free to establish the Cuban government as seemed
best for the Cuban people, but the same resolution distinctly
avowed that in taking upon ourselves the responsibility of re-
storing order in the island we should relinquish authority as
soon as we had been able to establish an independent Cuban
republic. Recognition of the Masé government would not
only have hampered our military operations, but it would have
been humiliating to have taken the field simply as an ally of
the Cuban army, reserving no authority over the determina-
THE ULTIMATUM PRESENTED 501

tion of results. The shrewdest men in Congress saw this
plainly, although all their feelings were for the Cuban re-
public. If we had recognized the republic months earlier and
allowed the Cubans to win their own independence, if they
could, the case would have been different.

The resolutions were sent to the President late on Tuesday,
the 19th. As there was reason to believe that if they were
promptly signed diplomatic relations would be broken off be-
fore an ultimatum could be sent, the President delayed the
act of signing till an ultimatum had been prepared. Shortly
before noon on the 20th the ultimatum was delivered to Sejior
Polo, the Spanish Minister at Washington. About an hour
earlier it was sent to Minister Woodford as an open dispatch,
accompanied by an order that it be presented to the Sagasta
ministry at once.

Immediately on receiving the ultimatum Sefior Polo de-
manded his passports, which were sent to him promptly by
the State Department, and he closed the legation, leaving at
once for Canada. The ultimatum arrived at the Madrid tele-
graph office in due time, but by direction of the Spanish gov-
ernment was withheld from Minister Woodford till the follow-
ing day. Spain, having learned the contents of the dispatch,
decided to give Minister Woodford his passports before he had
an opportunity to present the ultimatum, and this she did,
seeking by a characteristic trick to win a technical advantage.
But this she lost, as the ultimatum had already been officially
communicated through Minister Polo.

The ultimatum, a paraphrase of the resolutions of Congress
couched in diplomatic language, was as follows:

“To Woodford, Minister, Madrid:

“You have been furnished with the text of a joint resolution voted by
the Congress of the United States on the 19th inst., approved to-day, in
relation to the pacification of the island of Cuba. In obedience to that act
the President directs you to immediately communicate to the Government
of Spain said resolution, with the formal demand of the Government of the
United States that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority
and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval
502 SPAIN RESOLVES UPON WAR

forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. In taking this step, the United Stateg
hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, juris-
diction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government
and control of the island to its people, under such free and independent
government as they may establish.

“Tf by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23d day of April,
instant, there be not communicated to this Government by that of Spain
a full and satisfactory response to this demand and resolution whereby the
ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured, the President will proceed without
further notice to use the power and authority enjoined and conferred upon
him by the said joint resolution to such extent as may be necessary to carry
the same into effect.”

In view of the swiftness with which the quarrel had come
to a head the new Spanish Cortes was called by the Queen to
meet on April 20th, a day somewhat earlier than that originally
set. The party groups held preliminary meetings on the 19th,
by which time the action of the American Congress had be-
come fully known in Madrid. Sagasta at the head of the
Liberal party made statements of the most uncompromising
character, and war was declared inevitable alike by all Spanish
statesmen and the press. The belief prevailed in this country
that Spain would endeavor to resort to another evasive diplo-
matic scheme, but she knew quite well that the President had
resolved to listen no longer; he would approve the resolutions
of Congress, and she resolved to let the war come. It had the
desired effect of bringing all parties together and of strengthen-
ing for the time the position of the Queen. Don Carlos was
forced to join in the warlike procession, though he knew that
his opportunity would inevitably come later.

In her speech to the Cortes on the 20th, or at the very time
President McKinley was signing the resolutions, the Queen de-
clared “the unalterable resolution of my government to de-
fend our rights whatsoever sacrifices may be imposed upon us
in accomplishing this task.” She added: “Thus identify-
jing myself with the nation, I not only fulfill the oath I swore
in accepting the Regency, but I follow the dictates of a
mother’s heart, trusting the Spanish people to gather behind
MINISTER WOODFORD LEAVES MADRID 503

my son’s throne and defend it until he is old enough to defend
it himself, as well as trusting to the Spanish people to defend
the honor and the territory of the nation.” She ascribed the
most unworthy motives to those in the United States who had
urged interference in Cuban affairs.

Sagasta, in his opening address to the Cortes, used even
stronger language, and amid universal enthusiasm said:
“ Acts, not words, are required. . . . We are resolved not to
yield in anything touching the national honor or the integrity
of Spanish territory, because we admit no negotiations in ques-
tion of honor and we do not make a traffic of shame.”

Minister Woodford left Madrid promptly after receiving
his passports, having notified the United States consuls
through Consul-General Bowen at Barcelona to close their
consulates. There were some demonstrations at his departure,
but he was carefully guarded at the instance of the Spanish
authorities. At Valladolid, the train was attacked and stoned
and windows were broken; but the civil guards protected Min-
ister Woodford’s carriage with drawn swords. At Tolosa, the
Spanish police made an attempt to arrest Mr. Woodford’s
colored servant, claiming that he was a citizen of Spain.
Woodford protested and declared he would only allow the
servant to be removed by force, and this was not attempted.
It was a relief to him and his party when they finally reached
French soil. The Spanish minister and his suite left Wash-
ington without molestation or any hostile demonstrations, and
made his way to Canada without receiving insults of any kind.

The day after General Woodford left there were a number
of enthusiastic processions in Madrid, and a mob gathered in
front of the Equitable Life Insurance building, tore down the
American escutcheon; and gleefully broke the American eagle
in pieces. The civil governor, instead of checking the demon-
stration, allowed the mob full liberty, mingling with the crowd
and saying in an address to the populace: “The Spanish lion
is aroused from his slumber. He will shake his mane and dis-
perse the rest of the brute creation.” :
504 MOBS IN BARCELONA

At Barcelona, Consul-General Bowen reported that during
the week before he left, eight angry mobs of over 8,000 persons
each made violent demonstrations before the consulate. Once
he was compelled to face a mob for some time before the police
came, and the night before he left, a mob, including some of
the most influential citizens, came to the building determined
to secure the Eagle and Shield. On finding they had been re-
moved, they were very angry and it required force on the part
of the police to disperse them.

The series of events indicates clearly enough that peace
between the two countries was broken by the act of Spain and
not of the United States. Spain considered the approval of
the joint resolutions of Congress a virtual declaration of war,
and she at once broke off relations with this government. That
began the war. The Cuban question became our war with
Spain.
CHAPTER XXXVI

THE SPANISH AND AMERICAN NAVIES —PROCLAMATION
OF CUBAN BLOCKADE— DEPARTURE OF AN AMERICAN
SQUADRON FOR CUBAN WATERS —THE FIRST SHOT OF
THE WAR—THE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS.

Beginning Operations — Plans for Offensive and Defensive Action — Com-
parison of the Spanish and United States Navies —Spain’s Armored
Cruisers — Superiority of Our Guns and Gunners— The Spirit of the
Navy — Lieutenant Commander Wainwright’s Plea for a Chance
to Fight— Peculiar Positions of Antagonists —Spain’s Best Ships
neither in Cuban nor Philippine Waters — The Cape Verde Squadron —
Speculations as to Naval Results— Spaniards Suspected of Dark De-
signs— Commodore Howell’s Auxiliary Fleet —Blockading Cuban
Ports— Departure of Admiral Sampson’s Imposing Fleet —Commo-
dore Dewey Ordered to Sail for Manila — Caution of the Naval Strategy
Board— A Spanish Ship Sighted — The First Shot of the War— The
Spanish Flag Comes Down— Other Prizes Captured — The Call for
Volunteers — Prompt Response— A Conflict between Amateurs and
Professionals — Reorganizing the Army — A Cause of Delay.

HEN on Thursday, the 21st, the news of General
‘Woodford’s dismissal was received at Washington,
it was considered as sufficiently marking the be-

ginning of hostilities. No further answer could be expected
to the ultimatum, and the administration felt free to begin
active operations at once. In adopting plans for the war the
government was obliged to consider the requirements of both
offensive action and of defensive precautions. The President
at first kept strongly in view the possibility of carrying supplies
to the reconcentrados, an object at once requiring a convenient
base of operations on the Cuban shore, which was in the hands
of the Spanish, whom it was proposed to drive from the island.
While, to accomplish these objects, an army would be very
soon required, it was evident that the initial steps would be
taken at once by the navy, and it was decided to direct it
towards two ends — a blockade of Havana and the destruction

of Spain’s fleet. The idea of taking Havana at once was dis-
(505)
‘

506 THE TWO NAVIES COMPARED

carded as too risky, though it was, doubtless, less risky than
the cautious strategists of the government supposed. The
fear of incurring the loss of some of our fighting ships and the
suspicion that Spain might await a good opportunity to strike
our navy, when weakened by the loss or absence of ships for
repairs, or to strike at our extensive seaboard, led the govern-
ment quite naturally to the conclusion that the safer and surer
course would be to blockade Havana and await Spain’s attempt
to relieve the city, in the meantime seeking a convenient hase
of operations on the Cuban coast as near Havana as possible.
A. comparison of Spain’s navy with ours showed but one
first-class Spanish battleship, the Pelayo, to our four. Spain
had two old second-class battleships, the Numancia and Vit-
toria; we had a modern one, the Texas. But if we were su-
perior in battleships, Spain was ahead in armored cruisers;
while we had but two, the New York and Brooklyn, she had
no less than eight — the Vizcaya, Almirante Oquendo, Carlos
V., Cardinal Cisneros, Cristobal Colon, Cataluia, Maria
Teresa, and Princess de Asturias. In protected cruisers,
however, the tables were again turned; Spain had eight, the
United States had more than twice as many. In gunboats
and dispatch boats, Spain’s great number of eighty represented
but small and weak vessels far inferior to those of the United
States. Of monitors she had none; we had five modern and
thirteen old-fashioned boats of this type, and one dynamite
monitor or cruiser, the Vesuvius, whose utility, however, re-
mained to be tested. Spain’s torpedo-boat destroyers num- -
bered six; we had none except such vessels as were armed in
the auxiliary fleet. Spain’s entire torpedo outfit numbered
about sixty vessels and ours about twenty. Many naval ex-
perts considered armored cruisers and torpedo craft the two
most effective engines of war and, therefore, regarded our navy
as behind that of Spain in real effectiveness; but this was only
a theory. As a whole, taking account of tonnage, speed, and
armament, our navy was far better than Spain’s. This was
especially noticeable in guns, of which we had more than twice
 

 

 

 

 

 

PROMINENT AMERICAN NAVAL OFFICERS.
Admiral F. M. BUNCE. Commodore Joun C. Watson.
Lieut. RICHMOND P. Hogson. Captain CHARLES D. SIGSBEE.
THE MAN BEHIND THE GUN 509

as many as Spain had. Taking into account our auxiliary
fleet of eighty vessels, many of them of superior speed, we
certainly possessed a good advantage over Spain in striking
power. But the greatest advantage we had was in the supe-
riority of American sailors, even if in number they were less
than Spain’s. The Spaniards had never had much drill in
squadron maneuvers or in gun practice.

We did not appreciate at this time as it deserved the fact
that no matter how marvelous the gun it is really the man
behind the gun who decides the contest. The modern gun
had become a complicated machine, terrible if used effectively,
but, capable of firing at long range, the chances of missing had
been greatly increased unless skill had kept pace with the
development.

The spirit prevailing in our navy is well illustrated by the
appeal of Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, who was exe-
cutive officer of the A/aine, to be allowed to go into active
service again. He was formerly Chief Intelligence Officer
of the navy, and Secretary Long had decided to restore him
to his old duties. But he did not wish to stay on shore duty;
he wanted a chance to fight the men who had been responsible
for the destruction of the J/mine, and he saidso. The authori-
ties finally gave way to his appeal, and he was placed in com-
mand of the fast vacht, Corsair, which had been purchased
from J. Pierpont Morgan and renamed the Gloucester. He
looked eagerly for opportunities to meet the enemy, and, in
time, they came.

Like the Spanish military service, the naval service was
in bad condition. As a matter of fact, the Spanish had hardly
mechanical skill enough to handle the new fighting craft which
on paper gave her a fair. strength. But this was not
appreciated at first anywhere, not even in Spain, and certainly
the United States government could not with wisdom place
confidence in any apparent or theoretical weakness of the
enemy.

The naval position of the two antagonists was certainly
bl
510 SPAIN’S SCATTERED SQUADRON

peculiar at the beginning. Spain had no large, heavily-
armored vessels to guard her interests either in the West
Indies or the Philippines. The Vizcaya and Almirante
Oquendo had a few days before, or when war appeared inevi-
table, sailed from Havana, and were supposed to have gone
to join the Cape Verde fleet. As far as the Navy Depart-
ment knew, the old cruiser Alfonso VII. and a number of
small gunboats were all that remained in Cuban waters. At
Puerto Rico there were a few gunboats, but nothing formi-
dable. The most formidable and first available Spanish squad-
ron was in command of Admiral Cervera, at St. Vincent in the
Cape Verde islands, which belong to Portugal. This com-
prised the armored cruisers Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon,
Vizcaya, and Almirante Oquendo, with three torpedo-boat
destroyers, three torpedo boats, the transatlantic steamer City
of Cadiz, armed as an auxiliary cruiser, and a coaling vessel.
As naval reckonings went, this squadron was considered to be
a fair match for our flying squadron at Hampton Roads.

Spain was apparently forming a second squadron at Cadiz,
consisting of the battleship Pelayo, the armored cruisers Carlos
V., Cardinal Cisneros, Numancia, Vittoria, Princess MMer-
cedes, and a few gunboats, torpedo-boat destroyers, and torpedo
boats. The Philippine squadron consisted of four cruisers,
none of them armored, and several gunboats and small craft.

A torpedo-boat destroyer, the Temerario, was in the Rio
de la Plata on the South American coast, and it was even con-
sidered possible that she might be waiting there to make a
night assault upon our battleship Oregon and the gunboat
Marietta, which were on their long journey around Cape
Horn. Two Spanish torpedo-boat destrovers were also being
repaired in the British Isles.

What Spain proposed to do with these ships was a matter
of pure speculation; what she could do with them or what
the United States could do against them was quite as much so,
for, with the exception of the short and sharp battle of the
Yalu, in the war between Japan and China, there was little
NECESSITY OF CAUTION 511

in the history of actual warfare to judge modern warships by.
All calculations had been theoretical and based upon the size
of vessels, their speed, the number and character of their guns,
and the qualities of their armor. It was admitted that there
might be undreamed-of possibilities in the action of such fight-
ing machines; the ease with which the Maine had been blown
up suggested the dangerous character of torpedo boats, and.
among the general public any fears were apt to be exaggerated.
Moreover, we had grown into the habit of always suspect-
ing the Spaniard of dark designs, and it was a notable fact that
owing to the strict censorship of the Spanish press and the con-
centration of authority in Spain, it was difficult to know for
a certainty where any of the Spanish ships were, or what
strategy the wily Spaniard might invent. On the other hand,
our plans of campaign were at first published openly in the
papers, so that the Spaniards, if they cared to know, could
easily perceive what we were thinking of and doing. Indeed,
the Spanish minister, Sefior Polo, instead of departing for
home, at once took quarters in Toronto, where he carried on a
spy system and bureau of information for the Spanish govern-
ment. An enemy in the dark is usually smaller than one in
the open, but he always looks larger, and consequently our
strategy board proceeded with the utmost caution, never with
reckless bravado, though sometimes with apparent fickleness.
In view of the possibility that Spain might send one of her
squadrons either to harass our shipping, which was mostly
coastwise, or to attack our coast cities, some of which were not.
supposed to be well defended, though harbors were being
rapidly mined, it had been early decided to equip a patrol
squadron under the command of Commodore Howell, com-
posed largely of well-built liners which had been purchased
and converted into armed cruisers. Conspicuous among these
were four admirable ships of the Morgan line, which had
joined the navy under the picturesque names of the Yankee,
the Dixie, the Prairie, and the Yosemite. The splendid
American-built transatlantic liners St. Paul and St. Louis had
512 THE PATROL SQUADRON

also been impressed into the naval service, and Captain Sigsbee,
of the ill-starred Maine, had been given the command of the
former. The liners New York and Paris were also taken and
rechristened the Harvard and the Yale. The attempt to buy
warships abroad had brought a very small aggregate of results.
The transformation of merchantmen and yachts into a naval
auxiliary fleet had, however, been accomplished in a_ re-
markably successful manner. This auxiliary fleet did away
with the necessity of keeping Schley’s flying squadron at
Hampton roads, and left it free to strike for any point, while
the main fleet, under Sampson, could at once begin operations
on the Cuban coast, awaiting the movements of the Spanish
fleet, if it should come in that direction.

The necessity of these extensive preparations was made
more conspicuous by the uncertainty as to what Spain would
do as to privateering. The-government of the United States
at the beginning announced its intention of adhering to the
declaration of Paris, though not a party to it, and of maintain-
ing its four cardinal principles: abolishment of privateering,
neutral flag to exempt an enemy’s goods from capture except
contraband of war, neutral goods under the enemy’s flag not
to be seized, a blockade to be binding must be effective. Spain,
on her part, issued a decree recognizing that a state of war ex-
isted, breaking off all treaties with the United States and
promising to observe the rules of the declaration of Paris, ex-
cept that she maintained her rights to grant letter of marque
to privateers. But to carry on privateering after the old-time
methods would have been to fly in the face of European senti-
ment, and that Spain could hardly afford to do, great as was the
temptation to prey upon American shipping, inflicting expen-
sive injuries, though she might not hope to overcome us in war.

Regarding the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations as a
virtual declaration of war, the President, without waiting for
time limit set in his ultimatum to expire, ordered the Key
West fleet to move at once to Cuba and form a blockade, and
the same day, the 21st, he issued a proclamation declaring
DEPARTURE OF OUR WAR VESSELS 513

that the United States government “has instituted and will
maintain a blockade on the north coast of Cuba, including
ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and
the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba.” The
proclamation added that neutral vessels approaching such
coasts or attempting to leave them without knowledge of the
establishment of the blockade would be duly warned by the
commander of the blockade forces and released, but upon at-
tempting the second time to enter any blockaded port they
would be captured and sent to the nearest American port as
prizes. Nevitral vessels lying in blockaded ports were allowed
thirty days to issue therefrom.

In accordance with this order Rear Admiral Sampson’s
fleet, the most imposing that had ever been gathered in this
country, departed on the following morning in two columns
for the Cuban coast. At the same time Commodore Schley
of the flying squadron was ordered to put his ships in readiness
for instant action, and a little later two of his fastest cruisers
were ordered off to sea to cruise in search of Spanish ships, es
pecially off the New England coasts, for there were various
stories afloat of the presence of Spanish cruisers near those
waters, a fair illustration of the uncertainty even in official
circles of the probable movements of the Spanish navy.

On the 21st also, orders were sent to Commodore Dewey,
whose squadron was mobilized at Hong Kong, on the opposite
side of the globe, to proceed at once to Manila, the chief port
of the Philippines, institute a blockade and destroy or capture
whatever Spanish fleet existed there. To follow up these
steps it was decided to call for 100,000 volunteer troops as
soon as Congress could authorize it, and steps were taken to
charter a large number of transports and supply ships as
quickly as possible.

It seems to have been the plan of Spain to hold the flower
of its navy at the Cape Verde Islands in the hopes that Ad-
miral Sampson’s squadron would at once attack Havana and
suffer considerable losses under the guns of its forts, whereupon
514 THE FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR

the Spanish ships could hurry over and attack our fleet in a
weakened condition. Some of the more warlike newspapers
in the country, less proficient in naval strategy than in the
issue of extra editions, were raising the cry, “Smash Havana! ”
but our naval strategy board were too wise to risk their fleet
while the Cape Verde ships were in prime condition, and
orders were issued to Sampson not to attack Cuban ports for
the present, though he could use his discretion if fired upon.

The Key West fleet had proceeded but a short distance on
the morning of the 22d, the flagship New York and the battle-
ships Jowa and Indiana leading in one line to the southward,
and the gunboats Helena, Machias, Nashville, and Castine in
another to the northward, when smoke was seen on the horizon
to westward. Ty seven o’clock it was discovered that she was
a merchantman flying a Spanish flag. The Nashville suddenly
left the line and headed at full speed for the Spaniard. As
she approached a shot was fired from her port battery, striking
the water some distance ahead of the merchantman, which
held her way as if nothing was happening. Fora few minttes
the Nashville continued the chase and then fired another shot
which apparently passed within a rod of the Spaniard’s bow,
and the captain quickly reversed the engines and hauled down
the Spanish ensign. She was boarded by a half-dozen men
from the Nashville, and was found to be the steamship Buena
Ventura, plying between New York and West Indian ports.
The captain said he did not know that war had been declared,
but she was sent to Key West, where much excitement pre-
vailed over, the first shot of the war.

The blockading squadron arrived off Havana towards even-
ing of the same day; the red light was lighted in Morro Castle
tower and three shots were fired as a signal that the Americans
had appeared. Havana armed itself at once in anticipation of
attack, not understanding our more peaceful intentions for
the time being. Some shots were fired from the fortifications
during the night, falling far short of our ships, which lav
quictly ont some distance, working their search lights and
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On the 23d and

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keeping a sharp eye for blockade runners.
516 A CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS

the latter, a fine, large new vessel. Two ships were taken at
the mouth of Havana harbor, indeed almost under the guns of
Morro Castle. The President was disposed to release all
Spanish prizes taken during these first days of the war in con-
_sideration of the notice given by Spain allowing American
vessels in Spanish ports freely to depart, but he waited to see
if Spain were acting in good faith. As a matter of fact, there
were no American vessels in Spanish ports, except possibly a
few pleasure yachts, and Spain’s action might have been for
effect and for the very purpose of placing our seizures of
Spanish ships in as bad a light as possible.

On the 20th, or immediately after the resolutions for inter.
vention were disposed of, the Ilouse passed promptly and with-
out division a bill authorizing the President to call for army
volunteers, and defining the terms on which volunteers from
the state militia forces could be enlisted and officered. The
bill was passed in the Senate the next day, but owing to de-
fects it was sent back to both houses and did not become a law
till the 23d, when the President, in conformity with its pro-
visions, issued a proclamation calling for two-year volunteers,
the total number apportioned among the states according to
population. Measures were taken for the enlistment of as
large a proportion as possible of the National Guard in the
United States Army, the purpose being to amalgamate the
regulars and volunteers as soon as possible.

The requisitions made by Secretary Alger on the state
governors calling for 125,000 volunteers, met with instant
and adequate response, but also not a little adverse criticism
from the National Guardsmen, whose jealousy of the regular
army had much to do with the defeat of the first Hull bill for
its reorganization to meet requirements. By the provisions of
that measure, the regular army’s war strength would have been
raised to 104,000 men. In his telegraphic call Secretary
Alger declared that preference would be given to regiments of
the National Guard or state militia, for the reason that they
were armed, presumably equipped and drilled. Tn issuing his
 

 

 

 

 

THE CALL TO WAR,
A Grand Army Veteran of the Civil War bringing his son into a recruiting office in a
country town to answer to the call for volunteers in the war with Spain.
FRICTION BETWEEN REGULARS AND VOLUNTEERS 519

confirmatory letter, however, the Secretary of War said that
the men called for were to be enlisted in the United States
service, their state organizations being preserved as long as
they remained in their own states. The result was that many
regiments manifested a decided reluctance to act under an un-
certainty as to the necessity of giving up their organizations.

It was not so much a conflict between State and Federal
elements as a conflict between amateurs and professionals, and
when the fact was thoroughly understood there was no uncer-
tainty as to results. Whatever the influence of the National
Guard, the Federal government could ill-afford to have men
enlisted as volunteers who would not serve unconditionally
under army orders. It was very soon shown that while the
National Guard in some States was in a high state of efficiency,
in others it was far from being prepared for war. Some of the
‘Western regiments came into the Eastern camps almost desti-
tute of equipments. Even the New York State militia, ill-
provided with overcoats and blankets, were sent to an unpre-
pared camp, and the control was so poor that at first there were
scenes of rowdyism in the villages about the camps. Had
United States army officers been in charge there would have
been nothing of this kind permitted. It was a useful lesson
to State authorities, for it revealed the fact that the organiza-
tions which had been maintained with so much expense, and
which had been so often admired in parades, were in a condi-
tion far from satisfactory to meet a sudden call in defense of
the country.

Soon after gathering in their respective State rendezvous,
the volunteers were forced to undergo the somewhat trying
ordeal of examination by United States army surgeons before
they could be accepted and mustered into service. In not a
few of the States the percentage of men rejected, both officers
and privates, was so large that State officials endeavored to in-
duce the Federal authorities to be less rigorous in their de-
mands, but, for reason obvious enough, the Federal authorities
declined to relent. :

Sc
520 ARMY REORGANIZATION BILL

Tf the militia in some States had permitted officers and pri-
vates to come to look upon the militia organization as a social
institution existing chiefly for the pleasure of the men enrolled,
it was certainly a fortunate event that disclosed the weakness
at this early day of the war and at a time when not faced by a
foe more dangerous than Spain. The Federal authorities were
quite right in insisting that men entering the army should be
unlikely candidates for the hospital and pension roll, and, in
spite of the influence of the National Guard in some States, the
Federal authorities were supported by public opinion.

On the 25th was passed a modified bill for reorganizing the
regular army, giving it a maximum strength of 61,000, creat-
ing the three-battalion form, and providing for the enlistment
and promotion of the requisite number of officers. The im-
perative necessity for passing the reorganization bill was that,
owing to the complicated machinery of modern siege guns, it
would be impossible to entrust volunteer forces with the coast
defenses within three months. But considerable jealousy was
shown between the amateur and regular forces, and it soon be-
came apparent that the formation of the army would be respon-
sible for delay in the war.

Among the people who had not an adequate idea of the re-
quirements of war there was the greatest optimism as to the
promptness with which it would end —a naval battle or two
and it would all be over with, they thought; and the idea was
also extensively held in official circles, though not among the
army and navy. But the co-operation of the Cubans was exag-
gerated, and, besides, the troops immediately available for
military operations in Cuba were only those which could be
spared from the small regular army. None of the National
Guard regiments were fitted at once for such campaigning as
would be required in Cuba. At the best, from one to three
months of preliminary training and seasoning was needed. It
was shown unmistakably both in the Mexican and Civil War
that training and drilling consuming months of time were ab-
solutely necessary to get raw recruits into shape.
CHAPTER XxXxvIii

WAR FORMALLY PROCLAIMED—THE BOMBARDMENT OF
MATANZAS— EXPERIENCES ON A MODERN WARSHIP—
COMMODORE DEWEY SAILS TOWARDS MANILA.

Enthusiasm and Generosity among the People of the United States — Col-
lege Patriotism — Prompt Action by the Women of the Country — Red
Cross Nurses—The Dangers of Yellow Fever — Surgeon-General’s
Warning — Rejoicing in Havana— Blanco’s Grandiloquent Manifesto
— Congress Formally Declares War— Spain Talks of Scandalous Ag-
gression — Troubles in the Cortes— Importance of Securing a Base on
Cuban Coast — Havana Ignored— Advancing to Matanzas — The Nze-
ture of the Bay — Waiting for the Word to Fire—A Shot from the
Batteries —- Engagement Becomes General — A Thrilling Sight — Fol-
lowing the Powerful Projectiles to the Target — Clouds of Smoke —
Three Hundred Shots in Eighteen Minutes — The Puritan’s Remarkable
Shot — Terrible Destruction — The Concussion of Great Guns—Gen-
eral Blanco’s Report of Casualties—‘‘A Mule Killed” — The Cape
Verde Spanish Fleet Sails— Commodore Dewey Points his Fleet
towards Manila — Significance of his Orders.

and generosity. Of course, as in every war, there

were avaricious speculators who figured how much
personal wealth they could grab from the national treasury
which required so much for the equipment of the forces. But
the great multitude of the rich and poor alike had no such
sordid ambition. Enlistments came in rapidly from every
quarter, and from every station in life. The Federal Treasury,
the Post-Office Department, the boards of aldermen in many of
the cities, presidents and directors of great railway corpora-
tions and many patriotic employers of labor put their em-
ployes at ease by either guarantecing that all of them who cared
to volunteer should be paid in full while away and reinstated
when they returned, or that they should be reinstated simply.
Prominent and rich people offered money and services to the
government and valuable steam yachts were tendered for its.

use. John Jacob Astor, having offered free transportation for
(521)

() N every side existed abundant evidence of patriotism
522 THE GENERAL ENTHUSIASM

troops over his railroads in Ohio and Illinois, and having put
his yacht, the Nourmahal, at the disposal of the government
as an auxiliary cruiser, then offered to furnish and equip a
battery of artillery for service in Cuba or in any place where
the government might wish to use it. At the colleges the en-
thusiasm was great, and mass meetings addressed by the presi-
dents and professors were held in many of the leading educa-
tional institutions. Many students volunteered. As a recog-
nition of the contributions of Yale and Harvard to our national
glory in years past, the Paris and the New York, the fast
steamers impressed into the service of the navy, were renamed
after those institutions.

The expression of patriotism from the women of the coun-
try was what was to be expected. In several cities they had
early organized, forming auxiliary corps to make comforts for
the soldiers going to the war. These auxiliaries were inde-
pendent, being formed without any immediate connection with
regiments, and others were formed connected semi-officially
with companies and regiments of the National Guard.

The volunteers, nurses, and honorary members of the Red
Cross Society received instructions at the hospitals. A detach-
ment of the nurses of this society sailed from New York on the
State of Texas on the 23d to be in readiness in Cuban waters.
The nurses of the Red Cross Society, and others who maintain
an independent organization, were not governed by the Sur-
geon-General’s ultimatum that the government would not ac-
cept the services of any nurse who had not had yellow fever or
passed through one or more epidemics of that disease. In the
judgment of the Surgeon-General, it would be adding burdens,
and making more demands on the hospital resources of the
government in Cuba and Key West, to send out nurses who
were not immune. The male nurses meeting the government
requirements were the only government nurses at first sent out.
This decision changed the character of the services rendered
to the soldiers and sailors by the volunteer women and nurses,
but did not lessen their enthusiastic determination to serve.

*

y
 
 
HAVANA REJOICES 525

The Surgeon-General, who was considered one of the high-
est authorities in the world on enteric diseases, strongly ad-
vised against the immediate invasion of Cuba, predicting that
the mortality among volunteers from yellow fever alone would
be between 35 and 50 per cent. if undertaken before October
1st. This fact, together with the other that many of the regi-
ments from the different States were slow in recruiting and
came to the national camps pobrly equipped, led the authori-
ties to delay any large military operations on the island for a
time, though it was desired to secure a base for distributing
provisions to the reconcentrados if possible, and arms to the in-
surgents. But, as in most wars, it was found that plans had to
be changed to meet new conditions.

The news of the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations be-
tween the United States and Spain appeared to be received in
Havana with rejoicing. No further attempt to secure a con-
ference with the insurgents in the interests of autonomy was
made, and the Captain-General declared the island to be in a
state of war. He annulled all his former decrees granting
pardon to insurgents, and placed under martial law all ac-
cused of rebellion. Spanish forces in the western provinces
began to concentrate in Havana, burning and destroying the
country as they came in. In a grandiloquent manifesto,
Blanco declared his intention of shedding his blood for the
honor of Spain, and he called upon all to vigorously repel the
invader. The Correspondent of the London Times, whose re-
ports were as impartial as any sent from the island, was ex-
pelled, and other steps taken to prevent the exact state of
things from being known.

While no doubt as to when the war began was entertained
by the administration, it was deemed best that Congress should
adopt a resolution formally declaring the time when the state
of war began to exist. Ina message to Congress on the 25th,
the President asked that, in view of the measures already
taken by him and with a view to the adoption of other neces-
sary measures, Congress take formal action at once “ to the end
526 FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR

that the definition of the international status of the United
States as a belligerent power may be made known, and the as-
sertion of all its rights and the maintenance of all its duties in
the conduct of a public war may be assured.” Congress acted
with the utmost promptness and passed a resolution declaring
that a state of war existed and had existed between the United
States and Spain since, and including, April 21st. The vote
in the House was unanimous.

The Spanish government followed up its circular of the
18th by another on the 26th, in which it expressed its regret at
being compelled to appeal to force to expel the “ scandalous
ageression ” of the United States and defend the national dig-
nity and historic integrity of the fatherland.

Tt was the evident purpose of the United States govern-
ment at this time, while the intentions of the Cape Verde fleet
were uncertain, to effect a landing in Cuba promptly and as
near Havana as possible, in order to hold communication with
the insurgents, to form a base for our own military operations
and to carry relief to reconcentrados.

All reports indicated that the Spanish army in concentrat-
ing their forees had seized all available food in the large cen-
ters, and the reconcentrados were in a worse predicament than
ever. A base for our own military operations was quite as
important. General Grant had pointed out many years be-
fore, or when the Virginius case seemed likely to lead us into
war, that the conquest of Havana could best be undertaken by
an army landed somewhere east of the city while a blockading
force held the approaches to the harbor. This plan was evi-
dently in the minds of the government and it was the expecta-
tion that such an expedition might lead the way in a short
time.

In carrying out this policy it became Admiral Sampson’s
duty to ignore the fortifications of Havana, keeping the block-
ade effective at all times, while preparing a suitable base for
landing troops. The city of Matanzas presented a convenient
point for such a base, but the blockading fleet could see that
THE SERIOUS BUSINESS OF WAR 527

the Spaniards were very busy in placing new fortifications and
more modern guns about the harbor, and, consequently, Ad-
miral Sampson set out to destroy them on the 27th.

It was a very interesting event, drawing the first blood of
the conflict. For the first time in thirty years our war ships en-

HAVANA
THE HARBOR AND DEFENCES) t
SCALE OF MILES zt

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MAP OF HAVANA, ITS HARBOR AND DEFENCES.

tered upon the serious business of war. In the afternoon Ad-
miral Sampson on his flagship New York reached the harbor of
Matanzas, where the monitor Puritan and the cruiser (in-
cinnati were maintaining the blockade. The city lies at the
head of a bay about four miles from the sea and the mouth of
the bay is about three miles wide. On its west side is Point
Rubalcaya and on the east side Point Maya, both having a
high elevation above the sea and giving their batteries a very
commanding position. Stretching back from these batteries
are commanding hills, in the shrubbery of which the Span-
iards had been busy placing concealed batteries.

The New York led the way into the bay, followed a hun-
dred yards astern on the port side by the Puritan, while the
Cincinnati was about the same distance behind on the star-
board. The crews were all at their quarters waiting for the
528 THE ATTACK UPON MATANZAS

“music ” to begin, the orders being to open fire when the bat-
teries fired their first shot. At a few minutes before one
o’clock there was a puff of smoke from the east shore and an
8-inch shell whizzed toward the New York and fell consider-
ably short. The range to the east shore was still over three
miles, but the flagship promptly opened fire with one of her
heavy guns. The engagement in a few minutes became gen-
eral, and shore and bay was covered with the wind-swept smoke
while the hollows below the hills roared with the cannonading.
The New York steamed quickly in and cireled around to the
westward toward Point Rubaleaya, while the Puritan swung
eastward to engage the Maya batteries.

It was the first opportunity the gunners of the New York
had enjoyed for target practice of this kind and it was a stir-
ring sight to see. As a big puff of smoke rose from her side,
the eye turning to the battery on shore would behold a cloud of
dust and fragments flying high in the air, indicating the terrific
force of modern projectiles. The New York soon reduced the
range to about a mile and a quarter, and was tossing shells into
Rubalcaya at the rate of about three a minute with wonderful
precision and apparently with great destructiveness.

In the meantime the Purilan was taking care of Point
Maya. It was a long shot to that battery and it was so well
masked that the only target was the infrequent smoke of a
gun, but when the Puritan found the range her shells burst
every time within the fortifications, great clouds of dust and
fragments rising high in the air with every explosion. Up to
this time the Cincinnati had received no order to join in the
action and her crew and officers could hardly contain them-
selves. Finally, Captain Chester himself signaled asking per-
mission to engage, and it was granted by the flagship. The
Cincinnati quickly steamed up to within two thousand yards
broadside on and all her guns seemed to go at once. But this
grim sport was of short duration.

At the end of eighteen minutes, the batteries apparently
having been silenced, the New York gave the signal to retire,
GUN CREW WORKING A MONSTER 13-INCH GUN IN ACTION

 
SUPERB MARKSMANSHIP OF THE AMERICANS 531

but soon after a last defiant shot was fired from the shore.
Almost instantly one of the big guns of the Puritan, which
was in line, replied. It was the best shot of the day and ex-
cited the admiration of every witness. It struck the battery
just where the smoke had showed the gun, tore its way into the
earthworks and exploded with terrible destruction. Then the
ships stood out to sea.

The display of marksmanship on the American vessels was
superb; the firing was rapid and every one of the three hundred
shots fired seemed to do its work of destruction to the new
forts, but not one of the enemy’s shots hit the ships; they were
absolutely unharmed except from the usual results of the con-
cussion of their own guns. .\ correspondent wrote: “ When
a 10,000-ton ship, usually as steady as a rock, shakes and
trembles like a frightened child; when firmly-fitted bolts start
from their sockets and window-panes and woodwork are shat-
tered; when the roar peals up from port and starboard and you
feel your feet leaving the deck and your glasses jumping
around your forehead, while blinding, blackening smoke hides
everything from sight — then it is that you first realize the ter-
rible power of a modern war ship’s batteries.”

Not one of our men was hurt, and the gunners and their as-
sistants were delighted to embrace the opportunity they had
so long waited for to “ pump a little iron,” as one of them ex-
pressed it, “into those Spaniards.” It is not known what the
casualties were on shore, but it is difficult to see how those who
manned the batteries could have entirely escaped unless they
ran away. Captain-General Blanco sent home a report of the
usual Spanish color. No lives were lost, he said, except that
of one mule. Our vessels were injured by the Spanish fire,
and he was quite sure a smokestack was hit.

On the 26th the President issued an order proclaiming our
policy regarding the rights of Spanish vessels and the rights of
neutrals, indicating an intention to pursue a liberal course
least calculated to irritate foreign powers, and giving Spanish
merchant vessels within the ports of the United States until
532 DEWEY’S SQUADRON SAILS FOR MANILA

May 21st for loading their cargoes and departing. The right
of search was to be exercised with strict regard for the rights
of neutrais, and mail steamers were not to be interfered with
except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of having contra-
band goods or of violating the blockade. This proclamation
was followed within a few days by decrees of neutrality from
most of the foreign nations. Great Britain was one of the
first to declare her neutrality, sending notices to all ports in
all colonies under her dominion. This, of course, necessitated
a prompt departure from the port of Hong Kong of Dewcy’s
fleet, and it moved to Mirs Bay, a Chinese port, where also it
could remain but twenty- -four hours.

Portugal, having dominion over the Cape Verde Islands,
at which the Spanish fleet was concentrated, delayed for some
days to define her position, and it was at one time suspected
that she might make common cause with Spain. At last, how-
ever, she took a neutral position, daring no longer to disregard
the obligations of neutrality, and the Spanish fleet, which had
been reported as having sailed several times, actually sailed on
the 29th, two days after Commodore Dewey sailed from Mirs
Bay for Manila.

Public attention in the United States was so completely
taken up with the situation about Cuba, especially after the
news of the departure of Cervera’s fleet from St. Vincent, that
little was thought of Dewey’s movements. In a general way,
it was thought that, neutral declarations having shut our
Asiatic squadron off from Hong Kong, it would be necessary
for our fleet to secure a base for coal and supplies nearer than
Honolulu or San Francisco, and, as the Spanish Philippines
lay but two or three days’ sail from Hong Kong, and as we were
at war with Spain, it would be a stroke to secure a coaling sta-
tion there. Very few in the discussion which preceded the
actual outbreak of war had for a moment supposed that the
armed intervention for the pacification of Cuba would begin
with a campaign of conquest in islands on exactly the opposite
side of the world. It had been the declared purpose of our gov-
AN ENLARGED CONCEPTION OF DUTY 5383

ernment to free Cuba and extend a helping hand to the starving
people of that island, and it had begun by establishing a
pacific blockade which for the time shut off supplies not only
from the Spanish but from the reconcentrados, and all were
expecting that as speedily as possible we would use the navy
to strike at any naval force Spain sent to the defense of the
islands, and also to assist in landing troops near Havana, estab-
lishing a base of supplies for ourselves and for the suffering
Cubans. Incidentally, we were at war with Spain, and it was,
of course, our business to strike Spain wherever we found her.
While we were thinking of other things, and wondering at
what point Cervera’s fleet would appear, Dewey, obeying
orders the significance of which had not occurred to the Ameri-
can people, struck a blow that in a day changed the opinions of
the nation and, apparently, the course of its policy.

The revolution which had been proceeding in the Philip-
pines against Spanish authority, for very much the same rea-
sons as in Cuba, had up to this time attracted little attention in
the world and least of all in the United States. Agreeably to
the traditions of a hundred years, we had viewed with little eon-
cern the troubles of others in far-away lands. Having rigor-
ously kept to the doctrine that the destiny of all peoples on the
Western Hemisphere was a subject for our immediate con-
cern, and having upheld it whenever occasion demanded, we
had confined our efforts on the other side of the world to the
support of enterprising and daring missionaries, satisfied to
take the heathen under our religious influence under whatever
flag of authority the exigencies of European colonization im-
posed upon him. As a government, we had grown into the
habit of keeping our hands off. Spanish oppression and brutal-
ity would never have tempted us to assume the duty of a maker
of peace and a bearer of freedom to the Philippines had Cuba
not been at our doors. But the conception of our duty
quickly enlarged after Commodore Dewey pointed his ships
for Manila.
CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS— THEIR EXTENT, CHARACTER,
AND NATIVE LIFE —REBELLION OF THE FILIPINOS AND
ITS THRILLING INCIDENTS — THE TRAGIC DEATH OF DR.
RIZAL—GENERAL AGUINALDO AND COMMODORE DEWEY.

Magellan the Navigator Hears of the Wonderful Spice Islands — Persuades
the Spanish King that they Might Belong to Spain — Sailing Westward
Instead of Eastward — Wonderful Voyage — Discovery of the Philip-
pines— The Natives — Early Importance of Manila — The Slaughter of
the Prosperous Chinese — Depressing Results — A Long and Ugly His-
tory — Character of the Islands— Peculiarities of Spanish Government
—The Uprising of 1896— The Catapunan Society — Appealing to the
Filipinos — A Bloody Conflict — Outrages on Both Sides— A Hundred
Prisoners Suffocated in a Single Night — Public Executions —Dramatic
Incidents — The Romantic Story of Dr. Rizal — His Love Affair — Sen-
tenced to Death — Married in his Cell Just Before his Execution — His
Death — Patriotic Verses— His Widow Joins the Insurgents and is
Welcomed as a Joan of Arc—Insurgent Leaders Leave the Country —
Insurrection Breaks Out Again — General Aguinaldo’s Exile.

tween Portugal and Spain by a line from pole to

pole some three hundred miles west of the Azores,
as related in an early chapter, he did not imagine that one navi-
gator sailing east and another west might meet somewhere on
the other side of the globe. Yet this very thing happened,
and, in consequence of it, for three hundred years the Spanish
had one day too many in their calendar and the Portuguese one
day too few. It happened that Magellan, who was a Portu-
guese, had begun his career as a navigator by sailing under
Portuguese commanders eastward around the Cape of Good
Hope to the Indies, and he had a desire to lead an expedition
to the rich “spice ” islands about which he had heard. But
his king treated him ungratefully, so he transferred his al-
legiance to the Spanish flag, and finally persuaded Charles V.
of Spain that the wonderful islands would lie within that part

of the world the Pope had given to Spain, if only good ‘care
(534)

W Pope Alexander VI. divided the world be-
AN OLD COLORED COUPLE, CUBAN REFUGEES, DRIVEN FROM THEIR HOME BY SPANISH CRUELTY.
The wife was 80 years old and blind. They are making their way into the American lines,

 
THE FIRST JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD 53%

was taken to sail westward instead of eastward. Thus it hap-
pened that Magellan made that wonderful journey — “ the
most wonderful in history,” as John Fiske, the historian, calls
it, “ doubtless the greatest feat of navigation that has ever been
performed.” THis ships were the first to circumnavigate the
globe, though Magellan himself was killed by natives in the
islands which were claimed by Spain and soon became known
as the Philippines, in honor of Philip I1., one of the most dis-
honored kings who ever reigned in Spain.

Antonio de Morga, writing about eighty years later, or in
1609, put this maritime achievement in this way: “ Having
won America, a fourth part of the earth which the ancients
never knew, the Spaniards sailed, following the sun, and dis-
covered in the western ocean an archipelago of many islands
adjacent to further Asia, inhabited by various nations, abound-
ing in rich metals, precious stones, and pearls, and all manner
of fruit, where, raising the standard of the faith, they snatched
them from the yoke and power of the devil and placed them
under the command and government of Spain.”

Manila was an important commercial center while Liver-
pool was only a fishing station and while the Indians were still
oceupying Manhattan Island. Formerly, the islands had been
under Chinese dominion, but the yoke was shaken off by an
invasion from India, and it was these invaders with whom the
Spaniards chiefly had to deal. But the Chinese still main-
tained a brisk trade with the Philippines in cotton, silks,
metals, and quicksilver. rom time to time a great many en-
terprising Chinese landed in the islands, and early in the
seventeenth century they came in large numbers, but the
Spaniards became jealous of their strength and. began to per-
secute them in many ways till at last they were goaded into
rebellion. Several times the Spaniards endeavored to ex-
terminate them, but they continued to arrive and to thrive
till finally it was decreed that every Chinaman on the island
of Luzon should be killed. Twenty-four thousand of them
were put to death with one curious result, according to the his-
538 THE USUAL MISTAKES OF SPANISH POLICY

torian of that day: “When the war was at an end, the want
and difficulties of the city began because there were no Chinese
who exercised various arts and brought all the provisions;
neither was any food to be found to eat nor shoes to wear, not
even for very.excessive prices. All this weighed down the
spirit of the Spaniards.”

We need not follow the long and ugly history of the Span-
iards in these islands; in many respects it is similar to that of
Cuba. It was the purpose and the endeavor of the Spanish
government to make all the money possible out of the people,
giving to them little in return but “ the faith,” which was al-
ways rather obstinately declined.

Lying wholly within the tropics, the islands, big and little,
number nearly a thousand, varying in size from Luzon, which
is somewhat larger than Cuba and about the size of the State
of Illinois, to tiny islets hardly worth a name. .Altogether
their area is twice that of New England. The tropical scenery
in the forests of this archipelago is of unsurpassed splendor, the
heat and moisture combining to produce vegetation of a mag-
nificence which beggars description. Gigantic trees towering
to a height of two or three hundred feet are festooned with
graceful rattans. Splendid tree-ferns rise thirty or forty feet
into the air, while underneath are smaller varieties and ex-
quisite orchids. So dense is the vegetation in some of these
forests that the fierce tropical sun hardly penetrates to the
ground beneath them and the dense undergrowth constantly
drips with moisture.

The islands contain some 10,000,000 natives of different
tribes, many of whom the Spaniards were never able to bring
under their authority. The main population consists of the
Tagals. They, together with the various mixtures of half-
breeds, bore a burdensome taxation and other unhappy condi-
tions for many years, and, so long as the only edueated people
on the islands were the rulers, there was little trouble. Little
by little, the natives and half-breeds heeame educated, some of
the young men of the richer families going abroad, and with
AVARICE AND RELIGIOUS FANATICISM 539

greater education came greater ambition. The natives began
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MAP OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

they began to understand; and, of course, the proud Spaniard
and the power-loving friar looked with as pronounced disfavor
540 GRIEVANCES OF THE FILIPINOS

upon the demands of these people as they did upon those of the
Cubans.

The church organization became very powerful in the
hands of the various orders of Dominicans, Augustinians,
Recoletanos, and Franciscans, and even the Governor-General
himself dared not oppose them. The Archbishop received a
salary of $12,000 a year, though to conduct the whole ecclesi-
astical establishment cost no less than $1,000,000 a year.
The Archbishop lived in a palace in considerable state, and on
the great feast days he was the only one allowed to ride in a
carriage.

The Governor-General received a salary of $40,000,
though the cost of his office to the colony was no less than
$1,000,000 a year. As in Cuba, governors came with empty
pockets and went away with full ones. It was asserted that
Weyler put $6,000,000 to his credit during the short time he
had control of the Philippines, and the sub-officials stole in like
manner. The peculations amounted to millions of dollars an-
nually and absolutely nothing was done for internal improve-
ments. The budget showed that only $6,000 was appropriated
for new improvements in this whole archipelago, and yet
$60,000 was set apart for the Manila Cathedral, $4,000 for the
choir alone.

