KE 755 Tt) Gornell Law School Library Cornell University Libra ‘iin THE LAW OF WILLS AND THE MANNER OF THEIR DRAFTING, EXECUTION, PROBATE AND CONTEST TOGETHER WITH TESTAMENTARY FORMS By GEORGE W. THOMPSON Of the Indianapolis Bar INDIANAPOLIS THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY PUBLISHERS 138.7277), CopyRIGHT 1916 By Tue Bosss-MERRILL COMPANY PREFACE ’ The object of this work on wills is two-fold. In the first place it is designed to fill the real purpose of a text-book by stating in concise form the modern law of wills as deduced from the stat- utes and adjudicated cases. It has been the aim of the author to present in moderate compass the entire law of wills and cite ample authorities on every question discussed. An attempt has been made to cite all the leading and well-considered cases upon the several topics, and to bring them down to the latest moment, so as to give the true state of the law at the time of publication. The second, and by no means the least important, object of this work is to furnish the busy lawyer a ready reference or guide in the preparation, execution, probate, and contest of will; a book to which he can readily turn, after receiving his instruc- tions from the testator, and ascertain if the dispositions are per- missible and proper, or whether they should be abridged or en- _ larged. By its use defects or ambiguities in the instrument may be discovered and corrected before it is too late. This feature of the work is intended to deal with testamentary dispositions from an ante-mortem rather than a post-mortem standpoint. It is obvious to every lawyer that litigation over wills would be greatly lessened if more attention were given to their plan and preparation. If a will clearly expresses the wish of the testator and is executed with all the formalities required by law it will not only be a credit to the lawyer who prepared it, but it will safeguard the testator’s estate and devolve it in accordance with his desire. Hence it is the aim of this work to assist the busy lawyer in drafting a will that will carry out the wishes of the testator and will be both safe and sound. With this end in view many practical hints and valuable sug- gestions on the drafting, execution, probate, and contest of wills have been included. Also a complete and comprehensive set of iv PREFACE forms and precedents on all the subjects which may arise in draft- ing a will has been given. These forms are of three classes, (1) precedents for particular clauses, (2) complete wills and adjudi- cated forms, and (3) extracts from wills of famous persons. All these forms have been selected with great care and their number is far in excess of those in any contemporaneous work. The work is prepared for use in every state in the United States. As an aid in the preparation of a will for a testator domiciled in a foreign state or country, or for a resident testator owning real estate in a foreign state or country, a digest of the statutes of wills of such foreign states and countries, and also all treaties between the United States and foreign powers per- taining to the testamentary disposition of property within the respective jurisdictions, have been included. With this epitome of the scope of the work and its purpose the author respectfully submits it to the kindly consideration of the legal profession. Gzorce W. THompson. Indianapolis, September 4, 1916. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY SECTION 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. %° 10. 11. 12. 13. 14, 15. Devolution of property on death of owner. Intestate succession. Gift causa mortis. Trust deed or declarations of trust. Deed to take effect at death. Antenuptial agreements. Transmission of property by survivorship. Will and related words defined. Distinguishing characteristics of a will. The right to make a will. Importance of the instrument. Reasons for making a will. Functions of a will. Objects of testamentary disposition. Inheritance or transfer tax. CHAPTER II KINDS AND CLASSES OF WILLS SECTION 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25; 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. Classification of wills. Ordinary written wills. Nuncupative wills at common law. Nuncuptative testaments under the civil law of Louisiana, Mystic wills. Holographic wills. Contingent or conditional wills. Alternative wills. Joint and mutual wills. Separate wills in relation to property in different jurisdictions. Wills appointing executor only. Wills operative at discretion of another. Codicils. Contracts to make or not make a will. Vv vi TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER III LAWS BY WHICH WILLS ARE GOVERNED SECTION 40. Where a will may be executed. 41. Laws governing wills of real estate. 42. Laws governing wills of personal property. 43. Effect of changing domicil after making will. 44. Law governing capacity of beneficiary to take. 45. Law governing trusts created by will. 46. Laws governing wills executing powers. 47. Laws governing revocation. 48. Laws governing election, dower and inheritance. 49. Laws governing construction and interpretation. 50. Effect of legislative enactment subsequent to execution of will. $1. Effect of legislative enactment after testator’s death. COAPIER. Ly PROPERTY SUBJECT TO TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION SECTION 55. What property may pass in general. 56. After-acquired personal property. 57. After-acquired real estate. 58. Property transformed. 59. Interests under trusts and powers. 60. Interests under contract to convey or purchase. 61. Proceeds of insurance. 62. Homestead and other exemptions. 63. Dower, curtesy and statutory allowances. 64. Future or contingent estates. 65. Community property and estates by entireties. 66. Rights of entry. 67. Interests not surviving, and property transferable to others at testator’s death, CHAPTER V TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND RESTRICTIONS UPON TESTATOR SECTION 75. Capacity to make a will in general. 76. At what time capacity must exist. 77. Limitations and restrictions upon capacity in general. 78. Restrictions upon power of testator to give to charitable and religious uses. : TABLE OF CONTENTS Vii 79. Capacity of aliens. 80. Capacity of infants. 81. Married women. 82. Convicts and persons guilty of crime. 83. Persons of unsound mind. 84. Aged persons. 85. Deaf, dumb and blind persons. 86. Persons under duress or undue influence. 87. Drunkards and drug fiends. CHAPTER VI CAPACITY TO TAKE UNDER A WILL AND RESTRICTIONS UPON BENEFICIARIES SECTION 95. Capacity to take under a will in general. 96. Aliens. 97. Private corporations. 98. Public and quasi corporations. 99. Unincorporated societies. 100. Charitable, religious and educational institutions. 101. Gifts to separate use of females. 102. Husband or wife. 103. Children and their descendants. 104. After-born children. 105. Adopted children. 106. Illegitimate children. 107. Subscribing witnesses. 108. Paramours. 109, Murderer of testator. CHAPTER VII PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS IN PLANNING AND DRAFTING WILLS SECTION 115. Knowledge of testamentary law essential. 116. Testator preparing his own will. 117, Testator’s instructions. 118. Inquiry concerning testator’s real and personal property. 119, Inquiry concerning particular kinds of property or interests. 120. Inquiry concerning character and kinds of gifts to be made. 121. Inquiry concerning objects of testator’s bounty. 122. Inquiry concerning management and settlement of estate. 123. Attorney’s advice and explanation to testator. 124. Inquiry into testator’s capacity. 125. Precaution against fraud, undue influence and mistake. vili TABLE OF CONTENTS 126. Precautionary measures where contest is probable. 127. Selecting attesting witnesses. 128. Suggestions concerning the making of codicils. 129. Time employed in preparation of will. 130. Testing the will before death. 131. Depositary of wills. CHAPTER VIII KINDS AND CHARACTER OF DEVISES AND LEGACIES SECTION 135. Devises and legacies in general. 136. General devises. 137. Specific devises. 138. General legacies. 139. Specific legacies. 140. Demonstrative legacies. 141. Additional or cumulative legacies, 142. Substitutional legacies. 143. Residuary devises and legacies. CHAPTER IX FORM AND LANGUAGE OF WILLS SECTION 150. Form of instrument. 151. Separate instruments and separate sheets of paper. 152. Incorporation by réference. 153. Incomplete and uncertain instruments. 154. Repugnancy. 155. Language in which a will may be written. 156. Alterations and additions. 157. Grammatical requirements. 158. The use of technical words. 159. Punctuation and capitalization. CHAPTER X DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES SECTION 165. Certainty of designation. 166. Designating the beneficiary by name. 167. Designating beneficiary by description. 168. Gift to more than one person. 169. Heirs and lawful heirs, 170. Next of kin. 171, 172. 173. 174, 175, 176, 177. 178. 179, 180. 181, 182. 183, 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194, 195. TABLE OF CONTENTS ix Representatives, legal representatives and personal representatives. Husband and wife. Issue, lawful issue, legitimate issue, immediate issue and issue of the body. Descendants. Offspring. Children, grandchildren, adopted children, step-children, illegitimate chil- dren and children en ventre sa mere. Brothers and sisters. Nephews and nieces, Cousins. Family. Relatives or relations. Servants and employés. Creditors. Debtors. Corporations and associations generally. Unincorporated societies and assemblages. Charitable corporations or associations. Educational objects. Religious societies and organizations. Class in general. Language denoting gift to class. Time of determination of class. Persons included in gift to class. Shares or portions in general. Per capita and per stirpes. CHAPTER XI LANGUAGE DESCRIPTIVE OF PROPERTY DEVISED OR BEQUEATHED SECTION 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. Failure to describe property. Certainty of description. Conflicting and repugnant descriptions. False and erroneous descriptions, Language passing entire estate. Share, part or portion. After-acquired property. Estate. Property. Effects. Description of real estate in general. What words will carry real property. Particular descriptions of real estate. Rents, income and profits of real estate. What words will carry personal property. e x 215. 216. 217. 218. 219, 220. 221. 222. TABLE OF CONTENTS Money and cash. Goods and chattels. Furniture, household furniture and household goods. Stock. Bonds, mortgages and securities. Notes, accounts and choses in action. Insurance. Interest, income or profits of personal property. CHAPTER XII ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED AND THEIR MODE OF CREATION SECTION 230. 231. 232. 233. 234, 235. 236. 237. 238. 239, 240. 241, 242. 243. 244, 245. In general. Estates or interests created by implication. Absolute gifts of personalty. Life estate in personalty. Fee simple in real estate. Limited or conditional fees. Life estates in real estate. Life estates with power of disposition. Estates tail. Estates for years. Joint tenancy and tenancy in common. Estates in remainder. Executory devises. Gifts of a use. Rule in Shelley’s Case. Rule in Wild’s Case. CHAPTER XII VESTED AND CONTINGENT ESTATES AND INTERESTS SECTION 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. Vested and contingent interests defined and distinguished. Intention of testator respecting vesting. Construction in favor of vesting. Condition or contingency on which interest vests. Vesting under certain words of futurity. Vesting indicated by form of gift. Interest contingent because of contingency of person. Vested interest subject to open and let in. Vested interest subject to be divested. TABLE OF CONTENTS Xi CHAPTER XIV RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES SECTION 265. Meaning of perpetuity in law. 266. Common-law rule. 267. Statutory modifications of the rule. 268. Nature and purpose of the rule. 269. Period allowed for vesting. 270. Estates or interests subject to the rule. 271. Application of rule to charitable gifts. 272. Effect of directions to accumulate the income. 273. Disposition of property where gift void under the rule against perpetui- ties. CHAPTER XV CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS SECTION 280. How conditions defined and created. 281. Void and repugnant conditions. 282. Effect on estate when condition fails. 283. Conditional limitations. 284. Survivorship as a contingency. 285. Gifts over on death as sole contingency. 286. Death without issue or heirs as condition to gift over. 287. Conditions putting beneficiary to his election. 288. Conditions restricting marriage. 289. Conditions favoring divorce or separation. 290. Conditions against contest of will. 291. Conditions against claims against estate. 292. Conditions against bankruptcy or insolvency. 293. Conditions as to residence, occupation, education or religion. 294. Conditions as to name or other personal characteristics of beneficiary. 295. Conditions as to support, payment of debts, etc. 296. Conditions against alienation in general. 297. Conditions restraining married women from alienating. | CHAPTER XVI LAPSE, AND METHODS OF PREVENTING SECTION 305. Lapsed and void gifts in general. 306. Death of beneficiary as cause of lapse. 307. Causes of lapse other than by death of beneficiary. 308. Devolution of lapsed legacies and devises. 309. Intention of testator respecting lapse. Xil TABLE OF CONTENTS 310. Lapse prevented by statutory provisions. 311. Lapse prevented by substitution or gift over. 312. Lapse prevented by gift over after gift to a class. 313. Lapse prevented by residuary clause. CHAPTER XVII CHARGING SPECIFIC PROPERTY WITH PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND LEGACIES SECTION 320. Legacies and debts payable out of personalty. 321. Express charge of legacies upon realty. 322. Implied charge of legacies upon realty. 323. Charging realty with payment of annuity or support. 324. Charging real estate specifically devised with payment of debts and legacies. 325. Charging debts and legacies upon personal property specifically be- queathed. 326. Effect of residuary clause blending realty and personalty. 327. Exoneration of personalty from liability for debts and legacies, CHAPTER XVIII TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS SECTION 335. Testamentary trusts defined and distinguished. 336. Essentials of a testamentary trust. 337. Purposes of testamentary trusts. 338. Words creating testamentary trust. 339, Trusts by precatory words. 340. Intention of testator to create a trust. 341. Trusts implied from context of will. 342. Trust ex maleficio. 343. Passive and active trusts. 344. What property may be subject of trust. 345. What constitutes income from trust property. 346. Trusts for the accumulation of income. 347. Time from which income is to be estimated. 348. Alienation or assignment of income by anticipation. 349. Application or payment of income. 350. Who may be a trustee. 351. Title or interest of trustee. 352. Who may be a cestui que trust. 353. Estate or interest of cestui que trust. 354. Trust created for benefit of married women. 355. Effect of provisions for maintenance, support and education. TABLE OF CONTENTS Xill 356. Rights of creditors respecting trust funds. 357. Duration of trust term. 358. Termination of the trust. 359, Effect of failure of purpose of trust. CHAPTER XIX TESTAMENTARY POWERS SECTION 365. Testamentary powers in general. 366. Classification of testamentary powers. 367. Purposes of testamentary powers. 368. Creation of testamentary powers. 369. Who may be donee of power. 370. Who may exercise power where no person designated. 371. Joint donees of power. 372. Discretion of donee. 373. Delegation of testamentary powers. 374. To whom appointment under power may be made. 375. Apportionment of shares and exclusion of appointees. 376. Estates or interests appointed. 377. Statutory regulation of powers. 378. Power to lease. 379, Power to mortgage. 380. Power to sell or exchange. 381. Power to manage, control, improve and invest. 382. Advancements under power. CHAPTER XX PROVISIONS CONCERNING MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE SECTION 390. Directions concerning investments. 391. Instructions as to voting shares. 392. Selling real estate to pay debts. 393. Paying debts and funeral expenses. 394. When legacies payable. 395. Payment of legacies in case of shrinkage. 396. Payment of interest on legacies. 397. Appointing agents and attorneys. 398. Applying proceeds of sale or mortgage of trust property. 399. Authorizing compromise of claims. 400. Inventories, appraisements and reports. 401. Auditing accounts and examining securities. 402. Distribution in kind. 403. Insuring property belonging to estate. XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER XXI PROVISIONS RESPECTING EXECUTORS, TRUSTEES AND GUARDIANS SECTION 410. Appointment of executors. 411. Appointment of trustees. 412. Appointment of guardians. 413, Death, resignation, renunciation or relinquishment of executors and trustees. 414. Liability of executors. 415. Liability of trustees. 416. Executor’s bond. 417. Trustee’s bond. 418. Authority of less than all executors or trustees to act. 419. Conflicting relations of executor and trustee. 420. Authority and duties of executors. 421. Authority and duties of trustees. 422. Compensation of executors, trustees and guardians. CHAPTER XXII MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SECTION 430. Provisions disposing of testator’s body. 431. Disinheritance of heirs. 432. Provision for construction by umpire. 433. Provisions respecting advancements, 434. Ademption and satisfaction of legacies. 435. Provision against void gift. CHAPTER XXIII EXECUTION OF WILLS SECTION 440, Requisites of execution in general. 441. Testator’s knowledge or understanding of contents of will. 442, Signature of testator. 443. Signature of testator’s name by another. 444. Location of signature. 445. Publication of will. 446. Attestation by witnesses. 447. Attestation clause. 448. Competency of attesting witnesses. 449. Attestation at the request of testator. 450. Signing by witnesses in presence of testator. TABLE OF CONTENTS XV 451. Witnesses signing in presence of each other, 452, Alterations and additions. 453. Execution of a holographic will. 454. Execution of a nuncupative will. CHAPTER XXIV REVOCATION SECTION 460. Revocation in general. 461. By writing not testamentary in character. 462. By a subsequent will. 463. By codicil. , 464. Mutilation, cancelation, or destruction. 465. By alterations and additions. 466. Changes in condition or circumstances of testator—In general. 467. By marriage, and by marriage and birth of issue. 468. Revocation by divorce. 469. By sale or conveyance of property. 470. Revocation of joint or mutual wills. CHAPTER XXV REPUBLICATION AND RE-EXECUTION SECTION 475, Republication at common law. 476. Republication under statutes. 477. Revival depending on intention of testator. 478. Republication by codicil. 479, Effect of republication. 480. Re-execution of wills. CHAPTER. XXVI PROBATE OF WILLS SECTION 485. Probate of wills in general. 486. Rights and interests under unprobated will. 487. Place of probate. 488. What must be probated. 489. Production of will for probate. 490. Who may be proponent of a will. 491. Jurisdiction of courts in probate of wills. 492. Form and contents of application. 493. Notice of proceedings for probate. 494, Probate in common form. 495. Probate in solemn form. Xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS 496. Repropounding a will once probated or rejected. 497. Hearing where application not formally contested. 498. Evidence and burden of proof. 499. Time of competency of witnesses. 500. Probate where will valid in part only. 501. Probate of conditional and alternative wills. 502. Probate of joint, double, mutual and simultaneous wills. 503. Probate of nuncupative wills. 504. Procedure to establish and probate lost or destroyed will. 505. Degree of proof required to establish a lost or destroyed will. 506. Probate of foreign wills. 507. Uniform foreign probate law. 508. The effect of probate. 509. Revocation of probate. CHAPTER XXVII CONTEST OF WILLS SECTION 515. Various methods of contest. 516. Nature of proceeding to contest. 517. Who may oppose or contest probate. 518. Who may contest a probated will. 519. When contestant estopped. 520. Limitation of time for contest. 521. Jurisdiction of actions to contest wills. 522. Jurisdiction of federal courts. 523. Parties in actions to contest wills. 524. Grounds for contest in general. 525. Pleadings in actions to contest wills. 526. Burden of proof. 7 527. Issue in general. 528. Invalidity of execution as an issue. 529. Issue of testamentary incapacity. 530. Undue influence as an issue. 531. Issue of fraud and forgery. 532. Trial. 533. Evidence. 534. Verdict and decree. CHAPTER XXVIII DIGEST OF STATUTES SECTION 540. Alabama. 541. Alaska. $42. Arizona, 543, 545. 546. 547, 548. 549, 550. 551. 552. 553. 554, 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. . Montana. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574, 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. TABLE OF CONTENTS Arkansas. . California. Colorado. Connecticut. Delaware. District of Columbia. Florida. Georgia. Hawaii. Idaho. Illinois. Indiana. Towa. Kansas. Kentucky. Louisiana, Maine. Maryland. Massachusetts. Michigan. Minnesota. Mississippi. Missouri. Nebraska. Nevada. New Hampshire. New Jersey. New Mexico. New York. North Carolina, North Dakota. Ohio. Oklahoma. Oregon. Pennsylvania. Philippine Islands. Porto Rico. Rhode Island. South Carolina. South Dakota. Tennessee. Texas. Utah. Vermont. Virginia. Washington. . West Virginia. Xvil XVili TABLE OF CONTENTS 591, 592. 593. 594, 595, 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. Wisconsin, Wyoming. British Columbia. England and Ireland. Manitoba. New Brunswick. Newfoundland. Nova Scotia. Ontario. Other British possessions. Quebec. Saskatchewan. Scotland, CHAPTER XXIX TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS SECTION 610. 611, 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621, 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634, 635. 636. 637, 638. 639, 640. Treaties affecting disposition and transmission of property. Argentine Republic. Austria-Hungary. Bavaria. Belgium. Bolivia. Brazil. Brunswick and Luneburg. Columbia. Costa Rica. Denmark. France. German Empire. Great Britain. Greece. Gautemala. Haiti. Hanseatic Republics. Hesse. Honduras. Italy. Japan. Kongo. Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Morocco. Netherlands. Ottoman Empire, Paraguay. Persia. Prussia, Roumania. TABLE OF CONTENTS xix 641. Russia. 642. Saxony. 643. Servia. 644. Spain. 645. Sweden and Norway. 646. Switzerland. 647. Tripoli. 648. Wurttemberg. 649. Hague Convention. CHAPTER XXX FORMS AND PRECEDENTS FOR PARTICULAR CLAUSES ArtTIcLE 1. IntTRopucTorY SECTION 655. Generally. ARTICLE 2. CoMMENCEMENT CLAUSES 656. Commencement clauses of a will. 657. Commencement of codicil. Articte 3. Speciric Lecacies anp Devises 658. Specific bequests. 659. Bequest of bonds. 660. Bequest of cash on hands to wife. 661. Bequest to wife of personal and household effects. 662. Specific legacy in proceeds of bonds. 663. Specific legacy of stock. 664. Specific legacy—Gift of stock in trust for grandson. 665. Bequest of business to son. 666. Confirming daughter’s right to a deposit in her name in a savings bank. 667. Devise of lot. 668. Devise of dwelling-house to wife for life, with remainder to sons. 669. Devise of farm with crops, live stock, implements, etc. ArTICLE 4. GENERAL Lecacies AND DevisEs 670. Pecuniary legacies. 671. Bequest to wife for immediate use. 672. Legacies to wife—One payable immediately. 673. Legacy to wife to be paid in instalments. 674. General gifts of estate in shares, 675. General devise. Articte 5. DEMoNSTRATIVE, CUMULATIVE AND SUBSTITUTIONAL GIFTS 676. Demonstrative legacies. 677. Demonstrative legacy with proviso for ademption. XxX TABLE OF CONTENTS 678. Cumulative legacies. 679. Substitutional legacy. Articte 6. Lrcactes CHARGED 680. Legacies charged on estate. 681. Legacies charged on realty. 682. Legacies charged upon land. 683. Charge to secure payment of legacies. 684. Charge of legacies. 685. Legacy charged on specific real estate, 686. Charge of support for son. Articte 7. Resipuary Lecactes anp DevisEs 687. Residue of personal estate. 688. Residuary clause. 689. Residue of personalty to wife. 690. Residue of personalty to children as a class with provision against lapse. 691. Residue of personalty to children with substitution of issue. 692. Residuary bequest per capita. 693. Residuary legacy to daughters. 694, Legacy of residue of personalty to several in equal shares. 695. Advances to a son brought into hotchpot in distribution of residue. 696. Residue of realty and personalty to one. 697. Residuary devise and bequest specifying property, which gives residuary legatee no right to lapsed legacies. ’ 698. Residue of realty and personalty to children and issue of deceased chil- dren. 699. Residue of real and personal estate to trustees. 700. Residue of real estate to son for life with remainder to trustees. 701. Residue according to law—No power of sale. 702. Bequest of share in residue for life. 703. Allotment of real estate to one residuary legatee. Articte 8, Brgursts AND Devises to Certain Kinps or BENEFICIARIES 704. Gifts to servants and employés. 705. Bequest to several persons. 706. Afterborn children. 707. Legacy to adopted child. 708. Gifts to absent legatees. 709. Legacy to one whose whereabouts are unknown. 710. Provisions for wife in lieu of dower. 711. Provision in lieu of dower. 712. Legacies to debtors. 713. Releasing debts to debtor. 714, Forgiving debts. 715. Release to a debtor of all debts. 716. 717. 718. 719, 720. 721, 722, 723. 724, 725; 726. 727, 728. 729, 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737, 738. 739, 740. 741. 742, 743, 744, 745. 746, 747, 748. 749, 750. 751. 752. 753. 754, 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. TABLE OF CONTENTS XXi Release of mortgage debt. Release of son from payment of interest on debts, Legacy to creditor. Bequest to executors. Legacy to a charity. Devise to churches as tenants in common. Devise and bequest to a college. Bequest to namesakes. Devise to wife for life, then to son in fee. Devise to children with substitution of issue. Devise to trustees upon trust to permit unmarried daughters to reside. Devise to testator’s sons with gifts over if they die preceding testator. Devise to several as tenants in common, with cross limitations. Legacy to one or to his children by substitution. Legacy to two sisters or the survivor. Legacy to children to equalize share. Bequest per stirpes, granting each heir of L. A. a full share. Devise to a class, heirs of the body. Devise and bequest per capita. Devise per capita. Gift to class. Gift per capita. Bequest per stirpes. Gift to children upon the death of the wife. Bequest to go to personal representatives (executors or administrators) at death. Estate given according to laws of descent. Legacies to executors and trustees. ArticLe 9, Bequests AND Devises or Certain Kinps or Property Bonds to be purchased and held in trust for children at twenty-one or marriage. Bequests or devises of community property and declarations as to such. Provision as to wife’s separate property. Confirming conveyances. Debt owing the testator. Dumb animals. Furniture. Furniture to daughters. Furniture and personal effects to daughters. Furniture of her bedroom and sitting-room to daughter. Leasehold house with furniture. Power of sale of furniture and effects bequeathed. Furniture to wife during her widowhood, afterward to children. Declaration dispensing with inventory of furniture bequeathed. Farming stock. Plantation tools and stock. Rights of fellow or patron. xxii TABLE OF CONTENTS 760, 761. 762, 763. 764, 765. 766. 767. 768, 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778, 779. 780. 781. 782, 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789, 790. 791. 792, 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. Devise of fixtures. Heirlooms. Heirlooms and keepsakes, Insurance policy. Jewelry. Bequest of personal property. Keepsakes or mementos. Letters and manuscripts. Manuscripts to literary executor. Private letters and papers. Memorials. Monument. Cemetery lot. Bequest to erect and keep in repair monument. Portraits. Bequest of income from stock for life. Property of others in testator’s possession. Share in partnership to a son under a power in the partnership articles. Direction as to taxes. Devise of mortgaged property. Devise subject to mortgage not to be paid out of personalty. Devise of buildings to son subject to lease and mortgage. Direction that incumbered property shall bear the burden of the incum- brance. Devise free from mortgage debt. Residénce as home for testator’s family, Gift over after invalid gift. Invalid gifts not to defeat will. Assignment of book debts. Assignment of business and good will by parent to son. Articte 10. Creation oF Dirrerent Kinps or Estates Devise of fee simple—Indiana. Devise to wife in fee—Iowa. Fee simple—Pennsylvania. Devise to wife in fee making her an executor, but not creating a trust —Illinois. Devise in fee. Life estate—Pennsylvania. Life estate to wife—Maine. Devise of life estate—Illinois. Life estate in realty and personalty—Pennsylvania. Life estate to husband—Indiana. Devise to wife for life—Michigan. Life estate—Pennsylvania, Bequest by wife for maintenance of husband—Massachusetts. Life estate in personalty—Mississippi. Bequest of money for life—New York. TABLE OF CONTENTS XXili 804. Life estate—Mississippi. 805. Bequest of life estate in income of personalty—Pennsylvania. 806. Estate for life with power to lease. 807. Devise to wife with power to convey a fee simple title. 808. Gift for life with right to use—Illinois. 809. Bequest of life estate with remainder to personal representatives of life tenant—Connecticut. 810. Devise to wife for life, with power of sale, and condition against remar- riage—Maine. 811. Life estate to wife and vested remainder in children—Illinois. 812. Devise for life with remainder over—Missouri, North Carolina. 813. Bequest of personal property for life, with remainder over—Indiana. 814. Devise for a term and for life—Massachusetts. 815. Life estate with power of sale—Maine. 816. Estate for life with power to convey the fee—Illinois. 817. Life estate with power of disposition by will—Tennessee. 818. Life estate with power of disposition, remainder to children—Iowa. 819. Devise of life estate with power of disposal—Maine. 820. Bequest for life with power of disposal—Maine. 821. Devise and bequest for life to wife with power to sell and reinvest, re- mainder to children—Georgia. : 822. Life estate with power of disposal—Massachusetts. 823. Life estate with power of disposal—New Hampshire. 824. Life estate with power of disposal of fee—North Carolina. 825. Devise for life with power to convey fee—Massachusetts, 826. Devise to wife for life with limited power of disposal—Michigan. 827. Devise to wife for life or so long as sie remains a widow—Pennsylvania. 828. Estate for life or widowhood with power of disposal—Georgia. 829. Execuitory devise—Connecticut. 830. Determinable fee—Illinois. 831. Defeasible fee—Illinois, 832. Base or determinable fee—Illinois. 833. Defeasible fee—Missouri. 834. Determinable fee—North Carolina. 835. Devise of estate tail—Pennsylvania. 836. Devise of real estate to two with power of sale after five years and trust in proceeds of sale for one. 837. Devise of house and contents and land therewith to wife for life, then to son. 838. Devise to grandsons, providing for reversion in case of death without issue—Mississippi. 839, Life estates to children, contingent remainder to grandchildren—Mary- land. 840. Bequest for sole and separate use of daughter. 841. Estate for years, remainder vested in grandchild—New York. 842. Income to wife, estate vesting in children at her death, to be distributed when youngest comes of age—Iowa. XXIV TABLE OF CONTENTS 843, Devise to son for life, remainder to church, also of another remainder to church upon definite failure of issue to son—Arkansas. Articte 11. Provision as To Time oF VEsTING. CoNTINGENT EsTATES 844, 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859, 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. Legacy to vest when legatee is twenty-one. Legacy to vest on marriage. Vested remainder. Remainder vesting at death of life tenant. Bequest to son when he attains age of twenty-one with maintenance ‘meanwhile, Remainder vesting at testator’s death, enjoyment postponed. Remainder to children jointly, vesting on testator’s death. Devise of fee to vest when son reaches majority. Legacy to son to vest at twenty-five, interest in the meantime to be ap- plied for maintenance, with power to apply principal for his advance- ment. Legacies to nephew and niece to be paid at twenty-one or on marriage. Legacies to several children to be paid at twenty-one or on marriage. Remainder vesting at testator’s death. Legacies in trust to several with restraint on anticipation by female legatees during coverture. Legacy in trust for the family of a son who is or may become bankrupt. Fee with remainder contingent on death without disposal or without issue. Devise to son for life, with contingent remainder to lawful heirs (not within rule in Shelley’s Case). Estate for life with remainder over, vested if children exist when tes- tator dies, contingent if they do not. Absolute bequest in trust for daughters, limited over on marriage and birth of issue. Bequest to daughter on termination of marriage. ArticLe 12. Girrs To CHarITIES Bequest to charity, beneficiaries to be selected by life tenant. Bequest for charitable use. Devise for charitable use. Bequest to charity on condition subsequent. Charitable bequest to purchase and distribute religious books. Charitable gift for use of most deserving poor of a city. Bequest to poor of a foreign city. Bequest to worthy poor of a city. Bequest for benefit of poor. Devise to church to be applied to foreign missions, Gift to home for aged women. Bequest to endow bed in hospital. Bequest for charitable purposes. TABLE OF CONTENTS XXV 876. Remainder to charity. 877. Bequest to town for school purposes. 878. Trust for suppressing sale of intoxicating liquors. 879. Devise to charity or to bishop individually upon failure. 880. Charitable bequest in discretion of executor. 881. Bequest to Salvation Army, valid on incorporation. 882. Bequest to bishop for charity. 883. Alternate charities. 884. Bequest to charities in discretion of executors. 885. Request not to exclude certain classes of books from library. 886. Charitable objects, subscription to. 887. Bequest absolutely, with request to use for charities. 888. Gift to charitable use in foreign country—A municipal corporation as trustee, 889. Bequest to foreign charities. ArticLe 13. Conpirions AND REstTRICTIONS 890. Conditional devise. 891. Life estate on condition. 892. Devise on condition precedent. 893. Devise on condition of living on land, with vested remainder. 894. Conditional bequest to son on executor’s approval. 895. Bequest on condition subsequent. 896. Condition against marrying certain persons. 897. Condition as to marriage. 898. Gift to polygamous wife with condition against polygamous remarriage. 899. Bequest on condition of husband’s death. : 900. Provision against contest. 901. Condition prohibiting contest of will. 902. Condition as to disputing will. 903. Legacy conditional on reformation. 904. Bequest on condition of reconciliation. 905. Bequest to son on condition he attend a certain church. 906. Bequest on condition beneficiary is educated a Roman Catholic. 907. Devise conditional on religious connection. 908. Condition to pay annuity, life estate innuring to second wife. 909. Conditional devise for support. Articte 14, Provisions as To Lapse, ABATEMENT AND Priority or LEcaciEs 910. Lapsed legacies. 911. Provision as to lapse of legacies. 912. General provision against lapse. 913. Provision for lapsed legacy to go to issue or to brothers and sisters, but excluding issue of deceased brothers and sisters. 914. Devise with provision against lapse. 915. Legacy with provision against lapsing in case of legatee leaving issue. 916. Ademption.-of specific legacies, etc. XXvi TABLE OF CONTENTS 917. Gift as satisfaction of legacy. 918. Abatement of legacies. 919. Abatement of particular legacies. 920. Certain legacies to abate in case of deficiency. 921. Priority of legacies. 922. Priority of one legacy. 923. Priority of several legacies. 924. Direction as to time at which legacies are to be payable. Articte 15. ANNUITIES 925. Bequest of annuity. 926, Annuity to wife to be paid in preference to all other bequests. 927, Annuity to husband and wife and the survivor of them. 928. Annuity charged on realty. 929. Proviso that annuitant may elect to take gross sum. 930. Annuity to cease on alienation. 931. Power to purchase annuities. 932. Annuity during term of partnership. 933. Advice to purchase annuity. Articte 16. Trusts 934. General bequest of personal estate in trust to be converted. 935. Real estate devised to trustees for sale. 936. Securities belonging to testator to become trust funds with power to change. 937. Life interest in trust estate to widow charged with maintenance of chil- dren. 938. Trust for wife during her widowhood and children after her death, with request as to maintenance of children during her life. 939. Trust providing for income of moiety to wife for life, other moiety and Principal to children. 940. Trust for wife to terminate at age of seventy-five, or on marriage. 941. Residue in trust for children, to be conveyed after twenty-one years. 942, Trust for child during minority. 943. In trust for grandson with contingent remainder. 944. Trust to pay income of fund to three and the survivor. ‘945. Trust in income to several for life, with trust of capital for survivor. 946. Trust for daughters in proceeds of real estate. 947, Life interest in trust estate determinable on bankruptcy, attempt to alienate. 948. Trust with discretion to apply income for benefit of life tenant and his family. 949. Reason for creating trust for sons. 950. Trust for son for life, occupancy, use, rents, and profits of real estate, under control of trustees. 951. Trust for testator’s children to be applied as widow shall appoint. 952. Trust for children and issue of deceased children. TABLE OF CONTENTS XXVvil 953. Trust for children unequally.. 954. Trust for granddaughter. 955. Gift to trustees for investment and pay annuity to son for life or to chil- dren, upon his bankruptcy or attempted alienation. 956. Trusts for wife and children of son after his death. 957. Trust for children and issue of deceased children at twenty-one or mar- riage. 958. Bequest in trust for children of sister at twenty-one or marriage. 959. Trust for children at twenty-five, with substitution of grandchildren of children dead at testator’s death. 960. Trust for children, without devise in terms to trustee to terminate as children reach age of twenty-five, in discretion of trustees. 961. Trust in personal property for life for afflicted daughter corpus after her death to her heirs. 962. Devise and bequest to children in dry trust for their issue. 963. Trust for issue of grandchildren. 964. Trust for brother for life, afterward to nephews and nieces in shares for their lives, and afterward for their children. 965. Residuary trust to terminate at death of sons and their wives. 966. Trust for three nieces for life, then for their children and issue at twenty-five, etc., with cross limitations. 967. Legacy in trust for housekeeper, becoming part of her estate on her death. 968. Trust to executors for lives of wife and son or longest liver, with vested remainder. 969. Trust of an annuity for a spendthrift and his wife and children. 970. Spendthrift trust. 971. Trust for improvident son. 972. Trust for son for life, to cease on his alienation of his interest. 973. Discretionary trust of income after alienation. 974. Income to be applied after alienation as if son were dead. 975. Trust for son for life, determinable on bankruptcy. 976. General proviso that life interest shall cease on bankruptcy or alienation. 977. Trust, income placed beyond reach of creditors, trust to cease on obtain- ing of judgment. 978. Bequest to trustee to appropriate as he deems best. 979, Precatory words which do not create a trust. 980. Absolute gift, not a trust. 981. Bequest to daughter to confirm invalid devise. 982. General power of appointment of cestui que trust. 983. General form of ultimate trust. 984. Ultimate trust for person who would take under statutes of descent. 985. Trust for testator’s brothers and sisters, and their issue by right of rep- resentation. . 986. Trust for preachers, no trustee appointed. 987. Short will leaving property to trustees and referring to deed of trust. 988. Discretion in terminating trust. 989. Power of appointment after termination of trust estate. XXV 990. 991. 992. 993. 994, 995. 996. 997. 998. 999, 1000. 1001. 1002. 1003. 1004. 1005. 1006. 1007. 1008. 1009. 1010. 1011. 1012. 1013. 1014. 1015. 1016. 1017. 1018. 1019. 1020. 1021. 1022. 1023. 1024. 1025. 1026. 1027. 1028. 1029. 1030. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Devise to daughter, with power of appointment. Request to daughter to keep open a certain house during a certain period of the year. Bequest for the “comfortable support” of relatives. Appointments under trusts. Refusal to execute power of appointment. Trust deed, or declaration of trust. Articte 17. Powers or TRUSTEES Power to trustees to sell trust property, with advice as to its manage- ment. Power to trustees to sell real and personal estate. Power to hold and invest proceeds of real and personal estate. Power to lay out streets, etc. Power to postpone the sale and conversion of real and personal estate. Recommendation to trustees that real estate remain unsold. Trust with power to sell and reinvest, but not to carry on, mercantile business. Power to retain investments. Direction as to wasting investments. Power to compound debts, etc. Appreciation or depreciation of bonds. Power to continue mortgages. Foreclosure of mortgages. Power for trustees to mortgage trust property. General direction as td consent’to sales and investments, General direction for investment of trust moneys. Power to make investments within a limited range. Power to vary investments. Investments and reinvestments. Power to apply to maintenance of child in trustee’s discretion. Powers as to advancement, maintenance, and education of children. Powers to provide for maintenance, etc., out of capital. Direction as to stock or extra cash dividends. Power to trustees to make advancements. Power for trustees to make advances to son out of trust funds. Power to rebuild. Erecting buildings and making improvements. General power to accumulate surplus income. Power to lease for twenty-one years. Power to lease furnished house until ‘sold. Authority to trustees to permit testator’s widow to reside in his man- sion house. Auditing and examining accounts. Payment of commissions. Power to partition among cestui que trust. Power to allot specific property in satisfaction of legacies. TABLE OF CONTENTS XxXix 1031, Proviso that questions arising under the will shall be settled by the trustees. 1032. Power of trustees to determine matters in doubt. 1033, Declaration that decision of majority of trustees shall be binding. 1034. Power to trustees to carry on testator’s business. 1035. Power to dispose of business. 1036. Disposition of profits from business. 1037. Power to abstain from engaging in business. 1038. Power to continue partnership business. 1039. Power to purchase shares of partners. 1040. Power to trustees to leave capital in partnership business on loan, 1041. Power for trustee to purchase any part of trust estate. 1042. Power for son, who is trustee, to purchase part of the trust estate on a valuation. 1043. Power for testator’s sons, who are trustees, to purchase. 1044. Power to mortgage. 1045. Request by testator that the trustees for the time being under this will shall employ a certain attorney. 1046. Trustee who is an attorney at law to charge for business. 1047. Trustees’ receipt clause. 1048. Trustees’ indemnity clause. 1049, Trustees to hold purchased lands upon trusts before declared. 1050. Request to trustees to collect mortgage and purchase land. 1051. Request to trustees to change investment. 1052. Disclaimer of trust under will by one trustee. 1053. Disclaimer of the trusts of a will by a trustee who has renounced pro- bate thereof, 1054. Direction to trustees under a will to sell stock and invest proceeds of sale in mortgages. Articte 18. Powers to Executors anD Provisions As To MANAGEMENT oF EstTATE 1055. Statement as to debts. 1056. Expenses of contest of will. 1057. Power of sale to executor. ; 1058. Power to executors to sell real and personal estate. 1059. Power to executors to sell real estate with consent of wife. 1060. Power to executors to mortgage and sell real estate. 1061. Directions to executors to sell property, reinvest and pay income. 1062. Power to borrow money. 1063. Power to sign commercial paper. 1064. Power to complete contracts. 1065. Voting shares. 1066. Partition by executors. 1067. Authority to executors to lease. 1068. Power to pay infant’s legacy to parent or guardian. 1069. Executors to have power to convey—Title vesting in them by implica- tion. xxXX TABLE OF CONTENTS 1070, Bequest to wife and children distributively—Power to executors to sell. 1071. Direction for sale of property when youngest child is twenty-one, or all children are married. 1072. Carrying on partnership. 1073. Incorporation of business. 1074. Power to executors to wind up testator’s partnership business. 1075. Power to executors to continue testator’s business. 1076. Power to executors to make arrangements for admission of testator’s son into his partnership business. 1077. Power to executors to continue loan. 1078. Power to executors to continue loan to son. 1079. Employment of attorneys, etc., by executor. 1080. Employment of clerks, etc., by executors. 1081. Power to executors to compromise and arbitrate. 1082. Insurance by executors. 1083. Keeping records by executors. 1084. Inventory, filing of. 1085. Powers of attorney by executors or trustees, 1086. Discretionary powers of executors. 1087. Executor’s receipt. 1088. Request to consult with wife. 1089. Request to an executor in nature of a precatory trust. 1090. Request to literary executor. 1091. Request to destroy letters. 1092. Interest upon legacies. 1093. Apportionment of interest. 1094. Time of payment of legacies, 1095. Payment of income. 1096. Capitalization of income, ArticLe 19, Provisions as to APPOINTMENT oF EXECUTORS AND TRUSTEES AND GUARDIANS 1097. Appointment of executors. 1098. Appointment of executrix without security. 1099, Appointment of executors to serve without bond and settle estate out of court. 1100. Substitutive appointment of executors and trustees, 1101. Appointment of new executors or trustees. 1102. Appointment of literary executor. 1103. Appointment of executor as to particular property. 1104. Delegation of power to appoint executor. 1105. Power of appointment of executor left to judge. 1106. Appointment of guardian. 1107. Appointment of an agent to manage and wind up testator’s partnership business. 1108. Trustees, appointment of, 1109. Filling vacancies in board of trustees. 1110. Appointment of new trustees. TABLE OF CONTENTS Xxxi 1111. Codicil appointing an executor and trustee in place of an executor and trustee who has died. 1112. Codicil appointing an executor and trustee in place of a son named in will who has died, and revocation of bequest to son. 1113. Appointment of a new trustee as provided for by will. 1114. Termination of trust on death, etc., of trustee, 1115. Liability of executors and trustees. 1116. Compensation of trustees. 1117. Provision for services to estate. 1118. Compensation of executors. ArticLe 20. MuiscELLaANrous Provisions 1119. Declaration of domicil. 1120. Request to executors as to cremation, 1121, Naming children. : 1122. Excluding children. 1123, Inequalities as to children or their issue. 1124. Disinheriting children. 1125. Exclusion of certain persons. 1126. Exclusion of adopted children. 1127. Devise of farm to son’s wife and children as joint tenants, and exclu- sion of son from inheritance. -1128. Omission of one son. 1129, Disinheriting granddaughter. 1130. Exclusion of son from share in residuary estate, 1131. Antenuptial agreement recognized. 1132. Direction as to division of property. 1133. Direction for conversion. 1134, Equitable conversion. 1135. Advancements to be treated as gifts. 1136. Declaration that sums advanced shall be regarded as gifts. 1137, Advancements to children to be pro tanto in satisfaction of their shares. 1138. Advancements in testator’s lifetime to be brought into account. 1139. Advancement not to be in satisfaction of portions. 1140. Taxes. 1141. Inheritance tax. 1142. Interpretation clauses. 1143. Incorporation of paper in will by reference. Articte 21. AtTresTATION AND Trestrmonium CLAUSES 1144, Attestation clauses. 1145. Testimonium clauses. 1146. Alteration clause. 1147. Alterations and additions. XXXii TABLE OF CONTENTS ArTICLE 22, CopIcILs 1148. Codicil reviving will revoked by testator’s marriage and providing for wife. 1149. Codicil made after remarriage. 1150. Codicil providing for birth of child, 1151. Codicil bequeathing legacy lapsed by legatee’s death to her children liv- ing at testator’s decease, payable at age of twenty-one years. 1152. Codicil devising real estate contracted to be purchased subsequently to execution of will. 1153. Codicil devising land purchased since execution of will. 1154, Codicil making substituted and additional bequests. 1155. Codicil reducing legacy by amount of advances made to legatee. 1156. Codicil substituting children of son who has died. 1157. Codicil revoking bequest. 1158. Codicil revoking a will in the possession of a third party. 1159, Codicil revoking an item. 1160. Codicil revoking a former will previously revoked. 1161. Codicil directing which of two prior wills shall take effect. 1162. Codicil revoking bequests to trustee and appointment of executors, and substituting trust company as trustee and executor. : 1163. Codicil appointing two new trustees in the place of a deceased and a ; retiring trustee. 1164. Alteration of will by erasure and interlineation. CHAPTER XXXI ENTIRE WILLS AND ADJUDICATED FORMS SECTION 1170. Brief will giving all testator’s property to his wife absolutely. 1171. Devise and bequest of entire estate to wife. 1172. Will devising real estate to testator’s wife for life, and after her death upon trusts for his children. 1173, Will giving the whole of the testator’s real and personal property to his brother with substitution of his children or issue. 7 1174, Will giving immediate legacy to wife and residue of property to trustees in trust for wife for life, with remainder to children. 1175. Will making immediate bequest to wife with other bequest and placing remainder of property in trust for benefit of wife and children. 1176. Will giving residuary estate to trustees with life interests to son and his wife, afterward income to son’s children and division of capital on the death of the longest surviving child living at testator’s de- cease. 1177. Will of widow devising and bequeathing her estate to trustees in trust for minor son, with ultimate trust to sisters, TABLE OF CONTENTS XXXi1i1 1178. Will authorizing executors to carry on the business of the testator’s firm during the life of his wife and daughter, giving annuity to wife, income to children, and dividing property on death of wife and daughter. 1179, Will of a married woman in exercise of a power of appointment in her marriage settlement. 1180. Agreement to give effect to intended will not executed. 1181. Assignment by way of sale of a legacy. 1182. Will limiting time of sale of real estate. 1183. Joint will by tenants in common. 1184. Joint and mutual will. 1185. Joint will. 1186. Short will. 1187. Will in form of a letter. 1188. Short holographic will. 1189, Will—Fee simple to wife. 1190. Will not in technical legal terms, but explicit, giving life estate to chil- dren, remainder to grandchildren, living ‘at death of testator. 1191. Will with remainder to church. 1192. Will—Directions to executors to retain real estate two years, then to sell it. 1193. Directions for sale of real estate by executors—Estate in children vest- ing at time of distribution. 1194, Will devising property for life with power of disposition of fee. 1195. Determinable fee and executory devise. 1196. Will—Gift of use. 1197. Will—Proceeds of real estate subsequently sold by testator passing as r ‘personalty. 1198. Will disposing of several plantations—Power to sell and reinvest. 1199. Will—Words in brackets show construction placed on will by court. 1200. Will with codicil, which creates an implied charge on entire estate. 1201. Will—Trust for wife and daughter—Remainder to heirs on failure of issue, ‘ 1202. Will under which on death of nephew before testatrix, his legacy lapsed and was distributed as intestate property. 1203. Will giving life estate with power to sell. 1204, Will—Life estate to wife and daughter, remainder to go according to intestate laws. 1205. Will—Charge of support for one living in family. 1206. Income, rents and profits for life to wife, fee to children, 1207. Will—Bequests to children of brothers per capita. 1208. Vested remainder—Defeasible fee in remainder—Executory devise. 1209. Will—Trust to executors for support and education of children—Fee in executors, 1210. Will—Specific legacies—Provision as to contest of husband’s will. 1211, Will—Entire estate community property—All given to wife with power to sell—Precatory trust for support of testator’s mother and sister. 1212, Will—Life estate to wife—Specific legacies to children. xxxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS 1213. Will—Gift to wife in lieu of dower—Provision for grandsons condi- tioned on character—Bequests to charity. 1214, Will—Directions for sale of real estate and distribution of proceeds. 1215. Will—Directions for equitable conversion. 1216. Will creating trust for son during life, though he survives his daugh- ter, and that grandchildren born after testator’s death have no right to share in legacy to grandchild dying before reaching age of twenty- five. 1217, Will made in two countries—Bequests to citizens of foreign countries, and disposing of property in foreign land. 1218. Will—Property in several states, 1219, Will leaving property to mother and husband of testatrix referring to children sufficiently to preclude their sharing in estate. 1220. Devise of residue to children in trust; share of child dying before tes- tatrix to go to children surviving at death of testatrix. ‘1221, Will—Devise to widow for life, remainder to sons on condition prece- dent. 1222. Will—Life estate given to wife and daughter ; fee by implication to chil- dren of daughter. 11223, Will—Life estate to children—Contingent remainder in residue to : grandchildren. 1224, Will—Gifts to a‘class as tenants in common—Codicil. 1225. Will—Trusts—Provisions for advance and payment of claims—Codicil. 1226. Will—Trust for son—Income after death to his widow—Trust for -daughter. 1227. Will—Trust for son. 1228. Will with alterations and codicil—Devise to nearest blood nelahives: 1229, Will leaving residue to prison association, 1230. Will—Trust for granddaughter—Remainder to charities —Codicil re- voking gift. 5 1231, Will—Determinable fee—Legacies charged—Directions as to carrying on insane hospital. 1332. Will—Conditional legacies—Residue to Smithsonian Institution for sci- entific publications. 1233. Will by husband—Various charitable bequests—Later will by wife, exer- cising power of appointment given by husband’s will. CHAPTER XXXII EXTRACTS FROM WILLS OF FAMOUS PERSONS SECTION 1240. Will of John James Audubon. 1241. Will of Henry Ward Beecher. 1242. Will of Thomas H. Benton. 1243. Will of James G. Blaine. 1244. Will of Edwin Booth. 1245. Will of David J. Brewer. 1246. Will of Salmon P. Chase. TABLE OF CONTENTS XXXV 1247, Will of Roscoe Conkling. 1248, Will of Jefferson Davis. 1249, Will of Mary Baker G. Eddy. 1250. Will of Edwin Forrest. 1251. Will of Benjamin Franklin. 1252. Will of Horace Greeley. 1253. Will of Hetty H. R. Green. 1254. Will of Edward H. Harriman. 1255. Will of Sam Houston. 1256. Will of Thomas Jefferson. 1257. Will of Robert E. Lee, 1258. Will of Cecil John Rhodes, 1259. Will of Russell Sage. 1260. Will of Jane Lathrop Stanford. 1261. Will of George Washington. 1262, Will of John R. McLean. TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] A Abbey v. Christy, 49 Barb. a Y.) 276 445 Abbott v. Lewis, 77 N. H. 255 v. Traylor, 11 Bush as) 335 521 Abel v. Abel, 201 Pa. 169 Abell v. Abell, 75 Md. "aa 353 Abend v. McKendree College, 174 Il. fa Abercrombie v. Abercrombie, 27 Ala. 489 200, 359 Abrams v. Moseley, 7 S. Car. 150 506 Abrey v. Duffield, 149 Mich. 248 978 Abshire v. State, 53 Ind. 64 7 Ackerman v. Crouter, ee ne J. Eq. 49 212 v. Fichter, 179 Ind. 103 v. Vreeland, 14 N. y "ha. 2 233 Ackerman, In re, 129 App. Div. (N. Y.) 584 465 Ackerson v. Fly, 99 Mo. App. 116 33 Acree v. Dabney, 133 Ala. 437 250 Adair v. Brimmer, 74 N. Y. 539 390 v. Craig, 135 Ala. 332 9 Adams v. Adams, 154 os 290 176, a v. Akerlund, 168 I v. Cole, 6 Beay, 353 14 v. Cowen, 177 U. S. 471 1135 v. Farley (Miss.) Pe So. 390 41 v. Johnson, 129 . 611 527 v. Morrow, 42 Ma. "434 212 v. Phillips, 132 Ga. 455 486 x Ross, 30 N. J. L. 505 238 Spalding, 12 Conn. on 396 Addenan v. Rice, 19 R. I. 325, 327 Addington v. Wilson, 5 Inde 137 431 Addition v. Smith, 83 Maine 551 395 Adsit 's Estate, In re, Myr. Prob. (Cal.) 520 Ahrens v. Jones, 169 N. 555 342 Albertson, In re, 113 N. ¥ 434 222, 345 Albin v. Parmele, 70 Nebr. 740 244 Albrecht, In re, 136 N. Y. 91 7 Albright v. Albright, ae He St. 381 321 Alchin, In re, L. 230 187 Aldrich v. Aldrich,” re lass 101 340 v. Barton, 153 ‘Cal. 337 Alexander v. sestaee 56 Mo. 413 280, 295 v. Bates, 127 Ala. 328 139 v. De Kermel, 81 Ky. 345 64 v. McMurry, 8 Watts (Pa.) 504 418 v. McPeck, 189 Mass. 34 171 v. Paxson, 47 Pa. St. 12 56 v. Thompson, 38 Tex. 533 323 v. Wallace, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 569 701 Kiesaeder’ s Estate, In re, 149 Cal. 146 288 Alfred v. Marks, 49 Conn. 473 266 Allaire v. Allaire, 37 N. J. L. 312 508 Allardyce v. Hambleton, 96 em 30 744 Allder v. Jones, 98 Md. 101 375, 376 Allen v. Allen, 28 Kans. 18 e 28 v. Allen, 121 N. Car. ue 295 v. Allen, 13 S. Car. a 434 v. Barnes, 5 Utah 100 375 v. Craft, 109 Ind. 476 169, 238, 296 v. Edwards, 136 Mass. 138 184 Allen v. Griffin, 69 Wis. v. Hoyt, 5 Metc. ‘lass 324 v. Mc arland, ae Til, v. McGee, 158 Ind. 465 340 v. McPherson, 1 H. L. Cas. 191 500 v. Maddock, 11 Moore P. C. 4 7: % 152, 488 v. Markle, 36 Pa. St. 117 175 v. Mattison (R. I.), 39 Ath 241 526 245 368 320, 326 v. Ruddell, 51 S. Car. 366 379, "1198 v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122 78, 357 v. Stewart, 214 Mass. 109 353 v. Watts, 98 Ala. 384 v. Sve piaee Sav. Bank, 69 N. + 314, 321 Allen, te re, 151 N. Y. 243 435 Allen’s Succession, 48 La. Ann. 1036 195, 201 Allen’s Will, In re, 25 Minn. 39 442, ey v. Lawrence, 12 Gray (Mass.) Ale Estate, In re, 123 Wis. 223 Allison v. Allison, 7 Dana (Ky.) 90 v. Allison, 101 Va. 537 256, 284 Allison’s Eat In re, 104 Iowa 130 526 Allshouse v. Kelly, 219 Pa. 652 108 Almand v. Whitaker, us a 889 195 Almy v. Jones, 17 R. 188 aos v. Walters Ind. 106 N. E. 257 Alsop v. Bowers, 76 N. Car. 168 395 Alsop’s Appeal, 9 Pa. St. 374 180 Alston v. Davis, 118 N. Car. 202 453 Alsup v. Clarke, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 71 991 American Hantst ga ena Union v. Peck, 10 Mich. 341 50 American act Sc v. Marshall, 15 Ohi ve Noble, “P Rick, - 5 oe 156 v. Pendleton, 7 W. 49 v. Wetmore, 17 ee ar 186 American Board &c. Beatles Mission v. Ferry, 15 Fed. 696 194 American Cannel Coal Co. v. Clemens, 132 Ind. 326 American Demat Fund Assn. v. Lett, 42 N. J. E 165 American “o oreien ses Comrs. v. Ferry, 15 Fed. 432 American Tract oe v. Atwater, 30 Ohio St. 77 99 Ames v. Holderbaum, 44 Fed. 224 393 Ames’ Succession, 33 La. Ann. 1317 103 Ames’ Will, In re, 51 Iowa 596 84 Ametrano v. Downs, 170 N. Y. 388 469 Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282 78, 342, 415 Amiss v. Walletinebt ae vs Va. 673 416 Amos, In re, 3 Ch. 186 Angie s Estate, In = “ai Phila. (Pa.) 3 Ses v. Gerhard, 140 Pa. St. 153 238 Andersen v. ‘Andersen, 69 Nebr. 565 521 Anderson v. Anderson, 112 N. Y. 104 521 XXXVii XXXViii TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 506 296 v. Crist, 113 Ind. 65 355 v. Hendrickson, 5 ai J. Eq. 106 394 v. Irwin, 101 Ill. 504 v. Messinger, 146 Fed, a 241, 392 vy. Northrop, 30 Fla. 612 411 v. Pryor, 10 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 620 150 Anderson, In re, 78 Misc. (N. Y.) 713 42 Anderson’s Estate, In re, 14 ae 502 28 Anding v. Davis, 38 Miss. 574 33 Andrews v. Applegate, 223 Ill. 535 209 v. Brumfield, 32 Miss. 107 207 v. Harron, 59 Kans. 771 431 v. Schoppe, 84 Maine 170 214, 217 Angell v. Springfield Home for Aged Women, 157 Mass. 241 218, 873, 874 Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 56 213, 255, 340 a 419 a In re, 80 Misc. (N.Y 10 ” a9 Anthony v. Anthony, 55 Conn. 256 169 aonhony's Estate, In re, 121 Cal. App. = App v. App, 106 Va. 253 49, 286 Apperson v. Bolton, 29 Ark. ae 48, 49, 506 Applegate v. Smith, 31 Mo. 49 Apple’s Estate, In re, 66 Cut Sa 42 Archambault v. Blanchard, 198 Mo. 384 87 Archer v. Jacobs, 125 Towa 4 251 neat v. Sweet, 25 ‘Bare, CN. Y.) is Arendt v. Arendt, 80 Ark. 204 25 Bateson State Bank v. Paulsen, 57 Nebr. 286 069 Armant’s Succession, 43 La. Ann. 310 453 Armant’s Will, In re, 43 La. Ann. a tee Armistead v. Armistead, 32 Ga. 597 205 v. Hartt, 97 Va. 316 358 Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124 3 Any v. Meredith, 7 Allen (Mass.) A ae - 14B.M ae rmstrong _v. eee on. éKy.) 311 v. Armstrong, a Minn. 248 84 v. Baker, 9 Ired. om oe 109 495 ve Barber, 239 Ill. 255 v. Kerns, 61 Md. see. 369 v. Lear, 12 Wheat. Pe S.) 169 485 v. Zane, 12 Ohio 2 354 Armstrong’s Estate, re cs 2 Pa. County Ct. 166 150 Arneson, In re, 128 Wis. 112 441 Arnett v. ‘Arnett, a Il, 247 22, 454 Arnold v. Alden, 173 Ill. 229 176 v. Lincoln, 8 R. I. 384 234 Arnold’s Estate, In re, 240 Pa. 261 214 Arrington v. McLemore, 33 Ark. 759 485 Arrowsmith, In re, 162 App. Div. (N. Y.) 62 290 Ashby v. McKinlock, 271 Ill. 254 234, 242 Ashton v. Wilkinson, 53_N. J. Eq. 6 394 v. Wilkinson, 53 N. J. Eq. 227 396 _ Ashton’s Estate; In re, 134 Pa. St. 390 169 Ashurst v. Given, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 323 Ashworth v. McNamee, 18 Colo. App. 85 498 Aspy v. Lewis, 152 Ind. 493 252 Atkins v. Guice, 21 Ark, 164 195, 396 Atkinson v. Dowling, * S. Car. 414 372 v. Staigg, 13 R. I. 725 , 48, 49 Atmore v. Walker, 46 Fed. 429 321 ee v. Atkinson, L. R. 1 P. ar Aare re v. Stafford, 58 N. J. Eq. 186 166 Attorney-General v. Dutch Reformed 7 a Church, 36 N. Y. 4! v. Jolly, 2 Strob. Eq. (S. Car.) 379 v. Merrimack Mite Co., 14 Gray (Mass.) 5 v. Parker, 126 a 216 v. Sands, Hardres 488 v. Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220 Atwood v. Weems, 99 U. S. 183 Aubert’s Appeal, 119 Pa. St. 48 Auch’s Succession, 39 La. Ann. 1043 Aue ee 's Estate, In re, 4 Pa. County t. Auger v. Tatham, 191 Ill, 296 195, Augusta v. Walton, 77 Ga. 517 350, Auld v. Cathro, 20 ’N. Dak. 461 Ault v. Karch (Pa.), 69 Atl. 857 ee v. Bristol, 40 Conn. 120 254, . Chambers, "33 Okla. 40 392, = Davis, 128 Ind. 472, v. Oakes, 117 N. Y. 577 Austins Will, In re, 35 App. Div. we Avaro v. ‘Avaro, 235 Mo. 424 Aveling v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Assn., 72 Mich. 7 Avery v. Everett, 110 N. Y. 317 v. Pixley, 4 Mass; 460 Ayers v. Ayers, 43 N. J. Eq. 565 33, Ayers’ Estate, in re, 84 Nebr. 16 B Baacke v. Beneks, 50 Nebr, 18 466, Babineau v. Le Blanc, 14 La. Ann. 729° Bape vy. Superior Court, 108 Cal. 50 Backus v. Cheney, 80 Maine 17 529, Backus, In re, 49 App. Div. (N. Y.) Bacon v. Bacon, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 134 v. Gassett, 13 Allen (Mass.) 334 v. Pomeroy, 104 Mass. v. Ransom, 139 Mass. 117 v. Woodward, 12 Gray (Mass.) 376 Bacon’s spoeel, in re, 57 Pa. St. 504 Badenhoof v.. Johnson, 11 Nev. 8 Bailey _v. Bailey, 25 Mich. — v. Dilworth, 10 Sm. & M 404 v. Sanger, 108 ind. 264 Bailey, In re, 13 R. I. 543 Bailey, In re, 15 R. t 60 Bailey’s Estate, In re, 153 Pa. St. 402 Ballers Goods, In re, L. R. 1 P. & D. Bailie v. McWhorter, a6 eee 183 Bain v. Cline, 24 Ore. Baird v. Winstead, 123 Y Car. 181 Baker v. Baker, 8 ‘Gray (Mass,) 101 v. Baker, 53 W. Va. 165 . (Miss.) 3 Baker, 57 Wis. 382 . Bancroft, 79 Ga. 672 448, . Brown, 146 Mass. 369 . Brown, 83 Miss. 793 a5, Chastang, 18 Ala, 417 Clarke Institute, 110 Mass. 88 Dobyns, 4 Dana (ky) 220 Fooks, 8 Del. Ch. Johnston, 39 N. J. Eo. 493 Keiser, 75 Md. 332 McAden, 118 N. Car. 740 McGrew, 41 Ohio St. 113 . McLeod, 79 Wis. 534 Red, 4 Dana By) 158 Scott, 62 Ill, 86 Sid848448884958 TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Baker v. Shy, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 85 96 v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49 33, 81, 470, 502 Baker’s Appeal, In re, 107 Pa, St.'381 ° 152 Bakert v. Bakert, 86 Mo. App. 83 321 Balcom v. Haynes, 14 AI an (Mass.) 204 195 Baldwin v. Baldwin, 7 N. J. Eq. 211 58 v. Bean, 59 Maine 481 231, 234 v. Morford, 117 Iowa 72 233 v. Parker, 59 Mass, 79 526 v. Sheldon, 48 Mich. 580 184 v. Spriggs, 65 Md. 373 467 v. Tucker, 64 N. J. Eq. 333 232 Baldwin’s Estate, In re, 13"Wash. 666 526 Baldwin’s Will, In re, 146 N. Car. 25 1144 Ball v. Phelan (Miss.), 49 So. 956 1222 v. Tompkins, 41 Fed. 486 350, 522 Ball. In re, 153 Wis. 27 75 Ball’s Estate, In re, 153 Wis. 27 10 Ballantine v. Proudfoot, 62 Wis. 216 534 Ballantyne v. Turner, 59 N. Car. 224 201, 396 Ballard v. Camplin, 161 Ind. 16 306, 309 Ballentine v. Foster, ae Cae ae 195, 255 Balls v. Dampman, 69 M 392 Balot v. Morina, 12 Rob. 4d 395 552 106 Baltimore Sisters of Mercy v. Ben- zinger, 95 684 87 Baltz v. ‘Muskopf, 34 TI. App. 625 167 Bancroft v. Hartford Security Co., 74 Conn. 218 396 Bane v. Wick, 14 Ohio St. 505 392 Bankhead v. Hubbard, 14 Ark. 298 416 Bank of Ukiah v. Rice, 143 Cal. 265 1133 Banks v. Howard, 117 Ga. 94 33 v. Sherrod, 52 Ala. 267 80 Banks’ Will, in re, 87 Md. 425 242 Baptist Female, University v. Borden, 2 N. Car. Bazandow s eu In re, 41 Misc. (N. ¥o 3 506 Barber = Barber, 17 Hun (N. Y.) 72 30 v. wi oes &c. R. Co., 69 Fed. oe v. Binchaegh &c. R. Co., 166 U. S. ped Barber’s Appeal, In re, 163 Conn. 393 526, 533 Barbo v. Jeru, 155 Mich. 353 194 Barclay v. Dupuy, 6 & ee (Ky.) 92 381 v. Platt, 170 TH. 241 Barker_v. Bell, 46 x 216 476 v. Clark, 72 N. H. 334 823 vi Hinton, 62 W. Va. 639 50 vy. Pearce, 30 Pa. St. 173 193 Barkley v. Donnelly, 112 Mo. 561 78, 100 Barksdale v. Capital City Realty Co., 88 Miss. 623 341 v. Davis, 114 Ala. 623 525, 527, 528 v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332 461, 495 Barlow v. Waters, 16 Ky. L. 426 63 Ralpard v. Crossman, 54 Hun (N. Y.) ‘np 3 Barnes v. Barnes, 66 Maine 286 498, 526 v. Chase, 208 Mass. 490 444 v. Dow, 59 Vt. oe : 351, 355, 356 v. Hanks, 55 Vt. 141 v. Marshall, 102 Mich, 248 355 Barnes Cycle Co. v. Haines, 69 N. J. a Eq. 651 a oa a, $98 255 arnett v. ontgomer: a. pee 348, 356 Barnett’s Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 342 309 Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366 151, 445, 498, 526 Barney % soomteniien, 2 Greene (fowa) 4 XXXiX Barney v. Hays, 11 Mont. 571 » 150, 480 v. Saunders, 16 How. (U. sj) 535” 390 Barnum v. Baltimore, a Pie 275 293, 907 v. Barnum, 26 Md. 270 ‘vy. Barnum, 42 Md. 308 Barr v. Closterman, 2 Oto C. C. 387 524 v. Graybill, 13 Pa. St. 396 v. Weaver, 132 Ala, 212 233 Barrett v. Gwyn, 28 Ky. L. 101 232 Barrett’s Will, In re, tit ee 570 241 we pee 790 Barricklow v. Stewart, 163 ind, 4 447 Barstow v. SUTaees 40 N, 06 Bartlett v. Nye, 4 Metc. (Mass) 378 187 v. Patton, 33 W. Va. 233 v. Sears, 81 Conn. a 173 v. Slater, 53 Conn. 102 347 v. Sutherland, 24 Miss. 395 71 Bartol’s Estate, Tn re, 182 Pa. St. 407 390 Barton_v. King, 41 Miss. 288 97, 100 v. Robins, 3 Phillim, 455 500 v. Tuttle, 62 N. H. 558 169 Bascom v. Weed, 53 Misc. mt Po) 496 418 Basket v. “Hassell, 107 U.S. 3 Batchelder, In re, 147 Mass. oes 12, 308 Bates v. Bates, 134 Mass. 110 336 v. Dewson, 128 Mass. 334 180, 309 v. Gillett, 132 Ill. 287 174, 256 v. Hacking, 28 R. I. 523 462 v. Officer, 70 Iowa 343 448 v. Porter, 74 Cal. 224 222 Battelle v. Parks, 2 Mich, 531 380 Battersby v. Castor, 181 Pa. St. 555 353 Battle v. Lewis, 148 N. Car. 142 1202 v. Speight, 31 N. Car. ae8 57 Batton v. Watson, 13 Ga. 464 Baugarth v. Miller, 26 Sao St. 541 564 Baumann’s Will, in re, 85 Misc. (N. Y.) 656 443 Bayer v. Cockerill, 3 Kans. 282 354 Bayley v. Bayley, 5 Cush. ey 245 40 s Be nue D bey a ee ‘On ) aylie’s Exr. v. Spaulding ee N. E. 62 > "86 Beal v. Crafton, 5 Ga. 396 Bean v. Atkins (Vt.), so Sh 643 283 v. Commonwealth, 186 Mass. 348 351, 419 v. Kenmuir, 86 Mo. 237 Beane v. Yerby, 12 eae bya.) 239 445 Beardsley v. Bridgeport, 52 Conn. ae ne Beard’s Succession, 14 La. Ann. 121 150 -Beatty v. Cory Universalist Soc., 39 N. Eq. 452 166 ony, Lalor, 13 N J. Eq. 108 215 Beaufort v. Collier, 6 Puniph, (Tenn.) 487 297 Beaumont v. Keim, 50 Mo. 476 Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. wy. YO a ae > Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90 270 Becker, In re, 28 Hun (N. Y.) 207 520 Beckley v. Leffingwell, 57 Conn. 163 252 v. Riegert, 212 Pa. 91 800 Bedell v. Clark, 171 Mich. 486 49 v. Fradenburgh, 65 Minn, 361 57 Bedford v. Bedford, 99 Ky. 273 188 Beecher v. Yale, 45° N. Y. S. 622 187 Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298 201, 359 Beers v. Narramore, 61 Conn, 13 212, 222, 308 Beetson v. Stoops, 91 App. Div. (N. ¥.) 185° | : 55 Behrens v. Behrens, 47 Ohio St. pen se , Beidman v. Sparks, 61 N. J. Eq. 226 353 xl TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Beilstein v. Beilstein, 194 Pa. St. 152 231 Beirne v. Beirne, 33 W.Va. 663 ae 353 Belcher v. Belcher, 38 N. J. Eq. 1 368, a0 Bell v. Driggs, 63 N. H. 592 v. Scammon, 15 H. put 23 v. Watkins, 104 Ga. 345 323 Belle County v. Alexander, 22 Tex. ae 280 Belledin v. Gooley, 157 Ind. 49 ius’ 499 Bellinger v. Thompson, oe oe 320 416 Belt v. Lazenby, 126 Ga. 33 Bendall v. Bendall, 24 AI 05 313 Benesch v. Clark, d. 497 233 Benge v. Hiatt, 82 Ky. 666 33 Benjamin v. Welch, 73 Hun 371 212 Benner’s Estate, In re, 155 i 153 469 Benneson v. Aiken, 102 Ill. 5 Bennett v. Bennett, 66 IIl. a 28 oor v. Chapin, a Mich. 526 296, 370 v. Gaddis, 79 Ind. 347 469 v. Garlock, 10 pie. ee Y.) 328 250 v. Garlock, 79 N. 351 v. Harper, 36 W. Va. 3346 ‘ 342 vy. Hibbert, 88 Iowa 154 63 v. Packer, 70 Conn. 357 288 Bennett’s Estate, In re, 134 Cal. 320 311 Bennett’s Estate, In re, 148 Pa. St. 139 326 Benson’s Estate, In re, 169 Pa. St. 602 167 Bent v. Thompson, 5 N. Mex. 408 494, 523 v. Thompson, 138 U. S, 114 520 Benton v. Benton, 78 Kans. 373 288 yv. Benton, 63 N. H. 289 219 Benton’s Estate, In a 131 Cal. 472 ‘ 18, 531 Bent’s Appeal, In re, 35 Conn. 523 494, 500 Berberet v. Berberet, se ae 399 446, 447 Berdan, In re, 65 N. J. Eq. 681 25 Bee a Elliott, 1 a esas: (Ss. Car.) 1 286 fone: Swit, In re, 206 N. Y. a: = Bergengren v. Aldrich, 119 Mee 259 378 Bergman v. Arnhold, 242 ii, 218 258 Berg’s Estate, In re, 73 Pa. St. 647 516 Bermingham v. Wilcox, 120 Cal. 467 415 Berry v. Dunham, 202 Mass. 133 3 49 v. Hamilton, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 129 448 v. Hanks, 28 Ill. App. 51 180 v. Heiser, 271 Ill. 264 230 Berst v. Moxom, 157 Mo. App. 342 498, 530 vy. Moxom, 163 Mo. App. 123 84, 443 Best v. Berry, 189 Mass. 510 306 v. Best, 11 Ky. L. 215 87 v. Gralapp, 69 Nebr. 811 33 Berneey 5 Hospital Co. v. Philippi, ae ans. Bethea ‘Bethea, ae gee 265 283 v. McColl, 5 Ala. ey Bethel v. Mayor, 24 Ky. L. 398 191 Betts v. Harper, 39 Ohio ot, yor" 502, 1183 Beurhaus v. Cole, 94 Wis. 368 v. Watertown, 94 Wis. 67 98, 336 Bevan v. Cooper, 72 N. Y¥. 317 320; 324 Bevis v. Heflin, 63 Ind. 129 398 Beyer v. LeFevre, 17 App. Cas. (D. C.) 238 ¥ 521 Bible Society v. Pendleton, 7 W. Va. 79 100 Biddle v. ee 36 Md. 630 454 Biddle’s Appeal, In re, 80 Pa. St. 258 340 Biddle’s Ap eal, In re, 99 Pa. St. 525 251 Biedler v: Biedler, 87 Va. 300 433 Bigelow v. Cady, 171 Ill. 229 357 v. Gillott, 123 Mass, 102 464 Big s v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352 245 istey v. Watson, 98 Tenn. 353 67 zi ger v. Nunan, 186 Fed. 665 237 Bill v. Payne, 62 Conn. 140 191, 306 Bills v. Bills, 80 Iowa 269 237, 339 Bingham, In-re, 127 N.Y. 296 392 Bingham’s Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 345 46 Binns v. LaForge, 191 Ill. 598 oa 421 Binsse v. Paige, 1 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 138 397 Bioren y. Nesler, 77 N. J. Eq. 560 447 Birchard v. Scott, 39 Conn. 63 188 Bird v. Gilliam, 121 N. Car. 326 241 v. Merklee, 144 N. Y. 544 187 v. Stout, 40 W. Va. 43 326 Birmingham v. Lesan, 76 Maine 482 368, $19 Biscoe v. State, 23 Ark, 592 422 v. Thweatt, 74 Ark. 545 842 Bishop v. Bishop, 56 bee 208 410, 1104 v. Bishop, 81 Conn. 222, 396 v. Howarth, 59 cose E88 322, 324, 223 v. O’Connor, 69 Til, 431 v. Rider, 31 Ohio C. C. 332 130 Bissell v. Heyward, 96 U. S. 580 469 Binees Estate, In re, 129 Pa, St. Black 4, Cartel, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) v. Herring, 79 Md. 146 159, 290 v. Ray, 18 N. Car. 334 233 v. Richards, i Ind. 184 502 v. Whitall, 9 N. J. Ee. 572 433 v. Woods, 213 Pa. 583 284 Black’s Estate, In re, “223 Pa. 66: Blackbourn v. Tucker, 72 tee, 735 50, 78 Blackburn v. Stables, 2 Ves. & B. 367 193 Blackler v. Boott, 114 Mass. 24 184 Blackman v. Edsall, 17 Bee App. 429 530 v. Gordon, 2 Rich. 5. Car.) 43 50 Blackmer v. Blackmer, ™ GE 23 an 217 Blackmer’s Estate, In re, 66 Vt. 62 Blacksher Co. v. Northrup, 176 a 190 41 Blain v. Dean, 160 Iowa 708 286 Blair v. Blair, 82 Kans. 464 323 Blake v. Rourke,,74 Iowa 519 526 Blake’s Estate, In re, 136 Cal. 306 444 Blake’s Estate, In re, 157 Cal. 448 251, 353 Blake’s Estate, In re, 134 Pa. St. as 322 Blanchard v. Blanchard, 4 Hun (N. Y. 287 367 v. Blanchard, 32 Vt. 62 460 Bland v. Dawes, 17 Ch. Div. 794 101 Blankenbaker v. Snyder, + Ae L. 437 176 Blass v. Helms, 93 Tenn. 192 Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 Til, 11 135, Bleeker v. Lynch, 1 Bradf. Surr. (N. Y.) 458 uy Blewer v. Brightman, 4 McCord (S. Car.) 60 207 Block Ye Magick (Teta, Ch. App.), 52 . W. 689 ve vals Mut. Ins. Assn., 52 Ark. 0 61 Blodgett v. Moore, 141 Mass. 75 467 v. Stowell, 189 Mass. 142 169 Blood v. Fairbanks, 48 cn eee 215 Bloom v. Strauss, 73 Ark. 340 Bloomer v. Waldron, 3 ‘hh CN. Y.) 361 379 Blough v. Parry, 144 Ind. 463 526, 529 Blount v. Moore, 54 a 360 380 v. Walker, 28 S. ae ee 46, 106 Blower, In re, L. R. 178 Board Jee of Fairheld = + aad, 26 Ohio St. 193 Reelnon v. Hitchcock, 136 App. Div. (N. ¥.) 253 i ne TABLE OF CASES xli [References are to Sections.] Boatman v. Boatman, 198 Ill. 414 258 Botb’s Succession, 42 La. Ann. 40 462 Bodfish v. Bodfish, 105 Maine 166 368 Bodine v. Brown, 154 N. Y. 778 194 Bodley v. McKinney, 9 Sm. & M. (Miss.) Bower ‘ ae, I 43 A Div. (N. ee 0. te i n re, pp. Div. v5 ? 340 Hoes 7 oe s, 62 Nebr. 274 530 Bohannon v. ae 25 Ky. L. 515 532 Bohanon v. Walcot, 1 How. (Misé.) 336 475 Bohler v. Hicks, 120 Ga. 800 530 Boland v. Tiernay, 118 Iowa 59 380 Bolick v. Bolick, 23 N. Car. 244 212 Bolles v. Harris, 34 Ohio St. 38 503 Bolling v. Bolling, 88 Va. 524 48 - v. Miller, 133 Ind. 602 394 Bolman v. Overall, 80 Ala, 451 470 Bolton v. Bolton, 73 Maine 299 178 Bond v. Cedar Rapids Home for Aged Women, 94 Iowa 458 185, 187 v. Martin, 25 Ky. L. 719 214 Boning’s Estate, In re, 214 Pa, 19 413 Bonnemort v. Gill, 167 Mass. 338 493, 523 Booe v. Vinson, 104 Ark. 439 252, 358 Boofter v. Rogers, 9 Gill. cid) 44 76 Boone v. Ritchie, 21 Ky. L. 8 5 Booth v. Baptist Chuzch, 126 N Yi ie 1152 Boothe v. Cheek, 253 Mo. 119 59 Boraston’s Case, 3 Coke et 254 Borden v. Borden, 2 R. I. 94 469 Borgner, v. Brown, 133 Tad 391 306 Born v. Horstmann, 80 Cal. 452 289, 293, 862 Bosley v. Wyatt, 14 How. (U. S.y 390 = 32 Boston v. Robbins, 126 Mass. 384 418 Boston Ease Co, v. Condit, 19 N. J. Eq. Boston” Safe Deposit &c. Co. v. Sn 196 Mass. 35 1201 ve Comin’ 152 Mass. 95 135 v. Mixter, 146 Mass. 100 207 v. Nevin, 212 Mass. 232 257 v. Stich, 61 Kans. 474 234 Bothamley v. Sherson, L. R. 20 Eq. aa 139 Bouk’s Estate, In re, 80 Misc. (N. Y.) 196 39, 140 Boulevard, In re, 230 Pa. 491 99 Bourke v. ’ Boone, 94 Md. 472 57, 202 vy. Wilson, 38 La; Ann. 320 23 Bourquin, ve Bourquin, 120 Ga, 115 415 Bousauet's Succession, 10 Rob. (La.) *O8 143 Bowditch v. Andrew, 8 Allen (Mass.) 588 339 Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 480 84 Bowdre v. Jones, 34 Ga. 399 396 Bowen _v. Dean, 110 Mass. a 339 vy. Howenstein, 39 a a Ge B85 519 v. Johnson, 5 RT 491 v. Lansing, 129 tic 7047 60 v. Stewart, 128 Ind. 515 2 Bower v. Bower, 142 Ind. 194 533 Bowerman v. Sissel, 191 Ill. 651 233 Bowers v. Bowers, 63 Ind. 430 467 v. Pomeroy, 21 Ohio St. 184 211 Bowes v. East London Waterworks Co., Jac. 324 378 Bowes, In re, L. R. (1896) 1 Ch. 507 9359 Bowker v. Bowker, 148 Mass. 198 176 Bowles v. Smith, 39 Conn. a 191 Bowlin v. Furman, 34 Mo. 214 Bowman Ee ‘ee 47. B. isons (Ky.) - oe Mie, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 67 416 Boyd v. Boyd, 2 Fed. 138 32, 463 Boyd v. Hawkins, 37 'N. Car. 304 415 v. Latham, 44 N. Car. 365 463 v. McConnell, 209 Ill. 396 448 v. Oglesby, 23 Grat. peed 674 399 v. Perkins, 130 Ky. 181 me Sachs, 78 Md. or 288 Talbert, 12 Ohio 212 381 ‘Boyer v. Allen, 76 Mo. 498 288 v. Robinson, a aoe 117 1099 Boyett v. Kerr, 92 4 Boylan v. Macher, 1 if Nd eh gut 310 63 v. Meeker, 28 N. J. L. 274 462 v. Boyle, 136 App. Div. (N. Y.) 67 185 Boyle v. Boyle, 158 Ill. 228 464 v. Boyle, 152 Pa. St. 108 372 Bradford v. Andrews, 20 Ohio St, He is 20 v. Blossom, 207 Mo, 177 485, 516 Vv. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546 290 v. Brinley, 145 Mass. 81 140, 1212 v. Clayton, 18 Ky. L. 1043 415 v. Haynes, 20 Maine 105 138, 139 v. Monks, 132 Mass. 405 371 Bradford Academy v. Grover, 55 Vt. Bradish S Site, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. vy)? 81 v. MeCiellan, 100 Pa. St. 607 501, 1161 Bradlee v. Andrews, 137 Mass. 374, 460 Bradley v. Andress, 27 fe 596 503 v. Bradley, 24 Mo. 311 103 v. Carnes, 94 Tenn. 27 237 v. eee 1 fhe eee Eq. (S. Car.) 1 49 v. Rees, 1 203 v. ems 62 S. Car. 494 284 v. Saddler, 54 Ga. 681 6 v. Young, 2” MacArth. (D. C.) 229 358 Bradley’s Estate, In re, 238 Pa. 440 218 Bradsby v. Wallace, 202 Ill. 239 831 Bradshaw v. Roberts (Tex. Civ. App.), 52 S. W. 574 492 Bradt v. Hodgdon, 94 Maine 559 365, 366, 380 Bragg v. Litchfield, 212 Mass. 148 “237 Brainerd v. Cowdrey, 16 Conn. 1 138, 139 Brgeabesty Estate, In re, 156 Pa. St é Bramel v. Bramel, 101 Ky. 64 528, 529, 534 Bramell v. Cole, 136 Mo. Seis 237, 368 Bramhall v. Ferris, 14 N. 296° Brandeis v. Atkins, 204 ae “71 2 Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. He 429 292 Brannock v. Stocker, 76 Ind. 813 Brant v. Brant, 40 Mo. 266 393 Brantley v. Porter, 111 Ga. 886 351, Brantly v. Kee, 58 N. Car. 332 Brattle vee Church v. Grant, 69 Mass. 142 258, 273, 283 Brawley v. Collins, 88 N. Car. 605 208 Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432 176 Hee ees v. Whittaker, 8 B Mon. (Ky.) 3 8 Pip elie v. Bardin, 36 S. Car. 197 51, 370 Brengle v. Tucker, 114 Md. 597 25 Brennan v. Brennan, 185 Mass. 560 890 v. Moran, 6 Ir. Ch 126 142 Bresler, In re, 155 Mich. 567 152 Brett v. Brett, 3 Addams 210 495 v. Donaghe, 101 Va. 786 176 Brevard v. Jones, 50 Ala. wo re Brewer v. Hutton, 45 W. Brewster v. Demarest, 48 N. ae 2. 559 390 xlii TABLE OF CASES 4 [References are to Sections.] Brewster v. McCall, 15 Conn. 274 ee 57, 167, 185, v. Mack, 69 N. H. Brewster Maritime cas &c. Mis- sion Board, In re, 2 N. Bruns. Eq. oe v. Horner (Tenn.), 38 S. W. 44 Bridger, In re, 1 Ch. 297 Bridgewater v. iene (Tex. Civ. App.), 186 284 33 Bridgnorth v. Collins, 15 Sim. 538 179 Briggs v. Briggs, 69 Iowa 206 v. Carroll, 117 N. Y. 288 326 v. Walker, 171 U. 8. 466 171 Brigham v. Kenyon, 76 Fed, 30 79 v. Winchester, 1 aete, bseeo 390 «658 Bright v. Adams, 51 Ga. 5 Bright’s Appeal, 100 Pa. ‘Si ” 602 395 Brill v. Wright, 112 N. 129 320, 326 Bee v. Farias, 32. ‘App. Div. (N. id Bringhurst v. Orth, 7 Del. Ch. 178 32, 463 Brinker v. Brinker, 7 Pa. St. 53 33 Brinkman v. Rueggesick, 71 Mo. 553 83 Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah 480 33 Brisbin v. Huntington, 128 Iowa 166 173 Bristol v. Atwater, 50 Conn. 402 242 v. Austin, 40 Conn. 438 339 v. Bristol, 53 Conn, 242 359 v. Ontario Orphan Asylum, 60 Conn. 472 : 166 Britt v. Smith, 86 N. Car. 305 812 Broach v. Sing, 57 Miss. 115 454, 503 Broadbridge v. "Sackett, 138 Mich. 293 680 Brock v. Frank, 51 ‘Ala. 85 486, 507, 508 v. Sawyer, 39 N. H. 547 101, 341 Broe v. Boyle, 108 Pa. St. 76 476 Brokaw v. Hudson, 27 N. J. Eq. 135 311 Broliar v. Marquis,.80 Iowa 49 244 Brombacher v. Berking, 56 N. J. Eq. 213, 222, 241 Bromley v. Gardner, 79 ae 246 342 v. Mitchell, 155 ‘Mass. 5 4 Brook v. Chappell, 34 Wis Ef 5 342 Brooke v. Lewis, 6 Madd. & Geld. 358 394 Brookhouse v. Pray, 92 Minn. 448 709 Brooks v. Belfast, 90 Maine 318 271, 307 v. Raynolds, 59 Fed. 923 296 v. Whitney, 11 Metc. (™" .ss.) 413 60 Brooks’ Appeal, 68 Cony , v. Bundy, 38 N. Y. 410 a a Winthrope, 1 seuss Ch, Ow Bunnell v. Evans, 26 Ohio St. 409 v. Hixon, 205 Mass. 468 Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kans. 424 Burbank v. Sweeney. 161 Mass. 490 v. Whitney, 24 Pick. (Mass:) 146 Burbeck v. Little, 50 Vt. 78, ar. TABLE OF CASES xiii [References are to Sections.} Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91 102 | Calvert v. Boullemet, 46 La, Ann, 1132 Burdis v. Burdis, 96 Va. 81 280, 281 411, 419 Burford v, Aldridge, Ae pio 419 237, 241 eee v. Free, 66 Kans. 466 3 Burge v. Hamilton, 72 Ga. 568 Springer, 28 ae: App. 443 253 ‘tsé, 452 a 480 anni v. Camp, 18 H ae a .Y.) 217 433 Burges v. Hill, 1 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y. v. Cleary, 76 Va. 296 360 > 500 v. Shaw, 52 Ill. ow 241 32, 478 Burgin vy. Chenault, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) v. Stark, 81 Pa. St. 235 50 285 411 v. Stark, 10 Phila. a 528 50 Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262 237, 344 v. Vaughan, 119 Ga. 56, 143 v. Chamberlain, 22 ae 298 211 | Campbell v. Beaumont, ‘oh NX Y. 464 237 v. Stiles, 65 N. H. 395 v. Bradford, 166 Ind. 451 849 Burkett v. iy riteunee, 3 S. Car. 428 v. Campbell, 130 Ill. 466 523 50, 76 v. Campbell, 21 Mich. 438 22, 454 Burkhart v. Gladish, 123 Ind. 337 529 v. Clough, 71 N. H. 181 294, 419 Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N. H. 267 v. Fichter, 168 Ind. 645 518 233, 237, 242 v. Foster, 35 N. Y. 361 292 Burleyson v. Whitley, 97 N. Car. 295” 307 v. Hinton, 150 Ky. 546, 56 Burnes v. Burnes, 137 Fed. 781 339 v. Miller, 38 Ga. 304 403 Burnet v. Burnet, 30 N. J. Eq. 595 688 v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478 485, 522 Burney v. Allen, 125 N. Car. 314 449 v. Rawdon, 18 N. Y. 412 192 v. Torrey, 100 Ala. 157 533 % Sheldon, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 8 506 Burnham v. Burnham, 79 Wis. a 2) 282 Taul, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 548 33 v. Comfort, 37 Hun (N. che 434 Cunpbell, In. te, 27 Utah 361 139 v. Comfort, 108 N. Y. 535 460 | Canada’s Appeal, 47 Conn. oo 445 Burns v. Burns, 132 Mich. 441 799 | Canfield v. anfield, 118 Fed. 250 v. Smith, 21 Mont. 257 33 v. Canfield, 62 N. J. Ea. ae 313 a Travis, 117 Ind. 44 462, 494, 508 Rantenhury v. Wyburn, @. C) A. Cc. Van Loan, 29 La. Ann. 560. 492 89 78 Burns’ yah re, : arn N. Car. 336 go. 4ae Gapetart Fe See te N. Car, 119 218 urr mit Cape May &c. Nav. Co., In re, 51 pe Pmen wanae? Be len, 8 urroug s v. Gaither, Burt v. Gill, 89 Md. 145 346 card Pete WOR Re ek aa. oe Burton v. Black, 30 Ga. 638 204 | Cardross, In’re, 7 Ch. Div. aan * 369 v. Provost, 75 Vt. 199 255 | Cardwell v. Rogers, 76 Tex. 57 ae Will, In re, 87 Misc. (N. Y.) aes Carew, ea He Cees} 2c. 311-292 Bush v. Lisle, 89 Ky. 393 87 | Carly, Gabel 120 Moo 383 $36 Bush’s Estate, In re, 89 Nebr. 334 414 vy. Northcutt, 48 Colo. 47 33 Bussell v. Wright, 133 Wis. 445 358 | Carle v. Miles 39 Kans. 540 | 28 Butcher v. Butcher, 21 Colo. App. 416 Carlton v. Carlton, 40 N. H 448, 499 47, 498 | Carmen v. Kight, 85 Kane > "65 Butcher, 1 Ves, & Bea, 79 373 | Carmichael v. Carmichael, 2 Mich. 76 33 Butler v. Butler, 97 Ky. 136 195 | Garnagy v. Woodcock, 2 Munf. (Va.) v. Gazzam, 81 Ala. 491 379 | 354° 217 v. Greenwood, 22 aoe 303 32 v. Huestis, 68 Til. 376 | Carney_v. Byron, 19 R. I. 283 358 Butler, In re, 66 Mise” ‘GW. Y.) 406 = 178 v. Carney, 95 Mo. 353 33 Butler & Baker’s Case, 3 Coke 25 115 v. Kain, 40 W. Va. 758 ar 64, 358 Butterfield v. Hamant, 105 Mass. 33° 157 Carpenter v. Bailey, 127 Cal. 316 v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598 250 v. Benoon, 22 Ohio 379” 489, a0 v. Dodge, Ty Button v. American Tract Soc., 23 Vt. 1e7 ae Hay irs, 72 W. Va, 780 449 v. Hazelrigg, ye Busby v. Roberts, 53.N. J. Ea “ig, 192] ve Perkins, $3 Conn, 11,9376, 252 Byers v. Hoppe, 61 Md. 206 1187 Ve MENZSMON LOBE, CEC WGiy : "y, McAuley, 149 U.S. 608 522 486 285, 832 Byrd v. Surles, 77 N. Car. 435 467 | Carper v. Crowl, 149 Ill. 465 395 Byrne v. Hume, 86 eet a 140 | Carr v. Bredenberg, sq ee Car. 471 253 v. McGrath, 130 C 236 | Carr, In re, 16 R. I. 380 Byrnes v. Stilwell, 103" we F453 252 parma v. Es Cattgan, 123 ea. 657 a arrie v. Cumming, Cc Carrigan v. Drake, 36 S. at ana 244 Carrithers v. Neal, 12 Ky. 349 Cabigting’s Will, In re, 14 Philippine Carroll v. Carroll, 16 How. ay. °8) 275 57 463 77 v. Carroll, 20 "Tex. 176, 193 Cadell v. pales, 1 Cl. & F. 372 269 | Carson _v. Carson, 36 ‘N. om 329 355 Cady v. Cady, 67 Miss. 425 306 v. Carson, 62 N. Car. 57 374 Caeman v. Van Harke, 33 Kans. 333 Be os Fuhs, 131 Pa. St. 256 244 462, 505 | Carstensen’s Estate, In re, 196 Pa. St. Cain v. Cain, 127 Ala. 440 136 325 254 Calder v. Curry, 17 R. I. 610 327, 392 | Carswell v. Lovett, 80 Ga. 358 Caldwell v. Renfrew, 33 Vt. 213 3 | Carter v. Bloodgood, 3 Sade, (N. Y.) Calkins v. Calkins, 216 Ill, 458 450 |. 293 157 Call v. Byram, 39 Ind. ae 533 vy. Carter, 39 Ala. 579 235, 281 v. Shewmaker, 24 Ky. L. 1167 296 v. Christie, 57 Kans. 496 350 Callerand v, Piot, 241 Ill. 120 5 v. Gray, 58 N. J. Eq, 411 326 xliv TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Carter v. Greenwood, 5 Jones Eq. (N. Car. 2 v. Long, 181 Mo. 701 343 v. Rolland, 11 Humph. penta) 333 421 v. Van Bokkelen, 73 Md. 175 380 v. Worrell, 96 N. Car. 358 324 Carvill v. Carvill, 73 Maine 136 534 Case v. Case, 51 Ind. eo 139 v. Hasse, 83 N. J. Eq. 170 201 Casper v. Walker, 33 N. i Eq. 35 293 Cassels v. Finn, 122 Ga. 33 342 Castens v. Murray,. 122 Ga. 396 460, 462 Castine Trinitarium Cong. Church, In re, 91 Maine 416 448 Castro v. Castro, 6 Cal. 158 20 Cate v. Cranor, 30 Ind. 292 Catholic Knights of America v. Kuhn, 91 Tenn, 214 61 Garhelts University v. O’Brien, 181 Mo. 25 Cauvien’s eaieaest 46 Tey Ann. 1412 23 Cavagnaro v. Don, 63 Cal. 227 415 Cavarly’s Estate, In re, can a 406 268 Caw v. Robertson, 5 N. Y. 107 Cawley’s Estate, In re, lie Pa St. 628 ao Cawthorn v. Haynes, 24 Mo. 236 498 Central Trust Co. v. Skillin, 154 App. Div. (N. Y.) 227 173 Chace v. Chace, 6 R. I. 407 103 v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552 212 v. Lamphere, 148 N. Y. 206 202, 212 Chadwick v. Chadwick, 37 a a Eq. 71 307 Chafee v. Maker, 17 RI 184 he apenas, v. Mica er N. Y. 42, 44, 45 Chambers y. Davis, 15 B. Mon. (By.) ” v. Higgins, 20 Ky. L. 1425 78, 99, 166 v. McDaniel, 28 N. Car. 226 152 Champion, Ex parte, 45 A ‘Car. 246 60 Chandler v. Jost, 96 Ala, 596 526 v. Pomeroy, 96 Fed. 156 358 Chaney v. Home Society, 28 Ill. App. ag Chapin v. caake 73 Conn. 72 357 v. School Dist. No. 2, 8 N. H. 445 283 Chaplin v. Doty, 60 Vt. 237 v. Leapley, 35 Ind. oe 511 65 Chapman v, Chick, 81 Maine 109 207, 214, 308 v. Price, 83 Va. 392 101 Chapman, Tn re, 32 Beav. 382 312 Chappell v. Trent, 90 Va. 849 443, 526 Charch v. Charch, 57 Ohio St. 561 61, 287 Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St. 298 ae 2 Chase v. Benedict, 72 Conn. 322 353 v. Bradley, 26 *Maine 531 399 v. Cartwright, 53 Ark. 358 1209 v. Davis, 65 Maine 102 325 v. Dickey, 212 Mass. 555 78 v. Howie, 64 Kans, 320 241 v. Isherwood, 5 Ohio S. & C. Pl. Dec. 1 340 v. Kittredge, 11 Alles aManed 49 442 v. Lincoln, 3 Mass. 498 v. Toe mats 11 Gilt 2 J. (Mid) 185 192, 193 v. Mathews, 12 La. 357 400 ve Peckham, 17 R. I. 385 192 v. Warner, 106 Mich, 695 324 v. Winans, 59 Md. 475 521 Ghaey v. Gowdry, 43 N. J a 95 Chauncey v. Salisbury, Mi ass. 516 Cheairs v. Smith, 37 Miss. 646 281 Chenault v. Scott, 28 Ky. L. 1974 235 Cheney v. ‘Selman, 71 384 167 v. Stafford, 76 Vt. 16” 362 v. Teese, 108 Ill. 473 236 Cherry, In re, (N. Car.), 79 S. E. 288 449 Chesebro v. Palmer, 68 Conn. 207 238 Chester County Hospital v. Hayden, 83 Md. 104 Chevallier’s Estate, In re, 159 Cal. oat 59 a Chew v. Hyman, 7 Fed. 335 Chew’s Appeal, 37 Pa. Se 23 254 Chicago &c. R. Co. ve Wasserman, 22 Fed. 872 104 Chicago Terminal T. R. Co. v. Winslow, 216 Ill. 166 343, 351 Chidsey v. Brookes, 130 Ga. 218 486 Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40 242, 485 eines Appeal, In re, 134 Pa. St. aoa Chisholm. v. Ben, 7 B. Mon. (sy) 408 442 Chouquette v. Barada, 23 Mo, 331 103 Chrisman v. Chrisman, 16 Ore. 127 Christ Church v. Trustees of Donations &c., 67 Conn. 554 271 Chngian Union v. Yount, 101 U. S. . Christman v. Roesch, 198 N. Y. 538 Christopherson v. Naylor, 1 Merv. 319 ey Hae v. Grainger, 1 Macn, Christy v. Badger, 72 Iowa 581 200, Chubbock v. Murray, 30 Nov. Sc. 23 222 Church v. Ruland, 64 Pa. St. 432 342 Churchill v. Churchill, a ae L. 2365 212 v. Jackson, 132 Ga. 412 Chwatal v. Schreiner, ae oN Y. 683 51 Citizens Bank & ae Co, v. Brandt (Tenn.), 50 S. 778 355 Claflin v. Claflin; is Mass. 19 346, 394 Claflin’s Will, In re, 73 Vt. 129 445 Claiborne v. Holland, 88 Va. 1046 398 Claiborne’s Estate, In re, 158 Cal. 646 136 Clark v. Anderson, 10 Bush. gee 99 412 v. Atkins, 90 N. Car. aere 218 v. Cammann, 160_N. Y. 315 306 v. Clark, 178 U. S. 186" 41 v. Clark’s Estate, 54 Vt. 489 107 v. Denton, 36 N. J. Eq. 419 370 v. Ellis, 9 Ore. 128 516 v. Fleischmann, 81 Nebr. 445 392 v. Hornthal, 47 Miss. 434 368, 370 v. Hoskins, 6 Conn. 106 107 v. Kittenplan, 63 Misc. o a 122 173 v. Lyons, 38 Misc. (N. Y.) 5 519 v. Mack, 161 Mich. 545 170 v. Marlow, 149 Ind. 41 322, 323 v. Middlesworth, 82 Ind. 240 368 v. Miller, 65 Kans, 726 107, 446 v. Morehous, 74 N. J. Eq. 658 257 v. Niles, 42 "Miss. 460 416 v. Powell, 62 Vt. 442 419 v. Turner, 50 Nebr. 290 440 v. Vorce, 19 Wend. She ¥.) 232 448 v. Wilson, 53 Miss. 366 Clarke v. McCreary, 20 Miss. 347 250 v. Ransom, 50 Cal. 595 462 v. Terry, 34 Conn. 176 236, 243 Clark, In re, (N. J.), 52 Atl. 222 451 Clark’s Appeal, 70 Conn. 3 47, 49, 1218 Claussenius v. Claussenius, 198 ml’ 548 516 Clawson v. Brewer, 67 N. Eq. 201 33 Clay v. Chenault, 108 Ky. 7 234 v. Hart, 7 Dana (Ky.) 1 371 v. Layton, 134 Mich, 317 440 v. Smallwood, 100 Ky, 212 375 TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Clay v. Wood, 153 N. Y. 134 339 Clayson’s Estate, In re, 26 Wash. a a5 > Clayson’s Will, In re, 24 ote 542 50 Clayton v. Akin, 38 Ga. 320 434 v. Hallett, 30 Colo. 231 » 206 Closers Twp. v. Blough, 173 Ine nai Cleaver v. Cleaver, 39 Wis. 96 181 Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716 188 Cleverly v. Cleverly, 124 Mass. 314 212 Clifford v. Stewart, 95 Maine 38 419 Cliff's Trusts, In re, 2 Ch. Div. 229 155 Clifton v. Haig, 4 Desaus. (S. Car.) 330 96 v. Murray, 7 Ga. 564 441 Clinefelter v. Ayres, 16 Ill. 329 371 Clingan v. Mitcheltree, 31 Eee St. 25 464 Clisby v. Clisby, 146 Ala. 353 Clore v. Smith, 45 Ind. Nae 340 ae 284 ee v. Farmers’ Loan &c. Co. 195 N- 92 338, jal a 419 Cleigh v. Clough, a ao App 433 = 4497, 516, $32, Clusky v. Burns, 120 “Me. 567 340 Coane v. Harned, 51 N. J. Eq. 554 325 Coates v. Burton, 191 Mass. 180 195 Coats v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 13 Ky. L. 557 369, 373 v. Lynch, 152 Mo. 161 532. Cobb v. Denton, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 235 99 sv. Macfarland, 87 Nebr. 408 33 v. Trammell, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 527. 415 Coburn v. Anderson, a Mass. 513 355 v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147 21 Coburn, In re, 9 Misc. (N. Y.) 437 47 Cochran v. Cochran, 127 Pa. St. 486 171 v. Cochran, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 259 176 v. Elwell, 45 N. J. Eq. 333 374, 375 v. Thompson, 18 Tex. 652 2 Cochrane v. Pacha 140 N. Y. 516 272 Cockrill v. Cox, 65 Tex. 669 532 Codman v. Brigham, 187 Mate oa 411, 419 Coe _v. Hill, 201 pase. eo 289 Coffin 'v. Coffin Y. 9 449 Coffman v. Larne 85 Va. Aso 13, 488 v. Hedrick, 32 W. Va. 521 Coggins v. Flythe, 113 N. Ae 102 192, 193, 257 Coggins’ Appeal, 124 Pa. St. 10 191, 269 Coghill v. ennedy, 119 Ala. er 533 Coghlin v. Coghlin, 26 Ohio C. C. 470 Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352 "36 865 ee v. Speer, 24 App. Cas. (D. C.) inp Colby v. Dean, 70 N. H. 591 293 Cole v. Fitzgerald, 3 Russ. 301 217 v. Littlefield, 35 Maine 439 349 v. Varner, 31 Ala, 244 354 Coleman v. Col leman, 69 Bony 39 1182 v. Coleman, 2 Ves. Jr. 638 140 v. Connolly, 242 IIL. 574 373, 418 v. Floyd, 105 Ark. 300 523 v. Jackson (Tex. Civ. App.), 126 S. W. 117 309 v. O'Leary, 114 Ky. 388 50 v. San Rafael Tpk. Road Co., 49 Cal. 517 352 Coleman, In re, 111 N. Y. 220 127 Cole’s Estate, In re, 85 Misc. (N. Y.) 493 630 Collagan v. Burns, 57 Maine 449 505 Collier v. Grimesey, 36 Ohio St. 17 213, 243, 370 v. Munn, 41 N. Y. 143 397 v. Slaughter, 20 Ala. 263 288 Collier’s Will, In re, 40 Mo. 287 254 Collins v. Brazill, . a 432 534 v. Capps, 235 "Til. 560 203 v. Foley, 63 Md. 158 378 v. Hoxie, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 81 352 v. Phillips, 91 Iowa 210 169 v. Smith, 105 Ga. 525 55, 64 v. Wickwire, 162 Mass. 143 237 Collister v. Fassitt, 163 _N. ie 281 355 Collyer v. Collyer, 110 N. 481 464 Relates: v. Alton, 23 App. Ca (D. Ga) Colt v. Colt, 32 Conn. 422 32, 463 v. Hubbard, 33 Conn, 281 232; 254 v. O’ Connor, 59 Mise. (N. aot 83 33 alton vy. Colton, 127 2 S. 300 323, 339, 355, 1211 Colvin v. Warford, 20 Nia: 357 476, 477 Comassi’s Estate, in re, 107 Cal. 1 105, 466, 467 Combs v. Combs, 67 Md. 11 237 Commons v. Commons, 115 Ind. 162 : 236, 323 Commonwealth v. Coleman, 52 Pa. St. 468 15 v. Martin, 5 Munf. a? 117 352 ‘v. Pollitt, 25 Ky. L. 235 Compton v. ‘McMahan 3 Mo, APRs 505 8 v. Pierson, 28 N. 5. Eq. 81 v. Prescott, 12 Rob. (fa5 ae 106 Comstock v. Adams, 23 Kans. 513 63 v. Hadlyme Ecclesiastical Soc., 8 ‘Conn. 254 448 Conant v. Stone, 176 Mich. 654 282 Condit v. DeHart, 62 N. I L. 78 167, 368 v. Reynolds, 66 N. j. L. 242 340, 352 v. Winslow, 106 Ind. 142 14 Conger v. Lowe, 124 Ind. 368 244, 296, 893 Canes tons Unitarian Soc. v. ‘Hale, 9 App. Div. (N. Y.) 396 42, 44 Conklinn v. ee 173 N. Y. 43 681 Conley, In re, 197 Pa, 291 218 Connecticut Trust &c. Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683 218, 219, 469 v. Hollister, 74 Conn. a 346, 431 Connelly v. Beal, 77 Md. 527 Connor v. ‘Akin,’ 34 Ill. ae 431 414 v. Sheridan, 116 Wis. 666 293 Conoly v. Gayle, 61 Ala. 116 446, 448 Conover v. Fisher (N. J. en 36 Atl. 948 355 Conrad v. Long, 33 Mich. isi, yee 289, 293 Conrades v. Heller, 119 Md. 449 Contentnea Quaker Soc. v. eas 12 N. Car. 189 100 Converse v. Converse, 21 Vt. 83 v. Starr, 23 Ohio ‘St. 491 a: 487, 516 Convey, In re, 52 Iowa 197 87 Conway v. Vizzard, 122 Ind. 266 449 Conwill v. Livingston, 61 Miss. 641 414 Canyigiem v. Conyngham (1750), 1 gis Cooeh v. Cooch, 5 Houst. Apel) 540 138 v. Brown, 34 N. H. 5 Oe ‘Collier (Tenn, ), 62 e ow. 658 233 v. Hayward, 172 Mass. 195 96 v. Lambert, 3 Sw. & Tr. 46 151 v. McDowell, 52 N. J. Eq. 351 257 v. Universalist Gen. Convention, 138 Mich. 157 166, 189 v. White, 43 App. Div. iM, Y.) 388 478 v. bison 81 Mich. 50 Cooke v. Crawford, 13 Sim. My 371 v. Husbands, 11 Md. 492 376 v. Meeker, 36 N. Y. 15 347 v. Platt, 98 N. Y. 35 370 Cooksey v. Hill, 106 ee gk 286 Coon v. McNelly, 254 Til. 176 xlvi TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Cooney v. Glynn, 157 Cal. 583 Reape Yi Cooper, 36 N. J. Eq. 121 » Eerste 65 App. Dis, WN. Y.) 342 351 < v. Horner, 62 Tex. 356 381 v. Mitchell Inv. Co., 133 Ga. 769 257 v. Pogue, 92 Pa. St. 254 827 v. Williams, 109 Ind. 270 403 Cooper’s Estate, In re, 150 pe 576 338 Coover’s Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 51 Cope v. Cope, 45 Ohio St. tea 153 Copeland v. Barron, 72 Maine 206 820 v. Bruning, 44 ind. App. 405 353 Copley v. Ball, 176 Fed. 682 244 Copp v. Copp,’ 20 N. H. 284 412 Coppedge v. ‘Weaver, 90 Ark. 444 293 Corey v. Springer, 138 Ind. 506 235 Corker v. Corker, 87 Cal. 643 467 Cornelison v. Roberts, 107 Iowa 220 4 Cornell v. Goodrich, 21 Ind. 179 520 Cornell, In re, 17 Misc. (N. Y.) 468 410 Cornell's Estate, In re, 15 App. Div. (N. Y:) 285 345 Cornwall, ae Falls City Bank, 92 Ky. gue 8 v. Hill (Ky.), 117 S. W. 311 194 Cornwell v. © Mount aoe M. XE. Church, 73 W. Va. 97,231 Corrigan v. Jones, 14 Calo. 311 487 Corse v. Chapman, 153 N. Y. 466 368 v. Corse, 72 Hun (N. Y.) 39 421 Cort v. Massie, 171 III. ape 123 236 Corwine v. Corwine, 24 Eq. 579 9 See ae Will, In re, 4 App. Div. (N. Bee Gale v. De Sartiges, 17 f . & Dz. Sale v. Cottrell, L. R 397 462 Couch v. Eastham, 29 W. Va. 784 324 v. Gentry, 113 Mo. 248 63 Coulan v. Doull, 133 U. S. 21 103 Coulson v. Alpaugh, 163 Ill. 298 336, 340 Coulter v, Crawfordsville Trust Co., 48 Ind. App. 64 v. People, 53 Colo. 40 489 Coulton v. Coulton, 127 U. S. 310 157 Coursen’s Will, In re, 4 N. J. Eg. 408 517 Courter v. Stagg, 27 J. Eq. Cousens v. Advent Church, 93 Maine 2: Cousino v. Cousino, 86 Mich. 323 Couts v. Holland, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 476 287, Coveney v. Conlin, 20 App. (D. C.) 303 Cover v. Stem, 67 Md. 449 Covington First Nat. Bank v. De Pauw, 86 Fed. 722 Cowan v. Shaver, 197 Mo. 203 | 450, Cowden v. Cowden, 2 How. (Miss.) 806 Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U. 509 Ss. 270 v. South Denver R. E. Co., 16 Colo. pp. 108 237 Cowell’s Estate, In re, 167 Cal. 222 182 Cowherd v. Kitchen, 57 Nebr. 426 394 Cowie v. Strohmeyer, 150 Wis. 401 11 Cowley v. Knapp, 42 N. J. L. 297 26, 150, 1187 v. Twombly, 173 Mass. 393 340 Coye v. Leach, 8 Metc. (wase.) 371 12 Coyle v. Coyle, 73 N. J. Eq. 528 173 Cox v. Handy, 78 Md. 252, 257, 258, ae . John, 32 Ohio e 532 : Jones, 229 Mo. 53 . Von Ahlefeldt, 50 a Ann, 1266 103 . Wills, 49 N. J, Eq. 130 237 sas<< Cox’s Estate, In re, 5 Pa. Dist. 206 Cox’s Estate, In re, 167 Pa. St. 501 Cozzens v. Jamison, 12 Mo. App. 452 Cozzens’s Will, In re, 61 Pa. St. 196 Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y. 56 390, Crafton v. Beal, 1 Ga. 322 Craig v. Beatty, 11 S. Car. 375 v. Leslie, 3 bu ge (U. oe 563 Crain v. Wright, 114 N. Y. 3 Cramton v. Rutledge, 157 ee 141 Crandall’s Appeal, 63 Conn. 365 Crandell v. Barker, 8 N, Dak. 263 Crane v. Bolles, 49 N. J. Eq. 373 Crane, In.re, 164 N. Y. 71 Crane’s Will, In re, 159 N. Y. 557 Crapo v. Price, 190’ Mass. 317 Crawford v. Clark, 110 Ga. 729 v. Engram, 153 Ala. 420 v. McCarthy, 159 N. Y. 514 138, 139, v. Schooley, 217 Pa. 429 v. Thomas, 21 Ky. L. 1100 v. Wearn, 115 N. Car. 540 Crawford, In re, 113 N. Y. 366 311, Crawford, In re, 21 Ohio C. C. 554 Crawiord’s Estate, In re, 17 Pa, Super. t; Crawfordsville Trust Co. 178 Ind. 25 Crawley v. Blackman, 81 Ga. 775 Crecelius v. Horst, 78 Mo. 566 Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625 Cresap v. Cresap, 34 W. Va. 310 v. Ramsey, 271, ig ers Estate, In re, 161 Pa. Crew v. Dixon, 129 Ind. 85 v. Pratt, 119 Cal. 131 Gedieadis Estate, In re, 132 Pa. St. eraeh v. Dexter, 13 Gray ee) 330 , 493, Crist v. Schank, 146 Ind. 277 Crittenden v. Fairchild, 41 N. Y. 289 Crittenden’s Estate, In re, Myr. Prob. (Cal.) 50 caer v. Crocker, 11 Pick. (Mass.) Crofeot’s Will, In re, 137 N. Y. S. 430 213, 231, | Croft v. Croft, 4 Grat. oe 103 v. Williams, 88 N. Croft, In re, 162 Mass. a a Croker v. Croker, 87 Cal. 643 Crook v. Hill, 3 Ch. Div. 773 Capote v. Kings (Prince), 97 Ny. ¥. 4 3 Croom v. Herring, 11 N. Car. 393 Crosgrove v. Crosgrove, 69 Conn. 416 74, 180, 231, Cross v. Benson, 68 Kans. 495 v. Del Valle, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 5 v. Hoch, 149 Mo. 325 v. Robinson, 21 Conn, 379 Cross’ Estate, in re, 163 Cal. 778 Eapesett v. Clements (Miss.), 7 Crossley v. Leslie, 130 Ga. 782 Crossman v. Crossman, 95 N. Y. 145 v. Crossman, 95 N. Y. 145 Crow v. Powers, 19 Ark. 424 Crowder v. Clowes, 2 Ves. Jr. 449 Crowley v. Hicks, 72 Wis. 539 Crowson v. Crowson, 172 Mo. 691 Crozier v. Bray, 120 N. Y. 366 So. 201, 237, St ae TABLE OF CASES xvii [References are to Sections.] Cruger v. Phelps, 21 Misc. (N. Y¥.) 252 43 Coptatonls ¥s Home for Friendless, 113 Y 3 Cruit v. Owen, 21 App. D. C. 378 516 v. Owen, 203 U. S. 368 240 Crum _v. Bliss, 47 Conn, 592 307 Crumb’s Will, 2 N. Y. S. eee 441 Crump v. Williams, 56 Ga. 420 Cenmpler v. Barfield &c. On 114 Ga, 570 296 Cruse v. Cunningham, 79 Ind, ae 201 v. McKee, 2 Head (Penn) 1 374, 375 Cudney v. gay. 68 N. 530 Culp v. Lee, 109 N. Car. ast 7a5 Cummings v. Lohr, "246 a 577 235 rans x Cummins, 1 Marv. (Del.) 495, 532, 534 v. Riorion, 84 Kans. 791 210 Cundiff v. Seaton, 20 Ky. L. 1271 212 Cunningham v. Cunningham, 72 Conn. 253 321 v. Cunningham, 140 Ky. 193 63 v. Cunningham, 81 S. Car. 506 415 v. Mills, 102 Ga. 584 446 Curd v. Field, 103 Ky. 293 341, 398 Curdy v. Berton, 79 Cal. 420 342 Curling v. Curling, 8 poe AKy) 38 56 Curran v. Green, 18 R. I. an Currie v. Murphy, 35 Miss 3 Currin v. Fanning, 12 Hun (N. Y.) 458 5 Curry v. Patterson, 183 Pa. St. 238 213 Curtis v. Underwood, 101 Cal. 661 493, 497 Curtiss v. Strong, 4 Day (Conn.) 51 448 Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689 101, 354 Cushman v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 165 855 v. Cushman, 116 App. Div. (N. Y.) 763 294 Custis v. Adkins, 1 Houst. ag Ree) ie 396 Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. 358 Cutler v. Cutle., 130. N. Car. a 442 Cutter v. Butler, 25 N. H. 343 8 D Daggett v. Slack, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 450 194, 195 v. White, 128 Mass. 398 411 aihy v. Maxfield, 244 Ill. 214 33 Dale’s Appeal, 57 Conn, 127 530 Dalrymple’s Estate, In re, 67 Cal. 444 534 Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann, 355 23 Dalzell by Crawtord, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 3 398 Dame v. Dome, 20 N. 55, 77 Dammert v. pet lat w By. 564 45 Damon v. Damon, 8 Allen (Mase.) 192 ae Dana v. Dana, 185 Mass. 156 822 Daniel v. Whartenby, 84 U. S. 643. 173 v. Whartenby, 17 Wall. (U.S.) 639 210 Daniels v. Pratt, 143 Mass. 216 67 Dannelli v. Dannelli, 4 oe (Ky.) 51 49 Darne v. Loyd, 82 Va. 433 Dart v. Dart, 7 Conn. 250. 238 Daubenspeck’ v. Biggs, 71 Ind. 255 6 Dauphin County Historical Soc. v. Kelker, 226 Pa. 16 448 Davenport v. Sargent, 63 N. H. 538 Davidson v. Chalmers, 33 Beav. 653 356 v. Coon, 125 Ind. 497 320, 321, 322, 326 v. Koehler, 76 Ind. 398 412 Davie v. Wynn, 80 Ga. 673 306 Davies v. Davies, 55 Conn. 319 358, 809 171, v. Jones, L. R. 24 Ch, Div. 190 351 ‘i ‘ Davies, In re, L. re (1892) 3 Ch. 63 221 Davis v. Baugh, 1 Sneed (Tenn.} 477 80 v. Berger, 54 Mich. 652 472 v. Boggs, 20 Ohio nt pre 154 v. Chapman, 83 Va. 414 v. Davis, 43 W. ae 107 v. Fogle, 124 Ind. a” 105, 460 v. Hutchings, 15 Ohio C. C. 174 435 v. Inscoe, 84 N. Car. 396 413 v. Kerr, 3 App. Div. i Y.) 3220-172 v. King, 89 N. Car. 467 v. Laning, 85 Tex. a 82 v. Martin, 3 Munf. (Va.) 66 v. Milady, 92 S. Car. 135 62 v. Ripley, 194 Ill. 399 245 v. Rogers, 1 Houst. oo 44 441 v. Sanders, 123° Ga. 191, 284 ve pes 209 Ill. 308" 509 v., Williams, 57 Miss. 843 5 v. Williams, 85 Tenn. 646 213 Davis’ Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 201 233, 805 Davis’ Estate, In re, 136 Cal. 590 493 Davis’ Estate, In re, 157 a 318 485, 516 Davis, In re, 45 Misc. (N. Y.) 554 517 Davis, In re, 103 Wis. 455 22 Davis, Succession of, 12 La. Ann. 399 416 Davis’ Will, In re, 120 N, Car. 9 28, 502 pane a ‘Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 2 368 Dawes v. Pelee 4 Mass. 208 396 Dawson v. Dawson, 6 Ae 292 106 v. Ramser, 58 Ala. 398 v. Smith’s Will, 3 Foust, (Del.) gay 0 , eer oe Appeal, 23 hee 69 454 Day v. Day, 3 N. J Eq. 549, 441 v. Floyd, 130 lass 488 492 v. Roth, 18 N. a 4 Vv. Washburn, 56 N. 33 Day, Ex parte, 1 Bradt oe CN. Y.) 476 28 Deake’s Appeal, a Maine 510 51 Dean v. Jagoe, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 389 469 v. Loewenstein, 6 Ohio C. C. 587 322 v. Mumford, 102 Mich. 510 172 v. Rounds, : ig R. 436 139 v. Swayne, 67 Rane. 241 521 nee v. Littlefield, 1 Pick. (Mass.) a De Sets Estate, In re, 165 Cal. 223 ee , 194, 212 De Berry v. Wheeler, 128 Mo. 519 De Jane v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Ea 36 188 Dobbins, 31 N. J. Eq. 671 44, 97 OSs Castrol Will, In re, 32 Misc. (N. oy Y.) 193 Decker v. Decker, 12k il 341 58, 215, 324 Dee v. Dee, 212 II. 201, 340 Deering v. ’Adams, 3 ‘Maine 264 417 v. Tucker, 55 Maine 284 296 Deering & Co. v. Kerfoot, 89 on 491 327 Deford v. Deford, 36 Md. 168 270 Defreese v. Lake,” 109 Mich. 415 236, 244 De Geofry v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258 96 Degman v. Degman, 98 Ky. 717 375 Be Hart, In re, 67 Misc. (N. Y.) 13 116, 447 De Haven v. Sherman, 131 Ill. 115 222 Deifendorf v. Deifendorf, 132 N. ¥Y. 100 4 el sehirors v. Delacherois, 11 H. L. 7 Cas. 57 ia v. Salina, 34 Kans. 532 530 Delaney’s Estate, In re, 49 Cal. 76 419 De eee v. De Boom, we Cal. 581 342 De Boom, 67 Cal. 195 De ee s Estate, In Rs "19 Cal. OL i xlviii TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412 ‘Demeritt v. ‘Young,’ 72 N. H. 202 ‘Deming v. Butcher, 91 Iowa 425 1DeMoss v. Robinson, 46 Mich. 62 Dempsey v. Lawson, 46 L. J. P. 23 ,. v. Taylor, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 126 cone v. Kemp, 79 Misc. (N. Y.) poneele v. Morgan, 5 Call (Va.) 407 r. oH ex dem v. McMurtrie, 15 N. J. L v. Gibbons, 22 ut a L. 117 ;Dengel v. Brown, 1 App. D. C. 423 'Denigan v. a Francisco Sav. Union, 127 Cal. Denike v. Havtis, 84 N.Y. 8 Denison v. Denison, 185 N. Y. 438 Denning v. Butcher, 91 Iowa 425 Dennis v. Dennis, 5 Rich. v. Holsapple, 4148 Ind. Dennis’ Estate, In re, 169 Da. St. 493 Dennison v. Goehring, 7 Pa. St. 175 Denny v. Pinney, 60 Vt. 524 De Nottebeck v. Astor, 13 N. Y. 98 Denslow v. Moore, 2 Day ene 12 Dent v. Pickens, 61 W. Va. 4! Denton v. Clark, 36 N. J. Ea 534 De a v. Clendining, 8 Paige (N. ive Michael, . N. Y. 467 ‘Deppen v. ‘Deppen, 132 Ky. 755 oe Car.) 468 ‘ 462, 463, ue Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 4 Derickson v. Garden, 5 Del Ch, 323 283 Deseumeur v. Rondel, 76 N. J. Eq. 394 470 De ane v. Supreme’ Council, 109 Cal. 373 Deslonde v. Darrington, 29 Ala. 92 492 Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192 410 Detwiller v. ‘Hartman, 10 Stew. (37 N. J. Eq.) 347 Deupree v. Deupree, 45 Ga. 414 447 Petters v. Rohlfing, 22 Colo. App. 543. 81 De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S 566 41, 47 v. McLeroy, 82 Ga. 687 394 Devaynes v. Robinson, 24 Beav. 86 379 Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335. 440 Devlin v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. St. a 273 Devling v. Little, 26 Pa. St. 502 418 Devoe, In re, 66 App. Div. (N. Y.) 1 312 Devoe, In re, Y¥. 281 170 De Vries, In re, 17 Cal, App. 184 252 Dew v. Reid, 52 Ohio St. 519 51 i ae v. Yates, 10 Johns, (N. Y.) 141, 142 ig ne v. Evans, 63 Conn. 58 355 v. Gardner, 7 Allen (Mass.) 243 189 be Harvard College, 176 Mass, 192 152, 313 v. Inches, 147 Mass. 173 Diament v. Lore, 31 N. 2 1. 220 213, 243 Dibble v. Winter, 247 Ill. 243 521 Dicken v. McKinlay, 163 Tu. 318 33 Dickerman v. Eddinger, 168 Pa. 86,240 a Dickerson vy. Dickerson, 211 Mo. 483 ~ 50, ae 284 v. Sheehy, 156 App. Div. MN Y.) 101 253 Dickerson’s Appeal, a Conn, 223 57, 206 Dickey v. Vann, 81 Ala. 425 485, 506 Dickie v. Carter, 42 Ill. 376 108 Dickinson v. Conniff, 65 Ala. 581 381 v. Henderson, 122 Mich. 583 347, 349 v. Overton, 57 N. Eq. 26 142 v. Stidolph, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 341 152 Dickison v. Dickison, 138 Ill. 541 Dickson v. Dickson 23 S, Car. 216 v. Field, 77 Wis. 439 v. Montacmery, 31 Tenn. 348 v. United States, 125 Mass. 311 Diehl v. Middle ate Loan &c. Co., 72 W. Va. ey Rodgers, 169 Pa. St. ate Diehl’s Will, In re, 112 N. Y. S. 717 Dieter v. Shafter, 70 Vt. iio” Diez’s Will, In re, 50 N. Y. 28, Dildine v. Dildine, 32 N. J. Ea, a 191; Dilger v. McQuade, 158 Wis. Dillard v. Diflard ee a Ss. 3B 669 v. Ellington, 57 Ga. Dillon v. Gray, 87 ee 129 Dills v. La Tour, 136 Mich. 243 Dimmick v. Patterson, 142 N. Y. 322 Dingman v. Beall, 213 Ill. 238 Disney, In re, 190 N. ¥. 128 Ditchey v. Lee, 167 Ind. 267 Pixon v. Cooper, 88 Tenn. 177 D’Armond, 23 La. Ann. 200 Dixon's Appeal, 55 Pa, St. 424 Dixon’s Estate, In re, 143 Cal. 511 1132 64 323 186 98 Doan v. Carroll County Parish, 103 Md. 662 Doane _v. Hadlock, 42 Maine 72 a Mercantile Trust Co., 160 N. Y. 3 ack v. Robinson, 26 N. H. 372 20, Dodd v. Winship, 144 Mass. 461 Dodds v. Winslow, 26 Ind. eee 652 Dodge v. Gallatin, 130 N. 117 v. Williams, 46 Wis. sa 185, Doe v. Atkinson, 63 ae Car. 210 v. Bryan, 34 N. 11 Considine, 6 Wall (U. S.) 458 242, Pattison, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 355 44 ve. Vv. - puulenane 5 B. & Ad. 765 Tofield, 11 East 246 5 Vincent, 1 Houst. (Del.). 6 v. Willetts, 7 Mann. Gr. & S. Tokers v. Grady, 105 Maine 36 70098, . O'Callaghan, 157 Mass. 90 = O’Hearn, 214 Mass. 290 Dolbeer, Estate of, 153 Cal. 652 Dole’s Estate, In re, 147 Cal. 188 Dombrowski’s Estate, In re, 163 Cal. saa 29 Baigpeele v. Sayre, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) Donaldson v. Allen, 182 Mo. 626 v. Hall, 106 Minn. 502 Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501 Donge’s ‘Estate, In re, 103 Wis. 497 Donnell’ v. Newburyport Homeopathic Hospital, 179 Mass. 187 Donnellan’s Estate, In re, see ee 14 Donnelly v. Edelen, 40 Md. Donohoo v. Lea, 1 Swan Crenn.) 119 Donohue v. Donohue, 54 Kans. 136 v. McNichol, 61 Pa. St. 73 Dunne v. Clonwetter, 20 Ohio C, C. Doran vy. Mullen, 78 i a Dorin v. Dorin, L. R. L. 568 Dorion v. Dorion, 20 ea “Sup. Ct. 430 Dorr v. Johnson, 170 Mass. 540 Dorries’ Succession, 37 La. Ann. 833 23, 454, 466, 290, Dorsey v. Dodson, 203 Tll. 32 Dortch v. Dortch, 71 N. Car. 224 Seni Dougherty, 4 Met. (Ky.) TABLE OF CASES xlix [References are to Sections.] Dougherty ‘vy. Holscheider, 40 Tex. Civ. App. al 56 2 v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 87 Hun (N. Y.) 15 127 v. Thompson, 167 N. Y. 472 205 Doughten v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51 2 167, 187 Douglas v. James, 66 Vt. 21 193 Douglass v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686 413 Dow v. Abbott, 197 Mass. 283 814 v. Gould &. Mfg. Co., 31 Cal. 629 3 Dowd v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197 342 Dowell v. Workman, 25 Ky. L. 1761 194 Dower _v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23 523 v. Seeds, 28 W. Va. 113 464 Downey v. Downey, 16 Hun (N. Y.) 481 497 Downie’s Will, In re, 42 Wis. 66 446 Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366 97, 352, 367 v. Nicholson, 115 Iowa 493 192, 310 Doyle v. Blake, 2 Sch. & Lef. 231 413 Drake v. Drake, 134 N. Y. 220° 372, 374 v. Steele, 242 Ill. 301 213 165, ay Drane v. Beall, 21 Ga. 21 Draper v. Jackson, 16 Mass. 480 Drayton v. Rose, 7 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 328 479 Dresel v._King, 198 Mass. 546 308 Drew v. Drew, N. H. 489 202 v. Wakefield, 54 Maine 291 181, 307, 313 Dreyer v. Reisman, 202 N. Y. 476 25, 200 Drohan v. Drohan, 1 Ball & B. 185 - 378 Druid. Park Heights Co. v. Oettinger, 53 Md. 46 372 Dryer v.:Crawford, 90 Ala. 131 191, 237 Dublin v. Chadbourn, 16 Mass, 433 508, 524 Du Bochet, In re, 70 L. J. Ch. 647 193 Duckworth v. Jordan, 138 N. Car. 520 308 Duclos v. Benner, 136 N. Y. 560 241 Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, 87 Mo. 218 324 Dudley v. Weinhart, 93 Ky. 401 26, 31 Duff v. Duff, 103 Ky. 348 520 Duffel v. Burton, 4 Har. (Del.) 290 57 v. Robeson, 2 Harr. (Del.) 375 82, 87. Duffy v. Calvert, 6 Gill (Md.) 487 398 Dufour v. Deresheid, 110 La. 344 340 Dugan v. Northcutt, 7 App. D. C. 351 493 Duggan v. Slocum, 92 Fed. 806 265 Dukes v. Faulk, 37 S. Car. 255 282 Dulany v. Middleton, 72 Md. 67 190, 435 Dulin v. Moore, 96 Tex. 135 296, 341 v. Moore tex Civ. App.), 69 S. . 234 Dulle’s Estate, In re, 218 Pa. 162 884 Dunahugh, In re, 130 Iowa 692 462 Dunavant v. Fields, 68 Ark. 534 240 Duncan v. De Yampert, 182 Ala. 528 176 v. Forrer, 6 Binn. (Pa.) 193 7 v. Franklin Twp., 43 N. J. Eq. 143 395 v. Martin, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 519 232 v. Stewart, 25 Ala. 408 492 v. Wallace, 114 Ind. 169 320, 322, 326 Dunham v. Averill, 45 Conn. 61 32, 189 v. Marsh, 52 N. J. Eq. 256 208 v. Milhous, 70 Ala. 596 398 Dunlap v. Ingram, 57 N. Car. 178 291 v. Robinson, 28 Ala. 100 106 Dunlop v. Dunlop, 10 Watts (Pa.) 153 443 v. Lamb, 182 Ill. 319 6 Dunn & Bryan, 38 Gz. he 240 ~ Cor . J. Eq. © Hourtton (3 J. 24 AHS v. Houghton (N. J. Eq.), tl. v. Morse, 109 Maine 254 367, 372 Dunn " v. Schell, 122 Cal. 626 250 Dunsmuir’s Estate, In re, 149 Cal. 67 520 Duperier v. Bevard, 107 La, 91 493 Du Pont v. Du Bos, 52 S. Car. 244 235 Durand, In re, 194 N. Y. 477 77, 78 Durbin v. Redman, 140 Ind. 694 169 Durfee v. MacNeil, 58 Ohio St. 238 286 v. Pomeroy, 154 N. Y. 583 Durham v. Smith, 120 Ind. 463 Durr v. Wilson, 116 Ala, 125 365 Dworsky v. Arndstein, 29 App. Div. (N. Y.) 2 523 Dwight v. Newell, 15 Ill. 333 418 Dwyer’s Estate, In re, 159 Cal. 680 78 Ne - Beaver Creek Church, 48 S. an 86 Dyer v. Dyer, 87 Ind. 13 449 v. Jacoway, 50 Ark, 217 414 Dye’s Will, In re, 16 N. Mex. 297 518 E Eager v. Brown, 14 La. Ann. 684 354 Eagle’s Case, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 218 221 Eames v. Hickman, 12 Hun (N. Y.) 425 14 v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 68 N. H. 203 395 Earhart, In re, 50 La. Ann. 524 487 Earle v. Coberly, 65 W. Va. 163 232 Early v. Early, 5 Redf. Surr. (N. Y.) eid v. Nash, 139 App. Div. (N. Y.) 736 523, 525 Earnhardt v. Clement, 137 N. Car. 91 33 Easterly v. Keney, 36 Conn. 18 353 Eastis v. Montgomery, 93 Ala. 293 500 Eaton v. Broaderick, 101 Miss. 26 232 v. Brown, 193 U. S. 411 453 v. Brown, 20 App. Cas. 453 26 v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 286 173 v. Straw, 18 N. H. 320 365 v. Perolin, 49 N. J. Eq. 570 159 v. Rath, 89 Kans. 329 6 Eberley’s Appeal, 110 Pa. St. 95 346 Eberts v. Eberts, 42 Mich. 404 284 Eckstein v. Radi, 72 Minn. 95 62 Eddie v. Parke, 31 Mo. 513 523 Edelman’s Estate, In re, 148 Cal. 233 506, 518, 519 Edenfield v. Edenfield, 131 Ga. 571 62 Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N. H. 434 190, 413 Edson v. Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555 28, 470 Edwards v. Barksdale, 2 Hill Ch. (S. Car.) 416 170 v. Bender, 121 Ala. 77 176, 351 v. Bibb, 43 Ala. 666 173 v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581 347 v. Hammond, 1 B. & P. N. R. 324n 254 Edwards, In re, 132 App. Div. (N. Y.) 544 Edwards’ Estate, In re, 12 Phila. (Pa.) 8 410 Ege v. Hering, 108 Md. 391. 280 Eggleston v. Merriam, 83 Minn. 98 138 Eglehart v. Eglehart, 26 App. Cas. (D. C.) 20 3 : 9 ENe’s Will, In re, 155 Wis. 46 194 Ehrenberg’s Succession, 21 La. Ann. 280 453 Eichelberger’s Estate, In re, 135 Pa. St. 5 160 Eichelberger’s Estate, In re, 170 Pa. St. 242 347 Eikman v. Landwehr, 43 Ind. App. 724 341 ] TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] St. Eisiminger v. Eisiminger, 129 Pa. St. Ela v. Edwards, 16 Gray (Mass.) a1, Elcock’s avail, In re, 4 McCord Ss Car.) 3 Eldon v. Doe, 6 6 Blackf. Gad 341 nidned, v. Meek, 183 Ill. Shaw, 112 Mich. 537° ERSePROnE Estate, In re, 180 Pa. 3 Eldridge Me Eldridge, 9 Cush. (Mass.) v. Eldridge, 41_N. J. E v. Greene, 17 R. I. 7" 3 Elkinton v. Elkinton (N. J. Eada, f Atl. 587 Ellerson v. Wescott, 148 N. ait 149° Ellicott v. Ellicott, 50 Md. Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 683 Elliot v. Fessenden, 83 Maine 197 Elliott _v. Brent, 6 ee cy (D. C.) 98 v. Elliott, 117 Ind. v. Welby, 13 Mo. rea 19 Elbarr s Estate v. Wilson, 27 Mo. App. Ellis v. Aldrich, 70 N. H. 219 232, v. Crawson, 147 Ala. 294 v. Granger, 22 Misc. (N. Y.) 656 v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185 Elmore’s Succession, 124 ia, 91 Elmslie’s Estate, In re, 10 Pa. Dist. 397 Elston v. Montgomery, 242 Ill. 348 Elwell v. Universalist General aoe tion, 76 Tex. 514 166, 167, ‘algae v. Deifendorf, 5 Barb. (N. VY.) 3 Ely v. Ely, 163 ae Ds, ih Y.) 320 v. Pike, 115 Ill. ape 2 Emans v. Emans, 3 qi L 967 Emery v. Darling, 50 Ohio St. 160 v. Van Syckel, 17 N. J. Eq. 564 v. Wason, 107 Mass. 507 56, Emmons v. Atchison, 13 Ky. L. 142 Emmons, In re, 110 App. Div. (N. Y:) 701 32, Endicott v. Endicott, 41 N. J. Eq. i 2 65 Md. 539 In re, 124 Cal. 292 Engle’s Estate, In re, 166 Pa. St. 280 Engle’s Estate, In re, 167 Pa. St. 463 Engel’s Estate, In re, 180 Pa. St. 215 English v. McCreary, 157 Ala. 487 Enloe v. Sherrill, 28 N. Car. 212 Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. (U. S.) 400 > Engel v. State, Engle’s Estate, Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68 13, Enslen v. Allen, 160 Ala. 529 Ensley: v. Ensley, 105 Tenn. 107 340, Episcopal City Mission v. Appleton, 117 ass. 326 Epps v. Dean, 28 Ga. 533 Eegmat v. Meyer, 52 Misc. Erwin v. Hamner, 27 Ala. 296 Eschbach v. Collins, 61 Md. 478 Essington v. Vashon, 3 Mer. 434 Estep v. Mackey, 52 Md. 592 v. Morris, 38 Md. 417 Esty v. Clark, 101 Mass. 36 Ethridge v. Bennett, 9 Houst. (N. Y.) 452, (Del.) Etter v. Armstrong, 46 Ind. 197 Eubank v. Clark, 78 Ala. 73 Eufaula Nat. Bank v. Manasses, soa Ala. 379 Evans v. Anderson, 15 Ohio St. Pee v. Arnold, 52 Ga. 169 5235 v. Beaumont, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 599 v. Crosbie, 15 Sim. 600 v. Massey, 8 Price 22 v. Moore, 247 Ill. 60 v. Smith, 28 Ga. 98 v. Walker, 3 Ch. Div. 211 Evans, In re, 37 Misc. (N. Y.) 337 Evan’s Appeal, In re, 51 Conn. 435 Evan’s Estate, In re, 155 Pa. St. 646 Hyaville Ice &c. Co. Ps Winsor, 148 , 47, 490, 506, Bverdell 2 Hill, 58 ar ’ Div. (N, Y.) Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N. Y. Everson v. Pitney, 40 N. J. ie. 539 Everts’ Estate, In re, 163 Cal. 449 Ewing v. Mallison, 65 Kans. 484 v. Nesbit, 88 Kans. 708 Eyre’s Estate, In re, 205 Pa. 561 Eyre’s Estate, In re, 7 Wash. 291 F Faber v. Police, 10 S. Car. Fahnestock v. Fahnestock, en Pa. am 56 Fahnestock’s Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 46 Fahrney v. Holsinger, 65 Pa. St. 388 Fairchild v. Edson, 154 N. Y. 199 Fairfax v. Brown, 60 Md. 50 Fairman v. Beal, 14 Ill, 244 Fair’s Estate, In ré, 136 Cal. 79 Falk v. Turner, 101 Mass. 494 Falkner v. Butler, 1 Ambl. 514 Fallon v. Chidester, ' 46 Iowa 588 Fallon’s Will, In re, 107 Iowa 120 Faloon v. Flannery, 74 Minn. 4 366, 374, Fargo v. Miller, ee Mase. 225 v. Squiers, 154 N 250 325, Faries’ Appeal, 23 Pa, a 29 Farish v. Cook, 78 Mo. 212 Farley v. Farley, 50 N. J. Eq. 434 Farmer v. Farmer, 93 Ind. 43 v. Farmer, 129 Mo. 530 v. oe 46 N. H. 435 28, 375, Farmers’ L. &c. Co. v. Ferris, 67 App. Div. ¢ 1 Farmers’ L. &c. ape In re, 138 App. Div. ‘((N. Y.) 1 Farmington oe Bank v. Curran, 72 Conn. 342 Farnam v. Farnam, 83 Conn. 369 Farnham v. Barker, 148 Mass. 204 Farnsworth v. Whiting, 102 Maine 296 Farnum v. Bascom, 122 Mass. 282 ie, 137, 139, v. Boyd, 56 N. J. Eq. 7 Farnum’s Estate, In re. 191 Pa St. 75 Farrar v. McCue, 89 N.Y Farrell v. O’ Brien, 199 vu st 308 Faught v. Faught, 98 Ind. 470 Faulk v. Dashiell, 62 Tex. 642 Fay v. Taft, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 448 v. Vanderford, 154 Mass. a Fay’s Estate, In re, 145 Cal. Fearn v. Postlethwaite, a i ” 626 Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195 Fearson v. Dunlop, 21 D. C. 236 Felersvend) In re, 38 Misc. (N. Y.) 234, Feit v. Richard, 64 N. J. vt 16 Feley v. Syer, i121 Md. 79 508, TABLE OF CASES lt \ [References are to Sections.] Fellows v._Allen, 60 N. H. 439 467 Felton v._Sowles, 57 Vt. 382 416 Fenn v. Death, 23 Beav. 73 176 Pergueen, sy Ferguson, 39 U. C. Q. B. v. Herr, 64 Nebr. 649 105 v. Thomason, 87 Ky. 519 285 346 Ferguson’s Estate, In re, 223 Pa. 720 Ber ees Will, In re, L. R. (1902) 1 Ch. Div. 483° 49 Fernandez’s Estate, In re, Bs Cal. 579 414 Ferrell v. Gill, 130 Ga. 534 32 Ferris v. Neville, 127 Mich. 444 447 Ferry’s Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 207 ef Fesler v. Simpson, 58 Ind. 83 488 Festorazzi v. St. Joseph’s, 104 Ala. 327 100 Fetterhoff’s Estate, In re, 228 Pa. 535 448 Fickle v.. Snepp, 97 Ind. me ae 488 Fidelity Insurance T. & S. D. Co’s A peal, 121 Pa. St. 1 * 467 Fidelity Trust Company’s Appeal (Pa. . Eastern Rep. 261 6 ints Tae Company’s Appeal, 108 Z St. 06 Field v. v. ‘Apple River Log Driv. Co., 67 * , 49 v. a. 193 Fed. 160 530 Fields v. Carlton, 75 Ga. 554 469 v. Fields, 93 Ky. 619 194 Field’s Appeal, 36 Conn. 277 498 Field’s Will, In re, 204 N. Y. 448 444 sere Vv. Shepard, 26 Hun (N. Y.) 167 Fifer v. Allen, 228 Ill. 507 830 Fifield v. Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557 186, 189, 290 ‘Filhiol’s Succession, 119 La. 998 108 Filkins v. Severn, 127 Iowa 739 187 Finch v. Finch, 14 Ga. 362 490, 518 Findley v. Findley, 11,Grat. (Va.) 434 6 Finegan v. Theisen, 92 a 178 107 mines v. Sinnott,’ 57 N. Y. Super. Ct. 212 Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 346 280 ee Bapuist Church v. Robberson, 71 First Nat. Bank v. De Pauw, 86 Fed. 722 286 First Universalist Soc. v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171 70, 283 Fischbeck v. Gross, 112 Ill. 208 342 Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kans, 237 533 Fisher v. Clopton, 110 Me App. 663 519 v. Fisher, 80 Nebr. 280 Ve Wagner, 109 Md. rn 64 v. Wister, 154 Pa. St. 65 242 Fisher, In re, 4 Wis ant 462 Fisk v. Fisk, 60 N. ‘S. Eq. 170 Fisk, In re, 45 pie, (N. yy ae 349, at Fitch v. Randall , 163 Mass. 381 Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U. S. 321 346 Fite v. Beasley, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 328 773 Fitzgerald v. Wynne, 1 App. D. C. 107 505 Fitzgerald, In re, 33 Misc. (N. Y.) 325 151 Fitzhugh v. Hubbard, 41 Ark. 64 a. v. Townsend, 59 Mich. 427 Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 10 am 552 245 Flagg v. Walker, 113 U. ’s. Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio c 108 Flanner v. Fellows, 206 Ill. 136 250, asi Flannery’s Will, In re, 24 Pa. St. 502 42 Flannigan v. Howard, 200 Ill. 396 105, 467 Flatauer v. Loser, 156 App. Div. -) 591 4 Fleming v. Ray, 86 Ga. 533 241 Flenner v. Flenner, 29 Ind. 564 6 Fletcher v. American Trust &c. Co., a. 30 379 v. Gates (Tex. Civ. App.), 63 S. W. O57 151 v. Williams wee Civ. App.), 66 S. W. 860 221 Fletcher’s Appeal, 125 a ae 352 347 Flinn v. Davis, 18 Ala. 154 v. Flinn, 4 Del. Ch. a 396 v. Frank, 8 Del. Ch. 186 32 v. Owen, 58 Ill. 111 451, 528 Flintham v. Bradford, 10 Pa. St. 82 477 Flint’s Estate, In re, 100 Cal. 391 533 Flood v. Kerwin, 113 Wis. 673 442, 493 v. Pragoff, 79 Ky. 607 442, 445 v. Ryan, 220 Pa. 450 879 Flora v. Anderson, 67 Fed. 182 173, 176, 193 Florey v. Florey, 24 Ala. 241 500, 531 Floto v. Floto, 213 Ill. 438 493, 523 Flowers v. Flowers, 74 Ark, 212 518 Floyd v. Floyd, 90 Ind. 130 520, 523 Flummerfelt v. Flummerfelt, 51 N. J. Eq. 432 347 Flynn v. Holman, 119 Iowa 731 194, 212 Fogg v. Clark, 1 N. H. 163 208, 211, 234 Fogle v. St. Michael Church, 48 S. Car. Pe Fogler v. Titomb, 92 Maine 184 243 Foley v. O’Donaghue, 167 Ind. 134 523 Foley, In re, 27 Misc. (N. Y.) 77 Foley’s Will, In re, 76 Misc. (N. Y.) 168 PRS eee v. Follansbee, 7 App. D. C. 8: Folwell’s Estate, In re, 67 N. J. Eq. 570 232 Foote v. Foote, 61 Mich. 181 489 v. Saunders, 72 Mo. 616 812 Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42 41, 45, 49 v. Ford, 23 N. H. 212 434 v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19 35, 41, 49 v. Gill, 109 Ga. 691 234 v. Ticknor, 169 Mass. 276 233, 237 Forepaugh’s Estate, In re, 199 Pa. 484 395 Heres Oil Co. v. Crawford, 77 Fed. 0 236, 245 Forman v. Woods, 20 Ky. L. 1700 286 Forney v. Ferrell, 4 W. Va. 729 534 Forrest v. Porch, 100 Tenn. 391 256 Forsaith v. Clark, 21 N. H. 409 234 Fortner v. Wiggins, 121 Ga. 26 446 Fortune v. Buck, 23 Conn. 1 107, 495 Fosdick v. Fosdick, 6 Allen (Mass.) 44 193, 265, 270 v. Hempstead, 55 Hun (N. Vv.) 611 208 Foss v. Crisp, 20 res pero 121 96 v. Sowles, 62 Vt. 417 Fosselman v. Elder, 98 cm St. 159 488 Foster v. Foster, 7 Paige Oy, Y.) 48 489 v. Stewart, 18 Pa. St. 23 234 v. Wick, 17 Ohio 250 235 v. Willson, 68 N. H. 241 355 Foster’s Appeal, In re, 87 Pa. St. 67 505 Fotheree v. Lawrence, 30 Miss. 416 485 Fouke v. Kemp, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 135 176 Fowler v. Black, 136 Ill. 363 244 v. Duhme, 143 Ind. 248 158, 286 v. Stagner, 5S ‘Tex. 393 442, 448 v. Young, 19 Kans. 150 525 Fowlkes v. Wagoner (Tenn.), 46 S. W. 586 283, 296 Fow’s Estate, In re, 147 Pa. St. 264 84 Fox v. Fox, 102 Tenn. 77 232 v. Senter, 83 Maine 295 61, 221 Foxall v. McKenney, Fed. Cas. No. 5016 ° 216 lii TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Fox’s Estate, In re, 154 Mich 5 Fox’s Will, In re, 52 N. 530 98 Frame v. Thorman, 102 Wis. 653 487 Francis v. Marsh, 54 W. Va. 545 478 Francis’ Estate, Tn ne 94 Nebr. 742 505 Frank v. Frank, 120 Tenn. 569 176, 1132 Franke v. Auerbach, 72 Md. 580 375, 382 Franken heiticr, In re, 130 App. Div. (N. Y.) 454 432 Franklin’ v. Belt, 130 Ga. 530 v. Boone, 38 "Tex, C4, “hoo. 597 530 v. Franklin, 91 Tenn. 169 Bans Admx. v. Philadelphia, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 241 272 Franks v. Chapman, 60 Tex. a 491 Frasier v. Littleton, 100 Va. 392 Frazer v. Frazer, 24 Ky. L. 3517 241 ve Waves Circuit Judge, 39 Mich. 198 493 Frazer, In re, 92 N. Y. 239 217 Frazer's Case, 92 N. ¥. 239 14 Frazier v. Boggs, 37 Fla. 307 41, 47 v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80 28, "470 Frear v. Williams, 7 a cheat 550 465 Freeman v. Cook, 41 N. Car. 373 415 v. Easly, 117 Ill, 317 83, 523 v. Flood, 16 Ga. a 297 v. Freeman, 141 N. 251 v. Aellees. 4 Redf. poets "MN Y.) 416 v. Prendergast, 94 Ga. 369 365, 372 Freeman, In re, 146 Iowa 38 309 Freeman’s Estate, In re, 220 Pa. 343 797 Freeman’s Estate, In re, 40 Pa. Super. Ct. 3 181 Frelinghuysen _v. New York L. Ins. &e. c , 31 R. I. 150 463 Freme’s Estate, In re, 2 Ch. 778 142 French v. Frazier, 7 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) i 92 v. French, 14 W. MBs yee 26 v. Hatch, 28 N. H. 233 v. Mehan, 56 Pa. st 86 7 Fretwell v. McLemore, 52 Ala. 124 2 Frew v. Clarke, 80 Pa. St. 170 488 Frey v. Thompson, 66 Ala. 287 235 ee In re, 20 App. Div. (N. Y.) Friend’s Estate, In re, 209 Pa. i! Frierson v. Beall, 7 Ga. 438 153 Frisby v. Withers, 61 Tex. ee 370 Fritz v. Turner, 46 N. Ts 515 442 Fronty v. Godard, 1 Bailey Eq. (S. ar.) 517 Bias a20 Frost v. Atwood, 73 Mich. 392 v. Blackwell, 82 N. J. Ea. 184 281, 282 v. Courtis, 167 Mass. 251 191 v. Frost, 63 Maine 399 357 v. McCaulley, 7 Del. Ch. 162 358 Frothingham, In re, 75 N, a Eq. 205 460 ay v. Morrison, 159 Ill. 32 Shipley, 94 Tenn. 352 208, 2 Fry’: S Estate, In re, 163 Pa. St. 30 bene v. Perry County, 145 Mo. 432 Fulgham v. Strickland, 123 Ga. 258 ss 191, 193 Fullenwider v. Watson, 113 Ind. 18 Fuller v. Fuller, 83 Ky. 345 528 v. Fuller, 84° nteine. "475 234 v. Fuller, 58 N. Car. 223 253 v. Martin, 96 Ky. 500 177 v. Wilbur, 170 Mass. 506 00 Fuller, Ex parte, 2 Story (U. S.) 327. 494 Fullerton v. Jackson, 5 Johns. Ch, (N. Y.) 278 412 Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill, 515 234 Furenes v. Severtson, 102 Iowa 322 169 Furness v. Fox, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 134 254 G Gable v. Daub, 40 Pa. St. 217 57 Gadd v. Stoner, 113 Mich, 689 826 Gaffield v. Plumber, 175 Ill. 521 368 Gage v. Gage, 12 N. H. 371 150 v. Gage, 29 N. H. ie 103 Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. 522 v. Hennen, 24 How. G, ee 553 504 v. Lizardi, 154 U. S. 555 462 Gaither v. Gaither, 3 Md. Ch. 158 342 Gale v. Bennett, Ambler 681 176 v. Corey, 112 Ind. 39 2 v. Drake, 51 N. H. 78 220 v. Gale, 21 Beav. 349 60 Gallagher v. McKeague, 125 Wis. 116 204, 214 Gallaher v. Herbert, 117 Ill. 160 323 Galland’s Estate, In re, 92 Cal. 293 420 Gallison v. Quinn, 183 Mass. 241 232 Gallon v. Haas, 67 Kans, 225 65, 532 Galloway ve Carter, 100 N. Car. 111 252, 258 v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558 234, 306, 308 v. Durham, 118 Ky. 544 858 v. Galloway, 32 App. Cas. (D. C.) 76 214 Gamble v. Butchee, 87 Tex. 643 107, 448 Gamble, In re, 13 Ont. L. 299 308 Gandolfo v. Walker, is Ohio St. 251 419 Gannon vy. Albright, 183 Mo. 238 234 v. Pauk, 200 Mo. 75 833 bas Peterson, 193 Ill. 372 Hab, 1195 Garcelon’s Estate, In re, 104 Cal. 100, 519 Gardenhire v. Hinds, 1 Head (Tenn.) 402 357 Gardenville Permanent L. Assn. v. Walker, 52 Md. 452 324 Gardiner v. Gardiner, 65 N. H. ait 465 Gardner v. Gardner, iy Pa. St. 218 464 v. Viall, 36 R. I. 182 Gat sche v. Levering ts Co., 146 Mo. 4 42 Garibaldi vy. Hollowell, 68 N. Car. 251 392 Garland v. Garland, 73 Maine 97 231, 891 v. Garland, 87 Va. 758 348 v. Harrison, 8 Leigh. en 368 2 v. Smiley, 51 N. J. E 06 v. Smith, 164 Mo. 366 Garland’s Will, In re, 160 N. Car. 555 10 Garman v. Glass, 197 Pa. 101 143 Garraud, In re, 35 Cal. 336 103 Garret v. Rex, 6 Watts (Pa.) 14 222 Garrity’s Estate, In re, 108 Cal. 463 400 Garth v. Meyrick, 1 Bro. Ch. 30 141 Garvey v. Horgan, 38 Misc. (N. Y.) 164 42 v. Union eet Co., 29 App. Div. (N. 513 359 Gass v. Withite 2 —_ (i) 170 357 Gaster v. Gaster, 92 Nebr. 63 Gates v. Cole, 137 Iowa 613 84 v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254 191, 250 Gaude v. Baudoin, 6 La. 722 478 Gaven v. Allen, 100 Mo. 293 506 Gavitt v. Moulton, 119 Wis. 35 464 Gay v. Gay, 84 Ala. 38 467 v. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 250 530 v. Grant, 101 N. Car. 206 368 v. Minot, 3 Cush. (Maes) 352 496 Geale’s Goods, In re, 3 S. & T. 430 85 . TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Gebbie’s Estate, In re, 9 Pa. Dist. 56 Seats .v. Riesenberg, 116 Mo. App. Ge v. Worth, 17 Ohio a 564 Gelbach v. Shivel ly, 67 Md. 498 Gelbke v. Gelbke, 88 Ala. 427 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S_ 258 George Weg VSEIOE 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) v. George, 47 N. H. 27 281, 494, v. Greer, 53 Miss. 495 Gerard v. Buckley, 137 Mass. 475 Gerbrich v. Freitag, 213 Ill. 552 German-American State Bank v. God- man, 83 Wash. 231 Gernert v. Albert, 160 Pa. St. 95 Gerrish v. Gerrish, 8 Ore. 351 Gfroerer v. Gfroerer, 173 Ind. 424 Gibbens v. Gibbens, 140 Mass. 102 Gibbon v. Gibbon, 40 Ga. 562 Gibbons, In re, 234 Pa. 37 Gibney v. Allen, 156 Mich. 301 Gibson Me ioe (Ind. App.), 110 N. v. Dooley, 32 La. Ann. 959 108, v. Gibson, 93 S. Car. 385 Vv. Gibson, Walk (Miss.) 364 v. Nelson, 181 Ill. 122 v. Seymour, 102 Ind. 485 Gibson’s Estate, In re, 75.Cal. 329 Gibson’s Will, In re, 28 App. Div. (N. Y.) 769 Giddings v. Giddings, 65 Conn. 149 , v. Gillingham, 108 Maine 512 = 188, v. Turgeon, 58 Vt. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 127 Iowa 568 v. Knox, 52 N. Y. 125 v. Welsch, 75 Ind. 557 Gilbert’s ‘Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 347 oe - Estate, In re, 2 Con. Surr. ¢ ) 390 Gilbreath v. Alban, 10 Ohio 64 Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 126 Giles v. Anslow, 128 Ill. 187 235, 339, v. Little, 104 U. S. 291 207; Gilham, In re, 64 N. J. Eq. 715 Gilkey v. Hamilton, 22 Mich. 283 Gill v. Grand Tower Mining &c. Co., 92 Ill. 249 Gillett v. Gaffney, 3 Colo. 351 v. Gillett, 109 Ill. HDP: 75 Gillis v. Gillis, 96 Ga. Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144 v. Gilman, 52 Maine 165 v. Gilman, 54 Maine 453 v. Healy, 55 Maine 120 Gilmer v. Gilmer, 42 Ala. 9 Gilmore v. Hayworth, 26 Tex. 89 Gilmore’s Estate, In re, 81 Cal. 240 65, Gilmor’s Estate, In re, 154 ee Hes Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 81 Maine 137 Gilpin v. Williams, 17 Ohio St. 396 Gtey v. Richards, 26 Tex. Civ. App. Gilruth v. Gilruth, 40 Iowa 346 498, 5 Gindrat v. Western R. Co., 96 Ala, 162 Gingrich v. Gingrich, 146’ Ind. Ginter v. Ginter, 79 Kans. 721 Girard v. Futterer, 83 Ala. 234 Gittings v. McDermott, 2 Myl. & K. 69 Given v. Hilton, 95 U. S. ae = Givens v. Ott, 222 Mo. 227 2 2 Gladding v. St. Matthew's * checks 25 I. 628 3 222 49 320 140 463 610 Glancy v. Glancy, 17 Ohio St. 134 534 Glascott v. Bragg, 111 Wis. 605 105, 466 Glass v. Dunn, 17 Ohio St. 413 325 v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24 342 Glasscock v. Tate, 107 Tenn. 486 235 Glass’ Estate, In re, 164 Cal. 765 95 Glenn v. Glenn, 21 S. Car. 308 374 v. Spry, 5 Md. 110 323 Glore v. Scroggins, 124 Ga, 922 237 Glover v. Condell, 163 Ill. 566 242, 244 v. Stillson, 56 Conn, 315 236 Goddard v. Brown, 12 R. I. 31 378, 381 Godfrey v. Humphrey, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 537 2 34 v. Phillips, 209 Ill. 584 448 v. Smith, 73 Nebr. 756 22, 503 Godman v. Simmons, 113 Mo. 122 244 Godshalk v. Akey, 109 Mich. 350 233 Godwin v. Godwin, 129 Ga. 67 487 Goebel v. Wolf, 113 N. Y. 405 251, 255, 306 Goerke v. Goerke, 80 Wis. 516 155 Going v. Emery, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 107 368, 380 Golder v. Chandler, 87 Maine ue » 221, 322 Goldsmith v. Petersen, 159 os 692 296 Goldstein v. Hammell, 236 Pa. 305 240 Goldthorp, In re, 115 Iowa 430 103, 431 Goldtree v. Thompson, 79 Cal. 613 266, 346 Gomez v. Higgins, 130 Ala. 493 150 Goodell v. Pike, 40 Vt. 319 80, 509 Goodlett v. Kelly, 74 Ala. 213 5 Goodloe v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn, 252 33 Goodman vy. Winter, 64 Ala. 410 485, 491 Goodrich v. Ferris, 145 Fed. 844 493 v. Lambert, 10 ‘Conn. 448 244 Goodrich’s Appeal, 57 Conn. 282 188 Good Samaritan Hospital v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 137 Mo. App. 179 420 Goodsell’s Appeal, 35 Conn. 171 467 Goods of Gosling, In re, 55 L. J. P. 27 461 Goose of Seaman, In re (1891), Prob. ws Good’s Succession, 45 La. Ann. 1392 154 Sadie v.. Meredith, 2 Maule & Sel. aie Gondwin v. Coddington, 154 N. Y. 283 32, 463 McDonald, 153 Mass. 481 284 Gordes v. Burris, 153 Mo. 223 530 v. Gordon, 1 Meriv. 141 106 Vv. Jackson, 58 N. J. Eq. 166 245, 309 v. Old, 52 N. des a oe 509 ve West, 8 N. 414 Ve Whitlock, 92 on 123 151, 461, 462 Gordon, In re, 50 N. J. Eq. 397 487, 506 Gore v. Clark, 37 S. Car. 537 106, 108 Gorham v. Dodge, 122 Ill. 528 287 Gorkow’s Estate, In re, 20 Wash. 563 529 Gormley’s Estate, In re, 154 Pa. St. 378 176 Goslee v. Goslee, 29 Ky L. 654 351 Goss v. Withers, 153 Ky. 5 237 Gough v. Manning, 26 Md. 347 288 Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408 28, 33, 470 v. piace 104 Mass. 283 371 v. Safford, 39 Vt. 498 503 Gould, In re, 72 Vt. 316 477 475, Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 51 Pa. St. 345 3 Gourley’s Estate, In re, 238 Pa. 62 Grace v. Perry, 197 Mo. 550 Grady v. Hughes, 64 Mich. 540 516 Graeff v. De Turk, 44 Pa. St. ee 366, 375 Graham v. Allison, 24 Mo. . 516 221 v. Burch, 47 Minn. 171 v. De Yampert, 106 Ala. 279 57, 136, 169, 206 liv TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Graham v. Edwards, 162 Ky. 7 444 v. Graham, 67 Hun Nr 20 329 6 v. Gear a a ze 210 v. Kin 373 Graham’s es In aS 198 Pa, 216 965 Grand Prairie Seminary v. Morgan, 171 - Ill. 444 188 Granger v. Granger, 147 Ind. 95 236 Granfield, In re, 79 Misc. (N. Y.) 374 a Granniss’ Estate, In re, 142 Cal. 1 Grant v. Bradstreet, 87 Maine 583 342 v. rants Pa | ae ), 2 33 v. Mose enn. pp. ” 50 * "285, 310 v. Saunders, 121 Iowa 80 871 v. Spann, 34 Miss. 294 a Graves v. Mitchell, 90 Wis. Graves’ Estate, In re, 242 il 612 2575, a Gray v. Bailey, 42 Ind. 349 v. Corbit, 4 Del. Ch. 135 356 v. Gray, 60 N. H. 28 494, 497 v. Kauffman, 82 Tex. 65 96 v. Parks, 94" ery 7a 491, ey v. Pash, 24 Ky. L. 192 Graydon v. Graydon, 33 . J. Eq. 229 288, 289 Gray, Estate of, 88 Nebr. 835 533 Gray’s Estate, In re, 159 Cal. 159 65 Gray’s Estate, In re, 147 Pa. St. 67 313 Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 491 378 Green v. Alden, 92 Maine 177 41 v. Crain, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 252 451 v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 349 v. Gordon, 38 App. D e 443 235 v. Green, 125 N. Y. 350 v. Green, 19 R. I. ae 390 v. Hewitt, 97 Ill. 113 207 v. Huntington a eos 106 171 v. Lane, 45 N.C 32 v. Smith, 17 R. ra “ea he v. Speer, 37 Ala. 532 v. Winter, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 26 307 Greene v. Dennis, 6 Conn. 293 99, 186 v.. Greene, 145 Ill. 264 33; 450 v. Huntington, 73 Conn. 106 432 Greenheld v. Morrison, 21 Iowa 538 79 Greenland Church &c. Soc. v. Hatch, 48 N. H. 393 189 Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. St. 489 50, 443 v. Welles, 10 Cush. a 571 7 Green’s Appeal, 42 Pa. St. 25 178 Greenwood v. Murray, Y Minn. 259 508 Greer v. Wilson, 108 Ind. 322 235 Gregg v. McMillan, 54 S. Car. 378 469 Grege’s Estate, In re, 213 Pa. 260 100 Gregory v. Oates, 92 Ky. 532 50 v. Welch, 90 Ark, 152 252 Gregory’s Estate, In re, 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 407 67 Grey s Trusts, In re, L. R. (1892) 3 Ch. 76 Gridley v. Wynant, 23 How. (U. S.) 500 350 Grieves v. Rawley, 10 Hare 63 177, 178 Griffin v. Nicholas, 224 Mo. 275 237, 357 Griffith v. Derringer, 5 Har. (Del.) 284 244 Griffith, 59 Fla. 512 62 ilcabs Vis Cocke, 85 Ky. 314 416 Grimm v. Tittman, 113 Mo. 56 107, 448, 451 Grimmer v. Friederich, 164 Ill. 245 252, 254 Grim’s Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 391 359 Griswold v. Heard, 2 Gray (Mass.) 322 394 yv. Johnson, 5 Conn. 363 240 Griswold, In re, 42 Misc. ee a" 230 136 Groom, In re, L. J. Ch. Gross v. Burneston, 51 Md. 7733 499 v. Sheeler, 7 Houst. (Del.) 280 244, 323 Grossman, In re, 73 Ill. App. 224 22 Grotenkemper v. Bryson, 79 Ky. 353 398 Grubbs v. McDonald, 91 Pa. St. 236 440 Grubb’s Estate, In re, 174 Pa. St. 187 151 Gruendike’s Estate, In re, 154 Cal. 628 172 Gruenewald v. Nue, 215 Ill. 132 171 Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y. 23 3 Guerard v. Guerard, 73 Ga. 506 49 Guild v. Allen, 28 R. I. 430 189 Guilfoyle, In re, 96 Cal. 598 442 Guinasso’s Estate, In re, 13 Cal. App. 518 505 Guitar v. Gordon, 17 Mo. 408 431 Gump v. Gowans, 226 Ill. 635 499 Gunn v. Brown, 63 Md. 96 297 Gunnings’ Estate, In re, 234 Pa. 139 289 Gunter v. Gunter, 48 N. Car. 441 448 Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37 33 Gutman v. Buckler, 69 Md. 7 Guy v. Mayes, 235 Mo. 390 Gwin v. Gwin, 51 Idaho 271 83 H Haas v. Atkinson, 9 Mackey (D. C.) Hacker v. Hacker, 153 App. Div. (N. Y.) 270 :) Hackett v. Hackett, 67 N. H. 424 Hadley v. Hadley, 147 Ind. 423 v. Simmons (N. J. Eq.}, 49 Atl. Hagen v. Sacrison, 19 N. Dak. 160 269, 271 Haggerty v. Lanterman, 30 N. J. Eq. 37 Hague v. Ahrens, 53 Fed. 58 283 Haight, In re, 51 App. Div. (N. Y.) 10 Haight, In re, 63 Misc. (N. Y.) 624 Hainer v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 78 Iowa 245 61 Haines v. Allen, 78 Ind. 100 878 v. Christie, 28 Colo. 502 194 Hair v. Caldwell, 109 Tenn. 148 81 Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276 462, 525, 534 Hale v. Green, 2 Rolle Abr. 261 378 v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227 351, 352 v. Hale, 137 Mass. 168 368 v. Hobson, 167 Mass. 397 250 v. St. Paul, 54 Minn. 521 325 Haley v. Boston, 108 Mass. 576 169 v. Gatewood, 74 Tex. 281 65, 206, 207 v. Palmer, 107 Maine 311 351, 353 Hall v. Coggswell, 183 Mass. 521 836 v. David, 67 Ga. 72 253 v. Getman, 121 Mo. App. 630 33 v. Hall, 38 Ala. 131 498 v. Hall, # Als. 290 498, 508 v. Hall, L. (1892) 1 Ch. 361 209 v. Hall, 123 es 120 269, 273 v. Hall, 81 N. Y. 130 96 v. Hancock, 15 Pick. {Mazs.) 255 176 v. Hill, 6 Ta. Ann. 745 152 ve Holloway, 58 Conn. 210 349 v. Priest, 6 Gray eee) 18 241 v. Smith, 61 N. 240, 307 v. Stephens, 65 Io. "370 168, 180 v. Turner, 110 N. Car. 292 235 v. Wiggin, 67 N. H. 89 181 Hallett v. Allen, 13 Ala, 554 396 Hall’s Estate, In re, 70 Vt. 458 414 Hall’s Succession, 28 La. Ann. 57 448 Hallyburton v. Carson, 86 N, Car. 290 TABLE OF CASES lv [References are to Sections.] Halsey v. Gee, 79 Miss. ae 838 v. Goddard, 86 Fed. 281 v. Patterson, 37 z is 4 445 171, 221 Ham v. Ham, 58 N. 418 v. Twombly, 181 Mace 170 342 Hamilton v. Crowe, 175 Mo. 634 464, 533 v. Downs, 33 Conn. 211 337, 353 v. Flinn, 21 Tex. pie 50 v. Jacobs, 4 Ohio C. 398 v. Serra, 6 Mackey. &, oo 168 215 v. Smith, 110 N. 324 Vv. Thirston, 93 id. ay : “33 “Hamilton’s Estate, In re, 120. Cal. 421 495 Hamilton’s Estate, In re, 74 Pa. St. 69 62, 501 Hamilton’s Succession, 3° La. Ann. 640 108 Hamlet v. Johnson, 26 Ala. 557 308 Hamlin v. Mansfield, 88 Maine 131 435 Ve Dsgced: 1 Redf. Surr. (N. Y.) ‘ 409 . Hammel v. Palmer, 12 Ohio C. C. 184 212 Hammell v. Swan, 61 N. J. Eq. 179 219 Hammett v. Hammett, 43 Md. 307 285 Hammond v. Croxton, 162 Ind. 353 366, 368 v. Hammond, 55 Md. 575 895 Hampton v. Holman, 5 Ch, Ue 183 268 Hancock v. Lyon, 67 N. H. 215 Handley v. Palmer, 91 Fed. je 42, 98 v. Palmer, 103 Fed. 39 49 v. Wri htson, 60 Md. 198 181 Handley, In re, 208 Pa. 388 211 Handy’s Estate, In re, 167 Pa. St. 552 348 Hankins v. Kimball, 57 Ind. 42 414 Hanna v. Ladewig, 73 Tex. 37 374 Hannah v. Anderson, 125 Ga. 407 531 Hannon v. Hounihan, 85 Va. 429 96 v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 12 Cal. App. 350 2 Hannum v. Day, 105 Mass. 33 418 Hans v. Holler, 165 Mo. 47 491, 521 Hansen’s Estate, In re, 87 Nebr. 567 502 Hanson v. Hanson, 81 Kans. 305 63, 81 v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 79 Md. . 4 434 Hanvy v. Moore, 140 Ga. 691 241 ciaugoce v. Houghton, 10 Pick. Mas 4 Haraden v. Larrabee, 113 Mass. 430 17 Harberger’s Appeal, 98 a a 29 416 Harbison v. James, 90 Mo. 367 Hard v. Ashley, 117 N. Y. 60 iz 142, 463 Hardage v. Stroope, 58 Ark. 3 244 Hardenburgh v. Ray, 151 U. 3 112 57 Hardesty’s Succession, 22 La. Ann. 332 95 Harding v. Harding, 174 ee 268 ‘ v. Schapiro, 120 Md. 541 Hardman v. Johnson, 3 Mer. 347 208 Hargraves v. Lott, 67 Ga.. 133 95 Hargroves v. Redd, 43 Ga. 142 50, 95 Haring v. Shelton, 103 Tex. 10 235, 288 Harker v. Harker, 3 Harr. (Del.) 51 81 v. Reilly, 4 Del. Ch. 72 376 v. Smith, 41 Ohio St. 236 1117 Harkins v. Hugh es, 60 Ala. 316 392, 393 Harkness v. Lisle, 132 Ky. 767 296 Harman’s Estate, In re, 135 ae St. 441 169 Harmon v. Smith, 38 Fed. 482 324 Harp v. Adams, 142 Ga. 5 22 v. Parr, 168 Ill. 459 oy 107, 445, 448, a v. Wallin, 93 Ga. 237 Harper v. Anderson, ba N. Car. 89 212 v. Harper, 148 N. Car. EP 25, 207 Harrall v. Wallis, 37 N. J. E 48 458 Harrell v. Hagan, 147 N. on ‘411 173, 834 Harriman v. Harriman, 59 N. H. 135 167 Harrington v, Pier, 105 Wis. “485 313 Harrington v. Stees, 82 Ill. 50 454 Harris v. Dainley, 22 e Pa 633 233, 702 v. Douglas, 64 i 486 v. Dyer, 18 R. ap 286 v. Harris, 36 Bar ae Y.) 88 504 vy. Harris, 82 Vt. 251, 940 v. Hays, 53 Mo. so 534 v. Judd, 3 Hawaii 421 356 v. Keasbey yi J. Fv), 53 Atl 555 187 v. Pue, 39 Md. 535 - 200, 500 v. Tisereau, 52. Ga. 153 491, 504 v.. Wright, ue ‘N. Car. 422 281, 295 Harrison v. Brophy, 59 pare: 1 = 232, 296 v. Denny, 113 Md. 509 352° v. Foote, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 576 236, 293 v. Harrison, 105 Ga. 517 235, 281, 282 v. Nixon, 9’ Pet, (U. S.) 483 41, 45, 2 v. Rowan, Fed. Cas. No. 6141 ve Stanton, 146 Ind. 366 si v. Stockton, 19 N. J. Eq. 235 354 v. Weatherly, 180 Til. 418 47 Harrison’s Appeal, In re, 48 Conn. 202 500 Harrison’s Estate, In re, 12 Pa. County Ct. 388 400 Hart v. Chesley, 18 i H. 373 293 v. Rust, 46 Tex. 556 418 v. Seymour, 147 Ill. 598 265, 271 v. West, 16 Tex. ser App. 395 460 v. White, 26 Vt. 207 v. Young, 3 Ji a0 Marsh. (Ky.) a Hartman v. aurmsttane: | 59 Kans, 696 339 Hartnett v. Wandell, 60 N. Y. 346 410 Hartson v. Elden, 50 N. J. Pa = 51, 270 Hartwell v. Martin, 71 N. J. Eq. 157 9 152 v. Parks, 240 Mo. 537 486 v. Tefft, 19 R. I. 644 105, 173 Hartwig v. Schiefer, 147 Ind. 61 Harvard College v. Balch, 171 th, 275 64 Harvey v. Smith, 1 Dev. & B. L. (N. Car.) 186 496 v. Von Cott, 71 Hun (N. ae 394 9221 Harvy v. Chouteau, 14 Mo. 587 152, 478, 480 Harwell v. Lively, 30 Ga. 315 475, 476 Hascoll v. King, 162 N. Y. 134 346 Haseltine v. Shepherd, 99 Maine 495 9810 Haselwood v. Webster, 82 Ky. 409 434 Hastings v. Earp, 62 N. Car. 5 313 Haszard v. Haszard, 19 R. I. 374 312 Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Moe 324 3 v. Ferguson, 57 Fed. 65 Hatchett v. Hatchett, 103 Pits 556 366, 375 Hathway’s Appeal, 46 Mich. 326 492 Hattersley v. issett, 52 N. J. Eq. 693 392 Haubrich v. Haubrich, 118 Minn. 394 33 Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 610 Haug v. Schumacher, 166 N. Y. 506 368 Haven v. Foster, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 534 479 v. Haven, 181 Mass. 573 774 Havens v. Haverts, 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 324 58 v. Sackett, 15 N. Y. 287 v. Seashore Land Co. is oy N. J. Ea. is Haviland v. Haviland, 130 Iowa 611 255 Haviland, In re, 19 N.Y. St. 524 138 Haviland, In re, 17 Mise’ (N. Y.) 193 440 Hawaiian sauce Co. v. Van Holt, 216 U. S. 367 347 Hawes v. Kepley, 28 Ind. App. 306 194 v. Nicholas, 72 Tex ‘oan 476 Hawke v. Enyart, 30 ‘Neb, 288. "288, “104, 478, 479 v. Lodge, 9 Dei. Ch. 284 Hawkes v. Slight, 110 wis, 125 321 lvi TABLE OF CASES references are to Sections.] Hawkins v. Bohling, 168 Ill. 214 250 v. Garland, 76 Va. 149 723 v. Grimes, "13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 257 526 v. Hansen, 92 Kans. 73 , 280, 282 v. Hawkins, 54 Iowa 443 107 Hawley v. Brown, 1 Root (Conn) 494 448 Hawthorn v. Ulrich, 207 Ill. 375 Hayden’s Estate, In re, 149 Ca 680 498 Hayes v. Hall, 188 Mass. 510 415 v. Hayes, 242 Mo. 155 10, 339 v. Hayes, 45 N. J. Eq. 461 220 v. Sykes, 120 Ind. 180 327 v. Tabor, 41 N. H. 521 253, 343 Hayne v. Irvine, 25 S. Car, 289 Haynes v. Haynes, = ae St. 598 495, 504, 516, Hays v. Bowdoin, 159 ae s18, 23, 524, v. Seadey, 69 N. H. 308 Hayward v. Loper, 147 Ill. 41 184, 434 v. Rowe, 190 Mass.1 59, 351, 358, 967 v. Spaulding, 75 N. H. $2 419, 860 Haywood v. Wright, 152 N. Car. 421 338, 341 Hazard v. Gushee, 35 R. I. 438 56 Hazelett v. Farthing, 94 Ky. 421 62 Heald v. Heald, 56 Md. apo 268, 308 Healey v. Bartlett, 73 N. 110 450 Healy v. a © 5 App. Div. Gs YJ ” v. Hels, 70 Conn. 467 1196 v. Reed, 153 Mass. 197 78 Heard v. Read, 169 Mass. 216 “4 Heaston v. Kreig, 167 Ind. 101 Heath v. McLaughlin, 115 N. Car. ee 398 Hebberd v. Lese, 107 App. Div. (N. Y. way 87 425 Hebert v. Winn, 24 La, Ann. 385 Heermans v. Robertson, 64 N. Y. 332 392 Hegarty’s Appeal, In re, 75 Pa. St. 503 494 Hegney v. Head, 126 Mo. 619 526 Heidenheimer v. Bauman, 84 Tex. 174 340, 352, 440 Heidlebaugh v. Wagner, is Iowa 601 ° 154 Heisen 7. Ellis, 247 Til. 251 Heiskell v. Chickasaw, 37 a 668 188 Heisler v. Sharp, 44 _N. a Eq. 167 381 aes v. Markland, Rawle (Pa.) Bhs Hellier v. Hellier, 9 P. D. ee 462 Helling, In re, 84 Misc. (N. Y.) 684 194 Hellwig v. Bachman, 26 Ill. App. 165 239 Helm v. Leggett, 66 Ark. 23 288 Hemenway v. Hemenway, 171 Mass. 40 Hemhauser v. Decker, 38 N. J. Eq. 426 380 Hemingway v. Hemingway, 22 Conn. 59 Heminway v. Reynolds, 98 Wis. 501 493 Hemphill v. Moody, 62 Ala. 510 463 v. Pry, 183 Pa. St. 593 393 Henpailllg Estate, In ve, 180 Pa, St. , 34 Henderson v. Adams, 15 Uisk 30 343 v. Blackburn, 104 IIL. 368, 808 v. Clark, 27 Miss. ee 2 v. Harness, 176 Ill. 302 292 v. Henderson, 113, N. Y. 1 378 v. Ryan, 27 Tex. 670 50 Henderson, In re, 161 Cal. 353 191 Hlenderens Trust Co. v. Stuart, 108 Ky. 04 4 Hennessy v. Woulfe, 49 La. Ann, 1376 23 Henry v. Griffis, 89 Iowa 543 324 v. Hall, 106 Ala. 84 63 v. Henry, 81 Ky. 342 v. Pittsburgh ls Mfg. Co., 80 Fed. 485 236 Henry v. Thomas, 118 Ind. 23 195 Henry, Ex parte, 24 Ala. 638 446 Hengic vy. Henzie, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 43% Herber’s Succession, 128 La. 111 41 Herbert v. Berrier, 81 Ind. 1 440, 443 447, 525 Herdlitchka v. Foss, 2 Nebr. (Unof.) 428 682 Hernandes v. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522 412 Herrick v. Fowler, 108 Tenn. 410 374 Herring v. Ricketts, 101 Ala. 342 495, a Herring, In_re, 152 N. re 258 Herriott v. oe 155 N. 5 1130 Hersee v. Simpson, 154 N. ¥. 496 254, 255 Hersey v. Purington, 96 Maine 166 255, 252 Hershey v. Meeker County Bank, 71 inn, 255 366 Herzog v. Title Guarantee &c. Co., 177 N. Y. 86 141, 142, aels Hesketh v. Murphy, 36 me Eq. 3 Heslop v. Gatton, 71 Ill. 528 321 Hess’ Appeal, In’ re, 43 Pa. St. 73 Hess’ Will, In re, 48 Minn, 504 63 Hesterberg v. Clark, 166 Ill. 241 452, Heuser v. Harris, 42 Ill. 425 72 Hewes v. Dehon, 3 Gray (Mass.) 205 v. Preston, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 152 Heyer v. Kranch, 52 Pa., Super. Ct, 635 Heywood’s Estate, In re, 148 Cal. 184 Hiatt v. McColley, 171 Ind. 91 499 Hibb’s Estate, In re, 143 Pa. St. 217 Hibler v. Hibler, 104 Mich. 274 140, 306, Hickman’s Estate, In rey ie Cal. 609 Hicks v. a ae Ga. 176 v. Ward, 107 N. ie 302 374 Hiestand v. ieee: 150 Pa. St. 501 154 Spi nbedigae v. Higginbotham, 106 Ala. 530 Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 115 499 v. Dwen, 100 Ti. 554 212 v. Eaton, 178 Fed. 153 522 Vv. Eaton, 183 Fed. 388 42 v. Eaton, 188 Fed. 938 41, 42 Higgins, In re, 15 Mont. 474 411 Hig; ins’ Estate, In re, 156 Cal. 257 533 Hig ’s Estate, In re, 136 Pa. St. eo 253 Hill v. BuEerty 10 How. Pr. GN. ¥) 500 v. Clark, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 405 369 v. Crook, Jw R, 6 He L. 265 106 v. Dade, 68 Ark. 409 - 351 v. Den, 54 Cal. 6 287, 380, 392 v. Felton, 47 Ga. 455 203 v. Harding, 92 Ky. 76 28, 470 v. Hill, 90 Nebr. 43 343, 358 v. Jones, 65 Ala. 214 376 v. McRae, 27 Ala. a 356 v. Page (Tenn.), 36 S. W. 735 336 v. Peoples, 80 ‘Ark. 15 418 Hillen v. Iselin, 144 N. Y. 365 174, 376 Hills v. Putnam, 152 Mass, 123 349 v. Simonds, 125 Mass. 536 190, 192 Hill’s Estate, In re, 102-Mo. App. 617 410 Hill’s Succession, 47 La. Ann. 329 461 Hillyard y. Miller, 10 Pa. St. 326 265 Hilpire v. Claude,” 109 Towa 159 105, 467 He v. Hilton, 2 McArthur (D. Cc) 207 Hinckley v. Primm, 41 Til. App. 579 2u ey Ny Luana, Ve gis be (C L 186 inckley, In re Hines a Hines, 95. N. Ce fs po ue 393 Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333 62 TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Hinton v. Hinton, 68 N. Car. 99 Htireeh, In re, 116 App. Div. (N. Y.) 36 Hirst’s Estate, In re, 12 W. N. Cas. (Pa.) 323 Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257 345, v. Hite, 133 Ky. 554 Hite’s Estate, In re ant oe 436 Hittell, In_re, 141 Hixon v. West, 83 Gr 786 Hoadly v. Wood, 71 Conn, 452 180, 192, 284, Hoagland v. Beckley, 158 Mich. 565 Hobbins’ eae, In re, 41 Mont 39 Hobbs v. Chesley, 55 N. H. v. Peyson, 85 Maine ae v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 419 EaSHion v. Blackburn, 1 Add. Ecc. 274 Hale, 95 N. Y. 588 Biel v. Lynn, 200 Mo. Pie Hodges v. Phelps, 65 Vt. Hodge’s Estate, In re, 63 Ve 661 411, Hodgin v. Toler, 70 Iowa 21 Hodgman v. Kittredge, 67 N. H. 254 107, Hodgman’s Estate, In re, 140 N. Y. - Aa 95, Hodnett, In re, 65 N. J. Eq. 329 Hoffman v. Hoffman, 26 Ala, 535 Hoffman’s Will, In re, 140 App. Div. (N. Y.) 121 Hoffner’s Estate, In re, 161 Pa. St. 331 Hossa v. Hogan, 3 Dana (Ky.) 572 yman, 2 Ore. 302 High aback v. nee nae Wis. 487 Hoit v. Hoit, 42 N. J. Eq. 388 Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. “G75 306, 460, 466, Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa. St. 301 Holbrook v. Bentley, 32 Conn. 502 v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201 Holcomb v. Gillet, 2 Beer (Conn.) 448 v. Palmer, 106 Maine 17 355, Holcombe v. Spencer, 82 Conn. 532 Holdefer v. Teifel, 51 Ind. 343 Holden v. Strong, 116 N. Y. 471 Holland v. Couts, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 515 518, v. Taylor, 111 Ind. 121 Holliday v. Hively, 198 Pa. 335 Holpiepiese Y. Sturgis, 21 La. Ann. 450 v. Wood, 84 N. J. E Hollister v. Butterworth,” it “Ccbh, ae 8. > v. Shaw, 46 Conn. 248 Holiday v. alwaey 74 Md. 458 Holman v. Riddle, 8 Ohio St. 384 156, Heepogs Will, In re, 83 Misc. Mm ) Holmes v. Holloman, 12 Bis 535 v. Walter, 118 Wis. 409 338, 341, 343, 357, 358, Holt v. Lamb, 17 Ohio St. 374 v. Pickett, 111 Ala. 362 v. Rice, 54 H. 398 v. Sindry, L. R7 EG: 170 Holt, In re, 56 Minn. 448, Holtby v. Wilkinson, ae Grant Ch. (U. C.) 5 0 Holton,v. Cochran, 208 Mo. 314 82. Holt’s Estate, In re, 146 Cal. 77 Holyoke v. Sipp, 77 Nebr. 394 Home for Incurables v. Maule 383 Home of Aged v. Bantz, 107" Ma. 543° Homer v. Landis, 92 Md. - 381 ‘Hotchkiss v. "Ladd, 62 ve 209 Honaker v. Duff, 101 Va. 675 Honnett v. Williams, 66 Ark, 148 Hood v. gare: 1 McCord (S, ce) ‘ ve i. 98 Ky. 285 v. Dorer, 107 Wis. 149 v. Haden, 82 Va. 588 373, 374, 376, Hooker v. Montague, 123 N. Car. 154 Hooks v. Barnett, 38 Ala. 607 v. Brown, 125 Ga. 122 Hooper Yq Meluarr, 5 Cold. (Tesny v. Smith, 88 Md. 577 192, 233, Hoopes’ Estate, In re, 174 Pa. St. 373 Hoover v. Gregory, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 44 Hope v. Brewer, 136 N. Y. 128 Hopf v. State, 72 Tex. 281 Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342 270, v. Keazer, pe Maine ay v. Lane, 49 Hun an ae 608 v. Smith, 162 Mass. Hopkins, In re, 102 i. “hiv. (N. ¥.) ning In re, 32 Hun a oe 618 Hopkins, In re, 172 N. Hopper’s Estate, In re, 68 ca 80 Hoppe’s Will, In re, 102 Wis. 54 Hoppock v. Tucker, 59 N.Y. 202 191, Horstmann v. Flege, 172 N. Y. 381 Horton v. Earle, 162 Mass. 448 191, Horwitz v. Norris, 49 Pa, St. 213 v. Norris, 60 Pa. St. 261 Hiosch Lumber Co. v. Weeks, 123 Ga. 336 Hosea v. Jacobs, 98 Mass. 65 Hoshauer v. Hoshauer, 26 Pa. St. pee Hoskins v. Arterburn, 7 ae L, 291 Hoss v. Hoss, 140 Ind. 491, Holtz’s Estate, In re, 38 Pa. St. 422 Houck v. Patterson, 126 yy Car. 885 Hough v. Harvey, 71 Ill. Mougaten v. Kendall, 7 Aten (Mass.) aes of Mercy v. Davidson, 90 Tex. 271 12. 280 4 Houston v. Houston, 3 McCord (S. : Car.) 491 Hovely v. Herrick, 152 Wis. 11 Hovey v. Chase, 52 Maine 304 v. Walbank, 100 Cal. 192 | Howard v. American Peace Soc., 49 7,419, M. (D. 296, Maine 288 v. Carpenter, 11 Md. 259 vy. Carusi, MacArthur & C.) 260 . Carusi, 109 U. S. 725 .» Howard, 30 Ala. 391 + Howard, 19 Conn. 313 . Hunter, 115 Ga. 357 . Moot, 64 N. Y. 262 v. Trustees, 88 Md. 292 Howard’s Estate, In re, 22 Cal. 395 ass Howarth v. Mills, L. R. 2 Eq. 389 Howe v. Bemis, 2 ele (Mase) 205 v. Day, 58 N. H. Gregg, 52 S. eae 53 236, Vy v. Hodge, 152 Ill. 252 v. Howe, 152 Ill, 252 v. Watson, 179 Mass. 30 v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 45 Howell v. Ackerolah, 89 Ky. 22 Howe’s Appeal, 126 Pa. St. 233 Howland v. Howland, 11 Gray (Mass.) 469 3 lili TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.j Howland v. Howland, ae Mass. 222 208 v. Slade, 155 Mass. 415 179, 192, 310 Howze v. Davis, 76 Ala. 381 281 ooh Fae 393 Hoysradt v. Kingman, p, a V3 528 Hoyt v. Hoyt, 69 N. H. 320 v. Hoyt, 77 Vt. 244 355 v. Jaques, 129 Mass. 286 379 Hubbard 1 Hubbard, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 56 v. Hubbard, 198 Til. 621 156 v. Hubbard, 8 N. Y, 196 454 Vv. Hubbard, 7 Ore, 42 63 v. Lloyd, 6 Cush. (60 Mass.) 523 192 ve Worcester Art Museum, 179 Fed. v. Wigreester Art Museum, 194 Mass. Huber v. Donoghue, 49 N. J. Eq. 125 358 sa aee Estate, In re, 181 Pa. St. sek Hackabee v. Swoope, 20 Ala, 491 35, 281 Hudson v. Gray, 58 Miss. 882 308 v. Hudson, 87 Ga. 678 33 Vv. Hudson; 160 Ky. 432 50 v. Hughan, 56 Kans. 152 83, 84, 527, 534 Huff v. Huff, 41 Ga, 696 449 Huggins v. ‘Huggins, a ae 66 433 Huggins, 72 Ga. 195 Hughes v. Allen, 31 Ge, 7783 308, 313 v. Bent, 118 Ky. 6 152, 231 v. Boone, 81 N. Car, ou 520 v. Burriss, 85 Mo. 520 v. Fitzgerald, 78 ee 4 338, 339 v. Hughes, 31 Ala. 519 533 v. Hughes, 37 Ind. 183 467 v. Hughes, 118 Ky. 751 1207 v. Hughes, 14 La. Ann. 85 48 v. Knowlton, 37 Conn. 429 169 v. Nicklas, 70 Md. 484 232 v. Tabb, 78 Va. 313 398 Hughes, In re, 61 Misc. (N. Y.) 207 Hughey v. Sidwell, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) Hioptley v. Lanier, 86 Ga. 636 6 Huie v. McConnell, 47 N. Car. 455 448 Huling v. Fenner, 9 R. 1.410 181, 366, Aol v. Holmes, 78 Conn. 362 286 Hull, 117 Iowa is 451 - Hull? 16 Ohio C. 236 v. Hull, 2 Strob, Eq. cg “Cae 174 106 Hull, In re, 97 App. Div. (N. Y.) 265 231 Hull's Will, In re, 117 Iowa 938° 449 Humble v. Bowman, 47 os J. Ch. ee 374 Humes v. st Serge. & R (Pa.) 4 66 v. Wood, 8 Pick, (Mass.) 478 137 Humphries v. Settlemeyer, 91 S. Car. 389 106 Hunt v. Booth, 1 Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 215 101 v. Evans, 134 Ill. 496 152 v. Fowler, 121 Ill. 269 870 v. Hawes, 181 Ill. 343 296 v. Hayes, 19 Ohio C. C. 151 322 v. Hunt, 4 Gray io 190 151 ve Hunt, 11 New 339 v. Hunt, 4N. a 150 v. Smith, 58 N. He ae Hunter v. Bryant 2 Witat Soy. S.) 32 22 v. Bryson, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 483 2 85 v. Hunter, 17 Barb. Y.) 325 v. Hunter, 58 S. Car. 382 355 v. Stembridge, 12 Ga, 192 339 Huntress v. Place, 137 Mass. 409 177 Hunt’s Estate, In re, 133 Pa. St. 260 193 Hunt’s Will, "In re, 122 Wis. 460 533 Hurley v. Hewett, 89 Maine 100 402 v. Rosensteel, 104 Md, 262 194 ae s Estate, In re, 13 Phila. (Fa) 276 Hurry v. Hurry, L. R. 10 pe 346 32 Hurst v. Beach, 5 Madd. 351 141 v. Davidson, 116 Ky. 351 394 Hurt v. Brooks, 89 Vane 496 241 Huse v. Den, 85 St ae 380 Huss, In re, 126 N. 44 Huston v. Read, 32 N. YF A 591 231, 232 Huston’s Estate, In re, 163 Cal. 166 84 Hutcheson v. Hodnett, 115 Ga. 990 378 Hutchins v. State Bank, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 421 0. Hutchinson v. Maxwell, 100 Va. 169 356 Hutchinson’s Appeal, 34 Conn. 300 308 Hutson ‘v. Sawyer, 104 N. Car. 1 523 Hyde v. Heller, 10 Wash: 586 60 . Hyde, Prec. Ch. i18 ae Li Rainey, 233 Pa. Hylton v. Hylton, 1 ee (Va.) 161 407 I Tasigi v. panel 161 wane 75 380 Ide v. Ide, 5 Masa. 5 368 Ihmes’ Tei In ons "iss, Iowa 20 78 Thre, In re, 162 Pa. St. 195 limas v. Neidt, 101 ee 348 286 Illinois Land &c. Co. v. Bonner, 75 Il. 315 258 Ingails? Will, In re, 148 Ill. 287 499 Inge v. Johnston, 110 Ala. 650 486 v. Jones, 109 Ala. 175 192 Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 77 Conn. 408 829 Ingersoll’s Appeal, In re, 86 Pa. St. aor 2 Ingersoll’s Estate, In re, 3 Pa. Dist. ; 399 374 Ingilby v. pears: at Beav. 585 55 Inglis v. McCook, J. Eq. 27 173 Ingraham v. ioe 169 Ill, 432 192, 271, ai G83 346, 372 v. Meade, 3 Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 32” 374 Ingram v. Ingram, 2 Atk. Oe 373 International Tr. Co. v. ‘Anthony, 45 Colo. 474 446 Towa Loan &c. Co. v. Holderbaum, 86 Iowa 1 9 Irvine _v. Irvine, 12 Ky. L. 827 293, ae v. Newlin, 63 Miss. oo v. Putnam, 28 rs i 465 231 Irvine, In_re, 206 Pa. 442 Irving v. Bruen, 110 ae Div. (N. Y.) ee } Irwin v. Teller, 188 N. Y. 25 322 | Irwin’s Appeal, In re, 33 Conn. 128 506 Isaac v. Halderman, 76 Nebr. 823 443 Isner v. Kelley, 51 W. Va. 82 295 Ison v. Hialeomy, 136 Ky. 523 2 Israel v. Wolf, 100 Ga. 339 491 Ives v. Allyn, 12 Vt. 589 506 Ivin’s Appeal, 106 = St. 176 169 Izard v. Middleton, 1 Desaus. Eq. (S. Car.) 116 J Jack v. Hooker, 71 Kans, 652 Jackman’s Will, In ts 26 Wis. 104 491, sto Jacks v. Henderson, i Desaus. Eq. (S. Car.) 543 26 State, 44 Ark. 61 398 Jackson v. Alson, 67 Conn. 249 195, 309 v. Bevins, 74 Conn. 96 392 TABLE OF CASES lix [References are to Sections.] Jackson v. Bu ohns, Bull, 10 Joh (N. Y.) 1 234 v. Everett (Tenn.), 58 S. w. 3340 379 v. Jackson, 6 Dana (Ky.) 257 150 v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374 173 Vv. + Jackson, 4 Mo, 210 504 ackson, 56 S. Car. 346 243 v. Littell, 213 Mo. 589 234 Ve err. onns. M ill, 6 Joh CN. Y.) 185 234 ve ee 14 Per etees 539 271 v. Rowell, 150 v. Tozer, ei o2 ‘ae 223 528 v. Twenty-Third St. R. Co., 88 N. ¥, 320 3 v. Wells, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 222 234 Jackson’s Succession, 47 La. Ann. 1089 183 Jackson’s In re, 20 N. Y. S. 380 294 Jacobs_v. Bradlens 36 Conn, 369 188 v. Tee oP cae 27 #9 399 v. itney, ass. 4 49 Jacoway v. Hall, 67 Ark. 340 14 Jacquat v. Bachman 2 Te 2 Pp 169 239 ames v. Dean, 11 a 56 ames’ Estate, In re, 5 En — 396 te v. McWhorter, 7 Houst. (Del.) 2 Janes v. Williams, 31 Ark. 175 486, 498, 508, 523 Jaques v. Horton, 76 a 238 487; 506 Jarboe v. Hey, 122 Mo. 294 Jarrett v. Johnson, 216 in 212 415 Jasper v. Jasper, 17 Ore. 590 347, 411 Jastram v. McAuslan, 26 R. I. 320 341 Jagneey vs Thorne, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. 50 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324 269 Jeffreys v. Alston, 2 Law Repository (N. Car.) 634 525 Jenkins v. Fowler, 63 a H. 244 215 v. Horwitz, 92. Md. 293 v. Jenkins, 64 N. H. S67 105 v. Merritt, 17 Fla. 304 280 v. Shields, 47 Iowa 708 399 Jenkins’ Will, In re, 43 Wis. 610 443) Jennings v. Jennings, 21 Ohio St. 56 48, 49 Jeremy’s Estate, In re, 178 Pa. St. 477 034 Jewett me Sua 83 App. Div. (N. ) 419 vw Schmidt, 39 Misc. (N. Y.) 502 413 Jobe. vw Dillard, 104 Tenn. 658 351 Jocelyn v. Nott, 44 Conn. 55 271 John, In re, 30 Ore. 494 488 John o preteen Home, In re, 162 Pa. St. 2 271 Johnes 2 Beers, 57 Conn. 295 257 v. Jackson, 67 Conn. 81 486, 491 Johns v. Doe, 33 Md. 515 57 v. Hodges, 62. Md. 525 485 v. Johns, 23 Ga. 31 416 John’s Estate, In re, 11 Phil. (Pa.) 144 177 Johns Hopkins University v. Pinckney, 55 Md. 365 462, 463 Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250 492 v. Brasington, 156 N. Y. 181 169 v. Buck, 220 Ill, 226 351 ve Childs, 61 Conn. 66 205 v. Clarkson, 3 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 305 152 v. Delome L. &c. Co., 77 Miss. 15 234, 446 v. Edmond, 65 Conn. 492 171 v. Gooch, i16 N. Car. 64 292 ve Holifield, 82 Ala, 123 308, 313 v. Home for Aged Men, 152 Mass. 39 138, 324 v. Hubbell, 10 N. J, iu 332 33 Vv. Johnson, 98 Iil. 796 v. Johnson, 187 Ill. oe 499 Johnson v. Johnson, 106 Ind, 475 451 v. Jobnsen, 128 Ind. 93 157 v. Johnson, 1 Tenn. Ch. 621 172 v. Lawrence, 95 N. Y. 154 422 v. Morton, 10 Pa. St. 245 284 v. Poulson, 32 N. J. Eq. 390 324 v. Stevens, 95 Ky. 128 526 v. Terry, 139 Ala. 614 253 v. Warren, 74 Mich. 491 282 ve Washington L. &c. Co., 33 App. D 242 250 Washington L. &c. Co. 224 U. S. 224 52 v. Webber, 65-Conn. 501 172, 257, 394 v. White, 76 Kans. 159 57, 206 v. Whiton, 159 Mass. 424 zn Johnson, In re, 23 R. I, 111 Johnson's Estate, In re, 134 Cal. 662 ie Jeunes Estate, In re, 170 Pa. St. nie Johnson’s Succession, 24 La, Ann. 125 396 Johnson’s Will, In re, 40 Conn. 587 v. 464, 505 Johnston v. Stassock, 2 Ala. 7" 22, 503 v. Hughes, 187 N. Y. 446 187 v. Johnston, 1 Phila, (Pa.) 447 467 v. Morrow, 28 N. J. Eq. a 421 Jobastone v. Harrowby, 1 DeG. * ie Jehastans 's Estate, In re, 141 Iowa 109 189 Johnston’s Estate, In re, 185 Pa. St. 179 265, 268 John’s Will, In re, 30 Ore. 4 » 188, 271 Jones v. Caldwell, 97 Pa. St. a "1134 v. Casler, 139 "Ind. 382 504 v. Chandler, 40 Ind. 588 7 v. Deyer, 16 Ala, 221 3 v. Doe, 2 Ill. 276 281 v. Grieser, 238 Ill. 183 448 v. Habersham, 63 Ga. 146 107, 444, 448 v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174 44, 77, vy 100, 281 v. Hand, 78 App. Div. (N.Y 56° 240 v. Hartley, 2 Whart. (Pa.) ibs 75 v. Hunt, 96 Tenn. 369 193 Vv. Hunter, 6 Rob. (La.) 235 49 v. Huntley, 156 N. Car. 410 55 v. Jones, 93 Ky. 532 355 v. Jones, 223 Mo. 424 go 282, 343 Vv. Jones, 13 N. J. Eq. 236 245 v. Larrabee, 47 Maine 474 448 v. Lloyd, 33 Ohio St. 572 169 v. Loveless, 99 Ind. 317 5 v. McPhillips, 82 Ala. 102 519 v. Minogue, 29 Ark. 637 96 v. Moore, 96 Ky, 273 351 v. Myatt, 153 N. Car. 225 194, 210 v. Nicolay, 2 Rob. (Eccl.) 288 488 v. Oliver, 38 N. Car. 369 170 v. Paschall, 36 N. Car. 430 195 v. Port Huron E. &c. Co, 71 Il, 502 296 v. Quattlebaum, 31 S. Car. 606 212 v. Rees, 6 Penne. (Del.) 504 244, 961 v. Richardson, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 247, 443 v. Robinson,’ 17 Ohio St. 171 50 us Tebbetts, 57 Maine 572 448 Webb, 5 Del. Ch. 132 286 ones In re, 103 N. Y. 621 345 Jones’ Appeal, In rh a Conn. 60 191, 192 Jones’ Estate, In re, 211 Pa. 364 172, 468 Jones Estate, In ee ‘8 Phila. (Pa.) aes oe v. Abney, 97 Tex. 296 33 v. James Dunn & pias Loan &c. o., 13 Ont. 2 294 Ix TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.} Jordan v. Miller, 47 Ga. 346 v. Roach, 32 Miss. 481 v. Thornton, 7 Ga. 517 Jossey v. Brown, 119 Ga. 758 Jost v. Jost, 1 Mackey (D. C.) 487 coueeeays In re, 15 App. Div. (N. Y.) 7 Jourolmon v. Massengil, 86 Tenn. et Judevine v. Judevine, 61 Vt. 587 oF Justus’ Succession, 45 La, Ann. 190 232, K Kalbach v. Clark, 133 Iowa 215 195, Karrick vy. Pratt, 4 Greene (Iowa) 144 Rarstens v. Karstens, 29 App. Div. Me = 29 Kauffman v. Gries, 141 Cal. 295 232, Kaufman v. Caughman, 49 S. Car. 159 Kaufman’s Estate,‘In re, 117 Cal. 288 Kavanaugh’s Will, In re, 125 N. Y. 418 Kean v. Hoffecker, 2 Harr. (Del.) 103 Kearney v. Brooklyn Industrial School ae 1 Redf. Surr. (N. Y.) 292 412 v. St. Paul &c. Missionary nee 10 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 2 100 Keebler v. Shute, 183 Pa. St. aes 534 Keefe v. Keefe, 19 Cal. App. 310 33 ee an v. Geraghty, 101 He 26 105 eler v. Keeler, 39 Vt. 293 = Laver, 73 sane 383 65 Keep, In_re, 17 N. St. 470 Keim v. Lindley, 54 N j. EL er 8 373 Keister v. Keister, 178 Ill. 103 516 Keith v. Copeland, 138 Mass. 303 347 Vv. Rakae 58 Kans, 732 41, 49 v. Proctor, 114 Ala. 676 89 v. Raglan, 1 Coldw. a : 525 Kelby, In re, Fed. Cas. No. 1830 22. Keleman, In re, 126 N. Y. 73 187 Keller v. Gaylor, 40 Conn. 348 61, 221 Kellerman’s aaa In re, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 5 177 Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433 169 Kelley_v. Devin Ore. 211 33 v. Meins, 135 Mass. 331 231, 237, 296 v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288 81 v. Welborn, 110 Ga. 540 \ 77, 78, 100 Kellogg v. Ridgely, 161 Ind. 110 504 Kellum’s Will, In re, 52 N. Y. 517 528 Kelly v. Johnson, 34 Mo. 400 62 v. Moore, 22 App. C.9 447, 498 v. Nichols, 17 R. I. 306 273 v. Nichols, 18 R. I. 62 308 v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 584 32, - as 138, a v. Stevenson, 85 Minn. Kelso v. Cuming, 1 Redf. (x 4) 392 284 Repneey v. Maginnis, 2 Mich. N. P, 240 49 Kenaday v. Sinnot, 179 U. S. 606 140, 434 Kendall v. Clapp, 163 Mass. 69 234 v. Kendall, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 217 440 v. Kendall, 4 Russ. 216 Keniston v. Adams, 80 Maine 290 306, 311, 490 v. Mayhew, 169 Mass. 166 241 Kennard v. Kennard, 63 N. H. 303 490 Kennedy v. Alexander, 21 App. D. C. 288 424 Kennedy’s Estate, In re, 190 Pa. St. 79 253 Kennedy’s Will, In re, 167 N. Y. 163 504 Kennett v. Kidd, 87 Kans. 652 99 Kenney v. Parks, 125 Cal. 146 Kent v. Kent, 106 Va. 199 v. Morrison, 153 Mass, 137 3 Kent’s Estate, in re, 161 Cal. 142 ate ; Kenworthy v. Williams, 5 Ind. 375 Kenyon v. Saunders, ig R. I. 590 ieeeeh In re, 112 App. Div. (N. ce 414 ? Kern v. Kern, 154 Ind. 29 Kernan’s Succession, In re, 52 i Ann. 48 Kerr v. Leuahertzs 59 How. Pr. a. v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 659 v. White, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 161 Kerrigan - Conelly (N. J. Eq.) 46 Atl o v. Tabb_(N. J.), 39 Atl. 701 Kerry v. Derrick, Cro. Jac. 104 Kessler v. Kessler, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. 522 Ketchum v. Corse, 65 Conn. 85 v. Walsworth, 5 Wis. ie Kettlewell, In re, 98 L. (N. 8.) 23 Kettry v. Thumma, 9 ind, “App . 498 Key v. Holloway, 7 Baxt. (Tenn. 575 v. Weathersbee, 43 S. Cae 414 107, Kiah v. Grenier, 56 N. Y. 220 Kidd v. Bates, 120 Ala. 79 Kidwell v. Ketler, 146 Cal. 12 Kiesenwetter v. Kress, 24 Ky. L. 1239 Kilborn’s Estate, In re, 158 Cal. 593 Kilgore v. Kilgore, 127 Ind. 276 a gm 284, Kilgore, Ex parte, 120 Ind. Killingsworth v. Portland Trust Co., 18 Ore. 351 Kilpatrick v. Barron, 125 m5 Y. 751 v. Johnson, 15 N.Y. Kimball v. Blanchard, Yor ise 383 ve. ohappels 27 Abb. N. Cas. (NL Y.) v. Crocker, 53 Maine 263 Vv. Ellison,’ 128 Mass. 41 v. Story, 108 Mass. 382 181, Kimball’s Will, In re, 20 R. i at? 217° Kimberly, In re, 150 N. Y. Hrepenly's Appeal, In re, 768 Conn. Kimble v. White, 50 N. J. Eq. 28 King v. Beck, 15 Ohio 559 169, v. Cole, 6 R. I. 584 v. Frick, 135 Pa. St. 575 v. King, 168 Ill. 273 v. Merritt, 67 Mich. 194 ve Savage, 121 Mass. 303 v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76 Kingman v. "Harmon, 131 Ill. 171 Kingsbury v. Bazeley, 75 N. H. 13 ve Beaneeets 113 App. Div. (N. Y.) Kinkele v. Wilson, 151 N. Y. 269 Kinne v. Phares, 79 Kans. 366 Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 Ill. 449 241, 286, v. Kinney, 86 Ky. 610 Kiracofe v. Kiracofe, 93 “Va. 591 Kirby v. Kirby, 40 Ala, 492 Kirkpatrick v. Jenkins, 96 Tenn. 85 Kirkpatrick, In re, 22 N. J. Eq. 463 Kirkwood v. Gordon, 7 Rich. (S. Car.) 390, 474 Kirsher v. Kirsher, 120 Iowa 337 Kischman v. Scott, 166 Mo. 214 Kitchell v. Burgwin, 21 Ill. 40 v. Young, 46 N. J. Eq. 506 Klabunde v. Casper, 139 Wis. Klein, In re, 35 Mont. 185 497, 491 107, 182, TABLE OF CASES Ixi [References are to Sections.] Klock v. Stevens, 20 Misc. (N. Y.) 383 a Klumpert v. Vrieland, 142 Iowa 434 869 Klussman v. Wessling, 238 Ill. 568 33 Knapen’s Will, In re, 75 Vt. 146 465 Knauss’ Estate, In re, 148 Pa. St. 265 291 Knefler v. Shreve, 78 Ky. 297 356 Knight v. Hollings, 73 N. H. 495 493, 523, 524 v. Knight, 2 Sim. & Stu. 490 253 ve Mahoney, 152 Mass. 523 288 v. Tripp, 121 Cal. 674 3 Knorr v. Millard, 57 Mich. 265 193 Knost v. Knost, 229 Mo. 170 288 Knowles v. Knowles, 132 a 806 167 Knox v. Barker, 8 N. Dak. 272 49, 244 = Jones, 47 ’N. Y. 389° 47 ~» Knox, 95 Ala. 495 530 x Paull, 95 Ala. 505 486, “se 515 Kohler’s Estate, In re, 79 Cal. 313 532 Kohne’s ia In re, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 3 49 Kohtz v. Eidred, 208 Ill. 60 Kondolf v. Britton, 160 App. Div. (N. Y.) 381 Kopmier’s Will, In re, 113 Wis. 233 9, 50, 941 Koppikus, In re, 1 Cal. App. 84 14 Kort v. Gerichs’ 145 Ind. 134 231 Karki 2 Cutler, 26 Conn. 4 211, 353, Kornegay v. Morris, 122 N. Car. 199°” 286 Kramer v. Kramer, 201 Fed. 248 138, 140 v. Lyle, 197 Fed. 618 61 v. Weinert, 81 Ala. 414 84 Krause v. Klucken, 135 Mass. 482 55, 368 Krechter v. Grofe, 166 Mo. 385 212 Kuhn’s Appeal, In re, 4 Wash. 534 397 Kultz v. Jaeger, 29 App. D. C. 300 500, 527 Kumpe v. Coons, 63 Ala. 448 499, 516 Kundinger v. Kundinger, 150 Mich, 636 33 Kunkler’s Will, In re, 147 N. Y¥. S 1094 44 Hunlemat 's Estate, In re, 136 Pa. St. Kurtz v. Saylor, 20 Pa. St. 205 50 . Kurtz’s Estate, In re, 145 Pa, St 637, 176 L Lacey v. Collins, 134 (ori 583 1200 v. Dobbs, 63 N. J. Eq. 325 442 v. Floyd, 99 Tex. 112 306 Lackey’s Baths In re, 4 Redf. (N. Y. Surr.) 95 14 Ladd v. Harvey, 21 N. H. 514 210 v. Ladd, 125 Ala. 135 417 Lafon v. ‘Gravier, 1 Mart. (N. S.) (La.) 243 394 Lafoy v. Campbell, 42 N. J. Eq. 34 286 La Grange County v. Ropers 55 Ind. 297 165 Laing v. Barbour, 119 Mass. 523 214 Laird v. Vila, 93 Minn. i 342 Laird’s Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 193 Laisure v. Richards, 56 Tnd> hes. 301 195 Lake v. Hood, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 32 486 Lamar v. McLaren, 107 Ga. 591 287 v. Simpson, 1 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 71 352° Lamb v. Girtman, 33 Ga. 289 450 v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 456 532, 533 v. Lamb, 131 N. Y. 227 143 v. Lynch, 56 Nebr. 135 268 Lambe v. Drayton, 182 Ill. 110 241 v. Eames, L. R. 6 Ch. 597 374 Lambert v. Harvey, 100 Til. 338 372 Lambert v. Paine, 3 Cranch (U. “ae 97 Lamberton v. Pereles, 87 Wis. 348 Lamb’s Estate v. Hall, 122 Mich. 239 485 Lampert v. Haydel, 96 Mo. 439 296, 348, 356 Taneyabire v. Lancashire, 2 Phil. Ch. Lancaster v. Lancaster, 187 Ill. 540 192, 733 Land v. Otley, 4 Rand. Ave, 213 59 Lander v. Lander, 217 I 212 Landon v. Moore, 45 ek 7402 231 Landram v. Jordan, 203 U. S. 56 359 Landry v. Tomatis, 32 La. Ann. 113 454 Landry’s Succession, 114 La. 829 108 Lane v. Parise 78 App. Div. (N. ) 60 402 v. Eaton, 69 Minn. 141 186, 271, 881 ve Ewing, 31 Mo. 75 4 v. Hill, 68 N. H. 275 462 v. Utz, 130 Ind. 235 ae Lane’s Appeal, 57 Conn. 182 50, Lang v. Everling, “ Misc. a, Y.) 530 335 Langdon v. Astor, N. 433, oe v. Blackburn, 109 Cal. a v. Ingram, 28 Ind. 360 Lange v. Dammier, 119 tne, 567 524, 235 v. Wiegand, 125 Mich, 647 Tanuel's Appeal, 154 Pa. St. 188 a3 Langford v. Pitt, 2.P. Wms. 629- 60 Langford’s Estate, In re, 108 Cal, oe 30, 532 Langley v. Langley, ¥ La. 114 453 Vv. Langley, 18 R. I. 618 Langley’s Estate, In Z 140 Cal. oe 17, 518 Lanius v. eines 100 Tex. 550 45, 49 penning v. Cole, 6 N. J. Eq. 102 56 Gay, 70 Kans. 353 519 tanner v. Buck, 2 Diets, a Sm, 484 312 v. Despard, 1 Cal. 214 Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mice ote 468 v. Lansing, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 182 422 Lantz v. Trusler, 37 Pa. St. 482 258 Larmon v. Knight, 140 Ill. 232 342 Larned v. Bridge, 17 Pick. Cisse) 339 366 Larsen v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 300 368 Larson v. How, 71 Minn. 250 491, 509 v. Reynolds, 13 Iowa 579 62 Larson’s Estate, In re, 71 Minn. 250 493 Lash v. Lash, 209 Ill. 595 134 Lasher_v. McDermott, 144 App. Div. (N. ¥.) 8 33 Latham v. Set 25 Nebr. 535 530 Lathorp v. Merrill, 207 Mass. 6 296 Lataop: 's Estate, In re (Cal.), 131 Pac. Laughlin v. Page, 108 Maine 307 59 v. Norcross, 97 Maine 33 56, 61, 221 Laughton v. Atkins, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 535 462, 488 Lauman v. Foster, 157 Iowa 275 222 Lausman v. Drahos, 12 Nebr. 102 231 Lavery v. Egan, 143 Mass. 389 169 Lavigne v. Ligue des Patriotes, 178 Mass. 25 181 Law v. Douglas, ae Tose. 606 281 v. Law, 83 Ala. 464 Law Guarantee & Test Co. v. Jones, 103 Tenn. 245 365, oor Lawrence v. Cooke, 104 N. Y v. Elliott, 3 Redf. Surr. tie ¥) 235 7 v. Hebbard, 1 Bradf. Surr. (N. Y.) 252 0, 176 v. Phillips, 186 Mass. 320 913 v. Smith, 163 Ill. 149 269 Lawrence’s ‘Appeal, 49 Conn. 411 48 Lawrence’s Estate, In re, 136 Pa. St. 354 266, 376 * Ixii e Lawton v. Event Sav. Bank, 160 ies Mass, 154 2 v. Lawton, 7 Ohio Dec. 493 370 Lawyer v. Smith, 8 Mich. 411 505 Layman’s Will, Tn re, 40 ce att 526 Laytin v. Davidson, 95 N. 422 Layton v. Jacobs, 5 Penn. toa) 71 523 Lazier v. Lazier, 35 ee Va. 567 394 Leach v. Burr, 188 U. S. 510 493 Leacroft v. Maynard, “3 Bro. Ch. 233 142 Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363 177, v. Watson, 58 Conn. 332 398 Learned’s Estate, In re, 70 Cal. 140 50 Leathers v. Greenacre, 53 Maine 561 20, 453 Leaver v. Gauss, 66 Iowa 314 5 Leavitt v. Beirne, 21 Conn. 1 292, 356 Le Breton v. Cook, 107 Cal. 416 243 Ledebuh: if is Wisconsin Trust Co., 112 Wis. 295 Lee v.. Baia, 132 N. Car. 755 176, 195 ve 41 Grat. (Va.). 182 434 v. Tose 45 Ind. App. 645 463 v. Lee, 88 Va. 805 320 ve MeFarland, 19 Tex. Civ. App. - v. O’Dennell, 95 Md. 538 357, 943 v. Smith, 84 Va. 289 395 SN, Templeton, 73 Ind, 3 ‘519 Lee’s Will, In_re, 46 N. TLE 193 87 Leffingwell v. Bentley, 74 Ill. on 292 194 Leggett v. Hunter, 19 a My 445 381 v. Stevens, 183 N 194 Legwin v. McRee, we a a 252 Lehman v. Lindenmeyer, 48 Colo, 5 €55 - Lehnhoff v. Theine, 184 Mo. 346 167 Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923 348, 356 Leitch v. Wells, 48 N. Y. 585 421 Leland v. Adams, 9 Gray Cas 171 234 v. Hayden, 102 Mass, 542 345 Lemen v. McComas, 63 Md. 153 358 Lemmons v. Reynolds, 170 Mo. 227 240, 306 Lennen v. Craig, 95 Ind. 167 231 Lennig’s Estate, In re, 154 Pa. St. 209 187 Lennon’s Estate, In re, 152 Cal. 327 527 Lenz v. Sens, 27 Tex. Civ. “apP- 442 308 Leonard v. Burr, 18 N. Ys. 271 v. Burtle, 226 Ill, 422 532 Leonard, Ex parte, 39 S. Car. 518 443 Leo-Wolf, In re, 25 Me (N. Y.) 469 44 Lepps -v. Lee, 92 Ky. 253 v. Lee (Ky.), 16. 's ow. 346 258 Lester v. Kirtley, 83 Ark. 554 392 v. Stephens, 113 Ga. 495 352 Leveaga’s Estate, In re, 119 Cal. 651 142 Levengston’ 4 gue In re, 158 App. Div. (N. Y.) 6 25, 451 Leverett _v. mivetiy 208 Mass. 241 367 Levi v. Bergman, 94 ae ane 349 Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 352 Levy’s Estate, In re, 161 Pa. St. 189 215 Lewis v. Ames, 44 Tex. 319 521 v. Barkley, 91 Nebr. ae, 396 v. Bryce, 187 Pa. St. 245 v. Fisher, 2 Yeates a) 196 178 v. Harrower, 197 Ill. 243 v. Howe, 174 N. Y. 340° 250° Ve Lewis, 5 La. 387 24 v. Luckett, on App. D. C. 188 495 v. Lusk, 35 Miss, 401 313 v. Maddocks, 8 Ves. Jr. 150 33 x Scofield, 26 Conn. 452 28, 502 Smith, 03 N. Car. 145 64 dig Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 133 205 Lewis’ Estate, In re, 32 La. Ann. 385 41 Lewishon v. Henry, 179 N. Y. 352 159, 255 TABLE CF CASES [References are to Sections.] Leyte v. Thompson, 36 L, T. (N. 9 238 Ls Brick Co. v. Thornton, 141 7° 367 Eticenislen L. R. (1894) 1 a pee 382 L’Hommedieu, In re, 138 Fed. 6 37 351 ? L’Hote v. Roca, 102 Miss, 121 Lich v. Lich, 158 Mo. App: 400 174 Lichter vy. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481 176 Liggat v. Hart, 23 Mo. 127 206 Likefield v. Likefield, 82 Ky. 589 26 Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477 496 Lincoln v. Lincoln, 107 Mass. 590 v. Perry, 149 Mass. 368 41, 169 Lincoln Trust Co., In re, 78 Misc. N. Y.) 325 255 Lindemann Me poseeey (Tex. Civ. App.) 4 107 S. W. Lindley v. O'Reilly, 50 N. j. L. ee 470 Lindo v. Murray, 91 Hun (N. Y.) Frit 372 Lindsay v. Wilson, 103 Md. 252 210 v. Zanoni, 6 Ohio C. C. 474 394 Lindsay, Ex parte, 2 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 204 501 Lindsey v. Lindsey, 45 Ind. 552 293. v. Stephens, 229 Mo. 600 84, 445 Lindsley v. Dodd, 53 N. a Eq. 69 414 Lines v. Darden, °5 Fla, 338, *’a9, 340, 372, 378 v: Lines, 142 Pa, St Link v. Link, 90 N. Car. 1935 337 Linney v. Peloquin, 35 Tex. 29 103 tanger v. Strang (Iowa), 126 N. W. ais Linton v. Laycock, 33 Ohio St. a 252 Lippincott v. Lippincott, 19 N. J. . “wo. #9 6g 6 v. Ridgway, 10 N. qe a 164 366 v. Wikoff, 54 N. Eq. 107 448 Lipps v. Panko, 93 Nevs® 469 519 Lisk v. Sherman, 25 age foe Y.) 433 33 Lisle v. Tribble, 92 Ky. 3 183 Lissauer’s Will, In re, 5 nN. Y. S. 260 497 Little v. Bennett, 58 N. Car. 156 aot v. Giles, 25 Nebr. 313 Livermore v. Somers (N. J. Ea.), 16° 513 232 Livingston v. Gordon, 84 N. Y. 136 295, 866 Livingston’s Appeal, 63 Conn, 68 526, 527 Lloyd i Tey 173 Mass. ae 355 v. Lloyd, 3 Kay & & Johns, 2 253 v. Lioyd, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 255 14 Lockard v. Ste henson, 120 Ala. 641 Lockart v. orthington, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 318 368 Locke v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 140 N. Y. 135 Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162 242, v. McCommon, 90 Tex. 234 283 Loeb v. Struck, 42S. W. 401 256 Loebenthal v. Raleigh, 36 N. J. Eq. 169 379 Lofton v. Murchison, 80 Ga. 321 238, 245 Logan _v. Brunson, 36 S. Car. 7 176, 310 v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44 65 Logan, In re, 131 N. Y. 456 191 Lombard v. Witbeck, 173 Ill. 396 333 Long v. Aldred, 3 Add. Eccl. 48 475 v. Rodman, 58 Ind. 58 418 v. Zook, 13 Pa. St. 400 50 Leones Estate, In re, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 176 Loomis v. Loomis, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 624 323 Loosemore v. Smith, 12 Nebr. 343 491 Loosing v. Loosing, 85 Nebr. 66 237 TABLE OF CASES Ixiii [References are to Sections.] Lopez’s Succession, 33 La. Ann. 368 496 Lord v. Bourne, 63 Maine 368 169, 241 v. Hough, 37 Cal. 657 412 v. Lord, . H.7 448 Lorieux v. Keller, 5 5, Loves 196 103 Loring v. Arnold, 15 R 428 64 v. Oakey, 98 Mass. 267 489 v. Wilson, 174 Mass. 132 374, 376 Lorton v. Woodward, 5 Del. Ch. 505 222 Lorts v. Wash, 175 Mo. 487 10, 498, 533 Losey v. Stanley, 147 N. Y. 560 257 Loud v. Winchester, 52 Mich. 74 418 Lougheed v. Dykeman’s Baptist Church, 129 N. Y. 211 Logpsbury v. Burial Assn., 170 Mich, ay Lovass’ Estate, In re, 92 Wis. 616 286 Love v. Blauw, 61 Kans. a v. Johnston, 12 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 355 478 Lovell v. Quitman, 88 N. Y. 377 452, 464 Loveren v. Donaldson, 69 N. H. 639 309 v. Lamphrey, 22 N. HL. 434 50, 56, 57, 206 Lovering v. Lovering, 129 Mass. 97 273 v. Worthington, 106 Mass. 86 268, 273 Lowe v. Cloud, 45 Ga. 481 293 Loyless v. Blackshear, 43 Ga. 327 245 Lucas v. Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 436 488 v. Goff, 33 Miss. 629 22, 454 ve Lockhart, 10 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 466 355 v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41 41 Luce v. Dunham, 69 N. Y. 36 170 Ludington v. Patton, 111 Wis. 208 415 Ludlow v. Ludlow, 36 N. J. Eq. 597 aa6 ug pbert v. Brockmeyer, 158 Mo. App. i Luett v. Lueft, 129 Wis. 534 381, 1227 “Lumber Co. v. Files, 104 Ark. 600 41 Lumpkin v. Rodgers, 155 Ind. 285 1189 Lundy v. Lundy, 24 Can. Sup. Ct. 650 109 Lurie v. Radnitzer, 166 Ill. 609 447 Lusby v. Cobb, 80 Miss. 715 171 Luscomb’s Will, In re, 109 Wis. ti — Lushington v. Sewell, 1 Aes & M. 169 60 Lusk v. Lewis, 32 Miss. 297 359 Luther v. Luther, 122 Ill. 558 525 Lutz, In re, 157 Mo. 439 322 Lyman vy. Parsons, 26 Conn. 493 345 Lynch v. Miller, 54 Iowa 516 521 v. Paraguay, L. R. 2 P. & D. 268 51 Lynch’s Estate, In re, tag Cal. 373 203 Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn, 222 195 v. Fidelity Bank, 128 N. Car. 75 740 v. Industrial School Assn., 127 N. Y. 402 396 v. Lyon, 88 Maine 395 178 v. Ogden, 85 Maine 374 41 Lyons_v. Campbell, 88 Ala. 462 525 v. Van Riper, 26 N. J. Eq. 337 441 Lyon’s Will, In re, 96 Wis. 339 oy ae 499 : Lytle’s Succession, 1 Rob. (La.) 2 “00, 524 M Mabics Will, In re, 5 Misc. (N. Y.) a 9 McAlister v. Burgess, 161 Mass. 269 177 vy. Butterfield, 31 Ind. 433 McAllister v. McAllister, 46 ve. 272 189 v. Tate, 11 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 509 234 a 's Istate, In re, 15 Pa, Dist. re MeAlpine vy. Potter, 126 N. Y. 285 422 McAndrew’s Estate, In re, 206 Pa. 366 509 McAnnulty v. McAnnulty, ne Ill. 26 467 McArthur v. Gordon, 126 N, 597 349 v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340 ‘66. 269, 523 McBeth v. ‘McBeth, 11 Ala. 596 504 McCall v. McCall, 161 Pa. St. 412 295 McCamant v. Nuckolls, 85 Va. 331 375 McCambridge v. Walraven, 88 Md. 378 525 McCan’s Succession, 48 La. Ann. 145 355 McCarn v. Rundall, 111 Iowa 406 464 McCartee v. Orphan Asylum Soc, 9 Cow. (N. 4 McCarthy vy. Provident Sav. Inst., 159 Mass. 527 344 McCartney v. Osburn, 118 Ill. 403 49, 169, 192, 194 McCarty v. Fish, 87 Mich. 48 252, 295 McCauley’s Estate, In re, 138 Cal. 432 100 McCauley’s Estate, In re, ae Cal. 546 100 wea v. Galbraith, 7 Rich. L. (S. can, 52 MoCay v. Clayton, 119 Pa. St. 133 485 McChord v. Caldwell, 96 Ky. 617 394 McClain v. ie 98 Iowa 145 306 McClaskey v. Barr, 54 ped. 781 486 McClellan v. Larchar, 45 N. J. Eq, 17 237 v. Mackenzie, 126 Fed. 701 285 McClench v. Waldron, 204 Mass. 554 195 McClernan v. McClernan, 73 Md. 283 341, 417 McClure v. McClure, i, ve. St. 374” 33 v. Spivey, 123 N. 678 485 ee In re, 16 oe. N. Cas. (N. McCommon v. McCommon, oH Til, 428 63 McConnel v. Smith, 23 Ill. 611 234 McConnell v. McConnell, # Ont. 36 49 are v. Stewart, 169 Ill. 252 McCoon v. All en, 45 a a Eq. 708 526 McCord v. Whitehead, 98 Ca. 381 240 McCormick, In re, 40 App. Div. (N. Y.) 73 349 Mecewn v. Terrell, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 392 MeCoy v. Conrad, 64 Nebr. 150 443 v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183 390 v. Houck (Ind.), 99 N. E. 97 213 McCracken v. McBee, 96 Ark. 251 287 vy. McCracken, 6 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 342 414 oy i McCray, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. ie McCrea v. Yule, 68 N. J. L. 465 34 McCreary v. Robinson, 94 Tex, 221 323 McCroan v. Pope, 17 ‘Ala. 612 354 McCulloch v. Campbell, 49 Ark. 367 526 McCullom v. Mackrell, 13 S. Dak. 262 33 MeGullegh v. Copeland, 40 Ohio St. 3 392 v. Lauman, 38 Wash. 227 215 v. McCullough, 44_N. J. Eq. 313 390 Meculbugy® Estate, In re, Myr. Prob. (Cal.) 76 444 McCune v. Baker, ee Pa. St. 503 232 v. House, 8 Ohio eS 43 McCurdy v. Neall, 42 N. J. Eq. 333 32, 478, 480 McCutchen v. Loggins, 109 Ala. 457 518, 521, 534 McDaniel v. Crosby, 19 Ark. 533 530 vy. Hutcherson, 136 Ky. 412 33 v. Johns, 45 Miss. 633 233 v. Pattison, 98 Cal. 86 491 McDermott v. Hannon, 203 Fed. 1015 522 My Denmeie Estate, In re, 148 Cal. MeDonald v. King, 1 N. J. L. 432 v. McDonald, S42 Ind, 55 408. 370 518, 525 lxiv TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] McDonald v. McMullen, 2 Mill (S. Car.) 91, -64 v. Shaw, 81 Ark, 235 165, 167, 188 v. Shaw, 92 ‘Ark. iz 287 McDonnell v. Farrow, 132 Ala. ne 487, 492 my Jorden 178 U. S. 229 522 McDuitie ~ Montgomery, 128 Fed. 105 339 McElfresh. v. Guard, 32 Ind. 408 450 ee eens Will, Tn re, 18 N. j. Eq. 443 Mera ‘adden v. Hefley, 28 S. Car. 317 136, 138 McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 252 63, 84 McFait’s Appeal, In re, 8 Pa. St. 290 324 McFarland v. McFarland, 177 Ill. 208 234, 235, 123t McFeely v. Moore, 5 Ohio 464 238 McGeath v. Starr, SE Ind. 320 523 Me bhne v. Abbott, L. R. 10 App. Cas. MiCillis v. McGillis, 154 N. Y. 532 251, 254 McGinnis v. Harris, 52 N. Car. 213 169 McGovern v. McGovern, 75 Minn, 314 a 203 MeGovranis Estate, In re, 190 Pa. 375 191, ass, 309 McGowan v. Elroy, 28 App. D. C. 188 469 McGraw v. Miner, 12 Ky. L. fi 236 McGraw’s Estate, In re, 111 N. Y. pa 97 McGraw’s Will, In re, 9 App. Div. a ey) 372 oe 526 McGreevy v. McGrath, 152 Mass. 24 307 McGrews v. McGrews, . 1 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 30 490 McGriff v. Porter, 5 Fla. 373 366 McGuire v. Gallagher, 99 Maine 334 815 Machem v. Machem, 28 Ala. 374 11 McHugh v. McCole, 97 Wis. 166 340 os v. Hockaday, 36 Tex. Civ. 1 14 Meteire v. McConn, 28 Iowa 480 87 v. McIntire, 19 D. C. 482 453 v. McIntire, 162 U. S. 383 we 452, 516 v. McIntire, 192 U. S. 195 McIntire Poor School v. 1 ainesville Canal &c. Co., 9 Ohio at 99 ‘McIntosh v. Suen 45 S. Car. 584 98 v. Moore Tex. Civ. App. 22 84, 464 Metnioae ee In re, 158 Pa. St 99% 464 Metstyre v. McIntyre, 120 we Mack v. Mulcahy, 47 Ind 3 Mackall v. Mackall, 135 ty, 8. 171 63 Mackay v. Mackay, 107 Cal. 303 222 Mackay, In re, 77 Misc. (N. Y.) i 49 Meher 's Estate, In re, 5 Misc. (N. Y.) McKee v. McKee, 26 Ky. L. 736 233, v. McKee (Tenn.), 52 S. W. 320 McKeough v. McKeough 69 Vt. 34 Mackey v. Mackey, 71 ee Eq. 686 McKibbin, In re, 207 Pa. 152 McKiernan v. Beardslee, 72 N. J. Eq. Meinley v. Coe, 66 N. & Eq. 70 v. Martin, ao Pa. 550 282 McKinney v. Noble, 37 Tex. 731 McKinnon v. Lundy, 21 Ont. App. 560 McKnight v. McKnight (Tenn.), 107 Ss 6 817 McKrell v. Walker, 172 Pa. St. 154 357 Mack’s Appeal, In re, 71 Conn. 122 271, 516 McLain v. Garrison, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 431 446 Howald, 120 Mich, 274 176 McLane’ Cropper, 5 App. Cas. (D. aie McLaughlin v. McManigle, 63 Tex. 553 5 v. Penney, 65 Kans. 252 McLean v. Elliott, a a Car. 70 107, 448 v. McLean, 207 N. 365 285 v. Williams, 116 en 257 195 Mal out v. Dell, 9 Fla. ae 22, 392 McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N. 179 345 McMahon’s Estate, In re, “ish a St. 175 eo 395 McMaken v. McMaken, 18 Alas 523 McMaster v. Scriven, 85 Wis. 6a So7, 526 McMechen v. McMechen, 17 W. Va. 683 449, 526 McMillan v. Cox, 109 Ga. 42 237, 379, 821 McMillen, In re, 12 N. Mex. 31 440 McMullin v. Leslie, 29 Pa. St. 314 231 v. McMullin, 8 Watts (Pa.) 236 357 McMurray v. Stanley, 69 Tex. 227 251 MeMuterie v. McMurtrie, 15 N. J. L. 193 MeNatly v. McNally, 23 R. I, 108 212 McNaughton v. Ay Hae aniOR 41 Barb. CN. ¥.) 50 58 v. McNaughton, 34 N._Y. ft 56, 434 McNeal v. Sherwood, 24 R. 314 177 McNeely v. Me Nery. 50 La. pees 823. 420 McNeile, In re, 217 Pa. 179 375, 376 McNitt, In re, 229 Pa. 71 76 McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kans. 25 231 v. McNutt, 116 Ind. 545 6 McQueen v. Farquar, 11 Ves. 467 380 v. Lilly, 131 Mo. 9 194, 320, 321, 322, 326 McWilliams v. Gough, 116 Wis. 576 417 Mente? vy. Alderson, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 467 Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35 63 Mader v. Apple, 80 Ohio St..691 Madison v. Larmon, 170 Ill. 65 192, 256, Maeck v. Nason, 21 Vt. 115 217 Mascari vy. Mayor, 1 Mart. (La.) MaGee v. Alba, 9 Fla, 382 v. McNeil, a Miss. 17 . 26 v. O’ Neill, 9 S. Car. 170 293, 906 Mager v. gis 8 How. (U. S.) 490 15 Me sechen s Appeal, In re, 117 Pa. St. 152 eee: i gait Trust &c. Bank, 170 U. &. 15 Maguire pi Piece: 8 Mo. 267 195, 241 Maitland v. Adair, 3 Ves. Jr. 231 181 v. Baldwin, 70 Hun _(N. Y.) 267 376 Maitlen v.. Maitlen, 44 Ind. App, 559 2 Major v. Hunt, 64 S. Car. 97 80, 582 Majot’s Estate, In re, 199 N. Y. 29 2 Male’s Will, In re, 49 N. J. Eq. 266 22 Mallery v. Dudley, 4 Ga. 52 231 Malone v. Cornelius, 34 Ore. 3 523 497, v. Hobbs, 1 Rob. (Va.) uae 464 Manatt v. Scott, 106 Iowa 203 63 Manderson v. Lukens, 23 Pa. St. Me 253 Mandlebaum v. McDonnell, 29 Mich 8 296, 368, Mangum v, Piester, 16 S. Car. 316 242 Manierre v. Welling, 32 R. I. 104 282 Meatols's Appeal, In re, 126 Pa, St. 141 Mann v. Balfour, A Mo. 290 464 v. Fuller, Kay 6 141 TABLE OF CASES ixv [References are to Sections.] Mann = Hyde, 71 Mich. 278 ackson, 84 Maine 400 a ann, 14 Johns. (N, Y.) 2 Manners v. Philadelphia Library Co., 93 Pa. St. 165 Matesse Estate, In re, 22 Pa. Co. Ct. 309 288 215 885 63 Manning v. Pippen, 86 aes 357 33 v. Pippen, 95 Ala. 537 42, Mansfield v. Mix, 71 Conn, 72 359 v. Shelton, 67 Conn. 390 154, 233 v. Turpin, 32 Ga. 260 506 Manton v. Tabois, 54 L.. J. Ch. 1008 217 Manuel v. Manuel, 13 Ohio St. 458 40, 42 Mapes v. American era Missionary Soc., 33 Hun (N. 36 42 March v. Huyter, 9G eo 243 28 ee ai (Tex. Civ. App.), 166 Market ae R. Co. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571 Markham v. Hufford, 123 Mick. 505 253, 294, 903 Markillie v. Ragland, 77 Ill. 231 Markle’s Estate, In re, 187 2, St. 639 191 oe v. Bryant, 4 Hen, . (Va.) ia Marks’ Succession, 35 La. Ann. 1054 58 Markwell v. eho 28 Wis. 548 506 Marrett v. Babb, 91 Ky. 88 380 Marsh v. Hoyt, "161. Mass, 459 54 Vv. aa 10 B. Bons 9h) 360 392 v Marsh, 92 Nebr. 171 v. Marsh; 48 N. Ca o oy 75 Marsh, In re, 45 Hun (N. Y.) 107 39505 Marshall v. Baltimore Safe Deposit &c. Co., 101 Md. 353 v. Berry, 13 Allen (Mass.) 43 3 v. Hartzfelt, 98 Mo. App. 178 137, 469 v. Rench, 3 Del. Ch. 239 434 Marston v. Marston, 47 Maine 495 293 v. Marston, 17 N. H. 503 440 Marston, In re, 79 Maine 25 48 Martin_v. Bowdoin, 158 Mo. 379 449 v. Davis, 82 Ind, 38 348 vy. Erdman, 124 Md. 668 212 v. Fort, 83 Fed. 19 231 Be a 2? Be ea tae 3 v. Holgate, L. R. 1 H. L. 175 312 v. King, 72 Ala. 354 452 v. Lachasse, 47 Mo. 591 311 v. Martin, 69 Miss. 315 394, 802 v. Mercer University, 98 Ga. 320 192, 310 v. Osborne, 1 Pickle (85 Tenn.) 420 209 v. Perkins, 56 Miss. 204 490, 495, 496 v. Stovall, 103 Tenn. 506 v. Stubbings, 126 Ill. 387 61 Martin, In re, 25R.L1 136, 138, 218, 392 Martindale v. Smith, 31 Kans. 270 62 Martineau v. Simonson, 59 App. Div. (N. Y.) 100 107 Marton v. iseae: 85 Tenn. 420 214 Marvin v. Ledwith, 111 Ill. 144 250 Marx v. Clisby, 126 Ala. 107 379 Maskell v. Roussel, 5 Rob. (La.) 500 523 Mason v. Bloomington Library Assn., 237 Ill. 442 14 v. Jones, 13 Barb, (N. Y.) 461 349 v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 207 Mass. 419 165 Vis Pomeroy, 151 Mass. 167 14 v. Rodriguez, 53 i Civ. App. 445 84 v. Smith, a Ala 141, 142 R- (1891) 3 Ch. 467 346 Mason, In re, L. Masonic Ben. Assn. v. Bunch, 109 Mo. 560 Masonic Mut. Assn. v. Jones, 154 Pa, St. 107 Masonic Mut. Ben. Assn. v. Severson, Conn. passey's ee 88 Pa. St. 470 313 os v. Massie, 54 Tex. Civ. App. a0 ale tacos v. Townshend, 123 N. Y. — oy Mastick v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Bay 460 Matheney’s Estate, In re, 121 Cal. 267 62 Mather v. Mather, 103 Ill. 607 213, 236 Mathews v. Krisher, 59 Ohio St. 562 431 pee eecereety In re, 12 R. I, 145 380 Mathis v. Mathis, 18 N. J. L. 59 139 Matlock v. Lock, 38 Ind. App. 281 235. Mattison v. Mattison, 53 Ore. 254 950 Mauldin v. Armistead, 14 Ala. 702 344 Maulding -v. Scott, 13 Ark. of Maurer v. Bowman, 169 Ill. 586 v. Miller, 77 Kans. Maverick v. Reynolds, 2 Bradf. Sur. (CN. Y.) 360 84 Maxwell v. Featherston, 83 Ind. 339 309 v. Harper, 51 Wash, 351 5 232, 241 400 v. Hill, 89 ce 584 499 v. Maxwell, fg 5 4H. L. 506 393 Vv. Wettenhall, Wing 27 139 May v. May, 167 %y Ps. 411 ve Slagehter, aA. By Marsh, (Ky.) é v. Thomas,. a4 S. Car, 158 10 Maybee, In re, 8 Ont. L. Rep: 601 107 Maybury v. Grady, 67 Ala. 147 392 Mayer v. American Bseneity &c. Co., es v. Hover, 81 Ga. 308 195 Mayhew v. Davidson, 62 N. Car. 47 284 Maynard v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139 450 Mayo v. Blount, 23 N. Car. 283 202 v. Harrison, 134 Ga. 737 231 v. Jones, 78 N. Car. 402 497 Mayott v. Mayott, 2 Bro. C. C. 125 179 May’s Appeal, In re, 41 Ea, St. 512 311 May’s Succession, 109 94 85 9 2 Meacham v. Graham, 98 Tesi, 190 285, 286 Mead v. Jennings, 46 Mo. 91 351 v. Robertson, 131 Mo. “App. 185 342 Meagleys Een In re, 39 App. Div. 414 m&uings v. Cromwell, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 351 379 Means v. Ury, 141 N. Car. 248 476 Mears v. Mears, 15 Ohio St. 90 500 Mechanics’ &c. Bank v. Harrison, 68 Ga. 463 49 Medlock v. Merritt, 102 Ga, 212 519 Meek v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 610 296, 348 Moh v. Draffen, 137 App. Div. (N. ws Meeks v. Toftey, 99 Ga. 170 53 Meier v. Lee, 106 Iowa Pre Meiners v. Meiners, 179 Mo, 614 194 Meis v. Meis (N. J. Eq.), 38 ae 369 325 Meister v. Meister, 121 Md. 440 367 a a Estate, In re, 139 Pa. St. 348 Melia v. Simmons, 45 Wis. 334 7 Mellor v. Smyth, 220 Pa. 169 Mellows v. Mellows, 61 N. H. 137 61, a Melone’s Estate, In re, 141 Cal. 331 "495 Melton v. Camp, 121 Ga. 693 » 828 Melvin v. Proprietors, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 15 Mendel v. Levis, 40 Misc. (N. Y.) 271 394 Mendell v. Dunbar, 169 Mass. 74 450: Mercantile Bank v. Ballard, 83 Ky. 481 257 Ixvi TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Mercantile Tr. Co. v. Adams, 95 Ark. Mercantile Reset ees In re, 156 App. Div. (N. Y.) 224 36 Mercer v. Mackin, 14 Bush (Ky.) 434 505 Meredith v. Anders, 31 N. Car. 329 351 Merriam v. Merriam, 80 Minn. 254 395 v. Simonds, 121 ‘Mass. 198 192 Merrill _v. Bickford, 65 Maine 118 324 v. Hayden, 86 Maine 133 340 v. Morrissett, 76 ae 433 487 v., Rush, 33 N. J. Eq. 537 84 Merriman, In re, 1d Mich, 454 63, 76 Merritt v. Bucknam, 78 Maine 504” 323, 324 v. Corlies, 54 N. Y. St. 215 45 Merritt’s Estate, In re, 62 Mo. 150 414 Merryfield’s Estate, In re, 167 Cal. 729 25 Meserve v. Haak, 191 Mass. 220 306 Messmore v. Stone, 6 Ky. L. 596 414 Messner v. Elliott, 184 Pa. St. 41 526 Metcalf v. Framingham Parish, 128 Mass. 370 157 v. Gladding, 35 R. I. 395 367 v. Sweeney, 17 R. I. 213 182 Methodist Church v. Clark, 41 Mich. fae 8 Maihodist Church Missionary Soc. v. Ely, 56 Ohio St. 405 497 Metropolitan Sav. Bank v. Murphy, 82 Md. 314 7 Metzen v. ee 202 Til, 275 233 Meyer v. Fogg, 7 Fla. 292° 448, 517, 518 v. Henderson, 88 Md. 585 520, 527 v. Rusterholtz, 23 Ind. Hi phe 569 214 Meyers v. Smith, 50 Kans. 487 Middleton, In re, 68 N. J. Eq. 584 108 Middleton’s Estate, In ré, 212 Ps. 119 194 Middleton’s Will, In re, 72 Iowa 424 493, 495 Mifflin’s Appeal, In re, 121 Pa. St. 205 265 Miles’ Appeal, In re, 68 Conn. 237 52, 464 Miller v. Ahrems, 150 aoe 644 100 v. Carlisle, 90 Ky. 205 176, 193 v. Carr, 94 Ark. 176 530 v. Chittenden, 2 Iowa 315 357 v. Chittenden, t ae 252 99 v. Colt, 32 N. Hg. 6 431 v. Cooch, 5 Del he eae 322, 326 v. Coulter, 156 ty 490, 492 v. Gilbert, 144 _N. 258 v. Harwell, 3 in oh om. eo 194 327 v. Holt, 68 Mo. 584 150 v. Lamprey, 68 N. a 376 223 v. Levi, 44 N. Y. 489 283 v. Livingston, ms Utah 228 530 v. London, 60 N. Car. 628 359 v. Lullman, 81 Mo. 311 5 v. McNeill, 35 Pa. St. yt 442 v. Meetch, 8 Pa. St. 417 372 v. Metcalf, 77 Conn. 176 169, 306, 311 v. Miller, 151 Ky. 563 173 v. Miller, 32 La. enn 437 13, 30 v. Miller, 73 Md. 414 v. Miller, 187 Pa. TEE, 572 526 v. Miller, 99 Va. 662 1205 v. Physick, 24 Ark, 244 5 v. Speight, 61 Ga. 460 486 v. Springer, 70 Pa. St. 269 287 v. Steele, 64 Ind. 79 414 v. Western College, ae a 280 9 v. Williamson, 5 Md. 233 Miller, In re, Del. 477 76 Miller, In re, 28 Misc. (N. Y.)_ 373 509 Miller’s Appeal, In re, 52 Pa. St. 113 173 Miller’s Appeal, In re, 159 Pa. St. 575 523 Miller’s Estate, In re, 156 Cal, 119 290 Miller’s Estate, In re, 158 Cal, 420 102 Miller’s Estate, In re, 37 Mont. 545 442 Miller’s Estate, In re, 179 Pa. St. 645 87 Miller’s Estate, In re, 31 Utah 415 521 Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659 271 v. Joiner, 20 Fla. 479 33 v. Newberry, 112 Ill. ae 307, 336 Milne v. Milne. 17 La. 95 MialeARSger Ve Nee h aed 78 Mo. Hes Milton v. Kite, 114 Va. 256 33 Milwaukee Protestant ao for Aged v. Becher, 87 Wis. 78, 435 Mims v. Machlin, 53 $ OB 343, 962 Miner, In re, 146 N, Y. 121 209, 214, 313 Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Menage, 73 Minn. 441 415 Minnich’s Estate, In gh 206 Pa. 405 970 Minot v. Amory, Cush. (Mass.) sh 377 v. Doggett, 190 Mass. 435 306° vy. Harris, 132 Mass. 528 169° v. Purrington, 190 Mass. 336 253 v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113 Mitchell v. Danforth, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 330 v. Denson, 29 Ala. 327 372 v. Hughes, 3 Colo. App. 43 491, 521 v. Kimbrough, 98 Tenn. 535 50, 76 v. Mitchell, 73 Conn. 303 245 v. Mitchell, 143 Ind. 113 154 v. Mitchell}.3 Md. Ch. 71 327 R. Co., 165 Pa. v. Stanton (Tex. Civ. Aj 139 aon PP-)» v. Thorne, 134 N. Y. 536 Vv. Pittsburgh - &e. 174 v. Vest, 157 Iowa 336 183 v. Vickers, 20 Tex. 377 22 Mobley v. Cummings, 35 S. Car. 101 359” v. Mobley, 85 S. Car. 319 191 Moeller v. Poland, 80 Ohio St. 418 415 Moffett v. Elmendorf, 152 N. Y. 475 191, 1224 Moline v. Carlson, 92 Nebr. 419 33 Malneaux v. Raynolds, 55 N. J. Eq. 308 Mollenkamp v. Farr, 70 Kans. 786 1221 Moloughney, In re, 67 App. Div. (N. Y.) 148 353 Monarque v. Monarque, 80 N. Y. 320 213 Monday v. Vange, 92 Tex. 428 297, 356 Mondorf, In re, 110 N. Y. 450 108 Monjo v. Woodhouse, 185 N. Y. Ze 3» O15 Monroe v. Barclay, 17 Ohio St. 302° ” 108 v. Huddart, 79 ae r. 569 452 v. Jones, 8 RT 211, 392 Montgomery v. fees 91 Ala. 613 518 v. McPherson, i Miss, 4 804 v. Mallen, Sm, Son. (Miss.) Montiers Estate, In re, 7' Phila. eed Moody v. Found, 208 a 78 497, $32 2 v. Walker, 3 Ark, Bibogrs v. White, 6 Tohne, Ch. (N. Y.) Moon v. Stone, 19 Gratt. ceo 130 193 Mooney v. Purpus, 70 Ohio St. 195, 692 Mooney’s Estate, In re, 205 Pa. 418 358 Moore v. Alden, 80 Maine 301 395 v. Christian, 56 Miss. 408 412 v. Gary, 149 Ind. 51 245 v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362 v. Harrison, 26 Ind. ‘App. 408 6 TABLE OF CASES xvii [References are to Sections.] Moore v. Hegeman, 72 N. Y. 376 349 v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 638 sere 524, 530, pit v. Littel, 41 N.Y. v. McFall, 263 Til. 596 a4 Vv. McNulty, 164 Mo. 111 516 v. Miller, 8 ae St. 272 239 v. Moore, 50 N. J. Eq. 554 138, 166, ot v. Moore, 23 Tex, 637 v. Perry, 42 S. Car. 369 280 v. Sanders, 15 S. Car. 440 296 v. Sinnott, 117_ Ga. 1010 348 v. Spier, 80 Ala, 129 469, 451 v. Stephens, 97 Ind, 271 442, 446, 508 v. Trott, 156 Cal. 353 5 v. Willamette Transp. &c. Co. 7 Ore. 3 492 Moores v. Hare, 144 Ind. cid 254 Mooy v. Gallagher, 36 R. 405 237 Moran v. Lezotte, "54 vias 33 ae v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451 290 Moran’s Will, In re, 118 Wis. 177 250, aot Morcel’s Estate, In’ re, 162 Cal. 188 530 Mordecai v. Boylan, 69 ae Car. 365 410 v. Canty, 86 S. Car. 4 523 Moredock v. Moredock, vo gor 163 180 Morell v. Morell, 157 Ind. 179 518 Morey v. Sohier, 63 N. H. 507 ve 464 Morey’s Estate, In re, 49 Hun (N, Y. 608 291 Morffew v. S. F. & S. R. Co., 107 Cal. 587 Mortond v. Dieffenbacker, 54 mee ae nes v. Dodge, 44 N. a ae ‘08, 492 v. Huggins, 42 Fed. 57 v. Ireland, 1 Idaho ‘786° 467 Vv. Robbins, 152 Ind. 362 192, 286 Moriarty v. Moriarity, 108 Mich. 249 526 Morrell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. 436 Y.) 153. Morrill v. Morrill, 53 Vt. 74 499 atone, v. Sickly, 133 N. Y. 456 326 Stokes, 21 Ga, 552 500 Moweizon v. Bartlett, 148 Ky. 833 150 v. Bowman, 29 oe 337 287 v. Clariburg, Gc & C Co, 52 W. Va. 331 234 v. Lennard, 3 Car. & P. 127 85 v. Schorr, 197 Ill. 554 213, 1206 Morrison’s Estate, In re, 139 Pa. St. 306 190, 192, 312 Morrow v. Morrow, 113 Mo. App. 444 419 v. Saline County, 21 Kans. 484 415 Morrow’s Appeal, Tn re, 116 Pa. St. ea 440 26, Morrow’s Estate, In re, 204 Pa. see 56, an Morse v. Blood, 68 Minn. 442 v. Hayden, 82 Maine 227 281, 282, 298 v. Lowe, 182 Mich. 607 v. Macrum, 22 Ore. 229 208 v. Mason, 11 Allen (Mass.) 36 193 v. Morrell, 82 Maine 80 - 357 v. Morse, "42 Ind. 365 521 v. Nantick, 176 Mass. 510 773 v. Thompson, 4 Cush. (aiae5.) 562 ae Morton v. Hatch, 54 Mo. 396 v. Ingram, 33 N. Car. 4368 448 vy. Morton, 120 Ky. 251 211 v. Onion, 45 Vt. 145 467 v. Woodbury, 153 N. Y. 243 _ 143, 313 Morton Tr. Co. v. Chittenden, 81 Conn. 105 Morville v._ Fowle, se an 109 2 371 Mosely v. Carr, 7 Ga. 3 505 Murphy, In re, 80 App. Div. (N. Y. 3 Moss v. Helsley, 60 Tex, 426 307, 308 Mott v. Ackerman, 92 N. Y. 539 376 Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N. Y. 394 506 Mourain v. Poydras, 6 La. Ann. 151 396 Mousseau’s Will, In re, 30 Minn, 202 nee 496 Mt. Holly Safe ime &c. Co. v. Dea- con, 79 N. J. Eq. 120 215 Mowatt v. Cites, 7 Paige (y x) Sa 106 Mueller v. Buenger, 184 Mo. 575 er 308 Meulenbere s Appeal, In re, 103 Pa. St. ei Mubike v. Teidemann, 177 Ill. 606 296 Muldoon v. Trewhitt (Tenn.), 38 W. 109 343 Mulford v. Mulford, 42 N. J. ae 68 410 Mulholland v. Gillan, 25 R. I. 13, 30 Mullanney v. Nangle, 212 Ill. B47 341 Mullany v. Mullany, 4 N. J. Ea. i 230 Mullarky v. Sullivan, 136 N. Y. ay, 431 Mullen v. Doyle, 147 Pa. St. 512 415 v. McKelvy, 5 Watts jue) 399 50 v. McKeon, 25 R. 108. Mulligan _v. Leonard 46 fs 692 22, 454 Mullin, In re, 110 Cal. 252 127, 443, 445 Mulvane v._ Rude, 146 a ave 232; 237 Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290 54, 445, 449, 464 Munnikhuysen v. McGraw, 35 Md. 286 441 Murchison v. Whitted, 87 "N. Car. 465 286 urff v. Frazier, 41 "Misc. 408 402 Murfield’s Will, In re, a Iowa 479 446, sae 479, 480 Murphy v. Caslin, 113 Mo. oF v. Delano, 95 Maine a v. McKeon, 53 N. J. Eq. 406 306 v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. 1460 517 v. Nett, 47 Mont. 38 83 287 v. ‘Sisters, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 638 ) 222 MMurpreye Estate, In re, 184 Pa. St. 4 Murray v. Cannon, 41 Md. 466 v. Miller, 178 N.Y. 316 340, 352 v. Murray, 5 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) | v. Oliver, 41 N. Car. 55 479 Murry v. Hennessey, 48 Nebr. 608 517, 518, 526 v. Murry, 6 Watts (Pa.) 353 50, 153 Mutual Benefit iis Ins. Co. v. Tis- dale, 91 U._S. 492 Mutual Life Ins. e v. Shipman, 108 N. Y. 19 367 v. Tillman, 84 Tex. 31 505 Myers v. Hauger, 98 Mo. 433 3 530 v. Myers, 33 Ala. 85 140, 396 v. Norman, 20 Ky. L. 343 211 v. Safe Deposit &c. Co. 73 413 376 v. Vanderbelt, 84 Pa. St. 510 150: Myers? Appeal, Tn re, 62 Pa. St. 104 400 Myers’ Estate, In re, 69 N. J. Eq. 793 523 Myers’ Estate, In re, 48 Pa. St. 26 208 N Tage v. Hirsch (Ind. App.), 108 N. E. a6 ie tee v. Trimmier, 56 Ga. 600 33 Nash v. Nash, 12 Allen (Mass.) 345 256 % Ober, 2 App. D. 04 396 . Simpson, 78 Maine 142 288 % Taylor, 83 Ind. 347 321 xviii TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Nashville First Nat. Bank v. Nashville Trust Co, (Tenn. Ch.), 62 S. W, 392 292 Nason v. First Bangor Christian Church, 66 Maine 100 185, 189 Nat v. Coons, 10 Mo. 543 43 National Bank of Commerce v. Smith (CR. 1.), 24 Atl. 273 National Exchange Bank v. Watson, 13 R. I. 90 National Safe Deposit &c. Co. v. Sweeney, 3 App. (D. C.) 401 495, 527 Naylor_v. Arnitt, 1 Russ. & Myl. 501 378 v. Godman, 109 Mo. 543 286 v. Shelton, 102 Ark. 30 33 Neal v. Lamar, 18 Ga. 746 399 v. Patten, 40 Ga. 363 392 Needham v. Gillett, 39 Mich. 574 2 Neely v. Phelps, 63 Conn. 251 359 Neer v. Cowhick, 4 Wyo. 39 25 Neff’s Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 91 Negus v. Negus, 46 Iowa 487 Neilson v. Bishop, 45 N. J. Eq. 473 v. Brett, 99 Va. 673 174 v. Lagow, 12 How. (U. S.) 98 Neimand v. Seemann, 136 Iowa 713 532 Neistrath’s Estate, In re, 66 Cal. 330 325 Nellis v. Rickard, 133 Cal. 617 350 Nelson v. Moore, 36 N. Car. 31 194 v. Nelson, 57 N. J. Eq. 118 222 v. Pomeroy, 64 Conn. 257 201 v. Potter, 50 N. J. L. 324 506 Nelson, In re, 141 N. Y. 152 . 449 Nester v. Nester, 68 Misc. (N. Y.) 207 170 Neubert v. Colwell, 219 Pa. 24 286 8 Nevin’s Estate, In re, 192 Pa. Shee Nevitt v. Woodburn, 190 Ill. 283 273, 290 Nevius v. Gourley, 95 Ill. 206 892 Newberry v. Hinman, 49 Conn. 130 306 Newbold v. Boone, 52 Pa. St. 167 194 Newcomb v. Newcomb, 108 Ky. 582 506 v. Williams, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 525 410 Newcomb’s Will, In re, 98 Iowa 175 326 Newcombe’s Will, In re, 63 Hun (N. Y.) 633 5 -) 32 Newell, In re, 10 Hawaii 80 25 Newell’s Appeal, 24 Pa. St. 197 166, 188, 189 New Haven County v. New Haven Trinity Church, 82 Conn. 378 235, 281 New Jerusalem Church v. Crocker, 7 Ohio C. C. 327 Newlin v. Phillips (Del. Ch.), 60 Atl. 1068 762, Newlin’s Estate, In re, 209 Pa. 456 466 Newman v. Newman, 152 Mo. 398 415 v. Willetts, 52 Ill. 98 506 New Orleans v. Baltimore, 13 La. Ann. 16 281 v. Hardie, 43 La. Ann, 251 185, 307 ‘New Orleans First Congregational Church v. Henderson, 4 Rob. (La.) 209 95 Newsom v. Thornton, 82 Ala. 402 320 Newsome v. Tucker, 36 Ga. 71 527 Newton v. Seaman’s Friend Soc., 130 Mass. 91 488, 1143 New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Sands, 24 Misc. (N. Y.) 102 345 New York L. Ins. &c. Co. v. Viele, 161 N, Y. 11 49, 105, 173 New York L. Ins. &c. Co., In re, 139 N. Y. S. 695 - 49 Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 17 3 v. Kershner, 20 W. Va. 251 63 Nichols v. Allen, 87 Tenn. 131 56 v. Denny, 37 Miss. 59 7 Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716 292, 296, 346, 348, v. Guthrie, 109 Tenn. 535 ve Kingdom Iron Ore Co., 56 N. Y. 61 v. Wentz, 78 Conn, 429 76 Nicholson v. Cousar, 50 S. Car. 206 Nicholson’s Will, In re, 115 Iowa 493 Nickerson v. Van Horn, 181 Mass, 562 56, 954 Nicrosi v. Phillippi, 91 Ala. 299 6 Niederhaus v. Heldt, 27 Ind. 480 Rughongale Burrell, 15 Pick, (Mass.) v. Phillips, 29 R. I. 175 Nilson’s Estate, In re, 81 Nebr. 809 Nimmons v. Westfall, 33 Ohio St. 213 Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich. Eq. (S. oe 43 01, 297 Noble’s Appeal, 39 Pa. St. 425 Noecker v. Noecker, 66 Kans, 347 63 356 285 Noel v. Harvey, 29 Miss. 72 371 Nolan v. New, 31 La. Ann. 552 103 Noland v. Chambers, 84 Ky. 516 101, 354 Norcum v. D’Oench, 17 Mo. 98 341 Norris v. Clark, 10 N. J. Eq. 51 207 v. Hensley, 27 Cal. 439 237, 244 age harapeoe v. Smith, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 0 North Carolina Inst. for Education of Deaf, &c., v. Norwood, 45 N. Car. North's Goods, In re, 6 Jur. 564 31 Norwood v. Mills, 3 Ohio Sup. & C. P. Dec. 356 Notes v. Doyle, 32 App. D. C. 413 445, 452, ase v. Vannoy, 6 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) Noyes v. Southworth, 55 Mich. 173 Noye’s Estate, In re, 40 Mont. 178 10, 75, 77, 440 Noyes, In re, 40 Mont. 190 25, 453 Noyes’ Will, 61 Vt. 14 Nugent v. Cloon, 117 Mass. 219 365, 372 Nunn v. Lynch, 73 Ark. 20 504 Nunnery y. Carter, 58 N. Car. 370 Nusly v. Curtis, 36 Colo. 464 61, 136, 139 oO Oberndorf_v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 71 Misc. (N. Y.) 64 _ O’Brien v. Galagher, 25 Conn. 229 O’Callaghan v._ O’Brien, 116 Fed. 834 Occleston yv. Fullalove, L. R. 9 Ch. 147 O’Connor’s Will, In re, 65 Misc. (N. Y.) 4 22, Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen (Mass.) 1 - 271, 272, 346, v. Rogers, 44 Wis. 136 Odom v. Thompson, 8 N. Car. 58 509, 523 v. Thompson, 9 N. Car. 5 O’Donnell v. McCann, 77 N, J. Eq. 188 Oertle, In re, 34 Minn, 173 Oetjen v. Diemmer, 115 Ga. 1005 26, 233, U’Fallon v. Tucker, 13 Mo. 262 O’Ferrall v. Simplot, 4 Iowa 381 21 Offutt v. Offutt, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 162 Ogden v. Pattee, 149 Mass. 82 Ogier’s Estate, In re, 101 Cal. 381 Ogle v. Reynolds, 75 Md. 145 368, 370 ore v. Crowly, 80 N. J. Eq. TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] O’Gorman’s Estate, In re, 161 Cal. 654 7, 206 Ogsbury v. Ogsbury, 115 N. 290 212 Oluagents’ Will, Ia'26, 73 Wis. 78 528 O’Hara v. Dudley, 95 N. 403 Ohio Oil Co. v. eee 240 Ill. 361 378 Ohio State University v. Folsom, 56 Ohio St. 701 78 Olcott v. Tope, 213 Ill. 124 431 Old_ Colony Trust Co. v. Bailey, 202 Mass. 283 485 Oldham v. York, 99 Tenn. 68 212 Olivier v. Blanca, 2 La. Ann. 517 108 Olmstead v. Webb, 5 App. D. C. 38 495 Olney v. Balch 154 ee a 368, 372 v. Bates, 3 Drew Ch. 310 Olson v. Court of Hanes "100 Minn, 117 533 Olson’s Will, In re, 63 Iowa 145 487 Onderdonk v. etenimatts 62 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 3 374 v. Onderdonk, i37 N.Y. ae 296, 435 O’Neil v. Beall, 10 B. Mon. (3 272 419 O'Neal Vv. Farr, 1 Rich, L. (S. Car.) ea O’Neil’s Will, In re, 91 N. Y. 516 440 Onondaga eee &c. Co. v. Price, 87 N. Y. 542 381 Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa 407 96, 288 Orgherd v. David, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 463 Orchardson v. Cofield, 171 Ill. 14 83, 86 O'Reilly v. Nicholson, 45 Mo. 160 287 Orgain v. Irvine, 100 Tenn. 193 153, 440 O’Riley v. McKiernan, 90 Ky. 116 355 Ormiston v. Olcott, 84 N. Y. 339 390, 414 Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S. 47 491, » out 08 Orr v. O’Brien, 55 Tex. 14 v. Yates, 209 Ill, 222 413 Orrick v. Boehm, 49 Md. 72 231 Ortmayer v. Elcock, 225 Ill. 342 241 Osborn v. Cook, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 532 25 Osborne v. Gordon, 86 bee 92 365, 372 v. Leak, 89 N. Car 495 v. Taylor, 12 Gran, wh) 117 281 Osenton v. itliott 73 _W. Va. 519 189 Osgood v. Bliss, 141 M Mass. 474 369 v. Breed, 12 Mass. 525 76 Ve Franktin, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Ys) 1 371 v. Rogers, 186 Mass. 238 721 Ostrander v. Davis, 191 Fed. 156 469 Otjen v. Frohbach, 148 Wis. 301 236 Otterback v. Bohrer, 87 Va. 548 193 Otto v. Doty, 61 Iowa _23 5, 506, 524 Otts v. Otts, 80 S. Car. 1 55 Ouachita Papunt College e Scott, 64 Ark, 349 83 Oulg. v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. Bee oO : an . Outcalt, ae N. J. Eq. 500 312 Outland Outland, 118 N. Car. 138 a Overton v. Davy, 20 Mo. 273 94 y. Lea, 108 Tenn. 505 296 Owen v. ‘Ellis, 64 Mo. a 380 v. Tankersley, 12 Tex. 287 Owens v. Bennett, 5 Harr, Gao 367 444 v. Sinklear, 110 Mo. 527 Owings v. Bates, 9 Gill. (Md.) 463 2 Owsley v. Harrison, 190 Ill. 235 268 Oyster v. Orris, 191 Pa. St. 606 245 P Pace v. Pace, 73 N.' Car. 119 356 * Packard v. Kingman, 109 Mich. 506 14 Packer v. Packer, 179 Pa. St. 580 50 Packer’s Estate, In re, 164 Cal. 525 Packer’s Estate, In re, 246 Pa, 116 Padfield v. Padfield, 68 Ill. 210 Page v. nore e Bublic Library Assn. g g HL. 578 Ty “9 1 ve Foust, 3 N. Car. 447 v. Frazer, 14 Bush (Ky), 205 v. Page, 2 Rob. (Va.) 424 Page’s Estate, In re, 75 Pa. St. 87 Paget v. Melcher, 156 N. Y. 399 Paine v. Barnes, 100 Mass. 470 v. Forsaith, 84 Maine, 66 Palmer v. Dent, 2 Robt. aeeels 284 Dunham, i25 N.Y, 190, . Holford, 4 Russ. 403 . Horn, 84 N.Y. 516 . Matthews, 33 a, Supp. 72 » Moore, 82 Ga. . Owen, 229 Til. Ws Stevens, 15 Gray (Mass.) ae Palmer’ s Will, In re, 42 Misc. (N. Y Pacand v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488 400, Parish v. Ulich, 69 Pa. St. 177 daddseasd4 Parker _v. Bogardus, 5 N. Y. 309 v. Churchill, 104 Ga. 122 192, v. Day, 155’N. Y. 383 397, 414, v. Hill, 85 Ark. 363 Vv. Parker, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 134 v. Parker, 123 Mass, 584 281, v. Wilson, 98 Ark. 553 Parker, In re, 16 Ch. Div. 44 Parks v. American pane Missionary Soc., 62 Vt. v. Robinson, 138 ne on 269 Parnell v. Thompson, 81 Kans. 119 151, Ea v. Jewell, 57 Tex. Civ. App. Parrott _v. Einoeet: | 64 Ga. 332 v. Kelly, 79 Ky. 490 Parry’s Estate, In re, 188 Pa. St. 33 Parsons v. Balson, 129 Wis. 311 v. Kinser, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 342 v. Lance, 1 Ves. 189 v. Millar, 189 Ill. 107 v. Parsons, 2 Greenl. Ciaie) 298 Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. Patch v. White, 1 Mackay ren D. C.) 468 v. White, 117 U. S. 210 Patchen v. Patchen, 121 N. Y. 432 Pate v. Bushong, 161 Ind. 533 203, v. Pierce, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 104 Tacereon v. Ellis, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 9 * Paton y. Robinson, 81 Cost 547 Paton, In re, 111 N.Y 176, Patrick v. Patrick, 438 Ky 307 Patten v. Cilley, 67 N. H. 520 v. Herring, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 640 32 v. Tallman, 27 Maine 17 Patterson v. Devlin, McMull. Eq. (S. Car.) 459 vs Earhart, 6 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. v. Gaines, 6 How. 8.) 550 v. Hickey, 32 Ga. v. Patterson, 59 N. v 574 v. Ransom, 55 Ind. 402 vy. Snell, 67 Maine 559 Patterson’s Estate, In re, 173 Pa. 185 Patton v. Ludington, 103 Wis. 629 252, 254, 310, v. Patton, 39 Ohio St. a Patty v. Goolsby, 51 Ark. 57, Paul v. Ball, 31 Tex. 0° Ixix 215 Ixx TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Paul v. Philbrick, 73 N. H. 237 v. Williams, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 625 Paulson’s Will, In re, 127 Wis, 612 293 Pawtucket_v. Ballou, 15 R. I. 58 A Paxson’s Estate, In re, 221 Pa. 98 78 285 347 Payne v. Payne, 54 Ark, 415 449 Payne’s Succession, 25 La. Ann. 202 524 Peabody v. Tysziewicz, 191 Mass. 317 353 Peake v. Jamison, 6 Mo. App. 590 339 v. Jenkins, 80 Va. 283 9; Peale v. Ware, 131 Ga. 826 498 Pearce _v. Savage, 45 Maine 90 351 v. Rickard, 18 R. I. 142 173 Pearl v. Lockwood, 123 Mich. 142 295 Pearson v. Wartman, 80 Md. 528 326 Pearson’s Will, In re, 113 Cal. 577 185 Pease v. Allis, 110 Mass. 157 499 Reasleee Will, In re, 73 Hun (N. Y.) Peck v. Cary, 27 N. Y. 9 vy. Vandemark, 99 N. Y. 29 6 Peckham v. Lego, 57 Conn. 553 237 v. Newton, 15 R, I. 321 187 Pedrick v. Pedrick, 50 N. J. Eq. 479 9894 Peebles v. Acker, 70 Misc. 356 26 v. Graham, 128 N. Car. 218 202 Peet v. Peet, 229 Ill. 341 1186 Peet’s Estate, In re, 99 Iowa 314 324 Peirce v. Peirce, 195 Pa. St. 417 378 Peirsol v. Roop, 56 N. J. Eq. 739 208, 233 Pell v. Mercer, 14 R. I. 412 347 Pellizzarro v. Reppart, 83 Iowa 497 355 Pembroke Academy v. Epsom School Dist., 75 N. H. 408 38 Pender y. Dicken, 27 Miss. 252 7 Pendleton v. Kinney, 65 Conn, 222 191 v. Larrabee, 62 Conn. 393 431 Penfield v. Tower, 1 N. Dak. 216 45 Penn v. Folger, 182 Ill. 76 390 v. Penn, 120 Ky. 557 2 Pennel v. Weyant, 2 Harr. (Del.) 501 506 Pennington v. Seal, 49 Miss. 518 415 Penniman’s Will, In re, 20 Minn, 245 a6 465 Pennsylvania Co.’s Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 489 2 1203 98, 271 96 y Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471 People v. Folsom, 5 Cal. 373 v. Powers, 147 N. Y. 104 v. St. Patrick’s Cathedral, 21 Hun 4. Pennsylvania Land Co. v. Justi, 121 Ky. 765 ’ (N. Y.) 18 People’s Loan &c. Bank v. Garlington, 54 S. Car. 413 351, 419 People’s Trust Co. v. Flynn, 44 Misc. CN. ¥.) 6 . ¥. : 43 Peoria Humane Soc. v. McMurtrie, 229 Til. 519 470, 1184 Pepper’s Estate, In re, 148 Pa. St. 5 Pepper’s Appeal, I 120 Pa. St” epper’s Appeal, In re, a, St. 235 375, 376 Peralto v. Castro, 6 Cal. 354 Perdue v. Perdue, 124 N. Car. 161 Perea v. Barela, 5 N. Mex. 458 323 214, 446 Perez v. Perez, 59 Tex. 322 503 Perkins gt Nat. Bank, 81 Miss, 98 3 v. Fisher, 59 Fed. 801 273 v. George, 45 N. H. 453 50 v. Lewis, 41 Ala. 649 411, 419 v. Mathes, 49 N. H. 107 139 v. Perkins, 39 N. H. 163 526 Perrin v. Lyon, 9 East 170 288 Perrine v. Petty, 34 N. J. Eq. 193 390 Perrine v. Vreeland, 33 N. J. Eq. 102 Perry v. Bowman, 151 Ill. 25 v. Brown, 34 R. I. 203 v. Maxwell, 17_N. Car. 488 v. Perry, 110 Ky. 16 Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. (U. S.) aoe D Peters v. Siders, 126 Mass. 135 Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313 Pettit v. Black, 13 Nebr. 142 485, 486, 488, 495, Petty v. Ducker, 51 Ark. 281 Peynado v. Peynado, 82 Ky. 5_ Pfender v. Depew, 136 App. Div. (N. Y.) 636 ae v. Dolfinger (Ky.), 20 S. W. 34 Pflugar v. Pultz, 43 N. J. Eq. 440 forr, In re, 144 Cal. 121 Pfuelb’s Estate, In re, 48 Cal. 643 Phayer v. Kennedy, 169 Ill. 360 Phelps v. Bates, 54 Conn. 11 v. Harris, 101 U. S. 370 v. Phelps, 143 Mass. 570 180, v. Robbins, 40 Conn. 250 32), Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169 v. Girard, 45 Pa. St. 9 272, 281, Philbrick v. Spangler, 15 La. Ann. 46 Phillipe v. Clevengor, 239 Ill, 117 Phillips v. Brown, 16 R. I. 279 v. Clark, 18 R. I. 627 v. Duckett, 112 Ill. App. 587 v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 509 v. Grayson, 23 Ark. 769 . Harrow, 93 Iowa 92 . Heldt, 33 Ind. App. 388 . Lowther, 111. Ga. 852 - Moore, 100 U. S. 208 . Phillips (Del. Ch.), 91 Atl. 452 v. Stewart, 59 Mo. 491 371, Phillips, In re, 98 N. Y. 267 Phillips’ Estate, In re, 205 Pa. St. 504 Phillips’ Estate, In re, 133 Pa. St. 426 eEpe Estate, In re, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. Pig inebiten v. Bruch, 37 N. J. Eq. Phinizy v. Foster, 90 Ala. 262 176, v. Wallace, 136 Ga. 520 Phipps v. Ackers, 9 Cl. & F. 583 Piatt v. Sinton, 37 Ohio St. 353 Pickens v._ Davis, 134 Mass. 252 Pierce v. Knight, 182 Mass. 72 v. Phelps, 75 Conn. 83 v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86 v. Pierce, 38 Mich. 412 v. Root, 86 Conn. 90 v. Simmons, 17 R. I. 545 Pierce, In re, 20 R, I. 380 Pierce’s Estate, In re, 56 Wis. 560 Pike v. Collins, 33 Maine 38 v. Stephenson, 99 Mass. 188 Pimel v. Betjemann, 183 N. Y. 194 Pine v. Callahan, 8 Idaho 684 Pingrey v. National L. Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 374 Pinkham v. Blair, 57 N. H. 226 Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141 Piper v. Moulton, 72 Maine 155 367, 288, dae 477, 22, 336, 448, Pirrung v. Pirrung, 228 Ill. 441 Pittengel v. Boynton, 139 Mass. 244 Pitts v. Melser, 72 Ind. 469 486, v. Milton, 192 Mass. 88 Plant v. Donaldson, 39 App. D. C. 162 ve ACH OR 52 App. Biv. (N. Y.) TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Plate’s Estate, In re, 148 Pa. St. 55 442 Pleasants v. McKenney, 109 Md. 277 523 Plume v. Beale, 1 P. Wms. 388 500 Plumel’s Estate, In re, 151 Cal. 77 25, 32, 453 Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115 ae v. Shepherd, 94 Md. 466 169, 190, 191 Plymouth Society v. Hepburn, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 161 97 Pohlman v. Pohlman, 150 Ky. 679 215 Pollard v. Barkley, 117 Ind. 40 397 v. Merrill, 15 Ala. 169 101 Pollock v. Farnham, 156 Mass. 388 311 ‘Glassell, 2 Gratt. SVE) 439 152 Bening v. Lewis, 14 R. 419 Pond v. iarets 10 Paize ‘cht "oN, May _ v. ee. 132 Til, 312 33 Ponton v. McLemore, Posey v._ Posey, 3 Strob. 167 582 Post v. Jackson, 70 Conn. 283 195 v. Rohrbach, 142 Ill. 600 273 Pott v. Pennington, 16 Minn. 509 506 Potter_v. Couch, 141 U.S. ae 296, 351 v. Eames, 70 Misc. (N, 147 367 v. Gardner, 12 Wheat. . S.) 498 324 v. McAlpine, 3 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 108 400 v. Nixon, 81 N. J. Eq. 338 240 Potts v. Breneman, 182 Pa. St. 295 370 v. House, 6 Ga. 324 85 v. Terry, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 394 412 Pottstown Hospital v. New York Life Ins. &c. Co., 208 Fed. 196 78 Poultney v. Tiffany, 112 Md. 630 251 Pounds v. Dale, 48 Mo. 270 103 Powell_v. Cobb, 56 N. Car. 456 354 v. Cosby, 89 8. W. 721 285 v. Hurt, 108 Mo. 507 414 v. Meyers, 64 S..W. 428 6 v. Powell, 30 Ala. 697 50 v. Powell, 41 N. Car. 50 392 v. Woodcock, 149 N. Car, 235 207 Powell’s Estate, "In re, 138 Ee St. 322 141 Power v. Hafley, 85 Ky. 05 Powers v. Scharling, 64 ae: 339 150 P’Pool v. P’Pool, 121 Ky. 588 476 Prater v. Miller, 25 Ala. 320 519 v. Whittle, 16 S. Car. 40 500 Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574 533 Pratt v. Douglas, 38 N. J. Eq. 516 41, 47, 49 v. Flamer, 5 Harr. & J. (Md.) 10 106 v. Pratt, 161 Mass. 27 62 v. Sheppard & ee Pratt Hos- pital, 88 Md. 610 340 Pray v. Belt; 1 Pet. (U. S:) 670 432 Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 508 346 v. Waterston, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 262 57 Bicaeners Aid Soc. v. Rich, 45 Maine 26 Prentis v. Bates, 93 Mich. 234 526 pane ytsr ea Church v. McElhinney, 61 203 540 v. Yeranle 159 Til. 215 55, 66 President &c. of Yale University, In re, 67 Conn, 237 Preston v. Fidelity Trust &c. Co., 94 Ky. 295 516 v. Foster, 75 Conn. 709 189 v. Howk, 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 4 189 Prevost v. ‘Martel, 10 Rob. (La.) S12 106 Price v. Baws, 1 Brad. Surr. (N. Y.) ee v. Ose 87 Mo. eet 367, 379 v. Price, “a N. J. Eq. 322 Price, In re, L. R. (1900) ‘ sch, Div. 442 49 Paces Appeal, In re, 169 Pa. St. 294 214, 215 Prickett v. Leonard, 104 N. Car. 326 212 Priest v. Lackey, 140 Ind. 399 212 Primmer v. Primmer, 75 Iowa 415 83 Prince v. Barrow, 120 Ga. 810 341, 355 v. Hazleton, 20 pole ao Y.) 502 454 v. Prince, 64 Wash. 33, 470 Prior v. Talbot, 10 Cush *(Mass.) 1 411 Prison Assn. of Va. v. Russell, 103 Va. 563 1229 ee v. Digi low, 57 Kans. 119 350 Propst v. Mathis, 115 N. Car. 526 505 Provenchere’s Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 463 253 Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788 222 Prowitt v. Rodman, 37_N. Y. 42 176 Pruden v. Paxton, 79 N. Car. 446 240 Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644 5 Pugh v. Pugh, 105 Ind. 552 176, 193 Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Maine 359 265, 268 Pulliam v. Pulliam, 10 Fed. 53 396 Pulling, In_re, 93 Mich. 274 Bigs ve Purcell, Riley Eq. (S. Car.) Purdy v. Davis, 13 Wash. 164 431 v. Evans, 156 Ky. 342 75 Eula v. Putnam, 4 Bradf. Surr. (N. Y.) 308 240 Putnam Free School v. Fisher, 30 Maine 523 368, 371, 419 Q Quinby v. Frost, 61 Maine 77 321 Quincy v. Attorney-General, 160 Mass. 431 98 Quinn v. Shields, 62 Iowa 129 338, 448, 863 R Raab, In re, 79 Misc. (N. Y.) 185 : 191, 253 Rackemann v. Taylor, 204 Mass. 394 41 Radovich’s Estate, In re, 54 Cal. 540 325 Ragan v. Hill, 72 Ark. 307 3 Ragland v. Huntingdon, 23 N. Car. 561 450 Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 68 Miss. 92 342 Raiford v. Raiford, 6 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 490 4 Rainey v. Ridgway, 148 Ala. 524 518 Ralston v. Truesdell, 178 Pa. St. 429 835 Ixxil TABLE OF CASES [References are to S' ections.] Ralston’s Estate, In re, 1 Chest. Co. Rep. (Pa.) 482 Ramsdeli v. Ramsdell, 21 Maine 288 Ramsey v. Stephenson, 34 Ore. 408 2 5, Randall v. Beatty, 31 N. J. Eq. 643 Ys J. Eq oe v. Gray, 80 N._J. Eq. v. Morgan, 12 Ves. Jr. 69 vy. Randall, 135 Ill. 398 340, Randolph v. Lampkin, 90 Ky. 551 vy. Randolph, 40 N. J. Eq. 73 Rand’s Estate, In re, 61 Cal. 468 25, Rankin v. Rankin, 36 Ill, 293 vy. Rankin, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 531 v. Rankin, 31 N. Car. 156 503, Teasing Etats In re, 13 Pa. County t. Ransdell v. Moore, 153 Ind. 393 Ransdell v. Boston, 172 Ill. 439 282, Ransome v. Bearden, 50 Tex. 119 Rash v. Purnell, 2 Har. (Del.) 448 . Rasquin v. Hamersley, 152 App. Div. CN, ¥.) 4 173 2 Ratcliffe v. Sangston, 18 Md. 383 Harapene vy. Hamilton, 4 App. D. C. 4 Ratto, In re, 149 Cal. 552 Raub v. Carpenter, 187 U. S. 159 Raudebaugh v. Shelley, 6 Ohio St. 307 Raupp, In re, 10 Misc. (N. Y.) 300 Rausch,. In re, 35 Minn, 291 Rayoratt y. Johnston, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 4 6 5 Raymond v. Sellick, 10 Conn. 480 vy. Wagner, 178 Mass. 315 Read v. Watkins, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 158 Rendmen v. Ferguson, 13 App. D. C. 6 Reagan v. Stanley, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 316 Records v. Fields, 155 Mo. 314 190, Reddick v. Lord, 131 Ind. 336 Redding v. Rice, 171 Pa. St. 301 Redfield v. Marvin, 78 Conn. 704 Redfield’s Estate, Tn re, 116 Cal. 637 Redmond v. Burroughs, 63 N. Car. 242 v. Collins, 4 Dev. L. (N. Car.) 430 Reed v. Davis, 95 Ga. 202 v. Hazelton, 37 Kans. 321 v. Head, 6 Allen (Mass.) 174 v. Reed, 53 Maine 527 vy. Reed, 9 Mass. 372 v. Watson, 27 Ind. 443 vy. Woodward, 11 Phil. (Pa.) 541 Reed’s Estate, In re, 82 Pa. St. 428 Reed’s Estate, In re, 10 Pa. Dist. 162 Reese v. Ivey, 162 Ala. 448 ve aS Court of Newport, 9 R. . 434 Reeve v. Beekman, 42 N. J. Eq. 613 Reeves v. Craig, 60 N. Car. vy. School Dist., 59 of L. 24 Wash. 282 Redfeld v. Bellette, 14 Ark. 148 Reformed Dutch Church v. Brandow, 52 Barb, (N. Y.) 228 Reformed Presbyterian Church v. Mc- : Millan, 31 Wash. 643 v. Nelson, 35 Ohio St. 638 Reid v. Borland, 14 Mass. 208 vy. Corrigan, 143 Ill. 402 322; vy. Gordon, 35 Md. 174 v. Walbach, 75 Md. 205 256, 308, Reid, In re (Del.), 64 Atl. 822 Reiff v. Horst, 52 Md. 255 Reiff’s Appeal, In re, 124 Pa, St. 145 Reilly v. Bristow, 105 Md. 326 Reilly v. Union Protestant Infirmary, 87 Md. 664 166, Reimete Estate, In re, 159 Pa. St. Reinders v. Koppelman, 94 Mo. 338 Reisenberg, In re, 116 Mo. App. 308 171 Reith’s Estate, In re, 144 Cal. 314 338, 351, 355, 960 Rembert v. Vetoe, 89 S. Car. 198 173 ReGen vy. Metro. Sav. Bank, 76 167 209 169 o. Renn v. Samos, 33 Tex. 760 498 Renner v. Williams, 71 Ohio St. 340 284 Reuff v. Coleman, 30 W. Va. 171 288, 294 Rexford v. Bacon, 195 Ill. 70 1225 Reyle’s Estate, In re, 5 Pa. Dist. 416 49 Reynolds v. Bristow, 37 Ga. 283 78 v. Pettyjohn, 79 Va. 327 415 v. Reynolds, 16 N. Y. 257 321 Reynolds, In re, 124 N. Y. 388 214, 217 Reynolds, In re, 20 R. I. 429 313 Reynolds’ Estate, In re, 175 Pa. St. 257 236 Reynolds’ Will, In re, 20 R. I. 429 76, 308 Rhoads v. Rhoads, 43 Ill. 239 77, 103 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Keith, 26 R. I. 42 466 Rhodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 279 33 Rhyne v. Torrence, 109 N. Car. 652 463 Rice v. Boston Port &c. Aid Soc., 56 N. 3 194 394 vy. Harbeson, 63 N. Y. 493 392 v. Rice, 68 Ala. 216 8 v. Rice (Iowa), 119 N. W. 714 137 vy. Tilton, 14 Wyo. 101 495 Rice’s Estate, In re, 14 Phila. (Pa.) 4 325 Rice’s Will, In re, 81 App. Div. (N. Y.) 223 497° Rich v. Beaumont, 6 Bro. P. C. 152 81 _ vy. Bowker, 25 Kans. 7 532 Richards v. Humphreys, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 133 434 v. Miller, 62 Ill. 417 169 _v. Richards, 90 Towa 606 295 Richardson v. Fletcher, 74 Vt. 417 489 v. Hall, 124 Mass. 228 128, 217 v. Orth, 40 Ore. 252 33, 77 v. Ranson, 99 Ill. App. 258 394 v. Richardson, 75 Maine 570 345, 775 _v. Stodder, 100 Mass. 528 337 Richardson’s Will, In re, 81 Hun (N. Y.) 425 509 Richmond v. Davis, 103 Ind. 449 267, 378 v. State, 5 Ind. 334 188, 211 Richter v. Bohnsack, 144 Mo. 516 51 vy. Richter, 180 Ala. 218 62 Rickards v. Gray, 6 Houst. (Del.) 232 286 Ricks’ Estate, In re, 160 Cal. 450 533 Ridley we eeipeais 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 22 v. McPherson, 100 Tenn. 402 173 Riegelman’s Estate, In re, 174 Pa. St. 476 392 Riggin v. West Minster College, 160 — “Mo. 570 25 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506 109 v. Sally, 15 Maine 408 238 Righter v. Riley, 42 W. Va. 633 372 Riley v. Riley, 36 Ala, 496 443 _v. Sherwood, 144 Mo. 354 526 Ringot, In re, 124 Cal. 45 410 Ringrose v. Gleadall,-17 Cal. App. 664 43, 358 Riordon v. Holiday, 8 Ga. 79 ” 236 TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] * Risk’s Appeal, In re, 110 Pa. St. 171 Ritch v. Talbot, 74 Conn. 137 Rivard v. Rivard, 109 Mich. 98 Rivers v. Rivers, 36 S. Car. 302 Rixey v. Stuckey, 129 Mo. 377 Rixner’s Succession, 48 La. Ann, $52 Roane v, Hollingshead, ae Md. 369 Robards vy. Brown, 167 Mo. 447 Robb v. Robb, 173 ee St. 620 v. Washington = ene on aliens, 103 App. Div. (N. Y.) 327 Robbins v. Hore 50 Colo. 610 - v. Smith, 72 Ohio St. 1 v. Swain, Ind. App. 486 Robbin’s Estate, In re, 89 Misc. (N. Y.) 345 Roberson v. Roberson, 21 Ala. 273 Robert_v. Corning, 89 N. Y. 225 v. West, 15 Ga. 122 154, 244, Roberts v. ” Abbott, 127 Ind. 83 v. pianeean, 21 Nebr. 503 v. Hall, 1 Ont. 388 ve Lewis, 153 U. S. 367 v. McMillan, 9 Lea cents 571 v. Roberts, 102 Md. 13 v. Stevens, 84 Maine 338 296, 348, Robert’s Appeal, In re, 59 Pa. St. 70 Roberts’ Estate, In re, 163 Pa. St. 408 Robertson v. Broadbent, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 812 136, v. Brown, 187 Mo. 452 v. Johnson, 24 Ga. 102 v. McGeoch, 11 Paige ans be 640 v. Pickrell, 109 U. orn, 487, 506 Berean Will, In re, 23 Mise. (N. Robert’s Succession, 2 Rob. (La.) “ae, a6 Robeson v. Shotwell, 55 N. J. Jat 318 233 Robinson v. Allison, 74 Ala. 254 370 v. Brewster, 140 Ill. 649 150 v. Cogswell, 192 nae a 338, 341 v. Duvall, 27 pop. 2D 535 527, 533 ve Martin, 138 App. “Se, (N. Y.) 310 284 v. Ostendorff, 38 S. Car. 66 230 v. Palmer, 90 Maine 246 306 v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629 234, 297 v. Raynor, 28 N.Y. 494 33 v. Robinson, 105 Maine 68 380 v. Zollinger, 9 Watts ive) 169 412 Robnett v._Ashlock, 49 ae 171 26 Robson v.: Jones, 3 Del. Ch. 440, 491 Roby v. Smith, 131 tna” 342 350 Roche v. ‘Nason, 105 App. Div. (N. a 1s 256 i Rochford v. Hackman, 9 Hare 480 292 Rock v. Zimmerman, 25 S. Dak. ay ane ? Rocker v. Metzger, 171 Ind. 364 2 Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 8 ane ? v. Holden, 22 R. I. 244 09 v. Swift, 59 Conn, 289 Ts 40, 291 Rodermund v. Clark, 46 N. Y. 354 519 ‘Bangers ve Rodgers, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) des Rede ce v. Rodman, 112 wes 378 33 Roe v. Vingut, 117 NY 213, 380 Roe, In re, 82 Misc. n aA) 565 449 Roederer v. Hess, 112 Ky. 807 296 Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. age » 449, 451 v. Highnote, Fa Ga. 740 241 v. Hinton, 63 N. Car. 78 394 v. Law, 1 Black. Oe S.) 253 291 v. Rogers, 78 Ga. 6 485 Rogers v. Rogers,’ 111 Be & ge v. Rogers, I R. v. Stevens, 8 Tad ies Rogers’ Estate, In re, 94 Cal. 526 Rohrbach_v. Sanders, 212 Pa. 636 Rolfe & pa Asylum v. Lefebre, 69 N. 238 Rican v. Rollwagen, 63 N. Y. 504 85, Romjue v. Randolph, 166 Mo. App. 87 , Rood v. Hovey, 50 Mich. 395 Rook v. Wilson, 142 Ind. 24 Roome v. Phillips, 24 N. Y. 463 Root’s Estate, In re, 187 Pa. St. 118 Ropp v. Minor, 33 Grat. (Va.) 97 Rose v. Eaton, 77 Mich. 247 v. Hale, 185 Ill. 378 v. McHose, 26 Mo. 590 v. O’Brien, 50 Maine 188 Rosenau v. Childress, 111 Ala, 214 Ixxiii 6, 257 23 Rosenbaum v. Garrett, 57 N. J. Eq. 186 Ross v. Carpenter, g B. Mon. (Ky.) v. Conwell, 7 Ind. App. 375 v. Ross, 25 Can, Sup. Ct. he iy Rossetter _v. Simmons, 6 Serg. &R (Pa.) 452 Rote v. Warner, 17 Ohio C. C. 342 Rothrock v. Rothrock, 22 Ore. 551 83, Rothwell v. Jamison, 147 Mo. 601 Roulett.v. Mulherin, 100 Ga. 591 GHEE v. Roundtree, 26 S. Car. 284, Roush v. Wenzel, 15 Ohio C. C. 133 Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jr. 366 Rowland v. Gorsuch, 2 Cox Ch. 187 Rowley v. Sanns, 141 Ind. 179 Roy v. Segrist, 19 Ala. 310 Rubencane v. McKee, 6 Del. Ch. 40 Rubottom v. Morrow, 24 Ind. 202 403, Ruch v. Rock Island, 97 U. S. 693 Rucker v. Lambdin, 12 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 230 Ruckle v._Grafflin, 86 Md. 627 Rudd v. Roberts, 146 Ky. 622 Ruddeil v. Wren, 208 Ill. 508 250, Bradf. Surr. Ruddon_v. McDonald, 1 N.Y.) 352 a Rudolph v. Rudolph, 207 Ill. 266 Rudy v. Ulrich, 69 Pa. St. 177 Rudy’s Estate, In ae 185 Pa. St. 359 Ruffin v. Ruffin, 112 N. Car. 102 Ruffino’s Estate, In. re, 116 “Cal. 304 Ruggles v. Randall, Rumph v. Hiott, 35 S. Car. 444 Runkle v. Gates, 11 Ind. 95 Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1 Rush v. Landers, 107 La. 549 Hash County v. Dinwiddie, 139 Ind. Husnoee v. Rushmore, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 615 Rusing v. Rusing, 25 Ind. 63 Rusk v. Zuck, 147 Ind. 388 Rusling v. Rusling, 42. N. J. Eq. Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 163 Andrews, 120 Ala. 222 . Bates, 181 Mass. 12 . Elden, 15 Maine 193 . Evans, 3 Houst. eh 103 . Hartley, 83 Conn. 654 . Hartt, 87 N. Y. 19 fe Loring, 3 Allen see gat . Minton, 42 N. J. 594 166, 490, sdsseee8 70 Conn. 44 190, i 45 58 422 181 207 232 441 494 518 312 150 269 195 798 495 252 414 66 294 169 233 745 271 *1071 343 210 445 460 506 346 711 Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Russell v. Peyton, 4 Ill. App. 473 421 v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48 105, 176, 193 v. Russell, 3 Houst. Eheky 103 527 v. Russell, 36 N. Y. 581 380 v. Switzer, 63 Ga. 711 440 Russell, In re, 168 N. Y. 169 ae 2h ay Russell’s Estate, In re, eS Cal. we Rutherfurd, In re, 196 396 Rutt’s Estate, In re, 200 Pa. Bo 22 Ryan v. Egan, 156 Ill. 224 96 Ryder v. Lyon, 85 Conn. 245 338 Ryder’s Estate, In re, 41 _App. Div. (N. Y.) 247 233 Ryno v. Ryno, 27 N. J. Eq. 522 485 Ss Saeger v. pode, 181 Til. 514 234 Saint v. Charity Hospital, 48 La. 236 24 St. James v. Bagley, 138 N. Car. 384 187 St. James Church v. Walker, 1 Del. ee 284 James pigten Asylum v. Shelby, oe Nebr. 882 St. John v. Andrews, dnstitate. for Girls, 191 N. Y. 77, 78, 185 v. Andrews sie ia Girls, 117 App. Div. (N. Y.) 698 77, 78 v. Dann, 66 Conn. 401 238, 242, 292, 295, 348, 356 St. polars Parish v. Bostwick, 3° App. 452 151, 478, 490, ‘406, 518 St. ee 's Appeal, In re, 34 Conn. 434 + 492, 494, St. Mark’s Church v. Teed, 120 N. Y: 583 St: ne oe Church v. Stockton, 8 N. J. St. Paul's Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188 272, St cl Church v. Brown, 21 R. L ee v. Huff, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 164 Salter v. Bryan, 26 N. Car. 494 0 Sampson v. Browning, 22 Ga. 293 22, 454 v. Randall, 72 Maine_109 213, 231 Sanborn v. Clough, 64 N. H. 315 392 Sander’s Estate, Tn re, 126 Wis. 660 1 1228 Sanderson v. Sanderson, 52 N. J. Eq. 243 516 Sa v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575 244 Sanford v. Sanford, 45. N. Y. 723 7 San Francisco &c. "Asylum v. Superior Ct., 116 Cal. 443 493 Sappingfield v. King, 49 Ore. 102 Sargent v. Burdett, 96 an ga v. Cornish, 54 N. OH. 350 v. Siler 8 Ohio oe (Reprint) 381 Sartor v. ine 39 Miss. 760 528, 534 Sasse’s Estate, In re, 93 Nebr. 640 393 Satterfield v. Tate, 132 Ga. 256 242 Saunders v. J T. Samarreg Co., 205 Pa. 632 463 v. Saunders, 109 Va. 191 191 193, 736 v. Webber, 39 Cal. 287 373 Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540 449 Savin v. Webb, 96 Md. 504 394 Sawin v. Cormier, 179 Mass. 420 825 Sawyer v. Banfield, 55 N: H. 149 353 v. Freeman, 161 Mass. 543 307 v. Sawyer, 52 N. Car. 134 476 vy. White, 122 Fed. 223 $22 Saxton v. Krumm, 107 Md. 393 108- Scaife v. Emmons, 84 Ga. 619 454 Scales v. Thornton, 118 Ga. 93 22 Scattergood v. Kirk, 192 Pa. St. 263 446 Schaadt v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 2 Cal. App. 715 33 Schaeffer v. Messersmith, 10 Pa. County Ct. 366 283 Schafer v. Eneu, a Pa. St. 304 105, 176 Schaff v. Peters, 111 Mo. App. 447 504 Schaffer v. Mtiews 77 foar "93 6 Schardt v. Schardt, 100 Tenn. 276 61 Schedel’s Estate, In re, 73 Cal. 594 105, 176, 193 Schermerhorn v. Merritt, 123 Mich’ 310° 442 Schieffelin v. Schieffelin’ 127 Ala. = 530 Schierbaum v. Schemme, 157 Mo. 1 449, 531 Schimpf v. Rhodewald, 62 Nebr. 105 236 Schlottman v. Hoffman, 73 Miss. 188 520 Schmaunz v. Goss, 132 Mass. 141 174 Schmidt v. Bomerbach, 64 Ind. 53 518, 525 v. Mitchell, 101 Ky. 570 391 v. Schmidt? 201 Ill, 191 529 v. Schmidt, 47 Minn. 451 530 v. Schmidt, 7 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 201 59 Schmidt, In rg, 185 Pa. St. 579 232 Schmidt's Estate, In re, 15 Mont. 117 78 Schnee v. Schnee, 61 Kans. 643 490, 498, 504 Schneer v. Greenbaum, 27 Del. 97 234 Schneider_v. Heilbron, 115 App. Div. Ny Voy 720 307 v. Holzhauer, 134 Ky. 235 Schnell v. Schnell, 39 tal, oe 556 295 Scholl’s Will, In re, 100 Wis. 650 105, 106, 176 Schorr v. Etling, 124 Mo. 42 62 Schreyer v. rere 101 App. Div. N. Y.)_456 358 | Schuldt’s Estate, In re, 199 ie 58 253 Schult v. Moll, 132 N. Y. 122 231 Schultz v. Schultz, 10 Grat. We) 358 490 Schultze v. Schultze, 144 Ill. 610 Schumacher v. Schumacher, “ay Tex. Civ. App. 497 61 Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 A, 454° 28, 502 Schwab v. Piero, 43 Minn. 520 33 Soltuate v. Hanover, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 4 Scobey v. Gano, 35 Ohio 2 ee 412 Scott v. Farman, 89 Ind. 518 v. Fink, 45 Mich. ie 476 v. Harkness, 6 Idaho 736 25, 453 v. Hawk, 107 Iowa 723 445 v. Herrell, 31 App. D. C. 45 498 ve Kramer, 31 Ohio a 295 281, 295 v. McKee, 105 Ga. 533 v. Maddox, 113 Ga. 5 464, 505 v. Morrison, 5 Ind. 392 v. Riley, 16 Phila. (ee) 106 13, 430 e Thrall, 77 Kans. 688 452 West, 63 Wis. 529 . 420 Scott, In re, 141 Cal. 485 463 Scott?s Estate, In ,re, 128 Cal. 57 526 Scott’s Will, In re, 88 Minn. 386 1159 Scoville v. Mason, 76 Conn. 459 211, 219 Scripps v. Wayne Prob. Judge, 131 Mich. 265 521 In re, 52 Pa. Super. Scull’s Estate, Ce 87 Seabright v. Seabright, 28 W. Va. 412 3 Seabrook v. Grimes, 107 Md. 410 357 ear v. Seaburn, 15 Grat. (Va.) Seaman’s Estate, In re, 146 Cal. 455 440, 444 TABLE OF CASES Ixxv - [References are to Sections.] Seamonds v. Hodge, 36 W. Va. 304 Sears v. Chapman, 158 Mass. 400 v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395 358 v. Dillingham, 12 Mass. 358 448, 499 v. Russell, 8 Gray (Mass.) 86 265 Sear’s Estate, In re, 18 Utah 193 347 Seattle v. McDonald, 26 Wash. 98 341 Seaver v. Lewis, 14 "Mass. 83 392 Seaverns v. Presbyterian Hospital, 173 Ill, 414 398 Seay v. Cockrell, 102 Tex. 280 244 Sechrest v. Edwards, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 163 441 Second Congregational Soc. v. Waring, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 304 352 ‘Second Reformed Presbyterian Church v. Disbrow, 52 Pa. St. 219 231 Security Co. v. Brinley, 49 Conn. 48 434 v. Pratt, 65 Conn. 161 368 v. Snow, 70 Conn, 288 372 Seebeck, In re, 140 N. Y. 241 367, 378 Seebrock v. paere 30 Nebr. 424 526 Seeley v. Hincks, 65 Conn. 1 293 Seery v. Murray, 107 Towa 384 492 Seguine v. ae 42 N. Y. 663 103 Segur’s Will, In re, 71 Vt. 224 83 Seibert v. Wise, 70 Pa. St. 147 237, 241 Seibert’s “Appeal, In re, 13 Pa. St. 501 254 Seibert’s opel, In tes 19 Pa. St..49 255 Sellards v. Kirby, 82 Kans. 291 151 Selman v. Robertson, 46 S. Car. 262 242, 286 Sells v. Delgace) 186 Mass. 25 421 Semmes v. orthington, 38 Md. 298 33 Senac’s Succession, 2 Rob. (La.) 258 47 Senn v. Greundling, 218 Ill. 458 440 Serre’s Succession, 133 La. 929 55 Sessions’ Estate, Tn re, 70 Mich. 297 169 Sevier v. Douglass, 44 *La. Ann. 605 41, 47, Wee v. Woodson, 205 Mo. 202 Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262 tee v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131 46, 365 Seymour v. McAvoy, 121 Cal. 438 296, 356 v. Sanford, 86 Conn. 516 339 Seymour’s Succession, 48 La. Ann. 993 461 Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 212 288 Shackley v. Homer, 87 Nebr. 146 250 Shadden v. Hembree, 17 Ore. 14 241, 306 Shaffer’s Succession, 50 La. Ann. 601 153 Shahan v. Swan, 25 Ohio L. Bul. 69 3 v. Swan, 48 Ohio St. 25 Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112 539 Shallcross, In re, 200 Pa, 122 ,, 296 a ed Estate, In re, 9 Pa. Dist. 353 See v. Kelly, 88 Minn. 202 341 Shaner v. Wilson, 207 Pa. 550 794 hangs vy. Hallock, 6 App. Div. (N. Y¥.) 55 346 Shank v. Dewitt, 44 Ohio St. 237 376 Shanilead’s Appeal, In re, 47 Pa. St. 5 Shapter’s Estate, In re, 35 Colo. Orr 533 Sharboro’s Estate, In re, 63 Cal. 5 520 Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala, 110 485 v. Humphreys, 16N. J. L 234 vy. ‘McPherson, 10 Ohio C. é * 181 60 v. Wallace, 83 Ky. 584 479 Sharp’s Appeal, In re, 134 Pa. St. 492 85 Sharp’s Estate, In re, 17 Cal. App. 634 Shattuck v. Young, 2Sm. & M. Miss.) Shaw vi Camp, 163 IIL ee 156, 478, v. Camp, 61 Ill. App. 6 515 Sheehan v. Kearney, 82 Miss. 688 442, Sheets, In re, 52 Pa. St. 257 411, 419, Sheirick v. Maxwell, 28 Ky. L. 173 Shelby v. o James Orphan Asylum, 66 Nebr. 532 Sheldon v. Newt t; 3 Ohio St. 494 369 v. Stockbridge, 67 Vt. 299 98 Shelton v. Hadlock, 62 Conn. 140 306 v. Homer, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 462 373 371 Shepard v. Burr (Del. Ch.), 87 Atl. 1020 293 v. Shepard, 57 Conn. 24 293 v. Shepard, 60 Vt. 109 205 sneppard’ ‘Ss Estate, In re, 149 Cal. 219 -525 Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208 242, 270 Sheppey v. Stevens, 185 Fed. 147 519 Sherman _v. American Cong. Assn., 98 Fed. 295 v. Baker, 20 R. I. 446 271 Sherwood v. American Bible Soc., 40 N. Y. 561 97 Shibla v. Ely, 6 N. J. Eq. 181 411 Shields v. Stillman, 48 Mo. 82 7 v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 119 N. Car. 380 506 Shillaber’s Estate, In re, 74 Cal. ee 152, » 500 Shimer v. Mann, 99 Ind. 190 * 351 Shindler My ge EER 150 App. Div. CN, VN 875 243 Sluper v. Shiner, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 392 Shinkle v. Crock, 17 Pa. St. 159 50 Shippen v. Burd, 42 Pa. St. 461 422 Shirey v. Postlethwaite, 72 Pa. St. 39 9234 Shirk’s Estate, In re, 242 Pa. 95 281 Shirley v. Healds, 34 N. H. 407 420 v. Shattuck, 28 Miss, 13 Shivers v. Latimer, 20 Ga. 327 80 Shockley v. Parvis, 4 Houst. (Del.) 235 Shoemaker v. Eeewn, 10 Kans. 383 350 Shorten v. Judd, 60 Kans. 73 466, 467 Shull v. Johnson, Ss N. Car, 202 178 Shultz v. Houck, 29 Md. fs 487, 509 Shuman v. Heldman, 63_S. Car. 474 293 Shumate v. Bailey, 110 Mo. 411 207 SHeeney v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 488 Shurtleff v. Francis, 118 Mass. 154 5 Shute v. Sargent, 67 N. H. 305 43 Sibley v. Cook, 3 Atk. 572 309 Sibthrop, In re, L. R.1 P. & D. 106 488 Sickles v. New Orleans, 80 Fed. eee » 45 Siddons v. Cockrell, 131 Ill. 653 Wasa "811 Sigel, In re, 213 Pa. 14 463 Sill v. White, G2 Conn. 430 237 Sillcocks v. Sillcocks, 50 N. J. Eq. 25 236 Silliman v. Whitaker, 119 N. tae” 89 = 245 Silverthorn, In re, 15 Ont. L. R. 112 236 Simickson v. Snitcher, 14 N J. L. 53 207 Simmons v. Beazel, 125 Ind. 362 208, 1197 v. Cabanne, 177 Mo. 336 136, 241 v. Leonard, 89 Tenn. 622 521 v. Leonard, 91 Tenn, 183 446, 451 v. Oliver, 74 Wis. 633 390 v. Simmons, 73 Ala. 235 194 Simms v. Buist, 52 S. Car. 554 238 singe. v. Middleton, 51 Tex. oe App. 3 53 , 530, 531 Simonds v. SuiGnss 168 Mass. 144 234 Simons, In re, 55 Conn. 239 374 Simonsen v. Hutchinson, 231 Ill. 508 684 Simons’ Will, In re, 55 Conn, 239 323 Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50 297 Simpson v. Adams, ta Ky. 790 1129 v. Cherry, 34 S. Car. 68 241 v. Millsaps, 80 Miss. 239 345 y. Welcome, 72 Maine 496 867 Ixxvi TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Simrell’s Estate, In F614 Pa. St. 604 ae Sims v. Sims, 94 Va v. Skinner, 118 Ky. 573 1188 Singleton v. Scott, 11 Iowa 589 373 Sinnet v. Bowman, 151 Ill. 146 525 Sinnott v. Moore, 113 Ga. 908 45, 296 Sisk v. Almon, 34 Ark. 391 392 Sistrunk v. Ware, 69 Ala. 273 Sites v. Eldridge, 45 N. J. E Fy 204 Sizer, In re, 129 App. Div. (N.Y 446 Skeen v. Marriott, 22 Utah 8 35 Skeggs v. Horton, 82 Ala. 352 505 Skerrett’s Estate, "In re, 67 Cal. 585 Skinner v. American Bible Soc., 92 Wis. 209 449, 478, 480 v. Hemenway, ~ a nee 582 167 v. Spann, 175 Ind 213, 214 v. Wood, 76 N. al 409 Skinner, In’ re, 40 Ore. 571 449 Shoutenburgi v. Hopkins, 43 N. J. Ea. 102 Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747 533 Slayton v. Singl eton, 72 Tex. 209 506 Sleeper v. Kelley, 65 N. H. 206 184 Slemmer v. Crampton, 50 Iowa 302 244 Slingluff v. Johns, 87 Md. 273 157 Sloan v. Thornton, 102 ey 443 310 Sloane v. Stevens, 107 N. 122 32, 184 Slocum, In re, 169 N. Y. 183 345, 1061 Slote v. Reiss, 153 Ky. 30 174 Small v. Field, 102 Mo. 104 339, 355 v. Jose, 86 Maine 120 221 v. McCalley, 51 Ala. 527 492 v. Thompson, 92 Maine 539 233, 237 Smalley v. Smalley, 70 Maine 545 448 Smaw v. Young, 109 Ala. 528 250 Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320 421 v. Bryan, 34 N. Car. 11 55 v. Cairns, 92 Tex. 667 321 v. Chadwick, 111 Ala. 542 241 v. Clark, 10 Md. 186 296 v. Curry, 52 Ill. opr 227 154 v. Day, 2 Penn. ( ay 245 76, 526 v. Dennis, 163 Ill. 211 v. Dolby, 4 Harr. ba) 350 460 v. Dorsey, 38 Ind. 3 v. Du Bose, 78 Ga. ai 14, 106, 531 v. Edwards, 88 _N. Y. 254 v. Greeley, 67 N. H. 2 180 v. Hardesty, 88 Md. 374 v. Harrington, 4 Alien “Mass. 566 358 v. Henline, 174 Ill. 526 v. Holden, 58 Kans. 1835 150 v. Hutchinson, 61 Mo. 83 211 v. Jackman, 115 Mich. 192 322 v. Jewett, 4 N. H. 513 217 v. Johnson, 21 Ga. 386 354 v. Jones, 4 Ohio 115 60 v. Joyner, 136 Ga. 755 284 v. Kimball, 62 N. H. 606 167 v. McIntyre, 95 Fed. 585 368 v. McKitterick, 51 Iowa 548 1210 v. Nelson, 18 ‘Vt. 511 185 v. Phillips, 131 Ala, 629 234 v. Pierce, 65 Vt. 200 33 v. qaonels a Iowa 55 207, 236 v. Smith, 157 Ala. 79 286 v. Smith; 7 Ga. 477 v. Smith; 64 Nebr. 563 280, 294 v. Smith; 72 N. H. 168 1 v. Smith; 28 N. J. L. 208 38 Vv. Smith, 48 N. J. Eq. 566 63 v. Smith) 79 N. Car. 455 414 Vv. Smith; 17 Grat. i 268 207 v. Smith, 23 Wis. 258, 283 v. Sweringen, 26 Mo 551 $5 v. Terry, 43 N. J. Eq. 659 205 y. Thurman, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 110 22 Smith v. Towers, 69 Md, 77 348 v. Townsent, 32 Pa. St. 434 271 v. ve Dursen, 15 Johns, (N. Y.) se v. Sates. 4 Ala. 96 Smith, In re, 7 Ch, Div. 665 ai2 Smith, In re, 85 Mise. of Y.) 636 78 Smith, In re, 131 N. 1216 Smithdeal v. Smith, “aN Pw. 52 22 Smith’s Appeal, In re, 61 Conn. 420 410 Smith’s Appeal, In re, 103 Pa. St. oe? 434 Smith’s Estate, In re, 46 Misc. (N. Y.) 210 231 Smith’s Estate, In re, 6 Pa. Dist. 329 215 Smith’s Estate, In re, 140 Pa. St. 344 345 Smith’s Estate, In re, 144 Pa. St. 428 338 Smith’s Estate, In re, 226 Pa. 304 256 Sen's Goods, In re, L. R. 1 P. & Dz Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U. S. 398 290, 1232 Smith's Will, In re, 52 Wis. 543 451 Smithwick v. Jordan, 15 pees 113 355 Smoot v. Heyser, 113 Ky. 63 Smullin vy. Wharton, 73 Nene 667 39, 340, 341, 342, 349 Smyth v. Burns, 25 Mins 422 390 Sneed v. Ewing, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 460 467 Sneer v. Stutz, 102 Iowa 462 351 Snider v. Burks, 84 Ale. 53 450° v. Snider, 160 N. 151 169, 803 Snodgrass v. Se ee 164 Ind. 59 789 Snow v. Foley, 119 Mass, 102 141 Snowball v. Snowball, 164 Cal. 476 519 Snuffer v. Howerton, 124 Mo. 637 485, 488 Snyder v. Baker, 5 Mackey (D. C.) 443 683, 861 v. Nesbitt, 77 Md. 576 231, 234 Snyder, In re, 217 Pa. 71 138, 140 Soher’s Estate, In re, 78 Cal. 477 25, 461, 463 Sohier v, Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1” 280 Souder’s Estate, In re, 203 Pa, 293 233 Soulard’s Estate, In re, 141 Mo. 642 338 Southard v. Central R. Co., 26 N. J. . 66. Southgate v. Karp, 154 Mich. 697 194 South ae Tp. v. Marshall, 138 Pa. St. 323 South NS click Bettie dst Seminary v. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 188. Southworth v. Spal onh 173 Mo. 59 156, 452, 533 Sowell v. Sowell, 40 Ala. 243 509 Sowers v. Cyrenius, 39 Ohio St. 29 864 enter Estate, In re, 49 Pa. Super. Ct. 314 91 Spathaw v. Sparhawk, 10 Allen COD Sparks v. Dorrell, 151 Mo. App. 173 387 Spath v. Ziegler, 48 La. Ann. 1168 184 Spaulding vy. Chicago &c. R. Co., 30 Wis. 110 21 Speer v. Speer, 146 Iowa 6 83. Spence v. Widney (Cal.), 46 Bae; 463 271 Spencer v. Spencer, 163 N. Car. 83 be v. Spencer, 25 R. I, 239 Spencer, In re, 16 R. I. 25 394, 398 Spencer’s Appeal, In re, 77 Conn. 638 464 Spicer v. Connor, 148 ee Div. (N. Y.) 334 176 Sprague v. Sprague, 13 R. 701 351 Spreckels’ Estate, Tn re, 163 Cal. 559 63, 65 Spring, In re, 216 Pa. St. 529 337, 343 TABLE OF CASES Ixxvii [References are to Sections.] ‘Sticldoee v. Congleton, 30 Ga. 976 191, 240, 257 Stableton v. Ellison, A olne St. 527° 375 Stacey v. Cunningham, 6 ? Otis St. 176 516 Stafford v. Villain, io La. 319 24 Stagg v. Green, 47 Mo. 500 ai Staigg v. Atkinson, 144 Mass. 564 48, Staines v. Burton, 17 en 331 271, 332 Stamm v. Bostwick, 122 N. Y. 4 Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 119 3 38 Stant v. American Security &c. Co., 23 B0 App. D. C. 25 108 Stanwood v. Stanwood, 179 Mass. 223 306 Staples v. Lewis, 71 Corin, 288 171 v. Mead, 152 App. Div. (N. Y.) 745 190, 191 Stapleton v. Stapleton, 21 Ala. 587 523 Starbuck v. Starbuck, 93 N. Car, 183 434 Stark v. Conde, 100 Wis. 633 281, 282, 294 v. Parker, 56 N. H. 481 524 Stark, In re, 149 Wis. 631 219 Starke v. Wilson, 65 Ala. 576 324 Starkweather v. American Bible Soc., 72 Til. 50 44, 97 Starling. v. Price, 16 Ohio St. 29 176 Starnes v. Hatcher, 121 Tenn. 330 33 v. Hill, 112 N. Car. 1 244 Starr v. Moulton, 97 Ill. 525 379 v. Starr, 2 Root (Conn.) 303 448 v. Willoughby, 218 Ill. 485 380, 1193 Starrs v. Mason, 32 La. Ann. 454 Staser v. Hogan, 120 Ind. 207 533 State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 674 15 v. Bates, 2 Harr. (Del.) 18 100 v. Bazille, 97 Minn. 11 77 v. Crossley, 69 Ind. 203 394, 462, 476 v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294 15 v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93 85° v. Guilbert, 70 Ohio St. 229 77 v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456 271 v. McGlynn, 20 Cal. ae 508, 518, 521 v. McQuillin, 246 Mo. 518 v. Main, 87 Conn. 5° 253 v. Meagher, 44 Mo. 356 403 v. Raughley, 1 Houst. Pele ae 193 v. Rogers, 1 Houst. (Del.) 5 410 v. Sacramento County eee Ct; 148 Cal. 517, 518 v. Smith, 52 Conn. 557 237 v. Smith; 16 Lea (Tenn.) 662 167 ve Twelfth qucieial Dist. Ct. 34 Mont. 485 v. White, 30° f. Car. 116 492 Stayman v. Paxson, 221 Pa. 446 173 Stead v. Curtis, 205 Fed. 439 491, 495 Stearns v. Godfrey, 16 Maine 158 283 as v. Lathrop, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 489 Stebbins’ Estate, In re, 94 Mich. 304 534 Stedfast v. Nicoll, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 18 193 Stedman v. Priest, 103 Mass. 293 191 Steel v. Steel, 4 J. I Marsh. (Ky.) 231 413 Steel, In re, *L. RB. (1903) 1 Ch. 135 9 211 Steele v. Helm, 2 Marv. (Del.) 237 30, 533 v. Price, 5 B. Mie, ao 58 460 v. Steele, 64 Ala. 393 Steen v. Steen, 68 N. Pee 472 172 Steib v. Whitehead, 111 ti. 247 296, 348, 356 Steinke v. Yetzer, 108 Towa 512 398 Steinmetz’s Estate, In re, 168 Pa. St. 175 59 Stephens v. Evans, 30 Ind. 39 265 v. Milnor, 24.N. J. Eq. 358 381 ve Serer cas. temp. Talb, 228 269 v. Swann, 9 Leigh (Va.) 404 96 Stephenson v. Richardson, 88 Pa. St. 376 v. Short, 92 N. Y. 433 77 Stephenson, In re, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 97 232 Sterling v. Ives, 78 Conn. 498 351, 357 Sternburg’s Estate, In re, 94 Iowa 305 463, 488 Stetson v. Eastman, 84 piste 366 306, 308 v. Stetson, 200 Ill. 462 Stevens v. De La Vaale 166 Mo. 20 281 v. Dennett, 51 N. H. 324 519 v. Flower, "46 N. a i 340 322 v. Gage, 55 N. 175 403, 414 v. Hope, 52 Mick, 65 485 _v. Underhill, 67 N. H. 68 327 Stevens, In re, 83 Cal. 322 103 Stevens’ Estate, In re, 163 Iowa 364 63 DRREHERD a Abingdon, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 179 v. Abington, 31 Bray, 305 179 v. Lesley, 70 N. Y. 512 192 v. Superior Ct. 6 “Cal. 60 492 Steward v. Knight, 62 N. ii Eq. 232 234 v. Lyons, 54 W. Va. 76 v. Middleton, 47 N. 3° Ey, 293 81 Stewart v. Harriman, 56 N. H. 25 448 v. Mathews, 19 Fla. 752 371 v. Mulholland, 88 Ky. 38 476 v. Pettus, 10 Mo. 755 487 v. Smiley, 46 Ark. 373 392, 420 v. Stewart, 15 Ch. Div. 539 433 v. Stewart, 177 Mass. 493 13, 30, 32 v. Stewart, 13 N. J. Eq. 398 1214 v. Stewart, 56 N. J. Ba, pat 526 Stewart, In re, 5 N. Y. S. 290 Stewart’s Appeal, In re, sé Aisias 300 410 Stewart’s Estate, In re, 74 Cal. 98 65 Stewart’s Estate, In re, 147 Pa. St. 383 431 Stewart’s Estate, In re, 26 Wash. 32 41 Stickney, In re, 41 Misc. (N. Y.) 70 156 Stickney’s Will, In re, 85 Md. 79 44, 270, 280 Still v. Ruby, 35 Pa. St. 373 350 Stirling v. Lawrason, 31 La. Ann. 169 414 Stitt v. Stitt, 205 Mo. 155 414 Stockwell v. Bowman, 23 1 L. 2304 313 Stoddard v. Bowie, 5 Md. 6 Stoelker v. Thornton, 88 Al, 241 61 Stoff v. McGinn, 178 Ill. 181, 368 eugnon v. Lee, 60 L. J. a” B. 669 101 Stokes v. McKibbin, 13 Pa. St. 267 101 v. Payne, 58 Miss. 614 379 v. Pillow, 64 ae 1 62 Vv. Stokes, 78 L. age 42 v. Weston, 142 N. “Y. 433 252, 258, 285, 286 Stone v. Brown, 16 Tex. 425 410 v. Cook, 179 Mo. 534 519 vy. Framingham, a Mass. 303 307 v. Green, 30 Ga. 523 v. Griffin, 3 Vt. 400. 99 v. Hackett, 12 Gray (Mass.) 227 4 v. Huxford, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 452 490 v. Littlefield, 151 Mass. aes 222, 345, 349 Stone, In re, 138 Mass. 476 357 Stone, In re, 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 317 77 Stone’s Appeal, In re, 74 Conn. 301 22 Stone’s Succession, 31 La. Ann. 311 414 Stonestreet v. Doyle, 75 Va. 356 308 Storey, In re, 120 Ill. 244 489, 492 Storrs v. Burgess (R. I.), 67 Atl. 731 "1208 v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 180 Ill. 368 520 Story v. Palmer, 46 N. J. Eq. 1 343, 350, 358 v. Story, 188 Mo. 110 525 Stout v. Cook, 77_N. J. Eq. 153 176 vy. Young, 217 Pa. 427 485 Ixxvili TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Stpivenbiatls v. Hopkins, 43 N. J. Eq. Stover v. Kendall, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 557 452, 480 Stowe v. Stowe, 140 Mo. 594 485, 491, 520 Strand v. Stewart, 51 Wash. er 7, 77 Stratton v. Physio-Medical Gale 149 Mass. 505 185 Stratton, In re, 112 Cal. 543 25 Straub’s Case, 49 N. J. Eq. 264 495 Straw v. East Maine Conference, 67 Maine 493 66, 189 ae badges Estate, In re, 5 Pa. Dist. oie Striewig’s Estate, In re, 169 Pa. - 61 192, 240 Stringfellow v. Somerville, 95 Va. 701 13 Strode v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. St, 181 i v. McCormick, 158 Til, 142 Strong v. Williams, 12 Mass. 391 183 Stuart Moraes of Bute, 11 Ves. Jr. nie v. Stuart, 18 W. Va. 675 180 v. Walker, 72 Maine 145 795 Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Ala. 555 469 Studdard v. Wells, 120 Mo. 25 66, 67 Studer v. Seyer, 69 Ga. 125 33 Stultz v. Kiser, 37 N. Car. 538 141 DDE HEEn's Estate, In re, 108 Iowa 555 1185 Stunz v. Stunz, 131 Ill. 210 62 Sturdevant’s DREals In re, 71 Conn. 392 76, 529 Sturdivant v. Neill, 27 Miss. 157 49 Sturges v. Cargill, 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. ¥.5, 216 354 Sturgis v. Paine, 146 Mass. 354 339 v. Work, 122 Ind. 134 -191, 201 Sturtevant v. Sturtevant, 116 Ill. 340 86 Sullivan v. Garesche, 229 Mo. 496 241, 242, 284 v. Jones, 129 N. Car. 442 241 v. Larkin, 60 Kans. 545 308 v. Sullivan, 106 Mass. 474 107, 448 Sullivan, In re, 114 Mich, 189 Sulzberger v. Sulzberger, 50 Cal. 385 62 Summerel v. Summerel, 34 S. Car. 85 55 Summers v. Copeland, 125 Ind. 466 v. Smith, 127 Ill. 645 286 Summit v. Yount, 109 Ind. 506 258, 283 Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483 30, 410, v. Staton, 151 N. Car. 198 Sumpter. v. Carter, 115 Ga. 893 Sumwalt v. Sumwalt, 52 Md. 338 Sunderland v. Hood, 84 Mo. 293 252, Supplee’s Estate, In re, 5 Pa. Dist. 41 400 Sutphen v. Ellis, 35 Mich, 446 508 Sutro’s Estate, Tn re, 139 ‘Cal. 87 306 Sutton v. Chenault, 18 Ga. 1 50 v. Hancock, 118 Ga. 857 467 v. Harvey, "24 Tex. oie App. 26 412 v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 33 v. Sutton, 5 Harr. (Del) 459 498 Suydam v. Thayer, 94 Mo. 49 210 Svanburg v. Fosseen, 75 Minn. 350 33 Swaim’s Will, In re, 162 N. Car. 213 151 Swain v. Duane, 48 ey 358 101 v. Gilbert, 3 Mo. 521 Swallow v. Swallow, 7 "N. J. Eq. 278 172 Swan v. Hammond, 138 Mass. 45 467 Swann v. Swann, 58 N. Car. 297 392 Swarthout v. Ranier, 143 N. Y. 499 237 Swasey v. serceriea Bible Co, 57 Maine 5 14 v. Jaques, 144 Mass, 135 | Tayloe v. Johnson, 63 N.. N. Car. 381 Sweeney v. Muldoon, 139 Pad 304 420 v. Warren, 127 N. ¥. 366 Sweeney’s Estate, In re, $4 Nebr. 834 fe Sweet v. Burnett, 136 N. Y. 204 215 Sweitzer’s Estate, In re, 142 Pa. St. 541 204 Swenson’s Estate, In re, 55 Minn. 300 169, 192 Swift Mia, ousted 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) v. Wiley, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 114 swift, In re, 137 Ni. Ys Swing v. Gatch, 7 Am. u Ree. 5 Swygart v. Willard, 166 Ind. 25 87 Sykes v. Van Bibber, 88 Md. 98 395 lg Tabler v. Tabler, 62 Md. 601 153 Taft v. Smith, 186 Mass. 31 415 Talbot v. Field, 173 Mass. 188 1233 Talbott v. Hamill, 151 Mo, 292 236 Tally v. Butterworth, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 501 Tamplin’s Goods, In re, L. R. (1894) Prob. 39 487 Tanton v. Keller, 167 Ill. 129 479 Tappan’s Appeal, In re, 52 Conn, 412 187, 280 Tarbell v. Walton, 71 Vt. 406 487, 506 oe Estate, In re, 3 Pa. County or 3 Tarver v. Haines, 55 Ala. 371 v. Tarver, 9 Pet. (U. 3) S74 26 Tate v. Tate, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) ee 453 Tatnall v. Hankey, 2 Moore P. C. 342 46 Taubenhau v. Dunz, 125 Ill. 524 204 Taussig v. Reel, 134 Mo. 530 a8 v. Mosher, 29 193 Taylor v. Benham, 5 iow, ay oe 233 335 v. Bennett, 1 Ohio C. C. 504 . Calvert, 138 Ind. 67 415 Columbian University, 226 U. 18, 188 ee 153 Ill. 220 63, 431 Harwell, 65 Ala. 1 356 Henry, 48 Md. 550 33:4 Hudson, 145 Mo. App. 377 33 James, 4 Dete, Pa (S. Car.) 1 60 Kelly, 31 Ala. 9, 464 SaddddddSSdd¢de4888 S88 Lindsay, 14 R. 2 518 244 McClintock, 87 Ark. 243 532 Mitchell, 57 Pa. St. 209 50 Pegram, 151 an age 461 . Phillips, 30 Vt. 2 Stephens, 165 ind * 00 158, 284, 850 Taylor, 174 Ind. 670 201; 210 Taylor, 145 Mass. 239 433 Thieman, 132 Wis. 38 *33 . Tibbatts, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 177. 491 : Cea 38 N. J. Eq. 91 295 . Wardlaw, 3 Dem. Surr. (N. Y.) 48 151 v. Wright, 93 Ind. 121 397 Taylor’ 's Estate, In re, 230 Pa. 346 444 Taylorsville lage: {Ghureh v. Offutt, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 5 189 Deg eubrocic v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533 Teed v. Morton, 60 N. Y. 502 191, 312 Teegarden v. Lewis, 145 Ind. 98 - 415 =o v. Bishop. of Derry, 168 Mass. 7 Teets v. Weise, 47 N. J. L. 154 at Tendick v. Evetts, 38 Tex. 275 Teopfer’s Estate, In re, 12 N. Mex, 372 466 TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Terhune v. cone Nat. Safe De- posit Co., 245 Ill. 463 Terrell v. eked g ‘rob, (La.) 243 106 v. McCown, 91 Tex. 373 Terry v. Bourne, 17 Ky. i 1042 241 ‘ vy. Buffington, 11 Ga. 337 76, 83 v. Smith, 42 N. J. Eq. 504 419 v. Wiggi ns, 47 Y. 512 231 Teske v. Dittberner, 70 Bebe 544 33 Tevis v. McCreary, 3 he ey 151 6 Thaw v. Ritchie, 136 U. 519 36 Thayer v. Boston, 15 coe “(Mass.) 347 (165 v. Finnegan, 134 Mass. 62 324 v. Paulding, 200 Mass. 98 663 v. Pressey, 175 Mass. 225 344 v. Spear, 58 Vt. 327 289, 899 v. Wellington, 9 Mass. 152 ‘rheliusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227 269, 272, 346 Theobald v. Fugman, 64 Ohio St. 473 77 Theological Soc. v. Attorney-General, 135 Mass. 285 271 Theriot’s Succession, 114 La. 611 517 Thiebant v. Sebastian, 10 Ind. 454 506 Thieme v. Zumpe, 152 Ind. 359 222, 351 Thissell v. Schillinger, 186 Mass. 180 322 Thom v. Thom, 101 Md. 444 251 Thomas v. Blair, 111 La. 678 204 v. Carter, 170 Pa. St. 272 83 v. Castle, 76 Conn. 447 241, 358 v. Higgins, 47 Md. 439 244 v. Miller, 161 Ill. 60 236 v. Morrissett, 76 Ga. 384 420 v. National Christian Assn., 63 Nebr. 14, 77 v. ORs ciate University, 70 Ohio 368, 981 ve Ge 431 Ga, 248 367 v. People, 107 Ill. 517, 492 v. Scott, 24 Ky. L. 2031 212 v. Thomas (Ky.), 110 S. W. 853 1199 v. Thomas, 97 Miss. 697 176, 353 v. Thomas, 149 Mo. 426 257 v. Troy cy Nat. Bank, 19 Misc. (N. Y.) 470 231 v. Williams, 9 Fla. 289 412 Thomas’ Estate, In re, 155 Cal. 488 524 Thomasson v. Driskell, 13 oe 253 486 Thome v. Allen, 24 Ky. L. 987 347 Thomman’s Estate, In re, 161 Pa. St. 444 257 Thompson v. Beasley, ie prey 175 v. Brown, 4 Johns. C (N. ry 619 414 v. Churchill, 60 Vt. Bey 32, 141, 142 v. Crump, 138 N. Car. 32 859 v. Deeds, 93 Iowa 228 430 v. Garwood, 3 Whart. Fe) 287 366 v. Gaut, 14’ Lea (Tenn.) 3 290 v. Hoop, 6 Ohio St. 480 64 v. King, 95 Ark. 549 498 v. McDermott, 19 Fla. 852 523 v. Marshall, 75 7 ba 89 358 v. Myers, 95 K 306 v. O'Dell, 22 Ghis ev C. 200 255 v. Penn, 149 Ky. 158 49 v. Rainer, 117 Ala, 318 524 v. Stevens, 62 N. Y. 634 445 v. Thompson, 27 Ky. L. 949 212 v. Thompson, 49 Nebr. 157 449 v. Thompson, 4 Ohio St. 333 157 v. Thornton, 197 Mass. 273 306 v. Turner, 173 ee a 518 v. Young, 25 Md. ae Thompson, In re, L. Rr ‘1890), 45 Ch. Div. 161 78 Thompson’s Estate, In re, 182 Pa. St. 340 ; 392 Thompson’s Estate, In re, 234 Pa. 82 gee Thomson vy. Carruth, ao Mass. 77 v. Thomson, 115 56 oa ton v. Hall, ii. “Ala. 323 ‘horington, 411 Ala. 237 hark v. pe Breteuil, 86 App. Div. (N. Y.) 405 337; Thornburg v. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178 Thorndike v. Loring, 15 Gray (Mass.) 391 270, Thornley v. Kershaw, 109 Ill. App. 113° Thornton v. Stanley, 55 Ohio St. 199 292, v. Zea, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 509 Thornton, In re, 21 os ones Appeal, In ae Sad. (Pa.) 453 Thrasher v. Ballard, 33 W. Va. 285 v. Ballard, 35 W. Va. 524 366, Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U. S. 552 Thurston v. Prather, 25 Ky. L. 1137 eb betes v. Berry, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) Tichenor v. Brewer, 98 Ky. 349 a Ticknor’s Estate, In re, 13 Mich. 44 + Tiernan v. Bean, 2 Ohio 383 Tiffany v. Clark, 58 as Y. 632 v. Emmet, 24 R. 1 411 Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29 Tilden In re, 56 App. Div. (N. Y.) Tilley ne patie (Ala.), 62 So. 761 v. 109 N. Car. 461 ‘"llsaghast v. Bradford. 5 - I, 205 Tillinghast, In re, 23 RI 121 Tillinghast, In re, 25 R. I. 338 232, Tillman v. Hatcher, 1 Rice L. (S. Car.) 271 Tveaae Estate, In re, 3 Cal. Unrep. ‘as Timpsos v. Lorsch, 50 Misc. (N. Y.) Tindall v. Miller, 143 Ind. 337 v. Tindall, 167 Mo. 218 v. Tindall, 23 N. J. Eq. 244 Tingley v. Harris, 20 R, 517 Tinnin v. “Womack, 54 N. Car. 135 Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mass. 448 Tobias v. Ketchum, 32 N. Y. 319 343, Tobin v. Haack, 79 Minn. 101 440, v. Jenkins, 29 Ark, sat v. Tobin, 163 Ind. 240 Toch v. Toch, 81 Hun (N. Y.) 410 139, Todd v. McFall, 96 Va. 754 321, Toland v. Toland, 123 Cal. 140 Tolley v. Wilson (Tenn.), 47 S. W. 156 Tomkins v. Miller (N. 7; Eq.), 27 Atl. 484 Tomlinson v. Bury, 145 Mass, 346 139, v. Ellison, 104 Mo. 1 Pom Dason’s Estate, In re, 133 Pa. St. Tompkins v, Griffin, 92 Va. 307 v. Tompkins, 1 Bailey (S. Car.) ? Vis Werpianel, 10 App. Div. (N. Y.) 57 Sees, In re, 10 App. Div. (N. Y.) Tompkins’ Estate, In re, 154 N. Y. oy Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 Toner v. Collins, 67 Iowa 369 Toole v. Perry, 80 Va. 681 Toomes’ Estate, In re, 54 ar 509 Torrance v. Torrance, 4 Md. Torrey v. TN TL Fla, coe v. Torrey, 70 . 672 210, Ixxix Ixxx TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Totten, In re, 179 N, Y. 112 4 Towar v. Hale, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 361 352 Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. ane ee oO Townsend v. Bogart, 5 Be w 88 v. Downer, 32 Vt. 5 ee v. Townsend, 156 ts 454 195 v. Townsend, 25 Ohio St. 477 326 -Townsend’s Appeal, In re, 106 Pa. St. 268 . 347 Townshend v. Frommer, 125 N. Y. 446 354 Tracy, In re, 3 N. Y. St. 239 81, 102 Trammel v. Trammel, 148 Ind. 487 433 Trammell v. Johnston, 54 Ga. 340 296 Traphagen v. Levy, 45 N. J. Eq. 448 231 Trapnell v. Conklyn, 37 a Va. 242 51 Traylor, In re, 81 Cal. 201 Treat v. Vose, 63 ses Div. (N. oe 338 351, 353 “Trelease, In re, 49 Misc. (N. Y.) os 390 hey v. Trembly, 11 Week. B. Supp. 50 443 Tremmnel v. Kleiboldt, 75 Mo. 255 101, 354 Trenton Hawn Co. v. Woodruff, 2 N: J. Eq. 117 101 aiventon Trust &c. Co. v. Sibbits, 62 N. J. Ba. 131 191 Trimble ou Rneciayie, 57 How. Pr. a v. le ie Mo. 309 232 Trinitarian Cong. Church &c. Soc., In re, 91 Maine 416 499 Trost’s Will, In re, 38 Misc. (N. Y.) 404 478 #rotter v. Blocker, 6 Port. ae 269 352 Trotters v. Winchester, 1 413 48 Troutman v. De Boissiere Odd Fellows’ &c. School, 66 Kans, 1 68 Truman, In re, 27 R. I. 209 ae 176 Trumbull v. Gibbons, 22 N. J. L. 117 281 hagus Academy v. Keene, 59 Ore. ae 6 Tucker v. Bishop, 16 N. Y. 4 192 a Seaman’s Aid Soc., 48 Mass. 188 186 . Stites, 39 Miss. 196 193 = Tucker, 27 N. Car. 161 448 v. Whitehead, 58 Miss. 762 08 Tucker, In re, L. R. (1893) 2 Ch. 323 323 Tuckerman v. Currier, 54 a: o. 25 13 Tudor v. James, 53 Ga. 302 521 Tuller, In re, 79 Ill. 99 81 Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 ae & C. 377 297 Tunis ae Hestonville &c. R. Co., 149 Pa. at. 391 Tonaich v. Fox, 68 Nebr. 392 Tike v. Martin, 2 Neca cD. C.) it Turley v. Turley, 11 Ohio St. 173 174 Turnell’s Succession, 32 Iba. Ann. 1218 103 Turner v. Balfour, 62 Conn. 89 205, 253 v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129 445; 450 v. Fenner, 19 Ala, 355 49 v. Gibb, 43 N, J. Eq. 526 322 v McDonald, 76 Cal, 177 486 v. Mather, 86 App. Div. (N. Y.) 172 392 Turner, In re, 34 Misc. or ee 366 232 Turner, In re, 82 Misc. Y.) 25 41 Turner’s ‘Appeal, In re, in Conn, 305 83 Turner’s Will, Tn re, 208 a . 261 159 Turpin v. Turpin, 88 Mo. 433 v. ey Wythe (ay % (2d ed. ee Tuttle v. Robinson, 33 N. H. 104 414 Twiss v. Simpson, 183 Mass. 212 232 Tygard v. McComb, 54 Mo. APD 85 3, 22 Tyler v. Tallman, 29 I. 911 Tyler’s Estate, In re, 121 Ca. 405 498 505 Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Tex. 286 526 Tyson v. Tyson, 37 Md. 567 U ve e Ohio River R. Co., 51 W. Va. Underhill v. Dennis, 9 Paige (N. Y.) Underaead ie at ea N. Y. 523 Union Safe Deposit &c. Co. v. Dudley, 104 Maine 297 173 98 98 United States v, Fox, 94 u S. 315 98 v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625 75, 77 United States Trust oe v. Maresi, 33 Misc. - 539 341 v. Maxwell, 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 276 = 173 University of Georgia v. Denmark, 141 Ga. 390 University of Pennsylvania Trustees’ Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 187 Upham’s Estate, In re, 127 Cal. 90 308 Upington v. fe ea 151 N. Y. 143 66 Usry v. Hobbs, 58 306 32° Utassy v. Geintngianen; 132 Mo. 53 79, 96 Utermehle v. Norment, 197 U. S. 40 "51 9 Vv Valentine v. Ruste, 93 Ill. 585 396 Valentine’s Will, In re, 93 Wis. 45 504 Vamplew v. Chamb ers, 29 Nebr. 83 365 Van Alstine’s Estate, In re, oh Utah 193 »_518, 533’ Wap Beecklans Estate, In re, a "Iowa Van Brunt v. Van Brunt, 111 N. Y. 178 172 Vancleave v. Beam, 2 Dana (Ky.) 155 523 Van Derlyn v. Mack, 137 Mich. 146 105 Van Driele v. Kotvis, 135 Mich. 181 1204 Van Houten v. Hall, "73 N. J. Eq. 384 738 Van Houton v. Hall, “1 N. J. Eq. 626 258. Vandevort, In re, 62 Hun (CN. Y.) 612 s 281, 291 Vance _v. Upson, 64 Tex. 266 509 v. Upson, 66 Tex. 476 532 v. Vance, 74 Ind. 370 524 Vance’s Estate, In re, 209 Pa. 561 1220 anes s Estate, In re, 141 Pa. St. a one Wey Emon vy. Superior Court, 76 14 Vas iarane, Campbell, 10 s oe 287 235 v._ Demarest, 76 N. J. E 33 Van Horn, In re, 5 N. J. i ie 67, Van Nostrand v. Sees 16 App. Div. * (N. Y.) 28 258 v. Moor, 52 N. Y. 12 154 v. Reformed Church in America, 59 ‘ 89 . J. Eq. 19 Van Osdell v. Champion, 89 Wis. eet 292, 356 Van Riper v. Van Riper, 2 N. X Eq. 1’ 183 Van un prekel v. Van Syckel, 51 N. J. Eq. 172 Van Vleet v. McCarn, 18 N. Y. S. 73. 3 be ghaaenen v. Brown, 26 N. J. L. 58 van’ Wert v. Benedict, 1 Brad. (N. Y.) ve Wichle v. Van Wickle, 59 N. J. Yun" Winkle v. Fowler, 52 Hun (N,. Y.) v. Schoonmaker, 15 N, fs oe 38h un (N, Van ae vy. Van Wyck, 22 416 TABLE OF CASES Ixxxi [References are to Sections.] Varick v. Smith, 69 N. J. Eq. 505 Varner’s A peal, 80 Pa. St. 40 341, Varnon v. aroa, 67 Mo. App. 534 151, 452, 500, Varrell v. Wendell, 20 N. H H. 431 181, Vaughan v. Farmer, 90° N. Car. aoe = Vaughn v. Lovejoy, 34 Ala. 437 Venable 2 v. Mercantile Trust Co., 74 Vender v. Luckenbach, 162 Pa. St. 18 Verdier v. Simons, .2 McCord Eq. (S. Car.) 385 Vestal v. Garrett, 197 Ill. 398 Vester v. Collins, 101 N. Car. 114 Vice v. Hall, 120 Ill. 597 Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. (U. 8.) We Villamil v. Hirsch, 138 Fed. 690 Vincent v. Vincent, 70 N. J. Eq. 272 Vines v. Clingfost, 21 Ark. 309 Viney v. Abbott, 109 Mass. 300 Vining v. Hall, 40 Miss. 83 Virgin v. Marwick, 97 Maine 578 Vogel v. Lehritter,. 139 N. Y. 223 Vogt v. Vogt, 26 App. D. C. 46 Von de Veld v. Judy, 143 Mo. 348 Von Rosenberg v. Wickes, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 455 Voorhis’ Will, In re, 125 N. Y. 765 Vrooman v. Powers, 47 Ohio St. 191 ; WwW Waddell v. Waddell, 68 S. Car. 335 Wade v. American Colonization Soc., 7 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 663 Wadhams v. ppenteant Home Mis. Soc., 12 N. Y. 415 Wagner v. McDonald, 2 Harr. & J. (Md.) 346 Wainwright v. Tuckerman, 120 Mass. Wait v. Belding, 24 Pick. (Mass.) ee v. Huntington, 40 Conn. Vv. society for Political "Shudy: re Misc. (N. Y.) 245 95, Waite v. Frisbie, 45 Minn. 361 Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295 ¥ > Walch v. Orrell, 53 Colo. 361 Waldo v. Cummings, 45 Ill. 421 Wales v. Bowditch, 61 Vt. 23 Walker v. Atmore, 50.Fed. 644 . Gibson, 164 Pa. St..512 Hill, 73 N. H. 254 5 Johnston, 70 N. Car. 576 Murphy, 34 Ala. 591 Parker, 13 Pet, @. 4 166 . Peters, 139 Mo. 81 . Pritchard, 121 int 31 Redding, 40 Fla. 124 v. Upson, 74 Conn. 128 Wiallerly’s Estate, In re, 108 Cal. 627 sdddedaas 235, 268, Walker’s Estate, In re, 110 Cal. a > Walker’s Estate, In re, 150 Iowa 284 all v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91 5, 9, 491, Wallace v. Minor, 86 Va. 550 v. Smith, 113 Ky. 263. v. Wallace, 23 N. H. 149 Waller v. Ray, 48 Ala. 468 Walley’s Estate, In re, 11 Nev. 260 Wallis v. Luhring, 134 Ind. 447 v. Wallis, 114 F Nase, 510 311 354 505 374 370 288 372 60 399 204 499 83 Waln’s Estate, In re, 189 Pa. St. 631 Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. ee 169, Walsh’s Appeal, In re, 122 Pa. St.177. 3 Walter v. Brugger, 25 Ky. L. 1597 398 Walter, In re, 64 Wis. 487 155 306 Walters’ Estate, In re, 197 Pa. 555 321 Walton v. Kendrick, 122 Mo. 504 443 v. Walton, 7 Johns, Ch. (N. Y.) 262 140 Waltof’s Estate, In re, 194 Pa, St. 528 478 Walts v. Walts, 127 Mich. 607 532 Wankford v. Wankford, 1 Salk. 299 410, 413, 490 Warburton v. Williams, 116 Wis. 557 686 ard v. Brown, 53 W. Va. 227 490 v. Cooper, 69 Miss. 789° 176 v. County Comrs., 12 Okla. 267 447 v. Edge, 100 Ky. 757 250 v. Oates, 42 Ala. 225 402 v. Oates, 43 Ala. 515 506 Wardner v. Seventh Day Baptist Me- morial Board, 232 Ill. 606 1149 Ward’s Will, In re, 70 Wis. 251 467 Wardwell v. Hale, 161 Mass. 396 255 v. McDowell, 31 Ill. 364 371 v. Wardwell, 91 Mass. 518 412 Ware v. Brush, 1 McLean (U. S.) shy 392 v. Wisner, 50 Fed. 310 47 Wareham v. Brown, 2 Vern. 153 379 Warfield’s Will, In re, 22 sy ee 496, 509 Warner v. Durant, 76 253 v. Marshall, 166 Ind. a 33 v. Warner, "37 Vt. 356 462, 476 v. Willard, 54 Conn. 470 207 Warren v. Morris, 4 Del. Ch. 289 a v. Warren, 148 Ill. 641 v. Wigfall, 3 Desaus. (S. Car.) 47 ag Warwick v. Warwick, 86 Va. 596 25 Washburn v. Van Steenwyck, 32 Minn. 336 41, 49 Washburn College v. O’Hara, 75 Kans. 700 188 Wesnbera's Estate, In re, 45 Minn. Washburn’s Petition, In re, 20 R. I. 697 353 Washington &c. University’s Appeal, In re, 111 Pa. St. 572 a 4 Waterman v. Alden, 2 U. S. 96 v. Alden, 115 Ill. 402 v. Canal-Louisiana Bank &c. Co., 186 Fed. 308 7 v. Greene, 12 R. I. 483 234 Waters v. Reed, 129 Mich. 131 108 v. Waters, 24 Md. 430 253 Watkins v. Blount, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 460 177, 193 v. Eaton, 173 Fed. 133 49 v. Quarles, 23 Ark. aay 273 vy. Stewart, 78 Va. 414 v. Waiters (Ky. oe , 120 S. bi aii 222, 24 Wiakious e smith, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 544” 402 Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo, 333 | 486, 517, 523 v. Blackwood, 50 Miss. 15 154 v. Bothwell, 11 Ala. 650 521 v. Hinson, 162 N. Car. 72 451 v. Martin, 228 Pa. 248 215 v. Penn, 108 Ind. 21 220 v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451 445 vy. Turner, 89 Ala. 220 8, 32, 520 v. Warnock, 31 Ga. 716 412 v. Watson, 1 Houst. (Del.) 209 33 vy. Watson, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 74 84 Ixxxii TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Watson v. Williamson, 129 Ala. 362 244 Watson, In re, 131 N. Y. 587 $16, 525 Watts v. Cole, 2 Leigh (Va.) 653 66 v. Watts, 38 Ohio St. 480 321, 392 Watts, In re, 202 Pa. 85 368, 380 Waughop v. Bartlett, 61 Ill. App. 252 393 Wax, In re, 106 Cal. 343 127 Weakley v. Buckner, 91 Ky. 457 357 Wear, In re, 131 App. Div. (N. ) 875 462 Weatherhead v. Sewell, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 272 201 v. Stoddard, 58 Vt. 529 252 Weathersbee v. Weathersbee, 82 S. Car. 4 Webb v. Archibold, 128 ao 299 57, 202 v. alg 16 R. 462 v. Day, 2 Dem. Sire, &. Y.) 459 182 v. Fleming, 30 Ga. 445, 451 v. Hayden, 166 Ato. 39" 341, 343, 358, 942 v. Jones, 36 N. J. Ea. 163 434, 467 v. Lines, 77 Conn, 51 396 v. Meyers, 64"Hun (N. Y.) 11 67 v. Neal, 5 Allen (Mass.) 575 350 v. Webb, 111 Ark, 54 204 v. Webb, 130 Iowa 457 818 es Webb, 7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 626 503 Webb, 92 Md. 101 254, 255 Webber Hospital Assn. v. McKenzie, 104 Maine 320 419 Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. (U. S.) 488 394, ee v. Lowe, 107 Ky. 293 v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366 293, 1913 v. Wathen, 97 Ky. 318 340 v. Wiggin, 19 R. I. 73 206, 271, 321 Weed v. Hoge, 85 Conn. 490 138, 139 v. Knorr, 77 Ga. 636 376 v. Scofield, 73 Conn. 670 187 Weeks v. McBeth, 14 Ala. 474 464 Weimar v. Fath, 43 -N, J. Ls 3 371 Weir v. Chidester,, 63 Ill. 453 22 v. Fitzgerald, 2 Bradf. (N. 2) 42 5 126, 441 v. Mosher, 19 Wis. 330 418 v. Smith, 62 Tex. 1 237 Weisert v. Muehl, 81 Ky. 336 61 Weiters v. Hart, 67 N. J. Eq. 507 390 Welch v. Adams, 63 N. H. 344 451 Welch’s Will, In re, 69 Vt. 127 532 Weldes v. McComb, 10 Tex. Civ. App. Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Nebr. 455 287, 296, 351, v. Weller, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 247 Weller’s Succession, 107 La. 466 233 Wellford v. Snyder, 137 U. S. a - Welling v. Owings, 9 Gill. (Md.) 467. 454 Wells v. eqetts, 45 App. Div. (N. aaa v. Harris, 5 J. J. Marsh. re 4 22 v. Holt, 104 L. T. Rep. 253 v. Houston, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 629 241 v. Seeley, 47 Hun (N. Y.) 109 80 v. Wells, 4 T.°B. Mon. (Ky.) 152 465, 490 v. Wells, 35 Miss. 638 506 v. Wells, 144 Mo. tne 523 Wells, In re, 113 N. Y. 3 309 Wells-Fargo Co. v. Walsh °87 Wis. 67 490 Wells’ Succession, 4 La. Ann. 522 49 Wells’ Will, In re, 5 Litt. (Ky.) 273 43N. JL 90, 496 eh 9: Brown, 43 Ne eee 768. 778, 1094 Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 606 431 v. Pounders, 36 Ala. 668 47, 469 Wemyss v. White, 159 Mass. 484 348 Wenger v. Thompson, 128: Iowa 750 368 Wenning v. Teeple, 144 Ind. 189 525, 527 Wentworth v. Read, 166 Ill. 139 308, 320 Werstler v. Custer, "46 Pa. St. 502 440 Wesco’s Appeal, In re, 52 Pa. St. 195 183 West v. Moore, 37 Miss. 114 282, 294 ve Rassman,. 135 Ind. 278 176, 194 v. West, 144 Mo. 119 461, 462 v. Wright, 115 Ga. 277 5 Westbrook v. Wilson, 135 N. Car. 400 108 Westcott v. Sheppard, 51 N. J. Eq. 315 530 weer v. Wester, 5 Jones (N. Car.) BA 9 Western a College v. McKin- stry, 75 Md. 440 Westfaling v. We die, - ee 460 211 Weston v. Hanson, 212 270 10 v. Johnson, 48 Ind. c 434 v. Weston, 38 Ohio St. 473 169 Weston, In re, 60 Misc. (N. Y.) 275 490 West Aaa Pulp &c. Co. v. Miller, 176 Fed. 97, 100 Wethered Ae "Safe Deposit & Trust Co.} 79 Md. 325 Wetmore : —— 52 N. Y. 450 32 Wetter v. Habersham, 60 Ga, 193 518 v. Walker, 62 Ga, 142 170, 237 Whall v. Converse, 146 Mass. 345 252 Wheaton v. Andress, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) : 452 234 v. Pope, 91 Minn. 299 203 Wheeler v. Bent, 7 ek (Mass.) 61 156 v. Brem, 33 Miss. 1 394 v. Fellowes, 52 Cae 238 268 v. Brewster, 68 Conn. 177 57 v. Long, 128 Iowa 643 235 v. Perry, 18 N. H. 307 411 v. Walker, 2 Conn. 196 280 neg In re, 32 App. Div. (N. Y.) 3 186 Whelan v. Reilly, 3 W. Va. 597 347 Whelen’s Estate, In re, 175 Pa. St. 23 142 Whetton’s Estate, In re, 98 Cal. 203 523 Whitbeard v. St. John, 10 Ves. Jr. 152 257 Whitcomb v. Rodman, 156 Ill. i116 203 White v. ener General, 39 N. Car. 2 16 v. Geaitie, 16 N. Car. 87 138 v. Bigelow, 54 Mass. 593 6 v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa. St. 90 208 v. Donnell, 3 Md. Ch. 526 355, 394 v. Fitzgerald, 19 Wis. 480 4 v. Holmes (Tex. Civ. App.), 129 S. W. 874 492 v. Howard, 38 Conny 342 97 v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144 41, 44, 51 v. Kauffman, 66 Md. 89 324 v. Keller, 68 Fed. 796 51, 100, 209, 486 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech’, 171 ass, 158,” 179, eee s v. Old, 113 Va. 709 78 v. White, 52 Conn. 520 136 v. White, 150 Ky. 283 195 White, 73 S. Car. 261 676 Winchester, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 48 White, In re, Myr. Prob. oo 157 26 ss White, In re, 125 N. Y. 544 137 Whitehead v. Gibbons, 10 N. J. Eq. 230 392 v. Park, 53 Ga. 575 323 v. Tapp, 69 Mo. 415 180 Whitehouse v. Bolster, 95 Maine 458 342 Whitelock y. Heddon, 4 Hoe & Pp. a 193 Whitenack v. Stryker, 2 N. J. Eq. 8 449 Wigeend v. Woerner, TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] White’s Estate, In re, 174 Pa. St. 642 Whitesides v. Cooper, 115 N. Car. 570 v. Whitesides, 28 S. Car, 325 White’s Will, In re, 25 N. J. Eq. 501 Whitfield v. Garriss, os N. Car. 148 234 v. Hurst, 9 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 170 : 492, 496 Whiting, In re, 33 Misc. (N. Y.) 274 i 308, 313 Whiting’s Appeal, In re, 67 Conn. 379 , 295 Whitman’s Estate, In re, 22 Ill. 511 355 Whitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192 42, 45 v. Hanington, 36 Colo. 407 151, 495 v. Hay, 15 App. s. 164 33 v. Twombly, 136 Mass. 145 83, 84 Whittemore v. Bean, 6 N. H. 47 66 v. Russell, 80 Maine 297 103, 231 737 373 435 256 167 31 Whittle v. Whittle, 108 Va. 22 Wickersham v. Savage, 58 Pa. St. 365 Wicke’s Estate, In re, 128 Cal. 270 487 Wickes’ Estate, In re, 139 Cal. 195 518 155 Mo. App. 227 323 Wiess v. Goodhue, 98 Tex. 274 250, 351, 368 Wigan v. Rowland, 11 Hare 157 107 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohie &c. R. Co., 94 Ill. 83 235 Wikman’s Estate, In re, 148 Cal. 642 464 Wikoff’s Appeal, In re, 15 Pa. St. 281 151, 464 Wilbanks v. Wilbanks, 18 ls 17 287 Wilber v. Wilber, 165 N. Y. 451 841 HEpent Estate, In re, 166 Pa. St. es Wilbourn v. Shell, 59 Miss. 205 25 Wilbur v. Almy, 12 How. (U. S.) 180 371 Wilcox v. Wilcox, 13 Allen (Mass.) 252 140 Wilcoxon v. Wilcoxon, 165 Ill. 454 534 Wilcox’s Appeal, In re, 54 Conn. 320 411 Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 137 14 Wildberger v. Cheek, 94 Va. 517 191 Wilder v. Holland, 102 a 44 431 v. Ranney, 95 Yi 371 Wilder, In re, 9 Hawaii 492 394 Wilenou v. Handlon, 207 Ill. 104 498 Wiley v. Ewalt, 66 Ill. 26 87 v. Gregory, 135 Ind. 647 237 Wilhelm v. Calder, 102 Iowa 342 253, a Wilkerson v. Clark, 80 Ga. 367 44 Wilkins v. Young, 144 Ind. 1 7, 55, 67 Willtesin v. Getty, 13 Iowa 157 372 v. ight, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 576 39 Wilks v. " Sladghter, 49 Ark. 235 399 Will v. Sisters of Order of St. Bene- dict, 67 Minn. 335 448 Willard v. Darrah, 168 Mo. 660 178, 204 v. Willard in J EG ), 21 Atl. 463 ae Willets, In re, 112 N. 289 422 Willett v. Carroll, 13 “Md. 459 201, 323 v. Porter, 42 ind. 250 524 Willey v. Clark, 105 Wis. 22 201 Wiley’s Estate, In re (Cal.), 56 Pac. 550 987 Willey’s Estate, In re, 128 Cal. 1 152 Williams v. Allison, 33 Iowa 278 285 v. Balmese Baptist Church, 92 Md. a6 v. Burrows, 1 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 2 351, 374 v. Campbell, 85 Kans. 631 63 v. Corbet, 8 Sim. 349 401 v. Cowden, 13 Mo. au 288 v. Haddock, 145 N. att 60 v. Herrick, 19 R. I. Yo7 357 v. Jones, 166 N, Y. 522 258, 283 Williams v. Knight, 18 & J 333 310 v. Lane, 4 N. 246 212 v. McKeand, 19. Mich. 507 697 v. Miles, 63 Nebr. 859 $21 v. Miles, 68 Nebr. 463 447, 475, 477, 478, 505 v. Newton, 86 S. Car. 248 106 v. Noland, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 629 13 v. Robinson, 42 Vt. 658 526 v. Thacher, 186 Mass. 293 357 v. Way, 135 Ga. 103 448 v. Williams, 49 Ala. 439 368 v. Williams, 189 Ill. 500 201 v. Williams, 142 Mass. 515 477 v. Williams, 20 Ch, Div. 659 430 v. Vreeland, 29 N. J. Eq. 417 342 Williams, In re, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 529 508 Williams, In re, 106 Mich. 490 33 Williamson v. Hall, 3 Ohio Dec. (Re- print) 504 355 Williams’ Succession, 132 La. 865 194, 211 Willingham v. Bentley, 20 Ga. 783 341 Willis v. Alvey, 30 ae a App. 96 411 v. et 30 Ga. 200 v. Sharp, 113 N. y 00 14, 390 v. Smith, 66 Tex. 31 379 Willis, In re, 25 R. I. 332 67, 202 Wills v. Lochnane, 9 Bush oy 547 532 v. Spraggins, 3 Grat. (Va.) 555 96, 497, 523 v. Wills, 85 Ky. 486 235 Wilmarth v. Bridges, 113 Mass. 407 231 ‘Wilmerding: In re, 75 Misc. (N. Y.) oe Wilmoth v. Wilmoth, 34 W. Va. 426 355 Wilson_v. Bostick, 151 Ala. 536 462 v. Cox, 49 Miss. 538 48 v. Curtis, 151 Ind. 471 410 v. Denig, 166 Pa. St. 29 256 v. Fisher, 5 N. J. Eq. 493 402 v. Hall, 6 Ohio C. C. 570 282 v. Maryland Life Ins. Co., 60 Md. 150 379 v. Mason, 158 Ill. 304 oP dy ate v. O'Dell, 58 Mich. 533 359 v. Perry, 29 W. Va. 169 189 v. White, 133 Ind. 614 345 v. Wilson, 6 Md. 487 57 v. Wilson, 145 Mass. 490 350, 411 v. Wilson, 17 N. Car. 181 340 Wilson, In re, 8 Wis. 171 156 Wilson's ‘Appeal, In re, 115 Pa. ae 95 414 Wilson’s Estate, In re, 117 Cal. 262 63, 87 Wilson’s Estate, In re, 78 Nebr. 758 533 Wilts v. Wilts, 151 Iowa 149 136, 137 Winch’s Estate, In re, 84 Nebr. 251. 84 Wind v. Jekyl, 1 P Wms. 572 206 Winder v. Nock, 104 Va. 759 415 Wing v. Deans, "214 Mass. 546 81 v. McDowell, sake, Ch pidtahs) 175 60 Winn v. Hall, I Ky. 289 v. Tabernacle Inf., M33 be, oe 280 Winne v. Winne, 166 N.Y. 2 33 Winslow v. Cummings, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 358 189 v. Kimball, 25 Maine 493 448 Winston v. Jones, 6 Ala. 550 368 Wintermute v. Snyder, 3 N. J. Eq. 489 232 Winter’s Estate, In re, 114 Cal. 186 284 Wirth v. Wirth, 149 Mich. 687 468 Wisehart v. Applegate, 172 Ind. 313 448 Wistar v. Scott, 105 Pa. St. 200 173 Wiswall v. Stewart, 32 Ala. 433 415 Withee v. Rowe, 45 Maine 571 34 Withers v. Jenkins, 14 S. Car. 597 235 v. Patterson, 27 Tex. 491 92 Ixxxiv TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] App. me 289 Withy v. Mangles, 4 Beav. 358 170 Witter v. Mott, 2 Conn, 67 464, 476 Wixon v. Watson, 214 Ill. 158 233 Wolbert v. Beard, 128 Wis. 391 341 Wolf v. Schoeffner, 51 Wis. 53 215 Witherspoon v. Brokaw, 85 Mo. Wolfe v. Hatheway, 81 Conn. 181 ay v. Hines, 93 Ga. 329 371 v. Mueller, 46 Colo. 23 75, 77 Wolffe v. Loeb, 98 Ala. 341 Wolfinger v. Fell, 195 Pa Be 12. 222, 345 Woman’s Foreign Missionary Soc. v. Mitchell, 93 Md. 199 189 Woman’s Missionary Soc. v. Mead, 131 In. 33 166, 167, 187, 206 aps v. Bullard, 151 Mass. 324 169 Cosby, 76 ‘Ala. 557 410 he Gaynon, 1 Ambl. 395 217 v. Hammond, 16 R. I. 98 97, 137, 368, 370, 419, 421 v. Lane, 102 Ga. 199 84 v. Mitcham, 92 N. Y. 375 177 v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., a? R. L. 295 442 v. Robertson, 113 or 323 237 v. Wood, 63 Conn. 180 v. Wood, 4 Paige os Y) 299 416 ¥ Wood, 83 N. Y. 101 Wood, 45 §. Car. 50 236 Wood, In re, L. R. Ose 8 3 Ch. 381 192 Woodbery vy. Collins, Desaus. Eq. (S. Car.) 424 107 Woodbridge v. Banning, 14 Ohio St. 328 Woodburn’s Estate, In re, 138 Pa. St. 606 345 Woodbury v. Woodbury, 141 a 329 86 Woodcock, In re, 103 Maine 214 176 Woodgate v. Fleet, 64 N. Y. 566 352 Woodley v. Calhoun, 69 S. Car. 285 250 Woodman v. Madigan, 58 N. H. 6 235 v. Woodman, 89 Maine 128 255 Woodroof v. Hundley, 133 Ala. 395 498 v. Hundley, 147 Ala. 287 883 Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 445, 447, 458. 500, 527 v. Lounsberry, 40 ea J. Eq. 545 390 v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125 271.272 v. Pleasants, 81 Va. 37 190, 341 Woods v. Ridley, 27 Miss. 119 503 Woods’ Estate, In re, 36 Cal. 75 8 Washoe Estate, In re, 188 Pa. St. 204 Woodward v. James, 115 N. Y. 346 . 169, es, 327, 341, 350, a3) v. Jewell, 140 U.S. 247 v. Woodward, 33 Colo. 457 a9 Woodworth’s Estate, In re, 31 Cal. 595 136, 327 Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N. Car. 460 296 Woolery v. Woolery, 48 Ind. 523 469 Woolley v. Sullivan, 92 Tex. 28 62 Woolsey, In re, 17 Misc. (N. Y.) 547 449 Woolverton v. Johnson, 69 Kans. 708 285 Wisananenet Sav. Inst. v. Ballou, 16 R. 983 3 Weg et v. House (Tenn.), 36 S. W. Wooton v. Redd, 12 Grat. (Va.) 196 153, 431 Worcester v. Worcester, 101 Mass. 128° 192 Worcester City Missionary Soc. v. Me- morial Church, 186 Mass. 531 390 Word v. Whipps, 16 Ky. L. 403 442 Workman v. Workman, 2 Allen (Mass.) 2 191, 306 Worrell v. Vinson, 50 N. Car. 91 232, 353 Worth v. Worth, 95 N. Car. 239 324 oe v. Robinson, 44 Hun (N. ¥.) é4 3 Wrench v. Jutting, 3 Beav. 521 214 Wright v. Denn, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 204 234 v. Dunn, 73 Tex. 293 371, 418 v. Fleming, 19 Hun (N. Y.) 70 492 v. Fultz, 138 an 594 504, 532 v. Gaskill, 74 N. J. Eq. 7 173 v. Herron, 5 Rich. Eq. Xs. Car.) 441 235 v. Masters, 81 Ohio St. 304 206 v. Methodist ee mea! Church, Hoffm. (N. Y.) 201 311 v. Minshall, os ‘Ti. 584 60 v. Tinsley, "30 Mo. 389 35 v. West, 1-Cranch (C. C.) 303 393 v. Wright, 5 Ind. 389 440, 452, 465 v. Wright, 79 Mich. 527 509 v. Wright, 41 N. J. Eq. 382 375 v. Young, 75 Kans. 287 494, 498 Wyte v. "Gann, 43 Tex. 543 28, 470, 502 Wyckoff v. Wyckoff, 49 N. £ Eq. 344 324 Wylie v. "Lockwoud, 86 N. 291 176 Wyman v. Brigden, 4 Mass. Xisb 137 v. Johnson, 68 Ark. 369 169, 1190 Wyman’s Appeal, In re, 13 N. H. 18 399 Wynne v. jprters 7 Humph GTenii: 394 v. Wad 23 Miss. 251 a v. Wynne, 56 Tenn. 308 173 ¥ Yale College ¥. Runkle, 8 Fed. 576 280 Yard v. Murray, 86 Pa. St. 113 308 v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 13 Pa. 205 3 St. 68 Yard’s Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 95 57 Bagels Will, In re, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 4 Yates v. Thomson, 3 Cl. & F. 544 49 Yearly v. Long, 40 Ohio St. 27 324 Yerkes v. Yerkes, 200 Pa. St. 419 241 Yetter’s Estate, In re, 160 Pa. St. 506 177 Yocum v. Siler, 160 Mo. 281 234, ae Yore v. Cook, 67 Ill. App. 586 York’s Estate, In re, 185 Pa. St. 61 526 Yost v. McKee, 179 Pa. St. 381 296 Youmans v. Petty, 33 N. J. Eq. 532 532 Young Meg Seanet, 16 Lea ATsne) v. Bradley, 101 U. S. 782 337 v. Davies, 2 Dr. & Sm. 167 175 v. McKinnie, 5 Fla. 542 137, 287 v. Miles, 10 B. Mon. (Ky) 287 347 v. Norris Peters Co., 27 App. D. C 140 485 v. Quimby, 98 Maine tet ot v. Ridenbaugh, 67 Mo. 534 v. Robinson, 11 Gill & ~ ana.) 328 310 v. Sheldon, 139 Ala. 444 366, 369 v. Snow, 167 Mass. 287 55, 67 v. Young, 26 Beav. 522 "327 v. Young, 68 N. Car. 309 368 v. Young, 97 N. Car. 132 372 Youngblood v. Youngblood, 74 Ga. 614 4 Younger v. Duffie, 94 N. Y. 535 442 Young’s Estate, Tn re, 123 Cal. 337 152 Young’s Estate, In re, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. a] 400 Z Zabriskie v. Huyler, 62 N. J. Eq. 697 311 v. Wetmore, 26 N. J. Eq. 18 341 TABLE OF CASES [References are to Sections.] Zabriskie v. Wood, 23 N. J. Eq. 541 173 Zane v. Kennedy, 73 Pa. St. 182 379 Zartman v. Ditmars, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 173 253 Zavitz v. Preston, 96 Iowa a 236 Zeile’s Estate, In re, 74 Cal. 8, 32, t30, 141, 1217 Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465 Zentner’s Estate, In re, 90 Wis. pe oe v. Staffan, 16 App. Cas. (D. 4 Zillmer v. Landguth, 94 Wis. 607 Zirkle v. Leonard, 61 Kans. 636 Zollicoffer, In re, 50 N. Car. 309 Ixxxv 95 395 Cc.) 81 296 Soo 460 WILLS THEIR DRAFTING, EXECUTION, PROBATE AND CONTEST CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY SECTION SECTION 3 1. Devolution of property on death 8. Will and related words defined. of owner, 9, Distinguishing characteristics of a 2. Intestate succession. will. 3. Gift causa mortis. 10. The right to make a will. 4. Trust deed or declarations of 11. Importance of the instrument. trust. 12. Reasons for making a will. 5. Deed to take effect at death. 13. Functions of a will. 6. Antenuptial agreements. 14, Objects of testamentary disposi- 7. Transmission of property by sur- tion. ' vivorship, 15. Inheritance or transfer tax. §1. Devolution of property on death of owner.—The va- rious methods for the transmission of property from one person to another at or in view of the death of the owner are, (1) by intestate succession, (2) by gifts causa mortis, (3) by trust deed, (4) by deed to take effect at death, (5) by antenuptial agree- ment, (6) by survivorship, and (7) by will. The owner may choose any one or more of these methods as will best conform to his wishes and the condition or circumstances attending his estate. Each method has its own peculiar advantages and dis- advantages, and for this reason it is thought best to treat them at considerable length in succeeding sections. §2. Intestate succession—When a person dies without leaving a will his property, both real and personal, descends to his heirs under the laws of intestate succession.* It is intended 1Hannon vy. Southern Pac. R. Co., 12 Cal. App. 350, 107 Pac. 335. 1 S 2 WILLS 2 by these laws to make such a will for the intestate as, if he had died testate, he would have been most likely to have made for himself, and its obvious policy is to follow the lead of the nat- ural affections, and to consider as most worthy the claims of those who stand nearest to the affections of the intestate.” Where a person dies leaving a will disposing of either his real or per- sonal property and not the other, or any part of his property and not all, it is a case of partial intestacy. And the word “intestate” used in the rules of descent and distribution, refers to the prop- erty of the intestate undisposed of by will, and does not mean that a decedent shall literally die intestate; that is, not having made any will. A person is also said to die intestate when his will has been revoked or annulled as irregular. But where the word “intestate” is used with respect to particular property, it has reference to a person who dies without effectually dispos- ing of that property by will, whether he left a will or not. The descent and distribution of property by intestate succes- sion is wholly statutory and subject to legislative control. The rights of heirs expectant are determined by the law in force at the ancestor’s death, and the law of domicil governs the dis- tribution of personalty,* while the descent of realty is controlled by the law of situs.° While those who are heirs are the ultimate beneficiaries, and real estate descends at once to the heir, the personal property first vests in the personal representative of the deceased, who alone may sue to recover the same, and all the property, both real and personal, may be subjected, if necessary, to the payment. of debts and administration expenses, except such allowance as may be provided by statutes for the surviving spouse and chil- dren.° 2Garland v. Harrison, 8 Leigh 5 Brandeis v. Atkins, 204 Mass. 471, (Va.) 368. 90 N. E. 861, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 3 Rocker v. Metzger, 171 Ind. 364, 230; In re Majot’s Estate, 199 N. Y.. 86 N. E. 403. 29, 92 N. E. 402, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.): 4Kingsbury v. Bazeley, 75 N. H. 780n. 13, 70 Atl. 916, 139 Am. St. 664; In 6In re Graves’ Estate, 242 Ill. 212, re Majot’s Estate, 199 N. Y. 29, 92 89 N. E. 978; Maitlen v. Maitlen, 44- N. E. 402. Ind. App. 559, 89 N. E. 966; Ison v.. 3 INTRODUCTORY § 3 Where there is any personal property to distribute, or where there are any debts owing by the decedent, an administrator is usually appointed for the purpose of making final settlement of the estate. But such administration is not absolutely necessary; especially where there are no debts against the estate, and the heirs have made a satisfactory distribution among themselves.” Such settlements, however, are not favored by the courts, and if made unfairly, or in disregard of the right of any one inter- ested in the estate, they may be set aside by the subsequent ap- pointment of an administrator.6 While the personal property is the primary fund out of which debts are to be paid, the fact that a decedent's real estate also is liable for his debts, makes it im- portant, so far as the title to the real estate is concerned, that there should be an administration of his estate; for if there is no evidence in the public records of an administration, it may prove difficult to show that the real estate may not be held liable for some unpaid debt of the decedent. §3. Gift causa mortis.—A gift causa mortis may be de- fined to be a gift of personal property made by a person in expec- tation of death that is imminent, coupled with a delivery of the property to the donee, but subject to the conditions, expressed or implied, that if the danger of death pass without the donor dying, or-if the donee should die first, or if the donor should revoke the gift before death, the gift shall be void.° From this definition it results that to constitute a gift causa mortis there must be three attributes. First, the gift must be with the view of the donor’s death. Second, it must be conditioned to take effect only on the death of the donor by his existing illness. And third, there must be a delivery of the property to the donee.*® A Halcomb, 136 Ky. 523, 124 S. W. 813. E. 108; Carter v. Greenwood, 5 7 Fretwell vy. McLemore, 52 Ala. Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 410; Cochran 124; Bowen v. Stewart, 128 Ind. 515, v. Thompson, 18 Tex. 652. 26 N. E. 168, 28 N. E. 73; Owings v. ® Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Whart. Bates, 9 Gill (Md.) 463; Needham v. (Pa.) 17; Seabright v. Seabright, 28 Gillett, 39 Mich. 574; Henderson v. W. Va. 412, 470, 474. Clark, 27 Miss. 436; Taylor v. Phil- 10 Calvin v. Free, 66 Kans. 466, 71 lips, 30 Vt. 238. Pac. 823. 8 Gale v. Corey, 112 Ind. 39, 13 N. § 3 WILLS 4 valid gift causa mortis can not be made by one in anticipation of some peril to his life, or in apprehension of death from a future cause of death.** The mere intention to give is not a gift; and so long as the gift is incomplete it can not be enforced in equity.” Neither is a mere agreement to give for the consideration of love and affection a transfer of the right to the property in the donee, nor does it secure to him a right to compel the completion of the contract.” The policy of the law is opposed to gifts causa mortis because of the danger of fraud, and the law requires much stronger proof to sustain such gifts than is demanded to prove an ordi- nary transaction.** But if the gift be accompanied by an actual delivery of the property to the donee in the donor’s lifetime, it is valid, notwithstanding the law of wills.** This is the vital point, and the one that distinguishes the gift from a nuncupa- tive will.*° The delivery must be Such as to vest the donee with the control and dominion over the property, and to absolutely divest the donor of his dominion and control, and delivery must be made with the intent to vest the title to the property in the donce.*” But it is not necessary that the delivery should be made to the donee personally, it may be made to a third person in his behalf.** A delivery to the donor’s own agent has been held insufficient.*” The acceptance of the gift by the donee is also essential in order to make a gift complete or perfect.2” The delivery of the savings-bank book to the alleged donee, without an 11Smith v. Dorsey, 38 Ind. 451; Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550; Van Vieet v. McCarn, 18 N. Y. S. 73; Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 51 Pa. St. 345, 12 Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134; Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio St. 108. 13 Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio St. 108; Carpenter v. Dodge, 20 Vt. 595. 14Raymond v. Sellick, 10 Conn. 480; Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Maine 324; Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y. 23. 15 Marshall v. Berry, 133 Allen (Mass.) 43. 16 Ragan v. Hill, 72 Ark. 307, 80 S. W. 150; Knight v. Tripp, 121° Cal. 674, 54 Pac. 67; Tygard v. McComb, 54 Mo. App. 85. 17 Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 27 L. ed. 500; Jackson v. Twenty- third St. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 520. 18Jones v. Deyer, 16 Ala. 221; Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 51 Pa. St. 345; Caldwell v. Renfrew, 33 Vt. 213. 19 Tomlinson v. Ellison, 104 Mo. 105, 16 S. W. 201. 20 Dow v. Gould &c. Mfg. Co., 31 Cal. 629; Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124. 5 INTRODUCTORY § 4 order in writing of the donor, the depositor, or a letter of attor- ney duly authenticated as required by the terms of the contract between the bank and its depositor, did not absolutely divest the donor of his dominion and control over the debt due to him from the bank, or confer upon the alleged donee the present right to reduce the fund to possession by enforcing the con- tract according to its terms.”* § 4. Trust deed or declarations of trust.—It is possible to convey all of one’s property to another by an irrevocable deed of trust, although it includes gifts which do not pass to the pos- session of the cestui que trust until the death of the grantor. But this may be done only when the grantor intended to make a present conveyance, and there was a sufficient delivery of the instrument.”? It is immaterial whether there was any other con- sideration than appears upon the face of the instrument; for even if the conveyance was purely voluntary, if completely exe- cuted, without any circumstances tending to show mental inca- pacity, mistake, fraud, or undue influence, it is binding and will be enforced against the grantor and his representatives, and can not be revoked except so far as a power of revocation has been reserved in the deed.** But in order that the grantor may revoke or change the deed during life, a suitable clause reserving that right must be inserted in the instrument.** If the right of revocation is not exercised during the lifetime of the grantor and according to the terms in which it is reserved, the validity of the trust remains as though there had never been reserved a right of revocation.” It may be said that the creation of a trust to take the place of a will is rarely advisable. It often happens, however, that a testator desires to leave a portion of his property to a person without resorting to the notoriety of 21Murray v. Cannon, 41 Md. 466, v. Deifendorf, 132 N. Y. 100, 30 N. 477, 478; Allen v. Williamsburgh Sav. E. 375, 8 N. Y. S. 617. Bank, 69 N. Y. 314, 321; Walsh’s Ap- 23 Viney v. Abbott, 109 Mass. 300; peal, 122 Pa. St. 177, 188, 189,1 L. R. Falk v. Turner, 101 Mass. 494. A, 535, 15 Atl. 470, 9 Am. St. 83. 24 Locke v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust 22 Youngblood v. Youngblood, 74 Co., 140 N. Y. 135, 35 N. E. 578, Ga. 614; Bromley v. Mitchell, 155 25 Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. St. 149, Mass. 509, 30 N. E. 83; Deifendorf 21 Atl. 809, 24 Am. St. 487, a WILLS 6 proclaiming the gift in the form of a legacy. This he may do by a trust deed or declaration of trust, and if such instrument is otherwise valid it is not affected by the fact that it was made without any consideration.2* A deed or declaration of trust need not be under seal’? or acknowledged,** except where the statute requires its execution to be in the same manner as deeds of conveyance,”® as its validity is presumed from being exe- cuted and acknowledged as a deed of conveyance it need not be probated. Declarations of trust as to personalty may be by parol or in writing, and are enforcible in equity after the donor’s death.” It may often occur that the wishes of a person can be better accomplished, and at much less expense, by a trust deed than by a will, but in drafting the instrument care should be taken to follow somewhat the plans of a will. Often persons of small means seek to dispose of their property on their death other than by will. This is sometimes done by the person depositing his money in a bank in his own name as trustee for the beneficiary. It has been held that this does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor, but that it is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or com- pletes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declara- tion, such as delivery of the passbook, or notice to the benefi- ciary. And in case the depositor dies before the beneficiary with- out revocation or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirm- ance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor.** But in most jurisdictions such attempts to make bank accounts serve the purpose of a will prove ineffectual because they are held 26 Padfield v. Padfield, 68 Ill. 210, 72 Ill. 322; Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray (Mass.) 227; Lane v. Ewing, 31 Mo. 75, 77 Am. Dec. 632; Dennison v. Goehring, 7 Pa. St. 175, 47 Am. Dec. 505. 27 Scituate v. Hanover, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 222; White v. Fitzgerald, 19 Wis. 480. “ 28 White v. Fitzgerald, 19 Wis. 480. 29 Cornelison v. Roberts, 107 Iowa 220, 77 N. W. 1028. 30 Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550, 30 Am. Rep. 486; Day v. Roth, 18 N. Y. 448. 31In re Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748, 70 L. R. A. 711. 7 INTRODUCTORY § 5 to be attempted testamentary dispositions contrary to the provi- sions of the statutes of wills. Appropriate forms of trust deeds and declarations of trust will be found in a subsequent section.*? §5. Deed to take effect at death—A very common method of disposing of real property upon the death of the owner is that accomplished by a deed executed by the owner and delivered to a third person to be delivered to the grantee after the grantor’s death. The original tendency was toward holding that instruments indicating an intention to postpone en- joyment by the persons claiming to be the grantees until after the death of the person executing the instrument should be classed as wills. This tendency in time yielded to another, namely, that it was a sounder policy in a case of duty to declare that the instrument was a deed and thus make it effectual, when holding it to be testamentary would, for want of the required number of witnesses, render it nugatory. So the modern decisions up- hold such conveyances when not clearly repugnant to some well- defined rile of law.** Where the form of a deed is actually employed, stich phrases as “after my death,” “vest at my death,” “take effect at my death,” and the like, may well be construed as merely designed to postpone possession or enjoyment by the grantee until after the death of the grantor.** The effect of conveyances of the character under discussion is to vest a present interest or estate in the grantee, possibly reserving a life estate in the grantor. But if the obvious pur- pose of the instrument was that it should not take effect to con- vey any title until after the death of the person making it, it is a will, and may be given effect as such if it has the requisite formalities of a will.* But a grantor’s deposit of his deed with 82 See post ch. 31. 85 Bright v. Adams, 51 Ga. 239; 23 Love v. Blauw, 61 Kans. 496, 59 Jones v. Loveless, 99° Ind. 317; Pac. 1059, 48 L. R. A. 257, 78 Am. Leaver v. Gauss, 66 Iowa 314, 17 N. St. 334; Uhl v. Ohio River R. Co. 51 Wz. 522; Wall v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91; W. Va. 106, 41 S. E. 340. Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. 460. 34 West v. Wright, 115 Ga. 277, 41 S. E. 602. : § 6 WILLS 8 a third party, to be held by such third party until the grantor’s death, and then delivered to the grantee therein named, the grantor reserving no dominion or control over the deed during his lifetime, constitutes a valid delivery, and vests an immediate estate in the grantee subject to a life estate in the grantor.*° After a grantor has made delivery in this manner he can not change his intention and withdraw the deed without the grantee’s consent.*7 If the grantor reserves control of the instrument, and it is subject during his life to revocation, no present estate passes to the grantee, and the deed is invalid for want of de- livery.*® Forms of deeds to take effect at death will be found in a sub- sequent section.*° §6. Antenuptial agreements.—Another means often em- ployed for the transmission of property is that accomplished by an antenuptial agreement, or marriage settlement. This is either in the nature of a contract or a conveyance in contemplation of marriage, whereby property is promised or settled on either or both of the parties by either or both of them or by a third party, and whereby either or each of the parties releases or agrees to release his or her property rights, which would otherwise be created upon the marriage of the parties.*® The sole considera- tion for such agreement or conveyance is that of marriage, and it has been held that such consideration is sufficient to support. the agreement.** But in some jurisdictions the right of a wife 36 Moore v. Trott, 156 Cal. 353, 104 Pac. 578, 134 Am. St. 131; Callerand v. Piot, 241 Ill, 120, 89 N. E. 266; Hoagland v. Beckley, 158 Mich. 565, 123 N. W. 12; Maxwell v. Harper, 51 Wash. 351, 98 Pac. 756; Klabunde v. Casper, 139 Wis. 491, 121 N. W. 137. 37 Maxwell vy. Harper, 51 Wash. 351, 98 Pac. 756. 38 Goodlett v. Kelly, 74 Ala. 213; Miller v. Physick, 24 Ark. 244; Ben- *neson v. Aiken, 102 Ill. 284, 40 Am. Rep. 592; Jones v. Loveless, 99 Ind. 317; Otto v. Doty, 61 Iowa 23, 15 N. W. 578; Patterson v. Snell, 67 Maine 559; Shurtleff v. Francis, 118 Mass. 154; Davis v. Williams, 57 Miss. 843; Miller v. Lullman, 81 Mo. 311; Mc- Laughlin v. McManigle, 63 Tex. 553; Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644, 11 Am. Rep. 592. 39 See post ch, 31. 40 Croker v. Croker, 87 Cal. 643, 25 Pac. 922. 41 Peck v. Vandemark, 99 N. Y. 29, 1 N. E. 41; National Exchange Bank v. Watson, 13 R. I. 90, 40 Am. Rep. 623, 9 INTRODUCTORY § 6 to dower in her husband’s estate is not barred by such agree- ment unless there is some other valuable consideration in addi- tion to that of marriage.*? A husband may bar himself from any interest in the wife’s property by an antenuptial agreement, and if such agreement is properly executed it can not be revoked by the husband, but stands as a bar to any claim he may urge to his interest as widower in the property of the wife.** Such agreements whether between the parties to the marriage, or with a third person, must be in writing, or no action can be main- tained upon them, either in the way of enforcing them or for damages for a breach of them; and such writing must be signed before the marriage takes place.*° But it has been held that if there be a written agreement after marriage, in pursu- ance of the parol agreement before the marriage, this takes the case out of the statute of frauds.*® Such agreement will not deprive the right of a husband or ‘wife to inherit the estate of the other unless such was the clear ‘intention apparent from the contract.‘7 If the agreement en- tered into expressly provides that the provision therein made shall be in lieu of any right to inherit from the other spouse, the ‘right to so inherit is barred.“* Where a valid antenuptial agree- ment is made which defines the rights of the wife in her hus- band’s personal property, she will be confined to the provisions so made, and will not be entitled to take any portion of the husband’s personal property which is given to her absolutely by statute.*® Such agreement when entered into in contemplation of marriage, by the prospective spouses, on behalf of each other, 42In re Pulling, 93 Mich. 274, 52 N. W. 1116; Graham v. Graham, 67 Hun 329, 22 N. Y. S. 299. 423 Daubenspeck v. Biggs, 71 Ind. 255. 44Bradley v. Saddler, 54 Ga. 681; Flenner v. Flenner, 29 Ind. 564; Powell v. Meyers, 23 Ky. L. 795, 64 S. W. 428; White v. Bigelow, 54 Mass. 593, 28 N. E. 904. 45 Stoddard v. Bowie, 5 Md. 18; Randall v. Morgan, 12 Ves. Jr. 69. 46 Moore v. Harrison, 26 Ind. App. 408, 59 N. E. 1077. 47 Dunlop v. Lamb, 182 Ill. 319, 55 N. E. 354. 48 McNutt v. McNutt, 116 Ind. 545, 19 N. E. 115, 2 L. R. A. 372; Eber- hart v. Rath, 89 Kans. 329, 131 Pac. 604. 49 McNutt v. McNutt, 116 Ind. 545, 19 N. E. 115, 2 L. R. A. 372; Schaf- fer v. Matthews, 77 Ind. 83; Tevis v. McCreary, 3 Met. (Ky.) 151; Find- ley v. Findley, 11 Grat. (Va.) 434. 37 WILLS 10 their heirs, executors, and administrators, constitutes an abso- lute and irrevocable contract. Neither has any more power to abrogate or revoke it than the other, and it binds them both equally and may be enforced against the personal representatives of either spouse after death." In some states, however, it is provided by statute that such instruments do not alter the laws of descent.5+ Antenuptial settlements sometimes take the form of a trust deed, and in such case it should conform to the law relating to trusts. In drafting a will where the testator is a party to an antenuptial contract it is important that the terms of such contract be thoroughly understood, and its effect upon the will explained to the testator. Examples of antenuptial agree- ments may be found among the forms hereinafter given.*” § 7. Transmission of property by survivorship.—The doc- trine of survivorship is a method of transmission of property incident to joint estates, and is the immediate consequence of the peculiar mode in which joint tenants are seized. This right of survivorship is called the jus accrescendi, for the reason that the right upon the death of one joint tenant accumulates and increases to the survivors. One joint tenant can not devise his interest in the joint estate; for, upon his death, another joint tenant surviving, there is no estate or interest in the joint estate left for his will to take effect upon.**? However, it may pass under the will to the last survivor.®* Joint tenants are said to hold individually and jointly, having one and the same interest, accruing through one and the same conveyance, commencing at the same time and held by one and the same possession. On the death of one joint tenant, there being no severance in the estate, his entire interest is cast upon the survivor or survivors, to the exclusion of the inheritance of the same by his heirs.** 50 Huguley v. Lanier, 86 Ga. 636, 12 Duncan v. Forrer, 6 Binn. (Pa.) 193. S. E. 1065, 22 Am. St. 478. 54 Wilkins v. Young, 144 Ind. 1, 41 51 Arizona: Rev. Stat. (1913), N. E. 68, 55 Am. St. 162; Duncan v. § 3845; Texas: Vernon’s Sayles’ Forrer, 6 Binn. (Pa.) 193. Civ. Stat. (1914), art. 4617. 55 Wilkins v. Young, 144 Ind. 1, 41 52 See post ch. 31. N. E. 868, 55 Am. St. 162. 58 Nichols v. Denny, 37 Miss. 593; ‘ 11 INTRODUCTORY § 7 The doctrine of survivorship, however, has been generally abol- ished in this country, but in jurisdictions where -joint tenancy still exists, real or personal property owned by two or more persons as joint tenants, on the death of the one passes to the survivor or survivors and not by will.°* There is another species of estate existing between husband and wife which is recognized by the laws of some states, by which, where a conveyance is made to a man and woman who are at the time husband and wife, the estate vested in them by such conveyance is a kind of joint estate held by them by entire- ties, an estate in which each owns an equal and unseverable interest, and upon the death of either the survivor holds the entire estate in severalty.°’ These estates are generally spoken of as “joint tenancies,’ but this expression is not strictly accu- rate. It is neither a joint tenancy nor a tenancy in common, but as it is now commonly and properly called a “tenancy by the entireties,” for both are seized of the entirety.°° Such an estate, however, can be created only where the relation of hus- band and wife exists.°° Where a husband deposits money in a bank to the credit of himself and wife with instructions to the bank that the balance at the death of either was to belong to the survivor, this consti- tutes an agreement between the bank and the husband which remains in force after his death, and the balance remaining on deposit at his death is payable to her as survivor.®° Also stocks, bonds, mortgages, or other choses in action, standing in the joint names of a husband and wife, upon the death of one, vests in the survivor. While there are many cases holding that where the 56 Rockwell v. Swift, 59 Conn. 289, 20 Atl. 200; Wilkins v. Young, 144 Ind. 1, 41 N. E. 868. 57 Jones v. Chandler, 40 Ind. 588; French v. Mehan, 56 Pa. St. 286. 58 Ketchum v. Walsworth, 5 Wis. 95, 68 Am. Dec. 49. 59 Thornburg v. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178, 34 N. E. 999, 41 Am. St. 422, 22 L. R. A. 42. 60 Metropolitan Savings Bank v. Murphy, 82 Md. 314, 51 Am. St. 473, 33 Atl. 640, 31 L. R. A. 454. 61 Abshire v. State, 53 Ind. 64; Pike v. Collins, 33 Maine 38; Draper v. Jackson, 16 Mass. 480; Pender v. Dicken, 27 Miss. 252; Shields v. Still- man, 48 Mo. 82; Sanford v. Sanford, 45 N. Y. 723; Bramberry’s Estate, 156 Pa. St. 628, 632, 27 Atl. 405, 36 Am. St. 64, 22 L. R. A, 594. § 8 WILLS iS husband purchases a security, or makes a deposit, or subscribes for stock in the joint namie of himself and wife, and pays there- for with his own funds, upon his death the entire security belongs to his wife, if she survives him, yet the decision in these cases is put upon the ground that it is apparent from the character of the transaction that the husband intended to give the property to his wife in the event of her survivorship, and hence the trans- fer possesses all the essential qualities of a gift causa mortis which he may revoke in his lifetime and which does not take effect until his death, if not previously recalled. But it has been held that a deposit of money, the separate property of the wife, and the taking of the passbook showing an account in her name and that of her husband, payable to the order of either of them, does not of itself show any gift to him, nor any joint interest in the deposit with the right of survivorship.® § 8. Will and related words defined. —Will.—A will is a legal declaration of a person’s intention or wish respecting what shall be done after his death touching the disposition of his prop- erty, the guardianship of his children, or the administration of his estate.** Testament.—Originally the term “will” was used to denote an instrument disposing of real estate, while an instrument dispos- ing of personal property was termed a “testament.” An instru- ment disposing of both real and personal property was called a “ast will and testament.” ‘This distinction, however, is no longer observed, the term “will” being used to designate an instrument disposing of both real and personal property, while the term “testament” is practically obsolete.® Codicil—A codicil is a supplement or addition to a will made after the execution of the will and annexed to or to be taken as 62 Draper v. Jackson, 16 Mass. 480; 64 See Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. In re Albrecht, 136 N. Y. 91,18 L. R. 300, 32 L. ed. 138, 8 Sup. Ct. 1164; A. 329, 32 N. E. 632, 32 Am. St. 700. Rice v. Rice, 68 Ala. 216; Wood’s 63 Denigan v. San Francisco Sav. Estate, 36 Cal. 75. Union, 127 Cal. 142, 59 Pac. 389, 78 65 Compton v. McMahan, 19 Mo. Am. St. 35, App. 505. 13 INTRODUCTORY § 9 a part thereof, by which the disposition made in the original will is explained, added to or altered.” Testator—The word “testator” has reference to the person who. makes a will, and a woman who has made a will is some- times called a “testatrix.” Devisor—A person disposing of real property by will is termed a “devisor.” Devisee.—A person taking real property under a will is termed a “devisee.” Bequeath.—As a verb the word “bequeath” denotes the mak- ing of a bequest or will of personalty. Bequest.—A bequest is a gift of personal property in general by will. Legacy.—A legacy denotes a gift of money, also of personalty generally by will. ’ Legatee.—A person taking personal property under a will is termed a “legatee.” Devise —When used as a verb the word “devise” denotes the act of disposing of real property by will, and when used as a noun it denotes a gift of real property by will. The terms used to designate gifts of realty and personalty, respectively, have no fixed legal meaning, and when used inter- changeably in a will do not affect the validity of the gift. §9. Distinguishing characteristics of a will—From the definition given of a will, it will be observed that the instrument. does not pass a present interest or right in property, and that such right or interest does not take effect until the death of the testator. During his lifetime it is entirely inoperative ;*’ in other words, the will is ambulatory during the life of its maker. It is in effect reiterated as his will at each moment during his life.® The true test of the character of the instrument is not the testator’s realization that it is a will, but his intention to 66 Home for Incurables v. Noble, 67 Dunn v. Houghton (N. J. Eq.), 172 U. S. 383, 19 Sup. Ct. 226, 43 L. 51 Atl. 71. ed. 486; Watson v. Turner, 89 Ala. 68 In re Kopmier’s Will, 113 Wis. 220. 8 So. 20: In re Zeile. 74 Cal. 125, 233, 89 N. W. 134. ° § 9 WILLS 14 create a revocable disposition of his property to accrue and take effect only upon his death, and passing no present interest. To be a will the instrument must have been intended as such. Mere memoranda or directions for drawing a will, or a paper recit- ing the terms of a proposed or partly executed will do not con- stitute a will, though sufficiently executed as such.” A will is distinguished from a deed of conveyance in that the latter instrument must pass a present interest in property. Whether, therefore, an instrument be a deed or a will, depends upon whether the maker intended the estate to vest before his death and upon execution of the paper, or whether he intended that all the interest and estate should take effect only after his death. If the former, it is a deed; if the latter, a will; and it is immaterial whether he calls it a will or a deed, the instrument will operate according to its legal effect.” The same test applies in determining the question whether an instrument is a will or a contract as in determining whether an instrument is a will ora deed. The time when the property rights under the instrument attach is the true test and not the time of performance.” Where the instrument contains all the elements of a contract, the fact that the time of performance is fixed at the maker’s death, does not make it a will.7* Asa general rule the same instrument can not operate as a will and also as some other transfer of property; but the general rule is subject to exceptions. Thus it sometimes happens that certain provisions of the instrument may be sustained as a will and other provisions thereof which relate to the subject-matter not testamentary in character, may be sustained as a contract."* Generally, without regard to its form, any instrument which does not pass a present interest in property, and is to take effect on the death of the maker, and is testamentary in character, may operate as a will.” 69 Kenney v. Parks, 125 Cal. 146,54 78 Miller v. College, 177 Ill. 280, 52 Pac. 251. N. E. 432, 42 L. R. A. 797, 69 Ar. 70 Peake v. Jenkins, 80 Va. 283. St. 242. 71 Adair v. Craig, 135 Ala. 332, 33 7 Taylor v. Kelly, 31 Ala. 59, 68 So. 902; Wall v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91, Am. Dec. 150; Reed v. Hazelton, 37 64 Am. Dec. 149. Kans. 321, 15 Pac. 177. 72 Heaston v. Kreig, 167 Ind. 101, 74a Corwine v. Corwine, 24 N. J. 77 'N. E. 805, 119 Am. St. 475. Eq. 579, 15 INTRODUCTORY § 10 §10. The right to make a will_—The right of a person to make testamentary disposition of his property is very ancient, and it is considered of the same nature as his right of ownership in the property itself. If his right of ownership is absolute the natural sequence is that he may not only control it while he lives, but he may designate by will the person or persons who shall own and enjoy it after he is dead. The absolute ownership implies the right of arbitrary disposition of it according to the loves, hates, or caprices of the testator.” On the other hand if the testator’s right of ownership in the property be limited, his right to make posthumous disposition thereof may be limited also. Some authorities hold that there is no natural right to make testamentary disposition of property, but that the right is con- ferred by the legislature in conformity with the constitution ;*° while others hold that the right is absolute and one which every person of mature mind and disposing memory may exercise, subject to certain regulations to safeguard it and to prevent its abuse.” However, our modern system of making testamentary disposi- tion of property, though remarkably liberal, by no means con- cedes an absolute right in this respect, as the rule against perpetu- ities shows. It is a right neither fixed nor absolute, but it has its roots:in the actual life of the community, and which, like every thing else human, is subject to change. The right is in no sense a property right and is therefore not a right protected by any of the constitutional provisions protecting property.” The right to make a testamentary disposition of property is not an inherent right; nor is it a right guaranteed by the fundamental law. Its exercise to any extent depends entirely upon the consent of the legislature, as expressed in the statute enacted on the 75 Hayes v. Hayes, 242 Mo. 155, 145 May v. Thomas, 94 S. Car. 158, 78 S. S. W. 1155; Weston v. Hanson, 212 E. 85. Mo. 270, 111 S. W. 44; Lorts v. 7 In re Ball’s Estate, 153 Wis. 27, Wash, 175 Mo. 505, 75 S. W. 95. 141 N. W. 8 76 In re.Garland’s Will, 160 N. Car. 78 Patton v. Patton, 39 Ohio St. 555, 76 S. E. 486; In re Bergdorf’s 590. Will, 206 N. Y. 309, 98 N. E. 714; § il WILLS 16 subject. It can withhold or grant the right, and, if it grants it, it may make its exercise subject to such regulations and re- quirements as it pleases. It may declare the rules which must be observed, touching the execution and authentication of the instrument necessary to indicate the testator’s intention and make a compliance with them mandatory.” §11. Importance of the instrument.—The making of a will is the most solemn and consequential act of a man’s life. Upon its legal and proper preparation depends the future happi- ness and welfare of the persons and objects most dear to him. Although wills are often regarded as the simplest of instruments, they are never-failing sources of litigation. It is an astonish- ing fact that most men spend their lives in accumulating a fortune for the use and enjoyment of surviving loved ones, but pro- crastinate the execution of this most important instrument until their thoughts have been insistently directed'to the fact of the inevitable journey to the great beyond. At this time the mental faculties of the testator may have become so impaired by age or the ravages of disease that his act would only invite a con- test. The fact that many testators attempt to draft their own wills without the aid of legal advice is another illustration of their lack of appreciation of the importance of. the instrument. Also other testators employ incompetent attorneys because their services can be obtained at a less price than skilled services are worth, and, by so doing, usually get about what they pay for. It may be said that a will is the most intricate as well as the most important of all legal documents. A man may make a deed or other written contract and it may be reformed or set aside on equitable grounds. Not so with a will after the tes- tator’s death.*° The court and parties must take it as they find it, and, if valid, abide by the intent embodied in it so far as that can be discovered. There is no judicial power even to correct a will which extends beyond the field of construction and inter- pretation.** 79In re Noye’s Estate, 40 Mont. Cowie v. Strohmeyer, 150 Wis. 401, 178, 105 Pac. 1013. 126 N. W. 956. 80 Machem v. Machem, 28 Ala. 374; 81 Cowie v. Strohmeyer, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N. W. 956. 17 INTRODUCTORY. § 12 If the draftsman is not familiar with legal rules and princi- ples governing wills, and with the precise meaning of technical words and phrases, he should not undertake the task. This is especially true if the testator’s estate be large, and he wishes to tie it up or devote it to specific purposes. Prudence, therefore, dictates that a will be executed, if pos- sible, at a time when the testator has sufficient capacity to make the same, and that the instrument be prepared by or with the aid and advice of one having a thorough knowledge of testa- mentary law. §12. Reasons for making a will——The various reasons for making a will have their basis in the condition of ‘he tes- tator’s estate or business and the circumstances attending his relations with those who would otherwise succeed to his estate under the laws of intestate succession. As a matter of economy and in order to escape the annoying formalities of an adminis- tration under the law, a will is often made for the sole purpose of appointing an executor. Where the right of dower exists a will is often made to avoid the difficulties attending the setting off of dower. Offensive relations anxious to inherit may have their rights impaired or totally destroyed by will. When the estate is of considerable magnitude, but contains little available cash, the testator may, by will, give valuable instructions for the marshaling of assets to pay debts and legacies. Many per- plexing questions relative to inheritance in case of concurrent deaths may be avoided by the making of wills.” Where the statutory provisions relative to advancements are ‘unsatisfactory, a will may be made for the express purpose of providing for advancements made by the testator. Where statutes of descent and distribution promote inequali- ties, as they sometimes do, a will may be made that will redress the inequality. So it would seem that very good reasons exist for the making of a will, even if the testator intends to make a disposition conformably to the laws of intestate succession. By 82In re Batchelder, 147 Mass. 465, 18 N. E. 225; Coye v. Leach, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 371. 41 Am. Dec. 518. § 13 WILLS 18 making a will the settlement of the estate is greatly facilitated and the expense thereof materially reduced. § 13. Functions of a will—The principal function of a will is the disposition of one’s property to take effect after death.** This was at one time regarded as the sole function, but under modern statutes testators are permitted to appoint one or more guardians to have the care of the persons and property of their minor children.** The appointment of an executor is another important func- tion of a will under modern statutes. An instrument merely appointing an executor, or guardian, without making any direct disposition of property, is a will and entitled to probate.** An instrument discharging any one or more of the functions men- tioned above is a,valid will, but an instrument discharging none of such functions is not a will, though executed with all the for- malities required for executing a will. Thus an instrument pur- porting merely to disinherit an heir is not a will.*® Nor is an instrument a will which merely leaves children to certain persons without appointing such persons guardians.*’ Nor is a disposi- tion of decedent’s body a testamentary disposition, a corpse not being property.** An instrument which merely revokes a will is not a will.®° §14. Objects of testamentary disposition—A testator may provide in his will for the establishment of a business or for the continuation of one already established, and may devote a part or the whole of his estate for the purpose of carrying on 83 Coffman v. Coffman, 85 Va. 459, 8S. E. 672,2 L. R. A. 848, 17 Am. St. 69. 84 Wardwell v. Wardwell, 9 Allen (Mass.) 518; Stringfellow v. Somer- ville, 95 Va. 701, 29 S. E. 685, 40 L. R. A. 623. 85 Miller v. Miller, 32 La. Ann. 437; Stewart v. Stewart, 177 Mass. 493, 59 N. E. 116; In re John’s Will, 30 Ore. 494, 47 Pac. 341, 50 Pac. 226, 36 L. R. A. 242; Mulholland v. Gil- lan, 25 R. I. 87, 54 Atl. 928, 86 Coffman v. Coffman, 85 Va. 459, 8 S. E. 672, 17 Am, St. 69,2 L. R. A. 848. 87 Williams v. Noland, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 629, 32 S. W. 328. 88 Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 Pac. 170, 82 Am. St. 330,53 L. R. A. 221. But see Scott v. Riley, 16 Phila. (Pa.) 106. 89 Parish v. Ulich, 69 Pa. St. 177. 19 INTRODUCTORY § 14 such business after his death.°° In the absence of a statute to the contrary, any person having the legal capacity to make a will, may, by such instrument, set aside a specified sum of money, with which to erect a monument over his or her grave, or asa memorial to another.** But a provision in a will that testatrix’s grave be cared for and kept in order for at least twenty years after her death has been held to be unenforcible for indefinite- ness.°? Also a devise creating a perpetual trust to take care of a private burial lot is unauthorized and void, unless the creation of such a trust is authorized by statute.* In fact, a person may dispose of his property by will for the promotion of any object that is not illegal, immoral, or against public policy.°* If, how- ever, the testamentary disposition is to carry into effect some purpose which the law regards as illegal, impossible, impolitic, or immoral, it will be held void upon the ground of public policy and good morals.* It is held that a will is not invalid on the ground of public policy if made by a testator contemplating suicide and he afterward commits suicide.** 90 Moore v. McFall, 263 Ill. 596, 105 N. E. 723 (affg. 183 Ill, App. 628) ; Mason v. Pomeroy, 151 Mass. 167, 24 N. E. 202, 7 L. R. A. 774; Packard v. Kingman, 109 Mich. 506, 67 N. W. 551; Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 137, 7 Atl. 295, 57 Am. Rep. 552; Willis v. Sharp, 113 N. Y. 590, 21 N. E. 705, 4 L. R. A. 493. 91 Gilmer v. Gilmer, 42 Ala. 9; Van Emon v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. 589, 18 Pac. 877, 9 Am. St. 258; In re Koppikus, 1 Cal. App. 84, 81 Pac. 732; Phillips v. Heldt, 33 Ind. App. 388, 71 N. E. 520; Detwiller v. Hart- man, 10 Stew. (37 N. J. Eq.) 347; Frazer’s Case, 92 N. Y. 239; Eames v. Hickman, 12 Hun (N. Y.) 425; In re Lackey’s Estate, 4 Redf. (N. Y. Surr.) 95; Hirst’s Estate, 12 W. N. Cas. (Pa.) 323; MclIlvain v. Hocka- day, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 81 S. W. 54; Adams v. Cole, 6 Beav. 353, 49 ~ nen v4 1a 338, 16 Jur. 306, L. J. (1852) 21 Ch. 596, 42 Eng. Ch. 255. 92In re Koppikus’ Estate, 1 Cal. App. 84, 81 Pac. 732; Phillips v. Heldt, 33 Ind. App. 388, 71 N. E. 520; McIlvain v. Hockaday, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 81 S. W. 54. . 93Mason v. Bloomington Library Assn., 237 Ill. 442, 86 N. E. 1044; Phillips v. Heldt, 33 Ind. App. 388, 71 N. E. 520; Swasey v. American Bible Co., 57 Maine 527; Bell v. Driggs, 63 N. H. 592, 4 Atl. 702; Detwiller v. Hartman, 10 Stew. (37 N. J. Eq.) 347; Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 255, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 139. °4Thomas v. National Christian Assn., 63 Nebr. 585, 88 N. W. 683. 95 Smith v. Du Bose, 78 Ga. 413; In re Kernan’s Succession, 52 La. Ann, 48. 96 Roche v. Nason, 105 App. Div. 256, 93 N. Y. S. 565 (affd, 185 N. Y. 190 "77 AT TX ANNTN § 15 WILLS 20 It is not the intention of the legatee or devisee, but that of the testator, which will vitiate the will for illegality of object. Thus where a testator makes a testamentary disposition of his property to another with no instructions as to the application thereof, the mere fact that the legatee or devisee intends to apply the property to an illegal purpose, because he knew of the testator’s desire that it should be thus applied, will not vitiate the will.*” § 15. Inheritance or transfer tax.—In many of the states statutes have been enacted providing for the collection of an inheritance tax from legatees and distributees, especially those of collateral kindred. Such tax is not a tax upon property, but upon the right or privilege of acquiring it by succession. It is a condition upon which the person may take the estate of a deceased relative by inheritance, or testator by his will. It is a retention by the state of a part of a deceased person’s property, which the state may take to meet its necessities, and which in certain cases it may take in toto, as in cases of escheated prop- erty. It is not a tax upon the right of alienation but the privi- lege of receiving by inheritance or will or otherwise at the death of a former owner.* In some jurisdictions this tax is levied against nonresident beneficiaries alone;*® but it is usually imposed against both resident and nonresident beneficiaries.’ The personal property of a decedent, though it be situated in a foreign jurisdiction, is subject to the tax if it is not needed to satisfy local indebtedness in such foreign jurisdiction ;? but real estate situated in a foreign jurisdiction is not taxable by the laws of the domicil of the owner.® It is important that the testator be advised respecting the effect certain provisions of his will may have upon the payment of 97 Carrie v. Cumming, 26 Ga. 690. 1 State v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294. 98 Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. 2 Commonwealth v. Coleman, 52 Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 Pa. St. 468. Sup. Ct. 594; State v. Alston, 94 3In re Swift, 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. Tenn. 674, 30 S. W. 750, 28 L. R. A. 1096, 18 L. R. A. 709; In re Bitting- 178. er’s Estate, 129 Pa. St. 338. 99 Mager v. Grima, 8 How. (U. S.) 490. 21 INTRODUCTORY § 15 such tax. He may not desire that the legatee bear the burden of the tax, or it may be his desire that the legatee should bear such burden. He should be informed that he has the power to relieve the legatee from the payment of the tax by throwing it on the residue of the estate.* In view of the fact that the stat- utes usually impose a penalty for failure to pay the tax at a time specified therein it is important that payment be made in accordance with the statutory provision. It is also important to know whose duty it is to pay the legacy or inheritance tax, and out of what fund it may be paid. #Dos Passos on Inheritance Tax Law, § 64. CHAPTER II KINDS AND CLASSES OF WILLS SECTION SECTION 20. Classification of wills. 28. Joint and mutual wills. 21. Ordinary written wills. 29. Separate wills in relation to prop- 22. Nuncupative wills at common law. erty in different jurisdictions. 23. Nuncupative testaments under the 30. Wills appointing executor only. civil law of Louisiana. 31. Wills operative at discretion of 24. Mystic wills. another. 25. Holographic wills, 32. Codicils. 26. Contingent or conditional wills. 33. Contracts to make or not make a 27. Alternative wills. will. § 20. Classification of wills —Wills are sometimes divided into two general classes, (1) written wills, and (2) oral or nun- cupative wills.*_ To the former class belong practically all wills, as the statutes generally provide that wills must be in writing.” Written wills are divided, with respect to their manner of exe- cution, into (1) ordinary written wills, (2) holographic wills, (3) mystic wills, and (4) nuncupative wills under the civil law. With respect to their contents and effect written wills may be divided into (1) contingent or conditional wills, (2) alternative wills, (3) joint and mutual wills, (4) separate wills in relation to property in different jurisdictions, (5) wills appointing an executor only, and (6) wills operative at discretion of another. These different kinds of wills will be discussed in succeeding sec- tions of this chapter. It may be noted here that wills are divided by the civil law into (1) solemn and (2) privileged wills, the latter corresponding to the common-law nuncupative wills. By the same law a solemn will is divided into (1) nuncupative or open wills and (2) sealed or written wills.* While codicils and 1Leathers v. Greenacre, 53 Maine 2See digest of statutes of the va- 561; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 12 Barb. rious states. (N. Y.) 153. 3Castro v. Castro, 6 Cal. 158; Dockum v. Robinson, 26 N. H. 372. 22 23 KINDS AND CLASSES § 21 contracts to make or not make wills do not properly belong in a classification of wills, we have seen fit to discuss them in this connection. § 21. Ordinary written wills—-The ordinary written will, signed by the testator and attested as required by law, is the normal will. This is the form of will used in Great Britain and her principal colonial possessions, and in all the states of the United States except Louisiana.* But where an ordinary or English will is made in any state in the Union except Louisiana it may be proved in the latter state if executed in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where made.’ This form of will is sometimes called the English will, being based mainly upon the provisions of the Stat. 29, Charles I]. The English colonists who settled in this country in the seventeenth century brought with them the English law of wills as it then existed in that country, and that law has been followed with slight vari- ations in this country in such states as were founded by the ‘English. But not all the territory which is now included in the United States was settled by the English. Louisiana, being set- ‘tled by the French, has adopted the French law of wills, which ‘in turn was based upon the Roman. In this territory settled by colonists from France there has been a gradual change in the © law of wills from that of the mother country. In many respects there has been a gradual yielding to the influence of the states that have adopted the English law. Also in some of the western and southern states which were settled by the Spanish, we find the law of wills to be of Spanish origin. Generally speaking then, the common law of England, which includes the statutes of that country prior to our independence, became, and has been. judicially regarded as the common law of this country in so far as that law has not been changed by subsequent statutes.° 4See digest of statutes of the vari- ¢ O’Ferrall v. Simplot, 4 Iowa 381; ous jurisdictions. Spaulding v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 5 Louisiana Civ. Code (Merrick, 30 Wis. 110, 11 Am. Rep. 560; Co- 1912), art. 1596. burn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147. § 22 WILLS 24 Examples of the ordinary written will may be found in sub- sequent sections of this work.’ § 22. Nuncupative wills at common law.—A nuncupative will may be defined to be an oral declaration made by a testator in extremis, and in the presence of witnesses, respecting the dis- position of his personal property after death. This form of wills was abolished in England by the Statute of Wills of I Vict. The common law permitted nuncupative dispositions, and its principles are still alive, save so far as they are affected by stat- utory provisions. As a general rule, however, such wills are not favored by the courts, for the very obvious reason that “they are at best uncertain productions, depending upon the attention, intelligence, memory, and honesty of those surrounding the dy- ing testator.”’® No such disposition of property can be made where the statute requires all wills to be in writing.*® Where nuncupative wills are authorized by statute, the authori- ties very generally hold that the provisions of the statute must: be strictly complied with,** yet there are other decisions holding that a substantial compliance with the statute is all that is neces- sary."* From the authorities it may be derived that a mariner at sea may orally make an effectual disposition of his personal property which shall have full testamentary effect, and that, in addition to the rules regarding testamentary capacity and free- 7 See post ch, 31. 8 Hunter v. Bryant, 2 Wheat. (U. Parsons v. Parsons, 2 Greenl. (Maine) 298; Lucas v. Goff, 33 S.) 32, 4 L. ed. 177. 9In re Male’s Will, 49 N. J. Eq. 266, 24 Atl. 370. See also Mellor v. Smyth, 220 Pa. 169, 69 Atl. 592. , 10Stone’s Appeal, 74 Conn. 301, 50 Atl. 734; In re Thornton, 21 Wyo. 421, 133 Pac. 134. 11In re Kelby, Fed. Cas. No. 18306, 2 Hayw. & H. (D. C.) 149; Johnston v. Glasscock, 2 Ala. 218; Scales v. Thornton, 118 Ga. 93, 44 S. E. 857; In re Grossman, 73 Ill, App. 224 (affd. 175 Ill. 425, 51 N. E. 750, 67 Am. St. 219); Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86; Miss. 629; Godfrey v. Smith, . 73 Nebr. 756, 103 N. W. 450, 10 Ann. Cas. 1128n, 11 Prob. Rep. Ann. 1; Bundrick v. Haygood, 106 N. Car. 468, 11 S. E. 423; In re Rutt, 200 Pa. 54, 50 Atl. 171; Smith v. Thur- man, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 110;. Mitchell v. Vickers, 20 Tex. 377; Brunson v. Burnett, 2 Pinn. (Wis.) 185, 1 Chandi. 136. 12 Weir v. Chidester, 63 Ill, 453; Arnett v. Arnett, 27 Ill, 247, 81 Am. Dec. 227; Ridley v. Coleman, 1 Sneed. (Tenn.) 616. 25 KINDS AND CLASSES § 22 dom from restraint, the only essentials are that the act shall be performed with testamentary intent and shall be sufficiently ex- plicit and intelligible to permit a finding of its purport and scope, and that its execution must be proved by at least two witnesses. Though at common law the requirement was finally developed that the nuncupative transaction, to be effectual, should ordinarily be made in the last sickness and in prospect of death, there is no trace that this requirement ever applied to soldiers in actual service or sailors at sea, and certainly there is none to show that it now applies to them.