If a bridge was destroyed by a flood or earthquake, it was
never repaired. And so it went on for year after year. Had
Spain been actuated by the spirit of internal improvement that
characterized the administration of England and Holland in
adjacent countries, had she subordinated her religious fanati-
cism and her avarice to a desire to better the natives, the com-
merce of the islands might have been fifty times as great, for
in natural productiveness there is no land on the globe surpass-
ing the Philippines.

The beginning of the end of it all came in 1896 while Gen-
eral Blanco was Governor-General of the colony. Rebellion
broke out, and Spain, whose forces in Cuba under General
Campos had just been swept back to Havana, was called upon to
A HUNDRED SUFFOCATED IN A NIGHT 541

face the brotherhood of the Catapunan in the Philippines.
This society was the strongest political society in the islands,
having a membership of about 50,000 “ Filipinos” in Luzon
alone, and through it the munitions of war were mostly con-
tributed to the insurgents. They issued an appeal in which
they said: ‘“ We make no racial distinction. We call upon
all possessing honor and national dignity. All are sufferers,
the Filipino, and the Asiatic, the American, and the European.
We invite all to help raise a down-trodden and tormented race
—a country destroyed and hurled into the slough of degrada-
tion. We except no one, not even a Spaniard, because in our
ranks there are some noble Spaniards, lovers of justice, free
from prejudice, who are supporting our demands for individu-
ality and national dignity.”

Native Filipinos, residing in Madrid, expressed their griev-
ances in an address to the Spanish people, containing extracts
from the Philippine budget for 1896-97. It showed that the
Philippine treasury was compelled to pay a heavy contribution
to the general expenses of the government at Madrid; pensions
to the Duke of Veragua and to the Marquis of Bedmar, besides
providing for the entire cost of the Spanish consulates at all
the important Asiatic ports. It contributed, like Cuba, a large
amount of money for the office of the colonial minister, and for
a purely ornamental and purely Spanish body called the Coun-
cil of the Philippines. It paid the expenses of the penal colony
of Fernando Po in Africa, and all the pensions and retiring al-
lowances of all the civil and military employes who had
ever served in the Philippines, a sum amounting to nearly
$2,000,000 annually.

The real fighting began in August, 1896, and repeated
bloody conflicts followed. At first the natives were poorly
armed; indeed, the majority bore no weapons at all. But
after a while the organization was improved, bolos, or long
sharp knives somewhat like the Cuban machetes, were dis-
tributed to the men, and a few secured firearms which were
brought in from Hong Kong and Singapore. Gradually, the
542 EXECUTIONS AS SOCIAL EVENTS

area of discontent widened into the province of Cavité, where
most of the fighting took place. Before reinforcements could
be brought from Spain, the insurgents had practical control of
that province.

The rebels were not as wisely controlled as the Cubans and
many outrages occurred on both sides. The Spanish authori-
ties, with their usual stupidity, endeavored to prevent the
foreigners in the islands sending out information, but, in spite
of all precautions, a few details reached the outer world, show-
ing that the rising was a serious one, that horrible outrages
were committed by the rebels, and that the Spanish troops re-
taliated with almost corresponding brutality.

A hundred rebels, or suspected rebels, were suffocated to
death in the “ Dark Hole of Manila” in one night. This place
is an old inquisitorial prison, in the base of the main fortifica-
tions on the Pasig River, which flows through Manila, a dark
and unsanitary hole below the ground level, unused for more
than a hundred years before this revolution, with stagnant
water, poisoned, stifling atmosphere, and infested with rats and
vermin. Spanish officers on guard during that long and awful
night heard the piteous cries of the miserable creatures who had
been thrown into this horrible pit, and their condition was made
more terrible when, acting upon the orders of a lieutenant, the
sentinel in charge covered up the only air hole in the dungeon,
“because it rained,” he said.

The public executions were made greater fétes even than
in Cuba. An American who was present in the country at
this time wrote:

‘« These executions were generally made the occasion for quite a jubilee
—aturnout of the élzte, 1 gala day, a time for rejoicing. The fact that
there was to be an execution was prominently, joyously announced,
officially and otherwise, in the local newspapers. There was at Jeast one
military band in evidence, and the morning when unfortunates who had
protested against Spanish misrule were to be shot found the Spanish colors
flying from a great many buildings, and the warships in the harbor
‘dressed.’ The Philippine capital had a holiday aspect.

“The deadly work was generally performed in the cool of the morning.
That these events were fully appreciated was shown by the presence on the
A LIFE SACRIFICED FOR LIBERTY 543

Lunetta of thousands of people. Hundreds of fashionably-dressed ladies
and gentlemen ‘graced’ the occasion with their presence. For the most
part these fashionubles came in their equipages. These ladies would stand
in their vehicles, determined not to miss any part of the ghastly show.
The signal from the commanding lieutenant that the victims were dead was
the signal for these delighted lady spectators to wave their handkerchiefs
or parasols as evidence of their satisfaction.”

As in Cuba, this bloody work abounded in dramatic inci-
dents, many touching examples of heroic martyrdom; and the
fate of Dr. Rizal will have an enduring place in the history of
these troubled isles. He was one of the prominent leaders in
the secret organization which supported the insurrection
against Spanish tyranny; not an adventurer, but a man of cul-
ture, an experienced and able physician, once the president of
the Manila University, a leader in the educational and scien-
tifie as well as social life of his “ beloved Filipinas.” He was
a lover of equality, and while Spain’s yoke did not chafe his
own shoulders severely, he had pity for the less fortunate
natives about him, and his love of his native country took pre-
cedence of all else in his strong and impulsive nature.

Although he did not appear directly in connection with
the organization of the rebellion, the Spanish secured evi-
dence to show his intimate relations with the most active lead-
ers of the insurrection. Two years before, because of his po-
litical views, he had been sent into exile in the island of Min-
danao, where he practiced his profession with profit, and where
he met the lady who finally became his wife and his widow in a
single day. Miss Taufer was born at Hong Kong of European
parents. Her father was in poor health, and they went to
Manila, thinking the climate would be beneficial. After a
stay of six months they visited the island where Dr. Rizal was
a practitioner and where he was called in as an attending physi-
cian. THe fell in love with the young lady, and the engage-
ment was ultimately announced. Upon promise of freedom,
Dr. Rizal seems to have been tricked, late in 1896, into return-
ing to Manila, where he was at once placed on board the Span-
ish cruiser Castilla and conveyed to Spain.
544 THE LAST THOUGHT OF A PATRIOT

Meanwhile, the Spanish authorities had seized certain
papers of the Catapunan society which were thought to im-
plicate Dr. Rizal, and to show that he had been in constant
communication with the insurgent leaders in Luzon. Arriving
at Barcelona, he was arrested and sent back to Manila for trial.
Once there, he was speedily condemned to death. The time
for his execution was fixed for December 6th. At six o’clock
on that fateful morning, Miss Taufer was admitted to his cell.
In two hours the execution would take place. A priest was in
attendance upon the condemned man. The scene was pa-
thetic.

Dr. Rizal, seized with a sudden inspiration, proposed that
a marriage ceremony be performed then and there, and the
lady eagerly assented. There, while the rays of the early
tropical sun streamed through the little barred window of the
cell upon the group, were spoken the solemn words which
joined the lovers in wedlock till death should part them. The
wife remained with her husband till the summons came, and
then they led her away. The execution was attended with the
usual formalities and was a sad but imposing spectacle. Great
crowds of Spaniards, including many ladies, attended, but the
natives were not so numerous as on former occasions. Rizal
displayed great fortitude, walking from the prison with firm
tread and head erect, his arms pinioned behind his back. He
looked about him carefully, glanced at his executioners, and
then, with his eyes fixed upon the rippling sunlit waters of the
bay, received the volley of eight rifles, swayed and fell. An-
other bullet was put into the body at short range to make sure
of death, and the band struck up the usual lively airs.

A few hours before his marriage and his death he wrote
some remarkable verses — “Mi Ultimo Pensamiento”’ (My
Last Thought) — an incident somewhat similar to that when
years before the Cuban poet Valdez left an enduring prayer in
verse before falling a martyr on the plaza of Matanzas. Rizal’s
poem abounded in the spirit of a patriot, as will be seen from a
translation of the opening verse:
A PROMISE OF REFORM 545

‘Farewell, adored fatherland ! Our Eden lost, farewell !
Farewell, O sun’s lov’d region, pearl of the Eastern sea !
Gladly I die for thy dear sake: Yea, thou knowest well
Were my sad life more radiant far than mortal tongue could tell
Yet would I give it gladly, joyously for thee.”

The execution caused a great sensation in Manila because
of his prominence and his romantic marriage, and a week later
the widow set off on foot for the rebel camp at Imus, where she
was hailed as a modern Joan of Are and was received with
great demonstrations. She followed the insurgents into many
of their victorious engagements.

During the long struggle many wealthy half-castes were
implicated. Many fled the country and their estates were
turned into the coffers of the government. More troops. were
hurried out from Spain, earthworks were thrown up at Cavité,
and 8-inch guns looked out over the bay. New batteries were
planted behind the walls of Old Manila, stretching from the
river south along the bay to the promenade, and families liv-
ing in the suburbs pitched tents in the streets of the old city.
Thus Spain held the insurgents in check, while the commercial
interests of the islands suffered greatly.

In December, 1897, General Primo de Rivera, who above
all Spanish generals had an intimate knowledge of the country
and its inhabitants, found the situation untenable for both
parties. It appeared to be somewhat like the Cuban situation.
Neither party could drive out the other, the rebels being secure
in their mountain fastnesses and the Spaniards holding the
chief towns and villages on the coast. Rivera, therefore, sent
two well-known Philippine natives occupying high position in
Manila to propose terms of peace to General Emilio Aguinaldo,
the head of the military movements of the insurgents, then at
Biac Na Bato. A council of the revolutionary government
was held in which it was agreed to lay down their arms on con-
dition of certain reforms being introduced. The principal
ones which the Spanish authorities agreed to were: the secular-
ization of the religious orders and their inhibition from all
546 AGAIN IN REVOLT

official vetoes in civil administration; a general amnesty for all
rebels and guarantees for their personal security and frora
vengeance of the friars after returning to their homes; radical
reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in public administration;
freedom of the press; representation in the Spanish parlia-
ment; abolition of the system of the deportation of political
suspects.

If the Philippine insurgents had had the benefit of as much
experience with the Spanish government in such agreements
as the Cuban insurgents had, they would have known that no
such arrangement would have received the necessary sanction
at Madrid; but Rivera agreed to the reforms, making the sig-
nificant condition that the principal rebel leaders must leave
the country during the pleasure of His Majesty. As these
leaders had lost all their property either by confiscation or
plunder, Rivera agreed further to provide them with funds to
live in a becoming manner on foreign soil. He was very glad
to get them out of the way so cheaply, and it was generally re-
garded asabribe. To what extent the leaders were influenced
by this offer it is difficult to say.

The rebels laid down their arms and peace was apparently
secured, but no sooner had they done so and had returned to
their homes than the religious orders began again to persecute
them and to trump up imaginary charges to procure their ar-
rest. The Spanish government, on its side, imagining itself
now secure, desisted from carrying out the proposed reforms,
a trick like that played on the Cubans at Zanjon in 1878.
The Filipinos, however, refused to be duped, and again rose
in rebellion, not only around Manila but all over the neighbor-
ing islands, but they necessarily had to begin all over again,
their arms having been surrendered and their leaders having
left the country.

General Aguinaldo, accompanied by his aid-de-camp and
private secretary, had gone first to Hong Kong, then to Saigon
in French Indo-China, and then to Singapore, arriving there
incognito at about the time matters came to a crisis between
THE INSURGENT CHIEF RETURNS 547

Spain and the United States. The purpose of his visit to
Singapore, as the story goes, was to consult with some of his
Philippine friends, and particularly with Howard W. Bray,
an old and intimate English friend for ten years resident in
the Philippines, about the affairs of the islands generally, and
particularly as to the advisability of lending his aid to the
Americans in the Philippines in case of war. The repudia-
tion of the reforms which Rivera had promised to immediately
carry into effect left Aguinaldo and other leaders, many of
whom had gone to Hong Kong, free to act. Meanwhile, Mr.
Bray was introduced to Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the
United States at Singapore, who was anxious in view of the
contingencies to learn as much as possible as to the conditions
in the Philippines.

Soon after Aguinaldo arrived, therefore, an interview was
arranged at which Bray acted as interpreter. Aguinaldo ex-
plained the nature of the co-operation he could give in the
event of the American squadron operating on Manila, and
said he would guarantee to maintain order and discipline
among the native troops, preventing them from committing
outrages upon defenseless Spaniards beyond the inevitable in
fair and honorable warfare. He further declared his ability
to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal
principles and would be willing to accept the same terms for
the Philippines as the United States proposed to give Cuba.

The Consul-General placed himself at once in telegraphic
communication with Commodore Dewey at Hong Kong, and
it is said that as a result of the interchange of messages Agui-
naldo at once left for Hong Kong and for Manila.
CHAPTER XXXIX

COMMODORE DEWEY AND HIS SQUADRON — INCIDENTS OF
THE CRUISE TO MANILA —SEARCHING FOR THE ENEMY
—THRILLING SAIL PAST THE BATTERIES AND OVER
THE MINES—ADVANCING TO THE BATTLE.

Commodore Dewey’s Squadron —Its Guns and Armor — Dewey’s Service
in the Navy — Admiral Porter’s Tribute — Proclamation of the Gov-
ernor-General of the Philippines—Bombastic Encouragement —
Dewey’s Cruise to Manila— Rolling in the China Sea — ‘‘ Prepare for
Action” — Practice on the Way — Stripping the Ships — All Unneces-
sary Articles Thrown Overboard — A Look into Subig Bay — Move-
ments of the Spanish Admiral— Why he Retired to Manila— The
United States Squadron Holds a Council of War— Dewey Announces
His Purpose to Enter Manila Harbor that Night — Engines Started
Again— Men Quietly Sent to Their Guns—In Sight of the Forts —
Increasing the Speed — Silent and Alert — Discovered at Last —A
Flash of Light, « Rocket, and then the Boom of a Gun — Dewey’s
Orders — Silencing a Battery —Silently Onward — Breakfast at the
Guns — The Morning Breaks over Manila— The Enemy Sighted at
Cavité — Heading for Battle — The Spanish Squadron — Its Advantage.

HE United States squadron which sailed out of Mirs Bay

| on April 27th was not made up of “ ironclads” or
armored battleships. They were the four protected
cruisers, Olympia, Baltimore, Boston,and Raleigh, and the two
gunboats, Concord and Petrel. The Olympia, which was the
flagship, Captain C. V. Gridley commanding, carried ten rapid-
fire 5-inch guns and four 8-inch guns mounted in barbette tur-
rets, with armor of four inches in average thickness. This was
about all the armor there was in the whole squadron. In her
secondary battery were fourteen 6-pounders, seven 1-pounders,
four Gatlings, and one field gun. The Baltimore, Captain
N. M. Dyer commanding, had four 8-inch and six 6-inch rifles,
and four 6-pounders, with several smaller rapid-fire guns.
The Boston, Captain Frank Wildes commanding, carried two
8-inch and six 6-inch rifles, and two 6-pounders, with other
smaller guns. The Raleigh, Captain J. B. Coughlan com-
manding, had one 6-inch and ten rapid-fire 5-inch guns and

(548 )
THE SQUADRON AND ITS COMMODORE 551

cight 6-pounders. The combined tonnage of the last three
cruisers is less than that of the battleship Jowa. The tonnage
of the Olympia, the largest and strongest of the squadron, is
about one-half that of the Iowa.

The 1,700-ton gunboat, Concord, carried six 6-inch rifles
and two 6-pounders; the 900-ton gunboat Petrel carried four
6-inch guns. The combined tonnage of these boats was 19,-
100. Accompanying the squadron was the revenue cutter
Hugh McCulloch, which had just arrived at Hong Kong, hav-
ing been ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury to report
to Commodore Dewey as a dispatch vessel. She carried four
light pieces. Two merchant steamers, the Nashan, laden with
3,000 tons of Cardiff coal, and the Zafiro, carrying 7,000 tons
of similar coal, having been purchased by the Commodore,
went with the squadron, regarded merely as merchant vessels
owned by the United States. Their officers and crew all gave
notice of their intention to become American citizens and re-
mained on board to navigate the vessels as needed. It should
be remembered that all these steps, including the concentration
of these vessels at Hong Kong, had taken place in the interval
following the destruction of the A/aine, and is a clear indica-
tion of the expectation of war which prevailed at Washington
and also of the expectation that the Philippines would figure
in the conflict which had become inevitable. It was due to
the prudent foresight of the authorities at Washington,
seconded by the prompt and energetic action of Commodore
Dewey in the Orient, that he was able to sail out of Chinese
waters within a week after war was opened.

Commodore George Dewey was a good type of the Ameri-
can naval officer. He had been faithfully performing the
tasks allotted to him for thirty years and the time of his re-
tirement was approaching. In person he is slightly built, of
medium height, with finely-chiseled face, firmly-set lips, and
clear eyes. He was known as a man quiet in manner, sparing
and incisive in speech, and decisive in action. He was just

beginning his naval career at the time of the Civil War, and
33
552 A BOMBASTIC PROCLAMATION

at the time of the capture of New Orleans was a lieutenant on
the old Mississippi, which, when trying to run the batteries
of Port Hudson in March, 1863, ran aground. The enemy
had her in range and poured shells into her hull till her com-
mander, seeing she could not be saved, ordered her fired.
Captain Smith and Lieutenant Dewey were the last to leave
the ship. “It is in such trying moments,” said Admiral
Porter in his official report, “that men show of what metal
they are made, and in this instance the metal was of the best.”

When, late in 1897, changes were made in the command
of the some of the squadrons, Commodore Dewey did not wish
togot the Orient. He much preferred a station where there
would be fighting if war came, for no one then thought of
active hostilities in the East. He was, nevertheless, assigned
to the Asiatic squadron and raised his flag on the Olympia on
January 3, 1898.

When information that Commodore Dewey would proceed
to threaten the Philippines reached Manila, the Spanish Gov-
ernor-General issued several proclamations, one of which in-
cluded the following:

‘““The American people, composed of all the social excresences, have
exhausted our patience and provoked war with perfidious machinations,
acts of treachery and outrages against the law of nations and international
conventions.

«A squadron manned by foreigners and possessing neither instructions
nor discipline is preparing to come to this archipelago with the ruffianly
intention of robbing us of all that means life, honor, and liberty.

“ The aggressors shall not profane the tombs of your fathers, shall not
gratify their lustful passions at the cost of your wives and daughters, shall
not cover you with dishonor, shall not appropriate the property your
industry has accumulated as provision against old age, and shall not perpe-
trate any of the crimes inspired by their wickedness and covetousness,
because your valor and patriotism will suffice to punish this miserable
people, that, claiming to be civilized and cultivated, have exterminated the
unhappy natives of North America instead of bringing them to a life of
civilization and progress.”

Owing to the necessity of economy in the use of coal as well
as the danger of driving into the rather heavy sea that was
running, a speed of about eight knots was maintained in mak-
IN PREPARATION FOR THE COMBAT 5538

ing the trip to the Philippines. Even at this slow speed the
heavily-laden Nashan and Zafiro made a decidedly wet voy-
age, and the Petre pitched and rolled deeply. Gun-drills and
other exercises kept the officers and men occupied continuously
during this run, and from the time the squadron left Mirs Bay
until it came into the presence of the enemy there was not an
hour in which preparations for battle were not under way.

When the tired ship’s company had finished its day’s work
on Wednesday, the first day out, and the Olympia had settled
down to the quiet of the first watch, the stillness was broken
with alirupt harshness by the blare of the bugle, and red and
white lights flashed up and down the masts of all the ships in
response to the Commodore’s peremptory signal: “ Prepare for
action.”

In two minutes each vessel was alive with men, who, but a
moment before, had been soundly asleep, or were supposed to
be. From the bridge of the flagship sharply-uttered orders
proceeded, and in seven minutes the executive officer was able
to report to Captain Gridley:

“The ship is ready for action, sir.”

Looking back along the line of ships dimly visible in the
moonlight, which fell on the China Sea, it was easy to see that
every one of them were stripped for battle, and the Commo-
dore was naturally greatly pleased with the quick and thorough
response to his signal, for he knew that such readiness was very
soon to be in serious demand. He was preparing for the
first naval battle of the new navy of the United States.

Search-light and night-signal exercise took place during a
large part of the first watch on Thursday night, and the pro-
gress made in working both the lights and the signals was very
satisfactory. Friday was passed without incident, except that
the weather became very warm and muggy, and the work of
the men below deck was exhausting, but in spite of the heat
and the heavy sea the ships kept their positions with precision.

The island of Luzon was sighted early Saturday morning,
and being, as was supposed, in close proximity to the enemy,
554 LOOKING FOR THE SPANISH ADMIRAL

the whole squadron began its final preparation for battle.
Chain-cables were coiled around the ammunition hoists to give
them further protection. Nets of tough Manila rope were
stretched beneath all the boats and drawn across the wardroom
bulkheads to protect the woodwork, flying splinters from
which, when struck by shot or shell, might become deadly
nssiles. All unnecessary material was thrown overboard and
went swimming off on the tossing China Sea.

When a few miles distant from Subig Bay, a rather deep
opening in the bold and rugged coast, about forty miles north
of Manila, the Boston and the Concord were sent ahead to learn
whether any part of the Spanish squadron was hidden there.
Later, they were reinforced by the Baltimore, the three vessels
moving at a speed of about fifteen knots, while the other three
remained with the transports and steamed at only six knots.
In the afternoon the three scouting vessels returned, having
explored Subig Bay without finding any craft there except a
few small sloops and schooners which were overhauled, but
not otherwise disturbed.

It had been reported from Manila several days before
Dewey sailed, that Montijo, the Spanish Admiral, had taken
his fleet to Subig Bay and assumed a position favorable for
giving the Americans a warm welcome, and while the Commo-
dore was taking no Spanish reports for granted, he took the
precaution to look in. The bay is one of the best harbors on
the coast, being used by steamers in the typhoon season in
preference to Manila Bay. The latter is surrounded chiefly
by lowlands so that the fury of the storm is not diminished by
the surroundings, while Subig Bay is amply protected hy the
Bataan Mountains on the east and a coast range on the west.
About half way up the bay is Grande Island, commanding
both sides of the entrance, which, at this point, is but about
two miles wide, and if the island were properly fortified it
would be an absolute protection to the city of Subig, a place of
about 19.000 inhabitants at the head of the hay. Montijo
went to the bay at ahont the time of the declaration of war, in-
FORTIFIED ENTRANCE TO MANILA BAY 555

tending to fortify Grande Island, either to prevent Dewey
from using it as a base in case he did not enter Manila Bay, or

 

 

 

 

 
       
  
  
  
     
    

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MAP OF MANILA AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY.

to be used by the Spanish in case Manila became too unpleas-
ant for them. But he concluded that he could not fortify the
place in less than a month, and having heard that Dewey had
556 THE SILENT APPROACH — THE ALARM

sailed he put back to Manila on the 30th, or the day Dewey’s
fleet came in sight of the island.

When the scouting vessels returned, reporting no enemy
at Subig and none in sight along the coast, Commodore Dewey
came to the conclusion that the Spanish admiral had with-
drawn to Manila with the intention of holding against him the
mouth of the harbor, which is about ten miles wide, between
flanking chains of low mountains that start upward from the
water’s edge, each point being occupied by a fort. Dividing
this entrance into two channels are two islands, Corregidor and
Cadallo, both fortified, and lying so far to the north that the
northern channel is narrow, while between the islands and the
forts on the southern point there is a sweep of water over eight
miles wide. The usual course for vessels going and coming
from Chinese ports is through the narrow channel, which
Dewey knew was well mined, and while the other channel was
supposed to be mined, it presented less dangers because of its
width and, though there were some shallows, deep water could
be followed by an experienced navigator.

Dewey halted his squadron a short distance from Subig
Bay, and, while the vessels lay motionless on the calm sea, the
commanding officers were summoned over to the flagship for -
instructions. He told his astonished captains that he intended
to enter Manila Bay that night in spite of the forts and in spite
of the mines. He felt confident that the Spaniards would not
expect him to make such a move, and, therefore, he was re-
solved to make it. He stated the details of his plans and gave
his directions. The officers went back to their ships, the
engines were started again, and the squadron idled along at a
speed of about four knots, not wishing to appear at the entrance
of Manila Bay too early. The moon had risen, and, although
it was occasionally obscured by light clouds, the night was not
one in which a squadron ought to have been able to run through
a well-defended channel without drawing upon itself a hot fire.
Something of the kind was expected, and at a quarter to ten
o’clock, as the ships drifted quictly along, the men were sent
THE FIRST SHOT 557

to their guns, not by the usual bugle call, but by a whispered
word of mouth.

Every man was ready and the final steps of battle clearing
were completed in silence in a very few minutes — and they
were dramatic moments. Off to port could be seen the sullen
“loom of the land,” where, for all they knew, the enemy was
already watching their approach, and were preparing their
guns for a terrific fire at the right moment. Closer and closer
they crept, a long line of dark hulks with the transports in the
rear. Nota light was permitted to show in any vessel except
one at the very stern, which was necessary as a guide to the fol-
lowing ship, and these lights were shaded on each side.

As they approached the entrance and the first fort, the
speed was increased to eight knots, and quietly the line slipped
past the batteries on the north point of the entrance without
any evidence that the enemy had discovered them. Every
man was silent, but on the alert; every eye was fixed on the
sombre forts; every nerve was strained; every pulse beat
strongly. Then Corregidor Island came abeam to port and
every glass was turned on its frowning point. But not until
the long line had swung into the broad channel — the Boca
Grande as it is called — did the outlooks of Corregidor catch
sight of it. A few sparks flew up out of the funnel of one of
the gunboats. In a moment a bright light flashed up in the
center of the island, and it was answered by a similar one on
the north shore. Then a rather feeble rocket staggered aloft
over Corregidor, and the American sailors standing by their
guns felt sure every moment that the batteries would open.
But they did not. The Spaniards were evidently taken by
surprise. No one had been at the guns, and it took time to
get the batteries ready for action. On went the American
squadron deeper and deeper into the bay. And not until the
leaders of the squadron had passed out of easy range did a gun
greet the long line of silent ships.

Tt was nearly half-past eleven when there was a bright flash
from the batteries off to port, the boom of a heavy gun, and the
558 IN SIGHT OF MANILA

vindictive whistle of a shot far overhead. It came from a
battery too far astern to enable the leaders to return the fire
to advantage, but the Commodore was somewhat uneasy about
the three non-combatant ships in the rear. He, therefore,
signaled to the Hugh McCulloch to lead the transports up to
a position where they would be protected by the cruisers and
less exposed to attack. As the Hugh McCulloch was coming
up she signaled that her chief engineer had been taken with
a stroke of heat prostration and medical consultation was asked
for. He died in twenty minutes of heart failure, due, perhaps,
to the strain of those thrilling moments, during which all stood
silent in the constant expectation of an exploding mine or a
hail of shell from the shore. But the minutes dragged by
and the ships crept onward.

The Raleigh, which was steaming along third in line, fired
the first reply to the shot from the batteries from a 5-inch gun,
and presently the Boston followed suit. Another shot flew
from the batteries, and, as the Commodore’s ships were on the
close lookout for the flash to obtain an idea of where to aim,
the Concord placed a 6-inch shell so exactly over the spot where
the flash had occurred that an exclamation of admiration was
heard on all sides. It was a marvelous shot. Dewey’s sailors
did not know it then, but that shot disabled the gun and killed
nearly every man in the group of Spaniards about it.

There were no more shots fired from the shore, and as the
Commodore did not wish to waste time on the batteries or to
make any more “ fuss ” than necessary in approaching Manila,
where he now supposed the Spanish fleet must be, the squadron
kept on its silent course. Speed was reduced to less than three
knots, as there was no haste. The Commodore wished to ar-
rive off Manila at the first break of dawn, but no earlier. The
men lay down beside their guns to get what sleep they could,
but the time was not conducive to sleep, and the strictest look-
out was kept for the enemy’s ships and torpedo boats.

At four o’clock coffee and hardtack were served out to the
men, and the officers were glad to get the same frugal refresh-
COMPOSITION OF EACH FLEET 554)

ments. No one felt like sitting down to a formal breakfast.
The lights of Manila had long been in sight. The dawn of
that Sunday morning began at half-past four when the squad-
ron was about six miles from the city, lying on the low alluvial
plains which form a sort of huge doormat to the main range of
mountains, running along the eastern coast of Luzon. As
the sun came up exactly behind the city, the shadow cast by the
land obseured the harbor foreground, but finally the city be-
came clearer, looking like a white chalk-line on the low shore,
and its domes began to glisten against the mountains fifteen
miles beyond. Then the presence of a group of vessels in the
foreground could be made out, but before five o’clock it could
be seen that they were nothing but merchant ships. Where
was the enemy?

The cruisers were creeping up in close battle order, the
flagship leading, followed by the Baltimore, the Raleigh, the
Petrel, the Concord, and the Boston. They had passed up the
broad bay to the northward of Manila, and had turned toward
the south, which position they were holding when the Spanish
squadron was sighted in the little bay of Cavité, under the guns
of the forts of that arsenal, the larger ships lying outside the
breakwater, while inside could be seen the smaller gunboats.
The enemy was found and the American squadron was holding
a course directly towards him. It was about five o’clock.

The vessels under Admiral Montijo’s command consisted
of the cruiser Reina Christina, the flagship, 3,500 tons, and
with a battery of six 6.2-inch, two 2.7-inch, six 6-pounders,
and six 8-pounder rapid-fire guns; the Castilla, 3,300 tons,
with a battery of four 5.6-inch, two 4.7-inch, two 3.3-inch,
four 2.9-inch, and eight 6-pounder rapid-fire guns; the Isla
de Cuba and Isla de Luzon, 1,030 tons each, with batteries of
four 4.7-inch, four 6-pounders, and two 38-pounder rapid-fire
guns; the Don Antonio de Ulloa and Don Juan de .Lustria,
1,130 tons each, with batteries of four 4.7-inch, two 2.7-inch,
and two 38-pounder rapid-fire guns; the General Lezo and
Marques del Duero, 524 and 500 tons respectively, with bat-
560 THE ENEMY’S ADVANTAGES

teries of small rapid-fire guns. The Velasco was also in port,
but was undergoing repairs and her guns were mounted on
earthworks on the shore. There were also four torpedo boats
and two fine transports, the Manila and the Isla de Mindanao.

While the Spanish ships exceeded those of Commodore
Dewey’s attacking squadron in number and in the number of
its men, they were less in aggregate tonnage. Neither were
they as well protected as Dewey’s ships, although their guns
could readily pierce the steel sides of the American cruisers if
well aimed. If the Spanish squadron had been compelled to
come out in the open sea and fight it would have had little
chance even in the hands of experienced gunners. But what
gave the Spaniards an equalizing, if not a superior, advantage
was the position they held under the protection of the shore
batteries. Experts have estimated that one good gun mounted
on shore is worth several aboard ship, having a fixed platform,
and, therefore, able to fire with greater accuracy. Another
advantage the enemy had was the perfect knowledge of the
harbor and the exact distance of our ships at all times. The
American fleet was compelled to maneuver in strange waters
with a Spanish chart which they dared not trust.
CHAPTER XL

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY —A TERRIBLE STORM
OF SHOT AND SHELL — SCENES OF BLOOD AND CARNAGE
—ANNIHILATION OF THE SPANISH FLEET—COMMO-
DORE DEWEY’S GREAT VICTORY.

Commodore Dewey’s Squadron in Battle Array — Advancing Silently
towards the Enemy — Mines Exploded in Front «f the Olympia —
“Remember the Maine!”—The Time for Action Comes — ‘Torpedo
Launches Venture an Attack — Rapid Guns — The Reina Christina At-
tacks the Olympia — Meets with a Terrible Fire — Destructive Shot of
the Boston — Retiring for Breakfast — Taking Account of Damages —
The Fury of the Second Attack — Spaniards Fighting Desperately —
Defiant Gunners Swallowed up in the Bloody Water — Escape of the
Spanish Admiral— A Gruesome Sight — Ships Burnt, Sunk, and De-
serted — Surrender of the Fort— Care of the Wounded — Experiences
on the American Ships— Cutting the Cable—Commodore Dewey’s
Modest Despatches.

ANILA Bay extends in a northeasterly direction, its
M greatest length being some thirty-five miles and its
circumference about one hundred and twenty. .The

city of Manila lies to the extreme east side on both banks of the
muddy Pasig River. On the south bank is the old city sur-
rounded by a moat and massive walls, constructed in the six-
teenth century and crowned by some antiquated guns and a
few modern and high-power guns recently added. New
Manila on the north bank is entirely defenseless. Eight miles
distant and on the southern shore of the bay is Cavité, having
a small bay of its own, formed by a projecting neck of land.
This was well fortified by large guns and contained an arsenal
and slips for large vessels. Under these heavy guns and
drawn up in fair order for defense were the fourteen ships of
the enemy, and apparently they had been taken by surprise,
for they were in no position to maneuver as a squadron; in-

deed, some were making hurried efforts to get up steam.
(561)
562 EAGER FOR THE FRAY

As the Olympia, followed by the Baltimore, Raleigh,
Petrel, Concord, and Boston in the order named, steamed
towards the enemy, every man was on the alert. Trim and
fresh-looking in their paint, gay with fluttering signals, they
presented a real holiday aspect as they cruised along, but clus-
tered about the decks at their guns, stripped for hot work and
—— impatient for the
a . signal which

MR 4) would mean a
plunge into an ex-
perience entirely

iy.
Ges

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io

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Pt.Luzon Are
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novel, were eager,
gallant men, while
Fort in CoRREAION Eo down out of sight
MANILA BAY BY in the bowels of
Ete YY, _the ships at the
ammunition hoists
and at the boilers
were others equally eager who could not see what was going
on outside but felt that every moment they might hear the
boom of a gun and the rattle of projectiles. On the bridge
were the commanding officers; in their proper stations were
the signal officers, the range-finders, the navigators, all per-
forming duties of the utmost importance upon a modern fight-
ing ship.

At intervals the range was called out. Nearer and nearer
they were approaching the enemy. Yet the minutes, minutes
of fearful tension, passed and not a sound broke the stillness of
that Sabbath morn whose flaming light was breaking over the
mountains back of Manila.

Commodore Dewey’s orders were to hold the fire till an
effective range had been reached. He did not propose to
waste any more powder than necessary. On they went, the
transports holding off out of range and their crews crowding
the decks to watch the spectacle.

At 5:15, when about five miles from the Spanish fleet and

a,
SOS

B

Laguna de

 

MAP OF THE BAY AND HARBOR OF MANILA.
THE BATTLE-CRY 563

about four miles from the Old Manila guns, two batteries from
the former and three from the latter opened fire. But it was
ill-directed. Shot followed shot, kicking up the water about
Commodore Dewey’s squadron, on board which, as it steamed
ahead, all was as silent as if the ships were empty, except for
the whirr of the blowers and the throb of the engines and an
occasional order.

At intervals the range-finders exhibited their signal flags,
and as each range was called the gunners lowered the sight
bars. The range from Cavité was decreasing fast and the
shots from its guns and from the Spanish cruisers, which now
opened fire, began to shriek through the air and lash the water
about them. Faster and faster they came, when suddenly,
some distance ahead, a great column of water shot into the air,
and then another close by. The enemy had fired two mines,
but they were too far away to do any damage, and the ships
pushed on. “The air seemed full of things,” as one of the
officers expressed it. The heat was intense. Stripped of all
their clothing except their trousers, the gunners waited im-
patiently at the port guns to line them on the enemy.

When about three miles from Cavité, the Olympia began
to swing her port batteries towards the Spanish line, and just
then a shell burst directly over her. From the boatswain’s
mate at the after 5-inch guns came a hoarse cry: “ Remem-
ber the Maine!” And then the cry arose from the throats of
every man on the decks.

The time had come. The gunners had the range. One
after another the ships followed after the Olympia with their
port batteries to the enemy. At exactly nineteen minutes to
six, or more than twenty minutes after the enemy had opened
fire, Commodore Dewev, who stood on the bridge closelv
watching events, turned to the captain of his flagship and said:

“You may fire, when ready, Captain Gridley.”

Tn an instant one of the Olympia’s 8-inch guns sent a shell
screeching into Cavité fort three miles away. Big guns and
little guns chimed in from all the ships before the roar had
564 THE CEASELESS THUNDER OF CANNON

died away. A hailstorm of iron flew at the Spanish ships from
the rapid-fire guns, while large shells dropped upon the fort.
It was one continuous roar. The fire from Cavité and the
.Spanish ships was redoubled. Shot and shells flew all about,
splashed the water about the ships, throwing it over the decks
and drenching the men. Occasionally, they came whistling
through the rigging and rattling about the sides of the vessels.
A great cloud of smoke enveloped them, for there was very
little wind, and signaling became difficult. Still the terrific
fire was poured into the enemy as the squadron steamed by.
It was a scene of awful magnificence.

“ Another unpleasant thing about the Spanish shells,” said
an eye-witness on the Olympza, “ was the way they had of com-
ing at us even when they had not been properly aimed. Thus
it often happened that a projectile which had not only fallen
short, but which was not even a good line shot, would be up-
set by its impact with the water and would come tumbling end
over end, far out of its original direction. And how these fel-
lows did roar, plainly visible if they came anywhere near us,
and as they rose from the water and spun round and round,
they seemed to be about the size of a barrel, especially if an ob-
server happened to be close on the line of their eccentric
flight.” But all these flying missiles did no serious execution,
while our sailors could see through the rifted smoke that the
broadsides poured by our vessels were making some impression
on the Spanish ships.

Having passed the line firing the port batteries, the
Olympia came around, taking a course back and closer to the
enemy’s ships, and the others followed, a great roaring, smok-
ing, flashing, shricking procession, and, as it passed along,
the starboard batteries blazed away at the enemy.

The roar of the steady thunder of cannon was terrible.
When the fort was pouring its terrific fire upon our ships, it
looked to those on the McCulloch and the transports as if our
vessels could not possibly endure the fusilade. Heavy shells
and solid shot fell about them like hail from the clouds, and
 

 

 

 

PROMINENT AMERICAN GENERALS.
Maj.-Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE. Maj.-Gen. FirzHuGH LEE.
Maj.-Gen. ADNA R. CHAFFEE. Maj.-Gen. JOSEPH E. WHEELER.
THE SPANISH ADMIRAL’S GALLANT ASSAULT 567

many exploded immediately over the ships. At one time the
Americans were anything but sure of victory, and this was
after the fire had been kept up for an hour. It looked as
though every gun of the Spanish ships had been turned loose
on Dewey’s cruisers, and the shore line was a veritable blaze of
fire from the batteries. The din was simply indescribable.

Tons and tons of shot continued to fall over our ships,
whose salvation was the bad marksmanship of the Spaniards.
Most of their shots were high, falling over into the bay beyond.
This was especially noticeable after the American ships had
swung about and run back nearer to the enemy’s line. The
Spanish gunners did not change their range except on the forts,
where the marksmen were better trained, or had the advantage
of a solid platform and a better defense.

In the midst of the terrific din a couple of torpedo launches
were seen leaving the shore and heading for the American
ships. Quickly the gunners turned their rapid-fire guns on
them, and in the terrible hail of shot and shell which fell upon
them one was immediately sunk and the other so badly dam-
aged that she ran on the beach to save herself. That was the
first and last venture of the Spanish torpedo craft.

Round came the Olympia again, after having passed the
enemy’s line to the eastward, and nearer still toward it the
procession retraced its course, using again the port batteries.
Then the Reina Christina was seen coming out towards the
Olympia to give her battle. Admiral Montijo stood on the
bridge, and his vessel made a gallant assault. But the fire
of Dewey’s squadron was concentrated upon the reckless Span-
iard. Shells riddled her sides and swept her deck, and just
as the admiral stepped from the bridge a shot struck it and car-
ried it completely overboard. She quickly turned back
towards the harbor, and while speeding in the Boston sent an
8-inch shell into her stern, sweeping through the vessel, creat-
ing terrible havoc, and setting the ship afire. Many of the
men were killed. Yet through his glass the American com-
modore could see the Spanish admiral calmly walking the deck
568 A LULL IN THE TEMPEST

while the Spanish sailors were keeping their guns hot, discharg-
ing shells which flew all around the Olympia and her followers,
doing very little damage to the flagship, but how much to the
others he could not tell.

Round swung the line again, giving the starboard batteries
another chance, and this time closer still to the enemy. From
the beginning of the engagement, the three batteries at Manila
had kept up a continuous fire, which the American squadron
had not returned, paying its attention entirely to the Spanish
fleet and the Cavité batteries. At this point, Commodore
Dewey sent a message to the Governor-General to the effect
that if the Manila batteries did not cease firing he would shell
the city. It had the effect of silencing them. The Governor-
General could not fail to appreciate Commodore Dewey’s ad-
vantages in the situation, for, if he withdrew his ships from in
front of the Cavité batteries to Manila, eight miles away, he
could shell the city without probable interference from the
Spanish fleet, whose admiral would not dare to attack Dewey
unaided by the strong forts at Cavité after what he had seen of
American gunnery. Dewey would doubtless have been very
glad to have enticed the Spanish admiral away from the Cavité
forts so that he might speedily finish his ships in open battle.
This would have left him free to return to Cavité and devote
his undivided attention to its batteries.

After steaming past the Spanish line the fifth time, Com-
modore Dewey, at 7.35, gave orders to withdraw across the
bay for breakfast. The men had been fighting for two hours
on nothing but the coffee and hardtack which they had at 4
o’clock. The commodore also wished to take account of his
damages and the loss of life.

When the American “jackies” realized that they were
being withdrawn from the fight, there was a wail of disap-
pointment at first, illustrated by the almost tearful appeal of
one gun captain to Commander Lamberton of the Olympia:

“For God’s sake, captain, don’t stop now. Let’s finish ’em
up right off. Damn the breakfast!”
, MARVELOUS ESCAPES 569

In passing the last time by the enemy’s line the American
cruisers had gone within very close range, and while the
officers could see that they had wrought sad havoe with some
of the Spanish ships, the batteries and vessels were still firing
vigorously. One shot passed through the Baltimore, and the
Boston was hit not far from the water line. Dewey did not at
this time appreciate how nearly he had the enemy whipped, and
the Spanish did not realize as yet the straits they were in.

Seeing the storm of shells striking about the Olympia and
bursting close aboard the ships of the squadron, the commo-
dore had reason to fear that our loss had been heavy. He
knew that the Olympia had escaped without serious casualties,
but as she had had a dozen hairbreadth misses, it did not seem
possible that the others had been equally fortunate. On the
other ships the situation was similarly regarded; indeed, it was
thought that the Olympia had been seriously damaged when
she pulled away.

It was not long before it was discovered that no serious
harm had been done his ships and not a life had been lost. It
seemed nothing less than miraculous that they should have
come out of such a hail of iron so little damaged.

When it was found that not a man had been killed, and
that none of the vessels had been seriously harmed, an old gun-
ner on the flagship remarked: “The Spaniards couldn’t hit a
flock of barns.”

But the lack of precision in the aim of the Spaniards was
not more remarkable than the small damage done when their
shots did hit, for in such a rain of iron some could not fail to
strike even if the aim had been poor or at random. The
escapes were wonderful. The shell which pierced the Boston
went crashing into the wardroom and exploded within five
feet of Paymaster Martin. He was not hit, though it set fire
to the lockers and did considerable damage before the fire was
extinguished. The fragments of a single shell struck within a
radius of fifteen feet of Commodore Dewey. An armor-
piercing projectile struck a box of 3-pounder ammunition on
570 ADMIRAL MONTIJO’S STORY

board the Baltimore, exploded it, and the whole discharge
passed between two groups of men so near together that it was
difficult to see how all escaped, and yet but a half dozen were
wounded and that only slightly.

The Spaniards knowing that the Baltimore and Boston
had been hit, and thinking that all their firing must have done
some damage, when they saw the American ships draw away
concluded that they had been obliged to give up the attack.
They set up a cheer, and the story at once went to Manila and
from there to Madrid that the American squadron had at-
tacked, partially destroying the Spanish fleet, and had finally
been obliged to retreat. But the American sailors were only
resting on their guns and taking a little well-earned breakfast;
and as they did so the damage they had done the enemy began
to appear. The Reina Christina was seen to be burning
fiercely and two of the other ships were on fire.

In telling his own story afterwards, Admiral Montijo said:
“T observed fire on my ship forward and our steering gear was
damaged, rendering the vessel unmanageable. We were sub-
jected to a terrific hail of shell and shot. The engines were
struck and we estimated that we had seventy hits about our
hull and superstructure. The boilers were not hit, but the
pipe to the condenser was destroyed. A few moments later, I
observed that the after part of the ship was on fire. <A shell
from an American ship had penetrated and burst with deadly
effect, killing many of our men. My flag lieutenant said to
me: ‘The ship is in flames. It is impossible to stay on the
Christina any longer.’ He signaled to the gunboat Isla de
Cuba, and I and my staff were transferred to her and my flag
was hoisted. Before leaving the Christina my flag was hauled
down. My flagship was now a mass of flames. I ordered
away all the boats I could to save the crew. Many of the
men, jumped overboard without clothing, and succeeded in
reaching the shore several hundred yards away.”

As the Americans looked through their glasses they could
see that the enemy’s fleet was done for. In a little time the
CHEERING THE ‘‘ BALTIMORE” yal

Reina Christina was a mass of flames, and the Castilla and the
Don Antonio del Ulloa were burning fiercely. It would be an
easy matter to rush in and finish the fleet, but the Cavité fort-
ress remained to be silenced, and there was no telling what
its guns might do at close range. Commodore Dewey decided
to run in and do his worst. What followed is thus concisely
told in his official report:

‘At 11.16 I returned to the attack. By this time the Spanish flagship
and almost all the Spanish fleet were in flames. At 12.80 the squadron
ceased firing, the batteries being silenced, and the ships sunk, burned, and
deserted.”

This modest statement gives a very inadequate idea of the
fury of that final attack. This time the Baltimore, which the
enemy supposed had been disabled, took the lead, followed by
the Olympia. The Baltimore had orders to attack the shore
batteries furiously, and hers was one of the most daring deeds
of the engagement. The batteries mounted 10-inch guns, a
shot from one of which, had it struck her, might have sunk her
immediately. But, using the lead for soundings, she dashed in
at high speed until she was close under the blaze of the guns on
shore, when she swung around and let them have her big shells
with all the fury they were capable of. She was the admira-
tion of the whole fleet. Cheer after cheer went up from the
Olympia’s men, who had borne the brunt of the first: battle.

The other ships turned their rapid-fire guns upon the
Spanish fleet, particularly the Isla de Cuba, to which the ad-
miral had transferred his flag. The Don Antonio de Ulloa
made a magnificent show of desperate bravery. When her
commander found that she was so torn by American shells
and swept by fire that he could not keep her afloat, he nailed
her colors to the mast and she sank with all hands fighting to
the last. The Isla de Cuba was soon on fire, but her men were
fighting with desperation. This soon left the Don Juan de
Austria practically to make the fight alone, the gunboats being
already disabled or withdrawn to the little harbor behind the
fort. For a few minutes this cruiser received the hail of
572 SPANISH SHIPS ABANDONED

Dewey’s rapid-fire guns, when suddenly a shell struck her and
exploded in her forward magazine. Like a fan, splinters, men,
guns, parts of the superstructure, and thousands of movable
things shot high into the air. The next moment the Don Juan
de .lustria was sinking. Still the men aft worked their guns,
and as the ship sank they went down in a frenzy of impotent
rage, shrieking defiance as the blood-stained water closed over
them, and still the American ships relentlessly advanced.

The Isla de Cuba sought refuge behind the pier at Cavité,
where, recognizing the futility of fighting any more, Admiral
Montijo prepared to disembark, and he gave orders for the
evacuation of the remainder of the ships. His last signal to
the captains of his fleet was, “Scuttle and abandon your
ships.” Then he escaped in a small boat into Racoor Bay,
and finally to Manila. The American vessels closed in and
rained a deadly fire upon the forts, and at 12.15 the Spanish
flag was hauled down and a white flag went up, amid great
cheering from the decks of the American sailors.

One gunboat was sunk at the end of the engagement. Her
crew had left her with her colors flying and she went down
thus — a very impressive picture.

It was a gruesome sight which the bay presented. The
smoking hulks of the Spanish vessels which had not fully sunk
were seen to be strewn with corpses and wounded men, and
bodies were floating about in the water.