** In many states persons in their last illness are permitted to make nuncupative wills.** Where the testator’s sickness has progressed to a point where he expects death at any time, and, as preparatory thereto makes an oral will and the circumstances are such that it can not be reduced to writing, and death results from such illness, the nuncupative will will be admitted to probate, if the statute in other respects has been complied with.** One of the essential requisites to the validity of a nuncupative will which must be made to appear is that it was made in the last sickness of the testator, and that by reason of the near approach of death there was neither time nor opportunity for the testator to execute a written will. In other words, there must be an urgent necessity or an emergency to justify a nuncupation.** It is a well recognized rule that only personal property can be disposed of by a nuncupative will and that any attempt to pass real estate by this method is ineffectual.” A similarity may be noted between a nuncupative will and a gift causa mortis. Both of these methods of disposing of prop- erty are testamentary in their character, and are consummated only by the death of the donor; both are revocable by the donor 18In re O’Connor’s Will, 121 N. Y. Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86; Mulli- S. 903, gan v. Leonard, 46 Iowa 692; Wells 14 See Digest of Statutes, ch. 28. v. Harris, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 4; 15 Harp v. Adams, 142 Ga. 5, 82 S. Campbell v. Campbell, 21 Mich. 438; E, 246. Smithdeal v. Smith, 64 N. Car. 52; 16 Mellor v. Smyth, 220 Pa. 169, 69 Mitchell v. Stanton (Tex. Civ. App.), Atl. 592. 139 S. W. 1033; In re Davis, 103 Wis. 17McLeod v. Dell, 9 Fla. 451; 455, 79 N. W. 761. Sampson v. Browning, 22 Ga. 293; § 23 WILLS 26 during his life, and are consummated only upon his death; both dispose of personal property only, and are made in extremis. But a very marked distinction will also be noted, in that a gift causa mortis requires a delivery of the property to complete the act, while a nuncupative disposition contemplates no such de- livery, but must be probated in accordance with statutory re- quirements.** § 23. Nuncupative testaments under the civil law of Lou- ‘isiana.—A nuncupative will under the civil law of Louisiana is very different from a nuncupative will at common law. Two forms of such disposition are authorized by statute,*® one known as the nuncupative testament by public act, and the other as the nuncupative testament by private act. A nuncupative testament by public act is one dictated by the testator to a notary public, who reduces the same to writing. The disposition must be writ- ten by the notary as it is dictated, putting down all of the tes- tator’s intentions as expressed by him, with due regard to iden- tity of thoughts and not of words.”® The instrument must then be read to the testator in the presence of three witnesses resid- ing in the place where the will is executed or five witnesses not re- siding in such place. The testament must be signed by the testa- tor, or if he does not know how or is not able to write his name, express mention of his declaration and of the cause which hin- ders him from signing must be made in the act.?1_ The testament must also be signed by the witnesses, or at least one may sign for all, if the others are unable to sign, and express mention must be made in the will of the performance of these necessary acts.”? The nuncupative testament by private act must be written by the testator himself, or by any other person at his dictation, or even by one of the witnesses in the presence of five witnesses 18Tygard v. McComb, 54 Mo. 21Hennessy v. Woulfe, 49 La. Ann. App. 88. 1376, 22 So. 394. 19 Louisiana Civ. Code (Merrick’s, 22 Dorries’ Succession, 37 La. Ann. 1912) ), arts. 1574-1588. 833; Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 20 Cauvien’s Succession, 46 La. Ann. 355. 1412, 16 So. 309. “ 27 KINDS AND CLASSES § 24 residing in the place where the will is executed or in the presence of seven witnesses residing out of the place; or it will suffice if in the presence of the same number of witnesses the testator presents the paper on which he has written his testament or caused it to be written out of their presence, and declares to them that the paper contains his last will and testament.” In either case the testament must be read by the testator to the wit- nesses, or by one of the witnesses to the rest in the presence of the testator. It must be signed by the testator if he knows how or is able to sign, and by the witnesses, or at least by two of them in case the others know not how to sign, and those of the wit- nesses who do not know how to sign must affix their mark. § 24. Mystic wills —The mystic will is a form of written will sometimes used in states settled by colonists from France and Spain. It consists of a written testamentary disposition of property, signed by the testator, whether written by himself or another, which writing is inclosed in an envelope and sealed in the presence of witnesses.** After such sealing the testator makes a declaration to a notary in the presence of witnesses that the envelope contains his will, that it was written by himself, or another at his direction, and signed by him. The notary then proceeds to draft the superscription upon the sealed envelope, which superscription is then signed by the testator, the notary, and the witnesses. The superscription must recite all the facts required by the statute in order to render the instrument valid as a mystic will. Thus it must recite that the testator presented the envelope to the notary, closed and sealed, with the declara- tion that it contained his last will.?* It is not essential that the envelope be sealed with wax, the use of mucilage or wafers being held sufficient for that purpose.** The object of sealing and clos- ing is to guard against any substitution of another paper for that 23 Bourke v. Wilson, 38 La, Ann. 25 Stafford v. Villain, 10 La. 319; 320. Lewis v. Lewis, 5 La. 387. 24 ouisiana Civ. Code (Merrick’s, 26 Saint v. Charity Hospital, 48 La. 1912), arts. 1577-1580; Broutin v. 236, 19 So. 275. Vassant, 5 Mart. (O. S.) (La.) 169, 182. § 25 WILLS 28 contained in the envelope, or any tampering with the paper con- taining dispositions of the testator. § 25. Holographic wills—A holographic will is one writ- ten entirely by the hand of the testator.*” In some jurisdictions a holographic will is required to be written, dated, and signed in the handwriting of the testator,* while in other jurisdictions such a will is valid without a date.”® In North Carolina and Tennessee no such will is recognized unless found among the testator’s valuable papers, or came from the custody of one with whom he had deposited it for safe keep- ing. Generally speaking such wills require no attestation; the only requirement being that the instrument be in the handwriting of the testator and signed by him in the manner required. by law.** But in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, holographic wills are required to be published, witnessed, and attested in the same manner as other wills.*? However, the rule respecting the method of publication of holographic wills is not 27In re Rand’s State, 61 Cal. 468, 44 Am. Rep. 555; Wilbourn v. Shell, 59 Miss. 205, 42 Am. Rep. 363; Neer v. Cowhick, 4 Wyo. 39, 31 Pac. 862, 18 L. R. A. 588. 28 California: Civ. Code (1915), § 1277; Idaho: Rev. Stat. (1908), § 5728; Louisiana: Civ. Code (1912), § 1588; Montana: Rev. Codes (1907), § 4727; North Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), § 5648; Oklahoma: Rev. Laws (1910), § 8347; Porto Rico: Civ. Code (1913), §§ 3774-3780; South Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), § 1006, p. 185; Utah: Comp. Laws (1907), § 2736; Quebec: Civ. Code (1889), §§ 831, 853. 29 Arizona: Rev. Stats. (1913), § 1207; Arkansas: Kerby Dig. Stat. (1904), § 8012; Indian Territory: Stat. (1899), § 3564 (see Oklahoma statute); Kentucky: Stat. (1915), § 4828; Mississippi; Code (1906), § 5078; Nevada: Rev. Laws (1912), § 6224; North Carolina: Code (1908), § 3113; Tennessee: Code (1896), § 3896; Texas: Vernon’s Sayles’ Civ. Stat. (1914), art. 7857; . Virginia: Ann. Code (1904), § 2514; West Vir- ginia: Code (1916), p. 968; New foundland: Consol. Stats. (1896), ch. 79, §§ 1, 2. 30 Harper v. Harper, 148 N. Car. 453, 62 S. E. 553. 21 Reagan v. (Tenn.) 316. 32 Brengle v. Tucker, 114 Md. 597, 80 Atl. 224; Osborn v. Cook, il Cush. (Mass.) 532, 59 Am. Dec. 155; In re Berdan, 65 N. J. Eq. 681, 55 Atl. 728; In re Wilmerding, 75 Misc. (N. Y.) 432, 135 N. Y. S. 516; In re Ralston’s Estate, 1 Chest. Co. Rep. (Pa.) 482; Neer v. Cowhick, 4 Wyo. 39, 31 Pac. 862, 18 L. R. A. 588. Stanley, 11 Lea 29 KINDS AND CLASSES § 25 so severe as where the will is drawn by a scrivener.*® Where attestation of a holographic will is not required the fact that one or more witnesses has signed it does not render it invalid.** The instrument need not be prepared according to any particular form, but may be fragmentary,** or in the form of a letter.** But two letters not connected by contents has been held not to constitute a holographic will.?? Where the testator in his own ‘handwriting merely fills in the blanks of a printed form, the instrument is not a valid holographic will.°* A testator may make a valid holographic will while sojourning in a state where such wills are not permitted, provided the state of his domicil rec- ognizes such wills.*° At common law holographic wills were of no greater sanctity than other wills. They did not have any greater legal force than a will written by a third person and signed by the testator, but like any other testament, they are solemn acts depending for their validity upon compliance with the forms prescribed by law.*° In jurisdictions where holographic wills are permitted they are very common, doubtless because they can be made secretly and with very little trouble. The fact, however, that the testator can execute his own will without the aid of any other person, sometimes results in the failure of the will, where ignorant testators, attempting to write their wills without assist- ance, fail to comply with some of the simple requirements of the statutes. But where the testator is competent to write his own 33In re Holmberg’s Will, 145 N. Y. S. 846, 83 Misc. 245; In re Leven- ston’s Will, 142 N. Y. S. 829, 158 App. Div. 69. 34In re Soher’s Estate, 78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 8. 85In re Merryfield’s Estate, 167 Cal. 729, 141 Pac. 259; In re Stratton, 112 Cal. 513, 44 Pac. 1028. 36 Arendt v. Arendt, 80 Ark. 204, 96 S. W. 982; In re Chevallier’s Estate, 159 Cal. 161, 113 Pac. 130; Dougherty v. Holscheider, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S. W. 1113. 37Jn re Anthony’s Estate, 121 Cal. App. 157, 131 Pac. 96. 88In re Plumel’s Estate, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192, 121 Am. St. 100; Maris v. Adams (Tex. Civ. App.), 166 S. W. 475. 39Tn re Newell, 10 Hawaii 80; Dreyer v. Reisman, 202 N. Y. 476, 96 N. E. 90; Ross v. Ross, 25 Can. Sup. Ct. 307. 40Tn re Rand’s Estate, 61 Cal. 468, 44 Am. Rep. 555; Scott v. Harkness, 6 Idaho 736, 59 Pac. 556; In re Ar- mant’s Will, 43 La. Ann. 310, 9 So. § 26 WILLS 30 will, or where he writes it under the advice of a competent attor- ney, the fact that it is in his own handwriting may aid in its construction and meaning, or furnish some presumptive evidence of his sanity, or the absence of undue influence.** § 26. Contingent or conditional wills—A contingent or conditional will is one that is to take effect upon the happening or not of some event; or upon a certain set of circumstances being or not being in existence at a time named, or during a certain period.*? Where the testator’s lifetime is designated as the period during which the condition is to be performed, full effect will be given to the condition, and the will must be treated as in force or not, according to the performance or nonper- formance of the condition during such period.** Conditions may also be imposed which are to be performed after the death of the testator and before probate, and the validity of wills con- taining such conditions depends upon performance during such period.** The contingency which operates only to defeat certain be- quests will be considered elsewhere in this work, the discussion here being confined to such wills as are usually made by the testator before starting upon a journey, or in. contemplation of a hazardous undertaking. There is a broad distinction between a condition attached to a particular testamentary disposition, and a condition attached to the operation of the instrument. A testa- mentary disposition subject to a condition precedent will not be admitted to probate after failure of the contingency on the hap- 35, 26 Am. St. 183; Baker v. Brown, 83 Miss. 793, 36 So. 539, 1 Ann. Cas. 371, 9 Prob. Rep. Ann. 282; In re Noyes, 40 Mont. 190, 105 Pac. 1017, 42Damon v. Damon, 8 Allen (Mass.) 192; Dougherty v. Hol- scheider, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S. W. 1113. 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1145n; Warwick v. Warwick, 86 Va. 596, 10 S. E. 843, 6L.R. A. 775n. 41 Catholic University v. O’Brien, 181 Mo. 71, 79 S. W. 901; Riggin v. Westminster College, 160 Mo. 570, 61 S. W. 803. : 43 Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 174; Likefield v. Likefield, 82 Ky. 589; Magee v. McNeil, 41 Miss. 17; Robnett v. Ashlock, 49 Mo. 171; Morrow’s Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 440. 44 Dudley v. Weinhart, 93 Ky. 402, 20 S. W. 308, 14 Ky. L. 434, 31 KINDS AND CLASSES § 27 pening of which it was to have taken effect.“* Thus if a testator, about to make a journey, makes a testamentary disposition of his property upon the condition that it should take effect if he did not return, the fact that he does return defeats the contin- gency upon which the disposition was to take effect.** It would seem that if the happening of the event is merely referred to as giving the reason or inducement for making the will, it is not conditional ; but if it appears that the testator intended to dispose of his property in case of the happening of the named event, it is conditional.*? Forms of contingent or conditional wills may be found in sub- sequent sections of this work.** § 27. Alternative wills—Where a testator, after having executed one or more wills, executes another in which he ex- presses a contingency upon which that will or one of the former wills is to become operative, such wills are said to be alternative wills. To illustrate, a testator made a will on November 20, 1871; on January 13, 1873, he made a second will, to which last will he made a codicil in January, 1873. By the codicil he declared that “‘said will of 20th November, 1871, to be my last will should I die before the first of March, 1873, otherwise, the will of 13th January, 1873, shall be my last will.” He died January 23, 1873. It was held that the first will made by him was entitled to probate as his last will and testament.” Where the testator executes two different wills, with a proviso that in a certain event one shall be his will, and in a different 45In re White, Myr. Prob. (Cal.) 157; Eaton v. Brown, 20 App. (D. C.) 453; Oetjen v. Diemmer, 115 Ga. 1005, 42 S. E. 388; Dougherty v. Dougherty, 4 Met. (Ky.) 25; Wag- ner v. McDonald, 2 Harr. & J. (Md.) 346; Damon v. Damon, 8 Allen (Mass.) 192; Magee v. McNeil, 41 Miss. 17, 90 Am. Dec. 354; Robnett v. Ashlock, 49 Mo. 171; Cowley v. Knapp, 42 N. J. L. 297; Morrow’s Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 440, 9 Atl. 660, 2 Am, St. 616; Jacks v. Henderson, 1 Desaus. Eq. (S. Car.) 543; Dough- erty v. Holscheider, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S. W. 1113; French v. French, 14 W. Va. 458; Parsons v. Lanoe, 1 Ves. 189. 46 Morrow’s Appeal, 116 Pa. 440, 2 Am. St. 616, 9 Atl. 660. 47 Dougherty v. Holscheider, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S. W. 1113; French v. French, 14 W. Va. 459. 48 See post ch. 31. 49In re Hamilton’s Estate, 74 Pa. St. 69. St: § 28 WILLs 32 event, the other shall be his will, the alternate instruments should be clearly identified, and the contingency accurately expressed. An example of an alternative will may be found in a subse- quent chapter.” § 28. Joint and mutual wills—A joint will is one where the same instrument is made the will of two or more persons and is jointly signed by them. Such a will contained in a single instrument is the will of each of the makers, and at the death of one may be probated as his will, and be again probated at the death of the other as the will of the latter. Such wills are usually executed to make testamentary disposition of joint prop- erty.** Wills may be joint or mutual, or both joint and mutual. Mutual wills may be defined as the separate wills of two per- sons, which are reciprocal in their provisions.6* A will that is both joint and mutual is one executed jointly by two or more persons, the provisions of which are reciprocal, and which shows on its face that the devises are made one in consideration of the other. These several classes of wills have some characteristics that distinguish them one from the other. A joint will which is not reciprocal is simply the individual personal will of each of the persons signing the same, and is subject to the same rules that would apply if the wills were several. Mutual wills, that is, where two persons execute wills reciprocal in their provisions but separate instruments, may or may not be revocable at the pleasure of either party, according to the circumstances and un- derstanding upon which they were executed. To deprive either party of the right to revoke such mutual wills, it is necessary to prove such wills were executed in pursuance of a contract or a 50 See ch. 31. Miles, 89 Kans. 540, 132 Pac. 146, 51In re Anderson’s Estate, 14 Ariz. Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 363n; In re Diez’s 502, 131 Pac. 975; Romjue v. Ran- Will, 50 N. Y. 88; Ex parte Day, 1 dolph, 166 Mo. App. 87, 148 S. W. Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 476; In re Caw- 185; March v. Huyter, 50 Tex. 243. ley’s Estate, 136 Pa. 628, 20 Atl. 567, 52 In re Cross’ Estate, 163 Cal. 778, 10 L. R. A. 93. 127 Pac. 70; Frazier v. Patterson, 243 58 Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, Till. 80, 90 N. E. 216, 27 L. R.A. (N. 90 N. E. 216, 27 L. R. A, (N. S.) S.) 508. 17 Ann. Cas. 1003: Carle v. 508. 17 Ann. Cas. 1003. 33 KINDS AND CLASSES § 28 compact between the parties and that each is the consideration for the other; and, even in cases where mutual wills have been executed in pursuance of a compact or agreement between the ‘parties, the law appears to be well settled that either party may, during the lifetime of both, withdraw from the compact, and revoke the will to himself.* A joint and mutual will is revocable during the joint lives by either party, so far as relates to his own disposition, upon giv- ing notice to the other ; but it becomes irrevocable after the death of one of them, if the survivor takes advantage of the provi- sions made by the other.°° Though the will of a husband and wife be joint in form, it is not a joint will if the property devised belongs to the husband or wife only.°* And where husband and wife have joint power to devise, and have executed it by joint will, it was held that neither of them could revoke the joint will so made by a separate will." As a general rule joint wills are not regarded with very great favor by the courts, and are more apt to invite litigation than separate independent reciprocal wills. The fact, however, that they express the entire arrangement between the testators is an element in their favor. Where several reciprocal wills are in- tended to be mutually binding on the parties, and not subject to change, it is advisable to embody such intention in a separate agreement signed by the parties to be bound thereby.** 54Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454, 4 Am. Rep. 135; Paton v. Rob- 380; Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408, 4 Am. Rep. 573; In re Cawley’s inson, 81 Conn. 547, 71 Atl. 730; Lewis v. Scofield, 26 Conn. 455, 68 Am. Dec. 404; Evans v. Smith, 28 Ga. 98, 73 Am. Dec. 751; Allen v. Allen, 28 Kans. 18; Hill v. Harding, 92 Ky. 76, 17 S. W. 199, 437, 13 Ky. L. 380; In re Davis’ Will, 120 N. Car. 9, 26 S. E. 636, 38 L. R. A. 289, 58 Am. St. 771; In re Cawley’s Estate, 136 Pa. 628, 20 Atl. 567, 10 L. R. A. 93. 55 Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454, 4 Am. Rep. 135; Hill v. Harding, 92 Ky. 76, 17 S. W. 199, 437, 13 Ky. L. 3—Tuomp. WILLS, Estate, 136 Pa. St. 628, 20 Atl. 567, 10 L. R. A. 93; Izard v. Middleton, 1 Desaus. Eq. (S. Car.) 116; Wyche v. Clapp, 43 Tex. 543; Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. Ecc. 274. 56 Chaney v. Home Society, 28 Ill. App. 621; Allen v. Allen, 28 Kans. 18. 57 Breathitt v. Whittaker, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 530. 58 Edson v. Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555, 50 N. E. 265; Everdell v. Hill, 58 App. Div. (N. Y.) 151, 68 N. Y. S. 315, § 29 WILLS 34 Forms of joint and mutual wills may be found in subsequent sections.°? § 29. Separate wills in relation to property in different jurisdictions.—A testator may make separate wills respecting property in different jurisdictions. Thus he may make two wills, one relating to property in the jurisdiction where he lives, and afterward one relating to property in a foreign country, and the two wills will be deemed independent documents. In each will the testator should declare that it should apply only to property in a certain jurisdiction. An example of such declaration may be found in a subsequent section..°° The testator may appoint a different executor in each will, and the courts of each jurisdiction will grant probate of the will relating to the property which is within their jurisdiction at the date of the testator’s death.** The reason for making more than one will disposing of prop- erty in separate jurisdictions is apparent from the fact that the formalities required are not uniform in all jurisdictions. Thus where a testator is domiciled in a jurisdiction wherein a partic- ular form of will is recognized and owns realty in a jurisdiction wherein a different form of will is recognized, he is obliged to make a will for each jurisdiction. Where there is likely to be some question as to the testator’s domicil at the time of making his will, the safer plan would be to make a will in conformity with the laws of each particular jurisdictiori. § 30. Wills appointing executor only.—A will is valid if made for the sole purpose of appointing an executor.*® And this is so, even though the executor renounces probate.** The power of sale may be given to an executor appointed by a will which makes no direct disposition of property.®* It would seem that an instrument in which no testamentary 59 See post ch. 31. * tan, 25 R. I. 87, 54 Atl. 928; Brown- 60 See ch. 31. rigg v. Pike, 7 P. Div. 61. ' 61In re Goods of Seaman (1891), 63 Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, Prob. 253: : 29 N. E, 1151, 15 L. R. A. 447. "82Miller v. Miller, 32 La. Ann. 64 Barber v. Barber, 17 Hun (N. 437; Stewart v. Stewart, 177 Mass. Y.) 72. 493, 59 N. E. 116; Mulholland v. Gil- . 35 KINDS AND CLASSES § 31 disposition of property.has been attempted, but was executed for the sole purpose of appointing an executor, is not entitled to probate as a will if the person appointed as executor is dead at the time the instrument is offered for probate.® The form of a will appointing an executor only will be found in a subsequent section.°® §31. Wills operative at discretion of another.—While a testator can not delegate authority to another to make a will for him, nor empower another to revoke his will after death,®’ it has been held that a testator may provide that an instrument in form testamentary shall become operative or not at the election of an- other.** We submit that for a testator to make a provision either in his will or codicil thereto that the disposition shall take effect or not at the election of another made after the testator’s death is unsound in principle, and its practice is apt to lead to much mischief. An example of a will operative at the discretion of another will be found in another section of this work.*° § 32. Codicils—We have said that a codicil is an addition to, qualification, or alteration of, a will. It is practically a supple- mental will, incomplete in itself, but merely an appendage to an existing will, of which it is a part. It must be executed with all the formalities required in executing wills.7° But an instrument testamentary in character and executed with the formalities of a will may operate as a codicil, although it be in the form of a deed,”* power of attorney,” or a letter.” A codicil is often made for the sole purpose of naming an ex- 65In re Pepper’s Estate, 148 Pa. St. 5, 23 Atl. 1039. 66 See post ch. 31. 67In re White’s Will, 25 N. J. Eq. 501; In re North’s Goods, 6 Jur. 564. 68 Dudley v. Weinhart, 93 Ky. 401, 20 S. W. 308; In re Smith’s Goods, L.R.1P.& D. 717. 69 See post ch. 31. 70Home for Incurables v. Noble, 172 U. S. 383, 43 L. ed. 486, 19 Sup. Ct. 226; Watson v. Turner, 89 Ala. 220, 8 So. 20; In re Zeile, 74 Cal. 125, 15 Pac. 455; Green v. Lane, 45 N. Car. 102; 2 Cooley’s Bl. Comm. 500. 71 Kelly v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 584, 13 So. 785. 72 Stewart v. Stewart, 177 Mass. 493, 59 N. E. 116. 73 Barney v. Hays, 11 Mont. 571, 29 Pac. 282, 28 Am. St. 495. § 32 36 WILLS ecutor," but great care should be exercised in naming an executor to take the place of one named in the will.7* And in case of the death of the beneficiary during the lifetime of the testator, a codi- cil is sometimes made to prevent a lapse. Its use is generally to modify or vary the terms of the will, and does not revoke it unless it is expressly stated that it is made for that purpose.”* Nothing short of an absolute inconsistency will work a revocation by im- plication.”” Codicils are included in the term “will” and all legal provisions pertaining to wills must be understood as embracing codicils.” The will and codicil are to be taken and construed as parts of one and the same instrument, and the dispositions of the will are not to be disturbed further than are necessary to give effect to the codicil.” For certain purposes the codicil brings the will to its own date; it is to be regarded as a part thereof; both are to be construed as one instrument, and they are alike subject to the rules of law gov- erning the admission of parol evidence for the purpose of adding to, varying, or explaining their respective conditions. The au- thority of both rests upon the execution of the writing in accord- ance with the statutory requirements.°° The distinction between a will and a codicil exists only in their relation to each other. Thus a will has the effect of revoking all wills previously made; whereas a codicil recognizes the existence of a previous will, to which it is supplementary, but leaves it in 74 Stewart v. Stewart, 177 Mass. 493, 59 N. E. 116. 77 Bosley v. Wyatt, 14 How. (U. S.) 390, 14,L. ed. 468; Derby v. 7 In re Bailey’s Goods, L. R. 1 P. & D. 628. 7 Colt v. Colt, 32 Conn. 422; Bringhurst v. Orth, 7 Del. Ch. 178, 44 Atl. 783; Herzog v. Title Guar- antee & Trust Co., 177 N. Y. 86, 97, 69 N. E. 283, 67 L. R. A. 146; Good- win v. Coddington, 154 N. Y. 283, 48 N. E. 729; Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 450; In re Hoffman’s Will, 140 App. Div. 121, 124 N. Y. S. 1089; Thompson v. Churchill, 60 Vt. 371, 14 Atl. 699, Derby, 4 R. I. 414; Butler v. Green- wood, 22 Beav. 303. 78 Fry v. Morrison, 159 Ill, 244, 44 N. E. 774. 79Herzog v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 177 N. Y. 86, 69 N. E. 283, 67 L. R. A‘ 146; Goodwin v. Cod- dington, 154 N. Y. 283, 48 N. E. 729: Hard v. Ashley, 117 N. Y. 606, 23 N. E, 177. 80 Dunham v. Averill, 45 Conn. 61, 29 Am. Rep. 642. 37 KINDS AND CLASSES § 33 full force except so far as it undertakes to alter its terms. If the codicil is not attached to the original will, it must expressly identify the will to which it relates.** Ifa codicil is executed with all due formalities, and expressly confirms the will so far as it is consistent with such will, it serves to republish the will, supplies all omissions, and remedies all defects, if any, in the execution of the will.** It is provided by statute in many states that the word ‘“‘will” shall include or mean a codicil,** but in the absence of such statute the word “will” does not cover or embrace the codicil where anything appears to show that it was not intended to do so.** Examples of codicils are given in a subsequent section.*® § 33. Contracts to make or not make a will—There may be a binding contract to make a will or not make a will, or to leave property by will, if founded upon a valuable consideration.*’ The consideration must be valuable, as distinguished from a merely good or moral consideration.** A mere voluntary agreement or gratuitous promise to provide for the promisee by will is unen- forcible ;** nor will a court of equity decree a specific performance 81 Boyd v. Boyd, 1 McCrary (U. S.) 268, 2 Fed. 138; Kelly v. Rich- ardson, 100 Ala. 584, 13 So. 785; In re Plumel’s Estate, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192, 121 Am. St. 100; Flinn v. Frank, 8 Del. Ch. 186, 68 Atl. 196; Simon v. Middleton, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 531, 112 S. W. 441. 82 Ferrell v. Gill, 130 Ga. 534, 61 S. E, 131, 14 Ann. Cas. 471. 83 Camp v. Shaw, 52 Ill. App. 241; McCurdy v. Neall, 42 N. J. Eq. 333, 7 Atl. 566; Mooers v. White, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 360. But see Phelps v. Robbins, 40 Conn. 250, 271, 272; Booth v. Baptist Ch., 126 N. Y. 215, 247, 28 N. E. 238; In re Emmons, 110 App. Div. (N. Y.) 701, 96 N. Y. S. 506. 84See Digest of Statutes, ch. 28. 85 Sloane v. Stevens, 107 N. Y. 122, 13 N. E. 618. 86 See post ch. 30. 87 Banks v. Howard, .117 Ga. 94, 43 S. E. 438; Napier v. Trimmier, 56 Ga. 600; Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 112; Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37; Wright v. Tinsley, 30 Mo. 389; Cobb v. Macfarland, 87 Nebr. 408, 127 N. W. 377; Teske v. Dittberner, 70 Nebr. 544, 98 N. W. 57, 113 Am. St. 802; Kelley v. Devin, 65 Ore. 211, 132 Pac. 535; Jordan v. Abney, 97 Tex. 296, 78 S. W. 486; Bridgewater v. Hooks (Tex. Civ. App.), 159 S. W. 1004. 88 Schaadt v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 2 Cal. App. 715, 84 Pac. 249; Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530, 29 Atl. 15, 38 Am. St. 379; Klussman v. Wessling, 238 Ill. 568, 87 N. E. 544. 89 Studer v. Seyer, 69 Ga. 125; Mc- Clure v. McClure, 1 Pa. St. 374. WILLS 38 § 33 of a unilateral contract so to provide, which by its terms remains executory until the death of the person so contracting.” Such contracts are within the statute of frauds and must be in writing if they affect real property.*! But the courts of some states have held that contracts of this character may be estab- lished by oral testimony.°** A partial performance of a verbal contract of this character will take it out of the operation of the statute of frauds when a breach of the contract would work a fraud on the party so performing.®** Where a will is executed in pursuance of a verbal contract to make same, such execution takes the contract out of the statute of frauds.* A will executed in pursuance of a contract is nevertheless re- vocable, but the testator’s estate will be liable for the breach.” Where services have been performed under a verbal contract to devise real property by will, and the contract being unenforcible by reason of the statute of frauds, an action will lie against the personal representative of the decedent on a quantum meruit to 90 Colt v. O’Connor, 59 Misc. (N. Y.) 83, 109 N. Y. S. 689. 91 Pond v. Sheean, 132 Ill. 312, 23 N. E. 1018, 8 L. R. A. 414; Austin v. Davis, 128 Ind. 472, 12 L. R. A. 120, 26 N. E. 890, 25 Am. St. 456; Benge v. Hiatt, 82 Ky. 666, 6 Ky. L. 714, 56 Am. Rep. 912; Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408, 4 Am. Rep. 573; DeMoss v. Robinson, 46 Mich. 62, 8 N. W. 712, 41 Am. Rep. 144; Carney v. Carney, 95 Mo. 353, 14 S. W. 729; Pflugar v. Pultz, 43 N. J. Eq. 440, 11 Att. 123; Lisk v. Sherman, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 433; Sha- han v. Swan, 25 Ohio L. Bul. 69; Campbell v. Taul, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 548; Maddison v. Alderson, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 467. 92 Healy v. Healy, 55 App. Div. 315, 66 N. Y. S. 927, 8 Ann. Cas, 325 (affd. 166 N. Y. 624). But see Dicken v. McKinlay, 163 Ill. 318, 45 N. E. 134, 54 Am. St. 471 (as to lands); Sha- han v. Swan, 48 Ohio St. 25, 26 N. E. 222, 29 Am. St. 517 (as to goods and lands). . 93 Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 40 N. W. 173, 1 L. R. A. 596, 16 Am. St. 528; Svanburg v. Fos- seen, 75 Minn. 350, 78 N. W. 4, 43 L. R. A. 427,'74 Am. St. 490; Ackerson v. Fly, 99 Mo. App. 116, 72 S. W. 706; Best v. Gralapp, 69 Nebr. 811, 96 N. W. 641, 99 N. W. 837; Winne v. Winne, 166 N. Y. 263, 59 N. E. 832, 82 Am. St. 647; Rhodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 279; Shahan v. Swan, 48 Ohio St. 25, 26 N. E. 222, 29 Am. St. 517. 94Naylor v. Shelton, 102 Ark. 30, 143 S. W. 117, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 394n; Dalby v. Maxfield, 244 Ill. 214, 91 N. E. 420, 135 Am. St. 312; Jack v. Hooker, 71 Kans. 652, 81 Pac. 203; Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. 332, 66 Am. Dec. 773. 95 Day v. Washburn, 76 N. H. 203, 81 Atl. 474; Van Horn v. Demarest, 76 N. J. Eq. 386, 77 Atl. 354; Dilger 39 KINDS AND CLASSES § 33 recover the value of the services.°* Where there has been a defi- nite and certain agreement to make a will, or to make a certain testamentary disposition and the promisee has changed his condi~ tion and relations so that a refusal to complete the agreement would be a fraud upon him, the relief granted to the promisee is not by ordering the will to be made in pursuance of the agree- ment, but by regarding the property in the hands of the heirs, devisees, assignees, or representatives of the deceased promisor, as impressed with a trust in favor of the promisee.*” v. McQuade, 158 Wis. 328, 148 N. W. 1085. 96 Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530, 29 Atl. 15, 38 Am. St. 379; Watson v. Watson, 1 Houst. (Del.) 209; Mills v. Joiner, 20 Fla. 479; Hudson v. Hudson, 87 Ga. 678, 13 S. E. 583, 27 Am. St. 270; Kettry v. Thumma, 9 Ind. App. 498, 36 N. E. 919; McDan- iel v. Hutcherson, 136 Ky. 412, 124 S. W. 384; Hamilton v. Thirston, 93 Md. 213, 48 Atl. 709; In re Williams, 106 Mich. 490, 64 N. W. 490; Schwab v. Piero, 43 Minn. 520, 46 N. W. 71; Hall v. Getman, 121 Mo. App. 630, 97 S. W. 607; Howe v. Day, 58 N. H. 516; Smith v. Smith’s Admrs., 28 N. J. L. 208, 78 Am. Dec. 49; Robinson v. Raynor, 28 N. Y. 494; Goodloe v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S. W. 767, 6L. R. A. (N. S.) 703; Raycraft v. Johnston, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 466, 93 S. W. 237; Taylor v. Thieman, 132 Wis. 38, 111 N. W. 229, 122 Am. St. 943. 97 Whitney v. Hay, 15 App. Cas. 164 (affd. 181 U. S. 77, 21 Sup. Ct. 537, 45 L. ed. 758) ; Manning v. Pip- pen, 86 Ala. 357, 5 So. 572, 11 Am. St. 46; Naylor v. Shelton, 102 Ark. 30, 143 S. W. 117, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 394n; Keefe v. Keefe, 19 Cal. App. 310, 125 Pac. 929; Carl v. Northcutt, 48 Colo. 47, 108 Pac. 994; Holcomb v. Gillet, 2 Root (Conn.) 448; Belt v. Lazenby, 126 Ga. 767, 56 S. E. 81; Evans v. Moore, 247 Ill. 60, 93 N. E. 118, 139 Am. St. 302; Warner v. Mar- shall, 166 Ind. 88, 75 N. E. 582; Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N. W. 998; Dillon v. Gray, 87 Kans 129, 123 Pac. 878; Semmes v. Worthington, 38 Md. 298; Howe v. Watson, 179 Mass. 30, 60 N. E. 415; Kundinger v. Kundinger, 150 Mich. 630, 114 N. W. 408; Haubrich v. Haubrich, 118 Minn. 394, 136 N. W. 1025; Anding v. Da- vis, 38 Miss. 574, 77 Am. Dec. 658; Taylor v. Hudson, 145 Mo. App. 377, 129 S. W. 261; Burns v. Smith, 21 Mont. 257, 53 Pac. 742, 69 Am. St. 653; Moline v. Carlson, 92 Nebr. 419, 138 N. W. 721; Day v. Washburn, 76 N. H. 203, 81 Atl. 474; Clawson v. Brewer, 67 N. J. Eq. 201, 58 Atl. 598; Lasher v. McDermott, 144 App. Div. CN. Y.) 843, 129 N. Y. S. 416; Earn- hardt v. Clement, 137 N. Car. 91, 49 S. E. 49; Emery v. Darling, 50 Ohio St. 160, 33 N. E. 715; Richardson v. Orth, 40 Ore. 252, 66 Pac. 925, 69 Pac. 455; Brinker v. Brinker, 7 Pa. St. 53; Spencer v. Spencer, 25 R. I. 239, 55 Atl. 637; Fogle v. St. Michael Church, 48 S. Car. 86, 26 S. E. 99; McCullom v. Mackrell, 13 S. Dak. 262, 83 N. W. 255; Starnes v. Hatcher, 121 Tenn. 330, 117 S. W. 219; Jordan v. Abney, 97 Tex. 296, 78 S. W. 486; Brinton v. VanCott, 8 § 33 WILLS 40 Forms of contracts to make or not make a will may be found in a subsequent section. Utah 480, 33 Pac. 218; Smith v. Wis. 378, 88 N. W. 218; Roberts v. Pierce, 65 Vt. 200, 25 Atl. 1092; Mil- Hall, 1 Ont. 388; Lewis v. Maddocks, ton v. Kite, 114 Va. 256, 76 S. E. 313; 8 Ves. Jr. 150. Prince v. Prince, 64 Wash. 552, 117 98 See post ch, 31. Pac. 255; Rodman v. Rodman, 112 CHAPTER III LAWS BY WHICH WILLS ARE GOVERNED SECTION ; 40. Where a will may be executed. 41. Laws governing wills of real estate. SECTION 46. Laws governing wills executing powers, 47. Laws governing revocation. 42. Laws governing wills of personal 48. Laws governing election, dower property. and disinheritance. 43. Effect of changing domicil after 49. Laws governing construction and making will. interpretation. 44. Laws governing capacity of bene- 50. Effect of legislative enactment ficiary to take. subsequent to execution of will. 45. Laws governing trusts created by 51. Effect of legislative enactment wills. after testator’s death. § 40. Where a will may be executed.—As a general rule the place of making a will is immaterial, the only requirement being that it be executed according to the law of the testator’s domicil. But in executing a will in a foreign state or country care should be taken, if possible, to have the will witnessed by persons of the same nationality as the testator and whose domicil is the same as that of the testator. “The will of a person whose domicil at the time of his death is in this state is a domestic will, and properly admitted to original probate at the place of such domicil without regard to where the will was made or where such person died.”* The statutes of many states provide that a will made in a foreign state or country and valid according to the laws of such state or country may be proved and allowed in the state enacting such statute, and shall thereupon have the same effect as if it had been executed according to the laws of the latter state.2 A testator domiciled in a state where such a statute is in effect may go into a foreign state and there execute his will with 1Converse v. Starr, 23 Ohio St. 2 See digest of statutes of the vari- 491. See also Manuel v. Manuel, 13 ous states. Ohio St. 458. 41 § 41 WILLS 42 only two witnesses as there required, and the will may be probated in the state of his domicil, although the law therein requires three witnesses to a will.? While this is true, the better practice would be to execute a will according to the law of the testator’s domicil. The laws affecting the testamentary disposition of property by subjects of the United States and of foreign powers are embodied in certain treaties and conventions made from time to time be- tween this country and foreign governments, extracts from which treaties will be found in a separate chapter of this work.* §41. Laws governing wills of real estate—The intentions of testators have frequently failed because they executed their wills according to the forms prescribed by the laws of their re- spective domiciles, which were not in accordance with the laws of the states where some of their lands were situated, and most at- torneys have doubtless realized the difficulties arising from so many statutes on the subject, when called upon to hastily draw a will for a person who owned real estate in different jurisdictions. It is a well settled policy of the law in this country, except where not modified by statute, that wills of real estate or affecting real estate must be executed in accordance with the law of the state where the real estate is situated, and that the provisions dis- posing of such real estate must be valid under the laws of such state. It is not enough that such will and the provisions thereof are valid in the state of the testator’s domicil.° This rule includes not only the form and mode of execution of a will, but also the lawful power and authority of the testator to make such disposi- 3 Bayley v. Bayley, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 111, 54 So. 579; Brosnahan v. Turner, 245; Crippen v. Dexter, 13 Gray 16 La. 433; Sevier v. Douglas, 44 La. (Mass.) 330. Ann. 605, 10 So. 804; Rackemann v. 4See ch. 29, Taylor, 204 Mass. 394, 90 N. E. 552; 5 Clark v. Clark, 178 U. S. 186, 44 L. ed. 1028, 20 Sup. Ct. 873; Higgins v. Eaton, 188 Fed. 938; Blacksher Co. v. Northrup,. 176 Ala. 190, 57 So. 743, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454n; Lum- ber Co. v. Files, 104 Ark. 600, 149 S. W. 908; Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41; Succession of Herber, 128 La, In re Turner, 82 Misc. 25, 143 N. Y. S. 692; White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144, 52 Barb. 294; Kessler v. Kessler, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. 522; In re Stewart’s Estate, 26 Wash. 32, 66 Pac. 148, 67 Pac. 723; Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19, 33 N. W. 188, 5 Am. St. 117. 43 LAWS BY WHICH WILLS ARE GOVERNED § 42 tion.® It also includes the capacity of the testator to make such disposition.’ The rule also includes the power to devise after- acquired property,* the power to devise property held in common,” the power to disinherit by devise,*® the application of the rule in Shelley’s Case,** the application of the Rule against Perpetuities,*” and the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion.** There are cases holding that a will disposing of real estate is governed by the law of the testator’s domicil, unless it appears from the will that he drew it with reference to the law of the place where the land was situated.** The rule that the lex rei sitae governs a will devising real prop- erty has been modified in some states by the adoption of the rule that a will is valid to pass land anywhere if it is valid by the law of the jurisdiction where the testator was domiciled at the time of his death. § 42. Laws governing wills of personal property.—The general rule is that a will disposing of personal property is gov- erned by the law of the testator’s domicil at the time of his death.** This rule, however, is subject to the all important limi- 6 Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19, 33 N. W. 188, 5 Am. St. 117. 7 Evansville Ice & C. S. Co. v. Win- sor, 148 Ind. 682, 48 N. E. 592. 8 Wynne v. Wynne, 23 Miss. 251, 27 Am. Dec. 139; Frazier v. Boggs, 37 Fla. 307, 20 So. 245. 9 Pratt v. Douglas, 38 N. J. Eq. 516. 10In re Lewis’ Estate, 32 La. Ann. 385. 11De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566, 41 L. ed. 827, 17 Sup. Ct. 461. 12Hobson vy. Hale, 95 N. Y. 588; Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42, 44 N. W. 1057. 18 Clark’s Appeal, 70 Conn, 195, 39 At. 155, 14 Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 483, 9 L. ed. 201; Higgins v. Eaton, 188 Fed. 938; Keith v. Eaton, 58 Kans. 732, 51 Pac. 271; Lincoln v. Perry, 149 Mass. 368, 21 N. E. 671, 4 L. R. A. 215; Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42, 44 N. W. 1057; Washburn v. Van Steenwyck, 32 Minn. 336, 20 N. W. 324; Adams v. Farley (Miss.), 18 So. 390; Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19, 33 N. W. 188, 5 Am. St. 117, 72 Wis. 621, 40 N. W. 502. 15Green v. Alden, 92 Maine 177, 42 Atl. 358; Lyon v. Ogden, 85 Maine 374, 27 Atl. 258. 16 Higgins v. Eaton, 183 Fed. 388; In re Lathrop’s Estate, 165 Cal. 243, 131 Pac. 752; Whitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192, 38 Pac. 636; In re Apple’s Estate, 66 Cal. 432, 6 Pac. 7; Yore v. Cook, 67 Til. App. 586; Succession of Robert, 2 Rob. (La.) 427; Flatauer v. Loser, 156 App. Div. 591, 141 N. Y. S. 951; Congregational Unitarian Soc. v. Hale, 29 App. Div. 396, 51 N. Y. S. 704, 27 Civ. Proc. R. 303; Garvey v. § 43 WILLS 44 tation that the law of the domicil controls if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the personal property is situ- ated.*” : : It is the policy of the law that a testator shall have but one will as to his personal estate in whatever state of the Union it may be situated, and that the law of the state of his domicil determines what that will is, and that it becomes operative and binding on all whose rights under it are in question, and con- trols the distribution of the personal estate wherever situated. A sound public policy demands that this should be the rule.** The rule generally applies to the form of the will and the capacity of the testator to make same.’® But there is a differ- ence of opinion as to whether the rule applies to testamentary capacity.?° The general principles which refer wills of personal property to the law of the testator’s domicil, are frequently stated by the courts in very broad and comprehensive terms, which are cal- culated to convey the impression that every question that may arise in respect to a will of personal property is necessarily and under all circumstances to be determined solely by the law of the testator’s domicil; but these general statements, though doubt- _less sufficiently accurate for the immediate purposes of the cases in which they are made, are not to be accepted without qualifi- cation and limitation as will be subsequently shown in this section. While very many of the questions that relate to wills of per- sonal property are to be referred to the lex domicilii, the law of the domicil not infrequently yields wholly or partially to the law of another jurisdiction. A will may have all the forms and requi- sites to pass title to personalty within the lex domicilii, yet the Horgan, 38 Misc. 164, 77 N. Y. S. 290; In re Robertson’s Will, 23 Misc. 450, 51 N. Y. S. 502; Mapes v. Amer- ican Home Missionary Soc., 33 Hun (N. Y.) 360; In re Anderson, 78. Misc. 713, 140 N. Y. S. 230; Kerr v. Dougherty, 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 44. 17In re Lathrop’s Estate, 165 Cal. 243, 131 Pac. 752. 18 Higgins v. Eaton, 188 Fed. 938. 19 Sickles v. New Orleans, 80 Fed. 868; Handley v. Palmer, 91 Fed. 948; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424; Stokes v. Stokes, 78 L. T. 50, 67 L. J. P. D. & A. (N. S.) 55; Ross v. Ross, 25 Can. Sup. Ct. 307. 20 Story Conflict of Laws, § 465 et. seq. 45 LAWS BY WHICH WILLS ARE GOVERNED § 43 validity of particular bequests will depend upon the law of the domicil of the legatee.** If the will contains particular bequests of funds to be transmitted to, and administered for particular purposes in, another state, the validity of such particular be- quests must be tested by the law of the state to which the fund is, by the terms of the will, to be transmitted and in which it is to be administered.”? A bequest in a will executed by a testator residing in one state, valid if the legatee resides in such state, but void by the law of the legatee’s domicil, is consequently void in the state where the testator resided and executed the will.* nor could she make testamentary disposition of her personal property without the consent of her husband.** She could not in general make a will disposing of property to her husband, for she was presumed to act under his coercion, and hence her will in his favor was not considered as her voluntary act.*’ But the old Jaw on the sub- ject of wills of married women is now practically obsolete, for modern statutes generally empower married women to make wills ’ disposing of both real and personal property as if sole.** Where general power is conferred upon a married woman to make testamentary disposition of her property, it is held that she may make a valid disposition thereof by will to her hus- band ;*° but where a statute expressly provides against such dis- position she has no power to make it.*® As a general rule a married woman is incapable of making a will so as to defeat the right of curtesy, but aside from this she may dispose of her property by will to the exclusion of her husband.** If, however, the husband waives his right to the property of his wife, and consents to her disposing of it by will, 22 Am. Rep. 164; Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N. W. 998; Kel- ley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 70 N. E. 89; Wadhams v. American Home Mis. Soc, 12 N. Y. 415; Hair v. Caldwell, 109 Tenn. 148, 70 S. W. 610; Kiracofe v. Kiracofe, 93 Va. 591, 25 S. E. 601. 35 Baker v. Chastang, 18 Ala. 417; Harker v. Harker, Exr., 3 Harr. (Del.) 51; George v. Bussing, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 558; Wing v. Deans, 214 Mass. 546, 102 N. E. 313; Van Winkle v. Schoonmaker, 15 N. J. Eq. 384. "86 Bunnell v. Hixon, 205. Mass. 468, 91 N. E. 1022; Compton v. Pierson, 28 N. J. Eq. 229. 87 Hood v. Archer, 1 McCord (S. Car.) 225; Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295. 38See Digest of Statutes, post, ch. 28. See also Deutsch v. Rohlfing, 22 Colo. App. 543, 126 Pac. 1123; Zeust v. Blatant, 16 App. Cas. (D. Fuk Aad. FT: - at mT 39 Parrott v. Kelly, 79 Ky. 490, 3 Ky. L. 269; Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295; Bradish v. Gibbs, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 523; Rich v. Beaumont, 6 Bro. P. C. 152, 40 Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295. 41 Stoutenburgh v. Hopkins, 43 N. J. Eq. 577, 12 Atl. 689; In re Tracy, OD AT XT G&L NIN 75 CAPACITY AND RESTRICTIONS UPON TESTATOR § 82 the will is valid and operative.” It seems that no particular form of consent is necessary; it may be by parol or in writing, or im- plied from circumstances. It must be a consent to the particular will, and not a mere general consent that the wife may make the will. It seems that the consent unless founded upon a valuable consideration, is revocable until the will is probated.“ At common law the marriage of testatrix revoked her will and in some states it is so provided by statute. The reason for the common-law rule is found in the fact that the same capacity is required to revoke as to make a will and upon marriage the testatrix therefore became incompetent to revoke her will, and, since there can not be an irrevocable will, it was deemed revoked by operation of law by marriage. There is a conflict of author- ity as to whether statutes giving married women full testa- mentary power impliedly abrogate the common-law rule as to revocation, but, on principle, it seems that they should have this effect, since they revoke the reason of the rule.** § 82. Convicts and persons guilty of crime.—The early treatises on the law of wills included a large number of persons who were disqualified from making testamentary disposition of their property. Among these were slaves, villains, captives, pris- oners, traitors, felons, heretics, apostates, usurers, libellers, prod- igals, and suicides.** Under the old rule of the common law one attainted of treason and felony could not devise his real estate so as to deprive the crown of the right to enforce a forfeiture, though it seems that he could make and receive transfers subject to such right in the crown.** But a great many of the disquali- ‘fications recognized by the old law no longer exist. In this country where forfeiture for crime is not generally recognized, 42 Hanson v. Hanson, 81 Kans. 305, 105 Pac. 444; Steward v. Middleton, 47 N. J. Eq. 293, 20 Atl. 846, 17 Atl. 294, 43 Cutter v. Butler, 25 N. H. 343, 57 Am. Dec. 330. 44Roane v. Hollingshead, 76 Md. 369, 25 Atl. 307, 17 L. R. A. 592, 35 Am. St. 438; Kelly v. Stevenson, 85 Minn. 247, 88 N. W. 739, 56 L. R. A. 754, 89 Am. St. 545; In re Lyon’s Will, 96 Wis. 339, 71 N. W. 362, 65 Am. St. 52. 45 Swinb. pt. 1, § 7 et seq. 46 Avery v. Everett, 110 N. Y. 317, 18 N. E. 148,1L. R. A. 264, 6 Am. St. 368; Doe, ex. dem. Griffith v. Pritchard, 5 B. & Ad. 765. § 83 WILLS 76 the conviction of crime does not affect the capacity of the per- son to take or transfer real estate.‘ Attainders, outlawry, dep- rivation of property except by due process of law, and the cor- ruption of blood or forfeiture to the state, as a result of convic- tion of crime are expressly prohibited by the organic law.** It is provided by statute in some states that a person convicted of crime can not make a valid will ;*° but it would seem that in the absence of such a statute a will made by a person convicted of crime is valid. The fact that the testator committed suicide soon after mak- ing his will does not render the instrument invalid; but such fact, when taken with other proof of mental derangement, may aid in setting aside the will.°° § 83. Persons of unsound mind.—By the statement that the testator has “a sound mind and memory” is meant that he is able to execute his will with an understanding of the nature of the act, such as the recollection of the property he means to dispose of, of the persons who are or who might reasonably be the objects of his bounty, and the manner in which it is to be dis- tributed among them. It is sufficient if he understands what he is about even if he has less mental capacity than would be re- quired to make a contract.** But it is evident that it takes more mental capacity to make some wills than it does to make some contracts, and vice versa; and there is excellent authority for 47 Rankin v. Rankin, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 531, 17 Am. Dec. 161; Avery v. Everett, 110 N. Y. 317, 18 N. E. 148, 1 L. R. A. 264, 6 Am. St. 368. 48 Davis v. Laning, 85 Tex. 39, 19 S. W. 846, 18 L. R. A. 82, 34 Am. St. 784. 49 Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R. I. 590, 30 Atl. 470, 26 L. R. A. 232. See Di- gest of Statutes, post ch. 28. 50In re Chevallier’s Estate, 159 Cal. 161, 113 Pac. 130; Duffield v. Morris’ Exr., 2 Har. (Del.) 375; Holton v. Cochran, 208 Mo. 314, 106 S. W. 1035. 51 Harrison v. Rowan, Fed. Cas. No. 6141, 3 Wash. (C. C.) 580; Terry v. Buffington, 11 Ga. 337, 56 Am. Dec. 423; Speer v. Speer, 146 Iowa 6, 123 N. W. 176, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 294, 140 Am. St. 268; Brinkman v. Rueggesick, 71 Mo. 553; Kirkwood v. Gordan, 7 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 474, 62 Am. Dec. 418; Converse v. Con- verse, 21 Vt. 168, 52 Am. Dec. 58; Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 659, 8 S. E, 493, 2 L, R. A, 668, 77 CAPACITY AND RESTRICTIONS UPON TESTATOR § 83 the rule that, while contractual capacity implies prima facie the capacity to make a will, yet neither is a test for the other, and the presence or absence of one does not conclusively establish the presence or absence of the other.” The existence in the mind of the testator of minor details which do not affect either the natural or selected objects of his bounty is not inconsistent with testamentary capacity.** All cases of bodily diseases in some degree affect the mind and thus ren- der it, technically speaking, unsound, but it does not follow that the patient is therefore incapacitated from transacting ordinary business.** A monomaniac, or a person partially insane, although sensible and prudent on subjects and occasions other than those upon which his infirmity is commonly displayed, is not capable of making a will, if his monomania relates to the object or objects of his bounty.” -Eccentricities of conduct, absurd opinions, and a belief in things which to other persons may seem absurd do not neces- sarily establish testamentary incapacity.°* The proposition is well settled that an idiot is incapable of making a valid will.’ But persons possessing a low grade of intellect yet having capacity to know and understand the nature and extent of their prop- erty, the proper objects of their bounty and the nature of the testamentary act have been held capable of making a valid 52 Turner’s Appeal, 72 Conn. 305, 44 Atl. 310; Greene v. Greene, 145 Ill. 264, 33 N. E. 941; Murphy v. Nett, 47 Mont. 38, 130 Pac. 431; Brown v. Mitchell, 88 Tex. 350, 31 S. W. 621, 36 L. R. A. 64; In re Segur’s Will, 71 Vt. 224, 44 Atl. 342. 53New Jerusalem Church v. Crocker, 7 Ohio C. C. 327, 4 Ohio C. D. 619. 54Freeman v. Easley, 117 Ill. 317, 7 N. E. 656; Vice v. Hall, 120 Ill. 597, 12 N. E. 236. 55 Gwin v. Gwin, 51 Idaho 271, 48 Pac. 295; Orchardson v. Cofield, 171 Ill. 14, 49 N. E. 197, 40 L. R. A. 256, 63 Am. St. 211; Whitney v. Twombly, 136 Mass. 145; Rivard v. Rivard, 109 Mich. 98, 66 N. W. 681, 63 Am. St. 566; Thomas v. Carter, 170 Pa. St. 272, 33 Atl. 81, 50 Am. St. 770; In re Segur’s Will, 71 Vt. 224, 44 Atl. 342. 56 Farnum v. Boyd, 56 N. J. Ea. 766, 41 Atl. 422; Onachita Baptist College v. Scott, 64 Ark. 349, 42 S. W. 536. 57 Hovey v. Chase, 52 Maine 304, 83 Am. Dec. 514; Browning v. Reane, 2 Phil. Ecc. 69. § 84 WILLS 78 will."* The same rules governing the testamentary capacity of idiots apply to imbeciles."° § 84. Aged persons.—Great age alone does not incapaci- tate a person from making testamentary disposition of his prop- erty; but, on the contrary, it calls for protection and aid to fur- ther its wishes, when a mind capable of acting rationally and a. memory in essentials, are shown to have existed, and the last will is in consonance with definite and long-settled intentions, is not unreasonable in its provisions, and has been executed with fairness.°° “A man may freely make his testament how old soever he may be. It is one of the painful consequences of ex- treme old age that it ceases to excite interest, and is apt to be left solitary and neglected. The control which the law still gives to a man over the disposal of his property, is one of the most efficient means which he has in protracted life, to command the attention due to his infirmities. The will of such an aged man ought to be regarded with great tenderness, when it appears not to have been procured by fraudulent acts, but contains those very dispositions which the circumstances of his situation, and the course of the natural affections, dictated.” But where the testator is afflicted with senile dementia, and the affliction has reached a stage where he does not understand the act in which he is enagaged, he no longer has capacity to make a valid will, regardless of what his age may be.*? One of the surest indications of the approach of senile decay is that of 58 Townsend v. Bogart, 5 Redf. (N. Y.) 93. 59 Smith v. Smith, 75 Ga. 477; Primmer v. Primmer, 75 Iowa 415, 35 N. W. 676; Hudson v. Hughan, 56 Kans. 152, 42 Pac. 701; Ayers v. Ayers, 43 N. J. Eq. 565, 12 Atl. 621; Rothrock v. Rothrock, 22 Ore. 551, 30 Pac. 453. 60 Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 480; In re Huston’s Estate, 163 Cal. 166, 124 Pac. 852; Wood v. Lane, 102 Ga. 199, 29 S. E. 180; Lindsey v. In re Estate of Winch, 84 Nebr. 251, 121 N. W. 116, 18 Ann. Cas. 903; McIntosh v. Moore, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 22, 53 S. 'W. 611; Maverick v. Reyn- olds, 2 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 360. 61 Bleeker v. Lynch, 1 Bradf. (N. Y. Surr.) 458. 62Tn re Huston’s Estate, 163 Cal. 166, 124 Pac. 852; Hudson vy. Hughan, 56 Kans. 152, 42 Pac. 701; Berst v. Moxom, 163 Mo. App. 123, 145 S. W. 857; Mason v. Rodriguez, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 445, 115 S. W. 868. 79 CAPACITY AND RESTRICTIONS UPON TESTATOR § 85 loss of memory, and where such loss of memory is such as to prevent testator from recalling and holding in his mind the value and extent of his property and the persons who would be the natural objects of his bounty, he lacks capacity to make a valid testamentary instrument. But the mere fact that an aged tes- tator’s memory is failing,** or his judgment is vacillating,*® does not invalidate his will if it is fairly made and he was free from any undue influence.°* While age is not of itself a disqualifica- tion, yet it excites vigilance to see if it is accompanied with inca- pacity.*” § 85. Deaf, dumb and blind persons.—In England it was formerly held that a deaf and dumb person was, prima facie, incapable of making a will, being included in the same class with idiots, among those who lacked testamentary capacity; the rea- son given for the holding being that they were deprived of the use of those senses through which intelligence could be com- municated.® But it was always supposed that if it were shown that such persons had understanding, or if they were not deaf from: birth, and could write or speak, having once acquired these faculties, they were to be regarded like other persons, capable of making a will. Persons deprived of the sense of sight have always been held capable of executing a will, where the act is done with proper precaution.” The modern law has restored the capacity to these unfortunate persons to make testamentary disposition of their property where 65In re Tarr’s Estate, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 319. 63 Kramer v. Weinert, 81 Ala. 414, 1 So. 26; In re Packer’s Estate, 164 Cal, 525, 129 Pac. 778; In re Dole’s Estate, 147 Cal. 18%, 81 Pac. 534. 64 Gates v. Cole, 137 Iowa 613, 115 N. W. 236; McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 252, 25 S. W. 506; Merrill v. Rush, 33 N. J. Eq. 537; In re Mabie’s Will, 5 Misc. 179, 24 N. Y. S. 855, 1 Powers 503; Bain v. Cline, 24 Ore. 175, 33 Pac. 542, 41 Am. St. 851; In re Fow’s Estate, 147 Pa. St. 264, 23 Atl, 447. 66 In re Ames’ Will, 51 Iowa 596, 2 N. W. 408; Watson v. Watson, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 74. 67 Whitney v. Twombly, 136 Mass. 145. 882 Cooley BI. Comm. *497. 69 State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93, 20 Am. Dec. 90; Morrison v. Len- nard, 3 Car. & P. 127. 70 Sharp’s Appeal, 134 Pa. St. 492, 19 Atl. 679. § 86 WILLS 80 the proof of their intentions is clear and no circumstance of undue advantage of their infirmities appears."* Where the dis- ability of blindness, deafness, or dumbness has not existed from birth, it may be some evidence of mental incapacity, but the infirmity itself affords no presumption whatever of legal dis- qualification.” § 86. Persons under duress or undue influence.—A person making a will should possess the power to withstand all contradic- tion and control. And whatever will destroy his free agency will not only invalidate the will as to the person exercising the undue influence, but the whole will. In short, it must be the will of him who makes it and not of another person.* Whatever destroys the free agency is restraint. All overpowering influence, whether of affection or fear, love or dread, becomes irresistible, from the fact that it absorbs and swallows up the will and thus virtually introduces another person’s purpose into the purposes of the testator, and so, in fact, destroys his personal independence and virtually his identity. Honest endeavor, importunate solicitation for remembrance in a will by a wife or child is not necessarily undue influence."* The law presumes undue influence where a patient makes a will in favor of his physician, a client in favor of his attorney, a ward in favor of his guardian, a person in favor of his priest or religious adviser; and where other cases of confi- dential relationship exist the wills are viewed with great suspicion by the law and some proof besides the making of the will is re- quired. Indeed, the fact of undue influence is often gathered from all the circumstances surrounding the donor; his health, age and mental condition; how far he was dependent upon or subject to the control of the person benefited; the opportunity which the latter had to exercise his influence, and the disposition of the donor to be subject to it.”® 71 Rollwagen v. Rollwagen, 63 N. 78 Orchardson v. Cofeld, 171 Til. Y. 504; Weir v. Fitzgerald, 2 Bradf. 14, 49 N. E. 197, 40 L. R. A. 256, 63° (N. Y.) 42. Am. St. 211; Baylie’s Exr. v. Spaul- 72 Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324, 50 ding (Mass.), 6 N. E. 62. Am. Dec. 329; In re Geale’s Goods, 74 Sturtevant v. Sturtevant, 116 IIL. 3S. & T. 430, 33 L. J. P. 125, 12 W. 340, 6 N. E. 428. R. 1027. 7 Woodbury v. Woodbury, 141 81 CAPACITY AND RESTRICTIONS UPON TESTATOR § 87 § 87. Drunkards and drug fiends.x—Drunkenness, unless so complete as to destroy the victim’s capacity to understand what he is doing will not invalidate his will.”° It has been held in many cases that an habitual drunkard may make a valid will.” Thus if a testator is sober, and in the possession of all his mental facul- ties at the time of making his will, the fact that he was of intem- perate habits does not invalidate his will."* If the drunkenness is of such duration as to produce unsoundness of mind, the same rules as to the testamentary capacity will apply as in the cases of mental unsoundness from other causes.” A person addicted to the use of morphine may make a valid will if he is not under the influence of the drug at the time of the execution of the will.®° Mass. 329, 5 N. E. 275, 55 Am. Rep. 479, 76 Duffield v. Robeson, 2 Harr. (Del.) 375; In re Convey, 52 Iowa 197, 2 N. W. 1084; Best v. Best, 11 S. W. 810, 11 Ky. L. 215; Pierce v. ‘Pierce, 38 Mich. 412; In re Lee’s Will, 46 N. J. Eq. 193, 18 Atl. 525; Peck v. Cary, 27 N. Y. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 220; Key v. Holloway, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 575. 77 In re Wilson’s Estate, 117 Cal. 262, 49 Pac. 172; Duffield v. Morris’ Exr., 2 Har. (Del.) 375; Archam- bault v. Blanchard, 198 Mo. 384, 95. S. W. 834. 6—Tuomp. WILts. 7 In re Wilson, 117 Cal. 262, 49 Pac. 172; Wiley v. Ewalt, 66 Ill. 26; McIntire v. McConn, 28 Iowa 480; Hebert v. Winn, 24 La. Ann. 385; In re Gilham, 64 N. J. Eq. 715, 52 Atl. 690; Peck v. Cary, 27 N. Y. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 220; In re Miller’s Estate, 179 Pa. St. 645, 39 L. R. A. 220, 36 Atl. 139; In re Van Alstine, 26 Utah 193, 72 Pac. 942. 79 Swygart v. Willard, 166 Ind. 25, 76 N. E. 755. 80 Bush v. Lisle, 89 Ky. 393, 12 S. W. 762, 11 Ky. L. 708. CHAPTER VI CAPACITY TO TAKE UNDER A WILL AND RESTRICTIONS UPON BENEFICIARIES SECTION SECTION 95. Capacity to take under a will in 102. Husband or wife. general. 103. Children and their descendants. 96. Aliens. 104. After-born children. 97. Private corporations. 105. Adopted children. 98. Public and quasi corporations. 106. Illegitimate children. 99. Unincorporated societies. 107. Subscribing witnesses. 100. Charitable, religious and educa- 108. Paramours. tional institutions. 109. Murderer of testator. 101. Gifts to separate use of females. § 95. Capacity to take under a will in general.—As a gen- eral rule any person may take property by devise or bequest. But for reasons of public policy and good morals the law has seen fit to designate who may and who may not be the objects of the testator’s bounty. The restrictions and limitations upon the power to make testamentary disposition of property have been discussed in a previous chapter.* The capacity of a person to take a present vested interest under a will is to be judged as of the date of the testator’s death,” and if capacity existed at that date, a prior or subsequent incapacity does not render the gift invalid. But where a devise or bequest is in- tended to be vested in the beneficiary, not at the death of the testator, but at some later time, it is immaterial whether the bene- ficiary is capable of taking at the time of the death, provided he is capable at the time when the gift is intended to become vested.* 1See ante ch. 5. 4 New Orleans First Congregational 2Hargraves v. Lott, 67 Ga. 133; Church v. Henderson, 4 Rob. (La.) “Hardesty’s Succession, 22 La. Ann. 209; Lougheed v. Dykeman’s Baptist 332. Church, 129 N. Y. 211, 29 N. E. 249, 3 Hargroves v. Redd, 43 Ga. 142; 14 L. R. A. 410; Wait v. Political In re McClyment, 16 Abb. N. Cas. Study Soc., 68 Misc. 245, 123 N. Y. (N. Y.) 262. S. 637. 83 CAPACITY OF BENEFICIARIES § 95 A beneficiary under a will must be in existence either at the death of the testator or at the time the gift vests." Thus a gift by will to the heirs of a person not in being at the death of the tes- tator, is void.* Likewise a gift to a corporation not in existence at the death of the testator is void.” Also a will devising or be- queathing property to the estate of a person is void; it not being a person or entity which can take under a will.® §96. Aliens—At common law an alien may take title to real estate by devise,® subject only to the right of the state to claim it by escheat upon proper proceeding, such as office found.?? But the common-law rule has been modified by statute in most states and aliens are now permitted to take real estate by devise as fully as Citizens can.** In some states, however, nonresident aliens are forbidden by statute to acquire any interest in real estate.** The common-law rule has also been generally modified by treaties made by the United States with foreign powers, and in jurisdictions where nonresident aliens are forbidden by statute to acquire real estate by devise it is held that such treaties supersede the statute disqual- ifying such aliens to take, as far as the citizens of such nations are 5 Milne v. Milne, 17 La. 46. 6 Sevier v. Douglas, 44 La. Ann. 605, 10 So. 804; Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465, 3 Am. Rep. 558. 7 Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465, 3 Am. Rep. 558. 8In re Glass’ Estate, 164 Cal. 765, 130 Pac. 868. ®Cross v. Del Valle, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 5, 17 L. ed. 515; Smith v. Zaner, 4 Ala. 99; Jones v. Minogue, 29 Ark. 637; People v. Folsom, 5 Cal. 373; Foss v. Crisp. 20 Pick. (Mass.) 121; Hall v. Hall, 81 N. Y. 130; Clifton v. Haig, 4 Desaus. (S. Car.) 330; Baker v. Shy, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 85; Gray v. Kauffman, 82 Tex. 65, 17 S. W. 513; Stephen’s Heirs v. Swann, 9 Leigh (Va.) 404. But see Eldon v. Doe, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 341. 10 Phillips v. Moore, 100 U. S. 208, 25 L. ed. 603. 11De Geofry v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 33 L. ed. 642, 10 S. Ct. 295; Ni- crosi v. Phillippi, 91 Ala. 299, 8 So. 561; Utassy v. Geidinghagen, 132 Mo. 53, 33 S. W. 444; Stamm v. Bost- wick, 122 N- Y. 48, 25 N. E. 233, 9 L. R. A. 597; Hannon v. Hounihan, 85 Va. 429, 12 S. E. 157. 12 Ryan v. Egan, 156 Ill. 224, 40 N. E. 827; Meier v. Lee, 106 Iowa 303, 76 N. W. 712, § 97 WILLS 84 concerned.* ‘At common law an alien may take personal prop- erty by will for his own benefit.** §97. Private corporations.—By the common law a private corporation may acquire title to real estate by devise,** and unless prohibited by statute, the devise may be made to a foreign corpo- ration.1* This power was restricted in England by the statute of Mortmain; and in some states statutes have been enacted which provide that no devise to a corporation shall be valid unless it is expressly authorized to take by devise.*” Statutes sometimes provide that certain corporations shall not take by gift, grant, or devise more than a certain stated amount in value of property. Under such a statute a devise or bequest to a corporation which exceeded the specified amount, was held void as to such excess; and that as to such excess no title vested in the corporation.** A devise to a corporation not authorized to take real estate, or to one which has acquired all the property it is en- titled by its charter to take, is void.” A statutory limitation on the power to take by devise in one state, has been held not to af- fect the power of a corporation of such a state to take by devise real property of another state.” A corporation having no capacity to take real estate or other 18 Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa 407, 69 N. W. 560, 37 L. R. A. 583; Adams v. Akerlund, 168 Ill. 632, 48 N. E. 454; Rixner’s Succession, 48 La. Ann. 552, 19 So. 597, 32 L. R. A. 177. See also Treaties and Conventions, post ch. 29. 14 Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 35; 1 Cooley BI. Comm. *373; 2 Kent Comm. 62. 15 Hubbard v. Worcester Art Mu- seum, 179 Fed. 406; In re McGraw’s Estate, 111 N. Y. 66, 19 N. E. 233, 2L. R.A. 387, 16 West Virginia Pulp &c. Co. v. Miller, 176 Fed. 284. 17 Oklahoma: Rev. Laws § 8342; Porto Rico: Civ. (1910), Code Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), § 1002, p. 185; Starkweather v. American Bible Soc., 72 Ill. 50, 22 Am. Rep. 133; Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366, 80 Am. Dec. 290. 18In re McGraw’s Estate, 111 N. Y. 66, 19 N. E. 233, 2 L. R. A. 387. 19 Barton v. King, 41 Miss. 288; De Camp v. Dobbins, 31 N. J. Eq. 671; Wood v. Hammond, 16 R. I. 98, 17 Atl. 324, 18 Atl. 198, 20 Christian Union vy. Yount, 101 U. S. 352, 25 L. ed. 888; White v. Howard, 38 Conn. 342; American Bible Society v. Marshall, 15 Ohio St. 537. But see Starkweather v. American Bible Soc. 72 Ill. 50, 22 Am. Rep. 133; House of Mercy v. 85 CAPACITY OF BENEFICIARIES § 97 property at the time the devise or bequest is created, may have such incapacity cured and may legally be qualified to take before the happening of the event upon which a devise or bequest was to become vested.”* But where a devise is absolutely void so that the title to the property vests in the heirs at law immediately upon the death of the testator, then a subsequent legislative act enlarging the capacity of the corporation to take the devise will be unavail- ing because the title vested in the heirs, and it was not in the leg- islative power to divest it.” A corporation having the right to take and hold personal property may take such property as a bequest under a will.?* The statutes generally sdo not prevent bequests of personal property even to foreign corporations. While such corporations have no legal existence out of the state of their creation yet their existence is so far recognized in other states that their nonresidence cre- ates no valid objection to bequests of personalty, provided they have power to take such gifts under their own charter.** § 98. Public and quasi corporations.—As a general rule a municipal corporation, unless specially restricted, is capable of taking property by devise, and acting as a trustee for the purpose of a public nature germane to the objects of the corporation.” The capacity of a municipal corporation to administer a trust for educational purposes under a devise has been sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States.** Also a municipal corpo- ration may take personal property by bequest.*” It has also been Quincy v. Attorney-General, 160 Mass. 431, 35 N. E. 1066; Carder v. Fayette, 16 Ohio St. 353; Philadel- phia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; MclIn- tosh v. Charleston, 45 S. Car 584, 23 21 Plymouth Society v. Hepburn, 57 Hun 161, 10 N. Y. S. 817, 32 N. Y. St. 943. 22Tn re McGraw’s Estate, 111 N. Y. 66, 19 N. E. 233, 2 L. R. A. 387. 23 Lounsbury v. Burial Assn., 170 Mich. 645, 129 N. W. 36, 137 N. W. 513; Boardman v. Hitchcock, 136 App. Div. 253, 120 N. Y. S. 1039; Cornell v. Mount Morris M. E. Church, 73 W. Va. 96, 80 S. E. 148. 24 Sherwood v. American Bible Soc., 40 N. Y. 561, 4 Abb. App. Dec. 227. 25 Handley v. Palmer, 91 Fed. 948; S. E. 943; Sheldon v. Stockbridge, 67 Vt. 299, 31 Atl. 414; Beurhaus’ v. Watertown, 94 Wis. 617, 69 N. W. 986. : 26 Vidal v. Girard’s Exrs., 2 How. (U. §.) 127, 11 L. ed. 205. 27In re Crane’s Will, 159 N. Y. 557, 54 N, E. 1089. § 99 WILLS 86 held that a devise may be made to a school district,”* a county,” a state,°° or the general government.** All municipal corporations hold their property as trustees for , the general benefit, and, although lands can only be acquired for the use of such corporation, and such uses are specified in a stat- ute, the fact that the devise does not specify the particular use to which the property is to be applied does not invalidate the de- vise.*? In case there is any doubt about the capacity of a public corporation to take a devise it is advisable to provide for an equi- table conversion, by which the proceeds of the real estate are made to form the subject of a trust as personal property.” § 99. Unincorporated societies.—Unincorporated societies are generally held incapable of taking property by devise or be- quest, for the reason that the beneficiary is uncertain ;** although a devise or bequest may be made to trustees of such unincorpo- rated society for its benefit.*° Bequests to unincorporated societies organized for charitable purposes are good and enforcible, unless rendered invalid by local laws.*® Courts of equity have often given effect to such bequests as executory devises upon the incorporation of the society subse- 28In re Bulmer’s Estate, 59 Cal. 131. 29 Fulbright v. Perry County, 145 Mo. 432, 46 S. W. 955. 30In re President &c. of Yale Uni- versity, 67 Conn..251, 34 Atl. 1036. 31 Dickson v. United States, 125 Mass. 311, 28 Am. Rep. 230. But see United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 24 L. ed. 192; In re Fox’s Will, 52 N. Y. 530, 11 Am. Rep. 751 (affd. 94 U. S. 315, 24 L. ed. 192). 32 Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N. W. 649, 5 L. R. A. 858; Fulbright vy. Perry County, 145 Mo. 432, 46 S. W. 955; Gilmore v. Hayworth, 26 Tex. 89. 33 Underwood v. Curtis, 127 N. Y. 523, 28 N. E. 585. See also Forms and Precedents for Particular Clauses, 34Greene v. Dennis, 6 Conn. 293, 16 Am. Dec. 58; Kennett v. Kidd, 87 Kans. 652, 125 Pac. 36, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 544, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 592; Wait v. Society &c. New York City, 123 N. Y. S. 637, 68 Misc. 245; In re Boulevard, 230 Pa. 491, 79 Atl. 716. 35 Cobb v. Denton, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 235; Stone v. Griffin, 3 Vt. 400. 36 Chambers v. Higgins’ Exr., 20 Ky. L. 1425, 49'S. W. 436; Preachers’ Aid Soc. v. Rich, 45 Maine 552; Bur- bank v. Whitney, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 146, 35 Am. Dec, 312; In re Ticknor’s Estate, 13 Mich. 44; American Tract Soc. v. Atwater, 30 Ohio St. 77, 27 Am. Rep. 422; Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241, 29 Am. Dec. 154, 87 CAPACITY OF BENEFICIARIES § 100 quent to the death of the testator.** Where a bequest was made to an unincorporated society by name, it was held to be sufficient to entitle it to hold the property where it became incorporated after the death of the testator.*® § 100. Charitable, religious, and educational institutions. —As a general rule charitable and religious institutions can take both real and personal property under a will, but the statutes of many states regulate the amount, character and manner of gifts to such institutions.*® The restrictions placed upon the amount of property that may be devised or bequeathed to a religious society is intended to prevent the accumulation of vast estates by the church, and not against the power of testamentary disposition.*® In some jurisdictions it is held that where the statute limits the amount of a devise or bequest for charitable or religious uses, and the devise or legacy is in excess of the amount so prescribed, the beneficiary may take the amount limited to it by the statute.** The fact that the charter of a charitable or religious corpora- tion authorizes it to purchase land does not enable it to take land by devise ;*? nor does an act which authorizes the conveyance of land for the residence of a minister authorize a devise or bequest to a church for the purpose of a parsonage.** By statute in some 37 Miller v. Chittenden, 4 Iowa 252; McIntire Poor School v. Zainesville 326; Contentnea Quaker Soc. v. Dick- enson, 12 N. Car. 189. Canal &c. Co., 9 Ohio 203, 34 Am. Dec. 436; St. Peter’s Church v. Brown, 21 R. I. 367, 43 Atl. 642. 38 Wade v. American Colonization Soc., 7 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 663, 45 Am. Dec. 324. 39 Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 27 L. ed. 401, 2 Sup. Ct. 336; West Virginia P. & P. Co. v. Miller, 176 Fed. 284; Miller v. Ahrems, 150 Fed. 644; In re McCauley’s Estate, 138 Cal. 546, 71 Pac. 458; Kelley v. Welborn, 110 Ga. 540, 35 S. E. 636. See also ante, § 78. 40 White v. Keller, 68 Fed. 796; Barton v. King, 41 Miss. 288; First Baptist Church v. Robberson, 71 Mo. 41In re McCauley’s Estate, 138 Cal. 432, 71 Pac. 512; Barkley v. Don- nelly, 112 Mo. 561, 19 S. W. 305; Kearney v. St. Paul &c. Missionary Soc. 10 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 274; In re Farmers L. & T. Co., 138 App. Div. 121, 122 N. Y. S. 956, 199 N. Y. 569, 93 N. E. 1120; In re Gregg’s Estate, 213 Pa. 260, 62 Atl. 856; In re Hoffner’s Estate, 161 Pa. St. 331, 29 Atl. 33. 42McCartee v. Orphan Asylum Soc, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 437, 18 Abb. Dec. 516. 48 Seaburn v. Seaburn, 15 Grat. (Va.) 423; Bible Society v. Pendle- ton, 7 W. Va. 79. § 101 WILLS 88 states it is provided that a will must be made a specified time be- fore the death of the testator in order that a religious or charita- ble institution be entitled to take a gift or devise thereunder.** Where the charter of a charitable or religious corporation pro- hibits the taking of real estate by devise, it has been held that the gift may be of the proceeds of the sale of the real estate ;*° but it has also been held that such gift fails entirely.** In most jurisdictions gifts for saying masses are not upheld, but there seems to be no objection to the making of a gift abso- lutely to the church or clergy, with a written request outside the will that the fund be used for that purpose. If the request be made in the will the gift is liable to be declared void.*7 In making such request in the will, however, care should be taken that a precatory trust be not created.** § 101. Gifts to separate use of females.—A testator may make a devise or bequest for the sole and separate use of a fe- male, and such gift will be free from the claims of any present or future husband.*® But in order to vest such gift in the benefi- ciary alone the intention must be clearly stated. This may be done by making the gift to the beneficiary “‘to her sole and sepa- rate use,” or “to her own use, independent of her husband.’ It would seem that the use of language prohibiting her from alien- ating the property is not alone sufficient.®* If the testator intended in creating the separate use to destroy the curtesy of the husband, such intention must be clearly stated. The mere fact that-the estate is limited to her separate use, or that it shall be exempt from the husband’s debts, or that she is 44 See ante, § 78. N. J. Eq. 117; Little v. Bennett, 58 45 Baker v. Clarke Institute, 110 N. Car. 156; Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich. Mass. 88; American Bible Soc. v. Eq. (S. Car.) 43. See post ch. 31 Noble, 11 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 156. for form of gift. 46 State v. Bates (Wiltbank), 2 50 Swain v. Duane, 48 Cal. 358; Har. (Del.) 18. Wood v. Wood, 83 N. Y. 575; Holli- 47 Festorazzi v. St. Joseph’s, 104 day v. Hively, 198 Pa. 335, 47 Atl. Ala. 327, 18 So. 394, 25 L. R. A. 360, 988; Bland v. Dawes, 17 Ch. Div. 53 Am. St. 48. 794, 48 See Precatory Trusts. 51 Stogdon v. Lee, 60 L. J. Q. B. 49 Brock v. Sawyer, 39 N. H. 547; 669, 1 Q. B. 661, 64 L. T. 494, 39 W. Trentan Ranking Ca wo Wandruff 2 R447 ‘ 89 CAPACITY OF BENEFICIARIES § 102 given unlimited power to dispose of it by will, does not destroy his right of curtesy, unless she disposes of it by will.°*? The mari- tal rights of a husband in property devised or bequeathed to a wife is not excluded by the intervention of a trustee, where the terms of the will do not expressly exclude such rights."* § 102. Husband or wife—At common law, a wife may take property by her husband’s will. The rule, founded upon the legal unity of husband and wife, that the husband can not trans- fer property directly to the wife, does not apply to the case of the transfer by will, for a will does not take effect until after the death of the testator, and this event severs the matrimonial union.°* But a wife can not ordinarily make a will disposing of property to her husband, for she is presumed to act under his co- ercion, and hence her will in his favor is not considered as her voluntary act.°> Under modern statutes, however, either spouse may leave property to the other by will.°° The old law on the subject of wills of married women is now practically obsolete, for modern statutes generally empower married women to make wills disposing of both real and personal property as if sole, but under some of the early statutes giving a married woman power to make a will it was provided that she could not devise property to her husband.*” Neither husband nor wife is capable of making a will so as to defeat the respective rights of dower and curtesy, but aside from this either may dispose of his or her property by will to the exclu- sion of the surviving spouse.®* The statutes of some states give 14 Mich. 91, 90 Am. Dec. 225; Wake- field v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295. 52 Pool v. Blakie, 53 Ill. 495; No- land v. Chambers, 84 Ky. 516, 2 S. W. 121; Tremmel v. Kleiboldt, 75 Mo. 255; Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689; Stokes v. McKibbin, 13 Pa. St. 267; Chapman v. Price, 83 Va. 392, 11 S. E. 879, 53 Pollard v. Merrill, 15 Ala. 169; Hunt v. Booth, 1 Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 215. 54Morse v. Thompson, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 562; Burdeno v. Amperse, 55 Hood v. Archer, 1 McCord (S. Car.) 225. | 56 Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295. See Digest of Statutes, post, ch. 28. 57 Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295. 58 Skoutenburgh v. Hopkins, 43 N. J. Eq. 577, 12 Atl. 689; In re Tracy’s Will, 3 N. Y. St. 239, § 103 WILLS 90 the wife other rights in the estate of her husband which can not be defeated by his will. In other states, where the value of the estate is less than a certain amount, he can not by will prevent her from taking the whole estate.°? § 103. Children and their descendants.—Where there are no statutory provisions to the contrary a testator may by will se- lect such of his children or their descendants as he may see fit as beneficiaries, or he may exclude any or all of them from sharing in his estate.®° In some jurisdictions, however, it is held that the intention of the testator to exclude his children must appear from the will;* while in other jurisdictions parol evidence may be ad- mitted to show that the testator intentionally omitted his children from the will.°* In jurisdictions where the intention of the tes- tator to omit his children from the will is required to be shown in some manner, precaution should be taken to so frame the provi- sions of the will that no question can arise as to such intention. Where there is no restriction on the right of the testator to dis- inherit his children or their descendants, children unintentionally omitted from the will are generally protected by a statutory pro- vision. Such statutes usually provide, in some form or other, that children and their descendants unintentionally omitted from the will shall take as if the testator had died intestate. 59In re Miller’s Estate, 158 Cal. 420, 111 Pac. 255. 60 Rhoads v. Rhoads, 43 Ill. 239; Ackerman v. Fichter, 179 Ind. 392, 101 N. E. 493, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.)- 221n, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1117n; In re Goldthorp, 115 Iowa 430, 88 N. W. 944; Seguine v. Seguine, 42 N. Y. 663, 4 Abb. Dec. 191, 35 How. Pr. 336; Linney v. Peloquin, 35 Tex. 29. 61In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 23 Pac. 379, 17 Am. St. 252; In re Gar- raud, 35 Cal. 336; Pounds v. Dale, 48 Mo. 270; Bradley v. Bradley, 24 Mo. 311; Gage v. Gage, 29 N. H. 533; Chace v. Chace, 6 R. I. 407, 78 Am. Dec. 446. AF Cawlnnw 2 Nxt 1272 TT CGC 914 23 L. ed. 596, 10 Sup. Ct. 253; Lorieux v. Keller, 5 Iowa 196, 68 Am. Dec.- 696; Whittemore v. Russell, 80 Maine 297, 14 Atl. 197, 6 Am. St. 200; Peters v. Siders, 126 Mass. 135, 30 Am. Rep..671; Buckley v. Gerard, 123 Mass. 8. 63 Alaska: Civ. Code (1900), §$§ 143, 144; Arkansas: Dig. of Stat. (1904), § 8020; California: Civ. Code (1915), § 1307; Idaho: Civ. Code (1908), § 5744; Indian Ter.: Stat. (1899), § 3572; Kentucky: Carroll’s Stat. (1915), § 4848; Maine: Rev. Stat. (1903), ch. 76, § 9; Massachu- setts: Rev. Laws (1902), ch. 135, 88 19, 20; Michigan: Howell’s Stats. £1012 gs 1n000. Can Miinnaanta + oi § 104 CAPACITY OF BENEFICIARIES The statutes of a few states restrict the power of a testator to dispose of by will a certain portion of his estate, the amount de- pending on the number of his children ;** and where the testator in making disposition of his property exceeds the amount per- mitted by law, the court will make a reduction thereof.® § 104. After-born children—Most of the states have enacted statutes providing in effect that if a child living or leaving issue at the testator’s death was born after the execution of the will, such child or issue shall take the share to which he or they would have been entitled if the testator had died intestate. Ina number of the states, this provision applies only in case the child or issue were not provided for otherwise by the testator, or were not intentionally omitted.°* Some of these statutes provide that Stat. (1913), $8 7260, 7261; Missouri: Rev. Stats. (1909), § 544; Montana: Civ. Code (1907), § 4755; Nebraska: Cobbey’s Ann. Stat. (1911), §§ 5013, 5014; Nevada: Rev. Laws (1912), § 6216; New Hampshire: Pub. Stat. (1901), ch. 186, § 10; New Mexico: Ann. Stat. (1915), § 5870; North Da- kota: Comp. Laws (1913), § 5674; Oklahoma: Rev. Laws (1910), §§ 8372-8374; Oregon: Lord’s Laws (1910), § 7325; Philippine Islands: Code of Proc. (1901), §8 614, 753; Porto Rico: Civ. Code (1913), § 3899 (the heir by force of law to whom the testator has left, for any reason whatsoever, less than the legal portion due him may demand the fulfilment thereof); Rhode Island: Gen. Laws (1909), ch. 254, § 22;° South Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), § 1062, p. 190; Utah: Comp. Laws (1907), § 2761; Vermont: Pub. Stat. (1906), § 2947; Washington: Bal. Codes and Stats. (1910), § 1326; Wisconsin: Stats. (1913), ch. 103, § 2287. 64 Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. (U. S.) 550, 12 L. ed. 553; Cox v. Von Ahlefeldt, 50 La. Ann. 1266, 23 So. 959; Ames’ Succession, 33 La. Ann. 1317; Turnell’s Succession, 32 La, Ann, 1218; Chouquette v. Barada, 23 Mo. 331. 65 Nolan v. New, 31 La. Ann. 552; Montgomery v. Milliken, Sm. & M. Ch. (Miss.) 495. 66 Alabama: Civ. Code (1907), $ 6160; Alaska: Civ. Code (1900), §8§ 143, 144; Arkansas: Dig. of Stat. (1904), § 8019; Arizona: Rev. Stat. (1913), par. 1215, 1216; California: Civ. Code (1915), §§ 1306, 1307; Colo- rado: Mills’ Ann. Stat. (1912), § 7871; Delaware: Rev. Codes (1915), § 3252; Idaho: Civ. Code (1908), $ 5743; Illinois: Rev. Stat. (1915-1916), p. 981, § 10; Indiana: Burns’ Ann. Stat. (1914), § 3116; Indian Terr.: Stat. (1899), § 3571; Iowa: Code (1913), § 3279; Kansas: Gen. Stat. (1909), § 9816; Kentucky: Carroll’s Stat. (1915), § 4847; Maine: Rev. Stat. (1903), ch. 76, § 8; Massachusetts: Rev. Laws (1902), ch. 135, §§ 19, 20; Michigan: Howell’s Stats. (1913), § 10998; Minnesota: Gen. Stat. (1913), § 7259; Mississippi: Code (1906), § 5080; Missouri: Rev. Stats. (1909), § 544; Montana: Civ. Code (1907), § 105 92 WILLS the after-born child will take a share in the estate unless it is ap- parent from the will that the testator intended that it should not be specially provided for.®” At common law the birth of a child subsequent to the execu- tion of the will does not work a total revocation of the will; but this rule has been greatly modified by statute in many jurisdic- tions, some providing that the will is revoked in toto by the sub- sequent birth of a child, and others that it is revoked in toto by such birth where no provision is made in the will for the child. Hence it is important that these statutes be consulted to determine the rights of after-born children wherever there is a probability of the event of the birth happening.®* § 105. Adopted children—The rights of adopted children in the estate of their foster parents are almost entirely regulated by statute. These statutes usually provide that the adopted child shall have the same rights in the estate of the foster parent as a natural child, but in the absence of such a provision the adopted child will receive no part of the estate of its foster parent unless provided for by will. It is the event of the adoption that fixes, under the law authorizing the adoption, the legal status of the adopted child; and the child, by the event of adoption, becomes the legal child of the foster parent, and stands, as to the property § 4754; Nebraska: Cobbey’s Ann. Stat. (1911), 8§ 5013, 5014; Nevada: Rev. Laws (1912), § 6215; New Hampshire: Pub. Stat. (1901), ch. 186, § 10; New Jersey: Comp. Stat. Gen. Laws (1909), ch. 254, § 23; South Carolina: Code of Laws (1912), § 3572; South Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), § 1030, p. 187; Tennes- see: Ann. Code (1896), § 3925; (1910), p. 5865, §§ 20, 21; New Mex- ico: Ann, Stats. (1915), §§ 1849, 5870; New York: Consol. Laws (1909), p. 964; North Carolina: Pell’s Revisal (1908), § 3145; North Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), $ 5276; Oklahoma: Rev. Laws (1910), ch. 82, art. II, § 8371; Ohio: P. & A. Ann. Code (1912), § 10561; Oregon: Lord’s Laws (1910), § 7325; Pennsylvania: Purdon’s Dig. (1910), p. 5135, § 16; Philippine Islands: Code of Proc. L10N01N RR FEE WEL. DLA. T-1...4. Texas: Sayles’ Civ. Stat. (1914), arts. 7865, 7867 ; Utah: Comp. Laws (1907), § 2760; Vermont: Pub. Stat. (1906), § 2946; Virginia: Ann. Code (1904), §§ 2527, 2528; Washington: Bal. Codes & Stats. (1910), § 1326; West Virginia: Code (1916), p. 790, § 16; Wisconsin: Stats. (1913), ch. 103, § 2286. 87 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Was- serman, 22 Fed. 872. 68 See post ch. 28. 93 CAPACITY OF BENEFICIARIES § 105 of the foster parent, in the same light as a child born in lawful wedlock, save in so far as the exceptions to the statute authoriz- ing adoption declare otherwise. And when the statute authorizes a full and complete adoption, the child adopted thereunder ac- quires all of the legal rights and capacities, including that of in- heritance, of a natural child, and is under the same duties. But a statutory provision making an adopted child the heir at law of its foster parent does not make it the heir of the kindred of such foster parent.” The general trend of the authorities is to the effect that where a statute of adoption makes an adopted child the child of the adopter for purposes of inheritance, its object is to enable the child to inherit from, and not through, the adoptive parent, and that the adopted child will not benefit by a limitation under a deed or grant to the adopter’s child or children.”* It has been held that an adopted child is not included in a gift to “chil- dren’ or “issue,’”’”* unless it clearly appears that the testator in- tended to include such child; such intent, when legally ascer- tained, being the test."* In some jurisdictions the adoption of the child by the testator subsequent to the execution of his will does not operate to revoke the will; but in. other jurisdictions the effect is the same as the subsequent birth of a child,”* and acts as a revocation of a prior will.” 69 Power v. Hafley, 85 Ky. 671, 4 S. W. 683, 9 Ky. L. 369; Virgin v. Marwick, 97 Maine 578, 55 Atl. 520; Ferguson v. Herr, 64 Nebr. 649, 90 N. W. 625. 70 Flannigan v. Howard, 200 Ill. 396, 65 N. E. 782, 59 L. R. A. 664, 93 Am. St. 201; Van Derlyn v. Mack, 137 Mich. 146, 100 N. W. 278, 66 L. R. A. 438, 109 Am. St. 669. 71 Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 3 So. 900; Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 Ill. 26; Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W. 585, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 118 Am. St. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N. H. 407, 14 Atl. 557; Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. St. 304. 72 Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 3 So. 900; In re Schedel’s Estate, 73 Cal. 594, 15 Pac. 297; In re Scholl’s Will, 100 Wis. 650, 76 N. W. 616. 73 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N. H. 470, 14 Atl. 557; New York Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Viele, 161 N. Y. 11, 55 N. E. 311, 76 Am. St. 238 But see Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R. I. 644, 35 Atl. 882, 34 L. R. A. 500. 74In re Truman, 27 R. I. 209, 61 Atl. 598. 75In re Comassi’s Estate, 107 Cal. 1, 40 Pac. 15, 28 L. R. A. 414; Davis v. Fogle, 124 Ind. 41, 23 N. E. 860, 7 LR. A. 485. 76 Flannigan v. Howard, 200 Ill. 396, 65 N. E. 782, 59 L. R. A. 664, 93 Am. St. 201. 77 Hilpire v. Claude, 109 Iowa 159, § 106 WILL, 94 § 106. Illegitimate children—The right of illegitimate children to take under the will of their putative parent is gener- ally regulated or restricted by statute. Hence, unless there is a statutory provision prohibiting or restricting such right, a testator may devise or bequeath his property to his illegitimate children, and even to the exclusion of his legitimate children.” The illegit- imate child begotten, but not born before the execution of the will is favored by both American and English law, and a gift to such child is not considered against the policy of the law.” But in England if such illegitimate child be not begotten at the time of the execution of the will, the devise or bequest is void as against public policy.*? ; A devise or bequest to an illegitimate child or children is, in some jurisdictions, limited to a certain amount of the testator’s estate, and if such gift exceed that amount it is reducible to the legal amount.** In South Carolina where it is provided by stat- ute that a testator having lawful children of his own living shall 80 N. W. 332, 46 L. R. A. 171, 77 Am. St. 524; Glascott v. Bragg, 111 Wis. 605, 87 N. W. 853, 56 L. R. A. 258. See post ch, 24. 78 Dunlap v. Robinson, 28 Ala. 100; Smith v. Du Bose, 78 Ga. 413, 3 S. E. 309, 6 Am. St. 260; Elliott v. Elliott, 117 Ind. 380, 20 N. E. 264, 10 Am. St. 54; Mowatt v. Carow, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 328, 28 Am. Dec. 41; Gore v. Clark, 37 S. Car. 537, 16 S. E. 614, 20 L. R. A. 465; In re Scholl’s Will, 100 Wis. 650, 76 N. W. 616; In re Sander’s Estate, 126 Wis. 660, 105 N. W. 1064, 5 Ann. Cas. 508, 11 Pro. Rep. Ann. 350; Holt v. Sindry, L. R. 7 Eq. 170, 38 L. J. Ch. 126, 19 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 669, 17 Wkly. Rep. 249. See also Occleston v. Fullalove, L. R. 9 Ch. 147, 43 L. J. Ch. 297, 29 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 785, 22 Wkly. Rep. 305. 79 Pratt v. Flamer, 5 Harr. & J. (Md.) 10; Holt v. Sindry, L. R. 7 Eq. 170, 38 L. J. Ch. 126, 19 L. T. Rep. “nt GN (2027 4°97) UKT1.1.. D--~ AAN. Crook v. Hill, 3 Ch. Div. 773, 46 L. J. Ch. 119, 24 Wkly. Rep. 876; Daw- son v. Dawson, 6 Madd. 292, 56 Eng. Reprint 1102; Evans v. Massey, 8 Price 22, 22 Rev. Rep. 691; Gordon v. Gordon, 1 Meriv. 141, 35 Eng. Re- print 628, 15 Rev. Rep. 88. 80 Occleston v. Fullalove, L. R. 9 Ch. 147, 43 L. J. Ch. 297, 29 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 785, 28 Wkly. Rep. 305; Howarth v. Mills, L. R. 2 Eq. 389, 12 Jur. (N. S.) 794, 14 L. T. (N. S.) 544; Hill v. Crook, L. R. 6 H. of L. 265, 42 L. J. Ch. 702, 22 Wkly. Rep. 137. 81Elmore’s Succession, 124 La. 91, 49 So. 989; Compton v. Prescott, 12 Rob. (La.) 56; Balot v. Morina, 12 Rob. (La.) 552; Prevost v. Martel, 10 Rob. (La.) 512; Terrell v. Cham- bers, 6 Rob. (La.) 243; Williams v. Newton, 86 S. Car. 248, 68 S. E. 693; Gore v. Clarke, 37 S. Car. 537, 16 S. E. 614, 20 L. R. A. 465; Hull v. TT AW Oat RL ren N 4-4 95. CAPACITY OF BENEFICIARIES § 107 give by legacy or devise forthe use and benefit of his illegitimate child or children one-fourth part only of the real clear value of his estate, it is held that such provision applies only to property in the state, and is unaffected by what property he has out of the state, or how he disposes of it.**? But where such illegitimate child was left one-fourth of the testator’s estate, and in addition thereto, a legacy was left to the executor for the use of such ille- gitimate child, it was held that the legacy was void.*? Inasmuch as the use of the word “children” does not prima facie include illegitimate children, it is the better practice to designate them by such words as will properly identify them. § 107. Subscribing witnesses——In many jurisdictions it is held that a devise or bequest to an attesting witness is void.** But where such attesting witness would be entitled to a share of the testator’s estate in case of intestacy, it is held that so much of such share shall be preserved to him as does not exceed his gift under the will. It has also been held that if there are sufficient other competent subscribing witnesses besides the beneficiary to prove the will the gift may be valid, and it matters not whether the beneficiary testi- fied as a witness or not.*® 82 Humphries v. Settlemeyer, 91 S. Car. 389, 74 S. E. 892; Blount v. Walker, 28 S. Car. 545, 6 S. E. 558, 88 Gore v. Clarke, 37 S. Car. 537, 16 S. E. 614, 20 L. R. A. 465. 84 Clark v. Hoskins, 6 Conn. 106; Elliott v. Brent, 6 Mackey (D. C.) 98; Jones v. Habersham, 63 Ga. 146; Harp v. Parr, 168 Ill. 459, 48 N. E. 113; Hawkins v. Hawkins, 54 Iowa 443, 6 N. W. 699; Clark v. Miller, 65 Kans. 726, 68 Pac. 1071; Finegan v. Theisen, 92 Mich. 178, 52 N. W. 619; Rucker v. Lambdin, 12 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 230; Grimm v. Tittman, 113 Mo. 56, 20 S. W. 664; Hodgman v. Kittredge, 67 N. H. 254, 32 Atl. 158, 68 Am. St. 661; Martineau v. Simon- son, 59 App. Div. 100, 69 N. Y. S. 185; McLean v. Elliott, 72 N. Car. 70; Vrooman v. Powers, 47 Ohio St. 191, 24 N. E. 267, 8 L. R. A. 39; Gamble v. Butchee, 87 Tex. 643, 30 S. W. 861; Clark v. Clark’s Estate, 54 Vt. 489; Croft v. Croft, 4 Grat. (Va.) 103; Wigan v. Rowland, 11 Hare 157, 21 Eng. L. & Eg. 132; In re Maybee, 8 Ont. L. Rep. 601. 85 Fortune v. Buck, 23 Conn. 1; Clark v. Miller, 65 Kans. 726, 68 Pac. 1071, 70 Pac. 586; Grimm v. Titt- man, 113 Mo. 56, 20 S. W. 664. 86 Caw v. Robertson, 5 N. Y. 125; Woodbery v. Collins, 1 Desaus. Eq. (S. Car.) 424; Davis v. Davis, 43 W. Va. 300, 27 S. E. 323; In re Klein, 35 Mont. 185, 88 Pac. 798. § 108 WILLS 96 In order to render a devise or bequest to a subscribing witness void it must be a beneficial interest in him, not a mere trust.** By express provision of many statutes a devise or bequest to the wife or husband of a witness whose testimony is necessary to prove the will is void.** $108. Paramours.—In the absence of a restrictive statute a man may make testamentary disposition of all of his property to his mistress, ignoring his wife, if he does so with free, sound, and disposing mind, pursuant to the formalities which the law prescribes.*® The same rule has been applied to a woman who makes a testamentary disposition of her property to a man with whom she has had illicit relations; that fact of itself, however immoral, is not sufficient to invalidate a will made in his favor. But by statute in some jurisdictions a testator is prohibited from disposing of his property by will to his paramour, to the ex- 87 Sullivan v. Sullivan, 106 Mass. 474, 8 Am. Rep. 356; Barnard v. Crossman, 54 Hun 53, 7 N. Y. S. 275, 26 N. Y. St. 30; Hogan v. Wy- man, 2 Ore. 302; Key v. Weathers- bee, 43 S. Car. 414, 21 S. E. 324, 49 Am. St. 846. _ 88Connecticut: Gen. Stat: (1902), .§ 294; Kentucky: Carroll’s Stat. (1915), § 4836; Manitoba: Rev. Stat. (1913), ch. 204, § 12; Massachusetts: Rev. Laws (1902), ch.. 135, § 3; New Brunswick: Consol. Stat. (1903), ch. 160, § 9; New Foundland: Consol. Stat. (1892),:ch. 79, 86; Nova Scotia: ‘Rev. Stat. (1900), ch. 139, § 12; North Carolina: Pell’s Revisal (1908), § 3120; Ontario: Rev. Stat. (1914), ch. 120, § 17; Philippine Islands: Code of Proc. (1901), § 622; South Carolina: Code of Laws (1912), § 3567; Vermont: Pub. Stat. (1906), § 2738; Virginia: Ann. Code (1904), § 2529; West Virginia: Code (1916), p. 970, § 18; England: 54 Vict, 1159, § 13; British Columbia- Rev. Stat. (1911), ch. 241, § 12. 89 Pool v. Pool, 35 Ala. 12; Stant v. American Security & T. Co., 23 App. (D. C.) 25; Saxton v. Krumm, 107 Md. 393, 68 Atl. 1056, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 477, 126 Am. St. 393; Waters v. Reed, 129 Mich. 131, 88 N. W. 394; Sunderland v.-Hood, 84 Mo. 293; In re Middleton, 68 N. J. Eq. 584, 59 Atl. 454; In re Mondorf, 110 N. Y. 450, 18 N. E. 256; West- brook v. Wilson, 135 N. Car. 400, 47 S. E. 467; Allshouse v. Kelly, 219 Pa, 652, 69 Atl. 88; Mullen v. Mc- Keon, 25 R. I. 305, 55 Atl. 747; O’Neall v. Farr, 1 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 80; Bryant v. Pierce, 95 Wis. 331, 70 N. W. 297. 90 Dickie v. Carter, 42 Ill. 376; Porschet v. Porschet, 82 Ky. 93, 99, 5 Ky. L. 893, 56 Am. Rep. 880, 884; In re Evans, 37 Misc. 337, 75 N. Y. S. 491 (affd. 81 App. Div. 636, 81 N. Y. S. 1125); Monroe v. Barclay, 17 Ohio St. 302, 93 Am. Dec. 620. 97 CAPACITY OF BENEFICIARIES § 109 clusion of his wife or children.** Other statutes restrict the dis- position to a certain amount which the testator or testatrix may give to those with whom they have unlawfully cohabited, and such statutes have been strictly construed.” § 109. Murderer of testator.—Under the general principle of law that no man is permitted to acquire property as the result of his own crime, the murderer of a testator is not allowed to take as a beneficiary under the will of his victim.®* This is true even though the slayer is guilty of the crime of manslaughter only, in killing the testator. It has been held, however, that the killing of the testator by a devisee for the purpose of making the will operative does not ren- der the devise void, but merely authorizes a court of equity to deny the devisee the right to the fruits of his iniquity.” ®1Gibson v. Dooley, 32 La. Ann. 959. 92 Filhiol’s Succession, 119 La. 998, 44 So. 843; Landry’s Succession, 114 La. 829, 38 So. 575; Hamilton’s Suc- cession, 35 La. Ann. 640; Olivier v. Blancq, 2 La. Ann. 517; Bousquet’s Succession, 10 Rob. (La.) 143; Gore v. Clarke, 37 S. Car. 537, 16 S. E, 614, 20 L. R. A. 465. 7—TuHomp. WItrs. 98 Roche v. Nason, 105 App. Div. 256, 93 N. Y. S. 565 (affd. 185 N. Y. 128, 77 N. E. 1007); Riggs v. Pal- mer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188, 5 L. R. A. 340, 12 Am. St. 819, Lundy v. Lundy, 24 Can. Sup. Ct. 650. 95 Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540. CHAPTER VII PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS IN PLANNING AND DRAFTING WILLS SECTION SECTION 115. Knowledge of testamentary law 123. Attorney’s advice and explana- essential. tion to testator. 116. Testator preparing his own will. 124. Inquiry into testator’s capacity. 117, Testator’s instructions. 125. Precaution against fraud, undue 118. Inquiry concerning testator’s real influence and mistake. and personal property. 126. Precautionary measures where 119. Inquiry concerning particular contest is probable. kinds of property or interests. 127. Selecting attesting witnesses. 120. Inquiry concerning character and 128, Suggestions concerning the mak- kinds of gifts to be made. ing of codicils. 121. Inquiry concerning objects of 129. Time employed in preparation of testator’s bounty. will. 122. Inquiry concerning management 130. Testing the will before death. and settlement of estate. 131. Depositary of wills. § 115. Knowledge of testamentary law essential.—Wills are a never-failing source of litigation, due primarily to a lack of knowledge of testamentary law on the part of draftsmen; and cases have occurred where even the most experienced lawyers have, in preparing their own wills, fallen into disastrous blunders. The earnings of a lifetime are often dissipated or diverted from the heirs at law, and a sense of hatred and disappointment is en- gendered by a failure of the will to express in appropriate legal phraseology the actual intention of the testator. There is an impression quite prevalent among laymen espe- cially that a will is a very simple instrument, and that a knowledge of testamentary law is not required of the person who undertakes its preparation. But instead of being a simple instrument a will may be, and usually is, the most intricate of all legal documents, and its preparation is one of the most difficult and responsible tasks of the lawyer’s business, one which calls for the greatest amount of skill and legal knowledge. In an early case Lord Coke 98 99 SUGGESTIONS IN DRAFTING § 116 said: “TI find great doubts and controversies daily arise on de- vises made by last wills * ™* * in respect of obscure and in- sensible words and repugnant sentences, the will being made in haste, and some pretend that the testator in respect of extreme pain was not compos mentis and divers other scruples and ques- tions are moved upon wills. But if you please to devise your lands by will, make it by good advice in your perfect memory and inform your counsel truly of the estates and tenures of your land and by God’s grace the resolution of the Judges in this case will be a good direction to learned to make your will according to law and thereby prevent questions and controversies.”* Upon another occasion the same learned author and jurist said: “‘Wills, and the construction of them, do more perplex a man than any other learning.” Hence, a last will and testament, being a serious and formal document, its preparation should be undertaken only by a person who is thoroughly familiar with the legal rules and principles governing testamentary dispositions. This applies to the testator preparing his own will, as well as the lawyer who is engaged to prepare it for him. A lawyer may be suddenly called upon to make a will, perhaps by a bedside, without opportunity to consult his library, and unless he is familiar with testamentary law and the usual formalities required by the statute, and has a thorough knowledge of the legal phraseology appropriate to carry the wish of the testator into effect, he should not undertake the task, especially if the testator’s estate is large, and he wishes to tie it up or devote it to specific purposes. If the person who undertakes the preparation of a will has taken the precaution to obtain a clear conception of the intention and wishes of the tes- tator and has used the proper words or phrases that will express such wishes, there will be no necessity for construction or inter- pretation. § 116. Testator preparing his own will—There is nothing to prevent a person from writing his own will.? Any person of fair intelligence and education may safely do this where his es- 1 Butler & Baker’s Case, 3 Coke 25. 2TIn re De Hart, 67 Misc. 13, 122 N. Y. S. 220. § 117 WILLS 100 tate is small and no attempt is made at complex dispositions ; but where it is proposed to make an unnatural or complicated dispo- sition of his property, involving a considerable estate, it would be very unwise for him to make the will without consulting some competent attorney and submitting to him the plans of the draft. As a general rule laymen prepare their wills only from a particu- lar standpoint, and consider only the probable or natural contin- gencies. Their scheme does not always comprehend possible fu- ture events, the happening of which might render the will unintel- ligible or ineffective. They do not consider the effect of death, infancy or marriage of the beneficiaries under all possible combi- nations. If it is proposed to create conditions, limitations, remainders, etc., a knowledge of the use of technical terms is indispensable, and unless the testator possess such knowledge he should not at- tempt such provisions. Whether the testator writes his own will, or whether its preparation is left to another, he at least must plan the disposition himself. This plan may embrace such mat- ters as the property to be devised or bequeathed, the persons or objects of his bounty, and the kind or character of the gifts to be made. Many other things may be included in the testator’s plan, but the above matters must be held firmly in his mind at the time the will is executed. If the testator decides to write his own will, without the aid or advice of an attorney, he may profit by a careful perusal of the. plans of other testators and forms of model wills to be found in leading text books on the subject. He must make sure that the model used fits his financial and family circumstances. And where a complicated disposition is undertaken it is not safe for him to follow a precedent without competent legal advice. § 117. Testator’s instructions.—Where the testator em- ploys an attorney to prepare his will he should furnish the latter with the necessary information for carrying out his wishes. This information is usually furnished in the form of a written memo- randum of instructions, and the testator is often prompted to give such instructions by proper inquiry on the part of the attorney. 101 SUGGESTIONS IN DR Se sh )) § 118 This memorandum should at least contain the full oo of the testator, place of domicil, whether married or single and with or without children or descendants, names or descriptions of the beneficiaries, the property to be given to each, the names of exec- utors and trustees, and such other matters as the testator’s wishes may suggest. Where the testator manifests a want of explicit- ness or candor in communicating the actual state of his property or circumstances he should be admonished of the danger of with- holding any information necessary to a disposition in accordance with his true wishes and intention. After the testator has made known his wishes, his attorney often finds it difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish all that the testator wishes. Where time will permit, it is a good plan to have the testator write a preliminary draft of the will himself, as a guide to work from. Such instrument, if preserved, may prove valuable as evidence in case of a contest. It is too frequently the habit of draftsmen to obtain from the testator a mere general outline of the will, and then, without any further consultation with him, to follow out in detail the various possible devolutions of the property according to the testator’s own scheme. ‘This method often gives rise to much discrepancy in wills, and its practice is not to be recommended. The more proper course would seem to be for the testator, subject to the advice and sug- gestions of the draftsman, to state, step by step, his wishes, and by that means to preserve such uniformity in the limitations and provisions as may be attainable. It not infrequently happens that a testator postpones the mak- ing of his will until the very moment of death, or so near thereto that he has little time for reflection or deliberation upon such mat- ters, much less time in which to prepare a memorandum of in- structions. In such case the draftsman must make the best of what information he is able to obtain from the dying testator. § 118. Inquiry concerning testator’s real and personal property.—It is not safe for an attorney to prepare a will dis- posing of even the smallest interest, without full and accurate in- formation of the nature and extent of the testator’s property. In § 118 WILLS 102 case the preliminary information and instructions furnished by the testator are insufficient to warrant the preparation of the will, the draftsman should make inquiry respecting all matters upon which information is lacking. Thus he should inquire fully as to the nature and extent of the testator’s property, both real and personal. A devise of real estate, being governed by the lex rei sitae it is important to know its exact location and correct de- scription.’ If the real estate is described by metes and bounds as well as by the name of the occupant, it should be ascertained if the two descriptions concur.* The exact estate or interest which the testator owns should be ascertained; and if the property is incumbered, or will be incumbered when the devise vests, it is im- portant to know whether the devise is to be made subject to or free from the incumbrance, and if made free from the incum- brance, whether or not the same is to be paid out of the personal estate of the testator.? If the devise is to be for use only, the draftsman should inquire whether such use is to be exclusive, what its duration is to be, whether for life, for years, or for any other limited period ;* and if the use is for the life of the devisee, whether he is to have the power to dispose of the property,’ or to lease it for a period extending beyond his term.* He should as- certain what gift, if any, the testator wishes to make the devisee in lieu of the devise in case the real estate is sold before the devise vests.” He should ascertain what disposition, if any, the testator wishes to make of after-acquired real estate.*° He should know the wishes of the testator concerning any interest the latter may have in a contract for the sale or purchase of real estate pending at the time of death; how the land in case of purchase, or how the proceeds in case of sale, is to go, and what is to be done in case the purchase is not completed."* The draftsman should also ascertain the wishes of the testator concerning the disposition to be made of personal property, what part thereof, if any, is to be given specifically.** He should in- 3 See ante, ch. 3, § 41. 8 See post, ch. 12, § 237. 4See post, ch. 11, § 212. ® See post, ch. 13, § 251. 5 See post, ch. 19. 10 See ante, ch. 4, § 57. 6 See post, ch. 12. 11 See ante, ch. 4. § 60. 103 SUGGESTIONS IN DRAFTING § 120 quire if it is the wish of the testator to pass after-acquired per- sonal property. If the personal property to be bequeathed con- sists of securities which may be pledged at testator’s death, he should ascertain if it is desired that the beneficiary take such securities subject to or freed from such pledge. § 119. Inquiry concerning particular kinds of property or interests.—The draftsman should ascertain what disposition the testator wishes to make of personal chattels in the nature of heirlooms ; whether they are to remain in the family, or are to be enjoyed in succession by friends or relatives, or whether they are to be specifically bequeathed.** He should ascertain the testator’s wishes concerning the home or residential property; whether it shall be maintained for the benefit of the entire family as a home- stead, or whether it is to be given in fee simple or for life to the husband or wife of the testator, or to some one else.?® If the tes- tator is a member of a partnership the partnership articles should be carefully examined, and the testator’s wishes obtained regard- ing the carrying on or winding up the partnership business.*® If the testator is engaged in business it is important to know what disposition he wishes to be made of such business; whether it is to be continued by his executor or trustee, turned into a corpora- tion, or discontinued entirely. The draftsman should inform himself relative to the treatment to be made in the will of such other particular kind of property as burial lots, franchises or priv- ileges, joint property, community property, life insurance, inter- ests under other wills, powers of appointment, and trust funds.*’ § 120. Inquiry concerning character and kinds of gifts to be made.—The draftsman should ascertain the character and kind of the devise or bequest which the testator wishes to make, whether it is to be general, specific, demonstrative, residuary, cu- mulative, or substitutional.** If general, and there is a deficiency of assets to pay debts and all legacies in full, what, if any, provi- sion is to be made concerning preference in payment of some leg- acies over others, or if it is desired that certain specific legacies 13 See ante, ch. 4, § 56. 16 See post, ch. 19, § 381. 14 See ante, ch. 4, § 55. 17 See post, ch. 11. 15 See ante, ch. 4, § 62. 18 See post, ch. 8. § 121 WILLS 104 shall abate in favor of certain general ones.*? If the testator wishes to make a specific devise or bequest the draftsman should inquiré what, if any, equivalent gift is to be made in case the de- vise or bequest fails by reason of a sale or destruction of the sub- ject of the gift.2° He should ascertain whether the testator wishes to give one specific gift preference over another.** He should ascertain whether the gift is to be a vested interest or a contingent interest, and if vested whether there is to be a present or a future enjoyment ;*? and if the interest is to be contingent, what the particular contingency is that will give the beneficiary a fixed right to the property ;** and whether the gift is to be subject to being divested or subject to open and let in other benefi- ciaries ;** also how are rents, profits, or income to be disposed of meanwhile, when the period of absolute vesting is postponed.” Where the gift is to a class, as to children, he should ascertain at what ages are shares to children to vest, and whether the income, or any portion of it, is to be applied for maintenance until the vesting period.”® If it is the wish of the testator that the gift be conditional, he should ascertain if the condition is to be per- formed before or after the vesting of the gift, and what disposi- tion is to be made of the estate in case of breach or nonfulfilment of the condition.”" § 121. Inquiry concerning objects of testator’s bounty.— The draftsman should obtain from the testator the names or de- scription of the persons or objects who are to become beneficiaries under the will, and the property or interest to be given to each. If the testator be married, or is contemplating marriage, it is im- portant to know what provision, if any, is to be made for husband or wife both as to the amount and character of the devise or bequest.?* -Inquiry should be made relative to the existence of an antenuptial agreement, and where such agreement exists its pro- 19 See post, ch. 8, § 138. 24 See post, ch. 13, § 257. 20 See post, ch. 8, § 137. 25 See post, ch. 13, § 253. 21 See post, ch. 8, § 139. 26 See post, ch. 13, § 256. 22 See post, ch. 13, § 251. 27 See post, ch. 15, § 280. 23 See post, ch. 13, § 254. 28 See post, ch. 6, § 102. 105 SUGGESTIONS IN DRAFTING § 123 visions are to be carefully examined.”® In jurisdictions where the wife has the right of dower or the husband the right of cur- tesy it is important to know whether the intended provisions under the will are to be in lieu of or in addition to such dower or curtesy.*° Also whether it is the wish of the testator that the provision for husband or wife be conditional on the surviving spouse not remarrying.** Inquiry should be made concerning what provision if any is to be made for children and other descendants, adopted children, and after-born children, and whether such provisions are to be in lieu of or in addition to interests given to such persons by statute; or whether the gifts to any such persons are to be conditional. If testator has made gifts to any such persons before his death, or if any of them are indebted to the testator, it is important to know if such gifts or debts are to be treated as advancements.” In case any of the beneficiaries are infarits inquiry should be made as to whom the gift is to be paid or delivered, whether to a guardian, to the infant’s parents, or to a trustee, and how much of the income is to be applied for the use of the infant.** Inquiry should be made whether, in case of the death of beneficiary be- fore vesting time, it is the testator’s wish that the children or other representatives of such beneficiary take the share.** Where the proposed beneficiary is a female the draftsman should ascertain if it is the wish of the testator that the gift be for the sole and separate use of such female, independent of the mari- tal rights of any present or future husband, or whether he desires to place any restrictions upon the alienation of the gift.** Where the testator wishes to give to a plurality of beneficiaries it is important to know if the gift is intended for each or all col- lectively; and if all, whether they are to take as a class, as joint tenants, or tenants in common. If a devise is to be made to a husband and wife, is it the wish of the testator that they take an estate by the entirety. And if a husband and wife are joined 29 See ante, § 6. 83 See post, ch. 18, § 349, 30 See post, ch. 30, § 710. 34 See post, ch. 16. 31 See post, ch. 15, § 288. 35 See post, ch. 6, § 101. 32 See post, ch. 22, § 433. § 122 WILLS 106 with other beneficiaries in the gift to all, is it intended that each spouse shall take a share, or that they shall take one share between them.** If the testator desires to make a devise or bequest to a creditor, inquiry should be made as to whether he intends the gift to be in satisfaction of his debt to the beneficiary or in addition thereto. If he wishes to make a devise or bequest to a person in- debted to him, is such indebtedness to be forgiven or must the beneficiary pay the debt.*” § 122. Inquiry concerning management and settlement of estate.—Inquiry should be made of the testator’s wishes con- cerning such matters as the selection of executors and trustees; the extent and scope of their powers, duties and liabilities ; com- pensation of executors and trustees ; whether they are to be given authority to delegate their powers or appoint their successors; whether they shall be exempted from giving bond; whether they are to be given power to sell, mortgage, exchange, or lease real estate; whether they are to be given authority to sign or indorse commercial paper; whether they are to be given authority to pur- chase property of the estate; whether the will is to confer upon the executor some title, power or right of possession; whether authority is to be given a majority of the executors or trustees to act; authority of executors or trustees to invest money, and au- thority to vote corporate stock.** Inquiry should be made concerning what provisions, if any, are to be made respecting the payment of inheritance or legacy tax; auditing accounts and examining securities ; appointing of agents or solicitors; distribution in kind; accounting, and final settle- ment.*? § 123. Attorney’s advice and explanation to testator.— Just how far the attorney ought to go in tendering his advice to ‘the testator without being requested, must depend upon the cir- cumstances of each particular case; but there is no doubt that he may have many and great opportunities for counseling modera- 36 See post, ch. 10. 38 See post, ch. 21. 37 See post, ch. 10, § 168. 39 See post, ch. 20. 107 SUGGESTIONS IN DRAFTING § 123 tion and forgiveness, and making suggestions consonant with reason and justice. He should be careful, however, in giving such advice, not to incur the risk of being accused of having made the will himself. He should endeavor, to the extent that circum- stances will allow, to prevent the testator from carrying into effect any contemplated injustice toward those for whom he is bound by natural or moral duty to provide. Thus where the testator shows a disposition to omit a child from his will, the attorney should place before him the real effect of such omission, and, if the circumstances justify it, should endeavor to induce him to provide for the child in such a manner as may prevent a repetition of the fault of which the testator complains. The draftsman, especially if he be a lawyer, is not to be a mere instru- ment to effectuate as nearly as possible the testator’s intention, but a higher and a moral duty devolves upon him in the matter ; for example, that of an adviser for the benefit of the testator’s family, or any other objects of the testator’s bounty. The attorney should at least point out to the testator the prob- able effect of the various provisions of the will, and advise the testator upon every matter where such advice is requested. He should carefully consider and direct the attention of the testator to any inconvenience or disadvantages which may attend the gifts or limitations the latter may propose to make. Thus he should -always inform the testator that his subsequent marriage will give his wife her legal rights in his estate ;*° that the subsequent birth of issue unprovided for in the will, will work a revocation pro tanto ;** that the adoption of a child may revoke the will ;* that a change of domicil may invalidate the will ;** that vested or contin- gent interests pass under the residuary clause, where no provision is made as to them.** The incidents attending the form or char- acter of general, residuary, cumulative or substitutional, and spe- cific or demonstrative legacies should be fully explained to the testator.*° He should also be informed of the law pertaining to lapsed legacies and of the circumstances or events that are liable 40 See post, ch. 24, § 467. 43 See ante, ch. 24, § 466. 41 See post, ch. 24, § 467. 44 See post, ch. 8, § 143. 42 See post, ch. 24, § 467. 45 See post, ch. 8. § 124 ‘WILLS 108 to revoke a will.*®° The testator should be advised that the in- heritance taxes will be payable by the collateral legatee or devisee unless the will directs its payment out of the residuary estate.” He should also be advised respecting what will pass under a gen- eral residuary clause of the will.** If the testator desires to cre- ate a life estate in personal property, he should be advised to make provision for a trustee.*® Where the testator desires to create a trust by his will, the draftsman should make clear to him what a trust really implies, and he should be informed respecting the law of wasting investments.”° In jurisdictions where a surviving husband or wife has rights in the estate which he or she may elect to take despite the terms of the will, the attorney should explain this right of election and point’ out the confusion which it frequently works among the other provisions of the will.°* Where the estate is to be left for the benefit of a widow and children, the testator should be advised that the widow be given power of appointment among the chil- dren, as in this way her influence over them is preserved and she is enabled to make final disposition of the estate suitable to their needs at the time of her death.°* The testator should also be in- structed as to what disposition the law would make of his prop- erty were he to die intestate.** Where the testator wishes to in- clude in his will language reflecting upon the personality of some person who has injured him or incurred his displeasure, he should be advised that the use of such language might subject his estate to a claim for damages, as for libel on the part of the person in- jured. $124. Inquiry into testator’s capacity—Before proceed- ing to take instructions for preparing a will the attorney should satisfy himself that the party is not incapacitated from making it. It is an easy matter to determine whether or not the client is le- gally incapacitated, but it is often difficult to determine his mental capacity. Counsel should be satisfied, however, with respect to it, 46 See post, ch. 24. 50 See post, ch. 18. 47 See ante, § 15. 51 See post, ch. 3, § 48. 48 See post, ch. 8, § 143. 52 See post, ch. 19, § 382. 49 See post, ch. 12, § 233, 53 See ante, § 2. 109 SUGGESTIONS IN DRAFTING § 125 and must exercise tact in his investigation of the matter. Age is not of itself a disqualification, but it excites vigilance to see if it is accompanied with incapacity.°* Disease is not of itself a dis- qualification, but all infirmities awaken caution to see if mental capacity is impaired or gone. The testator should be closely questioned concerning the nature and situation of his property, and the persons who would natu- rally be the objects of his bounty. If he is capable of understand- ing these things and comprehends the nature of the act he is do- ing, it is fairly safe to proceed with the preparation of the will. If the testator is ill and under the care of a physician, it is advis- able for the attorney to consult such physician respecting the men- tal condition of his patient. If the testator manifests a morbid delusion respecting his wife or children, his will made while in such frame of mind is apt to be-contested, and unless the attorney succeeds in allaying such delusion to the extent that no injustice is accomplished, he should refuse to prepare the will. If the tes- tator is intoxicated or under the influence of a drug to such an extent so as not to know what he is about, the attorney should refuse to prepare the will while his client is in such condition.*° § 125. Precaution against fraud, undue influence and mis- take.—The attorney should be vigilant and cautious respect- ing any fraud or undue influence that might be practiced upon the testator. If the proposed testator be a stranger, the attorney should require an introduction or identification. In the majority of cases where the attorney is called upon to draw a will, he is acquainted with the testator and knows whether he is free from undue influence, but where the testator is a stranger, extreme cau- tion should be used, and the circumstances are likely to be such as to enable the attorney to determine whether it is prudent or not to prepare the instrument. The instructions for the will should be taken immediately from the testator himself, rather than from a third person, particularly where such person is inter- ested, and where the instructions are given by a party other than the testator, and more especially where they are given by 54 See ante, ch. 5, § 84. 55 See ante, ch. 5, § 87. § 126 WILLS 110 an interested party, it is the bounden duty of the attorney to satisfy himself as to the proposed testator’s volition and ca- pacity. Where the proposed testator is blind, illiterate, or confined to a sick room, every precaution should be taken to see that he is not exposed to the suspicion of being defrauded, coerced, or unduly influenced by any one. If the attorney is named as a legatee or devisee he should be able to prove by others that the testator so intended, thus avoiding a possible accusation of fraud- ulently altering the will, or of inserting that which the testator did not intend. But by far the safest rule is to have the will drawn by another, when the attorney is to be remembered by a bequest or devise. It is also the duty of the attorney who prepares the will to see that the testator executes it understandingly, or, in other words, that he does not execute it through mistake as to the character of the instrument itself or a material part of its contents. Care should be exercised that there be no misunderstanding between the testator and the attorney, whereby the will as drawn up con- tains provisions different from what the testator really intended. If the attorney, in preparing the will, misinterprets essentially the instructions given him by the testator, and his error is shown to have entered into the execution of the will, the will can not stand.°° § 126. Precautionary measures where contest is probable. —tThe attorney should consider whether the testator’s situation exposes him to the suspicion of being defrauded, coerced, or subject to the undue. influence of certain persons; as if, for instance, he should be aged, blind, illiterate, or confined to a sick room and excluded from social intercourse. Where such is the condition of the testator the attorney should be very care- ful of the proof that he executed the will intelligently and of his own free volition. Care should be taken that the witnesses to the will understand that the testator is fully acquainted with its 56 Christman v. Roesch, 198 N. Y. 538, 92 N. E. 1080, 111 SUGGESTIONS IN DRAFTING § 127 contents.°* To this end the attorney should read the will aloud to the testator in the presence of the attesting witnesses.°* If it is the disposition of the testator to benefit some one whose access and opportunity of influencing him is much greater than others having equal natural claims upon his bounty, his testamentary act should be carefully hedged in with strong and ample proof of capacity and freedom from fraud or undue influence. While the presence of a beneficiary under a will at its execution is not in all cases improper or objectionable, yet where his presence is not absolutely required he should be requested to retire. If the testator be infirm or of great age it is advisable to fortify care- fully against litigation, both in the scheme of disposition and in the proof of mental capacity at the time the will is executed. If deemed prudent the instrument should be read aloud in the presence of the witnesses and the testator. The testator should be requested to talk with the witnesses and others, and impress upon them his favorable condition. It is proper, in some cases, to have the testator converse with a reliable physician at the time the will is executed. Where the testator is of intemperate hab- its, or addicted to the use of drugs, make sure the proof that he is sober and free from the effects of narcotics at the time the will is executed. § 127. Selecting attesting witnesses.—In view of the fact that the witnesses to a will are apt to be called as witnesses in case the probate thereof is contested, they should be selected with great care. Only those whose testimony in a court of justice will carry conviction should be chosen, especially where the circum- stances attending the testator and his relatives is such as to ren- der a contest probable. The witnesses should be disinterested, clear-headed persons, whose testimony will carry favorable weight in support of the will. Care should be taken to select no witness who is likely to stultify himself or yield to bribes. Persons of intelligence and character, preferably those engaged. in business or professional pursuits, should be chosen, as they 57 Jarman on Wills (6th ed. Big.) 58 Weir v. Fitzgerald, 2 Bradf. (N. *35, Y.) 42. § 128 WILLS 112 are not so apt to have their testimony weakened by a rigid cross- examination. Besides the signatures of such persons are more easily proved in case they should die before the will is offered for probate. The witnesses should be selected from the testa- tor’s acquaintances in order to prevent fraud and impersonation. The testator may select his lawyer as a witness without incur- ring the risk of having the communications made by him to his attorney held privileged, as his selection of the attorney as a witness is deemed as a waiver of the privilege.*° The same rule permits a physician or surgeon, who signs a will as a wit- ness, to testify respecting the mental and physical condition of the testator.°° Therefore, the testator who wishes to fortify the execution of his will with expert medical testimony may do so by having his medical experts attest the instrument, and as a fur- ther precaution he may execute a written waiver of his privilege, so that it can not be insisted upon to exclude the testimony.” § 128. Suggestions concerning the making of codicils.— The attorney should not attempt the preparation of a codicil un- less he has‘before him the original will or an exact copy thereof. The memory of the testator should not be relied upon concerning the provisions of the original will, for to do so might result in a conflict or inconsistency between the two instruments. Some testators have a particular fondness for making codicils affecting the whole scheme of the original will. Many embarrassing ques- tions have grown out of a will to which numerous codicils have been made; hence the practice of making a large number of codicils should be discouraged. Where, however, a codicil em- braces a simple provision not materially affecting the will, no question is likely to arise. Where several codicils have already been made, and the tes- tator is undoubtedly competent and free to make a new will 59In re Wax, 106 Cal. 343, 39 Pac. 60In re Mullin, 110 Cal. 252, 42 624; Denning v. Butcher, 91 Iowa Pac. 645. 425, 59 N. W. 69; In re Coleman, 61 Dougherty v. Metropolitan L. 111 N. Y. 220, 19 N. E. 71; McMas- Ins. Co., 87 Hun 15, 33 N. Y. S. 873. ter v. Scriven, 85 Wis. 162, 55 N. 62 Richardson v. Hall, 124 Mass. W. 149, 39 Am. St. 828. 228. + 113 SUGGESTIONS IN DRAFTING § 129 embracing the provisions of the original will and all codicils made thereto, it is advisable to destroy utterly whatever instru- ment or instruments precede, and make a new will which shall embrace the whole disposition and stand as sufficient by itself. But if the testator be very old or infirm, or there is any doubt about his capacity to make the codicil or codicils, it is better to keep the original will intact. . § 129. Time employed in preparation of will—Too much attention can not be given to the plan and preparation of a will, and it is never advisable to hasten the matter unless the circum- stances make it necessary. Where the circumstances will permit, the will should be made deliberately, with sufficient time for con- sultation and revision. Ample time should be employed to get at the real purpose of the testator, and to ascertain if he com- prehends the full force of his act. Great pains should be taken to obtain full and complete instructions from the testator, and where time will permit he should himself prepare a preliminary draft of the will. After taking instructions from the testator the attorney should prepare a preliminary draft of the instrument which he should submit to the testator for his approval or disapproval. The provi- sions of this draft should be carefully gone over, and their effect fully explained to the testator before preparing the final draft. The attorney himself should take sufficient time to examine care- fully the local laws pertaining to wills and their execution, and to map out the exact provisions to be made against every possible contingency that may arise in connection with the testator’s fam- ily and estate before and after death. After the final draft is completed, it also should be carefully and deliberately gone over with the testator in an effort to discover if any thing has been omitted that should be included, or any thing included that should be omitted. § 130. Testing the will before death—As a will takes ef- fect only upon the death of the testator there can, of course, be no judicial construction or interpretation thereof until after the happening of that event. But it is possible, during the lifetime 8—Tuomp. WILLS. § 131 WILLS 114 of the testator, to determine with reasonable certainty whether the will is safe and sound. This may be accomplished by having the completed will criticized by one or more competent attorneys who had no part in its preparation. This does not mean that the attorney or attorneys employed to test the will should be hos- tile to the one who prepared it. On the contrary, the minds oi both should be sympathetic, rather than competitive. The attor- ney who drafted the will may possess equal ability with those making the test, but the former, having the burden of its prepara- tion and the desire to satisfy his client, may have overlooked some vital defect that an independent mind might be able to discover. The attorney who prepares the will is seldom responsible if the instrument does not express the exact wishes of the testator. The defect usually grows out of the testator’s failure to prop- erly instruct the attorney respecting his wishes, or withholding some important information concerning his property or family. Therefore, instead of hiding the will away as soon as it is exe- cuted, the testator should take the precaution to test it while he is alive and able to repair any defects or ambiguities that may be discoverable. If the defects are discovered while the testator is living it is a simple matter to eliminate the bad and doubtful clauses and to substitute safe and sound ones; but after he is dead the doubtful and bad provisions must stand as they are written. § 131. Depositary of wills—The testator should be cau- tioned as to the safe-keeping of the will. It should be placed where it would be inaccessible to those who might have designs upon its alteration or destruction, and at the same time it should be deposited in a place where the testator may have access to it if he desires, or be readily obtained for probate after he is dead. The safety deposit vault of some trustworthy and disinterested _person is probably the safest and most suitable place to deposit the instrument. Or the safe-keeping may be intrusted with the testator’s attorney, or the executor named in the will. Another precaution against destruction or alteration is the execution of the instrument in duplicate, and the placing of the copies in sep- arate custody. Where but one copy of the will is made, it is 115 SUGGESTIONS IN DRAFTING § 131 never advisable for the testator to retain it in his own custody, as a presumption arises that he canceled or destroyed it if it can not be found after he is dead.** In some jurisdictions a correct copy of a lost or destroyed will may be admitted to pro- bate. It is provided by statute in some states that the testator may inclose his will in a sealed receptacle and deposit it in the registry of probate, and that after his death it shall be delivered to the executor or executors named in the will. 68In re Hopkins, 172 N. Y. 360, 65 N. E. 173, 65 L. R. A. 95, 92 Am. St. 746. CHAPTER VIII KINDS AND CHARACTER OF DEVISES AND LEGACIES SECTION SECTION 135. Devises and legacies in general. 140. Demonstrative legacies. 136. General devises. 141. Additional or cumulative lega- 137. Specific devises. cies. 138. General legacies. 142. Substitutional legacies. 139. Specific legacies. 143. Residuary devises and legacies. § 135. Devises and legacies in. general—Before execut- ing his will it is important that the testator should know the kind and character of the gifts he is about to make, as the same rights and liabilities of legatees and devisees do not attach to all. Where the testator is not familiar with the character and effect of the various kinds of legacies and devises that may be created, it is the duty of his attorney to explain the same fully in order that the testator may select those most suitable for car- rying out his wishes. The proposed gifts must be considered with reference to the identity of the property to be given,’ to the amount of the estate to be given,” to the time of the enjoyment of the estate,* and to the number and connection of the bene- ficiaries.* In framing the particular kinds of gifts selected great care should be exercised to use only such words as will clearly express the intention of the testator. The word “give” may be used with reference to either real or personal property, yet in giving real estate by will the proper word to use is “devise.” The word “bequeath” is used with reference to personal property, but it may be used for “devise,” and the term “residuary lega- tee” may be used to pass the residuum of both real and personal property.” Direct words of gift may be used in creating gifts, 1 See post, ch. 4. 4 See post, ch. 10. 2 See post, ch. 12. 5 Evans v. Crosbie, 15 Sim. 600. 3 See post, ch. 13. 116 117 KINDS AND CHARACTER OF DEVISES AND LEGACIES § 136 but the vesting of the estate thus given is not postponed, except the instrument contains words limiting the period of enjoyment to some future time.® Gifts may also be made indirectly by direc- tion to executors or trustees to pay or divide, but in such case the direction to pay or divide constitutes the devise or bequest, and therefore the vesting in interest is postponed, as well as the vesting in possession or enjoyment.’ Even where the will con- tains no formal words of gift, a gift will be implied where the intention of the testator to dispose of his property by will is clearly shown.® § 136. General devises—A general devise is a gift of a quantity of land not limited to any particular tract; as a gift of “forty acres of land.”® At common law, all devises of land, whether given by particular description or residuary clauses, were specific,?? and such seems to be the rule still in England and quite generally in this country.** Some modification, however, of this doctrine has been admit- ted in the American courts, in view of statutory provisions which have the effect of making wills speak from the death of the tes- tator instead of from their execution. Considering that testa- tors could not have had property acquired after the execution of their wills in their minds at the time, and that it is only by force of statute, and wholly apart from the testator’s intent, that such property passes at all, and hence that they could not and did not specifically intend that residuary devisees should take such prop- erty, the tendency of American decisions has been to hold that no devise of after-acquired real estate is specific, unless the land 6 Jarman on Wills (6th ed. Big.) *756. 7 Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 Iil. 11; Reiff’s Appeal, 124 Pa. St. 145, 16 Atl. 636. 8 Boston Safe Deposit &c. Co. v. Coffin, 152 Mass. 95, 25 N. E. 30, 8 L. R. A. 740; Masterson v. Towns- hend, 123 N. Y. 458, 25 N. E. 928, 10 L.-R. A. 816. ® Kelly v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 584, 13 So. 785; Nusly v. Curtis, 36 Colo. 464, 85 Pac. 846,7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 592, 118 Am. St. 113, 10 Ann. Cas. 1134; Graham v. De Yampert, 106 Ala. 279, 17 So. 355. 10In re Woodworth’s Estate, 31 Cal. 595; Wilts v. Wilts, 151 Iowa 149, 130 N. W. 906. 11 Robertson v. Broadbent, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 812, § 137 WILLS 118 is described with sufficient particularity to enable the devisee to identify it? A general devise of land will pass a fee simple title, unless a contrary intention appears from the will. It would seem that, where real estate is by statute made an asset in the hands of the executor for the payment of the tes- tator’s debts, and the devise of real estate is general, instead of specific, the general bequest of personalty and the general devise of realty will stand upon an equal footing, and on like grounds be required to contribute to the indebtedness pro rata.** § 137. Specific devises—A specific devise is a gift of a part or all of the testator’s real estate specifically and definitely described: as “Lot one, Block two, Park Addition to Indian- apolis, Indiana.’”’*® But where the testator makes a gift of land owned by him at the time the will is executed, it has been held to constitute a specific devise,*® whether the land is definitely de- scribed or not.” A residuary devise of land is specific, except in- so-far as it may include after-acquired real estate.** A gift of the use and improvement of a definitely described tract of land for a term of one’s natural life, as well as the remainder after the termination of such life, is a specific devise.*® Also a devise of the residuary estate is a specific devise of land 12Kelly v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 584, 13 So. 785; In re Woodworth’s 13 So. 785; In re Ratto, 149 Cal. 552, 86 Pac. 1107; Young v. McKinnie, Estate, 31 Cal. 595; Farnum v. Bas- com, 122 Mass. 282; In re Martin, 25 R. I. 1, 51 Atl. 589; McFadden v. Hefley, 28 S. Car. 317, 5 S. E. 812, 13 Am. St. 675. 18 Cain v. Cain, 127 Ala. 440, 29 So. 846; In re Claiborne’s Estate, 158 Cal. 646, 112 Pac. 278; White v. White, 52 Conn. 520; Simmons v. Cabanne, 177 Mo. 336, 76 S. W. 618. 14 Wilts v. Wilts, 151 Iowa 149, 130 N. W. 906. 15 Humes v. Wood, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 478; In re De Bernald’s Estate, 165 Cal. 223, 131 Pac. 355, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 26. 16 Kelly v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 584, 5 Fla, 542; Chambers v. Davis, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 522; Wallace v. Wallace, 23 N. H. 149; Buckwalter v. Klein, 5 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 55. 17Farnum v. Bascom, 122 Mass. 282; Page v. Eldredge Public Li- brary Assn., 69 N. H. 575, 45 Atl. 411; In re White, 125 N. Y. 544, 26 N. E. 909; Wood v. Hammond, 16 R. I. 98, 17 Atl. 324, 18 Atl. 198. 18 Kelly v. Richardsan, 100 Ala. 584, 13 So. 785; Rice v. Rice (Iowa), 19 N. W. 714; Wyman v. Brigden, 4 Mass. 150. 19 Farnum v. Bascom, 122 Mass. 282. 119 KINDS AND CHARACTER OF DEVISES AND LEGACIES § 138 which the testator owned at the time of the execution of the will, and at his death, and not otherwise disposed of.*? We have seen that at common law all devises of real estate were regarded as specific. This rule grew out of the doctrine that a man could devise only what he had at the time of the execution of his will. A will was construed as speaking from the date of its execution, and so the lands which were intended to pass thereunder might be identified. So where the testator intended to dispose of after- acquired real estate, he could not well have known the real estate which he undertook to dispose of, and consequently the reason for the rule that all devises of real estate are specific fails. We may conclude, therefore, that no devise of after-acquired real estate is specific unless the land is described with such partic- ularity as to enable the devisee to identify it." If the testator, at the time of his death, no longer owns that particular property described the devise must fail.” In most jurisdictions a specific devise of real estate which is subject to a mortgage or lien placed thereon by the testator or his ancestor will be exonerated from such mortgage or lien, unless there is an expressed intention in the will to the contrary. But this rule does not apply to cases where the testator or his ancestor purchased the real estate subject to the incumbrance, unless the testator or his ancestor has rendered himself person- ally liable therefor.”* § 138. General legacies.—A general legacy is a bequest chargeable upon the general estate, and not so given as to be distinguishable from other parts of the estate of the same kind; but is one of a quantity merely, and includes all bequests not demonstrative or specific.** Thus a bequest of a certain number of shares of stock, of a kind of which the testator owns a larger 20 Rice v. Rice (Iowa), 119 N. W. 23 Hewes v. Dehon, 3 Gray (Mass.) 714. 7 205. 21Kelly v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 24 Kramer v. Kramer, 201 Fed. 248; 584, 13 So. 785; Wilts v. Wilts, 151 Kelly v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 584, 13 Iowa 149, 130 N. W. 906. So. 785. 22Marshall vy. Hartzfelt, 98 Mo. App. 178, 71 S. W. 1061. § 139 WILLS 120 number, is a general legacy.*® Also a gift of a sum of money generally and without reference to a particular fund, is a gen- eral legacy.”* A direction to the executor to invest a certain sum of money in the purchase of particular securities is a gen- eral legacy.*7 A bequest of all the testator’s personal property except a specified portion is a general legacy.”* Where the testator creates a general legacy, owning no prop- erty of the kind bequeathed, it amounts by inference to a direc- tion to his executor to procure, out of the general fund, property of the character and quantity bequeathed and give it to the legatee.” General legacies may be satisfied out of the general assets of the testator’s estate without regard to any particular fund. There is no intent on the part of the testator to make a specific disposition of particular assets of his estate as such.°? A general legacy has no reference to the actual state of the testator’s property, it being only supposed that he has sufficient property which, being realized upon, will procure for the legatee that which he is given.** A general legacy can not fail by reason of the testator disposing of any particular thing during his life- time. But if there is a shortage of assets to pay the legacy in full after the payment of debts, a general legacy must abate before specific legacies are allowed to suffer.** This may be pre- vented by a provision that the more important general legacies shall be paid first.** 25In re Snyder, 217 Pa. 71, 66 Atl. 157, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49, 118 Am. St. 900, 10 Ann. Cas. 488. 26JIn re Martin, 25 R. I. 1, 54 Atl. 589, 27 Eggleston v. Merriam, 83 Minn. 98, 85 N. W. 937, 86 N. W. 444; Moore v. Moore, 50 N. J. Eq. 554, 25 Atl. 403; In re Haviland, 19 N. Y. St. 524, 6 Dem. Surr. 4; White v. Beattie, 16 N. Car. 87; McFadden v. Hefley, 28 S. Car. 317, 5 S. E. 812, 13 Am. St. 675. “8 Kelly v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 584, 13 So. 785; Cooch v. Cooch, 5 Houst. (Del.) 540, 1 Am. St. 161. 29 Weed v. Hoge, 85 Conn. 490, 83 Atl. 636, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 543. 30 Brainerd v. Cowdrey, 16 Conn. 1; Bradford v. Haynes, 20 Maine 105; Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100; Crawford v. McCarthy, 159 N. Y. 514, 54 .N. E. 277. 31 Weed v. Hoge, 85 Conn. 490, 83 Atl. 636, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 543. 32 Johnson v. Home for Aged Men, 152 Mass. 89, 25 N. E. 44. 33 See post, ch. 20, § 395, 121 KINDS AND CHARACTER OF DEVISES AND LEGACIES § 139 § 139. Specific legacies—A specific legacy, as the term imports, is a gift or bequest of some definite thing, or group of things, and something which is capable of being designated and identified.** A legacy is said to be specific when it is answered by any particular portion of, or article belonging to, the estate, the delivery of which will alone fulfil the intent of the testator.*® A legacy is specific even though it includes numerous articles. Thus a bequest of all the horses which the testator may own, of all his household furniture, of all the books in his library, or of all the horses, cattle, and farming tools on a particular farm or farms, is specific.*® But a legacy of money is usually considered a general legacy.*” The fundamental distinction between general and specific lega- cies is that the former may be satisfied out of the general assets of the testator’s estate without regard to any particular fund, thing, or things, while the latter are gifts of particular specified things, or of the proceeds of the sale of such things, or of a spe- cific fund or a definite portion thereof. In the case of the for- mer, there is no intent on the part of the testator to make a specific disposition of particular assets of his estate as such; in the latter case, the intent is that the attempted gift shall be satis- fied by the delivery of specific property forming a part of the estate, and so described as to be identified as the subject of the gift and in no other way. If the specified property is not owned by the testator at his death, the legatee, in the case of a specific legacy takes nothing. He has no claim upon the general assets.** A general legacy has no reference to the actual state of the tes- tator’s property, it being only supposed that he has sufficient property which, being realized upon, will procure for the legatee 34 Dean v. Rounds, 18 R. I. 436, 27 Atl. 515, 28 Atl. 802. 35 Alexander v. Bates, 127 Ala. 328, 28 So. 415; In re Zeile, 74 Cal. 125, 15 Pac. 455; Nusly v. Curtis, 36 Colo. 464, 85 Pac. 846,7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 592, 118 Am. St. 113, 10 Ann. Cas. 1134; Weed v. Hoge, 85 Conn. 490, 83 Atl. 636; In re Bouk’s Estate, 80 Misc. 196, 141 N. Y. S. 922; In re Campbell, 27 Utah 361, 75 Pac. 851. 36 Tomlinson v. Bury, 145 Mass. 346, 14 N. E. 137, 1 Am. St. 464. 37 Perkins v. Mathes, 49 N. H. 107; Mathis v. Mathis, 18 N. J. L. 59. 38 Brainerd v. Cowdry, 16 Conn. 1; Bradford v. Haynes, 20 Maine 105; Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100; Crawford v. McCarthy, 159 N. Y. 514, 54 N. E. 277. § 140 WILLS 122 that which is given, while in the case of a specific bequest it must be a part of the testator’s property itself.* A specific legacy is the gift of something which a testator, identifying it by a sufficient description, and manifesting an in- tention that it should be enjoyed or taken in the state or condi- tion indicated by that description, separates in favor of a particu- lar legatee from the general mass of his personal estate.*® In case of a shortage of assets to pay debts and legacies all prop- erty not specifically devised or bequeathed must be first applied before specific legacies can be resorted to.** If the legacy is specific and is appropriated to the payment of debts, the legatee, in case the general or residuary legacies are not sufficient, is entitled to contribution from the holders of other specific lega- cies.” A specific legacy, if vested, carries interest and profits from the death of the testator.“ And it has been held that a specific legacy of a coupon bond carries with it an overdue nego- tiable coupon attached to it at the testator’s death.** A specific legacy can only be satisfied by delivery of the thing bequeathed, and if that thing be not in existence at the time the bequest would otherwise become operative, the legatee gets nothing*® unless the testator makes other provision for him in the will. § 140. Demonstrative legacies—A demonstrative legacy is a bequest of a thing or money not specified or distinguished from all others of the same kind, but payable out of a designated fund.** Thus a gift of $1,000 payable out of the proceeds of a specified note and mortgage is a demonstrative legacy.*” But a 89 Bothamley v. Sherson, L. R. 20 Eq. 304. 40 Weed v. Hoge, 85 Conn. 490, 83 Atl. 636, Anh. Cas. 1913 C, 543; Rob- ertson v. Broadbent, 53 L. J. Ch. 266, 8 App. Cas. 812, 50 L. T. 243, 32 W. R, 205. 41 Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100; Toch v. Toch, 81 Hun (N. Y.) 410, 30 N. Y. S. 1003, 63 N. Y. St. 197; In te McMahon’s Estate, 132 Pa. St. 175, 19 Atl. 68. 42 Tomlinson v. Bury, 145 Mass. 346, 14 N. E. 137, 1 Am. St. 464; Far- num v. Bascom, 122 Mass. 282. #8 Case v. Case, 51 Ind. 277; Max- well v. Wettenhall, 2 P. Wms. 27. 44 Ogden v. Pattee, 149 Mass. 82, 21 N. E. 227, 14 Am. St. 401. 45 Tomlinson v. Bury, 145 Mass. 346, 14 N. E. 137, 1 Am. St. 464. 46 Kennedy v. Sinnott, 179 U. S. 606, 45 L. ed. 339, 21 Sup. Ct. 233; Kramer v. Kramer, 201 Fed. 248; Myers’ Exrs. v. Myers, 33 Ala. 85. 47 Bradford v. Brinley, 145 Mass. : 123 KINDS AND CHARACTER OF DEVISES AND LEGACIES § 140 mere direction to pay a person a certain sum of money without words of direct gift does not constitute the gift a demonstra- tive legacy.** But it seems that the term “‘issue,’’ when applied to children, will include illegitimate children, where such an intent can be gathered from the words of the will and the condi- tion of the parties, and more especially when, from the operation of the statute, the illegitimate children come clearly within the descriptive words of the gift.” The use of the word “‘issue” in a will, where nothing appears to limit its legal import, generally includes adopted children.” But where it is the intention of the testator to include adopted or ille- gitimate children, it is advisable to indicate that intent by the use of proper words, as otherwise they might be excluded. The word “children” or “descendants,” having a more definite mean- ing, should be used in preference to the word “‘issue’’ wherever practicable.” § 174. Descendantsx—Descendants are those who have issued from an individual, including his children, grandchildren, 73 Jackson v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 76 Harrell v. Hagen, 147 N. Car. 374, 26 N. E. 1112, 25 Am. St. 643, 111, 60 S. E. 909. 11 L. R. A. 305; Dexter v. Inches, 77 Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R. I. 644, 147 Mass. 324, 17 N. E. 551. 35 Atl. 882, 34 L. R. A. 500. 74Brisbin v. Huntington, 128 Iowa 78 Flora v. Anderson, 67 Fed. 182; 166, 103 N. W. 144; Black v. Cart- New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viele, 161 mell, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 188; United N. Y. 11, 55 N. E. 311, 76 Am. St. States Trust Co. v. Maxwell, 26 238. Misc. 276, 57 N. Y. S. 53. 79 See post, ch. 30, § 725. 75 Central Trust Co. v. Skillin, 154 App. Div. 227, 138 N. Y. S. 884. 153. DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES § 174 and their children to the remotest degree,*° but does not include “next of kin” or “heirs at law” generally, as these terms compre- hend descendants as well as ascendants and collaterals.** “A gift to descendants receives a construction answering to the obvious sense of the term, namely, as comprising issue of every de- gree.”*? According to its accurate lexicographical and legal mean- ing the word “descendant” generally designates the issue of a deceased person, and does not describe the child of a parent who is still living. The word is correlative to “ancestor” or “ascendant.”** It includes the most remote lineal offspring, and it is practically synonymous with “issue” in its legal mean- ing. It does not include relatives in the ascending line ;* nor does it include collateral relations.** It may be conceded that the words “children” and “descend- ants” are not ordinarily synonymous.** While children are de- scendants, descendants are not always children ;** for descendants are those who have issued from an individual, and include his children, grandchildren, and their children to the remotest de- gree.** But it sometimes happens that a testator uses the word “descendants” in the sense of “‘children.”°? Thus where the word “descendants” is qualified by the phrase “by my said son Wash- ington,” only such descendants as were begotten by the testator’s son Washington were included.** 80 Lich v. Lich, 158 Mo. App. 400, 138 S. W. 558. 81 Tompkins v. Verplanck, 10 App. Div. 572, 42 N. Y. S. 412; Hamlin v. Osgood, 1 Redf. Surr. (N. Y.) 409. 82Jarman Wills (6th ed. Big.) #943, 83 Hillen v. Iselin, 144 N. Y. 365, 39 N. E. 368. 84 Bates v. Gillett, 132 Ill. 287, 24 N. E. 611; Tichenor v. Brewer’s Exr., 98 Ky. 349, 33 S. W. 86, 17 Ky. L. 936. 85 Tichenor v. Brewer’s Exr., 98 Ky. 349, 33 S. W. 86, 17 Ky. L. 936; Schmaunz v. Goss, 132 Mass. 141; Mitchell v. Thorne, 134 N. Y. 536, 32 N. E. 10, 30 Am. St. 699. 86 Bates v. Gillett, 132 Ill. 287, 24 N. E. 611; Tichenor v. Brewer’s Exr., 98 Ky. 349, 33 S. W. 86, 17 Ky. L. 936; Baker v. Baker, 8 Gray (Mass.) 101. But see Turley v. Turley, 11 Ohio St. 173. : 87 Neilson v. Brett, 99 Va. 673, 40 S. E. 32. 88 Bates v. Gillett, 132 Ill. 287, 24 N. E. 611. 89 Tichenor v. Brewer’s Exr., 98 Ky. 349, 33 S. W. 86, 17 Ky. L. 936; Bryan v. Walton, 20 Ga. 480. 90 Schmaunz v. Goss, 132 Mass. 141. 91 Slote v. Reiss, 153 Ky. 30, 154 S. W. 405. § 175 WILLS 154 § 175. Offspring —The term “offspring,” as used in a will, is said to be synonymous with issue.°? It includes lineal descendants of every degree.** The word “offspring,” like the words “issue” and “descendants,” may be used in different senses. It may mean children only, or it may include more remote de- scendants. In its proper and natural sense, the term includes every degree of lineal descendants.°* While the term may mean “children,” yet when used in the phrase “children or offspring,” it refers to other offspring beyond children.°° The word “off- spring,” when used in connection with a devise of real estate, is a word of limitation, not of purchase.”° § 176. Children, grandchildren, adopted children, step- children, illegitimate children and children en ventre sa mere. —The word “children,” in its technical as well as popular mean- ing, includes the immediate legitimate offspring of the person indicated as the parent.%” Usually it does not include grand- children,°** stepchildren,*® adopted children,* or illegitimate chil- 92 Barber v. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. 166 U. S. 83, 41 L. ed. 925, 17 Sup. Ct. 488; Mitchell v. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co., 165 Pa. St. 645, 31 Atl. 67. 93 Barber v. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co., 166 U. S. 83, 41 L. ed. 925, 17 Sup. ‘Ct. 488; Allen v. Markle, 36 Pa. St. 117. 94 Young v. Davies, 2 Dr. & Sm. 167, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 399, 32 L. J. Ch. 372. ®5 Thompson v. Beasley, 3 Drew. 7. 96 Barber v. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co., 69 Fed. 501; Allen v. Markle, 36 Pa. St. 117. ®7 Duncan v. De Yampert, 182 Ala. 528, 62 So. 673; Carpenter v. Perkins, 83 Conn. 11, 74 Atl. 1062; Arnold v. Alden, 173 Ill. 229, 50 N. E. 704; Pugh v. Pugh, 105 Ind. 552, 5 N. E. 673; Ward v. Cooper, 69 Miss. 789, 13 So. 827; Dunn v. Cory, 56 N. J. Eq. 507, 39 Atl. 368; Wylie v. Lock- wood, 86 N. Y. 291, 20 Hun 377; Mc- Intosh’s Estate, 158 Pa. St. 528, 27 98 Phinizy v. Foster, 90 Ala. 262, 7 So. 836; West v. Rassman, 135 Ind. 278, 34 N. W. 991; Thomas v. Thomas (Miss.), 53 So. 630; Kondolf v. Britton, 160 App. Div. 381, 145 N. Y. S. 791; Spicer v. Connor, 148 App. Div. 334, 132 N. Y. S. 877; Lee v. Baird, 132 N. Car. 755, 44 S. E. 605; In re Long’s Estate, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 323; In re Reynold’s Will, 20 R. I. 429, 39 Atl. 896, 3 Prob. Rep. Ann. 17; Logan v. Brunson, 56 S. Car. 7, 33 S. E. 737; Frank v. Frank, 120 Tenn. 569, 111 S. W. 1119; Brett v. Donaghe’s Gdn., 101 Va. 786, 45 S. E. 324. 