At 12.30 the squadron returned and anchored off Manila,
the Petre! being left behind to complete the destruction of
the smaller vessels, which had run in behind the point of
Cavité. This duty was performed in the most expeditious
and complete manner. There was plenty of material for dis-
cussion among the gallant sailors of Commodore Dewey’s
squadron that night. They had experienced their first battle,
the first battle of the new navy. They realized, as only men
after such a battle can, the dangers from whith they had es-
eapod unscathed. Even when no shots entered the ships the
experiences were anything but pleasant. The concussion of
BRAVERY ON BOTH SIDES 573

the big guns when fired across the deck made havoc with the
breakables on board. “ Bookshelves were torn out,” said one
officer in speaking of his room, “and everything — clothes,
electric fans, books, tobacco, curios, and the rest — was on the
floor in one mass.”

An Axoerican officer, writing home a few days later, said:
“T have often wondered, as I dare say everyone has, how
people in a scrap would feel and behave; have wondered
whether calm, deliberate action would be possible to a tender-
foot. Personally, I sincerely hope I have seen my last, as
well as my first, battle. All the same, I was delighted to see
that, so far from being rattled or excited, we seemed to do
what was to be done as deliberately as on parade. IJ have more
respect for the Spaniards than ever before. Their fighting
their ships as long as they did in the condition in which they
were is wonderful. I said as much to one of them in a party
on board yesterday. Te replied, with a bow:

“<We but did, or tried to do, what you did; we did cur
duty.”

Early the next morning the squadron returned to Cavité .
to take possession, but when the officers, sent in on the Pefrei,
approached the shore, they were surprised to find the
arsenal still occupied by a force of Spaniards with Mauser
rifles. As the white flag had been hoisted the day before,
(‘ommander Lamberton of the Olympia, who had been sent
ashore to represent the Commodore, could not understand what
the Spaniards intended to do. On landing he was met by
Captain Sostoa of the Spanish navy and they went to the
arsenal headquarters, where they were at once surrounded by
an armed guard. When asked why men were under arms
when they had surrendered the day before, Captain Sostoa
replied that they had not surrendered, but had merely hoisted
the white flag to enable the women and children to repair to
places of safety. There was some further parley, and finally
Commander Lamberton said that they were not there to discuss
past events, but to take possession of the arsenal, and if all the
574 THE SURRENDER OF THE ARSENAL

Spaniards there did not surrender their guns and persons as
prisoners of war the American ships would open fire.

The Spanish captain asked for more time, and finally Com-
mander Lamberton said that he would give them two hours,
and if the white flag was not hoisted over the arsenal by noon
fire would be reopened witheut any more parley. He then
returned to report to the Commodore. While they waited the
crews from the ships rowed about the wrecks and observed the
destruction they had made. But the Spaniards wished to
parley further, and in a little while army officers came out to
the flagship and said that the navy would surrender, but the
army could not. They were told that they must or take the
consequences, and a general recall was sounded for the men
off in the boats. The Olympia offered the Spanish officers
coal for their launch to take them back, and while they stood
on deck they were given an object lesson. A small steamship
was reported leaving Cavité for Manila. “(jive her a shot,”
was the order to the Olympia’s gunners, and in less than a
half-ninute a shot was tossed across her bows. She did not
stop, but another caught the range exactly and she was at once
beached.

At quarter to eleven the white flag was hoisted on the
arsenal, but when a landing party was sent to take possession
in the afternoon they found that every seaman had marched
off to Manila, taking his Mauser rifle with him. As they had
been announcing that the Americans would kill everyone in
Cavité, the landing party was met by a long procession of
priests and Sisters of Mercy, begging them not to injure the
wounded men in the hospital As a matter of fact, the
Americans had already rescued about 200 Spaniards and sent.
them ashore, but they had been so misled by the priests and
friars that they expected to be killed. Our men procecded to
take care of the wounded, to bury the dead, and to defend
the place from the swarm of native looters that had rushed in
on learning that the Spanish euard had withdrawn. The same
day the Raleigh and the Baltimore went down the bay and
BRIEF BUT IMPRESSIVE DISPATCHES 575

secured the surrender of the batteries on Corregidor Island,
paroled the garrison, and destroyed the mines and torpedoes
past which the squadron had had the good fortune to sail
unharmed.

Having learned that the Governor of Manila had refused
to allow the cable company to transmit his message announcing
the result of his visit to Manila, Commodore Dewey sent the
Zafiro a short distance to cut the cable, which was done, thus
making the world dependent for several days upon the first
Spanish report for information as to the situation. On Thurs-
day the Hugh McCulloch sailed for Hong Kong, and so ended
the first chapter of the Manila campaign.

Commodore Dewey’s own modest account of the conflict,
which he sent to Hong Kong on the McCulloch, and which ar-
rived in Washington six days after the battle, was as follows:

Mania, May 1st.

The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Imme-
diately engaged the enemy and destroyed the following vessels: ILeeina
Christina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba,
General Lezo, Marques del Duero, El Gano, Velasco, transport Isla de
Mindanao, and one other vessel and water battery at Cavité. Squadron is
uninjured. Only few men were slightly wounded. The only means of.tele--
graphing is to the American consul at Hong Kong. I shall communicate

with him.
DEwEY.

Cavite, May 4th.

I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavité, Philippine
Islands, and destroyed its fortifications. Have destroyed fortification at
bay entrance, paroling the garrison. I control the bay completely and can
take the city at any time. The squadron is in excellent health and spirits.
The Spanish loss is not fully known, but very heavy ; 150 killed including
captain, on Reina Christina alone. I am assisting in protecting the Spanish
sick and wounded. Two hundred and fifty sick and wounded in hospital
within our lines. Much excitement at Manila. Will protect foreign

residents.
DEWEY.

The orders which Commodore Dewey had received from
his government were to destroy the Spanish fleet. He obeyed.
Seven thousand miles away from a home base of supplies he set
576 A BATTLE UNSURPASSED IN NAVAL HISTORY

out calmly to run the gauntlet of mined harbors and land
fortifications. His answer to his government’s instructions
was in the brief dispatches above, brief, but as impressive as
anything in naval history.

The losses of the Spaniards included ten warships, several
torpedo boats, two transports, the navy yard, and nine batteries.
About 1,200 men were killed or wounded, and the estimated
value of the Spanish property destroyed or captured was $6,-
000,000. On the American side the total loss was eight men
slightly wounded, and $5,000 damage to the ships.

The moral of it is that unskilled bravery is no match for
bravery mated with skill in the use of the modern machinery
of war. Civilization has advanced beyond the crude instru-
ments that in their management demanded nothing so much as
a strong arm and a brave heart. The modern fighting machine
requires training and skill.

Neither squadron contained an armored ship. The Amer-
ican vessels had their vitals covered by what are known as pro-
tective decks, while but two of the Spanish ships were so built.
But for all that they might have riddled or sunk some of our
squadron; the forts might have done this alone had they been
able to shoot straight. The little Petrel, secure in their wild
inaccuracy, danced up to within a thousand yards of their forts.

Nothing but audacity that was much more than bravado
could have accomplished so much; an audacity born of the
conviction that they had vessels which were honestly con-
structed, guns that had been tested in target practice, gunners
that had become so expert in sub-caliber practice that they
scarcely ever missed fire. The Spanish were overborne by the
torrent of metal which rained down on their ships, their guns,
and their men. They fought desperately with pure animal
courage and sank with their ships rather than surrender them.
The Spaniards were without skill, fired in the old fashion, blaz-
ing away with only general aim, while every American gunner
was an expert sharpshooter, trained by target practice, and
their shots told with terrible effect.
THE EFFECT AND THE MORAL OF THE VICTORY 577

The international effect of the victory was at once to give
the United States prestige among the nations of the world as
a naval power. Its effect in the United States was to give a
good degree of sober self-confidence as to the result of any en-
gagement in American waters between the Spanish and
American fleets. Another Spanish fleet might be more formi-
dable than that at Manila, but there would be the same ditler-
ence between the Spanish and the American gunner.

No wonder the President, without waiting for further
action, promoted Commodore Dewey to be acting rear ad-
miral, and Congress promptly complied with the suggestion to
create him a rcar admiral and to extend the nation’s thanks. *
Beautiful was the spirit of the comments of brother ofticers
upon the valor and glory of the officers and crew of the Asiatic
squadron. Not the slightest trace of jealousy, naught but joy
in the result and entire willingness that honor be given to
those to whom honor is due. As for the carping critics of the
navy at home, they became as dumb as the Sphinx.

In the combined sagacity and boldness of Commodore
Dewey this naval engagement was unsurpassed in the naval
history of the world; in the results achieved, unequaled.
Never before had an entire fleet been destroyed without the
loss of a ship or even of a single life on the part of the attacking
forces. The silent sail at midnight past the fort which was
supposed to command the entrance to the bay, the almost con-
temptuous disregard of the mines placed in the harbor for its
protection, the calm pushing forward after two mines had
exploded in front of one of the vessels, the silent receiving
without return the earliest fire of the enemy, the terrible fire
poured upon the fleet and shore batteries when the Commo-
dore had reached the point where he could make fire most ef.
fective, the stopping after two hours of cannonade for break-
fast, and taking account of damages, and then the resumption
of the battle, the sailing closer to the shore by the aid of the
lead to make the fire more effective, the brave, but hopeless,
resistance of the Spaniards till their every ship was absolutely
578 A DECISIVE BATTLE

destroyed or placed entirely hors de combat, the quick and
chivalrous attention to the Spanish wounded by Commodore
Dewey as soon as victory was complete, the report wired to the
government at home as modest as the deed was heroic -— all
combine to make this naval engagement one of the most ro-
mantic, as well as one of the most decisive, in the world’s
history.
CHAPTER XLI

AWAITING ADMIRAL CERVERA AND HIS FLEET— ANXIETY
FOR THE ORE@ON—CERVERA’S UNEXPECTED ARRIVAL
AT MARTINIQUE.

A Period of Uncomfortable Uncertainty —Where would Cervera Appear ?—
Relative Distances of the Hostile Squadrons— Three Theories as to
Cervera’s Probable Course — Plausibility of the Theory that He Might
Intercept the Oregon — The Oregon at Rio Janeiro — Captain Clark has
no Fear of Spanish Fleet — Possibility of a Spanish Attack on Coast
Cities — General Opinion that Cervera would Steer for Puerto Rico —
Admiral Sampson Starts Out to Meet Him — His Formidable Fleet —
The Anticipated Battle — Days of Anxious Waiting — Strategists all at
Sea— Renewed Concern for the Oregon — Strength of the Spanish
Cruisers — Unknown Possibilities of Torpedo Warfare — Astonishing
Announcement that Cervera had Returned to Cadiz — Assurances from
London — Spanish Denials Disbelieved — Sudden Preparations for In-
vading Cuba — Cervera is Sighted off Martinique— He Learns that
Sampson Had Called for Him at Puerto Rico.

arms in the Orient, produced a most exciting period
of uncertainty on this side of the world, where we
were supposed to be immediately engaged in war. So crush-
ing was Dewey’s victory that, while hardly a blow had been
struck in the west, many began to speak of peace, assuming
that Spain could not possibly be so rash as to pursue a warlike
course with such unfavorable prospects; but, by her naval
strategy, which consisted of dodging under cover of misleading
reports, for many days she kept not only our people, but the
government, in a state of uncertainty, at times bordering upon
fear, and in the end her maneuvers resulted in a complete
change of the government’s plans for the invasion of Cuba.
When it was definitely known that the Cape Verde fleet ,
under Admiral Cervera had actually sailed on April 29th, Ad-
miral Sampson’s squadron was maintaining without notable

incidents the Cuban blockade, and Commodore Schley’s flying
(579)

T HE month of May, which opened so gloriously for our
580 UNCERTAIN WHEREABOUTS OF CERVERA

squadron was impatiently awaiting orders, with steam up, at
Hampton Roads. It was reported that some of the torpedo
craft when sailing out of the Cape Verde harbor had taken a
northerly direction, as if bound for the Canaries, while the
four armored cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers had
taken a westerly direction. A dispatch boat in the service of
a New York newspaper followed the main fleet for some hours,
and, when it was seen to continue on in a westerly course after
nightfall, returned to St. Vincent, the information being
cabled to this country. Apparently, this was the only infor-
mation the government had of the intended course of the
Spanish squadron, and the question before the naval strategy
board at once became: Where will Cervera make his ap-
pearance?

The nearest Spanish port in western waters was San Juan,
Puerto Rico, which is 2,300 miles from the Cape Verde
Islands. It is also about 1,100 miles from Havana, off which
lay Sampson’s squadron, and about 1,300 miles from Hamp-
ton Roads, where Schley’s sailors were pining for Spanish
targets. It is something over 3,000 miles from St. Vincent
to important ports on our Atlantic seaboard, and on the other
hand it is only about 1,600 miles from St. Vincent to the
eastern point of Brazil, towards which the battleship Oregon
and the gunboat A/arietla were making their way, convoying
the unarmed Nictheroy, which had been purchased in Brazil,
and was to become the cruiser Buffalo.

Apparently, there was not the slightest information outside
of Spain’s ministry as to what Cervera’s sailing orders were,
and it was quite probable that Cervera did not know himself
till he opened them well out to sea, and, having sailed while
Dewey was still on his way to the Philippines, his voyage
could not have been marred or his purposes changed by any
unpleasant reflections upon the nature of that event. To the
government and to everyone in the United States obliged or
disposed to speculate upon what Cervera would do, there ap-
peared three courses more or less rational open to him. He
ANXIETY FOR THE ‘‘ OREGON” 581

might adopt the shortest trip, that to the Brazilian coast, and
attempt to take or destroy our battleship and its attendants;
or he might proceed at once to Puerto Rico to replenish his
stock of coal and supplies and learn the situation; or, he might
count upon our looking for him in these more southerly ports,
and, therefore, embrace the opportunity to take the longer
journey to the New England coast or to ports further south on
the Atlantic seaboard.

All three of these theories had their supporters among the
strategists of the people, of the press, and even of the gov-
ernment. It did not seem probable that he would run to any
place but one of these, though the fact that the enemy, if wise,
is apt to appear where least expected was appreciated and added
its share to the spicy uncertainty of the problem.

Some plausibility was given to the theory that Cervera
would endeavor to intercept the Oregon and her consorts, be-
cause he had deferred sailing till a date which would naturally
be adopted if having in mind the accomplishment of that ob-
ject. The Oregon, which had left Callao, Peru, on April 7th,
had on the 17th arrived at Punta Arenas, the Chilian port in
the Straits of Magellan, where the Marietta was waiting.
They delayed two days taking on coal and proceeded on their
way northward. By making the same speed as on the trip from
Callao, they would naturally arrive off the easternmost point
of South America at about the same time that the Cape Verde
fleet would reach it, if steaming in that direction. The force
of this conjecture was strengthened on the 30th, or the day
after Cervera’s squadron sailed, by the arrival of the
Oregon and Marvetla at Rio Janeiro. He who studies the map
will observe that the eastern point of South America, around
which the American vessels would be compelled to sail, is
about half-way between Rio Janeiro and the Cape Verde
Islands, whence Cervera’s fleet sailed.

The government strategists regarded such a Spanish pur-
pose as a possibility, and when Captain Clark of the Oregon
reported from Rio Janeiro, he was at once informed that he
 

Ethic by A EBAL IY, Jrrvic as fetapiafhe befall; Jor Teed

 

  
ADMIRAL SAMPSON’S DEPARTURE TO MEET CERVERA 585

have contemplated without sending an army along with Samp-
son. His instructions were to locate and destroy the Spanish
fleet, which was supposed to be making its way either to San
Juan or to intercept the Oregon. These instructions left him
free to use scouts and to go in any direction in which he had
reason to suppose the Spanish fleet lay; if possible, he was
to prevent the fleet from entering San Juan and departing with
fresh supplies, and under no circumstances was he to endanger
his ships by a fire on forts till Cervera’s fleet should have been
destroyed or captured.

Accordingly, at daybreak on May 4th, Admiral Sampson
left Key West, sailing eastward with the flagship New Jork,
the battleships Zowa and Indiana, the two monitors, Amphi-
trite and Puritan, the protected cruisers Detroit, Montgomery,
and Jfurblehead, and the torpedo boat Porter, and other
smaller vessels. Thereupon, the United States waited breath-
lessly for the great naval battle of the war. It was calculated
that, Cervera would arrive near Puerto Rico about the 9th
and that Admiral Sampson would arrive there at about the
same time.

The Oregon and her consorts left Rio Janeiro on the same
day Sampson’s fleet left Key West, and the opinion was that
she would not reach the waters of Puerto Rico for at least
twelve days, or too late to participate in the great battle, unless
Cervera went after her.

Nothing further was heard of the fleets till the 8th, when
the cruiser A/fontgomery, which was acting as a scout for
Sampson’s fleet, put into the port of Cape Haytien, on the
island of Haiti, sending dispatches to Washington, and receiv-
ing messages for the admiral. The fleet had been making
very slow progress, because of the monitors, which, while ex-
pected to give a good account of themselves in close fighting,
had small coal capacity, and were being towed by nimbler
vessels, the others accommodating themselves to the reduced
speed. The date of the anticipated battle was, therefore,
postponed; it was then expected that Admiral Sampson’s fleet
~586 ALL AT SEA

would arrive off Puerto Rico by the 11th, and that the battle
might take place the following day, but nothing was being
heard of the whereabouts of the Spanish ships, which were
already ten days out from St. Vincent. The exciting mys-
tery was further enhanced by the orders of the Navy Depart-
ment that nothing concerning the movements of the vessels
should be given to the public for the time being.

Two days more passed, and nobody was able to answer the
question which everyone was asking as to the whereabouts of
Cervera. The Oregon and her attendants arrived at Bahia,
Brazil, on the 9th, having seen nothing of the Spaniards. The
New England coast became concerned because it was reported
that a Spanish fleet had been sighted off Nova Scotia, heading
for the Maine coast. Key West became anxious because it
was reported that Cervera had sailed for the Florida coast.
There were many reports of battles and of Spanish fleets, not
all of which could possibly be true, and none of which proved
to be true.

It was evident that Washington was working in the dark.
On the morning of the 10th the ships were all at sea and so
was our strategic board. As the hours passed and nothing
definite was heard of the Cape Verde fleet, the strategists in-
clined to the theory that it had after all gone to intercept the
Oregon, and at once the speculations as to the fate of that
vessel became active, and news from Brazil was breathlessly
awaited, for if Cervera had gone in that direction, he must
now be in striking distance of our battleship and gunboat.

The possibilities of such a contest could not but be regarded
with some concern by our government. It was true that the
Oregon was one of the most powerful of her class afloat, but
there were plenty of naval experts in this country and abroad
who declared that we had no ships in our navy equal in real
efficiency to the swift armored cruisers of Cervera’s fleet. The
Oquendo, Maria Teresa, and Vizcaya were sister ships of a
class not found in the American navy — cruising battleships.
They carried battleship armor, 12-inch side belts and 10-inch
CERVERA REPORTED BACK AT CADIZ 537

gun protecting armor. The armor was much inferior in
quality to the Oregon’s, but sufficiently heavy to keep out all
but the heaviest shells. The armament of these ships was
much superior to that of our cruisers, but inferior to the Ore-
gon’s. Each ship mounted a pair of 11-inch guns, ten 5.5-inch
guns (the Vizcaya’s being rapid-fire), in addition to sixteen
small guns, similar to those on the Oregon. The Colon was a
less formidable ship, but she, too, was a fighting cruiser. She
carried 6-inch armor and her heavy guns were a pair of 9.8-inch
rifles. She was remarkably strong in rapid-fire guns, mount-
ing ten 6-inch and six 4.7-inch guns of this type. She had
been built but a short time, and was regarded as one of the
finest cruisers afloat.

What damage to our ships might be wrought by Spanish
torpedoes in an engagement off the South American coast
could only be conjectured. Certainly, four heavily armored
cruisers, carrying two dozen torpedo tubes, would be a formi-
dable fighting force against the battleship Oregon, the un-
armored cruiser Buffalo, and the little unarmored gunboat
Marietta, with but ten torpedo tubes on all three. The un-
armored boats would be of little value in a fight against armor-
clads. The Oregon would bear the brunt of the fight, and
upon the fighting qualities of her officers and men would de-
pend the issue of the battle.

But late on the 10th, when Admiral Sampson was supposed
to be drawing near to the port of San Juan in Puerto Rico,
and when Admiral Cervera was supposed to be very close to
Captain Clark off the coast of Brazil, came the surprising an-
nouncement from London that Cervera’s fleet had returned to
Cadiz! As the newspapers agreed in putting it in enormous
headlines, the Spanish fleet had “turned tail.” Cervera had
apparently been afraid to cross the Atlantic, and, after skulk-
ing about, avoiding the frequented lanes of commerce, so that
no one might tell tall tales of his cowardice, had at length,
when in need of fuel, been compelled to swallow his pride
and go home to Spain.
588 ASSURANCES FROM LONDON

This report was promptly accepted by the newspapers and
by the government, apparently with little skepticism at
first. The State Department authorized the announcement:
“ Official information has been received that four Spanish
cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers have returned to
Cadiz.” As nothing but important announcements were al-
lowed to break the secrecy of the government, there was every
reason to suppose that the information was correct, and to the
satisfaction of the government. Indeed, it transpired that our
ambassador at the court of St. James, Mr. Hay, had cabled his
assurances to the State Department at Washington that he
had unquestioned information from private sources in Cadiz
to the effect that Admiral Cervera’s ironclads were lying in the
harbor. The London papers published similar reports and
presumably from similar sources.

The statement made by Admiral Bermejo, Minister of
Marine, denying that Cervera’s fleet had returned to Spain,
and declaring that it was actually where it ought to be in
accordance with the instructions given to its commander, had
little effect, because of the general belief that the crafty
Spanish strategists deliberately misrepresented everything,
and owing to the close watch kept in Spanish ports it was im-
possible, apparently, to verify the reports from Cadiz. No one
in Madrid knew or, knowing, dared to say whether the fleet
was really in home waters or not, but the opinion was general
that the government was seeking in every way to delay opera-
tions so that the troops of the United States would not make
a landing in Cuba till the summer should be well advanced
and the dangers of sickness increased many fold.

Relying, apparently, upon the news from London that the
Spanish fleet had wholly deserted the western side of the
Atlantic, the government formed the opinion that there was
no longer reason for delay in proceeding to occupy Cuba with
a large force of men. A few days previously the plan had
been to begin occupation with a small advance guard to co-
operate with General Gomez and other Cuban commanders,
 

 

 

 

 

START OF THE AMERICAN ARMY OF INVASION FOR CUBA FROM CHICKAMAUGA,
A CHANGE OF PLANS 591

to whom it was also intended to send a large quantity of re-
peating rifles and ammunition, so that they might be prepared
for rendering assistance when the real invasion should come.

But in view of the improbability of naval interference from
Spain, preparations were at once begun for moving the regu-
lars and the available volunteer troops to convenient places
for embarking. Chickamauga was abandoned as a place for
receiving the greater part of the army, and instructions
were given on the 10th for mustering in the volunteers as
rapidly as possible and sending them to Tampa and other points
on the Gulf for speedy transportation to Cuba. It was an-
nounced that General Miles would himself go to Cuba, Gen-
eral Wesley Merritt, who, it had been supposed, would be the
leader of the forces in Cuba, having been selected to lead the
expeditions to the Philippines. It was proposed to send Gen-
eral Shafter with a force of regulars in his command to secure
a base on the Cuban coast, which he should hold till reinforee-
ments enough to warrant an attack upon Havana could be
taken over. There was the greatest excitement at the camps
at Tampa, Mobile, and New Orleans, and hurry orders were
sent to some of the state governments for mustering in troops.
On the 11th everyone was looking for the immediate move-
ment of the army.

But all this was changed in a single day. The plans of in-
vasion were suddenly and indefinitely postponed. Just be-
fore midnight of the 12th the Navy Department received a
cipher dispatch from Captain Cotton of the Harvard, from
Fort de France, Martinique, and dated the day before, saying
that the Spanish fleet was off that place. An intimation that
the fleet might be in those West Indian waters had come to
this country early on the 12th in the form of a dispatch from
Madrid giving an official statement of the Minister of Marine
to the effect that the Spanish fleet had that day touched at the
French Island of Martinique, which is one of the Windward
Islands forming the eastern fringe that encloses the Caribbean
Sea. The fast cruisers, Vale, Harvard, and St. Louis, had
592 CERVERA AT MARTINIQUE

been patrolling the waters about Windward Islands for days,
and were doing so at the time Cervera was approaching Marti-
nique, but, unfortunately, just at that time none of them were
in that particular vicinity.

The authorities had considered Guadaloupe the most likely
place for Cervera to put in for news, if he put in at all, and for
that reason the St. Louis had cruised in those waters. Com-
mander Goodrich remained about the islands till the 11th, and,
indeed, steamed by Martinique a little before Cervera’s fleet
came into sight. Martinique has good cable connections, and
thus Admiral Cervera was at once in communication with
Madrid, and also, presumably, with the very active Spanish
agency which ex-Sefior Polo had been maintaining in Canada
since his retirement from service as Spanish Minister at Wash-
ington. It was, of course, fair to suppose that Admiral Cer-
vera’s dispatches, which had been received and held for him
by the Spanish consul at the port in Martinique, duly informed
him of the position of the United States squadrons, of the
exact condition of the Cuban blockade, and of the fact that
Admiral Sampson had called for him with some rather good
fighting ships at Puerto Rico, and not having found him as
expected, had shelled the forts of San Juan on that very morn-
ing of May 12th.
CHAPTER XLII °

ADMIRAL SAMPSON’S BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN—
THRILLING SCENES DURING THE ACTION —SKILLFUL
AMERICAN GUNNERY—SAMPSON’S WITHDRAWAL.

Admiral Sampson’s Cruise to Puerto Rico — The Gallant Sailors Expect a
Great Fight — Approaching San Juan — Preparations for the Combat
— San Juan Learns of Sampson’s Approach —The Jowa Becomes the
Flagship — Peculiarities of San Juan Harbor — Admiral Sampson’s
Plan of Attack — Running up the Stars and Stripes — Speeding into
the Bay — The Duty of the Wompatuck—Sampson, Finding Cervera
Absent, Decides to Shell the Forts— The First Shot — The Music of
the Projectiles— Spaniards Return the Fire Vigorously — Bravery of a
Spaniard at an Old Gun—Some Dangerous Guns on the Forts —
Marksmanship as Worthless as Spanish Promises — ‘‘ Threaten, Puff,
Splash !” — Cruising by the Forts Three Times — Shells Land on the
New York and Jowa— One Man Killed — The Withdrawal — Admiral
Sampson’s Official Report — Spaniards Think They Have Driven Him
Off — Not Even a Spanish Gunboat in the Harbor — Criticism of Ad-
miral Sampson’s Attack.

to have been undertaken in the confident ex-

pectation of meeting Cervera and destroying his
ships in those waters. San Juan being a well-defended
Spanish port, the nearest point for Cervera in western
seas, and being well supplied with coal, the admiral, not
without good reasons, supposed that Cervera would cer-
tainly try to make that port about the 9th of May, and
he planned to make his own appearance there at about the
same time. After making preparations to leave Key West on
the afternoon of May 3d, the fleet was held till midnight, and
the flagship did not start till the next morning. Going direct
to the blockading squadron off Havana the admiral was there
joined by the battleships Towa and Indiana, and, proceeding
westward, they arrived off Cardenas at dark, where they came
up with the rest of the fleet, including the cruisers Detroit and

Montgomery, the monitors Amphitrite and Terror, the torpedo
(593)

T HE cruise of Admiral Sampson to Puerto Rico seems
594 A NAVAL ABSURDITY

boat Porter, the tug Wompatuch, and the collier Niagara. In
order to make better time the Iowa took the Amphitrite in tow,
and a little later, the Terror’s speed proving too slow, she was
taken in tow by the New York. From at least one important
point of view Admiral Sampson’s cruise was a naval absurdity.
He had set out to capture a 20-knot Spaniard with a 10-knot
fleet. Not one of his vessels excepting the New York could
steam 20 knots, and having taken the slower vessels in tow, the
admiral necessarily moped along for-over 1,000 miles at an
average speed of 7 knots, the gallant sailors believing that
they were creeping nearer and nearer to the great naval
battle of the war, when they should riddle the flower of
Spain’s navy and eclipse the wonderful victory of Dewey
at Manila. On approaching the port of Cape Haitien the
Montgomery was sent in to receive any dispatches from Wash-
ington, but, obtaining only the information that Cervera had
not been reported anywhere, the 8th and 9th were spent in
filling some of the exhausted coal bunkers of the fleet, the sea
being remarkably smooth and making the operation more than
usually easy. Some inquiry had been made as to coal at Cape
Haitien, but the price was extremely high, and the admiral de-
termined to depend upon his own reserve. Meanwhile, pre-
parations were going on aboard the fighting ships for a battle.
The sailors pitched through the portholes all sorts of movables,
and over the sides into the sea flew doors and parts of wooden
bulkheads. Piles of sand-filled bags were also arranged to
give increased protection to some of the gunners against the
fragments of Spanish shells that were expected to fly about
the decks a little later on.

But it seems that while lying off Cape Haitien the shipping
lookout on top of the mountain west of the town had seen the
squadron and reported the fact at once, and the Spanish consul
immediately and faithfully wired the information to Puerto
Rico and Madrid. When, on the 9th, Admiral Sampson
learned this he turned the squadron about and headed con-
spicuously for Key West again until the Cape Haitien moun-
PREPARATION FOR BATTLE 595

tains were well out of sight, then he put out to sea, and gradu-
ally headed back for San Juan, hoping that the Spaniards had
been thereby deceived; but whether they were or not made
very little difference, as a cruel chance ordained that Sampson
should appear at San Juan just in time to have the fact known
to Cervera as he sailed into the waters of Martinique.
Admiral Sampson led his fleet on without further inter-
ruption till about five o’clock on the afternoon of the 11th,
when, about fifty miles northwest of San Juan, the flagship
hove to in a smart sea, the jackies watching for what was to
happen. A boat was lowered from the flagship, the admiral
and his staff climbed down the iron ladder on the side of the
New York, his two-starred blue flag disappeared from the fore
and appeared set to the jackstaff of the small boat, which was
rowed to the Jowa lying about a quarter of a mile to the lee-
ward, and the flag soon fluttered from the top of her military
mast. The admiral had concluded to make the battleship
Iowa, instead of the armored cruiser New York, his flagship,
and every one knew from this that he soon expected to smell
powder. Thereafter the Towa led the procession until night-
fall, with the Indiana next in line, and the New York third.
The monitors worked along under their own steam, while an-
other line lay north and abreast of the New York. That after-
noon the admiral distributed among his vessels the plan of
procedure he had adopted, based, as will be seen, upon the
expectation, or probability at least, of finding the Cape Verde
fleet in the harbor of San Juan, which is a bay projecting into
the north shore and is formed by a small island which runs
along the shore, ending in Morro Castle at the mouth of the
harbor. This island, which at its eastern end is separated from
the mainland by a tidal stream only, and is, therefore, more
of a peninsula, is something in the shape of a human leg, hav-
ing a stubby foot at the west end, on which San Juan lies,
Morro being at the extremity of the toes. This old castle,
with its thick frowning walls, has stood here since the days of
the old corsairs, but the Spaniards have in the course of time
596 THE ADMIRAL’S INSTRUCTIONS

run another line of defense along the sea — on the shin-bone
of the leg, so to speak — ending in another old fort. The
sole of the foot also has another line of defense enclosing the
town on the west.

Across the mouth of the harbor on the opposite point of
land is Fort Cafiuelo, and between Morro and this fort, and a
little out to sea, is Cabras Island. Several miles further west
on the main shore is Point Salinas, behind which the Ameri-

can vessels were steaming up.

, The admiral’s instructions were that the squadron was to
pass near Salinas Point and then steer about east to pass just
outside the reefs otf Cabras Island, the column to be formed
with the flagship Zowa in the lead, followed by the Indiana,
New York, Amphitrite, and Terror. The Detroit was to go
ahead of the Iowa about 1,000 yards, and the Wompatuck was
to keep on the Zowa’s starboard bow about 500 yards off, both
to sound constantly after land was closed, and to immediately
signal if ten fathoms or less were obtained. The Montgomery
was to remain in the rear of the column on the lookout for
torpedo boats, and if Fort Cafiuelo fired she was to silence it.
The Porter was to take a station under the cover of the Iowa
on the port side.

While approaching, a close watch was to be kept on the
coast for torpedo eraft, and when near Cabras Island the
Porter was to rapidly cross the mouth of the harbor and stand
close under Morro to the westward, screened frotfm the fire of
Morro’s western battery, and if the old guns on the north side
of Morro were opened she was to have the enjoyment of silenc-
ing them. Both the Detroit in front and the Montgomery
in the rear were also to keep a sharp lookout for any torpedo
boats coming out of the harbor.

There were to be two objects of attack, the instructions
went on to say, the batteries upon Morro and the men-of-war.
If it was clear that the Spanish vessels were lying in port, fire
was to be opened upon them as soon as they were discernible
over Cabras Island, the action of the flagship being followed in
COUNTING ON THE PRESENCE OF THE ENEMY 597

this regard. If, however, it should be evident that neutral
men-of-war were in line of fire, a flag of truce would probably
be sent in before fire on the vessels was opened, and the
Porter was to hold herself in readiness for this service. Care
was to be used to avoid striking the hospitals on Cabras Island,
and if it became necessary to silence the Morro batteries a por-
tion of the fire would be directed with this object, but the
principal object was to destroy the ships.

Then followed instructions as to the course of maneuvers.
If nightfall came with the port in the enemy’s hands and the
ships inside, the cruisers were to take up positions just outside
the harbor, the Montgomery to the eastward, and the Detroit
to the westward, with the batteries ready, and the men at
their guns, and showing no lights. The other ships were to
sweep the entrance to the harbor and the channel Jeading into
the anchorage with searchlights, to keep the torpedo craft
from coming out. In case the enemy should attempt to escape
from the port, fire was to be concentrated upon the leading
ship, and should the attempt be made at night, the searchlights
were to be turned on her bridge and conning-tower and kept
there.

It will be observed that Admiral Sampson had worked
his plans out with extreme care and a definiteness which had
been entirely impossible for Commodore Dewey in searching
about the great bays of the Philippines for Admiral Montijo;
they were worked out in the faith, shared by his gallant cap-
tains, that Cervera would by that time be in the harbor of
San Juan, and the admiral would apparently have been greatly
surprised had he been able to communicate with Washington,
which at this very hour was in receipt of reliable assurances
that Cervera had turned tail and run back to Cadiz.

With the first flush of color in the eastern sky on the morn-_
ing of the 12th and while the ornamental bows of Cervera’s
cruisers were courtesying to the shores of Martinique 500 odd
miles away, the Detroit ran into her place 1,000 yards ahead
of the flagship, and the Wompatuck began to take her’s to
598 APPROACH TO THE FORTS

the westward of the Detroit. The voices of the boatswain’s
mates calling the crews to quarters were heard along the
column, the guns were manned and loaded, the decks sanded,
the implements of the surgeons laid out in their proper places,
and the fleet steamed slowly on in perfect silence, and pointed
right into the harbor where a few lights were glimmering,
and where half of San Juan were still in bed; but the forts
were evidently expecting them, for the lights in Morro’s tower
were dead. The smart easterly breeze of the day before had
lasted during the night, and enough sea was rolling into the
coast to make each battleship roll until the thin iron plates be-
neath the armor belts were intermittently awash. Such a sea
was hardly favorable for the aiming of large guns, and it served
to expose somewhat the weaker parts of the ships to the enemy.
The monitors, however, pushed along through it with hardly
a suggestion of-a roll, and the waves which ran over their
decks were not sufficient to interfere with the working of the
guns.

The Detroit and Wompatuck led the way in unmolested,
while the torpedo boat Porter ran off to the eastward about a
half-mile, as arranged, and stopped about a mile from the shore.
About 1,400 yards from Morro the Detroit turned eastward
and steamed slowly along the beach, while from the Iowa
fluttered the signal for the hoisting of the American ensign on
every ship. Up to every masthead and every staff-head slid
the Stars and Stripes, a picture worth a long voyage for any
American to see. For a few minutes the vessels sped in
towards the bay, and shortly after 5 o’clock the little Wompa-
tuck, having accomplished her purpose of fixing a small boat
at the proper place to indicate the depth of the water, a mark
to steer by later if the smoke obscured the marks ashore,
scurried back to where the non-combatants lay. By this
time, Admiral Sampson, standing on the bridge and peer-
ing anxiously into the harbor through his glasses, saw that
Cervera’s fleet was not there. He still believed, however,
that Cervera would try to make the port, and he concluded
THE OPENING FIRE 599

a

that the best thing to do was to test the batteries with which
he should have to contend if he later fought the Spanish in
that harbor. If he could destroy them, so much the better.
So, at 5.17, the admiral gave Captain Evans of the Zowa the
word to fire and a Jong 6-pounder at the starboard end of the
Lowa’s bridge was fired at Morro. The battle was on. The
forward turret had already been turned so that the great 12-
inch guns pointed directly at the old castle walls, and very
‘soon after the order, with a mighty report and a roar like that
of an angry lion, a great projectile flew towards one of the
batteries, and then another and another, with such deadly aim
that no shots were fired from that battery during the re-
mainder of the engagement.

Then while the big guns smoked, as the eye-witnesses de-
scribe it, the 8-inch guns took up the work, and sent their lean
projectiles with an eager, whining cry to hunt for Spaniards.
The little Detroit, unarmored though she was and with only
5-inch guns in her battery, joined in. For days the gunner
in charge of a rifle on her quarter deck had carried a tiny flag
over the breach of his gun, to the joy of every one who saw it;
but he took it down now, rolled it up, shoved it into his shirt,
and, bending low over the breech, he looked clear-eyed through
the sights, pulled the trigger, and drove a shot straight into the
porthole on the face of Morro. In quick succession his ship-
mates of the other guns, six clean, 5-inch rifles, followed his
lead. The boom of the huge guns had awed, but the sound of
these rifles was like the music of “ Yankee Doodle ” played on
a snare drum; and it thrilled the spectators on the non-com-
batant’s boats till they involuntarily shouted aloud for the
glory of the flag and the honor of the American gunner. .

Then came the Indiana with the solemn thunder of her
18-inch volcanoes to take the place of the flagship that, with
her stern turret hurling winged death to the fort, was by this
time steaming out to sea. Her 8-inch guns took up the cry
as well. Indeed, every gun of whatever caliber that would
reach from either vessel was engaged.
600 A DESERVING SPANIARD

~ Soon after our fire began, the forts began to reply vigor-
ously on the squadron. On top of the front wall of Morro
and near the west end, stood an old-fashioned gun, under the
charge of a man worthy of a better training and of a more
generous nation. His was a useless task, for no shot from
his old smooth-bore could harm the battleships; but there he
stood, aimed, fired, swabbed, loaded, aimed, and fired again,
while the shots splashed in the water half-way to the ships,
as a rule, though now and then one exploded in the air be-
cause the time fuse was short. Never but once did they come
near a ship, but save for brief intervals, when the rapid-fire
batteries afloat drove him to the bomb-proofs, this Spaniard
worked on with delirious energy and spirit.

But there were other guns of a less innocuous character.
In the Morro itself were pieces which could not be counted
because the smoke kept the wall so obscured. Moreover, they
were worked irregularly because the gunners on the American
vessels, having rapid-fire cannon, had the range of the em-
brasures and portholes, and at times made it too uncom-
fortable for the Spaniards. On the crest just east of Morro and
back of the cemetery two 10-inch guns were diligently worked.
At the barracks a little further east was another battery, and
over at the east end of the town was an old stone fort, its face
towards the west, and there were at least four modern rifles of
large calibre, and still further east, on a point, were other
large guns. All these batteries, save the last, opened on the
fleet within five minutes after the first gun from Morro.

But the marksmanship was Spanish. “ Never,’ wrote an
eye-witness, “ will an American see hostile guns make a more
pleasing spectacle than these; for they stood on emplacements
forty to sixty feet above the sea on the crest of a hill, whose
lower slopes were green and the upper slopes house-covered.
The green sea was below and the fleecy trade wind clouds
above and behind them. They gleamed like wicked Spanish
eyes and then puffed white like Spanish cigarette smoke. The
song of the projectile was like the music of the fandango, and
WORTHLESS MARKSMANSHIP 601

the marksmanship as worthless as Spanish promises. Threaten,
puff, splash! Not since modern rifles with gun sights were
invented has any one seen such shooting as from these crest
batteries. Shot after shot, dozens and scores, and at last the
count rose into hundreds, were fired with never a hit, and,
indeed, with every shot flying above and beyond huge targets.
High as the New York stood above the water when she rounded
to before Morro, third in the moving line; broad as the Iowa
lay on the water as she headed the procession, not a shot struck
them as they passed before the fort. Even the Detrovt, lying,
perhaps, 1,200 yards from the nearest battery, and too busily
engaged firing to think about getting hit, remained wholly
untouched. Quite as interesting as the position of the Detroit
was that of the torpedo boat Porter. She was recognized, of
course, soon after the engagement became general, and the
guns at the eastern end of the island began sending greeting.
The gun on the point at the extreme east end of the Spanish
works was so placed as to be unable to reach either the Detroit
or the line of battleships, but it found the Porter within easy
range, and with deliberation that indicated a sober desire to
hit something, the captain worked the piece. He was aided
at times by the guns from the higher fort near by, but for
hours he kept his eyes on the Porter. As a rule, no shot fell
more than a half-mile wide of the target, though now and then
one would strike as much as a mile short or three-quarters of a
mile beyond. At rare intervals a shell would by accident get
within 200 or 800 yards, and then Captain Freemont would
turn his little 1-pounders loose and fire back as John Paul
Jones fired his pistol at British batteries at White Haven.”
The marksmanship of the American squadron on the first
round was not on the whole up to target records, for while
a majority of the shots hit Morro, some fell considerably short,
but there was no more of this after the first round. After
passing the forts the column turned to the left and made a
complete circle. The Zowa came in again as the monitors
were passing out, so that there was a constant fire. As the
602 DANGEROUS BRAVERY

Iowa came down the second time the Spaniards worked their
guns with increased fury and with increased wretchedness of
aim, until she reached the turning point and once more began
her 13-inch practice with the Indiana following. Shell after
shell passed through or over Morro to land in the city behind
it, and many of the Spaniards fled from their guns, while the
Americans were as cool as at target practice.

One of the first shots to fall over into the city struck the
huge barracks east of Morro, and a cloud of brick-dust rose
high in the air, obscuring the building till flames were seen
to burst from it. Within ten minutes a half-dozen other
shots had fallen elsewhere in the town, and by the time the
New York had turned out to sea on the second round, as many
different fires were seen in the western portion of the city.
The forts were now more obscured by the bursting of Aimeri-
can shells than by the firing of their own guns, for most of the
Spaniards had by this time fled for shelter. The guns at the
east’ of the city, however, continued to work, as they received
only occasional attention from the ships.

Meantime, the Detroit had turned away to the westward,
and, running close under the guns of Morro, attacked a new
earthwork built on an island on the west side of the channel.
Two 8-inch guns there might have destroyed the cruiser at
the first round had they been properly handled, but she ran in
toa range of less than 1,000 yards, firing as she went; and the
Spaniards scampered away from their great guns. There was
no more trouble from that battery. It was an impressive
lesson in the effectiveness of rapid-fire guns intelligently and
bravely handled. Undoubtedly, the work of the cruisers was
risky with such large guns on the forts, and they were then
ordered to follow the battleships out, and to stay out after the
second round; but they fired as long as they could, and their
sailors were evidently disinclined to give up the dangerous
sport. The Porter also reluctantly withdrew.

A few minutes after seven o’clock the Iowa opened fire
on the third round, and the others followed in another blaze
IN THE FORWARD TURRET OF THE BATTLESHIP “IOWA” IN ACTION.

 
A FATAL SHELL 605

of fire and smoke. As the Jowa turned away she aimed her
last shot at the big fort cast of the city and knocked a hole in
it. Five guns had been working steadily from this fort, but
only two continued after the Iowa’s shot, and these were
silenced when the New York came along and fired her broad-
sides; but about eight o’clock, just as the New York finished,
and was setting out to sea, a 6-inch shell from the eastern bat-
teries came aboard over the port quarter, struck the top awn-
ing stanchion and exploded in the eutter, which was in the
port after-cradle on the superstructure deck. The fragments
killed one man and wounded two, all members of the port
waist 6-inch gun crew. Parts of the shell went in all direc-
tions; the cutter was an absolute wreck, parts of it flying higher
than the smoke stack. A searchlight was destroyed and
some damage was done to other small boats. At about the
same time a 10-inch shell struck a gallows frame on the Iowa
and burst, hurling fragments in all directions, slightly wound-
ing several sailors. Both these shots were plainly accidental,
coming on board at long range and being apparently aimed at
vessels which were still nearer in action. No damage was
done the Indiana nor the monitors, which had maintained a
destructive fire during the three rounds, and though shells... ---
had burst over them they were not in the least injured.
Admiral Sampson’s purpose in attacking the fortifications
were, according to his official report to the government, simply
to learn their character. “Upon approaching San Juan,” he
said, “it was seen that none of the Spanish vessels was in the
harbor. Iwas considerably in doubt whether they had reached
San Juan and again departed for some unknown destination,
or whether they had not arrived. As their capture was the **''**
object of the expedition, and as it was essential that they should
not pass to the westward, I decided to attack the batteries de-
fending the port in order to develop their position and strength,
and then without waiting to reduce the city* or to subject it to
a regular bombardment, which would require due notice,
turned to the westward. JI commenced the attack as soon as
606 UNWARRANTED JOY OF THE SPANISH

it was good daylight. It lasted about three hours, when the
signal was made to discontinue the firing, and the squadron
stood to the northeast until out of sight of San Juan, when
the course was to the westward with a view to communicating
with the department at Port Plata and learn if the department
had obtained information as to the movements of the Spanish
vessels.” :

Whether Admiral Sampson could have continued the
attack and taken the city then is a question which has been dis-
puted, but as he still had Cervera’s four armored cruisers and
torpedo-boat destroyers to meet he naturally avoided doing
anything to weaken his own vessels. It was the general
opinion among the officers of the fleet that it would be a
difficult matter to reduce the forts with ships alone; but, ac-
cording to reports which came from San Juan later, they had
done much more damage than they supposed, and the Span-
iards could not understand why they should have withdrawn,
unless they had been compelled to by losses. They were,
therefore, inclined to rejoice. Impartial witnesses from San
Juan said that several of the large guns in Morro were com-
pletely disabled. It is a curious fact, in view of the general
understanding of the superiority of smokeless powder, that the
Spaniards excused their poor marksmanship on the ground
that the Yankee ships were so enveloped in smoke that it was
impossible to get a good aim at them.

When one of the monitors ran in close to Morro with her
decks awash, the Spanish gunners, occasionally getting a
glimpse of her through the smoke her big guns were making,
supposed that she had been hit and was sinking, and they set up
a great shout of joy. But they were puzzled when the same
vessel continued to pour enormous shells into the forts with
deadly effect. The loss of life in the city was not great,
though considerable damage was done to buildings and a little
to shipping.

It is a curious fact that Sampson not only missed the
Spanish cruisers he had gone on his long cruise for, but missed
CRITICISM OF SAMPSON’S ATTACK 607

the Spanish war vessels which were supposed to be stationed
there. It appears that the troop vessel, Alfonso VIII., had
been sent over from Cadiz, and was expected to arrive at
Puerto Rico at about the time the Cape Verde vessels did. A
few days before Sampson arrived the Spanish men-of-war, Isa-
bella IT., Concho, and Ponce de Leon, had left San Juan east-
ward to meet the troop ship and conduct her in. She arrived
alone, however, the day before the bombardment, having
missed the gunboats, which came steaming in shortly after
Sampson had finished the bombardment and turned westward.

Some criticism was made of Admiral Sampson for attack-
ing the forts when he knew the fleet he was looking for was
not there, and when he had no intention of taking the city.
The Spaniards complained that he had bombarded the city
without the notice which is customary in war, and they were
able to construe the attack and Sampson’s withdrawal as a
Spanish victory. It seems to be true that the admiral’s action
contributed nothing towards facilitating hostilities, and it is
quite possible that, had he waited outside and out of sight till
he had gent scouts in to discover whether the ships were in
San Juan harbor, Cervera might have endeavored to make
that port after leaving Martinique. Then Sampson would
have had the Spanish fleet where he had expected to find it.
As it was, he left the forts just as two of his vessels had been
struck, left the Spaniards supposing that they had driven him
away, and convinced Cervera that it would be wise for him

to sail for Cuba while Sampson was waiting for him at Puerto
Rico.

36
CHAPTER XLIITI

INCIDENTS ON THE BLOCKADE LINE— FIRST AMERICAN
BLOODSHED AT CIENFUEGOS — THE BRAVE AND BLOODY
FIGHT OF THE WINSLOW AT CARDENAS —SWEPT BY
SHOT AND SHELL.

The Blockade in Early May — The Capture of the Lafayette — Recklessness
of Some of the American Vessels — Work of Cutting the Cables — Eager
Volunteers for a Dangerous Task— Advancing Close to Shore in
Launches and Cutters — Fire from the Spanish Masked Batteries — Men
Drop at their Oars—Ship’s Guns Drive the Spaniards to Shelter —
Dead Men in the Cutters — Shelling the Lighthouse — First Adventure
of the Torpedo Boat Winslow — Laying a Trap for the Spaniards — In
a Nest of Red Buoys—A Spanish Trap— Deadly Fire Pours in on
the Winslow —The Hudson to the Rescue—-A Fatal Shell — Death of
Ensign Bagley and his Men—Terrific Fighting— Brave Act of the
Hudson — Getting the Winslow Out — Spanish Gunboats Disabled —
Scattering a Spanish Garrison.

URING the weeks following the inauguration -of the

LD) blockade of Cuban ports there was little of incident

except the early capture of prizes till attempts were

made to cut cables in different ports and to tempt out some

of the Spanish gunboats, which timidly remained behind the
protection of the forts and mines.

The most important incidents of the blockade during the
first week in May were a renewed short bombardment of the
fortifications outside of Matanzas and the capture and release
of the French vessel Lafayette, which was boarded, told that
a blockade had been established, and forbidden to enter
Tlavana. But as soon as she was released she made all haste
for the harbor, and again was brought to and taken as a prize
to Key West. The government, however, ordered her im-
mediate release, as the State Department had promised the
French embassy to give her a safe conduct, a fact unknown

on the blockade line, Thus the danger of arousing French
(608)
AN EASY CAPTURE 609

antagonism was averted. One of the amusing features of
the chase for Spanish prizes was the capture of the steamship
Panama by the little Mangrove. The Panama was trying to
run the blockade and had a valuable cargo. The Mangrove
happened to fall in with her, and the ridiculous thing about
it was that the Panama’s guns were superior to those of the
Mangrove, but the latter’s commander boldly dashed in and
the Spaniard surrendered without firing a shot. At about the
same time the Argonauta, a Spanish ship with supplies, 100
soldiers, and General de Corlejo and staff, was captured while
trying to run the blockade at Cienfuegos by the Nashville.
Many of the American vessels had acquired such a con-
tempt for Spanish gunnery from such exhibitions of it as they
had seen that they somewhat recklessly ran within close range
of some of the fortifications, and as our sailors were brave and
eager for action which should distinguish them they welcomed
any orders which would take them into the line of danger.
One of the tasks devolving upon the blockading fleet as well
as upon some of the scouting vessels was the cutting of the
various cables which afforded Havana communication with
Madrid and the other Cuban ports. In pursuance of this ob-
ject, an attempt was made on the 11th of May to cut the cables
running out of the harbor of Cienfuegos on the south coast to
Satttiago, which was connected with European lines, an attempt
which resulted in the first loss of life among American forces.
The vessels in the neighborhood of Cienfuegos were the
cruiser Marblehead, Captain McCalla commanding, the gun-
boat Nashville, and the converted revenue cutter Windom.
This blockading station had been a quiet one, except for an
occasional brush with some Spanish gunboats when venturing
down towards the mouth of the harbor, but they always quickly
retired when fired wpon. Commander McCalla instructed
Lieutenant Anderson of his command to call for volunteers to
cut the cable early on the morning of the 11th, and practically
the whole of the crews of both the Marblehead and the Nash-
ville, to which the call was confined, expressed an eagerness
610 VOLUNTEERS FOR A DANGEROUS SERVICE

to undertake the service, even after a warning that it would be
especially dangerous. , .

“JT want you men to understand,” said the lieutenant,
“that you are not ordered to do this work, and do not have to
unless you want to.”

But they did want to and, in the end, the lieutenant had
the pick of the men on both ships. A cutter containing twelve
men and a steam launch containing six were manned from
each ship and a guard of marines and men to man the 1-
pound guns of the launches were put on board. In the mean-
time the Marblehead took a position 1,000 yards off shore op-
posite the Colorado Point lighthouse, which is on the east
side of the narrow entrance to Cienfuegos’s harbor and just
to the east of the cable landing, and with the Nashville a little
further to the west began shelling the beach, which at that
point is low and covered with a dense growth of high grass and
weeds. The lighthouse stands on an elevation behind which,
hidden in the long grass, were known to be a large number of
rifle pits, and some masked machine and 1-pound guns. These
the Spaniards deserted as fast as the ships’ fire reached them,
and, as their answering fire slackened and died out, the boats
were ordered in shore.

Advancing in double column, the launches under Lieu-
tenant Anderson and Ensign McGruder of the Nashville went
ahead with their sharpshooters and gunners looking eagerly for
targets, and were followed by the cutters with the grappling
irons out, their men peering into the green water for a sight
of the cable. Ata distance of 200 feet from shore the launches
stopped, and the cutters worked ahead, covered as far as possi-
ble by the launches. The first cable was picked up about
ninety feet off shore, but no sooner had the work of cutting it
begun than the Spanish fire was renewed, the soldiers skulking
back to their deserted rifle pits and rapid-fire guns through the
high grass. The launches replied to this fire, and the fire from
the ships quickened. But, though the Spanish fire slackened
momentarily, every now and then it became stronger.
SILENT HEROES AT THE OARS 611

The men in the boats succeeded in cutting the first cable
and coolly proceeded to grapple for the next. Meantime, the
Spaniards were firing low in an evident endeavor to sink the
cutters, but many of their shots fell short. The second cable
was finally grappled. Several men were kept at the oars to
hold the cutters in position, and the first man wounded in the
fire was one of these. No one else in the boat knew it, how-
ever, till he fainted in his seat from loss of blood. Others
took the cue from this and there was never a groan or com-
plaint from the two boats as the bullets, coming thicker and
faster, began to bite the flesh every now and then. The men
simply possessed themselves in patience and went on with their
work with not even the satisfaction of being able to return the
Spanish fire. But the marines in the stern of the boat kept
their guns busy. Again and again they expressed approval
as the living targets their sights had covered dropped.

The second cable was finally cut, and the third, a smaller
one, was grappled and hoisted to the surface. The fire of the
Spaniards had reached its maximum; it was estimated that
1,000 rifles and guns were speaking, and the men who handled
them grew incautious and exposed themselves here and there.

“Use shrapnel,” came the signal for the ships, and then
ean after can exploded over the Spaniards, who broke and
ran to cover, a sort of fortification behind the lighthouse, and
to this place they dragged a number of the machine guns and
again opened fire on the cutters. This fire could not be an-
swered so well from the launches, and the encouraged Span-
iards fired the more rapidly. Man after man in the boats was
hit, but not one let a sound escape him. Like silent machines
they worked, grimly hacking and tearing at the third cable.
For a half-hour they had worked on it, but the fire from behind
the lighthouse was becoming too deadly, and, reluctantly, at
Lieutenant Anderson’s signal, the cable was dropped and the
boats retreated.

The work had lasted two hours and a half, two men lay
dead in the cutters, two were fatally wounded, and four seri-
612 FIRST LOSS OF AMERICAN BLOOD

ously so. The loss among the Spaniards was much greater.
As the boats withdrew, the Windom was ordered in to shell the
lighthouse, which had not been fired on before according to the
usages of international law, though it had been used as a shelter
by the Spaniards. The revenue boat’s rapid-fire guns quickly
riddled it, and soon a shell from a 4-inch gun struck it fair and
toppled it over. With the collapse of their protection the
Spaniards seampered away to escape the screaming shrapnel.
On the day following, or the day on which Admiral Samp-
son was shelling the forts of San Juan, a similar and somewhat
more bloody engagement occurred on the opposite side of the
Cuban coast. In the bay of Cardenas there were three Span-
ish gunboats, which the Americans hoped to capture, but their
commanders carefully kept them out of reach within the
harbor. On the 8th the torpedo boat Winslow had been
ordered to steam in and, if possible, entice the gunboats within
reach of the United States gunboat Machias. The little tor-
pedo boat steamed boldly into the channel, where the Machias,
drawing more water, could not go, and succeeded in rousing
one of the Spanish gunboats, whereupon the Winslow hurried
back, followed by the Spaniard. At the same time.the enemy
at the signal station on Chalupa Key, thinking an opportunity
was offered for overcoming the two American vessels signaled
to two other gunboats to come out. The little Winslow fired
sixty rounds from her 1-pounders and succeeded in getting one
of the Spanish gunboats far enough out so that the Machius
hit her with a 6-pounder. This was too much for the conrage
of the Spaniards, and they put back into the harbor, while
from the shore a small submarine mine was exploded near the
torpedo boat, but not sufficiently near to do any damage.
But this little affair whetted the appetites of the Americans
for a better chance at the gunboats, and plans were laid to force
them out. The Spaniards, evidently mistrusting that the at-
tempt would be made, laid traps of their own, by placing con-
cealed batteries along the shore of the entrance at night, while
the operation could not be discovered by-the blockading fleet.
SHE “ WINSLOW” IN A SPANISH TRAP 613

Early on the morning of the 12th, while the Winslow was
coaling from the gunboat Wilmington, Commander Merry of
the Machias, the senior officer of the station, conferred with
the other officers as to cutting out the Spanish gunboats, and
the Winslow, with the revenue cutter Hudson, was ordered
to sound the little-used channel between the Romero and
Blanco Keys. The other channels into the harbor were known
to be mined, but this third was sounded and dragged, and
found to be safe and deep enough for all except the Machias.
When this was reported to the Wzlmington it was resolved to
make the attempt in the afternoon. Therefore, at about one
o'clock the three vessels started up the bay, the Winslow to
the east, the Wilmington in the center, and the Hudson to
the west. When about a mile and a half from the city one of
the Spanish gunboats could be plainly seen lying alongside
the wharf amid a lot of shipping.

The Winslow was ordered by Commander Todd of the
Wilmington to run in and cut out this gunboat with the
heavier guns of the other American vessels to protect her from
the distance. So Lieutenant Bernadou of the Winslow ordered
his little vessel ahead, while the Hudson followed some dis-
tance behind. There was no thought of real danger, for no
batteries were supposed to exist at that point. When within
2,000 yards of the longed-for prize the men on the Winslow
noticed bobbing about them a number of red buoys which
were supposed to mark the channel, but in reality they were
range buoys which had been put there for the guidance of the
masked batteries on a jutting point a little to the left of where
the Spanish gunboats lay, and suddenly these guns, six 10-
pounders, opened fire.

The gallant little crew on the Winslow were taken entirely
by surprise. The very first shot struck among the buoys near
them, and the next went through the bow of the boat, setting
a paint locker on fire. Then they came thick and fast, churn-
ing the water about them into a foam.

The Spanish trap had caught its victim; the decoy gun-
614 AN UNEQUAL CONTEST

boat had lured the brave little fighter to the very point where
the Spaniards had deliberately calculated the range. It was
then a fight to the death, and the three little 1-pounders of the
torpedo boat, whose steel shell was but a quarter of an inch
thick, began to pour their missiles into the shore and into the
gunboat, which had also opened fire ahead of them.

But it was a sadly unequal contest. Again and again
shells crashed into the little Winslow. One went through the
top of the forward conning tower, a fragment or a splinter
striking the brave commander of the little craft just below
the groin in the right leg. He tied a towel about the wound
and went on with his duties. Another shell cut the wheel
ropes, and knocked the wheel from the helmsman’s hands.
At that moment a water-tender came up from below and re-
ported that a shell had pierced the forward boiler. It had ex-
ploded in the boiler, destroyed seventy of the tubes, thrown
open the doors, and filled the boiler-room with steam and dust.
Steam was already pouring from the hatches, and the men
were coming up from below. Another shot wrecked the port
engine. “Others struck the deck, cut steampipes, went through
the smoke pipe, and disabled the forecastle gun. But the
brave men kept firing away with their remaining 1-pounders.
Help was coming, for the Hudson was steaming ahead at full
speed, and the Wilmington’s 4-inch guns were dropping shells
into the murderous battery ashore.

So far, although the Winslow had been completely dis-
abled, not a man had been killed in the terrible rain of shot and
shell. Amidships near the ammunition stand was Ensign Bag-
ley calling down to the engineer to back and go ahead with
the one remaining engine in an effort to spoil the Spanish aim.
All the electrical contrivances had been wrecked, so orders
had to go by word of mouth, while the screeching shells were
fillmg the air about them. By the ensign were standing a
half-dozen of his crew. Then came the fatal shell. It struck
the hose reel on the deck a little aft of midship, glanced, and
exploded. The //udson was then so close that her crew
DEATH OF ENSIGN BAGLEY 615

could plainly hear the words of the brave men as they went to
their death.

“Save me! Save me!” shouted one poor fellow, whose
face was partly torn away, as he staggered back and nearly fell
into the sea. Someone reached an arm to him, caught him
by aleg, pulled him back, and laid him on the deck dead. En-
sign Bagley threw his hands into the air, tottered forward,
and fell against the signal mast, around which he clasped his
arm and sank slowly down in a heap. They did not know he
was dead until they went to carry him below.

Two others were killed outright, an oiler and fireman.
Two others, a fireman and a cook, were so badly injured that
they died within an hour. They had come up on deck to see
the fight. Had they staid below, they might have escaped.

The fudson had by this time reached a position to extend
aid to the Winslow. Her gunners were doing nobly, indeed,
while in that trying position endeavoring to get the Winslow
out, her guns fired 135 rounds in a half-hour. Barring a few
scratches, none of her men were hurt, though the water about
them was continually lashed by shells. “ Every man and boy
on board,” said one of the Hudson’s gunners afterwards,
“acted with coolness, and placed each shot just right, until the
time when trying to get the Winslow in tow, and the fatal shot
fell in the group about Ensign Bagley. Then they cried and
yelled, and the way the shells flew into the guns was terrible.
It was a wonder the shell man’s hands were not cut off by the
way No. 2 threw the breech lock in and out. The gun became
so hot it could not be touched. Cartridges began to jamb,
and they were pushed in by main strength.”

A long line was thrown from the Hudson to the Winslow
and made fast, but the latter being disabled would not tow
easily, and as the Hudson backed away the line parted. An-
other line was made fast after twenty minutes’ work, under the
constant fire of the enemy. This line held, but still the
Winslow would not tow because she could not be steered, and
at last the Hudson made fast alongside.
616 CRIPPLED AND BLOODY, YET FIGHTING

Though crippled and bloody, the little torpedo boat was
still able to fight, and, with flag flying, and her two remaining
guns puffing away at the enemy, she was dragged away. The
Hudson was fighting fiercely as she had been all the time.
The bravery of her captain and crew in rescuing the Winslow
from her perilous position was unsurpassed even by that of
the men on the torpedo boat.

The Wilmington, in the meantime, had played havoe with
the city of Cardenas. By the time the smaller vessels were in
safety, the town along the shore was on fire; the Spanish
gunboats also caught fire, and soon the shore batteries ceased
to answer the Wilmington’s guns. Many of their guns were
wrecked and their artillerymen were killed.

When the firing ceased, Lieutenant Bernadou signaled to
the Wilmington. “ Many killed and wounded. Send boat.”

A surgeon at once put off in a boat and took the wounded
into it. Among them was the cook, terribly mutilated, but
brave, and while his comrades were rowing him across the bay
from one ship to the other, he died with these last words:
“Tell them I died like a man.”

Another wounded man died soon after, being put. aboard
the Wilmington. Of the crew of twenty-one men, five were
killed and five were wounded.

While all this was going on in the bay, the Machias was
knocking to pieces the signal station on Diana Key, where
there was a blockhouse and a small battery. This was two
miles southwest of where the vessels entered the bay. The
Spaniards fled to the mainland and Commander Merry sent a
boat crew ashore on the key, and, having searched the block-
house and found a quantity of arms and some official papers
of the Spanish commandant, they set it on fire. The Ameri-
can flag was unfurled from the key and remained there un-
disturbed.

The Spanish reports, of course, claimed the day as a vic-
tory, and the Cardenas garrison was warmly congratulated by
Blanco and eulogized at Madrid. The usual complaint was
THE ‘‘GUSSIE” EXPEDITION 617

made as to the town being fired on without a notice, but in
this case the fire was abundantly justified. Notwithstanding
the Joss of life and the damage to the Wins/ow, it was really an
American victory, for the Spanish gunboats were disabled by
the fire, and one of them was made a hopeless wreck.

The lesson of the day was a rather wholesome one, in that
it made the blockading fleet more cautious. Torpedo boats
were not intended to run in under the heavy guns of hostile
shores, and there had already been much criticism of the un-
necessary daring displayed by the commanders of these frail
eraft about Cuban shores. After some of the larger vessels
were withdrawn from the blockade about the north shore to
join Admiral Sampson in his cruise to Puerto Rico, the Span-
ish gunboats at Cardenas had become venturesome in the face
of the smaller craft left. They had interfered with the re-
connoitering of the United States vessels, and it was thought
that their capture or destruction would be of decided benefit.
This was happily accomplished by a brave, but bloody, deed.

During the second week in May an attempt was made to.
put a large quantity of arms and ammunition into the hands of
the insurgents, one of our daring army officers having secretly
made his way to the insurgent headquarters and arranged for
a meeting place. The expedition sailed in the steamer Gussie,
under Captain Dorst, with two companies of United States
regulars, and a landing place was made west of Cardenas bay
. under the protection of the gunboats. Evidently, the Span-
ish forces had received warning of the expedition, for when
our soldiers landed a lively fight ensued, and the enemy were
driven back with considerable logs, while our soldiers were un-
injured. But the insurgents failed to put in an appearance,
and our forces finally re-eembarked and returned to Key West.
CHAPTER XLIV

CHASING CERVERA’S FLEET—DAYS OF EXCITEMENT AND
UNCERTAINTY — SAMPSON AND SCHLEY AT KEY WEST
AND CERVERA AT SANTIAGO.

Cervera Raises another Question for the Strategists — Schley Receives Or-
ders to Leave Hampton Roads— Cervera Reported at Curacoa— He
Seeks Coal and Supplies — Sampson a Day’s Sail from Santiago — More
Days of Uncertainty — Cervera and Sampson Both Sailing in the Same
Direction — Sampson and Schley Arrive at Key West and Cervera at
Santiago — Cervera’s Luck as a Dodger —How He Entered Santiago
while our Scouts Were Away — Schley Hurries to the South Coast of
Cuba— Unaware of Cervera’s Arrival at Santiago —Schley Prepares to
Attack Cervera at Cienfuegos — Finds Cervera is not There and Pushes
on to Santiago— Doubt as to Whether Cervera is Really There —
Sampson Turns Back— Schley Steams up before Santiago.

HE authentic information that Cervera’s ships were in
| the waters of Martinique settled for the time the
question of where he was, but raised another as to
what port he was bound for. How soon this country would
have received information of his arrival in the West Indies
had not Captain Cotton’s auxiliary cruiser, the Harvard, in-
jured her machinery and put in to a Martinique port for re-
pairs is uncertain, but as it was the United States did not re-
ceive official information till some hours after Cervera had
taken on board some required supplies and a full complement
of advices and departed. Although Captain Cotton’s dispatch
was delayed for some reason for twenty-four hours, it was
officially denied by the French government of that island that
it had been unfairly detained. The problem presented by
Captain’s Cotton’s dispatch, which arrived near midnight of
the 12th, constituted a very fascinating strategic puzzle, and
the navy strategists were credited with a rather sleepless night. -
(618)
STRATEGISTS AGAIN PUZZLED 619

Yo the best of their information, Admiral Sampson was
cooling his guns somewhere off San Juan, which is about 520
miles from Martinique, 1,100 from Havana, and 700 from
Santiago. Commodore Schley was still in Hampton Roads,
where he had been impatiently waiting with steam up for
nearly a month; he was over 1,000 miles from the Cuban coast
and about 1,000 miles further from Martinique than Sampson;
Commodore Watson was about Havana and the other block-
aded ports of Cuba with the smaller unarmored craft which
Sampson had left him, and which was no match for Cervera’s
armored cruisers and large guns.

The general opinion of the naval strategists was that Cer-
vera had left Martinique with the intention of either proceed-
ing along the southern route to Cuba, putting in at Santiago
or Cienfuegos, hoping to catch some of the weaker blockading
vessels there, or of moving through the Windward Passage be-
tween Cuba and the island of Haiti to strike the blockading
fleet on the northern coast of Cuba. It was not thought that
he would run to San Juan, though he, doubtless, would have
done so had he not heard of Sampson. Cervera’s ships were
all fast and hampered only by the torpedo-boat destroyers,
which might have to stop to be coaled, and it was calculated
that he could probably reach Cienfuegos by the evening of
the 15th, or the blockading vessels on the north by the morning
of the 16th. He might reach Santiago the 14th, but little
thought was given to that port. Admiral Sampson’s fleet was,
on the other hand, slow, unless he should leave the monitors
behind. As Cervera had already started and would be nearly
two days out before the government had the good fortune to
get word to Sampson, it was not probable that the latter would
catch Cervera unless he happened to run upon him. Schley’s
squadron hardly deserved the name of flying squadron, as it
was hampered by the battleship Massachusetts, which could
make but about thirteen knots an hour, but it might reach the
north coast of Cuba at about the time Cervera would arrive
there, supposing that was his purpose.
620 DEPARTURE OF THE FLYING SQUADRON

In this state of affairs, the authorities promptly abandoned
the plan for the immediate dispatch of a large expedition to
Cuba. As that had been hurried forward on the supposition
that Cervera had returned to Cadiz, there was a good reason
for not hurrying when the Spaniard was somewhere in the
West Indies, and neither American squadron was near Cuba.
Early on the morning of the 13th Sampson’s dispatch from
St. Thomas telling of the San Juan bombardment and of the
non-appearance of Cervera there reached the naval board,
which immediately returned to the waiting Yale information
of the appearance of Cervera, who might at that moment be
steaming through the Caribbean within 200 miles of Sampson.
With this startling information and instructions the lale
hurried back after Sampson’s squadron, which was well off
the coast of Haiti. Early that same morning sailing orders
were sent to Commodore Schley, whose sailors jumped with
joy when told that their long idleness was over, and that even-
ing, the 13th, the squadron was off southward with instructions
to call the government up at Charleston. Then the govern-
ment waited with the most intense interest and some anxiety
while the problem was figured out in various ways by the
people of the country. “ Extras” appeared with rumors of
big battles and heavy cannonading heard at sea, but for some
hours the public was in complete ignorance, not simply as to
Cervera’s whereabouts, but as to those of Sampson and Schley.

Assuming that Cervera had been fully informed at Marti-
nique of the location of the American squadrons, his best policy
would seem to have been to have sailed direct for either San-
tiago or Havana, the latter if he had been disposed to inflict
any damage on our blockading fleet while the armored vessels
of the United States were away. With a start of over 200
miles he would have stood a fair chance to have broken the
blockade about Havana, and even if Schley caught him in the
act of breaking it, Cervera had four armored ships to Schley’s
three. If the Spanish admiral was informed of the speed of
Sampson’s squadron he must have seen that his chances of
THE SPANISH FLEET AT CURAGAO 621

getting through the Windward Passage before Sampson could
arrive there were excellent. But Cervera’s movements were
evidently directed from Madrid and it was the apparent pur-
pose of the Spanish government to as long as possible post-
pone the operations of the United States against Havana by
diverting attention to other points till the rainy season ap-
proached, for in that season the difficulties of offensive action
were greatly increased, while the advantages of defensive
action were correspondingly increased. On the other hand, the
United States authorities desired to -prevent Cervera from
getting under the strong guns of Havana.

Whatever his purpose or the purpose of his government,
Cervera was on the 14th reported at the Dutch island of
Curagao, which is about 500 miles further west than Marti-
nique, but three degrees further south, indeed, it is about fifty
miles from the coast of Venezuela. On the same day Samp-
son, returning westward along the north coast of Haiti, and
making the best time possible, having left the monitors behind,
sent the torpedo boat Porter into the harbor of Puerto Plata,
San Domingo, for news, but the government not being certain
then as to the location of Cervera, the Porter put in the next
day at Cape Haitien, about a hundred miles further westward.
By this time the reports were that Cervera’s ships were surely
and still at Curagao taking on coal and supplies.

On the evening of the same day Schley’s fleet arrived off
Charleston, S. C., or less than half the distance from Hampton
Roads to Havana. Running into a fog soon after departing,
the squadron had made but nine knots. Dispatches had been
sent to him at Charleston and were taken out to him on a
revenue cutter, so that there was a delay of only an hour, and
as night fell the squadron was cruising on southward.

It was certain by this time that Cervera could not reach
Commodore Watson’s fleet about Havana before Commodore
Schley did. Assuming that Cervera intended to make for a
Cuban port, it was calculated that he could hardly cruise
through the Windward Passage to the north coast without
622 CERVERA IN NEED OF SUPPLIES

being in danger of encountering Sampson, and he could hardly
pass westward through the Yucatan channel without encoun-
tering Schley, though it was possible for him to pass either
fleet at some distance away without being detected, even
though both American commanders made the best use of their
scouts.

It seems to be clear that Cervera’s fleet was in a bad way;
at least he desired to pick up all the coal and supplies he could
before making for a Cuban port. Te had asked permission
from the Dutch governor to bring his whole fleet into the
harbor for coal and provisions. The United States consul
had protested, though in doubt at first, considering that it
might be best to allow them to come in while Washington had
a longer time to plan the capture. The governor had finally
decided that he would allow two of the vessels to come in for
necessary provisions, and at noon of the 14th the Maria Teresa
and the Vizcaya dropped anchor in the harbor. The other
vessels were two and a half miles out.

The consul set about learning all he could concerning the
condition of the Spanish squadron, and heard that they were
so short of rations that the officers had been living on beans for
four days, and the crew had been put on half rations. The
vessels stood very high out of the water, indicating that they
were short of coal. The torpedo-boat destroyer Terror had
been left behind at Martinique for repairs.

The Spanish officers started at once to get in all the coal
and provisions they could, but all the fuel to be had was 300
tons of slack coal, condemned by the Dutch government, and
it had been lying there for about two years waiting for a pur-
chaser. They took this and an enormous stock of provisions,
all to the value of $16,000, which they were required to pay
in gold or drafts on London. All day Sunday they worked
loading up. Towards night a cable dispatch was received by
the Spanish officers, and they began to make preparations for
immediate departure. They got away at 6 o’clock in an evi-
dent hurry, for they left two lighter loads of coal and some
RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE SQUADRONS 623

provisions they had purchased behind. They left behind also
astory that they were bound for Puerto Rico. It transpired
afterwards, according to Admiral Cervera’s reports, that this
cablegram came from General Blanco, ordering Cervera to
hurry at once to the port of Santiago. Apparently alarmed
by the approach of Schley’s squadron, Blanco considered San-
tiago the best port for Cervera to hide in while taking on sup-
plies. Cervera thought otherwise and disliked the order.

On the same day, therefore, and indeed at about the same
hour, that Sampson left Cape Haitien westward, and Schley
left Charleston southward, Cervera left Curagoa, and, accord-
ing to reports, westward. Thus Sampson was about 500 miles
from Cervera; Schley about 1,500. Sampson and Schley
were each about 600 miles from Havana; Cervera nearer 1,000.
Cervera was about 600 miles from Santiago; Sampson only
about 200, and Schley considerably over 1,000 by either
route. The Oregon, though well-nigh forgotten in the ex-
citement of the moment, was actually about where Cervera
had been four days before, off the Windward Islands.
The public had the impression, and naturally so from this
arrangement, that Schley was simply going to the relief of the
blockading squadron, the danger to which had been greatly
lessened by Cervera’s trip to Curagoa, while Sampson, who had
been looking for Cervera for two weeks, and was now so near
him, would with little difficulty find the Spaniard and have
his desired encounter.

Had Sampson sailed westward a day through the Wind-
ward Passage along the south coast of Santiago province, and
there quietly dropped his anchor and waited, Cervera would
have come sailing directly into his presence. But Sampson
appears to have been of the opinion that Cervera intended to
make for Havana, and that if he was to have the honor of
measuring guns with him he should make haste back for those
waters which he had left a fortnight before, in the hopes of
meeting Cervera at Puerto Rico. Moreover, in his fruitless
cruise he had nearly exhausted his coal,

a7
624 RUMORS OF BATTLES

If Cervera’s immediate destination had been Havana, how-
ever, he would hardly have lost the opportunity he had of reach-
ing there before either of the American squadrons could have
prevented. It was strongly suspected that one of Cervera’s
objects was to land munitions of war for General Blanco, but
this he could accomplish by running into Cienfuegos on the
south coast, and joined by railroad with Havana. But, as
already related, the cable at Cienfuegos had been cut on the
11th, and that left Santiago as the most available point for him
to touch for further advices from Madrid. It would have
been natural to suppose, therefore, that he would, on leaving
Curacoa, at least look in at Santiago, although Sampson had
his magnificent fighting ships within a day’s sail of that
port.

Then followed four days of the most exciting uncertainty
and rumors of battles. The government advised all its con-
sular offices in West Indian and South American ports to make
every investigation possible and report at once any information
of the Spanish squadron. Scouts were sent to watch different
ports. Admiral Sampson was supposed by some to be lying
in wait in the Windward Passage. Schley was supposed to be
hurrying about the western end of Cuba to guard the Yucatan
channel.

Asa matter of fact, both Cervera and Sampson were sailing
in the same direction — to the northwest, with Cervera’s bows
pointed towards Sampson’s sterns. On the 17th, while Cer-
vera was in the middle of the Caribbean, Sampson was in the
Old Bahama Channel off the north coast of Cuba. On the
18th, when Cervera was sailing between Jamaica and Haiti,
Sampson had reached the blockade fleet, where all was well,
and the Oregon and her consorts were plowing their way west-
ward off Haiti, where Sampson had been five days before.
On the afternoon of the 19th Sampson arrived off Key West,
where he found Schley, who had arrived from the north that
morning. On the 19th also Cervera sent the following
message to Madrid:
CERVERA ARRIVES AT SANTIAGO 620

SantTraco, 19.

This morning I have, without incident, entered this port, accompanied
by the squadron.

CERVERA.

Had Madrid made a shrewd use of this information, by
carefully keeping it a state secret, it is impossible to say when
Cervera would have been found. Owing to the conditions of
the harbor of Santiago, it was impossible for a ship on the out-
side to have any idea of what was inside. Cervera had entered
a blind pocket unobserved by the enemy, and, if Madrid had
kept still, our ships, having not the slightest clue to his where-
abouts, might have sailed around the whole Cuban coast and
been none the wiser, until, possibly, Cervera saw his: oppor-
tunity to slip out. But the fact that he had been able to get
into a Cuban port without incident was considered at Madrid
as too good news to keep. The Minister of Marine immedi-
ately called at. the residence of Sagasta, and then at the palace
to lay the dispatch before the Queen Regent; but her Majesty
had retired, and the news was conveyed to her by the Infanta
Isabel. The Queen at once dispatched her congratulations
to Cervera, and the whole proceeding was given the greatest
publicity.

While there was much less cause for rejoicing over Cer-
vera’s tactics, as the Madrid authorities seemed to suppose, his
remarkable maneuvers could not fail to put Admiral Sampson’s
trip to Puerto Rico in a somewhat ridiculous light, whether
advised by the strategy board or by Sampson himself. Samp-
son had steamed about 1,150 miles to meet Cervera, who had
arrived on time, but a little south of the rendezvous we had
anticipated, and then Sampson had steamed 1,150 miles back,
covering as many miles, therefore, as Cervera had in crossing
the ocean from the Cape Verde Islands. He had emptied his
coal bunkers and bombarded San Juan.

The naval strategists, who had become somewhat sensitive
over the thoughtless criticisms of their conduct, were not sure
whether they should be pleased or otherwise with Cervera’s
626 LESS SKILL THAN LUCK

alleged appearance in Santiago. They could not fail to be a
little nervous over his possible escape from that place as soon
as he had coaled, for with nearly all the American naval vessels
at the other end of Cuba, Cervera had ample opportunity to
make another quick movement with his fleet ships, and be out
of reach of either Sampson or Schley before either could get
to Santiago. The opinion still prevailed that he would en-
deavor to come to Havana’s relief, possibly by sending muni-
tions from Cienfuegos, or, probably, by watching his chance
to steam direct to Havana.

It could hardly be said that Cervera’s movements were
skillful, for he certainly ran the risk of meeting the enemy.
He could have had no good reason for supposing that Sampson,
who was so near to Santiago, would, by the time he reached
those waters, be 1,000 miles away. However inconsequential
the Caribbean Sea may look upon the map, it is a large place
to dodge in or even to miss a foe in, whether anxious to meet
him or not. Cervera, at this stage, was blessed with a rounded
measure of good fortune, as may be seen from the fact that he
arrived at Santiago at just the time when he could slip in with-
out being observed by our scouts.

The cruiser St. Louts, which, under command of Captain
Goodrich, had been scouting about West Indian waters since
May ist, had met Admiral Sampson on the 14th, while he was
hurrying westward off Haiti, and, receiving orders, had arrived
off Santiago on the 18th, without any intimation that Cervera’s
four armored cruisers were at that time pointed for the same
port and not a day’s sail away. The ¢ !. Lowis’s orders were
to cut the cable connecting Santiago and Jamaica. She began
the search with the armed tug Wompatuck, commanded by
Lieutenant Jungen, who had escaped from the Maine disaster,
at about six o’clock on the evening of the 18th, gradually
working nearer the forts at the mouth of the harbor, expect-
ing every moment to draw their fire. Aboyf noon, having
reached a position less than two miles from Morro, the grapnel
caught the cable, and the Spaniards seem to have then dis-
MOVEMENTS OF THE SCOUTS 627

covered the purpose of the Americans, for a battery on Morro
opened fire, which was returned by the St. Louis’s 6-pounders.
The engagement became quite fierce and the St. Louis was
in some danger of the fire from a mortar battery which her
guns could not reach; but, fortunately, the cable was brought
up and cut in time to allow them to get away uninjured, and
that night she steamed off eastward to cut the cable from
Guantanamo, about thirty miles east of Santiago, to Mole St.
Nicholas, Haiti, a work at which Commander Goodrich was
engaged when Cervera slipped into Santiago, and this gave
rise to the Spanish report, so joyously received at Madrid, that
the American warships had disappeared on Cervera’s approach.
Had the St. Louis and the little Wompatuck loitered about
Santiago a few hours longer they would have had early infor-
mation of the whereabouts of Cervera, and possibly more than
they could have successfully carried away, in view of their
lack of armor and their inferior guns, though they were com-
manded by skillful and vigilant officers.

Acting upon the news of Cervera’s arrival at Santiago, the
Harvard, which had run into Martinique to repair her ma-
chinery, thereby giving to Washington the first official infor-
mation of Cervera’s appearance on this side, as already related,
was ordered to go at once to Santiago and watch for the possible
departure of the Spanish fleet, so that the government might
be informed at once of the fact and his probable course, though
the government was by no means sure that Cervera was actu-
ally there or even that he had been there, the sous of in-
formation being so far entirely Spanish; indeed, as soon as the
government at Madrid perceived that our naval board were
proceeding to work on the supposition that Cervera was at
Santiago, fresh batches of Spanish reports began to arrive, re-
ports that Cervera had departed, that he had been sighted off
Costa Rica and even that he had not been at Santiago at all.
Nothing was wanting to make it one of the most uncertain
and exciting problems of naval strategy, entirely without pre-
cedent in history, and, if anything were lacking to give the
628 SCHLEY’S HURRIED DEPARTURE

finishing touch to the exciting mystery, it was the remarkably
varying reports of the movements of the American squadron
under the stress of enterprising journalism hampered by the
censorship at the convenient cable stations.

‘When Sampson arrived at Key West on the 19th he found
Schley throwing coal into his ships with all the haste possible.
As his flying squadron approached Key West he had picked
up orders which had been hurried out to him from Washing-
ton to prepare with all haste for an immediate cruise. His
flag ship Brooklyn put at full speed and quickly came to an
anchorage and began to take in coal at a rate which astonished
even the veterans along the shore. Soon after came the
Texas, Massachusetts, and the torpedo boat Scorpion of his
squadron — all for coal in a hurry. No dispatches telling of
these sudden movements were, of course, allowed to pass the
censor, and the public outside of Key West were in entire ignor-
ance of them, while even the sailors had no idea of where they
were going, unless it were to reinforce Sampson, who was sup-
posed to be after the enemy somewhere in the Caribbean. But
while they were speculating they were surprised to see Samp-
son’s flagship New York come rushing into the harbor, also
after coal, and the Admiral was so impatient that he sent back
the Dupont to hurry in the laggards of his squadron. When
the last of Sampson’s ships dropped anchor, the first of Schley’s
pointed out for the Cuban coast and vanished in the gathering
darkness,

But it should be understood that Schley did not know
when he sailed that Cervera had reached Santiago. That in-
formation had been reported late in the day, reached Wash-
ington soon after Schley had departed in the expectation that
he would most probably find Cervera at Cienfuegos, and in
the hope that he might find him cruising into the Yucatan
channel, and there settle which was the best man.

Admiral Sampson, having now the information which
Schley did not possess, again prepared some of his ships
for action, and departed with them to the blockade line in
THE ADMIRAL CRUISES AGAIN 629

front of Havana, where he spent the 21st and 22d in reassem-
bling his fleet, which came in one by one, starting some of the
slower ones on ahead for another cruise eastward. In order
to receive the latest news from Washington he waited till
Monday morning when, with his fleeter vessels, he started on
after those he had sent ahead. During the night the fleet
came up to the monitors Puritan and Miantonomoh, and two
torpedo boats which had been sent on ahead, and later in the
day others joined, so that it was an imposing array of fighting
vessels which lined into the Old Bahama Channel. In the
central group, with the flagship New York, were the Indiana,
Puritan, Miantonomoh, and the torpedo boats; a flying divis-
ion, composed of the cruisers New Orleans, Montgomery, and
Jlarblehead, formed a group two miles to the north, while the
gunboats Newport, Vicksburg, and Wasp steamed along on
the south, and the Wilmington and Machias in the rear.

Meanwhile, Schley, still without any information that
Cervera had been reported at Santiago, was making his way
around by the longer route through the Yucatan channel,
expecting to meet the Spaniard at any moment. Guns were
loaded and the men slept at their stations. The east end of
Cuba was sighted on the afternoon of the 20th, and shortly
afterwards, while bearing through the channel, the squadron
felt sure the enemy was at hand. Men were sent to quarters,
and the ships were cleared, but the vessels turned out to be
friendly. As the squadron approached Cienfuegos early on
Sunday morning, Commodore Schley signaled “ We will block-
ade Cienfuegos. Have steam up to-night and be ready for
anything. Do not know if enemy is in port.”

Just as the flagship passed the promontory at the entrance
to the harbor, the rest of the squadron being about two miles
off, five shots were fired from the shore. They were appar-
ently rifle shots, but the commodore signaled to clear for im-
mediate action. Everything movable went overboard to the
sharks, guns were manned, and up went the battleflags. But
as the squadron swung by the mouth of the harbor, nothing
630 SCHLEY AT CIENFUEGOS

could be seen from the foretops but the masts of three sailing
vessels and the gray funnel of a steamer. A small coast
steamer came out towards the mouth of the harbor, but
quickly turned and hurried back out of sight. Somewhat dis-
appointed, the vessels swung out from the coast, the men were
dismissed from the guns, and the battleflags were hauled down.
The commodore was not disposed to waste any ammunition in
bombardments unless the Spanish fleet were really there.

Whether there or not, Schley could not make cer-
tain by a simple reconnoiter, for the topography of Cienfuegos
is somewhat similar to that of Santiago. Both harbors have
long, narrow entrances, protected by high land, and a whole
fleet can lie in the inner harbor and be invisible from the out-
side. But Schley determined to make sure, and found a way
to communicate with some Cubans ashore on the following
day. The result was that by the 24th he was satisfied, though
disappointed, that Cervera was not there. He dispatched a
vessel to the nearest cable station to inform Washington, and
headed his ships for Santiago.

Meanwhile, the swift St. Paul, which, having arrived at
Key West on the 18th, in advance of either Schley’s or Samp-
son’s squadrons, and having received orders there to proceed
to Cape Haitien, had on the way picked up the Yale, and to-
gether they reached the cape on the 21st, where the St. Paul
was ordered to hurry to Santiago to watch for the possible
escape of Cervera from Santiago, that is, if he were there.
Reaching the waters off Santiago, she fell in with the Zarvard,
which had arrived there shortly after Cervera without seeing
him, and the Minneapolis, which had been cruising about the
Caribbean for several days with similar results. For the next
four days, or from the 22d to the 26th, they cruised about the
* mouth of the harbor hoping to catch a glimpse of what was
within, sometimes running in close, and again running far out,
to sea in the hopes that the Spaniard, if he were there, would
be bold enough to show himself. But all their maneuvers
were apparently in vain. They could only assure themselves
SAMPSON TURNS BACK 631

that if Cervera had gone in there he had not come out while
they were there.

As soon as the Washington strategists learned that Schley
was approaching Santiago on the south, while Sampson, they
were aware, must be about the same distance away on the north,
they appear to have become alarmed over the fact that pretty
much the whole strength of the fighting navy was concentrat-
ing on the eastern end of the island, when they had not the
slightest official assurance that Cervera was there at all. The
government was not disposed to put any credence in Spanish
reports after the Cadiz rumor, and felt anything but sure that
the reserve Spanish squadron, under Camara, which had been
reported so persistently at Cadiz by Spanish advices, might
not be approaching the Atlantic coast at some point or seek-
ing Havana by some out-of-the-way route. With Sampson
and Schley both converging on Santiago, therefore, the strate-
gists became alarmed at the serious possibility that either Cer-
vera or Camara might break the blockade and upset all the
plans of war.

The result was that Sampson came about again. When
night closed in on the 24th, or the day Schley sailed from Cien-
fuegos, Sampson’s magnificent fleet of fifteen vessels was plow-
ing its way eastward off the coast opposite Santiago; when the
sun came up on the 25th the fleet was plowing its way along
the same coast — but to the westward, back towards Havana,
where he arrived at about the same time that Schley steamed
up before Santiago’s frowning Morro. The unfortunate ad-
miral had steamed another 1,000 miles, about 3,500 in all
since May 4th, and again emptied his coal bunkers. The slow-
going monitors had been towed back and forth for the service
they might render in a battle which could not. be brought
about, and when at last the battle did come, neither the ad-
miral nor the monitors had a part in it.
CHAPTER XLV

THE HARBOR OF SANTIAGO— ADMIRAL CERVERA’S ALLEGED
STRATEGY — COMMODORE SCHLEY MAKES SURE HE HAS
THE ENEMY —CERVERA ‘‘ BOTTLED UP.”

A Beautiful Harbor — Morro Castle — Background for Many Bloody
Scenes—The Winding Channel and the Bay — Doubt as to Whether
Cervera was Actually There — Irrational Movements of the Spanish
Admiral — Guided Largely by Necessities — Opportunities which He
Refused'to Embrace — Evidence of Cervera’s Presence in the Harbor —
All Doubts Removed — Schley’s Attack on the Forts — Cervera’s Ships
Fire at Random over the Hills — Remarkable Reports from Madrid —
Too Late for Falsehoods — Cervera ‘‘ Bottled Up”— The Government
at Once Takes Steps to Send Forces to Santiago — Admiral Sampson
Arrives Back at Key West and Prepares to Join Schley — The Monitors
Left Behind — Remarkable Trip of the Oregon — Thirteen-Thousand-
Mile Run and then to Battle— Admiral Sampson Takes Command —
Organizing the Army— Found Unprepared at the Last Moment —
The Departure at Last.

most beautiful in the world, but it must be admired

from the inside, not from without. Approaching
from the sea, it is utterly impossible to make out the mouth
of the entrance even from comparatively close quarters. A
long range of high and steep mountains seem to make an im-
penetrable front. But coming near the coast a rift appears
in the ramparts, disclosing a passage only 180 yards wide,
with a picturesque castle on the eastern bluff, a relic of the six-
teenth century. Like Havana and San Juan, Santiago has its
Morro, but it antedates all others. It is an antique, yellow,
Moorish-looking stronghold, with crumbling honey-combed
battlements and queer little flanking turrets, grated windows,
and shadowy towers. Built wpon the face of a lofty dun-
colored rock, upon whose precipitous side the fortifications
are terraced, the light and shade formed by the time-stained
walls make a strikingly artistic picture. A flight of well-worn

(632)

T HE harbor of Santiago has often been called one of the
SANTIAGO AND THE DEFENSES 633

steps winds from the water’s edge up the side of the grim old
walls, while the moat, drawbridge, and other surroundings
make up the charming picture, more suggestive of the days of
gallant knights and imprisoned maidens than of modern sea-
coast fortifications.

It was a formidable defense in the days of the buccaneers,
but its old guns have lain there in the sun, wind, and rain of
the tropics for years and years, and for as many years Morro
has been little used except as a prison for political offenders.
Those who visited Santiago before the war with the United
States could, as they sailed past its frowning walls, see pallid
faces at the grated windows; but prisoners generally remained
there but a short time. They were either taken out on the
ramparts, shot, and thrown into the sea, as the morning sun
streamed along the picturesque shore, or were carried off to the
African penal colonies. Old Morro has been the background
for many a bloody scene in the pages of Spain’s history of
bloodshed and torture.

On the mountain to the left of the entrance is the Castle
La Socapa, also presenting a very picturesque appearance,
while a little further inland and on Morro’s side is a small
fortification resembling a star in shape, and for that reason
ealled the Batteria de ]a Estrella. Still further in to the left
is a little island, on the hillside of which is built the hamlet of
Cayo Smith, of late years patronized by the best families of
Santiago as a watering place. Then comes a narrow winding
channel, a mile in length, between the mountains and broad
meadows covered with rank verdure, cocoanut groves, and
little fishing hamlets. Thrifty laurels, palms with their grace-
ful plumes of foliage, and banana trees line the way, while here
and there upon the banks appears a pleasant country house in
the midst of a pretty garden of flowering shrubs. Then a
sharp angle in the hills is passed, from which look the guns of
the Punta Gorda battery, and the broad sheltered bay of
Santiago lies in full view, with the quaint rambling old city
on a hillside at the northern end.
634 DOUBTS AND UNCERTAINTIES

It was in this unique harbor that were fought many bloody
battles in the old days; here was the three-days contest between
a French corsair and Spanish vessel, related in an early chapter;
here, too, was brought the Virginius, and here were slain the
members of her crew; in these regions began the Cuban
struggle for independence, and here it was that the United
States, because of Cervera’s alleged strategy, was to first plant
its flag.

For, as a matter of fact, Cervera was at Santiago, and as a
matter of fact, also, no one in the United States was sure of it.
Neither was Schley sure of it as his ships steamed in from
Cienfuegos and lay off the narrow mouth of the tortuous har-
bor, rolling in the swell of the glistening Caribbean. The
Cadiz fleet, moreover, was really at Cadiz, though the dis-
patches from Cadiz said it was off for the Philippines, and the
dispatches from Madrid said it was off for the West Indies, and
other dispatches from sources which were usually regarded
more reliable, reported a large Spanish squadron off the New
England coast. The only reasons thus far for believing that
Cervera was at Santiago were the reports from Madrid, and
these were considered at Washington as excellent reasons for
believing that he was not there, till Madrid began to report that
he was not there. That seemed to strengthen the possibility
that he was there, and official opinion, or a part of it, veered
that way. Another reason for thinking he was there was the
fact that he had not been seen elsewhere, which was a very un-
. satisfactory reason in view of the fact that the Caribbean is a
large sea and the Atlantic is a large ocean. One of the main
reasons for believing that he was not there was that Cervera
could hardly be so foolish as to pocket himself in such a harbor,
for with but a small part of the American fleet before its
mouth, he could not possibly escape except under the most
disastrous disadvantages. His ships would be compelled to
emerge singly and they could be attacked and destroyed singly.