99 Coon v. McNelly, 254 Ill. 39, 98 N. E. 218; Blankenbaker vy. Snyder, 36 S. W. 1124, 18 Ky. L. 437; Fouke v. Kemp, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 135; Lawrence v. Hebbard, 1 Brad. Surs. (N. Y.) 252; In re Kurtz’s Estate, 145 Pa. St. 637, 23 Atl. 322; Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 731. 1 Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 3 So. § 176 155 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES dren,? unless there be some word or expression within the will to show that the testator used the word in a broader sense,’ or unless the extrinsic circumstances show that the testator intended to in- clude such persons.* The term “children,” when used in a will, will usually be taken to refer to “issue” or descendants of the first degree, and to ex- clude descendants of a more remote degree, but it would seem that the term will be given a wider signification and include issue, however remote when reason demands it,® and where such is the manifest intention of the testator.° A child en ventre sa mere is included in a devise to the “chil- dren” of its parents generally.’ “Generally a child will be consid- ered in being from conception to the time of its birth, in all cases where it will be for the benefit of such child to be so considered.’’* Also children born illegitimate, who are subsequently rendered legitimate by statute, are included under a devise to the “children” of their putative parent.° While the term “children” may be ex- tended by the terms of the will itself, or by the surrounding facts and circumstances, so as to include grandchildren, adopted chil- 214, 68 Atl. 821, 125 Am. St. 291; In re Hopkins, 102 App. Div. 458, 92 N. Y. S. 463; Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. St. 304; Cochran v. Cochran, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 95 S. W. 731; Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 121 N. W. 153; Stout v. Cook, 77 N. J. Eq. 153, 75 Atl. 583. But see Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 54 N. E. 446, 55 N. E, 510; Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262; In re Truman, 27 R. I. 209, 61 Atl. 598. 2Flora v. Anderson, 67 Fed. 182; Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260, 13 L. R. A. 275. 3 Edwards v. Bender, 121 Ala. 77, 25 So. 1010; Miller v. Carlisle, 90 Ky. 205, 14 S. W. 75, 12 Ky. L. 66; Bowker v. Bowker, 148 Mass. 198, 19 N. E. 213; In re Paton, 111 N. Y. 480, 18 N. E. 625; In re Keogh, 126 App. Div. 285, 110 N. Y. S. 868. 4In re Schedel’s Estate, 73 Cal. 594, 15 Pac. 297; Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 121 N. W. 153; Gale v. Bennett, Ambler 681; Fenn v. Death, 23 Beav. 73, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 700, 5 Pfender v. Depew, 136 App. Div. 636, 121 N. Y. S. 285. 6 Jordan v. Roach, 32 Miss. 481; Prowitt v. Rodman, 37 N. Y. 42; In re Gormley’s Estate, 154 Pa. St. 378, 25 Atl. 814; In re Scholl, 100 Wis. 650, 76 N. W. 616. 7 Mclain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N. W. 182, 77 Am. St. 597; Star- ling v. Price, 16 Ohio St. 29. 8Hall v. Hancock, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 255, 257, 26 Am. Dec. 598.. 9Tn re Grey’s Trusts, L. R. (1892) 3 Ch. 88. But see Hicks v. Smith, 94 Ga. 809, 22 S. E. 153, § 177 WILLS 156 dren, stepchildren, and illegitimate children, it is better not to rely on the context or family circumstances, but to use such words as will clearly designate the intended beneficiaries.*° § 177. Brothers and sisters—Where the testator uses the word “brothers” or “sisters” in his will, he will be presumed prima facie to mean brothers or sisters of the whole blood. But this presumption is not conclusive, and may be rebutted by infer- ence from the context showing that he meant brothers or sisters of the half blood. The more recent authorities, however, hold that a gift to the “brothers and sisters” of the testator, includes brothers and sisters of the half blood, as well as those of the full blood.” But a gift to “brothers and sisters’ does not include the children of deceased brothers and sisters, unless the context of the will shows such an intention.** Where the gift is to brothers and sisters they take as a class.** The use of the plural word “brothers” or “sisters” has been held to indicate an intention on the part of the testator to include the heirs of deceased brothers or sisters, although the testator had but one brother or sister living at the date of the will.*® Buta gift to the “surviving brothers and sisters” of the testator does not include the children of a deceased brother or sister.*® § 178. Nephews and nieces.—“Nephews” and “nieces” mean the immediate descendants of the brothers and sisters of the persons named,*? and when such words are used in a will they 10 See post, ch. 30. 11 Wood v. Mitcham, 92 N. Y. 375, 61 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 48; Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363. 12 McAlister v. Burgess, 161 Mass. 269, 37 N. E. 173, 24 L. R. A. 158; In re Yetter’s Estate, 160 Pa: St. 506, 28 Atl. 847; McNeal v. Sherwood, 24 R. I. 314, 53 Atl. 43; Watkins v. Blount, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 460, 94 S. W. 1116; Grieves v. Rawley, 10 Hare 63. 183In re Edwards, 132 App. Div. 544,117 N. Y. S. 3; In re Kellerman’s Estate, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 530. 14Jarman Wills (6th ed. Big.) *232, 15 Fuller v. Martin, 96 Ky. 500, 29 S. W. 315; Huntress v. Place, 137 Mass. 409; In re John’s Estate, 11 Phil. (Pa.) 144. 16 Mullarkey v. Sullivan, 136 N. Y. 227, 32 N. E. 762. 17In re Butler, 66 Misc. 406, 123 N.Y. S. 282. 157 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES § 179 do not ordinarily include grandnephews or grandnieces,** unless the context shows that such was the plain intention of the testa- tor" Where the testator makes a gift to “nephews and nieces” it will be presumed that he intended: nephews and nieces by birth, and not by adoption, in the absence of knowledge by him of the fact of such adoption.” The words “nephews” and “nieces” mean not those of the whole blood alone, but children of half-brothers and half-sisters.* But the words do not include a nephew or niece by marriage, that is, a nephew or niece of the testator’s husband or » wife.” Where legacies or devises are given to “nephews” or “nieces,” only legitimate nephews or nieces will be included.” $179. Cousins.—“‘Prima facie the word ‘cousin’ means first cousin, and not a first cousin once or more times removed: still less does it mean a second or third cousin which might go on indefinitely.”** “Those only having either the same great grand- grandfather or the same great-grandmother are second cousins to each other.”** The word “cousin,” when used in a will to desig- nate a beneficiary, ordinarily means a first cousin.” Thus a gift to each of the “cousins” of a testator passes to the first cousins 18 Willard v. Darrah, 168 Mo. 660, 68 S. W. 1023, 909 Am. St. 468; Buzby v. Roberts, 53 N. J. Eq. 566, 32 Atl. 9; Kimball v. Chappel, 18 N. Y. S. 30, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 437; Shull v. Johnson, 55 N. Car. 202; Lewis v. Fisher, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 196; White v. Old, 113 Va. 709, 75 S. E. 182, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 586; In re Blower, L.R.6 Ch. 351, 42 L. J. Ch. 24, 25 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 181, 19 Wkly. Rep. 666. 19 Schull v. Johnson, 2 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 202. But see In re Holt’s Estate, 146 Cal. 77, 79 Pac. 585. 20In re Haight, 63 Misc. 624, 118 N. Y. S. 745. 21 Shull v. Johnson, 2 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 202; Grieves v. Rawley, 10 Hare 63. 22In re Root’s Estate, 187 Pa. St. 118, 40 Atl. 818; Green’s Appeal, 42 Pa. St. 25. 23 Bolton v. Bolton, 73 Maine 299; Lyon v. Lyon, 88 Maine 395, 34 Atl. 180. 24 Stevenson v. Abington, 31 Beav. 305. 25 Bridgnorth v. Collins, 15 Sim. 538. 26 White v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 171 Mass. 84, 50 N. E. 512; Stevenson v. Abingdon, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 811, 6 L. J. 345, 10 Wkly. Rep. 591. § 180 WILLS 158 only, and not to first cousins once removed." A gift to all of the “first cousins” of the testator does not include the issue of first cousins deceased when the will was executed.”* Buta gift to “all the first and second cousins” has been held to include all within the degree of second cousin, and hence embraces the first cousins first removed and first cousins twice removed.”° § 180. Family.—The use of the word “family” in desig- nating beneficiaries in a will should be avoided wherever possible ; but if its use can not be well dispensed with, care should be exer- cised to make its intended meaning clear. The term being of flex- ible meaning, it is often difficult to determine what persons are intended to be included. Its meaning is always to be gathered from the whole will, read in the light of all the circumstances sur- rounding its execution. Primarily it means all those who live under the same roof with the proprietor of the premises, includ- ing his wife, children and servants. In its ordinary and common meaning, when used in wills, it means a man’s wife and children. It is also used to designate a man’s brothers and sisters, or his next of kin, where he has no wife or children. In its broad sense it sometimes has reference to those persons of the same name who are descended from a common though remote ancestor.*° Whether the term “family” includes the wife of the person desig- nated when there are no children is a question upon which the courts differ. The weight of authority, however, upholds a gift for the benefit of the husband and his family to include a childless wife who is dependent upon her spouse for support.** It has been held that a ‘husband and wife without children con- stitute a family.*? The term “family,” when used in a will, in- 27 White v. Massachusetts Inst. of 302 Story, Eq. Jur., 8 1065 B. Tech., 171 Mass. 84, 50 N. E. 512; 31 Oberndorf v. Farmers’ Loan & Howland v. Slade, 155 Mass. 415, 29 Trust Co., 71 Misc. 64, 129 N. Y. S. N. E. 631. 814. 28 White v. Massachusetts Inst. of | 32Crosgrove v. Crosgrove, 69 Tech., 171 Mass. 84, 50 N. E. 512. Conn. 416, 38 Atl. 219; Kitchell v. 29 Mayott v. Mayott, 2 Bro. C. C. Burgwin, 21 Ill. 40. 125, 1 Sim. & Stu. 301. 159 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES § 181 cludes a childless widow.** Also a deserted wife without children is within the term “family.’’** It has been held that a man who has a wife is the head of a family although his wife may have deserted him.** A gift to the “family” of a designated person will include the children of such person, unless the context shows a different intention; but it does not include the parent of such children.°* Where, however, the gift is to a certain person and his “family,” it will usually include such person and his children.** It has been held that the term “family” does not include adult children living separately and not forming a part of the same household.** § 181. Relatives or relations.—It is never advisable to use the words “relatives,” “relations” or “kin” in designating benefi- ciaries under a will, as their use may render the gift void for un- certainty. If they are used they should be accompanied by other words to designate the beneficiaries. In the popular sense such words mean all persons within any degree whatever of consan- guinity or affinity.°® But when such words are used in a will to denote a class of beneficiaries, they will be held to include only such persons as would take under the statutes of descent and dis- tribution if the testator had died intestate.*° When used alone to designate beneficiaries the term “relations” or “relatives” in- cludes only blood relations,** and not those related by marriage.** 33In re Walley’s Estate, 11 Nev. 260. 3¢Berry v. Hanks, 28 Ill. App. 51. 35 Whitehead v. Tapp, 69 Mo. 415; Oberndorf v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 71 Misc. 64, 129 N. Y. S. 814. 36 Moredock v. Moredock, 179 Fed. 163; Hoadly v. Wood, 71 Conn. 452, 42 Atl. 263; Alsop’s Appeal, 9 Pa. St. 374; Stuart v. Stuart, 18 W. Va. 675. 37 Crosgrove v. Crosgrove, 69 Conn. 416, 38 Atl. 219; Bates v. Dewson, 128 Mass. 334; Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 67, 27 Am. Rep. 302; Greeley, 67 N. H. 37, 30 Atl. 413. 38 Wood v. Wood, 63 Conn. 324, 28 Smith v.- Atl. 520; Phelps v. Phelps, 143 Mass. 570, 10 N. E. 452. 39 Esty v. Clark, 101 Mass. 36, 3 Am. Rep. 320; Huling v. Fenner, 9 R. I. 410. 40 Drew v. Wakefield, 54 Maine 291; Handley v. Wrightson, 60 Md. 198; Hall v. Wiggin, 67 N. H. 89, 29 Atl. 671; Varrell v. Wendell, 20 N. H. 431; Ross v. Ross, 25 Can. Sup. Ct. 307. 41JTn re Pfuelb’s Estate, 48 Cal. 643; Boyd v. Perkins, 130 Ky. 77, 113 S. W. 95; In re Freeman’s Estate, 40 Pa. Super. Ct. 31; Cleaver v. Cleaver, 39 Wis. 96, 20 Am. Rep. 30. 42 Stoff v. McGinn, 178 Ill. 46, 52 § 182 WILLS 160 The term has been held not to include illegitimates* or step- children ;** but the testator may, by suitable language, clearly show that he intends to include such persons. The words “kin” or “kindred,’’ when used in a will, has been held to include blood relatives only.*° § 182. Servants and employes.—Gifts to servants or em- ployés are frequently made subject to some condition, as, that the beneficiary shall be in the testator’s employment at the time of the latter’s decease ;** that beneficiary shall have been in the employ- ment of the testator for a certain period, or that he shall continue in the employment of the testator’s widow. But where a gift to servants is unexplained, it will include only those directly and reg- ularly employed, and not those who have been only occasionally employed.*? The mere fact that the beneficiary was paid by the piece or ‘quantity of a given article produced by him, instead of by the day, week or month, is not sufficient to take him out of the cate- gory of employés.** However, the persons included in a gift to “servants” or “employés” will be determined upon a proper con- struction of the language of the will in connection with the sur- rounding circumstances.*® Examples of gifts to servants and employés will be found in a subsequent chapter of this work.*° § 183. Creditors——As a general rule a legacy given by a testator to his creditor, which is equal or greater than the debt, shall be considered as a satisfaction of the debt; yet where there exists any circumstances to repel the presumption that such was the intention of the testator, courts have always eagerly seized N. E. 1048; Elliot v. Fessenden, 83 46 White v. Massachusetts Inst., 171 Maine 197, 22 Atl. 115, 13 L. R. A. Mass. 84, 50 N. E. 512. 37; Maitland v. Adair, 3 Ves. Jr. 231. 47In re Klein, 35 Mont. 185, 88 43 Lavigne v. Ligue des Patriotes, Pac. 789; Metcalf v. Sweeney, 17 R. 178 Mass. 25, 59 N. E. 674, 54 L. R. I. 213, 21 Att. 364, 33 Am. St. 864. A. 814, 86 Am. St. 460. 48In re Cowell’s Estate, 167 Cal. 44 Kimball v. Story, 108 Mass. 382. 222,-139 Pac. 82. 45In re Freeman’s Estate, 40 Pa. 4Gardner v. Viall, 36 R. I. 436, Super. Ct. 31. -90 Atl. 760. 50 See post, ch. 30, § 704. 161 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES § 184 upon them to prevent the application of the rule.°* Thus it has been held that a direction in a will for the payment of debts rebuts the presumption.*? And where the legacy is less than the amount of the debt, or is of a different nature, the same rule applies.” In view of the ease with which such presumption is overcome by some chance expression in the will, the testator should use such language as will leave no room for doubt as to, his intention. If he does not make it clear that the gift is to be in satisfaction of the debt, the legatee will be entitled to collect his claim against the estate in addition to his legacy. It has been held that the mere giving of a legacy to a creditor does not indicate that the testator intended that it should be in satisfaction of a debt due the cred- itor from the testator, but that the testator’s intention must ap- pear from the will to cause this result.°* Where the will makes reference to the creditor as such for the mere purpose of descrip- tion, it is held not to be a direction for satisfaction.** Examples of gifts to creditors will be found elsewhere in this work.** § 184. Debtors.—The mere giving of a legacy to a debtor does not indicate that the testator intended that it should be in satisfaction of a debt due the testator from the legatee.*’ It raises no presumption of an intention by the-testator to forgive the debt in addition to the legacy."* The testator’s wishes should clearly appear, as it has been held that his intention may be im- plied from some other part of the will or may be proved by extrinsic evidence.*® If the debt is barred by the statute of limi- 51In re Cole’s Estate, 85 Misc. 630, 148 N. Y. S. 1099, 52 Mitchell v. Vest, 157 Iowa 336, 136 N. W. 1054; Strong v. Williams, 12 Mass. 391, 7 Am. Dec. 81; Van Riper v. Van Riper, 2 N. J. Eq. 1; Wesco’s Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 195. 53 See cases cited in preceding note. 54Lisle v. Tribble, 92 Ky. 304, 17 S. W. 742, 13 Ky. L. 595; Jackson’s Succession, 47 La. Ann. 1089, 17 So. 598. 55 Swing v. Gatch, 7 Am. L, Rec. 5. 56 See post, ch. 30, § 718. 11—Tuomp. WILLs. 57 Hayward v. Loper, 147 Ill. 41, 35 N. E. 225; Spath v. Ziegler, 48 La. Ann, 1168, 2 So. 663; Sleeper v. Kelley, 65 N. H. 206, 18 Atl. 718; In re Bailey’s Estate, 153 Pa. St. 402, 26 Atl. 23; Chafee v. Maker, 17 R. I. 739, 24 Atl. 773. 58 Spath v. Zeigler, 48 La. Ann. 1168, 20 So. 663; Blackler v. Boott, 114 Mass. 24; Baldwin v. Sheldon, 48 Mich. 580, 12 N. W. 872. 59 Sloane v. Stevens, 107 N. Y. 122, 13 N. E. 618. § 185 WILLS 162 tations at the time of the testator’s death, it would seem that it can not be deducted from the legacy, unless that intention appears by the will.°° Examples of gifts to debtors will be found else- where in this work.** § 185. Corporations and associations generally.—The ca- pacity of corporations and associations to take under a will is dis- cussed in a previous chapter ; and where a testator wishes to make a corporation a devisee or legatee, either in his own jurisdiction, or in a foreign state, it is incumbent upon the attorney in drawing the will to ascertain the law on the subject. In designating cor- porations or associations who are to take under the will, they should be described with such certainty as to enable them to be identified. But the devise or bequest will not be held invalid, if the description is sufficient, in view of the surrounding circum- stances, to identify with reasonable certainty the corporation or association intended, and such corporation or association was in existence at the time of the testator’s death.” Thus a gift to “Woodstock College, Howard County,” was held valid though the college was-situated in Baltimore County.** A gift to a corporation or association to be formed after the death of the testator will go to the corporation or association formed in conformity with the terms and conditions of the will,® and when he directs the creation of a corporation, he means a legal entity coming into being as the statute directs.%° Forms of 93, 14 Am St, 442: Reformed Dutch Church v. Brandow, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 60 Allen v. Edwards, 136 Mass. 138. 61 See post, ch. 30, §§ 712-718. 62 Doan v. Carroll County Parish, 103 Md. 662, 64 Atl. 314, 115 Am. St. 379, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1119; In re Foley, 27 Misc. 77, 58 N. Y. S. 201. 63 In re Pearsons’ Will, 113 Cal. 577, 45 Pac. 849; Brewster v. McCall, 15 Conn. 274; Bond v. Cedar Rapids Home for Aged Women, 94 Iowa 458, 62 N. W. 838; New Orleans v. Hardie, 43 La. Ann. 251, 9 So. 12; Stratton v. Physio-Medical College, 149 Mass. 505, 21 N. E. 874,5 L. R. A. 228; Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511. 64 Kerrigan v. Conelly (N. J. Eq.), 46 Atl. 227. 65 Nason v. First Bangor Christian Church, 66 Maine 100; St. John v. Girls’ Institute, 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981, 14 Ann. Cas. 708; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70, 1 N. W. 92; 50: N. W. 1103. 66 Boyle v. John Boyle & Co., 136 App. Div. 367, 120 N. Y. S. 1048. 163 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES § 186 gifts to corporations and associations will be found in a subse- quent chapter.* § 186. Unincorporated societies and assemblages.—A gift to an unincorporated assemblage or society having no certain membership, must of necessity fail for uncertainty ;°* and al- though there is a certain membership, it would seem that the members could not take beneficially, for the reason that any mem- ber might call for a division at any time, and thus entirely defeat the testator’s intention. A corporation bearing the same name as an unincorporated society can not take a gift intended for the latter, although organ- ized to hold property for it ; but where the statute provides that on such societies becoming incorporated the property held by the society before shall vest in the society as fully as if incorporated, the gift may be made good by the incorporation of the society after the death of the testator.” Where a gift is made to an unincorporated association for a charitable use, the members thereof take as natural persons, and not as an association, and if the testator fails to appoint a trustee, the members of the association may be treated as trustees for the purpose of effectuating the gift.” A gift to a natural person in trust for an unincorporated society may be upheld as a charitable gift,”* though the membership of the society may be uncertain.” § 187. Charitable corporations or associations.—A person desiring to make a testamentary disposition of his property, or a 67 See post, ch. 30, § 722. 68 Greene v. Dennis, 6 Conn. 293, 16 Am. Dec. 58. 69 In re Amos, 3 Ch. Div. 159. But see Ticknor’s Estate, 13 Mich. 44. 70 Hinckley v. Thatcher, 139 Mass. 477, 1 N. E. 840, 52 Am. Rep. 719; In re Wheeler, 32 App. Div. 183, 52 N. Y. S. 943; Fifield v. Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557, 27 S. E. 446, 64 Am. St. 745. But see Brewster v. McCall, 15 Conn. 274. 71 Methodist Church v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730; Lane v. Eaton, 69 Minn. 141, 71 N. W. 1031, 38 L. R. A. 669, 65 Am. St. 559. 72 American Bible Society v. Wet- more, 17 Conn. 181; Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 S. Car. 444,26 S. E. 717, 59 Am. St. 724. 73 Tucker v. Seaman’s Aid Soc., 48 Mass. 188; Dickson v. Montgomery, 31 Tenn. 348. 74 Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241, 29 Am. Dec. 154, § 187 WILLS 164 portion thereof, for the use of charity, may do so by giving it to a corporation already in existence, or he may provide by will or in his lifetime for the establishment of a suitable institution to carry his wishes into effect. He may make his gift general, with- out designating the use, or he may designate that his gift be ap- plied to the general use of the corporation or assigned to a specific purpose within the general scope of its powers."’ A gift is valid if absolute and made direct to a charitable corporation to be used by it for any object or objects germane to its corporate purposes. In such case the corporation takes the property as owner and not as trustee.” Testators frequently wish to benefit a particular person or some lawful object without making such wish public, and this is usually done by a direct gift to a trusted friend, with a request that he expend the fund conformably to the testator’s * wishes.”” Provision may be made in a will for alternative plans or a suc- cession of institutions, and if either plan is capable of being en- forced, or either institution is in turn capable of taking, a trust will be created.”® : It is well settled that gifts to charitable institutions will not fail because the beneficiary is not named, or misnamed, provided the language of the will and surrounding circumstances make it rea- sonably certain what institution the testator intended.” The gen- 7 Robb v. Washington & Jeffer- son College, 103 App. Div. 327, 78 N. E. 359. For forms of gifts to charity, see post, ch. 30, §§ 863-889. 78 Bird v. Merklee, 144 N. Y. 544, 39 N. E. 645, 27 L. R. A. 423. 77In re Keleman, 126 N. Y. 73, 26 N. E. 968. 78 Taylor v. Columbian University, 226 U. S. 126, 57 L. ed. 152, 33 Sup. Ct. 73; Tappan’s Appeal, 52 Conn. 412. 797In re Gibson’s Estate, 75 Cal. 329, 17 Pac. 438; Weed y. Scofield, 73 Conn. 670, 49 Atl. 22; Doughten v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51; Colbert v. Speer, 24 App. Cas. (D. C.) 187; Woman’s Union Missionary Soc. v. Mead, 131 Ill. 33, 23 N. E. 603; Bond v. Cedar Rapids Home for Aged Women, 94 Iowa 458, 62 N. W. 838; Tichenor v. Brewer, 98 Ky. 349, 33 S. W. 86, 17 Ky. L. 936; Baltimore Sis- ters of Mercy v. Benzinger, 95 Md. 684, 53 Atl. 448; Harris v. Keasbey (N. J. Eq.), 53 Atl. 555; Johnston v. Hughes, 187 N. Y. 446, 80 N. E. 373, 12 Prob. Rep. Ann. 409; North Caro- lina Inst. for Education of Deaf &c. v. Norwood, 45 N. Car. 65; In re Lennig’s Estate, 154 Pa. St. 209, 25 Atl 1049; Peckham v. Newton, 15 R. I. 321, 4 Atl. 758; In re Alchin, L. R. 14 Eq. 230, 26 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 763. 165 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES § 188 eral rule is that in order to constitute a valid trust provision for charity there must be a beneficiary capable of being designated and who can enforce the trust provision.*® Thus a bequest of money for the erection of a soldiers’ monument, there being no one named to execute the trust, was held void for that reason.** But by statute in New York in 1893 it was provided that no devise or bequest to charitable or benevolent uses shall be deemed in- valid by reason of indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated as beneficiaries, if the gift be valid under the law in other respects.** In creating a charitable trust great care should be used in providing for trustees. Generally if no trustee is pro- vided for, the estate descends to the heirs of the testator subject to the trust.** Examples of gifts to charity will be found in an- other chapter.** § 188. Educational objects——Where the recipients of a gift for educational purposes are so indefinite as to render the grant charitable, it will be held to be a charitable use.** Thus a gift to a state to establish a permanent school fund is a gift toa charitable use.** Such a gift will be valid if the language used designates the objects with sufficient certainty.*” A gift to an educational institution will not fail because the 80 Filkins v. Severn, 127 Iowa 739, 104 N. W. 346; St. James v. Bagley, 138 N. Car. 384, 50 S. E. 841, 70 L. R. A. 166. 81 Beecher v. Yale, 45 N. Y. S. 622. 82 Wait v. Society for Political Study, 68 Misc. 245, 123 N. Y. S. 637. 83 Bartlett v: Nye, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 378. 84 See post, ch. 30, §§ 863-889. 85 Taylor v. Columbian University, 226 U. S. 126, 57 L. ed. 152, 33 Sup. Ct. 73; Birchard v. Scott, 39 Conn. 63; Grand Prairie Seminary v. Mor- gan, 171 Ill. 444, 49 N. E. 516; Wash- burn College v. O’Hara, 75 Kans. 700, 90 Pac. 234; Attorney-General v. Parker, 126 Mass. 216; De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36; In re John’s Will, 30 Ore. 494, 47 Pac. 341, 50 Pac. 226, 36 L. R. A. 242; Almy v. Jones, 17 R. I. 265, 21 Atl. 616, 12 L. R. A. 414; Belle Co. v. Alexander, 22 Tex. 350, 73 Am. Dec. 268; Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716, 28 Am. Rep. 522; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70, 1 N. W. 92, 50 N. W. 1103. 86 Bedford v. Bedford, 99 Ky. 273, 35 S. W. 926, 18 Ky. L. 193; Sears v. Chapman, 158 Mass. 400, 33 N. E. 604, 35 Am. St. 502; Almy v. Jones, 17 R. I. 265, 21 Atl. 616, 12 L. R. A. 414. 87 Richmond v. State, 5 Ind. 334; Giddings v. Gillingham, 108 Maine 512, 81 Atl. 951; Newell’s Appeal, 24 Pa. St. 197. § 189 WILLS 166 testator has not pointed out the persons to be benefited, provided that he has endowed the institution with express or implied power to select such beneficiaries.** Where an educational institution is indicated in a will by an erroneous name or by an incorrect de- scription, such a mistake will not avoid the gift if it is possible to show by extrinsic evidence the institution intended.*? Education being generally held to be a charitable use, testamentary gifts for that purpose will be accorded the same liberality of construction as any other class of charitable gifts. Descriptions of donees and of the objects of the testator’s bounty, which would be held void for uncertainty in any but charitable gifts, will be upheld. But there are limitations beyond which courts refuse to sustain such gifts on the ground of vagueness or uncertainty of either the ben- eficiaries thereunder, or of the direct donees where a trust is created. It is obvious that it is more difficult to sustain a trust in which neither the ultimate beneficiaries nor the instruments to carry it out are clearly pointed out, than one in which either of these elements of a trust are specific and certain. It has been held, therefore, that where both these elements are wanting, the gift must fail, but where neither is present the gift will be up- held.°°. Examples of gifts to educational objects will be found in another chapter.** § 189. Religious societies and organizations.—It is gen- erally held that a gift for the maintenance and support of religion is a charitable use, and will be upheld if it contains the elements of a valid charitable gift.°* Such a gift will be upheld if the or- ganization or society intended can be ascertained with reasonable certainty from the language used and the surrounding circum- stances,” although the organization or society intended is mis- 88 McDonald v. Shaw, 81 Ark. 235, sity’s Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 572, 3 Atl. 98 S. W. 952. 664. 89 Goodrich’s Appeal, 57 Conn. 282, 90 Heiskell v. Chickasaw, 87 Tenn. 18 Atl. 49; Jacobs v. Bradley, 36 668, 11 S. W. 825,4 L. R. A. 699. Conn. 369; South Newmarket Metho- 91 See post, ch. 30, § 722. dist Seminary v. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 92Tn re Murphey’s Estate, 184 Pa. 317; Kerrigan v. Conelly (N. J. Eq.), St. 310, 39 Atl. 70, 63 Am. St. 802. 46 Atl. 227; Washington &c. Univer- %3 Preston v. Foster, 75 Conn. 709, 167 § 190 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES named or inaccurately described.°* The uncertainty in the desig- nation of the beneficiaries under a gift to a religious organization or society is a characteristic of charitable gifts, and is no obstacle to their validity.°* Forms and precedents of gifts to religious so- cieties and organizations will be found elsewhere in this work.” § 190. Class in general—“A number of persons are popu- larly said to form a class when they can be designated by some general name as, ‘children,’ ‘grandchildren,’ or ‘nephews.’ ”’°? “In legal contemplation, a gift to a class is a gift of an aggregate sum to a body of persons uncertain in number at the time of the gift, to be ascertained at a future time, who are all to take in equal or in some other definite proportions, the share of each being de- pendent for its amount upon the ultimate number.”** The above definition is defective in restricting the time of as- certainment of the numbers of the class to a future time, as it is possible for the testator to devise to a class as fixed at the time the will is made.*° A bequest is not a gift to a class where, at the 55 Atl. 558; In re Johnston’s Estate, 141 Iowa 109, 119 N. W. 275; Taylors- ville Catholic Church v. Offutt, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 535; Giddings v. Gilling- ham,’ 108 Maine 512, 81 Atl. 951; Nason y. First Bangor Christian Church, 66 Maine 100; Dexter v. Gardner, 7 Allen (Mass.) 243; Gil- christ v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 126, 118 N. W. 938, 130 Am. St. 575; Van Nostrand v. Reformed Church in America, 59 N. J. Eq. 19, 44 Atl..472; Kingsbury v. Brandegee, 113 App. Div. 606, 100 N. Y. S. 353; Newell’s Appeal, 24 Pa. St. 197; Attorney- General v. Jolly, 2 Strob. Eq. (S. Car.) 379; Fifield v. Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557, 27 S. E. 446, 64 Am. St. 745; Osenton v. Elliott, 73 W. Va. 519, 81 S. E. 837. °4 Dunham v. Averill, 45 Conn. 61, 29 Am. Rep. 642; Straw v. East Maine Conference, 67 Maine 493; Woman’s Foreign Missionary Soc. v. Mitchell, 93 Md. 199, 48 Atl. 737, 53 L. R. A. 711; Winslow v. Cummings, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 358; Cook v. Uni- ° versalist Gen. Convention, 138 Mich. 157, 101 N. W. 217, 10 Prob. Rep. Ann, 376; Greenland Church &c. Soc. v. Hatch, 48 N. H. 393; Bruere v. Cook, 63 N. J. Eq. 624, 52 Atl. 1001; Preston v. Howk, 3 App. Div. 43, 37 N. Y. S. 1079, 74 N. Y. St. 426; In re Bryson’s Estate, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 624; Guild v. Allen, 28 R. I. 430, 67 Atl. 855; McAllister v. McAllister, 46 Vt. 272; Reformed Presbyterian Church v. McMillan, 31 Wash. 643, 72 Pac. 502; Wilson v. Perry, 29 W. Va. 169, 1 S. E. 302. 95 Auch’s Succession, 39 La. Ann. 1043, 3 So. 227. 96 See post, ch. 30, § 721. 971 Jarman Wills 336. 981 Jarman Wills (5th ed.) 269. See also Dulany v. Middleton, 72 Ma. 67, 19 Atl. 146; In re Brown, 154 N. Y. 313, 48 N. E. 537. 99 Dunn v. Cory, 56 N. J. Eq. 507, § 191 WILLS - 168 time of making it, the number of the donees is certain, and the share each is to receive is also certain, and in no way dependent for its amount upon the members who shall survive.* The question as to whether a testator provided for a number of persons as a class, or as individuals constituting a class, is one of intention.*, Where a will creates different classes of persons to share in the property each class will be treated as a unit in the distribution thereof.* Care should be exercised in making a gift to a class that it does not violate the rule against perpetuities. If the gift is to such of the grandchildren of the testator as reach an age over 21 years, the gift is bad, although the testator has grandchildren living at his death ;* but such a gift is good if the vesting is not postponed to a time after the grandchildren become of age. “Where a devise is given to a class of persons answering a given descrip- tion, and any member of that class may possibly have to be ascer- tained at a period exceeding the limits allowed by law, the whole devise is void.’’® § 191. Language denoting gift to class—Whether a de- vise or bequest in a will is to a class or to individuals as tenants in common must depend on the language employed by the testator in making the gift.7_ All the provisions of the will may be con- sulted, and sometimes aid may be sought from the situation and relation of the parties. It is by no means an easy matter to form- ulate language necessary to constitute a gift to a class, and unless the language employed discloses an intention to create a class, the beneficiaries will take individually.® 39 Atl. 368; Palmer v. Dunham, 125 N. Y. 68, 25 N. E. 1081; In re Mor- rison’s Estate, 139 Pa. St. 306, 20 Atl. 1057. 1Staples v. Mead, 152 App. Div. 745, 137 N. Y. S. 847. 2Kent v. Kent, 106 Va. 199, 55 S. E, 564. 3 Ruggles v. Randall, 70 Conn. 44, 38 Atl. 885; Plummer v. Shephard, 94 Md. 466, 51 Atl. 173; Records vy Fields, 155 Mo. 314, 55 S. W. 1021. 4Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N. H. 434, 31 Atl. 900, 28 L. R. A. 328. 5 Woodruff v. Pleasants, 81 Va. 37. 6 Hills v. Simonds, 125 Mass. 536. 7 Mobley v. Mobley, 85 S. Car. 319, 67 S. E. 556; Saunders v. Saunders, 109 Va. 191, 63 S. E. 410. | £In re Russell, 168 N. Y. 169, 61 N. E, 166. 169 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES § 191 Gifts to a class are usually made under such general terms as “children,” grandchildren,” “brothers and sisters,” “nephews and nieces,” and the like; but they may be made under such technical terms as “heirs,” “descendants,” “issue” and ‘“‘family.”® A gift to a class may be constituted by making the gift to the children of ‘a son,*® or to heirs,** or by a direction to the executor to dis- tribute the residue “under the intestate laws” of a certain state.** But when the persons to whom a legacy is given are not described as a class, but by their individual names—though they may con- stitute a class—the death of any one of them, before the testator, has been said to cause a lapse of the legacy intended for the lega- tee so dying.¥ Where the beneficiaries are designated by such words as “chil- dren” or “nephews,” without indicating individuals by name or by description, the gift will be treated as one to a class;** but where the gift is made to persons who are designated individ- ually, as by name or description, or where the property is devised severally to a number of persons, the gift is not one to a class, since the share of each does not depend upon the ultimate number of those who compose the class.** If a number of beneficiaries are indicated by name, and also by reference to the class to which they belong, the gift is prima facie a distributive gift and not a gift to a class.*° There can be no survivorship in such cases.*” But where it clearly appears that the names were added to the de- 9In re Logan, 131 N. Y. 456. 10 Bethel v. Mayor, 68 S. W. 631, 24 Ky. L. 398; Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254, 57 S. W. 1065, 80 Am. St. 625; Trenton Trust &c. Co. v. Sib- bits, 62 N. J. Eq. 131, 49 Atl. 530. 11 Plummer v. Shepherd, 94 Md. 466, 51 Atl. 173. 12In re McGovran’s Estate, 190 Pa. St. 375, 42 Atl. 705. 13 Workman v. Workman, 2 Allen (Mass.) 472. 14Dryer v. Crawford, 90 Ala. 131, 7 So. 445; Pendleton v. Kinney, 65 Conn. 222, 32 Atl. 331. 15 Sturgis v. Work, 122 Ind. 134, - 22 N. E. 996, 17 Am. St. 349; Horton vy. Earle, 162 Mass. 448, 38 N. E. 1135; In re Markle’s Estate, 187 Pa. St. 639, 41 Atl. 304. 16 Bill v. Payne, 62 Conn. 140, 25 Atl. 354; Frost v. Courtis, 167 Mass. 251, 45 N. E. 687; Dildine v. Dildine, 32 N..J. Eq. 78; Moffett v. Elmen- dorf, 152 N. Y. 475, 46 N. E. 845, 57 Am. St. 529. 17 Hoppock v. Tucker, 59 N. Y. 202; Wildberger v. Cheek, 94 Va. 517, 27 S. E. 441, § 192 WILLS 170 scription for the purpose of greater certainty the gift will be treated as one to a class."* Where one of the persons who is to take with the class is named, and the others are uncertain in number, to be ascertained in the future, the share of each being dependent upon the actual number, the devise is to a class as a body of persons, and not to individuals, unless the will or the attendant circumstances require a different construction.*® Where the language used indicates that the number of persons who are to take and the amounts of their shares are uncertain until the gift takes effect, the benefi- ciaries will generally take as a class;*° while if the number of beneficiaries and the amounts of their shares are certain at the time of making the will, the gift will generally go to the individ- ual beneficiaries distributively.” Where there is no gift, but a direction to pay and divide at a future time or on a given event, the vesting will be postponed until the time appointed for the division or the happening of the specified event; unless a contrary intent can be collected from the whole will. And where legacies are given to a class, all are deemed to be included who answer the description at the time the legacy is payable, so that where the legacy is payable at a future time, those who come into being intermediate the death of the testator and between the time of payment, and answer the de- scription, take as independent objects.”? § 192. Time of determination of class.—Where a devise is made to a class, and there is nothing in the will showing a con- trary intention, the numbers of the class will be determined upon 18 Bowles v. Smith, 39 Conn. 217; Springer v. Congelton, 30 Ga. 976; Stedman v. Priest, 103 Mass. 293; Rixey v. Stuckey, 129 Mo. 377, 31 S. W. 770. 19 Davis v. Sanders, 123 Ga. 177, 51 S. E. 298. 20Fulghum v. Strickland, 123 Ga. 258, 51 S. E. 294; Matter of Raab, 79 Misc. 185, 139 N. Y. S. 869. 21In re Henderson, 161 Cal. 353, 119 Pac. 496; Staples v. Mead, 152 App. Div. 745, 137 N. Y. S. 847; In re Spang’s Estate, 49 Pa. Super. Ct. 314. 22 Jones’ Appeal, 48 Conn. 60; Kil- patrick v. Barron, 125 N. Y. 751, 26 N. E. 925, 4 Silvernail Ct. App. 347; Teed v. Morton, 60 N. Y. 502; Cog- gin’s Appeal, 124 Pa. St. 10, 16 Atl. 579, 10 Am. St. 565. 171 § 192 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES the death of the testator.” If the‘time of determining the class is at the death of the testator, only the persons answering the description at that time will be included.** ‘Speaking generally, when a gift is made to a class to take effect in possession immedi- ately, those who constitute the class at the death of the testator, when the will becomes operative, take unless a different intent appears from the will, or from such extrinsic circumstances as may be properly taken into account.” Unless there is something in the will showing a contrary inten- tion, a gift to a class would seem to exclude those dying before the death of the testator,?* and to include those born after the exe- cution of the will.?’ Where the members of a class are to be de- termined at the death of the testator, those who have died before the death of the testator can not be counted in the class, so that the devise will inure to their heirs or representatives.”* The will may expressly, or by necessary implication, fix the time when the members of a class are to be ascertained at a time other than the testator’s death.”® Thus the time of ascertainment may be fixed as of the date of the execution of the will by making a devise to the members of a class living at the date of the execu- tion of the will®° The time of ascertainment may also be fixed 23 Lancaster v. Lancaster, 187 Iil, 540, 58 N. E. 462, 79 Am. St. 234; Morgan v: Robbins, 152 Ind. 362, 53 N. E. 283; In re Nicholson’s Will, 115 Iowa 493, 88 N. W. 1064, 91 Am. St. 175; Hooper v. Smith, 88 Md. 577, 41 Atl. 1095: Merriam v. Simonds, 121 Mass. 198; Worcester v. Worces- ter, 101 Mass. 128; Campbell v. Raw- don, 18 N. Y. 412. 24 Parker v. Churchill, 104 Ga. 122, 30 S. E. 642; Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 48 N. E. 561, 49 N. E. 320; Pierce v. Knight, 182 Mass. 72, 64.N. E.. 692. 25 Howland v. Slade, 155 Mass. 415, 29 N. E. 631. 26 Martin v. Trustee, 98 Ga. 320, 25 S. E. 522; Downing v. Nicholson, 115 Towa 493, 88 N. W. 1064, 91 Am.’ St. 175; Howland v. Slade, 155 Mass. 415, 29 N. E. 631; Walker v. John- ston, 70 N. Car. 576. 27 Gray v. Pash, 66 S. W. 1026, 24 Ky. L. 963; Chase v. Lockerman, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 185, 55 Am. Dec. 277; Coggins v. Flythe, 113 N. Car. 102, 18 S. E. 96. 28 Hoadly v. Wood, 71 Conn. 452, 42 Atl. 263; Buzby v. Roberts, 53 N. J. Eq. 566, 32 Atl. 9; In re Striewig’s Estate, 169 Pa. St. 61, 32 Atl. 83; Chase v. Peckham, 17 R. I. 385, 22 Atl. 285. 29 In re Swenson’s Estate, 55 Minn. 300, 56 N. W. 1115. 30In re Wood, L. R. 1894, 3 Ch. 381. See also Palmer v. Dunham, 125 N. Y. 68, 25 N. E. 1081; In re Morrison’s Estate, 139 Pa. St. 306, § 193 WILLS 172 at a date subsequent to the death of the testator, as long as the time so fixed is not so remote as to violate the rule against perpe- tuities. Thus where the class is to take the remainder of a partic- ular estate devised, the time of ascertainment is not of the testa- tor’s death, but at the expiration of the particular estate.** Where a devise is given to a class of persons answering a given descrip- tion, and any member of that class may possibly have to be ascer- tained at a period exceeding the limits allowed by law, the whole devise is void.** If the period of distribution is postponed until the attainment of a given age by children, or their marriage, the determination of the class is the time when the first child attains the age named or is married, as the case may be.* Where there is a simple devise to a class, and the will does not expressly, or by necessary implication, fix the time when the ob- jects of the gift are to be ascertained or when distribution is to be made, the law itself will fix it at the testator’s death, that being the time when the will first speaks.** The wish of the testator with reference to the time at which the members of the class are to be ascertained, should be clearly expressed, else they will be deemed to be those who answer its description at the time the gift takes effect.** § 193. Persons included in gift to class.—In cases of gifts to classes, persons dying before the time when the class is deter- mined are excluded from the gift,** and those born after the will was made are included,*’ unless there is something in the will that clearly indicates a contrary intention.*® 20 Atl. 1057; Dunn v. Cory, 56 N. J. v. Osborn, 118 Ill. 403, 9 N. E. 210. Eq. 507, 39 Atl. 368. 24 McCartney v. Osborn, 118 III. 31Inge v. Jones, 109 Ala. 175, 19 So. 435; Madison v. Larmon, 170 Ill, 65, 48 N. E. 556, 62 Am. St. 356; Hemenway v. Hemenway, 171 Mass. 42, 50 N. E. 456; Patchen v. Patchen, 121 N. Y. 432, 24 N. E. 695; Blass v. Helms, 93 Tenn. 166, 23 S. W. 138. 32 Hills v. Simonds, 125 Mass. 536. 33 Hubbard v. Lloyd, 6 Cush. (60 Mass.) 523, 53 Am. Dec. 55; Tucker v. Bishop, 16 N. Y. 402; McCartney 403, 9 N. E. 210. 35 Jones’ Appeal, 48 Conn. 60; Ste- venson v. Lesley, 70 N. Y. 512. 36 Fulghum v. Strickland, 123 Ga. 258, 51 S. E. 294; Watkins v. Blount, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 460, 94 S. W. 1116. 37 Chase v. Lockerman, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 185, 35 Am. Dec. 277; Cog- gins v. Flythe, 113 N. Car. 102, 18 S. E, 96. : 88 Morse v. Mason, 11 Allen (93 173 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES § 193 Unless the testator expressly states or clearly creates an infer- ence to the contrary, children born after the period fixed for the distribution are not included in the gift,®® although the gift be to children “born or to be born.”** Nor are children adopted after the execution of the will included in a gift to “children.” Where the gift is to a class and it fails as to one of the class be- cause of death, revocation, or any other cause, the survivors of the class will take.** A bequest to a class does not include persons dead before the making of a will, who, had they survived until that time, would have fallen within the description given to a class.** The general rule is that, in a devise to children as a class, the word “children” is to be construed as immediate offspring, and will not include grandchildren or issue generally.** But where the testator used the word “children” when he had only grand- children, the word children will be construed according to his in- tention, as meaning his grandchildren ;** and this construction will also be given where it is clear that the testator uses the words “children” and “issue” indiscriminately.** In many cases of bequest or devise to a class, where the person or persons entitled to the benefit are to be determined on the hap- pening of some particular event, the courts have included a child en ventre sa mere when the event actually occurred. This result is reached when the devise or Mass.) 36; Jones v. Hunt, 96 Tenn. 369, 34 S. W. 693; Board &c. Fair- field v. Ladd, 26 Ohio St. 210. 39 State v. Raughley, 1 Houst. (Del.) 561; Fosdick v. Fosdick, 6 Al- len (Mass.) 41. 40 Brown v. Williams, 5 R. I. 309. 42 Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 3 So. 900. 43 Saunders v. Saunders, 109 Va. 191, 63 S. E. 410. 44Pimel v. Betjemann, 183 N. Y. 194, 76 N. E. 157,2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 580. 45 Fulghum v. Strickland, 123 Ga. 258, 51 S. E. 294; Pugh v. Pugh, 105 bequest runs to “children” or Ind. 552, 5 N. E. 673; Tayloe v. Mosher, 29 Md. 443; Tucker v. Stites, 39 Miss. 196; In re Hunt’s Estate, 133 Pa. St. 260, 19 Atl. 548, 19 Am. St. 640. 46In re Schedel, 73 Cal. 594, 15 Pac. 297; Moon v. Stone, 19 Grat. (Va.) 130. 47 Miller v. Carlisle, 90 Ky. 205, 14 S. W. 75, 12 Ky. L. 66; Houghton v. Kendall, 7 Allen (Mass.) 72; In re Paton, 111 N. Y. 480, 18 N. E. 625; Douglas v. James, 66 Vt. 21, 28 Atl. 319, 44 Am. St. 817; Otterback - v. Bohrer, 87 Va. 548, 12 S. E. 1013. § 194 WILLS 174 “grandchildren” as a class,** to a “‘son,”** or to one living at the particular time." In other cases such children have been in- cluded when the words were “issue then living,’’** one “born” to A, if B “hath no son,” or “sons born and begotten.’’* Generally speaking, a gift to “children” as a class includes only those who are legitimate,** unless the surrounding circumstances show a strong probability that the testator intended to include ille- gitimate children.” Likewise a gift to “children” as a class does not include step- children of the testator.°° | § 194. Shares or portions in general—The courts will look to the language of the will and the surrounding facts and circumstances in determining the shares or portions to which the beneficiaries are entitled,’ and they will favor a construction that produces equality rather than one that produces inequality,°* and, unless the testator clearly expressed an intention to dispose of his property otherwise, an interpretation which will cause the . ‘property to be distributed more nearly in accordance with the law will be given.” It will not be presumed that the testator in- tended to prefer one of the beneficiaries to others, unless his in- tention to do so appears from a fair reading of the will.°° 48 Knorr v. Millard, 57 Mich. 265, 23 N. W. 807; Swift v. Duffield, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 38. - 49 Stedfast v. Nicoll, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 18. 50 Randolph v. Randolph, 40 N. J. Eq. 73. 51 Laird’s Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 339; Barker v. Pearce, 30 Pa. St. 173, 72 Am. Dec. 691.° 52 Blackburn v. Stables, 2 Ves. & B. 367. 53 Whitelock v. Heddon, 1 Bos. & P, 243, 54Flora v. Anderson, 67 Fed. 182; Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260, 13 L. R. A. 275. 55In re Du Bochet, 70 L. J. Ch. 647. 56 Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 731. 57 Tn re De Bernal, 165 Cal. 223, 131 Pac. 375, Ann. Cas. 1914.D, 26; Jor- dan v. Miller, 47 Ga. 346; Flynn v. Holman, 119 Iowa 731, 94 N. W. 447; Dowell v. Workman, 78 S. W. 857, 25 Ky L. 1761; Barbo v. Jeru, 155 Mich. 353, 119 N. W. 580; Leggett v. Ste- vens, 185 N. Y. 70, 77 N. E. .874; Jones v. Myatt, 153 N. Car. 225, 69 S. E. 135; In re Middleton’s Estate, 212 Pa. 119, 61 Atl. 808; In re Ehlers’ Will, 155 Wis. 46, 143 N. W. 1050. 58 Southgate v. Karp, 154 Mich. 697, 118 N. W. 600. 59 Williams’ 865, 61 So. 852. 60 Cornwall v. Hill (Ky.), 117. S. W. 311., Succession, 132 La. 175 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES § 194 But where the will shows a clear intention of the testator that his property should be given to the beneficiaries in equal or un- equal shares, the courts give effect to such intention without ref- erence to the statute of descent and distribution.*! Thus where the language of the will, when construed in connection with the surrounding facts and circumstances, indicate that the testator intended an unequal disposition of his property among the benefi- ciaries, the construction will conform to the testator’s intention.®” Where shares are once given in positive and decisive language, the rule of construction is that they can not be cut down, limited or diminished by subsequent vague and general expressions. But a direction to divide property equally among beneficiaries may be so far modified by a subsequent clause clearly directing its division per stirpes that the provision for equality of division will be wholly nullified.°* Where the beneficiaries in a will stand in different degrees of relationship to each other, the presumption ordinarily is that the two classes should not be benefited equally, unless the intention to do so can be clearly gathered from the whole will.°° Where, in a legacy to more than one person, there is no definition of the proportions in which they are to take, they take equally.°* It is a well established rule of law, that a devise to “heirs” whether it be to the testator’s own heirs or to the heirs. of a third person, designates not only the persons who are to take, but also the manner and proportions in which they are to take; and that, when there are no words to control the presumption of 61 Howard v. Howard, 30 Ala. 391; McCartney v. Osburn, 118 Ill. 403, 9 N. E. 210; West v. Rassmann, 135 Ind. 278, 34 N. E. 991; McQueen v. Lilly, 131 Mo. 9, 31 S. W. 1043; Bodine v. Brown, 154 N. Y. 778, 49 N. E. 1093. 62 American Board &c. Foreign Mission v. Ferry, 15 Fed. 696; Brown v. Weaver, 28 Ga. 377; Leffingwell v. Bentley, 74 Ill. App. 292; Hurley v. Rosensteel, 104 Md. 262, 64 Atl. 1041; Ellis v. Granger, 22 Misc. 656, 50 N. Y. S. 1113; Meiners v. Meiners, 179 Mo. 614, 78 S. W. 795; Nelson v. Moore, 36 N. Car. 31; Newbold v. Boone, 52 Pa. St. 167. 63 Simmons -v. Simmons, 73 Ala. 235; Haines v. Christie, 28 Colo. 502, 66 Pac. 883; Brown v. Weaver, 28 Ga. 377; Hawes v. Kepley, 28 Ind. App. 306, 62 N. E. 720; Cooper v. Heatherton, 65 App. Div. 561, 73 N. Y. S. 14. 64 Fields v. Fields, 93 Ky. 619, 20 S. W. 1042, 14 Ky. L. 865. 65 Bayley v. Lawrence, 118 N. Y. S. 286. 66 In re Helling, 84 Misc. 684, 147 N. Y. S. 799. § 195 WILLS 176 the will of the testator, the law presumes his intention to be, that they shall take as heirs would take by the rule of descent. Such presumption, however, will easily be controlled by any words in the will indicating a different intention of the testator; as if, after a devise to “heirs,” it be added, “in equal shares,” or “share and share alike,” or “to them and each of them,” or “equally to be divided,” or any equivalent words indicating an equal division, then they will take per capita each in his own right. But when there are no such words, the presumption is, that the testator re- ferred to the familiar law of descent and distribution, to regulate the distribution of his bequest.°° The wish of the testator re- specting the manner of taking and the proportions given should be expressed in appropriate words. Thus “taking by representa- tion,” “substitution,” “per stirpes,” and “per capita,” are terms frequently used. ” § 195. Per capita and per stirpes.—As a general rule, where a gift is made to two or more named persons, they will take per capita.®® Also where a gift is made to a class whose members stand in equal degree of relationship to the testator they take per capita and not per stirpes,”° but where the degree of relationship is unequal or the right depends upon representation™ or by oper- ation of the law of descents and distributions,” they take per stirpes.” It has been held that a gift to a person described as standing in a certain relation to the testator and to the heirs of another person 67 Daggett v. Slack, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 450. 68 See post, ch. 30. com v. Haynes, 14 Allen (Mass.) 204. 71 Haas v. Atkinson, 9 Mackey (D. 69 Follansbee v. Follansbee, 7 App. D. C. 282; De Laurencel v. De Boom, 67 Cal. 362, 7 Pac. 758; Post v. Jackson, 70 Conn. 283, 39 Atl. 151; Almand v. Whitaker, 113 Ga. 889, 39 S. E. 395; Kean’s Lessee v. Hof- fecker, 2 Har. (Del.) 103, 29 Am. Dec. 336. 70 McIntire v. McIntire, 192 U. S. 116, 48 L. ed. 369, 24 Sup. Ct. 196; Huggins v. Huggins, 72 Ga. 825; Bal- C.) 537; Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn. 222; MacLean v. Williams, 116 Ga. 257, 42 S. E. 485, 59 L. R. A. 125. 72 Ruggles v. Randall, 70 Conn. 44, 38 Atl. 885. 73 Atkins v. Guice, 21 Ark. 164; ° Kidwell v. Ketler, 146 Cal. 12, 79 Pac. 514; Jackson v. Alsop, 67 Conn. 249, 34 Atl. 1106; Ramsey v. Stephenson, 34 Ore, 408, 56 Pac. 520, 57 Pac. 195. 177 DESIGNATING BENEFICIARIES AND THEIR SHARES § 195 standing in the same relation to him, imports an intention on the part of the testator that the persons named and described shall take per stirpes; while the general rule is that a gift to a person described as standing in a certain relation to the testator and to the children of another standing in the same relation imports an intention that the legatees shall take per capita.™* A per capita distribution is often indicated by the use of language denoting equality of distribution, such, for example, as “equally divided” or to be divided “share and share alike,”’’® and such words may be applied to a division between classes as well as individuals.”® “Under a gift to descendants, equally, it is clear that the issue of every degree are entitled per capita, i. e., each individual of the stock takes an equal share concurrently with, not in place of, his or her parent. And even where the gift is to descendants simply, it seems that the same mode of distribution prevails; unless the context indicates that the testator had a distribution per stirpes in his view.”"7 But where there is a provision in the will, that they shall take by way of representation, this implies that they shall take per stirpes and not per capita.” In the absence of any intention to the contrary appearing on the face of the will, the general rule is that all take per capita rather than per stirpes under a gift to the children of several per- sons.” Where the gift is to “heirs,” “heirs at law” or “legal heirs,” the law presumes an intention on the part of the testator that the ben- 74In re Griswold, 42 Misc. 230, 86 N. Y. S. 250. 75 Ballentine v. Foster, 128 Ala. 638, 30 So. 481; Almand v. Whitaker, 113 Ga. 889, 39 S. E. 395; Henry v. Thomas, 118 Ind. 23, 20 N. E. 519; White v. White, 150 Ky. 283, 150 S. W. 388. 76 Laisure v. Richards, 56 Ind. App. 301, 103 N. E. 679; Coates v. Burton, 191 Mass. 180, 77 N. E. 311; Records y. Fields, 155 Mo. 314, 55 S. W. 1021. 77 Jarman Wills (6th ed. Big.), #945. See also Rood Wills, § 446; Theobald Wills (Sth ed.), 294; 12—Tuomp. WILLS. Farmer v. Kimball, 46 N. H. 435, 88 Am. Dec. 219. 78 Rowland v. Gorsuch, 2 Cox Ch. 187. 792 Jarman Wills (6th ed. 1711); Mayer v. Hover, 81 Ga. 308, 7 S. E. 562; Butler v. Butler, 97 Ky. 136, 30 S. W. 4, 17 Ky. L. 129; Allen’s Suc- cession, 48 La. Ann. 1036, 20 So. 193, 55 Am. St. 295; Townsend v. Town- send, 156 Mass. 454, 31 N. E. 632; In re Keogh, 112 App. Div. 414, 98 N. Y. S. 433; Jones v. Paschall, 36 N. Car. 430; In re Ihre, 162 Pa. St. 369, 29 Atl. 450. § 195 WILLS 173 eficiaries take per stirpes;*° but this presumption may be con- trolled by the use of words indicating an equal division of the property among all the beneficiaries thus designated.** “But when there are no such words, the presumption is, that the testa- tor referred to the familiar law of descents and distributions, to regulate the distribution of his bequest.’”*? 80 MacLean v. Williams, 116 Ga. 257, 42 S. E. 485, 59 L. R. A. 125; Do- herty v. Grady, 105 Maine 36, 72 Atl. 869; McClench v. Waldron, 204 Mass. 554, 91 N. E. 126; Rasquin v. Ha- mersley, 152 App. Div. 522, 137 N. Y. S. 578; Lee v. Baird, 132 N. Car. 755, 44 S. E. 605; In re Crawford’s Estate, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 170; Nightingale v. Phillips, 29 R. I. 175, 72 Atl. 220; Hodges v. Phelps, 65 Vt. 303, 26 Atl. 625, 81 Auger v. Tatham, 191 Ill, 296, 61 N. E. 77; Kalbach v. Clark, 133 Towa 215, 110 N. W. 599, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801, 12 Ann. Cas. 647; Doherty v. Grady, 105 Maine 36, 72 Atl. 869; Maguire v. Moore, 108 Mo. 267, 18 S. W. 897; Mooney v. Pur- pus, 70 Ohio St. 57, 70 N. E. 894; Ramsey v. Stephenson, 34 Ore. 408, 56 Pac. 520, 57 Pac. 195. 82 Daggett v. Slack, (Mass.) 450, 8 Metc. CHAPTER XI LANGUAGE DESCRIPTIVE OF PROPERTY DEVISED OR BEQUEATHED SECTION SECTION 200. Failure to describe property. 213. Rents, income, and profits of 201. Certainty of description. real estate. 202.°Conflicting and repugnant de- 214, What words will carry personal scriptions. property. 203. False and erroneous descrip- 215. Money and cash. tions. 216. Goods and chattels. 204. Language passing entire estate. 217. Furniture, household furniture 205. Share, part or portion. and household goods. 206. After-acquired property. 218. Stock. 207. Estate. 219. Bonds, mortgages, and securi- 208. Property. ties. 209. Effects. 220. Notes, accounts, and choses in 210. Description of real estate in gen- action. eral, 221. Insurance. 211. What words will carry real 222. Interest, income, or profits of property. personal property. 212. Particular descriptions of real estate. § 200. Failure to describe property——The making of a will naturally imports an intention to make a testamentary dispo- sition of property. But the intention is one thing and its execu- tion is quite another. In cases where the language of wills has been inexact or ambiguous, the courts have frequently transposed or inserted words or phrases or even left out or inserted provi- sions in order to effectuate an intent that was with reasonable certainty to be gathered from the context of the whole instru- ment. But the courts have no power to import into a will new provisions which are designed to create a testamentary disposi- tion which is neither expressed nor necessarily to be implied. So a will which utterly fails to mention, much less identify, any gift, devise, or legacy is fatally defective.’ i Aberorombic v. Abercrombie, 27 34 N. W. 427; Dreyer v. Reisman, Ala. 489; Willis v. Jenkins, 30 Ga. 202 N. Y. 476, 96 N. E. 90. 167; Christy v. Badger, 72 Iowa 581, 179 § 201 WILLS 180 This doctrine is especially applicable to the effect of the failure to designate the subject-matter of the gift, and in accordance with this general rule as to omissions, it is held that a devise or bequest left blank as to the subject-matter fails for uncertainty, and the omission can not be supplied by parol proof of the testa- tor’s intention in that regard.? Thus where the legacy provided for “the sums of money stated after each name, to wit: to Rev. Father Griffin, ; to Rev. Father Chappal, ; to Hetty Shields, .” the gift was held to fail for uncertainty.’ § 201. Certainty of description—While in most jurisdic- tions reasonable certainty in the description of the property to be devised or bequeathed is all that is necessary, yet enough care. “should be taken to leave no doubt as to the testator’s intention. Language that is apt to- give rise to ambiguity in the description should be always avoided. If the description is insufficient to identify the property given there can be nothing added that will make it good. Extrinsic circumstances can not be resorted to for the purpose of importing into a will any intention not therein expressed. So if the description is wholly false, or so defective that the property can not be identified with the aid of such light as the testator’s situation throws on the will, the gift must fail for uncertainty.* Thus a bequest to a person named of “a few ori- ental rugs to be selected by her” was held void for uncertainty.® An examination of the adjudicated cases shows great care- lessness on the part of testators in the matter of description, and in many cases the courts encounter much difficulty in determining the exact property that the testator intended to be included in his gift. The rule of construction usually applied is that, the prop- erty will be adjudged sufficiently described if the description given in the will furnish means of identifying it. The meaning 2Dreyer v. Reisman, 202 N. Y. 476, 96 N. E. 90. 3 Harris v. Pue, 39 Md. 535. 4 Williams v. Williams, 189 Il. 500, 59 N. E. 966; Sturgis v. Work, 122 Ind. 134, 22 N. E. 996, 17 Am. St. 394; McGovern v. McGovern, 75 Minn, 314, 77 N. W. 970. 5 Case v. Hasse, 83 N. J. Eq. 170, 93 Atl. 728. 6In re Traylor, 81 Cal. 9, 22 Pac. 297, 15 Am. St. 17; Nelson v. Pom- eroy, 64 Conn. 257, 29 Atl. 534; Drane v. Beall, 21 Ga. 21; Dee v. Dee, 212 Ill. 338, 72 N. E. 429; Tay- lor v. Taylor, 174 Ind. 670, 93 N. E. 181 DESCRIPTION OF DEVISE OR BEQUEST § 202 of the language used and the property to which it refers may be shown by parol evidence.’ § 202. Conflicting and repugnant descriptions.—Gifts by words of general description will not be limited by subsequent at- tempts at particular description, unless such appears to be the in- tention of the testator. Where the property intended to be given is described in different ways which do not agree, and some of the property answers all the descriptions and some answers a part only, the expressions will be understood as restrictive, and only that property will pass which answers all the descriptions? __ Where the property intended to be given is described in such distinct and explicit terms that it can not, without inconsistency. admit of the qualification resulting from the subsequent partial description, and that partial description seems, upon its face, rather designed as an additional description of the same property than as intended as.a-qualification, such partial description will be rejected for its inconsistency with other parts of the description.*° A perfect description which fully ascertains the corpus is not to be defeated by the addition of a further and false description.** The general rule is that if the several descriptions do not corre- spond, and appear not to have been intended to restrict each other, the one is to be taken which is the least liable to have been mis- taken."? Ordinarily a description of the premises by the name by 9; Allen’s Succession, 48 La. Ann. 8 Chace v. Lamphere, 148 N. Y. 206, 1036, 20 So, 193, 55 Am. St. 295; Willett v. Carroll, 13 Md. 459; Do- herty v. O’Hearn, 214 Mass. 290, 101 N. E. 519; Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298, 80 Am. Dec. 269; Ballan- tyne v. Turner, 59 N. Car. 224; Weatherhead v. Sewell, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 272; Cresap v. Cresap, 34 W. Va. 310, 12 S. E. 527; Willey v. Clark, 105 Wis. 22, 80 N. W. 102; Brewster Maritime Provinces &c. Mission Board, 2 N. Bruns. Eq. Rep. 172. 7 Cruse v. Cunningham, 79 Ind. 402. 42 N. E. 580; In re Willis’ Will, 25 R, I. 332, 55 Atl. 889. ® Bourke v. Boone, 94 Md. 472, 51 Atl. 396; Webb v. Archabald, 128 Mo. 299, 34 S. W. 54; Peebles v. Graham, 128 N. Car. 218, 39 S, E. 24. 10 Thomson v. Thomson, 115 Mo. 56, 21 S. W. 1085; Chace v. Lam- phere, 148 N. Y. 207, 42 N. E. 580. 11 Mayo v. Blount, 23 N. Car. 283. 12 Melvin v. Proprietors, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 15, 38 Am. Dec. 384; Moran v. Lezotte, 54 Mich. 83, 19 N. W. 757; Drew v. Drew, 28 N. H. 489. § 203 WILLS 182 which it is commonly known will prevail over any other descrip- tion.** § 203. False and erroneous descriptions.—In arriving at the intention of the testator, so much as is false in the description of the premises devised may be stricken out, and if enough re- mains to identify the premises intended, the will will be sustained with the false words** eliminated therefrom. So a description, though false in part, may, with reference to extrinsic circum- stances, be absolutely certain, or, at least, sufficiently so as to en- able the court to identify the subject intended; as where a false description is superseded by one which by itself would have been correct. To ascertain the intention of the testator, the court may hear evidence of the circumstances, situation, and surround- ings of the testator when the will was made, and the state and description of his property.*° But extrinsic evidence is not ad- missible to substitute a totally different description of land for that described in the will.*” Where the will is entirely devoid of any general description which can be identified by extrinsic evidence, and the rejection of a false description leaves the description not merely imperfect but wholly uncertain, it is wholly void.** As a general rule parol evidence will not be admitted to reform or correct an erroneous description in a will caused by a failure on the part of the drafts- man to follow the instructions given him by the testator respect: ing such description.*® Where a testator devised the “‘west one- half” of a certain quarter section “containing about 76 acres,” when the only land owned by him in that county was 76 acres in the north one-half of that quarter section, the word “west”? may 13 Thomson v. Thomson, 115 Mo. 17 Patch v. White, 1 Mackay (12 56, 21 S. W. 1085; Drew v. Drew, D.C.) 468. 28 N. H. 489, : 18In re Lynch’s Estate, 142 Cal. 14 Whitcomb v. Rodman, 156 Ill. 373, 75 Pac. 1086. 116, 40 N. E. 553. 19 Hill v. Felton, 47 Ga. 455, 15 Am. 15 Wigram Wills (2d Am. ed.) 144, Rep. 643; Bradley v. Rees, 113 Ill. 147, 327, 55 Am. Rep. 422. But see 16 Pate v. Bushong, 161 Ind. 533, Wheaton v. Pope, 91 Minn. 299, 97 69 N. E. 291, 63 L. R. A: 593, 100 N. W. 1046. Am. St. 287. 183 DESCRIPTION OF DEVISE OR BEQUEST § 204 be stricken out and the will be given effect as a gift of the 76 acres in the section which he owned, though there is a residuary clause.*® On the contrary, it has been held that where a will pur- ported to devise the northeast quarter of a certain section which the deceased did not own, but he owned the southeast quarter of the section, and owned no other land, a rejection of the false description in the will as surplusage, left no description whatever by which the land intended to be devised could be identified, and the will did not devise the land owned by the testator.** Where some of the specifications in a description are found to be false, so much of the property will pass as can be identified by the aid of both the false and correct specifications given when ‘read in the light of the testator’s situation. Thus if a testator describe a horse given as his “black horse,” having only a white one, or devise his “freehold estate,” having only a leasehold estate, the white horse in the one case and the leasehold estate in the other will pass.” § 204. Language passing entire estate——When a person makes a will the presumption is that he intends to dispose of his entire estate, unless the provisions of the will or extrinsic circum- stances clearly show a contrary intention.” The mere fact of making a will raises a very strong presumption against any ex- pectation or desire on the part of the testator of leaving any por- tion of his estate beyond the operation of his will, and this pre- sumption obtains though the description of the property be in- formal and lacking in technical accuracy.** While no particular form of expression is required to pass the 20 Collins v. Capps, 235 Ill. 560, 85 N. E. 934, 126 Am. St. 232, 21McGovern v. McGovern, 75 Minn. 314, 77 N. W. 970. 22 Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 210, 29 L. ed. 860, 6 Sup. Ct. 617. 23 Vestal v. Garrett, 197 Ill. 398, 64 N. E. 345; Pate v. Bushong, 161 Ind. 533, 69 N. E, 291, 63 L. R. A. 593, 100 Am. St. 287; Willard v. Darrah, 168 Mo. 660, 68 S. W. 1023, 90 Am. St. 468; In re Phillips’ Estate, 205 Pa. 504, 55 Atl. 210; In re Dong’s Estate, 103 Wis. 497, 79 N. W. 768, 74 Am. St. 885. 24Taubenhau v. Dunz, 125 Ill. 524, 17 N. E. 456; Sites v. Eldridge, 45 N. J. Eq. 623, 18 Atl. 214, 14 Am. St. 769; In re Sweitzer’s Estate, 142 Pa. St. 541, 21 Atl. 885; Dempsey v. Tay- lor, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 126, 23 S. W. 220. : WILLS . § 205 184 whole estate, the intention to do so must be expressed in some form, and wherever the words used are such as will carry the whole estate, it will be presumed that the testator intended to dis- pose of all his property.?*> Where the general gift shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to dispose of all his property, a subsequent attempt at an enumeration of the specific articles owned by the testator does not prevent the entire estate from passing under the general gift.** A gift of “all my property of every description,’ or “all the property I possess, real and per- sonal, movable and immovable,” will pass everything which the testator has a right to dispose of by will.?* But a gift of all the personal property of the testator does not include the realty.?° § 205. Share, part or portion—The word “share” ordi- narily means a part or definite portion of a thing owned by a number of persons in common, and refers to that portion of the undivided property which belongs to any one of them.®*® The words “share” and “portion” are equivocal, and may mean im- mediate gifts, or be descriptive of gifts to be made in the future.** But it has been held that the word “share” is not equivocal, and parol evidence is not admissible to. show what was intended.®? The usual meaning of “share,” when used in a will, is that portion of the estate which has already been set apart to a legatee, and becomes such contemporaneously or subsequent to the decease of the testator, but never antedates such decease,®* A bequest of the “share” of one beneficiary to another will in- clude all that the former takes under the will, whether contingent 25 Given v. Hilton, 95 U. S. 591, 21 L. ed. 458; Ferry’s Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 207; Gallagher v. McKeague, 125 Wis. 116, 103 N. W. 233, 110 Am. St. 821. 26 Sites v. Eldredge, 45 N. J. Eq. 632, 18 Atl. 214, 14 Am. St. 769; In re Woodside’s Estate, 188 Pa. St. 45, 41 Atl. 475; Dempsey v. Taylor, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 126, 23 S. W. 220. 27 Burton v. Black, 30 Ga. 638. 28 Thomas v. Blair, 111 La. 678, 35 So. 811. 29 Webb v. Webb, 111 Ark. 54, 163 S. W. 1167; Turner v. Balfour, 62 Conn. 89, 25 Atl. 448. 80 Smith v. Terry, 43 N. J. Eq. 659,. 12 Atl. 204. 31 Dougherty v. Thompson, 167 N. Y. 472, 60 N. E. 760. 32 Armistead vy. Armistead, 32 Ga. 597. 88 Shepard v. Shepard, 60 Vt. 109, 14 Atl. 536, 185 DESCRIPTION OF DEVISE OR BEQUEST § 206 or vested,** and will include the corpus of the estate, but’ not the income.*® This principle applies whether the gift consists of a specific legacy or devise or of an interest in property given. gener- ally.*° The term “portion” is defined to be that part of the parent’s estate, or all the estate of one standing in the place of a parent, which is given to a child.” § 206. After-acquired property.—Generally gifts of per- sonal property pass everything which answers the description thereof at the death of the testator, unless a different intention is expressed in the will.** “Should a man bequeath all his estate in the public funds, all his bank stock, or all his farming stock and utensils, it would embrace all held at the time of his decease, whether held at the date of the will or acquired afterward.”® But if the bequest is of a particular thing, specified and separated from all other things constituting the testator’s estate, that only will pass which answers the description at the date of the will.*° In such case, if the subject of the bequest does not remain in specie at the time of the testator’s death, the bequest is at an end.** As a rule, general words are sufficient to pass after-acquired real or personal property, and a simple devise or bequest of all of the testator’s real and personal estate will pass real or personal property acquired by the testator after the making of his will, unless a different intention appears by the will.** In some juris- 129 34Eisiminger v. Eisiminger, Pa. St. 564, 18 Atl. 557. 35 Johnson v. Childs, 61 Conn. 66, 23 Atl. 719. 3¢ Hardman v. Johnson, 3 Mer. 347. 37 Lewis’ Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 133. 38 Wind v. Jekyl, 1 P. Wms. 572; Briggs v. Briggs, 69 Iowa 617, 29 N. W. 632; Loveren v. Lamprey, 22 N. H. 434; Morse v. Macrum, 22 Ore. 229, 29 Pac. 615. 39 Wait v. Belding, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 129. See also Kimball v. Ellison, 128 Mass. 41; Briggs v. Briggs, 69 Iowa 617, 29 N. W. 632. 40 Fidelity Trust Co.’s Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 492, 1 Atl. 233. 41JIn re Tillinghast, 23 R. I. 121, 49 Atl. 634, 42 Graham v. De Yampert, 106 Ala. 279, 17-So. 355; Patty v. Goolsby, 51 Ark. 61, 9 S. W. 846; In re O’Gor- man’s Estate, 161 Cal. 654, 120 Pac. 33; Clayton v. Hallett, 30 Colo. 231, 70 Pac. 429, 59 L. R. A. 407, 97 Am. St. 117; Dickerson’s Appeal, 55 Conn. 223, 10 Atl. 194, 15 Atl. 99; Woman’s Union Missionary Soc. v. Mead, 131 Til, 33, 23 N. E. 603; Johnson v. White, 76 Kans, 159, 90 Pac. 810; § 207 WILLS 186 dictions, however, it is held that after-acquired real estate is not affected by a will in which there is no express reZerence to such estate, although the description contained in the will is general and although it might be inferred from the whole will that it was the intention of the testator to dispose of all of his property.** Under the statutes of Ohio lands acquired by a testator subse- quent to the execution of his will, do not pass thereby, unless the testator’s intention to include therein such after-acquired property clearly and manifestly appears on the face of the will itself.** It would seem that the question of passing after-acquired real estate is always one of intent, and such language should be used as will clearly express such intent. While a residuary clause may be all that is necessary to pass such property, yet it is advisable to specifically mention this species of property.*° § 207. Estate.—In legal parlance the word “estate” was anciently confined to land,*® and meant degree, quantity, or ex- tent of ownership rather than the land itself. As used in wills, however, the term is sometimes. held to be synonymous with “property” when not qualified by the words “real” or “‘per- sonal” ;** the presumtion being that the testator used the term in its inclusive signification, unless the context restricts its meaning to some particular species of property.** When used in a will to describe property given, the word “estate” will include all of the property of the testator, both real and personal, unless the term is limited in meaning by the context.*® But it has been held that Paine v. Forsaith, 84 Maine 66, 24 Atl. 590; Liggat v. Hart, 23 Mo. 127; 9 Atl. 136; Chapman v. Chick, 81 Maine 109, 16 Atl. 407; Norris v. Mueller v. Buenger, 184 Mo. 458, 83 S. W. 458, 67 L. R. A. 648, 105 Am. St. 541; Haley v. Gatewood, 74 Tex. 281, 12 S. W. 25. 43 Webster v. Wiggin, 19 R. I. 73, 31 Atl. 824, 28 L. R. A. 510. 44 Wright v. Masters, 81 Ohio St. 304, 90 N. E. 797, 135 Am. St. 790, 18 Ann. Cas. 165. 45 See post, ch. 30, § 1153. 46 Co, Lit. 345, 47 Warner v. Willard, 54 Conn. 470, Clark, 10 N. J. Eq. 51. 48 Powell v. Woodcock, 149 N. Car. 235, 62 S. E. 1071. 49 Hilton v. Hilton, 2 MacArthur (9 D. C.) 70; Warner v. Willard, 54 Conn. 470, 9 Atl. 136; Smith v. Run- nels, 97 Iowa 55, 65 N. W. 1002; Chapman v. Chick, 81 Maine 109, 16 Atl. 407; Boston Safe-Deposit &c. Co. v. Mixter, 146 Mass. 100, 15 N. E, 141; Andrews v. Brumfield, 32 Miss 107; Shumate v. Bailey, 110 Mo. § 208 187 DESCRIPTION OF DEVISE OR BEQUEST the use of such a general word as “estate” means one species of property only, and that it does not always mean both real and per- sonal property.°° When the term is intended to apply to real property, it may either express the quantity of interest devised or designate the thing devised or both.™ If it is the wish of the testator to include both real and personal property in his gift the words “real” and “personal” should be ‘used in connection with the word “estate,” and thereby avoid all possible doubt. § 208. Property.—The term “property,” when used in its most comprehensive sense, signifies every species of property which goes to make up one’s wealth or estate, but when used in a will directing the disposition of the testator’s property, will in- clude both real and personal property, unless restricted in its meaning by the context.°* And unless a different intention ap- pears from the context the term includes choses in action,** and the proceeds of lands subsequently sold by the testator.°* But the meaning of the word “property,” when used in a will, may be confined to either personal property” or real property” by the in- sertion of words which are especially suitable for passing these particular kinds of property. So where it is the wish of the tes- 411, 20 S. W. 178; Walker v. Hill, 73 611, 8 N. Y. S. 772, 29 N. Y. St. 545; N. H. 254, 60 Atl. 1017, 10 Prob. Rep. Ann. 650; Simickson v. Snitcher, 14 N. J. L. 53; Hacker v. Hacker, 153 App. Div. 270, 138 N. Y. S. 194; Harper v. Harper, 148 N. Car. 453, 62 S. E. 553; Rossetter v. Simmons, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 452; Blewer v. Brightman, 4 McCord (S. Car.) 60; Haley v. Gatewood, 74 Tex. 281, 12 S. W. 25; Smith v. Smith, 17 Grat. (Va.) 268. 50 Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291, 26 L. ed. 745; Green v. Hewitt, 97 Il. 113, 37 Am. Rep. 102; Crew v. Dixon, 129 Ind. 85, 27 N. E. 728. 51 Hart v. White, 26 Vt. 260. 52 Fosdick v. Hempstead, 55 Hun Brawley v. Collins, 88 N. Car. 605; White v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa. St. 90, 1 Atl. 33; Fry v. Shipley, 94 Tenn. 252, 29 S. W. 6. 53 Cate v. Cranor, 30 Ind. 292; Fogg v. Clark, 1 N. H. 163; In re Myers’ Estate, 48 Pa. St. 26; Fry v. Shipley, 94 Tenn. 252, 29 S. W. 6. 54 Simmons v. Beazel, 125 Ind. 362, 25 .N. E. 344, 55 Peirsol v. Roop, 56 N. J. Eq. 739, 40 Atl. 124; Brawley v. Collins, 88 N. Car. 605; Howe’s Appeal, 126 Pa. St. 233, 17 Atl. 588. 56 Howland v. Howland, 100 Mass. .222; Dunham v. Marsh, 52 N. J. Eq. 256, 30 Atl. 473, 188 § 209 WILLS tator to confine his gift to either personal or real property, such language should be used as will carry out the wish of the testator. § 209. Effects—The word “effects,” as used in a will, un- less restricted by the context, prima facie includes the testator’s personal property only.*’ The term includes all kinds of personal property, and is more extensive in its operation than the term “goods,”°8 But the term “effects,” when used in its broadest sense of prop- erty or worldly substance, may include land, and should be so construed when it appears from other parts of the will that such was the testator’s intention.°® In such cases, of course, the scope of its meaning is measured, not by its own inherent force, but by the import of the words with reference to which it is used. Thus where the articles to be included in the gift are referred to as “furniture, goods, chattels and effects” in one place, and in an- other as “furniture and moneys or any property,” it was held to pass the testator’s real estate.°° “It is unsafe to use the term to describe the gift unless suitable restrictive words are used in con- nection with it. § 210. Description of real estate in general—As a gen- eral rule technical accuracy in the use of language to describe the real estate which the testator intended to devise is not required, if from the whole will it appears that it was his intention to pass. his interest in the property.** The testator’s intention is the mas- ter-key which the court will always use to unlock the hidden meaning of the terms which he has employed. Every case de- pends upon its own peculiar circumstances, and no uniform rule of construction can be applied. But technical words are subordi- 57In re Miner, 146 N. Y. 121, 40 N. E. 788; In re Reimer’s Estate, 159 Pa. St. 212, 28 Atl. 186; Martin v. Osborne, 1 Pickle (85 Tenn.) 420, 3 S. W. 647. 58 Andrews v. Applegate, 223 Ill. 535, 79 N. E. 176, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 661; In re Miner, 146 N. Y. 121, 40 N. E. 788. 59 Andrews v. Applegate, 223 IIl, 535, 79 N. E, 176, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 661. 60 White v. Keller, 68 Fed. 796; Ruckle v. Grafflin, 86 Md. 627, 39 Atl. 624; Hall v. Hall, L. R. (1892), 1 Ch. 361. 61 Lindsay v. Wilson, 103 Md. 252, 63 Atl. 566, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 408; Torrey v. Torrey, 70 N. J. L.-672, 59 Atl, 450. : 189 DESCRIPTION OF DEVISE OR BEQUEST § 211 nate to other explanatory and qualifying expressions in the con- text which disclose the testator’s actual intention ;°? and where a different meaning is fairly deducible from the whole will, the technical sense must yield to the apparent intention. It is not the office of a will to describe the property devised, but if the language used “furnishes the means of identifying it, it is sufficient. “So words intrinsically applicable to personal estate may, by force of the context, be made to include land. This fre- quently happens where an expression is evidently used as refer- ential to and synonymous with an anterior word clearly descrip- tive of real estate, in which case its extent of operation is meas- ured not by its own inherent strength, but by the import of its synonym. Even the expression ‘personal estates’ will carry realty, if the testator has clearly shown his intention that it shall be so.” In the absence of anything to the contrary, the testator must be understood as asserting that he is the owner of the real estate which he undertakes to devise, though he does not use words indi- cating that he is the owner. While no particular words are necessary to pass real estate, enough must appear to evidence the intention of the testator in this respect, and words can not be supplied to meet the deficiency, even though they may have been omitted by what might seem to be palpable error,®” and where specific mention is made of certain property, other property not alluded to or covered by general terms will not pass. § 211. What words will carry real property.—The most comprehensive words of description applicable to real estate are “tenements” and “hereditaments,” as they include every species 62 Daniel v. Whartenby, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 639, 21 L. ed. 661; Robert- son v. Johnson, 24 Ga. 102. 63 Suydam v. Thayer, 94 Mo. 49, 6 S. W. 502. 64 Taylor v. Taylor, 174 Ind. 670, 93 N. E. 9. 65 Gardner Wills, p. 403. See also Russell v. Elden, 15 Maine 193; Ladd v. Harvey, 21 N. H. 514; Jones v. Myatt, 153°N. Car. 225, 69 S. E. 135. 66 Cummins v. Riordon, 84 Kans. 791, 115 Pac. 568. 67 Graham v. Graham, 23 W. Va. 36, 48 Am. Rep. 364. 68 Farish v. Cook, 78 Mo. Am. Rep. 107. 212, 47 190 § 211 WILLS of real property as well corporeal as incorporeal.° The term “real estate’ includes lands, tenements, and hereditaments, whether the latter be corporeal or incorporeal.’? The word “lands” is not so comprehensive as “real estate’ or “tenements and hereditaments,” as it would not comprehend incorporeal hereditaments,”* nor would it include an advowson.” In its primary and technical meaning the word “premises” has reference to something that goes before or precedes ;* but when used in a will, it means a separate portion or parcel of land with all buildings, tenements and other appurtenances on it.* If the testator uses the term to describe a dwelling house, it will include not only the garden and land adjacent, with its stables, barns and out-houses, but whatever else is permanently annexed to the land devised.” Other words which operate to pass real estate or interest therein are such as “‘freehold,’’® “‘house,’’* ‘‘homestead,”7® “farm,” “home place,’’*® “appurtenances,’’** and the like. The words “property” and “estate” when used in a general sense, are always held sufficient to embrace all the testator’s prop- erty, real as well as personal,*? but when coupled with directions applicable only to personalty, they will not have this effect, nor when subsequent particulars clearly indicate that the testator had only personalty in contemplation. The word “effects,” though savoring strongly of personalty, 69In re Handley, 208 Pa. 388, 57 Atl. 755. 70 Gillett v. Gaffney, 3 Colo. 351. 712 Jarman Wills, 382; In re Handley, 208 Pa. 388, 57 Atl. 755. 72 Westfaling v. Westfaling, 3 Atk. 460. 732 BI. Comm. 298. 74Doe v. Willetts, 7 Mann. Gr. & S. 709. 75 Bowers v. Pomeroy, 21 Ohio St. 184, 76In re Steel, L. R. (1903), 1 Ch. 135, 72 L. J. Ch. 42, 87 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 548, 51 Wkly. Rep. 252. 77 Richmond v. State, 5 Ind. 334, 78 Smith v. Dennis, 163 Ill. 631, 45 N. E. 267; Morton v. Morton, 120 Ky. 251, 85 S. W. 1188, 27 Ky. L. 661. 79 Scoville v. Mason, 76 Conn. 459, 57 Atl. 114; Williams’ Succession, 132 La. 865, 61 So. 852. ; 80 Burke vy. Chamberlain, 22 Md. 298. 81 Myers v. Norman, 46 S. W. 214, 20 Ky. L. 343. 82Korn v. Cutler, 26 Conn. 4; Fogg v. Clark, 1 N. H. 163; Monroe v. Jones, 8 R. I. 526; Doe, ex dem. Tofield v. Tofield, 11.East 246. 838 Smith v. Hutchinson, 61 Mo. 83. § 212 191 DESCRIPTION OF DEVISE,OR BEQUEST may, when the context clearly shows the intention, as when used in connection with the word “real,” be sufficient to pass the land.** The phrase, “all my worldly goods,” if used without spevific enumeration, may reasonably be supposed to embrace lands, and in some instances has been so construed;* but if the attempt is made at designation, the restricted meaning implied from such designation will prevail. § 212. Particular descriptions of real estate-—The usual method of describing real estate is by metes and bounds,** and where this method is employed the devise only passes title to the land embraced in such description, notwithstanding the fact that a partial intestacy may result,*? but this rule may be modified by the context of the will and extrinsic circumstances.** Where the land is properly described by metes and bounds, and further ref- erence to it as containing a certain number of acres, the devise will pass only the land included in the description, and not the number of acres named,*® whether the tract contains a greater or a fewer number of acres than the number indicated.” - In jurisdictions where there are government surveys, the land may be described by designating the governmental subdivisions, and the fact that such subdivisions are abbreviated does not create any uncertainty as to the intention of the testator.°** Where this method of description is employed care should be exercised to designate the state, county, township, range, section or part of 84 Page v. Foust, 89 N. Car. 447. 85 Torrey v. Torrey, 70 N. J. L. 672, 59 Atl. 450. 86 Thompson v. Thompson, 87 S. W. 790, 27 Ky. L. 949; Krechter v. Grofe, 166 Mo. 385, 66 S. W. 358; McNally v. McNally, 23 R. I. 108, 49 Atl. 699. 87 Oldham v. York, 99 Tenn. 68, 41 S. W. 333; Chace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 32 S. W. 520. 88 Benjamin v. Welch, 73 Hun 371, 26 N. Y. S. 156, 55 N. Y. St. 908. 89 Martin v. Erdman, 124 Md. 668, 93 Atl. 212; Higgins v. Dwen, 100 Ill. 554; Priest v. Lackey, 140 Ind. 399, 39 N. E. 54; Cundiff v. Seaton, 49 S. W. 179, 20 Ky. L. 1271; Hobbs v. Peyson, 85 Maine 498, 27 Atl. 519; Prickett v. Leonard, 104 N. Car. 326, 10 S. E. 466; Portland Trust Co. v. Beatie, 32 Ore. 305, 52 Pac. 89; Jones v. Quattlebaum, 31 S. Car. 606, 9 S. E. 982; Oldham v. York, 99 Tenn. 68, 41 S. W. 333. 20 Cundiff v. Seaton, 49 S. W. 179, 20 Ky. L. 1271. 91 Flynn v. Holman, 119 Iowa 731, 94 N. W. 447. § 212 WILLS 192 section in which the land is situated, and the number of acres the tract is supposed to contain. While descriptions will be construed liberally, so as, if possible, to carry out the intention of the tes- tator, nothing passes by the devise but what is described in the will, whatever the intention of the testator may have been, and evidence is’ inadmissible to make a will operate on land not em- braced in the descriptive words.” Where the real estate to be devised is located in a city or town, the description should designate the state, county, city or town, addition, and the number of the lot, if the property be located in a platted addition; but where the land is unplatted, it should be described either by metes and bounds or as a part of a govern- mental subdivision. Where, however, it is impracticable to pro- cure a correct description, a reference may be made in the will to a deed of the property, as this will have the effect to incorporate the deed for the purpose of the description, and the devise will only pass the land embraced within the description in the deed, although partial intestacy may result. Devises of land have been upheld where the description of the property was by its area,°* inclosure,®* condition of improve- ment,°° and possession or occupancy.” Also it has been held that land may be accurately described by the name in which it is commonly known.** 92 Christy v. Badger, 72 Iowa 581, 34 N. W. 427, 93 Finelite v. Sinnott, 57 Super. Ct. 57, 5 N.Y. S. 439; Oldham v. York, 99 Tenn. 68, 41 S. W. 333. 94In re De Bernal, 165 Cal. 223, 131 Pac. 375; Churchill v. Churhill, 67 S. W. 265, 23 Ky. L. 2365; Williams v. Lane, 4 N. Car. 246, 6 Am. Dec. 561. 5 Thomas v. Scott, 72 S. W. 1129, 24 Ky. L. 2031; Phillipsburgh v. Bruch, 37 N. J. Eq. 482; Gibson v. Gibson, 93 S. Car. 385, 76 S. E. 980. 98 Robb v. Robb, 173 Pa. St. 620, 34 Atl. 237. 7 Lander v. Lander, 217 Ill. 289, 75 N. E. 487; Adams v. Morrow, 42 Md. 434; Cleverly v. Cleverly, 124 Mass. 314; Ogsbury v. Ogsbury, 115 N. Y. 290, 22 N. E. 219; Bolick v. Bolick, 23 N. Car. 244; Hammel v. Palmer, 4 Ohio C. D. 90, 12 Ohio C. C. 184; McKeough v. McKeough, 69 Vt. 34, 37 Atl. 275. 98 Beers v. Narramore, 61 Conn. 13, 22 Atl. 1061; Ackerman v. Crouter, 68 N. J. Eq. 49, 59 Atl. 574; Chace v. Lamphere, 148 N. Y. 206, 42 N. E. 580; Harper v. Anderson, 132 N. Car. 89, 43 S. E. 588; Gibson v. Gibson, 93 S. Car. 385, 76 S. E. 980. 193 § 213 DESCRIPTION OF DEVISE OR BEQUEST § 213. Rents, income, and profits of real estate.—An un- qualified and unlimited gift of the “rents,” “income,” or “profits” of real estate is a gift of the land itself, for the value lies in the profits ;°° but this rule is one of construction which may be re- butted by any clear expression in the will to the contrary. Thus where the will contains a provision for the sale of the real estate at a fixed time, it is clear that the testator did not intend to pass the fee.” A gift of “rents” and “profits” of land for life is a gift of the land itself for life,* and a gift of a part of the rents is a gift of a corresponding part of the land.* A gift of “rents and profits” has been held to pass real estate which was purchased with the proceeds of such rents.° Where it is the intention of the testator not to include the land in his gift of rents and profits to be derived therefrom, cere should be exercised in so wording the will that his intentions may be carried out. § 214. What words will carry personal property.—Unless restricted by the context of the will the entire personal estate of the testator will be included under such words as “personal prop- erty,’’® “effects,” “things,’”* or “‘goods,and chattels.”® Unless so 99 Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 56, 62, 46 Atl. 278, 5 Prob. Rep. Ann. 643; Drake v. Steele, 242 Ill. 301, 89 N. E. 1018; Morrison v. Schorr, 197 Iil. 554, 64 N. E. 545; McCoy v. Houck (Ind.), 99 N. E. 97; Sampson v. Ran- dall, 72 Maine 109; Reed v. Reed, 9 Mass. 372; Diament v. Lore, 31 N. J. L. 220; In re Crofoot’s Will, 137 N. Y. S. 430; Curry v. Patterson, 183 Pa. St. 238, 38 Atl. 594; Conyngham v. Conyngham (1750), 1 Ves. 522; Kerry v. Derrick (1602), Cro. Jac. 104. 1Skinner v. Spann (Ind.), 93 N. E. 1061. 2Collier v. Grimesey, 36 Ohio St. 17. 3 Mather v. Mather, 103 Ill. 607; Sampson v. Randall, 72 Maine 109; 13—Tuomp. WILLS. Brombacher v. Berking, 56 N. J. Eq, 251, 39 Atl. 134; Monarque v. Mon- arque, 80 N. Y. 320; Davis v. Will- iams, 85 Tenn. 646, 4 S. W. 8 4Morrison v. Schorr, 197 Ill. 554, 64 N. E. 545; Durfee v. Pomeroy, 154 N. Y. 583, 49 N. E. 132. 5 Roe v. Vingut, 117 N. Y. 204, 22 N. E, 933. 6 Skinner v. Spann, 175 Ind. 672, 93 N. E. 1061; Risk’s Appeal, 110 Pa. St. 171, 1 Atl. 85. 7Galloway v. Galloway, 32 App. Cas. (D. C.) 76; In re Miner, 146 N. Y. 121, 40 N. E. 788; Price’s Appeal, 169 Pa. St. 294, 32 Atl. 455. 8In re Arnold’s Estate, 240 Pa. 261, 87 Att. 590. ®» Bowlin v. Furman, 34 Mo. 39. § 215 WILLS 194 restricted, such words may operate to pass money,*° choses in ac- tion and securities,** and live-stock.” Such words, however, may be limited by the context in various ways, for example, where another specific or pecuniary legacy is given to the same beneficiary,** where other words operate to pass the property,** or where more restrictive words are used in connection with the general words.*° While such phrases as “my property,” “my estate,” and “my whole estate,” will ordinarily operate to pass personal property,*® nevertheless great care should be exercised in the description of the property and in the expression of intention. 29 66. § 215. Money and cash.—Both the word “money” and the word “cash” ought to be avoided as a description of property in a will. The use of the word “cash” is never necessary. The use of the word “money” is only advisable in connection with the liquidation of the testator’s estate, as where there is a trust or di- rection for sale followed by a trust or direction to make certain payments out of the proceeds. The term is essentially an ambig- uous one. Sometimes it has a very wide meaning, and may in some wills embrace a variety of things. In other cases the con- struction placed upon it by the court is very narrow. In its usual and ordinary acceptance it means, gold, silver, or paper money used as a circulating medium of exchange,*’ and does not em- brace notes, bonds, evidence of debt, or other personal or real 10 Perea v. Barela, 5 N. Mex. 458, 23 Pac. 766. 11 Ritch v. Talbot, 74 Conn. 137, 50 Atl 42; Penn v. Penn, 120 Ky. 557, 87 S. W. 306, 27 Ky. L. 946; Andrews v. Schoppe, 84 Maine 170, 24 Atl. 805; In re Eisenberry’s Estate, 180 Pa. St. 125, 36 Atl. 569. 12 Marton v. Osborne, 85 Tenn. 420, 3S. W. 647. 18 Wrench v. Jutting, 3 Beav. 521, 5 Jur. 145, 43 Eng. Ch. 521. 14Lanphier v. Despard, 1 C. & L. 200, 2 Dr. & War. 59, 4 Ir. Eq. 334. 15 Meyer v. Rusterholtz, 23 Ind. App. 569, 55 N. E. 870; Bond v. Martin, 76 S. W. 326, 25 Ky. L. 719; In re Reynolds, 124 N. Y. 388, 26 N. E, 954; In re Gibbons, 224 Pa. 37, 73 Atl, 183; Gallagher v. McKeague, 125 Wis. 116, 103 N. W. 233, 110 Am. St. 821. 16 Chapman v. Chick, 81 Maine 109, 16 Atl 407; Laing v.. Barbour, 119 Mass. 523, 17 Hancock v. Lyon, 67 N. H. 216, 29 Atl. 638; Mann v. Mann, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 1, 7 Am. Dec. 416; In re ‘Price’s Will, 169 Pa, St. 294, 32 Atl. 455. 195 § 216 DESCRIPTION OF DEVISE OR BEQUEST estate, and this popular and well understood meaning should be given to the word when used in a will, unless from a considera- tion of the entire instrument it was intended by the testator to have a broader meaning and to include notes, bonds and other securities.*® Unless the context gives it a more extended meaning, the word “money” does not include money on deposit not subject to imme- diate call.*° But the term is often given a broader and more elastic meaning, and when it appears to have been the intention of the testator it may include his personal property in general,” his bonds and notes,?* and even his entire personal and real prop- erty.”? The use of the expression “money on hand” or “money on deposit” should be avoided, as the testator may spend or invest the money before his death, or he may die after disposing of his real estate and depositing the proceeds, and thereby defeat the plan of his will. § 216. Goods and chattels—The words “goods and chat- tels’ are the most comprehensive terms of description for passing personal property by will, yet they may be restricted by the con- text.2? They will pass all the personal estate, but, where used after the word “furniture” restrict the articles to those of furni- ture.2* They may include choses in action, chattels real, corporeal and incorporeal property.” 18 Pohlman v. Pohlman, 150 Ky. 679, 150 S. W. 829; Mann v. Mann, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 1, 7 Am. Dec. 416. 19 Beatty v. Lalor, 15 N. J. Eq. 108; In re Levy’s Estate, 161 Pa. St. 189, 28 Atl. 1068; Wolf v. Schoeff- ner, 51 Wis. 53, 8 N. W. 8. 20 Decker v. Decker, 121 Til. 341, 12 N. E. 750; Jenkins v. Fowler, 63 N. H. 244; Sweet v. Burnett, 136 N. Y. 204, 32 N. E. 628; Watson v. Martin, “228 Pa. 248, 77 .Atl. 450; Fry v. Shipley, 94 Tenn. 252, 29 S. W. 6. 21 Hamilton v. Serra, 6 Mackey (17 D. C.) 168; Hinckley v. Primm, 41 Ill, App. 579; Henry v. Henry, 81 Ky. 342, 5 Ky. L. 283; In re Smith’s Estate, 6 Pa. Dist. 329; Paul v. Ball, 31 Tex. 10. \ 22 Blood v. Fairbanks, 48 Cal. 171; Mt. Holly Safe Deposit &c. Co. v. Deacon, 79 N. J. Eq. 120, 81 Atl. 356; In re Strawbridge’s Estate, 5 Pa. Dist. 692, 18 Pa. Co. Ct. 485; McCul- lough v. Lauman, 38 Wash. 227, 80 Pac. 441. 23 Foxall v. McKenney, Fed. Cas. 5016, 3 Cranch C. C. 206. 24Stuart v. Marquis of Bute, 11 Ves. Jur. 656. 25 Kendall v. Kendall, 4 Russ. 360. § 217 WILLS 196 While they may pass all personal property when used alone without restrictive words, yet it is never advisable to employ them for that purpose without the use of other words. § 217. Furniture, household furniture and household goods.—Care should be exercised in taking instructions for, and in framing bequests of furniture and other effects in, or in and about, a dwelling-house. There are perhaps fewer clauses in a will which require more, or receive less attention, especially in these times of new inventions.”° The word “furniture” is a very comprehensive term, and includes about everything with which a house can be furnished to make it habitable and reasonably con- venient for living purposes.” It includes beds and bedding, car- pets, rugs, draperies, chairs, tables, dressers, bureaus, kitchen utensils, household linen, china, glassware, porcelain, bronze stat- uary, pictures on the wall, silver ornaments, plate for family use, stoves, clocks, curios, etc., according to their connection with the testator’s house or residence and the habitual use and enjoyment of them by the testator and his family.”* But it has been held that books in the home library do not pass under a gift of “furni- tures The word “furniture” does not include money,” or securities.** Nor do the words “household furniture” include articles of per- sonal use, such as a gold watch and chain.** The words “house- hold goods” mean substantially the same as “furniture,” though of somewhat wider scope.** Where the bequest of furniture and the devise of the house in which it was used is made to the same person, all the usual con- 26 Wells v. Holt, 104 L. T. Rep. 13 So. 785; Smith v. Jewett, 4 N. H. 253. 513; In re Reynolds, 124 N. Y. 388, 27 Cole v. Fitzgerald, 3 Russ. 301; 26 N. E. 954. Manton v. Tabois, 54 L. J. Ch. 1008. 31 Andrews v. Schoppe, 84 Maine 28 Richardson v. Hall, 124 Mass. 170, 24 Atl. 805; Blackmer v. Black- 228; Endicott v. Endicott, 41 N. J. mer, 63 Vt. 236, 22 Atl. 600. Eq. 93, 3 Atl 157; Bunn v. Win- 32Tn re Kimball’s Will, 20 R. I. 619, thrope, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 329. 40 Atl. 847. 29 Ruffin v. Ruffin, 112 N. Car. 102, 33In re Frazer, 92 N. Y. 239; Car- 16 S. E. 1021. nagy v. Woodcock, 2 Munf. (Va.) 80 Kelly v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 584, 234, 5 Am. Dec. 470. 197, DESCRIPTION OF DEVISE OR BEQUEST § 218 tents of the house will be included.** But where the furniture is given to one and the house to another, they should be definitely described, otherwise a conflict may arise with reference to those household effects which partake of the nature of fixtures.*> The testator should be explicit in the expression of his intention in bequeathing household effects.** A bequest of “household and kitchen furniture, bric-a-brac, and articles of personal use and ornament”’ has been held not to pass a steam yacht in use by the testator at the time of his death.*” § 218. Stock—Where there is nothing in the wili that indicates a contrary intention, the term “stock”’ means shares in a corporation,** but it may include bonds,*® loan certificates,*® or de- posits in a savings bank.“t When the term is used to designate bank stock it will include the stock in which the testator is benefi- cially interested as well as that standing in his own name.” But it has been held not to include a mortgage or nondividend-paying shares,** or debenture stock.** Where stocks or bonds to a certain amount are given, a propor- tionate amount of the given stock at par, irrespective of the mar- ket value of the stock when the bequest takes effect, passes to the beneficiary.** A general bequest of all the testator’s stock in a given railroad company must be construed as including that which is only in part paid for as well as that which has been fully paid and certified.“* Also a gift of “my stock” may include all the 34 Richardson v. Hall, 124 Mass. 228. 41Tomlinson v. Bury, 145 Mass. 346, 14 N. E. 137, 1 Am. St. 464. 35 Wood v. Gaynon, 1 Ambl. 395. 36 Maeck v. Nason, 21 Vt. 115, 52 Am. Dec. 41. 87In re Parry’s Estate, 188 Pa. St. 33, 41 Atl. 448. 88 Capehart v. Burrus, 122 N. Car. 119, 29 S. E. 97, 42 L. R. A. 152. 39 Clark v. Atkins, 90 N. Car. 629, 47 Am. Rep. 538. 40 In re Conley, 197 Pa. 291, 47 Atl. 238. 42 Angell v. Springfield Home for Aged Women, 157 Mass. 241, 31 N. E. 1064. 43Jn re Bradley’s Estate, 238 Pa. 440, 86 Atl. 291. 44Connecticut Trust &c. Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 55 Atl. 171. 45In re Johnson’s Estate, 170 Pa. St. 177, 32 Atl. 636. 46 Emery v. Wason, 107 Mass. 507. § 219 WILLS 198 stock of the particular description belonging to the testator at his death.* In making bequests of stocks and bonds care should be taken to describe them in language by which they may be readily identi- fied. § 219. Bonds, mortgages, and securities—The word “bonds,” when used in a will, may include stock,** but it has been held that where a testator bequeathed to his widow all of his gov- ernment and other bonds which he might possess at the time of his death, it did not include shares of stock in a bank.*® Also where a testator bequeathed to his daughter all bonds and real estate mortgages, it was held that trust certificates secured by de- posits of corporate stock were not within the bequest.®° The words “bonds and mortgages of every kind” has been held to pass corporate bonds secured by a general trust mortgage.** The use of the term “mortgage” has been held to include a bond secured by a mortgage where both are held by the testator at the time of his death. It has been held that a mortgage taken by the testator subsequent to the execution of his will did not pass under the description of “all loans secured by mortgage upon real es- tate.”*> The word “securities,” in its broadest sense, embraces bonds, certificates of stock, promissory notes, bills of exchange, and all other evidences of debt.** a3 § 220. Notes, accounts, and choses in action.—A testator may bequeath anything due him from another, or simply owing and to become due.°® Thus he may make a gift of notes, ac- counts, and choses in action. A bequest of all debts due and ow- 47Tn re Martin, 25 R. I. 1, 54 Atl. 52 Klock v. Stevens, 20 Misc. 383, 589, 45 N. Y. S. 603. 48 Scoville v: Mason, 76 Conn. 459, 53 Connecticut Trust &c. Co. v. 57 Atl. 114. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 55 Atl. 171. 49 Benton v. Benton, 63 N. H. 289, 54In re Stark, 149 Wis. 631, 134 N. 56 Am. Rep. 512. W. 389. 50 Hollingshead v. Wood, 84 N. J. 55 Hayes v. Hayes, 45 N. J. Eq. 461, Eq. 492, 94 Atl. 618. 17 Atl. 634. 51 Hammell v. Swan, 61 N. J. Eq. 179, 47 Atl. 801. 199 DESCRIPTION OF DEVISE OR BEQUEST § 221 ing to the testator at the time of his death, has been held to carry a bond conditioned for replacing stock which the testator sold after the date of his will and loaned the proceeds to the obligor, the time of reinvestment having passed at the testator’s decease. A bequest of “notes in hand” has been held to pass bonds as well as promissory notes.°? A bequest of the amount of a certain note will pass the note itself, and not an amount of money equal thereto. If a note bequeathed be secured by a vendor’s lien, the lien will pass by a bequest of the note.°® A bequest of “accounts” or “ac- counts owing”’ does not pass savings bank accounts,® nor accru- ing rents.** §221. Insurance.—A testator may bequeath money to become due and payable to him as insurance on his own life or on the life of one who survives him. Likewise a policy payable to the legal representatives of the testator and for the benefit of his estate, passes under a general bequest of his property ;°* but where the policy is payable to the testator’s representatives, the proceeds are not covered by the will unless expressly included.® If the policy is payable to a named beneficiary, or even if pay- able to the testator’s “legal heirs,” it is held that he has no prop- erty in it that will pass under his will.°° But where the testator is a beneficiary under a policy upon the life of a third person, his rights under such policy will pass under general words in his will without special designation.“ Where the testator has power to 56 Essington v. Vashon, 3 Mer. 434. 64 Fox v. Senter, 83 Maine 295, 22 57 Perry v. Maxwell, 17 N. Car. 488. Atl. 173; Aveling v. Northwestern 58 Howe v. Bemis, 2 Gray (Mass.) Masonic Aid Assn., 72 Mich. 7, 40 N. 205. W. 28,1 L. R. A. 528. 59 Tiernan v. Bean, 2 Ohio 383, 15 65 Golder v. Chandler, 87 Maine 63, Am. Dec. 557; Parsons v. Kinser, 3 32 Atl. 784; Graham v. Allison, 24 Lea (Tenn.) 342. Mo. App. 516. 60 Gale v. Drake, 51 N. H. 78. 66In re Davies, L. R. (1892), 3 61 Watson v. Penn, 108 Ind. 21, 8 Ch. 63. N. E. 636, 58 Am. Rep. 26. 67 Keller v. Gaylor, 40 Conn. 343; 62 Fletcher. v. Williams (Tex.), 66 Small v. Jose, 86 Maine 120, 29 Atl. S. W. 860. 976; Halsey v. Patterson, 37 N. J. 63 Laughlin v. Norcross, 97 Maine Eq. 445; Harvey v. Von Cott, 71 Hun 33, 53 Atl. 834. 394, 25 N. Y. S. 25. | 1 ‘ ' t § 222 WILLS 200 dispose of his life insurance by will, his bequest thereof passes policies payable to a person other than the beneficiary.*° Fire insurance policies will not pass under a general bequest of personal property, or under a devise of the property insured,” but should be specifically bequeathed.” § 222. Interest, income, or profits of personal property.— 30 66s The words “interest,” “income,” and “profits” are sometimes used as synonymous terms.” But the word “income” as used in a bequest of personal property, means that which comes into or is received from any business or investment of capital, without ref- erence to the outgoing expenditures ;* while “profits” means the ‘gain made on any business or investment when both the receipts and payments are taken into consideration.” A bequest of the “income” of a business or investment prima facie means the net income thereof.”* In the absence of anything in the will indicating a contrary intention, a bequest of the “in- come” of personal property passes the property itself.7° Likewise a bequest of the “interest” or “produce” of a fund, without limi- tation as to the extent of its duration, is a bequest of the fund itself."7 But a bequest of the “income” to one for his natural life does not pass the fund or property from which it is derived.” 68 Tompkins v. Griffin, 92 Va. 307, 23 S. E. 756. 69 Fagle’s Case, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 218. 70Jn re Hurley’s Estate, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 276. 71 See post, ch. 30, § 763. 72 Beers v. Narramore, 61 Conn. 13, 22 Atl. 1061; In re Murphy, 80 App. Div. 238, 80 N. Y. S. 530. 73 Bates v. Porter, 74 Cal. 224, 15 Pac. 732; In re Murphy, 80 App. Div. 238, 80 N. Y. S. 530. 74 Providence Rubber Co. v. Good- year, 76 U. S. 788, 19 L. ed. 566; In re Murphy, 80 App. Div. 238, 80 N. Y. S. 530; In re Gebbie’s Estate, 9 Pa. Dist. 56. 75 Stone v. Littlefield, 151 Mass. 485, 24 N. E. 592; In re Albertson, 113 N. Y. 434, 21 N. E. 117; Wol- finger v. Fell, 195 Pa. St. 12, 45 Atl. 492. 76 Wellford v. Snyder, 137 U. S. 521, 34 L. ed. 780; Lorton v. Wood- ward, 5 Del. Ch. 505; Watkin’s Admr. v. Watkin’s Exrs. (Ky.), 120 S. W. 341; Brombacher v. Berking, 56 N. J. Eq, 251, 39 Ati. 134. 77 In re Thompson’s Estate, 234 Pa. 82, 82 Atl. 1108; Ganret v. Rex, 6 Watts (Pa.) 14, 31 Am. Dec. 457. 78 Thieme v. Zumpe, 152 Ind. 359, 52 N. E. 499; In re Nevin’s Estate, 192 Pa. St. 258, 43 Atl. 996; Chub- bock v. Murray, 30 Nov. Sc. 23. 201 DESCRIPTION OF DEVISE OR BEQUEST § 222 The word “income,” as used in a will bequeathing stock, means the same thing as “‘dividends.’’” If it is the wish of the testator to give the income separate and apart from the principal, so that the beneficiary has no interest whatever in the property from which the income is derived, he may do so by the use of such words as will clearly indicate his in- tention.*° This intention to separate the income from the princi- pal is generally accomplished either by creating an express trust or by limiting the interest to a life interest in the income only.** 79 Lauman v. Foster, 157 Iowa 275, 118, 36 Atl. 280; Walker v. Gibson, 135 N. W. 14; Reed v. Head, 6 Allen 164 Pa. St. 512,.30 Atl. 399; Beirne (Mass.) 174. v. Beirne, 33 W. Va. 663, 11 S. E. 46. 80 Mackay v. Mackay, 107 Cal. 303, | 8!Bishop v. Bishop, 81 Conn. 509, 40 Pac. 558; De Haven v. Sherman, 71 Atl. 583; Diehl v. Middle States 131 Ill. 115, 22 N. E. 711,6 L. R. A. Loan &c. Co., 72 W. Va. 74, 77 S. E. 745; Nelson v. Nelson, 57 N. J. Eq. 549. CHAPTER XII ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED AND THEIR MODE OF CREATION SECTION SECTION 230. In general. 238. Estates tail. 231. Estates or interests created by 239. Estates for years. implication. 240. Joint tenancy and tenancy in 232. Absolute gifts of personalty. common. 233. Life estate in personalty. 241. Estates in remainder. 234, Fee simple in real estate. 242. Executory devises. 235. Limited or conditional fees. 243. Gifts of a use. 236. Life estates in real estate. 244. Rule in Shelley’s Case. 237. Life estates with power of dis- 245. Rule in Wild’s Case. position. § 230. In general.—The estate or interest created by will must be one which the law recognizes,’ and may be either legal or equitable. The devise or bequest may be of every possible inter- est in the property, or the use or income thereof for a limited period, or the remainder after such use. The estate or interest given may also be made to depend upon the happening of an un- certain event.’ The estate or interest given may be enjoyed from the death of the testator, in which case it is said to be a gift in possession, or its enjoyment may be postponed to some future time, in which case it is said to be a gift in expectancy. To the former class of gifts belong such estates as, fee simple absolute, fee determinable, fee qualified, fee conditional, fee tail, estates for life, and estates at will; while to the latter class belong vested remainders and executory interests. 1Kernan’s Succession, 52 La. Ann. 31 Am. Dec. 238; Faries’ Appeal, 23 48, 26 So. 749; Johnson v. Whiton, Pa. St. 29; Robinson v.. Ostendorff, 159 Mass. 424, 34 N. E. 542; Berry 38S. Car. 66, 16 S. E. 371. v. Heiser, 271 Ill. 264, 111 N. E. 99; 22 BI. Comm. 103. Mullany v. Mullany, 4 N. J. Eq. 16, 202 203 ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED § 231 § 231. Estates or interests created by implication —An estate or interest in real or personal property may be impliedly created by will where such is the manifest intention of the tes- tator.2 Thus a gift of the use or income of real property for an indefinite period, without limit as to time or gift over, has been held to constitute a gift of the property itself.* But an estate by implication will not arise in contradiction to or in the absence of some expression of intention.’ Likewise a bequest of the income, use, or occupation of any species of property, without words of limitation, is in effect a bequest of the corpus of the property.° Thus a bequest of personalty to a trustee for the use and benefit of another without words of restriction, vests the absolute prop- erty in the fund bequeathed in the beneficiary.” But an absolute estate in the principal will not pass by a bequest of the income if the testator manifests an intention to sever the product from its source, as when only a life estate in the income is given.® A gift of the use of personal property for a life-time, with a gift over, is to be regarded according to the nature of the prop- erty and other circumstances. If of perishable articles, the use of which consists in their consumption, it amounts from necessity to an absolute gift of the property.® In the absence of legal words of limitation a fee in real estate may be impliedly created by giving the beneficiary power of dis- position,”° or by imposing a personal charge upon him to pay 3In re Smith’s Estate, 46 Misc. 210, 04 N. Y. S. 90; Masterson v. Town- shend, 123 N. Y. 458, 25 N. E. 928, 10 L. R. A. 816. 4In re Hull, 97 App. Div. 265, 89 N. Y. S. 939; Thomas v. Troy City Nat. Bank, 19 Misc. 470, 44 N. Y. S. 1039; Traphagen v. Levy, 45 N. J. Eq. 448, 18 Atl. 222; Beilstein v. Beilstein, 194 Pa. St. 152, 45 Atl. 73, 75 Am. St. 692. 5 Mallery v. Dudley, 4 Ga. 52. 6 Crosgrove v. Crosgrove, 69 Conn. 416, 38 Atl. 219; In re Barrett’s Will, 111 Iowa 570, 82 N. W. 998; Sampson v. Randall, 72 Maine 109; Huston v. Read, 32 N. J. Eq. 591; In re Cro- foot’s Will, 137 N. Y. S. 430. 7 Martin v. Fort, 83 Fed. 19. See also. Cornwell v. Mt. Morris M. E. Church, 73 W. Va. 96, 80 S. E. 148. 8 Diehl v. Middle States Loan &c. Co., 72 W. Va. 74, 77 S. E. 549. ® Whittemore v. Russell, 80 Maine 297, 14 Atl. 197, 6 Am. St. 200. 10Mayo v. Harrison, 134 Ga. 737, 68 S. E. 497; Markillie v. Ragland, 77 lil. 98; Kelley v. Meins, 135 Mass. 231; Terry v. Wiggins, 47 N. Y. 512; Second Reformed Presbyterian Church v. Disbrow, 52 Pa. St. 219. § 232 WILLS 204 debts,** or other sums of money.” A fee is also implied from a devise in lieu of dower,” or for the separate use of a married woman.** Also a life estate in real property may be created by implication when an intention to do so is clearly manifested by the will.” § 232. Absolute gift of personalty—The absolute estate in personalty may be created by the use of such words of limita- tion as “heirs,”’*® “heirs of the body,’*” “issue,’** ‘“descend- ants,’*® or “representatives.”*° But it has been held that the ab- solute title to personalty will pass by the use of ordinary words of gift without the use of such words of limitation, or without the use of words of perpetuity or of inheritance.** The absolute ownership of personal property passes to the beneficiary under a gift thereof without limitation of time or specification of the duration of the estate.” If in a bequest of personal property, the testator uses words of limitation, which, when applied to real 11 McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kans. 25, 58 Pac. 965; Baldwin v. Bean, 59 Maine 481; Bell v. Scammon, 15 N. H. 381, 41 Am. Dec. 706. 12 Parsons v. Millar, 189 Ill. 107, 59 N. E. 606; Korf v. Gerichs, 145 Ind. 134, 44 N. E. 24; Donohue v. Dono- hue, 54 Kans. 136, 37 Pac. 998; Hughes v. Bent, 118 Ky. 609, 81 S. W. 931, 26 Ky. L. 453; Snyder v. Nesbit, 77 Md. 576, 26 Atl. 1006. 18 Orrick v. Boehm, 49 Md. 72; Lausman v. Drahos, 12 Nebr. 102, 10 N. W. 573; Schult v. Moll, 132 N. Y. 122, 30 N. E. 377. 14Landon v. Moore, 45 Conn. 422; Lennen v. Craig, 95 Ind. 167; Irvine v. Putnam, 89 S. W. 520, 28 Ky. L. 465. 15 Holbrook v. Bentley, 32 Conn. 502; Garland v. Garland, 73 Maine 97; Wilmarth v. Bridges, 113 Mass. 407; McMullin v. Leslie, 29 Pa. St. 314. 16 Trimble v. Hensley, 10 Mo. 309; Ellis v. Aldrich, 70 N. H. 219, 47 Atl. 95; Wintermute v. Snyder, 3 N. J. Eq. 489; Karstens v. Karstens, 29 App. Div. 229, 45 N. Y. S. 966, 20 Misc. 247; Worrell v. Vinson, 50 N. Car. 91; In re Schmidt, 185 Pa. St. 579, 40 Atl. 93. 17Duncan yv. Martin, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 519, 27 Am. Dec. 525. 18 Bryan v. Duncan, 11 Ga. 67; Karstens v. Karstens, 29 App. Div. 229, 45 N. Y. S. 966, 20 Misc. 247. 19 Huston v. Read, 32 N. J. Eq. 591. 20Livermore v. Somers (N. J. Eq.), 16 Atl. 513. 21 Mulvane v. Rude, 146 Ind. 476, 45 N. E. 659; Barrett v. Gwyn, 88 S. W. 1096, 28 Ky. L. 101; Twiss v. Simpson, 183 Mass. 212, 66 N. E. 795; Eaton v. Broaderick, 101 Miss. 26, 57 So. 298. 22Wellford v. Synder, 137 U. S. 521, 34 L. ed. 780, 11 Sup. Ct. 183; In re Barrett’s Will, 111 Iowa 570, 82 N. W. 998. 205 ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED § 233 property, would create an estate tail, the legatee takes an absolute title to the property.” A gift of personalty may be absolute though made on condi- tion.** A bequest of personalty with power of disposition creates an absolute estate, though there is a disposition over of property undisposed of.*° Likewise a gift of personalty with power to consume is presumed to be an absolute gift.2* Also a gift of a fractional part,”’ or of the remainder,” or of the residue”® of per- sonal property is absolute unless a contrary intention is clearly shown by the will. Usually a bequest of personalty to one for a certain purpose,°® or for the entire benefit** or maintenance” of a beneficiary, passes an absolute interest. § 233. Life estate in personalty.—At common law a testa- mentary gift for life of personal property with remainder over could not be created,** and a gift for life of such property carried the absolute interest.** But it is now settled that such estates may be created by will,®° 23 Maulding v. Scott, 13 Ark. 88, 56 Am. Dec. 298; Hughes v. Nicklas, 70 Md. 484, 17 Atl. 398, 14 Am. St. 377; In re Tillinghast’s Accounts, 25 R. I. 338, 55 Atl. 879. 24 Kauffman v. Gries, 141 Cal. 295, 74 Pac. 846; In re Folwell’s Estate, 67 N. J. Eq. 570, 59 Atl. 467; In re Kimball’s Will, 20 R. I. 619, 40 Atl. 847. 25 Farle v. Coberly, 65 W. Va. 163, 64 S. E. 628. 26In re Gourley’s Estate, 238 Pa. 62, 85-Atl. 999, 27 Brevard v. Jones, 50 Ala. 221; In re Stephenson, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 97.. 28 Baldwin v. Tucker, 64 N. J. Eq. 333, 55 Atl. 1132. 29 Colt v. Hubbard, 33 Conn. 281; Fox v. Fox, 102 Tenn. 77, 50 S. W. 765. . 30 Harrison v. Brophy, 59 Kans. 1, 51 Pac. 883, 40 L. R. A. 721. even without the intervention of a trustee.** 81 Crosgrove v. Crosgrove, 69 Conn. 416, 38 Atl. 219; Justus’ Succession, 45 La. Ann. 190, 12 So. 130; Gallison v. Quinn, 183 Mass. 241, 66 N. E. 961; In re Turner, 34 Misc. 366, 69 N. Y. S. 1019; Rote v. Warner, 17 Ohio C. C. 342, 9 Ohio C. D. 536. 32 McCune v. Baker, 155 Pa. St. 503, 26 Atl. 658. 332 Bl. Comm. 398. 342 Kent Comm. 352. 35 Wixon v. Watson, 214 Ill. 158, 73 N. E. 306; McKee v. McKee, 82 S. W. 451, 26 Ky. L. 736; French v. Hatch, 28 N. H. 331; Peirsol v. Roop, 56 N. J. Eq. 739, 40 Atl. 124; In re Ryder, 41 App. Div. 247, 58 N. Y. S. 635; Black v. Ray, 18 N. Car. 334; Davis’ Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 201; Ting- ley v. Harris,°20 R. I. 517, 40 Atl. 346. 36 McDaniel v. Johns, 45 Miss. 632; Cook v. Collier (Tenn.), 62 S. W. 658. § 234 WILLS 206 A gift of the use of personal property of a perishable character, the use of which consists in its consumption, amounts from ne- cessity to an absolute gift of the property; but a gift of such property will be for life only if such was the manifest intention of the testator shown by the will.%” If personal property is included in a general residuary bequest for life it must be sold and the principal preserved for the remain- derman.** A life estate in personal property may be created by the use of any language showing an intention to limit the gift to the life of the donee,*® though no gift over of the residue is made.*° And when the gift is in terms absolute, or the duration is not in terms limited in the gift, it will be limited to a life estate if the added clauses indicate clearly that such was the intention of the testator.** An express gift of a life estate in personal prop- erty has generally been held not to be enlarged to an absolute gift by a subsequent provision empowering the donee to dispose of so much as may be necessary for support,*” or by giving him unlim- ited power to dispose of the property. § 234. Fee simple in real estate.-—A devise of real estate to one and his “heirs and assigns” is the surest method of creat- ing a fee in the devisee,** but even in the absence of the word 37 Miller v. Williamson, 5 Md. 219. 38 Ackerman v. Vreeland, 14 N. J. Eg. 23; Patterson v. Devlin, McMull. Eq. (S. Car.) 459. 39 Barr v. Weaver, 132 Ala. 212, 31 So. 488; Hooper v. Smith, 88 Md. 577, 41 Atl. 1095; McKee v. McKee (Tenn.), 52 S. W. 320. 40 Weller’s Succession, 107 La. 466, 31 So. 883; Harris v. Dainley, 22 R. I. 633, 49 Atl. 29; Bartlett v. Patton, 33 W. Va. 71, 10 S. E. 21,5 L. R. A. 523. 41 Mansfield v. Shelton, 67 Conn. 390, 35 Atl. 271, 52 Am. St. 285; Bowerman vy. Sissel, 191 Ill. 651, 61 N. E. 369; Miller v. Lamprey, 68 N. H. 376, 44 Atl. 528; In re Souder’s Estate, 203 Pa. 293, 52 Atl. 177. 42 Baldwin v. Morford, 117 Iowa 72, 90 N. W. 487; Godshalk v. Akey, 109 Mich. 350, 67 N. W. 336; Hunt v. Smith, 58 N. J. Eq. 25, 43 Atl. 428. 43 Mansfield v. Shelton, 67 Conn. 390, 35 Atl. 271, 52 Am. St. 285; Met- zen v. Schopp, 202 Ill. 275, 67 N. E. 36; Rusk v. Zuck, 147 Ind. 388, 45 N. E. 691, 46 N. E. 674; Small v. Thomp- son, 92 Maine 539, 43 Atl. 509; Be- nesch y. Clark, 49 Md. 497; Ford v. Ticknor, 169 Mass. 276, 47 N. E. 877; Robeson y. Shotwell, 55 N. J. Eq. 318, 36 Atl. 780; Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N. H. 267, 13 Am. Rep. 23. 44 Galloway v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558, 151 S. W. 1014, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 782, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 712; Red- dick v. Lord, 131 Ind. 336, 30 N. E. 207 ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED § 234 “heirs,” other words in the will showing an intention to devise a fee simple are sufficient to pass such an estate.*° But the inten- tion must, in the absence of a statute changing the rule, appear in some way on the face of the will,*® and it is sometimes said that there must be words from which an intention to pass a fee may necessarily be implied.** But by statute in most states it is provided that a devise of land shall pass or be construed to pass a fee simple, or all the testa- tor’s interest in the land, unless a contrary intention appear from the words of the will;** the presumption which formerly obtained that only a life estate was intended to pass, unless the contrary appeared, being thus reversed.*® Where the statute has dispensed with the use of the word “heirs” in devising real estate, the fact that a testator used the word has been held not to cast any doubt upon the intention of the testator to devise a fee simple.” 1085; Kendall v. Clapp, 163 Mass. 69, 39 N. E. 773; Jackson v. Littell, 213 Mo. 589, 112 S. W. 53, 127 Am. St. 620. And see post, ch. 30, § 793. 45 Wright v. Denn, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 204, 6 L. ed. 303; Schneer v. Greenbaum, 27 Del. 97, 86 Atl. 107; Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629, 58 Am. Rep. 692; Ashby v. McKinlock, 271 Til. 254, 111 N. E. 101; 2 BL Comm. 108; Co. Lit. 9b. 46 Jackson v. Wells, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 222. 47 Wheaton v. Andress, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 452. 48 For cases illustrating the appli- cation of these statutes, see Smith v. Phillips, 131 Ala. 629, 30 So. 872; Ford v. Gill, 109 Ga. 691, 35 S. E. 156; ‘McFarland v. McFarland, 177 Ill. 208, 52 N. E. 281, 4 Prob. Rep. Ann. 279; In re Barrett’s Will, 111 Towa 570, 82 N. W. 998, 5 Prob. Rep. Ann. 639; Boston S. D. & T. Co. v. Stich, 61 Kans. 474, 56 Pac. 1082; Fuller v. Fuller, 84 Maine 475, 24 Atl. 946; Simonds v. Simonds, 168 Mass. 144, 46 N. E. 421; Johnson v. Delome L. & P. Co., 77 Miss. 15, 26 So. 360; Yocum v. Siler, 160 Mo. 281, 61 S. W. 208; Clay v. Chenault, 108 Ky. 77, 55 S. W. 729, 21 Ky. Law 779; Feit v. Richard, 64 N. J. Eq. 16, 53 Atl. 824; Crain v. Wright, 114 N. Y. 307, 21 N. E. 401; Whitfield v. Gar- riss, 131 N. Car. 148, 42 S. E. 568; In re Jeremy’s Estate, 178 Pa. St. 477, 35 Atl. 847; Waterman v. Greene, 12 R. I. 483; McAllister v. Tate, 11 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 509, 73 Am. Dee. 119; Dulin v. Moore (Tex. Civ. App.), 69 S. W. 94; Reeves v. School Dist. 59 of L., 24 Wash. 282, 64 Pac. 752; Morrison v. Clarksburg C. & C. Co., 52 W. Va. 331, 43 S. E. 102. 49 McConnel v. Smith, 23 Ill. 611; Baldwin v. Bean, 59 Maine 481; Shirey v. Postlethwaite, 72 Pa. St. 39. 50 Gannon v. Albright, 183 Mo. 238, 81 S. W. 1162, 105 Am. St. 471, 67 L. R. A. 97, § 235 WILLS 208 It has been held that, unless a contrary intention appear, a de- vise of one’s “estate’’ located at a certain place,”* or of “all” his “estate,’’°? or “all’’ his “real estate,”** or his “property,” with ref- erence to particular land or to the testator’s possessions gener- ally,** though without a word “heirs” or other words of limita- tion, will vest a fee simple in the devisee; such expressions being regarded as descriptive of the quantity of interest intended to be conveyed. The same effect is given to a devise to a person “in fee simple,” or “forever,”’®> and to such a devise with merely a charge or duty imposed on the devisee personally in regard to the payment of money, to enable him to discharge which an estate for life might not be sufficient, though not if the charge is imposed on the land alone.** § 235. Limited or conditional fees.—Limited or condi- tional fees are (1) base, qualified, or determinable fees; and (2) fees conditional at common law.*’ The terms “base fees,” “quali- fied fees,” and “determinable fees,” have been used promiscuously as descriptive of an estate which has a qualification’ subjoined thereto, and which may be determined whenever the qualification annexed to it is at an end.°® 51 Lambert’s Lessee v. Paine, 3 Cranch (U. S.) 97, 2 L. ed. 377; Rob- inson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629, 58 Am. Rep. 692; Leland v. Adams, 9 Gray (Mass.) 171. - 52 Saeger v. Bode, 181 Ill. 514, 55 N. E. 129; Godfrey v. Humphrey, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 537, 29 Am. Dec. 621; Forsaith v. Clark, 21 N. H. 409; Steward v. Knight, 62 N. J. Eq. 232, 49 Atl. 535; Jackson v. Merrill, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 185, 5 Am. Dec. 213. 53 Boston Safe Deposit &c. Co. v. Stich, 61 Kans. 474, 59 Pac. 1082; Bacon v. Woodward, 12 Gray (Mass.) 376; Forsaith v. Clark, 21 N. H. 409; Sharp v. Humphreys, 16 N, J. L. 25. 54Tincoln v. Lincoln, 107 Mass. 590; Fogg v. Clark, 1 N. H. 163; But these terms have been distin- Foster v. Stewart, 18 Pa. St. 23; Arnold v. Lincoln, 8 R. I. 384. 552 Bl. Comm. 108; Co. Lit. 9b. 562 Jarman Wills, 1131; Wright v. Denn, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 204, 6 L. ed. 303; Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill. 515, 34 Am. Rep. 136; Snyder v. Nesbitt, 77 Md. 576, 26 Atl. 1006; Parker v. Parker, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 134; Jack- son v. Bull, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 148, 6 Am. Dec. 321; King v. Cole, 6 R. I. 584. 57 Paterson v. Ellis Exrs., 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 259. 582 BI. Comm. 109; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio &c. R. Co., 94 Ill. 83; Wills v. Wills, 85 Ky. 486, 3 S. W. 900, 9 Ky. Law 76; Hall v. Turner, 110 N. Car. 292, 14 S. E, 791. 1 209 ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED § 235 guished, and classified under the head of “modified fees.”** A base, qualified, or determinable fee is created by a devise in fee coupled with a provision that upon the happening of a certain condition or contingency the estate so devised may be deter- mined.®° The estate, when so limited, is still a fee, for the reason that it will last forever if the contingency does not happen, but so long as it is possible that the contingency may happen, it is a base, qualified, or determinable fee. If the condition or contingency be void®* or become impossible of performance without fault of the devisee, the estate becomes a fee simple absolute. The event or contingency which may be provided for to defeat the qualified or defeasible fee may be the marriage of the first devisee,* or his death before marriage, or death before distribu- tion, or death before attaining a certain age.°* The event or contingency expressed must be of such a character that it may by possibility never happen.®’ ‘No particular phraseology is neces- sary to introduce the future event: until, till, so long as, whilst, or any other equivalent words may be used, provided they clearly express the dependency of the duration of the estate upon the future event.’ 59 Challis Real Property, ¥ 215, 227, 60 McFarland v. McFarland, 177 Ill. 208, 52 N. E. 281; Greer v. Wilson, 108 Ind. 322, 9 N. E. 284; Common- wealth v. Pollitt, 76 S. W. 412, 25 Ky. L, 790. 61 Carter v. Carter, 39 Ala. 579; In re Walkerly’s Estate; 108 Cal. 627, 41 Pac. 772, 49 Am. St. 97. 62 Green v. Gordon, 38 App. D. C. 443; Huckabee v. Swoope, 20 Ala. 491; New Haven Co. v. Trinity Church Parish, 82 Conn. 378, 73 Atl. 789, 17 Ann. Cas. 432; Shockley v. Parvis, 4 Houst. (Del.) 568; Harri- son v. Harrison, 105 Ga. 517, 31 S. E. 455, 70 Am. St. 60. , 63 Frey v. Thompson, 66 Ala. 287; Cummings v. Lohr, 246 Ifl. 577, 92 N. E. 970; Chenault v. Scott, 66 S. W. 759, 28 Ky. L. 1974; Rohrbach 14—Tuomp. WILLs. * 197, vy. Sanders, 212 Pa. 636, 62 Atl. 27; Haring v. Shelton, 103 Tex. 10, 122 S. W. 13. 64 Wheeler v. Long, 128 Iowa 643, 105 N. W. 161. 65 Giles v. Anslow, 128 Ill. 187, 21 N. E. 225; Corey v. Springer, 138 Ind. 506, 37 N. E. 322; Schneider v. Holzhauer, 134 Ky. 33, 119 S. W. 177; Robert v. Corning, 89 N. Y. 225, 23 Hun 299. 66 Matlock v. Lock, 38 Ind. App. 281, 73 N. E. 171; Wheeler v. Long, 128 Towa 643, 105 N. W. 161; Hersey vy. Purington, 96 Maine 166, 51 Att. 865; Woodman v. Madigan, 58 N. H. 6; Foster v. Wick, 17 Ohio 250; Glasscock v. Tate, 107 Tenn. 486, 64 S. W. 715. 67 Van Horn v. Campbell, 100 N. Y. 287, 3 N. E. 316, 53 Am. Rep. 166. 68 Challis Real Property, * 198. § 236 WILLS 210 “A conditional fee is one which restrains the fee to some par- ticular heirs, exclusive of others; as to the heirs of a man’s body, or to the heirs male of his body. This was at the common law construed to be a fee simple on condition that the grantee had the heirs prescribed. If the grantee died without such issue, the lands reverted to the grantor. But if he had the specific issue, the con- dition was supposed to be performed and the estate became abso- lute, so far as to enable the grantee to alien the land, and bar not only his own issue but the possibility of a reverter.’’*’ This estate is now practically obsolete in England and the United States, ex- cept in South Carolina.” § 236. Life estates in real estate—An estate in real prop- erty may be limited on the life of the donee or some other person or persons, or for the joint lives of two or more persons ;"* in which last case the estate endures till the death of the survivor.” Although such estates are denominated estates in freehold, they are not estates of inheritance.” In jurisdictions where the Rule in Shelley’s Case has been abol- ished, a life estate may be created by a gift to one for life, with remainder to his heirs.7%* And even in jurisdictions where this rule prevails, a devise to one for life, and on his death to the “heirs of his body by him begotten,” passes a life estate only to the devisee.”* Unless modified by some other provision of the will, a life estate only will pass by such expressions as, “during his life” or “for the full term of his natural life.”"® 694 Kent Comm. 11. freese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 415, 67 N. 70Du Pont v. Du Bos, 52 S. Car. 244, 29 S. E. 665; Withers v. Jenkins, 14S. Car. 597; Wright v. Herron, 5 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 441. 71 Riordon v. Holiday, 8 Ga. 79. 72 Glover v. Stillson, 56 Conn. 315, 15 Atl. 752; Cheney v. Teese, 108 Ill. 473. 732 Bl. Comm. 120. 74Rosenau v. Childress, 111 Ala. 214, 20 So. 95; Thomas v. Miller, 161 Ill. 60, 43 N. E. 848; Zavitz v. Pres- ton, 96 Iowa 52, 64 N. W. 668; De- W. 505, 32 L. R. A. 744, 63 Am. Rep. 584; Wood v. Wood, 45 S. Car. 590, 23 S. E. 950. 7 Granger v. Granger, 147 Ind. 95, 44.N. E. 189, 36 L. R. A. 186. 76 Perry v. Bowman, 151 Ill. 25, 37 N. E. 680; Smith v. Runnels, 97 Iowa 55, 65 N. W. 1002; McGraw v. Miner, 15 S. W. 6, 12 Ky. L. 687; Cousino v. Cousino, 86 Mich. 323, 48 N. W. 1084; Sillcocks v. Sillcocks, 50 N. J. Eq. 25, 25 Atl. 155; In re Brook’s Will, 125 N. Car. 136, 34 S. E. 265; 211 ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED § 237 Where the words used show an intention on the part of the testator to give nothing more than a life estate, such estate will be. created,’” especially where the remainder is given to others.”* If so expressed, a devise may be for life even though there is no disposition of the fee. In such case the fee becomes a part of the residuary estate or passes.as in case of intestacy.” A life estate may be created by a gift of the use,®° possession,®* or enjoyment* of the real estate for life; also by a gift for life of the rents, profits, or income.** But an unlimited gift of the pro- ceeds of real estate has been held to vest in the beneficiary an ab- solute estate in the corpus.** § 237. Life estates with power of disposition.—The power of disposition in a tenant for life under a will must be expressly given, as it does not generally arise from implication.® It is usually construed strictly,** and will be confined, for the protec- tion of the remainderman, to the purpose for which it was given.*” Thus where the life tenant is given the power of sale in case it becomes necessary for his support or maintenance, he can Hull v. Hull, 16 Ohio C. C. 688, 9 Ohio C. D. 19; In re Reynold’s Es- tate, 175 Pa. St. 257, 34 Atl. 624; Howe v. Gregg, 52 S. Car. 88, 29 S. E, 394; Harrison v. Foote, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 576, 30 S. W. 838. 77 Forest Oil Co. v. Crawford, 77 Fed. 106; Talbott v. Hamill, 151 Mo. 292, 52 S. W. 203. 78 Thaw v. Ritchie, 136 U. S. 519, 34 L. ed. 531, 10 Sup. Ct. 1037; Henry v. Pittsburgh Clay Mfg. Co., 80 Fed. 485; Clarke v. Terry, 34 Conn. 176. 79 Byrne v. McGrath, 130 Cal. 316, 62 Pac. 559, 80 Am. St. 127; Schimpf v. Rhodewald, 62 Nebr. 105, 86 N. W. 908. 80 Cort v. Massie, 171 Ill, App. 123; Heyer v. Kranch, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 635; Otjen v. Frohbach, 148 Wis. 301, 134 N. W. 832; In re Silverthorn, 15 Ont. L. R. 112, 10 Ont. W. R. 798. 81 Rudd v. Roberts, 146 Ky. 622, 143 S. W. 2. 82 Feley v. Syer, 121 Md. 79, 88 Atl. 38; In re Mercantile Trust Co. 156 App. Div. 224, 141 N. Y. S. 460. 83 Mather v. Mather, 103 Ill. 607; Commons v. Commons, 115 Ind. 162, 16 N. E. 820, 17 N. E. 271; Weathers- bee v. Weathersbee, 82 S. Car. 4, 62 S. E. 838. 84In re Crofoot’s Will, 137 N. Y. S. 430; Hyde v. Rainey, 233 Pa. 540, 82 Atl. 781, Ann. Cas. 1913.B, 726. 85 Glore v. Scroggins, 124 Ga. 922, 53 S. E. 690; Bramell v. Cole, 136 Mo. 201, 37 S. W. 924, 58 Am. St. . 619, 86 Bilger v. Nunan, 186 Fed. 665; State v. Smith, 52 Conn. 557; Harp v. Wallin, 93 Ga. 811, 20 S. E. 966. 87 Cowell v. South Denver R. E. Co., 16 Colo. App. 108, 63 Pac. 991; McMillan vy. Cox, 109 Ga. 42, 34 S. E, 341, § 237° WILLS 212 not exercise the power in the absence of such necessity.°* But it has been held that where the wife of the testator is given a life estate with power to sell the property “for her own comfort and support” the power to sell is at her discretion, and it is not essen- tial to the exercise of the power that the sale is necessary for her support and comfort.* Where the gift is for life with power of disposal for the neces- sary benefit of the life tenant, the power must be exercised during the active enjoyment of the life estate, and in aid of that enjoy- ment.°? Where a life estate is expressly created, a power of dis- position does not enlarge such estate into a fee, either absolute or qualified.°* The above rule is generally held applicable even in cases where the power of disposal is an unlimited beneficial power,” but this is not the holding in all jurisdictions.” When real estate is given absolutely to one person, with a gift over to another of such portion as may remain undisposed of by the first taker at his death, the gift over is void, as repugnant to the absolute estate first given ;°* and it is also established law that, where an estate is given to a person generally, or indefinitely, with a power of disposition, it carries a fee, and any limitation 88 Peckham v. Lego, 57 Conn. 553, 19 Atl. 392, 7 L. R. A. 419, 14 Am. St. 130; Cox v. Wills, 49 N. J. Ea. 130, 22 Atl. 794; Cresap v. Cresap, 34 W. Va. 310, 12 S. E. 527. 89 Griffin v. Nicholas, 224 Mo. 275, 123 S. W. 1063. 90 Small v. Thompson, 92 Maine 539, 43 Atl. 509; Ford v. Ticknor, 169 Mass. 276, 47 N. E. 877. 91 Dryer v. Crawford, 90 Ala. 131, 7 So. 445; Morffew v. S. F. & S. R. Co., 107 Cal. 587, 40 Pac. 810; Sill v. White, 62 Conn. 430, 26 Atl. 396, 20 L. R. A. 321; Wetter ¥. Walker, 62 Ga. 142; Wood v. Robertson, 113 Ind. 323, 15 N. E. 457; Ramsdell v. Rams- dell, 21 Maine 288; Collins v. Wick- wire, 162 Mass. 143, 38 N. E. 365; Burford v. Aldridge, 165 Mo. 419, 63 S. W. 101, 65 S. W. 720; Loosing v. Loosing, 85 Nebr. 66, 122 N. W. 707, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 920; Bur- leigh v. Clough, 52 N. H. 267, 13 Am. Rep. 23; Swarthout v. Ranier, 143 N. Y. 499, 38 N. E. 726; Weir v. Smith, 62 Tex. 1. 92 Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262, 102 N. E. 293; Goss v. Withers, 153 Ky. 5, 154 S. W. 398; Bragg v. Litchfield, 212 Mass. 148, 98 N. E. 673; Romjne v. Randolph, 166 Mo. App. 87, 148 S. W. 185; In re Granfield, 79 Misc. 374, 140 N. Y. S. 922; Hovely v. Her- rick, 152 Wis. 11, 139 N. W. 384. 88 Dills v. La Tour, 136 Mich. 243, 98 N. W. 1004; Bradley v. Carnes, 94 Tenn. 27, 27 S. W. 1007, 45 Am. St. 696; Honaker v. Duff, 101 Va. 675, 44 S. E. 900. °4Mulvane v. Rude, 146 Ind. 476, 45 N. E. 659, 213 ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED § 238 over is void for repugnancy.**® Where the testator, by residuary clause, leaves the rest and residue of his estate to one for his sole use and benefit during the term of his natural life and upon his death the remainder to be divided in a specified manner, but fur- ther provides that “it is my will” that the first taker “‘be not re- stricted in any manner from using or disposing of all or any part” of the property, it was held that a life estate with power of disposition, and not a fee was created.°° Gifts for life with power of sale in the life tenant are a con- stant source of litigation, due mainly to the confused ideas re- specting the scope of the power intended to be conferred. Such gifts generally subject the property to the payment of the life tenant’s debts, and often give rise to contention and litigation be- tween the life tenant and the remainderman. The purpose of the testator may be better accomplished, and rights of both the life tenant and the remainderman be better protected by creating a trust with power in the trustee to make advancements.*” § 238. Estates tail—An estate tail is an estate of inher- itance limited, not to the donee’s heirs in general, but to the heirs of his body.** Such estates have been abolished very generally in this country and in parts of the Dominion of Canada; but are in general use in England. In some of the states of the United States they are converted into estates in fee simple*® and in oth- ers, into life estates in the first taker with remainder in fee simple in his immediate heirs. It would seem, however, that in Kansas, 95 Norris v. Hensley, 27 Cal. 439; Wiley v. Gregory, 135 Ind. 647, 35 N. E. 507; Bills v. Bills, 80 Iowa 269, 45 N. W. 748, 8 L. R. A. 696, 20 Am. St. 418; Kelley v. Meins, 135 Mass. 231; Combs v. Combs, 67 Md. 11, 8 Atl. 757, 1 Am. St. 359; Bean v. Ken-- muir, 86 Mo. 666; McClellan v. Larchar, 45 N. J. Eq. 17, 16 Atl. 269; Campbell v. Beaumont, 91 N. Y. 464; Seibert v. Wise, 70 Pa. St. 147; Chap- lin v. Doty, 60 Vt. 712, 15 Atl. 362. 96 Mooy v. Gallagher, 36 R. I. 405, 90 Atl. 663, L. R. A. 1916 C, 1040, 97 See post, ch. 30, § 745. 28 Allen v. Craft, 109 Ind. 476, 9 N. E. 919, 58 Am. Rep. 425; McFeely v. Moore, 5 Ohio 464, 24 Am. Dec. 314; Anders v. Gerhard, 140 Pa. St. 153, 21 Atl. 253; Simms v. Buist, 52 S. Car. 554, 30 S. E. 400. 99 Dengel v. Brown, 1 App. D. C. 423; English v. McCreary, 157 Ala. 487, 48 So. 113; Lofton v. Murchison, 80 Ga. 391, 7 S. E. 322; Paterson v. Ellis, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 259. 1 Mercantile Tr. Co. v. Adams, 95 Ark, 333, 129 S. W. 1101; St. John § 239 WILLS 214 the essential character of the estate tail (the right to convert the estate into a fee simple by a conveyance) is preserved.” To create an estate tail it is generally essential to use not merely the word “heirs,” but some word indicating the body from which the heirs are to come, or some word of procreation from a particular person.? While the words of limitation gener- ally used are “heirs of his body,” other equivalent words, which clearly make the limitation to the heirs of the body of the grantee, are sufficient. Any words which especially show the testator’s in- tention to create such an estate will be sufficient. Thus a devise to a person, his heirs and assigns, providing that, if the devisee should die leaving no heirs, it should go to a has been held to create an estate tail.* When the grantee in tail is alone mentioned as the person from whose body the heirs are to be derived, the estate is in tail gen- eral.” When both the parents from whose bodies the heirs must be derived are specified, as where the devise is to one and the heirs of his body by a woman named, the estate is a tail special.° The estate may be confined to heirs male or heirs female, and then the descendant must be traced through heirs male in the one case, or to the heirs female in the other, and the estate is in tail male or tail female.” An estate tail, so far as it depends upon the words “of his body,” may be created by implication.® § 239. Estates for years.—Estates for years are usually created by a lease, but they may result from a devise.® Such estates are chattels real, and are not of inheritance.*° They may be created by the use of any words that will clearly indicate an in- v. Dann, 66 Conn. 401, 34 Atl. 110; Cox v. Jones, 229 Mo. 53, 129 S. W. 495; Yocum v. Siler, 160 Mo. 281, 61 S. W. 208. 2Ewing v. Nesbit, 88 Kans. 788, 129 Pac, 1131. 8 Adams v. Ross, 30 N. J. L. 505, 32 Am. Dec. 237. 4 Chesebro v. Palmer, 68 Conn. 207, 36 Atl. 42. 5Co. Lit. §§ 14, 15, 21, 22. Riggs v. Sally, 15 Maine 408; Emans v. Emans, 3 N. J. L. 967. 6 Allen v. Craft, 109 Ind. 476, 9 N. E. 919, 58 Am. Rep. 425. 7 Dart v. Dart, 7 Conn. 250; Lew- thwait v. Thompson, 36 L. T. (N, S.) 910. 8 Fahrney v. Holsinger, 65 Pa. St, 388. 9 Rice Real Property, § 120. 10 Hellwig v. Bachman, 26 Ill. App. 165. 215 ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED § 240 tention to pass such estate." Thus, a devise to one to hold for a definite time after the testator’s death will pass an estate for years.” § 240. Joint tenancy and tenancy in common.—The chief characteristic which distinguishes an estate in joint tenancy from an estate in common is that of survivorship ;* but the principle of survivorship will also apply to tenants in common where the gift is to the donees as a class, and one dies before the testator, or afterward before the gift vests.** Joint tenancies, as contradistinguished from tenancies by en- tireties, have been much in disfavor since feudal times, because of the principal incident of survivorship; and in a large number of states, this spirit of hostility has crystallized in legislative re- strictions. A tenancy in common will be presumed, unless the devise expressly declares that a joint tenancy was intended.” It was at one time held that a gift to two persons, naming them, created a joint tenancy,*® but such gift is now generally held to create a tenancy in common.*’ Likewise, a tenancy in common is created by a gift to two persons, naming them, and “their chil- dren,”** or their heirs and assigns.*® A tenancy in common is al- ways created, without the aid of a statute, by words that look to a division of the land devised, such as the words “‘to be equally di- vided,” or “share and share alike,” or any words indicating a division.”° 11 Moore v. Miller, 8 Pa. St. 272. 12 Hellwig v. Bachman, 26 Ill. App. 165; Jacquat v. Bachman, 26 Ill. App. 169. 138 Rockwell v. Swift, 59 Conn. 289, 20 Atl. 200. 14Springer v. Congleton, 30 Ga. 976; Crecelius v. Horst, 78 Mo. 566; Hall v. Smith, 61 N. H. 144; Hop- pock v. Tucker, 59 N. Y. 202; In re Striewig’s Estate, 169 Pa. St. 61, 32 Atl. 83. 15 Lemmons v. Reynolds, 170 Mo. 227, 71 S. W. 135. 16 Putnam v. Putnam, Surr. (N. Y.) 308. 4 Bradf. 17 In re Hittell, 141 Cal. 432, 75 Pac. 53; Lemmons vy. Reynolds, 170 Mo. 227, 71 S. W. 135; In re Kimberly, 150 N. Y. 90, 44 N. E. 945. 18 Cruit v. Owen, 203 U. S. 368, 51 L. ed. 227, 27 Sup. Ct. 71; McCord v. Whitehead, 98 Ga. 381, 25 S. E. 767; Matter of Tompkins, 10 App. Div. 572, 42 N. Y. S. 412. 19 Jones v. Hand, 78 App. Div. 56, 79 N. Y. S. 556. 20 Howard v. Howard, 19 Conn. 313; Griswold v. Johnson, 5 Conn. 363; Dunn v. Bryan, 38 Ga. 154; Dodds v. Winslow, 26 Ind. App. 652, 60 N. E. 458; Potter v. Nixon, 81 N. § 241 WILLS 216 A devise of land to two persons, “to be equally divided between them,” but one of them named “‘to have the part next the brook,” creates an estate in common in them, and not an estate in sever- alty in each. The statement that a particular one is “to have the part next the brook” denotes merely that, when a future division of the property shall be made, that person shall have his portion assigned to him in the place named. It has no possible effect on the tenancy in common necessarily arising from the unity of pos- session, nor can it operate to produce such estate.** A devise to persons as tenants in common is not to be recom- mended, as it gives rise to much friction and litigation among the co-owners concerning such matters as use and occupation, rent, accounting, taxes, repairs and improvements, incumbrances, and waste. Also partition is expensive and often results unsatisfac- torily. There is neither dower nor curtesy in estates in joint tenancy, and the interest is not subject to testamentary disposition unless the testator survives his co-tenant. The rights of each tenant, like those of tenants in common, are equal in the property until division.® § 241. Estates in remainder.—An estate created to take effect upon the termination of a prior estate in the same property created by the same instrument is an estate in remainder.?? Such estate may be created by any expression which shows the testa- tor’s intention to dispose of his entire estate in the property in such manner that there is at the same time created a particular estate therein, less than a fee, followed by a limitation over to take effect upon the termination of such preceding particular estate.** J. Eq. 338, 86 Atl. 444; Pruden v. S. E. 944; Barclay v. Platt, 170 IIL Paxton, 79 N. Car. 446, 28 Am. Rep. 333; Goldstein v. Hammell, 236 Pa. 305, 84 Atl. 772. 21Griswold v. Johnson, 5 Conn. 363. 22 Dunavant v. Fields, 68 Ark. 534, 60 S. W. 420. 23 Fleming v. Ray, 86 Ga. 533, 12 384, 48 N. E. 972; In re Rudy’s Es- tate, 185 Pa. St. 359, 39 Atl. 968, 64 Am, St. 654. 24 Smith v. Chadwick, 111 Ala. 542, 20 So. 436; Fleming v. Ray, 86 Ga. 533; 12 S. E. 944; Barclay v. Platt, 170 Ill. 384, 48 N. E. 972; Tindall v. Miller, 143 Ind. 337, 41 N. E. 535; 217 ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED § 24]. “The essential characteristics of a remainder are: (1) There must be a precedent particular estate, whose regular termination the remainder must await. (2) The remainder must be created by the same conveyance, and at the same time, as a particular estate. (3) The remainder must vest in right during the con- tinuance of the particular estate, or eo instanti that it determines. (4) No remainder can be limited after a fee simple. The neces- sary features of a remainder arise out of the definition. The defi- nition describes a remainder as the remnant of the whole after a part has been disposed of. It follows, therefore, of course, that there must be that part in order to fulfil the definition.””** The chief distinction between a remainder and an executory devise is that a remainder follows a particular estate, while an executory devise follows a fee.2* So an estate in remainder can not be limited after an estate in fee simple,”’ whether it be a quali- fied or defeasible fee, or a conditional fee.?* An estate in remainder is usually limited after an estate for life,*® although it may be limited after an estate tail,°° or an estate for years,** Terry v. Bourne, 33 S. W. 403, 17 Ky. L. 1042; Maguire v. Moore, 108 Mo. 267, 18 S. W. 897; Brombacher v. Berking, 56 N. J. Eq. 251, 39 Atl. 134; Duclos v. Benner, 136 N. Y. 560, 32 N. E. 1002; Bird v. Gilliam, 121 N. Car. 326, 28 S. E. 489; Shadden v. Hembree, 17 Ore. 14, 18 Pac. 572; In re Rudy’s Estate, 185 Pa. St. 359, 39 Atl. 968, 64 Am. St. 654; Simpson v. Cherry, 34 S. Car. 68, 12 S. E. 886; Hurt v. Brooks, 89 Va. 496, 16 S. E. 358. 252 Minor, Inst. 331, 332. See also Wells v. Houston, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 629, 57 S. W. 584. 26 Sullivan v. Garesche, 229 Mo. 496, 129 S. W. 949, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 605. 27Lambe v. Drayton, 182 Ill. 110, 55. N. E. 189; Watkins v. Watkins (Ky. App.), 120 S. W. 341; Simmons vy. Cabanne, 177 Mo. 336, 76 S. W. 618; Seibert v. Wise, 70 Pa. St. 147. 28 Sullivan v. Garesche, 229 Mo. 496, 129 S. W. 949, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 605. 29 Anderson v. Messinger, 146 Fed. 929,7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094; Rogers y. Highnote, 126 Ga. 740, 56 S. E. 93; Ortmayer v. Elcock, 225 Ill. 342, 80 N. E. 339; Bruce v. Bissell, 119 Ind. 525, 22 N. E. 4, 12 Am. St. 436, 12 Ann. Cas. 436; Chase v. Howie, 64 Kans. 320, 67 Pac. 822; Sheirick v. Maxwell, 89 S. W. 4, 28 Ky. L. 173; Lord v. Bourne, 63 Maine 368, 18 Am. Rep. 234; Sullivan v. Jones, 129 N. Car. 442, 40 S. E. 113; Yerkes v. Yerkes, 200 Pa. 419, 50 Atl. 186. 30 Hall v. Priest, 6 Gray (Mass.) 18. 31 Frazer v. Frazer, 74 S. W. 259, 24 Ky. L. 2517. § 242 WILLS 218 A valid remainder may exist as to property undisposed of by a life tenant with power of disposition.®* A remainder in personal property could not be created at com- mon law ;** but it is now generally held that an interest or estate in remainder may be limited after a life estate in such property.** § 242. Executory devises—An executory devise is such a limitation of a future estate and interest in lands as the law ad- mits in the case of a will, though contrary to the rules of limita- tions in conveyances inter vivos at common law. It is an estate created by will to take effect at some future time subsequent to the death of the testator without any reference to the existence or continuance of an intermediate estate.** Thus a will devising to testator’s niece an estate in fee simple, with a provision that if she married and left no issue the estate should go to the testator’s brothers and sisters or their children, and that if she left living issue at her death the estate should go to such issue, was given effect as an executory devise.°* There are two kinds of executory devises: one, where an estate is devised to one, but upon some future event that estate is determined, and the estate thereupon is to go to another; the other, when the estate is limited to com- merce in futuro, contrary to the rules of the common law. In the latter case the fee in the meantime remains in the heir of the devisor.** An executory devise may be contingent not only on the event that is to determine the fee, but also on the being of the person to take when the event occurs.** One of the distinctions 32 Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 Ill. 449, 50 N. E. 131; Keniston v. Mayhew, 169 Mass. 166, 47 N. E. 612; Crozier v. Bray, 120 N. Y. 366, 24 N. E. 712. 838 Maulding v. Scott, 13 Ark. 88, 56 Am. Dec. 298, : 34Thomas v. Castle, 76 Conn. 447, 56 Atl. 854; Hanvy v. Moore, 140 Ga. 691, 79 S. E. 772; McKee v. McKee, 82 S. W. 451, 26 Ky. L. 736; Burford v. Aldridge, 165 Mo. 419, 63 S. W. 109, 65 S. W. 720; In re Scull’s Es- tate, 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 87. 35 St. John v. Dann, 66 Conn. 401, 34 Atl. 110; Glover v. Condell, 163 Til, 566, 45 N. E. 173, 35 L. R.A. 360; Bank’s Will, 87 Md. 425, 40 Atl. 268; Fisher v. Wister, 154 Pa. St. 65, 25 Atl. 1009; Selman v. Robert- son, 46 S. Car. 262, 24 S. E. 187. 36 Ashby v. McKinlock, 271 Ill. 254, 111 N. E. 101. 37 Nightingale v. Burrell, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 104, 111. 38 Sullivan v. Garesche, 229 Mo. 496, 129 S. W. 949, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 605. 219 ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED § 243: between a remainder and an executory devise is that a remainder follows a particular estate, while an executory devise follows a fee.°° Where there is doubt whether a certain disposition is an executory devise or a contingent remainder, the courts will favor the latter.*° The first taker under a will creating an executory devise has no right to alienate or incumber the property as against those who may be entitled to succeed thereto upon, the termination of his estate.** In creating an executory devise care should be exercised not to postpone the vesting beyond the period fixed by the rule against perpetuities.*? § 243. Gifts of a use.—For the purpose of convenience, gifts of the use, possession, enjoyment, rents, profits, in- terest, and income of property, are usually called gifts of a “use.” We have seen that a gift of the rents, profits, interest, or income of property, if there is no disposition of the property itself, passes the absolute interest in the property to the benefi- ciary. But this rule is applicable only where the testator has not expressly or by implication disposed of the corpus in some other way. Thus a gift of the “profits and benefits” of certain real estate, followed by a provision for the sale of such real estate at a fixed time, was held not to pass the fee.“ While a gift of the use or the use and occupation of land will carry the fee, yet if the gift be to a trustee to permit the benefi- ciary to occupy without rent, the interest passing will amount to a license of a use only.** If the use be restricted to life, during mi- 39 Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 458, 18 L. ed. 869; Bristol v. At- water, 50 Conn. 402; Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N. H. 267, 13 Am. Rep. 23; Mangum v. Piester, 16 S. Car. 316. 40 Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N. H. 267, 13 Am. Rep. 23; Manderson v. Lu- kens, 23 Pa. St. 31, 62 Am. Dec. 312. 41 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147; St. John vy. Dann, 66 Conn. 401, 34 Atl. 110; Satterfield v. Tate, 132 Ga. 256, 64 S. E. 60. 42 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147; Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45 Pac. 391, 35 L. R. A. 41; Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S. W. 989; Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162, 18 S. W. 1145. 43 Collier v. Grimesey, 36 Ohio St. 17. 44Le Breton v. Cook, 107 Cal. 410, § 244 WILLS 220 nority, during widowhood or during widowhood until marriage, until a certain age, and the like, only an estate or interest com- mensurate with the limitation prescribed will pass.* The time fixed for the termination of the use must be within the period allowed by law, otherwise the gift may fail or be held to amount to a gift of the corpus.*® If it is desired that the bene- ficiary should use and enjoy personal property in specie, without being subjected to the giving of security for its preservation, the will should so state.*7 Likewise, if it is desired to exempt such gift from taxes, insurance, interest on incumbrances, and the like, the will should so provide.* § 244. Rule in Shelley’s Case.—The Rule in Shelley’s Case is this: Where a freehold estate is limited to one for life, and by the same instrument the inheritance is limited, either immediately or after another estate in freehold, to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, the whole estate vests in him, either in fee simple or in fee ‘tail, in the same manner as if the estate had been given to him and his heirs, or to him and the heirs of his body; and the words “heirs” and “heirs of his body” are words of limitation and not of purchase.*® The rule, though of feudal origin, has been re- peatedly declared to be in accordance with the general policy of modern jurisprudence.°° While the rule has been generally abol- ished by statute in this country,™ it remains a rule of property in 40 Pac. 552; Hadley v. Simmons (N. J. Eq.), 49 Atl. 816; Jackson v. Jack- son, 56 S. Car. 346, 33 S. E. 749; Shindler v. Robinson, 150 App. Div. 875, 135 N. Y. S. 1056. 45 Lewis v. Harrower, 197 Ill. 315, 64 N. E. 374; Fogler v. Titomb, 92 Maine 184, 42 Atl. 360; Diament v. Lore, 31 N. J. L. 220. 46 See Rule against Perpetuities, § 265. 47 Clarke v. Terry, 34 Conn. 176; In re Oertle, 34 Minn. 173, 24 N. W. 924, 57 Am. Rep. 48. 48 See post, ch. 31, § 1206. 49 Holt v. Pickett, 111 Ala. 362, 20 So. 432; Norris v. Hensley, 27 Cal. 439; Goodrich v. Lambert, 10 Conn. 448; Griffith v. Derringer,.5 Har. (Del.) 284; Seay v. Cockrell, 102 Tex. 280, 115 S. W. 1160. 50 Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. Car. 1, 16 S. E. 1011, 22 L. R. A. 598. 51 Watson v. Williamson, 129 Ala. 362, 30 So. 281; Wilkerson v. Clark, 80 Ga. 367, 7 S. E. 319, 12 Am. St. 258; Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 415, 67 N. W. 505, 32 L. R. A. 744, 63 Am. St. 584; Godman v. Simmons, 113 Mo. 122, 20 S. W. 972; Moore v. Lit- tel, 41 N. Y. 66; In re Tillinghast, 25 R. I, 338, 55 Atl, 879. 221 ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED § 244 the construction of both deeds and wills in several states.°? In jurisdictions where the rule has been abolished, a devise that would formerly have vested a fee in the first taker now gives him a life estate only, with remainder in fee to his heirs.** Generally speaking the rule is not one of construction or inter- pretation, but a rule of property,°* and is not governed by the in- tention of the testator.” But it has been held that where the in- tention of the testator is clearly ascertainable, it will prevail even against the rule.°° This rule is not regarded as a device to dis- cover the intention of the testator, but is only applied after such intention has been discovered, when, by its own inexorable force, it unites in the ancestor any estate which his heirs are to take as such, after a precedent estate given to him, no matter what the purpose of the testator may have been; and there is a material and controlling distinction between a devise of an estate to a per- son named and his lawful heirs, and a devise to the lawful heirs of a person named.** “As applied to wills the rule is not allowed to override the manifest and clearly expressed intention of the testator, but the intention will always be carried into effect if it can be ascertained. If the language of the will is such as to bring the case within the rule, full force and effect will be given to it; but if it clearly appears that the testator had a meaning and inten- tion different from the rule, this will not be allowed to frustrate his intention.” 52 Hardage v. Stroope, 58 Ark. 303, 24 S. W. 490; Fowler v. Black, 136 Ill, 363, 26 N. E. 596, 11 L. R. A, 670; Lane v. Utz, 130 Ind. 235, 29 N. E. 772; Broliar v. Marquis, 80 Iowa 49, 45 N. W. 395; Thomas v. Hig- gins, 47 Md. 439; Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. Car. 1, 16 S. E. 1011, 22 L. R. A. 598; Carson v. Fuhs, 131 Pa. St. 256, 18 Atl. 1017; Carrigan v. Drake, 36 S. Car. 354, 15 S. E. 339, 53 Copley v. Ball, 176 Fed. 682; Wilkerson v. Clark, 80 Ga. 367, 7 S. E. 319, 12 Am. St. 258; Cross v. Hoch, 149 Mo. 325, 50 S. W. 786; King v. Beck, 15 Ohio 561. 54 Baker v. Scott, 62 Ill. 86. 55 Jones v. Rees, 6 Pennew. (Del.) 504, 69 Atl. 785, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 734; Robert v. West, 15 Ga. 122; Brown v. Bryant, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 454, 44 S. W. 399. 56 Slemmer v. Crampton, 50 Iowa 302; Albin v. Parmele, 70 Nebr. 740, 98 N. W. 29; Tendick v. Evetts, 38 Tex. 275. 57 Conger v. Lowe, 124 Ind. 368, 24 N. E. 889, 9 L. R. A. 165n. 58 Jones Real Property, § 606. § 245 WILLS 222 While the Rule in Shelley’s Case was laid down as applicable to real estate only, with reference to which alone could the word “heirs” properly be used as a word of limitation, it has, in some cases, been extended to testamentary dispositions of personal property, with the same result of giving an absolute title to the taker of a mere life estate by reason of a subsequent limitation to his heirs, upon the ground that words which would pass an estate of inheritance in real estate must be construed as giving an abso- lute title to personal property.*® It has been held, however, that the rule has no application in a testamentary disposition of per- sonal property.** A thorough understanding of the application of this rule is of great practical importance, both in drawing wills and in construing their provisions. § 245. Rule in Wild’s Case.-—According to the Rule in Wild’s Case,® if there be in a will a limitation of real estate to A and his children or issue, A takes an estate tail, provided there be no children or issue at the time the will is made. And his estate will not be divested by the subsequent birth of a child.°* Modern statutes, however, usually give a fee simple where the common law gave only a life estate, and the Rule in Wild’s Case would seem to be no longer necessary, for it would cut down the estate, and not enlarge it as it was intended to do.** But if there were children or a child in being at the time the will was made, such children or child would take by purchase,®* unless the context of the will shows that the testator intended the first taker to have a fee. 59 Glover v. Condell, 163 Ill. 566, 45 N. E. 173, 35 L. R. A. 360; Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575, 81 N. E. 300; Knox v. Barker, 8 N. Dak. 272, 78 N. W. 352; Taylor v. Lindsay, 14 R. I. 518. 61 Gross v. Sheeler, 7 Houst. (Del.) 280, 31 Atl. 812; Jones v. Rees, 6 Pennew. (Del.) 504, 69 Atl. 785, 16 L. R.A. (N. S.) 734. 626 Coke, 16b. 638 Loftin v. Murchison, 80 Ga. 391, 7 S. E, 322; Moore v. Gary, 149 Ind. 51, 48 N. E. 630; Silliman v. Whit- aker, 119 N. Car. 89, 25 S. E. 742; Oyster v. Orris, 191 Pa. St. 606, 43 Atl. 411. 64 Davis v. Ripley, 194 Ill. 399, 62 N. E. 852. 65 Forrest Oil Co. v. Crawford, 77 Fed. 106; Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352, 44 Am. Rep. 320; Gordon v. Jackson, 58 N. J. Eq. 166, 43 Atl. 98; Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 100 Va. 552, 42 S. E. 306, 93 Am. St. 976. 66 Hood v. Dawson, 98 Ky. 285, 33 223 ESTATES OR INTERESTS CREATED § 245 The Rule in Wild’s Case has no application where an estate is given to one expressly for life, with “remainder to his children” as the first taker has a life estate and his children a remainder as purchasers.’ In some jurisdictions Wild’s Case has been fol- lowed in part, when there were children born at the time the will was executed, and the ancestor and the children in such cases have been held to take as tenants in common in fee simple.** S. W. 75, 17 Ky. L. 880; Jones v. 68 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 73 Conn. Jones, 13 N. J. Eq. 236; Houck v. 303, 47 Atl. 325; Jamison v. Mc- Patterson, 126 N. Car. 885, 36 S. E. Whorter, 7 Houst. (Del.) 242, 31 198. Ati. 517; Loyless v. Blackshear, 43 67 Crawford v. Clark, 110 Ga. 729, Ga. 327; Allen v. Hoyt, 5 Metc. 36 S. E. 404, 6 Prob. Rep. Ann. 15; (Mass.) 324; Gordon v. Jackson, 58 Crandell v. Barker, 8 N. Dak. 263, 78 N. J. Eq. 166, 43 Atl. 98, N. W. 347; Lewis v. Bryce, 187 Pa, St. 362, 41 Atl, 275, CHAPTER XIII VESTED AND CONTINGENT SECTION 250. Vested and contingent interests defined and distinguished. 251. Intention of testator respecting vesting. 252. Construction in favor of vesting. 253. Condition or contingency on which interest vests. 254. Vesting under certain words of futurity. ESTATES AND INTERESTS SECTION 255. Vesting indicated by form of gift. 256. Interest contingent because of contingency of person. 257. Vested interest subject to open and let in. 258. Vested interest subject to be di- vested. § 250. Vested and contingent interests defined and dis- tinguished.— Perhaps no question can arise in the course of legal inquiries more doubtful in its nature, or less referable to fixed and certain rules and principles, than whether the words of a devise or bequest constitute a vested or contingent interest. An estate is said to be vested when there is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of future enjoyment.’ “By a vested estate, in relation to interests of a freehold quality, is to be understood an interest clothed, as to legal estates, with a legal seizin, or, as to equitable estates, with an equitable seizin, which enables the person to whom the interest is limited to exercise the right of present or future enjoyment immediately, in point of estate.” When a person has a fixed interest in a definite piece of property or fund, which is clothed with all the attributes of own- ership, he is said to have a vested title. The term “vested estate” applies to equitable as well as to legal 1Flanner v. Fellows, 206 Ill. 136, 68 N. E. 1057; Clarke v. McCreary, 20 Miss. 347; Bennett v. Garlock, 10 Hun (N. Y.) 328; In re Moran’s Will, 188 Wis. 177, 95 N. W. 367. 21 Prest. Est. 65. See also Thorn- ton v. Zea, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 509, 55 S. W. 798. 3 Johnson v. Washington L. & T. Co., 33 App. D. C. 242; Wiess v. Goodhue, 98 Tex. 274, 83 S. W. 178. 224 225 VESTED AND CONTINGENT ESTATES AND INTERESTS § 250 estates,* and includes all estates which are not contingent, whether in possession, reversion, or remainder.° An interest is said to be contingent where there is no present fixed right of either present or future enjoyment ; but where there is a chance of enjoyment in the future if a certain specified event happens.® “It is not the uncertainty of enjoyment in the future, but the uncertainty of the right to that enjoyment, that makes the difference between the vested and the contingent interest.”* Con- tingent interests do not constitute an estate in the land, but a mere chance that there may be an estate if the contingency turn out favorably to the beneficiary.* But vested interests constitute a fixed and certain estate, though the right to possession is deferred to some future period, dependent upon the happening of some future contingency.® Where, under the terms of the gift, the estate is limited to take effect either to a dubious and uncertain person or upon a dubious and uncertain event, so that the preceding particular estate may never be determined and the remainder may never take effect, the estate or interest is contingent.*° On the other hand, an estate which is limited to an ascertained person in being, whose right to the estate is fixed and certain, and does not depend on the happen- ing of any future event, but whose enjoyment and possession is postponed to some future time, the interest is vested.”* A vested estate or interest may be assigned, mortgaged, con- veyed or devised,*? and if the beneficiary is clothed with the pres- 4Canfield v. Canfield, 118 Fed. 1; Shackley v. Homer, 87 Nebr. 146, 127 N. W. 145. 5 Ward v. Edge, 100 Ky. 757, 39 S. W. 440, 19 Ky. L. 59. 6 Kingman v. Harmon, 131 Itl. 171, 23 N. E. 430; Hale v. Hobson, 167 Mass. 397, 45 N. E. 913. 72 Kent Comm. 206. See also Smaw v. Young, 109 Ala. 528, 20 So. 370; Hawkins v. Bohling, 168 Ill. 214, 48 N. E. 94; Lewis v. Howe, 174 N. Y. 340, 66 N. E. 975. 8 Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 15—Tuomp. WILLS. 58 N. E. 602, 52 L. R. A. 75, 79 Am. St. 246. 2 Woodley v. Calhoun, 69 S. Car. 285, 48 S. E. 272. 10 Poor v. Considine, 73 U. S. 458, 18 L. ed. 869; Marvin v. Ledwith, 111 Ill. 144; Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kans. 424, 21 Pac. 288, 3 L. R. A. 690. 11 Ruddell v. Wren, 208 Ill. 508, 70 N. E. 751; Faber v. Police, 10 S. Car. 376. 12 Acree v. Dabney, 133 Ala. 437, 32 So. 127; Dunn v. Schell, 122 Cal. 626, 55 Pac. 595; Cross v. Robinson, 21 § 251 WILLS 226 ent right of alienation the estate or interest is vested; otherwise not.” § 251. Intention of testator respecting vesting—lIn a given case the question of the time of vesting is one of intention, as that may be manifested in the instrument creating the estate as to which the question arises. The testator may fix the period of vesting to suit himself, and, when this intention is manifested with reasonable certainty, the law will give it effect, if the time so fixed is within that which the rule of law fixes.** All rules of construction pertaining to the vesting of estates or interests under a will will yield to the clearly expressed intention of the testator.*® The testator may express his intention to postpone vesting by describing the class in connection with the death of the life tenant or other future contingency as “then living,” or by the use of some equivalent words.*® But a testator’s particular intent, shown by a single provision standing by itself, must yield to the general leading intent, gathered from the whole instrument.” So in construing a will, all of the provisions will be regarded for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the testator, and if any particular paragraph of the will indicates an intent varying from that which is manifest from a consideration of all the other provisions, the general intent must prevail.** It is not always safe for the testator to rely on inference in the postponement of vesting, as a supposed contrary intent may be gathered from Conn. 379; Crossley v. Leslie, 130 Ga. 782, 61 S. E. 851, 14 Ann. Cas. 703. 13 Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254, 57 S. W. 1065, 80 Am. St. 625; Thorn- ton v. Zea, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 509, 55 S. W. 798. 14 Thom v. Thom, 101 Md. 444, 61 Atl. 193. 15In re Blake, 157 Cal. 448, 108 Pac. 287; Heisen v. Ellis, 247 Ill. 418, 93 N. E. 362; Archer v. Jacobs, 125 Iowa 467, 101 N. W. 195; Poultney y. Tiffany, 112 Md. 630, 77 Atl. 117; Tindall v. Tindall, 167 Mo. 218, 66 S. W. 1092; Freeman v. Freeman, 141 N. Car. 97, 53 S. E. 620; Biddle’s Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 525; Rogers v. Rogers, 11 R. I. 38; Harris v. Har- ris, 82 Vt. 199, 72 Atl. 912; In re Moran, 118 Wis. 177, 96 N. W. 367. 16 McGillis v. McGillis, 154 N. Y. 532, 49 N. E. 145, 17 Phelps v. Bates, 54 Conn. 11, 5 Atl. 301, 1 Am. St. 92. 18 McMurray v. Stanley, 69 Tex. 227, 6 S. W. 412. 227 VESTED AND CONTINGENT ESTATES AND-INTERESTS § 252 other parts of the will.° It is safer to expressly provide that the estate shall vest on the happening of a certain event.”° § 252. Construction in favor of vesting.—All estates cre- ated by will are to become vested upon the death of the testator, unless there is a provision to the contrary. And where the will contains words limiting the period of enjoyment of the estate to some future time, after the death of the testator, it may then be- ‘come a question whether the vesting of the estate is thus intended to be delayed, or only the time for present enjoyment.?* Where the will contains no provisions or conditions for future estates or for the postponement of enjoyment or distribution it is easy to determine when the gift vests, but where the will creates some form of future estate, or where the possession or enjoyment of the estate is postponed it is sometimes very difficult to determine when the estate vests. The law favors that construction by which gifts will be vested at the earliest moment consistent with a fair interpretation of the whole will,” which is usually at the death of the testator.** Even where the will contains a provision or con- dition for a future estate or for the postponement of enjoyment or distribution, the estate will be held to vest at the earliest possi- ble moment.** 19In re Brown, 154 N. Y. 313, 48 N. E. 537; Goebel v. Wolf, 113 N. Y. 405, 21 N. E. 388, 10 Am. St. 464. 20 See post, ch. 30, 8§ 844-862. 21 McCarty v. Fish, 87 Mich. 48, 49 N. W. 513. 22Johnson v. Wash L. & T. Co., 224 U. S. 224, 56 L. ed. 741, 32 Sup. Ct. 421; Crawford v. Engram, 153 Ala. 420, 45 So. 584; Booe v. Vinson, 104 Ark. 439, 149 S. W. 524; In re De Vries, 17 Cal. App. 184, 119 Pac. 109; Morton Tr. Co. v. Chitten- den, 81 Conn. 105, 70 Atl. 648; Sump- ter v. Carter, 115 Ga. 893, 42 S. E. 324, 60 L. R. A. 274; Mclaughlin v. Penney, 65 Kans. 527, 70 Pac. 341; Dickerson v. Dickerson, 211 Mo. 483, 110 S. W. 700. 23 Phinizy v. Foster, 90 Ala. 262, 7 So. 836; Rubencane v. McKee, 6 Del. Ch. 40, 6 Atl. 639; Sumpter v. Car- ter, 115 Ga. 893, 42 S. E. 324, 60 L. R. A. 274; Grimmer v. Friederich, 164 Ill. 245, 45 N. E. 498; Aspy v. Lewis, 152 Ind. 493, 52 N. E. 756; Hersey v. Purington, 96 Maine 166, 51 Atl. 863; Whall v. Converse, 146 Mass. 345, 15 N. E. 660; Rood v. Hovey, 50 Mich. 395, 15 N. W. 525; Kimble v. White, 50 N. J. Eq. 28, 24 Atl. 400; Byrnes v. Stilwell, 103 N. Y. 453, 9 N. E. 241, 57 Am. Rep. 760; Galloway v. Carter, 100 N. Car. 111, 5 S. E. 4; Patton v. Ludington, 103 Wis. 629, 79 N. W. 1073, 74 Am. St. 910. 24Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 458, 18 L. ed. 869; Gregory v. Welch, 90 Ark. 152, 118 S. W. 404; § 253 WILLS 228 In doubtful cases courts will incline to construe a devise or legacy as vested rather than contingent. The law always gives preference to vested over contingent interests. It does not favor the abeyance of estates. Where it is a remainder after a life estate, it is regarded as a vested remainder, and the possession only is postponed.” § 253. Condition or contingency on which interest vests. —An estate may be made to vest on one or more of a great va- riety of contingencies; but when it is made to depend on two or more contingencies, they must all take place before the vesting will occur.** The contingency may be the “defeat of a previous interest upon which the limitation over depends,’ or a change in the character of the beneficiary,”* or the exercise of a power by a trustee,”® or the survivorship of the testator by the beneficiary, or the profitable character of certain of the testator’s investments,** or the death of another than the beneficiary without issue.’’** A common contingency is where the gift is made to depend on the beneficiary surviving some designated person. As long as such designated person lives the gift is contingent.** Carpenter v. Perkins, 83 Conn. 11, 74 E. 482; Hayes v. Tabor, 41 N. H. Atl. 1062; Jossey v. Brown, 119 Ga. 758, 47 S. E. 350. 25 Bethea v. Bethea, 116 Ala. 265, 22 So. 561; Beckley v. Leffingwell, 57 Conn. 163, 17 Atl. 766; Legwin v. McRee, 79 Ga. 430, 4 S. E. 863; Mc- Connell v. Stewart, 169 Ill. 374, 48 N. E. 201; Gingrich v. Gingrich, 146 Ind. 227, 45 N. E. 101; Cox v. Handy, 78 Md. 108, 27 Atl. 227, 501; Pike v. Stephenson, 99 Mass. 188; Kimble v. White, 50 N. J. Eq. 28, 24 Atl. 400; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433, 37 N. E. 515; Pennsylvania Co.’s Ap- peal, 109 Pa. St. 489, 1 Atl. 82; Lin- ton v. Laycock, 33 Ohio St. 128; Weatherhead v. Stoddard, 58 Vt. 529, 5 Atl. 517, 56 Am. Rep. 573; Baker v. McLeod, 79 Wis. 534, 48 N. W. 657. 26 Donnell v. Newburyport Homeo- pathic Hospital, 179 Mass. 187, 60 N. 521; Dimmick v. Patterson, 142 N. Y. 322, 37 N. E. 109; Manderson v. Lukens, 23 Pa. St. 31, 62 Am. Dec. 312, 27 Calvin v. Springer, 28 Ind. App. 443, 63 N. E. 40; Baird v. Winstead, 123 N- Car. 181, 31 S. E. 390; In re Kennedy’s Estate, 190 Pa. St. 79, 42 Atl, 459. 28 Markham v. Hufford, 123 Mich. 505, 82 N. W. 222, 48 L. R. A. 580, 81 Am. St. 222. 29 Crist v. Schank, 146 Ind. 277, 45 N. E. 190. 30Oetjen v. Diemmer, 1005, 42 S. E. 388. 31In re Patterson’s Estate, 173 Pa. 185, 34 Atl. 117. 82 Farmers’ L. & T. Co. v. Ferris, 67 App. Div. 1, 73 N. Y. S. 475. 83 Turner v. Balfour, 62 Conn. 89, 25 Atl. 448; Phayer v. Kennedy, 169 115 Ga. 229 VESTED AND CONTINGENT ESTATES AND INTERESTS § 253 Where the gift is made to depend entirely on the attainment by the beneficiary of a designated age it is contingent ;°* but if the gift is to a named person, and its payment is postponed until he attains a certain age, it is vested.° “A bequest to A at twenty- one, and a bequest to A payable at twenty-one, do not much differ in expression; yet one is a vested, the other a contingent gift.”** “Where real or personal estate is devised or bequeathed to such of the children, or to such child or individual as shall attain a given age, or the children, etc., who shall sustain a certain char- acter, or do a particular act, or be living at a particular time, with- out any direct gift to the whole class, immediately preceding such restrictive description; so that the uncertain event forms part of the original description of the devisee or legatee,—in such case, the interest so devised or bequeathed is necessarily contingent on account of the person. For until the age is attained, the charac- ter sustained, or the act performed, the person is unascertained ; there is no person in rerum natura answering the description of the person who is to take as devisee or legatee.’”*” Where the gift is to be severed instanter from the general es- tate for the benefit of the beneficiary, and in the meantime the interest thereof is to be paid to him, that is indicative of the in- tent of the testator that the beneficiary shall at all events have the principal, and is to wait only for the payment until the day fixed.*® But it has been held that where a will gives the residuary estate to trustees to pay over to a beneficiary a certain portion of the income until he attains a certain age, and then to convey, transfer, and pay over to him certain proportions of the residue of the real Ill. 360, 48 N. E. 828; Lepps v. Lee, 77 N. E. 630; Fuller v. Fuller, 58 N. 92 Ky. 16, 17 S. W. 146, 13 Ky. L. 317; In re High’s Estate, 136 Pa. St. 222, 20 Atl. 42f, 423. 34 Waters v. Waters, 24 Md. 430; Dickerson v. Sheehy, 156 App. Div. 101, 141 N. Y. S. 35; In re Raab, 79 Misc. 185, 139 N. Y. S. 869. 35 State v. Main, 87 Conn. 175, 87 Atl. 38; Hall v. David, 67 Ga. 72; Minot v. Purrington, 190 Mass. 336, Car. 223; Waddell v. Waddell, 68 S. Car. 335, 47 S. E. 375. 36 Hawkins’ Wills, 225. 37 Smith Executory Interests, § 281. See also Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 Ill. 11; Wilhelm v. Calder, 102 Iowa 342, 71 N. W. 214; In re Schuldt’s Estate, 199 Pa. 58, 48 Atl. 879. 38 Warner v. Durant, 76 N. Y. 133. § 254 WILLS 230 estate and personalty, his interest in the residue is contingent on his attaining that age.®° If the gift is made to depend on the marriage or remarriage of a designated person, it is contingent until the event takes place, when it vests.*° If the interest upon a legacy or share of residue is given to the legatee in the meantime or until the time of pay- ment arrives, the gift is vested.** The rule is the same where the interest is given to other persons to be applied for the benefit of the legatee.*? Where the interest is made-applicable to support, the gift is vested.** But it seems that where the interest is given as a common fund for the maintenance of all members of a class, the legacy does not vest.** Where there is no gift of an aliquot share of the income to any individual child, but only a trust for maintenance out of the income of the whole fund, the gift is not vested.** If the gift or interest itself is contingent on the legatee attaining a certain age, so that the interest is to follow the fate of the principal, the principal is not vested.** § 254. Vesting under certain words of futurity—Whether a legacy is contingent or vested depends upon whether the con- tingency, if any, is annexed to the gift or to the time of pay- ment.*? If futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift, the vesting is suspended; but where the gift is absolute, and the time of payment only is postponed, the gift vests at once.** Words or phrases of futurity, such as “when,” “then,” and “from and after,” in a devise of a remainder limited upon a particular estate, determinable on an event which must necessarily happen, are con- strued to relate to the time of the enjoyment of the estate, and not 39 Dickerson v. Sheehy, 156 App. Div. 101, 141 N. Y. S. 35. 40 Carr v. Bredenberg, 50 S. Car. 471, 27 S. E. 925. 41 Provenchere’s Appeal, 67 Pa. 463. 42 Zartman v. Ditmars, 37 App. Div. 173, 55 N. Y. S. 908; Robert’s Ap- peal, 59 Pa. St. 70, 98 Am. Dec. 312. But see Johnson v. Terry, 139 Ala. 614, 36 So. 775. 43 Provenchere’s Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 463. 44 Lloyd v. Lloyd, 3 Kay & Johns. 20. 45 In re Parker, 16 Ch. Div. 44. 46 Knight v. Knight, 2 Sim. & Stu. 490. 47 Muhlenberg’s 587. 48 Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92. Appeal, 103 Pa. § 254 231 VESTED AND CONTINGENT ESTATES AND INTERESTS 99 668 oF ce ” if, : to the time of its vesting.*® The words “when, at “upon,” ‘on arrival” and the like as applied to the age when the devisee shall take, render such bequest prima facie contingent.*° But it has been held that a gift to a legatee, to be paid to him if he attain twenty-one, is vested.°* The rule is the same where the bequest is to a class or in the form of a direction to pay.” But these expressions are ambiguous, and slight circumstances in the context may be sufficient to show that the attainment of a specified age was not intended as a condition but only to fix the time of actual payment.** It is competent for the testator in terms to direct whether the estate over shall vest or not, and un- less very decisive terms of contingency are used, the estate will not be held contingent.** When the words used are equivocal, leaving it in some doubt whether words of contingency or condition apply to the gift itself or to the time of payment, courts are inclined to construe them rather as applying to the time of payment, and to hold the gift rather as vested than contingent. A gift of real estate to a devisee “at’’ a given age or marriage, “when” or “as” he shall at- tain, or “upon” or “from and after” he attains a given age, passes to such devisee an immediate vested estate, not deféasible in the event of his death under the specified age.°* But the use of these words with reference to gifts of personal property will usually create contingent interests.°’ A devise of real estate to A “if,” or “when,” he shall arrive at a certain age, with limitation over 49Grimmer y. Friederich, 164 IIL. 245, 45 N. E. 498; Moores v. Hare, 144 Ind. 573, 43 N. E. 870; Marsh v. Hoyt, 161 Mass. 459, 37 N. E. 454; Neilson v. Bishop, 45 N. J. Eq. 473, 17 Atl. 962; Hersee v. Simpson, 154 N. Y. 496, 48 N. E. 890; In re Car- stensen’s Estate, 196 Pa. St. 325, 46 Atl. 495; Patton v. Ludington, 103 Wis. 629, 79 N. W. 1073, 74 Am. St. 910. 50 Webb v. Webb, 92 Md. 101, 48 Atl. 95, 84 Am. St. 499, 51 Furness v. Fox, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 134, 48 Am. Dee. 593. 52 Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363. 53 Kimball v. Crocker, 53 Maine 263; Chew’s Appeal, 37 Pa. St. 23. 54 McGillis v. McGillis, 154 N. Y. 532, 49 N. E. 145. 55 Eldridge v. Eldridge, 9 Cush. (63 Mass.) 516. 56 Austin v. Bristol, 40 Conn. 120, 16 Am. Rep. 23; Roome v. Phillips, 24 N. Y. 463. 57 Seibert’s Appeal, 13 Pa. St. 501. But see Colt v. Hubbard, 33 Conn. 281. § 255 WILLS 232 in the event of his death before attaining that age, the attainment of the given age is held to be a condition subsequent and not precedent, and A takes an immediate vested estate, subject to be divested upon his death before arriving at the specified age.” And if the devise be to A ‘if,’ or ‘when,’ he shall attain a given age, with a limitation over upon his death or under that age with- out issue, A takes a vested estate, defeasible only in the event of his death without issue under the specified age.* If the devise be to A “at,” “upon,” or “from and after,” attaining a given age, with the gift over, the rule is the same. The provision for the gift over is held to show testator’s intention that the gift to A is to vest at once, subject to be divested upon his death before reach- ing the specified age.°° § 255. Vesting indicated by form of gift-—The question whether an estate is vested or contingent will often be determined by the form of the gift. Thus it has been held that where the will directs the estate to be distributed “according to law” it will vest immediately in the distributees.°* Also a vested estate is commonly indicated by words of limitation as to heirs or repre- sentatives of the first taker.®? It is a well settled rule of construction that, where an absolute property in a fund is bequeathed in fractional interests in succes- sion at periods which must arrive, the interests of the first and subsequent takers will vest together.** Where the gift’is accom- panied with a distinct direction to pay over or distribute in the future,** or where there are words importing a gift in addition to 58 Roome v. Phillips, 24 N. Y. 463; Kelso v. Cuming, 1 Redf. (N. Y.) 392; Edwards v. Hammond, 1 B. & P. N. R. 3241. 59 Phipps v. Ackers, 9 Cl. & F. 583; Holtby v. Wilkinson, 28 Grant Ch. (U. C.) 550, 60 Boraston’s Case, 3 Coke 51; In re Collier’s Will, 40 Mo. 287; In re Engle’s Estate, 167 Pa. St. 463, 31 Atl. 681. 61 Hersee v. Simpson, 154 N. Y. 496, 48 N. E. 890; In re McGovran’s Estate, 190 Pa. St. 375, 42 Atl. 705. 62 Woodman v. Woodman, 89 Maine 128, 35 Atl. 1037; Thompson v. O’Dell, 22 Ohio C. C. 200, 12 Ohio C. D. 396; Burton v. Provost, 75 Vt. 199, 54 Atl. 189. 63 Barnes Cycle Co. v. Haines, 69 N. J. Eq. 651, 61 Atl. 515; Lewisohn v. Henry, 179 N. Y. 352, 72 N. E. 239. 64 Webb v. Webb, 92 Md. 101, 48 233 VESTED AND CONTINGENT ESTATES AND INTERESTS § 256 the direction to pay over, divide, or distribute,°* or where the postponement of payment is for the purpose of letting in an inter- mediate estate,°° then the interest may be vested; but where the only gift is embodied in a direction to pay or distribute in the future, the legacy will be deemed contingent.” A gift is not ren- dered contingent by the mere postponement of payment thereof,** unless such postponement is for reasons personal to the legatee.” By the terms of the will a gift is sometimes prevented from vesting until the time for enjoyment.”° § 256. Interest contingent because of contingency of per- son.— Where the terms of the gift are such that the benefi- ciary can not be ascertained until the happening of some future event, the interest in remainder is contingent. Thus, where a gift is made to a class in such terms that the class can not be ascer- tained at the time of the testator’s death, but must be asser- tained at some future time, until such ascertainment the interest of the members of such class corresponding to such description is a mere contingency according to numerous holdings.” A bequest to one for life, and at her death to be equally divided among her children, creates a contingent remainder in the children, for, until the death of the life tenant, it can not be ascertained which of her Atl. 95, 84 Am. St. 499; Wardwell v. Hale, 161 Mass. 396, 37 N. E. 196, 42 Am. St. 413. 65 In re Crane, 164 N. Y. 71, 58 N. E. 47; Seibert’s Appeal, 19 Pa. St. 49, 66 Tn re Crane, 164 N. Y. 71, 58 N. E. 47. 67 Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 56, 46 Atl, 278; Armstrong v. Barber, 239 Ill. 389, 88 N. E. 246; Haviland v. Haviland, 130 Iowa 611, 105 N. W. 354,5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 281. 68 Abbott v. Lewis, 77 N. H. 601, 88 Atl 98; In re Lincoln Trust Co., 78 Misc. 325, 139 N. Y. S. 682. 69In re Engles’ Estate, 166 Pa. St. 280, 31 Atl. 76. 70 Ballentine v. Foster, 128 Ala. ‘638, 30 So. 481; Harding v. Harding, 174 Mass. 268, 54 N. E. 549; Goebel v. Wolf, 113 N. Y. 405, 21 N. E. 388, 10 Am. St. 464. 71 Buchanan v. Denig, 84 Fed. 863; Gindrat v. Western R. Co., 96 Ala. 162, 11 So. 372, 19 L. R. A. 839; Madison v. Larmon, 170 Ill. 65, 48 N. E. 556, 62 Am. St. 356; Bates v. Gil- lett, 132 Ill. 287, 24 N. E. 611; Loeb v. Struck, 42 S. W. 401, 19 Ky. L. 935; Reid v. Walbach, 75 Md. 205, 23 Atl. 472; Fitzhugh v. Townsend, 59 Mich. 427, 27 N. W. 561; Whitesides v. Cooper, 115 N. Car. 570, 20 S. E. 295; Wilson v. Denig, 166 Pa. St. 29, 30 Atl. 1025; Nicholson v. Cousar, 50 S. Car. 206, 27 S. E. 628; Forrest v. Porch, 100 Tenn. 391, 45 S. W. 676. § 25/7, 234 WILLS children will survive her.”7 Where the interest of a beneficiary is contingent until the time for ascertainment of the members of a class, it has been held that such interest does not pass to the trustee or assignee in bankruptcy of such beneficiary.” In some cases where the gift was to a class upon their attaining a certain age, a reference to “the share” of a member of the class dying before that age has been held to show that the members of the class took a vested interest." On the death of such beneficiary before his interest becomes vested, such interest does not pass to his issue unless specifically so provided by the terms of the will ;”° nor has the surviving wife or husband of such beneficiary any in- terest in the property in which the decedent had such contingent interest.”® § 257. Vested interest subject to open and let in.—Where a gift is to a class, which may increase or decrease in number during a particular estate, the gift will vest in those members of the class who are alive at the death of the testator, subject to open and let in all after-born members of the class.” “Where a remainder is limited to the use of several persons who do not all become capable at the same time, as a devise to A for life, remain- der to his children, the children living at the death of the testator take vested remainder, subject to be disturbed by after-born chil- dren. The remainder vests in the persons first becoming capable, and the estate opens and becomes devested in quantity by the birth of subsequent children, who are let in to take vested portions of 72 Allison v. Allison, 101 Va. 537, 44 S. E. 904, 63 L. R. A. 920. 73 Buchanan v. Denig, 84 Fed. 863. But see Nash vy. Nash, 12 Allen (Mass.) 345. 74In re Smith’s Estate, 226 Pa. 304, 75 Atl. 425. 7 Fitzhugh v. Townsend, 59 Mich. 427, 27 N. W. 561; Whitesides v. Cooper, 115 N. Car. 570, 20 S. E. 295, 76 Wilson v. Denig, 166 Pa. St. 29, 30 Atl. 1025. 77 Johnes v. Beers, 57 Conn. 295, 18 Atl. 100, 14 Am. St. 101; Cooper v. Mitchell Inv. Co., 133 Ga. 769, 66 S. E. 1090, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 291; Springer v. Congleton, 30 Ga. 976; Siddons v. Cockrell, 131 Ill. 653, 23 N. E. 586; Alsman v. Walters (Ind.), 106 N. E. 879; Kilgore v. Kilgore, 127 Ind. 276, 26 N. E. 56; Mercantile Bank v. Ballard’s Assignee, 83 Ky. 481, 7 Ky. L. 478, 4 Am. St. 160; Cox v. Handy, 78 Md. 108, 27 Atl. 227, 501; Dodd v. Winship, 144 Mass. 461, 11 N. E. 588; Clark v. More- hous, 74 N. J. Eq. 658, 70 Atl. 307; Cook v. McDowell, 52 N. J. Eq. 351, 235 VESTED AND CONTINGENT ESTATES AND INTERESTS § 258 ‘the estate.”"* Under this rule, children born or begotten prior to, and in esse at the time of, the death of the testator will be entitled to share in the distribution, but those living at the execution of the will who die before the testator are excluded.” The share of each member of the class, being vested, may be granted or devised during the existence of the particular estate, subject, however, to diminution as to the amount or quantity which the remainderman or his heirs will ultimately receive by reason of the class being subject to open and let in after-born members.*° The general rule is that a devise or bequest to a class, if no time for vesting is fixed, will take effect at the death of the testator. But where the will, either by express words, or neces- sary implication, fixes a different time, and the whole class is not then completed, the devise or remainder will vest in those then existing who will hold it subject to be opened so as to let in after- born persons who shall belong to the class at the time fixed by the will for its final completion.*t This form of vested gift is inde- feasible,** and has all the qualities of an absolute gift except that it is subject to be diminished by the subsequent birth of new mem- bers into the class during the duration of the particular estate.** § 258. Vested interest subject to be divested.—There is a class of gifts occupying an intermediate position between abso- lute gifts and contingent gifts which vest in the beneficiary sub- ject to being divested by the happening of a contingency or the exercise of a power. Until the contingency happens or the power is exercised this gift has all the incidents of an indefeasible inter- est. If the contingency never 30 Atl. 24; Losey v. Stanley, 147 N. Y. 560, 42 N. E. 8; Coggins v. Flythe, 113 N. Car. 102, 18 S. E. 96; In re Thomman’s Estate, 161 Pa. St. 444, 29 Atl. 84; Toole v. Perry, 80 Va. 681, 7 S. E. 118. 784 Kent Comm. 197. 79 Thomas v. Thomas, 149 Mo. 426, 51 S. W. 111, 73 Am. St. 405; Heisse v. Markland, 2 Rawle (Pa.) 274, 21 Am. Dec. 445; Whitbeard v. St. John, 10 Ves. Jr. 152, happens or the power is never 80 Rosenau v. Childress, 111 Ala. 214, 20 So. 95; Crawley v. Blackman, 81 Ga. 775, 8 S. E. 533. 81 Buckner v. Buckner, 255 Mo. 371, 164 S. W. 513. 82 Boston Safe Deposit &c. Co. v. Nevin, 212 Mass. 232, 98 N. E. 1051. 83 Johnson v. Webber, 65 Conn. 501, 33 Atl. 506; Losey v. Stanley, 147 N. Y. 560, 42 N. E. 8 § 258 WILLS 236 exercised the gift becomes absolute.** The most common exam- ple of this class of gifts is where a remainder is vested subject to be divested on the death of the first taker leaving children,*’ or the birth of issue of another.** But such a gift is sometimes made “subject to be divested by the exercise of a power of appointment*’ or disposition.®* If such estate is created by words of gift upon condition subsequent without any gift over, the first taker’s in- terest is terminated only upon entry or claim made by the testa- tor’s heirs.*® But where the estate is created upon a conditional limitation, the estate of the first taker comes to an end upon a breach of the condition, and the subsequent estate vests in the remainderman immediately without entry.°° Divesting provisions and conditions subsequent are always strictly construed, and where the language used is doubtful or ambiguous courts will decide the doubt in favor of the first taker." Hence the importance of using clear and unambiguous language when it is desired to make a vested gift subject to being divested upon the happening of a contingency. The time to which the contingency relates should be clearly indicated, else it may be referred to the death of the testator.°* In order that an estate once vested may be divested on the happening of a contin- gency, the contingency must have completely and literally hap- pened.°? -** Sumpter v. Carter, 115 Ga. 893, 42 S. E. 324, 60 L. R. A. 274, 85 Kilgore v. Kilgore, 127 Ind. 276, 26 N. E. 56; Lepps v. Lee (Ky.), 16 S. W. 346; Cox v. Handy, 78 Md. 108, 27 Atl. 227; Van Houton v. Hall, 71 N. J. Eq. 626, 64 Atl. 460; Van Nostrand v. Marvin, 16 App. Div. 28, 44 N. Y. S. 679; Doppler v. Clon- wetter, 20 Ohio C. C. 701, 11 Ohio C. D. 374. 86 Boatman v. Boatman, 198 Ill. 414, 65 N. E. 81; Hebberd v. Lese, 107 App. Div. 425, 95 N. Y. S. 333. 87 Thorington v. Thorington, 111 Ala. 237, 20 So. 407, 36 L. R. A. 385. 88 Bergman v. Arnhold, 242 Ill. 218, 89 N. E. 1000. 89 Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray (Mass.) 142, 63 Am. Dec. 725; Williams v. Jones, 166 N. Y. 522, 60 N. E. 240. 90 Summitt v. Yount, 109 Ind. 508, 9 N. E. 582; Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray (Mass.) 142, 63 Am. Dec. 725; Smith v. Smith, 23 Wis. 176, 90 Am. Dee. 153. 91 Sumpter v. Carter, 115 Ga. 893, 42 S. E. 324, 60 L. R. A. 274; Gallo- way v. Carter, 100 N. Car. 111, 5 S. E. 4. 92 Engel v. State, 65 Md. 539, 5 Atl. 249; Miller v. Gilbert, 144 N. Y. 68, 38 N. E. 979; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433, 37 N. E. 515. 93 Tllinois Land &c. Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315; Lantz v. Trusler, 37 Pa. St. 482, CHAPTER XIV RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES SECTION SECTION 265. Meaning of perpetuity in law. 271. Applications of rule to charitable 266. Common law rule. gifts. 267. Statutory modifications of the 272. Effect of directions to accumu- late the income. 273. Disposition of property where rule, 268. Nature and purpose of the rule. 269. Period allowed for vesting. gift void under the Rule 270. Estates or interests subject to against Perpetuities. the rule. § 265. Meaning of perpetuity in law.—A perpetuity in law has been defined to be “a limitation of property which renders it inalienable beyond the period allowed by law. That period is a life or lives in being and twenty-one years more, with a fraction of a year added for the time of gestation, in cases of posthumous birth.”* An accurate definition of perpetuity in the sense used in the Rule against Perpetuities is the following from Mr. Lewis: “A perpetuity is a future limitation, whether executory or by way of remainder, and of either real or personal property, which is not to vest until after the expiration of, or will not necessarily vest within, the period fixed and prescribed by law for the creation of future estates and interests; and which is not destructible by the persons for the time being entitled to the property subject to the future limitation, except with the concurrence of the individual interested under that limitation.”? It is a grant or devise of property wherein the vesting of an estate or interest is unlawfully postponed. The law allows the 1Quld v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303, 24 L. ed. 450. See also Duggan v. Slocum, 92 Fed. 806; Hart v. Seymour, 147 Ill. 598, 35 N. E. 246; Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Maine 359, 36 Atl. 635; In re Johnston’s Es- tate, 185 Pa. 179, 39 Atl. 879, 64 Am. St. 621. 2 Lewis Perp. 164. See also Waldo v. Cummings, 45 Ill. 421; Hillyard v. Miller, 10 Pa. St. 326; Ferguson v. Ferguson, 39 U. C. Q. B. 232. 237 § 266 WILLS 238 vesting of an estate or interest, and also the power of alienation to be postponed for the period of a life or lives in being and 21 years and 9 months thereafter ; and all restraints upon the vesting that may suspend it beyond that period are treated as perpetual restraints, and void, and estates or interests which are dependent on them are void. Nothing is denounced as a perpetuity that does not transgress this rule. The limitation, in order to be valid, must be so made that the estate, or whatever is devised or be- queathed, not only may, but must necessarily, vest within the pre- scribed period. If by any possibility the vesting may be post- poned beyond this period, the limitation over will be void.* To constitute a perpetuity, within the Rule against Perpetuities, it is essential that the estate of the person who for the time being is entitled to the property, subject to the future limitation, should be indestructible; and if by force of the instrument creating the limited estate the taker thereof is empowered to become the owner in fee or to alienate the property and to thus destroy the limited estate and defeat the limitation, although such power may not have been exercised, a perpetuity does not exist.° If the vesting in possession of an estate limited over is postponed beyond the period of a life or lives in being and 21 years and 9 months, the limitation is void, and the period from which the rule runs is the death of the testator.® § 266. Common-law rule.—Anciently, under the common law, it was possible by executory devise to lock up estates in fami- lies so as to prevent alienation for any period of time the owner might desire. And such estate was termed a perpetuity, a thing which the law is said to abhor, as estates are made by it incapable of answering those ends of social commerce and providing for the sudden contingencies of private life for which property was first established.”. The abhorrence of the law for estates so tied up 3 Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Maine 15 Atl. 525,1L. R. A. 453, 6 Am. St. 359, 36 Atl. 635. 781, 4Fosdick v. Fosdick, 6 Allen 6 Stephens v. Evans, 30 Ind. 39; (Mass.) 41. Sears v. Russell, 8 Gray (Mass.) 86. 5 Mifflin’s Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 205, 72 Bl Comm. 174; Tiedman Real Prop., § 544; 2 Wash. Real Prop. 701. 239 RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 267 led to the gradual establishment by judicial decisions of the Rule against Perpetuities, which in short was, that estates could not be so limited as not to be alienable for a longer period than the life or lives in being and 21 years after; and for the purpose of letting in posthumous children, 9 months, the period of gestation, was added.*® “The true form of the Rule against Perpetuities is believed to be this: No interest subject to a condition precedent 1s good, un- less the condition must be fulfilled, if at all, within twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.” “This appears to be correct if we assume that ‘condition’ includes not only all uncertain future acts and events but also certain fu- ture events with the exception of the termination of preceding estates. If we decline to make this assumption, and confine ‘con- dition’ to uncertain future acts and events, then the Rule against Perpetuities will take this shape: No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life ~in being at the creation of the interest.’”*® The common-law rule permits the tying up of property for lives in being at the death of the testator, and 21 years in addi- tion. It does not limit the lives to those of persons in being at the date of the will.** The common-law rule against perpetuities prevails in all of the states, excepting as it may have been modified by statute.** § 267. Statutory modifications of the rule—In a number of jurisdictions the common-law Rule against Perpetuities has been more or less modified by statute. Such statutes usually for- bid a limitation for a longer period than the continuance (1) of lives in being, (2) of two lives in being, or (3) some other pe- riod. The statutes of California,? Idaho,‘ Montana, North 8 Perry Trusts (5th ed.), 380; Gold- 12In re Lawrence’s Estate, 136 Pa. tree v. Thompson, 79 Cal. 613, 22 Pac. St. 354, 20 Atl. 521, 20 Am. St. 925; 50. Alfred v. Marks, 49 Conn. 473. ®°Gray Perp., § 201. 18 Cal. Civ. Code (1916), §§ 761- 10 Gray Perp. (2d ed.) 200. 781, 11 McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 14Tdaho Rev. Code (1908), §§ 3067, 28 L. ed. 1015, 5 Sup. Ct. 652; Hosea 3072. v. Jacobs, 98 Mass. 65. 15 Mont. Rev. Code (1907), §$ 4463, 4464, 4492. § 267 WILLS 240 Dakota,** and South Dakota forbid the suspension of the abso- lute power of alienation for a longer period than the lives of per- sons in being at the death of the testator. The restraint against alienation is not limited to a particular number of lives in being. The provision of the Indiana statute is similar to the above, ex- cept that it does not apply to charities.** In New York,*® Michi- gan,”° Minnesota,”* and Wisconsin” the statutes provide that the power of alienation of real estate shall not be suspended by any condition or limitation for a longer period than during the con- tinuance of two lives in being at the creation of the estate, and that such suspension occurs when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed. This, it would appear, is entirely different from the common-law rule, since it is directed, not against remoteness of vesting, by which the title is kept in a condition of uncertainty, but merely against a suspension of the power of alienation. The Wisconsin statute, however, forbids the suspension of the power of alienation of real estate for a longer period than during the continuance of two lives in being and 21 years thereafter. In Ohio an estate in land can not be limited except to a person or persons in being, or to their immediate issue or descendants.” It is provided by the statutes of Alabama, that conveyances, ex- cept to one’s wife and children, can not extend beyond three lives in being.** And in Mississippi, it is provided that a devise may be made to a succession of donees then living, not exceeding two; and to the heirs of the body of the remainderman, and, in default thereof, to the right heirs of the donor in fee simple.”® By either statutory declaration or judicial sanction, the com- 16 North Dak. Comp. Laws (1913), 20 Howell’s Mich. Ann. Stats. §§ 5313-5315. (1913), §§ 10637, 10638. 17 South Dak. Comp. Laws (1913), 21Minn. Gen. Stats. (1913), §§ §§ 224, 225, p. 24. 6665, 6666. 18 Burns’ Ann. Stats. (1914), §§ 22 Wis. Stats. (1913), §§ 2039, 2040. 3998, 3999, 9723. Richmond v. Davis, 23 P.& A. Ann. Code (1912), § 8622. 103 Ind. 449, 3 N. E. 130. 24 Ala. Code (1907), §§ 3416, 3417. 19New York Real Property Law, 25 Miss. Code (1906), § 2765. § 43. 241 § 268 RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES mon-law rule is believed to prevail in all the other states not spe- cially mentioned in this section. § 268. Nature and purpose of the rule-—The Rule against Perpetuities is not complicated or difficult of understanding, but like most rules of universal application, it is often found difficult of application to the facts of a particular case. If the object or purpose of the rule is kept in mind, and the kind of interests or estates which come under its operation, the proper application of the rule will be very much simplified. The rule is aimed against undue restraints or alienation. A devise to a named bishop and his successors, without such restraint is not against the rule.** It concerns itself only with the vesting—the commencing—of es- tates, and not at all with their termination. It makes no differ- ence when such a vested estate or interest limited terminates.’ “The remoteness against which the rule is directed is remoteness in commencement, or first taking, and not in the cesser or deter- mination of them. An estate that is to arise within the prescribed period may be so limited as to be determined on the happening of any event, however remote.”** Accordingly, if a life estate con- tinues beyond the period fixed by the rule, this fact does not affect its validity if it is to vest immediately, or must vest within that time.?° The purpose of the Rule against Perpetuities is to facilitate the alienation of property, by prohibiting the clogging of the title with future interests dependent on contingencies which may not occur at all, or until a remote period. It was devised to prevent the perpetual entailment of estates, and to give them over to free 26 Lamb v. Lynch, 56 Nebr. 135, 76 N. W. 428. 27 Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jr. 366; Evans v. Walker, 3 Ch. Div. 211; Hampton v. Holman, 5 Ch. Div. 183. 28Lewis Perp., p. 173. See also Owsley v. Harrison, 190 Ill. 235, 60 N. E. 89; Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa 92, 61 N. W. 434; Pulitzer v. Livings- 16—Tuomr. Wits. ton, 89 Maine 359, 36 Atl. 635; In re Johnston’s Estate, 185 Pa. St. 179, 39 Atl. 879, 64 Am. St. 621. 29 Madison v. Larmon, 170 Ill. 65, 48 N. E. 625, 62 Am. St. 356; Heald v. Heald, 56 Md. 300; Lovering v. Worthington, 106 Mass. 86; Donohue v. McNichol, 61 Pa. St. 73. § 269 WILLS 242 conveyance.*° The absolute power of alienation is equivalent to the power of conveying an absolute fee.** The law against the suspension of the power of alienation ap- plies to every kind of conveyance and devise. It applies to all trusts, whether created by will or deed, whether providing for re- mainders or executory devises, or merely restraining the power of alienation for a fixed period of years, and then providing for sale with gift over.*? In short, it “covers the entire field of es- tates, interests, rights and possibilities.”** “A perpetuity will no more be tolerated when it is covered by a trust than when it dis- plays itself undisguised in the settlement of a legal estate.’’** § 269. Period allowed for vesting.—We have seen that, in order not to be invalid under the Rule against Perpetuities, the future interest must vest within a life or lives in being, and 21 years thereafter. If the person to take such interest is an infant, either born or en ventra sa mere during a life in being, the time may be extended until the termination of such infant’s minority, thus extending the possible time of vesting to 21 years and the period of gestation after a life or lives in being.** The persons in being by whose lives the period allowed for vesting is in part measured may be indefinite in number, provided it is possible to ascertain the termination of the life of the last survivor, in order to be able to ascertain when the period of twenty-one is to com- mence. Nor need such persons be connected in any way with the property devised,—that is, they need not be persons taking prior estates therein,—nor need they even be relatives of the devisees.*° In case the time named for the vesting of the future interest is not measured by lives, but by a definite number of years, it is essen- tial that the number of years be less than 21, in order that the lim- 30 Troutman v. De Boissiere Odd Fellows’ &c. School, 66 Kans. 1, 71 Pac. 286. 31 Chaplin Suspension of Aliena- tion, § 64. 32Tn re Walkerly’s Estate, 108 Cal. 627, 41 Pac. 772, 49 Am. St. 97. 33 Chaplin Suspension of Aliena- tion, § 2. 84 Perry Trusts, § 382. See also In re Cavarly’s Estate,-119 Cal. 406, 51 Pac. 629; Wheeler v. Fellowes, 52 Conn. 238. 35 Stephens v. Stephens, cas. temp. Talb. 228. 36 Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372; Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112. 243 RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 270 itation be valid.**’ The validity of the limitation is to be deter- mined as of the time of the testator’s death, and not at the time of the execution of the will.®* The requirement that the contingency on which the estate is to vest shall occur within the time named by the rule is absolute, and the mere improbability that it will occur after that time is imma- terial.*° Nor is a limitation not in compliance with the rule ren- dered valid by the happening of the contingency within the legal period.*° The rule is not violated by a direction in a will which may in- volve some delay in the actual conversion of the property, arising from any cause; nor does the fact that the trustee is vested with a discretion to delay the sale of the real estate, not exceeding a certain period mentioned, involve an unlawful suspension of the power of alienation.** § 270. Estates or interests subject to the rule-—We stated in a former section that the Rule against Perpetuities has no ap- plication to vested estates or interests or such as begin within the period limited by the rule, no matter how long they may continue ; but there are cases holding that the particular as well as the con- tingent devise is void where the contingency is or may be post- poned beyond the limitation of the rule.” It is generally held that the rule does not apply to the contingent right of entry for breach of a condition, even though annexed to a fee.** Nor does the rule 37 Rolfe & Rumford Asylum v. Le- febre, 69 N. H. 238, 45 Atl. 1087; Palmer v. Holford, 4 Russ. 403. 38 McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 28 L. ed. 1015, 5 Sup. Ct. 652; Hall v. Hall, 123 Mass. 120; Brown v. Brown, 86 Tenn. 277, 6 S. W. 869, 7 S. W. 640. 39 Lawrence v. Smith, 163 Ill. 149, 45 N. E. 259; Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324. 40 Coggins’ Appeal, 124 Pa. St. 10, 16 Atl. 579, 10 Am. St. 565. 41 Hagen v. Sacrison, 19 N. Dak. 160, 123 N. W. 518, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 724. 42Deford v. Deford, 36 Md. 168; Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119, 90. Am Dec. 88; Fosdick v. Fosdick, 6 Allen (Mass.) 41; Thorndike v. Lor- ing, 15 Gray (Mass.) 391. 48 Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 41 L. ed. 739, 17 Sup. Ct. 401; Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55, 25 L. ed. 547; In re Stick- ney’s Will, 85 Md. 79, 36 Atl. 654, 35 L. R. A. 693, 60 Am. St. 308; Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mass. 448. § 271 WILLS 244 generally apply to a possibility of reverter after a determinable fee.** Generally the rule is applicable alike to all future interests in real and personal property which are not vested.*° But by statute in Wisconsin, the rule is made applicable to real estate only.** All future equitable interests in realty or personality are sub- ject to the rule.*” Respecting the application of the rule to pow- ers, Professor Gray says: “In powers, questions of remoteness are governed by three rules. 1. If a power can be exercised at a time beyond the limits of the Rule against Perpetuities, it is bad. 2. A power which can not be exercised beyond the limits of the Rule against Perpetuities is not rendered bad by the fact that within its terms an appointment could be made which would be too remote. 3. The remoteness of an appointment depends on its distance from the creation and not from the exercise of the power. The first two rules relate to the creation of powers, the third to their execution.”’** § 271. Application of rule to charitable gifts—A public or charitable trust may be perpetual in its duration.*® As such trust is established for objects of public, general, and lasting ben- efit, it is allowed by the law to be as permanent as any human in- stitution can be, and courts will readily infer an intention in the donor that it should be perpetual.°° So it may be stated as a gen- eral rule that the Rule against Perpetuities is not applicable to charitable trusts.°* But it must be understood that the word “perpetuity” is here used in its primary sense, and the statement taken as merely 44 Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 49 Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 342, 41 L. ed. 739, 17 Sup. Ct. 401; First Universalist Soc. v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N. E. 524,15 L. R. A. 231. ‘ 45 Lewis Perp. 169. 46 Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90, 91 N. W. 87, 650. 47 Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S. W. 989; Hartson v. Elden, 50 N. J. Eq. 522, 26 Atl. 561. 48 Gray Perp. (2d ed.), § 473. (Mass.) 539, 50 Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen (Mass.) 1, 512 Kent Comm. 288, note a; Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659, 35 Atl. 1072, 55 Am. St. 594, 35 L. R. A. 113; Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 48 N. E. 561, 49 N. E. 320; Sherman v. Baker, 20 R. I. 446, 40 Atl. 11, 40 L. R. A. 717, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 245 § 271 meaning that the trust is not invalid, though it is indestructible, and though, since there are no definite cestuis que trust to alien it, it is inalienable.°? So if the gift is such that it is recognized by the law as charitable, it may restrain the alienation of property beyond the period fixed by the rule, and hold the property for such use.” Especially is this true where such gifts are made with no intervening gift to or for the benefit of a private person or corporation, or to a contingent limitation over from one char- ity to another; but it does apply to a gift to a private person, al- though limited over after an immediate gift to a charity.” Where a devise to charity is so given as not to vest within the period fixed by the rule it is deemed within the rule, and conse- quently void.” The authorities generally hold that the Rule against Perpetuities is not violated by the power given to a trus- tee to use his discretion as to the time within which he may make a sale of the real estate.°* A devise over to charity after a life estate is not contrary to the Rule against Perpetuities.°” But a gift over to an individual after a charitable trust is held subject to 52 Brooks v. Belfast, 90 Maine 318, 38 Atl. 222. 52 Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 163, 27 L. ed. 397, 2 Sup. Ct. 327; Spence v. Widney (Cal.), 46 Pac. 463; Wood- ruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 26 Atl. 846, 38 Am. St. 346; Parker v. Churchill, 104 Ga. 122, 30 S. E. 642; Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 48 N. E. 561, 49 N. E. 320; Rush County v. Dinwiddie, 139 Ind. 128, 37 N. E. 795; Brooks v. Belfast, 90 Maine 318, 38 Atl. 222; Teele v. Bishop of Derry, 168 Mass. 341, 47 N. E. 422, 38 L. R. A. 629, 60 Am. St. 401; Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N. W. 649,5 L. R. A. 858; Lane v. Eaton, 69 Minn. 141, 71 N. W. 1031, 30 L. R. A. 669, 65 Am. St. 559; Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. §59, 35 Atl. 1072, 55 Am. St. 594, 35 L. R. A. 113; In re John C. Mercer Home, 162 Pa. St. 232, 29 Atl. 731; Webster v. Wiggin, 19 R. I. 73, 31 Atl. 824, 28 L. R. A. 510; Staines v. Burton, 17 Utah 331, 53 Pac. 1015, 70 Am. St. 788. 54 Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 41 L. ed. 739, 17 Sup. Ct. 401; Christ Church v. Trustees of Dona- tions, &c., 67 Conn. 554, 35 Atl. 552. 55 Jocelyn v. Nott, 44 Conn. 55; Parker v. Churchill, 104 Ga. 122, 30 S. E. 642; Crerar v. Williams, 145 Til. 625, 34 N. E. 467, 21 L. R. A. 454; Clearspring Tp. v. Blough, 173 Ind. 15, 88 N. E. 511, 89 N. E. 369; Brooks v. Belfast, 90 Maine 318, 38 Atl. 222; State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N. W. 548; In re John’s Will, 30 Ore. 494, 47 Pac. 341, 50 Pac. 226, 36 L. R. A. 242. 56 Hart v. Seymour, 147 Ill. 598, 35 N. E. 246; Hagen v. Sacrison, 19 N. Dak. 160, 123 N. W. 518, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 724. 57 Mack’s Appeal, 71 Conn. 122, 41 Atl. 242. § 272 WILLS 246 the Rule against Perpetuities ;°° and likewise where the gift is to an individual and then over to a corporation or person on a char- itable trust.°° If instead of being a gift over after another be- quest, the gift is made to a charity upon the happening of a con- tingent event as a condition precedent, it is held that if the condi- tion is too remote, or for any other reason illegal, the gift to charity is void.°° § 272. Effect of directions to accumulate the income.—At common law, the power of controling the rents and profits was coextensive with the power to dispose of the estate which pro- duced them, the limit of the accumulation of annual income was the same as the limit of the creation of future estates, and the en- joyment of the profits could not be suspended for a longer period than the full power of alienating the estate itself.** Statutes gen- erally limit the accumulation periods to 21 years after the death of the testator, or during the period of minority where such pe- riod exists at the death of the testator, and accumulations can not be made for any longer period than that provided for by the statute. The object of these statutes is to prevent a permanent accumulation by which the property accumulated may be perma- nently taken out of the market. A mere temporary accumulation of a surplus arising after the support of a legatee is provided for, is not prohibited by the statute. Where a trust for an illegal ac- cumulation has been framed, the amount accumulated under it goes to the person who is next eventually entitled under the will.** In the case of gifts to charity, with a direction to accumulate for a period beyond that allowed by law, the gift will be upheld, if it can be regarded as a present gift, and, in place of the illegal accumulation, the court will direct a management of the fund which is legal and possible, cy pres the original direction.” An 58 Theological Soc. v. Attorney- 62 Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N. Y. General, 135 Mass. 285. 516, 35 N. E. 971; In re Farnum’s 59 Leonard v. Burr, 18 N. Y. 96; Estate, 191 Pa. St. 75, 43 Atl. 203. Smith v. Townsent, 32 Pa. St. 434. 63 In re Hibb’s Estate, 143 Pa. St. 60 Jocelyn v. Nott 44 Conn. 55. 217, 22 Atl. 882. 61 Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen (Mass.) 64 Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N. Y. 1; Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 516, 35 N. E. 971. ~ 227, 11 Ves. 112. 65 Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 III, 247 RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 273 explicit direction that the income of a sum of money shall accu- mulate for a specified number of years, and at the end of that period shall be given to a charity, has been held valid.°® But accu- mulations, although for charitable uses, may be for too long a period to be permitted by the local statute, so it is not safe to make a direction to accumulate without consulting the statute. § 273. Disposition of property where gift void under the Rule against Perpetuities—Many gifts are void as being in contravention of the Rule against Perpetuities,°’ and where the limitation over is void under the operation of this rule, the estate becomes vested in the first taker, discharged of the condition or limitation over, according to the terms in which it was granted or devised; if for life, then it takes effect as a life estate; if in fee, then as a fee simple absolute.*® Thus a devise in fee simple to A with a limitation over to B, at the termination of 25 years, the latter limitation being void under the rule, A has an indefeasible fee simple estate.®® Also where the limitation over of the fee to the heirs-at-law of the children of the testator’s daughter was void under the rule, the daughter and children being successively entitled to the income of the estate, it was held that the effect of such invalidity was not to defeat the prior life estate to such chil- dren.”° But it has been held that where a remainder is void under the rule, the preceding life estate is also void, on the theory that the 432, 48 N. E. 561, 49 N. E. 320; St. Paul’s Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N. E. 231; Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen (Mass.) 1; Phil- adelphia v. Girard, 45 Pa. St. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 470. 66 Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 26 Atl. 846, 38 Am. St. 346; North- ampton v. Smith, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 390; Franklin’s Admx. v. Philadel- phia, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 241, 2 Pa. Dist. ‘Ct. 435, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 484. 87 Perkins v. Fisher, 59 Fed. 801; Ketchum v. Corse, 65 Conn. 85, 31 Atl. 486; Kelly v. Nichols, 17 R. I. 306, 21 Atl. 906. 681 Jarman Wills, 200, 783; Lewis Perp. 657; 2 Bl. Comm. 156; 4 Kent Comm. 130; Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray (Mass.) 142, 156, 63 Am. Dec. 725. 69 Watkins v. Quarles, 23 Ark. 179; Nevitt v. Woodburn, 190 Ill. 283, 60 N. E. 500; Howe v. Hodge, 152 Ill. 252, 38 N. E. 1083; Post v. Rohrbach, 142 Ill. 600, 32 N. E. 687; Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray (Mass.) 142, 63 Am. Dec. 725. 70 Lovering v. Worthington, Mass. 86, 106 § 273 WILLS 248 entire gift should stand or fall together." Where there is a valid general residuary clause, and the devise is void as being in contra- vention of the Rule against Perpetuities, the residuary legatees become entitled to distribution.” But where the residuary clause passes only the property “not hereinbefore disposed of,” it has been held not to pass land devised, though the devise is void as in violation of the Rule against Perpetuities.”* 71 Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162, 129 Mass. 97; Hall v. Hall, 123 Mass. 18 S. W. 1145. 120. 72 Thorndike v. Loring, 15 Gray 78 Kelly v. Nichols, 17 R. I. 306, 21 (Mass.) 391; Lovering v. Lovering, Atl. 906, 19 L. R. A. 413. CHAPTER XV CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS SECTION SECTION 280. How conditions defined and cre- 290. Conditions against contest of ated. will. 281. Void and repugnant conditions. 291. Conditions against claims against 282. Effect on estate when condition estate, fails. 292. Conditions against bankruptcy or 283. Conditional limitations. insolvency. 284. Survivorship as a contingency. 293. Conditions as to residence, occu- 285. Gifts over on death as sole con- pation, education or religion. tingency. 294, Conditions as to name or other 286. Death without issue or heirs as personal characteristics of ben- condition to gift over. eficiary. 287. Conditions putting beneficiary to 295. Conditions as to support, pay- his election. ment of debts, etc. 288. Conditions restricting marriage. 296. Conditions against alienation in 289. Conditions favoring divorce or general. separation. 297. Conditions restraining married women from alienating. § 280. How conditions defined and created.—Conditions are either precedent or subsequent, and they are best defined sep- arately instead of by a general definition. The condition is precedent when it must be fulfilled before the estate can com- mence or be enlarged ;* while a condition subsequent is one which does not prevent the vesting of the estate, but which may defeat an estate already vested if the condition be not performed.’ The same technical words of condition are appropriate to cre- ate either a condition precedent or a condition subsequent.® 1Yale College v. Runkle, 8 Fed. 57 S. W. 110; Smith v. Smith, 64 576, 10 Biss. (U. S.) 300; Oetjen v. Nebr. 563, 90 N. W. 560; Tilley v. Diemmer, 115 Ga. 1005, 42 S. E. 388; King, 109 N. Car. 461, 13 N. E. 936; Fisher v. Fisher, 80 Nebr. 145, 113 McKinnon v. Lundy, 21 Ont. App. N. W. 1004; Moore v. Perry, 42 S. 560. Car. 369, 20 S. E. 200. 3 Hopkins v. Smith, 162 Mass. 444, 2Tappan’s Appeal, 52 Conn. 412; 38 N. E. 1122. Alexander vy. Alexander, 156 Mo. 413, 249 § 280 WILLS 250 “Divers words there be, which by virtue of themselves make estates upon condition.”* A condition is created by the use of such appropriate words as “on condition,” “provided,” “so as,” “so that,” “if it happen,” or the like, which import, ex vi termini, that the vesting or continuance of the estate is to depend upon the observance of the provision named.’ “To every good.con- dition is required an external form.’”° But apt words, even, do not always create a condition, when the intent of the testator, as shown by the whole will, is other- wise.’ Whether the condition be precedent or subsequent is a question of intention to be gathered from the whole will.® If the thing to be done does not necessarily precede the vesting of the estate in the devisee or legatee, but may accompany or fol- low it, and may as well be done after as before the vesting of the estate, the condition is subsequent.® The tendency of the courts is to construe a condition as sub- sequent, rather than as precedent, so as to give the devisee a present estate liable to be divested, rather than to defer the vest- ing.*° Thus a devise to one on condition that he marry a certain person was held to be on condition subsequent.*t The rule is that, if the act or event named must necessarily precede the vest- ing of the estate, it is a condition precedent, while, if the act or event may accompany or follow the vesting of the estate, it is a condition subsequent.” 4Littleton 328. 203a. 5 Wheeler v. Walker, 2 Conn. 196, 7 Am. Dec. 264; Hopkins v. Smith, 162 Mass. 444, 38 N. E. 1122. 6 Shep. Touch. 126. 7 Episcopal City Mission v. Apple- ton, 117 Mass. 326; Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1. 82 Jarman Wills 842; Burdis v. Burdis, 96 Va. 81, 30 S. E. 462, 70 Am. St. 825. ® Hawkins v. Hansen, 92 Kans. 73, 136 Pac. 1022, L. R. A. 1915 A, 90. See also Co. Lit. Besides, the fact that the condition 104 Kent Comm. 129; Ege v. Her- ing, 108 Md. 391, 70 Atl. 221. 11 Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 346, 7 L. ed. 701. 12 Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 346, 7 L. ed. 701; Jenkins v. Merritt, 17 Fla. 304; Winn v. Tabernacle Inf., 135 Ga. 380, 69 S. E. 557, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 512; In re Stickney’s Will, 85 Maine 79, 36 Atl. 654, 60 Am. St. 308, 35 L. R. A. 693; Bell County v. Alexander, 22 Tex. 350, 73 Am. Dec. 268; Burdis v. Burdis, 96 Va. 81, 30 S. E. 462, 70 Am. St. 825. 251 CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 281 involves something in the nature of a consideration for the gift tends to show that the condition is precedent.*® § 281. Void and repugnant conditions.—A testator may subject his gifts to such lawful conditions and limitations as he chooses to impose ;** but conditions in conflict with public pol- icy, or inhibiting the performance of acts which the public has an interest in having performed, are void, and can not be im- posed on his beneficiaries.** If a condition precedent be void or if it be or become impos- sible of performance, even though there be no fault on the part of the devisee, the devise can not take effect.*° If, on the other hand, the condition be subsequent, the estate becomes absolute in the devisee.*” Conditions which are impossible of performance are void; and when a condition precedent becomes impossible to be performed, even though there be no default or laches on the part of the devisee himself, the devise fails.** The rule as to a legacy subject to a condition precedent is that, where the performance of the condition is made impos- 13 Theobald Wills (Sth ed.) 492; Tilley v. King, 109 N. Car. 461, 13 N. E. 936. 14Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 27 L. ed. 401, 2 Sup. Ct. 236; Howze v. Davis, 76 Ala. 381; Stevens v. De La Vaulx, 166 Mo. 20, 65 S. W. 1003; Scott v. Kramer, 31 Ohio St. 295; In re Shirk’s Estate, 242 Pa. 95, 88 Atl. 873. 18 New Orleans v. Baltimore, 13 La. Ann. 162; Osborne v. Taylor, 12 Grat. (Va.) 117. 16 Halsey v. Goddard, 86 Fed. 25; Carter v. Carter, 39 Ala. 579; Rob- bins v. Hoover, 50 Colo. 610, 115 Pac. 526. 17 Huckabee v. Swoope, 20 Ala. 491; New Haven County v. New Ha- ven Trinity Church, 82 Conn. 378, 73 Atl. 789, 17 Ann. Cas. 432; Harrison v. Harrison, 105 Ga. 517, 31 S. E. 455, 70 Am. St. 60; Jones v. Doe, 2 Ill, 276; Hoss v. Hoss, 140 Ind. 551, 39 N. E. 255; Morse v. Hayden, 82 Maine 227, 19 Atl. 443; Ellicott v. Ellicott, 90 Md. 321, 45 Atl. 183, 48 L. R. A. 58; Parker v. Parker, 123 Mass. 584; Conrad v. Long, 33 Mich. 78; Cheairs v. Smith, 37 Miss. 646; Jones v. Jones, 223 Mo. 424, 123 S. W. 29, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 424; George v. George, 47 N. H. 27; Trum- bull v. Gibbons, 22 N. J. L. 117; In re Vandevort, 62 Hun 612, 17 N. Y. S. 316, 43 N. Y. St. 695; Harris v. Wright, 118 N. Car. 422, 24 S. E. 751; Philadelphia v. Girard, 45 Pa. St. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 470; Burdis v. Burdis, 96 Va. 81, 30 S. E. 462, 70 Am. St. 825; Burnham v. Burnham, 79 Wis. 557, 48 N. W. 661. 182 Jarman Wills 12. § 282 WILLS 252 sible by the act or default of the testator, the bequest is abso- lute.*® But ‘where the performance of the condition is the sole motive of the bequest, or its impossibility was unknown to the testator, or the condition which was possible in its creation has since become impossible by the act of God, or where it is illegal as involving malum in se, in these cases the civil agrees with the common law in holding the gift and conditions void.’?° Conditions which are repugnant to the estate limited are void also. Thus a testator can not create a fee with absolute power of disposal, and at the same time clog that power of alienation by limitations over to another; in other words he can not in- clude provisions which are absolutely inconsistent in terms and meaning, and have all given force and effect.” § 282. Effect on estate when condition fails—When a condition precedent becomes impossible to be performed, the es- tate which depended upon it can never take effect;*? and this is true even where the condition was beyond the control of the devisee, and he was entirely free from blame.” But it is held that a legacy bequeathed subject to a condition precedent is absolute where the performance of the condition is made impos- sible by the act of the testator.”* Where, however, a condition subsequent becomes impossible of performance, the general rule is that the estate granted upon it vests absolutely in the beneficiary as though no condition had ever attached.” Likewise if a condition subsequent be possible 19 Frost v. Blackwell, 82 N. J. Eq. 184, 88 Atl. 176. 202 Jarman Wills *853. See also Stark v. Conde, 100 Wis. 633, 76 N. W. 600. 21 Law v. Douglas, 107 Iowa 606, 78 N. W. 212; Ingersoll’s Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 245. 22 Ransdell v. Boston, 172 IIl. 439, 50 N. E. 111, 43 L. R. A. 526; Conant v. Stone, 176 Mich. 654, 143 N. W. 39; Johnson v. Warren, 74 Mich. 491, 42 N. W. 74; West v. Moore, 37 Miss. 114; Wilson v. Hall, 6 Ohio C. C. 570, 3 Ohio C. D, 589; Perry v. Brown, 34 R. I. 203, 83 Atl. 8; Stark v. Conde, 100 Wis. 633, 76 N. W. 600. ° 23 Stark v. Conde, 100 Wis. 633, 76 N. W. 600. 24Frost v. Blackwell, 82 N. J. Eq. 184, 88 Atl. 176. 25 Derickson v. Garden, 5 Del. Ch. 323; Harrison v. Harrison, 105 Ga. 517, 31 S. E. 455, 70 Am. St. 60; Hawkins v. Hansen, 92 Kans. 73, 139 Pac. 1022, L. R. A. 1915 A, 90; Morse v. Hayden, 82 Maine 227, 19 Atl. 443; Parker v. Parker, 123 Mass. 584; Conrad v. Long, 33 Mich. 78; In re Anonymous, 80 Misc. 10, 141- 253 CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 283 at the time of making it and afterward impossible of perform- ance, either by act of God, or of the law, or of the testator, or if it is impossible at the time of making it, or illegal, the estate of the devisee, being once vested, is not divested, but becomes absolute.*® In such case the income and use of the property de- vised will follow the fee and vest in the devisee.2” But it has been held that the legal incapacity of a legatee to perform a condition on which the gift is made will prevent it from taking effect, although the time for performance was subsequent thereto.” § 283. Conditional limitations.—If a condition subsequent be followed by a limitation over in case the condition is not complied with, it is termed a conditional limitation, and takes effect without any entry or claim, and no act is necessary to vest the estate in the person to whom it is limited.” A condition determines a precedent estate after breach upon entry by the person next entitled, while a limitation determines the estate without entry, and, if a condition subsequent is followed by a limitation over upon breach, it is a conditional limitation, and no entry is necessary.*° Upon the happening of the prescribed contingency, the estate first limited comes at once to an end, and the subsequent estace arises.** This form of gift is of a mixed nature, and partakes of a condition and a limitation; of a con- dition, because it defeats the estate previously limited; and of a N. Y. S. 700; McKinley v. Martin, 226 Pa. 550, 75 Atl. 734, 134 Am. St. 1076; Manierre v. Welling, 32 R. I. 104, 78 Atl. 507, Ann. Cas, 1912 C, 1311; Dukes v. Faulk, 37 S. Car. 255, 16 S. E. 122, 34 Am. St. 745; Burn- ham v. Burnham, 79 Wis. 557, 48 N. W. 661; McKinnon v. Lundy, 21 Ont. App. 560. 26 Jones v. Jones, 223 Mo. 424, 123 S. W. 29, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 424; 4 Kent Comm. 130. 27In re Budd’s Estate, 166 Cal. 286, 135 Pac. 1131. 28 Bullard vy. Shirley, 153 Mass. 559, 27 N. E. 766, 12 L. R. A. 110. But see Carder v. Lafayette County, 16 Ohio St. 353. 29 Stearns v. Godfrey, 16 Maine 158; Attorney-General v. Merrimack Mfg. Co, 14 Gray (Mass.) 586; Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray (Mass.) 142, 63 Am. Dec. 725; Williams v. Jones, 166 N. Y. 522, 60 N. E. 240; Miller v. Levi, 44 N. Y. 489. 30 Bean v. Atkins, — Vt. —, 89 Atl. 643. 31 Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 69 Mass. 142, 63 Am. Dec. 725. § 283 WILLS 254° limitation, because, upon the happening of the contingency the es- tate passes to the person having the next expectant interest, without entry or claim.** A conditional limitation—an exam- ple of which is a grant to one so long as he occupies the premises, or to a widow during widowhood—differs from a condition sub- sequent, which is a contingency named on the happening of which a grant may be defeated, only in form, and the fact that re-entry is not necessary to terminate the grant. No precise language is necessary to create a conditional lim- itation, but apt words for that purpose should always be used. Those most commonly used are ‘“while,’”’ “so long as,” “until,” “provided that,” “so that,” “as long as,” “wheresoever,” “as far as,” “up to,” and “so long.” But the form or connection of words used is immaterial, as the particular character of the provision may be determined from the intention of the testator manifest from the whole will.3* “Words of limitation mark the period which is to determine the estate, but words of con- dition render the estate liable to be defeated in.the intermediate time, if the event expressed in the condition arises before the determination of the estate, or completion of the period de- scribed by the limitation. The one specifies the utmost time of continuance, and the other marks some event which, if it takes place in the course of that time, will defeat the estate.’’** Where an estate in fee is created on condition, the entire in- terest does not pass out of the testator. All that remains after the gift takes effect continues in the testator, and goes to his heirs; while in the case of a conditional limitation, the whole interest of the testator passes at once, and creates an estate to arise and vest in a third person upon a contingency, at a future and uncertain time.*® Where there is a void limitation over, , 32 Brattle Square Church v. Grant, N. H. 445; Schaeffer v. Messersmith, 69 Mass. 142, 63 Am. Dec. 725; 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 366. Fowlkes v. Wagoner (Tenn.), 46 S. 854 Kent Comm. 126. W. 586; Lockridge v. McCommon, 90 36 Summit v. Yount, 109 Ind. 506, Tex. 234, 38 S. W. 33; Smith v. 9 N. E. 582; Brattle Square Church Smith, 23 Wis. 176, 99 Am. Dec. 153. v. Grant, 69 Mass. 142, 63 Am. Dec 83 Hague v. Ahrens, 53 Fed. 58. 725. 84 Chapin v. School Dist. No. 2, 35 255 CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 284 the general rule is that the preceding estate is unaffected, and the estate is vested in the first taker according to the terms in which it is devised.*” Examples of conditional limitations will be found in another part of this work.*® § 284. Survivorship as a contingency.—As words of sur- vivorship will be referred to the event clearly intended to ac- complish the testator’s purpose, whether that event be before, at the time of, or subsequent to the testator’s death,®® it is im- portant that the point of time as it exists in the mind of the testator be clearly stated or necessarily inferable from the lan- guage employed. In the absence of anything in the will showing a contrary intention, words of survivorship will be held prima facie to refer to the time of the testator’s death, because that is the time at which the property to be divided usually comes into enjoyment ;*® hut if the time of payment or distribution of the bounty, or the time of the vesting of an estate be post- poned in the will to a time later than the death of the testator, the words of survivorship will relate to such later period.** A will giving to one a life estate with remainder over to tes- tator’s “surviving children,” will be construed as meaning the 37 First Universalist Soc. v. Boland, 155 ‘Mass. 171, 29 N. E. 524, 15 L. R. A. 231, 38 See post, ch. 30, §§ 890-909, 89 Clore v. Smith, 45 Ind. App. 340, 90 N. E. 917; Dent v. Pickens, 61 W. Va. 488, 58 S. E. 1029, 40 Hoadly v. Wood, 71 Conn. 452, 42 Atl. 263; Phinizy v. Wallace, 136 Ga. 520, 71 S. E. 896; Davis v. San- ders, 123 Ga. 177, 51 S. E. 298; Pir- rung v. Pirrung, 228 Ill. 441, 81 N. E. 1065; Taylor v. Stephens, 165 Ind. 200, 74 N. E. 980; Carpenter v. Ha- zelrigg, 103 Ky. 538, 45 S. W. 666, 20 Ky. L. 231; Goodwin v. McDon- ald, 153 Mass. 481, 27 N. E. 5; Eberts v. Eberts, 42 Mich. 404, 4 N. W. 172; Sullivan v. Garesche, 229 Mo. 496, 129 S. W. 949, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 605n; Brewster v. Mack, 69 N. H. 52, 44 Atl. 811; Robinson v. Martin, 138 App. Div. 310, 123 N. Y. S. 146; Mayhew v. Davidson, 62 N. Car. 47; Renner v. Williams, 71 Ohio St. 340, 73 N. E. 221; Black v. Woods, 213 Pa. St. 583, 63 Atl. 129; Bradley v. Richardson, 62 S. Car. 494, 40 S. E. 954; Allison v. Allison, 101 Va. 537, 44 S. E. 904, 63 L. R. A. 920. 41In re Winter’s Estate, 114 Cal. 186, 45 Pac. 1063; Hawke v. Lodge, 9 Del. Ch. 146, 77 Atl. 1090; Kilgore v. Kilgore, 127 Ind. 276, 26 N. E. 56; Renner v. Williams, 71 Ohio St. 340, 73 N. E. 221, 10 Prob. Rep. Ann. 464. § 285 WILLS 256 children surviving at the death of the life tenant.*? ‘While the general rule is that words of survivorship must be referred to the death of the testator whether the gift is immediate, or the limitation is after a prior estate, or particular interest carved out, yet that general intent may be controlled by particular expres- sions in the will indicating a contrary intention.** In all cases of limitation to survivors, it should be clearly and explicitly stated to what period survivorship is to be referred; that is, whether the property is to go to the persons who are survivors at the death of the testator, or at the period of distribution. Examples of this form of gift will be found in another part of this work.** § 285. Gifts over on death as sole contingency.—Where . the testator desires to provide for a gift over in case of the death of a primary beneficiary, it becomes necessary to ascertain whether he means such beneficiary’s death during his own life or subsequently thereto; and if during his own life, whether he means death before or after the execution of the will. As a general rule where the gift over is made contingent upon the death of such beneficiary, it can not take effect unless the death referred to occurs after the date of the will.*® When an abso- lute gift is made to one with a provision over in “case he die,” or “if he should happen to die,” or “if he die,” or other like form of words, the courts will assume that the testator had in mind something else than merely to provide for the case of the legatee dying at some time. In such case the courts will construe the bequest over as intended to take effect in case the death referred to should occur in the testator’s lifetime or before some period fixed for the enjoyment of the estate or gift which is in such event to go over.*® So when a devise or bequest over to a third 42 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 54 44 See post, ch. 30, §§ 844-862. Minn. 248, 55 N. W. 971; Roundtree 45 Hoadly v. Wood, 71 Conn. 452, v. Roundtree, 26 S. Car. 450, 2 S. E. 42 Atl. 263; Grant v. Mosely (Tenn. 474. Ch. App.), 52 S. W. 508. 43 Smith v. Joyner, 136 Ga. 755, 72 46 McClellan v. MacKenzie, 126 S. E. 40; Dickerson y. Dickerson, 211 Fed. 701. See also Walsh v. Mc- Mo. 483, 110 S. W. 700; Johnson v. Cutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 41 Atl. 813; Morton, 10 Pa. St. 245, Carpenter v. Sangamon L. & T. Co., 257 CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 286 person is made dependent upon the death of the first taker as a contingency, the death referred to is generally held to be a death in the lifetime of the testator. Though when the devise is of a remainder the question is enlarged by the inquiry as to whether a death during the lifetime of the testator is referred to or a death before the remainder falls in.*” The general rule is that, where the gift over is to take effect after a prior estate or at a time appointed, the death referred to means at any time before the vesting in possession, whether before or after the death of the testator.** In all these cases the testator intended not to give a life interest with a remainder at or from the death of the legatee, but to provide a gift by sub- stitution in case of the death of the legatee before he received it and to avoid a lapse. Hence it is important that great care should be exercised to provide against an intestacy as to the share disposed of in case the beneficiary should not live to en- joy it in person and to avoid lapse. Examples of gifts over after a prior estate may be found elsewhere in this work.” § 286. Death without issue or heirs as condition to gift over.—Where property is devised to a named devisee with the condition that if such devisee shall die “without issue” or “without heirs” the property shall go to another designated per- son and there is nothing in the will to indicate a different inten- tion, the weight of authority is that the death referred to means death in the lifetime of the testator, and if the named devisee dies before the testator the estate goes to such other person, while, if he survives the testator, he takes the devise absolutely 229 Ill. 486, 82 N. E. 418; Williams y. Allison, 33 Iowa 278; May’s Suc- cession, 109 La. 994, 34 So. 52. 47 Ferguson v. Thomason, 87 Ky. 519, 9 S. W. 714, 10 Ky. L. 562; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433, 37 N. E. 515; Meacham v. Graham, 98 Tenn. 190, 39 S. W. 12. , 48 Hollister v. Butterworth, 71 Conn. 57, 40 Atl. 1044; Woolverton v. Johnson, 69 Kans. 708, 77 Pac. 17—Tuomp. WILtts. 559; Powell’s Exr. v. Cosby, 89 S. W. 721, 28 Ky. L. 619; Hammett v. Hammett, 43 Md. 307; Ro Bards v. Brown, 167 Mo. 447, 67 S. W. 245; Paul v. Philbrick, 73 N. H. 237, 60 Atl. 282; McLean v. McLean, 207 N. Y. 365, 101 N. E. 178; In re Cox’s Estate, 5 Pa. Dist. 206; Nichols v. Guthrie, 109 Tenn. 535, 73 S. W. 107. 49 See post, ch. 30, § 785. § 286 WILLS 258 free of any condition.*° Under such construction the words used are not strictly conditions, but directions for substitution in or- der to prevent lapse. The death without issue of such beneficiary after the death of the testator does not prevent the estate from going to his heirs or beneficiaries.** The above rule is based on the principle that the law favors such construction as will create an absolute rather than a con- ditional estate. The use of such words of condition in connec- tion with a limitation over creates a doubt respecting the testator’s intention, and this doubt is accordingly settled by construing the will as creating an absolute estate, with a substitution of the beneficiary in case the primary beneficiary dies before the tes- tator.°* Many cases, however, do not restrict the words to death before the testator, but hold them to mean death at any time, either before or after the death of the testator.** But the testator may fix some other point of time as that upon which such death, 50 Covington First Nat. Bank v. De Pauw, 86 Fed. 722; Smith v. Smith, 157 Ala. 79, 47 So. 220, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1045; Hull v. Holmes, 78 Conn. 362, 62 Atl. 705; Rickards v. Gray, 6 Houst. (Del.) 232; Kohtz v. Eldred, 208 Ill. 60, 69 N. E. 900; Morgan v. Robbins, 152 Ind. 362, 53 N. E. 283; Blain v. Dean, 160 Iowa 708, 142 N. W. 418; Cooksey v. Hill, 106 Ky. 297, 50 S. W. 235, 20 Ky. L. 1873; Lafoy v. Campbell, 42 N. J. Eq. 34, 6 Atl. 300; In re Disney, 190 N. Y. 128, 82 N. E. 1093; Murchi- son v. Whitted, 87 N. Car. 465; Baker v. McGrew, 41 Ohio St. 113; Neubert v. Colwell, 219 Pa. 248, 68 Atl. 673; In re Johnson, 23 R. I. 111, 49 Atl. 695; Beresford v. Elliott, 1 Desaus. (S. Car.) 183; Meacham v. Graham, 98 Tenn. 190, 39 S. W. 12; App v. App, 106 Va. 253, 55 S. E. 672; Hohn- bach v. Hohnbach, 151 Wis. 487, 139 N. W. 731. 51 Patterson v. Earhart, 6 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 16, 29 Wkly. Law Bul. 313; In re Engel’s Estate, 180 Pa. St. 215, 36 Atl. 727; Meacham v. Gra- ham, 98 Tenn. 190, 39 S. W. 12. _ ®2 First Nat. Bank v. DePauw, 86 Fed. 722; Austin v. Bristol, 40 Conn. 120, 16 Am. Rep. 23; Jones v. Webb, 5 Del. Ch. 132; Fowler v. Duhme, 143 Ind. 248, 42 N. E. 623; Cornwall v. Falls City Bank, 92 Ky. 381, 18 S. W. 452, 13 Ky. L. 606; Cox v. Handy, 78 Md. 108, 27 Atl. 227; Brown v. Lippincott, 49 N. J. Eq. 44, 23. Atl. 497; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433, 37 N. E. 515; King v. Frick, 135 Pa. St. 575, 19 Atl. 951, 20 Am. St. 889; Harris v. Dyer, 18 R. I. 540, 28 Atl. 971; In re Lovass’ Estate, 92 Wis. 616, 67 N. W. 605. 53 Summers v. Smith, 127 Ill. 645, 21 N. E. 191; Dorr v. Johnson, 170 Mass. 540, 49 N. E. 919; Naylor v. Godman, 109 Mo. 543, 19 S. W.. 56; Durfee v. MacNeil, 58 Ohio St. 238, 50 N. E. 721; Selman v. Robertson, 46 S. Car. 262, 24 S. E. 187. 259 CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 287 or death without issue, is to occur in order to entitle the sub- stitutionary beneficiary to take the estate.“* Thus he may fix the marriage,*® or the arrival of the beneficiary at a certain age,”° as the time before which the death is to occur; or he may in- dicate his intention to fix the point of time as subsequent to his death by creating a life estate in one, and subsequent to that a remainder to another, provided that on the death of such other “without issue” the estate shall go to a third beneficiary.*” § 287. Conditions. putting beneficiary to his election.— The testator may make such provision in his will as will compel the beneficiary to choose between a gift under the will and rights or property independent of the will.°* As applied to the law of wills the doctrine of election simply means that he who takes under a will must conform to all its provisions and renounce any right inconsistent with them; he will not be allowed to claim botn under and against the will.°? While a testator has no power to make testamentary disposition of the property of another, still if he undertakes to do so, and in the same instrument makes a devise or bequest of his own property to such other, the latter will be put to his election to take under the will, or renounce the will and stand on his rights under the law.°° Also if a testator should devise an estate belonging to his son or heir at law, to a third person, and should, in the same will, bequeath to such 54 Hollister v. Butterworth, 71 McCracken v. McBee, 96 Ark. 251, Conn. 57, 40 Atl. 1044; Kinney v. Kepiinger, 172 Ill. 449, 50 N. E. 131; Naylor v. Godman, 109 Mo. 543, 19 S. W. 56; Kornegay v. Morris, 122 N. Car. 199, 29 S. E. 875. 55 Forman v. Woods, 50 S. W. 61, 20 Ky. L. 1700. 56 In re Rogers’ Estate, 94 Cal. 526, 29 Pac. 962; Iimas v. Neidt, 101 Iowa 348, 70 N. W. 203. 57 Hollister v. Butterworth, 71 Conn. 57, 40 Atl. 1044; Naylor v. Godman, 109 Mo. 543, 19 S. W. 56. 58 Charch v. Charch, 57 Ohio St. 561, 49 N. E. 408. 59 Howze v. Davis, 76 Ala. 381; 131 S. W. 450; Hill v. Den, 54 Cal. 6; Walker v. Upson, 74 Conn. 128, 49 Atl. 904; Lamar v. McLaren, 107 Ga. 501, 34S. E. 116; Sparks v. Dorrell, 151 Mo. App. 173, 131 S. W. 761; Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Nebr. 455, 77 N. W. 1075; Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173. 60 Fitzhugh v. Hubbard, 41 Ark. 64; Morrison v. Bowman, 29 Cal. 337; Farmington Sav. Bank v. Curran, 72 Conn. 342, 44 Atl. 473; O’Reilly v. Nicholson, 45 Mo. 160; Murphy v. Sisters, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 638, 97 S. W. 135. § 288 260 WILLS son or heir at law, a legacy in money, an implied or constructive election is raised. The son or heir must relinquish his own es- tate or the bequest under the will.** But in order to create the necessity for an election there must appear a clear, unmistakable intention on the part of the testator to dispose of property not his own; “for if the testator’s ex- pressions will admit of being restricted to property belonging to or disposable by him, the inference will be that he did not mean them to apply to that over which he had no disposing power.” “It seems clear, to constitute a case of election, there must be an actual! disposition of the property belonging to the person who is to be put to his election.”** The testator must be presumed not to have intended to devise or bequeath any property over which he had no power of testa- mentary disposition,®* but a beneficiary is put to his election even though the testator was in error respecting the ownership of the property devised or bequeathed.** In order to create a con- dition requiring an election it must clearly appear that the tes- tator undertook to dispose of some property belonging to the person called upon to elect.* § 288. Conditions restricting marriage.—As a general rule a condition in a gift restraining the marriage of a person who has never married is void, as against public policy, and the person to whom the gift is made takes an absolute gift free of the con- tion ;* and a subsequent marriage in violation of such condition 61 Wilbanks v. Wilbanks, 18 Ill. 17. See also Whiting’s Appeal, 67 Conn. 379, 35 Atl. 268; Gorham v. Dodge, 122 Ill, 528, 14 N. E. 44; Brown v. Brown, 42 Minn. 270, 44 N. W. 250. 62 McDonald v. Shaw, 92 Ark. 15, 121 S. W. 935, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 657; Young v. McKinnie, 5 Fla. 542; Couts v. Holland, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 476, 107 S. W. 913. : 63 Jarman Wills (6th ed. Big.) #225, 64 Gilman v. Gilman, 54 Maine 453 (quoting 2 Redf. Wills 744); In re Gilmore’s Estate, 81 Cal. 240, 22 Pac. 655; Owen v. Tankersley, 12 Tex. 405. 65Tn re Gilmore’s Estate, 81 Cal. 240, 22 Pac. 655; Owen v. Tankers- ley, 12 Tex. 405. 66 McDonald v. Shaw, 92 Ark. 15, 121 S. W. 935, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 657. “67 Fitzhugh v. Hubbard, 41 Ark. 64; Havens v. Sackett, 15 N. Y. 365; Miller v. Springer, 70 Pa. St. 269. 68 Kennedy v. Alexander, 21 App. D. C. 424; Vaughn v. Lovejoy, 34 261 CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 288 does not defeat the donee’s title to the gift.°° This rule is ap- plicable generally where the condition is a subsequent one; but where the condition is precedent, with a limitation over on breach of the condition, it is valid.” But a gift to the wife or husband of the testator or testatrix while the beneficiary shall continue unmarried or until he or she remarries is valid, without any limitation over, and the con- ‘dition must be complied with. In such case the restriction is not treated as a condition subsequent divesting the beneficiary’s estate upon breach of the condition, but as a conditional limita- tion or a qualification determining the duration of the donee’s estate, so that the contingency upon which the gift depends, al- though there is no gift over, is good as a conditional limitation.”* Conditions against marrying specified persons or persons of a specified class, have been upheld.” Likewise a gift with a con- dition that the beneficiary shall not marry until he or she arrives at the age of twenty-one years is lawful, and a violation of it with notice works a forfeiture of the estate devised or legacy bequeathed. Also a condition precedent requiring consent to marriage generally without limitation of age is good if there is a gift over; and some cases hold that if'there is no gift over, Ala. 437; In re Alexander’s Estate, 149 Cal. 146, 85 Pac. 308; Knost v. Knost, 229 Mo. 170, 129 S. W. 665, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 627; Hawke v. Euyart, 30 Nebr. 149, 46 N. W. 422, 27 Am. St. 391. 69 Williams v. Cowden, 13 Mo. 211, 53 Am. Dec. 143; Perrin v. Lyon, 9 East 170. 70 Collier v. Slaughter, 20 Ala. 263. 71 Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291, 26 L. ed. 745; Helm v. Leggett, 66 Ark. 23, 48 S. W. 675; Bennett v. Packer, 70 Conn. 357, 39 Atl. 739, 66 Am. St. 112; Rose v. Hale, 185 Ill 378, 56 S. E. 1073, 76 Am..St. 40; Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa 407, 69 N. W. 560, 37 L. R. A. 583; Benton v. Benton, 78 Kans. 373, 104 Pac. 856; Nash v. Simpson, 78 Maine 142, 3 Atl. 53; Boyd v. Sachs, 78 Md. 491, 28 Atl. 391; Knight v. Mahoney, 152 Mass. 523, 25 N. E. 971, 9 L. R. A. 573; Boyer v. Allen, 76 Mo. 498; Redding v. Rice, 171 Pa. St. 301, 33 Atl. 330; Wooten v. House (Tenn.), 36 S. W. 932; Haring v. Shelton, 103 Tex. 10, 122 S. W. 13; In re Poppleton’s Es- tate, 34 Utah 285, 97 Pac. 138, 131 Am. St. 842. 72 Graydon v. Graydon, 23 N. J. Eq. 229; Phillips v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 512, 8 S. E. 241, 17 Am. St. 78, 1 L. R. A. 837, 78 Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 212; Reuff v. Coleman, 30 W. Va. 171, 3 S. E. 597; Collier v. Slaughter, 20 Ala. 263; Gough v. Manning, 26 Md. 347. § 289 WILLS 262 the condition must be considered in terrorem merely, and void.” However, a condition precedent in partial restraint of marriage, as not to marry under a certain age, or requiring consent to marriage if under a certain age, is valid though there is no gift over.” If the testator makes provision for a beneficiary as long as she remains single, but upon her marriage the gift is to go over, such limitation has been held valid, and not in restraint of marriage.”* Such a devise or bequest is merely a limitation as to the time of enjoyment, and therefore valid.7 Examples of valid conditions respecting marriage may be found elsewhere in this work.’* § 289. Conditions favoring divorce or separation.—A con- dition attached to a devise in a will which constitutes an induce- ment to married persons to become divorced, or to live separate and apart from one another, is opposed to public policy and void, and the devise is operative to the same extent as though such condition had not been written in the will.”? Likewise a bequest of a part of the income of an estate, conditioned to be increased to the whole in the event of the beneficiary becoming divorced, is void as tending to encourage divorce, and the en- tire income goes to the beneficiary.*° On the other hand, if the testator makes a provision which is not intended to accomplish a separation or divorce between married persons, but is intended to take effect in case of a legal separation or divorce, the provision is valid.8* | Thus a provision 74 Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ilf. 212; Gough v. Manning, 26 Md. 347. 75 Phillips v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 512, 8S. E. 241, 1 L. R. A. 837, 17 Am. St. 78. 7 Mann v. Jackson, 84 Maine 400, 24 Atl. 886, 1 L. R. A. 707, 30 Am. St. 358; Nagle v. Hirsch, — Ind. App. —, 108 N. E. 9; Courter v. Stagg, 27 N. J. Eq. 305. 77In re Bruck’s Estate, 185 Pa. St. 194, 39 Atl. 813; In re Hotz’s Estate, 38 Pa. St. 422, 80 Am. Dec. 490. 78 See post, ch. 30, § 897. 79 Ransdell v. Bostin, 172 Ill. 439, 50 N. E. 111, 43 L. R. A. 526; Con- rad v. Long, 33 Mich. 78; Hawke v. Euyart, 30 Nebr. 149, 46 N. W. 422, 27 Am. St. 391; Graydon v. Graydon, 23 N. J. Eq. 229; In re Haight, 51 App. Div. 310, 64 N. Y. S. 1029. 80In re Haight, 51 App. Div. 310, 6A N. Y. S. 1029. 81 Ransdell vy. Boston, 172 Ill. 439, 50 N. E. 111, 43 L. R. A. 526; Winn v. Hall, 1 Ky. L. 337; Coe v. Hill, 201 Mass. 15, 86 N. E. 949; Thayer v. Spear, 58 Vt. 327, 2 Atl. 161. 263 CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 290 that each of testator’s daughters are to receive certain portions of the estate on becoming widows or lawfully separated from their husbands was held not void as against public policy in in- ducing unlawful separation.*? Also a bequest providing for the support of a married woman pending a present or contemplated separation from her husband has been held valid.** The volun- tary exercise by a legatee of a right which the law confers is not against public policy, and does not avoid a testamentary gift, the language of which may show the testator had in mind that such a contingency might arise.** A condition attached to a devise that the devisee should not be living with the woman he married on a specified date, was held a condition and valid.** § 290. Conditions against contest of will—Owing to the confused state of the law concerning conditions in wills impos- ing forfeitures of benefits on beneficiaries contesting the will, great care should be exercised in their preparation. Such a con- dition in a will is a condition subsequent,** and is generally held valid,*’ particularly when there is a limitation over on breach of the condition ;** but in such case the gift is said to be merely in terrorem and void as to personalty.*® It has been held in some jurisdictions that a gift over is not necessary to the validity of a non-contest clause.°° 82 Born v. Horstmann, 80 Cal. 452, 22 Pac. 169, 5 L. R. A. 577. 83 Witherspoon v. Brokaw, 85 Mo. App. 169. 84 Coe v. Hill, 201 Mass. 15, 86 N. E. 949, 85In re Gunning’s Estate, 234 Pa. 139, 83 Atl. 60. 86 Nevitt v. Woodburn, 190 Ill. 283, 60 N. E. 500. 87 Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501; In re Miller’s Estate, 156 Cal. 119, 103 Pac. 842, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 868; Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451, 123 N. W. 202, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 898; Bryant v. Thompson, 59 Hun 545, 14 N. Y. S. 28, 37 N. Y. St. 431; Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546, 2 Am. Rep. 419; In re Friend, 209 Pa. 442, 58 Atl. 853, 68 L. R. A. 447; Massie v. Massie, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 617, 118 S. W. 219; Fifield v. -Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557, 27 S. E. 446, 64 Am. St. 745. 88 Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U. S. 398, 42 L. ed. 793, 18 Sup. Ct. 396; Thompson v. Gaut, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 310. 89 Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501; In re Arrowsmith, 162 App. Div. 623, 147 N. Y. S. 1016; Fifield v. Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557, 27 S. E. 446, 64 Am. St. 745, 90In re Garcelon, 104 Cal. 570, 38 Pac. 414, 32 L. R. A. 595, 43 Am. St. 134, WILLS 264 5 20 Such clause in the will embraces the contest of a codicil, where the codicil merely modifies the will in some particulars, and ex- pressly re-affirms it in every other particular.” It is agreed, however, that there is no substantial ground for any distinction in this respect between real and personal prop- erty.’ It has been held that the condition may be enforced even though the contest is abandoned by compromise ;** but is not operative against infants.°* Some courts hold that if a prob- able cause exists for a contest, the provision for forfeiture is inoperative,®® while others hold that probable cause will not suf- fice to exempt the contestant from the operation of the clause.’® In the preparation of a clause against contest it is advisable, if practicable, to make the condition precedent so that the gift will not vest until the condition is performed, thus obviating the necessity of forfeiture or divesting of title, as would be the case if the condition were subsequent and the gift vested on the death of the testator.°” § 291. Conditions against claims against estate —A condi- tion inserted in a will to the effect that the gift shall be void if the beneficiary presents a claim against the testator’s estate, has been upheld as valid,®® and his presentation of a claim in viola- 91TIn re Hite’s Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 101 Pac. 443, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 953, 17 Ann. Cas. 993, 922 Jarman Wills, 53; In re Stew- art, 1 Con. Surr. 412, 5 N. Y. S. 32, 24 .N. Y. St. 322; Bradford v. Brad- ford, 19 Ohio St. 546, 2 Am. Rep. 419, . 93In re Hite’s Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 101 Pac. 443, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 953, 17 Ann. Cas. 993. 94 Bryant’ v. Thompson, 59 Hun 545, 14 N. Y. S. 28, 37-N. Y. St. 431. 95 Black v. Herring, 79 Md. 146, 28 Atl. 1063; In re Friend’s Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 Atl. 853, 68 L. R. A. 447; Fifield v. Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557, 27 S. E. 446, 64 Am. St. 745. 96 Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 42 L. ed. 793, 18 Sup. Ct. 396; In re Miller’s Estate, 156 Cal. 119, 103 Pac. 842, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 868; Hoit v. Hoit, 42 N. J. Eq. 388, 7 Atl. 856, 59 Am. Rep. 43; Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546, 2 Am. Rep. 419. > 97 See post, ch. 30, § 900. 98 Rogers v. Law, 1 Black (U. S.) 253, 17 L. ed. 58; Rockwell v. Swift, 59 Conn. 289, 20 Atl. 200; Farnham v. Barker, 148 Mass. 204, 19 N. E. 371; In re Morey’s Estate, 49 Hun 608, 1 N. Y. S. 687, 16 N. Y. St. 776; Dunlap v. Ingram, 57 N. Car. 178. 265 CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 292 tion of the condition operates as a forfeiture of the bequest.” But suca condition has been held invalid where there was no limitation over.* Thus where a testator inserted in his will a declaration that he was not indebted to any of his children and made certain bequests to them upon the condition that they would not make a claim against his estate, there being no lim- itation over on breach, it was held that the condition was in terrorem only, and that the presentation of a valid claim did not work a forfeiture.? But a provision that if the legatee bring in a claim against the estate, the amount thereof is to be deducted from the legacy, has been held valid. Where a will provided that the value of the services of a beneficiary should be added to the legacy given him, in case such claim should be recorded against the estate by “due course of law,” it was held that the allowance of the claim by the court upon due presentation constituted “due course of law,” and entitled the beneficiary to have the amount so al- lowed added to the legacy given him.* § 292. Conditions against bankruptcy: or insolvency.— Testators often desire to secure the gift-to their beneficiaries free from liability for their debts, and to this end they often make the gift upon the condition that the property is not to be liable in any manner or shape for the debts of the beneficiary. Such condition attached to an estate devised or bequeathed abso- lutely and not in trust, is void, as inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the state devised or bequeathed.? But gifts to beneficiaries until they shall become bankrupt or insolvent, with limitation over, have generally been held to be valid conditional limita- tions. Such gift may be made by inserting a condition precedent 99 Rockwell v. Swift, 59 Conn. 289, 4In re Knauss’ Estate, 148 Pa. St. 20 Atl. 200. 265, 23 Atl. 894. 1In re Vandevort, 62 Hun 612, 17 5 Henderson v. Harness, 176 II) N. Y. S. 316. 302, 52 N. E. 68; Van Osdell v. 2In re Vandevort, 62 Hun 612, 17 Champion, 89 Wis. 661, 62 N. W. N. Y. S. 316. 539, 46 Am. St. 864, 27 L. R. A. 773. 3 Farnham vy. Barker, 148 Mass. 6 Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, 23 204, 19 N. E. 371. L. ed. 254; Leavitt v. Beirne, 21 Conn. § 293 WILLS 266 that it shall not vest until the beneficiary has discharged certain obligations,” or by including a condition that the interest of the first taker shall cease and that there shall be a gift over to an- other upon the taking of the property devised on execution for the debts of the first taker.® It has been held that a gift upon condition that the estate shall cease upon the insolvency of the beneficiary is valid, even without a limitation over.® Such conditions are not favored in law, and it has been held that the mere obtaining of a judg- ment against the devisee,’® or the obtaining of a judgment and issuing of an execution thereon which was returned “no prop- erty” would not avoid the estate. § 293. Conditions as to residencc, occupation, education, or religion.—Gifts made conditional on the residence of the donee in a particular place, or that he will occupy the premisés devised, etc., have been frequently upheld ;** but: such condition must be clearly expressed, so as to avoid uncertainty.** It has been held, however, that such condition as applied to married women is void as tending to cause separation from her husband.** A gift may be conditioned on the beneficiary engaging in a ‘certain trade or occupation ;*° 1; Campbell v. Foster, 35 N. Y. 361; Nashville First Nat. Bank v. Nash- ville Trust Co. (Tenn. Ch.), 62 5S. W. 392. 7St. John v. Dann, 66 Conn. 401, 34 Atl. 110; Johnson v. Gooch, 116 N. Car. 6&4, 21 S. E. 39. 8 Thornton v. Stanley, 55 Ohio St. 199, 45 N. E. 318; Brandon v. Rob- inson, 18 Ves. Jr. 429. See also post, ch. 30, § 903. : ® Rochford v. Hackman, 9 Hare 480, 16 Jur. 212, 21 L. J. Ch. 511. 10In re Carew, L. R. (1896) 2 Ch. 311. 11 Bryan v. Dunn, 120 N. Car. 36, 27 S. E. 37. 12 Lowe v. Cloud, 45 Ga. 481; Lind- sey v. Lindsey, 45 Ind. 552; Irvine or on his pursuing a: particular v. Irvine, 15 S. W. 511, 12 Ky. L. 827; Marston v. Marston, 47 Maine 495; Jenkins v. Horwitz, 92 Md. 34, 7 Atl. 1022; Hart v. Chesley, 18 N. H. 373; Casper v. Walker, 33 N. J. Eg. 35; Reeves v. Craig, 60 N. Car. 208; Harrison v. Foote, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 576, 30 S. W. 838; Keeler v. Keeler, 39 Vt. 550; Connor v. Sher- idan, 116 Wis. 666, 93 N. W. 835. See also Shepard v. Burr (Del. Ch.), 87 Atl. 1020. 13 Shuman v. Heldman, 63 S. Car. 474, 41 S. E. 510. 14Born v. Horstmann, 80 Cal. 452, 22 Pac. 169, 338, 5 L. R. A. 577; Conrad v. Long, 33 Mich. 78. 15 Seeley v. Hincks, 65 Conn. 1, 31 Atl. 533; Colby v. Dean, 70 N. H. 267 CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 294 line of study or possessing certain educational qualifications.*° Conditions attached to a devise or bequest that the beneficiary shall become a member of a particular religious society, or ad- here to a certain religious faith, or attend a particular church, have been held valid.7 Also a condition that the beneficiary withdraw from a certain religious body, faith, or order, has been sustained.** These holdings are based on the principle that the power to give includes the right to withhold or to fix the terms of gift, no matter how whimsical or capricious they may be, only provided that they do not in any way violate the law. Ex- amples of conditions as to residence, occupation, education, and religion will be found elsewhere in this work.’ § 294. Conditions as to name or other personal character- istics of beneficiary.— Conditions in a will that the beneficiary should be christened and baptized by a certain name, or that he shall adopt and assume a certain name, have been held reasonable and enforcible.”” Also conditions that the beneficiary shall live a moral life or shall reform are valid, and must be performed in order to obtain or keep the gift.2* Thus a condition in a legacy that the legatee’s right thereto shall depend upon the decision of the executors at the end of a certain time that he is a re- formed man, was held not to be void for uncertainty, and that such decision was a condition precedent to his right to the leg- acy.”? Similar provisions have been held conditions precedent to the 591, 49 Atl. 574; Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 28 N. W. 353, 57 Am. Rep. 278. 16 Shepard v. Shepard, 57 Conn. 24, 17 Atl. 173; Baker v. Red, 4 Dana (Ky.) 158. But see Coppedge v. Weaver, 90 Ark. 444, 119 S. W. 678. 17 Magee v. O’Neill, 19 S. Car. 170, 45 Am. Rep. 765; In re Paulson, 127 Wis. 612, 107 N. W. 484,5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804. 18 Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 275, 50 Am. Rep. 219. 19 See post, ch. 30, art. 13. 20 Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. (U. S.) 488, 14 L. ed. 510; Smith v. Smith, 64 Nebr. 563, 90 N. W. 560; In re Jackson’s Will, 1 Pow. Surr. 20 N. Y. S. 380, 47 N. Y. St. 443; In re Bruch, 185 Pa. St. 194, 39 Atl. 813. 21 Hawke v. Euyart, 30 Nebr. 149, 46 N. W. 422, 27 Am. St. 391; Reuff v. Coleman, 30 W. Va. 171, 3 S. E. 597. 22 Markham v. Hufford, 123 Mich. 505, 82 N. W. 222, 48 L. R. A. 580, 81 Am. St. 222. § 295 WILLS 268 right to obtain or keep the gift.2* Among the many conditions of this character are, that the beneficiary shall be capable of making a prudent use of the gift,?* that he shall abstain from 25 the use of tobacco, intoxicating liquor,”* and card playing, or that he shall exhibit various other desirable personal traits.” Examples of these conditions will be found elsewhere in this work.*8 § 295. Conditions as to support, payment of debts, etc.— Gifts made upon the condition that the beneficiary shall support or work for a person named, are reasonable, and generally up- held.” Such conditions are generally construed as conditions subsequent.*® Gifts conditioned on the beneficiary’s paying -cer- tain annuities, or furnishing support or care to another are or- dinarily held to be conditions subsequent, and therefore do not. defeat the devise or legacy on failure of performance caused by the death of the annuitant before time of payment,** or by a waiver of the provision. Also a testator may create a valid condition precedent or subsequent that the beneficiary pay certain debts,** or a sum of 23 West v. Moore, 37 Miss. 114; Jarboe v. Hey, 122 Mo. 341, 26 S. W. 968; Stark v. Conde, 100 Wis. 633, 76 N. W. 600: 24 Rushmore v. Rushmore, 59 Hun 615, 12 N. Y. S. 776, 35 N. Y. St. 845. 25 Onderdonk v. Onderdonk, 127 N. Y. 196, 27 N. E. 839. 26 Jordan v. James Dunn & Ontario Loan &c. Co., 13 Ont. 267. 27 Campbell v. Clough, 71 N. H. 181, 51 Atl. 668; Cushman v. Cushman, 116 App. Div. 763, 102 N. Y. S. 258. 28 See post, ch. 30, art. 13. 29 Gingrich v. Gingrich, 146 Ind. 227, 42 N. E. 101; Irvine v. Irvine, 15 S. W. 511, 12 Ky. L. 827; Pearl v. Lockwood, 123 Mich. 142, 81 N. W. 1087; Harris v. Wright, 118 N. Car. 422, 24 S. E. 751; McCall v. McCall, 161 Pa. St. 412, 29 Atl. 63. 30 Gingrich v. Gingrich, 146 Ind. 227, 42 N. E. 101; Allen v. Allen, 121 N. Car. 328, 28 S. E. 513. 31Sherman v. American Cong. Assn., 98 Fed. 495; Morse v. Hay- den, 82 Maine 227, 19 Atl. 443; Nun- nery v. Carter, 58 N. Car. 370, 78 Am. Dec, 231. ; 32 Alexander v. Alexander, 156 Mo. 413, 57 S. W. 110; Livingston v. Gor- don, 84 N. Y. 136. 33 Howze v. Davis, 76 Ala. 381; St. John v. Dann, 66 Conn. 401, 34 Atl. 110; Schnell v. Schnell, 39 Ind. App. 556, 80 N. E. 432; Taylor v. Tolen, 38 N. J. Eq. 91; Monjo v. Wood- house, 185 N. Y. 295, 78 N. E. 71, 6L. R. A. (N. S.) 746; Ledebuhr v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 112 Wis. 657, 88 N. W. 607. 269 CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 296 money to a named person.** If the testator intends that the gift shall be upon condition subsequent, the language used should clearly express that intention, otherwise it is liable to be held not a condition at all, but a charge.** Examples of conditions of the character mentioned above may be found elsewhere.** § 296. Conditions against alienation in general.—The power to sell or incumber real estate is an inseparable incident of the ownership thereof in fee, and so when the fee is given it carries with it this important incident. This power to sell or incumber the land is not only the most valuable and impor- tant incident of ownership, but it is absolutely necessary to meet the social and commercial exigencies of the community. Prompted by a desire to prevent their property from being sold or dissipated after they die, many testators have attempted to create conditions restraining the power of their. beneficiaries to dispose of or incumber their estate. Such a condition attached to an unqualified devise of real estate, or an absolute bequest of personalty, is void, as repugnant to the nature of the estate or interest given.*” A devise with limitation over in case the first devisee shall alienate the property is void for the same rea- son.*8 84 Whiting’s Appeal, 67 Conn. 379, 35 Atl. 268; Ditchey v. Lee, 167 Ind. 267, 78 N. E. 972; Richards v. Rich- ards, 90 Iowa 606, 58 N. W. 926; Scott v. Kramer, 31 Ohio St. 295. 35 McCarty v. Fish, 87 Mich. 48, 49 N. W. 513; Isner v. Kelley, 51 W. Va. 82, 41 S. E. 158, 86 See post, ch. 30, art. 13. 37 Potter v. Couch, 141 U. S. 296, 35 L. ed. 721, 11 Sup. Ct. 1005; Crumpler v. Barfield &c. Co., 114 Ga. 570, 40 S. E. 808; Muhlke v. Teide- mann, 177 Ill. 606, 52 N. E. 843; Al- len v. Craft, 109 Ind. 476, 9'N. E. 919; Goldsmith v. Petersen, 159 Iowa 692, 141 N. W. 60; Harrison v. Brophy, 59 Kans. 1, 51 Pac. 883, 40 L. R. A. 721; Harkness v. Lisle, 132 Ky. 767, 117 S. W. 264; Deering v. Tucker, 55 But where the estate given is an equitable estate or a Maine 284; Smith v. Clark, 10 Md. 186; Lathorp v. Merrill, 207 Mass. 6, 92 N. E. 1019; Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 43 N. W. 893, 7 L. R. A. 377; Morse v. Blood, 68 Minn. 442, 71 N. W. 682; Feit v. Richards, 64 N. J. Eq. 16, 53 Atl. 824; Onder- donk v. Onderdonk, 127 N. Y. 196, 27 N. E. 839; Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N. Car. 460, 48 S. E. 785, 67 L. R. A. 444; Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 506, 38 Am. Rep. 602; In re Shall- cross, 200 Pa. 122, 49 Atl. 936; Moore vy. Sanders, 15 S. Car. 440, 40 Am. Rep. 703; Overton v. Lea, 108 Tenn. 505, 68 S. W.. 250; Zillmer v. Land- guth, 94 Wis. 607, 69 N. W. 568. 38 Howard v. Carusi, 109 U. S. 725, 27 L. ed. 1089, 3 Sup. Ct. 575; Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 247; Kelley v. § 296 WILLS 270 life estate, it would seem that the testator may limit it in any way that he may desire, and this upon the theory that the un- restricted fee is vested somewhere else.*® A testator can not devise a feé, and then destroy it entirely.*° Conditions subsequent preventing any and all alienation of an estate in fee, even for a limited time, are generally declared void.** Thus a condition that the property devised in fee shall not be sold until the oldest of the children arrived at the age of twenty-five years,*? and a condition that the realty devised in fee should not be sold, mortgaged or incumbered for thirty years, was held void.# But a devise of an estate for life or for years with a condi- tion, either subsequent or precedent, restraining alienation, has been held valid.** Also a condition that the devisee shall not sell to a particular person or limited class of persons, has been held good.** But in order to make a valid restriction upon alienation, even for a limited time or to a limited class of persons, there must be a provision for a reversion or limitation over to a third per-. son, in case of violation of the restriction.*® A condition that the devisee shall not sell the land until he ar- rives at a certain age, as twenty-five years or thirty-five years, Meins, 135 Mass. 231; Anderson v. W. 586; Zillmer v. Landguth, 94 Wis. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 506, 38 Am. Rep. 602. 39 Trammell v. Johnston, 54 Ga. 340; Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Nebr. 455, 77 N. W. 1075; Dulin v. Moore, 96 Tex. 135, 70 S. W. 742. 40 Harkness v. Lisle, 132 Ky. 767, 117 S. W. 264. 41 Jones v. Port Huron E. & T. Co., 171 Ill. 502, 49 N. E. 700; Mandle- jbaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78, 18 ‘Am. Rep. 61; Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 506, 38 Am. Rep. 602. Contra: Wallace v. Smith, 113 Ky. 263, 68 S. W. 131, 24 Ky. L. 139. 42 Roederer v. Hess, 112 Ky. 807, 66 S. W. 1012, 23 Ky. L. 2165; Fowlkes v. Wagoner (Tenn.), 46 S. 607, 69 N. W. 568. #3 Jones v. Port Huron Engine &c. Co., 171 Ill. 502, 49 N. E. 700. 44 Conger v. Lowe, 124 Ind. 368, 24 N. E. 889, 9 L. R. A. 165; Roberts v. Stevens, 84° Maine 325, 24 Atl. 873, 17 L. R. A. 266; Lampert v. Haydel, 96 Mo. 439, 9 S. W. 780,2 L. R. A. 113, 9 Am. St. 358; De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y. 467, 57 Am. Dec. 470; Yost v. McKee, 179 Pa. St. 381, 36 Atl. 317, 57 Am. St. 604. But see Hunt v. Hawes, 181 Ill. 343, 54 N. E. 953. 45 Overton v. Lea, 108 Tenn. 505, 68 S. W. 250. 46 Conger v. Lowe, 124 Ind. 368, 24 N. E. 889, 9 L. R. A. 165; Mandle- 271 CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 297 is valid, the restriction not being unreasonable.*7 Also a con- dition that the land devised shall not be sold or conveyed by the devisees until they have been in possession of it for twehty years, has been held good.* A testator may accomplish his desire to prevent the sale or dissipation of his property after death (1) by the insertion of a provision that the estate is to become void on the bankruptcy of the beneficiary or any attempt by his creditors to reach the property,*® and (2) by making the gift to trustees with power to apply the corpus or income to the use of the beneficiary ac- cording to their discretion.” § 297. Conditions restraining married women from alien- ating.—Contrary to the rule that a condition restraining a beneficiary from alienating an estate in fee simple, it is gener- ally held that a married woman may be restrained by will from the voluntary or involuntary alienation of her estate ;°* and ‘the fact that she was unmarried at the time the restriction was made does not render it invalid.°2 The restriction, however, will have no binding force so long as she is unmarried, but will become binding upon her marriage, unless the testator limits the re- straint to a particular coverture.®* baum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78, 18 Am. Rep. 61; Fowlkes v. Wagoner (Tenn.), 46 S. W. 586. 47 Wallace v. Smith, 113 Ky. 263, 68 S. W. 131, 24 Ky. L. 139. 48 Call v. Shewmaker, 69 S. W. 749, 24 Ky. L. 1167. 49 Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, 23 L. ed. 254; Bull v. Kentucky Nat. Bank, 90 Ky. 452, 14 S. W. 525, 12 Ky. L. 536, 12 L. R. A. 37; Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Nebr. 455, 77 N. W. 1075; Emery v. Van, Syckel, 17 N. J. Eq. 564; Bramhall v. Ferris, 14 .N. Y. 41, 67 Am. Dec. 113; Camp v. Cleary, 76 Va. 140; In re Lus- comb’s Will, 109 Wis. 186, 85 N. W. 341. 50 Brooks v. Raynolds, 59 Fed. 923; Seymour v. McAvoy, 121 Cal. 438, 53 Pac. 946, 41 L. R. A. 544; Sinnott v. Moore, 113 Ga. 908, 39 S. E. 415; Meek v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 610, 54 N. W. 456, 43 Am. St. 410; Guy v. Mayes, 235 Mo. 390, 138 S. W. 510. See post, ch. 30, art. 16. 51 Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629, 58 Am. Rep. 692; Freeman v. Flood, 16 Ga. 528; Gunn v. Brown, 63 Md. 96; Simonton v. White, 93 Tex. 50, 53 S. W. 339, 77 Am. St. 824; Monday v. Vance, 92 Tex. 428, 49 S. W. 516. 52 Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629, 58 Am. Rep. 692. 53 Phillips v. Grayson, 23 Ark. 769; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195; Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 43; Beaufort v. Collier, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 487, 44 Am. Dec. 321; Tul- lett v. Armstrong, 4 Myl. & C. 377. CHAPTER XVI LAPSE, AND METHODS OF PREVENTING SECTION 305. Lapsed and void gifts in general. 306. Death of beneficiary as cause of lapse. 307. Causes of lapse other than by death of beneficiary. 308. Devolution of lapsed legacies and . devises. 309. Intention of testator respecting lapse. § 305. SECTION 310. Lapse prevented by provisions. 311. Lapse prevented by substitution or gift over. 312. Lapse prevented by gift over after gift to a class. 313. Lapse prevented by residuary clause. : statutory Lapsed and void gifts in general—A legacy or de- vise is said to lapse when it: fails because the beneficiary in some way becomes incapable of taking under the will before such de- vise or legacy vests.1 This may result from the death of the beneficiary before the testator,? or before the estate vests.* There is a distinction between a lapsed and a void gift. In the former case the beneficiary dies in the interim between the execution of the will and the death of the testator, but in the latter case the gift is void from the beginning, as if the bene- ficiary was dead when the will was made.° The rule as to lapsing of legacies applies as well to residuary legatees as to others.® 1Hibler v. Hibler, 104 Mich. 274, 62 N. W. 361; Murphy v. McKeon, 53 N. J. Eq. 406, 32 Atl. 374; Shad- den v. Hembree, 17 Ore. 14, 18 Pac. 572; In re Waln’s Estate, 189 Pa. St. 631, 42 Atl. 299, 3 Galloway v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558, 151 S. W. 1014, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 782, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 712; In re Sutra’s Estate, 139 Cal. 87, 72 Pac. 827; Miller v. Metcalf, 77 Conn. 176, 58 Atl. 743; Lemmons v. Reynolds, °° 170 Mo. 227, 71 S. W. 135. 4Robinson v. Palmer, 90 Maine 246, 38 Atl. 103; Goebel v. Wolf, 113 N. Y. 405, 21 N. E. 388, 10 Am. St. 464. 5 Murphy v. McKeon, 53 N. J. Ea. 406, 32 Atl. 374. 6 Shelton v. Hadlock, 62 Conn. 140, 25 Atl. 483. 272 273 LAPSE—METHODS OF PREVENTING § 306 Where the deceased was the sole legatee the will is not re- voked by a lapse caused by his death,’ but the will may still be probated in order to empower the executor with the legal right to settle the affairs of the deceased testator, and to pay his debts and funeral expenses. § 306. Death of beneficiary as cause of lapse.—A lapse is most frequently caused by the death of the beneficiary before that of the testator, and it is immaterial whether or not the tes- tator had knowledge, in his'lifetime, of the death of such bene- ficiary.2 A gift will also lapse where the beneficiary dies after the testator, but before the time arrives for the gift to vest.° A devise in trust or in the nature of a trust does not lapse by reason of the death of the trustee before the testator,*® but lapses where the cestui que trust dies before the testator** in case there is no gift over.? There is no lapse because of the death of a life tenant before the testator, where the will gives a remainder in fee.** Where the gift is to several as tenants in common, the death of one before the testator will occasion only his share of the gift to lapse.** But where the gift is made to several as joint tenants, or as a class, there is no lapse on account of the death of any member so long as any survive, but the entire gift goes over to the survivor or survivors.” When, however, the parties to whom a legacy is given are not 7 Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475, 3 12Thompson vy. Thornton, 197 Atl. 604, 56 Am. Rep. 530. 8 Dildine v. Dildine, 32 N. J. Eq. 78; Dixon v. Cooper, 88 Tenn. 177, 12 S. W. 445. ®2Usry v. Hobbs, 58 Ga. 32; Gillett yv. Gillett, 109 Ill. App. 75; McClain vy. Capper, 98 Iowa 145, 67 N. W. 102; Minot v. Doggett, 190 Mass. 435, 77 N. E. 629; Garland v. Smiley, 51 N. J. Eq. 198, 26 Atl. 164; Clark v. Cammann, 160 N. Y. 315, 54 N. E. 709. 10In re Elmslie’s Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 397. 11 Stanwood v. Stanwood, 179 Mass. 223, 60 N. E. 584. 18—Tuomp, WILLs. Mass. 273, 83 N. E. 880. 18 Lacey v. Floyd, 99 Tex. 112, & S. W. 665. 14 Bill v. Payne, 62 Conn. 140, 25 Atl. 354; Dorsey v. Dodson, 203 Ill. 32, 67 N. E. 395; Stetson v. East- man, 84 Maine 366, 24 Atl. 868; Best v. Berry, 189 Mass. 510, 75 N. E. 743,109 Am. St. 651. 15 Rudolph v. Rudolph, 207 Ill. 266, 69 N. E. 834, 99 Am. St. 211; Gray v. Bailey, 42 Ind. 349; Howard v. Trustees, 88 Md. 292, 41 Atl. 156; Meserve v. Haak, 191 Mass. 220, 77 N. E. 377, § 307 WILLS 274 described as a class, but by their individual names—though they may constitute a class—the death of any one of them, before the testator, causes a lapse of the legacy intended for the legatee so dying.*® Where real estate devised is charged with the payment of a legacy, such legacy does not lapse by reason of the death of the devisee before the testator, but the heir takes subject to the charge.*7 After a gift has once vested there can be no lapse by the subsequent death of the beneficiary,** even though his death occurs before the legacy becomes payable.*® If the gift vests on the death of the testator, it will not lapse because of the death of the beneficiary before the time arrives for his en- joyment in possession. But if the gift does not vest until some time after the death of the testator, the fact that the beneficiary survives him is immaterial.” § 307. Causes of lapse other than by death of beneficiary. —Aside from lapse caused by the death of the beneficiary prior to the death of the testator, there may be a lapse where there is no one in existence at the testator’s death capable of taking the gift,2* or when the purpose of the gift fails, is void, or where it becomes impossible, 22 or when it 24 or where the bene- ficiary, though competent to take the gift, refuses to do so.” Where the gift is to a corporation, and it ceases to have a 16 Workman v. Workman, 2 Allen (Mass.) 472. 17 Cady v. Cady, 67 Miss. 425, 7 So. 216; Gilroy v. Richards, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 355, 63 S. W. 664. 18 Ballard v. Camplin, 161 Ind. 16, 67 N. E. 505. 19 Newberry v. Hinman, 49 Conn. 130; Dorsey v. Dodson, 203 Ill. 32, 67 N. E. 395; Hibler v. Hibler, 104 Mich. 274, 62 N. W. 361. 20 Bill v. Payne, 62 Conn. 140, 25 Atl. 354; Davie v. Wynn, 80 Ga. 673, 6 S. E. 183; Borgner v. Brown, 133 Ind. 391, 33 N. E. 92; Thompson v. Myers, 95 Ky. 597, 26 S. W. 1014; Keniston v.. Adams, 80 Maine 290, 14 Atl. 203. 21New Orleans v. Hardie, 43 La. Ann. 251, 9 So. 12. 22 Chadwick v. Chadwick, 37 N. J. Eq. 71; Burleyson v. Whitley, 97 N. Car. 295, 2 S. E. 450. 23Jn re Russell’s Estate, 150 Cal. 604, 89 Pac. 345; Wolfe v. Hatheway, 81 Conn. 181, 70 Atl. 645; Kinne v. Phares, 79 Kans. 366, 100 Pac. 287; Moss v. Helsley, 60 Tex. 426. 24 Hall v. Smith, 61 N. H. 144. 25 Sawyer v. Freeman, 161 Mass. 543, 37 N. E. 942; Hall v. Smith, 61 N. H. 144. 275 LAPSE—METHODS OF PREVENTING § 308 corporate existence for the purpose of taking the gift prior to the death of the testator, the gift will lapse.** The lapse of a legacy may be occasioned by the legatee ceas- ing to occupy the position upon which the testator’s bounty de- pends, as the remarriage of the testator’s widow to whom he has left a legacy during her widowhood.*” Also a gift will lapse where it is made upon a condition precedent and such condition is not performed within a reasonable time,”* or where it is made contingent upon an event which does not happen.” § 308. Devolution of lapsed legacies and devises.—A dis- tinction was made by the common law as to the ultimate des- tination of the property attempted to be disposed of by will between a devise of land and a bequest of personal property. In case of the lapse of a devise the property was not comprised in a general or residuary devise, but passed to the heirs as in- testate property ;°° while a lapsed legacy, unless a contrary in- tention appeared, passed under the residuary clause of the will.** This distinction seems to have sprung from the fact that no real estate acquired by the testator after the execution of his will passed under the residuary clause, while such a clause in- cluded all personal property owned by the testator at the time of his death not otherwise given, no matter when acquired.” 26Crum v. Bliss, 47 Conn. 592; Brooks v. Belfast,.90 Maine 318, 38 Atl. 222; Stone v. Framingham, 109 Mass. 303; Gladding v. St. Matthew’s ‘Church, 25 R. I. 628, 57 Atl. 860, 65 L. R. A. 225, 105 Am. St. 904. 27 Schneider v. Heilbron, 115 App. Div. 720, 101 N. Y. S. 152. 28 Mills v. Newberry, 112 Ilf. 123, 1 N. E. 156, 54 Am. Rep. 213; Drew v. Wakefield, 54 Maine 291; Chad- wick v. Chadwick, 37 N. J. Eq. 71. 29 Gibson v. Seymour, 102 Ind. 485, 2 N. E. 305, 52 Am. Rep. 688; Mc- Greevy v- McGrath, 152 Mass. 24, 25 N. E. 29. 30 Beers v. Narramore, 61 Conn. 13, 22 Atl. 1061; Gill v. Grand Tower Mining &c. Co., 92 Ill. 249; Heald v. Heald, 56 Md. 300; Hudson v. Gray, 58 Miss. 882; Yard v. Murray, 86 Pa. St. 113; Kelly v. Nichols, 18 R. I. 62, 25 Ati 840, 19 L. R. A. 413; Stonestreet v. Doyle, 75 Va. 356, AO Am. Rep. 731. 31 Roberson v. Roberson, 21 Ala. 273; Hughes v. Allen, 31 Ga. 483; ‘Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 34 N. E. 467, 21 L. R. A. 454; Chap- man v. Chick, 81 Maine 109, 16 Atl. 407; Reid v. Walbach, 75 Md. 205, 23 Atl. 472; In re Batchelder, 147 Mass. 465, 18 N. E. 225. 32 Molineaux v. Raynolds, 55 N. J. Eg. 187, 36 Atl. 276, § 309 276 ‘WILLS But this rule has been changed by the aid of statutes and the presumption against partial intestacy, so that in most jurisdic- tions a residuary devise or bequest now carries everything the testator has attempted but failed to dispose of,** unless a con- trary intention appears from the will.®* The general rule is that, where a specific legacy or devise lapses on account of the death of the legatee or devisee dying before the testator, and such deceased legatee or devisee was also a residuary legatee or devisee, the lapsed specific legacy or devise falls into the residuum.®> Where, however, the lapse is in the residuary clause, and the beneficiary dying before the testator is the sole bene- ficiary, or one of several who take as tenants in common, the gift which lapses is not reabsorbed into the residue, but goes to the heirs or next of kin of the testator as intestate property.*° § 309. Intention of testator respecting lapse.—A testator may, by the terms of his will, prevent a legacy from lapsing, but to effect this object he must declare, either expressly, or in terms from which it can be collected with sufficient clearness, who is to take in case of the primary legatee’s death before his own death.*” When the intention of the testator in this respect is clearly shown, it will be given full force and effect.** 33 Waterman v. Canal Louisiana Bank, 186 Fed. 71; Johnson v. Holi- field, 82 Ala. 123, 2 So. 753; Galloway v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558, 151 S. W. 1014, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 782, Ann. Cas. 1914.D, 712; In re Upham’s Es- tate, 127 Cal. 90, 59 Pac. 315; Rock- well v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 8, 34 Atl. 758; Sullivan v. Larkin, 60 Kans. 5459 57 Pac. 105; Mueller v. Buenger, 184 Mo. 458, 83 S. W. 458, 67 L. R. A. 648, 105 Am. St. 541; Cruikshank v. Home for Friendless, 113 N. Y. 337, 21 N. E. 64,4 L. R. A. 140; Lenz v. Sens, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 442, 66 S. W. 110. 34 Moss v. Helsley, 60 Tex. 426. 85 Hogan v. Hogan, 3 Dana (Ky.) 572; Stetson v. Eastman, 84 Maine 366, 24 Atl. 868; Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251; Dresel v. King, 198 Mass. 546, 85 N. E. 77, 126 Am. St. 459; Givens v. Ott, 222 Mo. 395, 121 S. W. 23; In ré Whiting, 33 Misc. 274, 68 N. Y. S. 733; Duckworth v. Jordan, 138 N. Car. 520, 51 S. E. 109; In re Reynolds’ Will, 20 R. I. 429, 39 Atl. 896; In re Gamble, 13 Ont. L. R. 299. 36 Hamlet v. Johnson, 26 Ala. 557; Hutchinson’s Appeal, 34 Conn. 300; Wentworth v. Read, 166 Ill. 139, 46 N. E. 777; Stetson v. Eastman, 84 Maine 366, 24 Atl. 868. 37 Bates v. Dewson, 128 Mass. 334; University of Pennsylvania Trustees’ Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 187; Coleman v. Jackson (Tex. Civ. App.), 126 S. W. 1178. 88 Kerrigan v. Tabb (N. J.), 39 277 LAPSE—METHODS OF PREVENTING § 310 Where tne wiil shows a clear intention of the testator that the property shall go to the heirs of the beneficiary, a lapse is said to be prevented by implication.*® Some authorities hold that it is requisite not only that the testator should declare his inten- tion that the legacy shall not lapse, but that he shall point out how the same shall be kept on foot in the event of the decease of the legatee before the testator, and to whom it shall be paid.*° It has been held that the mere use of the words “‘heirs,” “‘ex- ecutors,”’ “administrators,” etc., will not prevent a lapse where the beneficiary dies before the testator, as these words are prima facie to be regarded only as words of limitation, calculated to describe the nature of the estate given to the legatee or devisee, and not as used with any express intention of preventing a lapse.** Where the testator clearly intends that his gift shall pass to the beneficiaries as a class, there is no lapse by reason of the death of any one of them before the class is determined.** § 310. Lapse prevented by statutory provisions.—At the present time in England, and generally in this country, statutes for the prevention of the lapsing of gifts in case of the death of the donee before the testator, where the testator leaves issue or lineal descendants surviving him, are very generally in force. Some of these statutes are applicable only to gifts to children,* or to children and grandchildren of the testator ;** others extend Atl. 701; In re McGovran’s Estate, 190 Pa. St. 375, 42 Atl. 705; Rivers v. Rivers, 36 S. Car. 302, 15 S. E. 137; Brice v. Horner (Tenn.), 38 S. W. 440. 39 Ballard v. Camplin, 161 Ind. 16, 67 N. E. 505; In re Freeman, 146 Jowa 38, 124 N. W. 804; Mann v. Hyde, 71 Mich. 278, 39 N. W. 78; Rivers v. Rivers, 36 S. Car. 302, 15 S. E. 137, 402 Redfield Wills 162; Sibley v. Cook, 3 Atk. 572, 41 Jackson v. Alson, 67 Conn. 249, 34 Atl. 1106; Thornley v. Kershaw, 109 Ill. App. 113; Maxwell v. Feath- erston, 83 Ind. 339; Farnsworth v. Whiting, 102 Maine 296, 66 Atl. 831; Horton v. Earle, 162 Mass. 448, 38 N. E. 1135; Loveren v. Donaldson, 69 N. H. 639, 45 Atl. 715; McKiernan v. Beardslee, 72 N. J. Eq. 283, 73 Atl. 815; In re Wells, 113 N. Y. 396, 21 N. E. 137, 10 Am. St. 457; Bar- nett’s Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 342. 42 Gordon v. Jackson, 58 N. J. Eq. 166, 43 Atl. 98; In re McGovran’s Estate, 190 Pa. St. 375, 42 Atl. 705. 43 South Carolina: Civ. Code (1912), § 3574; Logan v. Brunson, 56 S. Car. 7, 33 S. E. 737. 44Colorado: Mills’ Ann. Stat. (1912), § 7875; Illinois: Ann. Stats. (1913), p. 2275, par. 4212. § 310 WILLS 278 to gifts to testator’s children, grandchildren, brothers and sis- ters;** while others apply only to gifts to the children or de- scendants of the testator.** A few statutes entirely abolish lapse by death of the legatee. before the testator, giving the property to the heirs or distribu- tees of the deceased legatee.*7 In others a lapse is abolished in all cases if the beneficiary leave issue surviving the testator, the issue taking as the ancestor would have taken had he sur- vived.*8 In a large majority of the states the statutes leave the common-law lapse unmodified, unless the deceased benefi- ciary was a relative of the testator, and left issue surviving.” These statutes’do not ordinarily apply where the beneficiary died before the will was executed ;°° nor where the interest was vested in the beneficiary upon the testator’s death, and he dies before taking possession of the property devised.** 45 Connecticut: Gen. Stat. (1902), § 296; New Jersey: Gen. Stat. (1911), p. 5866, § 22; Pennsylvania: Purdon’s Dig. Stat. (1910), p. 5142, § 21. 46 Alabama: Code (1907), § 6162; Arkansas: Dig. Stat. (1904), $ 8022; Arizona: Rev. Stat. (1913), par. 1218, p. 499; Indiana: Burns’ Ann. Stat. (1914), § 3127; Mississippi: Code (1906), § 5081; New York: Consol. Laws (1909), p. 967; North Car- olina: Pell’s Revisal (1908), § 3144; Texas: Sayles’ Civ. Stats. (1914), art. 7869. 47Towa: Code (1897), § 3281; Maryland: Ann. Code (1911), p. 2148, art. 93, § 326. 48 District of Columbia: Code (1911), § 1631; Georgia: Code (1911), § 3906; Kentucky: Carroll’s Stats. (1914), § 4841; New Hamp- shire: Pub. Stat. (1901-1913), p. 617; Rhode Island: Gen. Laws (1909), ch. 254, § 31; Tennessee: Code (1896), § 3928; Virginia: Ann. Code (1904), § 2523; West Virginia: Ann. Code (1913), ch. 77, § 3877. The stat- 49 Alaska: Carter’s Ann. Codes (1900), part 5, ch. 15, § 145; Cali- fornia: Civ Code (1915), § 1310; Idaho: Rev. Code (1908), § 5747; Kansas: Gen. Stat. (1909), § 9832; Maine: Rev. Stat. (1903), ch. 76, § 10; Massachusetts: Rev. Laws (1902), ch. 135, § 21; Minnesota: Gen. Stat. (1913), § 7262; Missouri: Rev. Stat. (1909), § 546; Montana: Civ. Code (1907), § 4789; Nebraska: Cobbey’s Ann. Stat. (1911), § 5016; Nevada: Rev. Laws (1912), § 6219; North Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), § 5679; Ohio: Ann. Code (1912), § 10581; Oklahoma: Rev. Laws (1910), § 8407; Oregon: Lord’s Ore. Laws (1909), § 7327; South Da- kota: Comp. Laws (1913), § 1062; Utah: Comp. Laws (1907), §§ 2764, 2793; Vermont: Pub. Stat. (1906), § 2949; Washington: Rem. and Bal. Ann. Codes & Stats. (1910), § 1328; Wisconsin: Stat. (1913), § 2289, 50 Williams v. Knight, 18 R. I. 333, 27 Atl. 210. 51 Patton v. Ludington, 103 Wis. 629, 79 N. W. 1073, 74 Am. St. 910. 279 LAPSE—METHODS OF PREVENTING § 311, utes are generally held applicable to gifts whether made to in- dividuals or classes ;°* but in a few jurisdictions the courts have held that they apply to gifts to individuals only, and not to gifts to classes.*° § 311. Lapse prevented by substitution or gift over.—One of the most common methods of preventing a lapse is by a pro- vision in the will substituting one beneficiary for another upon the happening of a specified contingency. The contingency most usually provided for is that of the death of the beneficiary be- fore the testator, and a lapse by the happening of such a con- tingency is prevented by an express provision for a substitution or gift over to another.** Where a will is specially prepared so as to avoid a lapse, care must be taken to show exactly how the gift is to go in the event of the beneficiary dying in the life- time of the testator. It should declare in express terms what person or persons are to be substituted. Although, it has been held that a substitution is clearly implied by the use of the term “or” in the disjunctive, although there is no gift over.” Thus a gift to a particular person “or” his heirs will not lapse upon the death of the beneficiary before the testator.°* The inser- tion, after the name of the beneficiary, of the words “‘his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns,” will not prevent a lapse in case of the death of the beneficiary before the testator, un- less a declaration that the gift shall not lapse is superadded ;** 156 Mass. 388, 31 N. E. 298; Martin v. Lachasse, 47 Mo. 591; Varick v. 52 Downing v. Nicholson, 115 Iowa 493, 88 N. W. 1064, 91 Am. St. 175; Sloan v. Thornton, 102 Ky. 443, 43 S. W. 415, 19 Ky. L. 1511; Howland v. Slade, 155 Mass. 415, 29 N. E. 631. 53 Martin v. Mercer University, 98 Ga. 320, 25 S. E. 522; Young v. Rob- inson, 11 Gill. & J. (Md.) 328; Grant v. Mosely (Tenn.), 52 S. W. 508; Olney v. Bates, 3 Drew. Ch. 319. 54In re Bennett’s Estate, 134 Cal. 320, 66 Pac. 370; Miller v. Metcalf, 77 Conn. 176, 58 Atl. 743; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 127 Iowa 568, 103 N. W. 789; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 333; Pollock v. Farnham, Smith, 69 N. J. Eq. 505, 61 Atl. 151; In re Crawford, i13 N. Y. 366, 21 N. E. 142; May’s Appeal, 41 Pa. St. 512; Lee v. McFarland, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 292, 46 S. W. 281. 55 Keniston .v. Adams, 80 Maine 290, 14 Atl. 203; Kimball v. Story, 108 Mass. 382; Zabriskie v. Huyler, 62 N. J. Eq. 697, 51 Atl. 197; Brokaw v. Hudson, 27 N. J. Eq. 135. 56 Keniston v. Adams, 80 Maine 290, 14 Atl. 263; Zabriskie v. Huyler, 62 N. J. Eq. 697, 51 Atl. 197. 57 Kimball v. Story, 108 Mass. 382. € 312 WILLS 280 but if the gift was in the disjunctive to the beneficiary named “or his heirs,” the legacy will not lapse.** Where a gift is made to depend for its operation on the hap- pening or not happening of any other uncertain contingency, the gift will lapse when the condition fails, unless the will con- tains suitable provision for substitution or gift over.” § 312. Lapse prevented by gift over after gift to a class.— Gifts over after a gift to a class are made (1) by mak- ing a substitutional gift, as “to my brothers and sisters upon the death of my wife, and if any of my brothers and sisters shall be dead, his or her children shall take his or her part,” and (2) by a gift in the nature of an original gift, as “to my brothers and sisters who shall be living at the death of my wife, and to the issue of such of my brothers and sisters as shall be then dead.” Either of these methods will prevent a lapse, but the effect on the gift over resulting from a failure of the pri- mary gift may not be the same. Under the substitutional method persons might be excluded who would be included under the orig- inal method.®° Thus if the testator, under the substitutional method, make a gift to the children of A, and in a subsequent clause provide that in case of the death of any one of the chil- dren of A before the period of distribution, the issue of such child shall take their parent’s share, such issue can not take un- less the parent might have taken;** while if the testator, under the original method, makes a gift to the children of A and then a gift to the issue of any child of A who may be dead, of the share which the parent would have taken if living, such issue will take the gift without reference to when the parent died.” “88 Wright v. Methodist Episcopal (N. S.) 837, 5 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.). Church, .Hoffm.. Ch. (N. Y.) 201; 222. Gittings ve, McDermott, 2 Myl. & K. 61 Outcalt v. Outcalt, 42 N. J. Eq. €9.5 2, : 500, 8 Atl. 532; In re Crawford, 113 39 See ch. 30. _ N. Y. 366, 21 N. E. 142; Roundtree 60 Martin v. Holgate, L.R.1H.L. v. Roundtree, 26 S, Car. 450, 2 S. E. Rep.. 175, 35 L. J. Ch. 789, 15 W. R. 474. 135; Lanphier v. Buck, 2 Drew. & 62 Teed v. Morton, 60 N. Y. 502; Sm. 484, 34 L. J. Ch. 650, 11 Jur. In re Chapman, 32 Beav. 382, 9 Jur. . (N. S.) 657, 11 W. R. 578. 281 LAPSE—-METHODS OF PREVENTING § 313 Under the form of a substitutional gift, the substituted lega- tee must point out the original legatee in whose place he claims to stand.** The issue of members of the class who die after the date of the will take by substitution to the exclusion of the issue of those who died prior to such date.°* Under the form of an original gift, it is not necessary that such issue survive their own parents in order to take;® but tinder the substitutional form of gift, such survivorship is necessary, otherwise there would be a substitution of dead persons for living ones.* § 313. Lapse prevented by residuary clause.—As a gen- eral rule, a lapsed or void legacy or devise will pass by a gen- eral residuary clause.’ It has been held in some jurisdictions, however, that lapsed devises pass to heirs, and lapsed legacies go to the residue, as at common law,® and in Kentucky, by statute, lapsed legacies and lapsed devises both pass as intestate property rather than under a general residuary clause.” A lapse of part of the residue by death of one of the residuary legatees taking as tenants in common will not go to the other residuary legatees, but will go as intestate property in the ab- sence of substitution by the will or by force of a statute pre- 638 Christopherson v. Naylor, 1 Merv. 319. 64 Ruddell v. Wren, ‘208 Ill. 508, 70 N. E. 751; Dunn v. Corey, 56 N. J. Eq. 507, 39 Atl. 368; In re Devoe, 66 App. Div. 1, 72 N. Y. S. 962; In re Morrison’s Estate, 139 Pa. St. 306, 20 Atl. 1057. 65In re Smith, 7 Ch. Div. 665, 47 L. J. Ch. 265, 26 W. R. 418. 66 Haszard v. Haszard, 19 R. I. 374, 34 Atl. 150; Hurry v. Hurry, L. R. 10 Eq. 346, 39 L. J. Ch. 824, 22 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 577, 18 W. R. 829. 67 Hughes v. Allen, 31 Ga. 483; Drew v. Wakefield, 54 Maine 291; Dexter v. Harvard College, 176 Mass. 192, 57 N. E. 371; Lewis v. Lusk, 35 Miss. 401; Tindall v. Tindall, 23 N. J. Eq. 244; Morton v. Woodbury, 153 N. Y. 243, 47 N. E. 283; Hastings v. Earp, 62 N. Car. 5; In re Gray’s Estate, 147 Pa. St. 67, 23 Atl. 205; In re Reynolds, 20 R. I. 429, 39 Atl. 896. 68 Johnson v.' Holifield, 82 Ala. 123, 2 So. 753; In re Miner’s Will, 146 N. Y. 121, 40 N. E. 788; Massey’s Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 470. 69 Stockwell v. Bowman, 67 S. W. 379, 23 Ky. L. 2304. § 313 WILLS 282 venting lapse.” It becomes important, therefore, to safeguard a residuary clause against lapse by proper words of substitu- tion.” 70 Bendall v. Bendall, 24 Ala. 295, Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 82 60 Am. Dec. 469; Canfield v. Can- N. W. 345, 50 L. R. A. 307, 76 Am. field, 62 N. J. Eq. 578, 50 Atl. 471, St. 924. ‘ 7 Prob. Rep. Ann. 202; In re Whit- 71 See post, ch. 30, art. 14, ing, 33 Misc. 274, 68 N. Y. S. 733; CHAPTER XVII CHARGING SPECIFIC PROPERTY WITH PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND LEGACIES SECTION SECTION 320. Legacies and debts payable out 325. Charging debts and legacies upon of personalty. personal property specifically 321. Express charge of legacies upon bequeathed. realty. 326. Effect of residuary clause blend- 322. Implied charge of legacies upon ing realty and personalty. realty. 327. Exoneration of personalty from 323. Charging realty with payment of liability for debts and legacies. annuity or support. 324. Charging real estate specifically devised with payment of debts and legacies. § 320. Legacies and debts payable out of personalty.— The general rule is that the personal estate of the testator sup- plies the fund out of which legacies and debts are to be paid, unless it clearly appears from the will that the testator intended otherwise.t In the absence of anything in the will to indicate an intention on the part of the testator that a legacy shall be charged upon the real-estate, or paid out of the proceeds thereof, and there is a deficiency in the personalty, the legacy abates in whole or in part.?, Such was the rule of the common law, and such is still the rule where not changed by statute.® § 321. Express charge of legacies upon realty.—A testa- mentary charge upon real estate may be made by the testator 1Davidson v. Coon, 125 Ind. 497, 25 N. E. 601, 9 L. R. A. 584; Dun- can v. Wallace, 114 Ind. 169, 16 N. E. 137; McQueen v. Lilly, 131 Mo. 9, 31 S. W. 1043; Geiger v. Worth, 17 Ohio St. 564. 2 Wentworth v. Read, 166 Ill. 139, 46 N. E. 777; McQueen v. Lilly, 131 Mo. 9, 31 S. W. 1043; Bevan v. Cooper, 72 N. Y. 317; Lee v. Lee, 88 Va. 805, 14 S. E. 534. 3 Newsom v. Thornton, 82 Ala. 402, 8 So. 261, 60 Am. Rep. 743; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 69 N. H. 303, 45 Atl. 138; 283 § 321 WILLS 284 either by express direction to that effect contained in the will, or the intention thus to charge it may be implied from the whole will taken together.* An endless variety of expressions have been employed to charge real estate with the payment of debts and legacies, and whether there is such a charge in any particular case depends upon the intention of the testator, to be determined by a con- sideration of the whole will. Where a long course of decisions have established a particular meaning as belonging to particular expressions used to charge real estate with the payment of debts and legacies, the use of such expressions for the purpose is ad- visable. Thus it has been held that a gift of testator’s estate, “after” a certain legacy is paid, charges such legacy upon the real estate.> Also a specific direction to take a certain sum “out” of the real estate devised to a named devisee creates a charge on such real estate.° A charge upon real estate is clearly created by a provision in the will that certain property, part of which is realty, is “to be used for the payment of my debts.”” Examples of expressions ‘which have been construed as creating a charge upon real es- tate will be found in the reported cases,* and among the forms hereinafter given.° Brill v. Wright, 112 N. Y. 129, 19 N. E. 628, 8 Am. St. 717; Allen v. Mattison (R. 1), 39 Atl. 241. 4Heslop v. Gatton, 71 Ill. 528; Nash v. Taylor, 83 Ind. 347; Quinby v. Frost, 61 Maine 77; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 16 N. Y. 257; Dickerman v. Eddinger, 168 Pa. St. 240, 32 Atl, 41; Gilbert’s Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 347; Webster v. Wiggin, 19 R. I. 73, 34 Atl. 990, 5 Atmore v. Walker, 46 Fed. 429; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 72 Conn. 253, 44 Atl. 41; Davidson v. Coon, 125 Ind. 497, 25 N. E. 601,9 L. R. A. 584; McQueen v. Lilly, 131 Mo. 9, 31 S. W. 1043; Smith v. ‘Cairns, 92 Tex. 667, 51 S. W. 498. *In re Roberts’ Estate, 163 Pa. St. 408, 30 Atl. 213; Albright v. Albright, 128 Pa. St. 381, 18 Atl. 490, 7 Watts v. Watts, 38 Ohio St. 480. 8 Buchanan v. Lloyd, 88 Md. 642, 41 Atl. 1075; Bakert v. Bakert, 86 Mo. App. 83; In re Walters’ Estate, 197 Pa. 555, 47 Atl. 862; Smith v. Cairns, 92 Tex. 667, 51 S. W. 498; Todd v. McFall, 96 Va. 754, 32 S. E. 472; Hawkes v. Slight, 110 Wis. 125, 85 N. W. 721. 9 See post, ch. 30, § 680. 285 CHARGING PROPERTY WITH DEBTS AND LEGACIES § 322 § 322. Implied charge of legacies upon realty.—Legacies may be charged upon real estate without the use of express words where an intention on the part of the testator to so charge his real estate is clearly manifested by the whole will.*° A di- rection in the will to pay a legacy without sacrificing the real estate if possible, impliedly charges the real estate with such payment.** Also a charge is impliedly created on real estate by a power created by the will to sell the real estate for the purpose of paying a legacy bequeathed ;** and a direction to executors or trustees to pay an annuity during the life of the beneficiary impliedly charges such annuity upon the testator’s entire estate.*® Where a testator has no personal property at the time he ex- ecutes a will and bequeaths specific legacies, the reasonable pre- sumption is that he intended to charge them upon the land, for it is not to be presumed that he did no more than make an empty show of giving a bounty to the legatee. But this presumption does not prevail where there is personal estate at the time the will was executed, although it may subsequently be lost to the testator.1* But some courts hold that the mere fact that the testator’s personalty is insufficient to pay the legacies in full, does not of itself show an intention to charge the legacies upon the realty." 10 Sistrunk v. Ware, 69 Ala. 273; Miller v. Cooch, 5 Del. Ch. 161; Reid v. Corrigan, 143 Ill. 402, 32 N. E. 387; Davidson v. Coon, 125 Ind. 497, 25 N. E. 601, 9 L. R. A. 584; Thissell v. Schillinger, 186 Mass. 180, 71 N. E. 300, 9 Prob. Rep. Ann. 290; Smith v. Jackman, 115 Mich. 192, 73 N. W. 228; Perkins v. First Nat. Bank, 81 Miss. 358, 33 So. 18; McQueen v. Lilly, 131 Mo. 9, 31 S. W. 1043; Price v. Price, 52 N. J. Eq. 326, 29 Atl. 679; Irwin v. Teller, 188 N. Y. 25, 80 N. E. 376; Dickerman v. Ed- dinger, 168 Pa. St. 240, 32 Atl. 41. 11 Price v. Price, 52 N. J. Eq. 326, 29 Atl. 679. 12 Clark v. Marlow, 149 Ind. 41, 48 N. E. 359; Stevens v. Flower, 46 N. J. Eq. 340, 19 Atl. 777; Dean v. Loewenstein, 6 Ohio C. C. 587, 3 Ohio C. D. 597; In re Blake’s Estate, 134 Pa. St. 240, 19 Atl. 850. 13 Hunt v. Hayes, 19 Ohio C. C. 151, 10 Ohio C. D. 388. 14 Duncan v. Wallace, 114 Ind. 169, 16 N. E. 137; In re Lutz, 157 Mo. 439, 57 S. W. 1018, 50 L. R. A. 847. 15 Bishop v. Howarth, 59 Conn. 455, 22 Atl. 432; Golder v. Chandler, 87 Maine 63, 32 Atl. 784; Lawton v. Fitchburg Sav, Bank, 160 Mass. 154, 35 N. E. 670; Turner v. Gibb, 48 N. J. Eq. 526, 22 Atl. 580, § 323 WILLS 286 § 323. Charging realty with payment of annuity or sup- port.—Real estate may be charged by will with the payment of an annuity,’® or the support of some person other than the owner.** But a provision in a will for the support of the widow or others out of the estate or some portion of the property does not ordinarily give such widow or other person any title to any portion of the property even though a particular part thereof is charged with the performance of the obligation.** Such pro- visions usually constitute mere equitable liens in favor of the person entitled to the support or annuity and are enforcible against the executor, testamentary trustee, residuary devisee or other person in possession of the estate as a trust obligation.*® A mere recommendation or request that the devisee shall sup- port and care for another does not: impose a charge on the realty devised, nor upon the devisee individually.2° Where the care contemplated by a direction in the will is in the nature of per- sonal attention merely, and can not be complied with by the pay- ment of a sum of money to another, the charge is personal to the devisee and is not a charge upon the real estate.** On the other hand, if the direction to support another is imperative, the real estate is charged with the support.** The question whether a person entitled to support under the terms of a will is entitled to an allowance of money for that purpose is one 16 Gallaher v. Herbert, 117 Ill. 160, 7 N. E. 511; Merritt v. Bucknam, 78 Maine 504, 7 Atl. 383; Glenn v. Spry, 5 Md. 110; Hines v. Hines, 95 N. Car. 482; In re Pierce’s Estate, 56 Wis. 560, 14 N. W. 588; In re Tuck- er, L. R. (1893) 2 Ch. 323. 17 Bell v. Watkins, 104 Ga. 345, 30 S. E. 756; Commons v. Commons, 115 Ind. 162, 16 N. E. 820, 17 N. E. 271; Donnelly v. Edelen, 40 Md. 117; Outland v. Outland, 118 N. Car. 138, 23 S. E. 972; Dickson v. Field, 77 Wis. 439, 46 N. W. 668,9 L. R. A. 537; 18 Farnam v. Farnam, 83 Conn. 369, 77 Atl. 70; Gross v. Sheeler, 7 Houst. (Del.) 280, 31 Atl. 812. 19 In re Simons’ Will, 55 Conn, 239, 11 Atl. 36; Whitehead v. Park, 53 Ga. 575; Blair v. Blair, 82 Kans. 464, 108 Pac. 827; Wiegand v. Woerner, 155 Mo. App. 227, 124 S. W. 596; Alexander v. Thompson, 38 Tex. 533. 20 Perdue v. Perdue, 124.N. Car. 161, 32 S. E. 492. 21 South Mahoning Tp. v. Marshall, 138 Pa. St. 570, 21 Atl. 79. 22 Bell v. Watkins, 104 Ga. 345, 30 S. E. 756; Clark v. Marlow, 149 Ind. 41, 48 N. E. 359; Crossett v. Clements (Miss.), 7 So. 207; Outland v. Out- land, 118 N. Car. 138, 23 S. E. 972. 287 CHARGING PROPERTY WITH DEBTS AND LEGACIES § 324 of construction upon consideration of the whole will in the light of surrounding circumstances.* § 324. Charging real estate specifically devised with pay- ment of debts and legacies.—In order to charge real estate specifically devised with the payment of debts and legacies the will must contain an express provision to that effect, or the charge must be clearly and unmistakably implied from the whole will, read in the light of all the surrounding circumstances.”* Thus a charge may be expressly created by the use of the word “charge,” or by a devise to A “on condition that” he pay a cer- tain debt or legacy.”° Also an intention to charge the real estate devised may be implied from the fact that, in the same clause with a devise of the land, there is a direction to the devisee to pay a debt or a legacy.** But the use of general words directing the payment of debts does not usually have the effect of charging the debts on land specifically devised, such words being found in most wills, and being merely a direction for the doing of what the law compels.” A residuary clause, blending realty and personalty, does not 23 Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 32 L. ed. 138, 8 Sup. Ct. 1164; Willett v. Carroll, 13 Md. 459; Crocker v. Crocker, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 252; Loom- is v. Loomis, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 624; Block v. Mauck (Tenn. Ch. App.), 52 S. W. 689; McCreary v. Robin- son, 94 Tex. 221, 59 S. W. 536. _ 24Hibler v. Hibler, 104 Mich. 274, 62 N. W. 361; Johnson v. Poulson, 32 N. J. Eq. 390; Bevan v. Cooper, 72.N. Y. 317. 25 Sistrunk v. Ware, 69 Ala. 273; Merritt v. Buckman, 78 Maine 504, 7 Att. 383; Gardenville Permanent L. Assn. v. Walker, 52 Md. 452; Mc- Fait’s Appeal, 8 Pa. St. 290; Couch y. Eastham, 29 W. Va. 784, 3 S. E. 23. 26 Potter v. Gardner, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 498, 6 L. ed. 706; Henry v. Grif- fis, 89 Iowa 543, 56 N. W. 670; Mer- rill v. Bickford, 65 Maine 118; Bu- chanan v. Lloyd, 88 Md. 642, 41 Atl. 1075; Thayer v. Finnegan, 134 Mass. 62, 45 Am. Rep. 285; Chase v. Warn- er, 106 Mich. 695, 64 N. W. 730; Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, 87 Mo. 218; Wyckoff v. Wyckoff, 49 N. J. Eq. 344, 25 Atl. 963; Brown v. Knapp, 79 N. Y. 136; Carter v. Warrell, 96 N. Car. 358, 2 S. E. 528, 60 Am. Rep. 420; Yearly v. Long, 40 Ohio St. 27. 27 Harmon v. Smith, 38 Fed. 482; Starke v. Wilson, 65 Ala. 576; Deck- er v. Decker, 121 Ill. 341, 12 N. E. 750; White v. Kauffman, 66 Md. 89, 5 Atl. 865; Hamilton v. Smith, 110 N. Y. 159, 17 N. E. 780. But see Tuohy v. Martin, 2 MacArthur (9 D. C.) 572; Bishop v. Howarth, 59 Conn. 455, 22 Atl. 432, § 325 WILLS 288 charge specific legacies upon real estate specifically devised,”* nor does a charge of legacies in general terms upon all the tes- tator’s real and personal property show his intention to charge realty specifically devised ;?® especially where the land specifically devised was exempted from the operation of a power of sale of the realty in order to pay the legacy.*° § 325. Charging debts and legacies upon personal prop- erty specifically bequeathed.—Debts and legacies may be either charged upon personalty generally or upon personalty specifically bequeathed to another.** Thus where the testator made a gift of specific property invested in a certain business “after payment of my debts which are to be paid from said personal property,” it was held that the property was charged with the payment of all the testator’s debts.** A specific legacy, however, is not usually charged with general legacies, unless such was the intention of the testator.** § 326. Effect of residuary clause blending realty and per- sonalty.—If, after giving certain legacies and making disposi- tion of specific articles, the testator, by a residuary clause, gives the remainder of his property to a residuary legatee, he will be held to have intended in case of a deficiency in personalty to charge the unpaid legacies upon the realty devised by such 28Jn re Peet’s Estate, 99 Iowa 314, 68 N. W. 705; Phillips v. Clark, 18 Squiers, 154 N. Y. 250, 48 N. E. 509; Woodward v. James, 115 N. Y. R. I. 627, 29 Atl. 688. 229 Davenport v. Sargent, 63 N. H. 538, 4 Atl. 569; Kitchell v. Young, 46 N. J. Eg. 506, 19 Atl. 729; Worth v. Worth, 95 N. Car. 239; Phillips v. Clark, 18 R. I. 627, 29 Atl. 688; Todd v. McFall, 96 Va. 754, 32 S. E. 472, 30 Johnson v. Home for Aged Men, 152 Mass. 89, 25 N. E. 44, 31In re Radovich’s Estate, 54 Cal. 540; Wethered v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 79 Md. 153, 28 Atl. 812; Hale v. St. Paul, 54 Minn. 521, 56 N. W. 63; Coane v. Harned, 51 N. J. Eq. 554, 26 Atl. 810; Fargo v. 346, 22 N. E. 150; Addeman v. Rice, 19 R. I. 30, 31 Atl. 429; Rock v. Zimmermann, 25 S. Dak. 237, 126 N. W. 265; Patten v. Herring, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 640, 29 S. W. 388. 32 Bishop v. Howarth, 59 Conn. 455, 22 Atl. 432. 83Tn re Neistrath’s Estate, 66 Cal. 330, 5 Pac. 507; Chase v. Davis, 65 Maine 102; Davenport v. Sargent, 63 N. H. 538, 4 Atl. 569; Meis v. Meis (N. J. Eq.), 35 Atl. 369; Hunter v. Hunter, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 25; Glass v. Dunn, 17 Ohio St. 413; In re Mc- Mahon’s Estate, 132 Pa. St. 175, 19 Atl. 68, 289 § 327 CHARGING PROPERTY WITH DEBTS AND LEGACIES residuary clause.** But to effect this the real and personal es- tate must be blended into one mass by the residuary clause.*° In some jurisdictions, however, the blending of realty and personalty into one fund by the residuary clause is not sufficient to show the testator’s intention to charge the real estate devised in the residuary clause with the payment of general legacies ;°* ” but an intention to so charge such real estate may be shown by extrinsic evidence.*’ Thus proof of the additional fact that the legacies were largely in excess of the personalty at the time the will was executed has been held sufficient to show testator’s in- tention to charge the realty with the payment of the legacies.** While the blending of realty and personalty into one mass by the residuary clause has the effect to charge the realty with the payment of legacies, it does not exonerate the personalty from their payment, unless such was the intention of the tes- tator. Payment of the legacies out of the real estate is limited to any deficiency remaining unpaid after exhausting the per- sonalty.*? § 327. Exoneration of personalty from liability for debts and legacies.—We have said that the personal estate of the testator is the primary fund for the payment of debts and leg- acies.*° But an express or implied charge of the debts or legacies on the real estate has the effect to exonerate the personalty from 34 Walker v. Atmore, 50 Fed. 644; Readman v. Ferguson, 13 App. D. C. 60; Reid v. Corrigan, 143 Ill. 402, 32 N. E. 387; American Cannel Coal Co. v. Clemens, 132 Ind. 163, 31 N. E. 786; In re Newcomb’s Will, 98 Jowa 175, 67 N. W. 587; Peebles v. Acker, 70 Miss. 356, 12 So. 248; Mc- Queen v. Lilly, 131 Mo. 9, 31 S. W. 1043; Carter v. Gray, 58 N. J. 411, 43 Atl. 711; Townsend v. Townsend, 25 Ohio St. 477; In re Dennis’ Es- tate, 169 Pa. St. 493, 32 Atl 436; Bird v. Stout, 40 W. Va. 43, 20 S. E, 852. 35In re Bennett’s Estate, 148 Pa. 19—Tuomp. WILLS. St. 139, 23 Atl. 1103; Allen v. Mat- tison (R. I.), 39 Atl. 241, 3 Prob. Rep. Ann. 428, 36 Pearson v. Wartman, 80 Md. 528, 31 Atl. 446; Morris v. Sickly, 133 N. Y. 456, 31 N. E. 322. 87 Brill v. Wright, 112 N. Y. 129, 19 N. E. 628, 8 Am. St. 717. 38 Davidson v. Coon, 125 Ind. 497, 25 N. E. 601, 9 L. R. A. 584; Duncan v. Wallace, 114 Ind. 169, 16 N. E. 137; Briggs v. Carroll, 117 N. Y. 288, 22 N. E. 1054. 39 Miller v. Cooch, 5 Del. Ch. 161. 40 See ante § 320. § 327 WILLS 290 their payment. In order to accomplish this, however, the tes- tator must not only charge the payment of the debts and legacies ‘upon his real estate, but he must also expressly or by necessary implication direct that the real estate shall be primarily liable and that the personalty shall be discharged.* To exonerate personalty the language must clearly show an intention on the part of the testator that his lands shall be the primary fund for the payment of debts and legacies.*? Also ‘personalty may be exonerated by a provision that it shall pass to the legatees free from any charge or contribution for the payment of debts.” It has been held that where the testator bequeathed personal property to his widow in lieu of her dower, such bequest is impliedly exonerated from the payment of debts.** 41In re Woodworth’s Estate, 31 Cal. 595; Bishop v. O’Connor, 69 III. 431; Hayes v. Sykes, 120 Ind. 180, 21 N. E. 1080; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 3 Md. Ch. 71; Stevens v. Underhill, 67 N. H. 68, 36 Atl. 370; Miller v. Harwell, 3 Murph. (N. Car.) 194; Deering & Co. v. Kerfoot, 89 Va. 491, 16 S. E. 671. 42 Young v. Young, 26 Beav. 522. 43 Fargo v. Squiers, 154 N. Y. 250, 48 N. E. 509; Woodward v. James, 115 N. Y. 346, 22 N. E. 150; Adde- man v. Rice, 19 R. I. 30, 31 Atl. 429; Patten v. Herring, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 640, 29 S. W. 388. 44 Calder v. Curry, 17 R. I. 610, 24 Atl. 103. CHAPTER XVIII TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS SECTION SECTION 335. Testamentary trusts defined and 347. Time from which income is to distinguished. be estimated. 336. Essentials of a testamentary 348. Alienation or assignment of in- trust. come by anticipation. 337. Purposes of testamentary trusts. 349. Application or payment of in- 338. Words creating testamentary come. trust. 350. Who may be a trustee. 339. Trusts by precatory words. 351. Title or interest of trustee. 340. Intention of testator to create a 352. Who may be a cestui que trust. trust. 353. Estate or interest of cestui que 341. Trusts implied from context of trust. will. 354, Trust created for benefit of 342. Trusts ex maleficio. married woman. 343. Passive and active trusts. 355. Effect of provisions for mainte- 344. What property may be subject nance, support and education. of trust. 356. Rights of creditors respecting 345. What constitutes income from trust funds. trust property. 357. Duration of trust term. 346. Trusts for the accumulation of 358. Termination of the trust. income, 359. Effect of failure of purpose of trust. § 335. Testamentary trusts defined and distinguished.— A trust is the general name applied to the relation between two persons, by virtue of which one of them, as trustee, holds property for the benefit of the other, the cestui que trust. In this chapter it is proposed to treat of trusts created by will as distinguished from trusts created by deed or declaration of trust, executed, de- livered and taking effect during the lifetime of the maker. In a testamentary trust, the legal title to the property devised or bequeathed is in one who is known as the trustee; while the’ equitable right, title, or interest in the property is in another who is known as the cestui que trust. During the existence of the trust relation the legal title is separated from the equitable. The 291 § 336 WILLS 292 distinction between a power created by will and a trust so created has been clearly defined by the courts. The Supreme Court of the United States says: “One of the tests as to a trust or a power is that a naked power to sell may be exercised or not by executors, and is discretionary, while an imperative direction to sell and dis- pose of the proceeds is a power coupled with a trust.’’* In the nature of things, there is a wide distinction between a power and a trust. In the former, the party may or may not act in his dis- cretion; in the latter, the trust will be executed, notwithstanding his omission to act.* A charge on real estate is distinguished from a trust thereof, in that in case of the former the real estate is devised generally for the beneficial enjoyment of the devisee, subject, however, to the payment by him of a sum of money or the performance of a duty, while in the case of a trust the devise is limited to some particular purpose, with no beneficial interest in the devise.* An estate in trust created by will is distinguished from an estate upon condition subsequent in that in the former the proper persons to secure the performance of the trust are not the heirs of the testator, but the beneficiaries of the trust property, while in the latter estate the breach of the condition gives the testator and his heirs, or perhaps his devisees, a right of entry on the land, which is the legal right, enforcible only in an action at law.* As a general rule, any person having capacity to make a will disposing of the legal estate in his property may create a trust.® § 336. Essentials of a testamentary trust.—To constitute a trust there must be a concurrence of (1) words sufficient to raise it, (2) a certain subject and (3) a definite object.° By this is meant sufficient language to sever the legal from the equitable estate, and to clearly identify the beneficiaries and the property 1Taylor v. Benham, 5 How. (U. 5 Reiff v. Horst, 52 Md. 255; Skeen S.) 233, 12 L. ed. 130. y. Marriott, 22 Utah 73, 61 Pac. 296. 2Chew v. Hyman, 7 Fed. 7, 10 ® Coulson v. Alpaugh, 163 Ill. 298, Biss. 240. 45 N. E. 216; Mills v. Newberry, 112 ® Lang v. Everling, 3 Misc. 530, 23 Ill. 123, 1 N. E. 156, 54 Am. Rep. N. Y. S. 329, 52 N. Y. St. 489. 213; Hill v. Page (Tenn.), 36 S. W. 4 Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 735. 119, 18 L. ed. 502. 293 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 337 out of which the trust is to take effect. The testator should, in express terms, give the legal title to the property to the trustee, and the equitable interest to the cestui que trust and expressly provide for a term, within the period allowed by law, when the trust must terminate.’ The testator should clearly set forth the purpose for which the trust is created in order that a court of equity can enforce his wishes.* It might be suggested that the designation of a competent trustee, while not essential, is always advisable. § 337. Purposes of testamentary trusts—Where a testa- tor, who desires to create a trust, is not fully informed of what a trust really implies, he should not attempt its creation without the advice of competent counsel. Good reasons may exist for not creating a trust, and the testator’s real intention would be as well carried out and the parties in interest would fully enjoy the testa- tor’s bounty if the gift were an absolute one. However, in many cases it may be advisable to create a trust, and cases constantly arise which make the creation of a trust almost imperative. Such, for example, if the testator have a son who is dissipated, a spend- thrift, or is incapable of managing his own affairs.° Also, where the testator wishes to make a gift to a married woman domiciled in a foreign state or country, the laws of which state or country give her only a limited interest in property be- queathed to or acquired by her, it may be advisable to create a trust in her favor. The trust in such case will, of course, be gov- erned by the laws of the testator’s domicil, and he may provide for the disposition of the principal by power of appointment to be exercised by her.*° If the testator has a married daughter whose husband is un- trustworthy, he may create an active trust for her benefit, and 7 Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352; 9In re L’Hommedieu, 138 Fed. Piper v. Moulton, 72 Maine 155; 606; Parker v. Wilson, 98 Ark. 553, Bates v. Bates, 134 Mass. 110. 136 S. W. 981; Aldrich v. Barton, 153 8 Coulson v. Alpaugh, 163 Ill, 298, Cal. 488, 95 Pac. 900; Hamilton v. 45 N. E. 216; Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Downs, 33 Conn. 211. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880, 14 L. R. A. 33, 27 10 Richardson v. Stodder, 100 Am. Rep. 487; Beurhaus v. Water- Mass. 528, town, 94 Wis. 617, 69 N. W. 986. 294 § 338 WILLS thus protect her from the influence and importunity of her hus- band. Various other objects can be accomplished by a trust, among which are: support for minors and incompetents, estab- lishment of charities, grant annuities, pay debts, and the like. In some jurisdictions it has been held that trusts may be created for the purpose and with full power to continue the testator’s busi- ness.** So, also, a trust may be created to continue the administration of the estate beyond the time allowed by statute so as to protect the property from sacrifice or forced sale. In fact, the formation of a trust, is the most effective mode of continuing the control of the testator over his property after his death, and so long as its purpose is not against public policy or in violation of a statute, he may create an active express trust for any purpose he deems wise and expedient.” The trust must of course be a lawful trust particularly as re- lates to the statutes of the state governing testamentary trusts. Hence the necessity of consulting the statutes of the testator’s domicil before attempting to create a testamentary trust. § 338. Words creating testamentary trust—To create a good testamentary trust a high degree of care and skill on the part of the draftsman is required. While no particular or tech- nical words are required to create a testamentary trust, the words used for that purpose must clearly show an intention on the part of the testator to give to one the legal interest in the property de- vised, and to another the equitable interest in the same property.