Assuming that Cervera had brought his armor-clad vessels
over for the practical purpose of fighting, his entrance into
CERVERA’S LOST OPPORTUNITIES 635

Santiago was deemed a reckless or irrational move, but his
continuing there for a week without anything to bar his way
except two or three converted merchantmen and liners, was
considered inexplicable, and, therefore, improbable. Spain
was manifesting considerable elation over the notion that her
fleet was accomplishing great things. Some of the expert
nautical critics of Europe wrote learnedly of the way Spain
was out-maneuvering us. Cervera acquired a brief reputa-
tion as a strategist, when, as a matter of fact, he does not seem
to have been able to exercise sufficient option to make strategy
possible. The reduced conditions of his supplies compelled
him to adopt a certain course, and its effect upon the Wash-
ington strategists was largely incidental. He had steamed
from Martinique to Curagoa and from Curacoa to Santiago,
and it was due more to his good fortune for the time than to
any strategy he exercised that every American vessel in those
waters happened to miss him. Guided largely by his neces-
sities, he acquired the reputation of an artful dodger, much to
the disparagement of his reputation as a brave fighter; for it
was fair to suppose that he had brought his armored vessels
over here to fight, not to incapacitate them in a land-pocket;
and had he had the inclination to fight, the favorable oppor-
tunities were not lacking. In view of the swiftness of his
vessels, he could readily have engaged either Sampson or
Schley while separated, and especially Sampson, who was
laboriously towing monitors back and forth through the Ba-
hama channel. How he would have come out of such a fight
with either of the American commanders, it is impossible to
say, but if he stood any chance at all of success it was in taking
the American naval forces when separated. But these op-
portunities, which chance afforded him, he took good: care not
to embrace even after he had entered the harbor of Santiago,
“without incident ”; for eight days his exit was opposed only
by ships, all of which any one of his cruisers, properly handled,
could have sunk, if they had ventured any opposition. There
was coal at Santiago, as it turned out, and he could in two days
636 A TELL-TALE MAST

have filled his bunkers. With his four fast cruisers he could
have run to Puerto Rico while Sampson was running to Key
West; having coaled at San Juan he could have run back to
Cuban waters, or, possibly, have intercepted the Oregon, which
he could not fail to know must by this time be approaching
Cuban waters. But, for some reason, which must, perhaps,
remain a mystery until some future historian has the privilege
of delving among the archives of the Spanish government,
Cervera remained in the trap as if indifferent to the possi-
bility of its closing upon him. As a good sailor he must have
known that on the 27th, when the lookouts on the forts saw
Schley’s squadron steaming by the entrance to the harbor, the
trap had closed. It seems probable that Cervera had really in-
tended to send out a couple of vessels for the attack upon the
unarmored scouts, for the log of the Cristobal Colon shows
that the vessels moved down to the mouth of the harbor on
the 25th, and on the 27th, as Schley steamed by he saw through
his glasses at least one vessel, which he took for a member of
Cervera’s fleet, the Cristobal Colon having a peculiar construc-
tion, a military mast between the smoke pipes.

“ He will never get home again,” Schley is reported to have
remarked as he took his glasses from the tell-tale mast; but
while the American commodore was pretty well satisfied him-
self that he had the Spaniard in a pen, he needed more evi-
dence to convince the strategists at Washington, or Sampson,
who had arrived back off Havana. There was the possibility
that even if one or two of the enemy’s vessels was in the harbor
the others might be elsewhere; that Cervera had left them
there as a decoy, and gone elsewhere, possibly to effect a
junction with the Cadiz fleet, whose real whereabouts appeared
to be as uncertain as anything in this life, and with the inten-
tion of dropping on the blockade line when all the American
fighting vessels had concentrated hefore the Santiago decoy.
The authorities were taking no chances with the wily Spaniard,
who seemed to be enjoying a reputation he did not in the least
deserve, But by the 28th Schley was able to report to Wash-
SCHLEY TRIES TO ROUSE CERVERA 637

ington that he had made out three of Cervera’s fleet in the
lower part of the harbor, and Washington began to make its
plans accordingly.

Schley, however, manifested a disposition to have it out
with the enemy then and there if possible. On Sunday, the
29th, or the day when his first dispatches reached Washington,
he ordered the J/arblehead to run in close to Morro in order
to see as far as possible into the winding entrance. The cruiser
started, and as she approached within range of Morro’s guns,
she was going at a speed which would have required far better
marksmanship than the Spaniards had yet displayed to hit her.
She kept a course that carried her well clear of the shoal water
which extends from Morillo Point, and, as she went by the en-
trance, those aboard of her obtained a fair view of the harbor
nearly as far as Punta Gorda, and caught a further glimpse of
Spanish cruisers. To make assurance doubly sure, Commo-
dore Schley had the benefit of the services of Lieutenant Blue,
who went ashore, and, without guard, bravely worked his way
to high ground, till he was enabled to secure a full view of the
harbor, and to clearly see the four Spanish cruisers and two
torpedo boats. Je returned from his dangerous trip un-
harmed. It was one of the most daring and successful deeds
of the war. All doubt having been removed, Commodore
Schley determined to draw the fire of the forts in order to
discover their position and the locality of any masked batteries,
and also, if possible, to draw out Cervera. If he had crossed
the ocean with the desire of fighting for his country, Schley
determined to gratify it.

«At noon of the 31st the Commodore left his flagship
Brooklyn, which was coaling from the collier Merrimac, two
miles out to sea, where lay also most of the other vessels occu-
pied in routine duties, and hoisted his flag from the battleship
Afassachusetts, which soon headed for the entrance of the
harbor, followed by the cruiser New Orleans and the battle-
ship Iowa. Near the mouth of the channel could be seen the
Cristobal Colon, lying with her port broadside towards the
638 AN HOUR’S FIERCE BOMBARDMENT

American ships, and flying an immense ensign. The Span-
iards had their awnings up fore and aft, and the crew were
moving lazily about the decks, apparently taking the move-
ment of the American ships for another parade by the forts,
such as had taken place before. Behind the Cristobal Colon
could also be distinguished the Vizcaya and the Almirante
Oquendo, while close by were the destroyers Pluton and Furor.
As the Massachusetts passed the entrance she opened fire
upon the Cristobal Colon, using her forward 8-inch guns on
the port side and her 13-inch rifles. The Spanish cruisers and
four batteries, two on the east side of the entrance, one on the
west, and one on Cayo Smith, began to reply. Some of the
guns on the batteries were 10 and 12-inch Krupps, and the fire
on both sides was so well sustained and the reverberations were
so thrown back by the mountains that hardly an interval in.
the roar could be distinguished. Both sides showed bad judg-
ment in getting the range, as the American ships made their
first manuever past the fortifications, but on the second round
the Americans showed a decided improvement, and ancient
Morro was struck again and again, each shell tearing great
rents in the yellow walls and sending skyward masses of
masonry, which had lain undisturbed for three centuries. The
Spanish artillerymen also began to show a surprising accuracy
of aim on the second round. Several of their shells burst over
the Iowa, and three fell dangerously near the New Orleans.
The Spanish vessels seemed to be firing over the hills at ran-
dom, but they did not venture out. After the cannonading
had lasted for a half-hour three of the batteries ceased firing,
having been badly demolished, and a few minutes later the
American ships desisted and worked contentedly away. But
the Cristobal Colon and the battery on the western shore kept
up a weak and harmless fire for about twenty minutes longer.
Altogether, the firing lasted less than an hour, but it satisfied
Schley still further of the presence of the Spanish cruisers near
the mouth of the harbor. One of the shells of the Iowa had
struck the Cristobal Colon and started a fire, which was, how-
““BOTTLED UP” 639

ever, quickly extinguished. The latter fired the last shot, and
the Spanish reports claimed in the customary manner that the
Americans had been driven off. Sefior Aunon, Minister of
Marine, declared in the Senate that the news was a good augury
for further victories that would be gained by the courage and
merit of the Spanish sailors, and the Senate unanimously
adopted an expression of satisfaction at the striking victory
gained by the Spanish fleet. Thus were the exigencies of
domestic politics in Spain met. But what was more remark-
able was the official information from Madrid the same day
that only the Cristobal Colon, which was repairing her boilers,
was at Santiago, the others had gone!

But the time for manuevering under cover of false reports
had passed. Satisfied of the correctness of Schley’s reports,
the United States government was already preparing for the
campaign. The troops which had been hurried to the south-
ern ports two weeks before in the expectation of striking at
Havana, were now to be headed for Santiago. Cervera had
changed our plans of invasion by allowing himself to be, in
the popular expression of the day, “bottled up.” Finding
ample field for the exercise of his genius, the cartoonist repre-
sented the Spaniard in traditional garb crouching at the
bottom of a bottle, labeled “ Santiago Preserves,” while over
the mouth of the bottle hung Uncle Sam’s old beaver hat, and
Uncle Sam himself, resting after a long and somewhat arduous
chase, was seated close by, looking contentedly at the agonized
Spaniard within.

Admiral Sampson, having arrived back to Key West at
about the time Commodore Schley had assured Washington
of the presence of the Spanish ships in Santiago harbor, he at
once made preparations for joining Schley and taking com-
mand of the naval operations. But in this trip he left the
monitors behind. Having been helped back and forth in
search of Cervera, these unfortunate vessels were in the end
denied the opportunity of showing their efficiency in a real
naval battle, while the Oregon, which had been steaming for

38
640 THE RECORD OF THE “ OREGON”

three months, and had arrived at Key West a little ahead of
Admiral Sampson, was destined to proceed at once to the
scene of operations and take a glorious part in the destruction
of Cervera’s fleet. Her cruise and successful arrival excited
the admiration of the world. It spoke volumes for the
efficiency of a battleship which could make a 13,000 mile
run, throw in.fresh coal, and steam off ready for battle
without even stopping to tighten a crank pin. Her achieve-
ments were among the most notable in the whole war, and no
crew of American sailors had more right to be proud than the
crew of the Oregon when she set out with Admiral Sampson
for Santiago, before which they arrived on June 1st.

Had the government of the United States arranged the
movements of Cervera in its own way, it could have hardly dis-
tributed them to better advantage for its own convenience; for
not simply was the Spanish fleet placed where it could neither
help the Spaniards in Cuba nor hurt the Americans outside,
but the weeks of uncertainty in locating him had been of con-
siderable advantage to the army department. It was one of
the peculiar features of the situation at this point that while
the steps had been taken to mobilize a large army as soon as
war was declared, and while the government had planned an
immediate invasion of Cuba in the middle of May, when Cer-
vera was supposed to be at Cadiz, the army was actually far
from ready to move by the 1st of June, when its presence at
Santiago became an imperative necessity, the harbor of San-
tiago having been fixed so that Cervera could not get out nor
Sampson get in. It had been supposed that the army had
been waiting for the navy; but when the navy had Cervera
“bottled up,” it had to wait for the army.

In preparation for the organization of the army, both
regular and volunteer, it had been decided during the first
week in May that it should be divided into seven army corps,
and that into these should be put both regular and volunteer
regiments. In order that there might be a sufficient number
of major-generals and brigadier-generals to officer these corps,
NEW GENERALS - 641

the President had on the 4th sent to the Senate, which had
promptly confirmed it, a long list of nominations. For major-
generals he named for promotion eight regular army men and
four civilians; the former being Joseph C. Breckinridge, El-
well S. Otis, John J. Coppinger, William R. Shafter, William
M. Graham, James F. Wade, and Henry C. Merriam. The
civilians raised to this high rank were General Fitzhugh Lee,
Congressman Joseph Wheeler of Alabama, J. H. Wilson of
Delaware, and Senator Sewell of New Jersey. This list, as
well as the longer list of nominations for brigadier-generals,
was notable as containing, so far as could be seen, no political
nominations, though great stress had been brought upon the
President to secure such appointments. Of the four civilians
who became major-generals, two served in the Union and two
in the Confederate army during the Civil War. The ap-
pointment of two Confederate veterans was conclusive evi-
dence that sectional feeling had become a matter of past his-
tory, and the wisdom of the President in securing trained
leaders had, doubtless, been derived from his own four years’
experience in the Union army in the field. The North had
spent two years in learning how to fight and in discovering and
educating its generals, and at the end every man who had se-
cured a first place in either army was a graduate of West Point.
The President proposed to secure the results without incurring
the perils of a season of education. He, therefore, selected
men of expert training and experience, not amateurs and poli-
ticians. The great majority of men were graduates of West
Point, who had spent all their lives in the profession of arms,
and those who were not graduates, and who came from civil
life had had the training of one of the most terrible wars of
modern times.

Up to the latter part of May no thought had been given to
Santiago, which, while an important port, was in a province
largely controlled by the insurgents, and there the reconcen-
trado order had not taken effect. Miss Clara Barton had ar-
rived at Key West in a very few hours after the declaration
642 NO HELP FOR RECONCENTRADOS

of war with over 2,000 tons of provisions, ready to advance
with the army, and, finding that there was no army there at that
time, nor likely to be for some time, she sought permission of
Admiral Sampson, who was maintaining the blockade, to take
her provisions to the starving reconcentrados. But the ad-
miral pointed out to her that it would be useless for him to
blockade Havana if the Red Cross took in provisions for the
people, who, however much they needed it, would be thrust
aside by the Spaniards, the supplies being taken for the main-
tenance of the Spanish army, to cut off which the blockade
was proclaimed. She appealed to the President, but, while
he sympathized with her purposes, he agreed with the admiral,
that nothing in the way of relief should be done. So Miss
Barton whiled away the time about Key West, feeding Cuban
refugees and prisoners on the prize boats. And as time
went on the public interest became absorbed in Cervera, the
reconcentrados slipped out of mind and, to a large extent, out
of this world and into the next.

And now Havana itself was to lose its importance in the
public interest, except to the weary lookouts on the blockad-
ing fleet, which had been rolling in the sea for a month with
nothing more exciting on hand than the chase of an occasional
fishing smack. Santiago had become the center of operations.
But while the delay in definitely locating Cervera had been of
considerable convenience to the Department of War engaged
in the monumental and novel task of not simply recruiting an
army, but of providing for its sustenance, it was at once ap-
parent that a little longer delay would have been useful. The
regulars had been moved up promptly, had taken to camp life
naturally, and a large part of them had been at Tampa for
weeks, “marking time.” Gradually, as the volunteers were
mustered in and equipped, they had been moved up from
state encampments to Camp Alger, across the Potomac from
Washington and Chickamauga, the volunteers moving in as
the regulars moved out for Tampa in the days when Cervera
was supposed to be back in Cadiz. As the volunteers were
THE ARMY UNPREPARED 643

moved on to Florida, the operation of amalgamating them with
the regulars proceeded, and a new camp was fixed at Jackson-
ville, under the command of General Lee.

As the number of troops sent to the Philippines was much
larger than was originally contemplated, and as many of the
regiments of the volunteers under the first call remained
incomplete, it was deemed advisable to have more men
mustered in, and on May 26th the President issued a call for
75,000 additional. U'p to the 1st of June about 118,000 of the
125,000 called for in the first proclamation had been mustered
in and recruiting for the regular army had raised it 30,000,
making 155,000 in all. Including the 10,000 men authorized
to be enlisted as immunes, this provided for an army, when
fully mustered, and the regular army when increased to its
legal limit, of over 260,000.

Yet, when the campaign was suddenly transferred to
Santiago and the order came for an expedition of about 12,000
under General Shafter to invest the city, it was found impos-
sible for it to get away promptly. The men were ready, had
been ready for some time, but when it came to the point of
putting them on transports, it was found that the commissary
department was weak. Line after line of freight cars loaded
with supplies came into Tampa, but for a time there seemed to
be no one who knew what was in the cars or where it was to
go. On account of the censorship prevailing at the Florida
headquarters, the public was supposing every day that tlie ex-
pedition was ready to start or was actually under way, when,
as a matter of fact, it was engaged in the difficult work of
bringing order out of chaos. Not having had a war for nearly
forty years the officers in charge of the commissary arrange-
ments had not risen to the emergency, however efficient they
were in the routine of times of peace. The little, but very
important, problems of fitting out even a small army with all
essentials, uniforms, ammunition, tents, picks, spades, shovels
for throwing up intrenchments, food, medicines, and so on
to the end of a very long list, had been unfamiliar to our army
644 THE TROOPS OFF AT LAST

officers, and, while it was disappointing, it was not surprising.
It was fortunate that we were dealing with an enemy no
livelier than Spain, and it provided a very profitable lesson to
be kept in mind in a future.

But the officers worked untiringly, and with such results
that by the 8th the troops were on board. the transports, and
the expedition had actually set out under the convoy of the
Indiana; but it had gone but a little distance when it was per-
emptorily recalled, much to the disgust of the troops, who were
crowded into rather close and warm quarters. At the last
moment the War Department considered that it would be rash
to set out without a stronger convoy. There had been repeated
rumors that Spanish ships of war had been seen in the neigh-
borhood of Cuba. They had generally been regarded as only
new editions of similar rumors and reports that had been cir-
culated from the very beginning of the war. These rumors
gave Spain the credit of having a fleet almost everywhere on
the Atlantic coast; but at just the moment the expedition was
to set out for Santiago, where the navy was impatiently await-
ing, came a circumstantial story declaring positively that a
Spanish battleship, a cruiser, and two torpedo boats had been
sighted sneaking about in the proposed path of the expedition.
It was difficult to see where such a fleet could come from, unless
the Cadiz fleet had slipped over unannounced; but the de-
partment proposed to take no chances, and back the expedition
came, to await other war vessels.

At last, however, on the 15th, the expedition got under
way for good. It consisted of sixteen infantry regiments of
the regulars, two volunteer regiments (fhe Seventy-first New
York and the Second Massachusetts), detachments of heavy
and light artillery, engineer and signal corps, and a part of the
First Volunteer Cavalry, under Colonel Wood and Lienten-
ant-Colonel Roosevelt, a division of expert horsemen and
sharpshooters, which had been organized by Roosevelt, and
which was popularly known as the “ Rough Riders.”
CHAPTER XLVI

THE BRAVE DEED OF LIEUTENANT HOBSON AND HIS CREW
— GOING INTO THE JAWS OF DEATH — FEARFUL EX-
PERIENCES AND A WONDERFUL ESCAPE.

Plans for Destroying or Capturing Cervera’s Fleet — Hobson Presents a
Plan to Prevent His Escape — Admiral Sampson Gives His Consent —
Preparing the Merrimac for a Dangerous Trip — Asking for Volun-
teers — Drawing Lots — Details of Hobson’s Plans — Preparations
Made at Last — The Crew as Selected — Hobson Speaks of His Chances
of Success — Battleships Take up Position at Sunset — Hobson Appears
on the Bridge — Everything Ready — The Merrimac Moves in —
Watching in Breathless Interest — Disappearing in the Mist of the
Shore — A Blaze of Fire — The Search of the Little Launch — Hobson
Given up for Lost — How He Steams into the Sheet of Flame— A Mine
Explodes under the Merrimae—On the Deck in a Hail of Shot and
Shell — Slipping Overboard and Clinging to the Catamaran — A Span-
ish Launch Appears— An Offer to Surrender — “It was Admiral Cer-
vera ””— Prisoners in Morro — Their Fate Made Known.

confident that Cervera was at Santiago, plans for

tightening the cork of the bottle, so to speak, were con-
sidered. Having the Spaniard there, every effort should be
made to prevent his escape. Realizing his situation, as he cer-
tainly must have done, it might fairly be expected that on a
dark, foggy, or stormy night he might work his way out suffi-
ciently far to escape before being recognized. The Caribbean
is noted for the fierceness and suddenness of some of its tropical
storms, and in one of these the American fleet might be separ-
ated, or at least obliged to lie off at a great distance from the
shore to ensure safety. At once, therefore, inquiries had been
set afoot for some available old vessel which might be taken to
Santiago and, possibly, sunk in the channel. In view of the
defenses at the entrance, however, the dangers of the proposed
operation seemed to render it impracticable, but Admiral

Sampson kept it in mind when-he set out for Santiago, hoping
(645)

F ROM the time the authorities at Washington became
646 HOBSON’S STARTLING PROPOSITION

that when he had looked over the defenses a way might be
found for such an attempt, and one of the first persons to claim
an audience with him on his arrival on June 1st, was Assistant
Naval Constructor Richard Pearson Hobson, a native of Ala-
bama, twenty-seven years old, a graduate of the Naval Aca-
demy in 1889, a student of naval construction abroad at one
time, and at this time holding the rank of Lieutenant in the
navy, and attached to the New York.

THe had looked over the mouth of the harbor and laid be-
fore the admiral a plan which he claimed would effectually
block the channel, so that a large part of the fleet would be at
liberty to cover the landing of the expected troops elsewhere.
It was a daring expedition which he proposed, and with true
courage he offered to lead it himself, indeed, he desired the
privilege of doing so. His plan was to select a volunteer crew
of just sufficient number to navigate the collier Merrimac, to
strip the old ship of everything of value except the coal remain-
ing in her, and then under cover of darkness, while the fleet
engaged the forts, to run her straight towards the narrowest
part of the channel, swing her across it, and sink her by firing
explosives in her bottom. He and his crew would jump over-
board as she sank and endeavor to make their way out so as to
be picked up by the torpedo boat Porter or a steam launch
from the New York, which should lie in close to shore for that
purpose. It was a startling proposition, an expedition which
the admiral could not feel justified in ordering, as it would
seem like sending men to certain death; but when one of his
subordinates offered and begged to undertake it and urged the
plan in eloquent and persuasive language, the admiral de-
termined to put it into execution if possible. He had seen
evidences of the cool bravery of Hobson at San Juan, where
he had stood at the New York’s range-finder throughout the
bombardment.

Hobson was ready to act that night, and he received his
commission to immediately prepare the Aferrimac for the
ordeal. While the officers of the collier were contentedly eat-
A CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS 647

ing their lunch, Hobson appeared on board and made the
startling announcement that he was going to sink their ship
that night in the channel, and he proceeded to fit her for the
emergency. The four transverse bulkheads were located and
their positions marked on the outside at the rail. A line was
run along the port side of the ship parallel to and under the
water line, and supported by other lines running over the rail.
Along this suspended line in 8-inch copper cases were hung
six charges of powder, each weighing about eighty pounds.
An igniting charge of brown powder was attached to each,
and the whole covered with pitch for protection against the
water. The wire and battery for exploding the charges were
made ready, and as far as possible all stores were removed,
leaving little in the ship, except 2,000 tons of coal. The
anchor chains were laid out on deck so that they would run
out without hitch. The men worked merrily, singing as they
prepared the collier for her fearful mission. At sunset a
thunder storm blew up, covering the mountains about Santiago
with dense clouds, which were rifted by brilliant flashes of
lightning. The echoes of the thunder peals rolled off to the
fleet in dull rumblings, like distant cannonading, and in the
intervals could be heard the voices of the men on the Merri-
mac, as they sang “ The Star Spangled Banner,” and “ Home,
Sweet Home.”

These preparations took time, and Hobson and the crew
were busy all that afternoon, and far into the night. Mean-
while, the admiral was making other preparations. Shortly
after Hobson had gone to the Merrimac, the ships’ crews of
the fleet saw the following signal flying from the New York:

“An attempt will be made to-night to sink the collier Merrimac at the
entrance to the harbor. One volunteer, an enlisted man, is requested from
each ship.”

Immediately the men were mustered on the quarter decks,
and the captains laid the plan before them, carefully explain-
ing the unusual risks that the volunteers would incur, but
practically the entire companies of the ships volunteered for
648 GLORY, BUT ALMOST CERTAIN DEATH

the dangerous work. On Commodore Schley’s flagship, the
Brooklyn, alone, 150 men volunteered; on the Texas 140
signified their desire to go; Hobson and the admiral really had
the pick of the men of the fleet. Sailors, machinists, firemen,
engineers, petty officers, junior officers, all begged to be al-
lowed to go. Commander Miller and the crew of the J/erri-
mac were particularly anxious to go, and a formal order was
necessary to get them off the ship. The New York’s launch
was selected to run in shore and pick up survivors. There was
intense rivalry for places in the launch. Cadets Palmer and
Powell disputed for the command. They settled the dispute
by drawing cigarettes from a box. Powell drew the odd one
and won.

About five o’clock the Vixen went around to the different
ships and picked up the volunteers, their comrades envying
them as they departed for a task that meant certain glory, but
almost as certain death. They were taken to the Merrimac,
where Hobson and a large force were busily at work, and
where the admiral came aboard to examine the preparations.
The squadron was moved down to the entrance of the harbor,
lying off in a semicircle, and there they awaited the Merrimac.
Hobson and his men worked away with a will. He had one
man stationed at the wheel, another to stand by with an axe
to cut the lashings to the bow anchor; another similarly to cut
the lashings of the starboard quarter anchor; another was to
explode the charges on a signal. Two signals only were to
be sent to the engineer, at first to knock out the props from
over the bonnets of the sea valves, and to cut the small sea
pipes, while a man was to haul in the life-boat; at the second,
the engineer was to stop the engines, run on deck and jump
over the starboard side. Realizing that in such a hazardous
undertaking, a mistake might prevent success, every detail
was worked out with precision.

It was Hobson’s purpose to creep in and approach the en-
trance from the westward until he could shape his course as
near as possible directly for Estrella Point. IIe wished to
THE ATTEMPT POSTPONED 649

put the bow of the boat near this point and then swing her
acryss the channel. When the ship was sufficiently near, in
his judgment, the bonnets were to be knocked off the sea
valves, and the engines stopped. The helm was to be put
hard to port, and the starboard bow anchor let go. This, he
thought, would swing the ship across the channel and stop her
headway. When she had swung far enough, the quarter
anchor was to be let go to check her and the mines exploded.
The strong flood tide was to be relied upon for assistance.
The powder charges were about thirty-five feet apart and ten
feet below the waterline.

The signals to the men at the anchors were to be given by
ropes attached to their wrists and leading to the bridge, where
it was Hobson’s purpose to stand till he felt the ship settle.
The other men, as soon as they had done the duty assigned to
them, were to jump over the side and make for the lifeboat.
Life preservers were served out, as well as revolvers and am-
munition. Each man was carefully instructed in the duty he
was expected to perform, and the necessity of his remaining at
his post until he had completely performed his duty, was im-
pressed upon each. They fully appreciated the desperate
nature of the undertaking.

At last all preparations were completed, but by this time
it was dawn. Hobson headed his ship in at about a 10-knot
speed, but had been running but a few minutes when she was
signaled to make for the flagship. This recall was a great dis-
appointment to Hobson, and, in answer to the admiral’s order,
he signaled, requesting that he be allowed to make the attempt,
late though it was, feeling certain that he could succeed. But
the admiral feared that daylight might spoil the chances of
success, and a positive order was given Hobson to stop.

So the fires were banked, and it was decided to postpone
the attempt till the following night. The men left their sta-
tions and the vessel steamed further off shore. The strain
had been very great on the men, who had nerved themselves
for the trying moment, but they were resolved to carry out
650 THE VOLUNTEER CREW

the undertaking, and only slight changes were made in the
crew. It was made up as follows:

Lieut. Richard P. Hobson.

Osborn Deignan, a coxswain of the Merrimac.
George F. Phillips, a machinist of the Merrimac.
John Kelly, a water-tender of the Merrimac.
George Charette, a gunner’s mate of the New York.
Daniel Montague, a seaman of the Brooklyn.

J. C. Murphy, a coxswain of the Jowa.

Randolf Clausen, a coxswain of the New York.

Hobson had selected but seven men for his crew, but at the
last moment, when those preparing the ship were withdrawn,
Clausen declined to leave, his desire to participate in the ad-
venture being so great that he practically deserted his ship.

The men lay around the Merrimac most of the day,
attempting to secure a little rest, and some slight changes were
made in the plans. Additional batteries were obtained, and
an additional powder charge was made ready on the port side.
The Jarge catamaran of the ship was slung over the side by a
single line. Hobson decided that it would-be safer to ex-
plode each charge separately, and directed that the men below,
as soon as their duties were performed, should assist in this
work before jumping overboard.

Hobson, who had spent most of the afternoon on the flag-
ship, boarded the Merrimac again at seven o’clock, went below
and tried to secure a little rest, of which he stood sadly in need.

“You expect to come out of this alive?” he was asked.

“ Ah! that is another thing,” he replied. “T suppose the
Estrella battery will fire down on us a bit, but the ships will
throw their searchlights on the gunners’ faces and they won’t
see much of us. Then if we are torpedoed we shall even then
be able to make the desired position in the channel. It won’t
be so easy to hit us, and I think the men should be able to swim
to the dinghey. I may jump before I am blown up, but I
don’t see that it makes much difference what I do. I have a
fair chance of life either way. If our dinghey gets shot to
pieces we shall then try to swim for the beach right under
HOBSON ON THE BRIDGE 651

Morro Castle. We shall keep together at all hazards. Then
we may be able to make our way alongside and, perhaps, get
back to the ships. We shall fight the sentries or a squad until
the last, and we shall only surrender to overwhelming num-
bers.”

At sunset the fleet again took up its formation before the
entrance to the harbor, in an are of a cirele of five miles
radius, with Morro Castle in the center. Beginning to the
westward they stood in this order: Viaven, Brooklyn, Marble-
head, Texas, Massachusetts, Oregon, Iowa, New York, New
Orleans, and Mayflower. The other boats remained outside
the circle, while the Dolphin and Porter acted as dispatch
boats. The evening wore away slowly. A full moon bathed
the quiet waters of the Caribbean in a splendid lustre of silver,
and the high mountains in front of Santiago lay in a robe of
white mist. The scene was beautifully peaceful.

On the decks of the ships lay the crews, with only rubber
blankets beneath them. The men are numbered, and when
in the presence of the enemy, the even and the odd numbers
sleep alternately, two hours at a time, with their guns and
small arms at their sides. In the event of a torpedo attack
each man slaps on the shoulder the man next to him who is
sleeping, and then the guns are turned on the enemy. So
they were sleeping on the moonlight night of the 2d of June,
into the moonlight morning of the 3d.

At about 1.30 A. M., Hobson came up on the bridge of the
Merrimac. All the men who were to go with the ship were
called up and given final instructions. Everything was made
ready below. The relief crew was then sent aboard the Tewas,
Hobson’s men took their positions, and at about 2.30 o’clock
the ship began to steam slowly towards the entrance.

Every man on the fighting ships, odd or even, was awake
now, and the progress of the big black hulk of the Merrimac
was watched with breathless interest. On towards the misty
entrance she moved, followed by the launch of the New York,
with a crew of five, in command of Cadet Joseph W. Powell.
652 GIVEN UP FOR LOST

The moon sank behind a bank of clouds near the horizon, and
then the Merrimac could no longer be distinguished from the
ships. The lower shore line was indistinguishable in the haze
which hid the entrance; still the crews on the big ships watched
and waited, expecting to see a burst of fire from the forts.

The crew in the steam launch had a nearer view and saw
the Merrimac heading straight in; Lieut. Hobson stood on the
bridge in full uniform; the other six men were at their posts,
clad in tights to aid in their escape if they should be compelled
to swim a long distance. The watchers saw the old collier
head straight for Estrella Point, saw her swing across the
channel, apparently undiscovered, for not a sound had as yet
broke the stillness, heard five of her seven charges explode, and
then began a screaming, flashing, death-dealing fire from the
Spanish ships and batteries. The rest was hidden from the
view of the ships and the launch.

It was about 3.15 when the first gun flashed out in the
misty entrance, but it was followed by a fusilade of rapid-fire
guns. Some of the batteries near the entrance directed their
fire at the little launch, but in the face of it all, Cadet Powell
and his crew continued to wait and search for Hobson and his
gallant heroes. They saw the guns of the Cristobal Colon
and tle Reina Mercedes, which had been supposed to be gun-
less, turned on their launch and thundering in their ears.
Still they searched and waited. Those on the line of battle-
ships could see only the sheet of flame ahead. At last the fire
slackened somewhat, and by the light of the dawn, now tinge-
ing the sky and land, the little launch was seen steaming from
west to east near the mouth of the entrance.

Then she steamed back from east to west and began skirt-
ing the coast to the west of the entrance. The batteries were
still firing at her, but she went as far as a small cove on the
shore, then put about and steamed for the flagship.

It was broad daylight by this time. As the launch came
alongside Cadet Powell shouted:

“No one has come out of the entrance of the harbor.”
IN A STORM OF SHOT AND SHELL 653

His words seemed like the death knell of all who had gone
in on the Merrimac, but as it grew lighter they could see the
tops of the old collier’s masts in the center of the channel, about
where Hobson said he would sink her.

It seemed incredible, almost impossible, that any of the
AMerrimac’s heroes could have lived through that awful fire.
There were few men in the fleet who did not think that all of
the eight men had perished. Still they hoped.

But we must return and follow the Merrimac as she dis-
appeared from the view of the ships first in the mist and then in
the blaze of fire which broke out from both sides. Hobson,
standing on the bridge, kept his eyes fast fixed on the channel
ahead, every nerve strained, waiting for the time when he
could sink the ship. That was the work before him. He
could pay no attention to the fire and he was not there to
answer it. The shells from the large guns on the hills first
roared about the ship and then the rapid fire from the Spanish
cruisers Joined in, their shots screaming through the rigging;
troops from some of the camps in the hills came rushing down,
and as the collier approached the Estrella battery the soldiers
lined the foot of the cliffs; rifle bullets whistled above them,
but Hobson could see that they were firing wildly at him; the
Spaniards were actually killing each other with their cross
fire, those on one bank shooting down those on the other.

The A/errimac’s steering gear broke when she reached Es-
trella Point, somewhat interfering with her management, and
but three of the torpedoes on her side exploded when Hobson
touched the button, but a large submarine mine, fired by the
Spaniards, caught her full amidships, hurling the water high
in the air and tearing a great rent in her side. Her stern in-
stead of her bow ran on Fstrella Point and she began to sink
slowly. She was just across the channel, going just where
Hobson -wished her to, but as she scttled the tide drifted her
around a little in spite of all efforts.

After firing the torpedoes and getting the ship in place,
Hobson and his men all ran aft and lay down on the deck wait-
604 MINUTES THAT SEEMED HOURS

ing for the water to reach it. Shells and bullets were making
a terrific din about them. The air seemed full of fire. Six-
inch shells from the Vizcaya came tearing into the collier,
crashing into the wood and iron, while the plunging shots from
the forts broke through her decks, riddling it all about them.

“Not a man must move,” shouted Hobson to those lying
beside him; and it was largely owing to the splendid discipline
of the men that they escaped the terrific fire. As the shells
rained over them, minutes seemed hours of suspense; the old
vessel seemed to sink very slowly. The men’s mouths grew
parched, but they dared not move.

“ Hadn’t we better drop off now, sir,” a man would say as
he lay prone on the deck expecting the next shell to come their
way.

“Wait,” said Hobson. “ We must wait till daylight, per-
haps.”

Wait in that hail of shot and shell! But Hobson knew it
would be impossible for them to escape on the catamaran to
any place but the shore, and there stood the soldiers still shoot-
ing. He hoped that by daylight some of the fleet might rescue
them. Fortunately, the Spaniards fired mostly at the bow of
the old Merrimac. It was being riddled and she was sinking
faster. Still Hobson and his men lay there motionless.
Finally, the water came to the decks where they were. It had
become daylight; the Spaniards thought no life remained on
the Merrimac, and the firing had ceased except on the launch
of the New York. Then the men slipped off into the water
and clung to the catamaran, which was floating amid the
wreckage but still fastened to the old hulk. Only their heads
were above the water, and the Spaniards seemed to have over-
looked them.

As it grew lighter they noticed a Spanish launch coming
towards the Merrimar, and they agreed that, if possible, they
would capture her and run out of the harbor; but as she came
closer the Spaniards saw them; half a dozen marines jumped
up and pointed their rifles at their heads.
THE BLOWING UP OF THE “MERRIMAC” ACROSS THE ENTRANCE OF SANTIAGO HARBOR, AND
ESCAPE OF LIEUTENANT HOBSON AND HIS CREW,

 
PRISONERS OF WAR - 657

“Ts there any officer on that boat to receive a surrender of
prisoners of war?” shouted Hobson.

An elderly man leaped out from under the awning and
waved his hand. It was Admiral Cervera. The marines
lowered their rifles; they came up and Hobson and his men
were helped into the launch, objects of admiration and awe
to the-Spanish marines. They were taken ashore and put in
cells in that Morro upon which they had looked so ofteu from
the sea, and now through their barred windows they beheld
their fleet where officers and crews were wondering and per-
haps despairing of their fate.

The day dragged on. Lobson and his men were given up
for lost. Finally, in the afternoon, a Spanish launch flying a
flag of truce was seen coming out of the harbor. Had it come
to tell them that Hobson and his men were dead? Or had it
come to tell them that they were alive? Out went the Viren
to meet the tug; a Spanish officer was taken on board and the
Vixen hurried off to the flagship. Then every man’s eyes
were on the New Yor)’, and at last they read a signal:

“(Collier’s erew prisoners of war; two slightly wounded.
All well.”

A mighty cheer went up. The Spanish officer informed
the admiral that the prisoners were confined in Morro Castle
and that Admiral Cervera had considered their adventure an
act of such great bravery and desperate daring that he deemed
it proper to notify the American commander of the safety of
the men. Whatever the motive for sending out the officer
under a flag of truce, the act was considered a very graceful
and courteous one, though the suspicion at once crossed the
minds of the American officers that the prisoners might have
been placed in Morro to save the fort from attack. The Span-
ish officer is reported to have said in reference to the sinking of
the Merrimac: “You have made it more difficult, but we
can still get out.”

From bearings taken of the Merrimac, whose masts and
smokepipes only could be seen, it was plainly evident now

39
658 UNPARALLELED HEROISM

that she had swung around so that she was not lying across the
channel; so far as completely blocking the channel, the at-
tempt had not been wholly successful. Still, the event de-
served a place in history as one of the bravest and most daring
deeds in naval annals.

No parallel to the achievement could be found in naval
warfare. Somers had shown a magnificent daring when he
blew up the ketch in the hurbor of Tripoli and Cushing’s dash
upon the Albemarle was likewise heroic. But both of these
crept to their destination in little vessels. Hobson steamed
into a narrow channel with a huge 4,000-ton ship, in plain view
of the batteries, almost under the muzzle of their guns; he
moved to a particular spot, manetvred his vessel in a particu-
lar way and worked to sink her in a particular position, under
a hail of shot and shell, which rendered the chances of success
infinitely remote. To conceive that the thing could be done
was an inspiration; to be willing to do it was the highest hero-
ism; to do it coolly, deliberately, and with professional skill
under the fearful fire was marvelous. The men who went
with Hobson should not be forgotten, and when it is recalled
that hundreds of others were ready to follow his lead, were dis-
appointed that they could not, there need be no anxiety about
American character.
CHAPTER XLVII

LANDING OF MARINES IN GUANTANAMO BAY — SUR-
ROUNDED BY HIDDEN ENEMIES — SPANIARDS CAUGHT
AT LAST — SHARP NAVAL FIGHT AT SAN JUAN.

Spaniards Strengthen Their Position — Bombarding the Forts at the
Harbor Mouth — The Reina Mercedes Wrecked — Looking for a
Possible Place for the Army to Land — Pluck of the Naval Re-
serves — Landing the Marines — Preparing Camp McCalla — Its
Peculiar Position — Fatal Search for the Enemy — No Sleep for the
Marines — Mauser Bullets Continually Whistling through the
Camp — Bravely Facing the Foe — Untenable Position of the Camp
— Spaniards Fire upon a Funeral Cortége — Driving Them Back
and Resuming the Services —Attacked from u New Quarter — A
Critical Situation — The Enemy Caught in a Trap — Slaughtered
without Mercy — The Camp Moved to a Less Exposed Position —
The Blockade of San Juan — Arrival of the St. Paul — The Terror
Makes an Attack — A Broadside from the St. Paul.

URING the long wait for the appearance of the army
LD upon which it was proposed to place the burden of
taking the city, the navy was much of the time lying

idly off Santiago, and Cervera’s ships were apparently as idle
within the harbor. The Spaniards, however, being fully in-
formed of the intended military expedition and of the purpose
of the United States to reduce the city and capture the Spanish
fleet before doing anything more, became very busy in
strengthening the land fortifications, so that altogether, from
a theoretical point of view, their position was impregnable.
Admiral Sampson, who was opposed to any rash experiments
endangering his fleet, endeavored to make some preparations
likely to be of advantage when the army arrived. He was
compelled to bear in mind the fact that Cervera might at any
time seek to escape, for it was now understood that Hob-
son’s heroic act had not been entirely successful. Either

in a battle with Cervera at the entrance of the harbor or in co-
(659)
660 ADMIRAL SAMPSON’S TARGET PRACTICE

operating with General Shafter, who was to command the
army, the forts might give some trouble, and he, therefore,
set out to weaken or reduce their batteries on June 6th. Hav-
ing received information that Hobson and his men had been
transferred from the Morro prison to the military prison out-
side the city, he no longer felt any delicacy as to breaking down
the historic walls of the old castle.

The fleet was formed in a double line about six miles from
shore — in one the New York, Iowa, Oregon, Dolphin, and
Yankee ; in the other, the Brooklyn, Commodore Schley’s flag-
ship, Massachusetts, Texas, Vixen, and Suwanee. They ap-
proached to within 4,000 yards of Merro, pouring in a tre-
mendous fire for an hour with generally fine marksmanship,
driving the Spaniards from their guns, crushing down masonry
and earthworks, and receiving unharmed the fire of the Span-
ish Krupp and Armstrong guns. Only one man on the fleet
was injured, and he but slightly. During part of the en-
gagement American vessels went within 1,000 yards of the
forts and drove the Spaniards from the guns. The Reina
Mercedes, which lay near the mouth of the harbor, was practi-
cally wrecked, but the Spaniards had already removed most of
her guns and mounted them on shore.

In searching for a favorable place for the expected troops
to land, Admiral Sampson’s attention was attracted towards
the harbor of Guantanamo, about forty miles east of Santiago.
To clearly understand the problem which General Shafter
was to meet when he came to consider the landing of his troops,
it should be borne in mind that the coast of Cuba between
Santiago and Guantanamo is in a general way formed of three
parallel ranges of hills. First there is the rampart on the sea-
front, a high flat-topped ridge very steep in most places, and
broken into terraces by outcropping ledges of limestone; be-
hind this are foothills rising out of the wooded valleys, and
behind that and another line of valleys or ravines, are the high
mounteins of the coast range, about six miles from the shore.
In the vicinity of Santiago the rampart or outer ridge along
 

 

 

 

 

THE INVASION OF CUBA.
United States soldiers embarking on transports at Tampa, Fla,
ADVANTAGES OF GUANTANAMO BAY 663

the sea front is about 300 feet high, stretching eastward and
westward like a great stone wall. At two places this wall is
cut down to the sea level in two narrow clefts or notches about
100 yards wide at the bottom, and these appear to be the only
openings through which the interior of the country is accessi-
ble to an invading force. In one of these and the nearest to
Santiago lies the village and railway station of Siboney, and in
the other the village which takes its name from the Baiquiri
River emptying at that point.

But it could not fail to appear to Admiral Sampson or to
anyone that a landing in either of these places would be diffi-
cult, perhaps impossible, if opposed strongly by a daring
enemy. Even without artillery, 1,000 men with Mausers on
the heights surrounding the notches and the approaches might
keep back a strong landing force for days, for, if driven from
the tops of the bluff, the Spaniards could fortify the foothills
beyond and be out of reach of the heavy guns of the warships.

If General Shafter should, upon examination, prefer not to
land his troops in Guantanamo Bay, because it would imply a
march through the foothills of forty miles to Santiago, the
harbor would at least be very useful as a naval rendezvous and
coaling station. The ships had lain out to sea a long time, and
at times had been obliged to coal under extremely unfavorable
conditions. Guantanamo Bay afforded a splendid shelter for
the fleet, and it was believed that a small party of marines
could establish themselves there and control the entrance.

On the day after the attack on the forts about Morro, there-
fore, Admiral Sampson sent the Marblehead, with the Yankee
and St. Louis, to shell the defenses of Guantanamo Bay, cut
the cables, and prepare for a landing. The Spanish fortifica-
tions were battered to pieces, and, while the Spaniards stood
by their guns for a time, they soon retreated. The naval re-
serves, which manned the Yankee, acquitted themselves with
great credit under the fire. A Spanish gunboat had the
temerity to come down and fire upon the American ships, but
the Yankee’s guns quickly drove her back, and soon afterwards
664 CAMP MCCALLA

the Marblehead took a position to hold the harbor till the land-
ing party should arrive.

It arrived on the 10th, a body of 600 Brooklyn marines
on the Panther, and with them came the Oregon, Dolphin,
and Yosemite to protect their landing. The marines, which
had been chafing under inaction for nearly a month, joy-
fully jumped into the boats and were landed without a
shot being fired. The Spaniards had apparently deserted the
landing point, which was chiefly occupied by the huts of the
Guantanamo fishermen and pilots, and these huts, as well as
the blockhouse, which had been partially destroyed in the pre-
vious bombardment, were burned as a precaution against
yellow fever. The Stars and Stripes were quickly raised on
the bluff by Color Sergeant Silvey, and the marines set merrily
to work getting their teuts and other appliances ashore and
laying out a camp to be called Camp McCalla, in honor of
the commander of the J/arblehead.

All the land, except that on the top of the bluffs selected
for the camp, was covered with woods and thick tropical
bushes, and the only road was a mule path skirting the
mountain. The landward approach was on the south side, and
here the hill fell away to a foothill, backed up against the
high ridge or rampart running along the shore of the Carib-
bean. West of the camp was the bay, to the north was
Fisherman’s Point, where the landing was effected, and to the
east was a lagoon putting into the foothills above mentioned.
All that night and the next day the marines worked with
energy in establishing their camp, and incoming sentries on
the morning of the 11th reported that none of the enemy had
been seen. The worst foe they had encountered were the
mosquitoes, which abound in the chaparral or thickets.

But at about 5.30 o’clock that afternoon a weather-beaten
old insurgent rushed into camp from the road leading from the
valley over to the tall hills three miles distant, and reported
that a skirmish line of Spaniards was advancing. He was not
a moment too soon, for a bullet from a Mauser rifle came hot
FIRE FROM A CONCEALED FOE 665

on his trail. Before the camp could make any preparations,
the Spaniards were making a fierce attack on the outposts from
the bushes near the lagoon.

Fully fifteen minutes of lively firing followed. Every
marine in the camp wished to dash into the bushes and at once
chase the hidden foe, but Col. Huntington and his officers kept
their men in check, and prepared to resist the attack on the
camp. Trenches had not been dug and the only shelter for the
few sick men and non-combatants was in the ruins of the block-

‘house. So fierce was the firing that Commander McCalla of

the Marblehead, thinking the Spaniards were attacking the
camp with a large force, hurried his marines ashore, and fifty
or sixty of the camp marines, who had been refreshing them-
selves by a bath in the bay, ran half-naked up the hills, caught
up their guns, and went to the aid of their comrades. For
nearly three-quarters of an hour shots were exchanged, now
brisk, then a scattering fire across the lagoon, or out of the
thickets. It was nearly dark when the outermost sentries
came in, hot, wearied, and panting. Three of their men were
missing, but one of them appeared later all right. Two had
been killed in the bushes.

There was a hasty meal of hardtack and coffee, but no
sleep for the men that night. The enemy continued to harass
the sentry lines, and Mauser bullets constantly whistled
through the camp. Commander McCalla kept the search-
lights of his vessel trained upon the dense thickets, but the
Spaniards concealed their movements. At least a dozen dif-
ferent attacks were made on the camp between dusk and dawn,
the heaviest and the best organized being made about one
o’clock in the morning. Then, apparently, the Spaniards
had completely surrounded the camp, and they poured in
volley after volley. But the marines, though hemmed in,
bravely kept their faces to the foe, and maintained a lively
return fire. At no time was it possible for the marines to see
objects twenty yards away, and only by the flash of the enemy’s
guns could the whereabouts of the attacking party be learned.
666 ATTACKING A FUNERAL CORTEGE

During the hottest of the fighting, four of the little camp
force were killed, including Dr. Gibbs, a New York physician, ©
who was picked off by a guerrilla as he stood near the hospital
tent. The enemy’s loss proved to be heavy, but the marines
at the time could judge nothing of the effect of their volleys,
as the bushes seemed to be full of Spaniards, maintaining an
exasperating fire, first from one side and then the other. The
Afarblehead and other vessels in the harbor dropped shells into
the thickets from which the Spanish fire seemed to come, and
this caused its temporary cessation from that quarter, only to
be soon and suddenly renewed from another.

At last the officers were convinced that the camp was un-
tenable; while it was on high ground and ought to be advan-
tageous in case of attack, little could be done against the Span-
iards hiding in the surrounding thickets and having a full view
of the exposed camp. It was decided to remove it to another
location on the hillside near the sea, and this work was vigor-
ously prosecuted on Sunday, the 12th, while the Spaniards
maintained their pestering attacks, well illustrated by their
fire upon the little party attending the funeral services of those
who had been killed the day before.

The bodies of the dead marines were wrapped in black
oilskins taken from their tents. Graves were dug on the edge
of a hill overlooking the bay to the northward of the camp.
A squad of marines from the Texas, under command of Lieu-
tenant Radford, acted as escort to the cortége as it passed
slowly along to the field where the dead were to be laid to rest.
It was impossible for all the men to attend the funeral. They
had other work to do, work on which depended the safety of
every manashore. While some of the marines took the bodies
of their comrades to their graves, the others proceeded with
the main work, some continuously on the lookout for the
enemy, others busy with the details of removing the camp.

There had been a lull for a few minutes in the firing, and
the men had a chance to look about and see what was going on.
One by one, as they observed the little funeral procession
EVIDENCES OF BARBARISM 667

stumbling over the loose stones on the camp ground, those who
could do so hurried forward, fell in behind and grouped them-
selves about the empty graves. ‘The stretcher bearing the
bodies was lifted to its place, and Chaplain Jones of the Texas
was about to begin the reading of the burial service, when the
Spaniards, who could see plainly what the men had gathered
for, gave a remarkable exhibition of their boasted chivalry.
Concealed in the bushes and trees of the western thickets, they
began shooting at the party, and this action convinced the
marines, if conviction were needed, that the stories told of
Spanish barbarism were true.

“Fall in! Company A! Company B! Company C!
Fallin! Fallin! ” was the word from one end of the camp to
the other.

The graves were deserted by all save the chaplain and the
little escort, who still stood unmoved. Everywhere men
sprang to arms and placed themselves behind the rolled tents,
their knapsacks, the bushes in the hollows or boxes and piles of
stones with rifles ready and eyes strained into the brush. The
little Colt’s guns which had been brought up from the ships
began their clatter, howitzers roared, blue smoke arose where _
the shells struck and burst in the chaparral and rifles snapped
angrily. There was trouble for the Spaniards in that particu-
lar place whence their bullets came, and shortly the firing
ceased everywhere in the brush and the funeral was resumed.
The Texas kept using her smaller guns on the chaparral near
the camp, and once more the men gathered about the grave
and Chaplain Jones began reading the Episcopal service. He
had nearly finished when the rifles of the enemy again cracked,
this time to the east.

A dozen men in the pits by the old blockhouse answered
and the chaplain kept right on with the solemn service. When
he had finished, the men again took their rifles and resumed
their watching, and the Panther shelled the brush to the east.
From that time on less trouble was experienced. In the after-
noon, the tents were all struck and carried to the low stretch
668 SPANIARDS IN A TRAP

of land rising from the beach, but were not again pitched, be-
cause they made too good targets while the Spaniards were in
the brush.

The situation for a time seemed decidedly critical. The
marines were obliged to forego all sleep and the skirmishing
was incessant day and night. The vessels in the harbor

 

1 Ycayo et?
HOSPITAL

1

 

4
1OF MILES
BRADLEY & POATES, ENGA'S, NAY

ENTRANCE TO HARBOR OF GUANTANAMO.
(Showing Camps of the Marines.)

dropped shells into the bushes, but, the Spaniards kept reap-
pearing at different places. In the end, however, the incom-
parable superiority of the Americans in marksmanship, in cool-
ness, and steadiness of nerve was triumphant. On Tuesday,
the 14th, Colonel Huntington abandoned defensive tactics and
sent out four scouting parties with orders to make an aggres-
sive fight. This they did in a most effective manner. Each
THE FIRST BLOODY ENGAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TROOPS ON CUBAN SOIL.

United States Marines at Guantanamo repelling a midnight attack of Spanish soldiers with the aid of the searchlight of the

Marblehead Sunday Morning, June 12, 1898,

 
FACING AMERICANS’ FIRE O71

detachment fell in with the skulking Spaniards and gradu-
ally worked them between their fires. Early in the after-
-noon, Captain Elliot drove the main body of the Span-
iards over the crest of the third hill, where Lieutenant
Magill had another division, which poured a deadly fire
into them as they descended. They ran back to the crest
of the hill, and this the Dolphin, which was in position,
swept with a murderous fire of 4-inch shells. The Span-
iards rushed down the hill again, and again fell into the
clutches of Captain Elliot’s men, including some Cubans, who
fought their old enemies like demons. Spaniards were fall-
ing all along the line, and they rushed back, endeavoring again
to escape along the crest of the hill, and there they were again
met by the Dolphin’s shells. Turn which way they would,
they were face to face with an American fire that had no
mercy in it. «As the Spaniards rushed along the crest of the
hill, they came face to face suddenly with a third scouting
party under Captain Spicer. Then in desperation they turned
back and ran into the marines under Captain Elliot and Lieu-
tenant Magill. Thus they fought desperately, refusing to
surrender till more than 200 lay dead on the hill. And the
only casualty that day on the American side was one Cuban
killed. The Americans left their Cuban allies to pursue the
remnant and returned to camp with a score of prisoners and a
large quantity of arms and ammunition. They had no more
serious trouble with the enemy at Camp McCalla. In view
of the dangers to which the camp had been exposed for five
days, almost constantly under fire, it is certainly remarkable
that no more than five lives were lost.

On the 15th, the Texas, Marblehead, and Suwanee steamed
up the bay and attacked the fortifications at Caimanera, about
three miles above Camp McCalla, and a bombardment of a
few minutes was sufficient to drive the Spaniards from their
guns, and an hour completely destroyed the forts and earth-
works which formed the main defense of the inner bay.

But it was plain to the eyes of the officers that the place
672 OPERATIONS OF THE ‘‘ VESUVIUS”

was not a good one for the landing of an army for the invest-
ment of Santiago forty miles away. No roads existed, and it
would have been a difficult undertaking to have handled heavy
artillery in such a mountainous country, which had been so
well adapted to the Cuban guerrilla warfare. It was near
Guantanamo, it will be remembered, that Goulet and his bands
had their early successes in the Cuban revolution.

Little was left for Admiral Sampson to do until the army
arrived, but he did not leave the Spanish forces at Santiago
unoccupied. On the 16th, he again shelled the enemy’s bat-
teries and battered down some new earthworks within his
reach. Again the wretched marksmanship of the Spaniards
saved the fleet from any damage. One of the most interesting
features of the work before the harbor at this time was the
successful practical trial of the so-called dynamite gunboat
Vesuvius. This boat, which, as a matter of fact, throws
through her pneumatic guns charges of guncotton instead of
dynamite, went close to the mouth of the harbor on the night
of the 13th and fired three shots, each containing 500 pounds.
They wrought havoe where they struck, and the performance
was repeated several times, much to the terror of the Spaniards.

The war was not without some important and interesting
incidents in other quarters at this time. From the beginning
it had been the purpose of the government to operate in Puerto
Rico, and arrangements for sending an expedition to that island
were under way even while the one to Santiago was causing so
much trouble and delay. In accordance with this plan, a
blockade had been declared against the port of San Juan, and
the St. Pau/, commanded by Captain Sigsbee, was sent to in-
stitute it. In the interval between Cervera’s arrival at San-
tiago and the beginning of operations against Santiago, the
torpedo boat-destroyer Terror, which Cervera had left at Mar-
tinique for repairs, had made her way to San Juan, and as
there was no way of her reaching Cervera then, there she re-
mained. The Isabella IT., an old cruiser, and one or two gun-
boats, were also in the port.
BLOCKADING SAN JUAN 673

When the St. Paul arrived before the harbor on June 22d,
the Spanish lookouts took her for the St. Louis, which they
knew was lightly armed, and the commanders of the Terror
and Isabella IT. figured that they could run out and destroy
the former liner before they were within reach of her guns.
So confident were they that they boastingly made public their
plans, and as a result the Spanish people in the city gave the
officers a great ovation, and the commander of the Terror made
a speech in the public square, declaring that he was going out
to engage the Yankee warship and inviting the people to
ascend the hills and watch the fight. This they did, and the
cloud of witnesses were noticed through the glasses of the
officers on the St. Paul before they knew what it meant.

About 1 o’clock, when the men were at mess, the lookouts
discovered a steamer coming out of the harbor. The St. Paul
was then about seven miles out, but she was turned towards
the approaching vessel and steamed at full speed to meet
her. The character of the vessel had not been made out as
yet, but the prospects even of holding up a merchantman was
sufficient to bring every man to the deck. The strange craft
wasted little time in informing the St. Paul of her character,
for she dropped a shell within a thousand yards of the liner,
which was immediately put around so that the Isabella IT.,
for she it was, might have the benefit of a broadside when she
approached near enough. But the Spaniard decided to come
no nearer, much to the disgust of the men at the guns of the
St. Paul. It was at this moment that the lookout reported
the little destroyer sneaking out of the harbor under cover
of the cruiser. Under all the recognized rules of naval war-
fare, it was rather dangerous for the converted liner to attack
a cruiser reinforced by so dangerous a craft as the Terror was
supposed to be, but our sailors were eager for a fight.

The Isabella If. continued to throw shells in the direction
of the St. Paul, but Captain Sigsbee paid little attention to
her at this time. Instead, he worked along with the Terror,
endeavoring to separate her from the cruiser and to keep her
674 SINKING THE ‘“‘ TERROR”

in the trough of the sea if she undertook to run for the St.
Paul. This she did when her commander saw that the St.
Paul was thus maneuvering. It was a dangerous moment,
for everything depended upon the gunnery of the St. Paul’s
men. Unless stopped by well-directed shots, there was noth-
ing to prevent her from getting close enough to launch a tor-
pedo, and then ho one of the St. Paul might live to tell the
tale. But Captain Sigsbee and his men were perfectly cool;
they allowed the Terror to get within 6,000 yards, and then
they let go the whole starboard battery.

The Terror had evidently been hit, and both Spanish
vessels began to act as if they were rather sorry they had come
out. The St. Paul worked up closer, and the Spaniards at
once made preparations to retreat. After putting two shots
into the Terror and knocking her after smokestack into the
sea, Captain Sigsbee turned his attention for a moment to the
Isabella II., which had been wasting hundreds of dollars
worth of ammunition in a wild fire. Then another gunboat
came out of the harbor and the Terror began to show further
signs of fight. Her gunners were beginning to get the range,
and were dropping a few shots uncomfortably near to the St.
Paul. But as soon as the latter’s guns were again trained on
the saucy torpedo boat, she turned about and started full speed
for the harbor. At this juncture a remarkable shot was made
from one of the St. Paul’s 5-inch guns. <A shell struck the
retreating Terror on the port side near the stern, and went
clear into the engine-room, killing the engineer and wounding
several others, wrecking the machinery, and placing the boat ‘
in a sinking condition. Ter propellers stopped working, and
she drifted in a westerly direction, signaling for help. Ina
few moments a vessel came out and took her in tow, but it was
too late to run her into the harbor; she was taken ashore and
beached in shallow water. The people on the cliff who had
come out to see the Yankee sunk were at a loss to understand
just why she still floated, while the Terror lay on the sands.
CHAPTER XLVIII

LANDING OF THE TROOPS AT BAIQUIRI AND SIBONEY —
THE ADVANCE THROUGH CUBAN THICKETS—A MAG-
NIFICENT CHARGE AND A_ DECISIVE VICTORY —
CAMARA’S PHANTOM FLEET.

Arrival of the Transports with General Shafter’s Army — Admiral Samp-
son and General Shafter Consult— Meeting the Cuban Leaders —
Enthusiastic Cubans — Baiquiri Selected as a Landing Place— Plans
and Preparations — Anticipating an Attempted Escape by Cervera —
Incidents of a Difficult Landing — Unfurling the Stars and Stripes —
On the Road to Santiago —— Yankee Ingenuity — The Enemy’s Retreat
to Guasimas— General Wheeler Decides to Attack — Moving Ahead
on Difficult Trails and under a Burning Sun— The Music of a Mauser
Bullet — Rough Riders Attacked— A Fierce Battle is On— Deploying
through the Thickets — Death in the Ranks— A Relentless Advance
— Victory and a Well-Earned Rest—The Dead and Wounded —
Camara Leaves Cadiz — His Trip to the Suez Canal.

flagship booming a salute to General Shafter com-

manding, the army of invasion steamed grandly
up almost to within range of the guns of Morro, or what was
left of them, at a little after noon on June 20th, just two
months after the opening of the war, and one month after Cer-
vera had entered Santiago harbor without incident. The
great transports and their convoys presented an impressive
sight, stretching out over eight miles of the Caribbean Sea and
gently moving with the heavy ground swell as though cour-
tesying to the grim warships which had so long awaited their
coming. The decks were thronged with soldiers gazing at the
remarkable scene before them. The line paraded in single file
past the warships, each vessel dipping her flag to the admiral
as she passed. The battleship Indiana was in the lead, fol-
lowed by the gunboats Bancroft, Castine, Machias, and

Annapolis. Then followed the transports, while the rear was
(675 )

W ITH flags flying and the guns of Admiral Sampson’s
676 CONFERENCE WITH THE CUBANS

brought up by the cruiser Detroit and several other smaller
convoys. General Shafter was immediately taken to the flag-
ship, where he informed the admiral that the trip had been
without incident of note, and plans were at once considered for
the landing of the troops, eager to leave the crowded transports.

The admiral had already made arrangements for a consul-
tation with the Cuban leaders, and that afternoon a preliminary
landing for this purpose was made at Aserraderos, a point
about twenty miles west of Santiago, which the Cuban General
Rabi had occupied a few weeks before and was still holding.
But about twenty people went ashore, and they certainly made
one of the most striking pictures of the war. Admiral Samp-
son and General Shafter, with but a small escort, were rowed
to the beach in a small boat, which was met by a mounted
foree of Cuban officers. As the blue jackets drove the boat
towards the shore, the Cybans dashed into the surf, cheering
and shouting. The party was conducted to General Rabi’s
headquarters, where a conference was held, General Garcia,
the Cuban commander in the province, being present. The
camp was a very picturesque collection of shelters made of
palm leaves after the Cuban fashion, situated on the crest of a
rugged hill and containing something over a thousand soldiers
newly equipped and furnished with stores from the fleet.

It was evident that Aserraderos was no place for a landing,
for the so-called road leading to Santiago was only a mule path
over which it would require many days of hard work to trans-
port artillery, and the city was on the opposite side of the bay.
Guantanamo, on the east, Shafter considered equally bad, and
still further away. It was agreed that Baiquiri, about fifteen
miles east of Morro, would be the best place, though it was
admitted that it would be difficult to land there if the Span-
iards made a very stout resistance. With the aid of the ships
and a plan for diverting the attention of the enemy to other
points, however, General Shafter thought it could be done
without great loss.

The plan as finally agreed upon was to begin the landing
 

 

 

INVASION OF CUBA. FIRST UNI ) STATES SOIL,

Landing of the first American /

  

 
KEEPING AN EYE ON CERVERA 679

at Baiquiri soon after daylight the 22d. General Castillo was
ordered to bring a thousand Cubans to flank out the Spanish
on the east of the landing, while four vessels were to shell the
beach and blockhouses, the Detroit and Castine on the west-
ward flank and the New Orleans and Wasp on the eastern
flank. In order to deceive the enemy, feints were arranged for
other points; vessels were to take positions at daylight in front
of Siboney and Aguadores, both to the eastward of Morro and
somewhat nearer than Baiquiri, and also in the bay of Cabafias
to the westward of Morro. In the latter place a feint of land-
ing would be made, ten transports lying off that point and low-
ering boats and pretending to make ready to row ashore. The
Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa, and Oregon were to retain
their positions in front of the mouth of the harbor. The last
clause of Admiral Sampson’s order to his vessels was sig-
nificant. It read:

“The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in block-
ading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmcest
vigilance from this time forward — both as to maintaining stations ard
readiness for action, and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor
mouth. If the Spanish admiral ever intends to attempt to escape, that
attempt will be made soon.”

The plan as outlined worked at first with satisfactory suc-
cess. The feints deceived the Spanish; the bombardment by
the ships was described in the Spanish reports to Madrid as ter-
rific and insupportable; the Cubans did their share in distract-
ing the enemy, which fled from Baiquiri’s blockhouse to posts
along the coast towards Sevilla, a town about six miles east of
Santiago and about three miles from the shore. Before they
fled from Baiquiri an attempt was made to burn the town and
the supplies, but much of it was left unharmed, even food was
found cooking for the Spaniards’ breakfast. The only dam-
age suffered by the fleet in the engagement was on board the
Texas; a shell from Socapa battery happened to strike her,
killing one sailor and wounding eight.

When the signal for landing was given, scores of rowboats,

steam launches, and dispatch boats crowded with soldiers
40
680 LANDING THE TROOPS

made for the little pier belonging to the Spanish-American
Iron Company. The men at the oars pulled hard in a desire
to be the first to land, the steam launches rolled and pitched
and puffed, while over them flew the shots from the gunboats,
tearing off the roofs of the huts and battering the blockhouses
to pieces. The waves ran high and as the first of the launches
approached the pier it was suddenly lifted and the men, in
attempting to spring out, were thrown violently to the wharf;
others were scrambling out of rowboats through the surf; then
a cheer arose and was caught up by the sailors on the warships
and the soldiers on the transports; men waved their hats,
jumped up and down and yelled. But the noise was even
greater a little later when four men were seen scaling the sheer
face of the mountain up the narrow trail to the highest block-
house; for a moment they were outlined against the sky in a
bunch by the side of the blockhouse and all was still; then up
went a flag, out flashed the Stars and Stripes against the blue
sky at the very top of the ridge. Sailors, Cubans, and soldiers,
on land and on sea, shouted and cheered again, and every
steam whistle for miles around shrieked and tooted and roared
in a pandemonium of delight and triumph.

The landing recalled the pictures of naval maneuvers of
long ago, when armed boat crews and boarding parties were
in vogue. Throughout the day smoke was issuing from the
burning buildings of the town. Outside were the transports,
ranging from the huge coastwise steamer to side-wheelers and
nondescript vessels. All were constantly moving to overcome
the diift of the current. Among them and spread out to
either shore were the convoys whose keen-eyed lookouts
scanned the beach and hills beyond. Small boats were every-
where. They came and went singly, in pairs, in groups, in
long lines, rowed and towed. They clung to the ships, they
lined the landing wharf, and they filled the space between.

The men, after landing at the low wharf inside the iron
pier, straggled up a level bit of sand beyond it. Then they
fell into companies, and, marching away, were soon lost to
RETREATING SPANIARDS 681

view in the tangle of tropical underbrush. Of the thousands
who landed not more than 200 were in sight at any time on
shore.

All day long and all the next day the boats went back and
forth, landing the soldiers at Baiquiri without resistance, and
the Spaniards having evacuated Siboney, that place was taken
for the landing of other troops and the horses and mules; the
latter were pitched overboard in the expectation that they
would swim ashore, and most of them did so, though a few
swam directly out to sea and were drowned. Landing 15,000
men, with arms and equipment and all the paraphernalia of
war on such a beach without the aid of lighters was a long and
difficult undertaking even when unresisted. If the Spaniards
had made a bold stand at the first it would have been much
more difficult, if not impossible, but they feared the guns of
the fleet and fell back to the hills.

General Lawton, who was in command of the advance
landing party, occupied the town of Baiquiri the first night,
posting sentries about in the hills, and General Young’s troops
had advanced some distance on the road to Santiago. The
next day the head of the column was pushed further on. One
road runs along the coast behind the cliffs for some distance,
but it was found to be hardly more than a wood path over-
grown with bushes and shut in on either side by the chaparral.
Another road, but no better, runs to the north of this to
Juragua and Seville, where the Spanish general, Linares, had
assembled his forces for resistance. Either road was a dan-
gerous one to follow and artillery could be moved up but
slowly. Yet the men worked bravely on, the line moving
ahead on the roads as it was landed from the transports with-
out a challenge from the enemy. ‘

An interesting incident of the march through the village
of Demajayabo on the 23d was the capture of a locomotive
left by the Spaniards standing on the track with steam up.
Before they scampered away they attempted to disable the
engine, but their efforts merely served to again illustrate Span-
682 THE PEACEFUL PROLOGUE ENDS

ish lack of mechanical skill and the ingenuity of the Yankee.
The railroad employes had hurriedly taken off the eonnect-
ing rods, throttle gear, and other important pieces of the
machinery, concealing them behind fences and under cars, and
even burying some of them. Then, after blocking the piston
guides with pieces of wood, they ran off in the firm belief that
they had put the locomotive permanently out of commission.

But in the Yankee forces were half a dozen old railroad
engineers and mechanics who shouted with joy when they saw
the engine. Ina few moments they were clambering all over
the machine, and it took them but a minute to discover its
condition. A search was started for the missing parts, some
of which were found; clever makeshifts were resorted to in
place of those not found, and in a short time the locomotive
was puffing away in the direction of Juragua drawing a train
of ore cars filled with Yankee soldiers.

On the 24th the end came to this peaceful prologue and
war began in earnest. The hot sun came up from behind
the mountain peaks, lifted the curtain of morning mist and
revealed the advance line of the army scattered along the nar-
row valley which traces irregular paths between Baiquiri and
Sevilla. Two miles to the rear were the tents of the second
division marking with a white line the road to Demajayabo,
to which General Wheeler had moved and established head-
quarters during the night.

General Lawton’s headquarters consisted of a cluster of
half a dozen huts two miles inland from Siboney, whose little
harbor was crowded with transports, launches, and small boats
still engaged in landing troops. The third division was clus-
tered about the beach, some bathing, others gathering the scat-
tered equipments, and still others making preparations for
breakfast. Far to the front was the thin line of Castillo’s
Cuban outposts, their flags faintly moving in the morning air.

According to reports brought to General Wheeler, who
was in command of the forces which had already landed, while
General Shafter was still on his ship, the Spaniards, after their
 

 

 

 

 

BLOCK HOUSE AT SIBONEY WHERE THE AMERICAN TROOPS FIRST HOISTED THE UNITED STATES
FLAG; AFTERWARDS MADE A BASE OF SUPPLIES,
APPROACHING GUASIMAS 685

evacuation of Siboney, had retired to a point three miles away
near Sevilla, and had intrenched themselves at a junction of
two roads or trails called Guasimas. From that point a single
road leads to Santiago. General Wheeler had in this local-
ity the Twenty-third Infantry, four troops of the First
Cavalry, four of the Tenth Cavalry, and the troops of the
Rough Riders — in all about 1,000 men. After making an
examination of the country in which the enemy was supposed
to have halted, he returned to his headquarters and notified
his officers that he proposed to attack. Colonel Wood of the
Rough Riders was ordered to approach the enemy from the
left while the force under General Young followed the road
to the right, the two meeting at Guasimas.

Gradually the sun chased the lingering shadows out of
the ravines and began to scorch the hillsides. Camps were
broken, columns of soldiers were formed, and the advance was
resumed. Blazing blockhouses here and there indicated that
the enemy was still in full retreat, hastening to the shelter of
the entrenchments nearer the city. Not a Spaniard could be
seen, although hundreds of field glasses scrutinized every part
of the landscape in a vain effort to penetrate the thickets.
Early in the morning General Young started towards
Guasimas with the First and Tenth dismounted Cavalry, and,
according to the agreement of the night before, he took the
trail to the right of the Rough Riders, who as yet had not
come into possession of their horses and were therefore dubbed
the “ Rough Walkers.” They left their camp at 5 o’clock, and
at 7 entered the village of Siboney. After a short halt they
began a long climb up the steep western trail toward the ren-
dezvous. By this time the heat of the sun was beginning to
be keenly felt by the men. Laden with full marching equip-
ment, they toiled slowly up the rocky path in single file. Not
enough air was stirring to make a leaf flutter. Along the hill-
side several halts were necessary before the men could reach
the mountain. A dozen mules carried the reserve ammuni-
tion and the scanty hospital supplies. The beasts were se-
686 UP TO THE ENEMY

riously affected by the heat also, but despite these obstacles
the toilsome ascent was.finally made and a refreshing sea
breeze afforded a trifling relief. Before the Rough Riders
stretched for nine miles a comparatively level plateau half a
mile in width, dotted with chaparral thickets and frequently
broken by small ravines.

Meanwhile, Young’s men were slowly winding their way
along about a half mile to Wood’s right, but the bushes were
so thick in every direction that neither line could see the other.
Skirmish lines had been sent ahead to prevent a surprise. The
men advanced in high spirits, remarking upon the scenery, but
the heat was so intense that some began to fall out of the ranks
and drop exhausted under the shade of convenient bushes.

Still no sign of the enemy. The columns labored along
over the narrow uneven path for an hour and a half, when
Wood called another halt and rode forward to meet Captain
Capron, who had been sent on ahead and who was now coming
back. He had gone within sight of the enemy’s outposts, and
the officers knew that a battle was at hand. The Rough
Riders had not been ambushed, but they had been ordered
ahead to attack the enemy, whose position was known in a
general way, but it is doubtful if such a battlefield was ever
seen before. The place where the Rough Riders were halted
was where the trail narrowed and proceeded downward. On
one side of it was a stout barbed wire fence and on both sides
was a dense chaparral, which in places was absolutely im-
penetrable. Wood and Capron came back and said to Roose-
velt: “Pass the word back to keep silence in the ranks,”
and then they disappeared again towards the front. The men
had no knowledge of what was ahead and merely welcomed
the opportunity for a little rest and a chance to shift their
packs. Asa matter of fact they had little expectation that an
enemy which had made no resistance to their landing would
oppose the march very seriously till in force before Santiago.

After waiting about ten minutes, Wood returned and gave
orders to deploy the troops at either side of the trail, Ca-
THE MUSIC OF MAUSERS 687

pron’s troops were ordered down the trail itself; Troop G into
the bushes on the right, and K and A were sent down into the
hollow to connect with Young’s column across the valley,
which had also come up with the enemy and had begun firing.
Troops F and E were deployed in skirmish line to the left.
But the movement had hardly begun when, with surprising
unexpectedness, there was a sharp crack which seemed very
near, and the peculiar music of a Mauser bullet sounded over
the Rough Riders’ heads. There was no more gossip in the
ranks, but the men séattered in the directions in which they
had been ordered, Roosevelt leading the men to the right and
Wood down the grassy slope to the left. The music of the
bullets at once became constant; the enemy’s fire was heavy.
While the Rough Riders had not been strictly taken by sur-
prise, the lay of the land placed them at a terrible disad-
vantage. But no one seemed frightened. Though a moment
before they had scarcely been able to realize that they were
actually at war, they now rushed forward with an excitement
which amounted almost to ecstacy. Whether the Spaniards
could see our men or not, our men could not see the Spaniards,
and yet the fire was not more than eighty yards away and was
so hot that our men could only lie in the grass and fire in that
position. As they rose up to rush a little further towards the
enemy, some dropped not to rise when the next order for an
advance came. The advances were made in quick, desperate
rushes, and sometimes the ground gained was very slight.
There was but an occasional glimpse of the enemy, and our
men could only fire their volleys into the places whence the
shots seemed to come, but they fired with perfect discipline
and the advance was steady. Gradually the line became
divided by the trail into two wings, that in the valley and that
on the left, swinging around on the enemy’s right flank.
When the fighting had lasted about an hour, the line
reached a more open country in front of a slight hill. Mean-
time, the troops that had pushed out in the direction of
Young had joined his line, which was meeting a desperate re-
688 A MAGNIFICENT DASH

i

sistance and which had thus far been unable to dislodge the
enemy from his rifle pits. By this time also the troops in the
rear, the Tenth Cavalry and the Twenty-second Infantry,
hearing of the battle ahead, had hurried forward to reinforce
their comrades. Both Wood and Roosevelt led their men
in a charge up the incline, and the enemy, thinking that the
whole army was behind them, retreated. The Rough Riders,
reinforced by the men hurrying up from the rear, pressed their
advance relentlessly, throwing away everything that could
impede their progress and rushing on regardless of danger.
Such an advance in the face of terrific volleys was past the
comprehension of the Spaniards. “ When we fired a volley,”
said one of the prisoners later, “instead of falling back they
came forward. That is not the way to fight, to come closer at
every volley.” Many striking incidents occurred. One pri-
vate continued firing after being hit by three bullets and re-
tired only when the fourth had disabled him. One who had
been sent to the rear seriously wounded, caught up a rifle, and,
running back, joined.in the charge. It was a magnificent
dash, and when the enemy had disappeared towards Sevilla,
the Rough Riders and their comrades rested on the ground
they had gained and where some of their bravest men had
fallen. The Spanish force engaged has been variously esti-
mated, but numbered at least 2,000. When the battle began,
the American force at the front was less than a quarter of that
of the enemy, which, moreover, had a marked advantage in
position. The Rough Riders had made a night march the
evening before, had secured but about three hours’ sleep on
the wet ground, and had been marched under a burning sun
and over a difficult trail right into action. Few of them had
ever fired a Krag-Jorgensen rifle before, as they had secured
their arms but a short time before leaving Tampa, and probably
not over 80 per ecnt. had been under fire before. Of the
Rough Riders eight were killed and thirty-four wounded, and
of General Young’s force there were eighteen killed and
eighteen wounded. Among the officers killed were Captain
THE PHANTOM FLEET 689

Capron and Sergeant Fish, a grandson of the Secretary of
State under Grant. Both Wood and Roosevelt were in the
thick of the fight, and walked calmly about the lines encourag-
ing their men, but neither was hit, though they had many
narrow escapes.

The Spaniards had not simply lost many men, but their
courage. From this time they acted simply on the defensive.
In their retreat they passed beyond many places where they
might have secured a terrible advantage over our advancing
troops and devoted themselves entirely to an ingenious defense
of the outer intrenchments of Santiago.

Shortly after General Shafter’s expedition had departed
from Tampa, it was announced that Admiral Camara’s fleet
had left Cadiz. Javing derived some satisfaction from the
manner in which Cervera had eluded Sampson the month be-
fore, much to the anxiety of people on the coast, Spain appa-
rently decided to use similar tactics at this important time,
when the better part of the American navy was engaged in
holding Cervera. Admiral Camara’s ships departed after the
most solemn ceremonies, the blessing of flags by the bishops
and a brilliant procession. For some days its destination was
mere guess-work. It was considered probable that Camara
was coming to the relief of Cervera. While the number of
the ships was considerable — sixteen altogether — but two
were really formidable, even in theory. These were the
battleship Pelayo and the armored cruiser Carlos V. With
them were three new torpedo-boat destroyers and two auxiliary
cruisers. The remainder were gunboats and colliers.

On the 25th, Sagasta announced that the fleet was bound
for the Philippines, and the movement was considered as of
little importance except as a sop to public opinion in Spain,
for the people complained that the government was weak in
not relieving Governor-General Augusti at Manila. They
were still supposing that Cervera was preventing the United
States from doing anything in Cuba, and were inclined to
think that Camara could easily redeem the Philippines. On
690 CAMARA RETURNS TO SPAIN ,

the 26th he reached the north end of the Suez Canal and
acted as if he intended to go on. While the United States
government saw nothing to seriously fear in the Cadiz squad-
ron, as the Monterey and Charleston would arrive at Manila
before Camara possibly could, it announced on the 27th that
an American squadron under Commodore Watson would pre-
pare for immediate cruise to the coast of Spain. The Spanish
coast cities at once became alarmed and fortifications were
strengthened in a hurry. But Watson’s fleet did not sail “ at
once.” The government kept reiterating its intention to have
it sail, but there were delays in getting the ships ready and
there were other excuses. Indeed, the announcement seemed
to be mainly intended to divert Camara’s ships from the Philip-
pines and back to Spain. If such was the strategy, it
proved entirely successful, for after hovering about the en-
trance of the canal for some days, paying toll money amount-
ing to $250,000, and, after taking the fleet to Suez, he turned
about, paid return toll, and eventually started homeward, to
the amazement and bewilderment of everybody. This return
movement, however, did not occur till after Cervera’s fleet
had been destroyed and the capitulation of Santiago had be-
come inevitable.
CHAPTER XLIX

CONTINUED ADVANCE OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS—GEN-
ERAL SHAFTER ARRIVES AT THE FRONT—PREPARA-
TIONS FOR A GENERAL ATTACK —INGENIOUS SPANISH
DEFENSES.

Advancing the American Lines —The Spanish Retreat — Trials of the Trail
—Soldiers Pushing Ahead Faster Than Supplies Could be Brought
Up —Impossible to Land Heavy Guns—Cutting a Way through
Tropical Jungles—General Shafter Leaves the Ship—The Cuban
Soldiers— A Remarkable Collection of Warriors —Famished and
Naked Patriots —No Understanding of Organized War — Their
Value as Scouts and Guides — Their Aversion to Spades and Picks —
Good Reasons for an Immediate Attack — Dangers of the Climate —
Stretching the Line Northward — Position of the Different Divisions
— Within Rifle Range of the Enemy — Traps Laid by the Spaniards —
Disguised Sharpshooters in the Treetops— Rifle Pits Trained on the
Openings through Which our Troops Must Advance — Riflemen
Placed Like Machine-Guns— The Block Houses-and Masked Batteries
— Expecting to Take Santiago in a Day — Inadequate Hospital
Arrangements — The Greatest Land Battle of the Wav.

pushed forward his command through the valley and

Generals Lawton and Kent with their commands oc-
cupied the adjacent hills as fast as troops were landed. By
the night of the 25th there were about 8,000 American and
Cuban troops in and about Sevilla, which the Spaniards had
evacuated without resistance. On the following morning the
advance guard, led by the Seventh Infantry under Colonel
Benham, pushed forward about three miles, halting and camp-
ing near San Juan on the Guamo River about four miles from
Santiago. During the day the entire First Brigade moved
forward and camped within two miles of the Seventh Infantry,
while the Cubans, whose knowledge of the country surpassed
that of the Spaniards themselves, were kept a little in advance
of the most advanced American lines. They were indeed
within two miles of the Spanish outposts in the hills, a short

distance east of the city. The scouts had explored the terri-
(691)

\ FTER the engagements of the 24th, General Wheeler
* 692 TRIALS OF AN EAGER ARMY

tory between the head of the column and the Spanish outposts
and no considerable body of Spaniards was reported. The
remainder of our army was camped along the hills between
the front and the landing places at Baiquiri and Siboney.
These detachments were being moved forward as rapidly as
possible, but in the face of the most unfavorable conditions.
No opposition was met from the Spaniards, however, who
seemed to have been dazed by the rapidity and daring of the
American advance. They had abandoned position after posi-
tion with scarcely a show of resistance. If they had fought
every inch our army would have been in a very difficult posi-
tion. One who has not gone over the trails in this section of
Cuba in a pouring rain or burning sun cannot understand the
sufferings to which the American troops were subjected and
the heroism with which they bore it. These infantrymen
from cool northern climes toiled hour after hour along these
so-called roads and paths, through jungles of cacti, poison
vines and high grass which cuts like a razor, in a blistering
sunlight which made the horizon waver before the eyes, or in a
torrent of rain which drenched to the skin, while from the
stagnant pools gray mists arose, and everywhere vultures with
outstretched wings looked greedily down.

And yet all the men were anxious for the fighting to begin,
many of them as yet without any adequate idea of what real
fighting was like. They chafed at the delay caused in bring-
ing up supplies, which was, of course, a very hard task in such
a country, especially when the commissary department had
been mismanaged. General Shafter had hurried forward the
light guns as fast as he could and did not wish fighting to begin
till he had the batteries in position, but the heavy guns were
still on the transports. There was only one lighter to take off
supplies. The spirit of the men was such that they would
have rejoiced at an order to carry the city by assault, big guns
or not. But General Shafter had no intention of attacking
till the subsistence department had become able to provide
three days’ rations for the soldiers’ knapsacks, and it appeared
GENERAL SHAFTER AT THE FRONT 693

impossible ‘to work the provisions along as fast as the eager
soldiers advanced. With a high sea running it was dangerous
work even to land the supplies, and yet the soldiers at the
front, often obliged to wait a disagreeably long time for their
rations, were ready to throw away their knapsacks and rush
upon Santiago. Tired, footsore, drenched as they were, they
were eager for any orders involving some daring deed without
any consideration of what might follow.

On the 26th, General Shafter left the ship on which he
had made his headquarters during the work of landing the
expedition and went along the road and among the camps,
consulting with his generals and the Cuban leaders. THe was
informed that General Linares, who was in command at San-
tiago, was about to be reinforced by a division from Man-
zanillo, and he decided to send a detachment of Cuban troops
to intercept them, or at least keep them at bay till the city
could be completely surrounded. When General Shafter
reached the front on the 29th, having had abundant oppor-
tunity on the way to observe the obstacles under which the
transportation of military supplies had been made, he found
that a large part of his troops had reached a position so close
to the Spanish lines before Santiago that only the intervening
hills.remained to be taken. In view of the difficulties of the
country, General Shafter had reason to feel proud that in a
week’s time his army had made such headway. The soldiers
were in good form; the Cubans added greatly to the numbers,
and while they had not as yet been tested in regular battle,
they had proved of great advantage in scouting. General
Garcia was working cordially with him and seemed to be ready
to do whatever was ordered.

Up to this time the Cuban soldiers had been regarded with
something like enthusiastic interest. They were the most re-
markable collection of warriors which our army officers had
ever seen. On the morning of the 29th, for instance, one
of the transports had landed at Siboney 2,000 insurgents
which had been brought around from Aserraderos under the
694 CUBANS AS SOLDIERS

command of General Sanchez. They were landed through
the heavy surf and lined up emaciated, half naked, and in
some instances almost entirely nude; but, weak as they were,
they stood up proudly and shouted “Cuba Libre” much to
the astonishment of the foreign military representatives, who
were utterly at a loss to understand the enthusiasm of men in
their miserable condition. These famished men fell to de-
vouring the rations served to them like starving wolves; some
of them ate so much that they nearly died, but then they cheer-
fully prepared to march to the front among the Cuban scouts.
The American officers soon found, however, that the value of
these allies was mainly confined to their scouting. In a cer-
tain way their bravery was phenomenal, but they bad no
understanding of organized war or discipline. In the excite-
ment of the fighting they paid no attention to orders; they
would lacerate the treetops with their bullets, then fling down
their rifles and rush through the bushes at a few Spaniards
with their machetes. All the work of making intrenchments,
of widening the roads for bringing up guns or food was to
them a puzzle. They would cheerfully scout, but they would
not work with spades and picks; and naturally the Americans
became indignant when they saw the Cubans sitting around
munching the food brought up with so much difficulty, while
hard digging in trenches was to be done. These half clad,
lean, and dusky fellows would sneak through the underbrush
up under the noses of the Spaniards, and when hit with a bul-
let would throw up their arms, shout “ Cuba Libre,” and drop
dead; but all the Cubans in Cuba could not have taken San-
tiago. Our soldiers could readily understand why the Span-
iards had never been able to drive them out of such a country,
and why the Cubans had seldom shown a disposition to fight
in the open. Gomez’s plan of wearing out Spain was the
only one in which his picturesque forces had any chance of
success.

But leaving the possible assistance of the Cubans out of
the question, General Shafter took an optimistic view of the
 

 

 

 

AN ALARM NEAR THE SPANISH LINE AT SIBONEY. CUBAN SCOUTS RALLYING AROUND A UNITED
STATES DESPATCH BEARER.

 
REASONS FOR PROMPT ACTION 697

situation as he found it at the front. So weakly had the Span-
iards resisted his landing when they might have made it ex-
ceedingly difficult, so quickly had they abandoned strong posi-
tions and fallen back on their intrenchments, that Shafter
thought they could be easily beaten out of their last defense.
Nearly everything went to confirm him in this opinion. De-
serters from Santiago told him of the desperate condition of
the Spaniards in the city. It had been expected that they
would make a strong defense of Aguadores near the coast and
on the left of the American line, for they had strongly in-
trenched it and had some artillery there, but on the 30th they
deserted it and moved to the seaward fortifications a little to
the west and containing the strongest batteries on the coast.
But they were within reach of the fleet, and therefore the left
of the American line was ordered to move up to the position
the Spaniards had deserted.

But while General Shafter had his army within rifle range
of the enemy, his heavy guns were still on the transports; his
soldiers had forged ahead over roads which could not be made
passable for heavy guns for days. It is not strange that the
question whether he should wait for the heavy guns occurred
to him nor is it altogether strange that he decided not to wait
for them.

The country was such that inactivity might prove more
fatal to the soldiers than action; sickness due to climatic condi-
tions might in a few days weaken and demoralize such an eager
army; in their desire to push on rapidly they had thrown away
much that they were likely to need when waiting in their
position. They were still in excellent form, but as one or
two of the officers had become ill and General Shafter himself
began to feel the effects of the climate, prompt attack seemed
wise. Moreover, reinforcements were hurrying to Linares
from the west and the Spanish near Guantanamo might take
advantage of delay to seek a position on the American right.
Everything tended to convince Shafter that it might be fatal
to wait. Later experience justified his conduct. The risks
698 SHAFTER’S DECISION

of the Cuban climate to Northern men, exposed to the furious
sun during the days and compelled to sleep through the
damp, chill nights with no shelter, were at least as great as
could be expected, even from stubborn Spanish resistance.
At first the weather had been very good, but rains had begun
during the advance and the men suffered discomforts which
finally told on their health. But this was after the fight had
been won. When they fought they were fresh and vigorous.
Had Shafter waited for the heavy guns there might not have
been as many lives lost in the furious assault, but he might
have had a discouraged and enfeebled army. His decision,
which seemed to some so unwise, was really the critical move
upon which everything depended. It meant bloodshed, but
it also meant victory and a speedy termination of the war.

To the north of the American position lay the fortified
village of Caney, which it was deemed necessary to reduce
lest the enemy threaten the rear. The garrison there was
supposed to number about 800 men. To the south was
Aguadores, where the Spaniards had already abandoned bet-
ter fortifications than were supposed to exist in Caney.
Directly in front and all that prevented the Americans from
marching up to the city intrenchments was the fortified hill
of San Juan. General Shafter considered that Caney would
make but slight resistance and that Lawton’s (the Second)
division of 6,000 men could take it, while Kent’s (the First)
and Wheeler’s cavalry were advancing in the valley towards
San Juan hill. Having reached Caney, Lawton would be
able to return and co-operate with Kent and Wheeler before
San Juan, which appeared to be the strongest defended. At
the same time General Duffield, in command of the Thirteenth
Michigan Volunteers, a battalion of the Thirty-fourth Michi-
gan, and with 2,000 Cubans, could make an attack on the
Spanish near the coast and prevent their going to the assistance
of those at San Juan and Caney.

During the 30th the troops gradually assumed the posi-
tions convenient for such a general movement. Lawton’s
PLACING THE ARMY 699

division, which stretched northward towards Caney, consisted
of two brigades, the Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth under
General Chaffee, and the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry
and Second Massachusetts Volunteers under General Ludlow,
and the First, Fourth, and Twenty-fiftth Infantry under
Colonel Miles. With General Lawton were Capron’s and
Parkhouse’s batteries of light guns, the former being in the
lead. Captain Grimes’s battery was moved forward to a com-
manding position in front of General Kent in the center, and
he had also Captain Best’s battery. Kent’s second and third
brigades, the former composed of the Second, Tenth, and
Twenty-first Infantry under Colonel Pearson, the latter of
the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-fourth Infantry under
Colonel Wickoff, were moved forward about two miles to a
point on the Santiago road near corps headquarters, where
they bivouacked. His first brigade under General Hawkins,
composed of the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry and Seventy-
first New York Volunteers, remained in its camp a little in
the rear of the corps headquarters. General Bates had the
Third and Twentieth Infantry back near the coast, while Gen-
eral Duffield had the Thirty-third and a part of the Thirty-
fourth Michigan before Aguadores with a force of about 2,000
Cubans. Admiral Sampson was prepared to open fire on the
shore battery to which the Spanish on the south of our line
had taken refuge, while the land division at Aguadores at-
tacked from that side. Neither Admiral Sampson nor Gen-
eral Garcia agreed with General Shafter on the weak resistance
likely to be expected from the Spanish. Garcia said that in
their final intrenchments they would fight desperately, and
he was right. But Shafter was justified in hastening opera-
tions as much as possible.

The American officers had no idea, nor could they have
even after the most effective work of scouts, of the ingenious
character of the Spanish defense. While they had been
weakly surrendering outside positions, they had been work-

ing persistently at devices which they had planned as traps.
41
700 SHARPSHOOTERS IN THE TREETOPS

So, indeed, they were. Against a less courageous and ag-
gressive army, their effect would have been practical annihila-
tion. According to all military rules, the Spaniards had made
themselves impregnable and had craftily led the Americans
on into the jungle to fall a victim to their devices.

The Spanish plan was to stop our-advance by three different
methods and at three different stages of attack. It must al-
ways be remembered that the roads and trails in this vicinity
had all been cut through dense tropical jungles, in some places
so wild and tangled with vines and creepers as to be almost
impenetrable. Here and there were openings or glades of
high grass dotted with clumps of bushes. The first or outer
line of Spanish defense consisted of sharpshooters posted in
the tree tops along these roads and trails. It was the business
of these men to harass and, if possible, demoralize our troops
by subjecting them to galling cross fires from a series of petty
ambuscades. Such a scheme could never have been thought
of except by a Spaniard and could never have been carried
out except in a country of this kind. But it was carried out
with thoughtful attention to every detail. These sharpshooters
were hidden in carefully prepared nests of leaves in the tops
of dense trees; some of them had tunics of fresh palm leaves
tied around their bodies from the shoulders down, so that at a
little distance they could not be distinguished from the foliage
in which they were concealed. They could neither he seen,
driven in, nor dislodged; thev used Mauser rifles with smoke-
less powder and they were posted in the trees in the confident
expectation that they could pick off our soldiers as they ad-
vanced. After our men had passed bv, these skirmishers
could still fire at them, shoot them in the back, worry them by
an unseen fire, shoot those bringing up supplies or carrying
back the wounded.

But failing, as they doubtless expected to fail, in the at-
tempt to check our troops by these petty ambuscades, the
Spaniards had made careful and elaborate preparations to
slaughter them in the glades or openings through which the
INGENIOUS DEFENSES 701

troops must pass on the way to the city. Almost every one
of these openings was within range of either a line of rifle pits
or of a substantial log blockhouse, placed in a commanding
position on a knoll or hill. The distance between the rifle pits
or blockhouses and the openings had been carefully measured
and large sheets of what appeared to be metal roofing had been
set up back of the glades to serve as aiming guides. Machine-
guns had been accurately trained on these sheets of metal and
given the proper elevation. In some of the blockhouses firing
boards consisting of slightly inclined tables or shelves with
deep grooves cut in them for rifle barrels had been prepared
as a means of directing the fire of the soldiers to the particular
opening in the road which was to be swept when the American
troops appeared in it. The inclination of these boards was
such that all the Spaniards had to do was to load and blaze
away, thus preventing wild random firing in the excitement
of battle. It was virtually equivalent to turning a file of rifle-
men into a machine gun, the range for which had been ac-
curately calculated and which waited only for Americans to
appear in front of the target, as they inevitably must if they
advanced.

The third and final line of Spanish defense consisted of
the blockhouses with a few open or masked batteries of light
guns and a net work of connecting or encircling rifle pits and
the barbed-wire entanglements intended to prevent a rush
assault and detain our troops under a murderous fire. These
intrenchments were not continuous along our whole front, but
they were at all points in such a way as to command all the
easy and natural approaches. It is not strange that the Span-
iards after such preparation confidently counted on resisting
the American troops before which they had so weakly retired,
and as these devices were not suspected by the American
officers, it is not strange that they advanced confidently to take
a position which, technically, it was impossible for them to
take.

So general was this sanguine. feeling that when dawn
702 THREE BATTLES IN ONE

broke they would begin a march which would in a few hours
end within the walls of Santiago, that preparations for remain-
ing outside were neglected and preparations for possible fatali-
ties or reverses were inadequate. One small field hospital
with equipments had reached the front on the 29th and been
placed in one of the glades of high grass near the road and
surrounded by a jungle. It provided tent shelter for but about
a hundred wounded men. The supply of blankets was very
short; and, indeed, no cots or mattresses had been brought for-
ward. $o rapid had been the advance of the brave army that it
had been impossible to follow up with all the requirements for
severe fighting, but as General Shafter apparently did not ex-
pect this, nor the army fear it, too little thought was given to it.

Under such conditions was begun the battle of July 1st, the
greatest land battle of the war. It was really three battles
in one, for the taking of Caney occupied Lawton’s division
so long that it was unable to co-operate in the center before
San Juan as expected. As the line of battle was so extended
and the whole country was so covered with woods-and chapar-
ral, those fighting in any one place had little idea of what was
going on elsewhere, and it was not till the sun went down
that the army knew what a great day it had been. It will be
impossible to describe the battle as one general engagement,
but the fighting at the three different points must he described
separately, the reader remembering that the troops were simul-
taneously engaged all along the line and all day.
CHAPTER L

THE FIERCE BATTLE OF JULY FIRST AT SAN JUAN, CANEY,
AND AGUADORES — GALLANT CONDUCT AND HEAVY
LOSSES OF SHAFTER'S ARMY — INADEQUATE PROVISION
FOR THE SUFFERING WOUNDED — A DARK OUTLOOK.