** There must concur sufficient words or acts to show an unequiv- ocal intention to devote the subject-matter to the object of the 41Thorn v. De Breteuil, 86 App. v. Cogswell, 192 Mass. 79, 78 N. E. Div. 405, 83 N. Y. S. 849. 12 Link v. Link, 90 N. Car. 235; In re Spring, 216 Pa. St. 529, 66 Atl. 110. 13Tn re Heywood’s Estate, 148 Cal. 184, 82 Pac. 755; Hughes v. Fitzger- ald, 78 Conn. 4, 60 Atl. 694; Quinn v. Shields, 62 Iowa 129, 17 N. W. 437, 49 Am. Rep. 141; Patrick v. Patrick, 135 Ky. 307, 122 S. W. 129; Robinson 389; Pembroke Academy v. Epsom School Dist. 75 N. H. 408, 75 Atl. 100, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 646; Close v. Farmers’ L. & T. Co., 195 N. Y. 92, 87 N. E. 1005; Haywood v. Wright, 152 N. Car. 421, 67 S. E. 982; In re Nevins’ Estate, 192 Pa. St. 258, 43 Atl. 996; Holmes v. Walter, 118 Wis. 409, 95 N. W. 380, 62 L. R. A. 986. 295 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 339 trust; the subject-matter must be definite in character and so at the disposal of the settler as to enable him to devote it to the ob- ject of the trust; and this object must be one that is lawful, cer- tain, and ascertained.** The words “trust” and “trustee,” though effective in creating a trust, are not necessary.*° Thus it has been held that a devise of land to an executor, with directions to sell the same and dis- tribute the proceeds among beneficiaries named, creates a trust, although the will fails to expressly declare the executor to be a trustee.** It is sufficient if the will as a whole shows a purpose of creating a trust though no special words be used.** If the testator has named a person in his will and has directed such person to carry out the provisions made for others therein, and the person thus named can not execute such provisions of the will, except the legal title to the property shall be vested in him as trustee, then that person will be a trustee by implication, though there may have been no direct gift of the legal title to him and the word “trustee” or “trust”’ was not used.’® It is sufficient if it clearly appears from the terms of the will that it was the inten- tion of the testator to create a trust for a lawful purpose and for the management of the estate. The manner in which the trust is imposed is not material, provided the intention can be clearly gathered from the will.*® § 339. Trusts by precatory words.—Where a testator de- sires his devisee or legatee to benefit some third person out of the estate given, he frequently expresses his desire by words of entreaty, expectation, request, recommendation, hope, wish, de- sire, and the like, rather than by words of command. Such expressions in wills are termed “precatory words,” and they 14Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51; In 16 Plant v. Donaldson, 39 App. D. re Soulard’s Estate, 141 Mo. 642, 43 C. 162. S. W. 617; In re Smith’s Estate, 144 17 Ryder v. Lyon, 85 Conn. 245, 82 Pa. St. 428, 22 Att. 916, 27 Am. St. Atl. 573. 641. 18In re Reith, 144 Cal. 314, 77 Pac. 15 Hughes v. Fitzgerald, 78 Conn. 4, 942. 60 Atl. 694; Patrick v. Patrick, 135 19In re Cooper’s Estate, 150 Pa. Ky. 307, 122 S. W. 159. St. 576, 24 Atl. 1057, 30 Am. St. 829. § 339 WILLS 296 have often been held sufficient to create a trust in favor of the _ person or object sought to be benefited. The real question to be determined in such case is whether, looking at the entire context of the will, the testator intended to impose an obligation on the legatee or devisee to carry out his wishes, or intended to leave it to the legatee or devisee to act on them or not, at his discretion.*° Where the first taker has the absolute power of disposal, -or own- ership, or where a clear discretion and choice to act, or not, is given equity will not construe a trust from the language em- ployed.* /There is a simple, sure, and familiar form of devise or bequest to raise a trust, which consists of a gift to the devisee or legatee in trust for the beneficiary, and a failure to use it indicates an in- tention to avoid the creation of a trust. Words of desire, request, recommendation, or confidence in a will, addressed by a testator to a legatee whom he has the power to command, create no trust in favor of the parties recommended, unless (1) the intention of the testator to make the desire, request, recommendation, or con- fidence imperative upon the legatee, so that he shall.have no op- tion to comply or to refuse to comply with it, clearly appears from the whole will and the relation and circumstances of the testator when it was made, (2) unless the subject-matter of the wish or recommendation is certain, and (3) unless the beneficiaries are clearly designated. When these three conditions exist, a preca- tory trust may be raised.” It is a settled doctrine of courts of chancery that a devise or 20 Burnes v. Burnes, 137 Fed. 781; Kauffman v. Gries, 141 Cal. 295, 74 Pac. 846; Seymour v. Sanford, 86 Conn. 516, 86 Atl. 7; Hughes v. Fitz- gerald, 78 Conn. 4, 60 Atl. 694; Bryan v. Milby, 6 Del. Ch. 208, 24 Atl. 333, 13 L. R. A. 563; Hartman v. Arm- strong, 59 Kans. 696, 54 Pac. 1046; Murphy v. Caslin, 113 Mo. 112, 20 S. W. 786, 35 Am. St. 699; Hunt v. Hunt, 11 Nev. 442; Weller v. Weller, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 247, 54 S. W. 652. 21McDufhe v. Montgomery, 128 Fed. 105; Giles vy. Anslow, 128 Ill. 187, 21 N. E. 225; Fullenwider v. Watson, 113 Ind. 18, 14 N. E. 571; Bills v. Bills, 80 Iowa 269, 45 N. W. 748, 8 L. R. A. 696, 20 Am. St. 418; Bowen v. Dean, 110 Mass. 438; Clay v. Wood, 153 N. Y. 134, 47 N. E. 274. 22 Burnes v. Burnes, 137 Fed. 781; Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 32 L. ed. 138, 8 Sup. Ct. 1164; Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51; Hunter v. Stem- bridge, 12 Ga. 192; Peake v. Jamison, 6 Mo. App. 590; Smullin vy. Wharton, 73 Nebr. 667, 103 N. W. 288, 106 N. W. 577, 112 N. W. 622, 113 N. W. 267. 297 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 340 bequest to one person accompanied by words expressing a wish, entreaty, or recommendation that he will apply it to the benefit of others, may be held to create a trust, if the subject and the objects are sufficiently certain. It must appear that the words were in- tended by the testator to be imperative, and, when property is given absolutely and without restriction, a trust is not tobe lightly imposed upon mere words of recommendation or confidence.” Courts are not so astute as they formerly were to imply a trust from certain words, but are more inclined to find in the words the mere statement of a motive for the devise, or the vesting of a discretion in the devisee,* and it is well settled that the words used must be essentially imperative in their character to create a trust.** Thus where a will provided as follows: “I give tomy wife, A.C. P., all the rest of my estate, whatever the same may be, to be at her sole use and disposal. My said wife is fully acquainted with my reasons for this disposal of my estate, and will by her own last testament do what is right and just to my children and their natural heirs.” The court said: “The last words do not cre- ateatrust. They express the testator’s confidence that his wife will do what is just of her own motion, as a reason why he leaves the property to her unfettered disposition.””* It follows from what we have said, that in attempting to create a trust by will, all preca- tory language and words of recommendation and confidence should be avoided. The better method is to make the gift to the devisee or legatee an absolute one, with the wish that he will dis- pose of the same conformably to an oral or written request en- tirely independent of the will.*” § 340. Intention of testator to create a trust.—In order that a testator may create a trust he must adequately indicate his intention to do so by the use of appropriate language, and not 23 McDuffie v. Montgomery, 128 25 Bristol v. Austin, 40 Conn. 438; Fed. 105; Bristol v. Austin, 40 Conn. Hayes v. Hayes, 242 Mo. 155, 145 S. 438; Hayes v. Hayes, 242 Mo. 155, W. 1155. 145 S. W. 1155. 26 Sturgis v. Paine, 146 Mass. 354, 24Toland v. Toland, 123 Cal. 140, 16N. E. 21. 55 Pac. 681; Pierce v. Phelps, 75 27 See post, ch. 30, art. 16. Conn. 83, 52 Atl. 612; Small v. Field, 102 Mo. 104, 14 S. W. 815. § 340 WILLS 298 leave such intent to implication. The fact that he‘designates the purpose for which a legacy or devise may be used does not neces- sarily indicate an intention to create a trust ;* nor does the mere expression of his motive in making the gift indicate such inten- tion?” Even where the words used are sufficient to show an -in- tention on the part of the testator to create a trust, if there is un- certainty as to the beneficiaries or the objects to be benefited, or in the subject-matter to be affected, a trust will not arise.*° The intention of the testator to create a trust is to be gathered in each case from the general purpose and scope of the will.** While an intention on the part of the testator to create a trust, though not expressly stated, will be inferred from the context of the whole will, yet it is always advisable to provide in connection with the gift to the trustee that it is “in trust” for certain purposes speci- fied in the will.” 28 Randall v. Randall, 135 Ill. 398, 25 N. E. 780, 25 Am. St. 373; In re Bogart’s Will, 43 App. Div. 582, 60 N. Y. S. 496. 22 Williams v. Baltimore Baptist Church, 92 Md. 497, 48 Atl. 930, 54 L. R. A. 427; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 172 Mass. 101, 51 N. E. 449; Elkinton v. Elkinton (N. J. Eq.), 18 Atl. 587; Baker v. Baker, 53 W. Va. 165, 44 S. E, 174. 30 Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 56, 46 Atl, 278; Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51; Coulson v. Alpaugh, 163 Ill. 298, 45 N. E, 216; Allen v. McGee, 158 Ind. 465, 62 N. E. 1002; Webster v. Wathen, 97 Ky. 318, 30 S. W. 663, 17 Ky. L. 32; Dufour v. Deresheid, 110 La. 344, 34 So. 469; Pratt v. Shep- pard & Enoch Pratt Hospital, 88 Md. 610, 42 Atl. 51; Cowley v. Twombly, 173 Mass. 393, 53 N. E. 886, 46 L. R. A. 164; Smullin v. Wharton, 73 Nebr. 667, 103 N. W. 288, 106 N. W. 577, 112 N. W. 622, 113 N. W. 267; Condit v. Reynolds, 66 N. J. L. 242, 49 Atl. 540; Murray v. Miller, 178 N. Y. 316, 70 N. E. 870; Chase v. Isherwood, 5 Ohio S. & C. Pl. Dec. 1, 1 Ohio N. P. 31; Ensley v. Ensley, 105 Tenn. 107, 58 S. W. 288; Heidenheimer v. Bauman, 84 Tex. 174, 19 S. W. 382, 31 Am. St. 29; Sims v. Sims, 94 Va. 580, 27 S. E. 436, 64 Am. St. 772; Baker v. Baker, 53 W. Va. 165, 44 S. E. 174; McHugh v. McCole, 97 Wis. 166, 72 N. W. 631, 65 Am. St. 106, 40 L. R. A. 724, 31 Bloom v. Strauss, 73 Ark. 56, 84 S. W. 511; Dee v. Dee, 212 Ill. 338, 72 N. E. 429; Merrill v. Hayden, 86 Maine 133, 29 Atl. 949; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 172 Mass. 101, 51 N. E. 449; Clusky v. Burns, 120 Mo. 567, 25 S. W. 585; Lawrence v. Cooke, 104 N. Y. 632, 11 N. E. 144; Wilson v. Wil- son, 17 N. Car. 181; Biddle’s Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 258; Seamonds v. Hodge, 36 W. Va. 304, 15 S. E. 156, 32 Am. St. 854. 82 See post, ch. 30, art. 16. 299 § 341 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 341. Trusts implied from context of will—A trust may often be implied from the nature of the powers granted or duties imposed by the will.** Thus a trust will be implied from an ex- press authorization to the executor to pay certain annuities, as this would be impossible unless the executor has a trust estate in the property.** The same result will follow from a provision giving directions to manage, dispose of, or distribute property for the benefit of others.** But a trust must be reasonably certain in its terms as to the property embraced in the trust, the beneficiaries, the nature of the estate they are to have, and the manner in which the trust is to be executed, and, when either of these elements is indefinite or un- certain, the trust must fail.2° A mere. discretion in the trustee creates a mere power; but an imperative discretion implies a trust.” The general rule is that, in the absence of an express provision creating a trust, a trust will be implied where executors are given duties beyond their ordinary functions as executors.*® § 342. Trusts ex maleficio.—Where a testator is induced to make a will, or not to change one after it is made, by a promise 33 Prince v. Barrow, 120 Ga. 810, 48 S. E. 412; Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 48 N. E. 561, 49 N. E. 320; Robinson v. Cogswell, 192 Mass. 79, 78 N. E. 389; Barksdale v. Capital City Realty Co., 88 Miss. 623, 42 So. 668; Woodward v. James, 115 N. Y. 346, 22 N. E. 150; Varner’s Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 140; Woodruff v. Pleas- ants, 81 Va. 37; Wolbert v. Beard, 128 Wis. 391, 107 N. W. 663. 34 United States Trust Co. v. Ma- resi, 33 Misc. 539, 68 N. Y. S. 918. 35 Prince v. Barrow, 120 Ga. 810, 48 S. E. 412; Abend v. McKendree Col- lege, 174 Ill. 96, 50 N. E. 1052; Eik- man v. Landwehr, 43 Ind. App. 724, 88 N. E. 105; Curd v. Field, 103 Ky. 293, 45 S. W. 92, 19 Ky. L. 2016; Mc- Clernan v. McClernan, 73 Md. 283, 20 Atl. 908; Robinson v. Cogswell, 192 Mass. 79, 78 N. E. 389; Shanahan v. Kelly, 88 Minn. 202, 92 N. W. 948; Norcum v. D’Oench, 17 Mo. 98; Erd- man v. Meyer, 52 Misc. 256, 102 N. Y. S. 197; Dulin v. Moore, 96 Tex. 135, 70 S. W. 742; Holmes v. Walter, 118 Wis. 409, 95 N. W. 380, 62 L. R. A. 986. 36 Smullin v. Wharton, 73 Nebr. 667, 103 N. W. 288, 106 N. W. 577, 112 N. W. 622, 113 N. W. 267. 87Q’Gorman v. Crowly, 80 N. J. Eq. 101, 83 Atl. 397. 38 Wolffe v. Loeb, 98 Ala.'426, 13 So. 744; Willingham v. Bentley, 20 Ga. 783; Mullanney v. Nangle, 212 Ill, 247, 72 N. E. 385; Codman v. Brigham, 187 Mass. 309, 72 N. E. 1008, 105 Am. St. 394; Webb v. Hay- den, 166 Mo. 39, 65 S. W. 760; Brock v. Sawyer, 39 N. H. 547; Zabriskie v. Wetmore, 26 N. J. Eq. 18; Close v. Farmers’ L, & T. Co., 195 N. Y. 92, § 342 WILLS 300 express or implied, on the part of a legatee or devisee that he will devote his legacy or devise to a certain lawful purpose, a secret trust is created, and equity will compel him to apply the gift thus obtained in accordance with his promise.*® ‘This trust springs from the intention of the testator and the promise of the legatee. The same rule applies to heirs and next of kin who induce their ancestor or relative not to make a will by promising, in case his property falls to them through intestacy, to dispose of it, or a part of it, in the manner indicated by him. This rule is based on the principle that the legacy would not have been given, or intestacy allowed to ensue, unless the promise had been made, and, hence, the person promising is bound in equity to keep it, as to violate it would be fraud.*° The law, not the will, fastens the trust upon the fund by requir- ing the legatee to act in accordance with the instructions of the testator and his own promise.** Equity acts in such case, not be- cause of a trust created by the testator, but because of the fraud of the legatee or devisee.** To uphold such a trust it is necessary to prove that the testator relied upon the promise or acts of the heir or devisee as an ef- 87 N. E. 1005; Haywood v. Wright, 152 N. Car. 421, 67 S. E. 982; In re Anck’s Estate, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 118, 33 Leg. Int. 54; Jastram v. McAnslan, 26 R. I. 320, 58 Atl. 952; Seattle v. McDonald, 26 Wash. 98, 66 Pac. 145. 39 Curdy v. Berton, 79 Cal. 420, 21 Pac. 858, 5 L. R. A. 189, 12 Am. St. 157; Bromley v. Gardner, 79 Maine 246, 9 Atl. 621; Ham v. Twombly, 181 Mass. 170, 63 N. E. 336; Am- herst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282, 45 N. E. 876, 37 L. R. A. 305. 40 Cooney v. Glynn, 157 Cal. 583, 108 Pac. 506; Dowd v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197; Cassels v. Finn, 122 Ga. 33, 49 S. E. 749, 68 L. R. A. 80, 106 Am. St. 91; Larmon v. Knight, 140 Ill, 232, 29 N. E. 1116, 33 Am. St. 229; Ransdel v. Moore, 153 Ind. 393, 53 N. E. 767, 53 L. R. A. 753; Grant v. Bradstreet, 87 Maine 583, 33 Atl. 165; Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, 3 Am. Rep. 418; Ragsdale v. Rags- dale, 68 Miss. 92, 8 So. 315, 11 L. R. A. 316, 24 Am. St. 256; Mead v. Rob- ertson, 131 Mo. App. 185, 110 S. W. 1095; Smullin v. Wharton, 73 Nebr. 667, 103 N. W. 288, 106 N. W. 577, 112 N. W. 622, 113 N. W. 267; Am- herst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282, 45 N. E. 876, 37 L. R. A. 305; Ben- nett v. Harper, 36 W. Va. 546, 15 S. E. 143; Brook v. Chappell, 34 Wis. 405. 41De Laurencel v. De Boom, 48 Cal. 581; Dowd v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197; Ahrens v. Jones, 169 N. Y. 555, 62 N. E. 666, 88 Am. St. 620; Church v. Ruland, 64’ Pa. St. 432. 42 Q’Hara v. Dudley, 95 N. Y. 403, 14 Abb. N. Cas. 71, 47 Am, Rep. 53. 301 4 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 343 fective arrangement for the future disposition of his property ;** and also fraud on the part of the promisor, as a mere refusal to perform the trust is not enough; and it must also appear that there has been a fraudulent agency, active or passive, in procuring the devise.** parol evidence.* Such a trust may be made out or established by Where no trust or invalidity appears upon the face of the will, it will be probated and given effect according to its terms, and the secret trust can only be established through an independent suit in equity against the legatee or devisee.** § 343. Passive and active trusts.—A passive trust, or dry trust as it is sometimes called, is one in which the trustee has a mere legal title, and which, in jurisdictions where the statute of uses is in force, will be executed so as to vest the entire legal title in the beneficiary.*7 Where the trustee is given a mere legal title, with no control over the subject-matter, and no duties to perform, the trust is passive and is executed in the cestui que trust by the statute of uses.** Thus a bequest to A to hold personal property, or a devise to hold the title to real estate, in trust for B, but with no duties to perform and no estate in remainder or gift over, is a dry trust, and the court may terminate it.*° 43 Whitehouse v. Bolster, 95 Maine 458, 50 Atl. 240; Laird v. Vila, 93 Minn. 45, 100 N. W. 656, 106 Am. St. 420. 44 Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 81 Maine 137, 16 Atl. 464, 2 L. R. A. 662, 10 Am. St. 245. 45 Manning v. Pippen, 95 Ala. 537, 11 So. 56; Cassells v. Finn, 122 Ga. 33, 49 S. E. 749, 68 L. R. A. 80, 106 Am. St. 91, 2 Ann. Cas. 554; Fisch- beck v. Gross, 112 Ill. 208; Gaither v. Gaither, 3 Md. Ch. 158; Williams w. Vreeland, 29 N. J. Eq. 417. 46 In re Sharp’s Estate, 17 Cal. App. 634, 120 Pac. 1079; Smullin v. Whar- ton, 73 Nebr. 667, 103 N. W. 288, 106 N. W. 577, 112 N. W. 622, 113 N. W. 267. 47 Russell v. Bates, 181 Mass. 12, 62 N. E. 950; Jones v. Jones, 223 Mo. 424, 123 S. W. 29, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 424; Carter v. Long, 181 Mo. 701, 81°S. W. 162; Hayes v. Tabor, 41 N. H. 521; Denison v. Denison, 185 N. Y. 438, 78 N. E. 162; Mims v. Mach- lin, 53 S. Car. 6, 30 S. E. 585; Hen- derson v. Adams, 15 Utah 30, 48 Pac. 398; Holmes v. Walter, 118 Wis. 409, 95 N. W. 380, 62 L. R. A. 986. 48 Ringrose v. Gleadall, 17 Cal. App. 664, 121 Pac. 407; Jones v. Jones, 223 Mo. 424, 123 S. W. 29, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 424. 49 Hill v. Hill, 90 Nebr. 43, 132 N. W. 738, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 198. § 344 WILLS 302 | An active trust is one in which powers or duties are imposed upon the trustee with reference to the property devised or be- queathed, in which case it becomes necessary that he should con- tinue to hold the legal title in order to perform his duty or execute the power.°° Thus where the trustee is given the duty to care for the land devised, or pay taxes, or collect rents, or make sale of or mortgage the land, the trust is active.** § 344. What property may be subject of trust.—As a gen- eral rule every kind of property, real or personal, capable of as- signment or transfer may be the subject-matter of a trust. Thus it has been held that a trust may exist in bonds,°? promissory notes,"* bank deposit,°* growing crop, copyright or patent right,°® and in fact, any right, interest, or thing which may be the subject of property may be granted in trust.°? So, also, a trust may exist in a chose in action, an estate in expectancy, a contingent interest, an equitable reversionary in- terest, and even in a possibility.°* § 345. What constitutes income from trust property.— The words generally employed to designate the income from trust real estate are “rents and profits,” and those to designate the in- come from trust personal property are “income and profits.” Or- dinarily, when property is given in trust to pay the “income” to the cestui que trust, the net income, and not the gross income, is meant.*® “Net income” as used in a will requiring a trustee to 50 Chicago Terminal T. R. Co. v. 52 Brown v. Harris, 25 Barb. (N. Winslow, 216 Ill. 166, 74 N. E. 815; Gerard v. Buckley, 137 Mass. 475; Webb v. Hayden, 166 Mo. 39, 65 S. W. 760; Story v. Palmer, 46 N. J. Eq. 1,18 Atl. 363; Tobias v. Ketchum, 32 N. Y. 319; In re Spring’s Estate, 216 Pa. 529, 66 Atl. 110; Muldoon v. Trewhitt (Tenn.), 38 S. W. 109, 51 Chicago Terminal T. R. Co. v. Winslow, 216 Ill. 166, 74 N. E. 815; Gerard v. Buckley, 137 Mass. 475; Webb v. Hayden, 166 Mo. 39, 65 S. W. 760. Y.) 134. 53 Broughton v. West, 8 Ga. 248. 54 McCarthy v. Provident Sav. Inst., 159 Mass. 527, 34 N. E. 1073. 55 Mauldin v. Armistead, 14 Ala. 702. 56 Thayer v. Pressey, 175 Mass. 225, 56 N. E. 5. 57 Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262, 102 N. E. 293. 58 Perry Trusts (5th ed.), § 68. 59 Stone v. Littlefield, 151 Mass. 485, 24 N. E, 592; In re Albertson, § 346 303 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS pay over all the net income derived from the trust estate, means the income derived from the whole property, less the necessary expenses in its management, and disbursements incurred on ac- count thereof; that is, such expenses and disbursements as taxes, commissions or fees of trustee, ordinary repairs, insurance, in- terest on incumbrances, and such other expenses as the trustee might lawfully incur in carrying out the trust.°° But the will may provide for the payment of taxes and other expenses incident to the trust property and the execution of the trust out of other assets of the estate, and not out of the income of the trust fund.** The testator may expressly provide what shall be regarded as “income” for distribution ;°* but in the absence of such provision, interest on trust moneys or securities, rents and profits of real estate, and other earnings of the trust estate, will be regarded as income.** Much diversity of opinion prevails as to whether cor- porate stock dividends or bonuses are capital or income, but the prevailing rule seems to be that any dividends, whether payable in money, in bonds, or in new stock, by whatever name they are called, are income if paid out of the corporation’s earnings or ac- cumulated profits. § 346. Trusts for the accumulation of income.—A valid trust for the accumulation of the income arising from property 113 N. Y¥. 434, 21 N. E. 117; Wol- finger v. Fell, 195 Pa. St. 12, 45 Atl. 492. 60In re Jones, 103 N. Y. 621, 9 N. E. 493, 57 Am. Rep. 775; New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Sands, 53 N. Y. S. 320, 24 Misc. 102; In re Cornell’s Estate, 44 N. Y. S. 585, 15 App. Div. 285; In re Hemphill’s Estate, 180 Pa. St. 95, 36 Atl. 409. 61 Wilson v. White, 133 Ind. 614, 33 N. E. 361, 19 L. R. A. 581. 62 Lyman v. Parsons, 26 Conn. 493; Willard v. Willard (N. J. Eq.), 21 Atl. 463. 63 In re Slocum, 169 N. Y. 153, 62 N. E. 130; In re Woodburn’s Estate, 138 Pa. St. 606, 21 Atl. 16,21 Am. St. 932. 64 Kalbach v. Clark, 133 Iowa 215, 110 N. W. 599, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801, 12 Ann. Cas. 647; Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778, 14 Ky. L. 385, 19 L. R. A. 173, 40 Am. St. 189; Richardson v. Richardson, 75 Maine 570, 46 Am. Rep. 428; Leland v. Hay- den, 102 Mass. 542; Simpson v. Mill- saps, 80 Miss. 239, 31 So. 912; Hol- brook v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201, 66 Atl. 124, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 768; McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N. Y. 179, 48 N. E. 548, 39 L. R. A. 230; In re Smith’s Estate, 140 Pa. St. 344, 21 Atl. 438, 23 Am. St. 237. 304 § 346 WILLS may be created, provided it does not violate the Rule against Per- petuities, nor the local statute of accumulations.” In a previous chapter we pointed out the dangers that lay in permitting accumu- lations for a time longer than allowed by the Rule against Perpe- tuities.°° But such trusts are not favored by the law, even when they do not violate the Rule against Perpetuities.” At common law, the power of controlling the rents and profits was co-extensive with the power to dispose of the estate which produced them, the limit of accumulations of annual income was the same as the limit of the creation of future estates, and the en- joyment of the profits could not be suspended for a longer period than the full power of alienating the estate itself.°° By the Thellusson Act, which has been substantially re-enacted in many of the states, the testator is prohibited from making a devise of land or a bequest of personalty for the purpose of accumulation by means of rents or profits for a longer period than the life of the settler, or twenty-one years after his death, or during the minority of any person or persons, living at his decease, who un- der the will directing the accumulations would, if then of full age, be entitled to the rents and profits.° In jurisdictions where no such statute has been enacted there seems to be no limitation to trusts for accumulations except the Rule against Perpetuities.” In the case of a gift to a charity, with a direction to accumulate for an illegal period, the gift is valid, if it can be regarded as a present gift, and, in place of the illegal accumulation, the court will direct a management of the fund which is legal and possible, cy pres the original direction.”* 65 Brown v. Wright, 168 Mass. 506, 47 N. E. 413; Eldred v. Shaw, 112 Mich. 237, 70 N. W. 545; In re Ma- son, L. R. (1891), 3 Ch. 467. 66 See ante, ch. 14, § 268. 67 Thorn v. De Breteuil, 86 App. Div. 410, 83 N. Y. S. 849. 68 Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen (Mass.) 1; Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227. 69 Statutes 39, 40, Geo. III, ch. 98; Goldtree v. Thompson, 79 Cal. 613, ““Where there are no statutes 22 Pac. 50; Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N. W. 814; Thorn v. De Breteuil, 86 App. Div. 405, 83 N. Y. S. 849. 70 Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U. S. 321, 53 L. ed. 202, 29 Sup. Ct. 106; Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, 23 L. ed. 254: Connecticut Trust & S. D. Co. v. Hollister, 74 Conn. 228, 50 Atl. 750; Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E, 454, 3 L. R. A. 370, 14 Am. St. 393. Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Itt. 305 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 347 regulating accumulations, a direction to accumulate a fund for a charity, for a term beyond the common-law limit, does not vitiate the gift for the charity, although no limit has been determined by courts during which an accumulation for a charity may be per- mitted. It is probable that courts would take care that no ex- traordinary or extravagant term for accumulation should be al- lowed for a future and prospective good. But where there are statutes against accumulations, charities will be governed by the same rules unless they are specially excepted.’’”” The will may provide for the accumulation of income from trust property, or it may leave it to the discretion of the trustee to add a part or all of the income to the principal fund. It may give the beneficiary of the income any excess or surplus of income above a designated amount.” It may also provide that any ex- cess of accumulations above a specified amount may go to the trustee as part of the trust estate to be disposed of according to the other provisions in the will.” Under the Thellusson Act in England and under similar stat- utes in this country, accumulations may be directed for the benefit of beneficiaries generally; but the statutes of some American states restrict accumulations for the benefit of minors only.” In such cases, the inclusion of adults with minors renders the whole accumulation void.”® § 347. Time from which income is to be estimated.—In some jurisdictions legacies are not payable until the expiration of one year from the death of the testator, and until that time in- 432, 48 N. E. 561, 49 N. E. 320; St. Paul’s Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N. E. 231; Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen (Mass.) 1; Phila- delphia v. Girard, 45 Pa. St. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 470. 721 Perry Trusts (6th ed.), § 399. . 78 Burt v. Gill, 89 Md. 145, 42 Atl. 968, 43 Atl. 177; Russell v. Loring, 3 Allen (Mass.) 121; Hobbs v. Ches- ley, 55 N. H. 31; Shangle v. Hallock, 6 App. Div. 55, 39 N. Y. S. 619; In re 20—Tromp. WILLS. Ferguson’s Estate, 223 Pa. 530, 72 Atl. 896. 7 Holcombe v. Spencer, 82 Conn, 532, 74 Atl. 904. 75 Goldtree v. Thompson, 79 Cal. 613,.22 Pac. 50; Hascoll v. King, 162 N. Y. 134, 56 N. E. 515, 76 Am. St. 306; Eberley’s Appeal, 110 Pa. St. 95, 1 Atl. 330. 76 Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 508; Kilpatrick v. Johnson, 15 N. Y. 322. § 347 WILLS 306 terest does not begin to accrue thereon, unless otherwise provided by the testator; and in such jurisdictions the interest or income from trust property will not begin to accrue until the expiration of one year from the death of the testator, being payable then only at the end of the second year." But in other jurisdictions, in the absence of a contrary intention, the beneficiary is entitled to the income from the testator’s death, such an intention on the part of the testator being presumed.” A pecuniary legacy for support and maintenance entitles the legatee to interest from the testator’s death.” Likewise, where the testator by will has given annuities, the annuities must be paid from the date of the testator’s death, unless a contrary intention appears.*° But the time of accrual of the right of beneficiaries to income and the time at which payments are to be made depend upon the provisions of the will and the testator’s intention.™* Where the income directed to be paid the beneficiary is to be ob- tained from a certain specified fund, for instance, one derived from the sale of real estate, it is held that the beneficiary can re- ceive only the actual income when received from such fund.*? 77 Bartlett v. Slater, 53 Conn. 102, 22 Atl. 678, 55 Am. Rep. 73; Flum- merfelt vy. Flummerfelt, 51 N. J. Eq. 432, 26 Atl. 857. 78 Baker v. Fooks, 8 Del. Ch. 84, 67 Atl. 969; McLane v. Cropper, 5 App. Cas. (D. C.) 276; Young v. Miles, 10 /B, Mon. (Ky.) 287; Edwards v. Ed- -wards, 183 Mass. 581, 67 N. E. 658; Dickinson v. Henderson, 122 Mich. 583, 81 N. W. 583; Cooke v. Meeker, 36 N. Y. 15, 34 How. Prac. 115; Thouron’s Appeal, 1 Sad. (Pa.) 453, 5 Atl. 218; Pell v. Mercer, 14 R. I. 412. - 79 Cooke v. Meeker, 36 N. Y. 15, 34 How. Prac. 115; Townsend’s Ap- peal, 106 Pa. St. 268, 51 Am. Rep. 523. 80In re Eichelberger’s Estate, 170 Pa. St. 242, 32 Atl. 605; Curran v. Green, 18 R. I. 329, 27 Atl. 596; In re Sear’s Estate, 18 Utah 193, 55 Pac. 83. 81 Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Van Holt, 216 U. S. 367, 54 L. ed. 519, 60 Sup. Ct. 303; Thome v. Allen, 70 S. W. 410, 24 Ky. L. 987; Doherty v. Grady, 105 Maine 36, 72 Atl. 869; Keith v. Cope- land, 138 Mass. 303; Rose v. Mc- Hose, 26 Mo. 590; Paul v. Williams, 59 Hun 625, 13 N. Y. S. 701, 37 N. Y. St. 195 (aftd. 136 N. Y. 644, 32 N. E. 1015); Jasper v. Jasper, 17 Ore. 590, 22 Pac. 152; Fletcher’s Appeal, 125 Pa. St. 352, 17 Atl 340; In re Bailey, 13 R. I. 543; Judevine v. Ju- devine, 61 Vt. 587, 18 Atl. 778, 7 L. R. A. 517; Whelan v. Reilly, 3 W. Va. . 597, 82 Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778, 14 Ky. L. 385, 19 L. R. A. 173, 40 Am. St. 189. 307 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 348 § 348. Alienation or assignment of income by anticipation. —lIt is possible for the beneficiary to alienate or assign the income from trust property before it becomes due,** unless there exists a statute restraining such alienation or assignment,** or unless there is a provision in the will against such alienation or assignment.*° It is held that a gift of property in trust, directing the payment of the income thereof to the beneficiary, and also that the trustee may, at any time, in his discretion, discontinue the payment of the income, and apply the same as he deems best for the beneficiary’s support, the beneficiary does not have an absolute right to the in- come which he can alienate in advance of its payment to him.** The testator may desire to make a provision in his will against anticipation or alienation of the income by his beneficiaries. Such provision is permitted in some jurisdictons only in case of aliena- tion, attachment, bankruptcy, etc., by a declaration that the estate shall terminate by a condition or conditional limitation ;** and in other jurisdictions the intention of the testator that the gift shall not be liable for the debts of the beneficiary is inferred from the fact that the gift is expressly stated to be for the support and maintenance of the beneficiary.** 83 Martin v. Davis, 82 Ind. 38; Palmer v. Stevens, 15 Gray (Mass.) liott, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 56; Roberts v. Stevens, 84 Maine 325, 24 Atl. 873, 17 343; McCrea v. Yule, 68 N. J. L. 465, 53 Atl. 210; Lamberton v. Pereles, 87 Wis. 449, 57 N. W. 776, 23 L. R. A. 824. 84 See statutes of different states. 85 Moore v. Sinnott, 117 Ga. 1010, 44 S. E. 810; Martin v. Davis, 82 Ind. 38; In re Mehaffey’s Estate, 139 Pa. St. 276, 20 Atl. 1056; Ropp v. Minor, 33 Grat. (Va.) 97. 86 Wemyss v. White, 159 Mass. 484, 34 N. E. 718. 87 Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, 23 L. ed. 254; St. John v. Dann, 66 Conn. 401, 34 Atl. 110; Barnett v. ‘Montgomery, 79 Ga. 726, 4 S. E. 874; Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 247; Meek v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 610, 54 N. W. 456, 43 Am. St. 410; Pope v. EI- L. R. A. 266; Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 Atl. 497, 15 Atl. 92, 9 Am. St. 398; Wemyss v. White, 159 Mass. 484; Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 11 So. 604, 18 L. R. A. 49; Lampert v. Haydel, 96 Mo. 439, 9 S. W. 780, 2L. R. A. 113, 9 Am. St. 358; In re Handy’s Estate, 167 Pa. St. 552, 31 Atl. 983; Journolmon v. Massengil, 86 Tenn. 81, 5 S. W. 719; Wales v. Bow- ditch, 61 Vt. 23, 17 Atl. 1000, 4 L. R. A. 819; Garland v. Garland, 87 Va. 758, 13 S. E. 478, 13 L. R. A. 212, 24 Am. St. 682. 88 Meek v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 610, 54 N. W. 456, 43 Am. St. 410; Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 11 So. 604, 18 L. R. A. 49. § 349 WILLS 308 § 349. Application or payment of income.—In directing the trustee to apply the income of trust property for the benefit of the cestui que trust, the testator may use such words as “pay over,”’®® “appropriate,”®° or “use.” Under authority given a trustee to apply the income of trust property to the use of the cestui que trust the trustee may pay the income to the cestui que trust or expend it for his benefit as such trustee may deem best,” but his authority in the matter may be limited by the use of the words “pay over” instead of “apply.” It is the duty of the trus- tee to comply with the terms of the will in regard to applying the income, and he should pay it over, as it accrues, to the person en- titled thereto under the provisions of the trust, and should con- tinue to pay it over during the length of time contemplated by the will. Whether the trustee shall pay over the income directly or per- sonally use, apply, and disburse it for the benefit of the cestui que trust, depends upon the language of the will.°* But even where the will expressly provides that payment shall be made directly to the beneficiary, it has been held that payment need not be made to the beneficiary when he is incapable of receiving it.?* A provi- sion authorizing payment to a guardian or committee should be inserted in the will, where the trust is for the benefit of an infant or incompetent beneficiary.°° The period of payment, whether stated to be “monthly,” “quarterly,” “semi-annually” or “annu- ally” should be observed, and the amounts as are specified should be paid; or if the amount is left to the discretion of the trustee, he should pay such sums as his best judgment dictates as necessary for the specified use.*” In leaving the amount of payment to the discretion of the trustee the will should provide that the amount 89 Moore v. Hegeman, 72 N. Y. 376. 90 McArthur v. Gordon, 126 N. Y. 597, 27 N. E. 1033, 12 L. R. A. 667. 91 Kiah v. Grenier, 56 N. Y. 220. 92 Holden v. Strong, 116 N. Y. 471, 22 N. E. 960. 93 Hills v. Putnam, 152 Mass. 123, 25 N. E. 40; Dickinson v. Henderson, 122 Mich. 583, 81 N. W. 583; In re Eyre’s Estate, 205 Pa. 561, 55 Atl. 541, ®4In re Fisk, 45 Misc. 298, 92 N. Y. S. 394, 95 In re Fisk, 45 Misc. 298, 92 N. Y. S. 394; Noble’s Appeal, 39 Pa. St. 425. 96 See post, ch. 30, art. 16. 87 Kimball v. Blanchard, 101 Maine 309 § 350 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS shall be such as may be deemed necessary from time to time, or some similar expression.®® A bequest of income means the whole net income, unless a con- trary intention appears from the will.°® The testator may fix the amount of income on a specified sum,* or designate so much only that the trustee shall expend for support or some other particular purpose.” Where the trustee is directed to apply the net income of a fund “to the support, maintenance, and education” of a minor child until he becomes of age, at which time the principal fund is to be paid him, the entire net income need not be used for such purpose, unless necessary.* The court will usually fix the amount to be expended by the trustee for the support of the bene- ficiary where the will itself does not fix it or authorize its deter- mination by the trustee.* § 350. Who may be a trustee.—Any person who is capa- ble of taking and holding the legal title or interest in the property devised or bequeathed, or who is capable of exercising a power in trust, and who is possessed with natural capacity to perform the duties imposed by the trust, may act as trustee. Generally speak- ing, an executor may always be regarded as a trustee. His duties as executor, being fiduciary in their character, courts of equity early exercised a superintending control over him in the adminis- tration of his trust.° But probate courts now very generally super- 383, 64 Atl. 645; Green v. Crapo, 181 W. 288, 106 N. W. 577, 112 N. W. 622, Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956; Green v. Smith, 17 R. I. 28, 19 Ati. 1081. 98 Mason v. Jones, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 461 (affd. 9 N. Y. 28, 59 Am. Dec. 515). 29 Stone v. Littlefield, 151 Mass. 485, 24 N. E. 592. 1Berry v. Dunham, 202 Mass. 133, 88 N. E. 904. 2Hall v. Holloway, 58 Conn. 210, 20 Atl. 445; Caruthers v. Neal, 14 S. W. 599, 12 Ky. L. 567; Cole v. Little- field, 35 Maine 439; Levi v. Berg- man, 94 Md. ‘204, 50 Atl. 515; Smul- lin v. Wharton, 73 Nebr. 667, 103 N. 113 N. W. 267; Demeritt v. Young, 72 N. H. 202, 55 Atl. 1047; Reeve v. Beekman, 42 N. J. Eq. 613, 9 Atl: 27 (affd. 42 N. J. Eq. 295, 18. Atl. 80) ; In re McCormick, 40 App. Div. 73, 57. N. Y. S. 548 (affd. 163 N. Y. 551, 57 N. E. 1116). 3 Hooper v. Smith, 88 Md. 577, 41 Atl. 1095; In re McCormick, 40 App. Div. 73, 57 N. Y. S. 548 (affd. 163 N. Y. 551, 57 N. E. 1116). 4Bundy v. Bundy, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 135 (affd. 38 N. Y. 410). 5 Carter v. Christie, 57 Kans. 496, 46 Pac. 964; Shoemaker v. Brown, 10 Kans. 383. ool WILLS 310 intend his acts, and courts of equity will extend their supervision only when the executor is acting as trustee under the will.° A public or private corporation may act as trustee under a will, if the execution of the trust is within the scope of its corporate powers.” One is not disqualified to be a trustee by infancy, though, owing to his lack of discretion, he should never be ap- pointed. An alien may act as trustee of personal property, but he should not be appointed as trustee of real property unless his dis- ability to take and hold title to land has been removed by statute.* Nonresidents may be appointed and may act as trustees under a will. A married woman may likewise be a trustee in jurisdic- tions where her common-law disabilities have been removed by statute.° A cestui que trust may be appointed a co-trustee,™ in case he is not the sole beneficiary ;** but it has been held that he can not act as sole beneficiary for himself.**. So a beneficiary un- der a will should not be appointed a trustee thereunder unless joined with other persons,** and even this is not favored.” . The appointment of near relatives is not always advisable, as in most cases the purposes of the trust will be best carried out when there is no relationship subsisting between the trustee and the cestui que trust.*® § 351. Title or interest of trustee.—The nature and extent of the trustee’s title or interest in the subject-matter of the trust 6 Ball v. Tompkins, 41 Fed. 486; Proctor v. Dicklow, 57 Kans. 119, 45 Pac. 86. “Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. (U. S.) 127, 11 L. ed. 205; Eglehart v. Egle- hart, 26 App. Cas. (D. C.) 209, 6 Ann. Cas. 732; Augusta v. Walton, 77 Ga. 517, 1 S. E. 214; Webb v. Neal, 5 Allen (Mass.) 575; Sargent v. Cor- nish, 54 N. H. 18. 8 Perry Trusts (5th ed.), § 55. ®Roby v. Smith, 131 Ind. 342, 30 N. E. 1093, 15 L. R. A. 792, 31 Am. St. 439. 10 Gridley v. Wynant, 23 How. (U. S.) 500, 16 L. ed. 411; Still v. Ruby, 35 Pa. St. 373. 11 Story v. Palmer, 46 N. J. Eq. 1, 18 Atl. 363; Rogers v. Rogers, 111 N. Y. 228, 18 N. E. 636; Tiffany v. Clark, 58 N. Y. 632. 12 Woodward v. James, 115 N. Y. 346, 22 N. E. 150. 18 Nellis v. Rickard, 133 Cal. 617, 66 Pac. 32, 85 Am. St. 227; Green v. Green, 125 N. Y. 506, 26 N. E. 739, 21 Am. St. 743. 14 Bundy v. Bundy, 38 N. Y. 410. 15 Perry Trusts (5th ed.), § 59. 16 Wilson v. Wilson, 145 Mass. 490, 14 N. E. 521, 1 Am. St. 477. 311 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 351 depend upon the provisions of the will. As a rule the legal title or interest vests in the trustee for the purpose of executing the trust, even though it is not expressly given him,** but where the will does not fix the extent of his estate or interest, he will take only such interest as is necessary to enable him to execute the trust.® “Where there is no express devise to the trustees, it must appear that it is the intention of the testator that they shall take an estate, and where from the nature of the duties to be per- formed, it appears that the taking of an estate is necessary the in- tention of the testator will be presumed; and when the intention is clear, an estate in the trustee will vest by implication.”” Again “it by no means follows that the same words devising to the trustees two parcels of land, must necessarily vest the legal estate in both parcels in the trustees, because they take a legal es- tate in one of those parcels. They may take a legal estate in one, because subsequent parts of the will require them to do acts in reference to it which can be done only by the holder of the legal estate, and then the law assigns to them such an estate as the due execution of their trust demands; while at the same time, by force of the statute of uses, or of wills, the other land, as to which no duties are required of the trustees, goes to the cestui que use.’ But if the trustee is not given a legal title to the trust property by express terms, or by necessary implication, there can be no ex- press trust.** There is a sense in which a life tenant is trustee for the remain- 17In re Reith’s Estate, 144 Cal. 314, 77 Pac. 942; Reed v. Davis, 95 Ga. 202, 22 S. E. 140; Flanner v. Fellows, 206 Ill. 136, 68 N. E. 1057; Sneer v. Stutz, 102 Iowa 462, 71 N. W. 415; Goslee v. Goslee, 94 S. W. 638, 29 Ky. L. 654; Haley v. Palmer, 107 Maine 311, 78 Atl. 368; Bean v. Common- wealth, 186 Mass. 348, 71 N. E. 784; Mead v. Jennings, 46 Mo. 91; Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Nebr. 455, 77 N. W. 1075. 18 Potter v. Couch, 141 U. S. 296, 35 L. ed. 721, 11 Sup. Ct.. 1005; Doane v. ‘Mercantile Trust Co., 160 N. Y. 494, 55 N. E. 296; Gilpin v. Williams, 17 Ohio St. 396; Coover’s Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 143; Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 10 Atl. 258. 19Fay v. Taft, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 448, 20 Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. (U. S.) 488, 14 L. ed. 510. 21 Phelps v. Phelps, 143 Mass. 570, 10 N. E. 452; Cooper v. Cooper, 36 N. J. Eq. 121; Bennett v. Garlock, 79 N. Y. 302, 35 Am. Rep. 517; Sprague v. Sprague, 13 R. I. 701; Davies v. Jones, L. R. 24 Ch. Div. 190, WILLS 312 § 352 derman. While he is entitled to the possession of the lands in- volved, and may use them for his own benefit, and appropriate to himself the proceeds arising from such use, still he holds the corpus of the estate in trust in the sense that he must exercise reasonable precaution to preserve the property intact for trans- mission to the remainderman at the termination of the life estate, and may not injure or dispose of it to his detriment.” The title of the trustee may be a fee simple absolute, subject to the trust, or a fee defeasible upon condition subsequent ;” or the estate or interest given may be limited only for the life of the trustee or another.** The estate or interest of the trustee may be for years only ;”° or the will may vest no title or interest in the property in the trustee, but simply confer on him a power over it to be exercised for the benefit of the cestui que trust.”* § 352. Who may be a cestui que trust.—As a general rule, any person who is capable of taking and holding title to real or personal property under a will may be a cestui que trust, as, a married woman, an infant, an insane person, or even a person 22Gibson v. Brown (Ind. App.), 110 N. E. 716. 23 Potter v. Couch, 141 U. S. 296, 35 L. ed. 721, 11 Sup. Ct. 1005; Hill v. Dade, 68 Ark. 409, 59 S. W. 39; In re Reith’s Estate, 144 Cal. 314, 77 Pac. 942; Chicago Terminal T. R. Co. v. Winslow, 216 Ill. 166, 74 N. E, 815; Sneer v. Stutz, 102 Iowa 462, 71 N. W. 415; Pearce v. Savage, 45 Maine 90; Bean v. Commonwealth, 186 Mass. 348, 71 N. E. 784; Crane v. Bolles, 49 N. J. Eq. 373, 24 Atl. 237; Woodward v. James, 115 N. Y. 346, 22 N. E. 150; Meredith v. An- ders, 31 N. Car. 329; Williams v. Burrows, 1 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 218, 4 West. Law J. 527. 24 Sterling v. Ives, 78 Conn. 498, 62 Atl. 948; Brantley v. Porter, 111 Ga. 886, 36 S. E. 970; Hale v. Hale, 146 Ti. 227, 33 N. E. 858, 20 L. R. A, 247; Kilgore v. Kilgore, 127 Ind. 276, 26 N. E. 56; Jones v. Moore, 96 Ky. 273, 28 S. W. 659, 16 Ky. L. 561; Hay- ward v. Rowe, 190 Mass. 1, 76.N. E. 286; Doane v. Mercantile Trust Co., 160 N. Y. 494, 55 N. E. 296; People’s Loan &c. Bank v. Garlington, 54 S. Car. 413, 32 S. E. 513, 71 Am. St. 800; Jobe v. Dillard, 104 Tenn. 658, 58 S. W. 324; Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 10 Atl. 258. 25 In re Reith’s Estate, 144 Cal. 314, 77 Pac. 942; Johnson v. Buck, 220 Ill. 226, 77 N. E. 163; Weller v. Noff- singer, 57 Nebr. 455, 77 N. W. 1075; Treat v. Vose, 63 App. Div. 338, 71 N. Y. S. 507; Gitpin v. Williams, 17 Ohio St. 396. : 26In re. L’Hommedieu, 138 Fed. 606; Edwards v. Bender, 121 Ala. 77, . 25 So. 1010; Hill v. Dade, 68 Ark. 409, 59 S. W. 39; Thieme v. Zumpe, 313 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 353 ° unborn.”” The statutes of. some states, however, prescribe that trusts shall be created for the benefit of minors, insane persons, and such persons only as are unfit to be put in the management and right of property. Under such a statute it is doubtful whether a trust can be created to protect the property of benefi- ciaries not within the statute from creditors.?® In the absence of a prohibitive statute, a trust may be created for the benefit of the federal government,” a state,®° or a corpora- tion.** But it has been held that a corporation can not be a cestui que trust as to land of which it could not hold the legal title.*? An alien can not have an equitable estate in land unless the law authorizes aliens to hold land, but he may take a trust created for his benefit subject to the right of the state to claim the beneficial interest in the subject-matter of the trust.** If the cestui que trust named is incapable of enforcing the trust, or if there is no cestui que trust sufficiently designated, the trust is void.** § 353. Estate or interest of cestui que trust.—The cestui que trust has only an equitable or beneficial title or interest in the 152 Ind. 359, 51 N. E. 86, 52 N. E. 449; Pittengel v. Boynton, 139 Mass. 244, 29 N. E. 655; Wiess v. Goodhue, 98 Tex. 274, 83 S. W. 178. 27 Trotter v. Blocker, 6 Port. (Ala.) 269; Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 33 N. E. 858, 20 L. R. A. 247; Woodgate vy. Fleet, 64 N. Y. 566; Collins v. Hoxie, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 81; Ashurst vy. Given, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 323. 28 Lester v. Stephens, 113 Ga. 495, 39 S. E. 109; Sargent v. Burdett, 96 Ga. 111, 22 S. E. 667. 29 Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. (U. S.) 98, 13 L. ed. 909. 30Lamar v. Simpson, 1 Rich, Eq. (S. Car.) 71, 42 Am. Dec. 345. 31Coleman v. San Rafael Tpk. Road Co., 49 Cal. 517; Second Con- gregational Soc. v. Waring, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 304; Towar v. Hale, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 361. 32 Coleman v. San Rafael Tpk. Road Co., 49 Cal. 517; Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366, 80 Am. Dec. 290. . 33 Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 563, 4 L. ed. 460; McCaw v. Gal- braith, 7 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 74; Com- monwealth vy. Martin, 5 Munf. (Va.) 117; Attorney-General v. Sands, Hardres 488. 34 Condit v. Reynolds, 66 N. J. L. 242, 49 Atl. 540; Murray v. Miller, 178 N. Y. 316, 70 N. E. 870; Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97; Ensley v. Ensley, 105 Tenn. 107, 58 S. W. 288; Heiden- heimer v. Bauman, 84 Tex. 174, 19 S. W. 382, 31 Am. St. 29; Staines v. Burton, 17 Utah 331, 53 Pac. 1015, 70 Am. St. 788. WILLS 314 " § 354 trust property.** Such estates or interests are sttbject to the same incidents,°** and are governed by the same rules of construction as legal estates.*” But the nature and extent of the estate or interest of the cestui que trust is to be determined from the will itself.** By the will the cestui que trust may be given an equitable fee in reality®® or an absolute estate in personal property.*® It may also give him an estate during his life or during the life of another.** So, also, the will may create in the cestui que trust an estate for years only.*? The estate or interest of the beneficiary may be vested** or contingent,** and a testamentary trust may be created without giving the cestui que trust any estate or interest at all.*° § 354. Trust created for benefit of married woman.— Property may be given in trust for the sole use of a married woman, and the husband’s marital rights therein will be entirely barred.*® Where property is thus placed in trust for the wife she 35In re Dixon’s Estate, 143 Cal. 511, 77 Pac. 412; Haley v. Palmer, 107 Maine 311, 78 Atl. 368. 36 Beidman v. Sparks, 61 N. J. Eq. 226, 47 Atl. 811; In re Shallcross’ Estate, 9 Pa. Dist. 388. 87 Fairfax v. Brown, 60 Md. 50; Worrell v. Vinson, 50 N. Car. 91. 38In re Blake’s Estate, 157 Cal. 448, 108 Pac. 287; Chase v. Benedict, 72 Conn. 322, 44 Atl. 507; Lombard v. Witbeck, 173 Ill. 396, 51 N. E. 61; Copeland v. Bruning, 44 Ind. App. 405, 87 N. E. 1000, 88 N. E. 877; Thomas v. Thomas, 97 Miss. 697, 53 So. 630; Treat v. Vose, 63 App. Div. 338, 71 N. Y. S. 507; Battersby v. Castor, 181 Pa. St. 555, 37 Atl. 572; In re Washburn’s Petition, 20 R. I. 697, 41 Atl. 658; Howe v. Gregg, 52 S. Car. 88, 29 S. E. 394; Beirne v. Beirne, 33 W. Va. 663, 11 S. E. 46. 89Korn vy. Cutler, 26 Conn. 4; Palmer v. Matthews, 33 Ga. Supp. 72; Haley v. Palmer, 107 Maine 311, 78 Atl. 368; Murray v. Murray, 5 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 382. 40 Hamilton v. Downs, 33 Conn. 211; Brantley v. Porter, 111 Ga. 886, 36 S. E. 970; Chauncey v. Salisbury, 181 Mass. 516, 63 N. E. 914; Sawyer v. Banfield, 55 N. H. 149. 41 Clisby v. Clisby, 146 Ala. 687, 40 So. 344; Easterly v. Keney, 36 Conn. 18; Copeland v. Bruning, 44 Ind. App. 405, 87 N. E. 1000, 88 N. E. 877; Abell v. Abell, 75 Md. 44, 23 Atl. 71, 25 Atl. 389; Peabody v. Tyszkiewicz, 191 Mass. 317, 77 N. E. 839; Endicott vy. Endicott, 41 N. J. Eq. 93, 3 At. 157. 42 Allen v. Stewart, 214 Mass. 109, 100 N. E. 1092. ; 43 Marshall v. Baltimore Safe De- posit &c. Co., 101 Md. 1, 60 Atl. 476; In re Moloughney, 67 App. Div. 148, 73 N. Y. S. 598; Patton v. Ludington, 103 Wis. 629, 79 N. W. 1073, 74 Am. St. 910. 44In re Reed’s Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 162. 45 Abend v. McKendree College, 174 Til. 96, 50 N. E. 1052. 46 See post, ch. 30, art. 16. See 315 § 399 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS may dispose of it by sale, mortgage or devise, free from the con- trol of the husband, unless the will expressly limits her power of alienation.* But the mere fact that an estate is simply limited to the separate use of a married woman, or even that it is secured to her free from her husband’s debts, or that it is expressly stipulated that it should go to her heirs, or that she is given an unlimited power of testamentary disposition over it, does not prevent his curtesy from attaching, if she does not dispose of it by her will.** If the husband is trustee for the wife’s separate estate, his pos- session as trustee does not entitle him to the use of the personalty as his own.*® Separate trusts for the benefit of married women may be cre- ated by implication,*° estate so created may be for life,° her coverture.** § 355. as well as by express provision, and the * or an equitable fee,°* or during Effect of provisions for maintenance, support, and education.—A trust will usually be created by a provision for the support, maintenance, or education of others; 54 especially where the direction for support, maintenance or education is also Cole v. Varner, 31 Ala. 244; Robert v. West, 15 Ga. 122; Bayer v. Cockerill, 3 Kans. 282; Powell v. Cobb, 56 N. Car. 456. ° 47 Townshend v. Frommer, 125 N. Y. 446, 26 N. E. 805. 48 Pool v. Blakie, 53 Ill. 495; No- land v. Chambers, 84 Ky. 516, 2 S. W. 121, 8 Ky. L. 557; Tremmel v. Kleiboldt, 75 Mo. 255; Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689. 49 Eager v. Brown, 14 La. Ann. 684, 50 Varner’s Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 140. _ 51McCroan v. Pope, 17 Ala. 612; Hoskins v. Arterburn, 7 Ky. L. 291; Sturges v. Cargill, 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 318; Ponton v. McLemore, 22 N. Car. 285; In re Kuntzleman’s Estate, 136 Pa. St. 142, 20 Atl. 645, 20 Am. St. 909. 52Korn v. Cutler, 26 Conn. 4; Smith v. Johnson, 21 Ga. 386; Har- rison v. Stockton, 19 N. J. Eq. 235; Armstrong v. Zane, 12 Ohio 287; Bacon’s Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 504. 53In re Wilbert’s Estate, 166 Pa. St. 113, 30 Atl. 1022. 54JIn re Reith’s Estate, 144 Cal. 314, 77 Pac. 942; Dexter v. Evans, 63 Conn. 58, 27 Atl. 308, 38 Am. St. 336; Prince v. Barrow, 120 Ga. 810, 48 S. E, 412; In re Whitman’s Estate, 22 Til, 511; Anderson v. Crist, 113 Ind. 65, 15 N. E. 9; O’Riley v. McKier- nan, 90 Ky. 116, 13 S. W. 360, 11 Ky. L. 931; Holcomb v. Palmer, 106 Maine 17, 75 Atl. 324; White v. Donnell, 3 Md. Ch. 526; Pitts v. Mil- ton, 192 Mass. 88, 77 N. E, 1028, 116 Am. St. 223; Lucas v. Lockhart, 10 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 466, 48 Am. Dec. 766; Fester v. Willson, 68 N. H. 241, § 356 316 WILLS imposed on the executor,®® or guardian.** But no general rule can be stated that will determine when a gift will carry with it the whole beneficial interest.*” If the provision clearly shows that the use cf the property is merely the motive which leads the testator to make the gift, and if the beneficiary is not limited in his discretion as to the use which he is to make of it, no trust is created. Thus where the testator makes a testamentary gift to his wife to support herself and her children, an absolute gift to the wife is generally held to pass to her, free from any trust for the benefit of the children, this being merely testator’s motive in making the gift.°* Buta trust is created if the person charged with support is given a dis- cretion, and'the discretion is subject to the control of the gourt if misused.”° § 356. Rights of creditors respecting trust funds.—It is possible for.a testator to protect the income of property given in trust from the creditors of the beneficiary of the trust, although the beneficial use and enjoyment of such income is expressly granted the beneficiary.®° The statutes of some states provide that when a trust is created to receive rents and profits, and no valid direction for accumula- 38 Atl. 1003, 73 Am. St. 581; Con- over v. Fisher (N. J. Eq.), 36 Atl. 948; Collister v. Fassitt, 163 N. Y. 281, 57 N. E. 490, 79 Am. St. 586; Carson v. Carson, 36 N. Car. 329; Williamson v. Hall, 3 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 504; Hunter v. Hunter, 58 S. Car. 382, 36 S. E. 734, 79 Am. St. 845; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 77 Vt. 244, 59 Atl. 845; Cresap v. Cresap, 34 W. Va. 310, 12 S. E. 527. 55 McCan’s Succession, 48 La. Ann. 145, 19 So. 220; Brown v. Brown, 12 Md. 87; Coburn v. Anderson, 131 Mass. 513; Barnes v. Marshall, 102 Mich. 248, 60 N. W. 468; Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 10 Att. 258. 56 Smithwick v. Jordan, 15 Mass. 113, 57 Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 32 L. ed. 138, 8 Sup. Ct. 1164. 58 Randall v. Randall, 135 Ill. 398, 25 N. E. 780, 25 Am. St. 373; Pelliz- zarro v. Reppart, 83 Iowa 497, 50 N. W. 19; Jones v. Jones, 93 Ky. 532, 20 S. W. 604, 14 Ky. L. 556; Lloyd v. Lloyd, 173 Mass. 97, 53 N. E. 148; Small v. Field, 102 Mo. 104, 14 S. W. 815; Elkinton v. Elkinton (N. J. Eq.), 18 Atl. 587; In re Cressler’s Estate, 161 Pa. St. 427, 29, Atl. 90; Citizens’ Bank & Trust Co. v. Brandt (Tenn.), 50 S. W. 778; Wilmoth v. Wilmoth, 34 W. Va. 426, 12 S. E. 731. 59 Collister v. Fassitt, 163 N. Y. 281, 57 N. E. 490, 79 Am. St. 586. ° 60 Hill v. McRae, 27 Ala. 175; St John v. Dann, 66 Conn. 401, 34 Atl, 317 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 356 tion is given, the surplus of such rents and profits, beyond the sum necessary for the support of the beneficiary, shall be liable to the claim of creditors ;** while other statutes render the income of trust funds in excess of a stipulated amount liable for “neces- saries sold, or work performed in a family as a domestic, or for services rendered for salary owing to an employé of the judgment debtor.”*? In some states it is held that where no discretionary power to give or withhold the gift is conferred upon the trustee, and there is no limitation over upon the insolvency of the benefi- ciary, the interest of the beneficiary can be reached by his cred- itors. Before attempting to exempt the income of a trust fund from the claims of creditors, by a provision in the will, the law of the jurisdiction applicable to the trust should be carefully examined. The law in some jurisdictions does not permit a testator, who has given an equitable life estate to a beneficiary, to take away from it the incidents of alienation or liability for debts,°* but where he expressly provides that the beneficiary shall receive and enjoy the -income during his life in amounts stated or to be determined by the discretion of the trustee, and that the income shall not be sub- ject to anticipation or alienation by the beneficiary or liable for his debts, this will usually prevent creditors from subjecting the in- come to the payment of their claims.* 110; Barnett v. Montgomery, 79 Ga. 726, 4 S. E. 874; Binns v. La Forge, 191 Tif. 598, 61 N. E. 382; Demuth v. Kemp, 79 Misc. 516, 140 N. Y. S. 152. 61 California: Civ. Code (1915), § 859; Michigan: Howell’s Ann. Stat. (1913), § 10681; Minnesota: Gen. Stats. (1913), § 6712; Mon- tana: Rev. Codes (1907), § 4541; North Dakota: Comp. Laws (1915), § 5369; Oklahoma: Rev. Laws (1912), § 6664; South Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), § 307, p. 32; Wisconsin: Stat. (1913), § 2083. 62 New York: Consol. Laws (1909), p. 4994, 63 Thornton v. Stanley, 55 Ohio St. 199, 45 N. E, 318. 64 Taylor v. Harwell, 65 Ala. 1; Honnett v. Williams, 66 Ark. 148, 49 S. W. 495; Gray v. Corbit, 4 Del. Ch. 135; Bailie v. McWhorter, 56 Ga. 183; Harris v. Judd, 3 Hawaii 421; Knefler v. Shreve, 78 Ky. 297; Pace v. Pace, 73 N. Car. 119; Hobbs v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 419; Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 R. I. 205; Hutchinson v. Maxwell, 100 Va. 169, 40 S. E. 655, 57 L. R. A. 384, 93 Am. St. 944; Da- vidson v. Chalmers, 33 Beav. 653. 65 Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, 23 L. ed. 254; Fearson v. Dunlop, 21 D. C. 236; Seymour v. McAvoy, 121 ‘ § 357 WILLS aLS Where the testator wishes his bounty protected from the cred- itors of the beneficiary he may do so with reasonable safety by directing the payment of the income to or its application for the benefit of the beneficiary, with a provision for forfeiture or cessa- tion of payment in case of insolvency, bankruptcy, attempted alienation, or the like, followed by a gift over of the income, or a direction to accumulate, coupled with a discretion in the trustees thereafter to apply such amount as they may think proper to the use of the cestui que trust.** ‘ § 357. Duration of trust term.—In making a provision in the will limiting the duration of the trust term, great care should be taken not to violate the Rule against Perpetuities. This is dif- ficult of accomplishment if the testator desires to postpone the vesting period for any considerable length of time. It is very easy to provide for the probable termination of the trust within the period required by law, and still to make it possible that the estate will not vest within that time. The duration of the term may be fixed by an express provision, or, in the absence of such provision a term sufficient in duration to accomplish the purpose of the trust will be implied.” The accomplishment or failure of the purposes for which a trust is created is the measure of the term in the absence of a pro- vision fixing a particular time for its termination.® Cal. 438, 53 Pac. 946, 41 L. R. A. 544; Leavitt v. Beirne, 21 Conn. 1; Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 247; Rob- erts v. Stevens, 84 Maine 325, 24 Atl. 873, 17 L. R. A. 266; Baker v. Keiser, 75 Md. 332, 23 Atl. 735; Nickerson v. Van Horn, 181 Mass. 562, 64 N. E. 204; Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 11 So. 604, 48 L. R. A. 49; Lamport v. Haydel, 96 Mo. 439, 9 S. W. 780, 2 L. R. A. 113, 9 Am. St. 358; Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Nebr. 455, 77 N. W. 1075; Shankland’s Appeal, 47 Pa. St. 113; Jourolmon v. Massengill, 86 Tenn. 81, 5 So. 719; Monday v. Vance, 92 Tex. 428, 49 S. W. 516; Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 10 Atl. ® But the mere 258; Van Osdell v. Champion, 89 Wis. 661, 62 N. W. 539, 27 L. R. A. 773, 46 Am. St. 864. 66 See post, ch. 30, art. 16. See also Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, 23 L. ed. 254; Bull v. Kentucky Nat. Bank, 90 Ky. 452, 14 S. W. 425, 12 Ky. L. 536, 12 L. R. A. 37; Lampert v. Haydel, 96 Mo. 439, 9 S. W. 780, 2L. R. A. 113n, 9 Am. St. 358. 67 Flagg v. Walker, 113 U. S. 659, 28 L. ed. 1072, 5 Sup. Ct. 697; Angus vy. Noble, 73 Conn. 56, 46 Atl. 278; Frost v. Frost, 63 Maine 399; In re Stone, 138 Mass. 476. 68 Young v. Bradley, 101 U. S. 782, 25 L. ed. 1044; Weakley v. Buckner, 319 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 358 fact that no time is stated in the creation of a trust for its termi- nation, does not render it void for uncertainty. The duration of the term may, by the terms of the will, be lim- ited to the happening of a certain event, as the death of the bene- ficiary,"° his marriage,"* or upon his attainment of a certain age.” A private trust is void where it is for an indefinite time or where its purposes can not be fully accomplished within the period allowed by the Rule against Perpetuities,”* but in the case of a charitable trust, owing to the fact that there can be at no time as- certained individuals who are entitled to the corpus of the trust fund, or who can alien the beneficial interest in the property, a charitable trust is usually indefinite in point of duration, and con- sequently is not illegal, though it be, by the terms of the will, perpetual.”* § 358. Termination of the trust.—A trust terminates when the purposes for which it was created have been accomplished.” If the intention of the testator as to the time of termination is uncertain, it is the duty of the court to fix such time as will best 91 Ky. 457, 16 S. W. 130, 13 Ky. L. 37; Holcomb v. Palmer, 106 Maine 17, 75 Atl. 324; Lee v. O’Donnell, 95 Md. 538, 52 Atl. 979; Williams v. Thacher, 186 Mass. 293, 71 N. E. 567; Shattuck v. Young, 2 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 30; Attorney-General v. Dutch Reformed Protestant Church, 36 N. Y. 452; Baker v. McAden, 118 N. Car. 740, 24 S. E. 531; McMullin v. McMullin, 8 Watts (Pa.) 236; Gardenhire v. Hinds, 1 Head (Tenn.) 402. 69 Holmes v. Walter, 118 Wis. 409, 95 N. W. 380, 62 L. R. A. 986. 70 Griffin v. Pringle, 56 Ala. 486; Sterling v. Ives, 78 Conn. 498, 62 Atl. 948; Augusta v. Walton, 77 Ga. 517, 1S. E. 214; King v. King, 168 Ill. 273, 48 N. E. 582; Weakley v. Buck- ner, 91 Ky. 457, 16 S. W. 130, 13 Ky. L. 37; Morse v. Morrell, 82 Maine 80, 19 Atl. 97; Harrison v. Denny, 113 Md. 509, 77 Atl. 837. 71 Chapin v. Cooke, 73 Conn. 72, 46 Atl. 282, 84 Am. St. 139. 72 Walker v. Murphy, 34 Ala. 591; Phillips vy. Lowther, 111 Ga. 852, 36 S. E. 596; Bennett v. Bennett, 66 III. App. 28; Langdon v. Ingram, 28 Ind. 360; Seabrook v. Grimes, 107 Md. 410, 68 Atl. 883, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 483, 126 Am. St. 400; McKrell v. Walker, 172 Pa. St. 154, 33 Atl. 337. 73 Bigelow v. Cady, 171 Ill. 229, 48 N. E. 974, 63 Am. St. 230; Williams v. Herrick, 19 R. I. 197, 32 Atl. 913. 74 Miller vy. Chittenden, 2 Iowa 315; Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana (Ky.) 170; Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen (Mass.) 1; Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568; Yard’s Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 95; Attorney-General v. Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220; Christ’s Hospital v. Grainger, 1 Macn. & G. 460. 75 Vogt v. Vogt, 26 App. D. C. 46; Booe v. Vinson, 104 Ark. 439, 149 S. WILLS 320 § 358 aid the trustee in carrying into effect the purpose for which the trust was created.”* It may, however, terminate by a merger of interests, or by the mutual consent of all the parties beneficially interested.” It is possible in some cases for the court to decree the termina- tion of a trust when all the parties are capable of acting and as- sent thereto, although all its purposes may not be accomplished ;”* but this can not be done where the testator’s evident intention was to keep the trust alive for some purpose.” When a trust is created for the benefit of a life tenant his death will terminate the trust, and the fee will vest in the remain- derman discharged of the trust, unless there be express language in the will requiring its continuance.*° No act, default or estop- pel on the part of the life tenant, or of the trustee, or of both con- junctively, will terminate the trust.8* But the trustee or some person other than the cestui que trust may be empowered by the. will to terminate the trust,*? and it would seem that the cestui que W. 524; Ringrose v. Gleadall, 17 Cal. App. 664, 121 Pac. 407; Thompson v. Marshall, 73 Conn. 89, 46 Atl. 825; Carswell v. Lovett, 80 Ga. 36,4 S. E. 866; Hifl v. Hill, 90 Nebr. 43, 132 N. W. 738, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 198. 76 Frost v. McCaulley, 7 Del. Ch. 162, 44 Atl. 779. 77 Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395, 15 N. E. 786, 4 Am. St. 320; Huber v. Donoghue, 49 N. J. Eq. 125, 23 Atl. 495; Carney v. Byron, 19 R. IL. 283, 36 Atl. 5; Armistead vy. Hartt, 97 Va. 316, 33 S. E. 616; Holmes v. Walter, 118 Wis. 409, 95 N. W. 380, 62 L. R. A. 986. 78 Bowditch v. Andrew, 8 Allen (Mass.) 339; Smith v. Harrington, 4 Allen (Mass.) 566. 79In re Walkerly’s Estate, 108 Cal. 627, 41 Pac. 772, 49 Am. St. 97; Da- vies v. Davies, 55 Conn. 319, 11 Atl. 500; Lemen v. McComas, 63 Md. 153; Hayward v. Rowe, 190 Mass. 1, 76 N. E. 286; Webb v. Hayden, 166 Mo. 39, 65 S. W. 760; Story v. Palmer, 46 N. J. Eq. 1, 18 Atl. 363; Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326, 32 N. E. 1088, 18 L. R. A. 745; Robbins v. Smith, 72 Ohio St. 1, 73 N. E. 1051; In re Mooney’s Estate, 205 ‘Pa. 418, 54 Atl. 1094; Carney v. Kain, 40 W. Va. 758, 23 S. E. 650; Bussell v. Wright, 133 Wis. 445, 113 N. W. 644, 80 Bradley v. Young, 2 MacArth. (D. C.) 229 (affd. 101 U. S. 782, 25 L. ed. 1044); Thomas v. Castle, 76 Conn. 447, 56 Atl. 854; Jordan v. Thornton, 7 Ga. 517. 81 Chandler v. Pomeroy, 96 Fed. 156. 82 Crooke v. Kings (Prince), 97 N. Y. 421; Schreyer v. Schreyer, 101 App. Div. 456, 91 N. Y. S. 1065 (affd. 182 N. Y. 555, 75 N. E. 1134). 321 TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS § 359 ' trust may be given the power of termination, where its exercise, as a power of sale, is beneficial to some third person.* § 359. Effect of failure of purpose of trust——Where the will shows an intention on the part of the testator to create a trust for the benefit of the cestui que trust, and the trust subse- quently proves impossible of fulfillment, the gift will not fail, but will be'treated as absolute, and free from any trust.** Nor does the invalidity of the trust render invalid other provisions of the will not affected by the trust.* The invalidity of one of two or more trusts created by the same will does not defeat the valid trust or trusts, if they can be sepa- rated without defeating the general intention of the testator.*® Where the trust is invalid, and there is no provision in the will to the contrary, the property included in the trust will pass to the heirs or next of kin of the testator, or to his residuary legatees or devisees, as the case may be.*” Where the duration of a trust is limited to the happening of a particular event, it will ordinarily terminate when the event be- comes impossible.** ‘Thus a trust created to last until the mar- riage of A, terminates upon the death of A;*° and a trust to be exercised by the trustee in his discretion terminates upon the death of such trustee.°° 83 Crooke v. Kings (Prince), 97 N. Y. 421. 84 Mansfield v. Mix, 71 Conn. 72, 40 Atl. 915; Neely v. Phelps, 63 Conn. 251, 29 Atl. 128; In re Bowes, L. R. (1896), 1 Ch, 507. 85 Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N. Y. 39; Holmes v. Walter, 118 Wis. 409, 95 N. W. 380, 62 L. R. A. 986. 86 Landram v. Jordan, 203 U. S. 56, 51 L. ed. 88, 25 App. D. C. 291, 27 Sup. Ct. 17; Garvey v. Union Trust Co., 29 App. Div. 513, 52 N. Y. S. 260. 87 Abercrombie v. Abercrombie, 27 Ala. 489; In re Fair’s Estate, 136 Cal. 79, 68 Pac. 306; Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242, 5 Atl.'687; Wilson v. -21—Tuomp. WILts. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N. W. 506; Lusk v. Lewis, 32 Miss. 297; Beek- man v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298, 80 Am. Dec. 269; Miller v. London, 60 N. Car. 628; Grim’s Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 391, 1 Atl. 212; Craig v. Beatty, 11 S. Car. 375. 88 Mansfield v. Mix, 71 Conn. 72, 40 Atl. 915. 89 Toner v. Collins, 67 Iowa 369, 25 N. W. 287, 56 Am. Rep. 346; Baker v. McAden, 118 N. Car 740, 24 S. E. 531. 9 Neeley v. Phelps, 63 Conn. 251, 29 Atl. 128; Hadley v. Hadley, 147 Ind. 423, 46 N. E. 823; Mobley v. Cummings, 35 S. Car. 101, 14 S. E 721. CHAPTER, XIX TESTAMENTARY POWERS SECTION SECTION 365. Testamentary powers in general. 374. To whom appointment under 366. Classification of testamentary power may be made. powers. 375. Apportionment of shares and 367. Purposes of testamentary pow- exclusion of appointees. ers. 376. Estates or interests appointed. 368. Creation of testamentary pow- 377. Statutory regulation of power. ers. 378. Power to lease. 369. Who mav be donee of power. 379. Power to mortgage. 370. Who may exercise power where 380. Power to sell or exchange. no person designated. 381. Power to manage, control, im- 371. Joint donees of power. prove and invest. 372. Discretion of donee. 382. Advancements under power. 373. Delegation of testamentary pow- ers, § 365. Testamentary powers in general—A testamentary power is an authority conferred upon one or more persons by will to perform, after the testator’s death, certain acts in relation to the subject-matter of the gift. The powers most commonly conferred by will are power to devise, power to sell and convey, and power to incumber an estate. It must be understood, how- ever, that the power is distinct from the estate,’ although it may be, and frequently is, coupled with an interest in the land, as in case of a gift to a tenant for life, with a general power of disposi- tion; in which case the power does not enlarge the life estate into a fee, although a sale thereunder will pass a fee to the pur- chaser.” Where the executor is authorized to sell any or all of the tes- tator’s real estate and make a certain disposition of the proceeds, 1 Sewall v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131; So. 536; Vamplew v. Chambers, 29 Eaton v. Straw, 18 N. H. 320. Nebr. 83, 45 N. W. 268; Little v. 2Durr v. Wilson, 116 Ala. 125, 22 Giles, 25 Nebr. 313, 41 N. W. 186. sae 323 TESTAMENTARY POWERS § 366 such authority is a mere naked power, disassociated with any estate.* It has been held, however, that an authority conferred upon an executor to “apportion and distribute” certain realty vests the. legal title to such realty in him as trustee until such distribution.* A clear distinction has been made by the courts between a “power” and a “trust.” A power conferred upon one by will is not imperative, but may be exercised by him at his discretion; that is, the testator, having full confidence in the judgment, dis- position, and integrity of the person, empowers him to act accord- ing to the dictates of that judgment. On the other hand, a trust is imperative, and is made with strict reference to its faithful execution. The trustee is not empowered, but is required to act in accordance with the will of the testator.® However, if the power is made a duty, or if it is coupled with the duties of a trustee for the benefit of the trust, or ministerial or coupled with an interest, it may be enforced by a court of equity.® While a power is a species of agency, it does not terminate, like an ordinary agency, upon the death of the principal. The power may be exercised immediately upon the death of the testator.” § 366. Classification of testamentary powers.—Testamen- tary powers may be general or special. They are general when they are capable of being exercised by the donee in favor of any person, including himself, and are not restricted as to the estate or interest over which he may exercise the power, while the power is special if its exercise is restricted to particular persons, or a particular class of persons, or if it can be exercised only for certain named purposes or under certain conditions.® Under some statutes “a power is general where it authorizes the transfer 3 Bradt v. Hodgdon, 94 Maine 559, 48 Atl. 179, 4Nimmons v. Westfall, St. 213. 5Law Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Jones, 103 Tenn. 245, 58 S. W. 219. 6 Freeman v. Prendergast, 94 Ga. 369, 21 S. E. 837; Nugent v. Cloon, 33 Ohio 117 Mass. 219; Osborne v. Gordon, 86 Wis. 92, 56 N. W. 334. 7 Welder v. McComb, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 85, 30 S. W. 822. 8 Sugden Powers (8th ed.) 394; Thompson v. Garwood, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 287, 31 Am. Dec. 502, § 366 WILLS 324 or incumbrance of a fee, py either a conveyance or a will of or a charge on the property embraced in the power, to any grantee whatever’; and a power is special where either: (1) the person or class of persons to whom the disposition of the property under the power is to be made are designated; or (2) the power au- thorizes the transfer or incumbrance, by a conveyance, will or charge, of any estate less than a fee.’’ Under the statutes of New York and Minnesota a general or special power is beneficial or in trust where no person other than the beneficiary has, by the terms of the will, any interest in its execution; and a beneficial power, general or special, other than one within the purview of the statute, is void.*® Powers are also further classified as appendant or appurtenant, in gross, or collateral. Powers are said to be appendant or appur- tenant when they depend on the estate limited to the person to whom they are given.** Thus, where an estate for life is limited to a person, with a power to convey or incumber his life estate, the power is appendant.” Powers collateral or in gross are powers given to one who has an interest in the estate, to create such estates only as will not attach on the interest limited to him, or take effect out of his own interest. Thus where a tenant for life has a power to create an estate which is not to begin until his own ends. It is a power in gross, because the estate for life has no concern in it.* A power simply collateral is a power given to a person not having any interest or estate in land, and to whom no estate is given, to dispose of or charge the estate in favor of another."* ®New York: Consol. Laws (1909), p. 5010; Michigan: Howell’s Ann. Stats. (1913), §§ 10759-10762, 10777, 10778; Minnesota: Gen. Stats. (1913), §§ 6732, 6743, 6749; North Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), §§ 5385-5391, 5434; Oklahoma: Rev. Laws (1910), § 6680; South Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), § 323, p. 33; Wisconsin: Stat. (1915), § 2104. 10 Sweeney v. Warren, 127 N. Y. 426, 28 N. E. 413, 24 Am. St. 468; Hershey v. Meeker County Bank, 71 Minn. 255, 73 N. W. 967. 11 Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 67; Clark v. Wilson, 53 Miss. 119. 12 Garland v. Smith, 164 Mo. 1, 64 S. W. 188. 13 Young v. Sheldon, 139 Ala. 444, 36 So. 27, 101 Am. St. 44; Garland v. Smith, 164 Mo. 1, 64 S. W. 188. 14 McGriff v. Porter, 5 Fla. 373; Hammond v. Croxton, 162 Ind. 353, 325 TESTAMENTARY POWERS § 367 There is a well settled distinction between a devise of land to executors to sell, and a devise that executors shall sell, or that land shall be sold by them. A devise of the first description gives a power coupled with an interest, and the estate passes. to the executors ; but the latter are instances of a naked power.*® Again, powers are (1) exclusive, such as to appoint to certain members of a class,** or (2) nonexclusive, as a power to appoint among all the members of a class.*” Examples of the various classes of powers will be found in another part of this work."® § 367. Purposes of testamentary powers.—The purposes. for which powers may be created are numerous. Ordinarily, the owner of property may confer on another the power to do any act respecting the property which he might himself lawfully per- form at the time of granting the power and within the limits and restrictions of statutory provisions relating to powers. Thus a power may be given to sell;*® to mortgage;”° to manage and control ;?* to pledge or hypothecate ;?* to distribute ;”* to make advancements ;** to make investments;?° to appoint or select beneficiaries ;?° to collect income;?” to lease property;”* to ex- 69 N. E. 250, 70 N. E. 368; Bradt v. Hodgdon, 94 Maine 559, 48 Atl. 179; Reid v. Gordon, 35 Md. 174. 15 Bradt v. Hodgdon, 94 Maine 559, 48 Atl. 179; Larned v. Bridge, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 339. 16 Portsmouth v. Shackford, 46 N. H. 423; Graeff v. DeTurk, 44 Pa. St. 527; Huling v. Fenner, 9 R. I. 410. 17 Hatchett v. Hatchett, 103 Ala. 556, 16 So. 550; Faloon v. Flannery, 74 Minn. 38,.76 N. W. 954; Lippin- cott v. Ridgway, 10 N. J. Eg. 164; Thrasher v. Ballard, 35 W. Va. 524, 14 S. E. 232. 18 See post, ch. 30, art. 17. 19 Tilley v. Barnes (Ala.), 62 So. 761; Price v. Courtney, 87 Mo. 387, 56 Am. Rep. 453; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shipman, 108 N. Y. 19, 15 N. E. 58. 20Law Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Jones, 103 Tenn. 245, 58 S. W. 219. 21 Blanchard vy. Blanchard, 4 Hun (N. Y.) 287 (affd. 70 N. Y. 615, 6 Thomp. & C. 551). 22 Harbison v. James, 90 Mo. 411, 2S. W. 292. 23 Crittenden v. Fairchild, 41 N.Y. 289. 24 Metcalf v. Gladding, 35 R. I. 395, 87 Atl. 195. 25 Meister v. Meister, 121 Md. 440, 88 Atl. 235. 26 Lexington Brick Co. v. Thornton, 141 Ky. 207, 132 S. W. 422; Dunn v. Morse, 109 Maine 254, 83 Atl. 795; Leverett v. Rivers, 208 Mass. 241, 94 N. E. 470. 27 Potter v. Eames, 70 Misc. 147, 126 N. Y. S. 787. 28 Randall v. Gray, 80 N. J. Eq. 13, § 368 WILLS 326 change ;” to partition or divide ;*° to carry on a business ;** or to do any other act which the donor of the power might himself lawfully perform. Examples of powers for the above purposes may be found in another chapter of this work.*? § 368. Creation of testamentary powers.—No particular form of words is necessary for the creation of a power; any expression, however informal, being sufficient if it clearly indi- cates an intention to give a power. Usually, the power is given by words which express the effect of its exercise in terms em- powering the donee to sell, lease, or mortgage, as the case may be.** In the case of a trustee or executor appointed by will, a power of sale, though not expressly given, will be implied from provi- sions in the will imposing on him duties as to the distribution of the estate which can not be performed without a sale;* as when he is required to divide testator’s estate among persons named, and the estate is not divisible in kind.*® A power of sale of the remainder may be expressly given one to whom a life estate in the property, covered by the power, is devised,*’ or such power may be implied from a gift to one for 83 Atl. 482; In re Seebeck, 140 N. v. Goodhue, 98 Tex. 274, 83 S. W.. Y. 241, 35 N. E. 429, 29 Phelps v. Harris, 101 U. S. 370, 25 L. ed 855. 30 Thomas v. Owens, 131 Ga. 248, 62 S. E. 218. 31 Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366, 80 Am. Dec. 290. 32 See post, ch. 30, art. 18. 33 Allen v. McFarland, 150 Ill. 455, 37 N. E. 1006; Hammond v. Croxton, 162 Ind. 353, 69 N. E. 250, 70 N. E. 368; Pennsylvania Land Co. v. Justi, 121 Ky. 765, 90 S. W. 279, 28 Ky. L. 669; Bodfish v. Bodfish, 105 Maine 166, 73 Atl. 1033; Haug v. Schu- macher, 166 N. Y. 506, 60 N. E. 245; Young v. Young, 68 N. Car. 309; Thomas v. Ohio State University, 70 Ohio St. 92, 70 N. E. 896; In re Watts, 202 Pa. 85, 51 Atl. 588: Wiess 178; Cheney v. Stafford, 76 Vt. 16, 56 Atl. 88. 34Sugden Powers (8th ed.) 102, 104. 35 Winston v. Jones, 6 Ala. 550; Putnam Free School v. Fisher, 30° Maine 523; Going v. Emery, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 107, 26 Am. Dec. 645; Lind- ley v. O’Reilly, 50 N. J. L. 636, 15 Atl. 379, 1 L. R. A. 79, 7 Am. St. 802; Belcher v. Belcher, 38 N. J. Eq. 126; Vaughan v. Farmer, 90 N. Car. 607; Beurhaus v. Cole, 94 Wis. 617, 69 N. W. 986. 36 Corse v. Chapman, 153 N. Y. 466, 47 N. E. 812; Tomkins v. Miller (N. J. Eq.), 27 Atl. 484; Stoff v. Mc- Ginn, 178 Ill. 46, 52 N. E. 1048. 37 Security Co. v. Pratt, 65 Conn. 161, 32 Atl. 396; Larsen v. Johnson, 327 § 368 TESTAMENTARY POWERS life, and a gift over of the unexpended portion at the death of the life tenant to another.** Where the testator directs the prop- erty to be sold, without specifying by whom the sale is to be made, if the proceeds are distributable by the executor, a power in him to make the sale is implied.*® It is always a question of intention and construction whether a particular power is expressly created, or whether it is to be implied from the language of the will.* If the will prescribes no special method by which the power is to be executed, as by deed, will, or other writing, its execution may be accomplished by any writing sufficient as regards the subject-matter.** A power to a donee to dispose of his property by will to take effect upon his death may be given by such general words as give authority to dispose of the property described, if such donee should deem expedient.*? This power to dispose of property by will may, of course, be given in specific terms, such as a devise of property to any one whom A should, by will, direct ;** and the power may be exercised by A’s will even if A dies before the donor of the power.** 78 Wis. 300, 47 N. W. 615, 23 Am. St. 404. 38 Roberts v. Lewis, 153 U. S. 367, 38 L. ed. 747, 14 Sup. Ct. 945; How- ard v. Carusi, 109 U. S. 725, 27 L. ed. 1089, 3 Sup. Ct. 575; Smith v. Mc- Intyre, 95 Fed. 585; Gaffield v. Plumber, 175 Ill. 521, 51 N. E. 749; Henderson v. Blackburn, 104 Ill. 227, 44 Am. Rep. 780; Clark v. Middles- worth, 82 Ind. 240; Pfingst v. Dol- finger, 20 S. W. 534, 14 Ky. L. 489; Paine v. Barnes, 100 Mass. 470; Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 500; Bramell v. Cole, 136 Mo. 201, 37 S. W. 924, 58 Am. St. 619; Pierce v. Simmons, 17 R. I. 545, 23 Atl. 638. 39 Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 532, 9 L. ed. 522; Rankin v. Rankin, 36 Ill. 293, 87 Am. Dec. 205; Ogle v. Reynolds, 75 Md. 145, 23 Atl. 137; Hale v. Hale, 137 Mass. 168; Mandle- baum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78, 18 Am. Rep. 61; Clark v. Hornthal, 47 Miss. 434; Lippincott: v. Lippincott, 19 N. J. Eq. 121; Davone v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 252; Gay v. Grant, 101 N. Car. 206, 8 S. E. 99; Wood v. Hammond, 16 R. I. 98, 17 Atl. 324, 18 Atl. 198; Lockart v. Northington, 1 Sneed. (Tenn.) 318. 40 Williams v. Williams, 49 Ala. 439; Henderson yv. Blackburn, 104 Ill. 227, 44 Am. Rep. 780; Clark v. Mid- dlesworth, 82 Ind. 240; Wenger v. Thompson, 128 Iowa 750, 105 N. W. 333; Birmingham v. Lesan, 76 Maine 482. 41Fairman v, Beal, 14 Ill. 244; Yard v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 13 Pa. St. 205, 18: Atl. 874. 42 Burbank v. Sweeney, 161 Mass. 490, 37 N. E. 669. 43 Olney v. Balch, 154 Mass. 318, 28 N. E. 258; Krause v. Klucken, 135 Mass. 482; Austin v. Oakes, 117 N. Y. 577, 23 N. E. 193, 44 Condit v. DeHart, 62 N. J. L. 78, 40 Atl. 776. § 369 WILLS 328 § 369. Who may be donee of power.—A power may be conferred upon a person who is the holder of a particular estate in the property or it may be conferred upon one who holds no estate therein. Asa general rule, any person capable of disposing of his own estate may be the donee of a power and execute the same, and it has been held that a power may be granted to and executed by a married woman,“ or by an infant.*° Where a power is conferred upon a married woman, and there is no pro- vision requiring her husband’s concurrence in its exercise, there is some dispute as to her authority to exercise it without such concurrence.*7 Before conferring a power on a married woman it should be ascertained if there are any statutory or other re- straints as to its execution by her. An infant is not a competent donee of a power requiring the execution of an instrument which his nonage incapacitates him from executing,** but infants fre- quently hold such powers during minority and exercise them after attaining majority, and it would seem that he may execute the powers before attaining majority if the instrument creating the power authorize its execution during infancy.* A corporation possessed with power under its charter to hold and convey real estate may act as donee of a power, if its execu- tion is within the corporate powers which ate conferred upon it by statute.°° It has been held that a general power of disposition may be exercised by the attorney in fact of the donee of such power.” § 370. Who may exercise power where no person desig- nated.—Construction will usually supply an omission to pro- vide who is to exercise a power created by will. Thus where 45 Young v. Sheldon, 139 Ala. 444, Powers (8th ed.), 181, 211; 2 Wash. 36 So. 27, 101 Am. St. 44; Armstrong v. Kerns, 61 Md. 364; Osgood v. Bliss, 141 Mass. 474, 6 N. E. 527, 55 Am. Rep. 488. 46 Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494. 47 Sugden Powers (8th ed.) 161- 167. 484 Kent Comm. 325; Sugden Real Property, 652. 49 Hill v. Clark, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 405; In re Cardross, 7 Ch. Div. 728. 50 Killingsworth v. Portland Trust Co., 18 Ore. 351, 23 Pac. 66,7 L. R.A. 638, 17 Am. St. 737. 51 Coats v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 92 Ky. 263, 17 S. W. 564, 13 Ky. L. 557. 329 TESTAMENTARY POWERS § 371 the will provides for the receipt and expenditure of the proceeds of a sale by the executors, a power of sale in them will be im- plied.** Likewise where a will provides that the proceeds of a sale are to be expended by a trustee, the power of sale may be exer- cised by such trustee.** If the power is coupled with an interest, and there is no pro- vision as to who shall execute the power in the event of the donee’s death, the power may be exercised by the survivors of such donee.** A power to sell land given by will to an executor will not, as a general rule, devolve upon an administrator with the will annexed.°® In all cases where the power given to an executor or trustee is personal, it does not follow the office ;** but, where the power to such persons is impersonal, or where the will imposes upon them the duty of selling real estate absolutely, un- conditionally, and without discretion, the power follows the of- fice, and will exist in their successors.*” § 371. Joint donees of power.—As a general rule, where a power is given to two or more donees, all must join in its execu- tion unless otherwise declared in the will or the statute.°* Espe- cially is this true where the power is a mere naked power to sell, not coupled with an interest.” Accordingly, where a power 52 Rathbone v. Hamilton, 4 App. 55 Hodgin v. Toler, 70 Iowa 21, 30 D. C.- 475; In re Van Brocklin’s Estate, 74 Iowa 412, 38 N. W. 119; Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78, 18 Am. Rep. 61; Ogle v. Reyn- ‘olds, 75 Md. 145, 23 Atl. 137; Belcher yv. Belcher, 38 N. J. Eq. 126; Vaughan v. Farmer, 90 N. Car. 607; Collier v. Grimesey, 36 Ohio St. 17; Wood v. Hammond, 16 R. I. 98, 17 Atl. 324, 18 Atl. 198. 53 Lindley v. O’Reilly, 50 N. J. L. 636, 15 Atl. 379, 1 L. R. A. 79, 7 Am. St. 802; Lawton v. Lawton, 7 Ohio Dec. 493. 54 Robinson v. Allison, 74 Ala. 254; Bredenburg v. Bardin, 36 S. Car. 197, 15 S. E. 372. N. W. 1, 59 Am. Rep. 435. 56 Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 43 N. W. 893, 7 L. R. A. 377; Clark v. Hornthal, 47 Miss. 434; McDonald -y. King, 1 N. J. L. 432; Cooke v. Platt, 98 N. Y. 35; Frisby v. Withers, 61 Tex. 134. 57 Clark v. Denton, 36 N. J. Eq. 419; Farrar v. McCue, 89 N. Y. 139; Potts v. Breneman, 182 Pa. St. 295, 37 Atl. 1002. 581 Chance Powers, § 603; Peter y. Beverly, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 532, 9 L. ed. 522. 59 Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 532, 9 L. ed. 532; Shelton v. Homer, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 462; Wilder v..Ran- ney, 95 N. Y. 7. § 372 WILLS 330 is given to two or more executors, all who are living and acting must unite in its execution.°° But an executor who refuses to qualify need not join.*t Nor need an executor who has been removed from office, or has renounced after qualifying, join in the execution. But it seems that if the context of the will shows an intention on the part of the testator to give a personal discretion to the particular individuals named by him as executors, to be exercised by them jointly, all must join in the execution of the power, though one renounce the office.** On the same principle, where a power is given to two or more trustees, all must, if living, unite in its exercise,** unless one disclaims the trust, in which case the remaining trustee or trustees may exercise the power.®* But where the power to two or more persons is coupled with an interest, the survivor or successor may exercise the power.®® § 372. Discretion of donees.—Where the donee of a power given by will is vested with an absolute discretion not only respecting the manner of its execution, but to choose whether he shall or shall not exercise it at all, he can not, in the absence of bad faith on his part, be compelled to exercise it.°7 And where a 60 Wilson v. Mason, 158 Ill. 304, 42 N. E. 134, 49 Am. St. 162; Gould v. Mather, 104 Mass. 283; Noel v. Har- vey, 29 Miss, 72; Osgood v. Frank- lin, 2 Johns, Ch. (N. Y.) 1, 14 Johns. 562, 7 Am. Dec. 513; Deneale v. Mor- gan, 5 Call (Va.) 407; Crowley v. Hicks, 72 Wis. 539, 40 N. W. 151. 61 Stewart v. Mathews, 19 Fla. 752; Wolfe v. Hines, 93 Ga. 329, 20 S. E. 322; Wardwell v. McDowell, 31 Ill. 364; Putnam Free School v. Fisher, 30 Maine 523; Phillips v. Stewart, 59 Mo. 491; Denton v. Clark, 36 N. J. Eq. 534; Wright v. Dunn, 73 Tex. 293, 11 S. W. 330. 62 Clinefelter v. Ayres, 16 Ill. 329; Gould v. Mather, 104 Mass. 283; Wei- mar v. Fath, 43 N. J. L. 1. 63 Tarver v. Haines, 55 Ala. 503; Clay v. Hart, 7 Dana (Ky.) 1; Bart- lett v. Sutherland, 24 Miss. 395; Os- good v. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 1,7 Am. Dee. 513. 6¢ Wilbur v. Almy, 12 How. (U. S.) 180, 13 L. ed. 944; Morville v. Fowle, 144 Mass. 109, 10 N. E. 766; Boston Franklinite Co. v. Condit, 19 N. J. Eq. 394; Lancashire v. Lancashire, 2 Phil. Ch. 657. 652 Perry Trusts, §§ 493, 499; Cooke v. Crawford, 13 Sim. 91. 66 Parrott v. Edmondson, 64 Ga. 332; Gutman v. Buckler, 69 Md. 7, 13 Atl, 635; Bradford v. Monks, 132 Mass. 405; Osgood v. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 1, 7 Am. Dec. 513. 87 Mitchell v. Denson, 29 Ala. 327, 65 Am. Dec. 403; Lambert v. Harvey, 100 Ill. 338; Wilkinson v. Getty, 13 Iowa 157, 81 Am. Dec. 428; Venable 331 § 372 TESTAMENTARY POWERS power, not a power in trust, is given to one not a trustee or execu- tor, as in the case of an ordinary power of appointment, since the exercise of the power is within the discretion of the donee, the power terminates with his death, unless the will or statute pro- vides otherwise, and equity will not cause its execution by an- other. Also if a mere naked power is given, with a discretion in the trustee to exercise it or not, it can not be exercised by his successor in the absence of a provision empowering the successor to. act” Where the testator gives a power of appointment in such terms that the donee may exercise his own discretion in selecting the persons of a designated class who are to be benefited by the power, the members of the class can not assert any interest in the property covered by the power unless the donee exercises such power.”° But a power in the nature of a trust, or a power coupled with a trust, makes it the imperative duty of the donee to carry it out, and where he refuses to do so, or dies without executing it, a court of equity will exercise it, so far as it is able to do so.” But there is a true distinction between trusts where the whole power is discretionary in the trustee, where it is left to his will whether it shall be exercised or not, and a trust where the power is im- perative, and the mere manner, time, or mode of its execution only is discretionary. In the first case only the trustee upon v. Mercantile Trust Co., 74 Md. 187, 21 Atl. 704; Olney v. Balch, 154 Mass. 318, 28 N. E. 258; King v. Merritt, 67 Mich. 194, 34 N. W. 689; Lindo v. Murray, 91 Hun 335, 36 N. Y. S. 331, 70 N. Y. St. 805; Dillard v. Dillard (Va.), 21 S. E. 669; Righter v. Riley, 42 W. Va. 633, 26 S. E. 357. 68 Mitchell v. Denson, 29 Ala. 327, 65 Am. Dec. 403; Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51; Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144; Howard v. Carpenter, 11 Md. 259; Brown v. Phillips, 16 R. I. 612, 18 Atl. 249; Fronty v. Godard, 1 Bailey Eq. (S. Car.) 517. 69 Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 39 Atl. 153, 66 Am. St. 107; Young v. Young, 97 N. Car. 132, 2 S. E. 78. 70 Drake v. Drake, 134 N. Y. 220, 32 N. E. 114, 17 L. R. A. 664; Boyle v. Boyle, 152 Pa. St. 108, 25 Atl. 494, 34 Am. St. 629. 71 Freeman v. Prendergast, 94 Ga. 369, 21 S. E. 837; Ingraham v. Ingra- ham, 169 Ill. 432, 48 N. E. 561, 49 N. E. 320; Druid Park Heights Co. v. Oettinger, 53 Md. 46; Nugent v. Cloon, 117 Mass. 219; Miller v. Meetch, 8 Pa. St. 417; Atkinson v. Dowling, 33 S. Car. 414, 12 S. E. 93. § 373 WILLS 332 whom the power was conferred can exercise it; in the second case it may be exercised by a trustee appointed by the court on the death or resignation of the original trustee.” As an example of a power in the nature of a trust, may be mentioned a power of sale given by will to an executor or trus- tee with specific directions to.apply the proceeds for the benefit of persons named.” “It is perfectly clear that, where there is a mere power of disposing, and that power is not executed, this court can not execute it. It is equally clear that wherever a trust is created, and the execution of that trust fails by the death of the trustee or by accident, this court will execute the trust. * * * But there are not only a mere trust and a mere power, but there is also known to this court a power which the party to whom it is given is intrusted and required to execute; and with regard to that species of power the court consider it as partaking so much of the nature and qualities of a trust that, if the person who has that duty imposed upon him does not discharge it, the court will, to a certain extent, discharge the duty in his room and place.”’** ‘ Where a power vests in executors a discretion as to whether or not relatives of the testator should be designated by such executors as heirs to a trust fund and entitled to inherit there- from, and no relatives having been designated by the executors during their lifetime, it was held that the power could not be ex- ercised by the court.” § 373. Delegation of testamentary powers.—Where the gift of a power implies personal trust and confidence in the donee, he can not transfer or delegate its exercise to another, except as to details not involving the exercise of any discretion, unless a right of transfer or delegation is expressly given.”* Thus 72 Osborne v. Gordon, 86 Wis. 92, 75 Dunn v. Morse, 109 Maine 254, 56 N. W. 334. 83 Atl. 795. 73 Druid Park Heights Co. v. Oet- 76 Saunders v. Webber, 39 Cal. 287; tinger, 53 Md. 46; Greenough v. Singleton v. Scott, 11 Iowa 589; Wil- Welles, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 571; In re son v. Mason, 158 Ill. 304, 42 N. E. Bailey, 15 R. I. 60, 1 Atl. 131. 134, 49 Am. St. 162; Shelton v. Ho- 74Lord Elden in Brown v. Higgs, mer, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 462; Graham 8 Ves. Jr. 570. v. King, 50 Mo. 22, 11 Am. Rep. 401; 333 TESTAMENTARY POWERS § 374 it is held that the donee of a power, other than a general power, can not exercise it by appointing to another a life estate, with power in that other to appoint in remainder.” Power given to trustees and executors to sell real estate at their discretion can not be delegated to an agent,”* and a devisee of a life estate who is given a power of sale can not delegate the execution thereof to the probate court."® This rule does not, however, apply to a general power of appointment, unrestricted as to its beneficiaries and the mode of its execution, since there is in each case no trust and confidence, and the power is tanta- mount to ownership, and accordingly the donee may delegate its execution to another, or may appoint to such uses as another shall appoint.*° The testator may invest his donee with authority to delegate the power by a gift in terms to the donee “and his assigns,” and upon assignment the assignee may execute the power." § 374. To whom appointment under power may be made. —Under a general power of appointment the donee may exer- cise the power by appointing any person, including himself,*? his creditors or his estate.** Under limited powers, however, the appointment must be exercised in favor of the beneficiaries or class of beneficiaries designated.** Keim v. Lindley, 54 N. J. Eq. 418, 34 Atl. 1073; Phillips v. Brown, 16 R. I. 279, 15 Atl. 90; Terrell v. McCown, 91: Tex. 231, 43 S. W. 2; Hood v. Haden, 82 Va. 588; Ingram v. Ingram, 2 Atk. 88. 77 Wickersham v. Savage, 58 Pa. St. 365. 78 Coleman v. Connolly, 242 Ill. 574, 90 N. E. 278, 134 Am. St. 347. 79Cramton v. Rutledge, 157 Ala. 141, 47 So. 214. 80 Coats v. Louisville & N. R. Co, 92 Ky. 263, 17 S. W. 564, 13 Ky. L. 557; Crooke v. Kings County, 97 N. Y. 421. 81 Sugden Powers (8th ed.) 180. 82 Hicks v. Ward, 107 N. Car. 392, 12 S. E. 318, 10 L. R. A. 821; Hanna v. Ladewig, 73 Tex. 37, 11 S. W. 133. 83 Onderdonk v. Ackerman, 62 How. Pr. (N. Y¥.) 318; In re Inger- sol’s Estate, 3 Pa. Dist. 399. 84 Thorington v. Hall, 111 Ala. 323, 21 So. 335, 56 Am. St. 54; Smith v. Hardesty, 88 Md. 387, 41 Atl. 788; Loring v. Wilson, 174 Mass. 132, 54 N. E. 502; Faloon v. Flannery, 74 Minn. 38, 76 N. W. 954; Cochran v. Elwell, 46 N. J. Eq. 333, 19 Atl. 672; Drake v. Drake, 134 N. Y. 220, 32 N. E. 114, 17 L. R. A. 664; Austin v. Oakes, 117 N. Y. 577, 23 N. E. 193; Herrick v. Fowler, 108 Tenn. 410, 67 § 374 334 A power of appointment to “children” will not authorize an appointment to grandchildren or other descendants,” unless an intention to include them appears from the will,*° or unless the statute provides that they shall be included.*” Likewise a power of appointment to “children” does not include illegitimate chil- dren unless an intention to include them appears.** A power of appointment to “issue” contemplates all descendants to any remote degree,*® unless it can be shown that the word was used in the sense of “children.” A power of appointment to one’s “family” has been held to include illegitimate children,*® grand- children,®® and blood relatives.°* But in New York it has been held that the use of the word “family” includes children only.”* Where one has the power of appointment under a will limited to nephews and nieces, such power is not well exercised by a dis- position of the property to which the power relates to great nephews and great nieces.” A power of appointment among “relatives” extends to relatives at large, and is not confined to next of kin, if the donee has the right of selection among the relatives ;°* but where the power is merely to appoint among relatives, and not among such as he may choose, he is confined WILLS in his appointment to the next of kin within the statute.*’ S. W. 861; Parks v. American Home Missionary Soc., 62 Vt. 19, 20 Atl. 107. 85 Thorington v. Hall, 111 Ala. 323, 21 So. 335, 56 Am. St. 54; Smith v. Hardesty, 88 Md. 387, 41 Atl. 788; Carson v. Carson, 62 N. Car. 57; Horwitz v. Norris, 49 Pa. St. 213; Herrick v. Fowler, 108 Tenn. 410, 67 S. W. 861; Cruse v. McKee, 2 Head (Tenn.) 1, 73 Am. Dec. 186; Hood v. Haden, 82 Va. 588. 86 Ingraham v. Meade, 3 Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 32, Fed. Cas. No. 7045; Hood v. Haden, 82 Va. 588. 87 Alabama Civ. Code (1907), § 3435. 88 Dorin v. Dorin, L. R. 7 H. L. 568, 45 L. J. Ch. 652, 33 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 281, 23 Wkly. Rep. 570. 89 Drake v. Drake, 134 N. Y. 220, 32 N. E. 114, 17 L. R. A. 664; Glenn v. Glenn, 21 S. Car. 308. 90Humble v. Bowman, 47 L. J. Ch. 62. 82Lambe v. Eames, L. R. 6 Ch. 597, 40 L. J. Ch. 447, 25 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 175, 19 Wkly. Rep. 659. 83In re Simons, 55 Conn. 239, 11 Atl. 36; Bradlee v. Andrews, 137 Mass. 50. ; °4 Dominick v. Sayre, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 555, 95 Falkner v. Butler, 1 Ambl. 514, 27 Eng. Reprint 332. 96 Williams v. Burrows, 1 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 218, 4 West. L. J. 527; Huling v. Fenner, 9 R. I. 410. 97 Varrell v. Wendell, 20 N. H. 431, 335 § 375 TESTAMENTARY POWERS § 375. Apportionment of shares and exclusion of ap- pointees.—Under an exclusive power of appointment it is discretionary with the donee to appoint such of the objects, ex- cluding others, and in such shares as he may see fit.°* But where the power is non-exclusive, the donee must distribute the property so that all the appointees shall have some portion of it.* In the absence of an intention on the part of the testator in creating a non-exclusive power that the appointees shall take equally, the donee may appoint such shares as he may see fit,* provided, in some jurisdictions, none of the appointments are illusory. Formerly in England, under the doctrine of “illusory” appointments, where the donee had a power of appointing among all the members of a class, as, for instance, to all one’s children, equity would give relief to one to whom only a nominal share had been appointed.” In this country, however, this doctrine has been rejected by some courts, the execution of the power being considered valid if the appointment to one is merely nominal,’ while other courts hold that a substantial share must be appointed to each.* § 376. Estates or interests appointed—Where there is a restriction in the power of appointment as to the estate or in- 98 Franke v. Auerbach, 72 Md. 580, 20 Atl. 129; Cochran v. Elwell, 46 N. J. Eq. 333, 19 Atl. 672; Monjo v. Woodhouse, 185 N. Y. 295, 78 N. E. 71,6L. R. A. (N. S.) 746; In re Mc- Neile, 217 Pa. 179, 66 Atl. 328. 99 Hatchett v. Hatchett, 103 Ala. 556, 16 So. 550; Farmer v. Farmer, 93 Ind. 435; Clay v. Smallwood, 100 Ky. 212, 38 S. W. 7, 19 Ky. L. 50; Faloon v. Flannery, 74 Minn. 38, 76 N. W. 954; Wright v. Wright, 41 N. J. Eq. 382, 4 Atl. 855; Stableton v. Ellison, 21 Ohio St. 527; Allen v. Barnes, 5 Utah 100, 12 Pac. 912. 1Hawthorn v. Ulrich, 207 Ill. 430, 69 N. E. 885; Clay v. Smallwood, 100 Ky. 212, 38 S. W. 7, 19 Ky. L. 50; Allder v. Jones, 98 Md. 101, 56 Atl. 487; Wright v. Wright, 41 N. J. Eq. 382, 4 Atl. 855; In re Pepper’s Will, 120 Pa. St. 235, 13 Atl. 929, 6 Am. St. 702; Allen v. Barnes, 5 Utah 100, 12 Pac. 912. 2 Sugden Powers, 449, 938; Butcher v. Butcher, 1 Ves. & Bea. 79, 5 Gray’s Cas. 371. 3 Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51; Graeff vy. DeTurk, 44 Pa. St. 527; Fronty v. Godard, Bailey Eq. (S. Car.) 517; McGibbon v. Abbott, L. R. 10 App. Cas. 653. 4Hatchett v. Hatchett, 103 Ala. 556, 16 So. 550; Degman v. Degman, 98 Ky. 717, 34 S. W. 523, 17 Ky. L. 1310; Portsmouth v. Shackford, 46 N. H. 423; Cruse v. McKee, 2 Head (Tenn.) 1; McCamant v. Nuckolls, § 376 WILLS 3365 terest to be appointed, the donee can not create a greater or less estate or interest than that authorized;* but in the absence of such restriction, or if the matter is left to the donee’s discretion, he may appoint any estate or interest he may see fit.® In creating a general power of appointment words of inher- ‘itance are not essential in order that the donee may appoint an estate in fee;? but where the power authorizes the appointment of an estate less than a fee he can appoint such an estate only as is authorized.* Where a power to appoint is either general or special, and is without positive restriction as to the nature of ‘the estate or interest to be appointed, the donee may execute the power by an appointment in trust for the objects of the power.® Where the power authorized the donee to divide or appoint the estate to or among the testator’s children as he might deem proper, ‘it was held that the power was properly exercised by a will de- vising the real estate to two children, and creating a charge therein for a substantial sum in favor of a third.*° Under a power to appoint an estate the donee is authorized to appoint trustees to sell the estate and divide the proceeds among the objects of the power," unless the context clearly shows that it was intended that the objects of the power should take the real estate and not the proceeds thereof.” 85 Va. 331, 12 S. E. 160; Thrasher v. Ballard, 35 W. Va. 524, 14 S. E. 232. ® Hill v. Jones, 65 Ala. 214; Harker v. Reilly, 4 Del. Ch. 72; Butler v. Huestis, 68 Ill. 594, 18 Am. Rep. 589; Shank v. Dewitt, 44 Ohio St. 237, 6 N. E. 255; Pepper’s Appeal, 120 Pa. St. 235, 13 Atl. 929, 6 Am. St. 702; Hood v. Haden, 82 Va. 588. 6 Hill v. Jones, 65 Ala. 214; Tor- rance v. Torrance, 4 Md. 11; Hillen v. Iselin, 144 N. Y. 365, 39 N. E. 368; {n re Lawrence’s Estate, 136 Pa. St. 354, 20 Atl. 521, 20 Am. St. 925, 11 L. R. A. 85. 7Weed v. Knorr, 77 Ga. 636, 1 S. E. 167; Myers v. Safe-Deposit, &c. Co., 73 Md. 413, 21 Atl. 58; Mott v. Ackerman, 92 N. Y. 539, 8 Cooke v. Husbands, 11 Md. 492. ® Harker v. Reilly, 4 Del. Ch. 72; Torrance v. Torrance, 4 Md. 11; Lor- ing v. Wilson, 174 Mass. 132, 54 N. E. 502; Maitland v. Baldwin, 70 Hun 267, 24 N. Y. S. 29, 53 N. Y. St. 894; In re Lawrence’s Estate, 136 Pa. St. 354, 20 Atl. 521, 11 L. R. A. 85, 20 Am. St. 925. 10 Allder v. Jones, 98 Md. 101, 56 Atl. 487. 11 Harker v. Reilly, 4 Del. Ch. 72; In re McNeile, 217 Pa. 179, 66 Atl. 328. 12 Doe v. Vincent, 1 Houst. (Del.) 416; Alley v. Lawrence, 12 Gray 337 TESTAMENTARY POWERS § 377 § 377. Statutory regulation of powers.—The creation, execution and effect of powers are, to some extent, regulated by statute in many states; and in a few jurisdictions the law of powers has been completely codified, thereby abolishing powers as they exist at common law, and leaving their creation, con- struction and. execution entirely governed by statute. These latter statutes are, in effect, similar to the New York statute, which is as follows: “Where an absolute power of disposition, not accompanied by a trust, is given to the owner of a particular estate for life or for years, such estate is changed into a fee absolute in respect to the rights of creditors, purchasers, and incumbrancers, but subject to any future estates limited thereon, m case the power of absolute disposition is not executed, and the property is not sold for the satisfaction of debts. Where a like power of disposition is given to a person to whom no par- ticular estate is limited, such person also takes a fee, subject to any future estates that may be limited thereon, but absolute in respect to creditors,’ purchasers, and incumbrancers. Where such power of disposition is given, and no remainder is limited on the estate of the grantee of the power, such grantee is entitled to an absolute fee. Where a general and beneficial power to devise the inheritance is given to a tenant for life, or for years, such tenant is deemed to possess an absolute power of disposition within the meaning of and subject to the provisions of the last three sections. Every power of disposition by means of which the grantee is enabled, in his lifetime, to dispose of the entire fee for his own benefit, is deemed absolute.’’** While these statutes expressly abolish powers as they formerly existed, any question not fully covered by them will be solved by the common law on the subject, and in many respects the same principles apply as before the statutory change. Powers are, by these statutes, di- (Mass.) 373; Stephenson v. Richard- Gen. Stats. (1913), §§ 6735-6739; son, 88 Pa. St. 40. North Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), 18New York: Consol. Laws §§ 5421-5425; Oklahoma: Rev. Laws (1909), pp. 5007-5042. See also (1910), §§ 6676-6737; South Dakota: Alabama Civ. Code (1907), §§ 3423- Comp. Laws (1913), §§ 319-381; Wis- 3426; Michigan: Howell’s Ann. Stats. consin: Stats. (1915), §§ 2101-2158. (1913), §§ 10764-10768; Minnesota: 22—Tuomp. WILLS. § 378 WILLS 338 vided (1) according to the degree of control given over the prop- erty, into general and special powers, and (2) according to the persons interested in their exercise, into beneficial powers and powers in trust.** § 378. Power to lease.—Power may be given a donee to lease the property which is the subject of the power, provided it does not transgress the Rule against Perpetuities. Such power ‘may be given by express words or by necessary implication, and it will be construed liberally according to the intention of the donor.” A will giving to certain beneficiaries the net rents and profits of all the testator’s real estate, after deducting expenses of col- lection and keeping up repairs, but designating no one to collect the rents, creates an implied power. in the executors to lease the lands and collect the rents.*® The authority to lease may be conferred by means of a power in trust;’’ and in executing the power the trustee must follow the power strictly.** Trustees have a general power of leasing, if the lease does not exceed the quantity of the estate that is in them and is a reason- able one.*® A devise of land to a trustee to manage, rent, lease and control in trust to pay over the annual proceeds to a desig- nated devisee for his life with gift over to remaindermen on his death without issue, gives the trustee authority to give ordinary farming leases, but not unusual leases or leases of unopened mines.”° A life tenant or trustee can not, in the absence of a suitable 14 See statutes cited above. 15 Collins v. Foley, 63 Md. 158, 52 Am. Rep. 505; Taussig v. Reel, 134 Mo. 530, 34 S. W. 1104; Goddard v. Brown, 12 R. I. 31. 16 Peirce v. Peirce, 195 Pa. St. 417, 46 Atl. 78. 17JIn re Seebeck, 140 N. Y. 241, 35 N. E .429; Henderson v. Henderson, 113 N. Y. 1, 20 N. E. 814. 18 Bergengren v. Aldrich, 119 Mass. 259, 29 N. E. 667. 19 Hutcheson v. Hodnett, 115 Ga. 990, 42 S. E. 422; Richmond v. Davis, 103 Ind. 449, 3 N. E. 130; Naylor v. Arnitt, 1 Russ. & Myl. 501; Bowes v. East London &c. Co., Jac. 324; -Drohan v. Drohan, 1 Ball & B. 185; Bowes v. East London Waterworks Co., 3 Madd. (Am. Reprint) 194, Jac. 324. 20 Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughetee, 240 Ill. 361, 88 N. E. 818. 339 TESTAMENTARY POWERS § 379 power or a valid statutory provision, make a lease to extend beyond the life of the tenant or the trust term, except that a trustee holding a legal fee, determinable when the purpose of the trust shall cease, may give a lease for a term which may extend beyond the period of his trust estate, subject to the juris- diction of a court of equity to annul the lease if unreasonable or improvident.”* Where the power to lease is given one person by will with a devise of the fee to another, a lease given under the power for any term of years not exceeding the limitation placed upon the power in the will is valid, and will be binding upon the owner of the reversion; but where the power is not created in this manner but is merely the outcome of and an incident to the ownership of an estate for a limited period with a remainder or reversion in another, the lease created by the owner of the limited estate will terminate with the expiration of the limited estate itself.” A lease made under a power may continue notwithstanding the ter- mination of the estate by the death of the donee of the power.” A court of equity, will sometimes enforce the execution of a power to lease when the lessee is in possession under a contract with the donee of the power for a lease.** § 379. Power to mortgage—Power to mortgage real estate may be conferred by will, and the scope and extent of such power will depend upon the construction of the will.creating the power.”” A power to sell is not, in itself, usually regarded as authorizing a mortgage of the land, unless there is something in the will to show that a mortgage was within the intention of the testator.”° 21 Bergengren v. Aldrich, 139 Mass. Co., 111 Ga. 300, 36 S. E. 767, 78 Am. 259, 29 N. E. 667; Greason v. Keteltas, St. 164; Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. 17 N. Y. 491. Holderbaum, 86 Iowa 1, 52 N. W. 221 Underhill Landlord and Tenant, 550; Brown v. Crittenden (Ky.), 1 p. 40. S. W. 421. 23 Hale v. Green, 2 Rolle Abr. 261, 26 Butler v. Gazzam, 81 Ala. 491, pl. 10. 1 So. 16; McMillan v. Cox, 109 Ga. 24 Taussig v. Reel, 134 Mo. 530, 34 42, 34 S. E. 341; Wilson v. Mary- S. W. 1104. land Life Ins. Co., 60 Md. 150; Hoyt 25 Fletcher v. American Trust &c. v. Jaques, 129 Mass. 286; Stokes v. § 380 WILLS 340 A devise of so much of the testator’s estate as may be sufficient for the maintenance of the devisee during his life, “he having full power to sell and convey any and all of my real estate, at any time, if necessary to secure such maintenance,” does fot give the devisee the right to mortgage the estate in fee.” But a dif- ferent rule prevails if the purpose of the authorization of a sale is the raising of money for some objects specified, or to pay charges imposed on the land;”* and by some authorities, on the view that a mortgage is a mere conditional sale, the power to mortgage is regarded as prima facie included.” A power to raise a sum of money upon certain land, has been held to au- thorize either an absolute sale or a mortgage, as the donee may ;deem expedient.*° A trustee empowered by will to mortgage real estate, owned © by the testator at the time of his death, to pay testator’s debts, can not give a mortgage on land purchased by him as trustee, although paid for with trust rents and profits.** Statutes usually provide for the mortgaging of estates by trustees or executors, and where there is no testamentary provision giving them power to mortgage, they will be confined to mortgages authorized by the statute.” § 380. Power to sell or exchange.—A testator may ex- pressly confer upon the executor or trustee power to sell and convey real estate,°* and such power will authorize a conveyance Payne, 58 Miss. 614, 38 Am. Rep. 340; Price v. Courtney, 87 Mo. 387, 56 Am. Jackson v. Everett (Tenn.), 58 S. W. 340. Rep. 453; Bloomer v. Waldron, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 361; Allen v. Ruddell, 51 S. Car. 366, 29 S. E. 198; Willis v. Smith, 66 Tex. 31, 17 S. W. 247. 27 Hoyt v. Jaques, 129 Mass. 286. 28 Starr v. Moulton, 97 Ill. 525; Kent v. Morrison, 153 Mass. 137, 26 N. E. 427, 10 L. R. A. 756, 25 Am. St. 616; Hoyt v. Jaques, 129 Mass. 286; Loebenthal v. Raleigh, 36 N. J. Eq. 169; Faulk v. Dashiell, 62 Tex. 642, 50 Am. Rep. 542; Devaynes v. Robinson, 24 Beav. 86. 29 Zane v. Kennedy, 73 Pa. St. 182; 80 Wareham v. Brown, 2 Vern. 153. 31 Marx v. Clisby, 126 Ala. 107, 28 So. 388, ] 32 See statutes of various states. 33 Starr v. Willoughby, 218 III. 485, 75 N. E. 1029, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 623; Boland v. Tiernay, 118 Iowa 59, 91 N. W. 836; Marrett v. Babb, 91 Ky. 88, 15 S. W. 4, 12 Ky. L. 652; Bradt v. Hodgdon, 94 Maine 559, 48 Atl. 179; Carter v. Van Bokkelen, 73 Md. 175, 20 Atl. 781; Iasigi v. Iasigi, 161 Mass. 75, 36 N. E. 579; Battelle v. Parks, 2 Mich. 531; Brown v. Do- TESTAMENTARY POWERS § 380 341 in fee simple, although no words of inheritance are used in creat- ing the power.** The rule is that, if a sale of the real estate is necessary to carry out the purposes of the testator, the power to make the sale will be given by implication, as otherwise the intention of the testator might be defeated.** Although not expressly given, a power of sale may be implied from the fact that the trustee is charged with a duty which can not be performed without a power of sale; and it is held that the words “invest and manage” imply a power of sale unless a contrary intention can be found in the will taken as a whole.*® But a power of sale will not be implied merely because it will be beneficial to the estate,*” nor from a mere direction to pay debts.** But such power will be implied from a direction to pay debts with the proceeds of land.*®? A power of sale alone will not imply a power to partition between joint owners,*° but a power in a trustee to sell and exchange has been held to have this effect.** A power of sale authorizes a sale for cash only, and not an exchange.*” But it is advisable to provide whether the sale is to be for cash, on time, or exchange; also whether it shall be a public or private sale. Also the purpose for which the sale is authorized should be indicated.** herty, 185 N. Y. 383, 78 N. E. 147, 113 Am. St. 915; In re Watts’ Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51 Atl. 588, 34 Hemhauser v. Decker, 38 N. J. Eq. 426. 35 Blount v. Moore, 54 Ala. 360; Going v. Emery, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 107, 26 Am. Dec. 645; Haggerty v. Lanterman, 30 N. J. Eq. 37; Van Winkle v. Fowler, 52 Hun 355, 614, 5 N. Y. S. 317, 24 N. Y. St. 811; Skinner v. Wood, 76 N. Car. 109; In re Mathewson, 12 R. I. 145. 36 Robinson v. Robineon, 105 Maine 68, 72 Atl. 883, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 675, 134 Am. St. 537. 37Roe v. Vingut, 117 N. Y. 204, 22 N. E, 933. 38 Huse v. Den, 85 Cal. 390, 24 Pac. 790, 20 Am. St. 232; Hill v. Den, 54 Cal. 6; Owen v. Ellis, 64 Mo. 77. 389 Meakings v. Cromwell, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 512; Skinner v. Wood, 76 Me Car. 109, 40In re Carr, 16 R. I. 645, 19 Atl. 145, 27 Am. St. 773; McQueen v. Far- quar, 11 Ves. 467. 41 Phelps v. Harris, 101 U. S. at 25 L. ed. 855. 42 Woodward v. Jewell, 140 U. S 247, 35 L. ed. 478, 11 Sup. Ct. 784; Russell v. Russell, 36 N. Y. 581, 93 Am. Dec. 540. 43 Chaplin Trusts and Powers, § 621, § 381 WILLS 342 '§ 381. Power to manage, control, improve and invest.— The scope and extent of the powers of an executor, or testamen- tary trustee, to manage and control the estate are necessarily dependent upon the terms of the will and the object had in view by the testator.** Usually an executor or trustee may do any- thing within the scope of the power conferred which does not involve the risk of personal liability for the consequences of his act; but in all cases, he should exercise the care and judgment of a man of ordinary prudence and sagacity.** This is the test which the courts apply where the power is conferred on executors or trustees to make improvements ;** or to invest or re-invest the property and funds of the estate intrusted to them.* A power to collect dividends on shares of stock in an incor- porated company may by will be lodged with one person, while the title to the stock is in another.*® But on the other hand, if the testator clothes his executor or executors, or the survivor or survivors of them, with full power and authority to rent, lease, repair, insure, etc., the real estate during any period of time it shall remain unsold and undivided, the title thereto vests in the executor or executors as the case may be; so, also, if the will creates a trust and vests the entire estate in the trustees, or it becomes necessary to the due execution of the trust that it should vest in the trustees, the rule is that it vests in them.*® § 382. Advancements under power.—It has been held that a donee under a power of appointment may make advance- 44 Dickinson v. Conniff,65 Ala.581; W. 652, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 263, 9 Palmer v. Moore, 82 Ga. 177, 8 S. E. 180, 14 Am. St. 147; Mack v. Mul- cahy, 47 Ind. 68; Hinton v. Hinton, 68 N. Car. 99; Cooper v. Horner, 62 Tex. 356. 45 Heisler v. Sharp, 44 N. J. Eq. 167, 14 Atl. 624 (affd. 45 N. J. Eq. 367, 19 Atl. 621). 46 Ely v. Pike, 115 Ill, App. 284; Barclay v. Dupuy, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 92; Brown v. Chesterman, 56 Hun 641, 9 N. Y. S. 187, 30 N. Y. St. 537; Lueft v. Lueft, 129 Wis. 534, 109 N. Ann, Cas. 639. 47 Stephens v. Milnor, 24 N. J. Eq. 358; Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445; Crawford v. Wearn, 115 N. Car. 540, 20 S. E. 724; Sargent v. Sibley, 8 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 434, 8 Wkly. L. Bul. 6; Gernert v. Albert, 160 Pa. St. 95, 28 Att. 576; Goddard v. Brown, 12 R. I. 31. 48 Onondaga Trust & Deposit Co. v. Price, 87 N. Y. 542. 49 Tobias v. Ketchum, 32 N. Y. 319; Boyd v. Talbert, 12 Ohio 212. 343 TESTAMENTARY POWERS § 382 ments of money or property among appointees ;°° and the testator will be presumed to have intended that. it should be an effective power, and that the donee may do all that is necessary to ac- complish the object, even to the making a deed of conveyance to the appointees, if that is necessary to effect the purpose. But where a testator gave his property to his wife for life, and au- thorized her to divide it or any portion of it, among his children, it was held that she had no power to make an unequal division or advancement among them, or to favor one child as against the others.”? This power to advance or pay over to beneficiaries may be conferred upon executors or trustees, and the extent of their discretion in exercising the power necessarily depends upon the wording of the power. In the creation of such a power the donee’s discretion in its exercise should be particularly defined, and the occasion and the amount of payments to be made should be definitely set forth, otherwise resort to the court may be neces- sary to fix the amount to be paid over.** 50TIn re L’Herminier, L. R. (1894), 52 Farmer v. Farmer, 93 Ind. 435. 1 Ch. 675. 53 Lewin Trusts (11th ed.) 719. 51 Franke v. Auerbach, 72 Md. 580, 54 Bundy v. Bundy, 38 N. Y. 410. 20 Atl. 129; Pate v. Pierce, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 104, CHAPTER XX PROVISIONS CONCERNING MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE SECTION SECTION 390. Directions concerning invest- 398. Applying proceeds of sale or ments. mortgage of trust property. 391. Instructions as to voting shares. 399, Authorizing compromise of 392. Selling real estate to pay debts. claims. 393. Paying debts and funeral ex- 400. Inventories, appraisement and penses. reports. 394. When legacies payable. 401. Auditing accounts and securities. 395. Payment of legacies in case of 402. Distribution in kind. shrinkage. 403. Insuring property belonging to 396. Payment of interest on legacies. estate. 397. Appointing agents and attor- neys. § 390. Directions concerning investments.—A _ testator may make specific directions in his will touching investments to be made, by the executors or trustees, of the funds belonging to the estate, and they will be liable for such interest as the invest- ment so directed would have produced.* In the absence of such direction, or where the will in general terms commits the invest- ments to the discretion of the executors or trustees it would seem that they will be held liable for any loss occasioned by investing funds outside the jurisdiction in which they have to account, or for loss occasioned by investing in securities not well recognized as proper for such investments.” Where a will directed that a legacy be put at interest, it was held that the purchase by the executor of bank stock was not a compliance with the direction.’ 1 Barney v. Saunders, 16 How. (U. bot, 40 N. Y. 76. But see Brown v. S.) 535, 14 L. ed. 1047; Perrine v. French, 125 Mass. 410, 28 Am. Rep. Petty, 34 N. J. Eq. 193. 254, 2 McCullough v. McCullough, 44 N. 3 Gilbert v. Welsch, 75 Ind. 557. J. Eq. 313, 14 Atl. 642; King v. Tal- 344 1 345 MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE § 390 But where the will exempts trustees or executors from liability “for any loss or damages that may happen to the estate except the same shall occur or take place from their own wilful defaults, misconduct, or neglect,” they are not liable for losses by reason of improvident or careless investments, but only for wilful and intentional disregard for the rules of prudence.* In many juris- dictions only certain kinds of investments can be made by execu- tors and trustees from funds belonging to the estate.° Among the several kinds of investments directed to be made by testators as particularly safe and proper are government or state bonds. Real estate mortgages are generally an approved form of investment, and one perhaps most commonly designated by testators. If the latter form of security is selected, care should be taken to designate that the mortgage must be a first lien, and that the amount invested should be only a limited part of the actual value of the property. Investments may and often are directed to be made on personal security, and corporate stocks and bonds, but such investments should not be authorized, and should never be made by executors or trustees unless authorized by express provisions in the will.° But where the will gives the trustee a broad discretion in the matter of investments he has been allowed to invest in corporate stock or bonds.” Express‘authority is sometimes given a trustee to employ trust property in trade or speculation, or in manufacturing, or to con- tinue the business or trade of the testator; but in the absence of such authority it will be considered a gross breach of trust to use trust property for such purposes.* Authority to continue the trade or business of the testator must be conferred in direct, explicit, and unequivocal language, else it will not be deemed 4Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y. 56. : 5 McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183; Brown v. French, 125 Mass. 410, 28 Am. Rep. 254; Woodruff v. Louns- berry, 40 N. J. Eq. 545, 5 Atl. 99; Ormiston v. Olcott, 84 N. Y. 339; In ‘te Cridland’s Estate, 132 Pa. St. 479, 19 Atl. 362. 6 Barney v. Saunders, 16 How. (U. S.) 535, 14 L. ed. 1047; In re Allis’ Estate, 123 Wis. 223, 101 N. W. 365; In re Bartol’s Estate, 182 Pa. St. 407, 38 Atl. 527. 7 Smyth v. Burns, 25 Miss. 422; In re Allis’ Estate, 123 Wis. 223, 101 N. W. 365. But see Adair v. Brim- mer, 74 N. ¥. 539. ® Penn v. Folger, 182 Ill. 76, 55 N. § 391 WILLS 346 conferred.® Express authority is sometimes given a trustee to convert trust funds by purchasing real estate with the trust money, and an intention to authorize such investment may be gathered from the language of the will, although it contains no direct or explicit authorization.?” The testator may direct how investments are to be made, and what securities shall be taken, or he may dispense with any security.** And if he gives explicit directions as to the class of securities in which the fund shall be invested, it is the duty of the executor or trustee to follow the instructions literally.*? It would seem that a mere recommendation that the trustee invest funds in a specified manner, as distinguished from a direc- tion to so invest, does not impose upon the trustee a duty to comply therewith, or render him personally liable for any losses occasioned through making other investments in good faith and with reasonable prudence.* Examples of directions to invest will be found in another chapter of this work.** § 391. Instructions as to voting shares.—An executor or administrator may vote the stock standing on the books of the corporation in the name of his decedent, on presentation of a certified copy of his letters; and he may generally do this without any formal transfer of the shares to him on the books of the corporation.** The testator’s ownership of corporate stock terminates with E. 192; Weiters v. Hart, 67 N. J. Eq. N. J. Eq. 559, 23 Atl. 271; Eldridge 507, 63 Ati. 241; In re Hirsch, 116 App. Div. 367, 101 N. Y. S. 893; Sim- mons v. Oliver, 74 Wis. 633, 43 N. W. 561. 9 Willis v. Sharp, 113 N. Y. 586, 21 N. E. 705,4 L. R. A. 493. 10 Bethea v. McColl, 5 Ala. 308; In re Trelease, 49 Misc. 205, 96 N. Y. S. 318. 11 Denike v. Harris, 84 N. Y. 89. 12 Worcester City Missionary Soc. vy. Memorial Church, 186 Mass. 531, 72 N. E. 71; Brewster v. Demarest, 48 v. Greene, 17 R. I. 17, 19 Atl. 1085. 18 Baker v. Fooks, 8 Del. Ch. 84, 67 Atl. 969; Brown v. French, 125 Mass. 410, 28 Am. Rep. 254; Green v. Green, 19 R. I, 619, 35 Atl. 1042, 35 L. R. A. 790. 14 See post, ch. 30, art. 17. 15 Market St. R. Co. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571, 42 Pac. 225; Schmidt v. Mitchell, 101 Ky. 570, 41 S. W. 929, 19 Ky. L. 763, 72 Am. St. 427; In re Cape May &c. Nav. Co., 51 N. J. L. 78, 16 Atl. 191. 347 MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE § 392 his death, and the title thereto passes by his will to the executors and trustees to be held by them in trust for certain beneficiaries. They are entitled to vote the stock, because the right of voting stock is inseparable from the right of ownership. But such executors and trustees can not vote the stock when they disagree as to the manner in which the vote shall be cast.*° Some testators make specific bequests of shares of stock with the request that the shares be voted in a certain way. It is deemed advisable to make provision for the voting of stock in case there should be any disagreement among the executors or trustees respecting the manner of voting. Examples of directions respecting the voting of shares of stock may be found elsewhere in this work.*” § 392. Selling real estate to pay debts —The title to real estate does not vest primarily in the executor,*® but descends to the heirs of the testator or vests in his devisees subject to the debts of the estate,”® and if there are no debts, or if the personal property is sufficient to pay all the debts, the title to the real estate vests in such heirs or devisees free from any title, power or right of possession on the part of the executor or adminis- trator.*° The general rule is that the general or residuary personal estate constitutes the natural and primary fund for the payment of the testator’s debts, and the real estate will be resorted to only where there is not enough personalty to discharge the debts.”* In the absence of statutory power or authority given them by will, executors or trustees can not sell real estate.** It is gen- erally advisable to insert a provision empowering the executor 16 Villamil v. Hirsch, 138 Fed. 690; v. Chambers, 33 Okla. 40, 124 Pac. Tunis v. Hestonville &c. R. Co., 149 310. Pa. St. 70, 24 Atl 88, 15 L. R. A. 21 Hattersley v. Bissett, 52 N. J. Eq. 665. 693, 30 Atl. 86; In re Thompson’s 17 See post, ch. 30, art. 17. Estate, 182 Pa. St. 340, 37 Atl. 940; 18 Tunnicliff v. Fox, 68 Nebr. 811, In re Martin, 25 R. I. 1, 54 Atl, 589. 94 N. W. 1032. 22 Ware v. Brush, 1 McLean (U. 19 Clark v. Fleischmann, 81 Nebr. S.) 533, Fed. Cas. No. 17171; Hill v. 445, 116 N. W. 290. Den, 54 Cal. 6; Frost v. Atwood, 73 20 Stewart v. Smiley, 46 Ark. 373; Mich. 67, 41 N. W. 96, 16 Am. St. Sisk v. Almon, 34 Ark. 391; Austin 560. § 392 WILLS 348 s to sell the real estate to pay debts or for distribution, unless some special reason exists for withholding such power. No precise form of words is necessary to confer such power, but unless it is expressly given, the testator can only sell the real estate under order of the probate court, in accordance with the statute.” The testator may, however, charge the payment of his debts generally, or certain specified debts upon his real estate, so far as the same may be sufficient to pay them.”* But in order to exonerate lega- cies from the payment of debts it must appear that the testator not only intended to charge the real estate with the payment of his debts, but that he also intended to exonerate his personal property from their payment ;?° and the fact that the personalty is not disposed of is strong evidence of the testator’s intention not to exonerate it.°® Testators sometimes provide that the executor shall dispose of the property, “real and personal, for the payment of my debts,” in which case it is discretionary with the executor to make the proceeds of either the primary fund for the payment of the debts.” A gift of property “after payment of debts” charges the property given with their payment.” Real or personal property, owned by the testator at the time of his death, and which is not disposed of by his will, is liable for debts before property of the same class covered by the will, unless a contrary intention clearly appears.”? While a testator may 22 Anderson v. Messinger, 146 Fed. 929, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094; Lester v. Kirtley, 83 Ark. 554, 104 S. W. 213; Neal v. Patten, 40 Ga. 363; Mc- Cown v. Terrell, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 66, 29 S. W. 484. 24 Harkins v. Hughes, 60 Ala. 316; Whitehead v. Gibbons, 10 N. J. Eq, 230; Heermans v. Robertson, 64 N. Y. 332; Garibaldi v. Hollowell, 68 N. Car. 251; Shiner v. Shiner, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 666, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 489, 40 S. W. 439. .25 Scott v. Morrison, 5 Ind. 551; Seaver v. Lewis, 14 Mass. 83; Turner v. Mather, 86 App. Div. 172, 93 N. Y. S. 1013; In re Riegelman’s Estate, 174 Pa. St. 476, 34 Atl. 120; Monroe v. Jones, 8 R. I. 526. 26 Marsh v. Marsh, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 360. 27 Powell v. Powell, 41 N. Car. 50. 28 Maybury v. Grady, 67 Ala. 147; Phillips vy. Duckett, 112 Ill. App. 587; Currie v. Murphy, 35 Miss. 473; San- born v. Clough, 64 N. H. 315, 10 Atl. 678; Watts v. Watts, 38 Ohio St. 480. 29McLeod v. Dell, 9 Fla. 451; Swann v. Swann, 58 N. Car. 297; Bane v. Wick, 14 Ohio St. 505. 349 MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE § 393 impliedly charge his real estate with the payment of his debts,*° an express provision to that effect is always advisable. By some authorities a general direction by the testator that his debts shall be paid is sufficient to charge his debts upon his real estate,** while other cases hold that such direction will not have this effect, unless the devise of the real estate is made to the executor.®? Ex- amples of clauses authorizing the executor or trustee to sell real estate may be found elsewhere in this work.** § 393. Paying debts and funeral expenses.—A direction in the will that the executor pay all testator’s just debts and funeral ‘expenses adds nothing to the duty which the law imposes upon all executors.** Hence it would seem that a provision of this kind need not be made, unless the testator wishes to make some ex- traordinary provision relative thereto.** A testamentary direction to pay debts includes debts of all kinds,** including those contracted subsequent to the execution of the will.*” Such a direction, however, does not include a debt barred by the statute of limitations.** The testator may, by the terms of his will, vary the common- law or statutory order for the payment of debts,*® and may charge his debts, in the first instance, upon certain specific prop- erty, but not to the prejudice of his creditors.*° 30 Rice v. Harbeson, 63 N. Y. 493; Calder v. Curry, 17 R. I. 610, 24 Atl. 103. 81 Jackson v. Bevins, 74 Conn. 96, 49 Atl. 899; Kiesewetter v. Kress, 24 Ky. L. 1239, 70 S. W. 1065, 24 Ky. L. 405, 68 S. W. 633; Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 Atl. 16,1 L. R. A. 545; McKinley v. Coe, 66 N. J. Eq. 70, 57 Atl. 1030; McCullough v. Copeland, 40 Ohio St. 329. 32In re Bingham, 127 N. Y. 296, 27 N. E. 1055; Frasier v. Littleton, 100 Va. 9, 40 S. E. 108. 33 See post, ch. 30, art. 18. 34 Bacon v. Pomeroy, 104 Mass. 577. 35 Hapgood v. Houghton, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 154. Forms of clauses 36 Hewes v. Preston, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 152; Elwood v. Deifendorf, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 398. 37 Maxwell v. Maxwell, L. R. 4 H. L. 506, 39 L. J. Ch. 698, 23 L. T. R. (N. S.) 325, 19 Wkly. Rep. 15. 38 Steele v. Steele, 64 Ala. 438, 38 Am. Rep. 15; Waughop v. Bartlett, 61 Ill. App. 252; Hemphill v. Pry, 183 Pa, St. 593, 38 Atl. 1020; Woonsocket Sav. Inst. v. Ballou, 16 R. I. 351, 16, Atl 144,1 L. R. A. 555. 89 Wright v. West, 1 Cranch. (C. C.) 303, Fed. Cas. No. 18102; In re Sasse’s Estate, 93 Nebr. 640, 141 N. W. 1026. 40 Ames v. Holderbaum, 44 Fed. 224; Howze v. Davis, 76 Ala. 381; § 394 WILLS 350 directing the payment of debts may be found in a subsequent chapter.** § 394. When legacies payable.—Legatees have no rights or equities as against creditors,* and the latter must all be satis- fied before legacies are payable: Hence the executor must be given a reasonable time to ascertain the value of the estate and the indebtedness before he can be compelled to pay legacies. The period for payment of legacies under both the civil and common law is one year after the testator’s death,** and the executor can not be compelled to pay the legacy within this period, although directed by the testator to pay it sooner.** By statute in most jurisdictions the time of paying legacies is; fixed at the expiration of the period allowed creditors to prove their claims, but in the greater number of jurisdictions permis- sion is given the executor to pay legacies before the expiration of the period allowed claimants to prove their claims, if there be sufficient assets for that purpose, and the legatees give a re- funding bond conditioned that they shall refund their due pro- portion for the payment of all debts and costs subsequently estab- lished against the estate. A testator may, however, fix by will the time for payment of legacies, and such direction will be en- forced, provided, of course, it is not in violation of the Rule against Perpetuities.*° Thus the testator may fix the time of Harkins v. Hughes, 60 Ala. 316; Brant v. Brant, 40 Mo. 266. 41 See post, ch. 30, art. 18. 42 Richardson v. Ranson, 99 IIl. App. 258; Hurst v. Davidson, 116 Ky. 351, 76 S. W. 37, 25 Ky. L. 555; O’Donnell v. McCann, 77 N. J. Eq. 188, 75 Atl. 999; Rogers v. Hinton, 63 N. Car. 78; In re Chilcott’s Ap- peal, 134 Pa. St. 240, 19 Atl. 850. 43In re Wilder, 9 Hawaii 492; State v. Crossley, 69 Ind. 203; Lafon v. Gravier, 1 Mart. (N. S.) (La.) 243; White v. Donnell, 3 Md. Ch. 526; Fitch v. Randall, 163 Mass. 381, 40 N. E. 182; Wheeler v. Brem, 33 Miss. 126; Rice v. Boston Port &c. Aid Soc. 56 N. H. 191; Ashton v. Wil- kinson, 53 N. J. Eq. 6, 30 Atl. 895 (affd. 53 N. J. Eq. 227, 35 Atl. 1130.) 44Tn re Spencer, 16 R. I. 25, 12 Atl. 124; Brooke v. Lewis, 6 Madd. & Geld. 358. 45 Johnson v. Webber, 65 Conn. 501, 33 Atl. 506; De Vaughn v. Mc- Leroy, 82 Ga. 687, 10 S. E. 211; Boling v. Miller, 133 Ind. 602, 33 N. E. 354; McChord v: Caldwell, 96 Ky. 617, 29 S. W. 440, 16 Ky. L. 733; Lindsay v. Zanoni, 6 Ohio C. C. 474, 3 Ohio C. D. 544; In re Hubert’s Estate, 181 Pa. St. 551, 37 Atl. 576; Lazier v. Lazier, 35 W. Va. 567, 14 S. E. 148. Jo § 395 MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE payment within a specified number of months after his death,** on the arrival of the legatees at majority,*” on the marriage** or on the death of a designated person,* or at any other time, not beyond the period allowed by law, that the testator may choose to ’designate.°° The testator may leave the time of payment of legacies to the discretion of the executor,®* or he may leave it to the discretion of the executor whether the legacy shall be paid ‘at all.°? Examples of provisions relative to the payment of legacies will be found in a subsequent chapter." § 395. Payment of legacies in case of shrinkage.—A tes- tator may direct that certain legacies are to be given priority over others in case the assets are not sufficient to pay all, and such direction will be enforced.°* Such a direction is often made in contemplation of an unexpected shrinkage in the estate after the execution of the will. In the absence of such a direction the legacies must be paid in the order provided by law. In the ab- sence of such direction, general legacies suffer where a shortage of assets exists, and they share pro rata in whatever amount re- mains after payment of debts and specific legacies.°° Specific legacies will not be allowed to suffer on account of shrinkage, so long as any of testator’s property not specifically bequeathed, remains unapplied.”° 46 Martin v. Martin, 69 Miss. 315, 13 So. 267; Cowherd v. Kitchen, 57 Nebr. 426, 77 N. W. 1107, 4 Prob. Rep. Ann. 325. 47 Anderson v. Hendrickson, 5 N. ‘J. Eq. 106; Mendel v. Levis, 40 Misc. 271, 81 N. Y. S. 965. 48 Overton v. Davy, 20 Mo. 273. 49 Griswold v. Heard, 2 Gray (Mass.) 322. 50 Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454, 3 L. R. A. 370, 14 Am. St. 393. 51 Savin v. Webb, 96 Md. 504, 54 Atl. 64. 52 Girard v. Futterer, 83 Ala. 234, 3 So. 516; Howland v. Howland, 11 Gray (Mass.) 469. 53 See post,-ch. 30, art. 18. 54 Chester County Hospital v. Hay- den, 83 Md. 104, 34 Atl. 877; Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100; Eames v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 68 N. H. 203, 44 Atl. 382; Moore v. Moore, 50 N. J. Eq. 554, 25 Atl. 403; Heath v. McLaughlin, 115 N. Car. 398, 20 S. E. 519; Bright’s Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 602; In re Spencer, 16 R. I. 25, 12 Atl. 124; Lee v. Smith, 84 Va. 289, 4 S. E. 717. 55 Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100; Addition v. Smith, 83 Maine 551, 22 Atl. 470; Duncan vy. Franklin Twop., 43 N. J. Eq. 143, 10 Atl. 546. 56 Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100; Toch vy. Toch, 81 Hun 410, 30 N. Y. ‘§ 396 WILLS 352 If by reason of a shrinkage in the estate, all the legacies and devises can not be paid in full, the legacies given in a residuary clause abate first and all other legacies must be paid in full be- fore residuary legatees are entitled to payment.°* But if a gen- eral legacy is sustained by a valuable consideration, such as the relinquishment of a debt, or a claim of dower, and the right subsists at the death of the testator, such general legacy will have priority over other legacies.°* Examples of directions to pay legacies in case of shrinkage will be found elsewhere in this work,”® § 396. Payment of interest on legacies—Ordinarily gen- eral legacies begin to bear interest from one year after the tes- tator’s death, and continue to draw interest until paid. The testator may, however, make a valid provision in his will that the legacy shall bear interest from a time specified therein, or on the happening of some event,°° and interest will begin to run from the time designated, or from the happening of the event, whether the legacy be vested or contingent.** S. 1003, 63 N. Y. St. 197; In re Mc- Mahon’s Estate, 132 Pa. St. 175, 19 Atl. 68. ; 57 Warren v. Morris, 4 Del. Ch. 289; Carper v. Crowl, 149 Ill. 465, 36 N. E. 1040; Sykes v. Van Bibber, 88 Md. 98, 41 Atl. 117; Porter v. Howe, 173 Mass. 521, 54 N. E. 255; Burke v. Stiles, 65 N. H. 163, 18 Atl. 657; In re Hodgman’s Estate, 140 N. Y. 421, 35 N. E. 660; Alsop v. Bowers, 76 N. Car. 168; In re Vance’s Estate, 141 Pa. St. 201, 21 Atl. 643, 12 L. R. A. 227, 23 Am. St. 267; In re Zent- ner’s Estate, 90 Wis. 236, 63 N. W. 162. 58 Moore v. Alden, 80 Maine 301, 14 Atl. 199, 6 Am. St. 203; Farnum v. Bascom, 122 Mass. 282; Merriam v. Merriam, 80 Minn. 254, 83 N. W. 162; Ellis v. Aldrich, 70 N. H. 219, 47 Atl. 95; Duncan v. Franklin Twp., 43 N. J. Eq. 143, 10 Atl. 546; In re Forepaugh’s Estate, 199 Pa. 484, 49 Atl. 236. 59 See post, ch. 30, art. 18. 60 Hallett v. Allen, 13 Ala. 554; At- kins v. Guice, 21 Ark. 164; In re Brown’s Estate, 143 Cal. 450, 77 Pac. 160; Redfield v. Marvin, 78 Conn. 704, 63 Atl. 120; Custis v. Adkins, 1 Houst. (Del.) 382, 68 Am. Dec. 422; Bowdre v. Jones, 34 Ga. 399; Mor- ton v. Hatch, 54 Mo. 408; Lewis v. Barkley, 91 Nebr. 127, 135 N. W. 379, 61In re James’ Estate, 65 Cal. 25, 2 Pac. 494; Valentine v. Ruste, 93 Ill. 585; Johnson’s Succession, 24 La. Ann. 125; Cook v. Hayward, 172 Mass. 195, 51 N. E. 1075; Ashton v. Wilkinson, 53 N. J. Eq. 227, 35 Atl. 1130; In re Rutherfurd, 196 N. Y. 311, 89 N. E. 820; Ballantyne v. Tur- ner, 59 N. Car. 224; In re Brotzman’s Estate, 133 Pa. St. 478, 19 Atl. 564. § 397 353 MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE The statutes of most states fix the time when a legacy shall commence to bear interest, but the testator may fix the time by a provision in his will, in which case the provisions of the will control." The courts will usually presume that it was the testator’s in- tention to have interest paid from the date of his death where (1) the legacy is specific,** (2) where the legacy is of the residue of the whole or an aliquot part of the estate,* (3) where the legacy is to an infant child or other dependent for its support,*° (4) where the legacy is to a creditor in satisfaction of a debt,®* or (5) where the legacy is for life or a term of years.” Examples of clauses providing for the payment of interest on legacies may be found elsewhere in this work.** § 397. Appointing agents and attorneys.—Testators often express requests as to the employment of attorneys, overseers, accountants or clerks, and collectors, whose assistance is deemed necessary in the management and settlement of the affairs of the estate, but the appointment of such persons can not generally be controlled by will, and the executor may employ persons other than those designated, or employ none at all. Where a tes- tator, by express provision in his will, selects a certain person as the attorney of his estate, and directs the executor to consult and employ him, such selection is not binding on the executor, but is only effective as an advisory provision.” Security Co., 74 Conn. 218, 50 Atl. 735; Adams v. Spalding, 12 Conn. 62 Mourain v. Poydras, 6 La. Ann. 151; Budd v. Garrison, 45 Md. 418; Dawes v. Swan, 4 Mass. 208; In re Brownell’s Estate, 1 Con. Surr. 175, 3.N. Y. S. 276, 18 N. Y. St. 999; In re Phillips’ Estate, 133 Pa. St. 426, 19 Atl. 404; Bradford Academy v. Grover, 55 Vt. 462. 63 Pulliam v. Pulliam, 10 Fed. 53; Nash v. Ober, 2 App. D. C. 304; Myers v. Myers, 33 Ala. 85; Beal v. Crafton, 5 Ga. 301; In re Pope’s Estate, 83 Nebr. 723, 120 N. W. 191. 64 Bishop v. Bishop, 81 Conn. 509, 71 Atl. 583; Bancroft v. Hartford 23—Tuomp. WILLS. 350. 65 Crew v. Pratt, 119 Cal. 131, 51 Pac. 44; Flinn v. Flinn, 4 Del. Ch. 44; Lyon v. Industrial School Assn.,.127 N. Y. 402, 28 N. E. 17. 66In re McKay’s Estate, 5 Misc. (N. Y.) 123, 25 N. Y. S. 725. 67 Webb v. Lines, 77 Conn. 51, 58 Atl. 227. 68 See post, ch. 30, art. 12. 69 In re Ogier’s Estate, 101 Cal. 381, 35 Pac. 900, 40 Am. St. 61; Young v. Alexander, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 108, § 398 WILLS 354 While the selection of an attorney can not be controlled by the testator, yet if he wishes his legal adviser to overlook the ad- ministration and settlement of his estate his wish may be fulfilled by appointing the attorney one of the executors or trustees. In such case, however, the attorney may not be allowed to charge for both professional and official services, unless the will makes special provision therefor."° Compensation for legal services rendered by the executor in person is not usually allowed,"* tor can he claim credit for legal services rendered to the estate by a law firm of which he is a member.” § 398. Applying proceeds of sale or mortgage of trust property.—Upon a sale or mortgage of trust property by the trustee in the course of the execution of the trust, the rule for- mally prevailed that the purchaser or mortgagee was generally bound to see that the proceeds of the sale or mortgage was prop- erly applied by the trustee. The rule was never regarded with favor by the courts of this country, and, even when not expressly abolished by statute, may be regarded at the present day as prac- tically nonexistent; the purchaser or mortgagee being so liable only when the circumstances were such as affect him with notice of a possible misapplication by the trustee.” The title of the purchaser or mortgagee is not affected by a misappropriation of the proceeds,’* unless he colluded with the trustee or knew, at the time of purchase or mortgage, of the trustee’s violation of trust, committed or intended.” 70Green v. Winter, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 26, 7 Am. Dec. 475; Binsse v. Paige, 1 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 138, 1 Keyes 87. ™ZHough vy. Harvey, 71 Ill. 72; Pollard v. Barkley, 117 Ind. 40, 17 S. E. 294; Collier v. Munn, 41 N. Y. 143, 7 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 193; Kuhn’s Appeal, 4 Wash. 534, 30 Pac. 643. 72 Taylor v. Wright, 93 Ind. 121; Parker v. Day, 155 N. Y. 383, 49 N. E, 1046, 73 Dunham v. Milhous, 70 Ala. 596; Seaverns v. Presbyterian Hospital, 173 Ill. 414, 50 N. E. 1079, 64 Am. St. 125; Steinke v. Yetzer, 108 Iowa 512, 79 N. W. 286; Walter v. Brugger, 78 S. W. 419, 25 Ky. L. 1597; Bur- roughs v. Gaither, 66 Md. 171, 7 Atl. 243; Hamilton v. Jacobs, 4 Ohio C. C. 250, 2 Ohio C. D. 528; Claiborne v. Holland, 88 Va. 1046, 14 S. E. 915. 74 Dawson v. Ramser, 58 Ala. 573; Jacks v. State, 44 Ark. 61; Bevis v. Heflin, 63 Ind. 129. 75 Reese v. Ivey, 162 Ala. 448, 50 So. 223; Leake v. Watson, 58 Conn. 332, 20 Atl. 343, 8 L. R. A. 666, 18 Am. St. 270. 35D § 399 MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE However, a provision may be inserted in a will to the effect that no purchaser or mortgagee shall be bound to see that the proceeds of a sale or mortgage by the trustee shall be properly applied, or the testator may accomplish the same purpose by a provision that the receipt of the trustee shall be a sufficient dis- charge. The purpose of such a provision in the will is to relieve the purchaser or mortgagee from liability for misappropriation, according to a distinction drawn by some authorities, where the trust is of a defined and limited nature as distinguished from one of a general and unlimited nature."* Thus where the trust is for the payment of specified debts, annuities, or legacies, it is sometimes held that the purchaser must see that the proceeds are properly applied.’ Where there is no provision in the will relieving a purchaser or mortgagee from liability for the misappropriation of the pro- ceeds of a sale or mortgage, prospective purchasers or mortgagees are often deterred from investing in trust property, and as a consequence the execution-of the trust is often prevented or greatly hindered. The statutes of many states contain provisions relieving purchasers and mortgagees of trust property from liability for misapplication of proceeds by the trustees. Ex- amples of provisions relieving purchasers or mortgagees from liability for misapplication of the proceeds of a sale or mortgage may be found elsewhere in this work.” § 399. Authorizing compromise of claims.—As a general rule, the executor may compromise any claim or demand due the estate, provided he acts honestly and with reasonable discre- tion for the best interest of the estate.*° It would seem that due 76 Grotenkemper v. Bryson, 79 Ky. 353, 2 Ky. L. 335; Duffy v. Calvert, 6 Gill (Md.) 487; St. Mary’s Church v. Stockton, 8 N. J. Eq. 520; Dalzell v. Crawford, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 37, 1 Clark 155, 2 Pa. L. J. 17; Na- tional Bank of Commerce v. Smith (R. 1.), 24 Atl. 273; Hughes v. Tabb, 78 Va. 313. 77 Curd v. Field, 103 Ky. 293, 45 S. W. 92, 19 Ky. L. 2016, 78 Michigan: Howell’s Ann. Stats. (1913), § 10690; Minnesota: Gen. Stats. (1913), § 6721; New York: Consol. Laws (1909), p. 4993; Wis- consin: Stats, (1915), § 2092. 79 See post, ch. 30, art. 18. 80 Neal v. Lamar, 18 Ga. 746; Bailey vy. Dilworth, 10 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 404, 48 Am. Dec. 760; Verdier v. Simons, 2 McCord Eq. (S. Car.) § 400 WILLS 356 -prudence on the part of the executor is all that is required, even though there appears a probabilty that a better settlement could have been made.*? Even the sanction of the probate court will not relieve the executor where he has not acted judiciously and for the benefit of the state.®* Much litigation may be averted or the necessity of obtaining the sanction of the court obviated by a provision in.the will au- thorizing executors and trustees to compromise claims in favor of or against the estate; but even where such provision exists the executor can accept less than is due only when in his judgment this may avoid the loss of the whole or a greater part of the debt.** Examples of provisions authorizing executors and trus- tees to compromise claims may be found in a subsequent chapter.*° § 400. Inventories, appraisements, and reports.—The first duty of an executor, upon obtaining his letters testamentary, is to prepare and file with the probate court an inventory of the assets of the estate, and it would seem that a provision in the will directing him not to make and file an inventory will not relieve him of this duty, especially if he is not a residuary legatee.** Such a provision in most jurisdictions would have no legal effect,*’ and will usually be disregarded by the court.** If the will contains a full inventory of all the effects of the testator it may not be necessary for the executor to make a new inventory.*? As a rule the appraisers are appointed by the probate court, and the executor has nothing to do with their selection or appoint- 385; Boyd v. Oglesby, 23 Grat. (Va.) 86In re Gilbert’s Estate, 2 Con. 674. Surr. 390, 11 N. Y. S. 743, 33 N. Y. 81 Jenkins v. Shields, 47 Iowa 708; St. 12. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 99 Mo. 427, 12 S. 87 Fuller v. Wilbur, 170 Mass. 506, W. 457. 49 N. E. 916. 82 Jenkins v. Shields, 47 Iowa 708. 88 Chase v. Mathews, 12 La. 357; 83 Wilks v. Slaughter, 49 Ark. 235, Potter v. McAlpine, 3 Dem. Sur. (N. 4 S. W. 766; Chase v. Bradley, 26 Y.) 108 See also In re Garrity’s Maine 531; Wyman’s Appeal, 13 N. Estate, 108 Cal. 463, 38 Pac. 628, 41 H. 18. Pac: 485. 84 Buerhaus v. De Saussure, 41 S. 89 Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488. Car. 457, 19 S. E. 926, 20 S. E. 64. 85 See post, ch. 30, art. 18. 357 MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE § 401 ment, unless there is a testamentary provision to the effect that he shall make the appraisment in such manner as he may deem best.°° But even where the will directs a special appraisement, it is to be presumed that the appraisement shall be under the direc- tion and control of the court.®* Probate courts are usually vested with power to compel regular accounting by the executor. The statutes usually provide that the first account shall be filed within a certain time from the date of appointment, that others shall follow at prescribed intervals, and that a final account shall be made at the expiration of a pre- scribed period. But the testator may entirely relieve the execu- tor from his obligation to account by the terms of his will;°* al- though he is not so relieved merely because the will gives him absolute discretion as to the management of the estate,®* or allows him a designated time in which to settle the same."* Examples of provisions concerning inventories, appraisements, and reports will be found in a subsequent chapter.” § 401. Auditing accounts and examining securities.—It is the duty of an executor or trustee to keep a clear, distinct and accurate account of his management of the estate, and this ac- count ought in some way to be open to the inspection of persons interested in the estate. Even though the estate is not in a posi- tion to be finally settled, it often becomes important to interested persons to know the situation of the property, and, in order to enable beneficiaries to obtain such knowledge, testators often insert in their wills a direction to the executors or trustees to permit the beneficiaries under proper regulations to examine the accounts and securities: Other testators appoint auditors of accounts and prescribe their duties and compensation.*® The general use of one or the other of these methods would go a long way in preventing defalcations of executors and trustees. 90In re Supplee’s Estate, 5 Pa. Dist. 983In re Harrison’s Estate, 12 Pa. 41, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 335. Co. Ct. 388. 91 Myers’ Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 104. °4In re Young’s Estate, 1 Pa. Co. 92 Maurer v. Bowman, 169 Ill. 586, Ct. 513, 48 N. E, 823. 95 See post, ch. 30, art. 18. 96 Williams v. Corbet, 8 Sim. 349. § 402 WILLS 358 Provisions respecting the auditing of accounts and examining securities will be found elsewhere in this work.” § 402. Distribution in kind.—Where a conversion of the property into money is not necessary to the administration of the estate, and such conversion is not demanded by the parties in- terested, a distribution in kind may be made.°* A distribution in kind may be made where the parties interested consent thereto,” or where a conversion of the property into money would necessi- tate a loss to the estate." A. specific legacy should, of course, be delivered in kind to the legatee, unless the will provides for its investment and the deliv- ery of the proceeds thereof to the legatee.? The payment of pecuniary legacies in property instead of money is sometimes a convenient way of payment, and testators often make provision for this mode of final distribution, prescribing the manner of determining the value of the assets to be distributed. Examples of such provisions may be found in another chapter.® § 403. Insuring property belonging to estate.-—Ordinarily -an executor or trustee is not required to insure or continue insur- ance upon the property of the decedent,* yet they must adopt such precautions against loss, and exercise such forethought for the security of the property as prudent men are accustomed to employ in regard to their own property ;° and in cases where the loss was of such a nature as might have been covered by an in- surance policy, and would have been so covered by a prudent man 97 See post, ch. 30, art. 18. 98 Ward v. Oates, 42 Ala. 225; Wa- terman v. Alden, 115 Ill. 83, 3 N. E. 505; Rose v. O’Brien, 50 Maine 188. 99 Dillard v. Ellington, 57 Ga. 567; Hurley v. Hewett, 89 Maine 100, 35 Atl. 1026; Murff v. Frazier, 41 Misc. 408; Wilson v. Fisher, 5 N. J. Eq. 493; Lane v. Albertson, 78 App. Div. 607, 79 N. Y. S. 947; Baptist Female University v. Borden, 132 N. Car. 476, 44 S. E. 47, 1007; In re Reed’s Estate, 82 Pa. St. 428. 1Lane v. Albertson, 78 App. Div. 607, 79 N. Y. S. 947. 2 Watrous v. Smith, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 544, 3 See post, ch. 30, art. 17. #Rubottom v. Morrow, 24 Ind. 202, 87 Am. Dec. 324; Dortch v. Dortch, 71 N. Car. 224. 5 Cooper v. Williams, 109 Ind. 270, 9 N. E. 917; In re Rice’s Estate, 14 Phila. (Pa.} 325. 359 MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE § 403 in the course of his own business, and there was sufficient money in the hands of the executor or trustee to pay the premium on the policy, the loss will be charged to such executor or trustee.® But the executor or trustee is only held to the exercise of rea- sonable care in the preservation and protection of the property of the estate in his hands, and is not chargeable with loss by fire, to which his own negligence or bad faith has in no way con- tributed.” Some testators insert a provision in their wills direct- ing executors, trustees, and guardians to keep the property in- sured, while others leave the matter to the discretion of such officers, and direct that they shall not be held liable for loss on account of failure to insure.® 6 Rubottom v. Morrow, 24 Ind. 202, vens v. Gage, 55 N. H. 175, 20 Am. 87 Am. Dec. 324, Rep. 191; Neff’s Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 7Campbell v. Miller, 38 Ga. 304, 91. 95 Am. Dec. 389; State v. Meagher, 8 See post, ch. 30, art. 18. 44 Mo. 356, 100 Am, Dec, 298; Ste- CHAPTER XXI PROVISIONS RESPECTING EXECUTORS, TRUSTEES AND GUARDIANS SECTION SECTION 410. Appointment of executors. 418. Authority of. less than all ex- 411. Appointment of trustees. ecutors or trustees to act. 412. Appointment of guardians. 419.. Conflicting relations of executor 413. Death, resignation, renunciation, and trustee. or relinquishment of executors 420. Authority and duties of execu- and trustees. tors. 414. Liability of executors. 421. Authority and duties of trustees. 415. Liability of trustees. 422. Compensation of executors, trus- 416. Executor’s bond. tees and guardians. . ‘417. Trustee’s bond. § 410. Appointment of executors.—Wills are often made for the sole purpose of naming an executor, and such wills are generally held valid even though the executor renounces probate thereof.* At common law all persons except idiots and lunatics were competent to act as executors; neither infancy, ignorance, non- residence, coverture, intemperance, improvidence, vice, dishon- esty, nor moral delinquency disqualified one for the office. And in the absence of any statute expressly disqualifying any partic- ular class of persons, or conferring a discretion upon the court vested with the power of appointment, the rule will prevail that courts have no discretion in respect to the issue of letters to the persons nominated in the will, and the person appointed by the will can not be rejected by the court except where the law ex- pressly so provides.” In the absence of statutory regulation the choice of the testator in the selection of an executor must be’ respected regardless of the moral character of the nominee. Fors 1Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, 735, 41 L. R. A. ‘154, 74 Am. St. 17; 29 N. E. 1151, 15 L. R. A. 447. Stewart’s Appeal, 56 Maine 300. 2 Kidd v. Bates, 120 Ala. 79, 23 So. : 360 361 EXECUTORS, TRUSTEES AND GUARDIANS § 410 from the earliest times, it has been the rule that every person may be an executor, saving only such as are expressly forbidden; the rule being that all persons who were capable of making a will were qualified to act as executors.® The fact, however, that one is named in the will as executor, does not make him so in fact, but only gives him the legal right to become executor upon complying with the conditions required by law.* He derives his right and title to the estate, as well as his appointment, from the will, but his power of administration over the estate does not become substantial until letters testa- mentary authenticating his appointment and right have been is- sued to him by the proper court. Such letters do not create the executor nor confer any title upon him, but are simply the au- thentic evidence of the power conferred by the will and which existed before the letters issued. The issuing of letters testa- mentary, and the qualifying of the executor are matters of form and are for purposes of authentication, as well as to give the stamp of legal approval and power to the appointment made by the testator in his will.® . A testator may nominate different executors for different ju- risdictions in which his estate may be situated, or different ex- ecutors as to different parts of his estate in the same jurisdic- tion,® or he may name two or more, substituting one after another in order, so that if the first dies or can not act, the next may act, and so on.” But where several executors are nominated together they-are presumably intended to be co-executors, all be- ing thus legally regarded as an individual in place of a sole ex- ecutor, and those living and competent to act at the time of the testator’s death will be entitled to letters testamentary. The ap- pointment of an executor may be constructive as well as express. No particular form of appointment, nor the use of the word 3 Smith’s Appeal, 61 Conn. 420, 24 (Md.) 483, 25 Am. Dec; 313; Despard Atl. 273, 16 L. R. A. 538n. v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192; Mordecai 4 Stagg v. Green, 47 Mo. 500. v. Boylan, 69 N. Car. 365. 5 Wood v. Cosby, 76 Ala. 557; 7In re Cornell, 1 Gibbons 1, 17 Stagg v. Green, 47 Mo. 500; Wank- Misc. 468, 41 N. Y. S. 255, 75 N. Y. ford v. Wankford, 1 Salk. 299. St. 664; In re Edwards’ Estate, 12 6Hunter v. Bryson, 5 Gill & J. Phila. (Pa.) 85. § 411 WILLS 362 “executor,” is required. Any language adopted in the will which expressly or by fair implication clothes a given party with the authority and duties of an executor will be held to constitute such appointment.® In some jurisdictions the testator may delegate to some per- son or persons named in the will or to the probate court the power to nominate the executor.® This power to delegate the appointment to a third person was valid at common law, and the appointment when made by such third person will be the same as if the testator had named such person in his will.*° Where two or more persons have been named by a testator in his will as executors thereof, and only one of them qualifies, that one has all the authority under the will which would have vested in all had they qualified. If the testator fails to appoint an executor in his will, and by such will directs that all of his estate shall go at once into the hands of legatees, such direction will be nugatory and void as against creditors or others adversely interested in his estate.” Examples of provisions appointing executors will be found in another part of this work.* § 411. Appointment of trustees.—The question of who may act as trustee was discussed in a previous chapter.