The Morning of July First — Grimes’s Battery Opens Fire — The Spanish
Reply — The Advance in the Center towards San Juan — A Tell-tale
Balloon — Critical Position of the Seventy-first New York — Storming
the Hill — General Hawkins’ Brave Charge — Capturing the Spanish
Position — Roosevelt Leads the Charge up San Juan Hill— Lawton’s
Attack upon Caney — Desperate Defense of the Spaniards — The Dash
of the Colored Troops — Storming the Fort — Caney Falls — General
Duffield’s Attack at Aguadores— Inadequacy of Hospital Arrange-
ments — Terrible Suffering but Brave Endurance of the Wounded —
Provisions Run Short — General Shafter Sick and Disheartened — A
Dark Outlook — Looking to the Fleet for Help —The Spaniards also
in Despair— Cervera Receives Orders to Escape.

Thickets and overhanging palms were wreathed in
vapors. To the north of the forces in the center of
the line rose a range of verdant peaks. Along the road lead-
ing to E] Poso were silently marching the troops. Beyond Fl
Poso was a dense Cuban forest into which regiment after regi-
ment was marching, and, somewhere in that thick under-
growth, was forming a line of battle. Further on rose the
green hill of San Juan capped by its blockhouse, and to the
right and left along the crest were Spanish intrenchments.
Over the uneven valley floated the buzzards waiting for the
carnage — “all in a hot and copper sky.” On a little hill to
the left of El Poso ranch house, an artistic old building with
tiled roof, was posted Captain Grimes’s battery of four guns,
and at twenty minutes to 7 Grimes gave the order:
“Number one, ready! Fire!” This was followed by one

gun after another with solid shot and shrapnel, making a
(703)

T HE morning of July 1st was hot with tropical intensity.
704 THE BATTLE OPENS

very exhilarating spectacle in the bright sunshine. In the in-
tervals could be heard the boom of Capron’s battery, which
had opened on the defenses of Caney far off to the right, and
above the palms rose a cloud of smoke marking his position.
Grimes’s guns had boomed a few times when a voice down in
front called out, “ Here it comes!’ Men instinctively ducked
their heads and the first Spanish shell came screaming over the
artillerymen and throwing shrapnel into the ranks behind.
Another came and burst among our men near the ranch house,
wounding several; another exploded in a dip under the hill,
where twelre Cubans were torn to pieces. The music of
shrapnel is anything but pleasant, but Grimes’s voice was as
clarion-like as ever, the “Ready! Fire!” coming as regular
as clockwork. One of his shots tore through the roof of the
blockhouse, others damaged the Spanish battery, and finally
their fire ceased. Grimes continued to fire a little longer, and
then for a moment all was still, excepting for the occasional
erack of a Spanish rifle — no one could tell where.

Far to the front the war balloon was slowly moving down,
keeping pace with the firing line of infantry, and suddenly a
volley crashed from the Spanish rifle pits; there was an an-
swering crash from the rifles of our men and the great battle
of San Juan had fairly begun.

Wheeler’s dismounted cavalry had been ordered off the
hill to the front, while Kent’s infantry moved similarly on the
left, but the road narrowed, crossing several fordable streams,
and Kent received orders to allow the cavalry the right of way.
But, compelled to wade the river and other streams to get into
line, the progress was necessarily slow, and it had to he made
under a galling fire not simply from the Spaniards on San
Juan hill but from sharpshooters in the treetops. The for-
tunes of the Signal Corps’ war balloon were not conducive to
the belief in the efficiency of such means in warfare, especially
in such an engagement. As it kept pace with the move-
ments of the division, it only indicated its line of march and
drew upon it the enemy’s fire. Soon the balloon itself be-
UNDER GALLING FIRE 705

came a target for the enemy’s gunners and riflemen; it was
pierced many times and the occupants of the car gave them-
selves up for lost. It was finally brought down to the bed of
a stream and abandoned.

Whenever the men waded the streams the enemy’s fire fell
among them like hail, and they went down dead, wounded, and
dying on every side without having even seen the face of a
Spaniard. The fire increased steadily, coming from all direc-
tions, even from the sharpshooters in the rear and from the
shrapnel aimed at the balloon. At this point General Kent
was informed that a trail or narrow way had been discovered
by the signal men in the balloon, leading to the left to a ford
lower down the stream. Into this he turned the Seventy-first
New York Regiment. General Kent, in his official report of
the battle, says:

‘“This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the
left of their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the leading
battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in dis-
order on the troops in the rear. At this critical moment the officers of my
staff practically formed a cordon behind the panic-stricken men and urged
them to go forward. I finally ordered them to lic down in the thicket and
clear the way for others of their own regiment who were coming up behind.
This many of them did, and the second and third battalions came forward
in better order and moved along the road to the ford. One of my staff offi-
cers ran back waving his hat to hurry forward the third brigade who, upon
approaching the forks, found the way blocked by men of the Seventy-first
New York. There were other men of this regiment crouching in the
bushes, many of whom were encouraged by the advance of the approaching
column to rise and go forward. As already stated, I had received orders
sometime before to keep in the rear of the cavalry division. Their advance
was much delayed, resulting in frequent halts, presumably to drop their
blanket rolls, and due to the natural delay ia fording the stream. These
delays under such a hot fire grew exceedingly irksome and I therefore
pushed the head of my division as quickly as I could towards. the river in
column of files or twos, paralleled in the narrow way by the cavalry. This
quickened the forward movement and enabled me to get into position as
speedily as possible for the attack. Owing to the congested condition of
the road the progress of the narrow columns was, however, painfully slow.
I again sent a staff officer at a gallop to urge forward the troops in rear.
The head of Wickoff’s brigade reached the forks at 12.20 p.m. and hurried
on the left, stepping over prostrate forms of men of the Seventy-first. This
heroic brigade (consisting of the Thirteenth, Ninth, and Twenty-fourth
United States Infantry) speedily crossed the stream and were quickly
706 “OLD SMOKE GUNS”

deployed to the left of the lower ford. While personally superintending
this movement, Colonel Wickoff was killed, the command of the brigade
then devolving upon Lieut.-Col. Worth, Thirteenth Infantry, who imme-
diately fell severely wounded; and then upon Lieut.-Col. Liscum, Twenty-
fourth Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the withering fire
of the enemy. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieut.-
Col. E. P. Ewers, Ninth Infantry.

It was a trying place for volunteers and even for regu-
lars. On the whole, the New York soldiers did not flinch,
though thirty or forty fell in a neck of the woods before they
had seen a Spaniard, for the cover from which the sharp-
shooters fired was as dense as a jungle; many of them were
firing from the rear while the bullets poured in from the in-
* trenchments on the hill.

The Seventy-first were at a great disadvantage because
they were fighting with the old Springfield rifles —* old smoke
guns,” as the soldiers called them. Every time they fired a
volley the Spaniards could easily locate them, and the Mauser
bullets would ‘pour a perfect torrent upon the New York
boys, doing terrible execution. It was not strange that strong
hearts grew faint. It is to their credit that with few excep-
tions they did not flinch in that terrible ordeal.

In what was afterwards christened the Bloody Angle, a
piece of grassless ground at a ford which encompassing trees
made an ideal hiding-place for sharpshooters, even cool-headed
officers occasionally sought a sheltering bush. In doing so
one of them called out to Colonel Roosevelt: “ Colonel, bet-
ter get down or they’ll pot you.” To which the acting colonel
of the Rough Riders, grimly biting the stump of a cigar, re-
plied:

“T’m not going to lie down for any confounded Spaniard,”
and he stalked about, fortunately uninjured.

No time was lost in deploying from right and left, but it
was clear that the advance was confused, and it was inevitable
in such a country. Looking at San Juan hill from Fl Poso, it
appeared to consist of but one very high hill, whereas it was a
series of hills, steep and difficult and forming a veritable Gib-
raltar against an assault by infantry. From the first the
 

 

 

 

 

INFANTRY ON THE WAY TO THE BATTLE OF SAN JUAN.
From a photograph taken just twenty minutes before the battle opened.
THE EMERGENCY AND THE HERO 709
Spanish had every advantage of position. As our men ad-
vanced they were met by an ever-increasing cross fire poured
from the wooded eminences on both flanks which could not
be seen from the road even by the skirmish line. Every little
mound, every inch of the country was perfectly known to the
enemy and had been measured and filled with sharpshooters.
When the Americans had to cross one of the glades or clearings
it seemed as if the whole Spanish fire was concentrated upon
it; yet the same thing was happening in different places. The
Americans were in a continual ambush. Where the volleys
came from and why the bullets reached them in such showers
they could not realize. It was like being shot at in the dark
and yet seeing men fall like tenpins. It was no wonder that
in such a deadly labyrinth some heart weakened and com-
mands got mixed up and orders went astray.

The division had been feeling its way along in this way for
two hours when the word was passed along to halt, and there
was an impression that it was the intention to go into camp on
the plain below San Juan, and within range of the Spanish
batteries and even of the trenches. But there were but two
things to do: to retire or to storm the trenches. <A retreat
would have demoralized the army and postponed the taking
of Santiago indefinitely. An advance was again ordered, and
the troops went doggedly on, driving the Spanish outposts
back and into their trenches.

At last the little foothill below San Juan was reached and
the emergency developed the indispensable hero, in the person
of General Hawkins, a tall, well-knit old man with a white
moustache and pointed beard. With him were the Sixth and
the Sixteenth Infantry; the other regiment of his brigade, the
New York Volunteers, was not vet up. Hawkins rode out in
front of his regulars, and, drawing his sword, pointed to the
hill, and called upon them in ringing tones to follow him.

Then he turned and set his face to the enemy who had
marked him for slaughter and were volleving viciously. The
regulars dashed forward with a cheer in which the old rebel
710 HAWKINS LEADS THE CHARGE

yell could be distinguished. Withering was the fire on them,
and men reeled and dropped in tlicir tracks. There was some
straggling, as there always is in a charge up a steep slope,
but the body of men moved on and up. Volley after volley
was blazed at them. The Spaniards were now in plain sight.
Our men fired as they ran forward — fired at Spanish faces,
peering and strained. In a moment it was all over, for the
enemy scrambled out of the trenches and ran back to San
Juan without looking behind. This was at 1.30 p.m. Gal-
lant old General Hawkins did not get a scratch, but his losses
were heavy. Lieutenant Ord, son of the distinguished gen-
eral of that name and a lieutenant of the Sixth, had been
killed by a wounded Spaniard after he had bidden his men to
spare the fellow, and Lieutenant Michie of the same regiment
had also fallen. Before the end of the day the Sixth lost 100
killed and wounded, and the casualties of the Sixteenth were
also serious. To General Hawkins belongs the honor of tak-
ing the key of the position and the heart out of the Spaniards.

But in the confusion or mixed condition in which the
troops were, owing to their difficult advance, it appears that
other regiments of regulars joined in the assault and partici-
pated in the glory of the achievement, particularly the Ninth,
Thirteenth, and Twenty-fourth, or Ewer’s brigade. In fact,
in the difficult work before them the brave men did not wait
for orders. They rushed ahead wherever they could. One
colonel found himself on a ridge with the fragments of six
cavalry regiments, and he was the ranking officer. One troop
of the Tenth Cavalry was found a half mile from the rest of
the command.

Under the brow of the hill they had stormed there was a
place where a large number of men could lie in safety, and it
was soon black with them. During the afternoon the ridges
to the right and left of this hill were occupied by our regi-
ments as fast as they could come up, the Spaniards offering
diminished resistance, but steadily retiring to their strong in-
trenchments. Two Gatling guns were finally brought into
THE BATTLE WON 711

play on the right of the enemy’s second line of defense, and
Best’s battery also moved up and opened fire on the enemy.

At a little before 4 o’clock occurred the second thrilling
episode of the day. Under the brow of the little hill a council
of war had been held, the question being whether they should
push on and take the main hill where the Spanish blockhouses
were. Colonel Roosevelt volunteered to head the charge. It
seemed a mad rush. <A foreign officer standing near the posi-
tion when the men started out to make the charge was heard
to say:

“Men, for Heaven’s sake, don’t go up that hill. It will
be impossible for human beings to take that position. You
can’t stand the fire.”

But with a terrific yell they rushed up to the enemy’s
works, and the Spaniards, whose courage had fled after the
first charge, retired, and when night came they had been
driven back upon the city. But it had been a hard experience
for our men. They had become drenched not simply from
fording streams but by a rain which had set in. Notwith-
standing their exhausted condition, they labored during the
night digging trenches, furnishing details to bury the dead
and to carry the wounded back in improvised litters, often
being shot down by some dastardly Spanish sharpshooter left
in the rear.

As the sun went down the men in Wheeler’s and Kent’s
divisions fell to wondering what had become of Lawton’s and
what fighting they had had to capture Caney. As already
stated, it had been thought that after Lawton had taken Caney
a part of his forces could turn and assist the center; but Law-
ton did not advance on San Juan that afternoon because he
had found that he had all he could attend to in taking Caney.
It is no secret that General Lawton expected to dispose of
Caney at one blow, and General Chaffee was to have the honor
of capturing the place and Lawton was to earn his laurels in
‘an attack on Santiago afterwards. He may have indulged in
a hope of reaching the Spanish defenses ahead of Kent and
712 FIGHTING BEFORE CANEY

driving the enemy back on the city. At any rate, both Law-
ton and Chaffee thought Caney would be an easy nut to crack.

The start was made at dawn, and the march was made as
rapidly and quickly as possible to prevent a hasty exit from
Caney, for there would have been no glory in capturing an
evacuated town. The Spaniards, numbering over 1,000, as it
turned out, had no notion of running away. They did not
come out to give battle, but fought mainly in trenches sur-
rounding the fort and blockhouse and in those buildings.
From a hill a mile and a quarter from the stone fort, Captain
Capron opened the attack with shells fired at 6.35 a. a. at a
body of Spaniards who were falling back to the trenches.
The- infantry was distributed as follows: Chaffee’s brigade
advanced from the east; Colonel Miles’s brigade attacked
from the south, and Ludlow’s was sent around to make the
approach from the southwest. General Chaffee rode up and
down behind his firing line encouraging his men. “ Now,
boys, do something for your country to-day,” he frequently
said. Chaffee did not think the Spaniards would hold out
very long. Ludlow’s men made slow but steady progress
through a tract of woods running from bush to bush and shoot-
ing at a Spaniard whenever they could see one.

The Second Massachusetts Volunteers of this command
behaved splendidly, exposing themselves freely and display-
ing fine marksmanship, but, like the Seventy-first New York,
they were at a disadvantage with their “smoke guns.”

The Spaniards, shooting from their trenches and from loop-
holes, kept up a galling fire upon our men wherever they
showed themselves. They fired an immense amount of am-
munition. It was a continuous fusilade. If not the most
brilliant, it was perhaps the most desperate battle of the San-
tiago campaign. It was demonstrated that the Spaniards
were hard fighters in defense. In one little line of intrench-
ments were fifty or sixty with a young officer constantly ex-
posing himself to our fire as he commanded his men. Time
after time, for hour after hour, at his word these Spaniards
THE FALL OF THE TOWN 713

rose and delivered volley after volley into our advancing ranks.
Time after time our men were thrown against the defenses, al-
ways gaining ground, but always with terrible losses. So the
battle went on all day, none of our soldiers flinching and the
Spaniards fighting like demons. Gradually our lines closed
in on three sides of the town, driving the Spaniards out of their
trenches.

Two companies of the colored Twenty-fifth Infantry, led
by Lieutenant Moss, had the honor of storming and taking in
two rushes the blockhouse. Many Spaniards in it were killed
and the survivors made a rush for the stone fort in Caney
under a hot fire. A company of the Twelfth Infantry, with a
newspaper correspondent in advance of it, ran up and took
possession of this fort after Capron’s shells had made a wreck
of it and all but three of its defenders had been killed. These,
bespattered with blood and exhausted by the tremendous strain
of their defense, were glad to surrender. The Spanish flag
was hauled down at 5 o’clock and the American colors went up
and floated out bravely. One hundred and fifteen prisoners
were taken; wounded were lying about everywhere. The
Spanish loss at Caney embraced most of its defenders, and
among them General Linares; the Americans lost some
valuable regimental officers and their list of wounded was
large.

While the severe fighting had been going on before San
Juan and Caney, General Duffield and his forces had not been
idle on the left near the coast. In accordance with the plans
he made a feint before the Spanish garrison near Aguadores,
consisting of 4,000 Spaniards strongly fortified, and the New
York and a few other war vessels bombarded the fort from
the sea, but doing little damage. The Spaniards selected Duf-
field’s advancing force as their target, and the first shell they
fired killed seventeen Cubans on the hill above the railroad.
Another shot mowed down two files of fours in the Michigan
Twenty-third, killing two men and wounding several others.
Duffield fired several volleys into the fort and accomplished
714 RETREAT OF THE ENEMY

his purpose of preventing the Spaniards there from co-oper-
ating with the intrenched army at San Juan.

The Cubans with Kent did no fighting, or, rather, the
situation was such that there was no fighting for them to do.
Lawton was to have had the assistance of several thousand
Cubans, but the truth is that they kept well out of danger,
fired their ammunition into the treetops and called for more.

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POSITION OF OUR TROOPS AFTER THE BATTLES OF CANEY AND SAN JUAN—
LINE OF SPANISH RETREAT.

the battle, and firing continued throughout the day all along
the line, part of the time in a drenching rain. There were
many casualties from bullets clearing the crest of our in-
trenchments and striking men as they were moving up to posi-
tion or going back and forth with supplies or caring for the
wounded. At nightfall the firing eeased, but later in the
evening another vigorous assault was made all along the line.
This was completely repulsed, and the enemy retired to his
trenches, and the almost impregnable nature of his last de-
fenses was beginning to dawn upon our men. According to
SUFFERINGS OF THE WOUNDED 15

the official report of casualties for the three days’ fighting
231 were killed, 1,283 wounded, and 81 were missing. The
Spanish loss, especially at Caney, was much heavier.

In even a brief history of the fighting before Santiago
notice must be taken of an unfortunate condition of things
which became conspicuous a little later. Mention has been
made of the single field hospital which had, been brought up
to the advance lines the day before the battle began. Pos-
sibly, the hospital equipment would have been complete and
adequate had the Spaniards made little resistance, as our gen-
erals expected, but with our severe losses the condition of the
wounded became deplorable. The first of the wounded, most
of whom had received aid at bandaging stations just back of
the firing line, began to reach the hospital as early as 9 o’clock.
As the hot tropical day advanced, the numbers constantly in-
creased, until at nightfall long rows of wounded were lying
in the grass in front of small operating tents, without awnings
or shelter, awaiting examination and treatment. The small
force of field surgeons worked without either rest or food
for twenty-one hours, and yet hundreds of seriously wounded
men lay on the ground for hours. No organized provision
had been made for feeding them or giving them drink. At
sunset, the five surgeons had operated upon and dressed the
wounds of 154 men; still long lines of suffering men lay wait-
ing, and the number brought in constantly increased. A few
more surgeons arrived and the force worked all night, partly
by moonlight and partly by the light of flaring candles, which
occasionally drew a shot from sharpshooters still nesting in the
treetops not far away. These cold-blooded and merciless
guerrillas fired all day on the 1st at our ambulances, and it
was two days before they were finally driven out of the trees.
After being operated upon, there was no place for the suffering
but out under the trees, where, weak and shaken from agony
under the surgeon’s knife, they had to lie in the wet grass,
with no one to look after them, no one to give them food or
water, no blanket for them, for only a few had been brought
716 A DISCOURAGING OUTLOOK

to the front. The scenes of the 2d were like those of the pre-
vious day, but worse. Many of the wounded brought in from
Caney had had nothing to eat or drink for twenty-four hours,
for they had started with but one day’s rations, and some of
the boys had shared that with those who had foolishly thrown
theirs away so that they might advance faster. And yet these
brave fellows uttered no complaint; some would yield their
turn with the surgeon to a comrade who seemed to be worse off.
Those in charge of the supplies on the transports or at the
landing places were working night and day to unload them
and hurry them to the front, but over such a country it was
slow, difficult work. Soon provisions began to run low, for
a strong sea had set in and it was impossible to take off the
supplies. The mistake had been made of pushing too rapidly
to the front with soldiers and articles needed in fighting, pro-
visions and medical supplies taking second place, and when
the attempt was made to move them up the pack trains were
cut off by the dastardly Spaniards in the trees, who shot the
mules. Men were under fire for forty-eight hours, with
scarcely any food, and with but little water.

As he had been optimistic before the battle, so now Gen-
eral Shafter became disheartened at the prospect. He had a
brave army, but improperly supplied; firing at his army con-
stantly were the Spaniards in defenses such as few armies
ever faced. He needed heavy guns, but it would be days be-
fore they could be brought up. He was suffering from fever
himself, and at any time it might break out in an army in such
a trying position, with insufficient food, without shelter, in
trenches flooded with rain or steaming in the sun. He had
heard that Spanish reinforcements had broken past Garcia
sent to head them off. On the whole, the outlook could not
have been darker.

At this critical time it became a serious question whether
the fleet could not do something’ to assist the land forces.
There was the Spanish fleet in the harbor, where it had been
for nearly six weeks, and our forces were in a position where
 

 

 

 

 

ARRIVAL OF THE WOUNDED FROM THE BATTLEFIELDS OF SAN JUAN AND CANEY AT THE
FIELD HOSPITAL.
ADMIRAL SAMPSON’S PLANS 719

they might be liable to a terrific fire from the ships. Even
if our army could succeed in storming the city, there was the
Spanish fleet ready to make the city a desert as soon as it fell
into American hands. There was Admiral Sampson’s fleet,
which had for two months been longing for a chance to train
its guns upon Cervera’s vessels, and it had lain outside the
mouth of the harbor for weeks with nothing but a narrow
channel in the-way, a channel mined, to be sure, and guarded
by guns so mounted as to threaten a strong plunging fire.
But with the army in such a serious position, had not the
time come when the risk of running the channel must be
taken? If Sampson could only run past the forts, which he
had already partly demolished, dispose at once of Cervera’s
fleet, the enemy in Santiago could not hold out long.
Admiral Sampson seems to have faced the requirements
of the situation somewhat reluctantly at first. Naturally, he
did not wish to subject his ships to such serious dangers. Edu-
cated to a nicety in all the technical points of naval warfare,
he had not that almost reckless bravery which was shown by
Dewey, and which a technical proficiency sometimes spoils.
IIe would have weleomed nothing so much as an open con-
test with the Spanish cruisers, and sincé the army had landed
he had hoped that the Spaniard would attempt to escape; he
had expected it and had issued explicit orders as to what the
fleet should do in case of such an attempt. But as Cervera
was still entrapped, the probability of his attempting to
escape steadily dwindled and the hope faded. Admiral
Sampson had thought of sending in torpedo boats, but this in-
tention had been abandoned because of the unsuitable condi-
tion of some of the small craft, and he then made up his mind
that he must force an entrance, and this he was planning to
do with two battleships to head the line. He had worked the
plan out with skill, had ordered the J/assachusetts to Guanta-
namo to coal up and had arranged to meet Shafter and his

generals at army headquarters on the morning of Sunday, the
42
720 SPANIARDS IN DESPAIR

3d, to secure a perfect understanding between the land and
naval forces for the combined attack.

But neither Shafter nor Sampson dreamed of what was go-
ing on over the Spanish lines, where the desperate condition
of the Americans was not understood. The Spaniards them-
selves were in despair; they realized that their game was lost;
their outer defenses had been taken by a dash that took their
hearts away. Blanco had telegraphed Cervera that he must
make his escape at all hazards, for Santiago could not hold
out; he must escape and run to Havana if possible. Other-
wise he must lose his ships with the fall of Santiago, and that
would be to lose all. Cervera had not forgiven Blanco for
the order which six weeks before had placed him in the San-
tiago trap, but Blanco’s purposes were shrewd enough and
would have perplexed us considerably had Madrid kept the
news of Cervera’s arrival at Santiago secret, as Blanco had
expected. But however much Cervera disliked the orders to
escape, he must needs obey, and he planned accordingly at the
very time that Sampson was at last contemplating the prospect
of running in at all hazards.
CHAPTER LI

ADMIRAL CERVERA’S ATTEMPTED ESCAPE — THRILLING
INCIDENTS OF COMMODORE SCHLEY’S PURSUIT AND
VICTORY — THE RESCUE AND SURRENDER OF CERVERA
AND THE REMNANTS OF HIS CREWS.

The Waiting American Squadron — Admiral Sampson Departs to Consult
with General Shafter — Watching Suspicious Smoke beyond the Ridge
— The Enemy Appears — Commodore Schley’s Prompt Action — The
Spanish Cruisers Emerge from the Harbor— Pictures of Smoke and
Fire — Network of Bursting Shells — Cervera’s Tactics — Pouring
Shells upon the Spanish Cruisers— The Chase Begins — Appearance of
the Pluton and Furor— Wainwright’s Handling of the Gloucester —
His Quick and Fearless Advance — Destruction of the Destroyers —
Admiral Sampson Turns Back from Siboney —The Maria Teresa and
the Almirante Oquendo Run Ashore —The Brooklyn and Oregon Have
a Running Fight with the Vizcaya — Another Spanish Cruiser Beached
— Gallant Rescue of the Spanish Crews — Chase of the Colon —Working
the Spaniard into a Trap — The Surrender — Admiral Sampson Arrives
—Schley’s Splendid Command.

UNDAY morning dawned bright and warm, with the
S American warships slowly rocking in the swell be-
fore the harbor of Santiago. During the night the
Massachusetts had gone to Guantanamo, and shortly before
9 o’clock the flagship New York steamed away towards
Siboney, where Admiral Sampson was about to land with
several of his staff and proceed on mule back to the head-
quarters of General Shafter. The Oregon moved up and took
the New York’s place in the blockade line. To the east of her
stood the Indiana, and between them and a little nearer the
shore, indeed almost under the guns of Morro, stood the little
Gloucester. West of the Oregon were the Iowa, Texas, Brook-
lyn, and Vixen in the order named. The distance of the ves-
sels from the mouth of the harbor was from two and a half to
four miles, and the are of the cirele formed was about eight

miles long.
At 8 o’clock a signal boy on the Towa went on deck as

(721)
722 “THE ENEMY’S SHIPS ESCAPING ”

usual for signal watch. The night before this sailor lad had
noticed three distinct lines of smoke beyond the hills to the
left of the harbor entrance, and had reported it to the officers.
It had also been noticed from other ships. That it came from
the Spanish fleet there was no doubt, but by this time little
hope that the ships would come out remained. As this signal
boy came on deck in the morning, he observed the smoke again
and kept his eyes intently on it, watching every feature of it
as it rolled up. At 9 o’clock he reported that the smoke
seemed to be coming up nearer the entrance. He had a belief
that the enemy’s ships were moving out, improbable though it
seemed in broad daylight. As he watched he saw the smoke
work nearer and nearer the entrance, and at 9.15, of his own
accord, he bent on the signal, “ The enemy’s ships escaping,”
and laid it on the bridge ready to hoist at the very instant it was
beyond doubt, for the navigator had sometime before promised
ten dollars to the signal boy who should first give the alarm.
With his signal ready, he watched the smoke as a cat would
watch a mouse. Fifteen minutes more passed, and then he
saw the bow of a cruiser just appearing in the entrance; he re-
ported it to the navigator, who had just come on deck and
who shouted back, “ Bend on the signal.” Before he had the
words out of his mouth, he was surprised to see the signal run-
ning up to the peak. A warning gun was fired. Then orders
came thick and fast. The watches on the Oregon, Texas, and
Brooklyn had discovered the enemy at the same time that he
was discovered on the Iowa, but the latter’s signal, being al-
ready bent, first fluttered in the breeze.

Commodore Schley, on whom in Admiral Sampson’s ab-
sence the command fell, acted instantly. From his flagship
flew the signal: “Close in and attack the enemy.” On every
ship routine discipline showed itself with precision. Orderlies
and messengers rushed here and there carrying orders. Men
cheered as they sprang to their guns. There was a jingle of
bells in the engine rooms; fires were spread, tle smoke began
to roll up; soon the Oregon was under way; others began to
REMARKABLE PANORAMA OF WAR 123

move in slowly; every man was at his post, clear-eyed and
alert.

The Spanish vessels came filing out of the harbor at a
speed of about ten knots, the flagship Maria Teresa leading
and followed by the Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, and the <Al-
mirante Oyuendo. The distance between them was about
800 yards, which means that from the time the first one be-
came visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last
one was out of the harbor an interval of twelve minutes
elapsed. Following the Oquendo at a distance of about 1,200
yards came the torpedo-boat destroyer Pluton, and after her
the Furor. The Spanish cruisers, as rapidly as they could
bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the
American vessels, which had got under way and were closing
in, but chiefly on the Brooklyn. They emerged from the
channel shrouded in the smoke of their guns, while above them
thundered the guns of the forts. Then they turned west-
ward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of
their engines and in a storm of fire which had opened from the
American vessels.

What followed is not easily described. Of the thousands
of men who took part in the action or witnessed parts of it,
few agree as to details. It is doubtful if a complete story of
that momentous morning will ever be written. There had
never been anything like it in the world before, and, where
such great fighting machines and so many guns are brought
into their fearful play, even one so fortunate as to have been
a witness from the distance fails to appreciate what he saw,
much less to secure any adequate idea of the fierceness and
the glory of the details.

This remarkable panorama of modern warfare had for its
background the high green hills which skirt the shore of Cuba;
in the foreground was the Caribbean shimmering in a sum-
mer sun. Out from the little crevice in the hills crept the
line of Spanish battleships, forming a great wall of smoke
from under which angry streaks of fire shot out towards the
24 CERVERA’S TACTICS

American ships, from the prows of which the sea was rolling
in foaming folds; another line of foam followed in their wake,
and over them hung the black clouds thrown’ up from the
furnaces. Then their guns answered the terrific thunder of
the Spanish guns, and great heaps of whiter smoke rolled away
and mingled with the black above. Across the sea there
arose a lattice work of water columns raised by splashing shells.
Innumerable, they sprang up and fell slowly back, while more
slowly there drifted away from each a little spurt of smoke,
and these, gradually accumulating, formed a haze on the water
in which the flashes of the guns assumed a deeper red while
the location of the ships became more and more indistinct.
At the eastern end of this fearful picture of smoke and fire, as
it moved westward, came the smaller streams of smoke from
the torpedo-boat destroyers, their low black forms more dis-
tinctly seen than those of the eruisers ahead. More distinct,
too, were the columns of water made by the shells landing near
them, nearer and nearer, till the miniature flashes of their own
guns was joined by the deeper glare of shells exploding right
upon them. And over all steadily deepened the dark over-
hanging canopy of smoke.

Cervera, whatever his motives for remaining so long in
Santiago, committed a fatal blunder in coming out in day-
light. He should have done as Dewey did at Manila — per-
fected his formation under cover of the night. Dewey, with-
out pilots or trustworthy charts, safely took his ships by the
Spanish guns and over the Spanish mines; and Cervera, free to
choose his own time, able to make all his own plans in his own
port, with plenty of pilots at hand, nevertheless neglected the
opportunity to rush out at night, when he would have stood
a fair chance of breaking through the blockade. The Ameri-
ean searchlights doubtless would have discovered him, but
their gunners could not have made anything like the effective
practice they did in daylight.

But according to his subsequent statements he feared to
run the obstructed channel unless the American searchlights
POSITION OF AMERICAN VESSELS 725

lit it up, and he claims that the night before, when he had pre-
pared to make the attempt, the blockading squadron left the
channel in darkness. His scouts on the hilltop in the morn-
ing notified him of the absence of the Massachusetts and the
departure of the New York, and so he concluded that his
chance had come. He gave orders to destroy the Brooklyn,
ram her if possible, making westward at the highest speed.
But even in attempting a daylight escape he erred in keeping
his ships in a single line. Had they scattered, it is possible
that some of them would have got away.

The reader will understand that as the blockading line of
American ships formed an are before the harbor eight miles
long, and as the Spanish vessels turned westward, the Ameri-
can vessels were not all at equal points of advantage. The
escaping vessels turned directly away from the Oregon and
Indiana, which were off to eastward of the entrance, but on
the other hand turned in the direction of the Texas and
Brooklyn, which were standing to westward. The [owa was
almostly directly in front of the harbor entrance. Cervera,
presumably, had the hope that by turning westward his ves-
sels, emerging at full speed, could quickly run out of the
range of the heavy battleships Oregon and Indiana, that after
a time he could shake off the Jowa and Texas, and, though the
Brooklyn’s speed equaled that of any of his cruisers, he could
dispose of her easily when out of reach of the blockading ves-
sels left behind. In theory this was all possible, for every
one of Cervera’s vessels were capable of steaming 20 knots,
and only Schley’s flagship was credited with any such speed.
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Cervera appeared
under full headway and had evidently taken the American
vessels by surprise and at a dead standstill, some of them with
only steam enough up to make five knots. :

Nevertheless, inside of eight minutes after the Spanish
flagship’s prow became visible at the entrance of the harbor,
and before the third ship emerged, every one of the American
ships was under way closing in, and their projectiles, great and
726

ATTACKING THE CRUISERS

small, were flying at the Spanish admiral from east, south, and

west.

The Indiana, Gloucester, and Oregon, which had been

off to the eastward, headed westward, pointing in towards the
eutrance; the Sowa started straight north, while the Brooklyn,
in pointing for the entrance, took a course northeast, using
her port battery. In other words, the ships simply converged

 

Braoktyn
(Com.Schley)

f a
qe

Indiana

 

FROM THE HARBOR.

Commodore Schley stood coolly

    

2

se1saneg ena,\c
jsog EUNTRIED PlUEg

 

 
 
     

- 1
i. Teresa

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&

obat
ion Cayo Batt
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Cast Uae
Gtoucester

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF THE OP-
POSING VESSELS SOON AFTER THE
SPANISH CRUISERS HAD EMERGED

 

upon the leading Span-
ish ships so far as pos-
sible, and by the time
they were in close range
the three leading Span-
ish cruisers were steam-
ing along close to the
shore and the fourth was
emerging from the har-
bor.

While all of these
eruisers were subjected
to the fire of the Amer-
ican vessels, the first fury
of the American shells
naturally fell upon the

Maria Teresa, which
was in the lead. The
‘Brooklyn, after firing

from her port batteries
for about ten minutes,
wore around, and, taking
a course alongside the
Teresa, emptied her star-
board batteries as the
vessels plowed along.
on the bridge, and his

men were encouraged to their best efforts by his cheery

words:

“Fire steady, boys, and give it to them.”

The

Texas, which had rushed in from her position east. of the
 

 

 

 

 

COMMODORE SCHLEY ON BOARD HIS FLAGSHIP DURING THE BOMBARDMENT OF SANTIAGO,
APPEARANCE OF THE DESTROYERS 929

Brooklyn, quickly became engaged first with the Vizcaya and
then with the Colon. The Jowa, which had begun firing at
the Teresa at a range of 6,000 yards, speedily diminished this
as she rushed straight for the harbor entrance, until the range
was considerably less than‘a half mile; but when it was certain
that the Teresa would pass ahead of her and that the Brooklyn
was to engage her at close range, the Jowa turned and de-
livered her starboard batteries at the J'eresa, then turned to
head off the Vizcaya and fired her port batteries, joining with
the Teaas. As the Vizcaya drew ahead, the Iowa turned
again and gave her a broadside from the starboard; after a
few minutes of this, she executed similar tactics on the third
Spanish ship, while her secondary batteries were turned on
the Pluton and Furor, which had by this time emerged and
were at once in a circle of terrific fire.

In the chase which had now developed at the head of the
fleeing line; the owa and Texas were dropping astern a little,
and the fire of the three Spaniards was concentrated on the
Brooklyn. But meantime the battleship Oreyon, coming in
from her position to the southeast, had adopted different tactics.
Quickly getting under rapid headway, she steamed directly
west, pouring in a fire from her guns upon one ship after an-
other as she came up in the most glorious and gallant style,
outstripping all her sister battleships. She was an inspiring
spectacle, with a large white wave before her bow, her smoke-
stacks belching forth great puffs of smoke from her forced
draft, her guns thundering at the escaping ships ahead. She
quickly passed the Iowa, while her secondary batteries took a
share in the fire on the torpedo-boat destroyers, and, gaining
every moment on the Texas, pushed on to the assistance of the
Brooklyn.

But while the chase was in this condition, or about forty
minutes after the alarm had been given, one of the most ex-
citing and glorious features of the engagements was taking
place at the rear of the escaping line near the mouth of the
harbor. The destroyers Pluton and Furor were among the
730 THE ‘‘ GLOUCESTER’S”’ BRAVE FIGHT

finest vessels of their class in the world, and were considered
particularly dangerous because of their high speed and their
torpedo equipments. C'ervera’s plan had been tc have the fire
of his large ships concentrated upon the Brooklyn.as the only
vessel supposed to be able to keep abreast of ‘him, while the
Pluton and Furor were to take advantage of the confusion and
the nearness of the attacking vessels to launch their torpedoes.
But while the cruisers were concentrating their fire on the
Brooklyn, now over a mile west of the entrance, the torpedo-
boats became the center of a fire from other American ships,
which made it impossible for their crews to work their tor-
pedoes, and very quickly destroyed them completely.
Commanding the entirely. unprotected Gloucester was
Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright, who had been
executive officer of the Maine, and who had pleaded so well
for active service against the Spaniards that the department
had put him in command of the converted yacht. But the
moment he saw that the Spanish vessels were escaping, Wain-
wright determined to make a spirited attack upon the Span-
ish torpedo craft when they should appear. Rushing in at
full speed, the little Gloucester poured an accurate and deadly
fire from all her guns upon the destroyers. Her advances
were straight, quick, and fearlessly undertaken. The little
vessel was a target for every gun mounted on shore, and for
the broadsides of the Colon, Oquendo, Pluton, and Furor, all
at easy range, and the shells flew around her on all sides, but
she was not hit. Her skillful handling and gallant fighting
excited the wonder and admiration of all who witnessed it, for
while other ships were firing their secondary batteries at the
destroyers, the Gloucester, pushing inside the course of the
cruisers, at ‘much closer range, practically rendered the de-
stroyers unmanageable; her gunners could not remain at their
posts; they fell in bloody groups about the decks, which were
riddled bv the Gloucester’s rapid fire. Secing the terrible
plight of the destroyers, the batteries on Socapa opened fire on
the Gloucesler, but she kept her guns hot regardless of danger.
ADMIRAL SAMPSON’S RETURN 731

Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged the
careers of the Pluton and Furor were ended, and two-thirds of
their people killed. Both destroyers were total wrecks.
Rough-edged wounds of all sizes showed on the low dark hulls
and superstructure. There had been no time to note the
flight of minutes, but there were two of the most powerful tor-
pedo-boat destroyers in the world, of supposedly twenty-eight
or thirty knots speed, cut down, riddled, and wholly disabled in
a run of less than three miles, and while they had been fired
upon by the battleships as they pushed by after the Spanish
cruisers, their destruction was largely due to the terrible, rapid,
and accurate fire poured in at close range by an unprotected
yacht. Both had struck their colors, and those of the Pluton
had been secured by Commander Wainwright. He was en-
_gaged in saving the Spanish crews when the New York came
steaming in at her highest speed from the east.

At-the time the Spanish cruisers came out of the harbor,
the flagship New York, bearing Admiral Sampson, was about
to put in at Siboney. At the first boom of a gun every one
knew that the long-expected was happening at the entrance,
and that the New York had lost a chance to participate in the
game. Orders were at once given to bring the ship about, and
she was started back with all the speed she could muster from
the two boilers which were in readiness. As she flew along,
her disappointed sailors could see the ships come out, watch
the sharp attack of the American fleet under Commodore
Schley, and by the time she arrived at the mouth of the harbor
shortly after 10 o’clock, where the gallant Gloucester was
engaged in the work of rescue, the chase of the cruisers had
set far to the eastward. The New York did not stop, but
forged ahead with ever increased speed in a vain effort to
reach a point where she could participate. But the admiral
was to have only the enjoyment of seeing one cruiser after an-
other run helpless upon the beach before he could get within
range. It was Schlev’s hattle.

But we must now turn to the point in the chase at which
732 SPANISH CRUISERS BEACHED

our attention was temporarily diverted to the battle between
the destroyers and the Gloucester. As already stated, the first
rush of the Spanish squadron had carried it past the Lowa and
Teaas before they could work up to their best speed, but the
Spaniards suffered heavily in passing and the first in the line,
the Maria Teresa, and the last, the Oquendo, were set on fire
by shells during the. first fifteen minutes of the engagement.
The very first shot had cut the main water supply pipe of the
Teresa, and the second that landed set her afire astern.
Several large shells swept through her, and countless of smaller
caliber burst within her. As the Oquendo was the last to come
out of the harbor, and the other vessels had run ahead of some
of our battleships, she at once received their concentrated fire.
One of the first shots exploded in her after torpedo apartment,
setting a raging fire, and the guns’ crews were driven from
their guns by the American shells.

During the fight with the destroyers, the Teresa had fallen
behind with the Oquendo, and the Vizcaya was leading, fol-
lowed by the Colon, the fire of the Brooklyn, Oregon, and
Texas being largely concentrated upon the former. The
Towa was still in the chase and still firing at long range, but
was dropping behind. The Teaas was gaining speed, but the
Oregon was coming up with a mighty rush. With flames
arising from the after-decks of the Teresa and the Oquendo,
both vessels gave up the fight, the former at about 10.15 run-
ning on the beach aboui six miles west of Santiago harbor en-
trance; the latter a few minutes later was beached less than a
mile beyond. Just before this occurred the Oregon came
up with the Tevas, and passed inside so that the latter’s
guns were blanketed for a moment. The Colon had now
forged ahead of the Vizcaya, towards which the Oregon
and Brooklyn were now aiming their guns with destructive
results. The Oquendo having been beached, the Texas also
turned her guns at longe range on the Vizcaya. So the chase
continued for about a half hour, when the Vizcaya was seen
to be in flames, and she ran on the beach at Aserraderos, fifteen
 

 

 
RESCUE OF SURVIVING SPANIARDS 735 ;

miles from Santiago, at about 11 o’clock, torn by a terrific ex-
plosion as she sank. She was still flying the Spanish flag from
the gaff, and it was not hauled down till almost burned down
by the flames mounting up from the riven hull. Some idea of
the storm of iron may be gathered from the fact that the
Brooklyn alone fired about 2,000 shots during the engage-
ment.

Meanwhile, the Harvard and little Gloucester, having set-
tled the fate of the destroyers, had run up and were engaged
in the work of reseue about the wrecks of the Teresa and
Oquendo. Some were rescued as they swam; a few “were
taken directly off the burning Pluton, and some from the
beach, where they were glad enough to fall into their hands
rather than into those of the Cubans, who manifested a dis-
position to shoot them down. Nearly all the prisoners were
clad only in underclothes at most. Such was the case with Ad-
miral Cervera, who, with a small party, had reached the beach
near the stranded Teresa and were surrounded by an exultant
band of Cubans. Cervera surrendered himself gladly and was
transferred to the Jowa. On a signal from the New York,
which was now coming up, the Zowa proceeded to the same
work near the Vizcaya. This rescue of prisoners from the
burning ships was the occasion of some of the most gallant
conduct of the day, for they were burning fore and aft; some
of their guns and reserve ammunition was exploding, and it
was not known at what moment the fire might reach the main
magazines. In addition to this, a heavy surf was running just
outside the Spanish ships, but no risk deterred our officers and
men; the work of rescue was complete. The Iowa picked up
38 officers and 238 men from the Vizcaya. The Harvard
rescued 35 officers and 687 men. The Indiana was ordered
back to the blockade line when overtaken by the New Yort,
and on her way rescued over 200 men from the wrecks of the
Oquendo and Teresa.

Shortly after the chase there was a terrific explosion in
the forward part of the Oquendo, caused by the fire reaching
736

 

   
  
   
     

=]\ Brooklyn,
(cCom.Schley)

Oregon

raed 5

Cristobat
Coton

Vizcayd

Oquendo
lowa

Infanta Marig
Teresa

Indiana

Gloucester |
nae
Fidg Ship

Aamiral Sam €\ Morr
iral Sampson cat

JoqueH OBewes.

  

 

 

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF 'THE OPPOS-
ING VESSELS AT THE CLOSE OF THE
BATTLE.

CHASE OF THE ‘‘COLON”

the magazine. It bulged
out the plates in every
direction. The results
were altogether different
from those on the Maine,
and the Oquendo lay there
as mute evidence of the
Spanish treachery in Ha-
vana harbor five months
before. The wrecks were
pitiful sights. As fine
armored cruisers as there
had been in the world lay
covered with scars and
smouldering. Charred hu-
man bodies lying about
told the story of the fierce
fight.

Of the Spanish ships
only the Cristobal Colon
remained, and she was their
fastest ship. She had been
so fortunate as to escape
the concentration of fire
which had riddled the other
vessels, and by the time the
Vizcaya was beached she
was at least six miles ahead
of the Brooklyn and the
Oregon. Being thus far
out of effective range, it
looked as if she might es-
cape. Her funnels belched
out great columns of smoke
and her forced draft even

earrked flames at times
THE END OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON V37

from her stacks. The Brooklyn was hot on the chase, standing
well out, the Oregon a little astern but inside and gaining fast;
the Texas was some distance behind but running nobly with
the little Vizen abreast. The guns were still now and the
interest had centered entirely in the contest of speed. If the
Colon could maintain her superior lead she might escape. But
she was forced by the situation to hug the shore; if she pointed
out the American vessels would come up into firing range be-
fore she could get out tosea. Jar ahead the dim blue outlines
of Cape Cruz were growing more and more distinct on the
horizon, and straight towards this steered the Brooklyn and
Oregon, while the Spaniard was running in close. It was
evident by noon that he could not make the point without pass-
ing the bows of his pursuers, which were steadily gaining,
coupling on more boilers as the steam was got up.

After 12 o’clock Commodore Schley saw that the Spaniard
was in a trap and could not get out, but the chase continued
till ten minutes before 1, when the Brooklyn and Oregon were
alongside, and the latter dropped a large shell beyond the
Colon. A moment later one from the Brooklyn struck close
to her bow. The Spanish commander saw that his game was
up, and he began to hunt for a convenient place to beach.
He did not think of fighting. He evidently had no heart for
it, though but one man had been killed on board and no fire
had been started on the ship. The only object of the Span-
iards now was to destroy their ship. The breechblocks of the
guns were torn out and thrown overboard, and every possible
inlet for water was opened. At 1.20 she hauled down her
colors and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, about forty-eight miles
from Santiago. A boat from Commodore Schley’s flagship
went alongside to receive the surrender, while the gallant
commodore ordered the signal to the Oregon: “Cease firing.
Congratulations for the grand victory. Thanks for your
splendid assistance.” The commander of the Colon was very
polite and surrendered unconditionally to Captain Conk, who
remained on board about fifteen minutes, observing the con-
738 SAMPSON RESUMES COMMAND

dition of the ship. As he was returning, Admiral Sampson
came up in the New York, took charge of matters and ordered
the vessels to report their casualties. But there was only
one to report. A man on the Brooklyn had been killed and
another wounded. Acting on Cervera’s orders, the Spanish
ships had concentrated their fire on Schley’s flagship, fully
expecting to sink her and then run away from the remaining
ships. The marks and sears show that the Brooklyn was hit
twenty-five times, and the ensign at the main was so shattered
that when it was hauled down it fell in pieces. ’

Soon after the New York came up, the Vixen reported to
the admiral that two strange ‘cruisers were in the distance.
The Brooklyn was signalled to investigate, although she had
borne the brunt of the fighting, and Commodore Schley was
obliged to leave his prize to Admiral Sampson and hurry away.
The stranger proved to be an Austrian, and it was after mid-
night when the Brooklyn reported at Santiago with one of her
compartments filled with water, where a 11-inch shell had
pierced her side.

After sinking six ships, killing and wounding over 600
men, and making hundreds of prisoners without the loss or
serious injury of a single vessel, and with casualties limited
to one man killed and a couple wounded, and having dis-
patched the whole business within five hours after the Spanish
flagship had poked her nose out of the entrance, the Americans
took a well-earned rest, and on the next morning awoke the
Cuban echoes with such a celebration of the Fourth of July
as history had never before recorded.