** In creating a testamentary trust, the least important matter is the designation of a trustee, as equity will never allow a trust to fail 8In re Ringot, 124 Cal. 45, 56 Pac. 781; Grant v. Spann, 34 Miss. 294; In re Hill’s Estate, 102 Mo. App. 617, 77 S. W. 110; Hartnett v. Wan- dell, 60 N. Y. 346, 19 Am. Rep. 194, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 383; Stone v. Brown, 16 Tex. 425. ® Bishop v. Bishop, 56 Conn. 208, 14 Atl. 808; State v. Rogers, 1 Houst. (Del.) 569; Wilson v. Curtis, 151 Ind. 471, 51 N. E. 913, 68 Am. St. 236; Brown v. Just, 118 Mich. 678, 77 N. W.. 263; Mulford v. Mulford, 42 N. J. Eq. 68, 6 Atl. 609; Hartnett v. Wandell, 60 N. Y. 346, 19 Am. Rep. 194, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 383. 10 Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 Ill. 449, 50 N. E. 131; Wilson v. Curtis, 151 Ind. 471, 51 N. E. 913, 68 Am. St. 236. 11 Bodley v. McKinney, 9 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 339; Phillips v. Stewart, 59 Mo. 491. 12 Newcomb v. Williams, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 525. 13 See post, ch. 30, art. 19. 14 See ante, ch. 18, § 350. 363 EXECUTORS, TRUSTEES AND GUARDIANS § 411 for want of a trustee,*> but if discretionary powers are to be exercised the trustee should not only be named, but provision should be made for the appointment of his successor.*® It is obvious that in most cases the purposes of the trust can be best carried out where there is no relationship between the trustee and the beneficiaries.*” Where the will fails to designate a trustee, the trust will some- times devolve upon the executor by implication.** It may be advisable in many cases to appoint the same person both executor and trustee. “The fact, therefore, that the same “persons are executors and trustees, though it does not affect the ultimate rights of parties beneficially interested, yet enables the individuals clothed with this double character to act in the two capacities with more ease and safety than they otherwise could. As the funds are at all times under their own control, either in the one capacity or the other, then, under the rule mentioned, that the law considers that paid which it requires to be paid, nothing remains for the executors and trustees to do, but to keep accurate accounts, to charge and credit the one fund or the other, according to every possible contingency, with moneys received and debts and charges paid; and when the executorship account is closed, and the statute of limitations has taken effect, then the trust account will exhibit the trust fund, as directed to be formed by the will.’’° It must be remembered, however, that the trusteeship and executorship are two separate and distinct 15 Willis v. Alvey, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 96, 69 S. W. 1035. 16 May v. May, 167 U. S. 310, 42 L. ed. 179, 17 Sup. Ct. 824; Wilcox’s Ap- peal, 54 Conn. 320, 8 Atl. 136. 17 Wilson y. Wilson, 145 Mass. 490, 14 N. E. 521, 1 Am. St, 477. 18 Perkins v. Lewis, 41 Ala. 649, 94 Am. Dec. 616; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 33 Atl. 591; Anderson v. Northrup, 30 Fla. 612, 12 So. 318; Calvert v. Boullemet, 46 La. Ann. 1132, 15 So. 363; Codman v. Brigham, 187 Mass. 309, 72 N. E. 1008, 105 Am. St. 394, 10 Prob. Rep. Ann. 49; Wheeler v. Perry, 18 N. H. 307; Shibla v. Ely, 6 N. J. Eq. 181; Close v. Farmers’ L. & T. Co., 195 N. Y. 92, 87 N. E. 1005; Tinnin v. Womack, 54 N. Car. 135; In re Crawford, 21 Ohio C. C. 554, 11 Ohio C. D. 605; Jasper v. Jasper, 17 Ore. 590, 22 Pac. 152; In re Sheets, 52 Pa. St. 257; In re Hodges’ Estate, 63 Vt. 661, 22 Atl. 725. 19 Minot v. Amory, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 377. § 412 WILLS 364 offices,” and a bond is required to be given in each capacity.”* Where the will does not appoint a trustee the court may, in some cases, hold the heirs at law or distributees as trustees.2? Exam- ples of clauses appointing trustees will be found elsewhere in this work.?* §412. Appointment of guardians.——Testators often ap- point a guardian or guardians for the protection of those of their beneficiaries who are legally incompetent to control them- selves and their property. This power is founded upon the Stat- ute of 12 Car. II, c. 24, § 8. By this statute the father alone had the power to appoint a testamentary guardian for his child by last will and testament,”* but modern statutes have broadened the right considerably.” The appointment of guardians by will is authorized by statute in many states, and wills merely making such appointments have been admitted to probate.*® “There can be no valid testamentary appointment of a guardian for an infant who already has a guardian whose guardianship has not been revoked.*” But this rule does not apply where the two guardianships do not conflict,"* nor where the former guardian is ineligible to serve.”? | : Where the will appoints the same person as guardian and trus- tee, two separate and distinct offices are created.*° 20Daggett v. White, 128 Mass. 398; In re Higgins, 15 Mont. 474, 39 Pac. 506, 28 L. R. A. 116. 21Prior v. Talbot, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 1. 22 Burgin v. Chenault, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 285. 23 See post, ch. 30, art. 19. 24Hernandes v. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522, 39 So. 641,2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 203, 111 Am. St. 137, 7 Ann. Cas. 446; Fullerton v. Jackson, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 278. 25 Churchill v. Jackson, 132 Ga. 666, 64 S. E. 691, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 875, Ann, Cas. 1913 E, 1203; McKinney v. Noble, 37 Tex. 731; Sutton v. Har- vey, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 26, 57 S. W. 879. 26 Wardwell v. Wardwell, 91 Mass. 518. 27 Magdeleine v. Mayor, 1 Mart. (La.) 200; Copp v. Copp, 20 N. H. 284; Robinson v. Zollinger, 9 Watts (Pa.) 169; Potts v. Terry, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 3947 28 S. W. 122. 28 Kearney v. Brooklyn Industrial School Assoc. &c., 1 Redf. Surr. (N. Y.) 292. 29 Scobey v. Gano, 35 Ohio St. 550. 30Clark v. Anderson, 10 Bush (Ky.) 99. 365 EXECUTORS, TRUSTEES AND GUARDIANS § 412 In some jurisdictions testamentary guardians are recognized by statute to the extent only of giving them the preference of a statutory appointment. Without such appointment, such guard- ian, although appointed and named by the will, would have no authority or control over the property or estate of the ward.** A person designated by will as guardian of the minor children of the testator, would, perhaps, if both parents of such children were dead, succeed, by virtue of such appointment, to the nat- ural guardianship of such children.** When a guardian for a minor has been appointed by will, by its father or mother, such guardian will generally be entitled to preference in appointment over all others, without reference to his place of residence or choice of such minor; but his appointment, duties and powers shall, in all other respects, be governed by the law regulating guardians not appointed by will.®* And if such testamentary guardian fails or refuses to accept such trust it then becomes the duty of the court to appoint some other competent person as guardian.** Ifa testamentary guardian is appointed it is ad- visable to give him all the powers of a trustee, or make him an absolute trustee for the period of minority, including power to sell, invest, and reinvest the estate from time to time, as he may deem best. Another method is to give the property to the trustee to pay the income to the mother to be applied for the maintenance, support, and education of the minor children. This is sometimes done without appointing a guardian at all; the persons of the minors being commended to the care of a relative. Examples of clauses appointing guardians and designating their powers may be found in another chapter.** § 413. Death, resignation, renunciation or relinquishment of executors and trustees.—Vacancies often occur by reason of the death, resignation or renunciation of executors or trustees 81Lord v. Hough, 37 Cal. 657; Badenhoof v. Johnson, 11 Nev. 87; Moore v. Christian, 56 Miss. 408, 31 Underhill v. Dennis, 9 Paige (N. Y.) Am. Rep. 375. 202. 82Lord v. Hough, 37 Cal. 657; 34 Davidson v. Koehler, 76 Ind. 398, Thomas v. Williams, 9 Fla. 289. 35 See post, ch. 30, art. 19. 83 Watson v. Warnock, 31 Ga. 716; § 413 WILLS 366 named in the will, and if the will fails to provide for suitable successors, the duty of filling such vacancies devolves upon the probate court. The testator may, however, expressly provide for such a contingency by designating who shall act,** or he may pro- vide that their appointment may be made by others, or by the probate court.®” By the common law, upon the death of an executor testate, the executorship devolved upon his executor; and upon the death of that executor testate, the trust passed to his executor, and so on, so long as the chain of representation remained unbroken by any intestacy; and upon the death of one or more joint executors the trust devolved upon the survivors, and would ultimately pass to the executor of the last survivor.** An executorship, being a private office of trust named by the testator, and not by the law, it follows that he can not be com- pelled to accept, but may refuse to act, even if in the lifetime of the testator he has agreed to accept the office.*® But an agree- ment made with persons in interest before the death of the tes- tator and contrary to his expressed wishes, with one named by him as executor, to renounce the appointment for a considera- tion, is void as against public policy.*° Asa matter of precaution it might be well for the testator to consult with the person or persons he desires to name to see if they are willing to accept the trust. Where the trust is to continue for some time the will should contain provisions for the relinquishment of the trust by the trustees and for filling vacancies occasioned thereby. Forms of provisions appointing new or substituted executors and trus- tees may be found in another chapter.** 36 Tuckerman v. Currier, 54 Colo. 88 Crafton v. Beal, 1 Ga. 322; 25, 129 Pac. 210, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 599; Von Rosenberg v. Wickes, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 455, 109 S. W. 968. 37 Orr v. Yates, 209 Ill, 222, 70 N. E, 731; Hite v. Hite, 133 Ky. 554, 118 S. W. 357; Edgerly v. Barker, 67 N. H. 443, 32 Atl. 766; Jewett v. Schmidt, 39 Misc. 502, 80 N. Y. S. 352; In re Boning’s Estate, 214 Pa, 19, 63 Atl. 296. Wankford v. Wankford, 1 Salk. 299. 89 Steel v. Steel, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 231; Douglass v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686; Doyle v. Blake, 2 Sch. & Lef. 231, 40 Robertson v. McGeoch, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 640; Davis v. Inscoe, 84 N. Car. 396. 41 See post, ch. 30, art. 19, § 414 367 EXECUTORS, TRUSTEES AND GUARDIANS § 414. Liability of executors.—The care, prudence and judgment which a man of fair and average capacity and ability is accustomed to use in the transaction of his own business fur- nishes the standard to govern an executor in the discharge of his trust duties.** He will not be permitted to make private profit in his dealings with the property of the estate,** and if he assumes to act outside of his power under the law, he is a wrong- doer and personally liable, in his natural capacity, to parties in- jured.** He is personally liable for waste,*° or for conversion,*® misapplication,*” or embezzlement of the assets of the estate.*® An executor is chargeable with the loss or depreciation of assets occasioned by the exercise of bad faith or the failure to use due prudence and diligence ;** but he is not liable for losses where he has acted in good faith and with due prudence and diligence in the care and management of the estate."° But if the executor is lenient or indulgent to the debtors of his decedent, and for- bears to sue them, he acts at his peril, and incurs a personal liabil- ity which may result in a serious loss.** 42In re Bush’s Estate, 89 Nebr. 334, 131 N. W. 602. 43 Jacoway v. Hall, 67 Ark. 340, 55 S. W. 12; Stitt v. Stitt, 205 Mo. 155, 103 S. W. 547; Parker v. Day, 155 N. Y. 383, 49 N. E. 1046; Cox v. John, 32 Ohio St. 532. 44 Hankins v. Kimball, 57 Ind. 42. 43 McCracken v. McCracken, 6 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 342; Gordon v. West, 8 N. H. 444; In re Feierabend, 38 Misc. 524, 77 N. Y. S. 1106; In re Montier’s Estate, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 491. 46 Miller v. Miller, 73 Md. 442, 21 Atl. 321; In re Buck’s Estate, 185 Pa. St. 57, 39 Atl. 821, 64 Am. St. 816. 47JTn re Meagley’s Estate, 39 App. Div. 83, 56 N. Y. S. 503. 48 Connor v. Akin, 34 Ill. App. 431. 49 Eubank v. Clark, 78 Ala. 73; Ru- bottom v. Morrow, 24 Ind. 202, 87 Am. Dec. 324; Henderson Trust Co. v. Stuart, 108 Ky. 167, 55 S. W. 1082, 21 Ky. L. 1164, 48 L. R. A. 49; Stone’s Succession, 31 La. Ann. 311; Tuttle v. Robinson, 33 N. H. 104; Lindsley v. Dodd, 53 N. J. Eq. 69, 30 Atl. 896; Brinckerhoff v. Farias, 52 App. Div. 256, 65 N. Y. S. 358; Smith v. Smith, 79 N. Car. 455; Wilson’s Ap- peal, 115 Pa. St. 95, 9 Atl. 473; In re Hall’s Estate, 70 Vt. 458, 41 Atl. 508; Davis v. Chapman, 83 Va. 67, 1 S. E. 472, 5 Am. St. 251;-Brewer v. Hut- ton, 45 W. Va. 106, 30 S. E. 81, 72 Am. St. 804. 50 Waller v. Ray, 48 Ala. 468; Dyer v. Jacoway, 50 Ark. 217, 6 S. W. 902; In re Fernandez’s Estate, 119 Cal. 579, 51 Pac. 851; Messmore v. Stone, 6 Ky. L. 596; Stirling v. Lawrason, 31 La. Ann. 169; Conwill v. Living- ston, 61 Miss. 641; Powell v. Hurt, 108 Mo. 507, 17 S. W. 985; Stevens v. Gage, 55° N. H. 175, 20 Am. Rep. 191, 51 Condit v. Winslow, 106 Ind. 142, § 415 WILLS 368 An executor is not generally held liable for the negligence oz waste committed solely by a co-executor.®? And, in the absence of wilful misconduct or fraud, an executor will not be held re- sponsible for losses where he acted under the advice of his at- torney.** Testators often insert in their wills a clause for the relief of the executor from liability where he acts in good faith’ ‘in the management and settlement of the estate. Examples of such clauses may be found in another chapter.** § 415. Liability of trustees—The principles governing the liability of executors are alike applicable to testamentary trustees. In the performance of his duties a trustee must act in good faith,’ and exercise that care and diligence which an or- dinary prudent man would exercise in the management of his own affairs.°° He will not be held liable for mere mistakes or errors of judgment, or for losses not attributable to his lack of fidelity or failure to exercise reasonable care and prudence; but he will be held liable for losses due to the exercise of authority beyond the scope of that conferred,** or gross neglect of the du- ties imposed upon him.*® He is not permitted to use the advantages afforded by his office to gain any benefit for himself at the expense of the cestui que trust.°° If the trustee acquire any interest for himself which is 5 N. E. 751; Miller v. Steele, 64 Ind. 79. ‘ 52 Ormiston v. Olcott, 84 N. Y. 339. 53In re Merritt’s Estate, 62 Mo. 150; Perrine v. Vreeland, 33 N. J. Eq. 102; Thompson v. Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 619; Watkins v. Stewart, 78 Va. 111. 54 See post, ch. 30, art. 19. 55Linsley v. Strang (Iowa), 126 N. W. 941; Morrow v. Saline County, 21 Kans. 484; Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Menage, 73 Minn. 441, 76 N. W. 195; Freeman v. Cook, 41 N. Car. 373; Reynolds v. Pettyjohn, 79 Va. 827, 5¢ Bermingham v. Wilcox, 120 Cal. 467, 52 Pac. 822; Bourquin v. Bour- qtin, 120 Ga. 115, 47 S. E. 639; King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76; Fahnestock’s Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 46; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 81 S. Car. 506, 62 S. E. 845; Winder v. Nock, 104 Va. 759, 52S. E. 561, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 415. 57 Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 683; Taft v. Smith, 186 Mass. 31, 70 N. E. 1031. 58 Gibney v. Allen, 156 Mich. 301, 120 N. W. 811; Pennington v. Seal, 49 Miss. 518. 59 Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 683; Moel- ler v. Poland, 80 Ohio St. 418, 89 N. E. 100. 60 Enslen v. Allen, 160 Ala. 529, 49 So. 430; Bermingham v. Wilcox, 120 Cal. 467, 52 Pac. 822; Teegarden v. 369 § 416 EXECUTORS, TRUSTEES AND GUARDIANS adverse to that of the cestui que trust, such interest will be held to inure to the benefit of the latter.* The trustee can not shift his responsibility to others, but is himself liable for loss due to the dishonesty, negligence, or mis- management of agents or attorneys appointed by him, unless he has exercised the care and discretion of an ordinary prudent person in selecting such agents or attorneys.°? Some testators insert a clause in the will expressly relieving the trustee from liability for the misfeasance of agents.** Also it is quite com- mon to insert a clause relieving the trustee from personal liability for any loss except such as may be occasioned by the trustee’s wilful neglect, default or misconduct. Examples of such clauses may be found elsewhere in this work.®° § 416. Executor’s bond. In England, and in a few of the states of this country, an executor is not required to give a bond unless the circumstances require it. Thus he will be required to give a bond in case he is a nonresident,” insolvent,®* or that his financial circumstances are not such as to afford adequate security for the due administration of the estate. In a few other states the matter of requiring a bond of the Lewis, 145 Ind. 98, 40 N. E. 1047, 44 N. E. 9; Linsley v. Strang (Iowa), 126 N. W. 941; Hayes v. Hall, 188 Mass. 510, 74 N. E. 935; Newman v. Newman, 152 Mo. 398, 54 S. W. 19; Boyd v. Hawkins, 37 N. Car. 304; Ludington v. Patton, 111 Wis. 208, 86 N. W. 571. 61 Wiswall v. Stewart, 32 Ala. 433, 70 Am. Dec. 549; Cavagnaro v. Don, 63 Cal. 227; Broome v. Alston, 8 Fla. 307; Jarrett v. Johnson, 216 Ill. 212, 74 N. E. 756; Taylor v. Calvert, 138 Ind. 67, 37 N. E. 531; Morrow v. Sa- line County, 21 Kans. 484; Bradford v. Clayton, 39 S. W. 40, 18 Ky. L. 1043; Shirley v. Shattuck, 28 Miss. 13; Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282, 45 N. E. 876, 37 L. R. A. 305; 24—Tuomp. WILLS. Brantly v. Kee, 58 N. Car. 332; Mul- len v. Doyle, 147 Pa. St. 512, 23 Atl. 807; Cobb v. Trammell, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 527, 30 S. W. 482. 63 Donaldson v. Allen, 182 Mo. 626, 81 S. W. 1151. 64 Q’Fallon v. Tucker, 13 Mo. 262. 65 Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y. 56. 66 See post, ch. 30, art. 19. 67 Grigsby v. Cocke, 85 Ky. 314, 3 S. W. 418, 9 Ky. L. 12; Davis’ Suc- cession, 12 La. Ann. 399; Van Wyck v. Van Wyck, 22 Hun (N. Y.) 9; Harberger’s Appeal, 98 Pa. St. 29. 68 Johns v. Johns, 23 Ga. 31. 69 Wood v. Wood, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 299; Freeman v. Kellogg, 4 Redf. Surr. (N. Y.) 218. § 417 WILLS 370 executor is left to the discretion of the court.” In still others the executor must give a bond unless the testator in his will has directed otherwise. In the latter instance the direction amounts merely to a power given the court to dispense with the bond where it is deemed prudent to do so, but does not deprive the court of the power to require a bond if it is deemed necessary, or is demanded by one who is interested in the estate; but the testator’s wishes in the matter will be respected unless good rea- sons for disregarding them appear.” In a few states, however, the necessity of giving a bond, at least to secure the payment of debts, can not be dispensed with by a testamentary direction. This seems to be the rule in Ar- kansas, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa and Maryland. In many of the states not requiring an executor to give a bond, a discrimina- tion is made against nonresident executors, requiring them to give bond.”* The amount of the bond to be given by the executor and the number of sureties thereon is usually regulated by statute. In most states the executor is required to give an additional bond for the sale of real estate; his general bond not being liable for the proceeds of such sale. The form and requisites of an executor’s bond is usually prescribed. by statute. § 417. Trustee’s bond.—What was said in the preceding section with reference to the executor’s bond will generally apply to the bond-of a testamentary trustee. But in the matter of re- quiring a bond where the will directs that none shall be given, a lesser degree of strictness is required from the trustee. If the will expressly directs that the trustee shall not be required to execute a bond, the court has no power to require such bond, unless it be in pursuance of some express statutory requirement,™* or unless 70 Bankhead v. Hubbard, 14 Ark. 72 Bowman v. Wootten, 8 B. Mon. 298. (Ky.) 67; Amiss v. Williamson, 17 71 Grigsby v. Cocke, 85 Ky. 314, 3 W. Va. 673. . S. W. 418, 9 Ky. L. 12; Clark v. Niles, 73 Succession of Davis, 12 La. Ann. 42 Miss. 460; Freeman v. Kellogg, 4 399. Redf. Surr. (N. Y.) 218; Bellinger 74Ex parte Kilgore, 120 Ind. 94, 22 v. Thompson, 26 Ore. 320, 37 Pac. N. E. 104, 714, 40 Pac. 229; Felton v. Sowles, 57 Vt. 382. 371 EXECUTORS, TRUSTEES AND GUARDIANS § 418 there is reason to apprehend that the safety of the estate requires it.”> “Tt is undeniably true that trustees and trust estates are, by the express terms of the statute, placed under the equitable con- trol of the court having jurisdiction thereof, for the preservation of the funds and carrying out the purposes of the trust, and that, ‘in a proper case, the court may, by virtue of its inherent chancery jurisdiction over trust estates, require the execution of a bond for the faithful administration of the trust.””° The statutes now quite generally require testamentary trustees to give bond, but it has been held that a statute requiring bonds of executors and administrators does not apply to a trustee of a trust created by will.” Where the executor appointed by the will is appointed trustee also, he is required to give a separate bond in his character as trustee.” § 418. Authority of less than all executors or trustees to act.—Where there are several trustees appointed, and all have accepted and are exercising the office, their powers, interests, and authority are equal and indivisible; they can not act sepa- rately, but must act as a unit,” unless the provisions of the will permit a majority or other number less than all to act.*° However, an act done by a less number than is required, may be ratified by those who did not join in such act originally.** It often becomes inconvenient for all the trustees to act, and disagreements among them are not uncommon. A provision per- mitting a majority or other number less than all to act would be very serviceable in such cases. The occasion for such a provision 73 Ladd v. Ladd, 125 Ala. 135, 27 So. 924; Kerr v. White, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 161; Foss v. Sowles, 62 Vt. 221, 19 Atl. 984. 76 Ex parte Kilgore, 120 Ind. 94, 22 N. E. 104. 77 Dingman v. Beall, 213 Ill. 238, 72 N. E. 729, 78 Deering v. Adams, 37 Maine 264; McClernan v. McClernan, 73 Md. 283, 20 Atl. 908; McWilliams v. Gough, 116 Wis. 576, 93 N. W. 550. 79Hosch Lumber Co. v. Weeks, 123 Ga. 336, 51 S. E. 439; Coleman v. Connolly, 242 Ill. 574, 90 N. E. 278, 134 Am. St. 347; Boston v. Rob- bins, 126 Mass. 384; Loud v. Win- chester, 52 Mich. 174, 17 N. W. 784; Ham v. Ham, 58 N. H. 70. 80 Barney v. Chittenden, 2 Greene (Iowa) 165; Ratcliffe v. Sangston, 18 Md. 383; Bascom v. Weed, 53 Misc. 496, 105 N. Y. S. 459. 81 Hill v. Peoples, 80 Ark. 15, 95 S. W. 990. 372 § 419 WILLS in the case of executors is not so urgent, as joint executors may, within certain limits act independently, the act of any one, within the scope of his authority, being considered the act of all.*? This rule, however, does not apply where the power to sell real estate vests in executors, but all who are acting at the date of the sale must join in the conveyance.** In order to avoid questions where less than all the executors act, the will should contain a provision empowering a certain number less than all to act. Examples of such provisions will be found in a subsequent chapter.** § 419. Conflicting relations of executor and trustees.— Testators often make the executors trustees of a testamentary trust by imposing duties beyond their duties as executors, so that they will take as trustees as well as executors.** But it is some- times difficult to determine whether the testator intended to con- stitute the executor a trustee as well as an executor. If the acts to be done or the powers to be exercised by the person appointed are such as pertain solely to the office of an executor the ap- pointee will have the sole and exclusive right to carry out the provisions of the will in the capacity of an executor. But if the testator has directed acts to be done and created powers to be exercised such as do not pertain to the office of an executor, it is the province and duty of the person named as executor to act as trustee, and he may be held as such.** Where there is a doubt 82 Dwight v. Newell, 15 Ill. 333; Free School v. Fisher, 30 Maine 523; Long v. Rodman, 58 Ind. 58; Gilman v. Healy, 55 Maine 120; Devling v. Little, 26 Pa. St. 502; Weir v. Mosher, 19 Wis. 330. 83 Hannum v. Day, 105 Mass. 33; Croft v. Williams, 88 N. Y. 384; Al- exander v. McMurry, 8 Watts (Pa.) 504; Wright v. Dunn, 73 Tex. 293, 11 S. W. 330; Hart v. Rust, 46 Tex. 556. 84 See post, ch. 30, art. 17. 85 Perkins v. Lewis, 41 Ala. 649, 94 Am. Dec. 616; In re Delaney’s Estate, 49 Cal. 76; Calvert v. Boullemet, 46 La. Ann. 1132, 15 So. 363; Putnam Codman v. Brigham, 187 Mass. 309, 72 N. E. 1008, 105 Am. St. 394, 10 Prob. Rep. Ann. 49; Close v. Farm- ers’ L. & T. Co., 195 N. Y. 92, 87 N. E. 1005; In re Sheets, 52 Pa. St. 257; Wood v. Hammond, 16 R. I. 98, 17 Atl. 324, 18 Atl. 198; People’s Loan &c. Bank v. Garlington, 54 S. Car. 413, 32 S. E. 513, 71 Am. Dec. 800; In re Hodges, 63 Vt. 661, 22 Atl. 725. 86 O’Neal v. Beall, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 272; Webber Hospital Assn. v. McKenzie, 104 Maine 320, 71 Atl. 1032; Morrow v. Morrow, 113 Mo. App. 444, 87 S. W. 590; Hayward v. 373 EXECUTORS, TRUSTEES AND GUARDIANS § 420 whether the executor is to act as such or as a trustee, the rule is that the duty or trust devolves upon the executor, or upon the trustee as executor, by virtue of his office of executor.*’ In order that there may be no doubt about the executor’s au- thority to perform trust duties under the will, the testator should impose such duties upon him in express terms, and vest title to the trust property in him. But if the will in effect subjects the property in the hands of the executor as such to certain trusts to be carried out by him he will be deemed to hold the property as trustee by virtue of his appointment as executor.** In order to hold the executor as acting in both the capacity of an executor and the capacity of a trustee, it must plainly appear that such was the intention of the testator.® § 420. Authority and duties of executors.—As a general rule the authority of the executor does not begin until probate and letters issued to him.°® He has no power to intermeddle with the estate, further than is necessary to preserve the same, until after the issuing of letters testamentary, and if he should do so he becomes, in effect, an executor de son tort. He holds the estate as trustee for the legatees, creditors and parties inter- ested under the will; and, pending the issuing of letters and his qualifying and giving bond, is the legal representative of the estate. For the purposes for which he may intermeddle with the estate before qualifying, the issuing to him of letters will relate back as of the death of the testator. But this doctrine of rela- tion will not be applied where its effect will be to divest a right Spaulding, 75 N. H. 92, 71 Atl. 219; 83 App. Div. 276, 82 N. Y. S. 49; Terry v. Smith, 42 N. J. Eq. 504, 8 Pomroy v. Lewis, 14 R. I. 349. Atl. 886. 89 Howard v. American Peace Soc., 87In re Crawford, 21 Ohio C. C. 49 Maine 288; Gandolfo v. Walker, 554, 11 Ohio C. D. 605. 15 Ohio St. 251; Clark v. Powell, 62 88 Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 56, 46 Vt. 442, 20 Atl. 597. ” Atl. 278; Clifford v. Stewart, 95 90Thomas v. Mornissett, 76 Ga. - Maine 38, 49 Atl. 52; Bean v. Com- 384; Good Samaritan Hospital v. monwealth, 186 Mass. 348, 71 N. E. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 137 Mo. 784; Campbell v. Clough, 71 N. H. App. 179, 117 S. W. 637. 181, 51 Atl. 668; Jewett v. Schmidt, 91 Shirley v. Healds, 34 N. H. 407. § 421 WILLS 374 which has legally vested in another between the death of the testator and the grant of letter. It exists only where the act to be validated is for the benefit of the estate.°? One of the first duties of an executor is to bury the decedent, and as this is usually done before letters issue, a reasonable and judicious expenditure for this purpose will always be approved.” Other duties which devolve upon the executor are to propound the will for probate, collect assets, pay debts and legacies, prevent waste, and such other duties as may be imposed by statute or by the terms of the will.°* The scope of the executor’s powers and duties, in the absence of statutory or testamentary provision extending or limiting them, is similar to those of an administrator. While an administrator derives his authority wholly from the court and the law of his appointment, an executor’s power and right to act is derived from his testamentary appointment; his powers, under the law, are as great as those of an administrator, and by the terms of the will may be made greater.” He does not take title to real estate, or acquire any power or right of possession therein, unless conferred by statute or testamentary provision.*° The special powers that executors have as trustees have already been considered.” § 421. Authority and duties of trustees.—The duty of a testamentary trustee is to carry out the provisions of the will re- specting the trust, in so far as this may be legally done, in accord- ance with the rules governing the execution of trusts generally. His duties and powers are to be ascertained from an inspection of the will, and of the statutes, if any, which are applicable.” 92Crump v. Williams, 56 Ga. 590; Gilkey v. Hamilton, 22 Mich. 283. ®8In re Galland’s Estate, 92 Cal. 293, 28 Pac. 287; McNeely v. Mc- Neely, 50 La. Ann. 823, 24 So. 338; Sweeney v. Muldoon, 139 Mass. 304, 31 N. E. 720; Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574, 17 Am. Rep. 384. 941 Willianis Executors (7th Am. ed.), 362, 372. 95 Scott v. West, 63 Wis. 529, 24 N. W. 161, 25 N. W. 18. 96 Stewart v. Smiley, 46 Ark. 373; Austin v. Chambers, 33 Okla. 40, 124 Pac. 310. 97 See Chap. 18. 98 Russell v. Peyton, 4 Ill, App. 473; Murphy v. Delano, 95 Maine 229, 49 Atl. 1053, 55 L. R. A. 227; Burroughs v. Gaither, 66 Md. 171, 7 Atl. 243; Hackett v. Hackett, 67 N. H. 424, 40 Atl, 434; In re Fisk, 45 Misc. 298, 92 N. Y. S. 394; Carter v. Rolland, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 333, oo § 422 6) EXECUTORS, TRUSTEES AND GUARDIANS Thus the provisions of the will, and the law applicable thereto, measure the extent of the trustee’s duties and powers respecting the possession, control, and management of the trust estate,” ‘the investment of the trust funds,* the sale of trust property,” and the payment or distribution of principal or income.’ A trustee-can not generally charge the estate by an executory contract unless authorized to do so by statute or by the terms of the will. But where a trustee has full power to manage and con- trol an estate he may sell personal property without authority being given by will or statute,® especially where such sale is neces- sary to the execution of the trust.® A trustee in whom there is vested discretionary powers in- volving personal confidence can not delegate his powers or duties to a stranger or a co-trustee, unless authorized to do so by will.” § 422. Compensation of executors, trustees and guardians. —By the common law neither executors, trustees nor guardians were entitled to compensation for their services as such, but a more enlightened policy now generally prevails, and not only are such officers allowed reasonable compensation for their labor, time and expenses, but such compensation is made a first charge against the estate in their hands. The testator may provide in his will the compensation to be allowed such officers for their services, and they will be bound thereby.® The compensation of such officers, in the absence of a provision 29 Corse v. Corse, 72 Hun 39, 25 N. Y. S. 290, 55 N. Y. St. 461; In re Sheets, 52 Pa. St. 257; Wood v. Ham- mond, 16 R. I. 98, 17 Atl. 324, 18 Atl. 198. 1Garesche v. Levering Inv. Co., 146 Mo. 436, 48 S. W. 653, 46 L. R. A. 232. 2 Hackett v. Hackett, 67 N. H. 424, 40 Atl. 434. 3 Sells v. Delgado, 186 Mass. 25, 70 N. E. 1036. 4 Johnston v. Morrow, 28 N. J. Eq. 327; Parker v. Day, 155 N. Y. 383, 49 N. E. 1046. 5 Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320, 25 L. ed. 955; Leitch v. Wells, 48 N. Y. 585. 6 Murphy v. Delano, 95 Maine 229, 49 Atl. 1053, 55 L. R. A. 227; Eld- ridge v. Greene, 17 R. I. 17, 19 Atl. 1085. 7Binns v. La Forge, 191 Ill. 598, 61 N. E. 382. 8 Biscoe v. State, 23 Ark. 592; Ross v. Conwell, 7 Ind. App. 375, 34 N. E. 752; In re Hopkins, 32 Hun (N. Y.) 618. § 422 WILLS 376 therefor in the will, is usually allowed by the court or fixed by statute. It would seem that where, by the terms of the will, the functions of an executor and of a trustee co-exist, and -the same person is called upon to perform two distinct kinds of serv- ice for each of which the law awards compensation, he should receive compensation for both.? So where, under a will, the du- ties of an executor as such are to be first performed and then he is required to assume duties as a trustee, he will be entitled to compensation in both capacities.° But where the functions of executor and that of trustee are so blended that they are insep- arable then but one compensation should be allowed.** But in every instance the intention of the testator as gathered from the will is decisive and must be given effect.” A testator may give the executor or trustee a legacy in lieu of compensation, or provide that he shall be entitled to no compensation outside his interest in the estate, but an intention to supplement the usual compensation | in this regard must clearly appear. Clauses fixing compensation for executors, trustees and guardians will be found elsewhere in this work.” 9 Baker v. Johnston, 39 N. J. Eq. N. J. L. 237; Johnson v. Lawrence, 493; Laytin v. Davidson, 95 N. Y. 95 N. Y. 154. 263. 12 Lansing v. Lansing, 45 Barb. (N. 10McAlpine v. Potter, 126 N. Y. Y.) 182, 1 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 280, 31 285, 27 N. E. 475; In re Willets, 112 How. Pr. 55; Shippen v. Burd, 42 N. Y. 289, 19 N. E. 690. Pa. St. 461. 11 Everson v. Pitney, 40 N. J. Eq. 18 See post, ch. 30, art. 19. 539, 9 Atl 95; Brush v, Young, 28 CHAPTER XXII MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SECTION SECTION 430. Provision disposing of testator’s 433. Provisions respecting advance- body. ments. 431. Disinheritance of heirs. 434, Ademption and satisfaction of 432. Provision for construction by legacies. umpire. 435. Provision against void gift. § 430. Provision disposing of testator’s body.—The gen- eral English and American authorities on the law regarding the right of a testator to make disposition of his own body by will are not very satisfactory. The view maintained by some of these authorities is that in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, there is no property in a dead body; that it is not a part of the estate of the deceased person; and that a man can not by will dispose of that which after his death will be his corpse.* However, the weight of authority in this country holds that a testator has a right to direct the manner in which his body shall be disposed of after death,” and his directions in this respect have generally been given effect.? In the absence of such direc- tion the paramount right to bury the testator is in the surviving husband or wife, or next of kin.* It has been held that where the will makes no disposition of the dead body of the testator, the surviving relatives, and not the exccutor, have a right to the custody thereof for the purpose of 1Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 tigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, Pac. 170, 53 L. R. A. 221, 82 Am. St. 330, 6 Prob. Rep. Ann. 314; Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. Div. 659, 15 Cox Cr. C. 39, 46 J. P. 726, 51 L. J. Ch. 385, 46 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 275, 30 Wkly. Rep. 438. 2 Thompson v. Deeds, 93 Iowa 228, 61 N. W. 842, 35 L. R. A. 56; Pet- 56 Atl. 878, 64 L. R. A. 179, 99 Am. St. 795, 9 Prob. Rep. Ann. 446. 3 Scott v. Riley, 16 Phila. (Pa.) 106, 40 Leg. Int. 382. 4 People v. St. Patrick’s Cathedral, 21 Hun (N. Y.) 184; Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 Atl. 878, 64 L. R. A. 179, 99 Am. St. 795. 377. § 431 WILLS 378 burial.’ Provisions respecting the disposal of testator’s body after death may be found in another chapter.° § 431. Disinheritance of heirs.—As the right to dispose of property by will is an inherent one, any person who is competent to make a will can, as a general rule, make such disposition of his property as he pleases, and may disinherit his children, and his motives for so doing can not be questioned.’ But an heir at law will not be disinherited except by express words in the will or necessary implication arising therefrom.*® There is an erroneous impression in the minds of many pe.- sons that a testator must mention all of his children or relatives in his will else it will be void. This notion is due, no doubt, to the presumption, usually indulged, that the omission was unin- tentional. In some jurisdictions, however, an omission to pro- vide in the will for the children or for the issue of deceased children of the testator, entitles them to take the same share in the testator’s estate which they would have taken had he died intestate, unless they were provided for by the testator in his life- time or unless the omission was clearly intentional and not occa- sioned by accident or mistake. Many cases strenuously insist that an heir at law can be disinherited only by words clearly and necessarily producing that effect; hence the necessity of using 5Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 Pac. 170, 53 L. R. A. 221, 82 Am. St. 330. 6 See post, ch. 30, art. 20. 7 Taylor v. Cox, 153 Ill. 220, 38 N. E. 656; Addington v. Wilson, 5 Ind. 137, 61 Am. Dec. 81; In re Gold- thorp’s Estate, 115 Iowa 430, 88 N. W. 944; In re Rausch, 35 Minn. 291, 28 N. W. 920. 8 Connecticut Trust &c. Co. v. Hol- lister, 74 Conn. 228, 50 Atl. 750; In re Reid (Del.), 64 Atl. 822; Olcott v. Tope, 213 Ill. 124, 72 N. E. 751; Emmons v. Atchison, 13 Ky. L. 142; Young v. Quimby, 98 Maine 167, 56 Atl. 656; Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 606, 61 Atl. 665; Guitar v. Gordon, 17 Mo. 408; Miller v. Colt, 32 N. J. Eq. 6; Langel’s Appeal, 154 Pa. St. 188, 26 Atl. 218; Dieter v. Shafter, 70 Vt. 150, 40 Atl. 100; Purdy v. Davis, 13 Wash. 164, 42 Pac. 520. ® Walker v. Parker, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 166, 10 L. ed. 109; Pendleton v. Lar- rabee, 62 Conn. 393, 26 Atl. 482; Wilder v. Holland, 102 Ga. 44, 29 S. E, 134; Andrews v. Harron, 59 Kans. 771, 51 Pac. 885; Howard v. American Peace Soc., 49 Maine 288; Mullarky v. Sullivan, 136 N. Y. 227, 32 N. E. 762; Mathews v. Krisher, 59 Ohio St. 562, 53 N. E. 52; In re Stewart’s Estate, 147 Pa. St. 383, 23 Atl. 599; 379 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS § 432 clear and explicit language in expressing the testator’s intention as to all his living children and the issue of any deceased child. Some testators give their heirs at law a legacy of only a nominal sum; but this is not always necessary, as in most jurisdictions it need only appear by the will that the testator had not forgotten the heir. To effectively disinherit an heir or next of kin a valid disposition of the testator’s entire estate must be made by the will, for if he should die intestate as to any portion thereof such portion would pass to his heirs or next of kin under the laws of intestate succession, regardless of a provision in the will exclud- ing them from participation in a division of the property.” Dis- inheritance of a husband, wife or descendant is permitted only to a limited extent in some jurisdictions; hence it becomes im- portant that the local statute be consulted before attempting to exclude such persons from taking any share in the estate. Ex- amples of clauses disinheriting heirs will be found elsewhere in this work.” § 432. Provision for construction by umpire.—It is not unusual for a testator to provide in his will that all questions relative to the construction thereof are to be submitted to a cer- tain designated person or persons,” such as his executors,’* who shall act as umpire or arbitrator, and whose decisions, if fairly and honestly made, will be final and binding on all parties in- terested.** The fact that such umpire is interested in the residue of the estate which may be increased or diminished by his deci- sions does not disqualify him to act.* Where, however, such umpire renders a decision involving a Hoover v. Gregory, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 444; Wootton v. Redd, 12 Grat. (Va.) 196. 10 People’s Trust Co. v. Flynn, 44 Misc. 6, 89 N. Y. S. 706. 11 See post, ch. 30, art. 20. 12JTn- re Phillips’ Estate, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 374; Couts v. Holland, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 476, 107 S. W. 913. 18 Pray v. Belt, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 670, 7 L. ed. 309; American Foreign Mis- sion Comrs. v. Ferry, 15 Fed. 696; \ Greene v. Huntington, 73 Conn. 106, 46 Atl. 883, 5 Prob. Rep. Ann. 448; Wait v. Huntington, 40 Conn. 9; In re McAllister’s Estate, 15 Pa. Dist. 430. 14Greene v. Huntington, 73 Conn. 106, 46 Atl. 883, 5 Prob. Rep. Ann. 448; Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362. 15 American Foreign Mission Comrs. v. Ferry, 15 Fed. 696. § 433 WILLS 380 clear abuse of his power, or where he commits a gross mistake or error of judgment evincing partiality, corruption or prejudice, the court will interfere and decide whether the construction adopted by the umpire is correct.** Forms of clauses providing for construction by umpires will be found in a subsequent chapter.” § 433. Provisions respecting advancements.—As a gen- eral rule where one dies testate the doctrine of advancements does not apply, even in cases where the will does not dispose of the entire estate.** And though the testator may have made ad- vancements before making his will, they will not be charged against the donee unless so provided in the will,” it being said, “Tt is true that when a will is made, all previous advancements are extinguished, unless the same are saved by will; and this is held upon the ground that the testator has graduated his legacies with reference to such prior advancements.”*® But when a tes- tator provides in his will that his property shall descend the same as if he had died intestate, prior advancements are to be taken into account in the division of his estate.** And where he directs certain gifts, or loans he may have made to be deducted to equalize the shares of legatees or devisees, they must be treated as advancements, though they would not have constituted ad- vancements had the testator died intestate.” A testamentary direction for the deduction of a debt from a legacy can not be avoided by the legatee by showing that the testator was mistaken as to the existence of the debt, or as to 16 Pray v. Belt, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 670, 7 L. ed. 309; Greene v. Huntington, 73 Conn. 106, 46 Atl. 883, 5 Prob. Rep. Ann. 448; In re Frankenheimer, 130 App. Div. 454, 114 N. Y. S. 975. 17 See post, ch. 30, art. 17. 18 Green v. Speer, 37 Ala. 532; Hug- gins v.-Huggins, 71 Ga. 66; Biedler v. Biedler, 87 Va. 300, 12 S. E. 753. 19Trammel v. Trammel, 148 Ind. 487, 47 N. E. 925; Jones v. Richard- son, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 247; Turpin v. Turpin, 88 Mo. 337; Camp v. Camp, 18 Hun (N. Y.) 217. 20Trammel v. Trammell, 148 Ind. 487, 47 N. E. 925. 21Trammel v. Trammel, 148 Ind. 487, 47 N. E. 925; Raiford v. Raiford, 6 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 490; Stewart v. Stewart, 15 Ch. Div. 539. 22 Black v. Whitall, 9 N. J. Eq. 572, 59 Am. Dec. 423; Porter’s Ap- peal, 94 Pa. St. 332; Darne v. Loyd, 82 Va. 859, 5 S. E. 87, 3 Am. St. 123. 381 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS § 434 the amount of it.2* Nor can the recitals in a will as to advance- ments be disputed.** Where the testator provides in his will that certain gifts made by him to, or debts due him by note or book account, etc., from his children or others, shall be regarded as advancements, they become so by virtue of the will.” The executor has no right to charge interest upon an advance- ment after the death of the testator unless such was the manifest intention of the testator as gathered from the will.?* It is ad- visable for the testator to take a promissory note in every case of a loan, fixing therein the rate of interest, and direct in the will whether interest is to cease with the testator’s death or continue until final settlement of the estate. Provisions respecting ad- vancements and interest on loans will be found elsewhere in this: work.”” § 434. Ademption and satisfaction of legacies.—Where the thing given by will has, by some act of the testator, ceased to exist in the form in which it is described in the will, so that on the testator’s death there is nothing answering the description of the legacy to be given to the legatee, the legacy is said to be adeemed. Ademption, therefore, can only happen in cases of specified legacies, since general or demonstrative legacies are not dependent upon the existence of specific things, and are not af- fected by the destruction or alteration of the subject of the gift.”* Satisfaction is where the testator in his lifetime takes upon himself duties he has imposed upon his executor in his will, and gives the legatee what he has bequeathed to him by will, thus satisfying the legacy himself, leaving nothing to be done after his death in respect to such legacy.” Satisfaction is predicable only of general legacies.*° 23Jn re Eichelberger’s Estate, 135 27 See post, ch. 30, art. 20. Pa. St. 160, 19 Atl. 1006. 28 Gilbreath v. Alban, 10 Ohio 64; 24 McAlister v. Butterfield, 31 Ind. Smith’s Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 559. 25. 229 Burnham v. Comfort, 37 Hun 25Bacon v. Gassett, 13 Allen (N. Y.) 216. (Mass.) 334; Langdon v. Astor, 16 30 Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. (N. N. Y. 9. Y.) 35. 26 Taylor v. Taylor, 145 Mass. 239, 14.N. E. 101. . § 434 WILLS 382 Ademption, in effect, amounts to a revocation of the will pro tanto.** A specific legacy is adeemed by the extinction of the particular article bequeathed. In such case ademption becomes solely a question of identity; and when the property bequeathed is lost, destroyed, or disposed of in the lifetime of the testator, or its form so changed that it can not be identified when the will goes into effect, a specific legacy is said to be adeemed.*” A distinction exists between the bequest of a thing in specie and the bequest of its proceeds; in the one case the sale of the article will work an ademption of the bequest, in the other it will not.” There is an arbitrary doctrine which originated in equity, some- times called ademption by advancement, in which, where a father, or one who stands in loco parentis to a child or grandchild, having by will given such child a legacy, afterward, in his lifetime, ad- vances such child, as a marriage portion or otherwise. Such advancement is held to constitute a complete ademption of the legacy whether the portion so advanced was larger than, equal to, or smaller than the legacy.** The rule is that where a parent, or other person in loco parentis, bequeaths a legacy to a child or grandchild, and afterward, in his lifetime, gives a portion, or makes a provision for the same child or granchild, without ex- pressing it to be in lieu of the legacy, if the portion so received, or the provision made, be equal to, or exceed the amount of the legacy; if it be certain and not merely contingent; if no other distinct object be pointed out; and if it be ejusdum generis, then it will be deemed an ademption of the legacy. The ground of this doctrine seems to be, that every such legacy is to be presumed as intended by the testator to be a portion for the child or grandchild, 1Kenaday v. Sinnot, 179 U. S. 606, 45 L. ed. 339, 21 Sup. Ct. 233; White v. Winchester, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 48; Ford v. Ford, 23 N. H. 212, 32Clayton v. Akin, 38 Ga. 320, 95 Am. Dec. 393; Weston v. Johnson, 48 Ind. 1; Starbuck v. Starbuck, 93 N. Car. 183; Smith’s Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 559; Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa. St. 301; Hood v. Haden, 82 Va. 588. 33 McNaughton v. McNaughton, 34 N. Y. 201; Nove v. Vannoy, 6 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 185; Warren v. Wig- fall, 3 Desaus. (S. Car.) 47. 34 Story Eq. Jur. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 1118; Williams Executors, 1332; Weston v. Johnson, 48 Ind. 1; Evans v. Beaumont, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 599, 383 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS § 435 whether so called or not; and that, if he afterward advances the same sum, he does it to accomplish his original object, as to a portion; and that under such circumstances it ought to be deemed an intended satisfaction or ademption of the legacy, rather than as an intended double portion.® While a legacy may be adeemed by implication, when the testator stands in loco parentis to the legatee, there is no rule of law that prohibits a legacy from being satisfied by advance- ments, by express agreement, even though the legatee be a stranger.*° Where the testator, in his lifetime, makes a conveyance to the devisee, of lands specifically devised, such conveyance is both a satisfaction and ademption of the devise.** The satisfaction of a general legacy depends upon the intention of the testator im- plied from his acts,** or by his testametary declarations,*® but the ademption of a specific legacy is effected by the extinction of the thing or fund bequeathed, and the intention that the legacy should fail is presumed.*® However, it is not safe to depend upon presumptions to effect the testator’s purpose, either in the case of ademption or satisfaction, but suitable provision therefor should be made in the will. Examples of such provisions will be found in another part of this work.** § 435. Provision against void gift—We have seen that, in the absence of a residuary clause, the property which is the sub- ject of a void gift descends as in case of intestacy.“ But where there is a valid general residuary clause void legacies pass under such residuary clause to the residuary legatees.** Such residuary 852 Story Equity, §§ 1111-1112; Weston v. Johnson, 48 Ind. 1. 36 Robbins v. Swain, 7 Ind. App. 486, 34 N. E. 670; Richards v. Hum- phreys, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 133. 37 Marshall v. Rench, 3 Del. Ch. 239; Haselwood v. Webster, 82 Ky. 409, 6 Ky. L. 376; Webb v. Jones, 36 N. J. Eq. 163. 38 Hayward v. Loper, 147 Ill. 41, 35 N. E. 225; Richards v. Humphreys, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 133; Allen v. Allen, 13 S. Car. 512, 36 Am. Rep. 716. 39 Security Co. v. Brinley, 49 Conn. 48; Lee v. Boak, 11 Grat. (Va.) 182. 40 Kenaday v. Sinnott, 179 U. S. 606, 45 L. ed. 339, 21 Sup. Ct. 233. 41 See post, ch. 30, art. 20. 42 See ante, ch. 22, § 435. 483 Dulany v. Middleton, 72 Md. 67, 19 Atl. 146; In re Allen, 151 N. Y. 243, 45 N. E. 554; Davis v. Hutch- § 435 WILLS 384 clause, however, must contain apt words in order to carry such property.** If, however, there is a specific gift over of the property which was the subject of the void gift, in case of the failure of such gift, effect will be given to this specific provision, and the prop- erty given will pass neither under the residuary clause nor as in- testate property.* Such gift over in the event of a failure of the original gift is good,* and it is thought that the use of such a pro- vision has the effect to deter persons who might otherwise be tempted to attack the original gift. A provision is frequently inserted in the will to the effect that if one portion of the will shall prove illegal and void, other portions are not to be impaired thereby.*? ings, 15 Ohio C. C. 174, 8 Ohio C. D. 45 Hamlin v. Mansfield, 88 Maine 52. 131, 33 Atl. 788; In re White’s Estate, 44 Giddings v. Giddings, 65 Conn. 174 Pa. St. 642, 34 Atl. 321. 149, 32 Atl. 334, 48 Am. St. 192; Mil- 46 Onderdonk v. Onderdonk, 127 N. waukee Protestant Home vy. Becher, Y. 196, 27 N. E. 839. 87 Wis. 409, 58 N. W. 774, 47 See post, ch. 30, art. 14. CHAPTER XXIII EXECUTION OF WILLS SECTION SECTION 440. Requisites of execution in gen- 448. Competency of attesting wit- eral, nesses. 441, Testator’s knowledge or under- 449, Attestation at the request of tes- standing of contents of will. tator. 442, Signature of testator. 450. Signing by witnesses in presence 443. Signature of testator’s name by of testator. another. 451. Witnesses signing in presence of 444, Location of signature. each other, 445. Publication of will. 452. Alterations and additions. 446. Attestation by witnesses. 453. Execution of a holographic will. 447. Attestation clause. 454, Execution of a nuncupative will. § 440. Requisites of execution in general—The statutes of the various states of this country prescribe certain formalities in the execution of a will to insure its genuineness. The pur- pose of these statutory formalities is to provide against false and fraudulent wills, and to afford means of determining their authenticity. These statutes are largely copied from the cele- brated Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, ch. 3. In some of the states this statute has been held to be part of the common law; in others, however, it has been substantially re-enacted. In Eng- land, the whole subject is regulated by the statute, 1 Vict., ch. 26, and which statute has also been liberally copied by our legisla- tures. The formalities required, being entirely statutory, are necessarily different in the different states.” The formalities prescribed by statute must be strictly observed, otherwise the instrument will be inoperative as a will.’ All the 1In re Seaman’s Estate, 146 Cal. 455, 80 Pac. 700, 106 Am. St. 53; Rus- 455, 80 Pac. 700, 106 Am. St. 53. sell v. Switzer, 63 Ga. 711; Senn v. 2Clark v. Turner, 50 Nebr. 290, 69 Greundling, 218 Ill. 458, 75 N. E. N. W. 843, 38 L. R. A. 433. See 1020; Herbert v. Berrier, 81 Ind. 1; also chap. 28. Clay v. Layton, 134 Mich. 317, 96 N. 3In re Seaman’s Estate, 146 Cal. W. 458; Tobin v. Haack, 79 Minn. 385 25—Tuomp. WILLS. § 440 WILLS 386 formalities prescribed by the statute are of equal importance,* and the court has no discretion to dispense with any of them,’ or supply a defect caused by a failure to comply with some of them.*® The rule that the intention of the testator must govern, which applies to the interpretation of wills, does not apply to their execution.” The formalities usually required for the execution of an or- dinary written or English will are that it (1) shall be in writing, (2) signed by the testator or some one in his presence and by his direction, and (3) witnessed by a designated number of witnesses. In some states, however, less formality has been required for a will of personalty than of realty. But where the will covers both real and personal property, and is invalid as to the realty, it will be ineffective to carry the personality,® unless it clearly appears that the provisions relating to each kind of property are separate.” In the absence of a statutory provision making the date a material part of the will, its omission or an erroneous date does not invalidate the will. Nor is a will rendered invalid by a failure to place a revenue stamp thereon, although the statute requires such stamp.” A seal is not essential to the validity of a will unless specially required by statute.* 101, 81 N. W. 758; Ludlow v. Lud- low, 36 N. J. Eq. 597; In re McMil- len, 12 N. Mex. 31, 71 Pac. 1083; In re O’Neil’s Will, 91 N. Y. 516; Hei- denheimer v. Bauman, 84 Tex. 174, 19 S. W. 382, 31 Am. St. 29. 4 In re Noyes’ Estate, 40 Mont. 178, 105 Pac. 1013. 5 Doran v. Mullen, 78 Ill. 342. 6 Robson v. Jones, 3 Del. Ch. 51. 7TEstate of Walker, 110 Cal. 387, 42 Pac. 815, 1082, 30 L. R. A. 460, 52 Am. St. 104. 8 Western Maryland College v. Mc- Kinstry, 75 Md. 188, 23 Atl. 471; Marston v. Marston, 17 N. H. 503, 43 Am. Dec. 611. 9Kendall v. (Mass.) 217. 10 Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335; Orgain v. Irvine, 100 Tenn. 193, 43 S. W. 768. 11 Wright v. Wright, 5 Ind. 389; Lange v. Wiegand, 125 Mich. 647, 85 N. W. 109; Matter of Haviland, 17 Misc. 193, 40 N. Y. S. 973, 2 Gibbons 75, 75 N. Y. St. 372. 12 Werstler v. Custer, 46 Pa. St. 502. 18 Doe v. Pattison, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 355; Avery v. Pixley, 4 Mass. 460; In re Diez’s Will, 50 N. Y. 88; Grubbs v. McDonald, 91 Pa. St. 236. Kendall, 24 Pick. 387 EXECUTION § 441 § 441. Testator’s knowledge or understanding of contents of will.—It is essential to the validity of a will that the tes- tator should know and understand the contents and meaning of the instrument ;** but the fact that he has an erroneous opin- ion with regard to their legal effect and operation does not ren- der the will invalid** The testator will be presumed to have knowledge of the contents of the will where it is read over to or by him,** but if it appear affirmatively that he did not read it, or that it was not read to him, it must be shown that its contents were in some manner known to him.” If the will is executed substantially in accordance with the testator’s instructions it will be valid though not read by or to him.* Where the testator is unable to read his will because of illiter- acy, blindness, or other infirmity, his knowledge of its contents must be shown.”® In such case the will should be read aloud to the testator in the presence of the witnesses and a statement that this was done inserted in the attestation clause.*® Where the testator is aged and feeble-minded affirmative proof is often required that the contents of the will were known to him and that the will was his spontaneous act.’** Where the testator is unable to read, write, or speak, there must be proof, not only that the will was executed by the testator, but that his mind vaccompanied the act.”?7_ A will is valid though written in a lan- guage unknown to the testator, if he understood its contents.” 14In re De Castro’s Witl, 32 Misc. 193, 66 N. Y. S. 239; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 1 Bailey (S. Car.) 92, 19 Am. Dec. 656. 15 Munnikhuysen v. Magraw, 35 Md. 280: 16 Atter v. Atkinson, L. R. 1 P. & D. 665, 20 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 404. 17 Day v. Day, 3 N. J. Eq. 549. 18Day v. Day, 3 N. J. Ea. 549; Crumb’s Will, 2 N. Y. S. 744, 6 Dem. Sur. 478, 18 N. Y. St. 254; Hess’ Ap- peal, 43 Pa. St. 73, 82 Am. Dec. 551. 19 Brown v. Brown, 3 Conn. 299, 8 Am. Dec. 187; Davis v. Rogers, 1 Houst. (Del.) 44; Clifton v. Murray, 7 Ga. 564, 50 Am. Dec. 411; Sechrest v. Edwards, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 163; Lyons vy. Van Riper, 26 N. J. Eq. 337; Roth- rock v. Rothrock, 22 Ore. 551, 30 Pac. 453. 20 Weir v. Fitzgerald, 2 Bradf. Sur. (N.-Y.) 42. ; 21 Jarman on Wills (6th ed. Big.), * 36. 22 Rollwagon v. Rollwagon, 63 N. Y. 504, 23 Gerbrich v. Freitag, 213 Ill. 552, § 442 WILLS 388 § 442. Signature of testator.—The statutes almost uni- versally require the will to be signed by the testator, and where such is the requirement the instrument is not operative as a will for any purpose until the signature of the testator is affixed to it. It has been held not necessary that the testator should sign the will in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, though if this is not done he should acknowledge such signature in their presence.* But where the execution and attestation are parts of one transaction it has been held that the signature of the testator need not precede those of the witnesses.” There are cases, how- ever, which hold that the signature of the testator must precede attestation and subscription by the witnesses.”* The testator may sign the will by a mark and it will be suffi- cient notwithstanding he was able to write; and this is true al- though his name does not appear on the face of the will, or some name other than his appears thereon.” But the mark, whatever it be, must be made with the intent to execute the will by such mark.?8 Where the place for the signature is not fixed by statute, sign- ing below the attestation clause, or before the date, or after a blank space does not invalidate a wil i The fact that another person guided the hand of the testator 73 N. E. 338, 104 Am. St. 234; Hos- hauer v. Hoshauer, 26 Pa. St. 404; In re Arneson, 128 Wis. 112, 107 N. W. 21. 24 Moore v. Stephens, 97 Ind. 271. 25Q’Brien v. Galagher, 25 Conn. 229; Gibson v. Nelson, 181 Ill, 122, 54 N. E. 901, 72 Am. St. 254; Lacey v. Dobbs, 63 N. J. Eq. 325, 50 Atl. 497, 92 Am. St. 667, 55 L. R. A. 580; Cutler v. Cutler, 130 N. Car. 1, 40 S. E. 689, 89 Am. St. 854, 57 L. R. A. 209; Miller v. McNeill, 35 Pa. St. 217, 78 Am. Dec. 333; Kaufman v. Caughman, 49 S. Car. 159, 27 S. E. 16, 61 Am. St. 808. 26 Reed v. Watson, 27 Ind. 443; Chisholm v. Ben, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 408; Chase v. Kittredge, 11 Allen (Mass.) 49, 87 Am. Dec. 687; Scher- merhorn v. Merritt, 123 Mich. 310, 82 N. W. 513, 83 N. W. 405; In re Irvine, 206 Pa. 1, 55 Atl. 795; Fowler v. Stagner, 55 Tex. 393; Flood v. Kerwin, 113 Wis. 673, 89 N. W. 845. 27In re Guilfoyle, 96 Cal. 598, 31 Pac. 553, 22 L. R. A. 370; Rook v. Wilson, 142 Ind. 24, 41 N. E. 311, 51 Am. St. 163. 28In re Plate’s Estate, 148 Pa. St. 55, 23 Atl. 1038, 33 Am. St. 805. 29 Flood v. Pragoff, 79 Ky. 607, 3 Ky. L. 372; Younger v. Duffie, 94 N. Y. 535, 5 Civ. Proc. Rep. 84, 46 Am. Rep. 156, 389 EXECUTION § 443 when the latter signed the will does not render the signature invalid.*° It matters not how imperfect or illegible the testator’s signa- ture may be, it will be a sufficient signature if he intended it as his signature.** § 443. Signature of testator’s name by another.—In the absence of an express statute authorizing a person other than the testator to sign the will for the testator, the signature must be made by the testator.** But many statutes provide that under certain conditions and in a specified manner another may sign the will for the testator and in his stead.** The conditions generally required by these statutes are that (1) such other person must sign the will in the presence of the testator, and (2) that he must sign the will at the express direc- tion of the testator. The testator must be physically present when his name is signed, and must be conscious of what is taking place.** It has been held that the subscription of the tes- tator’s name by another without the addition of such other’s name is a valid execution,®* but under some statutes, if the name of the testator was signed by another, the person signing must subscribe his own name as a witness, and state that he subscribed the testator’s name at his request.*® 30 Vines v. Clingfost, 21 Ark. 309; In re Allen’s Will, 25 Minn. 39; Shee- han v. Kearney, 82 Miss. 688, 21 So. 41, 35 L. R. A. 102; In re Miller’s Estate, 37 Mont. 545, 97 Pac. 935; Fritz v. Turner, 46 N. J. Eq. 515, 22 Atl. 125; Wood v. Rhode Island Hos- pital Trust Co., 27 R. I. 295, 61 Atl. 757. 31 Word v. Whipps, 16 Ky. L. 403, 28 S. W. 151; In re Plate’s Estate, 148 Pa. St. 55, 23 Atl. 1038, 33 Am. St. 805. 32In re McElwaine’s Will, 18 N. J. Eq. 499. 33 Riley v. Riley, 36 Ala. 496; In re Dombrowski’s Estate, 163 Cal. 290, The statutes generally re- 125 Pac. 233; In re Toomes’ Estate, 54 Cal. 509, 35 Am. Rep. 83; Elston v. Montgomery, 242 Ill. 348, 90 N. E. 3, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 420; Herbert v. Berrier, 81 Ind. 1; Berst v. Moxom, 163 Mo. App. 123, 145 S. W. 857; Haynes v. Haynes, 33 Ohio St. 598, 31 Am. Rep. 579; Peake v. Jenkins, 80 Va. 293; Jenkins’ Will, 43 Wis. 610. 34Dunlop v. Dunlop, 10 Watts (Pa.) 153; Chappell v. Trent, 90 Va. 849, 19 S. E. 314. 35JIn re Dombrowski’s Estate, 163 Cal. 290, 125 Pac. 233. 36 Walton v. Kendrick, 122 Mo. 504, 27 S. W. 872, 25 L. R. A. 701. § 444 WILLS 390 quire that the signature by another be at the express direction of the testator.*” While the most common and safe form of direction by the testator is one given in so many words, yet the express direction may be given by the testator’s adoption of a suggestion of some other person as his own.** But the mere knowledge by the testator that some one is signing his name to the will and makes no objection does not amount to an express direction.” Under some statutes, physical and mental inability of the testator to sign the will himself is sufficient grounds for permit- ting another to sign for him.*° In the absence of special statutory restriction, a subscribing witness, a beneficiary, or any other properly authorized person, may sign the will for the testator.* Where the will is to be signed by another for the testator the best method is for such other to write the name of the testator, followed by a statement that it was written by subscriber, naming such subscriber, in the presence of the testator and at his express request. The statutes of some states expressly require some such accuracy.*” § 444. Location of signature—The proper place for the signature of the testator is at the foot or end of the will, and this is made a requirement by statute in many states.** The words “end of the will” in the statute of wills refer to the logical end, and apply to the time as well as the place of signature.** The 37 McCoy v. Conrad, 64 Nebr. 150, 89 N. W. 665; Greenough v. Green- Toomes’ Estate, 54 Cal. 309, 35 Am. Rep. 83; Herbert v. Berrier, 81 Ind. ough, 11 Pa. St. 489, 51 Am. Dec. 567. 38 Mullin’s Estate, 110 Cal. 252, 42 Pac. 645, 39 Waite v. Frisbie, 45 Minn. 361, 47 N. W. 1069; Isaac v. Halderman, 76 Nebr. 823, 107 N. W. 1016. 40In re Baumann’s Will, 85 Misc. 656, 148 N. Y. S. 1049; Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. St. 316, 32 Atl. 424, 47 Am. St. 908. 41 Riley v. Riley, 36 Ala. 496; In re 1; Trembly v. Trembly (Ohio S. Ct. Com.), 11 Wkly. L. B. Supp. 50; Ex parte Leonard, 39 S. Car. 518, 18 S. E, 216, 22 L. R. A. 302. 42 See ch. 28. 43In re Fields’ Will, 204 N. Y. 448, 97 N. E. 881, 39 L. R. A. (N. 5.) 1060, Ann. Cas. 1913-C, 842n; In re Taylor’s Estate, 230 Pa. 346, 79 Atl. 632, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 66. 44In re Foley’s Will, 76 Misc. 168, 136 N. Y. S. 933. 391 EXECUTION § 444 purpose of these statutes requiring testator's signature at the end of the will is to prevent fraud by unauthorized addition.* Where testator’s signature is required to be at the end of the will, the placing of a part of a testamentary disposition below the signature will vitiate the will; but where the part below the signature is unimportant or immaterial, that part only will be stricken out, leaving the rest unaffected.*® Ordinarily, no terms will be considered as part of the will which are written below the signature ;*7 and where the signature of the testator and the attestation clause were placed at the end of certain printed mat- ter on the first page, it was held that testamentary matter on the second page without any signature rendered the will wholly defective.“* If the signature is placed at the foot or end of the will, it is more clearly to be inferred that it was intended as an authentication of the will as a whole.**: The requirement that the testator’s signature shall be at the end of the will does not mean that a blank space may not intervene between the end of the testamentary provisions and the signature.°? Where a will completely filled a page of legal cap paper, and the testator’s signature was in the margin, it was held to be a sufficient signing despite the space above the sig- nature.** One signature of the testator, properly placed, is sufficient, and other signatures by him improperly placed are no part of the will.” The signature of the testator should generally be placed above the attestation clause,** but it has been held that the signature 45In re Gibson’s Will, 128 App. Div. 769, 113 N. Y. S. 266. 46In re Gibson’s Will, 128 App. Div. 769, 113 N. Y. S. 266. -47In re McCullough’s Estate, Myr. Prob. (Cal.) 76; Owens v. Bennett, 5 Har. (Del.) 367. 48In re Diehl’s Will, 112 N. Y. S. 717, 42In re Seaman’s Estate, 146 Cal. 455, 80 Pac. 700, 106 Am. St. 53. 50In re Blake’s Estate, 136 Cal. 306, 68 Pac. 827, 89 Am. St. 135; Mader v. Apple, 80 Ohio St. 691, 89 N. E. 37, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 515, 131 Am. St. 719; In re Morrow’s Estate, 204 Pa. 479, 54 Atl. 313. 51 Graham v. Edwards, 162 Ky. 771, 173 S. W. 127. 52 Thompson v. Carruth, 220 Mass. 77, 107 N. E. 395. 53 Barnes v. Chase, 208 Mass. 490, 94 N. E, 694, § 445 WILLS 392 beneath such clause is a sufficient compliance with the provision that the signature must be at the end of the will.°* Where a will consists of more than one sheet of paper, it is considered the better practice, in addition to the regular signing at the end of the will, to have the testator write his name or initials on each sheet of the manuscript for identification.” $445. Publication of will—Publication, as the term is used in the law of wills, is the declaration or act of the testator, at the time of signing or acknowledging his signature, manifest- ing his intention to adopt the instrument as his will; and any communication indicating to witnesses that the testator intends to give effect to a paper as his will by word, sign, motion, or con- duct is sufficient in law to constitute a publication.*® Publication is not necessary to the validity of a will unless made so by statute.** But where the statute requires that the testator publish or declare the instrument to be his will to the attesting witnesses, it must be made in the manner and form required.°® As a general rule it is not necessary for the subscribing wit- nesses to see the testator subscribe his name to the will;®* but they should at least see his signature where they do not see him sign, and he should acknowledge to them that the signature so affixed is his signature to the paper as his will.°° In some states the statute requires that the testamentary character of the instru- 54In re Busch’s Will, 87 Misc. 239, 150 N. Y. S. 149; In re Kunkler’s Will, 147 N. Y. S. 1094. 55 Jones v. Habersham, 63 Ga. 146. 56 Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. 474; Harp v. Parr, 168 Ill. 459, 48 N. E. 113; In re Ayers’ Estate, 84 Nebr. 16, 120 N. W. 491; In re Claflin’s Will, 73 Vt. 129, 50 Atl. 815, 87 Am. St. 693. ‘ 57 Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 So. 831; Canada’s Appeal, 47 Conn. 450; Turner v. Cook, 36 Ind, 129; Scott v. Hawk, 107 Iowa 723, 77 N. W. 467, 70 Am. St. 228; Flood v. Pragoff, 79 Ky. 607, 3 Ky. L. 372; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451. 58 Abbey v. Christy, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 276. 59In re Crittenden’s Estate, Myr. Prob. (Cal.) 50; Brown v. McBride, 129 Ga. 92, 58 S. E. 702. 60 Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98, 85 Am. St. 145; Rus- sell v. Evans, 3 Houst. (Del.) 103; In re Porter, 20 D. C. 493; Webb v. Fleming, 30 Ga. 808, 76 Am. Dec. 675. 393 EXECUTION § 445 ment be communicated by the testator to the witnesses. Even where this is not a statutory requirement, it should be done,** although it is held in some jurisdictions that the witnesses need not know the testamentary character of the instrument, provided they can identify it as the paper signed by them.” While it is generally required that the witnesses should know the testamentary character of the instrument, it is not necessary or proper that they should know its contents.°* Publication may be made at the time the testator signs the will or prior thereto, or after, so long as it is done as a part of the execution of the will.°* And it may be made to the witnesses at different times,°° when they are apart from each other,®* pro- vided this is done as a part of one transaction. The declaration may be made by another than the testator, but in his presence and by his direction and with his assent. § 446. Attestation by witnesses. The statutes of most states require the will to be attested by two or more competent witnesses subscribing their names to the will in the presence of the testator ;°* and, although the instrument be testamentary in character, it will be void if not attested as required.®? In the ab- sence of a statute requiring attestation by witnesses a will of personalty is good without attestation.” To “attest” a will means something more than a mere sub- scription of the witnesses’ names thereto. To attest a will is to know that the testator published it as such, and to certify the 61 Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 So. 831; Mullin’s Estate, 110 Cal. 252, 42 Pac. 645; Lindsey v. Stephens, 229 Mo. 600, 129 S. W. 641; In re Ayers’ Estate, 84 Nebr. 16, 120 N. W. 491. 62 Canada’s Appeal, 47 Conn. 450; Notes v. Doyle, 32 App. D. C. 413. 63 Notes v. Doyle, 32 App. D. C. 413. 64Jn re Phillips, 98 N. Y. 267. 65 Thompson vy. Stevens, 62 N. Y. 634. 66 In re Palmer’s Will, 42 Misc. 469, 87 N. Y. S. 249; Beane v. Yerby, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 239. 6? Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290; Voorhis’ Will, 125 N. Y. 765. 68 Poore v. Poore, 55 Kans. 687, 41 Pac. 973; Elliott v. Welby, 13 Mo. App. 19; Perea v. Barela, 5 N. Mex. 458, 23 Pac. 766. 69 Cunningham v. Mills, 102 Ga. 584, 30 S. E. 429, 70 Ex parte Henry, 24 Ala. 638. 71 International Tr. Co. v. Anthony, 45 Colo. 474, 101 Pac. 781, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1002, 16 Ann. Cas. 1087. § 447 WILLS 394 facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication, but to subscribe a paper published as a will consists merely of writing on the same paper the names of the witnesses for the sole pur- pose of identification. There may be a perfect attestation, in fact, without subscription.” At the time the witnesses are called upon to witness the will they should contemplate the signing of the will by the testator, the publication thereof, the identity of the instrument, and the mental capacity and freedom of choice of the testator.” The number of attesting witnesses is usually fixed by statute, and a will that is witnessed by a less number of witnesses than is designated by the statute is invalid.* But attestation by more than the required number does not invalidate the will.” § 447. Attestation clause.—A clause, called the attesta- tion clause, is usually affixed to a will just above the signatures of the attesting witnesses, in which is recited a compliance with the statutory requirements in the manner of execution. While it is always desirable to have such clause, it is not strictly neces- sary where the will is properly witnessed.” The validity of the execution of a will depends not on the attestation clause, but on 72 Swift v. Wiley, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 114; Tobin v. Haack, 79 Minn. 101, 81 N. W. 758; In re Downie’s Will, 42 Wis. 66. 73 Crowson v. Crowson, 172 Mo. 691, 72 S. W. 1065. : %%Fortner v. Wiggins, 121 Ga. 26, 48 S. E. 694; Moore v. Stephens, 97 Ind. 271; In re Murfield’s Will, 74 Towa 479, 38 N. W. 170; Clark v. Miller, 65 Kans. 726, 68 Pac. 1071; Tobin v. Haack, 79 Minn. 101, 81 N. W. 758; Johnson v. Delome Land &c. Co. 77 Miss. 15, 26 So. 360; Berberet v. Berberet, 131 Mo. 399, 33 S. W. 61, 52 Am. St. 634; Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 18 S. W. 280, 30 Am. St. 875; McLain v. Garrison, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 431, 88 S. W. 484, 89 S. W. 284. See also post, ch. 28. 7 Conoly v. Gayle, 61 Ala. 116; Matter of Sizer, 129 App. Div. 7, 113 N. Y. S. 210;-Scattergood v. Kirk, 192 Pa. St. 263, 43 Atl. 1030. 7 Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98, 85 Am. St. 145; In re Kent’s Estate, 161 Cal. 142, 118 Pac. 523; Butcher v. Butcher, 21 Colo. App. 416, 122 Pac. 397; Kelly v. Moore, 22 App. D. C. 9; Deupree v. Deupree, 45 Ga. 414; Ferris v. Ne- ville, 127 Mich. 444, 86 N. W. 960, 54 L. R. A. 464, 89 Am. St. 480; Avaro y. Avaro, 235 Mo. 424, 138 S. W. 500; Berberet v. Berberet, 131 Mo. 399, 33 S. W. 61, 52 Am. St. 634; Williams v. Miles, 68 Nebr. 463, 94 N. W. 705, 96 N. W. 151, 62 L. R. A. 383, 110 Am. St. 431; Ward v. County Comrs., 12 Okla. 267, 70 Pac. 378. 395. EXECUTION § 448 the conformity of such execution to the requirements of the statute and the testimony of the subscribing witnesses.” No precise form of attestation clause need be used; any form being sufficient which shows that the testator’s signature was affixed or by him acknowledged in the presence of witnesses.”* A presumption of the due execution of a will arises from the pres- ence of a perfect and formal attestation clause which ‘recites the facts necessary to a valid execution of the will. An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that, in case of the failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved.*® While the attesta- tion clause should be placed below the testator’s signature, its location is generally considered immaterial, for it is not strictly a part of the will. All erasures and interlineations should be noted in the attestation clause, as they are operative only when attested with the same formalities as the will itself.®* § 448. Competency of attesting witnesses.—The statutes usually provide that the witnesses to a will shall be “competent” or “credible.” By either of these terms is meant that they must be competent persons to testify in court, and not disqualified by interest, relationship or mental incapacity.*? They must be of sufficient age, intelligence and moral standing to entitle them to testify in other matters.** If a witness is competent at the time he attested the will, his subsequent incompetency does not affect the validity of the will.** 77 Barricklow v. Stewart, 163 Ind. v. Morris, 38 Md. 417; Sparhawk v. 438, 72 N. E. 128. 78 Herbert v. Berrier, 81 Ind. 1. 79 Holyoke v. Sipp, 77 Nebr. 394, 109 N. W. 506. 80 Bioren v. Nesler, 77 N. J. Eq. 560, 78 Atl. 201; Matter of De Hart, 67 Misc. 13, 122 N. Y. S. 220. 81Lurie v. Radnitzer, 166 Ill. 609, 46 N. E. 1116, 57 Am. St. 157; Cross- man v. Crossman, 95 N. Y. 145. 82 Jones v. Grieser, 238 Ill. 183, 87 N. E. 295, 15 Ann. Cas. 787: Estep Sparhawk, 10 Allen (Mass.) 155; Carlton v. Carlton, 40 N. H. 14; Dauphin County Historical Soc. v. Kelker, 226 Pa. 16, 74 Atl. 619, 134 Am. St. 1010. 83 Curtiss v. Strong, 4 Day (Conn.) 51, 4 Am. Dec. 179. 84 Wisehart v. Applegate, 172 Ind. 313, 88 N. E. 501; Holmes v. Hollo- man, 12 Mo. 535; Hopf v. State, 72 Tex. 281, 10 S. W. 589. § 448 WILLS 396 If the required number of attesting witnesses are competent, the fact that an additional witness, who was incompetent, also attested the will can not impair its validity.*° The interest which disqualifies a person as a witness to a will must be a present, certain, and vested interest as contradistin- guished from one that is uncertain, remote, or contingent.**° Some states have enacted the common-law rule that a husband or wife is not a competent witness to a will which makes one of them a beneficiary.*7 Other statutes, however, have been construed to render competent as a witness, the husband or wife of a bene- ficiary.** In one case where the husband was a beneficiary under the will it was held that his wife was not competent as a witness thereto ;*° but in another case the court declined to say whether, where the wife was a beneficiary, the husband was a competent witness or not.®° In the absence of a statute to the contrary, devisees and lega- tees under a will are incompetent to act as witnesses thereto.™ In many states, however, legacies and devises to subscribing wit- nesses are, by statutory provision, rendered void, and the sub- scribing witnesses declared competent.°? In some jurisdictions, a 85 Conoly v. Gayle, 61 Ala. 116. 86 Bates v. Officer, 70 Iowa 343, 30 N. W. 608; Berry v. Hamilton, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 129; Jones v. Teb- betts, 57 Maine 572; Bacon v. Bacon, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 134; Lord v. Lord, 58 N. H. 7, 42 Am. Rep. 565. 87 See post, ch. 28. See also Fearn v. Postlethwaite, 240 Ill. 626, 88 N. E. 1057; Belledin v. Gooley, 157 Ind. 49, 60 N. E. 706; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 106 Mass. 474, 8 Am. Rep. 356; Hodgman v. Kittredge, 67 N. H. 254, 32 Atl. 158, 68 Am. St. 661. 88 Bates v. Officer, 70 Iowa 343, 30 N. W. 608; Winslow v. Kimball, 25 Maine 493; In re Holt, 56 Minn. 33, 57 N. W. 219, 45 Am. St. 434, 22 L. R. A. 481; Lippincott v. Wikoff, 54 N. J. Eq. 107, 33 Atl. 305; Gamble v. Butchee, 87 Tex. 643, 30 S. W. 861. 89 Belledin v. Gooley, 157 Ind. 49, 60 N. E. 706. 90 Wisehart v. Applegate, 172 Ind. 313, 88 N. E. 501. 91 Starr v. Starr, 2 Root (Conn.) 303; Hall’s Succession, 28 La. Ann. 57; In re Castine Trinitarium Cong. Church, 91 Maine 416, 40 Atl. 325; Trotters v. Winchester, 1 Mo. 413. 92 See post, ch. 28. See also Will- jams v. Way, 135 Ga. 103, 68 S. E. 1023; Harp v. Parr, 168 Ill. 459, 48 N. E. 113; Grimm v. Tittmann, 113 Mo. 56, 20 S. W. 664; Hop- kins v. Lane, 49 Hun 608, 2 N. Y. S. 322, 17 N. Y. St. 677; McLean v. Elliott, 72 N. Car. 70; Fowler v. Stagner, 55 Tex. 393, 397 EXECUTION § 448 beneficiary under a will who takes less thereby than he would as ‘heir is a competent witness to the will.®* One named as executor in a will, if not a beneficiary therein, is competent to act as a witness thereto, although entitled to an allowance for his services.**> Some cases hold, however, that he is a competent witness only when he is allowed nothing for his services,*® or is bound, by a valuable consideration moving from the testator, to execute the will without compensation.*” Other cases hold that he is not a competent witness even though he refuses to act®® or releases his right to compensation.°® Where the executor is incompetent to act as a witness to a will, his wife is also incompetent ;* and where thu executor is a competent wit- ness his wife also is competent.” A guardian of record of a beneficiary under a will is not a com- petent witness thereto ;? but a trustee who takes no beneficial interest under the will may be a witness thereto.* The fact that a person is a member of an educational, religious, or charitable corporation, society, or association to which a gift is made by will does not render such person incompetent to act as a witness to the will.® 23 Smalley v. Smalley, 70 Maine 545, 35 Am. Rep. 353; Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 10 Allen (Mass.) 155; Clark v. Vorce, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 232; In re Hoppe’s Will, 102 Wis. 54, 78 N. W. 183. 94Wisehart v. Applegate, 172 Ind. 313, 88 N. E. 501. 95 Comstock v. Hadlyme Ecclesias- tical Soc., 8 Conn. 254, 20 Am. Dec. 100; Meyer v. Fogg, 7 Fla. 292, 68 Am. Dec. 441; Baker v. Bancroft, 79 Ga. 672, 5 S. E. 46; Jones v. Larra- bee, 47 Maine 474; Estep v. Morris, 38 Md. 417. Contra: Tucker v. Tucker, 27 N. Car. 161. 96 Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488. 97 Godfrey v. Phillips, 209 Ill, 584, 71 :N. E. 19, °8Gunter v. Gunter, 48 N. Car. 441, 89 Morton v. Ingram, 33 N. Car. 368. 1Fearn v. Postlethwaite, 240 Ill. 626, 88 N. E. 1057; Huie v. McCon- nell, 47 N. Car. 455, 2 Hawley v. Brown, 1 Root (Conn.) 494; Piper v. Moulton, 72 Maine 155; Stewart v. Harriman, 56 N. H. 25, 22 Am. Rep. 408; In re Lyons’ Will, 96 Wis. 339, 71 N. W. 362, 65 Am. St. 52, 8Sears v. Dillingham, 358. 4 Peralta v. Castro, 6 Cal. 354; Boyd v. McConnell, 209 Ill. 396, 70 N. E. 649; Key v. Weathersbee, 43 S. Car. 414, 21 S. E. 324, 49 Am. St. 846. 5 Jones v. Habersham, 63 Ga. 146; Boyd v. McConnell, 209 Ill. 396, 70 N. E. 649; Quinn v. Shields, 62 Iowa 129, 17 N. W. 437, 49 Am. Rep. 141: 12 Mass. § 449 WILLS 398 § 449. Attestation at the request of testator—The stat- utes of some states require the testator to request the witnesses - to attest his will; and it has been held that even in the absence of an express statute requiring such request, one will be implied from the use of the word “attest.”® But generally the witnesses are not required to subscribe the will at the express request of the testator.” He need not formally request the witnesses to attest his will,* as the request may be implied from his acts, and from the circumstances attending the execution of the will.”° Thus a request will be implied from the testator’s asking that the witnesses be summoned to attest the will,** or by his ac- quiescence in a request by another that the will be signed by the witnesses.” Where a will has been signed by the testator, a request made in the presence of the testator to-persons to attest the will as witnesses, made by the person who prepared the will, is equivalent to a request by the testator himself.* Where the request is made by another and is approved of by some sign or act on the part In re Marston, 79 Maine 25, 8 Atl. 87; Will v. Sisters of Order of St. Benedict, 67 Minn. 335, 69 N. W. 1090. But see In re Fetterhoft’s Estate, 228 Pa. 535, 77 Atl. 826. 6 Huff v. Huff, 41 Ga. 696; Gross v. Burneston, 91 Md. 383, 46 Atl. 993; In re Roe, 82 Misc. 565, 143 N. Y. S. 999; Burney v. Allen, 125 N. Car. 314, 34 S. E. 500, 74 Am. St. 637; Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 49 S. E. 668; Skinner v. American Bible Soc., 92 Wis. 209, 65 N. W. 1037. 7 Dyer v. Dyer, 87 Ind. 13; In re Allen’s Will, 25 Minn. 39; Thompson v. Thompson, 49 Nebr. 157, 68 N. W. 372; Ayres v. Ayres, 43 N. J. Eq. 565, 12 Atl. 621; In re Cherry (N. Car.), 79 S. E. 288. 8 Payne v. Payne, 54 Ark. 415, 16 S. W. 1; Kempsey v. Maginnis, 2 Mich. N. P. 49; Carpenter v. Hay- hurst, 72 W. Va. 780, 79 S. E. 819. ® Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. 474; Conrades v. Heller, 119 Md. 448, 87 Atl. 28; Schierbaum v. Schemme, 157 Mo. 1, 57 S. W. 526, 80 Am. St. 604; Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290; Coffin v. Coffin, 23 N. Y. 9, 80 Am. Dec. 235; McMechen v. McMechen, 17 W. Va. 683, 41 Am. Rep. 682. 10 Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. 474; In re Woolsey, 17 Misc. 547, 41 N. Y. S. 263, 75 N. Y. St. 674, 2 Gibb. 127. 11 Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. 474. 12 Harp v. Parr, 168 Ill. 459, 48 N. E, 113; Conway v. Vizzard, 122 Ind. 266, 23 N. E. 771; In re Hull’s Will, 117 Iowa 738, 89 N. W. 979; Martin v. Bowdoin, 158 Mo. 379, 59 S. W. 227; Whitenack v. Stryker, 2 N. J. Eq. 8; Gilbert v. Knox, 52 N. Y. 125; In re Herring, 152 N. Car. 258, 67 S. E. 570; In re Skinner, 40 Ore. 5¥1, 62 Pac. 523, 67 Pac. 951; Denny v. Pinney, 60 Vt. 524, 12 Atl. 108. 13 Dyer v. Dyer, 87 Ind. 13. 399 EXECUTION § 450 of the testator, and the witnesses, with the knowledge of the testator, and in response to such request, sign their names to the will, the request is implied.** While a request will usually be im- plied, the better practise is to have the testator make his request to the witnesses by word of mouth. | § 450. Signing by witnesses in presence of testator.—The statutes almost universally require that the witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator. It is not necessary that the testator should actually see the attesting witnesses subscribe their names to the instrument; if he is in such a situation that he might see them sign if he chose, it will be presumed that he did see them sign.*® The act of signing must take place within the testator’s un- obstructed range of vision, so that he may readily see what they are doing, if he is so disposed, and if he is deprived of the use of any of his faculties by mere physical infirmities, the test to determine whether his will is attested in his presence is to inquire whether he was conscious of the presence of the witnesses and understood what they were doing when they wrote their names on the will.*° Where, by reason of some physical infirmity, the testator is unable to see the act of attestation, it will be deemed signed in his presence when he is aware of it through his other senses, and the act takes place in such close proximity that he could see it but for his physical infirmity. The subscription by the witnesses should take place in the same room with the testator, and care should be taken to remove any obstruction that might put the act of subscription out of the view of the testator. And where the subscription is to be made in an adjoining room the door should be open and the position of the witnesses be such as to render the act of attestation capable 14J3n re Hull’s Will, 117 Iowa 738, Am. Rep. 276; Healey v. Bartlett, 73 89 N. W. 979; In re Nelson, 141 N. N. H. 110, 59 Atl. 617, 6 Ann. Cas. Y. 152, 36 N. E. 3. 413. 15 Turner v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129; Mc- 17 Raymond v. Wagner, 178 Mass. Elfresh v. Guard, 32 Ind. 408. 315, 59 N. E. 811; Cook v. Winches- 16 Raymond v. Wagner, 178 Mass. ter, 81 Mich. 581, 46 N. W. 106, 8 L. 315, 59 N. E. 811; Maynard v. Vin- R. A. 822. ton, 59 Mich, 139, 26 N. W. 401, 60 § 451 WILLS 400 of being seen by the testator. The subsequent acknowledgment of a will signed by the witnesses in the absence of the testator does not satisfy a statute requiring it to be signed in his pres- ence.** Such a statute must be substantially complied with to render the will valid.? § 451. Witnesses signing in presence of each other.—In some jurisdictions the witnesses are required by statute to sign the will in the presence of each other, and whenever this is the case, such statutory requirement must, of course, be complied with. Even in the absence of such statutory requirement it is generally advisable to have the witnesses sign in the presence of each other. In the absence of such statutory requirement, how- ever, their simultaneous presence is not necessary,”® and they may sign at different times and places.* Where a will is altered between the time the first witness signed and the time when the others sign, there is no valid attestation.” § 452. Alterations and additions.—Any alterations or ad- ditions to a will, either upon the face of the instrument, by codicil, or upon separate paper, must be executed with the same formali- ties as a new will.** Where such alterations or additions appear 18Lamb v. Girtman, 33 Ga. 289; Calkins v. Calkins, 216 Ill. 458, 75 N. E. 182,1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 393, 108 Am. St. 233; Mendell v. Dunbar, 169 Mass. 74, 47 N. E. 402, 61 Am. St. 277; Ragland v. Huntingdon, 23 N. Car. 561; Pawtucket v. Ballou, 15 R. I. 58, 23 Atl. 43, 2 Am. St. 868. 19 Snider v. Burks, 84 Ala. 53, 4 So. 225; Greene v. Greene, 145 Ill. 264, 33 N. E. 941; Cowan v. Shaver, 197 Mo. 203, 95 S. W. 200. 20 Moore vy. Spier, 80 Ala. 129; Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. 474; Lane’s Appeal, 57 Conn. 182, 17 Atl. 926, 14 Am. St. 94,4 L. R. A. 45; Webb v. Fleming, 30 Ga. 808, 76 Am. Dec. 675; Flinn v. Owen, 58 Ill. 111; Hull v. Hull, 117 Iowa 738, 89 N. W. 979; Ela v. Edwards, 16 Gray (Mass.) 91; Grimm v. Tittman, 113 Mo. 56, 20 S. W. 664; Welch v. Adams, 63 N. H. 344, 1 Ati. 1, 56 Am. Rep. 521; In re Clark (N. J.), 52 Atl 222; Matter of Levengston, 158 App. Div. 69, 142 N. Y. S. 829; Watson v. Hin- son, 162 N. Car. 72, 77 S. E. 1089, Ann. Cas, 1915-A, 870; Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn, 183, 18 S. W. 280, 30 Am. St. 875; Green v. Crain, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 252; Smith’s Will, 52 Wis. 543, 8 N. W. 616, 9 N. W. 665, 38 Am. Rep, 756. 21Moore v. Spier, 80 Ala. 129; Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. 474; Johnson v. Johnson, 106 Ind. 475, 7 N. E. 201, 55 Am. Rep. 762: 22 Patterson v. Ransom, 55 Ind. 402. 23 Notes v. Doyle, 32 App. D. C. 413, 401 EXECUTION § 453 upon the face of the will they are presumed to have been made after the execution of the will; and hence they have no effect unless the will is re-executed in its altered condition. This pre- sumption, however, may be rebutted by a reference to the altera- tions in the attesting clause.* But if the alterations are im- material, a failure to re-execute the will, or to refer to them in the attestation clause, does not invalidate the will.” Alterations in a will, made by a stranger to it, and without the knowledge of the testator, are regarded as a mere spoliation of the instrument, and it will be admitted to probate as it stood be- fore the changes were made.” Where the testator, after the execution of his will, erases something and inserts something else in its place, the part in- serted will be treated as if it did not exist, and the part stricken out will be treated as if it were still a part of the will.” But in jurisdictions where partial revocation is allowed, an alteration in a will may take effect if it merely takes from the provisions of the will, though it can not be given effect where it adds some- thing to the will unless the will is afterward republished.” Any addition or alteration of a will made by the testator does not amount to a revocation of such will unless it is made with intention to revoke.”? ' § 453. Execution of a holographic will—We have seen that a holographic will is one entirely in the handwriting of the 24Martin v. King, 72 Ala. 354; Burge v. Hamilton, 72 Ga. 568; Southworth v. Southworth, 173 Mo. 46 N. E. 734, 57 Am. St. 135; Doane v. Hadlock, 42 Maine 72; Varnon v. Varnon, 67 Mo. App. 534; Gardiner 59, 73 S. W. 129. Contra: Scott v. Thrall, 77 Kans. 688, 95 Pac. 563, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184, 127 Am. St. 449, 25 McIntire v. McIntire, 162 U. S. 383, 16 Sup. Ct. 814, 40 L..ed 1009. 26 Monroe v. Huddart, 79 Nebr. 569, 113 N. W. 149, 14 L. R.A. (N. S.) 259; Holman v. Riddle, 8 Ohio St. 384. _?7 Hesterberg v. Clark, 166 Ill. 241, 26—Tuomp. WILLS. v. Gardiner, 65 N. H. 230, 19 Atl. 651, 8 L. R. A. 383; Lovell v. Quitman, 88 N. Y. 377, 42 Am. Rep. 254; In re Simrell’s Estate, 154 Pa. St. 604, 26 Atl. 599, 35 Am. St. 864; Stover v. Kendall, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 557. 28In re Miles’ Appeal, 68 Conn. 237, 36 Atl. 39, 36 L. R. A. 176; Eschbach v. Collins, 61 Md. 478, 48 Am. Rep. 123. 29 Wright v. Wright, 5 Ind. 389. § 454 WILLS 402 testator.*° And while, as in the case of other wills, no particular form is required,®* yet the provisions of the statute authorizing such will must be complied with.* Such statutes usually require that such will shall be wholly in the testator’s handwriting; that it shall be dated, and signed by him.** Where the statute requires the testator to sign at the end of the will, his signature at the beginning and not at the end of the will is not a proper signing thereof ;** but in the absence of such a statutory provision his signature placed in the body of the will with intent to make such his signature is a sufficient signing.** Attestation by witnesses is unnecessary, except where the stat- ute makes no exception in favor of such wills as regards attesta- tion.*® But the fact that a holographic will is attested by wit- nesses does not invalidate it.*” A holographic will of personalty was good at common law without the signature, seal or witness.* § 454. Execution of a nuncupative will—As we have seen a nuncupative will is an oral testament, declared by a testator in extremis before a sufficient number of witnesses, and after- ward reduced to writing.*° Such wills are not favorites of the law and can not be established except upon strict proof and 30 See ante, ch. 2, § 25. 81 Skerrett’s Estate, 67 Cal. 585, 8 Pac. 181; Webster v. Lowe, 107 Ky. 293, 53 S. W. 1030, 21 Ky. L. 998; Ehrenberg’s Succession, 21 La. Ann. 280, 99 Am. Dec. 729; Buffington v. Thomas, 84 Miss. 157, 36 So. 1039, 105 Am. St. 423, 9 Prob. Rep. Ann. 287; In re Noyes’ Estate, 40 Mont. 190, 105 Pac. 1017, 26 L. R. A. 1145, 20 Ann. Cas. 366; Alston v. Davis, 118 N. Car. 202, 24 S. E. 15. 32In re Rand, 61 Cal. 468, 44 Am. Rep. 555; Scott v. Harkness, 6 Idaho 736, 59 Pac. 556; Armant’s Succes- sion, 43 La. Ann. 310, 9 So. 50, 26 Am. St. 183; Baker v. Brown, 83 Miss. 793, 36 So. 539, 33Tn re Plumel’s Estate, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192, 121 Am. St. 100, 12 Prob. Rep. Ann. 576. 84In re Armant’s Will, 43 La, Ann. 310, 9 So. 50, 26 Am. St. 183. 85 Tate v. Tate, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 465. 86 Eaton v. Brown, 193 U. S. 411, 24 Sup. Ct. 487, 48 L. ed. 730, 9 Prob. Rep. Ann. 627; McIntire v. McIntire, 19 D. C. 482; Baker v. Dobyns, 4 Dana (Ky.) 220. 87 Langley v. Langley, 12 La. 114; Brown v. Beaver, 3 Jones (N. Car.) 516, 67 Am. Dec. 255. 88 Leathers v. Greenacre, 53 Maine 561. 39 See ante, ch. 2, § 22. § 454 403 EXECUTION compliance with all the requirements of the law, and are restricted to cases falling clearly within the reason of the statute.*° Generally no particular form is prescribed for such wills, but the intent to make a will must be plain. It must, however, be made by spoken words or signs, and may be made in answer to questions.*t But where the statute prescribes particular formali- ties in the execution of such wills, the requirements of the statute must be strictly observed.*” No words can be sustained as a nuncupative will, unless the person using them has the intention of making them his will, and believes he is making a will.** Mere verbal instructions and directions for drawing up a written will, although made in the presence of the required number of witnesses, do not constitute a nuncupative will.** It would seem to be indispensable to the validity of such will that the testator should request some of the persons present to bear witness that such was his last will, or do something which is equivalent to such request. In reducing such will to writing the exact words of the verbal declaration of the testator need not be preserved, but the substance of what was said by him must be retained and ‘reduced to writing.*® The declaration must be reduced to writing within the period required by the statute and shown to and approved by each of the attesting witnesses.** 40 Scaife v. Emmons, 84 Ga. 619, 10 S. E. 1097, 20 Am. St. 383; Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86. 41 Harrington v. Stees, 82 Ill. 50, 25 Am. Rep. 290; Mulligan v. Leon- ard, 46 Iowa 692; Starrs v. Mason, 32 La. Ann. 8; Campbell v. Campbell, 21 Mich. 438; Lucas v. Goff, 33 Miss. 629; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 8 N. Y. 196, Seld. Notes 89; In re Yarnall’s Will, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 46, 26 Am. Dec. 115, 42 Arnett v. Arnett, 27 Ill. 247, 81 Am. Dec. 227; Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86; Succession of Dorries, 37 La. Ann. 833. 43 Mulligan v. Leonard, 46 Iowa 692; Gibson v. Gibson, Walk (Miss.) 364. 44Lucas v. Goff, 33 Miss. 629; Dockum v. Robinson, 26 N. H. 372. 45 Sampson v. Browning, 22 Ga. 293; Arnett v. Arnett, 27 Ill. 247, 81 Am. Dec. 227; Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86; Babineau v. Le Blanc, 14 La. Ann. 729; Biddle v. Biddle, 36 Md. 630; Broach v. Sing, 57 Miss. 115; Dawson’s Appeal, 23 Wis. 69. 48 Landry v. Tomatis, 32 La. Ann. 113; Marks v. Bryant, 4 Hen. & M. (Va.) 91. 47 Welling v. Owings, 9 Gill (Md.) 467. § 454 WILLS 404 Where the statute requires two witnesses, its requirements are not satisfied by making the same oral declaration to one witness at one time and the other at another time.“ 48 Offutt v. Offutt, 3B. Mon. (Ky.) Dec. 307; Wester v. Wester, 5 Jones 162, 38 Am. Dec. 183; Prince v, Hazle- (N. Car.) 95; In re Yarnall’s Will, 4 ton, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 502, 11 Am. Rawle (Pa.) 46, 26 Am. Dec. 115, CHAPTER XXIV) REVOCATION SECTION SECTION 460. Revocation in general. 466. Changes in condition or circum< 461. By writing not testamentary in stances of testator—In generai. character. 467. By marriage, and by marriage 462. By a subsequent will. and birth of issue. 463. By codicil. 468. Revocation by divorce. 464. Mutilation, cancelation, or de- 469. By sale or conveyance of prop- struction. erty. 465. By alterations and additions, 470. Revocation of joint or mutual wills. § 460. Revocation in general_—A will is ambulatory dur- ing the life of the maker and only becomes irrevocable upon his death. The axiom of Holy Writ that “a testament is of force after men are dead; otherwise it is of no strength at all while the testator liveth,’’* has never been changed by legislature or court. The maker of a will has control over the property devised or bequeathed and power to revoke the instrument as long as he lives, and no title to the property under the will can vest in the beneficiary until the testator’s death.? Prior to the enactment of the statute of frauds a written will could be revoked by oral declarations. This loose method of revocation resulted in many bold attempts to defeat wills by false testimony concerning the declarations of the testator. The boldness and frequency of these attempts led to the enactment of the statute of frauds, which pointed out explicitly the manner in which wills should be revoked.* This statute has moulded and governed the modern 1Epistle of Paul to the Hebrews, pertaining to the revocation of wills: ch. 9, v. 17. “Sec. 6. And moreover, no devise 2Cozzens v. Jamison, 12 Mo. App. in writing of lands, tenements or 452; Hart v. West, 16 Tex. Civ. App. hereditaments, nor any clause thereof, 395, 41 S. W. 183. shall at any time after the said four 3 Sections of the Statute of Frauds and twentieth day of June be revo: 405 § 460 WILLS 4G6 statute law of this country on the subject, the resulf of which is that wills can no longer be revoked by the oral declarations of the testator.* The statutory requirements in reference to the revocation of wills must be strictly pursued,° and whatever is done by a testator, to be effectual as a revocation, must be done with the intention _of revoking the will.® Neither the act nor the intention alone will be sufficient; they must concur. The act of revocation must be done by the testator, or by some person in his presence and by his direction. The mere intention to revoke does not render a will inoperative, nor does the belief of the testator that the will has been destroyed or otherwise revoked affect its validity.” The mental capacity required for revoking a will is the same as that required for making a will. A will can not be revoked by the cable, otherwise than by some other will or codicil in writing, or other writing declaring the same, or by burning, canceling, tearing or oblit- erating the same by the testator him- self, or in his presence and by his directions and consent; but all de- vises and bequests of lands and tene- ments shall remain and continue in force, until the same be burnt, can- celed, torn or obliterated by the tes- tator or his directions, in manner aforesaid, or unless the same be al- tered by some other will or codicil in writing, or other writing, of the devisor, signed in the presence of three or four witnesses, declaring the same: any former law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding. “Sec. 22, And be it further en- acted, That no will in writing con- cerning any goods or chattels, or per- sonal estate, shall be repealed, nor shall any clause, devise or bequest therein be altered or changed by any words, or by will, by word of mouth only, except the same be in the life of the testator committed to writing, and after the writing thereof read unto the testator, and allowed by him and proved to be done by three wit- nesses at the least.” 4 See post, ch. 28. 5Smith v. Dolby, 4 Harr. (Del.) 350; Castens v. Murray, 122 Ga. 396, 50 S. E. 131, 2 Ann. Cas. 590; Runkle v. Gates, 11 Ind. 95; Steele v. Price, 5 B. Mon, (Ky.) 58; Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475, 3 Atl. 604, 56 Am. Rep. 530; In re Frothingham, 75 N> J. Eq. 205, 71 Atl. 695; Burnham v. Comfort, 108 N. Y. 535, 15 N. E. 710, 2 Am. St. 462; In re Zollicoffer, 50 N. Car. 309; Blanchard v. Blanch- ard, 32 Vt. 62. ® Russell v. Hartley, 83 Conn. 654, 78 Atl. 320; Bradlee v. Andrews, 137 Mass. 50. ; : 7Davis v. Fogle, 124 Ind. 41, 23 N. E, 860, 7 L. R. A. 485n. ~ 8 Bethany Hospital Co. v. Philippi, 82 Kans. 64, 107 Pac. 530, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 194. 407 REVOCATION § 461 guardian of one who nas become incompetent after the execution of the will.’ A will may be revoked by the testator (1) by a writing not testamentary in character, (2) by a subsequent will, (3) by a codicil, (4) by mutilation, cancelation, or destruction, and (5) by alterations and additions. A will may also be revoked by operation of law resulting from a change in the circumstances of the testator after the making of the will, such as (1) marriage of the testator, (2) birth of issue, (3) alteration of estate, or (4) loss of estate. These various methods of revocation will be discussed in succeeding sections. § 461. By writing not testamentary in character.—By statute in some jurisdictions a will may be revoked by a writing not testamentary in character, if executed with the required formalities.*° Such writiig must be made for the sole purpose of revoking the will, and must be of a date later than the will.** The instrument should contain only a provision for revocation,” and such provision must show the testator’s intention to revoke the will.* The statutes generally require that such revoking instrument be executed with all the formalities of a will,“* and it is held that, no matter how clear the testator’s intention may be, an instrument executed without these formalities does not work a revocation.” 9 Mastick v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. 347, 29 Pac. 869. 10 Reid v. Borland, 14 Mass. 208; In re Voorhis, 125 N. Y. 765, 26 N. E. 935, 4 Silvernail Ct. App. 328; In re Backus, 49 App. Div. 410, 63 N. Y. S. 544. 11 Thurston v. Prather, 77 S. W. 354, 25 Ky. L. 1137. 12 Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332; Seymour’s Succession, 48 La. Ann. 993, 20 So. 217; Goods of Gos- ling, 55 L. J. P. 27; Noyes’ Will, 61 Vt. 14, 17 Atl. 743. 18 Taylor v. Pegram, 151 Ill. 106, 37 N. E. 837; Hill’s Succession, 47 La. Ann. 329, 16 So. 819; Kirkpatrick v. Jenkins, 96 Tenn. 85, 33 S. W. 819. 14 Doe v. Pattison, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 355; Reid v. Borland, 14 Mass, 208; Vining v. Hall, 40 Miss. 83. 15 Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332; Hollingshead v. Sturgis, 21 La. Ann. 450; Eschbach v. Collins, 61 Md. 478, 48 Am. Rep. 123; West v. West, 144 Mo. 119, 46 S. W. 139; Morey v. Sohier, 63 N. H. 507, 3 Atl. 636, 56 Am. Rep. 538; Rudy v. Ulrich, 69 Pa. St..177, 8 Am. Rep. 238. § 462 WILLS 408 A paper attested by two witnesses can not revoke a will at- tested by three witnesses as required by statute.*® An ordinary written will executed with the formalities required by statute may be revoked by a holographic will.” Revocation by a later writing not a will, even where authorized by statute, is rarely resorted to, preference being given, if the testator’s intent to revoke is exercised in writing at all, to some writing testamentary in character and for the operation of which its admission to probate is necessary. § 462. By a subsequent will—A will may be revoked by a subsequent will, provided the latter instrument contains either an express clause of revocation, or an inconsistent disposition of the property devised in the former will.** To have the force and effect of revoking the former will it must be executed with all the formalities required by law to admit it to probate.” Where the disposition of the property by the revoking will is inconsistent with the disposition thereof by the former will, the former will is revoked, and this is so regardless of whether the former will is expressly revoked by the latter one or not.”° A second will may become operative as a revocation of a former 16 Morey v. Sohier, 63 N. H. 507, 3 Atl. 636, 56 Am. Rep. 538. 17 Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. (U. S.) 400, 14 L. ed. 472; Hooper v. Mc- Quary, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 129; Gordon v. Whitlock, 92 Va. 723, 24 S, E. 342; In re Soher’s Estate, 78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 8. 18 Wilson v. Bostick, 151 Ala. 536, 44 So. 389; Clarke v. Ransom, 50 Cal. 595; Stetson v. Stetson, 200 Ill. 601, 66 N. E. 262, 61 L. R. A. 258; Kern v. Kern, 154 Ind. 29, 55 N. E, 1004, 5 Prob. Rep. Ann. 337; In re Dunahugh, 130 Iowa 692, 107 N. W. 925; Deppen v. Deppen, 132 Ky. 755, 117 S. W. 352, 14 Prob. Rep. Ann. 348; Bobb’s Succession, 42 La. Ann. 40, 7 So. 60; Johns Hopkins Univer- sity v. Pinckney, 55 Md. 365; Laugh- ton v. Atkins, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 535; Kelly v. Johnson, 34 Mo. 400; Lane v. Hill, 68 N. H. 275, 44 Atl. 393, 73 Am, St. 591; Boylan v. Meeker, 28 N. J. L. 274; Matter of Wear, 131 App. Div. 875, 116 N. Y. S. 304; Hallyburton v. Carson, 86 N. Car. 290; In re Hamilton’s Estate, 74 Pa. St. 69; Reese v. Newport Prob. Ct, 9 R. I. 434; Warner v. Warner, 37 Vt. 356; In re Fisher, 4 Wis. 254, 65 Am. Dec. 309. 19 Gaines v. Lizardi, 154 U. S. 555, 44 Sup. Ct. 1201, 18 L. ed. 967; West v. West, 144 Mo. 119, 46 S. W. 139; Caeman v. Van Harke, 33 Kans. 333, 6 Pac. 620; Castens v. Murray, 122 Ga. 396, 50 S. E. 131. 20 Burns v. Travis, 117 Ind. 44, 18 N. E. 45; State v. Crossley, 69 Ind. 203. 409° REVOCATION § 462 will, although it may be inoperative in all other respects.** Thus where a testator, having devised property to a certain person, subsequently devises the same property to a different person, who is incapable of taking under the will, the devise in the latter will must fail, but it is sufficient to revoke the former devise.” The revocation of a former will by a later one takes effect at the testator’s death, and his intentional destruction of the later will leaves the former one in force.” Proof of the execution of a second or subsequent will is not sufficient of itself to establish revocation; but it is generally held that a second will, though it contains no clause of revoca- tion, must operate as a revecation of the first, either total or partial, when they are irreconciliable, either wholly or in some respects, and can not both be given effect at the same time, as where both purport to dispose of all the testator’s property, or one of them gives some part of it to one person, and the other to a different person.* But even when two wills do not com- pletely cover the same subject, if, from the second will, taken as a whole, and the circumstances attending its execution, there ap- pears an intention of the testator to dispose of his property in a manner different from that in the first will, it is to that extent revoked.” The expression in a later will that it is the testator’s last will and testament is entitled to very little weight ;?° it amounts to no more than a statement of a fact which is apparent from a mere inspection of the two wills if they are truly dated, and which, whether they are so dated or not, may be proved by any com- petent evidence. Where, however, the last will contains a gen- 21 Burns v. Travis, 117 Ind. 44, 18 N. E. 45; Laughton v. Atkins, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 535. 22Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276. 23 Bates v. Hacking, 28 R. I. 523, 68 Atl. 622, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 937, 125 Am. St. 759. 24 Bobb’s Succession, 42 La. Ann. 40, 7 So. 60; Webb v. Carpenter, 16 R. I. 68, 12 Atl. 129; Reese v. Pro- bate Court of Newport, 9 R. I. 434; In re Fisher, 4 Wis. 254, 65 Am. Dec. 309. 25 Dempsey v. Lawson, 46 L. J. P. 23, 2 P. D. 98, 36 L. T. 515, 25 N. R. 629, 26 Gordon v. Whillock, 92 Va. 723, 24 S. E. 342; Hellier v. Hellier, 9 P. D. 237, 49 J. P. 8,53 LJ. P.D.& Adm. 105, 33 Wkly. Rep. 324. § 463 410 WILLS eral clause revoking all prior wills, they are thereby rendered inoperative, though the dispositions of the property made by them are not wholly irreconcilable, and the second will does not purport to dispose of all the testator’s property, as where the first will disposes of his property, both real and personal, and the last will, containing the general clause of revocation, disposes of per- sonalty only.” § 463. By codicil—A will is not necessarily superseded or revoked by a codicil thereto, but the two instruments will be construed together as one entire will.* The codicil may, how- ever, operate as a revocation of the will by a direction to that effect, or by force of the clear import of language in some incon- sistent or repugnant provision.” In order that a will may be revoked by a codicil containing a disposition of property inconsistent with the disposition thereof in the will, such inconsistent disposition must be such as to ex- clude any other legitimate inference than that of a change in the testator’s intention.*° But in order to have the force and effect of revoking the will a codicil must be executed with all the formalities required by law to admit it to probate.** Unless a codicil can not otherwise be conceded its proper effect, it does not revoke the will, either totally or partially.* Even where it contains a general clause of revocation, such 27 Cottrell v. Cottrell, L. R. 2 P. & D. 397, 41 L. J. P. D. 57, 20 Wkly. Rep. 590, 26 L. T. (N. S.) 527. 28 Boyd v. Boyd, 2 Fed. 138, 1.Mc- Crary 268; Terhune v. Commercial Nat. Safe Deposit Co., 245 Ill. 622, 92 N. E. 532; Lee v. Lee, 45 Ind. App. 645, 91 N. E. 507; In re Sternburg’s Estate, 94 Iowa 305, 62 N. W. 734; Boyd v. Latham, 44 N. Car. 365; In re Sigel, 213 Pa. 14, 62 Atl. 175, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 397, 110 Am. St. 515, 11 Prob. Rep. Ann, 111. 29 Hemphill v. Moody, 62 Ala. 510; Deppen v. Deppen, 132 Ky. 755, 117 S. W. 352, 14 Prob. Rep. Ann. 348; Johns Hopkins University v. Pinck- ney, 55 Md. 365; Hard v. Ashley, 117 N. Y. 606, 23 N. E. 177; Rhyme v. Torrence, 109 N. Car. 652, 14 S. E. 95; In re Jones’ Estate, 18 Phila. (Pa.) 58; Frelinghuysen v. New York L. Ins. &c. Co., 31 R. I. 150, 77 Atl. 98, Ann, Cas. 1912 B, 237. 30 Bringhurst v. Orth, 7 Del. Ch. 178, 44 Atl. 783; Johns Hopkins Uni- versity v. Pinckney, 55 Md. 365; Manner’s Estate, 22 Pa. Co. Ct. 577. 81 Notes v. Doyle, 32 App. (D. C.) 413; Orchard v. David, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 376; Saunders v. J. R. T. Samarreg Co., 205 Pa. 632, 55 Atl. 763. 32 Hard v. Ashley, 117 N. Y. 606, 411 REVOCATION § 464 clause may be considered as relating to pre-existing wills, of which the codicil is not a part.** Where the codicil in express terms revokes certain provisions of the will every effect con- templated by the revoking clause must be given in order to carry into operation the wishes of the testator.** Where the statute authorizes the execution of holographic wills and a holographic codicil to a will is permissible, whether such will was holographic or not, it may operate as a revocation of a clause in the will with which it is inconsistent.** The general rule is that the provisions of a will are not revoked by a codicil, the language of which is capable of other reason- able construction, or is less clear and certain than the language of the will.*®* Hence, the codicil should specify with reasonable exactness and clearness what, if any, provisions of the will are intended to be revoked. § 464. Mutilation, cancelation, or destruction.—Under most statutes a testator may revoke his will by some equivocal act of destruction with the intention of revocation. Some of these statutes follow the statute of frauds literally by using the words, “burning, canceling, tearing, or obliterating,’ while others follow the Statute of Wills, 1 Vict., which contains the words “burning, tearing or otherwise destroying.’’*? To constitute revocation by this method the act of destruction must have been done. by the testator with the intention of revocation.** Thus a will is not revoked where the testator destroys it by mistake, through undue influence,*® or while of unsound mind.*° Such an act of revocation must be done by the testator himself or by 23 N. E. 177; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 6 v. Coddington, 154 N. Y. 283, 48 N. Heisk. (Tenn.) 489. E, 729, 33 Gelbke v. Gelbke, 88 Ala. 427, 6 37 See Digest of Statutes, ch. 28. So. 834. 38 Law v. Law, 83 Ala. 432, 3. So. 34In re Scott, 141 Cal. 485, 75 752; McIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. Pac. 44. 67, 47 S. E. 501, 102 Am. St. 71, 1 35In re Soher’s Estate, 78 Cal. 477, Ann. Cas. 606. 21 Pac. 8 39 Batton v. Watson, 13 Ga. 63, 58 36Colt v. Colt, 32 Conn. 422; Am. Dec. 504. Bringhurst v. Orth, 7 Del. Ch. 178, 40In re Johnson’s Will, 40 Conn, 44 Atl 783; Herzog v. Title Guar- 587. antee & Trust Co., 177 N. Y. 86, 69 N. E. 283, 67 L. R. A. 146; Goodwin 412 § 464 WILLS some other person by his direction or with his consent,“* and according to some statutes, in his presence.*? The destruction of a will out of the presence of the testator or without his con- sent does not destroy its legal effect, even though the paper evi-. dence of it is gone.* The statutes of some states have been construed as requiring a revocation by obliteration, mutilation, or cancelation to be of the whole will, and therefore, erasures or other obliterations intended to effect only some part or clause of a will, are disre- garded.** But, except where statutes are in force to which this construction has been or must be given, the obliteration or mutila- tion of a will may be partial as well as total, and where any clause is by any means so obliterated that it can no longer be read, it is revoked, and the will must be admitted to probate without it.* The act of destroying a will need not be witnessed,** but a presumption that it was destroyed arises from proof that it was executed, remained in testator’s possession, and is not found at his death,*” or is found in a torn, defaced or mutilated condi- tion.** 41 Howard v. Hunter, 115 Ga. 357, 41 S. E. 638, 90 Am. St. 121, 8 Prob. Rep. Ann. 9; McCarn v. Rundall, 111 Towa 406, 82 N. W. 924, 5 Prob. Rep. Ann. 624; Clingan v. Mitcheltree, 31 Pa. St. 25. 42 Miles’ Appeal, 68 Conn. 237, 36 Atl. 39, 36 L. R. A. 176, 2 Prob. Rep. Ann. 219; Morey v. Sohier, 63 N. H. 507, 3 Atl. 636, 56 Am. Rep. 538; Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290; Matter of Hughes, 61 Misc. 207, 114 N. Y. S. 929; Dower v. Seeds, 28 W. Va. 113, 57 Am. Rep. 646; Gavitt v. Moulton, 119 Wis. 35, 96 N. W. 395. 43 Mann y. Balfour, 187 Mo. 290, 86 S. W. 103. 44Law v. Law, 83 Ala. 432, 3 So. 752; Lovell v. Quitman, 88 N. Y. 377, 42 Am. Rep. 254; Malone v. Hobbs, 1 Rob. (Va.) 346, 39 Am. Dec. 263. 45 Taylor v. Kelly, 31 Ala. 59, 68 Am. Dec. 150; Bigelow v. Gillott, 123 Mass. 102, 25 Am. Rep. 32; Matter of Kirkpatrick, 22 N. J. Eq. 463; Wikoff’s Appeal, 15 Pa. St. 281, 53 Am. Dec. 597. ; 46 Witter v. Mott, 2 Conn. 67. 47 Weeks v. McBeth, 14 Ala. 474; Spencer’s Appeal, 77 Conn. 638, 60 Atl. 289; Scott v. Maddox, 113 Ga. 795, 39 S. E. 500, 84 Am. St. 263; Boyle v. Boyle, 158 Ill. 228, 42 N. E. 140; Hamilton v. Crowe, 175 Mo. 634, 75S. W. 389; Collyer v. Collyer, 110 N. Y. 481, 18 N. E. 110, 6 Am. St. -405; Behrens v. Behrens, 47 Ohio St. 323, 25 N. E. 209, 21 Am. St. 820; Gardner v. Gardner, 177 Pa. St. 218, 35 Atl. 558; McIntosh v. Moore, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 22, 53 S. W. 611; Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 474, 45 L. ed. 663. 48In re Wikman’s Estate, 148 Cal. 642, 84 Pac. 212. 413 REVOCATION § 465 § 465. By alterations and additions—Any alterations or additions to a will after it has been duly executed and attested will not work a revocation of the will unless the instrument is subsequently re-executed with all the formalities necessary to its execution originally. There must be an intention on the part of the testator to revoke the will at the time the alterations or additions are made, and to effectuate such intention there must be an attestation of the will in its changed condition.” § 466. Changes in condition or circumstances of testator —In general.—It is a thoroughly established principle of the common law that certain changes in the condition or circum- stances of the testator worked a revocation of the will by implica- tion, and this principle of the common law prevails wherever it has not been repealed by statute.** The statutes of many states enumerate the ways in which a will may be revoked by the act of the testator, and provide that nothing therein contained “shall prevent any revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator ;” and it is held that the revocation implied by law within the meaning of these statutes is the implied revocation which existed at common law.*? Under such statutes the subse- 49 Hesterberg v. Clark, 166 Ill. 241, 46 N. E. 734, 57 Am. St. 135, 2 Prob. Rep. Ann. 148; Wright v. Wright, 5 Ind. 389; Wells v. Wells, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 152, 16 Am. Dec. 150; In re Penniman’s Will, 20 Minn. 245, 18 Am. Rep. 368; Gardiner v. Gardi- ner, 65 N. H. 230, 19 Atl. 651, 8 L. R. A. 383; Matter of Ackerman, 129 App. Div. 584, 114 N. Y. S. 197; Brundige v. Benton, 9 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 786, 17 Wkly. L. Bul. 243; Dixon’s Appeal, 55 Pa. St. 424; Frear v. Williams, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 550; In re Knapen’s Will, 75 Vt. 146, 53 Atl. 1003, 98 Am. St. 808. 50 Wright v. Wright, 5 Ind. 389; In re Penniman’s Will, 20 Minn. 245, 18 Am. Rep. 368. 51 Phillipe v. Clevengor, 239 Ill. 117, 87 N. E. 858, 16 Ann. Cas. 207; In re Brown’s Estate, 139 Iowa 219, 117 N. W. 260; In re Teopper’s Estate, 12 N. Mex. 372, 78 Pac. 53, 67 L. R. A. 315, 52 Shorten y. Judd, 60 Kans. 73, 55 Pac. 286; Donaldson v. Hall, 106 Minn. 502, 119 N. W. 219, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1073, 130 Am. St. 621, 16 Ann. Cas. 541; Baacke v. Baacke, 50 Nebr. 18, 69 N. W. 303; Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475, 3 Atl. 604, 56 Am. Rep. 530; In re Newlin’s Estate, 209 Pa. 456, 58 Atl. 846, 68 L. R. A. 464; Glascott v. Bragg, 111 Wis. 605, 87 N. W. 853, 56 L. R. A. 258. § 467 WILLS 414 quent change of conditions or circumstances of the testator which will produce a revocation is left to be determined by the courts from the facts of each particular case. Such implied revocation may result from a change in the testator’s family, his property, or the beneficiaries.”* The statutes of a few states designate or specify what changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator shall operate as a revocation of the will,°* while in others revocation by impli- cation is entirely abolished.” § 467. By marriage, and by marriage and birth of issue.— At common law the marriage of a woman after the execution of her will revoked the will, whether she survived her husband or not, and by statute in a majority of the states of this country this rule is expressly declared, but in some the will is revived if she survives her husband.°* In many jurisdictions the incapacity of married women to make wills has been removed by statute, and if her marriage operated to revoke her pre-existing will, she might, by republishing it, or by executing a will of like tenor, avoid the effect of such implied revocation; but in most of the states this removal of her want of capacity has been determined to be in effect the removal of all the reasons of the common-law rule, and therefore to make the rule itself obsolete, and to leave her antenuptial will in full force.* At common law the marriage of a man did not revoke his will, and this is the rule in this country, unless expressly abrogated by statute.°* In several states, statutes have been enacted pro- 53 Graham v. Burch, 47 Minn. 171, nulty v. McAnnulty, 120 Ill. 26, 11 N. 49 N. W. 697, 28 Am. St. 339, , E. 397, 60 Am. Rep. 552, 54 See Digest of Statutes, ch. 28. 55In re Comassi’s Estate, 107 Cal. 1, 40 Pac. 15, 28 L. R. A. 414; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Keith, 26 R. I. 42, 57 Atl. 1060. 56See post, ch. 28. See also Blodgett v. Moore, 141 Mass. 75, 5 N. E. 470; Swan v. Hammond, 138 Mass. 45, 52 Am. Rep. 255; McAn- 57 Noyes v. Southworth, 55 Mich. 173, 20 N. W. 891, 54 Am. Rep. 359; Fellows v. Allen, 60 N. H. 439, 49 Am. Rep. 328; Webb v. Jones, 36 N. J. Eq. 163; Morton vy. Onion, 45 Vt. 145; In re Ward’s Will, 70 Wis. 251, 35 N. W. 731, 5 Am. St. 174. 58 In re Goodsell’s Appeal, 55 Conn. 171, 10 Atl. 557; Bowers v. Bowers, 53 Ind. 430; Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. 415 REVOCATION § 467 viding that the marriage of a man or woman revokes his or her will, unless the will makes provision in contemplation of the marriage, or otherwise shows that the marriage is not to re- voke it.” At common law the marriage of a man or woman, if followed by the birth of issue, revoked his or her will made prior to the marriage,°° but the birth of a child did not revoke a will made after marriage, as the testator was presumed to contemplate such event.** The statutes of descent and distribution in many states have greatly modified the common law, and the rule now generally prevails that if a testator makes his will after his marriage, either while he is wholly childless, or while he has one or more children living, and a child is afterwards born to him, and he subsequently dies without expressly revoking his will or making any provision for such child, and especially where any consid- erable time elapsed between the making of the will and his death, and a change has taken place in his financial circumstances, he will be presumed to have intended either an entire revocation of his will, or such revocation pro tanto as permitted the child to take the same share in his estate as if he died intestate.” It is generally held that an adopted child is not regarded as issue of the marriage, and consequently such adoption does not operate to revoke a previously executed will of the adopting H. 475, 3 Att. 604, 56 Am. Rep. 530; In re Ward’s Will, 70 Wis. 251, 35 N. W. 731, 5 Am. St. 174. Contra: Mor- gan v. Ireland, 1 Idaho 786. 59 Gay v. Gay, 84 Ala. 38, 4 So. 42; Corker v. Corker, 87 Cal. 643, 25 Pac. 922; McAnnulty vy. McAnnulty, 120 Ill. 26, 11 N. E. 397, 60 Am. Rep. 552; Byrd v. Surles, 77 N. Car. 435; In re Fidelity Insurance T. & S. D. Co.’s Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 1, 15 Atl. 484. 60 Gay v. Gay, 84 Ala. 38, 4 So. 42; In re Goodsell’s Appeal, 55 Conn. 171, 10 Atl. 557; Sutton v. Hancock, 115 Ga. 857, 42 S. E. 214; Shorten v. Judd, 60 Kans. 73, 55 Pac. 286. 61 Sutton v. Hancock, 115 Ga. 857, 42 S. E. 214; Baldwin v. Spriggs, 65 Md. 373, 5 Atl. 295; Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475, 3 Atl. 604, 56 Am. Rep. 530. 62 Hughes v. Hughes, 37 Ind. 183; Negus v. Negus, 46 Iowa 487, 26 Am. Rep. 157; Sneed v. Ewing, 5 J. J. Marsh (Ky.) 460, 22 Am. Dec. 41; Evans v. Anderson, 15 Ohio St. 324; Johnston v. Johnston, 1 Phillim. 447. Contra: Baldwin v. Spriggs, 65 Md. 373, 5 Atl. 295. § 468 parent.** WILLS 416 And this rule has been held to be true even when the statute declares that the person adopting and the child adopted shall sustain the legal relation of parent and child.“* But it has been held that the adoption of a child by a testator subsequent to the execution of a will by the adopting parent has the effect to revoke the will.® § 468. Revocation by divorce.—The rule is well settled that a divorce alone does not revoke a previously executed will. But there is a sharp conflict of judicial opinion on the effect of a decree of divorce when the property rights of the parties are determined thereby, or are voluntarily settled by the acts of the parties themselves either before or at the time the decree was granted. It has been held in such case that the decree of divorce following such settlement impliedly revokes the will.” § 469. By sale or conveyance of property.—Prior to the Statute of Uses a testator’s conveyance or contract of convey- ance of his real estate had the effect of revoking his former devise thereof even though the same estate became reinvested in 68 him during his life. The law required that the same interest which the testator had in the land when he made the will should remain unaltered to the time of his death. The least alteration of such interest amounted to a revocation of the will.® 63In re Commassi’s Estate, 107 _Cal. 1, 40 Pac. 15, 28 L. R. A. 414; Davis v. King, 89 N. Car. 441. 64In re Gregory’s Estate, 15 Misc. 407, 37 N. Y. S. 925, 1 Gibbons, 490, 73 N.Y. St. 3. 65 Flannigan v. Howard, 200 Iil. 396, 65 N. E. 782, 59 L. R. A. 664, 93 Am. St. 201; Hilpire v. Claude, 109 Towa 159, 80 N. W. 332, 46 L. R. A. 171, 77 Am.’ St. 524. 66 Card v. Alexander, 48 Conn. 492, 40 Am. Rep. 187; In re Brown’s Estate, 139 Iowa 219, 117 N. W. 260; Donaldson v. Hall, 106 Minn. 502, 119 N. W. 219, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1073, 130 Am. St. 621, 16 Ann. Cas, Under 541; Baacke v. Baacke, 50 Nebr. 18,” 69 N. W. 303; Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St. 298, 22 Am. Rep. 307; In re Jones’ Estate, 211 Pa. 364, 60 Atl. 915, 69 L. R. A. 940, 107 Am. St. 581. 67 Wirth v. Wirth, 149 Mich. 687, 113 N. W. 306; Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N. W. 699, 35 Am. St. 545; Donaldson vy. Hall, 106 Minn. 502, 119 N. W. 219, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1073, 130 Am. St. 621, 16 Ann. Cas. 541. 68 McGowan v. Elroy, 28 App. D. C. 188; In re Benner’s Estate, 155 Cal. 153, 99 Pac. 715. 694 Kent Com. 530; Woolery v. Woolery, 48 Ind. 523. 417 REVOCATION § 470 the modern rule, however, the will operates on such estate as he may have at the time of his death, and is revoked only as to that part which he has previously disposed of.” A revocation pro tanto takes place in case of contracts to sell the land devised, sales thereof reserving vendor’s lien,” or mortgage or other incumbrance placed thereon by the testator.” A subsequent sale and conveyance of property specifically de- vised necessarily revokes the devise.™ But an invalid deed of conveyance has no effect to revoke a previous devise of the same land.” The revocation is complete where the testator has di- vested himself of all title or estate in the property,’® or where no title can pass under the terms of the devise.” An involuntary alienation of property previously devised will revoke the will to the extent of the property so alienated. Thus, where a portion of the land devised was afterward sold for taxes,”* or taken under eminent domain proceedings,” the will is revoked to the extent of the estate so sold or taken. The doctrine of revocation of wills by subsequent conveyances is sometimes confused with the doctrine of ademption. The latter doctrine, as we have seen, is predicable on bequests of per- sonalty, while the former is predicable only on devises of real estate.®° § 470. Revocation of joint or mutual wills—As a general tule a joint or mutual will may be revoked by either of the 70 Bissell v. Heyward, 96 U. S. 580, 25 L. ed. 678; Moore v. Spier, 80 Ala. 129; Tillman’s Estate, 3 Cal. Unrep. Cas. 677, 31 Pac. 563; Wood- ward v. Woodward, 33 Colo. 457, 81 Pac. 322; Marshall v. Hartzfelt, 98 Mo. App. 178, 71 S. W. 1061; Dean v. Jagoe, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 389, 103 S. W. 195. 71 Ostrander v. Davis, 191 Fed. 156, 111 C. C. A. 636; Welsh v. Pounders, 36 Ala. 668; Bruck v. Tucker, 32 Cal. 425. 72 Fields v. Carlton, 75 Ga. 554, 73 Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Ala. 555. 27—Tuomp. WILLS. 74Connecticut Trust &c. Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 55 Atl. 171. ; 75 Bennett v. Gaddis, 79 Ind. 347. 76 McGowan v. Elroy, 28 App. (D. C.) 188; Epps v. Dean, 28 Ga. 533. 77 Howard v. Carusi, MacArthur & M. (11 D.C.) 260. 78 Borden v. Borden, 2 R. I. 94. 79 Ametrano v. Downs, 170 N. Y. 388, 63 N. E. 340, 58 L. R. A. 719, 88 Am. St. 671. 80In re Brown’s Estate, 139 Iowa 219, 117 N. W. 260; Gregg v. Mc- Millan, 54 S. Car. 378, 32 S. E. 447. 418 § 470 WILLS comakezs, provided it was not made in pursuance of any con- tract.** But where such will has been executed in pursuance of a compact or agreement entered into by the testators to devise their property to certain designated beneficiaries, subject to a life estate or other interest in the survivor, it is generally held irrevocable when, upon the death of one, the survivor avails himself of the benefits of the devise in his favor.* But, in the absence of a valid contract, the mere concurrent execution of the will, with full knowledge of its contents by both testators, is not enough to establish a legal obligation to forbear revocation.*? However, mutual wills executed in pur- suance of a contract are not irrevocable in such sense that one of the makers can not make a subsequent will which will be en- titled to probate, although the remedy for breach of-such con- tract may be enforceable in a court of equity.** 81 Coveney v. Conlin, 20 App. (D. 2 So. 624, 60 Am. Rep. 107; Baker C.) 303; Hill v. Harding, 92 Ky. 76, 17 S. W. 199; Edson v. Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555, 50 N. E. 265; Coghlin v. Coghlin, 26 Ohio C. C. 18; Sapping- field v. King, 49 Ore. 102, 89 Pac. 142, 90 Pac. 150,8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1066; Cawley’s Estate, 136 Pa. St. 628, 20 Atl. 567, 10 L. R. A. 93; Buchanan vy. Anderson, 70 S. Car. 454, 50 S. E. 12. 82 Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N. E. 216, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508; Brown v. Webster, 90 Nebr. 591, 134 N. W. 185, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1196; Bolman v. Overall, 80 Ala. 451, v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N. W. 998; Prince v. Prince, 64 Wash. 552, 117 Pac. 255; Deseumeur v. Rondel, 76 N. J. Eq. 394, 74 Atl. 703. 83 Edson v. Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555, 50 N. E. 265; Coveney v. Conlin, 20 App. (D. C.) 303. 84In re Keep, 17 N. Y. St. 812, 2.N. Y. S. 750; Peoria Humane Soc. v. McMurtrie, 229 Ilfl, 519, 82 N. E. 319; Buchanan v. Anderson, 70 S. Car. 454, 50 S. E. 12; Wyche v. Clapp, 43 Tex. 543; Gould v. Mans- field, 103 Mass. 408, 4 Am. Rep. 573. CHAPTER XXV REPUBLICATION AND RE-EXECUTION SECTION SECTION 475. Republication at common law. 478. Republication by codicil. 476. Republication under statutes. 479. Effect of republication. 477, Revival depending on intention 480. Re-execution of wills. of testator. § 475. Republication at common law.—At common law a revoked will of real or personal property could be revived or republished by an informal writing, or even by acts or declara- tions of the testator evincing an intention to revive it.” But a will impliedly revoked by a change in the testator’s condition or circumstances was not revived by the fact that such change ceased to exist.? Under this law if a testator made a second will by which he virtually or expressly revoked the first, but kept the first undestroyed and uncanceled, his cancelation or destruc- tion of the second will repealed his revocation of the first, and thus revived the first.’ But the ecclesiastical courts did not permit a revival or republi- cation of a former will by virtue of the revocation of a subse- quent will, unless such was clearly the intention of the testator.* § 476. Republication under statutes.—Statutes have been enacted in many jurisdictions abolishing the common-law rule that the revocation or destruction of a will revives and leaves 1 Harwell v. Lively, 30 Ga. 315, 76 64 Am. Dec. 598; In re Gould, 72 Vt. Am. Dec. 649; Bohanon v. Walcot, 316, 47 Atl. 1082, 6 Prob. Rep. 1 How. (Miss.) 336, 92 Am. Dec. Ann. 1. 631; Jones v. Hartley, 2 Whart. 4Williams v. Miles, 68 Nebr. 463, (Pa.) 103. 94 N. W. 705, 96 N. W. 151, 62 L. R. 2Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 369; A. 383, 110 Am. St. 431; Marsh v. Long v. Aldred, 3 Add. Eccl. 48. Marsh, 48 N. Car. 77, 64 Am. Dec. 3 Randall v. Beatty, 31 N. J. Eq. 598. 643; Marsh v. Marsh, 48 N. Car. 77, 419 420 § 477 WILLS in force pre-existing wills. Under the influence of these statutes the courts have almost universally held that a will revoked by a subsequent will can not be revived by the revocation of the latter will; also that the revival or republication of a revoked will is equivalent to the making of a new will, and that the same formalities must be observed.® Where the statute requires certain formalities in the execution of a will, the revival of a duly executed will that has been re- voked by implication can only be accomplished by a re-execution of the will.” § 477. Revival depending on intention of testator.—Some courts have held that whether the old will shall be revived or not depends upon the testator’s intention in revoking the last will,® though the last may have contained a clause expressly revoking the first ;° and that such intention may be gathered from all the circumstances of the case, including the declarations of the tes- tator at the time of or after the revocation.” But it is provided by statute in a number of states that when a testator duly executes a second will, the revocation thereof shall not revive the will revoked by it, unless it appears by the 5 Harwell v. Lively, 30 Ga. 315, 76 Am. Dec. 649; State v. Crossley, 69 Ind. 203; Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357; Wallis v.. Wallis, 114 Mass. 510; Scott v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, 7 N. W. 799; Beaumont v. Keim, 50 Mo. 28; Hawes v. Nicholas, 72 Tex. 481, 10 S. W. 558, 2 L. R. A. 863. 6 Barker y. Bell, 46 Ala. 216; Wit- ter vy. Mott, 2 Conn. 67; Carey v. Baughn, 36 Iowa 540, 14 Am. Rep. 534; P’Pool v. P’Pool, 121 Ky. 588, 89 S. W. 687, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 539; In re Penniman, 20 Minn. 245 (Gil. 220), 18 Am. Rep. 368; Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 369; Sawyer v. Saw- yer, 52 N. Car. 134; Broe v. Boyle, 108 Pa. St. 76; Warner v. Warner, 37 Vt. 356. 7 Carey v. Baughn, 36 Iowa 540, 14 Am. Rep. 534; Stewart v. Mulhol- land, 88 Ky. 38, 10 S. W. 125, 10 Ky. L. 824, 21 Am. St. 320; Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 369; Means v. Ury, 141 N. Car. 248, 53 S. E. 850. 8 Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252, 45 Am. Rep. 322; Gould’s Will, 72 Vt. 316, 47 Atl. 1082, 6 Prob. Rep. Ann. 1, 9 Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357; Williams v. Williams, 142 Mass. 515, 8 N. E. 424; Williams v. Miles, 68 Nebr. 463, 94 N. W. 705, 96 N. W. 151, 62 L. R. A. 383, 110 Am. St. 431, 4 Ann. Cas. 306, 8 Prob. Rep. Ann. 621; Randall v. Beatty, 31 N. J. Eq. 643; Flintham vy. Bradford, 10 Pa. St. 82. 10 Gould’s Will, 72 Vt. 316, 47 Atl. 1082. 421 REPUBLICATION AND RE-EXECUTION § 478 terms of such revocation that it was the testator’s intention to revive his former will.™ § 478. Republication by codicil—A codicil, duly signed, attested, and annexed to a will, operates as a republication of the whole will as it existed at the time of the publication of the codicil.” But a codicil does not have this effect where it is not properly executed.** It is generally held that a will imperfectly executed or attested will be republished by a duly executed codicil.** Also a duly exe- cuted codicil will operate to republish a will executed under undue influence ;** likewise one executed while the testator was under some disability, provided the disability did not exist at the time he executed the codicil.7® 11 Alabama: Civil Code (1907), § 6175; Arkansas: Dig. of Stat. (1904), § 8014; California: Fairall’s Civil Code Proc. (1916), § 1970; Idaho: Civil Code (1908), § 5734; Indiana: Rev. Stat. (Burns 1914), § 3115; Kansas: Gen. Stat. (1909), § 9815; Missouri: Rev. Stat. (1909), § 543; Montana: Civil Code (1908), § 4745; Nevada: Compiled Laws (1912), § 6210; New Mexico: Com- piled Laws (1915), 8 5868; New York: 1B. C. & G. Comp. Laws (1909), § 41; North Dakota: Rev. Codes (1913), § 5665; Ohio: Ann. Code (1912), § 10562; Oklahoma: Rev. Laws (1910), § 8363; Oregon: Lord Ann. Stat. (1910), § 7328; South Dakota: Comp. Laws (1913), § 1022, p. 186; Utah: Rev. Stat. (1907), § 2753; Washington: Rem. & Ball. Codes & Stat. (1910), § 1329. 12 Pope v. Pope, 95 Ga. 87, 22 S. E. 245; Shaw v. Camp, 163 Ill. 144, 45 N. E. 211, 36 L. R. A, 112; Hawke v. A codicil can not have the effect Euyart, 30 Nebr. 149, 46 N. W. 422, 27 Am. St. 391; Vogel v. Lehritter, 139 N. Y. 223, 34 N. E. 914; Gilmor’s Estate, 154 Pa. St. 523, 26 Atl. 614, 35 Am. St. 855; Skinner v. Amer- ican Bible Soc, 92 Wis. 209, 65 N. W. 1037. 13 Vestry of St. John’s Parish v. Bostwick, 8 App. (D. C.) 452; Love v. Johnston, 12 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 355. 14Burge v. Hamilton, 72 Ga. 568; Camp v. Shaw, 52 Ill. App. 241; In re Murfield, 74 lowa 479, 38 N. W. 170; Gaude v. Baudoin, 6 La. 722; Harvy v. Chouteau, 14 Mo. 587, 55 Am. Dec. 120; McCurdy v. Neall, 42 N. J. Eg. 333, 7 Atl. 566; In re Wal- ton’s Estate, 194 Pa. St. 528, 45 Atl. 426. 15 Cook v. White, 43 App. Div. 388, 60 N. Y. S. 153, 16 Brown v. Riggin, 94 Ill. 560; Mattet of Emmons, 110 App. Div. 701, 96 N.Y. S. 509, § 479 WILLS 422 to revive a will that has been destroyed,*” unless such was the intention of the testator as shown by the codicil.* §479. Effect of republication——The republication or re- vival of a will has the effect to bring it down to the date of such republication, and to make it speak as of that date.** The re- published will is held to pass property acquired after it was first executed if such would be a reasonable interpretation of the language written at the date of republication.” If no contrary ‘intention appears or exists such after-acquired property will pass.* While the execution of a codicil republishes the will, it does not prevent the ademption of specific legacies given by the will, nor does it validate such as have been adeemed.” § 480. Re-execution of wills—When a will is defectively executed, or was executed when the testator had not capacity to make a will, it should be re-executed, and when this is ac- complished with all the formalities required, it is valid, no matter what defects may have originally existed in its execution.2* A testator may desire to re-execute a will executed in a foreign jurisdiction. In all such cases re-execution is best accomplished by repeating the testimonium and attestation clauses and having testator and witnesses sign with the required formalities. 17 Williams v. Miles, 68 Nebr. 463, 04 N. W. 705, 96 N. W. 151, 62 L. R. A. 383, 110 Am. St. 431, 4 Ann. Cas. 306, 8 Prob. Rep. Ann. 621; Matter of Trost, 38 Misc. 404, 77 N. Y. S. 879. 18 Francis y. Marsh, 54 W. Va. 545, 46 S. E. 573. 19JTn re Murfield, 74 Iowa 479, 38 N. W. 170; Sharp v. Wallace, 83 Ky. 584, 7 Ky. L. 558; Hawke v. Euyart, 30 Nebr. 149, 46 N. W. 422, 27 Am. St. 391; Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 369; Murray v. Oliver, 41 N. Car. 55; Gilmor’s Estate, 154 Pa. St. 523, 26 Atl. 614, 35 Am. St. 855. 20Haven v. Foster, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 534; Drayton v. Rose, 7, Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 328, 64 Am. Dec. . 731. 21 Goodtitle ex dem. Woodhouse v. Meredith, 2 Maule & Sel. 5. 22Tauton v. Keller, 167 Ill. 129, 47 N. E. 376; Langdon v. Astor, 16 N. Y. 9. 23 Burge v. Hamilton, 72 Ga. 568; In re Murfield, 74 Iowa 479, 38 N. W. 170; Harvy v. Chouteau, 14 Mo. 587, 55 Am. Dec. 120; Barney v. Hays, 11 Mont. 571, 29 Pac. 282, 28 Am. St. 495; McCurdy v. Neall, 42 N. J. Eq. 333, 7 Atl. 566; Stover v. Kendall, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 557; Skin- ner v. American Bible Soc., 92 Wis. 209, 65 N. W. 1037. CHAPTER XXVI PROBATE OF WILLS SECTION SECTION 485. Probate of wills in general. 498. Evidence and burden of proof. 486. Rights and interests under un- 499. Time of competency of wit- probated wills. nesses, 487. Place of probate. 500. Probate where will valid in part 488. What must be probated. only. 489. Production of will for probate. 501. Probate of conditional and al- 490. Who may be proponent of a ternative wills. will. 502. Probate of joint, double, mutual, 491. Jurisdiction of courts in probate -and simultaneous wills. of wills. 503. Probate of nuncupative wills. 492. Form and contents of applica- 504. Procedure to establish and pro- tion. bate lost or destroyed will. 493. Notice of proceedings for pro- 505. Degree of proof required to es- bate. tablish a lost or destroyed will. 494, Probate in common form. 506. Probate of foreign wills. 495. Probate in solemn form. 507. Uniform foreign probate law. 496. Repropounding a will once pro- 508. The effect of probate. bated or rejected. 509. Revocation of probate. 497. Hearing where application not formally contested. § 485. Probate of wills in general—Before any will can have any force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind.*. In other words the probate of a will is a civil proceeding to establish the validity 1 Pettit v. Black, 13 Nebr. 142, 12 N. W. 841. 423 424 § 486 WILLS of a will.’ It is a proceeding in rem,°* calling for the exercise of the judicial powers of the court.* "The probate of a will of real estate was unknown to the com- mon law, but a will of personal property was probated in the ecclesiastical courts. So in the absence of a statute there is no necessity for the probate of a will of real estate, and in order that the will operate as a conveyance of the land it must be proved in a suit by proof of the testator’s signature.® But by statute in most of the states of this country wills of both real and personal property are expressly required to be probated,’ and any attempt by provision in the will to dispense with this statutory require- ment will be fruitless.® § 486. Rights and interests under an unprobated will.— Until a will is duly probated the courts will not recognize, in an action, any powers of a person named in the will as executor,® nor any title of a devisee or legatee under the will.*° The will 2Lamb’s Estate v. Hall, 122 Mich. 239, 80 N. W. 1081; McCay v. Clay- ton, 119 Pa. St. 133, 12 Atl. 860. 3 Dickey v. Vann, 81 Ala. 425, 8 So. 195; In re Davis’ Estate, 151 Cal. 318, 86 Pac. 183, 90 Pac. 711, 121 Am. St. 105; Torrey v. Bruner, 60 Fla. 365, 53 So. 337; Johns v. Hodges, 62 Md. 525; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Bailey, 202 Mass. 283, 88 N. E. 898; Stevens v. Hope, 52 Mich. 65, 17 N. W. 698; Bradford v. Blossom, 207 Mo. 177, 105 S. W. 289; State v. Twelfth Judicial Dist. Ct, 34 Mont. 96, 85 Pac. 866, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 617, 115 Am. St. 510. 4Fotheree v. Lawrence, 30 Miss. 416; Stowe v. Stowe, 140 Mo. 594, 41 S. W. 951; Snuffer v. Howerton, 124 Mo. 637, 28 S. W. 166; Ryno v. Ryno, 27 N. J. Eq. 522; McClure v. Spivey, 123 N. Car. 678, 31 S. E. 857; Stout v. Young, 217 Pa. 427, 66 Atl. 659, 5 Armstrong v. Lear, (U. S.) 169, 6 L. ed. 589, 12 Wheat. 6Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478, 16 Sup. Ct. 871, 40 L. ed. 1044; Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608, 3 Sup. Ct. 407, 27 L. ed. 1049; Ar- rington v. McLemore, 33 Ark. 759; Young v. Norris Peters Co., 27 App. (D. C.) 140. 7 Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478, 16 Sup. Ct. 871, 40 L. ed. 1044; Good- man v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 38 Am. Rep. 13; Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45 Pac. 391, 35 L. R. A. 41; Rogers v. Rogers, 78 Ga. 688, 3 S. E. 451. 8 Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala. 110, 5 So. 497, 11 Am. St. 28; Sevier v. Wood- son, 205 Mo. 202, 104 S. W. 1, 120 Am, St. 728. "Brock v. Frank, 51 Ala. 85; Johnes v. Jackson, 67 Conn. 81, 34 Atl. 709. 10 McClaskey v. Barr, 54 Fed. 781; Knox v. Paull, 95 Ala. 505, 11 So. 156; Crow v. Powers, 19 Ark. 424; Turner v. McDonald, 76 Cal. 177, 18 Pac. 262, 9 Am. St. 189; Thomasson 425 PROBATE § 487 is wholly ineffectual as an instrument of title until it is duly probated.** But after probate the powers and titles under the will relate back to the date of the testator’s death. Thus a will may be used as evidence of a title though probated after the bringing of the suit in which it is used.** In the absence of probate of a will the deceased is presumed to have died intestate,** and his real estate descends to his heirs and next of kin under the law of intestate succession.** § 487. Place of probate-——The probate of a will, in the first instance, should be made in the place of the testator’s domi- cile at the time of his death.° What the last domicile of the testator may be is to be inferred from all the facts and circum- stances of the case. It embraces the fact of residence and the intention to remain indefinitely. A mere temporary residence in any county does not give the courts of that county exclusive jurisdiction. The will must be prcbated in the place of the tes- tator’s domicile regardless of where he died,*® or where the will was executed.” Recitals in the will are not conclusive evidence of the testator’s domicile.*® Where a testator left real estate in a state other than that of his domicile, the will may be probated in any county in which v. Driskell, 13 Ga. 253; Hartwell v. Parks, 240 Mo. 537, 144 S. W. 793; Pettit v. Black, 13 Nebr. 142, 12 N. W. 841; Lake v. Hood, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 32, 79 S. W. 323. 11Inge v. Johnston, 110 Ala. 650, 20 So. 757; Janes v. Williams, 31 Ark. 175; Chidsey v. Brookes, 130 Ga. 218, 60 S. E. 529, 14 Ann. Cas. 975; Harris v. Douglas, 64 Ill. 466; Pitts v. Melser, 72 Ind. 469; Meyers v. Smith, 50 Kans. 1, 31 Pac. 670; Cousens v. Advent Church, 93 Maine 292, 45 Atl. 43, 5 Prob. Rep. Ann. 312; Mackey v. Mackey, 71 N. J. Eq. 686, 63 Atl. 984. 12 White v. Keller, 68 Fed. 796, 15 C. C. A. 683; Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S. W. 478, 69 Am. St. 615. 13 Adams v. Phillips, 132 Ge. 455, 64 S. E. 467. 14 Miller v. Speight, 61 Ga. 460. 15 McDonnell v. Farrow, 132 Ala. 227, 31 So. 475; Corrigan v. Jones, 14 Colo. 311, 23 Pac. 913; Godwin v. Godwin, 129 Ga. 67, 58 S. E. 652. 16 Shultz v. Houck, 29 Md. 24; Converse v. Starr, 23 Ohio 491. 17 Olson’s Will, 63 Iowa 145, 18 N. W. 854; Stewart v. Pettus, 10 Mo. 755; Converse v. Starr, 23 Ohio 491. 18 Merrill v. Morrissett, 76 Ala. 433; Corrigan v. Jones, 14 Colo. 311, 23 Pac. 913. § 488 WILLS 426 any of the land lies. If he left personal property only within the state, the will may be probated in any county.” Where the only disposition in a will consists of real estate situated in an- other jurisdiction,” or of personal property situated in another jurisdiction, the courts of the testator’s domicile sometimes re- fuse to entertain probate jurisdiction thereof.” The will of a married woman must be offered for original probate in the jurisdiction in which her surviving husband is domiciled regardless of where she died.” The probate of a will where the property of the testator is situated, without reference to his domicile, is termed an “ancillary” probate, and affects the property situated in such jurisdiction alone.” An ancillary probate is not precluded by the action of the court of the testator’s domicile in admitting the will to probate there.” § 488. What must be probated.—All instruments of a testamentary character must be probated in order to become op- erative to transfer title to either real or personal property.” So an instrument which neither disposes of property nor appoints an executor is not testamentary in character, and, consequently, is not entitled to probate,”* although it be executed with all the formalities required by law.” A codicil should be probated, even though it contains nothing 19 Jaques v. Horton, 76 Ala. 238; 39. But see Meyers v. Smith, 50 Ewing v. Mallison, 65 Kans. 484, 70 Pac. 369, 93 Am. St. 299; Stewart v. Pettus, 10 Mo. 755. 20In re Earhart, 50 La. Ann. 524, 23 So. 476. 21In re Goods of Tamplin, L. R. (1894) Prob. 39. 22 Wicke’s Estate, 128 Cal. 270, 60 Pac. 867, 49 L. R. A. 138. 23 Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608, 3 S. Ct. 407, 27 L. ed. 1049; Gordon’s Will, 50 N. J. Eq. 397, 26 Atl. 268; Pepper’s Estate, 148 Pa. St. 5, 23 Atl. 1039; Tarbell v. Walton, 71 Vt. 406, 45 Atl. 748; Frame v. Thérmann, 102 Wis. 653, 79 N. W. Kans. 1, 31 Pac. 670. 24Frame v. Thormann, 102 Wis. 653, 79 N. W. 39. 25 Rogers v. Stevens, 8 Ind. 464; Shumway v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 114, 11 Am. Dec. 153; Snuf- fer v. Howerton, 124 Mo. 637, 28 S. .W. 166; Pettit v. Black, 13 Nebr. 142, 12 N. W. 841; Woodbridge v. Banning, 14 Ohio St. 328; In re John, 30 Oreg. 494, 47 Pac. 341, 50 Pac. 226, 36 L. R. A. 242, 26 Coffman v. Coffman, 85 Va. 459, 8 S. E. 672, 2 L. R. A. 848, 17 Am. St. 69. 27 Lucas v. Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 436, 21 L. ed. 779. 427 PROBATE § 488 but the revocation of a former will.?* But a will may be pro- bated even though the codicil can not be found, for it may op- erate separate and apart from the codicil.” So, also, if properly attested, must-a deed be probated, or a bill of exchange, or a_promissory note.** Where a will which has been executed in due form, refers to some paper which has not been so executed as containing direc- tions in regard to the disposition of the testator’s property, such paper, if in existence, and clearly identified as the one referred to in the will, is made by such reference a part of the will, and should be probated as such.** But where such extraneous paper referred to is the property of another person who refuses to give it up, the court will not require him to produce it, but will direct the probate of the will without the incorporation of such paper.** Schedules, notes and other papers may be considered in con- nection with the will, and as a part of it, when they are plainly identified in the will. This was held to be the case where notes payable at the death of the testator were folded up with his will, and were clearly and fully identified, and remained in his pos- session at the time of his death.** “If a will, executed and wit- nessed as required by statute, incorporates in itself by reference any document or paper not so executed and witnessed, whether the paper referred to be in the form of a will or codicil, or of a deed or indenture, or of a mere list or memorandum, the paper so referred to, if it was. in existence at the time of the execution of the will, and is identified by clear and satisfactory proof as 28Laughton v. Atkins, 1 Pick. Rep. 449; Newton v. Seaman’s (Mass.) 535. Friend Soc. 130 Mass. 91, 39 Am. 29 Sternberg’s Estate, 94 Iowa 305, Rep. 433; Fosselman v. Elder, 98 Pa. 62 N. W. 734. St. 159; Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moore 30 Frew v. Clarke, 80 Pa. St. 170. P. C. 427. 31 Jones v. Nicolay, 2 Rob. (Eccl.) 83 Goods of Sibthrop, L. R. 1 P. 288; Cover v. Stem, 67 Md. 449,10 & D. 106. Atl. ‘231, 1 Am. St. 406. 34 Fickle v. Snepp, 97 Ind. 289, 49 32JIn re Shillaber’s Estate, 74 Cal. 144, 15 Pac. 453, 5 Am. St. 433; Fickle v. Snepp, 97 Ind. 289, 49 Am. Am. Rep. 449; Fesler v. Simpson, 58 Ind. 83, § 489 WILLS 428 the paper referred to therein, takes effect as part of the will, and should be admitted to probate as such.’ § 489. Production of will for probate-——Some states pro- vide an official depositary for a will from the time of its execu- tion until it is required for probate. But in most jurisdictions the right of custody and control remains with the testator, and where he has been reticent about the matter of its execution, it is often difficult to determine after his death, whether he left a will or not. Any person having the custody or possession of the will of a decedent may be required to produce it for probate.** If any person is interested in the estate, or if he has reason to believe that he is a legatee or devisee under the will of any decedent, he may apply for a citation to have the will produced.*’ Statutes sometimes prescribe a penalty for withholding a will from probate,** and where the wrongdoer is a beneficiary under the will so withheld, it is generally provided that he forfeits his rights thereunder.*® If the person withholding the will from probate is entitled by law or the will to administer the estate of the testator, he is held to renounce the right by his act of with- holding the will.*° § 490. Who may be proponent of a will.—It was formerly the rule that the executor named in the will was the only person who had the right and duty of propounding the will for admission to probate,** and by statute in a few states the primary right to offer the will for probate belongs to the executor, if one is named, 35 Newton v. Seaman’s Friend Soc., 130 Mass. 91, 39 Am. Rep. 433. 86 Walch v. Orrell, 53 Colo. 361, 127 Pac. 141; Coulter v. People, 53 Colo. 40, 123 Pac. 647. 37 Foster v. Foster, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 48. 38In re Storey, 120 Ill. 244, 11 N. E. 209; Loring v. Oakey, 98 Mass. 267; Richardson v. Fletcher, 74 Vt. 217, 52 Atl. 1064. év Foote v. Foote, 61 Mich. 181, 28 N. W. 90; Carpenter vy. Denoon, 29 Ohio 379. 40 Keith v. Proctor, 114 Ala. 676, 21 So. 502. 41 Baker v. Bancroft, 79 Ga. 672, 5 S. E. 46; In re Wells’ Will, 5 Litt. (Ky.) 273; In re Hodnett, 65 N. J. Eq. 329, 55 Atl. 75; Lindemann v. Dobossy (Tex. Civ. App.), 107 S. W. 111; Ward v. Brown, 53 W. Va. 227, 44 S. E. 488; Wankford v. Wankford, 1 Salk. 299, 91 Eng. Re- print 265. 429 PROBATE § 491 and a party interested may act only where none is named or the executor is dead, non-resident, or refuses to act.4? But under most modern statutes, any devisee or legatee named in the will, or any person interested in the estate, may be a proponent.* Under these statutes it is generally held that the executor named in the will may propound the instrument for probate.** Under other statutes it is expressly provided that the will may be exhibited by any person and proof may be immediately taken ex parte;*® but usually when the will is thus presented by a stranger the statutes provide that notice shall be given to the ex- ecutor or others interested in its provisions. In the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, the person offering the will for probate must have an interest as executor or otherwise,*® but the application may be made by his agent or attorney,*’ and - any interest, however slight, and even, it seems, the bare possi- bility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle one to propound a will for probate.“ ‘Whoever has a right to offer a will in evidence, or to take title under it, may insist on having it proved.”* § 491. Jurisdiction of courts in the probate of wills.— Courts whose jurisdiction is confined wholly to matters pertain- 42Finch v. Finch, 14 Ga. 362; Ward v. Brown, 53 Wa. Va. 227, 44 S. E. 488. ‘ 43 McGrews v. McGrews, 1 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 30; Stone v. Huxford, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 452; Miller v. Coul- ter, 156 Ind. 290, 59 N. E. 853; Wells v. Wells, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 152, 16 Am. Dec. 150; Lytle’s Succession, 1 Rob. (La.) 268; Keniston v. Adams, 80 Maine 290, 14 Atl. 203; Stebbins v. Lathrop, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 33; Mat- ter of Weston, 60 Misc. 275, 113 N. Y. S. 619; Enloe v. Sherrill, 28 N. Car. 212; Roberts v. McMillan, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 571; Elwell v. Universalist General Convention, 76 Tex. 514, 13 S. W. 552; Lindemann v. Dobossy (Tex. Civ. App.), 107 S. W. 111; Schultz v. Schultz, 10 Grat. (Va.) 358, 60 Am. Dec. 335. 44Kennard vy. Kennard, 63 N. H. 303. 45 Martin v. Perkins, 56 Miss. 204. 46 Enloe vy. Sherrill, 6 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 212; Finch v. Finch, 14 Ga. 362; Schnee v. Schnee, 61 Kans. 643, 60 Pac. 738 (holding infants may in- stitute proceedings to probate by next friend). 47 Evansville Ice &c. Co. v. Winsor, 148 Ind. 682, 48 N. E. 592; Russell v. Hartt, 87 N. Y. 19. 48 Vestry of St. John’s Parish v. Bostwick, 8 App. Cas. (D. C.) 452; Keniston v. Adams, 80 Maine 290, 14 Atl. 203. 49 Stebbins v. Lathrop, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 33. See also Wells Fargo Co. v. Walsh, 87 Wis. 67, 57 N. W. 969. $ 491 WILLS 430 ing to the probate of wills and to the administration of decedents’ estates are probate courts. These courts are variously designated as probate courts, surrogates’ courts, orphans’ courts, etc., and in some states this jurisdiction is conferred on local courts hav- ing common-law powers.°? The probate courts, while classed as courts of record, are courts of limited jurisdiction, wholly of statutory origin and possessing no powers except those conferred by statute.°* The powers of such courts can not be restricted or: enlarged by the terms of the will.? Such courts are usually given exclusive original jurisdiction in the probate of wills,°* whether of real or personal property.™* Courts of equity have no jurisdiction in the probate of wills, nor to establish wills which have been denied probate by courts of law.” Ifacourt of equity has any such power, it is conferred by statute.° Likewise a court of equity can not be invoked to set aside the probate of a will on the ground of fraud, mistake or forgery,*’ nor to cancel an alleged will on any grounds, nor to enjoin its probate.** Equity will, however, take jurisdiction in a case where fraud was practiced upon the court in procuring the probate of a will.” 50 See Digest of Statutes, Ch. 28. 51 Elliott’s Estate v. Wilson, 27 Mo. App. 218. 52 Presbyterian Church v. McEl- hinney, 61 Mo. 540. 53 Johnes v. Jackson, 67 Conn. 81, 34 Atl. 709; Larson v. How, 71 Minn. 250, 73 N. W. 966; Wall v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91, 64 Am. Dec. 147; Stowe v. Stowe, 140 Mo. 594, 41 S. W. 951; Loosemore v. Smith, 12 Nebr. 343, 11 N. W. 493; Morgan v. Dodge, 44 N. H. 255, 82 Am. Dec. 213; Bowen v. Johnson,-5 R. I. 112, 73 Am. Dec. 49; Franks v. Chapman, 60 Tex. 46; Hotchkiss v. Ladd’s Estate, 62 Vt. 209, 19 Atl. 638; In re Jackman’s Will, 26 Wis. 104. 54 Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 38 Am. Rep. 13; Taylor v. Tibbatts, 13. B. Mon. (Ky.) 177;°Rumph v. Hiott, 35 S. Car. 444, 15 S. E. 235, 55 Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 10 Sup. Ct. 478, 33 L. ed. 805; Stead y. Curtis, 205 Fed. 439, 123 C. C. A. 507; Erwin v. Hamner, 27 Ala. 296; McDaniel v. Pattison, 98 Cal. 86, 27 Pac. 651, 32 Pac. 805; Robson v. Jones, 3 Del. Ch. 51. 56 Clough v. Clough, 10 Colo. App. 433, 51 Pac. 513. But see Harris v. Tisereau, 52 Ga. 153, 21 Am. Rep. 242. 57 Langdon v. Blackburn, 109 Cal. 19, 41 Pac. 814; Mitchell v. Hughes, 3 Colo. App. 43, 32 Pac. 185; Hans v. Holler, 165 Mo. 47, 65 S. W. 308; Loosemore v. Smith, 12 Nebr. 343, 11 N. W. 493. 58 Israel v. Wolf, 100 Ga. 339, 28 S. E. 109; Brown v. Webster, 87 Nebr. 788, 128 N. W. 635. 59 Gray v. Parks, 94 Ark. 39, 125 S. W. 1023, 431 PROBATE § 492 § 492. Form and contents of application.—The statutes of some states require a written petition for admitting a will to probate ;° but in the absence of any such statutory requirement such petition is unnecessary,” the production of the will ordinarily being enough to initiate proceedings. The application may be made orally where no form is prescribed. The rules of the probate court, however, sometimes require a written application. Although a written application may not al- ways be required, it is the better practice to institute probate proceedings in this way. It has been held that the court has a discretion to require that the application be made in writing.® Where the statute requires a petition and prescribes the necessary- allegations, no other allegations need be made.*° The petition is usually required to describe the will offered for probate, and to set forth the fact of the testator’s death ;** also his domicile at the time of his death,® these facts being essential to the jurisdiction of probate tribunals. But the petition need 60 Malone v. Cornelius, 34 Oreg. 192, 55 Pac. 536. See also Digest of Statutes, Ch. 28. 61 Deslonde v. Darrington, 29 Ala. 92; St. Leger’s Appeal, 34 Conn. 434, 91 Am. Dec. 735; In re Storey, 120° Ill, 244, 11 N. E. 209; Seery v. Mur- ray, 107 Iowa 384, 77 N. W. 1058. 62In re Howard’s Estate, 22 Cal. 395. 63 Miller v. Coulter, 156 Ind. 290, 59 N. E. 853; Small v. McCalley, 51 Ala. 527; In re Howard’s Estate, 22 Cal. 395; In re St. Leger’s Appeal, 34 Conn. 434, 91 Am. Dec. 735. 64 Small v. McCalley, 51 Ala. 527; Wright v. Fleming, 19 Hun (N. Y.) 370. 65 Small v. McCalley, 51 Ala. 527. 66 White v. Holmes (Tex. Civ. App.), 129 S. W. 874. 67 Matter of O’Connor, 65 Misc. 403, 121 N. Y. S. 903. 68 Moore v. Willamette Transp. &c. Co., 7 Oreg. 359; Bradshaw v. Rob- erts (Tex. Civ. App.), 52 S. W. 574, 69 McDonnell v. Farrow, 132 Alay 227, 31 So. 475; Moore v. Willamette Transp. &c. Co., 7 Ore. 359. 70 Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U. S. 238, 23 L. ed. 314;' Duncan v. Stewart, 25 Ala. 408, 60 Am. Dec. 527; Stevenson v. Superior Ct., 62 Cal. 60; Thomas v. People, 107 Ill. 517, 47 Am. Rep. 458; French v. Frazier, 7 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 425; Burns v. Van Loan, 29 La. Ann. 560; Day v. Floyd, 130 Mass. 488; John- son v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250, 27 Am. Rep. 276; Morgan v. Dodge, 44 N. H. 255, 82 Am. Dec. 213; State ex rel. Ross v. White, 29 N. Car. 116; Devlin v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. St. 273, 47 Am. Rep. 710; With- ers v. Patterson, 27 Tex. 491, 86 Am, Dec. 643; Melia v. Simmons, 45 Wis. 334, 30 Am. Rep. 746. § 493 WILLS 432 not generally allege that the testator had capacity to make a will,” or that the court has authority to act.” It is the better practice to allege in the petition all the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction, the validity of the will, the interest of the petitioner, and the names, description and residence of those who would be entitled to the estate as heirs or distributees,” and this is the substance of statutory require- ments in many states.” § 493. Notice of proceedings for probate.-—Upon applica- tion made for admitting a will to probate, notice of the pendency thereof is usually required to be served upon persons interested.” But where no notice of the original application is required by statute, and none is given, the judgment admitting the will to probate is valid if the statute makes ample provision for a con- test by appeal or by some other mode.” Personal notice is not required by the constitution,” nor is it usually required by statute; notice by publication being the com- mon form of notice provided by law.” A failure to give notice as required by statute may be objected to in the proceedings,” or the judgment may be reversed on appeal, or vacated in some other form of direct attack.*° 71In re Hathway’s Appeal, 46 Mich. 326, 9 N. W. 435. 72 Hooks v. Barnett, 38 Ala. 607. 661, 36 Pac. 110; Bonnemort v. Gill, 167 Mass. 338, 45 N. E. 768; In re Mousseau’s Will, 30 Minn. 202, 14 73 Boyett v. Kerr, 7 Ala. 9; Mor- ford vy. Dieffenbacker, 54 Mich, 593, 20 N. W. 600; Whitfield v. Hurst, 9 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 170. 74 See Digest of Statutes, Ch. 28. 75 Curtis v. Underwood, 101 Cal. ‘661, 36 Pac. 110; Dugan v. Northcutt, 7 App. (D. C.) 351; In re Larson’s Estate, 71 Minn. 250, 73 N. W. 966; ‘Heminway v. Reynolds, 98 Wis. 501, 74 N. W. 350. 76 Crippen v. Dexter, 13 Gray (Mass.) 330; Knight v. Hollings, 73 N. H. 495, 63 Atl. 38; Frazer v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 39 Mich. 198. 77 Curtis v. Underwood, 101 Cal. N. W. 887; In re Middleton’s Will, 72 Towa 424, 34 N. W. 193. 78In re Davis’ Estate, 136 Cal. 590, 69 Pac. 412; Flood v. Kerwin, 113 Wis. 673, 89 N. W. 845; Goodrich v. Ferris, 145 Fed. 844; Burbeck v. Lit- tle, 50 Vt. 713. 79 San Francisco &c. Asylum v. Su- perior Ct., 116 Cal. 443, 48 Pac. 379; In re Friedell; 20 App. Div. 382, 46 N. Y. S. 787; Leach v. Burr, 188 U. S. 510, 23 Sup. Ct. 393, 47 L. ed. 567. 80 Duperier v. Bevard, 107 La. 91, 31 So. 653; Floto v. Floto, 213 IIL 438, 72 N. E. 1092. , 433 PROBATE § 494 § 494. Probate in common form.—By the English prac- tice, and by the practice of some of the states, a will may be probated either in common form, or solemn form. A probate in common form is where the will is produced before the proper court or officer, and after proof by the attesting witnesses of the validity of its execution, is admitted to probate without notice to any person interested therein.** This form of probate is an ex parte proceeding, and does not contemplate a contest.*? No opportunity is given persons opposing the admission of the will to probate to introduce evidence in support of their contention, but they may cross-examine the witnesses offered by the pro- ponent.