Commodore Schley’s instant decision and the dash and
vigor with which he met the emergency, and the splendid sea-
manship with which he headed off and caught the Colon in a
race which will he famous as long as naval history is written,
leave him entitled to the lion’s share of the credit. It was he
who discovered the elusive Spaniard in Santiago; it was he
who bottled him there; and there was a poetic justice and pos-
sibly a just providence in that fortune which enabled him to
 

 

 

 

 

ANNIHILATION OF ADMIRAL CERVERA’S SPANISH FLEET BY THE AMERICAN SQUADRON UNDER REDE
COMMAND OF COMMODORE SCHLEY, OFF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898,
COMMODORE SCHLEY’S GREAT VICTORY GAL

destroy it when there was no one at hand to deprive him of
the honors of command. Success in war is always more or
less a matter of opportunity. It was no disparagement to the
Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sampson, whose absence was
in pursuance of duty and without fault, to yield to Com-
modore Schley the full measure of reward.

A. few days after the battle the Spanish prisoners, num-
bering 746 and including 54 officers, were sent to Portsmouth,
N. H., on the cruiser St. Louis. They were dressed in cloth-
ing of every description, having come on board practically
without clothing of any kind. Admiral Cervera showed signs
of the terrible mental strain under which he had been for
weeks. The Spanish seamen frankly declared that they had
no further desire to fight with Yankees. Every provision
was made for their comfort, and Admiral Cervera became
quite a popular hero with the people, because of the nobility
of his conduct and the many evidences of his appreciation of
the treatment accorded to him and his officers, who were kept
in comfortable quarters at Annapolis, the prisoners of the
crews remaining at Portsmouth.

43
CHAPTER LII

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO—TRYING POSITION OF
THE ARMY—RELEASE OF HOBSON AND HIS CREW—
OCCUPATION OF THE CITY—THE PUERTO RICO CAM-
PAIGN,

General Shafter Calls upon Gen. Toral to Surrender — Refusal of the Span-
ish Commander — Refugees from the City — Fruitless Negotiations —
The Exchange of Hobson and His Crew—Their Warm Welcome —
American Lines Advanced — Strengthening the American Position —
The Truce Ends — Bombardment of the City — Another Demand for
Surrender — A Council of Officers — Arrival of General Miles — Alarm-
ing Condition of Our Army — Insufficient Provisions — Suffering of
the Sick and Wounded — Toral Asks for More Time — An Agreement
Reached — Conditions of the Capitulation — The President’s Message to
General Shafter — Occupation of the City — Looking over the Spanish
Defenses — ‘‘ Yellow Jack” Appears— Obstacles Which Our Army
Overcame — Shafter and Garcia—The Campaign in Puerto Rico —
General Miles’s Easy and Triumphal Advance — Ponce Welcomes
American Troops — Last of the Fighting.

HE news of Commodore Schley’s great victory soon
‘| reached Siboney and was carried along the lines, oc-
casioning great enthusiasm among the soldiers whose
position, as they lay in their wet trenches in constant danger
of Spanish bullets, was anything but pleasant. The lines
were being gradually extended, Kent working his division
northward, and Wheeler’s cavalry moving southward, and
this made the formation somewhat thin. But the fortitude of
our army in its difficult position and the willingness and en-
thusiasm with which it joined in the work of hemming in the
Spaniards was the admiration of every spectator of the cam-
paign.

On the day following the destruction of Cervera’s ships,
General Shafter summoned the city to surrender under threat
of bombardment, but he received a curt refusal from the
Spanish commander, with a request that the bombardment be

postponed till the foreigners and the women and children
(742)
WELCOME TO HOBSON AND HIS MEN 743

could leave the city. Action was, therefore, deferred till
noon of the next day, and thousands of people took ad-
vantage of the situation to come out of the city, where the
food situation had become desperate. While General Shafter
could not object to such a step, it increased the difficulties of
his situation, even more seriously than was at first realized.
Within a few hours it was estimated that 15,000 people froin
the city became dependent upon the Americans for food, when
the subsistence department was by no means in shape to pro-
vide rations at the front sufficient to meet the wants of the
army alone. But the soldiers in many cases shared their
meager rations with half-starved refugees, who came into our
camp not simply dependent but bearing germs from a disease-
stricken city. This reception of refugees proved to be the
worst blow which our brave army received before Santiago.

Before the time allowed by General Shafter for this pur-
pose had elapsed, General Toral, who had succeeded Linares,
wounded at Caney, in command of the city, requested another
postponement of the bombardment in order that he might
communicate with the authorities at Madrid, and to do this he
was obliged to ask permission to use cables in American hands.
Upon one excuse or another the truce was extended from day
to day till the 9th.

During these negotiations one of the interesting events
of the war took place. On the 7th the Spanish agreed to
effect an exchange of prisoners, the only Americans they held
being Lieutenant Hobson and his crew. The scene of the
exchange was a tree between the lines in front of the Rough
Riders. Hobson and his men came forth-accompanied by a
Spanish officer, and were met by Colonel John Jacob Astor
and a few prisoners captured at Caney. A Spanish officer
was given for Hobson and fourteen Spanish privates for his
seven men. The exchange was in full view of both armies,
and as Hobson and his men neared the American lines they
were welcomed with cheer upon cheer. Ranks were broken,
officers’ orders passed unheeded, and the men were simply
44 DEMAND FOR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

borne from one part of the line to another. Even more en-
thusiastic, if possible, was their reception by the fleet on
board the New York. The prisoners spoke cordially of their
treatment, and said they had suffered no real hardship. Lieu-
tenant Hobson modestly protested against the warmth of his
reception, both in the field and on the New York, declaring
again and again that the men who were greeting him would
have done the same thing in his place. He was the idol of
the hour and the contagious enthusiasm which greeted him
was a striking expression of that genuine admiration for
heroism so characteristic of the American soldier and sailor
in this war.

Shortly before the expiration of another truce on the 9th,
Toral sent to Shafter a letter offering to evacuate the city, if
allowed to march out with all his troops. This would have
meant simply a withdrawal to join the Spanish army further
west, ultimately to help Havana, and the offer was promptly
rejected by Shafter, who demanded an unconditional sur-
render.

General Toral then asked that the terms of evacuation he
had offered be submitted to the authorities at Washington,
and Shafter complied with the request, again postponing hos-
tilities a day, or until a reply could be received from the
President. It came at noon of the 9th and was an unquali-
fied approval of Shafter’s demand, with instructions to accept
no terms but unconditional surrender of the city, the fortifi-
cations, and the Spanish forces. As a matter of fact, the
Spanish commander was anxious to make the best terms pos-
sible, but Madrid was unwilling to allow him any discretion,
and was determined, for domestic reasons, to insist upon the
““defense of the city to the last extremity. From the stand-
point of the Spanish government, the situation had become
desperate, for, if the fall of Santiago followed swiftly after
the destruction of the navy, it might mean disaster to the
government. Some resistance was essential to the dynasty.

Meantime, Shafter had taken advantage of the delay to
 

 

 

 

A HAND-TO-HAND FIGHT IN THE IN? RENCHMENTS OF SANTIAGO,
Planting the Stars and Stripes within the enemy’s lines,

 
A COUNCIL OF OFFICERS w47

strengthen the American position, dig new trenches, and to
advance the American lines to within 400 yards of the Spanish
lines. Streams were bridged over, roads were put in con-
dition, reinforcements were landed and brought up, and the
heavy siege guns were at last worked to the front and put in
position. On the 10th, the truce having expired, the Span-
iards again opened fire, but it was soon silenced. Another
request for time having been asked by Toral and refused,
Shafter began an attack at five o’clock of the afternoon of
the 11th, and, though continued less than an hour, it was suffi-
cient to demonstrate to Toral the futility of holding out much
longer. Not only did heavy guns and mortars pour in shells
from the field, but the fleet outside threw destructive shells
over the ridge into the city and bay. The Spanish reply was
spiritless and weak. The reinforcements had enabled General
Shafter to stretch his lines entirely about the city, and its
investment was complete. After the bombardment and when
the town was on fire in several places, General Shafter sent
another note to Toral, again demanding unconditional sur-
render, but no reply was made to it till the following morning,
the 12th, when Toral wrote a terse reply, saying that he had
communicated the demand to his “superior government.”
General Shafter then decided to call a council of officers
to determine what should be done. General Miles had arrived
the day before, not to supersede Shafter in immediate com-
mand, but to observe the conditions before the city. The
severe losses in the battle of the 1st had made the government
anxious, and Miles had been hurried to the scene in conse-
quence. He attended the council, and so also did Lieutenant
Hobson, representing Admiral Sampson. Many of the army
men had declared that it was now the duty of the navy to
force its way into the harbor, and it was agreed that such an
act would bring the Spaniards to terms at once. But Samp-
son believed that, on account of the mines, it could not be
done without the loss of some of the ships. It was agreed by
the army officers that the city could be taken in three hours
448 SUFFERING OF THE ARMY

by an assault, but it would cost, possibly, a thousand
men, and, naturally, all desired to avoid losses whether of
ships or men. The troops were becoming impatient over the
delays, and argued that if the slow process of starving the city

into subjection was adopted, more men would be lost in sick-
ness than in storming the place. The officers were much
worried over the condition of the army, for the heavy rains
on the 11th and 12th had resulted in much sickness, and this
was being aggravated by the intense heat which followed.
Besides this the landing of supplies had become so difficult
at times that only half-rations could be served at the front,
and if a storm came up so as to prevent the landing of supplies
for any length of time the situation would become terrible.
The condition of the sick and wounded was already de.
plorable. The hospital service had broken down completely
under the strain put upon it. Wounded soldiers were lying
about on the grass with insufficient attendance, and often they
had to be carried to the rear over rough roads in jolting ammu-
nition wagons. They endured it bravely, but their sufferings
were terrible.

Any great delay in taking the city was, therefore, out of
consideration. On the 13th an interview was arranged be-
tween Shafter and Toral, and the former again impressed
upon the Spanish commander that longer delay on his part
could only result in the further slaughter of Spanish troops.
He must surrender, or a continued bombardment would be
begun from all sides, while the fleet would make an attack
from the sea. Toral declared that, whatever his personal
wishes might be, he would be unable to give up the city till
so instructed by his superiors. Ile asked for more time in
which to communicate with Blanco. After consideration,
Shafter granted him till noon of the 14th. But, on the morn-
ing of that day, an actual agreement for surrender was ac-
complished, Shafter modifying the terms in some smal] par-
ticulars. oral was inclined to haggle further, desired his
soldiers to keep their arms, and to have the action considered
TERMS OF SURRENDER 49

more like an evacuation; but the American generals informed
him that he must accept the terms or there would be a general
attack, to end only in an unconditional surrender.

The conditions of capitulation included all forces and war
material in the territory east of a line from Aserraderos, on
the south, to Sagua de Tananio on the north, General Luque’s
force of 10,000 men at Holguin, being a little outside the terri-
tory. For the United States, General Shafter agreed to trans-
port, with as little delay as possible, all the Spanish troops in
the district to Spain, the embarkation being near the points oc-

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EASTERN PART OF CUBA.

Showing portion surrendered to the United States at the fall of Santiago.
cupied. Officers were to keep their side arms, and both officers
and men were to retain their personal property. The Spanish
were authorized to take the military archives belonging to
the surrendered district, and all Spanish forces who wished to
remain in Cuba might do so under parole, giving up their arms.
The Spanish forces were to march out of Santiago with honors
of war, depositing their arms at a point agreed upon, to await
the disposition of the United States government. This left
the question of the return of the arms entirely in the hands of
the government. This surrender affected about 12.000
soldiers, against whom not an American shot had been fired,
and the troops in the whole district were estimated at about
25,000. f

President McKinley gave expression to the feeling of the
whole people over the event, when he cabled General Shafter:
750 YELLOW FEVER APPEARS

The President of the United States sends to you and your army the
profound thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at
Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops
and territory under General Toral. Your splendid command has endured
not only the hardships and sacrifices incident to the campaign and battle,
but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would
lave overcome men less brave and determined, One and/all have displayed
the most conspicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation.
The hearts of the people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and
wounded. May the Father of Mercies protect and comfort them.

Formal possession of the city was taken on the 17th, an
immense concourse of people being present. As the chimes
of the old Cathedral rang out the hour of twelve, the infantry
and cavalry presented arms. Every American uncovered,
and Captain McKittrick hoisted the Stars and Stripes. As the
brilliant folds unfurled in a gentle breeze, against a fleckless
sky, the cavalry band played “The Star Spangled Banner.”
At the same instant the sound of the distant booming of Cap-
tain Capron’s battery, firing a salute of twenty-one guns,
drifted in. When the salute ceased, from all directions along
the line came floating in across the Plaza the strains of regi-
mental bands and the cheers of the troops.

When the American officers had an opportunity to observe
the nature of the entanglement of defenses of the city, they
were convinced that General Shafter’s patience and modera-
tion in dealing with General Toral’s exasperating delays and
excuses were wise. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first
day, it would have required a loss of 5,000 men to have taken
the city. Indeed, in the face of a determined and well-
drilled enemy, it is doubtful if the city could have been taken
by assault.

But if the strength of these defenses furnished a sufficient
reason for putting up with some delays, there was another
development of the case which provided abundant reasons,
not simply for declining to haggle further, but for making
some apparent concessions to soothe the Spanish pride. To-
wards the latter end of the truce the dreaded “ yellow jack”
began to make its appearance in the American camps, and
 

 

 

 

CREEPING UP TO A LINE OF SPANISH SHARPSHOOTERS.
A United States trooper accompanied by Cuban scouts nearing the Spanish Intrenchments at Santiago,

 
VICTORY IN SPITE OF OBSTACLES 153

while soldiers had not quailed before Spanish bullets, they
feared the prospect of such a contagion in the ranks. The
conditions under which' the soldiers fought, lying in wet
trenches, exposed to a fierce heat or to the deluges of the rainy
season of a tropical climate, made the appearance of fevers
almost a certainty. Toral, undoubtedly, kept hanging off
in the hopes that yellow fever would appear in the American
camp and enable him to secure better terms. Santiago itself
was in a dirty condition; typical Spanish indolence and dis-
regard of common sense in time of peace had left the city un-
defended against: disease, and when the refugees left the city
and mingled with the Americans, Toral felt certain that
the contagion would be introduced among them. But when
he saw no indications of it and he was completely hemmed in,
he had no recourse but to yield.

Neither in the Spanish lines nor in the United States was
there a realization of the discouraging condition in which our
army was placed. It was extremely difficult to get food and
medicine. Not only were the facilities for lightering supplies
from the transports inadequate, but the road to the front was
almost impassable, the mud at times being two feet deep,
although Shafter had 1,000 men constantly at work on it.
The difficulties almost baffled description. It is doubtful if
ever in history an army has encountered such obstacles and
accomplished so much. It seemed to some in this country
that Shafter was making a mistake in temporizing with Toral,
but, in reality, he is entitled to the greatest credit for the
manner in which he met the terrible obstacles and won one of
the three great victories of the war, the victory which really
decided the issue and compelled Spain to hasten a suit for
peace. Less than four weeks had elapsed since the first soldier
of Shafter’s army set foot on Cuban soil, and he had secured
the surrender of a city, a large part of the province, and an
army of 25,000 men. It would be hard to name a siege of a
strongly-defended city carried out more quickly to a conclusive
issue. Despite the sufferings of our men, they had shown the
tod CONTINUED NAVAL SUCCESSES

highest soldierly qualities —courage, tenacity, cheerfulness,
patience.

General McKibben was given the temporary command of
the city, and for a few days the surrender of arms and ammuni-
tion, the clearing the harbor of obstructions, and the listing
of prisoners went rapidly on. Soon the Red Cross steamer
entered the harbor and relieved the conditions as to food.
American rule was accepted quietly by the people. General
Wood of the Rough Riders succeeded to the military com-
mand in a few days and carefully looked after the health
of the city. Meantime, Spanish commanders from other parts
of the district came in and surrendered, the prisoners eagerly
awaiting their return to Spain. ‘

Soon after the fall of Santiago, two naval victories were
gained — minor actions as compared with Manila and San-
tiago, but both accomplished with the thoroughness which
marked those events. On July 18th, at Manzanillo, Com-
mander Todd of the Wilmington, in command of a squadron
of six vessels, one a gunboat and the others auxiliary cruisers,
approached the harbor, remaining beyond the range of the
shore batteries, burned three Spanish gunboats, drove two
others ashore, destroyed three transports, and blew up a store
ship and a pontoon. All this was accomplished without the
loss of a life on our side. This left Manzanillo in a condition
to be easily taken if the campaign should require it.

Equally complete was the work of our ships at Nipe, a port
on the northeast coast of Cuba. It was proposed to take this
place as a convenient harbor for use in the expedition to
Puerto Rico, and our naval force consisted of four gunboats —
the Topeka, Annapolis, Wasp, and Leyden. In about an
hour after they entered the harbor on the 21st the batteries
of three forts had been silenced, the Spanish troops driven ont,
a Spanish gunboat larger than any of the attacking ships
sunk, and the harbor oceupied.

The relations between the Cuban officers and our generals
came to a crisis with the occupation of Santiago, and the ex-
GARCIA’S DISPLEASURE 755

aggerated notion the Cuban leaders had of the part they were
playing was apparent. A letter alleged to have Lcen written
by Garcia was published, in which he complained of not being
invited to take part in the ceremonies of the surrender, that
his army was forbidden to enter the place, and that the Cuban
leaders had been ignored in every way by General Shafter. He
protested against leaving the Spanish civil authorities in the
city, and said the officials should be elected by the Cuban
people. At the same time he withdrew his forces from the
vicinity of Santiago. General Shafter replied in a courteous
note, reminding Garcia that he had been invited to witness
the surrender, which was made to the American army alone,
and he referred him to President MeKinley’s proclamation as
the law for the provisional government of Santiago. This
proclamation continued in operation the municipal officers
and regulations guaranteeing private and property rights.

In a later dispatch to the government General Shafter said
that Garcia had refused to have anything to do with the sur-
render if the Spanish authorities were left in power, in spite
of the fact that he was assured it was but a temporary. ar-
rangement. General Shafter then added:

The trouble with General Garcia was that he expected to be placed in
command at this place; in other words, that we would turn the city over
tohim. I explained to him fully that we were at war with Spain, and thac
the question of Cuban independence could not be considered by me. An-
other grievance was that, finding that several thousand men marched in
without opposition from General Garcia, I extended my own lines in
front of him and closed up the gap, as I saw that I had to depend upon my
own men for any effective investment of the place.

The Cuban Junta in this country seemed content to leave
the future of Cuba to the American sense of justice and fair
dealing, and Garcia’s action received no endorsement.

A campaign to Puerto Rico had from the first been a part
of the government’s program, and it would have been
begun long before, had not the War Department been seriously
overtaxed to provide for the expedition to the Philippines,
and for the operations about Santiago. The destruction of
756 THE PUERTO RICAN EXPEDITION

Cervera’s fleet made it possible for the navy to co-operate in
Puerto Rico, and preparations were at once made for a prompt
and energetic movement. There was the further reason for
haste in the fact that Spain was showing a disposition to sue
for peace, and our government wished to establish its authority
in Puerto Rico before any armistice came, as it proposed to
take that island among others in lieu of an indemnity which
it was well known Spain would not be able to pay.

Profiting by the experience in the Cuban campaign, the
military authorities decided to send a much larger army to
Puerto Rico than was used before Santiago; but this was after-
wards shown to have been bad judgment, for, while a large
army was seriously necded before Santiago, it was not needed
in Puerto Rico, whose people were ready to welcome American
control. It would have been better if a part of the Puerto
Rican force had been sent to Santiago to relieve those who
had endured that campaign, and were soon to show the serious
results of it. There was but a comparatively small Spanish
force in Puerto Rico, and yet it was proposed to send there
about thirty thousand troops under the command of General
Miles himself. To Puerto Rico where less resistance was to
be expected and where less than expected was really en-
countered, was sent a well-equipped army; to Santiago was
sent a force inferior in numbers, and yet too large for the
commissary arrangements. which accompanied it. General
Shafter had been compelled to meet difficulties without a
parallel in warfare, without that support which was sent to
Puerto Rico, where Miles simply led a triumphal march in a
healthy country and without any serious resistance.

The Puerto Rican expedition, with the Massachusetts,
Columbia, Gloucester, Dixie, Yale, and eight transports,
left Guantanamo Bay July 21st. There were about 3,500
troops in the first detachment. The second expedition sailed
from Tampa on the 23d, and the third, under command of
General Brooks, embarked in the next three davs from Tampa,
Newport News, and Charleston. General Miles landed on
 

  

 

 
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the 25th at Guanica, a small town on the south coast not far
from Ponce, and advanced eastward, meeting with no resist-

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THE ISLAND OF PUERTO RICO.
Showing routes and distances to other points.
Meanwhile, the Dixie, which had been sent to Ponce, was

ance, except a slight Spanish force at a place called Yuaco.
welcomed effusively by the people of that place.
760 A TRIUMPHAL MARCH

authorities showed no antagonism, and the military commander
quickly withdrew his troops towards San Juan. When the
leading detachment of General Miles’s army reached Ponce,
therefore, it found the Stars and Stripes already floating and
the people cheering them. His troops were received with an
enthusiasm which made the extensive preparations to take the
island almost ridiculous. The natives fraternized with our
soldiers, loading them down with presents, and thousands of
them expressed a wish to enlist against the Spaniards. Gen-
eral Miles issued a proclamation assuring the people of the
continuance of public security and property rights and offer-
ing them.

Before the armistice had been declared General Schwan
had gained possession of the town of Mayagiiez, on the western
coast of Puerto Rico; about twelve hundred Spanish troops
were in the vicinity, and were driven back after brisk fighting,
in which we had two men killed and fourteen wounded. The
main advance of the army under General Wilson continued
on the road to San Juan, beyond Coama toward Aibonito,
while General Brooke advanced northward from Guayama.
A demand for the surrender of Aibonito had been refused, and
both General Wilson and General Brooke were about to begin
a vigorous attack, when the order came from Washington to
suspend hostilities.

The military operations of the last week of the war were
of a character to convince Spain that delay in agreeing to our
terms of an armistice would be foolish. In Cuba on the after- -
noon of the 12th, our cruiser Newark, with four gunboats,
began the bombardment of Manzanillo, and it was continued
into the night. A demand for the surrender of the place was
refused and the bombardment would have been renewed on
Saturday had not news reached the commander of the Newark
that an armistice had been declared.

But news of the armistice could not be so promptly sent to
the far-off Philippines, which continued without direct cable
communication.
CHAPTER LIiI

THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES —CONDUCT OF AGUI-
NALDO — PHILIPPINE EXPEDITIONS— ANNEXATION OF
THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS—FALL OF MANILA.

Hostilities Begin and End in the Philippines —The Philippine Question at
Home —Policy of Expansion—A Complicated Situation — General
Merritt Designated to Lead the Expeditions — Apprehension of Trouble
with the Germans— Dewey’s Tactful Management — The Insurgents
Threaten Trouble — Aguinaldo’s Conduct — Insurgents Invest Manila
— The First Expedition under Way — Manila’s Desperate Condition —
Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands — Arrival of the First Expedition
under General Anderson and the Departure of General Merritt — Tak-
ing Possession of the Ladrone Islands— The Jrene Incident — Organ-
izing for Attack —A Spanish Assault —.A Demand for Surrender —
Preparing for Bombardment — The Battle of Malate — Fall of the City
— Merritt’s Proclamation.

Philippines. Commodore Dewey opened them there

before we fairly realized that the Orient was involved
in the war, and Admiral Dewey and General Merritt closed
them before the information that an armistice had been de-
clared had reached them. In pursuing the course of events in
Cuban waters, the reader’s attention has necessarily been di-
verted from the state of-affairs prevailing at Manila after
Dewey’s brilliant victory, and it will be essential to return to
the time when the smoke of that engagement was clearing away
and notice the development of a situation possessing something
of a fascinating novelty to the people of the United States.
An exceedingly lively discussion at once aroke as to what we
should do with the Philippines, although, as a matter of fact,
we, as yet, held none of the soil of the islands except at Cavité.
But with an unerring intuition our people at once realized that

a new question and one of transcending importance had en-
(761 )

(): hostilities with Spain began and ended in the
762 ADMIRAL DEWEY’S POSITION

tered into the war and that in the end, whenever it came, a
responsibility for the future of the islands would rest upon
this government, in some way. Two parties naturally arose,
the so-called expansionists, who argued that we should keep
the islands, that we could not drop them if we would. To
leave the oppressed and rebellious islands to Spain seemed
out of the question; to sell them to Great Britain or any other
power would raise perilous complications; to divide them up
would be equally dangerous; to establish a stable and peaceful
native government hardly seemed possible, and to keep them
might embroil us in an Asiatic question with jealous powers
and certainly would mark a decided change in the policy of
the government. We need not enter into a more extended
notice of this discussion, for wholly outside of that the situa-
tion was such as to give the government some concern and
immediate opportunity for action.

Manila still remained in the control of the Spanish gov-
ernor-general, while camped about it, and gradually increas-
ing their advantage were the insurgents under Aguinaldo. It
was perfectly true, as Dewey had reported, that he could take
the city at any time, but it would be useless to do so until
troops could be sent as an occupying force, sufficient to assume
control and jurisdiction. A bombardment simply would have
only complicated Dewey’s position, which was perfectly safe
as far as it went.

Although it had been perfectky understood at. Washing-
ton from the day when war and operations in the Philippines
became inevitable, that Dewey’s little fleet, even if successful
over Montijo’s, could spare no men for the occupation and
administration of a country so large as the Philippines, and
although plans for sending a force to co-operate with Dewey
had been early discussed, it was not till the reports of
Dewey’s prompt victory came that active steps were taken
to send assistance. The possibilities of complications in the
far-off islands, in the very region which was the cause of so
much concern and jealousy among the European powers, was
CONCERN OVER GERMANY’S ATTITUDE 763

at once appreciated and the government determined to ad-
vance in that direction with as much discretion as energy. In
designating General Merritt, who had before been spoken of
as the probable leader of the important military operations in
Cuba, to take command of the proposed expedition, the gov-
ernment revealed its desire and purpose to deal with the new
problem ably and to send sufficient forces to reduce to a
minimum the possibility that some European power might
find an excuse for attempting to take our new obligations and
opportunities in the Orient off our hands.

From the very first some concern was felt as to the attitude
of Germany. Simultaneously with the sending of the ulti-
matum to Spain in April and before any power had signified
an intention to declare its neutrality, the State Department re-
ceived information that Spain had made a proposition to
Germany, under which the latter would furnish troops for
the suppression of the Philippine rebels in consideration of
large concessions in the islands. The advantages thus offered
to Germany were very tempting in view of the conditions in
the East, and there was a fear that the Kaiser might not pass
them by, and that complications of a serious nature might
arise. Immediately after Dewey’s victory all the European
powers sent warships to Manila, and Germany seemed in-
clined to keep a much larger naval force there than her com-
mercial interests warranted.

Admiral Dewey’s tact and ability as an administrator
under difficult circumstances were quickly demonstrated.
While maintaining a vigorous blockade he willingly gave per-
mission to a delegation of British and German merchants to
remove their families to Cavité, where he placed United States
Consul Williams in charge. The consequence was that
wealthy families placed their houses at Cavité at the Admiral’s
disposal. He made himself popular among the foreign ship-
masters, and aided and facilitated them in carrying on their
business so far as it did not interfere with his duties. His
praise was in every port in the East.
764 AGUINALDO’S CONDUCT

The Spanish papers and clergy did all they could to under-
mine his influence by false reports and sensational stories.
The Archbishop, late in May, issued a proclamation, in which
he said that Spanish battleships were hurrying on their way
to Manila, and stated that God had informed him that in the
next engagement the armies of Christian Spain would be
victorious. It seemed as if the world had- gone back three
centuries, and as if we were living in the time of the bloody
Philip IT., after whom these unfortunate islands were named.

As time went on it became apparent that the insurgents
might prove one of the most troublesome features in the
islands. It was generally believed that Admiral Dewey had
some understanding with Aguinaldo, and the latter seems to
have thought that he would have the support of the admiral
in setting up a native republic with himself as president. But
as a matter of fact, although the admiral had received the in-
surgent leader kindly and had given him some modern arms
and ammunition, he had committed his government in no way
to any future arrangement. And in supplying him with arms
the admiral stipulated that they were to be used only in ap-
proved methods of warfare. He knew the native disposition
and he tactfully guarded against its manifestations.

At first Aguinaldo simply expressed a willingness that
the United States should treat the Philippines precisely as
Cuba was to be treated. There was, undoubtedly, a strong
native sentiment in favor of the independence of the islands,
and in one of his proclamations Aguinaldo said: “ The great
North American nation, lovers of true liberty, and, therefore,
desirous of liberating our country from the tvranny and des-
potism to which it has been subjected by its rulers, has shown
us disinterested protection, considering us sufficiently able
and civilized to govern this unhappy shore.” Later, Agui-
naldo showed a disposition to hurry matters by setting up a
republic in the province of Cavité and proclaiming himself as
president.

But Admiral Dewey kept him well in check. By the
AN ARMY FOR THE ORIENT 765

middle of June it appeared from the admiral’s dispatches as if
the insurgents had Manila so closely invested that they could
force its surrender at any moment that the admiral would give
his consent and assistance. But Dewey did not propose to
risk the situation till he had a force sufficient to control it
absolutely.

Fully three weeks elapsed after Dewey’s victory before
troops for his support were actually embarked, and as time
went on the more apparent it became that the government
had entered upon a difficult undertaking. The number of
men to be sent was gradually increased; the number of regulars
was augmented, for General Merritt was too wise to endanger
the expedition by hastily dispatching only an army of un-
trained volunteers, such as were recruited in the militia of
some of the Western states.

The first expedition sailed from San Francisco with the
cruiser Charleston on May 22d, and it was followed a few days
later by the City of Peking with two transports. In all the
first detachment consisted of about 2,500 men under the
command of General Anderson. The monitor Monterey was
also ordered to make ready to proceed to the Orient, a fact
which indicated a desire to strengthen Admiral Dewey’s fleet
for possible contact with those of other powers, for Spain
had nothing left to trouble him.

That the situation of the Spaniards in Manila was desper-
ate was indicated by the published dispatches of Captain-Gen-
eral Augusti. Aguinaldo had by his proclamations aroused
insurgents all over the island and he was winning in many
skirmishes with the Spanish forces, having a well-armed force
of nearly 3,000 men before Manila. He practically held all
of the province of Cavité. In a despairing dispatch early in
June the Captain-General said: “The capital is besieged by
land and sea. I shall try to resist to the last, but I have no
confidence in the result. Numbers of volunteers and native
soldiers are deserting to the rebels.”

One of the important questions which Congress had taken
OUR NEW POSSESSIONS

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THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
Showing routes and distances to important points.
GENERAL MERRITT’S DEPARTURE 767

up after the disposition of necessary war measures was that
of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. This question
had not for a moment lost its importance since Queen Lilio-
kalani had been deposed early in 1893, and the provisional gov-
ernment had offered to cede the sovereignty of the islands to
the United States. The leading men of the island strongly
desired annexation, and resolutions had been introduced in
Congress to bring it about. The islands assumed a new im-
portance immediately after the battle at Manila, and when
preparations were being made for sending expeditions to the
Philippines. That the sympathy of the people was strongly
American was strongly shown by the enthusiastic and generous
welcome that was given the first expedition when it arrived at
Honolulu, a welcome which was repeated as other expeditions
touched at that point. The debate in Congress was prolonged
by a minority opposition, but the resolution was finally passed
early in July, and five commissioners were appointed to ar-
range for the future administration of the islands. This step
was important in many ways; it established a precedent in the
manner of arranging our interests outside of the ordinary
boundaries of the United States, and, in case it should become
our lot to administer affairs in the Philippines, the sovereignty
over Hawaii, as a stopping place in the Pacific, could not fail
to be of great advantage.

On June 15th the second expedition to the Philippines de-
parted from San Francisco, 4,200 men being taken in four
vessels, in command of General Francis V. Greene. It in-
cluded three volunteer regiments, one each from Pennsylvania,
Colorado, and Nebraska, two battalions of regular infantry,
two batteries, engineers, and hospital corps. The third ex-
pedition got away the last of June on six vessels, and with
them went General Merritt and his staff. It had thus taken
two months to dispatch the force which was deemed necessary
to support Admiral Dewey in the-future exigencies of the
islands, and another month was to elapse before General
Merritt could be on the spot. This third expedition num-
768 PICKING UP ISLANDS ON THE WAY

bered about 5,000 men, making a total of some 11,000 troops
sent to the Orient up to that time. Preparations for other
expeditions were also made, and upon further secret advices
from Admiral Dewey, the monitor Monadnock was ordered
to the Philippines.

On the day General Merritt set out with the third ex-
pedition, the first arrived at Cavité, having stopped on the
way to take possession of the Ladrone Islands, which are
about 1,200 miles east of the Philippines, and had been in
Spanish possession ever since the days of Magellan. The
Charleston entered the harbor of San Luis Dapia in these
islands on the 20th, shelled the fort, and, meeting with no
resistance, received the surrender of the town on the follow-
ing day, taking off fifty-two officers of the Spanish army and
ninety-four men. Immediately on the arrival at Cavité a con-
ference took place between the admiral, General Anderson,
and Aguinaldo, as to future proceedings.

It was reported that one of the results of the arrival of
American forces at Cavité was the withdrawal of a part of
the large German squadron which had been assembled to pro-
tect the persons and property of a very small group of German
subjects in the Philippines, but it appeared later that the
German ships had not left the archipelago. The insurgents
had, meantime, been preparing to seize Grande Island in Subig
Bay, which the Spaniards had been fortifying. The German
warship Irene entered, and her commander refused to allow
the insurgents to attack the place, alleging that as Germany
had not formally recognized them as belligerents, he could
not, from motives of humanity, allow them to attack the
Spanish, as he feared that a massacre might occur. On hear-
ing the situation, Dewey at once sent one of his own vessels,
the Raleigh, to take the island, and the Irene’s commander
could not very well object to this, as, whatever Germany might
think about the insurgents, she had fully recognized that a
state of war existed between Spain and the United States.
In fact, as soon as the Raleigh appeared, the Irene withdrew
769

Dewey

y treated.

DEWEY ASSERTS HIS CONTROL
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and Dewey handed the prisoners over to the insurgents, with

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t so long as they deserved

ference, active or passive, would not be brooked, and that the

made it understood that he was master in the island, that inter-

insurgents could trust to his suppor
“ 70 A TROUBLESOME GERMAN COMMANDER

it. It was another proof that Dewey was cool-headed and
quick-witted. What might have grown into a European com-
plication was.settled by him very promptly and without leav-
ing the resemblance of a ground for reasonable protest. But
the German commander continued to behave in an exasperat-
ing manner. Dewey’s regulations in the harbor of Manila
were disobeyed until he, in effect, asked the German com-
mander if he was there to make war on the United States. If
so, he could have it. The German commander apologized,
but did not reform. He even went so far as to sound the
English commander in the harbor as to what he would do if
the German vessels interfered with the American operations
at Manila. Obtaining no satisfaction from that source, he be-
came more obliging to Dewey, but he still held secret com-
munication with the Spanish.

‘The uncertainty of German intentions in the Philippines
oecasioned much concern and feeling in this country for a
time. There were many reports, particularly from English
sources, of Germany’s determination to take advantage of the
situation to gain a foothold in the islands to the extent at least
of securing a coaling station; there were rumors of an agree-
ment between Germany, Austria, and Russia in regard to a
common line of policy to be pursued by the three countries
in the disposition of the Philippines. Several of the Russian
newspapers were going so far as to urge the necessity of some
kind of intervention at this stage of the war. On the other
hand the official relations of these countries to the government
of the United States was all that could be asked for. Russia
intimated quite clearly that she would not interfere with us
in the islands; Germany continued in every way to express its
friendship for us, and, while it was doubtless true that the
appearance of the American navy in the Orient had made the
European diplomats extremely nervous, to say the least, none
__ of the governments could afford to give offense to this country,
even if for no other reason than that it might tend to precipitate
A SPANISH ATTACK val

an understanding between England, Jaan, and the United
States for showing influence in the East.

But the conduct of the German admiral at Manila was
not the only troublesome feature of the situation. As the
American forces arrived, the attitude of Aguinaldo towards
our commanders became more and more unsatisfactory. His
dream of becoming a dictator grew more and more apparent,
and the problem presented became graver. Although Gov-
ernor-General Augusti was hard pressed by the rebels invest-
ing the city, he had no intention of surrendering to them, real-
izing that the unrestrained natives might loot the city, and,
naturally, Admiral Dewey withdrew any support he might
have given the insurgents when they showed a disposition to
act independently of his advice.

General Merritt arrived at Manila July 25th, having gone
straight through on the Newport. The other transports and
the monitor Monterey arrived a few days later. By this time,
* in view of the attitude of the insurgents, there was a strong
feeling in Manila in favor of surrendering to the Americans,
for the last hope of succor from Spain had gone, and such a
course seemed the only way to escape the hands of the in-
surgents, which were pressing closer and closer upon the dis-
tressed city. It was because of the probability of such a sur-
render that the Spanish government, while peace propositions
were pending, transferred the general authority over the
islands, leaving General Augusti in command only in Manila,
so that the surrender would not affect the whole territory.

During the week following his arrival, General Merritt
organized his forces, about 10,000 -strong, and those arriving
on the first expedition were encamped at Malate, a place on
the shore of the bay about two miles south of Manila, the line
extending about a mile inland and near the insurgents. On
the dark night of July 31st, 3,000 Spanish soldiers made a
sudden and sharp attack on our forces, hoping to turn the
American right, but our soldiers, mainly state troops from
Pennsylvania, California, and Utah, fought valiantly and
92 PREPARING FOR ACTION

quickly repulsed the Spaniards, causing them a loss of 500
men. ‘Thirteen of our men were killed and several wounded.
The Spaniards were driven beyond their outer defenses into
the city.

Admiral Dewey had entertained the hope that he might
secure the surrender of the city without the loss of a single
American life. He had counseled postponing the demand for
surrender till the Spanish had become in the most desperate
straights, and until the Monadnock had arrived, for there
seemed to be always the possibility that the Germans would
interfere when the gauntlet was thrown down. But the ad-
vance of the army up to the Spanish lines and the fatalities of
the battle of July 31st, convinced him that it was time to act,
and on August 7th he joined with General Merritt in an ulti-
matum to General Jaudenes, who had, meanwhile, superseded
Augusti, informing him that if he did not surrender within
forty-eight hours he would begin a bombardment at any time
he pleased. The information which came to Dewey and Mer-
ritt from the city was to the effect that a large portion of the
Spaniards were ready to surrender and it was hoped that only
a perfunctory resistance would be made. The ultimatum ex-
pired at noon on the 9th, but, meanwhile, the Spanish com-
mander asked for another day to remove the non-combatants
and the sick. This was granted. On Tuesday afternoon the
American ships were prepared for action. But action was
again postponed till the army could be placed in a better
position. Two days passed, and then both sides were reported
prepared. Early on the morning of the 13th (the day after
the signing of the peace protocol at Washington, but, of course,
before the news could reach Manila) Dewev’s flect got under
way. The Concord took a position at the north end of the
line, and the monitor Monterey went close in to the Luneta
battery. The Charleston, Baltimore, and Boston went further
out to engage the same batteries, and the Olympia, Raleigh,
and Petre! took wp a position opposite Malate. The Olympia
opened fire at 9.30 o’clock, and it was followed by the other
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OUR FLAG FLOATS OVER MANILA vere)

ships, the shots, however, generally falling short, probably by
intention. ‘The Spanish guns remained silent. Then shots
began to strike in the forts and do more damage, but still the
Spanish flags flew. Dewey signaled “Do you surrender?”
but there was no reply. The ships closed in, and Dewey sent
Lieutenant Brumby in a Belgian launch with a flag of truce
to the city. A long wait followed, but shortly after two
o’clock the launch started back, and, as she did so, a white flag
was hoisted over the Luneta fort. American troops at once
began to advance into the city, and in a little time Lieutenant
Brumby had returned and hoisted one of the Olympia’s largest
flags on the staff where the Spanish flag had been flying. The
350 years of Spanish sovereignty in Manila was ended.

But, meantime, the troops had been taking their part in
the events of the day. They had advanced along the shore
as soon as the firing had begun and had attacked the Malate
forts sharply. The Spanish replied smartly, killing eleven
of our men and wounding thirty-one. After the surrender
our soldiers marched in along the shore and by night com-
pletely occupied Manila.

General Merritt established his headquarters at the Gov-
ernor’s palace, and issued a proclamation establishing a mili-
tary government and offering protection to all residents in
their personal rights. The cable which Dewey had cut soon
after his arrival was repaired and again Manila had direct
communication with the outside world.
CHAPTER LIV

SPAIN SUES FOR PEACE— THE AMERICAN TERMS —SIGN-
ING OF THE PROTOCOL — LESSONS OF WAR AND PROB-
LEMS OF PEACE.

Spain’s Reluctance to Yield — Her Embarrassed Condition — Symptoms of
Revolution — Don Carlos and Weyler — Cortes Dissolved in Disorder —
Waiting for Spanish Public Opinion — Overtures at Last through the
French Minister — Reply of the United States — Terms of the Protocol
—The Philippine Problem — Condition of Our Army in Cuba —
Examples of Genuine Heroism in the War— Credit to the Private
and to the Sailor — The Patriotic and Prudent Policy of the President
—A Rich Legacy for the Future — After War, the Responsibilities of
Peace — The Problems of Better Government in the Conquered Terri-
tory —The Beginning of a New Historical Period in Our National
Life.

passing through a ministerial crisis. The defeat at

Manila had been followed by symptoms of revolution
andanarchy. In the long debates in the Cortes the most bitter
attacks had been made on the ministry for its failure to meet
the situation. Several provinces were placed under martial
law. The premium on gold rapidly advanced and the Bank of
Spain was becoming seriously crippled in its efforts to financier
the government. The ministry held together because every
one feared the result of its disappearance. It became no longer
possible to secure credence in reports of Spanish victories or
to conceal Spanish defeats. By the first of July the Spanish
people were beginning to face the facts. There were petitions
for peace from several sections. But Don Carlos was threaten-
ing trouble, and Weyler, with characteristic perversity, was

ee of the time since the war began Spain had been

inflaming the military spirits. The Cortes was dissolved the

last week in June amid great disorder and with outspoken
(776)
PREPARING THE WAY FOR PEACE U77

attacks upon the dynasty. To have sued for peace then,
while it would have been better for Spain, might have en-
dangered the Queen, so Sagasta held off with nothing to gain.
He was required to wait till the Spanish mind was prepared
for peace. The pressure of the war was felt more and more,
and after the fall of Santiago peace proposals were daily ex-
pected.

The overturcs finally came on July 26th, or three days
after General Miles landed in Puerto Rico. The French
Minister at Washington, M. Cambon, called upon the Presi-
dent and presented a letter from the Spanish Minister of For-
eign Affairs, asking upon what terms the United States would
be willing to make peace. President McKinley at once called
his cabinet into consultation for the purpose of framing a reply.
The result was that on the 30th a reply was sent to Madrid to
the general effect that this country would enter into negotia-
tions for peace provided Spain agreed to certain conditions.
This answer Spain received on the 31st. On the following
day some explanation was asked as to some of its terms, and
the Spanish cabinet finally accepted the conditions on August
7th. With the signing on the 12th by Cambon on the part
of Spain, and Secretary Day on the part of the United States,
of a formal protocol as a basis for peace, the war begun on
April 21st was brought to a close. The protocol, embodying
the conditions above mentioned, was as follows:

His Excellency M. Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at Washington, and Mr. William
R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, having received respectively
to that effect plenary powers from the Spanish Government and the Govern-
ment of the United States, have established and signed the following
articles, which define the terms on which the two governments have
agreed with regard to the questions enumerated below and of which the
object is the establishment of peace between the two countries, namely :

Article 1. Spain will renounce all claim to all sovereignty over and all
her rights over the island of Cuba.

Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States the island of Puerto
Rico and the other islands which are at present under the sovereignty of

Spain in the Antilles, as well as an island in the Ladrona Archipelago, to be
chosen by the United States.
varite) SPAIN YIELDS TO THE UNITED STATES

Article 8. The United States will occupy and retain the city and bay
of Manila and the port of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of
peace which shall determine the control and form the government of the
Philippines. ;

Article 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Puerto Rico, and
the other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the Antilles. To this
effect each of the two governments will appoint commissioners within tun
days after the signing of this protocol, and those commissioners shall met
at Havana within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, with the
object of coming to an agreement regarding the carrying out of the details
of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and other adjacent Spanish islands ;
each of the two governments shall likewise appoint within ten days aftcr
the signature of this protocol other commissioners, who shall meet at San
Juan de Puerto Rico within thirty days after the signature of this protocol
to agree upon the details of the evacuation of Puerto Rico and other
islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the Antilles.

Article 5. Spain and the United States shall appoint to treat for peace
five commissioners at the most for either country. The commissioners shall
meet in Paris on Octgber 1, at the latest, to proceed to negotiations and to
tue conclusion of a treaty of peace. This treaty shall be ratified in con-
formity with the constitutional laws of each of the two countries.

Article 6. Once this protocol is concluded and signed hostilities shall
be suspended, and to that effect in the two countries orders shall be given
by either government to the commanders of its land and sea forces as
speedily as possible.

Done in duplicate at Washington, read in French and in English by the
undersigned, who affix at the foot of the document their signatures and
seals, August 12, 1898.

Thus, in all points but one, Spain was absolutely pledged
in advance to yield to the demands of the United States. It
left the formulating of instructions to the peace commissioners
in regard to the Philippine question, the most important
matter before the two governments.

Thus, after less than four months of warfare, ended a con-
flict which drove Spain from the last of her once great posses-
sions in the Eastern world, which gave the promise of inde-
pendence to the struggling Cuban, which established the
United States as a world-power of the first magnitude and
enlarged its territory in both hemispheres, which opened to
the American people new opportunities and new responsi-
bilities. An English paper called it “ one of the most swiftly
decisive wars in history.” It is true that when the protocol
THE ROLL OF HONOR V79

was signed, Spain was still in possession of Havana, Manila,
and San Juan. But Manila fell the day after, San Juan
would have been taken in a few days, and Havana, Spain well
knew, must surely fall into our hands in the end. It was,
however, one of the peculiar features of the war that the
Cuban capital, to which all eyes were directed when war was
declared, in which was the main strength of the Spanish army,
around which it was supposed our armies would at once
gather, and into which our navy would first throw its shells,
escaped all actual hostilities and almost escaped notice. The
blockade had been continued from the beginning and the
condition of the people had become more and more desperate.
Relief from the sufferings of the blockade mitigated the bitter-
ness of defeat among the Spaniards, who had once been so
boastful and had treated our interests so contemptuously. As
they looked upon the wreck of the battleship J/aine in the
harbor, they must have felt that the penalty for that treachery
had been swift and harsh.

Immediately following the signing of the protocol public
sentiment in this country was aroused over the condition of
the army in Cuba, and it was brought North, but these events
belong to post-bellum history.

Naught else occurred to seriously mar the glorious record
our nation made in war. It was a conflict in which our arms
suffered no reverse, and yet the advantages were not always
on our side. Our soldiers proved themselves as valiant after
battle in saving other lives as they were heroic in battle in
hazarding their own. It is doubtful if in four months of any
war that was ever fought could be found so much genuine
heroism. The names of Dewey and of Schley, of Sampson
and of Miles, of Shafter and of Merritt, are added to America’s
long roll of honor, while Hobson and his men stand forth as the
unique heroes of the war. But no officer in the field or on
the sea acquitted himself with greater honor than the private
of our army and the sailor of our navy. With Dewey at
Manila and with Schley at Santiago was the American gunner;
780 THE TREATY OF PEACE

with Shafter at Santiago was the patriot, not the mercenary.
As the American nation is great because of the intelligence
and the ability of its common people, so has our army and our
navy won new honors through the bravery and the skill of
the private in the field and the sailor on the ships.

With its heroes the people did not forget to place one man
whose work began long before war came and was not lessened
by its close: The President who had united all parties in sup-
port of his patriotic and prudent policy, whose patient diplo-
macy deferred war till it could be deferred no longer, whose
courage carried it through to a successful issue, and whose
gentle firmness at its close secured a peace on honorable con-
ditions with a rich legacy for our future, proved himself the
great American statesman of this generation, and amply justi-
fied the trust which his people placed in his hands.

With the days of waiting for the formal framing of a treaty
of peace we may well close this history of what will ever be
known as one of the most important periods in the life of this
great nation. Peace, no less than war, has its responsibilities,
and the peace now being made points the way to expanding
duties which we have not heretofore recognized as ours.
Having destroyed the only government that existed in Cuba,
in Puerto Rico, and in the Philippines, there rests upon us
the responsibility and the problem of securing to these islands
a better government. This work will not be the work of a
moment. It will, henceforth, be a feature of our govern-
ment, of our national life. It will be less an appendix to the
history of the war than a history in itself — the history of a
nation from the time it took its place as a dominating factor
in the civilization of the world.
    

 

 

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