** This method of probate is very simple, and consists of produc- ing the will itself to the court, or to the clerk in vacation, if the statute permits, accompanied by an affidavit of the testator’s death. But the act of the clerk in admitting the will to probate must be confirmed by the court at the next ensuing term.** Probate after the common form ascertains nothing but the prima facie validity of the will, and that the instrument offered is what it purports to be.** The proceeding is confined to the question as to whether the will has been legally executed, and is the will of the testator.** This form of probate is deemed suffi- cient to justify the establishment of the will as a muniment of title, the appointment of an executor and the administration of the estate. A person desiring to contest a will admitted to pro- bate in common form, or to establish a will rejected on such a proceeding, must bring a separate suit for that purpose. § 495. Probate in solemn form.—A will is said to be pro- bated in solemn form when all parties interested have been duly 81 Bent v. Thompson, 5 N. Mex. 601, 49 S. W. 503; Salmon v. Huff, 9 408, 23 Pac. 234, Tex. Civ. App. 164, 28 S. W. 1044. 82 Wright v. Young, 75 Kans. 287, 85 Ex parte Fuller, 2 Story (U. S.) 89 Pac. 694. 327, Fed. Cas. No. 5147; Burns v. 83In re St. Leger’s Appeal, 34 Travis, 117 Ind. 44, 18 N. E. 45. Conn. 434, 91 Am. Dec. 735; Gray v. 86 Bent’s Appeal, 35 Conn. 523; Gray, 60 N. H. 28. George v. George, 47 N. H. 27; In re 84 Rothwell v. Jamison, 147 Mo. MHegarty’s Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 503. 28—Tuomp. WILLs. § 496 + WILLS 434 notified to appear at the time of its probate and the will then duly proved by the witnesses.*7 This form contemplates that the probate of the will in the probate court may be opposed.® The heirs or next of kin must be notified of the proceeding,” and such notice may be by publication. The executor of a will probated in common form may be com- pelled to probate it in solemn form, if the application therefor is made within a reasonable time.** This second proceeding is a direct attack upon the order admitting the will to probate, and is generally known as a contest.°? § 496. Repropounding a will once probated or rejected.— A proceeding to re-probate a will once probated or rejected is a collateral attack on the first proceeding,” and should be dis- missed,** unless the first proceeding was void for want of juris- diction.°° And when a will has once been fairly propounded and fairly rejected on its merits, it can not be again propounded, 87 Roy v. Segrist, 19 Ala. 810; Petty v. Ducker, 51 Ark. 281, 11 S. W. 2; In re Middleton, 72 Iowa 424, 34 N. W. 193; Martin v. Perkins, 56 Miss. 204; Roberts v. Flanagan, 21 Nebr. 503, 32 N. W. 563; George v. George, 47 N. H. 27; Armstrong v. Baker, 9 Ired. (N. Car.) 109; Field v. Apple River Log Driv. Co. 67 Wis. 569, 31 N. W. 17; Brett v. Brett, 3 Addams 210; Palmer v. Dent, 2 Robt. (Eccl.) 284. 88 Clough v. Clough, 10 Colo. App. 433, 51 Pac. 513; Fortune v. Buck, 23 Conn. 1; Olmstead v. Webb, 5 App. (D. C.) 38; Nat. Safe Deposit &c. Co. v. Sweeney, 3 App. (D. C.) 401; Cummins v. Cummins, 1 Marv. (Del.) 423, 31 Atl. 816, 2 Hardesty 125; Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332. 89 Stead v. Curtis, 205 Fed. 439, 123 Cc. C. A. 507; Herring v. Ricketts, 101 Ala. 342, 13 So. 502; In re Ham- ilton’s Estate, 120 Cal. 421, 52 Pac. 708; Lewis v. Luckett, 32 App. (D. C.) 188; Pettit v. Black, 13 Nebr. 142, 12 N. W. 841; Rice v. Filton, 14 Wyo. 101, 82 Pac. 577. 90 Melone’s Estate, 141 Cal. 331, 74 Pac. 991; Whitney v. Hanington, 36 Colo. 407, 85 Pac. 84. 91Knox v. Paull, 95 Ala. 505, 11 So. 156; Clough v. Clough, 10 Colo. App. 433, 51 Pac. 513; Brown v. An- derson, 13 Ga. 171; Martin v. Per- kins, 56 Miss. 204; Straub’s Case, 49 N. J. Eq. 264, 24 Atl. 569; Osborne v. Leak, 89 N. Car. 433; O’Dell v. Rogers, 44 Wis. 136. 92 Haynes v. Haynes, 33 Ohio 598, 31 Am. Rep. 579. 93In re Warfield’s Will, 22 Cal. 51, 83 Am. Dec. 49. 94In re Warfield’s Will, 22 Cal. 51, 83 Am. Dec. 49. 95 Gay v. Minot, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 352. 435 PROBATE § 497 so long as the order rejecting the probate stands unreversed.” But if the original judgment admitting the will to probate was not rendered upon the merits,°’ or was fraudulently obtained, or if the second applicant had no notice or knowledge of the prior proceeding and is without other remedy, the instrument may be repropounded for probate. And it has been held that such proceeding may be justified by the discovery of new evidence.* The petition to re-probate a will should allege the grounds upon which the applicant seeks to avoid the effect of the prior rejection.” § 497. Hearing where application not formally contested. —Statutory provisions regulating the practice in probate courts where the application is not contested are exceedingly meagre. Generally proof by one or more of the attesting witnesses, or evidence of their handwriting, is required.* At least the will should not be admitted to probate upon the consent of those opposed to it and without any proof.* Where the application is not contested the proceedings are of a summary character and informal, but parties opposed to the will may cross-examine the proponent’s witnesses, though they will not generally be permitted to introduce evidence themselves in support of their contention.? The probate court has inherent power to continue the hearing of the application.® 96In re Wells’ Will, 5 Litt. (Ky.) 273; In re Mousseau’s Will, 30 Minn. 202, 14 N. W. 887. 97 Whitfield v. Hurst, 9 Ired. (31 N. Car.) 170; Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477, 15 S. W. 618, 23 Am. St. 887. 7 98 Wills v. Spraggins, 3 Grat. (Va.) 555; Vestry of St. John’s Par- ish v. Bostwick, 8 App. Cas. (D. C.) 452. 99 Martin v. Perkins, 56 Miss: 204. 1 Redmond v. Collins, 4 Dev. L. (15 N. Car.) 430, 27 Am. Dec. 208; Lo- pez’s Succession, 33 La. Ann. 368. 2Harvey v. Smith, 1 Dev. & B. L. (18 N. Car.) 186. 3 Wills v. Spraggins, 3 Grat. (Va.) 543; Downey v. Downey, 16 Hun (N. Y.) 481. 4In re Lissauer’s Will, 5 N. Y. S. 260, 22 N. Y. St. 877; Hylton v. Hyl- ton, 1 Grat. (Va.) 161; Mayo v. Jones, 78 N. Car. 402. 5 Clough v. Clough, 10 Colo. App. 433, 51 Pac. 513; Moody v. Found, 208 Ill. 78, 69 N. E. 831; Malone v. Cornelius, 34 Ore. 192, 55 Pac. 536; In re St. Leger’s Appeal, 34 Conn. 434, 91 Am. Dec. 735; Gray v. Gray, 60 N. H. 28; Mayo v. Jones, 78 N. Car. 402; M. E. Church Missionary Soc. v. Ely, 56 Ohio St. 405, 47 N. E. 537. €Curtis vy. Underwood, 101 Cal. 436 § 498 WILLS § 498. Evidence and burden of proof.—Before a will can be probated proof must be made of its proper execution, the testator’s signature, the attestation of the witnesses, the publica- tion of the will and such like matters, and the burden of proving such facts rests upon the propounder.’ The proof in support of probate must be sufficient to convince the court that the paper produced is the lawful will of the testator.™ A prima facie case is made when it is shown that all the re- quirements of law have been observed in the execution of the will,* and unless such prima facie case is made the court should refuse probate even where probate is not contested.° The oral testimony of the attesting witnesses, being the best testimony, should always be obtained where possible.*® It is not generally necessary to produce all the attesting witnesses, though in reach of process,** and even in the absence of any attesting witnesses due execution may be shown for the purpose of pro- bate.77 Where the attendance of attesting witnesses can not be procured on account of absence or death, their signatures may be proved by any one familiar with their handwriting.** But where such witnesses are living and can not be procured at the probate of the will, their depositions may be taken and used as evidence. In such case, however, the deponent must have the will before 661, 36 Pac. 110; Kischman v. Scott, 166 Mo. 214, 65 S. W. 1031; In re Rice’s Will, 81 App. Div. 223, 81 N. Y. S. 68. 7Woodroof v. Hundley, 133 Ala. 395, 32 So. 570; Peale v. Ware, 131 Ga. 826, 63 S. E. 581; Wilenou v. Handlon, 207 Ill. 104, 69 N. E. 892; Barnes v. Barnes, 66 Maine 286; Cowan v. Shaver, 197 Mo. 203, 95 S. W. 200. 7a Hall v. Hall, 47 Ala. 290; Janes v. Williams, 31 Ark. 175; Tyler’s Estate, 121 Cal. 405, 53 Pac. 928. 8 Woodroof v. Hundley, 133 Ala. 395, 32 So. 570; Wright v. Young, 75 Kans. 287, 89 Pac. 694. 9JIn re Hayden’s Estate, 149 Cal. 680, 87 Pac. 275; Renn v. Samos, 33 Tex. 760. 10 Chase v. Lincoln, 3 Mass. 236; Berst v. Moxom, 157 Mo. App. 342, 138 S. W. 74. . 11 Field’s Appeal, 36 Conn. 277. 12 Hall’s Heirs v. Hall’s Exrs., 38 Ala. 131. 18 Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98, 85 Am. St. 145; Thompson v. King, 95 Ark. 549, 129 S. W. 798; In re Tyler’s Estate, 121 Cal. 405, 53 Pac. 928; Scott v. Her- rell, 31 App. (D. C.) 45; Lorts v. Wash, 175 Mo. 487, 75 S. W. 95; Pettit v. Black, 13 Nebr. 142, 12 N. W. 841. 14 Moore v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 627, 437 PROBATE § 499 him for the purpose of identification.” Where the testimony of the attesting witnesses is available it is not conclusive as to the fact of execution.** And where the testimony of the subscribing witnesses is insufficient to prove the formal execution of the will, other evidence is admissible to supply the deficiency,” or if their testimony is against the due execution of the will, it may be contradicted and the will supported by the testimony of other witnesses or by circumstances.** § 499. Time of competency of witnesses.—In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the competency of an attesting wit- ness to a will must exist at the time of attestation; and it is at this time that the competency of witnesses is to be determined.”® It may be given as an illustration of a reason for the rule, that so far as the capacity of the testator to make a will is concerned, it is the opinion of the attesting witnesses at the time the will was executed which is material, not that opinion as subsequently modified.” Statutes usually provide that if the witnesses are competent at the time of attesting, their subsequent incompetency does not prevent the will from being probated.** Conversely, if the wit- 24 So. 374; Butcher v. Butcher, 2f Colo. App. 416, 122 Pac. 397; Kelly v. Moore, 22 App. (D. C.) 9. 15 Schnee v. Schnee, 61 Kans. 643, 60 Pac. 738; Cawthorn v. Haynes, 24 Mo, 236. 16 Estate of McDermott, 148 Cal. 43, 82 Pac. 842; Ashworth v. Mc- Namee, 18 Colo. App. 85, 70 Pac. 156. 17In re Kent’s Estate, 161 Cal. 142, 118 Pac. 523; Gillis v. Gillis, 96 Ga. 1, 23 S. E. 107, 30 L. R. A. 143, 51 Am. St. 121; Sutton v. Sutton, 5 Har. (Del.) 459; Underwood v. Thurman, 111 Ga. 325, 36 S. E. 788. 18 Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 So. 831; In re Shapter’s Estate, 35 Colo. 578, 85 Pac. 688, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575, 117 Am. St. 216; Rash v. Purnell, 2 Har. (Del.) 448. 19 Kumpe v. Coons, 63 Ala. 448; Gillis v. Gillis, 96 Ga. 1, 23 S. E. 107, 30 L. R. A. 143, 51 Am. St. 121; Johnson v. Johnson, 187 Ill. 86, 58 N. E, 237; Hiatt v. McColley, 171 Ind. 91, 85 N. E. 772; Patten v. Tallman, 27 Maine 17; Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 115, 92 Am. Dec. 666; Sears v. - Dillingham, 12 Mass. 358; Carlton v. Carlton, 40 N. H. 14; Vester v. Col-. lins, 101 N. Car. 114, 7 S. E. 687; Maxwell v. Hill, 89 Tenn. 584, 15 S. W. 253; In re Lyon’s Will, 96 Wis. 339, 71 N. W. 362, 65 Am. St. 52. 20In re Ingalls’ Will, 148 Ill. 287, 35 N. E, 743. 21 Belledin v. Gooley, 157 Ind. 49, 60 N. E. 706; In re Trinitarian Cong. Church & Soc., 91 Maine 416, 40 Atl. 325; Pease v. Allis, 110 Mass. 157, 14 Am. Rep. 591; In re Sullivan, 114 § 500 WILLS 438 nesses must be competent at the time of attestation, but were in fact incompetent at that time, it is clear that, in the absence of an enabling statute, any subsequent competency would be of no avail, as the will, not having been sufficiently executed, could not be proved.” § 500. Probate where will valid in part only.—An instru- ment testamentary in character, and executed in the form re- quired for a will, can not be denied probate upon the ground that some of its provisions are invalid, or contrary to the provisions of law.” The probate of the will merely determines the validity of its execution. The sufficiency or invalidity of its provisions will be determined when effect is sought to be given them.” However, it becomes necessary sometimes to admit the will to probate in part, and reject it in part. Thus if the court is satis- fied that a particular clause of the will has been inserted by fraud, in the lifetime of the testator, without his knowledge,”® or by forgery, after his death,” or that he has been induced by fraud or undue influence to make it a part of the will,” the instrument will be probated, with the reservation of that particular clause.” Also where a page is removed from an executed will and an- other substituted without re-execution, the will as originally ex- ecuted will be admitted to probate, and no effect will be given to the invalid substituted page.” Mich. 189, 72 N. W. 135; In re Holt, 56 Minn. 33, 57 N. W. 219, 22 L. R. A. 481, 45 Am. St. 434; In re Klein’s Estate, 35 Mont. 185, 88 Pac. 798; Morrill v. Morrill, 53 Vt. 74, 38 Am. Rep. 659. 22 Gump v. Gowans, 226 III. 635, 80 N. E. 1086, 117 Am. St. 275. 23 Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98, 85 Am. St. 145; Pool v. Pool, 35 Ala. 12; In re Shillaber’s Estate, 74 Cal. 144, 15 Pac. 453, 5 Am. St. 433; Bent’s Appeal, 35 Conn. 523; Kultz v. Jaeger, 29 App. (D. C.) 300; Harris v. Pue, 39 Md. 535; Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, 29 N. E. 1151, 15 L. R. A. 447; Mears v. Likewise, if a clause is inad- Mears, 15 Ohio St. 90; Prater v. Whittle, 16 S. Car. 40. 24Tn re Pforr, 144 Cal. 121, 77 Pac. 825. 25 Barton v. Robins, 3 Phillim. 455, note (b). 26 Plume v. Beale, 1 P. Wms. 388. 27 Eastis v. Montgomery, 93 Ala. 293, 9 So. 311; Florey v. Florey, 24 Ala. 241; In re Harrison’s Appeal, 48 Conn. 202; Morris v. Stokes, 21 Ga. 552; Burger v. Hill, 1 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 360. 28 Allen v. McPherson, 1 H. L. Cas. 191. 29 Varnon v. Varnon, 67 Mo. App. 534, 439 PROBATE § 501 vertently included in a will, without any direction on the part of the testator to make it a part of his will, probate will be granted of the instrument with such clause omitted.®® § 501. Probate of conditional and alternative wills.—A testamentary paper, by its terms to take effect only on the hap- pening of a certain contingency, can not be admitted to probate as a will if the contingency does not happen.** But in some cases conditional or alternative wills have been admitted to pro- bate whether the event has happened or not; the court preferring to leave the doubt to be decided by a proceeding to construe the will? And where a testator has made two wills, one to have effect upon the happening of one event, and the other upon the happening of another event, if the event has happened by the time of probate, the will which is favored by the event will be ad- mitted, and the other will be rejected.** § 502. Probate of joint, double, mutual, and simultaneous wills.—A will jointly executed by two persons, disposing of all the property to the survivor, is held to be in the nature of two separate and distinct wills which can be proved in favor of the survivor on the death of one of them without revoking it.** It is probated as the separate will of the one who first dies.** Where the will provides that the survivor shall succeed to the estate of the one first to die, it is ordinarily only necessary to probate the will as the will of the one first dying.*® If all the makers of a joint, double, mutual or simultaneous will die before the instrument is probated, it may be probated as the sole will of each at the same time.*” But the better practice 30 Hill v. Burger, 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 264. 31 Morrow’s Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 440, 9 Atl. 660, 2 Am. St. 616. 82 Ex parte Lindsay, 2 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 204. 33 Hamilton’s Estate, 74 Pa. St. 69; Bradish v. McClellan, 100 Pa. St. 607. 34 Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454, 4 Am. Rep. 135; Lewis v. Sco- field, 26 Conn. 452, 68 Am. Dec. 404; In re Davis, 120 N. Car. 9, 26 S, E. 636, 38 L. R. A. 289, 58 Am. St. 771. 35 Jn re Hansen’s Estate, 87 Nebr. 567, 127 N. W. 879; Wyche v. Clapp, 43 Tex. 543. 36 Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N. W. 998. 37 Betts v. Harper, 39 Ohio St. 639, 48 Am. Rep. 477; Black v. Richards, 95 Ind. 184. § 503 : WILLS 440 is to probate it as the will of the one who dies first, without waiting until the death of the other,** and, unless the will has in some manner been revoked, it may again be probated on the death of such other as to his property mentioned therein.” A will in which two persons have united, but which is in effect the separate will of each, is properly admitted to probate on the death of either as the separate will of that person, but if not proved until both are dead it can be probated as the will of both.” §503. Probate of nuncupative wills—The statutes usu- ally require a statement of the character of the will in the petition for probate of such will, and in the citation or notice, and fix the minimum and character of proof necessary to establish the will. In consequence of the disfavor with which nuncupative wills are looked upon by the courts,** it is necessary to prove testamen- tary capacity and animus testandi by the clearest evidence.** Strict proof must be made of all the facts which the law makes essential to the validity of such wills.** The statutes generally require the words spoken by the testator to be proved in court within six months from the time they were spoken, and after that time probate will not be allowed unless the testator’s words were reduced to writing within a specified time after they were spoken.** In some jurisdictions three wit- nesses are required to prove the testator’s words, and in others only two are required; but it is generally required that all the t 38 Evans v. Smith, 28 Ga. 98, 73 Am. Dec. 751; In re Davis’ Will, 120 N. Car. 9, 26 S. E. 636, 38 L. R. A. 289, 58 Am. St. 771; Wyche v. Clapp, 43 Tex. 543. 39In re Davis’ Will, 120 N. Car. 9, 26 S. E. 636, 38 L. R. A. 289, 58 Am, St. 771. 40In re Raupp, 10 Misc. 300, 31 N. Y. S. 680, 1 Gibbons 151, 64 N. Y. St. Rep. 305; Betts v. Harper, 39 Ohio St. 639, 48 Am. Rep. 477. 41 Kirby v. Kirby, 40 Ala. 492; George v. Greer, 53 Miss, 495; Perez v. Perez, 59 Tex. 322; O’Callaghan v. O’Brien, 116 Fed. 934. 42 Woods v. Ridley, 27 Miss. 119. 43 Johnston v. Glasscock, 2 Ala. 218; St. James Church v. Walker, 1 Del. Ch. 284; Webb v. Webb, 7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 626; Succession of Dor- ries, 37 La. Ann. 833; Broach v. Sing, 57 Miss. 115. 44 Godfrey v. Smith, 73 Nebr. 756, 103 N. W. 450; Rankin v. Rankin, 31 N. Car. 156; Perez v. Perez, 59 Tex. 322; Gould v. Safford, 39 Vt. 498 45 See Digest of Statutes, Ch. 28. 441 PROBATE § 504 witnesses must have been present together at the time the words were spoken, and each must testify to all the testamentary words spoken by the testator.*® The probate of a nuncupative will is conclusive,*” and can not in some jurisdictions, be set aside or contested in a court of equity, like a written will, the only remedy of the party aggrieved being by appeal ;** but a contest being, in some jurisdictions, in the nature of an appeal from the judgment of the probate court, every fact which is required to be proved to establish the validity of the will, may be disproved on the contest to show its invalid- ie” § 504. Procedure to establish and probate lost or de- stroyed will—Where a will has been lost or destroyed with- out the knowledge or consent of the testator, it does not cease to be his will, and its contents may be established by competent proof.”° In the absence of a statute conferring jurisdiction on the pro- bate court to establish a will that has been lost or destroyed, resort must be had to a court of equity to establish the instru- ment by proof of its due execution, its loss or destruction, and its contents.°** After the will is thus established in equity it must be probated or set up in a court of law as a muniment of title. But where the statute confers jurisdiction on probate courts to establish lost or destroyed wills, the necessity of resorting to equity is obviated.°* The loss or destruction of the will must occur after the death of the testator, unless it was fraudulently destroyed in his life- times- 46 Tally v. Butterworth, 10 Yerg. Schnee, 61 Kans. 643, 60 Pac. 738; (Tenn.) 501. 47 Bradley v. Andress, 27 Ala. 596; Brown v. Harris, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 386. . 48 Page v. Page, 2 Rob. (Va.) 424. 49 Bolles v. Harris, 34 Ohio St. 38. 50 Gaines v. Hennen, 24 How. (U. S.) 553, 16 L. ed. 770; McBeth v. McBeth, 11 Ala, 596; Schnee v. Schaff v. Peters, 111 Mo. App. 447, 90 S. W. 1037. 51 Nunn v. Lynch, 73 Ark. 20, 83 S. W. 316; Harris v. Tisereau, 52 Ga. 153, 21 Am. Rep. 242. 51a Jackson v. Jackson, 4 Mo. 210. 52In re Kennedy’s Will, 167 N. Y. 163, 60 N. E. 442; Harris v. Harris, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 88, 574. § 504 WILLS 442 The petition or complaint to establish a lost or destroyed will should show that the decedent executed a will, and that it was afterward destroyed without his consent in his lifetime, or other- wise fraudulently disposed of, or, if lost, that such will was in existence at the time of the death of the testator.* But such complaint or petition need not state the time nor place of destruc- tion, nor by whom, when or how it was destroyed.** Nor is it necessary to set out the exact words of the will alleged to be lost or destroyed. In the absence of a copy this could hardly be done. All that can reasonably be required of the pleader under such circumstances is to show in general terms the disposition which the testator made of his property by the instrument, that it pur- ported to be his will, was duly executed and attested by the requisite number of witnesses.°° Nor will such complaint or petition be bad for failing to allege the county and state where the testator died.*® The beneficiaries under a lost or destroyed will and all those who would take if such will were not probated are necessary parties to a suit to establish it.°’ Such parties must be served either personally or by publication, notice to the administrator not being sufficient.** In the absence of a statute to the contrary the action is not triable by a jury, but must be tried by the court as in other equitable actions.*° But where there is a statute which provides a proceeding in the nature of a contest as a direct attack upon an order admitting a lost or destroyed will to probate, a jury may be called to determine what the provisions of the will, as legally executed by the testator, were.® 53 Kellogg v. Ridgely, 161 Ind. 110, 67 N. E. 929. 54Gfroerer v. Gfroerer, 173 Ind. 424, 90 N. E. 757. 55 Anderson v. Irwin, 101 Ill. 411; Jones v. Caster, 139 Ind. 382, 38 N. E. 812, 47 Am. St. 274; Allison v. Allison, 7 Dana (Ky.) 90; Early v. Early, 5 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 376. 56 Jones v. Casler, 139 Ind. 382, 38 N. E. 812, 47 Am. St. 274. 57 Taylor v. Bennett, 1 Ohio C. C. 95, 1 Ohio C. D. 57; In re Valentine’s Will, 93 Wis. 45, 67 N. W. 12. 58 Baugarth v. Miller, 26 Ohio St. 541. 59 Wright v. Fultz, 138 Ind. 594, 38 N. E. 175. 60 Behrens v. Behrens, 47 Ohio St. 323, 25 N. E. 209, 21 Am. St. 820; Haynes v. Haynes, 33 Ohio 598, 31 Am. Rep. 579, 443 PROBATE § 505 § 505. Degree of proof required to establish a lost or de- stroyed will—There is no difference between the rules of evidence applicable to the case of a lost or destroyed will and those which govern the reproduction of any other lost or de- stroyed instrument. It is incumbent on the party seeking to establish the will, not only to prove its due execution, but also to rebut the presumption that the testator destroyed it if it can not be found at his death. In order to authorize the court to probate a copy of the lost or destroyed instrument it is incumbent upon the proponent to show what became of the original will, in whose custody it was placed, account for its non-production, and produce some com- petent proof of its contents.” Proof of the contents of a lost or destroyed will is quite a different matter from proof of its due execution and attesta- tion. Ordinarily the latter fact is sufficiently proved by one witness,** unless the statute requires more.” Such fact may also be proved by evidence of the testator’s declarations; but such declarations alone are not sufficient proof of the contents of the will.°* It has been held, however, that the declarations of a testator are admissible to show the making of a will, its con- tinued existence, its contents, and to rebut or confirm the pre- sumption of its revocation.” The contents of the instrument 61 Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Tex. 286, 84 Am. Dec. 619. 62 Caeman v. Van Harke, 33 Kans. 333, 6 Pac. 620; In re Francis’ Estate, 94 Nebr. 742, 144 N. W. 789, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 861. 63 In re Guinasso’s Estate, 13 Cal. App. 518, 110 Pac. 335; Nichols v. Kingdom Iron Ore Co., 56 N. Y. 618; Propst v. Mathis, 115 N. Car. 526, 20 S. E. 710; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 84 Tex. 31, 19 S. W. 294. 64 Skeggs v. Horton, 82 Ala. 352, 2 So. 110; In re Johnson’s Will, 40 Conn. 587; Varnon v. Varnon, 67 Mo. App. 534; Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Tex. 286, 84 Am. Dec. 619. 65In re Johnson’s Estate, 134 Cal. 662, 66 Pac. 847; Scott v. Maddox, 113 Ga. 795, 39 S. E. 500, 84 Am. St. 263. 66 Williams v. Miles, 68 Nebr. 463, 94 N. W. 705, 96 N. W. 151, 62 L. R. A. 383, 110 Am. St. 431, 4 Ann. Cas. 306. : 67 Patterson v. Hickey, 32 Ga. 156; Mercer v. Mackin, 14 Bush (Ky.) 434; Collagan v. Burns, 57 Maine 449; Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252, 45 Am. Rep. 322; Lawyer v. Smith, 8 Mich. 411, 77 Am. Dec. 460; In re Marsh, 45 Hun (N. Y.) 107, 9 N. Y. St. 441; Foster’s Appeal, 87 Pa. St. 67, 30 Am. Rep. 340. 444 § 506 WILLS are provable by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses, or other persons who have read the will. § 506. Probate of foreign wills —A court may grant orig- inal probate of the will of a non-resident who dies leaving either real or personal property within its territorial jurisdiction.” A will made in a foreign jurisdiction, and probated there, disposing of property elsewhere, must be probated in the state where the property is situated also, or courts can not enforce the provisions of such will.”° This is true except in those states in which the statutes confer certain powers upon foreign executors, which powers may be exercised by virtue of such statutory regula- tions.”* The title to personalty is made conclusive everywhere by the probate of the will in the jurisdiction of the testator’s domicil, but it is of no force in establishing the sufficiency or validity of a devise of real estate in another state, unless by virtue of a statute of the state in which the real estate is situated.” It is provided by statute in many states that the will of a non- 68 Dawson v. Smith’s Will, 3 Houst. (Del.) 335; Fitzgerald v. Wynne, 1 App. (D. C.) 107; Mosely v. Carr, 7 Ga. 333. 69 Jaques v. Horton, 76 Ala. 238; In re Edelman’s Estate, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 962, 113 Am. St. 231; Estate of Washburn, 45 Minn. 242, 47 N. W. 790, 11 L. R. A. 41; In re Gordon, 50 N. J. Eq. 397, 26 Atl. 268; In re Barandon’s Estate, 41 Misc. 380, 84 N. Y. S. 937; Shields v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 119 N. Car. 380, 25 S. E. 951; In re Clayson’s Estate, 26 Wash, 253, 66 Pac. 410. 70Ward v. Oates, 43 Ala. 515; Thiebant v. Sebastian, 10 Ind. 454; Dixon v. D’Armond, 23 La. Ann. 200; Campbell v. Sheldon, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 8; Pope v. Cutler, 34 Mich. 150; Townsend v. Downer, 32 Vt. 183; Ives v. Allyn, 12 Vt. 589, 71 Mansfield v. Turpin, 32 Ga. 260; Karrick v. Pratt, 4 Greene (Iowa) 144, 72 Dickey vy. Vann, 81 Ala. 425, 8 So. 195; Apperson v. Bolton, 29 Ark. 418; Irwin’s Appeal, 33 Conn. 128; Pennel v. Weyant, 2 Harr. (Del.) 501; Evansville Ice &c. Co. v. Win- sor, 148 Ind. 682, 48 N. E. 592; Otto v. Doty, 61 Iowa 23, 15 N. W. 578; Newcomb v. Newcomb, 108 Ky. 582, 57 S. W. 2, 22 Ky. L. 286, 51 L. R. A. 419; Budd v. Brooke, 3 Gill (Md.) 198, 43 Am. Dec. 321; Hutchins v. State Bank, 12 Met. (Mass.) 421; Pott v. Pennington, 16 Minn. 509 (Gil. 460) ; Wells v. Wells, 35 Miss. 638; Gaven v. Allen, 100 Mo. 293, 13 S. W. 501; Barstow v. Sprague, 40 N. H. 27; Nelson v. Potter, 50 N. J. L. 324, 15 Atl. 375; Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N. Y. 394; Carpenter v. Denoon, 29 Ohio St. 379; Abrams v. Moseley, 7S. Car. 150; Martin v. Stovall, 103 445 PROBATE § 507 resident, admitted to probate according to the law of the testa- tor’s domicile at the time of his death, may be admitted to pro- bate upon the production of a duly authenticated copy thereof together with the probate, without other proof, or notice. In some states, however, notice is required to be given to interested parties of the production of such authenticated copies.* Such statutes were not intended to deny original probate of foreign wills in states where property disposed of by the will is situated.” The probate of a foreign will is generally allowed as a matter of course and without inquiring into the validity of the will or the sufficiency of the proofs upon which the court granting the original probate acted, provided such original probate was granted by a court of competent jurisdiction and is properly authenticated.” § 507. Uniform foreign probate law.—The need of a uni- form foreign probate law has long been recognized by the legal profession. Through the efforts of a committee of the Amer- ican Bar Association such a law has been enacted in the states of Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mich- igan, Nevada, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, Alaska, and perhaps a few others. In order to awaken an interest in the Tenn. 1, 52 S. W. 296, 48 L. R. A. 130; Slayton v. Singleton, 72 Tex. 209, 9 S. W. 876; Tarbell v. Walton, 71 Vt. 406, 45 Atl. 748; Thrasher v. Ballard, 33 W. Va. 285, 10 S. E. 411, 25 Am. St. 894; Robertson v. Pick- rell, 109 U. S. 608, 27 L. ed. 1049, 3 Sup. Ct. 407. 73 See post, ch. 28, 74 California: Fairall’s Code Civ. Proced. (1916), § 1324; Connecti- cut: Gen. St. (1902), § 305; Maine: Rev. St. (1903), p. 538, § 13; Massa- chusetts: Pub. St. (1902), p. 1279, § 10; Minnesota: Gen. Stats. (1913), §§ 7250-7286; Montana: Revis. Code (1907), § 7405; Nebraska: Cobbey’s Ann. St. (1911), §§ 5010, 5011; Ne- vada: Rev. St. (1912), §§ 5878, 5879; New Hampshire: Pub. St. (1901), Ch. 187, § 13; New Jersey: Comp. St. (1910), pp. 3820, 3821, §§ 23,24; Ohio: Ann, Code (1912), §§ 10573; Okla- homa: Rev. Stats. (1910), §§ 6217- 6219; Rhode Island: Gen. L. (1909), pp. 1115, 1116, §§ 10-13; South Da- kota: Comp. Laws (1913), §§ 52-54; Tennessee: Code (1896), § 3916; Vermont: Pub. St. (1906), §§ 27505 2752. 7 Parnell v. Thompson, 81 Kans. 119, 105 Pac. 502, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 658n. 76 Brock v. Frank, 51 Ala. 85; Ap- person v. Bolton, 29 Ark. 418; New- man v. Willetts, 52 Ill, 98; Russell v. Hart, 87 N.- Y. 19; Markwell v. Thorn, 28 Wis. 548. § 507 WILLS 446 desirability of such a law, and to stimulate, if possible, the mem- bers of the profession in jurisdictions which have not adopted the law, to efforts to secure its adoption by their law-making bodies, it is deemed advisable to include herewith a copy of such law as drafted by the above mentioned committee and in effect adopted by the states named. The act is as follows: AN ACT Providing for the Probate in this State of Probated Foreign Wills. and to Make Uniform in that Regard the Laws of the States Enacting the Same. Be it enacted, etc. Section 1. A will duly proved, allowed and admitted to pro- bate outside of this state, may be allowed and recorded in the proper court of any county in this state in which the testator shall have left any estate. Sec. 2. When a copy of the will and the probate thereof, duly authenticated, shall be presented by the executor or by any other person interested in the will, with a petition for probate, the same must be filed and a time must be appointed for a hearing thereon and such notice must be given as required by law on a petition for the original probate of a domestic will. Sec. 3. If upon the hearing, it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the will has been duly proved, allowed and admitted to probate outside of this state, and that it was executed according to the law-of the place in which the same was made, or in which the testator was at the time domiciled, or in conformity with the laws of this state, it must be admitted to probate, which probate shall have the same force and effect as the original probate of a domestic will. Sec. 4. When a duly authenticated copy of a will from any state or country where probate is not required by the laws of such state or country, with a duly authenticated certificate of the legal custodian of such original will that the same is a true copy, and that such will has become operative by the laws of such state or country, and when a copy of a notarial will in possession of a notary in a foreign state or country entitled to the custody 447 PROBATE § 508 thereof (the laws of which state or country require that such will remain in the custody of such notary), duly authenticated by such notary, is presented by the executor or other persons interested to the proper court in this state, such court shall appoint a time and place of hearing and notice thereof shall be given as in case of an original will presented for probate. If it appears to the court that the instrument ought to be allowed in this state, as the last will and testament of the deceased, the copy shall be filed and recorded, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in the said court. Sec. 5. All laws and parts of laws in conflict or inconsistent herewith be and the same are hereby repealed. Sec. 6. This act may be’cited as the Uniform Foreign Probate Act, and shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of the states which enact it. § 508. The effect of probate—A decree of probate is gen- erally regarded as in the nature of a judgment in rem,” and in the absence of statutory provisions, is conclusive against all the world, as to the validity of the will,”* and affirms the title of the beneficiary under the will from the time of the testator’s death, relating back so as to make valid whatever has been previously done, which, under the will, after probate, the beneficiary could lawfully have done.” An ex parte probate ascertains nothing but the prima facie validity of the will and that the instrument is seemingly what it purports to be.*° Such probate is conclusive as to the fact that the will was executed, and the proceeding can not be attacked 77 Hall v. Hall, 47 Ala. 290; State In re Williams, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 529; v. McGlynn, 20 Cal. 233, 81 Am. Dec. Orr v. O’Brien, 55 Tex. 149. 118; Crippen v. Dexter, 13 Gray 79 Dublin v. Chadbourn, 16 Mass. (Mass.) 330. 433; Sutphen v. Ellis, 35 Mich. 446; 78 Brock v. Frank, 51 Ala. 85; Allaire y. Allaire, 37 N. J. L. 312. Janes v. Williams, 31 Ark. 175; 80 Burns v. Travis, 117 Ind. 44, 18 Tucker v. Whitehead, 58 Miss. 762; N. E. 45. § 509 WILLS 448 collaterally; but such probate is conclusive only as to the fact of the valid execution of the will; it adjudicates nothing as to the meaning or operation of the will.** Although the probate of a will establishes the sufficiency thereof, and confirms the claims of those holding under it so far as to make it evidence of title, it does not determine the title to the property, nor establish the validity of any devise given by it, the will having no greater effect after probate than other legal conveyances.*? Until the will has been properly probated, it can not be used for any purpose, either to vest or establish any right under it, or as evidence in any court of a right claimed ;** but when once properly probated, the will becomes operative, and relates back to the date of the testator’s death.** § 509. Revocation of probate.-—The court granting pro- bate of a will has inherent, and, in some states, statutory power to revoke the probate thereof.*° This power is exercisable as to wills probated in common form,** or without contest.*” Ina few jurisdictions, however, the court granting probate of a will is denied the power to vacate its decree.** Some sufficient grounds for revoking the probate must be al- leged and proved; and the statutes usually specify that the pro- bate may be revoked where it is shown that the court acted with- out jurisdiction,*® that the probate was the result of some fraud 81 Faught v. Faught, 98 Ind. 470; Fallon v. Chidester, 46 Iowa 588, 26 Am. Rep. 164; Poplin v. Hawke, 8 N. H. 124; Evans v. Anderson, 15 Ohio St. 324. 82 Fallon v. Chidester, 46 Iowa 588, 26 Am. Rep. 164; Greenwood v. Mur- ray, 26 Minn. 259, 2 N. W. 945. 83 Moore v. Stephens, 97 Ind. 271. 84 Pitts v. Melser, 72 Ind. 469. 85 Sowell v. Sowell, 40 Ala. 243; Bacigalupo v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. 92, 40 Pac. 1055; Larson v. How, 71 Minn. 250, 73 N. W. 966; In re Miller, 28 Misc. 373, 59 N. Y. S. 978; Rockwell v. Holden, 22 R. I. 244, 47 Atl. 543; Hotchkiss v. Ladd, 62 Vt. 209, 19 Atl. 638. 86 Wall v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91, 64 Am. Dec. 147, 87 Gordon v. Old, 52 N. J. Eq. 317, 30 Atl. 19. 88 Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 56 Atl. 881; Wright v. Wright, 79 Mich. 527, 44 N. W. 944; In re McAndrew’s Estate, 206 Pa. 366, 55 Atl. 1040. 89In re Warfield, 22 Cal. 51, 83 Am. Dec. 49; Davis v. Upson, 209 Ili, 206, 70 N. E. 602. 449 PROBATE § 509 or mistake,*° that the testator was without capacity to make the will,®* and “other sufficient causes. 9992 The probate of a will can be revoked only at the instance of a person interested in the estate,** provided he is not estopped by his acceptance of a legacy or otherwise.** 90 Shultz v. Houck, 29 Md. 24; Vance v. Upson, 64 Tex. 266; Good- ell v. Pike, 40 Vt. 319; Parsons v. Balson, 129 Wis. 311, 109 N. W. 136. 91In re Kilborn, 158 Cal. 593, 112 Pac. 52; Odom v. Thompson, 9 N. Car. 24. : 92Matter of Tilden, 56 App. Div. 277, 67 N. Y. S. 879, 29—Tuomp. WILLS. 83 Cowden v. Cowden, 2 How. (Miss.) 806; In re Peaslee’s Will, 73 Hun 113, 25 N. Y. S. 940, 56 N. Y. St. 134; Wynne v. Spiers, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 394, ®4In re Richardson’s Will, 81 Hun 425, 30 N. Y. S. 1008, 63 N. Y. St. 201, CHAPTER XXVII CONTEST OF WILLS SECTION SECTION 515. Various methods of contest. 524. Grounds for contest in general. 516. Nature of proceeding to contest. 525. Pleadings in actions to contest 517. Who may oppose or contest pro- wills. bate. 526. Burden of proof. 518. Who may contest a probated 527. Issues in general. will. 528. Invalidity of execution as an is- 519, When contestant estopped. sue, 520. Limitation of time for contest. 529. Issue of testamentary incapacity. 521. Jurisdiction of actions to con- 530. Undue influence as an issue. test wills. 531. Issue of fraud and forgery. 522. Jurisdiction of federal courts. 532. Trial. 523. Parties in actions to contest 533. Evidence. wills. 534. Verdict and decree. § 515. Various methods of contest.—The uncontested pro- ceeding to probate a will is wholly ex parte, and the judgment or order admitting it to probate establishes prima facie its validity as a testamentary instrument. This is the common form of pro- bate which we treated in the preceding chapter, and is the form authorized by statute in some states. In other states a notice and an opportunity for a contest are given, formal or informal, in the probate court. If the will is admitted to probate or rejected with- out a contest, or after a contest not tried by a jury, an appeal may usually be taken to a court in the county where the case may be tried de novo by a jury. In still other states, after the will is ad- mitted to probate in the probate court, a retrial may be had upon petition to that court to revoke the probate, or an action at law or a suit in equity to contest the validity of the probated will may be brought in another court within the county.t These methods of contest by appeal, by petition to revoke the probate, or by original 1See Digest of Statutes, ch. 28. 450 451 CONTEST § 516 action, correspond in purpose and effect to the probate in solemn form, of which we have already spoken.? The validity of a will may be tested by other methods than those set out in statutes authorizing contests of wills. Chancery courts have often construed wills and entertained suits for the purpose, and the first step in all cases seeking a proper construc- tion of a will was to ascertain the validity of the instrument.’ § 516. Nature of proceeding to contest—It would serve no useful purpose here to detail the various statutory provisions relating to the procedure for the contest of wills, The general purpose of these statutes is to provide a review, where demanded, of the action of the court in probating the will; to give to all par- ties in interest their day in court; and to fix a time within which the proceeding to contest must be brought or the decree of probate become final. The proceeding is generally held to be one in rem,* and can commonly be brought only after the will has been pro- bated.’ It was formerly treated asa suit in equity, and this view is still held by some courts in spite of statutory changes.® The right to test the validity of a will given by statute is cumu- lative in a certain sense, and is in addition to the old right in equity.” But it is generally regarded as neither an action at law nor a suit in equity,® and is a civil case, though not a civil action. 2 Knox v. Paull, 95 Ala. 505, 11 So. 156; Shaw v. Camp, 61 Ill. App. 68; of Sweeney, 94 Nebr. 834, 144 N. W. 902. Dew v. Reid, 52 Ohio St. 519, 40 N. E, 718, 32 Story’s Equity, § 1446; Craw- fordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 178 Ind. 258, 98 N. E. 177. 4Kumpe v. Coons, 63 Ala. 448; In re Davis’ Estate, 151 Cal. 318, 86 Pac. 183, 90 Pac. 711, 121 Am. St. 105; Cruit v. Owen, 21 App. (D. C.) 378; Maurer v. Miller, 77 Kans. 92, 93 Pac. 596, 127 Am. St. 408, 15 Ann. Cas. 663; Bradford v. Blossom, 207 Mo. 177, 105 S. W. 289; In re Estate 5Irving v. Bruen, 110 App. Div. 558, 97 N. Y. S. 180; Stacey v. Cun- ningham, 69 Ohio St. 176, 68 N. E. 1001. 6 Claussenins v. Claussenins, 179 Ill, 545, 53 N. E. 1006; Keister v. Keister, 178 Ill. 103, 52 N. E. 946. 7 Faught v. Faught, 98 Ind. 470. 8 Clough v. Clough, 10 Colo. App. 433, 51 Pac. 513; Grady v. Hughes, 64 Mich. 540, 31 N. W. 438. ® Carpenter v. Bailey, 127 Cal. 582, 60 Pac. 162. ~N § 517 WILLS 452 Although the proceeding is in the nature of an appeal,*° it is an original action,’ and must be tried de novo.” Whether the will was properly or improperly probated is not in issue, nor does the contest review the action of the court below onerror.*® Ina contest the question of the validity of the will as offered for probate is raised for adjudication on its merits, and the court is not restricted in its inquiry by the action of the court in admitting the instrument to probate.** § 517. Who may oppose or contest probate.—The probate of a will can be opposed or resisted only by one having some in- terest in the estate which will be adversely affected if the will be probated.** Such interest must be a substantial and not a mere contingent interest.*® Such contestant may be the testator’s heirs,’” his next of kin,** legatees or devisees under a prior will or codicil,*® or one entitled to administer the estate in case the proposed will is denied pro- bate.”° 10 Haynes v. Haynes, 33 Ohio St. 598, 31 Am. Rep. 579. 11 Bradford v. Andrews, 20 Ohio St. 208, 5 Am. Rep. 645. 12 Moore v. McNulty, 164 Mo. 111, 64 S. W. 159; Herring v. Ricketts, 101 Ala. 340, 13 So. 502. 13In re Watson’s Will, 131 N. Y. 587, 30 N. E. 56, 4 Silv. Ct. App. 30; Converse v. Starr, 23 Ohio St. 491; Clark v. Ellis, 9 Ore. 128. 14 McIntire v. McIntire, 162 U. S. 383, 16 Sup. Ct. 814, 40 L. ed. 1009; In re Mack’s Appeal, 71 Conn. 122, 41 Atl. 242; Shaw v. Camp, 163 Ill. 144, 45 N. E. 211, 36 L. R. A. 112; Preston v. Fidelity Trust &c. Co., 94 Ky. 295, 22 S. W. 318, 15 Ky. L. 130; Sanderson v. Sanderson, 52 N. J. Eq. 243, 30 Atl. 326; Berg’s Estate, 173 Pa. St. 647, 34 Atl. 234, 15 State v. Sacramento County Super. Ct., 148 Cal. 55, 82 Pac. 672, 2L. R. A. (N. S.) 643; Meyer v. Fogg, 7 Fla. 292, 68 Am. Dec. 441; Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S. W. 478, 69 Am. St. 615; Murry v. Hennessey, 48 Nebr. 608, 67 N. W. 470; In re Coursen’s Will, 4 N. J. Eq. 408. 16 State v. Sacramento County Su- perior Ct., 148 Cal. 55, 82 Pac. 672, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643; In re Fallon’s Will, 107 Iowa 120, 77 N. W. 575. 17 Murphy v. Murphy, 65 S. W. 165, 23 Ky. L. 1460; Theriot’s Succession, 114 La. 611, 38 So. 471; In re Hob- bin’s Estate, 41 Mont. 39, 108 Pac. 7. 18 Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S. W. 478, 69 Am. St. 615. 19In re Langley’s Estate, 140 Cal. 126, 73 Pac. 824; Murphy v. Murphy, 65 S. W. 165, 23 Ky. L. 1460. 20Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S. W. 478, 69 Am. St. 615; Matter of Davis, 45 Misc. 554, 92 N. Y. S. 968. 453 CONTEST § 518 § 518. Who may contest a probated will—The right to contest a will exists in favor of any interested person, and his interest must be pleaded and proved or the contest will be dis- missed.”* All must show an interest who join in such action.” The right to contest a will is purely statutory in most juris- dictions, and one insisting upon such right must bring himself clearly within the statute.”* This right of contest exists in be-~ half of heirs at law,** a surviving spouse,”® legatees and dev- isees,*° assignees of legatees,*” beneficiaries under a trust,”* claimants under a prior will,”® and claimants under a subsequent will. Devisees or legatees under a lost will may contest the validity of another will which attempts to dispose of the same property.** But persons without any interest can not maintain an action to contest a will.°? Thus it has been held that a creditor of the testator has no such interest as will authorize him to maintain the action,** nor has the donee of an heir at law such an interest as will entitle him to contest the will.** 21 Lockard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala. 641, 24 So. 996, 74 Am. St. 63; Flow- ers v. Flowers, 74 Ark. 212, 85 S. W. 242; Vestry of St. John’s Parish v. Bostwick, 8 App. (D. C.) 452; In re Edelman’s Estate, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 962, 113 Am. St. 231; Schmidt v. Bomerbach, 64 Ind. 53; State ex rel, Nolte v. McQuillin, 246 Mo. 674, 152 S. W. 341, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 526; Murry v. Hennessey, 48 Nebr. 608, 67 N. W. 470; Rothrock v. Rothrock, 22 Ore. 551, 30 Pac. 453. 22 Scott v. Farman, 89 Ind. 580. 23 Harrison v. Stanton, 146 Ind. 366, 45 N. E. 582. 24Hays v. Bowdoin, 159 Ala. 600, 49 So. 122; In re Benton’s Estate, 131 Cal. 472, 63 Pac. 775; Meyer v. Fogg, 7 Fla. 292, 68 Am. Dec. 441; Wetter v. Habersham, 60 Ga. 193. 25 Rainey v. Ridgway, 148 Ala. 524, 41 So. 632; In re Benton’s Estate, 131 Cal. 472, 63 Pac. 775. The state has no interest 26In re Wickes’ Estate, 139 Cal. 195, 72 Pac. 902; Finch v. Finch, 14 Ga. 362; State v. McQuillin, 246 Mo. 674, 152 S. W. 341, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 526. , 27In re Engle’s Estate, 124 Cal. 292, 56 Pac. 1022. 28In re Fay’s Estate, 145 Cal. 82, 78 Pac. 340, 104 Am. St. 17. 29In re Langley’s Estate, 140 Cal. 126, 73 Pac. 824; In re Buckingham’s Appeal, 57 Conn. 545, 18 Atl. 256. 30 McCutchen v. Loggins, 109 Ala. 457, 19 So. 810; Roulett v. Mulherin, 100°Ga. 591, 28 S. E. 291, 81 McDonald v. McDonald, 142 Ind. 55, 41 N. E. 336, 32 McCutchen v. Loggins, 109 Ala. 457, 19 So. 810. 33 Montgomery v. Foster, 91 Ala. 613, 8 So. 349; Hooks v. Brown, 125 Ga. 122, 53 S. E. 583. 84Ransome v. Bearden, 50 Tex. 119. § 519 WILLS 454 which will entitle it to contest a will, where it merely shows that there is a probability that some heir may fail to appear and claim the property, so as to permit proceedings to declare an escheat.*® Neither has a public administrator such interest as will entitle him to maintain an action to contest.** One who has resisted the probate of a will has had his day in court and can not afterward contest such will by an action under a statute providing for contest of probated wills ;*” and where the will gives to an heir the precise portion he would take as heir such person takes by descent and not under the will, and has no such interest in the will as will give him a right to contest it. The guardian of an infant or person of unsound mind, can not sue to contest a will, but the infant must sue by next friend,*° or guardian ad litem.*° § 519. When contestant estopped.—A person may estop himself from contesting a will by a transfer, release, agreement or extinction of his heirship, and such estoppel, though equi- table, may be pleaded as a defense in the probate court. Thus an agreement by a legatee to pay money to an heir at law of the testator for forbearance of his right to contest the will rests upon a valuable consideration and is valid, and the court will take cognizance of such agreement when it is relied on as a defense by way of estoppel to 35 State v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. 55, 82 Pac. 672,2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643; State v. McGlynn, 20 Cal. 233, 81 Am. Dec. 118. 36 In re Hickman’s Estate, 101 Cal. 609, 36 Pac. 118. 37 Morell v. Morell, 157 Ind. 179, 60 N. E. 1092; Harrison v. Stanton, 146 Ind. 366, 45 N. E. 582. _38Thompson vy. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N. E. 314, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 740, : 39 Campbell v. Fichter, 168 Ind. 645, 81 N. E. 661, 11 Ann. Cas. 1089. 49In re Dye’s Will, 16 N. Mex, an action to contest the will.‘ 297, 120 Pac. 306; Holland v. Couts, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 515, 98 S. W. 233; In re Van Alstine’s Estate, 26 Utah 193, 72 Pac. 942. 41In re Edelman’s Estate, 148 Cal. 233, 82 Pac. 962, 113 Am. St. 231; Fisher v. Clopton, 110 Mo. App. 663, 85 S. W. 623. 42 Sheppey v. Stevens, 185 Fed. 147; Prater v. Miller, 25 Ala. 320, 60 Am. Dec. 521; Rector &c. of St. Mark’s Church v. Teed, 120 N. Y. 583, 24 N. E. 1014; Clark v. Lyons, 38 Misc. 516, 77 N. Y. S. 967. 455 § 519 CONTEST Also a promissory note given in settlement of a threatened con- test is valid, and may be plead in estoppel.** An agreement between the testator and an expectant heir whereby the latter relinquishes all interest in the estate that might in the future vest in him will operate as an estoppel to a contest of a will made by such testator.** When one has accepted the benefits of a will with full knowl- edge of the facts on which his right is based he is thereby estopped from asserting the invalidity of the instrument, espe- cially if there has been a lapse of time, witnesses have died, or he and other interested parties have so altered their positions that they can not be restored to statu quo.* But there can be no estoppel as against a plaintiff unless it be shown that the defendant has incurred some liability, or has been induced to do something to his prejudice in consequence of the plaintiff’s conduct.** A person who has received a legacy under a will can not contest the validity of the instrument without restoring the legacy or bringing the money into court.*7 But where a devisee under a will, claiming a devise of land, joins in an unsuccessful suit for partition of the land, without knowledge at the time of the mental unsoundness of the testator, he will not be estopped to contest such will. He obtained nothing and has nothing to restore. His election was without knowledge of the facts.** 43 Snowball v. Snowball, 164 Cal. 476, 129 Pac. 784; Lipps v. Panko, 93 Nebr. 469, 140 N. W. 761; Parriss v. Jewell, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 199, 122 S. W. 399. 44In re Garcelon’s Estate, 104 Cal. 570, 38 Pac. 414, 32 L. R. A. 595, 43 Am. St. 134. 45 Utermehle v. Norment, 197 U. S. 40, 25 Sup. Ct. 291, 49 L. ed. 655; Medlock v. Merritt, 102 Ga. 212, 29 S. E, 185; Lanning v. Gay, 70 Kan. 353, 78 Pac. 810, 85 Pac. 407; Stone v. Cook, 179 Mo. 534, 78 S. W. 801, 64 L. R. A. 287; Holland v. Couts, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 515, 98 S. W. 233. 46 Jones v. McPhillips, 82 Ala. 102, 2 So. 468; De Berry v. Wheeler, 128 Mo. 84, 30 S. W. 338, 49 Am. St. 538; Stevens v. Dennett, 51 N. H. 324; Brown v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 541, 86 Am. Dec. 406. 47 Bowen v. Howenstein, 39 App. (D. C.) 585, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 1179; Lee v. Templeton, 73 Ind. 315; Holt v. Rice, 54 N. H. 398, 20 Am. Rep. 138. 48 Lee v. Templeton, 73 Ind. 315; Rodermund vy. Clark, 46 N. Y. 354. § 520 WILLS 456 § 520. Limitation of time for contest.—The statutes of most states fix a period of time within which a will, once ad- mitted to probate, may be contested; and if an action for that purpose is not brought within the time so fixed the probate becomes absolutely conclusive, and not open to further attack, direct or collateral.“° This period of time varies in the different states from one to five years, and contests are governed by such statute instead of the ordinary statute of limitations.°° These statutes are jurisdictional in their nature, since the court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter after the limitation has expired.** The limitation pfovided in the statute is a bar to all save those who are under disability, such as infants, persons of unsound mind, and non-residents of the state. These have a designated time after the removal of their disabilities to contest the will.°? As a result of these statutes a sale by the devisee of the land devised will pass no title to the purchaser in case the will is set aside in an action brought within the statutory period. Where petition to contest a will is filed within the statutory period of limitation, although a part only of the persons interested are made parties thereto, the right of action is saved as to all who may ultimately be made parties to such action, notwithstanding the fact that some of them are not brought into the case until after the period of limitation has expired.** 49 Bent v. Thompson, 138 U. S. 114, 11 Sup. Ct. 238, 34 L. ed. 902; In re Dunsmuir’s Estate, 149 Cal. 67, 84 Pac. 657; In re Sharboro’s Estate, 63 Cal. 5; Matter of Becker, 28 Hun (N. Y.) 207. 50 Bacigalupo v. San Francisco Super. Ct. 108 Cal. 92, 40 Pac. 1055; Storrs v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 180 Ill. 368, 54 N. E. 185, 72 Am. St. 211; Evansville Ice &c. Co. v. Winsor, 148 Ind. 682, 48 N. E. 592; Duff v. Duff, 103 Ky. 348, 45 S. W. 102, 20 Ky. L. 52; Justus’ Succession, 45 La. Ann. 190, 12 So. 130; Meyer v. Henderson, 88 Md. 585, 41 Atl. 1073, 42 Atl. 241, Schlottman v. Hoffman, 73 Miss. 188, 18 So. 893, 55 Am. St. 527; Stowe v. Stowe, 140 Mo. 594, 41 S. W. 951; Hughes v. Boone, 81 N. Car. 204; Cox’s Estate, 167 Pa. St. 501, 31 Atl. 747. 51 Meyer v. Henderson, 88 Md. 585, 41 Atl. 1073, 42 Atl. 241. 52 Cornell v. Goodrich, 21 Ind. 179. 53 Robertson v. Brown, 187 Mo. 452, 86 S. W. 187, 106 Am. St. 485; Hughes v. Burriss, 85 Mo. 660. 5¢Floyd v. Floyd, 90 Ind. 130; Bradford v. Andrews, 20 Ohio St. 208, 5 Am. Rep. 645. 457 CONTEST § 521 An attempt to probate a codicil or a later will is regarded as a contest, and is barred after tiie period of limitation has ex- pired.*® : $521. Jurisdiction of actions to contest wills—The courts uniformly hold, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, that whenever power is given to a probate or surro- gate court to probate a will, the decree of such court can not be set aside by a court of equity,°* except in the absence of any rem- edy at law.*’ Jurisdiction to determine the question of the validity of a will is vested exclusively in courts of law,** or in the probate court.®® In some states, however, actions in equity to contest wills are provided for by statute.® § 522. Jurisdiction of federal courts.—Federal courts have no jurisdiction in actions to contest wills unless a federal ques- 55 Watson v. Turner, 89 Ala. 220, 8 So. 20; In re Adsit’s Estate, Myr. Prob. (Cal.) 266. 56 Watson v. Bothwell, 11 Ala. 650; State v. McGlynn, 20 Cal. 233, 81 Am. Dec. 118; Mitchell v. Hughes, 3 Colo. App. 43, 32 Pac. 185; Hooks v. Brown, 125 Ga. 122, 53 S. E. 583; ’ Dibble v. Winter, 247 Ill. 243, 93 N.. E, 145; Kirsher v. Kirsher, 120 Iowa’ 337, 94 N. W. 846, 8 Prob. Rep. Ann. 719; Hughey v. Sidwell, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 259; Chase v. Winans, 59 Md. 475; Swain v. Gilbert, 3 Mo. 347; Vincent v. Vincent, 70 N. J. Eq. 272, 62 Atl. 700; Anderson v. Anderson, 112 N. ¥. 104, 19 N. E. 427, 2 L. R. A. 175; Simmons v. Leonard, 89 Tenn. 622, 15 S. W. 444. 57 Beyer v. Le Fevre, 17 App. Cas. (D. C.) 238; Anderson v. Anderson, 112 N. Y. 104, 19 N. E, 427, 2 L. R. A. 175. 58 Gray v. Parks, 94 Ark. 39, 125 S. W. 1023; Dibble v. Winter, 247 Til, 243, 93 N. E. 145; Morse v. Morse, 42 Ind. 365; Lynch v. Miller, 54 Iowa 516, 6 N. W. 740; Dean v. Swayne, 67 Kans. 241, 72 Pac. 780; Hans v. Holler, 165 Mo. 47, 65 S. W. 308; In re Austin’s Will, 35 App. Div. 278, 55.N. Y. S. 52; Lewis v. Ames, 44 Tex. 319; In re Miller’s Estate, 31 Utah 415, 88 Pac. 338. 59 Carrau v. O’Calligan, 125 Fed. 657; State v. McGlynn, 20 Cal. 233, 81 Am. Dec. 118; Tudor v. James, 53 Ga. 302; Gibson v. Dooley, 32 La. Ann. 959; Scripps v. Wayne Prob. Judge, 131 Mich. 265, 90 N. W. 1061. 100 Am. St. 614; Andersen v. Ander- sen, 69 Nebr. 565, 96 N. W. 276; An- derson v. Anderson, 112 N. Y. 104, 19 N. E. 427, 2 L. R. A. 175; Sumner v. Staton, 151 N. Car. 198, 65 S. E. *902, 18 Ann. Cas. 802. 60 McCutchen v. Loggins, 109 Ala. 457, 19 So. 810; Dibble v. Winter, 247 Ill. 243, 93 N. E. 145; Abbott v. Traylor, 11 Bush (Ky.) 335; Wili- jams v. Miles, 63 Nebr. 859, 89 N. W. 451; Raudebaugh v. Shelley, 6 Ohio St. 307; Coffman v. Hedrick, 32 W. Va. 119, 9 S. E, 65. § 523 WILLS 458 tion arising under the constitution and laws of the United States is involved, or unless there exists a question of diverse citizen- ship of the parties.** : When the controversy over the validity of a will arises be- tween two citizens of different states, a federal court has juris- diction of a proceeding to contest it which the statutes of a state authorize to be instituted in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state. “Where a state law, statutory or customary, gives to the citizens of the state, in an action or suit inter parties, the right to question at law the probate of a will, or to assail probate in a suit in equity, the courts of the United States in administering the rights of citizens of other states, or aliens, will enforce such remedies.’ By virtue of their chancery jurisdiction, federal courts have jurisdiction over the administration of estates when the requisite citizenship and other conditions exist; but this jurisdiction does not extend to the appointment of administrators, confirmation of executors, or the probate of wills in either common or solemn form or as a proceeding in rem,** unless the case comes up in some form or other from the District of Columbia or from the territories.® § 523. Parties in actions to contest wills—In order that there may be a full hearing and final determination in an action to contest a will, all persons interested in favor of the will or who would be interested in the estate in the absence of the will, should be made parties to the proceeding.®* The action may be instituted by any one of the interested 61 Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 37 L. ed. 867, 13 Sup. Ct. 906. 62 Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 22, 23 L. ed. 524, 1 Abb. N. Cas. 25n; .. McDermott v. Hannon, 203 Fed. 1015; Sawyer v. White, 122 Fed. 223. 63 Farrell v. O’Brien, 199 U. S. 98, 50 L. ed. 101, 25 Sup. Ct. 727. 64 McDonnell v. Jordan, 178 U. S. 229, 44 L. ed. 1048, 20 Sup. Ct. 886; Higgins v. Eaton, 178 Fed. 153; Ball v. Tompkins, 41 Fed. 486. 65 Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478, 40 L. ed. 1044, 16 Sup. Ct. 871. 66 Coleman v. Floyd, 105 Ark. 300, 150 S. W. 703; Layton v. Jacobs, 5 Penn. (Del.) 71, 62 Atl. 691; Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 349, 48 S. W. 478, 69 Am. St. 615; In re Coryell’s Will, 4 App. Div. 429, 39 N. Y. S. 508; Mordecai v. Canty, 86 S. Car. 470, 68 S. E. 1049, 459 CONTEST § 523 parties,®” and all others not joining as plaintiffs should be made parties defendant.® At common law heirs and next of kin were not necessary parties to an action to contest a will;°° but they are now generally made so by statute.” The beneficiaries in the will, and all other persons who would be injuriously affected by a decree setting aside the will are deemed necessary parties defendant.™ The executor of a will, if he has qualified as such, has a right to support and defend the will, and is usually deemed a neces- sary party defendant; but he is no longer a necessary party after he has fully administered the estate and been discharged.” Purchasers of land from a devisee under a will duly probated are necessary parties in an action to contest such will.” 67 Hays v. Bowdoin, 159 Ala. 600, 49 So. 122; Floyd v. Floyd, 90 Ind. 130, 68 Freeman v. Easly, 117 Ill. 317, 7 N. E. 656; Floyd v. Floyd, 90 Ind. 130; Tibbatts v. Berry, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 473; Eddie v. Parke, 31 Mo. 513; Hutson v. Sawyer, 104 N. Car. 1, 10 S. E. 85; In re Miller’s Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 575, 28 Atl. 443; Wills v. Spraggins, 3 Grat. (Va.) 555. 69 Bonnemort v. Gill, 167 Mass. 338, . 45 N. E. 768; Kischman v. Scott, 166 Mo. 214, 65 S. W. 1031; Knight v. Hollings, 73 N. H. 495, 63 Atl. 38, 12. Prob. Rep. Ann. 207; Bent v. Thomp- son, 5 N. Mex. 408, 23 Pac. 234; Ma- lone v. Cornelius, 34 Ore. 192, 55 Pac. 536. 70 Stapleton v. Stapleton, 21 Ala. 587; Stone v. Green, 30 Ga. 340; Floto v. Floto, 213 Ill. 438, 72 N. E. 1092, 10 Prob. Rep. Ann. 68; In re Myers’ Estate, 69 N. J. Eq. 793, 64 Atl. 138; Dworsky v. Arndstein, 29 App. Div. 274, 51 N. Y. S. 597; Ran- kin v.,Rankin, 31 N. Car. 156. ™ McMaken v. McMaken, 18 Ala. 576; Janes v. Williams, 31 Ark, 175; Thompson v. McDermott, 19 Fla. 852; Brown v. Riggin, 94 Ill. 560; McGeath v. Starr, 157 Ind. 320, 61 N. E. 664; Vancleave v. Beam, 2 Dana (Ky.) 155; Maskell v. Roussel, 5 Rob. (La.) 500; Wells v. Wells, 144 Mo. 198, 45 S. W. 1095; Early v. Nash, 139 App. Div. 736, 124 N. Y. S. 293; Odom v. Thompson, 8 N. Car. 58; Reformed Presb. Church v. Nelson, 35 Ohio St. 638; Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23. 72 McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 28 L. ed. 1015, 5 Sup. Ct. 652; In re Whetton’s Estate, 98 Cal. 203, 32 Pac. 970; Evans v. Arnold, 52 Ga. 169; Campbell v. Campbell, 130 Ill. 466, 22 N. E. 620, 6 L. R. A. 167; Pleasants v. McKenney, 109 Md. 277, 71 Atl. 955; Timpson v. Lorsch, 50 Misc. 398, 100 N. Y. S. 535. 73 Foley v. O’Donaghue, 167 Ind. 134, 77 N. E. 352, 7 Roberts v. Abbott, 127 Ind. 83, 26 N. E. 565. § 524 WILLS 460 § 524. Grounds for contest in general—The grounds for the contest of a will usually are (1) want of proper execution,” (2) forgery,”* (3) incapacity of the testator,” (4) accident or mistake,"* (5) fraud, (6) undue influence,” or (7) any other matter involving the execution of the will. By statute in some states the grounds for contesting a will are (1) unsoundness of the testator’s mind and (2) undue exe- cution. Under the first are to be classed every species of mental unsoundness that would render a party incompetent, while all objections to the validity of the execution of the will are in- cluded under the second head. Duress and fraud are not to be regarded as additional causes of contest, but as examples of undue execution.** Under such statutes the phrase’ “undue exe- cution” has been held to include every species of duress, fraud, coercion, infancy, revocation, and every other valid objection to the execution of the will.®? The plaintiff is not confined to any single ground of contest.** He may allege any number of grounds, and proof of one is suf- herent.* An application to probate a foreign will may be resisted on the ground that the copy of the will or of the record of the foreign probate is not properly authenticated, that the probate, though duly authenticated, is insufficient on its face,*® that the will is insufficiently executed as to its disposition of real estate within the state,°’ that the foreign court had no jurisdiction,** 75 Thompson v. Rainer, 117 Ala. 318, 23 So. 782. 76In re Thomas’ Estate, 155 Cal. 488, 101 Pac. 798. 77 Etter v. Armstrong, 46 Ind. 197. 78 Knight v. Hollings, 72 N. H. 495, 62 Atl. 38. 79 Wells v. Betts, 45 App. Div. 115, 61 N. Y. S. 231. 80 Etter v. Armstrong, 46 Ind. 197; Payne’s Succession, 25 La. Ann. 202. 81 Lange v. Dammier, 119 Ind. 567, 21 N. E. 749; Kenworthy v. Williams, 5 Ind. 375. 82Vance v. Vance, 74 Ind. 370; Willett v. Porter, 42 Ind. 250. 83 Hays v. Bowdoin, 159 Ala. 600, 49 So. 122. 84 Moore v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 627, 24 So. 374. 85 Lytle’s Succession, 1 Rob. (La.) 268. 86 Barr v. Closterman, 2 Ohio C. C. 387, 1 Ohio C. Dec. 546, 27 Wkly. L. Bul. 392. 87 Otto v. Doty, 61 Iowa 23, 15 N. W. 578; Dublin vy. Chadbourn, 16 Mass. 433. 88 Stark v. Parker, 56 N. H. 481. 461 CONTEST § 525 or that the party prosecuting the application for record has no interest.®° § 525. Pleadings in actions to contest wills.—An action to contest a probated will is instituted by the filing of a bill, peti- tion or complaint setting forth with definiteness and certainty the grounds relied on for relief, and the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. In whatever form the probate of a will is contested, it is re- quired that the contestant shall allege the grounds of his con- test. Any number of grounds may be alleged, and, unless re- quired by the code, the separate grounds need not be separately paragraphed.** The allegations should be of facts and not con- clusions of law.°* A prima facie case of the invalidity of the will must appear from the pleadings on the part of the contest- ant.°* Where unsoundness of mind or undue execution is relied on by the contestant it is sufficient if he state that at the time of the alleged execution of the proposed paper the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind,” or that the instrument was unduly executed.°* But the facts relied on for relief must be alleged where the grounds of contest embrace fraud, duress, or undue influence.” 89 Lytle’s Succession, 1 Rob. (La.) 268. 90 Barksdale v. Davis, 114 Ala. 623, 22 So. 17; In re Sheppard’s Estate, 149 Cal. 219, 85 Pac. 312; Hixon v. West, 83 Ga. 786, 10 S. E. 450; Sin- net v. Bowman, 151 Ill. 146, 37 N. E. 885; Fowler v. Young, 19 Kan. 150: 91 Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276; In re Cozzens’ Will, 61 Pa. St. 196. 92McDonald_ v. Ind. 55, 41 N. E. 336. 93 Ellis v. Crawson, 147 Ala. 294, 41 So. 942; Herbert v. Berrier, 81 Ind. 1. 94Lyons v. Campbell, 88 Ala. 462, 7 McDonald, 142 So. 250; Meeks v. Lofley, 99 Ga. 170, 25 S. E. 92. 85 Hays v. Bowdoin, 159 Ala. 600, 49 So. 122; In re Kilborn’s Estate, 158 Cal. 593, 112 Pac. 52; Lange v. Dammier, 119 Ind. 567, 21 N. E. 749. 96 Barksdale v. Davis, 114 Ala. 623, 22 So. 17; In re Burrell’s Estate, 77 Cal. 479, 19 Pac. 880; Wenning v, Teeple, 144 Ind. 189, 41 N. E. 600. 97 Ellis v. Crawson, 147 Ala. 294, 41 So. 942; In re Sheppard’s Estate, 149 Cal. 219, 85 Pac. 312; McCam- bridge v. Walraven, 88 Md. 378, 41 Atl. 928; Story v. Story, 188 Mo. 110, 86 S. W. 225; Brown v. Mitchell, 75 Tex. 9, 12 S. W. 606. § 526 WILLS 462 As the will itself is not the foundation of the action it is not necessary to file a copy of it with the complaint as an exhibit.** The interest of the contestor should also be shown,” and, if required, the complaint must allege that all interested persons are made parties to the action.* The complaint should contain a prayer for the relief contem- plated by the statute ;? and, where required by the statute or local usage, the pleading should be verified.* § 526. Burden of proof.—In an action to contest a will on the ground of unsoundness of mind of the testator the burden of proof is generally upon the plaintiff or contestant until the fact of such unsoundness of mind has been established.* But there are cases which hold that the proponent of the will has the burden of proof as to every fact necessary to the validity of the will, including the mental capacity of the testator.° The courts holding the latter view take the position that the rule that all persons are presumed sane until the contrary appears 98 Schmidt v. Bomersbach, 64 Ind. 53. 99 Niederhaus v. Heldt, 480. 1Early v. Nash, 139 App. Div. 736, 124 N. Y. S. 293. 5 2Luther v. Luther, 122 Ill. 558, 13 N. E. 166; In re Watson, 131 N. Y. 587, 30 N. E. 56, 4 Silv. Ct. App. 30. ° Jeffreys v. Alston, 2 Law Reposi- tory (N. Car.) 634; Keith v. Raglan, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 474. 4Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 So. 831; McCulloch v. Camp- bell, 49 Ark. 367, 5 S. W. 590; In re Scott’s Estate, 128 Cal. 57, 60 Pac. 527; Smith v. Day, 2 Penn. (Del.) 245, 45 Atl. 396; Blough v. Parry, 144 Ind. 463, 40 N. E. 70, 43 N. E. 560; Blake v. Rourke, 74 Iowa 519, 38 N. W. 392; Boone v. Ritchie (Ky.), 53 S. W. 518, 21 Ky. L. 864; Barnes v. Barnes, 66 Maine 286; Ty- son v. Tyson, 37 Md. 567; Carl v. Gabel, 120 Mo. 283, 25 S. W. 214; 27 Ind. Sheehan v. Kearney, 82 Miss. 688, 21 So. 41, 35 L. R. A. 102; Perkins v. Perkins, 39 N. H. 163; In re Burn’s Will, 121 N. Car. 336, 28 S. E. 519; McCoon v. Allen, 45 N. J. Eq. 708, 17 Atl. 820; Howard v. Moot, 64 N. Y. 262; Messner v. Elliott, 184 Pa. St. 41, 39 Atl. 46; Allen v. Griffin, 69 Wis. 529, 35 N. W. 21. 5In re Barber’s Estate, 63 Conn. 393, 27 Atl. 973, 22 L. R. A. 90; Evans v. Arnold, 52 Ga. 169; Bald- win v. Parker, 99 Mass. 79; Moriarity v. Moriarity, 108 Mich. 249, 65 N. W. 964; In re Layman’s Will, 40 Minn. 371, 42 N. W. 286; Patten v. Cilley, 67 N. H. 520, 42 Atl. 47; Murry v. Hennessey, 48 Nebr. 608, 67 N. W. 470; Chrisman v. Chrisman, 16 Ore. 127, 18 Pac. 6; Williams v. Robinson, 42 Vt. 658, 1 Am. Rep. 359; In re Baldwin’s Estate, 13 Wash. 666, 43 Pac. 934; McMechen v. McMechen, 17 W. Va. 683, 41 Am. Rep. 682. 463 CONTEST § 527 does not apply to cases of this character, and that there must be sufficient proof to make out a prima facie case of the sanity of the testator at the time the will is made as one of the juris- dictional facts.® Other courts hold that after the proponent has made out such prima facie case, the contestant must overcome this prima facie showing by substantial evidence ;” or by a preponderance of the evidence. Where the issue in a contest case is undue influence the weight of authority is that the burden of proof is upon the contestant.? But when suspicious circumstances of the existence of undue influence exist, it is sometimes said that the burden shifts to the beneficiaries under the will to show that there was no undue influence.*° § 527. Issues in general—The probate of a will and all forms of statutory contests of such probate are confined to the issue devisavit vel non—did he make a devise or not. But in actions to contest probated wills the grounds of contest must usually be specifically stated, and no evidence can be introduced upon issues not thus specified.™* *In re Baldwin’s Estate, 13 Wash. 666, 43 Pac. 934. 7 Barber’s Estate, 63 Conn. 393, 27 "Atl 973, 22 L. R. A. 90; Fulbright v. Perry County, 145 Mo. 432, 46 S. W. 955. 8 Smith v. Henline, 174 Ill. 184, 51 N. E. 227; Hawkins v. Grimes, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 257. 9 Chandler v. Jost, 96 Ala. 596, 11 So. 636; In re Livingston’s Appeal, 63 Conn. 68, 26 Atl. 470; In re Alli- son’s Estate, 104 Iowa 130, 73 N. W. 489; Johnson-_v. Stevens, 95 Ky. 128, 23 S. W. 957, 15 Ky. L. 477; Sheehan vy. Kearney, 82 Miss. 688, 21 So. 41, 35 L. R. A. 102; Prentis v. Bates, 93 Mich. 234, 53 N. W. 153, 17 L. R. A. 494; Riley v. Sherwood, 144 Mo. 354, 45 S. W. 1077; Stewart v. Stew- art, 56 N. J. Eq. 761, 40 Atl. 438; Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1, 86 In such proceedings the court Am. Dec. 459; York’s Estate, 185 Pa. St. 61, 39 Atl 1119; In re McGraw’s Will, 9 App. Div. 372, 41 N. Y. S. 481, 75 N. Y. St. 872; Seebrock v. Fedawa, 30 Nebr. 424, 46 N. W. 650; Chappell v. Trent, 90 Va. 849, 19 S. E. 314; McMaster v. Scriven, 85 Wis. 162, 55 N. W. 149, 39 Am. St. 828. 10Sheehan v. Kearney, 82 Miss. 688, 21 So. 41, 35 L. R. A. 102; Heg- ney v. Head, 126 Mo. 619, 29 S. W. 587; Stewart v. Stewart, 56 N. J. Eq. 761, 40 Atl. 438; Miller v. Miller, 187 Pa. St. 572, 41 Atl. 277; Chappel v. Trent, 90 Va. 849, 19 S. E. 314. 11 Barksdale v. Davis, 114 Ala. 623, 22 So. 17; Redfield’s Estate, 116 Cal. 637, 48 Pac. 794; In re Living- ston’s Appeal, 63 Conn. 68, 26 Atl. 470; Wenning v. Teeple, 144 Ind. 189, 41 N. E. 600; Hudson v. Hughan, 56 Kans. 152, 42 Pac. 701; § 528 - ' WILLS 464 has no power to strike out certain items of the will on the ground that they are illegal,"* or to interpret the meaning of the will,” or to pass upon question of title. While contestants are permitted to allege as many grounds as they expect to attempt to prove, the issue should not be duplicated. § 528. Invalidity of execution as an issue.—It has been held that the issue of the invalidity of a will is sufficiently raised by a general averment,*® but the better practice is to allege the grounds of invalidity more precisely.’ This issue is one of law where it is to be decided upon the face of the will,** or where the facts are not disputed.” Whether the attesting witnesses were competent is a question of law.” Under this issue all questions arising out of the compliance or noncompliance with the statutory formalities of execution will be inquired into, and such construction given the statute as will be most favorable to the will.** The principal subjects of inquiry under this issue relate to the signing, witnessing and publication of the will, and an attestation clause purporting to make the subscribing witnesses say that all the essentials to the proper execution of the will were observed is a valuable support to the will.” Meyer v. Henderson, 88 Md. 585, 41 Atl. 1073, 42 Atl. 241. 12 Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 20 So. 98, 85 Am. St. 145; Estate of Lennon, 152 Cal. 327, 92 Pac. 870, 125 Am. St. 58, 14 Ann. Cas. 1024; Kultz v. Jaeger, 29 App. (D. C.) 300; Newsome v. Tucker, 36 Ga. 71; Owens v. Sinklear, 110 Mo. 54, 19 S. W. 813. 13 Russell v. Russell, 3 Houst. (Del.) 103; Robinson vy. Duvall, 27 App. (D. C.) 535. 14 Adams vy. Johnson, 129 Ga. 611, 59 S. E. 269. 15 National Safe Deposit &c. Co. v. Sweeney, 3 App. ¢D. C.) 401; Con- nelly v. Beal, 77 Md. 116, 26 Atl. 408. 16 Barksdale v. Davis, 114 Ala. 623, 22 So. 17. 17In re Burrell’s Estate, 77 Cal. 479, 19 Pac. 880; Flinn v. Owen, 58 Ill. 111. 18 Sartor v. Sartor, 39 Miss. 760; Jackson v. Tozer, 154 Pa. St. 223, 26 Atl. 226. 19 Bramel v. Bramel, 101 Ky. 64, 39 S. W. 520, 18 Ky. L. 1074. 20Fuller v. Fuller, 83 Ky. 345, 7 Ky. L. 376, 395. 21 Hoysradt v. Kingman, 22 N. Y. 372, 22 Farley v. Farley, 50 N. J. Ea. 434, 26 Atl. 178; In re Kellum’s Will, 465 CONTEST § 529 § 529. Issue of testamentary incapacity.—The issue of tes- tamentary capacity is one of fact,’* but the standard by which such capacity is to be measured must be defined by the court.” The inquiry concerning the testator’s capacity must be confined to the time of the execution of the will.” While any of the statutory requisites of testamentary capacity may be inquired into in a contest proceeding, the issue of mental capacity is the most common and affords an extensive field of inquiry. It involves the consideration of such matters as idiocy, lunacy, monomania, delusions, hallucinations, eccentricity, de- lirium, superstition, moral depravity, drunkenness, blindness, feebleness, old age, and the like, and if it be shown that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was affected by any one or more of these afflictions to the extent of rendering him incapable of making a testamentary disposition of his property, the instrument will be set aside.”® But while the phrase “un-. sound mind” includes every species of unsoundness of mind, it is not necessary that the testator should be in full possession of all his faculties.2” It has been held sufficient if he have ca- pacity to comprehend the nature of the act in which he is en- gaged at the time he executes the will.” § 530. Undue influence as an issue—Undue influence; either alone or in conjunction with fraud, or unsoundness of mind, is the issue in most cases of contests of wills. The in- fluence exercised over the testator must have been such as to 52 N. Y¥. 517; In re O’Hagan’s Will, 73 Wis. 78, 40 N. W. 649, 9 Am. St. 763. : 23 Backus v. Cheney, 80 Maine 17, 12 Atl. 636; Tillman v. Hatcher, Rice L. (S. Car.) 271. 24In re Kimberly's Appeal, 68 Conn. 428, 36 Atl. 847, 37 L. R. A. 261, 57 Am. St. 101; “‘Bramel v. Bramel, 101 Ky. 64, 39 S. W. 520, 18 Ky. L. 1074. 25 Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112. 26 Blough v. Parry, 144 Ind. 463, 30—Tuomp. WILLS. 40 N. E. 70, 43 N. E. 560; Durham v. Smith, 120 Ind. 463, 22 N. E. 333; Den ex dem. Trumbell v. Gibbons, 22 N. J. L. 117, 51 Am. Dec. 253. 27 Burkhart v. Gladish, 123 Ind. 337, 24 N. E. 118. 28 Sturdevant’s Appeal, 71 Conn. 392, 42 Atl. 70; Schmidt v. Schmidt, 201 Ill, 191, 66 N. E. 371; In re Hoopes’ Estate, 174 Pa. St. 373, 34 Atl. 603; Brown v. Mitchell, 75 Tex. 9, 12 S. W. 606; In re Gorkow’s Estate, 20 Wash. 563, 56 Pac. 385. § 530 WILLS 466 amount to overpersuasion, coercion or force, an influence that destroys the. free agency and will power of the testator. It must not be merely the influence of affection or attachment, or the desire of gratifying the wishes of one beloved, respected and trusted by the testator.?? Undue influence may be exercised without actual fraud, or false representations made to the testator.*° Any fear, or desire for peace,** or flattery or overpersuasion,®® may amount to undue influence, if it was actually exerted and had its effect on the will?? But mere advice, argument or persuasion which does not deprive the testator of his free agency does not amount to undue influence.** No presumption of undue influence arises from the fact of the existence of interest or opportunity to exert undue influ- ence.®° In determining whether the will was the result of undue in- fluence it is entirely proper to consider the mental condition of the person upon whom the influence is alleged to have been 29 Ormsby vy. Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 33 L. ed. 805, 10 Sup. Ct. 478; Field v. Camp, 193 Fed. 160; Higgin- botham v. Higginbotham, 106 Ala. 314, 17 So. 516; Parker v. Hill, 85 Ark. 363, 108 S. W. 208; In re Morcel’s Estate, 162 Cal. 188, 121 Pac. 733; Blackman v. Edsall, 17 Colo. App. 429, 68 Pac. 790; Bohler v. Hicks, 120 Ga. 800, 48 S. E. 306; Schmidt v. Schmidt, 47 Minn, 451, 50 N. W. 598; Gordon v. Burris, 153 Mo. 223, 54 S. W. 546; Latham v. Schaal, 25 Nebr. 535, 41 N. W. 354; Westcott v. Sheppard, 51 N. J. Eq. 315, 30 Atl. 428; Simon v. Middleton, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 531, 112 S. W. 441; Miller v. Livingston, 36 Utah 228, 102 Pac. 996; In re Jack- man’s Will, 26 Wis. 104. 80 Moore v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 638, 24 So. 374; In re Morcel’s Estate, 162 Cal. 188, 121 Pac. 733; Franklin v. Belt, 130 Ga. 37, 60 S. E. 146. 31 McDaniel v. Crosby, 19 Ark. 533; Gay v. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 250, 5 S. W. 7, 1 Am. St. 712; Boggs v. Boggs, 62 Nebr. 274, 87 N. W. 39. 32Denslow v. Moore, 2 Day (Conn.) 12. 33 Knox v. Knox, 95 Ala. 495, 11 So. 125, 36 Am. St. 235; Miller v. Carr, 94 Ark. 176, 126 S. W. 1068; Crowson v. Crowson, 172 Mo. 691, 72 S. W. 1065. 84 Steele v. Helm, 2 Marv. (Del.)- 237, 43 Atl. 153; Berst v. Moxom, 157 Mo. App. 342, 138 S. W. 74; Frank- lin v. Boone, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 597, 88 S. W. 262. 35 In re Langford’s Estate, 108 Cal. 608, 41 Pac. 701; Dale’s Appeal, 57 Conn. 127, 17 Atl. 757; Ginter v. Gin- ter, 79 Kans, 721, 101 Pac. 634, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1024; Luebbert v. Brockmeyer, 158 Mo. App. 196, 138 S. W. 92; Cudney v. Cudney, 68 N. Y. 148, 467. CONTEST § 531 exerted. “And, as the physical condition has much to do with the mental, the physical condition of the testator may also be considered.** § 531. Issue of fraud and forgery—Fraud has reference to some deception practiced upon the testator in the execution, of his will. There are many different forms of fraud that may be made the basis of an action to contest a will. Thus it may consist of the assumption of a false character by one for the purpose of inducing a bequest in his favor by another ;°” or a false statement or other imposition on the testator by which he is made to believe that a certain person, who might otherwise expect some legacy from him, has wronged him, or is unworthy of his bounty.** But if the representations, though false, be honestly made and with good intentions, they are not fraud- ulent.*? The will must have been procured wholly by lying or false representations made by a beneficiary with the intention of pro- curing the execution of the will, in order to invalidate it for fraud.*® Deception and misrepresentation deliberately practiced on the testator for the purpdse of procuring the execution of the will, if in fact he is deceived thereby, is such a fraud as will viti- ate the will thus procured.** Fraud in obtaining particular legacies does not invalidate the whole will.* § 532. Trial—The authorities generally hold that there is no constitutional right to a trial by jury of questions of fact in proceedings to contest wills before or after probate;** but by 36 Schieffelin v. Schieffelin, 127 Ala. Schemme, 157 Mo. 1, 57 S. W. 526, 14, 28 So. 687; Tobin v. Jenkins, 29 80 Am. St. 604. Ark, 151; In re Everts’ Estate, 163 39In re Benton’s Estate, 131 Cal. Cal. 449, 125 Pac. 1058; Lehman v. 472, 63 Pac. 775; Hannah v. Ander- Lindenmeyer, 48 Colo. 305, 109 Pac. son, 125 Ga. 407, 54 S. E. 131; 956; Delaney v. Salina, 34 Kans. 532, 40 Simon v. Middleton, 51 Tex. Civ. 9 Pac. 271; Myers v. Hauger, 98 Mo. App. 531, 112 S. W. 441. 433, 11 S. W. 974. : 41 Moore v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 627, 37 Smith v. Du Bose, 78 Ga. 413, 3 24 So. 374, S. E. 309, 6 Am. St. 260. 42 Florey v. Florey, 24 Ala. 241. 38In re Ruffino’s Estate, 116 Cal. 43 Cummins v. Cummins, 1 Marv. 304, 48 Pac. 127; Schierbaum v. (Del.) 423, 2 Hard, 125, 31 Atl. 816; § 533 WILLS 468 statutory provision or established usage, a jury trial of an issue prescribed by statute or framed under the direction of the court is usually imperative, even where the contest is by suit in equity, or of right upon demand of either party.” In other jurisdictions, however, the court may, in the exer- cise of its sound discretion, submit the issues to a jury.** In its instructions to the jury the court should define the issues with clearness and precision,*’ so they will not set up their own opinions regarding the justness or reasonableness of the testator’s disposition of his property.* § 533. Evidence-—Where the mental capacity of the tes- tator is the issue in an action to contest a will the parties to the contest proceeding are competent witnesses even though the executor or administrator of the estate is a party to such action.* Also the subscribing witnesses to the will are competent to testifv as to the testator’s mental condition at the time the wil! was made.*® Wright v. Fultz, 138 Ind. 594, 38 N. E, 175; Gilruth vy. Gilruth, 40 Iowa 346; Rich v. Bowker, 25 Kans. 7; Wills v. Lochnane, 9 Bush (Ky.) 547; In re Welch’s Will, 69 Vt. 127, 37 Atl. 250; In re Clayson’s Estate, 26 Wash. 253, 66 Pac. 410; Moody v. Found, 208 Ill. 78, 69 N. E. 831. But see Cockrill v. Cox, 65 Tex. 669. 44 Clough v. Clough, 10 Colo. App. 433, 51 Pac. 513, affd. 27 Colo. 97, 59 Pac. 736; Brown v. Miner, 128 II, 148, 21 N. E. 223; Lamb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 456, 5 N. E. 171; Holt v. Lamb, 17 Ohio St. 374; In re New- combe’s Will, 63 Hun 633, 18 N. Y. S. 549, 45 N. Y. St. 806; Leonard v. Burtle, 226 Ill. 422, 80 N. E. 992. 45 Neimand v. Seemann, 136 Iowa 713, 114 N. W. 48; Crawford v. Schooley, 217 Pa. 429, 66 Atl. 743; Pine v. Callahan, 8 Idaho 684, 71 Pac. 473; Bohannon v. Tabbin, 76 S. W. 46, 25 Ky. L. 515; Walts v. Walts, 127 Mich, 607, 86 N. W. 1030; Shelby v. St. James Orphan Asylum, 66 Nebr. 40, 92 N. W. 155. 46 Gallon v. Haas, 67 Kans. 225, 72 Pac. 770; Plant v. Harrison, 52 App. Div. 434, 65 N. Y. S. 234; Backus v. Cheney, 80 Maine 17, 12 Atl. 636; Doherty v. O’Callaghan, 157 Mass. 90, 31 N. E. 726, 17 L. R. A. 188, 34 Am. St. 258; Youmans v. Petty, 33 N. J. Eq. 532. 47In re Kohler’s Estate, 79 Cal. 313, 21 Pac. 758; Lehman v. Linden- meyer, 48 Colo. 305, 109 Pac. 956; Vance v. Upson, 66 Tex. 476, 1 S. W. 179, 48In re Langford’s Estate, 108 Cal. 608, 41 Pac. 701; Taylor v. McClin- tock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S. W. 405; Coats v. Lynch, 152 Mo. 161, 53 S. W. 895. 42 Lamb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 456, 5 N. E. 171; Staser v. Hogan, 120 Ind. 207, 21 N. E. 911, 22 N. E. 990. 50 Scott v. McKee, 105 Ga. 256, 31 S. E. 183; Robinson v. Duvall, 22 469 CONTEST § 533 In some jurisdictions the testimony of attesting witnesses is given great weight,”* while in other jurisdictions their testimony is given no greater weight than other lay witnesses.” Witnesses who are neither medical experts nor attesting wit- nesses may give their opinions as to the mental condition of the testator at the time the will was executed, if it be shown to the jury that such witnesses had the opportunity to form such opinion from the habits, symptoms, acts and other manifestations on the part of the testator.°? And where such witnesses bore close family, business or social relations to the testator their evidence respecting his mental condition is entitled to great weight.** But such witnesses should not be permitted to give an opinion as to the testator’s mental condition without accompanying it with evidence of facts upon which such opinion is based.*° Medical experts may, in answer to hypothetical questions, based upon the evidence of others, testify to the effect of disease on the mind and give their opinion of mental capacity,°® but in some jurisdictions such expert opinion is of no value unless it it based upon the personal observation of the expert.” Some courts hold that the physician and attorney of a testator are competent to testify in a proceeding to contest his will as to facts ascertained in their attendance upon him in their profes- 54 Holton v. Cochran, 208 Mo. 314, 106 S. W. 1035. App. (D. C.) 235; Steele v. Helm, 2 Marv. (Del.) 237, 43 Atl. 153; Call v. Byram, 39 Ind. 499. 51 Ethridge v. Bennett, 9 Houst. (Del.) 295, 31 Atl. 813, 1 Hardesty 15; Brown v. Mitchell, 88 Tex. 350, 31S. W. 621, 36 L. R. A. 64. 52In re Crandall’s Appeal, 63 Conn. 365, 28 Atl. 531, 38 Am. St. 375; Hughes v. Hughes, 31 Ala. 519. 58 Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kans. 237, 116 Pac. 898; Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 57 S. E. 69, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1; In re Estate of Wilson, 78 Nebr. 758, 111 N. W. 788; Brown v. Mitchell, 75 Tex. 9, 12 S. W. 606; Burney v. Torrey, 100 Ala. 157, 14 So. 685, 46 Am. St. 33. .55 Southworth v. Southworth, 173 Mo. 73, 73 S. W. 129; Zirkle v. Leon- ard, 61 Kans. 636, 60 Pac. 318; Raub yv. Carpenter, 187 U. S. 159, 47 L. ed. 119, 23 Sup. Ct. 72. 56 Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324, 50 Am. Dec. 329; Prather v. McClel- land, 76 Tex. 574, 13 S. W. 543. 57In re Higgins’ Estate, 156 Cal. 257, 104 Pac. 6; Barber’s Appeal, 63 Conn. 393, 27 Atl. 973, 22 L. R. A. 90; Lorts v. Wash, 175 Mo. 487, 75 S. W. 95. § 534 WILLS 470 sional capacity,°® while others hold that such persons may testify at the instance of either party to the contest.*® But other courts hold the testimony of such persons is privileged even after the testator’s death, and can not be waived by his heirs.%° The record of the probate and proof of a will is admissible in an action to contest such will. Statements or declarations of a testator made before, or after, er contemporaneously with the execution of a will, may be ad- -mutted in evidence as tending to show his mental condition at the time of such execution; but unless made at or so near the time of the execution of the will as to be considered a part of the res geste, such statements are not at any time competent to show fraud or undue influence.” The admission of one devisee against the validity of the will is not admissible as against the interest of other devisees,® but such adniission may be received for the purpose of impeaching or discrediting his testimony.*“* Where, however, such admission is made by a sole devisee or legatee, and there are no others in- terested who could be affected by his admissions, they are ad- missible against his interest or those of his heirs.*° §$ 534. Verdict and decree.—In an action to contest a will on the ground of undue influence, it is competent for the jury to render a general verdict in favor of the will as to some of 58 Shapter’s Estate, 35 Colo. 578, 85 Pac. 688, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575, 117 Am. St. 216. 59 Hamilton v. Crowe, 175 Mo. 634, 75 S. W. 389; Estate of Gray, 88 Mebr. 835, 130 N. W. 746, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 319, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1037; In re Walker’s Estate, 150 Iowa 284, 128 N. W. 376, 129 N. W. 952; Olson v. Court of Honor, 100 Minn. 117, 110 N. W. 374,8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 521, 117 Am. St. 676, 10 Ann. Cas. 622. 60 In re Flint’s Estate, 100 Cal. 391, 34 Pac. 863; In re Hunt’s Will, 122 Wis. 460, 100 N. W. 874; In re Van Alstine’s Estate, 26 Utah 193, 72 Pac. 942; Auld v. Cathro, 20 N. Dak. 461, 128 N. W. 1025, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 71, Ann, Cas. 1913 A, 90n. 61 Summers v. Copeland, 125 Ind. 466, 25 N. E. 555. 62 Bower v. Bower, 142 Ind. 194, 41 N. E. 523; Estate of Ricks, 160 Cal. 450, 117 Pac. 532; Coghill v. Kennedy, 119 Ala. 641, 24 So. 459. 63 Estate of Dolbeer, 153 Cal. 652, 96 Pac. 266, 15 Ann. Cas. 207; Teck- enbrock v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533, 108 S. W. 46. 64 Robinson v. Duvall, 27 App. (D. C.) 535. 65 Wallis v. Luhring, 134 Ind. 447, 34 N. E. 231. ‘471 CONTEST § 534 its provisions and against it as to others.°* But the verdict must be responsive to the issue or issues,°’ and where several ques- tions are submitted it is the better practice to answer them sep- arately.®* In most jurisdictions the verdict of the jury, even where the proceeding is by bill in chancery, has the same force and effect as a verdict in an ordinary action at law.° But in a few of the states the verdict is merely advisory to the court, like the ver- dict on an issue in chancery, and may be accepted or rejected in whole of in part by the court.” The judgment or decree should simply establish or reject the will,* and should follow the verdict of the jury as a matter of course.” 66 Brook’s Appeal, 68 Conn. 294, 36 Atl. 47; Randolph v. Lampkin, 90 Ky. 551, 14 S. W. 538, 12 Ky. L. 517, 10 L. R. A. 87. 67 Forney v. Ferrell, 4 W. Va. 729; Withee v. Rowe, 45 Maine 571; Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276. 68 Keebler v. Shute, 183 Pa. St. 283, 38 Atl. 586. 69 McCutchen v. Loggins, 109 Ala. 457, 19 So. 810; In re Dalrymple’s Estate, 67 Cal. 444, 7 Pac. 906; Brook’s Appeal, 68 Conn. 294, 36 Atl. 47; Wilcoxon v. Wilcoxon, 165 Ill. 454, 46 N. E. 369; Collins v. Brazill, 63 Iowa 432, 19 N. W. 338; Bramel vy. Bramel, 101 Ky. 64, 39 S. W. 520, 18 Ky. L. 1074; Carvill v. Carvill, 73 Maine 136; Sumwalt v. Sumwalt, 52 Md. 338; In re Stebbins’ Estate, $4 Mich, 304, 54 N. W. 159, 34 Am. St. 345; Sartor v. Sartor, 39 Miss. 760; Young v. Ridenbaugh, 67 Mo. 574; Glancy v. Glancy, 17 Ohio St. 134. 70Cummins v. Cummins, 1 Marv. (Del.) 423, 31 Atl. 816, 2 Hardesty 125; Hudson v. Hughan, 56 Kans. 152, 42 Pac. 701; Fay v. Vanderford, 154 Mass. 498, 28 N. E. 681; Ballan- tine v. Proudfoot, 62 Wis. 216, 22 N. W. 392. 71 Harris v. Hays, 53 Mo. 90. 72 Haynes v. Haynes, 33 Ohio St. 598, 31 Am. Rep. 579; Sumwalt v. Sumwalt, 52 Md. 338, CHAPTER XXVIII DIGEST OF STATUTES SECTION SECTION 540. Alabama. 572. New York. 541. Alaska. 573. North Carolina. 542. Arizona. 574. North Dakota. 543. Arkansas. 575. Ohio. 544. California. 576. Oklahoma. 545. Colorado. 577. Oregon. 546. Connecticut. 578. Pennsylvania. 547. Delaware. 579. Philippine Islands. 548. District of Columbia. 580. Porto Rico. ‘549. Florida. 581. Rhode Island. 550. Georgia. 582. South Carolina. 551. Hawaii. 583. South Dakota. 552. Idaho. 584. Tennessee. 553. Illinois. 585. Texas. 554. Indiana, 586. Utah. 555. Iowa. 587. Vermont. 556. Kansas. 588. Virginia. 557. Kentucky. 589. Washington. 558. Louisiana. 590. West Virginia. 559. Maine. 591. Wisconsin. 560. Maryland. 592. Wyoming. 561. Massachusetts. 593. British Columbia. 562. Michigan. 594. England and Ireland. 563. Minnesota. 595. Manitoba. 564. Mississippi. 596. New Brunswick. 565. Missouri. 597. Newfoundland. 566. Montana. 598. Nova Scotia. 567. Nebraska. 599. Ontario. 568. Nevada. 600. Other British Possessions. 569. New Hampshire. 601. Quebec. 570. New Jersey. 602. Saskatchewan. 571. New Mexico. 603. Scotland. § 540. Alabama.—All persons of the age of twenty-one years and of sound mind may, by last will, devise lands, tene- ments or hereditaments, or any interest therein to any person 472 473 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 541 or corporation capable by law of holding the same. If the devisee is incapable of taking, the devise descends, as in case of intestacy, or, if the testator has no heirs competent to take, to the residuary devisee if one be named in the will capable of holding and if not to the state. All persons over the age of eighteen years and of sound mind, and no others, may bequeath their personalty. Every devise which a testator makes, in express terms or any other terms denoting his intention to devise all his real property must be construed to pass all the real estate he was entitled to devise at the time of his death. A will to be effectual to pass real or personal property must be in writing, signed by the testator or some person in his pres- ence, and by his direction, and attested by at least two witnesses who must subscribe their names thereto in the presence of the testator. This provision does not apply to wills of soldiers or mariners at sea; nor to wills of personal property not exceeding $500, made during testator’s last sickness at his dwelling, or where he has resided ten days or more, except when he was taken sick when away from home and died before his return; such wills are valid though unwritten. The subsequent incompetency of witnesses, from whatever cause it may arise, must not prevent the probate of a will if the witnesses are competent at the time of their attestation. A probated foreign will may be proved by bringing into pro- bate court a copy of the will and of the probate, certified by the clerk or officer of court and judge before whom probated. § 541. Alaska.—Every person of sound mind and over the age of twenty-one years may by last will devise all of his or her property, except dower and curtesy. The will must be in writing, signed by the testator or some other person in his presence and under his direction, and must be attested by at least two wit- nesses, subscribing their names thereto in the presence of the testator. The subsequent marriage of the testator revokes the will. 1Ala, Civ. Code (1907), ch. 150, §§ 172-6191. § 541 WILLS 474 If a testator die leaving a child or children or descendants thereof not provided for in his will, lie is deemed to have died intestate as to them, and all heirs, devisees, and legatees shall refund proportional part. But if such child or children, or their descendants, shall have an equal portion of the testator’s estate bestowed upon them by way of an advancement, they take nothing under the will. Any mariner at sea or soldier in the military service may dis- pose of his wages or other personal property as by common law or by reducing the same to writing. Nuncupative wills are allowed if the testamentary words or the substance thereof is reduced to writing within thirty days after they were spoken, and the writing probated within six months after such words were spoken. Where the beneficiary under a will attests the instrument as a witness, he thereby forfeits the devise or bequest made to him. If any such witness would be entitled to any share in the tes- tator’s estate in case the will should not be established, then so much of the estate as would have descended to him as will not exceed the value of the devise or bequest made to him in the will is given him; and he may recover the same from the devisees or legatees named in the will in proportion to and out of the parts devised and bequeathed to him. If the execution of such will be attested by a sufficient number of other competent wit- nesses, as required by code, then such devise shall be valid.” If a will by a person owning property in Alaska be probated in any state, territory or district of the United States or in any foreign country, copies of the will and probate certified by the clerk of court and judge may be recorded in the same manner as wills executed in Alaska and be of the same effect. Any such will may be contested in. Alaska. A last will and testament, written and subscribed by the testator without the territory, and executed in the mode prescribed by the law of either the testator’s domicil or the place where executed, is deemed to be legally executed, and is of the same force and effect as if executed in the mode prescribed by the laws of the territory.* 2Carter’s Ann. Civ. Code, Alaska, 3 Alaska, Session Laws (1913), ch. ch. 15, §§ 137-155. c 61. 475. DIGEST OF STATUTES § 542 § 542. Arizona.—Every person of sound mind and over the age of twenty-one years, or who may be or may have been lawfully married, shall have power to make a will. Such will shall be in writing and signed by the testator or some other person, by his direction and in his presence, and shall, if not wholly written by himself, be attested by two or more credible witnesses above the age of fourteen years, subscribing their names to the will in the presence of the testator. Where the will is wholly in the handwriting of the testator no witnesses are required. Nuncupative wills are allowed if made in the last sickness of the deceased, and where the property does not exceed fifty dol- lars in value. But it must be shown by the testimony of three competent witnesses that the testator called on some person to take notice and bear testimony that such is his will, and that the testimony or substance thereof was committed to writing within six days after the making of such will; in such case the amount is not limited. ; Any soldier in actual military service, or any mariner or sea- man.being at sea, may dispose of his personal property without regard to the provisions of the statute. Afterborn or pretermitted children take as though there had been no will. Legacies to subscribing witnesses are void unless they were otherwise entitled to share in the estate. Spendthrift trusts are provided for.* § 543. Arkansas.—Every person of sound mind and over the age of twenty-one may, by will, devise all his estate, both real and personal and all interest therein. All persons over the age of eighteen and of sound mind may bequeath by will personalty. A will to be effectual must be subscribed at the end by the testator, or some other person at his request, and the subscrip- tion shall be made in the presence of each of the attesting wit- nesses or shall be acknowledged by him to have been so made to each of the attesting witnesses. At the time of such subscrip- Arizona Civ. Code (1913), ch. 19, §§ 1204-1225. § 544 WILLS 476 tion or at the time of acknowledging the same, the testator shall declare the instrument so subscribed to be his last will and testa- ment. There shall be at least two attesting witnesses each of ‘whom shall, at the request of the testator, sign his name as wit- ness at the end of the will. (The attestation clause must contain the above facts.) Where the entire body of the will and the signature thereto shall be written in the proper handwriting of the testator or testatrix it may be established by the evidence of at least three disinterested witnesses to the handwriting and signature of the testator without attesting witnesses to such will. No will without such subscribing witnesses shall be pleaded in bar of.a will subscribed in due form. Nuncupative wills are effectual if made at the time of the last sickness and at the dwelling of the deceased in the presence of at least two witnesses and if the estate bequeathed does not exceed $500. It must also be proved that the testator called on some person present to witness that such was his will. Wills are probated in the county of the testator’s residence at time of death. If he had no known place of residence in this state, and land is devised, then in the county where the land, or the greater part of it, lies. When a foreign will relative to an estate within this state, has been proved without the same, a copy thereof and certificate of probate may be offered for probate in this state if it was so exe- cuted as to be a valid will of lands in this state by the law thereof. All mariners at sea or soldiers in the military service may dispose of their wages and other personal property as at com- mon law. Citizens of any of the United States or territories thereof, owning real or personal property in this state, may devise and bequeath the same by will, executed and proved according to the laws of this state or the place where made.® § 544. California—Every person over the age of eighteen’ years, of sound mind, may dispose of real and personal estate by 5 Arkansas: Kirby’s Dig. of Stats. (1904), ch. 160, §§ 8010-8050. 477 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 544 will. A married woman may dispose of all her separate estate by will, without the consent of her husband. Corporations other than counties, municipal corporations, and corporations formed for scientific, literary, or solely educational or hospital purposes, can not take under a will, unless expressed by statute. Every will, other than a nuncupative will, must be in writing, and every will, other than an olographic will, and a nuncupative will, must be executed and attested as follows: 1. It must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself, or some person in his presence and by his direction must subscribe his name thereto. 2. The subscription must be made in the presence of the attesting witnesses, or be acknowledged by the testator to them to have been made by him or by his authority. 3. The testator must, at the time of subscribing or acknowledging the same, declare to the attesting witnesses that the instrument is his will; and, 4. There must be two attesting witnesses, each of whom must sign the same as a witness, at the end of the will, at the testator’s request and in his presence. An olographic will is one that is entirely written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the state, and need not be witnessed. A witness to a written will must write, with his name, his place of residence; and a person who subscribes the testator’s name, by his direction, must write his own name as a witness to the will. But a violation of this section does not affect the validity of the will. A conjoint or mutual will is valid, but it may be revoked by any of the testators, in like manner as any other will. If the witnesses are competent when the will is executed, their subse- quent incompetency from any cause, does not prevent the probate of the will. Gifts to subscribing witnesses are void, unless there are two other competent witnesses to the same, but a mere charge on the estate of the testator for the payment of debts does not pre- vent his creditors from being competent witnesses to his will. No will made out of the state is valid as a will in the state, § 544 WILLS 478 unless executed according to the California laws, except that a will made in a state or country in which the testator is domiciled at the time of his death, and valid as a will under the laws of such state or country, is valid in this state so far as the same relates to personal property, subject to restrictions on devises for charitable uses. No estate, real or personal, shall be bequeathed or devised to any charitable or benevolent society or corporation, or to any person or persons in trust for charitable uses, except the same be done by will duly executed at least thirty days before the de- cease of the testator; and no such devises or bequests shall col- lectively exceed one-third of the estate of the testator, having legal heirs. A will is revoked by marriage of a man and birth of issue, or by the survival of his wife, unless otherwise provided for, and the will of a woman is revoked by her subsequent marriage, and is not revived by the death of her husband. Afterborn children, or unintentionally omitted children, take the same share as if the testator had died intestate. A will passes after-acquired rights, unless the contrary intention plainly appears. ‘A nuncupative will may be valid, if the estate bequeathed does not exceed in value one thousand dollars, but it must be proved by two witnesses who were present at the making thereof, one of whom was asked by the testator at the time, to bear wit- ness that such was his will, or to that effect. The decedent must, at the time, have been in actual military service in the field, or doing duty on shipboard at sea, and in either case in actual con- templation, fear, or peril of death, or the decedent must have been, at the time, in expectation of immediate death from an injury received the same day. There can be no proof of any nuncupative will, unless offered after speaking the testamentary words, nor unless the words, or the substance thereof, were re- duced to writing within thirty days after making. — %Cal. Civ. Code (1915), 1270-1313, 479 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 545 § 545. Colorado.—All wills by which any property, real or personal, is devised or bequeathed, shall be reduced to writing and signed by the testator, or by some one in his presence and by his direction, and attested in the presence of the testator by two or more credible witnesses. Males aged twenty-one years and females aged eighteen years, being of sound mind and memory, may devise real property by will. All persons aged seventeen years, of sound mind and memory, may dispose of personal property by will. The con- sent of the husband or wife, in writing, is necessary to the devise or bequest by a married person of more than one-half his or her estate away from the other spouse. Any will, concerning realty in Colorado, which has been ad- mitted to probate before a court in another state or territory may be admitted to probate without further formality if accom- panied by a certificate by the proper officer as to the former probate. The marriage of testator revokes his will, but the sub- sequent birth of child does not. Devises to witnesses are void unless they are otherwise en- titled to share in the estate. Gifts to a child or grandchild who died before the testator do not lapse but go to his issue if there be any, otherwise such portion of the estate is considered as intestate estate.” § 546. Connecticut.—All persons of sound mind aged eighteen years may dispose of their estate by will. A will must be written, subscribed by the testator, and at- tested by three witnesses, each of whom subscribes in the tes- tator’s presence. Devises to witnesses are void unless such wit- ness is an heir, or the will is otherwise legally attested. If a devisee or legatee being a child, grandchild, brother or sister of the testator, die before him, his issue take such estate if no other provision is made. And any will executed according to the laws of the state or country where it was executed may be admitted to probate in 7 Mills’ Ann. Stat. Colo. (1912), §§ 7867-7892. § 547 WILLS 480 Connecticut, and is effectual to pass any estate of the testator situated in Connecticut. A will is revoked by subsequent marriage of testator or birth of a child unprovided for. A will proved without the state may be proved within it by authenticated and exemplified copy of the will and record of probate proceedings.® § 547. Delaware—Any person of sound and disposing mind or memory, aged twenty-one or upward, may make a will of real as well as personal estate. Every will must be in writing, signed by the testator, or some person subscribing the testator’s name in his presence and by his express direction, and must be attested and subscribed in his presence by two or more credible witnesses. After-acquired land passes by a will, unless a contrary inten- tion appears. Afterborn children unprovided for take as though the parent died intestate. The birth of a child to a testator having no issue at the time the will was made revokes his will. A widow unprovided for by a will made before marriage takes as though her husband died intestate. A nuncupative will of personal estate to the extent of $200 is valid if pronounced before at least two witnesses requested to take notice of such will and reduced to writing within three days afterward. The last will and testament of a person not residing in the state at the time of his death, if properly executed and probated without the state may be proved in the state provided a copy of the same, duly verified, shall be presented for probate and filed of record in the office of the register of wills in the county where there are any lands, tenements or hereditaments of the testator.® ® Conn. Gen. Stat. (1902), §§ 292- 9Del. Rev. Code (1915), 8§ 3239- 305. 3263, 481 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 548 § 548. District of Columbia—Wills may be made by males aged twenty-one and females aged eighteen, if of sound and disposing mind and capable of executing a valid deed or con- tract. All wills must be in writing, and signed by the testator or some other person in his presence and by his direction. They must be attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by two credible witnesses. If it appears that such was the tes- tator’s intention after-acquired real estate will pass by will. Nuncupative wills to the amount of one hundred fifty dollars are valid if proved by three witnesses and made in the testator’s last illness at his habitation.” § 549. Florida—Every person of sound mind of the age of twenty-one years may dispose of real and personal property by will. A married woman may dispose by will of her property in the same manner as if not married, even though she be a minor. All general or residuary devises or bequests are construed to apply to the property owned by the testator at the time of his death, unless otherwise restricted. Every will disposing of real estate must be signed by the testator or some other person in his presence and by his express directions, and must be attested and subscribed in his presence by two or more witnesses. All wills of personal property must be in writing and signed by the testator or some other person in his presence and by his express direction. A nuncupative will must be proved by the oath of three wit- nesses present at its making, and it must also be proved by them that the testator at the time of pronouncing such will desired them to bear witness that it was his last will, or to such effect, and that such will was made during his last sickness. Nor can any testimony be received to prove such will after six months from the date of such will, unless it was reduced to writing and sworn to before some judicial officer of the state within six days from making. 10D. C. Code (1910), $$ 1625, 1626, 1634. ais 31--Tuomp. WILLs, § 550 WILLS 482 Foreign wills having been granted by a foreign court, may be admitted to record in the county judge’s court, and when re- corded, have the same effect as the probate of wills made in the state. An alien may devise and bequeath property as though a cit- izen.™ § 550. Georgia——No particular form of words are neces- sary to make a will. All persons of sound mind over fourteen years of age may make wills. All wills (except nuncupative wills) must be in writing, signed by the party making the same, or by some other person in his presence at his direction, and attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by three competent witnesses. A witness may attest by his mark if he can swear to it. One witness can not sign for another. Ifa witness is a legatee, the will is valid, but the legacy is void. Mutual wills may be made either separately or jointly. A deaf, dumb, and blind person may make a will provided both interpreter and scrivener are made attesting witnesses, If a person has a wife or child he can not leave more than one-third of his estate to a religious, charitable or educational association, to the exclusion of his wife or child. A devise or bequest to charity must be made at least ninety days before the testator’s death. Marriage of a testator or birth of a child, unprovided for, re- vokes a will. Foreign wills may be admitted to probate in the same manner as domestic. If probate has been had in the foreign jurisdiction, a certified copy of the will and an authenticated copy of the pro- ceedings, under seal of the court, is prima facie evidence of due execution. Nuncupative wills may be proved by the oaths of three com- petent witnesses, present at the time of making, whom the tes- tator bade bear witness to his will if made during his last sick- ness.7” 11Gen. Stats. Fla. (1906), §§ 2269- 12 Ga. Code (1911), §§$ 3827-3925. 2287, 2891. 483 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 551 §551. Hawaii—Every person of the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may dispose of both real and personal estate by will. This includes married women. A will to be valid must be in writing and signed by the tes- tator, or by some person in his presence and by his express direc- tion, and attested by two or more competent witnesses subscrib- ing their names to the will in the presence of the testator. Marriage of a woman revokes her will. Marriage of a man followed by birth of a child to him, will revoke a will, if such contingency is not provided for. Gifts to witnesses who are not heirs are void, unless there are two other competent witnesses.*® § 552. Idaho.—Same as California, except no limitations on devises and bequests to charities and corporations.** § 553. Illinois—Males aged twenty-one and females aged eighteen of sound mind and memory have the power to dispose of real or personal estate by will. All wills must be in writing and signed by the testator or tes- tatrix, or by some person in his or her presence and by his or her direction, and attested in the presence of the testator or testatrix by two or more credible witnesses, two of whom de- claring on oath or affirmation before the county court of the proper county that they were present and saw the testator or ‘testatrix sign said will, testament, or codicil in their presence, or acknowledged the same to be his or her act and deed, and that they believed the testator or testatrix to be of sound mind and memory at the time of signing or acknowledging the same, shall be sufficient proof of the execution of said will. A will executed out of the state is admitted to probate in the same manner as a will executed in the state. Any will probated according to law outside the state, con- cerning estates in Illinois, is good as wills made and executed in the state. Devises or legacies to witnesses, or to their wives or husbands, 13 Rev. Laws Hawaii (1915), §§ 14Tdaho Rev. Codes (1908), 88 3258-3267. 5725-5760. § 554 WILLS 484 are void, unless they were otherwise entitled to share in the estate. Personal property may be bequeathed by nuncupative wills, if committed to writing within twenty days after making and proved by two credible disinterested witnesses present at the time the will was spoken and published as such. And also it must be proved by two other witnesses that the will was com- mitted to writing within ten days after the testator’s death. A creditor whose debt is secured by the will is a competent witness.** § 554. Indiana.—All persons, except infants and those of unsound mind, may pass by will real or personal property. This includes married women. Birth to a man of a child unprovided for in his will revokes the will. The marriage of a woman re- vokes her will. No will except a nuncupative will shall affect any estate, un- less it be in writing, signed by the testator, or by some one in his presence, with his consent, and attested and subscribed in his presence by two or more competent witnesses. Nuncupative wills attested by two competent witnesses, made in the testator’s last sickness, reduced to writing within fifteen days, are valid to the extent of one hundred dollars. Soldiers in actual military service and mariners at sea may dispose of personal estate in possession and of wages by nuncupative will. A devise to a descendant of the testator who dies in the tes- tator’s lifetime, vests in the surviving descendant of the devisee. Wills probated in a foreign state or country may be recorded on production of a duly certified copy in a county where the testator had estate, and if the court is satisfied, the will is of the same effect as if originally probated in the state. Bequests to subscribing witnesses are void unless they were otherwise entitled to share in the estate. A wife may elect as to taking under her husband’s will, ar under statute.” 15TIl, Rev. Stats. (1915-1916), pp. _ 26 Burns’ Ann. Ind. ‘Stat. ae Sh05-2688* e1hes eh anes. ge grim 3131.8"? | yeh St © 485 DIGEST OF STATUTES 5 555 § 555. Iowa—Any person of full age and sound mind may dispose of his property by will, subject to rights of the sur- viving spouse, given by law. But if a spouse, parent or child survive the testator, no devise to a corporation not organized for pecuniary profit shall be valid in excess of one-fourth the testator’s estate. 4 After-acquired property may be devised, if the intention is clear. Personal property to.the extent of three hundred dollars may be disposed of by nuncupative will witnessed by two competent persons. A soldier in actual service, or mariner at sea, may dispose of all his personal estate, by such nuncupative will. All other wills must be in writing signed by the testator, or by some person in his presence and by his express direction writing his name thereto, and witnessed by two competent per- sons. A subscribing witness can not receive any benefit from the will unless there are two additional competent witnesses, or unless, by law, without a will, he would receive it. The subsequent birth of a legitimate child before testator’s death revokes a will, but not the birth of a posthumous child. Posthumous children take as if the testator had died intestate. Heirs of a devisee who dies before the testator inherit his property, unless a contrary intent is manifest. A will may be deposited with the clerk of the court. A foreign will already probated is admitted to probate on production of a copy thereof and of the original record of pro- bate, authenticated by the clerk of court where probation was made.’” § 556. Kansas.—Any person twenty-one. years old, of sound mind and memory, may make a will, of real or personal property. There may be a valid verbal will as to personal estate, if reduced to writing and subscribed by two disinterested competent witnesses, within ten days after its speaking. All other wills, shall be in writing signed at the end thereof by the testator or some other person in his presence and by his express 17 Towa Code (1907), §§ 3270-3295 § 557 WILLS 486 direction, and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by two or more competent witnesses, who saw him subscribe, or heard him acknowledge the same. A devise to a witness is void unless the will can otherwise be proved. A married person can not bequeath away from the other spouse more than half his or her property, without the consent in writing of such spouse. Authenticated copies of wills executed and proved according to the laws of any other state or territory or foreign country relative tc any property in Kansas may be admitted to record in the probate court of any county where any part of such prop- erty may be situated; and such authenticated copies so recorded shall have the same validity as wills made in Kansas in con- formity with the laws thereof. The subsequent birth of a child to the testator revokes the will, unless provision was made for such child. A widow may elect to take under the law of descents, and not under her husband’s will. A foreign will can not be contested in this state. The Rule in Shelley’s Case applies to devises of lands. An after-acquired property will pass if such was the intention. Afterborn children take as though there had been no will.’® §557. Kentucky.—Every person of sound mind and twenty-one years of age can make a will which will dispose of any interest he might be entitled to at his or her death, which would descend to his heirs or pass to his personal representa- tives, even if acquired after the will was made. This includes a matried woman, but she can not by will affect her husband’s interest against his consent. A will must be in writing and the name of the testator must be subscribed to it by himself, or some other person in his pres- ence at his direction. If not entirely written by the testator the subscription must be made or the will acknowledged by the testator in the presence of at least two credible witnesses, who 18Kans. Gen. Stats. (1909), §8§ 9'776-9847. 487 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 558 shall subscribe their names to the will in the testator’s presence and in the presence of each other. A person under twenty-one years of age may make a will in pursuance of a power expressly given to that effect and a father under that age may by will appoint a guardian for his child. The will of a person domiciled out of the state at the time of death is valid as to his personalty in the state, if executed ac- cording to the law of the domicil. ; The will of a nonresident relative to estate in the state, which has been probated elsewhere, may be probated in Kentucky by producing an authenticated copy and a certificate of probate. Wills must be probated before the county court of the county of the testator’s residence, or if he had no residence, where his estate or part of it, is situated. A soldier in actual service or mariner at sea may dispose of personal effects by verbal will made ten days before death in the presence of two competent witnesses, and if reduced to writ- ing within sixty days after they were spoken. Marriage of either a man or woman revokes his or her will, unless made in the exercise of a power of appointment. Incompetency of an attesting witness does not make the will void. A creditor of the testator or an executor, is a competent witness. A will speaks from the testator’s death. The issue of a devisee or legatee who dies before the testator take his share. A pretermitted child takes as though there were no will. A void or lapsed devise passes as in case of intestacy.” §558. Louisiana.—As the civil law obtains in Louisiana, the provisions of its laws respecting wills are very different from those of other states. All dispositions mortis causa must be made by last will or testament, of which there are many forms. Mutual wills are prohibited, and the testator can not commit the power of disposing to another. There are three classes of wills: 1. Nuncupative or open testament; 2. Mystic or sealed tes- taments; and 3. Olographic testaments. Either nuncupative or 19 Carroll Ky. Stats. (1915), §§ 4825-4855. § 558 WILLS 488 mystic wills must be drawn up in writing, and mere verbal tes- taments are abolished. There are nuncupative testaments by public act and under private signature. Such testaments by public act must be re- ceived by a notary in the presence of three witnesses residing in the place where the will is executed, or of five witnesses not residing in the place, and must be dictated by the testator, and written by the notary as it is dictated, then be read to the tes- tator in presence of the witnesses. Express mention at one time made of the whole, observing that all those formalities must be fulfilled is without interruption and without turning aside to other acts. The testament must be signed by the testator if he declares that he does not know how or is not able to sign, express men- tion of his declaration and of the cause which hinders him to sign must be made in the act. The testament must also be signed by the witnesses or at least one of them for all if the others can not write. A nuncupative testament under private signature must be written by the testator himself, or by any other person from his dictation, or even by one of the witnesses, in the presence of five witnesses residing in the place where the will is received or of seven witnesses residing out of that place; or it will suffice if in the presence of the same number of witnesses the testator present the paper on which he has written his testament or caused it to be written out of their presence, and declare to them that that paper contains his last will and testament. In either case the testament must be read by the testator to the witnesses, or. by one of the witnesses to the rest in the presence of the testator. It must be signed by the testator, if he knows how or is able to sign, and by the witnesses, or at least by two of them in case the others know not how to sign, and those of the witnesses who do not know how to sign must affix their mark. In the country it suffices for the validity of the nuncupative testaments under private signature if the testament be passed in the presence of three witnesses residing in the place where the testament is received, or of five witnesses residing out of that 489 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 558 place, provided that in this case a greater number of witnesses can not be had. The mystic, secret or closed testament is made in the following manner: The testator must sign his dispositions, whether he has written them himself or has caused them to be written by an- other person. The paper containing those dispositions, or the paper serving as their envelope, must be closed and sealed. The testator shall present it, thus closed and sealed, to the notary and to three witnesses, or he shall cause it to be closed and sealed in their presence. ‘Then he shall declare to the notary, in the presence of the witnesses, that the paper contains his testament, written by himself, or by another.by his direction, and signed by him, the testator. The notary shall then draw up the act of superscription which shall be written on that paper or the sheet which serves as its envelope, and that act shall be signed by the testator, and by the notary and the witnesses. All that is above prescribed shall be done without interruption or turning aside to other acts; and in case that the testator, by reason of any hindrance which has happened since the signing of the testament, can not sign the act of superscription, mention shall be made of the declaration made by him thereof, without its being necessary in that case to increase the number of wit- nesses. Those who know not how or are not able to write or sign their names can not make dispositions in the form of a mystic testament. If any witness to the act of superscription knows not how to sign, express mention shall be made thereof. The following persons are absolutely incapable of being wit- nesses to testaments: 1. Women of whatever age to the testa- ments of their husbands. 2. Children who have. not attained the age of sixteen years complete. 3. Persons insane, deaf, dumb or blind. 4. Persons whom the criminal laws declare in- capable of exercising civil functions. Neither can testaments be witnessed by those who are constituted heirs or named legatees, under whatsoever title it may be, provided that this qualification does not apply to the mystic testament. The olographic testament is that which is written by the tes- § 558 WILLS 490 tator himself. In order to be valid it must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator without its being subject to any other formality, and may be made anywhere, even out of the state. A testament intended to be in one form may be valid in another. Witnesses must reside in the parish where the testament is executed, when it is required that they reside in the place. The minor above the age of sixteen can dispose of property by dona- tion mortis causa. Testaments made in other states or countries take effect in this state, provided they are clothed with all the formalities pre- scribed for the validity of testaments in the place where they are made. Soldiers’ wills may be received by a commissioned officer be- fore two witnesses or if sick or wounded, before a physician or surgeon attending him, assisted by two witnesses. Such wills need only be reduced to writing and signed by the testator or the person receiving them and by the witnesses. Such testament is null six months after the testator’s return to a place where he can use the ordinary forms. The captain or master of a vessel in the presence of three wit- nesses may receive testaments at sea, the only formality being that they should be reduced to writing, signed by the testator, the receiver, and the witnesses, but such testament can pass nothing to any person employed on the vessel, unless a relative of the testator. It is not valid unless the testator die at sea or within three months after he landed in a place where he can use the ordinary forms. Donations inter vivos or mortis causa can not exceed two- thirds of the property of the disposer, if he leaves at his decease, a legitimate child, one-half if he leaves two children; and one- third if he leaves three or a greater number. Under the name of children are included descendants of whatever degree, it being understood that they are only counted for the child they repre- sent. Donations inter vivos or causa mortis can not exceed two- thirds of the property if the disposer, having no children, leave a father, mother, or both. 491 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 558 A disherison must be made by name expressly and for a just cause recognized by law. The following ten causes for the dis- herison of children are recognized: 1. If the child has raised his or her hand to strike the parent, or if he or she has actually struck the parent; but a mere threat is not sufficient. 2. If the child has been guilty, toward a parent, of cruelty, of a crime or grievous injury. 3. If the child has attempted to take the life of either parent. 4. If the child has accused a parent of any capital crime, except, however, that of high treason. 5. If the child has refused sustenance to a parent, having means to afford it. 6. If the child has neglected to take care of a parent become insane, 7. If the child refused to ransom them, when detained in captivity. 8. If he used any act of violence or coercion to hinder a parent from making a will. 9. If the child has refused to become security for a parent, having the means in order to take him out of prison. 10. If the son or daughter, being a minor, marries without the consent of his or her parents. As- cendants other than parents may disinherit their descendants for the first nine causes above enumerated, when the acts there mentioned have been committed toward them instead of toward their parents. Legitimate children dying without issue and leaving a parent can not disinherit him or her unless for the following seven causes: 1. Ifthe parent has accused the child of a capital crime, except, however, the crime of high treason. 2. If the parent has attempted to take the child’s life. 3. If the parent has, by any violence or force, hindered the child from making a will. 4. If the parent has refused sustenance to the child in necessity, having the means of affording it. 5. If the parent has neglected to take care of the child while in a state of insanity. 6. If the parent has neglected to ransom the child in captivity. 7. If the father or mother have attempted the life, the one or the other, in which case the child or descendant who makes a will may dis- inherit the one who has attempted the life of the other. A disin- herison td be valid must be made in one of the forms prescribed for testaments, and the testator must express for what reasons he disinherits the heir in question. And the other heirs of the § 559 WILLS 492 testator are, moreover, obliged to prove the facts on which the disinherison is founded. A testament is annulled by operation of law by the birth of legitimate children prior to its date.?° § 559. Maine—A person of sound mind, twenty-one years old may dispose of his real and personal estate by will, in writing, signed by him or by some person for him at his request and subscribed in his presence by three credible witnesses not beneficially interested thereunder. Subsequently acquired real estate passes if such was the tes- tator’s intention, and a devise of land conveys all the estate of the testator. A nuncupative will may be made during the last sickness of the testator, if made at home, unless he is taken sick suddenly away from home. Such will is effective only as to personal property under $300 in value, unless proved by the oath of three witnesses who were present at its making and requested by the testator to bear witness to his will. The nuncupative will must be proved within six months, unless reduced to writing within six days after they were spoken. Soldiers in service or mariners at sea, may dispose of personal estate and wages, by nuncupative will, without regard to the place of its making. An omitted or posthumous child takes as though there were no will. Wills executed and proved in another state according to its laws, may be proved in Maine, and one proved in another state may be allowed in Maine by producing an authenticated copy of the will and probate, and filing and recording after hearing.”* § 560. Maryland.—No will can create a perpetuity. No will will pass real estate unless the testator was at the time of acknogledging or executing same of sound and disposing mind and capable of executing a valid deed or contract, and if a male, aged twenty-one, if a female, aged eighteen. By the com- 20 Merrick’s Rev. Civ. Code, La. 21 Maine Rev. Stat. (1903), ch. 76, 1913, ch. 6, arts. 1570-1624; ch. 3, §§ 3-20, ch. 66, § 13. arts. 1493-1495. 493 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 561 mon law males over fourteen and females over twelve years of age may make valid wills of personal property. Wills of real and of personal property must be in writing, signed by the tes- tator or by some one for him, in his presence and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed in his presence by two or more credible witnesses, Although no nuncupative will is valid, a soldier in active serv- ice or mariner at sea, may by verbal will before witnesses, dis- pose of his wages, movables and personal property. A devise or legacy shall not fail because of the death of the legatee in the testator’s lifetime, but shall pass as if the devisee or legatee survived the testator. A will made out of the state will be held valid in Maryland, if made according to the forms required by the law of the place where made, or by the law of the place where the testator was domiciled when made, or according to the forms required by the law of Maryland. A copy certified as prescribed by law of the record of a will recorded in a foreign country is good evidence to prove such will in Maryland.” ' § 561. Massachusetts.—A will may be made by any per- son of sound mind of the legal age of twenty-one years. Wills must be in writing, signed by the testator or by some one in his presence and by his express direction and must be attested and subscribed in the testator’s presence by three or more competent witnesses. A married woman may make a valid will. Soldiers in service or mariners at sea may dispose of personal property by a nuncupative will. Marriage acts as a revocation of a will, unless it appears from the will that it was made in contemplation of marriage, or unless it was made in the exercise of a power of appointment. A testator may keep a will in his custody or deposit it in that of the probate court. A person other than the register of pro- bate, who has custody of a will, must produce it within thirty . 22 Bagby. Ann. Code, Md.- (1911); art. 93, -§8§ 316-343, ey § 562 WILLS 494 days from notice of the testator’s death, and one who conceals or retains a will may be examined and imprisoned. Devises to witnesses or their husbands or wives are void unless there are three other competent witnesses. The surviving husband or widow may elect to take under the statute instead of under the will. Pretermitted or posthumous children take as if there were no will. The issue of a legatee who is a child or relative of the testator and dies before the testator, take his share. A will which is made out of the commonwealth, valid accord- ing to the laws of the state or country in which it was made, may be proved and allowed in Massachusetts, and shall have the same effect as if it had been executed according to Massachusetts laws. A foreign will may be proved by producing an authenticated copy and a certificate of probate.” § 562. Michigan—Any person of sound mind, over twenty-one, may make a will disposing of lands or personalty, and every devise conveys all the testator’s interest, including after-acquired lands, unless a contrary intention appears. All wills made in the state must be in writing, signed by the testator, or by some person in his presence and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed in his presence by two or more competent witnesses. There is an exception as to nuncupative wills which are valid where the value of the estate does not exceed $300, or if made by a soldier in service or mariner on shipboard, relative to wages and personal property. Bequests to subscribing witnesses are void unless there are two other competent witnesses, or unless such witness was en- titled to a share by law, and a creditor secured by will is a com- petent witness. The provisions as to custody of a will are very similar to 232 Rev. Laws of Mass., tit. 2, ch. 135, 8§ 1, 6, 9, 5, 10, 14, 15, ch. 136, § 10. 495 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 563 those of Massachusetts. A will may be placed in the custody of the judge of probate. : Foreign wills may be proved by filing an exemplified copy of the will and the record of probate. Afterborn children take as if the parent had died intestate, their share first being taken from estate undisposed of by will, if any, then proportionally from all legatees and devisees. The widow may choose between dower and the provision for her in the will. A foreign will, made where probate is not required, may be proved in Michigan by producing the original or a full and com- plete copy. A will executed without the state, in the mode prescribed by law, is valid in Michigan if in writing and signed by the testator. The issue of a legatee, who is a child or other relation and dies before the testator, takes his share.”* § 563. Minnesota—Every person of full age (males twenty-one years, females eighteen years) and sound mind may make a will, including married women. Nuncupative wills are valid only as to personal estate, when made by a soldier in service, or mariner at sea. Other wills must be in writing, signed by the testator or by some person in his presence by his express direc- tion, and must be attested and subscribed in his presence by two or more competent witnesses. A creditor whose debt is secured by the will is a competent witness. A legacy to a witness is void, unless there are two other com- petent subscribing witnesses who are not beneficiaries or unless the witness was entitled to share in the estate in absence of a will. Marriage of a testator revokes a will, and divorce of the testator revokes provisions in favor of the testator’s spouse. Afterborn children take as if the testator had died intestate, first from an undisposed portion of the estate, then from the shares of all-devisees and legatees proportionally. After-acquired property will pass by the will. 24Howell’s Ann. Mich Stat, §§ 10975-11015, 11025, § 564 WILLS 496 A will may be deposited with the judge of the county where ‘the testator lives. The surviving issue of a child or relative of the testator who was a devisee or legatee and died before the testator, take the parent’s share. A will made out of the state valid according to the laws of the state or country in which it was made, or of the testator’s domicil, if in writing and signed by the testator, may be proved and allowed in Michigan, and have the same effect as if it had been executed according to the laws of Michigan. Every will proved outside of the state in accordance with law, may be allowed, filed and recorded in any county in this state where the testator left property. A duly authenticated copy of the will and of its probate must be presented to the court. A surviving spouse may elect between the provisions of one will and the statutory provisions for such spouse. Nuncupative wills must have two credible disinterested wit- nesses and must have been put in writing within thirty days after making.” § 564. Mississippi—Every person of the age of twenty- one years, male or female, married or unmarried, has the power by will in writing to dispose of real and personal property, so as such will be signed by the testator or testatrix, or by some other person in his or her presence and by his or her express direction; and, if not wholly written and subscribed by himself or herself shall be attested by two or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator or testatrix. A will is void if the testator had no child when it was made, and a child is later born to him. If the testator had children when the will was made, later-born children take as if he had died intestate, devisees and legatees contributing proportionally. Nuncupative wills are valid only when made in last sickness, at home, except where deceased was taken sick away from home, and died before return, nor are they valid to bequeath a value 25 Gen, Stats. Minn. (1913),: §§°7250-7275; 7282)¢ iA. 2 Merde 497 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 565 exceeding one hundred dollars unless it is proved by two wit- nesses that testator called them to bear witness to his will. Such will can not be proved after six months from making, unless reduced to writing within six days from speaking. Soldiers in actual service or mariners at seat, may dispose of goods and chattels in the manner permitted by common law. A wife or husband may renounce the provisions of the spouse’s will and take under the law. Any provision in a will for a husband or wife is in bar of a statutory share. The statutes of mortmain are in force. One who kills another shall not take under his will. The issue of a child or descendant who dies before the testator take any gifts made to him in the will. Authenticated copies of foreign wills proved according to the laws of any foreign jurisdiction, may be admitted to probate in Mississippi, but are subject to contest as the original might have been.”° § 565. Missouri—lLEvery male person, twenty-one years of age and upward, of sound mind, may by last will, devise all his estate, real, personal and mixed, and all interest therein, saving the widow her dower. And every male person over’ the age of eighteen years, and of sound mind, may, by last will, bequeath all his personal estate, saving the widow her dower. Any married or unmarried woman, of eighteen years of age and upward, of sound mind, may devise her land, tenements, or any descendable interests therein, or bequeath her personal prop- erty held in her own right, in possession or expectancy, by her last will and testament subject to the rights of the husband, if any, to his curtesy therein. Every will shall be in writing, signed by the testator, or by some person, by his direction, in his presence; and shall be at- tested by two or more competent witnesses subscribing their names to the will in the presence of the testator, and in the pres- ence of each other. 26 Miss. Code (1906), $8 5078-5092, 2004. 32—Tuomp. WILLs. § 566 WILLS 498 The husband’s rights in the deceased wife’s property are the same as those of a widow in the deceased husband’s property. A will executed by an unmarried woman shall be deemed re- voked by her subsequent marriage. If a testator after making a will disposing of his whole estate, marries and dies leaving is- sue of such marriage unprovided for, such will shall be deemed revoked. A testator is deemed to have died intestate as to children not named in the will. Where any estate shall be devised to any child or grandchild or other relative of the testator and such devisee shall die before the testator leaving lineal descendants, such descendants shall take the estate, real or personal, as such devisee would have done in case he had survived the testator. Nuncupative wills are not good where the estate exceeds two hundred dollars, or unless proved by two witnesses, and that the testator, in his last sickness, at his home, or taken sick away from home, called some person to witness the will. Proof of such will must be given within six months after speaking, or the substance reduced to writing within thirty days. Wills of mariners and soldiers, as to wages and personal prop- erty, are governed by the common law. A legacy to an attesting witness is void unless there are suf- ficient other witnesses. A devise omitting the words “heirs and assigns” or “heirs and assigns forever,” containing no words by which it appears a life estate was intended, passes a fee simple.?” § 566. Montana.—Same as California except no provision as to married woman and, “a will of real or personal property, or both, or a revocation thereof, made out of this state by a person not having his domicil in this state, is as valid when executed according to the law of the place in which the same was made, or in which the testator was at the time domiciled, as if it were made in this state, and according to the provisions of this chapter.’”’® 27 Rev. Stat. Mo. (1909), §8 535-584. 28 Rev. Code Mont. (1907), 8§ 4723-4762. 499 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 567, § 567. Nebraska.—Every person of full age (males, twenty-one; unmarried females, eighteen; married females, six- teen) may dispose of real and personal property by will. The will must be in writing signed by the testator, or by some person in his presence and by his express direction, attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by two or more com- petent witnesses. Nuncupative wills are not good, where the value of the estate exceeds one hundred fifty dollars, and unless proved by three witnesses present at the making, and that the testator called them to bear witness it was his will, and that it was made during the testator’s last sickness at his home, or while taken sick away from home. Unless reduced to writing within six days after speaking, proof of such wills will not be allowed after six months. These rules do not apply to wills by soldiers in service and mari- ners on ships, disposing of wages and personal estate. Bequests to subscribing witnesses are void, unless there are two others competent, or such witness would take by law without a will. A will may be deposited with the probate judge. After-acquired estate passes by will if such appears to have been the intention. Afterborn children take as if the testator had died intestate. All wills duly proved and allowed in a foreign state or country, according to law, may be filed in the probate court of any county where the testator has estate on which the will may operate, by producing a duly authenticated copy of the will and its probate.” § 568. Nevada.—Every person over eighteen years of age, of sound mind, may dispose of his or her estate, real or personal, by will. Married women may dispose of their separate property as though under no disability. No will except a holographic or nuncupative will is valid un- less in writing “signed by the testator and sealed with his seal, or by some person in his presence and by his express direction, 29 Cobbey’s Ann. Stats. Neb. (1911), §§ 4988-5014. § 569 - WILLS 500 and attested by at least two competent witnesses subscribing their names to the will in the presence of the testator.”’ A nuncupative or verbal will is valid where the estate be- queathed does not exceed in value one thousand dollars, when proved by the testimony of two witnesses who were present at the making thereof, and the testator at the making of the same bid some one present bear witness that such was his will, at the time of his last sickness. It must be proved not more than three months after it is made. . Provisions in favor of subscribing witnesses are void unless there are sufficient other witnesses. Marriage of an unmarried woman revokes her will previously made, likewise marriage of a man, unless provision is made for his wife. Afterborn or unintentionally omitted children take as if no will had been made. After-acquired property passes if such was the testator’s in- tention. Property may be disposed of and taken under holographic wills. Such wills shall be valid and have full effect for the purpose for which they are intended. A holographic will is subject to no other form than that it be written entirely by the hand of the testator himself. It may be made in or out of this state, and need not be witnessed, and may be proved in the same manner as other private writings are proved. “All wills which shall have been duly proved and allowed in any other of the United States, or any territory thereof, or in any foreign country or state, may be admitted to probate by the district court of any county in which the deceased shall have left any estate, provided it has been executed in conformity with the laws of the place where made,” and proceedings shall be had as in case of an original will for probate, with like force and effect.?? § 569. New Hampshire.—Every person of sane mind aged twenty-one may dispose by will of real and personal property. This includes a married woman. 30 Rev. Laws Nev. (1912), §3 5878, 6202-6222. 501 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 570 Wills must be made in writing, signed by the testator or some person in his presence and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed in his presence by three or more credible wit- nesses. A will not under seal is as effectual.as though sealed. A legacy to a witness is void, unless there are three other subscribing witnesses, but a gift to a corporation of which wit- nesses are members, does not make the will void or disqualify the witnesses. Aiterborn or omitted children take as if there were no will. The surviving spottse may waive provisions in the deceased spouse’s will, and take under the statute. A soldier in actual service, or a seaman at sea, may dispose of movables or personal estate as at common law. A will may be deposited for safe-keeping with the register of probate. Nuncupative wills shall not be ‘“‘valid where the personal estate bequeathed exceeds in value one hundred dollars, unless declared in the presence of three witnesses who are requested by the tes- tator to bear witness thereto, in his last sickness and in his usual dwelling; except when he was taken sick from home and died. before his return, nor unless a memorandum thereof was reduced to writing within six days, and presented to the probate court within six months after the making. A will made out of the state, valid according to the laws of the state or country where it was executed, may be proved and al- lowed in New Hampshire, and shall be as effective as it would have been if executed according to New Hampshire laws. No donatio causa mortis shall be valid unless the actual de- livery of the property to the donee be proved by two indifferent witnesses upon proceedings in the probate court to establish, such gift commenced within sixty days after the death of the donor.** § 570. New Jersey.—A will by a woman covert, person under twenty-one, or idiot, lunatic, or person of unsound mind, is not good. 31Pub. Stats. N. H. (1901), ch. 186, 8§ 1-22. *§ 571 WILLS 502 A witness to a will can not take as devisee, except to pay debts, but may prove the will. Estates pur autre vie may be devised. A nuncupative will is not valid except where the estate does not exceed eighty dollars, unless proved by three witnesses pres- ent at the making, and unless the testator asked persons present to bear witness.to the will, and unless made in time of last sick- ness, at home, or taken sick while away from home, dying before returning, and unless reduced to writing within six days from making, such will must be proved within six months. These rules do not apply to soldiers in service or mariners at sea. A written will can not be altered by an oral will. Afterborn children make void a will made when the testator had no children. Where a testator had children when the will was made, afterborn children take as though he died intestate. All wills except nuncupative wills must be in writing signed by the testator, and the signature shall be made by the testator, or the making thereof acknowledged by him, and such writing de- clared to be his last will, in the presence of two witnesses present at the same time, who shall subscribe their names thereto, as wit- nesses, in the presence of the testator. Unless intended clearly to convey an estate for life, all devises in which the words “heirs and assigns” are omitted, pass an estate in fee simple. A foreign will may be admitted to probate, by presenting a copy of the will, or a record of it, and the certificate of probate, all properly attested, to the surrogate, if executed in conformity with New Jersey law, and shall have the same force as if executed in New Jersey.” * §571. New Mexico.—Any person of the age of twenty- one years or upward, in sound mind, may make a will, disposing of all property save what is sufficient to pay his debts, and what is given by law as privileged property to his wife or family. An agent may be empowered to make a will. A verbal will may be valid. 32Comp. Stats. N. J. (1910), pp. 5862-5871, §§ 1-27, p. 3820, 8 23, 503 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 572 A will in writing should be signed by the testator, who, if unable or not knowing how to sign, shall request some reliable person to sign for him, and attested by two or more able and qualified witnesses, who must be present and see the testator sign the will, or some one sign it for him at his request as and for his last will and testament, and must sign as witnesses at his request in his presence and in the presence of each other. Two witnesses to a will are sufficient but in case of a verbal will there must also be two witnesses to testify as to the testator’s soundness of mind. Heirs or beneficiaries can not be witnesses to a will. Charitable bequests must be in writing. Children not named or after-born take as if no itt had been made. “Any will executed in any foreign jurisdiction, sufficient to convey the title of real estate in such jurisdiction, shall be valid in this state to the same extent as in the jurisdiction where made.” § 572. New York.—All persons, except idiots, persons of unsound mind and infants, may devise real estate, and males of the age of eighteen or upward, and females of the age of sixteen or upward, if of sound mind, may bequeath personal estate by written wills. Only soldiers in service or mariners at sea may bequeath per- sonal property by nuncupative will. Real property can not be devised to an alien, nor to a corpora- tion unless it is SaLonce by charter or statute, to take by devise. No person having a husband, wife, child, or parent, can will more than half his property to a religious or charitable society or corporation. Every last will and testament shall be executed and attested in the following manner: “1. It shall be subscribed by the tes- tator at the end of the will. 2. Such subscription shall be made by the testator in the presence of each of the attesting witnesses, 33N. Mex. Stats. Ann. (1915), §§ 5857-5870. § 572 WILLS 504 or shall be acknowledged by him, to have been so made, to each of the attesting witnesses. 3, The testator, at the time of mak- ing such subscription, or at the time of acknowledging the same, shall declare the instrument so subscribed to be his last will and testament. 4. There shall be at least two attesting witnesses, each of whom shall sign his name as a witness, at the end of the will, at the request of the testator.” “The witnesses to any will shall write opposite to their names their respective places of residence; and every person :who shall sign the testator’s name to any will, by his direction, shall write his own name as a witness to the will. Whoever shall neglect to comply with either of these provisions shall forfeit fifty dollars, to be recovered by any person interested in the property devised or bequeathed who will sue for the same. Such omission shall not affect the validity of any will; nor shall any person liable to the penalty aforesaid be excused or incapacitated on that account from testifying respecting the execution of such will.” Devises or bequests to subscribing witnesses are void where the will can not be proved without them, unless such witness would have been entitled by law to share in the testator’s estate. A will is revoked by marriage of the testator and the birth of issue, or by the marriage of an unmarried female testatrix. “A will of real or personal property, executed as prescribed by the laws of the state, or a will of personal property executed without the state and within the United States, the Dominion of Canada, or the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, as prescribed by the laws of the state or country where it is or was executed, or a will of personal property, executed by a person not a resident of the state, according to the laws of the testator’s residence, may be proved as prescribed in this article. The right to have a will admitted to probate, the validity of the execution thereof, of the validity or construction of any provision con- tained therein, is not affected by a change of the testator’s resi- dence made since the execution of the will.” A foreign will may be proved by filing a duly authenticated 505 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 573 copy of the will and the proof with the surrogate of the county in New York where property disposed of by the will is situated. Wills may be deposited with the clerk of every county, the register of deeds in the city and county of New York, and the surrogate of every county. A testator, who is a citizen of the United States, wherever resident, may declare that he elects his disposition by his will to be construed and regulated by the laws of New York.** § 573. North Carolina—No person under the age of twenty-one is capable of disposing of property by will. Married women may make wills. “No last will or testament shall be good or sufficient in law to convey or give any estate, real or personal, unless such last will shall have been written in the testator’s lifetime and signed by him, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, and subscribed in his presence by two witnesses at least. * * * Or, unless such last will and testament be found among the valuable papers and effects of any deceased person, or shall have been lodged in the hands of any person for safe keeping, and the same shall be in the handwriting of such deceased person with his name subscribed thereto, or in- serted in some part of such will, and if such handwriting shall be proved by three credible witnesses, who verily believe such will and every part thereof is in the handwriting of the person whose will it appears to be, then such will shall be sufficient to give and convey real and personal estate.” Wills, unless made in exercise of a power of appointment, are revoked by the testator’s subsequent marriage. “No person, on account of being an executor of a will, shall be incompetent to be admitted as a witness to prove the execution of such will, or to prove the validity or invalidity thereof. If any person shall attest the execution of any will, to whom or to whose wife or husband any beneficial devise, estate, interest, legacy or appointment of or affecting any real or personal estate 34Consol. Laws N. Y. (1909), D. ch. 244, E. Law, ch. 18, $§ 1048; Acts 1911, § 574 WILLS 506 shall be thereby given or made, such devise, estate, interest, leg- acy or appointment shall, so far as only concerns such person attesting the execution of such will, or the wife or husband of such person, or any person claiming under such person or wife or husband, be void; and such person so attesting shall be ad- mitted as a witness to prove the execution of such will, or the validity or invalidity thereof.” _ Any nuncupative wills must be proved by at least two wit- nesses who were present when it was made, and who state that they were especially requested to bear witness thereto by the testator himself. It must also be proved that such will was made in the testator’s last sickness in his own house, or where he had previously resided for at least ten days, unless he die on a journey or from home. No nuncupative will shall be proved by the witnesses after six months from the making thereof, unless it was put in writing within ten days from such making. After-born children, unprovided for, take as if there had been no will. A foreign will may be proved by exemplified copy, but will not pass real estate in North Carolina unless executed in con- formity with its laws.®° § 574. North Dakota.—Practically same as California ex- cept, no corporation can take by will, unless expressly authorized by statute, and no restrictions on devise for charitable use. After-acquired property passes by will. Foreign wills may be probated by filing in county court the duly authenticated copies of the will and the probate, and they are valid in North Dakota, if executed either according to the laws of the place where made, of the testator’s domicil, or of North Dakota.*® §575. Ohio.—Males aged twenty-one, females aged eighteen, of sound mind and memory, under no restraint, may make wills. All except nuncupative wills must be in writing, but may be handwritten or typewritten, and must be signed 35 Pell’s Rev. N. Car. Stats. (1908), 36 Comp. Laws N. Dak. (1913), §§ 8§ 3111-3146. 5640-5684, 8672, 507, DIGEST OF STATUTES § 575 at the end by the party making or some some other person in his presence and by his express direction, and attested and sub- scribed in the testator’s presence, by two or more competent witnesses, who saw him subscribe or heard him acknowledge it. A devise or bequest to a witness, without whose testimony the will can not be proved, is void, unless he was by law entitled to share in the estate. A widow or widower may elect to take under the will of a deceased consort or take under the provisions made by law for her or him. The will of an unmarried woman is not revoked by her mar- riage. The birth to a testator, who had-no children, of a child un- provided for revokes the will. Subsequently acquired property passes if such was the tes- tator’s intention, A bequest to charity is void, unless executed at least one year prior to the testator’s death. A verbal will, made in the last sickness, is valid as to personal estate, if reduced to writing, and subscribed by two competent disinterested witnesses within ten days after the speaking of the testamentary words; if it is also proved by such witnesses the tes- tator was of sound mind and memory and not under any re- straint, and called upon some person present to bear testimony to said deposition as his will, such a will must be offered for pro- bate within six months after his death. A duly executed written will can not be revoked by a nuncupative will. Authenticated copies of wills, executed and proved according to the laws of any state or territory of the United States rela- tive to any property in the state of Ohio, may be admitted to record in the probate court of a county where a part of such property is situated. Such authenticated copies so recorded shall have the same validity in law as wills duly made in Ohio, in conformity with the laws thereof, are declared to have. Foreign wills can not be contested in Ohio.” 37 Ohio Gen. Code (1910), §§ 10503, 10504, 10515, 10536, 10560, 10561, 10566, 10577, 10579, 10601. § 576 WILLS 508 § 576. Oklahoma.—Same as North Dakota, except no married person can bequeath more than two-thirds of his or her property away from the other spouse, and no person who is incapable of alienating, conveying or incumbering real property while living may bequeath the same by will.°* § 577. Oregon.—“‘Every person of twenty-one years of age and upward, of sound mind, may, by last will, devise all his estate, real and personal, saving to the widow her dower. Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may by last will, dispose of his goods and chattels. A married woman may, by will, dispose of any real estate held in her own right, subject to any rights which her husband .may have as tenant by the curtesy. Every will shall be in writing, signed by the testator, or by some other person under his direction, in his presence, and shall be attested by two or more competent witnesses, subscribing their names to the will in the presence of the testator.” “Every person who shall sign the testator’s name to any will by his direction shall subscribe his own name as a witness to such will, and state that he subscribed the testator’s name at his request.” “Tf, after making a will disposing of the whole estate of the testator, such testator shall marry and die, leaving issue by such marriage living at the time of his death, or shall leave issue of such marriage born to him after his death, such will shali be deemed revoked, unless provisions shall have been made for such issue by some settlement, or unless such issue shall be pro- vided for in the will, and no evidence shall be received to rebut the presumption of such revocation. A will made by an unmar- ried person shall be deemed revoked by subsequent marriage.” Children unprovided for take as though no will had been made. A mariner at sea or soldier in service may dispose of wages or personal property as at common law. “No proof shall be received of any nuncupative will unless 88 Okla, Rev. Laws (1910), 8§ 8317-8337, 509 DIGEST OF STATUTES § 577 it be offered within six months after speaking the testamentary words, nor unless the words, or the substance thereof, were re- duced to writing within thirty days after they were spoken.” “No probate of any nuncupative will shall be granted for fourteen days after the death of the testator; nor shall any nuncupative will be at any time proved unless the testamentary words, or the substance thereof, be first committed to writing, and a cita- tion issued, accompanied by a copy thereof, to call the widow or next of kin of the deceased, that they may contest the will if they think proper.” “Any person not an inhabitant, but own-_. ing property, real or personal, in this state, may. devise or be- queath such property by last will, executed and proved (if real estate be devised) according to the laws of this state, or (if per- sonal estate be bequeathed) according to the laws of this state or of the country, state or territory in which the will may be executed.” If such will be probated in a foreign jurisdiction, duly certi- fied copies of such will and the probate may be recorded, and be of the same effect as wills executed in Oregon, and if probate is not required in a foreign jurisdiction a will there made may be probated in Oregon. A foreign will may be contested in Oregon. A subscribing witness can not take unless there are sufficient other witnesses or he is entitled to a share by law.